metadata: authors: 0: author: Shingal,Anirudh
count: World
docna: 0: docna: Liberalizing versus Facilitating Mode 4
            Trade in Services
docty: Policy Research Working Paper
subtopic: International Trade and Trade Rules,Trade Facilitation,Transport Services,Trade and Services,Trade Policy,Rules of Origin,Trade and Multilateral Issues
teratopic: Transport,International Economics and Trade
abstracts: cdata!: The growing importance of services trade
            for countries across the world is well-documented in the
            services and trade literatures. At the same time, regulatory
            and administrative barriers to the movement of service
            suppliers to deliver services internationally have resulted
            in very low shares of "Mode 4" trade in total
            services trade. Against this background, this paper
            conceptualizes an agenda for trade facilitation in services
            as it would apply to the movement of natural persons. It
            also provides descriptive statistical evidence from the
            Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
            Development's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index
            database. The paper differentiates between regulatory
            measures that may improve transparency or facilitate access
            for service providers and those measures that impede Mode 4
            trade as well as the administrative, financial, and economic
            costs of compliance with such measures.
repnme: repnme: Liberalizing versus Facilitating Mode 4
            Trade in Services
display_title: Liberalizing versus Facilitating
            Mode 4 Trade in Services
listing_relative_url: /research/2020/05/32010976/liberalizing-versus-facilitating-mode-4-trade-services
topicv3: Transport m1326661 135,Trade m1326924 698,Trade in Services m1326928 780,Trade Facilitation and Logistics m1327174 772,Trade Policy m1327640 776
publishtoextweb_dt: 2020-05-05T00:00:00Z
historic_topic: Transport,International Economics and Trade
origu: EFI-MTI-TIC-Trade and RI (ETIRI)
no_of_pages: 48
author_keys: 0: author_key: 660334
model_extractions: Policy Research Working Paper 9226 Liberalizing versus Facilitating Mode 4 Trade in Services _Anirudh Shingal_ Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice May 2020
Policy Research Working Paper 9226

# **Abstract**

The growing importance of services trade for countries across the world is well-documented in the services and trade literatures. At the same time, regulatory and administrative barriers to the movement of service suppliers to deliver services internationally have resulted in very low shares of “Mode 4” trade in total services trade. Against this background, this paper conceptualizes an agenda for trade facilitation in services as it would apply to the movement of natural persons. It also provides descriptive statistical evidence from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index database. The paper differentiates between regulatory measures that may improve transparency or facilitate access for service providers and those measures that impede Mode 4 trade as well as the administrative, financial, and economic costs of compliance with such measures.

This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at igillson@worldbank.org or ssaez@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Liberalizing versus Facilitating Mode 4 Trade in Services**

# **Anirudh Shingal**<sup>**1**</sup>

**JEL classification:** F1, F10, F13

**Keywords:** Services trade, Mode 4, services suppliers, trade facilitation, STRI, movement of natural persons

> 1 ICRIER, New Delhi; EUI, Florence and WTI, Bern (anirudh.shingal@gmail.com). The paper is the result of a World Bank project on Trade Facilitation in Services that was led by Sebastián Sáez (Lead Economist, South Asia Region) and Ian Gillson (Lead Economist, Global Trade and Regional Integration Unit). The paper benefitted from support provided by the Umbrella Facility for Trade trust fund that receives contributions from the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The paper was discussed at a ‘Trade Facilitation in Services’ workshop that was jointly organized by the World Bank and the Indian Ministry of Industry and Commerce in December 2019 in New Delhi. I would also like to thank Nora Dihel and the workshop participants for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
# **1. Introduction**

Trade in services is important for countries across the world, especially small economies, which often derive a significant share of their foreign exchange revenues from services exports. According to data from the WTO, between 2010 and 2018, trade in commercial services grew by 42% for developed economies, by 60% for developing and emerging economies and by 49% for LDCs, while global trade in commercial services grew by 48%. In fact, exports of commercial services alone witnessed a 90% increase for LDCs over this period.

Services matter not just because they are a potentially important source of foreign exchange revenue and associated employment and household income. Many services are important for economic growth and development by virtue of their role as inputs into production in all sectors of economic activity. Realization of many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also depends on the performance of a range of specific services sectors (Fiorini and Hoekman, 2018).

The quality, price and availability of services inputs is determined by a mix of factors, including infrastructure connectivity network investments, the restrictiveness of trade and investment policies for goods and services, and the investment climate/business environment. There is substantial empirical evidence that services trade and FDI in services foster productivity growth by inducing greater competition in domestic markets and providing firms access to higher-quality, more varied, and cheaper services inputs, which benefits producers of both goods and services. However, trade costs for services are higher than trade costs for goods, and the rate of decline that has been observed in services trade costs since the early 2000s has been much less than for trade costs for goods (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2016).

These costs are especially salient for services delivered by the temporary movement of natural persons (MNP) or Mode 4 trade in GATS parlance, which inter alia explains the low share of Mode 4 trade in total trade in services.<sup>2</sup> Barriers to trade in services in general do not take the form of border measures such as tariffs, but are rather embedded in regulatory frameworks. However, barriers to Mode 4 trade are often border measures in the form of visa requirements and quotas and are therefore more distinct. This said, regulatory measures in general affect cross-border trade and investment in services by increasing both the fixed cost of entering a market and the variable cost of servicing it. The importance and potentially trade- and investment-inhibiting impact of domestic regulation on service sector performance has received some attention in the services literature (for instance see Kox and Nordås, 2007, 2009; Nordås, 2016). At the same time, it is not just the incidence of restrictive regulation but also regulatory heterogeneity that imposes costs on services trade, including Mode 4. In fact, regulatory heterogeneity has also been shown to exert a significantly negative impact on bilateral services trade delivered via commercial presence or Mode 3 (Kox and Nordås, 2009; Nordås, 2016).

Against this background, this paper focuses on regulatory measures and compliance issues that can be included in an agenda to facilitate trade in services delivered by MNP. To do so, it uses OECD data on services trade restrictiveness indices (STRI) to differentiate between regulatory measures that may improve transparency or provide market access to service providers (e.g. the requirement to apply for a business visa) and those measures that just impede MNP (for

> 2 Estimates by the WTO Secretariat suggest, for instance, that this share could be as low as 5% (Maurer et al., 2016).

2
instance, the requirement that foreign providers completely re-do the university degree, practice and exam in the domestic country) as well as the administrative, financial and economic costs of compliance with such measures (e.g. the costs of applying for a business visa). While minimizing the latter costs forms an obvious part of a trade facilitation in services (TFiS) agenda on Mode 4, eliminating excessively burdensome regulation or at least making it less onerous is more of a trade liberalization agenda. Meanwhile, another key issue in a Mode 4 TFiS agenda is reducing the heterogeneity in necessary regulation and the administration of regulatory measures, though regulatory heterogeneity also imposes trade costs on suppliers, accounting for 21 percent of total trade costs in services along with trade policy barriers (WTO, 2019). Finally, the emphasis should be on the extent to which a TFiS agenda can enhance predictability and certainty for service suppliers, since both these attributes reduce services trade costs. According to WTO (2019), information- and transaction-related costs form the largest component of bilateral trade costs, accounting for 25 percent of total services trade costs.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 conceptualizes a TFiS agenda as it would apply to Mode 4 trade. Section 3 discusses costs of restrictive barriers to Mode 4 trade by providing an analysis of the OECD’s STRI data on MNP. Section 4 provides suggestions on facilitating Mode 4 trade by drawing on the OECD’s STRI data on regulatory transparency applicable to MNP. Section 5 concludes.

