metadata: authors: 0: author: Reed,Tristan
1: author: Trubetskoy,Alexandr
count: Europe,Asia
docna: 0: docna: Assessing the Value of Market Access from
            Belt and Road Projects
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: International Trade and Trade Rules,Transport Services,Ports & Waterways,Financial Sector Policy,Roads & Highways,Inter-Urban Roads and Passenger Transport,Roads and Highways Performance
teratopic: International Economics and Trade,Transport
abstracts: cdata!: The present value of market access from
            the Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia does not exceed its
            costs. Many transportation projects are of little value
            because they fail to create new least-cost paths between
            large population centers, or because they create redundancy
            with paths already on the network. If built in isolation,
            only about one-third of projects provide market access
            gains. However, considering the proposed new transport
            infrastructure as a system, the share of projects that
            provide gains increases to almost two-thirds. International
            coordination and rigorous project selection allow mutual
            benefit from the investment program.
repnme: repnme: Assessing the Value of Market Access from
            Belt and Road Projects
display_title: Assessing the Value of Market Access
            from Belt and Road Projects
listing_relative_url: /research/2019/04/30976975/assessing-value-market-access-belt-road-projects
topicv3: Transport m1326661 135,Highways m1326916 1809,Trade m1326924 698,Ports m1327399 167,Financial Sector Development m1327681 1920
publishtoextweb_dt: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: International Economics and Trade,Transport
no_of_pages: 83
author_keys: 0: author_key: 948891
1: author_key: 1588069
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 8815 Assessing the Value of Market Access from Belt and Road Projects _Tristan Reed Alexandr Trubetskoy_ International Finance Corporation April 2019
Policy Research Working Paper 8815

# **Abstract**

The present value of market access from the Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia does not exceed its costs. Many transportation projects are of little value because they fail to create new least-cost paths between large population centers, or because they create redundancy with paths already on the network. If built in isolation, only about one-third of projects provide market access gains. However, considering the proposed new transport infrastructure as a system, the share of projects that provide gains increases to almost two-thirds. International coordination and rigorous project selection allow mutual benefit from the investment program.

This paper is a product of the International Finance Corporation’s Economics and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at treed@worldbank.org and trub@uchicago.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Assessing the Value of Market Access from Belt and Road Projects<sup>1</sup> Tristan Reed Development Research Group, World Bank Alexandr Trubetskoy Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

# Updated February 2021

JEL Classification Codes: R42, O18 Keywords: market access; transportation infrastructure; cost benefit analysis; Belt and Road

> 1 GIS shapefiles of the database of Belt and Road Initiative projects developed for this study are available here: https://github.com/sashatrubetskoy/bri_market_access. We thank Sam Asher, François de Soyres, Caroline Freund, Indermit Gil, Bert Hofman, Gabriel Kriendler, Somik Lall, Martin Melecky, Megha Mukim and Michele Ruta and participants at the Harvard Cities and Development conference for helpful comments. Robert Mwanamanga assisted with the compilation of Appendix A. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank Group or its Directors. Correspondence to: treed@worldbank.org.
# 1. INTRODUCTION

The Belt and Road Initiative is the largest infrastructure construction program of the current era, but it has been officially defined only in broad terms. The initiative is described in the Chinese government’s 13<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (Ch. 51) as an “all-around opening up in which China is opened to the world through eastward and westward links and across land and sea,” a reference to previous domestic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. While Deng’s Open Door Policy welcomed the world into China, the Belt and Road are understood to carry the country’s influence out into the world, in part by building a new network of road, rail and port infrastructure to lower trade costs between China and its neighbors. Despite ambition for mutual benefit, concerns have been raised that certain projects are not economically viable, and will leave countries burdened by debt that cannot be repaid by incremental economic growth (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, 2018; Financial Times, 2018, 2020).

Though a literature has applied quantitative spatial equilibrium models to value transportation investments, which comprise many Belt and Road projects, these models have not yet been widely applied by policy makers in ex-ante project evaluation. Given limited transparency regarding the results of economic feasibility studies for Belt and Road projects, there is an opportunity for quantitative spatial equilibrium models to fill a gap. For this purpose, we develop an original geographic information system (GIS) database that identifies as comprehensively as possible all proposed, ongoing or recently completed road, rail and port projects along six strategic Eurasian corridors laid out in 2
two Belt and Road strategy documents published by Chinese government agencies, and complete an ex-ante economic evaluation of these projects.<sup>2</sup> This paper does not seek to push the theoretical frontier in urban economics, but rather to apply widely-accepted frameworks to study the largest and most geo-politically consequential infrastructure construction program in recent history. To our knowledge, ours is the first analysis to systematically compare the potential economic benefits of individual Belt and Road projects. Project benefits are quantified in terms of expected changes in market access—the sum of the size of all markets on the transportation network, each weighted by the inverse of the ad-valorem trade cost needed to reach it. Theoretically, increases in market access lower the cost of consumption and the cost of production in a location, leading to an increase in the value of land in a location. Total 2 Open access GIS shapefiles of the BRI project database developed for this study are available <u>here. These projects, whose names, locations and status (i.e., proposed, planning,</u> under construction, operational) are listed in Appendix A, are located within 30 kilometers of at least 223 million urban residents, and span 23 different countries, which together produce 24 percent of global GDP. Excluding China, 22 countries and 9% of world GDP. Other estimates of the number of countries covered by the BRI are typically larger, as they include projects in Africa and Western Europe, which do not lie on the corridors identified in the two Chinese government documents on which we base our database. The nodes in our network include all cities described in the UN World Urbanization Prospects for 2015. Note that our database includes only transportation projects, which account for approximately 25% of BRI projects, the remainder of which comprise primarily electric energy projects, and select investments in chemicals, metallurgy and mining (World Bank, 2019). The value of non-transportation projects is outside the scope of this study.

3
land value generated summarizes a project’s benefit. Consistent with this idea, increases in market access have been shown empirically to predict growth in population (Redding and Sturm, 2008), land values (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016), and night lights (Alder, 2019).

When valued according to expected changes in market access, approximately half of the 68 Belt and Road projects in Eurasia generate little benefit. Remarkably, this result holds regardless of assumptions about the economy (i.e., city income, factor shares, and the responsiveness of trade to trade costs) because projects fail to create new least-cost paths between population centers or because they create redundancy with paths already on the network. These results are validated by evidence that some projects expected to generate little market access have now been cancelled or scaled back by sponsors, and are consistent with a view that the Belt and Road program is guided by non-economic motivations. For instance, one view suggests that some default on loans associated with Belt and Road projects is desired by the Chinese government, since it would allow state-owned banks to foreclose on strategic assets, so called `debt-trap diplomacy’. An alternative explanation could be that local elites select bad projects based on their own interests (Lee and Hameiri, 2020).

Having evaluated each project individually, we ask what economic assumptions one would have to believe such that all projects built in complement are worth more than total project costs, including the cost of those projects that provide least-cost paths to nowhere. This exercise evaluates the hypothesis that optimism about economic benefits, rather than non-economic motivations, could justify the investment program. We find that such a break-even scenario obtains only with the assumption that the infrastructure program increases GDP growth in all Eurasian cities by 40 basis points, in perpetuity, beyond any static gains already accounted for by changes in market access. Such an increment to growth could be motivated by external economies of scale in urban production (see, e.g., Glaeser and Mare 2001). Though such additional growth may be 4
plausible in certain cities nearby to projects creating large gains in market access, the existence of many individually uneconomic projects makes it less certain that such an increment to growth could be shared across all of Eurasia.

Beyond the results specific to the Belt and Road, the analysis illustrates four heuristics from the spatial equilibrium model that may be applied in transportation planning. First, projects may be complements or substitutes. If built in isolation, only about one-third of projects provide market access gains. Considering the proposed new transport infrastructure as a system, however, the share of projects that provide gains increases to almost two-thirds. Conversely, a small number of projects become less valuable when the rest of the network is built, as other links make the projects redundant.

Second, reforms that increase factor mobility across locations are likely to be complementary to investments in physical transportation infrastructure, though quantitatively they appear moderate. We simulate a counterfactual in which Eurasian Belt and Road countries become an economic union with free internal factor mobility, along the lines of the United States. In this case, aggregate value created by all projects built in complement is 8 percent larger than under a scenario in which factors are immobile.

Third, the same transportation network improvement is worth more in a richer country. This is due to a level effect in which improvements in market access are worth more in larger (i.e., richer or more populous) markets. To the extent that project costs are determined by prices of internationally traded materials and capital equipment rather than local land and labor costs, this implies any given transportation project is less likely to be economically feasible when it is located is in a poorer country. This observation may partially rationalize limited investment in infrastructure in low-income countries as an equilibrium market outcome and explain why poor countries struggle to finance 5
infrastructure through taxation of incremental income, leading to recurrent challenges with national debt.

Fourth, some projects, especially those affecting sea routes, generate external benefits far from their location. While the cities experiencing the greatest gains in market access are frequently those located close to the projects, the greatest gains in welfare accrue to China and western Europe. This suggests that infrastructure built in low- and middleincome countries along international trade corridors is a public good for which high income countries should be willing to pay.

Our work is related to a substantial literature quantifying the economic impact of between-city transportation investment programs ex-post.<sup>3</sup> The market access approach has been used to study railroads in the 19<sup>th</sup> century United States (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016; Hornbeck and Rotemberg, 2020), and more recently highways in India (Alder, 2019) and Brazil (Morten and Olivera, 2018). Others have used alternative research designs to study highways in China (Faber, 2014) and India (Ghani, Goswami, and Kerr, 2016), railways in Africa (Jedwab and Moradi, 2016) and ports and highways in Africa (Storeygard, 2016). Asher and Novosad (2019) find that the Prime Minister’s Village Road Program (PMGSY) in India provided little measurable economic benefit for households. The market access framework provides an economic rationale for this finding: since the size (and purchasing power) of the rural markets is not large, there is 3 A distinct literature studies the impact of within-city transportation investments, for instance radial highways and rail surrounding cities in China (Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang, 2017), a bus rapid transit system in Bogota, Colombia (Tsivanidis, 2019) and the steam railroad in 19<sup>th</sup> century London (Redding, Sturm, and Heblich, 2020).

6
little value in lowering the cost of trade between them. We build on these studies by applying the market access approach to evaluate port, rail, and road investments ex-ante while accounting for asymmetric trade costs between locations, a feature of the international transportation network, where tariffs are generally levied on imports but not exports. Existing applications assume trade costs are symmetric. Others have used variants of the equilibrium model employed here to conduct ex-ante economic evaluations of improvements to the road network in Africa (Buys, Deichmann, and Wheeler 2010), the United States (Allen and Arkolakis 2019), and Western Europe (Fajgelbaum and Schaal 2020). The general question of how to value the so-called “wider economic benefits” of transportation projects beyond direct benefits for users has been addressed by Venables (2017) and Melecky, Bougna, and Xu (2018) among others.

Alternative estimates of the economic impact of the Belt and Road Initiative are based on our original GIS database of transportation projects (De Soyres, et al., 2018, De Soyres, Mulabdic, and Ruta., 2019; Maliszewska and Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2019; Lall and Lebrand, 2019; World Bank, 2019). These studies evaluate the Belt and Road as a single bundle of projects built in complement, rather than evaluating individual projects.

# 2. A GIS DATABASE OF BELT AND ROAD TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS

This paper provides an original and comprehensive database of all existing and planned transportation infrastructure projects proposed under the Belt and Road Initiative. Our database is unique in that it includes geographical information describing the exact location of each project (i.e., in GIS shapefiles) on the international 7
transportation network.<sup>4</sup> This geographical information serves as the basis for our analysis of the projects’ welfare impact.

Projects are included in our database if they lie physically along Belt and Road routes defined by two official Chinese sources (Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, 2017; Government of China, 2017) and if they are mentioned in one of the following sources as being part of BRI: (i) a document issued by a government or its press agency, (ii) an article in a major academic journal or global news source, or (iii) a quote by a government official in a global or leading national news source. Sources reviewed include joint declarations by China and Belt and Road 4 Four other databases of Belt and Road projects exist. The Reconnecting Asia database by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the China Global Investment Tracker by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the MERICS Belt and Road Tracker, and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKDTC) database. The CSIS database is a broad database covering 152 BRI-related transportation projects in Eastern Europe and Asia and overlaps substantially with ours, though does not include detailed GIS files that overlay these projects onto the transportation network. The database is notable for including some (but not complete) information on project costs. The AEI database emphasizes capital flows associated with certain projects, covering 50 investments related to road, rail or shipping infrastructure. The MERICS Belt and Road Tracker includes ample discussion of policy related to the BRI but does not offer a specific database of projects accessible to researchers. The database by HKDTC has a very broad scope that extends beyond transport links. It does list 106 logistics-related projects, most of which are not directly related to transport infrastructure.

8
countries, statements issued by government agencies (e.g., ministries, legislatures) of individual countries, global news organizations (e.g., Financial Times, Reuters), local news sources in which government officials are quoted, industry journals, and think tank publications. Projects need not be financed by Chinese banks to be included. Given this approach, our database uses a consistent set of criteria to include projects and is comprehensive within those criteria.

Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative (2017, pg. 9) describes the overall geographic scope of the Belt and Road succinctly: “Based on the proposal from President Xi and the need to promote international cooperation and taking into consideration the routes of the ancient land and sea Silk Roads, China has determined five routes for the Belt and Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt has three routes: one from Northwest China and Northeast China to Europe and the Baltic Sea via Central Asia and the Russian Federation; one from Northwest China to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, passing through Central Asia and West Asia; and one - from Southwest China through the Indochina Peninsula to the Indian Ocean. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road has two major routes: one starts from coastal ports of China, crosses the South China Sea, passes through the Malacca Strait, and reaches the Indian Ocean, extending to Europe; the other starts from coastal ports of China, crosses the South China Sea, and extends to the South Pacific.” Note a source of potential confusion is that the “Belt” refers to the overland routes, where many of the projects are road improvements, whereas the “Road” refers to the maritime routes, where projects are primarily ports. Further, note that though Africa may be discussed by some as being part of the Belt and Road initiative given substantial Chinese investment on the continent, it is not included explicitly in these corridors.

Appendix A describes the 93 improvements to the transportation network included in our database and their status, as well as references to the sources used to include them. Of these improvements, 67 are on the Silk Road Economic Belt and 26 9
are on the Maritime Silk Road. These improvements are subsequently grouped into 75 projects when they are described jointly in our sources (for instance, the Sihanoukville Port project consists of three improvements: a port, a road, and a railway). In Table A1, Belt projects are grouped along six land corridors described by Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative (2017) and in Table A2, the Road projects are grouped along three sea passages described by the Government of China (2017). Table A1 includes a few examples of African rail projects that were attributed to the BRI by alternative sources, though Africa is not included in these corridors. In our analysis of welfare impacts, we will focus on the 68 projects from the Belt and Road that are in Eurasia. Figure 1 shows these projects.

These 68 projects are overlaid on the existing network of all major rail, road and port infrastructure in Asia, Europe and the Middle East (i.e., Eurasia), beginning with existing road and rail connections documented in Natural Earth (Kelso and Patterson, 2018). In cases where Natural Earth does not include connections between cities, we include on the network additional road connections from OpenStreetMap. In China, rail data are further supplemented using Li’s high-speed railway shapefiles (Harvard Dataverse, 2016). Ports included on this network are those handling more than 5 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) in 2015 (Nightingale, 2016). TEU is an inexact unit of cargo capacity used in the shipping industry, corresponding to the volume of a 20foot-long intermodal container. Sea links between ports are derived by assuming ships can take the most direct feasible route between ports. To our best understanding, the resulting transportation network includes all major highways, railroads and ports in Eurasia.

10
Finally, we identify population and land with nodes on the network using the 964 cities nearest (i.e., within 30 kilometers) to any link with the transportation network, when all 68 projects are built in complement. Populations of these cities are as reported for 2015 by the UN Urbanization Prospects. In the average country, cities on the network comprise 24 percent of total population, though there is a range, with Singapore 97 percent, Turkey at 49 percent, and Cambodia at 11 percent, reflecting variation in domestic connectivity and urbanization in these countries, as well as the geographic scope of the Belt and Road itself. As shown in Figure 1, the Belt and Road passes through only portions of many countries. Our baseline specification focuses on welfare gains accruing only to these cities with direct connectivity to the international network. In discussion of the results however, we consider the implication of allocating additional population and land (e.g., from rural areas, or greater metropolitan areas around cities) to the nodes on the network.

# 3. THE MARKET ACCESS APPROACH TO VALUING THE BENEFITS OF IMPROVEMENTS TO AN INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The market access approach to quantify the welfare benefit of a transportation investment is elaborated by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) for the case of a domestic transportation network. Here, we focus on how to interpret the model in the context of an international transportation network, and the specific modifications we make to their model in order to apply the framework to the Belt and Road. The central mechanism in the model through which transportation investment affects welfare is price adjustment--when investment causes trade costs to decline between cities, consumers and firms in each city can buy goods more cheaply.

11
To set up the model, index locations on the transportation network by o = 1, ... , O. The model is built on three assumptions about these locations. The first is that they share a Cobb-Douglas (constant returns) technology to produce goods with land, labor and capital. The share of local income Yo that is paid to land is given by α, the share paid to labor by β, and the share paid to capital by 1 −α−β. The second assumption is a neoclassical gravity model of trade, with constant elasticity of substitution preferences for varieties produced by each location, in which the elasticity of trade flows to trade costs is given by the ratio 1/θ, where θ> 1 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Head and Meyer, 2014; Adao, Costinot, and Donaldson, 2017). The third is a spatial equilibrium in which factors are mobile across space and the marginal product of capital and utility (i.e., the real, local-price-adjusted, wage) are equalized across locations (Glaeser, 2008).

In an international trade model, while the assumption of a common technology and trade elasticity are standard, the spatial equilibrium is a strong assumption. While there is substantial labor and capital mobility within subsets of Eurasian countries, facilitated for instance by the economic integration agreements underlying the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the European Union, mobility within the entire continent is clearly constrained. In the analysis we value market access under two alternative scenarios of international integration (among a variety of other alternative specifications). In the baseline scenario, local income Yo is held fixed in all cities to simulate the case in which there is no factor mobility, as in standard international trade analysis. In the alternative scenario, we use Theorem 1 of Allen and Arkolakis (2014) to calculate what income would be in each city if factors were able to freely reallocate in response to the change in trade costs induced by the Belt and Road projects, simulating a world in which the Belt and Road network of cities is a perfectly integrated economic union. The difference between the gains from Belt and Road projects under these two 12
scenarios describes the additional (complementary) benefit of implementing international integration agreements alongside Belt and Road projects.

