metadata: authors: 0: author: Bown,Chad P.
count: World
docna: 0: docna: Global antidumping database version 1.0
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: Disease Control & Prevention,International Trade and Trade Rules,Trade and Services,Crime and Society,Trade and Multilateral Issues
abstracts: cdata!: This paper describes a newly collected,
            detailed database on national governments' use of the
            antidumping trade policy instrument. The data collection
            project was funded by the Development Research Group of the
            World Bank and Brandeis University. While still preliminary,
            it goes beyond existing, publicly-used sets of antidumping
            data in a number of fundamental ways. It is a first attempt
            to use original source national government documentation to
            organize information on products, firms, the investigative
            procedure and outcomes of the historical use (since the
            1980s) of the antidumping policy instrument across large
            importing country users. The paper also reports more and
            recent data on a number of smaller users of antidumping, as
            well as some limited information on the use of
            countervailing measures from national governments that are
            users of countervailing duty laws.
repnme: repnme: Global antidumping database version 1.0
display_title: Global antidumping database version 1.0
listing_relative_url: /research/2005/10/6318296/global-antidumping-database-version-10
topicv3: Trade m1326924 698,Trade in Services m1326928 780,Criminal Justice m1326993 1014,Trade Policy and Integration m1327407 775,Injury m1327524 1428
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
no_of_pages: 57
author_keys: 0: author_key: 739462
model_extractions: WPS3737

# **Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0**

## **Chad P. Bown**<sup>**†,‡**</sup>

## **Brandeis University**

## **Abstract**

This paper describes a newly collected, detailed database on national governments’ use of the antidumping trade policy instrument. The data collection project was funded by the Development Research Group of the World Bank and Brandeis University. While still preliminary, it goes beyond existing, publicly-used sets of antidumping data in a number of fundamental ways. It is a first attempt to use original source national government documentation to organize information on products, firms, the investigative procedure and outcomes of the historical use (since the 1980s) of the antidumping policy instrument across large importing country users. We also report more and recent data on a number of smaller users of antidumping, as well as some limited information on the use of countervailing measures from national governments that are users of countervailing duty laws.

### **Database Website:** **<u>http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/</u>**

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3737, October 2005 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ ____________________

> **†** Department of Economics and International Business School, Brandeis University, MS 021, PO Box 549110 Waltham, MA 02454-9110, USA; tel: 781-736-4823; fax: 781-736-2269; email <u>cbown@brandeis.edu, web: http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/.</u>

> **‡** Funding for the data collection project is through the World Bank with contributions from a Mazer Award and Tomberg Funds from Brandeis University. I would also like to thank the hospitality of the World Bank (DECRG) which I was visiting while this project was initiated, as well as the Brookings Institution which I was visiting during some of the data collection. For helpful work collecting the data in this project I would especially like to thank the research assistance of David Cheong, Gloria Sheu, Nabeela Alam and Jaewoo Nakajima. Assistance in data acquisition at various stages of the process was also provided by Rebecca McKibbin, Gustav Brink, Honorio Kumé, Eric Haven, Jayanta Roy, Hilda Fridh, Raul Torres, Johann Human, and Kwang Hyok Yoo whose efforts are appreciated. I also thank Bernard Hoekman, Tom Prusa, Bruce Blonigen, James Durling, Nuno Limão, Robert Feinberg, Kara Reynolds, Michael Moore, Patrick Messerlin, J. Michael Finger, Maurizio Zanardi and Meredith Crowley for helpful discussions. Data errors and corrections should be emailed to <u>cbown@brandeis.edu.</u>
# **Table of Contents**

|1<br>Introduction.......................................................................................|1|
|---|---|
|2<br>Countries and Data Included in the Global Antidumping Database......................|7|
|2.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – AD-CTY-Master..........|9|
|2.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Products...........................|11|
|2.3 The “Domestic Firms” Spreadsheets – ADT-CTY-Domestic-Firms......|12|
|2.4 The “Foreign Firms” Spreadsheets – ADT-CTY-Foreign-Firms...........|12|
|3<br>More Country-Specific Information on AD Sources and Data...........................|13|
|3.1 Argentina (ARG).................................................................|15|
|3.2 Australia (AUS)..................................................................|16|
|3.3 Brazil (BRA)......................................................................|18|
|3.4 Canada (CAN)....................................................................|19|
|3.5 Colombia (COL).................................................................|21|
|3.6 European Union (EUN).........................................................|23|
|3.7 India (IND).......................................................................|25|
|3.8 South Korea (KOR).............................................................|26|
|3.9 Mexico (MEX)...................................................................|27|
|3.10 New Zealand (NZL)............................................................|29|
|3.11 Peru (PER).......................................................................|30|
|3.12 Turkey (TUR)...................................................................|31|
|3.13 United States (USA)............................................................|32|
|3.14 Venezuela (VEN)...............................................................|34|
|3.15 South Africa (ZAF).............................................................|35|
|4<br>AD-Using Countries with Data on Initiations Only........................................|36|
|5<br>Countervailing Duty-Using Countries in the Database.....................................|38|
|5.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – CVD-CTY-Master.......|39|
|5.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – CVD-CTY-Products........................|41|
|5.3 Canada (CAN).....................................................................|41|
|5.4 Mexico (MEX)....................................................................|42|
|5.5 United States (USA)..............................................................|43|
|6<br>Caveats for Data Use, Discovery of Errors, and Conclusions.............................|45|
|Appendix..........................................................................................|47|
|References........................................................................................|52|

ii
# **List of Tables**

|Table 1.1|International Use of Antidumping and the Global Antidumping Database.......|4|
|---|---|---|
|Table 2.1|Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database.................|7|
|Table 2.1.1|Variables in the AD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets......................................|10|
|Table 2.2.1|Variables in the AD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets.....................................|11|
|Table 2.3.1|Variables in the AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms Spreadsheets...........................|12|
|Table 2.4.1|Variables in the AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms Spreadsheets.............................|12|
|Table 3.1|User Countries’ Antidumping Investigative Agencies, Government Reporting<br>Publications and Website................................................................|13|
|Table 3.1.1|Additional Argentine Data Included in AD-ARG-v1.0.xls..........................|16|
|Table 3.2.1|Additional Australian Data Included in AD-AUS-v1.0.xls.........................|17|
|Table 3.3.1|Additional Brazilian Data Included in AD-BRA-v1.0.xls........................|18|
|Table 3.4.1|Additional Canadian Data Included in AD-CAN-v1.0.xls...........................|20|
|Table 3.5.1|Additional Colombian Data Included in AD-COL-v1.0.xls.........................|22|
|Table 3.6.1|Additional EU Data Included in AD-EUN-v1.0.xls..................................|24|
|Table 3.7.1|Additional Indian Data Included in AD-IND-v1.0.xls...............................|25|
|Table 3.8.1|Additional Korean Data Included in AD-KOR-v1.0.xls.............................|26|
|Table 3.9.1|Additional Mexican Data Included in AD-MEX-v1.0.xls........................|27|
|Table 3.10.1|Additional Data from New Zealand Included in AD-NZL-v1.0.xls...............|29|
|Table 3.11.1|Additional Peruvian Data Included in AD-PER-v1.0.xls...........................|30|
|Table 3.12.1|Additional Turkish Data Included in AD-TUR-v1.0.xls............................|32|
|Table 3.13.1|Additional US Data Included in AD-USA-v1.0.xls..................................|33|
|Table 3.14.1|Additional Venezuelan Data Included in AD-VEN-v1.0.xls.......................|34|
|Table 3.15.1|Additional South African Data Included in AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls.....................|35|
|Table 4.1.1|Other Antidumping User Countries with Initiation Information Only in the<br>Database....................................................................................|37|
|Table 4.1.2|Variables in the AD-OTH-Master Spreadsheets......................................|38|
|Table 5.1|Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database.................|38|
|Table 5.1.1|Variables in the CVD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets....................................|39|
|Table 5.2.1|Variables in the CVD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets..................................|41|
|Table 5.3.1|Additional Canadian Data Included in CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls........................|42|
|Table 5.4.1|Additional Mexican Data Included in CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls........................|43|
|Table 5.5.1|Additional US Data Included in CVD-USA-v1.0.xls................................|44|
|Table A.1|Country Codes and Country Names Used in the Database..........................|47|

iii
# **1 Introduction**

The spread and proliferation of antidumping statutes around the world and the imposition of importrestricting antidumping (AD) measures imposed under the auspices of these laws has been well documented (Miranda, Ruiz and Torres, 1998; Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2004). Not surprisingly, researchers seeking to understand this phenomenon would like to test empirically between evolving theories relating to the spread of AD, as well as industry linkages to the use of AD across countries. Furthermore, policymakers, trade negotiators and even legal practitioners involved in the AD process in national localities are also interested in cross-country comparisons of political and/or legal elements of the process, as AD reform is a potential topic on the agenda of WTO negotiations, during the Doha Round if not a future round of negotiations.<sup>1</sup> An improved understanding of antidumping requires access to data on its use, of course, so that this data can be effectively scrutinized.

Despite such interest in the international aspects of antidumping, empirical economic and political-economic research on antidumping has thus far focused primarily on its use by the United States first, and European Union a distant second.<sup>2, 3</sup> Empirical research on other countries’ use of antidumping has been extremely spartan in comparison, and even empirical research on the international (externality) implications of one country’s use is only beginning to evolve.<sup>4</sup> 1 See, for example, the symposium on the “Ten Major Problems” of ten countries’ use of antidumping, ten years after establishment of the WTO, organized by Horlick and Vermulst (2005).

2 Throughout this paper we may refer to the EU or EEC as a “country,” for ease of exposition since the antidumping trade policy instrument is administered by the EU/EEC jointly and not by each individual member country.

3 For recent surveys on various aspects of the economics research literature on antidumping, see Blonigen and Prusa (2004) and Nelson (forthcoming). See also the collection of published articles reprinted in Nelson and Vandenbussche (forthcoming).

4 Exceptions include a handful of empirical studies which have used a cross-country data set collected by researchers at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is a data set limited to antidumping case initiations and with information on products that is typically categorized only at the industry (2-digit) level, e.g., reported in Miranda, Ruiz and Torres (1998) with updates. Examples of papers that have used this data include Prusa and Skeath (2002, 2005) and Feinberg and Reynolds (forthcoming) which focus on retaliation threats. Related papers that motivate some of this emphasis on cross-country linkages also include Blonigen and Bown (2003) and Bown (2005). There is also some emerging research from other user countries which exploits more detailed data that has been collected on an individual basis - an example is the Mexican use of antidumping examined by Niels and Francois (forthcoming).
There are certainly many contributing factors to the resulting emphasis of research focused on the US antidumping process, for example. First, the United States is one of the most frequent “users” of the policy instrument. Until the mid-1990s, there were only four primary users of antidumping was– the US, EU, Canada and Australia. A second explanation for focus on the United States is the economic size of the market at stake and the value of imports affected by the policies. A third factor is that there is also readily available complementary data required for political-economic empirical analysis, such as data on product-level trade flows, disaggregated industrial level economic activity, and even political activity such as lobbying expenditures or political influence on Congressional committees that may affect the process.<sup>5</sup> In addition to these explanations, we believe that a fourth factor is an important determinant of substantial research on the US antidumping process relative to other countries: policy transparency and data availability. Researchers are more likely to scrutinize a policy when detailed information as to how it is being implemented is publicly available, which is the case for the United States’ use of antidumping.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, since 2000, Bruce A. Blonigen at the University of Oregon has provided an additional boost to research in this field by posting on the Internet a collection of well-organized and comprehensive Finally, papers examining the ramifications of antidumping on international trade flows use include Bown and Crowley (2005a, 2005b, forthcoming) and Prusa and Durling (forthcoming).

