metadata: authors: 0: author: Tellez,Juan Fernando
1: author: Balcells,Laia
count: Colombia
docna: 0: docna: Social Cohesion, Economic Security, and
            Forced Displacement in the Long-Run : Evidence from Rural Colombia
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
abstracts: cdata!: Millions of people around the world are
            internally displaced and yet—compared to other forms of
            wartime victimization—scholars know relatively little about
            the long-run consequences of displacement for victims. This
            gap in the literature is problematic since displacement is
            distinct from other forms of victimization and because IDPs
            face unique challenges in post-conflict transitions. This
            study contributes to the literature on the effects of
            displacement in three ways. First, the study brings to bear
            a unique sample of households in Colombia that is largely
            homogeneous along key confounders–mostly poor, rural, and
            conflict-afflicted— yet varies in their exposure to
            displacement. Next, the study draws on a rich set of
            covariates and outcomes to provide plausible estimates on
            the long-run effects of internal displacement, finding that
            a decade or more after displacement, victims experience
            substantial negative welfare effects yet exhibit higher
            levels of social cohesion than their counterparts. Finally,
            combining a prediction framework with interviews with key
            stakeholders and displacement victims, the study explores
            variation in outcomes among victims, particularly why some
            return home and seek reparations. The results reveal a wide
            assortment of consequences from displacement and should help
            inform policy-making bearing on support for internally
            displaced people.
display_title: Social Cohesion, Economic Security,
            and Forced Displacement in the Long-Run : Evidence from
            Rural Colombia
listing_relative_url: /research/2022/04/33801901/social-cohesion-economic-security-forced-displacement-long-run-evidence-rural-colombia
topicv3: Forced Displacement m1326032 740,Social Cohesion m1327189 738,Conflict and Violence m1327549 2433,Internally Displaced Persons m1939428 4819
publishtoextweb_dt: 2022-04-26T00:00:00Z
dois: 10.1596/1813-9450-10019
origu: Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
author_keys: 0: author_key: 1615349
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 10019 Social Cohesion, Economic Security, and Forced Displacement in the Long-Run Evidence from Rural Colombia _Juan F. Tellez Laia Balcells_ Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice April 2022
Policy Research Working Paper 10019

# **Abstract**

Millions of people around the world are internally displaced and yet—compared to other forms of wartime victimization—scholars know relatively little about the long-run consequences of displacement for victims. This gap in the literature is problematic since displacement is distinct from other forms of victimization and because IDPs face unique challenges in post-conflict transitions. This study contributes to the literature on the effects of displacement in three ways. First, the study brings to bear a unique sample of households in Colombia that is largely homogeneous along key confounders–mostly poor, rural, and conflict-afflicted— yet varies in their exposure to displacement. Next, the study draws on a rich set of covariates and outcomes to provide plausible estimates on the long-run effects of internal displacement, finding that a decade or more after displacement, victims experience substantial negative welfare effects yet exhibit higher levels of social cohesion than their counterparts. Finally, combining a prediction framework with interviews with key stakeholders and displacement victims, the study explores variation in outcomes among victims, particularly why some return home and seek reparations. The results reveal a wide assortment of consequences from displacement and should help inform policy-making bearing on support for internally displaced people.

This paper is a product of the Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at laia.balcells@georgetown.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# Social cohesion, economic security, and forced displacement in the long-run: Evidence from rural Colombia<sup>*</sup>

Juan F. Tellez<sup>†</sup> Laia Balcells<sup>‡</sup> JEL codes: O15, R23, D74, H56 Keywords: IDPs, social cohesion, civil war, displacement

> *This paper was commissioned by the World Bank Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice as part of the activity “Preventing Social Conflict and Promoting Social Cohesion in Forced Displacement Contexts.” The activity is task managed by Audrey Sacks and Susan Wong with assistance from Stephen Winkler. This work is part of the program “Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership”. The program is funded by UK aid from the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), it is managed by the World Bank Group (WBG) and was established in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The scope of the program is to expand the global knowledge on forced displacement by funding quality research and disseminating results for the use of practitioners and policy makers. This work does not necessarily reflect the views of FCDO, the WBG or UNHCR. We would like to thank Ana Maria Ibañez for making data on the _Fondo de Tierras_ available and one anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments.

> †Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Davis. Contact: jftellez@ucdavis.edu

> ‡Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University. Contact: laia.balcells@georgetown.edu
# 1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that more than 45 million people around the world are internally displaced, comprising roughly half a percent of the global population<sup>1</sup> (UNHCR, 2020). For many, displacement is a “life long sentence”, as IDPs can remain in a state of protracted crisis for years and even decades (OCHA, 2017). The magnitude and duration of displacement raises questions about how the experience of displacement affects victims, particularly in the long-run.

Surprisingly,whilethereisnowalargeliteratureontheconsequencesofwartimevictimization for a broad range of social and political outcomes (Bauer et al., 2016), academic research has relatively less to say about displacement, especially in the long-term. This is in spite of the fact that displacement is a unique form of victimization: in being forced to relocate, victims are separated from their communities and social networks; they face violence and social exclusion in new host communities(Rozo andVargas, 2021); andthey areoftenseparatedfromproperty,assets,andsavingsthattheystruggletorecover(ThapaandHauff, 2005; IbáñezandMoya, 2010). These characteristics also mean that displacement effects are especially likely to persist and evolve over time. Understanding how displacement affects victims – both in the short and long-term – is thus important not just for the academic value but also to inform the design of policy aimed at addressing one of the most pressing global humanitarian challenges.

Inthispaperwebringnewevidencetobearontheeffectsofinternaldisplacementthrough anoriginalsurveyof1,500ruralhouseholdsspreadacrossfiftymunicipalitiesinColombia. Colombia is a country where almost one in ten citizens have been internally displaced by armed conflict (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021) and where the success of a recent, fragile peace agreement may in part rest on the extent to which the plight of IDPs can be redressed.<sup>2</sup> Wecombinetheuniquenatureofthesample–householdsthatarelargelyhomogeneousalong key confounders, such as poverty, rurality, and conflict exposure, yet vary substantially in their incidenceofdisplacement–witharichsetofcovariatesandcausalinferenceapproachestoprovideplausibleestimatesoftheeffectsofdisplacementonavariedsetofvictimoutcomes<sup>3</sup> . Then,

> 1Internally displaced people (IDPs) remain within the boundaries of their country of origin. By contrast, refugees by definition cross international borders.

