metadata: authors: 0: author: Faruqee,Rashidur R.
count: Africa
docna: 0: docna: How macroeconomic projections in policy
            framework papers for the African region compare with outcomes
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: International Trade and Trade Rules,Inflation,Macroeconomic Management
teratopic: Poverty Reduction
abstracts: cdata!: Policy framework papers (PFPs) have
            become important documents because they provide a framework
            for the economic policies that a country will pursue and for
            donor assistance. The projections included in these
            documents reflect the policy targets and the expected
            outcomes of policy reforms. The author focuses on the
            quality and relevance of these projections, comparing actual
            outcomes with the projected or targeted outcomes for
            selected variables. The idea is that a retrospective survey
            such as this will eventually improve projections. The author
            recommends further country-by-country analysis and actual
            outcomes to identify how much of the divergence between the
            two is due to external factors (such as weather and terms of
            trade) and how much to lack of progress in policy reform.
            Delayed progress could be due to unforseen circumstances
            (such as political changes or internal strife) or to
            unrealistic targets. The quality and realism of PFP
            projections are likely to improve, says the author if
            certain steps are taken in making projections: all PFPs
            after the first one should contain a review of outcomes in
            relation to projections in previous PFPs; whenever the
            chances of falling short of projected or targeted outcomes
            are high, the PFP should say so; using references such as
            this review, the projections could consider benchmark
            figures based on experience with successful cases of
            adjustment; from time to time each country department could
            carry out a review to assess the realism of departmental PFP
            projections, and the Chief Economist's Office could
            review projections to assess their quality.
repnme: repnme: How macroeconomic projections in policy
            framework papers for the African region compare with outcomes
display_title: How macroeconomic projections in
            policy framework papers for the African region compare with outcomes
listing_relative_url: /research/1993/08/698940/macroeconomic-projections-policy-framework-papers-african-region-compare-outcomes
topicv3: Current Account m1326278 1135,Inflation m1326709 0870F4727ACED1CF8525815C00471347,Trade m1326924 698,Balance of Payments m1326965 441,Current Account Deficit m1582987 4544
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Poverty Reduction
origu: Africa
no_of_pages: 116
author_keys: 0: author_key: 89600
model_extractions: <!-- Start of picture text --> Policy Rosewohl<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Country Operatlons<br><!-- End of picture text --> WPS 1168 This paper -a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Regional Offlce -is part of a larger effort to assess the progress of adjusting countries in the Africa region with macroeconomic and structural reforms. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 23433. Please contact Nandita Ttnnan, room J5-101, extension 34581 (August 1993, 109 pages).

Policy framework paper (PFPs) have become Important documents because they provide a framework for the economic policies that a country will pursue and for donor assistance. The projections included in these documents reflect the policy targets and the expected outcomes of policy reforms.

The quality and realism of PFP projections are likely to Improve, says Faruqee, if certain steps are taken in making projections:

* All PFPs after the first one should contain a review of outcomes in relation to projections in previous PFPs.

Faruqee focuses on the qaality and relevance of these projections, comparing actual outcomes with the projected or targeted outcomes for selected variables. The Idea is that a retrospective survey such as this will eventually Improve projections.

Faruqee recommends further country-bycountry analysis of PFP projections and actual outcomes to identify how much of the divergence between the two is due to external iactors (such as weath.T and terms of trade) and how much to lack of progress in policy reform. Delayed progress could be due to unforeseen circumstances (such as political changes or internal strife) or to unrealistic targets.

* Whenever the chances of failing short of projec'ou or targeted outcomes are high, the PFP should say so.

* Using references such as this review, the projections could consider benchmark figures based on experience with successful cases of adjustment.

* From time to time, each country department could carry out a review to assess the realism of departmental PFP projections, and the Chief Economist's Office could review projections to assess their quality.

The PoHicyResearchWorking PaperSeriesdisseminates the findings of workunder way in the Banlc An objectiveof the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.

Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
How Macroeconomic Projections in Policy Framework Papers for the Africa Region Compare with Outcomes Rashid Faruqee Office of the Chief Economist Africa Region
# TABLE OF **CONTENTS**

# prefice

I. Introduction and General Issues ...................................... Pg.1-9 II. Overview of Results .... ............................. Pg.9-19 m. Are Tnere Differences Betweci Groups of Countries .....Pg **.** 20-22 ..... IV. Reconmimendations .. .................. P.g.22-23 Annex I: Country by Country Raview Country Graphs and Tables Annex H: Classiication of PFP Countries
# pREFAC

PFPs have become important documents because they provide a framework for the economic policies that a borrowing country will pursue and for donor assistance. The projections included in these documents reflect the policy targets and expected outcomes of policy reforms. The quplity and relevance of these projections are the subject matter of this paper, which compares actual outcomes with the projected or targeted outcomes for selected variables. It is hoped that such a retrospective survey would help us to improve the projections in the PFPs.

This paper is intended to be a usefil reference for the Regional staff working with PFP projections.

An earEer version of the paper was discussed with some staff members and this version takes into account the comments and suggestions received on the earlier version.

R. Faruqee
**1**

# MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS IN POLICY FRAMEWORK PAPERS IN **THE** AFRICA REGION

# I. Introduction and General Issues

A policy framework paper (PFP) is a requirement for access to the lMP's Structural Adjustmnent Facility (SAP) and Extended Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The Policy Framework Paper (PFP) process was introduced in 1985 to ensure that the Bank, the IMP and the recipient gov -nme-nts all operate within the s'ame macroeconomic and policy framework. A PFP provides "the broad outline of medium-term programs to overcome balance of payments problems and foster growth. In their final form, PFPs are statements by governments of their economic adjustment and development policies, plans, and objectives over a rolling three year period (with annual updates), and provide a framework within which macroeconomic and structural problems can be assessed".j/ As of November 1992, 102 PFPs have been prepared in the Africa region for 29 countries with SAF and ESAP programs. Over the years, the PFPs have become an important document on which the Bank staff, the IMF staff and the policy makers of the borrowing country spend considexmble time.

Have the PFPs actually served the purpose for which they are intended? Indeed, it is necessary to carefully examine whether these documents have given adequate 1/ Operational Directive 2.20
2 attention to all three aspects of adjustment - stabilization policies, structural adjustment policies and sectoral reforms. Another important question that needs to be answered is whether the PFPs have been fully interaied by the policy makers in the borrowing country.

A major issue in evaluating PFPs has been the relative weight attached to the IMW's macroeconomic concems versus the more *developmental" concerns of the Bank. The fist part of a PPP sets forth quantitative macroeconomic objectives for GDP growth, inflation and the balance of payments. This survey of African PFPs indicate - geater Bank influence in later PFPs than in earlier ones evident from more exposition of sectoral issues and more emphasis on poverty alleviation objectives in later PFPs than in earlier ones - evident from more exposition of sectoral issues and more emphasis on poverty alleviation objectives in later PFPs compared to the earlier ones.

The second part of a PFP describes a sere of policy measures deipned to address strucural adjustment issues. Across tie entire range of policies that a PFP can contain, an analysis of the content of first year PFPs revealed that all contain the standard macroeconomic policy prescriptions (monetary control, deficit reduction, exchange rate policy and debt management). These macroeconomic poliies form an identifiable 'core program' that has retained this preeminence also in later PFPs. However, sectoral policies have grown in importance again indicating tie increased role of the Bank in later PFPs.
3 The relevance of primarily pursuing a "cure program" of policies in the PFP countries has been questioned. The application of this program reflects a diagnosis that the countries are only suffering from a common set of macroeconomic problems when in fact they could be suffering from a different set of development problems iPz most cases, although displaying similar macroeconomic problems. Long-term development issues include a weak human capital endowment and lack of entrepreneurship, high populauon growth, a technologically backward agricultural sector and a fragile environment. These problems or impediments are in addition to the problems that usually are addressed by PFPs, namely overvalued exchange rates, poor incentives, Irgh lœboi costs and a grossly inefficient public enterprise sector. And this core program owes as much to short run macroeconomi **c** onsiderations (especially deficit reduction) as it does to growth concerns. While the concern that the growth issues still receive comparatively less attention in PFPs is sti1l justified, the later PFPs do show improvement in this regard.

On the positive side there appears to be a consensus that the PFP process has improved the coordination between the Bank, the IMF and other donors. However, the time cost of achieving this convergence of views has been quite high. From the point of view of the borrowing country, this convergence has produced both favorable and anfavorable outcomes. While it does simplify the task of dealing wi'C! the multi-lateral agencies it has led to an increase in 'cross conditionality" whereby both the Bank and Fund must be satisfied with the PFP before either is willing to provide financial assistance. In addition, the PFP has acquired the status of an "endorsement" of the
4 country by the Bank and Fund in the eyes of other donors, and thus has become so iething of a prerequisite for purely bilateral aid flows.

Focussing more closely on the projections, a strikin- anomaly in the PFPs is the inconsistency between the projections for growth and investment rates. A standard growth accounting framework would lead one to expect that if a country is predicted to undergo more rapid growth over a specified period, then _ceters paribus_ that country should be expected to have a higher rate of investment over thaf period. However, there is little comlation between the projected increased in investment and the projected growth rates by country. Overall, the projected increase in growth far exceeded the projected increase in investment. One is therefore left to wonder whether the increased productivity of existing capital and future investment could be expected to be the main sources of increased growth over the PFP period. In the short run, increased utilization of existing capacity can be the source but in the medium to long run this can not be the main source of growth.

The primary concern of this paper is with the realism of the supply response assumed in PFPs. In particular, it deals with the possibility that PFP projections could display excessive optmism about the medium term outlook. There are a number of reasons why this might happen. First, the issue of government "ownershl;' of the PFP program has given rise to concern. Involvement of the government in PFP formulation was very low in the initial stages. It has improved with later PFPs but there is still a tendency for gove..mer.:3 to simply sign off' on a document written for them by the
_5_ Bank and Fund. This has meant that the commitment to implementing the measures in the PFP has often been very poor and that the policy changes on which the projections were based may not in fact have taken place.

Second, the reformn process could be more sensitive to terms of trade develo; ments than was realized when the PFP was being formulated. Adverse terms of trade developments could undermine the reform process and in turn undermine the basis for the PFP projections. A recent IMF review _2I_ documented a strong correlation between terms of trade improvements and progress towards external balance and sustained growth. It is possible that it was relatively favorable circumstances that allowed for successful policy refornm rather than policy reform creating favorable circumstances. To the extent that this was not incorporated into PFPs, the projections could thus appear excessively optimistic.

A final reason to be concerned about excessive optimism is that an analysis of the projections in PFPs compared .4th the historical experience in a given country shows that a substantial improvement in various indicators was expected to take place under the adjustment program. These improvements would have represented a substantial departure from the recent experience of the countries in question. The PFPs in the sample incorporated buoyant expectations for growth rates, export volumes and also anticipated significant reductions in the rate of mnflation. The concern is that the projections might reflect a too radical a departure from recent behavior to be realistic.

_2I_ 'Review of Experience under ESAF-Supported Arrangements', February 1993
6 Given these concerns, this review asse-es whether the stabilization targets and projected adjustment outcomes during the mediuwn-term scuarios of the PFPs have been reasonable or whether they reflect excessively optinistic assumptions regarding policy progress and supply response to policy re forms. A related pulpose of this paper - partiularly relevant for countries where SAP a.ud ESAF operations of the ABF are - coming to an end is to assess whether stabilization targets set out in PFPs, supportd by SAPs and ESAPs, were met.

This note is organized as follows: Secton I presents an overview of the firdings, including aggregated results for the Region. Section m presents aggregat-' results by grouping these countries according to selected characterics in order to identify whether there is any systematic pattern emerging from the groupings. The final section summarizes the findings of die paper and suggests some steps that the Regional staff may take to make the PFP targets and projections more realistic. The note has two annexes - - Annex I presents the picture country by country, along with country graphs and tables, and Annex I gives the results by analytical groups along with relevant graphs and tables.

The paWer compares acual outcomes with projected values of selected macroenomic variables in PFPs of the Africa Reg;on. The oojective is to throw light on two central aspects of the adjustment programs: (a) how well the stabilization targets as reflected in the projections are being met, and (b) what has been the actual response
7 to the reforms in comparison to what was projected.Y The two stabiition indicators ued to do this are: (a) budget deficit to GDP ratio and (b) current account balance to GDP ratio. The four variables selected to assess actual progrs in responding to reforms are: investmen **t** o GDP ratio, savings to GDP ratio, export growth rate and the growth rate of GDP4/. The variables on trends of investmnent te, savings rates, and export growth represents outcomes expected of the reforms in the short- to medium-run. The GDP growth rAte reflects the overall outcome and will largely be influenced by the performance of investments, savings and exports. Box 1 below presents the exact definition of the variables reviewed and records the sources of the data used. One should note here that there are often differences among sources **ini** the actual values of the variables used. The paper however uses the common sources of country data in the Bank.

iIt would be useful to make a distinction between program targets, particularly with regard to stabilization, and projected outcomes. If the targets are not met, outcomes will not be as projected. Since the min focus of this exercise is to judge the degree to which PFP targets and projections were in pracice met, the paper will not differentiate between the program targets and projected outcomes. They will be treated in the same manner in reviewing the observed congruence or deviation between the actual and projected values of the selected variables. One should also note that the realization of program targets and projections would depend on. the implementation of underlying policies. For example, the reduction of a budget deficit would depend upon improved collection of revenue and/or control of public expenditure. A complete analysis of the sources of the discrepancy between targets and actual values will have to include a critical look at the progress of policies. This paper does not get into the sources of the discrepancy.

&/Of course, other variables could have been selected to assess progress In the implementation of policy reforms and outcomes of these reforms. The projected inflation rate, a key variable for progress in stabilization, was also examined for countries for which such projections were ;,vailable. Similarly, debt ratio was also reviewed. The conclusions reached form the analysis of the variables selected would generally hold for other variables not included in the analysis.
8

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9 The PFPs are like rolling plans. They are revised on the basis of emerging circumstances including the progress of ongoing reforms. Each PFP makes projections, and on occasion the projections of a particular PPP for a future year are different from the projections in earlier PFPs for those years. In comparing the projections and actuals, I have taken the latest projections into account. Since the later projections often reflected trends up to #hat point, they are expected to be closer to the actual values than earlier projections. _5I_ This paper considers PFPs prepared for 21 Sub-Saharan African countries. Eight coauntries have been excluded, however, from the total 51st of countries for which PFPs have been prepared. These include Somalia, Chad and Sierra Leone where intemal strife or political transition derailed adjustment programs. The other five countries are Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & Piincipe, and Comoros - countries that have had only one PFP until November 1992, the cut-off date for PFPs included for analysis in this paper.

# II. Overviiew of Results

The aggregated picture was estimated by comparing the average values of projections and actuals of the same set of countries for which the values were available. (See TalMe 1). As noted, the key indicator for intemal balance is the budget deficit to GDP ratio. While there can be different estimates of the budget deficit, this paper uses _5I_ From this point of view, the observed divergence of actual values from projections based on a later PFP will be generAlly less than what ouie would find if the projections of an earlier PFP were used.
10 the estimata without grant, a measure that will correctly reflect progress toward sustainable internal balance. Almost all adjustment programs aim at reduction of the relative size of the budget deficit which is key to containing effective demand and releasing resources for the pnvate sector. Here the projections have been somewhat ambitious. The average budget deficit to GDP ratio, 'or countries for which data was available, was just about 11 percent in 1986.bi For these countries, the average budget deficit to GDP ratio was projected (using the latest available projection from PFPs) to come down to 10% in 1987. Instead, the average budget deficit to GDP ratio went up to about 12% in that year. This implies that the expected efforts to reduce budget deficit did not come forth. In other words, the commitment of governments to reduction of budget deficit as assumed in the PFP projections, was in fact weak. Either the commitment of government improved in later years or the projections became much more realistic. The aggregated record of the subsequent years also shows that generally projected (or targeted) values for budget deficit were lower than actual outcomes, but the difference is much smaller than earlier years. The years 1990 and 1991 have seen progress both in reducing budget defi^its and in getting the deficit projection closer to the target level. In both years, the projection exceeded the outcome by only about 0.5% of GDP per year, a substantial improvement on earlier years.

{/As noted, most budget deficit estimates are without grants. In one or two cases, as noted in the graph, the data on budget deficit without grants are not available. There I have used grant-inclusive data. The awegate figures reflect unweighted averages. However, in the case of budget deficit, there are two small countries (Rwanda and Lesotho) where the deviations between projected and actual values are unusually high. Since inclusion in the aggregate measure will distort the picture, they have been excluded from estimating the aggregated simple average measure. It should also be noted that the figures for the budget deficit for Guinea-Bissau are not comparable between successive PFPs. I used the current budget deficit from the 1989 PFP.
11 TABLE 1: Sumary _Tabl_ for Couctri. R.vlwad (Unwe_ghted AvecWa **hr** 21 **Coied.)**

||1986<br>al|1987<br>Pated_|Acta|198<br>Projected|ActI|1989<br>Proetd|Acta|1990<br>Projee|al|_1991_<br>Projted|Ad"|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Budse<br>_D._|-10.8|-9.9|-11.8|4.|413<br>_|**3.5**|**-11.5**|**43**|4.|-7.6|-7.9|
|Currem<br>Account<br>**Deficit**|-14.6|-14.6|-153|-11.6|-14.9|-15.2|-16.0|-16.1|-16.4|.15.6|-16.6|
|**(cmT**<br>**Adjuetd**<br>Acuala)III|**(-15.0)**||(-14.9)||(-15.2)||(-143)||(-14.1)||(-13.9)|
|invatoet|**_1S.5_**|16.6|17.5|18.10|17.9|16.9|17.3|17.4|17.6|17.7|16.4|
|S&VIOg|6.8|63|5.6|7.0|**_5.5_**|7.0|4.9|6.7|4.3|6.4|3.4|
|Export<br>Growth|2.7|6.9|4.7|43|1.5|7.8|2.6|6.7|7.3|93|-0.1|
|aDp|3.1|2.9|2.2|3.8|4.9|4.0|3.2|3.7|2.1|3.4|2.|

As for external balance, the acul value of the curmt account deficit as a rato of GDP has also exceeded the proected figures in all the years. There are two aspects of the expectd impact of adjustmnent programs on this ratio - the compression of demand allowing imports to go down, and improved pnce incentives for ceprtu to go up, reducing the current account balance. I shall come back to the growth of **exports** while discusng supply responses. The slow pace of externa sctor adjustment reflects a continued reiance on the flow of _extrnal_ resource. Even the proected values assumed that these countres would continue to have on average 14 to 15 prroent cunrent account gap. In fact, snce the projections are based on the latest PFP available, the projected values indicate the acceptance of the fact that the gap would continue to be large. Whereas the gap on average was projected to come down to lower than 12 percent
12 in 1988, by 1991, the gap was expected to be over 15 percent. Aithough the actual gap has been larger than what was projected, the later projections reflect an expectation of a continued significant gap in the current account balance of SSA countries.

Why is the current account gap not narrowing? Part of the answer lies in the movement of the real effective exchange rate. The countries that managed to depreciate the real exchange rate were able to narrow their current account deficits. Deteioration in the terms of trade also contributes significantly to the gap. Most SSA countries suffered terms of trade setbacks. When the actual current account balance estimates are corrected for the terms of trade effect, the relative size of the deficit is smaller than the projected values. The terms-of-trade adjusted actual figures reflect even less deficit than projected values for recent years. This means that if there were no change in the terms of trade, the projected gap in current account would be quite close to the actual outcome. However, to the extent that some part of the movement in the terms of trade was predictable, the projections could have reflected it.27/ Growth in the medium- to long-run GDP depends on investment and saving trends. Stabilization and structural reforms should inurease the profitability of investments in certain sectors (such as tadables) where prices would be higher as a result 2/Another stabilization measure on which the record is discouraging is the rate of inflation. The projected values aiso consistently reflect the objective of bringing down inflation steadily. However, since policies have generally failed to reduce the budget deficit, the inflation rate has remained high and the projected decline proved generally elusive. The average inflation rate of a PFP country, for which information is available, was 16.4% in 1987 and the programs aimed at bringing it down to an average rate of 9.9% by 1988. But the actual inflation rate in 1988 was 14.2%. The record has been similar in other years. Thus inflation has turned out to be a tougher problem than the PFPs projected it to be.
13 of reforms. As a result, the investment rate is expected to increase. This increase may, however, come after a 'pause', according to the latest Bank-wide Review of Adjustment Lending (RAL IH), because adjustment programs in the short-run may have a negative effect on private investment because of reduction in aggregate demand and contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. However, as structural reforms are carried out, investment, particularly private investment, should go up in response to a new set of incentives. In the case of gross investmen **t** o GDP ratio, the projected values are generaUy close to the actual values. Both projections and actual outcomes have, on average, remained more or less at the same level indicating that not much immediat **e** ffect of adjustment on total investment was observed, ntor was it expected. The average projected ratio of the countries reviewed was up by one percentage point, from 17 in 1987 to 18 in 1991, the corresponding movement of actual outcome of investment ratio is that it remained more or less at the same level - 17 percent.

The closeness of the projected figures of investment ratios to actual figures is explained by the fact that in most SSA countries, a substantial part of public investment is donor financed. The projected figures reflect estimated future donor support to the public investment program, which generally is realized. Analysis done elsewhere shows that private investment in all of these countries continues to stagnate, indicating weak response to reforms during the period 1986-90.2/ The total investment figures for most SSA countries, therefore, reflect continued donor support in the short-run, which may not be sustainable in the medium- to long-run. The overall trend suggests that the E/ Faruqee, R. 'Private Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa' (World Bank, Africa Regional Office, 1992)
14 pause (lag between policy reforms and the investment response) may be long in this set of SSA countries.

