metadata: authors: 0: author: Christiansen, Lene Siljeholm
1: author: Gleditsch,Nils Petter
2: author: Hegre,Havard
count: World
docna: 0: docna: Democratic Jihad ? Military intervention and democracy
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Conflict and Fragile States,Human Rights,Social Cohesion,Armed Conflict
teratopic: Governance,Conflict and Development,Public Sector Development,Health, Nutrition and Population
abstracts: cdata!: Democracies rarely if ever fight one
            another, but they participate in wars as frequently as
            autocracies. They tend to win the wars in which they
            participate. Democracies frequently build large alliances in
            wartime, but not only with other democracies. From time to
            time democracies intervene militarily in ongoing conflicts.
            The democratic peace may contribute to a normative
            justification for such interventions, for the purpose of
            promoting democracy and eventually for the promotion of
            peace. This is reinforced by an emerging norm of
            humanitarian intervention. Democracies may have a motivation
            to intervene in non-democracies, even in the absence of
            ongoing conflict, for the purpose of regime change. The
            recent Iraq War may be interpreted in this perspective. A
            strong version of this type of foreign policy may be
            interpreted as a democratic crusade. The paper examines the
            normative and theoretical foundations of democratic
            interventionism. An empirical investigation of interventions
            in the period 1960-96 indicates that democracies intervene
            quite frequently, but rarely against other democracies. In
            the short term, democratic intervention appears to be
            successfully promoting democratization, but the target
            states tend to end up among the unstable semi-democracies.
            The most widely publicized recent interventions are targeted
            on poor or resource-dependent countries in non-democratic
            neighborhoods. Previous research has found these
            characteristics to reduce the prospects for stable
            democracy. Thus, forced democratization is unpredictable
            with regard to achieving long-term democracy and potentially
            harmful with regard to securing peace. But short-term
            military successes may stimulate more interventions until
            the negative consequences become more visible.
repnme: repnme: Democratic Jihad ? Military intervention
            and democracy
display_title: Democratic Jihad Military
            intervention and democracy
listing_relative_url: /research/2007/06/7680987/democratic-jihad-military-intervention-democracy
topicv3: Political Violence and Civil War m1326942 739,Political Violence and War m1327310 2462,Genocide m1327320 2509,Human Rights m1327778 2203,Military m1505651 3036
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Governance,Conflict and Development,Public Sector Development,Health, Nutrition and Population
no_of_pages: 62
author_keys: 0: author_key: 635052
1: author_key: 616764
model_extractions: WPS4242 POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 15

**Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy** 1

2

# **Nils Petter Gleditsch, Lene Siljeholm Christiansen & Håvard Hegre**

Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Department of Political Science, University of Oslo & Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Abstract: Democracies rarely if ever fight one another, but they participate in wars as frequently as autocracies. They tend to win the wars in which they participate. Democracies frequently build large alliances in wartime, but not only with other democracies. From time to time democracies intervene militarily in on-going conflicts. The democratic peace may contribute to a normative justification for such interventions, for the purpose of promoting democracy and eventually for the promotion of peace. This is reinforced by an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. Democracies may have a motivation to intervene in non-democracies, even in the absence of on-going conflict, for the purpose of regime change. The Iraq War may be interpreted in this perspective. A strong version of this type of foreign policy may be interpreted as a democratic crusade. The paper examines the normative and theoretical foundations of democratic interventionism. An empirical investigation of interventions in the period 1960–96 indicates that democracies intervene quite frequently, but rarely against other democracies. In the short term, democratic intervention appears to be successfully promoting democratization, but the target states tend to end up among the unstable semi-democracies. The most widely publicized recent interventions are targeted on poor or resource-dependent countries in non-democratic neighborhoods. Previous research has found these characteristics to reduce the prospects for stable democracy. Thus, forced democratization is unpredictable with regard to achieving long-term democracy and potentially harmful with regard to securing peace. However, short-term military successes may stimulate more interventions until the negative consequences become more visible.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4242, June 2007 _The Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about post-conflict development (more information about the Post-Conflict Transitions Project can be found at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict_ ). _An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at_ _<u>http://econ.worldbank.org</u> ._ 1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented, inter alia, to meetings of the International Studies Association in Montreal (2004), the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Uppsala (2004), and the Conference on ‘Political Institutions, Development, and a Domestic Civil Peace’, Oxford (2005). Our work has been funded by the Polarization and Conflict Project (CIT-2-CIT-2004-506084), funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Program. It has also received support from the Research Council of Norway and the World Bank. We are grateful to participants in the conferences where the paper was presented for comments and also to a number of colleagues and associates at the Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, for assistance, comments, and suggestions, particularly Joachim Carlsen, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Naima Mouhleb, Håvard Strand, Henrik Urdal, and Lars Wilhelmsen. We are grateful to Jeffrey Pickering for letting us use his data on military interventions. Lene S. Christiansen acknowledges a travel grant from the Department of Sociology and Political Science at NTNU. The dataset used here can be downloaded from <u>www.prio.no/cscw/datasets.</u>

> 2 _Nils Petter Gleditsch_ (nilspg@prio.no) is a Research professor at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), head of the working group on environmental conflict at PRIO’s Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), editor of _Journal of Peace Research,_ and professor of political science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim. _Lene Siljeholm Christiansen_

(lene.christiansen@riksrevisjonen.no) is an MA in political science from NTNU and was a Research assistant at CSCW when the first draft was written. This article relies heavily on her thesis (Christiansen, 2004). She now works for the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General, but that agency is in no way responsible for the views expressed here. _Håvard Hegre_ (hhegre@prio.no) is a Research professor at the CSCW and an Associate professor of political science at the University of Oslo.
2

## **Democratic Jihad?3 Military Intervention and Democracy**

‘America is a nation with a mission ... Our aim is a democratic peace – a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman ... This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. We will finish the historic work of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the world’. Thus spoke George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on 20 January 2004 (Bush, 2004) in what has become rather typical rhetoric from key decisionmakers in the current US administration. In this paper we look at how the theoretical and empirical work on the democratic peace can be absorbed into a policy of liberal imperialism. We examine the empirical foundations of this policy, the prospects of its success, its limitations, and its possible demise.

# **The Democratic Peace**

Democracies rarely if ever fight each other. This is the essence of the democratic peace, confirmed in a number of studies (Doyle, 1986; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Russett, 1993; Russett & Oneal, 2001). Raknerud & Hegre (1997) estimate that dyads of two democracies had a 57% lower probability than mixed dyads of onset of interstate war in the 1840–1992 period, and 35% lower probability than non-democratic dyads. The estimate is conservative since the analysis includes several dubious cases of wars between democracies such as the wars between Finland and the Allied powers. While Rummel (1983) sees the dyadic democratic peace (‘the joint freedom proposition’) as being without significant exceptions, as does Ray (1995), and Levy (1989: 88) has labeled it ‘as close as anything we have to an empirical law in world politics’, others limit themselves to viewing it merely as very strong (Weede, 1992: 382) and robust to the relevant control variables (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 313). The argument that it was

> 3 The expression ‘democratic jihad’ was used in print by Mitchell, Gates & Hegre (1999: 789), but it may have been used even earlier. Chan (1997: 59) expressed fear of a ‘democratic crusade’.
3 an artifact of the bipolar structure of the Cold War (Faber & Gowa, 1995) begs the crucial issue of why all the democracies were on one side in that worldwide conflict, and rapidly loses its force as the post-Cold War world piles up new dyad-years without new evidence of inter-democratic wars. The theoretical justifications for the dyadic democratic peace remain more contested. The main contenders – the normative and the structural explanations – still have their spokespersons, while Russett & Oneal (2001: 53f.) now argue that the two should not be seen as contradictory. Mansfield & Snyder (1995, 2002a) have argued that democratization promotes armed interstate conflict but others (Thompson & Tucker, 1997; Ward & Gleditsch 1998) hold that political instability is the main culprit, that failed or reversed democratization is particularly dangerous, and that the a higher level of dyadic democracy will soon outweigh the unsettling effect of political change. Mansfield & Snyder (2002b) also find that dyads where either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition are particularly prone to violence. In a theoretical model James & Mitchell (1995) allow democratic hegemons to coerce weaker democracies that are trying to break out of structural dependency, but there is no systematic empirical evidence for this. As Forsythe (1992) concedes in discussing the frequently cited examples of US covert action against Cuba, Nicaragua, and others, the target states were hardly model democracies and the level of violence was insufficient to record these episodes as armed conflict even by the Uppsala criteria.<sup>4</sup> While there is compelling evidence for the dyadic democratic peace, and the opposition voices are receding, the nation-level relationship remains more controversial. There is no evidence that democracies participate in war less than other regime types (Chan, 1984). Distinguishing between initiators and defenders does not show democracies to be more peaceful either (Small & Singer, 1976), although the war initiation variable is so questionable that this exercise is of limited value (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997: 295–297).<sup>5</sup> Rummel (1983) has nevertheless consistently argued for a monadic democratic peace (the ‘free-

> _4_ Particularly in cases of unsuccessful coercion, such as Cuba, the mystery most in need of explanation is why the US has not used the necessary force but limited itself to covert pinpricks. In any case, given the nature of the Cuban regime, this issue is not relevant to the dyadic democratic peace.

> 5 Caprioli & Trumbore (2006) finds democracies to be less likely to be the first to use violent force in a dyadic MID where both sides use force.
4 dom proposition’). His original empirical evidence showing democracies to fight less overall was based on data for a very short time-frame. But his later argument is based on the smaller losses suffered by democratic powers in wartime. Some of the participants on the democratic side of the major wars are very peripheral actors that join in for political solidarity more than anything. They hardly suffer any casualties, but they drive the rate of democratic war participation up. However, the lower losses of democracies is also compatible with the notion put forward by Galtung (1996) that democracies are particularly selfrighteous and belligerent, and the fact that democracies tend to win the wars they participate in (Lake, 1992; Reiter & Stam, 2002). However, Rummel’s argument about peripheral allies shows an important lead. Democracies are much better at building large coalitions once a war has broken out. These coalitions are frequently with other democracies, but democracies also ally with autocracies – the most glaring example is probably the wartime alliance between Stalin and the Western democracies, forged after Hitler’s June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union broke up the Hitler-Stalin pact. In all the large multilateral wars, the democracies were part of the larger coalition. In World War I it contained 73% of the participants (11 out of 15 countries), in World War II 75%, in the Korean War 82%, and in the Vietnam War 78%. Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (1991 and again in 2003) fought alone against large coalitions built by the major Western powers.<sup>6</sup> Most of the participants on the democratic side, including many of the democracies, joined the war after conflict had broken out. The best case for arguing that democracies are more peaceful overall is that they participate less frequently in the outbreak of new armed conflict. In all but one of the eight wars mentioned above, the violence had been initiated by two non-democratic actors, while the democracies joined later. The one exception is the Iraq War of 2003, to which we return later.<sup>7</sup> As the number of democracies increases, the crucial question is what happens at the system level. Generalizing from the dyadic level, most writers (like Singer & Wildavsky, 1993) have assumed that the systemic relationship could be deduced from the dyadic: the more democracy in the world, the more peace.

> 6 Data from the Correlates of War Project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Project.

> 7 The 2000 Afghanistan war is also an exception if we do not count the Taliban regime as an ally of al Qaeda in the attack on the US on 11 September.
5 A few have generalized from the monadic level: since democracies participate in war as much as other states, more democracy in the world makes no difference at the system level (Small & Singer, 1976). It is perfectly possible for the dyadic relationship to hold at the same time as the monadic non-relationship; it simply implies that politically mixed dyads are the most hazardous. But the generalizations from the dyadic level and the monadic level cannot both be true, since they lead to very different predictions. Combining the insights at the dyadic level and the monadic level, Gleditsch & Hegre (1997: 297–304) conclude that if the probability of war in the three types of democratic/authoritarian dyads (DD, DA, and AA) were independent of time and space, a parabolic relationship would be found at the system level: In a world with few democracies, adding another democracy would increase the probability of war overall, while in a world of many democracies increasing democratization would bring more peace. The systemic argument is hard to test empirically. Gleditsch & Hegre (1997: 304–307) adduce in support of their argument that the incidence of war at the system level (measured as the percentage of country-years at war) roughly follows an inverted U-shaped curve, while the share of countries with democratic government has increased over the same period, although not linearly. However, an analysis by Mitchell, Gates & Hegre (1999: 788) concluded that the positive systemic relationship between democracy and peace seemed to be monotonic rather than curvilinear. Among the many reasons why the Gleditsch & Hegre (1997) model may not hold is that democracies tend to cluster and that the probability of conflict with one’s immediate neighbors is likely to be more important that the probability of conflict with distant states (Gleditsch & Ward, 2000; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2004). Moreover, the increasing acceptance of democracy as an international norm may well have influenced the probability of conflict in the three regime type combinations. Since most wars are between neighbors (or at least regional) the question whether the systemic relationship between democracy and peace is monotonic or curvilinear is not important for those parts of the world where democracy is the dominant form of government. However, it is crucial for regions at a low level of democracy, another issue to which we shall return.

