metadata: authors: 0: author: Hoekman,Bernard M.
1: author: Zarrouk,Jamel Eddine
count: Middle East and North Africa
docna: 0: docna: Changes in cross-border trade costs in the
            Pan-Arab free trade area, 2001-2008
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
theme: Regional integration,Trade facilitation and market access
majtheme: Trade and integration
subtopic: Trade Policy,International Trade and Trade Rules,Rules of Origin,Transport Services,Trade and Multilateral Issues
teratopic: Transport,Law and Development,International Economics and Trade
abstracts: cdata!: The Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, negotiated
            under auspices of the Arab League, came into force in 1997.
            Under the agreement all tariffs on goods of Arab origin were
            to be removed by January 1, 2005. This paper summarizes the
            results of a firm-level survey in nine countries regarding
            the implementation of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area. A
            majority of respondent companies report that tariffs on
            intra-regional trade have largely been removed, and that
            there has been a marked improvement in customs
            clearance-related procedures. Costs associated with
            administrative red tape and weaknesses in transport-related
            infrastructure services are ranked as the most important
            constraints to intra-regional trade. This suggests that from
            a policy perspective, efforts to reduce real trade costs
            deserve priority, including transportation and logistics
            services. Periodic monitoring and assessment of trade
            incentives and performance would help governments to
            benchmark performance and identify priority areas for
            action, at both the national and the sub-regional levels.
repnme: repnme: Changes in cross-border trade costs in the
            Pan-Arab free trade area, 2001-2008
display_title: Changes in cross-border trade costs
            in the Pan-Arab free trade area, 2001-2008
listing_relative_url: /research/2009/08/11017288/changes-cross-border-trade-costs-pan-arab-free-trade-area-2001-2008
topicv3: Intraregional Trade m1326248 1175,Transport m1326661 135,Trade m1326924 698,Non-Tariff Measures m1326926 778,Trade Policy m1327640 776
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Transport,Law and Development,International Economics and Trade
no_of_pages: 35
author_keys: 0: author_key: 96350
1: author_key: 434031
model_extractions: WPS5031

# Policy Research Working Paper 5031

Changes in Cross-Border Trade Costs in the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, 2001–2008 _Bernard Hoekman Jamel Zarrouk_ The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network International Trade Department August 2009
Policy Research Working Paper 5031

# **Abstract**

The Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, negotiated under auspices of the Arab League, came into force in 1997. Under the agreement all tariffs on goods of Arab origin were to be removed by January 1, 2005. This paper summarizes the results of a firm-level survey in nine countries regarding the implementation of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area. A majority of respondent companies report that tariffs on intra-regional trade have largely been removed, and that there has been a marked improvement in customs clearance-related procedures. Costs associated with administrative red tape and weaknesses in transportrelated infrastructure services are ranked as the most important constraints to intra-regional trade. This suggests that from a policy perspective, efforts to reduce real trade costs deserve priority, including transportation and logistics services. Periodic monitoring and assessment of trade incentives and performance would help governments to benchmark performance and identify priority areas for action, at both the national and the subregional levels.

This paper—a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to monitor and assess the impacts of regional trade agreements. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at Bhoekman@ worldbank.org and jzarrouk@eim.ae.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Changes in Cross-Border Trade Costs in the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, 2001-2008**

Bernard Hoekman (World Bank and CEPR) Jamel Zarrouk (Arab Monetary Fund and ERF) JEL codes: F13, F15, F53, O53 Keywords: Arab economic integration, regional integration, free trade areas, Middle East and North Africa

* We thank participants at the Arab League Economic and Social Forum in Kuwait (January 2009), Paul Brenton, Ahmed Galal, Mona Haddad and Yan Wang for helpful comments on a draft, Francis Ng and Alessandro Nicita for help with data, and the Arab World Initiative of the MNA Region of the World Bank and the DFID Global Trade and Financial Architecture project for financial support. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank or the Arab Monetary Fund.
# **Changes in Cross-Border Trade Costs in the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, 2001-2008**

Regional integration is a major feature of the trade policy strategy of all countries in the Middle East and North Africa. An important vehicle to achieve greater integration of Arab countries was the agreement to form the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) in 1997 under Arab League auspices.<sup>1</sup> Under the PAFTA, all tariffs on goods of Arab origin were to be removed by January 1, 2008, which was subsequently brought forward to January 1, 2005. More recently, signatories of PAFTA have launched efforts to extend integration efforts to encompass trade and investment in services, and to increase efforts to deal with non-tariff measures restricting trade flows.

Little is known about the extent to which the provisions of PAFTA have been implemented. Regular monitoring of implementation is important for policymakers to be able to assess the effects of the agreement. It is also a precondition for action to be taken if necessary to address specific problems concerning the operation of the agreement. Absent information of the extent of implementation it is difficult for governments to either respond to concerns on the part of consumers, workers and businesses regarding the impacts of PAFTA or to make a compelling case that PAFTA has led to greater cross-border trade among Arab states. For example, it is sometimes reported in the trade press that PAFTA has not been implemented fully because customs officials do not accept that goods satisfy PAFTA rules of origin and therefore continue to levy tariffs.<sup>2</sup> More generally, it may be the case that specific policy measures or other factors unrelated to trade policy impede trade independent of implementation of the specific provisions of the PAFTA. As trade agreements are implemented and specific trade barriers are removed other constraints to trade become relatively more important. Having up-to-date information on what these constraints are is a necessary condition for policymakers to decide whether and how they might best be removed.

A primary source of information on the magnitude and type of constraints that affect crossborder trade are the firms that import and export, both those that are in the business of distribution and intermediation, and those that produce goods and either want to sell their output in other countries or want to import parts and components that they use to produce their goods or services. This paper summarizes the results of a survey of trading firms in 9 PAFTA members. The survey compiled information on the extent to which the costs of trading across Arab borders have declined since PAFTA was implemented. The survey spans official trade and tax policies, the administrative requirements that confront traders, and the costs/quality of transport infrastructure.

The survey is designed to allow comparisons with an earlier survey of bilateral trading costs among Arab countries undertaken in 2001. The purpose of that survey was threefold: first, to generate information on trading costs and other trade policies affecting trade and investment in the MENA region; second, to shed further light on the operation of the prevailing intra-regional trade agreements; and, third, to identify the most important factors affecting intra-regional investment decisions as well as the perceived constraints to investment in MENA countries by the investors who took part in the survey.

> 1  PAFTA is often also called the Greater Arab FTA (GAFTA) in the English-language literature.

> 2 For goods to be eligible for zero tariff status they must have at least 40 percent Arab content.

2
The results of the 2001 survey were reported in Zarrouk (2001, 2003). It revealed that the cost of getting goods across borders averaged 10 percent of the value of goods shipped. Next to tariffs and bureaucratic red tape, customs clearance procedures were the most important source of nontariff trading costs, with the average company spending 95 man-days per year resolving problems with customs and other government authorities. Excessive delays resulted from lengthy processes of clearance and inspection, the number of documents and signatures needed to process a trade transaction, and the frequency of problems with customs and other government authorities.

The survey that is the basis of the present paper replicated the main trade-related questions asked in the 2001 survey but goes beyond it by including specific questions relating to the implementation of the PAFTA and the relative importance of trade policies that are sometimes reported in the press to be problematical (such as rules of origin and enforcement of product standards). The survey suggests firms perceive PAFTA as being beneficial due to the removal of tariffs on intra-PAFTA trade. It also reveals a marked improvement in customs clearance-related procedures, with a substantial decline in the number of required documents and signatures, a significant reduction in the variance of clearance times, and fewer firms reporting having to make informal payments (bribes) to officials. Also of note is that only a minority of respondents reported having problems with rules of origin (13 percent), substantially fewer than those perceiving arbitrary customs valuation and costs associated with enforcement of product standards to be a problem. In 2001, tariffs were ranked as one of the most important barriers to intra-regional trade; in 2008 they were ranked last. Instead, transport-related infrastructure and real trade costs (trade facilitation) was ranked as the most important constraint. Thus, the survey reveals substantial satisfaction with implementation of PAFTA tariff liberalization. It also suggests that further action to reduce the trade costs associated with trade facilitation, enforcement of standards and other non-tariff policies is needed. From an economic policy perspective, actions on these fronts have the advantage of benefitting trade in general, not just from Arab countries, and thus can avoid giving rise to trade diversion costs.

The plan of this note is as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the trade agreements signed by MENA countries, and summarizes some of the existing literature on prevailing trade policies and the determinants of the trade performance of the region. Section 2 discusses the survey. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.

