metadata: authors: 0: author: Mukim,Megha
1: author: Zhu,Tingting Juni
count: China,World
docna: 0: docna: Empowering cities : good for growth ?
            evidence from China
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
theme: Export development and competitiveness,Other public sector governance
majtheme: Trade and integration,Public sector governance
subtopic: Labor Markets,Public Sector Economics,State Owned Enterprise Reform,Public Sector Administrative & Civil
            Service Reform,International Trade and Trade Rules,Public Finance Decentralization and
            Poverty Reduction,Democratic Government,Economics and Finance of Public
            Institution Development,Public Sector Administrative and Civil
            Service Reform,Access to Finance,De Facto Governments
teratopic: Law and Development,Urban Development,Poverty Reduction,Industry,Communities and Human Settlements,Private Sector Development,Public Sector Development,Governance,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
abstracts: cdata!: This paper utilizes a countrywide,
            county-to-city upgrade in the 1990s to identify whether
            extending the powers of urban local governments leads to
            better firm outcomes. The paper hypothesizes that since
            local leaders in newly-promoted cities have an incentive to
            utilize their new administrative remit to maximize gross
            domestic product and employment growth, there should be
            improvements in economic outcomes. The analysis finds that
            aggregate firm-level outcomes do not necessarily improve
            after county-to-city graduation. However, it does find that
            state-owned enterprises perform better post-graduation, with
            increased access to credit through state-owned banks as a
            possible explanation for the improvement in performance. The
            most important finding is that newly-promoted cities with
            high capacity generally produce better aggregate firm
            outcomes compared with newly-promoted cities with low
            capacity. The conclusions are twofold. First, in terms of
            access to credit, the paper provides evidence that relaxing
            credit constraints for firms could lead to large increases
            in firm operation and employment. Second, increasing local
            government's administrative remit is not enough to lead
            to better firm and economic outcomes; local capacity is of
            paramount importance.
repnme: repnme: Empowering cities : good for growth ?
            evidence from China
display_title: Empowering cities : good for growth
            evidence from China
listing_relative_url: /research/2015/02/23984231/empowering-cities-good-growth-evidence-china
topicv3: Public Finance m1326315 713,State Owned Enterprises m1326323 721,Trade m1326924 698,Access to Finance m1327464 1249,Jobs m1503931 2670
publishtoextweb_dt: 2016-08-26T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Law and Development,Urban Development,Poverty Reduction,Industry,Communities and Human Settlements,Private Sector Development,Public Sector Development,Governance,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
no_of_pages: 24
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1155613
1: author_key: 1305374
model_extractions: WPS7193 Policy Research Working Paper 7193 Empowering Cities: Good for Growth? Evidence from China _T. Juni Zhu Megha Mukim_ Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice Group & Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Group February 2015
Policy Research Working Paper 7193

# **Abstract**

This paper utilizes a countrywide, county-to-city upgrade in the 1990s to identify whether extending the powers of urban local governments leads to better firm outcomes. The paper hypothesizes that since local leaders in newly-promoted cities have an incentive to utilize their new administrative remit to maximize gross domestic product and employment growth, there should be improvements in economic outcomes. The analysis finds that aggregate firm-level outcomes do not necessarily improve after county-to-city graduation. However, it does find that state-owned enterprises perform better post-graduation, with increased access to credit through state-owned banks as a possible explanation for the improvement in performance. The most important finding is that newly-promoted cities with high capacity generally produce better aggregate firm outcomes compared with newly-promoted cities with low capacity. The conclusions are twofold. First, in terms of access to credit, the paper provides evidence that relaxing credit constraints for firms could lead to large increases in firm operation and employment. Second, increasing local government’s administrative remit is not enough to lead to better firm and economic outcomes; local capacity is of paramount importance.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice Group and the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mmukim@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Empowering Cities: Good for Growth?** **_Evidence from China_**<sup>**_*_**</sup>

## T. Juni Zhu and Megha Mukim<sup>†</sup>

_Keywords: Urbanization, Decentralization, Credit allocation, Capacity, Firm-level data, China JEL Classification:_ G21, H81, L11, R11, R51

> * The authors are grateful to several World Bank Group staff who contributed their time generously to this paper, providing feedback, comments and suggestions – Stefano Negri, Bob Rijkers, Ana Aguilera, Leo Iacavone and Bilal Zia. Ritam Chaurey worked side-by-side with us and provided constructive and timely comments at every stage of the process. The authors received constructive feedback from seminar participants in Washington DC and in Beijing, including Bert Hofman, Paul Procee, Karlis Smits, Min Zhao, Shahid Yusuf, David Robalino, David Mason, Chandan Deuskar, and Guilherme Lichand. And finally, we are extremely grateful to Xiaobo Zhang (IFPRI) and Lixing Li (Peking University) for providing us access to data, for answering many, many questions and for their feedback. Funding from the Competitive Industries and Innovation Program is very gratefully acknowledged.

- T. Juni Zhu is a consultant (Economist) with the Competitive Cities Knowledge Base (CCKB) project. Megha Mukim is an Economist and TTL of the CCKB Project. CCKB is a joint-collaboration between the Trade & Competitiveness GP and the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience GP.
# **1 Introduction**

In an effort to promote urbanization, the Chinese government began to upgrade counties to become county-level cities between the 1980s and up until 1997. Counties were eligible to graduate into county-cities if they met certain minimum requirements (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1993). An English version of this policy document can be found in Zhang and Zhao (1998). To become cities, counties needed to show that (1) their levels of industrialization were above certain thresholds, (2) the share of population engaged in non-agricultural activities was above a certain threshold, and (3) its fiscal status (as measured by total fiscal revenues and per-capita fiscal revenue) were in good shape – see Table 1 for the full list (taken from Fan, Li, & Zhang, 2012).