5 For example, historical data at high frequencies (e.g., monthly) on product level (at the 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule) trade flows is publicly available in the United States from the US International Trade Commission (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ ). See also Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2001). Furthermore, historical data on industry level indicators of economic activity at the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or 6-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) is also available from surveys posted by the US Census (http://www.census.gov/mcd/index.html ). See also Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (2000).

> 6 Information on US antidumping investigations is published in the US government’s _Federal Register_ publication, which can be accessed on line at <u>http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/</u> . The US antidumping cases follow a numerically chronological categorizing process which makes tracking a single case over time through government records very straightforward. While information on European Union antidumping cases can similarly be found in its publicly - available government publication titled the _Official Journal_ (see <u>http://europa.eu.int/eur lex/en/oj/), its case</u> categorizing process is not as transparent so as to allow an individual only minimal effort to be able to track the process of a single case over time.

2
US antidumping data (Blonigen, 2000), thus eliminating a substantial entry barrier to researchers interested in examination of the US process.<sup>7</sup> The global antidumping database project described in this paper seeks to emulate the basics of Blonigen’s data collection efforts and complement the data generated for the United States by establishing a relatively comprehensive, publicly available database on other countries’ use of antidumping. The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe the collected data, so as to provide researchers a starting point for examining other (non-US) users of the controversial trade policy. Our theory is that providing such data will eliminate some entry barriers to research in this area. We hope that additional entry by researchers will result in improved quality of empirical research on the global use of antidumping, like the Blonigen data collection effort has done for the United States’ use of the policy. A last goal would be that results of scientific research would lead to additional transparency and understanding as to what is actually taking place under the guise of antidumping laws and policy around the world.

With respect to coverage, table 1.1 illustrates the countries that are included in the detailed portion of our database, as a subset of antidumping users (WTO members) over the 1995-2004 period. While close to 50 countries have now adopted antidumping laws and initiated antidumping investigations (Zanardi, 2004), it is still the case that most of the use of antidumping – as measured, for example, by total number of investigations or measures imposed – is highly concentrated into around a dozen countries. Thus while the current database contains detailed antidumping use data for (only) 15 of these policy-imposing countries, these countries collectively make up a substantial fraction of the policy’s use – e.g., these countries were responsible for 85% of the antidumping investigations and 87% of antidumping measures imposed by all WTO members over the 1995-2004 period.

> 7 Thanks go to Bruce Blonigen for his collecting and original conception of publicly posting the antidumping data for the United States at his website at <u>http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html. His generation of this</u> public good has arguably spawned additional research into antidumping, improving transparency and allowing for more in depth research to improve scientific understanding over the implications of the policy instrument. The current project is largely the result of researchers recognizing the Blonigen contribution and wondering why no one had done something comparable for other countries’ use of AD. Additional personal thanks are also due to Tom Prusa for generously sharing his personal collections of antidumping data as well. Furthermore, Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak made data on the use of US antidumping for the 1980-1986 period (Staiger and Wolak, 1994) available on the NBER data CDs earlier in the 1990s (Feenstra, 1997).

3
**Table 1.1  International Use of Antidumping and the Global Antidumping Database**

||**Number of Antidumping**|**Number of Antidumping**|
|---|---|---|
|**Country**|**Investigations, 1995-2004**|**Measures Imposed, 1995-2004**|
|**User-Countries in the Global Ant**<br>|**idumping Database**<br>||
|Argentina<br>|192|139<br>|
|Australia|172|54|
|Brazil<br>|116<br>|62<br>|
|Canada|133|80|
|Colombia|23|11|
|European Union<br>|303|193|
|India|400|302|
|Mexico|79|69|
|New Zealand|47|14|
|Peru|55|34|
|South Africa|173|113|
|South Korea<br>|77<br>|43<br>|
|Turkey|89|77|
|United States|354|219|
|Venezuela|31|25|
|Subtotal|2244|1435|
|(share of total)|(84.8%)|(86.7%)|
|**User-Countries not yet in the Glo**|**bal Antidumping Database**||
|China (since 2001)|99|52|
|Egypt|38|30|
|Indonesia|60|23|
|Israel|27|15|
|Malaysia|31|18|
|Taiwan (since 2000)|8|2|
|Thailand|34|23|
|Other WTO Members|105|58|
|Subtotal|402|221|
|(share of total)|(15.2%)|(13.3%)|
|Total|2646|1656|

_Source_ : Data for the initiations and measures used in this table is taken from WTO (2005a,b).

Before turning to a discussion of the actual data, it is important to highlight a number of data collection hurdles affecting the structure of our approach as well as the end product. First, there is a 4
substantial fixed cost to collect data for each new user country that is added to the database. Given the leniency allowed by the WTO’s Agreement on Antidumping, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries as to how national laws are implemented and investigations proceed – i.e., each new user country is free to implement its antidumping law and investigative process as it sees fit, provided it is generally consistent with a basic set of principles under the WTO’s Agreement on Antidumping.<sup>8</sup> Thus there are a number of different administrative approaches that each new user country could take.

Second, the WTO imposes only a minimal reporting requirement on member countries’ use of the policy instrument which is insufficient from a research perspective.<sup>9</sup> While the WTO collects information on AD investigation initiations and measures imposed, it does not appear to systematically collect, organize and publicize data on the actual products (HS codes) under investigation, the dates of preliminary and final decisions and imposition of measures, or the names of firms involved in the investigations. This is the minimal amount of information required for empirical economic researchers to accurately match up AD case information with independently-generated data series on trade flows and other economic activity that is critical to assessing the impact of AD.

Thus, the data that we have collected for each of the countries described in section 2 goes beyond what the WTO has made available. Whenever possible, our data derive from original source, national government publications located primarily on domestic government websites, where a number of countries have quite detailed information available. Nevertheless, in a number of instances important elements of the data were only available in hard copy at government depositories in national capitals. For these countries, we dispatched research assistants to these localities to collect the data.<sup>10</sup>

> 8 One reason why the WTO’s Agreement on Antidumping is so lenient is likely because of pre-existing variation in how antidumping was administered by the “old users” who did not want to have too much of their existing procedure changed. For example, Canada’s antidumping law was first enacted in 1904, Australia’s was enacted in 1906, etc.

> 9 See for example the WTO’s website “Notifications under the agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994” at <u>http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/antidum3_e.htm</u> , last accessed on 20 August 2005.

> 10 This resulted in an additional fixed cost of finding and training new research assistance with the language skills and in the (physical) geographic location to translate original source information into our data base.

5
Given these hurdles, our relatively modest goal was to provide both a basic set of minimal information across countries that is essential for economic research while also including additional information, whenever it was available, for countries that report “more” than the basics. Thus, for a substantial number of user countries we have a basic set of information on Harmonized System product codes for the goods that were allegedly dumped and a cause of injury, as well as dates and outcomes of various stages of the investigative process. For most of these countries we were also able to collect information on the names of domestic firms participating in the antidumping investigation, the names of foreign firms being targeted by the investigation, and also the firm-specific outcomes facing those foreign producers at the outcome stage of antidumping investigation that result in the imposition of measures.

Equally important was our intention of transparency for the project. Thus we also attempt to provide information on where and how we were able to collect the data for each country, so that researchers have the ability to go back to original source documentation and both check the accuracy of our data as well as to augment the data for their own use. We make no claim to have fully exploited all of the data available in these government notifications.

Finally, given the fixed cost associated with data collection for each user country added to the database, the data set at this stage is not comprehensive. With limited resources, our strategy in data construction was to first focus on collecting data for the largest and historically active user countries. Thus, as table 1.1 indicates, while we arguably have decent data on roughly 85% of the use of antidumping by WTO members there are a number of relatively new users (e.g., China, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand) as well as smaller users and even non-members of the WTO for which detailed data have not yet been collected and compiled.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the variables and the data contained in the global antidumping database that is common across the 15 user countries. Section 3 then provides more details for each of the 15 user countries on additional, country-specific data included in the database, as well as particular elements of missing data for each user. Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the WTO Member countries that are also users of antidumping but that are not yet part 6
of the global antidumping database, and the limited data that are available for them from the WTO. Section 5 describes the detailed data on countervailing duty use for three countries that we were able to collect. Section 6 discusses some additional caveats to using the antidumping data and concludes.

# **2 Countries and Data Included in the Global Antidumping Database**

The basic contribution of the data set is to provide a standardized set of information for as many users of the antidumping policy instrument as possible. To that end, we have collected a reasonably consistent set of detailed data for 15 different user countries, listed in table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 : Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database**

|**Country Code**<br>**(3-letter CTY)**|**Country**<br>**Name**|**Excel Workbook**<br>**File Name**|**Spreadsheet Names within**<br>**Country Workbook**|**Available**<br>**Years of**<br>**Data**|**Current**<br>**Version**<br>**(last updated)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||AD-ARG-Master ,|||
|ARG|Argentina|AD-ARG-v1.0.xls|AD-ARG-Products ,<br>AD-ARG-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-ARG-Foreign-Firms|1996-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-AUS-Master ,|||
|AUS|Australia|AD-AUS-v1.0.xls|AD-AUS-Products ,<br>AD-AUS-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-AUS-Foreign-Firms|1989-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|BRA|Brazil|AD-BRA-v1.0.xls|AD-BRA-Master ,<br>AD-BRA-Products|1988-2003|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-CAN-Master ,|||
|CAN|Canada|AD-CAN-v1.0.xls|AD-CAN-Products ,<br>AD-CAN-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-CAN-Foreign-Firms|1985-2005|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|COL|Colombia|AD-COL-v1.0.xls|AD-COL-Master ,<br>AD-COL-Products|1991-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-EUN-Master ,|||
|EUN|European<br>Union|AD-EUN-v1.0.xls|AD-EUN-Products ,<br>AD-EUN-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-EUN-Foreign-Firms|1987-2005|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|IND|India|AD-IND-v1.0.xls|AD-IND-Master ,<br>AD-IND-Products ,<br>AD-IND-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-IND-Foreign-Firms|1992-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|

