metadata: authors: 0: author: Marrero,Gustavo Alberto
1: author: Rodriguez,Juan Gabriel
2: author: Van Der Weide,Roy
count: United States
docna: 0: docna: Unequal opportunity, unequal growth
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Labor Markets,Disease Control & Prevention,Educational Sciences,Poverty Reduction Strategies,Gender and Development
teratopic: Poverty Reduction
abstracts: cdata!: This paper argues that inequality can be
            both good and bad for growth, depending on what inequality
            and whose growth. Unequal societies may be holding back one
            segment of the population while helping another. Similarly,
            high levels of income inequality may be due to a variety of
            different factors; some of these may be good while others
            may be bad for growth. The paper tests this hypothesis by
            “unpacking” both inequality and growth. Total inequality is
            decomposed into inequality of opportunity, due to observed
            factors that are beyond the individual's control, and
            residual inequality. Growth is measured at different steps
            of the income ladder to verify whether low, middle, and top
            income households fare differently in societies with high
            (low) levels of inequality. In an application to the United
            States covering 1960 to 2010, the paper finds that
            inequality of opportunity is particularly bad for growth of
            the poor. When inequality of opportunity is controlled for,
            the importance of total income inequality is dramatically
            reduced. These results are robust to different measures of
            inequality of opportunity and econometric methods.
geo_reg_key: 517191,119228
repnme: repnme: Unequal opportunity, unequal growth
display_title: Unequal opportunity, unequal growth
listing_relative_url: /research/2016/10/26854147/unequal-opportunity-unequal-growth
topicv3: Sedentary Life m1326340 1440,Education m1327048 470,Gender m1327621 615,Income Inequality m1503891 2668,Jobs m1503931 2670
publishtoextweb_dt: 2016-10-11T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Poverty Reduction
no_of_pages: 38
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1211957
1: author_key: 1212598
2: author_key: 677092
model_extractions: WPS7853 Policy Research Working Paper 7853

# Unequal Opportunity, Unequal Growth

_Gustavo A. Marrero Juan Gabriel Rodríguez Roy van der Weide_ Development Research Group Poverty and Inequality Team October 2016
Policy Research Working Paper 7853

# **Abstract**

This paper argues that inequality can be both good and bad for growth, depending on what inequality and whose growth. Unequal societies may be holding back one segment of the population while helping another. Similarly, high levels of income inequality may be due to a variety of different factors; some of these may be good while others may be bad for growth. The paper tests this hypothesis by “unpacking” both inequality and growth. Total inequality is decomposed into inequality of opportunity, due to observed factors that are beyond the individual’s control, and residual inequality. Growth is measured at different steps of the income ladder to verify whether low, middle, and top income households fare differently in societies with high (low) levels of inequality. In an application to the United States covering 1960 to 2010, the paper finds that inequality of opportunity is particularly bad for growth of the poor. When inequality of opportunity is controlled for, the importance of total income inequality is dramatically reduced. These results are robust to different measures of inequality of opportunity and econometric methods.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Inequality Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rvanderweide@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Unequal Opportunity, Unequal Growth**<sup>1</sup>

Gustavo A. Marrero Departamento de Economía, Contabilidad y Finanzas (Universidad de La Laguna, Spain), EQUALITAS and CEDESOG. Tel: +34 922277798. E-mail: gmarrero@ull.es Juan Gabriel Rodríguez Departamento de Análisis Económico I (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), EQUALITAS and CEDESOG. Tel: +34 913942515. E-mail: juangabr@ucm.es Roy van der Weide World Bank Research Department. Tel: +1 202 473 1312. E-mail: rvanderweide@worldbank.org

**JEL** Classification: D63, E24, O15, O40

**Key Words** : Inequality; Inequality of opportunity; growth; United States.

> 1 Marrero and Rodríguez acknowledge the financial support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under projects ECO2013-48884-C3-3-P and ECO2013-46516-C4-4-R, respectively, and from Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under project S2015/HUM-3416-DEPOPORCM, and Fundación Caja Canarias (Spain). Rodríguez also appreciates the financial support of the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Spain). We are grateful to Francisco Ferreira and Branko Milanovic for providing helpful comments. All views, and any errors or omissions are our own responsibility.
# **1. Introduction**

The Great Recession has brought inequality to the forefront of the economic debate again. Does the recent rise in inequality in the United States and Europe bode well for future growth prospects? The opinions are still very much divided on this question (see for example, Krueger, 2012, and Mankiw, 2013). We will argue that it matters whose growth prospects we are talking about, and what type of inequality we are concerned with.

A variety of different channels via which inequality could affect growth have been suggested over the years. This has inspired an extensive empirical literature that dates back to the 1990s. However, the results are mixed and largely inconclusive (i.e., see Banerjee and Duflo, 2003, and Panizza, 2002). A select number of studies have proposed that this ambiguity could be due to the fact that income inequality has distinct offsetting effects on subsequent growth that may cancel out in the aggregate (Barro, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005).<sup>2</sup> Two recent empirical studies in particular stand out. In an application to the United States, Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) find that a particular component of overall inequality, _inequality of opportunity_ (IO), has a negative effect on growth. IO arguably reduces growth as it favors human capital accumulation by individuals with better social origins, rather than by individuals with more talent. The second study, van der Weide and Milanovic (2014), also an application to the United States, “unpacks” growth. It asks whether individuals at different steps of the socio-economic ladder fare differently in societies with high (low) levels of income inequality. They find that they do, namely that income inequality is bad for the growth prospects of the poor but good for the rich.

This paper disaggregates the inequality-growth relationship in order to address two <mark>empirical questions: Can the effect of overall inequality on future income growth be attributed to IO? If indeed, is this particularly true for the poor, or does it</mark> concern households of all socio-economic classes?

We explore these questions using the IPUMS-USA database, as in van der Weide and Milanovic (2014), since it is the largest individual level database for the United States

> 2 See also Galor and Moav (2004) who have proposed that the impact of inequality on growth changes with the replacement of physical capital by human capital accumulation as a main source of growth along the process of development.

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that covers the period 1960 to 2010. Our analysis is conducted at the level of states; we use the individual level data to compute state level measures of inequality of opportunity, overall income inequality, average income, and income growth (at selected percentiles). The same data are used to derive a set of controls including variables on demographics, education and employment. Additional controls are obtained from Marrero and Rodríguez (2013). Different methods are considered for the estimation of the dynamic panel data model (at the state level), specifically pooled OLS and different System-GMM regressions. As part of the robustness analysis we also consider different measures of IO (by varying both the choice of circumstances and the choice of outcomes along which inequality is being evaluated) and vary the choice of control variables.

Total income inequality is found to be negatively correlated with posterior growth of average income per capita when IO is not controlled for. Adding IO to the regression reveals that the correlation with future income growth is largely channeled through IO, leaving the effect of total inequality mostly insignificant.

When we re-examine the relationship between total inequality and income growth for low-, middle- and high income households, not controlling for IO, we find that the relationship is negative for the poor but positive for the rich. However, also here, the significance of total inequality is dramatically reduced when IO is added to the regression. This suggests that it is IO that is limiting the growth prospects of the poor rather than total inequality.

The exact channels via which IO might be impacting on future income growth remain to be identified. However, concentrating on IO while tracking growth separately for the poor, the middle class and the rich, denotes a necessary step forward in the dissection of the inequality-growth relationship.

The paper is organized as follows. Building on the literature of opportunity Section 2 develops the necessary distinction between overall inequality and inequality of opportunity. In Section 3 we introduce the database, including descriptives of the key variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical model and the main results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the main results.