**Table 1: County to county-level-city minimum upgrading requirements**

|**Population Density (p**|**erson/km**<sup>**2**</sup>**)**|**>400**|**100-400**|**<100**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Percentage of**<br>**counties in this**<br>**category**||25%|45%|30%|
|**Industrialization**<br>**level**|Industrial output (_yuan_)<br>Share of industrial output value<br>in gross value of industrial and<br>agricultural output|1.5 billon<br>80%|1.2 billion<br>70%|0.8 billion<br>60%|
|**Population engages**<br>**in non-agricultural**<br>**activities**|Size of non-agricultural<br>population|150 K|120 K|100 K|
||Share of non-agricultural<br>population in totalpopulation|30%|25%|20%|
|**Fiscal Strength**|Fiscal revenue (_yuan_)<br>Per capita fiscal revenue(_yuan_)|60 million<br>100|50 million<br>80|40 million<br>60|

In reality, these three requirements were not strictly enforced, partly because of large regional disparities across the country, wherein even after accounting for factors such as population density, counties in western and inland regions would still have trouble meeting these requirements. Instead, it seems that the decision to upgrade a county to a county-level city was based on rates of economic growth as well as the central government’s discretion (Li, 2011). Thus, this led to a situation where counties that did not meet any of the three requirements were upgraded, while some counties that met all three requirements were not upgraded – see Table 2 (taken from Fan, Li, & Zhang, 2012).

2
**Table 2: County to county-level-city upgrade**

Number of county-year observations by upgrading status and number of requirements satisfied (1994-1997)

|Number of requirements satisfied|Total|0|1|2|3|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Non-upgrading cases|6401|4583|1317|465|36|
|Upgradingcases|99|24|30|39|6|

Graduation into city status came with a number of benefits, relating to four main categories: (1) tax and fees, (2) land-related policies, (3) administrative powers, and (4) local government size, rank, salary and reputation - see Table 3 (taken from Fan, Li, & Zhang, 2012).

**Table 3: Benefits of being a city: An incomplete list**

|Category|Benefits|
|---|---|
|Tax and fees|- Cities enjoyed a higher urban construction tax (7%<br>compared to 5% for counties).<br>- Could collect the surcharges levied on the issuing of<br>motorcycle registration.<br>- In Liaoning province, cities could get 1-2 million additional<br>subsidies each year after upgrading.|
|Land-related policies|- Cities generally convert more land to construction use and<br>retain a larger share of revenue from land sale.|
|Administrative powers|- Cities have more authority on foreign trade and exchange<br>management.<br>- Could establish branches of custom and large state-owned<br>banks.<br>- Could approve projects with a higher investment cap.<br>- Gain authority over police recruitment and vehicle<br>administration.<br>- After achieving the status of “line item under province”<br>(Shengji Jihua Dalie), cities could report directly to the<br>provincial administration to ask for investment projects.|
|Government size; Rank and<br>salary; Reputation|- Cities could establish more branches of government and<br>have a larger number of government employees.<br>- Sometimes the bureaucratic rank and salary of officials are<br>raised after upgrading.<br>- Cities generally carry greater prestige and are more<br>attractive to investors from outside.|

In this paper, we investigate if newly-promoted county-level cities in China utilize these new powers to attract new firms and help firms grow. We study macro-level city outcomes and micro3
level firm outcomes. We hypothesize that since local government officials wanted to achieve high GDP and employment growth, they would have an incentive to utilize their new administrative remit to promote firm growth and hence we should observe better firm-level outcomes in the newly upgraded cities versus their similar counties. We exploit the ad hoc nature in which the countyupgrading takes place to identify the effect of an increase in city powers on firms’ economic outcomes. The paper adds to the existing literature in two ways – it identifies whether and to what extent firm-level outcomes improve post-upgrading, and importantly, it attempts to identify the channels through which these outcomes take place. In addition, this paper uses two proxies to measure local government capacity and documents the extent to which local government capacity matters for firm and job growth in China. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets and how these were prepared. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy used to identify the effects of city-upgrading on firm outcomes. Section 4 reports the econometric results for city-level outcomes and firm-level outcomes and Section 5 concludes.

# **2 Data Sets and Data Treatment**

This paper utilizes two panel data sets, one at the level of counties and the other at the level of firms. We use variables from 1993 to 2004 from the annual series of the Public Finance Statistical Materials of Prefectures, Cities, and Counties published by the Ministry of Finance of China to construct a county-level public finance data set (henceforth public finance data set). As of 1998, when the policy of county-to-city upgrading had come to an end, there were 99 counties that were upgraded from counties to county-level cities between 1994 and 1997.

The firm-level data set spans from 1998 to 2009 and is compiled from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. This data set is often referred to as the 5 Million RMB data set, since it contains non-SOE firms with main operating revenue (i.e., sales) of more than five million RMB, and all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) regardless of sales volume. Thus, the ASIF survey data set tracks the performance of all SOEs and all big non-SOEs. The ASIF data set details all operational, financial, and managerial facts of firms in three broad categories: (1) mining, (2) manufacturing, and (3) production and distribution of electricity, gas, and water, and classifies each firm to 6-digit sub-industries. Compared with the 2004 China Economic Census, the firms covered by this data set represented 89.5% of the total main operating revenue (sales) from all enterprises in China (Nie, Jiang, & Yang, 2012).

The 1998-2009 ASIF data set covers a period when some major structural reforms happened in China, such as the SOE reform in the mid-to-late 1990s. Following the end of the county-to-city upgrading policy in 1997, China carried out a major reform of SOEs between 1998 and 2000. The aim of the reform was to privatize or close down small and unprofitable SOEs (Song and Hsieh, 2013). In 2004, an economic census covering all firms regardless of size was carried out and more detailed information on firms was collected.<sup>1</sup> To mitigate the effects of the above SOE changes, and since we are only interested in understanding the effect of county-to-city upgrading, we restrict

> 1 For example, in this year, breakdown of employment by education level, gender, technical titles was collected (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, & Zhang, 2014).

