metadata: authors: 0: author: Rutherford,Thomas F.
1: author: Shepotylo,Oleksandr
2: author: Tarr,David
count: Russian Federation
docna: 0: docna: The impact on Russia of WTO accession and
            the Doha agenda : the importance of liberalization of
            barriers against foreign direct investment in services for
            growth and poverty reduction
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: International Trade and Trade Rules,Food Security,World Trade Organization,Inequality,Transport Services
teratopic: Macroeconomics and Economic Growth,Conflict and Development,International Economics and Trade
abstracts: cdata!: Taking price changes from the Global
            Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model of world trade, the
            authors use a small open economy computable general
            equilibrium comparative static model of the Russian economy
            to assess the impact of global free trade and a successful
            completion of the Doha Agenda on the Russian economy, and
            especially on the poor. They compare those results with the
            impact of Russian accession to the World Trade Organization
            (WTO) on income distribution and the poor. The model
            incorporates all 55,000 households from the Russian
            Household Budget Survey as "real" households.
            Crucially, given the importance of foreign direct investment
            (FDI) liberalization as part of Russian WTO accession, the
            authors also include FDI and Dixit-Stiglitz endogenous
            productivity effects from liberalization of import barriers
            against goods and FDI in services. The authors estimate that
            Russian WTO accession in the medium run will result in gains
            averaged over all Russian households equal to 7.3 percent of
            Russian consumption (with a standard deviation of 2.2
            percent of consumption), with virtually all households
            gaining. They find that global free trade would result in a
            weighted average gain to households in Russia of 0.2 percent
            of consumption, with a standard deviation of 0.2 percent of
            consumption, while a successful completion of the Doha
            Development Agenda would result in a weighted average gain
            to households of -0.3 percent of consumption (with a
            standard deviation of 0.2 percent of consumption). Russia,
            as a net food importer, loses from subsidy elimination, and
            the gains to Russia from tariff cuts in other countries are
            too small to offset these losses. The results strongly
            support the view that Russia's own liberalization is
            more important than improvements in market access as a
            result of reforms in tariffs or subsidies in the rest of the
            world. Foremost among the own reforms is liberalization of
            barriers against FDI in business services.
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            the Doha agenda : the importance of liberalization of
            barriers against foreign direct investment in services for
            growth and poverty reduction
display_title: The impact on Russia of WTO
            accession and the Doha agenda : the importance of
            liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment
            in services for growth and poverty reduction
listing_relative_url: /research/2005/10/6304708/impact-russia-wto-accession-doha-agenda-importance-liberalization-barriers-against-foreign-direct-investment-services-growth-poverty-reduction
topicv3: Agriculture and Food Security m1326205 435,Transport m1326661 135,Poverty m1326687 695,Trade m1326924 698,World Trade Organization Accession
            m1504273 2568
publishtoextweb_dt: 2010-07-01T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Macroeconomics and Economic Growth,Conflict and Development,International Economics and Trade
no_of_pages: 35
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model_extractions: WPS3725

# **The Impact on Russia of WTO Accession and The Doha Agenda: The importance of liberalization of barriers against  foreign direct**

# **investment in services for growth and poverty reduction**

Thomas Rutherford, University of Colorado David Tarr, The World Bank Oleksandr Shepotylo, University of Maryland Chapter 16 in _Poverty and the WTO: Impacts of the Doha Development Agenda_ , Thomas W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters (eds.) forthcoming from the World Bank, Washington, DC.

## World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3725, October 2005

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ We thank Maros Ivanic for the simulations from the GTAP model, Thomas Hertel and Mark Horridge for comments, and Maria Kasilag for help with the logistics. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the World Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).

.

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# **Abstract**

Taking price changes from the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model of world trade, we employ a small open economy computable general equilibrium comparative static model of the Russian economy to assess the impact of global free trade and a successful completion of the Doha Agenda on the Russian economy and especially on the poor. We compare those results with the impact of Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on income distribution and the poor. Our model incorporates all 55,000 households from the Russian Household Budget Survey as “real” households in the model. Crucially, given the importance of FDI liberalization as part of Russian WTO accession, we also include foreign direct investment and Dixit-Stiglitz endogenous productivity effects from liberalization of import barriers against goods and foreign direct investment in services.

We estimate that Russian WTO accession in the medium run will result in gains averaged over all Russian households equal to 7.3 percent of Russian consumption (with a standard deviation of 2.2 percent of consumption) with virtually all households gaining. We find that global free trade would result in a weighted average gain to households in Russia of 0.2 percent of consumption, with a standard deviation of 0.2 percent of consumption, while a successful completion of the Doha Development Agenda would result in a weighted average gain to households of –0.3 percent of consumption (with a standard deviation of 0.2 percent of consumption). Russia, as a net food importer, loses from subsidy elimination, and the gains to Russia from tariff cuts in other countries are too small to offset these losses. These results strongly support the view that Russia’s own liberalization is more important than improvements in market access as a result of reforms in tariffs or subsidies in the rest of the world. Foremost among the own reforms is liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business services.

