metadata: authors: 0: author: Inchauste Comboni,Maria Gabriela
1: author: Rubil,Ivica
count: Croatia
docna: 0: docna: The distributional impact of taxes and
            social spending in Croatia
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Macro-Fiscal Policy,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Health Care Services Industry,Public Sector Economics,Educational Sciences,Educational Populations,Education for Development (superceded),Education For All,Public Finance Decentralization and
            Poverty Reduction,Inequality
teratopic: Public Sector Development,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
abstracts: cdata!: This paper describes the impact of
            fiscal policy on inequality and poverty, and examines recent
            policy changes and whether there is room for an increased
            role for fiscal policy in improving the well-being of the
            poor. Taxes and social spending reduced inequality in
            Croatia; however, once the impacts of indirect taxes are
            considered, the system is unable to reduce poverty,
            especially for families with children and retirees.
            Beginning in the second decile, households are net payers to
            the treasury, as the share of taxes paid exceeded the cash
            benefits received for all but the poorest 10 percent of the
            population. Microsimulations of recent tax changes find that
            inequality after taxes and transfers is expected to increase
            slightly in 2017, as most of the benefits of the reform were
            concentrated at the top of the distribution. Although the
            impact of lower value-added taxes on electricity and utility
            bills is expected to be slightly poverty reducing, this
            effect is small relative to the relief that is needed. A
            reduction in the standard value-added tax rate from 25 to 24
            percent would result in a small decline in poverty and
            inequality. However, the impact may be much smaller,
            depending on how this measure would be financed.
geo_reg_key: 517190,517208,517191
repnme: repnme: The distributional impact of taxes and
            social spending in Croatia
display_title: The distributional impact of taxes
            and social spending in Croatia
listing_relative_url: /research/2017/09/27998739/distributional-impact-taxes-social-spending-croatia
topicv3: Poverty m1326687 695,Education m1327048 470,Education and Health m1327057 1512,Fiscal Policy m1327144 445,Health m1504661 3480
publishtoextweb_dt: 2017-09-21T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Public Sector Development,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
no_of_pages: 54
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1130122
model_extractions: WPS8203 Policy Research Working Paper 8203 The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Croatia _Gabriela Inchauste Ivica Rubil_ Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group September 2017
Policy Research Working Paper 8203

# **Abstract**

This paper describes the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty, and examines recent policy changes and whether there is room for an increased role for fiscal policy in improving the well-being of the poor. Taxes and social spending reduced inequality in Croatia; however, once the impacts of indirect taxes are considered, the system is unable to reduce poverty, especially for families with children and retirees. Beginning in the second decile, households are net payers to the treasury, as the share of taxes paid exceeded the cash benefits received for all but the poorest 10 percent of the population. Microsimulations of recent tax changes find that inequality after taxes and transfers is expected to increase slightly in 2017, as most of the benefits of the reform were concentrated at the top of the distribution. Although the impact of lower value-added taxes on electricity and utility bills is expected to be slightly poverty reducing, this effect is small relative to the relief that is needed. A reduction in the standard value-added tax rate from 25 to 24 percent would result in a small decline in poverty and inequality. However, the impact may be much smaller, depending on how this measure would be financed.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at ginchauste@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Social S endin in Croatia** **<u>p g</u>**

Gabriela Inchauste<sup>†</sup> and Ivica Rubil<sup>♦1</sup> JEL classification: H22, I38, D31 Keywords: fiscal policy, fiscal incidence, social spending, inequality, poverty, taxes, Croatia

> † The World Bank

> ♦ Postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Economics, Zagreb

> 1 We are indebted to Ivica Urban, Sanja Mađarević-Šujster, Moritz Meyer, Maria Davalos, Karolina Goraus, and Javier Suarez for helpful comments and advice. All remaining errors are our own.
# **I. Introduction**

Croatia is committed to a fiscal consolidation agenda in the context of its National Reform Program, aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth, increased employment, and the reduction of macroeconomic imbalances. As part of that effort, the government has recently designed and begun to implement a set of tax reforms and aims to align the education sector with labor market needs, improve the sustainability of the health care and pension systems, and improve the efficiency of the social benefit system, with the goal of reducing the number of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion (National Reform Plan, 2017).<sup>2</sup> Given the potential tradeoffs in terms of meeting fiscal consolidation and social inclusion goals, comprehensive empirical analysis of the distributional impact of changes in taxes and social spending can help to inform policy by ensuring that the combination of policies recently implemented and policies being envisaged achieve the goals laid out by the government.

In this context, work on the role of fiscal policy in Croatia has recently expanded significantly. Early work using 2007 data highlighted the relatively high pre-fiscal income inequality in Croatia and despite the relatively large redistributive effect of the policies, these were still less redistributive compared to Slovenia (Čok et al., 2012). In particular, earlier work using data for 2010 emphasized the fact that horizontal inequities arising from the benefit system dampened to some extent the redistributive role of fiscal policy (Urban 2014 and 2016). More recent work has been done in the context of a broader effort to build microsimulation models in the EU through EUROMOD (Urban and Bezeredi, 2016). This analysis includes the distributional impact of changes in subsistence and means tested benefits undertaken in 2014, as well as changes in personal income taxes in 2015. The results suggest that these policies led to an overall increase in average household disposable income, driven by changes in the increase in personal income tax allowances. Nevertheless, the main beneficiaries were people located in the upper and middle part of the income distribution (Urban and Bezeredi, 2016). Similarly, analysis of subsequent changes that entered into force in 2017 found only slight increases in disposable income in the middle of the distribution, while most of the gain was concentrated in the top two deciles. As a result, both the 2015 and the 2017 reforms somewhat increased income inequality (European Commission, 2017).

However, the existing analysis has so far not included the redistributive effects of indirect taxation, despite the fact that it makes up about half of total tax collections and imposes a relatively large burden on the population. In addition, most studies do not include the impact of spending on education and health, despite the fact that they make up more than 40 percent of total social spending, and are at the root of the National Reform Plan. Finally, existing studies have not focused

> 2 Croatia has recently exited the Excessive Deficit Procedure as a result of its fiscal consolidation efforts. See: <u>http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1339_en.htm.</u>

2
on the impact of taxes and spending on poverty. This is important, as a system could reduce inequality but still lead to greater poverty levels.

This paper aims to move a step in this direction by presenting a more comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of taxes and social spending in Croatia. Building on existing work, the analysis covers the impact of the contributory pension system, direct taxes and transfers. In contrast to previous studies, this work also includes the impact of value added and excise taxes, as well as the impact of education and health spending. The analysis assesses the progressiveness of each fiscal instrument and its contribution to poverty and inequality reduction. The approach follows the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) approach (Lustig, 2017), allowing for comparisons between Croatia with other countries where the CEQ methodology has been applied.<sup>3</sup> The results suggest that the existing system leads to higher levels of poverty, mostly on account of indirect taxes. In fact, only the poorest 10 percent of the population receive more in benefits than what they pay in taxes. Starting from a relatively low level of market income inequality, the Croatian direct tax and transfer system is redistributive, with progressive and inequality-reducing direct taxes and transfers, in line with other European countries, and more so than other developing countries. However, indirect taxes are regressive and inequality-increasing, so much so that the redistributive power of direct taxes and transfers is offset. With regards to in-kind transfers, when the value of education and health are included in the analysis, there is an important redistributive effect, mostly on account of primary education.

