metadata: authors: 0: author: Binswanger, Hans P.
1: author: Aiyar, Swaminathan
count: Indonesia,Malawi,Mexico,India,Georgia,Brazil,Bangladesh,Burkina Faso,Zambia,Zimbabwe
docna: 0: docna: Scaling up community-driven development :
            theoretical underpinnings and program design implications
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Adaptation to Climate Change,Community Development and Empowerment,Disability,Services & Transfers to Poor,Hydrology,Economic Assistance,Access of Poor to Social Services,Community Driven Development,Inequality,Global Environment
teratopic: Information and Communication Technologies,Health, Nutrition and Population,Finance and Financial Sector Development,Public Sector Development,Social Development,Environment,Governance
abstracts: cdata!: Community-driven development boasts many
            islands of success, but these have not scaled up to cover
            entire countries. Binswanger and Aiyar examine the possible
            obstacles to scaling up, and possible solutions. They
            consider the theoretical case for community-driven
            development and case studies of success in both sectoral and
            multisectoral programs. Obstacles to scaling up include high
            economic and fiscal costs, adverse institutional barriers,
            problems associated with the co-production of outputs by
            different actors on the basis of subsidiarity, lack of
            adaptation to the local context using field-tested manuals,
            and lack of scaling-up logistics. The authors consider ways
            of reducing economic and fiscal costs, overcoming hostile
            institutional barriers, overcoming problems of
            co-production, adapting to the local context with field
            testing, and providing scaling-up logistics. Detailed
            annexes and checklists provide a guide to program design,
            diagnostics, and tools.
geo_reg_key: 517208,517191,1927320,517195,517212,82689,517198,119228
repnme: repnme: Scaling up community-driven development :
            theoretical underpinnings and program design implications
display_title: Scaling up community-driven
            development : theoretical underpinnings and program design implications
listing_relative_url: /research/2003/03/2329631/scaling-up-community-driven-development-theoretical-underpinnings-program-design-implications
topicv3: Water m1326522 137,Poverty m1326687 695,Environment, Natural Resources and Blue
            Economy m1327391 566,Community Driven Development m1327662 732,Climate Change Adaptation m1327767 574
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Information and Communication Technologies,Health, Nutrition and Population,Finance and Financial Sector Development,Public Sector Development,Social Development,Environment,Governance
origu: Off. of Regional Vice President (AFEVP)
no_of_pages: 52
model_extractions: POLICY **RESEARCH WORKING PAPER** 3039

# Abstract

Community-driven development boasts many islands of success, but these have not scaled up to cover entire countries. Binswanger and Aiyar examine the possible obstacles to scaling up, and possible solutions. They consider the theoretical case for community-driven development and case studies of success **in** both sectoral and multisectoral programs. Obstacles to scaling up include high economic and fiscal costs, adverse institutional barriers, problems associated with the coproduction of outputs by different actors on the basis of subsidiarity, lack of adaptation to the local context using field-tested manuals, and lack of scaling-up logistics. The authors consider ways of reducing economic and fiscal costs, overcoming hostile institutional barriers, overcoming problems of co-production, adapting to the local context with field testing, and providing scaling-up logistics. Detailed annexes and checklists provide a guide to program design, diagnostics, and tools.

This paper-a product of the Office of the Vice President, Africa Regional Office-is part of a larger effort in the region to improve understanding of community-driven development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Tuu-Van Nguyen, room J5-120, telephone 202-473-13 89, fax 202-477-0380, email address tnguyen9@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at hbinswanger@worldbank.org or saiyar@worldbank.org. May 2003. (43 pages) _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work_ **_in_** _progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the senes_ **_is_** _to get the findings_ **_out_** _quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should_ **_be_** _cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed_ **_in this_** _paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessanly represent the view of the World Bank,_ **_its_** _Executive Directors, or the countnes they represent._

## Produced by the Research Advisory Staff
# SCALING UP COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT

## THIEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS<sup>AND</sup> PROGRAM DESIGN IMPLICATIONS

Hans P. Binswanger and Swaminathan<sup>S.Aiyar</sup>
|1.**INTRODUCTION...................................................**<br>**5**|
|---|
|_WhyisscalingupCDD_<sup>_sodifficult?....................................................._</sup><br>5|
|**_Totaland/orfiscal_**_costs_<sup>**_may_**</sup><sup>_betoohigh_</sup><br>**_.6_**<br> <br>|
|_Djfftcultiesarisingfrom_<sup>_co-production_</sup><sup>**_maynot_**</sup><sup>_bemastered_</sup><br>**_.6_**<br>_Adaptationtothelocalcontext_<sup>_maybe_</sup><sup>**_missing_**</sup><br>**_.7_**<br> <br>|
|_Lackofscaling-up_**_logistics_**<br>**_.7_**<br>|
|Objectivesandaudienceof<sup>the paper................................................... 8</sup>|
|Approachandoutlineofthe<sup>paper...................................................</sup><br>8|
|2.**WHICH COREFEATURES**<sup>**OFCDDDOWESEEKTO SCALEUP?**</sup><br>**9**|
|_2.1Realparticipation............._<br>_........................................ _<sup>_9_</sup>|
|_2.1.1Bargainingmodels_<sup>_ofpublicorsocialchoice_</sup><br>_.9_<br>|
|_2.1.2 Devolutionofauthority_<sup>_andresources.10_</sup><br>|
|_2.1.3.Realstakeholder_<sup>**_participation.11_**</sup><br>|
|_2.1.4.Comunications.12_<br>|
|_2.1.5.Co-financingbycommunities_<sup>**_.13_**</sup><br>|
|_2.1.6.Technicalassistance_<sup>_andfacilitationfromlocalandhigherlevels.13_</sup><br>|
|_2.1.7.Pro-poormarketdevelopment_<sup>_.13_</sup><br> <br>14|
|_2.2.ImprovingAccountability_<sup>_...................................................._</sup><br>|
|_2.3.Technicalsoundness_<sup>_..................._</sup><br>_................................._<sup>_15_</sup>|
|**_2.4._**Sustainability..................................................<br>15|
|**3.SCALINGUP:THREE**<sup>**STAGESOFCDD.**</sup><br>**.................................**<br>**16**|
|_3.1._<br>_Initiationstage_**_...................................................._**<br>16|
|_3.2.Scalingupstage.............._<br>_......................................_<sup>17</sup>|
|_3.3.Consolidationstage_<sup>**_.............................................._**</sup><br>17|
|4.EXAMPLESOFSCAUNG<sup>UP SECTOR-SPECIFICPROGRAMS</sup><br>17|
|_4.1.Indo-GermanWatershed_<sup>_DevelopmentProgram..........................._17</sup>|
|_4.2.Reclamationofsodic_<sup>_soils,UttarPradesh,India............................_18</sup>|
|_4.3.Conquestofriver_<sup>_blindness............_</sup><br>_.........................._<sup>_19_</sup>|
|_4.4. TheCAMPFIRE_<sup>_Programin Zimbabwe ......................................_</sup><br>19|
|_4.5.Swajal:ruralwater_<sup>_supplyinIndia......................._</sup><br>_................19_|
|_4.6.Malawi:ThePROSCAP_<sup>_program..................._</sup><br>_..................._20|

2
|_4.7.BurkinaFaso:CoveringtheProvinceofPoniwithAIDSprevention2l_|
|---|
|_4.8GrameenPhones,Bangladesh_**_...................................................._**<br>**21**|
|_4.9GyandootVDrishtee,India_**_........................._**<br>**_.........................._21**|
|_4.10 Association forSocialAdvancement(ASA),Bangladesh_**_..............._22**|
|_4.11SelfEmployedWomen'sAssociation, India_**_..................................._22**|
|5.IEXAMPLESOFSCALING UPMULTD-SECTOI^ALPOAR$MS23|
|_5.1Participatory budgetingandplanninginPortoAlegre,Brazil_**_..........._**<br>**23**|
|_5.2Mexico:empowermentofmunicipalitiesandcommunities_**_..............._24**|
|_5.3North-EastBrazilRuralDevelopmentProgram_<br>_..._<br>**24**|
|_5.4.KecamatandevelopmentProject,Indonesia_**_..................................._**<br>**26**|
|_5.5.ScalingupinZambia_<br>**_..................................................._**<br>**26**|
|_5.6ScalingupinGuinea_<br>_._<br>_._<br>**_..............................._26**|
|**_S._**CODMONSCONDUCOVETOSCALONGUP<br>...<br>..27|
|_6.1.Politicalcommitment_<br>_._<br>_._<br>**_.............................._27**|
|**_6.2_**_Well-designeddecentralization_**_._**<br>**_.................................................._**<br>**28**|
|7.REDUCDNGECONOPfCM!DFSCSALCOSTS.........................<br>28|
|8.OVERCOMINGADVERSEONSTDTUMONALBARRDERS.........29|
|**_8._**_1Overcomingunfavorablepoliticalconditions_<br>**_...................................._29**|
|_8.2_<br>_OvercomingUnfavorableSocialConditions_<br>_._<br>_._<br>**30**|
|_8.3_<br>_Helpinggovemmentsdesigndecentralizationbetter_**_................_31**|
|9.OVERCOMINGPROBLEMSASSOCDATEDWDTHCOPRODUCTDON<br>31|
|_9.1Fosteringa commonculture_**_......................................._**<br>**_............_31**|
|_9.2Makingsureevery stakeholderunderstandshis/hernewfunctionsandhowtodothem_<br>**_................................................................................................................_**<br>**32**|
|_9.3Providingincentivescompatiblewithprogramobjectives_**_................_32**|
|10.ADAPTNGTOTHELOCALCONTEXT.<br>..................................<br>33|
|11.FUELDTESTWEGMANUALS,TOOLrTSMDSCALMG-UPLOOSTMCS<br>**33**|
|12.SEQUENCIG..........................................<br>3|
|13.PROGRAMDESIGNAMDPROGRAMDIAGNOS7C........35|

**3**
|**ANNEXES**<br>**..............................................**<br>**37**|
|---|
|Annex1:OperationalFunctionsandManualsbyLevel..............<br>...........37|
|Annex2:Design ElementsandTools forLargeScaleCDDPrograms..38|
|REFERENCES**..............................................**<br>42|

4
I
## 1. **INTRODUCUlON**

Community driven development<sup>isnota project. It is anapproachthat aims to empower communitiesand</sup> local governments with<sup>resourcesand theauthorityto usethese flexibly, thus taking controlof their</sup> development.' Empowerment<sup>means the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate</sup> in, negotiate with and<sup>holdaccountableinstitutions that affect theirlives.2It means giving peopleaccess to</sup> voice and information.<sup>greatersocialinclusionand participation,greater accountability,and organizational</sup> strength. CDD aims<sup>toharness socialcapital throughempowerment, and increase socialcapital through</sup> scaling up.

When we talk of scaling<sup>up CDD, we primarily meanscalingup the entire approach to empowerment.This</sup> is ideally multisectoral.<sup>However, sectoral scaling upis part of CDD whenit incorporatesgenuine</sup> beneficiary participation.<sup>Communitiescan be eithergeographicalentities(urbanneighborhoods,villages,</sup> sub-districts) or groups<sup>with common interests(water usersassociations,herders,members of micro-credit</sup> groups). These sectoral<sup>communitieswill benefit from empowermentand scaling up no less than</sup> geographical entities.<sup>So thispaper deals withthescaling up of both sectoraland multi-sectoralCDD</sup> programs.

Many other agencies<sup>are addressingempowermentand scaling up. The PRSP processin many high-</sup> indebted poor countries<sup>aims to strengthencommunities and reduce povertywithin a frameworkof good</sup> macroeconomic and<sup>sectoral policies.</sup><sup>_Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: a Sourcebook_(World Bank</sup> 2002) disseminates<sup>successful approachesand tools/practicesthat can be usefulstarting points for scaling</sup> _up. "Scaling-up Issues_<sup>_and Options: SupportingGoodPractice and Innovation"_is anotherimportant</sup> document under preparation<sup>in the Agriculture and RuralDevelopment Department of the WorldBank.</sup> This paper draws on<sup>theseand otherefforts.</sup>

# _Why is scaling up CDD_<sup>**_so dficult?_**</sup>

We all are famniliar with<sup>islands of successin community-drivendevelopment. Theseempower a few</sup> villages, urban neighborhoods,<sup>or producer organizations.How wonderfulif they could be scaled up to</sup> cover all communities<sup>ina provinceor nation!But thereare preciouslyfewscaling-upsuccesses.Five key</sup> problems explain why: ' World Bank. CommunitY<sup>DnvenDevelopment:a Vision of PovertyReductionthroumh Empowennent. Washington,</sup> D.C., Dec. 2000.

> 2 Narayan, Deepa (Ed.). Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2002.

_5_
# _Total and/orfiscal costs may be too high_

Some CDD islands of success are inherently not replicable because, like many boutiques, they are too costly for the masses. Total cost per community member may be high because the island of success relies on expensive technology, inputs, staff, and advisers. Mobilizing and training community members is cheaper: communities and local governments do not have to travel over large distances, nor charge management fees. Costly boutiques have excessive overhead costs, and poor transfer efficiency: too low a proportion of program costs relate to actual work at the community level. Even if costs per unit are reasonable, national scaling up may lead to excessive fiscal cost, because the approach fails to mobilize sufficient co-financing from communities and local governments. Donors that support boutiques may not be willing to support national scaling-up.

# _The_ **_uastitutional setting may_** _be hosile to CDD_

> The laws/regulations of national governments/ donors may not allow disbursement directly to communities. The central government may not authorize local governments or communities to provide services

> (education, primary health) to themselves, or levy user fees/taxes. Locally generated revenues may be centralized, rather than left for local use. The central government may fear the political consequences of empowering communities, local governments, and even NGOs. The social environment may deprive

> women and minorities of voice. Ethnic, religious and class conflict may undermine real participation by all.<sup>3</sup>

# _Difficulties arisingfrom co-prodution may not be mastered_

> Scaling up CDD implies the co-production of investments, outputs and services by many different stakeholders at many different levels: community workers, local government officials, NGOs, the private

> sector, technical specialists at all levels, administrators, program managers and bureaucrats, politicians and

> aid agency personnel. Three problems afflict co-production.

_Differences in values and experience of co-producers._ Community workers and local NOOs often do not understand how higher levels or sector specialists operate or can contribute. Sector specialists often underestimate latent community capacity. Higher-level administrators are used to strict controls and cannot understand how social capital can enable communities to hold their leaders accountable. Until program participants learn to adhere to a common set of values and approaches, scaling up will remain difficult.

_No clear assignment offunctions to different co-producers._ Scaling up requires precise assignment of a long list of functions (see Annex 1) to specific actors at different levels, and clear instructions on what they should do, how to do it, and _what tools to use_ (forms, questionnaires, technical approaches, training materials, etc.). The problem is compounded in multi-sectoral programs, where all sectors need to harmonize with common basic rules and procedures while using sectoral best practice and norms. Afield- _tested operational manual is often missing or incomplete_ i.e. does not contain sub-manuals and tools critical functions or levels. Operational manuals are too often designed in an office, not the field.

_Incompatible incentives of co-producers._ Co-producers lacking compatible incentives will either produce low-priority outputs that bring them rewards (such as reports or workshops) or obstruct the program. Public sector workers, such as teachers or extension agents, may not gain from the program. Technical specialists may lack incentives to produce the specific inputs required. Communities may lack incentives to co-finance the program. The central bureaucrat or sector manager may lose budgets and staff by devolving power. Field-tested roll-out logistics in a single district would unearth all these incentives issues, and help design an incentive-compatible operational manual.

> 3World Bank. Community Dnven Development: a Vision of Poverty Reduction through Empowerment Washington, D.C., Dec. 2000.

6
## **_Adaptation to the_** _local_ **_context may be missing_**

What looks like best practice in some contexts may fail in others. Pilots may succeed because of special circumstances relating to geography or the socio-political context. Scaling up should be adapted each context. Ideally, process monitoring should provide continuous feedback that enables the scaling-up process to constantly be improved.