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# **Introduction**

There are two potentially quite important events on the horizon for Russia with respect to the World Trade Organization (WTO). First of all, Russia is negotiating accession to the World Trade Organization and as of late 2004 had signed bilateral agreements on its accession with at least 12 WTO members, including the European Union, China and South Korea. At the same time, the members of the WTO are negotiating tariff and subsidy cuts under the Doha Development Agenda. As a result of WTO member country changes in tariffs and subsidies agreed under the Doha Development Agenda, Russia will face a new set of prices for its exports and imports on world markets. In this paper we evaluate the impact of the likely changes in world prices as a result of a conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda (and of global free trade) on Russia and on poverty in Russia. We also compare these effects with the impact on Russia of Russian WTO accession.

Russian WTO accession is primarily a set of commitments by Russia to liberalize its own trade and, crucially, open up its foreign direct investment regime in business services. The comparison of Russian WTO accession with the impact of the Doha Agenda on Russia then devolves fundamentally to a question of whether Russia can gain more from trade and subsidy reform in the rest of the world or from its own liberalization.

This paper uses the model that we have developed through two earlier papers. In Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004) we developed a small open economy model of Russia that incorporated foreign direct investment in business services with Dixit-Stiglitz endogenous productivity effects from investment and trade liberalization in business services and imperfectly competitive goods sectors. We found substantial gains for Russia from its WTO accession, deriving primarily from the liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in
services. We show that a constant returns to scale model without FDI in business services (that we believe to be an inappropriate model specification given the importance of FDI commitments in Russian WTO negotiations) would produce estimated gains dramatically smaller. In Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2004) (RT&S), we extend the Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr model by incorporating all the 55,000 households of the Russian Household Budget Survey as agents in our general equilibrium model. That is, we build a “real household” model of the Russian economy with endogenous productivity effects. In that paper, we show that WTO accession could be expected to benefit virtually all the poor, but an inappropriately specified, constant returns to scale model, without liberalization of barriers against FDI in services and endogenous productivity effects would produce much smaller average welfare gains and the wrong sign for the about 7 percent of the Russian population.

In this paper we employ the same model and dataset that we employed in RT&S to examine the impact on poverty in Russia of the Doha Development Agenda as well as a result of global free trade. Crucially, we compare these impacts with the impact on Russia of its own liberalization through the commitments it will make as part of its WTO accession. In this process we are able to assess the relative benefits to Russia of liberalization of countries in the rest of the world of their tariffs or subsidies with liberalization in Russia of its barriers against FDI and goods imports. We examine impacts on Russia overall, at the decile level, as well as on the entire distribution of Russian households through our “real household” model of Russia.

As with the other country case studies in Hertel and Winters (forthcoming), the starting point for the analysis of the Doha agenda and global free trade impacts are the vectors of percentage changes in the price of exports and imports for Russia as a result of the completion of 2
the Doha agenda or global free trade. These vectors are derived from simulations of the GTAP model. We take these new price vectors as exogenous shifts in the terms of trade facing Russia.

Some of our key results are as follows. The mean welfare gain to Russia from its WTO accession, averaged over all households is 7.3 percent of Russian consumption (with a standard deviation of 2.2 percent of consumption) in the medium run. We find that virtually all households obtain at least some increase in their income. Nearly all the household gains fall between 2.0 percent and 25 percent of consumption. Poor households do slightly better than rich households because the wage rate of unskilled labor rises more than the return on capital. If an inappropriately specified constant returns to scale model were employed the gains from WTO accession would be only about 1.2 percent of consumption with about 7 percent of households expected to lose, i.e., the WTO accession estimates are decisively affected by liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business services sectors and endogenous productivity effects in business services and goods.

Regarding the impact on Russia of cuts in the tariffs and subsidies of other countries, we find that global free trade (which encompasses free trade in goods outside of Russia and the elimination of export subsidies, with domestic support for agriculture retained) would result in a weighted average gain to households in Russia of 0.2 percent of consumption, with a standard deviation of 0.2 percent of consumption. We estimate that a successful completion of the Doha Development Agenda (which we model as the elimination of export subsidies, substantial cuts in tariffs outside of Russia and reduction in domestic support for agriculture) would result in a weighted average gain to households of –0.3 percent of consumption. Russia, as a net food importer, loses from subsidy elimination, and the gains to Russia from tariff cuts in other 3
countries are too small to offset these losses. The impacts on Russia from these terms of trade changes tend to favor neither the rich nor the poor.

