metadata: authors: 0: author: Chatruc,Marisol Rodríguez
1: author: Rozo Villarraga,Sandra Viviana
count: Colombia,Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de
docna: 0: docna: In Someone Else’s Shoes : Reducing Prejudice
            Through Perspective Taking
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Gender and Development,Indigenous Communities,Indigenous Peoples Law,Indigenous Peoples,Educational Sciences,Labor Markets
teratopic: Gender,Communities and Human Settlements,Law and Development,Culture and Development,Education,Social Protections and Labor
abstracts: cdata!: This study investigates the
            effectiveness of online, low-cost, scalable interventions
            aimed at reducing prejudice against an out-group through the
            use of perspective taking. The authors conducted an online
            experiment in which Colombian natives were randomly assigned
            to either watch a video documentary about Venezuelan forced
            migrants crossing the Colombian border on foot or to play an
            online game that immersed them in the life of a Venezuelan
            forced migrant. Compared to a control group, both treatments
            led to increased altruism towards Venezuelans and improved
            attitudes toward forced migrants. However, only the game
            significantly boosted self-reported trust. In terms of
            effectiveness per minute of treatment, the video was at
            least four times more efficient than the game in enhancing
            prosociality. Given the video&#x2019;s comparably
            shorter duration, greater ease of dissemination, and lower
            demand for active involvement, it appears a superior option
            to enhance prosocial behaviors in the short term.
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repnme: repnme: In Someone Else’s Shoes : Reducing
            Prejudice Through Perspective Taking
display_title: In Someone Else’s Shoes : Reducing
            Prejudice Through Perspective Taking
listing_relative_url: /research/2021/11/33650167/someone-else’s-shoes-reducing-prejudice-through-perspective-taking
topicv3: Indigenous Peoples m1326947 749,Education m1327048 470,Gender m1327621 615,Jobs m1503931 2670,Psychiatry, Psychology m1504686 3613
publishtoextweb_dt: 2021-11-30T00:00:00Z
dois: 10.1596/1813-9450-9866
historic_topic: Gender,Communities and Human Settlements,Law and Development,Culture and Development,Education,Social Protections and Labor
origu: DECRG: Poverty & Inequality (DECPI)
no_of_pages: 72
author_keys: 0: author_key: NA
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model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 9866 In Someone Else’s Shoes Reducing Prejudice Through Perspective Taking _Marisol Rodríguez Chatruc Sandra V. Rozo_ Development Economics Development Research Group November 2021
Policy Research Working Paper 9866

# **Abstract**

This study investigates the effectiveness of online, low-cost, scalable interventions aimed at reducing prejudice against an out-group through the use of perspective taking. The authors conducted an online experiment in which Colombian natives were randomly assigned to either watch a video documentary about Venezuelan forced migrants crossing the Colombian border on foot or to play an online game that immersed them in the life of a Venezuelan forced migrant. Compared to a control group, both treat-ments led to increased altruism towards Venezuelans and improved attitudes toward forced migrants. However, only the game significantly boosted self-reported trust. In terms of effectiveness per minute of treatment, the video was at least four times more efficient than the game in enhancing prosociality. Given the video’s comparably shorter duration, greater ease of dissemination, and lower demand for active involvement, it appears a superior option to enhance prosocial behaviors in the short term.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at srozovillarraga@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **In Someone Else’s Shoes: Reducing Prejudice Through Perspective Taking**<sup>*</sup>

Marisol Rodr ́ıguez Chatruc<sup>†</sup> Sandra V. Rozo<sup>‡</sup> Originally published in the Policy Research Working Paper Series on _November 2021._ This version is updated on _May 2024._ To obtain the originally published version, please email prwp@worldbank.org.

## **JEL Classification:** C91, D91, J15 **Keywords:** migration, prejudice, perspective taking, altruism, trust, prosocial behaviors

> *We thank the editor Andrew Foster and the two anonymous referees for insightful suggestions and comments. We are also extremely grateful to Mar ́ıa Jos ́e Urbina, Tatiana Hiller, Camila Cort ́es, and Lucina Rodr ́ıguez for providing excellent research assistance. We benefited from comments from Pablo Bachelet, Mariana Blanco, Guillermo Cruces, David McKenzie, Berk Ozler, Salma Mousa, Margaret Peters, Yannay Spitzer, Mart ́ın Rossi, Subha Mani, and audiences at the 2021 Symposium on Economic Experiments in Developing Countries, LACEA BRAIN 2021, the 14th International Conference on Migration and Development, Universitat de Barcelona, Universidad de San Andr ́es, IZA 2021 Migration Webinar, and LACEALAMES 2021. We also thank Mariana Blanco and Andr ́es Zambrano from the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Lab at Universidad del Rosario (REBEL) for implementing the experiment, Gast ́on Cleiman for developing the interactive applications, and Carlos Macher, who produced “Walking for Freedom,” for adapting the documentary for our purposes. Finally, we thank Adela Barrio, Marcela Colmenares, Alejandra Holguin, and Carolina Aclan for their administrative support. USC IRB approval UP-20-00522 and Universidad del Rosario IRB Approval CS239. This study is registered in the AEA RCT Registry with unique identifying number AEARCTR-0006190. The contents of this study are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their employers, funding agencies, or governments. Marisol Rodr ́ıguez Chatruc acknowledges funding from the Inter-American Development Bank.

> †Inter-American Development Bank, email: marisolro@iadb.org.

> ‡Development Research Group, World Bank, email: sandrarozo@worldbank.org.
“ _As we have no immediate experience of what other men we can no idea the manner in which are feel, form of they affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation._ ” Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)

# **1 Introduction**

Out-group prejudice and its associated exclusionary behaviors can have damaging economic consequences. At the individual level, it can lead to lower effort, worse academic outcomes, and wage gaps (Glover, Pallais and Pariente, 2017; Alesina et al., 2024; Charles and Guryan, 2008). At the aggregate level, it can hurt productivity and economic growth (Hjort, 2014; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). With a record 108.4 million people forcibly displaced around the world, prejudice towards forced migrants is on the rise in host nations.<sup>1</sup> In this context, strategies to reduce such prejudice should be a policy priority, especially in developing countries that host the majority of these flows. But which interventions can truly reduce prejudice and still be scalable at a low cost?

This study tests the effectiveness in reducing prejudice of online, low-cost, scalable interventions that provide information while appealing to participants’ emotions. Previous work has shown that providing only factual information reduces misinformation but does not lessen prejudice (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin, 2019; Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal, 2020; Williamson, 2019). Moreover, although interventions to foster contact between groups have achieved the latter aim, they are difficult to coordinate and expensive to scale up (Mousa, 2020; Lowe, 2021).

We use a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the efficacy of two online, perspectivetaking interventions in promoting prosocial behaviors and improving hosts’ attitudes and beliefs about forcibly displaced migrants. Previous work grounded in social psychology

> 1 Displacement figures come from (UNHCR, 2023). Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index has decreased globally between 2016 and 2019; visit: https://news.gallup.com/poll/320678/ world-grows-less-accepting-migrants.aspx.

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has yielded promising results of perspective-taking interventions (e.g., Berthold et al., 2013; Hamilton-Giachritsis et al., 2018; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2018; Simonovits, Kezdi and Kardos, 2018). Yet, little evidence exists concerning the online efficacy of these types of interventions or the effects they have in changing actual behaviors toward forced migrants.

According to social psychology theory, cognitive-emotional interventions train individuals to use emotion-regulation strategies to fight their personal prejudices (Paluck et al., 2021).<sup>2</sup> In particular, perspective taking encourages individuals to experience the thoughts or emotions of others. This can lead to more favorable attitudes toward that particular person but also toward members of that person’s group (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; Todd and Galinsky, 2014).<sup>3</sup> In the case of Colombian hosts, we hypothesize that perspective taking could ease prejudice toward Venezuelan forced migrants by facilitating understanding of their decisions and the involuntary nature of their circumstances.

To test this hypothesis, we designed an experiment that exposed a random subset of 897 participants to either an online video or a game. The video is a documentary that depicts the struggles of Venezuelans crossing the Colombian border on foot, including hardships such as freezing temperatures and sleeping on the streets, and it features first-person testimonies about family separation. Participants in the game assume the role of a Venezuelan migrant and experience her challenges. They receive text and voice messages from her relatives and friends, and they can make decisions in her place—such as where to migrate—that lead to alternative life paths.

Each of our interventions explores a different pathway to activate perspective taking. On one hand, the game involves active role-playing, which has been shown to increase

> 2Cognitive refers to the mental processes involved in knowing, learning, and understanding things. 3Recent research has shown promising results for “perspective getting”—hearing about the experiences of an out-group member from them or others— interventions in reducing exclusionary behaviors (Kalla and Broockman, 2023). The authors compare the efficacy of perspective getting, analogic perspective taking (recalling a similar situation from one’s own experience), and vicarious perspective (recounting the experiences of an out-group member) using in-person, door-to-door canvassing experiments. They document that perspective getting consistently reduces exclusionary attitudes.

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one’s ability to see the world from other points of view and to increase perspective taking (Stewart et al., 2003).<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the video exposes participants to personal narratives that can emotionally “transport” the audience to a fictional world and spur changes in their beliefs (Green and Brock, 2000).

Immediately after the interventions, we applied a survey instrument that elicited attitudes and beliefs about migrants and assessed two prosocial behaviors: altruism and self-reported trust towards Venezuelans. We measured altruism through participants’ donation behavior in a dictator game. We told participants they would be given an amount of money and then we asked how they would allocate it among themselves, an organization that helps Venezuelan migrants, and a well-known Colombian nonprofit group that builds houses for vulnerable populations. A control group did not receive any treatment and only took part in the survey.

The participants in our intervention recently experienced a drastic change in the demographic composition of their communities due to a massive influx of Venezuelan forced migrants. In just six years, more than five million people have fled the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and relocated in other countries, making Venezuelans the second-largest internationally displaced population after Syrians. Colombia is the main destination country for this contingent, hosting 2.89 million Venezuelans, and Bogot ́a is the main recipient city, accounting for almost 20 percent of Colombia’s Venezuelan population. Attitudes towards Venezuelans have deteriorated markedly in Colombia, as reported in the media and evidenced by the decline in Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index, which in Colombia had the third-largest drop in the world between 2016 and 2019.<sup>5</sup>

> 4In order to ameliorate demand effects, we (unlike many studies in social psychology) do not provide explicit instructions to intervention participants when they perform the activities.

> 5Gallup compared 140 countries between 2016 and 2019 (see footnote 1); the three largest declines in migrant acceptance took place in the main destination countries of the Venezuelan exodus (Per ́u, Ecuador, and Colombia). Surveys conducted locally also reveal increases in intolerance; see, e.g., the following report by _Semana_ magazine: https://s3.amazonaws.com/semanaruralvzla/documentos/ 1568067274_boletin7pdf.

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Although our study focuses on college students and white-collar workers in Bogot ́a, prejudice toward in Colombia and Latin America is even migrants pervasively widespread across individuals with varying levels of education, as observed using data from the public opinion survey Latinobarometro (Figure A.1). In fact, prejudice against migrants is positively and strongly correlated with the stock of the migrant population (Figure A.2). Therefore, this study is informative for policy-making in countries that host many migrants and want to reduce prejudice in the short term. Moreover, individuals with high levels of education could contribute donations and taxes as well as financially through offer political support to bolster vulnerable populations. Thus, they are worth studying.

We document two main findings. First, the interventions successfully improved prosociality and attitudes toward migrants. Participants assigned to either the game or the video were approximately 11 percentage points (pp) more likely to donate to the charity that supports Venezuelan migrants than participants assigned to the control group, equivalent to a 16 percent increase. The game itself improved self-reported trust towards Venezuelans by 0.29 standard deviations (sd) relative to the control group. Regarding attitudes towards migrants, both treatments had a positive and significant impact on the assessment that migrant poverty was due to circumstances beyond a migrant’s control, rather than to a lack of effort on their part. Moreover, both treatments had positive and significant effects on policy attitudes about government assistance to migrants.

We also find that, per minute spent on each intervention, the video was at least four times more effective than the game in improving prosocial behaviors and attitudes toward forced migrants. This conclusion holds weight, especially considering the game’s demand for greater attention and active engagement, along with its limitation to a specific platform. The video’s shorter duration and seamless scalability across online platforms make it a more favorable choice for fostering prosocial behaviors in the short term.

In addition, we evaluated if the treatments affected the empathetic concern and perspective5
taking abilities of participants.<sup>6</sup> To this end, we applied (post-treatment) the empathy and perspective-taking subscales from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index questionnaire (Davis, 1983). These scales measure the extent of empathic concern and perspective taking in general, not just towards migrants. Both treatments had positive impacts on the perspective-taking scale, but only the game was statistically significant. The results align with the objectives of the game activity and with the fact that the game requires more involvement, since participants not only watch and listen but also make decisions and express ideas from a migrant’s perspective. Moreover, only the video had a positive impact on empathy. This accords with previous results suggesting that perspective taking through personal narratives is one potential way to increase empathy toward an outgroup (Busselle and Bilandzic, 2009; Nabi and Green, 2015).