# **_Lack_** _of_ **_scaling-up logisics_**

Scaling up can cover tens of thousands of widely-dispersed communities. So logistics must be designed to train tens of thousands of program participants and disburse resources to tens of thousands of communities, an issue that does not arise in successful pilots. Scaling-up logistics must control costs, otherwise fleets of jeeps, enormous travel allowances, and expensive training equipment can make national scaling up fiscally impossible. Not enough scaling-up programs design and field-test logistics carefully and cost-effectively.

When programs are approved without resolving these five issues, the newly appointed program managers bear the consequences. They rarely understand fully the need for a detailed design and testing phase. Such programs quickly run into bottlenecks. Typically, the donor sends out a supervision mission to fix that bottleneck, rather than operate at a more strategic level. The program cranks up but quickly runs into more bottlenecks, more missions come to the rescue, and the vicious cycle continues. Fatigue sets in, lack of capacity is blamed for the failure to reach cruising speed, and willingness to pay for scaling up fades away.

To overcome these problems, our main analytical focus will be on five classes of remedies.

1. Reducing economic and/or fiscal costs

2. Overcoming adverse institutional barriers 3. Overcoming problems associated with co-production by (a) fostering a common culture and vision among program participants; (b) assigning and describing program functions and tasks to different actors and levels; and (c) providing incentives compatible with program objectives 4. Using pilots to test what works in which context, adapting best practice to local conditions, using process monitoring and constant feedback to keep adapting and improving programs.

**_5._** Designing and field-testing the operational manuals, toolkits and scaling-up logistics

## **BOX I. The many facets of success in scaling up**<sup>**4**</sup> **.**

Drawing on case studies, an ARD paper "Scaling up Issues and Options" (still at the draft stage) identifies a wide range of reasons that facilitate success in scaling up. Some key reasons: Strong political commitment was vital for success, helping overcome resistance to change and facilitating the transfer of funds and technology to communities. Strong NGOs and a lively civil society helped greatly.

> 4 Hancock, Jim. "Scaling Up Issues and Options: Supporting Good Practices and Innovation". Draft Working Paper, 2003.

7
<!-- Start of picture text --> All successful scale-ups created sophisticated, context-specific procedures, incorporated in<br>manuals with simple transparent messages. These manuals/procedures were, however, living<br>documents that were constantly adapted in the light of new experiences and contexts.<br>All successful cases had detailed planning from the micro to macro dimension. They<br>benefited from a realistic assessment of financial resources, needs, and institutional realities.<br>Successful cases had good systems for sharing and spreading knowledge. These helped ensure<br>that different stakeholders knew precisely what their roles were, and helped provide<br>incentives compatible with roles. No-till farming and microcredit spread fast by person-to-<br>person and community-to-community contact.<br>Appropriate incentives for different stakeholders proved important. Managerial incentives<br>were aimed at getting the right outcomes rather than rapid disbursement. Establishing the<br>right processes took time and effort. Once the processes were well established, disbursement<br>picked up.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Some projects succeeded because they built on many years of past experience<sup>andutilized</sup> institutions already created, in part or full. The Indo-German watershed<sup>Development Project</sup> in India built on decades of previous experience. ASA in Bangladesh<sup>built on microcredit</sup> models pioneered by Grameen Bank. Best practice from earlier<sup>experiencesprovided a useful</sup> starting point, but required adaptation to each context. Scaling up is a long-haul process needing political commitment and<sup>patienceover long</sup> periods. Flexibility in sequencing needs to accommodate this.

# Objeeives and audience of the paper

The audience this paper seeks covers NGOs, the public sector, donor<sup>agenciesand development</sup> practitioners in general. Even practitioners with enormous community<sup>development experiencerarely have</sup> the breadth and depth of experience to master the complexities of scaling<sup>up. Theymay have successfully</sup> scaled up a specific sectoral intervention, and often want to<sup>stick to the toolkit used in thateffort instead of</sup> exploring a fuller set of design options. They may not understand<sup>decentralization very well, thoughthis is</sup> needed to scale up multi-sectoral approaches. Or they may have inadequate<sup>knowledgeof the complex</sup> disbursement and financial accounting architecture required. So teams of<sup>experiencedspecialistsmay</sup> attempt scaling up with a limited range of design options, and inadequate<sup>knowledgeof the international</sup> experience in relevant areas. Hence this paper presents

1. A theoretical framework to underpin program<sup>design for scaling up.</sup>

2. A systematic compilation of several design options that can help<sup>in scaling up.</sup> 3. A systematic approach to check program design for completeness.

4. An approach to design and field-test the logistics _5._ A diagnostic toolkit for existing programs.

# Aproaclh aid outlie of the paper

The paper attempts to assemble a full list of preconditions, design options<sup>and tools that facilitatescaling</sup> up. We discuss the core features of CDD to be scaled up (section 2),<sup>the three stages of developmentof</sup> CDD (section 3), and case studies of successful scaling up (section 4<sup>for sector-specificexamples, section5</sup> 8
for multi-sectoral examples). We discuss<sup>how these exampleshavemet key preconditions,anduse them to</sup> build the inventory of design features and<sup>tools.Theseare indicatedby a bolditalic typefacewhen they</sup> first are discussed. The remaining sections<sup>provide further discussionof preconditionsconducive to scaling</sup> up (section 6), reducing economic/fiscal<sup>costs(section 7),overcomingadverse institutional barriers (section</sup> 8). overcoming difficulties of co-production<sup>(section 9), adaptingto the local context (section10), field-</sup> testing operational manuals, toolkits and<sup>scaling-uplogistics(section11),sequencing (section12),andof</sup> the program design and diagnostic tools for<sup>analyzing existingprogramsor future programs for their</sup> readiness for scaling up (section 13). Annex<sup>table1 providesthelist of functionsandlevelsfor which</sup> program designers need to make assignments<sup>anddevelop operational manuals andtool kits.Annex table 2</sup> assembles all the design features, options,<sup>andtools thathave beenfound to facilitate scaling up. It explains</sup> why they are useful, and what their likely<sup>impacton programcosts wouldbe.These two tables are alsothe</sup> main toolkits proposed for program designers<sup>and programdiagnostics.</sup>

## **2. WHICH CORE FEATURES OF CDD DO**<sup>**WE SEEK TO SCALE UP?**</sup>

In this section we discuss the four core<sup>featuresof CDDwhichformpart of the Visionfor CDDarticulated</sup> by the Africa Region of the World Bank.<sup>5These arereal participation(which takes up thebulk of this</sup> section) improving accountability, technical<sup>soundness andsustainability.</sup>

# _2.1_ **_Realparticipation_**

The importance of this has been demonstrated<sup>in theoryandpractice.First, the theory.</sup>

- _2.1.1_ **_Bargaining_** _models ofpublic or social_<sup>**_choice_**</sup>

**Bargaining models** of public choice provide<sup>powerfulreasonsto foster real participationand</sup> empowerment in communities or governments<sup>(at local,district andnational levels), where collective</sup> choices are made on development plans<sup>and expenditures.The reasonsfor thisare wellknownbut have</sup> been especially well developed by Gary<sup>Becker whoproved thefollowingstatement:</sup>

**Bargaining will lead to decisions and**<sup>**outcomesthat will benefit all stakeholders or pressure groups**</sup> **(Pareto/welfare-improving choices) if**<sup>**thefollowingconditionshold.6**</sup>

1. All pressure groups have correct and<sup>equalinformation about theconsequencesof</sup> each option for each stakeholder group.

2. All pressure groups have equal lobbying<sup>poweror technology.</sup> 3. All decision and associated expenditures have<sup>to be evaluatedagainst a single</sup> aggregate budget constraint.<sup>7</sup> The logic behind this is simple. No group<sup>can secureunanimity on proposals that benefit it alone.So the</sup> bargaining process will drive participants<sup>towardsproposalsthatproducethe most benefit for mostor all</sup> stakeholders. The common budget constraint<sup>connectsthe decisions to eachother and ensuresthatthe set of</sup> proposals which are approved also improve<sup>welfarefor all groups.</sup> Real participation aims to reach all key<sup>stakeholdersatthevery outsetby conducting a stakeholder</sup> analysis, using institutional diagnostics and<sup>toolkits.This concept framework adopts the WorldBank</sup> operational definition of stakeholder as:<sup>'thoseaffectedby the outcome-negativelyorpositively-orthose</sup> ' Ibid.

> 6 Binswanger, Hans and Deininger, Klaus. "Explaining agncultural and agrarian policies in developing countries>'. Journal of Econornic Literature. 35:1958-2005,<sup>December1997</sup>

> 7 Two additional conditions which apply<sup>are:</sup> (i)<sup>redistnbutionis costly, and(6i) the usualconvexity properties which</sup> will ensure a unique maximum for the maximizing<sup>model.</sup>

9
who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention".<sup>8</sup> Key stakeholders are those whose real participation is essential for the initiative's success.

> Real participation means involving citizens at every stage and level. This includes the micro or community

> level, the meso or intermediate level (local governments, NGOs) and the macro or national/policy level

> (central government, World Bank staff). Real participation implies that development choices are taken

> under conditions of full information, full representation of all interests, and a hard budget constraint. These

> conditions can be met in substantial measure, if not fully, by good program design. Under these conditions, elites will be driven towards proposals that benefit all stakeholders, including poor and marginalized

> groups. Some caveats are in order. If poor and marginalized groups are prevented from participating effectively, elite capture will follow. Similarly, if community members dependent on natural resources and other environmental interest groups are inadequately represented, environmental degradation may result.

Empowerment means real control by communities over resources, project/program design and selection, implementation, and M and E. A good test of whether a pilot program will foster empowerment is whether the community/local government have full control over the financial resources to be used in the program, i.e whether _the money is in the hands of the community,_ and whether these resources are part of a _single untied development budget,_ rather than earmarked for specific purposes.<sup>9</sup> Shifting power from the top to the bottom requires strong political commitment. Good design is allimportant: without it, power may simply move from ineffective central governments to ineffective local ones. So, empowerment requires both political commitment and good design. These in turn should be used to ensure six critical factors.

1. Devolution of authority and resources;

2. Real participation of primary stakeholders. "' 3. A communication program that provides a two-way flow of information.

4. Co-financing by communities to promote local ownership.

5. Availability of technical assistance and facilitation from the private sector and/or higher administrative levels.

6. Pro-poor market development, including facilitation of producer/user groups that can federate upward to tap national and global markets. X 1

- _2.1.2 Devolution of authority and resources._

Shifts in power relations are fundamental in CDD. 1<sup>2</sup> Communities and local governments can be truly empowered only by giving them an _assuredjlow offunds from the central government,_ as well as the _authority to levy local taxes and user charges._ Only then can they participate fully in development bargaining. Untied funds are crucial to enable communities /local governments to choose their own priorities, and create skills through learning by doing. It allows them to evaluate propositions against a

> 8The World Bank, 1996. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Enviromnentally Sustainable Development, Washington D.C.

9 World Bank. Communitv Driven Development: a Vision of Poverty Reduction throueh Empowerment. Washington, D.C., Dec. 2000.

'° See Annex 3 for details.

> " Narayan, Deepa (Ed.). Empowermnent and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, The World Bank, Washington D.C.,

> Dec. 2002. 12 Ibid.

10
single budget constraint, one of<sup>the preconditionsof welfareimprovingsocial choice.'3</sup><sup>_Earmarking_of</sup> resources is justified only where<sup>community decision-makingcannot take place underour proposed</sup> bargaining conditions. For example,<sup>resourcesfor HIV/AIDSmayhave to be earmarkedas long as the</sup> disease leads to stigma and cannot<sup>even be talked about.Earmarking may also be needed for measures</sup> such as bio-diversity and soil conservation,<sup>since communitiesmayignore benefitsto outsiders.' 4Working</sup> towards a unified budget constraint<sup>implies that decentralization shouldgive localgovernmentsa</sup> _predictable, transparent share of_<sup>_revenue_(including foreign aid), preferably by a legally-mandated</sup> formula. This will empower them<sup>with financialviability.Short-lived donor programsand ad hoccentral</sup> grants cannot lead to empowerment.'<sup>5</sup> Decentralization should be based<sup>on the</sup><sup>**_principle_**</sup><sup>_of subsidiarity.'6_Responsibilityfor all tasks shouldbe</sup> devolved to the lowest level that<sup>can effectivelymanage them.The</sup><sup>_subsidiarity principle improves_</sup> _efficiency and reducesfiscal costs_<sup>by assigningtaskson thebasis of comparative advantage.It is also a</sup> powerful design element to _harness_<sup>_latent capacities,_thus reducing programcosts.</sup><sup>_Fiscalrewardsand_</sup> _penalies_ can spur competition<sup>betweenlocalgovernmentsandbetweencommunities. They can induce</sup> accelerated skill development<sup>by providingincentivesfor improvedperformance.This</sup><sup>_reducesfiscal costs._</sup> In Africa, Zambia has pioneered<sup>the grant of additional authorityand fundstolocalgovernmentsthat meet</sup> specified benchmarks (see section<sup>5).Other countriesin the region are consideringsimilar incentive</sup> schemes.

Even after decentralization and<sup>participationare in place, centralprogramswillbeneededforissues/sectors</sup> that local governments may neglect<sup>or be unsuitableto handle.. This includes trunk roads and canals</sup> cutting through several jurisdictions,<sup>andprojectswith environmentalor socialexternalities..</sup>

# _2.1.3. Real stakeholderparticipation._

Real stakeholder participation<sup>is required in appraisaland planning, implementationand M andE.</sup> _Participatory appraisal_ **_andplanning_**<sup>(PA&P) byall stakeholdershelp strengthendecision makingat the</sup> community level. PA&P requires<sup>skilled externalfacilitatorsand has been successfullyusedin urbanand</sup> rural programs. It is the starting<sup>pointfor acquisitionof citizen information about options, resources,</sup> constraints, latent capabilities,<sup>and the likelyconsequencesof eachsubproject for each stakeholder' 7.It</sup> helps bring about the conditions<sup>for optimalsocialchoice discussedabove.</sup> Based on an initial stakeholder<sup>analysis,ideally complemented by socialandinstitutionalanalysis, key</sup> stakeholders are divided into<sup>relevantgroupsto analyzetheir constraints, aspirations,and options.</sup> Participatory workshops may<sup>then bring togetheralllevels of stakeholdergroupsinto a single event, ormay</sup> be sequentially phased. These<sup>processes also strengthenor create a</sup><sup>_community development committee_</sup> _and relevant subcommittees, and_<sup>_ident#fy group leaders and appropriate institutional arrangements._</sup> Through bargaining, key stakeholders<sup>approvea list of agreed projects.The respective sub-committeesare</sup> then empowered to pursue these<sup>approved projects.Elite captureand social exclusionare ever-present</sup> dangers, and careful design of<sup>theparticipatory processare neededto check them.</sup> _The next step is participatory implementation,_<sup>_operation and maintenance._Communities andlocal</sup> governments need to be involved<sup>inthe design, execution,maintenance and operationof projects. This</sup> improves ownership, and in many<sup>instances (see sections 4 and 5)has reducedthe costs of small</sup> infrastructure by 20-40 9. In the<sup>past, infrastructurehassuffered frompoor 0and M,for want of sufficient</sup> funding and motivation from central<sup>agencies.Localgovernmentsandcommunitieshavehistoricallynot</sup> 13 World Bank. Community Driven<sup>Develonment:a Vision of PovertyReductionthrough Emnowerment. Washington,</sup> D.C., Dec,. 2000.

**'5** Ibid.

-

,

**'"** Ibid.

**16** Ibid. 7 Wor ld Bank: Village Level Participatory<sup>Approaches (VLPA). Washington,D.C., 2002</sup>
been empowered to operate systems, levy user charges or undertake maintenance. Recent experience shows that communities are willing to bear the entire 0 and M expenses for rural water supply plus part of the capital cost (see Section 4).

> _Process monitoring (PM) and Participatory_ **_M_** _and E (PME)._ Process monitoring provides feedback to project authorities while implementation is in progress. This is accomplished through continuous observation, interpretation and institutional learning, involving participant observation and I assessment.

> All stakeholder groups in a project see and judge it. Dynamics within and between stakeholders are usually not 'visible', so PM helps reveal these. It looks at both internal and external processes, and helps analyze

> the interaction within and across groups and levels.

Communities may be well placed to identify the most relevant and easily trackable indicators, and may be better motivated than government surveyors. In Guinea, for example, the Village Communities Support Program has established an M and E unit that coordinates PM and helps communities establish their own monitoring. Evaluation is carried out mostly by independent organizations such as universities and NGOs.