# **2. Conceptualizing a TFiS agenda for Mode 4**

In trying to conceptualize a TFiS agenda on MNP, which is the main objective of this paper, it is useful to clarify at the outset what constitutes services trade facilitation in Mode 4 and what does not (see Table 1 for examples). The distinction in this context is between liberalizing regulation that may be unnecessarily restrictive or burdensome and which can be streamlined, if not eliminated in its entirety, and between facilitating complying with regulation that may be necessary. Illustratively, suggestions for eliminating or easing regulations (e.g. the requirement for professionals to retrain in-country and get local qualifications) are more likely classified as services trade liberalization issues rather than trade facilitation. In contrast, suggestions for reducing visa fees; reducing the number of documents needed to get a visa; streamlining processing times; allowing for multiple entry visas etc. fall under the rubric of trade facilitation. While the focus of this paper is on trade facilitation (see Section 4 for details), it also provides an analysis of services trade barriers vis-à-vis Mode 4 as contained in the OECD STRI database (see Section 3 for details) for comparison. The analysis of services trade barriers outlined in Section 3 is also warranted by the fact that the distinction between trade cost and trade facilitation measures is not always watertight. For instance, while reducing heterogeneity in regulation clearly forms a part of a possible TFiS agenda, regulatory heterogeneity also imposes significant trade costs on suppliers, accounting for 21 percent of total trade costs in services along with trade policy barriers (WTO, 2019). We thus provide an analysis of predominantly trade cost measures from the OECD STRI database in Section 3 followed by an analysis of largely trade facilitation measures using the same data source in Section 4, while acknowledging links between the two.

3
**<u>Table 1: Trade barriers versus trade facilitation measures</u>**

|**Trade barrier **|**Trade facilitating measure**|
|---|---|
|Labour market tests for work permits and quotas<br>on service providers|Reducing costs and processing time for business<br>visa applications|
|Nationality/citizenship/permanent<br>residency<br>requiredfor license to practice|Introducing visa on arrival|
|Foreign professionals required to retrain locally|Allowing e-visa or online visa applications|
|Membership in the professional association<br>closed to foreigners|Granting multiple-entry visas|

Source: Author’s compilation Policy is a major determinant of the costs incurred by service suppliers to contest foreign markets (Hoekman, 2016). At its most restrictive, policy can completely prohibit Mode 4 trade for e.g. by not granting visas; in other cases, policy measures can greatly reduce the scope for MNP such as through the application of economic needs tests or quotas on foreign services suppliers. Irrespective of a government’s policy stance and the concomitant regulatory measures governing market access for foreign suppliers, certain procedural and administrative requirements must always be satisfied. As is true for procedures that apply to goods crossing borders, there are costs for service suppliers in complying with regulatory policies, that go beyond fees and charges for documents or certification/conformity assessment and the time allocated to doing so. Moreover, these costs tend to increase with inadequate information/transparency regarding the applicable measures and the uncertainty associated with the actual authorization of the services provision.

Delivery of services frequently requires cross-border movement of services suppliers, both temporary and longer-term in the form of contractual service suppliers (CSSs), independent service suppliers (ISSs) and intra-corporate transferees (ICTs). In addition to excessively restrictive regulation and heterogeneity in legal requirements and practices, these service suppliers are also constrained by “red tape” associated with the implementation of domestic tax and regulatory policies. In fact, both academic research and business surveys suggest that these associated costs may be a multiple of merchandise import tariffs without generating any revenue for the government and reflect a combination of the real resources that must be allocated to meet administrative requirements and the uncertainty and unpredictability associated with border clearance processes (Hoekman, 2016).

Apropos to Mode 4 trade, most of these associated costs center around different facets of applying for a business visa – the visa fees, the number of documents required, the visa processing times – as well as the lack of predictability and certainty associated with getting the visa, which is completely at the discretion of the visa officer. Immigration authorities have unfettered discretion to assess whether a service supplier falls into the committed definitional category. There is no predictability or certainty or objective criteria on the basis of which entry can be granted. Thus, while the existing low and shallow level of GATS commitments on Mode 4 trade is a concern in itself in terms of market access, a problem also lies in the implementation of these low and shallow commitments.

An additional problem for service suppliers accessing multiple markets is the heterogeneity in regulation, the most pressing example of which is the differences in the number and types of documents required to apply for a business visa (see Section 4 for details) or differences in 4
social security regulations and labor market tests in importing countries (which may be among the most burdensome regulation that importing countries resort to; see Section 3 for details).

These costs are accentuated by limitations on duration of stay associated with a visa, which again differ by importing country, as they necessitate multiple re-applications especially in the case of frequent service suppliers. In fact, a well-recognized challenge for MNP is the absence of any linkage between the duration for which a service supplier requires a visa to deliver the service and the actual duration for which a visa may be granted. This problem is compounded when importing countries do not entertain visa extensions or do not grant multiple-entry visas, which is especially true in the case of aircrew, seamen and truck drivers (see Section 4 for details). In fact, the Russian Federation does not grant multiple-entry visas even to business visitors (see Section 4 for details).

All these attributes generate costs, including in terms of time spent, even if they are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis but the costs get compounded in the event of “(i) (asymmetric) information on the applicable rules and requirements; (ii) the associated certification/conformity assessment processes; and (iii) uncertainty/variability in administration of (i) and (ii).” (Hoekman, 2016, op.cit.) Given the above, there are three potential channels for lowering trade costs pertaining to MNP and facilitating Mode 4 trade. One, to completely eliminate or sufficiently reduce unnecessarily restrictive formal (explicit) barriers to Mode 4 trade (these are captured in the OECD’s STRI data on MNP and discussed in detail in Section 3). Two, work to attenuate the prevalence of regulatory heterogeneity across countries for given sectors or activities (some suggestions on this are discussed in detail in Section 4 on the basis of the OECD’s STRI data on regulatory transparency for MNP). Three, take actions to lower compliance and administrative costs for service suppliers (some suggestions in this regard are also provided in Section 4). While the first channel would classify as trade liberalization, channels two and three would constitute as trade facilitation and are thus the focus of this paper, as its main objective is to provide details for a possible TFiS agenda.

In fact, when it comes to Mode 4 trade - where services trade barriers are very high and the potential gains are large (for instance see Walmsley et al. 2007) - there may be scope for even narrower trade facilitation measures to have more than a trivial effect. A case in point is India’s waiver of visa fees for LDC tour-guides and language teachers under the LDC Services Waiver, wherein the objective is to provide unilateral preferences to semi- and unskilled Mode 4 laborers in LDCs. Not only are visa fees often very high relative to average per capita incomes of the applicants’ countries (for details see Section 4), the entire visa application process is fraught with great uncertainty about the eventual outcome, including the variability in duration of visa processing times (for details see Section 4). All this is particularly onerous for LDC and developing country applicants (Drake-Brockman et al. 2016), likely resulting in an adverse extensive margin effect on Mode 4 services exporters.

Against this background, any agenda to facilitate MNP should focus on increasing transparency, streamlining procedures, and removing unnecessary red tape and bottlenecks associated in administering regulatory policies applicable to Mode 4 trade. Such an agenda would take domestic regulation on MNP as given and focus instead on reducing the costs of regulatory heterogeneity and processes associated with the implementation of Mode 4 services trade policies via actions to lower administrative and compliance costs for foreign service suppliers and making it easy for them to access importing country markets.

5
As outlined in van der Marel and Shepherd (2019), a first attempt to conceptualize TFiS in general was made during a conference organized by the World Bank in New Delhi in March 2017 in collaboration with the Government of India. Some of the extensive discussions held at this conference are also useful in helping us frame the concept of TFiS as it applies to Mode 4 trade.

One key take-away from the discussion was the need for TFiS measures to be pragmatic in nature i.e. the need for domestic regulation to be implemented in a manner that minimizes costs for service suppliers, and preferably be aligned with domestic regulation in other countries to further minimize costs of regulatory heterogeneity. In the context of Mode 4 trade for instance, while the objective of negotiating visa requirements for MNP is unlikely to eliminate them completely (differentiating from the case of quotas for service suppliers), the aim would instead be to formulate visa requirements in a manner that imposes minimum administrative and compliance costs on service suppliers.

