metadata: authors: 0: author: Murard,Elie
count: World
docna: 0: docna: Long-Term Effects of the 1923 Mass Refugee
            Inflow on Social Cohesion in Greece
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Indigenous Peoples,Indigenous Communities,Indigenous Peoples Law,Educational Sciences,Armed Conflict,Social Cohesion
teratopic: Culture and Development,Communities and Human Settlements,Law and Development,Education,Conflict and Development,Social Development
abstracts: cdata!: After the 1919–1922 Greco-Turkish
            conflict, 1.2 million Greek Orthodox were forcibly displaced
            from Turkey to Greece, increasing the host population by 20
            percent within a few months. Refugees were pro-vided with
            farmland, new houses and schools, and were granted the Greek
            citizenship. This paper analyses the long-term social
            integration of refugees and the effect of their resettlement
            on social cohesion. Combining historical and modern
            population censuses and surveys, this paper finds that, by
            the 2000s, refugees display a high rate of intermarriage
            with Greek natives, report levels of trust in others and in
            institutions similar to natives, and exhibit higher
            political and civic participation. At the community level,
            places with a higher share of refugees in 1928 are more
            likely to have at least one sport association 80 years
            later. There is no impact on political fragmentation nor on
            crime. The historical refugees’ integration starkly
            contrasts with the social marginalization of recent Albanian
            immigrants who, unlike the former, neither spoke Greek nor
            had the same religion as locals upon arrival. These results
            suggest that early investments in inclusion policies can be
            effective at fostering refugees’ assimilation, at least when
            newcomers and locals have similar cultural profiles.
repnme: repnme: Long-Term Effects of the 1923 Mass Refugee
            Inflow on Social Cohesion in Greece
display_title: Long-Term Effects of the 1923 Mass
            Refugee Inflow on Social Cohesion in Greece
listing_relative_url: /research/2022/01/33714410/long-term-effects-1923-mass-refugee-inflow-social-cohesion-greece
topicv3: Forced Displacement m1326032 740,Indigenous Peoples m1326947 749,Education m1327048 470,Social Cohesion m1327189 738,Political Violence and War m1327310 2462
publishtoextweb_dt: 2022-01-27T00:00:00Z
dois: 10.1596/1813-9450-9912
historic_topic: Culture and Development,Communities and Human Settlements,Law and Development,Education,Conflict and Development,Social Development
origu: Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
no_of_pages: 48
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1146087
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 9912 Long-Term Effects of the 1923 Mass Refugee Inflow on Social Cohesion in Greece _Elie Murard_ Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice January 2022
Policy Research Working Paper 9912

# **Abstract**

After the 1919–1922 Greco-Turkish conflict, 1.2 million Greek Orthodox were forcibly displaced from Turkey to Greece, increasing the host population by 20 percent within a few months. Refugees were pro-vided with farmland, new houses and schools, and were granted the Greek citizenship. This paper analyses the long-term social integration of refugees and the effect of their resettlement on social cohesion. Combining historical and modern population censuses and surveys, this paper finds that, by the 2000s, refugees display a high rate of intermarriage with Greek natives, report levels of trust in others and in institutions similar to natives, and exhibit higher political and civic participation. At the community level, places with a higher share of refugees in 1928 are more likely to have at least one sport association 80 years later. There is no impact on political fragmentation nor on crime. The historical refugees’ integration starkly contrasts with the social marginalization of recent Albanian immigrants who, unlike the former, neither spoke Greek nor had the same religion as locals upon arrival. These results suggest that early investments in inclusion policies can be effective at fostering refugees’ assimilation, at least when newcomers and locals have similar cultural profiles.

This paper is a product of the Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at elie.murard@ua.es.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Long-term effects of the 1923 mass refugee inflow on social cohesion in Greece<sup>_∗_</sup>

# Elie Murard<sup>_†_</sup>

_University of Alicante, NOVA SBE, IZA, LEAP_ _JEL Classification Codes_ : O15, J62 ,N34, N44 _Keywords_ : Refugees, social cohesion, integration, historical persistence, immigration

> _∗_ This paper was commissioned by the World Bank Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice as part of the activity “Preventing Social Conflict and Promoting Social Cohesion in Forced Displacement Contexts.” The activity is task managed by Audrey Sacks and Susan Wong with assistance from Stephen Winkler. This work is part of the program “Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership”. The program is funded by UK aid from the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), it is managed by the World Bank Group (WBG) and was established in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The scope of the program is to expand the global knowledge on forced displacement by funding quality research and disseminating results for the use of practitioners and policy makers. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG or UNHCR.

> _†_ I thank Sara Tonini for her very helpful suggestions and Chrysovalantis Vasilakis for sharing the crime data.
# **1 Introduction**

Mass displacement of people is common throughout history. The 20th century alone experienced the uprooting of millions of Jews, Hindus, and countless others. More recently, civil wars and conflicts displaced millions of Sudanese, Syrians, and Rohingyas. While significant attention has been given to the short-term costs that mass refugee inflows may cause for hosting countries in the shortterm, less is known about the long-term legacy of such events. In particular, little evidence exists on how large-scale population resettlements affect the social cohesion of receiving communities in the long-run.<sup>1</sup> This question is important because the short-term and long-term effects could be very different.

This paper aims to fill this gap by exploiting the 1923 Greek population resettlement to examine the long-run consequences of mass refugee inflow on the social cohesion of the receiving society. In the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922, escaping religious persecutions, the Greek Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire fled from their homeland in Turkey they inhabited since antiquity. In total, 1.2 million Greek Orthodox were forcibly resettled to Greece, increasing the host population by more than 20 percent within a few months. Confronted with such a sudden influx of refugees, Greece – an agrarian country economically drained by several years of war – called for the help of the League of Nations, which not only provided immediate relief (food and shelter) but also implemented an ambitious resettlement program. Former marshlands were reclaimed and refugees were provided with arable land, livestock and other farm inputs. New houses were build and new schools opened to accommodate the newcomers. Furthermore, given that refugees could not return to their homeland and had to remain in Greece permanently, they were granted the Greek citizenship.<sup>2</sup> Despite these substantial investments, refugees – initially in a state of “utter destitution”<sup>3</sup> – were often met with hostility by the locals, who felt their way of life under threat. Serious clashes occurred over the distribution of farmland, which mostly benefited refugees at the disadvantage of local cultivators.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, although refugees and natives shared the same religion and often the same language, they were often met with prejudice and rejection, especially as “competition for

> 1 For a review of the literature see Becker and Ferrara (2019); Verme and Schuettler (2019); Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013).

> 2Some of the terminology (“refugees”, “resettlement”) used in this paper does not align with contemporary legal definitions or customary uses in international refugee protection regimes. By “refugees”, I designate Greek Orthodox population who fled Turkey due to religious persecutions, even if they cannot be considered as refugees under the 1951 Genena Convention as they were already Greek nationals upon they entry on Greek territory. Likewise, by “resettlement”, I mean the displacement of population from an origin to a receiving country (and not the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another State).

> 3Kontogiorgi (2006), p. 88.

> 4Large tracts of arable land were also left vacant by the forced expulsion of all Muslim inhabitants of Greece (about 400,000 people), who resettled in Turkey 1928. The League of Nations split the large estates of the expelled Muslims into smallholdings and distributed them to the Greek refugees, while virtually none were redistributed to the native peasantry.

1
land and livelihood lowered the standard of living for everyone”.<sup>5</sup> The refugees’ distinct identity was further cemented by clear allegiances to opposing political parties during the interwar period, with refugees actively supporting the liberals and natives standing behind the conservatives.

Has the refugees’ initial economic hardship upon arrival turned into persistent social marginalization? Has the historical strife between refugees and natives cemented into deep-seated mistrust and oppositional identities? Has social cohesion – understood as “a sense of shared purpose and trust [...] and willingness to engage and cooperate” among members of a same society (Kim, Sheely and Schmidt, 2020) – been eroded by major inter-group cleavages? Or, to the contrary, have the League of Nations’ resettlement efforts proved sufficient to prevent refugee’s exclusion and foster their integration into the Greek society ?

To address these questions, I use Murard and Sakalli (2018)’s geocoded dataset of refugee settlements in 1928, which I combine with several indicators of social cohesion at the local level in the 2000s and 2010s. I also use various Greek population censuses from 1928 to 2001 to examine refugees’ social integration, and the European Social Survey to look at the second-generation refugees’ political values, trust, and civic engagement.

The first important result is that refugees experienced a successful social integration in the host society. By 2001 refugees display a high rate of intermarriage, with close to 50 percent of refugee women being married with a Greek native. Second generation refugees also report levels of trust in others and in institutions similar to natives, do not perceive to be discriminated against, and are more likely than natives to engage in political activism and to participate in voluntary associations. I also find no persistent inter-group inequalities between refugees and natives in terms of educational attainment or occupation. Furthermore, the civic engagement of refugees appears to have contributed to higher involvement in voluntary associations at the community level. I find that, among small communities (bellow 1,100 inhabitants), places with a higher share of refugees in 1928 are more likely to have at least one sport association in the early 2000s. I find no evidence that refugees increased political fragmentation – which is consistent with the fact that voting patterns of refugees and natives are very similar – nor that refugees increased crime in places of resettlement.

These results have important policy implications. They suggest that early investments in resettlement efforts (e.g., provision of farmland) and inclusion policy (e.g., citizenship) can have significant returns in the long-run by fostering refugees’s assimilation and sustaining social cohesion. Under the threat of profound social disruption caused by the influx of 1.2 millions destitute refugees, the Greek state sought to promote national unity by including refugees in the national community. This was accomplished not only by providing refugees with the economic tools for their

> 5Kontogiorgi (2006), p. 166, and Kritikos (2005)

2
integration (i.e., the material and productive assets lost during displacement), but also by granting them the same civil and political rights as natives. Furthermore, new schools were opened to teach refugee children the same education and civic values taught to Greek natives in order to promote a cohesive national identity.<sup>6</sup> Consistent with this historical account, I find evidence that the supply of new schools played an important role in the refugee children’s progress in literacy and in the catching up with natives in the interwar period.