Thus we find that, in the medium term, what other countries in the WTO do in terms of their tariff changes or changes in export subsidies or domestic support will have a very small effect on Russian households and poverty. On the other hand, we estimate that virtually all households will gain from Russian WTO accession, these gains are substantial and they are very slightly progressive. The distribution of gains across the 55,000 households is decisively affected by the inclusion of liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business services sectors and endogenous productivity effects in business services and goods. These results strongly support the view that Russia has by far the most to gain from its own liberalization, especially in business services, rather than from improvements in market access as a result in reforms in tariffs or subsidies in the rest of the world. Foremost among the source of gains from own liberalization is the gains from liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business services. The broader implications of this is that developing countries might experience larger gains in poverty reduction if the WTO could more effectively negotiate cuts in barriers against FDI in services.

Despite the significant gains we estimate from WTO accession, during a transition period it is likely that many households with displaced workers will lose as they are forced to seek new employment. We estimate that there will be a decline in employment in light industry, the food industry, mechanical engineering and metal-working and construction materials. Workers in these sectors will suffer losses from transitional unemployment and will likely incur expenses related to retraining or relocation. Some of the poorest members of the population are ill equipped to handle these transition costs. Thus, despite a likely substantial improvement in the 4
standard of living for almost all Russians after adjustment to the WTO, government safety nets are very important to help with the transition and especially for the poorest members of society.

We briefly describe the model and data in the next section. We focus on the evidence for endogenous productivity effects from liberalization of barriers against imports and FDI in services. Results are presented in section 2. We offer brief conclusions in the final section.

# **1. The Model**

We employ a small open economy computable general equilibrium model of the Russian economy with 55,000 households. As noted previously, this paper builds on two earlier papers where the model and data are documented. In Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004), we describe the structure of the single representative agent model, how we disaggregated the official Russian input-output table, and how we calculated the Russian tariff and export tax rates. In Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2004) (RT&S) we extend the model to incorporate the entire 55,098 households of the Russian Household Budget Survey.<sup>1</sup> We refer the reader to those papers for more detailed documentation of the model. Given its importance to the present paper, we briefly summarize here some evidence of the importance of liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in services, productivity impacts of greater variety of imported goods and our approach to estimating barriers to foreign direct investment in Russian business services sectors.

The key modeling features that distinguish this paper from previous applied general equilibrium modeling exercises linking trade and poverty are that we permit foreign direct investment in business services and additional varieties of business services that endogenously

> 1     Key to our capacity to solve a computable general equilibrium model with such a large number of householdagents in the model was the development of a new algorithm. In Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo we explain the intuition for that algorithm and provide a graphical interpretation. In the website version of this paper, we provide the GAMS code for that algorithm.

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increase the productivity of sectors using that service through the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect (see Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr, forthcoming for elaboration). We also allow for DixitStiglitz productivity effects in goods, both for final consumers and for intermediate use, as explained in Ethier (1982). We shall show that these features have a fundamental effect on the results for the estimated impact of WTO accession on poverty in Russia.

# **1.1   Competitive Sectors**

There are 35 sectors in the model listed in table 1. These sectors fall into three categories: competitive sectors producing goods and services; imperfectly competitive goods sectors; and imperfectly competitive services sectors. The structure of production is depicted in figure 1. In competitive sectors price equals marginal cost and imports and domestic goods are differentiated (the Armington assumption). See de Melo and Tarr (1992) for a description of the details of how these sectors are modeled.

# **1.2 Imperfectly Competitive Sectors**

In imperfectly competitive goods sectors, goods are produced with a fixed cost and constant marginal costs. Foreign firms supply the Russian market with production facilities abroad. We assume symmetry among domestic firms as well as among foreign firms, but costs differ between domestic and foreign firms. We have firm level competition with pricing decisions based on large group monopolistic competition. The ratio of marginal costs to average costs is assumed fixed, which together with our pricing assumption, implies that output per firm is fixed. Both final and intermediate users of the output of imperfectly competitive sectors obtain a variety-adjusted unit more cheaply when there are additional varieties on offer via the DixitStiglitz effect. Entry and exit is determined by a zero profit condition.

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# **1.3 Business Services Sectors**

Business services are supplied both by competitive firms on a cross border basis and, since many services are more effectively supplied with a domestic presence, by imperfectly competitive firms (both multinational and Russian) that have a domestic presence in Russia. For imperfectly competitive firms the cost and pricing structure is similar to imperfectly competitive goods producers except that production of services by multinational service providers is done in Russia. Multinational service providers will import some of their technology or management expertise when they decide to establish a domestic presence in Russia. Thus, their cost structure differs from that of Russian service providers. They incur costs related to both imported inputs and Russian primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. Restrictions on foreign direct investment, right of establishment, the movement of business personnel, lack of intellectual property protection and contract enforcement have major, direct impacts on multinational firms providing services to the market.