4
our analysis to incumbents from 1998 to 2004, hence excluding all new firm entries and exits. We create a balanced panel of 36,778 firms, located in 793 counties and 58 newly promoted countylevel cities. Table 4 summarizes the breakdown of firms by ownership.

**Table 4: Number of firms by ownership type**

|**Firms**|**Number of firms**|**As a % of total **|
|---|---|---|
|SOE|15,413|42.12%|
|Non-SOEs(e.g. collective, private,mix)|21,183|57.88%|
|**Total **|36,596|100%|

# **3 Empirical Strategy**

To properly identify the effect of a change in city-level powers on economic outcomes, we need to control for selection bias. Simply put, if better performing or better managed counties were more likely to be upgraded to county-level-cities, then a comparison of outcomes across counties and cities would be upwardly biased. Our aim is to evaluate the causal effect of city upgrading on economic outcomes.

We exploit the ad hoc nature of county-to-city upgrading to find an appropriate counterfactual. We do this by matching newly-promoted cities with counties that are similar to these cities (and if the upgrading requirements were properly applied, would have been promoted). The counterfactual allows us to analyze how economic outcomes within a city would have evolved if it had not been upgraded to city status.

# **_Propensity Score Matching (PSM)_**

Let’s assume that a county is promoted to a county-level city at time _s_  0 . Let  _is_ be the economic outcome at time _s_ (the outcomes for county _i_ at period _s_ ) following upgrading to city status at _s_  0 and the variable _CITYi_ takes on the value one if county _i_ becomes a city. The causal effect 1 0 can be verified by looking at the difference: (  _is_  _is_ ), where the superscript denotes the promotion. The crucial problem is that  _is_ 0 is not observable. We follow the micro-econometric evaluation literature (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997) and define the average effect of upgrading on economic outcomes as: The key difficulty is to identify a counterfactual for the last term in Equation (1). This is the economic outcome that a city would have experienced, on average, had it not been promoted to a city. What is mainly of interest is the magnitude of the ‘impact’, labelled in red in Figure 1, and the main problem is the calculation of the counterfactual that is to be deducted from the total change.

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> we 3<br>We =<br>8 | Ss<br>a see eee eee re. a = BY<br>a gad = =<br>= 4 OP = is<br>= Wo SI =<br>= )<br>=<br>o<br>Baseline Evaluation<br><!-- End of picture text -->
> where _F_ (.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The x variables used in this exercise correspond to the three upgrading requirements mentioned in Table 1. Since these upgrading requirements were not strictly enforced, we used these upgrading requirements variables as a general indicator of the economic development level of a county in 1993 to predict the probability of a county being upgraded to a city in 1994.

We use the first and second moments of the three upgrading requirements as our specification to predict propensity scores. If they can pass the common support test: the covariates in each stratified block are balanced, then we will use this specification to predict the effects of city upgrading by comparing outcomes between treatment (cities) and comparison (counties) groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). We find that there are no significant differences in covariates between counties and cities within each stratified block using this specification. We hence use this specification to estimate the city upgrading treatment effect on city-level and firm-level outcomes.

Since the public finance data set is a panel data set, we obtain one propensity score for each jurisdiction-year pair. Hence each county or city will have multiple propensity scores. To mitigate the potential problem of counties inflating their economic figures right before the upgrading (Li, 2011), we used the earliest data point possible from the public finance data set to conduct the matching exercise. Thus, a county or city’s 1994 predicted propensity score is used to match a city with its similar county.

Li (2011) pointed out that the rate of economic growth is one of the key factors in determining which counties can be upgraded to cities. Therefore, in addition to variables corresponding to the three upgrading requirements, ideally we should include the growth rate of GDP as a control in predicting upgrading probability. However, GDP at the county-level is only available starting in 1997 when there was a major statistical standard change in China. Before 1997, we have official statistics on gross value of industrial and agricultural output, and include these variables in our PSM model as an alternative measure of economic development at the county-level.<sup>2</sup> The propensity matching score method also assumes that there exists a region of ‘common support’, where the treated and control propensity scores overlap, and over which a robust comparison can be made. Cities that fall outside of the region of common support are disregarded and for these cities the treatment effect cannot be estimated With matching, the proportion of such cities is small (only two city-year observations using the specification that we described earlier fall into this case—see Figure 2). Since the region of common support is vastly improved (see Figure 3 for kernel density distribution comparison) and the balancing test is passed between the treatment and control groups, the estimated effect on the remaining cities can be viewed as representative.

> 2 Variables that can potentially have extreme values are transformed to logs to minimize distortions.

7
**Figure 2: Matched counties and cities by blocks of 1994 propensity scores**

|**Blocks of PScores**|**County**<br>**(comparison)**|**City**<br>**(treatment)**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|
|0|2,953|1|2,954|
|0.003125|470|3|473|
|0.00625|501|4|505|
|0.0125|522|16|538|
|0.025|541|14|555|
|0.05|532|34|566|
|0.1|387|73|460|
|0.2|239|92|331|
|0.4|64|57|121|
|0.6|6|19|25|
|0.8|0|2|2|
|**Total**|**6,215**|**315**|**6,530**|

**Figure 3: Kernel density distribution comparison between cities and counties**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Kernel Density Estimate<br>0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1<br>Estimated propensity score<br>City County<br>kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0552<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> 8
# **_Identification of City-Level and Firm-Level Treatment Outcome_**