The concept of meaningful transparency was also emphasized in these deliberations in discussing TFiS more generally. Thus, it is not just important that the procedures for a business visa application are well laid out and easily accessible to all potential applicants, but the entire process of getting a visa should be transparent and predictable in terms of visa processing times, objectivity in the decision to grant a visa, complete disclosure of information in the event of the rejection of a visa application, and real recourse to a decision-challenging mechanism without fear of adverse consequences in subsequent visa applications. All such measures would facilitate business visa applications enormously. In fact, frequent service suppliers could also be invited to participate in the development of future rules and procedures through consultation meetings, thereby enabling them to influence outcomes and leading to effective transparency or effective market access (van der Marel and Shepherd, 2019).

In sum, the measures that would fall within an MNP TFiS agenda would be “(a) regulatory in nature..., targeting the operations of the services business as opposed to market entry across the board, and (b) go beyond the mere fact of transparency by effectively operationalizing it and by allowing stakeholders to obtain meaningful outcomes. One additional element in this respect is how regulatory procedures are mapped so that deficiencies can be prevented in the preparation, adoption and application of regulations (Molinuevo and Sáez, 2014). If the procedures for regulatory adoption and implementation are secured, it enhances the likelihood that policy makers improve the quality of the regulation and avoid any arbitrary modification of the administrative practise afterwards.” (van der Marel and Shepherd, 2019, op. cit.)

# **3. Regulatory barriers to Mode 4 trade**

In this section, we undertake an analysis of measures that seem excessively restrictive in their regulatory role as applicable to MNP and thus primarily constitute barriers to Mode 4 trade. The data on these Mode 4 measures, publicly available online, have been put together by the OECD for 45 countries as a part of their STRI database. These data include 27 measures (across 29 sectors and sub-sectors) of which 24 measures entail a Yes/No answer and the remaining three<sup>3</sup> measures include quantitative information. The information is available for the years 2014 to 2017, but given the coverage of issues and the non-variability in responses over time,

> 3 These pertain to limitations on duration of stay for (i) contractual service suppliers (CSSs); (ii) independent service suppliers (ISSs); and (iii) intra-corporate transferees (ICTs).

6
we focus on the cross-sectional dimension of the database and look at the year 2017 in the analysis that follows. Details on the coverage of countries, sectors and measures in the OECD’s STRI database are included in Annexes A, B and C, respectively. The database also provides the source of information on each measure, sector and country as well as additional information as comments.

A quick look at some of these measures illustrates how they impose unnecessary costs on Mode 4 service providers and why eliminating such measures or making them less stringent is likely to liberalize (as opposed to facilitate) Mode 4 trade. For instance, the requirement of prior nationality or citizenship to practice or that foreign service providers need to take a local exam or completely re-do the university degree, practice and exam in the domestic country are unnecessarily restrictive and can be eliminated or toned down sufficiently. Similarly, relaxing labor market tests and quotas for contractual service suppliers (CSSs), independent service suppliers (ISSs) and intra-corporate transferees (ICTs) as well as limitations on the duration of their stay in the importing countries is likely to go a long way in liberalizing Mode 4 trade. In contrast, two measures in the STRI MNP data relate to laws or regulations that establish a process for recognizing qualifications gained abroad and these need to be encouraged in the context of Mode 4 trade liberalization.

For the purpose of analysis in this paper, we convert the main Yes/No response to 24 of the 27 qualitative measures in the OECD STRI database for the year 2017 into a binary quantitative index where N=0 and Y=1.<sup>4</sup> To provide an aggregate picture of the MNP restrictive regulatory landscape, we average the constructed index across measures and sectors by country such that the higher the score, the more restrictive is the country (including in a particular sector or for a particular measure). Illustratively, for the measure “foreign providers have to completely re-do the university degree, practice and exam in the domestic country”, Switzerland had an average score of 0.33 across sectors in the year 2017 compared to an average score of 0.5 in the case of Estonia and 0 in the case of Australia. This suggests that while this particular measure was not a requirement in Australia in the year 2017, it was applicable to more sectors in Estonia than in Switzerland.

The average restrictiveness towards MNP in the year 2017 for the 45 countries covered by the OECD STRI data is presented in Figure 1. The average scores range from 0.10 in the case of Colombia (at the bottom end of the distribution) to 0.72 for Russia (at the top end). The average score for non-OECD countries (0.34) is found to be lower than that for OECD (0.40) as Colombia, Latvia and Costa Rica are among the least restrictive countries in this sample in terms of policies towards MNP while nine of the top ten most restrictive MNP countries (with the exception of Russia at the top) belong to the OECD.

Annex Table 1 reports the average restrictiveness of policies towards MNP by sector in the year 2017 for the 45 countries covered by the OECD STRI data. Our analysis shows that sectors with the most restrictive MNP policies include: Audiovisual services – Broadcasting (16); Insurance services (15); Insurance services – Actuaries (16); Insurance services – Broking and Agency (33); Legal services – Domestic Law (18); Rail freight transport services (19); and Road freight transport services (21). The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of countries for which the average restrictiveness in the concerned sector is at least 0.5. In contrast, sectors with the least restrictive policies towards MNP include: Legal services –

> 4 Note that the two measures relating to laws or regulations that establish a process for recognizing qualifications gained abroad are reverse coded (i.e. N=1 and Y=0) in our analysis.

7
International Law (1); Engineering services (4); and Architecture services (5). Table 2 summarizes this information for all the sectors, including the average restrictiveness score for each sector.

**Table 2: Count of countries for which average restrictiveness in sector is at least 0.5**

|**Sector **|**Score (avg.)**|**Number of countries**|
|---|---|---|
|Accounting and auditing|0.40|9|
|Accounting|0.24|10|
|Air transport|0.41|12|
|Architecture|0.33|5|
|Audiovisual - Broadcasting|0.39|16|
|Audiovisual - Motion pictures|0.43|12|
|Audiovisual - Sound recording|0.34|7|
|Auditing|0.39|10|
|Commercial banking|0.41|13|
|Computer|0.34|8|
|Construction - Engineering|0.34|11|
|Construction|0.41|12|
|Courier|0.34|9|
|Distribution|0.41|12|
|Engineering|0.31|4|
|Insurance|0.38|15|
|Insurance - Actuaries|0.42|16|
|Insurance - Broking and agency|0.47|33|
|Legal|0.40|13|
|Legal - Domestic law|0.45|18|
|Legal - International law|0.16|1|
|Logistics cargo-handling|0.41|12|
|Logistics customs brokerage|0.38|14|
|Logistics freight forwarding|0.41|12|
|Logistics storage and warehouse|0.41|12|
|Maritime transport|0.46|14|
|Rail freight transport|0.49|19|
|Road freight transport|0.46|21|
|Telecommunication|0.42|11|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations The average restrictiveness of policies towards MNP by STRI measure in the year 2017 for the 45 countries covered in this database is reported in Annex Table 2. Our analysis reveals the following STRI measures to be the most restrictive, where the numbers in parentheses indicate the number of countries for which the average restrictiveness of the concerned STRI measure is at least 0.5: A temporary licensing system is in place (23); At least one engineer must be licensed for the issuance of construction permits (30); Foreign construction engineers are 8
required to take a local examination (16); Foreign professionals are required to take a local examination (20); and Labor market tests for CSSs (34), ISSs (30) and ICTs (35).

Not surprisingly, labor market tests for service professionals were the most onerous regulatory requirement for service providers in 2017. Eliminating such tests altogether or making them sufficiently less burdensome would clearly liberalize Mode 4 trade. In contrast, the least restrictive STRI measures include: Membership in the professional association is closed to foreigners (3); Nationality or citizenship required for construction engineers (4); and Prior or permanent residency is required for license to practice (5). Table 3 summarizes this information for all the measures, including the average restrictiveness score for each measure.

