metadata: authors: 0: author: Mani,Muthukumara S.
1: author: Hussein,Zekarias
2: author: Gopalakrishnan,Badri Narayanan
3: author: Wadhwa,Deepika
count: World,China,United States,India,EU Accession Countries,Australia,New Zealand,Mexico
docna: 0: docna: Paris climate agreement and the global
            economy : winners and losers
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: International Trade and Trade Rules,Energy and Mining,Energy and Environment,Energy Demand,Global Environment,Energy Policies & Economics,Science of Climate Change,Climate Change and Environment,Climate Change and Health
teratopic: Science and Technology Development,Health, Nutrition and Population,Environment,International Economics and Trade,Energy
abstracts: cdata!: The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was the
            first instance of countries adhering to take a collective
            action against global warming. More than 190 countries came
            forward and submitted their contributions in the form of
            Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, reflective of
            their ability and capacity to reduce greenhouse gas
            emissions, as each country set its own targets and actions.
            For some countries, it meant a significant decline in their
            emissions by 2030, while others, like China, the United
            States, and India, decided on a more gradual phasing out
            extending beyond 2030. This paper estimates the economic
            impacts of implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement in
            terms of its implications for welfare, gross domestic
            product, investments, and trade for major countries and
            regions. It uses a computable general equilibrium framework
            to model global, regional, and country impacts. The analysis
            suggests that the economic impacts will be mostly felt in
            the European Union if the Paris Agreement is fully
            implemented. The European Union is likely to suffer a
            welfare loss of 1.0 to 1.5 percent by 2030. Among
            non-European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico
            will also be affected, with an expected welfare loss of
            about 1.5 percent. Some of the major emitters, such as China
            and India, will experience minimal impacts to their welfare,
            and the United States will experience a welfare loss of only
            about 0.7 by 2030. The sectoral analysis of production and
            trade suggests a significant loss to fossil fuel–based
            sectors, while clean energy sectors can experience
            significant gains.
geo_reg_key: 517198,517212,119228,517191,119225
repnme: repnme: Paris climate agreement and the global
            economy : winners and losers
display_title: Paris climate agreement and the
            global economy : winners and losers
listing_relative_url: /research/2018/04/29772482/paris-climate-agreement-global-economy-winners-losers
topicv3: Energy and Extractives m1326595 507,Climate Change m1326829 567,Trade m1326924 698,Power and Electricity Sector m1327094 515,Environment, Natural Resources and Blue
            Economy m1327391 566
publishtoextweb_dt: 2018-04-02T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Science and Technology Development,Health, Nutrition and Population,Environment,International Economics and Trade,Energy
no_of_pages: 35
author_keys: 0: author_key: 96748
1: author_key: 1383841
2: author_key: 1558360
model_extractions: WPS8392 Policy Research Working Paper 8392 Paris Climate Agreement and the Global Economy

# Winners and Losers

_Muthukumara Mani Zekarias Hussein Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan Deepika Wadhwa_ South Asia Region Office of the Chief Economist April 2018
Policy Research Working Paper 8392

# **Abstract**

The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was the first instance of countries adhering to take a collective action against global warming. More than 190 countries came forward and submitted their contributions in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, reflective of their ability and capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as each country set its own targets and actions. For some countries, it meant a significant decline in their emissions by 2030, while others, like China, the United States, and India, decided on a more gradual phasing out extending beyond 2030. This paper estimates the economic impacts of implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement in terms of its implications for welfare, gross domestic product, investments, and trade for major countries and regions.

It uses a computable general equilibrium framework to model global, regional, and country impacts. The analysis suggests that the economic impacts will be mostly felt in the European Union if the Paris Agreement is fully implemented. The European Union is likely to suffer a welfare loss of 1.0 to 1.5 percent by 2030. Among non-European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico will also be affected, with an expected welfare loss of about 1.5 percent. Some of the major emitters, such as China and India, will experience minimal impacts to their welfare, and the United States will experience a welfare loss of only about 0.7 by 2030. The sectoral analysis of production and trade suggests a significant loss to fossil fuel–based sectors, while clean energy sectors can experience significant gains.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, South Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mmani@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Paris Climate Agreement and the Global Economy:**

# **Winners and Losers**

# Muthukumara Mani<sup>1</sup>

Zekarias Hussein Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan Deepika Wadhwa

**.**

Keywords: international climate negotiations, global stock taking, Carbon taxation, Paris Agreement, INDC, computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling JEL codes: C60, F47, F64, Q40, Q50, Q34, Q54, Q58

> 1 Corresponding author. Muthukumara Mani is with the office of the Chief Economist for South Asia. Zekarias Hussein is with the US Environmental Protection Agency. Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan is with the University of Washington, Seattle. Deepika Wadhwa is with Infinite Sum Modeling Inc. The authors would like to thank Martin Rama, Anil Markandya and Govinda Timilsina for their very thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier version.
# **1. Introduction**