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# **2. Inequality of opportunity: Concept and measurement**

The modern theories of justice emphasize that income inequality is a composite measure of different components, among which inequality of opportunity refers to inequality stemming from circumstances, factors that are beyond the scope of individual responsibility like race, gender and socioeconomic background (Roemer, 1993; van de Gaer, 1993; Fleurbaey, 2008). This literature considers IO to be unjust and believes it warrants a public intervention that would help level the playing field. Moreover, it has been recently proposed that, while the impact of total inequality on growth is ambiguous, IO is growth deterring as, for example, it may favor human capital accumulation by individuals with better social origins rather than individuals with more talent. The potential misallocation of talent yields an underinvestment in human capital and, consequently, lower growth.<sup>3</sup> To estimate IO, we adopt the ex-ante approach put forward by van de Gaer (1993) which partitions the population into types according to individuals’ circumstances. IO is obtained as a measure of between-group inequality. Consider a finite population of individuals indexed by _i_  {1,..., _N_ }. Following Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) the individual outcome, _yi_ , is assumed to be a function of the set of circumstances, _ci_ , and the amount of effort, _ei_ , such that: �� �����, ���. Circumstances are exogenous by definition. Effort however will likely be influenced, among other factors, by circumstances. Accordingly, individual outcome may also be written as: �� � ����, �������.

Suppose the population is partitioned into mutually exclusive and exhaustive types denoted by Φ = { _J_ 1, ..., _JT_ }, where all individuals of a given type _t_ share the same circumstances. Let �<sup>�</sup> �������, �<sup>�</sup> � denote the level of effort exerted by an individual of type _t_ at the �<sup>��</sup> quantile of the distribution of effort with �∈�0,1�. The level of outcome obtained by this individual is given by: �<sup>�</sup> �������<sup>�</sup> , �<sup>�</sup> ����. Equality of opportunity is achieved when the individual’s outcome is independent of her social origins. Strictly speaking, this would demand that the following condition holds true:

> 3 Bowles et al. (2005) have shown that even if individuals have high inborn talent, the likelihood of their being able to realize the benefits of that talent (for example, in terms of admission to university or access to employment) is strongly affected by initial conditions.

4
�<sup>�</sup> �����<sup>�</sup> ��� ∀�, �, (1) where �<sup>�</sup> ��� denotes the income distribution for individual’s of type _t_ . One could test for this by estimating the income distribution for each type and evaluating the significance of the difference. If one distribution dominates the other then this would offer unambiguous evidence against equality of opportunity. Unfortunately, relying on stochastic dominance is generally not guaranteed to rule one way or the other. Distributions can be significantly different yet cross each other in which case it is unclear whether one type is better off than the other (Atkinson, 1970).

To break potential ties, a practical alternative is to focus on a specific moment of the corresponding income distributions. Consider for example mean income. Let the vector ����<sup>�</sup> , ⋯, �<sup>�</sup> � be a partition of outcomes into _T_ groups, where the vector �<sup>�</sup> contains the outcomes for all individuals of type _t_ . Let ������<sup>�</sup> , ⋯, ��<sup>�</sup> � denote the _N_ - dimensional smoothed version of _y_ where each individual of type _t_ receives the mean income level for that type. A measure of IO can be obtained by evaluating ��������, where ��∙� denotes a given inequality index, with ���� measuring total income inequality.

Of all the possible inequality indices that fulfill the basic principles found in the literature on inequality (progressive transfers, symmetry, scale invariance and replication of the population), only those of the Generalized Entropy class are additively decomposable into a between-group and a within-group component (Bourguignon, 1979 and Shorrocks, 1980).<sup>4</sup> We use the Mean Logarithmic Deviation ( _IMLD_ ), because it belongs to the Generalized Entropy class and has a path-independent decomposition.<sup>5</sup> For an income distribution _y_ , with mean ��, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation is defined as: where _n_ denotes the number of income recipients. Using this inequality index, our IO estimates can be interpreted as the between-group component of total inequality.

> 4 In the case that type income ranges overlap, which occurs in our case, the broadly used Gini coefficient is decomposable in three terms: a between-group component, a within-group component and a residual. The problem here is how to assign the last term to the between-group and within-group components. 5 The path-independent property implies that the result of the decomposition is independent of the component that is eliminated first, the between-group inequality or the within-group inequality (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000).

5
Unfortunately, since one does not observe all relevant individual circumstances in practice, this measure of IO serves only as a lower bound.<sup>6</sup> Finally, IO can be estimated either non-parametrically (Lefranc et al., 2008, and Rodríguez, 2008) or parametrically (Bourguignon et al., 2007, and Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011). The non-parametric approach makes minimal assumptions, but requires a sufficient amount of data. When the data are limited there is a premium for imposing additional structure by assuming a functional form for the function _g_ . This would be the parametric approach. We will adopt the former, the non-parametric approach, as this takes full advantage of the fact that the database covers between 1 and 5 percent of the total population.

# **3. The database and variables**

# **3.1. The IPUMS USA database and sample design**

We use the IPUMS USA database, which contains the largest sample of US   population between 1 and 5 percent of the total population that covers a period of 50 years at regular decennial intervals: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010.<sup>7</sup> The data are representative at the US state level. The obvious advantage of working with such a large data set is that sampling errors are reduced to a minimum. For their special features we do not consider the states of Alaska, Hawaii, District of Columbia and Puerto Rico in this analysis.

Total yearly income is obtained by aggregating incomes from 8 different sources: ( _i_ ) wages, salary, commissions, bonuses or tips; ( _ii_ ) self-employment income; ( _iii_ ) interest, dividends, net rental income, or income from estate/trusts; ( _iv_ ) social security or railroad retirement; ( _v_ ) supplemental security income; ( _vi_ ) public assistance or welfare payments; ( _vii_ ) retirement, survivor or disability pensions; and ( _viii_ ) other regular sources of income, such as veterans payments, unemployment compensation, child support or

> 6 Using the MLD index, the within-group inequality component could be seen as a proxy of inequality due to individual effort. Unfortunately, this measure contains residual elements arising from non-observed circumstances, luck and other measurement errors, which prevents us from using this term in the empirical analysis. 7 The data cover 1 percent of the population for the years 1960-70 and 2010, and 5 percent of the population for the years 1980-2000.

6
alimony.<sup>8</sup> Income is made comparable over time by adjusting for inflation (all incomes are expressed in 2010 prices).

Income growth is evaluated for total household income per capita. Our measures of income inequality and inequality of opportunity are computed using individual income for the highest income earner within their household who are between the age of 30 and 50. The age restriction is included in order to mitigate the life-cycle composition effect on an individual’s income (Roemer et al., 2003; Marrero and Rodríguez, 2012). The motivation for using individual income rather than total family income for the measurement of inequality is that this facilitates the decomposition of total inequality into IO and a residual component.<sup>9</sup> Three different measures of inequality of opportunity are being considered: inequality of opportunity in the acquisition of income; inequality of opportunity in acquiring occupational prestige; and social immobility in occupational prestige.<sup>10</sup> The latter is measured as the correlation between the “occupational prestige” for a given individual and the average “occupational prestige” for individuals from an earlier generation belonging to the same race and the same state where the given individual was born. For the first two measures of inequality of opportunity we assume race and gender as circumstances. For race the following four groups are considered: non-Hispanic whites, Hispanic whites, blacks and others. Unfortunately, the IPUMS USA does not include information on parental education or income.

