metadata: authors: 0: author: Bossavie,Laurent Loic Yves
1: author: Rozo Villarraga,Sandra Viviana
2: author: Urbina Florez,Maria Jose
count: Afghanistan,Tajikistan
docna: 0: docna: Impacts of Extremist Ideologies on
            Refugees' Integration : Evidence from Afghan Refugees
            in Tajikistan
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
abstracts: cdata!: This paper examines the effect of
            exposure to extremist ideologies in the home country on the
            subsequent integration of refugees in host countries. For
            this purpose, it combines a rich census of Afghan refugees
            living in Tajikistan in 2023, following the
            Taliban&#x2019;s takeover in Afghanistan, with uniquely
            scraped district-yearly data on the territories controlled
            by the Taliban, U.S. allies, and contested territories
            between the two factions between 2017 and 2021. The
            empirical strategy compares the integration outcomes of
            refugees who experienced varying exposure to extremism
            generated by the exogenous and sudden dramatic shift in
            Taliban&#x2019;s territorial control in their province
            of birth between 2017 and 2021. Findings suggest that
            refugees who were born in provinces with increased Taliban
            territorial control between 2017 and 2021, despite having
            comparable pre-migration characteristics to refugees born
            elsewhere in Afghanistan, are less integrated into their
            Tajik host communities than the other refugees. These
            refugees also show lower educational levels and more mental
            health problems.
display_title: Impacts of Extremist Ideologies on
            Refugees' Integration : Evidence from Afghan Refugees
            in Tajikistan
listing_relative_url: /research/2023/11/34200651/impacts-extremist-ideologies-refugees-integration-evidence-afghan-refugees-tajikistan
topicv3: Mental Health m1326341 1430,Education and Gender m1326343 1545,Conflict and Violence m1327549 2433,Integration of Non-Nationals m1504167 2842,Refugee Resettlement m1505718 2665
publishtoextweb_dt: 2023-11-21T00:00:00Z
dois: 10.1596/1813-9450-10612
no_of_pages: 71
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1239893
1: author_key: 1932755
2: author_key: 2062597
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 10612 Impacts of Extremist Ideologies on Refugees’ Integration Evidence from Afghan Refugees in Tajikistan _Laurent Bossavie Sandra V. Rozo María José Urbina_ Development Economics Development Research Group November 2023 A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, click **here** for direct access.
Policy Research Working Paper 10612

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the effect of exposure to extremist ideologies in the home country on the subsequent integration of refugees in host countries. For this purpose, it combines a rich census of Afghan refugees living in Tajikistan in 2023, following the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, with uniquely scraped district-yearly data on the territories controlled by the Taliban, U.S. allies, and contested territories between the two factions between 2017 and 2021. The empirical strategy compares the integration outcomes of refugees who experienced varying exposure to extremism generated by the exogenous and sudden dramatic shift in Taliban’s territorial control in their province of birth between 2017 and 2021. Findings suggest that refugees who were born in provinces with increased Taliban territorial control between 2017 and 2021, despite having comparable pre-migration characteristics to refugees born elsewhere in Afghanistan, are less integrated into their Tajik host communities than the other refugees. These refugees also show lower educational levels and more mental health problems.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at sandrarozo@worldbank.org. A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available at http:// reproducibility.worldbank.org, click **here** for direct access.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Impacts of Extremism in Refugee’s Integration: Evidence from Afghan Refugees in Tajikistan**<sup>*</sup>

Laurent Bossavie<sup>†</sup> Sandra V. Rozo<sup>‡</sup> Mar ́ıa Jos ́e Urbina<sup>§</sup> Originally published in the Policy Research Working Paper Series on _November 2023._ This version is updated on _January 2024._ To obtain the originally published version, please email prwp@worldbank.org.

**Keywords:** Refugees, Female Education, Extremism **JEL Classification:** F22, D74, J15, I21, I10

*The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. All errors are our own. The team is grateful to the project “Enhancing Government capacity in hosting temporarily Afghan refugees”, funded under the Rapid Social Response Program (RSR) multi-donor Trust Fund of the World Bank, for funding data collection and allowing us to use the Afghan refugee survey as one of the multiple sources of data for the paper. The purpose of the project and the data it collected was to identify opportunities for refugee integration in Tajikistan. We acknowledge financial support from the Research Support Budget at the World Bank. We also thank Daniel Garrote for his initial support on instrument design and Merve Demirel for supporting data collection.

> †World Bank, e-mail: lbossavie@worldbank.org

- ‡World Bank, Dev. Research Group, e-mail: sandrarozo@worldbank.org

- §World Bank, e-mail: murbinaflorez@worldbank.org
“ _The pen is mightier than sword...The extremists are afraid of books and pens, the power of education frightens them._ ” Malala Yousafzai, UN Speech, July, 2013

# **I INTRODUCTION**

How does to extremism back in the home affect exposure country refugees’ integration in host countries? Extremist groups typically control their territories by limiting access to information (Naylor 2008, ICG 2008) and education (HRW 2006, Giustozzi 2010, Giustozzi and Franco 2011), using violence to undermine democratic institutions (Condra et al. 2018) and fostering a sense of distrust towards outsiders (Pourghadiri 2020). Consequently, as conflicts escalates, many refugees are compelled to flee their places of origin in an attempt to escape widespread extremism. However, there is a significant knowledge gap on the impact of exposure to extremism, beyond the migration episode, on the subsequent trajectories of refugees’ lives in host countries. Assessing these crucial impacts could provide valuable insights to effectively support refugees’ resilience in hosting locations.

We examine this question in the context of Afghanistan’s conflict. As many refugees in the world, Afghan refugees left their home country escaping extremist ideologies and regimes. The Taliban, an extremist Islamic group, ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, strictly imposing the mandates of Sharia law, the Islamic legal system.<sup>1</sup> Under their government, they issued numerous edicts to control many aspects of Afghan’s life in the public and private spheres (CFR 2020). For example, internet access, entertainment, and music were banned (Monitor 2023Mehran 2022),<sup>2</sup> and women were forbidden from receiving secondary or higher education, taking employment, and appearing in public without the appropriate custom and/or a male relative (U.S Department of State 2009).

> 1The sharia, means “the clear path” in Arabic, is derived from a univocal interpretation of the Quran and rules over almost every aspect of the daily life of a Muslim.

> 2During this period, the majority of Afghans could only access the internet through telephone lines in neighboring Pakistan. Moreover, when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, Afghanistan’s only radio station was ransacked and its library of music was destroyed.

2
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States launched the Operation Enduring Freedom, whose objective was to break apart the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan. The operation encompassed two decades of intense conflict between the U.S. allies and the Taliban militias until 2021, when the U.S. government withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. Seizing this opportunity, the Taliban abruptly regained complete territorial control of Afghanistan in 2021. Their rule, once again, restricted access to information, and women’s access to education and labor markets (Amnesty International 2023, United Nations 2023a, United Nations 2023b).

To examine the impacts of extremism exposure on refugees’ integration, we utilize a unique census of Afghan refugees living in Tajikistan in 2023.<sup>3</sup> Tajikistan has an open border with Afghanistan, and has accommodated nearly 9,532 Afghan refugees and asylumseekers after the events of 2021 (UNHCR 2023). For this purpose, the census interviewed all Afghan refugee households registered with the United Nations Refugee Agency office in Tajikistan.<sup>4</sup> Our empirical strategy compares the integration outcomes of refugees who experienced to extremism the and sudden dramatic shift varying exposure generated by exogenous in Taliban’s territorial control in their province of birth between 2017 and 2021. During this period, the Taliban’s territorial control abruptly shifted from 19 to 100 percent of the we the outcomes of Afghan territory. Specifically, compare integration refugees living in Tajikistan in 2023, that had similar characteristics before the migration episode, but who were born in provinces that experienced diverse shocks in Taliban territorial control between 2017 and 2021. To do this, our main specification controls for a rich

> 3The census was collected by the project Enhancing Government capacity in hosting temporarily Afghan refugees with focus on socio-economic resilience and gender issues, under the Rapid Social Response Program (RSR), multi-donor Trust Fund of the World Bank. The objective of that project was to identify opportunities for refugee integration in Tajikistan. The census was collected with the objective of understanding the profile of Afghan refugees, their current socio-economic outcomes, as well as their needs and potential vulnerabilities to support their integration.

> 4After their arrival, refugees are entitled to primary and secondary education, employment on legal basis, healthcare, and residence in Tajikistan until the final consideration of their migration status case.

3
set of demographics using retrospective information for the pre-migration period, while refugees still lived in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban’s take over. They include individual characteristics—such as age, gender, employment status, student status, and number of friends in Tajikistan before migrating; and household demographics, encompassing 34 variables characterizing household demographics, dwelling characteristics, income, and asset ownership.

Our primary analysis explores the effects of exposure to extremism on refugee integration, including both social and economic integration, using the rich set of outcome variables collected in the census. We also complement this analysis examining the effects of extremism on secondary outcomes including educational attainment, mental health, income and consumption, and labor market-related variables. For each outcome, we estimate effects on individual related variables and also combine them in an index outcome variable to gain precision.

Our data on Taliban’s territorial control between 2017 and 2021 comes from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal. It encompasses information on the districts controlled by the Taliban, U.S. allies, and contested territories between the two factions. The data set combines information from NATO, press reports, government agencies, and the Taliban itself. From these, we create district-yearly data that reflect the territorial control in Afghanistan from 2017 to 2021, classifying each district into three categories: Taliban-controlled, U.S. allies-controlled, and contested territories between both groups. Using this categorization we estimate the share of the territory controlled by each of the factions by province and year in Afghanistan between 2017 and 2021. We then utilize the census data to determine the province of birth for each Afghan refugee living in Tajikistan in 2021 and merge this information to calculate our three treatment variables, which include: the average share of a province that was Taliban-controlled, U.S. alliescontrolled, or contested between the two factions for each individual’s province of birth 4
# between 2017 and 2021.

The intuition behind analyzing these three treatment variables is to carry out a test of consistency. Given the actions taken by the Taliban in Afghanistan, we hypothesize that the effects of exposure to Taliban territorial control should be negative on the outcomes we examine. Moreover, we expect that the impacts of exposure to the territorial control of U.S. allies should be at least neutral and possibly positive in some of the outcomes we study (such as educational attainment) considering that more liberal education policies were established promoting information access and supporting female education (Alvi-Aziz 2008, AREU 2016). Moreover, we expect to observe detrimental effects of refugees’ exposure to contested territories, as documented extensively in the conflict literature (Bertoni et al. 2019, Dabalen and Paul 2012, Le ́on 2012, Diwakar 2015). Characterizing the size of these effects would be informative on their relevance to refugees’ lives.

Our results suggest that refugees’ exposure to Taliban’s territorial control has detrimental for their in host communities. The of these effects consequences integration magnitude are substantial. Our findings indicate that for every one-unit increase in the average share of exposure to the Taliban regime, the integration index of refugees is reduced by 0.56 standard deviations. This index is derived from six variables that the gauge refugees’ sense of belonging in their host communities and the number of friends they have in individual estimations of the effects of Taliban in each of Tajikistan. Notably, exposure the six variables consistently point to negative impacts across all the studied factors. We also document negative effects of refugees’ exposure to contested territories and positive effects of refugees’ exposure to U.S. allies territorial control. Yet, these effects are not statistically significant.

Regarding the effects of Taliban, U.S. allies, and contested territories exposure on other secondary outcomes, we also observe statistically significant effects of our treatment variables on educational attainment and mental health. Specifically, in terms of educational 5
attainment, an increase in the average share of exposure to Taliban presence by one unit (i.e., Taliban has 100% territorial control in the province of birth of the refugee between 2017 and 2021), results in a decrease of 18.5 percentage points in the likelihood that the refugee has received some level of education. Furthermore, an examination of the heteffects of Taliban’s reveals that these erogeneous exposure by gender negative impacts are observed solely among women. The findings align with reductions in the likelihood of being literate and having primary or secondary education, and is also reflected by an index that combines all of these education-related variables. Our analysis reveals, as expected, that exposure to contested territories has negative effects on refugee educational attainment. However, the magnitude of these effects is approximately half the size of the impacts observed for exposure to the Taliban’s territorial control. On the other hand, the effects of exposure to U.S. allies on refugee educational attainment are distinctly positive across all the variables related to educational outcomes that we examined.