2WewouldliketonotethatColombiahasalsohadsignificantnumberofrefugeessince2015,particularlyfrom Venezuela. In this paper, we focus only on Colombian IDPs.

3ThesamplewasnotdesignedtoberepresentativeofallIDPsinColombia,alimitationwediscussmorefullyin the appendix and research design section. That said, we would argue there is still great value in the sample, given thatdatacollectiononIDPsisrelativelyrare,particularlyintheremoteareaswecover. Wewouldalsoargue,along the lines discussed in Aronow and Samii (2016), that a nationally-representative sample analyzed in a regression framework would not avoid the generalizability concerns associated with our sample.

2
we use a predictive framework, a set of modules on IDP life after displacement, and qualitative interviews with key stakeholders<sup>4</sup> and victims of displacement to provide rare insight into two key post-displacement questions: 1) who returns home after they are displaced, and why?; 2) why do some victims seek out reparations for lost property from the state but not others?

Our results suggest displacement leaves victims transformed in varied ways, even years afterthedisplacingevent. Evenwithinthelargelypoorandconflict-affectedpopulationwestudy, IDPs are substantially worse off in economic terms than their counterparts (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010). They are also, surprisingly, much more mobilized and invested in collective action, perhaps attesting to the need for self-advocacy in the face of state failures in post-conflict policymaking (Sanín, Huertas and Hernández, 2019). IDPs also appear more invested in the prospect of peace-building, even as they expect insecurity to remain constant (Tellez, 2019 _b_ ). On the other hand, displacement does not seem to generate changes in attitudes towards the state or land security, which are generally low across the board. Finally, our analysis of who returns home and who seeks restitution highlights continuing insecurity (Prem et al., 2020) and low state capacity vis-a-vis post-conflict reparations (Sanín, Huertas and Hernández, 2019) as major obstacles to the resettlement of IDPs.

# 2 CONTEXT: THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CRISIS IN COLOMBIA

Colombiahasoneofthelargestpopulationsofinternallydisplacedpeopleintheworld–approximately 5 million in a country of 50 million people (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021). The displacement crisis also spans the country’s territory: civilians have been displaced in every department of Colombia. At the same time, IDPs are disproportionately concentrated inethnicminorities(CODHES, 2016,p.826)andhouseholdsheadedbywomen(CODHES, 2015). Despite an historic peace agreement in 2016 (Tellez, 2019 _a_ ) that brought an end to large-scale confrontations between the Colombian government and the country’s largest rebel group, the FARC, forced displacement continues to plague the country, with an estimated 106,000 new cases in 2020 alone (OCHA, 2020).

At the center of the displacement crisis in Colombia is a protracted, multi-party armed conflict that has lasted several decades, involving varied insurgent groups, the Colombian state, andnumerousparamilitaryorganizations. ThedynamicsofdisplacementinColombiahasbeen afunctionofciviliansfleeinginordertoavoidbeingcaughtinthecross-fireofcompetinggroups, but also the result of groups deliberately ‘cleansing’ territory of civilians in areas controlled (or 4The stakeholders we interviewed include representatives of NGOs and government agencies working in land restitution in Colombia, as well as victims of displacement.

3
suspectedtobecontrolled)byanothergroup(Steele, 2011; BalcellsandSteele, 2016).<sup>5</sup> Oncedisplaced, IDPs often resettle in the outskirts of big cities such as Cali, Medellín or Bogotá, where they face physical and economic insecurity (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010; Steele, 2017).

To be properly understood, the current displacement crisis must be set against a broader contextofweaktenuresecurity,widespreadinformality,andalonghistoryofviolentlandexpropriation in the country. The Colombian countryside has been characterized by cycles of forced expulsion and resettlement of peasants, which have fueled land conflicts long before the contemporary civil war (LeGrand, 1986). Land ownership is highly concentrated and interventions to increase peasant access to land have often faltered or been derailed (Albertus and Kaplan, 2013). As a result of these and other factors, rural informality is rampant, with an estimated 48% of rural parcels lacking a registered title.<sup>6</sup> These long-running land issues interact with the displacement crisis in complex ways. For instance, there is evidence that elites and other actors have leveraged tenure insecurity to expropriatepeasantlandduringtheconflict(VargasReina, 2021). InfluxesofIDPshavealsogenerated land conflicts among marginalized peasant and indigenous communities competing over resourcesandterritory(deBenito, 2015). Andfinally,withrespecttoIDPresettlementandrestitution, the fact that many rural landholders have no formal ownership of their land means that achieving the legal return of property lost during conflict is rife with judicial and administrative barriers (CODHES, 2015). The result is that displacement both results from and feeds into Colombia’s land historical land problems.

Given the scale of the crisis, a key element of post-conflict policy has been the question of how to resettle IDPs. While prior legislation and elements of the peace process provide for the _restitution_ , or legal return, of land and property to conflict victims, progress has been slow and impeded by numerous factors<sup>7</sup> . Figure 1 visualizes the scale of the restitution problem, highlighting howonly afractionoftheestimatednumberofrestitution-eligiblevictimshavebegun the restitution process, and among those, an even smaller percent have finished the process. The substantial gap between what the restitution need the state anticipated (based on the incidence of displacement) and the actual number of restitution claims received (Garayet al., 2016, p. 18), raises the question of why few victims pursue restitution – a question we shed light on in the study.<sup>8</sup>

> 5The process of political decentralization and democratization since the 1990s has also played a role in the political targeting of civilians (Steele, 2017).

> 6Figure retrieved from USAID’s Land-Links information portal. `https://www.land-links.org/ country-profile/colombia/#1528464011915-6f6e82e5-9a53`

> 7For a comprehensive review of barriers to restitution in Colombia, see CODHES (2016)

> 8Measuring the amount of restitution need is not straightforward and there are varying, competing estimates of total need. The estimates presented here come from De Justicia.

4
<!-- Start of picture text --> Status of case: No request Request filed Request completed<br>(Total: 360,000) (225,000) (124,000) (10,400)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 1,000 households<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: Progress on land restitution in Colombia as of 2019. Source: _DeJusticia_ .