We use the treatment and counterfactual groups to carry out two distinct exercises to identify the effect of city-level upgrading. First, we identify changes in city-level outcomes post-upgrading. Fan, Li, & Zhang (2012) used a county and year fixed effects model to identify post-upgrading effects. We use a propensity score model and compare our results with their findings. To identify city-level outcomes, we stratify the county-level data according to their propensity scores, and compare outcomes between treatment and comparison groups within each block and identify the average upgrading effect (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).<sup>3</sup> Second, we identify changes in firm-level outcomes post-upgrading. We compare the performance of firms located in cities versus the performance of firms located in matched counties. Ideally, we would have liked to use difference-in-difference estimation in addition to the PSM, however we are constrained by data limitations (firm-level data begin in 1998, after counties had already been upgraded). We try to minimize the selection bias problem by limiting the results to incumbents, i.e. firms that were already operating in 1997.<sup>4</sup> We also control for year, industry, and timevarying industry fixed effects in addition to the propensity score method to compare the robustness of our firm-level outcome.

> 3 We considered weighting the samples to identify the average treatment effect. However, since there is not a consensus which weighting method is the best in identifying the average treatment effect, we decide not to weight the samples, simply controlling for block and year fixed effects. 4 This assumes that firms in counties and newly-promoted counties were similar previous to the upgrade.

9
# **4 Econometric Results**

# **_City-Level Outcomes_**

Table 5 reports the city upgrading effects on city-level outcomes, especially government activities since the upgrading. Compared with a fixed effects model by Fan, Li, & Zhang (2012), the propensity score model with or without year fixed effects yields similar results. Thus, we confirm the findings in Fan, Li, & Zhang (2012) that government spending share in productive activities (as defined by spending in construction and providing support to agricultural production) decreases following upgrading. The share of agricultural tax in total tax also falls – this is intuitive since cities began to shift away from agricultural production.

In addition, newly-upgraded cities do not necessarily outperform similar counties in terms of rates of GDP growth in the post-upgrade period of 1998-2004. Similar to Fan, Li, & Zhang’s (2012) fixed effects model, findings using a propensity score matching method suggest that at the countylevel, upgrading does not necessarily lead to higher growth.

We also try and identify the rate of new firm entrants in newly-promoted counties compared to the counterfactual counties that were not promoted. We find that there is a significant difference between the two, suggesting that new firms favor cities to counties, even if the former are only recently promoted. Correspondingly, tax from business income for cities has increased more significantly than their similar counties.

**Table 5:  City-level outcome of city upgrading using PSM**

||**PS Model**|**PS + Fixed**<br>**Effects**|**Fan, Li, &**<br>**Zhang 2012**|
|---|---|---|---|
|_City-level Govt. Activities Outcome_||||
|# of public employees|414.9**|407.5**|995***|
|Share of productive expenditure|-0.00577**|-0.00575**|-0.026***|
|Share of agriculture tax|-0.0586***|-0.0588***|-0.053***|
|Post-upgrade average GDP growth|-0.000693|-0.000797|-|
|# of firm births|4.371***|4.844***|-|
|Logtax from business income|0.515***|0.517***|-|
|Controls|Block FE|Block FE|County FE|
|||Year FE|Year FE|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. The pscore model uses variables of the three upgrading requirements and their interactions to generate propensity score.

10
# **_Firm-Level Outcomes_**

We are also keen to understand how upgrading to city status affects firm-level outcomes. Before we employ the propensity score matching method to identify the upgrading effects on firms, please see below a summary of descriptive statistics between firms located in county-level cities versus firms located in counties. At first glance, firms located in newly-upgraded cities on average seemed to significantly outperform firms located in counties.

**Table 6: Descriptive statistics of mean aggregate firm-level outcomes**

||All Firms|Firms in<br>Cities|Firms in<br>Counties|t-test|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Firm-level Outcome_|||||
|Log main operating revenue|9.462|9.866|9.380|0.487***|
|Log main operating cost|9.228|9.649|9.142|0.507***|
|Log main operating profit|7.330|7.624|7.270|0.355***|
|Log # of employees|5.153|5.300|5.123|0.177***|
|Log labor vocational|2.502|2.439|2.514|-0.075|
|Log wage per employee|8.792|8.871|8.776|0.095***|
|Log paid-in capital|8.349|8.425|8.334|0.091***|
|Logexport output value|9.489|9.613|9.456|0.157***|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

In the next sections, we report firm-level outcomes using the propensity score matching method. City-level outcomes suggest that firms tend to favor cities over counties. To avoid distortion of statistical results, we first restrict our firm sample to incumbents (i.e. firms that were established before 1997) and report their firm-level outcomes after the upgrade. To better understand the full extent of firm-level outcomes, we also look at new firms’ performance and examine whether locating in cities helps them perform better. Since there is an inherent selection bias while studying new entrants to cities versus counties, we also study the effect of city upgrading on incumbents.

# **_Firm-Level Outcomes (for Incumbents)_**

After matching county-level cities with similar counties using propensity scores, Table 7 shows that, at the aggregate level, firms that are located in upgraded cities do not necessarily perform better than firms located in similar counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level. Although Fan, Li, & Zhang (2012) do not use firm level data, our estimates for aggregate firmlevel outcomes are in line with their findings that upgrading from county to county-level city does not necessarily generate better city-level economic performance and public service provision. Our results suggest that newly-formed cities are not using their increased powers to help Chinese firms perform better.