# **_2.1.4._** _Communications_

Scaling up requires a well-designed communications program. Information, education, and communication (EC) activities have to meet awareness and learning needs, as also process monitoring needs. Equal access to information by all participants is critical for welfare-enhancing social choice. Decentralization, community empowerment and capacity building can be aided by a multi-dimensional communication program which will also contribute independently to information, voice and organizational capacity.1<sup>8</sup>

> In Poni province, Burkina Faso, a local radio station (Radio Gaoua) gives information daily on an ongoing

> AIDS program, and has greatly improved awareness. It is also used to convene meetings in an area where mail and telephones are weak. Community radio can be a two-way information device. Sri Lanka's

> community radio has a panel of resource-persons whom listeners can phone in for a wide range of information and answers to problems. To take off, it requires a favorable regulatory environment, and

> possibly the promotional financing of community-owned radios.

> The success of Grameen Telephones in Bangladesh (see section 5) proves the value of telecom even in poor, remote areas. Here again, regulations need to facilitate rural mobile telecom, and initial promotional spending may be necessary. The Gyandoot project in Madhya Pradesh, India, shows that rural internet

> kiosks can greatly facilitate e-governance and e-commerce, improving the voice and incomes of poor

18 A communication strategy should include the following elements.

1. Communication rationale - Empowerment and voice for the poor, capacity building, community mobilization and education, cross-stakeholder partnerships, accountability and transparency, political incentives.

2. Target audience - sub-segments within major stakeholder groups: central, state, and municipal governments, community organizations and groups, private sector institutions, and other geographic, gender, economic, social and political divisions.

3. Types of message - benefits and tradeoffs, incentives, awareness needs, actions required, education and learnng needs, avenues for complaints and suggestions.

4. Strategic scope and delivery style - national or regional, mass communication or specialized targeted means, interpersonal or popular, i.e. radio, internet, grassroots media, computerized management information systems.

5. Creators of communication capacity-NGOs, PR firms, consultants, radio-internet operators.

12
villagers (see Section 5). The<sup>internet can also be used for training andcapacity building. It is used in</sup> Andhra Pradesh, India to train<sup>ruralmidwives,thus reducingmaternalmortality.</sup>

## **_2.1.5._** _Co-financing by communities_

To inculcate a sense of local<sup>ownership, communitiesshould contributeto both capitalcosts and</sup> maintenance costs of projects meant<sup>for their benefit.Contributions can be in cash or kind (labor,</sup> materials). Where communities<sup>have no sense of ownership,assets mayatrophy for want of motivation in</sup> O and M. In many countries, new<sup>rules/lawsare required to devolve authorityto levy localtaxesand user</sup> charges.

Local contributions mobilize additional<sup>resources,</sup><sup>_reduce thefiscal costs per community member, and_</sup> _ease the fiscal strain on central_<sup>_governments._Global experiencewarns us that devolving excessive funds</sup> to municipalities may induce the<sup>latterto reducelocal taxes.Soscaling up should be based at least partly</sup> on _matchiny grants, rewarding_<sup>_those municspalities/communities that make the most effort to raise own-_</sup> _resources.1_

# _2.1.6. Technical assistance andfacilitation_<sup>_from local and higher levels_</sup>

To assist with participatory<sup>appraisal, planningandimplementation,communitiesneed</sup><sup>_externalfacilitators_</sup> _and technical specialists._ The<sup>facilitatorsneedto guideinformation gathering and processing,andprovide</sup> fuller knowledge about the benefits<sup>andcosts of variousdevelopmentprojects,their technologicaloptions,</sup> and the consequences for the<sup>variousstakeholders.They need to ensure real participationand</sup> empowerment.

Communities and local governments<sup>alreadyhavelatent capabilities,andempowermentwill harness these</sup> skills and enhance them through<sup>learning by doing.Thisshouldbe supplementedby relevantcapacity</sup> building. Technical designs and<sup>assistanceshould be availableon demandfromformally trained specialists</sup> at local and higher levels. As<sup>communitiestake on increasedresponsibilities,the complexityof their</sup> technical needs will increase.<sup>Sothey needresourcesto upgradethe skills of communityspecialists, such as</sup> community health workers, and<sup>to</sup> _purchasefacilitation_<sup>_and technical inputsfrom different sources._In</sup> Northeast Brazil, communities<sup>provedthey couldcut costs greatly through innovativewaysof procuring</sup> technical services. Sectors,<sup>in collaborationwiththe private sectorand NGOs,needto strengthenor</sup> develop a _continuous system of training_<sup>_and retraining of their sector specialists,_and acquire the ability</sup> to respond to requests from communities.<sup>The T&V approachto agriculturalextension has manyelements</sup> of such a system.

## _2.1.7. Pro-poor market development_

Higher income is an essential<sup>form of empowerment,and requirespro-market policies that enhance the</sup> capacity of poor people to benefit<sup>fromparticipationin provincial,nationaland global markets.</sup> Preconditions for these are good<sup>macroeconomic and sectoralpolicies and good governanceand</sup> enforcement of property rights<sup>whichencourage entrepreneurship.The Sourcebookon Empowermentand</sup> Poverty Reduction classifies pro-poor<sup>market developmentinto three categories:access to information,</sup> inclusion/participation, and local organizational<sup>capacity.20</sup> Examples of pro-poor market development<sup>through better access to informationinclude:(a) global</sup> connectivity for villagers through<sup>Grameen Phones, Bangladesh(Section5 ); (b) e-commercevehicleslike</sup> Drishtee.com (section 5), Novica.com,<sup>andPeopLink.org; (c) credit ratings for self-helpgroups(Andhra</sup> 19 World Bank. Community Driven<sup>Develovment:a Vision of PovertvReductionthrouth Empowerment.Washington,</sup> D.C., Dec. 2000.

20 Narayan, Deepa (Ed.). Empowerment<sup>and PovertyReduction:ASourcebook,TheWorld Bank, WashingtonD.C.,</sup> Dec. 2002 13
Pradesh, India), that facilitate credit with minimal transactions costs; (d) smart cards, used to cut delays and transactions costs by microfinance groups in India and Swaziland.

> Examples of market development through inclusion/participation are: (a) one-stop shops in Bali,

> Indonesia, for facilitating government clearances for hawkers and other low-income entrepreneurs; (b)

> Urban Property Rights Project, Peru, that confers formal title on previously unregistered dwellings, increasing property values dramatically and enabling property-owners to raise credit against their newly registered property; (c) microfinance institutions catering those outside the formal credit system (section 5).

> Examples of market development through improved organizational capacity: (a) Self Employed Women's Association, India (section _5);_ (b) Rice millers' association, Cambodia (c) Metalworkers' and hammock makers' networks, Honduras and Nicaragua respectively.

# _2.2. Improving Accountability_

Almost all traditional accountability has been upwards, to central governments and donors. This violates the first condition for optimal public choice, namely full and equal information to all stakeholders, including reports and data that establish accountability. CDD aims to correct this fatal flaw by shifting the emphasis to horizontal and downward accountability to community members, users, and local peers, and by empowering them to take corrective actions against errant co-producers. This means, for example, that communities should be able to _hire, pay and disciplne stffdeliveringjrontine services such as primary educaton and health._ This approach can be initiated in pilots and ultimately scaled up nationally.

Formal reporting and audit mechanisms have failed to achieve high standards of accountability in poor countries. Yet successful social funds show that accountability can be harnessed through social capital in communities. Scaling up community empowerment can therefore scale up accountability. Greater participation in projects, transparency in local decision-making, and a strong communication strategy can all help improve accountability. _Greaterpolitical accountability via local government elections_ can be even more important.

_Fiscal rewards and penalties_ for good or unacceptable performance can induce greater accountability from local governments/communities. Zambia is a good example of this ( Section 4). Community leaders in high-performance communities will not only get bigger budgets but also build reputations and advance their political careers.

> In Bangalore, India, an NGO asks people to rate the local services they receive, and presents the findings as a _Report Card_ on public services. Similar report cards on five other Indian cities have since been published, and this approach has been tried as well in the Ukraine, the Philippines, and Washington D.C. This helps improve accountability<sup>21</sup> .

Upward accountability also needs to be overhauled. Traditional disbursement and audit mechanisms are unsuitable for disbursement to and oversight of tens of thousands of small community accounts. For this reason, the World Bank has gradually developed and now summarized _community-based disbursement andprocurement methods and guidelines._ These give communities simple methods to account for funds to their members and to higher authorities, and to procure goods and services for their projects. Greater reliance can be placed on peer pressure within communities, fiscal rewards/penalties, and random audits.

_PME mechanisms integrating micro/mesolmacro levels of an iniNtiatve_ can improve not only downward but upward accountability too, through timely tracking that quickly reveals technical or financial flaws.22

> 21 Paul, Samuel. Holdine the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action. Books for Change, Banagalore, India, 2002.

> 22 World Bank. Communitv Driven Development: a Vision of Poverty Reduction throueh Emowerment. Washington.

D.C., Dec. 2000.

14
Accotntability to donors is often balkanized into different channels<sup>for each donor,evenwithin the same</sup> sector and district. Often accounts and reports have to be prepared in the language of<sup>the donor,and this</sup> facilitates capture by elites, who alone know non-local languages. It also<sup>makesa joke of alphabetization</sup> programs, which are usually in the local language and often financed by<sup>the samedonor.A womanwhohas</sup> acquired reading and writing skills will still not be able to check the community<sup>accounts!While scaling</sup> up, donors need to harmonize assistance and procedures to produce a<sup>singlelineof accountability,with</sup><sup>**_all_**</sup> **_local- level documents in the local language._** Translation from the local language to that of<sup>donorscan be</sup> done by locally recruited staff.

# _2.3._ **_Technical_** _soundness_

Technical soundness implies using economically viable and **_locally tested_** _technologies._<sup>Islands of success</sup> have produced a wide choice of simple technical solutions. To ensure<sup>wide replicability, these solutions</sup> should be field-tested in several environmental and social regions.<sup>Technical soundnessis more about</sup> program design than technology. Some key elements are:

1. Designing CDD in phases taking into account the special history and characteristics of each country.

2. Ensuring real participation and guarding against elite capture/social exclusion.

3. Making sure that political decentralization is accompanied by administrative and fiscal decentralization.

4. Adapting country decentralization plans to make use of local level institutions and all latent skills and capacities.

**_5._** _Preparingfield-tested_ **_manuals and tools_** for every actor, sector, and level of government, so that all know precisely what they should do in CDD,<sup>and</sup> how.

6. Ensuring the availability of **_replicable, adaptable technical designs._** 7. Ensuring the availability of technical advisory services that communities, local service providers, facilitators, and local governments can draw<sup>on.</sup>

## 2.4. **Sustainability**

Sustainability has many different elements.

1. Fiscal sustainabilitv. **_Matching grants_** for communities from donor<sup>can</sup> kick-start CDD, but the process cannot rely forever on donor programs. It must be embedded in a permanent institutional framework. This can take the form of local governments, or federations of producer groups/ self-help groups. CDD needs to be financed by inter-governmental transfers mandated by a revenue-sharing formula, thus giving communities and local governments an assured shared of central revenue. It also needs to be financed by the own resources of communities, local governments and other co-producers. The revenue-sharing formula can help equalize fiscal capacities across advanced and backward regions. Funding for communities should become a fiscal right, not largesse from donors or the central government.

15
2. Asset sustainability. Experience shows that assets like roads and canals can erode or collapse for want of maintenance. Communities and local stakeholders should be given the responsibility for maintenance of mrost assets, and the authority to levy user fees and local taxes to finance maintenance. (Section 4, Swajal).

3. Environmental sustainability. The management of land, water, forests, pastures, groundwater of other environmental resources must aim at sustainable practices. _Giving ownership orpermanengt usufruct rights and management responsibility to communities_ helps solve open access problems and provides powerful incentives for sustainable management. (Dewees et al. on Tanzania Forests, other sources).

4. Social sustainability. CDD must be socially inclusive, build on existing local-level institutions, and include conflict resolution mechanisms. Participation and real empowerment are the bedrocic on which all forms of sustainability must rest. Only through these processes can real fiscal, asset, environmental and social sustainability be ensured. Seldom do participatory processes achieve perfection, and even less so at the outset. The constant improvement of participation and stakeholder empowerment is therefore a major objective of scaling up.

The key principles which lead to welfare-enhancing social decision, also enhance sustainability. In a setting in which all stakeholders are well informed about the financial, social, and environmental consequences of the development options discussed, and make their decision against a unified budget constraint, the choices will also ensure the various forms of sustainability. Real participation thus not only enhances efficiency<sup>but</sup> also sustainability. Environmental and social safeguards are needed where these ideal conditions for social choice are not met, for example when information is lacking or poorly distributed, or when key stakeholders are excluded from the decision process.

## 3. SCALING UP: TERME SAGES OF CIDD

Each country needs to analyze its particular conditions and tailor CDD accordingly. In doing so, countries may find it useful to consider three stages of CDD: _initiation, scaling up, and consolidaion.23_ Conditions vary vastly across countries. Where conditions are ripe for scaling up, we can proceed quickly. In other cases, it may be necessary first to create the necessary pre-conditions.

# _3.1 L nk o sgage_

Some countries have little or no participation or decentralization. The empowerment process can be initiated on three fronts: (a) enhancing real participation; (b) targeting specific groups (such as people affected by HIV/AIDS, women, ethnic minorities); and (c) starting a dialog with stakeholders on decentralization.

Where no decentralization or local funds exist, pilot projects can be initiated. Small learning-by-doing grants to communities or the lowest level of local government (as small as $ 5,000 to $<sup>10,000 per</sup> community) can kick-start the process. PA&P can begin using existing resources. In the Borgou<sup>region of</sup> Benin, half the 500 villages were covered with participatory appraisal within six months using only existing resources and facilitators. A similar approach gave good results in Malawi. This implies that entire countries can be covered fairly rapidly using modest external resources.

Pilots should be tailored to climatic, ecological and social contexts. If pilots have been conducted only in a small part of a country, further pilots are required to establish what works in what conditions.

### 23 IbidL

16
Many countries are not keen on decentralization.<sup>In such cases reformersneedto start a dialog with the</sup> government, and mobilize public opinion<sup>in the process.While that dialog proceeds, a startcan be made</sup> with participation. Enhanced participation<sup>is the first building blockof CDD, whosefoundationmust be</sup> laid quickly even if decentralization<sup>seems some way off.</sup>

## _3.2. Scaling up stage_

Where pilots have already succeeded,<sup>scalingup is thenext logical step.This rarelycan bedone in one big</sup> bang at the national level. All the<sup>tools andlogisticsfor scalingup should first be refined and testedin one</sup> district of province, as in the Borgou<sup>pilot. Suchfield-testingwill quickly identify critical bottlenecks</sup> which may, for example, prevent rapid<sup>disbursement,and mayrequirelegalor regulatorychanges. The</sup> field-tested operational manuals, tools,<sup>training manuals and scaling-uplogistics can then be extendedto</sup> and adapted to local conditions in a rollout<sup>processthatultimately coversall districts/provinces.</sup> Sectoral successes can be scaled up<sup>without waitingfor the creationof local governments.Swajalin India,</sup> the river-blindness eradication program<sup>in WestAfrica,and SEWA(see section</sup><sup>_5)_have scaledup with</sup> little or no help from local governments.

## _3.3. Consoidation stage_

When countries have scaled up<sup>insome sectors and/orregions, they can move towards consolidation.This</sup> can include: (a) integrating participation<sup>and decentralization; (b) scaling up provincial programsto full</sup> national coverage; (c) improving<sup>CDD designin the light of experience; (d) improving technical and</sup> organizational capability: and (e)<sup>expanding targeted programsto tackleissues that communitiesmay have</sup> neglected. For instance, communities<sup>maygive excessivepriorityto curativehealthand not enough to</sup> disease prevention measures like improved<sup>stoves,hygiene educationand malaria control awareness.Gaps</sup> left by community action can be filled<sup>in theconsolidation phase.</sup> Once strong communities and local<sup>governmentshaveemerged, officialsupport needs toassist the</sup> formation of networks and federations<sup>of stakeholders.Brazil provides a good exampleof communities</sup> federating to link up with export markets.<sup>Mexico,Turkeyand India have createdsuccessfulwater users'</sup> associations. The emergence of federations<sup>of communitiescanbe regardedas the climax of the</sup> consolidation stage.