Race has been shown to be an important factor in determining an individual’s success in life as measured by income or occupational prestige. Initial inequality in wealth between individuals from different racial backgrounds combined with barriers to accessing credit can generate significant degrees of inequality of opportunity (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Marrero and Rodríguez, 2011). There is also evidence of continued differential treatment by race in the U.S. labor market, i.e. racial discrimination (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Lang and Manove, 2011). Unequal opportunities between men and women are equally objectionable (Hederos et al., 2014; Calo-Blanco

> 8 Unfortunately, the IPUMS USA database does not provide data on the individual components of income. 9 Note that IO measures the extent to which individual income is driven by individual attributes that are beyond the individual’s control such as race and gender.

> 10 Occupation prestige is derived from the “occscore” variable that is constructed by IPUMS USA which assigns occupational income scores to observed occupations.

7
and García-Pérez, 2014). Other than being morally objectionable, affording individuals of different race and gender different opportunities may lead to a sub-optimal allocation of talent and a wasting of human resources. These inefficiencies are arguably harmful for growth.

The IPUMS USA database is also used to construct selected control variables. Following van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) we compute: (i) the percentage with a graduate degree among individuals between the age of 21 and 39 (Edu_ms); (ii) the share of women between the age of 24 and 65 who are out of the labor force (Olf_fem); and (iii) the population shares aged 15 or younger (Aged 0-15) and aged 65 or older (Aged 65+). We expand the number of controls by also considering a selected set of the independent variables used in Marrero and Rodríguez (2013), which include: (iv) the share of (nonagricultural) employment in construction (Emp_cons), finance, insurance and real estate (Emp_finan), and government (Emp_gov); (v) the percentage change in nonagricultural employment over the preceding decade (Emp_growth); (vi) the fertility rate measured as the number of live births per 1,000 women 15-44 years old (Fertility); and (vii) public welfare expenditure as a percentage of state personal income (Welfare).<sup>11</sup>

# **3.2. A first look at the data**

The four panels of Figure 1 plot the time-trends of the income growth rates (topleft, top-right and bottom-left panels) for the poor (10<sup>th</sup> percentile), middle-class (50<sup>th</sup> percentile) and the rich (99<sup>th</sup> percentile) as well as the time-trend of total income inequality (bottom-right panel) over the 50-year period. Low- and middle-income households have experienced a visibly different trend in income growth rates compared to top-income households. The last decade denotes an outlier arguably due to the 20072010 global financial crisis. Between 1970 and 2000 the poor and the middle-class have seen their growth rates decline while the rich have seen their growth rates increase.

> 11 Employment data come from the Current Employment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics ( _U.S. Department of Labor_ : http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment). ‘Welfare’ expenditures are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments (yearly data): https://www.census.gov/govs/local/historical_data.html. Fertility is obtained from the Vital Statistics of the United States: <u>http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus.htm.</u>

8
<!-- Start of picture text --> Income growth at 10th pctile Income growth at 50th pctile<br>Ss =:<br>ae og<br>3 an<br>So a s<br>cc<br>oo<br>3 8<br>1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10<br>excludes outside values excludes outside values<br>Income growth at 99th pctile Income inequality<br>3 <<br>£<br>53 = 8<br>es | = g°<br>N<br>50<br>on<br>ro : = °‘ : =<br>es =<br>1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br>excludes outside values excludes outside values<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> IO (income vs. race) IO (income vs. race-sex)<br>38<br>3 °o<br>fe) og =<br>1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br>excludes outside values excludes outside values<br>IO (occ. prestige vs. race-sex) Immobility in occ. prestige<br>8=<br>8<br>re) 5©<br>08 BS<br>: Stat -<br>1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br>excludes outside values excludes outside values<br>MLD (income) by State: 1960 versus 2010<br>|re<br>ia i i<br>0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 2 3) 4 5<br>MLD<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> IO (income-race) by State: 1960 versus 2010<br>1960 — 2010<br>Maine<br>} Nee Hampshire<br>i North Dakota<br>ae<br>5 Sonne<br>= ee Vronio<br>MS Rhode Island<br>= oer<br>Kentucky<br>=<br>———<br>SS Minos<br>as<br>(«Arizona<br>—<—<<<—<br>es MexicoNE<br>— io<br>—====_ =<br>es oe<br>LL&LLLL SouthMississippiCarolina<br>a i,i,i<br>0.12 0.08 0.04 0 04 08 12<br>fe)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> % graduate degree % women out of labor force<br>re) ~<br>oo<br>+ S<br>oy 2<br>2 ¥<br>‘©NN Eefe}<br>8S<br>@5<br>2=<br>8°o<br>8 8<br>@o et<br>B o<br>=] ~<br>3 3<br>oa” S<br>2 E<br>20<br>x<br>1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br>excludes outside values excludes outside values<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **4. Inequality of opportunity and growth at different steps of the income ladder**

We estimate a reduced-form growth equation (at different percentiles) with a set of inequality indices (total and IO) added to an otherwise standard set of growth determinants. The exact choice of control variables denotes a combination of the controls used in Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) and van der Weide and Milanovic (2014).

# **4.1. The reduced-form growth equation**

The reduced-form growth equation explores the link between overall inequality, inequality of opportunity and income growth for different segments of the population: where _yqit_ denotes log of per capita income for population segment _q_ in state _i_ at year _t_ . In our application _q_ either refers to average income in the state or to a given percentile in the state’s income distribution. We will consider the following selection of percentiles: 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th. The variables ��� and ��� denote state (or region) and time-specific effects, ��� and ���� are measures of overall inequality and inequality of opportunity in state _i_ at time _t_ , ��� denotes a vector of control variables other than lagged income, and ���� is an _iid_ error term. Income is always expressed in real terms, explanatory variables are always lagged one period (10 years in our case) and overall inequality and IO indices are as explained in the previous section. Equation (3) reduces to the specification from Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) when _yqit_ refers to the log of state GDP per capita, while the specification from van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) is obtained for �� �0. The parameters from eq. (3) will be estimated for each _q_ separately using separate regressions.

We will consider two different sets of controls: (a) the baseline specification with an economic set of controls derived from van der Weide and Milanovic (2014);<sup>13</sup> and (b) an expanded set of controls that is obtained by adding variables from Marrero and Rodriguez (2013). The baseline specification includes the following state-level variables: “Edu_ms”; “Olf_female”; “Aged 0-15” and “Aged 65+”; lag of income to allow for convergence; as well as time-period dummies and region (Northeast, Midwest, South and

> 13 Note that in the original analysis, van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) considered also the percentage of education short-fall. We have preferred not to include this variable in the analysis because it is expected a close link between this variable and individual opportunity.

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West) or state dummies, depending on the specification.<sup>14</sup> The expanded set of controls adds to this: “Emp_cons”, “Emp_finan”, “Emp_gover”, “Emp_grow”, “Fertility” and “Welfare”. See Section 3.1 for definitions of the control variables. Our motivation for using the share of young adults with a graduate degree rather than considering all adults is that the former exhibits more variation over time, and hence carries more information up and above the state fixed effects. We aim to keep the number of controls that are highly persistent over time to a minimum in order to limit the co-linearity with the state fixedeffects. For this reason we have omitted the percent employed in farming, mining, manufacturing and transport (which are included in Marrero and Rodríguez, 2013).