**<u>Table 3: Count of countries for which average restrictiveness per measure is at least 0.5</u>**

|**STRI measure**|**Score**<br>**(avg.)**|**Number of**<br>**countries**|
|---|---|---|
|A temporary licensing system is in place|0.36|23|
|At least one engineer must be licensed for the issuance of construction permits|0.67|30|
|Domicile required for License to practice|0.30|10|
|Foreign construction engineers are required to practice locally for at least 1 year|0.18|8|
|Foreign construction engineers are required to take a local examination|0.36|16|
|Foreign professionals are required to practice locally for at least 1 year|0.26|14|
|Foreign professionals are required to take a local examination|0.41|20|
|Foreign providers have to completely re-do the university degree, practice and<br>exam in the domestic country|0.09|4|
|Labour market tests: contractual services suppliers|0.75|34|
|Labour market tests: independent services suppliers|0.66|30|
|Labour market tests: intra-corporate transferees|0.78|35|
|Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications gained<br>abroad|0.37|12|
|Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications in<br>engineering gained abroad|0.18|8|
|Limitation on duration of stay for contractual services suppliers (months)|23|23*|
|Limitation on duration of stay for independent services suppliers (months)|25|31*|
|Limitation on duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees (months)|33|16*|
|Membership in the professional association is closed to foreigners|0.07|3|
|Memo: License or authorization is required to practice|0.57|14|
|Nationality or citizenship required for construction engineers|0.09|4|
|Nationality or citizenship required for License to practice|0.14|6|
|Other restrictions to movement of people|0.17|7|
|Prior or permanent residency is required for License to practice|0.19|5|
|Quotas: contractual services suppliers|0.18|8|
|Quotas: independent services suppliers|0.20|9|
|Quotas: intra-corporate transferees|0.13|6|
|Residencyisrequired to practice|0.21|6|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations Note: * indicates number of countries for which limitation on duration of stay is less than the respective sample average 9
Table 3 and Annex Table 2 also report the limitations on duration of stay for CSSs, ISSs and ICTs in the year 2017, which impose recurrent visa application and associated costs, especially on frequent service providers. There is considerable heterogeneity in the duration of stay across countries, ranging from only one year for Switzerland, Costa Rica, Finland, Israel and Turkey (across service professionals) to four years in the case of Australia and Denmark (but only 2 years for ISSs); four-five years for the United Kingdom; and five years in the case of China, Japan, Latvia (but only one year for ISSs) and South Africa (though only four years for ICTs). The sample maxima point to the ground that the remaining countries in the OECD database can cover in extending the duration of stay to these services professionals (if not eliminating limitations on these stay durations altogether), thereby greatly reducing costs imposed on Mode 4 trade.<sup>5</sup> Reducing heterogeneity in such regulation would also form part of a possible TFiS agenda, which is discussed in detail next, together with an analysis of predominantly trade facilitation measures as identified in the OECD STRI database.

# **4. Facilitating regulatory compliance for Mode 4 trade**

Distinct from the measures discussed in Section 3, the OECD STRI data also include 16 measures that relate to providing regulatory transparency for MNP which constitute a reasonable Mode 4 TFiS agenda; the details of these measures are provided in Annex D. Even among the 45 countries covered by the OECD STRI data, there is huge heterogeneity in the measures of regulatory transparency as applicable to MNP, which suggests that there is ample scope for minimizing the associated compliance costs involved in meeting these regulations. At the same time, reducing such regulatory heterogeneity would also directly minimize services trade costs, thus constituting a services liberalization agenda.

This is illustrated below by discussing various attributes related to business visa applications, all of which translate into costs for service suppliers, including in terms of time, and thus easily form a part of an MNP TFiS agenda. The sample average of these attributes, together with the minima and maxima of the respective distributions, are summarized in Table 4 and by sector in Table 5. A quick look at these two tables shows that the average cost of obtaining a business visa is slightly higher at US$87 for logistics services compared to the sample average of US$84 for the countries covered by the OECD STRI database; for all the other sectors these monetary costs are lower than the sample average.

**<u>Table 4: Attributes of business visa applications: summary statistics (2017)</u>**

|**Attribute**|**Sample avg.**|**Min**|**Max **|
|---|---|---|---|
|Cost to obtain a business visa (USD)|84|7 (JPN)|297 (COL)|
|Duration of visa for crew (no. of months allowed)|5|0 (COL)|23 (IND)|
|No. of documents needed to obtain a business visa|9|2 (GBR)|16 (FRA)|
|Range of visaprocessingtime(days)|13|1(JPN)|32(CAN)|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations

> 5 There is, however, no variation in limitations on duration for these service professionals across sectors for each country according to the STRI data for the year 2017 (detailed analysis at the sector level is presented in Annex Table 3).

10
**<u>Table 5: Attributes of business visa applications: summary statistics by sector (2017)</u>**

||**Cost to obtain a bu**<br>|**siness v**<br>|**isa ($)**<br>|**Number of documents**<br>**obtain a business visa**<br>|**needed t**<br>|**o**<br>**Range of visa proce**<br>**(days)**<br><br>|**ssing tim**<br>|**e**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Sector **|**Sample avg.**|**Min**|**Max **|**Sample avg.**|**Min**|**Max **<br>**Sample avg.**|**Min**|**Max **|
|Accounting and auditing|||||||||
|services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Air transport|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Architecture services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Audiovisual - Broadcasting|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Audiovisual - Motion pictures|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Audiovisual - Sound recording|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Commercial banking|84|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Computer services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Construction services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Courier services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Distribution services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Engineering services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Insurance|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Legal services|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Logistics cargo-handling|87|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Logistics customs brokerage|87|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Logistics freight forwarding|87|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Logistics storage and warehouse|87|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Maritime transport|82|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Rail freight transport|84|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Road freight transport|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|
|Telecommunication|83|7|297|9|2|16<br>13|1|32|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations 11
These data show that the average cost of obtaining a business visa in the year 2017 was US$84 (the OECD average is lower at US$82 and the non-OECD average higher at US$89). Twelve of the 45 countries have a visa cost greater than the average cost of US$84, with Colombia charging the most at US$297 (4.6% of that country’s per capita income in 2017) and Japan the least at US$7 (see Figure 2). The mode of this distribution is US$72, which could be a reasonable target<sup>6</sup> for the “more expensive visa” countries in the top half of the distribution (especially Colombia, New Zealand, Austria, India and the United States) leading to significant cost reductions for business visa applicants, resulting in likely facilitation of MNP, at least at the extensive margin. A case in point is India, where the cost of applying for a UK Visa was 6.1% of India’s per capita income in 2017.

Similarly, the average number of documents needed to obtain a business visa in the year 2017 was 9 (the OECD average is a little higher at 10 and the non-OECD lower at 7). Nineteen of the 45 countries have a number of documents requirement greater than the average, with Austria and France both needing the most at 16 and the United Kingdom the least at 2 (see Figure 3). It may not be unreasonable to expect at least the 10 countries in the top 25% of this distribution to move closer to the sample average, which would lead to a tangible reduction in costs for business visa applicants and a likely extensive margin effect in facilitating Mode 4 trade.

At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in the types of documents that are required to be submitted in support of a business visa or work permit application. For instance, Attström et al. (2013) note that even in the case of the common Schengen Visa, some EU Member State Consulates require official translations of supporting documents, imposing additional costs in terms of resources and time on the applicants. Harmonizing these requirements and declaring a common set of documents across visa jurisdictions would go a long way in reducing costs imposed by regulatory heterogeneity.

Likewise, the visa processing time (in number of days) in 2017 varied from as high as 32 for Canada to as low as 1 for Japan (see Figure 4). The average for the sample is 13, with the OECD average higher at 15 and the non-OECD average much lower at 9. Interestingly, 21 of the 45 countries (all OECD) needed 15 days on average to process a business visa, which could be a reasonable target, especially for the five countries at the top of this distribution (Canada, Turkey, Israel, Costa Rica and New Zealand). Again, this reduction in visa processing time is likely to facilitate Mode 4 trade, also by making the process more certain and predictable.