In terms of the recent changes to taxes implemented, the analysis finds that both direct and indirect taxes became more progressive in 2017 compared to 2014. However, since most of the tax relief accrued to the top of the income distribution, the redistributive impact of personal income taxes and social security contributions was reduced. As a result, inequality after taxes and transfers is expected to increase slightly in 2017 compared to 2014. However, when it comes to poverty, the impact of a lower VAT on electricity and utility bills is expected to be poverty reducing, however this effect is small relative to the relief that is needed. Finally, a simulation of a reduction in the standard VAT rate from 25 to 24 percent is presented, yielding a small decline in inequality and a 0.21 percentage point decline in relative poverty at a cost of about 0.41 percent of GDP. Depending on the sources of financing for such a measure, this impact may be much smaller.

The analysis is built on 2014 household surveys collected by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, data from National Income Accounts, and public finance accounts from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Science and Education. In terms of coverage of components of fiscal policy, the analysis includes 50 percent of tax revenue and 49 percent of government spending. The analysis does not cover the corporate profit tax or VAT paid by government or other institutions as these are difficult to assign to individual households based on the available information. On the spending side, the analysis only covers social spending, as it is very difficult

> 3 For more details, see <u>http://www.commitmentoequity.org.</u>

3
to assign benefits of other types of spending to individual households. Due to the difficulty in identifying veterans, we are unable to identify veteran benefits separately, but these are included as part of total pensions and disability benefits.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the structure of taxes and social spending in Croatia, followed by the general methodology, the data used and assumptions made in estimating the taxes paid by households and the benefits received. Section IV describes the overall impact of fiscal policy on poverty and inequality. The incidence of taxes and spending are presented in section V, followed by simulations of recent tax changes in section VI and discussion of alternative reforms in section VII. Section VIII concludes.

# **II. The structure of taxes and social spending in Croatia: 2014**

## **The Croatian Public Finance System**

Public finance in Croatia consists of the central and local governments and public enterprises. Social security funds are part of the central government and include the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, the Croatian Health Insurance Fund and the Croatian Employment Service. The structure of tax revenues in Croatia is shown in Table 1.

Indirect taxes made up about 68 percent of the total tax collection of the general government in 2014, with the bulk of indirect taxes collected from VAT (Table 1). Our analysis focused on the major tax items, namely personal income taxes, VAT, excise, and beverage taxes. These items made up about 83 percent of all tax revenue in 2014. Corporate taxes were not included given the difficulty of attributing the tax burden to specific households.

## **_Direct taxes and social insurance contributions_**

Personal income tax (PIT) revenues accounted for 3.6 percent of GDP in 2014, which was shared between the central, regional and local self-governments. The PIT applies to employment earnings, income from self-employment, pensions, rental income, some forms of capital income (including rental, interest and dividend income). The personal income tax (PIT) system is an individual system, with spouses being assessed independently. The income tax brackets of the PIT were reduced from three (12, 25 and 40 percent) in 2011-2015, to two rates in 2017 (24 and 36 percent) and the basic personal allowance was significantly increased (from a threshold of HRK 2,600 to HRK 3,800). Other changes in the PIT include a more progressive scale for expanding the personal allowance for dependent children and other supported family members (see Appendix 1 for details of the tax and spending system).

In addition, a surtax is paid by PIT taxpayers to local self-governments using the amount of PIT as the tax base. Local self-governments set the level of the rate with some restrictions. The 4
maximum rate is 10 percent in municipalities, 12 percent in cities with a population below 30,000, and 15 percent in cities with a population over 30,000, except for Zagreb, where the current rate is 18 percent and could increase to a maximum of 30 percent.

**Table 1. Croatia: General Government Revenue, 2014**

||Fiscal data<br>(in HRK)|<br>% of GDP|Included|Portion<br>in analysis (|fiscal data)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||Yes/No|<br>included|% of GDP|
|**Total revenue**|139,959|42.6||67,673|20.6|
|Total tax receipts|81,528|24.8||67,673|20.6|
|_Direct taxes_|17,612|5.4||11,890|3.6|
|Personal income tax + Surtax|11,954|3.6||11,890|3.6|
|Employment earnings (general schedule)|10,410|3.2|Yes|10,410|<br>32|
|Income from self-employment (general schedule)|784|0.2|Yes|784|<br>.|
|Capital tax (dividends, interest) - single 12% rate schedule|438|0.1|Yes|438|0.1|
|Rental income - single 12% rate|258|0.1|Yes|258|0.1|
|Income tax per annual report, net|64|0.0|No|||
|Corporate income tax (20%)|5,658|1.7|No|||
|_Indirect taxes_|55,783|17.0||55,783|17.0|
|VAT|40,923|12.5|Yes|40,923|12.5|
|Excise taxes|11,780|3.6|Yes|11,780|3.6|
|Beverages tax|1,067|0.3|Yes|3079|09|
|Other indirect taxes|2,013|0.6|Yes|,|.|
|_Other taxes_|8,133|2.5|No|||
|Social contributions|41,702|12.7||41,702|12.7|
|General health contributions|16,732|5.1|Yes|16,732|5.1|
|Occupational health contributions|576|0.2|Yes|576|0.2|
|Employment contributions|1,933|0.6|Yes|1,933|0.6|
|Pension contributions A<br>Pension contributions B1|22,460|6.8|Yes|22,460|6.8|
|Other revenue<br>Sources: World Bank staff based on Ministry of Finance|16,729|5.1|No|||

In terms of social contributions, the 2002 reform of the Croatian pension system introduced three pillars: (i) intergenerational solidarity, (ii) mandatory individual savings, and (iii) voluntary individual savings. Savings in the second and third pillars are collected by private pension funds. Two parallel contributory schemes were created: scheme A for people who participate in pillar 1 only, and scheme B for people who participate both in pillar 1 and pillar 2.<sup>4</sup> Persons who were aged above 50 (below 40) in January 2002 were automatically enrolled into scheme A (B), while people aged between 40 and 50 were able to choose to become members of scheme A or B. People in scheme A pay a 20 percent contribution to pillar 1 only; these contributions are called Pension

> 4 The terminology for scheme “A” and scheme “B” is taken from Urban and Bezeredi (2016).

5
contributions A. Correspondingly, people in scheme A receive pension from pillar 1 only. People in scheme B pay contributions to both pillars 1 (a 15 percent “pension contribution B1”) and 2 (a “5 percent pension contributions B2”).

Social contributions amounted to 12.7 percent of GDP in 2014, of which old-age pensions was the largest, amounting to 7.4 percent of GDP and health contributions amounted to 5.1 percent of GDP. Social contributions are paid by wage and self-employed workers based on different contribution bases. For wage earners, the social contributions base is equal to the gross employment earnings. Employer social contributions include a 15 percent general health contribution, a 0.5 percent occupational health contribution, and a 1.7 percent employment contribution. Employee social contributions include old-age pension contributions of 20 percent. For the self-employed, the contribution base is not income related, but instead is a lump-sum obtained as a percentage of the average gross wage of the previous year which ranges from 35 to 110 percent depending on the occupation. Self-employed persons pay the same general health, occupational health, employment, and old-age pension contributions as wage workers. Those earning other income (rents, dividends, interest) also pay old-age pension contributions based on the gross income amount, while the purchaser of services pays the relevant health contributions. Pensioners pay a special pensioner health contribution at two different rates, depending on the monthly gross pension.

