metadata: authors: 0: author: Durand-Lasserve,Alain
1: author: Durand-Lasserve, Maylis
2: author: Selod,Harris
count: Mali
docna: 0: docna: A systemic analysis of land markets and land
            institutions in West African cities : rules and practices -
            the case of Bamako, Mali
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
theme: Urban planning and housing policy,Land administration and management,Other accountability/anti-corruption,Tax policy and administration,Decentralization
majtheme: Urban development,Public sector governance,Environment and natural resource management
subtopic: Urban Housing and Land Settlements,City to City Alliances,Agricultural Economics,National Urban Development Policies & Strategies,Regional Urban Development,Urban Economics,Urban Governance and Management,Urban Housing,Municipal Management and Reform,Urban Economic Development,Energy Demand,Energy and Environment,Energy and Mining,Urban Communities
teratopic: Public Sector Development,Urban Development,Communities and Human Settlements
abstracts: cdata!: This paper presents a new type of land
            market analysis relevant to cities with plural tenure
            systems as in West Africa. The methodology hinges on a
            systemic analysis of land delivery channels, which helps to
            show how land is initially made available for circulation,
            how tenure can be formalized incrementally, and the
            different means whereby households can access land. The
            analysis is applied to the area of Bamako in Mali, where
            information was collected through (i) interviews with key
            informants, (ii) a literature review on land policies,
            public allocations, and customary transfers of land, (iii) a
            press review on land disputes, and (iv) a survey of more
            than 1,600 land transfers of un-built plots that occurred
            between 2009 and 2012. The analysis finds that land is
            mostly accessed through an informal customary channel,
            whereby peri-urban land is transformed from agricultural to
            residential use, and through a public channel, which
            involves the administrative allocation of residential plots
            to households. The integrated analysis of land markets and
            land institutions stresses the complexity of procedures and
            the extra-legality of practices that strongly affect the
            functioning of formal and informal markets and make access
            to land costly and insecure, with negative social, economic,
            and environmental impacts over the long term.
geo_reg_key: 1927320,517191
repnme: repnme: A systemic analysis of land markets and
            land institutions in West African cities : rules and
            practices - the case of Bamako, Mali
display_title: A systemic analysis of land markets
            and land institutions in West African cities : rules and
            practices - the case of Bamako, Mali
listing_relative_url: /research/2013/11/18475152/systemic-analysis-land-markets-land-institutions-west-african-cities-rules-practices-case-bamako-mali
topicv3: Energy and Extractives m1326595 507,Land Tenure m1326631 888,Urban Development m1327371 699,Land and Housing m1327648 817,Population, Aging and Health m1327736 640
publishtoextweb_dt: 2013-11-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Public Sector Development,Urban Development,Communities and Human Settlements
no_of_pages: 60
author_keys: 0: author_key: 791755
1: author_key: 750638
model_extractions: WPS6687 Policy Research Working Paper 6687 A Systemic Analysis of Land Markets and Land Institutions in West African Cities Rules and Practices The Case of Bamako, Mali _Alain Durand-Lasserve Maÿlis Durand-Lasserve Harris Selod_ The World Bank Development Research Group Environment and Energy Team November 2013
Policy Research Working Paper 6687

# **Abstract**

This paper presents a new type of land market analysis relevant to cities with plural tenure systems as in West Africa. The methodology hinges on a systemic analysis of land delivery channels, which helps to show how land is initially made available for circulation, how tenure can be formalized incrementally, and the different means whereby households can access land. The analysis is applied to the area of Bamako in Mali, where information was collected through (i) interviews with key informants, (ii) a literature review on land policies, public allocations, and customary transfers of land, (iii) a press review on land disputes, and (iv) a survey of more than 1,600 land transfers of un-built plots that occurred between 2009 and 2012. The analysis finds that land is mostly accessed through an informal customary channel, whereby peri-urban land is transformed from agricultural to residential use, and through a public channel, which involves the administrative allocation of residential plots to households. The integrated analysis of land markets and land institutions stresses the complexity of procedures and the extra-legality of practices that strongly affect the functioning of formal and informal markets and make access to land costly and insecure, with negative social, economic, and environmental impacts over the long term.

This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at a.durand-lasserve@wanadoo.fr, maylis.dl@orange.fr, and hselod@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **A Systemic Analysis of Land Markets and Land Institutions in West African Cities: Rules and Practices The Case of Bamako, Mali**<sup>**1**</sup>

Alain DURAND-LASSERVE<sup>2</sup> Maÿlis DURAND-LASSERVE<sup>3</sup> Harris SELOD<sup>4</sup>

**JEL classification** : P48, R52, R14 and Q15

**Keywords** : Access to land; Security of tenure; Land administration; Land governance; Land market **Sector** : Urban development

> 1 We are indebted to Demba Karagnara for superb research assistance and coordination of the field work, to Lamine Camara and his team for his contribution to the field work, Lara Tobin for contribution to the statistical analysis, Brian Blankespoor for helping us with GIS programming and mapping. We are also grateful to Wim Dekkers, Moussa Djire, Juliette Paradis-Coulibaly, as well as many informants and “land practitioners” in Mali, and our World Bank colleagues at the Bamako and Washington offices for useful discussions. We are grateful to the World Bank's Knowledge for Change Program for seminal funding of this work within a broader research program on urbanization (“Moving to Density”) under the supervision of Uwe Deichmann, and to the World Bank’s Multi Donor Trust Fund for Sustainable Urban Development for support in the advanced stages of the study. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Board of Directors or the countries they represent.

> 2 Emeritus Senior Research Fellow, National Center of Scientific Research, France. E-mail: a.durand-lasserve@wanadoo.fr. 3 Geoffrey Payne and Associates, London, UK. Email: maylis.dl@orange.fr.

> 4 Corresponding author. Senior Economist, Energy and Environment Team, Development Research Group, World Bank. Email: hselod@worldbank.org.
# **1. INTRODUCTION**

# **1.1. Land and urban development**

Land is a basic factor of urban development. Under functioning land markets, land will be allocated to the highest bidder and land-use changes will be mediated by market-determined land prices. In theory, this should lead to the most efficient use of land. In this context, the role of government is to ensure clarity of property rights (through a clear legal and regulatory framework and transparent and accessible land administration); enforce adequate measures to address externalities that are not internalized by land markets; plan for urban development in an appropriate manner; and optimize service/infrastructure provision. In addition to these interventions, authorities may also ensure a certain level of equity in access to land and housing (such as social housing programs in many developed countries).

In many cities of the developing world, the story is actually quite different. Social, economic and political constraints, unclear land rights, insufficient land supply, weaknesses of land governance, dysfunctional land administration and unregulated land markets may result in an unplanned and uncontrolled city structure, with landuse patterns that are both inefficient and inequitable. In cities where a significant part of the population is poor, access to land and housing has often become a key concern for residents and a source of social unrest and political instability.

# **1.2. Land issues in cities in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where so many countries share such strong similarities in terms of the legal and institutional framework that governs land and land tenure systems and face comparable challenges. Francophone and Lusophone countries in Western and Central Africa<sup>5</sup> have inherited comparable civil codes from the colonial era. In addition, the powers of the state in land matters are still governed in most cases by the principle of "presumption of ownership", whereby any land on which a title has not been issued - or on which a registration procedure in the name of a person is being processed - belongs to the state. However, this principle is often not subject to an explicit provision in the law. In these countries, the state is the main provider of land, especially in urban and peri-urban areas: land is still allocated by the state and, in an increasing number of countries, by local authorities, following decentralization measures. Allottees are usually granted personal use rights (evidenced by a temporary permit to develop and/or occupy the land) or, much more rarely, directly a real property right (evidenced by a property title). Over the past three decades, major structural changes have occurred with the implementation of legal and economic reforms: the adoption of new land codes which recognized, at least in principle, customary forms of tenure; the liberalization of land markets, institutional and political changes, namely decentralization policies which transfer some land management and administration prerogatives to local entities; and the democratization process.

These changes have occurred in a context of weak governance, insufficient human and financial resources and limited institutional capacities in the land sector. The converging efforts by aid and development agencies and international finance institutions to accelerate the development of formal private land markets (i.e. land markets that operate within legal and regulatory frameworks) have rarely been accompanied by major changes in the way land is accessed. However, it frequently happens that compliance with formal sets of rules applies only to some steps but not to others within the same land delivery process. For instance, the allocation of a personal administrative permit is a formal procedure, but the sale of this permit is prohibited (although very common, and sometimes even subject to a notarial deed).

Land market development has been limited by a series of factors, including land prices unaffordable for the vast majority of urban households (who have low income and irregular revenue from informal activities); a weak housing finance system; overcomplicated tenure formalization and titling procedures; widespread corruption in land administration; and weak land registration and information systems. Land markets in Sub-Saharan African cities are characterized by heavy pressure on land in urban and peri-urban areas extending up to the rural hinterland of cities

> 5 West Africa includes 8 French-speaking countries out of 15 and Central Africa 7 French-speaking countries out of 10. We refer in the text to Francophone West Africa of which Mali forms part.

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(see Annex 2.2). This increasing demand for land<sup>6</sup> comes up against limited supply on the formal private land market or through public land delivery channels (for definitions see subsection 2.1 and section 3). In fact, land markets in the region are still guided by a diversity of tenure systems and land for housing is mainly provided by customary land delivery channels and informal markets. Between 60% and 80% of the urban population in SubSaharan African cities is estimated to live in informal settlements (UN-Habitat 2010). As a result, most cities are characterized by the coexistence of various land delivery channels with different levels of formality, legality and legitimacy. A series of obstacles hinders most efforts to reform land administration institutions. Conventional policy options, tools and procedures tentatively implemented over the last decades to streamline and unify land markets and improve land administration have achieved limited results (Rochegude and Plançon, 2010).

# **1.3. A focus on Bamako**

# **1.3.1. Understanding land markets to inform policy**

Given its history and prevailing tenure system; legal, regulatory and institutional framework; administrative practices and recent attempts to improve land management; spatial patterns; rate of urbanization; and social organization, Bamako is to a large extent representative of the situation that prevails in Western and Central African cities (UN-Habitat, 2010). Improving our understanding of the drivers and the complexities of land markets in Bamako is interesting from an operational point of view as it reveals the challenges that have hindered the implementation of urban projects in Mali.<sup>7</sup> Unequal access to land and weaknesses of land governance have also played a part in generating social unrest and instability (see Section 6 below). A march of “land victims” saw over two thousands protesters in Bamako on March 12, 2012 (Afribone, March 13, 2012), about a week before the coup that resulted in the ousting of the President Amadou Toumani Touré. Awareness of the political risks of mismanagement in land administration and tenure insecurity for many households is currently rising. However, political patronage, the economic environment (where limited opportunities for wealth creation make land a key investment area) and the social structures that are deeply embedded in clientelist relationships severely hinder the effective implementation of more transparent modes of land access.

Better understanding of current land and housing practices at the scale of the metropolitan area, the functioning of land markets and the formation of land prices is a precondition for designing any sustainable land and housing policy. For these reasons, it is important to identify the options available to the different income and social groups in terms of access to land, tenure and location.<sup>8</sup> These options are determined by affordability as well as by access to information, ability to interact with the land administration and participation in clientelist relationships. Attempts to formalize land markets through, _inter alia_ , the creation of a parastatal land development agency in 1992, the _Agence de Cession Immobilière_ (ACI), have introduced formal land market mechanisms into a land delivery system dominated by informal and customary practices and, at government level, a land administration undermined by corruption, clientelism and political interference, land being frequently allocated at preferential prices on the basis of political affiliation (Bertrand 1998).<sup>9</sup> Safeguard measures such as the program “ _Sauvons notre Quartier_ ” (Save our Neighborhood), which was implemented in Bamako between 1993 and 1996 to mitigate the social impact of market pressure on the urban poor by combining physical upgrading in informal settlements and the resettlement of displaced households, were diverted from and did not achieve their objectives.<sup>10</sup> It is thus fair to say that, over the

> 6 Sub-Saharan Africa had 863 million inhabitants in 2010, of whom 37% were urban dwellers.  In 2025, the population is projected to reach 1.2 billion, of whom 45% will live in cities.  Between 2010 and 2025, the urban population is then expected to increase by 220 million (UN-Habitat, 2010).

> 7 See in particular the serious implementation challenges faced by the World Bank funded Third Urban Project (1996 – 2005) presented in Farvacque-Vitkovic _et al._ (2007).

> 8 The primary focus of our work is on the access to property rights on land for housing.  However, rental housing and free accommodation should not be neglected as they concern more than half of the households in Bamako and affect the land market (buyers may purchase with the intent to rent out; rental may substitute for ownership for some households depending on economic conditions, etc.).  Housing markets will not be addressed as such in our study and would require an additional subsequent analysis.

> 9 This has been repeatedly corroborated, in the course of this study, by observations and interviews with key informants amongst a wide range of stakeholders involved in land administration and land markets.

> 10 Farvacque-Vitkovic _et al._ describe the situation as follows: ‘In 1992, the District of Bamako undertook a program called _Sauvons notre quartier_ (SNQ - Save Our Neighborhood) with the aim of rapidly restructuring 24 informal settlements in Bamako. Various political, institutional, financial, land ownership and operational issues revealed the shortcomings of the

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last decade, land markets have been left in the hands of stakeholders and institutions that operated autonomously, without government guidance or strategy guidelines, and without transparent procedures.

# **1.3.2. Demographic pressure, urbanization and demand for land for housing**

Mali is a country of 14.5 million inhabitants. About one-third of the population was urbanized in 2010. The Bamako urban area (i.e. Bamako District and a large part of the 8 adjoining _communes rurales_<sup>11</sup> ) has been absorbing a very large share of the rural-urban migration that, adding to an already high natural population growth results in strong demographic pressure and a young population (see Annex1.1 for an example of the contribution of a migrant to the demand for land). On the basis of the 2009 population census projections and plausible assumptions regarding the urbanization rate in the peripheral _communes_ (INSTAT, 2011), we can estimate that around 2,350,000 people were living in the urban area of Bamako in 2011 _,_ of which 1,987,000 (85%) were living in the core district of Bamako.<sup>12</sup> Figures from the 1998 and 2009 censuses indicate that the population in Bamako District has increased by 4.8% annually, while the annual growth rate of the population in the eight communes has been even higher, ranging from 6.2% to 17.2%. If the overall annual rate of population growth during the next twenty years remains in the range of 4.5% (which can be considered a conservative estimate), the population of the city would reach 3.5 million in 2020 and about 5 million in 2030.<sup>13</sup> On this basis, assuming that the average household size and land consumption remain unchanged, an additional 5,200 ha of urban land will be required by 2020 to cope with the demand for residential land and nearly 12,000 ha by 2030.<sup>14</sup> This would thus require a sharp increase in the provision of land for housing.

# **1.3.3. Economic, financial and political changes stimulating the demand for land**

The demand for land for housing has increased as a response to the steady increase, until recently, in the incomes of urban households,<sup>15</sup> the emergence of urban middle classes which nevertheless remain fairly small,<sup>16</sup> massive remittances from Malian expatriates of which part is invested in land; changes in urban family structure and norms,<sup>17</sup> and a willingness on the part of low-income urban tenants to access land ownership in peri-urban areas,<sup>18</sup> in a context where rents for low-standard and unserviced housing are quite high.

program intended to improve living conditions for the poor. SNQ never managed to assert real control over the land in either the informal settlements or the planned resettlement areas. The resettlement areas were systematically occupied by new squatters, instead of the people they were originally intended for. Progressively, all control of land management was lost and Mali's Government had to suspend the allocation of plots for the first time in 1996 in order to halt land speculation. This effectively ended the SNQ initiative’ (Farvacque-Vitkovic et al., 2007).

> 11 _Communes_ of Baguineda Camp, Dialakorodji, Dogodouman, Kalabancoro, Mandé, Moribabougou, Mountougoula, and N’Gabacoro in the Kati _cercle_ .

12 There is an ongoing debate concerning the creation of Greater Bamako which would attach some of the "peri-urban" _communes_ to the current District (Ville de Bamako, 2012).

13 According to the report “Bamako 2030” (Ville de Bamako, 2012), which assumes an annual population growth rate for the District of 5.4%, the population of Bamako District alone is predicted to reach 6 million by 2030.

14 This crude estimate of the long-term requirement of land for housing is indicative. It only covers the need for residential plots and excludes land requirements for primary infrastructure. It does not take account of the likely lower incomes of internal migrant households, and thus of their smaller land consumption (although this may vary with the type of tenure and location and thus with corresponding land prices). The estimate does not take account of other parameters likely to result in a densification of the city, such as the expected demographic transition (especially in cities), the likely decline in household size for economic and cultural reasons, or the possible changes in the physical patterns of human settlement (with the development of condominium multi-story housing units and types of housing that allow higher urban population density). Nor does it consider the impact of regularization policies or the renewal and redevelopment of city center settlements, which are likely to increase population density but will be accompanied by increased demand of land for resettlement in the periphery of Bamako.

15 However, the real GDP growth rate slowed sharply in 2011 (+2.7%), resulting in a 0.3% drop in real GDP per capita (AfricanEconomicOutlook, 2012).

16 According to African Development Bank (2011), the middle class, characterized by a per capita daily consumption of $4-$20 per day, represents only 8.1% of the population of Mali.

17 Although there is no certainty that changes in family structure and norms have contributed to an increase or a decrease in the demand for land, we hypothesize that the effect of a modestly decreasing fertility rate in urban areas is likely to have been more than offset by children moving out their parents’ dwelling, thus increasing the demand for land.

18 According to the 2009 census (INSTAT, 2011), 43.4% of households in Bamako District were in rented accommodation and 10.2% were being housed free of charge.

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Other financial and economic factors have also played a role in stimulating the demand for land: because of weak savings institutions, or the scarcity of opportunities for investment, and in a context of limited social protection, holders of monetary assets and/or idle funds view land as a profitable and inflation-proof investment. With the development of the market economy, land can also be seen as an asset that allows access to mortgage finance. Although provision of land by the ACI over the last two decades and demand for land from formal private developers have contributed to the development of housing finance institutions, the lending system in Mali remains limited to short-term credit. It is also hindered by a series of obstacles: weak public administration capacity such as a poor vital records system, especially issues of faulty identity and birth certificates, and lack of reliability of the land titles used as collateral.

Speculative investments have a strong impact on the demand for land.<sup>19</sup> Land market activity in Bamako is partly driven by speculative strategies as many investors look for urban plots to buy, expecting a price increase with their future incorporation into the urban area, or, following improvement of the tenure status of the land. Speculative investment strategies in the rural hinterland have been observed as far as 70 to 80 km away from the city center. According to agents and brokers, this is fuelled by investments from Bamako-based merchants and from expatriate Malian communities. Speculative strategies are encouraged by widespread illicit practices and corruption among government institutions and local administrations (see Section 6 below).

# **1.3.4. Increases in land prices in urban and peri-urban areas**

Over the last 5 years, there has been a steady increase in land prices in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bamako (with several observers mentioning annual increases of up to 100% in some locations), which is further stimulating the demand for land due to expectations of further increases. The disappearance of cheap options to access land may have been exacerbated by the upgrade from affordable to more expensive land tenure forms (for those who can afford it or benefit from good personal links with the land administration).

# **1.3.5. The relationship between land delivery and political cycles**

There is some parallel in Bamako between political cycles (elections), allocation of land plots by the state or local authorities, and the business cycle in real estate: before elections, allocation of land plots may serve a political clientele. After elections, candidates who go into debt to finance their campaign may be tempted to reimburse their debt by selling in their own name plots obtained from the state to develop housing. This observation is corroborated by key informants involved in land allocations and transactions as well as by researchers (Bertrand, 2006; ISTED 2009).<sup>20</sup>

# **1.4. Purpose of the study and outline of the paper**

Our principal objective is to identify the different ways various social groups have access to land and the security of tenure they may obtain. We focus in particular on the peri-urban areas and the rural hinterland of Bamako where most land use conversion occurs and try to understand observed differences in access to land in these areas. In this respect, it is important to consider that land tenure does not simply refer to the rights on land conferred by documentation, but are embedded in social relations which determine the rules, practices and associated rights involved in the processes of land appropriation. These processes depend on the roles played by the different stakeholders in the land delivery channels and on the practices regarding land management and land administration. Another objective of the paper is to analyze the links between the various land delivery channels, which constitute

> 19 We consider as speculative investments that are not intended to develop the purchased land or to make productive use of it, but to keep it undeveloped and put it back onto the market when the value has increased.

> 20 On this topic, J. Coulibaly & Traoré (see Ville de Bamako, 2012), report an interview with the director of a project engineering and territorial development consultancy where the latter declares:  ‘The political system is somewhat perverse in Mali, inasmuch as anyone wishing to be elected first on the list will have to fund the bulk of the campaign.  This means that some people will get into debt to do so, telling themselves that they can recoup their outlay after the elections by selling or subdividing some land.’