# **1. Regional Integration and Trade-related Policies**

Regional integration is a central element of the trade strategies that are being pursued by Arab countries. Efforts to integrate regionally date back to the 1950s. Examples are the 1957 Arab Economic Unity agreement, the 1964 initiative by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria to form an Arab Common Market, the 1981 Gulf Cooperation Council and the 1989 Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). Regional trade integration was given a new stimulus in the mid 1990s, with countries around the Mediterranean signing free trade agreements with the European Community (EC) that aimed at the elimination of tariffs on trade in goods with the EC (with the exception of agriculture), and the revitalization of integration efforts by Arab League members through the creation of a Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) in 1998.

3
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below, these agreements in turn reduce the scope for harmful trade diversion that may be associated with preferential liberalization of trade among Arab countries.

For most Arab countries, regional trade accounts for less than 10 percent of total trade – the average for all PAFTA member imports taken together was 9.5 percent in 2007; and just 6.3 percent for exports.<sup>4</sup> Exceptions are Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Lebanon, Somalia and Syria. However, if the focus is limited to non-oil-related trade, the intra-regional trade ratio rises substantially. In the case of Syria and Yemen, regional markets account for more than half of all non-oil exports; for Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman, and the UAE it is in the 35-40 percent range; while it is more than 25 percent for Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The Maghreb countries have the lowest share of intra-regional non-oil merchandise trade—less than 5 percent. The exports of these countries go predominantly to the EU.

Since the late 1990s, the share of non-oil intra-regional trade has increased – in terms of exports, it has risen from around 20 percent to 24 percent in 2007; in terms of overall reported imports (a more reliable statistic), it has doubled, growing from 4.5 percent on average in 1998-99 to some 9 percent in 2006-07. Countries that have seen intra-regional exports expand the most include Yemen, Oman, Egypt, Kuwait and Lebanon. The increase in intra-regional sourcing of non-oil imports is more uniformly distributed – all PAFTA today source more from other PAFTA signatories as a group than they did in the late 1990s, when the PAFTA integration process was revitalized.

The extent of intra-regional trade for any country depends on many factors, including differences in endowments and incomes (preferences) and the costs that are associated with crossing borders. Such costs are determined by the applicable tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the administrative procedures that must be satisfied, as well as the availability/quality of transport-related logistics and infrastructure. Arab countries have undertaken significant liberalization of external trade in the last decade, complementing preferential liberalization under PAFTA and other agreements with reductions in MFN tariffs. The uniform tariff equivalent of all tariffs (ad valorem and specific) was 6.7 percent on average in 2007. Between 2002 and 2007 the average uniform tariff equivalent for the region fell by 8 percentage points (World Bank and IMF, 2009). The overall average level of trade restrictiveness, including NTMs, was 20 percent in 2007, down from 24 percent in 2006) (Table 1). Non-tariff measures increase real trade costs for many Arab countries significantly. As is the case for tariffs, governments have taken actions to reduce the incidence of certain types of NTMs, including documentary requirements.

Although significant progress has been made in reducing trade barriers, both tariffs and certain NTMs, the overall level of trade restrictiveness of a number of countries in the region remains high. The highest levels of MFN tariff protection are in the Maghreb countries, for both manufactures and agriculture. In Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon NTMs remain prevalent, resulting in overall trade restrictiveness levels that are more than double those prevailing in the GCC.

> 4 The data in this paragraph are from UN COMTRADE. It should be emphasized that trade data are often very weak and unreliable for some countries in the MENA region.

5
The relatively high levels of trade restrictiveness and the significant differences between Arab countries in the average OTRI level have implications for the potential economic effects of efforts to further reduce trade barriers on a regional basis. The higher are MFN tariffs, the greater the danger that preferential liberalization will generate welfare reducing trade diversion. The same is true for initiatives to lower the incidence of NTMs if this is done in a way that pertains only to intra-Arab trade. As the removal of tariffs on intra-PAFTA trade has already occurred, countries with high MFN tariffs can reduce the potential costs of trade diversion by lowering external tariffs. In the case of NTMs, there is great scope to pursue reductions in trade costs in a way that benefits all traders – both from within the region and those located outside it – thereby avoiding the costs of trade diversion.

**Table 1: Overall and Tariff-only Trade Restrictiveness Indices (2007, percent)**

|**Region **|**Total Trade**|**Agriculture**|**Manufacturing**|
|---|---|---|---|
|East Asia and Pacific|**12.5**|**34.5**|**10.6**|
||_4.9_|_8.3_|_4.7_|
|Europe and Central Asia|**11.3**|**41.1**|**8.5**|
||_5.0_|_13.0_|_4.4_|
|Latin America and Caribbean|**13.9**|**34.1**|**12.1**|
||_8.0_|_13.3_|_7.2_|
|**Middle East and North Africa**|**20.7**|**46.6**|**16.9**|
||_6.7_|_11.1_|_6.2_|
|GCC*|**NA**|**NA**|**NA**|
||_3.9_|_3.7_|_4.0_|
|Morocco, Tunisia|**25.7**|**97.2**|**29.3**|
||_17.1_|_36.0_|_15.0_|
|Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon|**22.5**|**40.4**|**18.8**|
||_5.3_|_6.8_|_5.0_|
|South Asia|**17.5**|**45.5**|**15.3**|
||_13.0_|_20.8_|_12.8_|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|**19.3**|**28.9**|**20.9**|
||_11.8_|_14.9_|_11.4 _|

_Source_ : Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009); UNCTAD and World Bank staff. _Notes:_ OTRI (i.e., including NTMs) in bold; TTRI in italics. Aggregates are unweighted averages of countries within each group.

* Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE.

6
||**Rank**|**No. of do**<br>**expo**|**cs for**<br>**rt**||**Tim**<br>**export**|**e for**<br>**(days)**||**Ta**<br>**Cost to**<br>**(US$**<br>**conta**|**ble 2. T**<br>**export**<br>**per**<br>**iner)**|**rading A**|**cross B**<br>**Documen**<br>**impo**<br>**(numb**|**order**<br>**ts for**<br>**rt**<br>**er)**|**s**|**Time for**<br>**(da**|**import**<br>**ys)**||**Cost to**<br>**(US**<br>**cont**|**import**<br>**$ per**<br>**ainer)**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**2008**|**2006**|**2008**|<br>**change**|**2006**|**2008**|**change**|**2006**|**2008**|**change**|**2006**|**2008**|**change**|**2006**|**2008**|**change**|**2006**|**2008**|**change**|
|Algeria|117|9|8|<br>1|15|17|-2|1,606|1,198|408|9|9|0|22|23|-1|1,886|1,378|508|
|Bahrain|20||5|<br>-5||14|-14||805|-805||6|-6||15|-15||845|-845|
|Egypt|21|8|6|<br>2|27|15|12|1,014|714|300|8|6|2|29|18|11|1,049|729|320|
|Iraq|178|10|10|<br>0|102|102|0|3,400|3,400|0|10|10|0|101|101|0|3,400|3,400|0|
|Jordan|64|7|7|<br>0|28|19|9|720|680|40|12|7|5|28|22|6|955|1,065|-110|
|Kuwait|99|10|8|<br>2|20|20|0|935|935|0|11|10|1|20|20|0|935|935|0|
|Lebanon|84|6|5|<br>1|22|27|-5|969|1,027|-58|11|7|4|34|38|-4|752|810|-58|
|Morocco|68|6|8|<br>-2|18|14|4|700|600|100|11|11|0|30|19|11|1,500|800|700|
|Oman|109|10|10|<br>0|22|22|0|665|665|0|10|10|0|26|26|0|824|824|0|
|Qatar|36||5|<br>-5||21|-21||735|-735||7|-7||20|-20||657|-657|
|Saudi<br>Arabia|33|5|5|<br>0|13|19|-6|654|1,008|-354|9|5|4|34|20|14|604|758|-154|
|Syria|127|12|8|<br>4|49|19|30|1,300|1,300|0|18|9|9|63|23|40|1,822|1,760|62|
|Tunisia|28|5|5|<br>0|18|17|1|770|540|230|7|7|0|29|22|7|600|810|-210|
|UAE|11|7|5|<br>2|13|10|3|462|462|0|8|7|1|13|10|3|462|462|0|
|Yemen|126|6|6|<br>0|33|31|2|1,129|1,129|0|9|9|0|28|28|0|1,475|1,475|0|

Source: World Bank, _Doing Business, 2008._ 7
The NTMs included in the OTRI include measures such as licensing requirements, quotas and product standards. They are not comprehensive and do not include many of the regulatory and administrative measures that affect trade costs. Data on the performance of logistics services and on the internal costs associated with shipping goods from the factory gate to the port, and from ports to retail outlets have recently been compiled by the World Bank. The Logistics Performance Index (World Bank 2007) and the “trading across borders” indicators reported in the Doing Business database (World Bank, 2008) capture important dimensions of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes that affect trade. The _Doing Business_ “cost of trading” measures the fees associated with completing the procedures to export or import a 20-foot container, measured in U.S. dollars. These include costs for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges and inland transport.<sup>5</sup> The _Logistics Performance Index_ (LPI) is based on a worldwide survey of global freight forwarders and express carriers and measures the logistics friendliness countries. _Doing Business_ also collects data on documentary requirements and the time associated with trading across borders.