5
WhilethereisimportantresearchonColombianIDPsbyeconomistsandpoliticalscientists (e.g., (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Steele et al., 2021)) there is still much that is unknown about the effects of displacement on IDPs, and particularly its effects on social andpoliticalattitudesandbehaviors. Weknowevenlessaboutwhatcomesafterdisplacement: why some IDPs are ultimately able to return home and seek out restitution, while others are unable or unwilling to do so. In what follows we shed some light on these questions.

# 3 THEORETICAL MOTIVATION

## _3.1 Theeffectsofvictimizationonsocialcohesion_

Displacementisaformofwartimevictimizationinwhichciviliansareforcedtofleetheirhome, either because they are fleeing the cross-fire of armed actors or because they are deliberately expelled by combatants (Steele, 2009). Research on the effects of displacement can be broadly separated into research that focuses on: (1) how displacement affects the _victims_ of displacement; and (2) how displacement affects the _communities_ which IDPs either arrive to or are expelled from. Our focus is on how displacement affects the displaced and, as a result, our analytical starting point is a broader literature on the general effects of victimization.

This larger literature has found some robust links between victimization and a range of social and political behaviors, including outcomes related to social cohesion. Early work by BellowsandMiguel (2009)and Blattman (2009)documentapositiveeffectofexposuretoviolence on post-conflict civic and political participation (measured by activities such as attending community meetings, joining social and political groups, voting, etc.) in Sierra Leone and Uganda, respectively. Likewise, more recent research in other parts of the globe has documented that those exposed to wartime violence generally are more likely to participate socially, join more social groups, and assume increased leadership roles within their communities (Bauer et al., 2016). Inbehavioralstudies,peoplewhohavehadgreaterexposuretoconflicthavebeenfound to exhibit more pro-social behaviors, measured through altruistic donations, public good contributions, and investment in trust-based transactions, among others (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014).

In contrast to these studies are a sizable set of findings linking victimization to ‘anti-social‘, conflictual, or vengeful attitudes and behaviors (Vinck and Pham, 2009). In a set of behavioral experimentsinruralColombia, Vélezetal. (2016)findthatvictimizationaffectssubjectiveinsecurityandhas a _negative_ effect onsocial cohesion, cooperation, andtrust, although it does have a positive effect on altruism. Likewise, other work has found that pro-social behavior is not nec6
essarily correlated with increased political participation (Steele et al., 2021). Finally, some work finds that victimizationincreasesangerandpunitivenesstowardsout-groups, underminingsocial cohesion in communities where victimization rates are high (Beber, Roessler and Scacco, 2014; Balcells, 2017).

Themechanismsunderlyingthesedisparatefindingsvary,buttheygenerallycenteronpsychologicaltheoriesthatlinktraumaticexperiencestobehavior. Studiesshowingthatvictimization _decreases_ social cohesion and other pro-social behaviors often point to the development in victims of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which has been linked to antisocial attitudes andbehaviorsinbothconflictsettings(VinckandPham, 2009)andthegeneralpopulation(Landwehr and Ojeda, 2021).<sup>9</sup> Other psychological mechanisms emphasize the social dimension of victimization, where feelings of shame, fear, or ostracism cause victims to retreat from public life (Wood, 2008; Nordås and Cohen, 2021). By contrast, studies that find victimization _increases_ social cohesion and other pro-social behaviors often point to “post-traumatic growth” as a potential mechanism, where individuals respond to victimization with an increased sense of resilience and a desire to engage more actively in their communities (Bauer et al., 2016; Bateson, 2012). Schon (2020) argues, for instance, that witnessing violence delays the decision to flee among Syrians because post-traumatic growth leads people to stay and try to help their home communities.

Precisely _why_ studies on victimization have appeared to produce contradictory results with competing psychological mechanisms is perhaps one of the key standing questions in the literature. One possibility is that in testing for the effects of ‘victimization’, broadly conceived, researchers are masking substantial heterogeneity among different types of victimization experiences. For instance, there is mixed evidence that suggests victimization effects can change over time (Balcells, 2012; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013; Villamil, 2020). The context in whichvictimsfindthemselvescanalsomoderatetheimpactofvictimization: scholarshavedocumented how wars can create “hierarchies of victimhood” that make some victims more likely to mobilize and participate than others (Berry, 2017) and that patterns of rebel governance can impede or mobilize victim activism (e.g. Arjona, 2016),<sup>10</sup> The type of victimization itself should also matter, as some forms of violence impact not just the individual but also the community 9However, not everyone who experiences trauma suffers from PTSD, and there is great diversity in the way PTSD can emerge (Galatzer-Levy and Bryant, 2013). There is also a debate in the psychology literature on whether PTSD is a universally experienced condition or whether it is relevant only to specific cultural groups.

10Justino and Stojetz (2019) find that individual exposure to governance in times of war increases participation in long-term local planning and provision of public goods, and stimulates interest in and commitment to politics, governance,andcollectiveaction,evenifonlylocally. Steeleetal. (2021)argue,fortheirpart,thatexposuretorebel mechanisms of competitive state-building increase informal political engagement (e.g., participating in strikes and protests, joining civil society organizations, etc.) once a conflict has ended.

7
(Wood, 2008), with downstream implications for social cohesion and mobilization.

There are thus potentially different effects and mechanisms at play depending on the type of victimization, the timing of the victimization, and the context in which victims find themselves. Withthisinmind,weturnnowtoadiscussionofhowdisplacementconstitutesadistinct form of victimization.