So far we have only discussed the effect of democracy on interstate peace. The numerically dominant form of conflict today is intrastate war, or civil war (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; Marshall & Gurr, 2005). The probability of civil war seems to have an inverted U-shaped relationship to
6 the probability of civil war (Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001). This relationship can be deduced from the theoretical notion that war is a function of _identity formation_ of the competing groups, the _motivation_ to fight over an issue, and the _opportunity_ to fight. Variants of this scheme are found in the writings of Gurr (1970) on political violence, Collier & Hoeffler (2004)<sup>8</sup> and Ellingsen (2000)<sup>9</sup> on civil war and Most & Starr (1989) on interstate war<sup>10</sup> . If we assume that increased democracy provides improved opportunity for rebels to organize, while the lack of democracy provides a motive for rebellion against the autocratic leadership, the combined effect of opportunity and motivation can be written as d(1-d), where d is the degree of democracy, i.e. a parabolic relationship. The inverted U-curve has been confirmed in several studies (e.g. de Soysa, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Hegre (2003) and Collier et al. (2003) argue that the relationship between democracy and civil war may be conditioned by economic development, and that at low levels of economic development increased democracy may even yield more conflict. There are relatively few poor democracies, so we regard the jury as still being out on this hypothesis. But if it is correct, it has implications for attempts to force democracy from the outside.

Finally, one-sided violence (the killing of unorganized people)<sup>11</sup> is not included in the Correlates of War data and is only available for the period after the Cold War in the Uppsala Conflict data Eck & Hultman, 2007; Mack, 2005). But such conflict is closely related to civil war in at least two ways: First, it frequently occurs in the same countries that are affected by civil war, for instance in order to disarm a minority group before it has a chance to rebel or after it has been defeated in battle. Second, one-sided violence seems to be associated with many of the same factors as internal violence. Rummel (1994) holds that the more authoritarian a country, the greater the probability of democide, while Fein (1995) argues that there is ‘more murder in the middle’, i.e. a pattern akin to the inverted U-curve posited for civil war. One could imagine that a stable autocracy might avoid politicide as well as civil war since the opposition is un-

> 8 Collier & Hoeffler refer variously to ‘greed and grievance’ and ‘opportunity and grievance’. 9 Ellingsen refers to identity, frustration, and opportunity.

> 10 Most & Starr refer to opportunity and willingness, identity presumably trivial given that nationstates are the obvious actors in interstate war. With the multilateralization of war, in particular the active involvement of NATO, the UN, and other international organizations, this may change.
7 able to organize. However, politicide might act as a powerful deterrent to organization and thus to civil war in the future. Krain (1997) holds that genocide occurs most frequently in states undergoing political change. Harff (2003: 70) finds that the risk of genocide and politicide is highest under autocratic regimes, while international economic interdependency reduces the likelihood that regime instability and internal war will lead to mass murder. This issue has not yet been the subject of as much systematic research as civil war, but countries with a high level of democracy are in any case likely to minimize internal violence, whether the one-sided kind or the civil war variety. Finally, political change has frequently been found to be associated with internal violence. Hegre et al. (2001) found that political change was more common among semidemocratic countries, but that the change effect could not be substituted for the level effect, or vice versa. In the lower range of democracy democratization can be doubly hazardous, because the destabilizing effect of change is reinforced by moving into the more violent middle range of democracy. At the democratic end of the scale, the destabilizing effect of democratization is likely to be overshadowed relatively quickly by the peace-inducing effect of a high level of democracy. Again, this has implications for attempts at forced democratization.

We sum up this thumbnail sketch of the literature on the democratic peace by concluding that as the world becomes more democratic (with more democracies, and particularly with more established democracies at a higher level of democracy), the greater the probability that further democratization will reduce internal and external violence, particularly after any initial destabilizing effect of political change has been overcome.

# **Towards a Global Liberal Peace?**

Given this relatively optimistic view of the relationship between democracy and peace, what are the prospects for global peace through democratization? Democracy has certainly advanced over time. Given a fairly strict cut-off between democracy and non-democracy (a democracy has 7 or higher on the combined scale of democracy minus autocracy; cf. Jaggers & Gurr, 1995: 479; Marshall &

> 11 Variously called democide (Rummel, 1994), politicide (Harff, 2003), and genocide (when directed against a particular ethnic group).
8 Jaggers, 2003), more than 40% of the world’s countries with more than 50% of the world’s population can now be counted as democratic (Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Countries characterized by Freedom House (2007) as ‘free’ have nearly half (47%) of world population and 77% live in countries that are either free or partly free<sup>12</sup> . The share of countries with electoral democracy is 83%. While the Polity project and Freedom House differ in their evaluation of some countries, they agree that the global level of democratization has never been higher. The same conclusion can be drawn from the Vanhanen’s Polyarchy scale.<sup>13</sup> The movement towards greater democracy has not been linear or even monotonic. It can be debated whether or not Huntington (1991) is correct in describing three waves of democratization; some may discern four or even five waves. In any case, it seems reasonable to say that there are three waves in the twentieth century, the first peaking in the early 1920s and the second in the late 1950s.

The notion of waves implies that there have also been democratic reversals. The first was associated with the rise of the two totalitarian movements in Europe in the 1920s. The second was in part a product of the many failed democratizations in the Third World after independence, but also with the continued spread of Marxist, personalist, and military regimes in many areas of the world. Zakaria (1997) and others have pointed to the fragile nature of many of the new democracies in the third wave, labeling this ‘the rise of illiberal democracy’. Freedom House (2007) sees the expansion of freedom as stagnating. While the third wave of democratization may appear to have leveled out, warnings of the imminent coming of the third reversal (Diamond, 1996) have so far proved to be premature.

Liberals see democratization in a mutually reinforcing relationship with other liberal values, such as economic interdependence and international law and organization. All of these, independently and together, strengthen international and domestic peace, in the liberal view (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Schneider, Barbieri & Gleditsch, 2003).

> 12 For both these indicators, the percentage of countries is the same as the percentage of world population.

> 13 See Vanhanen (2000), data available at <u>www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.</u>
9 One reason for an optimistic view of the future of democracy is that after the fall of the Soviet Union there appears to be no other worldview competing for global attention, democracy and the market economy are ‘the only game in town’ in the words of Fukuyama (1989), the ball being ‘very much in the court of those who want to rubbish democracy to provide justification for that rejection’ (Sen, 1999: 5). While China is still an authoritarian state proclaiming the dictatorship of the proletariat, its economic policies are moving in a liberal direction. It pursues national interest actively, but is no longer engaged in an ideological crusade through agents like Albania or the Khmer Rouge. ‘Asian values’, with an emphasis on collectivism rather than individual human and political rights, has lost some its appeal after the Republic of Korea has shown that political democracy is compatible with economic growth and continued respect for the elders and Japan has shown that Asian economic growth may not last forever. Fundamentalist Islam is certainly in opposition to democracy, and Freedom House (2005) characterizes 60% of the countries with a Muslim majority are ‘not free’ and only 4% as ‘free’. Unlike almost any other part of the world, the Muslim world has so far been left unaffected by the third wave. Yet, fundamentalist Islam is hardly a viable alternative for the world, the way communism appeared to be. It is strongly opposed by all major economic and military powers and is kept down in various ways by most countries where Muslims are in a minority. There is an incipient grass-roots movement against one of the liberal values, globalization, supported by a mixed coalition of radicals, protectionists, and environmentalists. But this movement has little government support and is not directed against democratization, although some of its opponents hold that this might be an indirect effect were its advocacy to succeed.

Although democratization is by no means an irreversible process, there is a ratchet effect. Contrary to the view promoted in the vast literature during the Cold War on the dim prospects of democracy (see e.g. Revel, 1983), democracy turns out to be more resilient than other forms of government. Hegre et al. (2001: 38) show that for the period 1816–1992 democracies are less likely to revert into an alternative regime type (autocracy or semi-democracy). The semidemocratic regime type is the least stable, while autocratic countries are somewhat more stable, but less than democracies. Thus, while some countries continue to move between the three regime types, fewer leave the democratic camp. If this pattern persists, eventually most if not all countries will end up in the democratic camp.
10 The third wave of democratization was initially accompanied by a rising trend in conflict. This trend went back to the late 1950s. It seems due in large part to a rising number of new states, many of which fell prey to civil war. In fact, the probability of a given country being involved in armed conflict stayed roughly level for the second half of the Cold War and is now lower than at any time since the end of the 1950s (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 621). The incidence of conflict also increased during the Cold War due to a failure to end a number of conflicts that dragged on for decades, frequently supported by the major powers (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 77–78). The frequently hailed ‘long peace’ of the Cold War period (Gaddis, 1987) preserved the nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers while avoiding a direct confrontation, but did not create peace in the Third World. On the contrary, it seems to have stimulated proxy wars in Southern Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. At the end of the Cold War, this changed drastically. A few new conflicts appeared, mainly in the two socialist federal states that fell apart (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), but soon a number of protracted Cold War-related conflicts were resolved and from 1993 the number of armed conflicts has declined (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005: 624). The United Nations was freed from the numbing effect of the bipolar divide, and got involved in an increasing number of peacekeeping missions.<sup>14</sup> The decline of war is not only reflected by the number of conflicts, but also in the number of battle-related casualties. In fact, the trend in battle-related casualties has been downward since World War II, while before that it had been pointing up. Over half the battle deaths in armed conflict since World War II are accounted for by five major international wars (Vietnam, Korea, Iran–Iraq, Afghanistan) and one civil war (China). The spikes in the curve created by these major wars decline over time and constitute the major reason for the decline in battle deaths overall (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Lacina (2006) finds democracy robustly and negatively associated with the severity of civil war, as measured by battle deaths.

Viewed at the global level, the prospects for a stable liberal peace seem promising. But most interstate wars are between neighbors and those interventions in civil wars that are not from major powers also tend to be from

> 14 Ironically, leading key decisionmakers at the UN to believe that the number of armed conflicts was increasing, rather than declining (Mack, 2002, 2004).
11 neighboring states. Both democracy and conflict are strongly clustered (Gleditsch, 2002). While some parts of the world – notably Western Europe and North America – make up a ‘pacific union’ (Kant, 1795) or a ‘pluralistic security community’ (Deutsch et al., 1957) where war has become ‘obsolescent’ (Muller, 1989, 2003), other regions are mired in conflict. The world is divided into ‘zones of peace’ and ‘zones of turmoil’ (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993). Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia are conflict-ridden, while Europe, North America, and East Asia are virtually without any active armed conflict. Isolated democracies are more likely to fall prey to authoritarian states (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2004). Clearly, attempts at forced democratization will have to take regional patterns into account.

# **Democratic Interventionism?**

An early objection to the dyadic democratic peace was based on the possibility that the causation might be reversed: peace was causing democracy rather than the other way around. Thompson (1996) made this argument on the basis of four historical case studies, but so far this view has not gained much support in statistical analyses (Mousseau & Shi, 1999). It is true that war (or even the threat of war) tends to heighten security concerns, that this may lead to a lower priority for freedom of speech and other civil liberties,<sup>15</sup> and in some cases the postponing of elections and other democratic procedures.<sup>16</sup> In a few cases, international tension leading up to war may conceivably be identified as contributing to increased authoritarianism, as in Greece and Turkey in the 1960s. But most democracies are much more resilient. While peace may permit them to deepen their commitment to civil liberties and political rights, the threat of war will not lead to the abolition of democratic norms.

Paradoxically, war may also be an effective midwife of peace. Although democracies rarely participate at the onset of new wars, they frequently join ongoing wars. And when they do go to war, they tend to be on the winning side (Lake, 1992; Reiter & Stam, 2002). In the two major wars of the twentieth cen-

> 15 The Official Secrets Act in the United Kingdom was passed in 1911 in the spy scare preceding World War I. Norway and other countries passed similar security legislation at about the same time.
12 tury, World Wars I and II, the democracies were on the winning side. The same was the case in Korea, but not in Vietnam. In the four largest wars after the end of the Cold War (in terms of the number of participants and the size of the military engagement, not in battle-deaths), the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War in 1999, the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003, the US and its allies quickly defeated the opponent militarily.<sup>17</sup> In all of these wars, as in the two World Wars, a number of non-democratic countries also fought on the side of the Western democracies.

Defeat in war frequently leads to regime change (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). In the case of surrender, the autocratic leader may be deposed by the victor, as happened to Hitler, Mullah Omar, and Saddam Hussein. But even if he survives the war itself, the defeated dictator has to face the consequences of his actions at home. Though he does not answer to an electorate, he loses credibility as a national leader and support from whatever groups have propped up his regime, as happened to the Greek colonels following their adventure in Cyprus in 1974, the Argentinean junta after their defeat in the Falklands War in 1982, or Slobodan Milosevic after the Kosovo War. The resignation of an autocratic ruler increases the probability of a regime change. In the rarer cases where a democratic leader loses a war, the system provides for a peaceful change of leadership, and the probability of a regime change is less.<sup>18</sup> The Democratic and Republican administrations were defeated in elections following their losses in Vietnam in 1968 and 1975, but the US did not switch to a different regime type. While defeat in war increases the probability of a regime change generally, this is particularly true for an autocratic state, and the net effect of many such changes is likely to shift the balance in the direction of democracy.