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the land delivery system. Finally, we also want to highlight the context whereby agricultural land is being eroded by urban expansion and implication in terms of land tenure dynamics.<sup>21</sup> This systemic analysis of the land delivery system makes it possible to answer a series of questions: What is the origin of the plots that are transacted on the market and that allow households to become land owners? What are the means at the disposal of households to access land and why is there such a diversity of access modes? Why is informality so resilient in spite of different attempts over the past two decades to develop and stimulate formal land markets? What is the role of legislation/regulations and land institutions in the different ways land is accessed? What is the role of intermediaries such as “coxers”<sup>22</sup> , surveyors and notaries in the allocation and sale of land? What are the causes of conflicts that characterize access to land and why are they so numerous?

In Section 2 below, we present the methodology for our work. In a subsequent section, we describe how land is supplied through the different land delivery channels and in Section 4, we explain how these channels interact to form a land delivery system. Section 5 presents the results of a survey we carried between February and April 2012 and which provided detailed tenure information on recent land transactions in the district of Bamako, its peri-urban areas and the rural hinterland. Section 6 discusses the difficulties encountered to access to land for housing and the conflicts that this generates.

# **2. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY**

# **2.1. A systemic perspective on land delivery channels**

Answering the questions set out in the previous section requires adopting a systemic perspective on land delivery channels, their dynamics and their interaction. This approach is particularly relevant for cities undergoing rapid spatial expansion and characterized by a plurality of land tenure situations.<sup>23</sup> Land delivery channels refer to all the steps in the process whereby land (i) is initially made available to buyers or allottees (origin of the land), (ii) undergoes an often incremental formalization of tenure (which is seldom obtained by the initial buyers or allottees), and (iii) is sold on land markets before or after formalization. The concept of land delivery channel complements that of land market, which refers only to transactions on land at a given point in time, irrespective of the origin of the land and of the step of the formalization process at which the transaction takes place.<sup>24</sup> . Knowing the origin of the land, the step within the tenure formalization process and the market segments on which that land can be sold makes it possible to underline the interrelations between the different land delivery channels. This justifies the use of the phrase “land delivery system”, which includes the three channels identified in the present study and their interrelations. Identifying the origin of the land is particularly important in peri-urban areas and in the rural hinterland since it makes it possible to understand, for instance, how agricultural land is incrementally being transformed into urban land and thus to consider land markets in a historical and dynamic perspective. A residential plot supplied on the market often has a customary and agricultural origin; which means that any change in the supply of customary land has an impact on the land market segments where it can be sold out. Knowing the steps of the formalization process, which is long and costly, gives valuable indications on the options available to households to obtain secure tenure depending on their income levels and social connections. Lessons learned from the analysis make it easier to understand differences between formal and informal markets and the diversity of market segments which largely account for the tenure types and corresponding levels of security.

> 21 In a study conducted in the rural _commune_ Sanankoroba, Djiré (2004) observes that Malian farmers are being excluded from (official) land ownership.  Ownership of valuable lands is increasingly concentrated in the hands of public servants and entrepreneurs living elsewhere.

> 22 “Coxers” are intermediaries who mostly operate on informal land markets throughout the Bamako area and to whom many buyers and sellers resort to transact land.  They have informers in peri-urban villages to identify land that can be transacted and negotiate with village authorities.  They are thus key players in the conversion process of rural land into urban land. They are also aware of the “tricks” in order to circumvent regular procedures and deal with the administration to make sales effective.  They are often found in publicly visible places, including on the side of roads not far from plots that are for sale, even on the formal market.

> 23 We try to avoid the term land tenure “duality” which does not appropriately convey the idea of a plurality of situations along a continuum from completely informal to completely formal situations (UN-Habitat, 2012).

> 24 See Dowall (1995) for a description of the standard tool for land market assessments in developing countries.

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Each type of land delivery channel is characterized by: (i) its organization and steps observed in the delivery process (from initial conversion of non-urban land into urban land to the occupation of the developed land by its final user); (ii) the parties involved in the delivery process; and (iii) the different tenure statuses of land, and (iv) land values (whether market or non-market based). These land delivery channels form a system: any change affecting one component within one land delivery channel has impacts on other channels and consequently on the whole land delivery system. For instance, a land price increase in a given delivery channel will drive households towards other delivery channels (substitution effect).

In our study, particular attention is given to: (i) the relationship between land allocation by public authorities and market transactions, and between formal and informal land markets; (ii) the diversity of tenure options on the different land delivery channels; (iii) the consequences of tenure status on security of tenure and on land values; and (iv) the interrelations between the land delivery channels within the land delivery system. Whereas the vast majority of studies usually focus on one particular land delivery channel or land market segment, very few, (such as Bertrand, 1998) have established and studied the relationship between the different elements of the system.

# **2.2. Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches**

We first documented the functioning of the land delivery system. This was done, qualitatively, through: (i) an assessment of the legal and institutional framework governing land administration and management in Bamako and surrounding areas; (ii) meetings with key stakeholders involved in land delivery,<sup>25</sup> and (iii) identifying the way land is transferred, possible changes in tenure status, and the role of stakeholders involved in these operations. Particular attention was given to factual information provided by press articles, especially over the last two years. This was complemented, quantitatively, with a survey of recent land transactions carried out throughout Bamako, its periurban areas, and rural hinterland.

It should be noted that the study was carried out in a particular administrative, socio-economic and political context characterized by: (i) the suspension of state allocation of land in the private domain to _communes_ and developers; (ii) the suspension of allocation of precarious titles<sup>_26_</sup> and their conversion into property titles; (iii) legal changes in the judicial procedures in cases of conflict about ownership of land with property titles; (iv) rising population concerns and social unrest about mismanagement and corruption in land administration; and (v) political change and instability following the March 22, 2012 coup and the military defeat of government forces in the northern provinces.

# **2.3. Study area**

The study focuses on residential land, with emphasis on the transformation of rural (mainly agricultural land) into urban (mainly residential) land. For this reason, the study area extends far beyond the urbanized areas of Bamako (continuous and high density developments), and its peri-urban areas (mixed rural and residential land-use), in continuity with the existing urban web. The study also covers the rural hinterland of Bamako, which includes parts of the territory of all adjoining _communes_ in the Kati _cercle_ , and some parts of _communes_ in the Koulikoro _cercle_ adjoining the Kati _cercle_ . The area covered by the study is presented in Annex 2.1.

> 25 We met village headmen, village councilors and inhabitants in nine villages in seven _communes_ (Sanankoroba village in Sanankoroba _commune_ , Kanadjiguila village in Mandé _commune_ , Dialakoroba village in Dialakoroba _commune_ , Kabala and Niamana villages in Kalabancoro _commune_ , Marako and Banankoro villages in Ouelessebougou _commune_ , Kakabougou village in Baguineda camp c _ommune_ , Faraba village in Faraba _commune_ ), mayors and deputies in three _communes_ in the Kati _Cercle_ , a mayor of one _commune_ of Bamako, a deputy  mayor of the _Mairie du District de Bamako_ , the Governor and his chief of staff at the Bamako District, officials of DNDC ( _Direction nationale des domaines et du cadastre_ ), DRDC ( _Direction Régionale des domaines et du cadastre_ ) and DDB-DC ( _Direction des domaines et du cadastre du District de Bamako)_ ,  the heads of the Urban Planners Order of Mali ( _Ordre des Urbanistes du Mali_ ) _,_ of the Property Developers Association of Mali ( _Association des Promoteurs Immobiliers du Mali - APIM_ ) and of the Rural Engineering Department ( _Genie rural_ ) _,_ a notary, 3 coxers, and staff at the World Bank Bamako office.

> 26 Council of Ministers, June 15, 2011.

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Although there is no official definition of these different zones, the urban and peri-urban areas can be distinguished from field observation and satellite imagery. The urban area is characterized by built-up contiguity; the peri-urban area by a mix of rural areas, incorporating core villages, agricultural land and uncultivated land that are being subdivided, built up and integrated within the urban area and buildings being erected at a low density. The rural hinterland does not have visible/physical characteristics that make it possible to identify it through satellite imagery. It can be defined as the rural area that is under the direct land market influence of the city. This is mainly reflected in land prices, which are higher than land prices in other rural areas that have similar physical characteristics and agricultural potentialities (see Annex 2.2). Consequently, the rural hinterland to be covered by the survey could not be identified prior to the fieldwork but in the course of the study, on the basis of the recorded land transactions and land prices.<sup>27</sup>

# **3. LAND DELIVERY CHANNELS**

We identified three land delivery channels:

- The customary channel (section 3.1), where transactions are most commonly informal;

- The public channel through which allocations and sales of land are initially made by the public and parapublic authorities (section 3.2);

- The formal private channel (section 3.3) through which land and plots equipped with property title are initially sold by property development companies and purchasing cooperatives and where transactions result in notarial deeds or equivalent documentation.

As in other cities in the sub-region, non-market forms of land allocation by the state and local authorities coexist with land markets _._ This classification requires the following comments: First, it can be noted that land markets operate within and across land delivery channels. There is a _formal_ market for plots obtained through the private formal land delivery channel and for plots initially obtained through the customary channel or bought from public authorities but whose tenure was formalized so they can be sold with a transferable property title. There is also an _informal_ market for plots with a non-transferable right, for plots with a transferable right but whose transfer is not made according to legal rules, and for plots with no legal right at all.

Second, in relation to the first comment, it can be noted that legal and illegal practices, the latter greeted with a degree of tolerance or resignation, are found in both land allocations and land-market transactions. In the public channel, allocations do not always follow the procedures laid down by law and decree and beneficiaries often do not take the necessary steps to obtain a precarious title. Transactions on the secondary market for land obtained by private individuals or small property developers from the first two channels are, in most cases, informal.

Third, a variety of tenure situations can be encountered on the different land delivery channels, depending on the documentation and conferred rights. Table 3.1 below shows the three major categories of documents relating to land tenure by increasing levels of tenure security.<sup>28</sup> The “administrative documents” category refers to documents that are not considered titles, although issued by the public authorities (state representatives or _communes_ ). Precarious titles give their holders temporary rights of use but not ownership. Only holders of property titles, known here as _Titres fonciers_ , enjoy full, absolute ownership.

> 27 The map does not show a boundary between the peri-urban area and the rural hinterland which would require further work involving treatment of satellite imagery. 28 Tenure security does not only depend on the document(s) held but also on various other factors including social recognition (a household whose parcel is in a village where everyone knows it may experience a certain level of solidarity should its occupation be challenged), connections within the land administration and political powers, or land prices (as the value of land may motivate attempts to grab the land).

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**Table 3.1 – Administrative documents and titles associated with land tenure**

|**Documents or titles involving representatives of**<br>**the State or communes and DRDC**_(1)_|**Characteristics**|
|---|---|
|**ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (residential)**|**ARE NOT TITLES**|
|_Bulletin_or_Lettre de convocation_(_sous préfets_or_préfets_).|Allocation of a plot following subdivision of farmland, with<br>no name indicated and before payment of local development<br>(infrastructure and services) taxes. Precedes allocation of a<br>CRUH.|
|_Lettre d’attribution – LA (2)_<br>_Lettre de notification_(_communes_)_(2)_|Stage in allocation of a CUH: notice of allocation of a plot by<br>a_commune_before payment of local development<br>(infrastructure and services) taxes and after submission of<br>manydocuments. Precedes allocation of a CUH or a CRUH.|
|**PRECARIOUS TITLE**_(3)_|**ARE USE RIGHTS**|
|_Concession rurale_(CR) (DRDC, representatives of the State,<br>level dependent on the size of the plot) On farmland|On farmland; must be developed within five years or the land<br>may be taken back. Should not be granted within Bamako<br>District. Annual fee, possible transformation into TF|
|_Concession rurale à usage d’habitation_(rural_communes_)<br>CRUH.<br>(For any allocation >1,000 m<sup>2</sup>, authorization required from<br>State representatives of different levels depending on the land<br>area)|Subdivision of a_concession rurale_. After payment of local<br>development (infrastructure and services) taxes.<br>Must be developed within three years or the land may be taken<br>back. May be transformed into TF|
|_Concession urbaine d’habitation_(urban_communes_) CUH|After payment of local development (infrastructure and<br>services) taxes to the_commune_+ 10% of these charges to the<br>State budget.<br>Must be developed within three years or the land may be taken<br>back. May be transformed into TF|
|TITLES PRE-DATING 2002, NOW THEORETICALLY<br>TREATED AS CUH OR CRUH BUT STILL IN<br>CIRCULATION||
|_Lettre d’attribution (2)_ from the Governor of Bamako District.<br>As of 1993, beneficiaries designated by_communes_during<br>“Save our neighborhood” operations.|Stage in allocation of a_Permis d’occuper_(permit to occupy).<br>Upgraded urban land and resettlement areas. Before payment<br>of local development (infrastructure and services) taxes.|
|_Permis d’occuper - PO (préfets_)|Precarious title conditional on development or the land may be<br>taken back. The_préfet_of Kati_cercle_went on issuing POs<br>until 2009although he no longer had the right to do so.|
|**PROPERTY TITLES**_(4)_|**ARE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS**|
|_Titres fonciers- TF_(DRDC, State representatives).|Granted after checking that land covered by CR, CRUH and<br>CUH has been developed.<br>For land under CR, prior_immatriculation_of the land|

_Notes:_ **_(1)_** _The Direction nationale des domaines et du cadastre (DNCD) has a representative office in each region (DRDC). DRDC Antennes (chapters) of Koulikoro region have been established in the cercles and communes of the Bamako district. Within these Antennes, the bureau spécialisé (specialist section) deals with precarious titles. The bureau ordinaire (ordinary section) deals with property titles._ **_(2)_** _It is difficult to place the lettre d’attribution with certainty in either the administrative document or precarious title categories, because this term seems frequently to be used to designate a lettre de notification. The issue of LAs should have come to an end in 2002 because the law of February 12, 2002, amending the Code domanial et foncier of 2000, specifies that: ‘Land allocations in the form of lettres d’attribution or permis d’occuper prior to the entry into force of this Code shall be treated as concessions urbaines or rurales à usage d’habitation...’. According to this text, LAs should be considered as precarious titles. However, our informants often speak of them whereas they never mention the lettre de notification, an essential document these days for obtaining a concession à usage d’habitation and concerning which the decree of March 6, 2002 specifies: ‘In_ 9
_no case may a lettre de notification stand in the stead of a use right title’. If the mention of a lettre d’attribution actually refers to a lettre de notification, then the LA is an administrative document._ **_(3)_** _There are no figures about the total number of precarious titles issued in Mali. Collecting these figures from administrative sources would be possible but in practice extremely difficult_ **_(4)_** _Some indicative figures concerning the number of landowning households with TF or land with TF are available for Bamako District and Kati cercle. The number of households in Mali who are owners with a TF is available from the 2009 Census: 117,897, 8.5% of all owners. More than half of those who have a TF in urban Mali live in Bamako District (36,895) where 38.6% of owners have a TF. In the Kati cercle, according to Djiré (2013), the number of plots with TF has been multiplied by 4.7 between the beginning of 2005 (14,314) and the end of 2012 (66,988). The author notes a sharp acceleration of delivery in 2011 and 2012._ It can be seen from Table 3.1 above that here is a gap between lawful and actual practices. In this context, relying on official documents (see Annex 3.1 for laws, decrees and other texts on land and tenure) alone cannot provide a sufficient understanding of land tenure situations. For this reason, particular attention has been given to actual practices. Interviews with informants, including with agents in charge of the land administration, reveal that they did not always agree on the meaning of words used to describe land tenure situations. Informants at the _commune_ and DRDC/Koulikoro levels told us that some practices, which should have disappeared following the power given to local authorities to allocate land<sup>29</sup> , were persisting. For instance, although he was no longer entitled to do so, the _préfet_ of Kati _cercle_ continued to issue _permis d’occuper_ . Despite the fact that the terms _lettre d’attribution_ (LA) and _permis d’occuper_ should have disappeared and been replaced by _concessions urbaine/rurale à usage d’habitation_<sup>30</sup> , our informants still used them. People we spoke to were often hesitant about the nature and name of the document that should back their rights. For example, the _attestation de vente authentifiée_ (see Annex 4.1), which grants no rights, is often considered by its holder as sufficient proof of the right to occupy a plot. This means that many people believe they hold the rights to a plot and are totally helpless when individuals or companies present other documents and seek to expel them from the plot. More details on the explanations for, and consequences of, the gaps between actual and legal practices can be found in section 6.

# **3.1. The customary land delivery channel (mainly informal)**

# **3.1.1. Customary tenure in Mali**

Customary land "ownership" refers to the communal possession of rights to use and allocate cropping and grazing land by a group sharing the same cultural identity. During the past two decades, customary land management practices have undergone various adjustments (Toulmin and Quan, 2000). In most countries, they have proved to have a surprising capacity to adapt to the new economic and social context introduced by the globalization of national economies and to the rapid spatial expansion of urban areas. In Mali, customary tenure is recognized in article 43 of the 2000 Land Code, which states that individual or collective customary right holders cannot be deprived of these rights, except in the public interest and with fair compensation (Djiré and Traoré, 2008). However, the implementing provisions of the Land Code have not yet been adopted. This issue was addressed at the National Land Conference ( _Etats généraux du foncier_ , see République du Mali, 2009a), but no decision has been made with regard to the formal recognition of customary tenure and transferability of customary rights. The state may register customary land in its own name ( _immatriculation_ ); in practice, it will “purge” customary rights, meaning that it offers no compensation for loss of the land but only for the loss of standing crops and other improvements made to the land. People are not entitled to compensation if, when customary land has been registered in this way, they are occupying it with authorization from customary landholders but have no administrative documents. They may, however, be allowed to regularize their occupancy and then fall into the category of people using the public land delivery channel to access land (see Subsection 3.2 below).

It should be noted that customary land is relatively scarce within Bamako District today, where most of it has already been sold out, but it is still abundant in peri-urban rural _communes_ and in the rural hinterland of the city.

Although customary ownership is legally recognized in rural areas in Mali, most customary owners do not have any document that guarantees their rights. Customary legitimacy is based on length of occupancy and the collective memory that gives much value to oral agreements.

> 29  Law of February 12, 2002, and decree of March 6, 2002. 30 See note 2 in Table 3.1.

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# **3.1.2. Sales of customary land**

Explicit threats of expropriation/confiscation of customary land in peri-urban areas by state representatives, along with pressures from local authorities (which propose resettlement of households evicted following settlement upgrading and tenure regularization within Bamako District), encourage customary landholders to sell their land to developers and coxers, or to accept land subdivisions made by _Préfets_ , in order to avoid the risk of expropriation and unfair compensation or outright confiscation. This very common practice has been observed in all visited villages in the peri-urban area of Bamako. It contributes to land speculation and can be considered as a factor of corruption in land administration.

Until recently, customary land was not sold but could be allocated by peri-urban village headmen without any money changing hands, in return for allegiance or acknowledgement of indebtedness.<sup>31</sup> The purchase of customary land has gradually become possible without initially taking a monetary form; the buyer would offer the seller some kola nuts. For example, the village headman of Faraba, in Faraba _commune_ , told us in January 2012 that before around 2007-2008, strangers to the village who wanted land would come bearing 10 kola nuts.

Monetary transactions are now swiftly gaining ground. Today, there are four main ways peri-urban customary land is transferred to buyers:<sup>32</sup> (i) The sale of customary land to individuals who will use it for agricultural purposes. They may subdivide it in a later stage in order to sell plots (see (iii) below).

(ii) The subdivision and transfer of individualized land plots by customary landholders themselves, which is not considered as a legal practice, although it can lead to the issuance of a precarious title after a complex, timeconsuming and costly administrative procedure. Customary landholders often go through the intermediary of an individual who pays himself handsomely for his participation in the plot subdivision. Customary landholders may ask for a CR and then subdivide land into plots and sell them on. In view of the lack of proper land information systems, the unavailability of subdivision layout plans, poor land management capacities at _commune_ level and widespread clientelism, and given the poor quality of the land transaction records kept at local level (villages and _communes_ ), a series of illicit practices and disputes between sellers and buyers can arise, especially when the same plot is the subject of multiple allocations to several different buyers.