# _3.2 Displacementasadistinctformofvictimization_

Inotherstrandsoftheconflictliterature–forinstance,onthe _causes_ ofviolence–itistodaywellestablished that displacement is a type of violence that should be studied separately (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Steele, 2017). Yet when it comes to research on the effects of displacement on victimoutcomes,displacementtendstobelumpedinwithotherformsofvictimization(Fearon andShaver, 2021). Forexample, LupuandPeisakhin (2017)focusonthedeathsofrelativesamong thesurvivorsofalargeforceddisplacementcampaign,butdon’tconsiderhowthedisplacement itself might have affected victims. Similarly, Hazlett (2020) studies the determinants of attitudes towards peace among refugees but focuses on the effects of their exposure to violence and not on the experience of displacement itself.<sup>11</sup> The key way in which displacement differs from other forms of victimization is that, in displacement,victimsareforcedtorelocate,oftenfarfromtheirhomes. Thisforcedrelocationhas a number of distinct implications for victim outcomes. First, forced relocation means that displacedhouseholdsareoftenseparatedfromsubstantialproportionsoftheirwealth,intheform of lost property, assets, and the costs associated with moving and resettling (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008). Resettlement also means moving to areas where there is often a mismatch between victims’ human capital and local labor market demand – seen most strikingly, for instance, with rural, agrarian households that are forced to relocate to urban environments (Calderón and Ibañez, 2009). The implication should be reduced economic welfare of displaced households even in the longer-term, as these effects are not one-off shocks but likely to persist over time.

Second,forcedrelocationalsomeansthatlong-standingnetworksofcooperation,reciprocity, andexchangewithincommunitiesareoftensevered(Dorff, 2017; TorresandCasey, 2017). While this should ultimately reduce social cohesion and the capacity for collective action among victimsofdisplacement,therearealsosomepotentialcounter-trendsinhowforceddisplacement affectssocial cohesion. Forone, refugeesoftenclusterin particularplaces: a functionofgeogra-

> 11Anexceptionisarecentstudyby Steeleetal. (2021),whosurveyvictimsinColombia–includingIDPs. However, they mainly focus on the political effect of IDPs registering as victims. They find that IDPs who register with the statearemorelikelytoengageinpoliticsthroughformalchannels(forexample,voting),inlinewith Voytas (2021)’s findings of Pinochet’s victims in Chile.

8
phy, information networks, and other factors (Steele, 2009; Schon, 2018). Such clustering may provide victims with the proximity and common interest necessary to spur social cohesion and collective action. Relatedly, the welfare losses associated with displacement – while undermining the economic security of victims – may also present victims with the motive and shared interest to pursue collective action as they try to recover land, property, or win reparations from thestate. Agitationforwartimereparationsmaybeparticularlysalientinpost-conflictsettings, where victims must often navigate a complex ‘state bureaucracy of victimhood’ in order to access services (Steele et al., 2021; Cronin-Furman and Krystalli, 2021). ’ Finally, displacement is a particularly long-lasting form of victimization. Psychological research on the mental well-being of refugees shows that IDPs can display significant distress symptoms for as long as their status as displaced people lasts (Vinck and Pham, 2009). This means that displacement effects should be more likely to persist over time than other forms of wartime victimization. The duration of displacement may also moderate the overall effects of displacement–forinstance,itispossiblethatinintheshortrunthenetwork-destroyingdimension of displacement would reduce overall social cohesion, while in the long-run it is possible IDPs could become more engaged and cohesive in their demands of the state for reparations.

In sum, while the effects of displacement on household economic welfare are likely to be unambiguously negative, the overall effect of displacement on social cohesion and other prosocial attitudes could potentially run in either direction depending on the balance of effects on victim’ssocialnetworksandcapacityandmotivationforcollectiveaction. Displacementeffects should also be particularly _persistent_ , in that many of the dynamics generated by displacement are likely to persist and change over time.

In addition to exploring overall displacement effects, we also leverage our data collection effort to explore heterogeneity among IDPs in their post-displacement experiences. We focus on two important yet understudied dimensions of life post-displacement: first, why some displaced people ultimately return to their origin communities while others do not; and second, whysomeIDPspursueformalreparationsfromthestatewhileothersareunwillingorunableto doso. Researchonreturnisstillscarce,anditismorefocusedonrefugeesthanonIDPs. Thereis notmuchevidenceonthepreferencesforreturnamongIDPs,andevenlessfordesireforreturn in the longer-term, as is the case in our study.<sup>12</sup> Research on reparations is also scarce, particularly on the determinants of who advocates for (and ultimately is able to win) reparations.<sup>13</sup>

> 12Somerecentcontributionstothistopicare: VinckandPham (2009), CamarenaandHägerdal (2020), Schwartz (2019), Ghosn et al. (2011), and Fakhoury (2021).

> 13Some recent exceptions look at the political effects of receiving reparations (Voytas, 2021; Steele et al., 2021).

9
# 4 RESEARCH DESIGN

## _4.1 Data_

DatafortheprojectcomesfromasurveyofruralhouseholdsinColombiafieldedbetweenMarch and June of 2017. The survey was commissioned as part of the performance evaluation<sup>14</sup> of USAID’s Land and Rural Development Program (LRDP), a program designed to improve institutional capacity in relation to land formalization, land restitution, and broader rural development outcomes. The survey was fielded at the halfway point of the LRDP’s lifespan, part of a broader effort to measure the program’s strengths and weaknesses up to that point in time.

The survey captured almost 1,500 responses across fifty rural and conflict-affected municipalities,25ofwhichwereselectedbecauseoftheirinvolvementinorrelevancetotheLRDPand an additional 25 which were selected through matching on observables to serve as comparable municipalities that did not experience any LRDP programming (Figure A.1). Survey responses were collected on tablets and in-person, in or near the respondent’s home. More detailed information on data collection, sampling, implementation, and ethical considerations of sampling in violent contexts are available in the Appendix.

This survey data has a number of strengths for the study of displacement. First, the sampling frame explicitly over-sampled areas and communities that have experienced a lot of displacement and as a result, produced a sample where approximately half of respondents have been displaced (sampling characteristics can be seen in Figure A.2). Second, and relatedly, the survey contains long modules both on displacement experiences as well as on a variety of postdisplacement outcomes that can be used to explore the effects of displacement. Finally, the sample is otherwise relatively homogeneous, capturing rural areas with a relatively high degree of exposure to conflict. This means that – following statistical adjustment to control for potential confounds in who is displaced – there is good coverage for comparing respondents whohaveexperienceddisplacementagainstthosewhohavenotexperienceddisplacement. An important limitation, however, is that the sample is not representative of the universe of IDPs in Colombia.<sup>15</sup> In terms of which outcomes to focus on with respect to displacement effects, we consider a broad range, which we group into six categories. Given prior work on the welfare-diminishing

> 14Generally, _performance_ evaluations differ from _impact_ evaluations in that the latter tend to have built-in randomized treatment and control groups for subsequent estimation of effects, while the former tend not to or are often more descriptive in their evaluation goals.

