metadata: authors: 0: author: Ruiz,Isabel
1: author: Vargas Silva,Carlos Ivan
count: Burundi
docna: 0: docna: Refugee Return and Social Cohesion
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
bdmdt: 2022-06-22T00:00:00Z
abstracts: cdata!: This paper explores the impact of
            refugee return on social cohesion using data from Burundi, a
            country that experienced high levels of repatriation during
            the 2000s. It uses a nationwide survey conducted in 2015 and
            relies on geographic features of the communities for
            identification purposes. The results suggest varying impacts
            of refugee return on different aspects of social cohesion.
            The stronger effects, suggest that refugee return has a
            negative impact on the feeling that community members help
            each other, could borrow money for emergencies from
            non-household members and feeling that the community is
            peaceful. The estimated impacts on measures of
            reconciliation, post-conflict justice, trust and
            participation in community groups are mostly statistically
            insignificant. The paper also explores how these effects
            differ across different sub-samples based on ethnic
            composition, land scarcity and attitudes towards return. The
            results highlight the possible role of new migration-related
            societal divisions (i.e. returnees versus stayees) in
            affecting post-return social cohesion.
display_title: Refugee Return and Social Cohesion
closedt: 2022-06-22T00:00:00Z
listing_relative_url: /research/2022/06/33849421/refugee-return-social-cohesion
topicv3: Forced Displacement m1326032 740,Social Cohesion m1327189 738,Conflict and Violence m1327549 2433,Social Inclusion of Youth m1327661 1842
publishtoextweb_dt: 2022-06-23T00:00:00Z
dois: 10.1596/1813-9450-10100
origu: Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
author_keys: 0: author_key: NA
1: author_key: 1389625
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 10100 Refugee Return and Social Cohesion _Isabel Ruiz Carlos Vargas-Silva_ Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice June 2022
Policy Research Working Paper 10100

# **Abstract**

This paper explores the impact of refugee return on social cohesion using data from Burundi, a country that experienced high levels of repatriation during the 2000s. It uses a nationwide survey conducted in 2015 and relies on geographic features of the communities for identification purposes. The results suggest varying impacts of refugee return on different aspects of social cohesion. The stronger effects, suggest that refugee return has a negative impact on the feeling that community members help each other, could borrow money for emergencies from non-household members and feeling that the community is peaceful. The estimated impacts on measures of reconciliation, post-conflict justice, trust and participation in community groups are mostly statistically insignificant. The paper also explores how these effects differ across different sub-samples based on ethnic composition, land scarcity and attitudes towards return. The results highlight the possible role of new migration-related societal divisions (i.e. returnees versus stayees) in affecting post-return social cohesion.

This paper is a product of the Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at carlos.vargas-silva@compas.ox.ac.uk.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Refugee Return and Social Cohesion**

Isabel Ruiz University of Oxford isabel.ruiz@bsg.ox.ac.uk Carlos Vargas-Silva University of Oxford, and Peace Research Institute of Oslo carlos.vargas-silva@compas.ox.ac.uk Key words: repatriation, social cohesion, Burundi JEL Codes: D74, F22, Q15 <mark>The paper was prepared for the Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice unit and is an activity related to “Preventing social conflict and promoting social cohesion in forced displacement contexts”, led by task team leader Audrey Sacks.</mark> This work is part of the program “Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership''. The program is funded by UK aid from the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), it is managed by the World Bank Group (WBG) and was established in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The scope of the program is to expand the global knowledge on forced displacement by funding quality research and disseminating results for the use of practitioners and policy makers. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG or UNHCR.

Vargas-Silva also acknowledges funding from the Research Council of Norway via the TRUST project, grant no. 301065. The data used for this project was collected as part of the LAMFOR project funded by IZA-DFID. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG, UNHCR, the RCN or IZA.
2

# **1. Introduction**

The preferred “solution” to their displacement for many refugees worldwide is to return home (UNHCR 2019). For some this return will occur eventually, even if years or sometimes decades have passed since they left their home communities. However, there is little understanding of the impact of repatriation on social cohesion in communities of return. This is a major gap in the evidence as social cohesion is crucial to maintain peace and stability in communities that are recovering from conflict (Langer et al., 2017). In this paper, we explore the impact of repatriation on social cohesion in communities of return.

While there is limited evidence on the impacts of refugee return on social cohesion, there is substantial evidence on the impact of exposure to conflict on social cohesion (Bauer et al. 2016). This evidence, which comes from a range of academic disciplines, provides insights on the possible positive and negative impacts of repatriation on social cohesion in communities of return. On the positive side, those more exposed to conflict tend to behave more cooperatively after the end of conflict. They are more likely to join social and civic groups and get involved in activities that are intended to benefit others (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012). These effects tend to be long-lasting. On the negative side, studies suggest that the increase in cooperative behaviour is limited to in-group members and that there is a tendency for those more exposed to conflict to cooperate less with out-group members (Bauer et al. 2014; Cecchi, Leuveld, and Voors 2016).

Therefore, an important aspect is whether stayees (i.e. those who did not leave the country during the conflict) and returnees (i.e. those who left and returned) perceive each other in a way that would lead to greater social cohesion after conflict. Divisions that contributed to conflict, such as clan, ethnic, regional or class lines, can still be present after conflict and can overlap with return patterns if returnees or stayees are concentrated in a particular group. In this case, out-migration of particular groups can reify and reinforce conflict-era cleavages, and then reintroduce those cleavages through the process of refugee return.