In the past, there has been a general reluctance on the part of countries to take voluntary and unilateral action on climate for the fear that if only some countries act, there was a risk that their efforts will be rendered futile as some emissions could simply move to countries with less strict climate-change regulations, thereby resulting in so-called carbon leakage. It was also believed that this could result in distortions to competitiveness, particularly for energy- and carbonintensive industries, as producers in mitigating countries would face costs for reducing emissions and compete against firms not burdened or burdened less by such costs. In this context, the Paris Agreement is an improvement over its predecessor, “the Kyoto Protocol” which differentiated between the developed and developing countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the developed countries (also known as Annex 1 countries under the UNFCCC Convention) had commitments to reduce their GHG emissions by 5.2 percent from the 1990 level; the developing countries did not have any commitment. The Paris Agreement on the other hand is unprecedented since it nullifies that differentiation by eliciting commitment from all countries (see Annex 1).

Around 190 countries got-together in Paris and adopted an historic international climate agreement at the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) in December 2015. Through this agreement, the countries acknowledged the seriousness of the climate change issues and outlined the post-2020 climate actions they intended to take. The commitments came to be known as their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These INDCs were communicated by UNFCCC Parties to its Secretariat much before the Paris Agreement. Countries negotiated on them and agreed on the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) “on a voluntary basis.” INDCs were primarily designed for governments to communicate the steps they will undertake to address climate change in their own countries. INDCs were supposed to reflect in some sense each country’s ambition for reducing emissions, taking into account its domestic circumstances and capabilities. Moreover, some countries also took the opportunity to highlight the ways they will adapt to climate change impacts, and the support they will need in terms of climate finance, or will provide to other countries to adopt low-carbon pathways, in order to build climate resilience (UNFCCC, 2016).

The climate actions communicated in these INDCs, thus, will largely determine if the world will be able to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement- to restrict the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C, to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C, and to achieve net zero emissions in the second half of this century. Under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, countries are expected to submit an updated NDC every five years, which will then represent a progression beyond the country’s then current NDC to reflect its highest possible ambition.<sup>2</sup> A well-designed NDC is a signal to the world that the country is doing its part to combat climate change and limit future climate risks. NDCs should also emphasize a country’s efforts in

> 2 The word “intended” was used initially because countries were communicating proposed climate actions ahead of the Paris Agreement being finalized. However, as countries formally join the Paris Agreement and look forward to implementation of these climate actions – the “intended” is dropped and an INDC is converted into a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

2
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Finally, the conclusions highlight the potential of investment in renewable energy which can make the economic costs of implementation of the Paris Treaty far more manageable.

# **2. Review of Recent Literature**

There have been a few studies in the existing recent literature which have examined the economic impacts of the Paris Agreement. A recent study by Bohringer and Rutherford (2017) focuses on the carbon tariffs that the United States might face in the context of its withdrawal from the Paris Accord (the paper was written before the actual US withdrawal). The authors examine the economic impacts of a US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for four policyrelevant scenarios against a reference scenario in which all signatory parties to the Paris Agreement including the United States comply with their INDC targets. Scenario 1 is where the United States defects from the Paris Agreement without any sanctions by trading partners. In scenario 2 the remaining regions to the Paris Agreement levy carbon tariffs on US imports at their respective domestic emission prices and in scenario 3, the United States retaliates with optimal tariffs. In scenario 4, the three strategic players, the United States, China, and Europe, end up in a tariff war. The empirical results suggest that carbon tariffs are not an effective instrument to prevent US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as carbon tariffs do not come as a credible threat to the United States when accounting for retaliatory tariffs and the possibility of a tariff war. Also, the United States performs slightly better under carbon tariffs compared to the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the prospect of a tariff war where China and Europe levy tariffs on US imports would not come as a credible threat to the United States, rather it would be China (the most trade-intensive region) that could incur a drastic economic loss from such a tariff war.

Hof et al (2017) estimate the annual abatement costs of achieving the NDC reduction targets, if countries would take additional targets beyond the Paris Agreement to keep global warming well below 2°C and pursue efforts towards 1.5°C by 2030. The authors find the abatement costs to be highly sensitive to socioeconomic assumptions. The global abatement costs of achieving the unconditional NDCs are projected between 58–135 billion USD in 2030 representing the differences between the three baselines, i.e. under SSP3 (with assumptions of slow economic growth, rapidly growing population, and high inequality) the global abatement costs are estimated at USD135 billion by 2030 which is more than twice the level as under the more sustainable socioeconomic assumptions of SSP1. These findings are consistent with Fujimori et al. (2016), who calculate the abatement costs for unconditional NDCs and a more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction scenario consistent with the 2°C goal using a general equilibrium model. The authors then assess the benefit of carbon emission trading on achieving the NDCs and show that welfare losses could be reduced by 75 percent when emissions trading was allowed.