# **_Indirect taxes_**

VAT is the single largest component of tax revenue, contributing to about 50 percent of total tax collection in 2014. VAT is levied at a standard rate of 25 percent on most goods and services, a 13 percent reduced rate applies to accommodation and restaurant services, edible oils and fats, baby food, delivery of water, concerts tickets, culture/art magazines, etc., while a minimum rate of 5 percent applies to bread, milk, educational books, medical drugs, newspapers, cinema tickets, scientific journals. With the 2017 reform, VAT rates remained unchanged, but categories of goods and services were shifted across rates. In particular, the reduced rate of 13 percent is now being applied to inputs in agriculture, electricity and utility services with the objective of supporting small farmers and households. On the other hand, food and drink services were moved from the reduced to the general rate.

Excise taxes contributed 3.6 percent of GDP in 2014 and are levied on goods that are deemed to be a harmful to the health of the population or create pollution (“sin taxes”). These include: motor vehicles for personal use, coffee products, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, energy products and electricity. Finally, beverages taxes contributed 0.3 percent of GDP in 2014 and were applied to providers of bar and restaurant services. The tax base is the sales revenue from served beverages.

6
# **Social spending**

Overall expenditures in Croatia amounted to 48 percent of GDP in 2014, up from 45 percent in 2008, but have since declined (Eurostat). A large part of public spending is dedicated to social protection (14.2 percent of GDP), while education (4.3 percent of GDP) and health (5.6 percent of GDP) are also relatively important (Table 2). Total social spending in Croatia amounted to 24 percent of GDP or 50 percent of total spending. The analysis presented below covers 45 percent of all government spending and 91 percent of social spending. In what follows, we describe the main highlights of existing social spending. Direct (non-contributory) transfers include the following programs.

- _Family benefit programs,_ including a one-time grant for newborn children received by all parents of newborn children and a child benefit, which is a means-tested benefit received by a parent or other person taking care of one or more children with substantial top-ups for households with three and four or more children. Supplements are also given for children without one or both parents and for children with health challenges.

- _Social assistance programs_ include a subsistence benefit which became a guaranteed minimum benefit in 2014. It is a means-tested benefit intended for households whose income is below a basic needs threshold and depends on the characteristics and composition of the household. There is also a housing benefit, funded and distributed by local self-governments, and is a means-tested benefit that covers the costs of rent, electricity, gas, heating, water, and other housing bills for subsistence-benefit recipients. Local governments determine the income test and benefit amounts, with a maximum of 50 percent of the amount of Subsistence benefit. The recipients of the subsistence benefit also have the right to claim the benefit for covering wood-heating costs, which is also administered and financed by local governments. Finally, there is a lump-sum assistance, which is a purpose-defined benefit received by a household for covering the costs related to transportation, education, clothing, child birth, funeral expenses (Urban and Bezeredi, 2016).

- _Programs for Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War_ include old-age pension supplement, disability pensions, orthopedic allowances, constant care supplement, survivor benefits and child benefits for surviving children. Beneficiaries are persons who participated in the organized armed defense in the period from August 1990 to June 1996. Disabled veterans (HRVIs) are categorized into 10 groups according to the level of bodily impairment sustained during the war, ranging from 20 to 100 percent impairment. Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify beneficiaries using the existing household surveys, so this is not included in the analysis.

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**Table 2: Croatia: General Government Spending, 2014**

|Spending Component|Millions of<br>HRK|% of<br>GDP|Included<br>in<br>analysis|% of<br>GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Total expenditures|158,037|48.1|60,816|18.5|
|Social Spending|78,847|24.0|60,816|18.5|
|_Social Protection_|46,749|14.2|28,977|8.8|
|Contributory social insurance benefits|35,976|11.0|25,341|7.7|
|Old age|21,054|6.4|21,054|6.4|
|Full-age retirement pension|19,106|5.8|19,106|5.8|
|Early-age pre-retirement pension|1,949|0.6|1,949|0.6|
|Other pension/benefits|14,921|4.5|14,921|4.5|
|Family pension|4,778|1.5|4,778|1.5|
|Disability pension|5,511|1.7|5,511|1.7|
|Unemployment benefit|1,496|0.5|1,496|0.5|
|Sickness benefit A|949|0.3|949|0.3|
|Sickness benefit B|345|0.1|345|0.1|
|Maternity leave benefit|1,842|0.6|1,842|0.6|
|Non-contributory benefits|9,386|2.9|3,636|1.1|
|Disability|949|0.3|949|0.3|
|Maternity, parental and child benefits|1,731|0.5|1,731|0.5|
|One-time grant for newborn children|92|0.0|92|0.0|
|Child benefit|1,639|0.5|1,639|0.5|
|Social assistance|956|0.3|956|0.3|
|Subsistence benefit|710|0.2|710|0.2|
|Housing benefit|171|0.1|171|0.1|
|Lump-sum assistance|75|0.0|75|0.0|
|HBDR/HRVI related benefits|5,750|1.8|||
|Benefits provided by local self-government units|1,387|0.4|||
|_In-kind transfers_|33,160<br>|10.1|31,839|9.7|
|_Education_|14,081|4.3|14,081|4.3|
|Kindergarten|2,149|0.7|2,149|0.7|
|Primary school|5,840|1.8|5,840|1.8|
|Secondary school|3,553|1.1|3,553|1.1|
|Tertiary schools|2,897|0.9|2,897|0.9|
|Other education|36|0.0||-|
|_Healthcare_|18,507|5.6|17,757|5.4|
|Health insurance fund|17,757|5.4|17,757|5.4|
|Other health|749|0.2|||
|_Other social spending_|325|0.1|||
|Income support to individual farmers|140||||
|Other expenditure(non-social)<br>Sources: World Bank staff based on Ministry of Finance|79,190|24.1|||

8
- _Local government benefits._ Most local governments provide additional lump-sum grants for newborn children, cash supplements to low income groups (pensioners, disabled, unemployed), subsidies for transportation costs for vulnerable groups (pensioners, unemployed, people with disability, school children, etc.), lump-sum benefits and food packages for the poor, and benefits for students (grants, subsidies for school books, school meals).

Social spending on in-kind transfers in the form of education and health amounted to 10 percent of GDP in 2014. Kindergartens, primary schools, and secondary schools are financed by central, regional and local governments, however the bulk of spending on wages is funded by the central government (World Bank, 2008). The education system is mostly public in Croatia (private expenditure on education is small at all levels of education).

Health services are provided through the Croatian Health Insurance Fund (HZZO), which is financed from health contributions and the government budget. Although health contributions constitute the budget of HZZO, a large part of total health care expenditures are paid for from the state budget. Dependent family members are insured through other family members who pay contributions, and certain vulnerable groups, such as older pensioners and people with very low or no income, are exempted from paying contributions, yet insured nevertheless. The basic health insurance, which is compulsory, covers about 80 percent of costs of health risks. The basic “basket” of health care services includes: primary care, specialized care, inpatient services, drugs from the HZZO’s list, health care while abroad, dental care, and orthopedic and other appliances. The remaining 20 percent is paid by patients themselves through out-of-pocket outlays, with a certain upper limit. The HZZO offers the ‘supplemental’ health insurance: for a fixed monthly fee, one gets an extension of the basic basket of services which covers a part of the 20 percent of costs not covered by the basic insurance.