To calculate benefits from a change in trade costs induced by a project, the model requires calibration of three parameters and baseline income Yo in each city. In our baseline specification, we use α= 0.05, the land share of income in the (urban) non-agricultural sector ( <mark>Valentinyi and Herrendorf, 2008); β</mark> = 0.65, a lower bound estimate for the labor share in developing countries (Gollin, 2002); and θ= 5, a standard value of the trade elasticity (Head and Mayer, 2014).

Under the three assumptions above, the price of land—the immobile factor of production—is a log-linear function of a location’s market access. In each location o, where ro is the annual rental rate of land, κ is a constant and εo is an error term that is increasing in the city’s underlying absolute productivity advantage and decreasing in the abundance of land.<sup>5</sup> The term FMAo is ‘firm market access’, and the term CMAo is ‘consumer market access.’ These terms are producer and consumer prices that summarize the value of all distant markets given the costs of trading with them. When these prices change in a city, the value accrues to owners of the immobile factor of production.

> 5 This corresponds to equation 6 in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016).

13
We work with first-order approximations<sup>6</sup> of these prices, which are functions only of market size and trade costs, where trade costs between market o and d τod > 1 are ad-valorem, taking the standard “iceberg” form. The mechanism through which transportation investments affect welfare is by changing in trade costs, which increase market access, and therefore land prices.<sup>7</sup> We proceed to describe the measurement of trade costs, and then how they are expected to be affected by Belt and Road projects.

Prior applications of this model to a domestic transportation network (e.g., Morten and Olivera 2018; Alder 2019) typically assume that τod = τdo, which implies equality of CMAo and FMAo up to a constant. This assumption is not appropriate on an international transportation network, since tariffs are an important component of trade 6 The exact values of firm and consumer market access in the model are defined by equations 7 and 8 in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), FMAo ≡∑τd od−θCMA−1d Yd and CMAd ≡∑τo od−θFMA−1o Yo, a system of O× 2 equations that can be solved numerically. We find that the (logs of) the exact values and (logs of) the first-order approximations are highly correlated.

7 In the background, the volume of trade will also increase as trade costs fall, increasing utilization of the transportation corridor. Appendix C reports the closed form equations for trade flows.

14
costs, and are generally levied on imports but not exports. Relaxing the symmetry assumption, we define ad-valorem trade costs when shipping from origin city o to destination city d as τod ≡ where countries are indexed by k; ĉ<sup>j</sup> is an estimate of the freight rate per unit of distance for each road, rail, or sea link segment j reflecting the labor, fuel, maintenance j and depreciation costs of freight transport; dod is distance; and the set of segments J is chosen such that it minimizes the trade cost τ̂od.<sup>8</sup> When cities are in the same country and k(o) = k(d) the interpretation of advalorem trade costs is straightforward: transport costs are the sum of transport costs along each segment, divided by the value of the shipment. We set S = $50,000 or the notional value of a shipment provided to survey respondents who quote border costs to the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators. Border and tariff costs are added only when the origin and destination are in different countries, or when k(o) ≠k(d). For country k, borderkexport refers to the sum of quoted export border and documentary import compliance costs and borderk refers to the sum of quoted import border and documentary compliance costs, all from the Doing Business Indicators. The average ad8 The selection of the minimum cost route is performed using the shortest_path function in the NetworkX package, which makes use of Dijkstra’s (1959) algorithm.

15
import valorem tariff in the importing country tariffk is observed in the World Development Indicators as the average applied tariff rate over all products, weighted by the value of products imported (this value is highly correlated with the simple average of tariffs across products). Border and tariff costs are applied only at the origin and destination, consistent with the fact that most countries on the network are signatories to the TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers) convention, which allows swift and lowcost movement of transit trade trucks across border. Rail and port facilities typically also have expedited processes for transit goods.

In addition to these ad-valorem trade costs, we allow for two additional costs along the network: mode-switching costs and (port) terminal handling charges. Modeswitching costs reflect the hassle of changing transport modes, so that the least-cost path does not switch modes an unreasonable number of times. Formally, when calculating |J| j trade costs τ̂od we replace the term ∑j=1 ĉ<sup>j</sup> dod with

where I[switch<sup>j</sup> ] is an indicator for whether the trip on segment j, in the direction from o to d, ends by connecting to a different mode (either rail to road, or road to rail). This effectively adds a $25 switching fee for each container. This fee is selected so that it is small compared to terminal handling charges, which are incurred when a shipment passes through a port. Herrera Dappe and Suárez-Alemán (2016) report that on our network these costs range between $65/TEU in Chennai, India to $268/TEU in Rotterdam, Netherlands. To also include terminal handing charges in trade costs, we

|J| j replace the term ∑j=1 ĉ<sup>j</sup> dod in the definition of trade costs τ̂od with

16
where I[port<sup>i</sup> ] is an indicator for whether the trip from o to d along segment i ends at a port, effectively adding a $200 terminal handling charge for each port the container passes through. The value of mode-switching and terminal handling charges are very small relative to the value of a shipment (i.e., 0.13–0.54 percent with a shipment value of $50,000/TEU).

We set freight rates ĉ<sup>j</sup> equal to those quoted along the network. Table 1 reports a range of quotes, by mode, measured in US dollars per twenty-foot-equivalent unit (TEU) per kilometer. Looking at the median upper and lower bound quotes by mode across references yields the well-known cost ranking in which sea is the cheapest mode (at $0.04 TEU/KM), rail is the next cheapest mode ($0.23-$0.47 TEU/KM) and road is the most expensive mode ($0.63-$0.85 TEU/KM). For regular road and rail segments (e.g., single carriageway), we set the freight rate equal to the median of the upper bound estimates in Table 1, a more expensive rate. For high capacity road and rail, we set the freight rate equal to the median of the lower bound estimates, a less expensive rate. This captures the idea that upgrades to higher capacity lowers costs. For sea, we use a single freight rate equal to the median estimate of the sea freight rate across all studies (the very high upper bound estimates for sea trade presented in Table 1 correspond to very short distances, due to the high fixed costs of sea travel, and so does not apply generally).

A Belt and Road project is modeled as a change in the vector of trade costs from τ= {τod} to τ′ = {τ′od}, leading to a change in market access. We can write this change as where the numerator in each expression indicates the value of market access evaluated when substituting τ′ in place of τ. Table 2 shows how specific improvements to the network are recorded as changes in trade cost, using several examples from the Belt and 17
Road. These examples demonstrate the order of magnitude of the expected changes in freight rates that can be expected from the Belt and Road. For instance, the road upgrade of Highway A2 connecting Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan implies a change from regular to high capacity, and so with the assumptions above, suggests a decrease in the freight rate on that road segment from $0.85 to $0.63. Here, we have modeled expected increases in speed (due to increased capacity) as reductions in costs, though part of this cost reduction will also come from reductions in vehicle operating costs. The Belt and Road may also build new links between two cities. For instance the Tehran-Isfahan high speed rail will add a route with a freight rate equal $0.23, where one did not exist before.

We close by describing how the model is used to put a dollar value on market access from Belt and Road projects. Equation (1) allows us to write where

# ln(MÂi) ≡ln(FMÂo) + β× ln ( CMÂo)

In this derivation, we have assumed no congestion or agglomeration externalities— besides the change in market access, a project has no other effect on the city’s absolute productivity advantage (i.e., ε′i −εi = 0).<sup>9</sup> Let the quantity of land in a city be given by Lo. Since the technology is Cobb-Douglas, we can define annual payments to land in 9 We subsequently relax the assumption of no economies of scale in Section 4. The present assumption also assumes that the project has a negligible effect on the supply of land.

18
the city as Vo ≡Loro = αYo. Taking the exponent of equation (2) and combining it with the definition of payments to land allows us to define The total additional land value generated is therefore given by and the total value created across all cities is given by Equation (3) describes the (dollar) value of changes in market access in each individual city. Equation (4) summarizes the total value of changes in market access across the entire network.

It is straightforward to use equation (4) for the benefit-cost analysis of any transportation project. The annuity or present value of the project’s benefits is given by where ρ is the discount rate and g is the GDP growth rate. The present value of construction and maintenance costs may be compared to the present value of project benefits. If benefits are larger than costs, the project is worthwhile.

What remains to undertake the analysis is a measure of income in each city (at the numeraire price), or Yo. Since most countries do not maintain national accounts disaggregated at the city level, especially within our large sample of countries, we evaluate Equation (4) under several alternatives. Our baseline measure is simply city population times national GDP per capita. Given the range of countries in our sample, from high-income Denmark to low-income Tajikistan, this assumption captures much 19
of the relevant variation in income across cities. However, within countries, this assumption may underestimate GDP in major metropolitan areas that are richer than the national average, or alternatively overestimate income in more remote cities. Therefore, in a second specification we replace our baseline estimate of income where possible with an estimate of city GDP from Oxford Economics, a research service that prepares forecasts. As expected, these estimates in some cases are lower than the national average, and in some cases are higher, with the average city GDP being 2.3 times larger using the alternative measure. Compared to variation across countries in national GDP per capita, this alternative specification does not appear to have a large effect on city income. In a third specification, we allocate all national income to cities on the network, in proportion to their relative populations (i.e., so a city with 20 percent of the population has 20 percent of GDP). This specification is comparable to what would be obtained by a country-level analysis that treats projects as a shock to international trade costs, while assuming a country’s entire land and population is affected similarly by reductions in trade costs (see, e.g., De Soyres, Mulabdic and Ruta 2019).

# 4. RESULTS

# 4.1 Trade on the Eurasian transportation network

Several cross-country results will be familiar to readers in international trade, and provide assurance that the gravity model (the second of our model’s three key assumptions) is appropriate in our context when using the specification of trade costs described above. In Figure 2, Panel (a) shows China’s 2017 exports to all countries in the sample, and (b) shows imports, both as reported by COMTRADE since comprehensive data on trade and traffic flows between cities are not available. In the top chart of each panel, the horizontal axes of both figures show the GDP of the trading partner. Trade flows and GDP are in log terms and normalized by dividing by the corresponding value for Portugal. Both have a positive slope and show substantial fit: R<sup>2</sup> = 0.64 for exports and R<sup>2</sup> = 0.65 for imports. The bottom chart in each panel displays 20
on the horizontal axis our measure of trade costs. Though both charts show a negative slope, the fit in these lower panels is not as high as in the upper panels (R<sup>2</sup> = 0.03 for exports and R<sup>2</sup> = 0.11 for imports), though it is larger for imports, where tariffs contribute disproportionately to overall trade costs. These results suggest we can apply the market access approach in our context, since though it has the advantage of not requiring data on trade or traffic flows, it does require that trade conforms to the gravity relationship.

# 4.2 Baseline market access

To describe the economy before the Belt and Road projects, we report baseline levels of (log) market access in each city, ln(MAo) = ln(FMAo) + βln(CMAo), where firm and consumer market access are calculated separately using asymmetric trade costs. Table 3 reports the largest city in each decile of baseline market access, for each of the World Bank’s groupings of national income, as well as the share of cities in each decile that are located near a port, border or the national capital.

Some of the results may be counterintuitive. First, while market access is correlated with national income, the correlation is not perfect. In the lowest three deciles of market access there are no cities in high income countries. In the top four deciles there are no cities with low income. Similarly, we see that some of the largest cities in India (Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai) all have relatively low market access relative to some of the largest cities in China (Shanghai and Guangzhou) which have higher per capita income. National income is not everything however; relatively highincome cities in smaller countries, such as Stockholm, Sweden, and Lisbon, Portugal, have lower market access than large cities in China, where the larger population of neighboring cities compensates for their relatively lower per capita income.

Second, though connectivity to ports appears related to market access, proximity to a border need not be. Twelve percent of cities in the top decile are port cities, compared to 0-6 percent in all other deciles. This result is likely due to the large 21
difference between sea freight rates ($0.04/TEU/KM) versus low capacity rail ($0.47) and road ($0.85). Looking at border cities, a substantial share of the population in the lowest decile of market access, 16 percent, is concentrated in border cities, but the same share of the top decile is also concentrated in border cities. Connectivity at the border does not necessarily increase market access, unless it also offers a link to substantially lower freight rates, which is only the case for a sea border. Being a capital does not seem systematically associated with market access.

# 4.3 The value of changes in market access from individual Belt and Road projects

We now value the expected changes in market access from building each of the 68 Belt and Road projects in Eurasia, using the correspondence between project type and change in trade costs in Table 3. We evaluate each project under two scenarios: (i) “in isolation”, in which no Belt and Road projects have been built, and (ii) “in complement”, in which all Belt and Road projects have been built except P. The comparison of these scenarios is informative about the extent to there is value from coordinated planning of projects. In this initial analysis, we hold Yo fixed at its baseline value, considering a world without complementary economic integration reforms, and apply the baseline specification of parameter values and income described in Section 3.

Figure 2 shows this result of the analysis visually, mapping the (log) changes in market access in each city in Eurasia for the scenario in which each project is built in complement.<sup>10</sup> Notably, some of the largest gains in market access are outside China, in

> 10 A question is whether the ranking of cities by changes in market access are stable to alternative specifications of the model. If the ranking is stable, this suggests that

22
lower income countries, for instance Kyrgyzstan and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Market access gains in Europe appear small, which is not surprising given the distance of Europe from most projects. Overall, this map suggests that the Belt and Road projects do have the potential to improve market access for some cities, especially in lower income countries.

Equation (3) converts changes in market access at the city level into units of welfare, yielding the value of market access in terms of income to land (∆Vi). Figure 3 show these values on a map, a very different picture from Figure 2. When represented in terms of incremental land value, the largest gains now appear in higher income cities of Europe. Large cities in China also have larger gains. This result stems from the fact that these cities have larger base levels of income, and so the same increase in market access generates much more benefit in rich markets than in markets that are poor. The comparison of these two maps highlights a useful heuristic for the cost benefit analysis of transportation projects. Since the value of gains in market access are a multiple of local income, the total value of project benefits will be smaller in poorer countries.

Table 4 reports the distribution of annual benefits ∆V generated by each project. For each project, the value of additional market access is disaggregated using Equation (3), to show the share of benefits accruing to the country in which the project is built (except the gravity model makes generalizable predictions about the location of benefits associated with a given project. To assess this question, Appendix Table B1 reports the Spearman (rank) correlation of changes in market access across cities for a variety of alternative specifications. Overall, the results show that the model’s rankings of cities are remarkably stable, with rank correlations in the range of 0.7–1.0 across specifications.

23
China), and the share accruing to China itself. This disaggregation allows one to evaluate the extent to which the BRI may be motivated by the national interest of China, or magnanimity towards other nations. An equal split of project benefits between China and other countries is consistent with the idea that there is potential for “mutual benefit” from the projects, as claimed in Chinese government sources.

This analysis delivers three key results. First, while some projects do appear to produce substantial benefit, more than half of all projects do not generate any benefit. The maximum annual benefit of a project (ΔV) when built insolation is just $750 million, or $1.45 billion, in present value terms with ρ= 0.06 and a perpetual GDP growth rate of g= 0.055 . This value drops off quickly however, with the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile project generating just $8.3 million per annum when built in isolation, or $16 million in present value, and the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile project yielding benefits equal to zero.

This result suggests that many Belt and Road projects should not be expected to generate incremental income. We note that this result obtains because many projects do not create new least-cost paths between any city pair on the transportation network, and therefore fail to change market access regardless of the model’s calibrated parameters α, β, θ, and Yo. Though in the following subsection we explore robustness of our estimates to alternative specifications of these parameters, our main conclusion that many projects do not generate increases in market access is robust to these alternative specifications. Moreover, benefits of these projects will fail to exceed project costs for any estimate of costs.

Table 5 provides some examples of projects that do and do not produce benefits. Projects in the table are grouped by terciles of estimated project value (ΔV). Several projects in the top tercile are those connecting major population areas. For example, the Tehran-Mashhad rail electrification connects two of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s largest urban agglomerations. The Kunming-Calcutta High Speed Rail is also expected to produce substantial benefits, mainly by linking poorly connected large cities in 24
Bangladesh. The ML-1 railway in Pakistan also connects the country’s major cities. This observation is consistent with the finding of Allen and Arkolakis (2019), also using a gravity model, that the most valuable highway improvements in the United States are along the heavily trafficked corridors of the north-east near large cities including New York.

Turning to the middle tercile of our valuations, which includes projects with ΔV= 0, we see that governments have indeed scaled back projects. Specifically, the East Coast Rail Link (Malaysia) was suspended and then renegotiated at 1/3 lower cost. The Kyaupyu Port (Myanmar) was recently scaled down from 10 berths to 2 berths. These results provide some external validation of the model’s predictions.

Our second result is that there appears to be substantial complementarity between projects. When projects are built in isolation, just 29 have value above zero, whereas when the projects are built in complement, 43 have positive value. This suggests that 14 projects only become valuable when the whole network is built. Perhaps surprisingly, some projects are more valuable when built in isolation. We see this in cases where the ratio ΔViso./ ΔVcomp. > 1. The project with the highest ratio is 192 times more valuable when built in isolation, suggesting it is possible for redundant projects to erase the benefits of a project. When ranked by this ratio, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile project is 4.2 times more valuable in isolation. Certain projects therefore may cannibalize each other’s traffic (along the least-cost path) when built concurrently. Examples of such projects include the Bangkok-Pedang Besar-Kuala Lumpur rail (Thailand, Malaysia) and the Burma Railway (Myanmar, Thailand). Taken together, these findings indicate there are returns to targeted inquiry into redundancy between projects.

Our third result is that gains from some projects are shared internationally with countries quite far from their location, demonstrating that infrastructure investment can 25
be an international public good. Considering projects when built in complement, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of projects with ΔV > 0 has 43 percent of the value accruing to a country (besides China) that the project is not located in. The 75<sup>th</sup> percentile has 21 percent of the value accruing to such countries. These international gains are slightly more common when projects are built in isolation. When projects are built in isolation, 38 percent of the gains accrue to China for the median project, even though projects are located outside of China.

Overall, our results are consistent with the Chinese government’s stated understanding of the Belt and Road as generating “mutual benefit” for China and other countries (Office of the Leading Group [...], 2017, pg. 4). Perhaps surprisingly, substantial gains accrue to European countries that do not lie along Belt and Road corridors, but nonetheless benefit from reduced trade costs along the international transportation network. However, the results also demonstrate that many projects cannot be justified on a purely economic basis, consistent with China (and project sponsoring countries) have non-economic motivations in promoting the projects. International coordination of investment can improve the economic returns to the program of investment, but these additional benefits will come from cancelling at least one third of the projects.