(iii) The sale of large tracts of customary land (as opposed to individualized plots) to investors, co-operatives<sup>33</sup> , potential developers and speculators, for further subdivision, which occurs in the rural hinterland up to about 50 to 70 km from Bamako city center. Sales of large tracts of customary land in peri-urban rural communes can be more easily formalized because of the financial means and social connections of powerful investors in land administration institutions. Although the beginning of the process is predominantly informal, the buyer can apply for a precarious title (CR). In a later stage, he can subdivide the land into plots and sell them on. This subdivision is not formally authorized by law but it is usually permitted. Keita & Djiré (2009) observe: _‘In Tienfala, we are seeing the emergence of a category of land speculators who call themselves land operators. The major land operators approach villagers and suggest plot division plans for the village or private individuals. Villagers get 10 lots out of 100 as remuneration for this operation. These transactions are formalized in memoranda of understanding signed by the customary landholders, the village headman and his council. Later on, the customary landholder will seek either a concession rurale or a concession à usage d’habitation for the plots divided in this way. Generally speaking, the land operator will sell his_

> 31 Bourdarias (2003), studying the tenure conflicts which broke out in Dialakorodji _commune_ between 1999 and 2002, writes: ‘The village is the place where a sense of belonging is built up through integration of “outsiders” in the networks of dependency founded on indebtedness, whereas the land market to some extent maintains the foreigner's status as someone extraneous to the village community. Consequently, the village is founded on the primacy of allegiance.’

> 32 Before 1991, according to our informants, the State used to allocate land of customary origin, which it had registered in its own name, to its clientele (army and police officers, senior government officials). Some of this land has since been sold on to individuals or investors.

> 33 We were told for instance that the co-operative of _gendarmes_ in the village of Missalabougou, Kalabancoro _commune_ , in Kati _cercle_ , illustrates this kind of operation.

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_plots on.’_ (iv) _Lotissements préfectoraux._<sup>34</sup> These are a kind of land sharing/subdivision scheme found in all rural _communes_ in the peri-urban areas of Bamako in the Kati _cercle_ with the support of _Préfets_ and _Sous-Préfets_ . In a _lotissement préfectoral,_ customary land is surveyed and subdivided into three categories with, generally, the following breakdown:

- 40% of the land is left to original customary holders who recei _ve bulletins,_ which are a form of administrative recognition of the subdivision and proof of the allocation, from the _Préfet_ or _Sous-Préfet_ .<sup>35</sup> In some cases the customary holder may be allocated a CRUH for the land he gets.  If he applies for a TF, it may cost him the equivalent of 75% of the value of the land that has been returned to him following the subdivision.  At the end of the process, customary landholders will find themselves with a TF covering only 10% of the land they owned originally under the customary regime (Sanankoroba village, Sanankoroba _commune_ , interview June 4, 2011).

- 40% is usually shifted to the _Préfet or Sous-Préfet_ who will subdivide it into building plots that are, in principle, allocated mainly to households displaced following urban settlement upgrading.  In principle, allottees receive an administrative document ( _bulletin)_ .  The name of the holder is left blank.  Once the plot has been sold on and the _bulletin_ transferred to the plot buyer, the latter can complete the procedure by adding his name on the _bulletin_ and continue the formalization process until he obtains a precarious title (CRUH).  He can also keep the _bulletin_ with a blank instead of adding his name in order to have more leeway to re-sell the plot to another buyer without paying taxes and fees.  Remaining plots are sold at market price.  The difference between market price and administration-set price (which should be enforced) is frequently diverted by the _Préfet_ or _Sous-Préfet_ . This is one of the reasons why the state is so reluctant to transfer land management and land allocation responsibilities to _commune_ authorities. These lands, which are shifted to the _Préfets_ enter the public land delivery channel and follow a path similar to plots allocated by _communes_ (see sub-section 3.2.1).

- 20% is allocated to the land surveyor who is paid in kind and will generally sell the plots.

# **3.1.3. Shifting from customary rights to precarious and property titles**

Depending on buyers’ strategy, on their investment capacity and on location, the customary land they buy can remain as it is (i.e. undeveloped or for agricultural use), can be developed without subdivision (for an investment made by the buyer in an agricultural project), or can be subdivided into smaller plots (for agricultural or housing purposes).

In all cases, to improve tenure security—and under certain conditions, to improve the transferability of the land—the buyers can, in a first stage, apply for a precarious title (CR).<sup>36</sup> In the case of subdivided plots, buyers may obtain, after the administrative document ( _bulletin)_ , a precarious title ( _concession rurale à usage d’habitation_ – CRUH).

> 34 The term _lotissement_ is misused. According to Decree No. 05-115 of March 9, 2005 (which lays down the procedures for carrying out the different types of urban development operations), a _lotissement_ is ‘the subdivision of a single piece of bare land into plots with appropriate provision of infrastructure and collective facilities to host the buildings to be erected by the future occupants’. Infrastructure and collective facilities are specified as ‘roads, drains/sewers, water supply, electricity and telephone’. Our field work showed that both residents and the authorities use the word _lotissement_ when speaking of nothing more than a subdivision or an urban restructuring or renovation operation with no piped water and no electricity let alone a telephone connection. Some _lotissements_ can be done on customary land by _communes_ when they have an urban planning document ( _plan d’urbanisme_ ).

> 35 It was reported to us that _Préfets_ are paid for providing a _bulletin_ by keeping the difference between the sum actually given to them and the sum they are officially supposed to receive. For example, in one of the rural _communes_ of the study, a customary holder told us he paid 500,000 FCFA to receive a _bulletin_ which, officially, should only have cost FCFA 80,000.

> 36 A CR ensures a fair degree of security of tenure. Furthermore, land with a CR can be transferred under certain conditions.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 3.1 – The customary land delivery channel<br>Formal market<br>Informal market<br>Registration in the name of the State (immatriculation)<br>Sale of land, in<br>Concession<br>principle for<br>agricultural use Attestation de rurale (CR)<br>vente<br>authentifiée<br>Sale of Subdivision INDIVIDUAL<br>individualized<br>PROPERTY<br>plot for<br>TITLE<br>residential use<br>Concession<br>Sale to co- rurale à usage<br>Bulletin<br>operatives and d’habitation<br>developers (CRUH)<br>- Sale of<br>surveyor's plots<br>(20%)<br>CUSTOMARY Subdivision by - Plots handed<br>LAND Préfets & sous- back to<br>préfet s<br>customary<br>( lotissement<br>holders (40%)<br>préfectoral )<br>Land allocated by<br>- Préfet ’s share<br>Préfet<br>of plots (40%) PUBLIC LAND<br> Extinction of<br>DELIVERY<br>customary rights<br>( purge des CHANNEL<br>droits ) through<br>Land registered<br>registration in in the name of (see Figure 3.2)<br>the name of the the State<br>13<br>State<br>( immatriculation )<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Having a precarious title (CR) makes it possible to obtain, in a later stage, a property title (TF) (see Annex 3.2). Obtaining a TF is very profitable. With it, land will be sold at a much higher price, commonly up to three times that of land bought with a mere _attestation de vente authentifiée_ (see Annex 4.1). According to our informants, in the _commune_ of Dialakorodji, the price is multiplied by three; in the village of Kanadjiguila, in the _commune_ Mandé, by four; and, in the _commune_ of Kalabancoro, by five,<sup>37</sup> which makes rent capture possible for agents of the administration and beneficiaries of a TF.

The issue of CRs on farmland encourages privatization of customary land. It is also increasingly seen by authorities as one of the causes of urban sprawl.<sup>38</sup> This is one of the reasons why the Council of Ministers decided to suspend the issue of CRs in 2011. Since then, an April 2013 decree reauthorized the issue of CRs but under new conditions, which strengthen the powers of the central state.

Figure 3.1 on the previous page represents the processes whereby a property title can be obtained for land initially purchased from a customary holder. In most cases, buyers may not complete the whole formalization process and may either keep the plot as it is, may possibly improve its tenure or/and sell it on the informal market. Figure 3.1 also shows the possibility of registration of customary land in the name of the state after the “purge” of customary rights.

# **3.2. The public and para-public land delivery channel**

There are different ways public land can be transferred: (i) the administrative allocation of residential plots; (ii) the allocation of land for auction sale after subdivision and provision of services of serviced land; (iii) the transfer of land by the state to property development companies and cooperatives; and (iv) the provision of land for social housing.

# **3.2.1. Administrative allocation of residential plots**

Before 1992, it was the Governor of Bamako (the supervisory authority for the _communes_ of Bamako) who granted authorization to occupy plots (by _lettre d’attribution_ ) on the private domain of the state. Half of the LAs were to regularize occupation whereas the rest was for resettlement. However, as demand for plots was much greater than supply, people who were unable to find a place began to engage in “spontaneous settlements”, which involved more than 45% of households by the early 1990s, because there was no more land available for resettlement (Bertrand, 2002).

This led to the launch in 1993 of a program to upgrade 24 spontaneous settlements, known as the Save our Neighborhood (SNQ) program, supported by the World Bank. At the same time, there was a change in connection with the decentralization process: _commune_ officials would no longer be appointed but elected. This led to changes in the administrative allocation of land. Although the state retained ownership of the land in these 24 neighborhoods, physical upgrading operations were organized by the mayors of the _communes_ in which these settlements were located. Municipal committees chose the beneficiaries of plots located either in the neighborhood or in the resettlement areas, who then obtained LAs after paying local development taxes (infrastructure and services). People who could not afford these charges, which were very high in relation to the average income of Bamako residents, sold their LAs (which is not allowed in principle) to others who would pay the charges in their stead and then receive precarious title to the plot (Bertrand 1998). In addition, plots were allocated to wellconnected individuals who, as they did not live in the neighborhood, could not claim regularization. Shortly before, a considerable amount of land in Bamako District had been allocated for the development of the formal market (see Section 3.2.2 below), which encroached on areas that the _communes_ could have developed. Elected officials then stepped up the number of subdivisions of land and sold plots despite not being entitled to do so.

> 37 Sources: interviews with key informants in Bamako between June 2011 and January 2012 and Durand-Lasserve (2009). 38 In the report “Bamako 2030” (Ville de Bamako, 2012), it is noted that the process of farmland sold with a CR to “private individuals" who divide it up into residential plots is “a real threat because it encourages urban sprawl to the detriment of rural natural resources.”

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The evaluation of the Save our Neighborhood (SNQ) program judged the servicing of the neighborhoods completely inadequate. According to the _Mairie du District de Bamako_ (2010), ‘the speculation that characterized the operation prevented the people who had been evicted from taking full advantage of the resettlement areas. Excluded from the resettlement process, these people simply re-established their precarious lifestyle elsewhere’.

Since 2002, _communes_ can allocate plots of land with precarious titles (CRUH and CUH). This requires an initial transfer from land registered in the name of the state according to the needs of _communes_ as assessed in their development plan submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers.<sup>39</sup> In practice, land is allocated by public authorities, either for resettlement projects following a settlement upgrading and tenure regularization project, or within the framework of a public land development/subdivision project ( _lotissement_ ). We describe these projects below.

# i) Settlement upgrading and tenure regularization project.

The rules for these operations<sup>40</sup> are often ignored. Households entitled to _in situ_ regularization who receive an administrative document ( _lettre de notification_ ) can be granted a precarious title provided they could pay the local development taxes for infrastructure and services ( _frais de viabilisation et d’édilité_ ) and submit many other documents. In practice, as in the 1990s, many beneficiary households do not obtain a precarious title because they cannot pay or because they sell the plot after receiving the _lettre de notification_ . Households not entitled to _in situ_ regularization must be resettled. Those who do not have any documents are at risk of not having access to any plot, either _in situ_ or in resettlement developments. Since there is not much more land available for resettlement within Bamako District, households are being resettled in peri-urban rural _communes._<sup>41</sup> It frequently happens that land allocation benefits households that are not entitled to it. It is a major source of revenue for mayors.

It is a widespread practice in any resettlement scheme in the urban or peri-urban area of Bamako to make more land plots available than are needed to resettle evicted households. The official reasons put forward by mayors or _Préfets_ is that they must take the opportunity of resettlement projects to provide land for housing the urban poor. However, informants indicate that the main purpose is to give the mayors plots of land for housing that they can allocate to their clientele.

# ii) _Lotissements_

Formal land subdivisions, both public and private, are also subject to very specific rules<sup>42</sup> such as, for example, the requirement for _communes_ to take a census of households occupying the area and arrange for compensation. In practice, the rules are often ignored. Some _communes_ engage in _lotissement_ without authorization from the central state and without consulting village headmen, plots are sold with no infrastructure or services and no account is taken of public spaces, even when shown in an urban planning document.<sup>43, 44</sup> The procedures by which the beneficiary of a plot in a land subdivision can obtain a TF are represented in Annex 3.3.

> 39 The first master plan/urban planning document ( _Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme_ - SDU) for Bamako was adopted in 1981.  The third revised version dates from 2004 but has not been approved. Some peri-urban _communes_ have prepared planning documents, some of which have been approved by the Council of Ministers (joint SDU for Moribabougou and N’Gabakoro Droit in 2008; joint SDU for Dialakorodji and Safo in 2010; SDU for Mountougoula and Sanankoroba in 2010).

> 40 See decree of March 9, 2005.

> 41 In this way, for example, resettlement areas for _communes_ I and II were planned in N’Gabacoro and, for _commune_ V, in Kalabancoro.

> 42 Decree of March 9, 2005.

> 43 Carrying out a _lotissement_ is a costly operation which requires the assistance of surveyors and various enterprises, so _communes_ are tempted to reward the latter by giving them plots in advance.

> 44 For an example of the difficulties faced by a _commune_ to implement a _lotissement_ , see Djiré (2004) in the case of the _commune_ of Sanankoroba.

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# **3.2.2. Land allocation to the parastatal land development agency** **_(Agence de Cession Immobilière)_ for auction sale after subdivision and development**

The _Agence de Cession Immobilière_ (ACI), which was created in 1992 with the support of the World Bank, has been selling serviced land usually through auctions. The objectives were to put an end to the government monopoly on land by selling plots with a property title, to improve transparency in allocation procedures and to develop a formal land market, which was hypothesized to improve access to land.

The ACI carried out most public land development projects within Bamako District under the 3<sup>rd</sup> Urban Development and Decentralization Project. It allocated serviced plots by combining auctions and crosssubsidization, to respond in principle to the demand from low-middle to high income groups, on a cost recovery basis, so that land development projects could be replicated. In practice, however, ACI, to which large parts of public land reserves in Bamako have been allocated (Bertrand 2002), used them mainly to satisfy the demand from high-income groups<sup>45</sup> and failed to provide enough land for the vast majority of the urban population, including emerging middle-income groups. In fact, land had been allocated by public authorities to ACI to the detriment of _communes_ who were engaged, shortly after, in regularization operations (see 3.2.1 above).

Bertrand (2002) analyses the failures of ACI as follows: _‘The ACI’s sales management teams change regularly (...) demonstrating (their) growing sensitivity (...) to political patronage, just the kind of logic that donors had denounced in favor of the supposed purity of the market in the previous decade. The operation of auctions has been distorted due to sellers and buyers knowing each other and coming to various arrangements between themselves; public procurement processes for development have short-circuited competition to the benefit of over-the-counter agreements; accusations of misappropriation of funds are coming into sharp focus in 2000 to the extent that the agency is being challenged in court. The watchword of transparency is flagrantly flouted, after land-use management has been shown to result more than ever in social exclusion for the mass of impoverished citizens’_ Once sold, plots serviced by ACI enter the private land delivery channel (see subsection 3.3 below).

It has also been stressed that many plots sold by the ACI were not built on but held by speculators: _‘Land bought at auction for one or two million CFA francs in 2000 can nowadays be sold on for several hundred millions’_ (Ville de Bamako, 2012).

# **3.2.3. Public land sold or allocated to private property development companies and cooperatives**

The state may sell land with property title (TF) to approved property development companies. The companies then subdivide it. Similarly, the state may allocate land from its private domain to cooperatives. For explanation of how these companies and cooperatives then operate downstream in the formal private land delivery channel, see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 below.

# **3.2.4. Provision of “social housing”**

The social housing program is aimed at helping households to access property ownership. It was initiated in 2003 by the Government of Mali, in order to respond to the needs of the middle-income groups that could afford neither land in ACI development schemes nor serviced land or housing put onto the market by formal private property developers.<sup>46</sup>

> 45 The purchase of several plots by the same person, although prohibited, is common (Bertrand 1998).

> 46 The origins of the policy lie in the provision of land to military personnel in 1992 by the then General Amadou Toumani Touré, hence the popular term “ATT-Bougou”.  Private developers may also be involved and can obtain land from the State at attractive prices, or even for nothing, and build housing to be sold on credit.

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**Figure 3.2 – The public and para-public land delivery channel**

<!-- Start of picture text --> LONG-TERM<br>LEASE<br>Land ceded to co-<br>Land<br>operative (with<br>registered in<br>transfer of TF)<br>the name of<br>the State<br>(customary<br>origin) Land ceded to PRIVATE<br>LAND<br>Agence de Cession<br>DELIVERY<br>Immobilière (ACI) for<br>development (with CHANNEL<br>transfer of TF) (See Figure<br>Other land<br>3.3)<br>registered in<br>the name of<br>Sale to property<br>the State<br>development<br>company (with<br>INDIVIDUAL<br>transfer of TF)<br>PROPERTY<br>TITLE<br>Land ceded to Lotissement<br>CUSTOMARY<br>commune (with and<br>Sale of plots at<br>CHANNEL<br>transfer of TF) for infrastructure<br>prices set by<br>(See Figure lotissement / the CUH<br>3.1) (conditional on service administration<br>CRUH<br>validated planning provision by<br>document) Commune<br>Allocation to Lettre de<br>commune for confirmation of occupation or recasement notification /<br>regularization lettre<br>(without transfer of d’attestation<br>TF)<br>Land to be notarial deed<br>sale or recasement<br>allocated by Bulletin<br>Allocation to<br>Préfets<br>individuals<br>Formal<br>17<br>market<br>Informal market<br><!-- End of picture text -->
So far, it has provided a relatively small number of dwelling units<sup>47</sup> at a subsidized price on lease purchase agreement or bank loans Implementation of these housing programs has been rushed.<sup>48</sup> The report “Bamako 2030” (Ville de Bamako, 2012) stresses the absence of collective facilities in these housing projects: _‘All the new social housing developments are located on the edges of the city's built area. Because the new neighborhood frequently lacks collective facilities, residents must travel long distances to go to school or to the market or fetch water from the nearest water point.’ (Ville de Bamako, 2012)._ Finally, it must be noted that, under cover of providing “social housing”, such allocation is routinely done by way of political patronage. This is another linkage to the political system.

Figure 3.2 on the previous page represents the public and para-public land delivery channel. It shows the different processes whereby the holder of a plot, which was originally allocated by public authorities, may obtain a property title. As in the customary land delivery channel, the plot holder may not complete the whole formalization process and may either keep the plot as it is, or may upgrade its tenure and/or sell it on the informal market (if he has no TF or has bought it with a precarious title but without notarial deed) or on the formal market (if those conditions are met). Figure 3.2 also shows allocations and sales of land by the state to private property development companies, cooperatives and ACI with a property title and highlights links between public delivery channel and customary and private delivery channels.

# **3.3. The formal private land delivery channel**

Part of the formal private land delivery channels directly derives from public land delivery (see subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). The rest derives from sales made by individuals who may receive land for free by the state (see subsection 3.3.3). Plots with property titles (obtained through formalization process) coming from these three sources are sold on the formal land market. Private property development companies can buy, on formal market, land which was, in a first stage, customary but whose buyers have managed to obtain a property title (subsection 3.3.4).

# **3.3.1. Approved private property development companies**

These companies can obtain land with TF from the state (see Figure 3.2) or buy it on the formal market (see 3.3.4 below) or from the ACI. They then service and develop the plots and sell them out (sometimes housing). In some cases, these plots have an individual TF, in other cases, an individual title must be extracted from the “mother title”. A plot with an individual TF is considerably more expensive than a comparable plot without one.

About 200 approved property developers operate in Mali, usually on a small scale, depending on business opportunities. Out of 45 developers that are members of the Association of Real Estate Developers of Mali ( _Association des Promoteurs Immobiliers du Mali_ - APIM), only 15 effectively operate. For decades, the land management and administration framework was not conducive to the development of a formal private land and housing development sector, but property developers were recently granted advantages.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, the activities of private developers remain limited by: (i) urban households' low and irregular income; (ii) complex procedures and restrictive standards constraining norms for planning, construction and development; (iii) the

> 47 According to the _Ministère du Logement, des Affaires Foncières et de l'Urbanisme_ , 2,930 social housing units have been put onto the market in Bamako between 2003 and 2007.  During this period of time, registered demand at national level was over 30,000.  The State provided 50% of the funding, with 35% coming from the Malian Housing Agency (OFM) and 15% from the ACI.  10,000 additional housing units (including 5,400 financed by the State) were scheduled countrywide between 2008 and 2012.  This objective was reassessed in 2010, with the announcement of the additional construction of 20,000 units over the next 4 years.