11
**Table 7:  Firm-level outcomes of city upgrading using PSM for incumbents**

|**_Incumbent Firms_**|(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|_Firm-level Outcome_||||
|Log main operating revenue|0.126|0.109|0.109|
|Log main operating cost|0.127|0.108|0.108|
|Log main operating profit|0.0673|0.0275|0.0275|
|Log # of employees|-0.0195|-0.0859|-0.0859|
|Log labor vocational|-0.0780|-0.0531|-0.0531|
|Log wage per employee|-0.0528|-0.0409|-0.0395|
|Log paid-in capital|-0.116|-0.117|-0.117|
|Logexport output value|-0.102|-0.118|-0.126|
|Controls|Block FE|Block FE|Block FE|
|||Industry FE|Industry**×**Year|
|||Year FE|<br>FE|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. When we report the firm-level results after PScore matching, we control for block fixed effects where samples are stratified and compared against each other in each block.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

To ensure that the above aggregate results are not sensitive to different matching methods, we report below the aggregate firm-level outcomes using three different matching methods commonly used in the propensity score literature. We used the same propensity scores generated above to conduct the matching. We can see that compared with Table 7, similar conclusions can be reached. Upgrading counties into county-level cities alone has very limited effects on aggregate firm level outcomes in terms of firm profits, export, and employment.

**Table 8: Firm-level outcomes using different propensity score matching methods**

|**_Incumbent Firms_**|Kernel|Local Linear<br>Regression|5-Nearest Neighbor|
|---|---|---|---|
|_Firm-level Outcome_||||
|Log main operating revenue|0.116***|0.340|0.457***|
|Log main operating cost|0.125***|0.378|0.552***|
|Log main operating profit|0.052|0.162|0.077|
|Log # of employees|-0.027|-0.096|-0.308***|
|Log labor vocational|-0.108|-0.114|-0.206|
|Log wage per employee|-0.064***|0.085|0.206***|
|Log paid-in capital|-0.158***|-0.214|-0.452***|
|Logexport output value|-0.062|0.206|0.359|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Average treatment on treated effects are reported, i.e. upgraded cities and their counterfactual counties are compared to obtain the upgrading effects.

12
# **_Are there winners and losers?_**

Next, we try and disaggregate this result using data on firm ownership. Firms are classified as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other (which includes collectives, private firms, and firms with mixed ownership). We are interested in understanding if SOEs seem to outperform their non-SOE counterparts after upgrading to city status. We find that although the aggregate results across all firms seem to suggest that cities are not using their powers to help firms, it turns out that SOEs in newly-upgraded cities do significantly better than non-SOEs, compared to those in matched counties. SOEs sell more and employ more (skilled) labor, although they are no more profitable.

**Table 9:  Firm-level outcome of city upgrading by ownership type using PSM for incumbents**

|**_Incumbent_**<br>**_Firms_**|Log main<br>operating<br>revenue|Log main<br>operating<br>cost|Log main<br>operating<br>profit|Log # of<br>employees|Log labor<br>vocational|Log wage<br>per<br>employee|Log<br>export|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**City**|-0.0828|-0.0827|-0.118|-0.268***|-0.241**|-0.0776|-0.160|
||(0.106)|(0.106)|(0.125)|(0.0812)|(0.0978)|(0.0519)|(0.233)|
|**SOE**|-0.911***|-0.908***|-0.573***|-0.0435|-0.00604|-0.293***|-0.630***|
||(0.0720)|(0.0730)|(0.0740)|(0.0559)|(0.0713)|(0.0326)|(0.157)|
|**City × SOE**|**0.305****|**0.304****|**0.249**|**0.390*****|**0.404*****|**0.0584**|**0.332**|
||(0.150)|(0.151)|(0.163)|(0.102)|(0.143)|(0.0552)|(0.368)|
|**Constant**|11.10***|10.64***|9.303***|6.038***|2.724***|8.623***|9.259***|
||(0.600)|(0.576)|(0.690)|(0.256)|(0.149)|(0.563)|(0.469)|
|Observations|32,517|32,428|21,283|18,193|3,892|17,496|4,759|
|R-squared|0.296|0.304|0.186|0.203|0.169|0.197|0.152|
|Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry**×**Year||||||||
|FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

# **_Why do SOEs outperform their private counterparts?_**

In this section, we try to solve the puzzle of why SOEs gain disproportionately compared with other types of firms. Going back to Table 3, one of the main benefits of city upgrading is that a city can now establish branches of state-owned banks (SOBs). According to Wei and Wang (1997), bank loans made from state-owned banks clearly favored SOEs. In the 1990s, many state-owned banks imposed softer budget constraints on SOEs than in the 1980s, such that bank finance and firm productivity were no longer linked (Cull and Xu, 2000). In other words, the literature provides evidence of favorable lending from SOBs to SOEs.

We go back to firm-level data and examine whether SOEs receive more credit from SOBs than other firms. Ideally, we would like to identify the source of the increase in credit to SOEs – however, the data do not provide a breakdown of the sources of debt financing. Instead, we use current debt and total debt as proxies to measure credit from SOBs and assume that most of the 13
debt financing in counties and county-level cities comes from SOBs. This assumption is not without foundation. The fact that the establishment of SOBs is one of the major benefits associated with city upgrading indicates that commercial banks or other credit channels are very limited at the county level in China.

In Table 10, the first two columns show that compared with non-SOEs, SOEs located in cities saw a big increase in both current debt and total debt. This suggests that part of the SOE performance differential obtained in Table 9 above could be explained by easier access to credit by SOEs (compared to non-SOEs) post-upgrading.

As a robustness check of this possible channel, we try to compare the debt profile of negative profit SOEs in cities versus counties. Our hypothesis is that if underperforming SOEs are able to access credit more easily than underperforming non-SOEs, then the debt is probably being financed by SOBs that have branches in cities (since commercial banks or other lending agents would not lend to these underperforming firms). The last two columns of Table 10 report this result. Although the coefficient is positive for cities, it is not significant (even though its p-value is not far from 0.1).