7
|**Country Code**<br>**(3-letter CTY)**|**Country**<br>**Name**|**Excel Workbook**<br>**File Name**|**Spreadsheet Names within**<br>**Country Workbook**|**Available**<br>**Years of**<br>**Data**|**Current**<br>**Version**<br>**(last updated)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|KOR|South Korea|AD-KOR-v1.0.xls|AD-KOR-Master ,<br>AD-KOR-Products ,<br>AD-KOR-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-KOR-Foreign-Firms|1986-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-MEX-Master ,|||
|MEX|Mexico|AD-MEX-v1.0.xls|AD-MEX-Products ,<br>AD-MEX-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-MEX-Foreign-Firms|1987-2003|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-NZL-Master ,|||
|NZL|New Zealand|AD-NZL-v1.0.xls|AD-NZL-Products ,<br>AD-NZL-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-NZL-Foreign-Firms|1995-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|PER|Peru|AD-PER-v1.0.xls|AD-PER-Master ,<br>AD-PER-Products ,<br>AD-PER-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-PER-Foreign-Firms|1992-2002|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|TUR|Turkey|AD-TUR-v1.0.xls|AD-TUR-Master ,<br>AD-TUR-Products ,<br>AD-TUR-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-TUR-Foreign-Firms|1990-2004|v1.0<br>(10/2005?)|
|USA|United States|AD-USA-v1.0.xls|AD-USA-Master ,<br>AD-USA-Products ,<br>AD-USA-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-USA-Foreign-Firms|1980-2005|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-VEN-Master ,|||
|VEN|Venezuela|AD-VEN-v1.0.xls|AD-VEN-Products ,<br>AD-VEN-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-VEN-Foreign-Firms|1992-2002|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
||||AD-ZAF-Master ,|||
|ZAF|South Africa|AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls|AD-ZAF-Products ,<br>AD-ZAF-Domestic-Firms ,<br>AD-ZAF-Foreign-Firms|1992-2004|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|

Note that we use the 3-letter UN country symbol to identify both the antidumping using countries (table 2.1), and then also the foreign countries that may be subject to the antidumping investigation, as even something as seemingly simple as the exact spelling of country names can differ across countries and sources of data. The 3-letter UN country symbol for each of the countries and territories in the database is presented in a table in the Appendix.

8
The data for each AD user country are contained in a Microsoft Excel 2003 Workbook file ~ (named as in table 2.1 and posted at <u>http://www.brandeis.edu/ cbown/global_ad/</u> ), within which are typically four spreadsheets of data: 1) a master spreadsheet with basic antidumping case investigation information on dates and outcomes; 2) a spreadsheet containing information on the Harmonized System (HS) products under investigation; 3) a spreadsheet containing information on domestic firms involved in the antidumping petition; and 4) a spreadsheet containing information on foreign firms named in the antidumping petition.

We have also attempted to remove “empty” cells in the spreadsheets, as these affect the ability to easily transform the spreadsheets into machine-readable ASCII files for merging into other data sets. Thus a cell entry for missing data (i.e., data that we are confident exists, but which we were unable to find) was filled in with an “MI.” On the other hand, cell entries that were empty because there was no relevant data (e.g., because it never reached that phase of the antidumping investigation) are filled in with a “.” In some instances, this admittedly required judgment. For example, consider the failure to find any information regarding consideration of the revocation of an antidumping measure – if no information was found, we typically assumed that the cell entry was not relevant (i.e., “.”) as opposed to the antidumping measure had been removed and the data was simply missing (i.e., “MI”).

The rest of section 2 details how each of these four basic spreadsheets is formatted for consistency across the AD-user countries.

# **2.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – AD-CTY-Master**

Each country has a master spreadsheet presenting a common set of information. The AD-CTY-Master<sup>11</sup> spreadsheet has the same 21 initial column headings (Columns A through T) for each of the AD using countries. For each country, columns U through (END) may contain unique additional variables depending on the country’s nuances of its own antidumping process and the availability of reported

> 11 CTY is replaced with the 3-letter UN country code for each of the 15 user countries in the data set.

9
information. Section 3 below describes the unique information for each country in columns U through (END), as well as descriptions of the sources of information for users that would like to go back and check/verify information in the data set or augment the data set for their own use. The following table describes the contents of the first 21 rows of each master spreadsheet for each country.

**Table 2.1.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A.**|**AD_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the user initiating the antidumping investigation|
|**B.**|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the database<br>[generated by us]|
|**C.**|**CASE_REPCODE**|Related antidumping investigations of multiple countries at the same time over<br>the same product|
|**D.**|**INV_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the foreign country under investigation|
|**E.**|**INV_CTY_CODE**|3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table 2.2)|
|**F.**|**PRODUCT**|Description of the product under investigation|
|**G.**|**INIT_DATE**|Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**H.**|**P_DUMP_DATE**|Date of preliminary dumping decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**I.**|**P_INJ_DATE**|Date of preliminary injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**J.**|**P_DUMP_DEC**|Preliminary dumping decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to<br>ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government<br>agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative),<br>B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision<br>is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as<br>case never reached that stage of the investigation)|
|**K.**|**P_INJ_DEC**|Preliminary injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling<br>by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency),<br>P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), B(ypassed, as<br>sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision is the final<br>decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never<br>reached that stage of the investigation)|
|**L.**|**P_AD_DATE**|Date of imposition of preliminary antidumping measure (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**M.**|**P_AD_MEASURE**|Preliminary antidumping measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (=<br>specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given<br>level), SA (= suspension agreement)|
|**N.**|**F_DUMP_DATE**|Date of final dumping decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**O.**|**F_INJ_DATE**|Date of final injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**P.**|**F_DUMP_DEC**|Final dumping decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by<br>petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial<br>– some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the<br>notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the<br>investigation)|
|**Q.**|**F_INJ_DEC**|Final injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by<br>petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial|

10
|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|||– some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the<br>notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the<br>investigation)|
|**R.**|**F_AD_DATE**|Date of imposition of final antidumping measure (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**S.**|**F_AD_MEASURE**|Final antidumping measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (= specific<br>duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given level),<br>SA (= suspension agreement)|
|**T.**|**REVOKE_DATE**|Date of revocation of antidumping order (MM/DD/YEAR)|

Before describing the other spreadsheets available across countries, it is important to identify that for a number of countries, much of the data described in the master spreadsheet in one column would be redundant – i.e., the same as that found in another column. For example, for a “single track” country that has one government agency carrying out a simultaneous injury and dumping investigation, the preliminary dumping and injury decisions (and any measures imposed) might take place on the same date. The same is likely to be the case for final decisions as well. Because some countries have “dual track” investigative processes, we have chosen this data presentation approach so as to have some standardization across country spreadsheets.

# **2.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Products**

Each user country also has a spreadsheet presenting information on the Harmonized System (HS) product codes listed in the antidumping investigation petition. The AD-CTY-Products spreadsheet has the same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) for each of the using countries, listed in table 2.2.1 .

**Table 2.2.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A. **|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the database<br>[generated by us]|
|**B. **|**HS_CODE**|Harmonized System product code for the product under investigation|
|**C. **|**HS_DIGITS**|Number of digits of the HS product code reported in HS_CODE|

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# **2.3 The “Domestic Firms” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms**

For many user countries, we also have a spreadsheet presenting a common set of information on domestic firms, trade associations and/or labor unions that are part of the filing of the antidumping investigation petition. The AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms spreadsheet has the same 2 initial column headings (Columns A and B) for each of the using countries, described in table 2.3.1.

**Table 2.3.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A.**|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the database<br>[generated by us]|
|**B.**|**D_FIRM**|Domestic firm, trade association, industry group, labor union, etc. that is part of the<br>antidumping petition requesting the investigation|

# **2.4 The “Foreign Firms” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms**

For many user countries, we also have a spreadsheet presenting a common set of information on foreign firms subject to the antidumping investigation, and, where available, the foreign-firm specific outcomes (e.g., level of duties imposed) at the resolution of the investigation. The AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms spreadsheet has the same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) as described in table 2.4.1.

**Table 2.4.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A.**|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the<br>database [generated by us]|
|**B.**|**F_FIRM**|Foreign firm under investigation in the antidumping petition|
|**C.**|**F_AD_MEASURE_FIRM**|Foreign firm-specific final antidumping measure imposed|

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# **3 More Country-Specific Information on AD Sources and Data**

For each of the AD user countries for which we have detailed data formatted as described in section 2, we describe in this section the additional and “unique” information specific to each user country.

Table 3.1 reports the sources of much of our information on national government agencies handling the dumping and injury determination of the antidumping process, their websites (if available) and the names of official government documents in which antidumping investigation notifications are published.

## **Table 3.1 : User Countries’ Antidumping Investigative Agencies, Government Reporting**

## **Publications and Websites**

|**Country**|**Government Agency Handling**<br>**Dumping Investigation**|**Government Agency Handling**<br>**Injury Investigation**|**Government Publications that**<br>**Report Antidumping Activity**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Argentina|Secretariat of Industry and Trade<br>(Secretaría de Industria y Comercio)|National Commision of Foreign<br>Trade (Comisión Nacional de<br>Comercio Exterior (CNCE))|Resolutions and Acts published by<br>the Documentation and Information<br>Center of the Argentine Economic<br>Ministry<br>http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/<br>|
|Australia|Dumping Unit of the Australian<br>Customs Service|Dumping Unit of the Australian<br>Customs Service|Commonwealth of Australian<br>Gazette, Australian Financial Review,<br>and Australian Customs Dumping<br>Notices (ACDNs)<br>http://www.customs.gov.au/|
|Brazil|Department of Commercial Defense<br>(Departamento de Defesa Comercial<br>(DECOM)) at the Secretariat of<br>Foreign Trade (Secretaria de Comercio<br>Exterior (SECEX))|Department of Commercial<br>Defense (Departamento de Defesa<br>Comercial (DECOM)) at the<br>Secretariat of Foreign Trade<br>(Secretaria de Comercio Exterior<br>(SECEX))|Official Diary of the Union (_Diario_<br>_Oficial da Uniao_), a circular of the<br>Secretariat of Foreign Trade<br>(SECEX)<br>http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/s<br>itio/secex/secex/competencia.php|
|Canada|Anti-Dumping and Countervailing<br>Directorate of the Canada Border<br>Services Agency (CBSA)<br>http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/menu-<br>e.html|Canadian International Trade<br>Tribunal<br>http://www.citt-<br>tcce.gc.ca/index_e.asp|_Canada Gazette_<br>http://canadagazette.gc.ca/|
|Colombia|Subdirección de Prácticas Comerciales<br>(Assistant Director of Trade Practices)<br>in the Ministerio de Comercio,<br>Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade,<br>Industry, and Tourism)<br>http://www.mincomercio.gov.co|Subdirección de Prácticas<br>Comerciales (Assistant Director<br>of Trade Practices) in the<br>Ministerio de Comercio, Industria<br>y Turismo (Ministry of Trade,<br>Industry, and Tourism)<br>http://www.mincomercio.gov.co|_Diaro Oficial_<br>http://www.imprenta.gov.co/print-<br>int/HTML/frameset/inter_diariofi.htm|