Economic recovery following stabilization and structural reforms should also eventually help the savings rate go up, although in the short-run the savings rate for low income countries may remain depressed or even go down as the demand management policies for stabilization may reduce disposable income further in the short-run. In the case of savings, the projected values are almost always higher than actual values. In fact, average domestic saving to GDP ratio for SSA countries has been declining (from 6.8% in 1986 to 3.4% in 1991). The actual values are generaly 2 to 3 percentage points less than the projected values. This persistent gap between actual and projected values of saving rate partly reflect the continuing large dissaving (deficit) of the public sector. The observed gap between the savings and investment ratio for the whole period implies continued dependency on foreign savings for financing investment. Here one should note that the current account gap represents foreign financing of the investment program and the gap along with domestic savings should equal investment. For some countries, this is not the case and the estimates of domestic savings may be low for some countries. 2/ Two final indicators-growth rates of exports and GNP-are also used to assess the accuracy of PFP projections. Similar to stabilization measures and the savings variable, projections of export growth rates have also been generally higher than am al 2/ Another estimate, gross national saving, would have been a more usefidl ratio - the data on which are not, however, available for many countries reviewed.
15 outcomes. The three years for which actual export growth fell far short of PFP projections are 1989 and 1991. This fall seems to be more than what one would<sup>have</sup> expected from the impact of weather on agricultural production and terms of trade<sup>of</sup> trade effect on the value of exports. As for other years included in the study<sup>-</sup> 1987<sup>and</sup> 1990 - the actual values were reasonably close to what was projected. The aggregated results on export growth, however, mask wide differences found in individual<sup>country</sup> performances.

Actual GDP growth has generally been lower than what was projected, except for 1988, when the actual average growth rate turned out to be higher than anticipated.<sup>Such</sup> an outcome in Africa is largely due to better than expected agricultural output from good weather in 1988. One should also note that the impact of adjustment programs<sup>on total</sup> output in the short run is generally confined to increased or more efficient use<sup>of</sup> productive capacity. Economies with no slack productive capacity will not respond<sup>in</sup> the short run and growth in those economies will come primarily only<sup>through</sup> investment, with output responding only after a lag. So the projected GDP growth<sup>in</sup> PFPs in the short run may generally reflect the extension of a trend and the divergence between the actual outcomes and projections seems to be increasing in recent years and this divergence cannot be explained by unforeseen weather condition and terms of trade movement.

Annex I provides country by country comparison of the projected values with actual outcomes.
16 Overall, the majority of projected values, as noted, have turned out to be ambitious in the sense that they diverge from actual values by more than 10%. (See Table 2). Only in the case of investment rates, were the majority of PFP projections generally consistent with actual outcomes. This is due to the fact that the major part of investment, public sector investmnent, is donor driven and therefore projected levels tend to be close to actual values. Some variation between projections and actual outcomes is found in stabilization measures - budget deficit and current account deficit ratios. Unlike the investment rate, the domestic savings rate has remained at an extremely low level and the divergence between the actual and projected savings rate is glaring. As for the outcome variables - GDP and export growti rates - the deviation between actual and projected values are also substantial. The findings of the paper support the conclusion that generally the pace of implementation of policy reforms have been slower than originally anticipated by the design of the adjustment programs, and that these programs have usually fallen somewhat short of attaining their stabilizalion and growth targets.
17 Table 2: Summary As-essment of PFP Countr Proections (total number of countries: 21)

||Overly Opdmifdo /thnidc|b|Realistic or Cautious c/|
|---|---|---|---|
|Budget Deficit (excl. gras)<br>a % GDP|Bumd, Gambia, Ghn. Kenya,<br>Lsotho, Mauritanh, Senegal, Togo,<br>Uganda,<br>Zambia (10)|CAR, Guia, Madssasr, Maawi,<br>Zire_(5)_<br>_<br>_|Benin, Guinea-Bisu, Masi,<br>Mozambique, Niger,_Tanzania (6)_<br>.|
|Cuent Account Deficit**As**<br>% GD?|Ghaa, Guinea, Gunea-Biau,<br>Lotho, Maurtania, Senegal,<br>Uganda, Zambia (S)|Togo (1)|Benin, Buuadi, C.AR., Tne<br>Gambia, Kenya, Madagasr,<br>Malawi, Mall, Mozambique,<br>Niger, Tanzania, Zaire (10)|
|Gro Domeic bnvtment<br>AsSGDP|Madar,<br>Uganda_(2)_|Bunndi, C.A.R., Guia,_Niger,_<br>Zaire, Zambia (6)|Benin,_TDe_Gambia, Ghana,<br>Guinea, Guinea-Bisru, Kenya,<br>Lesotho, Malawi, Mali,<br>Mozambique, Mauritania, Senegal,<br>Tanania,<br>Togo, Zaire (13)|
|Domesi Savinp<br>**As % GDP**<br>!<br>_______________|Buindi, C.AR., The Gambia,<br>Ghana,Gulasiaau,Lesotho,<br>Madagcr, Malawi, Mauiania,<br>Senegal, Tanan,<br>Uganda (12)||Benin, Guinea, Kenya, Mali,<br>M-Ambique, Niger. Togo, Zaire,<br>Zambia (9)|
|Expor of Goods and Non-<br>Factor Services Growth Rate|Bein, Bunindi, CA.R., Gambia,<br>Madagascar, Mali, Maurita,<br>Mozambique, Niger, Senegal,<br>Tanani, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia<br>(14)|Ghan (1)|Guinea, Guinea-Bisu, Kenya,<br>Lesotho, Togo (5)|
|GDP Growth Rate|Benin, C.A , Gambia, Guinea,<br>Madagascar, Mozambique,<br>**Maurna,**Niger_Senegal,_Togo,<br>Zaire, Zambia (10)|Guin<br>issau()|Bumdi, Ghana, Keaya, Lesotho,<br>Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, Ugan<br>(7)|

Notes; a/ Ovedy opdmitic impies tt aver actual values fen short of the average projected value by 20 perent or over. For variables such as the budget deficit this mans that the government commitment has been much weaker than anticipated.

b/ Optimistic inplhri that averge actual values fell short by more than 10 pernt but lowwer tha 20 percnt c/ The **average** projected values are within 10 peraent of actul values or the actual valu relect more progre than projected values.

Nots: _EW_ countries have been excded - three of them - Soma, Chad and Sierra Lone _-_ for unrlual circumstances. Five other counti - Burkina Fao, Rwanda, Equatoil Guin", SaoTom* e Pincipe and Comores- are also excluded bece ths countries have had only one PFP until November 1992,_ the cutoff date for this stdy.
18 GRAND TOTAL SIMPLE AVERAGES

|8udebtDeffeft/GD-||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|-10.84|
|8T<br>-9.94|*11.81|
|88<br>-8.82|-11.25|
|89<br>-8.33|*8.83|
|90<br>-7.58|*7.91|
|91<br>-7.15|-7.30|
|92<br>-5.47|N/A|
|g.<br>-8.36|-9.42|

|CurrentAcee<br> <br>|tlGOP<br>||
|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>_ _<br>_|Actual|Act TOT<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~Ad].|
|86<br>NA|-14.57|-15.00|
|87<br>-14.55|-15.32|-14.86|
|**88**<br>-11.60|-14.87|-15.21|
|89<br>-15.16|-16.02|-14.2Z|
|90<br>-16.06|-16.37|-14.08|
|91<br>-15.55|-16.58|-13.88|
|92<br>-16.18|N/A|N/A|
|Av<br>-14.<br>58|-15.8||

|Gros|sInvestment/GDP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr|ProJ cted|Actual|
|86|N/A|15.45|
|87|16.67|17.49|
|U|18.10|17.92|
|89|16.85|17.78|
|90|1t.41|17.61|
|91|17.71|16.43|
|92|18.61|N/A|
||_Av<br>1T.35|17.45|

|D__o_tf_S_ vfn_a_<br>_<br>DP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Proj cted<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>6.81|
|87<br>6.26<br>5.55|
|88<br>6.98<br>5.47|
|89<br>7.00<br>4.86|
|90<br>6.69<br>4.27|
|91<br>6.35<br>3.44|
|92<br>S.85<br>N A|
|6.66<br>4.72|

|**Real**Epo|rt GHFSGrowth Rate.|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prol cted<br>Actual|
|**86**|**N/A**<br>2.63|
|8T|6.95<br>4.67|
|so I<br>U<br>7|7<br>4.29<br>.46|
|89|7.78<br>2.55|
|90|6.66<br>7.68|
|91|9.30<br>-0.0|
|92|6.91<br>N/A|
||6vg.o.99<br>3.26|

||Resl GDP Grot h Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJ cted<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>3.07|
|8r|2.88<br>2.20|
|88|3.77<br>4.83|
|89|4.02<br>3.23|
|90|3.74<br>2.06|
|91|3.85<br>2.45|
|92|4.30<br>N/A|
|Avg.|3.65<br>2.95|

> NOTE: To **m*k** them coqaerobleo **the** averages in these **and all** subsequent tables **are based** only **on the years** for ,Ich both projected **nd** ectual values **are available.**
19 <!-- Start of picture text --> Budget Defl¢lt(.)/GDP<br>Grand Total Simple Averages<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Usd6. D.I Kg 14JGP<br>-4<br>*0<br>.j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S<br>* hel"t<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gross Domestl Investm.ntUGDP Grand Total Slmple Average <!-- Start of picture text --> O.u.ds G,. Srn..~<br>.s b ' - -1_4_<br>0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Real Export of GNFS Growth Rot<br>Grand Total Simple Avago<br>Grn otlSmpeAerg<br>bpt~ les :ar |<br>Real Export Pof GNF Growt R<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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20 m. A Th_

*_

In general, CPA counties have ieas budget and current account deficit than nonCFA countries. A!though, there are signs of convergence between the two groups with regard to the budget deficit, the task of reducing budget deficits seems to be equally difficult for both CPA and non-CPA countries. Since 1989, the record of non-CFA countries seems to be significandy better than CPA countries in attaining targeted reductions in their budget deficits. This means that although the level of deficit on average in non-CPA countries is higher than CPA countries, the trend especially in recent years, is clearly better for non-CPA countries. Ihe observed divergence between projection and actual outcomes in regard to current account deficit is somewhat simiLar in both groups of countries. As for investment ratios, the projection records of CP-A and non-CFA countries are comparable. In the came of savings ratio, however, the record of CFA countries seems to be better - in contrast to non-CFA countries, projected values and actual outcomes are farly close for CPA countries. As for other outcome variables (export growth and GDP growth) CPA countries have clearly done worse than non-CFA countries. The average export growth rate for CFA countries for the period 1986-91 was only 0,25%, as against an average rate of 4.5% for non-CPA countries during the same period, and the deviation between actal and projecdon is much more pronounced for CFA countries than for non-CFA countries. A similar picture is evident also in regard to GDP growth rate.

The grouping of countries by per capita income level do not support the hypothesis that the group with comparatively higher levels of income would reap more
21 benefits from adjustment programs (a hypothesis that emerges from RAL m findings). The comparatively low per capita income countries (<$250) - although have a comparatively higher level of deficit have been able to come closer than what the higher per capita income level (>$400) could. More surprisingly, economies with comparatively loss per capita income (less than $250) have done better in CDP growth than the group with comparatively high income (more than $400). The average GDP growth for the comparatively lower per capita income (3.6) was less than half percentage point of what was on average projected (4%), whereas the comparative higher income group attained on average a growth rate of 2.4% as against an average projected rate of 3.6%.

For some years, the export dominant economies (with exports accounting for more than 25% of GDP) seem to have suffered in GDP growth more than the other group of economies (with exports less than 25% of GDP). Interestingly, TOT effect on current account balance seems to be comparable in both groups.

The letigth of adjustment, including the number of PFPs, does not seem to have any impact on the accuracy of projections. This means that even with the experience of several PFPs (reflectng longer period of adjustment) the projections do not prove to be better predictors of actual outcomes. Despite the fact that length of adjustment has had no effect on ralism of projections, the actual performance of countries with a longer - - adjustment period in selected areas investment rate, export growth and GDP growth - is, on average, better than countries with shorter adjustment periods.
22 Surprisingly, debt burden seems to have had no serious effect on the performance of the countries in attaining stabilization targets. On export growth, the countries with comparatively higher debt burden seem to have generally done better tan groups with less debt burden.

Annex II presents the comparison of projected values and actual outcomes by various groups of countries.

IV. IeoomMendatona Further country by country analysis of PFP projections and actual outcomes will be useful to ascertain how much of the observed divergence between projections and actual outcomes is due to external factors (such as weather and terms of trade effect) and how much of it is due to lack of progress in policy reforms. The latter can be due to factors that were unforeseen - as for example, political changes, or internal strife can derail progress. Less than targeted progress can bejust due to unrealistc targets that did not fully take into account politcal and institutional reality. A future country by country review can look into these questions in depth.

In the future, the quality and realism of PFP projertons is likly to improve if certain steps are taken while mnalang these projections. First, all PFPs after the first one should contain a review of the outcomes in relation to projections of previous PFPs. Second, whenever the chances of falling short of projected or targeted outcomes are high, they should be noted. Third, using references such as this review, the projections could
23 consider benchmark figures based on the exper;6ice of successful cases of adjustment. Fourth, each country department may canry out a review from time to time to assess the realism of PFP projections of the department. 'rhe Chief Economist Office may carry out from time to time this ldnd of reviews to assess how good are the projections.
24

## ANNI= 1. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY I

# Countries of Department 1

- PFPs have been prepared for four counties in CD1 Benin, CAR, Guinea, and Togo. The congruence of the average projected values and actual values on the stabilization measure, budget deficit to GDP ratio, is somewhat weak for three of these countries - CAR, Guinea, and Togo. For these countries, the budget deficit figures were consistently higher than actual values for nearly all years. The record on current account balance to GDP ratio is generally better. If terms of trade movement is taken into account, the actual deficit would be lower than the prqections in three of these countries, Togo, CAR and Guinea. The projected gross investment to GDP ratio for most countries has been within 2 to 3 percentage points. In the case of Benin, the actual values of gross investment to GDP ratio was higher tha prjected. The projected values of saving to GDP ratio have been generally ambitious, except for Guinea. The projected export growth rates are generally higher thancta values for most countries with the exception of Benin for 1987, 1988 and Togo for most years. The projected GDP growth - rates for CAR has proven to be particularly otmistic the aveage actual GDP growth rate was less one percent a year for 1986-91, against a projected growth rate of 3.3 a year. Also for other three countries, the averge actual growth was one or more percentage point lower than what were projected.
25

# Countries of Department 2

Three countries of CD2-Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia-have had PFPs. Somalia was excluded from this review because civil war derailed the adjustment program there.

Overall, the projected and actual values of two selected stabilization measures show significant differences in the two CD2 countries reviewed-Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya, the PFP targeted the budget deficit to GDP ratio to come down to 4.3 percent by 1991, but the actual ratio remained about 9 percent. The experience with regard to the budget deficit in Uganda is almost similar; the actual deficit attained was 10.6 percent in 1991, against a projection of 6.5 percent.

The record on projections of the current account to GDP ratio appears to be - similar in the two countries for several years the projections have proved to be optimistic for both countries. The actual current account deficit in Kenya in 1989 was twice the level of what was projected, but for 1990 the values were close and further improvement was registered in 1991. For Uganda, the actual ratios for the years 1987 to 1991 were higher than what the PFPs projected. The average picure in regard to current account balance for both countries is similar for both countries. When correted for terms of trade effect, both countries current account balance would be less and even narrower than projected figures.
26 As for the investment variables, the projecdon records of PFPs for Kenya is quite good. The projected investmen **t** o GDP ratio for Kenya for the years 1989 and 1990 proved to be more or less the same as the acual rate obtained during that period. Some divergence occufred in 1991. For Uganda, the projected values of investment to GDP ratio proved to be somewhat optimistic for the years 1988 and 1989, but were somewhat closer to actual values for 1990 and 1991.

The projected estimates of domestic savings to GDP ratio in Kenya were close to the actual values in 1990 and 1991. In the case of Uganda, the prcjectei savings ratio proved to be highly optimistic and the acual savings ratio seems to be declining steadily since 1986, whereas the projections indicated a rise of the ratio until 1989, after which - a decline was expected. As for other response variables growth rates of exports and GDP - strong export growth allowed Kenya to exceed its targets in 1989 and 1990. Uganda's actual values of exports show much less than projected growth for the years 1988 to 1991. The actual values of GDP growth rates for both Kenya and Uganda have also been close to projected values for most years. The results on GDP growth rate, for Uganda indicate that target rates for 1988 and 1989 were in fact exceeded.

# Counai. of D =parent 3

- Four countries of CD3-Burundi, Comoros, M gascar, Rwanda, and Zaire have had PFPs. Of these five countries, Rwanda has had a PFP only recently (April
27 1991) and a comparison of actuals with projected values is not possible. Comoros is also dropped because it has only one PFP until November 1992, cut-off point of this exercise. According to the latest available data, the overall progress on reduction of budget deficit as a ratio of GDP is rather slow in all those CD3 countries. Zaire's budget deficit ratio has been consistently high and in one );ar (1988) the actual figure was 10 percentage points higher than what was projected. Burundi's budget deficit also exceeded projected values by a substantial margin in some years. Madagascar's performance on budget deficit is slightly better - budget deficit to GDP ratio declined in 1990, contrary to what was projected. In 1991, the situation changed and Madagascar's budget deficit went up contrary **to** what was projected. Since 1990, Madagascar's current account to GDP ratio was better than projected.

The record with regard to investment and savings rate has been mixed. Actual gross investment to GDP ratio for Burundi for the years 1988 to 1991 were lower than projected value, although the gap somewhat narrowed in recent years. Madagascar has experienced widening discrepancies between acthla and projected values since 1987. For the four countries, the average investment to GDP ratio has been 4 to 5 percent lower than what was projected. As for savings to GDP ratio, the projected values have proved to be generlly ambitious. For Burundi, PFPs projected that savings to GDP rates would be on average _5_ percent, whereas the actual rate on average was less than one percent. for Madagascar, the projected rate on average is also 3 percent higher than the actual outcomes. For Zaire, the projected savings rate turned out to be similar to what were projected.
28 As for the response vaiables, export growth rate has fluctuated widely but the actual outcome on average has been always less than what was projected. The growth rates of GDP in AF3 countries have generally fluctuated. Madagascar's growth nosedived in 1991, which was not projected. The growth rates of Zaire and Comoros have often been negative, which was not projected. Zaire, whole economy has been declining for a while, has gone down to negative GDP growth, whereas PFPs had projected three to four percent annual growth of GDP. Only Burundi's record on GDP growth is good for aU the years except 1989, and the actual rate was on average within one percentage point of what was projected.

Countries of De _mAent_ 4 PFPs have beeni prepared for two countries in CD4-Guinea Bissau and Ghana.MII The PFP projections of the budget deficit of the two countries proved to be ambitious especially for Guinea-Bissau. A more glaring divergence is evident in,the case of the current account deficit of Guinea Bissau. The PFPs consistently projected that the current account deficit would be between 13 to 15 percent of GDP, but the actual gap always exceeded 30 percent and sometimes even reached as high as 60 percent. The other glaringly unrealistic projection relates to savings rates. Whereas the PFPs projected a positive rate after 1989, the actual rate reached almost negative 8 percent in that year. The projection of export growth has been slightly ambitious except for the IW/Because of current political uncertainty and past reversals of policies, Sierra Leone, the third country in CD4 on which PFPs were prepared, is left out.
29 year 990 when exports shot up to a very high rate of 75%. The GDP growth rate in Guinea Bissau for 1988 has been higher than projected, but after 1989 the growth declined at a rate faster than what was projected.

The experience of projections of the four Ghana PFPs, where the adjustment program has been considered most successful, is quite revealing. The budget deficit remained unchanged at five to six percent at over the 1987-90 period. The PFPs, however, consistently projected a budget deficit of three percent until 1991. The experience of Ghana shows that even in a comparatively successful program, the budget deficit targets proved to be extremely difficult to reach. The picture on current account deficit is similar. However, if the terms of trade effect is taken into account, the actual current account deficits would have been substantially less.

Ghana's experience in regard to gross investment is similar to other countries. The actual values of gross investment were just marginally lower than projected rates. But the domestic savings ratio has proved to be much more difficult to change and it has remained between 6 and 9 percent, as against projected values that are between 11 and 15 percent. Ghana's export growth rate on average has been the same as projected. However, the actual growth rate varied a great deal from year to year. The projected growth of GDP seems to be slightly more optimistic than what has actually been attained -on average it attained an annual rate of 4.8% growth, as against 5.1% projected.
30 Countries of Deprtent 5

- Six countries of this department Burldna Faso, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, - Niger and Senegal are in adjustment and have had PFPs.fl/ Burldna Faso strted its program only recently and therefore its PFP projections cannot be compared to actual values.

The actual outcomes on budget deficit to GDP ratio show that in two of the AF5 countries - the Gambia, Mali - countries the ratio projected proved to be close to the actual ratio. Even for the other three countries, the actual budget deficit wa .generally within 3 to 4 percentage points of what was projected. The gap between the projected and actual values of the current account balance. The picture on investment is encouraging, but the savings to GDP ratio is not. As for the growh rates of export and GDP, the actual and projected values have tended to be fluctuating, reflecting the weather-related fluctuation of agricultural production in the Sahel countries. In addition to the weather- related uncetainty, many of the countries of this departnent are cufrently going through political changes, which have accentuated the uncertainty facing these resource-poor economies.

The projected (or targeted) deficit to GDP ratio for the Gambia was not significantly different from the actual outcomes. There was marked improvement in 1988, when the actual and projected values were close, but the budget deficit increased in 1989, instead of decreasng as projected. The budget deficit decreased during 1990-91 11 Chad, also in this department, had two PFPs. Chad is not included in this review because of serious political and military problems that have derailed its adjustment program.
31 and by 1991, the deficit was about 4% of GDP in comparison to a target of 2 percent. The projected and actual values on the current account deficit are also close, although the overall deficit is still high - an average of 14 percent of GDP. Gross investmen **t** o GDP ratio has also been generally realistic. Unlike most other countries, the domestic savings ratio for the period 1987 to 1989 was also close to what was projected. The PFPs projected a significant rise in saving rate to GDP ratio after 1989, a trend not borne out by the actual behavior of the savings to GDP ratio. As for export growth, the actual growth has been very volatile and occasionally has exceeded projections. The projection - on GDP growth rate has been fairly accurate the average growth rate was 4 percent, similar to what was projected on average.