## **4.** EXAMPLES OF SCAUNG UP SECIOR-SPECIFIC<sup>PROGRAMS</sup>

We give below examples from Africa<sup>andother regionsof sectoralprojectsthat havebeenscaledup</sup> successfully.

# _4.1. Indo-German WatershedDevelopment_<sup>_Program_</sup>

Launched in the late 1980s, this program<sup>in the Indianstate of Maharashtra, supportedby GTZ and the</sup> German Development Bank, has<sup>been scaledup to cover146watersheds withover 200,000villagers by</sup> 2002. Studies have shown impressive<sup>impacts-doubling of crop production, additionalemployment,</sup> restoration of depleted groundwater,<sup>creationof sociallycohesivewatershedcommitteeswith social</sup> inclusion, and accumulation of a<sup>locallyowneddevelopmentfund.Watershed developmentis difficult</sup> because of the opposing interests of<sup>inhabitants.Controlling grazing,building check dams to trap water and</sup> creating irrigation networks can greatly<sup>benefit downstreamfarmers, but can depriveuplandherders of a</sup> living. Richer farmers need to be persuaded<sup>not to drill deep tubewellsthat empty aquifers.Creating a</sup> social consensus requires considerable<sup>patienceand effort. Somekey reasonsfor success in scalingup:</sup> 17
1. The project selected the most harmonious communities and avoided villages riven by factionalism. Some view this as successful analysis and selection. Others view this as a model that cannot be scaled up fully.

2. The program was able to build on 25 years of scattered organizational structures and infrastructure created by earlier government/NGO programs.

3. The participatory process was _tested in pilots_ and _adapted_ to conditions in new watersheds. Participatory appraisal capacity was built up before full scaling up. The Watershed Organization Trust, which gives engineering and computer support to the program, developed a Participatory Operation Pedagogy and Gender Oriented POP as an integral part of its capacity building effort. It also runs a training center that has created 42,000 graduates badly needed by NGOs. It has created new watershed maps from scratch. The _emphasis on field-tested manuals, technical soundness and adaptability_ has been vital.

4. Maharashtra State has long been a pioneer of innovations in rural development, _so political and technical commitment was substantiaL_ 5. A major bottleneck in scaling up has been insufficient hieh-quality NGOs to work out the complex social, technical and institutional arrangements.

# _4.2. Reclamaton of sodic soils, Uttar Pradesh, India_<sup>_25_</sup>

In Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state, large tracts of poorly-drained land have become sodic and unfit for cultivation. Traditional top-down schemes for reclaiming sodic land yielded indifferent results. Then the World Bank supported a project focusing on _the participation of beneficiaries and NGOs. Strong poltical commitment_ led to the creation of a new autonomous executive agency with its own contract staff to oversee the project. The _technical and organizational design was carefully worked out in advance._ The 45,600 beneficiary farmers were organized into groups, which in turn formed 974 site committees. The farmers helped plan and execute the bunding of the land, sinking of borewells, land treatment with gypsum, and flushing out of surface salts. They kept reclaimed land under constant cultivation to reduce the water table. They undertook maintenance and collection of user charges more efficiently than bureaucrats had earlier. The result: against an initial target of 47,470 hectares, 69,000 hectares were reclaimed. According to an independent assessment by the Indian Institute of Management, average family income rose from Rupees 12,065 per year to Rupees 20,082. Family employment in farming rose from an average of 32.5 person-days/year to 119 person-days/year. Cropping intensity rose from 32 per cent to 230 per cent. The economic rate of return of the project was 32 per cent.

Spurred by this success, a second reclamation project has been launched in the state, this time covering 150,000 hectares. _The pilot yielded valuable lessons for scaling up,_ have some of which been _embedded in new manuals._ (a) Since the government farm extension was weak and unaccountable to farmers, the pilot _trained village level extension workers, whom farmers are willing to pay for advice._ This empowers local people, makes extension sustainable, and has been made an integral part of scaling up. (b) The pilot experimented with a farmer training institute which, in effect, makes farmers trainers through _peer-to-peer exchanges between farmers._ This is now being scaled up to ensure one such training institute in every district. (c) The pilot showed that roads are vital to enable farmers to market their new surpluses. So the scaled-up project has a specific financial provision for rural roads, _a good example of adaptation in the light of experence._ (d) Experimentation in the pilot proved the feasibility of using cheap locally-available materials to reduce the cost of land reclamation. The scaled-up project provides for further such 24 Kerr, John. Watershed Development, Environmental services and Poverty Alleviation in India. World Development Vol 30 No. 8., 2002.

Farrington, John and Crispino, Lobo. Scaling up Participatory Watershed Development in India; Lessons from the Indo-German Watershed Development Program. Natural Resource Perspectives, No. 17, Feb 1997 25 Personal communication with Task Team Leader, 2002.

18
experimentation, including experiments<sup>to establishwhichcrops are most suitable forsodic soils,and how</sup> maintenance costs can be reduced.<sup>(f) The pilot introducedwomen's microcredit groups.Though not</sup> strictly related to reclamation,<sup>it soon</sup><sup>_converted organizational strength into income-generation,_by</sup> linking the groups to the country's<sup>largerfinancialsystem.This hasbeen made a keyfeature of scalingup.</sup> (g) The scaled-up project ran<sup>into several initial difficulties,the mainone beinga constant change of staff</sup> in the executing agency. This<sup>reflectedpolitical instabilityin the state, and underlines</sup><sup>_the key role of_</sup> _political commitment_ in project<sup>success.(h) Farmers can successfullymanage link drains from their fields</sup> to the main drain, but this effort<sup>willgowaste if the maindrain isnot wellmaintained.Traditionallythe</sup> irrigation department has given<sup>top priority tocanals andleast to drainage.So the scaled up projecthas</sup> suggested shifting the responsibility<sup>for main drains to the district-level government.This willrepresent</sup><sup>_a_</sup> _better alignment of incentives of co-producers._

## _4.3. Conquest of river blindness_

River blindness, a terrible disease<sup>oncerampant in11West Africancountrieswitha population of40</sup> million, has virtually been eradicated.<sup>Thishas saved the sight of 600,000 people, spared18 million</sup> children the risk of infection,<sup>and openedup 25 millionhectares of land for cultivation. Transmissionof the</sup> disease by blackflies was controlled<sup>by governments throughthe aerialspraying of environmentally-safe</sup> insecticides. And local conmmunities<sup>managedthe supply and dosage of invermectin,a drug that hasnow</sup> cured over four million people.<sup>In effectit was</sup><sup>_a joint venture between the center and peripheries, based_</sup> _on the principle of subsidiarity._<sup>Communitiesdidwhat theycould best handle (distributionof medicines)</sup> and the center did what it alone<sup>could (aerialspraying plusarrangingthe import of medicines).</sup> Communities had the authority<sup>to designand plan distribution,and the</sup><sup>_authority to choose their own_</sup> _village specialists and distribution_<sup>_system._The drugwas made availablefree. Communitiescollected the</sup> drug from the nearest depot and<sup>distributedit, choosingwhateverdistributionsystem theydeemed best.</sup> Each community could decide<sup>how many villagersshould be chosen as distributors and sent for training.</sup> The communities undertook to<sup>keepmedical records,and hold a penodiccensusto monitor progress.They</sup> managed the distribution at very<sup>lost cost-just one cent perperson,against $ 2 budgeted.They achieved</sup> 75 percent coverage despite<sup>civil wars and financial crises.</sup> Building on this, a new program<sup>(African Program for Onchocerciasis Control)was established in 1996to</sup> extend the control of river blindness<sup>to19other African countrieswith80 million people.PhaseI of this</sup> was successfully completed<sup>in 2001, andis nowtreating 25million people annually. Phase11 (2002-07)</sup> will aim to scale up treatment<sup>to50 million peopleannually.In most of these countries,aerial spraying is</sup> useless since they are heavily forested,<sup>unlikethe grassysavannahs of West Africa where spraying was so</sup> effective. In these countries the<sup>bestsolution is high coverageof infected people:the medicine kills the</sup> worms and they die out for want<sup>of sufficient hosts.Inthis approach,communitieswilldo the brunt of the</sup> work. They handled 80 % of<sup>distributionin West Africa, and handlevirtually100%in the 19APOC</sup> countries.

# 4.4. _The CAMPFIRE Program_<sup>_in Zimbabwe_</sup>

Poaching threatened wildlife in<sup>Zimbabwetill the CommunalAreas ManagementProgram for Indigenous</sup> Resources (CAMPFIRE) involved<sup>localcommunities,</sup><sup>_giving them some power over local resources and a_</sup> _share offees,from hunting quotas._<sup>These benefits increasedlocal ownershipof theprogram,and embraced</sup> other communal resources such<sup>as grazing,water andwoodlands. Poachinghas declined and wildlife has</sup> staged a revival. This approach<sup>hasnow been adopted with successin many other African countries.</sup>

# _4.5. Swajal: ruird water supply in_<sup>_India_</sup>

26 World Bank. Community Driven<sup>Development: a Visionof PovertyReduction throughEmoowerment. Washington,</sup> D.C., Dec. 2000.

19
For decades, rural water supply in Uttar Pradesh, India's biggest state was handled by a state utility. This functioned in top-down mode, did not aim to recover capital costs, and was unable to recover even maintenance costs. Its model was unsustainable, and one-third of its projects stopped functioning. So the state government, supported by the World Bank, opted for a participatory approach, called Swajal, based on elected Village Water and Sanitation Committees. NGOs presented the committees with different options (gravity systems, lift systems, water harvesting) and the capital and maintenance costs of each alternative. This was an example of a _sector-specific technical manual._ Villagers chose the system they regarded as best, contributed 10% of the capital cost, and collected user charges to maintain the systems. _27_ Swajal was launched in two regions of the state, the Himalayan foothills and the Bundelkhand plains in the south. Initial results were encouraging. Administrative costs fell from 35 per cent of project costs for the state utility to 12 per cent for Swajal, and 90 per cent of villages in the Himalayan region reported sustainable self-management. However, greater obstacles were reported from Bundelkhand. Diverting perennial streams in the Himalayan foothills provided cheap water at Rs 10 per household. But Bundelkhand had few rivers, so water supply required expensive pumping from tubewells. The supply cost rose to Rs 50 per household, which some poor households were reluctant to pay. Tubewells are more likely to run dry than perennial streams. _28_ Swajal was not linked with local governments, partly because the panchayat (local government) system at the time was weak and lacked political support. However, panchayats are very well developed and have strong political backing in Kerala, the state where the Bank's next major project was launched. In Kerala funds and technical assistance go through local governments to beneficiary groups. _Field-tested manuals_ have led to a smooth launch and scaling up. The principle of _subsidiariy_ is applied-beneficiary groups manage water that is available in their own village, but management is done at higher levels when water lines run from distant sources to a group of villages. Resistance from the parastatal water authority is being overcome. _Potcal commitnment has proved vtal to success._ The government of India gives high priority to rural water supply and sanitation, and has committed ample funds to states that are serious. Kerala itself has gone in for deep decentralization of power to local governments and village councils as a political strategy. Initial reports suggest that the Kerala adaptation is working better than the original Swajal model.

# _4.6. Malawi: The PROSCAP program_

Soil fertility has been restored with a minimum of expensive chemical fertilizer in a CDD pilot (PROSCAP) in Malawi in 30 locations. This provides a menu of 12 techniques to increase soil organic matter and reduce soil erosion. The menu includes compost preparation, proper incorporation of compost and crop residue into the soil, high density planting of maize on ridges, careful application of scarce chemical fertilizer in between the maize plants, improved fallows and cover crops with nitrogen-fixing leguminous plants and trees, contour tillage, bunds, vetiver grass hedges and gully plugs. Crop yields and soil restoration have improved greatly in the pilots The pilot program has created a _field tested technical solution,_ proven in 30 villages all over the country, and so ready to be scaled up nationally.

Malawi's villages are grouped into some 2000 extension sections (containing 12 to 15 villages each), but the country has less than 1000 extension agents. _To mobilize the nal speciaked capacity needed,_ the government has decided in 20002-03 to provide an earmarked matching grant to one village in each of the 2000 extension sections to execute the PROSCAP approach on at least 50 ha. The communities and their extension agents will have to fulfill _a performance-based conact,_ monitored by the tracking system used in the T&V. This will later be extended to 3-4 villages in each extension section, using _communiy to community extension:_ Each extension section will train four _community agriculMi speciasts_ from its own community and from three to four neighboring communities. This training will also be an output of the performance contract.

27 Personal commumcation with Task Team Leader, 2002. 2 s Ibid. 29 Ibid.

20
# _4.7. Burkina Faso: Covering_<sup>_the Province of Poni with AIDS prevention_</sup>

_A Logistics Pilot_ in the backward<sup>Poni district hassuccessfullydisbursed smallmatchinggrants to newly</sup> formed HIV/AIDS committees<sup>in 500villagesandthe urbanneighborhoodsof Gaoua.Over 2000 program</sup> participants have been trained<sup>in thespaceof several monthsinthe basics of HIV/AIDS,onhow to prepare</sup> simple village projects<sup>and monitor their outputs,and on howto managethe financialresources.The pilot</sup> _relied entirely on existing or_<sup>_latent administruive and training capacities, and existing infrastructure_</sup> within the province. Under<sup>thestrong leadershipof thegovernorof the provinces multi-sectoralHIV/AIDS</sup> committees were formed<sup>for the provinceas a whole,for each of the10 departmentsinthe province,and</sup> for each of the villages and<sup>urban neighborhoods.The pilot adoptedthe principlethat no program</sup> participant would have<sup>totravel on a route otherthan theusual one to themarket or provincialcapital,</sup> reducing transport logistics.<sup>A keyinnovationwas the developmentof project</sup><sup>_preparation and monitoring_</sup> _tempkltes in theform of a_<sup>_questionnaire,_which greatlysimplifiedthe preparationand monitoring process</sup> in a setting where illiteracy<sup>is widespread.The other innovation was</sup><sup>_aper capita normrfor the_</sup> _determination of the budgetfor_<sup>_each viUlage granL_Thiswas set at around US$ 0.50, and constituted a</sup> _smaU learning- by- doing grant._<sup>An independent evaluationshowed that60-100 percent of the population</sup> received face-to-face AIDS<sup>training.Evaluatorswere struck by howmuch the villagers knew about AIDS,</sup> how freely they talked<sup>about it,and how muchthe associated stigma had decreased.</sup> The approaches and tools<sup>of the process pilot are currentlybeing documentedin andfield-tested</sup> operational manual covering<sup>the approaches, assignmentof responsibilities, trainingmaterials, tools and</sup> logistics. National coverage<sup>should be achievedin 2004, or at thelatest in 2005.</sup>

# _4.8 Graneen Phones, Bangladesh_

Mobile phones were originally<sup>regardedas a rich man'sbusiness accessory.But Grameen Bank,an NGO</sup> that pioneered micro-credit<sup>in Bangladesh,saw that mobile phones couldmeet theurgent needs of the rural</sup> poor and also become an<sup>income-generatingdevice.GrameenPhones providesa commercialmobile</sup> service through local entrepreneurs,<sup>usuallywomen,whoown andoperate cellular phones, chargingfees</sup> from users. The initial outlay<sup>for a handsetof around$ 350 is financed by GrameenBank at 22%interest,</sup> which is unsubsidized and<sup>sustainable.User charges enablethe entrepreneursto pay back the loan,usually</sup> within a year. _30_ Grameen Phones started<sup>operations inDhaka in1997,and by March2002had covered10,000villages with</sup> an estimated 15 million people.<sup>The averageannual income of phone ladiesis estimated at $ 700 after</sup> covering all costs, more<sup>thandouble the per capita income.Half all rural callsaremade for economic</sup> reasons, and many others<sup>forhealth reasonsor to contact relatives, often abroad.Commercialinformation</sup> has enabled villagers to<sup>makebig savings/incomebyutilizing telephonicinformationon market conditions</sup> to buy and sell at the right<sup>places.Illiteratewomenwhohave never'seena phone beforehavequickly</sup> mastered the required skills<sup>to runa business, gaining social status as wellas income.Looking ahead,</sup> Grameen Phones plans<sup>toset up cyber kiosksin villages to provide the internet,faxesand global</sup> networking to villagers.<sup>The founder, Mohammed Yunus, hopes this will revolutionizethe cognitiveworld</sup> of villagers, globalizing<sup>them evenwhiletheysit athome.</sup><sup>_31_</sup> _2_

# _4.9 Gyandoot/Drishtee, Indi&1_

30 CIDA. Grameen Telecom's<sup>Village Phone Programme:AMulti-Media Case Study. TeleCommonsDevelopment</sup> Group. 2000 htt://www.telecommons.com/villageohone/index.html _3'_ Ibid.