These results may yet be of limited external validity for current inflows of refugees with totally different ethnic and cultural backgrounds compared to the local population. The successful integration of the 1923 refugees stands in stark contrast with the social marginalization of more recent Albanian immigrants who, unlike past refugees, neither spoke Greek nor had the same religion as locals upon arrival (coming from a Muslim-majority country). Albanian immigrants have not experienced the same social assimilation as refugees, neither in terms of education, intermarriage, nor civic participation.<sup>7</sup> The discrepancy in the socio-economic trajectories of the two groups of newcomers highlights the specific challenges of providing integration policies for migrants who have profoundly different linguistic, religious and cultural profiles relative to those of the locals.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some elements of historical context. Sections 3 reviews the related literature and presents the paper’s contribution. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results, while section 6 concludes.

# **2 Context**

## **2.1 The Exodus**

Since it gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832, Greece pursued the goal to unite the ethnic Greek population scattered across the Ottoman territories. After the First World War, backed by the Allies, the Greek Army occupied territories in western Turkey that were heavily populated by ethnic Greeks. However, while the Greek advance stalled as the military support of the Allies faded, the Turkish Army’s counter-offensive at the end of August 1922 was successful. The persecution of Greek Orthodox communities by the advancing Turkish Army, in particular the fire in the Christian neighborhoods of Smyrna in September 13, 1922, triggered a mass exodus of population to Greek islands and mainland. Almost one million of Greek Orthodox, whose ancestors have been living in Asia Minor for millennia, left Turkey within a few months’ time.

> 6Kontogiorgi (2006), p. 241.

> 7As I cannot provide evidence on the second generation of Albanian immigrants, I examine the integration outcomes of first generation migrants who arrived in Greece at different age in order to measure intergenerational trends. Evidence from both the 2001 census and the ESS suggest that Albanian immigrants have not yet experienced any progress in integration outcomes between younger and older immigrants of the first generation.

3
The Lausanne Peace Treaty, signed in July 1923, ended the Greco-Turkish War. As a part of the treaty, Greece and Turkey signed the “Convention for the Exchange of Populations”, which devised and implemented the principle of a compulsory exchange of population for the first time in modern history. The convention dictated that all Greek Orthodox of Turkey and all Muslims of Greece were to be denaturalized, leave the country they reside in, and acquire the citizenship of their destination country. As a result of the population exchange, Greece, a country with less than five million inhabitants, received more than one million refugees from Turkey. In return, about 400,000 Muslims left Greece

# **2.2 Resettlement of refugees**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Greece was primarily a rural agrarian country. In 1920, the urbanization rate was only 23 percent, and more than half of the population was employed in agriculture. The relief and resettlement of such a large-scale refugee inflow were far beyond the limited resources of the Greek State, which had almost gone bankrupt after a long and costly war. As a result, the League of Nations intervened and founded the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) in September 1923. The RSC had full authority over the distribution of funds and resettlement of refugees.

**Agricultural Resettlement.** The mandate of the RSC was to establish refugees in agricultural work and assist them to become self-supporting. To this end, the RSC provided them with land suitable for cultivation and with various farm inputs, such as livestock, seeds, and some machinery (Kontogiorgi, 2006, pp. 78, 86, 90). The RSC concentrated its operation in Northern Greece where large tracts of arable land were left vacant by the expelled Muslim population. The RSC split the large estates of Muslim landlords ( _chiftliks_ ) into smallholdings and distributed them to the Greek refugees.<sup>8</sup>

**Infrastructure Works.** The RSC also expanded the cultivable land area by undertaking important and costly drainage and reclamation works in the valleys of the Northern provinces, often waterlogged and prone to malaria. As a result, the area of cultivated land doubled in Northern Greece (Kontogiorgi, 2006, pp. 277–290) and the drained marshlands hosted many new settlements of refugees.<sup>9</sup> In addition to distributing land and houses to refugees, the RSC also initiated a public utility program: it constructed roads, bridges, dispensaries, and schools (Pentzopoulos 1962, p. 108; Kontogiorgi 2006, p. 297). The decennial 1922–1932 total budgetary expenditures for the relief, housing and settlement of refugees amounted to a little more than 10 millions British pounds, with 9.1 millions spent for agricultural settlement and 1.3 millions for urban settlement (Kritikos

> 8By contrast, the refugees who settled in urban centers — about 50 percent of them — were given no means of providing for themselves, apart from accommodation (Kontogiorgi, 2006, p. 103).

> 9In total, the Greek regions of Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus, and Thessaly hosted more than 90 percent of the refugees’ agricultural settlements (uthors’ calculation using data from the 1930 Statistical Yearbook of Greece)

4
(2005); Pentzopoulos (1962)). This amount represented between 3 and 4% of Greek GDP.<sup>10</sup> For the agricultural resettlement, this translates into an expenditure of about 1500 US current dollars per rural refugee.

**School supply** The refugee inflow displaced more than 185,000 between 6 and 12, which represented a 20% increase in the number of school-age children living in Greece. Facing the high risk of over-crowded schools, the Greek State and the RSC responded by vastly increasing the supply of schools. Between 1921 and 1927, 1,466 new schools were opened in order to accommodate the newcomer children, i.e, almost 8 new schools were opened for 1000 refugee children. These new schools were mostly build in provinces who receive a very large inflow of refugees ( _>_ 20% of their population), where the increase in school supply (per children) was twice as high as in other provinces (see Table A.3 in the appendix).

**National interest** The important investment in the integration of the 1923 refugees was also made possible not only out of legal considerations (the 1923 Convention implementation) but primarily because it served national interests. First, it contributed to mitigate the devasting social and financial impact of the military defeat in the Greco-Turkish War. Second, the refugee resettlement was linked to national security problems in key border areas (Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace) in the proximity of Turkey and Bulgaria. The refugee resettlement served the purpose to consolidate these border areas by making them more ethnically homogenous ahead of a potential new round of armed conflict with neighboring nation-states.

# **2.3 Tensions with natives upon arrival**

**Conflict Over Land Distribution.** The transfer of Muslim farmland to refugees by the RSC created tensions with the native population. For a long time, the native landless peasants had nurtured expectations of becoming owners of the land abandoned by the Turks, which they had been cultivating for generations under a crop-sharing tenure system during the Ottoman Empire. Serious clashes with refugees occurred when almost all of the former Turkish estates were transferred to refugee families and virtually none were redistributed to the native peasantry (Kritikos, 2005). **Cultural differences** Before the exchange of population, all Orthodox Christian population of Turkey were grouped by the Ottoman authorities in the same confessional community, the Rum millet, under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, also known as the Greek Orthodox Church. Religious affiliation was the criterion for identity. The expulsion of the refugees in 1923 was based on their adherence to the Greek-Orthodox church. While the refugees and the local Greeks undoubtedly shared the same religion and had the same ethnic bonds (traditions from the Byzantine civilisation) they constituted two different worlds. The historical evolution of communities in Asia Minor (Turkey), their culture, and their outlook were

> 10At the end of the1920s, the Greek gross domestic product was about 14 billion in 1990 US dollars according to Maddison (2010), or about 320 millions in 1930 pounds.

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generally different to the local people’s cultural patterns (way of life, customs and mores, dress, homes), since each group had developed as a separate entity under radically different historical and social conditions. Furthermore, there were clear and significant differences between the refugees depending on the area from which they had come. Although the majority of refugees shared the same language with local Greeks, refugees from the Black Sea region (Pontics), who made up a large percentage of the refugees, could not communicate with local people very easily, and there were numerous Turkish-speaking groups among the refugees as well. This is why when locals and refugees first came into contact and realized how very different they were, they suffered what Mavrogordatos (1983) describes as “a traumatic cultural shock”. The ethnic boundaries separating refugees (Prosphyges) and their hosts (the “Old Greeks”, Palioelladites) were sufficient to cause strife and prejudice, particularly as “competition for land and livelihood lowered the standard of living for everyone” (Kontogiorgi, 2006, p. 166). Turkish-speakers and Pontics faced more difficulties, rejection, and discrimination, from the local population than Greek-speaking refugees, since, culturally speaking, they stood out more: They were often derided for their customs and traditions and natives referred to them as “Turkish seed” ( _Tourkosporoi_ ) and often “regarded the newcomers as a sickly lot and looked upon them with contempt and suspicion” (Kontogiorgi, 2006, p. 160). **Political cleavage** The refugees’ distinct cultural identity was further cemented by clear political allegiance in the 1930s. The Liberal Party led by E. Venizelos quickly recognized the importance of refugees’ votes and worked for the integration of the refugees into the Greek political system. The refugees became an integral part of the Venizelist camp (Pentzopoulos, 1962, p. 186). Partly due to their exclusion from native patron-client networks, _the refugees rapidly developed their own political machines, headed by refugee or pro-refugee politicians and enjoying access to the top Venizelist leaders (...) The refugees justifiably saw the Venizelist Republic as “their” regime, and the Liberal Party particular as “their” party_ (Mavrogordatos, 1983, p. 202). The Venizelists’ embrace of the refugees caused a conservative backlash against the newcomers, with anti-venizelists accusing the refugees of depriving the native majority of its legitimate political power and demanding the exclusion of refugees from the political process. As Mavrogordatos (1983) puts it, _“the distinction between refugees and natives provided the basis for the most salient cleavage in inter-war Greek society, which truly dominated the politics of the period.”_

# **2.4 Recent Albanian immigration**

Albanians form the largest group of immigrants in present-day Greece. Differently from the 1923 refugees, most Albanian nationals share neither the same language nor the same religion with Greek natives. They come from a country whose language has no similarities with Greek and where the predominant religion is Islam (with some Christians that are typically Catholic and not Orthodox).

Most Albanian immigrants arrived in Greece after the collapse of the communist regime in 6
1991 and were largely unwanted by the Greek authorities. In fact, according to Baldwin-Edwards (2004), the Greek immigration policy since 1991 has been (and continue to be) fundamentally exclusionary, offering no realistic possibility of legal immigration for non-ethnic Greeks from the Balkan countries. The illegal status of Albanian immigrants contributed to the negative perceptions and even hostility of the host population. From their very first arrival in Greece, Albanian migrants were stigmatised as “criminals” by the Greek media and became stereotyped as “dangerous Albanians” (Karydis, 1992). Sociological studies report that, confronted with systematic discrimination, Albanian immigrants have adopted tactics to conceal or de-emphasise their Albanian or Muslim background, by assuming Greek names, being baptised, or pretending to be Christian in order to avoid prejudices (Hatziprokopiou, 2003; Pratsinakis, 2005). All these factors combined (cultural differences with natives, illegal status, negative stereotypes) may explain why Albanian immigrants had not experienced the same successful integration as the 1923 refugees.

