metadata: authors: 0: author: Briceno-Garmendia,Cecilia M.
1: author: Ranganathan,Rupa
count: Sudan
docna: 0: docna: Sudan's infrastructure : a continental perspective
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Sanitation and Sewerage,Engineering,Water and Human Health,Hydrology,Water Supply and Sanitation Economics,Sanitary Environmental Engineering,Small Private Water Supply Providers,Environmental Engineering,Health and Sanitation,Transport Services,Intelligent Transport Systems,Town Water Supply and Sanitation
teratopic: Transport,Infrastructure Economics and Finance,Private Sector Development,Energy,Finance and Financial Sector Development
abstracts: cdata!: Improvements in infrastructure across
            Sudan in recent years have contributed 1.7 percentage points
            to the country's per capita growth. Consistent with
            trends in other countries, the ICT revolution that swept
            Africa contributed more than any other sector to growth in
            Sudan. Raising the infrastructure endowment of all parts of
            Sudan to that of the region's best performer --
            Mauritius -- could boost annual growth by about 3.5
            percentage points. Sudan has heavily invested in
            infrastructure in recent years. Notable achievements include
            tripling power-generation capacity, liberalizing the ICT
            sector, and connecting to an undersea fiber-optic cable.
            Looking ahead, Sudan's most pressing infrastructure
            challenges lie in the water and transport sectors. In the
            water sector, the country needs to dramatically improve
            access to safe sources of water and sanitation while
            improving utility efficiency. In the transport sector the
            country needs to vastly expand rural and international
            connectivity and improve quality across the network. Sudan
            presently spends about $1.5 billion per year on
            infrastructure, with $580 million a year lost to
            inefficiencies. Even if the inefficiencies were eliminated,
            however, Sudan would face an infrastructure funding gap of
            $2.9 billion per year. This gap could be reduced by half by
            choosing lower-cost water, sanitation, and road-surfacing
            technologies, and could be bridged by continuing to capture
            financing from the private sector and abroad.
geo_reg_key: 517191
repnme: repnme: Sudan's infrastructure : a continental perspective
display_title: Sudan's infrastructure : a
            continental perspective
listing_relative_url: /research/2011/09/15151842/sudans-infrastructure-continental-perspective
topicv3: Sanitation m1326453 2000,Water m1326522 137,Transport m1326661 135,Latrines m1505177 3454,Traffic Management m1583399 4231
publishtoextweb_dt: 2011-09-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Transport,Infrastructure Economics and Finance,Private Sector Development,Energy,Finance and Financial Sector Development
no_of_pages: 59
author_keys: 0: author_key: 420925
1: author_key: 583561
model_extractions: WPS5815 Policy Research Working Paper 5815 Sudan’s Infrastructure A Continental Perspective _Rupa Ranganathan Cecilia M. Briceño-Garmendia_ The World Bank Africa Region Sustainable Development Unit September 2011
Policy Research Working Paper 5815

# **Abstract**

Improvements in infrastructure across Sudan in recent years have contributed 1.7 percentage points to the country’s per capita growth. Consistent with trends in other countries, the ICT revolution that swept Africa contributed more than any other sector to growth in Sudan. Raising the infrastructure endowment of all parts of Sudan to that of the region’s best performer— Mauritius—could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points.

Sudan has heavily invested in infrastructure in recent years. Notable achievements include tripling powergeneration capacity, liberalizing the ICT sector, and connecting to an undersea fiber-optic cable. Looking ahead, Sudan’s most pressing infrastructure challenges lie in the water and transport sectors. In the water sector, the country needs to dramatically improve access to safe sources of water and sanitation while improving utility efficiency. In the transport sector the country needs to vastly expand rural and international connectivity and improve quality across the network.

Sudan presently spends about $1.5 billion per year on infrastructure, with $580 million a year lost to inefficiencies. Even if the inefficiencies were eliminated, however, Sudan would face an infrastructure funding gap of $2.9 billion per year. This gap could be reduced by half by choosing lower-cost water, sanitation, and road-surfacing technologies, and could be bridged by continuing to capture financing from the private sector and abroad.

This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Unit, the Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# Sudan’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective

**_Rupa Ranganathan and Cecilia M. Briceño-Garmendia_**
# **Acknowledgments**

This paper draws on contributions from sector specialists from the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Team; notably, Heinrich Bofinger on air transport, Alberto Nogales on roads, Carolina Dominguez on water, Michael Minges on information and communication technologies, Nataliya Pushak on public expenditure, and Alvaro Federico Barra on spatial analysis. The paper benefitted from substantial comments and guidance from Vivien Foster.

The paper is based on information provided from colleagues in the Sudan country team: notably, Greg Toulmin (country program coordinator), William G. Battaile (senior country economist), Yutaka Yoshino (corridors), Justin Runji (transport), Tesfaye Bekalu (water), Tesfamichael Nahusenay (transport), and Riahan Elahi (power).
# Contents

|**List of figures**|**iii**|
|---|---|
|**List of tables**|**iv**|
|**Synopsis**|**1**|
|**The continental perspective**|**2**|
|**Why infrastructure matters**|**3**|
|**The state of Sudan’s infrastructure**|**5**|
|Transport|9|
|Roads|13|
|Ports|17|
|Air transport|19|
|Water supply and sanitation|22|
|Energy|27|
|Information and communication technology|34|
|**Financing Sudan’s infrastructure**|**38**|
|How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope?|42|
|Annual funding gap|44|
|What else can be done?|45|
|**Bibliography and references**|**1**|
|General|1|
|Financing|1|
|Growth|1|
|Information and communication technologies|2|
|Irrigation|2|
|Power|2|
|Transport|3|
|Water supply and sanitation|4|
|Other|5|
|List of figures<br>Figure 1a. Infrastructure’s historic contribution to economic growth, 1990–95 vs 2000–05|4|
|Figure 1b. Infrastructure’s potential future contribution to economic growth|4|
|Figure 2. The demography, topography, and natural resources of all parts of Sudan|5|
|Figure 3. Development of the regional infrastructure backbone and national backbones in Sudan|7|
|Figure 4. National and regional transport network in all parts of Sudan|9|
|Figure 5. Transport poses an obstacle to business in some areas of Sudan|9|
|Figure 6. Moving freight within Sudan vs. moving imports from Durban to Lusaka|11|
|Figure 7. Expense of moving freight within Sudan and across southern Africa|12|
|Figure 8. Road quality in Sudan|13|
|Figure 9. Road traffic in Sudan|14|
|Figure 10. Port Sudan faces serious congestion problems|17|
|Figure 11. Khartoum is the main airport in Sudan|19|
|Figure 12. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Sudan|22|

iii
|Figure 13. Water resources in Sudan|23|
|---|---|
|Figure 14. Limited access to advanced water technologies in urban Sudan<br>|24<br>|
|Figure 15. Sanitation access is largely bimodal<br>|25|
|Figure 16. Hidden costs of selected water utilities, as percentage of revenue<br>|26<br>|
|Figure 17. Power infrastructure in Sudan|27|
|Figure 18a. Electricity is the largest obstacle to doing business in Sudan<br>|30<br>|
|Figure 18b. High reliance on generators for power|30|
|Figure 19. A small share of Sudan’s power consumption is for industrial activities|30|
|Figure 20. Moderate power tariffs in Sudan|31|
|Figure 21. Benchmarking historic power production costs in Sudan|31|
|Figure 22. Large hidden costs at the NEC due to underpricing and unaccounted losses|32|
|Figure 23. Hidden costs are high in Sudan relative to other African countries|33|
|Figure 24. Existing tariffs for power are insufficient to recover huge operating costs and long-run marginal costs|33|
|Figure 25. Sudan’s ICT backbone infrastructure as of the mid-2000s|34|
|Figure 26. A small subsidy could have closed the mobile telephony coverage gap in all parts of Sudan|36|
|Figure 27. The voice telephony gap could easily have been filled in Sudan|37|
|Figure 28. Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs in the regional context, as share of GDP|40|
|Figure 29. Sudan’s current infrastructure spending is average by African standards|41|
|Figure 30. Sudan’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure and that of comparator countries|42|
|Figure 31. Underpricing of power and water in Sudan|43|
|Figure 32. The burden of inefficiency in Sudan’s power and water utilities|44|
|Figure 33. Many African countries capture more private investment than Sudan|45|

# List of tables

|Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Sudan’s infrastructure sectors|8|
|---|---|
|Table 2. Benchmarking Sudan’s national network against African aggregates for regional corridors|9|
|Table 3. Time and costs associated with transport within Sudan|10|
|Table 4. Benchmarking the performance of Sudan’s roads|15|
|Table 5a. Land area in Sudan with high agricultural suitability|15|
|Table 5b. Distribution of agricultural value within Sudan|15|
|Table 6. Sudan’s spending needs for regional, national, rural, and urban connectivity|17|
|Table 7. Benchmarking Port Sudan’s performance|18|
|Table 8. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Sudan and select other countries|20|
|Table 9. Origin destination matrix—Sudan|21|
|Table 10. Benchmarking water and sanitation indicators in Sudan|23|
|Table 11. Operational indicators for water utilities in Sudan, 2005|26|
|Table 12. Relatively high usage of modern fuels for cooking in Sudan|28|
|Table 13. Benchmarking power indicators in Sudan|29|
|Table 14. Operational indicators for the NEC|32|
|Table 15. All parts of Sudan compare favorably to the average African country in terms of ICT access and prices|35|
|Table 16. Prices of Internet and phone calls in Sub-Saharan Africa, with and without access to submarine cables|37|
|Table 17. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Sudan|38|
|Table 18. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in Sudan, 2006–15|39|
|Table 19. Financial flows to Sudan’s infrastructure, average 2001 to 2005|40|
|Table 20. Identified infrastructure projects financed by non-OECD financiers|41|
|<br>Table 21. Sudan’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency|43|
|Table 22. Funding gaps by sector|44|
|Table 23. Savings from innovation|46|

iv
# Synopsis

Improvements in infrastructure in all parts of Sudan in recent years have had a strong impact on per capita growth, contributing 1.7 percentage points. Consistent with trends in other countries, the information and communication (ICT) revolution that swept Africa contributed the most to Sudan. Raising the infrastructure endowment of all parts of Sudan to that of the region’s best performer, Mauritius, could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points.

Sudan has invested heavily in infrastructure in recent years, with some notable achievements. Power generation capacity tripled in just a few years, rising from around 800 megawatts (MW) in 2005 to 2,687 MW in 2007, with a shift toward hydropower. Nevertheless, service reliability remains an issue. In ICT, Sudan has made enormous strides in liberalizing the sector and as a result has attracted significant private capital. Mobile penetration soared from less than 1 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2009. Recent connectivity to an undersea fiber-optic cable has led to expansions in access, improvements in quality, and reduction in prices.

Looking ahead, Sudan’s most pressing infrastructure challenges lie in the water and transport sectors.

Most of Sudan lacks access to safe sources of water. Access to sanitation is bimodal, where 40 percent of the population uses improved sanitation technologies and around 40 percent defecates in the open. Access challenges have been compounded by large inefficiencies at the water utilities. Inadequate collection of revenues, large distributional losses, and to some extent inability to recover costs have diverted over $120 million in revenues each year.

In the transport sector, even though the road network almost doubled in length to 6,200 kilometers (km) between 2000 and 2008, a sizable share of the country lacks roads. There are a few well-developed internal corridors, but rural connectivity is almost nonexistent. Road density is exceedingly low and traffic along most roads is sparse. Poor-quality roads drastically undermine the efficiency of transport services. Further, the large volumes of unpaved roads make movement impossible during the rainy season.