32 Narayan, Deepa (Ed.). Emoowerment<sup>andPovertyReduction: A Sourcebook,The World Bank, Washington D.C.,</sup> 2002.

21
In rural India, the internet has begun to provide e-governance, connect poor people to local leaders and markets, improve access to services, and reduce transactions costs. In 2000, the Gyandoot project of the Madhya Pradesh state government launched a computer network in the district of Dhar to empower people through e-governance and e-information. The network initially connected 20 villages, and later another 11. The district was wired for $ 55,000 in less than a year, and each internet kiosk cost $ 1,650. The kiosks were located in villages that are sub-district headquarters, or hold weekly markets where neighboring villagers come to trade. So each kiosk caters to 20-30 villages. Kiosks are run by franchisees paying an annual license fee of $ 100, and collecting user charges. For Rs. 5 (10 cents), Gyandoot provides historical and current prices and volumes at different market centers for major crops. Villagers use this service to pool resources, hire trucks to get their produce to the most lucrative market, and so increase profits. Gyandoot also provides downloads of land records for Rs. 15 (30 cents). Easy access helps the poor fight encroachment by the rich. Traditionally, land records have been maintained by corrupt officials who extract bribes for access, and have been known to forge records. Other services include online registration for certificates for caste, income and domicile; a public complaint line for broken hand pumps, unfair prices, absentee teachers; and sites for auctioning tractors and other equipment/produce.

> Successful internet kiosks require three pre-conditions: good internet design that can be widely replicated,

> a state government that is interested in e-governance, and good internet connectivity. The executing agency for Gyandoot was a private internet company, Drishtee.com. Encouraged by the success in Dhar, Drishtee now aims to scale up nationally under its own brand name in the next six years. Already it has scaled up to 90 internet kiosks across five states. _Because the model is field-tested and intrinsically profitable, it can be scaled up rapidly by training franchisees._

# _4.10Association for SocialAdvancement (ASA), Bangladesh_

> Starting off as a social service NGO, the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) in Bangladesh focused in the 1990s on micro-credit. By April 2002, it had 1,121 branches with over 4,0000 credit officers

> serving over 1.68 million clients (most rural women) with outstanding loans. It had Taka 6.7 billion

> (approx. $ 118 million) in outstanding loans and Takal.85 billion (approx. $ 32.5 million) in savings

> deposits. On-time loan recovery exceeds 98 per cent. Once supported by DANIDA, it is now self-sufficient,

> since it levies near-commercial interest rates. The reasons for success include:

1. ASA has tested manuals with clear, easily-disseminated rules. This reduces training costs. Strict adherence to manuals transparency throughout its highly decentralized network. Staff are penalized if they do not follow manuals and procedures.

2. Financial monitoring is highly detailed, and closely tracked by the founder.

_3._ Non-monitoring visits by supervisors give feedback on actual functioning and problems of branches. This is quickly translated into new organization-wide directives that amend procedures. _This combines flexiblity and constant adaptation with the discipline of sticking strictly to approved procedures."_

> ASA is now scaling up under the UNDP Micro-Start Program in Yemen, Philippines and Nigeria. In these countries, ASA selects a local partner and then embarks on branch pilots. Based on these, ASA attempts to adapt to local conditions the procedures and manuals used in Bangladesh.

## _4.11 Self Employed Women's Association, India_

This NGO began in 1972 as a quasi-trade union to represent the rights of self-employed women in the Indian state of Gujarat, but moved on to encourage women's producer groups and connect them profitably with local and global markets. It has scaled up nationally and now plans to scale up globally.

> 33 Femando Nimal and Richard Meyer. ASA-the Ford model of Micro-Finance. ADB Finance for the Poor, Vol 3, No.

> 2, 2002.

22
SEWA has 212,000 members<sup>covering 4,500 self-helpgroups,101cooperatives, and11federationsacross</sup> India. The SEWA Trade Facilitation<sup>Center(STFC)conductsa varietyof servicesfor member-producers</sup> including market research, quality<sup>control,productdevelopment, supply chain management,warehousing,</sup> and advanced technologies to track<sup>productsand demand.Ithas promoted over1,000savingsgroups and</sup> has 100,000 women depositors<sup>inthe SEWABank.Ithas beena powerful vehicleforempowermentof</sup> poor women, improving not their<sup>socialstatus,access, income, securityand independence.It beganby</sup> lobbying for changes in various<sup>rules and laws to improvewomen'saccessto naturalresourcesand</sup> vending rights in towns. It has<sup>now incubatedscoresof women's producergroups,andruns an academy</sup> that trains 30,000 female entrepreneurs<sup>annually.It has a barefootmanagerstrainingprogram, an</sup> information technology program<sup>to harness theinternetforcommercialandpersonal needsof members,</sup> and health and insurance programs<sup>to cover allmembers.Havinglong facilitated microcredit,SEWA is</sup> now exploring ways to scale up, and<sup>channellarge loans from bankstowomen'sproducer groups..</sup> SEWA has moved across national<sup>boundaries,andhas functionedin SouthAfrica for adecade.It now</sup> plans a non-profit company that can<sup>assist producergroupsin poor countries theworld overto enter the</sup> international marketplace and take<sup>advantageof globalization.It willtarget bulk purchasersin OECD</sup> countries, bulk and retail purchasers<sup>in EastAsia, andinternet sales.The companywill be ownedby the</sup> promoting grassroots organizations.<sup>Itsaims are (a)facilitatingmarketlinkages; (b) technicaland</sup> financial grants; (c) knowledge and<sup>information management;and (d) policyanalysis and advice.</sup>

# **5. EXAMPLES OF SCALING**<sup>**UP MULTI-SECTORALPROGRAMS**</sup>

The biggest examples of scaling<sup>up of scalingup CDD come from LatinAmerica and Asia. But a start has</sup> also been made in Africa, in countries<sup>such asZambia and Guinea.</sup>

# _5.1_ **_Participatory budgeting and_**<sup>**_planning_**</sup><sup>_in_</sup><sup>**_Porto Alegre,Brazil_**</sup>

Once empowerment begins, it<sup>can takeoff in new directionsspontaneously.The empowermentof</sup> municipalities in Brazil enabled<sup>the city of Porto Alegreto experimentwithparticipatorybudgetplanning.</sup> This process empowers citizens'<sup>associationsin the city's16 regionsto proposeprojectsin 5sectors each.</sup> These are publicly debated and short-listed<sup>in two rounds, withfinal allocations decidedby a weighting</sup> system combining citizens' preferences<sup>with objectivecriteria. The result:</sup>

- Between 1989 and 1996, access to<sup>water rose from80% to 98%of households.</sup>

- The number of enrolled schoolchildren<sup>doubled.</sup>

- Revenue increased 50% because of<sup>the willingness of citizens to payfor improved</sup> services.

- Equity improved in decision-making.<sup>Equal weightwas given toall city regions, and the</sup> poorest one with 5,000 people<sup>hadthe samevoting power as thewealthiestone with</sup> 300,000 people. Forty percent of<sup>participantsinpublic debateshad lessthan three times</sup> the median wage.

- The ruling Workers Party won<sup>severalconsecutivemunicipalelections,in contrastwith</sup> other leftist municipalities. Its<sup>shareof thepopularvote has increased from 34%to 56%.</sup>

Decentralization laws in Brazil<sup>did not mandate suchparticipatory budgeting.But once Porto Alegre</sup> became famous for its innovation,<sup>other municipalities began toadopt thesame strategyunder public</sup> pressure. As of June 20000, nearly<sup>100 municipalitiesinfive stateswere implementingsome form of</sup> participatory budgeting. This<sup>showshowempowerment can spur participatoryinnovations,andhow</sup> competition between local governments<sup>canhelp scale upimprovedgovernanceand voice.</sup> 23
# _5.2 Mexico: empowerment of munk4palities and commwweks_

> As part of its Integrated Rural Development Programs initiated in the early 1970s the World Bank funded

> three stages of the PIDER program in Mexico over nearly two decades, with mixed results. A Regional Development and Decentralization project approved in 1991 was prepared in a much more participatory

> way, and shifted the emphasis from community and local consultations (which had pioneered and scaled up PA&P processes) toward true decentralization and empowerment. A major component of this program was a _Municipal Development Funds_ Program, which then further transferred the funding to the communities,

> fulfilling the _money- in- the-hands-of-the-community condition._ Indeed, it was under this program that _community-based procurement and disbursement methods_ were first developed in the World Bank. In

> addition, the Municipal Development Funds for the first time provided untied development grants to municipalities. In effect, 1100 municipalities could operate like municipal social funds, mobilizing latent management capacities. The process multiplied by a factor of 50 the capacity for identification, appraisal

> and supervision, which was earlier restricted to 27 state development committees.

The municipal funds program benefited from several favorable preconditions:

- Municipalities with elected councils and latent management capabilities already existed.

- Earlier national and World Bank-supported projects had already produced a range of technically sound local investments: operational manuals for several specific issues in a large-scale program; and a cadre of specialists familiar with community development and community capabilities, and therefore with a more or less _common vision and cuture;_

- The program relied completely on existing municipal structures for management, rather than involving intermediary NGOs. The latter function only as facilitators and technical specialists at the request of the communities

The critical new innovations introduced by 1993 _werefungible grants to municipalities;_ transparent methods of project selection in the _mmncipal development council,_ transfer of _money- into- the-hands-ofcommunities,_ and _communigy-based procurement and disbursement methods._ The Municipal Funds programs was only one of 16 components in the 1991 reform, the remaining 15 being sectoral ones. A further reform in 1995 integrated all 16 components, along with a _mandatory formula for allocations._ This made municipal funds _an entitlement, not a discretionary transfer._ It also mandated transparency: all municipalities had to make public announcements on all subprojects to be financed, improving accountability. In 1997, a major political development occurred. Congress enacted a new law transferring _allfunds to municipalities directly from the federal budget,_ without going through state governments. This was a major scaling up of empowerment. By 2002, money in hands of communities had increased rapidly to around $ 4 billion a year.

> However, some municipalities appear now have too much money, some state governments too little. This

> goes _against the principle of subsidiarity._ Cash-rich municipalities have sometimes abandoned community contributions and cut local taxes, reducing ownership and increasing fiscal costs. Municipalities have the

> money for primary health centers and link roads, but these need to backed by sufficient funds with state

> governments for improving hospitals and trunk roads. Solid waste disposal and river pollution are rising

> problems that need to be tackled at the state level.

# _5.3 Norh-East Brazil Rural Development Program_

In Brazil, the PAC (Programa de Apoio Communitario) was piloted in the late 1980s. Rural communities submitted subproject proposals to technical units at the state level, which screened and approved them.

24
funds were disbursed directly<sup>fromthestatelevelto the bank accountsof individual communities,fulfilling</sup> the _money-in-the-hands-of-the-community_<sup>condition.In1993 PAC had conclusively provedthe</sup> effectiveness of community<sup>participation,and sowas ripefor scaling upwhen theentire NorthEast Rural</sup> Development Program financed<sup>by the World Bank was restructuredto this approach.At the sametime a</sup> new, more decentralized approach<sup>wasintroducedon a pilot scale:Under the FUMACmodel(Fundo</sup> Municipal de Apoio Communitario),<sup>a</sup><sup>_Municipal Development Council_(whichincluded community and</sup> civil society groups, as well<sup>asmembers of the municipal government) chose abundle of subprojects,and</sup> submitted it to the state technical<sup>units approval their proposalsand funding.This approvalwas mainly for</sup> validation: the state levels did<sup>not giveproject-by-projectapproval,but checked the conformityof</sup> proposals with eligibility criteria,<sup>procedures,and otherdesign parameters.FUMAC progressivelyreplaced</sup> PAC, and over then next few<sup>yearsenabled the latent capacities of nearly1,000 municipaldevelopment</sup> councils to be mobilized<sup>to undertakefunctionsearlier monopolized by10 state technicalunits andtheir</sup> deconcentrated offices. This<sup>_multiplied decision-making capacities a hundred-fold,_and made possiblethe</sup> massive subsequent expansion<sup>of the program.Toavoidpossible irregularitiesat the locallevel, funds were</sup> disbursed directly to the communities,<sup>rather than the municipaldevelopmentcouncils, ensuring that the</sup> money continued to be in<sup>the handsof the community.The municipaldevelopmentcouncildid not control</sup> or disburse money, and instead<sup>coordinatedall the otherprocesses and supervised project execution.</sup> Municipalities were given some<sup>guidanceas tohow manyprojectsthey couldreasonablyexpect to</sup> approve, moving the program<sup>closer towards a singlefungible developmentbudget.</sup> In addition the redesign of<sup>the NortheastRural Development Program eliminated the FederalGovernment,</sup> the Northeast Regional<sup>Development Authority, andNGOs as financialor technical intermediaries,</sup> _massively reducing overhead_<sup>_costs_and instead introduced a facilityfor</sup><sup>_communities to finance technical_</sup> _assistance out of their community_<sup>_grants,_enabling them to use up toeight percent of their community</sup> grant for technical assistance<sup>from a providerof their choice.</sup> FUMAC has now given way<sup>to FUMAC-P,whichbrings the program evencloser to the optimum</sup> conditions for social choice,<sup>providingmore responsibilityto thelocal development council. FUMAC-P</sup> transfers an untied development<sup>budget directlyto the municipaldevelopmentcouncils. Moneyis now</sup> managed at the level of the<sup>municipality,but continuesto be disbursedfrom thereinto community projects.</sup> This has further improved<sup>localownershipand participation, further reduced costs per beneficiary and</sup> encouraged larger co-finance<sup>from themunicipallevel.</sup> Earlier anti-poverty programs<sup>in Northeast Brazilfailed. But the community-basedapproach has</sup> successfully delivered over<sup>44,000 community-managedsubprojectsto 2.5million of the poorestfamilies</sup> in 30,000 communities. An<sup>assessment of FUMAC by Van Zylandothers34 showed that:</sup>

- Benefit cost ratios were high, 3.0<sup>or more.</sup>

- About 95 percent of the funds<sup>reached targetedbeneficiaries, mostlythe</sup> landless, an extraordinary<sup>pass-throughrate.</sup>

- The cost of subprojects executed<sup>by communitieswas 20-30percent lessthan</sup> similar ones executed by<sup>the earlier, more centralizedsystem.</sup>

- The program financed a lot of<sup>investment in ruralwater supplyand</sup> electrification, but also included<sup>a wide rangeof other socialand productive</sup> projects. Producer groups assisted<sup>undertheprogram arenow federatingand</sup> linking to export markets,<sup>andthis is seenas criticalto sustainprojectimpact.</sup>

34 Van Zyl, Johan, et al, 1995,<sup>DecentralizedRuralDevelopment and Enhanced Community Participation:a Case</sup> Study From Northeast Brazil,<sup>PolicyResearch working Paper1498,The WorldBank,Washington, D.C.</sup> Van Zyl, Johann; Sonn, Loretta;<sup>and Costa,Alberto."DecentralizedRural Development,Enhanced Community</sup> Participation, and Local Govemment<sup>Performance: Evidencefrom NortheastBrazil".Draft Paper.July2000.</sup> _25_
The program benefited from the decentralization process initiated by the new Constitution of 1987 following the demise of the previous military regime. It is a good example of CDD starting with public goods and then moving on to facilitate private production. It is also a good example of getting to the final stage of CDD consolidation.

