metadata: authors: 0: author: Mihalyi,David
1: author: Scurfield,Thomas
count: Africa
docna: 0: docna: How Did Africa's Prospective Petroleum
            Producers Fall Victim to the Presource Curse ?
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Oil Refining & Gas Industry,Oil & Gas,Public Finance Decentralization and
            Poverty Reduction,Public Sector Economics,Energy Demand,Energy and Mining,Energy and Environment
teratopic: Industry,Public Sector Development,Energy
abstracts: cdata!: This paper reviews resource sector
            developments in 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that made
            their first (major) petroleum discoveries during the most
            recent commodity boom. The analysis, which goes back to
            2001, looks at sector forecasts of international
            organizations, governments, and companies and compares them
            with the results that emerged. The paper finds that a third
            of the countries did not make any commercially viable
            discoveries. Among those that potentially had commercial
            finds, the latest timelines from discovery to production are
            73 percent longer on average than initially expected. In the
            six countries for which there are comparable data, revenue
            collected thus far or the most recent revenue projections
            for countries yet to reach production are 63 percent lower
            on average than the initial forecasts. All 12 countries
            experienced a disappointment in at least one of the three
            dimensions analyzed—and these disappointments are likely to
            be exacerbated by the recent price crash. The paper also
            documents the various policies adopted in response to the
            discoveries and -- with the benefit of hindsight -- finds
            that, in some cases, this over optimism contributed to the
            'presource curse~^!!^: suboptimal policymaking that did
            not align with the new realities. Some recommendations are
            provided on how better to navigate the inherent
            uncertainties in developing the sector.
repnme: repnme: How Did Africa's Prospective Petroleum
            Producers Fall Victim to the Presource Curse ?
display_title: How Did Africa's Prospective
            Petroleum Producers Fall Victim to the Presource Curse
listing_relative_url: /research/2020/09/32386438/africas-prospective-petroleum-producers-fall-victim-presource-curse
topicv3: Public Finance m1326315 713,Energy and Extractives m1326595 507,Oil and Gas Systems m1327342 549,Oil and Gas Industry m1327562 539,Petroleum Industry m1583790 4710
publishtoextweb_dt: 2020-09-08T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Industry,Public Sector Development,Energy
origu: Office of the Chief Economist (AFECE)
no_of_pages: 37
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 9384 How Did Africa’s Prospective Petroleum Producers Fall Victim to the Presource Curse?

_David Mihalyi Thomas Scurfield_ Africa Region Office of the Chief Economist September 2020
Policy Research Working Paper 9384

# **Abstract**

This paper reviews resource sector developments in 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that made their first (major) petroleum discoveries during the most recent commodity boom. The analysis, which goes back to 2001, looks at sector forecasts of international organizations, governments, and companies and compares them with the results that emerged. The paper finds that a third of the countries did not make any commercially viable discoveries. Among those that potentially had commercial finds, the latest timelines from discovery to production are 73 percent longer on average than initially expected. In the six countries for which there are comparable data, revenue collected thus far or the most recent revenue projections for countries yet to reach production are 63 percent lower on average than the initial forecasts. All 12 countries experienced a disappointment in at least one of the three dimensions analyzed—and these disappointments are likely to be exacerbated by the recent price crash. The paper also documents the various policies adopted in response to the discoveries and—with the benefit of hindsight—finds that, in some cases, this over optimism contributed to the ‘presource curse’: suboptimal policymaking that did not align with the new realities. Some recommendations are provided on how better to navigate the inherent uncertainties in developing the sector.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at dmihalyi@resourcegovernance.org and tscurfield@resourcegovernance.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# How Did Africa’s Prospective Petroleum Producers Fall Victim to the Presource Curse?*

## David Mihalyi<sup>a, b</sup> , Thomas Scurfield<sup>b</sup>

_aSchool of Public Policy, Central European University. Oktober 6 street 7, Budapest, 1053, Hungary. b Natural Resource Governance Institute, 80 Broad Street, Suite 1801., New York, 10004, NY, USA_ _Keywords:_ Natural Resources; Oil and Gas; Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development; Resource Curse; Presource Curse

* We would like to acknowledge the valuable comments received from Mamadou Tanou Balde, Thomas Baunsgaard, James Cust, Patrick Heller, Keith Myers, Silas Olang, Valerie Marcel and Albert Zeufack, as well as seminar participants of the New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group (Kampala), CSAE 2019 (Oxford) and Africa's Resource Future Seminar 2019 (Washington DC). All errors as well as all views expressed in this paper are those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group or the Natural Resource Governance Institute.
# **1. Introduction**

About a decade ago, as a result of new petroleum finds and with commodity prices at all-time highs, a group of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were identified by experts as being on the brink of becoming wealthy from their oil or gas deposits. These countries went from being described as resource poor to “prospective exporters” (International Monetary Fund, 2012a) or “new producers” (Chatham House, 2019). Such hopes were reflected in policy documents published by major institutions such as the Africa Progress Panel (2013), African Development Bank (AfDB) (2015) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012). Our analysis, which covers the period from 2001 to June 2020, looks back at the historical oil and gas sector forecasts of international organizations (namely the IMF and World Bank), governments and companies across 12 countries, and compares them with the actual results that emerged in terms of resources discovered, sector development and government revenues.

We find that all 12 countries fell short of the forecast expectations. The economic outlook of these countries has changed following these disappointments, especially following the slump in commodity prices that began in late 2014. Our study takes stock of the lessons and provides some recommendations to help countries navigate the path to becoming resource rich without succumbing to the ‘presource curse’ (Cust and Mihalyi, 2017; Frynas and Buur, 2020). These lessons and recommendations are even more important after the recent price crash, with oil prices reaching a record low in March 2020.<sup>1</sup>

# **2. Countries of focus**

We identified our focus countries by using two criteria. The first criterion measures whether countries are truly new producers, as opposed to established ones. We defined such countries as those for whom the share of oil and gas resource volume discovered between 2001 and 2018 represents at least three-quarters of the total oil and gas resource volume discovered since 1945 in said country (based on data from Rystad Energy’s Ucube). This criterion excluded all countries that were already deemed significant producers, while allowing us to include countries such as Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, which already had modest production but made potentially transformational discoveries. Using resources found rather than proven reserves allowed us to include countries like Liberia, whose oil finds were ultimately found to be commercially unviable.<sup>2</sup> The second criterion measured whether the resources found would, if extracted in their totality at the price average over the period, be large enough to significantly alter the country’s economic future. We measured this by multiplying the total size of the resources found between 2001 and 2018 by the average Brent oil and US gas prices from 2001 to 2018 measured in 2000 real USD.<sup>3</sup> We divided this value by 20 years to account for the fact that the GDP reported is for a single year, whereas production typically happens over an extended period of 15 to 30 years.<sup>4</sup> Where the resulting amount is equivalent to at least 5 percent of the country’s GDP in 2000 (before our study period), we included the country in our sample.<sup>5</sup> This allowed us to distinguish between countries

> 1 Our study is based on information that was public up to June 26, 2020.