Both data sources suggest that traders confront significant hurdles in the region, with only the UAE being among the world’s better performers. The _Doing Business_ data indicate that substantial progress has recently been made by some of the countries in the region to reduce procedural hurdles affecting movement of goods across borders (Table 2). The LPI data reveal a great deal of variance in logistics performance, with only one country in the region – the UAE – in the top twenty globally (Table 3).

**Table 3: Logistics Performance Index, 2006**

|**Globa**<br>**l**<br>**Rank**|**Country**|**LPI**|**Custom**<br>**s**|**Infra**<br>**structure**|**Internation**<br>**al**<br>**shipments**|**Logistics**<br>**competenc**<br>**e**|**Trackin**<br>**g &**<br>**tracing**|**Domestic**<br>**logistics**<br>**costs**|**Timelines**<br>**s**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|140|Algeria|2.06|1.60|1.83|2.00|1.92|2.27|3.17|2.82|
|36|Bahrain|3.15|3.40|3.40|3.33|2.75|3.00|2.25|3.00|
|97|Egypt, Arab<br>Rep.|2.37|2.08|2.00|2.33|2.38|2.62|2.83|2.85|
|52|Jordan|2.89|2.62|2.62|3.08|3.00|2.85|2.92|3.17|
|44|Kuwait|2.99|2.50|2.83|2.60|3.00|3.33|2.40|3.75|
|98|Lebanon|2.37|2.17|2.14|2.50|2.40|2.33|3.40|2.67|
|94|Morocco|2.38|2.20|2.33|2.75|2.13|2.00|2.38|2.86|
|48|Oman|2.92|2.71|2.86|2.57|2.67|2.80|3.25|4.00|
|46|Qatar|2.98|2.44|2.63|3.00|3.00|3.17|3.00|3.67|
|41|Saudi Arabia|3.02|2.72|2.95|2.93|2.88|3.02|2.76|3.65|
|135|Syrian Arab<br>Republic|2.09|2.17|1.91|2.00|1.80|2.00|2.89|2.67|
|60|Tunisia|2.76|2.83|2.83|2.86|2.43|2.83|3.20|2.80|
|20|United Arab<br>Emirates|3.73|3.52|3.80|3.68|3.67|3.61|2.80|4.12|
|112|Yemen, Rep.|2.29|2.18|2.08|2.20|2.22|2.30|2.67|2.78|

Source: Arvis and others (2007) _._

> 5 The cost measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. Only official costs are recorded. Inland transport costs are based on distance to the shipping port. The methodology, surveys and data are available at <u>http:// www.doingbusiness.org.</u>

8
# **2. The Survey**

The survey was implemented during October-December 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The questionnaire was completed by some 300 companies. Between 11 and 50 firms per country responded to the survey, with some 80 percent of the sampled firms exporting to other Arab countries. Follow up interviews were conducted with company managers to confirm the answers. To complement and validate/cross check the data gathered on procedures and policy measures to export and import consignments, interviews were also conducted with Customs and Trade Ministry officials as well as senior executives in freight forwarding companies in the surveyed countries.

Firms selling or producing food/agricultural products and chemical, rubber or plastic products each account for about 20 percent of the sample. Services firms represent around 17 percent. These are mostly distributor services (import/export) and transport services (maritime and road). Other sectors include textiles and leather; basic metals, electrical appliances and transport equipment – each of which represent between 4 and 10 percent of the total (Figures A-1 and A-2).

About a quarter of the respondents are “pure” traders; three-quarters are manufacturers or transport companies (Figure A-3). The sample is deliberately skewed towards small and medium sized, privately-owned firms with less than 250 employees (these account for 73 percent of the sample). The reason is that these types of companies will be more likely to confront scrutiny and administrative burdens. Large companies generally have better access to rapid clearance/”green channel” procedures. Only 5 percent of the respondent companies have public sector ownership. An implication of the sampling frame is that the results regarding trade costs are likely to be upper bounds.

The survey compiles information on the extent to which customs and other administrative requirements affecting the process of importing and exporting goods are perceived to be problematical (costly), including the stringency of customs clearance, technical controls, inspection and the extent of irregular payments and the time costs associated with border clearance. The survey also includes questions pertaining to the perceptions of traders in PAFTA member countries about the benefits to their businesses from PAFTA, as well as other trade agreements. The survey allows data to be compiled on the relative intensity of trade barriers on a bilateral country pair basis as well as on regulatory measures affecting road transportation to and from neighboring PAFTA countries. This is in contrast to the data on trading across borders collected by the World Bank in the _Doing Business_ report and similar indicators compiled by the World Economic Forum, which provide information at the country level as opposed to the level of a specific dyad (country pair/border).

The survey focuses on four topics. A first set of questions deals with customs and administrative procedures affecting the import and export of goods, restrictions on overland transport and transit, and the extent of informal payments to Customs. The second set of questions focuses on the specific trade policy instruments that are subject to PAFTA commitments/disciplines – to find out if these have been removed – and on the extent to which administrative requirements and burdens reduce or nullify the benefits of removal of tariffs by PAFTA members. The third set of questions addresses the relative intensity of the barriers that are perceived to prevail on a bilateral country pair-basis. A final set of questions focuses on the relative importance of the business environment confronting companies that want to invest in neighboring countries.

9
The methodology involves ranking the regulatory and administrative constraints that cause additional burdens on cross-border trade. Companies were asked to quantify the impact of administrative costs where possible (in terms of the number of documentary formalities for importing and exporting, as well as the time taken for the consignment to be inspected and cleared) and to provide information on the size of ‘informal’ payments to Customs, tax and other officials. They were also asked both to rank the major sources of trade costs and to provide estimates of the cost of the major obstacles.

# **3. Survey Results**

The results are reported in six parts: customs and administrative requirements affecting imports and exports, respectively; bureaucratic red tape on imports; traders’ estimates of trade costs; and their assessment of (i) bilateral trade barriers and (ii) the benefits of PAFTA to their businesses.

# **3.1. Customs and Administrative Requirements Affecting Imports**

Procedural requirements for importing are measured in terms of the time required for import clearance and inspection; the number of documents and signatures required to process import transactions; customs valuation; documentation relating to rules of origin; and compliance with technical requirements (product standards).

# **_Customs Clearance and Documentation_**

The survey results reveal that significant improvements have been made between 2001 and 2008 by many PAFTA countries in reducing the time for clearance, i.e., from the arrival of the goods (by air or sea or road) at the port of entry to the consignment’s release from customs. It takes 2 days, on average, to release goods imported by airfreight or by road transport from customs, and 5 days for sea shipments. Although this is much longer than international best practice (respectively less than 6 hours for airfreight, 24 hours for sea freight, and 4 hours for transshipment by road), it is better than what was reported in 2001 (Table A–1).

A major procedural constraint highlighted in the survey is the number of documents and associated signatures required for processing an import transaction. In most PAFTA countries about 5 documents/procedures are required to process an import shipment arriving by air or sea, and 4 documents to clear a consignment transported by road. The number of associated signatures has fallen to 4, 5 and 6, on average, for air, sea and road transport shipments, respectively. However, there is significant variance across countries with the UAE requiring the fewest number of documents and signatures, and Syria the most. The 2001 survey found that up to 20 signatures were needed to process air or sea freight shipments (Table A-2).