The process of large scale emigration during the conflict can also lead to the creation of new divisions in society (e.g. stayees versus returnees). These divisions can either replace or get mixed with more traditional identity categories. There is evidence of these types of divisions in many countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, El Salvador, and South Sudan (Schwartz 2019). In this case, out-migration and return can affect social cohesion by creating new divisions (i.e. stayees versus returnees) within previously coherent social groups.

The impact of repatriation is not confined to identity issues only, there could be broader economic concerns (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2021). This is particularly the case in communities that have limited natural resources. The influx of a large number of returnees can lead to more competition for those resources (e.g. land, water) and affect the level of social cohesion in the community.

To explore the impact of refugee return on social cohesion we use data collected in Burundi in 2015. This country experienced a major conflict during the 1993-2005 period, in which close to 5% of the population was killed and around 10% was displaced to other countries, mainly to neighbouring Tanzania (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2015; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2016). The
3 improvement in security conditions in Burundi, along with the end of protection and access to services in neighbouring countries led to the return of over 500,000 refugees in the period of a few years.

The agreement to end the conflict stated that refugees must be able to recover their property (Republic of Burundi 2000) , ‘especially their land’ (Protocol IV, Chapter 1, Article 8, 80). This was a strong incentive for former refugees to return to their communities of origin, as this is the place in which they could claim land. Therefore, we explore a case in which refugees did not have the option to stay in the host country and returned to their communities of origin.

In order to address potential issues regarding endogeneity between social cohesion and displacement levels, we control for conflict exposure and use an instrumental variable methodology which relies on distance to the border of Tanzania and altitude (i.e. elevation or distance above sea level). In Burundi, most of the displacement occurred by foot and distance to the border and altitude affected the level of international displacement from any given community. We check the plausibility of the instrument by using pre-war characteristics of the individuals, households and communities.

In the analysis, we explore the impact of refugee return in general and by community subgroups placing emphasis on the role of ethnic diversity, (pre-war) land scarcity, and attitudes towards migrant return. As stated in our theoretical motivation, the initial expectation is that in communities that are more homogenous in relation to other factors such as ethnicity, the arrival of returnees with a clearly different identity can have a more adverse effect on social cohesion. Also, in communities in which land scarcity is a bigger problem, return can lead to greater tensions regarding the rights to the land. Therefore, we would expect the impact of return on social cohesion to be more negative/less positive in communities with less ethnic diversity, less land available and more negative attitudes towards return.

Our results suggest varying impacts of refugee return on different aspects of social cohesion. The stronger effects, suggest that refugee return has a negative impact on the feeling that community members help each other, could borrow money for emergencies from nonhousehold members and feeling that the community is peaceful. The estimated impacts on measures of trust and participation in community groups are mostly statistically insignificant. The results also suggest that the negative effect on the feeling that community members help each other is stronger in communities with worse attitudes towards refugee return. These results highlight the possible role of the creation of migration-related divisions affecting postreturn social cohesion in the forced migration context. This means that policy efforts to encourage social cohesion in conflict-affected countries during the post-return period will require exploring and understanding the structure and nature of these new divisions.

# **2. Theoretical motivation**

There is scarce research on social cohesion in the context of refugee return. As suggested in a recent World Bank desk review on the evidence of social cohesion and forced displacement: “issues of return and repatriation are also largely invisible in the literature” (De Berry and Roberts 2018). This paper contributes to this literature both conceptually and empirically. In order to present the conceptual basis for the study, we combine four different strands of
4 literature. First, the effect of violence on out-group cooperation. Second, the effect of international displacement and return on identity formation. Third, the implications of threats to community homogeneity. Fourth, the role of resource scarcity in affecting social cohesion. We explain each of these in turn below.

# **2.1 Out-group cooperation and migration-related societal divisions**

There is an extensive literature exploring the impact of violence exposure on posterior social behaviour. The evidence from multiple countries suggests that exposure to violence leads to more prosocial behaviour (Bauer et al., 2016). This includes a myriad activities from behaving more altruistically (including in lab games) to a higher likelihood of joining social groups (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012).

The evidence suggests that this response is not the same across groups. The effect tends to relate to in-group prosocial behaviour. That is, the increase in prosocial behaviour is towards one’s own identity group. For example, Bauer et al. (2014) conducted several experiments to explore in-group and out-group cooperation in Sierra Leone. They found that those more exposed to violence behaved more altruistically towards in-group members compared to those less exposed. However, this effect was not present for out-group members. Conflict reinforces societal divisions between groups that potentially become increasingly divided by the conflict cleavage.

The explanations behinds these changes in response to violence exposure remain unclear. Bauer et al. (2016), in their large review of the subject, suggest that changes in parochial norms and preferences are likely to play a role in the explanation. In particular, evolutionary research suggests that the historical process of intergroup competition leads to adaptive psychological responses that promote in-group success (Boyd et al. 2003). This behaviour intensifies when there is more intergroup competition.

# **2.2 International displacement, return and identity formation.**

It is important to relate the distinct effect of violence on cooperation with in-group and outgroup members to repatriation. In many situations, group membership is based around a marker of identity such as belonging to a clan or ethnic group. Exclusion of others is more likely when it is possible to form groups along one of these identity lines (Caselli and Coleman 2013).

Based on the literature on conflict, and the broader literature on forced migration we posit that the process of displacement and return creates diverging identities between returnees and stayees. Returnees share the common experience of escaping the conflict, adapting to life abroad, sometimes even growing up abroad, and returning home (with many being forced to return). Stayees, on the other hand, can have different perceptions on patriotism, nationhood and deservedness of limited community resources given their role in protecting these resources during the conflict.