> 2 This measure comprises of proven, probable, and possible recoverable economical volumes at the time of discovery, as measured by Rystad Energy’s Ucube database.

> 3 The average Brent oil price was $52.4 per barrel (bbl) and average US gas price was $3.87 per million British thermal units (mmBtu).

> 4 This is clearly a simplification as it ignores what amounts of resources found are recoverable, the costs and profits of extraction, etc. However, it provides a ballpark estimate of their maximum revenue potential. 5 We had to use 2011 data for South Sudan because it did not exist before then.

2
based on both the size of oil and gas discoveries and the size of the economy. For example, initial finds in São Tomé and Príncipe were small in absolute terms but big for such a small country. Conversely, there were some finds in Botswana, but they are very small compared to the size of the economy.

These two criteria clearly delineate the 12 countries at the center of our study, which we present in Table 1. As we show in more detail in Table 5 in the appendix, our selection of countries is robust to adjusting these thresholds in different ways, as there is a large gap between the countries included and excluded from our study for both indicators.

|_Table 1. Countries of focus against the selection criteria_<sup>_6_</sup>|
|---|

|**Country**|**Share of oil and gas**<br>**resource wealth**<br>**discovered in 2001-**<br>**2018**|**Forecast average annual**<br>**gross value of resources**<br>**discovered in 2001 to 2018**<br>**as percentage of 2000**<br>**GDP**|
|---|---|---|
|Ghana|97%|44%|
|Guinea-Bissau|100%|8%|
|Kenya|99%|12%|
|Liberia|100%|22%|
|Mauritania|100%|76%|
|Mozambique|97%|480%|
|Niger|90%|31%|
|São Tomé and<br>Príncipe|100%|85%|
|Senegal|88%|77%|
|Sierra Leone|100%|42%|
|Tanzania|96%|46%|
|Uganda|100%|54%|

_Source: Rystad Energy’s Ucube database; authors’ calculations_ In each of the 12 countries reviewed, we identified a trigger event—the announcement of a specific discovery, sequence of discoveries or field reevaluation—that led to a significant shift in expectations regarding oil or gas prospects in the country.<sup>7</sup> As we will discuss in later sections, shortly after these trigger events, companies, governments and international experts showed increased interest in further exploration, started planning for the quick ramping up of petroleum production and began preparing for a transition to a petroleum-producing economy. Table 2 sets out some of the details of these events.

> 6 These criteria are based on resources found rather than proven reserves.

> 7 This list of events builds on the discoveries presented in the World Bank Africa’s Resource Future dataset.

3
_Table 2. Trigger events_ _<u>identified in the countries of focus</u>_

|Country|Time of<br>event|Event type|Name of<br>discovery|Location of<br>discovery|Operating<br>company|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Ghana|2007|First giant oil<br>discovery|Jubilee|Deepwater|Kosmos<br>Energy|
|Guinea Bissau|2004|First oil<br>discovery|Sinapa|Shallow water|Premier Oil|
|Kenya|2012|First oil<br>discovery|Ngamia|Onshore|Tullow Oil|
|Liberia|2012|First oil<br>discovery|Narina|Deepwater|African<br>Petroleum|
|Mauritania|2001|First oil<br>discovery|Chinguetti|Deepwater|Woodside<br>Petroleum|
|Mozambique|2010|First giant gas<br>discovery|Windjammer|Deepwater|Anadarko<br>Petroleum|
|Niger|2005|First<br>commercial oil<br>discovery|<br>Jaouro|Onshore|Petronas|
|São Tomé and<br>Principe (incl.<br>Nigeria JDZ)|2006|First oil<br>discovery|Obo|Deepwater|Chevron|
|Senegal|2014|First<br>commercial oil<br>discovery|<br>SNE|Deepwater|Cairn Energy|
|Sierra Leone|2009-<br>2010|Sequence of oil<br>discoveries|<br>Venus,<br>Mercury|Deepwater|Anadarko<br>Petroleum|
|Tanzania|2010|First giant gas<br>discovery|Pweza|Deepwater|Ophir Energy,<br>BG|
|Uganda|2006-<br>2008|Sequence of oil<br>discoveries|<br>Mputa,<br>Waraga,<br>Kingfisher|Offshore (in<br>Lake Albert)|Tullow Oil,<br>Hardman,<br>Heritage|

_Source: Cust, Mihalyi, Rivera-Ballesteros (2020); authors’ desk research of company announcements_ In six of the countries, the trigger event was the first discovery that put them on the map. For example, in Kenya, after intermittent exploration activity since 1954, oil was finally discovered by Tullow in March 2012. This first find was large enough for it to highlight the country’s potential. At the time, Tullow described as an “excellent start” (Tullow, 2012) and the Kenyan president called it a “major breakthrough” (Kibaki 2012, cited in BBC, 2012).

Uganda’s first oil discovery in June 2006 was quickly followed by two more discoveries that year and a string of discoveries in 2007 and 2008. The key event was the discovery of fields with better quality reservoirs in the north of Lake Albert in 2008. The following year, Tullow described Uganda as having a “world-class basin” and declared that the commercial threshold had been exceeded (Tullow, 2009, p. 1).

In four of the countries, oil and gas had been discovered much earlier than the identified trigger 4
event, but these discoveries were small and not viewed as transformational even when some were actually exploited. It was the giant nature of subsequent discoveries (real or imagined) that drastically changed expectations.<sup>8</sup> Oil was discovered and had been produced in small quantities in Ghana since the 1970s. However, in 2007, Kosmos and Tullow discovered the “world class” Jubilee field (Tullow, 2008, p. 15). After drilling the first exploration well, the Ghanaian president said that oil could turn the country into an “African tiger” (Kufuor 2007, cited in BBC, 2007). In Mozambique and Tanzania, limited onshore gas production had been taking place since 2004. Then in 2010, Mozambique made a giant offshore discovery that provided a “strong indication of the potential of the [Rovuma] basin” (Anadarko, 2010). Tanzania’s breakthrough discovery also came in 2010 in the Pweza field. After relatively large offshore discoveries in 2010 and 2011, Ophir Energy made its largest-ever discovery in 2012, which “substantially exceeded pre-drill expectations” and was a “major step closer” to a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project (Ophir Energy, 2012).

In Niger, exploration of the Agadem basin had taken place since the 1970s and had yielded multiple small oil discoveries. Petronas then made a larger discovery in 2005, but decided it was not commercially viable and abandoned the block. However, encouraged by high oil prices, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired the block in 2008. It announced a $5 billion investment plan to develop the resources that same year, which in turn triggered hopes of an oil-rich future.

Following these trigger events, all 12 countries started preparing to become petroleum rich. In the following section we review this journey.