The number of multinational and Russian firms that are present in the Russian market depends on profitability in that market. For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affects profitability. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment will typically lead to productivity gains from the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect because when more varieties of services are available, buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their needs.

# **1.4 Primary Factors**

Primary factors of production are capital, skilled and unskilled labor. There are five types of capital in the model: (1) mobile capital that can be used in any sector without adjustment costs (46 percent of the total capital stock); (2) sector-specific capital in the energy sectors, namely 7
ownership of the mineral resources in oil extraction, gas and coalmining (representing 15 percent of total capital); (3) sector specific capital required for expansion of output in imperfectly competitive domestic firms producing either goods or services (representing 32 percent of the capital in the benchmark); (4) sector specific capital required for expansion of output in imperfectly competitive foreign firms producing either goods or services (representing 5 percent of the capital in the benchmark); and (5) ownership of licenses for monopoly rents in services sectors (representing 2 percent of capital in the benchmark). We do not have data that would allow us to associate specific capital holdings in given sectors with particular households. Thus, we assume that all households that hold capital, hold the different types of capital in the same proportions.

# **1.5 Household Consumer Demand**

We assume each household maximizes a Cobb Douglas utility function of the aggregate 35 goods in our model subject to its budget constraint (which is factor income net of transfers). Factor income shares, aggregated to the decile level, are reported in Table 4.<sup>2</sup> Each of the 35 aggregate commodities is a CES (“Armington”) aggregate of imported goods or services and goods or services produced in Russia. In imperfectly competitive goods sectors, imported and Russian produced goods are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of the outputs of foreign or Russian firms.

> **2** Households are modeled endogenously based on the 55,000 households of the Russian Household Budget Survey (HBS). The HBS, which is representative at the regional level, has very detailed information on household consumption expenditures, and information about age, gender, education, and occupation of each member of the household. It also has information about expenditures and savings and by implication household income. The major shortcoming of the HBS for our purposes is that it does not contain information on the sources of income of the households. For sources of household income, we must turn to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RMLS has less than 5,000 observations and is not representative of the population on the regional level. But is has extensive information on individual and household sources of income: wages and profits from first, second, third jobs; pensions and unemployment benefits; profits and dividends from accumulated assets.

> We have employed both small area estimation and Matching techniques to generate sources of income data for all 55,000 plus households in the HBS. We describe our procedures in Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo. Results from both techniques yield similar results.

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The structure of consumer demand in imperfectly competitive services sectors (equivalent to business services in our model) is depicted on the left side of figure 1 under “Business Services.” Competitively supplied cross-border services and imperfectly competitive services produced in Russia are a CES (Armington) aggregate. Services produced in Russia are a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of services provided by multinational service providers and Russian service providers. Given our elasticity assumptions, we have pure firm level product differentiation (no preference biases for varieties according to country of origin) for all Dixit Stiglitz goods and services.

Consumer demand, as well as firm level demand, exhibits love of variety in imperfectly competitive goods. Given that we have weak separability and homothetic functions at all levels of consumer demand, the conditions for two-stage (or multi-stage budgeting) are satisfied. Given the initial data on each of the households, and our assumptions on the structure of demand, we solve for the parameter values in each of the 55,000 household utility functions that are consistent with optimization by the households. Thus, the demand functions of all households are dependent on their initial choices and, in general, differ from one another.<sup>3</sup>

# **2. Evidence on the Productivity Impact of Services Liberalization**

A growing body of evidence and economic theory suggest that the close availability of a diverse set of business services is important for economic growth. The key idea is that a diverse set (or higher quality set) of business services allows users to purchase a quality adjusted unit of business services at lower cost. As early as the 1960s, the urban and regional economics literature argued that non-tradable intermediate goods (primarily producer services produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale) are an important source of agglomeration

> 3 The model is solved using GAMS/MPSGE (see Rutherford, 1999) and the algorithm developed for this problem to solve general equilibrium models with a large number of agents.

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externalities which account for the formation of cities and industrial complexes, and account for differences in economic performance across regions. The more recent economic geography literature (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) has also focused on the fact that related economic activity is economically concentrated due to agglomeration externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, Italy).

Evidence comes from a variety of sources. Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms operating in economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor countries are spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where a large variety of such inputs are located. Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought from suppliers within the same region. He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the local availability of producer services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local availability of producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors.