**Table 10: Debt financing of incumbent SOEs**

||**Full Sa**<br>|**mple**<br>|**Negative prof**<br>|**it SOEs Only**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_Incumbent Firms_**|Logcurrent debt|Logtotal debt|Logcurrent debt|Logtotal debt|
|**City**|-0.273*|-0.207|0.442|0.421|
||(0.147)|(0.142)|(0.276)|(0.280)|
|**SOE**|0.261***|0.248***|||
||(0.0819)|(0.0801)|||
|**City X SOE**|**0.356****<br>(0.172)|**0.341***<br>(0.174)|||
|**Constant**|10.49***|10.77***|9.706***|10.10***|
||(0.529)|(0.513)|(0.255)|(0.277)|
|Observations|32,240|32,732|1,494|1,515|
|R-squared|0.201|0.188|0.388|0.350|
|Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry **×**Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

There is a vast literature showing how firms in developing countries are more likely to report access to finance as a major obstacle to their growth, especially for small firms (Bloom, Mahajan, & Roberts, 2010). Results from randomized control trials giving credit to small and medium-sized enterprises in Sri Lanka (De Mel, McKenzie, &Woodruff, 2008) and India (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008) illustrate that access to credit was indeed a big problem for disadvantaged firms in developing countries.

There is also cross-country evidence showing if banks are concentrated, with a large share being government-owned banks, then financing obstacles will increase and the chance of smaller firms 14
to access credit will decrease (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2004). With the new micro firm-level data from China, it seems this argument is even stronger that compared with SOEs, even large non-SOEs are disadvantaged in accessing credit at the county level.

# **_Does capacity matter?_**

Even though the city-level outcome does not show that cities with a bigger scope of power outperform their similar counties, we are worried that the reason we observe this result was because city governments do not have the capacity to carry out these new powers, and not because the new powers themselves are not useful. In urban governance literature, the powers of a city government for managing economic development depend on factors of not only its operational scope, but capacity as well (Davey, 1993). We therefore want to test and see whether newly promoted cities with higher capacity help firms perform better. Regional disparities in human capital are vast in China, and we include province fixed effects to offset partly this regional difference when evaluating firm-level outcomes, in addition to the time and industry fixed effects we have controlled for.

Since there is not a unified measure of city capacity, we propose using two proxies to measure capacity to conduct this analysis due to data limitation and availability. We propose using the percentage of public employees supported by public finance out of total city population as a measure of city capacity. Adequate and institutionalized human capital is often cited as one of the key factors in determining city capacity (World Bank, 2009). A recent paper by Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2014) also used a similar measure to measure capacity: the number of municipality-level bureaucrats e xcluding police officers, judges, all other judicial employees, and public hospital employees.

Alternatively, we propose using the total tax revenues collected, excluding land sales revenues, out of total city GDP as a proxy of city capacity.<sup>5</sup> Fukuyama (2013) proposed using tax revenues out of GDP as a proxy for state capacity, as the ability to extract tax not only indicates a government’s capability, but also means the government has revenues to carry out public functions and hence tax extraction can be a good proxy for capacity.<sup>6</sup> From previous results, we have shown that at the aggregate firm level, simply being located in a newly promoted city does not help firms perform better. However, from Table 11, after taking into account capacity as measured by more institutionalized human capital available to public services, firms located in newly promoted cities with higher capacity seem to perform better in terms of sales, profits and wage rate of employees.

> 5 The two proxies of city capacity are by no means perfect. In an ideal world, proper understanding and measurement of capacity would require a combination of quantitative proxies supplemented by qualitative data.

> 6 We are interested in whether city-upgrading itself leads to a jump in capacity post-upgrade.  Plotting the two proxies against time period of 1996 to 2004 shows us that city capacity does not change much after the upgrade.  Therefore, we are essentially comparing cities with different initial capacity levels here and report how capacity matters.

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**Table 11:  Firm-level outcomes of city upgrading and city capacity for incumbents**

|**_Incumbent Firms_**|Log main<br>operating<br>revenue|Log main<br>operating<br>cost|Log main<br>operating<br>profit|Log # of<br>employees|Log labor<br>vocational|Log<br>wage per<br>employee|Log<br>export|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**City**|-1.210**|-1.216**|-1.311**|-0.580|-0.252|-0.452*|-0.348|
||(0.504)|(0.501)|(0.537)|(0.390)|(0.357)|(0.262)|(0.925)|
|**Capacity**|-21.56***|-22.01***|-17.69***|-14.79***|-15.43***|-0.127|-7.195|
||(4.616)|(4.775)|(4.695)|(3.426)|(4.028)|(1.640)|(12.58)|
|**City × Capacity**|**46.61****|**46.65****|**49.13****|**18.57**|**8.353**|**17.37***|**8.777**|
||(20.33)|(20.12)|(21.80)|(15.02)|(13.86)|(10.38)|(37.08)|
|**Constant**|11.85***|11.43***|10.12***|6.673***|3.117***|8.353***|9.227***|
||(0.672)|(0.658)|(0.752)|(0.385)|(0.219)|(0.509)|(0.990)|
|Observations|32,517|32,428|21,283|18,193|3,892|17,496|4,759|
|R-squared|0.330|0.336|0.228|0.245|0.221|0.251|0.179|
|Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry**×**Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Province FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