> 48 The Focal Point for Urban Development, Ministry of Housing, Land Affairs and Urban Planning was requested in 2002 to urgently design a social housing program. After a week's work, its proposal (inspired from the experience of 300 housing units in Garantiebougou) was validated by the President of the Republic and implemented with State funding.  Consequently, no other comprehensive study was done (ISTED, 2009).

> 49 By way of example, Decree No. 00-274/P-RM of June 23, 2000 permits the State to sell land from its private domain at preferential prices or allocate land free of charge, with a clause reserving ownership for the State, to developers planning to establish a number of “affordable social plots” and/or “very affordable” and “low-cost” housing units.

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# **Figure 3.3 – The formal private land delivery channel**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Formal market<br>Auction Land owned by ab<br>by ACI individual under<br>TF<br>Sale to property<br>Sale of plots<br>development company<br>with individual<br>with transfer of master<br>TF<br>TF for lotissement<br>INDIVIDUAL<br>PROPERTY<br>Lotissement<br>TITLE<br>and<br>infrastructure/<br>service<br>PUBLIC provision<br>LAND<br>DELIVERY Land ceded to housing<br>co-operative for<br>CHANNEL<br>lotissement (with<br>(See Figure<br>transfer of TF)<br>3.2)<br><!-- End of picture text --> 19
weakness of the housing finance system (see Annex 3.4); (iv) uncertainties surrounding security of tenure even with a TF; (v) the competition from ACI for the provision of serviced land for housing for the high-income group; (vi) the competition from public land delivery channels; and (vii) competition from the informal sector resulting in limited demand for formal housing from middle-income households. Property development companies also complain about their own difficulties to access land, particularly in the centre of Bamako.

# **3.3.2. Cooperative housing**

A cooperative can obtain land from the state (see Figure 3.2) and will then subdivide for its members.<sup>50</sup> Cooperatives were originally set up by trade unions (ex. _Union des Travailleurs du Mali_ ) and by professional associations. Employees of both public and private organizations may gain access to land through membership of cooperatives.<sup>51</sup> Cooperatives are also popular with Malians abroad, who may club together to buy land (for instance Malians from Paris’ suburbs; see Keita, 2012).

It should be noted that the distinction between private developers and co-operatives is not always clear, because the former sometimes operate under the name of “housing cooperatives”.

# **3.3.3. Gifts of land with property title (TF) by the state**

Some people may sell land or plots with TF that they have obtained as a gift from the state (this applies particularly to military personnel before 1991). Some may arrange a _division parcellaire_ and then sell the plots.<sup>52</sup>

# **3.3.4. The secondary formal market**

Some owners who have purchased land with an administrative document or precarious title that they have then transformed into TF or who have purchased land directly with a TF can sell it on the secondary formal market. Selling land with TF is perfectly legal but expensive. A notarial deed must be drawn up and registration fees amounting to 15% of the price of the land must be paid, together with transfer charges.

All these processes are represented in Figure 3.3 on the previous page.

# **4. THE LAND DELIVERY SYSTEM**

# **4.1. Representing the land delivery system**

It is clear from figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 that the three land delivery channels make up a system. Customary and public channels interact as the state can purge the customary rights, register the land in its name and allocate it, while the _Préfets_ are using their share of _lotissements préfectoraux_ to allocate plots. The public land delivery channel supplies the bulk of the land for the private formal land delivery channel, which also obtains land with formal property titles from the customary channel. Both customary and public land delivery channels supply plots that may be sold on formal and informal markets. Figure 4.1 below represents the whole land delivery system.

The informal market concerns the sale of land with no administrative document or with non-transferable administrative documents, and the irregular sale of land with a precarious title. It is possible to obtain, through the formalization process, a property title, for land bought in the informal market and to sell it in the formal one.

> 50 It may also buy land and, in that case, will often approach a customary holder directly before having the land subdivided. In this case, the transaction comes under the customary land delivery system (see Figure 3.1).

> 51 There were great expectations in the early 2000s that co-operative housing would improve affordability for middle-income groups.

> 52 A _division parcellaire_ is the subdivision of a single piece of land into at most 5 plots which in theory are not to be sold but for donation or inheritance purposes (decree of March 9, 2005, article 27).  During our survey, we found that this rule had been ignored in some peri-urban communes of Bamako.

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**Figure 4.1 – The land delivery system**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Individual plots.<br>CUSTOMARY LAND<br>- No administrative document<br>DELIVERY CHANNEL<br>(Figure 3.1)<br>Informal<br>market<br>agricultural land, “lotissements prefectoraux”, informal developers<br>Individual plots.<br>- Administrative documents<br>- Precarious titles<br>“lotissements” and “recasements” by communes<br>PUBLIC LAND DELIVERY<br>Land registered in the<br>CHANNEL (Figure 3.2) “lotissements préfectoraux”<br>name of the State<br>after dispossession of<br>customary rights<br>development<br>( purge des droits )<br>requirement<br>ACI<br>Formal<br>Individual plots.<br>market<br>Other land registered FORMAL PRIVATE - Property title (TF)<br>in the name of the LAND DELIVERY formal developers, cooperatives<br>State CHANNEL (Figure 3.3)<br><!-- End of picture text --> 21
When a plot is sold without any administrative document, an _attestation de vente—_ which should preferably be authenticated by the mayor's office, i.e. an _attestation de vente authentifiée_ —is almost always established. This authentication protects the buyer in the event of a dispute with the seller (if it is demonstrated, for example, that the latter had no rights over the land sold) but it is not binding on third parties. Selling land with an administrative document ( _bulletin_ or _lettre d’attribution_ ) is prohibited but is not unknown; in practice, sellers and buyers establish an _attestation de vente authentifiée_ . Precarious titles are in general not supposed to be sold. To legally sell a plot with a precarious title (CR, CRUH or CUH) requires a notarial deed or an equivalent act, and the authority which issued the precarious title must authorize the transfer of the land after checking that it has indeed been developed and charges, amounting to 7% of the price of the plot, have been paid. However, these conditions are rarely met: to avoid paying charges, it is very common for transfers to be undertaken without changing the name of the holder. Annex 4.1 recapitulates all the documents that can be used for these different kinds of transactions.

The two main features of the land delivery system represented on Figure 4.1 above are: (i) the various interrelations between the land delivery channels and their links with the markets, and (ii) the diversity of tenure situations and of modes of access (allocations through the public or para-public land delivery channel or purchases). These situations and modes of access may or may not be legal and occur more or less frequently. This is summarized in a Table in Annex 4.2.

# **4.2 Stakeholders: Their role in the land delivery system**

# **4.2.1. Stakeholders by land delivery and geographic area of intervention**

The land delivery system involves many stakeholders. They have different functions that can be grouped in 6 main categories: (i) land suppliers/sellers; (ii) land purchasers; (iii) institutions governing land allocations and transactions (i.e. providing _attestations de vente authentifiées_ , administrative documents, precarious titles and property titles); (iv) intermediaries between sellers, buyers and authorities (brokers, _coxers_ ); (v) professionals (land surveyors who plot and subdivide land, notaries, and urban planners); (vi) credit / Finance institutions. A Table presented in Annex 4.3 details their participation to the different land delivery channels and the geographic areas where they operate.

# **4.2.2. The services provided by some stakeholders and related costs**

Many of these stakeholders charge money for their services, which weigh in the cost of accessing land. In this respect, we obtain from informants the following information: Institutions charge fees to provide an _attestation de vente authentifiée_ , to authorize transfers or issue titles. Some of these fees are statutory and others correspond to illicit payments for which no receipt will be given (see Annex 4.4).

Intermediaries also contribute to the cost of accessing land. In particular, _coxers_ , who are looking for quick profits, play an important role. Taking advantage of sellers' trust and buyers' haste, they often try to secure maximum margins with little concern for the legality of the transactions. According to informants, a _coxer_ may get a commission of between 5 and 10% of the price from the seller of customary land. He may sometimes get a commission from the buyer as well. Brokers may help to speed up processing of applications for _attestations de vente authentifiées_ , or for precarious title or property title.

Finally, the remuneration of professionals also weighs significantly in the cost of accessing land. Land surveyors are paid in either plots or money when the land is subdivided. In the case of sale of customary land, they receive between 10 and 20% of the plots. Surveyors are not always officially authorized and sometimes act as both surveyors and _coxers_ .

# **4.2.3. The importance of social connections**

Allocation of plots by the _communes_ is heavily dependent on social and political connections and clientelist relations, which play an important part in Malian culture. Plot allocation will be all the easier to obtain if the beneficiary has connections with the town councillors; the same goes for obtaining precarious title. In Annex 4.5, we give an example of the role of political/social connections in the public allocation of land.

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Similarly, a property title (TF) will be granted all the more quickly and easily (even if there has been no development) if additional sums have been paid to the various departments of the administration and the applicant is socially and politically well connected: _‘The matter of corruption is brought up in all studies of land-use management. All stakeholders consulted during various missions have mentioned it. Local elected councillors, customary landholders, prefecture officials, officials from the DDC and investors are all liable to benefit from corruption. It is important to recognize both its deep-rooted nature and its function in redistributing the profits anticipated by the various parties involved in the market, especially those who play a key role in the process of converting informal tenure rights into formal rights.’ (Durand-Lasserve, 2009)._ Suspicions of widespread corruption are aroused when reading the Auditor General’s 2011 Annual Report (République du Mali, 2012).<sup>53</sup>

# **5. RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY OF RECENT LAND TRANSACTIONS**

# **5.1. Methodology and sample**

The objective of the survey was to collect tenure and price information on the modes of access to land in Bamako and its surrounding areas.<sup>54</sup> It was carried out between February and April 2012 in the district of Bamako, its periurban area and the city’s rural hinterland (see Annex 2.2). Information was collected on 1,655 non-built plots transacted between 2009 and 2012 and located between 3.5 km and 72 km away from the city center. Information on each plot was collected by a team of investigators through a variety of local informants (neighbors, _coxers_ , customary chiefs, buyers, users, sellers and elected local officials). For each plot, the survey provides information on its characteristics (land use, surface, infrastructure services), its location (GPS co-ordinates, commune, distance to the closest paved road and to the river), and its tenure status (reported tenure types and corresponding documents). The questionnaire that was used is reproduced in Annex 5.1.

Although a strict random selection of plots was not possible, efforts were made to ensure uniform coverage of the survey zone, especially around roads extending outwards from Bamako. In this sense, although the sample cannot be said to be perfectly representative of the universe of transacted plots in Bamako and its surrounding areas, conclusions may be drawn regarding the broad patterns that characterize access to land in the area, shedding light on the available options and the strategies of households to obtain land and secure tenure.

The map in Annex 2.1 represents the study area, which extends over the Bamako District, the Kati _cercle_ and part of the Koulikoro _cercle_ , covering the urban, peri-urban and rural hinterland of the city. Information on transactions was collected within 27 communes in this zone.<sup>55</sup> The map in Annex 5.2 superimposes the plots in our sample on

> 53 The report states that ‘The DDC-DB reduced the sale prices of land, failing to apply the principle of uprating sale prices by a total amount of FCFA 80.35 million, in breach of the provisions of Decree No. 02-114/P-RM of March 6, 2002 establishing the sale prices and fees for urban and rural land in the State's private domain.  In addition, the DDC-DB granted property developers who had not submitted approved property development programs unjustified facilities totalling FCFA 163.94 million in breach of the provisions of Decree No. N0-274/P-RM of June 23, 2000 setting out the procedures for granting facilities to property developers’.

> 54 “Modes of access to land” refer to a position within a land delivery channel or market (see Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) and within the land delivery system (see Figure 4.1)

> 55 The following _communes_ are covered: Baguineda camp (255 obs.), Bamako _commune_ I (2 obs.), Bamako _commune_ IV (5 obs.), Bamako _commune_ V (35 obs.), Bamako c _ommune_ VI (30 obs.), Bancoumana (28 obs.), Bougoula (28 obs.), Diago (68 obs.), Dialakoroba (39 obs.), Dialakorodji (45 obs.), Dio Gare (30 obs.), Doubabougou (81 obs.), Kalabancoro (99 obs.), Kambila (51 obs.), Kati (26 obs.), Mande (141 obs.), Meguetan (17 obs.), Moribabougou (46 obs.), Mountougoula (148 obs.), N’gabacoroDroit (92 obs.), Ouelessebougou (61 obs.), Safo (172 obs.), Sanankoroba (88 obs.), Sangarebougou (21 obs.), Siby (23 obs.), Tiele (6 obs.), and Tienfala (18 obs.).  Four of these communes are located in the Bamako district, 21 in the _Kati cercle_ , and 2 in the _Koulikoro cercle_ .

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the same background. The shaded zone is the urbanized area as identified visually according to the criterion of density and contiguity of the built-up area. It extends beyond the boundaries of Bamako District. Beyond the shaded zone are the peri-urban areas and the rural hinterland.

# **5.2. The spatial segmentation of modes of access to land**

The main purpose of the survey is to explore how land has been accessed in and around Bamako over a several-year period in order to identify modes of access to land in terms of tenure and possible tenure transitions, accounting for the dynamic of the land delivery system (See figure 4.1). A period of three years only was chosen in order to ensure sufficient quality of responses to retrospective questions in our cross-sectional survey. According to the land delivery system described in Section 4, households may access land in the following ways:

- a. Purchase of land from a customary owner, which may or may not involve a monetary transaction (see subsection 3.1);

- b. Allocation of a land plot through the public and para-public land delivery channel (see sub-section 3.2);

- c. Purchase of a land plot in a land development ( _lotissement_ ) made by a formal private developer (see subsection 3.3);

- d. Purchase of a land plot on the formal or informal secondary land markets (see sub-section 4.1).

To analyze the data collected, we classify modes of land access by using the following categories:

- i. Purchase of land on the private land market (whether formal or informal), lumping together categories c and d which cannot be systematically distinguished with our data;

- ii. Public allocation of land (where plots are obtained directly from a public authority), corresponding to category b;

- iii. Purchase of customary land (i.e. where plots are transferred from a customary owner by means of a monetary transaction), corresponding to a subcategory of a; and

- iv. Non-monetary customary access to land (where customary land is obtained in exchange for a symbolic payment of kola nuts, sometimes including a chicken as well), which corresponds to the other subcategory of a.

It should be noted that just as our sample may not be representative of the universe of all transacted plots over the study period, it might also not be representative of the relative sizes of the different access modes. The survey nevertheless illustrates the diversity of the ways households access land and upgrade their tenure in Bamako and its surroundings, which is the main focus of our study.<sup>56</sup> The different types of transactions that we document tend to occur in distinct areas. This is shown on Figure 5.1 below which plots the geographic co-ordinates of our sample’s plots by land access modes.

The spatial patterns of land access modes are rather clear-cut. Although plots that were obtained under the private and public land access modes are spread out throughout the study area, they occupy relatively central locations. In contrast, plots obtained from customary owners are located further away from the city center. Monetized and nonmonetized transfers of customary land occur in outer rings of the peri-urban area and rural hinterland. Most interestingly, whereas the median monetized customary transaction occurs 32km away from the city center, nonmonetized customary transfers are found in a peri-urban ring with a greater median location of 37 km. This pattern corroborates previous observations made by social scientists on the “emergence of land markets” fueled by urban expansion and the conversion of customary land in peri-urban areas in Africa (see Durand-Lasserve 1998, Rakodi & Leduka 2004, Wehrmann 2008).

> 56 The composition of our sample is as follows: non-customary plots that were privately transacted (68%), plots publicly allocated (3%), customary plots sold for money (20%), and customary plots exchanged according to custom (9%).

24
<!-- Start of picture text --> Ge Private Public<br>of * Ne<br>i # 4 ® ., & .<br>ss.<br>.<br>. “e a<br>o *<br>g “5<br>6 ° Customary monetary Customary non-monetary<br>D 8 8<br># *<br>.<br>. 7 &<br>v. ‘al<br>°f<br>*<br>a a i 1<br>9 8.5 8 7.5 7 9 8.5 8 75 7<br>Longitude<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **Table 5.1 – Characteristics of land access modes**

|**Access to**<br>**land:**|**Definition**|**Number**<br>**of obs.**|**Median**<br>**distance**<br>**to city**<br>**center**|**Percentage**<br>**of plots**<br>**intended**<br>**for**<br>**residential**<br>**use**|**Medi**|**an size**|**Median p**<br>**of tran**|**rice (at time**<br>**saction)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Private (non-**<br>**customary)**|Land bought from<br>non-customary<br>“owner” (including<br>previously allocated<br>land and customary<br>land sold on the<br>secondarymarket)|1,120|21 km|84%|Residential:<br>300 m<sup>2</sup>|Agricultural:<br>2 ha|Residential<br>(CFA/m<sup>2</sup>):<br>1,125|Agricultural<br>(CFA/ha):<br>500,000|
|**Public (non-**<br>**customary)**|Land directly allocated<br>by central or local<br>government|52|21 km|75%|Residential:<br>300 m<sup>2</sup>|Agricultural:<br>2 ha|Residential<br>(CFA/m<sup>2</sup>):<br>1,583|Agricultural<br>(CFA/ha):<br>750,000<sup>57</sup>|
|**Customary**<br>**monetary**|Customary land<br>bought from owner|328|32 km|47%|Residential:<br>400 m<sup>2</sup>|Agricultural:<br>3 ha|Residential<br>(CFA/m<sup>2</sup>):<br>823|Agricultural<br>(CFA/ha):<br>300,000|
|**Customary**<br>**non-**<br>**monetary**|Land obtained through<br>customary mechanism|154|37 km|17%|Residential:<br>450 m<sup>2</sup>|Agricultural:<br>2ha|Residential<br>(CFA/m<sup>2</sup>):<br>n/a|Agricultural<br>(CFA/ha):<br>n/a|

_Source: authors’ survey, 20_ The Table in Annex 5.3 presents the profile of sellers and buyers by land access mode. Most sellers of non-built plots are farmers (63%). While 97% of “sellers” in the non-monetary customary access mode are farmers, the figure drops to 84% in the monetary customary access mode and to 56% in the private market (53% for plots with an intended residential use but 73% for agricultural plots). The latter figures suggest that more than half the sellers on the private market are farmers that do not hold the land customarily. They may have bought parcels from customary owners and are selling them on the secondary market. Interestingly, the share of _coxers_ identified as sellers of a plot is highest on the private residential market (16%) hinting at the specialization of intermediaries in the residential segment of the market.<sup>58</sup> Contrary to sellers, the majority of buyers of non-built plots are _not_ farmers (as farmers represent only 12% of all buyers). Although the occupation of a significant proportion of buyers is not known, the figures suggest that there are important differences in terms of buyers’ characteristics depending on the land access mode. While farmers represent 77% of “buyers” of customarily transacted plots (customary plots transacted according to custom), they represent only 9% of buyers on the monetary customary land market, and 4% of buyers on the private land market. Notice that farmers demanding land in the monetized customary and private markets are likely to be investors purchasing land whereas farmers demanding land through the nonmonetary customary land access mode are lowincome households likely to have been granted a right to use the land rather than “ownership” of the plot. The small

> 57 Table 5.1 surprisingly reports _a priori_ a higher price for land obtained through the public delivery channel than on the private land market.  To understand this result, it should be noted that these are raw values that do not account for differences in plot characteristics, including location (see the regressions at the end of this section for a better analysis of land prices) and that median price values can be sensitive to small sample bias (there are only 9 observations for agricultural land accessed through the public channel).  It is not clear also whether responses to our questionnaire make it possible to distinguish publicly allocated land from land acquired by a customary owner to which a precarious title was subsequently issued (which should indeed sell for a higher price than agricultural land acquired on the private market without any precarious title).

> 58 Notice that our questionnaire did not allow for a sufficient distinction between sellers and intermediaries. Some _coxers_ who appear as sellers of customary land in survey responses are in fact simply facilitating the transfer of land.  Other _coxers_ who rightly appear as sellers on the private land market do indeed buy customary rural land which they subdivide for residential use before reselling it. There might also be some confusion in responses regarding the profession of the seller and the function of the person delivering a property right within the land administration.

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proportion of farmers buying land on the private land market also reflects the fact that private land markets are overwhelmingly residential (see Table 5.1 above).

The survey also highlights women’s weak access to land. Regarding residential land, women represent only 18% of buyers in the private land market, 15% of beneficiaries of public land allocation, 13% of buyers in the monetized customary market, and 8% of recipients in the non-monetized customary access mode. This seems indicative of women having very little access to land through customary channels and only a slightly better access through the private and public land access modes. The figures are even lower for agricultural land where women represent between 5% and 6% of buyers depending on the land access mode.