A potential concern with our research design is the threat of social desirability bias (SDB), an individual’s tendency to answer according to how they believe others will view their Several comments are due here. responses. First, the survey was both online and anonymous, which can reduce the tendency to please others. Second, a large fraction of individuals in the control group expressed prejudice, so social desirability did not seem pervasive.<sup>7</sup> Third, we find changes in donations (a high-stakes behavior) in response to the treatments but significant changes in only a subset of attitudes, which seems inconsistent with individuals trying to act according to the study’s hypothesis. Fourth, we present formal evidence that rejects the hypothesis that social desirability—measured through the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale—was more prevalent in the treated groups and disproportionately affected our results.

Within the broad field of prejudice reduction (Paluck and Green, 2009; Paluck et al., 2021), our contributes to a recent literature on interventions to attitudes and be- paper change

> 6An empathetic response has been documented to occur after interventions that induce perspective taking (Batson, 2011).

> 7For example, among participants in the control group, 44 percent agreed that Colombians should have the first chance at any kind of job.

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haviors towards immigrants as well as preferences for migration policy. Given extensive evidence that natives hold biased beliefs about the size and characteristics of immigrant populations, a first group of studies has attempted to shift attitudes by correcting these misperceptions. Although information provision tends to update beliefs, these interventions have had mixed success in changing attitudes (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022; Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal, 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2020; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin, 2019; Williamson, 2019), perhaps because individuals tend to engage in motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge, 2006).

A second body of research has recognized the limitations of information provision and instead has leveraged emotional states to influence attitudes through perspective-taking exercises and games, and through drawing parallels to personal experiences. For example, individuals in the United States who were asked to imagine themselves as refugees were more likely to write a letter to the president in support of refugees (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2018); an online game reduced anti-Roma sentiment in Hungary and shifted voting intentions away from the right-wing party (Simonovits, Kezdi and Kardos, 2018); and individuals in Greece, Germany, and the United States who were primed to think about their families’ migration histories increased pledges of monetary donations and improved attitudes towards refugees (Dinas, Fouka and Schl ̈apfer, 2021; Williamson et al., 2021).

We directly contribute to this second group of studies by testing the impacts of two types of online perspective-taking interventions on prosocial behaviors—altruism and trust— and assessing whether they increased empathy and perspective taking as measured by a validated psychological scale. Except for Simonovits, Kezdi and Kardos (2018), existing studies have not used interventions based on online games or media as we do. The game in Simonovits, Kezdi and Kardos (2018) is closest to our intervention but the authors do not explore impacts on behaviors. Dinas, Fouka and Schl ̈apfer (2021) explore donating behavior but use interventions that appeal to participants’ feelings about their families’ 7
migration histories. Also, they measure altruism through a hypothetical donation (i.e., if the participants won a raffle) whereas we elicit an actual donation (i.e., a high-stakes behavior). We also innovate by introducing trust towards migrants as an outcome. Finally, existing studies have not examined the role of empathy, except for Williamson et al. (2021), but they use a self-reported measure whereas we use a validated scale.<sup>8</sup> Our also to the literature that studies the between paper speaks relationship migration and prosocial behaviors. A body of work finds that the desire for redistribution is typically lower across racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality groups than within these groups (Alesina et al., 2011; Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013), and that support for redistribution is lower when migration is higher (Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Tabellini, 2020). Recent evidence also suggests that priming people to think about migration reduces preferences for redistribution and donation to charities (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022), and that natives reciprocate trust less to immigrants from non-Western countries than to their own co-nationals (Cettolin and Suetens, 2019).<sup>9</sup> We contribute to this literature by providing evidence that online interventions that induce perspective taking can modify altruism and trust towards forced migrants.

Our results have important implications. Developing countries host 76 percent of displaced populations worldwide (UNHCR, 2023) and face significant challenges to integration. Governments allocate resources to communications campaigns and other initiatives to promote social cohesion and prevent conflict between groups—all without solid evidence on which programs are more effective.<sup>10</sup> Online, low-cost interventions like the ones in this paper could promote inclusionary behaviors in schools, colleges, universities, and workplaces in the short run.

> 8The question they pose is: _I empathize with the reasons people want to immigrate to the United States, as well as the hardships they face when coming to this country_ .

> 9An exception is (Hassan et al., 2019), who find that Egyptians display higher levels of altruism, trust, and cooperation towards Syrian immigrants than towards their own co-nationals.

> 10In Latin America and Colombia in particular, many such well-intended initiatives exist but are rarely, if ever, evaluated.

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# **2 The Interventions**

We randomly assigned participants in our experiment to a treatment group (either the game or the video) or to a control group. Groups were randomized at registration, after which each individual received Zoom meeting details to join a call at a specific date and time. Once they joined the call, they received a treatment. We describe each treatment in detail below. Immediately after the treatment, we collected a survey to elicit prosocial attitudes and behaviors. The control group only answered the survey and did not receive any treatment.

# **2.1 Treatment arms**

# **2.1.1 Game treatment**

In this arm, participants undertook an activity called _En Otros Zapatos_ (EOZ), which means _In Someone Else’s Shoes_ . The Inter-American Development Bank created the EOZ platform to promote empathy towards marginalized groups and underrepresented minorities by inviting users to “step into” the shoes of these individuals. The website is open to the public and allows users to participate in several interactive stories.<sup>11</sup> For this experiment, we used a new story of a Venezuelan forced migrant who moves to Colombia. A writer created this fictional story based on interviews he conducted with Venezuelan forced migrants in Colombia. In the game, the user takes the role of “Mile Rodr ́ıguez,” a female Venezuelan migrant with a husband and two young children. Participants begin by reading her story, which describes the challenges Mile faces in Venezuela (e.g., lack of food and proper medical attention) that eventually prompt her family to emigrate to Colombia. With this information, the user must decide whether to migrate directly to Bogot ́a—the capital and her husband’s preferred option—or to Riohacha, a northern city recommended by a neighbor. Each decision leads the user to a different life path. Once at either destination, the user continues to read Mile’s story and to make decisions for her.

11 For more details, visit https://enotroszapatos.iadb.org/.

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The user also receives letters and voice messages from Mile’s relatives and friends, listens to songs that are meaningful to her, and views pictures of her family. The activity also lets the user their and write a letter to Mile’s mother. B.1 illustrates express feelings Figure sample images of the game.

Participants took, on average, 29 minutes to complete the game, although the time that they spent on the game varied widely (Figure C.1). Importantly, participants do not control the game duration due to multiple story paths of varying length; some lead to an abrupt ending similar to those in the famous children’s book series _Choose Your Own Adventure_ . This feature was designed purposely to prevent selection of those individuals who would spend more time on the game. As shown in Table C.1, this design effectively prevented correlation between the time spent on the game and the individual demographics we collected. Particularly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that these covariates are jointly statistically different from zero (joint significance F-Test (Prob _>_ F): 0.185).

# **2.1.2 Video treatment**

In this arm, participants watched a short documentary, “Walking for Freedom.” It lasts 6:39 minutes and depicts the struggles of Venezuelan forced migrants who cross the Colombian border on foot. The video begins with sounds of roaring wind and images of the mountains in _El P ́aramo de Berl ́ın_ (a common migration route) with a caption that reads, “3,223 meters of altitude at its highest elevation point, minimum temperature -5 Celsius.” It then shows migrants walking on the road while female voice-overs offer reasons for leaving Venezuela, including one that says: “If I had stayed in Venezuela, I would be without a child.” This is followed by footage of migrants at an official border crossing where a woman reports that her son died from lack of oxygen in Venezuela. The video subsequently shows images of the _trochas_ , illegal border crossings, with a woman’s voice saying she crossed through the trocha but was separated from her son and has not seen 10
him in four days. The fourth location shown is a refuge for migrant women and children. The woman running the refuge, herself a Venezuelan migrant, shares emotive stories and explains that even in freezing temperatures, the male migrants must sleep outside due to lack of space. Then there is footage of dozens of men sleeping on the cold street at night and images from inside the refuge that show dozens of women with their children. A woman then narrates how much her body hurt after walking for so long in the cold. After that, a banner is shown that reads: “The Venezuelan people have become one of the largest displaced groups in the world. More than 5 million Venezuelans have escaped their country. This is approximately 17.6% of the population of their country.” The video continues with several emotional migrant testimonies—many about family separation— until the end, when a banner appears that reads: “More help is needed.” Figure B.2 illustrates sample images of the video.

# **2.1.3 Comparing the game and the video**

The game and video treatments differ in several key ways, although both underscore challenging realities such as the involuntary nature of these migration decisions and migrants’ vulnerability throughout the process. First, there is a notable difference in duration between the two interventions, with the game lasting 29 minutes on average, considerably longer than the 6:39-minute video. Second, while the video’s duration is fixed, the game’s length varies based on the user’s speed, decision-making, and the length of the selected path, which offers a dynamic experience. Importantly, as explained earlier, participants do not control the game’s duration. Third, in terms of engagement, the game demands more active participation from individuals, including decision-making and written responses, whereas the video—although quicker to consume—offers a passive experience. We wanted to test whether the game was more effective due to the more immersive experience it offers users. Finally, the video has greater potential for scalability through social media due to its shorter duration and ease of viewing and sharing compared to the game, which requires access to a specific website to play, plus more active engagement.

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# **2.2 Sample and randomization**

Our experiment took place between October 15th and November 23rd of 2020. We partnered with Rosario Experimental and Behavioral Economics Lab (REBEL), the first behavioral economics lab in South America, which is located at Universidad del Rosario, a renowned university in Colombia.<sup>12</sup> We originally planned to conduct the experiment in person at the lab but ended up conducting it online since the campus was closed during 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

# **2.3 Recruitment and eligibility**

We used the same REBEL for their In- recruiting process usually employs experiments. dividuals invited to the experiment are part of REBEL’s subjects pool, which includes university students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and nonstudents.<sup>13</sup> The lab sent an email to its subject pool that invited recipients to participate in an online experiment for no more than an hour in exchange for a monetary incentive.<sup>14</sup> The invitation did not provide any information about our hypotheses. We sent a total of 2,132 individuals the invitation, of which 897 registered successfully and showed up to the experiment sessions. Of these, 858 completed the activity. Connectivity issues predominantly explained the 4.3 percent attrition rate. The requirements to register were: to be older than 18 years of age, to be available for one hour, to have a computer with a stable internet connection, and to have access to an online financial platform in order to receive the compensation. We paid the compensation through three different, commonly used financial platforms in Colombia.

> 12For information about the lab, visit https://www.urosario.edu.co/Rebel/Inicio/?lang= ENG.

> 13Students are recruited from the most important universities in Bogot ́a: Universidad del Rosario, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad Tadeo Lozano, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Universidad Javeriana, Universidad Nacional, Universidad Central, Universidad Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca, and Universidad de la Salle. Nonstudents are recruited among employees of Universidad del Rosario and other public partner institutions such as the Colombian Central Bank.

> 14REBEL paid participants a show-up fee equivalent to 2.5 dollars plus an extra 5 dollars to those who completed the activity. Participants could obtain a maximum additional 2.5 dollars as a result of the dictator game. In 2020, the minimum hourly wage in Colombia was approximately 1.3 dollars.

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Once participants registered, they were individually randomized to one of three groups (game, video, and control) and received a Zoom link to connect to an online session. We organized 45 of these sessions according to treatment group to facilitate the provision of support in case technical difficulties arose. The sessions had different schedules to accommodate participants’ availability, and the average session size was 19 participants. Once individuals connected to the meeting, they received instructions and had the opportunity to chat with a technician if they had technical problems. Individuals in the meetings did not interact with or see one another. Immediately after the intervention, all participants answered a survey.

# **2.4**

Due to documented differences in altruistic behavior between men and women (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), we stratified invitations by gender to attain a balanced sample in this dimension. In addition, we stratified sessions by student status to increase the external validity of our results relative to what would have happened had we worked only with university students.<sup>15</sup> However, after three sessions of the game treatment, we noticed that more women than men were attending the sessions. To correct this, we applied gender quotas and oversampled the number of sessions of the game group, which yielded a larger sample size for this group. In the end, we obtained gender balance in the control group and the video treatment group; although gender balance improved purely by chance in the game treatment group, it still had more women, around 60 percent. In the student-status dimension, since more students registered overall, our sample had around 60 percent of students in each treatment group. The final sample sizes were: 272 for the control group, 316 for the game treatment group, and 243 for the video treatment group. In the preanalysis plan, we stated that we would collect a sample of 600, due mainly to budgetary constraints. When the experiment ultimately took place online instead of in

> 15In the preanalysis plan, we intended to stratify only by gender because we thought we would work with only university students, but later we learned REBEL’s subject pool contained adult nonstudents as well.

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person, our costs dropped and we were able to increase the sample size to 897.

Table 1 shows the treatment randomization was successful and the sample was balanced in terms of covariates, except for gender. We control for the stratification variables (gender and student status) in all regressions. Table D.1 shows descriptive statistics of our sample.