Lastly, we examine the impacts of Taliban exposure on mental health outcomes. Our estimates reveal that for every one-unit increase in the average share of exposure to Taliban presence, the likelihood that a refugee reports mental health issues increases by 7.5 percentage points. These effects are large and correspond to an increment of 46 percent of the mean mental health issues observed among refugees in our sample. The effects are also robust and consistently indicate a higher prevalence of mental health problems across all the variables we use as proxies for mental health status.

Our main results on the detrimental impacts of exposure to Taliban territorial control on refugees’ outcomes remain robust across a number of robustness tests. For example, our results hold after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing and after imposing several control-variable restrictions. We exclude variables such as employment and education status while in Afghanistan, and add controls for measurements of social desirability bias. Moreover, we apply multiple sample restrictions such as excluding from the sample 6
individuals born in provinces where the Taliban had more than 50 percent of territorial control before 2017. The rationale for doing so is to net out any potential endogeneity coming from the location of choice of the migrant’s families prior to the individual’s birth. Our results are robust to these various test and adjustments.

Our results are informative for hosting countries, humanitarian, and development organizations supporting refugees after forced migration has taken place. Our conclusions suggest that refugees who have been exposed to extremism might require tailored additional support to support their integration in hosting communities. Moreover, they might be disproportionately affected by mental health issues and will require additional guidance to improve female education.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature highlighted below.

_Conflict and integration._ There is a growing evidence on the effect of conflict on refugees’ social capital. These studies document that individuals exposed to conflict tend to be more altruistic and prosocial towards their neighbors (Becchetti, Conzo and Romeo 2014, Bowles 2009, Voors et al. 2012, Bauer et al. 2016, Jakiela and Ozier 2019, Cassar, Healy and Von Kessler 2017), more egalitarian towards in-group members (Bauer et al. 2014), and tend to increase their social participation by joining more local social and civic groups or taking on more leadership roles in their communities (Bellows and Miguel 2006, Bellows and Miguel 2009, Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014, Bauer et al. 2016, Blattman and Annan 2010).<sup>5</sup> However, few studies examine how refugees’ previous conflict exposure can affect their willingness to integrate in a new country, despite the importance of refugees’ integration on their economic assimilation in the host country. We advance this agenda by examining the effects of exposure to extremism and liberal ideologies on refugees’ integration sentiments in their host communities. In fact, we also document that the impact of conflict on refugee integration is harmful, but only about half as severe as the impact

> 5In contrast Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found that Americans who had a traumatic experience are much less likely to claim they “trust” others.

7
of exposure to extremist ideologies.

_Conflict and education._ Work in this area generally documents that conflict is detrimental for educational attainment (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004, Blattman and Annan 2010, Shemyakina 2011, Shemyakina 2011, Dabalen and Paul 2012, Le ́on 2012, Justino, Leone and Salardi 2014, Verwimp and Bavel 2014, Diwakar 2015, Swee 2015, Diwakar 2015, Singh and Shemyakina 2016, Bertoni et al. 2019, Efendic, Kovac and Shapiro 2022). Mechanisms driving these effects include the deterioration of school infrastructure, worse mental health outcomes (Br ̈uck, Di Maio and Miaari 2019), substitution effects between education and income (Justino, Leone and Salardi 2014), and child recruitment for war (Swee 2015). We add to this literature by analyzing the effects of being exposed to conflict and to extremist ideologies separately. The context of this paper is helpful in identifying the persistence of these effects after the individuals moved to a country that is not affected by conflict, where there is no school infrastructure deterioration. Moreover, our results also suggest opposite effects of being exposed to liberal education policies before migrating.

_Conflict and mental health._ Related literature in this area shows that exposure to armed conflict has been widely associated with negative mental health consequences (Boscarino 2006). Studies have documented that individuals exposed to violence show more symptoms of anxiety (Moya 2018), depression (Londono, Romero and Casas 2009), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Yehuda 2002, Espi ́e et al. 2012), relative to the individuals who have not been exposed to violence.<sup>6</sup> We advance this work by examining the role of exposure to extremist ideologies on the mental health of forced migrants.

> _Impacts of forced displacement._ This group of studies document that forced migrants usually live in conditions inferior to their pre-migration situation (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013, 6See Mesa-Vieira et al. (2022) for a detailed literature review on the effect of pre-migration exposure to armed conflict on migrant’s mental health. The migrant’s income in the host country and the migrant’s characteristics (Favara et al. 2022, Murthy and Lakshminarayana 2006) are correlated with the prevalence of mental health disorders. Particularly, poor, younger and female migrants have a higher propensity to experience mental health disorders.

8
Ib ́a ̃nez and Moya 2010).<sup>7</sup> An important number of these studies have focused on the impact of the European forced migration from events related to WWII instead of the prominent civil wars in the African continent or violence in the Middle East (Matti Sarvim ̈aki 2009, Kondylis 2010 Falck, Heblich and Link 2011, Bauer, Braun and Kvasnicka 2013). We contribute to this literature by providing evidence of the impacts of extremism for forcibly displaced migrants in a developing hosting country, where the vast majority of refugees live worldwide.

_Afghanistan’s conflict._ This literature examines the effects of the insurgent violence on electoral outcomes (Condra et al. 2018, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2017), economic risk, mobile money, saving preferences (Callen et al. 2014, Blumenstock et al. 2021, Blumenstock, Callen and Ghani 2018), international and government aid (Child 2019), security transition dynamics (Trebbi and Weese 2019), and the rise of opium production (Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2014). We contribute to this line of work, by examining how exposure to extremism and Western values impacts Afghan’s integration behaviors, income and consumption, labor market variables, educational attainment, and mental health.<sup>8</sup>

# **II CONTEXT: AFGHAN REFUGEES IN TAJIKISTAN**

# **II.A Afghanistan’s Conflict: 2001-2021**

The United States and its allies their in in October began military presence Afghanistan 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States (CFR 2021). In response to the attacks, President George W. Bush launched the combat mission Operation Enduring Freedom to dismantle Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime from power. Over the next two decades, the U.S. government led a coalition in an effort to stabilize Afghanistan, establish a democratic government, and develop Afghan security forces capable of main-

> 7See Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013) for a detailed literature review.

> 8Some other studies in Afghanistan have concentrated on evaluating which methodologies are better to use for program targeting, and for the detection of unobserved coalitions of militants in conflict areas (Aiken et al. 2023, Trebbi and Weese 2019); the role of government’s information campaigns on civilian security cooperation (Aiken et al. 2023), and electoral fraud (Callen and Long 2015), and the effects of differences in electoral systems on voter behavior, political selection, and policy outcomes (Beath et al. 2016)

9
taining stability in the country (Bereiter 2020).

As the years passed, the conflict in Afghanistan proved to be a protracted and challenging endeavor. The insurgency led by the Taliban persisted, despite the considerable investment in terms of troops, resources, and financial aid by the allied nations. As a result, in February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement, which outlined a framework for the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan (CFR 2020). The agreement stated that the U.S. would gradually reduce its military presence, with a complete withdrawal planned by May 2021, conditional upon the Taliban meeting certain commitments such as reducing violence and engaging in peace talks with the Afghan government.

In line with the Doha the U.S. and its NATO allies initiated the of Agreement, process withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan in May 2021. The withdrawal involved a phased approach, with coalition forces handing over security responsibilities to Afghan forces (CFR 2020). However, as the withdrawal progressed, the Taliban launched offensives and rapidly captured territory across the country. By mid-August 2021, the situation on the ground deteriorated significantly, and the Afghan security forces faced numerous challenges. The Taliban’s advances were swift, and they eventually took control of Kabul, the capital city, on August 15, 2021 (CFR 2023). The collapse of the Afghan government occurred much faster than anticipated, and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. The swift takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban marked a significant turning point, as they regained the control of the country after being ousted by the U.S.-led coalition over 20 years. The fall of the Afghan government led to a significant humanitarian crisis, with many Afghans fearing reprisals from the Taliban and attempting to flee the country.

# **II.B The Taliban’s Ideology and Policies**

The Taliban, an Islamist fundamentalist group historically engaged in the pursuit of governance in Afghanistan, ascended to power in 1996, establishing the Islamic Emirate of 10
Afghanistan (NCTC 2023). During their administration, Mullah Mohammad Omar, as the head of the state, oversaw the implementation of a stringent interpretation of Sharia law. Following the expulsion of the Taliban from power by the United States in 2001, their primary focus shifted towards territorial expansion, involving confrontations with foreign troops and government forces. This expansionist agenda was pursued through tactics such as assassinations, bomb attacks, and other coercive measures aimed at compelling civilian compliance (Clark and Bjelica 2018).

Between 2003 and 2005, the Taliban strategically aimed to mobilize support to expand and popularize an insurgency across Afghanistan, progressively gaining control, influence, and support. This calculated effort was designed to erode the connections between communities and the government (Clark and Bjelica 2018). In 2006, the Taliban introduced their inaugural code of conduct, characterized by egregious human rights abuses, restrictions on personal freedoms, and the deprivation of fundamental rights to women and minorities (U.S Department of State 2009). Notably, the group’s governance is distinguished by the imposition of a severe interpretation of Islamic law, leading to various restrictive measures, some of the key features of their governance include: _Restrictions on education and health care:_ The Taliban declared teaching in government schools illegal, imposing harsh punishments. Teachers faced warnings, and if deemed necessary, physical beatings. A stringent directive stipulated that those who continued to instruct contrary to Islamic principles could face severe consequences, including lethal measures (Clark 2010). Although education was allowed, it was constrained to mosques or similar institutions, utilizing specific textbooks from the jihad or Emirate era, taught by individuals with religious training. Schools, if deemed necessary, were subject to closure and even destruction. In contrast to education, the Taliban did not view the health service as a political issue, recognizing the utility of clinics to their cause, unlike state schools (Clark and Bjelica 2018).

11
_Restrictions on service delivery:_ The Taliban instituted parallel governmental structures, establishing commissions for education, health, agriculture, trade and commerce, financial affairs, and NGOs. These entities sought to co-opt the services of government, NGOs, and private companies at the local level, employing financial influence and control to align them with Islamic ideology (Clark and Bjelica 2018). They appropriated aid resources, imposing their ideological mandates.

_Restrictions for women:_ The Taliban enforced a strict dress code mandating women to cover themselves entirely in public. Women were prohibited from pursuing education beyond a specified age and grade level, with restrictions on subjects such as science, mathematics, and certain social sciences. Additionally, girls were banned from attending schools and universities, and women were barred from most professions, including teaching. Institutions catering to girls faced severe consequences, including closures, destruction, and harassment.

_Restrictions on personal freedom:_ The Taliban regulated various facets of daily life, instituting bans on activities such as listening to music, watching television, flying kites, and playing certain sports.

_Religious police:_ The Taliban maintained a dedicated religious police force tasked with enforcing their interpretation of Islamic law. This force played a crucial role in ensuring strict adherence to their moral code.

The U.S. between 2001 to 2021 a role in the life presence played significant improving of the Afghan population that resided in districts controlled by the U.S. allies. With the support of international aid and organizations, numerous schools and universities were established or reopened, providing educational opportunities for girls and women (Amnesty 2004). The number of girls attending school increased significantly, and female literacy rates showed improvement. Women also gained access to higher education and pursued various academic disciplines (UNESCO 2023). Additionally, initiatives were 12
launched to train and support female teachers, providing them with the necessary skills and resources to educate girls effectively (PBS 2006). These efforts aimed to empower women through education and promote gender equality in Afghanistan.