As Romer (1994) has argued, product variety is a crucial and often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there are other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, we take variety as a metaphor for the various ways increased trade can increase productivity. Winters et al. (2004) summarize

> 4 Trade liberalization may induce firms to move down their average cost curves, or import higher quality products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican manufacturing firms.

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the empirical literature by concluding that “the recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on productivity and its rate of change.” Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the following. Broda and Weinstein find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 1.2 percent per year in the “true” import price index. Hummels and Klenow (2002) and Schott (forthcoming) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of _exports_ in a sector increase total factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and The Republic of Korea, and they have some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. Finally, Feenstra and Kee (2004) show the export variety and productivity of a country are positively correlated.

# **3. Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services Sectors**

In Russia it is relatively easy to find a number of prominent examples of barriers in the services sectors. For example, in telecommunications, Rostelekom has a monopoly on long distance fixed line telephone service. In its bilateral agreement on WTO accession with the European Union, Russia has agreed to end the Rostelekom monopoly. In banking, although Russia allows multinationals to invest in new banks in Russia, there is a prohibition on multinationals opening branches in Russia. This distinction has been a significant point of contention in the accession negotiations. There are also limits on how much of the insurance market can be controlled by foreign banks. And maritime transportation _within_ Russia is limited 11
to Russian ships. Commitments within the context of WTO accession should provide significantly greater access to multinational service providers in these key sectors.<sup>5</sup> In order to estimate the ad valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment, we first commissioned surveys in telecommunications; banking, insurance and securities; and maritime and air transportation services by Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors. Using these surveys as well as supplementary data, Kimura, Ando and Fujii<sup>6</sup> employed the methodology explained in the volume by C. Findlay and T. Warren (2000) to estimate the barriers to FDI in the Russian services sector.

For each of these service sectors, authors in the Findlay and Warren volume evaluated the regulatory environment across many countries; the same regulatory criteria were assessed for all countries in a particular service sector. The price of services is then regressed against the regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of services. Assuming that the international regression is valid for Russia, and using their surveybased assessment of the regulatory environment, Kimura, Ando and Fujii estimated the _ad valorem_ equivalent impact of a reduction in barriers to foreign direct investment in these services sectors. The results are reported in table 2.

> 5   We estimate that the barriers in air and maritime transportation are higher than in other sectors, due to strong barriers to operation within Russia in these sectors. But since there is less international pressure in these sectors for cuts in these barriers, we believe that WTO accession will not have as significant an effect in these sectors.

> 6 The three papers by Kimura, Ando and Fujii as well as the underlying questionnaires are available at <u>www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto.</u>

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# **4. Estimated Impacts of Russian WTO Accession**

## **4.1 Specification of the Counterfactuals**

We examine and compare the potential impact on Russia of the Doha Development agenda as well as the impact on Russia of the changes it will make as a result of commitments it will take on as part of its WTO accession. We first produce results for Russian WTO accession. These results are based on our integrated “real” 55,000 household model explained in Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2004) (RT&S). In our WTO scenario, we assume: (1) that barriers against foreign direct investment in business services are reduced as indicated in table 2; (2) seven sectors subject to antidumping actions in export markets receive slightly improved prices in their market access. This is implemented as an exogenous increase in their export price as shown in table 2; and (3) the tariff rates of all sectors are reduced by 50 percent. In all scenarios, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the government employs taxes households in equal percentages of household income so that government revenue remains unchanged. The macroeconomic impacts of this scenario are presented in column 1 of table 5. In JRT, we have shown, that the most important impact of WTO accession on Russia is the liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business services. In column 2 we present results where we only liberalize these barriers (by the amount shown in table 2). In column 3 we reduce the barriers against foreign direct investment in services by 50 percent of the cuts shown in table 2. In column, we present results of a scenario in which we only reduce tariff barriers—by cutting tariff barriers by 50 percent across the board.

In columns 5 through 8 we present results of the impact of changes in world prices deriving from reforms undertaken at the global level, primarily in the context of WTO 13
negotiations. We take the changes in world prices derived from the GTAP model as exogenous changes in the export and import prices facing Russia. Then we run our 55,000 household model to examine the impact of these price changes on sector output, exports, imports, household welfare, and other economic variables. In column 5, we consider full elimination of tariffs worldwide, full elimination of export subsidies and elimination of domestic agricultural support. In column 6, labeled Doha, we evaluate the impact on Russia of the likely tariff reductions in the Doha agenda, full elimination of export subsidies and cuts in domestic agricultural support and tariffs in industrial countries, with developing countries making lesser cuts.