# **III. Data sources, method, and assumptions**

## **Data sources**

Data for 2014 were used to conduct this incidence analysis study in line with the availability of survey data. Specifically, we used both the Croatian Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2014 and the Population Income Survey (PIS) for 2015, which refers to 2014 income.<sup>5</sup> The HBS contains both income and expenditure data, along with demographic and household characteristics, thus enabling the identification of indirect taxes across the distribution. However, the HBS does not have the level of detail on income and benefits received available in the PIS, nor a large enough

> 5 The PIS serves as the basis for the EU-SILC for Croatia, which aggregates some of the categories to arrive at a database that is harmonized with other European countries. We used the 2015 PIS, because the survey asks respondents to report their incomes from the previous year (2014, which is of our interest here).

9
sample size to ensure that a sufficiently large variation in household types was captured to assign and interpret the impact of particular taxes and benefits. As a result, the analysis is primarily based on the PIS. In order to capture the impacts of indirect taxes on consumption, the analysis employed survey-to-survey imputation to assign consumption to each household, as detailed in Appendix 2.

Household survey data are combined with data from National Income Accounts and public finance accounts from the Ministry of Finance. This included information on consolidated central government budgets, Local government budgets, and annual reports from the Central Bureau of Statistics on various sectors.

# **Approach**

To analyze the incidence of each fiscal intervention, and the impact of taxes and social spending on poverty and inequality, we follow the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) approach of Lustig (2017) and measure per capita income before and after each fiscal intervention as described in Figure 1. In particular, for every household we define the following income concepts:

- _Market income_ includes pre-tax and pre-contribution wages, salaries, and income earned from capital assets (rent, interest or dividends) and private transfers.

- _Disposable income_ is constructed by adding direct transfers and subtracting direct taxes and social contributions to market income. The direct taxes considered in the case of Croatia include personal income taxes, surtaxes, taxes on vessel, road motor vehicles and vacation homes.

- _Consumable income_ subtracts indirect taxes from disposable income. In Croatia, indirect taxes included in this analysis include the VAT, excises on alcohol and tobacco, fuel and automobiles, and other indirect taxes (not classified as VAT or excises).

- _Final income_ adds in-kind benefits in the form of health and education to consumable income.

One area where there is no clear consensus in the literature is on how to treat contributory old-age pensions and the related contributions. Arguments exist in favor of treating contributory pensions as individual savings or deferred income, while others argue that they should be treated as a government transfer, with the related contributions being treated as a direct tax. Following Lustig (2017), we present three scenarios. Under our “main” scenario we treat old-age pensions as deferred income, and the corresponding contributions are treated as savings. In an alternative scenario, contributory old-age pensions are treated as transfers and added to market income. The corresponding contributions are treated as taxes and thus subtracted from market income to generate disposable income, in line with standard EU measurement of disposable income. Finally, in a third scenario in which the first pillar of the pension system (the pay-as-you-go pillar) is treated as a transfer, while the second pillar is treated as deferred saving. The alternative scenarios are presented in Appendix 3.

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the surtax rates across all the municipalities and cities, including those with zero surtax rate. The calculated rate is estimated at 8.79 percent.

The burden of indirect taxes is assumed to be borne entirely by the consumer. The burden of indirect taxes was estimated by applying statutory rates to the detailed consumption data in the HBS, which were mapped into the Croatian Classification of Goods and Services for which VAT rates are defined. Note that as in most household surveys, total consumption of households in HBS using the weights provided by the National Statistics Office amount to 77 percent of total household consumption reported in National Accounts. No assumptions about informality are made, such that using statutory rates, the amount of VAT calculated using the HBS constitutes 67 percent of total tax collections paid by the households. For excise taxes, we apply statutory rates to consumption of alcohol, tobacco, fuel and automobiles identified in the HBS to estimate the direct burden of these excises on households. Once the burden of each of these taxes was estimated, we followed the survey-to-survey imputation technique detailed in Appendix 2 to assign indirect tax burdens to households in the PIS. For both direct and indirect taxation, we employ statutory rates.<sup>6</sup> On the spending side, the PIS provides detailed information on who received payment from contributory and non-contributory social protection programs. In terms of contributory benefits, family benefits including the maternity and parental benefits are identified in the survey. Similarly, unemployment, disability, sickness, survival, caregiver, housing and other benefits can be identified in the survey. In terms of non-contributory benefits, family benefits including the onetime grant for newborn children and the child benefit are directly identified in the survey. Similarly, social assistance benefits, including the subsistence, housing and lump-sum benefits are directly identified. Since these benefits are not taxable, the reported value can be directly used. Unfortunately, there is no way to identify beneficiaries of the programs for Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War (HBDR/HRVI) or beneficiaries of local government transfers. These benefits are therefore not included in the analysis.

The approach to estimate the incidence of public spending on education followed here is the socalled “benefit or expenditure incidence” or the “government cost” approach. In essence, we calculate per beneficiary input costs by level of education from government spending and the number of pupils in each level and assign the per pupil expenditure to each student. This approach is also known as the “classic” or “non-behavioral approach”, and it amounts to asking the following question: how much would the income of a household have to be increased if it had to pay for the free or subsidized public service at the full cost to the government?

> 6 This assumption could be modified to incorporate the possibility of informality by using an effective tax rate as opposed to the statutory rate. However, there seems to be under-reporting of incomes in the PIS household survey, which may to some extent reflect this informality. Further work to assess this aims to use household consumption instead of income as a point of departure will aim to better assess potential levels of informality.

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Since the education system is mostly public at all levels of education in Croatia and there is no evidence of wide-spread opting-out of public education, benefits were assigned to households according to the number of children attending each level of education, according to the cost-perpupil of delivering education service at each level. For health services, all individuals have access to services, so we use the cost of insurance approach and assign a per capita benefit equally to all individuals. This is to ensure that sicker individuals are seen as being “better off”, simply because they use public services more often.

There are some important caveats about what the fiscal incidence analysis applied here does not address. First, it does not take into account behavioral, lifecycle or general equilibrium effects and focuses on average incidence rather than incidence at the margin. Our tax shifting and labor supply response assumptions are strong because they imply that that consumers have perfectly inelastic demand and that labor supply is perfectly inelastic too. Second, the analysis does not take into account the intra-household distribution of consumption. Third, the analysis cannot take into account the quality of services delivered by the government. In addition, we are unable to include some important taxes and spending. Corporate profit taxes, VAT paid by government or institutional consumption, and spending on infrastructure investments are excluded, even though the impacts of these may be substantial simply because the methods to assign these taxes and transfers are not robust. Finally, the analysis does not capture the growing debate on how asset accumulation and returns to capital impacts income inequality.