However, the restrictions persisted in areas where the Taliban kept control or held influence. In rural areas where the population was more conservative, the societal barriers limited girls and diminished minorities’ rights. Opposition groups in Afghanistan also attempted to frustrate educational development efforts (Narang and Stanton 2017). For example, the Taliban waged an active campaign of violence against educational institutions. The attacks were justified by the arguments that the educational curriculum in schools was influenced by the Western ideology, teachers delivered political lectures, imposed secularization, penetration of Christianity, and failure to enforce the veil (HRW 2006, Jackson and Giustozzi 2012).

# **II.C Tajikistan’s Policies toward Afghan Refugees**

The Republic of Tajikistan is a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the Convention against torture and other inhuman and degrading forms of treatment and punishment (UNHCR 2021). The country has also enacted a Refugee Law, initially adopted in 1994 and subsequently revised in 2014, which aligns with most international standards. Notably, it includes provisions against penalizing individuals who enter the nation without legal authorization to seek asylum. Moreover, it commits to not returning individuals to a jurisdiction where they would encounter severe harm. However, the present national legislation does impose limitations on the freedom of movement for refugees within Tajikistan. Resolutions 325 and 328, for instance, limit the residency options for refugees, primarily restricting them to areas within the Districts of Republican Subordination, such as Vahdat, Rudaki, Hissor, and Kushoniyon, along with the Jabbor Rasulov district in the Sughd region. It is important to note that refugees and asylum seekers who arrived after the year 2000 face further 13
restrictions. They are prohibited from settling in Gorno-Badakhshan province and in specific districts, including Varzob, Jirgital, Pianj, Jaikhun, Farkhar, Hamadoni, Shamsiddini Shohin, Shaartuz, Kabodion, Jilikul, as well as several cities, including Dushanbe, Khujand, Bokhtar, Tursunzade, Ragun, Levakand, Kulob, Nurek, Buston, Guliston, Taboshar, Konibodom, Isfara, and Bobojon Ghafurov. These resolutions are strictly enforced by the government, and non-compliance can result in the rejection of asylum applications, the _de facto_ revocation of refugee status, detention, and administrative penalties, including deportation.

However, the implementation of these policies, aligned with international conventions, has not been consistently applied. In response to the worsening crisis in 2022, the Tajik government started to implement a closed border policy. This policy restricts access for asylum-seekers with valid Tajik visas. Additionally, attempts to seek asylum through illegal border crossings have become virtually impossible and are subject to penal punishment. These challenges stem from existing contradictions between the Refugee Law and the country’s Criminal Code (UNHCR 2023).

In the context of Tajikistan’s humanitarian efforts, Afghan refugees are granted access to primary and secondary education, contingent to a completion of a language program transitioning from Farsi to Tajik language. Additionally, they can engage in lawful employment, receive essential healthcare services, secure temporary residency within Tajikistan pending the resolution of their asylum applications, and establish connections with organizations dedicated to providing complimentary assistance to refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, they receive support in initiating appeals to the Prosecutor’s Office in cases involving mistreatment or human rights violations, as documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2021 (UNHCR 2023). However, it is worth noting that there exist certain constraints pertaining to private enterprises, which are obligated to incur substantial financial obligations for the sponsorship of work visas 14
on behalf of refugee beneficiaries.

# **III DATA**

# **III.A Data for Afghan Refugees in Tajikistan**

The primary dataset is a detailed census of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan carried out by the World Bank at the end of 2022, after the Taliban regained complete control of Afghanistan in 2021. The questionnaire administered to refugee families was comprehensive; it collected detailed information on the socio-economic background, migration history, labor market outcomes and current socio-economic situation of Afghan refugee household and their members, and some measures of socio-economic integration. The approximate duration of the interviews was about two hours. The sampling frame for the census is the administrative database of Afghan refugees registered with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Tajikistan. All households recorded in the registry were interviewed, leading to a total of 1,958 Afghan refugee households and 9,763 individuals. Figure 2 displays the dates of arrival of the refugees in the census. As shown in the figure, the vast majority of migrants arrived to Tajikistan in 2021 when the Taliban gained complete control of Afghanistan.

We first use these data to describe the main socioeconomic characteristics of the population of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan and illustrate general patterns, as described in Appendix A. As shown in Figure A.1, the refugee population is disproportionately young and in working age. In terms of individual characteristics, the average age of refugees is approximately 25 years—with males being younger. Refugees have literacy rates close to 90 percent overall, but literacy is higher among males than females. Refugees completed 6 of formal education on with about 1 of difference between males years average, year and females (see Figure A.2).

Using this data, we also characterize the labor market situation of refugees before and after migrating to Tajikistan in Figure A.3. The data suggests that refugees are less in15
tegrated in Tajik labor markets relative to their previous situation in Afghanistan. This is a typical characteristic of forcibly displaced populations as it naturally take time for them to recover their livelihood. Moreover, females have lower labor market participation rates, hours worked, and wages relative to men. We also see that student enrollment for individuals of schooling age is dramatically lower in Tajikistan relative to Afghanistan. Finally, not surprisingly, household size for refugees is smaller in Tajikistan, which likely originates from family separation due to forced displacement from Afghanistan.

**_Outcome variables._** Using the census data, we construct five index variables for each of the outcomes of interest: refugee integration, educational attainment, mental health, income and consumption, and labor market outcomes. Indexes for dichotomous variables were constructed as the average of all outcomes. Indexes that include continuous variables were constructed standardizing each variable, averaging all variables, and stanthe once The to construct indexes was dardizing average again. methodology adopted from Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). Appendix B.A describes in detail all the variables included in each of the indexes. In sum, each of the indexes comprises the following:

_Integration index:_ Includes four variables that measure the feelings of belonging of refugees in Tajikistan. These are measured using a Likert scale. It also includes two additional variables that record the number of local and refugee friends that refugees have in Tajikistan. Because some variables are continuous the index is constructed following the methodology outlined in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).

_Educational attainment index:_ is calculated as the of four dichotomous variables average including being literate, having some formal education, completing primary, and completing secondary.

_Mental health index:_ averages four dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the individual feels little interest in doing things, had sleeping troubles, had poor appetite or over eating, had suicidal thoughts, or received mental health assistance.

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_Income and consumption index:_ includes the logarithm of monthly household income and consumption. Because these variables are continuous the index is constructed following the methodology outlined in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).

_Labor market index:_ includes a dichotomous variable for employment, and the logarithm of monthly wages and weekly hours worked.

Descriptive statistics for each of the outcomes and their components variables are described in Table 1.

# **III.B Data for the Taliban’s Geographical Presence**

To obtain information on the Taliban’s we online data geographical presence, scraped from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal on the districts controlled by Taliban, by U.S. Allies, and contested territories between the two groups.<sup>9</sup> The data includes a yearly evolution of the territorial control in Afghanistan. The classification is based on open-source information from NATO’s data in Afghanistan, press reports, information provided by government agencies, and the Taliban. To categorize the districts, they identify who provides government services, ensures security within the district, administers the district openly, and oversees local courts (see Appendix B.B for a detail description of the variable’s construction).<sup>10</sup> Figures 3 to 5 report province-yearly changes in the share of districts controlled by the Taliban, the U.S. allies, and the contested districts in dispute between the Taliban and the U.S. allies.<sup>11</sup> As seen in the figures, Taliban control was relatively stable from 2017 through 2019, after which drastic shifts took place across regions, in parallel with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

> 9The Foundation for Defense of Democracies is Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. It aims to strengthen US national security.

> 10The LJW data aligns with the territorial control analyses conducted by SIGAR and U.S. ForcesAfghanistan, which effectively tracks Taliban-controlled and contested districts by evaluating 5 indicators of stability, including governance, security, infrastructure, economy, and communications (Roggio 2017). 11More granular data is illustrated in Figures A.5 and A.6, which depict the district-yearly geographical distribution of Taliban controlled, U.S. allies controlled, and contested districts in Afghanistan.

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# **IV EMPIRICAL STRATEGY**

# **IV.A Measures of Taliban, U.S. Allies, and Contested Territories Exposure**

For each individual in our sample, we construct a measure of exposure to Taliban ( _ET_ ), exposure to U.S. allies ( _EA_ ), and exposure to contested territories between the two sides of the conflict ( _EC_ ) using the data from 2017 until 2021. For this purpose, we employ the district of origin and the location of the Taliban, U.S. allies, and contested territories during this period.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, we construct _ET_ , _EA_ , and _EC_ as: Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. The variables were constructed so that they can only take a maximum value of one and a minimum value of zero. For the case of Taliban exposure, for example, _ETi_ can be interpreted as the average share of territorial control that the Taliban had in the province of birth of individual _i_ during the five years between 2017 and 2021. The refugees in our sample have had more exposure to U.S. allies territorial control (mean: 0.60), than Taliban exposure (mean: 0.25), and exposure to contested territories (mean: 0.16). This is intuitive as most refugees are fleeing the Taliban and its policies, hence we expect to have fewer refugees from regions that have been dominated by the Taliban completely throughout the period of study. Fig12Appendix B.B describes in detail how we construct each of the treatment variables.

18
ures A.7 and A.9 show for the treatment variables and of the location histograms maps of origin of refugees in our sample. They confirm that there is sufficient variation in the treatment variables as well as on the province of origin in Afghanistan of the refugees surveyed in the census used for this study. The vast majority of changes in Taliban and U.S. allies territorial control occurred during 2020 and 2021 (see Figures 2 and 3). As such, the variation in our measure of exposure comes primarily from these two years.

# **IV.B Identification strategy**

We examine the impacts of Taliban exposure, U.S. allies exposure, and contested territories exposure on refugees’ outcomes using the following specifications: where _Yij_ represents our outcomes of interest including measures of i) integration (our primary outcome), ii) educational attainment, iii) mental health, iv) income and consumption, and v) labor market outcomes (ii to v describe our secondary outcomes). For each outcome, we evaluate the effects on multiple related variables and also combine them in an index to gain precision. The variables included in each of the indexes are summarized in Panels B, C, and D of Table 1, and described in Appendix B.A.<sup>13</sup>

> 13Indexes for dichotomous variables were constructed as the average of all outcomes. Indexes that include continuous variables were constructed standardizing each variable, averaging all variables, and standardizing the average once again. The methodology to construct indexes was adopted from Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007).

19
By comparing a measure of territorial control from 2017 to 2021 for all the refugees, in the same time period, we isolate endogeneity coming from refugees’ migration date to Tajikistan. Moreover, to account for potential differences in individual characteristics that could bias our results, we control for a rich set of demographics _Xi_ and _Zi_ . Those include variables not affected by the migration shock and collected using retrospective information on the pre-migration period, while in Afghanistan before the Taliban’s take over. _Xi_ is a vector of individual demographics which includes age, gender, employment status in Afghanistan, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends in Tajikistan before migrating. _Zi_ is a vector of household demographics listed in Panel B of Table 2. Those include households size, dwelling characteristics, income, and asset ownership. Our sample of interest is restricted to the forced migrants that only lived in the province where they were born and includes roughly 5,590 individuals. The intuition for restricting the sample to these individuals is to isolate endogeneity coming from migration decisions while in Afghanistan. The next section presents multiple tests to assess the robustness of our results.

# **V IMPACTS OF EXTREMISM ON REFUGEES’ OUTCOMES**

Our main results are presented in Tables 3 through 7. The reported estimates correspond to the coefficients of interest _α_ 1, _β_ 1, and _γ_ 1 of the specifications described in equations (4), (5), and (6). Each coefficient corresponds to an independent regression. In each table column (1) presents the estimated coefficients for the general index constructed based on all the remaining outcomes listed in the horizontal axis. All the tables have three panels. Panel A presents the results for equations (4) examining the effects of exposure to the Taliban presence. Panel B presents the results from estimating equation (5) that assesses the effects of to contested territories. Panel C the results for exposure Finally, presents equation (6) examining the effects of exposure to U.S. allies.