> 8 A giant discovery is one exceeding 500 million barrels (mbbl) and giant fields are those with estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of 500 mbbl of oil or gas equivalent. See Horn (2011).

5
# **3. The challenging road to becoming resource rich**

The sector can have many benefits and costs for a country. Our analysis is focused on the direct economic impacts and the expectations surrounding them. We analyzed the sector’s development and impact across three dimensions: resources discovered; timelines from discovery to production; and government revenues. Resources discovered and timeline to production underpin all other opportunities that a sector provides to a country; while the generation of government revenue tends to offer it the greatest potential source of benefits (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014) and should be an indicator of any wider disappointments. These dimensions are also easiest to measure and assess.<sup>9</sup> Each of the 12 countries we looked at has suffered from at least one disappointment on its road to benefiting from its perceived resource wealth. We now discuss these disappointments in more detail.

## **3.1 Resources discovered**

Economists often depict countries as being resource rich or resource poor based on a snapshot and using a single indicator. For example, Sachs and Warner (2001) use the single measure of resource export to GDP, Venables (2017) uses resource rent to GDP and Arezki et al. (2017) use the net present value of oil finds to GDP. In practice, the reality is more complex. Only known resource wealth can be readily assessed, but countries differ substantially in the amount of exploration undertaken (Arezki, van der Ploeg, and Toscani, 2019). Given that countries with weaker institutions are much less explored (Cust and Harding, 2019), estimates of known wealth mask how much more may be found if institutions improve. The certainty and commercial viability of resources found also varies significantly and may change over time. For example, a gas field once seen as non-viable may become lucrative once the necessary infrastructure is in place to utilize it.

In this section, we review how much the perception of the 12 countries’ resource endowments changed in the period of study.

In five of the twelve countries—Ghana, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal—discoveries have attracted a final investment decision (FID). Three countries—Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda— are still awaiting an FID. The initial oil discoveries in the other four countries—Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Sierra Leone—have already been deemed to be non-commercial and abandoned by the companies. Kenya has also suffered from disappointment in this area. While its oil discoveries may still attract an FID, discoveries of gas have already been abandoned. Current estimates of oil and gas reserves in the 12 countries are provided in the appendix.

## _Resource growth_

Initial discoveries in the East and Southern African countries of Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda led to further discoveries and production plans. For example, after Uganda’s first oil discovery in 2006, 20 subsequent discoveries were made in blocks 1, 2 and 3A. These blocks now comprise the Albertine Graben project planned by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Total and Tullow. Similarly, offshore gas discoveries in Mozambique and Tanzania in 2010 were followed by multiple others, with LNG projects now planned in both countries.

Similar success has been experienced in the West African countries of Ghana, Mauritania, Niger and

> 9 For example, government revenue forecasts are more common than, for example, employment forecasts. It is therefore easier to determine whether government revenue has disappointed rather than whether job creation has disappointed.

6
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discoveries was commercially viable. By 2014, optimism had begun to diminish. Initial prospects being found to be non-commercial was compounded by investor concerns about a devastating Ebola outbreak and falling global oil prices. Some companies decided to relinquish or not renew their expiring licenses in 2016 and 2017. In 2016, Exxon found a once-promising prospect to be dry, which effectively signaled the end of the wave of interest in Liberia’s waters. By the end of 2017, most companies had left and are yet to return.

In 2001, São Tomé established a joint development zone (JDZ) with Nigeria in the vicinity of major Nigerian oil discoveries. After the first licensing round attracted companies such as Chevron, Exxon and Total, in 2004, the IMF stated that the country stood at “the threshold of the oil era” (2004, p. 4). In 2006, Chevron reported a discovery in Block 1. While the company’s announcement indicated that it was premature to determine whether it was commercially viable, it referenced large oil field analogues in Nigeria. As a result, rumors emerged of at least 1 billion barrels being discovered: a significant find for such a small country (see, for example Shea, 2006). However, these rumors were not substantiated, and it was later confirmed that the discovery was not commercially viable. In all, seven wells were drilled between 2006 and 2012 that yielded six discoveries, none of which were deemed to have the potential to be commercialized. Due to the disappointing exploration results, all the major companies pulled out of the JDZ by 2013. Exploration activities only picked up again in 2019, but in São Tomé’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

Despite the oil discoveries in its Turkana Region leading to modest production plans, Kenya has also suffered from discovery disappointment. An onshore gas discovery in Block 9 by CNOOC in 2010 was abandoned the same year. After further exploration of the block by Africa Oil, a discovery was announced in 2014, only to later yield disappointing results. Gas discoveries in offshore Block 8 in 2012 and onshore Block 4 in 2018 have also been deemed non-commercial.

_Reasons for unfulfilled promise_

**Deposit size determines commercial viability.** In remote, deepwater basins, large discoveries are needed for a company to deem a discovery commercially viable.<sup>11</sup> Individual discoveries are often not of this size, and therefore it may take several wells to prove or disprove the commercial viability of a find. Several disappointments, such as those suffered by Liberia and Sierra Leone, arose when companies announced early findings without offering a caveat on commerciality.

**Misleading announcements by companies.** Sometimes smaller listed companies, such as African Petroleum, are incentivized to emphasize positive results to inflate their share price. This can mislead governments as well as other companies exploring in the same basin. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, companies’ lack of transparency on technical results obfuscated the true value of their discoveries, which led to companies continuing to drill in other blocks after the geological area had been shown to be unviable (Myers, 2019).

**Inadequate pre-qualification criteria to select companies.** While Liberia managed to attract some highly qualified companies like Exxon and Chevron, it also granted licenses to companies with no track record in exploration or tainted histories, like African Petroleum.<sup>12</sup> As Liberia’s experience highlights, the use of less qualified companies can not only reduce the likelihood of exploration success, it also makes discovery announcements less credible.<sup>13</sup>

11 For oil discoveries in Africa, this is about 300 mbbl (largely irrespective of the fiscal regime) (Myers, 2019). 12 In 2009, African Petroleum was blocked from listing on the London Stock Exchange due to concerns about the founder (Fortson, 2009).

13 For example, a company that previously had the same ownership as African Petroleum published misleading statements on its oil reserves (Armitstead and White, 2009).