Sudan’s infrastructure development has so far had a national focus, and there is much that remains to be done to achieve greater regional integration. While internal road corridors are developed, connectivity with neighbors is largely absent. Sudan has a natural gateway to the sea through Port Sudan but the port’s performance is severely hindered by long dwell times, high costs, and capacity constraints. Looking further ahead, Sudan has the potential to be a major hydropower exporter if additional capacity could be developed and transmission links with neighboring Nile Basin countries strengthened.

Addressing Sudan’s infrastructure challenges will require sustained expenditure of almost $4.2 billion per year over the next decade, mainly for capital investments. In terms of the size of the economy that level of infrastructure needs is equivalent to just over 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Not unthinkable of, as it is comparable to the 15 percent of GDP China has been investing in recent years on infrastructure. Yet, it is an ambitious target for Sudan as it would represent almost tripling the recently observed annual average of infrastructure spending (about 7 percent of GDP). Water and transport account for 80 percent of the spending needs.
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE Sudan already spends approximately $1.5 billion per year on infrastructure, equivalent to about 6 percent of its GDP. Two-thirds of Sudan’s spending consists of investment, with Chinese funds accounting for 40 percent of investment finance. Private investment in Sudanese infrastructure is also significant, at 23 percent of the total, while official development assistance (ODA) is negligible. In contrast to its peers, Sudan’s capital spending on infrastructure is strongly skewed toward the power sector.

A further $580 million a year (equivalent to 2.7 percent of GDP) is wasted due to inefficiencies, largely due to mispricing of power. Over 80 percent of these inefficiencies derive from the power sector. Electricity is currently priced at 50 percent of its cost-recovery threshold, leading to losses worth $378 million annually. The mispricing of power results in inefficiencies on the order of $380 million for the utility, while distribution losses are worth $106 million annually.

Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap is $2.9 billion per year, equivalent to almost 14 percent of its GDP. Most of the funding gap is associated with the water and transport sectors, each of which is more than $1 billion short of resources. But these gaps could each be reduced by half by judicious choice of lower-cost technologies for water and sanitation services and road surfacing. No funding gap is found for power, due to the relatively high level of spending in recent years and the magnitude of inefficiencies that could be captured to bolster sector finances.

To bridge the funding gap, Sudan could build on its existing success in capturing infrastructure finance both from China and the private sector. Sudan has done quite well in attracting about 1 percent of GDP in private investment for infrastructure; but a number of other African peers have done even better, capturing two to three times as much in proportional terms. Nevertheless, the largest funding gaps in transport and water may be less amenable to private finance. One option would be for Sudan to draw increasingly on its Chinese and Arab partners to support transport and water investments, and allow the private sector to play a larger role in the power sector, where it has not been active to date. Nevertheless, the funding gap remains substantial relative to the Sudanese economy.

# The continental perspective

The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Sudan. The results have been presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, and water and sanitation—and different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector performance.

This report presents the key AICD findings for Sudan, allowing the country’s infrastructure situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Sudan is a relatively well-off low-income state richly endowed with oil; therefore, both low-income and resource-rich benchmarks will be used to evaluate its performance. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional neighbors in the East African Community (EAC) and with countries in North Africa in some cases.

Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2006. Most technical data presented are for 2006–07 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are

> <sup>2</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE typically averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, to make comparisons across countries, the indicators and analysis were standardized so that everything was done on a consistent basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. Third, in terms of nomenclature, _all parts of Sudan_ refers to Sudan prior to the split of the country, _Sudan_ refers to the northern part of Sudan, and _South Sudan_ is the newly independent country. Fourth, data for Sudan and South Sudan were originally collected and processed for the country as a whole, that is, all parts of Sudan. But given recent geopolitical events, including the seceding of South Sudan from the rest of the country, and the vast differences between Sudan and South Sudan in terms of topography, infrastructure, and financial resources, this report presents analyses and results that reflect the situation in Sudan as much as possible. In a few cases, this involves relying on imperfect data and using proxy variables to attribute otherwise global estimates.

# Why infrastructure matters

The recent schism of _all parts of Sudan_ into Sudan and South Sudan will have massive impacts on the Sudanese economy. For one, the splitting of oil assets that are mostly in South Sudan will impact Sudan’s overall resource revenues in the coming years.

The economy for all parts of Sudan grew at the rate of 6 percent per capita between 2003 and 2007. Its growth was more robust than that of several of its East African peers, who grew at 4 percent per capita during the same period.<sup>1</sup> The advent of an oil-based economy in Sudan was the harbinger of robust growth between 2000 and 2008. Oil constituted around 90 percent of Sudanese exports and was driven by oil production in South Sudan. Oil resources enabled the government to roll out new physical and social infrastructure, focused primarily on the northern part of the country. There was an increase in the volume of transportation between Khartoum, where economic activity has been concentrated, and Port Sudan, the coastal gateway for imports and exports.

Empirical evidence linking infrastructure to recent economic growth patterns documents how the allocation of oil wealth to infrastructure development has impacted the economy. Between the 1990s and early 2000s, all parts of Sudan reaped large growth benefits in infrastructure development. Infrastructure contributed over 1.75 percentage points to all parts of Sudan’s per capita growth (figure 1a). The ICT sector made the strongest impact on growth. The road and power sectors made modest contributions in contrast to other countries, where inadequate power infrastructure had a negative effect on growth. Since most of the improvements in the ICT sector were recorded in Sudan and very little in South Sudan, it is reasonable to expect that the largest gains in growth came through contributions from the ICT sector in Sudan.

> 1 The growth represented is based on GDP per capita (constant 2000$). The East African peers are Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

> <sup>3</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 1a. Infrastructure’s historic contribution to economic growth, 1990–95 vs 2000–05**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>1.5<br>1<br>0.5<br>0<br>-0.5<br>-1<br>Congo, Rep Kenya East Africa Cameroon Cote d'Ivoire Tanzania Uganda Sudan<br>ICT Power Roads<br>Changes in per capita growth<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Calderón 2009. _Note:_ ICT = information and communication technology.

Infrastructure could contribute more to all parts of Sudan’s infrastructure in the future than it has in the past (figure 1b). Simulations suggest that if Sudan’s infrastructure were to be upgraded to the level of the best-performing country in Africa (Mauritius), the impact on per capita economic growth would be on the order of 3.5 percentage points. While all areas of infrastructure—ICT, power, and transport—need to be upgraded, improvements in roads can impact growth the most—by around 1.5 percent. Improvements in power infrastructure will add another 1 percent to per capita growth. Infrastructure’s immediate potential contribution to growth is less than it is in several other East African countries.

**Figure 1b. Infrastructure’s potential future contribution to economic growth**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>0<br>Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Cameroon Tanzania Sudan Congo, Rep of Uganda East Africa<br>ICT Power Roads<br>growth<br>Potential contributions of per capita<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Calderón 2009. _Note:_ ICT = information and communication technology.

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# **against African aggregates for regional corridors**

Around 22 percent of firms indicated that transport is a major obstacle to business activity, with challenges more acute in some areas than others. A sizable share of establishments in Sudan used their own transport facilities. The average share of own-transport use ranged from 35 percent of the total value of production-related transport activities within the country in Khartoum to 17 percent in North Kordofan. Nyala Red Sea (with 26 percent) and Gezira (with 25 percent) also registered a high rate of owntransport use. Transport in Nyala (Darfur region), meanwhile, was cited as a constraint on doing business by around 60 percent of the firms based there.

|Corridor|Road in good<br>condition (%)|Implicit<br>velocity (km<br>per hour)|Freight tariff<br>(US cents per<br>tonne-km)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Western|72|6|8|
|Central|49|6.1|13|
|Eastern|82|8.1|7|
|Southern|100|11.6|5|
|Sudan|26|8.5–13.5|8–10|
|South Sudan|0|6.4|20|

_Source:_ Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009; Nathan 2010; UNLJC and FAO 2005; Yoshino 2010; World Bank staff estimates _Note:_ Estimates for Sudan based on routes from Khartoum to Kosti and Khartoum to Port Sudan. For South Sudan, costs are based on varying estimates for travel between Juba to Nimule. Implicit velocity is the total distance divided by the total time taken to make the trip, including time spent stationary at ports, border crossings, <u>and other stops.</u> The main internal corridors in Sudan are well staff estimates developed and generally in good condition but do not _Note:_ Estimates for Sudan based on routes from Khartoum to Kosti and Khartoum to Port Sudan. For South extend to provide cross-border connectivity with neighbors Sudan, costs are based on varying estimates for travel (see figure 4). The trading artery in Sudan is the route that between Juba to Nimule. Implicit velocity is the total connects Kosti to Port Sudan via Khartoum. This road distance divided by the total time taken to make the trip, including time spent stationary at ports, border crossings, records the greatest traffic volumes in Sudan and boasts <u>and other stops.</u> overall good-quality roads, particularly from Khartoum to Port Sudan. Another corridor connects Sudan to the Djibouti Corridor offering connectivity to the Port of Djibouti and Addis Ababa. While systematic data on these routes are not available, traffic volumes from Sudan along this corridor are expected to be very low, and the quality of roads range from fair to poor. Connectivity with South Sudan is practically nonexistent and was never a strategic priority. The regional corridor connecting to South Sudan is in bad condition and records very low traffic volumes. During the rainy season (April/May to October/November), a majority of the roads particularly in South Sudan are impenetrable.

Sudan records average performance by African standards but poor performance when compared to global standards. Along some of the internal transport routes, surface transport moves at a pace that ranges from 8.5 kilometers per hour (kmph)<sup>2</sup> to over 13 kmph,<sup>3</sup> comparable to East Africa; in the parts less travelled and with poorer-quality roads, velocity is consistent with central African countries

**Table 3. Time and costs associated with transport within Sudan**

|Route|Mode of transport<br>Time (days)|Implicit velocity|
|---|---|---|
|Khartoum–<br>Malakal|Road and river<br>7|4.7|
||Road<br>5|6.7|
|Khartoum–<br>Juba|Road and river<br>13.5|6.3|
||Road<br>7.5|11.4|
|_Source:_AICD c<br>and FAO (2005|alculations based on data from Yoshino and oth<br>), and Keer- MISC (2007).|ers (2009), UNJLC|

(table 2). Overall, freight in Sudan moves at the pace of a horse and buggy.

Poor road transport connectivity between Sudan and South Sudan requires the use of multimodal transport during half the year and is associated with lengthy transit times. Roads, particularly during the

> 2 This is the estimated velocity of traffic between Khartoum to Kosti.

> 3 This is the estimated velocity of traffic between Khartoum and Port Sudan.

> <sup>10</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE rainy season, are often unavailable. Relying on other forms of transport does not solve the problem: river transport services are not well developed, ports are inadequate, and commercial vessels are old. Freight that has to move via river takes six days longer than if it were to travel only by road (table 3). Services are limited between Juba and Kosti, and are used mainly for transporting goods arriving by train in Port Sudan.

The cost of moving freight in Sudan is almost twice what it is on other continents, though it compares with the average for Africa. The average freight tariff between Khartoum and Port Sudan is about $0.08 per tonne-kilometer (tonne-km), and between Khartoum and Kosti is slightly higher, an average of $0.10 per tonne-km. These prices are comparable to that of East Africa but much higher than the global standard of around $0.04 per tonne-km.