> 15While the distribution of respondent characteristics in the household survey largely resemble comparable respondent characteristics from the recent (nationally representative) rural waves of LAPOP in Colombia (see Figure A.3), we cannot strictly generalize our findings outside of these areas.

10
consequences of displacement (e.g., Ibáñez and Moya (2010)), we look at survey items capturingdifferentdimensionsofeconomicwell-being( `welfare` ). Followingalargeliteratureonthe socialandpoliticalconsequencesofvictimization(Baueretal., 2016),wealsolookatitemsmeasuring social cohesion andcommunity cooperation( `cohesion` ), interest orinvolvementin politics ( `politics` ), and trust in state institutions ( `trust` ). Finally, we consider two other sets of outcomesthatareparticulartodisplacementandtheColombiancontext: thefirstareattitudes bearingonlandreformandtenuresecurity( `land` ),whichmaybeaffectedbydisplacementand are important elements of politics in countries with rural economies (Albertus, 2020). The secondareattitudestowardsthepeaceprocessbetweentheColombiangovernmentandtheFARC ( `peace` ),whichpriorworksuggestsmaybeinfluencedbyvictimizationexperiences(e.g., Tellez (2019 _b_ ); Hazlett (2020)).

# _4.2 Estimatingdisplacementeffects_

Estimating the effect of displacement – as with other victimization experiences – is difficult. Someciviliansaremorelikelytoexperiencedisplacementthanothers,eitherasaresultofbackgroundcharacteristicsthatexposethemtoconflictathigherrates(e.g.,poverty,insecurity,weak propertyrights)orcharacteristicsthatsinglethemoutastargetsduringwar(e.g.,perceivedloyalties, location in relation to battle-lines, lootable resources). The decision to flee itself – i.e., not just who is exposed to conflict, but who “chooses”to flee rather thanstay remain in the face of exposure (Schon, 2019) – may also be endogenous to outcomes of interest. And, unlike other ‘treatments’ of interest in the social sciences, field experiments and randomized control trials do not present a solution to these identification problems.

Ourapproachtoaddressingtheseidentificationproblemsreliesoninverseprobabilityweighting (IPW) (Imbens, 2000; Cole and Hernán, 2008). In short, IPW resembles matching methods whereresearchersattempttobalancepre-treatmentcharacteristicsamongtreatedandcontrol groups to create ‘apples-to-apples’ comparison groups that vary only in treatment status. IPW has the added advantage of not discarding observations that are left unmatched, instead reweighting the sample towards observations that are similarly likely to have received treatment.

Theweightscreateasyntheticsampleinwhichsubjectswhohavereceivedatreatment(the displaced) and subjects who have not received a treatment (the non-displaced) are balanced on pre-treatment characteristics (i.e., where the distribution of pre-treatment covariates is independent of treatment assignment) (Austin, 2011). In our application, weights are generated by the covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) methodology, which models treatment assignment while optimizing covariate balance (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014), though our results are 11
robust to other approaches.

Animportantpartofanyapproachtoestimatingtreatmenteffectswithobservationaldata is deciding what covariates to adjust for. Table A.1 lists and provides justification for all covariatesincludedinourIPWprocedure. Weincludecovariates(bothattheindividualandmunicipallevel) that are likely affect both the likelihood of being displaced and the class of outcomes we areinterestedin,whileavoidingadjustmentforpost-treatmentvariables(e.g.,completedyears of education, which are likely to be affected by displacement) (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres, 2018).<sup>16</sup> Afirststepinevaluatingourestimationstrategyisexaminingcovariatebalancepost-weighting. Figure 2 shows remarkable improvements in balance before (‘unadjusted‘) and after weighting (‘adjusted‘),andalsoshowcasestheproblemwithnaivelycomparingoutcomesofIDPsandnonIDPs. Prior to adjustment, IDPs and non-IDPs are fundamentally different in many ways that make comparison difficult (e.g., IDPs tend to have larger families). Post-weighting, many of these baseline differences shrink to zero. This can be seen, for instance, in the LRDP’s sampling design itself, which actively sought out places with displacement: respondents in LRDP areas are substantially more likely to have been displaced than those in other areas. Post-weighting, this difference effectively disappears. Table A.2 provides further summary statistics and also shows that we retain a relatively large post-weighting effective sample size (ESS).

> 16Importantly,ourmunicipal-levelcontrolsarebasedonthemunicipalityof _origin_ forrespondentsinoursample (i.e., for the displaced this is the municipality they were displaced from; for the non-displaced, it is where they currently live), out of concern that characteristics associated with the current location of the displaced are posttreatment.

12
<!-- Start of picture text --> Propensity score (distance)<br>White/non-white<br>Sex (male)<br>Population (logged)<br>Other victimization experiences<br>Number of people displaced (avg)<br>Municipal poverty index<br>Municipal homicides (avg)<br>LRDP programming area<br>literacy<br>Household size<br>FARC presence (prop. of years)<br>Distance to capital<br>AUC presence (prop. of years)<br>Altitude (logged)<br>Age (years)<br>% rural population<br>0.0 0.5<br>Standardized differences between treatment and control<br>Statistic: Unadjusted Adjusted<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 2: Love plot of covariate balance before and after weighting.

One potential confound that is specific to displacement but unaddressed by the set of covariates discussed above is that exposure to displacement may be a function of an individual’s (real or perceived) political loyalties (Steele, 2011; Balcells and Steele, 2016), which are in turn correlated with outcomes of interest. In the Colombian context, this might mean that civilians who are (perceivedtobe) loyal tothe left-wing guerrillasaremore likelytobe targetedby rightwing groups, or the military. Using an endorsement experiment designed to indirectly elicit truthful attitudes towards the FARC (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro, 2011), we find no evidence that the displaced in _our sample_<sup>17</sup> are any more likely to have favorable views of the FARC than their counterparts(Table A.6;detailsondesignavailableintheAppendix). Whiletheexperimentimperfectly addresses this concern, it does present some evidence against the possibility that the displacement effects we estimate are confounded by ideology.<sup>18</sup> 17Of course, we are not claiming that (perceived) loyalties have no bearing on the incidence of displacement in Colombia writ large. We are instead suggesting that, among the people we interviewed, loyalties do not seem a major potential confounding difference in attributes between IDPs and non-IDPs.