# **IV. Impact of taxes and social spending on poverty and inequality**

## **The impact on inequality**

The combined effect of taxes and social spending help to substantially reduce inequality in Croatia. Figure 2 shows the change in the Gini coefficient on account of taxes and social spending following the income concepts defined above for 2014. Prior to any fiscal intervention, market income inequality had a Gini of 0.383, if old-age contributory pensions are included and are treated as deferred income, but much higher (0.513) if these pensions are not included. If pensions in Pillar I are treated as <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 2. Croatia. Gini Coefficient<br>0.55<br>Old-age pensions as deferred<br>0.50 income<br>Old-age pensions as transfers<br>0.45<br>Old-age Pillar I as transfers;<br>0.40 Pillar II as deferred income<br>0.35<br>0.30<br>0.25<br>Market Income Disposable Consumable Final Income<br>Income Income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <u>Source: Own estimates using the Croatian PIS and HBS 2014.</u> 13
transfers and pensions in Pillar II are treated as deferred income, the Gini for market income, including pensions is 0.391. Once direct taxes, social security contributions and noncontributory transfers are accounted for, we end up with a measure of disposable income that has a Gini of 0.325 in all three scenarios. Indirect taxes are unequalizing as the Gini increases for consumable income to 0.355, which includes the impact of VAT, excise taxes, and other indirect taxes. Finally, in-kind transfers in the form of education and health helped to reduce inequality. The overall reduction in inequality was equivalent to 0.090 Gini points from market income to final income when old-age pensions are considered to be deferred income, but as much as 0.222 Gini points when pensions are treated as transfers.

The reduction in Figure <u>3. Decline in Inequality from Market to Disposable Income</u> inequality 0.00 achieved in -0.05 -0.10 Croatia on -0.15 account of direct -0.20 taxes and -0.25 transfers is -0.30 substantial relative to what is observed in other countries (such as Chile and Uruguay), Euromod estimates CEQ estimates (pensions as transfers) although less so when Pensions as deferred income Pensions as transfers considering oldSource: Armenia: Younger et al (2016); Brazil: Higgins & Pereira (2014); Georgia: Cancho age pensions as & Bondarenko (2016); Russia: Lopez-Calvo et al (2016); EU countries (*): Euromod (2014); Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016); Croatia: own estimates using PHBS 2014. deferred income Pensions <u>are treated as transfers in this figure to ensure comparability with Euromod.</u> (Figure 3). The redistributive effort through direct taxes and transfers in Croatia is comparable to other countries in Europe, with most of the reduction in inequality largely being achieved by pensions. This finding is in line with the existing literature that has so far focused on the impact on disposable income.

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However, once the impact of indirect taxes is taken into account, the redistributive effort is largely reversed as the Gini for consumable income is nearly as high as it was prior to any fiscal intervention (Figure 4), more so than in other countries in the region, including Poland. Once spending on education and health is taken into account, the overall fiscal effort is inequality-reducing, although less so than other countries.

# **The impact on poverty**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 4. Emerging markets: Gini Coefficient<br>(pensions as deferred income)<br>0.50<br>Georgia<br>(2013)<br>0.45<br>Poland<br>(2014)<br>0.40 Armenia<br>(2011)<br>0.35<br>Russia (2010)<br>Croatia<br>0.30 (2014)<br>0.25<br>Market Income Disposable Consumable Final Income<br>Income Income<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Armenia: Younger et al (2016); Georgia: Cancho & Bondarenko (2016); Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016); Russia: Lopez-Calvo et al (2016); <u>Croatia: own estimates using Croatian PIS and HBS 2014.</u> Beyond the impact on inequality, which measures the relative position of households, it is important to see the impact on poverty, which depends on the absolute level of income of a household. The results suggest that the combination of taxes and social spending was poverty increasing in 2014 **.** The share of the population whose market income (including pensions) was below the per capita US$10 PPP-a-day poverty line was 28 percent (Table 3). Once the burdens of direct and indirect taxes are considered, these are larger than the direct benefits received from transfers, so that the share of the population whose consumable income is below the US$10 PPPa-day poverty line increases to 50 percent. Similarly, if one were to use Eurostat’s relative poverty line of 60 percent of the median equivalized disposable income, the headcount poverty rate increases from 20.5 percent for disposable income to 28.8 percent for consumable income. Most of the increase in poverty is on account of the burden of indirect taxes, as households are not being compensated for this burden through direct transfers. Even for extreme levels of poverty (such as those captured by the US$2.50-a-day poverty line), social transfers are insufficient to mitigate the burden of taxes so that the level of extreme poverty after taxes and transfers is higher than before taxes and transfers are considered (Table 3). The poverty gap and the severity of poverty decline for all poverty lines when going from market to disposable income, but once indirect taxes are incorporated into the analysis, this effect is reversed.

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Table 3. Croatia. Changes in Poverty on account of taxes and transfers

|Market income +<br>old-age pensions|Disposable<br>income|Consumable<br>income|
|---|---|---|
|(1)|(2) = (1) - direct<br>taxes - social<br>contributions +<br>direct transfers|(3) = (2) -<br>indirect taxes|
|**Poverty headcount**|||
|US $2.5 PPP-a-day per capita<br>5.2%|2.4%|5.9%|
|US $5 PPP-a-day per capita<br>10.3%|8.4%|17.5%|
|US $10 PPP-a-day per capita<br>28.1%|31.3%|50.0%|
|60% of median equivalized disposable income<br>20.4%|20.5%|28.8%|
|**Poverty gap**|||
|US $2.5 PPP-a-day<br>3.1%|1.2%|2.5%|
|US $5 PPP-a-day<br>5.3%|3.1%|6.8%|
|US $10 PPP-a-day<br>12.1%|11.0%|20.3%|
|60% of median equivalized disposable income<br>8.7%|7.0%|10.8%|
|**Poverty severity**|||
|US $2.5 PPP-a-day<br>2.3%|0.8%|1.6%|
|US $5 PPP-a-day<br>3.8%|1.8%|3.9%|
|US $10 PPP-a-day<br>7.5%|5.8%|11.4%|
|60% of median equivalized disposable income<br>5.7%<br>Source: Own estimates based on Croatian PIS and HBS 2014.|3.7%|5.9%|

To the extent that income is underreported in household surveys, one could imagine that this result is overestimated as households may actually have higher incomes than reported. In fact, there is evidence that this is the case in Croatia. However, the overall result that poverty increases with indirect taxes is robust to alternative measures of welfare, including those that use consumption as the basis for welfare measurement. Regardless of whether we measure welfare using disposable income in the PIS or HBS surveys, or consumption in the HBS survey, we find that the poverty rate increases once indirect taxes are taken into account such that consumable income has a higher level of poverty relative to disposable income (Figure 5A and Appendix 4). Finally, given that households do not observe the value of the benefits of in-kind education and health, we refrain from measuring poverty including those benefits, as standard in the literature. In terms of household type, Figure 5B shows that the impact of indirect taxes on poverty was particularly large among households with children and among retirees.

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Figure 5. Croatia. Poverty Headcount Rate, 2014 <u>(US$10 PPP-a-day)</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> A. Income and Consumption-based B. By household type<br>measures (measured using income)<br>100 Market income plus pensions<br>60%<br>50.0% Disposable income<br>80 Consumable income<br>50%<br>40% 36% 60<br>31.3%<br>28.1% 40<br>30%<br>20%<br>20<br>20%<br>0<br>10%<br>0%<br>Market Disposable Consumable<br>Income + Income Income<br>Contributory<br>Pensions<br>Based on income Based on consumption<br>Source: World Bank estimates based on PIS and HBS (2014).<br>Poverty (share of population)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **V. Progressivity, marginal contributions, and pro-poorness of taxes and transfers**

How did each of the fiscal interventions contribute to the observed changes in poverty and inequality? Figure 6 presents the distributional impact of different components of the tax and benefit system as a share of market income (including pensions) in 2014. Most components of the system are progressive, with the bottom 10 percent of the distribution being net receivers of social benefits. However, in cash terms, households beginning in the second decile were net payers to the treasury in 2014, as the share of taxes paid exceeded the cash benefits received for all but the poorest 10 percent of the population.