An examination of the major waves of democracy in the twentieth century confirms this pattern. The defeat of autocracies in World War I (the German,

> 16 Great Britain put off parliamentary elections until the end of World War II, but he US conducted a contested presidential election in 1944, as well as congressional elections. 17 Following the military defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, internationalized civil wars continued in these countries. The eventual outcome of these wars remains undecided.

> 18 Regime change can be operationalized as a change of a fixed number of points on the Polity score, but we use it here in the sense of a change from one of the broad categories of democracy, semi-democracy, or autocracy to one of the others.
13 Hapsburg, and Ottoman empires) stimulated the growth of democracy in the later years of the first wave, just as the defeat of Nazi Germany, Japan, and their allies in World War II set off the second wave. The third wave of democracy does not coincide with the end of a hot war, but if we may interpret the end of the Cold War as a defeat for the Soviet Union in the ideological war with the West as well as in the arms race with the United States, leading to the collapse of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.

The establishment (or reestablishment) of democracy in the wake of major wars, has seen a number of success stories (Italy, Germany, and Japan after World War II), as well as some clear failures (Russia after World War I, Eastern Europe after World War II), and some ambiguous cases (Germany after World War I). On the whole, however, there is enough evidence for the idea of war as the midwife of democracy that it is not surprising if decisionmakers in democracies should begin to speculate if the world trend towards democracy might not be helped along by the judicious use of force.

Such ideas are not new, particularly not in the United States. Hook (2002: 109–110) argues that a ‘democratist crusade’ has been underway through the history of the US.<sup>19</sup> Smith (1994: 5) traces its origins to the Spanish-American war of 1898 – a war that has been interpreted as a war between democracies (Ray, 1995), but which according to Peceny (1997) was seen at the time as a liberation of Cuba from the colonial yoke of an autocratic Spanish monarchy. Light (2001: 76) counts no less than 40 episodes between 1912 to 1932 where the US intervened in the Western hemisphere in order to promote democracy. Above all, the US entered World War I (‘the war to end all wars’), in President Wilson’s Kant-inspired words, ‘to make the world safe for democracy’. His Fourteen Points advocated democratic government and national self-determination and the League of Nations set up in the wake of the war was meant to promote these goals. Another liberal democrat, President Roosevelt, brought the US into World War II for similar reasons. After the end of the war, again under US leadership, the victorious powers set up an international organization, the United Nations, with a broad liberal agenda, while the US set out to democratize Germany and Japan. When democracy in Western Europe seemed threatened by 19 This whole paragraph owes a great deal to Hook (2002).
14 the rise of communism, the US intervened overtly and covertly to promote democratic alternatives.

After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, President George Bush proclaimed that ‘the day of the dictator is over’ and his successor Bill Clinton embraced the ‘enlargement of the democratic community’ as a key element of US foreign policy (Hook, 2002: 115). US military interventions (which had been frequent throughout the twentieth century) were increasingly justified in terms of democracy promotion. For instance, the UN-sanctioned intervention in Haïti in 1994 in support of the popularly elected President Aristide, deposed by the military, was called ‘Operation Uphold Democracy’.

In any intervention carried out by a major power, it is difficult to distinguish between universalistic motivations like ‘promote democracy’ and selfinterested motivations like saving US citizens, protecting United Fruit, or ensuring continued oil supplies.<sup>20</sup> To some extent, the democratic peace blurs this distinction between universalism and self-interest. A leader of a democratic nation may argue that an autocratic state presents a danger, whereas a democracy would be able to live peacefully with other democratic states. Thus, the successful imposition of democracy is beneficial to national security. In a strong defense of democratic interventionism Bailey (2003: 2) goes so far as to argue that ‘the spread of liberal, free market democracy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been accomplished largely by force of arms’.

But the promotion of democracy is not only part of US foreign policy. During the Cold War, spokesmen for the UN were generally limited to advocating ‘good governance’, but in the post-Cold War world they more clearly espouse the goal of democracy.<sup>21</sup> The European Union has been committed to democracy from its inception. NATO has increasingly come to require its members to respect democratic procedures, while during the Cold War it was willing to tolerate authoritarian government in member states like Turkey and Portugal in defense against the greater enemy of communism.

A number of NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have come to play an important role in promoting human rights and, by implication, democ-

> 20 A consistent pattern of intervention may permit certain inferences, but we are not aware of any systematic test of this.
15 ratic governance. Their advocacy has made clear the normative dilemma inherent in the international system: On the one hand, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlines the inviolable rights of individual citizens. On the other hand, the Westphalian principles embodied in the UN Treaty ensure the inviolability of national sovereignty. But do nations have the right to use that sovereignty to violate international human rights? Increasingly, in the post-War World, the human rights movement began to answer this question in the negative, and this exercised a powerful influence on democratic governments and on international organizations. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, Kofi Annan asked the crucial question: ‘... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights ... ?’ A norm of humanitarian intervention began to emerge in international law, expanding the just war of self-defense to a just war in defense of citizens of other countries whose rights were being grossly violated (Rosas, 1994). A prominent democratic peace theorist, Rudolph Rummel (1994), has made the point that between four and five times as many people were killed by governments (in ‘democide’) in the twentieth century as were killed in war. While the figures for both forms of violence are highly uncertain, and Rummel’s democide figures may contain more indirect deaths from disease and starvation than are allowed into the war death figures, it seems probable that serious human rights violations have killed many more people than war during this period. If early military intervention could have prevented these killings, would it have been justified? This point has been made in relation to the Holocaust, and more recently in relation to events in Bosnia and in several countries in Africa. Defenders of humanitarian intervention can also point to the declining number of battle-related casualties in war and the increasing use of precision targeting in military action.

Critics of the democratic peace have long warned against such implications. Layne (1994: 14) argued that democratic peace theory could be used to legitimize an interventionist democratic crusade. Kegley & Hermann (2002: 19) have also pointed out how the logic of the democratic peace can encourage the

> 21 See e.g. Annan (2001). In this speech, the Secretary-General also embraced the idea of the democratic peace.
16 democracies’ ‘penchant for acting belligerently against autocratic governments, even to wage imperialistic wars against them. Flexing one’s muscle against a centralized policy is easily rationalized, and this rationale can become compelling to democracies if the action might convert non-democracies to democratic rule and thus enlarge the zone of peace’. Among the supporters of the democratic peace, Russett (1993: 135–136) has argued that the ‘model of “fight them, beat them, and make them democratic” is irrevocably flawed as a basis for contemporary action’ (see also Russett & Oneal, 2001: 303). Russett (2005: 405) concedes that military interventions ‘have sometimes installed democracy by force, but they have more often failed, and the successes have been immensely expensive in lives and treasure’.

A policy of democratization by force requires that decisionmakers in democracies are aware of the regularities described in this paper. If the peacebuilding effects of democracy, the tendency of democracies to win wars, the democratizing effects on authoritarian countries of losing wars were known only to the research community and disbelieved among policymakers, democratic interventionism would be a tool waiting to be discovered. But there is no question the democratic peace has penetrated the Western political establishment right to the top. James Baker, Secretary of State in the administration of George H. Bush, said in 1992 that ’real democracies do not go to war with one another’. President Clinton said in his State of the Union address in 1994 that ‘Democracies don’t attack each other’. And as early as 1990, Margaret Thatcher said that ‘democracies don’t go to war with one another’.<sup>22</sup> The democratic peace seems to have become part of the conventional wisdom of the West over a decade ago. In the Clinton administration enlargement of the world community of democracies was placed at the core of US foreign policy. The introductory quote from President George W. Bush makes it clear that the link between the democratic peace and military intervention is accepted in the current administration. The victory of the democracies in the two world wars and in Korea have not gone unnoticed in the minds of democratic decisionmakers, and the US defeat in the Vietnam war is generally accounted for as a political defeat on the home front in an unpopular war that the US should either not have entered or conducted with

> 22 All of these quotations are from _The Economist_ (1995: 19).
17 greater vigor. In the Cold War confrontation, victory for the democratic side could not be assured. But following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no real military challenge to the self-confidence of the democracies. Apart from military strength, they could take heart from the Freedom House statistic that free countries control 89% of the world’s GDP, and could sustain either an arms race or a prolonged war against any opponent in sight.

At least three recent wars can be interpreted in this perspective. The Kosovo War in 1999 was undertaken against the authoritarian government of Serbia with the stated purpose of preventing human rights violations in Kosovo. The outcome of the war is somewhat ambiguous as far as the long-term situation in Kosovo is concerned, but it was interpreted as an unqualified success in the sense that the Milosevic regime collapsed shortly after its defeat in the war. In 2001 the US (with support from the UN) unseated the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in retaliation for its support for terrorism. In 2003 regime change again seems to have played a role in the decision to go war against Iraq, although other issues (weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi support for terrorism) were touted more prominently in the hope of obtaining a better legal basis and greater international support for the intervention. In the public debate, the possibility of intervention to force regime change has also been discussed in relation to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Such a strategy has not been suggested in the case of China. This could be interpreted as implying that the winds of internal change are sufficiently strong in China that a democratic transition will eventually happen without external intervention. But the reluctance to take on the world’s largest authoritarian country can also be interpreted in a democratic peace perspective: As Reiter & Stam (2002) argue, democracies tend to win the wars they participate in because they are better than autocracies at calculating their chances, and thus avoid taking on opponents that they cannot be sure to defeat.

But can democratic interventionism be documented beyond reference to individual wars, where stated and unstated goals can easily be contested, particularly in the absence of declassified records of the decisionmaking? In the following we shall first summarize some existing research on this topic, before reporting results from our own empirical study. We focus on four main issues: Do democracies engage in frequent interventionary behavior? Do they target mainly authoritarian states? Do these interventions tend to promote democratization? And what kind of democratization is promoted?
18 James Meernik (1996) investigated whether US interventions tended to promote democratization. Meernik collected data on 27 cases of US intervention involving the use of ground troops in the period 1948–90. Using Polity III as his measure of democracy, he measured political change for up to three years after the intervention. In most of the cases the outcome was ‘no change’, but when he compared the intervention cases with other international crises in which the US did not intervene with ground troops, he found ‘qualified evidence that US military intervention exercises a significant and positive effect on democratization’ (Meernik, 1996: 397). He also found that when the US was truly committed to promoting democracy (as evidenced by presidential statements) it was generally quite successful (op.cit.: 400). Prior anti-US violence in the target country and prior US opposition to the regime were not significant in his study.

Margaret Hermann & Charles Kegley in a series of articles have examined democracies’ use of military intervention. They find that democracies make frequent use of military intervention. Somewhat more surprisingly, they also find that other democracies are targeted quite frequently. In one of their first studies (Kegley & Hermann, 1995b) they found 15 cases between 1974 and 1988 where free states (using the Freedom House classification) intervened in other free states. In this and in later publications, they characterize this as a possible ‘danger zone in the democratic peace’. Using data for military intervention during the period 1974–91 from Tillema (1991), Kegley & Hermann (1996: 314) found that roughly one fifth to one third of all interventions were initiated by democracies (depending on whether democracy was measured by Polity or Freedom House) and that a substantial share of them (19% when using Polity) was initiated by semi-democracies. This finding is somewhat confusing in relation to the idea of democratic interventionism. How can democratic states spread democracy by intervening in other democracies? Tures (2001) has largely cleared up this puzzle. He shows that the Kegley & Hermann studies used a Polity measure with annual dating of the polity changes. This may lead to erroneous conclusions with regard to the regime type of the target state at the time of the intervention, a problem which has plagued other studies of the democratic peace as well (Mitchell et al., 1998). Kegley & Hermann have also included interventions in democratic states where the intervener was asked by the local government to help it suppress a rebel movement, as well as interventions into occupied states. Thus, the US and allied interventions to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation is coded as a democratic intervention targeting a ‘partly
19 free’ state. Non-independent states (such as the Falkland Islands) are also coded as ‘partly free’. Dismissing such cases and using the Polity IIId data with more precise dating (Mitchell et al., 1998), Tures finds only 13 cases of democracies intervening in other democracies over the longer time-span 1945–91. Four of these are interventions by Rhodesia and South Africa in Botswana. Because it relies only on institutional characteristics (and pays no attention to the level of participation) the Polity project codes South Africa under apartheid (and Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence, when blacks were still denied the vote) as democracies. This startling classification makes little difference to most statistical studies, but exercises a strong influence on these results. The remaining five interventions are all in the two dyads India–Pakistan and Peru–Ecuador. Even including the interventions by Rhodesia and South Africa, Tures concludes – contrary to Kegley & Herman – that dyadic democratic interventions occur much less frequently than one would expect on the basis of the distribution of regime characteristics and the number of democratic interventions. The extensive targeting by democracies of other democracies appears to be a red herring. Pickering (1999) found that democracies with adequate military strength were less frequent targets of military intervention generally in the period 1975–1996.

