metadata: authors: 0: author: Islam,Roumeen
count: World
docna: 0: docna: Credit composition, output composition, and
            external balances
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Construction Industry,Common Carriers Industry,Food & Beverage Industry,General Manufacturing,Pulp & Paper Industry,Plastics & Rubber Industry,International Trade and Trade Rules,Financial Economics,Macroeconomic Management,Business Cycles and Stabilization Policies,Finance and Development,Financial Sector Policy
teratopic: Industry,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth,International Economics and Trade,Finance and Financial Sector Development
abstracts: cdata!: This paper builds on recent research
            examining the impact of finance on economic outcomes.
            Specifically, it asks whether credit extended to households
            and firms has an impact on the share of exports in gross
            domestic product and on the trade balance. The analysis
            finds that although household credit is not positively
            related to export shares or trade balances, firm credit is
            significantly related to both. The relationship with export
            shares is particularly strong and robust. Higher shares of
            credit going to firms means a higher export share in gross
            domestic product and stronger trade balances (any effect of
            credit on imports is subsumed by the larger effect on
            exports). Household credit has a negative or insignificant
            relationship with the trade balance and the share of exports
            in gross domestic product. Credit may also affect the choice
            between types of goods produced domestically, not just
            whether they are produced for export or domestic
            consumption. The paper finds that household credit has a
            negative relationship with the share of manufacturing in
            gross domestic product. Firm credit is positively associated
            with the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product,
            while the share of services does not seem to be affected by either.
repnme: repnme: Credit composition, output composition, and
            external balances
display_title: Credit composition, output
            composition, and external balances
listing_relative_url: /research/2017/06/27531166/credit-composition-output-composition-external-balances
topicv3: Manufacturing Sectors m1326521 1281,Trade m1326924 698,Finance and Growth m1327404 1081,Trade Balance m1327679 1136,Financial Sector Development m1327681 1920
publishtoextweb_dt: 2017-06-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Industry,Macroeconomics and Economic Growth,International Economics and Trade,Finance and Financial Sector Development
no_of_pages: 30
author_keys: 0: author_key: 99125
model_extractions: WPS8082 Policy Research Working Paper 8082 Credit Composition, Output Composition, and External Balances _Roumeen Islam_ Europe and Central Asia Region June 2017
Policy Research Working Paper 8082

# **Abstract**

This paper builds on recent research examining the impact of finance on economic outcomes. Specifically, it asks whether credit extended to households and firms has an impact on the share of exports in gross domestic product and on the trade balance. The analysis finds that although household credit is not positively related to export shares or trade balances, firm credit is significantly related to both. The relationship with export shares is particularly strong and robust. Higher shares of credit going to firms means a higher export share in gross domestic product and stronger trade balances (any effect of credit on imports is subsumed by the larger effect on exports). Household credit has a negative or insignificant relationship with the trade balance and the share of exports in gross domestic product. Credit may also affect the choice between types of goods produced domestically, not just whether they are produced for export or domestic consumption. The paper finds that household credit has a negative relationship with the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product. Firm credit is positively associated with the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product, while the share of services does not seem to be affected by either.

This paper is a product of Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author June be contacted at rislam@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Credit Composition, Output Composition, and External Balances**

# **Roumeen Islam**<sup>**1**</sup>

JEL classification: F65, F40, G01, O16, O47

> 1 <u>rislam@worldbank.org.  Zhoudan Xie provided excellent research assistance.</u>
A substantial amount of research has been done on the impact of the financial system on economic outcomes since the 2008 financial crisis. Attention has mostly been focused on the financial system’s contribution to productivity, innovation and growth on the one hand, and to the nature of recessions accompanying financial busts on the other. Related to the latter strand of study is the impact of financial sector activities on economic volatility, another area that has been of interest. The benefits of deep financial systems in supporting growth has long been recognized in both theoretical and empirical economics. Policy makers have supported enhanced access to credit for households as well as firms, with a view to support consumption smoothing and investment decisions by households. More recently, research has focused on whether finance in all forms supports growth and whether fast growing financial sectors support growth in all contexts or only under certain conditions. Researchers have asked whether certain financial sector activities should be constrained or regulated differently or whether growth of overall credit should be slowed because (a) the resource allocation that occurs in certain contexts is not productivity or growth enhancing, or (b) because the economywide cost risks associated with financial activities outweigh the benefits of individual risk-taking.

This paper examines whether credit to different types of borrowers, namely, households and firms, has differential effects on external balances. The reason for the differential effects would spring from the presumption that households and firms tend to borrow for distinct purposes. Households primarily borrow for consumption<sup>2</sup> while firms would borrow for production, part of which might be exported. In the first instance, therefore, trade balances would tend to be more negatively affected by consumer credit, while export shares to GDP would not be affected, or would be affected negatively if credit is diverted to imports for consumption. Part of firm credit may support export related activities, though overall, the effect is ambiguous. Rising credit may affect domestic demand to such an extent that the export facilitating effect is subsumed by the import effect.

This paper builds on recent research that examines the link between financial systems and economic outcomes by extending the types of outcomes affected by finance and also by distinguishing by borrower type. The paper uses panel data covering 42 countries over the period

> 2 Though they may “borrow” to purchase other financial assets.

2
1964-2013, using 2SLS estimations. The paper finds that the composition of borrowers – whether they are households or firms – matters in terms of how credit affects economic outcomes.

# **Related Literature**

This paper builds on studies that analyze the impact of financial activity on growth and volatility. Studies on finance and growth are plenty. Levine (2005) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008) discuss the many channels through which finance supports economic activity, including through higher investment, supporting innovation, and enabling consumption smoothing and risk sharing. They discuss both theoretical and empirical papers that demonstrate how finance supports growth. King and Levine (1993), Levine et al (2000), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), and Beck et al (2000) also discuss the impact of finance on growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and DemirgucKunt and Maksimovic (1998) use industry and firm level data to explore the positive impact of finance on growth. More recently, Levine and Warusawitharana (2014) find that external finance supports productivity growth in their sample of European countries.

However, a number of recent papers revisit the finance-growth relationship and find more nuanced effects. Gazdar and Cherif (2015), looking at countries in the Middle East and in North Africa, find that finance is more likely to support growth in good institutional contexts. Demetriades and Law (2006) find that financial development has larger effects on GDP per capita when the financial system is imbedded within a sound institutional framework. Barajas et al (2013) find that the beneficial effect of financial deepening on growth varies across countries; lower income countries benefit less because their regulatory and supervisory systems are less developed. Aizenman, Yinjarak and Park (2015) find a nonlinear effect of finance and growth and an uneven effect across sectors. They compare East Asia and Latin America, concluding that both the quantity and quality of finance matter in determining the impact of finance on economic activity. When the financial system channels resources to the most productive sectors of the real economy, then growth in finance and real output is expected to be positively correlated. Arcand et al (2012) find that there is a threshold size for the financial sector beyond which finance does not have a positive impact on growth. Shen and Lee (2005) show that stock market development has a positive effect on growth but banking development does not; they find that the conditioning variables of financial liberalization, high income level and good shareholder protection mitigate the negative effects of banking development on growth. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012, 2015) find that the impact of 3
finance on growth is nonlinear (very large financial sectors can have a negative relationship with growth) and that a fast growing financial sector has a negative impact on aggregate productivity growth. In their theoretical model, this is because (a) low productivity (and high collateral) projects are more likely to be financed by banks seeking collateral, and (b) the financial sector may take away human resources from more productive sectors. Their empirical work covers advanced economies.