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# **V.A Impacts of exposure to Taliban territorial control on refugees’ integration**

Table 3 summarizes the effects of Taliban, contested territories, and U.S. allies exposure on refugees’ integration in Tajikistan. All estimates show strong adverse effects of Taliban exposure on refugee integration. These effects are robust to multiple hypothesis testing, as illustrated by the False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values reported in brackets (see Panel A). Specifically, the estimates presented in Panel A and column 1 indicate that a one-unit increase in the average share of exposure to Taliban presence (i.e., 100% presence in the province of birth between 2017 and 2021) leads to a reduction of 0.56 standard deviations in the integration index of refugees.

We also document mixed results, some of which are not statistically significant, regarding the effects of exposure to contested territories, as reflected in Panel B. The coefficients show both positive and negative values. Interestingly, we find that all coefficients flip sign and become positive when examining the effects of refugee exposure to U.S. allies’ presence. However, it is important to note that these effects are not statistically significant (see Panel C).

_Robustness and heterogeneous effects._ Table C.1 includes estimates of the effects of Taliban exposure on refugee integration while incorporating an additional control measuring social desirability, as assessed by Crowne (1964). Our main results remain robust even after including this additional control in the analysis. Moreover, the main results are robust to excluding the provinces that had more than 50 percent of Taliban control in 2017 (Table C.3). The idea behind this exercise is to rule out that the main results effects are driven by the endogenous selection of the migrant’s families in regions with the highest Taliban exposure before 2017.<sup>14</sup> Finally, Table D.2 investigates potential heterogeneous effects of Taliban We do not evidence for differential effects exposure by gender. find by gender groups.

> 14We also carry out the same test for the outcomes of educational attainment and mental health. All of the estimates effects remain unchanged.

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# **V.B Impacts of exposure to Taliban territorial control on educational attainment**

Table 4 reports estimates for the effects of refugees’ exposure to Taliban, contested territories, and U.S. allies on refugees’ educational attainment. First, this reveals that the impact of Taliban exposure is negative across four variables we examined: literacy, formal schooling attendance, primary education completion, and secondary education completion. However, it is worth noting that the estimated effects do not reach statistical significance for the completion of primary education. Nevertheless, when we combine these four variables into an education index (computed as their average), we observe enhanced precision, allowing us to document the significant negative effects of Taliban exposure on the education index. These effects are both substantial and meaningful. For instance, the coefficients in column (3) and Panel A indicate that a one-unit increase in the average share of exposure to Taliban presence (representing 100% presence in the province of birth during the five years between 2017 and 2021) is associated with an 18.5 percentage point decrease in the share of individuals with some level of education.

The estimates further demonstrate strong and adverse effects of refugee exposure to contested territories on educational attainment. However, one should note that the magnitude of these effects is approximately half the size of those observed for Taliban exposure. This indicates that while both conflict and extremism exposure influence educational attainment negatively, the impact of extremism is significantly more detrimental than that of conflict.

Furthermore, we find positive effects of U.S. allies exposure on all the education-related outcomes examined. This finding aligns with the inclusive education policies that the U.S. and its allies supported in the regions under their territorial control.

_Robustness and heterogeneous effects._ All the aforementioned effects are robust to multiple hypothesis testing, as evidenced by the False Discovery Rate q-values reported in brackets below each coefficient. As shown in Table C.2, the main results are also robust to 22
excluding controls for student status and employment in Afghanistan, which could be highly correlated with educational outcomes under examination. Additionally, Table D.1 investigates potential heterogeneous effects of Taliban exposure by gender and confirms that the negative effects are exclusively observed for women. This finding aligns directly with the restrictions imposed by the Taliban on women’s education. Lastly, in D.4, we conducted a replication of the estimates presented in Table 4, but this time, we split the sample into two groups: individuals below and above 25 years of age. The rationale for doing so is to investigate whether the effects are disproportionately observed for individuals of traditional The results indicate that the effects are schooling age. negative concentrated individuals who are older than 25 of This that among years age. suggests this particular group might have been obliged to drop or abandon educational programs in their pursuit to increase educational attainment after they fled Afghanistan (see Table D.4).

# **V.C Impacts of exposure to Taliban territorial control on mental health**

Table 5 provides a summary of the effects of Taliban, contested territories, and U.S. allies exposure on mental health. Larger and positive values of any variable in the table indicate a higher prevalence of mental health issues, while vice versa suggests fewer mental health problems. The results predominantly indicate adverse effects of exposure to Taliban presence on mental health. these estimated effects remain robust even refugee Importantly, after undergoing multiple hypothesis testing. Additionally, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial and meaningful.

For instance, the coefficients in column (1) and Panel A indicate that a one-unit increase in the average share of exposure to Taliban presence (representing 100% presence in the province of birth during the five years between 2017 and 2021) is associated with a 7.5 percentage point increase in the share of refugees reporting mental health issues.

Moreover, the point estimates also suggest negative effects of refugee exposure to con23
tested territories and positive effects of refugee exposure to U.S. allies on mental health. However, it is worth noting that these effects are not statistically significant.

_Robustness and heterogeneous effects._ Table D.3 investigates potential heterogeneous effects of Taliban and indicates that there are no mental health differential exposure by gender effects.

# **V.D Income, consumption, and labor market access**

we examine the effects of Taliban U.S allies and contested Finally, exposure, exposure territories in labor market-related and income-related outcomes in Tables 6 and 7, rethe results effects of Taliban on these spectively. Although suggest negative exposure variables, the coefficients are not statistically significant potentially suggesting precision issues rather than null effects.

# **VI DISCUSSION**

This paper examines the effects of refugees’ exposure to religious extremism on refugees’ integration, educational attainment, mental health, income, and labor markets. For this we data from a census collected in which interviews all the purpose, employ Tajikistan Afghan refugees that fled their country after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021. Refugees’ exposure to Taliban presence is constructed as an average measure of the share of the territory controlled by the Taliban in the province of origin of each refugee between 2017 and 2021. We also contrast the effects of Taliban with refugees’ exposure that of U.S allies and contested territories exposure.

Our findings suggest that refugee exposure to extremism has significant and adverse implications for their integration, educational attainment, and mental health. Conversely, exposure to U.S. allies tends to have positive effects on these outcomes, although the effects are generally less precise. With regard to the detrimental effects of Taliban exposure on educational attainment, our expectations are confirmed, as these effects are primarily driven by a reduction in female education attainment. Furthermore, the negative impact 24
is particularly relevant for women above the age of 25 years.

Taken together, these results highlight the importance of understanding the differential effects of different of on and educational types exposure refugees’ well-being development, especially with regards to gender-specific and age-specific considerations. Such insights can inform policymakers and humanitarian efforts aimed at supporting refugees’ successful integration and well-being.

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# Figure 1. Taliban’s Territorial Control in Afghanistan

<!-- Start of picture text --> Pre-9/11 - 2000 Post-U.S. Invasion - Early 2002<br>!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !(!( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( Kabul !( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(!( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( Kabul !( !(!( !( !(!( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !( Province Status None or InsignificantTaliban Control !( !( !( !( Province Status None or Insignificant<br>!( !( !( Capital Status !(!( Taliban ControlNothern Alliance !( !( !( Capital Status Minimal Taliban Influence (-25%)Moderate Taliban Influence (+/-50%)<br>!( Government<br>Pre-Surge - Early 2009 Post-U.S. Troop Surge - 2012<br>!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( Kabul !( !( !( !( !( !( !( Kabul !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !( Province Status !( !( !( !(<br>!( None or Insignificant !(<br>!( !( Minimal Taliban Influence (-25%) !( !( Province Status<br>!( Moderate Taliban Influence (+/-50%) !( None or Insignificant<br>High Taliban Influence (+75%) Minimal Taliban Influence (-25%)<br>!( !( !( Capital Status !( Contested !( !( !( Capital Status Moderate Taliban Influence (+/-50%)<br>!( Government !( Government<br>Withdrawal - June 20, 2021 Endgame - Aug 15, 2021 - Sept 6, 2021<br>!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( Kabul !( !( !( !( !( !( !( Kabul !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( !( Province Status !( !( !( !(<br>!( !( !( None or InsignificantMinimal Taliban Influence (-25%) !( !( !( Province Status<br>!( Moderate Taliban Influence (+/-50%) !( Taliban Control<br>!( !( !( Capital Status !( High Taliban Influence (+75%)Contested !( !( !( Capital Status !( Taliban Control<br>!( Government<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Data comes from the FDD’S Long War Journal
Figure 2. Arrival Data of Afghan Refugees in Tajikistan in 2023 <!-- Start of picture text --> 1200<br>1000<br>800<br>600<br>400<br>200<br>0<br>Afghans Inflows to Tajikistan<br>2017m1 2017m7 2018m1 2018m7 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1 2020m7 U.S Withdrawal 2021m1 2021m7 2022m1 2022m7 2023m1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Date _Source:_ Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021.
Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of Taliban Exposure in Afghanistan <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Taliban Presence in 2017 Share of Taliban Presence in 2018<br>0.000 0.000<br>0.001 - 0.142 0.001 - 0.142<br>0.143 - 0.190 0.143 - 0.190<br>0.191 - 0.335 0.191 - 0.335<br>0.336 - 0.571 0.336 - 0.571<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Taliban Presence in 2019 Share of Taliban Presence in 2020<br>0.000 0.000<br>0.001 - 0.142 0.001 - 0.142<br>0.143 - 0.190 0.143 - 0.190<br>0.191 - 0.335 0.191 - 0.335<br>0.336 - 0.571 0.336 - 0.571<br>Share of Taliban Presence in July 2021<br>0.000<br>0.001 - 0.142<br>0.143 - 0.190<br>0.191 - 0.335 Share of Taliban Presence in Aug. 2021<br>0.336 - 0.909 1<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Taliban exposure is defined as the total number of districts with Taliban presence over the total number of districts in the province.
Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of U.S. Allies Exposure in Afghanistan <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in 2017<br>0.000<br>0.001 - 0.333<br>0.334 - 0.500<br>0.501 - 0.720<br>0.721 - 1.000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in 2018<br>0.071<br>0.072 - 0.333<br>0.334 - 0.500<br>0.501 - 0.720<br>0.721 - 1.000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in 2019<br>0.000<br>0.001 - 0.333<br>0.334 - 0.500<br>0.501 - 0.720<br>0.721 - 1.000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in 2020<br>0.000<br>0.001 - 0.333<br>0.334 - 0.500<br>0.501 - 0.720<br>0.721 - 1.000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in July 2021<br>0.000 - 0.067<br>0.068 - 0.200<br>0.201 - 0.308<br>0.309 - 0.571<br>0.572 - 1.000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Government Presence in Aug. 2021<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Allies exposure is defined as the total number of districts with U.S. presence over the total number of districts in the province.
Figure 5. Geographical Distribution of Contested Territories in Afghanistan <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Contested Provinces in 2017 Share of Contested Provinces in 2018<br>0.000 0.000<br>0.001 - 0.150 0.001 - 0.150<br>0.151 - 0.285 0.151 - 0.285<br>0.286 - 0.375 0.286 - 0.375<br>0.376 - 1.000 0.376 - 0.857<br>Share of Contested Provinces in 2019 Share of Contested Provinces in 2020<br>0.000 0.000<br>0.001 - 0.150 0.001 - 0.150<br>0.151 - 0.285 0.151 - 0.285<br>0.286 - 0.375 0.286 - 0.375<br>0.376 - 0.867 0.376 - 0.867<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Share of Contested Provinces in July 2021 Share of Contested Provinces in Aug. 2021<br>0.000 0<br>0.001 - 0.150<br>0.151 - 0.285<br>0.286 - 0.375<br>0.376 - 0.933<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Contested territories is defined as the total number of districts with contested presence over the total number of districts in the province.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Treatment and Outcome Variables