Schwartz (2019) conducted several months of ethnographic work in Burundi during 2015 and provides ample evidence of group identification based on location during the war. Individuals
5 in different communities made a distinction between the _Les Rapatriés_ and _Les Résidents_ and even use other labels such as “the Tanzanians” in reference to returnees. She explains that “migration-related divisions not only cut across ethnicity, but frequently divided families where members had lived on either side of the border during the war. As such, migrationrelated categorizations existed independent of, though sometimes associated with, ethnic categorizations” (Schwartz 2019).

This supports the idea that returnees are likely to be seen as out-group members by stayees and vice versa. These divisions can have major implications for social cohesion in communities that have been exposed to conflict and in which we would expect less cooperation with outgroup members. This leads to our first two hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Repatriation will have a negative impact on social cohesion.

- **Hypothesis 2:** The effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities with stronger signs of migration-related divisions.

# **2.3 Community homogeneity**

The level of diversity of the receiving community in terms of key markers of identity (e.g. ethnicity, class) could also play a role. For instance, there is a large literature on the implications of multiculturalism (Crisp and Meleady 2012) and the evidence suggests that individuals often react negatively to threats to homogeneity, at least in the short-term (Ramos et al. 2019). In communities that are more homogenous in relation to other key markers of identity, the arrival of returnees with a clearly different identity can have a more adverse effect on social cohesion.<sup>1</sup> This leads to our third hypothesis:

- **Hypothesis 3:** The effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities with less diversity related to other factors.

# **2.4 Competition for scarce resources**

Finally, in addition to pure identity issues, refugee return could reduce social cohesion because of the additional competition for scarce resources. For example, Prediger et al. (2016) present evidence from Namibia on the positive link between scarcity and antisocial behaviour. This effect should be greater for those resources (e.g. fertile land), in which the scarcity cannot be solved in the short-term. Based on this we developed our fourth hypothesis:

- **Hypothesis 4:** The effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities in which resources are scarcer.

# **3. Context**

> 1 Please note that in this study we were not allowed to collect information on ethnic identity of either stayees or returnees.
<!-- Start of picture text --> 600,000<br>refugees1972 1993 conflictoo. displacement Return period. waveNew<br>500,000<br>400,000<br>300,000<br>200,000100,000 |<br>eo¢£& oP8s$ oe8$8 e$€£$ e8& wp 8 we$8S$ » 8 Bw 8 Bw8 Bw82 BY 8 Bw 8 &8 BP8 BP8&® BW8& B8& BP 8 BP 8 B£€& BR8& BP8KS BW8& B & BW8&<br><!-- End of picture text -->
7 <mark>those provinces which are closer to Tanzania generally had higher levels of international displacement than other provinces.</mark> Figure 2 – Main locations of Burundian refugees (% in each country) <!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>90<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>DRC Rwanda Tanzania<br>Note: Source (UNHCR 2021b)<br>%<br>1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br><!-- End of picture text --> After the signing of the peace agreement, Tanzania closed the camps for the 1993 conflict refugees, ended official protection for this group and pushed them to return home. By 2009, the large majority of refugees from the 1993 conflict had returned to Burundi, along with about 50,000 of the 1972 refugees. This period of return lasted for a few years until late 2015 when there was a new spike of displacement following an announcement from the President of Burundi that he was running for a third term in office, what some considered a violation of the peace agreements. As we explain in the next section this occurred after the end of data collection for this paper, therefore in our analysis we focus on the return period. Please see Section 6.2 for a discussion of this new episode of displacement in Burundi and the applicability of the findings of this paper to such episode.

Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2021) suggest that by 2011 the economic conditions of stayees in areas of Burundi with below and above the median number of returnees were not very different.<sup>2</sup> There was no statistically significant difference in terms of livestock, subjective economic indicators, land access, and food insecurity. However, some important gaps started to appear by 2015.

The recovery of the “promised” agricultural land was particularly problematic. Many returnees found their land occupied by others or sold by family members who had returned to Burundi earlier (Hovil 2009; van Leeuwen 2010). In other cases, land abandoned by refugees was allocated to other households by the government (Fransen and Kuschminder 2012). The main challenge with the peace agreement conditions was that in practice there was insufficient land available to give returnees a landholding equivalent to their pre-exile land (van Leeuwen 2010). Many of the solutions to land disputes involved land-sharing 2 In particular, see Table 2 of that paper.
<!-- Start of picture text --> kirundo<br>(6%)<br>(2%)L} lL » : eee fe= 30%2<br>, <<. 03536) PR<br>ow Kayanza’ (GB%) _<br>> Bubanza (3%) y Karuzi Cankuzo<br>DRC [4261](2%) ( hee.—§ 2 (4%)[99,438] [7,889](6%)<br>he _..., ) Muram.. ,<br>| Mwaro,; ~<br>Bujumbura—y, ‘ eee “y Ruvyigi ;<br>es 5 ; (88,742 | Tanzania<br>[4,818] 9 © [13,821]<br>(1%) —i (2%)<br>Bururi Rutana<br>[20,944] fee Refugees in Tanzania<br>(5%) (13%) HH 50,000<br>IB 20.000 te to 50.000 75,000<br>OM) 10.000 te 20.000<br>Makamba _E.. .<br>[ 74,606 |<br>(33%)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
9 case, the sample is limited to stayee households in the 2011 round of the main survey that we used for the empirical analysis.<sup>3</sup> A third of respondents agree that emigration makes life harder for those who stay behind, 62% do not agree that Burundians abroad still contribute to the country of origin and a quarter agreed that they have abandoned Burundi. Panel C of Table 1 provide responses to questions that are specific about returnees. Close to a quarter of respondents agree that returnees do not fit in, and close to 67% agree that they get preferential treatment.