Few papers have differentiated between the impact of credit going to households versus firms. Yet in recent times, there has been increasing attention given to the fast increases in household credit (that have occurred in US and some European credit markets). Much of credit to households is mortgage credit, a type of credit that increases relative to enterprise credit during asset price booms, but other credit has also increased. There is an ongoing move to support further financial inclusion, that is, not just providing consumers with a savings source, but also facilitating the extension of household credit, as a means of improving welfare.

Theory is ambiguous with respect to the effect of higher household credit on growth. Results vary according to whether it is assumed (or demonstrated) that higher household credit raises consumption and lowers savings (and therefore investment), or whether it raises investment, for example in human capital. The former scenario is analyzed by Jappelli and Pagano (1994), while the latter is made by Galor and Zeira (1993) and De Gregorio (1996). For the period 19942005, Beck et al (2012) analyze the relationship between household credit and growth empirically. Examining the contribution of household credit to economic growth, they find that household credit has no positive relationship with growth, but that firm credit does. Moreover, enterprise credit growth is associated with faster reductions in income inequality, while household credit is not. BIS (2006) discusses the implications of rising household credit for financial and macroeconomic stability in mature markets. IMF (2006) highlights the additional risks associated with rapid household credit growth in emerging markets, where weaknesses in financial institutions and regulatory capacity can heighten risks. The IMF report concludes that access to credit should be accompanied by measures to enhance resilience and safety of the financial system. BIS (2006) examines the rise of housing finance pre-2008, raising concerns about the rise of subprime mortgages. It highlights the important role that governments play, particularly through tax and subsidy systems for housing and land, in affecting housing market developments, and 4
documents the rise of borrowing/lending for houses. Both the IMF and BIS papers focus on risks – for example debt-financed household borrowing leading to larger current account deficits on the one hand, and excessive borrowing in situations where there is little regulation to protect households or banks from taking on risks that they are unable to manage.

The link between financial development and trade and/or exports has been studied in previous papers. For example, Beck (2002, 2003) investigates whether financial development translates into comparative advantage for industries that use external finance. Using industry- level data, he finds that countries with better developed financial systems have higher export shares and trade balances. His paper follows the notions developed in Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) and Baldwin (1989) in which financial markets are a source of comparative advantage, particularly in industries with higher external financing needs. Some papers examine the role of financial constraints in explaining trade patterns in the wake of the recent financial crisis and come to varying results. Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Ahn et al (2011), and Chor and Manova (2012) conclude that credit frictions contributed substantially to the collapse in trade. Levchenko et al (2010) and Eaton et al (2011) do not find significant impacts of the credit channel. Coban (2015) finds finance to be important in supporting exports in Turkey. Contessi and Nicola (2013) review the literature on the role of finance in international trade and, after accounting for the heterogeneity in methodologies, measures of access to and dependence on finance, and find an important impact of finance on trade, particularly at the extensive margin.

Building on this theoretical and empirical research, this paper researches the relationship between borrower composition, external balances and GDP composition. It expands earlier research on the topic.

# **Data and Methodology**

The data for household and firm credit are taken from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Most regressions cover the period 1964-2013, for 42 countries. All other data sources and time periods are described in the annex, Table A1. The relationships are estimated using OLS and 2SLS, though only the 2SLS versions are shown.

Table 1A below shows indicators of financial sector development from 1994-2013, using credit ratios to GDP as the measure of financial sector development. The period before the most 5
recent financial boom (1994-2005) and the period covering the boom, crisis and recovery periods (2006-2013) are separated. The average for the entire period is shown in Annex Table A2. As the table shows, total credit to GDP increased in all countries in the sample, save five (Argentina, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Thailand), and in some cases, substantially, for example, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain, to name a few. In about a quarter of the sample (11 countries), the share of household credit in total credit has remained the same or fallen, when comparing the two periods. Interestingly, the countries in which the share of total credit has fallen are not the same countries where the share of household credit in total credit has fallen (save Germany). Examining the scatterplot of the household credit share against GDP per capita over the two periods (Figure 1A) shows a mostly unchanged association between the pre- and post-boom periods. In contrast, the association between nonfinancial corporation credit share and GDP per capita is stronger in the post-boom period than before.

Table 1B shows how real credit evolved in the years immediately preceding and following the financial crisis of 2008 (average of annual growth rates of real credit). The household credit booms of China (56% growth), the Russian Federation (53% growth) and Turkey (40% growth) during 2004-2008 are remarkable. Other countries with credit growth equal to or above 15% are Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Poland.<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, during the same period, growth rates for firm credit were much lower in comparison. For example, real credit growth to firms was only 9% in China, 19% in Russia and 18% in Turkey. Firm credit growth was lower than 10%, in some cases, much lower, in the other countries that saw large increases in household credit growth. Correspondingly, household credit growth rates were generally lower in the years including, and since, 2009, so that the mean decline in growth rates over all countries (average of the 2009-2013 column below) is 7% for household credit and 5% for firm credit. The changing composition of credit, reflecting different spending patterns, might be expected to have substantial impacts on the economy. These impacts may show in the composition of GDP as well as in external balances, aspects that are analyzed in this paper.

> 3 If looking over a longer timeframe (1994-2005), Chile, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia join this group.

6
**Table 1A: Financial sector development and credit composition across countries (%), 19942013**

|||||**1994-200**|**5**||||**2006-201**|**3**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Country<br>Name|Country<br>Code|Total<br>Credit/<br>GDP|HH<br>Credit/<br>GDP|<br>NFC<br>Credit/<br>GDP|HH/<br>Total<br>Credit|NFC/<br>Total<br>Credit|Total<br>Credit/<br>GDP|HH<br>Credit/<br>GDP|<br>NFC<br>Credit/<br>GDP|HH/<br>Total<br>Credit|<br>NFC/<br>Total<br>Credit|
|Argentina|ARG|37|5|32|14|86|20|5|15|25|75|
|Australia|AUS|135|72|63|53|47|184|109|75|59|41|
|Austria|AUT|122|45|77|37|63|145|53|92|37|63|
|Belgium|BEL|133|39|94|29|71|189|51|138|27|73|
|<br>Brazil|BRA|36|9|27|25|75|54|17|37|31|69|
|Canada|CAN|152|62|90|41|59|178|87|91|49|51|
|Chile|CHL|108|24|84|22|78|112|32|80|29|71|
|China<br>|CHN|-|-|-|-|-|140|24|116|17|83|
|Czech<br>Republic|CZE|71|10|61|14|86|80|27|53|34|66|
|<br>Denmark|DNK|165|88|77|53|47|249|131|118|53|47|
|Finland|FIN|121|35|86|29|71|162|58|104|36|64|
|France|FRA|131|35|96|27|73|163|51|112|31|69|
|Germany|DEU|123|67|56|54|46|114|59|55|52|48|
|<br>Greece|GRC|54|17|37|31|69|120|58|62|48|52|
|Hong Kong<br>SAR, China|<sup>HKG</sup>|163|53|110|33|67|211|57|154|27|73|
|Hungary|HUN|59|10|49|17|83|118|33|85|28|72|
|<br>India|IND|-|-|-|-|-|57|9|48|16|84|
|Indonesia|IDN|26|9|17|35|65|30|14|16|47|53|
|Ireland|IRL|153|66|87|43|57|286|103|183|36|64|
|Israel|ISR|109|37|72|34|66|122|38|84|31|69|
|Italy|ITA|80|23|57|29|71|120|41|79|34|66|
|<br>Japan|JPN|200|72|128|36|64|171|66|105|39|61|
|Korea, Rep.|KOR|145|54|91|37|63|174|77|97|44|56|
|Luxembourg|LUX|260|41|219|16|84|389|52|337|13|87|
|<br>Malaysia|<br>MYS|-|-|-|-|-|119|58|61|49|51|
|Mexico|MEX|33|10|23|30|70|31|14|17|45|55|
|Netherlands|NLD|201|78|123|39|61|239|115|124|48|52|
|New Zealand|NZL|140|61|79|44|56|181|90|91|50|50|
|Norway|NOR|162|59|103|36|64|214|79|135|37|63|
|Poland|POL|38|9|29|24|76|69|30|39|43|57|
|Portugal|PRT|137|53|84|39|61|212|89|123|42|58|
|Russian<br>Federation|RUS|29|2|27|7|93|53|12|41|23|77|
|Saudi Arabia|SAU|37|10|27|27|73|44|10|34|23|77|
|Singapore|SGP|107|39|68|36|64|112|48|64|43|57|
|<br>South Africa|ZAF|-|-|-|-|-|72|40|32|56|44|
|Spain|ESP|118|45|73|38|62|207|81|126|39|61|
|<br>Sweden|SWE|147|49|98|33|67|216|74|142|34|66|
|Switzerland|CHE|180|107|73|59|41|193|112|81|58|42|
|Thailand|THA|124|45|79|36|64|100|53|47|53|47|
|Turkey|TUR|23|3|20|13|87|49|16|33|33|67|
|United|GBR|134|68|66|51|49|179|92|87|51|49|
|Kingdom||||||||||||
|United States|USA|133|73|60|55|45|158|90|68|57|43|