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<!-- Start of picture text --> 20 years Block 2 , Uganda<br>Block 3A , Uganda<br>NX] Block 4 , Tanzania<br>A<br>5 Block 1 , Uganda Block 1 , Tanzania<br>8<br>3 Block 2, Tanzania<br>© 15 years<br>o<br>2 Area 1 , Mozambique<br>> Commodity<br>© Block BB , Kenya | Block 13T , Kenya<br>5 Gas<br>cs)2 [GTA, Senegal Dol<br>i} Area 4 , Mozambique IN GTA, Senegal | [SNE , Senegal Oil<br>5 10 years SNE , Senegal oa] Actual or latest<br>2o TEN , Ghana |_|(Jubilee, Jubilee , GhanaGhana] T=N+ Shans @ Actual<br>+ A Latest<br>2 : - —_ Agadeni , Niger<br>w Chinguetti , Mauritania<br>oO years<br>w Jubilee , Ghana<br>2<br>iS)<br>xt<br>0 years<br>0 years 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years<br>Initial forecast: Years from discovery to planned production<br><!-- End of picture text -->
While initial timelines across the eight countries forecast production to commence an average 6.4 years after discovery, even if the most recent timelines are met, the average would actually be 11 years. The differences are more marked for oil (forecast of 4.8 years versus actual/latest of 10.2 years) than for gas (forecast of 8.1 years versus actual/latest of 11.9 years).

# _Timely production_

After oil was discovered in Mauritania’s Chinguetti field by Woodside Petroleum in 2001, the country successfully reached first oil in 2006 as forecast. Ghana and Niger also reached first oil on schedule, and extremely quickly by international standards. Ghana took around three years to get from the first discovery in its large Jubilee field in 2007 to first oil in 2010, meeting Tullow’s ambitious timeline and, according to the company, setting a “new global benchmark” for the development of major deepwater projects (Tullow, 2011, p. 52). In Niger, development of the Agadem oil field by CNPC, and construction of a refinery and pipeline to connect the two by CNODC, were also completed in three years. First oil was reached in 2011 rather than in 2012 as expected. All three projects targeted oil rather than gas, and Mauritania’s Chinguetti and Ghana’s Jubilee fields were offshore and developed from floating facilities (known as floating production storage and offloading or FPSO facilities), though Niger’s Agadem was onshore. All three benefitted from high/increasing commodity prices through most of their development timeline.<sup>15</sup>

# _Delayed projects_

Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have taken much longer to reach production than expected. Each of these countries should have been producing by the end of 2020 according to early forecasts, and some should have already been producing for several years by now. The reality has been very different.

In Tanzania, the first publicized timeline for the development of the planned LNG project comprising blocks 1, 2 and 4 was from the IMF in 2012, which suggested that first gas by 2020 was achievable (IMF, 2012b). This prediction was subsequently echoed in company and government statements. However, delays in passing key legislation and identification of a site for the planned LNG plant and a fall in gas prices caused this timetable to slip. Sweeping legislative reforms in 2017 and a government review of existing production sharing agreements (PSAs) (including for blocks 1, 2 and 4) in 2019 have complicated negotiations and pushed back the timeline further.<sup>16</sup> In early 2019, the government stated that it hoped to agree to key terms by September 2019, reach an FID in 2022 and first gas in 2028 (Ng’wanakilala and Dausen, 2019). However, with key terms still yet to be agreed and negotiations currently suspended, further slippages are almost certain (Materu, 2019b).

Uganda’s journey to first oil has been similarly challenging. The first operator, Tullow, initially targeted first oil in 2009, and this timeline was reflected in IMF reports. However, it was soon pushed back to 2010 and then repeatedly delayed thereafter. The IMF, for example, has changed its first oil estimate eight times since its initial projection (see Figure 3). The most recent estimate is first oil in 2023 to 2024 (IMF, 2019b, p. 8), but this is likely to also prove over-optimistic with an FID unlikely before 2021 (Perkins, 2020).

Our analysis of oil and gas asset data between 1960 and 2018 suggests that, on average across all projects worldwide, it took 7.5 years to get from discovery to production. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 15 There was significant price volatility from 2007 to 2009, but prices on average were very high by historical standards.

16 The structure of the regulatory framework for the LNG project will depend on whether the blocks and the LNG plant are treated as separate entities. If, as expected, they are, PSAs will govern the blocks and a host government agreement will govern the LNG plant.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> 2007 -EEE 2.000<br>2008 EEE 2010<br>H1 2000 BEES 2011<br>H2 2000 DEES 2012<br>5 20102011 es 2017<br>o 2012<br>+} 2010 es 2018<br>i 2014<br>9005 eee 2021<br>20160 Es 2022<br>2017<br>2018<br>2010 Dee 2023/24<br>2020 ?<br>Estimated year of first oil<br><!-- End of picture text -->
new legislation or to revise existing legislation post-discovery as the prospect of an oil and gas sector becomes a reality. Delays in this process have been cited in Tanzania and Kenya as a significant obstacle to project development (see, for example: Miriri, 2018). Tanzania started developing the core of its legal framework as early as 2006, when offshore exploration was starting to increase. However, the Petroleum Act was only passed in 2015. Since then, only some of the necessary regulations have been finalized. Kenya’s Petroleum Bill took from 2013 to 2018 to pass. It is difficult to definitively establish common causes of these delays. However, it is likely to result in part from political deadlock, limited capacity, and insufficient prioritization of core parts of the legal framework. For example, alongside Tanzania’s delayed Petroleum Bill 2015, there was also a revenue management bill. Limited capacity makes prioritization more critical. There also appear to be specific “sticking points” in some cases. For example, in Kenya, the arrangement for sharing revenues sub-nationally appears to have been a key obstacle.

**Negotiating a better deal for the country.** Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique all appear to have taken longer to get to FID partly as a result of their governments trying to get a better deal. This has included attempts to negotiate higher taxes, a larger supply of the resource to the domestic market, greater local content and supporting infrastructure that is more beneficial to the country. These efforts have been made more difficult by lower prices.

**Slow development of negotiating and regulatory capacity.** Before a country has made a significant discovery, it often does not make sense for the government to invest heavily in developing the capacity necessary to negotiate deals in the sector or intensively oversee company operations. After a discovery, a government will often try to develop strong negotiating and regulatory capacity as it proceeds. However, when this process moves slowly, it can mean that deals, approvals and other regulatory decisions are delayed. For example, the Tanzanian government has indicated that it has been cautious about concluding a deal until it is confident that it has sufficient capacity to avoid mistakes (Materu, 2019a).

**Cross-border issues.** Several countries have had to resolve ownership questions where oil and gas deposits straddle national boundaries or when maritime boundaries are disputed. For example, while Ghana’s Jubilee project was developed on schedule, the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) field reached first oil two years later than expected as a result of a maritime border dispute with Côte d’Ivoire.

Resources discovered in landlocked countries require cross-border agreements to facilitate export routes to market. Disagreement around the route and the contractual terms for the pipeline to transport Uganda’s oil to the ocean for export is a key cause for delays in the development of both Ugandan and Kenyan oil. In 2015, Uganda agreed to route its oil through Kenya, with a pipeline also connecting Kenya’s oil blocks to the ocean. However, in 2016, the Ugandan government agreed to route its oil through Tanzania instead due to reported security and financial considerations. The companies operating in Kenya then had to agree a separate pipeline to a Kenyan port. Negotiations on both pipelines continued at the time of writing.