The middle-of-the-range costs of moving freight—relative to the African average—are driven by the competitiveness of the trucking industry and access to lower-priced petroleum. In Sudan the trucking industry appears competitive, with few barriers to entry. Growth in the trucking fleet was steady during 2004–06: 10 percent annually for lorries, 20 percent for tank trucks, and over 40 percent for dry-cargo heavy trucks. Additionally, the trucking sector is not cartelized as it is in West and Central Africa. Absence of cartels keeps profit margins reasonable without significant markups. Further, the low cost of petroleum, oil, and lubricants in Sudan—50 percent lower than the regional aggregate—helps maintain reasonable prices.

Trucks travelling to South Sudan, however, may encounter various transport bottlenecks that increase costs. For example, one truck transporting sacks of onions from Kassala to Malakal was subject to taxes and fee payments at about 20 different locations, totaling 2,000 SDG ($800) (Yoshino 2009). Similar payments have not been reported while travelling within Sudan.

Moving freight in Sudan is constrained by inadequate infrastructure and high costs. Comparing the competitiveness of Sudan’s main trading artery (Port Sudan to Kosti) with Africa’s best-performing corridor (the North-South corridor) reveals that there are significantly more costs and longer delays associated with moving along Sudan’s arteries (figures 6 and 7). Moving freight within Sudan takes longer than moving imports from Durban to Lusaka—a route across three countries that is 800 km longer.

**Figure 6. Moving freight within Sudan vs. moving imports from Durban to Lusaka**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 1000<br>800<br>600<br>400<br>200<br>0<br>Port Sudan- Kosti Durban-Lusaka<br>Port Road transport Border Administrative<br>Source: AICD calculations based on Nathan (2010); UNLJC and FAO (2005),<br>and Yoshino (2010).<br>freight<br>Time required to move<br><!-- End of picture text --> Transit times can be broken down into four components: the travel times of moving goods, that is, the time of travel based on the effective velocity along each corridor; administrative time spent importing goods to a country; port time, that is, the time taken to clear goods at ports; and border time, that is, the delays incurred in crossing borders. Transport costs are based on unit costs of moving freight along

> <sup>11</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE specific corridors, whereas administrative costs are based on costs involved in transporting imports into a country. Port and border delays were quantified into costs based on the assumption that delays cost $5 per day per tonne of imports.

Port-related delays **Figure 7. Expense of moving freight within Sudan and across southern Africa** are the primary reason why it takes 18 days 300 longer to move freight 250 from Port Sudan to 200 Kosti than from 150 Durban to Lusaka, a 100 route that is 800 km 50 longer and spans three 0 countries. The time Port Sudan- Kosti Durban-Lusaka required to move Port Road transport Border Administrative freight within Sudan does not include _Source:_ AICD calculations based on Nathan (2010); UNLJC and FAO (2005), and Yoshino (2010). border-related delays _Source:_ AICD calculations based on Nathan (2010); UNLJC and FAO (2005), and Yoshino (2010).

or customs clearance processes that imports or exports to another country would require. The main cause of the delays within Sudan are the extremely long wait times by vessels for a berth and long dwell times in Port Sudan. Durban, one of the most efficient ports in Africa, records far fewer delays.

In addition to the long delays, it costs more to move freight from Port Sudan to Kosti than it does to import freight to Lusaka from Durban. The extremely high costs posed by Port Sudan are reflected in the total cost required to move freight. Moving freight within Sudan is also much more difficult than across southern Africa (table 2). It is striking that even though imported freight to Zambia is subject to various customs fees and border delays, it is still cheaper overall.

> <sup>12</sup>
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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 4. Benchmarking the performance of Sudan’s roads**

|Indicator|Unit|Sudan|Low-<br>income<br>countries|East Africa|Middle-<br>income<br>countries|Resource<br>rich|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Classified road density|km/1,000 km<sup>2</sup>of arable land area|37|88|101|278|57|
|Paving ratio|% of primary network paved|47|71.6||32|82.1|
|Paved road traffic|AADT (vehicles per day)|369|1,341|1,549|3,798|1,408|
|Unpaved road traffic|AADT (vehicles per day)|13|39|47|75|54|
|Classified network<br>condition|Percentage in good or fair condition|26|86|59||80|
|Paved network condition|% of paved roads in good or fair condition|24|86|79|82|68|
|Unpaved network<br>condition|% of unpaved roads in good or fair condition|0|56||58|61|

_Source:_ Derived from AICD calculations.

_Note:_ The paving ratio for Sudan is calculated based on the classified road network that is paved. The paved network condition in Sudan is based on regional and national roads in Sudan. The paved road network for Sudan does not include roads of fair quality because the length of roads with fair quality is unknown. AADT = average annual daily traffic.

# **Table 5a. Land area in Sudan with high agricultural suitability**

|Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value|South Sudan|Sudan|All parts of<br>Sudan|
|---|---|---|---|
|< 10% but high suitability|4,381|1,438|5,819|
|10%–50%|2,279|4,793|7,072|
|> 50%|54|265|319|
|Total area of high agricultural suitability|6,714|6,496|13,210|

# **Table 5b. Distribution of agricultural value within Sudan**

|Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value|South Sudan|Sudan|All parts of<br>Sudan|
|---|---|---|---|
|< 10% but high suitability|65|22|44|
|10%–50%|34|74|54|
|> 50%|1|4|2|
|Total area of high agricultural suitability|100|100|100|
|_Source:_AICD calculations.||||

> <sup>15</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE The poor quality of roads in Sudan significantly lowers the efficiency of transport services. The poor maintenance and need for overlay in Sudan are due to inadequate funding for road maintenance and the lack of cost recovery along existing roads. The net result is a rapid deterioration of the quality of existing roads. The revenue collected by the National Highway Authority from tolls covers only 100 km of overlay and rehabilitation per year. In addition, a backlog of preventive maintenance needs has accumulated, to the extent that between 400 and 500 km of rehabilitation and overlay per year would now be required. Inadequate enforcement of restrictions on axle loads is further accelerating road deterioration (World Bank 2009a).

Agricultural land is very lightly used in Sudan, in part due to inadequate roads. Sizable parts of economically productive areas in Sudan are isolated from the markets. Development of roads is a necessary precondition to exploiting the agricultural potential of Sudan. Sudan has roughly 650,000 square kilometers (km<sup>2</sup> ) of land (table 5a) with high agricultural potential, but 75 percent of it is farmed at only 10 to 50 percent of its capacity. Around a quarter of the land that has high suitability is farmed at only 10 percent of its capacity (tables 5a and 5b).

Transport spending needs can be estimated based on the assumption that key economic nodes need to be connected. It is estimated that Sudan needs 2,900 km of road to meet regional connectivity standards (linking Khartoum to international frontiers); 5,300 km to meet national connectivity standards (linking all provincial capitals to the regional network); and a further 34,201 km to meet rural connectivity standards (linking land responsible for 80 percent of existing agricultural production value to the national network as well as linking land with the capability of producing 50 percent of the nonrealized agricultural value). In addition, the urban connectivity standard assumes an extension of the paved road network to within 500 meters of the population.

Two scenarios are considered. In the base scenario, all infrastructure is maintained in good condition, and higher-end surfacing options are used (asphalt for all regional, national, and urban roads and singlesurface treatment for rural roads). In the pragmatic scenario, half the infrastructure is maintained in good condition and half in fair condition, and lower-cost surfacing options are used (single-surface treatment for national and urban roads and gravel for rural roads).

An initial estimation of the connectivity needs suggests that sizable spending requirements—$750 million to $1 billion—are needed to reach the goals outlined in either scenario. The largest components of this total are attributed to improving conditions of existing roads and expansion of capacity. Once basic connectivity goals have been reached, an ongoing road sector maintenance budget of at least $400 million per year would be required to expand the network, and an additional $390 million would be required to sustain the network. In the pragmatic scenario, while the standards for new developments and upgrading are relaxed, emphasis on maintenance is sustained.

> <sup>16</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 6. Sudan’s spending needs for regional, national, rural, and urban connectivity**

||**Road length in go**<br>**(km)**|**od condition**<br>|**Spendin**<br>Exand|**g needs ($ mil**<br>Urade|**lion per year o**<br>Imrove|**ver a 10-year peri**|**od)**|As share|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Mode|**Actual**|**Required**|p<br>capacity|pg<br>category|p<br>condition|Maintenance|Total|<br>of GDP (%)|
||**Basic scenario**||||||||
|National|874|5,372|0|213|23|123|360|1.7|
|Regional|2,010|2,893|189|84|38|129|440|2.1|
|UAI|50|4,226|222|20|5|15|262|1.2|
|RAI|—|34,201|0|310|33|122|466|2.2|
|Total|2934|46,692|411|627|99|390|1,528|7.2|
|**Pragmatic s**|**cenario**||||||||
|National|874|5,372|0|160|3|119|282|1.3|
|Regional|2,010|2,893|113|33|4|117|268|1.3|
|UAI|50|1,839|63|17|5|15|100|0.5|
|RAI||34,201|0|116|2|258|376|1.8|
|Total|2,934|44,305|176|326|13|509|1,025|4.8|

_Source:_ Adapted from Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray (2009). _Note:_ RAI = Rural Accessibility Index ; UAI = Urban Accessibility Index

# Ports

## **Achievements**

The Sudanese Port Authority (SPC) has used its large revenues to invest in infrastructure improvements at Port Sudan. The SPC revenue per ton of throughput increased by 47 percent in dollar terms between 2000 and 2005. A combination of a higher realization per tonne handled and large increases in throughput has led to the generation of substantial surpluses. Information from the mid-2000s suggests that the SPC invested around $187 million in development projects. This resulted in the main areas being in good condition with a

**Figure 10. Port Sudan faces serious congestion problems**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 150%<br>125%<br>100%<br>75%<br>50%<br>25%<br>0%<br>Source: AICD ports database.<br>reported capacity<br>Ratio of current demand to<br>Cotonou Cape Town Luanda Port Sudan Douala Dar es Salaam Mombasa<br><!-- End of picture text --> number of new berths added and infrastructure projects commissioned. The SPC enjoys a monopoly in its role as the country’s main node for maritime trade, and its revenues appear high relative to the number of ships using the port and the volume of cargo it handles (World Bank 2008).

> <sup>17</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# **Challenges**

Port Sudan remains one of the most inefficient ports in Africa. Compared to regional benchmarks, container dwell time at Port Sudan is over four times that of global best practices and among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa. Truck cycle times for receipt and delivery of cargo at Port Sudan are 24 times higher than global benchmarks, and crane productivity is less than a third of what is observed in several parts of Africa. The handling charges at Port Sudan are at the lower end of what is charged in other African ports, but the inefficiencies present a huge deterrent to increased usage of the port (table 7).

**Table 7. Benchmarking Port Sudan’s performance**

||**Port Sudan**|**Mombasa**|**Dar es Salaam**|Southern<br>Africa|West Africa|Global best<br>practice|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Performance**|||||||
|Container dwell time (days)|28|5|7|4–8|11–30|<7|
|Truck processing time (hours)|24|4.5|5|2–12|6–24|1|
|Crane productivity (containers per<br>hour)|8|10|20|8–22|7–20|20–30|
|Crane productivity (tonnes per hour)|8|21|23|10–25|7–15|>30|
|**Charges**|||||||
|Container handling ($ per TEU)|150|67.5|275|110–243|100–320|80–150|
|General-cargo handling ($ per tonne)|10|6.5|13.5|11–15|8–15|7–9|
|Container handling ($ per TEU)|-130|-54.5|-248|110–244|100–321|80–151|

_Source:_ AICD ports database. _Note:_ TEU = 20-foot equivalent unit.