But the fact remains that democracies frequently intervene militarily and Hermann & Kegley also investigated the motives and effects of these interventions. Kegley & Hermann (1997a) showed that two-thirds of the democracies’ interventions were undertaken to expand or defend the liberal democratic community. Moreover, Hermann & Kegley (1998) showed that military interventions undertaken in order to protect or promote democracy generally led to an increase in the level of democracy in the target states. In a study of 106 developing countries from 1960 to 2002, Pickering & Kisangani (2006) found that hostile interventions can help to democratize non-democratic targets. Pickering & Peceny (2006) found a strong statistical relationship between US hostile military intervention and democratization, but this result seems to be driven by three cases in the Caribbean. Another note of skepticism is sounded by Bueno de Mesquita & Downs (2006), who argue that the citizens in a transformed democratic target are likely to have different policy priorities than those of the winning coalition in the intervening country. Empirically, they find for the period 1946–2001 that intervention does little to promote democracy when comparing it with a counterfactual trajectory without intervention.
20 Mark Peceny (1999a,b) in an examination of a much longer time-series of US military interventions (1898–1992) concluded that military intervention in and of itself was not the decisive factor. Rather, it was active support for free and fair elections that had a positive impact on the democratization of target states. Peceny found support for elections to remain statistically significant when controlling for other factors like prior democratic experience, war participation of target states, and US opposition to the government of the target state.

A weakness of most of these studies is the limited sample of interventions studied (small numbers in the case of Meernik and Hermann & Kegley; the limited focus on US interventions in the case of Meernik and Peceny), the weak coverage of the post-Cold War period (which has seen a strengthening of the ideology of democratic interventionism), and the limited number of control variables. The study of democratic change has not been situated within a more comprehensive theory of democratization. The interventions could have targeted countries where democratization was likely to happen in any case, because of internal factors or external factors not related to the intervention. We now turn to our own study, where we try to correct for these weaknesses.

# **Research Design**

The concept of democratization covers a variety of regime changes, ranging from incremental changes from any initial level of democracy to dramatic transitions from full dictatorship to coherent democracy. To keep the analysis simple and tractable, we follow Gates et al. (2007) in defining a single measure of democratization that covers all the possible changes, and use control variables to account for some of the diversity of transitions. This simplification allows us to use logit and probit models to test whether interventions tend to lead to democratization.

The unit of analysis is the country-year. We considered the use of smaller time intervals (months or days), but most of the data were available only on an annual basis. The analysis covers the time period from 1960 to 1996 and the dataset includes all independent members of the international system as defined by the Polity project. The dataset includes 166 states and 5,070 countryyears.
21

# **Dependent Variable: Democratization**

There are various operational measures of democracy, most of them quite highly correlated with each other. We use Polity IV. Although it has its weaknesses – notably the subjective nature of the coding – its focus on institutional dimensions of democracy is conveniently situated somewhere between the minimalist conception of Vanhanen’s Polyarchy index (political competition*participation, see Vanhanen, 2000) and the maximalist conception of the Freedom House political freedom scale (Freedom House, annual). We use as our measure democracy the _Polity_ variable (created by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score), which varies between –10 and +10. More precisely, we use the _Polity2_ score, where values for missing data, interregna, and transitions rather than coded as missing are scored either in the middle or prorated over the interregnum. The interregnum periods could have been problematic if they contained a large number of coups, but the _Polity2_ variable has only 25 (0.49%) missing values, with just four countries experiencing an intervention during these years.

Democratization is the dependent variable in the analysis and is defined (following Hegre et al., 2001: 36) as a positive change greater or equal to two points on the _Polity2_ variable from one year to the next. The variable is coded 1 if such a change occurs, 0 otherwise. By definition, we cannot expect democratization to occur for a country already at 9 or 10 on the _Polity2_ scale. In the analysis below of determinants of democratization we therefore leave out the 24% of the country years where the country had attained 9 or 10 in the year prior to the observation. Of the remaining 3,856 country-years, 204 (5.3%) experience democratization. Figure 1 presents the distribution of countries with democratization from 1961 through 1996. We see several peaks in the distribution, the largest one after the end of the Cold War.
22

# **Figure 1. Number of Democratizing Countries, 1961–96**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 16<br>14<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Independent Variable: Intervention**

To measure intervention we considered several possible datasets, such as those used by Tillema (2000) or Regan (2000). Tillema’s Overt Military Intervention dataset is being updated, but so far is only available up to 1991. The Regan dataset covers the period up to 1999, but is limited to interventions in on-going civil wars. We therefore chose to use Jeffrey Pickering’s update of the Pearson & Baumann (1993–94) dataset on International Military Interventions (Pickering, 1999, 2002). The original dataset spans the years 1946 to 1988, but was updated by Pickering through 1996, using the original coding guidelines.<sup>23</sup> The IMI dataset defines military intervention as ‘the use of troops or forces to cross borders or the employment of forces already based in a foreign country in pursuit of political or economic objectives in the context of a dispute’ (Pearson, Baumann & Pickering, 1994: 209). It includes friendly as well as hostile military interventions. Pickering’s updated dataset includes 827 individual military interventions between 1946 and 1996, and 673 military interventions between 23 These data were obtained directly from Pickering.
23 1960 and 1996.<sup>24</sup> Table I shows the most frequent intervening actors during this time period and Table II the most frequent targets of intervention. Most of the frequent interveners are indeed democracies, and most of the targets are non-democracies.

The interventions were coded as democratic or autocratic. Following Ellingsen (2000) and others, states receiving a score of 6 or higher on Polity2 are coded as democracies. A country-year with an intervention is coded as having a democratic military intervention if at least one of the intervening actors is coded as democratic. Other interventions are coded as autocratic. The Pickering dataset codes not only states as intervening actors but also international organizations and multilateral forces. We define these as democratic if at least one country in the organization is a democracy. Appendix 4 shows how these actors have been coded. Among the organizations, only one (the Arab League) was coded as non-democratic. In addition, a non-independent country (Belize) was also coded as a non-democratic actor.<sup>25</sup>

**Table I. The Five Most Frequently Intervening States, 1960–96**

|Intervener|Interventions|
|---|---|
|USA|63|
|UN|45|
|France|41|
|Soviet Un-<br>ion/Russia|27|
|UK|25|

Computed from data in Pickering (1999).

> 24 We have left out 23 military interventions listed by Pickering, since the targets of these interventions are not included in Polity for that year or at all. See Appendix 3 for a list of these interventions.

> 25 Each military intervention has a unique case number with start and termination dates. If the termination date was missing, we have coded only the start year of the intervention as a countryyear with military intervention. Interventions with code 99999999 for termination date are ongoing. Due to a misunderstanding we coded these as missing data. However, this has no effect on the results of the analyses because all these interventions start around 1991, and the subsequent year is coded as 1 on _Recent intervention_ . The important factor is whether there has been a recent intervention, not whether an intervention is on-going. In two cases, the intervention started before 1991. These cases were modified and coded as ongoing military interventions through 1996. Included in the recent democratic intervention variable are also cases where the intervention stopped before 1960 but the end date is 1955 or later.
24

# **Table II. The Seven Most Frequent Targets of Intervention, 1960–96**

|Target|Interventions|
|---|---|
|Zaire|33|
|Iraq|22|
|Egypt|22|
|Pakistan|19|
|Chad|18|
|Israel|17|
|Thailand|17|

Computed from data in Pickering (1999).

We have defined five sub-types of democratic interventions: democratic interventions involving the US, interventions involving the UN, interventions occurring after the end of the Cold War, and two variables denoting whether the interventions were in support of a democratic or an autocratic regime.

There are two timing issues to consider: First, interventions may be initiated as a result of institutional change. To avoid this potential endogeneity problem, we lag the intervention variables by one year. Second, the initiation of an intervention may not lead to an immediate democratization. Even so, institutional changes that occur within a limited time-frame following the intervention may be attributed to the intervention. To allow for different post-intervention dynamics, we coded three different pairs of intervention variables: _Recent democratic intervention_ and _Recent autocratic intervention_ are used to study political change that occurs within five years of the termination of an intervention. For each country-year we coded _Recent democratic intervention_ as 1 if a democratic intervention had been initiated (or was still on-going) from one to five years earlier. A zero value on this variable includes cases where the country has never been the target of a democratic intervention as well as cases where the intervention ended more than five years ago. The Recent autocratic intervention variable was coded in parallel fashion.

The two variables _Lagged democratic/autocratic intervention_ are more restrictively coded. Country-years are scored 1 on these variables only if the intervention occurred in the previous year. For the third and most restrictive pair of variables, _Lagged democratic intervention onset_ and _Lagged autocratic intervention onset,_ country-years are scored 1 only when the _onset_ of an intervention occurred in the previous year.
25

# **Control Variables**

We included a set of control variables to avoid bias due to omitted variables.<sup>26</sup> Most importantly, we include information on the democracy level of the country in the year before observation. As shown by Gurr (1974), Sanhueza (1999), and Gates et al. (2006), countries with intermediate levels of democracy are most likely to experience regime changes in any direction. As shown below, there is also a tendency for interventions to occur in these unstable regimes. To account for this, we include _Polity2 lagged_ , the Polity2 level for the year before the year of observation, and _Polity2 lagged squared_ to allow modeling a curvilinear relationship between the initial democracy level and the odds of democratization.

There is potential autocorrelation between instances of (incremental) democratization. To account for this statistical dependence, a variable called _Proximity of democratization_ was included in the model. The variable is a decaying function of the number of years since the previous democratization in the country; _prc=2_<sup>_(-years/2_)</sup> where 2 is the half-life measured in years (see Hegre et al., 2001).

Modernization theory suggests that a high level of development is a prerequisite for democracy (Lipset; 1959). Economic indicators of development have two important shortcomings; they do not account for possible internal inequalities and they do not capture non-economic aspects of development that influence peoples’ quality of life. Hence, we follow Urdal (2005: 424f.) in using as our measure of development the Infant Morality Rate (IMR) – the share of live-born children that die before the age of one year. GDP per capita and IMR are highly correlated, with a low value on IMR indicating a high level of development. The IMR data were collected by Urdal from the _World Population Prospects_ (UN, 1999) and the _Demographic Yearbook_ (UN, annual). The variable was log transformed in order to reduce its skewness.

Social capital has been put forward as a condition for democratization (Putnam, 1993). We follow Paxton (2002) and Wiik (2002) in operationalizing social capital as the number of memberships in international non-governmental organizations. Ideally, we would have preferred to use data on memberships in

> 26 Religion has also been found to influence democratization (Hadenius, 1992; Wiik, 2002). We originally included religion in our model, using data from _The World Factbook_ (CIA, 2002) and Hadenius (1992), failed find any strong relationship, and subsequently excluded it.
26 _national_ non-governmental organizations, but such data are not available on a cross-national basis. The data are estimated on the basis of data obtained from the Union of International Associations (UIA, annual; Wiik, 2002: 62). The variable was log-transformed.

Civil armed conflicts and international armed conflicts may have a negative relationship with democratization. We use the Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) to control for this. The variable _Civil conflict_ (including internationalized internal conflict) is a categorical variable with no conflict coded as 0, minor conflict coded as 1, and war coded as 2. The reference category for the variable is no conflict. The same procedure was applied for the _International conflict_ variable. Both these variables were lagged by one year in the analyses.

Finally, both the frequency and motivations for democratic interventions have probably changed after the end of the Cold War. Our _Post-Cold war_ variable was scored 1 in the years 1990–96 and 0 otherwise.

# **Democratic Interventions?**

The first question we investigate is whether democracies engage in frequent interventionary behavior. Figure 2 shows the trends in the _incidence_ of military interventions – the share of the world’s countries in which a democratic or a non-democratic country or alliance was intervening. The most striking trend is the decrease in non-democratic interventions after the end of the Cold War. This decrease is to a large extent due to the changes in the Soviet Union: The USSR ended five interventions in 1988 and a sixth one in 1991. Apart from a peak in early 1990s, there is no such trend for democratic interventions since the 1970s – around 10% of the world’s countries have been targets of democratic interventions in the last 25 years of the data material. In the 1990s, more than two thirds of all interventions have involved democratic countries. In the 1980s, almost two thirds of the interventions were non-democratic.
27

**Figure 2. Incidence of Military Interventions by Regime Type of Intervener, by Year, 1960–96**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995<br>Democratic Intervention Autocratic Intervention<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure shows the percentage of all countries with an on-going democratic or autocratic intervention in that year.