**Wider country developments.** In Mozambique, macroeconomic mismanagement—including significant borrowing without the required parliamentary approval and subsequent difficulties in servicing the loans—highlighted governance weaknesses and increased the country’s risk rating, making it a more difficult context for investors to operate. Governance and macroeconomic factors have also been found to hinder the timelines of mining projects going from discovery to production around the world (Khan, Nguyen, Ohnsorge, and Schodde, 2016).

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In Ghana, early projections by the IMF (2009, p. 28) and World Bank (2009, p. 21) suggested government revenues of at least $1 billion from 2011 onwards. However, as Figures 6 and 7 show, these projections proved overly optimistic. The World Bank estimated average government revenue of $1.4 billion a year in its central scenario between 2011 and 2018. Actual revenues were less than half that, approximately $0.6 billion for that same period (PIAC, 2019. p. 51).

This revenue shortfall was not caused by lower oil prices. From 2011 to 2014, the price averaged $108 per barrel, significantly higher than the IMF’s forecast of $62.5 per barrel and the World Bank’s main scenario assuming $75 per barrel. From 2015 to 2017, the actual Brent price was much lower, averaging $50 per barrel. However, the World Bank alternative scenario that assumed a constant price of $50 per barrel from 2011 (which therefore does not account for the earlier high prices enabling more rapid cost recovery in reality) still estimated revenues of more than $0.5 billion. In contrast, they were below $0.4 billion from 2015 to 2017.<sup>19</sup> Jubilee has suffered from several operational problems, never producing to its 115 mbd design specification and experiencing significant delays with its gas infrastructure. These challenges are believed to be at least partly due to the pace at which it reached production (New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group, 2019). The slight shortfall in production volumes compared to projections was offset by production from the neighboring TEN field in 2017. Another key driver of lower revenues is costs being higher than anticipated, compounded by limited ring-fencing of cost deductions across projects. While the World Bank assumed total capital costs of $4 billion for the Jubilee project, our best estimate of actual costs is closer to $7 billion.<sup>20</sup> The World Bank also assumed lower operating costs compared to the reality. Moreover, with the same companies involved in the TEN project and weak ring-fencing provisions, at least some of its development costs—initially planned to be around $4.9 billion—are likely to have been deducted against Jubilee’s taxable income. Initial projections of government revenues do not appear to have factored in this impact. The development of additional oil discoveries, such as the TEN project, means at least some of these revenues will be collected in the future. Though as a result of the sharp decline in oil prices in 2020, the government has slashed its oil revenue forecast to $0.6 bn, meaning revenue is no higher than in the early years despite the larger volumes (MOFEP, 2020).

> 19 The original IMF forecast stops in 2014, hence it is not directly comparable in this low price period.

> 20 Our estimate is based on initial development costs of $4.8 billion, $1.1 billion additional investment in 2012, and additional maintenance of around $1 billion.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> 2000<br>1800 poe<br>1600 —s -* - ~ ~<br>a “ ae<br>15 1400 *¢ ~<br>S<br>“4 1200 —_ ee’ ~<br>= i oo =<br>ian<br>BR 1000 =e<br>5 800 oy<br>600 ///<br>400 “a<br>v<br>200 ;<br>fe)<br>2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br>- = = IMF 2009 projection (estimate based on % non-oil GDP reported)<br>- — - World Bank 2009 projection (middle $75/barrel price scenario)<br>—— Actual revenue<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>50 >So SS SSssste<br>o o-<br>o-<br>o& 40 2 e =<br>as 2<br>Q 30 7*<br>5 ---"<br>20<br>10<br>fe)<br>2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br>- - - WB-2009 projection (middle $75/barrel price scenario)<br>—— Actual revenue per barrel<br><!-- End of picture text -->
life of the project and could reach $5 billion by the eighth year of production (ICF International, 2012). In contrast, the government indicated in 2018 that it did not expect annual revenues to exceed $1 billion until at least the tenth year of production (Government of Mozambique, 2018).

# _Reasons for revenue disappointments_

Government revenue projections are only as reliable as oil and gas price forecasts, which are notoriously hard to predict. However, there are several additional reasons why Ghana, Mauritania and Niger have suffered revenue disappointment, and Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda could as well.

**Over-optimism regarding ramp up and production levels** _._ In Niger, refining and pipeline limitations have constrained production capacity, while in Mauritania, geological complications resulted in lower than projected production and ultimately curtailed production earlier than expected. In Ghana, a combination of subsurface and surface issues caused Jubilee production to disappoint. Initial revenue projections for Mozambique and Tanzania are also likely to be unrealistic given the planned projects are smaller and likely to expand less quickly than these projections assumed.

**Prices and pricing arrangements.** In Niger, the refinery was buying oil at a discounted price and then reselling oil to consumers at a discounted price, which squeezed taxable profits. Early IMF projections of large oil revenues for Uganda were revised down as it reduced price assumptions from 2014 onwards.

**Underestimates of costs or cost deductions.** In Ghana, costs for producing blocks proved higher than assumed in earlier projections. Subsequent discoveries also increased cost deductions and delayed government revenues as a result of weak ring-fencing of projects. These problems might be exacerbated by fiscal regime choices which favor profit-based taxes over production-based taxes.

**Mistaken fiscal assumptions in models.** IMF projections for Mozambique appear to assume fiscal terms that are likely to differ from reality. In 2013, it estimated corporate income tax would be paid in the first production year, which is unlikely even if production ramped up as quickly as it assumed. IMF projections for Tanzania also appear to be based on higher taxes than at least some of the current contracts contain. For example, in its 2014 projections, the IMF assumed state equity of 20 percent and a government profit share of up to 60 percent (IMF, 2014), while the only PSA for the LNG project in the public domain (for Block 2) allows for state equity of 10 percent and a government profit share of up to 50 percent (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2020).

# **3.4 Impacts of disappointment**

In Sections 3.1 to 3.3, we presented several factors that have led to slower sector growth and lower petroleum revenues than initially anticipated. In this section, we present some descriptive evidence that both the discovery of oil and gas and subsequent disappointments likely had an important impact on the development of these countries. However, given the peculiarities of each case and the wide-ranging areas it may impact, we do not provide a comprehensive review, nor do we aim to prove causality between sector developments and the various indicators discussed below.

We have identified three potential areas of impact in our review of the 12 countries. These are unrealized public expectations, suboptimal policy and institutional frameworks, and the derailment of public finances. The three areas are strongly interlinked. Following a discovery, expectations of future petroleum wealth might shape policy changes, which in turn may drive the management of public finances. However, changes in public finances may in turn further drive future expectations 17
# and additional policy changes.

# _Unrealized expectations_

The first impact is unrealized expectations. Given the complexity of the sector, public misunderstanding is common. This can lead to unrealistic expectations about the scale and timing of production and its benefits. Over-optimistic projections and statements by companies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are also likely to have caused and exacerbated inflated public expectations in many of the countries we analyzed. The role of government is less clear cut. In some cases, the government has attempted to temper those expectations and align them better with reality. In others, government and politicians have only inflated them further.