A steady increase in containers handled at Port Sudan has created serious port congestion problems, adding significant delays to the movement of freight. Several of the region’s ports are beginning to experience serious capacity constraints (figure 10) due to burgeoning demand associated with increases in container traffic and dry-bulk cargo. Port Sudan in particular is already operating at 80 percent capacity at least, a level of intensity that creates problems in terms of congestion. There is some scope for easing capacity constraints by improving the efficiency of port performance, although ultimately new investments will be needed (see figure 10).

Labor requirements at the port lead to overstaffing, poor productivity, and higher costs. In the North Port, the equivalent of a dock labor board exists and there is a legal requirement to use labor from a pool of 25,000 workers. In the container terminal, the SPC provides the labor and acknowledges that it is overstaffed by 7,300 workers (World Bank 2008).

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE Growth in seats for travel between Sudan and South Sudan tripled between 2001 and 2007. The Diio SRS shows that in 2007, while there were 219,741 seats for travel within Sudan, there were only 696 seats advertised for South Sudan (table 8) These figures may mask the fact that traffic between the two regions has actually grown rather significantly—from 24,452 seats in 2001 to 87,191 in 2007. How much of that traffic is hub traffic through Khartoum traveling between points in South Sudan is not known.

**Table 8. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Sudan and select other countries**<sup>**4**</sup>

|Country|Sudan|Ethiopia|Chad|CAR|Kenya|Egypt|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Traffic (2007)|||||||
|Domestic travel (‘000 seats per year, excluding south)|218|729|n.a.|n.a.|2,093|5,959|
|International travel within Africa (‘000 seats per year)|302|1,837|110|21|3,145|1,886|
|Intercontinental travel (‘000 seats per year)|2,052|2,005|89|24|2,755|15,793|
|Seats available per 100 people|9.8|5.8|1.8|1|21|27.5|
|Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport market (%)|15.29|70.61|36.35|50.26|39.47|24|
|Quality|||||||
|Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft|71.9|98.5|99.5|100|80.2|90.7|
|Percent of seat-km in medium or smaller aircraft|72|39.7|93.6|23.5|20.8|51.2|
|Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA audit|0|100|0|0|11.1|50|
|FAA/IASA audit status|No audit|Passed|No audit|0|0|Passed|

_Source:_ Bofinger 2009.

_Note:_ The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. A HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; the lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent.

FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit; CAR = Central African Republic. n.a. = Not applicable.

# **Challenges**

Existing air connectivity in Sudan is largely oriented toward the Middle East and Egypt. Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) is used as the main connecting point to transit to the rest of Africa, while Sudan has, for example, no direct flights from Khartoum to Kampala (table 9).

There is a lack of regulatory oversight in the air transport sector. A number of small, domestic carriers, registered generally as charter airlines, are operational. These operators may act as scheduled carriers, but do not report information to a booking or ticket sales agency. Often such operators in countries with poor oversight pose an air safety problem as they operate aircraft maintained on minimal budgets, with maintenance crew and pilots whose skills may not be consistent with international standards. The percentage of seats in Sudan flown on newer aircraft is smaller than its neighbors, creating additional safety risks.

> 4 All data are as of 2007 based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the Diio SRS Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a percentage of African traffic is not captured by these data.

> <sup>20</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 9. Origin destination matrix—Sudan**

||Bahrain|Egypt|Eritrea|Ethiopia|Germany|Jordan|Kenya|Lebanon|Libya|Netherlands<br>**Sudan**|Qatar|Saudi Arabia|Syrian Arab Republic|Turkey|United Arab Emirates|United Kingdom|Yemen|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Bahrain||||||||||10||||||||
|Egypt||||||||||38||||||||
|Eritrea||||||||||1||||||||
|Ethiopia||||||||||10||||||||
|Germany||||||||||4||||||||
|Jordan||||||||||6||||||||
|Kenya||||||||||14||||||||
|Lebanon||||||||||3||||||||
|Libya||||||||||2||||||||
|Netherlands||||||||||3||||||||
|**Sudan**|10|38|1|10|4|6|13|3|2|3|15|17|2|7|29|3|2|
|Qatar||||||||||14||||||||
|Saudi Arabia||||||||||17||||||||
|Syrian Arab<br>Republic||||||||||4||||||||
|Turkey||||||||||7||||||||
|United Arab<br>Emirates||||||||||29||||||||
|United Kingdom||||||||||3||||||||
|Yemen||||||||||2||||||||

_Source:_ Bofinger 2009.

> <sup>21</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

## **Figure 12. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Seats b. City pairs<br>4,000,000 60<br>3,500,000<br>50<br>3,000,000<br>40<br>2,500,000<br>2,000,000 30<br>1,500,000<br>20<br>1,000,000<br>10<br>500,000<br>- 0<br>2,001 2,004 2,007 2009 (Est)<br>2,001 2,004 2,007 2009 (Est)<br>Total Total International<br>International<br>Intercontinental excluding flights between NA and SSA<br>Between North and South Intercontinental Between North and South<br>Domestic<br>City pairs<br>Number of seats<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). _Note:_ As reported to international reservation systems. NA = North Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

# Water supply and sanitation

## **Challenges**

Around 85 percent of Sudan’s populace lacks access to safe sources of water (figure 13). Over 25 percent of the population relies on surface water and almost 60 percent relies on wells and boreholes. Sudan’s reliance on wells and boreholes for water supply is higher than for any other country in its peer groups and is becoming a challenge for the country. Fewer than half the wells and boreholes in Africa provide safe water (table 10).

Sanitation access in Sudan is bimodal. On the one hand, 40 percent of the population has access to improved latrines; on the other, 40 percent continues to practice open defecation. Both ratios are substantially higher than for the relevant resource-rich and low-income African peer groups. In contrast to these peers, reliance on flush toilets and traditional latrines is much more limited.

A very small share of the population—15 percent—has access to utility water, well below all other African benchmarks. Available information suggests that there is almost no access to piped water, and stand posts are the only form of utility water that is accessed. Census data for all parts of Sudan indicate that in 1993 about 60 percent of the population had access to utility water but there has been a steep decline in access rates—down to 35 percent—in the 2000s. Since access to utility water is negligible in South Sudan, the access data for all parts of Sudan reported in the census relates primarily to Sudan itself.

> <sup>22</sup>
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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

||Unit|**Sudan**<br>Resource-rich<br>countries<br>**2009**<br>**Mid-2000s**|Low-income<br>countries<br>**Mid-2000s**|Middle-income<br>countries<br>**Mid-2000s**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Open defecation|% pop|43<br>28|38.3|11|
|||**2005**<br>**Mid-2000s**|**Mid-2000s**|**Mid-2000s**|
|Domestic water consumption|liter/capita/day|53<br>115|50.9|196|
|Revenue collection|% sales|64<br>60|94.1|99|
|Distribution losses|% production|40<br>40|34.8|29|
|Cost recovery|% total costs|62<br>67|89.5|86|
|Operating-cost recovery|% operating costs|86<br>94|125.2|121|
|Labor productivity|connections per employee|93<br>96|175.9|203|
|Total hidden costs|% of revenue|121<br>194||67|
|||**Scarce water**<br>**resources**<br>**S**|**udan**|**Other**<br>**developing**<br>**regions**|
|Average effective tariff|U.S. cents per m3|60|57|3–60|

_Source:_ Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and AICD water and sanitation utilities database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).Note: Access figures calculated by the AICD based on the 2000 and 2006 DHS figures published by the Joint Monitoring Program (WHO 2010). — = Not available.

Only 40 percent of urban dwellers rely on advanced water technologies for their water supply. Close to 40 percent of the population has access to utility water—mainly stand posts—in urban areas, and around 5 percent in rural areas. Almost 70 percent of rural Sudanese rely on wells and boreholes, 30 percent higher than in urban areas. It is very striking that there is little difference in the reliance on surface water—around 25 percent of both rural and urban Sudanese obtain their water from open sources.

There is significantly greater usage of improved sanitation technology types in urban areas (figure 14). Urban areas have twice the level of access to flush toilets or improved

**Figure 14. Limited access to advanced water technologies in urban Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>90<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Urban Rural<br>% population<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Access figures calculated by AICD using data 2009 DHS data.

latrines compared to rural areas. In the case of flush toilets, the access rate in urban areas is 14 percent compared to 1 percent in rural areas. Sixty percent of the urban population relies on improved latrines compared to 32 percent of the population in rural areas (figure 15). Some 68 percent of the rural population defecate in the open compared to 12 percent of urban dwellers.

Deep boreholes and hand pumps are the predominant technology used for water supply in the poorer households, and water filters (improved sources of water) are the water supply modalities in wealthier households. Around 41 percent of the poorest quintile of households derive their water from wells and

> <sup>24</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE boreholes, while 12 percent of the wealthiest quintile of households rely on water from wells and boreholes.

Lower-income Sudanese use lower-end sanitation technologies. Around 54 percent of the poorest quintile of the population defecates in the open compared to 13 percent of the richest quintile. While none of the poorest quintile of the population uses flush toilets, almost 20 percent of the richest quintile do so. The most dominant sanitation technology across the board is pit toilets. Disparities are less glaring in the use of pit toilets—around 42 percent of the poorest quintile of the population and 56 percent of the richest quintile of the population use them.

The KWC’s poor performance, particularly due to inadequate collection of bills and network losses, also holds back service expansion. The

**Figure 15. Sanitation access is largely bimodal**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>90<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Urban Rural<br>% population<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Access figures calculated by AICD using data 2009 DHS data.

KWC fares poorly when its performance is compared to regional benchmarks. Nonrevenue water, at 40 percent of production, is twice that of a well-performing utility. At 90 connections per employee, labor productivity is less than half the average productivity of a utility in middle-income countries, which is 200 connections per employee. On average, Sudan’s water utilities recover only 62 percent of the total billing, which is comparable to the revenue collection of utilities in resource-rich countries, but is a very poor track record in absolute terms. Finally, cost-recovery tariffs are not in place, creating a constant financial drain.

The poor performance can be quantified as a percentage of revenue, giving a sense of the hidden costs attached to such inefficiencies. Sufficient data were available to quantify these hidden costs for the KWC as well for one other provincial utility in Sudan: the South Darfur Water Corporation. The KWC emerges at the more inefficient of the two. Overall, the utilities lose between 80 and 120 percent of their revenues. The main drivers of these losses are collection inefficiencies, followed by distributional losses. The inefficiencies in Sudan’s utilities are slightly lower than several East African countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) that lose up to 150 percent of their revenues due to hidden costs (figure 16), but are still very high in absolute terms, amounting to $73 million a year.

> <sup>25</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 16. Hidden costs of selected water utilities, as percentage of revenue**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Khartoum Water Corporation<br>South Darfur Water Corporation<br>Kenya<br>Ethiopia<br>Sudan (Average 2005)<br>Tanzania<br>Uganda<br>0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200<br>Percentage of revenues<br>Losses Underpricing Collection Inefficiencies<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

The valuation of these hidden costs helps identify the individual challenges faced by Sudanese utilities. Collection inefficiencies are leading concerns for the South Darfur Water Corporation and the Khartoum Water Corporation. The underlying observable performance indicators are presented in table 11.