# **4.2 Aggregate Results in the Full 55,000 Household Model**

Aggregate results are summarized in table 5. Welfare results in this table are obtained by aggregating the equivalent variation gains (as a percent of consumption) of the 55,000 consumers.<sup>7</sup> _WTO Accession Scenarios._ For our general WTO scenario (column 1), we obtain rather substantial aggregate gains for a comparative state trade model equal to 7.3 percent of aggregate consumption, with a standard deviation in the welfare gains among households of 2.2 percent of consumption.<sup>8</sup> We show in column 2 that the main driving force for this result is that the reduction of Russian barriers against foreign direct investment in the services sectors. Liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment is responsible for an estimated welfare gain of 5.3 percent of consumption (with a standard deviation in the welfare results among households of 1.5 percent of consumption), or over 70 percent of the total welfare gain from Russian WTO accession. Given that our estimates are that barriers against FDI in services are much higher than tariff barriers and that there will be only small gains in market access, the

> 7 The equivalent variation of each household is weighted by its share of base year expenditures.

> 8   Computable general equilibrium evaluations of trade policy changes typically estimate gains of less than one percent of GDP.  See Rutherford and Tarr (2002) for a discussion and several examples.

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relative importance of liberalization of barriers to FDI is not surprising. In column 3 we also show the results of our estimates of the impact of only a 50 percent reduction in the barriers to FDI, along with the same improved market access and tariff reduction that we implement in our WTO scenario. The gains are reduced to 4.1 percent of consumption, with a standard deviation in the welfare gain of 1.3 percent of consumption; the gains remain substantial, but significantly reduced due to a less significant reduction in FDI barriers. A 50 percent reduction in tariff barriers yields a welfare gain of 1.3 percent of consumption (with a standard deviation of 0.8 percent). Although the gains are significantly less than the gains from services liberalization, this is a large gain for a country whose tariffs are not very high. The significant size of the gain is due to the endogenous productivity effects of goods liberalization.

The intuition for these results is the following. Reduction of barriers against multinational service providers or foreign goods producers increases the (tariff ridden) demand curve for multinational services or foreign goods. In imperfectly competitive sectors, this induces entry of new multinational service providers or new varieties of foreign goods until zero profit is restored. Despite the reduction in domestic varieties, there is a net increase in varieties overall. This serves to lower the quality-adjusted cost of purchasing the services or goods in downstream industries, and this acts like an externality that increases total factor productivity in the downstream using sectors.<sup>9</sup> Since households cannot change their factor endowments between unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital, but they can substitute among commodities consumed, impacts on factor incomes through changes in factor prices tend to dominate the welfare impacts in this type of

> 9 We have shown that if we assume constant returns to scale in all sectors of the economy, the estimated welfare gains from Russian WTO accession are reduced to 1.2 percent of consumption. These results show that incorporating liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in the analysis as well as the Dixit-StiglitzEthier formulation for endogenous productivity effects are both crucial in explaining the rather substantial estimated gains from Russian WTO accession.

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model.<sup>10</sup> In the WTO scenario, the wage rate of skilled labor increases by 5.3 percent, the wage rate of unskilled labor increases by 3.7 percent and the return on capital increases by 1.8 percent. Although the return to capital rises relative to a basket of consumption goods, it does not rise as much as wages. The return to capital increases less than wages because owners of “specific capital” in imperfectly competitive sectors that are subject to increased competition from imports or from foreign direct investment will see a reduction in the value of their returns. Returns to mobile capital increase by over six percent, even faster than returns to skilled labor because the economy shifts resources into the more capital intensive sectors and away from more unskilled labor intensive sectors such as light industry and mechanical engineering and metal working. But, the return on sector specific capital in the imperfectly competitive sectors falls, so that the total return on capital rises less than wages. The ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the expanding sectors in greater than that in the contracting sectors. As a result, the wage of skilled labor rises faster than the wage rate of unskilled labor.<sup>11</sup> _Changes in the World Trading Environment: Impacts on Russia._ In columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we examine the impact on Russia as a result of changes in the world trading environment. In column 5, we examine the impact of global free trade (without Russian participation)<sup>12</sup> , the removal of all export subsidies in agriculture and the removal of domestic

> 10  See, for example, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2003). 11

> The data do not allow us to distinguish capital holdings at the household level between the various types of capital. Thus, all households are assumed to hold the five kinds of capital in our model in equal proportions. Households that depend disproportionately on specific capital that falls in return would be expected to lose from WTO accession.

> 12  We assume that any commitments for tariff reduction as part of the Doha agenda will not apply to Russia, since Russia is not yet a member of the WTO and the terms of its accession agreement will define its tariff regime within the time frame of the Doha Development Agenda. Thus, we assume that Russia does not participate in these global liberalization scenarios. However, Russia is assumed to benefit from improved market access as a result of liberalization in other countries – presuming that WTO membership will be in place by the time the Doha scenario is implemented.