# 4.4 Sensitivity of results to alternative specifications

Though some projects fail to produce economic benefits in terms of market access, it could be that the benefits of some projects are so large that they could compensate for the construction cost of the projects that do not increase market access. In this scenario, Belt and Road countries in principle could redistribute income amongst themselves to pay for the bad projects. We explore the feasibility of this scenario in this subsection by evaluating the benefits of projects when built in complement under a diverse set of alternative specifications, which represent the different ways in which the analyst could choose to be optimistic about the project.

26
Total benefits are compared to an independent estimate of cost by De Soyres, Mulabdic and Ruta (2019), who estimate the cost of transportation projects as a function of mode and length, using our GIS database and country-specific cost information collected from World Bank country offices, which finance transportation infrastructure in the region and so has references for such projects. For all countries in Eurasia, these authors estimate the cost of all projects built in complement to be approximately $321 billion.<sup>11</sup> Table 6 reports the value of market access from each of the six Eurasian corridors when each corridor is built separately, and the value when all six corridors are built in complement. The columns of the table report these values under a variety of specifications, beginning with the baseline specification described in Section 3. The three panels of Table 6 show how the present value of benefits is built up using Equation (5). They are shown separately to illustrate the sensitivity of the estimates to the discount rate and growth rate, a standard issue in financial analysis. Panel A reports the annual value of market access (ΔV) implied by Equation (4). Panel B reports the present value of these benefits assuming a discount rate ρ= 0.06 and g= 0, indicating zero GDP growth. This discount rate is generously low (leading to an optimistic estimate of project benefits) for two reasons. First it is only in the lower range of the central bank policy rate in Belt and Road countries (e.g., Pakistan, Laos). Many other countries face a higher opportunity cost of funds. Second, since loans to finance infrastructure have longer tenure than short government loans, the discount rate applied to evaluating infrastructure investments is likely to be higher than even the central bank

> 11 Actual project costs are not available because, as described in the Introduction, governments in general have not been transparent about the financing of Belt and Road projects.

27
policy rate in any country. The relatively low rate selected here may be understood therefore to capture some preference for the welfare of future generations, in addition to the cost of capital. Panel C provides in our assessment a reasonable, if slightly optimistic basis for evaluating benefits, assuming ρ= 0.06 and a perpetual GDP growth rate of g= 0.055, the growth rate for developing Europe and Asia in 2019 (IMF, 2020). Comparing results in panels A, B and C illustrates the substantial degrees of freedom available in an analysis of the present value of a project’s benefits.

Focusing on the results in panel C, the present value of all projects when built in complement in our baseline specification is just $87.9 billion, far less than the independently estimated costs of $321 billion. Looking at an individual corridor, the value of the China-Pakistan Economic corridor is just $3.7 billion, far less than project costs in Pakistan alone of $49 billion according to De Soyres, Mulabdic and Ruta (2019). We now review the implications of alternative specifications.

First, we investigate alternative values of the model’s three fundamental parameters. Equation (4) shows that scaling the parameter α will increase one-to-one the expected benefit of the project. Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) show that across nonagricultural (urban) sectors this share varies little, from a minimum of α= 0.03 in construction and equipment investment to a maximum of α= 0.06 in services. Applying the value for services would increase benefits relative to our baseline specification by 0.06/0.05 = 1.2 or a 20 percent increase in benefits, to $105.4 billion, still far less than $321 billion. While a higher share of income to the fixed factor could feasibly obtain in some extremely dense urban centers, it would be optimistic to assume it is everywhere in all cities triple the estimate for the service sector.

Setting the labor share β = 0 corresponds to the case where consumer market access does not matter, only the value of the market to firms. As expected, benefits are reduced substantially. Increasing the labor share to β = 0.8 corresponds to an upper bound estimate of the labor share in developing countries (Gollin, 2002), which leads to 28
benefits in Panel C of $96 billion when all projects built in complement, only slightly higher than the baseline.

One hypothesis is that our single sector model ignores the fact that transportation investments may be especially beneficial to specific sectors. Using data on trade flows in North America, Caliendo and Parro (2015) find an aggregate elasticity of trade to trade costs θ= 4.55, close our baseline value, though they also find that θ can vary by sector. The value θ= 2 is a theoretical minimum (if the variance of the Type-II extreme value distribution underlying city productivity in the model is to be finite; see Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016). Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate elasticities in agriculture (θ= 8.11) and mining (θ= 15.72) implying these sectors offer a higher sensitivity of trade to trade cost than in aggregate. Alternative columns of Table 6 consider project benefits as if all trade was in these sectors. While project values are lower with θ= 2, they are almost double the result of the baseline specification when we set θ= 15.72. Nonetheless, the value of all projects in Panel C even under this specification is still just $170 billion, approximately half of costs. Allowing a very high sensitivity of trade to trade costs therefore may increase gains from individual projects but does not lead the present value of benefits from all projects to exceed their costs.

We turn to alternative specifications of income. First, we use alternative estimates of city GDP from the research service Oxford economics, as described in Section 3. These alternative values of city GDP lead to an estimate in Panel C of the present value of project benefits equal to $140.6 billion, 60 percent more than the baseline specification, but still less than half of project costs. Second, we use alternative estimates of city GDP that assume all of countries’ income is allocated to the nodes on the network. Here the present value of project benefits in Panel C is $272.2 billion, which is 309 percent of the baseline estimate, but still less than estimated projects costs. Even under the assumption therefore that within country trade costs are zero off of the international transportation network, and that the value of all land in the country will increase identically in response to 29
improvements to that network, the present value of the Belt and Road projects built in complement does not exceed their costs.

We now consider would happen if the Belt and Road were complemented by international integration reforms that freed labor and capital to reallocate optimally across the transportation network. So far, in our calculation of ∆V we have assumed that after trade costs fall, the income of each city remains constant (before adjusting for firm and consumer price changes). To relax this assumption, we apply Theorem 1 of Allen and Arkolakis (2014), which states that the vector of city income Yo in this model’s equilibrium is a unique fixed point, determined by trade costs. Using an iterative algorithm described in Appendix C we calculate the market size of each city under post-BRI trade costs if factors can optimally reallocate, holding each city’s total factor productivity fixed at baseline levels. Allowing for factor reallocation in this way leads to an improvement over our baseline specification, with the present value of benefits in Panel C equal to $95 billion, or 9 more more than the baseline specification. International integration agreements can therefore be complementary to transportation infrastructure, but in this case are not pivotal in determining whether benefits are greater than costs.

This discussion has demonstrated how allowing alternative specifications of the main parameters α, β, θ, and Yo as well as perfect factor mobility does not change the conclusion all Belt and Road projects, when built in complement, do not create gains in market access that exceed their costs.

A final argument we consider is that the program can break even, but only if, in addition to lowering production costs, reductions in trade costs allow cities to capture scale economies in urban production, or so-called `agglomeration’ economies (see, e.g., Duranton and Puga, 2004). These gains must be in addition to reductions in traffic congestion costs already accounted for by the fact that road and rail capacity expansions to deliver lower trade costs. In the baseline version of the model with no factor mobility, such economies would be hard to justify, since there only prices change, not the scale of 30
production in each city. However, such benefits could obtain in the specification with increased factor mobility, where the scale of production in cities in certain cities may increase. One potential mechanism for increased economies of scale through this channel could be that migration of workers to larger cities allows them to accumulate human capital more quickly (Glaeser and Mare, 2001), which would accelerate the growth rate of the economy.

Setting the present value of benefits in Equation (5) equal to the estimated costs of $321 billion and rearranging allows one to back out how much additional growth through this mechanism would be required to break even. Using the same discount rate ρ= 0.06 and the value of annual benefits ∆V= $452 million from the specification of the model in Table 6 that includes factor reallocation, this calculation yields a required growth rate of g = 0.059 for the program of all 68 projects built in complement to break even, or 40 basis points in additional annual GDP growth---in perpetuity---for all cities in Eurasia as a result of the program.

This calculation highlights how in benefit-cost analysis the terminal growth rate of benefits is an extremely important parameter.<sup>12</sup> For the complete program of Belt and Road projects to be justified on purely economic grounds, one must accept that it accelerates economic growth throughout Eurasia substantially, in addition to the static gains highlighted by the spatial equilibrium model in Section 3. Whether such gains are plausible is an active area of research in urban economics, though estimating the magnitude of agglomeration economies is notoriously difficult. Some recent descriptive work calls into question the potential for a substantial economic growth multiplier. Using both panel

> 12 The key robustness table in almost any financial valuation analysis explores sensitivity to the terminal growth rate and the discount rate.

31
and instrumental variable econometric methods, Frick and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) find that while in high-income countries average city size and GDP per capita growth are positively related, in developing countries this relationship is insignificant or negative. This finding suggests that while the Glaeser and Mare (2001) mechanism for dynamic agglomeration gains exists in the United States, it may escape developing countries where most Belt and Road projects are located. One explanation for this could be that higher congestion within cities not directly addressed by Belt and Road projects, which mainly connect cities, makes it more difficult for workers to learn from one another, eliminating the effect of increased density on human capital accumulation. This conjecture is plausible, having sat in traffic in Beijing or Lahore.

# 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper finds find that the present value of increased market access from all planned, on-going and completed Belt and Road transportation projects in Eurasia is very likely to be less than these projects’ costs. This conclusion stems from the fact that approximately one-third of projects do not create new least cost paths on the network, even when all projects are built in complement. Nonetheless, subsets of the investments could be economically viable. If benefits of the entire Belt and Road program are to be greater than costs, this will be due to either a much narrower set of projects being selected than the set proposed by officials, or the presence of external economies of scale leading to a substantial increase in the growth rate for all Belt and Road economies. Whether such dynamic gains from transportation investments are feasible, especially in low- and middleincome economies, is an important question that warrants future research.

Beyond the Belt and Road, the analysis has demonstrated several general heuristics that policy-makers can use to evaluate transportation projects: (i) projects may be substitutes or complements in reducing costs on the network, (ii) reforms that allow the reallocation of factors in response to the project can increase benefits, though this effect appears moderate; (iii) benefits will be higher in richer countries all else equal, 32
since project benefits are a multiple of national income, suggesting poorer countries in general may struggle to fund infrastructure; and (iv) transportation infrastructure can be an international public good that creates benefits far from its location.

Taken together, our findings do suggest the Belt and Road has the potential to create substantial mutual benefit for China and countries along the Eurasian transportation network. However, to achieve this, rigorous economic feasibility analysis is required, and some projects must be cancelled, as is already happening in select markets.

# 6. REFERENCES

Adao, R., Costinot, A. and Donaldson, D., 2017. “Nonparametric counterfactual predictions in neoclassical models of international trade.” American Economic Review, 107(3): 633-89.

Alder, S. 2019. “Chinese Roads in India: The Effect of Transport Infrastructure on Economic Development.” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill manuscript.

Allen, T. and Arkolakis, C., 2014. Trade and the Topography of the Spatial Economy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (3): 1085-1140.

Allen, T. and Arkolakis, C., 2019. “The welfare effects of transportation infrastructure improvements.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25487.

Asher, S.E. and Novosad, P. 2020. “Rural Roads and Local Economic Development.” American Economic Review. forthcoming.

Baum-Snow, N., Brandt, L., Henderson, J.V., Turner, M.A. and Zhang, Q., 2017. “Roads, railroads, and decentralization of Chinese cities.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 99(3): 435-448.

33
Buys, P., Deichmann, U. and Wheeler, D., 2010. “Road network upgrading and overland trade expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of African Economies, 19(3): 399-432.

Caliendo, L. and Parro, F., 2015. “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA.” The Review of Economic Studies. 82(1): 1-44.

Donaldson, D., and R. Hornbeck. 2016. "Railroads and American economic growth: A “market access” approach." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(2): 799-858.

De Soyres, F., Mulabdic, A., Murray, S., Rocha, N. and Ruta, M., 2018. “How much will the Belt and Road Initiative reduce trade costs?” Policy Research Working Paper 8614. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

<mark>De Soyres, F., Mulabdic, A. and Ruta, M., 2019. “Common transport infrastructure: A quantitative model and estimates from the Belt and Road Initiative.” P</mark> olicy Research Working Paper 8801. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Dijkstra, E.W., 1959. A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numerische Mathematik, 1(1): 269-271.

Djankov, S. 2016. “The Rationale Behind China’s Belt and Road Intiative” in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope and Challenges., Djankov, S. and Miner, S. editors. Washington, DC: Peterson Institution for International Economics https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-2_1.pdf Duranton, G. and Puga, D., 2004. Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies. Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 2063-2117.

Eaton, J. and Kortum, S., 2002. "Technology, geography, and trade." Econometrica. 70(5): 1741-1779.

34
Faber, B., 2014. “Trade integration, market size, and industrialization: evidence from China's National Trunk Highway System.” Review of Economic Studies. 81(3): 10461070.

Fajgelbaum, P.D. and Schaal, E., 2020. “Optimal transport networks in spatial equilibrium.” Econometrica, 88(4): 1411-1452.

Financial Times. 2018. “China’s Belt and Road projects drive overseas debt fears.” Kynge, James (London). August 7, 2018 Financial Times. 2020. “China faces wave of calls for debt relief on ‘Belt and Road’ projects” Kynge, James (Hong Kong) and Yu, Sun (Beijing). April 30, 2020 Frick, S.A. and Rodríguez-Pose, A., 2016. Average city size and economic growth. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 9(2), pp.301-318.

Head, K., and Mayer, T. 2014. “Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, Cookbook.” Handbook of International Economics, vol. 4, Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, eds. New York: Elsevier.

Herrera Dappe, M., Suárez-Alemán, A., 2016. “Competitiveness of South Asia’s Container Ports: A Comprehensive Assessment of Performance, Drivers, and Costs. Directions in Development—Infrastructure.” Washington, DC: World Bank.

Hornbeck, R. and Rotemberg, M., 2019. “Railroads, Reallocation, and the Rise of American Manufacturing” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 26594.

Hurley, J., Morris, S., and Portelance, G. 2018. “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” CGD Policy Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

International Monetary Fund, 2020. “World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown” Washington, D.C. Growth Projections Table.

35
Ghani, E., Goswami, A.G. and Kerr, W.R., 2016. “Highway to success: The impact of the Golden Quadrilateral project for the location and performance of Indian manufacturing.” The Economic Journal, 126 (591): 317-357.

Glaeser, E.L. and Mare, D.C., 2001. Cities and skills. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(2), pp.316-342.

Glaeser, E.L., 2008. Cities, agglomeration, and spatial equilibrium. Oxford University Press.

Gollin, D., 2002. “Getting income shares right.” Journal of Political Economy. 110 (2): 458-474.

Government of China. 2017. Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm> Jones, L. and Hameiri, S. 2020. “Debunking the Myth of Debt-Trap Diplomacy” Chatham House Research Paper 19 August 2020 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy Jedwab, R. and Moradi, A., 2016. ``The permanent effects of transportation revolutions in poor countries: evidence from Africa.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 98 (2): 268-284.

Kelso, N.V. and Patterson, T. eds., 2018. Natural Earth. www.naturalearthdata.com. Public domain.

Kent, P.L. 2009. “Freight transport for development toolkit: road freight.” Washington, DC: World Bank.

<mark>Lall, S.V. and Lebrand, M.S.M., 2019. “Who Wins, Who Loses? Understanding the Spatially Differentiated Effects of the Belt and Road Initiative.” P</mark> olicy Research Working Paper 8806. Washington, DC: World Bank.

36
<mark>Maliszewska, M. and Van Der Mensbrugghe, D., 2019. “The Belt and Road Initiative: Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts.” Policy Research Working Paper 8814. Washington, DC: World Bank</mark> Morten, M. and Oliveira, J., 2018. “The Effects of Roads on Trade and Migration: Evidence from a Planned Capital City.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22158.

Nightingale, L. ed., 2016. “The Top 100 Ports in 2015.” One Hundred Ports 2016, Digital Edition, pp.16–17.

Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative. 2017. “Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China's Contribution.” < https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylyw/201705/201705110537027 .pdf> May 2017.

Roberts, M., Melecky, M., Bougna, T. and Xu, Y. 2018. “Transport corridors and their wider economic benefits: a critical review of the literature” Policy Research Working Paper 8302. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

Redding, S., Sturm, D., and Heblich, S. 2020. “The Making of the Modern Metropolis: Evidence from London,” revised version of NBER Working Paper, 25047 Redding, S.J. and Sturm, D.M., 2008. “The costs of remoteness: Evidence from German division and reunification.” American Economic Review, 98(5): 1766-97.

Storeygard, A., 2016. ``Farther on down the road: transport costs, trade and urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa.” The Review of Economic Studies, 83(3): 1263-1295.

Tsivanidis, Nic, 2019. Evaluating the Impact of Urban Transit Infrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá’s TransMilenio. UC Berkeley Working Paper.

UNCTAD. 2013. “Review of Maritime Transport 2013 Chapter 3.” New York: UNCTAD 37
<mark>Valentinyi, A. and Herrendorf, B., 2008. “Measuring factor income shares at the sectoral level.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), pp.820-835.</mark> <mark>Venables, A.J., 2017. “Incorporating wider economic impacts within cost-benefit appraisal.” ITF Roundtable Reports Quantifying the Socio-economic Benefits of Transport, 109.</mark> <mark>World Bank. 2019. Belt and Road Economics. Washington, DC: World Bank.</mark> 38
# TABLES

# Table 1: Estimates of transport costs, USD/TEU/kilometer

||ROAD||RAIL||SEA||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Lower<br>bound|Upper<br>bound|Lower<br>bound|Upper<br>bound|Lower<br>bound|Upper<br>bound|
|EMERSON<br>(2009)|-|-|0.47|0.47|0.07|0.73|
|RODEMANN<br>(2014)|0.66|0.78|0.39|0.53|-|-|
|SEO (2017)|0.52|0.54|0.23|0.45|0.03|0.04|
|SLADKOWSKI<br>(2015)|0.6|1.78|0.23|0.56|0.04|0.7|
|SUN (2017)|0.84|0.92|0.14|0.25|-|-|
|MEDIAN|0.63|0.85|0.23|0.47||0.04|

## Table References

Emerson, Michael and Evgeny Vinokurov (2009). Optimisation of Central Asian and Eurasian Trans-Continental Land Transport Corridor. Emerson and Vinokurov not include distances, which were estimated by the authors of this paper.