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|**Country**|**Government Agency Handling**<br>**Dumping Investigation**|**Government Agency Handling**<br>**Injury Investigation**|**Government Publications that**<br>**Report Antidumping Activity**|
|---|---|---|---|
|European<br>Union|Trade Directorate of the European<br>Commission|Trade Directorate of the European<br>Commission|_Official Journal of the European_<br>_Communities_<br>http://europa.eu.int/eur-<br>lex/lex/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en|
|India|Directorate General of Antidumping<br>and Allied Duties in the Ministry of<br>Commerce|Directorate General of<br>Antidumping and Allied Duties in<br>the Ministry of Commerce|_The Gazette of India_<br>http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm<br>|
|South<br>Korea|Korean Trade Commission (KTC)|Korean Trade Commission (KTC)|Korean Official Gazette (Gwanbo)<br>http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/<br>http://www.ktc.go.kr/eng/main.asp|
|Mexico|Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales<br>Internacionales (UPCI, Internatational<br>Trade Practices Unit) in La Secretaría<br>de Economía (Economic Secretary)<br>http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=104|Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales<br>Internacionales (UPCI,<br>Internatational Trade Practices<br>Unit) in La Secretaría de<br>Economía (Economic Secretary)<br>http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=<br>104|_Diario Oficial de la Federación_<br>http://dof.terra.com.mx/|
|New<br>Zealand|Trade Remedies Group at the Ministry<br>of Economic Development|Trade Remedies Group at the<br>Ministry of Economic<br>Development|New Zealand Gazette<br>http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/trade_r<br>em.html|
|Peru|Comisión de Fiscalización de Dumping<br>y Subsidio (Commission Inspecting<br>Dumping and Subsidies) in INDECOPI<br>http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/|Comisión de Fiscalización de<br>Dumping y Subsidio<br>(Commission Inspecting Dumping<br>and Subsidies) in INDECOPI<br>http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/|_El Peruano_<br>http://www.elperuano.com.pe/|
|Turkey|“Board of Evaluation of Unfair<br>Competition in Importation” (the<br>Board) and the “Department of<br>Dumping and Subsidy Investigation”<br>(the Department)|“Board of Evaluation of Unfair<br>Competition in Importation” (the<br>Board) and the “Department of<br>Dumping and Subsidy<br>Investigation” (the Department)|_Resmî Gazete (Official Gazette)_<br>published in Turkish with links to<br>antidumping measures imposed and<br>current investigations at<br>http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ITHALAT/da<br>mping/dampgiris.htm<br>|
|United<br>States|International Trade Administration<br>(ITA) in the Department of Commerce<br>http://www.ita.doc.gov/<br>|US International Trade<br>Commission<br>http://www.usitc.gov<br>|_Federal Register_<br>http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/<br>|
|Venezuela|Comisión Antidumping y Sobre<br>Subsidios (CASS)<br>http://www.cass.com.ve/|Comisión Antidumping y Sobre<br>Subsidios (CASS)<br>http://www.cass.com.ve/|_Gaceta Oficial_<br>http://www.tsj.gov.ve/<br>gaceta/gacetaoficial.asp|
|South<br>Africa|Trade Remedies Directorates at the<br>Department of Trade and Industry<br>(DTI)|Trade Remedies Directorates at<br>the Department of Trade and<br>Industry (DTI)|International Trade Administration<br>Commission Reports<br>http://www.dti.gov.za/offerings/offeri<br>ng.asp?offeringid=82|

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In each user country-specific section that follows below, we add basic information on each country’s antidumping process. We also describe key missing elements of the data that we experienced during the data collection. Finally, so as not to throw away useful, but country-specific information, for each country’s spreadsheets we describe the additional data columns in AD-CTY-Master, AD-CTYProducts, AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms, AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms spreadsheets beyond the columns of data described in section 2.

# **3.1 Argentina (ARG)**

Argentina uses a dual track system: dumping is assessed by the Secretariat for Industry and Commerce while injury is determined by the National Commission for Foreign Trade (CNCE). Antidumping decisions by the two agencies are contained in Acts (Actas) and Resolutions (Resoluciones), which are available through the Economic Ministry’s “Documentation and Information Centre.” The source of the underlying data was online publications of Acts and Resolutions via the website of the Economic Ministry’s Documentation and Information Centre as well as tables in Nogués and Baracat (2005), which describes more detail on the Argentine antidumping process.

The Argentine spreadsheet contains additional data beyond the standard information described in Section 2. The additional items are described in the table below.

15
# **Table 3.1.1 : Additional Argentine Data Included in AD-ARG-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-AR**|**G-Master:**||
|**U.**|**INIT_GP**|The government publication initiating the investigation|
|**V.**|**P_GP**|The government publication containing the preliminary finding|
|**W.**|**P_MEASURES_GP**|The government publication containing the preliminary measures|
|**X.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary antidumping duty imposed with details on the<br>measure(s).|
|**Y.**|**F_GP**|The government publication containing the final finding|
|**Z.**|**F_MEASURES_GP**|The government publication containing the final measures|
|**AA.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final antidumping duty imposed with details on the measure(s).|
|**AB.**|**F_AD_MARGIN(min)**|The final minimum dumping margin found|
|**AC.**|**F_AD_MARGIN(max)**|The final maximum dumping margin found|
|**AD.**|**DUTY_RULE**|Either FD- Full duty or LD- Lesser Duty, where full duty implies the full<br>dumping margin was imposed as an antidumping duty while lesser duty<br>implies that the antidumping duty imposed was less than the full margin.<br>_Source:_Nogués and Baracat (2005)|
|**AE.**|**METHOD**|Methodology used to determine the dumping margin (DM- Domestic<br>market, TC- Third country, CB- Cost based)<br>_Source:_Nogués and Baracat (2005)|
|**AF.**|**TYPE**|Either D-Dumping Case or RD -Review of Dumping Case<br>_Source:_Nogués and Baracat (2005)|

In terms of incomplete or missing data, the Argentine data set does not have complete information on the revocation or continuation of measures, as this information is only available for cases that have undergone a review. Furthermore, the database contains only partial information on foreign exporters as only some were named in the official documents.

# **3.2 Australia (AUS)**

The Australian Customs Service (or Customs) is solely responsible for anti-dumping investigations and determines if dumping and/or injury has occurred for each case. The decisions of the Australian Customs Service’s Dumping Unit are sometimes reviewed by a Trade Measures Review Officer from the Trade Measures Review Secretariat. The initiation and outcomes of each investigation are published in the Australian Commonwealth Gazette and in Australian Customs Dumping Notices (ACDNs), which are available online at the Customs website. The sources for data included in the database is online 16
publications of Customs Notices and Reports at the Australian Customs website, as well as on-site inspection of Customs Documents at the Australian Customs Office in Canberra. Information about Australia’s antidumping process is available as an online public document named “Australia’s AntiDumping and Countervailing Administration”, which can be accessed via the Customs website. For a discussion of Australia’s antidumping process see also Moulis and Gay (2005).

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Australian spreadsheets contain additional data, which are described in the table below.

**Table 3.2.1 : Additional Australian Data Included in AD-AUS-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-A**|**US-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_DUTY(MIN)**|The minimum preliminary anti-dumping duty imposed|
|**V.**|**P_DUTY(MAX)**|The maximum preliminary anti-dumping duty imposed|
|**W.**|**F_DUTY (MIN)**|The minimum final anti-dumping duty imposed|
|**X.**|**F_DUTY (MAX)**|The maximum final anti-dumping duty imposed|
|**Y.**|**INIT_GP_ACDN**|The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)<br>containing the initiation of the case|
|**Z.**|**P_GP_ACDN**|The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)<br>containing the preliminary findings of the case|
|**AA.**|**F_GP_ACDN**|The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)<br>containing the final findings of the case|
|**AB.**|**GP_ADD_ACDN**|The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)<br>mentioning the imposition of antidumping duties|
|**AC.**|**GP_ACDN_TERM**|The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)<br>mentioning the termination of the case|
|**AD.**|**GP_ACDN_REVOKE**|<sup>The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice)</sup><br>mentioning the revocation of anti-dumping measures|
|**AE.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-AU**|**S-Foreign-Firms:**||
|**D.**|**P_DEC**|The preliminary decision for the case in which the foreign exporting firm is<br>involved|
|**E.**|**F_DEC**|The final decision for the case in which the foreign exporting firm is<br>involved|
|**F.**|**FIRM_D_MARGINS**|The dumping margin assessed for the foreign exporting firm|
|**G.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

17
In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Australian spreadsheet lacks details on final antidumping duties imposed such as Australian Customs Dumping Notice (ACDN) documents, dates on which antidumping duties were imposed, and the size of duties imposed for certain cases (especially those initiated between 1996 and 2004). Furthermore, the Australian data does not contain the outcomes of reviews.

# **3.3 Brazil (BRA)**

Brazilian antidumping investigations are carried out solely by the Department of Commercial Defense (DECOM), which is part of the Secretariat for Foreign Trade (SECEX). The Secretariat itself is under the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Trade, and Industry. The outcomes of investigations are published by the Secretariat (SECEX) in circulars, some of which are available online at the Secretariat’s website. The Brazilian data was provided by Honorio Kumé and is based on Kumé and Piani (2005), which includes a history and analysis of the use of antidumping in Brazil. See also Caetano (2005).

The Brazilian spreadsheet contains the standard data items described in section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

**Table 3.3.1 : Additional Brazilian Data Included in AD-BRA-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-BR**|**A-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary antidumping duty imposed. If several duties were imposed, this<br>column contains the maximum duty|
|**V.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final antidumping duty imposed. If several duties were imposed, this column<br>contains the maximum duty|
|**W.**|**TYPE**|An indicator of review cases (R=review case)|

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Brazilian spreadsheet lacks data on the preliminary outcomes for certain cases. There is also no firm-level data (neither for domestic nor foreign firms).

18
# **3.4 Canada (CAN)**

Canada’s antidumping process has a two-track determination of injury and dumping. Dumping determinations are handled by the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), while injury determinations are made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Both bodies initiate their own investigations, each followed by preliminary and final decisions. Note however that this system was not used prior to mid-2000. Prior to 2000 the CBSA was known as the CCRA (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency) and the CITT did not initiate a separate investigation in the preliminary phase. The CCRA would briefly discuss whether injury was evident if they found preliminary evidence of dumping. Then the CITT would begin a separate injury investigation only if the case proceeded to the final phase. Alternatively, if an interested party (such as a company named in the case) referred the preliminary issue of injury to the CITT, the tribunal would hold a preliminary investigation.

A number of data sources were used to collect the Canadian information. The primary resources were the websites of the CBSA and the CITT. If possible, any discrepancies in the data (such as a difference in a date listed in two separate sources) were decided in favor of the information found in the actual case files on these sites. However, for pre-1995 CCRA cases, hard copies were used because the site did not have coverage of that era. They were provided by the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate and only covered final determinations. Therefore, information on preliminary CCRA cases - before 1995 was gathered from three sources: the CBSA Historical Listing (http://www.cbsa <u>asfc.gc.ca/sima/historic-e.html), a list of CCRA decision dates provided by the Directorate, and the</u> _Canada Gazette_ microfiche collection at Harvard University. Similarly, CITT cases before 1988 were not available online, and information on these was gathered from the Canada Gazette microfiche.