Another interesting measure covered in the STRI data is the duration of the visa for crew members (in number of months). While the sample average in 2017 was only five months, the Indian visa allows crew members almost two years, while the visas of four other countries (Australia, Turkey, Russia and Malaysia) allow at least 12 months (see Figure 5). Longer visa durations will certainly facilitate the movement of aircrew, seamen and truck drivers in delivering services by reducing recurrent costs in re-applying for visas.

Longer visa durations for services suppliers should thus be a significant aspect of any TFS agenda on the MNP. Ideally, the duration of a visa should match the time needed by the service supplier to deliver the service. The challenges emanating from the absence of such a linkage

> 6 Alternatively, the costs of obtaining visas could simply be set as a cost-recovery fee and the cost of administering them. This would still lead to cost reductions though the visa costs would then not be the same across all countries.

12
are compounded when importing countries do not entertain visa extensions or do not grant multiple-entry visas.

Thus, while all 45 sample countries in the OECD STRI database except Russia allowed multiple-entry to business visitors in the year 2017, this was not found to be the case for aircrew, seamen and truck drivers (the latter are the most adversely affected with 9 of the 45 countries – Costa Rica, Greece, Iceland, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States - not allowing them any multiple-entry in the year 2017). Likewise, only four countries (Canada, Denmark, Indonesia and Japan) provided visas on arrival or exempted visas for temporary entry/transit of crew across services sectors. Most of the other countries are found to be rather restrictive along this dimension, with six countries (China, Ireland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and the United States) being completely restrictive across all sectors.

Moving towards multiple-entry visas for service providers in all sectors, providing opportunities for e-visas/visas on arrival and/or exempting visas for temporary entry/transit of service providers should all be a part of a viable MNP TFiS agenda. In fact, one notable development in facilitating visas for business professionals is the relatively recent good practice of enabling e-business visas (see Box 1 for details on the Indian e-business visa). Similarly, the Italian Embassy in Riyadh and the Italian consulate in Jeddah have introduced a new facilitation mechanism for Saudi businesspersons and investors to facilitate trade and investment between the two countries. Specifically, applicants who have a "declaration of invitation" from a firm operating in Italy are exempted from submitting certain supporting documents, including proof of the objectives of the journey and "the condition of economiccommercial operator" (Attström et al. 2013).

# **Box 1: India’s e-business visa program**

In November 2014, the Government of India introduced an online tourist Visa (e-Visa) for 43 countries. In 2015, India rolled out the e-Visa program to other major world countries. In April 2017, India retooled its e-Visa program, introducing a special visa subcategory for business travelers.

At present, business travelers from more than 160 countries can apply for a business e- Visa. Travelers who use India’s business e-Visa program apply, pay a fee online and receive their electronic visa online before traveling to India. The process has hugely simplified the visa application process for business travelers.

For more details see https://www.evisaindia.org/types/business-visa/.

Finally, it is interesting to note that there is little, if any, statistical correlation between the various attributes of business visa applications discussed in this section, as can be seen from Table 6, which further highlights the elements of discretion and heterogeneity in the determination of these attributes by the imposing jurisdictions. In fact, while there is some correlation between the average MNP restrictiveness score, the duration of visa for crew and the number of documents needed to obtain a business visa, the signs of the statistical correlations are found to be counter-intuitive in each case. For instance, one would expect countries with more restrictive policies towards MNP to require more documents to apply for 13
a business visa or to allow for smaller visa durations. Moreover, even the visa processing times and the duration of visas for CSSs, ISSs and ICTs are negatively correlated (see Figure 6), which suggests that even if it may take longer for a country to issue a business visa, that may not result in longer stays in that country for service professionals.

# **Table 6: Statistical correlation between average MNP restrictiveness and attributes of business visa applications**

||**Average Mode 4**<br>**restrictiveness**<br>**index **|**Cost to obtain**<br>**a business**<br>**visa (USD)**|**Duration of visa**<br>**for crew (no. of**<br>**months allowed)**|**No. of documents**<br>**needed to obtain a**<br>**business visa**|**Range of visa**<br>**processing**<br>**time (days)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Average Mode 4**<br>**restrictiveness**||||||
|**index**|1|||||
|**Cost to obtain a**||||||
|**business visa**||||||
|**(USD)**|-0.0249|1||||
|**Duration of visa**||||||
|**for crew (no. of**<br>**months allowed)**|0.2084|-0.013|1|||
|**No. of documents**<br>**needed to obtain**||||||
|**a business visa**|-0.2923|-0.1922|-0.1751|1||
|**Range of visa**||||||
|**processing time**<br>**(days)**|0.0512|0.0356|0.0221|-0.0323|1|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations

# **5. Conclusion**

The growing importance of services trade for countries across the world is well-documented in the services and trade literatures. At the same time, regulatory and administrative barriers on the movement of service suppliers to deliver services internationally have resulted in very low shares of Mode 4 trade in total services trade. Against this background, this paper attempts to conceptualize an agenda for TFiS as it would apply to MNP, providing descriptive statistical evidence from the OECD’s STRI database.

In doing so, it takes the prevailing domestic regulation on MNP across sectors as given and suggests, as components of a Mode 4 TFiS agenda, that (a) administrative and financial costs of complying with necessary policies be brought down and aligned with prevailing regulation in other countries, also to reduce the costs imposed by regulatory heterogeneity; and (b) predictability, certainty and meaningful transparency be brought to the whole process governing the design and implementation of rules and procedures regulating the temporary movement of service suppliers to deliver services across borders. The paper also suggests that some excessively restrictive and burdensome policies be sufficiently toned down if not eliminated altogether to liberalize Mode 4 trade.

More specifically, the paper makes the following recommendations to facilitate Mode 4 trade:

- (i) Lower the average cost of obtaining a business visa; (ii) Reduce the number of documents required to obtain a business visa;

- (iii) Require a common set of documents to obtain a business visa;

14
- (iv) Reduce the visa processing time;

- (v) Increase the duration of stay for service suppliers across sectors;

- (vi) Move towards multiple-entry visas for service providers in all sectors;

- (vii) Provide opportunities for e-visas/visas on arrival for service providers in all sectors; (viii) Exempt visas for temporary entry/transit of service providers.

This said, it must be recognized that discussing a TFiS agenda on Mode 4 trade is becoming increasingly challenging given the refugee crisis in the West. While this highlights the need to separate the issue of ‘temporary entry for supply of services’- which is the essence of Mode 4, from the overall migration debate, pragmatic solutions to address sensitive issues, including through specific visas for service suppliers in committed sectors, and implementing the concept of ‘authorized economic operator<sup>7</sup> ’ also need to be discussed. Moreover, innovative ways must also be deployed to address the inherent bias that continues to prevail in any discussion on Mode 4 against unskilled and semi-skilled service providers.

At the same time, providing empirical estimates of the costs imposed by specific regulatory and administrative barriers on Mode 4 trade would also inform the discussion on an MNP TFiS agenda and enable a prioritization of TFiS measures for policy makers. The WTO Secretariat has recently released services trade data by modes of delivery, which could be deployed in regression analysis to estimate the regulatory costs on Mode 4 trade, using the quantitative measures of MNP restrictiveness constructed in this paper, at least for the country sample in the OECD STRI database. This could be an agenda for future research on this subject.

Finally, one additional input into this analysis, which would substantively inform a TFiS agenda on MNP, would be constructive feedback from the actual stakeholders - i.e. sector organizations or representatives and services professionals that cross borders frequently to deliver services – on the actual regulatory, compliance and even investment climate issues that impose unnecessary costs on them. Conducting country- and sector-specific Mode 4 surveys<sup>8</sup> to elicit such feedback would be another agenda for further work on this subject.

> 7 Authorized economic operators (AEOs) are pre-recognized entities whose compliance with an importing country’s regulations could be certified by the exporting country to facilitate market access.

> 8 One example of this is the surveys undertaken of IT sector exporting firms in India by the country’s Central Bank, which inter alia, enables it to provide estimates of IT services exports by modes of delivery.