As explained below, in the analysis we also explore how the results change depending on the ethnic composition of the communities. The initial expectation (Hypothesis 3) is that in less diverse communities refugee return can have a more adverse effect on social cohesion.

Regarding ethnic composition in Burundi, the Hutu group accounts for close to 85% of the country’s population, with Tutsis and the Twa accounting for 14% and 1%, respectively. We consider a community less ethnically diverse if the majority group accounts for 90% or more of the population. The information on ethnic diversity comes from the community survey. Close to 45% of the respondents in our sample live in less ethnically diverse communities.

Table 1 suggests that some attitudes towards emigration, remittances and return are different for less and more ethnically diverse communities, although the direction of the difference changes across questions. For instance, the share agreeing that returnees help the country is lower in less ethnically diverse communities (54% versus 61%). Individuals in these communities are also more likely to indicate that returnees do not fit in (25% versus 22%). However, those in more ethnically homogeneous communities are less likely to say that returnees receive preferential treatment (64% versus 69%).

Table 1 – Attitude towards emigration and return (share agree %, 2011, stayees only)

|||Ethnic d<br>|iversity<br>|Land av<br>(pre-19<br>|ailability<br>93 war)<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||All|Less|More|Less|More|
||Panel<br>|A:When<br>|people le<br>|ave the c<br>|ountry<br>|
|It makes life harder for those who stay|32.01|22.10|39.34|29.41|35.39|
|They still contribute to the country of origin|38.24|39.61|37.15|34.84|42.52|
|They are able to support families in country of origin|68.38|64.34|71.51|67.08|70.43|
|They abandon their country|25.42|24.65|26.01|22.55|27.83|
|They get rich|59.54|60.15|59.09|57.70|61.61|
||Panel B|: When p|eople rec<br>abroad|eive mon|ey from|
|They become lazier|18.48|16.36|20.06|16.97|19.87|
|It leads to resentment from others|64.17|63.77|64.46|61.79|66.36|
|They get rich|51.91|54.04|50.38|52.02|51.62|
|It helps develop our country|48.33|42.63|52.44|47.42|49.32|
|<br>|Pane<br>|l C: Whe<br>abroad<br>|n people<br>come ba<br>|who have<br>ck they<br>|lived<br>|
|Help the country|57.98|53.85|61.01|58.50|56.85|
|Do not fit in|23.47|25.00|22.32|23.47|23.83|
|Bring new ideas, knowledge and technology|68.65|68.35|68.87|68.28|68.59|
|Receivepreferential treatment|66.83|64.62|68.51|66.45|67.00|

3 In the main analysis we focus on the 2015 round of the survey.
10 Finally, we divide the communities based on land scarcity before the 1993 conflict in order to explore the possible role of posterior rules regarding land provision to returnees. Respondents in communities that had more and less pre-war land available have broadly similar attitudes towards return.

# **4. Research design**

# **4.1 The survey**

We collected the data for this project during January to March 2015 as part of a nationwide survey on issues related to migration for the Labour Market Impacts of Forced Migration (LAMFOR) project. The survey had two components. First, a household survey in which 15 households were interviewed in 100 communities (i.e. sous-collines) across the 17 provinces of the country. Second, a community survey in which a local leader was interviewed in each of the 100 communities. The number of communities selected in each province was based on information from the 2008 Census. Figure 4 indicates the location of the communities surveyed.

Figure 4 – Location of communities surveyed in Burundi Note: Geolocation of the 100 communities (i.e. _sous-collines_ ) sampled in the survey. Each community corresponds to a dot. Fifteen households and a local leader were interviewed in each community. The number of communities selected in each province was based on information from the 2008 Census.

In the analysis below we focus on rural areas. In particular, we exclude Bujumbura from the analysis which is the largest city of the country and the centre of commercial activity. Until
11 recently, Bujumbura was also the political capital of the country. Excluding Bujumbura from the analysis is common in studies in Burundi given the different dynamics in the city (Fransen et al, 2017; Verwimp and Van Bavel, 2014).

The survey is a follow-up to a survey conducted with the same households in 2011. However, most of the variables related to social cohesion were only collected in 2015, hence the analysis in this paper focuses on that round.

# **4.2 Measuring social cohesion**

Social cohesion is a multi-dimensional concept. Therefore, we use a series of different variables to measure it, including: (A) measures of support across households, (B) feelings towards conflict and reconciliation, (C) trust in others and on specific groups, and (D) participation in different community organizations.

Table 2 reports means for all the dependent variables and the Appendix provides a description of all the variables included in the analysis (Table A1). We present the results for all respondents and then separately for those in more/less ethnically diverse communities, those in communities with more/less pre-war land availability and those in communities with better/worse attitudes towards return migration. In order to construct an index to proxy migration-related divisions at the community level we add the four responses to the return question in Table 1, Panel C (i.e. help the country, fit in, bring new ideas, and receive preferential treatment), in a way in which higher values indicate worse attitudes, and create a dummy to indicate that the community is above or below the mean for this variable.