Data are not available for some countries during 1994-2005 (indicated with “-”). Source: BIS Statistics. Household (HH) credit and nonfinancial corporation (NFC) credit to GDP are respectively total credit to households and nonfinancial corporations from all sectors as a ratio to GDP.

7
**Table 1B:  Average growth rate in real credit (%), 2004-2013**

|||**Average An**|**nual Growth**|**Rate (%) in**|**Average An**|**nual Growth**|**Rate (%) in**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Country|**R**|**eal HH Cred**|**it**|**R**|**eal NFC Cre**|**dit**|
|Country Name|<br>Code|||||||
|||2004-2008|2009-2013|Difference*|2004-2008|2009-2013|Difference*|
|Argentina|ARG|27.5|17.0|-10.5|-4.7|9.1|13.8|
|Australia|AUS|2.2|7.7|5.5|4.8|3.4|-1.4|
|Austria|AUT|1.8|1.6|-0.2|1.2|3.1|1.9|
|Belgium|BEL|3.6|5.1|1.4|3.3|3.4|0.1|
|Brazil|BRA|15.6|19.9|4.2|-0.2|12.8|13.0|
|Canada|CAN|4.4|6.9|2.5|-0.3|6.8|7.2|
|Chile|CHL|8.2|12.2|4.0|0.5|11.2|10.7|
|China|CHN|56.0|25.4|-30.5|8.8|19.4|10.6|
|Czech Republic|CZE|17.6|5.6|-11.9|2.1|4.9|2.9|
|Denmark|DNK|5.4|1.2|-4.2|7.8|-0.1|-7.9|
|Finland|FIN|7.1|5.2|-1.9|3.8|2.9|-0.9|
|France|FRA|4.8|4.7|-0.1|1.0|3.7|2.7|
|Germany|DEU|-5.0|1.2|6.2|-3.1|1.9|5.0|
|Greece|GRC|16.3|-2.4|-18.8|7.2|-4.8|-12.0|
|Hong Kong<br>SAR, China|HKG|1.4|5.3|4.0|10.8|9.3|-1.5|
|Hungary|HUN|15.1|-3.3|-18.4|6.1|2.2|-3.9|
|India|IND|-11.1|6.2|17.4|-0.5|11.8|12.4|
|Indonesia|IDN|12.4|15.3|2.9|6.5|14.2|7.7|
|Ireland|IRL|12.1|-1.4|-13.5|14.8|4.5|-10.3|
|Israel|ISR|2.4|7.3|4.8|3.8|3.3|-0.5|
|Italy|ITA|5.5|2.0|-3.5|3.0|0.6|-2.3|
|<br>Japan|JPN|-0.3|-4.0|-3.7|0.7|-5.0|-5.7|
|Korea, Rep.|KOR|3.5|8.9|5.4|4.6|7.6|3.0|
|Luxembourg|LUX|6.1|7.1|1.0|22.9|5.2|-17.7|
|<br>Malaysia|MYS|1.0|10.1|9.1|3.1|4.5|1.5|
|Mexico|MEX|9.9|7.9|-2.0|3.2|9.8|6.6|
|Netherlands|NLD|3.1|1.3|-1.8|-1.3|1.3|2.6|
|New Zealand|NZL|2.7|6.6|3.8|3.0|3.4|0.4|
|Norway|NOR|5.1|10.6|5.4|9.0|4.8|-4.2|
|Poland|POL|20.7|12.4|-8.3|5.0|10.7|5.7|
|Portugal<br>|PRT|3.2|-0.9|-4.1|2.0|2.2|0.2|
|Russian<br>Federation|RUS|53.0|14.4|-38.6|18.5|6.1|-12.4|
|Saudi Arabia|SAU|11.6|6.9|-4.7|27.3|1.0|-26.3|
|Singapore|SGP|3.6|11.5|7.8|6.5|6.8|0.3|
|<br>South Africa|ZAF|-|2.6|-|-|1.7|-|
|Spain|ESP|8.7|-2.5|-11.1|9.3|-2.5|-11.8|
|<br>Sweden|SWE|3.1|10.1|6.9|5.0|5.9|0.9|
|Switzerland|CHE|1.1|5.1|4.0|3.4|5.5|2.1|
|Thailand|THA|4.2|11.7|7.5|-0.5|4.5|5.0|
|Turkey|TUR|40.5|16.6|-23.9|17.8|14.3|-3.5|
|United Kingdom|GBR|0.3|4.1|3.9|1.1|2.8|1.7|
|United States|USA|4.5|-2.2|-6.7|5.1|-0.5|-5.6|

*: Difference is the percentage point change between the average annual growth rates of 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. Source: Household (HH) and Nonfinancial Corporation (NFC) credit measured in billion US$ at current prices is from BIS Statistics. It is converted to constant LCU using exchange rates from IMF International Financial Statistics and the consumer price index from BIS Statistics.

8
Tables 2 and Figures 1A and 1B show the changing correlation between household and firm credit and GDP per capita during different time periods. While there is variation across countries, there is substantial correlation between income level, trade openness, financial openness and credit growth relative to GDP, especially for firms. This correlation changes over time. For example, the correlation coefficient between NFC credit and GDP per capita during the period before the credit boom was 0.51 and had jumped to 0.69 during the period 2004-2013. At the same time, the correlation with trade and financial openness increased substantially for NFC credit, but not for credit to households. Clearly, other factors besides openness became more important in later years in terms of determining household access to credit;<sup>4, 5</sup> for example, a housing market boom or other factors increasing credit, such as a period of “excess” global liquidity.

**Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients by Time Period, 1964-2013**

||**1964-2013**<br>|||
|---|---|---|---|
||Total Credit|HH Credit|NFC Credit|
|HH Credit|0.797*|||
|NFC Credit|0.916*|0.496*||
|GDP per Capita|0.740*|0.673*|0.629*|
|Trade Openness|0.352*|0.138*|0.416*|
|Financial Openness|0.461*|0.081*|0.628*|
||**1964-2003**|||
||Total Credit|HH Credit|NFC Credit|
|HH Credit|0.807*|||
|NFC Credit|0.907*|0.519*||
|GDP per Capita|0.673*|0.711*|0.506*|
|Trade Openness|0.211*|0.076*|0.260*|
|Financial Openness|0.249*|0.064|0.341*|
||**2004-2013**|||
||Total Credit|HH Credit|NFC Credit|
|HH Credit|0.759*|||
|NFC Credit|0.920*|0.445*||
|GDP per Capita|0.777*|0.631*|0.690*|
|Trade Openness|0.365*|0.063|0.465*|
|Financial Openness|0.537*|0.025|0.731*|

Total credit, HH credit and NFC credit are ratios to GDP. GDP per capita are in constant 2010 US$. * indicates significance at 5% level.

4 The data on household credit shares were compared with that in a recent paper by Beck et al (2012) for the period 1994-2005. For the countries that overlap, the Beck et al figures are usually larger. However, the averages for the period 1994-2013 (used in this paper) are generally substantially larger for several countries than their averages, reflecting the fact that these ratios rose over time.

5 Note that only four countries (Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, and United States) have data beginning in 1964. The correlations and regressions (not shown) are also done for the period 1994-2013.

9
# **Figure 1A: Household credit share with GDP per capita, 1994-2013**<sup>*****</sup>

<!-- Start of picture text --> Household credit and GDP per capita Household credit and GDP per capita<br>1994-2005 2006-2013<br>CHE<br>DNK<br>DNK<br>NLD NLDAUS CHE<br>JPNAUSUSA IRL<br>KOR PRTHKG NZL GBRDEU IRLCAN NOR KORPRT ESPNZL GBR CANUSASWE NOR<br>THA ISRESP SGP FRAFINBELAUTSWE LUX THAMYS GRC HKG FRADEUJPNBELSGPAUTFIN LUX<br>ZAF ISR ITA<br>CHL GRC ITA CHN POLCHLHUN CZE<br>IDN RUSTURARGMEXPOLBRAHUN CZESAU INDIDN MEXARGTURRUSBRA SAU<br>0 20000 40000 60000 80000 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000<br>GDP per capita, constant 2010 USD GDP per capita, constant 2010 USD<br>hh1994-2005 Fitted values hh2006-2013 Fitted values<br>Data source: WDI, BIS Data source: WDI, BIS<br>*: Estimated slopes of the regression lines are 0.00093 for the period of 1994-2005, and 0.00091 for the period of<br>2006-2013. The difference between the two slopes is not statistically significant.<br>Figure 1B: Nonfinancial corporation credit share with GDP per capita, 1994-2013 **<br>Nonfinancial corporation credit and GDP per capita Nonfinancial corporation credit and GDP per capita<br>1994-2005 2006-2013<br>LUX<br>LUX<br>JPN NLD<br>HKG<br>IDNTHARUSTURARGMEXPOLBRACHLHUN KORCZESAU PRTGRCISRESPNZLSGPGBRITADEUFRAFINBELIRLAUTCANSWEAUSUSA DNK CHE NOR INDCHNTHAZAFMYSTURRUSBRAPOLCHLHUN SAUCZEKORPRT GRCISRESPHKGNZLITAGBRFRADEUJPNBELSGPAUTFINCANUSAIRLNLDAUSSWE DNK CHE NOR<br>IDN MEXARG<br>0 20000 40000 60000 80000 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000<br>GDP per capita, constant 2010 USD GDP per capita, constant 2010 USD<br>nfc1994-2005 Fitted values nfc2006-2013 Fitted values<br>Data source: WDI, BIS Data source: WDI, BIS<br>150<br>100<br>80<br>100<br>60<br>40<br>50<br>Household credit as a share of GDP 20 Household credit as a share of GDP<br>0 0<br>400<br>200<br>300<br>150<br>200<br>100<br>50 100<br>Nonfinancial corporation credit as a share of GDP 0 Nonfinancial corporation credit as a share of GDP 0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- *: Estimated slopes of the regression lines are 0.00093 for the period of 1994-2005, and 0.00091 for the period of 2006-2013. The difference between the two slopes is not statistically significant.

# **Figure 1B: Nonfinancial corporation credit share with GDP per capita, 1994-2013**<sup>******</sup>

- **: Estimated slopes of the regression lines are 0.00133 for the period of 1994-2005, and 0.00172 for the period of 2006-2013. The difference between the two slopes is statistically significant at the 10% level.

# **Model and Results**

The relationship between borrower type and output type and external balances is examined using the following equation:

- (1) Export share to GDP = a + b ln (initial GDP p.c) + c ln (household credit/GDP) + d ln (firm credit/GDP) + e DVFC + f (financial openness) + g (DVCX) + h (foreign direct investment) + iZ

where Z encompasses additional control variables, including the terms of trade, the exchange rate, an interaction term with initial GDP per capita and the log of private credit, institutions, and 10
inflation, among others. DVFC is a dummy variable representing the proportion of years in a banking crisis. DVCX is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a commodity exporter. The relationship between the trade balance and credit is investigated using the following relationship:

- (2) Trade balance to GDP = a + b ln (initial GDP p.c) + c ln (household credit/GDP) + d ln (firm credit/GDP) + e DVFC + f (financial openness) + g (DVCX) + h (foreign direct investment) + i (terms of trade) + jZ

A number of controls are also used (as above). Table 3A below shows the estimated relationship between total private credit as a share of GDP and the export share of GDP. In almost all specifications, the relationship is significant. In specifications that control for the share of years that a country has been in a financial crisis, the estimates show a much larger effect of private credit on export shares. The financial crisis dummy variable is large and significant, as expected. As expected, foreign direct investment is positively related to the export share in GDP.

Table 3B examines how the relationship between credit and the export share may depend on borrower type. The results clearly vary depending on whether credit is provided to households or firms. Household credit is not robustly related to export shares; in several specifications, the relationship is not significant. In cases where there is a significant relationship, it tends to be negative. Providing credit to households does not support export growth, as might be expected. However, the situation is very different with credit to firms, which has a robustly significant (and substantial) impact on export shares. FDI continues to be a strong explanatory variable as does the FCDV.<sup>6</sup> The effects are not small. In regression (1) of Table 3A, a 1 percent increase in total private credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated 0.1785 percentage-point increase in export share in GDP, holding all else constant (the average is 0.2). In regression (1) of Table 3B, a 1 percent increase in firm credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated 0.3873 percentage-point increase in export share in GDP, holding all else constant. The size of the coefficient is much larger than for total private credit, averaging 0.42.<sup>7</sup>

> 6 Note that a 1 percent increase in total private credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated �/100 percentage-point increase in export share in GDP, holding all else constant.

> 7 The coefficients remain substantial and significant when the shorter period, 1994-2013 is used as a robustness check. However, the coefficient size for firm credit is on average 0.32.