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Figure <u>6. Croatia. Distributional Impact of the Tax and Benefit System in 2014</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 300%<br>250%<br>200%<br>150%<br>100%<br>50%<br>0%<br>-50%<br>-100%<br>Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest<br>Deciles of Market income plus pensions<br>All direct taxes Non-pension contributions All Direct Transfers<br>All indirect taxes Education Health<br>Net cash position Total<br>Share of market income plus pensions<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own estimates based on the 2014 Croatian PIS and HBS. The Net Cash position of the household is measured as the difference between consumable and market income plus <u>pensions, and is equivalent to all the cash transfers to households minus all taxes.</u> Since the influence of specific interventions may be different from that of the overall system, a fundamental question in the policy discussion is whether a particular fiscal instrument (or a particular combination of them) is equalizing. If there were a single fiscal intervention, using the typical indicators such as the Kakwani index<sup>7</sup> to determine whether a particular intervention is progressive or regressive would be sufficient to unambiguously determine whether that intervention was equalizing. Given there is more than one fiscal intervention, this one-to-one relationship between the progressivity of a particular intervention and its effect on inequality breaks down. As Lambert (2001) demonstrates, depending on certain characteristics of the fiscal system, a regressive tax—for example—can exert an equalizing force over and above that which would prevail in the absence of that regressive tax. This is because each fiscal intervention interacts with all the others. For instance, the proceeds of a regressive indirect tax could be used very effectively in a pro-poor transfer, leading to a situation where post-fisc incomes are more equal than in the absence of that regressive tax. One way to calculate the effect of a particular fiscal instrument on inequality is to calculate its marginal contribution. The marginal contribution of a tax (or transfer) is calculated by taking the difference between the inequality indicator _with_ and

> 7 The Kakwani index for taxes is defined as the difference between the concentration coefficient of the tax and the Gini for market income. For transfers, it is defined as the difference between the Gini for market income and the concentration coefficient of the transfer. See, for example, Kakwani (1977).

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_without_ the tax (or transfer).<sup>8</sup> Table 4 shows both the Kakwani progressivity index for each tax and transfer along with its marginal contribution to reducing inequality and poverty for each tax and transfer intervention in 2014 under the main scenario. Results for the alternative scenario where old age pensions are considered as transfers are presented in Appendix 3. We describe each of these in turn.

# **Taxes**

Direct taxes and social contributions are progressive and inequality-reducing overall, however they also place a burden on the poor. That they are progressive can be seen by the fact that the Kakwani coefficient is positive, the fact that they are inequality-reducing can be seen by a positive marginal contribution to the redistributive effort (Table 4). However, they are also poverty increasing, as shown by a negative marginal contribution to poverty reduction when poverty is measured using US$5 PPP-a-day poverty line. There is substantial heterogeneity across categories of taxes and contributions. For instance, while PIT is progressive and redistributive, direct taxes on agriculture/fishing/hunting are slightly regressive, potentially because these taxes could be overestimated by respondents in household surveys from where we take the information. Similarly, social contributions to pensioner’s health and farmer’s contributions are regressive, but small enough that they do not make a large impact on poverty or inequality. In particular, we find that direct taxes in 2014 were not just progressive, but also highly redistributive relative to other countries (Figure 7A).

In contrast, indirect taxes were regressive and contributed to increasing poverty and inequality in 2014. While it is true that regressive taxes can be equalizing,<sup>9</sup> this was not the case in Croatia in 2014. In particular, VAT placed a large burden on low-income households, which was not compensated for by pro-poor spending, leading to an overall increase in poverty and inequality. Excise taxes were also regressive, but since they are not as large as VAT, their impact on poverty and inequality was substantially smaller (Table 4). When taken together, indirect taxes are not only regressive, but also highly unequalizing relative to other countries, including many Latin American and other developing countries (Figure 7B). These results point to potential improvements that could be achieved to reduce the burden on the poor.

> 8 Note that there is path dependence in estimating these marginal contributions, since the order in which each intervention is considered matters for the size of the estimated marginal contribution. The estimation approach uses a Shapely decomposition to address this issue, which involves estimating marginal contributions in every possible path and then taking the average.

> 9 For instance, the case of Chile. See Martinez-Aguilar et al (2017) and Lustig (2017).

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# **Table 4. Croatia: Marginal Contributions to Reducing Inequality in 2014 Pensions as Deferred Income Scenario**

||**Size (wrt**|||**Marginal co**|**ntributions**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||<br>**Market Income**<br>**plus pensions)**|**Concentration**<br>**Coeffecient**|**Kakwani**<br>**Coefficient**|**Redistributive**<br>**Effect**|**Poverty**<br>**Reduction Effect**<sup>**5**</sup>|
|**To Disposable Income**|**83.6%**|||||
|**All contributory pensions**|21.5%|0.1979|0.1848|0.1449|0.2049|
|education related benefits|0.1%|-0.1553|0.5381|0.0006|0.0010|
|maternity/parental benefit|0.7%|-0.1926|0.5754|0.0038|0.0039|
|unemployment related benefits|0.3%|-0.1516|0.5344|0.0015|0.0017|
|disability related benefits|0.4%|-0.2067|0.5895|0.0019|0.0021|
|sickness benefits|0.2%|0.0220|0.3608|0.0007|0.0003|
|social asisstance|0.2%|-0.7476|1.1303|0.0021|0.0027|
|childrelated benefits|1.1%|-0.5380|0.9208|0.0109|0.0127|
|other benefits|0.6%|-0.5331|0.9159|0.0049|0.0066|
|**All direct transfers excl contributory pensions**|3.5%|-0.3669|0.7497|0.0276|0.0382|
|**All direct transfers incl contributory pensions**|25.0%|0.1188|0.2639|0.1802|0.2457|
|PIT|-7.1%|0.6878|0.3050|0.0273|-0.0005|
|dir.taxes of agri/fish/hunt/forest|-0.1%|0.2947|-0.0880|0.0001|0.0000|
|tax on vacation homes|0.0%|0.3637|-0.0190|0.0000|0.0000|
|tax on motor vehicles|-0.1%|0.3577|-0.0251|0.0000|0.0000|
|tax on vessels|0.0%|0.4904|0.1076|0.0000|0.0000|
|ssc general health|-10.7%|0.4303|0.0475|0.0100|-0.0084|
|ssc occupational health|-0.4%|0.4331|0.0503|0.0003|0.0000|
|ssc employment|-1.2%|0.4460|0.0632|0.0012|-0.0004|
|ssc pensioners health|-0.3%|0.2863|-0.0965|0.0001|-0.0002|
|ssc farmers nonpension|-0.1%|-0.0379|-0.4206|-0.0003|-0.0001|
|**All direct taxes**|-7.3%|0.6773|0.2946|0.0272|-0.0005|
|**All contributions**|-26.4%|0.4339|0.0512|0.0267|-0.0175|
|**All direct taxes and contributions**|-33.7%|0.4865|0.1038|0.0465|-0.0191|
|**To Consumable Income**|**64.6%**|||||
|**All direct taxes**|-7.3%|0.6773|0.2946|0.0315|-0.0073|
|**All contributions**|-26.4%|0.4339|0.0512|0.0246|-0.0581|
|**All direct taxes and contributions**|-33.7%|0.4865|0.1038|0.0461|-0.0598|
|VAT|-17.1%|0.2173|-0.1655|-0.0283|-0.0877|
|excises|-1.7%|0.2366|-0.1462|-0.0030|-0.0116|
|other indirect taxes|-0.2%|0.2445|-0.1382|-0.0004|-0.0005|
|**All indirect taxes**|-19.1%|0.2194|-0.1634|-0.0303|-0.0913|
|**All taxes**|-26.4%|0.3458|-0.0370|-0.0030|-0.0918|
|**All taxes and contributions**|-52.8%|0.3899|0.0071|0.0162|-0.1103|
|**To Final Income**|**84%**|||||
|**All direct taxes and contributions**|-33.7%|0.4865|0.1038|0.0520|-0.0196|
|**All direct transfers excl contributory pensions**|3.5%|-0.3669|0.7497|0.0222|0.0295|
|**All Indirect taxes**|-19.1%|0.2194|-0.1634|-0.0170|-0.0393|
|**Allgross in-kind transfers**|18.9%|-0.0673|0.4500|0.0623||
|**Gross education transfers**|8.2%|-0.1562|0.5390|0.0115||
|pre-primary education|1.3%|-0.0176|0.4004|0.0022||
|primary education|4.4%|-0.2563|0.6391|0.0068||
|secondary education|1.1%|-0.1761|0.5589|0.0046||
|tertiary education|1.5%|0.0373|0.3455|0.0017||
|**Gross health transfers**|10.8%|0.0000|0.3828|0.0435||