## _5.4. Kecamatan development Project, Indonesia_

Three projects in Indonesia---Village Infrastructure project 1, Village Infrastructure project 2, and Kecamatan Development program 1---have scaled up a community-based approach very rapidly. The three represent a progression in community empowerment, with each subsequent stage building on the earlier one. This demonstrated that a large-scale project can be created rapidly to address the felt needs of villages, and that villages can be the "subjects of development rather than the objects of development." VIP-I was designed as a simple, short-term program, and its success laid the foundation for the subsequent programs. _In effect, afield-tested model was scaled up, with inbuiltflexibiity foor each locality._<sup>_35_</sup> KDP-1. launched in 1998, covered 10 million people in 20,000 villages within three years. KDP-2 is now under way to benefit an additional 20-30 million people, and aims to cover an additional 200-300 kecamatans (sub-districts) per year. Funds from Jakarta flow directly to village accounts, fulfilling the condition _of money-in-the-hands-of-the-community._ A specific aim of this mechanism is to bypass intermediate layers of government, _reducingfiscal costs._ Participating villages can choose from a wide range of options, giving communities the confidence to plan and organize. The program includes a credit component for the poor, and this has proved very successful in villages that already have decent infrastructure. **_36_**

## _S.S. Scaling up in Zambia_

Zambia has a head start over other African countries in CDD. Zambia Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF) began as a traditional social fund, with some elements of community participation. It worked well, so the next stage was ZAMSIF II (1996-2000), aimed to involve local governments in all stages of the project cycle, and transfer full authority for CDD to elected local governments by 2000. This was a partial success: district councils were progressively able to take up additional tasks. However, when this project came to a close, legislation for elected district councils had not been enacted, and many gaps in technical and managerial capacity were evident in district councils.

Now ZAMSIF III aims over 10 years (2000-2010) to create sufficient capacity in all 57 District Councils to enable them to take over the full envelope of responsibilities in the project cycle. ZAMSEF will then exit, having managed itself out of a job. Since capacities differ from district to district, ZAMSIF has a _district graduation scheme_ giving additional resources and powers to districts that meet performance benchmarks. This is a major innovation, the first of its kind in Africa. The scheme has penalties as well as incentives. No District Council is penalized for a wrong choice of projects-that is part of the learning-by-doing process. But a Council can be penalized for misusing funds or failing to follow the correct procedures. This _aligns incentives of co-producers with roles,_ and has worked well so far.

# _5.6 Scaling up in Guinea_

The World Bank has helped develop the vision for decentralization in Guinea. Under the programfungible _grants_ are provided to the municipalities, here called "communes rurales". The World Bank helped pilot

> 35 Edstrom, Judith. "Indonesia's Kacamatan Development Project. Is It Replicable? Design Considerations in Community Driven Development" in Social Development Papers, No. 39, World Bank, Washmngton D.C., Mar. 2002. `6 Ibid.

26
different management approaches at the local government level, developed procedures, approaches and manuals. This has now been scaled up in a major project (PACV), which has yielded several gains. 37

- The cost of building local infrastructure has fallen 30-40 %.

- Community collection of head tax has improved from 70% to almost 100%, and is now collected mainly in the first quarter of the year .This facilitates the release of matching grants, and is an example of _good alignment of incentives of co-producers_ **_with_** _roles._

- Local capacity has improved _through learning-by-doing: communities can now plan, procure and implement projects themselves._ Accountability has improved: two of the 26 mayors were removed by popular acclaim.

- Gender representation has improved. Women, who earlier had no voice, now participate in village councils and sometimes carry the day.

# 6. CONDMONS CONDUCIVE **TO SCANG UP**

The discussion of the difficulties of scaling up in the introduction led us to identify the five classes of remedies we already mentioned in Section 1. The case studies throw further light on these. Before discussing those, we need to emphasize how important an enabling climate for scaling up is. Conducive conditions include (1) strong political commitment from the top; and (2) well-designed decentralization.

## _6.1._ **_Political_** _commitment_

Strong political commitment alone can ensure that power actually shifts from the top to the bottom. In many countries the impetus for change has come from the very top, but in other cases it has come from state governors or chief ministers.

- In Brazil, the necessary political commitment came from state governors.

- In the province of Poni, Burkina Faso, it came from the provincial governor.

- In Mexico, it came initially from the federal government, and once the municipal funds program successful, also from the state governors.

- In Malawi, the political commitment came from the Minister of Agiiculture and his management team.

- In Indonesia, it came from the President.

- In India, the Constitution was amended in 1993 to make local governments mandatory. Yet in practice these were empowered only when state government were committed to the concept, as in Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Karnataka. Conditions were ripe for scaling up in some states but not others.

However, political commitment does not get created in a vacuum: it needs an enabling climate. Every country needs a lively and empowered civil society, accountability to citizens through elections, free media, strong NGOs. Major institutional change is required in some countries to create and nourish such institutions. Demands from an empowered citizenry for accountability and good governance can spur decentralization to the grassroots.

37 Narayan, Deepa (Ed.). Emoowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 2002.

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# _6.2 Wel-designed dece a n_

The historical experience of decentralization is mixed. Sometimes rulers have aimed to empower the grassroots, at other times to divert international attention from lack of democracy at the central level. Too often local governments have been created without administrative authority or fiscal resources. Decentralization has three key dimensions--- political, administrative and fiscal-and all three need to be harmonized to work well. Reporting on decentralization experiments in the 1980s, Crook and Manor found that the outcomes were poor in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Bangladesh, but satisfactory in the state of Kamataka, India. In the first three cases the local councilors were not elected, were accountable to central governments rather than the people they served, and lacked enough fiscal means to make a real difference. Decentralization worked in Kamataka because the Chief Minister was serious and provided ample fiscal resources.

Key stakeholder participation and some sector programs can be scaled up without waiting for all three dimensions of decentralization, but full national coverage will, at some point, require all elements to be in place.

Even where conducive conditions like political commitment and decentralization exist, scaling up boutiques can be difficult because of the various problems listed in section 1. So we now consider the five classes of remedies: (a) reducing economic/fiscal costs; (b) overcoming adverse institutional barriers; (c) overcoming problems associated with co-production; (d) using pilots, feedback and adaptation to improve technical design; and (e) designing and field-testing the operational manuals, toolkits and scaling-up logistics.

## 7. REDUCONG ECOM)blh AND RBCAL CO=

Successful pilots can sometimes not be scaled up for three financial reasons: excessive economic cost, poor transfer efficiency, and excessive fiscal cost. Economic cost per beneficiary may be too high because a program depends on expensive staff (sometimes expatriates), costly transport (maybe fleets of jeeps), expensive materials (sometimes imported) and costly designs/technology (often created for a different context). Funds may travel through several bureaucratic levels before reaching a community, clearances for projects may be required at several levels, excessive paperwork may constantly be required in the donor's language. High overheads reduce the transfer efficiency of funds: too little of the project money actually gets through to communities in the form of goods and services. In one project in Togo, overheads amounted to almost 90 per cent of the budget<sup>3 8</sup> . In Northeast Brazil, they have come down to around 7 per cent after local empowerment.

Ways to cut economic costs and improve transfer efficiency include the following.

1. Devolve authority based on subsidiarity. Putting the appropriate level in charge will lower costs. 2. Empower communities and/or local governments to choose, implement and monitor projects induces innovations using low-cost designs appropriate for local conditions. The use of local materials and contractors cuts costs further. Community and/or local government oversight is less expensive than oversight by government agencies. Our case studies show that CDD can cut project costs by 20-40 per cent.

3. 0 and M is typically cheaper, more efficient and more sustainable if done by communities on the principle of subsidiarity.

4. Training/facilitation by outsiders, and especially foreigners is expensive when tens of thousands of communities are targeted. The aim must be to train local community specialists chosen by the communities themselves to acquire skills. Communities and their trained community specialists in successful pilots can become trainers of other communities: successful farmers can spread good practices through farmer-to-farmer contacts. Harnessing and developing local skills can both cut costs and accelerate scaling up.

- 3 Personal conversation with TTL, 2002.

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5. Good logistics design can reduce costs. Local people do not have to travel long distances<sup>in jeeps.</sup> Community meetings, training sessions and the like should be arranged<sup>at locationsmost</sup> convenient in terms of local transport availability. Good logistics cut costs of information<sup>sharing</sup> and cash management, and simultaneously improve accountability<sup>and transparency.</sup> Even if the cost per beneficiary is reasonable, the fiscal cost may<sup>be too highfornationalscaling up.</sup> Central governments and donors may lack funds. CDD can bring down<sup>fiscalcosts in severalways.</sup>

1. Communities can be asked to contribute 15-40 per cent of subproject costs in cash or kind, depending on the nature of the project.

2. Communities/local governments can be authorized to levy user charges or<sup>local taxes.This</sup> typically increases the fiscal base.

3. Local empowerment improves tax compliance. Citizens are more willing to pay<sup>taxes/chargesif</sup> these are used for local facilities than if they go to national/provincial capitals (see<sup>case study on</sup> Guinea).

## 8. OVERCOMING ADVERSE INSTITTUnONAL BARRIERS

The political and social institutions in many countries are not conducive to shifting power to<sup>the grassroots.</sup> Top-down paternalism for decades has created structures that resist<sup>downwardempowerment. Some</sup> regimes fear that decentralization may create political complications. Social conditions<sup>in some countries</sup> are so adverse that they have escalated into violent conflict and civil war.

Even where decentralization has taken place, it has yielded mixed results<sup>(seesection 6). The resultshave</sup> been poor where local governments were accountable to central authorities rather<sup>than citizens;where</sup> public sector reforms did not take place to realign the functions and<sup>powersof the centralbureaucracy;</sup> where local communities were not empowered to discipline local officials; where local<sup>governmentswere</sup> not granted a reliable, adequate share of central revenue, or the<sup>authorityto levy and keep taxes.</sup> In Tanzania, local governments are supposed to collect a head tax and transfer<sup>80 per cent of that todistrict</sup> headquarters, from which it rarely returns. A much happier experience comes from<sup>Guinea (section 5),</sup> where the collection of head tax has improved and become more timely because it is<sup>available for localuse.</sup> Remedies will have to be tailored to the local context in each case.<sup>We considerbelow some possibilities.</sup>

# _81 Overcoming unfavorable politial conditions_

Where the political conditions are unfavorable and commitment to empowerment<sup>is lacking, the following</sup> strategies can be considered.

- a. Establish pilot programs as special enclaves that provide examples of<sup>success.</sup> Meanwhile canvass support for CDD as an ideal. Enter into a dialog with the government, opposition parties, think tanks and civil society.

- b. Where governments do not favor local governments, make a start with<sup>participatory</sup> appraisal and planning by communities, to which there is typically less resistance

- c. Where there is resistance to free media, make a start with community radio<sup>in pilot</sup> projects to disseminate project information. This can be designed to be interactive, and so provide voice to local people.

29
- d. Where possible, encourage internet kiosks to provide market and other information, tele-advice and training, and e-govemance. 39

- e. Help create and strengthen user groups and producer groups.

- f. Liberalize economic policy, and increase the space for entrepreneurs. This will help diffuse centralized power, and create more economic freedom and empowerment for buyers, sellers and intermediaries.

# _8.2 Overcoming Unfavorable Social CondMions_

Many countries have deep gender and social divisions. Empowerment requires the bridging of social divides and participation by all. A thorough analysis of social/political conditions needs to guide the program design. Ways of overcoming elite capture/social exclusion should be worked into the design. The participatory process itself is a means of accomplishing this, and details are given in the World Bank's participation website at www worldbank/ora/participation Remedies in every country will have to be tailored to local conditions. Some possible strategies:

- a. Using the participatory approach, attempt to create sustainable partnerships between all stakeholders, including majority and minority groups, NGOs and different levels of government

- b. In the initial stage, avoid the most faction-ridden villages, and focus on the relatively harmonious ones, as was done by the Indo-German Watershed Development Program.

- c. Where women/minorities have traditionally not been allowed to participate in village councils, institutionalize separate meetings of these groups prior to council meetings. This will help them to articulate their needs, and gain organizational strength. They will then better be able to overcome traditional social inhibitions and gradually be accepted as full partners.

- d. Improve awareness of non-traditional roles women can perform.

- e. Empower producer groups of women/minorities. That typically attracts less social resistance than some other forms of empowerment. Women's micro-credit societies have gained rapid social acceptance in many male-dominated societies. SEWA, India, is an outstanding example.

- f. Many different ethnic/social groups may be producers of the same commodity. Creating and empowering producer groups can create a social glue between different religious/ethnic/caste groups.

- g. Where the participatory approach fails to bridge social divides, consider special programs targeted at those most excluded.

Some countries like India have reserved a certain proportion of seats in local governments for women and historically-disadvantaged minorities. This will overcome traditional taboos only if the reserved proportion 39 Wireless technology and storage battenes enable the intemet to reach even non-electnc villages. The internet needs where possible to be part of the IEC component of projects, yet will serve a broader agenda than mere dissenunation Donors should consider paying for software that translates the internet into local Afncan languages.

30
is substantial, a quarter to one-third of seats. But even then social pressures<sup>may tryto sabotage these</sup> reservations.40

# _8.3_ **_Helping governments_** _design_ **_decentralizaton better_**

Even where political and social conditions are not favorable, poorly designed<sup>decentralizationmay leave</sup> major institutional barriers in place Some strategies to overcome this:

- I. Provide technical assistance from an early stage on decentralization.<sup>Some central</sup> authorities are unconvinced that local governments and communities<sup>have the capacity</sup> and accountability to use untied funds well. The cases studies quoted<sup>in this paper show</sup> otherwise.

2. Emphasize that the political, administrative and fiscal components of<sup>decentralization</sup> must move together in harmony.

3. Emphasize subsidiarity. Functions should be devolved<sup>to the lowestlevelwhere they can</sup> be performed efficiently, and fiscal powers and administrative resources<sup>should then be</sup> realigned with the new functions. Local taxes/user charges should<sup>be used locally.</sup> 4. Emphasize learning by doing by local governments/communities<sup>to acquireskills. This</sup> needs to be supported by training/capacity building.

_5._ Ideally, countries should mandate a fixed share of central<sup>resources to go to local</sup> governments (as in Mexico). This will ensure regular, reliable funding.

# **9. OVERCOMING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH**<sup>**CO-PRODUCTION**</sup>

Empowerment should not pit communities and local governments<sup>against centralgovernmentsor line</sup> Ministries. Development needs to be seen as the co-production<sup>of outputsin a joint venture of central</sup> governments, local governments and communities, with support from the<sup>privatesector and civilsociety.</sup> This requires major institutional reform and a new mind-set.<sup>Overcoming co-productionproblemsrequires</sup> (a) fostering a common culture and vision among stakeholders; (b) assigning<sup>and describingprogram</sup> functions unambiguously to different participants; and (c) providing<sup>incentives compatible with program</sup> objectives.

# **_9.1_** _Fostering_ **_a_** _common_ **_culture_**

CDD aims to change entrenched attitudes and mind-sets of co-producers.<sup>Thisis alwaysa difficulttask.</sup> Achieving it requires painstaking dialog, communication, and negotiation<sup>to reach agreementand</sup> commitment by all co-producers on a new participatory approach<sup>thatprovides voice/spacefor all</sup> stakeholders, and a common appreciation of the changed roles and<sup>powersof each stakeholdergroup.</sup> Some key steps to foster a common set of values include the following.

Engage in a dialog with civil servants, trade unions, and any other stakeholders<sup>whomight jeopardize</sup> success to explain the reforms, assuage fears, and overcome<sup>resistance. Explainthat CDD means not the</sup> 40 Often women will really be represented by their husbands or fathers.<sup>Powerful elites willtry to ensure thatminonties</sup> cannot effectively wield power. In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, elections<sup>havenot takenplace for some village</sup> panchayats (councils) where top posts have been reserved for scheduled castes:<sup>no member of the scheduled castes</sup> dares file a nomnation for fear of violence from upper castes. In the village<sup>of Melavalavu,the scheduled-caste</sup> panchayat president, vice-president and five others were killed for standing for<sup>and winning thelocalelection.(The</sup> Hindu, Oct.3 1 2002). Despite such horrendous problems, reservations have<sup>improvedupwardsocial mobility.</sup> 31
withering away of the center, but a joint venture or partnership among different levels of government and civil society groups. Facilitate the reaching of common ground where there is a convergence of<sup>interestsfor</sup> the benefit of all.