Earlier studies have documented this impact. Cust and Mensah (2020) find a jump in citizen expectations after oil finds in Africa, as measured by survey responses regarding their personal economic outlook using Afrobarometer public polling data. In Tanzania, a local research institute has been mapping citizen expectations around the gas sector. In 2015, only five years after the gamechanging offshore discovery in 2010 and still some years from FID, 53 percent of citizens surveyed believed production was already taking place.<sup>21</sup> The survey also highlighted over-optimistic expectations of how transformative gas production could be: 40 percent believed that they or a family relation would be employed in the sector, equivalent to more than 4 million jobs if extrapolated (Twaweza, 2015).

Despite Liberia’s very limited oil resources, its potential benefits have captured the imagination of citizens on multiple occasions, as discussed by Collier (2016). Confusion erupted in 2013 when African Petroleum reported a pre-drill estimate for its Bee Eater prospect (African Petroleum, 2013). But the 840 mbbl figure in estimated recoverable resources was mistakenly interpreted in the media, as if Liberia was starting to produce 840 barrels of oil a day (see, for example: All Africa, 2013). Another newspaper ran a headline “If last week’s announcement by African Petroleum that there’s a huge deposit of oil offshore Liberia is anything to go by, then there is no need for Liberians to live in abject poverty again.”<sup>22</sup> A third article stated that Exxon will be starting oil production in 2017 (Oguh, 2015), despite the Mesurado well that it drilled the year before being dry. After drilling, the well was announced as a discovery and it was some time before it was acknowledged to be noncommercial.

In several countries, the government has attempted to counteract some of this unrealistic excitement. After the confusion around exploration results in Liberia, the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL) issued multiple public statements to try and clarify the situation (see, for example: NOCAL, 2012).

In Senegal, there have been only minor slippages in the production timeline. However, the government and the IMF have been cautious not to integrate the boom expected from petroleum into their projections. For example, a bond prospectus issued by the government in 2018 states: “Until a reputable international firm sets a date and production targets, production and earnings from oil and gas will not be integrated into Senegal’s macroeconomic framework. No assurance can be given as to when or whether the new oil and gas discoveries will be developed or the level of production they will represent” (Government of Senegal, 2018).<sup>23</sup>

> 21 A limited amount of gas was being produced from onshore projects at this time, which could have been partly the reason for this mistake.

> 22  The article ran in print by _Independent_ , January 21, 2013 (source: presentation by David Santley, World Bank, 2013).

> 23 Bond prospectus of the $1bn Eurobond issued by Senegal on 13 March 2018 due 2048.

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However, in many countries, governments have often failed to challenge, caveat or highlight uncertainties inherent in over-optimistic projections by companies and IFIs; and have done little to temper inflated public expectations. In some countries, governments and politicians have actually exacerbated them.

Celebrating Ghana’s giant oil discovery in 2007, President John Kufour said “Even without oil, we are doing so well... With oil as a shot in the arm, we’re going to fly” (Kufuor, 2007, cited in BBC, 2007). A year later, before any government revenue projections had been published, the opposition’s presidential candidate stated that “In five years, Ghana will earn US$15 billion” (Addo, 2008). Then, in 2010, President John Atta Mills promised that “The petroleum resources will take Ghana into an industrial revolution in the next 10 years,” (Mills, 2010).

In Tanzania, when campaigning to be re-elected in 2010, President Jakaya Kikwete stated about the town near one of the large gas discoveries: “Mtwara will be the new Dubai” (Must and Rustad, 2018).

One explanation for the lack of government questioning of over-optimism by companies and IFIs may be limited capacity to interrogate it and develop countervailing analysis. However, some have pointed to political advantages to explain government encouragement of such over-optimism. (Bawumia and Halland, 2017). Similar political influences may have been at play in Tanzania (Dupuy and Katera, 2019).

Support for a government as a result of such promises is likely to dissipate when those promises are not fulfilled. Therefore, mismanaged expectations may be politically disadvantageous in the longer term. However, in the interim, these inflated expectations can have a tangible and damaging impact.

_Suboptimal policy and institutional frameworks_ The second impact of unrealistic projections is adoption of suboptimal policy and institutional frameworks. As we have discussed, the discovery events presented in Section 2 were followed by a surge in interest in further exploration as well as development of some potentially viable finds. These developments certainly warranted changes to the policy framework. However, our review found several cases where the changes implemented, often based on perceived ‘good practice’ for resource-rich countries, do not appear, in retrospect, to be well aligned with the new realities.

**Establishment of new government institutions.** In several countries, new government institutions have been established to focus on the sector. For example, Sierra Leone’s Petroleum Directorate was established in 2011, shortly after the country’s first discovery. Liberia’s Petroleum Regulatory Authority (LPRA) was established in 2018. Similarly, Uganda’s Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act 2013 provided for the establishment of a new regulatory authority, the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU).<sup>24</sup>

Setting up such institutions ensures resources are focused exclusively on developing and/or regulating the sector. However, in countries with limited financial and human resources, establishing these specialized entities needs to be carefully timed. If premature, they can hamper the strengthening of regulatory capacity and impact other areas of sector governance by spreading scarce resources too thinly or necessitating prioritization of one objective over the other (Heller and Marcel, 2012). Considering that Sierra Leone and Liberia are yet to make a commercially viable discovery, these countries may have benefited from waiting longer before investing substantial public resources in the development of new institutions. Indeed, Liberia’s 2012 National Petroleum Policy offered useful flexibility, only requiring the LPRA to be established “as soon as practicable and 24 The same Act also established the Uganda National Oil Company.

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no later than the commencement of commercial production.” With plans to develop Uganda’s discoveries in place by 2013, establishing PAU may have been timely. However, it should be cautious in expanding further—for example, from its current 86-person staff to the planned 239-person staff— and engage in a careful cost-benefit analysis, especially until an FID has been made (Government of Uganda, 2018).

**A risk-taking commercial role for national oil companies.** In 2011, Ghana established the Petroleum Commission to take over regulatory responsibilities from Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and to enable GNPC to have a clear commercial role. The government announced intentions for GNPC to develop its own risk-taking exploration and production activity in order to exert greater control over Ghana’s petroleum reserves and become an independent operating company over time. Given that oil production had already commenced, GNPC’s transition to a commercial role may have been timely. However, other national oil companies (NOCs), such as NOCAL, are beginning to assume an exclusively commercial role several years before an FID. Such a role can expose a country to the financial risks associated with exploration, and can make significant demands on a government’s scarce financial and human resources, but, before an FID, generate little return.