11
**Table 3A: Export share and total private credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS-FE|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|export|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|ln_totalcredit|17.8468***|22.3807***|21.0350***|18.8406***|
||(0.004)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.002)|
|fdi|2.3396***|2.2713***|2.2427***|2.2316***|
||(0.005)|(0.004)|(0.004)|(0.004)|
|ln_initialgdppc|-6.8612**|-7.7754**|-6.8356*|-5.0834|
||(0.050)|(0.029)|(0.062)|(0.174)|
|financialopenness|0.0019|0.0020|0.0020|0.0021|
||(0.392)|(0.312)|(0.308)|(0.296)|
|tot|-0.2225*|-0.3597**|-0.2688|-0.3277*|
||(0.073)|(0.014)|(0.111)|(0.071)|
|financialcrisis||-18.4777**|-19.1788**|-25.1928***|
|||(0.020)|(0.015)|(0.008)|
|commodityexporter|||-9.0356*|-8.6162|
||||(0.100)|(0.125)|
|Constant|-5.1132|-6.2392|-9.3134|7.7618|
||(0.809)|(0.789)|(0.695)|(0.786)|
|Observations|141|138|138|138|
|R-squared|0.433|0.457|0.467|0.491|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (3) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regression (4) is a 2SLS regression with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables and initial GDP per capita are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

12
**Table 3B: Export share and household and nonfinancial corporation credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS-FE|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|export|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|ln_hhcredit|-7.7272|-10.1627*|-8.7530|-6.4144|
||(0.152)|(0.100)|(0.199)|(0.259)|
|ln_nfccredit|38.7256***|47.9198***|44.8425***|37.3259**|
||(0.004)|(0.002)|(0.009)|(0.011)|
|fdi|2.1595***|2.0675***|2.0680***|2.0645***|
||(0.007)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|ln_initialgdppc|-6.2351|-6.2308|-6.0781|-4.7752|
||(0.117)|(0.133)|(0.152)|(0.265)|
|financialopenness|0.0005|0.0003|0.0005|0.0009|
||(0.803)|(0.879)|(0.816)|(0.650)|
|tot|-0.1562|-0.2651*|-0.2306|-0.2975*|
||(0.216)|(0.078)|(0.180)|(0.100)|
|financialcrisis||-20.8335**|-20.9521**|-27.7355***|
|||(0.012)|(0.011)|(0.007)|
|commodityexporter|||-4.1162|-4.7524|
||||(0.540)|(0.434)|
|Constant|-63.6293*|-78.3277*|-73.3892|-39.3398|
||(0.099)|(0.082)|(0.105)|(0.345)|
|Observations|141|138|138|138|
|R-squared|0.388|0.388|0.402|0.451|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (3) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regression (4) is a 2SLS regression with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables and initial GDP per capita are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

13
Table 4A explores the relationship between the trade balance and credit. In this case, private credit has a significant relationship with the trade balance, only once the years in financial crisis are accounted for with a dummy variable. However, examining the relationship between credit and the trade balance more closely by separating credit by type of borrower shows that the household credit share is consistently, significantly and negatively associated with the trade balance while the firm credit share is positively related (Table 4B).

In regression (1), a 1 percent increase in household credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated 0.0320 percentage-point decrease in trade balance as a share of GDP, holding all else constant; while a 1 percent increase in firm credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated 0.0611 percentage-point increase in the trade balance as a share of GDP, holding all else constant. Commodity exporter status has a large positive, significant association with the trade balance.<sup>8</sup> While the estimates vary, the impact of firm credit on the trade balance is larger and positive, while the share of household credit is negatively related to the trade balance. Net exports and FDI are positively related, as are financial openness and net exports, though the latter are not consistently so.

External balances reflect the pattern of domestic consumption and production as well as international market forces. Thus, this paper also analyzes whether private credit provision affects the composition of GDP, apart from the impact on export shares. For this estimation, the variables normally used in growth regressions are used (as in the export share regression) with numerous control variables:

- (3) Share in manufacturing = a + b ln (initial GDP p.c) + c ln (household credit/GDP) + d ln (firm credit/GDP) + e DVFC + f (trade openness) + g (enrolment) + h (foreign direct investment) + i (terms of trade) + jZ

> 8 In the regressions using the shorter data set (1994-2013), the negative relationship between the trade balance and the household credit share is not robust, and the positive relationship with the firm credit share is significant only after controlling for the financial crisis dummy.

14
**Table 4A: Trade balance as a share of GDP and total private credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS-FE|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|netexport|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|ln_totalcredit|-0.3622|-0.6467|2.0387*|2.4446**|2.1881**|
||(0.842)|(0.710)|(0.060)|(0.035)|(0.042)|
|fdi|0.2323***|0.2480***|0.2173***|0.2025***|0.2115***|
||(0.005)|(0.004)|(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.007)|
|ln_initialgdppc|1.0143|1.0448|-0.1017|-0.1615|-0.2932|
||(0.262)|(0.227)|(0.877)|(0.824)|(0.660)|
|financialopenness|0.0009***|0.0009***|0.0009***|0.0009***|0.0009***|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|tot|0.0669**|0.0383|-0.0015|0.0282|0.0012|
||(0.050)|(0.312)|(0.960)|(0.320)|(0.969)|
|commodityexporter||2.6816*|2.6776**||2.7274**|
|||(0.057)|(0.048)||(0.041)|
|financialcrisis|||-1.4052|-1.6476|-1.2599|
||||(0.311)|(0.230)|(0.443)|
|Constant|-6.7484|-3.4059|-8.3375|-12.2487**|-8.8258|
||(0.361)|(0.620)|(0.134)|(0.037)|(0.134)|
|Observations|141|141|138|138|138|
|R-squared|0.346|0.366|0.390|0.363|0.397|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (4) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regression (5) is a 2SLS regression with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables and initial GDP per capita are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

15
**Table 4B: Trade balance as a share of GDP and household and nonfinancial corporation credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS|2SLS-FE|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|netexport|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|ln_hhcredit|-3.1984***<br>(0.006)|-4.6973***<br>(0.001)|-4.2055***<br>(0.008)|-2.7021**<br>(0.020)|-2.5965**<br>(0.042)|
|ln_nfccredit|6.1132**|9.7092***|11.8835***|8.4584***|8.4563***|
||(0.013)|(0.002)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.002)|
|fdi|0.1940**|0.1926**|0.1601**|0.1620**|0.1658**|
||(0.013)|(0.018)|(0.033)|(0.023)|(0.024)|
|ln_initialgdppc|1.1283|0.8744|-0.1018|0.1052|-0.3430|
||(0.263)|(0.405)|(0.910)|(0.901)|(0.659)|
|financialopenness|0.0006**|0.0004|0.0004|0.0005**|0.0006**|
||(0.015)|(0.136)|(0.159)|(0.017)|(0.011)|
|tot|0.0828**|0.0474|0.0113|0.0475*|0.0102|
||(0.014)|(0.210)|(0.720)|(0.082)|(0.736)|
|commodityexporter||4.4719***|4.3796***||3.8140***|
|||(0.009)|(0.010)||(0.007)|
|financialcrisis|||-2.0288|-2.1450|-1.9610|
||||(0.205)|(0.157)|(0.299)|
|Constant|-24.2524***<br>(0.009)|-30.7479***<br>(0.002)|-34.7481***<br>(0.000)|-28.9522***<br>(0.001)|-24.8960***<br>(0.002)|
|Observations|141|141|138|138|138|
|R-squared|0.273|0.212|0.166|0.253|0.312|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (4) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regression (5) is a 2SLS regression with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables and initial GDP per capita are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