# **3 Related literature and contribution**

## **3.1 Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion**

Despite its ubiquity in the literature, social cohesion remains a concept with no consistent definition. Social cohesion is variously described as the absence of social conflict (Durkheim, 1897), the “affective bond between citizens” (Chipkin and Ngqulunga, 2008) “local patterns of cooperation” (Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009) and “the glue that bonds society together, promoting harmony, a sense of community, and a degree of commitment to promoting the common good” (Colletta et al., 2001). A contemporary definition that I will adopt for the rest of the paper is given by Kim, Sheely and Schmidt (2020): “a sense of shared purpose and trust among members of a given group or locality and the willingness of those group members to engage and cooperate with each other to survive and prosper”.

To operationalize this definition, this paper focuses on the presence or absence of major intergroup cleavages, which according to Chan, To and Chan (2006) and King, Samii and Snilstveit (2010) represents a key dimension of social cohesion, as strong divisions (whether by income, ethnicity, political party) can polarize the society and strain social solidarity. In the first part of the paper, I use different measures of refugees’ socio-economic integration and cultural assimilation to test whether the refugee inflow has caused the emergence of new cleavages (native vs. newcomer) within the Greek society as a whole. I notably use survey data on self-reported trust and selfperceived discrimination to measure the extent of social exclusion of the refugee population. I also use census data to measure educational and occupational inequalities between the two groups. In the second part of the paper, I focus on community-level measures of social cohesion, understood either as absence of societal conflict and division or, more positively, as civic participation. In partic7
ular, I use the presence of sport associations in a community to measure the degree of involvement in voluntary associations, which is a conventional indicator of community ties and pro-social norms in the literature on social capital.<sup>11</sup> I also use municipal or regional level indicators of crime rates and political fragmentation.

# **3.2 Refugees’ integration**

While the literature on voluntary migration has a long tradition of studying the assimilation of migrants (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Verdier et al., 2012), a smaller but fast-growing body of work has specifically focused on forced displacement and the integration of refugees in the host society. Relative to migrants, refugees are more disadvantaged from the start for a number of reasons: (i) having experienced persecutions and expulsions, they may bear lasting effects of physical and psychological trauma, (ii) most of them have lost possessions and assets due to destruction or hasty departure, (iii) as they often have limited control over their final destination, they may resettle in suboptimal locations where they cannot rely on past family or ethnic networks, or where their skills are not easily transferable. Consistent with these initial disadvantages, a number of studies show that present-day refugees experience slower and more difficult economic integration than other migrants and this gap persists over time up to 10-15 years after migration – see Fasani, Frattini and Minale (2021 _b_ ) and Bevelander (2020) for a review.

On the contrary, taking a longer-term perspective by studying historical expulsions of population in the wake of WWII, a number of papers show that forced displacement does not necessarily have detrimental effects. Looking at the resettlement of Poles, Becker et al. (2020) shows that being forcibly uprooted (and expropriated) has lasting positive effects on educational choices – over three generations – by increasing the subjective value of investing in portable assets, in particular in education. Forced migrants and their descendants tend to invest more in human capital also because, in the case of refugee farmers, they may not have access to land and may thus need to invest in skills outside agriculture (Bauer, Braun and Kvasnicka, 2013; Sarvim ̈aki, Uusitalo and J ̈antti, 2019). More in general, while forced displacement may in itself leave deep scars, it compels refugees to start from scratch and reinvent themselves, which may put them on an upward social trajectory, possibly across generations.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, unlike voluntary migrants, refugees often have nowhere to return to and may thus have a stronger incentive to invest in country-specific human capital in order to assimilate in their new destination (Cortes, 2004).

In the debate over the determinants of refugee integration in the host country, increasing atten-

> 11See Putnam (2000, 2002) and Stolle (2003) among others.

> 12Nakamura, Sigurdsson and Steinsson (2016) call this “the gift of moving”. The authors document the positive effect of forced migration on education and lifetime earnings of families displaced by the eruption of a volcano off the coast of Iceland in 1973.They interpret their findings in a similar to Sarvim ̈aki, Uusitalo and J ̈antti (2019): some people are “stuck” in locations and habits that do not fully exploit their economic potential. When displaced, people are able to benefit from opportunities available away from the origin.

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tion has been given to the crucial role of asylum and resettlement policies, both in developed and developing countries. In particular, previous studies have analysed the effectiveness of different program aimed at removing barriers to refugees’ (formal) employment, with the idea that facilitating their participation in the labor market is instrumental in fostering integration (Clemens, Huang and Graham, 2018; Fasani, Frattini and Minale, 2021 _a_ ). Another strand of research has shown the considerable benefits of giving greater rights to newcomers (Gathmann et al., 2020). In particular, granting the citizenship dramatically improves the rate of economic and social integration of immigrants, and encourages greater investments in immigrant children’s human capital and education (Felfe, Rainer and Saurer, 2020).

This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, unlike most of studies on refugees’ integration , I investigate medium and long-run outcomes across the first and secondgeneration of refugees. I also consider a broader set of outcomes: apart from educational attainment, I explore intermarriage with natives, political attitudes, voting, trust, and civic engagement of second-generation refugees. Furthermore, the specific historical context of the Greek refugee inflow – in which refugees were established in agricultural work and granted the citizenship – allows me to shed light on the effectiveness of resettlement policies in a poor agrarian economy, not unlike many developing countries today.<sup>13</sup> Finally I provide new, albeit suggestive, evidence on an often overlooked factor of long-term integration: the access to primary schooling for refugee children.

# **3.3 Refugees’ effects on social cohesion**

A large literature has explored how ethnic diversity affects social capital. Higher diversity is usually found to be associated with lower mutual trust and civic participation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Putnam, 2007), higher social anomia (Algan, H ́emet and Laitin, 2016), and lower welfare and public redistribution (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Desmet, Weber and Ortu ̃no-Ort ́ın, 2009) – see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review. With respect to the effects of (present-day) refugees more specifically, a number of studies has explored how natives’ support for far-right populist parties respond to refugee influx. Results on this topic are mixed: depending on the context, certain studies find that local exposure to refugees increases far-right voting (Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm, 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019; Dinas et al., 2019), while others find that exposure to refugees either reduces or has no impact on anti-refugee voting in hosting municipalities (Steinmayr, 2020; Gehrsitz and Ungerer, 2017). These conflicting results can be reconciled by the intergroup contact theory, which predicts that different types of exposure can generate different attitudinal reactions towards newcomers.<sup>14</sup> According to this theory, the contact between an in-group

> 1385 percent of the 70 million currently displaced people in the world are hosted in developing countries (UNHCR, 2018). Sub-Saharan Africa currently hosts the largest number of forcibly displaced people (26 millions), which are mostly resettled in rural areas (Huang and Graham, 2018).

> 14See Allport’s (1954); Pettigrew (1998); Pettigrew and Tropp (2006); Pettigrew et al. (2011).

9
(i.e., the native population) and an out-group (i.e., the refugees) reduces prejudice if the following features characterise the contact situation: firstly, _equal status_ of the groups in the situation, which means that the two groups are equally engaged in the relationship and ideally have similar backgrounds and characteristics. Secondly, the groups work together on _common goals_ , which should not be achieved in competition but rather in _intergroup cooperation_ . Thirdly, _personal interaction_ with cross-group members. Lastly, _support of authorities_ , law, or custom.

This paper contributes to this extensive literature by highlighting the important role of resettlement policies in creating favourable conditions for positive intergroup contact. By providing refugees with farmland and making the self-sufficient, the League of Nations reduced the competition with natives in the labor market. By opening new schools, constructing new roads and dispensaries, the Leagues’ public utility program further helped mitigate the risk of congestion and overcrowding caused by the sudden refugee inflow. Granting the citizenship also contributed to equal status between the newcomers and the locals.

# **4 Research Design**

## **4.1 Data**

### **4.1.1 Historical data on the refugees**

The primary data source to identify the spatial distribution of the refugee inflow is the 1928 population census.<sup>15</sup> This dataset provides information on the number of refugees for reach of the 140 provinces and 5,042 municipalities that existed in Greece in 1928. While the main variable of interest is the population share of refugees in 1928, I also draw on the 1923 refugee census at the municipality level to check the robustness of the analysis to using the distribution of refugees in 1923.<sup>16</sup> The 1928 census provides a rich set of information on the socio-economic characteristics, e.g., literacy rate by age and professions, of the total Greek population and of the refugees separately. It also tabulates the characteristics of the population in 1920 for comparison. However, these information are available only at the province level level.

According to the refugee census, 778,000 refugees arrived in Greece in April 1923. After the population exchange, their number rose up to 1.07 million in 1928, accounting for 16.6 percent of the total population (out of 6.08 million). 53.9% of refugees settled in urban areas, while only 30% of Greek natives lived in cities in 1928. The three biggest cities in Greece, Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki, hosted about half of the urban refugees. I exclude these three cities from the

> 15See Figure A.2 in the Appendix for the questionnaire (bulletin) and an example of historical table.

> 16This census was taken in April 1923, after the mass inflow of refugees but before the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the agreement on the forced population exchange between the Kingdom of Greece and Turkey. Figure A.1 in Supplementary Appendix presents the timeline of events that are relevant for the settlement and enumeration of refugees.

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analysis as they may have a different development trajectory and may thus introduce endogeneity. Figure 1 maps the distribution of refugees in 1928 at the community level.

# **4.1.2 Contemporary social cohesion at the local level**

I use three main indicators of social cohesion at the local level: participation in voluntary associations, political fragmentation, and crime.

**Sports clubs** To measure participation in voluntary associations, I use the register of sports clubs inventoried by the General Secretariat of Sports (GGA) in the early 2000s. The dataset provides the geolocation of more than 22,000 sport association across the country. The geolocation is precise enough to identify the number of association within each of the 5775 communities that existed in Greece in 2001.