**Stricter fiscal and regulatory terms.** Some governments have tightened terms after a discovery has highlighted a country’s potential and reduced the risk of further exploration (Heller, MebratuTsegaye, Mihalyi and Toledano, forthcoming). A better deal should be possible, but governments should be cautious of tightening terms too much. After the sequence of large discoveries in Tanzania in 2010 to 2012, the government attempted to take advantage of increased interest and introduced a new model PSA in 2013 with much stricter terms than previous versions. However, alongside falling prices, these stricter terms are believed to be at least partly the reason for the lack of interest in the 2013/2014 licensing round and that no new licenses being granted since then (Bofin and Pedersen, 2017).

**Setting up of sovereign wealth funds.** Countries such as Ghana, Mauritania, and São Tomé have set up SWFs for the deposit of petroleum revenues. For many countries, it is prudent to set aside a portion of petroleum wealth. These savings, and interest earned on them, can be used to benefit future generations. They can also help mitigate serious macroeconomic challenges like Dutch Disease or significant budget volatility.

However, given the size of government revenues actually generated in Ghana and Mauritania to date, such savings are unlikely to yield a greater return than investing in critical development projects or the interest payable on debt. Indeed, Ghana’s savings have yielded a net annual return of around 1 percent since 2011, while, over the same period, the country has been paying more than 9 percent interest on some of its loans (Bauer and Mihalyi, 2018). Petroleum revenues in these countries have also been small relative to the size of the economy and government revenues. For example, in Mauritania, government revenues from the sector were an average 1.3 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2015 so the kinds of macroeconomic challenges that SWFs are designed to mitigate—most notably Dutch Disease—were not significant. São Tomé established an SWF in 2004, even before a commercial discovery had been made. Establishing an SWF early can preempt special interests from capturing any future revenues and can increase the likelihood that the government introduces strong transparency and accountability provisions. However, even small SWFs require the use of scarce human and financial resources (Bauer and Mihalyi, 2018).

**Shifts in energy strategy.** Expectations surrounding oil and gas have impacted more than just the management of the public finances. After a large gas discovery in Kenya in early 2015, the government cancelled an LNG import deal with Qatar stating that it planned for the discovered gas to be extracted and converted into power in nine to 15 months’ time (Zyl, 2015). This gas has yet to

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be sanctioned for production—presumably resulting in the government having to seek out a costlier alternative.

# _Derailment of public finances_

The third area is the derailment of public finances. This area has already received considerable attention by scholars who have analyzed the impacts caused by giant oil and gas discoveries on various economic indicators. Arezki et al. (2017) find a decline in savings, and Cust & Mihalyi (2017) identify a growth disappointment, in the five years after discovery.

We do not aim to provide rigorous statistical evidence in this section, but would draw attention to only one indicator: debt sustainability. This is the result of the IMF/World Bank joint debt sustainability analysis across the 12 countries discussed in our study.

_Table 4. Change in debt sustainability risk, according to IMF and World Bank_<sup>_25_</sup>

|**Country**|**2011 Debt**<br>**Sustainability Analysis**|**2020 Debt**<br>**Sustainability Analysis**|
|---|---|---|
|Ghana|Moderate|High|
|Guinea-Bissau|High|Moderate|
|Kenya|Low|Moderate|
|Liberia|Low|Moderate|
|Mauritania|Moderate|High|
|Mozambique|Low|In debt distress|
|Niger|Low|Moderate|
|São Tomé and Príncipe|High|In debt distress|
|Senegal|Low|Moderate|
|Sierra Leone|Moderate|High|
|Tanzania|Low|Low|
|Uganda|Low|Low|

_Source: Authors’ collection from IMF and World Bank DSA reports_ As Table 4 shows, the IMF and World Bank’s assessment of debt sustainability worsened in 9 of the 12 countries, while it improved in only one case. Of course, there are regional and cyclical factors at play too, but various studies point towards resource sector disappointment being a major factor behind debt problems in Ghana (Bawumia and Halland, 2017), Mozambique (Hubert, 2019) and São Tomé (Frynas, Wood and Hinks, 2017). For example, both Ghana and São Tomé had taken on loans that were to be repaid in-kind using oil sector proceeds (Mihalyi, Adam and Hwang, 2020). With the

> 25 These represent the latest assessment as of April 2020. All were conducted before the 2020 global pandemic and economic crisis.

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global economic outlook significantly worsening as a result of the global pandemic, these countries are now at increased risk of a debt crisis. The resource revenues they were planning to use to repay their debt may be significantly smaller, arrive later or not at all.

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# **4. Lessons learned and policy recommendations**

We have reviewed the trajectory of petroleum sector development across 12 Sub-Saharan African countries that were once deemed to be on the verge of becoming resource rich. We have identified some success stories as well as several disappointments that these countries experienced.

Four countries never found large, commercially viable deposits. Five are still yet to start production, with three of these still yet to even secure the necessary investment. In the three countries where investment has happened, government revenues remain modest and have fallen short of projections.

We believe that governments, development partners, and other international organizations could do more to avoid these potential disappointments. We also think that they could do more to account for potential disappointments that cannot be avoided and therefore mitigate their impacts. We set out recommendations on both below.

## **4.1 Discoveries**

_Recommendations for governments_

**Select reputable, well-qualified companies.** The use of less qualified and reputable companies makes discovery announcements less credible. As a result, governments should time their licensing rounds well, and hold them only after sufficient preparation to maximize interest. Strong prequalification criteria should be used to exclude companies that have no record of accomplishment in exploration or have a history of breaking laws.

**Establish rules on company announcements.** Governments should set rules on how companies should announce exploration results. These rules should ensure that announcements are clear, comprehensive and accurate. Norway is an example of good practice in this area (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018).

**Assess company announcements.** Regardless of whether a government establishes rules for company announcements, it should not rely on those assessments for its own forecasting. Governments should seek expert advice to inform policy making and make their own announcements. This may cause challenges for a government as it has a promotional and a regulatory role which may be in conflict. However, when unfounded optimism dominates policy making and communication, problems arise.

**Avoid changing institutional frameworks and wider national planning processes prematurely** . Even if a government takes the above steps to avoid potential disappointments resulting from premature or over-optimistic discovery announcements by companies, it cannot control other potential sources of disappointment. For example, unforeseen geological complexities. Governments should therefore be cautious in changing the institutional framework and investing large public resources to operationalize new institutions until the commercial viability of a discovery has been demonstrated or it has progressed towards a development plan. This cautious approach should also apply to wider national planning processes, such as a country’s spending plans and energy strategy. However, even then, governments should develop different scenarios rather than one projection of how a project and therefore its impact on the sector, public finances and wider development may evolve.

**Manage public expectations through balanced communication.** Governments should ensure careful management of public expectations from an early stage. They should make their own announcements of discoveries, but should also announce dry wells. They should communicate any

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delays to project timelines and reductions in government revenue projections. Governments should use several means of communication to ensure that they reach the majority of the population (for more discussion, see Marcel, 2016).

_Role of development partners and other international organizations_

**Provide geological expertise.** Development partners could provide governments with geological expertise following discoveries, to help assess and update information on geological prospects and complement existing legal and economic expertise.