Another interesting result relates to the place of residence of buyers: whether in the private market, public mode access or monetized customary market, more than 60% of recipients of plots located outside Bamako District reside in Bamako District (which is more populated and concentrates households with the financial means and social connections required to purchase land). 70% of these plots are for residential use but only 25% of them have been built on since the date of the transaction, which is suggestive of an important proportion of speculative holdings. In the non-monetized customary access mode, there are very few buyers from Bamako District and 72% of buyers actually reside in the same _commune_ , which is consistent with local small farmers being granted the right to use the land under a symbolic exchange. As for Malian expatriates, they are mostly purchasing land on the private land market, where they represent 7% of all buyers.

# **5.3. Land tenure patterns**

There is a lot of variation regarding the tenure status of the plots. Focusing on tenure at the time of transaction, we can see in the Table in Annex 5.4 that most plots are obtained with some kind of administrative or legal documentation. While 29% of the plots in our survey have no administrative documentation whatsoever, the majority of plots (53%) were held at the time of transaction with some administrative document ( _bulletin_ , _lettre de convocation_ , _lettre de notification_ or _lettre d’attribution_ ; see Table 3.1 for a definition of these documents and the context in which they can be obtained).<sup>59</sup> These administrative documents do not confer any legal rights in theory. Only 13% of plots had a temporary use right also known as a “precarious title” which refers to the different forms of _concession and permis d’occuper_ . Only 5% of the plots in our survey were held under full ownership certified by a property title at the time of transaction.

Interestingly, plots for residential use (which represent 67% of our sample) are often held with an administrative document that provides no legal right (62%). The proportion of plots held with no administrative documentation is only 16%, while the proportion of plots held with a precarious title ( _permis d’occuper_ or _concessions à usage d’habitation_ ) or a property title adds up to 21% (15% and 6% respectively).

For agricultural plots (33% of our sample), the lack of documentation is more pronounced. At the time of transaction, only 10% of them were held with a precarious or property title (8% and 2% respectively). 30% of agricultural plots have an administrative document and 60% have no administrative document at all.<sup>60</sup> When looking simultaneously at the access mode to obtain the plot and the tenure status at the time of transaction (see the Table in Annex 5.5), one sees that a majority of plots is obtained on the private market with an administrative document (51%), which is given only by the public authorities ( _communes_ and _préfets_ ). Given that only 3% of the sample’s plots are directly obtained through the public land delivery channel, we can assume that plots allocated through this channel with an administrative document are not kept by recipients and end up fueling the large informal secondary market.<sup>61</sup> Only 16% of our sample’s plots are obtained on the private market with a

> 59 With the collected data, it was difficult to distinguish a _lettre d’attribution_ from a _lettre de notification_ (see Note (2) under Table 3.1 which details the reasons for this ambiguity).  For the analysis, we decided to treat all _lettres d’attribution_ as _lettres de notification_ , i.e. administrative documents.

> 60 About 50% of agricultural plots that did not hold an administrative document at the time of transaction had an _attestation de vente_ which was authenticated by the _commune_ (see Annex 4.1)

> 61 There are different ways whereby a plot of land can end up being privately transacted with an administrative document.  The origin of the land may be the public land delivery channel with the land being illegally resold on the private secondary market, or it may be the purchase of land of customary origin with the current owner initiating a process of formalization of tenure rights (see Section 3 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for the processes, and Annex 4.1 for the documents used in different transactions).

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more or less formal right (12% with a precarious title and 4% with a fully-fledged property title). 29% of the plots are obtained in the monetized and traditional segments of the customary land access modes. This may reflect the substitution of customary channels and informal secondary markets for the _direct_ public provision of land, which appears to be exhausted or frozen over the studied period. Interestingly, among households who accessed residential land in the non-monetized customary access mode, 96% do not have a document that justifies their occupation of the plot. The figure drops to 32% for households who purchased land in the monetized customary access mode (and 22% for all plots intended for residential use). As regards plots destined for agricultural use, 91% of them ~~w~~ ere obtained in the non-monetized customary access mode without an administrative document (suggesting that transfers could take the form of a right to use the land more than a transfer of ownership). This contrasts greatly with the fact that only 10% of households who purchase land in the monetized customary access mode do not have an administrative document. This suggests that buyers of agricultural land in the monetized customary access mode have the means to protect their investment (i.e. the urban elites buying up agricultural land).

When looking at the tenure obtained through each land access mode (see the Table in Annex 5.6), one sees that customary plots are never obtained with an administrative document even when the transaction is monetized. However, 78% of monetized transactions of customary land are made with an _attestation de vente_ ( _vs._ only 9% of non-monetized customary transactions). As regards public land allocation, in half the cases plots are obtained with an administrative document only (and in 31% and 19% of the cases with a precarious title or a property title respectively). For privately transacted plots, only a minority is obtained with a property title (7%) or a use right (17%). On the private market, land is predominantly obtained with an administrative document only (76%).<sup>62</sup> This suggests that the public and private access modes tend towards more formalization than the customary access mode that is totally informal.

The different tenure situations exhibit noticeable spatial patterns that partly reflect the spatial stratification of land access modes. As can be seen from the Table in Annex 5.7, more secure and more formal tenure situations are located closer to the center of Bamako with a median distance for property titles in our sample of 16 km whereas the median plot without an administrative document is located 33 km away from the city center. Intermediate forms of tenure (administrative documents and precarious titles) occupy intermediate locations in the city. This is true for the sample as a whole but also within the subsamples of residential and agricultural plots. There is a combination of reasons that could explain why more secure forms of tenure are on average closer to the city center (see Selod and Tobin, 2013). One explanation could be that richer individuals who have the financial means and social network to formalize tenure prefer to reside closer to the city. Another explanation is higher incentives to hold formal land close to the city center: since proximity to the city center commands greater land values, occupants who do not have formal titles are exposed to market pressures and a higher risk of conflict and evictions. A third explanation could be that formal land developments where plots are sold with a property title are located close to the city center, mechanically increasing the proportion of plots held under formal tenure in central locations. Finally, plots closer to the city center have been converted to residential use earlier giving more time for plot holders to upgrade their tenure.

Of course, there is not a complete spatial stratification of tenure and various situations may be observed in a given location. Figure 5.2 below represents the land tenure “mix” at the time of the survey for different distance ranges from the center of Bamako. As one moves further away from the city center, the share of more formal and more secure types of tenure (precarious titles and property titles) diminishes in favor of the share of less secure tenure types (administrative documents at best).<sup>63</sup> Figure 5.2 thus illustrates the phasing out of formality as distance from the city center increases: there are no property titles in our sample more than 24 km away from Bamako and no precarious tiles further than 32 km. The proportion of plots held under administrative documents decreases to about one-third 40 km and more away from Bamako.

> 62 This corresponds to the resale of an administrative document for which a large secondary market seems to exist.

> 63 A Kolmogor-Smirnov test confirms that the spatial distribution of more secure tenure types is significantly different at the 1% level from that of less secure tenure types.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> a L]<br>Qa®— ;<br>at<br>8Cc /<br>2<br>_5<br>©—<br>cy<br>ao<br>| :<br>O4kn 48kn 8-12km 1246km 1620km 2024km 2428kn 28-32kn 32-36Kn 36~40kn 40km +<br>No administrative document MN Administrative document<br>MEE Precarious title MEE Property title<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Table 5.2 – Tenure transition matrix – all plots (in %)**

|**Tenure at time of survey**<br>**Tenure at time of transaction **|**No administrative**<br>**document**|**Administrative**<br>**document**|**Precarious**<br>**title**|**Property**<br>**title**|**Unknown**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**No administrative document**|13.4|11.1|3.5%|0.7|0.4|29.1|
|**Administrative document**|0.0|44.4|8.0%|0.5|0.0|53.0|
|**Precarious title**|0.0|0.0|12.0%|0.7|0.1|12.7|
|**Property title**|0.0|0.0|0.0%|5.0|0.0|5.0|
|**Unknown **|0.0|0.0|0.0%|0.0|0.1|0.1|
|**Total **|13.4|55.5|23.5%|7.0|0.5|100.0|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_ The Table in Annex 5.8 represents tenure transitions for the subsample of plots destined for residential use. The figures are very similar to those for the sample as a whole and confirm that tenure upgrading strategies are not implemented to the full extent and that many households stop short of obtaining a property title.<sup>65</sup> No specific spatial patterns seem to determine where conversions occur.

# **5.5. Land tenure and land prices**

Having collected data on transaction prices (both at the time of transaction and at the time of the survey), we can explore the determinants of land prices in Bamako. Our main objectives are to assess both the values of the different land tenure situations and the spatial patterns that prevail in terms of land prices. In theory, land prices are expected to be related to physical characteristics such as plot size, location (physical accessibility of the city center) and availability of services (water or electricity), as well as to tenure status and associated security and embedded rights (e.g. transferability). We thus resort to hedonic price analysis to investigate how prices are correlated with tenure and location, while controlling for other characteristics. We do this for all plot transactions with a “price”, thus excluding the non-monetary land access modes from the pooled sample of observations and considering public allocation as if it were a land market.<sup>66</sup> To address possible outlier issues, we remove observations for which the price of land per square meter was in the top or bottom 1% of the price distribution. The equation we estimate is of the form: In this equation _pi_ is the price per square meter of plot _i_ (which can be either the price paid at the date of the transaction or the estimated price at the date of the survey), _ti_ is a set of dummy variables describing the tenure on the land, _di_ is the Euclidean distance to the city center. The _Xij_ are various covariates present in the database such as the distance to the nearest paved road, the area of the plot, whether the land is serviced (water and/or electricity) and the bank of the river on which the land is located. We include the area of the plot (even though the dependent variable is price per square meter in order to capture non-linear effects).

> 65 Explanations could be that tenure upgrading to property title is not always desired, it takes too much time to be observed within the retrospective 3-year time frame of the survey, and is most likely too costly for many households (see Section 4.2 for details on the costs of land tenure conversion).

> 66 It is legitimate to do so.  In all likelihood, since no specific indications were given to respondents, declared prices should be inclusive of bribes and should thus approximate the market value of land under the assumption that the land administration is able to fully extract rents from allottees (See Selod and Tobin, 2013 for a spatial theory of land price determination with the coexistence of diverse land tenure situations in a West African city).

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The coefficients of our regression are estimated by OLS.<sup>67</sup> Results are presented in Table 5.3 below for four different specifications. Specifications (1) and (2) are using the price at the time of transaction as the explained variable whereas specifications (3) and (4) are using the estimated price at the time of the survey.<sup>68</sup> Specifications (1) and (3) exclude the interaction term between distance and tenure category whereas specifications (2) and (4) include it. Inclusion of this term can account for different price gradients depending on the tenure category. All specifications include a dummy for plots that are destined for agricultural use (as opposed to residential).

Results are consistent across our different specifications. The land market in Bamako displays the patterns that could be expected from any land market: prices decrease with distance from the city center and road infrastructure, and increase for serviced plots. The market values residential plots more than agricultural plots. Plots with secure forms of tenure are on average more expensive than plots with less secure forms of tenure. Except for regression (4), there is no evidence that the price of plots with an administrative document differs significantly from those without one, which is consistent with the idea that an administrative document provides no legal right and is therefore not very valuable.<sup>69</sup> Across specifications, plots with property titles are worth 1.4 to 5.7 times the price of similar plots with no legal rights, demonstrating the high value of tenure security and of transferability.

To allow for the possibility that characteristics are priced differently for agricultural and residential plots, we have also run the same regressions for the subsample of residential plots. The results presented in columns (5)-(8) of Table 5.3. They are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those for the whole sample.

Regressions (5) and (6) in Table 5.3 which use prices at the date of transaction enable us to roughly estimate the annual rate of increase in land prices for plots destined for residential use. It is important to note that with our data, such estimates can only be very rough and may possibly provide an underestimation of land price increases, for instance if respondents tend to bias downwards the amount paid for recent land transactions: indeed both buyers and sellers may tend to minimize the price they agreed on by fear of taxes or to avoid pressures from relatives or people who may have a claim on the same plot. Conversely, overpricing by landowners, _coxers_ or developers may be observed when a plot is for sale (but this would not be included in our sample of effective transactions)<sup>70</sup> . Nevertheless, according to our data, prices are found to have increased by about 40% over the period covered by the study, which would indicate an increase of about 16% per year.<sup>71</sup> When restricting the sample to the private residential market for property titles, we estimate an annual price increase of about 20%. Bearing in mind the imperfections of our data noted earlier, we simply want to note that our results point to land price increases that are much higher than the nominal growth in GDP per capita (+2.6% in 2010 and -0.35% in 2011) and in the range of ten times the official inflation rate (the consumer price index has increased by 2% annually between 2008 and 2011). Given the high ratio of land prices to household incomes, this is indicative of a significant decrease in affordability.

> 67 Since we have no means to address possible endogeneity issues, we do not infer any causality from our results and interpret them as indicative of correlations only.

> 68 When using prices at the time of the transaction, time dummies are used to account for the year the plot was transacted.  When using estimated prices at the time of the survey, we consider the tenure variables at the time of the survey instead of the tenure variables at the time of transaction.  All other variables are considered time invariant.

> 69 The fact that more than half the plots in the whole sample are held under an administrative document could thus be viewed as an indication of the difficulty households face in upgrading to a precarious title or a property title.

> 70 Estimations of price increases with our data are also approximate given that we only have the year of transaction and not the exact date, because some respondents may fail to include the bribes they paid in the price, and because the sample may not be representative of the whole land market.

> 71 The last plot was surveyed in April 2012, so we used a period of 2.3 years for the calculation.

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# **Table 5.3 – Land price regressions**

|||**All u**|**ses**|||**Residenti**|**al use only**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Regressi**<br>**transacti**<br>|**on using**<br>**on price**<br>|**Regressi**<br>**current esti**<br>|**on using**<br>**mated price**<br>|**Regressi**<br>**transact**<br>|**on using**<br>**ion price**<br>|**Regres**<br>**current est**<br>|**sion using**<br>**imated price**<br>|
||**(1)**<br>|**(2)**<br>|**(3)**<br>|**(4)**<br>|**(5)**|**(6)**|**(7)**|**(8)**|
|**Dummy: agricultural use**|-0.422<sup>~~***~~</sup>|-0.400<sup>~~***~~</sup>|-0.476<sup>~~***~~</sup>|-0.458<sup>~~***~~</sup>|||||
||(0.101)|(0.101)|(0.096)|(0.095)|||||
|**Distance to city center (km)**|-0.069<sup>***</sup>|-0.068<sup>***</sup>|-0.068<sup>***</sup>|-0.101<sup>***</sup>|-0.072<sup>***</sup>|-0.055<sup>***</sup>|-0.068<sup>***</sup>|-0.105<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.004)|(0.007)|(0.004)|(0.012)<br>|(0.004)|(0.10)|(0.004)|(0.015)<br>|
|**Dummy: administrative document**|0.071|-0.052|-0.034|-1.054<sup>***</sup>|-0.038|0.213|-0.178**|-1.205<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.066)<br>|(0.199)<br>|(0.087)<br>|(0.304)|(0.079)<br>|(0.241)<br>|(0.094)|(0.338)|
|**Dummy: precarious title**|0.672<sup>***</sup>|1.458<sup>***</sup>|0.215<sup>**</sup>|-0.124|0.598<sup>***</sup>|1.840<sup>***</sup>|0.139|0.044|
||(0.085)<br>|(0.256)<br>|(0.093)<br>|(0.319)<br>|(0.098)<br>|(0.297)<br>|(0.101)<br>|(0.363)|
|**Dummy: property title**|1.912<sup>***</sup>|1.842<sup>***</sup>|1.346<sup>***</sup>|0.880<sup>**</sup>|1.727<sup>***</sup>|2.087<sup>***</sup>|1.295<sup>***</sup>|0.507|
||(0.127)|(0.331)|(0.121)|(0.351)<br>|(0.138)|(0.348)|(0.130)|(0.383)<br>|
|**Distance x administrative document**||0.006||0.045<sup>***</sup>||-0.011||0.049<sup>***</sup><br>|
|||(0.008)<br>||(0.013)||(0.011)<br>||(0.016)|
|**Distance x precarious title**||-0.044<sup>***</sup>||0.011||-0.070<sup>***</sup>||-0.003|
|||(0.012)||(0.013)||(0.015)||(0.018)<br>|
|**Distance x property title**||0.005||0.017||-0.017||0.038<sup>**</sup>|
|||(0.018)<br>||(0.016)<br>||(0.020)<br>||(0.020)<br>|
|**Surface (in log)**|-0.422<sup>***</sup>|-0.428<sup>***</sup>|-0.423<sup>***</sup>|-0.421<sup>***</sup>|-0.445<sup>***</sup>|-0.459<sup>***</sup>|-0.419<sup>***</sup>|-0.425<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.026)<br>|(0.025)<br>|(0.024)<br>|(0.024)<br>|(0.036)<br>|(0.035)<br>|(0.033)<br>|(0.032)<br>|
|**Dummy: South bank of the river**|0.793<sup>***</sup>|0.782<sup>***</sup>|0.742<sup>***</sup>|0.722<sup>***</sup>|0.794<sup>***</sup>|0.787<sup>***</sup>|0.823<sup>***</sup>|0.799<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.50)<br>|(0.050)<br>|(0.046)<br>|(0.046)<br>|(0.056)<br>|(0.057)<br>|(0.050)<br>|(0.051)<br>|
|**Distance to paved road (km)**|-0.077<sup>***</sup>|-0.077<sup>***</sup>|-0.086<sup>***</sup>|-0.084<sup>***</sup>|-0.074<sup>***</sup>|-0.075<sup>***</sup>|-0.078<sup>***</sup>|-0.077<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.004)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|**Access to water**|<br>0.662<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.649<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.762<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.707<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.587<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.608<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.655***|<br>0.612<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.139)|(0.139)|(0.134)|(0.134)|(0.152)|(0.150)|(0.141)|(0.140)|
|**Access to electricity**|0.092|0.165|-0.050|-0.014|0.135|0.153|0.059|0.017|
||(0.310)|(0.308)|(0.303)|(0.300)|(0.362)|(0.361)|(0.338)|(0.335)|
|**Dummy: sold in 2010**|<br>0.210<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.199<sup>***</sup>|||<br>0.265<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.235<sup>***</sup>|||
||(0.062)|(0.062)|||(0.071)|(0.071)|||
|**Dummy: sold in 2011**|<br>0.282<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.282<sup>***</sup>|||<br>0.297<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.289<sup>***</sup>|||
||(0.063)|(0.062)|||(0.069)|(0.069)|||
|**Dummy: sold in 2012**|<br>0.295<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.290<sup>***</sup>|||<br>0.406<sup>***</sup>|<br>0.381<sup>***</sup>|||
||(0.103)|(0.103)|||(0.112)|(0.112)|||
|**_Obs._**<br>|1,239|1,239|1,289|1,289|991|991|1,016|1,016|
|**_R_**<sup>**_2_**</sup>|0.79|0.79|0.79|0.80|0.63|0.64|0.64|0.65|

_Notes: OLS regressions for pooled residential and agricultural plots, excluding 1% of highest and lowest prices. In (1), (2), (5) and (6) the tenure dummies are at transaction time. In (3), (4), (7) and (8) the tenure dummies are at the time of the survey. Constant not shown. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level_ 32
We also characterized the negative land price gradient for Bamako. This is done for residential plots only and prices at the time of transaction by estimating a hedonic price regression with the same explanatory variables as in specification (1) but excluding the distance variable. Residuals from this estimation are then plotted against distance from the city center and represented on the Figure in Annex 5.9. This provides a simple graphical representation of land markets in Bamako that removes any price variability associated with spatial differences in observed characteristics. The negative gradient confirms the higher value of land close to the city center and the influence of Bamako throughout the study area.

# **6. LAND MANAGEMENT AND LAND CONFLICT ISSUES**

The previous sections have shown that access to land is a complex, costly and lengthy process. It is also characterized and impeded by various types of conflicts, which we describe and discuss in the present section. Many disputes arise as a result of inconsistencies in rules. Conflicts also thrive because of the gaps between rules and actual practice. Finally, they emerge due to the circulation of forged property titles and multiple allocation of a _lettre d’attribution_ for the same plot. In this context, conflicts are numerous and tend to linger on as there are many failures in the justice system which is supposed to resolve them.

# **6.1. Inconsistencies and lack of precision in rules**

# **6.1.1. Conflicting powers of the** **_communes_ and state over “** **_lotissements_ ”**

There has been a series of forward and backward steps regarding the respective roles of the local and central governments concerning land. This is well illustrated by the _Sauvons notre quartier_ (SNQ) regularization program, which was launched by the state in 1992 in 24 of the “spontaneous” settlements in Bamako. The program provided an opportunity for the newly elected _commune_ councils to manage resettlement areas allocated by the state to evicted households (“ _les déguerpis”_ ).<sup>72</sup> This program took place shortly after the state was transferring substantial land tracts in Bamako to the ACI (see Subsection 3.2.2). According to Bertrand (2006), fearing that new land would be allocated to the ACI and tempted by the prospect of making profits, elected officials proceeded without authority to subdivide land and sell plots. Following allegations of misappropriation against mayors and the Governor of Bamako District as well as substantial disputes with the occupants of the land, the SNQ program was suspended in 1997.<sup>73</sup> Regularization resumed in 2001 and resettlement areas were again allocated to the _communes_ .