We are especially interested in the sign of �, the parameter associated with IO in Equation (3). If the growth deterring effect of overall inequality (i.e., for poor households) is channeled through IO, then we should find that ��0. Once IO is controlled for, we hypothesize that ��0 because overall inequality is now a better proxy for the inequality due to individual effort (Marrero and Rodríguez, 2016a). It should be noted however that, as said above, our measure of IO under-estimates inequality of opportunity as we do not capture all relevant circumstances, in which case � would measure the combined effect of individual effort, unobserved circumstances and luck. As this combined effect need not be positive, a less demanding hypothesis is that ������0�, where ����0� denotes the value of � when IO is not controlled for. It is conceivable that IO has a different relationship with future growth at the top end of the income spectrum. This is an empirical question which we will address by estimating the IO-growth relationship along a wide range of state income percentiles.

> 14 _Northeast_ contains the following states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. In the _Midwest_ , we include the following: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. _South_ considers the following states: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Finally, we consider in the _West_ : Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, California, Oregon, and Washington.

14
# **4.2. Baseline specification with region fixed-effects: Robust pooled-OLS**

The between-group inequality component with income as outcome and race as circumstance denotes our benchmark IO measure. Table 2 presents robust pooled-OLS estimates for the baseline specification with region dummies. When IO is not controlled for, the coefficient for overall inequality is found to be negative and significant for the lower income percentiles, insignificant for the middle income percentiles, and positive and significant for the high income percentiles. Notably, when IO is controlled for, total inequality becomes insignificant as an explanatory factor for income growth along the income distribution; the inequality effect on income growth appears to be channeled through IO. It is the IO component that harms growth for the poor while helping income growth for the rich. In addition, it can be seen in Table 2 that the predictions concerning the coefficient of overall inequality � when IO is controlled for are fulfilled. Annex A presents a visual inspection of these findings.

Let us also briefly comment on the effects of the rest of controls on income growth across the different income percentiles. Higher levels of education (measured by the share of young adults who have a graduate degree) are positively correlated with growth across the income distribution. Likewise, female labor force participation helps growth, particularly for lower and middle income households (the effect is small and often insignificant for high income households). A larger share of the working age population also registers as a positive for future income growth. Finally, we find conditional convergence between states as the coefficient for the lag of income (in logs) is always negative and significant.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

# **4.3. Baseline specification with state fixed-effects: System-GMM estimation**

Pooled-OLS estimation with region-specific effects is vulnerable to endogeneity bias, specifically omitted variables bias. Allowing for state fixed effects should alleviate this concern to some degree. This however introduces a new challenge. Under the assumption that the (unobserved) state effects are correlated with the other independent variables that are part of the model, considering the state effects as part of the error term will introduce a bias. By the same token, eliminating the state effects by means of 15
“differencing” also introduces a correlation between the (differenced) error term and the (differenced) control variables, and hence also introduces a bias. A commonly used method of estimation in this context is the System-GMM approach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).<sup>15</sup> The validity of the GMM-style instruments can be tested using an over identifying Hansen J-test. The proliferation of instruments (a common fact in System-GMM) tends to introduce additional over identifying problems however, which may call for a reduction of the instruments count (Roodman, 2009a). With this in mind, our baseline SystemGMM specification limits the number of over identifying restrictions by building a maximum of two instruments from each variable and lag distance.<sup>16</sup> We initially consider _t-2_ and _t-3_ (for the first-difference equations) and _t-1_ (for the level equations) to construct the matrix of instruments. Because the test for second-order serial correlation in the first differences of the errors (the _m2_ test) rejects the null in most of the specifications (see Table 3), the set of instruments is lagged one more period to _t-3_ and _t-4_ (for the firstdifference equations) and to _t-2_ (for the level equations). This set of instruments remains valid even in the presence of second (but no higher) order serial correlation of the residuals, which is tested using an AR(3) test for the first differences of the errors (this test is also shown in Table 3).

Table 3 presents the estimates for our baseline System-GMM model (i.e., one-step with 2 lags for the instrument set starting at _t_ -3 for the first difference equation). The main result obtained using robust pooled-OLS is largely maintained: IO deters the growth prospects of the poor, and if anything helps the rich to further grow their incomes. For average income (see first two columns in the Table), we find a negative and significant relationship with IO and a positive but insignificant relationship with total inequality. The System-GMM specification confirms the result from Marrero and Rodríguez (2013), namely that IO is bad for growth, but finds that this is mostly true for the poor, and not for the entire distribution.

# INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

> 15 For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2015) have recently adopted the one-step System-GMM for the estimation of their dynamic panel model featuring growth, human capital, inequality and institutions. 16 Considering 3 lags in the matrix of instruments leads to a Hansen test with a _p_ -value that is almost equal to one, which is a clear symptom of a ‘too-many instruments’ problem (Roodman, 2009b).

16
To verify the robustness of our results, we test for weak instruments and compute confidence intervals for the parameters of interest (the coefficients associated with IO and total inequality) that are valid also when instruments are weak. The main result, that IO lowers the future income growth of the poor, is valid under alternative IO measures (this section), an expanded set of controls (next section), different GMM specifications (Annex B), and remains valid under weak instruments (Annex C). Let us briefly comment here on the issue of weak instruments. Growth regressions with inequality as the independent variable of interest are known to suffer from problems of weak instruments owing in part to the time-persistent nature of inequality (see Kraay, 2015). While our test results confirm that the instruments used in our regressions are weak, the negative effect of IO on growth for the poor and lower-middle class (up to the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile) continues to be significant. The effect of IO on growth for higher income households, however, is not found to be robust (see the confidence sets reported in Annex C which are valid in the case of weak instruments).

The regressions presented in Table 4 re-estimate the System-GMM specification using alternative measures of IO, as described in Section 3, which includes: IO in the acquisition of income with not only race but also gender as individual circumstances; IO in the acquisition of occupational prestige for race and, for race and gender; and social immobility in occupational prestige. Our main findings are in general preserved (see Table 4).

# **4.4. Expanded set of controls with state fixed-effects: System-GMM estimation**

We extend the baseline model by expanding the set of controls with those also used in Marrero and Rodríguez (2013), namely: the shares of employment for construction, finance, insurance and real estate, and government; the percentage change in nonagricultural employment in the preceding decade; public expenditure in welfare as a percentage of personal income, and the fertility rate. Since expanding the set of controls also increases notably the number of instruments, using the baseline System-GMM specification (including 2 lags) leads to ‘too-many instruments’ problems (i.e., the p- value of the Hansen test tends to 1.00; see Roodman, 2009a). We collapse the matrix of instruments to reduce the instrument count for the one-step System-GMM in this case, which denotes a standard approach.

17
As shown in Table 5, the negative and significant correlation between IO and growth of lower incomes and the positive and significant correlation between IO and growth of higher incomes prevails. While the coefficient of overall inequality continues to be positive and significant for the rich, it loses significance at the lower end of the income distribution. In addition, we find that: (i) the size of the public sector (in terms of employment) is positively correlated with income growth across the distribution, with larger effects observed for poor households; (ii) size of the construction sector undermines growth, particularly of lower incomes; (iii) size of the financial sector is positively correlated with growth of higher incomes, albeit insignificantly; (iv) expansion of non-agricultural employment is mostly insignificant; (v) public welfare expenditure lowers the growth prospects of top incomes but is insignificant in the growth regressions for the poor; while (vi) the fertility rate is clearly negatively correlated with growth, yet the size of the correlation appears to be slightly larger for lower income households.