16
First, a regression uses the share of total private credit as an explanatory variable (Table 5A). The relationship between total private credit to GDP and the share of manufacturing in GDP is positive, but the relationship is not robust, being significant in only specifications (1) and (6) below. Table 5B shows the relationship between household and firm credit shares and the manufacturing output share in GDP. Credit to firms is significantly and consistently related to the manufacturing share in GDP. However, household credit is negatively related and significant in only one specification. The coefficient sizes are relatively stable across specifications except in regression (4) where both the sample size and coefficients are smaller. To get an idea of the size of the impact, regression (1) is used. In regression (1), a 1 percent increase in firm credit as a share of GDP is associated with an estimated 0.0750 percentage-point increase in manufacturing value added as a share of GDP, and 0.0623 percentage-point change in equation (5), holding all else constant. These effects are not negligible.<sup>9</sup> In terms of other variables, the share of manufacturing is inversely related to the initial level of GDP per capita. FDI shows a consistently negative relation with the share of manufacturing in value added; this association may reflect the fact that much of FDI may have been in infrastructure, including telecommunications and energy, and in construction, instead of manufacturing. However, the coefficient on the FCDV is never significant. The same exercise was conducted for the share of services in GDP. No credit variable was significantly and robustly related to the share of services in GDP.

This paper revisits the relationship between the financial sector, specifically credit, and both exports and the trade balance. It also examines whether borrower composition, proxied by the ratio of household and firm credit shares in GDP, matters for these variables. Finding that both variables are positively related to the share of firm credit in GDP, it further explores to what extent the relationship might be affected by the composition of production. It finds that while there is a positive association between manufacturing shares to GDP and firm credit, there is no evidence showing a significant relationship between the share of services and credit variables.

> 9 Similar regressions covering a subset of countries over a shorter timeframe show a less robust relationship – when the financial crisis dummy variable is added, the significance disappears.

17
**Table 5A: Manufacturing value added as a share of GDP and total private credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:<br>manuf._share|2SLS<br>(1)|2SLS<br>(2)|2SLS<br>(3)|2SLS<br>(4)|2SLS<br>(5)|2SLS<br>(6)|2SLS-FE<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ln_totalcredit|2.4197*|1.5264|2.0091|1.4576|0.9954|6.2060**|0.7597|
||(0.067)|(0.239)|(0.110)|(0.247)|(0.445)|(0.027)|(0.554)|
|fdi|-0.1068**|-0.1046**|-0.0966**|-0.0793**|-0.0913**|-0.1451***|-0.0985**|
||(0.010)|(0.016)|(0.020)|(0.046)|(0.026)|(0.003)|(0.026)|
|enrolment|-0.0362|-0.0327|-0.0411*|-0.0153|-0.0001|-0.0492|0.0220|
||(0.134)|(0.173)|(0.085)|(0.589)|(0.998)|(0.170)|(0.522)|
|ln_initialgdppc|-3.0062***|-2.6310***|-3.1220***|-4.0587***|-3.4333***|-5.4944***|-3.3768***|
||(0.000)|(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|tradeopenness|-0.0158|-0.0130|-0.0206|-0.0282*|-0.0148|0.0054|-0.0110|
||(0.161)|(0.271)|(0.118)|(0.081)|(0.265)|(0.693)|(0.425)|
|financialcrisis||-0.8744|-0.7774|-0.7662||||
|||(0.478)|(0.526)|(0.561)||||
|ln_population|||-0.5342<br>(0.178)|-0.9563*<br>(0.062)||||
|tot||||-0.0970***<br>(0.000)|-0.0881***<br>(0.000)||-0.0891***<br>(0.000)|
|exchangerate||||||0.0408<br>(0.333)||
|Constant|21.3094***|24.0256***|30.0359***|47.3383***|34.1718***|7.1932|31.7566***|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.308)|(0.000)|
|Observations|169|167|167|124|126|137|126|
|R-squared|0.291|0.292|0.303|0.406|0.394|0.158|0.415|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (6) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regression (7) is a 2SLS regression with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables, initial GDP per capita and population are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

18
**Table 5B: Manufacturing value added as a share of GDP and household and nonfinancial corporation credit as a share of GDP**

|Dep. Var.:<br>manuf._share|2SLS<br>(1)|2SLS<br>(2)|2SLS<br>(3)|2SLS<br>(4)|2SLS<br>(5)|2SLS-FE<br>(6)|2SLS-FE<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ln_hhcredit|-1.7051<br>(0.131)|-1.8920*<br>(0.093)|-1.5068<br>(0.191)|-1.0565<br>(0.308)|1.3588<br>(0.329)|2.1457*<br>(0.079)|-0.2249<br>(0.834)|
|ln_nfccredit|7.4963***<br>(0.001)|6.8041***<br>(0.004)|6.2357**<br>(0.011)|4.0814*<br>(0.067)|6.2325**<br>(0.019)|5.4867**<br>(0.019)|1.8937<br>(0.427)|
|fdi|-0.1562***|-0.1490***|-0.1386**|-0.1222**|-0.1530***|-0.1359**|-0.1086**|
||(0.004)|(0.006)|(0.011)|(0.012)|(0.005)|(0.019)|(0.022)|
|enrolment|-0.0349|-0.0314|-0.0366|-0.0056|-0.0576|-0.0512|0.0141|
||(0.131)|(0.161)|(0.112)|(0.838)|(0.105)|(0.107)|(0.673)|
|ln_initialgdppc|-3.4189***<br>(0.000)|-3.0163***<br>(0.001)|-3.2188***<br>(0.000)|-3.5582***<br>(0.000)|-5.7100***<br>(0.000)|-6.2978***<br>(0.000)|-3.4586***<br>(0.000)|
|tradeopenness|-0.0251**|-0.0224*|-0.0253*|-0.0206|-0.0003|0.0138|-0.0142|
||(0.036)|(0.076)|(0.073)|(0.138)|(0.983)|(0.336)|(0.341)|
|financialcrisis||-1.5486<br>(0.242)|-1.4077<br>(0.282)|||||
|ln_population|||-0.2769<br>(0.464)|||||
|tot||||-0.0790***<br>(0.000)|||-0.0841***<br>(0.000)|
|exchangerate|||||0.0317<br>(0.470)|0.0357<br>(0.277)||
|Constant|9.0677<br>(0.151)|11.2095*<br>(0.080)|16.3257*<br>(0.059)|26.0424***<br>(0.000)|<br>7.9310<br>(0.284)|4.7304<br>(0.485)|29.0034***<br>(0.000)|
|Observations|169|167|167|126|137|137|126|
|R-squared|0.211|0.228|0.250|0.361|0.137|0.302|0.408|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|

Regressions (1) – (5) are 2SLS regressions with legal origin and religious composition as instruments. Regressions (6) and (7) are 2SLS regressions with the same instruments adding with year fixed effects. Credit variables, initial GDP per capita and population are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

19
# **Conclusion**

This paper has examined the relationship between financial system development and macroeconomic outcomes, specifically external balances, adding to recent research on the various effects of credit on aggregate outcomes. There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature examining the role of the financial sector in raising GDP growth and in managing risk in the economy. This literature got a substantial boost after the 2008 global financial crisis. In addition, policies to enhance the positive effects of financial system development (growth, consumption smoothing) and diminish the potentially negative consequences of financial system growth (unmanageable risks, and misallocation of resources from their most productive use, etc.) were developed and debated. These included various types of macroprudential regulation, and regulations on capital market transactions (financial system development being closely linked to cross border capital flows in recent times), and banking regulations, among others.