Other changes on _communes’_ prerogatives occurred in 2002 before being challenged later on. In 2002, the procedures for allocating land from the state's private domain to the local authorities, which now hosted decentralized departments of the DNDC, were specified in the law. Many of the technicians from these departments made arrangements to be transferred to specific _communes_ in which they knew, in view of their earlier activities, that there were resettlement areas where they could obtain plots. They then worked together with the elected officials to launch _lotissements_ (Bertrand 2006). Following further scandals, land allocations from the state's private domain to the local authorities were again suspended in 2003. The process of resumption/suspension went on during the following years.

In Kati _cercle_ , the representatives / agents of the state and local authorities compete to find land, usually customary, where subdivisions and _lotissements_ can be made. According to legislation, state representatives (notably _the Préfets_ ) should issue precarious titles (CR) to farmland, while the _communes_ should grant _concessions rurales à usage d’habitation_ (CRUH). Things are different in practice. The Auditor General mentions in his 2011 Annual Report (République du Mali, 2012) that ‘the Kati _cercle_ is continuing, despite the absence of legal foundation, to allocate CRUHs.’

> 72 In these neighborhoods, the State was indeed relinquishing its prerogatives in respect of plot allocation in favor of elected officials whose decisions it simply rubberstamped (Bertrand 2006).

> 73 Bourdarias (2003) notes that: ‘In the so-called spontaneous settlements, the operations of the SNQ program were marked by revolts.  The so-called illegal occupants had acquired concessions (rights of use) over plots from the original occupants in accordance with customary rules...  Ordered to legalize their rights of occupancy and evacuate plots affected by the road layout, they (the so-called illegal occupants) said they felt they had been robbed by a predatory power, which used to be kept at arm’s length but was now present in the heart of the settlements.  That power is presently personified by the municipal authorities’.

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# **6.1.2. Imprecise definition and enforcement of customary rights**

Rules regarding the definition and enforcement of customary rights are imprecise. Inhabitants of villages holding customary rights often feel that they are being robbed. The 2000 Land Code lays down that, before registering or allocating land, the state must carry out a public inquiry with due hearing of all parties but which modalities have not been spelled out. This can lead to conflict with other claimants to the land. As described in Annex 6.1, it happens that individuals or developers with financial resources and good social connections obtain a property title to land subject to customary rights without taking any account of the latter.

# **6.1.3. Misunderstandings regarding the land rights held**

Occupants of plots are often certain of their entitlements when in fact they are mistaken. This can partly be explained by the fact that the various stakeholders may use the same term, in good or bad faith, with a different meaning (see section 3). As many inhabitants cannot (or, in some cases, do not want to) pay the legal and illegal fees demanded in addition to the price of the land to complete the formalities for registering a precarious title, let alone a property title, they simply undertake the first steps, which provide them with a document, a " _petit papier_ ” (e.g. une _attestation de vente authentifiée_ ), (see Annex 6.2) or an administrative document (e.g. _bulletin or lettre de notification_ ). Although these “ _petits papiers”_ or administrative documents are not enough to ensure security of tenure, the holders are often convinced that they are occupying their land legally because they are in possession of a document bearing the signature of an authority.

# **6.1.4. Jurisdictional boundary issues**

Village and _commune_ boundaries are unclear, which leads to conflicts over land. An example is the dispute between two villages, N’Goninkoro and Dicko in Baguineda _commune_ . Both villages claimed, without supporting documents, that they had customary rights over the same land that they had each sold to two different people (Le Prétoire September 13, 2012; Le Républicain September 21, 2012).

# **6.2. Gaps between rules and practice**

# **6.2.1. Irregularities in** **_lotissement_ and** **_resettlement_ operations**

One of the reasons for all this confusion is that the _communes_ and state administration tend not to comply with the rules, particularly when engaging in " _lotissement_ " and resettlement operations.

The aim of upgrading/regularization operations is, in principle, to enable the poor to access land with a precarious title. These operations were and to a large extent still are diverted from their purpose by the _communes_ and the _bureaux specialisés des Antennes de la DRDC_ (see note 1 under Table 3.1) while state representatives turn a blind eye... An _Inspecteur des Domaines_ told us that many people were in resettlement areas although they were not authorized to be resettled. A former senior official responsible for housing policy at national level also told us that the allocation of resettlement plots, now a matter for mayors, was often undertaken to the benefit of people chosen by the latter. He reckoned that probably around 60% of so-called resettlement plots were misappropriated for the benefit of people likely to vote for the mayor (see also Annex 3.5).

Whereas, in order to encourage wider access to plots, _communes_ and _Antennes_ of the DRDC should no longer allocate more than one CHU to any one family,<sup>74</sup> this is common practice. The Auditor General’s Annual Report 2011 (République du Mali, 2012) notes, regarding Bamako district: ‘The _Antenne_ of _Commune_ V, for example, registered multiple land allocations. During the period 2008 – 2010, several people were individually allocated between five and fourteen residential lots’.

Some _communes_ have been known to carry out _lotissement_ or resettlement operations on land which is already the subject of property title (TF); they begin selling plots even before the _lotissement_ is completed, which is prohibited. Buyers of these plots lose out when the holder of the TF shows up (see Annex 6.3).

> 74 A person applying for precarious title (CUH or CRUH) must not have title to another plot in the same _commune_ (apart from a joint plot) and any allocation of more than 1000 m<sup>2</sup> must be authorized by a State representative.

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# **6.2.2. Other irregularities in land management**

The _communes_ do not comply with urban planning documents. Plots may be sold on public rights of way and spaces (green areas, public squares and shopping facilities), which can give rise to significant conflicts.

Certain state representatives grant _concessions rurales_ (CRs) on plots of a size more suitable for residential use. According to the Auditor General’s Annual Report 2011 (République du Mali, 2012), the _Sous-Préfet_ of Kalabancoro has granted CRs in respect of very small plots (300 m<sup>2</sup> ), by subdividing either land already allocated by the _Préfet_ as CR or customary land. Moreover, the _Préfet_ of Kati _cercle_ is said to have granted several CRs to the same person, which he is prohibited from doing.<sup>75</sup> Evictions following a declaration of expropriation in the public interest are not always carried out according to the rules and are not always accompanied by compensation.

# **6.3. Forged property titles, double or triple attribution of a** **_lettre d’attribution_ for the same**

# **plot**

In principle, a property title guarantees total security for its owner. In practice, forged titles may be issued, which weakens the security conferred by a property title. Banks in particular report their reluctance to grant loans on the basis of these securities. (see Annex 3.4). Doubts regarding the quality of property titles (TF) lead to conflicts (see Annex 6.4).

There are many inhabitants of Bamako and Kati _cercle_ who have a _lettre d’attribution_ for the same plot. This can happen in particular when beneficiaries of an LA ignore (or pretend to ignore) the provision in the law that stipulates that the land must be developed within three years. This means that someone who has held an LA for many years can transfer the plot (with the LA) without having developed it, whereas a middleman may offer this same land to a buyer because it appears to be vacant. That buyer can then, with the complicity of the local authority, also obtain an LA.

The identity of those who are taking up a precarious title is not always checked as evidenced by the Auditor General in his 2011 report: ‘The _Antenne_ of the _bureau specialisé_ of _commune IV_ also permitted the take-up of 811 CUHs by third parties without authority. By way of illustration, five of these people took up between 38 and 56 CUHs in 2009’ (République du Mali, 2012).

The Hamidou Diabaté Law of December 2011 provides that litigation between the holder of a precarious right and the holder of a property right shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the courts of law. Previously, the litigation was heard by an administrative court, which had the power to investigate whether all the administrative procedures for the allocation of a property title had been followed. The dispute may now relate only to the terms of the contact between the buyer and the seller.

Failures and conflicts result in frequent appeals to the justice system. According to the public prosecutor at the Supreme Court of Mali (République du Mali, 2009b), 80% of the many cases cluttering up the country’s courts involved a land tenure issue. The President of the Bar affirmed that tenure insecurity is the main cause of social conflict in Mali (ibid).

One should not conclude from the presentation of these different conflict types that they reflect a clear opposition between two groups: households or household groups on the one hand, and the administration, municipality councilors and speculators on the other hand. Many households speculate. Many know the rules but pretend to ignore them: as reported by Rakodi and Leduka (2004), this is often a means to passively resist rules. Councilors and those with responsibilities within the land administration do not only try to increase their wealth and influence but clientelist relations are also often a means to help the urban poor. Non-compliance of the administration of the rules is often presented as the only means to house the population. It seems, rather, that there is some sort of equilibrium or compromise between those groups as long as irregularities, corruption and speculation are considered by all as means to improve their own situation. It is only when the balance is disrupted by the excessive hunt for gains of

> 75 For example, in the area of Soro, he is said to have allocated several CRs covering 5 ha each, a total area of 459 ha, to a single person.

35
councilors, of the administration and of rich speculators and when these gains are insufficiently redistributed that the population strongly protests.

# **7. CONCLUSION**

## **Improving access to land in African cities: A highly sensitive issue**

Access to land in urban and peri-urban areas and the rural hinterland of African cities is a highly sensitive issue in a context characterized by widespread poverty and a high rate of urban population growth. The dysfunctional land sector is an impediment to investments and economic development, with major consequences for living standards, social peace and political stability. Inappropriate policy directions and loss of control over land delivery represent a major challenge and threat to governments.

The government of Mali has been aware of this problem at least since the early 1990’s,<sup>76</sup> but has not rolled out successful measures to ensure more efficient and equitable access to land and limit speculation. The March 22, 2012 military coup was, to a certain extent, fuelled by a general dissatisfaction due to inappropriate public land policy, gaps and weaknesses of land governance and corruption in land administration as evidenced by street protests and the tough resistance of communities and households threatened by evictions during the months that preceded the coup. Nationwide debate in the press concerning malpractice in land management and corruption in land administration has intensified after the coup.

Whereas the stakeholders involved in land markets acknowledge the shortcomings of the land policies implemented over the past two decades and the widening gap between household incomes and the cost of accessing land, elected representatives, government officials, decision-makers and professionals seem helpless to address this problem. This is not only due to divergent interests among them, or the lack of appropriate tools or political will. It is also the result of insufficient understanding of the procedures for accessing land and of the diversity and complexity of the mechanisms and dynamics involved in land delivery.

## **How have land market issues in Bamako been analyzed and addressed to date?**

The synthesis report of the Land Convention<sup>77</sup> ( _États Généraux du Foncier – EGF_ ) of 2008-2009 identifies the main constraints and problems that compromise the improvement of land governance in Mali and especially those related to access to land. Four main issues have been identified and discussed: the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks; the harmonization of state domain management with sectorial development policies; land management tools and procedures; and social participation and capacity building in land administration. It is, to date, the most comprehensive consensual diagnosis of land and tenure issues and policy in Mali. However: (i) it does not identify the structural causes of the problems encountered; (ii) their dynamics over time are not addressed in the report, which rather gives a snapshot of land management and administration problems; (iii) the relationships and interactions between the sets of issues are not discussed in the report as if they were independent from one another; (iv) for each set of issues identified, the report proposes a series of recommendations (more than 60), but neither their compatibility nor their contradictions are considered and they are not prioritized according to their relative importance and timing for implementation.

Our objective with the present study is not to propose another set of technical or policy measures to improve the functioning of land markets, but rather to propose a grid of analysis for a systemic analysis of the various modes of access to land. We believe that it is only through such a systemic analysis that policy makers may anticipate the consequences on the whole land delivery system of specific measures concerning any one of its components.

## **Access to residential land in Bamako relies on various land delivery channels and land markets, which coexist and frequently overlap**

> 76 _États Généraux du Foncier Rural_ (1992); _Conférence Nationale sur le Foncier_ (1994); _Forum régional de Bamako_ (2003). 77 Ministère du Logement, des Affaires Foncières et de l’Urbanisme, Commission Nationale d’organisation des États Généraux du Foncier (2010). États Généraux du Foncier. Rapport de synthèse (du 30 juin 2008 au 11 décembre 2009).

36
In many cases, especially in the areas where the city is expanding, land can be directly obtained from customary owners. This is the origin of what we call the customary land delivery channel. In other cases, land can be allocated by the state or by local authorities, usually at a set price below market price, through the public and semi-public land delivery channel. These two channels along with the markets that derive from them respond to the bulk of the demand for land in urban and peri-urban areas and in the rural hinterland. As most people do not complete the formalization process of their tenure situation (because of costly and time-consuming procedures) and as transactions in the land markets are usually illegal, these two channels and the associated markets provide land at a comparatively low access cost but with a low level of tenure security. The other way to access land is through the formal private land delivery channel and associated markets, which ensure security of tenure, but have such a high access cost that they are de facto targeted at the elites.

# **The obstacles to improving access to land**

In Bamako, attempts to improve access to land are severely limited by a series of obstacles, including:

- (i) a legal and regulatory framework based on a process for accessing secure land (through the property title) which is so selective that the vast majority of urban households are excluded;

- (ii) intense competition for access to land among a diverse range of potential buyers who have asymmetric access to information and social connections;

- (iii) a wide gap between rules and practices and, as a result, frequent erroneous assessment by people of the land rights they actually hold;

- (iv) the state’s reluctance to recognize or formalize customary tenure;

- (v) the limited capacity of land administration to deal with the demand for secure tenure or tenure formalization;

- (vi) widespread corruption in land administration resulting jointly from the land prerogatives of the state and from the juxtaposition of several land delivery channels and land markets with a wide range of associated tenure rights, together with the coexistence of both market and set prices;

- (vii) the under-estimation by governments of social, cultural and political constraints in their attempts to improve access to land: reforming land management and administration is a highly political matter and technical answers are not sufficient.

We can assume that the majority of people who have an interest in changing the legal framework of land management are not able to impose it; the majority of people who are in a position to make changes have no interest in doing so.

# **Making an accurate diagnosis is a prerequisite for making relevant recommendations**

Whereas various modes of access to land have been analyzed by scholars and experts, there are few attempts to describe the land delivery system as a whole.

This study is an attempt to understand what the components and dynamics of land delivery channels and associated land markets are, and how they are closely interrelated as evidenced by empirical observations and represented in figure 4.1. Any change in one element of the system may have an impact on the others. Taking this into account would make it possible to assess the consequences of land-related policy measures. For example, the land delivery system permits to understand that increasing public land reserves and reaffirming the land prerogatives of the state do not necessarily improve the supply of land for low-income households as plots allocated by public authorities are very often put onto the informal secondary markets before tenure formalization procedures have been completed.

Our approach is valid not only for Bamako but in many instances for other cities in the sub-region.

The same type of assessment of the situation and dynamics of land markets in cities in West and Central Africa, which share very similar land administration systems, would permit an accurate understanding of the obstacles to conventional measures designed to make access to land more efficient and equitable.

37
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# **ANNEXES**

# **Annex 0.1. French acronyms used in the text**

**ACI** : _Agence de Cession Immobilière_ (Land Development Agency) **APIM** : _Association des promoteurs immobiliers du Mali_ (Property Developers Association of Mali) **CARPOLE** : _Cellule de Cartographie Polyvalente_ (Mapping Center) **CR** : _Concession Rurale_ (Rural Concession) **CRUH** : _Concession Rurale à Usage d’Habitation_ (Rural Concession for Residential Purposes) **CUH** : _Concession Urbaine d’Habitation_ (Urban Concession for Residential Purposes) **DDC-DB** : _Direction des Domaines et du Cadastre du District de Bamako_ (Bamako District Directorate of State Domains and of the Land Register)

**DNDC / DRDC** : _Direction Nationale/Régionale des Domaines et du Cadastre_ (National/Regional Directorate of State Domains and of the Land Register) **FGHM** : _Fonds de Garantie Hypothécaire du Mali_ (Malian Mortgage Guarantee Fund) **LA** : _Lettre d’Attribution_ (Allocation Letter) **OFM** : _Office Malien du Logement_ (Malian Housing Authority) **PAFOC** : _Projet Gestion du Patrimoine Foncier Communal_ (Municipal Land Management Project) **PO** : _Permis d’Occuper_ (Occupancy Permit) **SNQ** : “ _Sauvons notre quartier_ ” (“Save Our Neighborhood” upgrading program” **TF** : _Titre Foncier_ (Property Title)

# **Annex 0.2. French/English glossary of technical terms**

_Acte de vente_ : Deed of sale _Acte de donation_ : Deed of Gift _Acte notarié_ : Notarial deed _Adjoint au maire_ : Deputy Mayor _Allocataire (de terrain_ ): Allottee (for a land plot) _Antenne de la DRDC_ : DRDC’s branch _Arrêté_ : Administrative order _Arrêté municipal_ : Mayoral order _Attestation de recasement / Certificat de recasement_ : Certificate of resettlement (Administrative occupancy permit issued by a mayor following a _lotissement_ , i.e. land readjustment and/or formal land subdivision) _Attestation de vente_ : Certificate of sale _Attestation de vente authentifiée_ : Certificate of sale authenticated by local authorities _Autorisation de paiement_ : Payment authorization _Autorisation de transfert_ : Transfer authorization _Bail_ : Lease _Bail emphythéotique_ : Long-term lease _Bornage_ : Land plotting _Bulletin_ : Bulletin _Bureau specialisé de l’Antenne de la DRDC_ : Specialized section of DRDC’s branch _Cahier des charges_ : Regulatory act of the commune administration, which lists obligations and requirements for use and development of the land that each landholder is to fulfill _Cercle_ : Administrative jurisdiction which includes several communes _Chef de Quartier / Délégué_ : Neighborhood headman _Chef de village_ : Village headman _Chef de terre_ : Land chief / customary chief _Code domanial et foncier_ : Land code _Collectivités territoriales_ : Local authorities _Commune_ : Administrative juridiction/municipality _Conseiller municipal_ : Municipal councilor _Convention de vente (de terrain_ ): (Land) Sale agreement 40
_Decision de justice_ : Court order resolving a dispute (over land) and defining the right of possession, proprietorship or occupancy and use _Déguerpis_ : Evicted people _District de Bamako_ : Bamako district, which includes 6 _communes_ . _Division parcellaire_ : Partition of land parcel into plots for donation or inheritance purposes only _Document administratif_ : Administrative document _Domaine privé de l’Etat_ : Private domain of the State _Droit réel_ : Real (property) right _Droit d’usage_ : Use right _Droit coutumier_ : Customary right _Droits de mutation_ : Transfer taxes _Enregistrement foncier_ : Land registration _Etats Généraux du Foncier:_ Land Convention _Filièred’approvisionnement en terres_ : Land delivery channel _Frais d’édilité et de viabilisation_ : Local development taxes (infrastructure and services) _Frais d’enregistrement_ : (Land) Registration fees _Génie rural_ : Department of Agricultural Engineering _Géomètre_ : Land surveyor _Gouverneur_ : Governor (representative of State at the region level) _Immatriculation_ : Registration of land under the name of the State; also used to designate registration of land under private ownership _Inspecteur des Domaines_ : Inspector of the State Domains _Lettre de notification_ : Notification letter _Livre foncier_ : Land book / register _Lotissement_ : Land subdivision that complies in principle with planning regulations _Lotissement préfectoral_ : Land subdivision by prefect or subprefect _Maire_ : Mayor. _Mairie_ : Town Council/Mayor's office _Mise en valeur (d’un terrain_ ): Land parcel development _Morcellement_ : Informal subdivision of land “Les _nécessiteux et démunis_ ” : The needy and poor _Occupations spontanées_ : Spontaneous settlements _Ordre des Urbanistes du Mali_ : Urban Planners Professional Order of Mali _Permis d’occuper_ : Administrative permit to occupy a parcel of land “ _Petits papiers_ ”: Petits papiers (“bits of paper”) _Préfet_ : Prefect (representative of the State at _cercle_ level) _Présumé propriétaire_ : Presumed owner _Principe de domanialité_ : Principle of "domanialité" _Promoteur immobilier_ : Property developer/ Property development company _Propriétaire coutumier_ / _propriétaire terrien_ : Customary landholder _Propriétaire occupant_ : Owner-occupier _Purge des droits_ : Extinction / purge of customary rights _Quartier_ : Neighborhood _Quartier informel_ : Informal settlement _Quitus fiscal_ : Tax receipt _Recasement_ : Resettlement _Région_ : Administrative jurisdiction which includes several _cercles Régularisation_ : Regularization/Tenure regularization _Réhabilitation_ : Physical upgrading _Reprise des apports_ : Return of rights to landholders following formal land readjustment and/or subdivision _Restructuration / remembrement foncier_ : Land readjustment _Schéma d’urbanisme_ : Master plan/Urban planning document _Sécurité de la tenure_ : Tenure security _Servitudes_ : Planning restrictions and easements _Sous-préfet_ : Subprefect _Système d’information foncière_ : Land information system _Taxe sur la transaction_ : Transaction tax 41
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The study area includes the _communes_ of Baguineda camp, Bancoumana, Bougoula, Diago, Dialakoroba, Dialakorodji, Dio-Gare, Doubabougou, Kalabancoro, Kambila, Kati commune, Mandé, Moribabougou, Mountougoula, N’Gabacoro, Ouelessebougou, Safo, Sanankoroba, Sangarebougou, Siby, Tiele in the Kati _cercle_ ; _communes_ of Meguetan and Tienfala in the Koulikoro _cercle_ and 4 _communes_ of Bamako (I, IV, V et VI).