It follows that the significance of overall inequality is somewhat sensitive to whether or not female labor force participation is controlled for. Table B2 (in the Annex) reproduces a version of Table 5 where “OLF-fem” is omitted as a control variable. This specification finds that overall inequality is significant at both ends of the income distribution, with inequality hurting income growth of the poor and helping growth of the rich. The results for the control variables are largely maintained.

# **5. Discussion**

This study is the first to disaggregate the inequality-growth relationship by “unpacking” both inequality and growth. Income inequality is decomposed into inequality of opportunity and residual inequality.<sup>17</sup> We unpack growth by tracking income growth at different steps of the income distribution. This allows for the possibility that the poor, the middle-class and the rich fare differently in societies with higher (or lower) levels of inequality of opportunity and total income inequality. It also allows us to verify

> 17 The residual inequality component is sometimes associated with “inequality of efforts” (see e.g. Marrero and Rodriguez, 2013). However, since the IO component in practice does not capture all inequality that is due to circumstances beyond the individual’s control, simply because one generally observes a sub-set of relevant circumstances, the residual inequality component will arguably measure the combined effects of individual efforts, unobserved circumstances and luck.

18
the extent to which the relationship between income inequality and future income growth is channeled through inequality of opportunity.

We find that it is inequality of opportunity that is negatively correlated with future income growth of the poor. Using weak instrument-robust inference confirms the robustness of this finding. While inequality of opportunity is also found to be positively correlated with growth at the top end of the income distribution, this effect is not robust. Our research advances the earlier studies by Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) and van der Weide and Milanovic (2014). The relationship between inequality of opportunity, inequality of effor ~~ts~~ and growth in average income uncovered by Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) is found to describe the income growth of poor households better than growth of the average household. The relationship van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) found between total inequality and growth of the poor versus growth of the rich appears to be driven mostly by inequality of opportunity.

The present paper also provides additional robustness checks to Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) and van der Weide and Milanovic (2014). Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) used the PSID database which provides detailed information on individual circumstances (including parental education) but for a relatively small sample of households, and for a limited period of time (1970-2000). They opted to disregard states with fewer than 50 observations for any given decade, which ultimately limited their database to 26 states. Despite the extensive robustness analysis they carried out, the smallness of their survey samples makes their analysis vulnerable to sampling error. Instead, we use an entirely different database (the US community survey) that covers between 1 and 5 percent of the US population which reduces sampling error to a minimum and allows us to consider all US states and the larger time period 1960-2010. Our study also extends the analysis of van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) by considering a different measure of inequality (MLD based on individual income at reference age – aged 30 to 50 – rather than the Gini of income per capita), and above all, by adding an important omitted variable, namely inequality of opportunity.

It remains to be verified whether the findings from this study extend to other countries, including less developed economies. For instance, a developing country could possess a trap in the accumulation of human capital (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005). If this is the case, an increase in any kind of inequality might be good for growth of the poor 19
because it would help such a country exit this trap (Castelló-Climent and Mukhopadhyay, 2013). Replicating our study using data for other countries, including those with high levels of poverty, denotes an interesting venue for future empirical research.

Future research will hopefully also shed some light on the channels via which IO affects future income growth. It is conceivable that IO alludes to unequal access to good schooling or discrimination in the labor market, to name two candidate channels, either of which signifying inefficiencies that will disproportionally concern the growth prospects of the disadvantaged. A potential positive relationship between IO and income growth for the rich may be harder to explain. One possibility is that the greater the share of the population who are disadvantaged by IO, the greater presumably the supply of labor at lower levels of skills, and the greater, even in a fully competitive market, the skill premium received by those who benefit from better opportunities. We should stress however that the positive effect of IO on growth for high incomes ceases to be significant when using weak instrument-robust inference.

Another empirical question worth exploring is how economic growth or development more broadly impacts on inequality of opportunity. In a preliminary investigation, Marrero and Rodríguez (2016b) find that raising the level of real GDP is associated with lowering levels of inequality of opportunity. If this is confirmed, then this may elude to the possibility of a positive cycle where economic growth lowers IO, and the reductions in IO further stimulate economic growth. However, more evidence on this will need to be obtained, including a precise analysis of the impact of pro-poor (and prorich) growth on inequality of opportunity. Finally, we can think of at least one extension of our analysis, namely one that tracks income growth by individual characteristics such as race (and other factors that are beyond the individual’s control) as an alternative to tracking growth by income percentile. See for example the recent study by Peragine et al. (2014) who develop the notion of the Opportunity Growth Incidence Curve. It is conceivable that unequal societies are more likely to hold back blacks relative to whites, for example, regardless of where they stand on the socio-economic ladder.

20
**Table 2.** Income growth and inequality by percentiles in the U.S.: estimated results using robust pooled-OLS.

||**All sa**|**mple**|**Perce**|**ntile 05**|**Perce**|**ntile 10**|**Perce**|**ntile 25**|**Perce**|**ntile 50**|**Perce**|**ntile 75**|**Perce**|**ntile 90**|**Perce**|**ntile 95**|**Perce**|**ntile 99**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0215|-0.00508|-0.0760*|0.0410|-0.0855**|-0.0176|-0.0456*|-0.0201|-0.0156|-0.0127|0.00867|-0.00666|0.0164|-0.0109|0.0264**|-0.00550|0.0399***|-0.00939|
||(-1.17)|(-0.22)|(-1.62)|(0.82)|(-2.19)|(-0.41)|(-1.90)|(-0.72)|(-0.98)|(-0.60)|(0.74)|(-0.39)|(1.58)|(-0.69)|(2.54)|(-0.36)|(3.20)|(-0.42)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.0534||-0.431***||-0.257***||-0.0898*||-0.00958||0.0493||0.0914**||0.110**||0.174***|
|||(-1.10)||(-4.48)||(-3.33)||(-1.63)||(-0.20)||(1.18)||(2.11)||(2.59)||(2.81)|
|**ln(y), lag**|-0.0512***|-0.0508***|-0.0495***|-0.0511***|-0.0543***|-0.0558**|* -0.0507**|* -0.0510**|* -0.0519***|-0.0518***|-0.0455***|-0.0466**|* -0.0402***|-0.0424**|* -0.0325***|-0.0348**|* -0.0353***|-0.0382*|
||(-9.43)|(-9.30)|(-8.03)|(-8.68)|(-9.22)|(-9.66)|(-9.46)|(-9.49)|(-9.55)|(-9.45)|(-8.92)|(-8.77)|(-9.01)|(-9.10)|(-7.41)|(-7.78)|(-6.35)|(-6.97)|
|**Edu_ms, lag**|0.0899***|0.0893***|0.0554*|0.0611**|0.0698***|0.0746***|0.0788***|0.0798***|0.0934***|0.0932***|0.0904***|0.0926***|0.0883***|0.0927***|0.0760***|0.0811***|0.0787***|0.0841***|
||(4.93)|(4.86)|(1.85)|(2.20)|(2.72)|(2.99)|(4.03)|(4.08)|(5.41)|(5.35)|(5.47)|(5.46)|(5.55)|(5.72)|(4.75)|(5.06)|(3.61)|(4.04)|
|**Olf-female, lag**|-0.0355***|-0.0415***|-0.0654**|-0.112***|-0.0630***|-0.0903**|* -0.0468**|* -0.0565**|* -0.0365***|-0.0376***|-0.0253**|-0.0194|-0.0189*|-0.00774|-0.0215**|-0.00811|-0.0171|0.00347|
||(-3.10)|(-2.97)|(-2.57)|(-4.04)|(-3.32)|(-4.18)|(-3.48)|(-3.49)|(-3.44)|(-2.85)|(-2.59)|(-1.62)|(-1.81)|(-0.63)|(-2.12)|(-0.69)|(-1.06)|(0.19)|
|**Aged 0-15, lag**|-0.170***|-0.161***|-0.121*|-0.0699|-0.163***|-0.136**|-0.143***|-0.132***|-0.175***|-0.174***|-0.162***|-0.174***|-0.161***|-0.183***|-0.142***|-0.168***|-0.144***|-0.182***|
||(-3.70)|(-3.43)|(-1.71)|(-1.07)|(-2.65)|(-2.31)|(-2.81)|(-2.62)|(-3.87)|(-3.71)|(-4.15)|(-4.07)|(-4.87)|(-5.03)|(-4.65)|(-4.97)|(-3.91)|(-4.40)|
|**Age 65+, lag**|-0.0946***|-0.100***|-0.0181|-0.0780|-0.0604|-0.0981*|-0.0696*|-0.0822**|-0.103***|-0.104***|-0.102***|-0.1000**|* -0.104***|-0.100***|-0.0889***|-0.0832**|* -0.0633|-0.0499|
||(-2.72)|(-2.86)|(-0.30)|(-1.22)|(-1.25)|(-1.94)|(-1.86)|(-2.17)|(-3.04)|(-3.06)|(-3.29)|(-3.26)|(-3.63)|(-3.58)|(-2.77)|(-2.66)|(-1.65)|(-1.32)|
|**Num.Obs**|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|
|**R2**|0.783|0.783|0.714|0.732|0.764|0.772|0.796|0.797|0.770|0.769|0.736|0.737|0.749|0.753|0.809|0.813|0.884|0.889|