# **3 Outcomes**

All the questions used in the analysis are described in detail in section J of the Appendix, which presents the survey instrument. We evaluate the impacts of our intervention on three groups of prespecified primary outcomes: (i) prosocial behaviors; (ii) attitudes towards migrants; and (iii) perspective taking and empathetic concerns as possible mechanisms. We also explore whether the treatments affected beliefs about the effects of migration on the host country. These outcomes are described below. The survey collected additional information on characteristics and assess- sociodemographic comprehension ments for the game and the video.

Our first outcome group is prosocial behavior, which includes altruism and trust. We measure altruism through an incentivized dictator game. Participants were presented with the following situation: _“At the end of this survey you will receive 10,000 additional COP (Colombian pesos). You can keep that money or you can donate it to the following organizations in Colombia. How would you like to distribute this money between: a) Yourself; b) Fundaci ́on Juntos se Puede (Together We Can Foundation): an organization that supports Venezuelan immigrants to access health, education, and legal advice; and c) Un Techo para mi Pa ́ıs (A Roof for my Country): an organization that supports vulnerable populations in Colombia (they build houses for Colombians)?.”_<sup>16</sup> Our altruism outcomes are: an indicator for donating to the Venezuelan charity ( _Together_

> 16A similar question was implemented by (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022). In their question, however, not all participants received a direct transfer but were told they were enrolled in a lottery to win 1,000 dollars. In our survey, a participant’s decision translates to effective action and is not simply associated with a probability of donation.

14
_We Can Foundation_ ) and an indicator for donating to the national charity ( _A Roof for my Country_ ). Additionally, we also explore the effects of the treatments in donation amounts.

To measure trust, we asked respondents how much they agreed with the phrase, “One can trust Venezuelan migrants,” on a four-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Since we also asked participants the same question in general without specifying Venezuelan we use that variable to whether the effects are migrants, explore program generalized or particular to these migrants.

To measure attitudes, we collected five questions. We asked participants: “Is the poverty of a Venezuelan more likely explained by lack of self-effort or by circumstances beyond their control?”; “Should Colombians have the right to keep Venezuelans out of their neighborhoods?”; “Should Colombians have the first opportunity at a job?”; “Is the government obligated to help Venezuelan migrants?”; and “Would you vote for a policy to increase spending on Venezuelan migrants?” Most of these questions are posed in a fouroption Likert scale format, and details of each are provided in section J of the Appendix.

For each of the main outcome groups (prosociality and attitudes), we also assessed the effects of the treatments using an index constructed by aggregating the responses of the outcomes within each dimension. The summary index was estimated following the method outlined in (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007), which involves standardizing each variable, calculating the average, and then standardizing this average using the mean of the control group as a reference. The index represents an equally weighted average of the standardized individual variables (i.e., z-scores), with the orientation of each measure adjusted so that outcomes indicating lower levels of xenophobia receive higher scores.

To measure empathy and perspective taking, we use two subscales from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index formulated by (Davis, 1980, 1983). (P ́erez-Alb ́eniz et al., 2003) have validated the scale in Colombia. The questions permit the construction of _Empathic Concern_ (EC) and _Perspective-taking_ (PT) scales. The EC scale has eight statements that assess the 15
tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and compassion for others. The PT scale has six statements that measure the reported tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological points of view of others in everyday life. All the statements are listed in section J that describes the survey instrument.<sup>17</sup> For each of the 14 statements, the respondent answers by choosing from a five-point scale from zero to four, where zero represents “does not describe me well” and four represents “describes me very well.” According to the answer, the respondent gets a score from zero to four. The total score is the sum of the scores across questions.

Finally, we investigate whether the treatments affected participants’ beliefs about the impact of migration on Colombia.<sup>18</sup> We ask respondents five questions: “Are immigrants good for the economy?”; “Do they compete with natives for jobs?”; “Do they contribute to increases in crime?”;“Do they bring new ideas?”; and “Overall, do they contribute more to the country than they take from it?”. Similarly to the attitudinal questions about migrants, we pose these questions in a four-option Likert scale format.

# **4 Empirical Specification**

We evaluate the impacts of the game and video interventions on outcome _y_ by using the following specification: where _i_ indexes participants, Game _∈{_ 0 _,_ 1 _}_ equals one for participants assigned to the _In Someone Else’s Shoes_ online game and zero otherwise, Video _∈{_ 0 _,_ 1 _}_ equals one for participants assigned to watch the documentary _Walking for Freedom_ and zero otherwise,

> 17A few examples of these statements include: “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”; “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other guy’s’ point of view”; “Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems”; and “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.”

> 18These outcomes were not prespecified.

16
and **X** is a vector of controls including the stratification covariates (gender and student status).

In order to account for multiple hypotheses testing, we report sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values and the p-values of the Westfall-Young joint test of the sharp hypothesis that no treatment has any effect. We also construct an index for each group of outcomes following the methodology in (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007)<sup>19</sup> and then apply to the indices the same procedure to account for multiple hypotheses (i.e., FDR q-values and the Westfall-Young test).

In addition to the exercise outlined above, we use a similar specification to assess the treatment effects by minutes of duration. To do this, we regress the outcomes on the time spent in minutes on each treatment. This exercise provides more comparable estimates of the relative efficacy between treatments.

# **4.1 Comprehension, immersion, and emotion assessments**

We assessed if participants paid attention during the game and video tasks by asking three comprehension questions about the activities. For the game group, we checked if respondents recalled the name of the game’s main character, her birthplace, and the two destinations she was considering. We asked the video group to name the title of the movie, recall approximately how many Venezuelans had left their country since the humanitarian crisis began, and recall which migrants were allowed to sleep in the shelter shown in the movie. E.1 illustrates the results of the assess- Figure comprehension ment. They suggest that respondents were attentive to both activities, but more so to the game. This might be because the game requires more active involvement from participants. Specifically, approximately 90 percent of participants in the game task and 70 percent of participants who watched the video answered the three comprehension questions correctly.

> 19The procedure entails standardizing each variable, averaging the output, and then standardizing again to yield easily interpretable values.

17
We also assessed if participants were immersed in the activities by asking: “How much did you feel the experience of the Venezuelan migrant was an extension of yourself?” Possible answers were: completely, quite a bit, a little, and none.<sup>20</sup> As Figure E.2 shows, a majority of individuals in both groups reported feeling that the migrant’s experience was an extension of themselves at least quite a bit or completely (64.5 percent for the game and 58.0 percent for the video). This suggests a high level of involvement in the activities.

Finally, we included questions to understand how the treatments affected participants’ emotions. We asked participants to choose a number from 1 (little feeling) to 10 (intense feeling) to evaluate the extent to which they felt compassion, distress, or happiness from participating in the online interactive game or watching the video. Figure E.3 presents the results, which show that both treatments induced higher levels of compassion and distress to a similar extent and lower levels of happiness; the game prompted lower happiness than the video.

# **5 Treatment Effects in Prosociality-Related Variables**

# **5.1 Altruism**

We find that both treatments increased altruism as measured through the results of the dictator game, where individuals were offered money and decided whether to keep it or donate it to a Venezuelan or nonmigrant NGO voluntarily. These results are in Table 2 in Panel A, whereas the raw data is in Figure D.1. Both the game and the video had a positive and significant impact on the probability of donation to a Venezuelan NGO of 10.6 pp and 11.1 pp, respectively. Given that the probability of donation for the control group was 66.7 percent, these effects are sizable and amount to an increase of approximately 15.9 and 16.6 percent, respectively. The treatments had a small and insignificant impact on the donation to a nonmigrant NGO, which implies that they generated changes in altruistic behavior toward Venezuelan forced migrants but not towards the general population. Moreover,

> 20This question was adapted from Behm-Morawitz, Lewallen and Miller (2015)’s _self-presence_ scale.

18
we could not reject the null hypothesis that these treatment effects are equal.

A relevant question relates to the effects of each treatment by unit of time. As noted above, the game lasts longer than the video; thus in comparing both treatments, the average time dose is much longer for individuals treated by the game. Interestingly, although the general conclusions are maintained, the estimates suggest that being treated by one additional minute of the video and the game increases the likelihood of making a donation to the Venezuelan NGO by 1.6 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively (Panel B in Table 2). These estimates, however, are statistically different from each other. Therefore, spending one more minute on the video is five times more effective than the game in improving altruism toward Venezuelan migrants.

Concerning the treatment effects on the donation amounts (Panel A in Table 3), both treatments crowd out the amount of money the individuals decided to keep for themselves. This reduction is disproportionately transferred to additional donations for the Venezuelan organization. Finally, conditional on donating to a Venezuelan NGO, treatment recipients, on average, donated 20.9 percent more in the case of the game and 14 percent more in the case of the video (Panel B in Table 3).

# **5.2 Trust**

Regarding trust towards Venezuelan migrants, the point estimates for both the game and video are positive, but only the game had a statistically significant impact (Panel A in Table 2). The game increased trust towards Venezuelans by 0.29 sd relative to the control similar results occur when the treatment effectiveness group. Although analyzing per additional minute of duration (Panel B in Table 2), for that case we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal effects of both treatments. Hence, in conclusion, the game improved trust and the video had positive but imprecise effects on this variable.

Interestingly, the game seems to produce positive effects on generalized trust and also on trust toward Venezuelans (Table F.1). However, the effects of the game on trust toward the 19
Venezuelan population (column (4)) are almost twice as large as those toward the general population (columns (1) and (3)). Moreover, the effects in column (1) are not statistically significant after correcting for multiple hypotheses. Therefore, these results suggest that improvements in trust induced by the game generalize to the whole population, but are larger toward Venezuelan forced migrants. It is possible that the game induced effects as

# **5.3 Prosociality index**

The treatment effects on the index of prosociality, constructed with variables in columns (1) – (3) in Panel A of Table 2, are positive and statistically significant for both treatments: the game increased prosociality by 0.27 sd and the video raised it by 0.20 sd. We cannot reject the null that these two effects are equal when using dichotomous variables to measure the treatments. However, a closer examination of their effectiveness in terms of duration (Panel B in Table 2) reveals additional insights. For each additional minute of exposure to the video treatment, there is a gain of 0.030 sd in the prosociality index, whereas exposure to the game results in a smaller increment of 0.009 sd. Importantly, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality between these two coefficients. This analysis suggests the video is at least three times more effective than the game in enhancing the prosociality index.

Overall, the combined evidence suggests that both treatments enhance altruism and prosociality. However, only the game proved effective in disproportionately improving trust towards the Venezuelan population. More importantly, the video demonstrates greater effectiveness than the game in fostering prosocial behaviors per minute of time spent on the interventions.

# **6 Treatment Effects on Attitudes toward Forced Migrants**

We examine the effects of the interventions on attitudes towards migrants in Panel A of Table 4. All the outcomes are codified in a way such that a positive coefficient is inter20
preted as a more positive attitude. Both the game and video treatments have a positive and significant impact of 8.9 pp and 10.5 pp, respectively, on the assessment that circumstances beyond a Venezuelan migrant’s control relate most to poverty (vs. lack of effort), which amount to an increase of 11.2 and 13.2 percent, respectively. Although the point estimates are positive, the treatments did not significantly influence attitudes about equal job opportunities for Venezuelan migrants and natives or attitudes about the right to segregate migrants from neighborhoods. Finally, regarding policy attitudes about government support for and increased spending on Venezuelan migrants, both treatments had positive and significant effects. Thus, both interventions were effective in shifting attitudes towards increased public support for migrants. Moreover, both treatments improved the attitudes index by 0.33 sd.

Panel B of Table 4 presents the effects of each intervention duration in minutes. The estimates affirm the programs’ effects in enhancing attitudes across the same variables. Additionally, they indicate that the video was at least four times more effective in improving attitudes toward migrants per minute spent compared to the game. Furthermore, the effects between treatments per minute of duration are statistically distinguishable.

# **7 Treatment Effects on Beliefs about Forced Migrant Impacts**

We also conducted an exploratory analysis (not prespecified) on respondents’ beliefs about the impacts of migration on the economy and on society. It is important to note that the treatments do not provide explicit information on the effects of migration on crime or on the labor markets. Yet, to the extent that they reflect the realities of migrants who are hard-working, honest individuals, it is possible that treated participants may generalize this information to other dimensions of the migrant experience and thus change their beliefs. Nonetheless, as shown in Panel A of Table 5,<sup>21</sup> the interventions had no statistically significant impact on commonly held beliefs that Venezuelan migrants compete with natives for jobs or that they increase crime rates.

> 21 The raw data is illustrated in Figure D.3.

21
However, the game does have a positive and significant impact (0.28 sd; p _<_ 0.01) on the belief that “immigrants contribute more to a country than they take from it.” We find this last result interesting because most research uses as outcomes commonly held beliefs about crime or jobs but does not measure beliefs about “net” effects. Moreover, most interventions to reduce prejudice document reductions in prosocial behaviors, whereas attitudes and beliefs are extremely difficult to change (Paluck et al., 2021). The game’s positive effects on this variable are reflected in improvements in the beliefs index. Similar effects occur when we examine the effects of the interventions by duration in minutes in Panel B of Table 5.