Table 2 – Means of independent variables

||All|Ethnic di<br>|versity<br>|Land av<br>(pre-19<br>|ailability<br>93 war)<br>|Negativ<br>toward<br>|e attitude<br>s return<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Less|More|Less|More|Less|More|
||||Panel<br>|A: Support<br>|<br>|||
|Help each other|0.4343|0.4435|0.4235|0.4635|0.3982|0.4306|0.4348|
|Borrow money|0.5851|0.5612|0.6039|0.6180|0.5459|0.5694|0.5968|
|||Pan<br>|el B: Violen<br>|ce and reco<br>|nciliation<br>|||
|Peaceful community|0.9601|0.9568|0.9608|0.9583|0.9597|0.9689|0.9526|
|Unlikely reoccurrence of conflict|0.1330|0.1259|0.1350|0.1346|0.1315|0.1510|0.1186|
|Reconciled with war|0.7630|0.7663|0.7598|0.7678|0.7590|0.7957|0.7366|
|Justice has been done|0.3730|0.4209|0.3347|0.4026|0.3349|0.3788|0.3705|
||||Panel<br>|C: Trusts in<br>|<br>|||
|People in the community|0.8898|0.8868|0.8922|0.8985|0.8724|0.8935|0.8793|
|Returnees|0.8862|0.8857|0.8845|0.8994|0.8792|0.9017|0.8792|
|Other ethnic groups|0.9223|0.9205|0.9235|0.9120|0.9329|0.9187|0.9266|
|Community leaders|0.8013|0.8101|0.7918|0.8113|0.7830|0.8201|0.7861|
|Ex-combatants|0.7652|0.8010|0.7366|0.7851|0.7448|0.7700|0.7675|
|||Panel D:|Household|membersp|articipating|in||
|Agricultural cooperative|0.1229|0.1247|0.1216|0.1357|0.1096|0.1340|0.1146|
|Credit/savings association|0.1972|0.2014|0.1961|0.1733|0.2260|0.1794|0.2134|
|Religious group|0.2274|0.2302|0.2275|0.2255|0.2304|0.2225|0.2332|
|Politicalparty/group|0.3513|0.3741|0.3314|0.3528|0.3468|0.3540|0.3439|
12 We start the analysis by looking at two variables to measure the degree to which individuals and households support each other. The first is a dummy indicating that the individual agrees that people in the community help each other at least most of the time. 43% of the individuals responded that this was the case. The second variable is a dummy that indicates that in case of an emergency the respondent could borrow money from someone in the community who was not a household member. This was the case for 59% of respondents. The averages are similar across less and more ethnically diverse communities and in communities with different attitudes towards return. In both cases, the share that could borrow from other community members is higher in communities that are more ethnically diverse or have more negative attitudes towards refugee return. The gap is larger if we divide communities based on their pre-1993 war land availability. Communities with less land available are 6 and 7 percentage points more likely to agree that the community members help each other and can borrow from others outside the household, respectively.

Next, we explore the role of factors related to violence and reconciliation. The first variable is a dummy indicating that the community is mainly peaceful and 96% of respondents agreed with this statement. In contrast, only 13% of respondents agrees with the next statement that a new conflict is unlikely. This is not surprising. As explained above, soon after we finished collecting the data, the President of Burundi announced that he was running for a third term in office and this led to renewed tensions and a new wave of out-migration to Tanzania.

The next variable indicates that the respondent feels reconciled with the atrocities of the war and a majority of respondents (76%) agrees with this statement. The share agreeing with this statement is lower in communities with higher levels of migration-related divisions. Interestingly, a minority of respondents think that justice has been done to those who committed crimes during the war (37%). There is a 9 percentage point gap in this regard between less and more ethnically diverse communities and a 6 percentage point gap based on pre-war land availability.

The next set of independent variables measures trusts on 9 different groups. In general, reported levels of trust are high, with 92% of respondents indicating that they trust those of other ethnic groups. The lower level of trust is for ex-combatants, with 76% of residents indicating that they trust this group. Here, there is also a substantial 7 percentage point gap between those in more and less ethnically diverse communities.

The last set of independent variables measures if a household member participates in different organisations. Participation in political (35%) and religious (23%) groups is more common that participation in agricultural cooperatives (12%). Participation in political groups is four percentage points higher in less ethnically diverse communities, compared to more diverse ones.

# **4.3 Regression specification**

In the analysis we estimate a series of linear probability regressions along the following lines: In the analysis we estimate a series of linear probability regressions along the following lines: (1) ii jj cc ii cc ii YY = δδ + ββRR + ∅HH + ρρCC + εε
13 Where represents one of the indicators of social cohesion explained above, is the province indicator, is the share of returnees in the community, indicates a series of ii jj household level controls and YY are a series of community level of controls. δδ cc ii RR HH cc In the main regressions we estimate the share of returnees in the community, using the CC In the main regressions we estimate the share of returnees in the community, using the information from the survey (i.e. share who are returnees), but in the robustness section we show that results are robust to the use of an alternative indicator in which the information is provided by a community leader. The Appendix (Table A2) includes the descriptive statistics for the control variables.

We present results for the full sample and divided by communities with lower/higher ethnic diversity, less/more pre-1993 war land availability and better/worse attitudes towards return. In the robustness checks we also present the results if we limit the analysis to stayees only. Limiting the sample in this way does not affect the main results of the paper.

# **4.4 Identification**

<mark>As mentioned above, Tanzania mandated the return of all Burundian refugees from the 1993 conflict. Returnees also had a very strong incentive to return to their communities of origin as this was the place in which they were entitled to land, a very scarce resource in the country.</mark> The main concern regarding identification is that communities with initially large levels of displacement, and more return later on, could be inherently different from other communities and that this is what may be driving the results regarding social cohesion.