Sokolov et al (2016) focus on the climate impact of the Paris Accord in the next few decades. Using the MIT Integrated Global System Model, the authors consider a ‘no climate policy’ scenario and three other scenarios that effectively extend the NDCs to 2100: 1) no additional climate policy after 2030, but the proposed cuts are extended to 2100; 2) reductions in emissions and emission intensities after 2030 at the same rate as in the 2020-2030 period; and 3) no country increases its GHG emissions after 2050. The empirical results indicate that the Paris 4
Agreement can reduce the global mean surface air temperature (SAT) in 2100 between 0.63 and 1.07°C relative to the no climate policy case. However, since the climate system takes many years to respond to emissions reductions, in 2050, the SAT is reduced only by about 0.12°C under all three scenarios. Moreover, the rise in SAT relative to preindustrial times (1861-1880) exceeds the 2°C goal in 2053, and in 2100, reaches between 2.7 and 3.6°C under all three scenarios.

Another study by Vandyck et al (2016) assesses the energy and economic implications of the climate mitigation policies in the NDCs. The study presents 3 scenarios: first, the Reference scenario, which includes only the existing climate policies particularly for 2020, without adding new additional policies. The second scenario represents the climate change mitigation pledges made by individual countries in the run-up to the COP21 in Paris. The third scenario considers a pathway of global greenhouse gas emissions that is likely to be consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 2°C by the end of the century. The results of simulations indicate that the NDCs have little impact on global demand for oil and gas. Rather, considerable demand reductions of energy and solid fuels would lead to lower greenhouse gas emissions. However, they argue that a substantial gap will remain between the global GHG emissions in the NDCs and the 2°C scenario in 2030, one-third of which could be bridged by decarbonizing the power sector. Moreover, the NDCs imply modest reductions in GDP for most regions (less than 1 percent compared to the Reference in 2030), whereas some regions will experience an increase in GDP due to gains in competitiveness. Overall, the analysis shows that global economic growth rates would be only marginally below the levels of the Reference with emerging and lowest-income economies maintaining high rates of economic growth, while fossil-fuel exporting countries could face larger impact.

This paper builds on the given literature and looks specifically at how the Paris commitments will impact the signatory countries.

# **3. Model, methodology and data**

# **Model**

To analyze the economic impacts of the Paris Agreement on countries, the study uses a comparative static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. CGE models are powerful tools for tracing how changes in one sector are propagated through the rest of the economy, affecting dependent sectors, patterns of trade, income and consumption and the fiscal and international financing needed for macroeconomic stability and growth goals (Figure 2).

CGE models are widely used to analyze the aggregate welfare and distributional impacts of policies whose effects may be transmitted through multiple markets. They have also been deployed to analyze the effects of specific instruments or a combination of instruments. Examples of their application may be found in areas as diverse as fiscal reform and development planning (see, e.g., Perry et al 2001; Gunning and Keyzer 1995), international trade (Shields and Francois 1994; Martin and Winters 1996; Harrison et al 1997), and, increasingly, environmental regulation (Weyant 1999; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Goulder 2002).

The paper uses a GTAP which is a publicly available multi-sectoral multi-regional CGE model. The model follows the standard approach of most CGE models in the sense that it models 5
competitive market behavior via producers, consumers, and government and their interaction with and within a set of countries. This has several standard features of a global CGE model such as Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nests for production and trade and firms supply commodities for private and government consumption and to other firms in the form of intermediate use. Some of the special features of the GTAP model relate to the use of a flexible Constant Difference Elasticity (CDE) functional form for allocating consumption across commodities,<sup>3</sup> Cobb-Douglas utility function for the aggregate regional household, perfect competition, constant returns to scale, conversion of all global savings into all global investment and Armington assumptions to capture product heterogeneity between domestic and imports as well as among imports from different sources (see Figure 2). This model is well-documented at length in Hertel (1997).

> 3 In each region of the GTAP model, a regional household allocates income to maximize per capita aggregate utility per a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The utility function is described as “aggregate” utility because it comprises both government and private sector behavior. The arguments in the utility function are per capita utility from private consumption, per capita utility from government consumption, and per capita real saving. Real saving is a single commodity, defined as saving deflated by a saving price. Utility from government consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of government consumption of individual commodities. Per capita utility from private consumption is aggregated from per capita private consumption of individual commodities using a constant difference elasticity (CDE) demand system (Hertel, 1997).