15
# **References**

Attström, K., M. H. Bausager, I. M. Nielsen, J. Leonardsen, T. N. Hansen, and A. Mercer (2013). Study on the economic impact of short stay visa facilitation on the tourism industry and on the overall economies of EU Member States being part of the Schengen Area. European Commission.

Drake-Brockman, J., A. Greenidge, J. Lan and Q. Zhao (2015). Making the Most of the LDC Services Waiver. Geneva: ITC.

Fiorini, M. and B. Hoekman. (2018). Services Trade Policy and Sustainable Development. World Development 112: 1-12.

Hoekman, B. (2017). Facilitating Trade in Services. Background Paper for the Government of India and World Bank Workshop on Trade Facilitation in Services, New Delhi.

Kox, H. and H. Nordås (2007). Services trade and domestic regulation, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper 49, OECD, Paris.

Kox, H. and H. Nordås (2009). Regulatory harmonization and trade in services: Volumes and choice of mode, mimeo.

Maurer, A., J. Magdeleine and R. Lanz (2016). Measuring Trade in Services in a World of Global Value Chains', in P. Sauvé and M. Roy (eds.), Research Handbook on Trade in Services, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, pp. 42-65.

Miroudot, S. and B. Shepherd (2016). Trade Costs and Global Value Chains in Services in _Research Handbook on Trade in Services._ Edited by M. Roy and P. Sauvé. Edward Elgar.

Molinnuevo, M. and S. Sáez (2014). Regulatory Assessment Toolkit: A Practical Methodology for Assessing Regulation on Trade and Investment in Services. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Nordås, H. (2016). Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): The Trade Effect of Regulatory Differences, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 189, Paris: OECD Publishing.

van der Marel, E. and B. Shepherd (2019). Trade Facilitation in Services: concepts and empirical importance, mimeo.

Walmsley, T., LA Winters and S. Ahmed (2007). Measuring the Impact of the Movement of Labor Using a Model of Bilateral Migration Flows. GTAP Technical Papers 2529.

WTO (2019). World Trade Report 2019: The future of services trade. Geneva, Switzerland.

16
# **Figure 1: Average restrictiveness towards movement of natural persons (2017)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> RUS 0.72<br>EST 0.65<br>HUN 0.65<br>CHE 0.65<br>GBR 0.61<br>ISL 0.56<br>DNK 0.56<br>USA 0.54<br>SVN 0.52<br>AUT 0.49<br>POL 0.45<br>IND 0.44<br>NLD 0.43<br>TUR 0.42<br>CHN 0.42<br>IDN 0.42<br>ISR 0.42<br>IRL 0.41<br>BRA 0.41<br>FRA 0.40<br>AUS 0.39<br>LUX 0.38<br>BEL 0.38<br>NOR 0.38<br>JPN 0.38<br>NZL 0.37<br>ITA 0.36<br>FIN 0.36<br>CAN 0.33<br>GRC 0.32<br>ZAF 0.30<br>SWE 0.29<br>DEU 0.29<br>PRT 0.28<br>MYS 0.28<br>KOR 0.26<br>LTU 0.25<br>MEX 0.22<br>SVK 0.22<br>CZE 0.21<br>CRI 0.20<br>ESP 0.19<br>LVA 0.14<br>CHL 0.11<br>COL 0.10<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: OECD STRI; own calculations 17
# **Figure 2: Average cost to obtain a business visa (USD, 2017)**

|COL|297|
|---|---|
|NZL|230|
|AUT|180|
|IND|168|
|USA|160|
|GBR|120|
|TUR|112|
|CHN|105|
|AUS|100|
|EST|96|
|KOR|90|
|BRA|89|
|PRT|84|
|CHL|81|
|CAN|78|
|ITA|76|
|POL|73|
|NOR|73|
|SVN|72|
|SVK|72|
|NLD|72|
|LUX|72|
|ISL|72|
|FRA|72|
|ESP|72|
|CZE|72|
|BEL|72|
|SWE|72|
|LTU|72|
|DNK|70|
|FIN|69|
|LVA|67|
|CHE|67|
|HUN|67|
|DEU|67|
|IRL|61|
|GRC|60|
|IDN|49|
|RUS|49|
|MEX|36|
|ZAF|33|
|CRI|32|
|ISR|26|
|MYS|15|
|JPN|7|

Source: OECD STRI 18
# **Figure 3: Average number of documents needed to obtain a business visa (2017)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> FRA 16<br>AUT 16<br>DEU 15<br>SWE 14<br>PRT 14<br>GRC 14<br>ESP 14<br>POL 13<br>LUX 13<br>AUS 13<br>ZAF 12<br>NOR 12<br>NLD 12<br>IRL 12<br>SVK 11<br>FIN 11<br>MYS 10<br>LVA 10<br>CAN 10<br>MEX 9<br>LTU 9<br>HUN 9<br>CHE 9<br>BEL 9<br>ITA 8<br>SVN 7<br>JPN 7<br>ISR 7<br>DNK 7<br>CZE 7<br>CRI 7<br>BRA 6<br>NZL 6<br>IDN 6<br>COL 6<br>CHN 6<br>CHL 6<br>USA 5<br>TUR 5<br>KOR 5<br>IND 5<br>EST 5<br>RUS 4<br>ISL 3<br>GBR 2<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: OECD STRI 19
# **Figure 4: Range of visa processing times (number of days, 2017)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> CAN 32<br>TUR 30<br>ISR 30<br>CRI 30<br>NZL 28<br>SWE 15<br>SVN 15<br>SVK 15<br>PRT 15<br>NOR 15<br>NLD 15<br>LUX 15<br>ITA 15<br>ISL 15<br>HUN 15<br>GRC 15<br>GBR 15<br>EST 15<br>ESP 15<br>DNK 15<br>CZE 15<br>CHL 15<br>CHE 15<br>BEL 15<br>AUT 15<br>AUS 15<br>POL 14<br>LTU 14<br>USA 10<br>RUS 10<br>LVA 10<br>IRL 10<br>DEU 10<br>MYS 7<br>BRA 7<br>ZAF 5<br>KOR 5<br>FRA 5<br>FIN 5<br>COL 5<br>IDN 4<br>CHN 4<br>IND 3<br>MEX 2<br>JPN 1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: OECD STRI 20
# **Figure 5: Duration of visa for crew (number of months allowed, 2017)**

|23<br>IND|
|---|
|14<br>AUS|
|12<br>TUR|
|12<br>RUS|
|12<br>MYS|
|10<br>BRA|
|7<br>ISR|
|7<br>GBR|
|7<br>CRI|
|5<br>SWE|
|5<br>MEX|
|5<br>KOR|
|5<br>ISL|
|5<br>FIN|
|5<br>DNK|
|5<br>CAN|
|4<br>PRT|
|4<br>POL|
|4<br>NOR|
|4<br>NLD|
|4<br>LVA|
|4<br>LTU|
|4<br>ITA|
|4<br>FRA|
|4<br>EST|
|4<br>ESP|
|4<br>DEU|
|4<br>SVK|
|4<br>LUX|
|4<br>HUN|
|4<br>CZE|
|4<br>CHE|
|4<br>AUT|
|4<br>BEL|
|4<br>SVN|
|4<br>GRC|
|3<br>ZAF|
|3<br>IRL|
|3<br>USA|
|2<br>NZL|
|2<br>IDN|
|2<br>JPN|
|1<br>CHN|
|1<br>CHL|
|0<br>COL|

Source: OECD STRI 21
# **Figure 6: Longer business visa processing times may not lead to longer duration of stays for contractual services suppliers (CSSs), independent service suppliers (ISSs) or intracorporate transferees (ICTs)**