# **8 Exploratory Analysis**

# **8.1 The role of empathy and perspective taking**

As stated in our preanalysis plan, we evaluate the role of the treatments in changing perspective taking and empathy as possible mechanisms for the effects on prosocial behaviors and attitudes. For this purpose, we estimate equation (1) using the two subscales described earlier that measure empathic concern and perspective taking.

The results in Panel A of Table 6 (raw data in Figure D.4) indicate that the game intervention increased the perspective-taking scale by 0.18 sd. Although the point estimates are positive, the video does not have statistically significant effects on any of the scales. The effect of the game on the PT scale is less precise when we account for multiple hypotheses testing, with a p-value of 0.11. The results align with the objectives of the game activity and with the fact that it requires more involvement, since participants not only watch and listen but also make decisions and express ideas from a migrant’s perspective. We note similar effects when examining the effects of the treatment duration in Panel B of Table 6. Moreover, for those estimates we can distinguish weak positive effects of the video on improving the empathic scale. However, the effects are not robust to multiple hypotheses testing, as reported in the FDR q-values.

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# **8.2 Did the treatments lessen misinformation?**

One possible explanation for the positive treatment effects on prosociality and attitudes toward migrants is that treated individuals have better information about the characteristics of the Venezuelan population and their rights in Colombia. Although this was not the objective, by considering migrant characteristics, treatment participants might indirectly update their information about this group. We test this hypothesis for seven variables we collected that aimed to measure misinformation related to the general characteristics of the Venezuelan population and their rights in Colombia (Table F.2). Importantly, the video provided factual information only about the number of forced migrants who left Venezuela. The correct answer to each question and the average response of the control group are reported at the bottom of the table.

We observe changes closer to the correct average values for two of the seven variables examined, relative to the average responses of the control group. In particular, the video improved the accuracy of the estimates participants held about the share of Venezuelans in the Colombian it 3.9 relative to the answer population, reducing by percent average of the control group (16.8 percent, column (1)). Furthermore, the game improved participants’ assessment of Venezuelans’ access to the subsidized health care program. We observed no statistically significant changes in correct answers for any other outcomes.

Hence, although the treatments indirectly decreased misinformation, these effects are neither generalized nor consistently observed across the treatments and outcomes.

# **9 Robustness Tests and Heterogeneous Effects**

# **9.1 Assessing sensitivity to adding control variables**

We test the robustness of our main estimates to the inclusion of the covariates in Table 1 by reestimating the treatment effects on the indices of prosociality, attitudes, and beliefs while controlling for these covariates. The results are in Table G.1. Since we report FDR 23
adjusted p-values, this is also a check that treatment effects on the indices are robust to adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing.

# **9.2 Exploring the role of experimenter demand effects**

To understand the prevalence of experimenter demand effects—that is, the tendency to act according to the study’s perceived hypothesis—in our sample, we included a list experiment in our survey instrument to indirectly assess respondents’ attitudes towards Venezuelan migrants. We asked _how many_ —not which—of the following four situations annoyed respondents: (i) homeless people sleeping on the street, (ii) people talking loudly close to them, (iii) people who cut in line, or (iv) people from other countries coming to live in their country. The last statement was randomly assigned to only half the sample. In the control group, respondents who received three options were annoyed, on average, by 1.96 situations and respondents who received four options were annoyed by 2.08 situations, suggesting that 12 percent of respondents were annoyed by migrants coming to live in their country (Figure H.1).

We used a list experiment to assess the difference-in-difference effects of being treated by the video or the game and receiving four potentially annoying options instead of three. The results of this exercise suggest that the video potentially increased prejudice while the game reduced it (Table H.1). Yet, the estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero, which means we cannot rule out experimenter demand effects with this exercise.<sup>22</sup> For this reason, we also explore the role of social desirability bias in our results in Table H.2. The table illustrates the estimates of the impacts of each treatment arm on the prosociality, attitudes, and beliefs indices, adding interactions for each treatment arm and the standardized measurement of the social desirability bias index. We measure social desirability bias by using four questions from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (see Crowne, Crowne and Marlowe, 1964 for details). The questions assess whether or

> 22In fact, in line with our results, large standard errors are pervasively common for list experiments (Blair and Imai, 2012).

24
not respondents are concerned with social approval. A high number of socially desirable responses suggests the respondent is concerned with social approval. Each question includes a statement to which the respondent must answer “true” or “false.” The four questions we included are: “It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged” (false corresponds to higher social desirability); “There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others” (false corresponds to higher social desirability); “I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake” (true corresponds to higher social desirability); and “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable” (true is associated with higher social desirability). Each statement gets a score of 0 or 1 (assigned to higher social desirability answers), and total social desirability bias comes from summing the scores of all questions. We add the four aforementioned questions to create a measurement scale ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates that the respondent does not exhibit social desirability bias and 4 represents the highest level. Subsequently, we standardized the variable on the 0-4 scale and tested for the existence of heterogeneous effects (Table H.2). Reassuringly, five out of the six tests suggest no heterogeneous effects for respondents who scaled higher on the social desirability scores in our sample. The only exception is for the estimates of the effects of the game on the prosociality index where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected narrowly (p-value=0.119).

# **9.3 Heterogeneous effects**

We estimate the heterogeneous effects of the game and video by gender, student status, level of education, and income group. Although our experimental design only stratifies by gender and student status, we also evaluate the effects of the video and the game across different income and education levels. This is because we consider that individuals with low income and those with higher levels of education might be disproportionately affected by immigrants and could react differently to the treatment (Tables I.1, I.2, I.3, and I.4). All the estimates point to coefficients that are largely too imprecise to make any conclusions. In fact, none of these differential effects are statistically significant.

25
# **10 Conclusion**

Prejudice against forced migrants can have damaging economic and social consequences including discrimination, inequality, and violence for migrants themselves and for all of society. Informed by social psychology insights, we evaluated the impact of two online interventions on prosociality, attitudes, and beliefs towards forced migrants by exposing Colombian participants to a game where they played the role of a Venezuelan migrant or to a video that depicted the struggles of these migrants as they fled Venezuela.

Both interventions improved altruism and some attitudes toward migrants. The game specifically improved trust and the belief that immigrants contribute more to a country than they take from it. Additionally, the video was more effective than the game in improving prosocial behaviors per minute of duration. Considering that the video is short, easily scalable through online platforms, and does not require active engagement, it is a more promising alternative than the game for effectively improving prosocial behaviors.

Our findings offer valuable insights for policymakers and private organizations looking for cost-effective ways to mitigate anti-migrant prejudice in the short run. Short time frames can be relevant to a wide array of decisions with permanent effects on migrants’ well-being, such as hiring decisions by managers and grading decisions by teachers, as well as to sways in public opinion, growth in charitable donations, and improved functioning within teams and groups across various environments. Future studies would do well to explore the sustainability of these effects over the medium to long terms. Moreover, it will be extremely interesting to see whether the effects of these interventions are monotonic as they are scaled in future studies.

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# **11 Tables and Figures**

Table 1. Covariate Balance between Treatment and Control Groups

||All<br>(1)|Game<br>(2)|Video<br>(3)|Control<br>(4)|Obs<br>(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Student [=1]|0.621|0.019|-0.001|0.614|831|
||(0.485)|(0.040)|(0.043)|(0.030)||
|Male [=1]|0.464|-0.080*|0.005|0.493|828|
||(0.499)|(0.041)|(0.044)|(0.030)||
|Age|25.255|0.328|0.496|24.985|829|
||(8.271)|(0.658)|(0.760)|(0.487)||
|Married [=1]|0.066|0.031|0.022|0.048|831|
||(0.249)|(0.020)|(0.021)|(0.013)||
|Religious [=1]|0.798|0.013|-0.004|0.794|831|
||(0.402)|(0.033)|(0.036)|(0.025)||
|Primary education completed [=1]|0.025|-0.017|-0.004|0.033|830|
||(0.157)|(0.013)|(0.015)|(0.011)||
|Secondary education completed [=1]|0.566|-0.045|-0.042|0.596|830|
||(0.496)|(0.041)|(0.044)|(0.030)||
|Higher education completed [=1]|0.408|0.062|0.046|0.371|830|
||(0.492)|(0.041)|(0.043)|(0.029)||
|Income (1 low- 10 high)|2.329|-0.090|-0.005|2.364|821|
||(1.072)|(0.092)|(0.095)|(0.070)||
|Low economic strata [=1]|0.726|0.015|-0.040|0.732|831|
||(0.446)|(0.036)|(0.040)|(0.027)||
|Children [=1]|0.143|-0.007|0.009|0.143|831|
||(0.350)|(0.029)|(0.031)|(0.021)||
|Joint F-Test (Prob_>_F)|0.567|0.227|0.963|||

_Notes:_ The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for the entire sample in column (1). Columns (2) through (4) display the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) derived from an OLS regression. The dependent variable in the regression is the corresponding covariate, with the treatment dummies utilized as regressors. Joint F-test (Prob _>_ F) indicates the p-value of the orthogonality joint test, which is obtained by running the treatment variable in all covariates and then testing the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero (b1 = b2 = b3 = ... = b20 = 0). Significance levels are denoted as follows:<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
Table 2. Treatment Effects on Prosocial Behavior Toward Venezuelan Forced Migrants

||Donation to<br>Venezuelan<br>Org. [=1]|Donation to<br>Non Migrant<br>Org. [=1]|Trust|Prosociality<br>Index|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|_Panel A. Treatment Effects_|||||
|Game [=1]|0.106***|0.027|0.297***|0.267***|
||(0.037)|(0.034)|(0.080)|(0.080)|
||[0.008]|[0.264]|[0.002]||
|Video [=1]|0.111***|0.038|0.116|0.201**|
||(0.039)|(0.035)|(0.090)|(0.089)|
||[0.008]|[0.207]|[0.178]||
|Observations|828|828|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.)|0.667|0.781|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.879|0.752|0.033|0.430|
|YWYjoint test|0.009|0.440|0.001||
|_Panel B. Treatment Effects by D_|_uration in Minut_|_es_|||
|Game Duration|0.003***|0.001|0.010***|0.009***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.003)|(0.003)|
||[0.007]|[0.217]|[0.001]||
|Video Duration|0.016***|0.006|0.017|0.030**|
||(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.014)|(0.014)|
||[0.009]|[0.197]|[0.193]||
|Observations|828|828|828|828|
|R-squared|0.016|0.006|0.019|0.017|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.)|0.667|0.781|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.016|0.322|0.608|0.097|
|YWYjoint test|0.003|0.432|0.001||

_Notes:_ This table presents the estimates from an OLS estimate derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables, (i) Donation to Venezuelan Org. and (ii) Donation to Nonmigrant Org., are indicator variables measured by an incentivized dictator game in which participants decide whether to donate money to an organization that supports Venezuelan migrants’ access to health, education, and legal advice, and/or to an organization that supports vulnerable populations in Colombia, respectively. (iii) Trust is the z-scored variable from a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) on the statement, “One can trust Venezuelan migrants.” (iv) The Prosociality Index is constructed using the dependent variables of columns (1) to (3), employing the methodology outlined by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). This method involves standardizing each variable within the index, calculating the average, and standardizing this average using the mean of the control group. All columns control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets. Av. Dep. Var. (Control group) represents the mean of the dependent variable in the control group. The Diff. p-value is a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY denotes the sharpened FDR q-values. Significance levels are indicated as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
Table 3. Treatment Effects on the Dictator Game Donation Amounts

|Money I will<br>Keep<br>(1)|Donation to<br>Venezuelan Org.<br>(2)|Donation to<br>Non Migrant Org.<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Hyperbolic Sine Transformation of the D_|_ependent Variables_||
|Game [=1]<br>-0.923**|0.845**|0.066|
|(0.360)|(0.328)|(0.303)|
|[0.022]|[0.022]|[0.381]|
|Video [=1]<br>-0.823**|0.998***|0.243|
|(0.382)|(0.342)|(0.317)|
|[0.025]|[0.022]|[0.216]|
|Observations<br>828|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.)<br>7.151|5.495|6.687|
|Diff. p-value<br>0.795|0.637|0.565|
|YWYjoint test<br>0.020|0.015|0.671|
|_Panel B. Logarithmic Transformation of the Depen_|_dent Variables_||
|Game [=1]<br>0.002|0.209***|0.092|
|(0.037)|(0.076)|(0.071)|
|[0.935]|[0.040]|[0.344]|
|Video [=1]<br>-0.018|0.144*|0.038|
|(0.043)|(0.083)|(0.077)|
|[0.669]|[0.253]|[0.669]|
|Observations<br>571|595|651|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.)<br>8.817|7.689|7.904|
|Diff. p-value<br>0.624|0.384|0.443|
|YWYjoint test<br>0.887|0.010|0.342|