The additional data collected for Canada beyond that described in section 2 is detailed in the following table: 19
**Table 3.4.1 : Additional Canadian Data Included in AD-CAN-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-C**|**AN-Master :**||
|**U.**|**CASE_CBSA**|Case code associated with the dumping investigation administered<br>by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)|
|**V.**|**CASE_CITT**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by|
|||the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Only assigned<br>in the final stage.|
|**W.**|**RELATED_CVD**|Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against<br>the same product and country, see CVD-CAN workbook|
|**X.**|**INIT_DATE_CBSA**|Date of initiation of the case at the CBSA|
|**Y.**|**INIT_DATE_CITT**|Date of initiation of the case at the CITT|
|**Z.**|**P_AVG_DUTY**|The weighted average preliminary duty|
|**AA.**|**F_AVG_DUTY**|The weighted average final duty|
|**AB.**|**TERM_DATE**|The date a case was terminated for reasons such as the case was<br>withdrawn by the petitioner or there was insignificant evidence of<br>dumping|
|**AC.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-C**<br>**D.**|**AN-Products :**<br>**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-C**|**AN-Domestic-Firms :**||

|**C.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-C**|**AN-Foreign-Firms :**||
|**D.**|**F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM**|Final dumping margin in percentage terms of normal value as<br>decided for a specific firm by the CBSA|
|**E.**|**F_AD_NDUTY_FIRM**|Final firm-specific dumping duty assessed in percentage terms of<br>normal value|
|**F.**|**F_AD_DUTYPAYABLE_FIRM**|Final dumping margin in percentage terms of export price as<br>decided for a specific firm by the CBSA|
|**G.**|**F_AD_EDUTY_FIRM**|Final firm-specific dumping duty assessed in percentage terms of<br>export price|
|**H.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

There are a few important caveats to the Canadian data with respect to the levels of duties imposed. Prior to 2001, most duties were reported in percentage terms of normal value, as opposed to percentage terms of export price. Thus, on the Master Spreadsheet, duties are in terms of normal value 20
until case CAN-AD-302 (Cold-rolled steel sheet from Brazil). Furthermore, duties were usually imposed as ad valorem rates. Nevertheless, there were some instances in which the duty was imposed as a tax on any good entering Canada at a price lower than a given selling price reported to customs. Finally, the levels of duty described in the Master spreadsheet are typically the trade-weighted average margin of dumping found across all investigated firms. However, in some cases, the weighted average was not available, so a proxy, such as the un-weighted average, was used instead. We include notes as to how the proxy was constructed.

Next, we were unable to verify the preliminary duty levels on cases appearing before CAN-AD209 and on a few cases afterwards, i.e., CAN-AD-218 through CAN-AD-225. These were gathered from the CBSA Historical Listing, which we found to contain a few minor errors. Second, the dates for CITT cases before CAN-AD-79 were gathered from the _Gazette_ , which means that these dates may be the publication dates for the decision, which usually occurred about 15 days after the actual decision date. The decision dates after CAN-AD-79 have been verified. Third, CITT dates for preliminary rulings before CAN-AD-272 were only available on a select number of cases that went to the final stage. Any cases that were terminated or suspended earlier lacked this information.

There are a few data columns that are redundant in the Canadian data. First, the P_AD_DATE series is largely identical to the P_DUMP_DEC series, as preliminary duties are assessed immediately from the date of the CBSA preliminary decision. Similarly, the F_AD_DATE is largely identical to the F_INJ_DEC, as final duties are assessed as soon as the CITT hands down an affirmative decision. Depending on the specifics of the tribunal’s decision, the final duty may be applied retroactively to goods imported during the provisional duty period. Finally, the INIT_DATE series is identical to the INIT_DATE_CBSA series, as the CBSA always initiates an investigation before the CITT.

# **3.5 Colombia (COL)**

In Colombia, injury, dumping, and causation are handled as a single track process. The main investigative authority is the Subdirección de Prácticas Comerciales (Assistant Director of Trade Practices), which is 21
the body that processes claims in dumping cases. The Subdirección presents its findings to the Comité de Prácticas Comerciales (Trade Practices Committee) which makes a final recommendation. The Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism) issues the overall decision corresponding to these recommendations. A more complete discussion (in Spanish) can be found at the Ministry website, http://www.mincomercio.gov.co/. The original source material for this data can be found in the dumping/subsidizing section of that website, particularly in the summary excel sheet provided there.

The Colombian spreadsheet contains the standard data items described in section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

**Table 3.5.1 : Additional Colombian Data Included in AD-COL-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-C**|**OL-Master :**||
|**U.**|**TERM_DATE**|Date of termination, usually instituted because the case was denied<br>initiation|
|**V.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary rate|
|**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final rate|
|**X.**|**INIT_GP**|The resolution number of the initiation action|
|**Y.**|**P_GP**|The resolution number of the preliminary decision of dumping and<br>injury|
|**Z.**|**F_GP**|The resolution number of the final decision of dumping and injury|
|**AA.**|**TERM_GP**|The resolution number of the termination action|
|**AB.**|**REVOKE_GP**|The resolution number of the revocation action|
|**AC.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

# **In AD-COL-Products :**

# **D. NOTES** Comments

Because this data was compiled from a secondary source (the Ministry’s excel file), and not from the actual case files, some information is incomplete. It was unclear exactly when duties were imposed, so the P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE columns are largely missing. All other dates are those listed with 22
the resolution numbers by the Ministry, which does not describe whether these are the dates of decision or of publication. Furthermore, termination dates and resolution numbers were only available for a select number of cases. Lastly, specific revocation resolutions were listed for only two cases. Other duties are known to have been revoked, but no details were available. Therefore, these revocations dates are simply listed as the standard five-year expiration date. Finally, the “DUMP” and “INJ” columns are identical, since Colombia uses a single track antidumping process. Firm-specific information is also currently unavailable.

# **3.6 European Union (EUN)**

Antidumping investigations in the European Union are handled by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission. Investigations follow a single-track i.e. the system assigns the responsibility for dumping and injury assessment only to the Commission. The initiations and outcomes of each investigation are published in the European Union’s _Official Journal_ . Electronic versions of antidumping-related documents are available online in the form of Information and Notices (prefix C) and Legislation (prefix L). The source of the data was primarily the European Union’s _Official Journal_ website. In cases where the online documents lacked certain data items, the Office for Official Publications provided the complete versions of these documents upon request by email. There is a fairly extensive research literature on various aspects of EU antidumping, e.g., for procedural descriptions and analyses see Messerlin (2001) and Vermulst (2005).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, the AD-EUN workbook contains much additional information that may be of use to researchers, as we describe in the table below.

23
**Table 3.6.1 : Additional EU Data Included in AD-EUN-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|<br>**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-E**|**UN-Master :**||
|**U.**|**INIT_GP**|The government publication containing the initiation notice|
|**V.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary antidumping duty imposed. If there were several duties<br>imposed, this column contains the maximum dumping duty|
|**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final antidumping duty imposed. If there were several duties<br>imposed this column contains the maximum dumping duty|
|**X.**|**P_AD_MARGIN**|,<br>The preliminary dumping margin assessed. If there were several<br>dumping margins assessed, this column contains the maximum dumping<br>margin found|
|**Y.**|**F_AD_MARGIN**|The final dumping margin assessed. If there were several dumping<br>margins assessed, this column contains the maximum dumping margin<br>found|
|**Z.**|**P_GP**|The government publication containing the preliminary outcome of the<br>investigation|
|**AA.**|**F_GP**|The government publication containing the final outcome of the<br>investigation|
|**AB.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-E**|**UN-Products :**||
|**D.**|**CN_ P_ex**|This column indicates whether the HS code (referred to as the CN code<br>in the European Union) of the good under investigation has an ‘ex’<br>prefix at the preliminary stage. The ‘ex’ prefix indicates that the<br>products being investigated are only a subset of the products in the<br>reported CN code.|
|**E.**<br>**F.**|**P_HS_CODE**<br>**SIG_DIGITS_P_HSCODE**|The HS code of the investigated good at the preliminary stage<br>Number of digits of the HS product code reported at the preliminary<br>stage.|
|**G.**|**CN_F_ex**|<br>This column indicates whether the HS code (referred to as the CN code<br>in the European Union) of the good under investigation has an ‘ex’<br>prefix at the final stage. The ‘ex’ prefix indicates that the products being<br>iid l b f h d i h d CN d|
|||nvestgate are ony a suset o te proucts n te reporte coe.|
|**H.**|**F_HS_CODE**|The HS code of the investigated good at the final stage|
|**I.**|**SIG_DIGITS_F_HSCODE**|Number of digits of the HS product code reported at the final stage|
|**J.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-E**|**UN-Domestic-Firms :**||
|**C.**|**COUNTRY**|The European country in which the plaintiff domestic firm is located|
|**In AD-E**|**UN-Foreign-Firms :**||
|**D.**|**PADMEASUREFIRM**|The firm-specific preliminary antidumping measure imposed|
|**E.**|**___**<br>**P_AD_MARGIN**|<br>The firm-specific preliminary antidumping margin imposed|
|**F.**|**F_AD_MARGIN**|The firm-specific final antidumping margin imposed|
|**G.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The firm-specific preliminary antidumping duty imposed|
|**H.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The firm-specific final antidumping duty imposed|
|**I.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the European Union dataset lacks information on reviews.

24
# **3.7 India (IND)**

India’s antidumping process has a single track determination of injury and dumping, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce. The Designated Authority initiates and carries out both the dumping and the injury investigations, and makes a ruling based on its findings. Information on these investigations are made public through The Gazette of India: Extraordinary (an issue of the Ministry of Commerce) and is available online at <u>http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm. More information regarding the Indian antidumping process can</u> be found in Kumaran (2005) and Banik (1998).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, additional data collected for India is described below:

**Table 3.7.1 : Additional Indian AD Data Included in AD-IND-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-IN**|**D-Master :**||
|**U.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-IN**<br>**C.**|**D-Domestic-Firms :**<br>**PET**|A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm/entity in COLUMN B<br>filed or supported the AD petition and 0 if the firm/entity forms part of<br>the domestic industry and is mentioned in the investigation but did not<br>file or act in support of the petition.|

## **In AD-IND-Foreign-Firms :**

**D. F_AD_MARGIN** The firm-specific final antidumping margin imposed **E. F_AD_DUTY** The  firm-specific final antidumping duty imposed **F. P_AD_MARGIN** The firm-specific preliminary antidumping margin imposed **G. P_AD_DUTY** The firm-specific preliminary antidumping duty imposed

25
Aside from information on antidumping revocations (if any exist), there is nothing systematically missing from the Indian data for all investigations. Nevertheless, for any given investigation there may some missing elements such as dates, decisions or even product codes.

# **3.8 South Korea (KOR)**

In South Korea, the Korean Trade Commission is wholly responsible for anti-dumping investigations. This quasi-judicial agency determines if dumping and/or injury has occurred for each case. The initiation and outcomes of each investigation are published in the Korean Official Gazette (Gwanbo). The Korean Trade Commission also publishes information about ongoing antidumping cases online at its website. The source of the data was hard-copies of antidumping documents in Korean provided by the Korean Trade Commission. Summary information about Korea’s antidumping process is available on the Korean Trade Commission’s website.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Korean file contains additional data described in the table below.