6
# **Figure 2:  Description of the workings of a CGE Model**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Domestic savings<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Domestic savings<br>Factor<br>Markets<br>Value added Wages, rents<br>Direct taxes<br>Indirect taxes<br>Producers Households Government Savings<br>Intermediate<br>Demand<br>Social Transfers<br>Private consumption Government<br>consumption<br>Product<br>Market<br>Sales Final Demand<br>Exports Imports<br>Foreign<br>Savings<br>Rest of the World<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Producers<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Savings<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Rest of the World<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Breisinger et al (2009) The paper uses a newly developed special version of the GTAP model, named the GTAPPOWER model. This is documented in Peters (2016). In this model, there is a substitution between capital and energy products as a composite commodity; there is a multi-level nesting system among different energy products, including both renewable and non-renewable energy. This accounts for substitution among these sources in response to either carbon taxes for cutting emissions or to any other economic and technological policy changes in the economy. Further to these changes, another modification is made to this model, which enriches the labor supply specification; in the standard GTAP model, one assumes a horizontal or vertical labor supply curve, whereas in this model, the labor supply curve for different countries is defined using the estimated labor supply elasticities. This helps in capturing a more realistic labor supply situation. <mark>Further in reality, the actions on climate change may affect technological innovations as well as investment levels. Therefore,</mark> the assumption is that investment and savings both are endogenous in each region in the model. The model does capture the reduction in investment due to reduced output and savings. <mark>Substitutability across energy sources does vary across sectors and regions, as the parameters and shares of different variables that influence substitutability have huge variations across sectors and regions.</mark> 7
# <u>y</u> ~~<u>¥</u>~~
the model, uses labor, capital, intermediate goods, and energy to produce power. By their very nature, energy inputs are interchangeable in production but differ in terms of their carbon intensity. Therefore, in the baseline scenario, production is a mix of fossil fuels and other power generation technologies and it happens to be the case that high-carbon intensive sources like coal are cheaper than low-carbon alternatives. When emission restriction policy is applied, the cost of all types of fuel used in power generation rises as there are no carbon free inputs. However, the rise in input price makes low carbon energy sources relatively cheaper than, say, coal or other high carbon fuels. This change in energy mix of inputs in favor of low carbon fuels derives the economy-wide decline in carbon emissions (Harris et al, 2017; Peters, 2016).

In the model, electricity is an intermediate good whose production cost also depends on the cost of all other inputs including energy. The extent of the price increase will ultimately depend on the elasticity of demand for electricity. In the immediate run, firms will have little time to substitute away from electricity in the face of the price rise, hence demand will likely be inelastic for all intended purposes. Hence, the production of electricity will be increased slightly but the now higher cost of production will be passed through to prices i.e. other sectors buying and final consumers of electricity will face higher prices. Other things remaining constant, expensive electricity leaves less income in the hands of consumers leading to a fall in overall economy-wide demand. On the supply side, increase in the price of electricity demands more resources i.e. with little opportunity to shift away from electricity in the short run, firms now spend more to get the same level of output. This leaves less resources for producing other goods. Hence, one would expect aggregate supply to decline following the rise in electricity price. Reduced output and demand mean lower employment of factors of production like capital, labor, and other intermediate inputs. The decline in total output will not be the same across sectors as the degree to which sectors use electricity differs markedly. Those that use less electricity will see modest change while those that rely on electricity will see noticeable decline in output. The example used so far about the impact of the emission restriction on the power generating sector can be applied to any sector of the economy that is carbon intensive. The qualitative nature of the story will remain the same while the magnitudes will differ across sectors. The basic process of transmission will start with an initial increase in production cost which will be partly passed through to prices and the rest of the economy leading finally to decrease in aggregate demand and supply (Harris et al, 2017; Peters, 2016).

# **Data**

The data source for this paper is the GTAP-POWER data set documented by Peters (2016). The data used in GTAP-POWER come from numerous IEA publications. For example, data on electricity production (in GWh) by fuel source for each region, levelized (i.e., annualized cost per GWh) capital, operating and maintenance (O&M), fuel, and effective tax costs of electricity for select generating technologies and regions are all collected from IEA and then processed and combined with the standard GTAP database. The standard GTAP Data Base is documented in Narayanan et al (2015). Version 9 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, with 9
2011 as the base year, is used to analyze the economic implications of the Paris Climate agreement.<sup>4</sup>

# **4. Scenarios**

Two scenarios modeled here are:

**_Scenario 1-_** Implementation of INDCs by all member countries that signed the Paris Accord.

**_Scenario 2_** - Scenario A along with exogenous reduction in the prices of renewables by 25 percent.

Starting from 2011, a baseline model is run until 2030 for GDP, labor force, and population, which would expand the whole global economy, including aspects such as production, trade, and investment. The baseline is based on IIASA's Sustainable Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP). The emission reduction commitment is treated in the model as an endogenous tax on carbon on sectors that use carbon-intensive inputs. It is important to keep in mind that the experiments reported are conducted under the counterfactual or “what if” analysis. The INDCs are unlikely to be implemented at the same time in all the regions reported and even more uncertain is the exact time frame these policies will likely get implemented and therefore a simpler approach is taken for imposing INDC shocks on the global economy for the base year 2011.