**Political fragmentation** To measure political fragmentation at the local level, I follow the political science literature (Gross and Sigelman, 1984) by using an index of fragmentation of votes between different political parties:

This index simply measures the probability that two people drawn at random in the population have voted for the same party at the last election. This index is lower when people tend to vote for the same party and higher when votes are scattered between different parties. Since the Greek political landscape has many parties that sometimes hold relatively similar ideological position, I also used a fragmentation index where parties are grouped into a leftist coalition and a rightist coalition.The electoral data I use covers the legislative elections of June 2012 and January 2015 and provides the number of votes for each of the 325 municipalities of Greece at that time.<sup>17</sup> **Crime data** I draw on crime data from Vasilakis (2018) who collected the data from the Greek police. This data comprise the total number of robberies, drug arrests and burglaries in 2015 for each of the 56 departments of Greece.

**Matching places over time** Out of the 5,042 municipalities that existed in 1928, 4,845 could be geocoded and matched to the 5,775 communities that existed in Greece in 2001. I collapse the dataset at the administrative borders of 1920 and treat observations that merged after 1920 as a single unit. As a result, I obtain a panel dataset with 4,409 observations (cluster of municipalities) covering the period between 1920 and 2001, achieving a match of 97.7 percent of the 1928 population to the rest of the dataset.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, out of the 325 municipalities of Greece in the 2010s, I

> 17Between 1991 and 2010, Greece went through two major administrative reforms that sharply reduced the number of municipalities from more than 5,000 to less than 400 (known as the 1997 Kapodistrias reform and the 2010 Kallikratis Programme)

> 18See Murard and Sakalli (2018) for details of the matching procedure.

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could match 275 to the 1928 census.

# **4.1.3 Integration outcomes of refugees**

I measure the integration of refugees by examining different generations of refugees: (i) those born in turkey who were forcibly resettled in Greece at a different age (ii) those born in Greece to refugee parents, i.e. the second-generation.

**First-generation** I measure the socio-economic integration of first-generation refugees by comparing the educational attainment of refugees displaced at a different age, i.e., either when adults (above 15) or when children (below 15). I rely on the 1928 census to obtain the literacy rate of refugees at arrival, and focus on those older than 15 years in 1923. To measure the socio-economic outcomes of refugees at a later period, I unfortunately cannot draw on population censuses as no information on country of birth is available. The earliest census to provide this information is the 2001 census and I use the 10 percent extract provided by IPUMS.<sup>19</sup> I identify as refugees the 3,486 sampled individuals born in Turkey between 1908 and 1922, who represent about 9% of the population born in the same period. Reassuringly, the share of individuals born in Turkey drops to less than 2% among cohorts born after 1922, while the share of foreign-born (in other countries than Turkey) remains stable across cohorts and start increasing only after the 1950s (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The 2001 census also allows to construct the rate of intermarriage between refugees and natives. Among the 2,102 refugee women in the sample, 293 report to be married with a currently co-residing husband – the other women being mostly widowed. When the husband belongs to the surveyed household, I can identify mixed refugee-native couple as instances in which the wife is refugee and the husband is born in Greece. Theoretically, although native-born, the husband could still be the child of refugee parents, which would hardly correspond to a mixed couple. This is almost never the case in practice as husbands are typically older than their wife, and hence are born before refugees arrived in Greece for the first time.

**Second generation** I use the European Social Survey (ESS) that provides information on parents’ birthplace for a sample of individuals living in Greece in the 2000s. I identify second-generation refugees as individuals born in Greece with at least one parent born in Turkey. I focus on the cohorts born between 1923 and 1950 as they are the most likely to be the children of first-generation refugees. Table A.2 in the appendix shows that the proportion of ESS respondents with parents born in Turkey is the highest for people born in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1940s. It dramatically drops for people born after 1950. In contrast, the share of individuals with parents born outside of Turkey remains stable across birth cohorts, with a peak in the 1990s. This provides empirical support that I am able to identify second-generation refugees. The ESS does not only provide data on the socio-economic outcomes of second-generation refugees (such as education or occupation)

> 19Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.3 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2020. https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.3

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but also contains information on a wide range of socioeconomic and political attitudes, beliefs, and values.

# **4.2 Empirical strategy**

The first part of the empirical analysis is essentially descriptive as it documents the socio-economic outcomes of refugees for different generations and relative to the native population. The second part aims at examining the long-term consequences of the refugee resettlement on the social cohesion of host communities.

I estimate the long-term effects of refugees on social cohesion using the following regression at the community level: where _c_ indexes communities and _p_ indexes provinces. _Ycp_ is a measure of contemporary social cohesion in the 2000s. _Refmp_ is the share of refugees in the 1928 population of community _c_ . Importantly, the specification includes a set of province fixed-effects _δp_ that controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the province level. The vector of covariates _Xcp_ , comprises population density in 1920; a dummy variable indicating whether the locality was a city in 1920; and some geographical features: a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is on an island; distances to the railway network in 1920, to the shoreline, and to the national border; altitude; average annual temperature and precipitation; and suitability of crops for rain-fed agriculture. I correct the standard errors for spatial correlation across communities by clustering the standard errors at the province level.

**Identification** An important concern with the estimation equation (1) is the self-selection of refugees into their final places of settlement. Refugees could have been attracted to places with better economic opportunities and greater potential for long-run growth. This could result in biased OLS estimates. I address this concern in two different ways. I first document in section B of the appendix that places of resettlement were neither more prosperous nor growing faster before the refugee inflow. If anything, places of resettlement tended to be more agricultural ans less economically developed. This is consistent with historical accounts according to which the RSC assigned refugees to agricultural colonies mostly based on vacant land suitable for cultivation. As a result, refugees could not often choose their settlement location.<sup>20</sup> Second, I test the robustness of the estimates to using the distribution of refugees in 1923 instead of that in 1928. Self-selection on

> 20 The refugees were transported to the settlement location, where a government representative delivered the land (Pentzopoulos, 1962, p. 108). The RSC planners determined the settlement locations based on “ _several quite patent factors, of which the geographical was the controlling one. The capacity of the country in the absorption of refugees was limited by its physical features_ ” (Kontogiorgi, 2006, p. 255). Cases of individual settlement were very rare and the resettlement process “ _left little if any scope for choice, on the part of the refugees, as regards the place of their final resettlement_ ” (Kontogiorgi, 2006, p. 143).

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unobservables is arguably less problematic for the distribution of refugees reported in the census of April 1923. At that time, refugees had been in Greece for less than 6 months (since the fire of Smyrna in September 1922), and still hoped to return to their homeland in Turkey. Upon arrival, the main worry of refugees, who were in a state of “utter destitution”, was to find relief and shelter where they could and less so to seek places with better economic opportunities (Kontogiorgi, 2006, pp. 88). The first place of settlement in 1923 was often temporary, as more than one third of refugees relocated to a different settlement between 1923 and 1928. As Figure A.5 shows, the spatial distribution of refugees in 1923 is correlated with but far from identical to the one in 1928.

# **5 Results**

## **5.1 Social integration of refugees**

**Closing the gap** I first examine the educational outcomes of refugees. The Panel A of Table 1 shows that, among adult refugee men in the 1928 census (15-65 years old in 1923), 66% are literate, while it is the case for the 75% of native men.<sup>21</sup> This initial negative gap disappears for refugees arrived in Greece at a younger age, i.e., below 15. The 1,270 refugee men sampled in the 2001 census and born between 1908 and 1922 are as likely as natives (born in the same period) to be literate (93%) and to have completed primary school (70%).<sup>22</sup> Differently from men, adult refugee women in 1923 had a literacy rate similar to native women (around 35%). When displaced as children, they became later in life more educated than native women. As for the second-generation refugees born in Greece, the Panel C of Table 1 shows that, among adult men, descendants of refugees and natives have similar educational attainment. Among women, refugees’ offspring are more educated than natives’.

**Factors of convergence** What factors can account for the observed pattern of convergence? Confronted with a mass inflow of refugee children that increased the school-age population by more than 20% in a few months, the RSC and the Greek State managed to open enough new schools to avoid overcrowding and accommodate the newcomers (see section 2). This public investment likely contributed to the impressive progress in literacy among refugees who were young enough to seat in the newly opened classrooms: the 1928 census reveals that the refugee-native gap in literacy went from -12% to less than -1% among male cohorts born between 1910 in 1917. Figure 2 provides evidence of the important role of the school supply. In provinces where the number of newly opened schools (per children, over the 1921-1917 period) was low (bottom tercile), male

> 21This data is provided by the 1928 census who ask respondents whether they are able to read and write in their mother tongue (not necessarily in the Greek language) - See Figure A.2.

> 22The sample I use in the 2001 census are made of individuals older than 78. One concern might be it is a nonrandom sample with respect to education as mortality rates are typically higher for less educated people. Yet there is no reason to expect that the educational gradient of mortality rates is different between natives and refugees. Second, life expectancy is typically above 80 years in Greece.

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refugees did not catch up with natives and the male literacy gap only narrowed from -10 to -5 percentage points between the 1910-1917 cohorts. In contrast, in provinces where the increase in school supply was higher, the literacy gap closed entirely by 1917, with a stark catching up from -15 to +1 percentage point in just seven cohorts.

To put the social integration of refugees into perspective, it is useful to examine another group of immigrants. I focus on the largest group of immigrants in Greece (about two-third of the immigrant population), the Albanians, most of whom arrived in the 1990s, after the the collapse of the Soviet Union.

# **5.2 Refugees’ integration compared to Albanian immigrants**

**Education and occupation** Table A.4 in the appendix presents regression estimates of the educational gap between Albanian immigrants and Greek natives, for different generation of migrants. In terms of secondary schooling Albanian migrants who arrived in Greece when adults are 22 percentage points less likely to have completed secondary schooling relative to natives (71% of whom hold secondary education). There is absolutely no catching up over generations: the educational gap with natives remains almost unchanged for migrants who arrived at a younger age, i.e., below 12, and even below 5. The same is true in terms of tertiary education. Furthermore, the ESS data allows to examine the occupations of second-generation refugees, either in their current or in their last job.<sup>23</sup> As Table A.5 in the appendix shows, refugees are less likely than natives to report being farmers and they have comparable household income (by decile). In contrast, first-generation Albanian immigrants are more likely to work in low-skill occupations (in the non-primary sector) and have a lower household income than natives.