_Notes:_ This table presents an OLS estimate derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables are sourced from an incentivized dictator game in which participants decide how much money from 10,000 COP they will keep or donate to an organization that supports Venezuelan migrants’ access to health, education, and legal advice, and/or to an organization that supports vulnerable populations in Colombia. Panel A shows the amounts transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is interpretable as a logarithmic transformation and accounts for zeros (individuals who do not contribute). Panel B shows the amounts transformed logarithmically. All regressions control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets. Av. Dep. Var (Control group) represents the mean of the dependent variable in the control group. The Diff. p-value is a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY denotes the sharpened FDR q-values. Significance levels are indicated as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
Table 4. Treatment Effects on Attitudes toward Venezuelan Forced Migrants

||Migrants Put Effort|Same<br>Job Opportunity|Acceptance|Government<br>Must Help|Increase<br>Gov. Spending|Attitudes<br>Index|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|_Panel A. Treatment Effects_|||||||
|Game [=1]|0.089***|0.048|0.079|0.299***|0.413***|0.334***|
||(0.031)|(0.041)|(0.081)|(0.082)|(0.081)|(0.079)|
||[0.005]|[0.151]|[0.172]|[0.001]|[0.001]||
|Video [=1]|0.105***|0.017|0.095|0.266***|0.453***|0.332***|
||(0.031)|(0.044)|(0.084)|(0.091)|(0.086)|(0.085)|
||[0.002]|[0.395]|[0.151]|[0.005]|[0.001]||
|Observations|826|826|827|827|827|827|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.793|0.558|0.000|0.000|0.000|-0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.550|0.462|0.849|0.708|0.628|0.987|
|YWYjoint test|0.002|0.361|0.410|0.003|0.000||
|_Panel B. Treatment Effects by Dur_|_ation in Minutes_||||||
|Game Duration|0.003***|0.002|0.004|0.011***|0.014***|0.012***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|
||[0.008]|[0.071]|[0.095]|[0.001]|[0.001]||
|Video Duration|0.015***|0.003|0.017|0.041***|0.068***|0.051***|
||(0.005)|(0.007)|(0.013)|(0.014)|(0.013)|(0.013)|
||[0.003]|[0.229]|[0.095]|[0.005]|[0.001]||
|Observations|826|826|827|827|827|827|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.793|0.558|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.004|0.842|0.272|0.020|0.000|0.001|
|YWYjoint test|0.007|0.183|0.302|0.002|0.000||

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables are (i) Migrants Put Effort: indicator equals 1 for respondents who attribute the poverty of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia primarily to circumstances beyond their control. (ii) Same Job Opportunity: indicator equals 1 for respondents agreeing that Venezuelan immigrants should have equal job opportunities in Colombia. (iii) Acceptance: Z-scored variable from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) on the statement, “Colombians have the right to exclude Venezuelan immigrants from their neighborhoods.” (iv) Government Must Help: Z-scored variable from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) on the statement, “The Colombian government is obligated to help Venezuelan immigrants.” (v) Increase Gov. Spending: Z-scored variable from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) on the statement, “I would vote for a policy to increase government spending to assist Venezuelan immigrants.” (vi) Attitudes Index is constructed using dependent variables of columns (1) to (5) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies standardizing each variable within the index, calculating the average, and standardizing this average using the mean of the control group. All regressions control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets. Av. Dep. Var. (Control group) represents the mean of the dependent variable in the control group. The Diff. p-value is a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY denotes the sharpened FDR q-values. Significance levels are indicated as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
Table 5. Treatment Effects on Beliefs About the Effects of Venezuelan Migration

||Migrants<br>Beneft the<br>Economy<br>(1)|Non Competing<br>Migrants in<br>Host’s Jobs<br>(2)|Criminality<br>Unaffected by<br>Migrants<br>(3)|Migrants<br>Enrich Host’s<br>Culture<br>(4)|Migrants’<br>Positive<br>Contribution<br>(5)|Positive<br>Beliefs<br>Index<br>6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Treatment Effects_|||||||
|Game [=1]|0.099|0.091|0.073|0.008|0.280***|0.161**|
||(0.081)|(0.080)|(0.080)|(0.084)|(0.082)|(0.081)|
||[1.000]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[0.007]||
|Video [=1]|-0.072|-0.009|0.029|-0.032|0.140|0.016|
||(0.087)|(0.085)|(0.087)|(0.089)|(0.087)|(0.087)|
||[1.000]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[0.983]||
|Observations|827|826|827|827|827|827|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.)|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.039|0.219|0.591|0.644|0.099|0.083|
|YWYjoint test|0.325|0.405|0.530|0.900|0.000||
|_Panel B. Treatment Effects by Dur_|_ation in Minutes_||||||
|Game Duration|0.002|0.003|0.005*|-0.000|0.008***|0.005**|
||(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|
||[1.000]|[0.747]|[0.296]|[1.000]|[0.014]||
|Video Duration|-0.014|-0.002|0.010|-0.006|0.018|0.001|
||(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|
||[0.769]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[1.000]|[0.747]||
|Observations|827|826|827|827|827|827|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.171|0.673|0.698|0.631|0.456|0.741|
|YWYjoint test|0.443|0.364|0.101|0.878|0.005||

_Notes:_ This table reports OLS estimates from Equation 1. Dependent Variables: (i) Migrants Benefit the Economy: z-scored response to the statement, “Immigrants are good for a country’s economy” on a four-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). (ii) Noncompeting Migrants in Host’s Jobs: z-scored response to the statement, “Immigrants come to compete for our jobs” on a four-point scale from 4 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). (iii) Criminality Unaffected by Migrants: z-scored response to the statement, “Immigrants increase crime” on a four-point scale from 4 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). (iv) Migrants Enrich Host’s Culture: z-scored response to the statement, “Immigrants improve our society by bringing new ideas and cultures” on a four-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). (v) Migrants’ Positive Contribution: z-scored response to the statement, “In general, immigrants contribute more to a country than they take away from it.” (vi) Positive Beliefs Index: Constructed using dependent variables of columns (1) to (5) following the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies standardizing each variable within the index, calculating the average, and standardizing this average using the mean of the control group. All columns control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, with False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values in brackets. Av. Dep. Var. (Control group) represents the mean of the dependent variable in the control group. The Diff. p-value is a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY denotes the sharpened FDR q-values. Significance levels are indicated as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
Table 6. Treatment Effects on Empathy and Perspective Taking

||Empathy<br>scale<br>Per<br>(1)|spective-taking<br>scale<br>(2)|
|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Treatment Effects_|||
|Game [=1]|-0.050|0.181**|
||(0.078)|(0.080)|
||[0.306]|[0.110]|
|Video [=1]|0.117|0.114|
||(0.081)|(0.084)|
||[0.213]|[0.213]|
|Observations|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.033|0.393|
|YWYjoint test|.271|.041|
|_Panel B. Treatment Effects by Dur_|_ation in Minutes_||
|Game Duration|-0.0004|0.006**|
||(0.003)|(0.002)|
||[0.420]|[0.101]|
|Video Duration|0.022*|0.015|
||(0.012)|(0.013)|
||[0.140]|[0.196]|
|Observations|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.054|0.397|
|YWYjoint test|0.150|0.053|

_Notes:_ This table displays OLS estimates derived from Equation 1. Dependent variables are constructed using the scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) originally formulated by (Davis, 1980, 1983). (i) The Empathy scale consists of eight statements assessing the tendency to feel sympathy and compassion for others in distress. (ii) The Perspective-taking scale comprises seven statements measuring the inclination to adopt others’ psychological viewpoints in daily life. Respondents rate each of the 15 statements on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates “does not describe me well” and 4 indicates “describes me very well.” Scores range from 0 to 4 for each statement, with the total score being the sum of partial scores. All regressions control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, with False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values in brackets. Av. Dep. Var. (Control grp.) represents the mean of the dependent variable in the control group. The Diff. p-value is a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY denotes the sharpened FDR q-values. The Westfall-Young joint test of the sharp hypothesis, asserting that no treatment affects the outcomes, yields a p-value of 0.070. Significance levels are indicated as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
## **Part**

# **Online Appendix**

## **Table of Contents**

|**A **|**Prevalence of Prejudice Toward Migrants by Level of Education**|**40**|
|---|---|---|
|**B**|**Interventions Description**|**42**|
||2.1<br>Intervention Images. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|.<br>42|
|**C **|**Treatments Duration**|**44**|
|**D **|**Descriptive Statistics**|**46**|
|**E**|**Assessment of Intervention Comprehension, Immersion, and Emotions**|**51**|
|**F**|**Exploratory Analyses**|**53**|
|**G **|**Robustness Tests**|**55**|
|**H **|**Assessing Experimenter Demand Effects**|**56**|
|**I**|**Heterogeneous Effects**|**59**|
|**J**|**Survey Instrument**|**63**|
|**K **|**Index Description**|**70**|

38
# **A Prevalence of Prejudice Toward Migrants by Level of Education**

Figure A.1. Prejudice Prevalence by Level of Education Panel A. Colombia <!-- Start of picture text --> At Least One Variable Equals 1 Index Average Index of Variables<br>1 0 .9 4 0 .9 6 0 .9 5 1<br>.9 0.89 .9<br>.8 .8 0 .7 6<br>0 .7 2<br>.7 .7 0.66 0 .6 6<br>.6 .6<br>.5 .5<br>.4 .4<br>.3 .3<br>.2 .2<br>.1 .1<br>0 0<br>Education Level Education Level<br>No Studies Primary Secondary Universitary or more No Studies Primary Secondary Universitary or more<br>Panel B. Latin America (18 Countries)<br>At Least One Variable Equals 1 Index Average Index of Variables<br>1 1<br>.9 0 .8 7 0 .9 0 0.89 0 .8 6 .9<br>.8 .8<br>.7 .7<br>.6 .6 0 .5 8 0 .5 9 0.59 0 .5 9<br>.5 .5<br>.4 .4<br>.3 .3<br>.2 .2<br>.1 .1<br>0 0<br>Education Level Education Level<br>No Studies Primary Secondary Universitary or more No Studies Primary Secondary Universitary or more<br>Prejudice Prevalence Prejudice Prevalence<br>Prejudice Prevalence Prejudice Prevalence<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure depicts the average level of prejudice by level of education for both the Colombian population and the aggregate Latin American population. The Prejudice Prevalence variable is constructed using the following indicator variables: (i) Accepting Venezuelan migrants will have a negative impact [=1], (ii) Belief that migrants have a negative impact on the host economy [=1], Belief that migrants compete with hosts for jobs [=1], (iii) Belief that migrants contribute to increased crime [=1], and (iv) Belief that migrants impose a burden on the state [=1]. The At Least One Variable Equals 1 Index equals 1 if any of the aforementioned variables is 1, and the Average Index of Variables is the mean of these variables. The data is extracted from the Latinobarometro survey for the year 2020, which is an annual public opinion survey representing the populations of 18 Latin American countries.
Figure A.2. Prejudice Prevalence and Migration Shares in Latin American Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> At Least One Variable Equals 1 Index<br>1<br>ECU<br>PER<br>BOL GTM COL<br>MEX DOM<br>CHL PAN<br>.9 CRI<br>HND<br>SLV<br>NIC<br>.8 PRY<br>BRA<br>ARG<br>.7 URY<br>0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5<br>Share of Migrants (% of Total Population)<br>(mean) xen<br>Fitted values<br>Note: Pearson corr. p-value=0.525***<br>Average Index of Variables<br>.8<br>ECU<br>.7 BOL CHL PER COL<br>GTM<br>MEX<br>.6 DOM CRI PAN<br>NIC<br>.5 SLVHND PRY ARG<br>BRA<br>.4 URY<br>0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5<br>Share of Migrants (% of Total Population)<br>Xenophobia (Index)<br>Fitted values<br>Note: Pearson corr. p-value=0.648***<br>Prejudice Prevalence (Index)<br>Prejudice Prevalence (Index)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates the relationship between the level of prejudice and the share of migrants across 18 Latin American countries in 2020. The Prejudice Prevalence variable is constructed using the following indicator variables: (i) Acceptance of Venezuelan migrants having a negative impact [=1], (ii) Belief that migrants negatively affect the host economy [=1], Belief that migrants compete with hosts for jobs [=1], (iii)Belief that migrants contribute to increased crime [=1], and (iv) Belief that migrants impose a burden on the state [=1]. The At Least One Variable Equals 1 Index equals 1 if any of the aforementioned variables is 1, and the ”Average Index of Variables” represents the mean of these variables. The data for prejudice prevalence is sourced from the Latinobarometro survey for the year 2020, an annual public opinion survey representing the populations of 18 Latin American countries. The data for the share of migrants is calculated by dividing the total number of migrants in each country by the total population in the same year. The migrant variable represents forced migrants and is sourced from the United Nations Refugee Agency data portal, which includes refugees, peoples of concern, and asylum seekers. Total population data is obtained from the World Bank data portal.