# **_Customs Valuation, Rules of Origin and Product Standards_**

Important aspects of the importing process include customs valuation, enforcement of rules of origin (if applicable), and compliance with technical requirements (product-specific health and safety standards). Traders may incur additional costs in satisfying such requirements, especially if customs authorities or other government bodies apply them in a restrictive way. Customs valuation is the procedure for determining the dutiable value of imported goods. The survey indicates that the majority of traders in PAFTA countries do not perceive customs valuation, in general, as problematic. It seems that customs authorities in many Arab countries now apply the WTO rules on customs valuation, i.e., accept the invoice as the basis for customs valuation. However, there are significant differences in how customs valuation in 10
specific countries is perceived by traders, with the majority of traders reporting that in Egypt and Yemen valuation on the basis of invoices is more frequently questioned. Interviews with traders in both countries confirm that that valuation practices in these countries reflect concerns on the part of Customs authorities about the truth or accuracy of commercial invoices (Table A-3).<sup>6</sup> Regarding traders’ perception of documentation requirements associated with origin of imports and rules of origin, traders’ answers overwhelmingly show that such rules are either not judged to be problematic or are of minor import. Only 13 percent of firms reported that documenting rules of origin was a source of problems. A higher percentage, on average 30 percent of importers in PAFTA countries, report that technical requirements (product standards) are problematic – roughly the same proportion as for customs valuation. In contrast to rules of origin there is significant variance across countries. Standards enforcement is seen to be particularly problematical in Egypt and Morocco, where the majority of respondent companies report difficulties with the standards authorities (Table A-3).

As the enforcement of product standards involves costs of testing and inspection, surveyed companies were asked to estimate how large such costs are on average. Responses regarding compliance costs show an estimated cost of 2 percent, on average, ranging between 1 and 15 percent of the value of imports, with the higher estimates being associated with respondent companies exporting to Egypt and Jordan.

# **3.2. Customs and Administrative Requirements Affecting Exports**

Many PAFTA countries have taken measures to encourage exports by improving the incentive framework – through policies such as duty drawback and export-processing zones. Many countries also subject exports to bureaucratic control, e.g., mandatory inspection of export consignments. The survey indicates that export procedures have become more streamlined (Table A-4). Many countries have duty drawback schemes allowing exporting companies to import inputs and components at world prices through refund of paid customs duties or temporary admission. Interviewed exporting companies overwhelmingly consider such mechanisms as important in assisting their exports. However, exporters in Egypt, Syria and Yemen highlighted that procedures are cumbersome and that delays in re-imbursement of tariffs are long. For instance it takes an average of 60 days (in Egypt) to 180 days (in Yemen) and sometimes up to a full year (in Syria) for duties paid on imported inputs to be refunded, as compared to an average 15 to 30 days in other countries.

The majority of exporters report that consignments are inspected. On average 3 percent of shipments are subject to inspection, ranging from a low of 1 percent, on average, in Lebanon, Syria, UAE and Yemen, to a high of 20 percent in Egypt (Table A-5).

# **3.3. Bureaucratic Red Tape and Additional Payments for Imports**

The survey collected information on the number of man-days per year that importing and exporting companies spend in "resolving problems" with customs authorities and other government officials. This takes 26 days, on average, ranging between 20 to 40 man-days per year, and up to 60 in Egypt. As is the case in other areas, matters have improved relative to 2001. The data in the earlier survey indicated that on average respondent companies devoted around 95 man days per year in contact with customs officials. This corroborates the finding

> 6 Even if tariffs are no longer collected as a result of the PAFTA, domestic indirect taxes will still need to be levied on imports. Yemen, as an LDC, has a longer implementation period under PAFTA to attain free trade.

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that import procedures in many PAFTA countries involve fewer documents and signatures today than in 2001. The improvement reflects customs reforms and the greater use of electronic transmission of documents, which both speeds the clearance of goods and may reduce the scope for additional informal payments (Table A-6).

The majority of interviewed companies in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and the UAE consider that difficulties in dealing with customs and other trade officials are less today compared to 3 years ago. In contrast, the majority of respondents in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are of the view that the difficulties in dealing with customs are about the same as 3 years ago (Table A-7).

Informal payments to customs officials (bribes) are another form of real trade costs. The questionnaire addressed questions about informal payments by traders to Customs officials and other trade related officials when companies deal with import clearance and inspection. About 31 percent of the respondents report they do not pay at all. Another 33 percent pay no more than 1 percent of the value of imports as “informal payments” to Customs officials. Relative to the 2001 survey this is an improvement of 8 percentage points. About 14 percent of the interviewed companies in Lebanon note that “informal payments” can be in kind. Although matters have clearly improved, there is widespread agreement among the interviewed companies that additional payments remain a common practice in many PAFTA countries (e.g., Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) (Table A-8).

# **3.4. Respondents’ Estimates of Trade Costs**

Estimates of the costs of trading (excluding statutory customs duties and para-tariffs such as import surcharges) are around 6 percent, on average, ranging from 2 to 11 percent of the value of imports. The estimated trading costs in the UAE are 3.5 percent, on average, compared to 7 percent in Morocco and 11 percent in Egypt. Here also there has been improvement since 2001, on the order of a 4 percentage point decline on average. The 2001 survey found that trade costs estimates averaged about 10.6 percent of the value of trade (Table A-9).

The surveyed companies were asked in a summary question to rank the most costly obstacles encountered in their trading activities. The results suggests that costs associated with road transit and maritime transport are the most important, followed by domestic taxes on imports and procedural requirements for imports (customs clearance, inspection and other bureaucratic trade control procedures). This ranking contrasts with the results obtained in the 2001 survey which ranked customs duties as the most important factor, followed by domestic taxes and customs clearance, and then public sector corruption (Table A-10).

# **3.5. Traders’ Assessment of Bilateral (Pair-wise) Trade Barriers**

Respondents were asked to rank the extent of restrictiveness of seven categories of regulatory and administrative measures affecting road transportation to and from neighboring countries. Road transportation is an important mode of freight transport in many PAFTA countries. Countries with limited access to the sea, such as Jordan and Iraq, rely mainly on road transportation for trade. Moreover, some countries are transit hubs for intra-regional trade by road – e.g., Jordan and Saudi Arabia are hubs for goods going to Iraq and the Gulf.

The most binding constraints for shipping or transiting via road to reach PAFTA markets are considered to be customs and inspection procedures, in particular frequent changes in paperwork requirements at a border without prior notification, followed by border closures and blocked roads for political and security reasons, and entry visa restrictions (Table A-11).

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The majority of respondents regard Saudi Arabia as imposing the largest number of constraints on cross-border road transport. Respondents from Yemen, in particular, ranked Saudi Arabia as the country imposing the largest number of constraints on exports shipped or in transit through the Saudi territories by road. Similarly, Lebanese exporters reportedly confront the most obstacles when shipping to or transiting Syria by road. Bureaucracy, red tape, blocked roads and excessive technical requirements at the border are listed as the major obstacles. Egyptian firms report that Jordan imposes stringent customs procedures, road closures and excessive technical requirements for shipments transiting by road. Firms from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen all judge that the UAE has restrictive visa issuance procedures and imposes high visa fees for entry of professional drivers, in addition to restrictive health requirements on certain agricultural products.

Traders were also asked to rank PAFTA countries by the severity of the overall obstacles to their export and import activities. Six countries emerge as the most problematical: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco. The 2001 survey found Syria to be regarded as the most problematical country, followed by Egypt, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is ranked first in the list of the most problematic PAFTA countries. The majority of respondents from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen cited many reasons, most of which repeat those mentioned earlier, namely inspection and customs procedures for crossborder shipments by road. Many of the complaints relate to the harsh treatment of consignments during inspection by Saudi customs, which often require the shipment to be unloaded for inspection then reloaded, raising the cost for shippers or forwarding agents, as well as frequent changes in required paperwork without prior notification. Yemeni traders are the most affected by Saudi customs and inspection measures, as shipments from Yemen must be reloaded on Saudi transport vehicles when entering Saudi territories. Difficulties in obtaining visit visas for transport drivers as well as businessmen also figure in the complaints.<sup>7</sup> Egypt is ranked the second most problematic PAFTA country. The majority of respondents from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia cited bureaucratic red tape, delays and additional payments associated with inspection and customs clearance procedures as the most important constraints, followed by unclear testing criteria for product standards, technical requirements and conformity assessment, which are perceived to be a means for protection of local industries. Jordan is ranked the third most problematic country. The majority of respondents from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, UAE and Yemen list complicated documentation for customs procedures, delays due to lack of automated customs clearance at certain points of entry and additional fees and charges on transit transport (diesel charges) by road, as the most problematic measures they face.

Syria is ranked fourth in terms of trade barriers, with firms mentioning red tape and informal payments during inspection and customs clearance, payment of additional fees and charges (diesel charges), charges for transit of convoys of trucks accompanied by guards and policemen, and technical requirements and standards which do not conform to the international norms. Finally, Tunisia and Morocco are ranked fifth and sixth in terms of trade costs, with the majority of respondents reporting stringent inspection and customs clearance

> 7  Note this survey result is in contrast with the ranking on trading across borders in the World Bank’s report Doing Business in the Arab World 2009, which rank the UAE and then Saudi Arabia as the easiest country to do trade with in the Middle East.