||N|Mean|SD|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Treatment Variables_||||||
|Taliban exposure|5,592|0.25|0.08|0.20|0.59|
|U.S. allies exposure|5,592|0.60|0.27|0.00|0.80|
|Contested territories exposure|5,592|0.16|0.21|0.00|0.65|
|_Panel B. Outcomesfor Integration_||||||
|Integration index (SD)|5,592|0.00|0.93|-3.52|4.36|
|<br>Feel comfortable if your child socialize with host children (1-5)|5,285|3.97|0.73|1.00|5.00|
|<br>Feel welcomed in this city (1-5)|5,535|4.17|0.61|1.00|5.00|
|Feel part of this village (1-5)|5,469|4.06|0.71|1.00|5.00|
|Feel that Tajikistan is your home (1-5)|5,592|7.53|2.56|1.00|10.00|
|Number of refugee friends|5,592|4.20|6.83|0.00|100.00|
|Number of Tajikistan friends|5,589|2.26|3.89|0.00|50.00|
|_Panel C. Outcomesfor Educational Attainment_||||||
|Education index|5,592|0.60|0.23|0.00|0.75|
|Literate [=1]|5,592|0.91|0.29|0.00|1.00|
|Some education [=1]|5,592|0.85|0.36|0.00|1.00|
|Primary [=1]|5,592|0.14|0.35|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Secondary [=1]|5,592|0.49|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|_Panel D. Outcomesfor Mental Health_||||||
|Mental health issues index|5,590|0.16|0.19|0.00|1.00|
|Felt little interest in doing things [=1]|5,554|0.30|0.46|0.00|1.00|
|Had sleeping troubles [=1]|5,570|0.14|0.35|0.00|1.00|
|Had poor appetite or overeating [=1]|5,573|0.11|0.31|0.00|1.00|
|Suicidal thoughts [=1]|5,568|0.01|0.10|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Mental health assistance[=1]|259|0.77|0.42|0.00|1.00|
|_Panel E. Outcomesfor Labor Market Access_||||||
|Labor index (SD)|5,592|0.12|1.10|-0.47|2.72|
|Employed [=1]|5,592|0.22|0.41|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Monthly wage (somoni)|5,592|357|1,086|0.00|40,000|
|<br>Weeklyhours worked(somoni)|5,592|11.75|23.72|0.00|84.00|
|_Panel F. Outcomesfor Income and Consumption_||||||
|Income and consumption index (SD)|5,592|0.01|1.00|-7.03|8.29|
|<br>Monthly house income (somoni)|5,587|5,159|3,412|0.00|30,850|
|Monthlyconsumption(somoni)|5,592|11,151|234,477|0.00|12,000,000|
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

||N|Mean|SD|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Individual Controls (in Afghanistan)_||||||
|Age|5,592|33.65|15.66|14.00|98.00|
|Male [=1]|5,592|0.49|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|Student before migrating [=1]|5,592|0.31|0.46|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Employed [=1]|5,592|0.34|0.47|0.00|1.00|
|Friends in Tajikistan(before moving) [=1]|5,592|0.44|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|_Panel B. Household Variables (in Afghanistan)_||||||
|Household size|5,592|6.70|2.61|1.00|25.00|
|Own an enterprise in Afghanistan [=1]|5,592|0.05|0.22|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Own a dwelling [=1]|5,592|0.53|0.50|0.00|1.00|
|Dwelling contract: own it [=1]|5,592|0.01|0.09|0.00|1.00|
|Dwelling contract: pay rent or lease [=1]|5,592|0.98|0.13|0.00|1.00|
|Dwelling contract: consent with the owner [=1]|5,592|0.01|0.10|0.00|1.00|
|Dwelling: individual apartment or house [=1]|5,592|0.92|0.27|0.00|1.00|
|Dwelling: shared apartment or house [=1]|5,592|0.08|0.27|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Dwelling: temporary shelter, shack or tent [=1]|5,592|0.00|0.04|0.00|1.00|
|<br>Income from wage labor (Somoni)|5,592|29,628|73,163|0.00|1,555,000|
|<br>Income from self-employment (Somoni)|5,592|16,779|47,019|0.00|800,000|
|<br>Income from livestock or crops (Somoni)|5,592|1,593|16,205|0.00|300,000|
|Income from handcrafted products (Somoni)|5,592|317|2,452|0.00|60,000|
|<br>Income from remittances (Somoni)|5,592|2,711|13,513|0.00|350,000|
|Income from a loan (Somoni)|5,592|20,353|516,832|0.00|20,000,000|
|Number of refrigerators in the HH.|5,592|1.06|0.57|0.00|11.00|
|<br>Number of washing machine in the HH.|5,592|1.03|0.55|0.00|10.00|
|<br>Number of AC in the HH.|5,592|0.62|1.20|0.00|40.00|
|Number of fan in the HH.|5,592|1.63|1.25|0.00|10.00|
|Number of stoves in the HH.|5,592|1.46|1.13|0.00|15.00|
|Number of bread oven in the HH.|5,592|0.78|0.64|0.00|8.00|
|Number of gas heaters in the HH.|5,592|0.78|0.93|0.00|19.00|
|<br>Number of microwaves in the HH.|5,592|0.38|0.59|0.00|8.00|
|Number of radios in the HH.|5,592|0.48|0.80|0.00|22.00|
|Number of TVs in the HH.|5,592|1.66|1.00|0.00|15.00|
|Number of computers in the HH.|5,592|1.07|0.94|0.00|12.00|
|Number of bicycles in the HH.|5,592|0.80|0.91|0.00|6.00|
|<br>Number of motorbikes in the HH.|5,592|0.12|0.36|0.00|2.00|
|Number of cars and other vehicles in the HH.|5,592|0.62|1.06|0.00|44.00|
|Number of mobile phone in the HH.|5,592|3.12|1.96|0.00|50.00|
|<br>Sqm plot of land in the HH.|5,592|12.26|387|0.00|20,000.00|
|<br>Number of livestock or farm equipment in the HH.|5,592|4.37|83.28|0.00|2,000.00|
|<br>Number of place of business in the HH.|5,592|0.06|0.31|0.00|4.00|
|<br>Number of business assets in the HH.|5,592|0.07|0.78|0.00|30.00|
Table 3. Impacts of Extremism on Refugees’ Integration

|Variables in SD.|Integration<br>Index<br>(1)|Feel Comfortable if<br>your Child Socialize<br>with Host Children<br>(2)|Feel Welcomed<br>in this<br>City<br>(3)|Feel Part<br>of this<br>Village<br>(4)|Feel that<br>Tajikistan is<br>your Home<br>(5)|Number<br>of Refugee<br>Friends<br>(6)|Number of<br>Tajikistan<br>Friends<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||||
|_ETi_|-0.566***|-0.500***|-0.189*|-0.261*|-0.366**|-0.335**|-0.451***|
||(0.160)|(0.174)|(0.160)|(0.161)|(0.164)|(0.164)|(0.138)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.007]|[0.074]|[0.056]|[0.027]|[0.034]|[0.004]|
|R-squared|0.027|0.026|0.030|0.024|0.046|0.060|0.037|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||||
|_ECi_|-0.086|-0.090|-0.113|-0.091|0.034|-0.029|-0.051|
||(0.062)|(0.067)|-0.062|(0.063)|(0.064)|(0.063)|(0.054)|
|FDR q-values|[0.468]|[0.468]|[0.468]|[0.468]|[0.468]|[0.468]|[0.468]|
|R-squared|0.025|0.025|0.030|0.024|0.045|0.059|0.035|
|_Panel C. U.S.- Allies Exposure_||||||||
|_EAi_|0.103|0.098|0.084|0.079|0.012|0.047|0.071|
||(0.048)|(0.052)|(0.048)|(0.048)|(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.041)|
|FDR q-values|[0.167]|[0.167]|[0.167]|[0.167]|[0.299]|[0.167]|[0.167]|
|R-squared|0.025|0.025|0.030|0.024|0.045|0.059|0.036|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.002|-0.027|0.026|0.038|0.074|-0.007|-0.099|
|Observations|5,592|5,285|5,535|5,469|5,592|5,592|5,589|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ The Integration Index is constructed using the outcome variables of columns (ii) to (vii) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again. See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.
Table 4. Impacts of Extremism on Educational Attainment

||Education<br>Index<br>(1)|Literate [=1]<br>(2)|Some<br>Education [=1]<br>(3)|Primary [=1]<br>(4)|Secondary [=1]<br>(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||
|_ETi_|-0.136***|-0.073*|-0.185***|-0.019|-0.267***|
||(0.037)|(0.045)|(0.056)|(0.059)|(0.084)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.056]|[0.002]|[0.177]|[0.002]|
|R-squared|0.192|0.178|0.182|0.053|0.073|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||
|_ECi_|-0.058***|-0.034*|-0.070***|-0.014|-0.115***|
||(0.014)|(0.017)|(0.022)|(0.023)|(0.032)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.027]|[0.002]|[0.121]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.193|0.178|0.182|0.053|0.073|
|_Panel C. U.S. - Allies Exposure_||||||
|_EAi_|0.047***|0.027**|0.058***|0.010|0.092***|
||(0.011)|(0.013)|(0.017)|(0.018)|(0.025)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.023]|[0.002]|[0131]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.193|0.178|0.182|0.053|0.074|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.599|0.911|0.848|0.141|0.495|
|Observations|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: Education Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (v). See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

43
Table 5. Impacts of Extremism on Mental Health

|Variables are indicators|Mental Health<br>Issues<br>Index<br>(1)|Felt Little<br>Interest<br>in Doing<br>Things<br>(2)|Felt<br>Depressed<br>or Hopeless<br>(3)|Had<br>Eating<br>Problems<br>(4)|Suicidal<br>Thoughts<br>(5)|Ask<br>Mental<br>Health<br>Assistance<br>(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_|||||||
|_ETi_|0.075**|0.039|0.099|0.129**|0.009|1.750***|
||(0.032)|(0.079)|(0.068)|(0.053)|(0.018)|(0.445)|
|FDR q-values|[0.035]|[0.286]|[0.125]|[0.035]|[0.286]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.031|0.025|0.033|0.039|0.031|0.406|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_|||||||
|_ECi_|0.019|-0.000|-0.005|0.082***|0.002|0.476***|
||(0.012)|(0.031)|(0.026)|(0.020)|(0.007)|(0.137)|
|FDR q-values|[0.185]|[0.977]|[0.977]|[0.001]|[0.977]|[0.003]|
|R-squared|0.030|0.025|0.032|0.040|0.031|0.397|
|_Panel C. U.S.-Allies Exposure_|||||||
|_EAi_|-0.017|-0.002|-0.005|-0.058***|-0.002|-0.399***|
||(0.010)|(0.024)|(0.020)|(0.016)|(0.005)|(0.107)|
|FDR q-values|[0.102]|[0.849]|[0.849]|[0.001]|[0.849]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.030|0.025|0.032|0.040|0.031|0.402|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.159|0.301|0.197|0.106|0.011|0.768|
|Observations|5,590|5,554|5,578|5,573|5,568|259|
|_Controls in All Panels_|||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: Mental Issues Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (vi). The average is calculated with the number of variables available per individual, the index do not take into account the variables with missing values. See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. The Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

44
Table 6. Impacts of Extremism on Labor Market Access

||Labor<br>Index<br>(1)|Employed [=1]<br>(2)|Monthly<br>Wage*<br>(3)|Weekly<br>Hours<br>Work*<br>(4)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_|||||
|_ETi_|-0.161|-0.053|-0.598|-0.229|
||(0.175)|(0.066)|(0.517)|(0.305)|
|FDR q-values|[0.822]|[0.822]|[0.822]|[0.822]|
|R-squared|0.165|0.156|0.169|0.163|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_|||||
|_ECi_|-0.083|-0.027|0.077|0.060|
||(0.068)|(0.026)|(0.105)|(0.059)|
|FDR q-values|[0.697]|[0.697]|[0.697]|[0.697]|
|R-squared|0.166|0.156|0.177|0.176|
|_Panel C. U.S.-Allies Exposure_|||||
|_EAi_|0.061|0.020|0.238|0.083|
||(0.052)|(0.020)|(0.154)|(0.091)|
|FDR q-values|[0.568]|[0.568]|[0.568]|[0.568]|
|R-squared|0.166|0.156|0.169|0.163|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.117|0.219|1.722|1.004|
|Observations|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|
|_Controls in All Panels_|||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: The Labor Market Index is constructed using the outcome variables of columns (ii) to (iv) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again. Wages and Hours Worked were transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. The Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