In the case of Mali, the deficit to GDP ratio was lower than the projected value in 1990 and 1991 and in all other years projected figures are higher. The projection of current account to GDP proved realistic. The gross investment to GDP ratio also generally behaved quite favorably, as did the domestic savings ratio. The performance of export growth has been impressive. In the case of Mali, also the actual GDP growth rate on average was about 2.5 percent and the corresponding projected rate was 2.5 percent.

In the case of Mauritaia, the actual budget deficit to GDP ratio was generally higher than the projected values. The PFPs projected a sharp decline in budget deficit between 1990 and 1991, which did not happen in reality. The current account deficit to GDP ratio consistently has been higher than projected values and this does not change
32 when the terms of trade effect is taken into account. The gross investmen **t** o GDP ratio has been close to projected values. However, in the case of the domestic savings ratio, the actual values are significantly lower than PFP projected values. As for exports, the growth performance has been generally much lower than PFP projections. The average export growth projected for the period 1987-91 was 6.7 percent as against actual rate of negative one percent during the same period. GDP growth rate has been declining precipitously and did not remain steady as the PFPs projected.

Niger's budget deficit to GDP ratio has also been on average about 3 percentage points higher than what the PFPs projected although 1991 is an exception in this regard. The projections of current account balance have been fairly accurate. The gross investmen **t** o GDP ratio has been somewhat lower than projected values but the saving rate in recent years has apparently exceeded PFP projected values (as in most other countries). The PFP projections have also been overly optimistic in regard to growth of exports. The average growth projected for the period 1989 to 1991 was 5.2 percent, whereas the actual outcome was viratually no growth during that period. The actual GDP growth rates have also been widely fluctuating, whereas the projection expected a steady rate of growth of three to four percent.

Senegal is another country which has had five PFPs. The budget deficit to GDP ratio has been slowly declining, yet the ratio has been significantly higher than what was projected or targeted for all the years except one (1991). The average actual deficit was more than 2 percentage points higher than what was projected. The current account
33

- deficit consistently has been between eight to ten percent of GDP on average about 4 percentage points higher than the projections. Regarding domestic savings, ratio prqections have been consistently optimistic. The actual export growth rate also consistently fell short of what the PFPs projected. Even in the case of Senegal with _5_ PFPs, the projections (takdng the latest ones available) have diverged quite significantly from actual values of selected indicators. The expected results of adjustment, as envisaged in PFPs, seems to be far from fully realized in Senegal.

# Countries of Department 6

Five countries of this department-Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia - have had PFPs. Highly volatile figures for Mozambique complicate the analysis. The countries of this Department have had a good record of reaching target budget deficit to GDP ratios. However, the record on current account deficit to GDP ratio is not that good. The actal performance with regard to investment is impressive, consistently higher than projected values for all the countries except Zambia. In contrast, the performance with regard to domestic savings to GDP ratio is poor. The actual export growth rates of these countries have also been close to the projected values. In 1989, the growth of exports in several CD6 countries increased faster than what the PFPs projected. With regard to GDP growth rates, the acal values were close or even higher than projections until 1989 for all countries. Growth of GDP in recent years, however, fell short of projections in some of the countries of the departnent.
34 Mozanbique's record in reducing deficit to GDP ratio has been slightly better than what the PFPs projected, although the level of deficit remains extremely high (over 25% of GDP). Also, the record on the current accoun **t** o GDP is similar, except for the initial year, when the projections seem to be cautious. Similar to few other countries, gross investment to GDP ratio is also better than projected. On the other hand, the savings ratio has been consistently negative but consistent with wha; the PFPs projected. The growth rate of exports has been impressive especially in 1990 and 1991. The GDP growth rate has slid down significantly from over 5 percent in 1989 to around 3 percent in 1991, whereas the PFPs projected a steady growth momentum.

The PFP projections on Malawi's fiscal performance have been realistic. On the current account, the projection has also been generally accurate, especilly in recent years. If the terms of trade effect is taken into account, the deficit would have been actually less than what was projected in 1991. The investment projections were generally accurate, again largely reflecting donor supporL The actual domestic savings ratio, although generally close to, but generally lower than, projected values. Exports, after a sharp unexpected decline in 1989, showed a remarkable growth, consistent or better than the projection, and GDP growth has been close to projected values.

Tanzan is also another case of doing better than the targeted reduction of the fiscal deficit. The performance on the current account deficit in Tanzania is also impressive, with actal performance better than what the PFPs projected. The record
_3S_ on gross investmen **t** o GDP has also boen realistic, but the export growth and domesic saving ratio has done poorly In reation to what was projected on growth rates of GDP.

According to the latest projections available for Lesotho, the budget deficit was to decline in 1991, which is not borne out by actual outcomes. A similar optimism is also evident in the case of the current account deficit. The investment outcomes seem to be markedly better than the projections. Also, the actual investment outcomes are strikingly high (in 1991, it was 94 percent of GDP). In sharp contast, the average domestic savings to GDP ratio is about -50%, which the PFPs projected at a rate of about 15%. The projecdons of the export jrowth rate have also been overly ambitious, whereas the projected GDP growth rate was actually lower than what was actually experienced.
30 SIN'"

|BudoatDtflit/GDP<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-11.00|
|87<br>N/A|- 9.40|
|88<br>N/A|- 9.60|
|89<br>- 8.40|-10.60|
|90<br>- 9.40|-10.10|
|91<br>- 9.70|- 7.20|
|92<br>**7**.90|<<br>8.10|
|_Avg.<br>8.85|*Q43|

# Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86||13.50|
|87|N/A|12.90|
|88|N/A|12.90|
|89|12.60|11.00|
|90|12.50|12.60|
|91|13.80|12.00|
|92|14.20|N/A|
|Avg.|13.28|12.48|

Real Ex ort GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|*8.90|
|87|N/5|S.30|
|as|N/A|-8.60|
|89|6.00|-25.60|
|90|4.10|1.10|
|91|8.30|7.60|
|92|5.60|N/A|
|_Avg.|<br>6.00|-4.8S|

||Current Act/P|||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|**66**|**N/**|-6.50|9.90|
|87|<br>N/A|**-S.90**|5.70|
|_u._|NIL|*7.70|-8.60|
|89|- 8.80|-6.30|- 7.00|
|90|<br>8.30|-7.00|<br>9.00|
|91|-11.20|<br>-6.90|N/A|
|92|*10.50|N/A|N/A|
|_ ".|*9.70|-6.72|-8.04|

|Dome|stfc Savings GDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Pro ected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>2.90|
|87|_NIA_<br>3.60|
|as|N/A<br>1.70|
|89|1.20<br>2.90|
|90|2.50<br>4.00|
|91|1.50.<br>3.00|
|92|2.10<br>N/A|
||1.83<br>3.02|

|RealCDPGrowth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>2.20|
|8T<br>N/A<br>-1.50|
|**86**<br>N/A<br>2.60|
|89<br>2.50<br>-2.90|
|90<br>2.50<br>3.70|
|91<br>3.00<br>4.70|
|92<br>3.5<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>2.88<br>1.47|
27 BenIn 1 - PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text -->
-4<br>*tO1 .<br>t4<br>-hW~~~t  ~~~TOT  twtab<br>*.~~~~~-  --  '<br><!-- End of picture text -->

BonIn 2- PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 41<br>4 t l @ 1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Twrme _d' We_ 4, Bonin 3 - PFP Proecotlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4rri .o . .<br>''S9<br>welf<br>-prel8mee +-4glsTeOs<br><!-- End of picture text --> lenIn 5- PFP Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> &a v-d Z awe an"<br>40 ~Y.4<br>SO se sode<br><!-- End of picture text --> Adude - _MNORQUOVAqdd_ F't Jon - **.o4** Oo Benin 4 -PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> .*ama .Au 0<br>of sI Se Se SO SI 52<br>Y w<br>-ft buOm* +AM M<br>Bonin 4. PFP Projections and Actualt<br>OW M b<br>0 44bm b1 }Gr<br>-<br><!-- End of picture text -->
36

# C.A.R.

|sU**getDicit/GOp**<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A_|<br>13.00|
|**_8**<br>13.40|-15.00|
|so<br>- 12.70|-13.70|
|89<br>10.90'.|10.70|
|90<br>- 10.70|.12.10|
|91<br>8.70|-l3.S0|
|92<br>^r.90|N/A|
|:Avg.<br>-11.28|*13.00|

Gross Investment/Gp_

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|12.20|
|By[<br>|14.20<br>|12.50|
|a_<br>0|88<br>0<br>15.10|10.60|
|i<br>8_[|<br>11.20|16.20|
|90|13.60|10.20|
|91|14.60|11.80|
||14.20|N/A|
|Avg.|_<br>13.74|12.26|

<!-- Start of picture text --> Real Export GNFS Growth Rate<br>Yr | Prol cted Actual<br>86 I/A -12.40<br>87 _ 13.70 11.10<br>8s8 7.30 *13.10<br>89 8.50 4.20<br>90 0.60 -6.40<br>91 7.30 -13.80<br>92 5.80 N/A<br>7.48 -3.60<br>L:g.jj<br><!-- End of picture text -->

||Current ACCt m|t/GDP|
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual<br>ActTOT|
|86|N/A|16.0<br>-16.50|
||-17.10|-19.00<br>*16.10|
|**88**|-16.30|16.60<br>-15.00|
|89|*15.10|-1S.20<br>13.20|
|90|-15.10|-17.00<br>-15.60|
|91|-14.40|-16.20<br>-14.80|
||-13.80|N/A<br>MIA|
||-15.60|-16.80|

|D<br>ftc**SevinaG**|**OP**|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|**86**<br>N/A|1.50|
|..<br>ay<br>0.20|0.60|
|as<br>1.80|-0.80|
|_-<br>1.40|6.10|
|9n<br>2.00|-4.40|
|91<br>3.30|0.40|
|92<br>3.30|N/A|
|1.18|0.38|

Reetl GP Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|S.20|
|87|3.80|-2.50|
|**88**|3.50|1.80|
|**89**|2.60|3.70|
|90|3.60|0.70|
|91|3.40|*1.90|
|92|3.80|N/A|
|Avo.|3.33|0.36|
CAR 1: PFP - Projectlons and Actua.s <!-- Start of picture text --> .,-<br>I s.dg. 7 .UsI 9 t t<br>Yew<br>-Pro"Iln -4PW<br>-34<br>_ _ *74* _ _ _ _ § ___ 1 §<br><!-- End of picture text --> CAR 3: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 07 11<br>66 ? 0 00 U 0YewYe<br>-4ptV n-+eAl<br><!-- End of picture text --> CAR S - PFP Pro4ctlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> P_d uF0 oe oaft% IbOl<br>.1.<br>-PV*J99U=w -+-A*uW<br>CAR P3:edl - PrfojoP , ItM 0an<br>Aduals- MNORMCatb *dd#<br>". Jm - Doe<br><!-- End of picture text --> CAR 2: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Am V G Yew<br>-raw*Uon -f- aWW* oWT7f Q4u4b<br>TOT * Twmo Trde<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
**  0  9  1  §<br>CAR 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals<br>' Ss<br>-Pre-oetin  +Atumle,<br><!-- End of picture text -->

CAR 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals kAR 6: PFP - Pro-ectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> am ag A<br>.<br>7 tl A *la tlO 9t<br>Yew<br>'OPhOndwe _ 4-A*I<br><!-- End of picture text -->
40 _GJINM_

||DOeit/|-|
|---|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|U6|<br>N/A|7.50|
|87|- 6.20|6<br>8.00|
|**88**|6.40|-10.00|
|89|- 8.60|- 7.70|
||9 6.90|- 8.40|
|91|- S.80|6<br>8.10|
||- 5.30|/A|
||-6.67_||-8.28|

Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|66|N/A|14.00|
|87|12.50|15.60|
|**_88_**|18.30|15.90|
|89|19.50|15.40|
|90|19.80|17.40|
|91|17.60|15.70|
|92|17.00|N/A|
|m.|17.45|1S.67|

|Real Export CUFS Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJ cted<br>Actual|
|**86**<br>N/A<br>5.40|
|871<br>3.60<br>6.70|
|88<br>- 6.80<br>10.40|
|89[<br>7.60<br>5.30|
|90<br>- 2.20<br>- 3.50|
|91<br>2.50<br>0.50|
|92<br>5.00<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>1.62<br>4.18<br>6v.|

||Current Ace<br>|jMtGOP<br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|Vr|ProJected|Actual|Act TOT|
|**86**||-4<br>-. 90|- 4.90|
|67|4.70|-9.40|- 2.30|
|**88**|a4.70||- 6.60|
|89|6*.60.|J.10|7.30|
||- 3.60|. 9.80|7.70|
|91|-10.30|- 9.90|M/A|
|92|-9.10|N/A|MIA|
|Avg.|*6.17|-9.03|0.24|

|Ogm|ectic Sngs<br>POOP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projectee<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>17.80|
|7|13.80<br>14.70|
|88|17.60<br>12.20|
|89|20.00<br>16.40|
|90|20.00<br>15.00|
|91|8.70<br>11.90|
|92|9.40<br>N/A|
||14.92<br>14.67|

<!-- Start of picture text --> Resl GOP Growth Rate<br>Vr ProJ cted Actual<br>86 N/A S.00<br>8? 6.10 2.90<br>as 5.40 5.90<br>89 4.10 3.20<br>4.40 4.30<br>91 4.00 2.40<br>92 5.00 N/A<br>4.63 3.95<br><!-- End of picture text -->

-.
41 Gulnea I - PFP Projectilons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> W t WOMNOM<br>0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>-4~~~~~~~~~~<br>Is es 6s .>7 9 01 02<br>Yew -IP,jbne<br>-Pr.e.tlan +AMtUMe<br><!-- End of picture text --> Guinea 3 - PFP Prolections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 0m av.Mo0P<br>207- -<br>20<br>n 6@7 O' 6' 90 01 02<br>Y"er<br>Gulnea 5 - PFP Projections and Actuals<br>ma Isp. ts o b<br>16<br>*<br>t 7 as f so f D<br>.26<br>Yew.<br>-ftobodwe -1-AstW0<br>-jres: Pr4e,l1ns. .Pa U/U. /M 061.<br>ale * Coty UdefaiWr Taoles S1<br>Jai i; *"<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gulnea 5 - PFP Projections and Actuals Guinea 2 - PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ctm #A"<br>Yew<br>+ADIUe IL TOTa641*Usd<br>TOT Twrm o Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Guinea 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> O.ud 0mINWP<br>C r 0 7 * | 91<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Guinea 6 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> p,smp an _<br>4<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2<br>-<br>YeW<br>_. @rijeU +A<br><!-- End of picture text -->
42

# TOGO

|BudgetOeffct/GOP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual<br>__________|
|86<br>N/A _|<br>8.70|
|87<br>N/A|-9.10|
|U<br>- 3.60|*5.20|
|89<br>*5.10|-6.10|
|90<br>. 4.80|-6.10|
|91<br>* S.10|7.10|
|92<br>-*5.20|N/A|
|vg.<br>*4.56|-7.05|

||Current Ace t|/GP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>_________|Projected<br>_|Actual<br>________Adi.|Act TOT|
|86|<br>N/A|-14.30|-10.10|
|87|N/A|-12.70|4.80|
|**88**|*10.20|-11.80|7.30|
|89|<br>9.40|*4.80|- 5.70|
|90|- 10.20|-13.50|*4.30|
|91|6<br>8.70|*10.30|4.60|
|92|- 9.90|N/A|N/A|
||9.68|-11.23|-6.13|

Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|Projected|Actuat|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|24.00|
|87|N/A|22.20|
|88|20.70|25.20|
|89|21.50|28.80|
|90|23.70|23.'(i|
|91|23.90|19.30|
|92|21.10|N/A|
||22.18|23.7I|

Dorntic Savin /GDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|12.30|
|87|N/A|12.80|
|as|14.80|16.20|
|89|12.80|16.40|
|90|15.30|11.30|
|91|16.30|10.30|
|92|11.30|N/A|
|Av.|14.10|13.2|

|Real Ep|ortGNFS<br>Growth**Rate**|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>12.40|
|87|N/A<br>6.00|
|**88**|2.50<br>17.30|
|89|2.00<br>2.10|
|90|2.40<br>3.70|
|91|3.80<br>6-50|
|92|2.40<br>N/A|
|Avg.|2.62<br>8.00|

**Real** GDP Growth **Rate**

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|1.60|
|87|N/A|0.50|
|U|2.80|6.60|
|89|4.00|3.70|
|90|2.60|0.70|
|91|3.80|-0.10|
|92|2.90|N/A|
|Avg.|3.22|2.17|
43

**-** Togo 1 PFP Projections and Actuals

Togo 2 - PFP Proloctions and **Aotuals** <!-- Start of picture text --> Sudgt O.USI*)IGOP<br>a<br>*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s t 9Y<br>Y gar<br>-ftoletioe -+-AtuW<br>20~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Ouwin Amim/GP<br>-44 .<br>.4__O's___Os___so__of_______Yew_<br>7 00 0 so #I<br>-Piewlieneb +Astl 'WA*%WTOFTq4Qm&<br>TOT Twn rm GT VdoTr<br><!-- End of picture text --> ~~~~~' ' I 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I **Togo** n **3 -** .. **PFP Projections and Actuals** . , <!-- Start of picture text --> .1Os1o so 02060<br>On"z 6 Inv*d*ntiOP 07 SO S 90 St 52<br>Year<br>-Prolltlon +MAtumle<br><!-- End of picture text --> 'sC 4SCo S s 1 * <!-- Start of picture text --> tc<br><!-- End of picture text --> Togo 3 - PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> GOW Ei OW OadinaVOOP<br>he? tuob n0 00 01<br>so ga PrnlAdon *- PFPo 06/90P 0 a/ n<br>Adualh: AORVa COUnlty BIW bb<br>li.t Jon - O*o<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Togo 4 - PFP Pro_ectlons and Actual_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Dm* tlk 0 S&vWq Ndtb So You. O' 9 U, el e 02a<br>YPTr<br>TPrOTtTme d +eOI<br>IC~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*<br>dogo 6 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals<br>Got" Fgb<br>t W 6 0 I #2<br>P eo<br>bat GOP be be<br>- - 4.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
44 KENYA

|udget Doeficit/GOP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actuat<br>-|
|86<br>N/A<br>-4.40|
|87<br>N/A<br>-?.60|
|**so8**<br>NA<br>-6.50|
|89_<br>3.80<br>7.10|
|90<br>- 6.30<br>-7.40|
|91<br>4.30<br>-9.00|
|92<br>-4.10<br>N/A|
|Av. -4.63<br>-7.00|

||Current Accot|mt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual<br>__.|Act TOT<br>Ad.<br>_|
|86|N/A|- 2.60|- 2.60|
|87|N/A|*7.70|- 5.50|
|88|N/A|- 8.00|-7.00|
|89|<br>5.50|*10.00|- 6.30|
|90|- 7.30|- 7.30|- 2.80|
|91|7.10|- 5.80|N/A|
|92|5.50|N/A.|N/|
|Avg.|-6.35|-6.90|-4.84|

|Gross Investment/GDP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Prol cted|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|21.80|
|87<br>_NIA_|24.30|
|a8<br>N7A|25.00|
|89<br>23.30|24.60|
|90<br>24.70|23.70|
|91<br>23.60|20.20|
|92<br>24.80|N/A|
|Avg.<br>24.10|23.27|

|DomsticSavings GDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Pro| cted<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>21.90|
|87<br>N/A<br>19.20|
|88<br>N/A<br>19.80|
|89<br>20.70<br>17.20|
|90<br>20.90<br>18.90|
|91<br>18.20<br>18.80|
|92<br>21.40<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>20.30<br>19.30|

|Real EJ ort GNFS Growth|Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|9.80|
|87<br>N/A|0.90|
|**88**<br>N/A|<br>4.60|
|89<br>6.10|9.20|
|90<br>7.20|17.30|
|91<br>0.60|0.50|
|92<br>16.20|N/A|
|7.23|6.88|

||Real GDP Growth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>7.20|
|87|N/A<br>5.90|
|88|N/A<br>6.00|
|89|5.10<br>4.60|
|90|5.20<br>4.30|
|91|4.00<br>1.70|
|92|5.00<br>N/A|
|[:Q|4.8j<br>4.95|
45 Kenya 2: PFP - Projections and Actual.