Note. Robust _t_ -statistics in parentheses. Balanced panel with 48 U.S. States, between 1960 and 2010 (every 10 years). The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita income for each decade. Explanatory variables are all lagged one period (10 years). A constant term and time and regional dummies are also included in all models (estimations not shown in the table).
**Table 3.** Income growth and inequality by percentiles in the U.S.: estimated results using robust System-GMM (baseline specification).

||**All sa**|**mple**|**Percen**|**tile 05**|**Perce**|**ntile 10**|**Perce**|**ntile 25**|**Perce**|**ntile 50**|**Perce**|**ntile 75**|**Perce**|**ntile 90**|**Perce**|**ntile 95**|**Perce**|**ntile 99**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0471*|0.0275|-0.0512|0.239***|-0.126**|0.0947*|-0.0800**|0.0264|-0.0380*|0.0142|0.00587|0.0195|0.0240|-0.0159|0.0415**|-0.0314|0.0628***|-0.000172|
||(-1.79)|(0.93)|(-0.65)|(2.84)|(-2.06)|(1.85)|(-2.17)|(0.77)|(-1.86)|(0.46)|(0.35)|(0.71)|(1.50)|(-0.52)|(2.37)|(-0.89)|(2.83)|(-0.00)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.170**||-0.783***||-0.601***||-0.263***||-0.110||-0.0130||0.118||0.195**||0.166|
|||(-2.25)||(-3.20)||(-3.45)||(-2.78)||(-1.41)||(-0.20)||(1.59)||(2.36)||(1.53)|
|**ln(y), lag**|-0.0634***|-0.0618***|-0.0472***|-0.0491***|-0.0634***|-0.0659***|-0.0614***|-0.0620***|-0.0684***|-0.0663***|-0.0585***|-0.0563***|-0.0498***|-0.0498***|-0.0402***|-0.0414***|-0.0357***|-0.0372***|
||(-6.37)|(-6.20)|(-4.18)|(-3.81)|(-5.93)|(-5.44)|(-5.65)|(-5.42)|(-6.05)|(-5.89)|(-6.77)|(-6.53)|(-7.16)|(-7.39)|(-6.08)|(-6.64)|(-3.71)|(-3.95)|
|**Edu_ms, lag**|0.114***|0.112***|0.0545|0.0511|0.103***|0.102**|0.0949***|0.0961***|0.124***|0.122***|0.106***|0.107***|0.0946***|0.103***|0.0832***|0.0957***|0.0673**|0.0797**|
||(4.09)|(4.06)|(1.24)|(1.03)|(2.75)|(2.60)|(3.07)|(2.95)|(4.15)|(4.16)|(4.57)|(4.72)|(4.71)|(5.15)|(4.00)|(4.69)|(2.23)|(2.39)|
|**Olf-female, lag**|-0.0425***|-0.0633***|-0.0744**|-0.162***|-0.0656**|-0.132***|-0.0657***|-0.0959***|-0.0505***|-0.0642***|-0.0354***|-0.0374***|-0.0265**|-0.0123|-0.0278*|-0.00163|-0.0315|-0.00614|
||(-3.13)|(-4.76)|(-2.30)|(-4.52)|(-2.39)|(-5.49)|(-3.64)|(-5.28)|(-3.72)|(-4.34)|(-2.85)|(-3.01)|(-2.01)|(-0.89)|(-1.85)|(-0.11)|(-1.65)|(-0.29)|
|**Aged 0-15, lag**|-0.250***|-0.225***|-0.150|-0.157|-0.209*|-0.213*|-0.217**|-0.213**|-0.270***|-0.246***|-0.258***|-0.226***|-0.245***|-0.218***|-0.235***|-0.207***|-0.210***|-0.194***|
||(-3.07)|(-3.02)|(-1.09)|(-1.20)|(-1.70)|(-1.80)|(-2.27)|(-2.27)|(-3.41)|(-3.29)|(-4.06)|(-4.04)|(-4.34)|(-4.72)|(-3.81)|(-4.29)|(-3.07)|(-3.40)|
|**Age 65+, lag**|-0.0969*|-0.119**|-0.147|-0.250*|-0.102|-0.186*|-0.0404|-0.0794|-0.0857|-0.0995*|-0.104**|-0.112**|-0.106**|-0.105**|-0.0761|-0.0692|-0.0381|-0.0372|
||(-1.69)|(-2.02)|(-1.47)|(-1.97)|(-1.14)|(-1.77)|(-0.64)|(-1.22)|(-1.54)|(-1.82)|(-2.08)|(-2.38)|(-2.15)|(-2.35)|(-1.56)|(-1.55)|(-0.69)|(-0.66)|
|**Num.Obs.**|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|
|**hansen (p-val)**|0.343|0.765|0.283|0.586|0.418|0.798|0.423|0.757|0.368|0.676|0.308|0.682|0.474|0.708|0.303|0.614|0.542|0.857|
|**m1(p-val)**|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|**m2(p-val)**|0.00630|0.0119|0.00687|0.00890|0.00288|0.00607|0.0154|0.0372|0.00609|0.0102|0.0109|0.0146|0.00454|0.00653|0.180|0.165|0.0882|0.0884|
|**AR(3)(p-val)**|0.111|0.142|0.124|0.243|0.195|0.442|0.0457|0.0959|0.119|0.149|0.256|0.260|0.544|0.651|0.341|0.437|0.990|0.761|
|**Num.States**|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**Num.Instr.**|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|

Note. See Note in Table 2. A constant term and time dummies are included in all models (estimations not shown in the table). Estimations are by one-step System-GMM, reducing the number of lags to just 2. Tests _m_ 1 and _m_ 2 are for first- and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Both are asymptotically N(0,1) distributed under the null of no serial correlation. Since most _p_ -values of the _m_ 2 test are below 0.10, _t_ -2 instruments are invalid. Thus, for the first difference equations, we use instruments starting at _t_ -3. The test for the existence of an AR(3) in the first-difference residuals is shown to check for the validity of these instruments. The Hansen over-identifying restrictions test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of parameters to be estimated. The _p_ -value reported is for the null hypothesis of instruments validity. A _p_ -value above 0.10 is symptom of instruments validity.