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support in agriculture. We estimate that Russia’s welfare gain will be 0.2 percent of consumption with a standard deviation among households of 0.2 percent of consumption)..

While the impact on Russia of global free trade outside of Russia and the removal of export subsidies alone is positive, the most noticeable aspect of these estimates is how small they are in relation to the 7.3 percent estimated gain that Russia will obtain from its commitments as part of its WTO accession. This result follows a common strand in the literature suggesting that the largest gains from trade liberalization come from own-liberalization and not from the actions of other countries. In this case, we also incorporate as part of the WTO accession scenario the liberalization of Russian barriers against foreign direct investment with endogenous productivity effects from liberalization of trade and FDI barriers.<sup>13</sup> In column 6, we examine possible outcomes of the Doha Development Agenda (without any reforms in Russia). We estimate that, on average, Russia will lose about -0.3 percent of consumption, with a standard deviation across households of 0.2 percent of consumption. These losses are due to the terms of trade loss to Russia from paying higher prices for food imports due to export subsidy removal. Without very substantial tariff cuts in the rest of the world to offset the losses from removal of export subsidies in agriculture, Russia loses from the adverse terms of trade effects of higher prices for food imports.

> 13  To put these numbers in perspective, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) have analytically derived the relationship between a permanent increase in the steady state growth rate and equivalent variation.  A welfare gain of 10 percent of consumption corresponds to a permanent increase in the growth rate of about 0.4 percent.  Although cross country assessments of the impact of trade liberalization of growth have been criticized, several authors have estimated that trade liberalization could increase the growth rate by between one and 2.5 percent. One criticism of these regressions is that trade liberalization is often accompanied by macro stabilization, institutional reforms and other market reforms, and the trade liberalization variable in the cross country regressions may be picking up these other effects. But WTO accession involves a range of reforms, including institutional reforms necessary to accompany FDI liberalization,  and trade liberalization may be a _sine qua non_ of the overall reform process, because other interventions such as state subsidies often are unsustainable in an open economy.

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To verify this intuition, we have separately evaluated the impact of the elimination of export subsidies, without any change in tariffs or domestic support. We estimate that Russia will lose –0.4 percent of consumption from the removal of export subsidies. These results are explained by the fact that Russia is a net food importer. So elimination of export subsidies in agriculture results in higher prices for food and agricultural products on world markets. Thus, the terms of trade shift against Russia since as a result of the elimination of these subsidies.

# **4.3 Results Aggregated to the Decile Level**

In order to ascertain the impact of the Doha Agenda and WTO accession on the poor, we have separated the 55,000 households into ten deciles, with 10 percent of the households in each. Households are ranked according to per capita income with decile 1 comprising the poorest 10 percent of the households, decile 10 the richest 10 percent and so on. We run the model with all 55,000 households. Then we aggregate the equivalent variation gains (as a percent of consumption) of the households in each decile and present these results in table 6. We also present in this same table the aggregated results for rural and urban households in each decile. In addition, we present the standard deviation of the disaggregated equivalent variation results within each decile.

_WTO Accession and FDI liberalization._ In columns (1) and (2) we present the results for Russian WTO accession and Russian reduction of barriers against foreign direct investment in services where we weight the gains of the households within each decile to obtain weighted average mean gains for the households. We see that all ten representative households gain significantly, but the richest household gains slightly less in percentage terms than the poorest. This is because the return on capital increases less than the wage rate of unskilled labor. From table 4 we can see that the rich depend more on earnings from capital than the rest of the 18
population, so the impact on their income is affected more by the relatively lower increase in the returns to capital.<sup>14</sup> Skilled labor is more evenly distributed across income deciles, reflecting the fact that government employees such as researchers and teachers often receive very low wages, and that retirees living on a pension were often skilled workers.<sup>15</sup> Rural households typically gain less than urban households. This is due to the fact that rural households have less education and are therefore classified as less skilled than urban workers in the same income group, and unskilled wages do not increase as much as skilled worker wages.

_Global Free Trade and the Doha Agenda Scenarios._ We see from the results in **c** olumn (4) that the impact of global free trade, removal of export subsidies and reduction in domestic support yields very little difference in the results across deciles. Household welfare in all deciles increases by an amount between 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent of consumption. That is, the results for all deciles falls within 0.1 percent of the weighted average for the entire population (shown previously in table 5) of 0.2 percent welfare increase as a percent of consumption. Similar results apply to the Doha scenario shown in column 5—the weighted average estimated welfare gains for virtually all deciles is within 0.1 percent of the estimated weighted average for the entire population in the respective scenario. The standard deviations for households within the deciles is 0.2 percent of consumption for all but one group.