**Table 11. Operational indicators for water utilities in Sudan, 2005**

|Utility|Water<br>delivered<br>(million<br>m<sup>3</sup>/year)|System<br>losses (%)|Collection<br>ratio (%)|Average<br>total cost<br>($/m<sup>3</sup>)|Average<br>effective tariff<br>($/m<sup>3</sup>)|Total hidden<br>costs ($ million/year)|Total<br>hidden<br>costs (%<br>revenues )|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Khartoum Water Corp|250|40|62|0.68|0.59|73|122|
|South Darfur Water Corp|7|49|49|0.89|1.13|3|87|

_Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

_Note:_ For Sudan water delivered (million m<sup>3</sup> /year) and total hidden costs ($/year) are reported as the sum of the utilities; the other indicators are calculated as weighted averages. Average total cost per cubic meter was calculated assuming a unit capital cost of 40 cents.

> <sup>26</sup>
<!-- Start of picture text --> a<br>¢ 5 Power Plants | Tyxe and Capacity(Mv)<br>aoe ra Ne<br>.<br>‘ Se .<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# **Achievements**

Installed electricity generation capacity in Sudan tripled between 2005 and 2007. Sudan’s installed capacity increased from 801 MW (AICD 2005) in 2005 to around 2,687 MW in 2009 (Platts 2009).<sup>6</sup> Compared to its African peers, Sudan’s installed capacity far exceeds what lowincome countries have put in place but lags behind that of resource-rich countries. In 2005 around 70 percent of the electricity was generated via thermal generation and around 20 percent using hydropower resources. But the composition mix seems to have changed since 2005; with the construction of new hydropower plants, the generation mix has now shifted to 55 percent hydropower and 45 percent thermal.

**Table 12. Relatively high usage of modern fuels for cooking in Sudan**

|Usage of modern fuels||
|---|---|
||All households<br>Richest households|
|**Sudan (2009)**|**36.10**<br>**64.90**|
|Kenya (2003)|3.45<br>16.52|
|Nigeria (2003)|1.19<br>5.51|
|Uganda (2001)|0.87<br>4.34|
|Ethiopia (2005)|0.31<br>1.48|
|South Sudan (2009)|0.30<br>0.80|
|Tanzania (2005)|0.24<br>1.22|
|_Source:_World Bank 2010|b and c DHS various years.|

The National Energy Corporation (NEC) enjoys healthy bill collection. The utility reports that all of the billings are routinely collected by the utility. These rates are higher than all other African peer groups (table 13).

Sudan boasts a relatively high use of modern fuels (gas and electricity) for cooking relative to its African peers. Around 36 percent of Sudan’s population uses modern fuels for cooking compared to 1 percent of resource-rich Nigeria’s population. Over 65 percent of Sudan’s richest quintile use modern fuels for cooking relative to 6 percent in Nigeria and 16 percent in Kenya (see table 12). Even 8 percent of the poorest quintile of the population used modern fuels.

# **Challenges**

Electricity access rates, at around 37 percent of the population, are still low relative to most of Sudan’s resource-rich peers. The figure is more or less comparable to that of African low-income countries, however. Over 52 percent of urban areas have access to electricity compared to 28 percent of rural areas. Rural electrification is broadly comparable with other parts of Africa, but urban electrification lags significantly. There is a difference of over 25 percentage points between access to power in urban areas in Sudan and in other resource-rich countries in Africa.

Inadequate power access retards business activity, with the challenge being more acute in some areas than others. Though firms reporting that power is not widely available varied from 25 to 60 percent, state to state, across all states firms identified power to be a major problem. This challenge is particularly acute in the Nyala region, where around 60 percent of firms say inadequate power constrains business activity (figure 18a). Power outages in Sudan, at 19 days per year, greatly impact productive activity and exceed those found among the country’s resource-rich and low-income peers.

> 6 Based on the estimate that around 97 percent of all parts of Sudan’s power is in Sudan.

> <sup>28</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 13. Benchmarking power indicators in Sudan**

|Indicators|Units|Sudan|Low-income,<br>nonfragile<br>countries|Middle-<br>income<br>countries|Resource-<br>rich<br>countries|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Access to electricity (national)|% of population|36.5|33|50|46|
|Access to electricity (urban)|% of population|52|86|72.8|79.4|
|Access to electricity (rural)|% of population|28|12.7|26.3|28|
|Installed generation capacity|MW|2,712|651|36,971|4,105|
|Installed generation capacity per<br>million population|MW per million population|80|20|799|43|
|Power outages|Days/year||10.4|5.9|14.5|
|Firms that find power a constraint for<br>business|% of firms||52|31|56|
|Firms with own generator|% of firms|41|41|18|63|
|Collection rate|% billing|100|92|91|70|
|Revenue per unit|US cents/ kWh|9|14|13|13|
|System losses|% of generation|22|24|20|52|
|Effective power tariff||Sudan|Predominantly|hydro|Other<br>countries|
|Residential at 100 kWh|US cents/kWh|0.09||10.27||
|Commercial at 100 kWh|US cents/kWh|||11.73|5.0–10.0|
|Industrial at 50,000 kWh|US cents/kWh|||11.39||
|Average effective tariff|US cents/kWh|9|8|15|12.6|

_Source:_ All data unless specified are for 2005 and based on AICD calculations; data for access to electricity for Sudan are from 2009 and were obtained from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA); data for South Sudan access to electricity are from 2010 and were obtained from World Bank (2011); data for installed capacity for Sudan are from 2009 and were obtained from Platts (2009); data for power outages ere derived from Vennemo and Rosnes (2009); data for Emergency Generation from Eberhard and others (2008); data for firms that find power to be a constraint and firms with own generators are from 2007 and were obtained from World Bank (2009b); data on Sudan collection rate, revenue per unit, and system losses are for 2004 and were taken from World Bank (2007); data for average effective tariff for Sudan are for 2004 and taken from World Bank (2007); data for average effective tariff for South Sudan are taken from World Bank (2011). For the thermal benchmark, data represent primarily residential users.

_Note:_ Access to electricity data for Sudan are estimates based on calculations from the AICD economic model for power investment needs. Installed capacity per million population was calculated based on Platts (2009) estimates for installed capacity. * The aggregate is based on manufacturing firms.

Excessive reliance on generators to cope with erratic and unreliable power supply increases production costs and reduces competitiveness. A significant share of manufacturing enterprises (from 36 percent in North Kordofan to 96 percent in Red Sea) share or own generators. The share of electricity consumption produced by generators in these states was 66 percent and 72 percent, respectively. Apart from increasing costs and reducing competitiveness, investment in these generators also holds up a significant amount of resources that could have been used for other fixed assets or to lower working capital constraints of most of the businesses (World Bank 2009b). Given erratic supply and high reliance on backup generators, industrial and commercial consumers account for only around 30 percent of electric utility consumption (figure 19). Consumption of power for agricultural uses is around 5 percent, and the rest of the consumption is primarily by domestic consumers. In contrast, billing patterns (as a proxy for consumption) in South Africa suggest that industrial and commercial consumers account for 92 percent of all billings, and residential consumers for only 8 percent.

> <sup>29</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 18a. Electricity is the largest obstacle to doing Figure 18b. High reliance on generators for power business in Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70 120<br>60 100<br>50 80<br>40 60<br>30 40<br>20 20<br>10 0<br>0<br>North river Nile Khartoum Gezira Nyala Red Sea<br>Kordofan<br>% of firms that own generator % of power from generator<br>Gazira Khartoum River Nile North Kordofan Red Sea Nyala<br>Perception that electricity is the biggest onstable to doing business (% of firms)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from World Bank (2009b).

**Figure 19. A small share of Sudan’s power consumption is for industrial activities**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6000<br>5000<br>4000<br>3000<br>2000<br>1000<br>0<br>2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br>Agriculture (pumps) consumption Industrial consumption<br>Government consumption Commerical consumption<br>Domestic consumption Electricity Generated<br>GWh<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Based on statistical handbooks produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics and on data reported by the NEC, which are assumed to reflect the situation in Sudan.

Power prices are toward the lower-middle end of the range observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. At $0.09 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), the price is close to the average of countries predominantly reliant on hydropower. Nevertheless, given that thermal power has been dominant until quite recently and continues to play a significant role, tariffs look low relative to historic costs of around $0.19/kWh (figure 20).

The costs of producing power are marginally higher than the average cost of power production in Africa. The average power production cost in Sudan, at $0.19/kWh, is slightly more than that of SubSaharan Africa’s, which is around $0.18/kWh (figure 21). The costs are partially offset by generous government subsidies to the power utility. In 2003 and 2004 the government of Sudan provided subsidies valued at around $60 million. While there are no data available for later years, it is believed that the power utility continues to receive these subsides from the government. The end user ultimately pays less than half of what it costs to produce the power.

> <sup>30</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 20. Moderate power tariffs in Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br>45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>US cents per KWh<br>Liberia Chad Burkina Faso South Sudan Cape Verde Senegal Mali Uganda Kenya Congo, Rep. Rwanda Benin Niger Cote d'Ivoire Namibia Madagascar Cameroon North Sudan Ghana Botswana Mozambique Lesotho Tanzania South Africa Ethiopia Zimbabwe Nigeria Malawi DRC Zambia<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2009; World Bank 2007; World Bank 2011 _. Note:_ South Sudan’s price is the median of its price range of 18–29 cents. DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Figure 21. Benchmarking historic power production costs in Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2009; World Bank 2007; World Bank 2011.<br>Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo.<br>Mali Niger Congo Benin North Sudan Cape Verde Cameroon Rwanda Burkina Faso Madagascar Kenya Tanzania Chad Ghana Senegal Namibia Cote d'Ivoire Lesotho Mozambique Uganda Zimbabwe Nigeria Malawi Ethiopia DRC Zambia South Africa Botswana<br>Total costs of power production<br>Sierra Leone (2001-07) Sierra Leone 2009/10<br><!-- End of picture text --> In spite of the generous subsidies received from the government, the NEC reported large financial losses. The utility lost $12 million each year in 2003 and 2004, $0.02–$0.03 per unit of electricity sold. Even the 10 percent increase in power sales from the previous year did not stabilize the financial performance of the NEC.

Hidden costs diverted significant resources from the utility, causing economic losses of almost $500 million ($484 million) in 2008 Underpricing is one major problem—the $0.09 per kilowatt-hour tariff recovers only 50 percent of the $0.18 required to produce a kilowatt-hour. Despite subsidization, this underpricing added almost $380 million to the NEC’s 2008 losses.

Network losses were around 22 percent in 2008. Though generally consistent with what most African utilities encounter, losses of this magnitude are double international best-practice standards. Network losses contributed $106 million to the NEC’s 2008 financial losses (table 14).

> <sup>31</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 14. Operational indicators for the NEC**

||Net generation|System<br>losses|Implicit<br>collection ratio|Average total<br>cost|Average<br>effective tariff|Total hidden<br>costs|Total hidden<br>costs|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(GWh/year)|(%)|(%)|($/kWh)|($/kWh)|($ million/year)|(% revenues)|
|2003|3,560|34.8|100|0.16|0.08|306|175|
|2004|3,749|33.4|100|0.16|0.09|293|129|
|2005|4,124|26|100|—|—|_|—|
|2006|4,521|24|100|0.16|0.092|340|96|
|2007|5,021|22|100|0.20|0.092|528|113|
|2008|5,506|22|100|0.19|0.098|484|96|

_Source:_ AICD analysis based on World Bank (2007) and Sudan Central Bureau of Statistical Handbooks. — = Not available.

Some progress has been made, however. Hidden costs as a share of utility revenue fell substantially from 175 percent of NEC’s revenues in 2003 to 96 percent in 2008 (figure 22). This is largely attributable to significant reduction in network losses, which were as high as 35 percent in 2003 but were reduced to 22 percent by 2008. While tariffs have risen slightly, they have not kept pace with the rising costs of production Nevertheless, a 60 percent expansion of power production all sold at a loss, has inflated absolute hidden costs from $306 million in 2003 to $484 million in 2008 Expressed in terms of the size of the economy, these hidden costs shaved off 2.2 percent of GDP in 2003, falling to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2008.