**Annex 2.2. Characteristics of urban and peri-urban areas and of the rural hinterland**

|**Areas**|**Built up area**<br>**and population density**|**Physical**<br>**characteristics**|**Land markets patterns**<br>**and prices**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Urban areas**|Built up contiguity. High and high-<br>medium density.|Dense road and<br>infrastructures network.|Fully monetized land markets.<br>High and medium landprices.|
|**Peri-urban areas**|Land subdivisions and<br>developments in progress.<br>Medium and low density.|Road and infrastructures<br>network being constructed|Usually, fully monetized land<br>markets. Medium and low land<br>prices.|
|**Rural hinterland**|Low density, except in core<br>villages or along main roads|Predominantly agricultural<br>use. Formation of<br>agricultural estates|Coexistence of monetized and<br>custom based land markets. Low<br>land prices (but higher than outside<br>the zone of influence of the urban<br>area).|

# **Annex 3.1. Laws, decrees and other texts on land and tenure**

- Décret n° 91-321/PM-RM du 3 octobre 1991, portant modalités d’application des dispositions du Code domanial et foncier relatives aux concessions rurales.

- Décret n° 91-322/PM-RM du 3 octobre 1991, portant réglementation des modalités et conditions des cessions des terrains domaniaux par adjudication publique.

- Décret n° 91-323/PM-RM du 3 octobre 1991, portant réglementation de la cession amiable des terrains domaniaux.

- Décret n° 91-324/PM-RM du 3 octobre 1991, portant organisation et modalités de fonctionnement de la commission chargée des évaluations foncières.

- Décret n° 92-113/PM-RM du 9 avril 1992, portant fixation des prix de cession et des redevances des terrains urbains et ruraux du domaine privé de l’État, à usage commercial, industriel et d’habitation.

- Décret n° 92-114/PM-RM du 9 avril 1992, portant fixation des barèmes généraux de base des prix de cession et des redevances des terrains ruraux appartenant à l’État et détermination des procédures d’estimation des barèmes spécifiques.

- Loi n° 95-034, du 12 avril 1995, portant Code des collectivités territoriales en République du Mali”

- Loi N° 96-025 du 21/02/1996 portant statut particulier du District de Bamako.

- Loi N°96-050 du 16 octobre 1996 portant principes de constitution et gestion du domaine des Collectivités Territoriales

- Loi N° 99-026 du 07 juillet 1999 portant ratification de l’ordonnance n°99-003/P-RM du 31 mars 1999 portant création de la Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales.

- Ordonnance n° 00-27 du 22 mars 2000 portant Code domanial et foncier.

- Décret n°01-040/P-RM du 21 février 2001 déterminant les formes et conditions d’attribution des terrains du domaine privé immobilier de l’Etat.

- Décret n°01-041/P-RM du 21 février 2001 fixant les modalités d'attribution du permis d'occuper.

- Loi n° 02-008 du 12 février 2002 portant modification et ratification de l’ordonnance n° 00-027/P-RM du 22 mars 2000 portant code domanial et foncier.

- Décret n° 02-113/P-RM du 6 mars 2002 fixant les modalités d’organisation et de confection du Cadastre.

- Loi n° 01-077 du 18 juillet 2001 fixant les règles générales de la construction.

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- Décret n° 02-114 P-RM du 06 mars 2002 portant fixation des prix de cession et des redevances des terrains urbains et ruraux du domaine privé de l’État, à l’usage commercial, industriel, artisanal, de bureau, d’habitation ou autres.

- Décret n° 02-115 P-RM du 06 mars 2002 portant fixation des barèmes généraux de base des prix de cession, des redevances des terrains ruraux appartenant à l’État et détermination de la procédure d’estimation des barèmes spécifiques.

- Décret n° 02-111 et 112/P-RM du 22 mars 2002 Déterminant les formes et les conditions de gestion des terrains des domaines publics immobiliers de l’Etat et des collectivités territoriales.

- Loi n° 02-016 du 3 juillet 2002 fixant les règles générales d’urbanisme.

- Décret n° 05-113/P-RM du 9 mars 2005 fixant les règles spécifiques applicables aux différentes catégories de servitudes en matière d’urbanisme.

- Décret n° 05-114/P-RM du 9 mars 2005 déterminant les modalités de réalisation, de gestion et de normalisation des infrastructures urbaines.

- Décret n°05-115/P-RM du 9 mars 2005 fixant les modalités de réalisation des différents types d’opérations d’urbanisme.

- Décret n°10-176/PM-RM du 25 mars 2010 fixant le cadre institutionnel de pilotage du quatrième Projet urbain du Mali.

- Lettre circulaire interministérielle n° 2011-001/MATCI-MLAFU-SG du 31 octobre 2011 relative à la suspension des attributions du domaine privé immobilier de l’Etat (suite au Conseil des ministres du 15 juin 2011).

- Loi du 15 Décembre 2011 (dite Loi Hamidou Diabaté) portant modification de l’ordonnance n°00-027 du 22 mars 2000 portant code domanial et foncier modifiée et ratifiée par la loi n°02-008 du 12 Février 2002.

- Décret N°2013-341/PRM du 18 avril 2013 portant modification du Décret N°01-040/P-RM  du 02 février 2001 déterminant les formes et conditions d’attribution des terrains du domaine privé immobilier de l’Etat.

**Annex 3.2. Details of required procedures and costs of formalization from customary land to property title (TF)**

|**Type of operation**|**Procedures (1)**<br>|**Participants (1)**<br>|**Costs of the operation (excluding**<br>**undeclared payments)**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|
||Stage1. Authentication of the sale: issuance of an<br>_attestation de vente authentifiée_by mayor's office|- Buyer and seller;<br>-_Coxer_, surveyor and<br>village’s authorities;<br>- Mayor's office|- Purchase price of land;<br>- Payments to_coxer_and surveyor ;<br>- Fee due to mayor’s office|
|Sale of customary land to<br>a private individual who<br>keeps the land and may<br>obtain precarious title<br>(CR) and then property<br>title (TF)|Stage 2.Application for CR:<br>- Plotting by authorized surveyor (2);<br>- Checking by DRDC (3) that no TF exist;<br>- Application to State representatives according<br>to land area involved;<br>- Public inquiry announced in newspaper then<br>_Procès verbal de palabres_(record of discussion)<br>and administrative certificate signed by State<br>representative;<br>- Allocation of CR with specifications (_cahier des_<br>_charges_)|- Surveyors<br>- DRDC<br>- Various levels of<br>government:<br>-_Sous-préfet_: if <2,5 ha (3)<br>-_Préfet_: 2,5-5 ha,<br>- Governor : 5-10 ha,<br>- Minister of State<br>Domains: 10-100 ha,<br>- Council of Ministers:<br>>100 ha<br>- Village communities<br>- All interested parties in<br>the vicinity|- Payment to authorized surveyor who<br>may have the work done by an<br>unauthorized surveyor<br>- Local development taxes and annual tax|
||Stage 3.Application for TF:<br>- Development within five years or land may be<br>taken back;<br>-_Immatriculation in the name of the State_;<br>- Allocation by DRDC (3) with data recorded in<br>the_Livre Foncier_|- DRDC|- Registration fees = 15% of the price of<br>the land|
|Sale of customary land to|Stage1._Same as stage 1 above_|_Same as stage 1 above _|_Same as stage 1 above _|
|a private individual who|Stage 2. _Same as stage 2 above_|_Same as stage 2 above _|_Same as stage 2above _|
|will arrange subdivision<br>and sell the resultantplots.|Stage 3.Application to_Préfet_for authorization to<br>subdivide aspreviouslyrecommended by|- Surveyor<br>-_Préfet_|- Cost of surveyor<br>- Charges for_bulletin_: FCFA 80,000 to|

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|The plot owners may<br>obtain a precarious title<br>(_concession rurale à usage_<br>_d’habitation_) - (CRUH)|surveyor:<br>- For each plot, the_préfecture_prepares_bulletin_<br>- Sale of plots with_bulletin_often with aid of<br>_coxer_||300 000<br>- Cost of_coxer_|
|---|---|---|---|
|and apply for TF|Stage 4.Transformation of bulletin into CRUH:<br>-_Bulletin_put in buyer's name and application for<br>CRUH sent to the_commune_by the buyer;<br>- Condition: non-possession of another residential<br>lot in the same_commune_and having tax receipt;<br>- Decision subject to signature by the mayor who<br>will issue notification of allocation and seek<br>payment of the fees;<br>- Registration of the title in the register of<br>CRUHs|_- Prefet or Sous préfet_<br>- Mayor’s office after<br>opinion from village<br>council meeting for the<br>purpose, endorsed by<br>resolution from commune<br>council|- Local development (infrastructure and<br>services) taxes varying according to<br>_commune_and 10% of the taxes for the<br>State budget|
||Stage 5.Transformation of CRUH into TF:<br>- Certificate of development issued by_Antenne_<br>DRDC (3);<br>- Deposit of copy CRUH which will be cancelled;<br>- Copy of TF handed to interested party;<br>- Recordingof TF in the Land Register|- Mayor's office:<br>Assessment of<br>development<br>- Ordinary section,<br>_Antenne_DRDC in the<br>_commune_|- Registration fees = 15% of plot price|

_Notes:_ _(1) Changes since 2011 and other changes after April 2013 (see Annex 3.1)_ _(2) Note that 90% of land subdivisions are carried out without the consent of all parties involved according to reliable sources at the Génie rural. This practice generates land disputes._ _(3) The Direction nationale des domaines et du cadastre - DNCD) has representation in each region (DRDC), for our study Koulikoro region. Local representative offices (Antennes) have been set up in the cercles and communes. Within these Antennes, the specialized section deals with precarious title and the ordinary section with property title._ The issue of a CR is a complicated procedure involving a large number of administrations at local and central government levels. Because conversion of a customary right into a CR results in a sharp increase in the market value of the land, it provides incentives to a series of irregular practices involving most stakeholders participating in tenure regularization, in public allocations of land and in land transactions. Having a precarious title (CR) makes it possible to obtain, in a later stage, a property title (TF). However, this is a time-consuming and costly process. One reason is that tenure regularization requires an investment, implying that CR holders must develop their land within a period of five years and pay very high fees to apply for a TF. Another reason is corruption: it happens that some people who own a CR and have not made any investment manage to achieve regularization and obtain a TF within 3 months, while others who have a CR and have developed the land as required by the law cannot obtain a TF even after 10 years. In practice, most customary landholders have limited scope to transform a CR into a _Titre Foncier_ : they do not have the required financial resources and they do not have sufficient connections within the land administration.

**Annex 3.3. Details of required procedures and costs of formalization from allocations by the State or local authorities to property title (TF)**

|**Type of operation**|**Procedures**|**Participants**|**Costs incurred**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Land of the State's private<br>domain transferred to a<br>_commune_, which allocates<br>|Stage 1. Assignment from the State's private<br>domain to the_commune_which has a planning<br>document and wishes to carry out a_lotissement_:<br>- Decision taken by the Council of Ministers<br>following application from the_commune_<br>- The TF is transferred to the_commune_with<br>prior checking that there is no TF other than that<br>held bythe State to the requested land.|- Council of Ministers on<br>submission from the<br>Minister for State domains<br>- The_commune_consults<br>residents and often acts at<br>their request||
|t to rate nas n||||
|pv vu<br>connection with a formal<br>land subdivision|Stage 2. Application for_Concession urbaine_<br>_d’habitation_(CUH) or_Concession rurale à_<br>_usage d’habitation_(CRUH) sent to the<br>_commune_by the occupant of the plot;<br>- Condition: non-possession of another<br>residential lot in the same_commune_and having<br>tax receipt;|- Village, fraction of<br>neighborhood, or mayor<br>- Various levels of<br>government:<br>-_Préfet_if land = 1000-<br>5000 m<sup>2</sup><br>- Governor = 5000-1 ha|- Local development (infrastructure and<br>services) taxes varying according to<br>_commune_and 10% of the taxes for the<br>State budget|

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|- Opinion from the village, fraction of<br>neighborhood or Municipal Council;<br>- In case of bare land >1000 m<sup>2</sup>, approval of<br>State representatives required;<br>- Decision subject to signature by the mayor who<br>will issue notification of allocation and seek<br>payment of the fees;<br>- Registration of the title in the register of CUHs<br>or CRUHs. Specifications approved by<br>Municipal Council|- Minister for local<br>authorities: 1-5 ha<br>- Council of Ministers >5<br>ha<br>- Specialized section,<br>_Antenne_DRDC in the<br>commune||
|---|---|---|
|Stage 3.Application for TF:<br>- Condition: development on terms imposed by<br>each_commune_or threat to take back land;<br>- Striking out of development clause;<br>- Application for TF to land registry office in<br>place where the building is located;<br>- Deposit of the original of the copy CUH or<br>CRUH which will be cancelled|- Mayor's office:<br>Assessment of<br>development<br>- Ordinary section of the<br>_Antenne_DRDC|- Registration fees (15%)|

# **Annex 3.4. Weakness of the housing finance system**

According to banking regulations, only property titles can be accepted as security for loans, but according to the law of February 12, 2002, a precarious title transferred by a notarial deed can also be accepted as collateral provided that the notary commits to transform it into a property title. In practice, obtaining the TF may prove impossible and the bank will lose out in the event of a default.

There are many cases of fraud concerning titles pledged to obtain a loan. Borrowers may obtain over-valued fictitious certificates from so-called expert assessors; in this case the Bank is at risk of never recouping the amount of the loan in case of a default. In addition, it is difficult to establish the value of mortgaged land correctly. Assessments made by State-approved property experts are not reliable. It is also difficult for a bank to verify that those who request loans truly own the land in the absence of a land information system and given the unreliability of the _Livre foncier_ . Loans may also be requested for properties that will never be built.

In addition, banks lend at a high interest rate (between 10 and 12%), for an average term of mortgage loan of 12-15 years, which further impedes the development of the formal housing sector.

_Source: Interview with managers of the Malian mortgage guarantee fund (September 2011)_

**Annex 4.1. Documents used for transactions (whether authorized or not)**

|**Type of legal or tolerated sale**|**Documents that can be used**|
|---|---|
|Purchase of customary land without subdivision|_Attestation de vente authentifiée_(deed of sale between buyer<br>and seller with signatures authenticated by the mayor's office).<br>Further transformation into precarious title and then property<br>title possible|
|Purchase of a plot following subdivision of a_concession_<br>_rurale_(administrative documents:_bulletins_)|_Attestation de vente_ _authentifiée_and transfer of_bulletin_<br>(bearing no name). Further transformation into precarious title<br>(CRUH) and then TF possible|
|Purchase of a plot with an administrative document (_lettre de_<br>_notification_or_lettre d’attribution_)|Sale by the beneficiary of the administrative document when<br>he/she does not need it, wants money immediately or cannot<br>pay the local development taxes. Common practice. Further<br>transformation into precarious title (CUH or CRUH) and then<br>TFpossible|

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|Purchase of a plot with precarious title (CUH or CRUH)|_Attestation de vente authentifiée_or notarial deed.<br>Authorization of transfer granted by the_commune_which<br>issued the_concession_= 7% of the plot price. Transfers often<br>done without changing the holder's name to avoid paying<br>these taxes. If taxes are paid, CUH or CRUH in the buyer's<br>name and possible further transformation into property title<br>(TF).|
|---|---|
|Purchase of land or a plot with property title (TF).<br>The purchase may concern all or part of the land with the TF:<br>in the latter case, the buyer must obtain a TF for his/her<br>individualplot.|Registered notarial deed of sale. Payment of registration fees,<br>amounting to 15% of the price of the land and transfer charges<br>amounting to 0.9% of the price.|

**Annex 4.2. Legality and frequency of allocations and sales**

|||**Land s**<br>|**old by**<br>||**Land all**<br>|**ocated by**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Documents**|**Customary**<br>**owner (1)**|**Private**<br>**development**<br>**company**<br>**(formal and**<br>**informal)**|**Individual**|**Para-public**<br>**development**<br>**company**<br>**(ACI)**|**State /**<br>**Central**<br>**government**|**Local**<br>**authority**<br>**(****_Commune_) **|
|**Property title (TF)**|Never / rare|Common for<br>formal|Common|Common|Common|Never|
|CUH,<br>CRUH|Under<br>conditions:<br>Rare|Under<br>conditions:<br>Rare|Under<br>conditions:<br>Rare|n/a|Rare /<br>common|Common|
|**Precarious**<br>**titles**<br>|Rare|Common for<br>informal|Common||||
|<br>CR|Under<br>conditions:<br>Rare|Rare|Under<br>conditions:<br>Rare|n/a|Common|Never|
||Rare||Rare||||
|**Administrative**<br>**documents**<br>Lettre<br>d’attribution<br>(2), lettre de<br>notification|n/a|Rare|Common|n/a|Never|Common|
|Bulletin|Common|Rare|Common|n/a|Common|Never|
|Legality of transfer:|Autho|rized|Not authorized||||

_Notes:_ **_(1)_** _In this table, a customary holder means someone holding land according to custom._ **_(2)_** _It is difficult to place the lettre d’attribution with certainty in either the administrative document or precarious title categories, because this term seems frequently to be used to designate a lettre de notification. The issue of LAs should have come to an end in 2002 because the law of February 12, 2002, amending the Code domanial et foncier of 2000, specifies that: ‘Land allocations in the form of lettres d’attribution or permis d’occuper prior to the entry into force of this Code shall be treated as concessions urbaines or rurales à usage d’habitation...’. According to this text, LAs should be considered as precarious titles. However, our informants often speak of those documents whereas they never mention the lettre de notification, an essential document today for obtaining a concession à usage d’habitation and about which the decree of March 6, 2002 specifies: ‘In no case may a lettre de notification stand in the stead of a use right title’. If the mention of a lettre d’attribution actually refers to a lettre de notification, then the LA is an administrative document._ 47
# **Annex 4.3. Stakeholders involved in land allocations and transactions**

||**Land del**|**ivery cha**|**nnels**|**Mai **|**nareas of inte**|**rvention **|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||**Bamako’s**|**’**|
|**Stakeholders involved**|**Customary**|**Public**<br>**and**<br>**para-**<br>**public**|**Formal**<br>**private**|**Bamako**<br>**District**|**peri-**<br>**urban**<br>**area**|**Bamakos**<br>**Rural**<br>**hinterland**|
|Government institutions||*|*|*|*|*|
|ACI||*||*|*||
|**Ld**<br>_Communes(Mairies_)||*||*|*|*|
|**an**<br> <br>Individuals|||*|*|*|*|
|**suppliers/sellers**<br>Customaryland holders<sup>~~(1)~~</sup>|*||||*|*|
|Informal land developers|*||||*|*|
|Formal land developers||*|*|*|*|*|
|Central and local<br>Government officers|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|Merchants and traders|*|*||*|*|*|
|**Ld h**<br>Individuals|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|**an purcasers**<br>Informal land developers /<br>coxers|*|*|||*|*|
|Formal real estate<br>developers||*|*|*|*|*|
|Village authorities|*||||*|*|
|Peri-urban_commune_<br>authorities(_Mairies_)|*|*|||*||
|_Communes_in Bamako<br>District||*||*|||
|**Institutions**<br>**governing land**<br>_Préfet:Sous_<br>_-Préfet_|*|*|||*|*|
|**allocations and**<br>**transactions**<br>Central<br>Council of<br>Ministers|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|<br>government<br>DNDC /<br>DRDC<br>Koulikoro|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|Cadastre /<br>CARPOLE|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|<br>Brokers|*|*|*|*|*||
|**Intermediaries**<br>Coxers|*|*||*|*|*|
|Land surveyors|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|**Professionals**<br>Notaries||*|*|*|*|*|
|Urbanplanners||*|*|*|*||
|**Credit / Finance institutions**||*|*|*|*||

_(1) When customary owners do not sell customary land but land which has already been extracted from the customary channel, they are classified as “individuals”._ 48
# **Annex 4.4. Costs of services by some stakeholders**

According to our informants, 1% of the price of the land has to be paid to the mayor's office in Kati _cercle_ to obtain an _attestation de vente authentifiée_ for customary land. With that document, the land may be sold for double its purchase price. To move from an _attestation de vente authentifiée_ to a precarious title (CR), the buyer of rural land officially have to pay FCFA 60,000/ha but the real cost of the transaction could be as much as FCFA 300,000 or even 400,000/ha. In all the _communes_ , transferring precarious title requires authorization from the _bureau specialisé of_ the _Antenne_ de la DRDC in the _commune_ which issued the title, costing 7% of the price of the land. The transfer may be refused if there is no _acte notarié_ and if the land has not been developed. However, arrangements can be made to convince the administration to accept the transfer. Assessing the development of plots to which precarious title is held (the land must be developed within three years in the case of CUR and CRUH and within five years for CR) is a somewhat arbitrary process. DRDC officials check whether the land has been developed but have no objective criteria on which to base their assessment.<sup>78</sup> This shortcoming has important consequences: firstly, holders of precarious title must develop their plots in order to sell them legally; secondly, the _commune_ may take the plots back if they are not developed. During our field work (see Section 5 below), several holders of precarious titles in a _commune_ of the Kati _cercle_ reported that they feared seeing their land taken away. Moving from precarious title to property title is even more expensive. The obligation to develop the land is costly and the fee for registering the TF amounts in principle to 15% of the price of the plot.<sup>79</sup>

# **Annex 4.5. The role of political/social connections in the public allocation of land: an example**

A list of households entitled to resettlement following a tenure regularization project that took place in a _commune_ of the Bamako district had been set up by the town council. People whose names were on the list had priority access to land in the resettlement area.