**Intermarriage** Refugees are more socially assimilated than recent Albanian immigrants in terms of intermarriage. Figure 3 reports the intermarriage rate of refugee women who were displaced at a young age, below 15. By 2001, almost 50% of refugee women got married with a Greek native. This represents a very high intermarriage rate in international comparison, with a typical rate between 2% and 25% among immigrant women in Western Europe in the 2000s (Lucassen and Laarman, 2009). In particular, the refugees’ high propensity to intermarry stands in contrast with Albanian immigrant women, who, despite living in Greece since childhood (15 or younger), have a less than 10% probability of getting married to a Greek native.

> 23The occupation of first-generation refugee cannot be observed in the 2001 census since most refugees are retired (being 79 or older).

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# **5.3 Trust, Political preferences and civic engagement**

Was the successful integration of refugees sufficient to lead to full cultural assimilation and the disappearance of refugees’ distinctive identity and values? Or, to the contrary, has the historical strife between refugees and natives (detailed in section 2) cemented into persistent mistrust, discrimination, and polarized political attitudes?

**Trust and self-perceived discrimination** To address these questions, I first look at trust and selfperceived discrimination, as elicited in the ESS survey. Table 2 shows that only 3% of secondgeneration refugees report to have ever felt discriminated against, no differently from natives. This stands in stark contrast with first-generation Albanian immigrant, 50% of whom declare to have been discriminated against, as Table 3 shows. This difference is also related to the fact that only 54% of Albanians report to speak Greek at home, while 99% refugees do. Another crucial difference is that only 12% Albanians report to have the Greek citizenship while all refugees have it. With respect to self-declared trust in others or in institutions (legal system, police, politicians), I find no significant differences between refugees and natives, with a gap of typically less than 5% of the standard-deviation in the attitudinal scale between the two groups.

**Voting** I also examine the voting patterns of second-generation refugees and of Greek natives. The ESS asks respondents the political party they have voted at the last national election. Table 2 shows that, on average, the voting patterns of refugees and natives are virtually identical. Self-reported political preferences measured with a 11-point left-right scale are also very similar between refugees and natives, with a gap of less than 2% of the standard-deviation of this scale between the two groups.

**Political values** Forced displacement, a life-changing experience of “uprootedness”, can have longlasting effect on individual preferences. An important body of evidence has documented how exposure to violence, conflicts, or economic shocks, even temporary, can induces a permanent shift in individual preferences, possibly persisting across generations.<sup>24</sup> Table 2 shows that, relative to Greek natives, second-generation refugees report more egalitarian preferences, and in particular higher support for the principle of equality of opportunity. Refugees also display more altruistic values and greater openness towards understanding different people. This is in line with the existing evidence that exposure to conflict and to economic shocks (e.g., loss of possessions in case of displacement) increases individual support for redistribution and egalitarian values (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Bauer et al., 2014) . Furthermore, refugees report greater support for a strong government that protects its citizen and ensures safety, as one could expect from people whose family and community have been persecuted and forcibly displaced by conflict. **Civic engagement** Importantly, refugees’ more egalitarian and prosocial values result into more

> 24See, among others, Bauer et al. (2014); Voors et al. (2012); Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2013). On economic shocks, c.f. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) and Fisman, Jakiela and Kariv (2015).

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civic behaviours. Refugees report to be more interested in politics than natives, and are more likely to engage in political activism (boycott, petition, demonstration, etc.). They are also significantly more likely to participate in voluntary organisations, such as sport or cultural clubs, trade unions, or humanitarian organisations. Again, this pattern contrasts with Albanian immigrants, who are much less likely to engage in political or civic activities relative to Greek natives (Table 3). These findings are consistent with existing evidence (Blattman, 2009; Bellows and Miguel, 2009) that exposure to violence and conflicts – such as the religious persecutions Greek refugees were victim from in Turkey – can lead victims to higher political and civic mobilization and engagement (as a post-traumatic coping mechanism).<sup>25</sup> An important body of work even suggests that individual exposure to war violence may increase social cooperation at the local level, including community participation and prosocial behavior (for a review, see Bauer et al. (2016)).

One question that remains is whether Albanians will gradually assimilated over time, and in particular whether the second generation of Albanian immigrants will be equally integrated as the 1923 refugees. Although it is probably too early to say (as most Albanian arrived in Greece after 1991), the ESS provides some suggestive evidence that Albanians have not yet experienced any progress in integration outcomes. Although the ESS sample contains (almost) no second generation Albanians, I can examine the integration outcomes of first generation migrants who arrived in Greece at different ages. If second generation migrants were to integrate better than the previous generation we would expect to detect such a trend already between migrants who arrived at a young and older age. Table A.6 in the appendix shows that it is not the case: migrants who arrived at a young age ( _<_ 24) are as likely as those who arrived later in life to report Greek as the first language spoken at home, to feel discriminated, to have the Greek citizenship, or to participate in civic organisation. This apparent absence of social assimilation is consistent with the lack of integration in terms of educational outcomes among younger and older immigrants from the first generation (see Table A.4).

# **5.4 Effects of the refugee inflow on host communities’ social cohesion**

I now explore the effect of the refugee inflow on the social cohesion of the host communities in the long-run, more than 80 years after the resettlement.

**Sport associations** Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between the 1928 share of refugees and the presence of at least one sport association in the early 2000s at the community level. I estimate various specifications: starting from a regression controlling for geographical and historical variables (see description in section 4.2 ), for the community’s population in 1991 and

> 25A set of the literature explores positive responses to trauma, the so-called post-traumatic growth theory (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1996; Powell et al., 2003), that also includes changes in political action and beliefs. For example, Palestinians who personally survived aerial attacks are more likely to engage in political activism (Punamaki, Qouta and Sarraj, 1997).

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for some indicators of contemporaneous socio-economic development (column 1), I add to the regression controls region fixed-effects (column 2), and province fixed-effects (column 3).<sup>26</sup> I find no significant effect of refugees on average. I then examine whether the effect is heterogeneous depending on the population size of the community as the presence of a sport association greatly varies with the population (almost all communities with more than 1,100 inhabitant have a association, while it is the case for only 58% of smaller communities). As columns 4 to 6 show, the effect of refugees becomes significantly positive among small communities with less than 1,100 inhabitants (which corresponds to the bottom two terciles of the distribution), while the effect is null in larger communities.<sup>27</sup> The estimates suggest that, among small communities, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of refugees is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability of having at least one sport association.

Importantly, this result is robust to using the distribution of refuges in 1923 (instead of 1928). At that time, refugees had been in Greece for less than 6 months and self-selection on unobservables is arguably less problematic as their principal worries were to find relief and shelter. Table A.7 in the appendix shows that, among small communities, the share of refugees in 1923 is positively correlated with the presence of a sport association.

This positive relationship is fully consistent with refugees’ higher civic engagement relative to natives, as evidenced in section 5.3. Interestingly, I find that Albanian immigrants – who are less socially integrated than refugees and rarely engage in public life – have no significant effects on presence of sport associations in the communities they live in (see Table A.8 in the appendix). This suggests that refugees’ positive impact on social capital is likely driven by their active participation in the civic and political life and by their efforts of assimilation in the Greek society more in general.

**Political fragmentation** Table 5 reports OLS estimates of the effects of refugees on political fragmentation across 325 municipalities of Greece in the 2010s. I find no evidence that refugees’ presence significantly affect political fragmentation, either in the 2012 or in the 2015 election. I continue to find insignificant effects when I use an alternative fragmentation index in which parties are grouped into a leftist and a rightist coalition (Table A.9), or when I estimate alternative specifications using a quadratic or a logarithm function of the refugees’ share (Table A.10). This null result is consistent with the fact that refugees’ voting patterns are extremely similar to natives. **Crime** Table 6 presents some suggestive evidence on the refugees’ impact on crime at a broad geographical level, i.e., across 55 departments of Greece. I find that a higher share of refugees is significantly associated with a lower number of crimes in 2015, with a 1% increase in the refugees’ share leading to a 2.4% reduction in the number of crimes.

> 26More specifically, regression controls in column 1 include terciles of the 1991 population, the share of secondary and tertiary educated individuals in the 20-65 population in 1991, the employment share of non-agricultural occupations and of the manufacturing sector in 1991.

> 27All regressions include a binary variable for small communities in the controls.

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# **6 Policy and Program Implications**

Confronted with the sudden influx of 1.2 million destitute refugees, Greece – a poor agrarian country drained by several years of war – was under threat of serious social turmoil in 1923.<sup>28</sup> The timely intervention of the League of Nations and the ambitious resettlement program that ensued turned this historical challenge into a formidable opportunity in the long-run. As Murard and Sakalli (2018) document, refugees contributed to higher economic growth in places of resettlement, notably by bringing new complementary skills and knowledge conducive to industrialization.

This paper shows that, while fostering economic prosperity, the refugee resettlement did not undermine social cohesion in the long-term.<sup>29</sup> To the contrary, I find that refugees successfully integrated in the Greek society, both in social, political and cultural terms, and that their active civic participation contributed to sustain social cohesion in places of resettlement. This was achieved by an ambitious integration policy that combined several features: (i) the provision of productive assets (farmland, livestock) that made refugees self-reliant (ii) an infrastructure program that prevented the overcrowding of public services (dispensaries, schools) and accommodated the newcomers (new houses) (iii) the granting of the citizenship that included the newcomers in the national community and give them political rights. The combination of the above likely created favourable (if not necessary) conditions for refugees’ assimilation and positive intergroup contact with the native population under the umbrella of national unity promoted by the state.

The historical setting was one in which refugees spoke the same language, had the same religion, and had more cultural similarities than differences with the local native population. These findings are thus likely relevant for current refugee inflows that are hosted in neighboring countries culturally similar to the refugees’ origin country, which is a frequent context of refugee resettlement at the global level (Devictor, Do and Levchenko, 2021).<sup>30</sup> The stark discrepancy in the integration outcomes of past refugees and present-day Albanian immigrants coming from a Muslim-majority and non-Greek speaking country (and who were typically denied legal residence permit in Greece) suggests that the paper’s policy recommendations may not be applicable when newcomers have profoundly different linguistic, religious and cultural profiles relative to those of the locals. For refugees with a totally different background from the locals, integration services may need to be tailored to their specific needs and profile so that they can benefit from the integration policies.