**Figure 22. Large hidden costs at the NEC due to underpricing and unaccounted losses**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 200<br>180<br>160<br>140<br>120<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>2003 2004 2006 2007 2008<br>Unaccounted Losses UnderPricing Collection Inefficiencies<br>(%)<br>Hidden costs as a share of revenue<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009) using data from World Bank (2007) and Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics handbooks.

The NEC’s hidden costs look high when compared to that of other African utilities (figure 23). They represent about 100 percent of the NEC’s revenues and are double that of the top-performing countries such as Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin. Nevertheless, they are far from being the worst in Africa.

> <sup>32</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 23. Hidden costs are high in Sudan relative to other African countries**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 300<br>250<br>200<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>Nigeria South Liberia Niger Mali Ghana Sudan Burkina Cote Benin Cape Senegal South<br>Sudan Faso d'Ivoire Verde Africa<br>Collection Inefficiencies Underpricing Losses<br>Percentage of revenues<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics handbooks.

In the long run, Sudan’s power cost-recovery situation looks a little more promising, particularly if the nation’s hydropower potential is developed. Using a model that simulates optimal (least-cost) strategies for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases, it is estimated that the long-run marginal costs of producing power in Sudan would be about $0.13/kWh when all cost-effective power strategies are fully developed. Although this is well below the historic cost of around $0.19/kWh, it is still significantly above the current tariff of $0.09/kWh. Thus, there is a need to continue raising the tariff toward these long-term equilibrium levels (figure 24).

**Figure 24. Existing tariffs for power are insufficient to recover huge operating costs and long-run marginal costs**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>US$ cents per KWh 0<br>Existing total Longrun - Existing Effective tariff Average Existing capital<br>cost marginal Cost operating cost revenue cost<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ AICD calculations.

Sudan’s rich endowment of hydropower resources could make it a significant exporter of hydropower in the Nile Basin region. To meet its potential, Sudan would need to develop more than 3,100 MW of hydropower capacity beyond its domestic needs, which would represent a doubling of capacity. The nation would also need to develop around 13,500 MW of interconnector capacity, the largest of any country in the region.

> <sup>33</sup>
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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# **Achievements**

All parts of Sudan have made impressive progress in the ICT sector since the early 2000s, placing access and service penetration rates on par with African peers. In the early 2000s, only around 60 percent of the population was covered by a GSM<sup>7</sup> signal. As of 2010, over 80 percent of the population is covered by a GSM signal. Mobile subscription rates have risen from less than 1 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2009. Growth in mobile telephony has been impressive and Sudan’s is among the most rapidly growing in Africa. Until recently, most of the development in the sector was in the northern part of Sudan .Only a few other countries in East Africa—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—have achieved mobile penetration of around 20 percent or more. Internet penetration has also grown significantly but slightly lags behind resource-rich and middle-income African countries. International bandwidth in all parts of Sudan has grown exponentially and exceeds all benchmarks except middle-income countries **.** The landline sector has not demonstrated much growth, meanwhile, in part because of an overwhelming preference for mobile phones. This trend is broadly consistent across Africa as a whole.

**Table 15. All parts of Sudan compare favorably to the average African country in terms of ICT access and prices**

||||All parts of|Sudan|Resource-<br>rich<br>countries|Low-<br>income<br>countries|Middle-<br>income<br>countries|Sub-<br>Saharan<br>Africa|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Indicator|Unit||2000|2008|2008|2008|2008|2008|
|Access|||||||||
|GSM coverage|% population<br>signal|under|60|80|78|63|96|72|
|International bandwidth|Bits/person||0.06|35|18|25|209|39|
|Internet|Users/100 pe|ople|0.1|5.9|9|3.5|7|5.5|
|Landline|Subscribers/|100 people|1.2|1.09|0.9|0.8|9.2|1.4|
|Mobile phone|Subscribers/|100 people|0.05|33|38.2|24.4|95.3|33.1|
|Prices|||2008|2009|2008|2008|2008|2008|
|Price of monthly mobile basket||US $|4.8|3|17.07|11|9.24|12.06|
|Price of monthly fixed-line basket||US $|4.4|5.3|15.12|10.43|11.41|12.38|
|Price of monthly fixed broadband||US $|47|25|231.98|286.72|57.42|208.71|
|Price of a call to the United States|per minute|US $||0.42|0.92|0.69|0.56|0.7|
|Price of an inter-Africa call per mi|nute|US $||0.42|1.16|0.94|1.06|0.99|

_Source:_ Adapted from Minges and others 2009 using data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Sudatel, Zain, and World Bank ICT At-aGlance.

_Source:_ Data for landline subscribers is for 2005 taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan; Mobile phone subscriptions based on World Bank staff estimates for 2011; _Note:_ Landline and mobile subscriber data are based on information from Sudan; the others are based on Sudan aggregates. These are representative of Sudan because until recently South Sudan did not have access to adequate ICT services. Most of the ICT connectivity existed only in Sudan.

Analysis of 2006 data for all parts of Sudan suggests that almost 98 percent of the population could access mobile telephony on a commercially viable basis (figure 26). This result is based on the assumption that 4 percent of local income in each area could be captured as revenue for voice telephony

> 7 Global system for mobile communications.

> <sup>35</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE services. The gap in universal access to telephony can be closed relatively easily for Sudan on a commercial basis. A small subsidy could aid in reaching the uncovered 2 percent of the population.

For broadband infrastructure, simulations present an optimistic picture. Around 96 percent of all parts of Sudan’s population could gain access to limited performance WIMAX<sup>8</sup> broadband infrastructure on a commercially viable basis. A gap of 3 to 4 percent exists in the northwest region of all parts of Sudan— primarily a desert—and in the south (figure 27)

# **Figure 26. A small subsidy could have closed the mobile telephony coverage gap in all parts of Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Existing access Efficient Market Gap Coverage gap<br>Source: Mayer and others 2009.<br>Percent of population<br>South Africa Nigeria Ghana Benin Côte d’Ivoire Senegal Sudan Malawi Burkina Faso Cameroon Ethiopia Tanzania Lesotho Mali Chad Niger Madagascar Congo-DRC<br><!-- End of picture text --> The advent of undersea fiber-optic cables has enabled Sudan to develop a strong ICT infrastructure backbone (figure 26). Three undersea cable systems land in Port Sudan: SAS-1 (providing a direct link to Saudi Arabia), Flag Falcon, and, most recently, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy). In addition, there are terrestrial links to Egypt and Ethiopia and a 10,000 km domestic fiber backbone (Sudatel 2009). The EASSy has established a landing station in Sudan. Significant private investment has facilitated Sudan’s fiber-optic connectivity. Sudan needs to establish overland connections to the cable to complete the national ICT backbone The emergence of competition in gateways as a result of connectivity to the undersea cable has facilitated very attractive prices for ICT services in Sudan—among the most attractive in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sudan pays a third of what resource-rich countries pay and a fourth of what low-income countries pay for the mobile basket. Landline telephony, which has not experienced any growth, has also seen its prices slashed. But prices for fixed broadband are the most striking. In 2005 all parts of Sudan paid 10 percent of what resource-rich countries paid for their ICT services and 8 percent of what low-income countries paid (table 15).

> 8 Worldwide interoperability for microwave access.

> <sup>36</sup>
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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE company and the rest is owned by other private entities. Shares in Sudatel have been available to the public since 1997 and are traded on several Middle Eastern stock markets. Sudatel is also a strategic investor in its own right, with operations in Mauritania and Senegal as well as Ghana and Nigeria. Now there are two fixed-line operators (Sudatel and Canar) and three nationwide GSM mobile operators (Sudatel, MTN, and Zain), which also operate in South Sudan.

By establishing a universal service fund, Sudan is garnering funds to expand service coverage to economically unviable rural areas. Effective from 2009, mobile network operators pay 2 percent of their gross revenues into a universal access fund, plus $0.87 per customer per year. Proceeds from the fund are expected to be used to subsidize rollouts in otherwise economically unfeasible rural areas (Lange 2010).

# Financing Sudan’s infrastructure

To meet its most pressing needs, Sudan has to significantly improve infrastructure in key areas. For the purpose of this report, illustrative targets have been set using standardized criteria and assuming a time horizon of 10 years to meet the targets. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be attained using a mix of technological options. Similarly, targets for increasing electrification assume, at least, doubling the current access rates, which in one case implies reaching 55 percent of the population on average. In the case of transport, national connectivity involves connecting centers with populations larger than 25,000 people. This translates into a need for 5,372 km of road in good condition in the north (table 17).

**Table 17. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Sudan**

|Sector|Economic targets|Social targets|
|---|---|---|
|ICT|Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and submarine cable.<br>Add 26,900 base stations for urban and 41,204 base stations for rural.|Provide universal access to GSM<br>signal and public broadband facilities.|
|Power|Assuming trade stagnation, estimate optimal (least-cost) investment strategies for<br>generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases.<br>Achieve exogenously determined electrification rates.<br>Develop 440 MW of new generation capacity (no trade scenario). This scenario could<br>be replaced under trade expansion with 2,200 MW of generation capacity and the<br>needed megawatts in interconnectors.|Raise electrification from 37 to 55<br>percent of population (100 percent<br>urban, 30 percent rural).|
|Transport|Achieve regional (national) connectivity across Sudan with good-quality 2-lane (1-<br>lane) paved road.<br>Provide rural road access to 100 percent of the highest-value agricultural land based<br>on current production, plus providing rural road access to 50 percent of the<br>nonproductive agricultural land with highest potential.<br>Add or rehabilitate roads to have the following number of kilometers in good condition:<br>5,372 km for national connectivity, 2,893 km for regional connectivity, 4,226 km in<br>urban areas, and 34,200 km in rural areas.|Provide urban road access within 500<br>square meters.|
|Water|Increase population with access to improved water to 72 percent of the population and<br>access to improved sanitation to 76 percent of the population.<br>Target technology mix for improved water:<br>Piped water (23% urban, 0% rural), standposts (52% urban, 12% rural), safe wells<br>(25% urban, 88% rural).|Achieve Millennium Development<br>Goals by preserving the current mix of<br>sanitation technological options and<br>clearing the sector rehabilitation<br>backlog.|

_Source:_ Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009.

> <sup>38</sup>
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE Sudan would need to spend $4.2 billion a year—or 20 percent of its GDP—over the next decade to meet infrastructure targets (table 18). After South Africa and Nigeria, these are the largest infrastructure spending needs for any Sub-Saharan African country. They are broadly comparable to the needs faced by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. As explained earlier, the massive needs are driven by the initial starting conditions and are based on reasonable assumptions regarding what outputs are attainable. The estimates are conspicuously large (i) because the land area of the country is massive, with large pockets of uninhabited terrain, and (ii) because of the low starting point, particularly in the water and transport sectors.