Rodemann, Hendrik and Simon Templar (2014). The enablers and inhibitors of intermodal rail freight between Asia and Europe. Rodemann and Templar also include sea costs for each connection, but the sea path taken is not clear, so these costs are not considered.

Seo, Young Joon et al. (2017). Multimodal Transportation: The Case of Laptop from Chongqing in China to Rotterdam in Europe. Seo et al. cite a shipping cost from Chongqing to Shanghai via inland waterway. These are not considered.

Sladkowski, Aleksander and Maria Ciesla (2015). Influence of a Potential Railway Line Connecting the Caspian Sea with the Black Sea on the Development of Eurasian Trade. Some costs are converted from other currencies. Costs for containers less than 20 tons are not included. In cases where a range of values was cited for a single journey (e.g. "3,465 – 3,635 USD"), the mean was taken.

39
Sun, Feng et al. (2017) Improvement of Rail-sea Multimodal Transport with Dry Port Construction: Case Study of Ningbo-Zhoushan Port. Some per-kilometer costs derived implicitly using a system of equations.

40
# Table 2: Representation of BRI projects by change in freight rates

FREIGHT RATE (USD/TEU/KM)

|Improvement Type<br>(see Appendix A)|Description|Example BRI project|Representation by change in fright<br>rate parameters (see Table 2)|PRE-BRI|POST-BRI|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|New road|A new undivided highway is built.|• M3/M4 Multan Highway (Pakistan)<br>• Highway AH4 (Russian Federation,<br>Mongolia, China)|Does not Exist (DNE)→Road|-|0.85|
|New divided road|A new divided highway (dual carriageway or 4-<br>lane road with median) or expressway is built.|• Urumqi-Khorgos road (China)<br>• Khorgos-Almaty road (Kazakhstan)|DNE→High capacity road|-|0.63|
|Road upgrade|An undivided road is upgraded to an expressway<br>or divided highway.|• Highway A2: Almaty-Tashkent<br>(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan)<br>• Highway A3 (Kazakhstan)|Road→High capacity road|0.85|0.63|
|Road reconstruction|Road was existing, but unsuitable for<br>commercial traffic. Road is upgraded to a<br>modern undivided highway.|• Jalalabad–Töö Ashuu (Kyrgyz<br>Republic)<br>• Kashgar–Khunerjab (China)|DNE→Road|-|0.85|
|New rail|A new unelectrified one-track rail connection is<br>built.|• Khorgos-Aktau Railway (Kazakhstan)|DNE→Rail|-|0.47|
|New high capacity<br>rail|A new electrified and/or dual-track trail<br>connection is built. May be for high speed<br>passenger traffic (“high-speed rail”), but not<br>necessarily.|• Tehran-Isfahan high speed rail (Iran,<br>Islamic Rep.)<br>• Kunming-Calcutta high-speed rail<br>(China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India)|DNE→High capacity rail|-|0.23|
|Rail upgrade|One-track rail line is expanded to two tracks or<br>electrified.|• Karachi-Peshawar capacity expansion<br>(Pakistan)<br>• Samarkand-Mashhad rail (Uzbekistan,<br>Turkmenistan, Iran, Islamic Rep.)|Rail→High capacity rail|0.47|0.23|
|Rail reconstruction|Rail connected was existing, but antiquated or<br>unsuitable for modern locomotives. Rail is<br>upgraded to a modern single-track connection.|• Erdent-Salkhit (Mongolia)<br>• Chifeng–Jinzhou (China)|DNE→Rail|-|0.47|

41
|New seaport|A seaport is significantly expanded (capacity at|•<br>Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka)|New sea links added|-|0.04|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||least doubled) or newly built|•<br>Gwadar Port (Pakistan)||||
|New sea link|A new shipping service is established between|•<br>Ankalia port (Georgia)|New sea links added|-|0.04|
||two existing ports.|•<br>Turkmenbashi–Baku (Turkmenistan,||||
|||Azerbaijan)||||

42
# Table 3: City summary statistics by decile of baseline market access (MA)

|||Largest city by|income group||Populati|on (2015)||UN<br>Forecast|GDP (2|015)<br>Per<br>capita|||% pop|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Initial||||||Median|CAGR,|CAGR,||median|%||in|
|MA|Median||Upper|||across|2005–|2015–||across|capital|% port|border|
|decile|ln(MA)|Lower Middle|Middle|High|Total|cities|2015|2030|Total|cities|cities|cities|cities|
||||||Mn.|Thou.|||Bn.|||||
||||||People|people|||USD|USD||||
|1<sup>st</sup>|29.63|Dhaka|Tehran|none|136|547|2.7%|2.4%|364|1,651|10%|3%|16%|
|2<sup>nd</sup>|29.73|Delhi|Baku|none|114|580|2.7%|2.4%|237|1,758|3%|0%|3%|
|3<sup>rd</sup>|29.76|Mumbai|Bangkok|none|146|584|2.6%|2.3%|362|1,758|0%|1%|1%|
|4<sup>th</sup>|29.81|Chennai|Kuala<br>Lumpur|Athens|93|565|1.8%|1.5%|951|11,325|12%|4%|2%|
|5<sup>th</sup>|29.85|Kharkiv|Istanbul|Stockholm|93|561|1.8%|1.2%|1,044|6,497|8%|1%|4%|
|6<sup>th</sup>|29.86|Kiev|Chongqing|Lisbon|112|619|2.7%|2.0%|936|6,497|6%|4%|1%|
|7<sup>th</sup>|29.87|none|Beijing|Warsaw|110|576|2.7%|1.9%|828|6,497|3%|6%|1%|
|8<sup>th</sup>|29.88|none|Shenyang|Budapest|101|732|3.0%|2.3%|723|6,497|4%|2%|3%|
|9<sup>th</sup>|29.88|none|Guangzhou|Madrid|162|892|2.9%|2.0%|1,760|6,497|6%|6%|1%|
|10<sup>th</sup>|29.90|none|Shanghai|Paris|149|638|1.4%|1.1%|4,818|41,642|9%|12%|16%|

Notes: Each decile has 96 cities, except the 1<sup>st</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> , which have 97 cities each. GDP figures use constant 2010 US dollars.

43
# Table 4: The value of market access from individual Belt and Road projects

|||Project-l<br>|evel summa<br>Percent<br>|ry statistics<br>ile<br>|<br>||||Number<br>of<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Units|Min|10|25|50|75|90|Max|projects|
|A) Projects built in isolation||||||||||
|Annual Project Value (ΔV)|$ millions|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|8.3|32.9|750.0|68|
|Share ofΔV in proj. country (besides<br>China), ifΔV>0|percent|0.0|0.0|0.0|5.0|50.0|58.3|66.0|29|
|Share ofΔV in China, ifΔV>0|percent|0.0|9.7|13.0|38.0|38.0|42.6|55.0|29|
|B) Projects built in complement||||||||||
|Annual Project Value (ΔV)|$ millions|0.0|0.0|0.0|4.0|15.3|42.2|744.0|68|
|Share ofΔV in proj. country (besides<br>China), ifΔV>0|percent|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.5|21.3|43.2|57.0|43|
|Share ofΔV in China, ifΔV>0|percent|0.0|0.0|0.0|1.0|9.3|21.3|47.0|43|
|Ratio of_Δ_V iso./_Δ_V comp.||0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.9|4.2|191.6|68|

Note: Table shows the distributions of individual BRI project values when built under two scenarios: (A) in isolation, wherein network on which the project is built does not include any other Belt and Road projects, and (B) in complement, wherein all other projects are assumed to be built before the project is built. Additional rows also show the share of project value either outside the project country or in China.

44
Table 5: Status of select projects and estimated value of market access

|Project|Est.ΔV in<br>isolation|Status of project|Discussion|
|---|---|---|---|
|Thai Canal<br>Thailand|Top tercile|Proposed, but no<br>studies conducted.<br>Project declared<br>not a priority by<br>Thai government.|The canal would bypass Singapore and shorten shipping by 1,000 km,<br>costing 20-30 Bn USD. Canal area currently faces religious insurgency.<br>Thailand only sees 1% ofΔV, andΔV is significantly lower in complement<br>with other projects.ΔV is much lower if the cost of sea travel is lowered<br>from 0.05 to 0.01 USD per km.|
|Kunming-Calcutta<br>High Speed Rail,<br>Bangladesh, India,|Top tercile|Chinese officials<br>have expressed<br>support, but|The market access gains from this project would come from connecting<br>cities in Bangladesh that currently have poor infrastructure. This assumes, of<br>course, that the rail is also used for freight. Since most of the 2,000-|
|Myanmar||concrete planning<br>has not begun.|kilometer railway will bring no benefit, concrete steps are not being taken.<br>Projects specific to Bangladesh are being promoted instead.|
|Tehran-Mashhad rail<br>electrification,|Top tercile|Studies finalized in<br>2018. Construction|This electrification project will enhance the rail link between two of the<br>Islamic Republic of Iran’s largest urban agglomerations. The high market|
|Islamic Republic of<br>Iran||set to begin in<br>2019.|access increase is also due in part to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s relatively<br>high GDP per capita.|
|Expansion of railway<br>Line ML-1,|Top tercile|Phase 1 of<br>construction|ML-1 is Pakistan’s most important rail line, linking the key cities of<br>Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore and Peshawar. Upgrades to this line will|
|Pakistan||initiated in 2018.<br>Expected<br>completion 2022.|greatly increase market access for Pakistan’s large cities, which are near but<br>have poor transport links.|
|Kuantan Port,<br>Malaysia|Top tercile|Completed in<br>2018.|The expansion of Kuantan Port creates new shipping links between<br>Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries. Reduced transport costs<br>increase market access in Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur, whose relatively high<br>GDP per capita translate to a large increase in land rents.|
|Bangkok-Vientiane<br>rail, Thailand and<br>Laos|Middle<br>tercile|Thailand portion of<br>railway is being<br>built and will open<br>in 2021.|This railway will connect large and higher-income Bangkok with areas of<br>northeast Thailand and Laos that were poorly connected prior to BRI,<br>increasing market access for cities in those areas.|
|East Coast Rail Link,|Middle|Work suspended|The railway would not link any major population centers, while access to|
|Malaysia|tercile|but resumed after<br>negotiation of 1/3<br>cost reduction.|shipping lanes would see only very slight improvement. Budget cut from<br>RM 66.7 Bn to RM 44 Bn. Cancellation would have incurred a<br>termination fee of RM21.8 Bn ($5.3 Bn).|

45
|Kyaukpyu Port,|Middle|Port project scaled|The port did not create any new routes that are sufficiently low in cost to|
|---|---|---|---|
|Myanmar|tercile|down from 10|generate any increases in land rents.|
|||berths to 2 berths.||

# Table References

The Straits Times (2018). Proposed Kra Canal not priority project for Thai govt.

Singh Maini, Trividesh (2018). China Reaches Out to West Bengal and Eastern India. Stratfor.

Iran Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (2018). Tehran-Mashhad Electrified Railway Studies Finalized.

CPEC Secretariat (2018). Expansion and reconstruction of existing Line ML-1. CPEC.gov.pk.

CSIS Reconnecting Asia (2018). Kuantan Port: New Deep Water Terminal Phase I.

Hunt, Luke (2017). Construction of the Thailand-China Railway Finally Gets Underway. The Diplomat.

Financial Times (2019). Malaysia renegotiated China-backed rail project to avoid $5bn fee.

Kapoor, Kanupriya and Aye Min Thant (2018). Exclusive: Myanmar scales back Chinese-backed port project due to debt fears – official. Reuters.

46
# Table 6: The value of market access from Belt and Road projects when built in complement

|||||||Model|Specificati|on|With|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Labor|Labor|θ=2,|θ=8.1,||Oxford||factor|||
||Base-|share|share|lower|agri-|θ=15.7,|Econ.|National|realloc-|||
|US$ Millions|line|β=0|β=0.8|bound|culture|mining|GDP|Population|ation|Min.|Max.|
|Panel A) Annual benefits ---ΔV||||||||||||
|China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor|273|167|297|125|384|547|442|832|<br>292|125|<br>832|
|New Eurasian Land Bridge|34|21|37|16|47|65|56|105|<br>37|16|<br>105|
|China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor|26|15|28|12|35|47|38|78|<br>28|12|<br>78|
|Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic|28|16|30|14|36|44|46|89|<br>31|14|<br>89|
|China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor|24|14|26|11|33|47|42|65|<br>26|11|<br>65|
|China-Pakistan Economic Corridor|18|10|19|9|23|28|22|59|<br>20|9|<br>59|
|All Projects Built in Complement|417|251|455|194|579|806|667|1,290|<br>452|194|<br>1,290|
|Panel B) Present value of benefits with 6% disc|ount rate, 0|% growth -|--ΔV/0.0|6||||||||
|China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor|4,548|2,776|4,957|2,088|6,401|9,121|7,371|13,867|<br>4,874|2,088|<br>832|
|New Eurasian Land Bridge|568|347|619|268|781|1,075|930|1,750|<br>616|268|<br>105|
|China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor|428|250|469|206|579|790|634|1,300|<br>466|206|<br>78|
|Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic|460|260|506|225|607|741|762|1,483|<br>510|225|<br>89|
|China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor|392|241|427|179|553|789|693|1,083|<br>428|179|<br>65|
|China-Pakistan Economic Corridor|293|161|323|145|385|470|368|983|<br>328|145|<br>59|
|All Projects Built in Complement|6,951|4,180|7,591|3,240|9,654|13,433|11,114|21,500|<br>7,531|3,240|<br>1,290|
|Panel C) Present value of benefits with 6% disc|ount rate, 5|.5% growth|--- (ΔV*|1.055)/(0.|06-0.055)|||||||
|China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor|57,582|35,150|62,761|26,435|81,038|115,474|93,312|175,552|<br>61,708|26,435|<br>832|
|New Eurasian Land Bridge|7,195|4,397|7,841|3,399|9,889|13,610|11,773|22,155|<br>7,794|3,399|<br>105|
|China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor|5,414|3,164|5,934|2,614|7,332|9,996|8,029|16,458|<br>5,897|2,614|<br>78|
|Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic|5,821|3,292|6,404|2,849|7,680|9,378|9,649|18,779|<br>6,455|2,849|<br>89|
|China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor|4,962|3,054|5,402|2,270|6,998|9,990|8,775|13,715|<br>5,416|2,270|<br>65|
|China-Pakistan Economic Corridor|3,706|2,037|4,091|1,835|4,869|5,950|4,657|12,449|<br>4,159|1,835|<br>59|
|All Projects Built in Complement|87,999|52,924|96,096|41,024|122,218|170,056|140,699|272,190|<br>95,345|41,024|<br>1,290|

47
<!-- Start of picture text --> f Nizhny Novgorod ij \<br>Kiev;, Kazan Nekaterinburg i767 km 485 ki \ \<br>//ff Kharidv © Voronezh 5Samara Via iH _. | chetyabinsk 9 9 irs|{ Oxrasnayarsk \\\ ,<br>odessa/y { Omsk Novosibirsk Ulan Ude \,<br>J/ Recor ates oVolgegraVol id =fi —. || i \\ Harbin,<br>: La \ “J Astana@ \ q \ ~ Vadivestok<br>Athensy Bursawe su * j \ ‘S 1 Ulaanbaatar... \<br>Izmiris) /i ns vs }Pej rdif iyts 4375 km 4700-km —‘yl \\. qonenyangShe<br>f Opnkara att = Anaktia A \ 1273 4m 4100 km », i Ley “<br>Konya? T7km OG remisy —_,PAktau i TM~ ; , +e Xe ining<br>~ / ER fo | Y f- { i \_ Beijing Seoul<br>—~ Adana? is),GazianteP ‘seku, bash|| 702%" .NeAlmaty </ RKhorgosG Urumqi Gt TianjinA.<br>aa ~_lurkme: | low : \<br>a oTabi iw 789 km/ Tashkent,3 8 200 km= 300»Bishkek km || \\,<br>Cairo, - Tehran Ashgabat Dushanbe 5 Kashgar | i a<br>// _ Oom i 365 kim 7 | : \; “oShanghai<br>— 4325 km pent | or \penens<br>aAhvaz) 2 Istehon /> 870 km Kabul -, fay Havelian \ ° Aaa \<br>ae | i - \ Chengdu, im , \<br>Lt | Faisalabad , pGujranwala \ ee \<br>Legend Shiraz ae| Quetta <j __ onal3,2 Lahore ee ee een \\<br>Shiraz | if Multan a ; \<br>———_ Existing‘aisting rairait ii = Lp fe) i | i<br>——_ Rail improvement Gwadar?i Bi ; Delhi |{| Kunmin g GuangzhouON . 2 ShenzhenHong Kong \\<br>| Karachi>’” tyderabad 866 kn A sayise4 wi oe anning \<br>i] Planned dry port } ' akal 532<3;km Hanoi= SHaiphon "<br>|| Kolkata 0 km ft andalay \ 935yOTz. jn phong \. |<br>1\<br>———_ Existing road | 112 km Chittagong ‘ oNaypyi“ee 293 kin Manila<br>Road improvement; |iMumbai? ]\ 1637 km Vientian Da Nang \\¥<br>| | Yangon? 1780 km ‘<br>«———=5 Proposed sea route | | \ - i 269 km \<br>| \ Bangkok 493 km<br>Istanbul | Fig, Phnom,Penh<br>Cities over 10 million (2015) || Bangalore® Chennai \| SihanoukvillePome9 Chi Minh City \\<br>; _ _<br>Hanoi i | Can Tho \<br>Vientiane CitiesOther aver important 1 million cities ||| ||\ \\<br>;||a<br>_j | Kuala Lumpur 7441 km es<br>ae | | \| =aSingapore—~<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) China's exports in 2017 (b) China's imports in 2017<br>HKG<br>+ + DEU<br>vNM NLD u vn MYS Jaa RUS<br>~ gee ~ sop 'TM CHE<br>° Pw — = ate ITA FRA ° nN IRN < ITAGBR<br>fr MMR Kaeox fe TKM KAZ ee<br>oa KGz ein ee U fre DNK SWE a MNG ee esc fey KORPOL TUR<br>a? WAP st PRAN IRbaga CHE a? Lao uze PRT pak<br>5 TK wing LAO 5 KHM BG pep<br>a GEO fRr a TR<br>a Nn ig AFG £ N ARM rr LKA ere<br>oo AREA wo! AL va HRV<br>g ARM 2 MKD. MAC<br>= MDA = SEQ<br>oy MKD BIH oy Ke<br>—_ —_ NPL<br>9 9<br>AFG<br>-4 -2 0 2 4 -4 -2 0 2 4<br>In(GDP) (PRT == 0) In(GDP) (PRT = 0)<br>Slope: .88 (.09), R-squared = .64 Slope: 1.09 (.11), R-squared = .65<br>HKG<br>+ + DEU<br>VNM mys yam<br>Sou sap weeFARR, aus IND an Sou scp csRAwo ROSTA CHE<br>a BEL POR az bays t ha Ke ee ESP IRL SWE Kaz<br>o IG<br>MAC CHE<br>2° BBE Ny Nor KHmSZ uzB a= mn TUR FA B efRERIYE PAK NOR LAO<br>3on cEBERSLTU ME NPL ° & “ BGR BLRepe | VE<br>% ALB ae of LA est ARM ity<br>& me a HRV LVA ALB<br>rsrs ARM &rs MAC MKD KGZ<br>EY a0 MDA rsEY MDABiH GEO<br>NPL<br>9 9<br>AFG<br>-5 Export0Cost to Largest City. (PRTRo) == 0) 1 -.15 -1 Import Cost-.05 from Largest0.City (PRT =050) 1<br>Slope: -1.48 (1.06), R-squared = .03 Slope: -14 (5.86), R-squared = .11<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> t — oe. \<br>~ . 7 7 ;<br>| RRL Ng<br>é \ \ Ss R = Sp R _& . ved Af eet’ ; 4<br>/ \ / \ NS r Y t L's 4 an if Pe ~ s ° ' - \\<br>arog<br>| Ps a, SOE<br>Ta) UZ OLN<br>@ 4-s% x asi Weg i ss SIN<br>@ 5-56 Se | ~~ N //<br>rn aa Za re<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> . 2:¢ ,<br>af’ “BR . . ‘ ‘ a<br>i: * e . eobs 6 &Mat?e ¥, . mS ° oye4<br>o * e ¥ igs Ps * , Ie bs “ 9) ° ss . F oe ¥ r<br>anewar aneCoe 3 ye= so,el o+9De ,‘aS * ‘ Fi.: t f“$3<br>e. oop Ne “nt ty : ‘eas F ° ‘ : P ad ‘ Pe<br>% *. ore P «. s °<br>» > Jak > Pee \ i . ? edt<br>acne” of:<br>Ti 6 A , ee yee<br>a: ° ° *a, Ua eo © eePRgn Seae 2.2 a coe a<br>i ¥ ba. > =ok Re = 2 rs oe, ght& ‘ °ip aresade ge et“e ‘*<br>’ 4“ o ive ° Pe of<br>*. =f Jf . PF ies ‘ ait<br>e 5 or x,<br>° *. °<br>s L<br>Existing route A * ° “ehwre ‘.eeelas~ *oh. \ .<br>~—— BRIimprovement ett cit yi (Wen <a<br>Annual land rents generated PSS ees oe P > F ° A<br>* less than 10 million<br>@ USD Fl ere ; \ wS |<br>@ 30-5010-30miillion million hsWent oy eg2 / 1 VAN<br>@ 50-70 million “Al hoe a:<br>& more than 70 million USD e “natesFi. ced oe —= a\<br>cw<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# APPENDIX A: DATABASE OF PLANNED BRI ROAD, RAIL AND PORT INVESTMENTS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