The analysis assumes no change in the trade account: thus, the variable representing the current account balance (DBALCAR **)** is set to be exogenous and equal to zero in all countries/regions except one. The slack variable, cgdslack, is made endogenous. These variables are usually exogenous in the standard GTAP closure. The implication here is that investment is calculated as a residue in order to guarantee no change of the trade account. The quantitative restrictions applied to carbon emissions are introduced by making the real carbon tax RCTAX (i.e. the nominal carbon tax deflated by the GDP deflator) endogenous and the emission growth rates gco2t exogenous and equal to the Paris commitments. It is also possible to impose an exogenous real or nominal carbon tax (RCTAX or NCTAX, respectively) and leave the emission growth rates to be determined endogenously.

# **5. Main findings**

All the results are cumulative as happening in the final year of analysis, i.e. 2030 and not annualized or year-by-year. The results from Scenario 1 are discussed below and highlighted in Figures 5 through 8, which show both welfare and macroeconomic impacts of the Paris commitments across countries. Four other hypothetical alternative sub-scenarios were also examined, besides the original INDC commitment scenario. They include: (i) INDC_50MR scenario that looks at the impact of increasing the INDC commitments by 50 percent more than what countries initially intended to achieve. This is an extreme case, however, having such a scenario helps in giving benchmark values to alternative policy measures (ii) INDC20 looks at the impact of achieving just 20 percent of the INDC targets. (iii) INDC50 shows percent

> 4   https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ GTAP (1997), T. Hertel Ed., Global Trade Analysis Modeling and Applications, NY, USA.

10
achievements of the original INDC commitments. (iv) INDC80 assumes 80 percent achievements of the original INDC commitments.

As shown in figure 5, for a few OPEC countries, the results indicate that overall these countries are likely to experience negative economic consequences following the global implementation of INDCs in all the five scenarios. The costs, as measured in terms of utility of the representative regional household, range from about 1 percent in Qatar to 2.1 percent in Saudi Arabia in the base INDC implementation scenario. The welfare loss in Saudi Arabia happens even though it has no carbon reduction commitments to comply with under the Paris deal. Overall, the higher cost in the OPEC region is partly explained by deterioration in terms-of-trade since the majority of the countries in the region are net energy exporters. Thus, even non-committed countries can experience welfare decline following the implementation of the INDCs. However, the welfare implications of the implementation of INDCs seem to be positively correlated with the size of ambition to reduce emissions. For instance, a 50 percent increase in commitments to reduce CO2 emissions across the globe can contribute to a welfare loss of about 9 percent in Ecuador and 4 percent in Saudi Arabia. The welfare impacts of achieving only about 20 percent of the INDC targets are mixed. Welfare costs seem to be marginally negative and even positive in some countries.

Likewise, for some of the top net emission importers, the welfare costs of the INDC commitments are negative across the board (measured by MtCO2 per year), as shown in Figure 6. The more ambitious are the commitments, the higher is the cost on society. However, the welfare loss is smaller in magnitude compared to the impact on OPEC member countries. Unlike OPEC countries, the terms of trade effect for these countries are in fact positive as they benefit from declining energy prices following the implementation of the carbon emission reduction policy. Moreover, some of these major countries have binding commitments to reduce emissions, by at least 40 percent from 1990 emissions levels.

Figure 7 shows the impact of INDC commitments across selected countries of the G20. The G20 group represents a mixed representation in terms of INDC commitments, some member countries have binding and ambitious INDC commitments (e.g. Australia and Canada), some have modest targets (the Republic of Korea, Japan and Argentina), while some countries (e.g. India, the Russian Federation, and South Africa) have no commitments to reduce emissions at all in the near-future. Overall, the Paris commitments would result in decline of welfare across these countries.

Figure 8 shows the marginal cost of achieving the Paris Agreement based on the alternative INDCs scenarios. The European countries face a high cost for meeting their aggressive Paris Agreement target which ranges from a low of $54 per ton of CO2 in Spain to $372 per ton of CO2 in France if they manage to reduce emissions by about 40 percent as planned. The cost is reduced if the target was set at only reaching 20 percent of the INDCs. In this case the marginal cost ranges from a high of $35 per ton of CO2 in France to $7 per ton of CO2 in Spain. A more stringent target, say achieving 50 percent more than what is stated in the INDCs leads to a much higher price of carbon in Europe. The price hike ranges from $914 per ton of CO2 in France to $101 in Spain.