**<u>Table 3.8.1 : Additional Korean Data Included in AD-KOR-v1.0.xls</u>**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-K**|**OR-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The maximum (or range) of preliminary anti-dumping duty (duties)<br>imposed|
|**V.**<br>**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**<br>**REVIEW_DUTY**|The maximum (or range) of final anti-dumping duty (duties) imposed<br>The range and schedule of anti-dumping duties maintained after a sunset<br>review|
|**X.**|**REVIEW_F_DATE**|The date when a sunset review final decision was taken|
|**Y.**<br>**Z.**|**REVIEW_DUTY_DATE**<br>**TYPE**|The date when reviewed antidumping duties became effective<br>A variable indicating if a sunset review was performed on the case<br>(Review=Sunset Review was carried out)|
|**In AD-K**|**OR-Foreign-Firms:**||
|**D.**|**F_AD_MARGIN**|The maximum (or range) of firm-specific dumping margin(s) found at the<br>final stage|
|**E.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|Details on the firm-specific antidumping duty (measures) imposed at the<br>final stage.|
|**F.**|**COUNTRY**|The country in which the foreign exporting firm is located|

26
In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Korean dataset is missing several cases for which hard-copy documents were not available, although antidumping investigations had been notified to the WTO, and this problem is especially severe between 2000 and 2004. The data is also missing the details on the government publications related to antidumping investigations at the initiation, preliminary, and final stages. Finally, the database lacks some information on preliminary outcomes in certain cases and it does not contain information on when antidumping measures were revoked.

# **3.9 Mexico (MEX)**

In Mexico, determinations of dumping and injury are made by one body, the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit), which is part of the Secretaría de Economía. Unlike many other countries, the Mexican authority is quite likely to continue an investigation through the preliminary phase without placing duties. Mexico was one of the earlier Latin American countries to introduce a dumping investigation system, in place since 1987. The current law which governs this process can be found at the OAS SICE website, <u>http://www.sice.oas.org/antidumping/legislation/mexico/LCEXT.asp. The data for this set was found in</u> electronic copies of the Mexican case files. For a discussion of Mexico’s antidumping process see Leycegui and de la Torre (2005), as well as Niels and Francois (forthcoming).

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Mexican file contains additional data described in the table below.

**Table 3.9.1 : Additional Mexican Data Included in AD-MEX-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-M**|**EX-Master :**||
|**U.**|**RELATED_CVD**|Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against<br>the same product and country, see MEX-CVD workbook|
|**V.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The “all others” preliminary rate|
|**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The “all others” final rate|
|**X.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**Y.**|**FURTHER NOTES**|Comments that wouldnotfitinthefirstnotes column|

27
**<u>Column Variable Name Description</u> In AD-MEX-Products : D. NOTES** Comments **In AD-MEX-Domestic-Firms : C. NOTES** Comments **In AD-MEX-Foreign-Firms : D. F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM** Final firm-specific dumping margin **E. NOTES** Comments

There were a number of difficulties in standardizing the Mexican data. First there was substantial variation in methods used to assess duties in the early cases. Rates could be expressed in per unit terms, as a percentage, or as the difference between an export price and a given normal value. Furthermore, some duties were only put in effect if the export price dropped below a set limit. Additionally, before the creation of the current dumping law, the Mexican authority could levy duties almost simultaneously with the case’s initiation. They only needed to use the amounts of dumping established in the initiation brief to decide tax levels. Therefore, a number of early cases lack separate initiation dates, and instead have the same date listed for both the preliminary and initiation phases. Note also that the preliminary duty was often revised later in the process. Finally, prior to 2000, the dates in all series are those listed at the top of each case file, and these dates appear to be the dates of publication in the _Diario Oficial_ . After 2000 the only available dates were those listed at the bottom of the case file, which appear to be the actual decision dates. Because of this inconsistency, P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE are incomplete. Note however that duties appeared to come into effect the day after publication.

A few columns are redundant, but were maintained to keep consistent with the overall format, because the same authority handles injury and dumping investigations in Mexico. P_DUMP_DATE and P_INJ_DATE are identical, as are P_DUMP_DEC and P_INJ_DEC.

28
# **3.10 New Zealand (NZL)**

In New Zealand, antidumping investigations are conducted by the Trade Remedies Group at the Ministry of Economic Development. The Trade Remedies Group publishes initiations and outcomes of antidumping cases in the official New Zealand Gazette as well as on the Ministry of Economic Development’s website. The source of the data was the Ministry’s website which was combined with some information provided directly by the Trade Remedies Group. Information about New Zealand’s antidumping investigative process can be found on the Ministry’s website via the Trade Remedies link.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for New Zealand contains additional data described in the table below.

**Table 3.10.1 : Additional Data from New Zealand Included in AD-NZL-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-N**|**ZL-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary anti-dumping duty for all non-named foreign exporting<br>firms imposed|
|**V.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final anti-dumping duty for all non-named foreign exporting firms or<br>range of duties imposed|
|**W.**|**INIT_GP**|The government publication containing the case initiation|
|**X.**|**P_GP**|The government publication containing the preliminary case outcomes|
|**Y.**|**F_GP**|The government publication containing the final case outcomes|
|**Z.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-NZ**|**L-Foreign-Firms:**||
|**D.**|**F_AD_MARGIN**|The trade-weighted average (or range of) firm-specific dumping<br>margin(s) found|
|**E.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The ad-valorem equivalent of the firm-specific final antidumping duties<br>imposed|

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the New Zealand workbook does not contain preliminary outcomes because New Zealand’s antidumping procedures differ from those of other countries in that a preliminary outcome is rarely issued unless provisional measures are imposed. Furthermore, the data is 29
missing the references to government publications from 1999 onwards. The data also lacks exact details on final antidumping duties imposed as these are often in terms of reference prices – e.g., Normal Value (Value for Duty Equivalent) or Non-Injurious Free-On-Board - for further sub-classifications of the investigated good. However, the workbook contains the ad-valorem equivalents of antidumping duties imposed as calculated by the Trade Remedies Group.

# **3.11 Peru (PER)**

In Peru, one authority investigates both dumping and injury, La Comisión de Fiscalización de Dumping y Subsidios (Commission Investigating Dumping and Subsidies). This body is part of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI). The actual laws governing this process can be found at the INDECOPI website (in Spanish).<sup>12</sup> This website includes the case files in html or PDF formats, which provided the source material for this data set. At the time of our data construction, this particular element of the Peruvian government’s website infrastructure was a bit unreliable, thus we found it useful to save relevant web pages if they are needed for long-term use.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for Peru contains additional data described in the table below.

**Table 3.11.1 : Additional Peruvian Data Included in AD-PER-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-PE**|**R-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|Preliminary duty imposed|
|**V.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|Final duty imposed|
|**W.**|**INIT_GP**|Resolution number for the initiation action|
|**X.**|**P_GP**|Resolution number for the preliminary dumping/injury decision|
|**Y.**|**F_GP**|Resolution number for the final dumping/injury decision|
|**Z.**|**REVOKE_GP**|Resolution number for the revocation action|
|**AA.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

> 12 See <u>http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/legislacionyjurisprudencia/cds/antidumping.asp</u> , last accessed on 15 August 2005.

30
|**Column**<br>**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|
|**In AD-PER-Products :**||
|**D.**<br>**NOTES**|Comments|

## **In AD-PER-Foreign-Firms :**

**D. F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM** Final margin of dumping for a specific firm **E. NOTES** Comments

The primary concern with the Peruvian data is that it is incomplete. The INDECOPI site does have the majority of the case files as several early investigations seem to be missing, and the documentation ends in 2002.

# **3.12 Turkey (TUR)**

The Turkish antidumping process is administered by two separate bodies, the “Board of Evaluation of Unfair Competition in Importation” (the Board) and the “Department of Dumping and Subsidy Investigation” (the Department). According to the Turkish government’s website, “The Board is an independent body consisting of 8 members, representing 7 different public institutions and non-profit organisations. The Board is empowered to take decisions for the initiation of an investigation, acceptance of undertakings, termination of an investigation or imposition of anti-dumping duties. The Department is subordinated to the Prime Ministry Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, Directorate General for Imports. The Department is entitled to make preliminary examination upon complaint, to present proposals to the Board on whether to initiate an investigation or to take measures and to carry out such investigations.” (DTM, 2005) Despite the existence of two bodies the investigations tend to follow a single track procedure as announcements on dumping and injury tend to be made simultaneously. Announcements are published in the Turkish government’s _Official Gazette_ (Resmî Gazete) publications which is available online, but only in Turkish.

31
In addition to the basic antidumping data described in section 2, additional data for Turkey is as described in the following table

**Table 3.12.1 : Additional Turkish Data Included in AD-TUR-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-TU**|**R-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|Description of the preliminary antidumping duty imposed|
|**V.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|Description of the final antidumping duty imposed|
|**W.**|**F_AD_GP**|_Official Gazette_government publication number documenting the final<br>antidumping determination|

# **3.13 United States (USA)**

The United States’ antidumping process is a two-track procedure handled by two distinct government agencies – the dumping investigations are administered by the International Trade Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the injury investigations are handled by the quasi-judicial United States International Trade Commission. Information on United States’ antidumping investigations is reported by these agencies to the public through the _Federal Register_ . The US antidumping process has been studied extensively, see for example, Boltuck and Litan (1991), Staiger and Wolak (1994), Blonigen and Prusa (2004), Horlick (2005), and Nelson (forthcoming).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, the AD-USA workbook contains much additional information<sup>13</sup> that may be of use to researchers.

> 13 Much of the information in the workbook on US domestic and foreign firms is graciously provided by Bruce A. Blonigen as posted at his website, http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html. The data can also be compiled from notifications to the _Federal Register_ (foreign firms and outcomes) and the ITA’s website, <u>http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/pet-init.htm</u> (domestic petitioners), last accessed on 22 July 2005.