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procedures and high shipping costs as the main problems in Tunisia. The same factors prevail in Morocco, in addition to restrictive rules of origin. Firms from Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt highlighted difficulties with Moroccan customs regarding rules of origin, including use of the change of tariff classification criterion to benefit from tariff exemptions, as per Agadir Agreement (which adopts the Pan-European Protocol of origin).

# **3.6. Traders’ Assessments of the Benefits of PAFTA**

The overwhelming majority of respondent companies – over 90 percent – report they have benefited from PAFTA. This strong result is found for all the countries in the sample, albeit with somewhat lower positive response rates for Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Syria than for other countries. When asked to rank the way PAFTA has benefited their businesses, respondent companies rank the removal of tariffs as the most important, followed by a reduction in trading costs (Table A-12).

A minority of respondents report having problems with documentation of PAFTA rules of origin (13 percent of respondents on the import side and 16 percent on the export side). The outlier here is Morocco, where non-acceptance of documentation of PAFTA rules of origin constitutes a problem for a larger number of companies (Table A-13).

The responses also show that the majority of affected exporting firms by problems related to rules of origin are from UAE and Saudi Arabia. For Saudi and UAE exporters certificates of origin issued by their national authorities were often rejected by Customs in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Affected products are concentrated in processed foods, including dairy produce, refined sugar, sugar confectionery and cocoa preparations. UAE-registered exporting companies, especially those located in the Jebel Ali Free Zone, report the most rejections of origin documentation by the customs authorities of PAFTA partner countries.

While the majority of responses judge Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia as the most restrictive in accepting origin documentation issued by other PAFTA countries, many firms in these three countries complained in turn about a lack of transparency in the implementation of PAFTA rules of origin and the non-acceptance of cumulation of origin by many PAFTA countries, in contrast to the Agadir agreement.

# **3.7. Cross-Sector Impediments in Trading across Borders**

The results of the survey were compiled using the HS 1-digit product categories to explore whether different product groups encounter cross-border trade impediments differently in PAFTA countries, and that such heterogeneity expresses itself in a way that cannot be captured simply through pooling firms at the country level or summing up all the firms from the surveyed countries. The collected data were sorted in ten main product groups: animal and vegetable products, prepared foodstuffs, mineral products, chemical products, plastics, wood and paper, textile and garments, base metal articles, electrical and mechanical appliances, and miscellaneous manufactures (Figure A-5).

Table A-14 presents results which display the most costly factors in imports by product groups. Note that these results should be interpreted as only an approximate guide to the types of cross sectoral heterogeneity in impediments that might be present in the survey data.

# _Standards-Related Problems Encountered by Product Groups_

Standards have been found of particular concern to vegetable products, prepared foodstuffs, wood and paper, products of the chemicals (pharmaceuticals). The survey data disclose some 14
evidence that standards in these products groups often act to raise costs and restrain intraregional trade.

In the vegetable products group, respondents from traditional PAFTA exporting countries of agricultural products (Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) perceive the stricter packaging and labeling requirements, which follow international standards, for fresh food (potatoes, fruits and rice) that GCC countries impose as technical barriers to trade and incur additional costs in meeting such mandatory standards. Other impediments facing fresh food are the seasonal restrictions on imports during peak harvests (e.g., Saudi Arabia and UAE impose import restrictions on dates during harvest periods; Egypt during apple crops; Jordan during seasonal tomatoes and cucumber crops).

In prepared foodstuffs group, standards-related problems are often associated with testing and certification (conformity assessment) procedures. For instance, respondents exporters of prepared meat from Jordan encounter cumbersome certification procedures when exporting to some PAFTA countries (Egypt and Lebanon). Other standards-related measures which respondents perceive as non-tariff barriers are packaging and labeling for chocolate and other preparations containing cocoa that Syrian exporters face at the Saudi borders. In wood and paper group, standards-related measures are perceived as non-tariff barrier by respondents exporters of sanitary and facial tissues and towels from Syria, Jordan and Lebanon to some GCC countries (UAE, Qatar). In products of the chemicals (pharmaceuticals), the costly testing procedures and very long testing periods (lasting two to four years) which is necessary to obtain the import license for any type of drugs are perceived by regional pharmaceutical companies as an important measure to protect local production of inferior quality.

# _Impediments-Related to PAFTA Rules of Origin by Product Groups_

Prevailing impediments related to PAFTA rules of origin are concentrated in the group of prepared foodstuffs. Table A-15 lists compiled information from the survey responses which disclose a sample of specific products for which importers still pay tariffs and because Customs in their respective countries determined that these products did not meet PAFTA rules of origin. For instance Moroccan Customs determine that refined sugar imported from the UAE does not meet the minimum local content value requirement even though the exporter could provide evidence for meeting the PAFTA rules of origin. Other specific products that are still subject to tariffs in the wood and paper (unfinished wooden furniture, facial tissues), textile and garments, articles of base metal (iron and steel) and miscellaneous manufactures (ceramics). All of these products are competing with similar products from local industries and for which Customs interpretation of the rules of origin are used to protect them.

# _Estimates of Trade Costs by Product Groups_

The compiled results of the most costly factors in imports by product groups suggest that the costs associated with problems in transport and transit of goods to and from PAFTA countries are most important to virtually all the products groups, followed by domestic taxes and fees, then customs clearance and inspection procedures of import. This ranking is consistent with the results obtained from pooling firms at the country level.

As far as estimates of the costs of trading by products groups are concerned, the compiled data show that such costs are around 3.5 and 5 percent of the value of imports, on average, articles of base metal, prepared foodstuffs, mineral products, products of the chemicals, plastics, textiles and garments; The estimated trading costs for wood and paper, electrical and 15
mechanical appliances, vegetable products and miscellaneous manufactures are higher and around 6 to 7.5 percent on average.

Summing up, this result reinforces the conclusion from aggregated survey data to the impact of constraints related to rules of origin and non-tariff barriers to trade in PAFTA countries.

# **4. Conclusions**

The main findings of the survey are that an overwhelming majority of respondent companies are of the view that they have benefited from PAFTA. These benefits stem in particular from the removal of tariffs on intra-PAFTA trade. The survey also reveals a marked improvement in customs clearance-related procedures, with a substantial decline in the number of required documents and signatures, a significant reduction in the variance of clearance times, and fewer firms reporting having to make irregular payments. A minority of respondents reported having problems with rules of origin (13 percent), and substantially fewer than those perceiving customs valuation and enforcement of product standards to be a problem (around 30 percent on average, with significant variation across countries).

In 2001, tariffs were ranked as one of the most important barriers to intra-regional trade; in 2008 they were ranked last. Instead, transport-related infrastructure and real trade costs (trade facilitation) was ranked as the most important constraint. Thus, the survey confirms recent analytical studies that conclude that the magnitude of Arab trade flows is significantly lower than it would otherwise be as a result of high real trade costs (e.g., Dennis, 2006; Harb, 2007; Péridy, 2007; Abedini and Péridy, 2008). It suggests that from a policy perspective efforts to facilitate trade and reduce the incidence of non-tariff measures deserve priority.

If such actions are implemented in a nondiscriminatory fashion – apply to and benefit all trade, independent of origin – potential trade diversion costs will be avoided. As noted in the Introduction, overall levels of trade restrictiveness of a number of the countries in the region remain relatively high. This reduces the competitiveness of firms and the real incomes of consumers. PAFTA-based initiatives to lower NTM-related real trade costs offer an opportunity to lower overall levels of trade restrictiveness in a way that does not generate trade diversion.<sup>8</sup> Regional cooperation to reduce trade costs can help stimulate both intraregional and trade with rest of world. The policy challenge is to identify what types of policies should be given priority attention and how regional cooperation in the PAFTA context can best be used to complement national efforts to facilitate trade.

The survey is an example of the type of monitoring that is needed to determine whether trade commitments are implemented and to identify where policy actions are needed to further reduce the costs of trade, thus improving competitiveness. An annual process of monitoring of the type implied by the survey – bringing in the private sector not only as a source of information but as a partner – can help to build public support for the process of regional integration and taking actions to reduce trade costs and enhance competitiveness. To be most effective, the data collected on implementation of PAFTA could be merged with information on the OTRI and other country-level data on trade and logistics costs/performance (such as the Logistics Performance Indicator and Trading Across Borders indicator (in the _Doing Business_ report). These data could be the basis for periodic engagement between governments and private sector on the “state of integration of markets”.