11
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**Table 1: Implications of Paris Treaty for GDP, Investment and Trade**

|Regions/Countries|percent<br>Change<br>in<br>GDP|percent<br>Change<br>in<br>Investment|percent<br>Change<br>in<br>Imports|percent<br>Change<br>in<br>Exports|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Australia|-0.84|-0.47|-3.08|-1.93|
|New Zealand|-1.06|0.65|-3.14|-4.3|
|**_East Asia_**|||||
|China(Mainland)|-0.06|-0.01|1.19|0.55|
|Japan|-0.26|-0.28|-1.67|-2.99|
|Korea, Rep.|0.04|0.99|-1.04|-1.89|
|Indonesia|-0.02|-0.23|-0.28|0.58|
|**_South Asia_**|||||
|India|-0.01|0.16|0.28|-0.91|
|Rest of South Asia|-0.01|-0.09|0.45|-0.14|
|**_North America_**|||||
|Canada|-0.27|0|-0.6|0.18|
|United States|-0.62|0.8|-1.19|-2.81|
|Mexico|-1.18|-0.27|-0.65|-0.07|
|**_Latin America_**<br>**_and Caribbean_**|||||
|Brazil|0|-0.01|-0.22|-0.1|
|Ecuador|0.32|5.97|1.1|2.7|
|Venezuela, RB|-0.1|-0.68|-5.13|0|
|Argentina|-0.01|-0.04|0.02|0.19|
|Other Latin<br>American|0.01|-0.11|-0.26|0.31|
|Central America<br>and Caribbean|0.01|-0.11|0.14|-0.06|
|**_Europe and_**<br>**_Central Asia_**|||||
|France|-1.63|0.38|-4.3|-6.04|
|Germany|-1.06|0.97|-3|-3.11|
|Italy|-1.13|0.08|-3.46|-4.54|
|Spain|-0.23|-0.29|-1.6|-2.38|
|United Kingdom|-1.06|-0.52|-2.63|-3.35|
|Other European<br>Union 27|-1.61|0.05|-3.9|-4.53|
|Rest of Europe|-1.27|0.68|-3.85|-4.56|

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|Russian Federation|-0.83|-0.28|-5.58|-1.61|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Norway|-4.6|-2.23|-8.13|-5.01|
|Turkey|-0.35|-0.22|0.17|-0.14|
|**Central Asia**|-0.07|-0.24|0.83|0.98|
|**_Middle East and_**<br>**_North Africa_**|||||
|Qatar|-0.05|-0.43|-3.23|-0.31|
|Saudi Arabia|0.05|0.06|-4.44|-0.51|
|United Arab<br>Emirates|-0.15|-0.75|-1.75|0.88|
|Iran, Islamic Rep.|-0.2|-0.69|-3.65|-0.58|
|Iraq|-0.35|-2.19|-2.37|0.81|
|Kuwait|-0.05|-0.81|-2.7|0.23|
|Algeria and Libya|-0.21|-2|-6.81|-2.3|
|Rest of Middle<br>East and North<br>Africa|-0.05|-0.33|0.47|1.57|
|**_Africa_**|||||
|Nigeria|-0.33|-1.22|-5.54|-1.07|
|Angola and Gabon|-0.1|-1.38|-3.81|-0.07|
|South Africa|0.02|-0.09|-0.54|-0.52|
|Sub-Saharan<br>Africa|-0.03|-0.31|-0.19|0.55|
|**_Rest of the World_**|0.1|-0.22|-0.17|0.22|

Source: Authors’ computations.

In terms of investments, the analysis suggests that the impact is likely to be minimal with most countries experiencing either a small positive or negative effect by 2030. Among European countries, France and Germany are likely to experience a positive increase in their investments, while Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom can register a small decline in their investments. Some of the oil exporting countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Russia, Nigeria and Kuwait can also show modest declines in their investments. The United States and Korea are likely to benef positively in terms of their investments.

The analysis also suggests that changes in trade could be a negative consequence of the implementation of the Paris Treaty. Most countries in Europe are likely to experience a decline of 3.0 to 5.0 percent in their imports and exports. Countries in MENA can experience a bigger percent change in their imports than the exports. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, the United States and African countries will also be negatively impacted to varying degrees. China and to some extent India will not experience any significant shift either in their exports or imports.

In terms of the implications for various industries/sectors, the analysis suggests that fossil fuelbased sectors such as coal, gas, and oil will be adversely affected by the implementation of the 16
Paris Agreement. Both basic production as well as power generation using coal, oil and gas and trade are likely to experience a significant decline as countries ramp up their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While China, India, Russia and Turkey will witness an increase in coal-fired power generation, most other countries will witness a significant decline in coalpowered generation by 2030. On the other hand, clean energy industries such as nuclear, wind and solar will experience a significant increase in their production and trade. This will have little implications for basic manufacturing industries or services. Overall, the dirty industries are likely to be majorly impacted, while clean industries show a flourishing trend as the Paris Agreement is implemented without any major implications for industrial competitiveness.