45
Table 7. Impacts of Extremism on Income and Consumption

||Income and<br>Consumption|Monthly<br>House Income|Monthly<br>Consumption|
|---|---|---|---|
||Index<br>(1)|(log)<br>(2)|(log)<br>(3)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||
|_ETi_|-0.176|-0.026|-0.178|
||(0.165)|(0.108)|(0.110)|
|FDR q-values|[0.460]|[0.756]|[0.460]|
|R-squared|0.091|0.095|0.073|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||
|_ECi_|-0.051|-0.035|-0.011|
||(0.064)|(0.041)|(0.043)|
|FDR q-values|[1.00]|[1.00]|[1.00]|
|R-squared|0.090|0.095|0.073|
|_Panel C. U.S.- Allies Exposure_||||
|_EAi_|0.050|0.025|0.025|
||(0.049)|(0.032)|(0.033)|
|FDR q-values|[0.780]|[0.780]|[0.780]|
|R-squared|0.091|0.095|0.073|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.011|8.385|8.326|
|Observations|5,592|5,453|5,558|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ The Income and Consumption Index is constructed using the outcome variables of columns (ii) to (iv) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again. See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. The Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

46
|**Co**|**ntents**||
|---|---|---|
|**A **|**Data Description**|**48**|
||A.A Characterizing Refugees in Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>48|
||A.B Characterization of Treatment Variables . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>52|
|**B**|**Description of Variable’s Construction**|**57**|
||B.A Outcome Variables<br>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>57|
||B.B<br>Treatment Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>58|
||B.C Social Desirability Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>59|
|**C **|**Robustness Tests**|**61**|
|**D **|**Additional Exercises**|**66**|
||D.A Impacts by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>66|
||D.B Impacts byAge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .|. . . . . . . . . . .<br>69|

47
# **A Data Description**

# **A.A Characterizing Refugees in Tajikistan**

Figure A.1. Age Distribution <!-- Start of picture text --> 80+<br>75-79<br>70-74<br>Male 65-69 Female<br>60-64<br>55-59<br>50-54<br>45-49<br>40-44<br>35-39<br>30-34<br>25-29<br>20-24<br>15-19<br>10-14<br>5-9<br>1-4<br><1<br>600 450 300 150 0 150 300 450 600<br>Total Number<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Source: Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021. The Figure includes the 5,592 individuals using in the main regressions.

48
Figure A.2. Refugee Characterization - Individual Characteristics <!-- Start of picture text --> 27 7<br>26.5 6.60<br>26.28 6.5<br>26<br>6<br>25.5 25.46 5.83<br>25 5.5<br>Female Male Female Male<br>.96 .31<br>0.95<br>.94<br>.3<br>.92<br>0.29<br>.29 0.29<br>.9<br>.88 .28<br>0.87<br>.86<br>.27<br>Female Male Female Male<br>.49<br>.48<br>0.47<br>.47<br>.46 0.46<br>.45<br>.44<br>Female Male<br>Age<br>Years of Education<br>Literate [=1] Student [=1]<br>Married or Engaged [=1]<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The data comes from the Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021. The Figure includes the 5,592 individuals using in the main regressions. Red lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean. Student is restricted to the population aged between 6 to 24 years old.

49
Figure A.3. Refugee Characteristics before and after moving to Tajikistan <!-- Start of picture text --> .5 1<br>0.46<br>0 .8 3<br>.4 0 .3 8 .8 0 .7 7<br>.3 .6<br>0.55<br>.2 .4<br>0 .1 6<br>0.29<br>0 .1 0<br>.1 Female Male .2 Female Male<br>Tajikistan Afghanistan Tajikistan Afghanistan<br>50 40000<br>4 6.0 7<br>30843.08<br>45 30000<br>40 4 0.0 2 20000<br>150 77 .52<br>35.83<br>35 10000<br>31.43<br>30 Female Male 0 79.70 Female 496.90 Male<br>Tajikistan Afghanistan Tajikistan Afghanistan<br>.45 7<br>6.86<br>0.41 6.77<br>.4<br>0.38<br>6.5<br>.35<br>.3 0.29 0.29<br>6.03<br>6<br>5.92<br>.25 Female Male Female Male<br>Tajikistan Afghanistan Tajikistan Afghanistan<br>Employed [=1]<br>Labor Contract in Afghanistan [=1]<br>Weekly Hours Work in Afghanistan<br>Monthly Wage in Afghanistan (Somoni)<br>Student [=1]<br>Household Size<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The data comes from the Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021. The Figure includes the 5,592 individuals using in the main regressions. Red lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean. Employed is [=1] if the individual has worked for remuneration during the past 7 days. Student is restricted to the population aged between 6 to 24 years old.

50
Figure A.4. Refugee Literacy Rate by Gender <!-- Start of picture text --> .8<br>.6<br>.4<br>.2<br>0<br>Year<br>Adult literacy rate female Adult literacy rate male<br>Adult literacy rate 15-24 female Adult literacy rate 15-24 male<br>1979 1985 1991 1997U.S Entry2003 2009 2015U.S. Withdrawal<br>% of Literacy Rate<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ The data comes from the The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

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# **A.B Characterization of Treatment Variables**

Figure A.5. Geographical Distribution of Taliban, Allies, and Contested Districts - Surveyed Sample <!-- Start of picture text --> District Control in 2017 District Control in 2018<br>Out of the Sample Out of the Sample<br>Taliban Presence Taliban Presence<br>Government Control Government Control<br>Contested Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Control in 2019<br>Out of the Sample<br>Taliban Presence<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br>52<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Control in 2020<br>Out of the Sample<br>Taliban Presence<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Control July 2021<br>Out of the Sample<br>Taliban Presence<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Control in Aug. 2021<br>Out of the Sample<br>Taliban Presence<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Source: FDD’s Long War Journal
Figure A.6. Geographical Distribution of Taliban, Allies, and Contested Districts- All Sample <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in 2017<br>Taliban Control<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in 2019<br>Taliban Control<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br>53<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in 2021<br>Taliban Control<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in 2018<br>Taliban Control<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in 2020<br>Taliban Control<br>Government Control<br>Contested<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> District Presence in Aug. 2021<br>Taliban Control<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Source: FDD’s Long War Journal
Figure A.7. Treatment Variables Distribution <!-- Start of picture text --> Panel A. Taliban Exposure Panel B. Taliban Exposure<br>3000 600<br>2500 500<br>2000 400<br>1500 300<br>1000 200<br>500 100<br>0 0<br>.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6<br>Taliban Exposure Taliban Exposure<br>Panel A. Allies Exposure Panel B. Allies Exposure<br>3000 500<br>450<br>2500<br>400<br>350<br>2000<br>300<br>1500 250<br>200<br>1000<br>150<br>100<br>500<br>50<br>0 0<br>0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7<br>Allies Exposure Allies Exposure<br>Panel A. Contested Territories Panel B. Contested Territories<br>3500 350<br>325<br>3000 300<br>275<br>2500 250<br>225<br>2000 200<br>175<br>1500 150<br>125<br>1000 100<br>75<br>500 50<br>25<br>0 0<br>0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7<br>Contested Territories Contested Territories<br>Frequency Frequency<br>Frequency Frequency<br>Frequency Frequency<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Source: FDD’s Long War Journal 54
Figure A.8. Treatment Variables correlation with Conflict Indicators <!-- Start of picture text --> 1 1<br>.8 .8<br>.6 .6<br>Taliban Exposure U.S. Allies Exposure<br>Fitted Values Fitted Values<br>.4 .4<br>.2 .2<br>0 0<br>0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500<br>Number of Affected and Killed People in Afghanistan Number of Affected and Killed People in Afghanistan<br>Note: Correlation=0.28*** Note: Correlation=-0.33***<br>1 1<br>.8 .8<br>.6 .6<br>Taliban Exposure U.S. Allies Exposure<br>Fitted Values Fitted Values<br>.4 .4<br>.2 .2<br>0 0<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130<br>Number of Individuals Displaced (Thousands) Number of Individuals Displaced (Thousands)<br>Note: Correlation=0.23*** Note: Correlation=-0.26***<br>Taliban Exposure by Province<br>U.S. Allies Exposure by Province<br>55<br>Taliban Exposure<br>U.S. Allies Exposure<br>IDPs Province of Origin IDPs Province of Origin<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Assistance Mission conflict data
Figure A.9. Share of Surveyed Individuals by Province <!-- Start of picture text --> Uzbekistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Turkmenistan<br>Badakhshan<br>Jawzjan Balkh Kunduz Takhar<br>Faryab<br>Samangan<br>Baghlan<br>Sar-e-Pul<br>Panjsher<br>Nooristan<br>Badghis Parwan Kapisa Kunarha<br>Bamyan Laghman<br>Kabul<br>Wardak Nangarhar<br>Herat Ghor Logar<br>Daykundi<br>Paktya<br>Ghazni Khost<br>Urozgan<br>Pakistan<br>Farah Paktika<br>Zabul<br>Helmand<br>Iran Nimroz Kandahar<br>Individuals Surveyed (% Tot. Sample)<br>0.000 - 0.100<br>0.101 - 0.300<br>0.301 - 1.500<br>1.501 - 3.500<br>3.501 - 51.788<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Source: Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021. The Figure includes the 5,592 individuals using in the main regressions.
# **B Description of Variable’s Construction**

This section describes how we constructed each of the variables in our main analysis.

# **B.A Outcome Variables**

Outcome variables were constructed using the data from the Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted for this study in the fall of 2021.

- Integration: we measured the integration dimension with three different types of questions. The first included the individual reported answer from a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 means strongly disagree, and 5 strongly agree of the following questions: (i) ”Would you feel comfortable if your child or grandchild were to socialize or be friends with children of Refugee community people?”, (ii) ”Do you feel welcomed in this village/town/city?”, (iii) ”Do you think that everyone living in this village/ town/ city feels like they are a part of this village?”. The second, included the answer to the following question ”On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not very much to 10 very much, how much do you feel that Tajikistan is your home?”, and the third, the total number of refugee, and Tajik friends among all of their friends, respectively.

The Integration Index is constructed using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) with the variables explained above. It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again.

- Educational Attainment: we measured the educational attainment dimension using the following questions: (i) ”Can ¡name¿ read and write in any language?”, and (ii) ”What is the highest level of formal school ¡name¿ completed?”. With the answer to the question (ii), we generate an indicator variable corresponding to each level of education: _Some Education [=1]_ if the refugee has completed any level under the primary education level, _Primary Education [=1]_ if the refugee has completed basic primary education level, and _Secondary Education [=1]_ if the refugee has completed secondary education level.

The Education index is constructed by calculating the average of the four indicator variables explained above.

- Mental Health: we measured the mental health dimension by constructing an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the respondent answers ”More than half of the days or Nearly every day” or 0 if the answer is ”Several Days or Not at All”, for each of the following questions: (i) ”Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you felt little interest or pleasure in doing things?” (ii) ”Over the last 2 weeks, how often have

57
you felt down, depressed, or hopeless?” (iii) ”Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you had poor appetite or overeating?” (iv) ”Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you had thoughts that you would be better off dead or of hurting yourself in some way?” and (v) ”Did you seek mental health assistance during the last three months? (1=Yes or 0=No)” The Mental Health index is constructed by calculated the average of the five outcome variables explained above. The average is calculated just with the information available for each individual, it excluded from the average the missing answers.

- Labor Market Access: we measured the labor market access dimension using the following variables: (i) Employed is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reported to have worked for remuneration for at least one hour in the last 7 days, (ii) Weekly Hours Worked: is the total number of reported hours the respondent spent working in the last 7 days, and (iii) Monthly Wage: is the total amount in somoni that the respondent earned from salary or self-employed profits after taxes in the last 30 days.