<mark>Before presenting our identification strategy it is important to highlight that there is substantial evidence that exposure to conflict in Burundi was generalised (Uvin 1999). In particular, the evidence suggests that it was unrelated to political allegiances or wealth levels (Voors et al. 2012). In the analysis, we include several variables to account for conflict exposure at the household and community level. These experiences during the conflict include: experiencing land disputes, the death/disablement of a family member during the conflict, and experiencing restrictions on movement.</mark> <mark>In the estimation, we use the geographical characteristics of the communities of origin for identification purposes. In particular, we use the logarithm of the inverse of distance to the border of Tanzania (proximity) and the logarithm of the inverse of altitude (flatness) as instruments for the share of returnees in the population.</mark> <mark>The idea is that once we control for conflict exposure, displacement largely depends on the accessibility of a safe haven. In Burundi, most of the displacement occurred by foot and therefore distance to the border and altitude affected the level of international displacement from any given community (see Figure 3).</mark> <mark>The Appendix (Table A4) reports the results of the first-stage estimation along with relevant tests. The estimation complies with the standard required tests, including over-identification tests. The main concern about the instruments is that proximity and flatness could relate to unobserved factors that affect variables related to social cohesion. We conduct several</mark>
14 <mark>analyses to explore this possibility and feel confident that this is not the case. See Table A5 in the Appendix for further details.</mark>

# **5. Results**

<mark>We present the main results of the study using figures. In particular, in the discussion we focus on the coefficient on the population share of refugees from IV regressions with full controls. The Appendix includes all regression tables (Tables A6 to A10) and results from other specifications (e.g. OLS, no controls, etc.)</mark>

# **5.1 Support measures**

Figure 5 reports the results measuring the degree to which individuals and households support each other. First, we measure the impact of refugee return on the perception that members of the community help each other at least most of the time (Panel A). The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in the specification with the full sample. In this case, the results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the population share of returnees in a community leads to a 10.3 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of stating that community members mostly help each other. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Note that the coefficient is substantially larger in communities with more negative attitudes towards return, which are less ethnically diverse and with less pre-war land availability. This supports our initial expectations regarding the communities in which the impact of refugee return should be more negative (Hypotheses 2 to 4).

Next, we explore the impact of refugee return on the possibility of borrowing money for emergencies from individuals outside the household (Panel B). Here also the coefficients are negative. Looking at the main estimation, the coefficient suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the population share of returnees decreases the possibility of borrowing money this way by 8.4 percentage points.

However, the dynamics across sub-samples of communities are different than for the previous variable. Now the coefficient is larger for more ethnically diverse communities and for communities with more positive attitudes towards return. This is contrary to our original expectations and can reflect, among other things, the degree to which indicators of social cohesion, even the ones related to support among community members, reflect different factors. It is still the case that the coefficient for communities with less pre-war land availability is larger than for other communities.
15 Figure 5 – Impact of refugee return on different measures of support (A) Help each other <!-- Start of picture text --> All<br>Less diverse<br>More diverse<br>Less land<br>More land<br>Less negative attitudes<br>More negative attitudes<br>-3 -2 -1 0 1<br>Percentage point<br>(B) Borrow money<br>All<br>Less diverse<br>More diverse<br>Less land<br>More land<br>Less negative attitudes<br>More negative attitudes<br>-3 -2 -1 0 1<br>Percentage point<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Coefficients are from IV regressions with controls. See the Appendix for regression tables and results from other specifications. Includes 90% confidence intervals.

# **5.2 Violence and reconciliation measures**

Figure 6 presents the results for the impact of refugee return on violence and reconciliation measures. First, we consider the question of whether the community is generally perceived as a peaceful community (Panel A). The results in Figure 6 suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the population share of refugees leads to a 5.6 percentage points reduction in the likelihood of perceiving the community as a peaceful one. The coefficient is similar across more and less diverse communities. The story changes if we divide communities on attitudes towards return. In those communities with more negative attitudes towards return the coefficient is larger and statically significant.

The coefficients are mostly statistically insignificant for the other three measures of violence and reconciliation. A key exception are the coefficients on war reconciliation and justice for communities with more negative attitudes towards return. In both cases the coefficient is negative, larger than for other communities and statistically significant.
16 Figure 6 – Impact of refugee return violence and reconciliation measures

- (A) Peaceful community

- (B) Unlikely reoccurrence of conflict

<!-- Start of picture text --> All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land<br>More land More land<br>Less negative... Less negative...<br>More negative... More negative...<br>-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1<br>Percentage point Percentage point<br>(C) Reconciled with war (D) Justice has been done<br>All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land<br>More land More land<br>Less negative... Less negative...<br>More negative... More negative...<br>-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2<br>Percentage point Percentage point<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- (D) Justice has been done

Note: Coefficients are from IV regressions with controls. See the Appendix for regression tables and results from other specifications. Includes 90% confidence intervals.

# **5.3 Trust**

Figure 7 presents the results related to trust towards different groups. There are several interesting patterns in the results. First, looking at the main coefficients we see that, even if none are statically significant, all are positive (i.e. top bar across panels). This contrasts with the previous results in which refugee return had negative effects on different measures related to social cohesion.

Second, the effect of refugee return is substantially more positive in communities that are less diverse. In other words, the effect on trust is more positive in the same types of
17 communities in which the effect on other measures of social cohesion was more negative. In this case, the coefficients are significant for trust towards other ethnic groups (Panel C) and community leaders (Panel D). A 10 percentage point increase in the population share of returnees increases trust in other ethnic groups and community leaders by 6.5 and 9.7 percentage points, respectively. The increase in trust towards other ethnic groups is not necessarily at odds with our expectations. It could be the result of the gradual process of replacing ethnic identification as a social marker (and the associated ethnic tensions) by migration-related divisions.