**Table 18. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in Sudan, 2006–15**

|US$ million per year|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Sector|Capital expenditure|Operations and<br>maintenance|Total needs|Total needs as<br>share of GDP|
|ICT|267|43|310|1.45|
|Irrigation|—|—|—|—|
|Power (nontrade)|320|104|424|1.98|
|Transport|1,295|490|1,785|8.35|
|Water supply and sanitation|1,422|280|1,701|7.97|
|Total|3,303|917|4,220|19.8|

_Source_ : Mayer and others 2008 **;** Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others, AICD 2009. Derived from models available online at www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. _Note:_ ICT = information and communication technology. — = Not available The transport and the water and sanitation sectors have the highest financing needs. About $1.8 billion would be needed to provide minimum surface connectivity and around $1.7 billion would be needed each year to meet the MDGs for water and sanitation. Particularly in the water network, decades of war have created an enormous rehabilitation backlog. For example, 40 percent of rural water assets and 42 percent of urban water assets need rehabilitation for Sudan as a whole. Transport needs are largely driven by the need to maintain regional corridors and upgrade existing rural tracks to make them usable.

A distant second are the needs for power, at $424 million. The spending needs estimates assume that only the power infrastructure needed to meet domestic demand is developed. The estimates would be substantially higher if the development of power export potential were also considered—that is, if Sudan were also to fully develop its 3,000 MW of hydropower export potential, a further $1.1 billion would be needed annually to develop additional capacity and interconnectors.

Needs estimates for ICT, at $310 million a year, are the lowest among the sectors. This is because of the recent ICT boom, which has largely been financed by the private sector. While an undersea cable is accessible via Port Sudan, overland connections to the cable need to be financed to complete the national ICT backbone.

At 20 percent of GDP, Sudan’s needs are twice as high as other resource-rich economies in Africa and broadly comparable to those of low-income countries such as Kenya, Senegal, and Madagascar (figure 28). These needs in terms of the economy’s size are strikingly high given the recent oil influx and revamping of infrastructure investments. New investments account for over three-quarters of total needs

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE and are around 15 percent of GDP—roughly equivalent to what China has been investing on its own domestic infrastructure development in recent years.

**Figure 28. Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs in the regional context, as share of GDP**

Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> SSA<br>LIC-Fragile<br>COMESA<br>LIC-NoFragile<br>Resource-Rich<br>MIC<br>Congo, Dem. Rep.<br>Ethiopia<br>South Sudan<br>Kenya<br>North Sudan<br>Uganda Capex O&M<br>South Africa<br>Botswana<br>% of GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. _Note:_ Values excludes irrigation.

LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure.

Sudan already spends a sizable amount—$1.5 billion per year, or 7 percent of GDP—to meet its infrastructure needs (table 19). In terms of the economy’s size, the aggregates are comparable to what middle-income countries spend and perhaps slightly higher than what other resource-rich countries spend (figure 29). About 60 percent of the total infrastructure spending is allocated to capital expenses and 40 percent to operating expenditures. Operating expenditure is entirely covered from budgetary resources and payments by infrastructure users. The composition of financiers indicates that Sudan has been able to capitalize on the interest of non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) investors and the private sector.

**Table 19. Financial flows to Sudan’s infrastructure, average 2001 to 2005**

|$ millions per year|O&M<br>Public<br>sector|Public<br>sector|Ca<br>ODA|pital expenditure<br>Non-OECD<br>financiers|<br>PPI|Total<br>CAPEX|Total<br>spending|Total<br>spending as<br>share of GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ICT|4|5|0|35|209|249|253|1.18|
|Power|281.9|104|0|304|0|409|690|3.23|
|Transport|282.0|183|22|22|0|227|509|2.38|
|WSS|2|6|12|5|7|31|32|0.15|
|Total|570|298|35|366|215|915|1,485|6.95|

_Source:_ Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). _Note:_ O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product.

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 29. Sudan’s current infrastructure spending is average by African standards**

<!-- Start of picture text --> SSA<br>LIC-NoFragile<br>COMESA<br>MIC<br>LIC-Fragile<br>Resource-Rich Capex O&M<br>Ethiopia<br>Kenya<br>Uganda<br>Botswana<br>South Sudan<br>South Africa<br>North Sudan<br>Congo, Dem. Rep.<br>% of GDP 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. _Note:_ Values excludes irrigation. LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure.

The largest single financier of infrastructure investment is China, followed by Indian and Arab investors. Together they account for 40 percent of total annual investments, almost entirely allocated to the power sector. China’s partnership with Sudan in infrastructure development dates back to 2001, with cumulative total financing commitments on the order of $2 billion in 2010. Sudan benefits from a $3 billion framework agreement signed in December 2007, one of the largest to have been accorded to any African country to date. Chinese projects are providing some 2,200 MW of new thermal power generation, and the country is responsible for the now-completed 1,250 MW Merowe Dam and associated 1,800 km transmission line. China has also been involved in the reconstruction of some 1,500 km of roads (table 20).

Sudanese federal and state governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for an additional third of Sudan infrastructure investments, and have focused on transport and to some extent power. The remaining capital funding comes from the private sector, which, as in most of the rest of Africa, supports the ICT boom. ODA flows have played a very small role in capital infrastructure financing.

Capital investments in Sudan are heavily skewed toward the power sector, much of this funded by China. Investment levels in ICT and transport are comparable

**Table 20. Identified infrastructure projects financed by non-OECD financiers**

|US$million|Project<br>costs|
|---|---|
|China|949|
|Construction of 300 MW gas-fired power plant in Al-Fulah|518|
|Construction of the El-Gaili Combined Cycle Power Plant, Phase 1|150|
|NEC transition line|81|
|White Nile electricity network|200|
|China and Arab countries|1,200|
|Construction of the Merowe hydroelectric dam (1,250 MW)|1,200|
|India|475|
|Setting up 4x125 MW Kosti Combined Cycle Power Plant|475|
|**Total**|**2,624**|
|_Source:_Foster, etc (2009). Calculations based on World Bank-PPIAF<br>project database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), in current $ millions .|Chinese|

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE in magnitude, with the former sourced largely from the private sector and the latter from the public sector. Investments in water and sanitation are absent.

**Figure 30. Sudan’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure and that of comparator countries**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source<br>2.5 Sudan<br>Resource Rich<br>2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>ICT Power Transport WSS ICT Power Transport WSS<br>Public ODA Non-OECD Private<br>Percentage of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

_Note:_ Private investment includes self-financing by households. ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and sanitation; LIC = low-income country.

# How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope?

Even without increasing spending, additional resources could be directed toward infrastructure by eliminating inefficiencies. This report quantifies some operational inefficiencies based on measurable and observable performance indicators. The first type relates to operators and/or infrastructure providers, including utilities, SOEs, and special funds. For this type of estimate, providers within Sudan will be compared against well-functioning utilities in Africa and/or engineering norms. These comparisons will cover (i) underrecovery of costs: comparing effective tariffs and user fees against actual unit costs of providing the service; (ii) overstaffing: assessing the difference between average labor cost per connection of the utility evaluated against a well-functioning utility; (iii) distribution losses: assessing the difference between distribution of losses of the evaluated system against engineering norms for a system of similar age and characteristics; and (iv) undercollection: assessing the ability of the operator to collect bills within the year against a standard of full revenue collection. In addition, the analysis measures the ability of governmental agencies to execute their budget allocations for capital projects within the fiscal year.

The analysis suggests that Sudan can recover $584 million each year by reducing inefficiencies in the system (table 21). Most of the efficiency gains are associated with aligning tariffs to cost-recovery levels and reducing distribution losses in both the water and power systems. Increasing tariffs to cost-recovery levels could save $378 million in power and $15 million in water sectors annually. Distributional losses in power cost $106 million per year, and another $27 million in the water sector. Undercollection of bills for water services could save a significant $35 million. Finally, budget underexecution is a significant issue in the transport sector, leading to underspending of about $20 million of available funds annually.

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 21. Sudan’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency**

|US$ million|ICT|Irrigation|Power|Transport|WSS|Total|Total as share<br>of GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Underrecovery of costs|—|n.a.|378|n.a.|15|393|1.84|
|Overstaffing|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|
|Distribution losses|—|n.a.|106|—|27|133|0.62|
|Undercollection|—|n.a.|0|n.a.|35|35|0.17|
|Low budget execution|0|n.a.|0|20|2|22|0.10|
|Total|0|n.a.|484|20|79|584|2.73|

_Source_ : Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). _Note:_ WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. — = Not available. n.a. = Not applicable.

The power sector offers the largest potential savings—up to $584 million per year—if the operational inefficiencies of its utility were tackled. Undercharging for power costs Sudan about $380 million each year, or around 1.8 percent of the country’s GDP. If compared with the rest of Africa, where underpricing of power is commonplace, the National Power Corporation of Sudan (NEC) is doing better than utilities in other resource-rich countries on average, but is nevertheless a poor performer (figure 31).

**Figure 31. Underpricing of power and water in Sudan**

Financial burden of underpricing, as percentage of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>Power Water<br>Sudan Resource Rich<br>Percenatage of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

The NEC’s 2004 distributional losses of 33.4 percent are three times the best-practice 10 percent benchmark, resulting in a staggering $106 million cost of inefficiencies.

In the water sector, average tariffs stand at $0.6 per cubic meter versus an estimated $0.69 per cubic meter average cost-recovery tariff. The macroeconomic burden of 0.007 percent of GDP is much lower than that for power, but is comparatively higher than that of other resource-rich countries.

Operational inefficiencies are also plaguing the water sector, and cost Sudan about $62 million a year, equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP. This cost could be avoided by increasing the collection efficiency for

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE water services and reducing nonrevenue water. In the water sector, the burden of operational utility inefficiencies is considerably higher than for the benchmark countries (figure 32).

**Figure 32. The burden of inefficiency in Sudan’s power and water utilities**

a. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the power sector, as a percentage of GDP b. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the water sector, as a percentage of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.700 0.35<br>0.600 0.30<br>0.500 0.25<br>0.400 0.20<br>0.300 0.15<br>0.200 0.10<br>0.100 0.05<br>0.000 0.00<br>Sudan Resource rich Sudan Resource rich<br>Collection inefficiencies Unaccounted losses Collection inefficiencies Unaccounted losses<br>Percenatage of GDP Percenatage of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

# Annual funding gap

Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap amounts to $2.9 billion per year, or roughly 14 percent of GDP (table 22). The largest funding gap is in the water and sanitation sector, followed closely by transport. Given strong private investment, only a small funding gap remains in ICT. In the case of power, existing spending is sufficient. But if power tariffs could be raised to cost-recovery levels, much more of this expenditure could be funded internally, freeing up external finance for other critically needed areas.

**Table 22. Funding gaps by sector**

|US$ million|ICT|Irrigation|Power|Transport|WSS|Total|Total as<br>share of<br>GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Spending needs|(310)|—|(424)|(1,785)|(1,701)|(4,220)|(19.8)|
|Existing spending*|253||424|509|32|1,218|5.7|
|Reallocation potential within sectors|0||0|0|0|0||
|Efficiency gains|0||484|20|79|584|2.7|
|Funding gap|**(57)**||**—**|**(1,255)**|**(1,590)**|(2,902)|**(13.6)**|
|Reallocation potential across<br>sectors|0||267|0|0|267|1.2|

_Source_ : Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). _Note:_ Estimates use the base scenario of spending needs. Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it would be applied toward other infrastructure sectors. WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. *traced to needs **Assuming complete fungibility across sectors — = Not available.

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# What else can be done?

Sudan’s funding gap is large relative to the size of its economy, and enormous with respect to its current level of spending. Nevertheless, there are a number of options that could make it more manageable, including raising additional finance, taking additional cost-cutting measures, and lengthening the period of time allotted for meeting the illustrative infrastructure targets. In any case, given the magnitude of the gap, difficult decisions will have to be taken regarding the prioritization of the different investments.