Source: own estimates based on PIS and HBS (2014).

Notes:

1. Original income is considered as Market Income plus Pensions

2. Redistributive effect equals the difference between market income Gini and the relevant ending income concept Gini. The shown change is measured in Gini points.

3. Size equals the ratio of the amount collected or spent divided by total market income.

4. Marginal contribution equals the difference between the Gini coefficient of the relevant ending income concept without the intervention in question and the Gini coefficient of the relevant ending income concept (which, of course, includes that intervention). By definition, the sum of the marginal contributions does not fulfill the adding-up principle so it will not be equal to the redistributive effect unless by coincidence. The marginal contribution shown above is measured in Gini points.

5. Poverty Reduction effect based on poverty headcount index using the poverty line of $5.00 per day in 2005 PPP.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 7. Progressivity and Redistributive Effect of Taxes<br>Figure A. Direct Taxes<br>0.70 0.035<br>0.60 0.030<br>0.50 0.025<br>0.40 0.020<br>0.30 0.015<br>0.20 0.010<br>0.10 0.005<br>0.00 0.000<br>Kakwani Marginal contribution<br>Figure B. Indirect Taxes<br>0.10 0.010<br>0.005<br>0.05<br>0.000<br>0.00<br>-0.005<br>-0.05 -0.010<br>-0.10 -0.015<br>-0.020<br>-0.15<br>-0.025<br>-0.20<br>-0.030<br>-0.25 -0.035<br>Kakwani Marginal contribution<br>(change in Gini points)<br>Kakwani Index Marginal contribution to equity<br>Regressive <------------------> Progressive<br>Kakwani Index (change in Gini points)<br>Marginal contribution to equity<br>Regressive <------------------> Progressive<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Source: Armenia: Younger et al (2016); Bolivia: Paz Arauco et al (2014); Brazil: Higgins & Pereira (2014); Chile: Ruiz-Tagle & Contreras (2014); Colombia: Melendez (2014); El Salvador: Beneke et al., (2014); Georgia: Cancho & Bondarenko (2016); Mexico: Scott (2014); Peru: Jaramillo (2013); Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016); Russia: Lopez-Calvo et al (2016); Sri Lanka: Arunatilake et al (2016); South Africa: Inchauste et al (2016); Uruguay: Bucheli et al (2014); Croatia: own estimates based on the 2014 PIS and HBS. Note: Old-age pensions are treated as deferred income for all countries shown. Marginal contributions are the <u>difference between the consumable income Gini coefficient with and without indirect taxes.</u> 21
# **Social spending**

Contributory non-pension benefits and direct transfers are all progressive, reducing both poverty and inequality (Table 4). Abstracting from old-age pensions, contributory benefit programs are progressive in both relative and absolute terms – that is, they represent a larger share of the budgets of the poor, and are pro-poor, as most of the benefits are concentrated at the bottom 40 percent of the distribution for almost all categories of benefits with the exception of sickness benefits, which are more concentrated at the top. In particular, 57 percent of maternity benefits<sup>10</sup> and 52 percent of unemployment benefits go to the bottom 40 percent of the distribution, while only 37 percent of sickness benefits do so (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Concentration of Social Protection Programs <u>(by market income plus pensions quintiles)</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Contributory Non-contributory<br>Poorest 2 3 4 Richest<br>Source: World Bank estimates based on Croatian PIS and HBS data for 2014.<br>benefits<br>benefit benefits benefits<br>Maternity/parental Unemployment Disability related Sickness benefits Social asisstance Child benefits Education related Other benefits All Direct Transfers<br><!-- End of picture text --> In terms of non-contributory transfers, all are progressive in relative and absolute terms (they are pro-poor as a larger share of benefits goes to the bottom of the distribution) as demonstrated by negative concentration coefficients (Table 4). In particular, 84 percent of social assistance benefits, and 55 percent of child benefits are devoted to the bottom 20 percent of the distribution (Figure 8). Education benefits are perhaps the least well-targeted, with 49 percent of all benefits going to the top 60 percent of the distribution, likely because these are designed as performance-based stipends and not meant to target the bottom of the distribution. In assessing how education and health spending benefit the poor, we have to caution that our analysis does not address the quality of such spending. We use government expenditure data on the various forms of education and health services to estimate unit costs of these programs. The analysis thus assumes that the actual

> 10 Note that the sample of households receiving maternity benefits in the survey is small, so this result should be interpreted with caution.

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benefit received by individuals is equal to the amount spent per capita. As the quality of school infrastructure, teachers, and health clinics and hospitals vary across the country then this is a clear limitation of the analysis.

The results show that education is progressive in relative terms, and given the amounts spent, it is also strongly equalizing.<sup>11</sup> In other words, the amount of spending on education is relatively high as a share of the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution. However, there is variation across educational categories, with primary education being the most redistributive (Table 4). Although 50 percent of all spending on secondary is devoted to the poorest 40 percent, 52 percent of pre-primary and 61 percent of tertiary education spending is devoted to the top 60 percent (Figure 9). The overall result is a slightly progressive and equalizing education structure, although the overall concentration of spending in absolute amounts is more or less neutral.

Similarly, health spending is equally distributed across the population in absolute terms. However, in relative terms, health spending is strongly progressive, as it makes up a larger share of the incomes of the bottom of the distribution (Figure 9). Thus, the overall impact of in-kind benefits is a redistributive impact, as shown in Figures 2 and 4 above.

Figure 9. Concentration of Education and Health <u>(by market income plus pensions quintiles)</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Pre-primary Primary Secondary Tertiary Gross Gross health<br>education transfers<br>transfers<br>Poorest 2 3 4 Richest<br>Source: World Bank estimates based on PIS (2014).<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> 11 Following CEQ conventions, we do not assess the poverty reducing impact of health and education spending.