22
**Table 4.** Income growth and inequality by percentiles in the U.S.: estimated results using robust System-GMM (alternative measures of IO)

||**All s**|**ample**|**Percen**|**tile 05**|**Perce**|**ntile 10**|**Perce**|**ntile 25**|**Perce**|**ntile 50**|**Percen**|**tile 75**|**Perce**|**ntile 90**|**Perce**|**ntile 95**|**Percen**|**tile 99**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||**IO**|**index: i**|**ncome bet**|**ween-gro**|**ups ineq**|**uality (rac**|**e &gend**|**er)**||||||
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0471*|-0.00324|-0.0512|0.208**|-0.126**|0.0645|-0.0800**|-0.0235|-0.0380*|-0.0274|0.00587|-0.0124|0.0240|-0.0378|0.0415**|-0.0471|0.0628***|-0.0195|
||(-1.79)|(-0.08)|(-0.65)|(2.16)|(-2.06)|(0.94)|(-2.17)|(-0.49)|(-1.86)|(-0.65)|(0.35)|(-0.33)|(1.50)|(-0.95)|(2.37)|(-1.09)|(2.83)|(-0.36)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.135||-0.726**||-0.552***||-0.179||-0.0431||0.0339||0.151||0.215**||0.196*|
|||(-1.33)||(-2.66)||(-2.72)||(-1.52)||(-0.44)||(0.39)||(1.61)||(2.24)||(1.71)|
|**Hansen(p-val)**|0.343|0.709|0.283|0.680|0.418|0.706|0.423|0.714|0.368|0.741|0.308|0.643|0.474|0.708|0.303|0.711|0.542|0.870|
||||||||**IO inde**|**x: occupat**|**ion betw**|**een-group**|**s inequali**|**ty (race)**|||||||
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0471*|0.0334|-0.0512|0.199**|-0.126**|0.0636|-0.0800**|0.0261|-0.0380*|0.0138|0.00587|0.0402|0.0240|0.0202|0.0415**|0.00531|0.0628***|0.0115|
||(-1.79)|(1.10)|(-0.65)|(2.03)|(-2.06)|(1.06)|(-2.17)|(0.76)|(-1.86)|(0.49)|(0.35)|(1.48)|(1.50)|(0.77)|(2.37)|(0.19)|(2.83)|(0.25)|
|**IO, lag**||-1.423**||-5.413***||-3.972***||-1.991***||-0.867||-0.552||0.158||0.733*||0.989|
|||(-2.38)||(-2.93)||(-3.17)||(-2.89)||(-1.65)||(-1.19)||(0.35)||(1.75)||(1.59)|
|**Hansen(p-val)**|0.343|0.647|0.283|0.804|0.418|0.770|0.423|0.586|0.368|0.711|0.308|0.767|0.474|0.743|0.303|0.648|0.542|0.829|
|||||||**IO i**|**ndex: occ**|**upation b**|**etween-g**|**roups ine**|**quality (ra**|**ce & gen**|**der)**||||||
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0471*|-0.0193|-0.0512|0.170**|-0.126**|0.0104|-0.0800**|-0.0282|-0.0380*|-0.0444|0.00587|-0.00520|0.0240|-0.0119|0.0415**|-0.00960|0.0628***|-0.00300|
||(-1.79)|(-0.56)|(-0.65)|(2.08)|(-2.06)|(0.17)|(-2.17)|(-0.69)|(-1.86)|(-1.41)|(0.35)|(-0.18)|(1.50)|(-0.45)|(2.37)|(-0.34)|(2.83)|(-0.07)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.338||-3.529***||-2.116***||-0.716||0.195||0.314||0.736*||0.959**||1.140**|
|||(-0.75)||(-3.16)||(-2.70)||(-1.43)||(0.46)||(0.74)||(1.86)||(2.43)||(2.18)|
|**Hansen(p-val)**|0.343|0.644|0.283|0.778|0.418|0.722|0.423|0.721|0.368|0.678|0.308|0.685|0.474|0.689|0.303|0.711|0.542|0.832|
|||||||||**IO index:**|**Occupat**|**ional mob**|**ility index**||||||||
|**Ineq., lag**|-0.0471*|0.0343|-0.0512|0.127|-0.126**|0.0396|-0.0800**|0.0272|-0.0380*|0.0244|0.00587|0.0427|0.0240|0.0499*|0.0415**|0.0664**|0.0628***|0.0880**|
||(-1.79)|(1.02)|(-0.65)|(1.20)|(-2.06)|(0.55)|(-2.17)|(0.70)|(-1.86)|(0.87)|(0.35)|(1.47)|(1.50)|(1.95)|(2.37)|(2.46)|(2.83)|(2.39)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.0413**||-0.131***||-0.0981***||-0.0505**||-0.0255||-0.0182||-0.0127||-0.0132||-0.0145|
|||(-2.19)||(-2.85)||(-2.96)||(-2.50)||(-1.56)||(-1.13)||(-0.93)||(-0.99)||(-0.95)|
|**Hansen(p-val)**|0.343|0.737|0.283|0.738|0.418|0.767|0.423|0.709|0.368|0.701|0.308|0.759|0.474|0.797|0.303|0.629|0.542|0.920|
|**Num. Obs**|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|
|**Num. states**|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**Num. Instr.**|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|53|61|

See Note in Table 3.

23
**Table 5.** Income growth and inequality by percentiles in the U.S.: estimated results using robust System-GMM (Collapse instruments) (extended controls from Marrero and Rodríguez, 2013)