18In particular, the endorsement experiment measures attitudes in the present and not attitudes at the time of displacement, which may have taken place years in the past.

13
# 5 RESULTS

## _5.1 MainResults: OutcomesofDisplacement_

We compile the main results of the project into Figure 3, which plots effect estimates (points) and95%confidenceintervals(lines)foreachofthesixtypesofoutcomes. Overall,afewdistinct patterns emerge.

First, displacement seems to have substantial negative welfare effects: IDPs report lower levelsofincometoday,aremorelikelytosaytheirincomeisnotenoughtosubsiston,andexperience food insecurity more frequently.<sup>19</sup> They are also more likely to be at risk of eviction, and to expect to have a harder time transferring their property, patterns that reflect the economic damages of displacement. We also test for whether displacement causes shifts in general riskseeking behavior, but find no evidence of differences between IDPs and non-IDPs.<sup>20</sup> Our evidence also suggests displacement may increase levels of social cohesion and mobilization: IDPs are more likely to say they’ve recently helped solve a local problem, support collective action (“ _Would you get together with other rural families to demand the state improve your situation?_ ”), are more willing to pay taxes if they were used to help the needy, and are more likely to say they’ve attended a variety of local meetings<sup>21</sup> . These findings echo prior work on the mobilizing effects of victimization (Blattman, 2009; Bauer et al., 2016), though to our knowledge these patterns have not been documented with respect to displacement.

Displacementalsoappearstoinfluenceattitudestowardspeace-building. Peoplewhohave been displaced are more likely to express support for the peace process ( _“to what extent do you support the implementation of the peace accords with the FARC?”_ ) and to be optimistic about the ability of ex-FARC members to reintegrate into society ( _“How optimistic or pessimistic do you feel about demobilized FARC members successfully reintegrating into society?”_ ) than those who weren’t displaced, even as they are _less_ likely to say they feel safer now. This latter pattern bearing on expectationsoffuturesafetyismoremixed: theyarenomorelikelytofeartheformationofnew groups, nor to expect less conflict after the end of the peace process.<sup>22</sup>

> 19These patterns are in line with prior work showing that IDPs have extreme poverty rates over three times higher than the national average (CODHES, 2016).

> 20Wepickedthreeitemsfroma“Risk-AcceptanceIndex”usedintheAmericanNationalElectionsSurvey(ANES) (Kam, 2012). The items we selected were very weakly correlated, and thus we did not combine them into an index. 21The “women’s meetings” item was only administered to respondents who identified as women.

> 22Wedelvemoredeeplyintotheeffectsofdisplacementonpeaceattitudesthroughaconjointexperimentthat randomly varies the attributes of hypothetical peace agreements (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Overall, we find no evidence that the displaced and non-displaced react differently to the peace agreement attributes, using the preference heterogeneity test in Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020) (Table A.4). Attribute-level results available in Table A.5.

14
<!-- Start of picture text --> Cohesion Land Peace<br>Would pay more tax Property safe from outsiders Supports peace<br>Property safe from govt<br>Helped solve local problem<br>Less conflict future<br>Property is respected<br>Favors collective action<br>Land rights protected Knows land victim law<br>Attends women's meetings<br>Land rights clear Feel safer now<br>Attends political party meetings<br>Land help available<br>Fear new groups<br>Attends farmer meetings<br>Land conflicts unlikely<br>Attends community meetings Knows of lru Belief farc can demobilize<br>0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4<br>Politics Trust Welfare<br>Trust in state Risk aversion 2<br>Supports land invasions<br>Trust in police Risk aversion 1<br>Supports expropriation Trust in personeria Monthly income<br>Trust in mayor Invested in property<br>Interest in politics<br>Trust in incoder Income not enough<br>Did not vote Trust in courts Has enough food<br>Belief in titling Eviction risk<br>Belief restitution is fair<br>Belief in state land reform Ease of property transfer<br>-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0<br>Coefficient estimate on displacement<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 3: Estimated effect of displacement across outcomes.

Intermsofpoliticalattitudes,differencesaremoremuted. Thedisplacedarenomorelikely than the non-displaced to claim they will vote in the next presidential elections, or to say they aregenerallyinterestedinpolitics. Theyare,however,morelikelythanthenon-displacedtoendorse land expropriation as a policy tool to improve access for the landless and (unsurprisingly) to believe that the restitution process is generally fair and equitable.

Where there is consistently little to no evidence of displacement effects is in attitudes towards land tenure and trust in the state. Across the board, displaced people are no more likely than the non-displaced to feel their land tenure is insecure, that their property is safe, that land conflicts are likely to emerge, even as they are more aware of the government’s land restitution unit (LRU). In terms of trust, the displaced are similarly no more or less likely to express trust in varied state institutions, though they do appear more optimistic about the ability of the state to implement land reform as part of the peace process. Jointly, these patterns perhaps attests to the widespread nature of tenure insecurity in the rural Global South (Deininger, 2003; Broegaard, 2005).

The results are robust to a few other, common modeling choices. With IPW, one decisionpoint is what algorithm or process to use in constructing the propensity scores underlying the 15
weights. Figure A.4 shows estimates are largely consistent across five different methodologies forconstructingpropensityscores. Adifferentdecision-pointconcernshowtoidentify‘extreme’ weightsandwhetherornottoremovethempriortoanalysis. Figure A.5 showsresultsarelargely similar even while truncating extreme weights (above the 99th percentile).

Insum,thepicturethatemergesoftheeffectofdisplacementoncivilianscentersonhousehold welfare and social cohesion. IDPs are clearly worse off in economic terms than their peers, even among the very poor and rural population that we sampled, and many years after the fact: the median respondent in our sample was displaced sixteen years before their responses were collected. Thisfinding mirrorspriorresearchonthe negativewelfareconsequencesofdisplacement (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010).