> 8  Countries with high average MFN tariffs can reduce potential trade diversion costs generated by PAFTA by reducing external levels of protection.

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The focus of this note has been on trade in merchandise. Policies affecting trade in services and the movement of factors of production (labor, capital) are important for regional competitiveness and welfare as well. Indeed, for some countries in the region services trade is as or more important than trade in goods. PAFTA members have identified services as an area for deeper cooperation. Much less is known about policies affecting trade and investment in services than about policies affecting merchandise trade. The type of data collection and monitoring exercise reported here for merchandise could also be undertaken for services. Templates that can be used for this purpose have been developed by the World Bank and have been implemented on a pilot basis in a number of Arab League member countries. The same is true for diagnostic tools to assess trade and transport facilitation performance of specific ports/border crossings and transport routes/corridors. Combining these tools into a regular process of monitoring and assessment of trade incentives and performance would help governments benchmark performance and identify priority areas for action, at both the national and the (sub-)regional level.

# **References**

Abedini, J. and N. Péridy. 2008. “The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of the Trade Effects,” mimeo.

- Arvis, J.F. and others. 2007. _Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy_

- _The Logistics Performance Index and Its Indicators_ (Washington DC: World Bank).

- Dennis, A. (2006), “The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Facilitation in the MENA Region,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3837, Washington DC: The World Bank.

- Galal, A. and B. Hoekman (eds.). 2003. _Arab Economic Integration between Hope and Reality_ . Cairo: Egyptian Center of Economic Studies and Brookings Institution.

- Harb, G. 2007 “Trade facilitation and intra-Arab trade: an empirical assessment,” Sciences Po, mimeo.

- Hoekman, B. and P. Messerlin. 2001. _Harnessing Trade for Development in the Middle East and North Africa._ New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

- Kee, H.L., A. Nicita and M. Olarreaga. 2009. “Estimating trade restrictiveness indices,” _The Economic Journal_ 119(534): 172-199.

- Peridy, N. 2007. “Toward a Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement,” _The Developing Economies_ 43(3): 329-45.

- World Bank. 2008. _Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness._ MENA Region report, World Bank.

- Zarrouk, J. 2001.  “A Survey of Barriers to Trade and Investment in Arab Countries,” in Hoekman and Messerlin. Reprinted in Galal and Hoekman.

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# **Figure A - 1 Selected Countries’ Representation in the Survey Sampling**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 20<br>16.7<br>15.7<br>15<br>13.7<br>12.0 13.0<br>11.0<br>9.7<br>10<br>5 4.7<br>3.7<br>0<br>United Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Saudi Syria Tunisia Yemen<br>Arab Arabia<br>Emirates<br>Percent<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure A - 2 Distribution of Companies by Activity**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Go lds m iths 'wa re sJ e we lla e ry a nd S e rv ic e s16 .7 % A g ric ulture5 .0 % F o o d P ro duc ts & B e v e ra g e s<br>0 .7 % 2 0 .7 %<br>Te xtile s ,<br>Ga rm e nts &<br>Ele c tric a l<br>Le a the r<br>A pplia nc e s &<br>8 .7 %<br>Tra ns po rt<br>Equipm e nt<br>7 .3 %<br>Wo o d, inc luding<br>F urniture<br>4 .0 %<br>B a s ic M e ta l<br>Indus tire s (Iro n, N o n-M e ta llic C he m ic a l P a pe r P ro duc ts ,<br>S te e l, C o ppe r, P ro duc ts P ro duts , R ubbe r P rinting a nd<br>A lum inium ) (C e m e nt, & P la s tic P ublis hing<br>8 .3 % C e ra m ic s , P ro duc ts 3 .7 %<br>Gla s s wa re ) 2 1.7 %<br>3 .3 %<br><!-- End of picture text --> 18
# **Figure A - 3 Distribution of Companies by Type of Business**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Importer & Manufacturer<br>Exporter & Exporter<br>Exporter only 10.3% only<br>2.3% 20.3%<br>Importer & Manufacturer<br>Distributor<br>& Importer<br>14.3%<br>only<br>3.7%<br>Manufacturer<br>& Importer &<br>Exporter<br>49.0%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure A - 4 Distribution of Companies by Size of Employees**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 1-10<br>Employees<br>More than<br>10%<br>250 Employees<br>27%<br>11-50<br>Employees<br>29%<br>51-250<br>Employees<br>34%<br><!-- End of picture text --> 19
# **Figure A-5**

# **Distribution of Companies by Product Groups (HS -1-digit)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Animal &<br>Miscellaneous<br>Electrical & Manufactures Vegetable<br>Mechanical Products<br>Articles<br>Appliances 11% 13% Prepared<br>11% Foodstuff<br>12%<br>Base Metal &<br>Articles<br>6%<br>Mineral Products<br>Textiles and 10%<br>Garments<br>Products of<br>7% Wood, paper and Plastics Chemicals<br>paperboard 9% 16%<br>5%<br><!-- End of picture text --> 20
# **Table A - 1 : Time for Customs Clearance of Imports by Port of Entry**

|**Selected PAFTA Countries**|**Air Freight**|**(days)**|**Sea Freig**|**ht (days)**|**Road Tran**|**sport (days)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|
|**Egypt**|2.0 - 7.0|2.0|3.0 - 9.0|3.0|2.0 - 5.0|3.0|
|**Jordan**|2.0 - 3.0|2.0|3.0 - 15.0|3.0|2.0 - 5.0|3.0|
|**Lebanon**|2.0 - 6.0|2.0|2.0 - 6.0|2.0|1 - 5.0|2.0|
|**Morocco**|Less than 1 - 1.5|1.0|1.0 - 5.0|2.5|1 - 2.0|1.0|
|**Saudi Arabia**|2.0 - 10.0|5.0|4.0 - 27.5|6.0|2 - 4.0|2.5|
|**Syria**|2.0 - 3.0|2.0|2.0 - 5.0|3.0|2 - 3.0|2.0|
|**Tunisia**|2.0 - 4.0|2.0|3.0 - 8.0|6.0|2 - 4.0|2.5|
|**UAE**|Less than 1 - 1.5|1.0|1.5 - 3.5|2.0|1.0 - 2.0|1.0|
|**Yemen**|2.0 - 4.0|3.0|4.5 - 5.0|5.0|1.0 - 3.0|2.0|
|**Total Countries (2008 Survey)**|**2.0 - 5.0**|**2.0**|**3.0 - 8.0**|**5.0**|**1.5 - 4.5**|**2.0**|
|**Total Countries (2001 Survey)**|**2.0 - 5.0**||**2.0 - 10.0**||**1.0 - 3.0**||

(*) Ranges represent lower and upper values using Tukey's hinges (lower and upper quartiles) which are standardized by avoiding the bias of extreme values; Average is the arithmatic average of lower and upper values (Tukey's hinges), for more details, see <http://support.spss.com/>.

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**Table A - 2 : Number of Documents and Signatures Requirements for Importing, by Port of Entry**

|||<br>**Air Fre**|<br>**ight**|||<br>**Sea Fr**|<br>**eight**|||<br>**Road Tra**|<br>**nsport**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Selected PAFTA Countries**|**Document**|**s for Imprts**|**No. of S**|**gnatures**|**Document**|**s for Imprts**|**No. of S**|**ignatures**|**Document**|**s for Imprts**|**No. of**|**Signatures**|
||**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*) **</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|
|**Egypt**|5 - 7|6|5 - 10|8|6 - 8|7|6 - 12|9|4 - 8|6|6 - 11|10|
|**Jordan**|3 - 4|4|3 - 6|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|3 - 4|4|3 - 4|4|
|**Lebanon**|4 - 5|4|4 - 8|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 7|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 8|4|
|**Morocco**|4 - 7|5|3 - 7|4|5 - 7|6|5 - 9|8|4 - 5|4|3 - 5|3|
|**Saudi Arabia**|4 - 7|5|4 - 5|5|4 - 6|5|5 - 6|5|4 - 5|5|4 - 5|5|
|**Syria**|6 - 10|8|15 - 40|20|6 - 10|8|17 - 30|25|6 - 10|8|20 - 39|27|
|**Tunisia**|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|4|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|4|3 - 4|4|
|**UAE**|4 - 5|4|1 - 3|2|4 - 6|5|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|4|2 - 7|3|
|**Yemen**|8 - 9|8|20 - 21|20|8 - 9|8|7 - 24|20|5 - 8|8|7 - 22|20|
|**Total Countries (2008 Survey)**|**4 - 6**|**5**|**3 - 10**|**4**|**4 - 7**|**5**|**4 - 15**|**6**|**4 - 6**|**4**|**4 - 17**|**5**|
|**Total Countries (2001 Survey)**|**-**|**5**|**10 - 20**|**-**|**-**|**6**|**12 - 20**|**-**|**-**|**5**|**11 - 15**|**-**|

(*) See Footnote in Table A-1.