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations 22
# **Annex Table 1: Average restrictiveness towards movement of natural persons by sector (2017)**

|**Country**|**Accounting**<br>**& auditing**|**Accounting**|**Air**<br>**transport**|**Architecture**<br>**AV-**<br>**Broadcasting**|**AV -**<br>**Motion**<br>**pictures**|**AV -**<br>**Sound**<br>**recording**|**Auditing**|**Commercial**<br>**banking**|**Computer**|**Const**<br>**-**<br>**Engng**|**Constrn**|**Courier**|**Distribn**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|AUS|0.43|0.22|0.43|0.44<br>0.38|0.44|0.44|0.33|0.43|0.44|0.14|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|AUT|0.57|0.33|0.57|0.38<br>0.50|0.56|0.44|0.44|0.57|0.44|0.43|0.57|0.44|0.57|
|BEL|0.43|0.56|0.43|0.38<br>0.50|0.44|0.44|0.22|0.43|0.33|0.00|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|BRA|0.43|0.33|0.43|0.44<br>0.38|0.44|0.44|0.33|0.43|0.33|0.57|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|CAN|0.29|0.33|0.29|0.44<br>0.25|0.33|0.22|0.33|0.29|0.22|0.43|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|CHE|0.86|0.11|0.86|0.38<br>1.00|0.89|0.78|0.33|0.86|0.67|0.00|0.86|0.67|0.86|
|CHL|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.06<br>0.13|0.22|0.11|0.00|0.00|0.11|0.29|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|CHN|0.43|0.33|0.43|0.38<br>0.50|0.44|0.33|0.33|0.43|0.33|0.43|0.43|0.56|0.43|
|COL|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.13<br>0.00|0.11|0.00|0.44|0.00|0.11|0.14|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|CRI|0.29|0.22|0.14|0.31<br>0.13|0.11|0.11|0.33|0.14|0.11|0.43|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|CZE|0.14|0.11|0.14|0.25<br>0.13|0.22|0.11|0.33|0.14|0.11|0.57|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|DEU|0.29|0.00|0.29|0.25<br>0.25|0.33|0.22|0.44|0.29|0.33|0.29|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|DNK|0.71|0.11|0.71|0.38<br>0.63|0.67|0.56|0.56|0.71|0.56|0.43|0.71|0.56|0.71|
|ESP|0.14|0.11|0.14|0.13<br>0.13|0.22|0.11|0.33|0.14|0.11|0.29|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|EST|0.86|0.22|0.86|0.50<br>0.75|0.78|0.67|0.33|0.86|0.67|0.57|0.86|0.67|0.86|
|FIN|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.25<br>0.38|0.44|0.33|0.44|0.43|0.33|0.14|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|FRA|0.43|0.67|0.43|0.44<br>0.38|0.44|0.33|0.56|0.43|0.33|0.00|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|GBR|0.29|0.11|0.86|0.31<br>0.75|0.78|0.67|0.56|0.86|0.67|0.00|0.86|0.67|0.86|
|GRC|0.29|0.22|0.29|0.25<br>0.38|0.33|0.33|0.33|0.29|0.33|0.43|0.29|0.33|0.29|
|HUN|0.86|0.22|0.86|0.56<br>0.75|0.78|0.67|0.33|0.86|0.67|0.29|0.86|0.67|0.86|
|IDN|0.43|0.44|0.43|0.25<br>0.50|0.44|0.44|0.44|0.43|0.44|0.43|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|IND|0.43|0.67|0.57|0.44<br>0.38|0.44|0.33|0.67|0.43|0.33|0.14|0.43|0.44|0.43|
|IRL|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.38<br>0.38|0.44|0.33|0.33|0.57|0.33|0.00|0.57|0.44|0.57|
|ISL|0.71|0.11|0.71|0.38<br>0.63|0.67|0.56|0.44|0.71|0.56|0.71|0.71|0.56|0.71|

23
|ISR|0.43|0.22|0.43|0.44|0.38|0.44|0.33|0.22|0.43|0.33|0.57|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ITA|0.29|0.56|0.29|0.38|0.25|0.33|0.22|0.56|0.29|0.33|0.57|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|JPN|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.31|0.38|0.44|0.33|0.33|0.43|0.33|0.29|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|KOR|0.14|0.56|0.14|0.19|0.25|0.33|0.11|0.56|0.14|0.11|0.43|0.14|0.22|0.14|
|LTU|0.29|0.00|0.29|0.25|0.38|0.22|0.22|0.11|0.29|0.22|0.29|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|LUX|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.31|0.50|0.44|0.44|0.44|0.43|0.33|0.43|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|LVA|0.14|0.11|0.14|0.13|0.13|0.11|0.11|0.33|0.14|0.11|0.14|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|MEX|0.14|0.22|0.29|0.19|0.13|0.22|0.11|0.22|0.14|0.22|0.29|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|MYS|0.14|0.44|0.14|0.38|0.25|0.22|0.22|0.44|0.14|0.11|0.57|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|NLD|0.57|0.22|0.57|0.31|0.50|0.56|0.44|0.11|0.57|0.44|0.00|0.57|0.44|0.57|
|NOR|0.43|0.56|0.43|0.25|0.38|0.44|0.33|0.33|0.43|0.33|0.00|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|NZL|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.38|0.38|0.44|0.44|0.22|0.43|0.33|0.29|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|POL|0.43|0.11|0.43|0.50|0.38|0.44|0.33|0.56|0.57|0.33|1.00|0.43|0.44|0.43|
|PRT|0.14|0.33|0.14|0.38|0.13|0.22|0.11|0.67|0.14|0.22|0.43|0.14|0.11|0.14|
|RUS|1.00|0.11|1.00|0.44|1.00|0.89|0.78|0.44|1.00|0.78|0.29|1.00|0.89|1.00|
|SVK|0.14|0.11|0.14|0.25|0.13|0.22|0.11|0.22|0.14|0.11|0.57|0.14|0.33|0.14|
|SVN|0.71|0.11|0.57|0.56|0.50|0.56|0.44|0.56|0.57|0.44|0.57|0.71|0.56|0.57|
|SWE|0.29|0.11|0.29|0.19|0.25|0.33|0.22|0.78|0.29|0.22|0.14|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|TUR|0.43|0.44|0.43|0.38|0.50|0.56|0.44|0.44|0.43|0.33|0.29|0.43|0.33|0.43|
|USA|0.57|0.44|0.57|0.50|0.50|0.56|0.44|0.44|0.57|0.56|0.71|0.57|0.44|0.57|
|ZAF|0.29|0.33|0.29|0.31|0.25|0.33|0.22|0.33|0.29|0.22|0.14|0.29|0.22|0.29|
|**Average**<br>**OECD**|**0.40**|**0.24**|**0.41**|**0.33**|**0.39**|**0.43**|**0.34**|**0.39**|**0.41**|**0.34**|**0.34**|**0.41**|**0.34**|**0.41**|
|**average**<br>**Non-**|**0.42**|**0.24**|**0.43**|**0.34**|**0.40**|**0.46**|**0.36**|**0.39**|**0.44**|**0.36**|**0.34**|**0.44**|**0.36**|**0.43**|
|**OECD**|||||||||||||||
|**avg. **|**0.35**|**0.27**|**0.35**|**0.31**|**0.35**|**0.34**|**0.29**|**0.38**|**0.34**|**0.28**|**0.32**|**0.34**|**0.30**|**0.34**|