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# **VI. What is the impact of recent changes in taxes and benefits?**

As noted earlier, reforms introduced in 2015 and 2017 were aimed at improving the fairness of the tax system. In 2015/16 the government increased the threshold for the top rate, increased the tax allowance slightly and introduced PIT on interest income. We estimate these impacts using the 2014 data, by changing solely the parameters of tax design, thus abstracting from any other changes that would have affected the distribution. The results suggest that the effect of these changes was a decline in collections and a more progressive PIT (Figure 10A) in relative terms as poorer households spent a smaller share of their incomes on direct taxes. This is also seen by an increase in the Kakwani index from 0.3049 to 0.3315. In 2017, the brackets of the personal income tax (PIT) were reduced from three to two and the personal allowance was increased. In addition, a more progressive scale for expanding the personal allowance for dependent children was introduced and the narrowing of eligibility criteria for other supported family members. Pensioners pay Personal Income Taxes calculated as 50 percent of the amount calculated based on the general PIT schedule (but their basic personal allowance is no longer lower than for non-pensioners). The effect of these changes was a further decline in collections and a slightly less progressive PIT, thus reversing part of the improvement that had taken place in 2016 (the Kakwani fell from 0.3315 to 0.3260).

In terms of changes to indirect taxes, in 2017 the reduced VAT rate of 13 percent is now being applied to inputs in agriculture, electricity and utility services while food and drink services were moved from the reduced to the standard rate. The effect of these changes, largely driven by lower electricity and utility bills was a less regressive VAT system (Figure 10B) as the Kakwani index for VAT fell from -0.1586 to -0.1515.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 10. Incidence of Taxes<br>C. Direct Taxes, 2014 -2017 D. Indirect taxes<br>16% 40%<br>2014 2016 2017<br>14% 35% 2016<br>12% 30% 2017<br>10% 25%<br>8% 20%<br>6% 15%<br>4% 10%<br>2% 5%<br>0% 0%<br>Deciles of Market income + Pension Deciles of market income + pensions<br>Source: World Bank estimates based on PIS and HBS (2014).<br>pensions<br>Share of market income plus Share of disposable income<br><!-- End of picture text --> 24
Although direct taxes became more progressive in relative terms between 2014 and 2017 (as poorer people paid a lower share of their incomes), when considering the absolute amount of tax relief, most of the gains of the changes in policy were concentrated in the top four deciles. This in turn has meant that the redistributive impact of PIT declined. The PIT’s marginal contribution to redistribution fell by 0.008 Gini points between 2014 and 2017, while that of social contributions also fell slightly by 0.002 Gini points. The slight improvement in the redistributive power of the VAT (0.003) was not enough to offset this increase in inequality, leading to a slightly higher Disposable income Gini (Figure 11). This combined with an estimated 0.5 percent of GDP reduction in tax collections from both the PIT and the VAT (European Commission, 2017), implies that the reforms put in place so far led to lower collections and lower redistribution.

However, when it comes to poverty, the impact of lower VAT on electricity and utility bills is expected to be poverty reducing. Poverty, measured using the US$10 PPP-a-day poverty line is expected to fall from 50 to 49 percent on account of the recent changes in VAT (Figure 12). Similarly, it declines from 17.5 to 16.6 percent using the US$5 PPP-a-day poverty line. However, this impact is not large enough to mitigate the impact of the burden of other taxes in the system.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 11. Croatia. Gini Coefficient Figure 12. Croatia. Poverty Headcount Rate<br>($10 PPP-a-day)<br>0.39<br>55% 50.0% 49.0%<br>50%<br>0.37<br>45%<br>0.35 40%<br>35% 31.3% 31.1%<br>0.33 30% 28.1% 28.1%<br>25%<br>0.31<br>2014 20%<br>0.29 2016 Simulation 15%<br>10%<br>0.27 2017 Simulation 5%<br>Market Income + Disposable Consumable<br>0.25<br>Contributory Income Income<br>Market Disposable Consumable Final Income<br>Pensions<br>Income + Income Income<br>Contributory 2014 2016 Simulation 2017 Simulation<br>Pensions<br>Poverty (share of population)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <u>Source: World Bank estimates based on Croatian PIS and HBS 2014.</u>

# **VII. Alternative reforms: Reducing the VAT rate to 24 percent?**

The existing framework can also be used to simulate reforms going forward. For instance, one potential reform that has been discussed is a reduction in the VAT rate from 25 to 24 percent. A simulation of the distributional impacts of such a change, holding everything else constant shows that such a change would lead to a reduction in the relative poverty headcount rate by 0.21 percentage points and it would reduce consumable income inequality by only 0.001 Gini points (Figures 13). However, the cost of such a move would amount to about HRK1.3 billion in 2014 25
real terms (0.41 percent of GDP), which would have to be financed through expenditure reductions or tax increases to avoid increasing the deficit and impinging on fiscal sustainability. Depending on the financing instrument chosen, the distributional impacts could be different than what is presented here.

<u>Figure 13. Croatia: Poverty impact of a VAT rate reduction to 24 percent</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 60%<br>49.0% 48.4%<br>50%<br>40%<br>27.9% 27.7%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Poverty headcount Poverty 2017 + change Poverty headcount Poverty 2017 + change<br>2017 in VAT 2017 in VAT<br>US $10 PPP-a-day 60% of median equivalized disposable<br>income<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank estimates based on Croatian PIS and HBS 2014. Note: This simulation does not consider the distributional impact of alternative financing <u>sources to compensate for the loss of revenue envisaged due to a reduction in the tax rate.</u>

# **VIII. Conclusions**

The analysis presented in this paper finds that starting from a relatively low level of inequality compared to other emerging high-income countries, such as Poland, the Croatian direct tax and transfer system is redistributive, with progressive and redistributive direct taxes and transfers, in line with other European countries, and more so than other developing countries. However, indirect taxes are regressive and unequalizing, so much so that the redistributive power of direct taxes and transfers is reversed. In cash terms, inequality is similar after all taxes and transfers than before them.

The results on poverty, on the other hand, show that indirect taxes effectively lead some households under the poverty line, and are therefore poverty increasing. With regards to in-kind transfers, when the value of education and health is included in the analysis, there is an important redistributive effect, primarily on account of primary education.

In terms of the recent changes to taxes implemented, the analysis finds that both direct and indirect taxes became more progressive in relative terms in 2017 compared to 2014, as poorer households paid lower taxes as a share of their incomes. However, in absolute amounts, most of the tax relief accrued to the top of the income distribution. As a result, the redistributive impact of personal income taxes and social security contributions was reduced, and inequality after taxes and transfers 26
is expected to increase slightly in 2017 compared to 2014. When it comes to poverty, the impact of lower VAT on electricity and utility bills is expected to be slightly poverty reducing, but not to provide enough of the kind of relief that would be needed given the impact of indirect taxes.

Finally, a simulation shows that reducing the statutory standard VAT rate from 25 to 24 percent would slightly reduce inequality, but could reduce poverty measured after taxes by 0.21 percentage points. However, this would cost about 0.41 percent of GDP, which would have to be financed either through expenditure cuts or tax increases to avoid increasing the fiscal deficit. Depending on the financing mechanism chosen, the positive impact of a VAT reduction on poverty and inequality would be smaller. Going forward, it will be important to consider similar exercises to better understand the redistributive and poverty-reducing impact of policies, including through assessment of the combination of policies.

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