# TABLE A1: SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT (“BELT”)

|CORRIDO|NO||IMPROVEMENT|COUNTRI|TYPE<br>(SEE||||STATUS|STAT<br>US|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|R|.|PROJECT|SECTION|ES|TABLE 3)|REF.|STATUS|DETAILS|DATE|REF.|
|CHINA-|||Ulan-Ude–|Russian||||Already in use European|||
|MONGOLIA||Central Rail|Ulaanbaatar–|Federation,|Rail upgrade|(1)||. ,<br>Mongolian and Chinese|||
|-RUSSIA|1.|<br>Corridor|Erenhot|Mongolia|||Operational|<br>firms are usin the|30-Sep-18|(2)|
|ECONOMIC<br>CORRIDO|||Erenhot–Beijing–<br>Tianjin|China|Rail upgrade|(1)||g<br>corridor.|||
|R (CMREC)|2.|Northern Rail<br>Corridor|Kuragino – Kyzyl<br>Kyzyl–Arts Suur–<br>Ovoot|Russian<br>Federation<br>Russian<br>Federation,<br>Mongolia|New rail<br>New rail|(1)<br>(1)|Planning|Construction started on<br>section to Ovoot coal<br>mine, to finish in 2019.<br>Section beyond Ovoot is<br>only planned. Final|10-Apr-18|(2)<br>(3)|
||||Ovoot–Erdenet<br>Erdenet–Salkhit|Mongolia<br>Mongolia|New rail<br>Rail<br>reconstructio<br>n|(1)<br>(1)||<br>feasibility study approved<br>in April 2018. Delays due<br>to funding shortfalls.|||
|||||||||Proposed under Mong.|||
||3.|Western Rail<br>Corridor|Arts Suur–Urumqi|Mongolia,<br>China|New rail|(1)|Proposed|national rail policy and<br>joint China-Mong.-Rus.<br>declaration. No concrete<br>steps taken.|25-Nov-<br>2018|(1)<br>(4)|
||4.|Eastern Rail|Choibalsan–Bichigt|Mongolia|New rail|(1)|Proposed|Proposed and still being|23-Jan-2018|(5)|
|||Corridor|Bichigt–Chifeng|China|New rail|(1)||discussed. China, Russian|||

52
||Chifeng–Jinzhou|China|Rail<br>reconstructio<br>n|(1)||Federation and Mongolia<br>ready to operationalize the<br>agreement.|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||China's side of the railway<br>bridge has been completed|||
|5.<br>Nizhneleninsko<br>ye Bridge|Leninskoye–<br>Tongjiang|China,<br>Russian<br>Federation|New rail|(6)|Under<br>Construction|already. Massive floods<br>delayed work on Russian<br>side. Russian Federation to<br>complete its section in<br>2018.|13-Nov-<br>2018|(6)<br>(7)|
||Pogranichny<br>crossing|China,<br>Russian<br>Federation|Border cost<br>reduction|(1)||Completed and now in|||
||Poltavka crossing|China,<br>Russian<br>Federation|Border cost<br>reduction|(9)||use. Corridor links Harbin<br>with Russian Federation<br>through Suifenhe, a|||
|Seaside 1||China,||||Chinese land port.|||
|6.<br> <br>Corridor<br>(Primorye-1)|Harbin–Ussuriysk|Russian<br>Federation|Rail upgrade|(9)|Operational|Vostochny sea port is in<br>use. Greatly shortens trip|26-Sep-18|(8)|
||Ussuriysk–China<br>border|Russian<br>Federation|Road<br>reconstructio<br>n|(9)||from factory to sea port for<br>northwest China. Eases<br>travel and customs regime|||
||Vladivostok–|Russian|New divided|(9)||between China to|||
||Nakhodka|Federation|road|||Vladivostok.|||
||Vostochny Port|Russian<br>Federation|New seaport|(9)|||||
|Seaside 2|Choibalsan–Arixan|Mongolia|New rail|(1)||Launched this year. The|||
|7.<br> <br>Corridor<br>(Primorye-2)|Kraskino-Hunchun<br>crossing|China,<br>Russian<br>Federation|Border cost<br>reduction|(9)|Operational|first test overload occurred<br>in April 2018 and in<br>September, a new|13-Nov-18|(10)|

53
||||China border–<br>Zarubino|Russian<br>Federation|New rail|(9)||Hunchun-Zarubino-<br>Ningbo transit line was|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||China border–<br>Zarubino<br>Zarubino Port|Russian<br>Federation<br>Russian<br>Federation|New divided<br>road<br>New seaport|(9)<br>(9)||opened within the<br>Primorye-2. The corridor<br>connects Hunchun, a<br>border city in Jilin<br>Province and the port of<br>Zarubino.|||
|||||Russian||||The link was tested for|||
||||Ulan-Ude–Erenhot|Federation,|New road|(1) (11)||operations in August 2016|||
||8.|Highway AH-3||Mongolia|||Operational|and has been in use since.<br>’|30-Sep-18|(12)|
|||||||||It is Ulaanbaatars only|||
||||Erehnot–Jining|China|Road<br>upgrade|(1)||<br>modern road link to China<br>and Russian Federation.|||
||9.|Highway AH-4|Novosibirsk–<br>Khovd–<br>Urumqi|Russian<br>Federation,<br>Mongolia,<br>China|New road|(1)|Operational|Open for use but<br>construction still ongoing.<br>Part of Asian Highway 4<br>which runs from<br>Novosibirsk to Karachi.<br>Virtually empty from<br>Russian border to Urumqi.|30-Sep-18|(13)|
||||Khuut–Tavan|||||Civil works underway in|||
|||Southern Coal|Tolgoi–Gushun|Mongolia|New rail|(4)|Under|Mongolia, scheduled|||
||10.|<br>il|Suhait||||<br>i|completion in 2019.|12-Feb-18|(14)|
|||Raway|Gushun Suhait–<br>Baotou|China|New rail|(15)|Constructon|Chinese section<br>operational.|||
|NEW||||||||The railway links the|||
|EURASIAN||KhAk|||N hi|||world's biggest dry port|||
|LAND<br>BRIDGE|11.|orgos-tau<br>Railway|Khorgos–Zhetygen|Kazakhstan|ew cap<br>rail|(16)|Operational|Khorgos (China) and Aktau<br>port (Kazakhstan).|<br>15-Apr-17|(17)|
|(NELB)||||||||Jezkazgan and Beyneu rail|||

54
|||Jezkazgan–<br>Saksaulsky|Kazakhstan|New rail|(18)||links completed in 2015.<br>Khorgos opened in 2017.|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Beyneu–Shalkar|Kazakhstan|New rail|(18)<br>(19)||Aktau port is continuously<br>being upgraded but remains|||
|||Khorgos Dry Port|China,<br>Kazakhstan|Border cost<br>reduction|(16)||operational. This project<br>makes it feasible to ship|||
|||Aktau Port|Kazakhstan|New seaport|(16)||from Xinjiang to the<br>Caspian sea.|||
||||||||In May 2018, Eurasian<br>Development Bank|||
|12.|Moscow-Kazan<br>HSR|Moscow–Kazan|Russian<br>Federation|New hicap<br>rail|(20)|Proposed|committed to funding,<br>signing a cooperation<br>agreement with Russian<br>Railways.|30-May-18|(21)|
||||||||A new section of railway|||
|13.|Urumqi-<br>Khorgos rail|Urumqi–Khorgos|China|New hicap<br>rail|(22)|Operational|came into operation<br>between Khorgos and<br>Urumqi.|30-May-18|(23)|
||||||||Some construction is|||
|14.|Urumqi-<br>Khorgos road|Urumqi–Khorgos|China|New divided<br>road|(24)|Operational|ongoing but the road is<br>open for use between<br>China and Kazakhstan.|30-May-18|(23)|
|15.|Khorgos-<br>Almaty road|Khorgos–Almaty|Kazakhstan|New divided<br>road|(25)<br>(26)<br>(27)|Operational|Currently in use although<br>some related civil works<br>mostly funded by China<br>are still underway.|30-May-18|(23)<br>(28)|
|16.|Highway<br>P4/A17|Astana–Pavlodar|Kazakhstan|Road<br>upgrade|(26)<br>(27)|Operational|Currently in use although<br>other civil works are still<br>underway.|7-Sep-18|(29)<br>(28)|

55
||17.|Highway M36|Astana–Karaganda|Kazakhstan|Road<br>upgrade|(26)<br>(27)|Operational|Currently in use but<br>Kazakhstan is still<br>embarking on other<br>expansions and upgrades<br>for the road.|7-Sep-18|(30)<br>(28)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||Almaty–Shymkent|Kazakhstan|Road<br>upgrade|(27)||The upgraded road runs<br>from Almaty to a point past|||
||18.|Highway A2|Shymkent–|Kazakhstan,|Road|(26)|Operational|Uzynagash. It continues as<br>tln hih t|11-Oct-18|(28)|
||||Tashkent|Uzbekistan|upgrade|(27)||wo-ae gway o<br>Shymkent.|||
||19.|Highway M32|Shymkent–<br>Tashkent|Kazakhstan,<br>Uzbekistan|Road<br>upgrade|(26)<br>(27)|Operational|Currently in use.|11-Oct-18|(28)|
|CHINA-||||||||Electrification project|||
|CENTRAL||Tehran-Mashad||Iran, Islamic|||Under|started in 2017 and is|||
|ASIA-|20.|rail|Tehran–Mashhad|Rep.|Rail upgrade|(31)|Construction|projected to be completed|4-May-18|(32)|
|WEST ASIA||||||||in 48 months.|||
|ECONOMIC||||||||Construction led by China|||
|CORRIDO||||||||Railway Engineering|||
|R<br>(CCWAEC)|21.|Tehran-Isfahan<br>HSR|Tehran–Qom–<br>Isfahan|Iran, Islamic<br>Rep.|New hicap<br>rail|(31)|Under<br>Construction|Corporation. Expected<br>completion 2021. The<br>Islamic Republic of Iran’s<br>first high speed rail<br>connection.|25-Nov-18|(33)|
||22.|Kashgar-<br>Tashkent rail|Kashgar–Andijan|China,<br>Kyrgyz<br>Republic,<br>Uzbekistan|New rail|(34)|Proposed|Proposal with potential<br>route but no concrete<br>plans.|19-Feb-18|(34)|
||||Pap–Tashkent|Uzbekistan|New hicap<br>rail|(35)|Operational|Line opened June 2016.|15-Feb-16|(35)|
||23.|Sher Khan-<br>Herat rail|Sher Khan–<br>Kunduz–Herat|Afghanistan|New rail|(36)|Under<br>Construction|Termiz extension<br>operational since 2012.|7-Nov-18|(37)<br>(38)|

56
||||Uzbekistan,||||Expected completion<br>March 2019.|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|24.|Samarkand-<br>Mashhad rail|Samarkand–<br>Ashgabat–Mashhad|Turkmen.,<br>Iran, Islamic<br>Rep.<br>China,|Rail upgrade|(39)|Operational|Completed, and now<br>operational.|1-Jun-18|(40)|
|25.|Kashgar-<br>Dushanbe rail|Kashgar–Dushanbe|Kyrgyz<br>Republic,<br>Tajikistan|New rail|(41)<br>(42)|Proposed|Tajikistan and China in<br>talks to build rail.|1-Sept-17|(43)|
||||||||In 2013, China Road and<br>Bridge Corporation|||
|26.|North-South<br>Alternate Road|Jalalabad–Töö<br>Ashuu|Kyrgyz<br>Republic|Road<br>reconstructio<br>n|(44)|Under<br>Construction|(CRBC) appointed as<br>contractor, funds linked to<br>a loan from the Export-<br>Import Bank of China.|1-May-18|(45)|
|27.|Dushanbe-<br>Afghan Rail|Dushanbe–<br>Kolkhozabad|Tajikistan|Rail upgrade|(42)|Proposed|Discussions still underway<br>between China and<br>Tajikistan.|23-Aug-18|(42)|
|||Aktau–Baku|Kazakhstan|New sea link|(46)||Baku, Aktau and|||
|28.|Baku Port|Turkmenbashi–<br>Baku|Turkmenista<br>n|New sea link|(49)|Operational|Turkmenbashi ports<br>operational. Turkmenbashi<br>opened recently.|5-Jul-18|(47)<br>(48)|
||||||||Launched in October|||
|29.|Baku-Tbilisi<br>Rail|Baku–Ganja–Tbilisi|Azerbaijan,<br>Georgia|Rail upgrade|(50)|Operational|2017. Though its planning<br>began in 2007, is was<br>postponed several times.|30-Oct-18|(51)|
|30.|Tbilisi-Kars<br>Rail|Tbilisi – Kars|Georgia,<br>Turkey|New rail|(50)|Operational|Construction officially<br>completed in October<br>2017 as indicated above.|28-May-18|(52)|

57
||||Anaklia port|Georgia|New port|(53)<br>(54)||In use but developments<br>are continuing, e.g.|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||31.|Anaklia port|Anaklia|Georgia|New hicap<br>rail|(53)|Operational|reclaiming 5.0 million<br>cubic meters of sand from<br>the sea and placement of|28-Jul-18|(55)|
||||Anaklia–Istanbul|Georgia,<br>Turkey|New sea link|(53)||the dredged material. To<br>be operational by<br>December 2020|||
||32.|Ambarli Port|Istanbul|Turkey|New ports<br>and sea links|(53)<br>(56)|Operational|The Port is in use and<br>expansions are still<br>ongoing. Chinese private<br>firms are now making huge<br>investments.|21-Apr-18|(57)|
||33.|Piraeus Port|Athens|Greece|Major port<br>expansion|(58)|Operational|New berths were added<br>this year. Piraeus, the 7th<br>largest seaport in Europe<br>was in 2016 sold to a<br>Chinese firm by Greece.|27-Feb-18|(59)|
|CHINA-<br>PAKISTAN|34.|Yarkant Road|Tashkurgan–<br>Yarkant (Shache)|China|New road|(60)|Proposed|No evidence of progress on<br>proposed class-II highway|25-Jun-17|(61)|
|ECONOMIC|||||Road|||Reconstruction of China-|||
|CORRIDO|||Kashgar–Khunjerab|China|reconstructio|(62)||Pakistan Highway still|||
|R (CPEC)|||||n|||underway and is expected|||
||||Raikot–Shinkiari|Pakistan|New road|(60)||to be completed by 2020.|||
||35.|Karakoram<br>Highway|||||Under<br>Construction|Highway follows historic<br>trade route. Khunjerab Pass|19-Oct-18|(61)|
||||Shinkiari–Burhan|Pakistan|Road<br>upgrade|(60)||is the only connection<br>between China and<br>Pakistan. Previous upgrades<br>were done outside scope of|||