Thus, there is indeed a great deal of democratic intervention, but there is no rising trend. Democratic interventions are now much more frequent than autocratic interventions, but this is mainly because of the sharp decline of autocratic interventions after the end of the Cold War. We have also compiled the onset of democratic and autocratic interventions (Figure 3). Here we do discern a long-term rising trend in the onset of democratic interventions that largely coincides with the third wave of democratization and a parallel decline in new autocratic interventions. However, the curve for the onset of democratic interventions declines again after the end of the Cold War.
28

**Figure 3. Onset of Military Interventions by Regime Type of Intervener, by Year, 1960–96**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 7<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>0<br>1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995<br>Democratic Intervention Onset Autocratic Intervention Onset<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure shows the percentage of countries where a democratic or autocratic intervention starts in that year. These two series have been smoothed using a three-year moving average.

# **Where Do The Interveners Intervene?**

Table III shows that semi-democracies have been targeted in 9% of all their country-years, clearly more frequently than autocracies (6.4%) and democracies (3.5%). This pattern is particularly marked for democratic interventions: Semidemocracies are targets of democratic interventions in 5% of the relevant country-years, twice as often as for autocratic country-years. Autocratic interventions are more likely to target autocracies (58% of 161 interventions) than democratic interventions are (45% of 130). Democratic interventions tend to target semi-democracies more often than autocratic interventions (36% vs. 24%).

This intervention pattern reflects the tendency for democratic interventions to occur in countries that are more likely to democratize, and demonstrates the importance of controlling for the initial democracy level when assessing the relationship between intervention and subsequent likelihood of democratization: Semi-democratic institutions have been shown to be less stable than other
29 types of institutions, and hence are also most likely to democratize.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, they are the most conflict-prone states. For a strategy of democratic interventionism it makes sense to target these states.

# **Table III. Frequency of Intervention Onset By Regime Type of Target and Regime Type of Intervener, 1960–96**

||**Type of interve**<br>|**ntion onset**<br>|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Regime type of**<br>**intervention target**|**Democratic**<br>**intervention**|**Autocratic**<br>**intervention**|**No intervention**|**Total**|
|**Autocracy**|59<br>2.47%|93<br>3.89%|2,240<br>93.65%|2,392<br>100%|
|**Semi-democracy**|47<br>4.95%|38<br>4.00%|865<br>91.05%|950<br>100%|
|**Democracy**|24<br>1.56%|30<br>1.95%|1,486<br>96.49%|1,540<br>100%|
|**Total**|130<br>2.66%|161<br>3.30%|4,591<br>94.04%|4,882<br>100%|

Autocracy: Polity2<=–6. Semi-Democracy: –5<=Polity2<=5. Democracy: Polity2>=6 Table III also shows that interventions generally, and democratic interventions specifically, are rarely targeted against other democracies. Moreover, two thirds of these interventions are in support of the regime. Table IV lists the eight democratic interventions undertaken in opposition to a democratic regime. All of them involve old rivals in the Third World and none of them involve the US or other major Western states that aim to use force to maintain or expand the global democratic community.

**Table IV. Democratic Interventions in Opposition to a Democratic Regime, 1960–96**

|**Target**|**Onset of intervention**|**Actor**|
|---|---|---|
|Venezuela|1987|Colombia|
|Ecuador|1984|Peru|
|Peru|1981|Ecuador|
|Greece|1986|Turkey|
|Turkey|1986|Greece|
|India|1996|Bangladesh|
|Pakistan|1990|India|

Table V presents a more systematic analysis of where the democratic interveners intervene. Columns 2 and 3 present the results of a probit estimation of the probability of the onset of an intervention involving democratic coun27 This raises the possibility of selection bias. We attempt to test for this below.
30 tries. Columns 4 and 5 present the result for a corresponding analysis for the onset of non-democratic interventions.

The analysis replicates the results of Figure 3 and Table III: Democratic interventions have become considerably more frequent after the end of the Cold War, and disproportionally occur in countries with political institutions that are coded as in the intermediate range of the Polity democracy index. These results are statistically significant. Autocratic interventions do not follow these patterns. In addition, the analysis shows that both types of interventions disproportionally occur in countries with low numbers of NGOs and in countries experiencing armed conflicts.<sup>28</sup>

> 28 The NGO variable was designed to capture ‘social capital’. The variable is highly correlated with other measures of socio-economic development such as the Infant Mortality Rate and GDP per capita. We estimated the models in Table VI using these variables and obtained very similar results.
31

## **Table V. Probability of Onset of Intervention, Probit Estimation, 1961–96**

||**Type of In**<br>|**tervention On**<br>|**set**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Characteristics of interven-**<br>**tion target**|**Democrati**<br>**tions**|**c Interven-**|**Autocratic i**|**nterventions**|
|**Explanatory variables**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|
|Polity2, lagged|–0.0020<br>(0.00072)|0.780|–0.0094<br>(0.022)|0.211|
|Polity2, lagged, squared|–0.0039<br>(0.0016)|0.016**|–0.00016<br>(0.0015)|0.914|
|Number of Non-governmental<br>organizations,logged|–0.075<br>(0.030)|0.012**|–0.098<br>(0.032)|0.002**|
|Post-Cold war period|0.38<br>(0.078)|<0.0005***|–0.059<br>(0.12)|0.623|
|**Civil conflict, lagged**<br>No conflict<br>Minor<br>War|ref.gr.<br>0.46<br>(0.106)<br>0.62<br>(0.089)|ref.gr.<br><0.0005***<br><0.0005***|ref.gr.<br>0.30<br>(0.12)<br>0.34<br>(0.11)|ref.gr.<br>0.012*<br>0.003**|
|Constant|–1.63<br>(0.169)||–1.41<br>(0.19)||
|N|4,844||4,844||
|Loglikelihood|–523.83||-666.66||
|Pseudo-R2|0.080||0.028||

(*) Significant at 0.10 level

* Significant at 0.05 level

** Significant at 0.01 level

- *** Significant at 0.001 level

The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable

# **Democratizing Interventions?**

Do democratic interventions tend to lead to democratization? Tables V and VI reports the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a positive change in Polity2 from one year to another.<sup>29</sup> Table VI reports the results from probit analyses of the probability of democratization. Three models are presented, one for each of the three types of intervention variables.

The model labeled ‘recent intervention’ indicates that there is a weak positive relationship between democratic interventions including the years immediately following them and democratization. The estimate for ‘democratic military

> 29 Recall that the change in Polity2 has to be at least two units, and that countries with Polity2score of 9 and 10 were excluded from the analysis since a positive change is impossible by definition.
32 intervention’ is positive but significant only at the 0.10 level. The corresponding estimate in the model labeled ‘Lagged intervention’ is roughly similar: When only including the years during which the intervention is going on (lagged), the estimate is positive but only barely significant at the 0.10 level.

**Table VI. Probability of Democratization. Multivariate Models with Intervention and Control Variables, Probit Estimation, 1961–96**

||**Recent in**|**tervention**|**Lagged**<br>**intervent**|**ion**|**Lagged**<br>**interventi**|**on onset**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Explanatory variables**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**<br>**(Exp(**β**))**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**<br>**(Exp(**β**))**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**<br>**(Exp(**β**))**|
|Democratic military inter-<br>vention|0.19<br>(0.11)|0.082 (*)|0.21<br>(0.13)|0.101 (*)|0.44<br>(0.16)|0.007***|
|Autocratic military inter-<br>vention|-0.05<br>(0.10)|0.632|–0.083<br>(0.14)|0.559|0.13<br>(0.18)|0.489|
|Number of non-<br>governmental organiza-<br>tions,logged|0.20<br>(0.046)|<0.0005***|0.20<br>(0.046)|<0.0005***|0.20<br>(0.044)|<0.0005***|
|Post-Cold war period|0.42<br>(0.095)|<0.0005***|0.42<br>(0.093)|<0.0005***|0.41<br>(0.093)|<0.0005***|
|Polity2, lagged|–0.055<br>(0.010)|<0.0005***|–0.054<br>(0.010)|<0.0005***|–0.053<br>(0.010)|<0.0005***|
|Polity2, lagged, squared|–0.012<br>(0.0019)|<0.0005***|–0.012<br>(0.0019)|<0.0005***|–0.012<br>(0.0019)|<0.0005***|
|Proximity of<br>democratization|0.15<br>(0.092)|0.093 (*)|0.15<br>(0.092)|0.095 (*)|0.16<br>(0.090)|0.076 (*)|
|Constant|–2.61<br>(0.26)||–2.59<br>(0.26)||–2.58<br>(0.25)||
|N|3,821||3,821||3,821||
|Loglikelihood|–723,25||–723,12||–722,40||
|Pseudo-R2|0.092||0.092||0.093||

(*) Significant at 0.10 level

* Significant at 0.05 level

** Significant at 0.01 level

- *** Significant at 0.001 level

The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation.

The results indicate that democratization is significantly more likely in the year immediately following the initiation of a democratic intervention.<sup>30</sup> In none

> 30 Table VII shows that the different sub-types of democratic interventions all are positively related to democratization, but these estimates are not statistically significant. The democratizing effect of democratic interventions does not seem to be restricted to any of these sub-types. We also included Recent US Intervention and Recent UN Intervention in multivariate estimations as those reported in Table VII, but their estimates are not significant in these models. It seems that
33 of the models do we find a relationship between autocratic interventions and subsequent democratizations.

The table shows that the relationship between recent democratic intervention and democratization hold when controlling for the possibly confounding factors. The results for the initial democracy level (Polity2 lagged and Polity2 lagged squared) are consistent with previous research (Sanhueza, 1999; Hegre et al., 2001; Gates et al., 2006, 2007): Democratizations are most likely to occur in countries where the political institutions mix democratic and autocratic traits. Figure 4 shows the estimated probability of democratization as a function of the initial democracy level. Countries with a Polity2 score equal to –2 are most prone to experience democratization – this is estimated to happen in 12% of the years for the baseline case. In contrast, democratization is estimated to occur in less than 3% of the years for the most autocratic countries, and in less than 1% for the most democratic countries.

**Figure 4. Estimated Probability of Democratization by Initial Democracy Level, 1961–96**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.14<br>0.12<br>0.1<br>0.08<br>0.06<br>0.04<br>0.02<br>0<br>-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10<br>Polity<br><!-- End of picture text --> it is the democratic makeup of the intervening powers that matters, not whether the US participated, or whether the UN sponsored the intervention.
34 The control variables perform largely as expected. The variable measuring social capital – the number of international NGOs in a country – is also significant at the 0.01 level, and confirms the hypothesis that social capital increases the likelihood of democratization even when controlling for initial democracy level.<sup>31</sup> The Post-Cold war variable is positive and significant in all three models. As clearly indicated in Figure 1, the post-Cold War years have seen a very high number of democratizations. The control for autocorrelation, _Proximity of democratization_ , is positive as expected but only significant at the 0.10 level.

A comparison of Tables V and VI shows that both democratic and autocratic interventions tend to occur in situations where regime changes in general and democratizations in particular are especially likely: Both phenomena tend to happen in under-developed and semi-democratic countries, and both democratic interventions and democratizations became more frequent in the 1990s. This raises the question whether there is a ‘selection bias’: democratic interventions tend to occur in countries where there is already a high probability of democratization.

As a first cut to investigate this potential problem, we restrict the attention to the intervention country-years, including both autocratic and democratic interventions. Among these, is democratization more likely in democratic interventions than in other interventions?

To study this, we estimate the models in Table VI for this subset. We also estimated the models for this subset using a Heckman probit model with sample selection to account for the potential bias (see Greene, 1997: 974–981). The results of the Heckman probit model are presented in Table VII. The results for the ordinary probit model for the sub-sample are not reported, since they correspond closely to the results in Table VII. Note that the results do not reject the null hypothesis that the two equations are uncorrelated – there is no selection bias in this model formulation.