As Clemens et al. (2018), puts its, “ _immigration is not inherently “good” or “bad”; its effects_

> 28Among which an epidemic outbreak, as typhus and cholera were ravaging the refugee camps.

> 29This result contrasts with Tabellini (2020) who finds that, in the U.S. context, the economic benefits brought by early 20th century immigrants came at the expense of political divisions, lower redistribution and lower social cohesion. 30According to the authors, in the period 2012-2017, 77 percent of global refugees find themselves in a country that shares a land border with their home country. It is there often the case that refugees are hosted in countries that are culturally similar. For example, Bangladesh hosts current Muslim Rohingya refugees who fled religious persecution in Myanmar; most of the Syrian refugees are hosted in neighboring Muslim countries some of which are Arabic speaking; and Colombia hosts Venezuelan refugees who migrated after the economic collapse of the country.

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_depend on the context and the policy choices that shape it._ ” In the Greek setting, the notion that “migration is what you make it” could not be more accurate, as only the critical resettlement efforts of the League of Nations and the Greek state could have turned a potential refugee crisis into what Pentzopoulos (1962) has termed as a “blessing in disguise”.

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26
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Table 1: Educational attainment of refugees and Greek natives

|||Male|||Female||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Natives<br>(1)|Refugees<br>(2)|Diff<br>(2)-(1)|Natives<br>(1)|Refugees<br>(2)|Diff.<br>(2)-(1)|
|**Panel A: 1928 Cen**|**sus**||||||
|Literacy|0.751|0.666|-0.085***|0.336|0.355|0.019***|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|N|1,301,237|263,461|1,564,698|1,342,233|287,981|1,630,214|
|**Panel B: 2001 Cen**|**sus**||||||
|Literacy|0.919|0.931|0.013*|0.688|0.788|0.100***|
||(0.002)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.003)|(0.009)|(0.011)|
|Primary school|0.693|0.706|0.014|0.431|0.497|0.066***|
||(0.004)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.004)|(0.012)|(0.012)|
|Secondary school|0.137|0.189|0.052***|0.053|0.103|0.050***|
||(0.003)|(0.011)|(0.010)|(0.002)|(0.007)|(0.006)|
|N|14,371|1,270|15,641|18,325|1,890|20,215|
|**Panel C: European**|**Social Surv**|**ey**|||||
|Primary school|0.817|0.843|0.026|0.660|0.671|0.011|
||(0.015)|(0.033)|(0.038)|(0.015)|(0.039)|(0.043)|
|Secondary school|0.293|0.256|-0.037|0.136|0.194|0.059*|
||(0.017)|(0.040)|(0.045)|(0.011)|(0.033)|(0.031)|
|Tertiary education|0.076|0.050|-0.027|0.021|0.069|0.048***|
||(0.010)|(0.020)|(0.026)|(0.005)|(0.021)|(0.015)|
|N|693|121|814|944|143|1,087|

**Notes** This table shows the average literacy and education of refugees and Greek natives in different dataset. In Panel A, the sample consists of individuals born in 1858-1907, i.e., 16-65 adults in 1923. In Panel B, the sample consists of individuals born in1908-1922, i.e., 0-15 children in 1923. In Panel C, the sample consists of secondgeneration refugees and natives’ offspring born in 1923-1950. Standard errors in parentheses. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 and 2001 Greek population censuses and European Social Survey (ESS).

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Table 2: Political preferences, trust, and civic engagement among second-generation refugees and Greek natives

||Natives|Refugees|Difference|betw. refug <br>|ees and natives<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(2)-(1)|With age|andgender FE<br>|
||||||standardized|
|**Trust and self-perceived discrimination**||||||
|Greek citizen|0.998<br>|1.000<br>|0.002<br>|0.002<br>|0.051<br>|
||(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.062)|
|Ever feel discriminated against|0.033<br>(0.004)|0.030<br>(0.010)|-0.003<br>(0.012)|0.002<br>(0.012)|0.010<br>(0.066)|
|Greek as language most often spoken at home|0.998|0.996|-0.001|-0.002|-0.045|
||(0.001)|(0.004)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.069)|
|Most people can be trusted (11 pts.-scale)|3.499|3.353|-0.145|-0.117|-0.048|
||(0.060)|(0.144)|(0.161)|(0.163)|(0.067)|
|Most people try to be fair and not take advantage of you (11 pts.-scale)|3.493|3.417|-0.077|-0.052|-0.022|
||(0.057)|(0.147)|(0.155)|(0.158)|(0.068)|
|Most of the time people helpful (11 pts.-scale)|2.984|2.989|0.005|0.022|0.010|
||(0.056)|(0.146)|(0.152)|(0.154)|(0.068)|
|Trust in the legal system (11 pts.-scale)|5.656|5.397|-0.259|-0.321|-0.107|
||(0.074)|(0.188)|(0.200)|(0.289)|(0.263)|
|Trust in the police (11 pts.-scale)|6.674|6.864|0.190|0.106|0.038|
||(0.068)|(0.170)|(0.183)|(0.176)|(0.064)|
|Trust in politicians (11 pts.-scale)|3.123|3.307|0.184|0.103|0.040|
||(0.064)|(0.166)|(0.174)|(0.163)|(0.063)|
|**Politicalpreferences**||||||
|Voted for PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement )|0.450|0.422|-0.028|-0.013|-0.026|
||(0.015)|(0.036)|(0.040)|(0.039)|(0.079)|
|Voted for ND (New Democracy)|0.476|0.508|0.032|0.010|0.019|
||(0.015)|(0.037)|(0.040)|(0.039)|(0.079)|
|Voted for KKE (Communist Party)|0.044<br>|0.049<br>|0.004<br>|0.009<br>|0.044<br>|
||(0.006)|(0.016)|(0.016)|(0.017)|(0.081)|
|Voted for SYN (Leftwing coalition)|0.012|0.005|-0.007|-0.005|-0.047|
||(0.003)|(0.005)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.078)|
|Self-placement on a left right scale (11 pts.-scale)|6.148<br>|6.195<br>|0.047<br>|-0.035<br>|-0.016<br>|
||(0.060)|(0.157)|(0.160)|(0.161)|(0.073)|
|**Political values**||||||
|Government should reduce differences in income levels (5 pts.-scale)|4.345|4.415|0.070|0.066|0.082|
||(0.020)|(0.046)|(0.052)|(0.053)|(0.067)|
|Important that people have equal opportunities (6 pts.-scale)|5.191|5.489|0.298***|0.309***|0.345***|
||(0.022)|(0.040)|(0.057)|(0.058)|(0.065)|
|Important to help people and care for others well-being (6 pts.-scale)|5.075|5.243|0.169***|0.184***|0.216***|
||(0.021)|(0.051)|(0.056)|(0.057)|(0.067)|
|Important to understand different people (6 pts.-scale)|4.764|5.008|0.243***|0.248***|0.239***|
||(0.025)|(0.055)|(0.068)|(0.068)|(0.065)|
|Important that government is strong and ensures safety (6 pts.-scale)|5.305|5.459|0.153**|0.165**|0.168**|
||(0.024)|(0.052)|(0.064)|(0.064)|(0.066)|
|**Politicalparticipation and civic engagement**||||||
|Voted last national election|0.935|0.940|0.005|-0.002|-0.008|
||(0.006)|(0.015)|(0.016)|(0.016)|(0.065)|
|Interested in politics|0.301|0.360|0.059*|0.060**|0.131**|
||(0.011)|(0.030)|(0.031)|(0.030)|(0.066)|
|Political activism (petition, boycott, demonstration...)|0.069|0.113|0.044**|0.050***|0.197***|
||(0.006)|(0.020)|(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.068)|
|Participattion in civic organisation|0.107|0.154|0.047|0.060*|0.193*|
||(0.012)|(0.036)|(0.034)|(0.034)|(0.111)|
|N|1,652|264|1,916|1,916|1,916|

**Notes** This table shows the average attitudes and behaviors of second-generation refugees and Greek natives. In the fourth column, the table reports regression estimates of the refugee-native gap after controlling for age and gender dummies. The fifth column reports the same coefficient using the standardized outcome (Z-score) instead. Standard errors in parentheses. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the European Social Survey (ESS).

30
Table 3: Self-perceived discrimination and civic involvement of Albanian immigrants

||Natives|Albanians|Difference b|etw. refugees and Albanians|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(2)-(1)|With age andgender FE|
|Greek citizen|0.999|0.127|-0.872***|-0.869***|
||(0.000)|(0.027)|(0.006)|(0.006)|
|Ever feel discriminated against|0.041|0.503|0.462***|0.454***|
||(0.003)|(0.040)|(0.017)|(0.018)|
|Greek as language most often spoken at home|0.990|0.541|-0.449***|-0.448***|
||(0.001)|(0.040)|(0.011)|(0.011)|
|Political activism (petition, boycott, demonstration...)|0.144|0.052|-0.092***|-0.142***|
||(0.005)|(0.018)|(0.028)|(0.028)|
|Participate in civic organisation|0.151|0.079|-0.072|-0.148**|
||(0.009)|(0.044)|(0.058)|(0.060)|
|N|4,596|157|4,753|4,753|

This table shows average attitudes and behaviors of Albanian immigrants and Greek natives. In the fourth column, the table reports regression estimates of the refugee-native gap after controlling for age and gender dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the European Social Survey (ESS).

Table 4: Refugee resettlement and sport clubs

|Dep. var:||Prese|nce of at l|east one sp|ort club||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Share of refugees in 1928|0.031|0.035|0.049|-0.048|-0.053|-0.042|
||(0.033)|(0.036)|(0.036)|(0.034)|(0.039)|(0.040)|
|Share of refugees in 1928 * small community||||0.151**<br>(0.060)|0.161***<br>(0.060)|0.157***<br>(0.058)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.288|0.294|0.327|0.289|0.295|0.328|
|Observations|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|
|Average outcome|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|
|Geography controls|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Population 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Socio-Economic Development 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Region FE||Y|Y||Y|Y|
|Province FE|||Y|||Y|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the effect of the share of refugees in 1928 on the presence of sport club in the early 2000s, at the community level. Small communities are those in the bottom two terciles of the distribution of the 1991, which corresponds to less than 1100 inhabitants in 1991. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 Greek population census and General Secretariat of Sports’ inventory.