32
**<u>Table 3.13.1 : Additional US Data Included in AD-USA-v1.0.xls</u>**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-U**|**SA-Master :**||
|**U.**|**CASE_ITA**|Case code associated with the dumping investigation administered by the<br>International Trade Administration (ITA) at the Department of Commerce|
|**V.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US<br>International Trade Commission (ITC)|
|**W.**|**RELATED_CVD**|Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against the same<br>product and country, see CVD-USA workbook|
|**X.**|**ITC_REPCODE**|First (chronological) ITC case code for multiple country/identical product<br>antidumping investigations|
|**Y.**|**INIT_DATE_ITA**|Date of initiation of the case at the ITA|
|**Z.**<br>|**INIT_DATE_ITC**<br>|Date of initiation of the case at the ITC<br>|
|**AA.**|**TERM_DATE**|Date of termination of investigation if terminated|
|**AB.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|Preliminary “all other firm” antidumping duty imposed|
|**AC.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|Final “all other firm” antidumping duty imposed|
|**AD.**|**INIT_ITA_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for initiation at the<br>ITA|
|**AE.**|**INIT_ITC_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for initiation at the<br>ITC|
|**AF.**|**P_DUMP_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITA<br>preliminary dumping determination|
|**AG.**|**P_INJ_GP**|<br>Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITC<br>preliminary injury determination|
|**AH.**|**F_DUMP_GP**|<br>Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITA final<br>dumping determination|
|**AI.**|**F_INJ_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITC final injury<br>determination|
|**AJ.**|**F_AD_MEASURE_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for imposition of<br>antidumping measure order|
|**AK.**|**REVOKE_GP**|<br>Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for revocation of<br>antidumping order|
|**AL.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-U**|**SA-Products :**||
|**D.**|**TS_CODE**|Prior to 1989, the US did not subscribe to the HS system and instead used<br>the TSUSA system to classify imports, thus this column reports the pre-<br>1989 cases which referenced the investigated products’ 5-7 digit TSUSA<br>code|
|**E.**|**TS_DIGITS**|Number of digits of the TSUSA product code reported in TS_CODE (e.g.,<br>5,7, etc.)|
|**F.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US<br>International Trade Commission (ITC)|
|**G.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-U**|**SA-Domestic-Firms :**||
|**C.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US<br>|
|**In AD-U**|**SA-Foreign-Firms :**|International Trade Commission (ITC)|
|**D.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US<br>International Trade Commission(ITC)|

33
In terms of missing or incomplete data, the US data set is complete, with the exception of information on domestic and foreign firms involved in the investigations – that data is only collected through investigation USA-AD-1058 (cases initiated through October 2003). More recent data on firms can be updated from the _Federal Register._

# **3.14 Venezuela (VEN)**

Venezuela has a single track antidumping investigation procedure administered by the Comisión Antidumping y Sobre Subsidios (CASS, Anti-dumping and Subsidy Commission), which is assisted by the Secretaría Técnica (ST). CASS issues the rulings, while the ST helps with administration and investigation duties. The Venezuelan system was instituted in the early 1990s. The CASS website, <u>http://www.cass.com.ve/ contains useful information on the dumping legislation and on the cases</u> themselves. However, the Venezuelan internet infrastructure is relatively unreliable, so we found it useful to archive pages offline for extended use. This site provided the information for this data set.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for Venezuela contains additional data described in the table below.

**Table 3.14.1 : Additional Venezuelan Data Included in AD-VEN-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-V**|**EN-Master :**||
|**U.**|**TERM_DATE**|Date of the termination action|
|**V.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|Preliminary antidumping duty imposed|
|**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|Final antidumping duty imposed|
|**X.**|**INIT_GP**|Decision number of the initiation action|
|**Y.**|**P_GP**|Decision number of the preliminary dumping/injury determination|
|**Z.**|**F_GP**|Decision number of the final dumping/injury determination|
|**AA.**|**TERM_GP**|Decision number of the termination action|
|**AB.**|**REVOKE_GP**|Decision number of the revocation action|
|**AC.**|**CASE_WORKING_ID**|Number on the folders used to organize the case files|
|**AD.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-V**|**EN-Products :**||
|**D.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In AD-V**|**EN-Foreign-Firms :**||
|**D.**|**F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM**|Final dumping margin for a specific firm|
|**E.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

34
The Venezuelan data typically reports duties in CIF (cost, insurance, freight) terms, though on some occasions they are reported as FOB (free on board). Furthermore, the data in P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE is missing. Resolutions would come into effect on the date of publication, but that date was not usually listed in the files. Some notes on publication may be available on the CASS website. Also, the “DUMP” and “INJ” series are largely identical, because CASS makes both decisions simultaneously.

# **3.15 South Africa (ZAF)**

South African antidumping investigations are administered by the Trade Remedies Directorates in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The outcomes of investigations are published in the International Trade Administration Commission’s reports. Data for South Africa was kindly provided by Gustav Brink and is based on Brink (2005). Holden (2002) provides an earlier analysis of South African antidumping as a reaction to trade liberalization or an anti-competitive instrument. The two articles contain descriptions of the antidumping process in South Africa, but a current summary of antidumping procedures can be found on the Department of Industry and Trade’s website.

The South African workbook contains the standard data items, as in Section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

**Table 3.15.1 : Additional South African Data Included in AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-Z**|**AF-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The maximum (or range of) preliminary antidumping duty (duties) imposed|
|**V.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The maximum (or range of ) final antidumping duty (duties) imposed|
|**W.**|**GP_P_Report**|The government publication reporting the outcomes of the preliminary stage|
|**X.**|**GP_F_Report**|Thegovernmentpublication reportingthe outcomes of the final stage|
|**In AD-ZA**|**F-Foreign-Firms:**||
|**D.**|**AD_MARGIN_FIRM**|The final firm-specific dumping margin(s) found|
|**E.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The preliminary firm-specific antidumping duty imposed|
|**F.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The final firm-specific antidumpingdutyimposed|

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In terms of missing or incomplete data, the South Africa dataset lacks dates when preliminary antidumping duties came into effect as well as dates when antidumping measures were revoked. Furthermore, the data set is missing preliminary outcomes, final outcomes, and HS codes for a few cases where hard-copy documents were missing. Finally, firm-specific information for a few cases where these were not published in the government reports.

# **4 AD-Using Countries with Data on Initiations Only**

As indicated already in table 1.1, there are a number of countries that also use antidumping policies but for which we have not managed to collect data, typically because of the lack of transparency making the data inaccessible. While most of these other (“OTH”) countries would qualify as “new” users, some of them have become quite prolific users of the antidumping policy instrument. For a discussion of various countries use of antidumping, see Bundjamin (2005) for Indonesia, Sutham, Attavipach and Eiamchinda (2005) for Thailand, and Tian (2005) for China.

Thus, in a separate file included in the data set (AD-OTH-v1.0.xls) we document basic information from the WTO on initiations by member countries (described below) over 1995-2003 that are not part of the more detailed database described in sections 2 and 3: 36
**Table 4.1.1 : Other Antidumping User Countries with Initiation Information Only in the Database**

|**Country Code**<br>**(3-letter CTY)**|**Country Name**|**Excel Workbook**<br>**File Name**|**Spreadsheet**<br>**Names within**<br>**Country**<br>**Workbook**|**Available**<br>**Years of**<br>**Data**|**Current**<br>**Version**<br>**(last updated)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|BGR|Bulgaria||AD-BGR-Master ,|||
|CHL|Chile||AD-CHL-Master ,|||
|CHN|China||AD-CHN-Master ,|||
|CRI|Costa Rica||AD-CRI-Master ,|||
|CZE|Czech Republic||AD-CZE-Master ,|||
|ECU|Ecuador||AD-ECU-Master ,|||
|EGY|Egypt||AD-EGY-Master ,|||
|GTM|Guatemala||AD-GTM-Master ,|||
|IDN|Indonesia||AD-IDN-Master ,|||
|ISR|Israel||AD-ISR-Master ,|||
|JAM|Jamaica||AD-JAM-Master ,|||
|JPN|Japan||AD-JPN-Master ,|||
|LVA|Latvia|AD-OTH-10xls|AD-LVA-Master ,|1995-2003|v1.0|
|LTU|Lithuania|v..|AD-LTU-Master ,||(8/2005)|
|MYS|Malaysia||AD-MYS-Master ,|||
|NIC|Nicaragua||AD-NIC-Master ,|||
|PAK|Pakistan||AD-PAK-Master ,|||
|PAN|Panama||AD-PAN-Master ,|||
|PRY|Paraguay||AD-PRY-Master ,|||
|PHL|Philippines||AD-PHL-Master ,|||
|POL|Poland||AD-POL-Master ,|||
|SVN|Slovenia||AD-SVN-Master ,|||
|TWN|Taiwan||AD-TWN-Master ,|||
|THA|Thailand||AD-THA-Master ,|||
|TTO|Trinidad and Tobago||AD-TTO-Master ,|||
|URY|Uruguay||AD-URY-Master|||

The WTO data was originally collected and described in Miranda, Torres and Ruiz (1998) and has since been updated as part of the WTO’s Rules Division Antidumping database.<sup>14</sup> We report only the information available in the WTO dataset on investigations for other WTO members, as detailed in the table below, with one “Master” sheet per using country:

> 14 The data for the WTO Rules Division Antidumping database is taken from the Semi-annual reports Members are obliged to submit to the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. Thanks to Raul Torres and Johann Human for making this database available.

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**Table 4.1.2 : Variables in the AD-OTH-Master Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A.**|**AD_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the user initiating the antidumping investigation|
|**B.**|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the database<br>[generated by us]|
|**C.**|**CASE_REPCODE**|Related antidumping investigations of multiple countries at the same time over<br>the same product|
|**D.**|**INV_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the foreign country under investigation|
|**E.**|**INV_CTY_CODE**|3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table 2.2)|
|**F.**|**PRODUCT**|Description of the product under investigation|
|**G.**|**INIT_DATE**|Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)|

# **5 Countervailing Duty-Using Countries in the Database**

The data for each CVD user country is contained in a Microsoft Excel 2003 Workbook file (posted at ~ <u>http://www.brandeis.edu/ cbown/global_ad/</u> ), within which are typically two spreadsheets of data: 1) a master spreadsheet with basic antidumping case investigation information; and 2) a spreadsheet containing information on the Harmonized System (HS) products under investigation. There are only three countries with detailed countervailing duty data in the database thus far:

**Table 5.1 : Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database**

|**Country Code**<br>**(3-letter CTY)**|**Country**<br>**Name**|**Excel Workbook File**<br>**Name**|**Spreadsheet Names within**<br>**Country Workbook**|**Available**<br>**Years of**<br>**Data**|**Current**<br>**Version**<br>**(last updated)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CAN|Canada|CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls|CVD-CAN-Master ,<br>CVD-CAN-Products|1985-2005|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|MEX|Mexico|CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls|CVD-MEX-Master ,<br>CVD-MEX-Products|1990-2003|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|
|USA|United<br>States|CVD-USA-v1.0.xls|CVD-USA-Master ,<br>CVD-USA-Products|1980-2005|v1.0<br>(8/2005)|

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The rest of section 5 details how each of these two basic spreadsheets is formatted for consistency across the CVD-user countries, before turning to country-specific descriptions for unique data found for each country.

# **5.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – CVD-CTY-Master**

Each country has a master spreadsheet presenting a common set of information. The CVD-CTY-Master<sup>15</sup> spreadsheet has the same 21 initial column headings (Columns A through T) for each of the using countries that we describe below. For each additional country, columns U through (END) contain unique variables depending on the country’s nuances of its own antidumping process and the availability of reported information. The following table describes the contents of the first 21 rows of each master spreadsheet for each country.