> 31 We found our measure of economic development, _Infant mortality_ , not to be statistically significant. The details of the analysis are not reported here. Our findings are consistent with earlier research (Przeworski et al., 2000; Gates et al., 2007). The relationship between democracy and development owes less to the influence of development on democratization than to the fact that developed democracies are much less likely to experience reversals than non-developed democracies.
35 Closely reflecting the results in Table VI, democratizations are more likely just after the onset of democratic interventions than just after the onset of autocratic interventions or at any other time during interventions. Also reflecting the results in Table VI, this effect is restricted to the first year of the democratic intervention.
36

# **Table VII. Probability of Democratization in Intervention Cases. Accounting for Selection Bias, Heckman Probit Estimation, 1961–96**

||**‘Lagged int**<br>**onset’**<br>|**ervention**<br>|**‘Lagged in**<br>|**tervention’**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Democratization Equation**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|
|Democratic military intervention|0.43<br>(0.21)|0.038*|–0.092<br>(0.16)|0.569|
|Autocratic military intervention|0.013<br>(0.12)|0.908|–0.46<br>(0.19)|0.019|
|Number of non-governmental<br>organizations, logged|0.18<br>(0.082)|0.027*|0.18<br>(0.081)|0.027*|
|Post-Cold war period|0.10<br>(0.16)|0.521|0.076<br>(0.16)|0.633|
|Polity2, lagged|–0.042<br>(0.018)|0.020 *|–0.043<br>(0.018)|0.016 *|
|Polity2, lagged, squared|–0.011<br>(0.0030)|<0.0005*<br>**|–0.010<br>(0.0030)|<0.0005***|
|Proximity of democratization|0.11<br>(0.15)|0.487|0.10<br>(0.16)|0.514|
|Constant|–2.57<br>(0.38)||–2.32<br>(0.40)||
|**Selection equation (incidence**<br>**of all types of intervention)**|||||
|Number of non-governmental<br>organizations, logged|–0.17<br>(0.021)|<0.0005*<br>**|–0.17<br>(0.021)|<0.0005***|
|Post-Cold war period|–0.15<br>(0.060)|0.010**|–0.16<br>(0.060)|0.008**|
|Polity2, lagged|–0.0027<br>(0.0047)|0.572|–0.0023<br>(0.0047)|0.621|
|Polity2, lagged, squared|–0.0035<br>(0.00097)|<0.0005*<br>**|–0.0035<br>(0.00097)|<0.0005***|
|**Civil conflict, lagged**<br>No conflict<br>Minor<br>War|ref.gr.<br>0.65<br>(0.067)<br>0.81<br>(0.066)|ref.gr.<br><0.0005*<br>**<br><0.0005*|ref.gr.<br>0.65<br>(0.068)<br>0.82<br>(0.067)|ref.gr.<br><0.0005***<br><0.0005***|
|Constant|0.26<br>(0.12)||0.23<br>(0.12)||
|N(total)|3,822||3,822||
|Censored observations|2,804||2,804||
|Uncensored observations|1,018||1,018||
|ρ|0.24<br>(0.28)||0.19<br>(0.27)||
|LR test of independence of equa-<br>tions(ρ=0):<br>Loglikelihood|Х<sup>2</sup>(1)=0.74;<br>p-value = 0<br>–2286.21|<br>.39|Х<sup>2</sup>(1)=0.53;<br>p-value = 0|<br>.47|

(*) Significant at 0.10 level * Significant at 0.05 level

** Significant at 0.01 level
37

*** Significant at 0.001 level Significance levels refer to two-sided tests.

‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation.

The analysis of the intervention cases yield slightly different results for the incidence of autocratic interventions variable, however. Democratizations are estimated to be less frequent during autocratic interventions than during democratic ones (and more frequent than the baseline, which is the last year of any intervention).

Finally, we supplement the analysis in Table VI by also looking at how democratic and autocratic interventions affect _autocratizations_ . Democratic interventions may be motivated by a desire to preserve democratic institutions just as much as promoting democratization. Hence, we would expect to observe a lower risk of autocratization following democratic interventions. Likewise, we would expect to see autocratizations to follow in the wake of autocratic interventions.

Table VIII reports the results of the estimation of a multinomial logit model where the possible outcomes are democratization, autocratization, and no change. We only report the results for the pair of ‘lagged intervention onset’ variables. The corresponding results for the other versions of the intervention variables are not statistically significant.
38

## **Table VIII. Probability of Democratization AND Autocratization by Recent Intervention Onset. Multinomial Logit Model, 1961–96**

||**Autocrat**<br>|**ization**<br>|**Democra**<br>|**tization**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Explanatory variables**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|β<br>**(s.e.)**|**p-value**|
|Democratic military interven-<br>tion|0.31<br>(0.44)|0.477|0.91<br>(0.31)|0.004**|
|Autocratic military interven-<br>tion|0.93<br>(0.38)|0.013**|0.33<br>(0.38)|0.387|
|Number of non-governmental<br>organizations,logged|–0.29<br>(0.086)|0.001***|0.39<br>(0.096)|<0.0005***|
|Post-Cold war period|–0.58<br>(0.27)|0.032*|0.79<br>(0.20)|<0.0005***|
|Polity2, lagged|0.14<br>(0.021)|<0.0005***|–0.14<br>(0.018)|<0.0005***|
|Polity2, lagged, squared|–0.044<br>(0.0038<br>)|<0.0005***|–0.033<br>(0.0035)|<0.0005***|
|Proximity of democratization|–0.23<br>(0.25)|0.367|0.35<br>(0.19)|0.069 (*)|
|Constant|–0.099<br>(0.46)||–4.79<br>(0.55)||
|N|4,840||||
|Loglikelihood|–1212.11||||
|Pseudo-R2|0.170||||

(*) Significant at 0.10 level

- Significant at 0.05 level

- ** Significant at 0.01 level

- *** Significant at 0.001 level

The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation.

The onset of democratic interventions is found to lead to subsequent democratizations just as in Table VI. We also find the onset of autocratic interventions to be followed by a high probability of autocratizations. We do not find democratic interventions to reduce the risk of subsequent autocratization, however, nor do autocratic interventions reduce the risk of democratization. The estimate for democratic interventions in the autocratization equation as well as that for autocratic interventions in the democratization equation are not statistically significant, and even have a positive sign.

# **What Kind of Democratization Follows Democratic Intervention?**

The analysis reported in Table VI shows that democratic interventions tend to be followed by changes toward democratic institutions. However, democratization was defined as a change of at least two units at the 21-point Polity2 scale. In addition to fairly marginal changes from any initial democracy level, these changes may include changes from very repressive autocracies to semi-
39 democracies, changes from semi-democracies to fully-fledged democracies, or changes that take the country all the way from dictatorship to democracy.

**Table IX. Regime Change Following Democratic Intervention, by Initial Regime Type, 1961–96**

||**Regime**<br>|**type after interventi**<br>|**on**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Initial regime type **|**Autocracy**|**Semi-democracy**|**Democracy**|**Total**|
|**Autocracy**|403<br>94.16%|21<br>4.91%|4<br>0.93%|428<br>100%|
||18|278|11|307|
|**Semi-democracy**|5.86%|90.55%|3.58%|100%|
||2|4|254|260|
|**Democracy**|0.77%|1.54%|97.69%|100%|
||423|303|269|995|
|**Total**|42.51%|30.45%|27.04%|100%|

Autocracy ranges from -10 to -6 on the Polity2 scale, Semi-democracy from –5 to +5, and Democracy from +6 to +10. The table includes all country-years with a recent democratic intervention and that had a Polity2 code in the previous year.

Table IX shows the distribution of the three regime types – autocracy, semi-democracy, and democracy – in the country-years with recent democratic interventions, broken down on the regime type of the previous year. Of the 428 autocratic country-years that were followed by a democratic intervention, 21 saw a change to semi-democracy, and only 4 a change to democracy. Thus, most of these democratizations were relatively incremental, only leading to the unstable semi-democratic type. Generally, as we would expect, we find more movement in the direction of greater democracy, 21 cases from autocracy to semi-democracy vs. 18 in the opposite direction, 11 cases from semi-democracy to democracy vs. 4 in the opposite directions, and 4 from autocracy to democracy vs. 2 in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, of the 428 autocratic countryyears that were followed by a democratic intervention, 21 saw a change to semidemocracy and only 4 to democracy. The overwhelming majority of semidemocracies also stayed in this category, and there were more changes into autocracy than into democracy. There is a net effect of greater democracy, but the democratic group is only marginally strengthened (260+9).

# **Democratic Jihad?**

Democratic interventionism is, understandably, a deeply troubling ideology for many liberals. There is something internally contradictory about forcing people
40 to be free and fighting war to end war. In a sense, militant liberal interventionism fits better into the value pattern of hardnosed realism. On the other hand, if we look at the potential consequences, it is also easy to see why democratic interventionism is a powerful and in many ways appealing ideology. Apart from its many other virtues, the continued spread of democracy is likely to reduce violence within and between nations. If a careful use of targeted violence against autocratic regimes could reduce genocide and politicide, decrease the risk of civil war, and promote international peace, it might be justified as a form of just war. This line of thinking appears to be gathering strength among Western democracies, particularly in the US (Bailey, 2003). The European Union appears to have a higher threshold for prior provocation by the target state and a greater emphasis on approval for the intervention from the United Nations but does not reject humanitarian intervention in principle.

The case for liberal interventionism has also been strengthened by the failure of many alternative strategies for ending internal violence, whether in the form of serious human rights violations or civil wars. Diplomatic initiatives generally fail against autocrats like Saddam Hussein, who succeed in shutting themselves off from international and domestic public opinion. And economic sanctions frequently cost more human lives than military interventions (Mueller & Mueller, 1999).

In our empirical analysis we study the effect of democratic and autocratic military interventions regardless of the purpose of the intervention. The argument is that a military intervention destabilizes the regime of the country where the intervention takes place, that a regime change is likely, and that if the intervention is democratic the change is more likely to be in the direction of democracy. This is true even if the motive for the democratic intervention was to protect oil interests or the intervener’s citizens living there, to remove weapons of mass destruction or sources of support of terrorism, or whatever. The important policy issue, however, is not whether such ‘inadvertent democratization’ will work, but whether military intervention can be used as a strategic tool by democratic states.

The analysis shows that in the short run, democratic intervention does indeed promote democratization and that this relationship is robust to the control variables most frequently invoked in studies of democratization. However, the relationship is only apparent in the first year following the onset of an intervention. When including the entire period of the intervention and its aftermath, we
41 do not find any strong relationship. Moreover, over the period 1961–96 this democratization appears to have had relatively little effect in terms of moving countries up into the category of democracies on a tripartite division (democracies, semi-democracies, autocracies). The greatest movement across categories is into semi-democracy (25 country-years), then into autocracy (20), and only then into democracy (15). Democracy is the only regime type that shows a net gain after a democratic intervention (+9, versus -5 for autocracy and -4 for semi-democracy), but the reason for this is that fewer democracies change regime type following intervention. If the semi-democracies that move up into the democratic category become stable democracies, we could speak with more confidence of a positive effect on peace. For this we would need to study the development of these states over a longer time period. For the short term that we have studied, the most troublesome aspect is the movement into the semidemocratic category, which is likely to be less peaceful and less stable.

Two other problematic aspects of democratization after intervention are the regional environment of the new democracies and the economic structure of the country. Several empirical studies indicate that the prospects for democracy are worse for countries that are located in non-democratic neighborhoods (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Gates et al., 2007), and that stable democracy is less likely in poor or oil-dependent countries (Carlsen & Hegre, 2007; Epstein et al., 2006; Gates et al., 2006; Przeworski et al., 2000; Ross, 2001). Serbia, a middleincome country located in an area of mostly democratic states, many of them well established democracies, seems a promising candidate for overcoming the rocky transition to democracy in a peaceful manner. Hence, although this paper has not modeled the regional context, our research gives us reason to believe that Afghanistan and Iraq are much less hopeful from this perspective.<sup>32</sup> The same is true for other potential targets like Iran, Libya, and Syria. The idea of remaking the Middle East into a haven of democracy may be laudable, but a piecemeal strategy does not seem to have much chance of success. Invading all of the autocratic countries in the region over a short period does not seem very realistic either. It would rob the West of most of its allies in the region and would inevitably lead to an imperial overstretch.