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# **Table A - 3 :  Traders' Perceptions of Import Documentations Associated with**

**Customs Valuation, Rules of Origins and Standards compliance**

||**Egypt**|**Jordan**|**Lebanon**|**Morocco**|**Saudi Arabia**|**Syria**|**Tunisia**|**UAE**|**Yemen**|**Total**<sup>**(1)**</sup>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**1. Customs Valuation :**|||||||||||
|Problems with Customs (e.g. do not accept invoice<br>as a basis for valuation) ?|||||||||||
|Yes (Count)|16|13|2|3|3|12|4|-|16|69 (29.6%)|
|No (Count)|9|15|24|7|14|25|43|13|14|164 (70.4%)|
|**2. Rules of Origin :**|||||||||||
|Problems with Documentations Related to Rules of|||||||||||
|Origin ?<br>Yes (Count)|4|2|3|4|1|7|4|1|2|31 (13.4%)|
|No (Count)|23|25|22|6|15|30|44|9|27|201 (86.6%)|
|**3. Product Standards Compliance :**|||||||||||
|Difficulties with Technical Requirements for<br>Product Standards?|||||||||||
|Yes (Count)|16|8|4|6|6|11|10|1|5|66 (29.3%)|
|No (Count)|10|19|22|5|12|22|33|10|25|159 (70.7%)|
|Costs of compliance with Techincal Requirements<br>(percent of CIF import value)|||||||||||
|Range<sup>(2)</sup>|5.0-15.0|3.0-12.5|1.0-7.0|1.7-2.7|4.0-5.0|0.7-10.0|1.0-3.0|1.0-10.0|1.0-1.5|1.0-15.0|
|Average<sup>(2)</sup>|7.0|7.0|2.0|2.0|5.0|5.5|1.0|5.5|1.0|2.0|

(1) Numbers in parentheses are percents of total respondents.

(2) See Footnote in Table A-1.

23
**Table A - 4 : Number of Documents and Signatures Requirements for Exporting**

|||<br>**Air Fr**|<br>**eight**|||<br>**Sea F**|<br>**reight**|||**Road Tr**<br>|**ansport**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Selected PAFTA Countries**|**No. of D**|**ocuments**|**No. of S**|**ignatures**|**No. of D**|**ocuments**|**No. of**|**ignatures**|**No. of D**|**ocuments**|**No. of**|**ignatures**|
||**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*) **</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*) **</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Range**<sup>**(*) **</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|
|**Egypt**|4 - 6|4|5 - 10|8|5 - 7|6|7 - 20|10|6 - 8|7|9 - 20|12|
|**Jordan**|3 - 4|4|3 - 4|4|4 - 5|5|4 - 5|5|3 - 4|4|3 - 4|4|
|**Lebanon**|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 6|5|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|5|3 - 5|4|
|**Morocco**|6 - 7|6|5 - 7|6|6 - 7|6|6 - 9|8|3 - 6|5|2 - 4|2|
|**Saudi Arabia**|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|4 - 5|4|
|**Syria**|5 - 7|7|10 - 25|13|6 - 8|7|11 - 21|15|5 - 8|7|10 - 16|15|
|**Tunisia**|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|3 - 4|3|
|**UAE**|3 - 4|4|2 - 4|2|3 - 4|4|2 - 3|3|3 - 4|4|2 - 4|3|
|**Yemen**|7 - 8|7|16 - 20|20|5 - 7|7|9 - 22|21|5 - 7|6|20 - 21|21|
|**Total Countries (2008 Survey)**|**3 - 5**|**4**|**3 - 7**|**4**|**3 - 7**|**5**|**3 - 11**|**5**|**3 - 6**|**4**|**3 - 12**|**4**|
|**Total Countries (2001 Survey)**|**-**|**5**|**8 - 10**|**-**|**-**|**6**|**8 - 10**|**-**|**-**|**5**|**11 - 15**|**-**|

(*) See Footnote in Table A-1.

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# **Table A - 5 : Traders' Responses to Requirements for Inspection of Export Consignments**

||**Yes**<br>**(Count)**|**No**<br>**(Count)**|**If Yes, What Percent Of**<br>**Export subject to**<br>**inspection ?(Range)**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**(Average)**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Egypt**|37|10|6.0-25.0|20.0|
|**Jordan**|23|1|1.0-2.0|1.5|
|**Lebanon**|16|11|1.0-2.5|1.0|
|**Morocco**|6|3|5.0-10.0|5.0|
|**Saudi Arabia**|20|9|1.0-2.0|2.0|
|**Syria**|19|10|1.0-2.5|1.0|
|**Tunisia**|33|15|3.0-20.0|10.0|
|**UAE**|7|6|0.5-5.0|1.0|
|**Yemen**|18|5|1.0-2.5|1.0|
|**Total**|179|70|1 - 15|3.0|

(*) See Footnote in Table A-1.

**Table A - 6 :  Bureaucratic Red Tape on Imports: Number of Man-days per Year Spent in Resolving Problems with Customs and Tax Administration**

||**2**<br>|**008 Survey**<br><sup>**(*)**</sup>|<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**2001 Survey**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Country**|**% of total**<br>**respondents**|**Range** <br>**(days)**|**Average** <br>**(days)**|**Average (days)**|
|**Egypt**|84.6|25 - 60|45|100|
|**Jordan**|46.8|25 - 42|30|200|
|**Lebanon**|88.5|20 - 50|29||
|**Morocco**|81.8|20 - 56|30||
|**Saudi Arabia**|89.5|14 - 24|20||
|**Syria**|96.2|20 - 42|32|209|
|**Tunisia**|57.7|18 - 30|25||
|**UAE**|75|13 - 27|20||
|**Yemen**|92.6|15 - 30|20||
|**Total**|89.7|20 - 40|26|95|

(*) See Footnote in Table A-1.

**Note:** Number of man-days is total time spent on resolving problems with Customs and Tax Departments about the application and interpretation of import laws and regulations in the country (e.g., customs formalities, product classification in the tariff schedule and other regulations directly related to import process).

25
# **Table A - 7 :  Traders' Perception of the Evolution of Difficulties in Dealing with Customs officials in Their Countries**

**(Today compared to 3 years ago)**

# **(% of total responses)**

||**Difficulties in Dealing with**<br>**Customs - Decreased**|**Difficulties in**<br>**Rem**|**Dealing with Customs -**<br>**ained the same**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Egypt**|75|Jordan|72 (remained same)|
|**Syria**|54|Lebanon|82 (remained same)|
|**Tunisia**|84|Morocco|70 (remained same)|
|**UAE**|87|Saudi Arabia|74 (remained same)|
|||Yemen|60 (remained same)|

**Table A - 8 :  Traders' Responses about "Informal" Payments to Customs Officials**

||**Is it common for trading that a**||**Range of**<br>**(C**|**"informal"**<br>**ompanies'**|**payments i**<br>**responses in**|**n % of impor**<br>**percent)**|**t value**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**C "Ifl"**||**0**|||||**D'**|
|**Country**|**ompany pays norma**<br>**Payments to Customs Ofiicials?**<br>**(Average)**<br>**(1)**|**0%**<br>**(2)**|**- No more**<br>**than 1%**|**2 - 9%**|**10 - 17%**|**18 - 25%**|**In-Kind**|**ont**<br>**Know**|
|**Egypt**|Mostly|7.7|42.3|42.3|11.5|3.9||0.0|
|**Jordan**|Seldom|93.9|97|-|-|-||3.0|
|**Lebanon**|Frequently|10.3|48.3|17.2|6.9|-|13.8|13.8|
|**Morocco**|Sometimes|18.2|36.4|36.4|1|-||18.2|
|**Saudi Arabia**|Never|95.0|95|-|-|-||5.0|
|**Syria**|Always|5.3|60.3|26.3|-|-||13.2|
|**Tunisia**|Sometimes|21.3|55.3|2.2|-|-||42.6|
|**UAE**|Sometimes|38.5|38.5|7.7|-|-||53.8|
|**Yemen**|Frequently|6.5|74.2|22.6|3.2|-||0.0|
|**Average (2008 Survey)**|**Sometimes**|**30.6**|**64.1**|**15.7**|**2.8**|**-**|**1.6**|**16.1**|
|**Average (2001 Survey)**|||**56.3**|**18.6**|**3.6**|**0.5**||**20**|

- (1)   Companies were asked to rank their answers using one of the following six point scale: always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never; the reported results represent averages using Tukey's hinges method (see footnote in Table A-1).