Thedisplacedalsoappearmuchmoremobilizedandinvestedincommunitythantheircounterparts, in part reflecting prior work on the potentially ‘positive’ effects of displacement on social cooperation, though at the same time clashing with work that suggests these pro-social effects are a function of social ties (which have often been destroyed for IDPs) (Dorff, 2017). One possibility, as discussed in Steele et al. (2021) is that the displaced have something at stake – recovering lost land or property, or returning to origin communities – that makes them more likelytomobilizeandexperiencesocialcohesionthanthenon-displaced. Weexplorethesetwo outcomes in the following section.

# _5.2 Whathappensafterdisplacement?_

Beyondestimatingtheeffectsofdisplacement,ourdataalsoprovideusarareviewintothepostdisplacement experiences of IDPs. Here, we focus on two key questions of post-displacement life: first, which victims return home after displacement? And second, which victims pursue legal restitution of their land?

# 5.2.1 IDP RETURN

Figure 4 presents a few descriptive patterns related to IDP return. More than half of IDPs in our sample do eventually return to their place of origin, and among those, the most common motivations for return are economic and social. Notably, almost no one in our sample listed state assistance as a factor facilitating return, which speaks to persistent low state capacity in redressing wartime victims (Voytas, 2021). Return for many is also a long process: the median victim who returned home did so after five years, but many spend much longer.

16
<!-- Start of picture text --> Were you able to return home? Why did you decide to return?<br>economic necessity<br>Yes family/friends<br>security improved<br>No destination worse<br>state helped return<br>0% 20% 40% 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%<br>Percent of respondents Percent of respondents<br>(N = 730) (N = 399)<br>Length of time until return Why were you unable<br>(in years) to return?<br>50<br>security concerns<br>40<br>30 property destroyed<br>20 can't recover land<br>10<br>destination better<br>0<br>0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%<br>Percent of respondents<br>(N = 327)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 4: Summary of descriptivecharacteristics concerningability ofdisplaced toreturn home.

Among those who never return, security concerns and an inability to recover property (either because it was destroyed, or because of legal issues) are the dominant obstacles.<sup>23</sup> Insecurity in the countryside is driven by various factors, including the violent expansion of armed groupsintoareaspreviouslycontrolledbytheFARC(Premetal., 2020). Suchinsecuritycanlimit the ability of victims to return, even for those who are already relatively near. Team interviews with a _Yupka_ indigenous community in the department of Cesar, for instance, highlighted how paramilitary groups continue to occupy Yupka land and forbid access to state officials working to map out the boundaries of the community’s territory.<sup>24</sup> The return of IDPs to areas where property rights are characterized by informality can also generate social conflict between different groups laying claim to the same land. In Colombia, landconflictsbetweenindigenousgroupsandpeasantshavesurgedoverquestionsofwhoowns what (de Benito, 2015). These patterns were echoed in our interviews with members of the _Yupka_ community, who argued that returning IDPs were creating conflict because “they [the 23ThesefindingsechoreportsbytheConsultancyonHumanRightsandDisplacement(CODHES),whoina2014 study found that security concerns are among the most important barriers to IDP return (CODHES, 2015). 24Research team focus group discussions in Valledupar, Cesar. March 27th, 2017.

17
peasants] are being given back land that was part of our ancestral territory”.<sup>25</sup> As discussed in the next section, informality can also exacerbate conflicts between returning IDPs and locals laying claim to the same parcel of land (CODHES, 2016, p. 453).

# 5.2.2 SEEKING LAND RESTITUTION

These dynamics demonstrate that the return of IDPs is often entangled with the question of whether IDPs are able to recover lost property through the restitution process. As seen in Figure 5, only a quarter of IDPs in our sample formally seek out restitution of property from the state. While the majority among these have some professional entity advocating their case, many claim they are serving as their own advocates. The process is also lengthy: among those who achieve restitution, the average respondent spent 2.25 years in the process, but others at different stages of restitution spend much longer.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Have you sought restitution? Who is advocating your case?<br>Public defender<br>Yes No representation<br>Private lawyer<br>Other<br>No Family<br>NGO<br>0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%<br>Percent of respondents Percent of respondents<br>(N = 726) (N = 166)<br>Time in restitution process<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Under review Request accepted Verdict reached, Land restituted<br>no restitution<br>In years<br>(N = 111)<br>Still waiting for restitution? No Yes<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 5: Summary of descriptive characteristics concerning restitution.

25Research team focus group discussions in Valledupar, Cesar. March 27th, 2017.

18
The restitution process itself is opaque, costly, and difficult for victims to navigate. Author interviews with state officials and advocacy organizations point to problems with institutional coordination, low state capacity, and the difficulty of adjudicating competing claims as key obstaclesintherestitutionprocess. Officialsnotedhowcourtsandlegalservicesareconcentrated in urban areas whereas restitution cases are concentrated in rural areas, limiting access for victimsandcreatingcoordinationproblemsamongentities<sup>26</sup> . Evenwhenarestitutioncaseisadjudicatedbythecourts,agenciesoftenlackthecapacitytoimplementandenforcecourtrulings.<sup>27</sup> . Restitution cases are also often complicated by the presence of _secondary occupants_ who live on the land abandoned by the IDP<sup>28</sup> . Indeed, of the 144 IDPs we interviewed who had a pending restitution case, about one quarter of them faced an opposing claimant. As (CODHES, 2016) notes, competing claims introduce additional normative and legal complexity in balancing the needs of IDPs against those of secondary occupants, who may have purchased the land in good faith and depend on it for survival.

# 5.2.3 PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

Given these obstacles, a natural follow-up question is what factors explain variation in who returnsandwhoseeksoutrestitution. Giventhenatureofthisquestionandthedata–arelatively small sample of displaced respondents (N = 733), many potential explanatory variables, and few _ex ante_ theoretical expectations – we adopt a prediction framework (Shmueli, 2010; Hill Jr and Jones, 2014), and ask which variables are most _predictive_ of these outcomes. To retain interpretability, we use LASSO regression, a common variable selection methodology (James et al., 2013). LASSO uses a penalization parameter to shrink coefficient estimates to zero based on how the resulting model performs in cross-validation.

Our process is as follows. First, we select a relatively large set of explanatory variables that are reasonably relevant to each outcome. Next, we use 10-fold cross-validation to tune the penalization parameter, using the explanatory variables in the training data. We then evaluate the predictive out-of-sample performance of the resulting model on the test set.