Kenya 1: PFP -Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> owmm * 0P<br>-4<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.4<br>o*t 06 es Y r O2<br>~~~~~Yew<br>+M -WA6WTart*T bd<br>TOT a Terms d rade<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> WA DOMstAGP (bse<br>0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>.,<br>-0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1<br>,, is 09 ,,s 07 so 08 8-1 -$J2<br>Yew<br>'Jo"don* +Atul<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> ~P,eMjeUona<br><!-- End of picture text --> Kenya 3: PFP - Projections and Actuals Kenya 4 - PFP Projections and Actual.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 24~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2<br>_a - ; _ _<br>If<br>M SS ea so 0 2<br>Year<br>=Prej.eoen +lAtua<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
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Kenya 5 - PFP Projections and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> &ae bxp.4UP aweS Gov*<br>IO,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I<br>.If~ ~ ~ ~<br>gew . 1<br>uroes: Prqeedlen PPS 07/1. 04930,0". C01/OS<br>Adums £lNOR/OVCo Sldehe<br>Ft Judy i * June So<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Kenya 6: PFP Projections and Actuals

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46 UGANDA

|**ludget**Deflcft/GOP<br>tnij ludfngorants_||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|-6.70|
|87<br>-7.70|-4.70|
|88<br>-4.00|*6.60|
|89<br>-3.90|*6.80|
|90<br>-5.70|-8.60|
|91<br>*6.50<br>|-10.60|
|92L<br>6.40|-6.80|
|L-5|.**7**0<br>- .35|

|Gross Investment/GOP|=|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|9.80|
|87<br>12.00|11.60|
|88<br>16.00|10.50|
|89<br>18.00|10.20|
|90<br>12.20|11.20|
|91<br>14.70|12.00|
|92<br>15.30|N/A|
|14.58|11.10|

|Resl Export GNFS Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>2.40|
|87<br>-14.70<br>2.50|
|**8a**<br>13.50<br>* 4.10|
|89<br>17.30<br>1.10|
|90<br>15.60<br>-3.70|
|91<br>15.30<br>-8.30|
|92<br>17.50<br>N/A|
|9.40<br>-2.50|

# Current Account/COP

|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|---|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-1.60|-1.90|
|87<br>-3.30|-4.40|-7.80|
|88<br>*4.70|-8.60|-6.90|
|89<br>-4.90|-7.50|*6.60|
|90<br>*9.80|-11.90|-5.10|
|91<br>-10.40|_<br>13.j0|N/A|
|92<br>-10.40|N/A|_NI_|
|-6.62|<br>-9.12||

|Domestfc Savings/GDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>6.90|
|87<br>5.20<br>6.10|
|88<br>7.10<br>3.90|
|89<br>8.20<br>2.20|
|90<br>-3.20<br>-0.90|
|91<br>3.50<br>-1.10|
|92<br>4.60<br>N/A|
|Av5<br>44S.<br>2.04|

|Real GOP Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>0.60|
|87<br>3.90<br>6.70|
|88<br>5.40<br>7.60|
|89<br>5.10<br>7.30|
|90<br>6.30<br>4.00|
|91<br>5.00<br>4.10|
|92<br>5.00<br>4.10|
|5.12<br>5.63|
47 Uganda 1: PFP- Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> llal9 D.mi*)/ODP<br>-21 -4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-<br>4 -%<br>4 / \-<br>as or so so_ so of 92<br>Year<br>-Proie.onUm +Aflus<br><!-- End of picture text --> Uganda 2: PFP - Projections and Actualb <!-- Start of picture text --> cm.. a..voo<br>*24\<br>~~~~~~~~~4<br>SO<br>Yso r s DI sa<br>e Y e TOT a4ui<br>TOT * Trrmo 1"udal<br><!-- End of picture text -->

*4-

U Uganda 3: PFP- Prooctjons and Actuals Uganda 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> In .u.fVGD ,e.<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 8 or ee oY r oo<br>R"l fxlwfl OllF 11_* fb<br>20<br>so 67 66 St so el 02<br>roje.eti.n- +AoIu.le<br>S ur Prclena g a PF - 00/0, P P 80oe osPoa7<br>Aluals: MOROtlContry Brlof<br>July 1 Juno O 16 - -e<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Y92r<br>_ O<br>of ST t 9 *0 el 92<br>vwr<br>-A<br><!-- End of picture text -->
.48 BURUNDI

|ludbet<br>DOeficit/G|OP|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|- 7.10|
|87<br>N/A|-16.80|
|88<br>*9.70|-11.20|
|89<br>- 8.20|- 9.60|
|90<br>- 6.40|-13.40|
|91<br>- 9.00|*12.40|
|92<br>*10.30|<br>-13.20|
|Avg.<br>-8.72|<br>-11.96|

||Current Acco|unt/GOP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|<br>N/A|*11.40|<br>-11.40|
|87|<br>N/A|-17.80|<br>-12.90|
|88|-17.60|<br>-14.40|<br>-10.30|
|89|<br>-21.30|-13.10|<br>- 7.60|
|90|<br>*20.30|<br>-20.80|<br>-15.10|
|91|<br>-16.60|<br>-18.10|<br>-12.60|
|92|<br>*20.70|<br>22.SO|<br>N/A|
|Avg.|<br>-19.30|<br>-16.87|<br>-11.65|

# Gross Investment/GDP

|<br>Yr|<br>ProJected|_<br>Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|11.70|
|87|N/A|22.70|
|_U|19.00|15.00|
|89|21.00|16.70|
|90|21.00|17.70|
|91|19.00|16.20|
|92|17.00|18.50|
|Avg.|19.40|16.93|

|Do|mesticSavings/CDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>1.20|
|87|N/A<br>6.90|
|88|6.20<br>1.60|
|89|5.10<br>4.40|
|90|5.50<br>-2.60|
|91|1.90<br>-2.80|
|92|3.50<br>N/A|
|Avg.|4.44<br>1.24|

# Rel Export GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr1|.<br>ProJected|<br>Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-13.10|
|87 _||6.80|
|as|4.70|10.50|
|89|4.60|2.90|
|90|6.00|4.80|
|91|22.00|21.50|
|92|17.00|- 1.90|
|_ _ Av=.|10.86|3.67|

Real GDP Growth Rate

|Yr<br>Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|3.30|
|87<br>N/A|5.50|
|U<br>4.10|4.90|
|89<br>4.50|1.50|
|90<br>4.50|3.50|
|91<br>3.30|5.00|
|92<br>4.00|4.00|
|Av.<br>4.08|3.96|
**40**

Burundi 1: PFP - Projectlons and A*tuals <!-- Start of picture text -->
*<br>_2_  _ _  _  _  _  _2<br>Y*w  ~ ~  ~<br>-Pmeoens  4 A.tsm<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Burundl 3: PFP - Projections and Actuate <!-- Start of picture text --> M . D* ~ijt-.<br>aI _ I2<br>- 1 06 SO SO St 03<br>Yer<br>- +MIaelo U<br><!-- End of picture text --> Burundl 5. PFP Projectlons and Actuahe <!-- Start of picture text --> &a &pt aw anw " " "<br>-.. ,-: , .'4't -<br>Y, .<br>~Pvft 1m +Aoj4ft -<br>Srn,. Pef dlens- PPPS U/SI. _1/.040<br>Adude. ANO MEW/sAUuY BdeW<br>Pt J.m D* Deeoww+A<br><!-- End of picture text --> Burundi 2: PFP - Prolojtions and Aotuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 4<br>of ea__<br>~ ~ -" +t WAWTQ t *4uobd<br>TOT * of Tr*l<br>Burundl 4<br>PFP Projections and Actuals<br>S<br>4o\\D<br>S O. 6? 55 5 05 St 02<br>Yew<br>-Projetei +Aeluai.<br>Burundl 6: PFP - Prolections and Actuals<br>660<br>YeW<br><!-- End of picture text --> Burundl 6: PFP - Prolections and Actuals
50

# MADAGASCAR

|Bude fict/GP_||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86 _<br>N/|-3.50|
|87<br>N/A|-3.40|
|88I<br>2.50|-3.30|
|89<br>4.90|-5.10|
|90<br>-6.'|-4.80|
|91<br>-4.80|-10.40|
|92<br>-2.90|N/|
|A!2.<br>-4.38|-5.08|

||Current Accu|nt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|<br>N/A|-8.30|-8.30|
|87|<br>N/A|-10.00|-5.60|
|88|<br>-10.20|*10.80|-6.60|
|89|- 9.30|-8.80|-2.30|
|90|*16.90|-12.90|-4.80|
|91|<br>-13.30|-11.40|-4.70|
|92|<br>-10.40|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-12.02|-10.37|-5.38|

Gross Investment/GDP

|rossnvesmen<br>Yr<br>Projected|_tic<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|13.40|
|...........<br>J.t<br>~<br>N/A|9.40|
|88<br>13.70|9.50|
|89<br>13.80'|8.40|
|90<br>20.30|11.40|
|91<br>17.30|4.50|
|92<br>15.40<br>|N/A|
|Av9i.<br>16.10|LL9.43L|

|Dom|_<br>SavirgvFGDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>6.50|
|87|N/A<br>5.50|
|as|9.80<br>6.00|
|89|11.50<br>6.20|
|90|8.20<br>4.00|
|91|8- 30<br>-0.40|
|92|8.30<br>N/A|
||9.22,<br>4.63|

|RealEx rtGNFS Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>-1.80|
|87<br>N/A<br>4.90|
|**a8**<br>5.00<br>8.20|
|89<br>8.60<br>16.90|
|12.10<br>12.00|
|91<br>10.70<br>4.80|
|92<br>10.70<br>N/A|
|-9.42<br>4.77|

|RealGDPGrowth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>2.00|
|87<br>N/A<br>1.20|
|88<br>3.20<br>3.40|
|89<br>3.40<br>4.10|
|90<br>4.50<br>3.10|
|91<br>4.60<br>-6.30|
|92<br>4.70<br>N/A|
|4.08<br>1.25|

9.42 4 77 A - - -~~~_
5) <!-- Start of picture text --> Madagascar 1<br>PFP - Projections and Actuals<br>.t~~so Is so to<br>Year<br>-Pjine +AsI.I<br><!-- End of picture text --> Madagascar 3 PFP - Projections and Actualb <!-- Start of picture text --> Ymr<br>Gi. ImNVO<br>=lbnodw +~t<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**c** -, -

<!-- Start of picture text --> Madagascar S<br>PFP Projectlons and Actualb Year<br>Pr.jseUatl@ +MIum<br>PFr*WoP P Projti 04 071 an. Actw<br>MoRmftw" f J<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Madagascar 2<br>PFP - Projectlons and Actuals<br>W0er<br>-tPmiblw +AWMI '*AeWTOT vebd<br>TOT * Trms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Madagascar 4<br>PFP Projections and Actual.<br>Year<br>*it e vfgGO<br>-Proetbn= -4 AOId<br>_ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 _<br>Madagascar 6<br>PFP -Projections Year and Actuals<br>Prje.Ihae tuaule 4<br>P<br>C - +<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# ZAIRE

|8udo,t Defictt/GDP_||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|.11.80|
|87<br>-16.30|-13.90|
|88<br>-13.80|-22.40|
|89<br>-16.10|-16.00|
|90<br>-1S.10|-16.00|
|91<br>-12.90|N/A|
|92<br>*11 80|N|
|_ Avg.<br>-15.33|*17.08|

|Gross Investment/GDP|
|---|

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|_N/A_|13.20|
|87|18.10|14.20|
|UI|18.50|14.40|
|89|13.40|14.60|
|90|13.50|11.50|
|91|14.00|_N/A_|
|92|14.50|N/S|
|Avg.|15.88|13.68|

# Real EJ ort GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-6.00|
|87|-5.20|5.60|
|88|1.80|4.00|
|89|2.50|-3.20|
|90|6.90|9.30|
|91|4.90|N/A|
|92|4.50|N/A|
|Avg.|1.50|-0.73|

||Curront Aeccu|t/GOP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|N/A|*7.00|-7.00|
|87|-15.90|-8.30|-9.00|
|**88**|-16.20|*6.00|*10.50|
|89|-14.50|-6.40|-7.50|
|90|-18.40|-13.20|*16.60|
|91|-16.70|N/A|N/A|
|92|-15.10|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-16.25|-8.48||

|D<br>__<br>I|.<br>restIe<br>SavingsGCDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Pro acted<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>13.90|
|87|12.30<br>12.20|
|as|12.90<br>12.20|
|89|11.20<br>11.90|
|90|8.50<br>11.90|
|91|10.00<br>N/A|
|92|41.50<br>_N/A_|
|A|11.23<br>12.05|

|Real GOP Growth Rate|
|---|

|Yr<br>Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|4.70|
|87<br>3.00|2.70|
|**a8**<br>3.50|0.60|
|89<br>3.30|-2.00|
|90<br>3.S0|-1.90|
|91<br>3.70|N/A|
|92<br>4.00|N/A|
|3.33<br>_|<br>0.15|
53 Zalre 1 - PFP Prolectlons and Actuals Zaire 2 - PFP Prolections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> b<br>.. ____________________________________ so~~~~~~~~~ U<br>YNew<br>P*tbln +stale<br>PFP Projectlons and Actuals<br>am"<br>or 9 o 9,0 SI 92 1<br>0 's Yeaf "I -'7<br>-t*OIUn +MtUI*<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> .4i , _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*4<br>6I 07 so so s of 02<br>r1 'few1<br>-Poo"tm.e +*ugu* *A.hml.TOTedju*d<br>TOT a Twrms d Trade<br>Zalre 4 - PFP Projections and Actual.<br>4.<br>60 @ G 01 02<br>O' Year , I<br>-P1.e.N +*i umi.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Zaire 3 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals

- Zaire 5 PFP Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> heel IzWA O"Si hem<br>4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>' S r o~n o M 012*<br>You<br>Admim *DNinr/@.uCy Sulo<br>Pr Ja D+ .<br>_ ._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Zaire 6 PFP Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> heel amGM" OuSemo<br>I .<br>4 . . . . . I<br><!-- End of picture text -->
44 GHANA

|udsetDeficit/GOP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|-5.50|
|87<br>-2.80|*4.70|
|**s88**<br>3.20|*5.10|
|89<br>-2.90|-4.70|
|90<br>-2.70|*5.40|
|91<br>*4.50|4.30|
|92<br>-4.70|N/A|
|Avg.<br>*3.22|'..84|

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|9.60|
|87|N/A|13.30|
|**88**|16.00|14.20|
|89|14.70|15.50|
|90|18.00|16.00|
|_<br>91|16.90|16.50|
|92|17.80|N/A|
||16.40||

Real Export GUFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prol eted|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|**86**|N/A|S0.50|
||N/A|-3.80|
|as|8.50|11.10|
|89|21.60|11.40|
|90|7.00|6.80|
|91|12.80|14.90|
|92|6.70|N/A|
||12.48|11.05|

||CurrentAccu|nt/GOP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|<br>J/A|-2.90|*2.90|
|67|N/A|-4.30|-2.20|
|as|-3.10|-5.00|-1.60|
|s9|-3.40|-1.10|-5.60|
|90|-5.10|-7.60|-2.20|
|91|*4.50|-6.10|N/A|
|92|-3.320|.<br>/A|..<br>A|
||-3.33|-4.88||

|'orestte<br>Savings GDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>8.00|
|87<br>MIA<br>7.20|
|**86**<br>12.90<br>8.30|
|89<br>11.30<br>7.90|
|90<br>13.10<br>6.10|
|91<br>14.30<br>8.10|
|92<br>15.00<br>/|
|12.90<br>7.60|

||**Real**GOPGrowth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Pro ected<br>Actual|
|**86**|.<br>l/A<br>5.20|
|ST|<br>t/A<br>4.80|
|**8s**|6.00<br>5.60|
|89|<br>5.00<br>5.10|
|90|4.80<br>3.20|
|91|4.50<br>5.10|
|92|5.00<br>N/A|
|vg.|<br>5.08<br>4.75|

**me**
55 Ghana 1: PFP **-** Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Bmdpg.ellof.IM(P<br>ci i4aD<br>.1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4<br>'2 - O~ ._ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S -<br>-1 1 a<br>4<br><!-- End of picture text --> '~~~~~~ **-X** Ghana 3: PFP - Projections and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> Pvj.fr<br>Ows Ir..eVO S'S0I' I<br>-Pre,feede +,ee<br>o<br>40~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Ghana 2: PFP **-** Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ounsd W..inVOo 3.gA'u *11WO soon*<br>C _flP t lb_<br>Oa<br>P' ,;w -AT .<br>-S''' o<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4,<br>Ghana 4 - PFP Projections and Actuala<br>OTuTr. rd verg<br>Ua .u.e PmjI2 r tbli.guIGOP o M o 9ot 92<br>-Prel"tone +Aolues<br>r<br><!-- End of picture text --> Ghana 4 - PFP Projections and Actuala el~~~~~~~~~~~~6 Ghana 3 - PFP Projectlons and Actual.

<!-- Start of picture text -->
*  67  66  60Mon  00NW<br>Yew<br>tle  rUncim " - 01/r1.  091@.  1/".  10<br>Atuob  ANCRIM  dr  .<br>PT  Jon  Doe<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Ghana 6: PFP Projections and Actuali <!-- Start of picture text --> of026 0 e76l0 O 02<br>0 o16<br>Yer<br>Py rridft<br>-O<br><!-- End of picture text -->
56 CUII@l-t -

|BudgetDeffcit/UP<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>NLA|-1l6.00|
|87<br>N/A|-3.00|
|88<br>j/A|j0.60<br>.L|
|as<br>-3.6|-6.40|
|°.0<br>2.3|1.50|
|91<br>-1.6|5.30|
|92<br>-0.3|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-1.50|-5.54|

Gross Invtm/DP

|Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|
|66<br>N/A|24.30|
|87<br>27.20|33.30|
|as<br>23.90|34.20|
|89<br>15.70|34.30|
|90<br>15.40|24.70|
|91<br>15.20|27.10|
|92<br>s15.00|N/A|
|18.73|2965|

|Real Exp|ort G)NS GrowthRate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|**86**|N/A<br>10.60|
|or|24.00<br>21.50|
|es|15.30<br>8.50|
|e9|21.80<br>4.20|
|90|11.10<br>75.00|
|91|9.50<br>-8.90|
|92|9.10<br>N/A|
||15.13<br>16.48|

|Currenit A cm|/GOP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|Act ToT<br>~~~~~~~~Adl.|
|86<br>N/A||-os50.80|
|r?<br>-.<br>30|-33.80|-35.00|
|*13.10|4.90|-46.00|
|89<br>-15.50..|49.20|-55.30|
|90<br>t<br>0||-25**.**3**0**<br>36 1|
|9L<br>-13.40|-36.10|N/A|
|92<br>.11jR|N/A|N/A|
|vg.<br>-13.57|40.90|-4.64|

|M<br>M<br>tic Savft<br>U|rsP|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|**86**<br>N/A|*1.30|
|r<br>-0.90|20.50|
|-1.10|-24.60|
|8s<br>0.00|-7.90|
|90<br>2.00|-4.20|
|91<br>.0.90||
|92<br>N/A|N/A|
|Av.<br>_0.76_|-11.23|

Resl **UOP** Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|e6|N/A|-1.00|
|67|4.70|6.00|
|so|2.80|6.60|
|69|5.10|5.00|
|90|4.50|3.00|
|91|4.40|3.10|
|92|4.50|JN/A|
|A.33||3.82|
57 <!-- Start of picture text --> Gulnea Bissau 1<br>PFP Projectlons and Actualt<br>= *e -<br>x«~~~~~~~~~S 62<br>'ew<br>-pral"U Go"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1+ Totuma<br>40~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~4<br>U9 0? O 5 U t 5<br>Gulnea Bissau 3<br>PFP Projections and Actuals<br>.. _____,______\_/ ui sn soau 3<br>2 . .4<br>PFP Projections and Actuats<br>U 7 55 SO St 52<br>Yost<br>40C- -r.Je.I. +~Ijf<br><!-- End of picture text --> U <!-- Start of picture text --> Guinea Blsaau 5<br>P't~ ~ ~ Jo *ao<br>$WeeM Pr4FPtIen8 . Pte 1 /P04P nd<br>Aduie Idl s ANOU/Cewn1v<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Gulnea Bissau 2<br>PFP Projectlons and Actuals<br>C--<br>n so so0<br>' e w<br>.- - ""- , O-T°<br>TOT 0 Trm of Trade<br>q~~~~~~~~~~4 _ *<br>e<br>Guinea Bissau 4<br>PFP Projections and Actual*<br>uie s u<br>.1C<br>PFP Projections and Actuate<br>U I7 N U U SI P<br>Year<br>-Pt.*eU.m +A.uIeX<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4<br>Guinea Blauw 6<br>C,~~~~~~~O<br>Yew<br><!-- End of picture text -->
58 GANBIA

|**BudbtDeffcIt/GDP**<br>Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-18.50|
|8r<br>-17.50|-16.80|
|**88**<br>- 8.20|4.10|
|89<br>- 6.00|- 8.20|
|90<br>* 3.70|- 4.10|
|91<br>- 2.20|- 4.10|
|92<br>2.00|N A|
|Avg.<br>*6.60||

||Current**Aecou**<br>|**nt/GDP**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|<br>N/A|-20.70|*30.10|
|8r|-31.60|-16.10|-21.50|
|**88**|-28.10|.13.10|.18.10|
|89|-21.10|-18.10|-12.30|
|90|-14.80|-13.20|7<br>r.90|
|91|-13.90|-13.00|- 9.40|
|92|<br>-16.70|N/A|N/A|
|A9.30<br>vg.|<br>-21.03|-15.70|.16.55|

|Gross Investment/GDP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected.|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|19.60|
|87<br>N/A|15.50|
|**88**<br>18.70|17.60|
|89<br>21.00|20.60|
|90<br>19.00|19.30|
|91<br>19.10|19.00|
|92<br>19.20|N/A|
|Avg.<br>19.40|18.60|

|flmt|ic<br>Savl<br>**s/GDP**|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>8.60|
|87|7.40<br>6.40|
|a8|7.40<br>10.10|
|89|7.10<br>8.00|
|so|14.10<br>3.60|
|91|14.70<br>7.90|
||9.60<br>N/A|
|Avg.|10.05<br>8.27|

|Real**Exp**|**ort**GNFS Growth R|ate||**RealGDP**Growth|**Rate**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Yr**|Prol cted|Actual|Yr|Prolacted|Actual|
|86|N/A|- 5.30|86|N//A|2.80|
|S8T|N|/A|3.70|or|*<br>/A|1.70|
|**88**|5.70|- 7.50|**88**|**3.40**|**4.30**|
|**69**|6.50|14.90|89|3.60|5.20|
|90|4.90|-24.30|.<br>90|4.50|**2.30**|
|91|4.50|2.70|91|4.50|4.00|
|92|4.90|N/A|92|4.50|N/A|
|_Av._|L.30|_-2.63_|Avg.4.10||3.8|
_39_ Gambia 1: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ohdgt bbI*Y00<br>-1<br>.4<br>*20<br>ofs 7 so DI ea .4<br>Y u<br>p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>-FrWeUaen +Atolu<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gambia 3: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.<br>0 07 oO 00 00 I 02<br>Ywr<br>-Pvej..tne +Aatush<br>0eX-~~~~~~~<br>V<br>Gambia S : PFP Projections and Actuals<br>20<br>W 0? 00 so 00 so01 00 0I<br>Yew<br>-Pre"loe 4tA8s tude<br>uro: Prdn. PFPco i , 10m. i live.i8. 0s<br>Adushs - .ry MO.un Bv.dtn<br>July I . June 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gambia S : PFP Projections and Actuals Gambia 2: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> OUU. m.m<br>4<br>SC We So _<br>Ne<br>TOT a Terms of Traed<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gambia 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> 1<br>*0Yn *o o2 ------<br>Yew<br>u4- TAt,a -TOTe<br>14-<br>X -<br>~~~~~~~~2<br>Gambia 6: PFP -<br>00.07 12<br>' li s o,t*<br>Yew<br>P<br>__egs 4-ea<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> ~~~~~~~~2<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gambia 6: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals
60 MALI