58
|||Kashgar–|||||BRI after floods washed<br>out Pakistani roads.<br>Feasibility study planned.<br>Considered a “missing|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|36.|China-Pakistan<br>Rail|Khunjerab–<br>Taxila|China,<br>Pakistan|New rail|(63)|Proposed|link” in the Asia railway<br>network. Would connect<br>to Chinese rail network at<br>Kashgar (Kashi).|7-Nov-18|(64)|
||Havelian-||||||Upgrade of ML-1 of|||
||Hyderabad|Havelian–Larkana–||||Under|Pakistan Railways began in|||
|37.|capacity<br>expansion (ML-<br>1)|<br>Hyderabad|Pakistan|Rail upgrade|(60)|<br>Construction|2018. The project's two<br>phases are expected to be<br>completed by 2022.|21-Mar-18|(65)|
||Karachi-<br>Ph|Karachi–|||||Under negotiation, but<br>Pakistan recently cut<br>funding by 2 Bn USD.|||
|38.|esawar<br>capacity<br>expansion|Hyderabad–<br>Lahore–Peshawar|Pakistan|Rail upgrade|(60)|Planning|This railway connects all of<br>Pakistan’s major cities and<br>is a transport backbone for<br>the country.|2-Oct-18|(66)|
|||Kotla Jam–Quetta–|||||The feasibility study has<br>just been completed|||
|39.|Gwadar rail|<br>Gwadar|Pakistan|New rail|(60)|Planning|awaiting approval from<br>Chinese and Pakistan<br>governments.|2-Apr-18|(67)|
||Alternative||||||As of late 2018, no||(68)|
|40.|Gwadar rail<br>passage|Gwadar–Karachi|Pakistan|New railroad|(60)|Proposed|concrete plans, though still<br>mentioned in discussions.|30-Oct-18|<br>(69)|
||||||||In final approval stage.|||
|41.|Besima-<br>Jacobabad rail|Besima–Jacobabad|Pakistan|New railroad|(60)|Planning|Completion expected<br>2023.|27-Mar-18|(70)|

59
|||M3/M4<br>|M2/M3 Bridge–|||||Launched in May 2018 and|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||42.|Multan<br>Highway|<br>Faisalabad–Multan|Pakistan|New road|(60)|Operational|<br>now in use.|27-May-18|(71)|
||43.|Lahore-Abdul<br>Hakeem road<br>upgrade|Lahore–Abdul<br>Hakeem|Pakistan|Road<br>upgrade|(60)|Operational|By October 2018, all<br>upgrades were completed,<br>and the highway is ready<br>for opening to traffic.|9-Nov-18|(72)|
|||||||||The first section of the<br>two-way six-lane road was|||
||44.|Multan-Sukkur<br>road|Multan–Sukkur|Pakistan|Road<br>upgrade|(60)|Under<br>Construction|launched in 2018 and is<br>operational. The rest is<br>under construction and to<br>be completed by 2019.|17-Sep-18|(73)|
||45.|Gwadar-Surab<br>road|Gwadar–Panjgur–<br>Surab|Pakistan|New road|(60)|Operational|Launched in 2016 and now<br>operational.|10-Sep-17|(74)|
||46.|Surab-DI Khan<br>road|Surab–Quetta–DI<br>Khan|Pakistan|Road<br>reconstructio<br>n|(60)|Operational|Launched in 2017 and now<br>in use.|26-Nov-17|(74)<br>(75)|
||47.|M8 Sukkur-<br>Besima road|Sukkur–<br>Shahdadkot–<br>Besima|Pakistan|New road|(60)|Operational|Construction completed in<br>early 2018. Work was<br>finished by the Pakistan<br>Army after Chinese<br>contractors refused to work<br>out of security concerns.|9-Apr-18|(76)|
|||||||||Marked as “medium to|||
||48.|Shahdadkot-DI<br>Khan road|Shahdadkot–DI<br>Khan|Pakistan|New road|(60)|Planned|long-term” on CPEC<br>maps. No evidence of<br>concrete steps.|25-Nov-18|(77)|
|BANGLADE<br>SH|49.|Kunming-<br>Calcutta HSR|Kunming–<br>Mandalay–|Bangladesh,<br>China, India,<br>Myanmar|New hicap<br>rail|(78)|Proposed|Chinese officials reiterate<br>support for the idea, but no<br>concrete plans.|13-Sep-18|(79)|

60
|-CHINA-|||Chittagong–Dhaka–||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|INDIA-|||Calcutta||||||||
|MYANMAR<br>ECONOMIC<br>CORRIDO|50.|Dali-Lashio<br>railway|Dali–Ruili–Lashio|China,<br>Myanmar|New rail|(80)|Under<br>Construction|Under construction since<br>2011, scheduled for<br>completion in 2021.|26-Sep-18|(81)|
|R<br>(BCIM)|51|Kalay-Jiribam|Kalay–Tamu–|Myanmar,|New rail|(80)|Under|Civil works are underway<br>for the rail which will link|18-Ma-15|(82)|
||.|rail|Jiribam|India|||Construction|<br>India and Myanmar.|y|(83)|
||52.|Dhaka-<br>Bongaon rail|Dhaka–Bongaon|Bangladesh,<br>India|New rail|(80)|Proposed|Still being discussed|5-Sep-18|(84)|
||||Kyaukpyu–Ann|Myanmar|New rail|(85)||On 8 November 2018,|||
||53.|Kyaukpyu port|Kyaukpyu–<br>Mandalay|Myanmar|Road<br>upgrade|(85)|Planning|Myanmar and China<br>agreed to scale down the<br>project from US$10 Bn to|8-Nov-18|(86)|
||||Kyaukpyu|Myanmar|New seaport|(87)||US1.3 Bn, from 10 to 2<br>berths.|||
|CHINA-||||||||Almost 25% works done,|||
|INDOCHIN||||||||project to be completed by|||
|A|54|Kunming-|Kunming–|China, Lao|New rail|(88)|Under|2021. Kunming-Hekou rail|22-Jul-18|(89)|
|PENINSULA|.|Vientiane rail|Vientiane|PDR|||Construction|on China side operational,|||
|ECONOMIC||||||||with wider track boosting|||
|CORRIDO||||||||cargo capacity.|||
|R||||||||Conventional rail|||
|(CICPEC)||||||||operational since 2009.|||
||55.|Bangkok-<br>Vientiane rail|Bangkok–Vientiane|Thailand,<br>Lao PDR|Rail upgrade|(90)|Under<br>Construction|High Speed Rail upgrade<br>to Nakhon Ratchasima<br>exp. by 2020 with future<br>plans to reach Laos.|11-Feb-18|(91)|

61
|56.|East Coast Rail<br>Link (ECRL)|Kuala Lumpur–<br>Kota Bharu|Malaysia|New hicap<br>rail|(92)|Cancelled or<br>postponed|Construction began in<br>August 2017. On 3 July<br>2018, Malaysia instructed<br>China Communications<br>Construction to suspend all<br>works. On 12 April 2019,<br>works allowed to resume,<br>given a 1/3 cost reduction|13-Sep-18,<br>4-Nov-18<br>12-Apr-19|(93)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||Malaysia Transport|||
|57.|Gemas-Johor<br>rail upgrade|Gemas–Johor Bahru|Malaysia|Rail upgrade|(94)|Under<br>Construction|Minister reports that<br>upgrade is 20% complete,<br>to be finished in 2022|30-Jul-18|(95)|
||BkkKl|Bangkok–Pedang|Thild||||Discussions still underway.|||
|58.|ango-uaa<br>Lumpur HSR|Besar–Kuala<br>Lumpur|aan,<br>Malaysia|Rail upgrade|(96)|Proposed|Operations are targeted to<br>begin by end of 2026.|7-Nov-18|(97)|
|||Kl L–|||||Officially suspended on Sep<br>5, 2018 at Malaysia’s|||
|59.|Kuala Lumpur-<br>Singapore HSR|uaa umpur<br>Seremban–<br>Singapore|Malaysia,<br>Singapore|New hicap<br>rail|(98)|Cancelled or<br>postponed|request. Singapore officials<br>report that the construction<br>will resume by May 31,<br>2020.|7-Sep-18|(99)|
||Vietnam|Hanoi–Ho Chi|||||Planning began in 2007,|||
|60.|<br>National HSR|<br>Minh City|Vietnam|Rail upgrade|(100)|Proposed|paused in 2010, now being<br>reconsidered.|8-Apr-18|(101)|
||||||||Still being discussed.|||
|61|Vietnam-<br>Cambodia rail|Phnom Penh–Ho<br>Chi Minh City|Cambodia,<br>Vietnam|New rail|(102)|Proposed|Though work on the<br>Bangkok-Phnom Penh rail<br>crossing has commenced.|15-Feb-18,<br>28-Jun-18|(103)<br>(104)|
|||Nam Tok–|Thailand||||Link still being|||
|62.|Burma railway|<br>Thanbyuzayat|,<br>Myanmar|New rail|(105)|Planned|“considered”. Railway was<br>built by Japan using forced|22-Jan-18|(106)|

62
|||||||||labor in WWII, later<br>destroyed. Difficult terrain<br>and troubled history make<br>construction difficult.|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||Phnom Penh–<br>Sihanoukville|Cambodia|New rail|(107)||Cambodia’s only<br>deepwater port.|||
||63.|Sihanoukville<br>port|Phnom Penh–<br>Sihanoukville|Cambodia|New divided<br>road|(107)|Under<br>Construction|Accompanying special<br>economic zone planned.|12-Sep-18|(108)|
||||Sihanoukville|Cambodia|New seaport|(107)||Expected completion of all<br>projects by 2023.|||
||64.|Thai Canal|Satun–Songkhla|Thailand|New sea<br>links|(109)|Proposed|Discussions still underway<br>with Chinese and non-<br>Chinese companies<br>interested. Also known as<br>“Kra Canal”. Would<br>provide alternative to Strait<br>of Malacca chokepoint.|6-Apr-18|(110)|
|ADDENDU||||||||Commercial operations|||
|M:||||||||began January 2018. To be|||
|SELECTED||Addis Abeba-||||||operated by Chinese firms|||
|RAIL|65|<br>Djibouti|Addis Abeba-|Djibouti,|New rail|(111)|Oerational|until 2023, and after by the|19-Nov-18|(112)|
|PROJECTS<br>IN AFRICA|.|<br>Railway|Djibouti city|Ethiopia|||p|Ethio-Djibouti Standard<br>Gauge Rail Transport S.C.,<br>a joint venture between<br>Djibouti and Ethiopia.||(113)|
||66.|Addis Abeba-<br>Nairobi<br>Railway|Addis Abeba-<br>Nairobi|Ethiopia,<br>Kenya|New rail|(114)|Proposed|Kenya-Ethiopia link<br>mentioned among other<br>proposals. No evidence of<br>concrete steps.|25-Nov-18|(115)|
||67.|Juba-Mombasa<br>Railway|Juba-Mombasa|Kenya, South<br>Sudan|New rail|(114)|Under<br>Construction|China has agreed to finance<br>and green light has been|16-June-18|(116)|

63
given by governments. So far only Nairobi-Naivashsa has been built, less than 1/10 of the way to Juba.

TABLE B2: MARITIME SILK ROAD (“ROAD”)

# TYPE

|PASSAGE|AREA|NO.|PROJECT|COUNTRIES|(SEE<br>TABLE 3)|REF.|STATUS|DETAIL|STATUS<br>DATE|STATUS<br>REF|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CHINA-INDIAN|Indian Ocean|||||||Port approved in 2013,|||
|OCEAN-AFRICA-<br>MEDITERRANEAN<br>SEA (CIAM)|(Africa)|68.|Bagamoyo<br>Port|Tanzania|New<br>seaport|(117)|Planned|negotiations still in<br>progress. Possibly shelved<br>by Tanzania gov’t in favor|6-Feb-18|(118)|
|BLUE ECONOMIC||||||||of existing Dar es Salaam.|||
|PASSAGE||69.|Dar es<br>Salaam Port|Tanzania|Seaport<br>expansion|(119)|Under<br>Construction|Improvements for Dar es<br>Salaam port commenced.|1-Sep-18|(120)|
|||||||||In progress. Initiated by<br>Kenya in 2007,|||
|||70.|Lamu Port|Kenya|New<br>seaport|(121)|Under<br>Construction|completion expected in<br>2020. Lamu will serve as a<br>terminus for new Chinese-<br>built rail links throughout<br>East Africa.|6-Nov-<br>18|(122)|
|||||||||The three countries|||
|||||||||Mozambique, Botswana|||
|||71.|Techobanine<br>Port|Mozambique|New<br>seaport|(123)|Proposed|and Zimbabwe signed<br>MoU in 2006 but no<br>physical progress.<br>Discussions have been<br>resumed after hiatus.|18-Apr-<br>18|(124)|

64
||72.|Beira Port|Mozambique|Seaport<br>expansion|(125)|Operational|In use, continuous<br>improvements ongoing.|10-Nov-<br>18|(126)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||73.|Gwadar Port|Pakistan|New<br>seaport|(127)|Operational|Expansions to continue<br>until 2025. Port given to<br>China on 40-year lease<br>due to payment|2-Apr-18|(66)<br>(128)|
||||||||difficulties.|||
|Indian Ocean<br>(Asia)|74.|Duqm Port|Oman|New<br>seaport|(129)|Planning|The port is part of<br>Omani's development<br>masterplan initiated in<br>2011 to make Duqm an<br>important port/city in the<br>Arab World.|4-Jun-18|(130)|
||75.|Hambantota<br>Port|Sri Lanka|New<br>seaport|(131)|Operational|In use, improvements still<br>underway, Sri Lanka<br>leased to Chinese state<br>firm to help with<br>construction cost payment.|4-Jun-18|(132)|
||76.|Colombo<br>Port City|Sri Lanka|New<br>seaport|(133)|Under<br>Construction|Built on land reclaimed<br>from the Indian Ocean<br>and funded with 1.4 Bn<br>USD Chinese investment.<br>To be completed in 2020.<br>Project aims to create a<br>world class city in Sri<br>Lanka on the model of<br>Dubai.|2-Aug-18|(134)|
||77.|Kyaukpyu<br>Port|Myanmar|New<br>seaport|(87)|Planning|Myanmar and China<br>agreed to scale down the<br>project in 2018 from 10 to<br>1.3 Bn USD. With rail|8-Nov-<br>18|(135)|

65
||78.|Melaka<br>Gateway|Malaysia|New<br>seaport|(136)|Under<br>Construction<br>(Stalled)|link through Myanmar to<br>China, this would present<br>an alternative route to the<br>Strait of Malacca.<br>Port was scheduled for<br>completion in 2019. As of<br>2018 no construction has<br>been done and regulatory<br>approval has officially<br>lapsed. Future of project is<br>uncertain.|12-Jul-18|(137)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||Minor existing port is in<br>use. Officials have|||
||79.|Kuala Linggi<br>Port|Malaysia|New<br>seaport|(136)|Planned|discussed expansion under<br>BRI. Along with Melaka,<br>would provide alternative<br>to Singapore as Strait of<br>Malacca hub.|10-Nov-<br>18|(138)|
||80.|Penang Port|Malaysia|New<br>seaport|(136)|Operational|Now in use and cruise<br>ships have started docking.|14-Nov-<br>18|(139)|
||||||||Partly operational; full<br>completion by 2023.|||
||81.|Sihanoukville<br>Port|Cambodia|New<br>seaport|(107)|Under<br>Construction|Accompanied by special<br>economic zone built on<br>Shenzhen model, touted as<br>“next Macao”.|26-Jun-<br>18|(140)|
|Mediterranean<br>Sea|82.|Suez<br>Economic<br>and Trade<br>Cooperation<br>Zone|Egypt, Arab<br>Rep.|New<br>seaport|(141)|Under<br>Construction|Area provides incentives<br>for Egyptian and Chinese<br>companies to set up<br>factories and R&D with|24-Oct-<br>18|(142)|

66
||||||||focus on tech. Located<br>near Suez Canal.<br>China Harbor Engineering<br>Company finished work to|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||New|||deeen Yuzhn Port|||
||83.|Yuzhny Port|Ukraine|<br>seaport|(143)|Operational|p y .<br>Located near Odessa, it<br>provides an alternative to<br>Russian-held Sevastopol.|21-Jan-18|(144)|
||||||||In use, new berths were<br>added this year. Piraeus,|||
||84.|Piraeus Port|Greece|New<br>seaport|(58)|Operational|the 7th largest seaport in<br>Europe was in 2016 sold<br>to a Chinese firm by<br>Greece.|27-Feb-<br>18|(59)|
|Atlantic<br>Ocean|85.|Cabinda Port|Angola|New<br>seaport|(145)|Under<br>Construction|Work in progress and is<br>being financed by Chinese<br>backed companies.|25-Jan-17|(146)|
||||||||Work in progress on|||
||86|N’Diago|Mauritania|New|(147)|Under|Mauritania's largest sea|13-Dec-|(148)|
||.|Port||seaport||Construction|port, located near<br>Senegalese border.|17||
||||||||In use but some civil<br>works are still ongoing.|||
||87.|Tema Port|Ghana|New<br>seaport|(149)|Operational|There are concerns over<br>government’s inability to<br>negotiate a better deal<br>with port developers.|14-Oct-<br>18|(150)|
|Pacific Ocean|88.|Thai canal|Thailand|New sea<br>links|(109)|Proposed|Thailand still discussing<br>with China to build the<br>new canal. Thailand's new|6-Apr-18|(110)|

67
|||89.<br>Kuantan Port|Malaysia|New<br>seaport|(151)|Operational|king wants to execute the<br>canal project as part of the<br>BRI. Canal would bypass<br>Malacca Strait chokepoint.<br>The upgrading works<br>were completed in 2018,<br>however the port will be<br>affected adversely by the<br>suspension of ECRL<br>project by Malaysia.|4-Nov-<br>18|(95)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CHINA-OCEANIA-<br>SOUTH PACIFIC|Pacific Ocean|—<br>(none<br>proposed)|—|—|—|—|—|—|—|
|(COS)|Indian Ocean||||||2015 deal gives Chinese|||
|BLUE ECONOMIC|||||||firm Landbridge 99-year|||
|PASSAGE||90.<br>Darwin Port|Australia|Seaport<br>expansion|(152)|Operational|lease. Port has now<br>borrowed heavily, raising<br>concerns about debt<br>sustainability.|17-Jun-<br>18|(153)|
|ICE SILK ROAD|Arctic Ocean||||||Potential alternative to|||
|(ISR)|||||||Suez Canal between Asia|||
|||91.<br>Northern Sea<br>Route|Russian<br>Federation|New sea<br>link|(136)|Planning|to Europe, shorter distance<br>and more secure. Russian<br>Federation and China are<br>intensifying feasibility<br>studies of this route.|4-Nov-<br>18|(154)|
|||92.<br>New Dvina<br>Port|Russian<br>Federation|New<br>seaport|(136)|Planning|This new mega port<br>valued at 2.3 Bn USD<br>would be Russian<br>Federation's central hub<br>for trade with Europe, the|19-Jun-<br>18|(155)|

68
|93.<br>Kirkenes<br>Port|Norway|New<br>seaport<br>(156)|Proposed|Asia-Pacific region and<br>North America.<br>Railway would link this<br>port to Baltic via Finland,<br>opening up to Europe.<br>Would compete with|10-Oct-<br>18<br>(157)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||New Dvina Port.||

# DATABASE REFERENCES

1. _Программа создания экономического коридора Китай_ - _Монголия_ - _Россия_ . Ufa : Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia, 2015. "Program for the creation of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor", document signed in Ufa by three governments, projects listed. In Russian..