We report the main results of the LASSO model in Figure 6. In terms of who returns, men andthosewhoreportgreatercomfortwithrisk-seekingweremorelikelytohavereturnedhome. Conversely, those who were deliberately displaced by force (as opposed to fleeing general inse-

> 26Author interview with Director of Access to Justice Program (March 9th, 2017) and interview with Director of _DefensoríaPública_ and head of _GroupfortheJudicialRepresentationofVictims_ (March 7th, 2017).

> 27Author interview with Secretary of Government of Santander de Quilichao, Cauca. April 3rd, 2017.

> 28 Author interviews with Director of _Defensoria Publica_ and head of _Group for the Judicial Representation of Victims_ . Bogota, Colombia, March 7th, 2017.

19
curity) were less likely to return, as were respondents who identified as white/mestizo (as opposed to other racial categories, such as Afro-Colombian or indigenous). That non-white IDPs aremorelikelytoreturnisinmanywayssurprising: multipleinterviewswithstateofficialshighlightadearthofspecialistsinethnicissuesanda“needforgreaterdialogue”withminoritycommunities affected by the conflict.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, if victims are returning largely without the help of the state it may be that these communities have a higher capacity for collective action that facilitates return (Arjona, 2016).

With respect to restitution, men also tend to be more likely than women to formally seek out restitution of lost property. This gender gap is also reflected in an earlier national survey by CODHES (2015), who find that although women-headed households constitute 45% of the displaced population, they comprise only 30% of restitution cases (pg. 130). In addition, respondents who have attended local meetings for victims of the conflict also appear more likely to seek out restitution, while the probability that a victim seeks out restitution decreases in how rural their origin municipality is. Interestingly, despite the legalistic nature of restitution processes, income and education seem to have little predictive power in who seeks restitution.

> 29Author interview with Director of Access to Justice Program (March 9th, 2017) and interview with Director of _DefensoriaPublica_ and head of _GroupfortheJudicialRepresentationofVictims_ (March 7th, 2017).

20
<!-- Start of picture text --> Was respondent able to return home?<br>Sex (male)<br>Risk-seeking<br>Years of education<br>Years since displacement<br>Monthly income<br>Age (years)<br>Household size<br>News consumption<br>White/non-white<br>Displaced by force<br>-0.2 0.0 0.2<br>Variable importance (LASSO)<br>Did respondent seek restitution?<br>Attends victims' meetings<br>Sex (male)<br>Age (years)<br>Years since displacement<br>Years of education<br>White/non-white<br>Risk-seeking<br>News consumption<br>Monthly income<br>Knows Victim's Law<br>Household size<br>Displaced by force<br>% rural population<br>-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4<br>Variable importance (LASSO)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 6: Penalized coefficient estimates from LASSO regression. Variables with missing bars had estimates pulled to zero.

21
How well do these models predict who returns and who seeks out restitution? We report receiver operating (ROC) curves for out-of-sample (test set) predictions in Figure A.6. The area under curve metric is .68 for the decision to return and .7 for restitution-seeking, which represents an improvement of 36% and 40% over guessing at random, respectively. In overall terms, these improvements are modest, which suggests other, unknown factors may be more predictive of these outcomes.

# 6 POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS

Displacement is a deeply traumatizing experience that affects millions around the world. The prospectofresettling,restituting,andrebuildingcommunitiesdestroyedbydisplacementalso represents a daunting challenge for societies in conflict and global humanitarian efforts. Understanding how displacement shapes victim’s trajectories is thus crucial for crafting informed policy-makingandadvocacy. Inthisproject, weadvanceourunderstandingoftheeffectsofdisplacement using original data from rural households with a high incidence of displacement in Colombia. The results have numerous implications for both the academic literature and policymakers.

First, the results provide strong evidence that there can be substantial heterogeneity of experience within the broad umbrella term of “wartime victimization”. Even after adjusting for other forms of wartime victimization, the experience of displacement appears to both undermine and mobilize victims in distinct ways that may set them apart from other conflict victims. Disaggregating wartime victimization may thus be one way of working towards resolving what areattimescontradictoryfindingsintheliteratureontheeffectsofvictimization. Withrespect to policy, this potentially means designing interventions that take into account the disproportionate economic burden faced by IDPs (Arias et al., 2014), or that leverages IDPs apparently higher capacity for collective action in ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding efforts (Autesserre, 2021).

Second,thestudyunderscoresthatthereissubstantialvariationamongIDPsinwhatcomes after displacement. Explaining and addressing this variation is likely crucial for the long-term well-being of IDPs. With respect to return, ongoing security concerns originating from postconflictinstability(Premetal., 2020)anddifficultyrecoveringpropertyappearasmajorimpediments. Interventiondesignshouldthustakeintoaccountthefraughtsecuritysituationpresent in many post-conflict settings. In terms of restitution-seeking and the recovery of property, a key insight is that few victims formally pursue restitution, and that many in our sample claim to lack access to representation in what is an often labyrinthine legal process (Sanín, Huertas and Hernández, 2019). A key area for policymakers to intervene is thus in facilitating the resti22
tution process for victims who want restitution, and to explore how the differential uptake of restitution may exacerbate inequities in post-conflict societies. Interventions to improve the restitution process and formalize land ownership should also, in turn, help to reduce local conflicts among IDPs and secondary occupants and ensure the rights of each in the process.

Finally, it is important to note that the results presented here are from a particular time (the post-accord peace process) and a particular place (rural Colombia). Displacement effects can vary significantly across countries in ways that are difficult to synthesize. More theoretical and empirical work is needed on the effects of displacement, especially work that leverages research design strategies to identify displacement effects. One clear avenue for future research is work that identifies the determinants of IDP return, particularly research that distinguishes betweenthe _desire_ and _ability_ ofIDPstoreturn(Arias,IbáñezandQuerubin, 2014; Camarenaand Hägerdal, 2020). Another avenue is to explore how IDPs navigate post-conflict programs and policies related to victim’s reparations and restitution (Voytas, 2021; Steele et al., 2021). Even if suchprogramsarekeytorebuildingafterwar,theirimpactwillbelimitedifIDPsfacesignificant barriers to uptake.

23