41
<!-- Start of picture text --> aa:otros<br>e zapatos<br>Mile Rodriguez<br>Venezuela Migrante<br>Vives en Maracaibo, una ciudad capital del<br>estado de Zulia. Los dias tranquilos y prosperos<br>se te hacen lejanos, lentamente fuiste<br>acumulandoStampr® tefrustracion amparabastrasen quefrustracién, en algtnpero<br>momento las cosas podrian cambiar.<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> en<br>otros<br>@ zapatos Mile Rodriguez<br>79:00<br>re<br>Maracaibo<br>Tu madre te entrega un pedacito de papel. Te pide que lo leas cuando ya estés lejos.<br>a & ae . ifi - y<br>ge , ‘i<br>oe i ; me<br>a chuck me Arar ct tor ‘a mi mideeve<br>See eer<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Mile Rodriguez<br>Bemotros 19:52.<br>e zapatos +<br>TienesM claroaracaibo que nadie quiere° irse de su pais natal, mucho menos si hay tanta incertidumbre, pero el<br>desespero es tanto, la ausencia de oportunidades se agudiza% de tal manera, que no tienes mas opciones.<br>Quieres que tu viaje sea sereno, seguro, que a tu familia no le pase nada, sobre todo eso, que a tus pequefios<br>no les pase nada. ¢Porque si le pasa algo a tu familia qué sentido tiene vivir? Todo esto lo haces por ellos.<br>Esa noche Iloran juntos, lo que tienen les ha costado muchisimo, no es facil dejarlo de un tajo. gIrse<br>definitivamente para otro lugar? La sola idea te aterra, qué haran en un lugar que no conocen, sin tu<br>familia, sin tus cosas. Una vecina les ha dicho que irse para Riohacha, una ciudad al norte de Colombia es<br>una buena soluci6n temporal; tu marido no luce muy convencido, él prefiere llegar directamente a Bogoté,<br>jugarsela toda en una capital, después de todo, esa es la ventaja de las capitales, siempre hay mas<br>oportunidades. Unos cuantos délares que han ahorrado con mucho esfuerzo durante afios es lo tinico que<br>tienen para enfrentar una nueva vida.<br>Ante esta situacion, debes tomar una decisién que te cambiaré la vida definitivamente.<br>éDecides9 irteq a Riohacha3 o directo‘ a<br>B 13?<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> rom 79:00<br>otros .<br>mame = *Varacaibo<br>Para tranquilizar a tu madre, gquisieras escribirle un mensaje corto?<br>fdstsdf<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Figure B.2. Images of the Video Intervention _Notes:_ The figure contains sample images of the documentary “Walking for Freedom.” 43
# **C Treatments Duration**

Figure C.1. Time Spent in the Game Activity <!-- Start of picture text --> .05<br>.04<br>.03<br>.02<br>.01<br>0<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>Activity Duration (Minutes)<br>Density<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure displays a histogram representing the time, in minutes, that respondents spent completing the game activity. The time variable ranges from 30 seconds to 56 minutes.

44
Table C.1. Game Duration and Individual Demographics

|Time|Duration (Log)|
|---|---|
||(1)|
|Student [=1]|-0.054|
||(0.075)|
|Male [=1]|0.010|
||(0.059)|
|Age|0.007|
||(0.006)|
|Married [=1]|-0.127|
||(0.121)|
|Religious [=1]|0.036|
||(0.074)|
|Secondary education completed [=1]|0.165|
||(0.233)|
|Higher education completed [=1]|0.143|
||(0.230)|
|Income (1 low- 10 high)|-0.033|
||(0.030)|
|Low economic strata [=1]|0.124*|
||(0.072)|
|Children [=1]|0.021|
||(0.110)|
|Joint F-Test (Prob_>_F)|0.185|
|R-squared|0.044|
|Observations|309|

_Notes:_ The table presents an OLS estimate of the relationship between the duration of time spent in the game activity and individual covariates within the sample. Time Duration is the logarithm of the time, in minutes, that respondents spent completing the game activity. Joint F-test indicates the p-value of the joint test for global significance. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

45
# **D Descriptive Statistics**

Table D.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Study Sample

||N|Average|SD|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|_Panel A: Sociodemographic Characteristics_||||||
|Male [=1]|828|0.46|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|Student [=1]|831|0.62|0.49|0.00|1.00|
|Age|829|25.25|8.27|18.00|78.00|
|Married [=1]|831|0.07|0.25|0.00|1.00|
|Religious [=1]|831|0.80|0.40|0.00|1.00|
|Primary education completed [=1]|830|0.03|0.16|0.00|1.00|
|Secondary education completed [=1]|830|0.57|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|Higher education completed [=1]|830|0.41|0.49|0.00|1.00|
|Income (1 low- 10 high)|821|2.33|1.07|1.00|10.00|
|Low economic strata [=1]|831|0.73|0.45|0.00|1.00|
|Children [=1]|831|0.14|0.35|0.00|1.00|
|_Panel B: Prosociality Indicators_||||||
|Donated to Venezuelan Org. [=1]|831|0.74|0.44|0.00|1.00|
|Donated to non-migrant Org. [=1]|831|0.81|0.40|0.00|1.00|
|One can trust Venezuelan Migrants (4=Strongly agree)|831|2.70|0.67|1.00|4.00|
|<br>ProsocialityIndex (Kling)|831|0.16|0.98|-3.00|1.00|
|_Panel C: Attitudes Indicators_||||||
|List experiment: Annoyed by 4 situations|420|2.03|0.73|0.00|4.00|
|List experiment: Annoyed by 3 situations|409|1.82|0.60|0.00|3.00|
|Venezuelan are poor due to lack of self effort [=1]|829|0.14|0.35|0.00|1.00|
|Keep Venezuelans out of neighborhoods (4=Strongly agree)|830|1.90|0.76|1.00|4.00|
|Same opportunity for Venezuelans to apply for a job [=1]|829|0.58|0.49|0.00|1.00|
|Government should help Venezuelans (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.74|0.72|1.00|4.00|
|Increase gov. spending to help Venezuelans (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.49|0.80|1.00|4.00|
|Attitudes Index (Kling)|830|0.22|0.96|-3.00|2.00|
|_Panel D: Empathy Indicators_||||||
|Empathic Concern Scale|831|0.03|0.96|-4.00|2.00|
|Perspective-takingScale|831|0.10|0.95|-4.00|2.00|
|_Panel E: Beliefs Indicators_||||||
|Migrants are good for the economy (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.51|0.76|1.00|4.00|
|Immigrants come to compete for our jobs (4=Strongly agree)|829|2.66|0.74|1.00|4.00|
|<br>Immigrants increase crime (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.53|0.78|1.00|4.00|
|Immigrants improve the society with ideas (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.72|0.71|1.00|4.00|
|Immigrants contribute more than they take (4=Strongly agree)|830|2.48|0.76|1.00|4.00|
|Beliefs Index (Kling)|830|0.05|0.98|-3.00|3.00|

_Notes:_ The table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of the paper.

46
Figure D.1. Raw Data on Prosocial Behavior Toward Forced Venezuelan Migrants Panel A: Altruism (Dictator Game) <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.81 0.82<br>0.78 0.78 0.78<br>0.67<br>Donation to Venezuelan Org. Donation Non-migrant Org.<br>Control Game Video<br>Panel B: Self-reported Trust<br>2.80<br>2.67<br>2.60<br>Trust<br>Control Game Video<br>1<br>.8<br>.6<br>.4<br>.2<br>0<br>2.90<br>2.80<br>2.70<br>2.60<br>2.50<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates the raw means of the prosocial behavior variables—altruism and trust—and their respective confidence intervals. Panel A displays the variables from an incentivized dictator game where respondents were presented with the following scenario: At the end of this survey, you will receive an additional 10,000 COP. You can either keep the money or donate it to the following organizations in Colombia: a. Yourself; b. Fundaci ́on Juntos se Puede—-an organization supporting Venezuelan migrants in Colombia by providing access to health, education, and legal advice; and c. Un Techo para Mi Pa ́ıs—-an organization building houses for vulnerable populations in Colombia. The variables Donation to Venezuelan Org. and Donation to Nonmigrant Org. are indicators equal to 1 if the respondent chose options b (to donate to a Venezuelan organization) and c (to donate to a nonmigrant organization), respectively. Panel B reports the raw means of the Likert scale measurements ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree) of the statement ’One can trust Venezuelan migrants.

47
Figure D.2. Raw Data on Attitudes Toward Forced Venezuelan Migrants Panel A: Putting Effort and Job Opportunities <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.90<br>0.88<br>0.79<br>0.61<br>0.57<br>0.56<br>Put Effort Same Job Opportunity<br>Control Game Video<br>Panel B: Segregation and Policy<br>3.12 3.12<br>3.05<br>2.82<br>2.79<br>2.61 2.62<br>2.59<br>2.26<br>Acceptance Government Must Help Increase Gov. Spending<br>Control Game Video<br>0.90<br>0.80<br>0.70<br>0.60<br>0.50<br>3.20<br>3.00<br>2.80<br>2.60<br>2.40<br>2.20<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrate the raw means of the attitude variables and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Panel A displays two variables:(i) Migrants Put Effort: indicator equals to 1 for respondents who attribute the poverty of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia primarily to circumstances beyond their control. (ii) Same Job Opportunity: indicator equals to 1 for respondents who agree that Venezuelan immigrants should have equal job opportunities in Colombia. Panel B presents the following variables: (i) Acceptance: This is a variable derived from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) on the statement “Colombians have the right to exclude Venezuelan immigrants from their neighborhoods.” (ii) Government Must Help: is a variable derived from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) on the statement“The Colombian government is obligated to help Venezuelan immigrants.” (iii) Increase of Gov. Spending: is a variable derived from a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) on the statement “I would vote for a policy to increase government spending to assist Venezuelan immigrants.” 48
Figure D.3. Raw Data on Beliefs <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.73 2.73<br>2.70<br>2.57 2.57<br>2.51<br>2.50<br>2.47<br>2.44 2.44 2.45<br>2.39<br>2.38<br>2.31<br>2.29<br>Benefit the Non-Compete Criminality Enrich Host' Positive<br>Economy with Host's jobs Unaffected Culture Contribution<br>Control Game Video<br>2.80<br>2.60<br>2.40<br>2.20<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ This figure illustrates the raw means of the beliefs variables and their respective confidence interval. Dependent Variables: (i) Benefit the Economy: answer to the question “Immigrants are good for a country’s economy” on a four-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). (ii) Non-Compete with Host’s Jobs: answer to the question “Immigrants come to compete for our jobs” on a four-point scale from 4 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). (iii) Criminality Unaffected: answer to the question “Immigrants increase crime” on a four-point scale from 4 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). (iv) Enrich Host’ Cultures: answer to the question “Immigrants improve our society by bringing new ideas and cultures” on a four-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). (v) Positive Contribution: answer to the question “In general, immigrants contribute more to a country than they take away from it” on a four-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

49
Figure D.4. Raw Data on Empathy and Perspective Taking <!-- Start of picture text --> 24.28<br>23.68 23.62<br>20.07<br>19.68<br>19.14<br>Empathy Scale Perspective-taking Scale<br>Control Game Video<br>26.00<br>24.00<br>22.00<br>20.00<br>18.00<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ This figure illustrates the raw means of the empathy and perspective taking scale variables and their respective confidence interval. Dependent variables are constructed using the scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) originally formulated by Davis (1980, 1983). (i) The Empathic scale consists of eight statements assessing the tendency to feel sympathy and compassion for others in distress. (ii) The Perspective-taking scale comprises seven statements measuring the inclination to adopt others’ psychological viewpoints in daily life. Respondents rate each of the 15 statements on a scale from zero to four, where zero indicates “does not describe me well” and four indicates “describes me very well.” Scores range from zero to four for each statement, with the total score being the sum of partial scores.

50
# **E Assessment of Intervention Comprehension, Immersion, and Emotions**

Figure E.1. Treatment Intervention Comprehension Assessment Score <!-- Start of picture text --> 69.8<br>89.1<br>26.9<br>9.6<br>1.3 3.3<br>Game Video<br>1 Point 2 Points 3 Points<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>Percentage 40<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates the comprehension assessment scores for the game and video treatments. Each answer received a score of 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. The score represents the sum of the three answers for each treatment. For the game treatment, the first question asks: What was the name of the primary character of the story? The possible answers were: a. Mile; b. Lina; c. Diana; and d. Paola. The second question asked: The primary character and her husband have to decide between leaving to... The answer options were: a. C ́ucuta and Bucaramanga; b. Bucaramanga and Bogot ́a; c. Riohacha and Bogot ́a; and d. Bucaramanga and Riohacha. The third question asks: Where is the primary character from? The respondents chose between: a. Caracas; b. C ́ucuta; c. Maracaibo; and d. Manzanillo. For the respondents in the video treatment arm, the first question was: What is the title of the video? The possible choices were: a. The perils of migrants; b. Walking for freedom; and c. Migration from Colombia to Venezuela. The second question reads: Which of the following migrants are allowed to sleep in the shelter presented in the video? The answer options were: a. Only children; b. Only women and children; c. All migrants (regardless of sex and age); and d. Only migrants that have a passport. Finally, the third question asked: Approximately, how many Venezuelans have fled their country? Respondents chose between: a. 1 million; b. 3 million; c. 5 million; and d. 7 million.