32 Weede (2004 : 174) shares this view.
42 In the public debate, there are also other arguments against a strategy of democratic interventionism. Some libertarians, although favorable to democracy and not necessarily averse for the use of force, argue that forced democratization inflates the state and threatens liberty at home (Preble, 2003). Radicals will be more concerned with the conflating of the spread of democracy with the spread of Western economic interests, and the fear of retaliation from targeted autocratic groups (radical islamists in particular). The bombings in Madrid and London strengthen these fears. Such counterarguments may not be powerful enough to halt the trend towards increased interventionism. Another quagmire like the US war in Vietnam might.
43

# **Appendix 1. Democratic Interventions**

## **Democratic interveners**

|**No.**|**Target**|**Year**|**Interveners**|**Democratic intervene**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**The Ame**|**ricas**||||
|40|Cuba|1960|USA|USA|
|41|Haiti|1963|USA|USA|
|||<br>1993–95|<br>UN (1993), USA (1994–95), Multi-|<br>UN, USA, Multination|
||||<br>nat’l Force for Haïti (1994–95)|Force for Haïti|
|42|Dom. Republic|1961<br>|USA<br>|USA<br>|
|||1965–66|USA, OAS|USA, OAS|
|90|Guatemala|1987|<br>USA|<br>USA|
|||1989–92|UN|UN|
|91|Honduras|1969–80|OAS, El Salvador (1969–71, 1976),<br>Nicaragua (1980)|OAS|
|||1986–92|<br>USA (1986–88), Nicaragua (1986–|USA, UN|
||||88) UN (1989–92)||
|92|El Salvador|1969–80,|,<br>OAS (1969–80,) Honduras (1969–<br>71, 1976)|OAS|
|||1982–95|<br>Honduras (1982–83), USA (1983–<br>|Honduras, USA, UN|
||||88), UN (1989–95)||
|93|Nicaragua|1979|<br>USA|USA|
|||1984|Costa Rica|Costa Rica|
|||1989–92|UN|UN|
|94|Costa Rica|1978–79|Ven., Panama, Nicaragua, USA<br>(1979)|Venezuela, USA|
|||1989–92<br>|UN<br>|UN<br>|
|95|Panama|1988–90|USA|USA|
|100|Colombia|1995|Venezuela|Venezuela|
|101|Venezuela|1987|Colombia|Colombia|
|110|Guyana|1970|Venezuela|Venezuela|
|||1978|USA|USA|
|130|Ecuador|1984|Peru|Peru|
|135|Peru|1981|Ecuador|Ecuador|
|||1995|Ecuador|Ecuador|
|145|Bolivia|1979|USA|USA|
|||1986|USA|USA|
|**Europe**|||||
|205|Ireland|1985|UK|UK|
|210|Netherlands|1962|Indonesia, UN|UN|
|235|Portugal|1961|India|India|
|310|Hungary|1993|EU|EU|
|325|<br>Italy|1985|USA|USA|
|343|Macedonia|1995|UN|UN|
|344|Croatia|1992|Yugoslavia, UN|UN|
|||1996|<br>UN|UN|
|345|Yugoslavia|1991|EU|EU|
|346|Bosnia–|1992–96|Yugoslavia (1992–95) EU (1992)|UN NATO EU|
||Herzegovina||, ,<br>NATO (1994–95), Croatia (1992–95),|, ,|
||||UN||
|350|Greece|1986|Turkey|Turkey|
|<br>352|<br>Cyprus|<br>1963–88|<br>UK (1963–64, 1974), Turkey (1963–<br>68, 1974–88) Greece (1963–68,<br>1974), UN (1964–88), USA (1974),<br>|<br>UK, USA, Turkey, UN|
||||Egypt (1978)||
|355|Bulgaria|1992|<br>EU|EU|
|359|Moldova|1992|Russia|Russia|
|372|Georgia|1992–93|Russia UN (1993)|Russia UN|
|<br>373|<br>Azerbaijan|<br>1992|,<br>Armenia|,<br>Armenia|

UN, USA, Multinational Force for Haïti USA USA, OAS USA UN OAS
44

|**Africa**<br>420|Gambia|1981|Seneal US|US|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|<br>433|<br>Senegal|<br>1969|g,<br>Portugal, France|<br>France|
|434|Benin|1991|France|France|
|435<br>|Mauritania<br>|1977–80<br>|France, Morocco (1977–79)<br>|France<br>|
|450|Liberia|1990–96|ECOMOG, USA (1990–91), Sierra<br>Leone (1991) UN (1993)|USA, ECO|
|471|Cameroun|1994|,<br>France|France|
|481|Gabon|1964|France, USA|USA|
|||1990|France|France|
|482|Central Afr. Rep.|1979–81<br>|France, Zaire (1979)<br>|France<br>|
|||1996|France, USA|France, U|
|483|Chad|1969–75|France, Libya (1973–75)|France|
|||1977–84|France (1977–80, 1983–84), Libya,<br>Nigeria (1979, 1983), OAU (1980–<br>82) Zaire (1983–84) USA (1983)|France, O|
|||1986–87|, ,<br>France, Libya|France|
|||1990–92<br>|France<br>|France<br>|
|||1994|UN|UN|
|490|Zaire|1960–65|Belgium (1960–61, 1964), UN<br>(1960–64), USA (1960–61, 1964–<br>65), Uganda (1965), UK (1964), Por-<br>tugal (1964)|Belgium, U<br>ganda, UK|
|||1967|<br>Ethiopia, USA|USA|
|||1977–79|Morocco, France (1977–78), Sene-<br>gal, Uganda (1977), Egypt (1977),<br>Belgium (1978–79), USA (1978–79),<br>UK (1978), Gabon (1978–79), Togo<br>(1978)|France, Be<br>UK|
|||1991|France, Belgium|France, Be|
|||1993–94|<br>France, USA (1994)|<br>France, U|
|500|Uganda|1964–68|<br>UK (1964), Zaire (1965), Sudan<br>(1965–68)|UK, Sudan|
|||1976<br>1991–94|Israel<br>UN (1993–94), OAU (1991–93)|Israel<br>UN, OAU|
|501|Kenya|1964–73|<br>UK|<br>UK|
|||<br>1982|<br>UK|<br>UK|
|510|Tanzania|1964|UK, OAU|UK, OAU|
|||1994|USA|USA|
|516|Burundi|1994–96|OAU|OAU|
|517|Rwanda|1967|USA|USA|
|517|Rwanda|1990–96|France (1990, 1993–94), Zaire<br>(1990, 1996), Belgium (1990), OAU<br>(1991–93), UN (1993–96), USA|France, Be<br>OAU, USA|
||||(1994 1996) Canada (1996)||
|520|Somalia|1976|, ,<br>France|France|
|||1992–95|UN|UN|
|522|Djibouti|1992|France|France|
|540|<br>Angola|1989–96|UN, S. Africa (1989), Namibia<br>(1995)|UN, Namib|
|541|Mozambique|1992–95|<br>UN|UN|
|551|<br>Zambia|1965–66|UK, Portugal (1966)|UK|
|560|South Africa|1979–82|<br>Botswana|Botswana|
|571|Botswana|1992|Namibia|Namibia|
|<br>581|<br>Comoros|<br>1989|<br>France|<br>France|
|||1995|France|France|
|590|Mauritius|1968|UK|UK|
|600|M|196364|OAU Ali|OAU|
||orocco|–<br>1976–78|, gera<br>France|<br>France|
|||1991|UN|UN|
|615<br>|Algeria<br>|1963–64<br>|OAU, Morocco<br>|OAU<br>|
|620|Libya|1986<br>1994|USA<br>UN|USA<br>UN|
|625|Sudan|<br>1984–85|<br>Egypt, USA|<br>USA|

US France France France USA, ECOMOG, UN France USA France France France, USA France France, OAU, USA France France UN Belgium, UN, USA, U- ganda, UK USA France, Belgium, USA, UK France, Belgium France, USA UK, Sudan Israel UN, OAU UK UK UK, OAU USA OAU USA France, Belgium, UN, OAU, USA, Canada France UN France UN, Namibia
45

|**Middle E**<br>630|**ast**<br>Iran|1980<br>1988|Iraq, USA<br>Iraq, UN|USA<br>UN|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||1994|<br>Turkey|Turkey|
|||1996|Turkey|Turkey|
|640<br>|Turkey<br>|1986<br>|Greece<br>|Greece<br>|
|645|Iraq|1967|Israel|Israel|
|||1981|Iran, Israel|Israel|
|||1983–88<br>1991–93|<br>Turkey (1983–87), Iran, UN (1988)<br>Turkey, UN (1991), Persian Gulf<br>War Coalition Forces (1991), Opera-<br>tion Provide Comfort (1991), Iran<br>(1992–93), Operation Southern<br>Watch (1992), Post Gulf War Coali-<br>tion Forces (1993)|Turkey, UN<br>Turkey, UN, Persian<br>Gulf War Coalition<br>Forces, Operation Pro-<br>vide Comfort, Operation<br>Southern Watch, Post<br>Gulf War Coalition<br>Forces|
|||1996|Iran USA|USA|
|651|Egypt|<br>1960–88|,<br>UN, Israel (1960, 1967, 1969–70,<br>1973–74), Russia (1967, 1970–72),<br>Sudan (1967–73), Algeria (1967,<br>1973), Libya (1973, 1977), Kuwait<br>(1973), North Korea (1973), Morocco<br>(1973), Iraq (1973), Tunisia (1973),<br>Multinational Force and Observers<br>in Sinai (1982–88), France (1984),<br>UK 1984 USA 1984|<br>Israel, UN, Sudan, Mul-<br>tinational Force and<br>Observers in Sinai,<br>France, UK, USA|
|652|Syria|1960–88|(), ()<br>Israel (1962, 1964–67, 1970, 1972–<br>74), UN, Egypt (1960–61), Iraq<br>(1969–70, 1973), Jordan (1971,<br>1973), Russia (1973, 1983–88),<br>Morocco (1973) Kuwait (1973)|Israel, UN|
||||, ,<br>Saudi Arabia (1973–76)||
|660|Lebanon|1960–88|<br>Israel (1965, 1969–88), UN, Syria<br>(1963, 1973, 1976–88), Libya<br>(1972–82), Arab League (1976–82),<br>USA (1976, 1982–84), France<br>(1982–84), UK (1982–84), Italy<br>198284|Israel, USA, UK, France,<br>Italy|
|663|Jordan|1960–88|(–)<br>UN, Israel (1960–70, 1972–88),<br>Saudi Arabia (1967), Iraq (1967–<br>70), Pakistan (1970), Syria (1970–<br>71), Arab League (1970–71)|Israel, UN|
|666|Israel|1960–88|<br>UN, Egypt (1960, 1967, 1969–70,<br>1973–74), Syria (1962, 1964–67,<br>1970, 1973–74), Jordan (1963,<br>1967–68) Iraq (1967–68)|UN|
|670|Saudi Arabia|1963–64|,<br>UN, USA (1963), Syria, Jordan,<br>Egypt|UN, USA|
|||1984|<br>Pakistan, USA|USA|
|||1988|Pakistan|Pakistan|
|||<br>1990–91|<br>Persian Gulf War Coalition Forces|<br>Persian Gulf War CF|
|678<br>690|North Yemen<br>Kuwait|1963–66<br>1991|Egypt, UN (1963–64), UK<br>Iraq, UN, Persian Gulf War CF|UN, UK<br>UN, Persian Gulf War<br>|
|||1993–94|Iraq (1993), USA (1993), Post Gulf<br>|CF<br>USA, Post Gulf War CF|
|||1996|War Coalition Forces (1994)<br>USA|USA|
|696|United Arab Em.|<br>1988|<br>Pakistan|<br>Pakistan|
|<br>698|<br>Oman|<br>1966–77|<br>UK, Russia (1973), Iran (1973–77),<br>S. Yemen (1973–76), Jordan (1975)|<br>UK|
|**Ai**|||||
|**sa**<br>700|Afghanistan|1988–89|Russia, UN (1988), Pakistan (1989)|UN, Pakistan|
46

|||1993|CIS|CIS|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||1995|CIS|CIS|
|702|Tajikistan|1992|CIS|CIS|
|||1994|UN|UN|
|710|China|1962|India|India|
|||1965–69|India, Russia (1969)|India|
|731|North Korea|1960–84|UN|UN|
|750|India|1960–88|UN, China (1962, 1965–69, 1975),<br>USA (1962), Pakistan (1965–66,<br>1971–72, 1981), Bangladesh (1979,<br>1981–85)|UN, USA|
|||1996|Bangladesh|Bangladesh|
|770|Pakistan|1960–88|UN, India (1965–66, 1971–72,<br>1981, 1984–87), UK (1971), Af-<br>ghanistan (1979–80, 1983–88),<br>Russia (1980–88)|India, UN, UK|
|||1990|India|India|
|||1996|India|India|
|771|Bangladesh|1975–76|India|India|
|||1991–93|India, Burma (1991, 1993)|India|
|775|Burma|1995|Thailand|Thailand|
|780|Sri Lanka|1987–88|India|India|
|800|Thailand|1962<br>1966–76|Australia, New Zealand, UK, USA<br>USA, Malaysia (1969–76), Laos<br>|Australia, NZ, UK, USA<br>USA|
||||(1975–76), Cambodia (1976)||
|811|Cambodia|1964–73|North Vietnam, USA, South Viet-<br>nam (1970–73)|USA|
|||1975|USA, North Vietnam|USA|
|||1991–93|UN|UN|
|812|Laos|1961–62|USA|USA|
|||1964–73|USA, North Vietnam, South Viet-|USA|
||||nam (1966–73), Thailand (1965–73)||
|816|North Vietnam|1964–75|USA, China (1964–71), South Viet-<br>nam (1964–65), Cambodia (1975)|USA|
|817|South Vietnam|1961–73|USA, North Vietnam (1964–73),<br>Australia (1965–72), New Zealand<br>(1965–72), Thailand (1966–72), the<br>Republic of Korea (1966–73), Phil-<br>|USA, Australia, New<br>Zealand|
||||ippines (1966–70)||
|820|Malaysia|1960–66|Indonesia (1963–66), Common-<br>wealth, Singapore (1965–66)|Commonwealth|
|840|Philippines|1989|<br>USA|USA|
|850|Indonesia|1966–68|Malaysia|Malaysia|
|910|Papua New|1994|South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in|South Pacific Peace-|
||Guinea||Papua New Guinea|keeping Force in PNG|
47