The Labor Market Access Index is constructed using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) with the variables explained above. It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again.

- Income and Consumption: we measured the income and consumption dimension using the answer to the following questions: (i) ”Approximately, what was the total household income in the last month? (amount in Somoni)”, and (ii) ”Approximately, how much did your household spend in the last month in total? (amount in Somoni)”. With these two questions, we created the Income and Consumption Index using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again.

# **B.B Treatment Variables**

Treatment variables were constructed using the online data from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal (LWJ). They map the districts controlled by Taliban, by U.S. allies, and contested territories between 2014 to 2021, when the Taliban’ took control over the total territory. The classifications are based on open-source information, such as press reports and information provided by government agencies and the Taliban. With this information, they defined the following:

- Taliban and U.S allies controlled districts: places where the Taliban or the U.S. allies

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are openly administering the territory, providing services and security, and running the local courts, respectively. LWJ may assess a district controlled by the Taliban or by the U.S. government if the district center frequently exchanges hands, and the Taliban or the government only controls a few buildings or villages in the district.

- Contested districts: places where the government is in control of the district center or buildings within the district center, or a base, but little else, while the Taliban controls large areas or all of the areas outside of the district center. Or, the Taliban may control several villages, mines and other resources, runs prisons in the district, or administers areas of the district.

With the classification of the LWJ, we construct the share of districts controlled by the Taliban, the U.S-Allies and the Contested territories in each of 31 provinces in Afghanistan.

# **B.C Social Desirability Bias**

Individuals tend to answer to how their will be viewed usually according responses by others instead of answering what they really believe, and this phenomenon is known as social desirability bias. For this purpose, we measure social desirability bias by using four questions from Marlone and Crowe’s social desirability scale (see Crowne (1964) for details). The questions assess whether or not respondents are concerned with social approval. A high number of socially desirable responses suggests the respondent is concerned with social approval.

Each question on the scale includes a statement to which the respondent has to answer true or false. The four questions we included are: ”It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged (false corresponds to higher social desirability)”, ”There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others (false corresponds to higher social desirability)”, ”I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake (true corresponds to higher social desirability)”, and ”I have never intensely disliked anyone” (false is associated with higher social desirability)”. Each statement gets a score of zero or one, and the total level is calculated by adding up the scores of the four questions. To facilitate its interpretation, the total value is standardized.

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# **C Robustness Tests**

Table C.1. Extremism Impact on Integration: controlling for Social Desirability Index

|Variables in SD.|Integration<br>Index<br>(1)|Feel Comfortable<br>if your Child<br>Socialize with Host<br>Children<br>(2)|Feel Welcomed<br>in this<br>City<br>(3)|Feel Part<br>of this<br>Village<br>(4)|Feel that<br>Tajikistan is<br>your Home<br>(5)|Number<br>of Refugee<br>Friends<br>(6)|Number of<br>Tajikistan<br>Friends<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||||
|_ETi_|-0.578***|-0.509***|-0.207|-0.277*|-0.356**|-0.343**|-0.450***|
||(0.160)|(0.173)|(0.160)|(0.160)|(0.164)|(0.163)|(0.138)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.006]|[0.060]|[0.054]|[0.030]|[0.030]|[0.004]|
|R-squared|0.031|0.032|0.039|0.031|0.049|0.061|0.037|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||||
|_ECi_|-0.093|-0.096|-0.123|-0.099|0.040|-0.033|-0.050|
||(0.062)|(0.067)|(0.062)|(0.063)|(0.063)|(0.063)|(0.054)|
|FDR q-values|[0.360]|[0.360]|[0.360]|[0.360]|[0.360]|[0.360]|[0.360]|
|R-squared|0.029|0.031|0.039|0.030|0.048|0.060|0.035|
|_Panel C. U.S.- Allies Exposure_||||||||
|_EAi_|0.107|0.103|0.092|0.085|0.008|0.051|0.071|
||(0.048)|(0.052)|(0.048)|(0.048)|(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.041)|
|FDR q-values|[0.137]|[0.137]|[0.137]|[0.137]|[0.331]|[0.137]|[0.137]|
|R-squared|0.030|0.031|0.039|0.031|0.048|0.061|0.036|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.002|-0.027|0.026|0.038|0.074|-0.007|-0.099|
|Observations|5,592|5,285|5,535|5,469|5,592|5,592|5,589|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ See Appendix B for details of variable’s constructions. We used the same controls listed in Table 3. We measure social desirability bias by using four questions from Marlone and Crowe’s social desirability scale. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.
Table C.2. Impacts of Extremism on Educational Attainment Excluding Student and Employment Status from Control Variables

||Education Index|Literate [=1]|Some Education [=1]|Primary [=1]|Secondary [=1]|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||
|_ETi_|-0.142***|-0.069*|-0.182***|-0.033|-0.284***|
||(0.037)|(0.046)|(0.058)|(0.059)|(0.084)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.071]|[0.003]|[0.196]|[0.003]|
|R-squared|0.180|0.150|0.148|0.043|0.068|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||
|_ECi_|-0.063***|-0.035**|-0.074***|-0.021*|-0.124***|
||(0.014)|(0.018)|(0.022)|(0.023)|(0.033)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.024]|[0.002]|[0.081]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.181|0.150|0.148|0.043|0.068|
|_Panel C. U.S. - Allies Exposure_||||||
|_EAi_|0.050***|0.027**|0.060***|0.015*|0.099***|
||(0.011)|(0.014)|(0.017)|(0.018)|(0.025)|
|FDR q-values|[0.001]|[0.024]|[0.001]|[0.088]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.181|0.150|0.148|0.043|0.068|
|Mean Dependent Variable|0.599|0.911|0.848|0.141|0.495|
|Observations|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: Education Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (v). Individual controls include: age, gender, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.
# Table C.3. Impacts of Extremism on Integration

Excluding Provinces with more than 50% of Taliban Control in 2017

|Variables in SD.|Integration<br>Index<br>(1)|Feel Comfortable if<br>your Child Socialize<br>with Host Children<br>(2)|Feel Welcomed<br>in this<br>City<br>(3)|Feel Part<br>of this<br>Village<br>(4)|Feel that<br>Tajikistan is<br>your Home<br>(5)|Number<br>of Refugee<br>Friends<br>(6)|Number of<br>Tajikistan<br>Friends<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||||
|_ETi_|-0.557***|-0.508**|-0.098|-0.281**|-0.357**|-0.353**|-0.457***|
||(0.169)|(0.184)|(0.168)|(0.169)|(0.172)|(0.173)|(0.145)|
|FDR q-values|[0.008]|[0.011]|[0.127]|[0.061]|[0.034]|[0.034]|[0.008]|
|R-squared|0.028|0.027|0.031|0.026|0.046|0.059|0.038|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||||
|_ECi_|-0.076|-0.089|-0.084|-0.108|0.054|-0.023|-0.042|
||(0.066)|(0.072)|(0.066)|(0.067)|(0.068)|(0.068)|(0.057)|
|FDR q-values<br>6|[0.801]|[0.801]|[0.801]|[0.801]|[0.801]|[0.801]|[0.801]|
|R-squared<br>3|0.026|0.026|0.032|0.026|0.046|0.058|0.036|
|_Panel C. Allies Exposure_||||||||
|_EAi_|0.098|0.100|0.059|0.092|0.000|0.047|0.068|
||(0.051)|(0.055)|(0.051)|(0.051)|(0.052)|(0.053)|(0.044)|
|FDR q-values|[0.213]|[0.213]|[0.239]|[0.213]|[0.529]|[0.239]|[0.213]|
|R-squared|0.026|0.026|0.031|0.027|0.046|0.058|0.036|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.004|-0.026|0.030|0.038|0.075|-0.006|-0.097|
|Observations|5,383|5,087|5,327|5,262|5,383|5,383|5,380|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ The Integration Index is constructed using the outcome variables of columns (ii) to (vii) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). It implies i) standardizing the variables, ii) averaging, and iii) standardizing the final average again. Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.
Table C.4. Impacts of Extremism on Educational Attainment Excluding Provinces with more than 50% of Taliban Control in 2017

||Education<br>Index|Literate [=1]|Some<br>Education [=1]|Primary [=1]|Secondary [=1]|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_||||||
|_ETi_|-0.105**|-0.070|-0.109*|-0.050|-0.192*|
||(0.038)|(0.047)|(0.058)|(0.062)|(0.088)|
|FDR q-values|[0.031]|[0.110]|[0.079]|[0.198]|[0.062]|
|R-squared|0.185|0.172|0.174|0.053|0.071|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||
|_ECi_|-0.045**|-0.034*|-0.033|-0.032|-0.080**|
||(0.015)|(0.018)|(0.023)|(0.024)|(0.035)|
|FDR q-values|[0.016]|[0.068]|[0.118]|[0.118]|[0.042]|
|R-squared|0.185|0.172|0.174|0.053|0.071|
|_Panel C. U.S. - Allies Exposure_||||||
|_EAi_|0.037**|0.027*|0.030*|0.023|0.066**|
||(0.012)|(0.014)|(0.018)|(0.019)|(0.027)|
|FDR q-values|[0.011]|[0.059]|[0.074]|[0.101]|[0.027]|
|R-squared|0.185|0.172|0.174|0.053|0.072|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.602|0.913|0.855|0.140|0.500|
|Observations|5,383|5,383|5,383|5,383|5,383|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: Education Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (v). Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

64
Table C.5. Impacts of Extremism on Mental Health Excluding Provinces with more than 50% of Taliban Control

|Variables are indicators|Mental Health<br>Issues<br>Index|Felt Little<br>Interest<br>in Doing<br>Things|Felt<br>Depressed<br>or Hopeless|Had<br>Eating<br>Problems|Suicidal<br>Thoughts|Ask<br>Mental<br>Health<br>Assistance|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_|||||||
|_ETi_|0.115***|0.066|0.147**|0.187***|0.018|1.750***|
||(0.034)|(0.083)|(0.072)|(0.055)|(0.019)|(0.445)|
|FDR q-values|[0.002]|[0.165]|[0.031]|[0.002]|[0.161]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.034|0.027|0.035|0.041|0.032|0.406|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_|||||||
|_ECi_|0.037***|0.009|0.014|0.112***|0.006|0.476***|
||(0.013)|(0.032)|(0.028)|(0.022)|(0.007)|(0.137)|
|FDR q-values|[0.007]|[0.655]|[0.587]|[0.001]|[0.490]|[0.003]|
|R-squared|0.033|0.027|0.034|0.044|0.032|0.397|
|_Panel C. U.S. - Allies Exposure_|||||||
|_EAi_|-0.032***|-0.010|-0.021|-0.082***|-0.005|-0.399***|
||(0.010)|(0.025)|(0.022)|(0.017)|(0.006)|(0.107)|
|FDR q-values|[0.003]|[0.513]|[0.300]|[0.001]|[0.300]|[0.001]|
|R-squared|0.033|0.027|0.034|0.043|0.032|0.402|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.161|0.301|0.199|0.108|0.011|0.768|
|Observations|5,381|5,346|5,369|5,364|5,359|259|
|_Controls in All Panels_|||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: Mental Issues Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (vi). The average is calculated with the number of variables available per individual, the index do not take into account the variables with missing values. The Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values are reported in brackets.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