51
Figure E.2. Task Immersion Measurement in the Treatment <!-- Start of picture text --> None 5.8<br>8.9<br>A little 36.2<br>26.7<br>Quite a bit 46.9<br>50.8<br>Completely 11.1<br>13.7<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>Game Video<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates the question used to evaluate the level of immersion experienced by respondents during both treatments. The question posed was: “To what extent did you perceive the experience of the Venezuelan migrant is an extension of yourself?” Respondents provided their responses by selecting from a 4-point scale ranging from “none” to “completely.” Figure E.3. Respondents’ Emotions after Treatment <!-- Start of picture text --> (A) Compassion (B) Distress (C) Happiness<br>GAME VIDEO GAME VIDEO GAME VIDEO<br>10 10 10<br>9 9 9<br>8 8 8<br>7 7 7<br>6 6 6<br>5 5 5<br>Mean of Compassion 4 Mean of Distress 4 Mean of Happiness 4<br>3 3 3<br>2 2 2<br>1 1 1<br>0 0 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates how the treatment affects participants’ emotions. The emotional reactions stem from a question aimed at measuring the respondents’ emotions after receiving the treatment. The question asks: Please indicate how much you experienced the following emotional states when you watched the video or engaged in the virtual activity: a. Compassion; b. Distress; and/or c. Happiness. Respondents answer by selecting one choice for each option a, b, and c, from a Likert scale ranging from one to ten, where one signifies “Not at all” and ten indicates “A lot.” 52
# **F Exploratory Analyses**

Table F.1. Treatment Effects on Generalized vs. Specific Self-reported Trust

||Trust in People<br>(Z-score)|Others Intention<br>to Help<br>(Z-score)|Count on<br>Others<br>(Z-score)|Trust in<br>Venezuelans<br>(Z-score)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|Game [=1]|0.169*|-0.064|0.187**|0.297***|
||(0.089)|(0.089)|(0.082)|(0.080)|
||[0.132]|[0.364]|[0.089]|[0.002]|
|Video [=1]|-0.004|-0.078|0.153*|0.116|
||(0.096)|(0.097)|(0.088)|(0.090)|
|FDRq-values|[0.568]|[0.364]|[0.144]|[0.202]|
|Observations|827|828|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Diff. p-value|0.082|0.888|0.691|0.033|
|YWYjoint test|0.124|0.664|0.045|0.001|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables are z-scores derived from a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) for the following statements: (i) “One can trust other people,” (ii) “In general, other people have good intentions toward me,” (iii) “One can rely on other people, even if one does not know them well,” and (iv) “One can trust Venezuelan migrants,” All columns control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. The Diff. p-value reports the p-value of a Wald test assessing the equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. The YWY joint test reports sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values. Significance levels are denoted as:<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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Table F.2. Treatment Effects on Misinformation about Venezuelan Forced Migrants

||% of<br>Venezuelans<br>in<br>Colombia|Venezuelans’<br>Years of<br>Education|Venezuelans’<br>Access to<br>Subsidized<br>Health<br>System|Venezuelans’<br>Children<br>Attend Public<br>Schools|Ven. Children<br>Born in<br>Colombia are<br>Colombians|Venezuelans<br>Pay Higher<br>Taxes Than<br>Colombians|Venezuelans<br>Receive More<br>Subsidies Than<br>Colombians|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|Game [=1]|-0.483|0.708**|0.156***|0.040|-0.021|0.025|0.027|
||(1.117)|(0.281)|(0.041)|(0.027)|(0.033)|(0.038)|(0.041)|
||[0.694]|[0.051]|[0.003]|[0.333]|[0.538]|[0.538]|[0.538]|
|Video [=1]|-3.944***|-0.524*|0.072|0.034|0.005|0.040|0.038|
||(1.147)|(0.289)|(0.044)|(0.029)|(0.034)|(0.041)|(0.044)|
||[0.005]|[0.239]|[0.308]|[0.446]|[0.921]|[0.538]|[0.538]|
|Observations|812|826|825|825|825|828|828|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|16.803|7.431|0.474|0.858|0.813|0.289|0.563|
|Diff. p-value|0.002|0.000|0.045|0.846|0.444|0.695|0.803|
|YWYjoint test|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.322|0.710|0.664|0.557|
|Correct Answer|5%|5.98|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|No|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables are as follows: (i) % of Venezuelans in Colombia: This variable represents the respondent’s answer to the question “What percentage of the Colombian population do Venezuelans represent today?” (ii) Venezuelans’ years of education represents the respondent’s answer to the question “How many years of average education do you think Venezuelan migrants in Colombia have?” (iii) Venezuelans’ access to subsidized health system is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement “Venezuelan immigrants have access to Colombia’s subsidized health system.” (iv) Venezuelan children attend public schools is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement “Venezuelan children can attend public schools in Colombia.” (v) Venezuelan children born in Colombia are Colombians is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement “Venezuelan children born in Colombia are Colombians (they have the right to obtain Colombian nationality).” (vi) Venezuelans pay higher taxes than Colombians is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that Venezuelans pay A lot more or More taxes than Colombians. (vii) Venezuelans receive more subsidies than Colombians is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that Venezuelans receive A lot more or More government transfers than Colombians. All columns control for gender and student status. The Diff. p-value reports the p-value of a Wald test assessing the equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. The YWY joint test reports sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values. Significance levels are denoted as:<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.
# **G Robustness Tests**

Table G.1. Effects of the Intervention on the General Indices Including Additional Controls

||Prosociality<br>Index<br>(1)|Attitudes<br>Index<br>(2)|Beliefs<br>Index<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.252***|0.318***|0.151*|
||(0.081)|(0.078)|(0.080)|
||[0.003]|[0.001]|[0.038]|
|Video [=1]|0.195**|0.312***|0.013|
||(0.090)|(0.084)|(0.086)|
||[0.023]|[0.001]|[0.172]|
|Diff. p-value|0.491|0.939|0.096|
|YWY joint test|0.003|0.001|0.099|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|815|814|814|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1. The dependent variables are constructed according to the methodology outlined by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) for three groups of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for gender, student status (1 if the person is a student, and 0 otherwise), age, marital status (1 if the person is married, and 0 otherwise), religious affiliation (1 if the person is Catholic, and 0 otherwise), education level indicator variables (primary, secondary, university or more), income, economic strata (1 if the person belongs to a low economic strata, and 0 otherwise), and whether they have children or not. The Diff. p-value reports the p-value of a Wald test of equality of coefficients between the game treatment and video treatment. YWY joint test reports the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values. Significance levels are denoted as:<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

55
# **H Assessing Experimenter Demand Effects**

Figure H.1. Results of the List Experiment <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.08<br>2.03<br>1.96 1.95 1.93<br>1.75<br>Control Game Video<br>3 options 4 options<br>2.5<br>2<br>1.5<br>1<br>Mean angry responses<br>.5<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The figure illustrates the results of the listing experiment randomly assigned to all participants. The respondents were asked: How many of the following issues annoy you? [Please respond how many not which of them]. The options were: a. Homeless people sleeping on the street; b. People talking loud close to me; c. People who cut in line; d. People from other countries coming to live in my country. Option d was assigned randomly so that only half of the participants got this statement. The bars represent the mean answer for each group.

56
Table H.1. Heterogeneous Effects of the Treatments by List Experiment Group

||Annoyed<br>Situations<br>(1)|
|---|---|
|Game [=1]|-0.002|
||(0.073)|
|Game x Has Four Options|-0.154|
||(0.113)|
|Video [=1]|-0.198***<br>(0.073)|
|Video x Has Four Options|0.131<br>(0.115)|
|List Experiment: Has Four Options [=1]|0.237***<br>(0.082)|
|P-value: Game + Game x Has Four Options = 0|0.068|
|FDR q-value: Game + Game x Has Four Options = 0|0.158|
|P-value: Video + Video x Has Four Options = 0|0.447|
|FDR q-value: Video + Video x Has Four Options = 0|0.288|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|2.000|
|Observations|825|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1, incorporating interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the indicator variable denoting whether participants have the randomly assigned extra option in the list experiment, indicated as has four option [=1]. The assignment of has four option is randomized, with only half of the participants receiving this statement. The dependent variable, Annoyed Situations, represents the total number of annoyed situations stated in the list experiment. Its range is from 0 to 3 for the control group and from 0 to 4 for the treatment group, which includes the extra option. All columns control for gender and student status, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x Has Four Options = 0 and Video + Video x Has Four Options = 0, indicate the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x Has Four Options = 0 and Video + Video x Has Four Options = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

57
Table H.2. Heterogeneous Effects on Indices by Social Desirability Score

||Prosociality<br>Index<br>(1)|Attitudes<br>Index<br>(2)|Beliefs<br>Index<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.250***|0.331***|0.158**|
||(0.080)|(0.079)|(0.081)|
|Video [=1]|0.194**|0.331***|0.020|
||(0.090)|(0.085)|(0.087)|
|Social Desirability Index (SDS)|-0.083|-0.127*|-0.174***|
||(0.067)|(0.066)|(0.056)|
|Game x SDS|0.132|0.056|0.119|
||(0.083)|(0.081)|(0.080)|
|Video x SDS|0.022|0.109|0.208**|
||(0.093)|(0.087)|(0.083)|
|P-value: Game + Game x SDS = 0|0.001|0.000|0.009|
|FDR q-value: Game + Game x SDS= 0|0.002|0.001|0.007|
|P-value: Video + Video x SDS = 0|0.119|0.001|0.070|
|FDR q-value: Video + Video x SDS = 0|0.042|0.002|0.029|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|823|822|822|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1 with interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the standardized variable for the Social Desirability Score (SDS). SDS is a measure of an individual’s propensity to report socially desirable answers. It represents a standardized variable of a measurement scale ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates that the respondent does not exhibit social desirability bias, and 4 represents the highest level of this measure. The dependent variables are constructed following the methodology outlined by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) for each group of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for student status and gender, the stratification variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x SDS = 0 and Video + Video x SDS = 0, represent the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x SDS = 0 and Video + Video x SDS = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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# **I Heterogeneous Effects**

Table I.1. Heterogenous Effects on Indices by Gender

||Prosociality<br>Index<br>(1)|Attitudes<br>Index<br>(2)|Beliefs<br>Index<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.248**|0.275**|0.202|
||(0.124)|(0.120)|(0.125)|
|Game x Female [=1]|0.034|0.100|-0.079|
||(0.162)|(0.160)|(0.163)|
|Video [=1]|0.207|0.402***|0.076|
||(0.131)|(0.123)|(0.126)|
|Video x Female [=1]|-0.011|-0.139|-0.118|
||(0.179)|(0.170)|(0.173)|
|Female [=1]|0.062|0.046|0.093|
||(0.122)|(0.121)|(0.119)|
|P-value: Game + Game x Female = 0|0.007|0.000|0.240|
|FDR q-value: Game + Game x Female = 0|0.018|0.001|0.169|
|P-value: Video + Video x Female = 0|0.107|0.024|0.725|
|FDR q-value: Video + Video x Female = 0|0.088|0.034|0.319|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|828|827|827|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1 with interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the indicator variable for female, denoted as female [=1]. The dependent variables are constructed following the methodology outlined by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) for each group of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for student status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x Female = 0 and Video + Video x Female = 0, represent the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x Female = 0 and Video + Video x Female = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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Table I.2. Heterogeneous Effects on Indices by Student

||(1)<br>Prosociality<br>Index|(2)<br>Attitudes<br>Index|(3)<br>Beliefs<br>Index|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.261*|0.405***|0.245*|
||(0.139)|(0.135)|(0.138)|
|Game x Student [=1]|0.009|-0.115|-0.136|
||(0.170)|(0.167)|(0.170)|
|Video [=1]|0.266*|0.426***|0.107|
||(0.150)|(0.143)|(0.146)|
|Video x Student [=1]|-0.106|-0.152|-0.147|
||(0.187)|(0.177)|(0.181)|
|Student [=1]|0.012|0.128|0.039|
||(0.130)|(0.127)|(0.124)|
|P-value: Game + Game x Student = 0|0.005|0.003|0.269|
|FDR qval: Game + Game x Student = 0|0.016|0.016|0.193|
|P-value: Video + Video x Student = 0|0.147|0.009|0.706|
|FDR qval: Video + Video x Student = 0|0.124|0.016|0.308|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|828|827|827|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1 with interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the indicator variable for student, denoted as student [=1]. The dependent variables are constructed following the methodology outlined by (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007) for each group of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for female indicator variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x Student = 0 and Video + Video x Student = 0, represent the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x Student = 0 and Video + Video x Student = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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Table I.3. Heterogeneous Effects by Level of Education

||Prosociality<br>Index<br>(1)|Attitudes<br>Index<br>(2)|Beliefs<br>Index<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.244**|0.343***|0.130|
||(0.104)|(0.097)|(0.102)|
|Game x Higher Education [=1]|0.026|-0.017|0.058|
||(0.164)|(0.169)|(0.168)|
|Video [=1]|0.226*|0.304***|0.017|
||(0.115)|(0.105)|(0.110)|
|Video x Higher Education [=1]|-0.063|0.075|-0.003|
||(0.183)|(0.180)|(0.180)|
|Higher Education Completed [=1]|0.152|-0.017|0.066|
||(0.134)|(0.137)|(0.130)|
|P-value: Game + Game x Higher Ed. = 0|0.033|0.019|0.159|
|FDR q-value: Game + Game x Higher Ed. = 0|0.061|0.061|0.136|
|P-value: Video + Video x Higher Ed. = 0|0.253|0.010|0.925|
|FDR q-value: Video + Video x Higher Ed. = 0|0.179|0.061|0.436|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|827|826|826|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1 with interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the indicator variable for high level of education, denoted as higher education completed [=1]. Higher Education Completed is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent has completed education beyond high school, including technical, university, or higher studies. The dependent variables are constructed following the methodology outlined by (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007) for each group of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for gender and student status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x Higher Ed. = 0 and Video + Video x Higher Ed. = 0, represent the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x Higher Ed. = 0 and Video + Video x Higher Ed. = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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Table I.4. Heterogeneous Effects on Indices by Income

||Prosociality<br>Index<br>(1)|Attitudes<br>Index<br>(2)|Beliefs<br>Index<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Game [=1]|0.219**|0.323***|0.195**|
||(0.099)|(0.093)|(0.094)|
|Game x High income [=1]|0.158|0.036|-0.112|
||(0.164)|(0.176)|(0.180)|
|Video [=1]|0.192|0.291|-0.025|
||(0.112)|(0.103)|(0.102)|
|Video x High income [=1]|0.020|0.125|0.113|
||(0.183)|(0.182)|(0.189)|
|High income [=1]|0.113|0.007|0.171|
||(0.127)|(0.133)|(0.130)|
|P-value: Game + Game x High income = 0|0.004|0.017|0.593|
|FDR q-value: Game + Game x High income = 0|0.019|0.024|0.274|
|P-value: Video + Video x High income = 0|0.143|0.006|0.580|
|FDR q-value: Video + Video x High income = 0|0.121|0.019|0.274|
|Av. Dep. Var. (Control group)|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations|828|827|827|