Based on social/institutional analysis, bring stakeholders together to examine how best they can make use of the resources and authority they will get from CDD. Explain how importance social inclusion is, how traditional attitudes to women and minorities need to give way to a new approach. Use the entire participatory process to try and create shared values. Well-designed CDD will enable traditionally voiceless groups to gain voice, and assist the emergences of a new set of shared values. Communities that function regularly in the new participative manner will find traditional discriminatory attitudes changing.

_9.2 Making sue every stakeholder undersan his/her new fnctions ad how to do them_ The major changes in institutions and mind-set required by CDD require clear-cut agreement on what precisely each stakeholder will do. These commitments should be formalized in the initiative's participation action plan (for details see Annex 3). The participation action plan should be reviewed and upgraded periodically by key stakeholders. It should equip them with the relevant training and tools (see Annex table 1).

1. Host participatory events to reach agreement/commitment from key stakeholders on the new allocation of functions for each level and stakeholder group. Participants should determine which stakeholder groups will undertake the preparation of relevant manuals (see annex 1). _reae an overal operational manual._ This needs to include manuals for all sub-functions and levels.

2. Insist on simplicity in procedures and rules, reduction of steps and intermediaries, and reduction of overlapping functions.

3. Disseminate the new roles and tasks through a well-designed communication strategy. This should involve the media as well as face-to-face training, as in the Gaoua case.

4. Facilitate learning by doing. Also facilitate interchange of experience of practitioners at each level, and between levels.

# _9.3 Droviding incentives compatible wihprogram objectives_

This is required in any program, but more so in a program that aims to change mind-sets and institutions. Field-tested roll-out logistics can help unearth incentive issues, and help design an incentive-compatible operational manual. Some examples:

1. Managers and project staff should initially have incentives related to CDD outcomes rather than disbursement. In the initiation stage, the participatory process needs to focus on creating the right processes rather than disbursing quickly, and managerial incentives should be tailored accordingly. Once the processes are well established, disbursement will pick up, and their expansion should then become an objective and be monitored. 42

> 41 It is advisable to identify these stakeholder groups as early as possible by conducting thorough stakeholder and institutional analyses, focusing on how important they are for the success of the initiative and what degree of influence they can exert over **it.** In most cases primary stakeholders and other disempowered groups, such as local level bodies, are very important yet yield the least influence. Special care might then be necessary to ensure their real participation and emnpowerment.

> 42 WordBank. Sourcebook for Communitv-Driven Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington<sup>D.C., June2002.</sup>

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2. Ownership is improved by requiring<sup>communities to makecontributions,by</sup> involving them in the participatory<sup>processand PME. Matching grants provide</sup> incentives to local governments<sup>and communities to get resources basedonwhat</sup> they themselves raise. A graduation<sup>program asin ZAMSIF,givinglocal</sup> governments additional resources<sup>and powersif they cross certain benchmarks,</sup> is a good incentive that stimulates<sup>competitionbetweenlocalgovernments.</sup> 3. Frontline staff (for primary education,<sup>primaryhealth, agricultural extension)</sup> need to be made accountable<sup>to communitiesfor performance.That provides</sup> better incentives than accountability<sup>to state/nationalcapitals. 43</sup> 4. Local taxes and user charges need<sup>to be retainedby communities/local</sup> governments and not passed<sup>on to nationalcapitals.This provides a higher</sup> incentive for timely tax collection.<sup>User chargesearmarkedfor 0and M provide</sup> the right incentive.<sup>44</sup>

# **10.** ADAPnNG TO THE LOCAL<sup>CONTEXT</sup>

The very fact that successful<sup>pilots have not automaticallyscaledup showsthat, whatever their</sup> merits, they may require adaptation<sup>to succeed in different contexts.What appearsto be best</sup> practice in one setting may be<sup>poor practice in another.Whileit is usefulto draw lessons from</sup> successful experiments within<sup>a country and from globalexperience,project design must be</sup> adapted to the local context.<sup>The Indo-German WatershedProject (section4) designedan</sup> approach that succeeded in many<sup>villageswhere social conditionswere conduciveto social</sup> inclusion, but deliberately steered<sup>clear of other villageswith deep social divisions.Those problem</sup> villages will require a different<sup>approach.</sup> The Swajal rural water supply<sup>project in Uttar Pradesh,India, (section 4) experiencedmuch</sup> greater success in the Himalayan<sup>pilots than those in the flat Bundelkhand area. Perennialstreams</sup> provided cheap, assured water<sup>in the former area, whereasthe latter required expensive deep</sup> tubewells that quintupled water<sup>supplycosts.Castedivisions posed muchgreater social obstacles</sup> in the Bundelkhand area than<sup>the Himalayan area.This illustrates how geographyand sociology</sup> can yield very different results<sup>within thesame state.</sup> Swajal was not linked directly<sup>tolocal governments,which were weakly developedin Uttar</sup> Pradesh. But the next major<sup>Bank-supportedprojectin thissectorwas launched in thestate of</sup> Kerila, where the panchayat<sup>system is strong and supportedbyfirm political commitment.</sup> Adapting to the new context, the<sup>Keralaproject routedfunds andtechnicalassistanceto</sup> communities through local<sup>governments.</sup>

# 11. RELD TESTING MANUALS,<sup>TOOLKITS AND SCALING-UP LOGISTICS</sup>

The examples in the previous<sup>section demonstratethat pilots should be usedin a widevariety of settings to</sup> field-test what works best in<sup>what situations.Suchfield-testingmakes it possibleto develop</sup><sup>_operational_</sup> _manuals and toolkits, and instruments_<sup>_tailored to the local context._That then sets the stage for scaling up.</sup> Process monitoring and PME<sup>are vital toprovide feedbackthat enablesprogram designedto be improved</sup> continuously. In the Kerala<sup>RuralWater Supply and Sanitationproject,the overalldesign provides for a</sup> roll-out in different communities<sup>in overlappingphases.Lessonslearnedfrom the early phases arebeing</sup> incorporated in subsequent<sup>ones. Evaluationis required throughout a project, not just at its end. The</sup> manuals in Kerala are field-tested,<sup>but arealso living documentsthat are constantlymodified in the light of</sup> experience. ASA in Bangladesh<sup>(see section5) has used a similar approachvery successfully.</sup>

**43** World Bank. Community Driven<sup>Development:a Vision of PovertyReduction through Empowerment. Washington,</sup> D.C., Dec. 2000.

"Ibid.

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Any scaling up exercise will have to tackle the huge logistical problem of training thousands of people, and managing thousands of community/local government accounts. Every program needs a logistics m agement system. This should be summed up in a scaling-up manual. This is different from the technical manuals, which are the responsibility of the relevant technical Ministries or organizations. The logistics management system needs to be based on logistics fleld-testng.

> As in the Poni AIDS program, a pilot program should field-test a draft scaling-up manual in an entire district or province. The many problems that arise should be sorted out at the pilot stage, used to modify the draft manual, and convert it to a finished, field-tested manual.

The scaling-up manual needs to incorporate several components.

1. The logistical system to train all communities, associations and other coproducers.

2. The logistical systems for disbursements, financial accountability, and auditing system.

3. The logistical systems for contracting, procurement and distribution of goods and services for the program.

4. The training manuals, forms and other tools required for scaling up _5._ The log framework and timetable for the scaling up effort 6. The templates for all the project preparation and monitoring documents, including those related to PME, and performance based contracts to be used in the scaling up effort 7. The processes for the recruitment and training of the training teams

# II dUENNG

Ideal conditions may not exist for scaling up in all countries. Some typical problems:

1. The top leadership is sometimes not interested in decentralization, or even in enhanced participation.

2. Decentralized structure should ideally be created on the principle of subsidiarity. This is often not the case.

3. Local leaders who manage funds need to be accountable to their own people. This is not always the case.

4. CDD works best where the investment climate allows local entrepreneurs to take up contracts. This is often not the case.

_5._ Technical capacity may be inadequate in many areas.

6. Major public sector reforms may be needed for scaling up. In many countries this process has not begun. Where it has, it may be a long and complex process.

7. Many countries suffer from deep social and gender divides, leading to elite capture and social exclusion. In some countries ethnic strife has escalated into civil war.

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8. Gender discrimination may be<sup>widespreadandentrenched.</sup> In Section II we used an analytic<sup>frameworkto divideCDD into three stages:initiation,scaling up and</sup> consolidation. Each country<sup>needs to take stockof its current institutions andstage of development to view</sup> its current position through<sup>this three-stage framework,anddecide howbestto proceed.There can be no</sup> single blueprint: every country<sup>willneeda separate action plan tailoredto itscircumstances.</sup> Allowing lots of time upfront<sup>for carefulpreparationis a goodpractice;pressure for rapid disbursementis</sup> not. Sequencing should allow<sup>for participatory processesto be established and runningbefore scaling up.</sup> Once the processes are in position,<sup>conditionswill havebeen createdfor more rapid disbursement.</sup> Process monitoring is all-important.<sup>Feedbackis requiredfrom the fieldto know what isworkingandwhat</sup> is not, and improve program design<sup>accordingly.</sup> A sufficient time horizon is essential<sup>for programsto be scaledup successfully.Manyimportantprocesses</sup> will take time, including the<sup>initialsocial and stakeholder analysis,getting the participatory process right,</sup> strengthening the framework<sup>for decentralization,fostering political commitment, implementingand</sup> evaluating pilots in different<sup>socialand geographicalconditions,etc.In countrieswhere there is little</sup> experience with decentralization<sup>and community development</sup><sup>_a phased program spread over perhaps 10-_</sup> _15 years may be the best course._<sup>This can be financed byan Adjustable Program Loan (APL).In Niger,for</sup> example, the World Bank has<sup>embarkedonan APL spreadover15yearsin four phases.Triggers have been</sup> devised for moving from one<sup>phase to thenext.If triggerconditionsarenot fulfilled, theprogramwill not</sup> be able to move to the next stage.<sup>The key featureof this modelis that phasing over a long period gives</sup> time to develop the preconditions<sup>for full nationalscalingup.</sup><sup>**45**</sup>

# **13. PROGRAM DESIGN AND**<sup>**PROGRAM**DIAGNOSIlCS</sup>

Program design and diagnostics<sup>tools are neededat program preparation, but maywell extendintoprogram</sup> implementation, implementation<sup>support,and the restructuringof poorly performing programs.This will</sup> contribute to the continuing upgrading<sup>and consolidation of CDD programs.</sup> Design teams can use Annex 1<sup>**functionsby levels**to guidetheir preparationactivitiesandpre-testingin</sup> the field. For each level there<sup>aregenerally12 functions, but someprogrammay not requireall12</sup> functions at each level. The table<sup>can be used to systematicallyaskthe following five questions:</sup>

1. Have all functions been properly<sup>agreed-uponby keystakeholdergroups at</sup> the different levels, and has<sup>theirexact natureand collaborative</sup> arrangements been clarified<sup>in theinitiative'sparticipationaction plan?</sup>

2. Do field-tested operational manuals<sup>existfor allfunctionsand levels?</sup> 3. Have all administrative impediments<sup>that might thwart the proposed</sup> reorganization of functions<sup>been removed?</sup> 4. Have forms and other information<sup>managementtools,includingPME</sup> mechanisms, been devised to<sup>enable functions to be executedandfeedback</sup> gathered at each level?

5. Do relevant training materials exist?

Annex 2 brings together the<sup>different design elementswhichhave been found essential or helpfulduring</sup> our theoretical discussion and<sup>in the cases presented.It isdividedinto design elements at the community</sup>

> **45** The World Bank. Project Appraisal<sup>Document on a ProposedGrantto the Republicof Niger forthe Community</sup> Action Program. Jan 21, 2003.

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> level, scaling up tools, design elements for decentralization, and sector-specific/technical design elements. Project design teams can use these lists to enrich the set of options they build into their program design.

Diagnosis and design, for either scaling up or recasting failed programs, will include the following steps.

1. Having conducted the initial stakeholder and institutional analyses, host a participatory event (e.g. focus discussion group or workshop) with the potential or actual key stakeholders to determine which functions will have to be performed at which of the four levels, and remove the rows not needed from the table

2. Participants at this event should answer the five questions for each of the functions identified at each level.

3. Whether in the course of this participatory event or at a later time, whenever you find an administrative impediment contact the relevant stakeholders and in collaboration with them prepare an action plan on how to remove it.

4. For those functions and levels without an existing field-tested operational manual, forms, tools, or training materials, see whether any other organization in the country has such materials, and choose the best one available.

- S. Hold a participatory workshop in which the additional manual is discussed with potential or actual key stakeholders, and make improvement based on these discussions.

6. Where no operational manual is being used by any organization within a country, do an international search to find a suitable field-tested manual, and continue as above. When in doubt about the suitability of foreign manuals, go to the field and work in collaboration with key stakeholders to develop a first draft.

7. Field-test the draft operational manual, and make improvements.

8. Incorporate the operational manual for each specific task and level into the manual for the entire program.

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## **ANNES**

# **Annex 1: Operational Functions and**<sup>**Manuals by Level**</sup>

|**LEVELS**<br> <br>**FUNCTIONS**<br>|**Community**<br>**[mlcro]**|**Local**<br>**[meso]**|**District**<br>**[meso]**|**National**<br>**[macro]**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|.<br>111<br>**JIVENATIONAL**<br>**FUNCTION_S_**<br>|||||
|AidMobilization/Coordigna<br>|_|____AMC|||
|Decentralizationpolicy/management<br>||||DPM<br>|
|Intergovernmental Fiscal System<br>||||IFS<br>|
|SectorProgramdesign/management.||||SPD|
|MANAGEMENTAND<br>COORDINATION<br> <br>|||||
|GovernanceAndDecisionMaking<br> <br>|CDM<br>|LDM<br>|DDM<br>|NDM<br>|
|Diagnostics,Priority Setting<br> <br>|CDP<br>|LDP<br>|DDP<br>|NDP<br>|
|ManagementTraining<br> <br>|CMT<br>|LMT<br>|DMTvf<br>|NMT<br>|
|MonitoringAndEvaluation<br> <br>(includingPME)|CME|LME|DME|NME<br>|
|**RESOURCEMOBIL.AND**<br>**MANAGEMENT**<br>||||**RMM**<br>**manuals**<br>|
|Resource Mobilization<br> <br> <br>|CRM<br>|LRM<br>|DRM<br>|NRM<br>|
|ParticipationofPrimaryandOther<br> <br>KeyStakeholders|CST<br>|LST<br>|DST<br>|NST<br>|
|Financial Managementand<br>Accountability<br>|CFA<br>|LFA<br>|DFA<br>|NFA<br>|
|Procurement,Contract,<br> <br>MaterialsManagement|CPM|LPM|DPM|NPM<br>|
|**TECHNICALISSUES**||||**Technical**<br>Manuals<br>|
|Technical DesignAndManagement<br>|<sup>CTM</sup><br>|LTM<br>|DTM<br>|NTM<br>|
|SpecialistTraining/Retraining|CST|LST|DST|NST<br>|
|**LOGISTICS**<br>||||**Logistcs**<br>**Manuals**<br>|
|RolloutLogistics<br>I<br>|Notneeded|LLO<br>|DLO<br>|NLO<br>|
|LogisticsTraining||ILLT|DLT|NLT|