The paper extends existing research and finds that private credit is positively associated with the export share in GDP, the trade balance and even the share of manufacturing in output. Separating credit into household and firm credit shows that credit provided to households does not affect the export share, though credit provided to firms is strongly related to export shares. Looking at overall external balances, the relationship between private credit and the trade balance is not generally significant; however, the ratio of household credit has a significant and robust relationship with the trade balance. Household credit shares are negatively, and often significantly related to the trade balance. This is presumably because household credit provision encourages consumption of imports. Finally, part of the differential impact of household and firm credit may be through the varying effect on manufacturing shares in output. This tends to increase with the share of firm credit and is not affected by the household credit share in GDP. While these results are preliminary, they are instructive in that they suggest that the impact of credit on the economy depends on who borrows as well as other factors found in the literature by previous authors. The analysis in this paper can be refined as data over longer time periods and for more countries become available.

20
# **Annexes**

# **Annex Table A1: Variables Definitions and Data Sources**

|**Variable**|**Explanation**|**Time**<br>**Frame**|**Source**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Dependent Variables**||||
|export|Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP (%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|netexport|Trade balance – the difference between exports and<br>imports as a share of GDP (%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|manufacturing_share|Manufacturing value added as a share ofGDP(%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|**Financial Variables**||||
|totalcredit|Total credit to the private nonfinancial sector as a share of<br>GDP (%) (= hhcredit + nfccredit)|1964-2013|BIS|
|hhcredit|Total credit to households from all sectors as a share of<br>GDP (%)|1964-2013|BIS|
|nfccredit|Total credit to nonfinancial corporations from all sectors<br>as a share ofGDP(%)|1964-2013|BIS|
|**Instrumental Variables**||||
|Legal origin: legor_uk,<br>legor_fr, legor_ge,<br>legor_sc|Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of<br>the country. There are five categories: (1) English<br>Common Law, (2) French Commercial Code, (3) German<br>Commercial Code, (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code,<br>(5) Socialist/ Communist Laws.|dummy|La Porta et al<br>(1999)|
|Religion:<br>religion_protestant,<br>religion_catholic,<br>religion_muslim|Percentage of the population of country that belonged to<br>the three most widely spread religions in the world in<br>1980. There are four categories: (1) Roman Catholic, (2)<br>Protestant, (3)Muslim, (4) Other.|dummy|La Porta et al<br>(1999)|
|**Control Variables**||||
|ln_initialgdppc|Log of GDP per capita in a previous period (thousand US$ at constant 2010 prices)|1964-2013|WDI|
|financialopenness|Total foreign assets plus total foreign liabilities of the<br>country as a share of GDP (%)|1970-2011|Lane and<br>Milesi-Ferretti<br>(2007)|
|tradeopenness|Total exports plus total imports of goods and services as a<br>share of GDP (%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|enrolment|Gross secondary school enrolment rate (%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|fdi|Foreign direct investment, net inflows as a share of GDP<br>(%)|1964-2013|WDI|
|ln_population|Log of total population (thousands)|1964-2013|WDI|
|tot|Net barter terms of trade index (2000=100)|||
|exchangerate|Real effective exchange rate index (2010=100)|1964-2013|WDI|
|financialcrisis|The ratio of the years with banking crises to total number<br>of years in the period|1970-2011|Laeven and<br>Valencia (2012)|
|commodityexporter|=1 if the country is classified as commodity exporter by<br>WEO October 2011,=0 if otherwise.|dummy|WEO|

21
**Annex Table A2: Average total credit and credit composition across countries (%), 19642013**

|Country Name|Country<br>Code|Total Credit/<br>GDP|HH Credit/<br>GDP|NFC Credit/<br>GDP|HH Credit/<br>TotalCredit|NFC Credit/<br>TotalCredit|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Argentina|ARG|30|5|25|16|84|
|Australia|AUS|129|66|63|51|49|
|Austria|AUT|132|48|83|37|63|
|Belgium|BEL|128|39|89|31|69|
|Brazil|BRA|44|12|31|28|72|
|Canada|CAN|138|57|81|41|59|
|Chile|CHL|111|30|81|27|73|
|China|CHN|140|24|116|17|83|
|Czech Republic|CZE|75|17|58|23|77|
|Denmark|DNK|198|105|93|53|47|
|Finland|FIN|118|36|82|31|69|
|France|FRA|129|35|94|27|73|
|Germany|DEU|107|55|52|51|49|
|Greece<br>|GRC|80|33|47|41|59|
|Hong Kong SAR,<br>China|HKG|177|52|125|29|71|
|Hungary|HUN|77|18|59|23|77|
|India|IND|58|9|48|16|84|
|Indonesia|IDN|28|12|16|42|58|
|Ireland|IRL|241|91|151|38|62|
|Israel|ISR|112|37|75|33|67|
|Italy|ITA|86|22|64|26|74|
|<br>Japan|JPN|170|55|115|32|68|
|Korea, Rep.|KOR|108|37|71|34|66|
|<br>Luxembourg|LUX|346|48|298|14|86|
|Malaysia|MYS|119|58|61|49|51|
|Mexico|MEX|32|11|20|36|64|
|Netherlands|NLD|206|85|121|41|59|
|New Zealand|NZL|151|66|85|44|56|
|Norway|NOR|166|61|105|37|63|
|Poland|POL|51|18|33|35|65|
|Portugal|PRT|140|44|96|32|68|
|Russian<br>Federation|RUS|41|7|34|17|83|
|Saudi Arabia|SAU|40|10|30|25|75|
|Singapore|SGP|107|40|67|37|63|
|<br>South Africa|ZAF|72|40|32|56|44|
|Spain|ESP|130|46|84|35|65|
|<br>Sweden|SWE|153|56|97|37|63|
|Switzerland|CHE|187|110|77|59|41|
|Thailand|THA|113|46|67|41|59|
|Turkey|TUR|29|6|23|20|80|
|United Kingdom|GBR|113|55|58|49|51|
|United States<br>Source: Bank for I|USA<br>nternationa|119<br>l Settlements St|62<br>atistics.|57|52|48|

22
**Annex Table A3: Summary Statistics**

|**Variable**|**Obs.**|**Mean**|**Std. Dev.**|**Min**|**Max**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Dependent Variables**||||||
|export|397|38.25889|35.97456|3.163298|223.506|
|netexport|397|1.515204|7.3522|-28.06513|42.13064|
|manufacturing_share|284|19.6104|6.592455|1.62631|39.05308|
|**Financial Variables**||||||
|ln_totalcredit|230|4.622114|0.5946558|2.805782|6.012443|
|ln_hhcredit|233|3.462456|0.9557726|-1.098612|4.904089|
|ln_nfccredit|230|4.176697|0.5478724|2.617396|5.867714|
|**Control Variables**||||||
|ln_initialgdppc|384|2.530398|1.24283|-1.886032|4.640225|
|financialopenness|352|468.8437|2106.484|18.0548|23711.4|
|tradeopenness|397|75.03002|68.4963|5.816363|431.9997|
|enrolment|344|85.93078|25.25798|18.64579|157.1274|
|fdi|330|3.130461|6.592679|-1.313013|84.83953|
|ln_population|420|10.01954|1.573442|5.807536|14.11133|
|tot|186|105.8028|25.65149|54.24646|266.145|
|exchangerate|274|101.1122|22.66005|45.94808|242.0277|
|commodityexporter|420|0.2857143|0.4522927|0|1|
|financialcrisis|369|0.1084011|0.2552916|0|1|