Figure 7 – Impact of refugee return on trust measures <!-- Start of picture text --> (A) People in the community (B) Trust returnees (C) Other ethnic groups<br>All All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land Less land<br>More land More land More land<br>Less negative... Less negative... Less negative...<br>More... More... More...<br>-1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2<br>Percentage point Percentage point Percentage point<br>(D) Community leaders (E) Ex-combatants<br>All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land<br>More land More land<br>Less... Less negative...<br>More...<br>More...<br>-1 0 1 2<br>-1 0 1 2<br>Percentage point<br>Percentage point<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Coefficients are from IV regressions with controls. See the Appendix for regression tables and results from other specifications. Includes 90% confidence intervals.

Third, higher levels of refugee return lead to greater trust in returnees in communities with higher pre-war levels of land availability. Finally, the impact of refugee return on social trust is higher on those communities with more positive attitudes towards return. In this case, the coefficient is statistically significant for trust towards other people in the community and community leaders.

# **5.4 Community participation**

Figure 8 reports the results for the level of participation in community activities. Overall, the results suggest mixed dynamics regarding the impact of refugee return on participation in community activities. The results suggest that refugee return leads to more participation in agricultural cooperatives in communities with less ethnic diversity, more pre-war land availability and worse attitudes towards return.
18 The coefficients that are statistically significant for the other three types of community participation are all negative. Refugee return has a negative impact on participation in credit/savings association in more diverse communities and in those with higher pre-war land availability. Refugee return has a negative impact on participation in political organisations in communities with less pre-war land availability and more positive attitudes towards return.

Figure 8 – Impact of refugee return on household participation in community activities (A) Agricultural cooperative (A) Credit/savings association <!-- Start of picture text --> All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land<br>More land More land<br>Less negative... Less negative...<br>More negative... More negative...<br>-3 -1 1 3 -3 -1 1 3<br>Percentage point Percentage point<br>(C) Religious group/organization (D) Political party/groups<br>All All<br>Less diverse Less diverse<br>More diverse More diverse<br>Less land Less land<br>More land More land<br>Less negative... Less negative...<br>More negative... More negative...<br>-3 -1 1 3 -3 -1 1 3<br>Percentage point Percentage point<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Coefficients are from IV regressions with controls. See the Appendix for regression tables and results from other specifications. Includes 90% confidence intervals.

# **5.5 Robustness**

We conduct two key robustness checks. First, we explore the results if we limit the sample to stayees only. It is possible to argue that even with controls, the presence of returnees in the sample can bias the estimated effect of return on social cohesion in different ways. Hence, limiting the sample to stayees can be a way of isolating the effects of return. Limiting the sample does not change the results in substantial ways (see Table A10 in the Appendix).
19 In a second robustness check, we check the implications of changing our measure of the returnee share of the population. In the main estimations, the share of returnees in the population is constructed with information from the survey roster. This information is more accurate for some communities than others. We interviewed 15 households in each community, but the number of households in each community ranged from 34 to more than 100. Therefore, we also present results with an alternative measure of the share of returnees. This information is constructed from the information provided by the community leaders, which includes information on the number of returnees in the community as well as overall population. The results are also similar with this alternative measure, although some more coefficients are statistically significant (see Table A10 in the Appendix). In particular, the coefficient of feeling reconciled with the war and participation in religious groups are now statistically significant (negative in both cases).

# **6. Summary and policy implications**

# **6.1 Summary of findings and overall implications**

Repatriation involves the reencounter of groups that were separated for many years and often decades. This process could lead to the reestablishment of old societal divisions or to the creation of new ones. Repatriation could also increase competition for scarce natural resources. These factors can have major implications for social cohesion at the community level. However, while there is a growing body of evidence on the impacts of forced migration on host communities (Becker and Ferrara 2019; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; Verme and Schuettler 2021), there is scarce research on the impacts of refugee return and particularly, on return and social cohesion. As explained by De Berry and Roberts (2018) “this absence weakens a programmatic ability to devise inclusive interventions in return areas.” In order to fill this gap, we explore these issues in Burundi, a country that experienced a major conflict and outflow of people, followed by large flows of refugee return a decade later.

Social cohesion is a multidimensional concept. We focus on aspects related to support across households, violence and reconciliation, trust, and participation in community groups. Our first hypothesis states that repatriation has a negative effect on these indicators of social cohesion. The results suggest varying impacts of refugee return on different aspects of social cohesion. The stronger effects, suggest that refugee return has a negative impact on the feeling that community members help each other, could borrow money for emergencies from non-household members and felt that the community is peaceful. The estimated impacts on measures of reconciliation, post-conflict justice, trust and participation in community groups are mostly statistically insignificant.

Given that the effect was stronger for the feeling that community members help each other, we focus more on this variable to explore the results related to the sub-samples. Our second hypothesis suggests that the effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities with stronger signs of migration-related divisions. We place particular attention on attitudes towards returnees, which we take as a proxy of “us” _versus_ “them”, that is, for the possible existence of migration-related identities (e.g. stayees versus returnees). The results confirm that the negative effect on the feeling that community
20 members help each other tends to be stronger in communities with worse attitudes towards refugee return.

Our third hypothesis states that the effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities with less diversity related to other factors. We place particular attention on ethnicity, which is a major marker of identity in Burundi. The results confirm that the negative effect on the feeling that community members help each other tends to be stronger in communities with less ethnic diversity.