65
# **D Additional Exercises**

# **D.A Impacts by Gender**

Table D.1. Heterogeneous Impacts on Educational Attainment

||Education|Literate [=1]|Some|Primar [=1]|Secondar [=1]|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Index||Education [=1]|y|y|
||(1)|(2)|<br>(3)|(4)|(5)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_<br>||||||
|_β_1=_ETi ×_I[Female]|-0.205***|-0.359***|-0.420***|0.074|-0.117|
||(0.072)|(0.088)|(0.111)|(0.116)|(0.165)|
|_β_2=_ETi_|-0.029|0.115*|0.034|-0.058|-0.206*|
||(0.053)|(0.064)|(0.081)|(0.085)|(0.120)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|0.012|0.043*|0.054*|-0.031|-0.019|
||(0.019)|(0.023)|(0.029)|(0.030)|(0.043)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.194***|-0.316***|-0.366***|0.043|-0.136|
||(0.055)|(0.067)|(0.084)|(0.088)|(0.125)|
|R-squared|0.194|0.180|0.184|0.053|0.073|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_||||||
|_β_1=_ECi ×_I[Female]|-0.059**|-0.103***|-0.124***|0.057|-0.068|
||(0.028)|(0.034)|(0.042)|(0.044)|(0.063)|
|_β_2=_ECi_|-0.028|0.018|-0.007|-0.043|-0.080*|
||(0.020)|(0.024)|(0.031)|(0.032)|(0.046)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|-0.030***|-0.029***|-0.030***|-0.022*|-0.038**|
||(0.008)|(0.009)|(0.012)|(0.012)|(0.017)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.089***|-0.132***|-0.154***|0.035|-0.106*|
||(0.024)|(0.029)|(0.037)|(0.039)|(0.055)|
|R-squared|0.193|0.179|0.183|0.053|0.074|
|_Panel C. U.S.- Allies Exposure_||||||
|_β_1=_EAi ×_I[Female]|0.053**|0.092***|0.110***|-0.042|0.053|
||(0.021)|(0.026)|(0.033)|(0.034)|(0.049)|
|_β_2=_EAi_|0.019|-0.020|0.002|0.031|0.065*|
||(0.015)|(0.019)|(0.024)|(0.025)|(0.035)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|-0.071***|-0.101***|-0.116***|0.012|-0.080**|
||(0.014)|(0.017)|(0.022)|(0.023)|(0.032)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.018*|-0.008|-0.006|-0.030*|-0.027|
||(0.011)|(0.013)|(0.016)|(0.017)|(0.024)|
|R-squared|0.194|0.180|0.184|0.053|0.074|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.695|0.981|0.922|0.227|0.651|
|Observations|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|5,592|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: (i) Education Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (v). Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2. _∗∗∗_ significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

66
Table D.2. Heterogeneous Impacts on Integration

|Variables in SD.|Integration<br>Index<br>(1)|Feel Comfortable<br>if your Child<br>Socialize<br>with Host<br>Children<br>(2)|Feel<br>Welcomed<br>in this<br>City<br>(3)|Feel<br>Part<br>of this<br>Village<br>(4)|Feel<br>that<br>Tajikistan<br>is your<br>Home<br>(5)|Number<br>of<br>Refugee<br>Friends<br>(6)|Number<br>of<br>Tajikistan<br>Friends<br>(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_<br>||||||||
|_β_1=_ETi ×_I[Female]|-0.323<br>|-0.487<br>|-0.072<br>|-0.209<br>|-0.014<br>|-0.409<br>|0.050<br>|
||(0.314)|(0.342)|(0.315)|(0.316)|(0.322)|(0.321)|(0.272)|
|_β_2=_ETi_|-0.398*|-0.246|-0.151|-0.152|-0.359|-0.121|-0.477**|
||(0.229)|(0.249)|(0.229)|(0.231)|(0.235)|(0.234)|(0.198)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|0.060|0.134|-0.040|0.018|-0.045|0.157*|-0.013|
||(0.082)|(0.089)|(0.082)|(0.083)|(0.084)|(0.084)|(0.071)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.263|-0.354|-0.111|-0.192|-0.059|-0.252|0.037|
||(0.239)|(0.259)|(0.239)|(0.240)|(0.245)|(0.244)|(0.206)|
|R-squared|0.027|0.027|0.030|0.024|0.046|0.060|0.037|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories E_|_xposure_|||||||
|_β_1=_ECi ×_I[Female]|-0.026|-0.039|-0.011|-0.014|0.127|-0.234*|0.052|
||(0.120)|(0.130)|(0.121)|(0.122)|(0.123)|(0.123)|(0.104)|
|_β_2=_ECi_|-0.073|-0.070|-0.108|-0.084|-0.030|0.091|-0.077|
||(0.087)|(0.095)|(0.087)|(0.088)|(0.089)|(0.089)|(0.075)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|-0.016|0.020|-0.056*|-0.032|-0.069**|0.092***|-0.009|
||(0.033)|(0.035)|(0.033)|(0.033)|(0.034)|(0.034)|(0.029)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.042|-0.019|-0.067|-0.046|0.058|-0.142|0.043|
||(0.105)|(0.114)|(0.105)|(0.106)|(0.108)|(0.107)|(0.091)|
|R-squared|0.025|0.025|0.030|0.024|0.045|0.059|0.035|
|_Panel C. U.S.-Allies Exposure_||||||||
|_β_1=_EAi ×_I[Female]|0.044|0.066|0.012|0.025|-0.072|0.176*|-0.033|
||(0.093)|(0.100)|(0.093)|(0.094)|(0.095)|(0.095)|(0.080)|
|_β_2=_EAi_|0.080|0.064|0.078|0.066|0.049|-0.043|0.088|
||(0.067)|(0.073)|(0.067)|(0.068)|(0.069)|(0.069)|(0.058)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|-0.047|-0.026|-0.065|-0.049|-0.006|-0.049|0.018|
||(0.062)|(0.067)|(0.062)|(0.062)|(0.063)|(0.063)|(0.053)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|-0.002|0.040|-0.053|-0.024|-0.078*|0.126***|-0.014|
||(0.046)|(0.050)|(0.046)|(0.047)|(0.047)|(0.047)|(0.040)|
|R-squared|0.025|0.025|0.030|0.024|0.045|0.060|0.036|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.004|-0.020|0.008|0.000|0.007|0.002|0.016|
|<br>Observations|5,592|5,285|5,535|5,469|5,592|5,592|5,589|
|_Controls in All Panels_||||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Dwelling Type in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afgh.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ The Social Capital Index is constructed using the outcome variables of columns (ii) to (vii) using the methodology of Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

67
Table D.3. Heterogeneous Impacts on Mental Health

|Variables are indicators|Mental Health<br>Issues<br>Index<br>(1)|Felt Little<br>Interest<br>in Doing<br>Things<br>(2)|Felt<br>Depressed<br>or Hopeless<br>(3)|Had<br>Eating<br>Problems<br>(4)|Suicidal<br>Thoughts<br>(5)|Ask<br>Mental<br>Health<br>Assistance<br>(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_<br>|||||||
|_β_1=_ETi ×_I[Female]|0.037|0.092|0.069|0.008|-0.018|-0.452|
||(0.063)|(0.155)|(0.134)|(0.103)|(0.035)|(0.612)|
|_β_2=_ETi_|0.055|-0.009|0.063|0.125*|0.018|2.036***|
||(0.046)|(0.113)|(0.098)|(0.075)|(0.026)|(0.590)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|0.005|-0.009|0.009|0.005|0.010|0.179|
||(0.016)|(0.040)|(0.035)|(0.027)|(0.009)|(0.155)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|0.042|0.083|0.079|0.013|-0.008|-0.273|
||(0.048)|(0.118)|(0.102)|(0.078)|(0.027)|(0.466)|
|R-squared|0.031|0.025|0.033|0.039|0.031|0.407|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_|||||||
|_β_1=_ECi ×_I[Female]|0.008|0.084|-0.031|0.002|-0.017|-0.136|
||(0.024)|(0.059)|(0.051)|(0.039)|(0.013)|(0.233)|
|_β_2=_ECi_|0.015|-0.043|0.010|0.081***|0.011|0.549***|
||(0.017)|(0.043)|(0.037)|(0.029)|(0.010)|(0.186)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|0.013*|0.001|0.031**|0.007|0.008**|0.085|
||(0.007)|(0.016)|(0.014)|(0.011)|(0.004)|(0.056)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|0.021|0.085|0.001|0.009|-0.009|-0.050|
||(0.021)|(0.052)|(0.045)|(0.035)|(0.012)|(0.209)|
|R-squared|0.030|0.025|0.032|0.040|0.031|0.398|
|_Panel C. U.S.- Allies Exposure_|||||||
|_β_1=_EAi ×_I[Female]|-0.009|-0.057|0.011|-0.003|0.012|0.108|
||(0.019)|(0.046)|(0.040)|(0.030)|(0.010)|(0.177)|
|_β_2=_EAi_|-0.013|0.027|-0.011|-0.057**|-0.008|-0.459***|
||(0.014)|(0.033)|(0.029)|(0.022)|(0.008)|(0.146)|
|_β_3=I[Female]|0.019|0.048|0.020|0.009|-0.001|0.000|
||(0.012)|(0.031)|(0.026)|(0.020)|(0.007)|(0.121)|
|Diff. Effect=_β_1+_β_3|0.011|-0.009|0.031|0.006|0.010**|0.109|
||(0.009)|(0.023)|(0.020)|(0.015)|(0.005)|(0.081)|
|R-squared|0.031|0.025|0.032|0.040|0.031|0.403|
|Mean Dep. Variable|0.165|0.294|0.215|0.112|0.011|0.781|
|<br>Observations|5,590|5,554|5,578|5,573|5,568|259|
|_Controls in All Panels_|||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables: (i) Mental Issues Index is constructed using the average of the variables in columns (ii) to (vi). The Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.

68
# **D.B Impacts by Age**

Table D.4. Heterogeneous Impacts on Educational Attainment

||Educatio|n Index|Literat|e [=1]|Some Edu|cation [=1]|Primar|y [=1]|Second|ary [=1]|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Age in 2017|Age_≤_25<br>(1)|Age_>_25<br>(2)|Age_≤_25<br>(3)|Age_>_25<br>(4)|Age_≤_25<br>(5)|Age_>_25<br>(6)|Age_≤_25<br>(7)|Age_>_25<br>(8)|Age_≤_25<br>(9)|Age_>_25<br>(10)|
|_Panel A. Taliban Exposure_|||||||||||
|_ETi_|-0.011|-0.240***|0.058|-0.193**|-0.027|-0.326***|0.120|-0.121*|-0.196|-0.321***|
||(0.040)|(0.059)|(0.037)|(0.078)|(0.062)|(0.089)|(0.087)|(0.072)|(0.122)|(0.111)|
|R-squared|0.060|0.143|0.043|0.182|0.075|0.216|0.226|0.029|0.070|0.050|
|_Panel B. Contested Territories Exposure_|||||||||||
|_ECi_|-0.012|-0.103***|0.017|-0.087***|-0.011|-0.140***|0.062*|-0.052*|-0.117**|-0.134***|
||(0.015)|(0.023)|(0.014)|(0.031)|(0.024)|(0.035)|(0.033)|(0.028)|(0.046)|(0.044)|
|R-squared|0.060|0.144|0.043|0.182|0.075|0.217|0.227|0.029|0.071|0.051|
|_Panel C. U.S-Allies Exposure_|||||||||||
|_EAi_|0.009|0.084***|-0.014|0.070***|0.008|0.114***|-0.046*|0.042*|0.087**|0.108***|
||(0.012)|(0.018)|(0.011)|(0.024)|(0.018)|(0.027)|(0.025)|(0.022)|(0.036)|(0.034)|
|R-squared|0.060|0.145|0.043|0.183|0.075|0.217|0.227|0.029|0.071|0.051|
|Observations|2,801|2,791|2,801|2,791|2,801|2,791|2,801|2,791|2,801|2,791|
|_Controls in All Panels_|||||||||||
|Individual Covariates|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household Size in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Enterprise Property in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Contract in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Dwelling Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Income Type in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of Assets in Afghanistan|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Dependent variables are described in the Appendix D. Individual controls include: age, gender, employed, student status in Afghanistan, and number of friends before moving to Tajikistan. Household controls include the variables listed in Table 2.<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> significant at the 1%,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> significant at the 5%,<sup>_∗_</sup> significant at the 10%.