**Table 2: Implication of Paris Treaty for Global Trade and Output in Various Sectors**

||in<br>Output|in<br>Trade|
|---|---|---|
|Crops|-0.2|-0.3|
|Processed Food|-0.3|-0.7|
|Textiles|-0.2|-0.6|
|Meat|-0.4|-1.1|
|Fish|-0.1|-0.5|
|Forest|0.1|2.6|
|Coal|-5.8|-23.5|
|Oil|-4|-5|
|Gas|-13.2|-13.4|
|Petroleum and Coal|-4.7|-10.2|
|Electricity Transmission|-5.8|-9.4|
|Nuclear Power|16.5|20.2|
|Coal-fired Power|-19.7|-42.9|
|Gas-fired Power|-11.8|-23.6|
|Wind Power|18.7|18.4|
|Hydro Power|13.2|16.6|
|Oil-fired Power|-3.5|-27.9|
|Other Power|11.6|12|
|Gas-fired<br>Power<br>(Peak<br>Load)|<br>-8.5|-16.6|

17
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The results for Scenario 2 are presented in Table 3. The findings suggest that the reduction in GDP resulting from the implementation of the Paris Treaty would be considerably nullified by a reduction in the price of renewables by 25 percent. For example, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are likely to experience a much smaller decline in their GDPs compared to the business as usual scenario (Scenario A). Similarly, the United States will witness a decline in GDP of 0.28 percent in scenario 2 as compared to 0.62 percent in the baseline scenario.

**Table 3: Scenario 2: Implication of Paris Treaty for Global Trade and Output in Various Sectors with 25 percent reduction in price of renewables**

|**Region/Country**|percent<br>Change in<br>GDP|percent<br>Change<br>in<br>Investment|<br>percent<br>Change in<br>Imports|percent<br>Change in<br>Exports|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Australia|-0.64|-0.27|-3.01|-1.83|
|New Zealand|-0.53|1.43|-2.76|-3.98|
|East Asia|||||
|China (Mainland)|0.17|0.18|1.19|0.62|
|Japan|-0.01|-0.27|-1.47|-2.74|
|Korea, Rep.|0.34|1.53|-0.79|-1.58|
|Indonesia|0.22|0.47|0.27|-1.29|
|**_South Asia_**|||||
|India|0.01|-0.13|-0.33|0.62|
|Rest of South Asia|0.33|0.99|0.39|-0.67|
|**_North America_**|||||
|Canada|0.3|0.45|-0.1|0.77|
|United States|-0.28|1.39|-0.9|-2.46|
|Mexico|-0.93|0.27|-0.56|-0.02|
|**_Latin America and Caribbean_**|||||
|Brazil|0.47|0.45|-0.04|-0.15|
|Ecuador|0.61|6.72|1.22|2.49|
|Venezuela, RB|0.23|-0.61|-5.35|-0.15|
|Argentina|0.03|0.14|0.05|0.01|
|Other Latin American|0.37|0.26|-0.27|0.51|

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|Central America and Caribbean|0.15|0.78|0.05|-0.27|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_Europe and Central Asia_**|||||
|France|-1.01|0.72|-3.94|-5.55|
|Germany|-0.55|1.99|-2.42|-2.52|
|Italy|-0.65|0.86|-2.82|-4.02|
|Spain|0.35|-0.16|-1.15|-1.96|
|United Kingdom|-0.72|-0.02|-2.24|-3.03|
|Other European Union 27|-0.91|1.04|-3.31|-3.92|
|Rest of Europe|0.06|1.99|-2.46|-3.11|
|Russian Federation|-0.57|1.42|-5.13|-1.35|
|Norway|-4|-1.77|-7.45|-4.41|
|Turkey|-0.17|-0.17|0.26|-0.45|
|**_Central Asia_**|0.1|0.1|0.78|0.91|
|**_Middle East and North Africa_**|||||
|Qatar|-0.05|-0.45|-3.41|-0.32|
|Saudi Arabia|0.06|0.1|-4.35|-0.5|
|United Arab Emirates|-0.15|-0.72|-1.66|0.89|
|Iran, Islamic Rep.|-0.16|-0.47|-3.64|-0.61|
|Iraq|-0.16|-0.78|-2.11|0.91|
|Kuwait|-0.05|-0.78|-2.64|0.24|
|Algeria and Libya|-0.21|-1.98|-6.78|-2.31|
|Rest of Middle East and North<br>Africa|-0.02|-0.2|0.52|1.55|
|**_Africa_**|||||
|Nigeria|-0.3|-1.31|-5.56|-1.13|
|Angola and Gabon|-0.03|-1.09|-3.75|-0.06|
|South Africa|0.03|0.04|-0.45|-0.55|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|0.29|0.45|0.01|0.65|
|**_Rest of the World_**|0.15|-0.01|0.03|0.17|

Source: Authors’ computations. Results from Scenario B.