Table 5: Refugee resettlement and political fragmentation

|Dep. var:|20<br>|<br>12 electio<br>|Political Fr<br>n<br>|agmentation<br>|Index<br>2015 election<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Share of refugees in 1928|0.022|-0.005|-0.012|0.060**|0.043*|0.031|
||(0.018)|(0.017)|(0.016)|(0.027)|(0.025)|(0.021)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.165|0.307|0.373|0.318|0.444|0.550|
|Observations|275|275|275|275|275|275|
|Average outcome|0.788|0.788|0.788|0.689|0.689|0.689|
|Region FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Geography controls and Population 2011||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|
|Socio-Economic Development|||Yes|||Yes|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the effect of the share of refugees in 1928 on the political fragmentation of the electorate, at the municipality level. Standard errors are clustered at the department level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 Greek population census and legislative election results (Ministry of Interior).

31
Table 6: Refugee resettlement and crime

|Dep. var:|Number|of criminal|offences in 2|015 (log)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|Share of 1928 refugees in pop1928|0.516|-2.468**|-3.871***|-2.497**|
||(1.469)|(0.974)|(1.046)|(1.103)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.002|0.618|0.675|0.725|
|Observations|55|55|55|55|
|Average outcome|5.908|5.908|5.908|5.908|
|Population 2011||Y|Y|Y|
|Geography controls|||Y|Y|
|Socio-Economic Development||||Y|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the effect of the share of refugees in 1928 on the number of crimes at the department level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 population census and crime data from Vasilakis (2018).

32
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Table A.2: Share of second-generation refugees in Greece (European Social Survey: rounds 2002, 2004, and 2010)

||Percentage<br>|of respondents with<br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|Decade of birth|Parents born<br>in Turkey|Foreign-born parents<br>(outside Turkey)|Number of<br>respondents|
|1910–1920|2.82|2.82|71|
|1920–1930|10.91|4.65|559|
|1930–1940|14.70|3.09|1102|
|1940–1950|9.18|3.13|991|
|1950–1960|3.59|1.64|976|
|1960–1970|1.32|1.23|1137|
|1970–1980|0.36|1.19|1097|
|1980–1990|0.26|2.08|768|
|1990–2000|0.00|7.58|211|

**Notes** This table shows the share of respondents with at least one parent born in Turkey and with at least parent born in another foreign country other than Turkey across decades of birth. Source: European Social Survey, Greece sample for rounds 2002, 2004, and 2010.

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: numbers of schools in the 1920s

||Low-refugee Province|High-refugee Provi|nce|
|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(2)-(1)|
|Number of schools in 1921 per 1000 children|7.335|3.184|-4.151***|
||(0.213)|(0.382)|(0.456)|
|Number of schools in 1927 per 1000 children|9.149|6.807|-2.342***|
||(0.284)|(0.533)|(0.602)|
|Number of schools built betw. 1921 and 19727|6.111|26.000|19.889***|
||(0.600)|(3.732)|(2.277)|
|Number of schools built betw. 1921-19727 per 1000 children|1.814|3.694|1.880***|
||(0.123)|(0.517)|(0.357)|
|N|108|31|139|

**Notes** The table presents the average number of schools by provinces. Standard errors in parentheses. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on yearly statistical yearbook of Greece, 1926-1927.

34
Table A.4: Educational outcomes of Albanian immigrants relative to Greek natives in 2001

|Dep. Var:|PrimaryE|ducation|Secondary|Education|Tertiary|Education|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Albanian, adult when arrived|-0.032***|-0.032***|-0.224***|-0.224***|-0.124***|-0.124***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|
|Albanian, below 12 when arrived|-0.020***||-0.253***||-0.181***||
||(0.002)||(0.006)||(0.008)||
|Albanian, 6-12 when arrived||-0.024***||-0.259***||-0.179***|
|||(0.002)||(0.007)||(0.010)|
|Albanian, below 5 when arrived||-0.014***||-0.242***||-0.189***|
|||(0.003)||(0.010)||(0.016)|
|R2|0.00|0.00|0.10|0.10|0.01|0.01|
|N|558,222|558,222|538,130|538,130|468,366|468,366|
|Average outcome among Greek natives|0.984|0.984|0.718|0.718|0.192|0.192|
|Age andgender FE|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|

**Notes** The table presents regression estimates measuring the educational gap between Albanian immigrants and Greek natives. The sample consists of 16-60 individuals in the 2001 Greek census who are either native-born or born in Albania (26,681). Albanian immigrants who arrived when adults are 19,879 individuals who report to have migrated when they were older than 20. There are 4,188 and 2,614 Albanian immigrants who arrived at an age between 6 and 12 and below 5. The sample is further resstricted to migrants who have eat least spend 5 years in Greece. The outcome tertiatry educaion is only defined for indivdiuals older than 25. All regressions estimates include both gender and age fixed-effects Notes: *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Source: Author’s elaboration on the 2001 Greek census.

35
Table A.5: Occupations and income of second-generation refugee, Albanian immigrants and Greek natives

**Panel A: Second-generation refugees and natives (born in 1923-1950)**

||Natives|Refugees|Difference|Difference|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(2)-(1)|With age &gender FE|
|Occupation in last or current job:|||||
|Farmer|0.420|0.327|-0.092***|-0.105***|
||(0.014)|(0.031)|(0.035)|(0.035)|
|Low-skill non-farmer occupation|0.127|0.159|0.032|0.025|
||(0.009)|(0.024)|(0.024)|(0.024)|
|Skilled occupation|0.166|0.128|-0.037|-0.028|
||(0.010)|(0.022)|(0.026)|(0.026)|
|Deciles of household’s income|3.748|3.665|-0.083|-0.099|
||(0.050)|(0.134)|(0.134)|(0.130)|
|N|1,256|226|1,482|1,482|

# **Panel B: Albanian immigrants and natives (all ages)**

||Natives|Albanians||Differences|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(2)-(1)|With age &gender FE|
|Occupation in last or current job:|||||
|Farmer|0.230|0.091|-0.139***|0.008|
||(0.007)|(0.025)|(0.037)|(0.035)|
|Low-skill non-farmer occupation|0.103|0.318|0.215***|0.239***|
||(0.005)|(0.041)|(0.028)|(0.028)|
|Skilled occupation|0.313|0.038|-0.275***|-0.383***|
||(0.008)|(0.017)|(0.041)|(0.040)|
|Deciles of household’s income|4.313|3.731|-0.582***|-1.111***|
||(0.036)|(0.154)|(0.198)|(0.194)|
|N|3,378|132|3,510|3,509|

**Notes** . The table presents the average occupation in the current or last job, and the self-declared household income in brackets corresponding to deciles. In the fourth column of Panel A, the table reports regression estimates of the gap in the outcome between natives and refugee (or between natives and Albanians in Panel B) after controlling for age and gender dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis; *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1. Source: Author’s elaboration on the European Social Survey.

36
# Table A.6: Social integration of Albanian immigrants arrived in Greece at different age

|Albania-born arrived in Greece when|Young (_<_24)|Older(_≥_24)|Difference|
|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(1)-(2)|
|Greek citizen|0.149|0.111|0.038|
||(0.044)|(0.033)|(0.054)|
|Ever feel discriminated against|0.522|0.489|0.033|
||(0.061)|(0.053)|(0.081)|
|Greek as language most often spoken at home|0.507|0.567|-0.059|
||(0.062)|(0.053)|(0.081)|
|Political activism (petition, boycott, demonstration...)|0.045|0.056|-0.011|
||(0.026)|(0.025)|(0.036)|
|Participate in civic organisation|0.077|0.080|-0.003|
||(0.077)|(0.055)|(0.095)|
|N|67|90|157|

This table shows average attitudes and behaviors of Albanian immigrants arrived in Greece at different age. Standard errors in parentheses. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the European Social Survey (ESS).

# Table A.7: Robustness check: Sport clubs and share of refugees in 1923

|Dep. var:||Presence o|f at least o|ne sport clu|b||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Share of refugees in 1923|0.066|0.120*|0.078|-0.015|0.039|0.023|
||(0.051)|(0.062)|(0.070)|(0.049)|(0.068)|(0.075)|
|Share of refugees in 1923 * small community||||0.266***<br>(0.100)|0.265***<br>(0.097)|0.187*<br>(0.100)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.288|0.295|0.327|0.288|0.295|0.328|
|Observations|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|
|Average outcome|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|0.712|
|Geography controls|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Population 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Socio-Economic Development 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Region FE||Y|Y||Y|Y|
|Province FE|||Y|||Y|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the effect of the share of refugees in 1923 on the presence of sport club in the early 2000s, at the community level. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 population census, 1923 refugee census and General Secretariat of Sports’ inventory.

Table A.8: Sport clubs and Albanians immigrants

|Dep. var:||Presen|ce of at le|ast one spo|rt club||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Share of Albanian immigrants in 2001|0.123|0.135|0.131|0.134|0.141|0.050|
||(0.143)|(0.140)|(0.148)|(0.098)|(0.090)|(0.099)|
|Share of Albanian immigrants in 2001 * small community||||-0.015<br>(0.188)|-0.008<br>(0.185)|0.112<br>(0.188)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.288|0.295|0.328|0.288|0.295|0.328|
|Observations|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|4,393|
|Geography controls|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Population 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Socio-Economic Development 1991|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Region FE||Y|Y||Y|Y|
|Province FE|||Y|||Y|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the joint effect of the share of refugees in 1928 and the share of Albanian immigrants in 2001 on the presence of sport club in the early 2000s, at the community level . Standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 Greek population census and General Secretariat of Sports’ inventory.