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**Table 12:  Re-examine incumbent SOE outcomes after taking into account city capacity**

|**_Incumbent Firms_**|Log main<br>operating<br>revenue|Log main<br>operating<br>cost|Log main<br>operating<br>profit|Log # of<br>employees|Log labor<br>vocational|Log<br>wage per<br>employee|Log<br>export|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**City**|-0.704|-0.685|-0.848|-0.255|-0.208|-0.209|0.0498|
||(0.760)|(0.767)|(0.906)|(0.443)|(0.444)|(0.294)|(1.045)|
|**Capacity**|-4.061|-5.576|4.035|8.095|-2.814|0.945|-5.989|
||(6.818)|(7.159)|(8.218)|(5.278)|(6.852)|(3.019)|(13.56)|
|**SOE**|-0.176|-0.206|0.263|0.721***|0.425**|-0.201**|-0.772|
||(0.218)|(0.226)|(0.242)|(0.172)|(0.213)|(0.0874)|(0.565)|
|**City × Capacity**|23.63|22.64|29.11|-0.644|-0.324|8.319|-7.217|
||(31.10)|(31.28)|(36.52)|(16.48)|(17.69)|(11.62)|(42.60)|
|**Capacity × SOE**|-19.84***|-18.57**|-25.01***|-26.82***|-15.12**|-1.173|10.27|
||(7.134)|(7.401)|(8.443)|(5.719)|(6.890)|(2.958)|(20.07)|
|**City × SOE**|-0.649|-0.721|-0.521|-0.138|0.173|-0.508|-1.901|
||(1.010)|(0.996)|(1.232)|(0.640)|(0.783)|(0.334)|(2.101)|
|**City × Capacity ×**<br>**SOE**|**30.70**|**33.60**|**22.80**|**17.64**|**6.978**|**18.52**|**80.49**|
||(39.36)|(38.63)|(47.66)|(24.26)|(30.54)|(12.77)|(80.46)|
|**Constant**|12.09***|11.70***|9.979***|6.097***|2.671***|8.573***|9.736***|
||(0.676)|(0.667)|(0.760)|(0.442)|(0.265)|(0.520)|(0.873)|
|Observations|32,517|32,428|21,283|18,193|3,892|17,496|4,759|
|R-squared|0.351|0.356|0.236|0.252|0.225|0.264|0.190|
|Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry**×**Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Province FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

SOEs located in newly promoted cities outperform non-SOEs (see Table 9). However, once we account for city capacity, this result no longer holds – see Table 12. This might suggest that cities with more power but lower capacity are more likely to exploit the extra power to favor certain types of firms, such as SOEs.

We re-run the above exercise using another proxy for city capacity, i.e. total tax collection as a proportion of city GDP. We find similar results - only cities with both the scope and capacity to carry out their additional remit are able to help firms grow and help employees increase wages.

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**Table 13:  Firm-level outcomes of city upgrading and city capacity for incumbents using an alternative measure of capacity**

|**_Incumbent_**<br>**_Firms_**|Log main<br>operating<br>revenue|Log main<br>operating<br>cost|Log main<br>operating<br>profit|Log # of<br>employees|Log labor<br>vocational|Log wage<br>per<br>employee|Log<br>export|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**City**|-0.606**|-0.560*|-0.642***|-0.457**|-0.496|-0.340***|-0.734|
||(0.301)|(0.306)|(0.234)|(0.228)|(0.302)|(0.114)|(0.530)|
|**Capacity**|-0.00236|-0.00171|0.00730|0.00318|-0.00427|0.000172|-0.0136|
||(0.00674)|(0.00672)|(0.00841)|(0.00387)|(0.00519)|(0.00173)|(0.00899)|
|**City ×**<br>**Capacity**|**16.22***|**14.70**|**16.29****|**9.629**|**12.46**|**9.621*****|**16.91**|
||(8.977)|(9.032)|(7.336)|(6.678)|(8.363)|(3.185)|(16.13)|
|**Constant**|11.07***|10.64***|9.474***|6.081***|2.779***|8.356***|8.822***|
||(0.682)|(0.658)|(0.776)|(0.201)|(0.190)|(0.504)|(0.917)|
|Observations|32,517|32,428|21,283|18,193|3,892|17,496|4,759|
|R-squared|0.325|0.330|0.225|0.240|0.218|0.252|0.180|
|Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry**×**<br>Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Province FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

Similarly, SOEs are less likely to outperform private firms in cities with high capacity when an alternative measure of city capacity is used.

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**Table 14:  Incumbent SOE outcomes of city upgrading (using an alternative measure of capacity)**

|**_Incumbent_**<br>**_Firms_**|Log main<br>operating<br>revenue|Log main<br>operating<br>cost|Log main<br>operating<br>profit|Log # of<br>employees|Log labor<br>vocational|Log wage<br>per<br>employee|Log<br>export|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**City**|-0.298|-0.251|-0.302|-0.512**|-0.418|-0.338**|-0.515|
||(0.340)|(0.339)|(0.412)|(0.236)|(0.284)|(0.147)|(0.687)|
|**Capacity**|0.00895**|0.00875*|0.0241***|0.00706***|0.00505|0.00402|-0.0114|
||(0.00401)|(0.00446)|(0.00579)|(0.00252)|(0.00508)|(0.00701)|(0.00845)|
|**SOE**|-0.708***|-0.706***|-0.394***|0.00481|0.0168|-0.230***|-0.501***|
||(0.0689)|(0.0709)|(0.0699)|(0.0535)|(0.0709)|(0.0261)|(0.156)|
|**City ×**<br>**Caacit**|4.205|2.606|4.621|6.125|4.677|10.16**|10.44|
|**py**|(11.15)|(11.06)|(13.31)|(6.679)|(8.124)|(4.378)|(21.20)|
|**Capacity ×**<br>**SOE**|-0.0148***|-0.0137***|-0.0215***|-0.00400|-0.0105|-0.00508|-0.0159***|
||(0.00379)|(0.00343)|(0.00309)|(0.00243)|(0.0107)|(0.00826)|(0.00380)|
|**City × SOE**|-0.340|-0.339|-0.448|0.222|-0.0435|0.00244|-0.0611|
||(0.410)|(0.403)|(0.555)|(0.317)|(0.413)|(0.174)|(1.158)|
|**City ×**||||||||
|**Capacity ×**|**16.10**|**16.16**|**16.56**|**4.236**|**13.08**|**-1.310**|**5.910**|
|**SOE**||||||||
||(12.48)|(12.15)|(16.50)|(9.334)|(12.06)|(4.969)|(31.68)|
|**Constant**|11.74***|11.30***|9.851***|6.061***|2.650***|8.602***|9.209***|
||(0.666)|(0.643)|(0.766)|(0.206)|(0.195)|(0.513)|(0.944)|
|Observations|32,517|32,428|21,283|18,193|3,892|17,496|4,759|
|R-squared|<br>0.346|<br>0.350|<br>0.231|<br>0.243|<br>0.221|<br>0.264|<br>0.189|
|<br>Block FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Industry**×**Year<br>FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Province FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at county-level.