23
**Annex Table A4: Exogenous determinants of household credit and nonfinancial corporation credit**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dep. Var.|ln_totalcredit|ln_hhcredit|ln_nfccredit|ln_totalcredit|ln_hhcredit|ln_nfccredit|
|legor_uk|0.3484**|0.9140***|0.1512|0.4330***|1.2452***|0.1827|
||(0.020)|(0.000)|(0.312)|(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.167)|
|legor_fr|0.0528|0.3394|-0.0550|0.2714**|0.7066***|0.1703|
||(0.717)|(0.164)|(0.719)|(0.029)|(0.004)|(0.179)|
|legor_ge|0.3456**|0.7814***|0.2050|0.5431***|1.2496***|0.3504***|
||(0.024)|(0.002)|(0.196)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.009)|
|legor_sc|0.4005*|0.2757|0.7588***|0.4383**|0.5925*|0.6596***|
||(0.086)|(0.421)|(0.002)|(0.012)|(0.054)|(0.001)|
|religion_protestant|-0.0026<br>(0.197)|0.0028<br>(0.313)|-0.0082***<br>(0.000)|-0.0025*<br>(0.061)|0.0026<br>(0.216)|-0.0068***<br>(0.000)|
|religion_catholic|-0.0032**|-0.0035*|-0.0028*|-0.0027*|-0.0027|-0.0023|
||(0.024)|(0.077)|(0.055)|(0.053)|(0.178)|(0.105)|
|religion_muslim|-0.0114***<br>(0.000)|-0.0192***<br>(0.000)|-0.0099***<br>(0.000)|-0.0105***<br>(0.000)|-0.0170***<br>(0.000)|-0.0096***<br>(0.000)|
|fdi|0.0080**|0.0070|0.0102**|0.0047*|-0.0032|0.0068**|
||(0.028)|(0.133)|(0.012)|(0.086)|(0.597)|(0.011)|
|ln_initialgdppc|0.3344***<br>(0.000)|0.4733***<br>(0.000)|0.2829***<br>(0.000)|0.2982***<br>(0.000)|0.3011***<br>(0.000)|0.2715***<br>(0.000)|
|financialopenness|0.0000***<br>(0.006)|-0.0000**<br>(0.047)|0.0000***<br>(0.001)||||
|tot|-0.0028|-0.0024|-0.0026||||
||(0.127)|(0.311)|(0.146)||||
|enrolment||||0.0037**<br>(0.037)|0.0112***<br>(0.000)|0.0020<br>(0.295)|
|tradeopenness||||0.0024***<br>(0.000)|0.0028***<br>(0.009)|0.0026***<br>(0.000)|
|Constant|3.9451***|2.0677***|3.7556***|3.0696***|0.5884*|3.0253***|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.092)|(0.000)|
|Observations|141|141|141|203|205|203|
|R-squared|0.712|0.696|0.648|0.693|0.697|0.595|
|Prob > F|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|F-stat legal origin|3.01|11.34|4.11|5.11|15.93|7.30|
|F-stat religion|19.37|11.12|21.38|17.97|8.96|22.26|

Regressions (1) – (3) are the first stage regressions for the 2SLS regressions in column (1) of Table 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B. Regressions (4) – (6) are the first stage regressions for the 2SLS regressions in column (1) of Table 5A and 5B. Credit variables and initial GDP per capita are in logs. All the other variables are in levels. Five-year average data are used. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

24
**Annex Table A5-1: Person’s correlations between export share and determinants**

|Variables|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1. export|1||||||||
|2. ln_hhcredit|0.1827*|1|||||||
|3. ln_nfccredit|0.3417*|0.6932*|1||||||
|4. fdi|0.6338*|0.1583*|0.3575*|1|||||
|5. ln_initialgdppc|0.2552*|0.6438*|0.5748*|0.2056*|1||||
|6. financialopenness|0.4917*|0.1016|0.3682*|0.6319*|0.2308*|1|||
|7. tot|-0.1777*|-0.2159*|-0.3196*|-0.1713*|-0.1380|-0.1314|1||
|8. financialcrisis|0.0141|0.1042|0.1928*|0.1746*|0.1535*|0.1309*|0.0038|1|
|9. commodityexporter|-0.1669*|-0.0416|-0.2165*|-0.1099*|-0.0383|-0.1039|0.2697*|-0.0128|

Person’s correlation coefficients are examined using five-year average data. * indicates significance at 5% level.

**Annex Table A5-2: Person’s correlations between trade balance and determinants**

|Variables|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1. netexport|1||||||||
|2. ln_hhcredit|0.1262|1|||||||
|3. ln_nfccredit|0.2399*|0.6932*|1||||||
|4. fdi|0.3820*|0.1583*|0.3575*|1|||||
|5. ln_initialgdppc|0.2212*|0.6438*|0.5748*|0.2056*|1||||
|6. financialopenness|0.4373*|0.1016|0.3682*|0.6319*|0.2308*|1|||
|7. tot|0.0073|-0.2159*|-0.3196*|-0.1713*|-0.1380|-0.1314|1||
|8. financialcrisis|0.0908|0.1042|0.1928*|0.1746*|0.1535*|0.1309*|0.0038|1|
|9. commodityexporter|0.1811*|-0.0416|-0.2165*|-0.1099*|-0.0383|-0.1039|0.2697*|-0.0128|

Person’s correlation coefficients are examined using five-year average data. * indicates significance at 5% level.

**Annex Table A5-3: Person’s correlations between manufacturing share and determinants**

|Variables|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9|10|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1. manuf._share|1||||||||||
|2. ln_hhcredit|-0.1755*|1|||||||||
|3. ln_nfccredit|-0.1717*|0.6932*|1||||||||
|4. fdi|-0.2204*|0.1583*|0.3575*|1|||||||
|5. enrolment|-0.2897*|0.5140*|0.4168*|0.1911*|1||||||
|6. ln_initialgdppc|-0.3214*|0.6438*|0.5748*|0.2056*|0.7740*|1|||||
|7. tradeopenness|-0.1253*|0.1819*|0.3397*|0.6238*|0.1371*|0.2458*|1||||
|8. financialcrisis|-0.1616*|0.1042|0.1928*|0.1746*|0.1619*|0.1535*|0.0060|1|||
|9. ln_population|0.2458*|-0.2539*|-0.4283*|-0.2860*|-0.3174*|-0.5547*|-0.5384*|0.0243|1||
|10. tot|-0.1276|-0.2159*|-0.3196*|-0.1713*|-0.0891|-0.1380|-0.1871*|0.0038|0.0288|1|
|11. exchangerate|0.0219|0.3859*|0.1168|-0.0592|-0.3239*|-0.2070*|-0.0238|-0.0083|0.0618|0.0922|

Person’s correlation coefficients are examined using five-year average data. * indicates significance at 5% level.

25