2. Judge, Connor. What does the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor mean for Mongolia? s.l. : Belt and Road Advisory, September 30, 2018.

3. Mongolian Mining Journal. Эрдэнэт-Овоот чиглэлийн төмөр замын шавыг тавилаа. Mongolian Mining Journal. June 20, 2017. "Erdenet-Ovoot railway line has been laid".

4. Parliament of Mongolia. Төрөөс төмөр замын тээврийн талаар баримтлах бодлогын хэрэгжилтийг хангах зарим арга хэмжээний тухай улсын их хурлын тогтоолын талаарх товч танилцуулга. Ulaanbaatar : s.n., November 2014. Updated Mongolian national rail policy. In Mongolian..

5. Aminaa, K. Mongolia, Russia and China discuss Eastern Railway Corridor. Montsame.mn. s.l. : Mongolian News Agency Montsame, Jan 23, 2018.

6. Deng, Xiaoci. Sino-Russian rail bridge to be completed this year . GlobalTimes.cn. s.l. : Global Times, Mar 9, 2018.

7. Строительство моста Нижнеленинское — Тунцзян продолжат после спада воды в Амуре. EastRussia.ru. s.l. : East Russia Info and Analytics Agency, August 2, 2018. "Construction of the Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang Bridge will continue after Amur River recedes". In Russian..

8. Chen, Qingqing. Russia’s Far East ambitions. s.l. : Global Times, September 26, 2018. GlobalTimes.cn.

9. Ministry of Far East Development, Russia. _Концепция развития международных транспортных коридоров_ « _Приморье_ -1» _и_ « _Приморье_ -2». [PDF] s.l. : Government of Russia., 2016. "Concept note for the development of "Seaside 1" and "Seaside 2" international transport corridors." In Russian. PDF Available at: http://static.government.ru/media/files/jqfm5NlYLGTTVhUn3AKqOAg9mJcb2Yxx.pdf.

10. _По транспортному коридору_ « _Приморье_ -2» _доставили груз из Японии в Китай_ . s.l. : East Russia Info and Analytics Agency, October 24, 2018. EastRussia.ru. "Freight delivered from Japan to China via Seaside-2 transport corridor." In Russian..

11. Russia-Mongolia-China Road Corridor to be Ready in 2018. s.l. : Silk Road Briefing, September 8, 2017. SilkRoadBriefing.com.

12. China, Mongolia, Russia start road freight test. s.l. : CCTV, August 18, 2016. CCTVPlus.com.

13. Asian Development Bank. Mongolia: The Road to Prosperity. November 8, 2018.

69
14. Yamada, Go and Palma, Stefania. Is China's Belt and Road working? A progress report from eight countries. Asia.Nikkei.com. [Online] Nikkei Asian Review, March 28, 2018. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Is-China-s-Belt-and-Road-working-A-progress-report-from-eight-countries.

15. Pozzebon, Stefano. Mongolia Has To Change Its Railroads To Account For An 85 Millimeter Difference In Track Spacing. BusinessInsider.com. [Online] Business Insider, October 1, 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/mongolia-extends-trans-border-railway-to-china-russia-2014-10?r=UK&IR=T.

16. Farchy, Jack, et al. One belt, one road. s.l. : Financial Times, September 14, 2016. FT.com.

17. Shepard, Wade. Aktau: A Look Inside Aktau, Kazakhstan's Other Hub On The 'New Silk Road'. Forbes.com. [Online] Forbes, April 15, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/04/15/a-look-inside-aktau-kazakhstans-other-hub-on-the-new-silk-road/#358f2eea7e1c.

18. Kazakhstan Railways Press Service. _Елбасы дал старт работе новых железных дорог Жезказган_ - _Бейнеу и Аркалык_ - _Шубарколь_ . August 22, 2014. TemirZholy.kz/press-tsentr. "President commences work on new Jezkazgan-Beyneu and Arkalyk-Shubarkol railways." In Russian..

19. _Протяженность железнодорожных путей Казахстана на начало года составила_ 15,3 _тыс_ . _км_ . _Ж_ / _д_ - _линии_ , _проходящие по территории страны_ , _занимают_ 14,5 _тыс_ . _км_ , _еще_ 275 _км проходят по территориям других государств_ . s.l. : EnergyProm, July 12, 2016. EnergyProm.kz. "Total length of railways in Kazakhstan at the beginning of the year was 15.3 thousand kilometers. Railways that traverse the country's territory cover 14.5 thousand kilometers, while 257 km pass through other countries." In Russian. Cites Kazakhstan Ministry of Transport web portal as data source..

20. Chu, Daye. Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway ‘may be built in stages’ for financial reasons . s.l. : Global Times, October 22, 2017. GlobalTimes.cn. Quotes Russian Railways (RZD)..

21. Railway Pro. Eurasian Development Bank to finance Moscow-Kazan HSR. RailwayPro.com. [Online] Railway Pro, May 30, 2018. https://www.railwaypro.com/wp/eurasian-development-bank-to-finance-moscow-kazan-hsr/.

22. `霍` 尔 `果斯往` 乌鲁 `木` 齐 `方向首趟客运列` 车 `正式开通` . Tianshan Network. December 26, 2013, Huochepiao. "Horgos to Urumqi, the first passenger train was officially opened." In Chinese.

23. Hulley-Jones, Frank, Blight, Garry and Gutierrez, Pablo. Follow the Silk Road. TheGuardian.com. [Online] The Guardian, July 30, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/follow-new-silk-road-china-belt.

24. Ping, Chong Koh. Horgas - China's gateway to the West. s.l. : Straits Times, August 7, 2016. StraitsTimes.com.

25. Ministry for Investment and Development of Kazakhstan. _Реализация государственной программы_ « _Нурлы Жол_ ». s.l. : Government of Kazakhstan, 2017. mid.gov.kz. Slides, including maps, depicting extent of the Nurly Zhol "Golden Road" highway program. In Russian. Available at: http://mid.gov.kz/ru/infografic/1191.

26. Kushkumbayev, Sanat. Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol and China’s Economic Belt of the Silk Road: Confluence of Goals. s.l. : The Astana Times, September 22, 2015. AstanaTimes.com. Xi Jinping quoted: "China intends to promote the convergence of the formation of the economic zone of the Silk Road with the Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol programme.".

27. _Казахстан вложит в строительство дорог почти_ 3 _млрд долларов в_ 2017 _году_ . Astana : REGNUM News Agency, June 28, 2017. Regnum.ru. "Kazakhstan will contribute almost 3 Bn USD for road construction in 2017." In Russian. Mentions significant contribution by China Exim Bank..

28. KazAutoZhol. Строительство и реконструкция дорог республиканского значения. KazAutoZhol.kz. [Online] November 25, 2018. Interactive map showing road construction status. In Russian.. http://www.kazautozhol.kz/map/.

70
29. Higgins, Andrew. China’s Ambitious New ‘Port’: Landlocked Kazakhstan. NYTimes.com. [Online] The New York Times, January 1, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/china-kazakhstan-silk-road.html.

30. KazDorNII. Environmental Management Plan, Karaganda-Balkhash-Burybaital Road Section. Committee for Roads, Ministry of Investment and Development, Republic of Kazakhstan Government. s.l. : World Bank, 2016.

31. Rogers, David. Iran’s railway revolution. s.l. : Global Construction Review, December 14, 2015. GlobalConstructionReview.com.

32. Financial Tribune. Tehran-Mashhad Railroad Project Gets Off the Ground. FinancialTribune.com. December 19, 2017.

33. CSIS Reconnecting Asia. Tehran-Isfahan High Speed Rail (Construction). s.l. : Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 25, 2018.

34. No Stops In Kyrgyzstan For China-Uzbekistan Railway Line . Pannier, Bruce. September 03, 2017, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.

35. Yue, Huang. Chinese, Uzbek Leaders Hail Inauguration of Central Asia's Longest Railway Tunnel. CRIEnglish.com. [Online] Xinhua, June 23, 2016. http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/06/23/4201s931703_1.htm.

36. Oskarsson, Katerina. The Rise of the Afghan Rails : Regional Railway Linkages and Economic Growth in Afghanistan. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. 2013.

37. Iran-Afghan railway to be launched in 8 months: Official. IRNA.ir. [Online] Islamic Republic News Agency, July 19, 2018. http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82975563.

38. President Ghani meets with president of People’s Republic of China. Office of the President of Afghanistan. June 9, 2017.

39. China proposes high-speed rail link direct to Tehran. Rogers, David. November 24, 2015, Global Construction Review.

40. Duhalde, Marcelo, et al. Belt and Road Initiative, The railway to Iran, A visual explainer. SCMP.com. [Online] South China Morning Post, 2018. http://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/iran.html.

41. Work to start on rail link with Iran. Cui, Jia. January 15, 2015, China Daily.

42. Advanced international freight routes. Qodirov, Sayfullo. Dushanbe : s.n., 2015. Presentation by Tajikistan Ministry of Transport official at UNECE EATL 13th Session; in Russian.

43. Times of Central Asia. Tajikistan, China to launch cross-border railway, road and natural-gas pipeline projects. TimesCA.com. Dushanbe : The Times of Central Asia, September 1, 2017.

44. Asian Development Bank. ADB, Kyrgyz Republic Sign Agreement for North-South Alternate Road Corridor Rehabilitation. ADB.org. December 1, 2016.

45. Timetric. MOTC - Bishkek-Osh Alternative Road - Kyrgyzstan - Project Profile. MarketReportsOnline.com. s.l. : Market Reports Online, May 2018.

46. Shepard, Wade. A Look Inside Aktau, Kazakhstan's Other Hub On The 'New Silk Road'. Forbes.com. [Online] Forbes, April 15, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/04/15/a-look-inside-aktau-kazakhstans-other-hub-on-the-new-silk-road/#683b0ac57e1c.

47. Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. Aqtau Port, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea Belt and Road Window to Europe. SilkRoadBriefing.com. [Online] Dezan Shira & Associates, July 5, 2018. https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/07/05/aqtau-port-kazakhstans-caspian-sea-belt-road-window-europe/.

48. —. Turkmenbashi’s Caspian Window and the Turkmenistan Belt and Road. SilkRoadBriefing.com. [Online] Dezan Shira & Associates, July 4, 2018. https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/07/04/turkmenbashis-caspian-window-turkmenistan-belt-road/.

49. Bai, Lianlei. Azerbaijan in the Silk Road Economic Belt: A Chinese Perspective. CIIS Website. [Online] China Institute of International Studies, August 30, 2016. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2016-08/30/content_8999522.htm.

71
50. Bagirova, Nailia. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey launch 'Silk Road' rail link. Reuters.com. [Online] Reuters, October 30, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/azerbaijan-railway/azerbaijan-georgia-turkey-launch-silk-road-rail-link-idUSL8N1N52XR.

51. RFERL Azerbaijani Service. Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Line Officially Launched . RFERL.org. [Online] Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 30, 2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/baku-tbilisi-kars-railway-line-officially-launched-azerbaijan-georgia-turkey/28824764.html.

52. Bagirova, Nailia. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey launch 'Silk Road' rail link. Reuters.com. Alyat, Azerbaijan : Thomson Reuters, 30 October, 2017.

53. Shepard, Wade. Anaklia 'Silk Road' Port Set To Transform Georgia And Enhance China-Europe Trade. Forbes.com. [Online] Forbes, September 29, 2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/09/29/silk-road-anaklia-deep-sea-port-set-to-transform-georgia/#57cec53a29df.

54. Commersant Georgia. Construction Begins on Anaklia Sea Port. Commersant.ge. [Online] October 11, 2017. Georgian minister quoted. http://commersant.ge/?view=post&id=132890&lang_id=en.

55. Anaklia Development Consortium. World’s leading Dutch company Van Oord awarded Anaklia Port’s marine contract for dredging and reclamation. AnakliaDevelopment.com. [Online] August 2018. http://anakliadevelopment.com/news/anaklia-deep-sea-ports-early-marine-works-set-to-start/.

56. China port giants pour $1 billion into Turkish terminal. Knowler, Greg. s.l. : JOC, September 17, 2015, Journal of Commerce.

57. Fang, Frank. Chinese Investments in European Ports Come Under Scrutiny. TheEpochTimes.com. s.l. : The Epoch Times, October 12, 2018.

58. Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece Embraces China’s Cash and Interests. Horowitz, Jason and Alderman, Liz. August 26, 2017, The New York Times.

59. Tornos News. Record January-October 2018 results for Piraeus container terminal. TornosNews.gr. Athens : Tornos News, November 20, 2018.

60. China Pakistan Economic Corridor. China Pakistan Economic Corridor Maps. CPEC official website. [Online] http://cpec.gov.pk/maps.

61. CPEC. CPEC Projects Progress Update – CPEC Infrastructure Projects . CPEC.gov.pk. s.l. : Government of Pakistan, November 2018.

62. Senate of Pakistan Secretariat. Questions for oral answers and their replies, 108th Session. Islamabad : s.n., October 23, 2014. p. 13.

63. Cui, Jia. China studying new Silk Road rail link to Pakistan. China Daily. June 28, 2014. Xinjiang dir. of regional development quoted.

64. Pakistan-China Institute. Pak Railways to conduct feasibility study for Havelian-Khunjerab Railway line. CPECInfo.com. s.l. : Pakistan-China Institute CPEC Portal, September 20, 2017.

65. The News International. Cost of CPEC’s Railways ML-I project brought down by $2 bn: Sheikh Rashid . TheNews.com.pk. [Online] The News International, October 2, 2018. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/375438-cost-of-cpec-s-railways-ml-i-project-brought-down-by-2-bn-sheikh-rashid.

66. Duhalde, Marcelo, et al. China's super link to Gwadar Port. SCMP.com. [Online] South China Morning Post, 2018. http://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/pakistan.html.

67. APP. Ministry to submit PC-1 for new railway tracks soon. Tribune.com.pk. [Online] The Express Tribune, February 16, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1636342/1-ministry-submit-pc-1-new-railway-tracks-soon/.

68. Khattak, Sohail. K-P proposes alternative routes for CPEC Western Alignment. Tribune.com.pk. [Online] The Express Tribune, December 16, 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1264815/western-alignment-k-p-proposes-alternative-routes-cpec/".

69. Khan, Faisal. A train will take you from Karachi to Dhabeji for free on Nov 1. Samaa.tv. s.l. : Samaa TV, October 30, 2018. Quotes Sheikh Rashid, Railways Minister of Pakistan, as "willing" to lay track from Karachi to Gwadar..

72
70. APP. Feasibility study of laying tracks finalized, NA body told. Tribune.com.pk. [Online] The Express Tribune, March 27, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1670078/1-feasibility-study-laying-tracks-finalised-na-body-told/.

71. —. Two motorway projects of M3, M4 to be inaugurated on Monday. APP.com.pk. [Online] Associated Press of Pakistan, May 27, 2018. https://www.app.com.pk/twomotorway-projects-m3-m4-inaugurated-monday/.

72. Pakistan Observer. Motorway M-3 section ready for opening to traffic. PakObserver.net. [Online] The Pakistan Observer, November 10, 2018. https://pakobserver.net/motorway-m-3-section-ready-for-opening-to-traffic/.

73. —. Multan-Sukkur Motorway project to be completed before time. PakObserver.net. [Online] The Pakistan Observer, September 17, 2018. https://pakobserver.net/multan-sukkur-motorway-project-to-be-completed-before-time/.

74. APP. CPEC Western route: Sorab-Hoshab Highway (N-85) to be inaugurated . TimesofIslamabad.com. [Online] Times of Islamabad, December 13, 2016. https://timesofislamabad.com/13-Dec-2016/cpec-western-route-sorab-hoshab-highway-n-85-to-be-inaugurated.

75. PAR. Govt provided Rs5.8b for Burhan-DI Khan Motorway. PAR.com.pk. s.l. : Pakistan Agriculture Research, January 19, 2017.

76. Haq, Riaz. The story of Pakistan’s M8 Motorway. DailyTimes.com.pk. [Online] The Daily Times (Pakistan), April 9, 2018. https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/M8_motorway_(Pakistan).html.

77. CPEC Secretariat. Highways Network of CPEC. CPEC.gov.pk. [Online] CPEC Secretariat. http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/1.

78. Arora, Rajat. New Silk Route? China plans Kunming-Kolkata railway link. The Economic Times. June 18, 2015.

79. Nag, Devanjana. Bullet train service to connect Kolkata in India to Kunming in China? Why China is pushing for the project. FinancialExpress.com. s.l. : Financial Express, September 13, 2018.

80. UNESCAP. Trans-Asian Railway Network Map. November 1, 2016.

81. Frontier Myanmar. The grand plan for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. FrontierMyanmar.net. [Online] Frontier Myanmar, September 26, 2018. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-grand-plan-for-the-china-myanmar-economic-corridor.

82. Chaudhury, Anasua Basu Ray and Basu, Pratnashree. India-Myanmar Connectivity: Possibilities and Challenges. Kolkata : Observer Research Foundation, 2015.

83. Arora, Rajat. Railways plans Rs 40k crore projects to improve connectivity in North East. EconomicTimes.IndiaTimes.com. s.l. : The Economic Times, May 15, 2018.

84. Ul-Karim, Naim. Roundup: China-funded bridge rail link contributes to Bangladesh-India connectivity project. XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, May 9, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/09/c_137167483.htm.

85. Paul, Joshy M. Myanmar in China’s Push into the Indian Ocean. [Online] Institude for Defence Studies and Analysis, March 14, 2016. https://idsa.in/backgrounder/myanmar-in-chinas-push-into-the-indian-ocean_jmpaul_120316.

86. MarEx. China and Myanmar Agree to $1.3 Billion Port Project. Maritime-Executive.com. [Online] Maritime Executive, November 8, 2018. https://maritimeexecutive.com/article/china-and-myanmar-agree-to-1-3-billion-port-project.