||**All sa**|**mple**|**Percen**|**tile 05**|**Perce**|**ntile 10**|**Perce**|**ntile 25**|**Perce**|**ntile 50**|**Perce**|**ntile 75**|**Perce**|**ntile 90**|**Perce**|**ntile 95**|**Perce**|**ntile 99**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Ineq., lag**|0.00956|0.0283|0.0634|0.157**|-0.0125|0.0331|-0.0114|0.00388|0.00373|0.00774|0.0250|0.0121|0.0303**|0.00402|0.0371**|-0.000633|0.0441**|-0.0367|
||(0.41)|(1.13)|(0.98)|(2.35)|(-0.28)|(0.74)|(-0.40)|(0.14)|(0.18)|(0.33)|(1.63)|(0.58)|(2.31)|(0.20)|(2.64)|(-0.03)|(2.36)|(-1.07)|
|**IO, lag**||-0.0815||-0.488***||-0.226*||-0.0709||-0.0353||0.0225||0.0600||0.0902||0.205**|
|||(-1.20)||(-3.40)||(-1.87)||(-0.90)||(-0.54)||(0.39)||(1.01)||(1.43)||(2.54)|
|**ln(y), lag**|-0.0456***|-0.0482***|-0.0402***|-0.0497***|-0.0475***|-0.0526***|-0.0460***|-0.0482**|* -0.0503**|* -0.0523***|-0.0409***|-0.0414***|-0.0375***|-0.0377**|* -0.0303**|* -0.0301**|* -0.0367**|* -0.0371***|
||(-6.17)|(-6.40)|(-4.59)|(-6.12)|(-7.12)|(-7.42)|(-7.85)|(-7.44)|(-6.16)|(-6.73)|(-4.57)|(-4.90)|(-4.51)|(-4.84)|(-3.84)|(-3.85)|(-3.70)|(-3.82)|
|**Edu_ms, lag**|0.0472|0.0552*|0.00727|0.0266|0.0375|0.0488|0.0465|0.0537**|0.0567*|0.0663**|0.0431|0.0506*|0.0328|0.0415|0.0222|0.0317|0.0317|0.0485|
||(1.50)|(1.90)|(0.12)|(0.50)|(0.82)|(1.17)|(1.65)|(2.07)|(1.87)|(2.42)|(1.52)|(1.90)|(1.22)|(1.59)|(0.87)|(1.24)|(1.04)|(1.53)|
|**OLM-fem., lag**|-0.0561**|-0.0549**|-0.108**|-0.122**|-0.0976**|-0.100***|-0.0675***|-0.0656**|* -0.0566**|-0.0509***|-0.0384*|-0.0300|-0.0409**|-0.0278|-0.0491**|*<br>-0.0315*|-0.0190|0.0120|
||(-2.42)|(-2.53)|(-2.07)|(-2.53)|(-2.64)|(-2.79)|(-2.78)|(-2.89)|(-2.64)|(-2.71)|(-1.82)|(-1.56)|(-2.03)|(-1.48)|(-2.76)|(-1.80)|(-0.62)|(0.37)|
|**Age 0-15, lag**|-0.0857|-0.0959|-0.141|-0.192|-0.100|-0.126|-0.000933|-0.0106|-0.0747|-0.0809|-0.0714|-0.0709|-0.176***|-0.177***|-0.203***|-0.203***|-0.129|-0.126|
||(-1.11)|(-1.35)|(-0.96)|(-1.39)|(-0.85)|(-1.14)|(-0.01)|(-0.14)|(-1.06)|(-1.25)|(-1.11)|(-1.19)|(-2.69)|(-2.86)|(-3.15)|(-3.35)|(-1.62)|(-1.66)|
|**Age 65+, lag**|-0.0767|-0.0838|-0.0374|-0.112|-0.0620|-0.0935|-0.0165|-0.0181|-0.0815|-0.0792|-0.0743|-0.0712|-0.133**|-0.125**|-0.145**|-0.135**|-0.0680|-0.0360|
||(-1.30)|(-1.45)|(-0.27)|(-0.82)|(-0.59)|(-0.88)|(-0.27)|(-0.30)|(-1.55)|(-1.61)|(-1.45)|(-1.46)|(-2.26)|(-2.16)|(-2.44)|(-2.30)|(-1.14)|(-0.65)|
|**Emp_cons, lag**|-0.0999|-0.0961|-0.336*|-0.295|-0.240**|-0.215*|-0.0753|-0.0709|-0.0736|-0.0790|-0.0615|-0.0715|0.0000836|-0.0191|0.0364|0.0108|0.00801|-0.0527|
||(-1.43)|(-1.35)|(-1.89)|(-1.63)|(-2.14)|(-1.87)|(-1.01)|(-0.95)|(-1.23)|(-1.35)|(-1.03)|(-1.20)|(0.00)|(-0.35)|(0.65)|(0.19)|(0.11)|(-0.67)|
|**Emp_finan., lag**|0.0730|0.0564|-0.0335|-0.0369|-0.0192|-0.0155|0.0498|0.0358|0.105*|0.0772|0.0929|0.0745|0.115|0.0960|0.116|0.101|0.183|0.155|
||(1.11)|(0.94)|(-0.25)|(-0.27)|(-0.19)|(-0.16)|(0.71)|(0.53)|(1.76)|(1.46)|(1.51)|(1.20)|(1.60)|(1.25)|(1.19)|(0.94)|(1.35)|(0.96)|
|**Emp_gov, lag**|0.0728**|0.0639*|0.169***|0.133*|0.122***|0.104**|0.0668**|0.0593|0.0603**|0.0534*|0.0578**|0.0568*|0.0605**|0.0644**|0.0547**|0.0617**|0.0316|0.0428|
||(2.31)|(1.84)|(2.78)|(1.95)|(2.70)|(2.08)|(2.04)|(1.64)|(2.16)|(1.76)|(2.10)|(1.97)|(2.27)|(2.37)|(2.35)|(2.66)|(0.90)|(1.30)|
|**Emp_growth, lag**|-0.00704|-0.00569|-0.0167|-0.0137|-0.0107|-0.00987|-0.00693|-0.00577|-0.00627|-0.00440|-0.00317|-0.00188|-0.00587|-0.00398|-0.00673|-0.00454|-0.00466|-0.000258|
||(-1.38)|(-1.07)|(-1.48)|(-1.19)|(-1.28)|(-1.20)|(-1.24)|(-1.03)|(-1.29)|(-0.92)|(-0.76)|(-0.44)|(-1.40)|(-0.93)|(-1.64)|(-1.12)|(-0.87)|(-0.05)|
|**Fertility, lag**|-0.0357***|-0.0370***|<br>-0.0222|-0.0250|-0.0335**|-0.0352**|-0.0516***|-0.0529**|* -0.0404**|* -0.0419***|-0.0399***|-0.0409***|-0.0252***|-0.0263**|* -0.0183**|* -0.0195**|* -0.0263**|-0.0268**|
||(-3.74)|(-3.80)|(-1.23)|(-1.39)|(-2.22)|(-2.31)|(-4.94)|(-4.96)|(-4.33)|(-4.46)|(-4.77)|(-4.90)|(-3.34)|(-3.51)|(-2.74)|(-3.07)|(-2.13)|(-2.38)|
|**Welfare, lag**|-0.0849|-0.119|0.0723|-0.0317|-0.106|-0.156|-0.0823|-0.110|-0.101|-0.132|-0.113|-0.126|-0.105|-0.119|-0.0630|-0.0686|-0.252**|-0.243**|
||(-0.81)|(-1.14)|(0.29)|(-0.13)|(-0.60)|(-0.89)|(-0.75)|(-0.99)|(-1.03)|(-1.34)|(-1.32)|(-1.52)|(-1.26)|(-1.53)|(-0.79)|(-0.92)|(-2.62)|(-2.53)|
|**Num.Obs.**|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|240|
|**hansen (p-val)**|0.595|0.795|0.730|0.920|0.638|0.884|0.560|0.832|0.560|0.797|0.678|0.825|0.665|0.815|0.713|0.834|0.772|0.842|
|<br>**m1(p-val)**|0.0000113|0.0000210|0.0000823|0.0000934|0.0000123|0.0000147|0.0000239|0.000032|6 0.0000099|9 0.0000193|0.0000243|0.0000388|0.0000375|0.0000504|0.0000140|0.0000189|0.0000657|0.000109|
|**m2(p-val)**|0.151|0.272|0.113|0.210|0.0824|0.149|0.128|0.218|0.167|0.249|0.609|0.621|0.572|0.511|0.877|0.985|0.435|0.358|
|**AR(3)(p-val)**|0.0684|0.0551|0.270|0.214|0.0400|0.0546|0.0177|0.0182|0.0533|0.0566|0.229|0.254|0.468|0.656|0.329|0.491|1.000|0.553|
|**Num.States**|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**Num.Instr.**|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|65|70|

See Note in Table 3. System-GMM is estimated collapsing the matrix of instruments to avoid the problem of ‘too-many instruments’ (Roodman, 2009a).

24