> 14  Household income in Russia exceeds household consumption for almost all households. The reason is that Russian has a large current account surplus. Consistency between the macro balances and the household data in construction of the Social Accounting Matrix implies that household factor income must be larger than household consumption for most households to allow for the transfer of capital to foreigners as well as to pay for investment. It follows that the change in factor income as a percent of consumption will be larger than the change in factor income as a percent of household income.

> 15 An individual is classified as skilled if he or she has any education post-high school. We defined skills at the individual level. We define labor and capital shares individually, and then aggregated factor shares within the household.

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The similarity of results across deciles for these three scenarios is explained by the fact that, in each scenario, the wage rate of unskilled labor is estimated to increase by the same percentage as the return to capital. Since it is principally in the disparate shares of capital and unskilled labor shares of income that the rich and poor differ, if the percentage returns to these factor moves the same, the welfare gains can be expected to be comparable.

# **4.4 Results for Individual Households**

_Distribution of the Results._ The distribution of gains from Russian WTO accession across all 55,000 households is summarized in figure 2, along with the distribution of gains for the poorest 10 percent and richest 10 percent of all households. The distribution in Figure 2 is centered around a mean gain of income of 7.3 percent with a standard deviation equal to 2.2 percent of consumption. As is evident from Figure 2, we find that virtually all households will gain in the new equilibrium, relative to the status quo. We calculate that 98 percent of the population will gain between 3.2 and 13 percent of consumption; 99.9 percent of the households will gain between 2 and 25 percent of consumption.<sup>16</sup> The distribution of gains for the poorest decile of the population is close to the distribution for the entire population, although the mean of the gains is slightly larger, while the richest decile gains slightly less than the average of the population, i.e., WTO accession produces slightly progressive effects for reasons already mentioned.<sup>17</sup> In figures 3 and 4, we plot the comparable distributions across the 55,000 households based on the global free trade and Doha scenario. For global free trade, we estimate that 98 percent of the households will experience a change in welfare of between –0.3 and 0.7 percent of

> 16  For the scenario where we cut barriers to FDI by only 50 percent of the cuts in our WTO accession scenario, 98 percent of the households experience a gain of between 0.9 and 6.3 percent of consumption.

> 17  While households that are heavily endowed with specific capital in declining sectors will lose on average from WTO accession, those who can form joint ventures with foreign investors will likely see the value of their specific capital holdings increase.

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consumption. For the Doha scenario, we estimate that 98 percent of the households will experience a change in welfare of between –0.8 and 0.2 percent of consumption. As was evident in the results at the decile level, the impact for the rich and the poor does not differ significantly, i.e., the impacts global free trade or Doha on Russian households are neither progressive nor regressive.

In figure 5, we compare the distributions of gains for all Russian households from the WTO accession, global free trade and Doha scenarios. The figure makes it very evident that WTO accession results in dramatically larger gains for Russian households than the impact on Russia of either global free trade or Doha. Global free trade is more beneficial than Doha for Russian households. But the distributions of gains from global free trade and the Doha scenario significantly overlap with each other so that a large part of the distribution from Doha is obscured by the global free trade distribution. That is, the difference in impact on Russia between global free trade and Doha is rather small compared with the gains we estimate that Russia could reap from its own reforms as embodied in its WTO accession commitments.

# **5. Policy Implications**

While this analysis has not accounted for the transition costs associated with such trade reforms, it is clear that the process of adjustment to this new trade and investment climate is likely to result in losses for many households. As we discuss at length in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004), we expect to observe a decline in employment in light industry, the food industry, mechanical engineering and metal-working and construction materials. These displaced workers will have to find new employment. They will suffer losses from transitional unemployment and will likely incur expenses related to retraining or relocation. Thus, despite a likely substantial 21
improvement in the standard of living for almost all Russians after adjustment to a new equilibrium after accession to the WTO, government safety nets are very important to help with the transition and especially for the poorest members of society who can ill afford a harsh transition.

The central finding in this paper is that Russia will gain more from WTO accession commitments than from a prospective Doha scenario, and this is primarily due to its own services liberalization. We estimate that in the medium term, what other countries in the WTO do in terms of their tariff changes or changes in export subsidies or domestic support will have a very small effect on Russian households and poverty. On the other hand, we estimate that virtually all households will gain from Russian WTO accession in the medium term, these gains are substantial and they are very slightly progressive. These findings suggest that the gains to other developing countries from participation in the WTO might be considerably enhanced if reductions in barriers against foreign direct investment in services were included in the negotiations. By deepening reforms to include the services sector, the prospects for enhanced economic growth and sustained poverty reduction are much improved.

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