_Notes:_ This table presents OLS estimates derived from Equation 1 with interactions between the treatment exposure indicator variables and the indicator variable for high income, denoted as high income [=1]. High Income is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s wage is higher than the median of the sample. The dependent variables are constructed following the methodology outlined by (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007) for each group of outcome variables: (i) Prosocial Behavior (detailed in Table 2), (ii) Attitudes (detailed in Table 4), and (iii) Beliefs (detailed in Table 5). All columns control for gender and student status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reported p-values, such as Game + Game x High income = 0 and Video + Video x Student = 0, represent the p-value of a Wald test for each linear combination. Additionally, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values for Game + Game x High income = 0 and Video + Video x High income = 0 are provided. Significance levels are denoted as<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> at 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> at 5%, and<sup>_∗_</sup> at 10%.

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# **J Survey Instrument**

# **I. Immersion**<sup>23</sup>

1. How much did you feel the experience of the Venezuelan migrant was an extension of yourself?

- a. Completely

- b. Quite a bit

- c. A little

- d. None

2. How aware were you of outside distractions around you during the activity?

- a. Very aware

- b. Aware

- c. Unaware

- d. Very unaware

# **II. Comprehension assessment**

_Game treatment recipients:_

1. What was the name of the main character of the story?

- a. Mile

- b. Lina

- c. Diana

- d. Paola

2. The main character and her husband have to decide between arriving to:

- a. C ́ucuta and Bucaramanga

- b. Bucaramanga and Bogot ́a

- c. Riohacha and Bogot ́a

- d. Bucaramanga and Riohacha

3. Where is the main character from?

- a. Caracas

- b. C ́ucuta

- c. Maracaibo

- d. Manzanillo

_Video treatment recipients:_

1. What sentence does describe your experience with the internet connection:

- a. I watched the video without interruptions.

- b. The video was interrupted only once.

- c. The video was interrupted more than once.

- d. I could not watch the video because it was frequently interrupted.

> 23Adapted from Behm-Morawitz, Lewallen and Miller (2015), applied only to individuals assigned to treatment. Question 2 was, due to a programming error, only applied to the game treatment and therefore we do not use it for the analysis)

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2. What is the title of the video?

- a. The perils of migrants

- b. Walking for freedom

- c. Migration from Colombia to Venezuela

3. The shelter that is shown in the video, which of the following migrants are allowed to sleep in:

- a. Only children

- b. Only women and children

- c. All migrants (independent of sex and age)

- d. Only migrants that have a passport

4. Approximately, how many Venezuelans have fled their country?

- a. 1 million

- b. 3 million

- c. 5 million

- d. 7 million

# **III. General characteristics**

1. What is your gender?

- a. Female

- b. Male

- c. Other

2. In what year where you born?

3. What is your marital status?

- a. Married/Living together

- b. Separated

- c. Widowed

- d. Single

- e. Other

4. In what country where you born?

- a. Colombia

- b. Venezuela

- c. Other

5. Where did you live 5 years ago?

- a. In the same municipality in Colombia where I live now

- b. In a different municipality in Colombia than where I live now

- c. In a different country

6. What is your religion?

- a. Catholic

- b. Evangelic

- c. Jewish

- d. Protestant

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- e. Jehovah witness

- f. Agnostic/Atheist

- g. Other

7. Left and right political trends are often spoke of. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, with what political tendency do you sympathize?

- a. Left

- b. Center-left

- c. Center

- d. Center-right

- e. Right

- f. NR

8. How many people live in your household? Think of people who you share a meal with on most days.

9. How many years of education have you completed? (please start to count from the first year of elementary school).

10. To what strata does you’re your dwelling belong to?

- a. Strata 1

- b. Strata 2

- c. Strata 3

- d. Strata 4

- e. Strata 5

- f. Strata 6

11. Think of your ten closest family members and friends (Please check that the three responses sum up to ten.). Of those:

- a. How many are Colombians?

- b. How many are Venezuelans?

- c. How many are from another nationality?

12. Do you have any children?

- a. Yes

- b. No

13. ¿What is your household’s average monthly income?

- a. $0-$999,999

- b. $1,000,000-$4,999,999

- c. $5,000,000 - $9,999,999

- d. $10,000,000-$14,999,999

- e. $15,000,000-$19,999,999

- f. $20,000,000 - $24,999,999

- g. $25,000,000 – $29,999,999

- h. $30,000,000 - $34,999,999

- i. $35,000,000- $39,999,999

- j. $40,000,000+

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# **IV. Misinformation**<sup>24</sup>

1. What percent of the Colombian population do Venezuelans represent today? (Please choose a number between 0% and 100%)

2. In Colombia, an average citizen has around 6 years of education (which is equivalent to having finished primary school). How many years of average education do you think Venezuelan migrants in Colombia have?

3. Please choose the statements that best describe your opinions (you may choose more than one option):

- a. Venezuelan immigrants have access to the Colombian’s subsidized health system.

- b. Venezuelan children can attend public schools in Colombia.

- c. The children of Venezuelans who are born in Colombia, are Colombians (they have the right to get the Colombian nationality).

4. Imagine two people, Carlos and Diego, currently living in Colombia with their families. Carlos is born in Colombia, while Diego legally moved to Colombia five years ago from Venezuela. They are both 35, have three children, and earn the same low income from their jobs. In your opinion, does Diego pay more, the same, or less in income taxes than Carlos?

- a. A lot more

- b. More

- c. Same

- d. Less

- e. A lot less

5. In your opinion does Diego, who is a Venezuelan immigrant, receive more, the same, or less government transfers (such as e.g., public assistance, Familias en Acci ́on, formation programs like SENA, unemployment benefits during unemployment spells, educational scholarships or housing subsidies) than Carlos?

- a. A lot more

- b. More

- c. Same

- d. Less

- e. A lot less

# **V. Attitudes Towards Venezuelan Migrants**<sup>25</sup>

1. List experiment: How many of the following issues annoy you? [Please tell us how many not which of them]

- a. Homeless people sleeping on the street

- b. People talking loud close to me

- c. People who cut in line

- d. People from other countries coming to live in my country (randomly assigned to all participants)

2. Which relates the most with a Venezuelan immigrant living in Colombia that is poor?

- a. Lack of effort on his or her own part

- b. Circumstances beyond his or her control

> 24Questions 3 and 4 are adpated from Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva (2022)

25Question 2 is adapted from (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2022) 66
3. The Colombian government is obligated to help Venezuelan immigrants.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

4. Colombians have the right to keep Venezuelan immigrants out of their neighborhoods and Venezuelans should respect that right.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

5. I would vote for a policy to increase government spending to assist Venezuelan immigrants a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

6. Please read the following statements and choose one:

- a. Venezuelan immigrants should have as good a chance as anyone to get any kind of job in Colombia.

- b. Colombians should have the first chance at any kind of job.

# **VI. Beliefs**

1. Please, read the following statements and tell us if you: “Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree”, “Strongly disagree”.

- a. Immigrants are good for a country ́s economy.

- b. Immigrants come to compete for our jobs.

- c. Immigrants increase crime.

- d. Immigrants improve our society by bringing new ideas and cultures.

- e. In general, what immigrants contribute to a country is more than what they take away from it.

# **VI. Altruism**

1. How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to do so” and a 10 means you are “very willing to do so”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

2. At the end of this survey you will receive 10,000 additional COP. You can keep that money or you can donate it to the following organizations in Colombia. How would you like to distribute that money between?<sup>26</sup>

> 26In the same screen particpants were told the following: “Please have in mind that all the resources you decide to donate, will in fact be delivered to the chosen organizations. The researchers of this project are committed to doing it. Once’s this study is finished, REBEL will send the total funds donated from the

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- (a) You: <u>$</u>

- (b) Fundaci ́on Juntos se Puede. Organization that supports Venezuelan immigrants to access health, education, and legal advice: $

- (c) Un techo para mi pa ́ıs. Organization that builds houses for vulnerable populations in Colombia: <u>$</u>

# **VII. Trust**<sup>27</sup>

For the following statements please choose one answer:

1. One can trust other people.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

2. In general, other people have good intentions toward me.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

3. One can rely on other people, even if one does not know them well.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

4. One can trust in Venezuelan migrants.

- a. Strongly disagree

- b. Disagree

- c. Agree

- d. Strongly agree

# **VII. Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking Scales**<sup>28</sup>

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter. On the scale, where A “Describes me very well” and E “Does not describe me well”. Please read each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you can.

participants of this study to each organization. While donating, REBEL will explain to the organizations that the funds come from a study, without giving any details about who donated, or the relationship of the Inter-American Development Bank and the University of Southern California with the study. After doing this, REBEL will send a proof to all the participants that the donations have been done.

> 27Questions 1 to 3 are from Kosse et al. (2020) and have been experimentally validated by Fehr et al. (2002) and Falk et al. (2018)

> 28Questions are taken from Davis (1980, 1983)

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1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ”other guy’s” point of view.(PT) (-)

2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 3. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 4. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (EC) (-) 5. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective. (PT) 6. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. (EC) 7. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other people’s arguments. (PT) (-) 8. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them. (EC) (-) 9. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 10. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 11. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ”put myself in his shoes” for a while. (PT) 12. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 13. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. (PT) 14. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (EC) (-) 15. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) Note: PT = perspective-taking scale; EC = empathic concern scale. (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion. A = 0, B = 1, C = 2, D = 3, E = 4. Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: A = 4, B = 3, C = 2, D = 1, E = 0

# **VIII. Social desirability bias**<sup>29</sup>

1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. True/False

2. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. True/False 3. I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake. True/False 4. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. True/False

# **IX. Emotions (for game and video treatment groups)**

1. Below you will find a scale with different adjectives that characterize different emotional states. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means ”Not at all” and 10 means ”A lot”, please indicate how much you experienced the following emotional states when you watched the video / realized the virtual activity. You can also use any numbers between 1 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10:

- a. Compassion:

- b. Distress:

- c. Happiness:

> 29Questions are adapted from Crowne, Crowne and Marlowe (1964)

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# **K Index Description**

Three of the outcome variables (Prosociality Index, Beliefs Index, Attitudes Index) are constructed by aggregating the responses of several individual questions into an index. The index is an equally weighted average of the standardized individual variables (i.e., z-scores) with the sign of each measure oriented so that less xenophobic outcomes have higher scores. We follow the procedure in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). The steps involved in producing the final indices are as follows:

1. We sign all the individual variables such that a higher score is less xenophobic. Likert-scale and dummy variables with negative statements towards immigrants would be scored in a reverse fashion.

2. The variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation.

3. Average all the z-scores 4. Normalize the average of all the z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and diving by the control group standard deviation.

Below is the complete list of all the indices used in the paper with details on measurement.

**Prosociality Index:** Index that combines the variables “Donation Venezuelan Org.”, “Donation Nonmigrant Org.” and “Trust”. _Scale:_ Z-score.

**Beliefs Index:** Index that combines the variables “Economy”, “Compete jobs”, “Crime”, “New ideas and cultures” and “Contribute”. _Scale:_ Z-score

**Attitudes Index:** Index that combines the variables “Effort”, “Same job opportunity”, “Segregate”, “Government must help” and “Increase gov. spending”. _Scale:_ Z-score

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