|BudgetDefIcIt/GOP<br>-||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>1/A|-11.90|
|87T<br>N/A|*10.20|
|88<br>N/A|*10.30|
|89<br>- 7.80|-9.80|
|90<br>. 9.00|.8.50|
|91<br>-13.70|-12.00|
|92<br>*10.70|**A|
|Avg.<br>-10.30|-10.45|

|Gross Investment/GOP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|23.00|
|87<br>NA|23.00|
|88<br>N/A|20.10|
|89<br>17.40|21.00|
|90<br>21.00i|22.20|
|91<br>23.50<br>|22.50|
|92<br>22.404|N/A|
|Avg.<br>21.08j|21.97|

|Real Ex ort GNFSGrowthRate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Pro ected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>14.60|
|87<br>N/A<br>3.20|
|88<br>N/A<br>-2.90|
|89<br>2.80<br>17.70|
|90<br>10.00<br>3.70|
|91<br>13.60<br>-15.10|
|92<br>3.00<br>N/A|
|Av.<br>-7.35<br>3.53|

|-<br>Yr|Current Aecot<br>._<br>__<br>Projected|at/GDP<br> <br>_<br>Actual|=-<br>Act TOT|
|---|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-21.90|-23.50|
|87|N/A|*15.30|-19.60|
|**88**|N/A|*17.00|-19.20|
|89|-16.80|-14.40|-15.90|
|90|-15.00|-14.70|-18.60|
|91|-16.30|.13.70|-11.60|
|92|-13.70|I/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-15.45|-16.17|-19.36|

|Domestic_Savng_sGOP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>1.20|
|87<br>N/A<br>6.00|
|88<br>N/A<br>2.409|
|89<br>0.10<br>4.90|
|90<br>5.00<br>5.60|
|91<br>5.30<br>6.00|
|92<br>6.40<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>4.20<br>4.35|

||RealGOP GrowthRate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>16.10|
|87|N/A<br>-2.40|
||Ns<br>_/A_<br>0.20|
|89|5.00<br>7.50|
|90_|<br>0.00<br>2.40|
|91|0.80<br>-0.20|
|92|5.90<br>N/A]|
|An.|2.93<br>3.93|
61 Mall I . PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text -->
-44<br>4o<br>41 .14 - *  -f  ,<br>.11  ~  ~  Os  Is$11<br>06 0?  00  00  U  t  0;tY2<br>Yewr<br>-<br>bng +AOSNIS<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Mall 3 - PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ge... .avUuaVGDP<br>20 t @0 @0 9.2<br>S 1<br>Y"r<br>- Prejdton +A1umls<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mall 5 - PFP Projec¢tons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> IS N<br>C.s I<br>20 ~~~ew<br>FV.I n Doeo<br>~Pv*lseee +AshrnOt<br>Souoem Predlon . PFPIO 12190,1 . 07/<br>Adualo. *NOAOVCeu* ddfs<br>P! J.-. Dee;l<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mall 2 - PFP ProjectIons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text -->
*10<br>-'  n<br>e<br>-1Mjete  +Aotw*e  1 - 4 A  TOT .4usd<br>TOT * Trms  Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Mall 4 - PFP ProjectIons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Dem*ak &vIq.VODP<br>E . 1 §<br>C~I' Ss 0<br>Yew<br>Pjectlee. +4Atuue<br>-<br>Mall 6 PFP Projections and Actuals<br>'-X<br>.<br>U 0? 00 02 S 02<br>Yea<br>+8|<br><!-- End of picture text -->
62

# MAURITANIA

|u<br>Oet Deficit/GO||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|1.50|
|87<br>3.30|0.00|
|so<br>4.30|-1.10|
|89<br>5.70|-5.20|
|90<br>0.00|-0.80|
|91<br>-4.TO|1.70|
|92<br>-3.00|N/A|
|-v.<br>1.72|-1.08|

||Current Acea|/DP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|N/A|-35.00|-36.70|
|87|*16.30|-28.60|-28.10|
|**88**|*14.20|*22.30|-28.90|
|89|-13.10|-14.50|-40.10|
|90|-15.50|-22.50|-32.50|
|91|-9.80|-14.40|-21.60|
|92|-7.90|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-13.78|-20.46||

# Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr<br>Projected|_<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|30.60|
|87<br>20.70|31.50|
|88<br>22.80|23.20|
|89<br>13.50|18.80|
|90<br>16.10|19.90|
|91<br>15.80|16.10|
|9<br>q2X<br>22.70|N/A|
|Ag.<br>1. 78|21.|

|D_<br>C.m|i tfe**Saving**GOP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>7.70|
|87|15.20<br>14.20|
|88|17.20<br>11.40|
|89|9.80<br>12.60|
|90|12.10<br>5.50|
|91|13.20<br>8.20|
|92|9.40<br>N/|
|Ag|13.50<br>10.38|

|Reat ExportGNFSGrowth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>5.10|
|87<br>13.40<br>1.40|
|as<br>6.40<br>-0.40|
|89<br>4.20<br>**3.90**|
|90<br>5.10<br>-2.20|
|91<br>4.60<br>-6.60|
|92<br>3.20<br>N/A|
|6.74<br>-0.78|

|Real GOP Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Pro ected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>5.70|
|87<br>3.30<br>1.90|
|**8a**<br>4.00<br>1.70|
|89<br>3.50<br>4.80|
|90<br>3.60<br>-1.80|
|91<br>**3.80**<br>2.60|
|92<br>2.40<br>N/A|
|v.<br>3.41.84|
63

# Mauritania 1 PFP - Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> 9t DU*P.UE/00DP<br>4 \'0<br>4~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>. . T . .<br>00 5? so so 90 St 0<br>Yea<br>PrvoUone I+ utl<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mauritania 3 PFP - Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> al.. Inv*ttmnVODP<br>20'~~~ -~\<br>10<br>- O* S 50 0@ S0<br>Yeer<br>-Proj..uone 4-Acuag<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mauritania 5 PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ned Ezp t .IX Q.. Neb<br>t 7 so so<br>r-P 4/. 10/;7.<br>AdSom- ANORUCndr Bl<br>". July I 1 June300<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Mauritania 2<br>PFP- Projections and Actuals<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Cmntc AW~UG<br>60 0? S0 00 s S2 90<br>Yer<br>-P#telbIler +-A, * ual emATOT*4uabd0<br>TOT a Term d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mauritania 4 PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> D tvqboIfDP<br>ST OS 559 90 91 02<br>Yer<br>PrJ.iton 4 A.Ielale<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mauritania 6 PFP - Projections and Actual.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Ne GO DPG<br>/e<br>_-/5 Yew<br><!-- End of picture text -->
64 NIGER

|Bud tDetfcit/GD,||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|-9.20|
|87<br>N/A|- 9.50|
|88<br>N/A|-10.00|
|89<br>-9.80|-10.30|
|90<br>*9.30|-10.60|
|91<br>-8.80|-4.00|
|92<br>-8.50<br>|N/A|
|A.<br>-9.30|-8.30|

|_<br>|Current Accou<br>|nt/G0P<br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|N/A|-7.80|-6.60|
|87|<br>N/A|-9.90|-10.40|
|88|N/A|-9.50|*6.3D,|
|89|-11.60|-10.40|-5.90|
|90|<br>-11.40|-11.10|*4.50|
|91|<br>-10.60|-7.20|-4.00|
|92|-10.10|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-11.20|-9.57||

|Gross|Investment/GOP<br>_||
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Proj cted|Actual|
|86|N/A|13.30|
|87|N/A|10.50|
|88|N/A|19.80|
|89|13.80|12.30|
|90|11.00|12.80|
|91|10.80|7.20|
|92|11.20|N/A|
|Avg.|<br>11.87|10.77|

|D<br>omestic Savings/GDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>7.90|
|87<br>N/A<br>-<br>8.00|
|88<br>_N/A_<br>18.70|
|89<br>6.50<br>9.10|
|90<br>3.70<br>8.70|
|91<br>4.00<br>6.50|
|92<br>4.40<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>4.73<br>8.10|

|Real Export GNFS Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86<br>_NIA_<br>2.70|
|87<br>N/A<br>9.10|
|as<br>N/A<br>-1.90|
|89<br>4.00<br>2.90|
|90<br>15.30<br>0.00|
|91<br>8.20<br>-0.90|
|92<br>3.40<br>N/A|
|9.17<br>0.67|

||Real GOP Growth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>4.50|
|87|N/A<br>-3.60|
|88|N/A<br>5.60|
|89|5.10<br>0.20|
|90|3.10<br>-1.80|
|91|<br>3.10<br>1.90|
|92|3.20<br>N/A|
|Avg.|3.77<br>0.10|

=~~~~~~~~~~~~,
65 Nlgwr 1: PFP - Projectlons and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> .4 .<br>4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1<br>.11 -- -<br>*~., *P 60 6r6o<br>r e ~~~~o $I la<br>VON<br>-Pr.efOUM +taue<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**XP.jebn**

Nlgor 3: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 01.4. 1 G O' s o GO M<br>21<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> I-C G~~~P.eUe + AIulPo.tMe+euI-_ -.....--<br>Niger 5 - PFP Projections and Actuals<br>NIe 5-PPPoetin Pt Jt- _Pw0Vest n cuasNgr6<br>Ai p USwAb<br>&a gxWW t<br>4.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-<br>Oes'rm ProiedIons. WPm 07*0. ili IO. 1037V.<br>Adudsm *DRD/C&Aauy idel.<br>Jo ju D* Deeeleen<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Nlger_ 2: PFP - Projections and Aotuial <!-- Start of picture text --> o so<br>Year<br>+A.Is *Aow Tar e4uvAd<br>TOT trms e d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Nlgor 4 - PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> .2 * 9 s0o t G9<br><!-- End of picture text --> . Niger 6: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> .<br>FP-Poeton Vee n cui<br>w P . w<br>Yw<br>+'oj<br><!-- End of picture text -->
.66 SENEGAL

|udnetDefcift/(3P<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-3.60|
|87<br>-0.90|-2.30|
|88<br>-0.20|2.50|
|89<br>0.20|-4.00|
|90<br>-2.60|-4.20|
|91<br>0.10|0.20|
|92<br>1.30|NA|
|Avg.<br>3S|-2.34|

____

|-|Current Acco|t/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT<br>~~~|
|86|N/A|*12.10|-11.90|
|8?|10.30|-11.60|-12.90|
|**88**|<br>8.60|-10.80|-10.90|
|89|<br>.8.20|-9.80|.10.00|
|90|.7.90|*7.50|-8.50|
|91|-7.20|-7.90|N/|
|92|-6.20|N/L|N/A|
|Avg.|-1.77|-8.53||

# Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|11.70|
|87|13.70|12.40|
|88|13.80|12.70|
|89<br>|14.00<br>|12.70|
|90L|<br>15.20|13.30|
|91|12.90|13.70|
|92|12.30|12.40|
||13.65|12.70|

|_'omestfcSlaevingGDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actuat|
|86<br>N/A<br>6.30|
|87<br>8.60<br>6.90|
|88<br>10.70<br>7.90|
|89<br>10.50<br>7.50|
|90<br>10.20<br>8.60|
|91<br>9.20<br>8.80|
|92<br>9.40<br>7.50|
|Avg.<br>9.77<br>-.64|

# Real Export GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Pro ected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|15.20|
|8?|11.80|1.50|
|as|7.30|5.00|
|**89**|7.80|-3.00|
|90T|1.40|-1.20|
|91|7.90|2.40|
|92|7.60<br>_|5.30|
||7.24|3.60|

||Real GOP Growth Rat,|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>4.60|
|87|<br>4.30<br>4.00|
|as|3.70<br>5.10|
|89|<br>3.80<br>-0.40|
|90|4.60<br>4.50|
|91|1.30<br>1.20|
|92|5.10<br>2.40|
|An.|3.54<br>**3. 066**|
67 Senegal 1: PFP Projections and Aetuals <!-- Start of picture text --> bit ... t.P<br>.1 . -1.".1<br>4 -.<br>-3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Y-<br>-~~~~~e<br>0;Y S' S'sXe soem SFtI UO<br>FProjethne +Mtuols<br><!-- End of picture text --> Senegal 3: PFP - Projections and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.. 1_duVGP _..I<br>4- ., -, _ ,<br>4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>O' SO .0 M @@ 92 *<br>Yeor<br>-hoelJmte +-I aIProJboon,<br><!-- End of picture text --> Senegal 5 - PFP Proljetlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> s.. I.,ioWe am . ___ raftp<br>t2<br>I~~. -f*wm iPWVSt<br>IC,. t 1S WM - loi . l<br>4V .y I - U~_fW 57 2 SO SO 5tEt0 St S<br>"Ue MOMCW ode 0 t§_<br>ew.e: roedew 1WP 11U.10/U *ISZ.f0 101U<br>PF JuI 1 .JuneSO<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Senegal 2: PFP Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> tnn A...OP<br>;<br>pfJo.eA.SI"~a ? e4ubd*<br>Now<br>TOT Terms Trrde<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Senegal 4 PFP Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> D _aiVXP<br>.. - ,_____ _,~~C<br>2<br>5I 4, * S' go Sf 02<br>Y_r<br>+Aotue<br><!-- End of picture text --> Senegal 6: PFP - Proljctlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> .<br>l<br>C/ _P<br>.t .<br>Yer<br>P,..u.. +Aulu<br><!-- End of picture text -->
68

# LESOTHO

|BudgetDeficft/GCP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|-11.90|
|87<br>N/A|-13.60|
|**88**<br>N/A|-19.80|
|89<br>-14.30|-16.60|
|90<br>-11.<br>60|7.70|
|91<br>- 2.20|- 1.00|
|92<br>- 1.20|-0.90|
|Av.<br>-7.33|*10.21|

|Gross<br>.<br>-|Investment/GDP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|86|N/A|45.40|
|87|NMA|44.90|
|88|_NA|58.00|
|89|18.40|33.00|
|90|18.80|40.80|
|91|53.30|45.80|
|92|48.80|58.90|
|Avg.|4.83|46.69|

Real E port GNFS Growth Rate _Re1

|Yr|Proljcted|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|6.10|
|87|N/A|35.10|
|**8**I|N/A|24.90|
|89|10.00|51.40|
|90|10.00|*13.80|
|91|-8.20|-17.20|
|92|10.00|4.10|
||5.45|12.94|

||Current Accou|nt/CDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|N/A|.30.2|-30.2|
|87|<br>N/A|-14.5|-13.1|
|**88**|N/A|-37.1|-31.3|
|89|<br>*10.3|-22.20|-25.9|
|90|<br>- 9.5|*24.20|-50.7|
|91|*37.7|-36.20|N/A|
|92|32.1|-"4.50|N/A|
||-22.40|-29.84||

|DomcstfcSavJ s/G<br>.-<br>.-|OP|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|8.00|
|87<br>N/A|12.00|
|a8<br>N/A|8.90|
|69<br>14.60|10.80|
|90<br>15.50|15.90|
|91<br>14.60|9.60|
|92<br>16.60|14.40|
|Av.<br>15.38|11.37|

||GDPGrowth R|ate|
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected|Actu l|
|86|N/A|0.70|
|87|<br>N/A|7.10|
|s|N/A|11.90|
|89|<br>3.50|12.40|
|90|<br>4.00|9.30|
|91|<br>7.70|4.60|
|92|<br>7.10|3.90|
|Av5.|<br>S.56|7.13|

-
69 Lesotho 1: PFP - ProWjctlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 40 ~ ~ ~ ~ .40 ,,p,, - ,, s ,, " *.<br>66 0? 60' 00, so SI 2<br>Year<br>prol.jesl +A9t1UI<br><!-- End of picture text --> Lesotho 3: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Gm. k,.d..a~<br>6S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J<br>2;<br>0? * 0S 01 02<br>Y"r<br>prel"Veae +DfjuI<br><!-- End of picture text --> Losotho 5 . PFP ProletIons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> so1 ___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _IPOSX<br>&a xp * owe a+_l $I? SO SO a el Oa<br>7,qS s ,<br>Sourem "s OW. PM*dlww MM. W4<br>"udo:MOR? 0w0 U 5S# S 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Lesotho 2: PFP - Projections end Actuale <!-- Start of picture text --> o**~~~~~~~~~~~~~~u. AeVOP<br>4 Y<br>Yew<br>_P.e3*m" +a~. *A.mmITOTe4u<br>TOT * Twmn hrded<br><!-- End of picture text --> Lesotho 4 - PFP Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Do*ub .de qslOP<br>So 0<br>Y"r<br>PrJ.Ue_ + *<br>Lesotho 6: PFP - Projections and Actuals<br>mw s 9-<br>ISS<br>.. r<br><!-- End of picture text --> Lesotho 6: PFP - Projections and Actuals
70 MALAWI

|**at**<br>**Iet**DtfcIt/0P1C|urrent|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|12.70|
|8?<br>-<br>6.20|-10.80|
|a8<br>*SJ.50|-8.00|
|89<br>- 6.30|- 6.70|
|90<br>-5.80|- 6.800|
|91<br>- 6.00|- 6.30|
|92<br>-10.00|- S.40|
|-6A63<br>*8.10||

|Yr|Acc__<br>Projected|mt/Gp<br>Actual|Act TOT|
|---|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|- 8.00|-10.10|
|8T|- 7.60|-5.10|* 7.60|
|as8|-7.30|*9.10|-<br>.40|
||§<br>* 8.40|-13.40|7<br>?.80|
||-8.50|-9.00|-6.90|
|91|- 8.50|-11.10|-6.80|
|92|.18.70|N/A|N/A|
|_L|9.83|*9.28||

|Gross|Investment/GDP|_retfc|
|---|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|86|N/A|12.30|
|_?<br>1|87<br> <br>16.70|15.40|
|**a88s**|<br>.40|16.70|
|89|17.30'|20.30|
|90|18.40|19.10|
|91|19.00|18.60|
|92|17.60|N/A|
|Avg.||17.73|17.40|

|Savings<br>/P|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>10.10|
|or<br>14.30<br>13.00|
|**8I**<br>15.20<br>12.00|
|89<br>6.90<br>10.90|
|90<br>12.40<br>14.30|
|91<br>12.80<br>12.00|
|92<br>13.20<br>N/A|
|Avg<br>12.47<br>12.05|

Resl Exoort GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Pro ected|Actuat|
|---|---|---|
|86|/A|-6.70|
|87|3.70|-0.50|
|**8**|3.90|-4.60|
|6o|4.40|-10.20|
|90|7.70|47.00|
|91|7.00|5.30|
|92|-11.10|N/A|
|Avg.<br>_|<br>_2.60|5.05|

|Real GOP Growth**Rate**|
|---|
|Yr<br>P<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>1.10|
|87<br>3.30<br>0.0|
|**88**<br>3.50<br>3.30|
|89<br>3.70<br>4.10|
|90<br>3.40<br>4.80|
|91<br>5.00<br>7.80|
|92<br>4.50<br>N/A|
|v.<br>3.90<br>3.60|

_.
71 Malawl 1: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text -->
*ip  wt 1  .UuN/O<br>14<br>.10  _<br>.12,  ,  ,  ,  .4<br>-14<br>s0  *7  *9  90  9t  02  93<br>Your<br>-Proi@  rone +^Atu<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Malawi 3: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 21<br>2_ - 1<br>'°I<br>I.<br>Os 67 as so S0 9I 92<br>Y.<;r<br>-FrolooIene +fAtul<br><!-- End of picture text --> Malawl 5 PFP Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 40 &a ES*a t \no<br>*.0<br>6? 60 60 Os 00 1 02<br>r:~11-StrelS ~Pr@jgdhn. n 08 +A.tsm. so| W $<br>-is PoeeIIofn . WP 07/SO. 0690,0/S 061360w<br>r. £eIi I * Mach 01<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Malawi 2: PFP - Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Ouu A..amtP<br>0/ U* *fWD<br>so -- so - el<br>*1 6<br>** 07 66 60 Os 01 02<br>Y<br>'Prtlotbnj -+A*isb t*AoI TOT a4vuud<br>TOT u Terms of Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Malawi 4 PFP Projectlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Do*a Gwle(aDP<br>1-- 4 _-S /_<br>'I<br>4 2<br>O S s o 00 0' 02<br>Y"r<br>-ProOolmon 4+AakfIe<br>ar~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~Ya<br>Malawi 6: PFP Projlcitons and Actuals<br>0-<br>4 _- - -\ '- 'l:X ,-<br>2<br>Os 07 66 66 00 S; 02|<br>Year<br>-Projee6.ne +AetsmI<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Malawi 6: PFP Projlcitons and Actuals
72

# _NOZANUSJA_

|sudoet<br>Deficit/GP<br>Yr<br>Projected|-<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-17.70|
|87<br>-20.30|-21.70|
|as<br>-28.10|-26.60|
|89<br>-24.60|-25.50|
|90<br>-36.30|-29.50|
|91<br>-32.00|-27.60|
|92<br>-27.50|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-28.13|-24.77|

|Yr|Current<br>Ace<br>Projected|P<br>Actual|Act TOT|
|---|---|---|---|
|**86**<br>s/A||-15.60|-14.00|
|ST|-34.70|-47.80|-46.80|
|a|-67.30|-52.90|-51.90|
|89|-69.80|-58.80|-59.20|
|90|-63.30|-54.40|*53.40|
|91|-60.30|-58.90|-58.90|
|92|<br>69.40||NA<br>NA|
|Avg.|60.80|-48.07|_|