There are realistic prospects for increasing the flow of resources to infrastructure. Although not all components of the required infrastructure platform are suitable for private finance (particularly roads, water, and sanitation), other components may be (for example, ICT, power generation, and ports). Challenges for attracting private investors are conspicuous particularly due to the country risks linked to the instability of the country, repeated violations of the rule of law, and the very poor ranking of Sudan’s governance compared to its peers in Africa.

Sudan has captured private investment commitments worth around 1 percent of its GDP, predominantly in the ICT sector. Many other African countries have done significantly better in this area (figure 33). Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal have all captured between 1.8 and 2.5 percent of GDP, while the most successful country in this regard—Guinea-Bissau—has captured in excess of 3.0 percent of GDP.

**Figure 33. Many African countries capture more private investment than Sudan**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 3.5<br>3.0<br>2.5<br>2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>Power ICT Transport Water<br>% GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), in current $ millions.

Adopting lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting the posited infrastructure targets, and help make the funding gap manageable. Meeting the MDGs for water supply and sanitation with lower-cost technologies than previously used (such as stand posts, boreholes, and improved latrines), could reduce the associated price tag from $1,701 million to $889 million each year. Similarly, meeting transport connectivity standards using lower-cost road-surfacing technologies (such as single-surface treatment) together with a rural policy that narrows its focus exclusively to provide 100 percent accessibility currently active (as opposed to potential) agricultural land postponing, could reduce

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE the associated price tag from $1,785 million to $771 million. The overall savings from these measures would amount to $2 billion for Sudan (table 23).

If Sudan were unable to raise additional financing or reduce infrastructure costs, the only way to meet the targets identified here would be to take longer than ten years to do so. If the

**Table 23. Savings from innovation**

|$ millions|Before<br>innovation|After<br>innovation|Savings|Savings as %<br>of sector<br>funding gap|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|WSS appropriate technology|1,701|889|812|51|
|Roads appropriate technology|1,785|1,124|660|53|
|Total|3,486|2,014|1,472|51|

_Source:_ Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, AICD Flagship Report, 2009 _Note:_ WSS = water supply <u>and sanitation.</u> country were able to instantly realize all potential efficiency gains while holding spending at current levels, it could meet the identified infrastructure targets within 30 years. These simulations underscore the importance of making progress on the efficiency agenda, which could propel the country forward toward meeting its infrastructure targets.

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# Bibliography and references

This country report draws upon a wide range of papers, databases, models, and maps that were created as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. All of these can be downloaded from the project Web site: www.infrastructureafrica.org. For papers go to the document page (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/documents), for databases to the data page (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), for models go to the models page (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models), and for maps to the map page (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps). The references for the papers that were used to compile this country report are provided in the table below.

## General

AICD (Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic). _Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation_ . www.infrastructureafrica.org.

- Foster, Vivien, and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, eds. 2009. _Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation._ Paris and Washington, DC: Agence Française de Développement and World Bank.

## Financing

Briceño-Garmendia, Cecilia, Karlis Smits, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns and Emerging Issues.‖ AICD Background Paper 15, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

## Growth

Calderón, César. 2009. ―Infrastructure and Growth in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4914, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Escribano, Alvaro, J. Luis Guasch, and Jorge Pena. 2010. ―Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure Quality on Firm Productivity in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 5191, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Yepes, Tito, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Making Sense of Africa’s Infrastructure Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4912, World Bank, Washington, DC.
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# Information and communication technologies

Ampah, Mavis, Daniel Camos, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Michael Minges, Maria Shkaratan, and Mark Williams. 2009. ―Information and Communications Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sector Review.‖ AICD Background Paper 10, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Infoasaid. 2011. Infoasaid Sudan media and telecoms landscape guide. Infoasaid Sudan media and telecoms landscape guide

Lange. 2010. Sudan: Telecoms, Mobile Broadband and Forecasts. A Buddecomm report. Bucketty.

Mayer, Rebecca, Ken Figueredo, Mike Jensen, Tim Kelly, Richard Green, and Alvaro Federico Barra. 2009. ―Connecting the Continent: Costing the Needs for Spending on ICT Infrastructure in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 3, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Sudatel. 2009. Annual Report 2008. http://www.sudatel.sd/extra/annrepots/2008en.pdf . Khartoum.

# Irrigation

Svendsen, Mark, Mandy Ewing, and Siwa Msangi. 2008. ―Watermarks: Indicators of Irrigation Sector Performance in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 4, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

You, L., C. Ringler, G. Nelson, U. Wood-Sichra, R. Robertson, S. Wood, G. Zhe, T. Zhu, and Y. Sun. 2009. ―Torrents and Trickles: Irrigation Spending Needs in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 9, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

# Power

Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan. 2009. Power Tariffs: Caught between Cost Recovery and Affordability. AICD working paper, draft version. Washington DC

- Eberhard, Anton, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Fatimata Ouedraogo, Daniel Camos, and Maria Shkaratan. 2008. ―Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 6, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- EIA (United States Energy Information Administration). 2009. ―Sudan Country Energy Brief 2009.‖ <u>www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Sudan/Background.html.</u>

- Foster, Vivien, and Jevgenijs Steinbuks. 2009. ―Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies: In-House Generation of Electricity by Firms in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4913, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Platts. 2009. WEPP database Rosnes, Orvika, and Haakon Vennemo. 2009. ―Powering Up: Costing Power Infrastructure Spending Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 5, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

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SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE World Bank. 2007. ―Ethiopia Power Export Project Stage 2: Ethiopia-Sudan Interconnector Project.‖ World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Washington, DC.

- ———. 2011. ―Energy Sector Strategy Note for South Sudan.‖ Draft note, World Bank, Washington, DC.

# Transport

Arvis, Jean-Francois, Gael Raballand, and Jean-Francois Marteau. 2009. _The Cost of Being Landlocked: Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability._ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4258. Washington DC.

- Bofinger, Heinrich C. 2009. ―An Unsteady Course: Growth and Challenges in Africa’s Air Transport Industry.‖ AICD Background Paper 16, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Bullock, Richard. 2009. ―Off Track: Sub-Saharan African Railways.‖ AICD Background Paper 17, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Carruthers, Robin, Ranga Rajan Krishnamani, and Siobhan Murray. 2009. ―Improving Connectivity: Investing in Transport Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 7, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Christ, Nannette, and Michael Ferrantino. 2009. ―The Effects of Cost, Time, and Uncertainty in SubSaharan Africa.‖ Draft Paper, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, DC.

- Gwilliam, Ken, Vivien Foster, Rodrigo Archondo-Callao, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Alberto Nogales, and Kavita Sethi. 2008. ―The Burden of Maintenance: Roads in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 14, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Keer- MISC. 2007. Keer- Misc Logistics Limited. http://www.keer-misc.com Kumar, Ajay, and Fanny Barrett. 2008. ―Stuck in Traffic: Urban Transport in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 1, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Nathan Associates. 2010. _Definition and Investment Strategy for a Core Strategic Transport Network for Eastern and Southern Africa: Corridor Review and Performance Report_ . Draft Document submitted to the World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Ocean Shipping Consultants, Inc. 2009. ―Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 8, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Teravaninthorn and Raballand. 2009. Transport Prices and Costs in Africa. World Bank: Washington DC.

United Nations Joint Logistics Center. http://www.unjlc.org/old-site/sudan/infrastructure/assessments/. Accessed in January 2011.

Yoshino Yutaka 2009. _Upper Nile State Growth Diagnostics: A Southern Sudan State Case Study_ .

- Background paper for Sudan: The Road Toward Sustainable and Broad-based growth. Washington, DC.

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# Water supply and sanitation

- African Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW). 2010. _Country Status Overviews on Water Supply and Sanitation 2010_ . Regional Synthesis Report, August 2010. Draft presentation https://www.wsp.org/wsp/sites/wsp.org/files/userfiles/WSP_AMCOW_CSO2.pdf

- ———. 2010. _Southern Sudan: Country Status Overview on Water Supply and Sanitation_ . Draft report (for circulation to Biannual Review participants), December 2009.

- Banerjee, Sudeshna, Vivien Foster, Yvonne Ying, Heather Skilling, and Quentin Wodon. 2008a. ―Cost Recovery, Equity, and Efficiency in Water Tariffs: Evidence from African Utilities.‖ AICD Working Paper 7, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Banerjee, Sudeshna, Heather Skilling, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Elvira Morella, and Tarik Chfadi. 2008b. ―Ebbing Water, Surging Deficits: Urban Water Supply in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 12, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- GoSS (Government of Southern Sudan)/Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MoWRI). 2010. ―GoSS Water Strategic Framework.‖ Advanced draft, Juba, December 2010.

- ———. ―Draft Water Policy.‖ Juba, September 2007.

Gulyani, Sumila, Debabrata Talukdar, and Darby Jack. 2009. ―Poverty, Living Conditions, and

- Infrastructure Access: A Comparison of Slums in Dakar, Johannesburg, and Nairobi.‖ AICD Working Paper 10, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- IBNET (The international Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities). 2011. www.ib- <u>net.org/.</u>

- Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2009. _Juba Urban Water Supply Capacity Development Study in the Southern Sudan_ . Interim Report I, JICA

Keener, Sarah, Manuel Luengo, and Sudeshna Banerjee. 2009. ―Provision of Water to the Poor in Africa: Experience with Water Standposts and the Informal Water Sector.‖ AICD Working Paper 13, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Morella, Elvira, Vivien Foster, and Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee. 2008. ―Climbing the Ladder: The State of Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 13, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- WHO (World Health Organization), Joint Monitoring Program (JMP). 2010a. ―Sudan Estimates for the Use of Improved Drinking-Water Sources.‖ www.wssinfo.org/resources/documents.html.

- ———. 2010. ―Sudan Estimates for the use of Improved Sanitation Facilities.‖ <u>www.wssinfo.org/resources/documents.html.</u>

- World Bank. 2010a. ―Sudan: Issues in Urban Development: Phase 1—Overview of the Urban

- Landscape.‖ Urban and Water Unit/Sustainable Development Department, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

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# Other

Financial Standards Foundation. 2010. ―Country Brief: Sudan.‖ E-standards Forum, New York.

- Foster. Vivien, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen and Nataliya Pushak 2009. Building Bridges China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, World Bank. Washington DC

- Louis Berger Group and Doshi Borgan & Partners. 2010. ―Sudan National Transport Master Plan: Executive Summary.‖ Prepared for the Ministry of Finance and National Economy and Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges, Sudan.

- Southern Sudan Center for Census, Statistics and Evaluation. 2010. _Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010_ . Juba.

- World Bank. 2008. ―Revitalizing Sudan’s Non-Oil Exports a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS).‖ Prepared for the Integrated Framework Program, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- ———. 2009a. ―Sudan: The Road toward Sustainable and Broad-based Growth.‖ Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

- ———. 2009b. ―Sudan Investment Climate.‖ Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

- ———. 2010b. ―Sudan Poverty Assessment. Part 1: Poverty Profile of the Northern States.‖ Draft version, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

- ———. 2010c. ―Sudan Poverty Assessment. Part 1: Poverty Profile of the Southern States.‖ Draft version, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC.

- Yoshino, Yuataka. 2010. ―Presentation of Key Findings from the Trade Facilitation Assessment Field Work: Case of Southern Sudan.‖ Draft presentation, Juba, Sudan.

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# About AICD and its country reports

This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. AICD provides a baseline against which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.

The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. _Africa’s Infrastructure— A Time for Transformation_ , published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.

The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national policy makers and development partners working on specific countries.

The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.

The AICD’s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage was expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.

Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term ―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that represents the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic
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