3. Analysis is restricted to firms opened before 1997.

4. Vocational labor data is only available in 2004.

Tax collection represents only a subset of total revenues that are available to a local government in China, where land sales and transfers from central government are also major sources of revenues. As a robustness test, we use total government spending as a proportion of city GDP as a proxy to measure the extent to which public services are being delivered using public funding. We obtain similar results - firms in high-capacity cities tend to create more jobs, especially skilled labor jobs, and SOEs are less likely to outperform private firms.

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# **_Firm-Level Outcomes (for New Entrants)_**

So far, we have shown that for incumbent firms, city status does not necessarily lead to better aggregate firm-level outcomes, unless accompanied by commensurate capacity. Now, we study new firms that are established in newly upgraded cities. After counties upgrade to cities, they tend to attract more firms. We examine whether these new firms also outperform new firms located in similar counties. Admittedly, this exercise is fraught with selection bias. However, we remain interested in knowing if new firms in cities outperform new firms in similar counties – especially, since this finding has policy implications. Cities care about better economic outcomes – these could be generated by better performance by incumbents, or by better-performing entrants.

New firms in cities tend to operate on a larger scale than new firms in counties – in terms of operating revenues (sales) and operating costs. However, they are not necessarily more profitable, nor do they generate more or better-paying jobs. Thus, city status does not necessarily attract better and more competitive firms to locate there. We also tried to break down new firms located in high capacity cities versus low capacity cities and see whether there is a difference. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data on entrants to carry out a robustness test.

**Table 15:  Firm-level outcomes of city upgrading using PSM for new firms**

|**_New Firms_**|(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|_Firm-level Outcome_||||
|Log main operating revenue|0.297|0.344*|0.344*|
|Log main operating cost|0.378*|0.423**|0.427**|
|Log main operating profit|0.0845|0.294|0.322|
|Log # of employees|0.113|0.154|0.140|
|Log wage per employee|-0.000390|-0.0564|-0.0572|
|Log paid-in capital|-0.111|-0.0189|-0.0180|
|Controls|Block FE|Block FE|Block FE|
|||Industry FE<br>Year FE|Industry**×**Year<br>FE|

1. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.

2. Please note that there are not enough observations for new firms’ vocational labor data and export value data. To avoid using an under-representative sample and generalizing results from comparing between new firms located in only a few cities and counties, we do not report the results of these two firm-level outcomes.

3. Analysis is restricted to new firms opened after 1997, i.e. after the upgrading was finished.

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# **5 Conclusion**

This paper utilizes a countrywide county-to-city upgrade in the 1990s in China to explore whether expanding city power leads to better firm performance. When counties are upgraded to cities, their remit expands and they gain additional administrative and fiscal powers. An increase in city powers provides these newly-promoted counties with the ability to provide greater support or at the minimum, a better business environment, for firms, helping to ensure more growth and employment.

Unfortunately, in this paper we find that this is not always the case. Increasing the policy space controlled by a city does not necessarily translate into better city and firm performance. This does not suggest that cities could not utilize their new powers effectively – indeed, we find evidence that certain types of firms (state-owned enterprises) begin to outperform their non-SOE counterparts as soon as their credit constraints are relaxed. Newly-established state-owned banks within cities might help explain better access to credit for SOEs, leading to higher levels of employment and increased sales by SOEs. This suggests that if access to finance were a marketbased decision, then the gains from the city-upgrading policy may be expanded to all firms, not just SOEs.

We also examine the effects of an increased “mayor’s wedge” and take into account not just increased powers, but also city capacity. Governance literature shows that in order for a government to manage well its economic development goals, both its operational scope and capacity matter. Therefore, granting additional powers to newly promoted cities does not necessarily translate into better economic performance **_unless_** these cities also have the capacity to utilize the additional remit and benefits. We measure city capacity by local government’s human capital level as well as tax extraction ability. We find that incumbent firms located in newlypromoted cities with high capacity tend to outperform firms in similar counties. Interestingly, SOEs in cities with high capacity do not necessarily outperform non-SOEs, indicating that lowcapacity cities are more likely to abuse their additional remit to favor certain groups of firms.

The WBG and other development institutions are dealing on an increasing basis with subnational governments to improve economic outcomes. In addition, many developing countries have devolved powers to subnational regions. However, there is a lack of evidence about how changing the powers available to local government policy makers relates to economic outcomes. This paper attempts to address this gap and provides some rigorous evidence in support of administrative decentralization accompanied by commensurate increases in capacity.

Governments are making employment their main priority and much of job creation – both in modern sector activities and in the informal sector – is overwhelmingly urban. This paper adds to the empirical evidence linking the ability of city governments to implement pro-active policies to actual economic outcomes. It sheds light on how and under what conditions city leaders can utilize the policy instruments at their disposal to actively target firm growth and job creation in cities. The lessons learned in China point overwhelmingly to the importance of local government capacity. To be an effective strategy for economic development, decentralization should to be accompanied by large and commensurate increases in capacity.

21