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|0.0|
|87|17.50|24.10|
|**881**|27.70|33.40|
|89|26.00|35.50|
|90|27.00|38.10|
|91|35.00|41.00|
|921|42.70|_<br>/A|
|Avg.|<br>29.32|28.68|

Damstic Sav_nosF_DP

|Yr|Pro ected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|0.00|
|87|*9.00|-114.00|
|**88**|-15.60|-16.40|
|89|*19.00|-16.60|
|90|-18.00|-11.70|
|91|-17.90|- _9.90_|
|92|-17.60|N/A|
|_16.22||-11.43|

|**RealEx**rt GNFS Growth Rate<br>m<br>O|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|6<br>*- 8.40|
|or<br>s.90<br>8.30|
|as<br>8.10<br>10.20|
|S9<br>9.20<br>7.80|
|90<br>6.60<br>**4.50**|
|91<br>14.50<br>17.10|
|92<br>13.80<br>N/A|
|10.18<br>6.58|

||**Real GP**Growth Rate<br>**_-_**<br>.|
|---|---|
|**Yr**|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>1.80|
|87|1.20<br>4.60|
|SS|<br>5.90<br>5.50|
||5.00<br>5.30|
|90|<br>4.70<br>1.50|
|91|6.00<br>2.70|
|92|5.00<br>N/A|
|Avg.|4.43<br>3.57|
73

# Mozambique 1 PFP - Projectlons and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> mi,., s.u.*I0<br>*a. .<br>-2i<br>41 s so l<br>" 57 95 5 00 0t 92<br>Yow r<br>ProljUen +Ieluef<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Mozambique 2 PFP - Projections and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> cu,fe _aeee~ DP<br>4c 41<br>-40' - '<br>.70<br>040<br>66 97 Y2 N t<br>¢<br>tP, lom., +A*mfI *A.hAl TorT e4usd<br>TOT a Trms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mozambique 3 PFP- Projections and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> Oasi _OOP P<br>31<br>61 7- 0 s .!.1<br>10~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1<br>US $0 so 00 of 92<br>Y"r<br>-Pojetloae +AtwW<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Mozamblque 4<br>PFP Projections and Actualt<br>Ou-a t<br>so so*0 o el 00<br>Yew<br>Phejtae. +-Atua<br><!-- End of picture text --> Mozambique 5 PFP Projections and Actuals

# Mozambiquo e PFP- Proloctions and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> &mi Eupd wiUSGsv bbw mmi GMP on" P."<br>ifr 4 -;w -! U 74 , -<br>Yew ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 S7 9 0 5 I 6<br>-Pvaledlom - rP. OEM, O1. _ /US. . . Y.w<br>ANONRE/CuA*Y Bdof<br>i 1Jt * _ +em<br><!-- End of picture text -->
'74

# TANZANIA

|Buds|etDofcet/8OP|||Current<br>Acco|unt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual<br>.|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT<br>j~~|
|86|N/A|-7.90|86|N/A|-7.20|- 8.10|
|87|<br>-11.10|<br>-8.20|87|U23.10|<br>.14.20|<br>-18.80|
|88|-12.30|-7.70|as|-19.10|-17.50|<br>-20.30|
|89|-12.20|-8.20|89|-29.80|*26.50|-23.30|
|90|<br>-9.30|-7.00|90|-34.80|-29.40|<br>-20.60|
|91|-8.60|-4.40|91|-33.10|-27.40|N/A|
|92|-6.10|N/A|9|-31.|-31.60|N/A|
|Avg.|-9.93|-7.23||-28.57|-21.97||

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|ProJected|Actuat|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|17.90|
|8T|22.90|25.90|
|as|27.40|30.50|
|89|25.50|28.80|
|90|19.30|27.10|
|91|19.70|21.80|
|92|20.00|30.20|
|Avg.|22.47|26.03|

|Domestfc Savings/G|DP|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJ ected|Actual|
|66<br>N/A|8.80|
|87<br>5.30|3.80|
|**88**<br>4.40|3.10|
|89<br>4.80|-5.50|
|90<br>- 3.50|-12.40|
|91-<br>3.50|-13.60|
|92<br>0.10|-11.80|
|Avg.<br>1.27|-3.94|

**Real Ex** rt GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|U.|N/A|.990|
|87|23.60|5.80|
|**88**|11.20|0.10|
|**89**|11.00|17.10|
|90|10.50|0.10|
|91|10.90|-2.40|
|**2**|lt.10|10.60|
||13.05|3.06|

|**Real GDP Growth**Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>3.00|
|87<br>3.70<br>4.70|
|**88**<br>4.00<br>5.10|
|89<br>4.30<br>3.60|
|90<br>4.50<br>3.20|
|91<br>4.50<br>3.70|
|92<br>4.70<br>4.20|
|Avg.<br>4.28<br>3.93|
75

# Tanzanla 1: PFP- Prolectlons and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> tPtd O#fM4W<br>*<br>*1<br>-4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S<br>4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~4<br>-14<br>so S o 90 o 0<br>Yew<br>o1etloone -+'AtuuI<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Tanzanla 3: PFP- Projectlons and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> 30<br>IL .4<br>Ist ot/ _<br>00 67 00 60 90 el 02<br>Year<br>-PJefloon +Atuml<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Tanzanla 5 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> Re Ewt We ffO re_b<br>10<br>* e eT " " 00so 92<br>£4<br>F.1 6-tblm---oM<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Tanzania 2:.PFP- Projections and Actuali

<!-- Start of picture text --> CmCtA UNA<br>0<br>-_,<br>goi .St * 01*<br>_Pubtbone +"AtuaIe *A*bA&I. -l TOT djusd<br>TOT a T*rms Trad<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Tanzania 4 - PFP Projectlons and Actu

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10---<br>.51o<br>' 07 @6 6* 00 0t 02<br>Yew<br>ProJellem +Aetiue<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Tanzania 6: PFP Projectlons and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> %Pl OMO Rob<br>- - - -g - -<br>I<br>-1 - -<br><!-- End of picture text -->
76 ZAMBIA

|Bub*O|t<br>Doficit/GoP|||Current Acc_nt|/GOP||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual<br>________|Yr<br>_~~~~~~~~~~~|Projected|Actual|Act TOT<br>Ad].|
|86|N/A|-28.30|86|N/A|-23.00|N/A|
|87|- 9.80|-10.30|s8|*46.S0|-16.70|*26.50|
|**88**|- 5.30|-13.10|88|45.10|-7.20|*25.70|
|89|- 9.20|-11.70|89|-4.80|-5.10|-2.10|
|90|-11.50|-11.20|90|-16.20|-10.80|*23.20|
|91|-3.80|-13.80|91|-13.00|-13.20|N/A|
|92|- 2.90|N/A|92|-14.00|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|*7.08|-14.73|Avg.|-7.90|-12.67||

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|23.80|
|87|14.70|13.90|
|**88**|15.10|11.40|
|89|13.60|9.90|
|90|17.10|15.30|
|91|18.70I|13.50|
|92|19.50|N/A|
|Avg.|16.45|14.63|

|Dom<br>|estic SavingsIGDP<br> <br>|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>22.60|
|87|10.50<br>18.00|
|88|12.80<br>18.70|
|89|17.60<br>3.50|
|90|13.90<br>14.60|
|91|19.20<br>12.00|
|92|12.60<br>N/A|
|Avg.|14.43<br>14.90|

Real Ex rt GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|1.90|
|ST|4.20|-6.00|
|88|4.00|- 5.90|
|89|10.30|- 1.40|
|90|-0.90|15.90|
|91|0.30|-16.30|
|92|7.60|N/A|
||4.25|-1.97|

||Real GDP Growth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>0.70|
|87|2.50<br>2.70|
|as|3.00<br>6.30|
|89|3.40<br>- 1.00|
|_90_|<br>1.90<br>*0.50|
|91|3.10<br>- 1.80|
|92|3.90<br>N/A|
|Avg.|<br>2.97<br>1.07|
77 Zambia 1 - PFP Projections and Actuals

# Zambia 2- PFP Prolootions and Actuals

<!-- Start of picture text --> .1<br>-4 ~ ~ ~ ~ -I<br>'<br>1- le t * 9~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0<br>*36, oo so, / St 92<br>Ye "<br>-Prolwtbm +Aetuol<br><!-- End of picture text --> _\_ *2~ _=_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 40 7N<br>_p<br>'X<br>Yew<br>Ppo tbn* +A9n1'**W IFTaOT *44uad<br>TOT a Terms Gd Trod*<br><!-- End of picture text --> _-_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 40<br><!-- End of picture text --> Zambia 3 - PFP Proleotlons and Actual* <!-- Start of picture text --> O@ . . . . .20<br>1<br>-10mieUme 4-Aotuawb<br><!-- End of picture text --> Zambia 3 - PFP Proloctions and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> .1*<br>S O s s 92<br>raom Prol dlorn P0,11W. /14U<br>Adt;l IMDAZYCounr grief<br>J- I Do o S-<br><!-- End of picture text --> Zambia 4 - PFP Projections and Aotuals <!-- Start of picture text --> @6 1 @0 0 90 e2 9<br>4<br>-11voloAei. -Atuuo u<br><!-- End of picture text --> Zambla 6- PFP Prlojctlons and Actuals <!-- Start of picture text --> 20<br>32<br>YOW<br>- -<br><!-- End of picture text -->
78 An analytical groupiLe of the countries for the purpose of comparing actual values with projections would permit a better understanding of which factors are generally associated with the observed divergence between projected and actual values. The shortfall in reaching stabilization targets can be due to external circumstances, internal unexpected developments (such as change of political leadership), a weak commitment to policy reforms and weak institutions. The paper, therefore, makes several analytical groupings that will permit some insight into the roles of these factors in producing varying degrees of congruence between projected and actual values. 12/

# CPA and Non CFA Countries

The first country grouping was carried out by CFA and non-CFA countries. Membership in the CFA zone takes away the chance of manipulating a key policy variable, the exchange rate. If there is any difference between the actual and projected values, can these differences be associated with membership of CFA? In the absence of exchange rate depreciation, CFA economies lose in competitiveness and this will impair its abilities to attain projected progress under PFP. Companng the experience of CFA and non CFA countries on PFP projections produce some interesting results.

In general, CFA countries have done better than the non-CFA countres<sup>in</sup> containing budget deficits. The average actual budget deficit of CFA countries has been _WV_ in analytical groupings of the countries, Lesotho was excluded because of unusually high projected figures for saving and investment.
79 about 2 percentage points less than the average for non-CPA countries. However, the divergence between projected and actual budget deficit seems to be comparable for the two sets of countries. The average budget deficit to GDP ratio for the CPA group of countries came down slowly from 9.7% in 1986 to about 9.3% in 1987, against a projected figure of 8.5%. The record of subsequent years is similar - the actual figures of 1988 to 1991 were consistently one or more percentage points higher than projected or targeted deficit. Until 1989, the record of non-CPA countries with regard to the - budget deficit is similar projected values are less than actual outcomes. After 1989, the non-CFA countries on average succeeded in reducing their budget deficits as projected by PFPs, although the actual deficits are still slightly higher than the average level in the CFA group of countries. This ;neans that even though the level of deficit on average is still higher in non-CFA countries than CFA countries, the trend seems better for non-CFA countries. It is worth noting that Senegal is responsible for much of the improvement in CFA budget deficits in 1991.

The PFP projections on current account balance for CFA countries also shows a narrower gap for this group of countries in comparison to non-CPA countries. Both groups of countries, however, have had a similar record in regard to projections on the current account balance. The current account gap for CPA countries was, however, higher than what was projected for all the years except 1991. For both groups, if terms of trade adjustments were made, the gap would have been much less, even less than what was projected. As for investment ratios, the projection records of CFA and non-CFA countries are comparable. But in the case of savings ratios, the records of CFA and non-
CFA countries are quift different. For CFA countries, the projected and actual values of savings ratios are fairly close, whereas the divergence of those values for non-CFA countries is pronounced.

The projected growth of exports for CFA countries proved to be consistendy optimistic, indicating the fact that the increasing overvaluation of the CFA has undermined competitiveness of the economies and intenal adjustment programs have not been adequate to create competitiveness. The average growth of exports projected for CFA group of countries for the period 1987-91 was over 5 percent per year, whereas the outcome was just above 0% per year. In sharp contrast, the non-CFA group attained on average nearly 4.5 percent growth of exports per year, as against a projected growth rate per year of seven and half percent. The GDP growth rates, projected and actual of CFA countries are generally lower than the growth rates for non-CFA countries and the actual outcomes of non-CFA countries seem closer to targeted growth rates than what is evident for CEA countries. The averag* actual GDP growth rate by CFA countdies was only about 40 percent of the projecteI rate, whereas non-CFA countries attained nearly 90 percent of the GDP growth rate projecked by PFPs.

Income Grogn RAL m has concluded that Bank adjustment loans have had a strong positive effect en middle income countries, wh reas low income countries have clearly lagged behind in availing full benefits from adjustment loans. The different income levels may
81 stem from other factors such as implementation capacity, infrastructure, etc. The PFP countries were grouped in categories of income levels to examine the expenence of policy progress tsuch as meeting stabilization targets) and adjustment outcomes (growth of savings, investment, exports and GDP).

The countries were grouped into three per capita income groups-countries with less than $250 per capita income, countries with income between $250-$400 and countries with over $400. Six countries are in group 1 (less than $250), nine countries in the middle group and five countries are in the top group (> $400). The budget deficit of the lower income group is higher than the other groups, but the actual outcomes are close to what was projected. The current account deficit of the low income group is also high, between 15 to 25 percent, but the deficits are close to projections. As for the budget deficits of the other two income groups, the actuals seem to be higher _than_ projected values for most years, although they are at a lower level than for the group at below $250 per capita income.

In regard to the savings rate, there is a difference between the three income groups. The group with the compartively high income (> $400) seems to have done the best - the savings rate on average is about 12% of GDP, in comparison to 7% for the group with $2504400 per capita income and a negative one percent for less than $250 per capita group. The divergence between the actual and projected values is, however, similar for all the groups. In export growth, the middle income group has done the worst - the average growth rate has been less than one percent - markedly less
82 than what was projected. Surprisingly, the group with less than $250 per capita income has done quite well in export growth - although actual values seem to have fluctuated. In GDP growth, the group with per capita income over $400 seem to have done worse than the group with below $250 per capita income. This is surprising and somewhat different from the RAL m conclusion for all developing countries that middle income countries seem to have benefitted more than low-income countries from adjustment loans.

# Srouping By Vulnerability to External Fatrs

External factors can significantly affect the chances of the economies to attain stabilization targets or achieve expected outcomes of an adjustment program. The vulnerability to external factors such as an abrupt negative shift in the terms of trade depends on the size and significance of the external sector and the degree of diversification of the export sector. Therefore, this paper utilizes another classification on the basis of the size and significance of the extenWal sector and diversification of exports in order to assess the vulnerability of regional economies to external factors.

Six countries-Guinea, Togo, Zaire, The Gambia, Senegal and Mauritania-were placed into one group. The exports of these countries acoounted for more than 25% of GDP for the period 1989-90, and they were compared with the rest of the group.f/ The purpose was to see whether the experience of export dependent countries was any L3/Another classification ofthe countries, separated 10 countries with one commodity accounting for more than 60 percent exports from die rest. The observe **d** ifferences between the groups were minimal.
83 different from the rest. The comparison shows, that economies with a high dependency on the export sector seem to have a lower budget deficit than the other group. However, there is very little difference between the two groups of countries in regard to the accuracy of deficit projections. The record on current account deficit is generally the same as on the budget deficit. Also, the group with high export dependency has done poorly in the growth of exports and GDP, in comparison to the rest of the group. Again, the difference between projected and actual values for export dependent countnes and the other group is similar - actual growth is over 2 percentage points less than what was projected. No difference is seen between the groups in regard to investment rates. Surprisingly, average savings rate of export-dominant economies has remained between 10 and 13 percent, relatively close to what was projected. In comparison, the rest of the group has had dismally poor savings ratios-zero to about 4 percent-that are totally divergent from projected rates of about _5_ percent.

# Lengt of Adjusmn

The length of adjustment progmms could be a factor in explaining the varying experience with PFP projections. ks noted before, since the projections are taken from the latest PFPs, the more PFPs a country has, the more reasonable the projections are expected to be. More importantly, the longer duration of adjustment programs would ensure that the economy can meet the targets as well as achieve the projected adjustnent outcomes. The paper first look, at the grouping RAL lm carried out - intensive adjustors and other adjustors. Intensive adjustors are those which have had at least 2 SALs or at least 3 SECALz. The rest are grouped as "other adjustors".
84 The actual budget deficit of the intenively adjusting countries has been on average about 9.2 percent, in comparison to over 11 percent for the countries grouped as 'other adjustors'. As for the current account deficit, the performance of intensively adjusting countnes fell clearly short of PFP targets. Other adjustors seem to have had outcomes closer to projections, which did not seem to anticipate a past narrowing of the deficit.

Both groups have had a similar experience in regard to investment - actual values were close to PFP projections. As in most groups, savings rate projections proved to be - optimistic more so in the case of intensive adjustors than other adjustors. Export growth of both groups has also been generally less than projections with the intensive adjustors doing better in this regard. In GDP growth, intensive adjustors did well during initial years but since 1988, the growth mte has been declining against a projected steady growth. The other adjusting group also had much less growth than what the PFPs projected.

# Debt Burden

Finally, debt can inhibit the ability of some economies to achieve desired results.

The last grouping used in the paper is on the basis of the burden of external debt. The - countries were grouped into three highly indebted group, moderately indebted and least indebted. The results are as follows. The highly indebted group consists of four countries (Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Tanznia) that DODIGDP rates
_85_ of more than 150% percentL A reference group is set up witi compatively less debt burden. This group consist of 8 countries (Benin, CAR, Rwanda, Ghana, Burldna Paso, Niger and Senegal) that have DOD/GDP ratio of less than 75%. The modaely indebted group is in between, with indebtedness between 75% and 150%. Debt burden seems to have had a very limited difference in the relationship between actual and projected values. A comparison of the first group (highly indebted) and the third group (compaatively less debt burden) shows that the projections on budget deficit for the first group have been rather cautious or realisdc, whereas in the case of low indebted countnes, the actual deficits have been higher than projected for most years.

There is some difference between the two groups in the GDP growth rate. The group with the comparatively higher debt burden suffered serious decline in GDP growth rate since 1988, whereas the PFPs projected a steady 4 to 5 percent growth. In some contrast, the group with comparatively low debt burden continued to grow, though modestly but at a higher rate than the group with comparatively higher debt burden. The actual GDP growth rate of the low-debt group approached the target levels in recent years.
86

# LOU INDEBTED COUNTRIES

|udg|etDeficIt/GDP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|**86**|N/A|-10.40|
|8S|- 10.30|*11.10|
|**88**|- 10.00|.10.00|
|89|- 9.40|-11.00|
|90|:- 9.30|*10.80|
|91|- 8.80|- 9.10|
|92|6<br>8.10|N/A|
|Avg.|-9.56|10.40|

||Current Acet/|GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|**86**|N/A|-13.50|<br>*13.SO|
|ST|- 9.60|-13.90|<br>-13.30|
|A|-10.70|.12.30|<br>-11.10|
|89|<br>-12.50|-12.70|<br>-11.30|
|90|<br>-12.10|-12.70|<br>-11.10|
|91|<br>-11.90|-12.40|<br>-12.00|
||-11.20|N/A|_VA2_<br>N/|
|Avg.|O36|2.80|-|

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|11.60|
|B7|13.30|12.00|
|Be|14.20|13.00|
|89|13.20|12.80|
|90|13.90|12.40|
|91|13.30|11.60|
|92|13.40|N/A|
|Avg.|13.S8|12.36|

|Do|<br>tfcSavings/GDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actuat|
|**86**|N/A<br>0.70|
|87|1.10<br>1.10|
|Be|2.10<br>3.70|
|89|3.10<br>2.90|
|90|3.60<br>1.80|
|91|3.70<br>1.70|
|92|4.10<br>N/A|
|Avg.|2.72<br>2.24|

|RealExrt|<br>GUFS Growth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Prolected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>9.20|
|r7|8.10<br>S.90|
|as|2.90<br>-0.90|
|89|8.40<br>-0.80|
||6.00<br>2.00|
|VI|8.70<br>1.10|
|92|6.00<br>N/A|
||6.82<br>1.02|

||Real GOP Growth<br>**Rate**|
|---|---|
|Yr|<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86||/A<br>2.90|
|_.r_|1.30<br>-0.20|
|as|4.10<br>6.00|
|89|<br>3.70<br>t.80|
|90|<br>3.60<br>1.60|
||1<br>3.10<br>3.20|
|92|<br>3.90<br>N/A|
||3.16<br>2.48|
87

# Budget Deficit(-)/GDP Low Indebted Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> &jgg g.NGOp<br>*°2<br>.-4<br>is 71 I 9.0 0I Da<br>Your<br>-Pteleeton +A.tuale<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Current Account/GDP Low Indebted Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> Cunint A..mODP<br>0<br>-4<br>*10. *t *t @ * 9§§0 1 (.<br>Yew<br>IPte,tb*n +fAtael *M tWTO? rdjuuia<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> TOT a Twrm Gd Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Gross Domestic Investment/GDP Low Indebted Countries

# Domestic Savings/GDP Low Indebted Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> X2 , _ = -~ _ _ _ ,<br>N @7 @6 60 . 00 01 02<br>Year<br>-Pvjteean +Ametui<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> __ _ - - '<br>A<br>@7 60 @0 se 00 of 92<br>Yewr<br>-P1ojetb.e +A.tsMIe<br><!-- End of picture text --> o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~loo