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Annex 2: Design Elements and Tools for Large Scale CODD Programs Table 2A: Community Design Elements and Tools

|**)esign**Element/Tool|MainReasonforuse|Impacton Econoniic<br>and/orFiscalCost-<br>Effectiveness|
|---|---|---|
|1.Atearliest opportunityconductinitial<br>stakeholder/institutionalanalyses[theseare<br>periodically reviewed/upgraded byallkey<br>stakeholders]-fordetailssee theWorld<br>Bank'sParticipationand SocialAssessment:<br>ToolsandTechnigues.|Determinewho aretheoperations'<br>primary andkeystakeholders,identify<br>stakeholders'interests**in,**importanceto,<br>andinfluenceovertheoperation;<br>identify/assess institutionsatlocal,<br>regional, andnationallevels and<br>processesupon whichto build;providea<br>foundationandactionplan/strategyfor<br>participation|Avoidfaultydesignand<br>inefficientimplementation<br>bygarneringlocal<br>knowledge,skillsand<br>commitment;lower<br>targetingcosts,lowerlosses<br>frommis-targeting|
|2.ParticipatoryPlanningandAppraisal<br>(PP&A)includessuchtoolsandparticipatory<br>methodologies/techniquesas:<br>**o**<br>TEAM-UP/ZOPPapproaches for<br>participatorypreparationoflogframe<br>**o**<br>Focusgroups/participatoryplanningand<br>PMEworkshops(e.g.Participatory<br>LearningandAction[PLA],participatory<br>strategicplanning[ICA,AIC<br>techniques]46,socialassessment, gender<br>analysis,andsoforth)|Developcommoninformationbase,<br>values andapproaches;designa<br>communitydevelopmentplanandlistof<br>immediate priorities plusPME<br>mechanisms;buildsownershipand<br>commonvalues necessaryfor sustainable<br>partnerships amongpublicandcivil<br>society stakeholders|Yieldsshortandlong-term<br>gainsviauseoflocal<br>knowledge,skillsand<br>commitmentforplanning,<br>implementing,monitoring/<br>maintaining,andevaluating<br>impactsofpoverty<br>reductionefforts.|
|3.Community DevelopmentCommitteeand<br>Sub-Committeestomanagecommunity<br>programandprojects<br>See2above|Mobilize latent managementand<br>technicalcapacities, buildsownershipand<br>commonvalues,approaches,in<br>community, promotesempowermentof<br>previouslyexcludedgroups|Reducescostsandimproves<br>effectivenessandefficiency<br>oftheoperationby<br>narrowingthegapbetween<br>deliveryofgoods/services<br>anddecision-making/<br>correctiveaction;<br>maximizesvolunteerlabor<br>andskills|
|3.MoneyintheHandsofCommunities|Empowerment,provideincentivesfor<br>resourcemobilization,forcostsavings,<br>accountability tomembers|Average40percent<br>reduction inproject costs|

46 The choice of participatory tools/techruques/methodologies will vary according to the specific needs of the initiative and the local availability or training needs in the country/region. Facilitators skilled **in** participatory approaches may or may not be available - the ideal **is** to team local facilitators with an intemational participatory development specialist to get the best of both perspectives. The approaches mentioned here which are by no means exhaustive include: TEAMUP/ZOPP, the former was developed by the World Bank's Economic Development Institute based on ZOPP, the Objectives-Onented Project Planning of GTZ; the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) and the Appreciation-InfluenceControl (AIC) methods; and Participatory Learning & Action (PLA, a.k.a. PRA, RRA). For further details, see the World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques, and Spencer, 1989.

38
|4.Fungible grantstocommunities|Empowerment,abilitytoallocatemoney<br>1.Econ<br>topriorityprojects, enhanced<br>bettera<br>accountability<br>withco<br>2. Grea<br>commu<br>latent c<br>efforts|omic gainsfrom<br>lignmentofchoices<br>mmunitypreferences<br>ter mobilizationof<br>nity co-financing,<br>apacities,volunteer<br>andlabor|
|---|---|---|
|5.Community co-financeandresource<br>mobilization<br>Seelabove|Ownershipandaccountability,builds<br>Noimp<br>commonvalues.<br>costsb<br>costs|acton economic<br>utreductioninfiscal|
|7.Community contractingfortechnicalservices|Empowerment,Demand-driven,<br>timeliness,accountability,quality,<br>massive reductioninlogisticalproblem<br>ofdeployingadvisoryservices, helps<br>build common valuesandgoodpractices|ReducedTechnical<br>Assistancecosts,quality<br>losses,andopportunity cost<br>ofdelays; expandsthelocal<br>marketforprovisionof<br>goodandservices<br>|
|8.CommunityContractingofCommunity Specialist|s<br>Empowerment,demand-driven,<br>timeliness, accountability,reduced<br>logisticsproblems,transport costs|Sameasabove|
|9.ParticipatoryM&E|Verifiesthatobjectivesandgoals agreed<br>uponduringthedesign phaseareindeed<br>beingmet;Empowerment, Ownership,<br>andimmediatefeedback,quality<br>enhancement,strengthens common<br>groundandvaluesandhelpsbuild<br>sustainablepartnershipsamongpublic<br>andcivilsocietystakeholder groups|Reducedriskof<br>mismanagement,lowers<br>economic andfiscalcosts<br>duetoerrors/omissionsin<br>designorimplementation<br>byprovidingimmediate<br>feedback;maximizes<br>synergiesamongvarious<br>operational components|

39
|Table2|b:**Scalingiu**designelementsandtools||
|---|---|---|
|DesignElement<br>1.Useoffield-testedoperational manualsfor<br>allfunctionsand levels[tobeperiodically<br>updatedatparticipatoryforums]|MainReasonforuse<br>Basis for programperformanceand<br>timelyimplementation|Cost-Effectiveness<br>Reducedmanagementcosts,<br>opportunitycostofdelays,<br>inadequate coverage,<br>mistakesindecisions,<br>mismatchofresources,etc|
|2.LearningbyDoingbyallparticipants|Developalreadypresentlatentcapacities,<br>putsanyformaltrainingtoimmediate<br>use,buildcommonvalues.|Increasedx-efficiency,<br>reducedtrainingcosts|
|3.Learningbydoinggrants|<br>Immediate mobilizationoflatentskills<br>andapplicationofskillslearnedin<br>training,helpsbuildcommon values|Enhancedx-efficiency<br>gains,reducesopportunity<br>costofdelays|
|4.Hosting periodicparticipatoryforumsat<br>regionalandnational levels|<br>Promotetheexchangeof<br>innovations/good practices;fosterthe<br>creationofnetworksamong key<br>stakeholders through personalcontact-<br>thesenetworksmaypavethewayforlater<br>federation; improve visibilityofprogram<br>byupdating regionalandnational media<br>aboutprogress made;updatingof<br>manualsasnecessary|Short-termx-efficiency<br>gains; long-terminvestment<br>towardscreationofsocial<br>capital|
|5.Connectingallkey stakeholdersvia<br>provision.ofstate-of-theartknowledge<br>informationtechnology|Enhancedempowermentlimprovedrapid<br>accesstoinformation; modernized<br>knowledgemanagement tools,e.g.<br>project/programplanning,customized<br>analysis,monitoringandevaluation;x-<br>fertilizationofbestpractices;accessto|Enhancedx-efficiency<br>gains,reducesopportunity<br>costofdelays|
||state-of-theart technology||
|4.CommunitytoCommunity Extension,|<br>Community appropriationofknowledge,<br>reduced logistics problems,helpsbuild<br>commonvalues,enhancesempowerment|Fewerextension workers<br>neededinPrivate,Public,or<br>NGOsectors|
|5,Performance-basedcontractingby<br>communities,other programparticipants|<br>Timeliness,accountabilityMobilizes<br>latent technicalskillsinprivate,NGO<br>sectorshelpsbuildcommonvalues|Lowercostthanpublic<br>sectorexecution|
|6.Useofexisting coordinationand<br>managementstructures,infrastructure,and<br>transport facilities|, <br>Mobilizes latent capacitiesfor<br>management,buildings,transport<br>services,reduceslogisticsproblems|Reducedmanagement,<br>investmentandtransport<br>costs|
|7.Financingonly incrementalcosts|Avoid un-neededinvestmentsand/or<br>enhancesresource mobilizationofkey<br>stakeholders|Reducedinvestmentcosts|
|8.Eliminationoffinancial intermediaries|Empowerment, accountabilityof<br>community andlocalleaderstoprimary<br>stakeholders simplifieslogistics.|Savesontransactionsand<br>transportcosts,program<br>overhead|
|9.Norm-basedallocationofmoney|<br>Improved transparency/accountability,<br>Everybodyknowstheir budgetenvelope,<br>simplifiessub-projectpreparation,<br>approval logistics|Reducedtransactionscosts<br>forall, reducedmanagement<br>costs|
|10.Projectproposalsinthe formof<br>questionnaires|<br>Simplificationofsub-project preparation,<br>lower entrybarriersforpoor<br>communities,marginalgroups,lower|Sameasabove|

40
|11.Locally recruited/contracted training<br>teams|training costs,logisticsproblems<br>Mobilizelatent capacities, theyknow<br>theirarea,language, culture,canadapt,<br>translatetrainingmaterials.<br>Createsaresidentcadreoftrainers:can<br>bemobilizedforlaterprogramphases<br>Reducedlogistics problems,helpsbuild<br>commonvalues.|Lowerperdiems,transport,<br>communications,<br>transactionscosts.<br>Noneedfor permanent<br>employees|
|---|---|---|
|12.CarefuldesignandtestingofTrainingand<br>Disbursementlogistics|Reducedprogramdelays,frustrations,<br>slippageincoverage|Savedopportunitycostof<br>program delays, slippages|
|Table3c:**DecentralizationDesignE **|**lementsandTools**||
|**DesignElement**|**MainReasonforuse**|**Cost Effectiveness**|
|1.ApplicationoftheSubsidiarity Principle|Improvedinformation,anddecision<br>making.<br>Incentive compatibility; Reducedmoral<br>hazard.Greater empowerment and<br>accountability, mobilizationoflatent<br>capacities, greaterlocalresource<br>mobilization<br>Helpsbuildcommonvaluesandvision|Multiplegainsin<br>transactionsand<br>management costs,reduced<br>lossesfrommoralhazard,<br>opportunity costofprogram<br>delays,failures,greaterx-<br>efficiencyandallocative<br>efficiency,lowercentral<br>fiscalcost|
|2.LocaUDistrictDevelopment<br>Committee/sub-committees|Basicinstrument for programandproject<br>management, appraisal,supervisionand<br>PME.Mobilizationoflatentlocal<br>capacities,reductionoflogistics<br>problems.Helpsbuildcommonvalues|Greaterallocative andx-<br>efficiency,reducedtravel,<br>management costs,<br>volunteerlaborfor<br>management and<br>coordination|
|3.Transferring sub-projectidentification,<br>appraisal, approval, validation, supervision<br>**and**PMEactivitiestolocaVdistrict<br>development committeesandtechnicians|Useoflatentlocalcapacities,and local<br>knowledge<br>Onlywaytomanagetensofthousandsof<br>sub-projects|Reduced transactions,<br>communication, travelcosts,<br>greaterx-efficiency,<br>allocative efficiency|
|4.Strengthenand usetechnicalleadershipand<br>supervisory rolesofDistricttechnical<br>specialist|Use andupgradingoflocallatent<br>capacities,helpsbuildcommonvalues<br>andpropagationofgoodpractices|Reduced transactions,<br>communication, travelcosts,<br>greater x-efficiency|
|5.Useofunconditional grants to local/district<br>levels|Empowerment, congruenceofprogram<br>with localpreferences,greater incentive<br>tomobilizelocalco-financing<br>Canbe usedforfiscalequalizationfor<br>poverty reduction|Gainsinallocative<br>efficiency<br>Greaterlocalco-finance|

**Table 4d: Sector-Specific and Technical CDD tools**

|**DesignElement**|
|---|

**Main Reason for use Cost Effectiveness**

41
|l.Knowledge upgradingandmanagement<br>systemreachingallsector specialists)from<br>Community Specialists)toDistrict/Regional<br>specialists|Ensureinclusivevertical/horizontal<br>transmissionofqueries,answers,<br>knowledge, technologies<br>Empowerallthe lowerlevelspecialists<br>with answers<br>Helpsbuild commonvaluesand<br>propagategoodpractices among<br>stakeholdersatalllevels|
|---|---|
|2.Technical Sourcebooksfordifferentlevels|Providechoiceandqualitydesign|
|3.Technical M&E (includingaPME<br>component) atlocalanddistrictlevel|Feedbacktotechnicalagencies,and<br>technicalprogram improvements|

x-efficiency gains from quality improvements, timeliness; reduced opportunity costs of poor technology choicestpractices Improved x-efficiency, saves TA costs, reduced sub-project failure rate X-efficiency gains from Quality improvements Insert Annex **3:** Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Stakeholder<sup>Analysis</sup> Source: Participation and Social Assessment:<sup>Toolsand Techniques , pp.85-87</sup> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors wish to thank Violeta Manoukian<sup>forvaluable suggestionsthat</sup> have been incorporated in this paper, and Tuu-Van<sup>Nguyenfor Assemblingthe References.</sup> R1E2RNC Binswanger, Hans and Deininger, Klaus "Explaimng agricultural and agrarnan policies in developing<sup>countries".</sup> Journal of Economic Literature. 35:1958-2005,<sup>December1997</sup> Cagatay, Nilufer, Mumtaz Keklik, "Budgets as if People Mattered: Democratizing<sup>Macroeconomic</sup> Radhika Lal, and James Lang Policies", UNDP/SEPED Conference Papers<sup>#4,New York, May</sup> 2000 [www.undp.lorg/seped/publicationstconf<sup>pub.htm].</sup> CIDA Grameen Telecom's Village Phone Programme: A<sup>Multi-Media Case</sup> Study. TeleCommons Development Group. 2000 http://www.telecommons.comtvillaeephone/mdex.html Drosdoff, Daniel "Del sufragio al presupuesto: En algunas ciudades<sup>latinoamericanas</sup> los votantes han comenzado a decidir el destino<sup>de los fondos</sup> p6blicos", Inter-American Bank, Washington<sup>D.C., n.d.</sup> [www.iadb.org/idbamerica/archive]. Edstrom, Judith "Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Project, Is It<sup>Replicable?Design</sup> Considerations in Community Dnven Development"<sup>in Social</sup> Development Papers, No. 39, World Bank, Washington<sup>D.C.,Mar.2002.</sup> Estrella, Marisol, et al, (Eds.) Learning from Change: Issues and experiences<sup>in participatory</sup> monitorine and evaluation, Intermediate<sup>TechnologiesPublications,</sup> London, 2000. Famngton, John and Cnspino, Lobo Scaling up Participatory Watershed Development in India;<sup>Lessonsfrom</sup> the Indo-German Watershed Development Program.<sup>NaturalResource</sup> Perspectives, No. 17, Feb 1997 Fernando Nimal and Richard Meyer ASA-the Ford model of Micro-Finance. ADB Finance<sup>for the Poor, Vol 3,</sup> No. 2, 2002. Gaventa, John and Jutta Blauert "Learning to Change by Learningfrom Change:<sup>Going to Scale</sup> with Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation"<sup>in Learning from</sup> Change: Issues and experiences in participatory<sup>monitoringand</sup> evaluation, Ed. Marisol Estrella et<sup>al</sup> Hancock, Jim "Scaling Up Issues and Options: Supporting Good<sup>Practices and</sup> Innovation". Draft Working Paper, 2003.

IIRR Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation: Experiences<sup>andLessons,</sup> Workshop Proceedings, International Institute of<sup>Rural</sup> Reconstruction, Silang, Cavite, Philippines,<sup>1998</sup> 42
[e-mail: IRRI@cav.pworld.net.ph)] Kerr, John Narayan, Deepa (Ed.) Paul, Samuel Rietbergen-McCracken, Jennifer and Deepa Narayan (Eds.) Spencer, Laura J.

Van Zyl, Johan, et al, 1995 Van Zyl, Johann; Sonn, Loretta; and Costa, Alberto World Bank World Bank World Bank World Bank Watershed Development, Environmental services and Poverty Alleviation in India World Development Vol 30 No. 8., 2002. EmRowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2002.

Holding the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action, Books for Change, Bangalore, India, 2002

[e-mail: bfc@actionaidindia.org)]. Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1998 Winning through Participation: The Group Facilitation Methods of the Institute of Cultural Affairs, Kendall/Hunt Publishing, Dubuque, Iowa, 1989.

Decentralized Rural Development and Enhanced Communitv Participation : a Case Study From Northeast Brazil, Policy Research working Paper 1498, The World Bank, Washmngton, D.C.

"Decentralized Rural Development, Enhanced Community Participation, and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Northeast Brazil". Draft Paper. July 2000.

Community Dnven Development: a Vision of Poverty Reduction through Empowerment. Washington, D.C., Dec. 2000. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Washington D.C., 1996 Village Level Participatory Approaches (VLPA). Washington, D.C., 2002 Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant to the Repubhc of Niger for the Community Action Program. Jan 21, 2003.

43
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