20
Similarly, in terms of investments, countries are likely to benefit much more with the reduction in the price of renewables than otherwise. Most European countries will experience a spurt in their investments. Countries like Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain will register a small decline in their investments. In trade, the majority of the countries show a decline in their exports and imports in scenario 2 but to a smaller extent as compared to scenario 1. In other words, trade disruptions are likely to be minimum with the reduction in the price of renewables.

**Table 4: Implication of Paris Treaty for Global Trade and Output in Various Sectors with reduction in price of renewables**

|**Sector/Industry**|**percent change in**<br>**Trade**|**percent change in**<br>**Output**|
|---|---|---|
|1 Crops|-0.18|-0.04|
|2 Processed Food|-0.44|-0.06|
|3 Textiles|-0.32|0.05|
|4 Meat|-0.66|-0.12|
|5 Fish|-0.05|0.14|
|6 Forest|2.92|0.43|
|7 Coal|-29.06|-5.34|
|8 Oil|-4.21|-3.58|
|9 Gas|-15.24|-11.16|
|10 Petroleum and Coal|-9.20|-3.90|
|11 Electricity Transmission|0.84|2.15|
|12 Nuclear Power|76.52|68.42|
|13 Coal-fired Power|-62.72|-39.64|
|14 Gas-fired Power|-41.46|-27.77|
|15 Wind Power|68.28|75.95|
|16 Hydro Power|65.24|59.04|

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|17 Oil-fired Power|-47.90|-13.47|
|---|---|---|
|18 Other Power|-10.90|-7.43|
|19 Gas-fired Power (Peak Load)|-19.74|-9.98|
|20 Hydro Power (Peak Load)|45.72|30.63|
|21 Oil-fired Power (Peak Load)|0.32|1.16|
|22 Solar Power|50.42|45.89|
|23 Light Manufacturing|-0.24|-0.02|
|24 Heavy Manufacturing|-0.39|0.07|
|25 Services|-0.54|-0.07|

Source: Authors’ computations. Results from Scenario B.

In scenario 2, in terms of the impact on various industries/sectors, the analysis suggests that fossil fuel-based power generating sectors such as coal, gas, and oil are expected to be hit negatively with the drop in the price of renewables. On the other hand, clean energy sectors will gain positively with significant increase in their production and trade. The impact on manufacturing sectors will also be less pronounced than in the business as usual scenario. Thus, the reduction in the prices of renewables is expected to result in the decline of fossil fuel-based power generation, with most countries except Russia and Turkey witnessing significant to modest declines in their coal-fired power generation (Figure 10).

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Moreover, the results also indicate that a fall in the prices of renewables would considerably soften the economic impact of the Paris Agreement. The economic impacts for Europe especially in terms of GDP loss will almost be halved for the majority of the countries. The associated investment gains would be significant and trade disruptions substantially minimized. In terms of specific sectors, a fall in the price of renewables will give further boost to clean energy sectors such as solar and wind at the cost of the fossil fuel-based sectors. Coal-fired power generation would also be significantly reduced.

The findings therefore point in the direction of improving the investment regime for renewable energy which in turn would make the economic costs of implementation of the Paris Agreement far more manageable. Investments in R&D could also help in speeding up innovation in technology which in turn would reduce the price of renewables considerably. Overall, all this could also spur more ambitious NDC submissions by countries as a follow-up to the commitments agreed in Paris.

It is important to highlight two major limitations of the current paper. First, the stylized nature of the policy experiment needs a careful interpretation of the results. In the paper, a “what if” scenario is developed to explore implications of INDCs, i.e., if INDCs were implemented in the global economy as represented by our 2011 base year. However, the INDCs, by their very nature, would be implemented over a period, which would undoubtedly take many policy reforms and approaches to achieve the goals. This contrasts very much with the approach used here and represents one of the major weaknesses of static CGE models that are mostly used in climate policy analysis. The use of a dynamic CGE model would have partially addressed some of these concerns.

Second, implementation of the INDCs is likely to impact the workings of energy markets across the globe. However, such impacts are likely to be transferred in the form of welfare change which depends on a number of factors that are particular to the model used here. For example, the degree to which changes in higher energy cost of production are <mark>passed on to consumers depends on the relative price elasticities of supply and demand. These elasticities therefore play a critical role in evaluating the impact of INDCs. In addition to demand elasticity, i</mark> nter-fuel substitution is key to the price responsiveness of firms’ demand for oil and other energy sectors. Thus, proper representation and validation of these parameters is paramount to proper documentation of the policy impacts of INDCs. Finally, one observes that the benefits from cutting emissions as per the Paris Accord may potentially outweigh the costs in terms of slowdown in GDP.

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