**Support public communication efforts.** Development partners could provide public information on exploration success rates—by both region and basin and both technical and commercial success rate—to help manage public expectations.

# **4.2 Timelines**

_Recommendations for governments_

**Prioritize policies that are critical for reaching production, without sacrificing a good deal.** Two key causes of timeline disappointments appear to be delays in passing key legislation and the time required to negotiate deals with companies. This does not mean that governments should rush policy making or agree to a bad deal to get to an FID and production. Indeed, the time taken by some governments to ensure a robust legal framework, particularly in areas such as subnational revenue sharing, and negotiate a good deal for the country is likely to be beneficial in the long term. However, governments should prioritize policies that are critical for getting to an FID and production, namely the regulatory framework (such as the role of an NOC, local content requirements and any restrictions on the use of the extracted oil and gas) and infrastructural arrangements (such as the route of cross-border pipelines). Better prioritization may free up capacity to ensure a good deal is more achievable and takes less time.

Exclusive focus on these priority areas may be politically difficult given the pressure on governments to demonstrate commitment to best practices such as sound management of petroleum revenues and a comprehensive transparency framework from an early stage. Therefore, a government could first announce and commit to a list of policies that it will adopt, but develop them in a pre-defined sequence rather than all at the same time. In doing so, it will be under less pressure to dedicate scarce financial and human resources to develop less urgent policies until necessary. Second, it could defer operationalization of any less urgent policies. For example, revenue management laws could specify how much revenue is to be shared across provinces or the amount of revenue that is to be saved, but delay the drafting of regulations on the specific sharing mechanism or permitted saving instruments until an FID has been reached or other legislative processes have been achieved.

**Account for sector norms and potential delays.** Even if a government prioritizes policies critical for reaching production, legislative processes and negotiations with companies could still take longer than expected. This may happen in part because some factors, such as price changes, are outside government control. Governments should therefore calibrate timeline projections against relevant analogue projects and regional benchmarks, which are then adjusted for country-specific factors, rather than rely on standalone projections. Other projects that have reached production and regional benchmarks are likely to better account for the time needed for legislative processes, negotiating a good deal, and any other steps required to reach production. The development of several scenarios is still critical though, particularly because the energy transition could change company behavior in unpredictable ways.

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_Role of development partners and other international organizations_

**Be cautious and develop scenarios when forecasting timelines.** International

organizations and public policy professionals should also be more cautious in forecasting timelines. They should have clearer and stricter rules on when to publish estimates of first oil or first gas after a discovery. Like governments, they should also base such projections on relevant analogue projects and regional benchmarks and conduct scenario analysis. They should discuss the policy implications of worse case scenarios materializing. A recent IMF guidance note cautions against incorporating discoveries in the baseline before most of the related investment has been made and a high likelihood of project implementation is affirmed (IMF, 2018). This more cautious approach was followed in Tanzania, for example, where offshore gas revenue projections were not incorporated into the baseline projections of the debt sustainability framework. However, gas finds at around the same period were incorporated into the baseline projections for Mozambique.

# **4.3 Government revenues**

_Recommendations for governments_

**Account for drivers of lower revenues.** Government revenue projections, whether produced by governments or other actors, should better account for risks to revenues. They should reflect the risk of lower production levels and ramp up speed, lower prices and pricing arrangements, cost overruns and tax offsets against new finds, as well as more accurately capture the applicable fiscal terms. Governments should build up their capacity to develop their own projections (AfDB and OpenOil, 2017). But an intermediary step would be to request the models and assumptions used by others to produce revenue projections. The parameters they have considered could then be compared against a checklist to verify their robustness against changing circumstances and other risks to revenues. Publishing the models that are used to produce revenue projections would enable other organizations to support governments in this area.<sup>26</sup>

**Prioritize policies critical for sound management of the public finances, rather than the use of petroleum revenues.** More realistic government revenue projections should reduce the risk of excessive borrowing and spending after a discovery. However, instituting overall fiscal rules for the public finances that prevent excessive public borrowing and spending is also critical. Governments should prioritize establishing these overall fiscal rules before rules that are specific to petroleum revenues. However, as noted above, governments may find that an early commitment to the sound management of petroleum revenues is politically important. Therefore, governments could still look to develop the policies without dedicating financial and human resources to operationalizing them until necessary.

**Avoid saving petroleum revenues prematurely.** Governments should assess the benefits of requiring a proportion of petroleum revenues to be immediately saved. This approach may not be optimal for many countries, particularly given that government revenue projections may turn out to be overly optimistic. Instead, a requirement for saving could be made conditional on reaching a degree of resource dependence. Tanzania has taken this approach: its revenue management framework requires saving only if revenues reach 3 percent of GDP.

_Role of development partners and other international organizations_

**Account for drivers of lower revenues.** International organizations and public policy professionals should systematically evaluate revenue forecasts for potential biases. For example,

26 As done by organizations such as OpenOil and the Natural Resource Governance Institute.

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company cost projections should probably be inflated in line with average overruns. They should conduct scenario analysis and advise on the policy implications of a worst case scenario materializing.

**Build separate programs for new producer countries.** Development partners should have separate programs for resource-rich countries and new producers given their distinct needs. For example, macroeconomic support from the IMF and World Bank to new producers could initially focus more on designing a fiscal framework that is robust to both upside and downside scenarios and then provide support for its implementation and monitoring. They should also be more cautious in supporting the setup of new SWFs.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, when advising new producers, they should focus their efforts on establishing transparency practices (as per the new EITI standard) on licenses, contracts and beneficial ownership rather than petroleum revenue disclosure. An example of good practice in this area is the New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group (see Chatham House, 2019).

# **5. Conclusion**

The disappointments experienced by Sub-Saharan African countries in the past decade are not unique to the region. For example, in 2014, a media headline in the Bahamas suggested a discovery of 17 billion barrels of oil was made in 1986 despite there being no commercially viable discovery in the country’s waters to date (Bahamas Press, 2014). In 2013, the Lebanese government suggested oil and gas production was possible by 2017 or 2018, but, in reality, exploration has only recently commenced (Sassine, 2013). However, by taking the above steps, governments, with the support of development partners and other international organizations, can both reduce the likelihood of disappointment by mitigating certain risks and better account for the possibility of disappointment in their decision-making. This will be even more important given the uncertainties the petroleum sector is facing. The global Covid-19 epidemic has led to plummeting demand, while the collapse of the OPEC+ agreement brought a surge in supply. As a result, oil prices reached a record low in March 2020. In the longer term, the energy transition will pose a key challenge, which will likely further increase global market volatility and make investment strategies more unpredictable, while gradually closing the window of opportunity for countries to develop their petroleum sectors.

> 27 The importance of setting up a sound macroeconomic framework is recognized in principal in documents, such as IMF (2012).

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