**Table 5.1.1 : Variables in the CVD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**A.**|**CVD_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the user initiating the countervailing duty investigation|
|**B.**|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the<br>database [generated by us]|
|**C.**|**CASE_REPCODE**|Related CVD investigations of multiple countries at the same time over the<br>same product|
|**D.**|**INV_CTY_NAME**|Country name of the foreign country under investigation|
|**E.**|**INV_CTY_CODE**|3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table<br>2.2)|
|**F.**|**PRODUCT**|Description of the product under investigation|
|**G.**|**INIT_DATE**|Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**H.**|**P_SUB_DATE**|Date of preliminary subsidy decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**I.**|**P_INJ_DATE**|Date of preliminary injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**J.**|**P_SUB_DEC**|Preliminary subsidy decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to<br>ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government<br>agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative),<br>B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first<br>decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not<br>relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)|

> 15 CTY is replaced with the 3-letter UN country code for each of the 15 user countries in the data set.

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|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**K.**|**P_INJ_DEC**|Preliminary injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to<br>ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government<br>agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative),<br>B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first<br>decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not<br>relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)|
|**L.**|**P_CVD_DATE**|Date of imposition of preliminary countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**M.**|**P_CVD_MEASURE**|Preliminary countervailing measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (=<br>specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given<br>level), SA (= suspension agreement)|
|**N.**|**F_SUB_DATE**|Date of final subsidy decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**O.**|**F_INJ_DATE**|Date of final injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**P.**|**F_SUB_DEC**|Final subsidy decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by<br>petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency),<br>P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er,<br>explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of<br>the investigation)|
|**Q.**|**F_INJ_DEC**|Final injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by<br>petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency),<br>P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er,<br>explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of<br>the investigation)|
|**R.**|**F_CVD_DATE**|Date of imposition of final countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)|
|**S.**|**F_CVD_MEASURE**|Final countervailing measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (=<br>specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given<br>level), SA (= suspension agreement)|
|**T.**|**REVOKE_DATE**|Date of revocation of countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)|

Before describing the other spreadsheets available across countries, it is important to point out that for a number of countries, much of the data described in the master spreadsheet may be redundant. For example, for a “single track” country that has one government agency carrying out a simultaneous injury and subsidy investigation, the preliminary subsidy and injury decisions (and any measures imposed) might take place on the same date. The same is likely to be the case for final decisions as well. Because some countries have “dual track” investigative processes, we have chosen this approach so as to have some standardization across country spreadsheets.

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# **5.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – CVD-CTY-Products**

Each user country also has a spreadsheet presenting information on the Harmonized System (HS) product codes listed in the countervailing duty investigation petition. The CVD-CTY-Products spreadsheet has the same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) for each of the using countries, listed in table 2.2.1 .

**Table 5.2.1 : Variables in the CVD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**D. **|**CASE_ID**|Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the database<br>[generated by us]|
|**E. **|**HS_CODE**|Harmonized System product code for the product under investigation|
|**F. **|**HS_DIGITS**|Number of digits of the HS product code reported in HS_CODE|

# **5.3 Canada (CAN)**

Canada’s countervailing duty cases are handled by the same authorities that investigate dumping. The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA, formerly the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, CCRA) examines subsidy issues, while injury determinations are made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Before late 2000, the CITT initiated an investigation only in two cases: after a preliminary determination of subsidizing had been made by the CCRA or if an interested party referred the issue of injury to the tribunal. The data sources used for these figures are identical to those used for the Canadian dumping data described in section 3.

The Canadian CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

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**Table 5.3.1 : Additional Canadian Data Included in CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In CVD-**|**CAN-Master :**||
|**U.**|**CASE_CBSA**|Case code associated with the subsidy investigation administered<br>by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)|
|**V.**|**CASE_CITT**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by|
|||the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Only assigned<br>in the final stage.|
|**W.**|**INIT_DATE_CBSA**|Date of initiation of the case at the CBSA|
|**X.**|**INIT_DATE_CITT**|Date of initiation of the case at the CITT|
|**Y.**|**P_AVG_DUTY**|The weighted average preliminary duty|
|**Z.**|**F_AVG_DUTY**|The weighted average final duty|
|**AA.**|**TERM_DATE**|The date a case was terminated for reasons such as the case was<br>withdrawn by the petitioner or there was insignificant evidence of<br>dumping|
|**AB.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**In CVD-**|**CAN-Products :**||
|**D.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

In terms of the data, the duties were usually reported in per unit terms until CAN-CVD-24, when duties were imposed as a percentage of the export price, for the most part. Second, preliminary case information for the years covered by hard-copy cases were not available at the time of data collection, so a number of duty values are missing in that time period.

# **5.4 Mexico (MEX)**

As with Mexican dumping investigations, subsidy cases are investigated by the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit), part of the Secretaría de Economía. Countervailing duty investigations are far less common than antidumping actions. The first cases described in the database date from 1990, while dumping cases began in 1987. Regardless, countervailing duty investigations follow the same track as that used for dumping, with the UPCI ruling on both injury and the existence of subsidies simultaneously. The data here was gathered from electronic copies of the existing case files.

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The Mexican CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

**Table 5.4.1 : Additional Mexican Data Included in CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In CVD-**|**MEX-Master :**||
|**U.**|**P_CVD_DUTY**|Preliminary “all others” rate|
|**V.**|**F_CVD_DUTY**|Final “all others” rate|
|**W.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

There are a few notable omissions in the current data set. In particular, the P_CVD_DATE and F_CVD_DATE series are missing, since the publication dates of decisions were not verifiable. Normally duties would come into effect the day after publication. We believe that the dates listed are the publication dates, but this would require further checking against the _Diario_ . Finally, the “SUB” and “INJ” columns are redundant, since Mexico has a one-track injury/subsidy investigation process.

# **5.5 United States (USA)**

Countervailing duty cases in the United States are investigated by the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC handles the injury determination, while the ITA determines the existence of countervailable subsidies. However, a number of cases prior to 1995 did not require ITC rulings because the target country was not a signatory to the Tokyo Round’s plurilateral Subsidy Agreement. Many of these cases are identified by ITC numbers in the form “COUNTRY-#” (such as COLOMBIA-1), which were created during data collection. The data was compiled from the _Federal Register_ .

The United States’ CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

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**Table 5.5.1 : Additional US Data Included in CVD-USA-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In CVD-**|**USA-Master :**||
|**U.**|**CASE_ITA**|Case code associated with the subsidy investigation administered<br>by the International Trade Administration (ITA)|
|**V.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by<br>the International Trade Commission (ITC)|
|**W.**|**ITC_REPCODE**|First (chronological) ITC case code for multiple country/identical<br>product investigations|
|**X.**|**INIT_DATE_ITA**|Date of initiation of the case at the ITA|
|**Y.**|**INIT_DATE_ITC**|Date of initiation of the case at the ITC|
|**Z.**|**TERM_DATE**|Date of the termination action|
|**AA.**|**P_CVD_DUTY**|The preliminary “all others” rate|
|**AB.**|**F_CVD_DUTY**|The final “all others” rate|
|**AC.**|**INIT_ITA_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>initiation at the ITA|
|**AD.**|**INIT_ITC_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>initiation at the ITC|
|**AE.**|**P_SUB_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITA<br>preliminary subsidy determination|
|**AF.**|**P_INJ_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITC<br>preliminary injury determination|
|**AG.**|**F_SUB_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITA<br>final subsidy determination|
|**AH.**|**F_INJ_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for ITC<br>final injury determination|
|**AI.**|**F_CVD_MEASURE_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>imposition of countervailing measure order|
|**AJ.**|**TERM_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>termination of the case|
|**AK.**|**REVOKE_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>revocation of countervailing duty order|
|**AL.**|**SUSP_GP**|Citation to the_Federal Register_government publication for<br>suspension of the case and acceptance of a suspension agreement|
|**AM.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

# **In CVD-USA-Products :**

|**D.**|**TS_CODE**|Prior to 1989, the US did not subscribe to the HS system and<br>instead used the TSUSA system to classify imports, thus this<br>column reports the pre-1989 cases which referenced the<br>investigated products’ 5-7 digit TSUSA code|
|---|---|---|
|**E.**|**TS_DIGITS**|Number of digits of the TSUSA product code reported in<br>TS_CODE (e.g., 5,7, etc.)|
|**F.**|**CASE_ITC**|Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by<br>the US International Trade Commission (ITC)|
|**G.**|**NOTES**|Comments|

44
# **6 Caveats for Data Use, Discovery of Errors, and Conclusions**

Given that the database has not yet been used in any actual research (that might help identify errors in the coding of data), we are certain that there are typographical errors, as well as errors that are more fundamental in nature in the data set. We also note that the quality of data available across countries varies substantially. To the extent that country notifications were unclear and data entry and collection require our research assistants to make decisions involving discretion at the margin, there are likely to be inconsistencies and the introduction of errors. As the data collection project is ongoing, we will correct such errors and repost the more accurate data to the research community via the website if notified by email at <u>cbown@brandeis.edu. Our intention is to correct errors and to fill in the remaining holes of</u> missing data for countries for which we have not been able to track down detailed data, and then to make the additional data available with updated and more accurate information at the website.

It is also important to point out that researchers who have experience focusing on the United States or the European Union’s antidumping process may be quite surprised when examining the data of other using countries for the first time, as their investigative procedures may be quite different. Furthermore, for many of the new user countries especially, there may be learning-by-doing with respect to antidumping. Thus, it was sometimes challenging for even an experienced AD researcher to always determine what government agencies were deciding, when they were making decisions, and what the exact antidumping measures were that were being imposed. Finally, antidumping measures in new user countries are extremely likely to be in the form of specific duties or complicated price undertaking arrangements with threats to reversion to duties if minimum price thresholds are not met. These outcomes, of course, make the coding of data difficult to standardize, especially in comparison to antidumping measures applied as ad valorem duties.

Next, given language barriers and translation difficulties as well as the actions of new user countries, we are least confident in the accuracy of the exact _dates_ of decisions and impositions reported in the spreadsheets. For example, there are likely instances where the date of a government publication reporting the antidumping outcome/decision was used in lieu of the date that the actual announcement 45
was made (which may not have been reported in a government publication in some countries until one or two weeks later). For most research using low frequency (e.g., yearly) data the exact date is not necessarily important. However, imprecise or inaccurate dates could have implications, for example, for event studies which match investigation announcements with high frequency data on economic activity (e.g., stock price movements). In such instances researchers are invited to go back and check the original government publications to verify the exact dates and timing of announcements and impositions.

Furthermore, the “start” years (in table 2.1) of available data for each user country do not necessarily indicate when the use of the AD instrument in a given country might have begun. It only represents the year for which we were first able to collect detailed data for the user countries. Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of missing data (denoted with ‘MI’) for the outcomes of antidumping investigations initiated in more recent years given the time lag to when government publications make information on outcomes available in some countries.

While we have reported data on antidumping revocations wherever they were available, for the most part when we could not find data on revocations of a final AD measure that was imposed we treated it as not revoked (a “.” entry, as opposed to a missing, “MI,” entry), though this is admittedly a guess based on the presumption that antidumping measures are politically difficult to remove once in place. Thus any research interested in focusing on the removal of antidumping measures should not treat this data set as exhaustive of such information, as this was admittedly not a priority in terms of initial data collection and reporting.

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