Finally, the fourth hypothesis relates to resource scarcity. We posit that the effect of repatriation on social cohesion should be more negative (less positive) in communities in which resources are scarcer. In the analysis we focus on land, which is very scarce in Burundi. The results confirm that the negative effect on the feeling that community members help each other tends to be stronger in communities with less pre-war land availability.

Overall, the results suggest that there is not a single driver or mechanism related to refugee return that can cover all aspects of a complex concept such as social cohesion. However, the results do suggest that the process of out-migration and return could lead to new divisions in society based on the location of individuals during the conflict. These effects could be present in other countries and even supersede (or get mixed with) previous societal divisions.

What does this mean for policy interventions in societies experiencing high levels of repatriation? Social cohesion is a multidimensional area for which it is difficult to isolate single factors and shape policy around them. However, using the research presented in this paper it is possible to understand the type of issues and communities that need particular attention at the policy design stage. For instance, policy efforts will require exploring and understanding the dynamics behind new migration-related divisions. We cannot simply expect returnees and stayees to assume their previous identities once the repatriation process is completed. Yet, even with this knowledge at hand, it would be challenging to “remove” these divisions. King, Samii, and Snilstveit (2010) suggest that “latent cleavages such as language differences, differences in descent, or caste-type distinctions cannot, or can only with great difficulty, be manipulated by development or peacebuilding interventions.” In the context of repatriation, it is possible to add migration-related divisions to that list of cleavages.

However, policy interventions can transform how community members perceive and cooperate across these cleavages. The recent evidence points in several possible directions, including the establishment of community driven development (CDD) projects (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2011; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009). In CDD projects, the community, as beneficiaries, play a key role in project decisions. The projects promote social cohesion by increasing community capacity for decision-making and collective action. Future policy initiatives should explore ways of adjusting CDD projects to deal with the case of refugee repatriation.

Finally, it is important that there are some important identity markers at the individual and community level that are not included in our study, but that could play a role in mediating the relationship between social cohesion and return. First, there is evidence that repatriation has different impacts across genders (Ruiz, Siegel, and Vargas-Silva 2015) . Therefore, it is possible
21 that the effect of return on social cohesion differs based on the gender composition of the returnees and stayees. Similarly, our analysis is based on communities in rural areas. The dynamics in an urban setting with different levels of access to the provision of services, including assistance from the international community (Bove, Salvatore, and Elia 2021), could be different. Third, our analysis is based on refugees (i.e. those who were displaced internally). The evidence suggests that the impact of hosting refugees and IDPs on social cohesion measures is different (Pham et al. 2021) and it could be that this is also the case for returning refugees and IDPs.

# **6.2 Implications for policies towards post-2015 returns**

As we explained in Section 3, there was a new wave of displacement from Burundi after the end of data collection. This wave of displacement is the result of political tensions that resulted from the 2015 election. Pierre Nkurunziza, then President of Burundi, ran for a third term in office and there was controversy over whether he was actually entitled to run again. It is estimated that over 250,000 Burundians have fled to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2021a).

This new large wave of displacement could be accompanied by a new large wave of refugee return to the country. UNHCR (2021a) projects that the number of returnees will reach 141,000 in 2021, up from 41,000 in 2020. There are no datasets such as the one used in this study to explore the impact of post-2015 returnees on social cohesion and it is not possible to determine the degree to which our findings our applicable to this new context.

However, it is possible to explore similarities and differences between the two contexts. Looking at a UNHCR report about the latest wave of returnees, it states that “almost all returnee households rely on food obtained from their own gardens (93%) and/or fields - households struggle to get food during the period they do not produce. 81% of households declared that they are not satisfied with their level of food security because of the low dietary diversity” (UNHCR 2021a). The report also suggests that “88% of returnee heads of households are subsistence farmers, but most of them declared not having the adequate resources to produce their land.” This high level of dependence on agriculture and prevalence of food insecurity are similar to the ones in our dataset for returnees and suggests that tensions related to access to agricultural land could also be present for post-2015 returnees.

There are also signs of potential differences between current dynamics and the pre-2015 period. UNHCR has been undertaking regular returnee protection monitoring since 2019. An estimated 9% of refugees returning to rural communities were not found at their respective return areas in 2019 and could have moved onward. This pattern is also similar with our dataset in which onward movement is not very common. However, in 2020 there was a substantial increase in the percentage of returnees not found (33%). While the UNHCR data is based on reports from monitors and the potential implications of not finding a household need to be treated with caution in this regard, it suggests that more recent returnees, could be more mobile than the ones in our sample.

Another difference between the pre- and post-2015 refugee outflow is that while Tanzania remains the main host of Burundian refugees (133,029 as of 30 June 2021), countries such as
22 Rwanda (47,911), the DRC (43,158) and Uganda (51,066) are playing a greater role as host countries. This means that there is greater scope for a variety of migration-related identities to develop among Burundian refugees in different countries.

The greater uncertainty concerning to the applicability of the findings to the current context is whether the conditions of stayees are different from the pre-2015 period. There is less information on this aspect. If the conditions are substantially different it is possible that the dynamics presented in this study have changed. For instance, if the conditions of stayees in communities of return are better, then the impact of refugee return on social cohesion might not be as marked. The contrary would be expected if the economic conditions of stayees has deteriorated. The World Bank (2021) suggests that the overall economic situation in the country has deteriorated during recent years, including a high level of inflation in food prices (7.5% in 2020) and a continuous rise in the poverty rate (expected to reach 87.1% in 2021).

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