37
Table A.9: Refugee resettlement and political fragmentation between the rightist and leftist parties

|Dep. var:|Political<br>20|Fragment<br>12 electio|ation Index<br>n|between Ri|ghtist and Left<br>2015 election|ist Parties|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Share of refugees in 1928|0.034|0.029|0.021|0.023|0.040*|0.031|
||(0.024)|(0.023)|(0.018)|(0.024)|(0.023)|(0.021)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.182|0.261|0.315|0.250|0.322|0.366|
|Observations|275|275|275|275|275|275|
|Average outcome|0.494|0.494|0.494|0.481|0.481|0.481|
|Region FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Geography controls and Population 2011||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|
|Socio-Economic Development|||Yes|||Yes|
|**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estim<br>fragmentation of the electorate, at the municipal<br>**_p <_0.05, *_p <_0.1;<br>Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 Greek|ates meas<br>ity level. St<br>population|uring the e<br>andard err<br>census an|ffect of the <br>ors are clust<br>d legislative|share of refu<br>ered at the de<br>election resu|gees in 1928 on <br>partment level. <br>lts (Ministry of I|the political<br>***_p <_0.01,<br>nterior).|

# Table A.10: Robustness check: Political fragmentation

|Dep. var:||||||Political Fr|agmentation|Index|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||201|2 election|||||2015 e|lection|||
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|(11)|(12)|
|Log Share of refugees in 1928|0.003**|0.000|-0.001||||0.008***|0.005**|0.002||||
||(0.001)|(0.002)|(0.002)||||(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)||||
|Share of refugees in 1928||||0.083|0.004|-0.014||||0.178**|0.098|0.057|
|||||(0.052)|(0.058)|(0.054)||||(0.069)|(0.072)|(0.060)|
|Share of refugees in 1928, square||||-0.099|-0.013|0.003||||-0.192**|-0.081|-0.038|
|||||(0.065)|(0.070)|(0.065)||||(0.078)|(0.078)|(0.066)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.189|0.307|0.372|0.181|0.307|0.373|0.356|0.448|0.546|0.341|0.447|0.550|
|Observations|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|
|Region FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Geography controls and Population 2011||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|
|Socio-Economic Development|||Y es|||Yes|||Yes|||Yes|
|Dep. var:||||Po|litical Fragm|entation Inde|x between Ri|ghtist and Left|ist Parties||||
||||201|2 election|||||2015 e|lection|||
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|(11)|(12)|
|Log Share of 1928 refugees in pop1928|0.002*|0.002|-0.000||||0.001|0.002|0.001||||
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)||||(0.001)|(0.002)|(0.001)||||
|Share of 1928 refugees in pop1928||||0.098|0.089|0.066||||0.056|0.097|0.078|
|||||(0.065)|(0.066)|(0.056)||||(0.065)|(0.065)|(0.056)|
|Share of 1928 refugees, Square||||-0.104|-0.090|-0.066||||-0.054|-0.085|-0.063|
|||||(0.071)|(0.070)|(0.061)||||(0.070)|(0.070)|(0.062)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.175|0.254|0.310|0.194|0.268|0.319|0.245|0.313|0.356|0.253|0.327|0.369|
|Observations|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|275|
|Region FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Geography controls and Population 2011||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|
|Socio-Economic Development|||Y es|||Yes|||Yes|||Yes|

**Notes** The table presents OLS regression estimates measuring the effect of the share of refugees in 1928 on the political fragmentation of the electorate, at the municipality level. Standard errors are clustered at the department level. *** _p <_ 0.01, ** _p <_ 0.05, * _p <_ 0.1; Source: Author’s elaboration on the 1928 Greek population census and legislative election results (Ministry of Interior).

38
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we find no statically significant difference in the pre-settlement population density and urbanization between municipalities with varying shares of refugees in 1928, conditional on geographic features. Moreover, Figure A.3 shows that, conditional on geographic characteristics and province fixed effects, there is no statistically significant correlation between pre-settlement population growth, i.e., between 1907/1913 and 1920, and the distribution of refugees across communities.<sup>31</sup> While we cannot explore this question any further at the community level due to lack of data, we can leverage richer data at the province-level. Table A.12 shows that provinces that hosted more refugees in 1928 were less developed in 1920, conditional on region fixed effects and on the covariates displayed in Table A.11. The share of refugees in 1928 is correlated with a lower share of employment in the nonagricultural sector and in manufacturing and with a lower literacy rate in 1920. We also examine pre-settlement trends in the literacy of the 1920 population. Figure A.4 shows that the increase in literacy rates across cohorts born between 1861 and 1905 follows a very similar pattern between high- and low-refugee provinces. Reassuringly, a statistical test of parallel pre-trends cannot be rejected, which suggests that places of settlement were not growing faster prior to refugees’ arrival.

> 31Greece conducted a population census in 1907 in all of its territories at that time, which comprised Central Greece, Peloponnese, Thessaly, Ionian Islands, and Cyclades Islands. After the annexation of Macedonia, Epirus, Crete, and Aegean Islands in 1913, an additional population census, similar to the one in 1907, was conducted in these regions. Population data for 1907/1913 is not available for Thrace as it joined Greece only after WWI.

40
Table A.11: Determinants of refugee settlement at the community level

|Outcome:|Share of|refugees|
|---|---|---|
||in 1923|in 1928|
||(1)|(2)|
|Log population density in 1920|0.730|0.212|
||(0.717)|(0.370)|
|Dummy: city in 1920|10.476***|3.718*|
||(1.426)|(2.193)|
|Dummy: island|24.736***|4.644***|
||(1.212)|(1.098)|
|Distance to railway network in 1920 (km)|-0.012|-0.047|
||(0.022)|(0.033)|
|Distance to shoreline (km)|-0.082***|-0.005|
||(0.020)|(0.049)|
|Distance to border (km)|-0.009|-0.080|
||(0.017)|(0.062)|
|Altitude (m)|-0.003|-0.003|
||(0.002)|(0.003)|
|Mean annual precipitation|0.003|-0.013|
||(0.007)|(0.012)|
|Mean annual temperature|-0.316*|0.211|
||(0.168)|(0.369)|
|Crop suitability score|1.251**|0.996**|
||(0.583)|(0.443)|
|N|4,388|4,388|
|R2|0.54|0.60|
|Province FE|Y|Y|
|Average of outcome|4.19|7.05|

**Notes.** This table examines the determinants of the share of refugees in 1923 and 1928 and the change in the share of refugees between the two years across municipalities. The unit of analysis is the municipality as defined by the 1920 population census of the Kingdom of Greece. All specifications controls for province fixed effects and a set of municipal-level covariates, which comprises: log population density in 1920; dummy variables indicating whether the municipality was a city in 1920 and whether it is an island; distances to railway network in 1920, shoreline, and national borders; altitude, mean annual precipitation and temperature, and crop suitability of the municipality. * _p <_ 0 _._ 10, ** _p <_ 0 _._ 05, *** _p <_ 0 _._ 01.

41
Table A.12: Determinants of refugee settlement at the province level

|Outcome:|Share|of refugees in|1928|
|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|Share of employment in non-agriculture in 1920|-0.198**<br>(0.091)|||
|Share of employment in manufacture in 1920||-0.468***<br>(0.163)||
|Literacy rate in 1920 (15-65 year olds)|||-0.368**<br>(0.153)|
|N|176|176|176|
|R2|0.73|0.74|0.74|
|Region FE|Y|Y|Y|
|Controls|Y|Y|Y|
|Average outcome|12.99|12.99|12.99|

**Notes.** This table examines the determinants of the distribution of refugees in 1928 across provinces. All specifications control for region fixed effects (for the following 10 regions of Greece: Crete, Peloponnese, Central Greece and Euboea, Cyclades Islands, Aegean Islands, Ionian Islands, Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia and Western Thrace) and a set of province-level covariates, which comprises: log population density in 1920; dummy variables indicating whether the observation unit was a city in 1920 and whether it is an island; the distances to railway network in 1920, to shoreline, and to national borders; altitude, mean annual precipitation and temperature, and crop suitability of the province. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * _p <_ 0 _._ 10, ** _p <_ 0 _._ 05, *** _p <_ 0 _._ 01.

42
Figure A.3: Correlation between the share of refugees and the population growth prior to their arrival (a) Share of refugees in 1928 <!-- Start of picture text -->
-100 -50 0 50 100<br>Population growth between 1907/13 and 1920 (%)<br>coef = .069, (robust) se = .047, t = 1.47, N = 1405, R-squared = .58<br>(b) Share of refugees in 1923<br>-100 -50 0 50 100<br>Population growth between 1907/13 and 1920 (%)<br>coef = .002, (robust) se = .015, t = .14, N = 1405, R-squared = .51<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>Share of refugees in 1928 -50<br>-100<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>Share of refugees in 1923 -50<br>-100<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Notes.** This figure presents the correlation between the share of refugees (in 1928 in panel (a) and in 1923 (in panel (b)) and the pre-treatment population growth, i.e., population growth between 1907/1913 and 1920, before the arrival of refugees, controlling for province fixed effects and a set of municipal-level covariates, which comprises: log population density in 1907/1913; dummy variables indicating whether the municipality was a city in 1907/1913 and whether it is an island; distances to railway network, to shoreline, and to national borders; altitude, mean annual precipitation and temperature, and crop suitability of the municipality. The sample excludes outliers, defined as the top and bottom 2.5% of municipalities in terms of population growth between 1907/1913 and 1920.. Data sources: The 1928 population census of the Kingdom of Greece.

43
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<!-- Start of picture text --> aX . a4 aebept4 Po £9p><br>AS AT ns S oy<br>a x © $23Ke) , %Gooea <. . 6<br>a “4 8 ° -<br>be ore WAS) cP = cK a3 a .<br>Bo ee<br>8j<br>y°<br>a<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> e<br>°<br>5 e ’ rq e e 3. © | ote e<br>g3 ° L Ce:ce Bf . eedx -_“4$2 e<br>2 e e°? 7 -J oy SS<br>£no ooh, - : wo<br>@ 4 ad “ oe<br>307 © %e * ’ a one re e® e<br>xe}2 de «Ae a] o yt ofa <<a 3 ee<br>5® ofe° a9 ~ ~'k.7 & jo 4<br>7) ee e + ee rY e<br>rd e %° ay< e<br>5 no %efe<br>-5 0 5<br>Share of refugees in 1923<br>coef = .40657753, (robust) se = .03864848, t = 10.52<br><!-- End of picture text -->