87. Lee, Yimou and Aung, Thu Thu. China to take 70 percent stake in strategic port in Myanmar - official. Reuters.com. [Online] Reuters, October 17, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-myanmar-port/china-to-take-70-percent-stake-in-strategic-port-in-myanmar-official-idUSL4N1MS3UB.

88. Ghosh, Nirmal. China's dream of rail link to S-E Asia coming true. Straits Times. January 21, 2016.

73
89. Xinhua. Lao think tank suggests to maximize Laos-China railway. [ed.] Liangyu. XinhuaNet.com. s.l. : Xinhua, November 6, 2018.

90. Jiang, Jie. Construction of first phase of Thailand-China railway project to start in October. en.people.cn. s.l. : Xinhua, August 20, 2017. Quoted statement by Joint Committee on Railway Cooperation between Thailand and China.

91. Bangkok Post. Laos to join high-speed rail talks Please credit and share this article with others using this link:https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/transport/1410474/laos-to-join-high-speed-rail-talks. View our policies at http://goo.gl/9HgTd and http://goo.gl/ou6Ip. © Bangkok Post Public Company Limited. All rights reserved. BangkokPost.com. [Online] Bangkok Post, February 11, 2018.

https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/transport/1410474/laos-to-join-high-speed-rail-talks.

92. HKTDC Research. BRI Backing Boosts Malaysia's Rail Infrastructure Redevelopment. HKTDC.com. s.l. : Hong Kong Trade Development Council, January 5, 2018.

93. Sukumaran, Tashny. First Port Dickson, then Malaysia: democracy icon Anwar Ibrahim's first steps to political comeback. SCMP.com. s.l. : South China Morning Post, October 12, 2018.

94. Hammim, Rizalman. Construction of Gemas-JB electrified double tracking project to begin by year-end. NST.com. s.l. : New Straits Times, March 11, 2016.

95. Long, Ace. A Look Behind The Development of Kuantan Port: Collaboration Between Malaysia and China under BRI. BusinessTimes.cn. [Online] Business Times, November 3, 2018. http://en.businesstimes.cn/articles/104621/20181103/a-look-behind-the-development-of-malaysia-kuantan-port-funded-by-china.htm.

96. The Star. Liow: Thailand keen to hold talks on KL-Bangkok HSR link. TheStar.com.

97. Today. Thailand, Malaysia to begin talks on HSR linking Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur: Thai minister. TodayOnline.com. [Online] Mediacorp News Group, February 8, 2017. https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/thailand-malaysia-begin-talks-hsr-linking-bangkok-and-kuala-lumpur-thai-minister.

98. Singapore Land Transport Authority. Kuala Lumpur-Singapore High Speed Rail . https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/featured-projects/hsr.html.

99. Ming, Cheang. Malaysia is scrapping plans for a high-speed railway to Singapore. Here's who wins and loses. CNBC.com. [Online] CNBC, June 5, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/05/malaysias-scrapping-of-kl-singapore-high-speed-rail-project-has-implications.html.

100. Rogers, David. Vietnam to probe high-speed railway between Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi. Global Construction Review. October 31, 2016.

101. Xinhua. Vietnam to build high speed railway to Chinese border . XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, April 9, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201804/09/c_137097954.htm.

102. Sokheng, Vong. China to bridge missing rail link . The Phnom Penh Post. Phnom Penh : s.n., October 31, 2010.

103. Hoekstra, Ate. Will new train boost trade in Southeast Asia? DW.com. s.l. : Deutsche Welle, August 27, 2018.

104. Bangkok Post. Cambodian, Thai railway line on track. BangkokPost.com. s.l. : Bangkok Post Public Company Limited, June 28, 2018.

105. Papazoff, Milko. ASEAN Railway Connectivity : Current Status and Major Issues . JOINT ESCAP-UIC SEMINAR ON FACILITATION AND COSTING OF RAILWAY SERVICES ALONG THE TRANS-ASIAN RAILWAY. Bangkok : s.n., December 11, 2015.

106. Ganjanakhundee, Supalak. Completion of high-speed Southeast Asian rail link is still far down the track. NationMultimedia.com. s.l. : The Nation, January 22, 2018.

107. Phan, Soumy. Chinese Companies to Develop New Cambodian Railways. CambodiaDaily.com. [Online] The Cambodia Daily, May 17, 2017. https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/chinese-companies-to-develop-new-cambodian-railways-129841/.

74
108. Khmer Times. Cambodia’s port-construction and expansion frenzy. KhmerTimesKH.com. [Online] Khmer Times, September 12, 2018. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50532905/cambodias-port-construction-and-expansion-frenzy/.

109. Mellor, William. Influential Thais in push for Kra Canal project. Asia.Nikkei.Com. [Online] Nikkei Asian Review, August 7, 2017. https://asia.nikkei.com/PoliticsEconomy/Economy/Influential-Thais-in-push-for-Kra-Canal-project.

110. Menon, Rhea. Thailand's Kra Canal: China's Way Around the Malacca Strait. TheDiplomat.com. [Online] The Diplomat, April 6, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/thailands-kra-canal-chinas-way-around-the-malacca-strait/.

111. staff, GCR. Indebted Ethiopia gets major break on Chinese loan for Djibouti railway. GCR.com. s.l. : Global Construction Review, September 2018.

112. Jeffrey, James. Taking the train from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. DW.com. s.l. : Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2018.

113. Stratfor. Ethiopia Offers Investors a Tantalizing, If Tainted, Promise. Worldview.Stratfor.com. s.l. : Stratfor, November 22, 2018.

114. Blas, Javier. Chinese investment triggers new era of east African rail building . FT.com. s.l. : Financial Times, 2013.

115. Kuo, Lily. Kenya’s $3.2 billion Nairobi-Mombasa rail line opens with help from China. QZ.com. s.l. : Quartz Africa, June 2, 2017.

116. Lasuba, Memoscar. China to finance standard railway line to Juba. EyeRadio.org. s.l. : Eye Radio, June 16, 2018.

117. Frannie A. Léautier, Michael Schaefer, and Wei Shen. The Port of Bagamoyo: A Test for China’s New Maritime Silk Road in Africa. The Diplomat. December 1, 2015.

118. Xinhua. China-Tanzania talks over Bagamoyo port project in progress: envoy. XinhuaNet.com. s.l. : Xinhua, April 20, 2018.

119. Reuters Staff. Tanzania signs $154 million contract with Chinese firm to expand main port. Reuters.com. s.l. : Thomson Reuters, June 10, 2017.

120. Van Mead, Nick. China in Africa: win-win development, or a new colonialism? TheGuardian.com. [Online] The Guardian, July 31, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/china-in-africa-win-win-development-or-a-new-colonialism.

121. Xinhua. Chinese contractor to complete first berth of Lamu port in mid 2018. Standard Digital. s.l. : Standard Media, April 8, 2017.

122. LCDA. What is the LAPSSET corridor program? Lapsset.go.ke. [Online] LCDA, November 2018. http://www.lapsset.go.ke/.

123. MacauHub. China’s CHEC involved in investment of US$1 billion in the new port of Maputo. MacauHub.com. s.l. : MacauHub.com.

124. Railways Africa. Is The Techobanine Port Construction Project Back On? RailwaysAfrica.com. [Online] Railways Africa, April 18, 2018. https://www.railwaysafrica.com/news/is-the-techobanine-port-construction-project-back-on.

125. Mozambique and China: A fast friendship into the future. MacaoMagazine.net. [Web]. s.l. : Macao Magazine, August 2016.

126. AfricaPorts. PORT OF BEIRA. AfricaPorts.co.za. [Online] 2018. https://africaports.co.za/beira/.

127. Xinhua. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Long Term Plan launched in Pakistan. SCIO.gov.cn. s.l. : The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, December 20, 2017.

128. MarEx. Pakistan Gives China a 40-Year Lease for Gwadar Port . Maritime-Executive.com. s.l. : The Maritime Executive, April 27, 2017.

129. Jabarkhyl, Nawied. Oman counts on Chinese billions to build desert boomtown. Reuters.com. s.l. : Thomson Reuters, September 5, 2017.

130. Macguire, Eoghan. Can Duqm become the Arab world's next 'great city?'. CNN.com. [Online] CNN, June 4, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/03/middleeast/oman-duqm-ime-diversification/index.html.

131. Stacey, Kiran. China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. FT.com. New Delhi : Financial Times, December 11, 2017.

75
132. BBC. Sri Lanka signs deal on Hambantota port with China. BBC.com. [Online] BBC, July 29, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40761732.

133. Aneez, Shihar. China Harbour Engineering to invest $1 billion in Sri Lanka's Port City: minister. Retuers.com. s.l. : Thomson Reuters, January 2, 2018.

134. Safi, Michael. Sri Lanka's 'new Dubai': will Chinese-built city suck the life out of Colombo? TheGuardian.com. [Online] The Guardian, August 2, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/02/sri-lanka-new-dubai-chinese-city-colombo.

135. MarEx. China and Myanmar Agree to $1.3 Billion Port Project . Maritime-Executive.com. [Online] The Maritime Executive, November 8, 2018. https://maritimeexecutive.com/article/china-and-myanmar-agree-to-1-3-billion-port-project.

136. Kynge, James. Chinese purchases of overseas ports top $20bn in past year. FT.com. London : Financial Times, July 15, 2017.

137. Aziz, Adam. Certain approvals for Melaka Gateway have lapsed, reveals minister. TheEdgeMarkets.com. [Online] The Edge Markets, July 12, 2018. http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/certain-approvals-melaka-gateway-have-lapsed-reveals-minister.

138. Bernama. Focus on port development to generate state economy,says Melaka CM. NST.com.my. [Online] New Straits Times, June 3, 2018. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/06/376178/focus-port-development-generate-state-economysays-melaka-cm.

139. Ali, intan Amalina Mohd. Cruise ship calls Penang home . TheStar.com.my. [Online] The Star, November 14, 2018. https://www.thestar.com.my/metro/metronews/2018/11/14/cruise-ship-calls-penang-home-state-welcomes-superstar-gemini-and-passengers-to-explore-its-attracti/.

140. Sokhorng, Cheng. Sihanoukville port kicks off use of new terminal . PhnomPenhPost.com. [Online] The Phnom Penh Post, June 26, 2018. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/sihanoukville-port-kicks-use-new-terminal.

141. TEDA Suez. China-Egypt Strategy Intersection. SETC-Zone.com. [Web]. s.l. : TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, April 6, 2017.

142. Xinhua. Spotlight: Fast growing China-Egypt ties backed by leaders' strong support . XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, October 25, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/25/c_137557525.htm.

143. —. Chinese firm signs deal to upgrade Ukraine's Black Sea port. ChinaDaily.com.cn. s.l. : China Daily, May 19, 2017.

144. Melkozerova, Veronika. Chinese company ends project to deepen Yuzhny Port (VIDEO). KyivPost.com. [Online] Kyiv Post, January 30, 2018. https://www.kyivpost.com/business/chinese-company-ends-project-deepen-yuzhniy-port-video.html.

145. Mooney, Turloch. China pumps $600 million into deep-sea Angola port. JOC.com. s.l. : Journal of Commerce, January 25, 2017.

146. Song, Lifang. Angola's Cabinda port projects running smoothly . XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, October 5, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201710/05/c_136660257.htm.

147. Tagba, Kamailoudini. Mauritania Awards Building of N’Diago Port to China’s Controversial Polytechnology. NorthAfricaPost.com. s.l. : The North Africa Post, December 13, 2016.

148. NAP. Mauritania Awards Building of N’Diago Port to China’s Controversial Polytechnology. NorthAfricaPost.com. [Online] The North Africa Post, December 13, 2016. http://northafricapost.com/15505-mauritania-awards-building-ndiago-port-chinas-controversial-polytechnology.html.

149. Egan, Corianne. China helps fill Africa port infrastructure vacuum. JOC.com. s.l. : Journal of Commerce, December 12, 2014.

150. Ezekiel, Kenny. Port Expansion Project: Mahama gov’t indicted; Ghana to lose over $2bn – Danquah Institute. TodayInGH.com. [Online] Today in GH, November 14, 2018. https://todayingh.com/port-expansion-project-mahama-govt-indicted-ghana-to-lose-over-2bn-danquah-institute-7056/.

76
151. HKTDC Research. Prospects for the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park and Kuantan Port. HKTDC.com. s.l. : Hong Kong Trade Development Council, May 16, 2017.

152. Smyth, Jamie. Australia port project highlights schism over Chinese investment. FT.com. Darwin, Australia : Financial Times, July 17, 2017.

153. Murray, Lisa. Chinese-owned Darwin Port struggling to pay back debts. AFR.com. s.l. : Financial Review, July 17, 2018.

154. L.G. What is the Northern Sea Route? Economist.com. [Online] The Economist, September 24, 2018. https://www.economist.com/the-economistexplains/2018/09/24/what-is-the-northern-sea-route.

155. Louppova, Julia. Russia to build a new deep-sea port in the north. Port.today. [Online] Port Today, June 19, 2018. https://port.today/russia-build-new-deep-portnorth/.

156. Xinhua. Norway's Arctic town envisions gateway on Polar Silk Road with link to China. China.org.cn. s.l. : China Internet Information Center, March 10, 2018.

157. Lifang. Feature: Norway's Arctic town envisions gateway on Polar Silk Road with link to China . XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, March 10, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029125.htm.

77
# APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS OF PROJECT RANKINGS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

Table B1: Spearman (rank) correlation of changes in (log) market access under different assumptions, when all BRI projects are built in complement

|||||No cost<br>to switch|||Halfway||No|Using|Using<br>pop.<br>instead of||||Add<br>external|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||θ=8.1,|between||Add retail|reduction|θ=15.7,|terminal|simple|GDP for|Oxford|No tariffs|ESCAP-W|B<br>markets|
|||Labor share|<br>for agri-|road and|Labor share|<br>distribution|in trade|for|handling|average|market|Economic|s<br>or border|tariffs and|(Rest of|
||Baseline|β=0.8|culture|rail|β=0|costs|costs|mining|charges|tariff|size|GDP|costs|border costs|<br>World)|
|Baseline|1|1|0.99|1|0.98|0.98|0.97|0.97|0.96|0.94|0.91|0.91|0.85|0.76|0.71|
|Labor share||||||||||||||||
|β=0.8|1|1|1|0.99|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.97|0.96|0.95|0.92|0.91|0.85|0.76|0.71|
|θ=8.11, for<br>agriculture|0.99|1|1|0.99|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.96|0.94|0.92|0.92|0.85|0.75|0.72|
|No cost to switch||||||||||||||||
|between road and||||||||||||||||
|rail|1|0.99|0.99|1|0.98|0.98|0.97|0.97|0.96|0.94|0.92|0.91|0.85|0.76|0.72|
|Labor share<br>β=0|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.98|1|0.97|0.96|0.97|0.94|0.93|0.93|0.93|0.87|0.77|0.71|
|Add retail<br>distribution costs|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.98|0.97|1|0.96|0.96|0.95|0.96|0.9|0.89|0.86|0.77|0.71|
|Halfway reduction<br>in trade costs|0.97|0.98|0.98|0.97|0.96|0.96|1|0.96|0.95|0.92|0.89|0.89|0.83|0.72|0.69|
|θ=15.72, for<br>mining|0.97|0.97|0.98|0.97|0.97|0.96|0.96|1|0.93|0.92|0.92|0.92|0.83|0.74|0.72|
|No terminal<br>handling charges|0.96|0.96|0.96|0.96|0.94|0.95|0.95|0.93|1|0.92|0.86|0.86|0.81|0.73|0.7|
|Using simple<br>average tariff|0.94|0.95|0.94|0.94|0.93|0.96|0.92|0.92|0.92|1|0.88|0.86|0.83|0.78|0.7|
|Using population||||||||||||||||
|instead of GDP<br>for market size|0.91|0.92|0.92|0.92|0.93|0.9|0.89|0.92|0.86|0.88|1|0.97|0.85|0.81|0.77|
|Oxford<br>Economics GDP|0.91|0.91|0.92|0.91|0.93|0.89|0.89|0.92|0.86|0.86|0.97|1|0.85|0.81|0.8|
|No tariffs or||||||||||||||||
|border costs|0.85|0.85|0.85|0.85|0.87|0.86|0.83|0.83|0.81|0.83|0.85|0.85|1|0.83|0.7|

78
APPENDIX C: COUNTERFACTUAL OUTPUT ACCOUNTING FOR FACTOR MOBILITY (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

# <u>Step 1: Estimate Baseline Productivity and Land Quantity</u>

Begin with equation (5) from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), originally a result of Eaton and Kortum (2002), which gives the value of total exports from o to d, Sum this equation over all locations d, and apply the goods market clearing condition to yield each location’s total output Combining equations (3) and (4) from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) yields the spatial −1/θ equilibrium condition in terms of consumer market access, wo = U̅Po = U̅CMAo . Further, due to the Cobb Douglas technology, Loqo = αYo. Substitute these two identities into the equation above and take logs to yield Rearranging terms yields κ1 where κ2 . The normalization of U̅ such that κ2 = 0 yields an expression for that = ln (α<sup>αθ</sup> U̅<sup>γθ</sup> ~~)~~ allows us to infer productivity (normalized by the quantity of land) from only baseline output, consumer market access and firm market access. We call this <u>Step 2: Calculate Counterfactual Output.</u> 80
Equation (5) defines counterfactual output and utility as a function of estimated baseline productivity and the new values of consumer and firm market access: 1 κ1 where κ<sup>′</sup> 3<sup>=</sup> and the term U̅<sup>′</sup> is utility after the road is constructed. This (1+θα) ln (α<sup>αθ</sup> (U̅<sup>′</sup> )<sup>γθ</sup> ) equation highlights that the new values of market access can result in multiple values of counterfactual output, depending on whether total utility changes as a result of the investment. As described in Donaldson and Hornbeck, the change in U̅<sup>′</sup> depends on whether the network is open to foreign factors; that is, whether additional population and capital from countries outside the BRI can move to BRI cities.

If the BRI countries are small enough, total utility remains fixed (U̅<sup>′</sup> = U̅) and equation (6) becomes Theorem 1 of Allen and Arkolakis (2014) states that Yo′ is a unique fixed point, which may be found through an iterative algorithm. To find it, begin by plugging into the right hand side of (7) values of CMA′o and FMA′o calculated using τ′o, the new set of transportation costs, and Yo, the original values of output in each location. This yields a new value of Yo′. Next, recalculate CMA′o and FMA′o using this new value of output in each location, and plug them back into (7) to yield a next value of Yo′. Eventually this will converge to the unique fixed point.

81