# Real Export od GNFS Growth Rate Low indebted Countries

# Real GDP Growth Rates Low Indebted Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> I0<br>C<br>I<br>Year<br>~-ftJ.Uw 1_ htsiI<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 7-.<br>- : C" -o A<br>I<br>You<br>_PrjlUese +FWgj<br><!-- End of picture text -->
88 MODERATELY INDEBTED COUNTRIES

|8 --<br>Yr|Deffeft/G<br>Projected|DP<br>Actu t|
|---|---|---|
|66|N/A|.<br>9.80|
|87|9 20|-<br>10.90|
|as|-<br>6.90|-<br>8.70|
|89|-<br>6.80|-<br>8.40|
|90|*7.20|-<br>8.70|
|91|- 6.70|-<br>8.90|
|92|-6.50|N/A|
|Av*|-7.36|<br>-9.12|

|GrosInvestment/GDP<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actuat|
|---|---|
|_<br>861<br>N/A|15.80|
|87<br>16.70|16.80|
|.88<br>17.80|16.70|
|89<br>18.00|17.00|
|90<br>18.60|17.10|
|91<br>18.70.|15.70|
|19.00|N..J<br>AL|
|Avg.<br>17.96|16.66|

|Real Ex rt GNFS Growth Rate<br>-<br>P*|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actuat|
|86<br>h1/A<br>0.30|
|87<br>2.70<br>3.30|
|88<br>2.90<br>2.30|
|89<br>5.80<br>2.70|
|90,<br>7.10<br>5.80|
|91<br>10.20<br>2.00|
|92<br>6.50<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>5.74<br>3.22|

|Current<br>Ae<br>Yr<br>Projected|Actusl|-<br>ActTOT|
|---|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|- 9.90|-10.90|
|87<br>.11.90_|-10.30|- J.40|
|,<br>-11.10|- 9.90|-8.70|
|89<br>-11.40|-11.10|..<br>00|
|_<br>*12.40|-12.90|.7.10|
|_<br>91<br>.12.80|-12.80|9.60|
|92<br>-13.40|N/A|N/A|
|A<br>-11.92|.11.40||

|D<br>Yr|tfcSavfnas(GDP<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86|_N/A_<br>7.60|
|ST|10.00<br>0.30|
|as|11.20<br>-1.40|
|_<br>89_ _|<br>11.10<br>-2.80|
|90|10.80<br>-1.60|
|91|9.30<br>-2.40|
|.......L92|9.00<br>N/A|
|Avg. I10|.4<br>-1.58|

|Real CDP Growth Rate<br>-<br>m<br>Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|---|
|86<br>**N/A**<br>3.60|
|87<br>3.60<br>2.80|
|**a8**<br>3.30<br>4.10|
|89<br>4.10<br>3.90|
|90<br>3.80<br>2.70|
|91<br>4.00<br>2.20|
|92<br>4.60<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>3.80<br>3.14|
89

# Budget Doticit(-)/GDP Moderately Indebted Countrlos

<!-- Start of picture text --> Current Account/GDP<br>Moderately Indebted Countries<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> gadget .ag4WCiuA.GO<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-<br>07 6 66 N *t 62Yw<br>Year<br>-PUlJstIneA +@etlmAO<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gross Domestic Investment/GDP Moderately Indebted Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> 20~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>N" 6* 66 _6 0 61 62<br>0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2<br>. . .P jeis. A.tut .meUn<br>'tear<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate Moderately Indebted Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> Eapa @15 e e<br>13<br>I"<br>0 ?67 n so 0 t 6<br>Year<br>-h**Usw -ta +1-Astufl<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Pm,IUebns. + MAituf *A*M TOT dju*d<br>TOT * Trms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Domestic Savings/GDP Moderately Indebted Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> +Mml<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rates Moderately Indebted Countrlis

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 eub<br>6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>W, -_.<br>6 ? 6 66 0 t<br>Yow<br>-s'PieUmn +A_bale<br><!-- End of picture text -->
90

# HIGHLY INDEBTED COUNTRIES

|8udget Deficit/GDP_<br>Yr<br>Projected<br>-|<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-13.70|
|87<br>-11.20|-14.80|
|88<br>-11.60|-18.40|
|89<br>-10.90|-18.80|
|90<br>-14.30|-14.80|
|91<br>-12.60|-1.7O|
|92_°0.00|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-<br>-12.12|-13.7 0|

||Current Accou|nt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>-|Projected<br>_________<br>_|Actual<br>_______|Act TOT<br>~~~~~~Adi.|
|o6|N/A|.26.20|-25.80|
|a?|-26.40|-28.20|-31.00|
|U|-*13.70|-29.00|-34.60|
|89|*26.60|-30.80|.36.00|
|90|-28.90|*28.40|-33.20|
|91|-25.90|-30.00|-25.50|
|92|-28.40|N/A|0/A|
|Avg.|<br>-24.30|-29.28||

|Gros|s Investment/GDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|ProJected<br>Actual|
|56|N/A<br>19.30|
|87|_<br>20.60<br>25.70|
|88|<br>23.40<br>26.50)|
|89|<br>18.90<br>25.50|
|90|19.00<br>25.00|
||20.90<br>23.90|
|92|24.00<br>1N/A|
|Avg.|20.56<br>25.32|

# Damestic Savinos/GDP

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|**86**|N/A|7.60|
|a?|4.20|0.30|
|**8S**|3.50|-1.40|
|89|2.60|-2.80|
|90|1.30|-1.60|
|91|3.00|-2.40|
|92|1.00|N/|
||2.92L|-1.58|

# **Real** Export GNFS Growth **Rate**

|Yr ||ProJeted|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-0.10|
|8a|14.80|6.20|
|**88**|9.00|2.50|
|89|11.30|6.30|
|90|6.50|**18.70**|
|91|8.00|-3.40|
|92|9.00|**N/A**|
||_<br>_g.9.92||

||**Real**GDP Growth Rata|
|---|---|
|r|ProJected<br>Actual|
|**86**|**N/A**<br>2.00|
|87|<br>3.30<br>3.80|
|as|3.90<br>5.10|
|89|4.30<br>3.50|
|90|3.80<br>**1.10**|
|91|<br>4.40<br>2.10|
|92|4.10<br>**N/A**|
|A6.06<br>**vg.**|<br>3.94<br>**3.12**|
91

# Budget DOficit(-)/GDP Highly Indebted Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> Deo. DfI*t /0<br>O<br>I1 /..- .<br>-11~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-<br>.20 -2~~~~~~~~~~~~~4<br>0 07 Ss St0 00 0I 02<br>Year<br>Prlgflon +-tuals<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> Gross Domestic InvestmenV,IGDP Hlghly Indebted Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> @01 -iI--<br>25 4<br>2'X ' I<br>16<br>00 07 00 6~09 0 of 92<br>Your<br>-PrPeotione +IAetus<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate Highly Indebted Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> Expet ONF8O* wg<br>4 | S ? 90 9 92 t<br>Year<br>-Pmoo-n +4otule<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Current Account/GDP Hlghly Indebted Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> umA.u/O<br>:1 .2 I<br>.30<br>* *r 66 IS oS t 02<br>Yew<br>~Prl +t ft..l *WMUW 0 .TOTa4uu.d<br>TOT u Terms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Domestl Savings/GDP Highly Indebted Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> .-<br>-<br>~~~~~~~~~~~2-<br>00 0 00 9 90 of 92<br>Ywar<br>-Projtone +Atuals<br><!-- End of picture text --> Real GDP Growth Rates Hlghly Indebted Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> W wg Rub.<br>SI Ss Da<br>Yew<br>-Pe t<br><!-- End of picture text -->
92

# INTENSIVE ADJUSTERS

|8ud9 tDeficit/COP<br>Yr<br>Projected<br>-|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|- 9.90|
|87<br>- 8.00|-10.50|
|88<br>- 7.10|-10.60|
|89<br>7.10|-11.60|
|90<br>. 7.80|- 9.30|
|91<br>- 6.90|- 4.00|
|92<br>v-6.70|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-7.38|-9.20|

||Current Accou|nt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>-|Projected|Actual|Act TOT<br>~~~~|
|86|N/A|-17.80|-17.60|
|87|<br>-14.50|-16.10|*16.30|
|88|- 5.30|-15.60|<br>-16.90|
|89|-13.00|-16.50|<br>-16.80|
|90|-14.40|-15.60|-15.30|
|91|-12.60|-15.80|-12.10|
|92|-13.80|N/A|_<br>/A|
||-11.96|-15.92||

# Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|18.00|
|87|18.40|19.30|
|88|19.20|19.30|
|89|16.90|18.70|
|90|18.30|18.50|
|91|17.60|16.30|
|92|17.90|N/A|
|Avg.|18.08|18.42|

|Domestic Savings/GDP|
|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>7.30|
|87<br>7.40<br>5.50|
|88<br>9.00<br>6.00|
|89<br>8.80<br>4.80|
|90<br>8.60<br>5.00|
|91<br>9.20<br>3.50|
|92<br>8.30<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>8.60<br>4.96|

# Real Export GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|8.70|
|87|10.50|4.00|
|88|6.70|3.60|
|89|9.10|5.00|
|90|6.40|16.90|
|91|_6.80|-1.60|
|92|6.40|N/A|
||7.90|5.58|

# Real GOP Growth Rate

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|2.20|
|87|3.60|2.70|
|88|3.60|5.90|
|89|4.00|3.50|
|90|3.90|2.20|
|91|3.80|2.20|
|92|4.20|N/A|
|Avg.|3.78||
93

# Budget DefIoct(-)/GDP Intensive Adjusters

# Current Aocount/GDP Intensive Adjusters

<!-- Start of picture text -->
-4~~~~~~~~~~~<br>07  es  0*9  90  91  92<br>Yoor ~  ~<br>Year<br>~Prtblsene  +Aotuele<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 62 S /11 o s<br>Yw<br>~Proj.bn. ~ ~ ~ Pmbotlone~~~~os +A.IamI **otugl TOT edju*.d<br>TOT * Twrms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Gross Domestic Investment/GDP Intensive Adjusters

# Domestic Savlngs/GDP Intensive Adjusters

<!-- Start of picture text -->
-we  0.m.dk  tw*ggmeM<br>21  .<br>20<br>ry~~~~~~~~~~~~~  .<br>I.  ___  . __ _.24<br>6<br>00  6  6  00  9t  02<br>Your<br>-Proje.tlonU  +'Atul*<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> O...ds bwIagP<br>6__ 0 -~~~~~~~~~-- -<br>0<br>2<br>6 ? O' 6s 00 91 92<br>Year<br>-Projelltan +eAtuals<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate Intensive Adjusters

<!-- Start of picture text --> Ib.u d ONP a w b<br>16 - s_<br>00 6 ? 66 6 90 el 92 I<br>Year<br>'P-v.jaPUan. +MtmI. tP-OO.1*.110<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rates Intensive Adjusters

<!-- Start of picture text --> GOP O_w bbs<br>-2-<br>0 *I<br>Yew<br>+A*tUMV<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Q4 OTHER ADJUSTERS

|BudgetDeficit/G<br>Yr<br>Projected|OP<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|S6<br>N/A|- 12.00|
|87<br>12.00|<br>-13.70|
|**88s**<br>9.70|-11.20|
|89<br>9.00|-10.60|
|90<br>8.80|- 10.80|
|91<br>8.70|**-**<br>8.80|
|92<br>7.80|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-9.64|<br>-11.02|

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|Proiecte-|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|14.70|
|87|15.30|15.20|
|88|15.70|15.30|
|89|15.20|15.50|
|90|15.40|14.70|
|91|16.10|14.20|
|92|17.20|_N.._|
|Avg.|15.54|14.98|

|RealExp|ort**GNFS**<br>Growth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>-4.60|
|87|4.90<br>5.20|
|**88**|0.70<br>-3.00|
|89|4.60<br>-1.70|
|90|7.00<br>-1.80|
|91|12.20<br>0.83|
|92|5.70<br>N/A|
|A!2.|5.88<br>-0.10|

|CurrentAcen|/lDP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>**.**<br>.|Actual|Act TOT<br>ZAdl.|
|**__ **<br>__|||
|86<br>N/A|-14.40|<br>-14.40|
|87<br>-14.80|<br>.13.00|<br>-11.30|
|88<br>*15.00|.12.30|<br>-10.40|
|89<br>-13.90|-10.70|- 8.80|
|90<br>-14.80|-12.10|-11.30|
|91<br>*15.30|*14.10|<br>-12.30|
|92 _<br>14.70|N/A|N/A|
|vg.<br>-14.76|-12.4||

|Domestic Savings GOP|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>5.60|
|87<br>5.80<br>6.90|
|88<br>5.60<br>6.90|
|89<br>6.10<br>6.50|
|90<br>5.90<br>4.60|
|91<br>5.50<br>4.60|
|92<br>5.10<br>N/A|
|Avg.<br>5.78<br>5.90|

||RealWOPGrowth Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>4.60|
|87|<br>1.50<br>0.70|
|**88**|3.30<br>2.70|
|89|<br>3.80<br>2.10|
|90|<br>3.00<br>1.50|
|91|<br>3.50<br>2.50|
|92|<br>4.20<br>N/A|
|As.|3.02<br>1.90|
95

# Budget Deficit(-)/GDP Other Adjusters

<!-- Start of picture text --> OUSigt tuI.floI*OOP<br>O__________________<br>-4 _4<br>.10 _-1<br>12.4-_r____ _=_________________66<br>IS 67 so so 90 91 02<br>Year<br>-Pmowibns +AotualI<br>Gross Domeutic Investment/GDP<br>Other Adjusters<br>Grow Domesic Imve,m.nt<br>10<br>-<br>o<br>1 807 66 09 90 91 02<br>Your<br>-PpojatIone +AtulM<br><!-- End of picture text --> Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate Other Adjusters <!-- Start of picture text --> Efpott NIFO towth Rsb 1DP<br>-6<br>S'S.S'? S'S so go $11<br>Year<br>-Prlt5sn. 4 AIe,uael<br><!-- End of picture text --> .-

# Current Acoount/GnP Other Adjustors

<!-- Start of picture text --> CUW.nt .sOGP<br>0g _____________uwo<br>=<br>_<br>7 66 6 SI 2<br>Year<br>Propeno +etul F TOTedjthd<br>TOT Trms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Domestic Savings/GDP Other Adjusters <!-- Start of picture text --> O.g brh OP<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0<br>so 67 SO so 00 SI 92<br>Year<br>-Projatimne, +Aotuaal<br>Real GDP Growth Rates<br>Other Adjusters<br>Rtibs<br>.<br>6 67 6* O2 U 01<br>Year<br>-0-Prsleam +A*UW*<br><!-- End of picture text -->
96

# EXGNFS **MRE** THAN 25X Of GDP

|3det<br>**Oaffe**<br>it/CJw_||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|86<br>N/A|11.00|
|87<br>- 7.80|- 8.60|
|88<br>- 4.70|- 8.30|
|89<br>-5.60|- 8.40|
|90<br>- 6.70|- 7.30|
|91<br>- 4.80|- 6.30|
|92<br>- 4.10|N/A<br>|
|Avg.<br>-5.92|<br>.7.781|

||Current Accou<br>|nt/GOP<br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|ActuaL|Act TOY|
|86|<br>N/A|-16.70|<br>-17.10|
|37|<br>-6.30|-14.80|<br>-15.00|
|88|<br>-2.80|-.1.90|-15.40|
|89|<br>* 10.80|-10.30|<br>*10.10|
|90|<br>- 12.40|-12.80|<br>-12.20|
|91|<br>1.40|-12.20|9.50|
|92|<br>12.70|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|<br>-10.74|*12.40_||

Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|Proj. cted|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|19.60|
|87|16.90|17.90|
|88|18.30|17.20|
|89|16.60|16.50|
|90<br>|17.80|17.10|
|914|17.40|15.90|
|92|18.00|N/A|
|Avg.|17.40|16.92|

|DomesticSavinsXGOP|
|---|

|Yr|ProJected|<br>Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|12.70|
|87|11.10|12.20|
|88|13.30|12.60|
|89|12.70|10.90|
|90|13.40|10.80|
|91|13.00|9.90|
|92|10.50|N/A|
|Avg.|12.70|11.28|

|ReaL ExportGNFSGrowt|h Rate|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected|<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A|<br>2.70|
|87<br>5.20|<br>3.30|
|88.<br>3.00|<br>2.70|
|89<br>5.60|<br>-3.00|
|90<br>2.50|-1.40|
|91<br>4.10|<br>-0.80|
|92<br>5.00|<br>N/A|
|Ayg.<br>4.08|<br>0.16|

|ReaLGDPGrowth Rate|
|---|

|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/:|3.60|
|87<br>3.50|2.30|
|**88**<br>3.70|4.40|
|89<br>3.70|1.90|
|90<br>3.60|1.10|
|91<br>3.50|1.70|
|92<br>4.00|N/A|
|Avg.<br>3.60|2.28|
_97_

# Budget DOeficit()/GDP EXGNFS more than 25% of GOP

<!-- Start of picture text --> d*tg S0ilSE4~W ~wI<br>I~~~~~<br>t~~~' so el ft<br>-Pmosdon 4+otefth<br><!-- End of picture text --> Giross Domestlo Inv*stMent/GDP EXGNF-S more than 2S% of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> 4<br>Y"r<br><!-- End of picture text --> " (GN@ mor 0tha 25% of GO <!-- Start of picture text --> _~~@e_ +wetl0||@~<br>Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate<br>EXGNFS More than 25% of GOP<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> d- as a v- -<br>_____________A __<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Current Account/GDP<br>EXGNFS more than 25% of GOP<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> SO.ODs o<br>Cr<br>*2 Yew1 |<br>?CT *Terms dI lhGd<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Domestic Savlngs/GDP EXGNFS more than 25% of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> ___S'S______I_______'s_so__s_SI__2<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> (Fmoe thant @25%oD<br><!-- End of picture text -->

-~@ - - Real GDP Growth Rate EXGNFS More than 25% of GDP

<!-- Start of picture text --> a* /"<br>6 , ? ' -Ae dI Nb 2<br><!-- End of picture text -->
98 EXGNFS LESS THAN 25 X OF GOP

|udeetDeficct/GCP||
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>-|Actual<br>-|
|85<br>N/A|- 10.80|
|?.<br>- 10.90|*13.30|
|**88**<br>*10.70|-12.60|
|89<br>-<br>9.80|-12.90|
|90<br>- 10.70|-12.20|
|91<br>- 10.40|7.80|
|92<br>-<br>6.10|N/A|
|-10.50|-11.76|

|Gros|s Investment/GOP||
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|86|N/A|13.50|
|87|16.50|17.30|
|88|18.00|18.30|
|89|17.00|18.40|
|90|17.20|17.80|
|91|17.80F|16.-|
|92|18.90||
|Avg.|17.30|17.70|

Real Export GNFS Grouth Rate

|Yr|Projected|Actuat|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|1.90|
|87|7.70|5.60|
|as|4.90|0.60|
|89|8.80|2.50|
|90|8.60|12.70|
|91|11.70|0.30|
|92|7.80|N/A|
|An.|8.34|4.34|

Curr.ot Ace /nt/GOP

|Yr|Projected<br>|Actual<br>________|ActTOT<br>~~~|
|---|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-13.6u|-14.00|
|8.|- 13.70|15.60|.14.80|
|**88**|- 15.70|.16.30<br>|_<br>'5.1O|
|89|17.20|.18.70|*16.20|
|90|*17.80|-19.00|*15.00|
|91|17.50|-18.6|-14.60|
|92|-17.80|N/A<br>|N/A<br>|
||.16.38|-17.64T<br>_||

# Domestic Savinas/GDP

|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|5.30|
|87<br>5.00|4.20|
|88<br>5.40|4.60|
|89<br>5.20|3.60|
|90<br>4.90|2.10|
|91<br>4.60|1.80|
|**4**A<br>92<br>.40|N/A|
|Avg.<br>5.02|3.26|

Real GDP Growth Rate

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/|2.80|
|87|2.60|2.10|
|8|3.80|5.10|
|89|4.20|3.80|
|90|3.80|2.50|
|91|4.00|2.80|
|92|4.50|N/A|
|An.|3.68|3.26|
99 Budget DOflctt(-)/GDP EXGNFS loss than 25% of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> Current Account/GDP<br>EXGNFS loss than 25% of GDP<br>t;<br>*1 -<br>Yaw-.- -<br>66 6e7 6* 6 60 61 92<br>~ ~ ~ PI*etbe @ A~~~1Patuate *"NM Tor 0q*4va<br>TOT * Trerm ofde d<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
-4<br>4  _~~~~~~~~~<br>4  =.<br>*1<br>so0  T  Ss  - ea<br>t14  3<br>66  67  6  66  90  Ot  62Y<br>Ye r  ~  ~  ~<br>-p,.js.  U  -,<br><!-- End of picture text -->

## Gross Domestic investmer .IGDP E-XGNFS less than 25% of GOP

Domestic Savlngs/GDP EXGNFS loss than 25% of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> ,o<br>Real Exo GF G -<br>4 -ftOAOtkn* +Aotusle<br>O1. 66 7 66 . 66 . 90 ... 91 62o<br>Year<br>P,,ee.tGe +AOtu, l<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> .<br>- - r __ _<br>4 -ft- -m<br>O . ST . 6 9 S 66 ft<br>Yer<br>PrJoultent +4tAWat<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export df GNfS Growth Rate EXGNFS toss than 25% of GDP

<!-- Start of picture text --> Imp.t ~ Y" ONP<br>IC ~ _@e,e+*_*<br><!-- End of picture text --> Real GDP Growth Rate EXGNFS toss than 25%C of GOP **. a rulb***
100

# COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOME LESS THAN S2SO

|Budget<br>Deffc1t/GoI<br>Yr<br>ProJected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|-11.20|
|87<br>-12.70|*14.20|
|**88**<br>-12.30|-13.00|
|89<br>-12.00|-12.80|
|90<br>-12.90|*12.30|
|91<br>-11.90|-12.10|
|92<br>-10.90|N/A|
|_Avg.<br>*12.36|-12.881|

|2|Current<br>Acc|CDnt/GO|P|
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>-|Actual|Act TOT<br>~~~~~~~~~~Adj.|
|**86**|N/A|-15.50|.15.50|
|8a|-16.20|-19.50|*17.10|
|U|*19.30|-19.80|-18.00|
|89|-21.00|-23.10|-19.70|
|90|-21.90|-22.60|-18.80|
|91,|<br>21.SO|-20.90|-17.90|
|___22|-20.30|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|<br>-19.98|-21.18||

Gross Investment/GOP

|Yr|Projected|ActuaL|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|12.30|
|87|17.30|17.70|
|88|19.10|18.60|
|89|17.50|18.90|
|90|17.10|18.20|
|*<br>91 1|17.80|17.40|
|92|18.30|N/A|
|Avg.|17.76|18.16|

Dome tc Sav1 sLGDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|3.40|
|87|3.50|0.50|
|88|3.40|-0.60|
|89|3.30|-0.60|
|90|1.30|-0.90|
|91|1.10 _|<br>-2.70|
|92|1.30_|<br>N/A|
|vg.|2.52c|<br>-0.86|

.,Real Export GNfS Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|ActuaL|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-3.30|
|87|7.50|6.40|
|S8|7.30|3.40|
|89|8.50|1.50|
|90|9.20|15.80|
|91|13.10|1.70|
|92|8.10|N/A|
|__|______9.12|5.76|

**Real** GOP Growth Rate

|Yr<br>Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>_N/A_|0.70|
|87<br>3.10|3.40|
|as<br>3.80|5.50|
|89<br>4.10|3.70|
|90<br>4.10|2.30|
|91<br>4.50|3.40|
|92<br>4.40|N/A|
|3.92|3.66|
101

# Budget DgotIcit()/GDP Low Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> 4.1% *X Se 0 0 * IY<br>1k 4'wl*<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Gross Domestic Investment/GDP Low Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> d-t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00" I<br>'izr *Yes<br>-hoe b8e +Aelusle<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export d GNFS Growth Rate Low Incomo Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> pdOMw- --<br>4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>* 07 60 n 00 Ot n 2<br>Veer<br>-p,*.uu,. .g, |m<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Current Account/GDP Low Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> .|Pmjen. +MA*tum *M*o% WTO n4u4<br>TOT * Twm d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Domestic Savings/GDP Low Incomo Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> 21 W I<br>-ftinOw -lll AstuMe<br><!-- End of picture text --> Real GDP Growth Rates Low Income Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> aw<br>7 0<br>Year<br>+*Mafl\<br><!-- End of picture text -->
COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOM IMORE THAN N0

|**aet**<br>DefHt/GOP||
|---|---|
|Tr<br>Projected|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|, 9.30|
|s4.10|. 5.90|
|**88**<br>.<br>2.20|-<br>6.40|
|89 -<br>^ 3.40|-<br>6.90|
|90<br>-<br>5.60|-<br>6.10|
|91<br>-<br>3.70|5<br>5.40|
|92<br>.<br>3.00|N/A|
|Avg.<br>-3.80|6-61L|

Gross Investment/GDP

|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|---|---|
|86|N/A<br>20.80|
|87|16.40<br>19.10|
|88|18.10<br>17.70|
|89|16.40<br>16.10|
|90|18.40<br>17.80|
|XX91|tt17.80<br>15.70|
|.<br>92|18.50|
|Avg.|17.42<br>17.28|

|**Real**E_rt<br>GNPSGrowth**Rate**|
|---|
|Yr|
|**86**<br>**N/A**<br>**8.00**|
|87<br>7.20<br>1.90|
|a8<br>2.70<br>S.30|
|89<br>6.40<br>1.40|
|**90**<br>1.20<br>2.50|
|**91**<br>**3.80**<br>*2.60|
|92<br>S.20<br>**N/A**|
|Avg.<br>4.26<br>1.70|

|Cure<br>A<br>lY<br>|||
|---|---|---|
|r<br>Projecte|d Actual|Acit<br>TOT|
|66<br>N/A|-1T.90|-16.60|
|?<br>-13.40|-15.0_|-14.90|
|**88**<br>4.90|-12.80|-15.90|
|89<br>. 8.10|*9.50|-10.10|
|90 1<br>10.70|-12.60|-12.20|
|91<br>_-_ 9.80|-11.10I|*8.10|
|9Z<br>-11.40|N/A|N/A|
|-7.42|-12.36||

|Domestifc<br>SsvifnsGOP|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJected<br>Actual|
|**86**<br>N/A<br>13.30|
|87<br>11.50<br>13.30|
|t8<br>14.60<br>13.20|
|89<br>14.10<br>11.30|
|19<br>14.30<br>11.00|
|91<br>13.30<br>1<br>t0.20|
|10.40<br>_NAL_|
|13.56<br>11.80|

||Resl GOP Growth**Rate**<br>|
|---|---|
|<br>Yr|LActual<br>Prolected<br>Actulot|
|**86**|**N/A**<br>3.50|
|8T|3.60<br>2.40|
|88|3.80<br>5.10|
|89|3.80<br>2.10|
|90|3.40<br>1.40|
|9t|**3.20**<br>**0.90**|
|**92**|3.90<br>**N/A**|
|Avo.|**3.56**<br>2.38|
103

# Budget DefIcitt()/GoP Countbes with per capita Income more Ihan $400

# Current Acocunt/GOP Countries with per capita Incomo more @1aN $400

<!-- Start of picture text --> BwOO o O = C o * *,P<br>o m . 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 .<br>-2 ~ ~~~~~<br>.t *1I 1 7 s 90 *<br>SS *7 so 90 9t 2o ' Ye 6 1<br>Wr 'OProimU.n. 4 AIwj *A9j. tOTndj*ul4<br>?jS *e +-tw TOT a Terms d Tade<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gross Domoetlc InvestmentUGOP Countries with per capita Income more than $400

# Domeesc Savings/GDP Countrles wlth per capita Income more than $400

<!-- Start of picture text --> as~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I<br>20 _<br>10 .<br>* 6 . 1..<br>10 F 07 0o o9 90 9 92<br>Year<br>-P,betion +Aealuwle '<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 1 .14<br>la<br>0<br>1 0 so so 00 9l 92<br>Year<br>joptIeon +AotualI<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Real Ixport of GNPS Arowth Rate<br>Countries with per capita Income more than $400<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> p* Gt Gw Fab<br>N4<br>10<br>a4024o,'\_,<br>a s -~~~~O e a9<br>10 0? 09 00 00 91 0290<br>Yer<br>Prs.el_ 4 etthb<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rate Countries with per capita Income more than $400

<!-- Start of picture text --> am Greo * Robe<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o STS,o o e<br>a<br>r u 9 0 91 0<br>Year<br>m +Mtae<br><!-- End of picture text -->
7I04

# COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCONE CTWECIN 6250 To 1400

|**Oafkb**<br>t<br>Dettcit/GOP<br>Yr<br>Projected<br>-|____<br>**-**<br>Actuat|
|---|---|
|**86**<br>N/A|10.50|
|87<br>-10.10|10.50|
|U<br>8.MJ|*8.50|
|89<br>- 7.10|- 8.80|
|90<br>-7.30|- 8.30|
|91<br>-7.40|- 7.70|
|92<br>*-6.50|N/A|
|Avg.<br>=8.08|-8.76|

|Current ACc<br>I<br>**~**<br> <br>|ownt/0OP<br>**~-**<br>|**-**<br>|
|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected<br>-<br>_________|Actual|Act TOT<br>~~~~|
|**86**_<br>/A|-11.60|.13.20|
|87<br>-13.10|*11.20|-11.60|
|a<br>.12.91|-11.00|-10.80|
|89<br>*11.80|-11.50|- 9.50|
|90<br>-11.00_|<br>11.20|- 8.70|
|91<br>11.10|-10.10|- 9.40|
|= 92<br>-10.50|N/A|N/A|
|vg.<br>-11.98|<br>*11.00||

Gross Investment/nOP

|Yr|Prointed|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|16.10|
|87|16.00|16.00|
|**8s**|16.60<br>_|17.20|
|89|16.30|17.30|
|90|17.10|16.70|
|9|17.50|15.60|
|92|19.10|N/A|
|Avg.|16.70|16.56|

|Domestfc Sav<br>_DP|
|---|
|Yr<br>ProJ cted<br>Actual|
|**86**<br>N/A<br>7.10|
|87<br>6.40<br>7.30|
|**88**<br>6.70<br>8.60|
|89<br>7.20<br>8.00|
|90<br>9.00<br>6.80|
|91<br>8.9f%<br>7.30<br>|
|921<br>9.10<br>N/A|
|7.64<br>7.60|

|Real Export GNFS Growth Rate|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>7.30|
|8?<br>6.00<br>4.20|
|**.88**<br>1.10<br>-4.00|
|89<br>7.70<br>5.00|
|90<br>7.00<br>-0.30|
|91<br>7.80<br>.0.70|
|92<br>6.50<br>N/A|
|5.92<br>0.84|

Real GDP Growth Rate

|Yr|Prol cted|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|6.20|
|87|2.10|0.30|
|**88**|3.70|3.70|
|s9|4.10|3.30|
|90|3.40|2.10|
|91|3.30|2.20|
|92|4.40|N/A|
||3.32|2.32|

,_.
105

# Budget Deolelt(-)/GDP Middle Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> _ 4<br>.40-<br>.11 .1~ . . .S .S<br>41* 1~ *g *t7 W 90 *i t<br>Year<br>-PVJatIbne +oueIW<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Gross Domostic Investment/GDP Middlo Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> "sos<br>U 7 0 0 90 09 9t 902<br>Year<br>-PteJedUn +MAISlu sPvee<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNF5 Growth Rate Middle Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> EUP.. GMg FWO bAb<br>0 - -s o- -- WX<br>X<br>0 or/e o 9 2°e<br>.2~~~0<br>-4<br>t r<br>_hojeege._ +Aetle<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Current Account/GOP Mlddle Income Countrie

<!-- Start of picture text --> .1_-<br>s 4 ___ (~~~a4n.e A -ASWTOTOVGoie<br>o S i"<br>Yr<br>-pjgtjF +Aetml 4Aui TOT a4uls<br>TOT a Terms d Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Domestic SavIngs/GDP Mlddio Income Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> U 67 $ so S 01<br>Year<br>ume +M'.UWe<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rate Mlddle Income Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> am &*W fhO<br>4d/<br>@ 0 s<br>Y"<br>-pIu, 4<br><!-- End of picture text -->
106

# NON-CA COUNTRIES

|_5udg<br>tDefcIt/GDP<br>Yr<br>Prolected|Actual<br>_ I|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|t11.30||
|87<br>*10.O|- 12.80|
|88<br>- 9.40|12.30|
|89<br>- 9.00|- 12.60|
|90<br>- 8.60|8.90|
|91<br>- 7.60|8.20|
|92<br>- 7.50<br>Avg.<br>-9.02|N/A<br>-10.96|

|_|Current Acco|unt/GDP||
|---|---|---|---|
|Yr<br>_|Projected<br>.A_j.|Actual|Act TOT|
|86|N/A|*15.00|- 15.70|
|87|- 16.80|16.40|16.10|
|88|-12.40|15.90|- 16.7n|
|89|16.50<br>_|<br>17.90|- 16.00|
|90|-17.80|- 18.10|- 15.60|
|91|-17.10|18.90|- 15.80|
|92<br>|- 18.20<br>|mlI||
|Avg.|-16.12|-17.44||

|GrossInvestment/GDP|_|
|---|---|
|Yr<br>Projected i|Actuat|
|86<br>N/A|15.10|
|87<br>17.30|18.20|
|88<br>19.10|18.30|
|89<br>17.50<br>=|<br>18.40|
|90<br>17.90|18.30|
|91<br>18.10|17.20|
|92<br>19.00<br>Avg.<br>17.98|N/A<br>18.08|

|Dostfic<br>Savi1s/GDP<br> <br> <br>|
|---|
|Yr<br>Prolected<br>Actual|
|86<br>N/A<br>7.50|
|87<br>6.90<br>5.30|
|88<br>7.60<br>4.70|
|89<br>7.40<br>3.80|
|90<br>6.70<br>3.80|
|91<br>6.20<br>2.50|
|92<br>5.60<br>N/A|
|Avg<br>6.96<br>4.02|

Real Ex ort GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr<br>Projected|Actual|
|---|---|
|86<br>N/A|2.10|
|87<br>6.90<br>|4.20|
|**88**<br>5.90|2.90|
|89<br>8.80|3.60|
|90<br>7.10|10.50|
|91<br>9.70|0.80|
|92<br>7.80<br>Avg.<br>7.68|N/A<br>4.40|

Real GDP Growth Rate

|Yr|Prolected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|2.10|
|87|3.50|3.40|
|**88**|4.00|5.30|
|89|4.10|3.70|
|90|4.10|2.20|
|91|4.30|3.00|
|92|4.40|N/A|
|_'<br>*,|4.00|3.52|
107

# Budget Do?icIt(-)/GDP Non CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> Sedget O.fhi*)OOoP<br>42<br>R ~ ~ ~<br>SI ? 66 60 00S OI S<br>Yeu^<br>Prej~tIn. +Aeadule<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gross Domestic Investment/GDP Non CFA Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> OR. Deei Inveguost<br>20~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>W 0? so so 00 01 02<br>Yor<br>-PVoJ.tlone +AIUSl.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> ExP.u ONfO &w Rab<br>12<br>I vJ/ s o so S-<br>O 0? SO SO S'S 90 1 92<br>YVer<br>-Prebotbn +Auale<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Current Account/GDP Non CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> Cw"ru Aae.mEVGOP<br>Yo;r<br>-PrjeetIen% 4&tuIl *Wtbug TOTY dju.Ad<br>TOT a Terms Trade<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Domestic Savings/GDP Non CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> o.udI Wvkgh'OP<br>*0 *07 Ss s* o 0 01 92<br>Year<br>- Ptojotlene +Aatumle<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rates Non CI9A Countrles

<!-- Start of picture text --> GDP Gmv* Raob<br>T a o<br>° 6 ? SO 00 00 St 92<br>Yew<br>~ftjdte +Aoti-A<br><!-- End of picture text -->
108

# CfA COUNTRIES

# Budget Deficit/MD ,

# Current Account/GDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|- 9.60|
|87|8.50|- 9.30|
|88|7.00|8.60|
|89|7.60|- 8.60|
|90|7.50|- 8.60|
|91|- 6.50|7.30|
|92|- 5.80|N/A|
|Avg.|_<br>7.42|-8.48|

|Yr|Projected|Actual|Act TOT|
|---|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|-13.50|-13.10|
|87|- 8.40|-12.40|-11.60|
|88|- 9.50|-12.20|*11.20|
|89|-11.70|-11.00|- 9.60|
|90|-11.30|-11.80|-10.10|
|91|11.40|-10.40|8.70|
|92|*10.70|N/A|N/A|
|Avg.|-10.46|-11.56||

Gross Investm_nt/GDP

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|16.30|
|87|15.00|15.60|
|88|15.40|16.90|
|89|15.10|16.20|
|90|16.20|15.70|
|91|16.60|14.40|
|92|17.60|N/A|
|Avg.|15.66|15 76|

|Dom|estic Savings/GDP|
|---|---|
|Yr|Projected<br>Actual|
|86|N/A<br>5.00|
|87|4.60<br>6.30|
|88|5.30<br>7.70|
|89|5.80<br>7.80|
|90|6.70<br>5.60|
|91|6.70<br>5.90|
|92|6.40<br>N/A|
|Avg.|5.82<br>6.66|

# Real Export GNFS Growth Rate

|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|---|---|---|
|86|N/A|3.90|
|87|7.00|6.00|
|88|0.10|-2.40|
|89|5.20|- 0.30|
|90|5.60|0.20|
|91|8.20|- 2.20|
|92|4.60|N/A|
|Avg.|5.22|0.26|

||ReaL GDP Growth|Rate|
|---|---|---|
|Yr|Projected|Actual|
|86|N/A|5.70|
|87|1.20|- 0.90|
|88|3.10|3.70|
|89|3.80|2.00|
|90|2.70|1.70|
|91|2.60|0.90|
|92|4.10|N/A|
|Avg.|2.68|1.48|
109 Budget D0l cIt(-)/GDP CFA Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> BWugt DeIIht (/00P<br>O 2<br>-4<br>4 ' ~~~I*4S<br>1 0<br>. 1 T07 so so 00 1I 02<br>Year<br>-holk^ +Aoguale<br><!-- End of picture text --> Gross Domestic Investment/GDP CFA Countries <!-- Start of picture text --> mrem Deetiat Inv*unt<br>10~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>%6 6<br>a 67 go S 00 S91 92<br>Year<br>PrefoetI.ns +'Actual*<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> Exzp.N ONfO Gmwt Rob<br>6 0 7 l0 Is 90 91 92<br>Y er<br>Pteooleimn. +Aotule<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Current Account/GDP<br>CFA Countries<br>ClmtWi Mc@nmvODP<br>.4<br>.<br>11<br>.14<br>@0 07 so s0 90 91 e2<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text --> Pmje.tI.ne +Aotmle *Aotual TOT adjualad TOT a Terms o Trade

# Domestic Savings/GDP CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> De-d- bevIng.IWDP<br>so. S7 es 89 00 01 92<br>Y"r<br>-ProjetIons +Aotulae<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Real GDP Growth Rate CFA Countries

<!-- Start of picture text --> GDP &ewth Rob*<br>4<br>3<br>2*<br>06 0? 0 so 00 91 92<br>Year<br>'Pr.jetluoe +AlIue<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# Policy Research Working Paper Series

|Title|Author|Date|Contact<br>for paper|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS1151 Is Growth Bad for the Environment<br>Pollution,<br>Abatement,<br>and<br>Endogenous<br>Growth|? Charles van Mairewijk<br>Federick<br>van der Ploeg<br>Jos Verbeek|July 1993|J. Verbeek<br>33935|
|WPSI 152 Population,<br>Health, and Nutrition:<br>Annual Operational<br>Review for Fisca<br>1992|Denise Vaillancourt<br>l Stacye Brown<br>and Others|July 1993|0. Nadora<br>31091|
|WPS**1**53 North American Free Trade<br>Agreement:<br>Issues on Trade in<br>Financial Services for Mexico|Alberto Musalem<br>Dimitri Vittas<br>Asli DemirgOg-Kunt|July 1993|P. Infante<br>37664|
|WPS**1**54 Options for Pension Reform in Tunisi|a Dimitri Vittas|July 1993|P. Infante<br>37664|
|WPS1155 The Regulation<br>and Structure of<br>Nonlife Insurance<br>in the United<br>States|Martin F. Grace<br>Michael M. Barth|July 1993|P. Infante<br>37664|
|WPSI 156 Tropical Timber Trade Policies:<br>What<br>Impact Will Eco-Labeling<br>Have?|Panayotis N. Varangis<br>Carlos A. Primo Braga<br>Kenji Takeuchi|July 1993|D. Gustafson<br>33714|
|WPS1 157 Intertempor**a**l nd Interspatial<br>Comparisons<br>ofIncome: The Meanin<br>of Relative Prices|Sultan Ahmad<br>g|July 1993|E. O-Reilly-<br>Campbell<br>33707|
|WPS1158 Population<br>Growth, Externalities,<br>and Poverty|Nancy Birdsall<br>Charles Griffin|July 1993|E. Homsby<br>35742|
|WPS**1**59 Stock Market Development<br>and<br>Financial Intermediary<br>Growth:<br>A Research<br>Agenda|Asli Demirg0v.-Kunt<br>Ross Levine|July 1993|P. Sintim-<br>Aboagye<br>38526|
|WPS**1**60 Equity and Bond Flows to Asia and<br>and Latin America: The Role of Globa<br>and Country Factors|Punam Chuhan<br>l Stijn Claessens<br>Nlandu Mamingi|July 1993|R. Vo<br>31047|
|WPS1 161 Increasing<br>Womens Participatio**n**<br>i<br>the Primary School Teaching Force an<br>Teacher Training in Nepal|Molly Maguire Teas<br>d|July 1993|L. Maningas<br>80380|
|WPS**1**62 The Slovenian<br>Labor Market in<br>Transition: Issues and Lessons<br>Learned|Milan Vodopivec<br>Samo Hribar-Milic|July 1993|S. Moussa<br>39019|
|WPS**1**63 Domestic Distortions<br>and<br>International<br>Trade|James E. Anderson<br>J. Peter Neary|July 1993|D. Gustafson<br>33714|
# **Policy Research Working Paper Series**

|**Title**|**Author**|**Date**|**Contact**<br>**for paper**|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS**1**64 Power, Distortions,<br>**Revolt,**<br>and<br>Reform in Agricultural<br>Land Relation|Hans P. Binswanger<br>s Klaus Deininger<br>Gershon Feder|July 1993|H. Binswanger<br>31871|
|WPS**1**65 Social Costs of the Transition<br>to<br>Capitalism:<br>Poland, 1990-91|Branko Milanovic|August 1993|R. Martin<br>39026|
|WPS**1**66 The Behavior of Russian Firms in<br>1992: Evidence<br>from**a**Survey|Simon Commander<br>Leonid Liberman<br>Cecilia Ugaz<br>Ruslan Yemtsov|August 1993|**0.**del Cid<br>35195|
|WPS**1**67 Unemployment<br>and Labor Market<br>Dynamics in Russia|Simon Comrnander<br>Leonid Liberman<br>Ruslan Yemtsov|August 1993|**0.**del Cid<br>35195|
|WPS**1**68 How Macroeconomic<br>Projections<br>in Policy Framework<br>Papers for the<br>Africa Region Compare<br>with Outcome|Rashid Faruqee<br>s|August 1993|N.Tannan<br>34581|