A decision allocating a parcel of land for housing was made for the benefit of Mr. X, who had recently been evicted from his plot following a regularization project. His name was on a list of numerous beneficiary households. Less than a week later, another decision from the same _commune_ modified the list of beneficiaries. The land originally allocated to Mr. X was then reallocated to Mr. Y, a high-ranking ministerial officer. Officially, Mr. X had sold the land that had been allocated to him right after the allocation. The justification given by the land administration was that Mr. X sold his land either because he did not need it, or because he was unable to pay the administrative costs and fees associated with the allocation of the plot. Many other beneficiaries of the same resettlement scheme also “resold” their plot right after allocation.

_Source: Interview with a land administration official_

> 78 Article 11 of the decree of March 6, 2002 sets out the conditions for allocating land from the territorial authorities' private domain: ‘Each authority shall set the conditions for, and development requirement of the allocated plots according to specifications approved by the municipal council’.  According to an Inspector of the State Domains, this also depends on location. Where permanent structures are required, more than FCFA 1 million must be spent but, in some other areas, there is no requirement for permanent structures.

> 79 Djiré (2006) drew attention to the very high official cost of the formalities involved in obtaining property title to land sold by a customary holder in the rural commune of Sanankoroba.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> ETUDE SUR LES COUTS D'ACCES AU FONCIER, DANS LES ZONES URBAINE, PERIURBAINE<br>ET L'HINTERLAND RURAL DE BAMAKO<br>ENQUETE SUR LES TERRAINS<br>NE SONT CONCERNES PAR L’ENGUETE QUE LES TERRAINS<br>GUDONT FAT LOBJET DUNE CES SION APRES LE fer JAMVIER 2009<br>ZONE DENGQUETE: oO 1. UREN oO 2 PERIURSAIN oO A HENTERLAND RURAL | DATE DENGQUETE:<br>(COMMUNE :<br>QUARTIER :<br>SECTEUR<br>ANNES...<br>VILLAGE :<br>TT METIALES ENGUET.<br>SUPERFIME SELON LA SOURCE<br>UNITE DE MESURE : | 1. HECTARES oO ARES oO 3, METRES CARRIES<br>SUPERFSME SELON LENQUETEUR<br>PEGNCPALK INFORMATEURIS)/<br>UNITE DE MESURE: 1 HECTARES 2 ARES 3. METRES CARRES S.0URCE(S) DINFORMATION<br>Oo O O (Puusteurs reponses possibles)<br>LATITUDE OU TERRAIN N a | :| oO 1, Habitantdu quartier / vaage<br>LONGITUDE DU TERRAIN wi CLT ra oO 2vig Chef coutumer / chef de<br>UTSATION DU SOL AU MOMENT DE LENQUETE oO 1. RESIDENTIEL OWA VOCATION RESIDENTELLE oO 3. Gower, Reormateur ou sare<br>oO 2. TERRUGN. A VOCATION. AGRICOLE ntermédiaire<br>oO 3. AUTRE oO 4, Acheteur occupant du temain<br>oO 5. Acheteur non-occupant du<br>DSS TANCE DU GOUDRON: temain<br>UNITE DE MESURE - | 1. KILOMETRES oO 2 METRES oO &QueOccupantscheturi. du terain (autre<br>DISTANCE DE LAVOE CARROSSABLE : oO 7. Wendeur du terrain<br>UNITE DE MESURE: oO 1, KILOMETRES oO 2. METRES oO 4. Mabe oudiude commune<br>DISTANCE oO 5. Gevices Techniques de<br> DU FLEUVE oO 1. 100 METRES OU MONS reba<br>| 2. PLUS DE 100 MET MOINS DE 500 M oO 10 Aue (specifiers :<br>oO 3, £00 METRES OU PLUS<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> REMARGUE: LE GUESTIONNAIRE CONCERHE LES TERRAING GUI ONT FAT DORSET DUNE -CEPSIOn<br>TELT-ADIRE PUNE VENTE, OUN DON OU DUBE ATTRIBUTION<br>DATE D'ACHAT/ OBTENTION BU TERRAIN<br>a<br>.<br>Quand i terrain a-ebe achete/, atibues = | Mots. 41 & 12, Année: 09, 00, 1 au t2 bots ttf<br>repel 35. Ne saltpas. Année if}<br>ACHAT/ OBTENTION DU TERRAIN<br>a<br>Gul a echetéJ obbenu !regu ie bean = 2.1. HommeFerman<br>3. Conjottiement homese et femme<br>4. AGES Membres Sune mame temic<br>5. Association ou cooper<br>5. Rocket powee<br>7. Cepanisme public<br>8. Autres). Seeiciier =<br>3. Ne salt pas.<br>@03. [LePeoementterrain 2-HF été obtenu dans te cade fun |1.~ Guipyr,<br>5. Ne salt pas<br>04 |Guetieeranaronne T est;iaquiaprofessionactetéJ obbenu/ le statutde! “ reguiale: 20.30.$0.EenSalacéExpicttantmengantdu agricolesecteur privé<br>20. Profession bere<br>0, Wendeur! iogsncur informed / comer<br>60. Agent de adeeinisiaton publique<br>51. Agent des cervices de rEtat<br>52. Agent des collectvités teniboriales<br>TO. Agent des services de stor! et de défense<br>Bo. Blu! responsable politique<br>AH. Aw nivese centre!<br>82. Aw niveae focal<br>30. Atre ‘cans protession. Specifier<br>55. Me salt pas.<br>G06 |Ou reside la personne quia acheté! obtenu! [pq pans ig mame commune<br>Pepa be benrain7 11. Sur be terrain enquete<br>42. Sur wn auire bean<br>20.30. DansDans uneume (autre)autre commonecommuneduouCercleCestrictdedeKall damako<br>20. Dans autre vile cu ngion do Mad<br>50. Areiranger<br>50. Autre. Specter:<br>35, Me salt pas.<br>VENTE/ DON / ATTRIBUTION (= CESSION)<br>a<br>@O8 |Le terrains ét vende! donné& /atrbet per.<br>10. Une personne<br>11. Propriétaire coubenier<br>72. Proprétaire pee-coutumier<br>20. Prometeur bnmobier et ietisseur forme!<br>21. Agence perapublique (ex. AC! SEMA, ...3<br>22. Promoteur ef infisseur du-secteur privé<br>30. LEbat<br>21. Gouvemeugr<br>a2. Pretet<br>33. Sous-pretet<br>34. Gomseil des Minisbes<br>40. Lo: Meare<br>44. Dare if cadre fun recasement<br>472. Dans fe cadre dune opération de jotssement,<br>hors recasement<br>50. Aube. Speéctier:<br>95. We sallpas.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> @07 |La personne quia vendu ou donnée ie terrain 1. sili<br>chatreae... 3. Conjoitement hoe ef femme<br>4. AGS Membres Cue meme tamil<br>5. Ne saltpas.<br>08: |Au momentde la cession, quele étaitla<br>profession: fhe shvtub ce la personne ol =a<br>feemaus oul comng ie terrain 30. Qalsrié du secteur pve<br>40. Profession Sbéraie<br>50. Wendeur! iotisnear ieformel s comer<br>60. Agent de Padrinistation publique<br>51 Agent des servicesde rEtat<br>62. Agent des collectvités teriboriaies<br>TO. Agent des services de stort et de defense<br>80. Blu! m=sponsable poltique<br>51. Au niveau centr<br>32. Au niveau local<br>50. Aire / sans protessiom. Epebcifier:<br>39. Ne salt pas.<br>@08 [Au moment de la cession, of réskiad fa 1. Danes la méme commune<br>Personne quia wendy !donné (atribut se |2 pang une aulre commune du District de Bamate<br>berrain 7 3. Dane une jsut) commune du Cercle de abl<br>2, Cares aotre vile ou région di Mal<br>5. A Péiranger<br>5. Agie. Specter:<br>5. Me sai pas.<br>La parson quis vendu / donna! atribud ie |7. Ou<br>errain avs-ele rep oe berrain dane 2 cadre |2. Nor<br>une opération de necasement 7<br>5 Ne salt pes.<br>GOCUMENTS ET STATUT JURIDIQUE DU TERRAIN<br>[ee | =<br>Quel Stok be statut juridique du terrain & la 1. Terrain: couturcder<br>diate de ia cession 7 20. Auioetsagionde pelement./ comrocaiion<br>30. Letine duatiipution<br>20. Thre provisoire<br>421. Concession urbane dhabiationCUH<br>42. Concession rune 4 usage Phabitaton CRUH<br>27. Tire provisoke de concession neale CR<br>44. Penmis dioceuper<br>50. Ball emphytectique<br>60. Thre Foncier<br>35. We salt pas.<br>Quel ectie statut juridique du terrain au 40. Terain couturcter<br>moment de Pergqudte? 20. Autorisationde psiensent | comrocetion<br>30. Letire Datiioution<br>40. Tire provisoire<br>41. Conceasion urbane dhabiationCU<br>42. Goncession runic & usage ohabitation CAUH<br>43. Tie provisote de concession rue CF<br>44. Perma dioceuper<br>50. Bali emphyteotque<br>SOT Foncier<br>35. Ne salt pas.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> 13 |Guels documents amestent de la cession<br>(wenterepo sesJ donpossibies,falibution)3 au 7maximum)(plusiwrs 10.41. PasCeassion de documentcoutumiee<br>12. Gession non-coutumiére<br>20. Abestation d= vente suthentifate parla Mabie ou ba Prefecture<br>21. Cession comtumitre<br>22. Cession non-coubemére<br>30. Amestation de vente non authentiiee par ia Maire<br>31. Gession comtamitre<br>32. Gession mon-coutumiétre<br>40. Auioisation de paiement! convocation<br>50. Letire fsiribution<br>60. Tire provisobe<br>61. Concession urbaine d'habitation SUH<br>62. Concession rumie.é usage dhabitaton CRUH<br>63. Tire provisoke de concession rurale CA<br>64, Penmis dioccuper<br>FO. Ball emphytéctique<br>50. Tire Foncier<br>55. Ae saltpas.<br>Le document sttestant is cession atl ett 1. Ou<br>authentté par un notaire? (acts notane) 2. Non<br>5. Ne salt pes<br>PRIX DU TERRAIN<br>i<br>a femmermranetserome = ff ee<br>ComberPeforsiecurlie terrain> codte-t- aujourdhal felon —woe—_*a<br>EQUIPEWENT ET MISE EN VALEUR DL TERRAIN<br>a<br>@q7 [Au moment<br>atrbation), iede terrainis cessionavail(ventede Peau? /don! Oe12. PutsFARCHEMERE' tauBa PERSEne SU<br>13. Aube<br>20. hom<br>55. We saltpes.<br>Au Porn de la cession (wenbe ior! 1d. Gur<br>atirbotion), is terrain avaltdl de Pelectricii#? 11. Gonnemnon dinette au réseau ED<br>12. Gonmesion indirecte au réseau EDM<br>13. Groupe Seciegéne<br>44, Panneaa sociale<br>15. Aue<br>20. Mow<br>55. Me salt pas.<br>Depuis la cession [vente J dom! athibuten), fe 10. Oa<br>terrain ali obbenu Peau? 41. Branchementau réseau<br>12. Puls<br>13. Aube<br>20. Aion<br>59. Me soll pas.<br>Ceputs ta mession (verte f dor / atiriputhon), be | 10. Out<br>terrain atl obb=nu (sectrichta? 71. Gonnexion directs au réseau ED<br>12. Gonmenion indinects au réseau EDM<br>13. Gmupe Sechogéne<br>14. Ponneay soiree<br>Te. Autre<br>20. Bion<br>35. Ne salt pas.<br>Depuls is cession (were S dom! atitibutien) te | 1. Oui<br>terrain a-t-Hi fait Pobjet fun Investissement! 71. bowestissement agricele:<br>une mse en wale7 12. Batmenten mabéiau dure<br>13. Gidture en maténes durable<br>14. Pult<br>15. Age<br>20. hom:<br>55. Me saltpas.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> 4 _—— \<br>AT _—<br>i. —— — | ae4%/one) 7‘| 4y oN\\}<br>—<br>( e l £ \ <a<br>xX \ . Ss : ff }<br>na S ee oa | \ —<br>\" | y af) ¢l << y) \/<br>a | Aaa |<br>esff~{—4 r <i“$/) ¢ ) 4of € — e .<br>WATS/ c wa “i <0Se<br>LO) 2 VE T®& Caeser<br>/ @ sy Ne / \<br>1/ Soe | \<br>in_| a Sy. So ~ s~es vy R‘Nee=»<br>{ ——4 bye ae ak \ e ~ |<br>to /* UA Sere \ 0 .<br>} \ id “ - >; \ » J<br>} ° “ss — (“7 foame | g 7 _<br>, 4 j Shy.<< rT)/ L) * c SS<br>/a(a<br>K<br>;<br>/ A “Ns \ ;<br>e Observations ( —s I :<br>“NU Roads \ \<br>C Urban built-up \ N<br>C1] Bamako district boundaries<br>ra) Communes within the area ofstudy _ . Py 10.” 20 30 40 A ls:<br>‘ Other communes ~ as a Kilometers}:<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Annex 5.4. Tenure status at time of transaction by intended use of plot (in %)**

|**Tenure status**|**All plots**<br>**_(1,655 obs.)_**|**Residential plots**<br>**_(1,104 obs.)_**|**Agricultural**<br>**plots**<br>**_(463 obs.)_**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**_No administrative_** **_~~d~~ocument_**|29.1|16.1|60.0|
|**_Administrative document_**|53.0|62.5|30.2|
|**_Precarious title_**|12.7|15.6|7.6|
|**_Property title_**|5.0|5.7|2.2|
|**_Unknown_**|0.1|0.1|0.0|
|**_Total_**|100.0|100.0|100|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_

**Annex 5.5. Tenure status and land access mode at time of transaction (in %)**

|||**Access **<br>|**to land by:**<br>|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Tenure status**|**Private**<br>**(non-**<br>**customary)**|**Public**<br>**(non-**<br>**customary)**|**Customary**<br>**monetary**|**Customary**<br>**Non-monetary**|**_Total_**|
|**_No administrative document_**|0.0|0.0|19.8|9.3|29.1|
|**_Administrative document_**|51.4|1.6|0.0|0.0|53.0|
|**_Precarious title_**|11.8|1.0|0.0|0.0|12.7|
|**_Property title_**|4.4|0.6|0.0|0.0|5.0|
|**_Unknown_**|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.1|
|**_Total_**|67.7|3.1|19.8|9.3|100.0|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_

**Annex 5.6. Tenure status at time of transaction by land access mode (in %)**

|||**Access **<br>|**to land by:**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Tenure status**|**Private**<br>**(non-**<br>**customary)**|**Public**<br>**(non-**<br>**customary)**|**Customary**<br>**monetary**|**Customary**<br>**Non-monetary**|
|**_No administrative_**<br>**_document_**|0.0|0.0|100.0|100|
|**_Administrative_**<br>**_document_**|75.9|50.0|0.0|0.0|
|**_Precarious title_**|17.4|30.8|0.0|0.0|
|**_Property title_**|6.5|19.2|0.0|0.0|
|**_Unknown_**|0.2|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|**_Total_**|100.0|100.0|100.0|100.0|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_ 55
**Annex 5.7. Median distance to city center (in km) by tenure status at time of transaction**

|**Tenure status**|**Median**<br>**All plots**|**distance to city**<br>**Residential**<br>**plots**|**center**<br>**Agricultural**<br>**plots**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**No administrative**<br>**document**|33|23|38|
|**Administrative**<br>**document**|22|21|29|
|**Precarious title**|18|17|21|
|**Property title**|16|13|23|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_

**Annex 5.8. Tenure transition matrix – residential plots only (in %)**

|**Tenure at time of survey**<br>**Tenure at time of transaction **|**No administrative**<br>**document**|**Administrative**<br>**document**|**Precarious**<br>**title**|**Property**<br>**right title**|**Unknow**<br>**n**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**No administrative document**|7.6|7.0|1.0|0.2|0.4|16.1|
|**Administrative document**|0.0|54.0|8.1|0.5|0.0|62.5|
|**Precarious title**|0.0|0.0|14.9|0.5|0.1|15.6|
|**Property title**|0.0|0.0|0.0|5.7|0.0|5.7|
|**Unknown **|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|
|**Total **|7.6|61.0|24.0|6.9|0.5|100.0|

_Source: authors’ survey, 2012_ 56
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unchallengeable in all respects than with simply having a document they could use against the seller or a third party with no such bit of paper. Consequently, they frequently opt for the least costly means of obtaining security of tenure. According to the notary*, most of the deeds concerning land transactions that he formalized, with the exception of those relating to property titles, were certifications of signature. Using this system, the buyer can escape the formalities of registration and related costs but, in so doing, denies himself the opportunity to give formal notice of the deed, which would give it legal effect vis-à-vis third parties’.

* _interviewed by the authors; Source: Djiré and Traoré (2008)_

# **Annex 6.3.** **_Lotissements_ and resettlement operations on land subject to property title**

In the area of Missabougou verger, _commune_ VI, the _commune_ team granted many precarious titles (CUH) in respect of building plots located on the property of a development company which had a TF. In June 2012, the Governor of Bamako District ordered the mayor to stop the ongoing work on the site and annul the titles that had been granted (L’Indicateur du Renouveau October 18, 2012).

In Sebenikoro, _commune_ VI, the resettlement of families on more than 260 lots, which had been carried out in 1996 by the town council and the governorate of Bamako District in connection with the SNQ program and the upgrading operation for the Sebenikoro settlement, was challenged in February 2011 by a company which said it was the owner of those lots (L’Indépendant June 27, 2012).

_Source: L’Indicateur du Renouveau (2012) and L’Indépendant ( 2012)_

# **Annex 6.4. Disputes concerning one or several property titles**

In Gouana village, Kalabancoro _commune_ , Kati _cercle_ , in March 2012, the member of parliament for _commune_ II claimed to hold TF dating from 2006 to 670 ha. He brought proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Koulikoro region seeking the eviction of around 970 families (L’Indicateur du Renouveau March, 12 2012).

In Sénou-Plateau, _commune_ VI, an individual attempted at the end of February 2012 to expropriate more than 2000 families who had been settled for many years on land (with a total area of 60 ha) affected by the Sénou infrastructure scheme drawn up by the council of _commune_ VI. Claiming to hold property title, he had the 60 ha surveyed and plotted. The community mobilized against the plan, the police intervened and fired warning shots to disperse the demonstrators. Clashes lasted three days, resulting in injuries and arrests (Indicateur du Renouveau February 29, 2012). Following these incidents, the authorities<sup>80</sup> decided to chase that individual away and said they were prepared to conduct an inquiry to establish who was responsible (L’Indicateur du Renouveau March 1, 2012).

_Source: L’Indicateur du Renouveau (2012)_

> 80 Ministries of Territorial Administration and Local Authorities, Housing, Land Affairs and Urban Planning and the municipal and traditional authorities of Sénou.

58