- (2)   The reported precents in this column were not reported in the 2001 survey.

26
# **Table A - 9 :  Traders' Estimates of Trade Costs (Percent of the Value of Imports)**

|**Country**|**Range**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|**Average**<sup>**(*)**</sup>|
|---|---|---|
|**Egypt**|8.5-15|11.0|
|**Jordan**|2-6.0|4.0|
|**Lebanon**|2.5-11|7.5|
|**Morocco**|3 - 17|7.0|
|**Saudi Arabia**|3 - 10|5.0|
|**Syria**|4-11.5|9.5|
|**Tunisia**|1.5-6.0|4.0|
|**UAE**|1.0-8.5|3.5|
|**Yemen**|2.0-10|7.0|
|**Average (2008 Survey)**|**2 - 11**|**6.0**|
|**Average (2001 Survey)**|**-**|**10.6**|

*  See Footnote in Table A-1.

27
# **Table A - 10 :  Ranking The Most Costly Procedural Requirements for**

# **Import Activities in PAFTA Countries**

|||**Respondents**|**Percent total**|**(2008 Survey)**|**(2001 Suvey)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||**(Count)**|**respondents**|**(Rank)**|**(Rank)**|
|**- **<br>|**Road Transport & Transit / Maritime**<br>**Transport / Air Transport**|115|(57%)|1|6|
|**- **<br>|**Domestic Taxes on Imports (e.g. VAT, Sales**<br>**taxes, etc)**|114|(59%)|2|2|
|**-**<br> <br>|**Procedural Requirements (Customs**<br>**clearance, Inspection & other administrative**<br>**procedures)**|109|(49%)|3|3|
|**- **|**Tariffs on Imports**|99|(45%)|4|1|
|**- **<br>|**Technical Requirements & Compliance to**<br>**Standards**|88|(42%)|5|5|
|**- **|**Public Sector Corruption**|84|(44%)|6|4|

28
# **Table A - 11 : Traders' Ranking of Barriers to Cross-Border Road Transportation, on a Bilateral Country Pair-Basis**

|**Traders' Country of**<br>**Origin**|||**C**<br>|**ountries wit**<br>|**h Most Problemati**<br>|**c Constraint**<br>|**s for Cross-b**<br>|**order Road**<br>|**Transportation**<br><br>|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Egypt**|**Jordan**|**Lebanon**|**Morocco**|**Saudi Arabia**|**Syria**|**Tunisia**|**UAE**|**Yemen**<br>**Tunisia**|**Algeria**|**Iraq**|
|**Egypt**||**1, 2, 6**||||||**3**|||**2**|
|**Jordan**|||||**1, 3**|||**3**|||**2**|
|**Lebanon**|||||**1, 2**|**1, 2, 5, 7**||**3**|||**2**|
|**Morocco**||||||||||**2**||
|**Saudi Arabia**||||||||||||
|**Syria**|**1**|**1**|||**1, 3**|||**3**|||**2**|
|**Tunisia**||||||||||||
|**UAE**|||||**1**|||||||
|**Yemen**|||||**1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7**|||**3, 6**||||

**1. Stringent customs procedures at the border (inspection and clearance); customs closures on public holidays and week end; paperwork and formalities uncertainty.**

**2. Cross-border roads closures and blocked roads for political and security reasons.**

**3. Restrictive rules for issuing visas for business and professional drivers (e.g. costly visa fees for one entry only, discrimination by nationality, etc.)**

**4. Requirements for Yemeni trucks to unload shipments at the Saudi border, and to pay for handling and loading charges of shipments on Saudi registered vehicles for final delivery within the Saudi territories; Return of the foreign trucks to country of origin with empty cargo, etc.**

**5. Excessive cross-border road transportation charges (road usage charges, diesel and fuel charges, convoy charges, etc.)**

**6. Technical and health requirements for crossing foreign trucks in order to transit the country.**

**7. Requirements that transiting foreign trucks move from border entry checks to border departure checks in convoy accompanied by security guards and policemen.**

**Note: Respondents were asked in the questionnaire to rank the severity of a set of obstacles on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 means that the constraint is not problematic/costly at all and 4**

**means that the constraint is extremely problematic/costly. Constraints ranked 4 and listed by 50 percent at least of total respondents to a particular obstacle, were retained in the final results.**

29
# **Table A - 12 : Traders' Ranking of the Ways PAFTA Mostly Benefitted Their Business**

|||**Rank**|**Percent of Total**<br>**Respondents**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**- **|**No Customs Duties / Tariffs paid on Imports**|1|90|
|**- **|**Cheaper Trading Costs**|2|88.5|
|**- **|**Cheaper Sources of Imports**|3|79|

30
# **Table A - 13: Problems with Rules of Origin (ROO) Documentation in PAFTA Countries**

||**Egypt **|**Jordan**|**Lebano**|**n Morocco**|**Saudi Ara**|**biaSyria **|**Tunisia **|**UAE**|**Yemen**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**How Problematic are ROO when**<br>**Importing from a PAFTA Country?**|||||||||||
|Problematic (Count)|2|2|4|6|1|4|4|1|2|26 (13%)|
|Not Problematic (Count)|23|17|18|1|19|23|39|4|28|172 (87%)|
|**How Problematic are ROO when**<br>**Exporting a PAFTA Country?**|||||||||||
|Problematic (Count)|-|2|2|5|6|4|7|4|2|32 (16%)|
|Not Problematic (Count)|24|20|17|2|16|22|35|4|25|165 (84%)|

31
# **Table A-14**

# **Ranking the Most Costly Factors  In Import by Product Groups**

|||**Customs Procedures**<br>**& Inspection**|**Standards & Tech.**<br>**Requirements**|**Transport &**<br>**Transit**|**Domestic Taxes**<br>**& other fees**|**Public sector**<br>**corruption**|**Estimates of**<br>**in Im**|**Trading Cost**<br>**ports***|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||**Range**|**Average**|
|1|Animal & Vegetable Products|√|√|√|||2.75-11.75|7.00|
|2|Prepared Foodstuffs||√|√|√||2.50-10.00|5.00|
|3|Mineral Products|√||√|√||2.00-10.00|5.00|
|4|Products of Chemicals|√||√|√||2.00-10.50|5.00|
|5|Plastics|||√|√|√|1.75-3.00|5.50|
|6|Wood, paper and paperboard|√|√|√|||4.00-7.75|6.00|
|7|Textiles and Garments|√||√|√||2.25-8.50|5.00|
|8|Base Metal & Articles|√||√|√||2.00-10.00|3.50|
|9|Electrical & Mechanical Appliances||√||√|√|3.50-12.50|6.00|
|10|Miscellaneous Manufactures Articles|√||√|√||5.50-13.50|7.50|

*  Respondents estimated cost of major factors (excluding import duties) in percent of an average import cost.

32
# **Table A - 15 Sample of Products Subject to Tariffs* and for which Customs Determined that PAFTA Rules of Origin are not Met**

|**Importing**|**Products Subject to Tariffs**|**Country of Origin**|
|---|---|---|
|**PAFTA Country**|||
|**Egypt**|- Iron & Steel|UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia|
||- Sugar & Sugar Confectionery|UAE|
|**Lebanon**|- Fiber Glass|Saudi Arabia|
||- Food Stabilisers|Syria|
||- Packing Containers of Aluminum|Egypt|
|**Morocco**|- Sugar and Sugar Confectionery|UAE|
||- Ceramics|UAE|
||- Sugar Confectionery|Egypt|
||- Cotton Yarn|Egypt|
||- viscose Fabrics|Egypt|
||- Acrylic Fabrics|Egypt|
||- Refrigerators|Saudi Arabia|
|**Saudi Arabia**|- Beans, Wheat products (Burgul, Friekah)|Jordan|
||- Unfinished Furniture (wooden body)|Egypt|
|**Syria**|- Facial Tissues & Towels|Jordan|
||- Ready made clothing|UAE|
|**Tunisia**|- Ceramics|UAE|
||- Sugar|UAE|

*  Information Compiled from the completed questionnaires.

33