# **Appendix 2. Non-Democratic Interventions**

**No. Target Year Interveners Americas** 40 Cuba 1962 Russia 1978 Russia 70 Mexico 1982–83 Guatemala 90 Guatemala 1995 Belize 91 Honduras 1981–82 El Salvador, Nicaragua (1981) 1984–85 Nicaragua 93 Nicaragua 1980–81 Honduras 1985–88 Honduras 94 Costa Rica 1983–85 Nicaragua 101 Venezuela 1967 Cuba 130 Ecuador 1995 Peru 135 Peru 1978 Ecuador 145 Bolivia 1967 Cuba 155 Chile 1982 Argentina

|**Europe**||||
|---|---|---|---|
|200|UK|1963–65<br>1971|Indonesia (1963), Egypt (1963–64), North Yemen<br>Iran|
|||1976<br>|Argentina<br>|
|||1979–80<br>1982|South Africa<br>Argentina|
|210|Netherlands|1961|Indonesia|
|230|Spain|1975–76|Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria (1976)|
|235|Portugal|1967–76|China (1967), S. Africa(1968–75), Senegal (1972),<br>Indonesia (1975–76),Cuba (1975), Zaire (1975)|
|260|West Germany|1985|Czechoslovakia|
|265|East Germany|1961|Russia|
|315|Czechoslovakia|1968–69|Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany|
|325|Italy|1986|Libya|
|344|Croatia|1993–95|Yugoslavia|
|365|Russia|1969|China|
|372|Georgia|1994|Russia|
|373|Azerbaijan|1993|Iran|
|**Africa**||||
|404|Guinea–Bissau|1990|Senegal|
|||1992|Senegal|
|411|Equatorial Guinea|1969|Spain|
|||1972|Gabon|
|||1979|Morocco|
|420|Gambia|1971|Senegal|
|||1974|Senegal|
|||1980|Senegal|
|||1982–88|Senegal|
|432|Mali|1985|Burkina Faso|
|433|Senegal|1961–68|Portugal|
|||1970–73|Portugal|
|||1989–90|Mauritania, Guinea–Bissau (1990)|
|434|Benin|1977|<br>Guinea|
|435|Mauritania|1981|Morocco|
|||1989–90|Senegal|
|436|Niger|1993|Chad|
|437|Ivory Coast|1966|France, Guinea|
|438|Guinea|1970|Portugal|
|439|Burkina Faso|1974–75|Mali|
48

|450|Liberia|1985<br>1979|Mali<br>Guinea|
|---|---|---|---|
|<br>451|<br>Sierra Leone|<br>1971–73|<br>Guinea|
|||1991|Guinea, Nigeria|
|471|Cameroon|1960<br>|<br>France<br>|
|||1993|Nigeria|
|475|Nigeria|1967–70|Egypt|
|481|Gabon|1965|France|
|482<br>|Central African Republic<br>|1967<br>|France<br>|
|483|Chad|1960–65|France|
|||1968|France|
|||1976<br>|Libya<br>|
|||1985<br>1988<br>|Libya<br>Libya<br>|
|484|Congo|1963|France|
|490|Zaire|1976<br>|Cuba<br>|
|||1996|Uganda, Rwanda|
|500|Uganda|1969–72<br>|<br>Sudan (1969–71), Tanzania (1971), Libya (1972)<br>|
|||1978–81|Tanzania, Libya (1979)|
|||1996|<br>Zaire|
|501|Kenya|1976<br>|Uganda<br>|
|510|Tanzania|1987–89<br>1966–67|Uganda (1987–88), Somalia (1989)<br>Portugal|
|||<br>1971–73|<br>Uganda (1971–72), Port. (1972–73), Burundi (1973)|
|||1978–79<br>|Uganda (1978), Mozambique, Libya (1979)<br>|
|516|Burundi|1972–73|Zaire (1972), Tanzania (1973)|
|520|Somalia|1964<br>|Ethiopia<br>|
|||1977–78|Ethiopia|
|||1982–85|<br>Ethiopia|
|530|Ethiopia|1964|Somalia|
|||1977–84|Somalia (1977–78), Cuba, South Yemen (1977–78,<br>Russia (1977–79)|
|540|Angola|1975–88|<br>Zaire (1975–76), Cuba (1975–88), Russia (1975–88),<br>South Africa Guinea (1975–76)|
|541|Mozambique|1976–79|,<br>Tanzania, Zimbabwe|
|||1981–89|S. Africa (1981, 1983–85, 1987, 1989), Zimbabwe<br>|
||||(1982–88), Tanzania (1987–88), Malawi (1987–88)|
|551|Zambia|1967–72|<br>Portugal|
|||1976–82|South Africa, Zimbabwe (1977–80), Zaire (1982)|
|||1986–87|<br>South Africa|
|552|Zimbabwe|1976–79<br>|South Africa, Mozambique (1976), Zambia (1977)<br>|
|||1982|South Africa|
|||1985–86|South Africa|
|565|Namibia|1990|Angola|
|570|Lesotho|1982|South Africa|
|571|Botswana|1975–88|Zimbabwe (1975–80, 1983), South Africa (1981–88)|
|572|Swaziland|1985–86|South Africa|
|600|Morocco|1960–62|France|
|615|Algeria|1984|Morocco|
|616<br>620|Tunisia<br>Libya|1961–62<br>1977|France<br>Pakistan, Egypt|
|625|Sudan|1970–72<br>|Russia (1970–71), Egypt<br>|
|||1986|Libya|
|||1989|Chad|
|||<br>1995|<br>Egypt|
|**Middle E**|**ast**|||
|630|I|1966|I|
||ran|<br>1972–74|raq<br>Iraq|
|||1979|<br>Iraq|
|||1981–87<br>|Iraq<br>|
|640|Turkey|1962<br>1965|Iraq<br>Ira|
|||<br>1974|q<br>Iraq|
49

|645|Iraq|1963<br>1969|Syria<br>Iran|
|---|---|---|---|
|||<br>1972–75|<br>Iran (1972–74), Russia (1973–75)|
|||1980|<br>Iran|
|||1982|Iran|
|||<br>1994|<br>Iran|
|666<br>|Israel<br>|1991<br>|Iraq<br>|
|670|Saudi Arabia|1962<br>1965–67|Egypt<br>Jordan, Egypt<br>|
|||1969–70<br>|South Yemen<br>|
|||1981–83|Pakistan|
|||1985–87|Pakistan|
|||<br>1994–95|<br>Yemen|
|678|North Yemen|1962|Et|
|||<br>1967–70<br>|gyp<br>Russia (1967–68), Egypt (1967), Syria (1968), South<br>Yemen (1968–70)<br>|
|||1972|South Yemen, Arab League|
|||1979–80|<br>South Yemen (1979), Saudi Arabia (1980)|
|679|Yemen|1994–96|Saudi Arabia (1994–95), Eritrea (1995–96)|
|680|South Yemen|1969–70|Saudi Arabia|
|||1972–76|Oman (1972–75) North Yemen (1972) Arab League|
||||, ,<br>(1972), Cuba (1976)|
|||1979<br>|North Yemen<br>|
|||1984|Russia|
|690|Kuwait|1963|Arab League|
|||1973|Saudi Arabia|
|||1975–77|Iraq|
|||1980–88|Iran|
|||1990|Iraq|
|692|Bahrain|1986|Qatar|
|694|Qatar|1992|Saudi Arabia|
|696|United Arab Emirates|1977–87|Pakistan|
|||1992|Iran|
|698|Oman|1978–79<br>|Iran<br>|
|||1981–82|South Yemen|
|**Asia**||||
|700|Afghanistan|1979–87|Russia|
|||1990–91|Russia|
|710|China|1960–61|Taiwan|
|||1963–64<br>|Taiwan<br>|
|||1970–79|Taiwan, South Vietnam (1974)|
|||1981<br>|Vietnam<br>|
|||1984–85|Vietnam|
|||1987|Vietnam|
|712|Mongolia|1966–88|Russia|
|713|<br>Taiwan|1960–78|China, South Vietnam (1974)|
|732|The Republic of Korea|1992|North Korea|
|770|<br>Pakistan|1989|Afghanistan|
|||1991<br>1994|Afghanistan<br>Afghanistan|
|771|Bangladesh|1994|Burma|
|<br>775|<br>Burma|<br>1969–74|<br>China|
|790|Nepal|1960–61|China|
|800|Thailand|1977–88|Malaysia (1977–80), Laos (1977–78, 1980–82,|
||||<br>1985–88), Cambodia (1977–78, 1980), North Viet-<br>|
||||nam (1980–87), Indonesia (1981)<br>|
|811|Cambodia|1992–93<br>1960–63|Burma<br>South Vietnam|
|||1974|North Vietnam|
|||1976–88|North Vietnam, Thailand (1977–78, 1982), Laos<br>(1979)|
|812|Laos|1960|<br>North Vietnam|
|||<br>1963|<br>North Vietnam|
50 1974–88 N. Vietnam, Thailand (1974–78, 1980–82, 1984–88) 817 South Vietnam 1974–75 North Vietnam 818 Vietnam 1976–79 Cambodia (1976–78), China (1979) 1981 China 1984–88 China, Malaysia (1984) 820 Malaysia 1967–81 Indonesia (1967–76), Thailand (1969–81) 840 Philippines 1974 South Vietnam 850 Indonesia 1969–76 Malaysia
51

# **Appendix 3. Military Interventions Not Included in the Analysis**

|**No.**<br>31|**Year**<br>1980<br>1985|**Target**<br>Bahamas|**Interveners**<br>USA, Cuba<br>USA|
|---|---|---|---|
|55|1983|Grenada|USA, West Indies Associated States|
|60|1969|St. Christopher|UK|
|338|1985|Malta|Egypt|
|511|1964|Zanzibar|USA, UK|
|565|1989|Namibia|UN|
|690|1961–62|Kuwait|Arab League, UK (1961), Saudi Arabia (1961)|
|781|1988|Maldives|India|
|835|1962–63<br>1984–88|Brunei|UK<br>UK|
|935|1980|Vanuatu|Australia, Papua New Guinea, UK, France|
|940|1992–93<br>1996|Solomon Island|Papua New Guinea<br>Papua New Guinea|
52

# **Appendix 4. Regime Type Coding of Intervening States and Organizations Not Included in Polity IV**

## **No. Country or organization**

- 1 UN, democracy

- 5 NATO, democracy

- 6 EU, democracy

- 10 Persian Gulf War Coalition Forces, democracy

- 11 Post Gulf War Coalition Forces, democracy.

US, UK, France, and six Gulf states provided troops/ships during 10/94–12/94 crises.

- 12 Operation Provide Comfort MNF Forces, democracy. US, UK, France, and Turkey.

- 13 Operation Southern Watch MNF Forces, democracy. US, UK, and France

- 16 Multinational Force for Haiti, democracy

- 29 OAS, democracy

- 80 Belize, non-democracy

- 204 Commonwealth, democracy

- 366 CIS, democracy

- 429 OAU, democracy 430 ECOWAS (ECOMOG action in Liberia), democracy

- 619 Arab League, non-democracy 653 Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, democracy 911 South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in Papua New Guinea, democracy

An organization is coded as a democracy if at least one member is a democracy.
53

# **Appendix 5. Abbreviations**

OAS Organization of American States OAU Organization of African Unity CIS Commonwealth of Independent States ECOWAS (ECOMOG) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) UK United Kingdom NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization USA United States of America UN United Nations
54

# **Appendix 6. Descriptive Statistics**

|**Variables**|N|Mean|St.dev.|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Dependent variable**||||||
|Democratization|4,880|0.043|0.202|0|1|
|**Intervention variable**||||||
|Recent intervention|5,070|0.363|0.481|0|1|
|Recent dem. intervention|5,070|0.201|0.401|0|1|
|Recent autocr. intervention|5,070|0.220|0.414|0|1|
|Recent US intervention|5,070|0.059|0.236|0|1|
|Recent UN intervention|5,070|0.|0.|0|1|
|Recent cold-war dem. int.|5,070|0.171|0.377|0|1|
|Recent dem. intervention<br>supportinga dem. regime|5,070|0.029|0.169|0|1|
|Recent dem. intervention|5,070|0.035|0.183|0|1|
|supportingan aut. regime||||||
|**Control variables**||||||
|Non-governmental org.|5,016|463.610|526.143|0|3255|
|Infant mortality|5,039|3.987|0.954|1.386|5.572|
|Previous democratization|5,070|9.457|10.703|0|36|
|Polity2,lagged|4,882|-1.023|7.523|-10|10|
|Polity2,lagged,squared|4,882|57.629|30.736|0|100|
|Christians|5,016|0.535|0.499|0|1|
|Orthodox|5,016|0.052|0.223|0|1|
|Muslims|5,016|0.296|0.457|0|1|
|Buddhists|5,016|0.096|0.294|0|1|
|Hindus|5,016|0.021|0.142|0|1|
|**Internat’l conflict, lagged**<br>Minor international conflict<br>International war|4,904<br>4,904|0.021<br>0.032|0.142<br>0.176|0<br>0|1<br>1|
|**Civil conflict, lagged**<br>Minor civil conflict|4,904|0.109|0.312|0|1|
|Civil war|4,904|0.098|0.297|0|1|