24
|**Country**|**Engng**|**Insurance**|**Ins -**<br>**Actuaries**|**Ins -**<br>**Broking**<br>**&**<br>**agency**|**Legal**|**Dom.**<br>**law**|**Int’l**<br>**law**|**Logistics**<br>**cargo-**<br>**handling**|**Logistics**<br>**customs**<br>**brokerage **|**Logistics**<br>**freight**<br>**forwarding**|**Logistics**<br>**storage**<br>**and**<br>**warehouse**|**Maritime**<br>**transport**|**Rail**<br>**freight**<br>**transport**|<br>**Road**<br>**freight**<br>**transport**|<br>**Telecom**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|AUS|0.25|0.50|0.67|0.25|0.36|0.20|0.20|0.43|0.40|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.56|<br>0.50|<br>0.44|
|AUT|0.38|0.50|0.67|0.75|0.45|0.80|0.00|0.57|0.40|0.57|0.57||0.56|<br>0.63|<br>0.56|
|BEL|0.25|0.50|0.00|0.50|0.55|0.60|0.00|0.43|0.40|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.56|0.38|<br>0.44|
|BRA|0.38|0.38|0.00|0.50|0.45|0.40|0.20|0.43|0.60|0.43|0.43|0.56|0.33|<br>0.38|<br>0.44|
|CAN|0.38|0.25|0.67|0.50|0.27|0.20|0.20|0.29|0.50|0.29|0.29|0.44|0.22|<br>0.38|<br>0.33|
|CHE|0.44|0.75|0.33|0.50|0.73|0.80|0.00|0.86|0.70|0.86|0.86||0.89|<br>0.88|<br>0.89|
|CHL|0.19|0.00|0.00|0.50|0.09|0.60|0.00|0.00|0.20|0.00|0.00|0.11|0.22|<br>0.13|<br>0.11|
|CHN|0.38|0.38|0.67|0.50|0.36|0.60|0.40|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43|0.56|0.56|0.38|<br>0.44|
|COL|0.13|0.00|0.00|0.50|0.00|0.40|0.20|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.11|0.22|<br>0.13|<br>0.11|
|CRI|0.31|0.13|0.00|0.25|0.27|0.40|0.00|0.14|0.40|0.14|0.14|0.22|0.11|<br>0.13|<br>0.22|
|CZE|0.31|0.13|0.00|0.50|0.27|0.40|0.40|0.14|0.10|0.14|0.14||0.33|<br>0.25|<br>0.11|
|DEU|0.25|0.25|0.33|0.50|0.45|0.40|0.20|0.29|0.20|0.29|0.29|0.33|0.44|<br>0.38|<br>0.33|
|DNK|0.38|0.63|0.33|0.50|0.82|0.40|0.00|0.71|0.50|0.71|0.71|0.78|0.78|<br>0.75|<br>0.67|
|ESP|0.13|0.25|1.00|0.25|0.09|0.40|0.00|0.14|0.20|0.14|0.14|0.22|0.33|<br>0.25|<br>0.22|
|EST|0.44|0.75|0.33|0.25|0.64|0.60|0.00|0.86|0.60|0.86|0.86|0.89|0.89|<br>0.88|<br>0.78|
|FIN|0.25|0.38|0.67|0.75|0.36|0.00|0.00|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43|0.56|0.56|<br>0.50|<br>0.44|
|FRA|0.25|0.38|0.33|0.25|0.55|0.40|0.40|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.44|<br>0.63|0.44|
|GBR|0.19|0.75|0.67|0.50|0.36|0.20|0.20|0.86|0.60|0.86|0.86|0.89|0.89|<br>0.88|<br>0.78|
|GRC|0.25|0.38|1.00|0.50|0.27|0.60|0.00|0.29|0.20|0.29|0.29|0.33|0.33|<br>0.38|<br>0.33|
|HUN|0.56|0.75|0.33|0.25|0.73|0.40|0.20|0.86|0.70|0.86|0.86||0.78|<br>0.88|<br>0.78|
|IDN|0.25|0.38|0.33|0.50|0.36|0.80|0.40|0.43|0.40|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.56|<br>0.50|<br>0.44|
|IND|0.25|0.50|0.33|0.50|0.36|0.40|0.40|0.43|0.50|0.43|0.43|0.56|0.56|<br>0.50|<br>0.44|
|IRL|0.31|0.50|0.33|0.50|0.45|0.20|0.00|0.57|0.40|0.57|0.57|0.56|0.67|<br>0.63|<br>0.44|
|ISL|0.38|0.63|0.67|0.75|0.64|0.20|0.00|0.71|0.70|0.71|0.71|0.67||0.75|<br>0.56|
|ISR|0.44|0.38|0.33|0.75|0.55|0.60|0.20|0.43|0.50|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.44|<br>0.50|0.44|

25
|ITA|0.38|0.38|1.00|0.75|0.45|0.40|0.00|0.29|0.30|0.29|0.29|0.56|0.44|0.38|0.22|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|JPN|0.19|0.38|0.67|0.25|0.45|0.60|0.40|0.43|0.40|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.56|0.38|0.56|
|KOR|0.19|0.13|0.33|0.50|0.27|0.60|0.40|0.14|0.20|0.14|0.14|0.22|0.33|0.25|0.33|
|LTU|0.13|0.25|0.33|0.50|0.27|0.40|0.00|0.29|0.30|0.29|0.29|0.33|0.44|0.38|0.22|
|LUX|0.31|0.38|0.33|0.50|0.27|0.40|0.40|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43||0.44|0.50|0.33|
|LVA|0.13|0.13|0.00|0.00|0.09|0.00|0.00|0.14|0.20|0.14|0.14|0.22|0.22|0.25|0.11|
|MEX|0.19|0.13|0.33|0.25|0.09|0.40|0.40|0.14|0.40|0.14|0.14|0.33|0.33|0.25|0.22|
|MYS|0.31|0.25|0.33|0.50|0.27|0.80|0.60|0.14|0.10|0.14|0.14|0.33|0.33|0.13|0.33|
|NLD|0.31|0.50|0.67|0.25|0.55|0.40|0.00|0.57|0.50|0.57|0.57|0.56|0.56|0.63|0.44|
|NOR|0.31|0.38|0.67|0.50|0.64|0.60|0.20|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.44|0.38|0.44|
|NZL|0.31|0.38|0.33|0.50|0.36|0.20|0.00|0.43|0.40|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.44|0.50|0.44|
|POL|0.50|0.38|0.33|0.25|0.45|0.80|0.40|0.43|0.30|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.44|0.50|0.44|
|PRT|0.25|0.13|0.67|1.00|0.36|0.60|0.00|0.14|0.40|0.14|0.14|0.22|0.33|0.25|0.33|
|RUS|0.44|0.88|0.33|0.50|0.73|0.00|0.00|1.00|0.90|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|0.78|
|SVK|0.25|0.13|0.33|0.50|0.27|0.40|0.40|0.14|0.10|0.14|0.14||0.33|0.25|0.22|
|SVN|0.56|0.50|0.33|0.50|0.55|0.60|0.40|0.57|0.40|0.57|0.57|0.56|0.56|0.63|0.56|
|SWE|0.19|0.25|0.67|0.25|0.27|0.40|0.00|0.29|0.20|0.29|0.29|0.44|0.44|0.38|0.33|
|TUR|0.31|0.38|0.33|0.75|0.36|0.80|0.00|0.43|0.50|0.43|0.43|0.44|0.56|0.38|0.44|
|USA|0.63|0.50|0.33|0.50|0.64|0.20|0.20|0.57|0.60|0.57|0.57|0.78|0.67|0.50|0.56|
|ZAF|0.31|0.25|0.67|0.50|0.36|0.60|0.00|0.29|0.30|0.29|0.29|0.33|0.33|0.25|0.33|
|**Average**<br>**OECD**|**0.31**|**0.38**|**0.42**|**0.47**|**0.40**|**0.45**|**0.16**|**0.41**|**0.38**|**0.41**|**0.41**|**0.46**|**0.49**|**0.46**|**0.42**|
|**average**<br>**Non-**|**0.32**|**0.40**|**0.47**|**0.49**|**0.43**|**0.45**|**0.15**|**0.43**|**0.39**|**0.43**|**0.43**|**0.48**|**0.51**|**0.49**|**0.44**|
|**OECD**||||||||||||||||
|**avg. **|**0.27**|**0.32**|**0.27**|**0.43**|**0.32**|**0.44**|**0.20**|**0.34**|**0.36**|**0.34**|**0.34**|**0.42**|**0.42**|**0.36**|**0.35**|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations 26
# **Annex Table 2: Average restrictiveness towards movement of natural persons by STRI measure (2017)**

|**Country**|**Temporary**<br>**licensing**<br>**system in**<br>**place**|**At least one**<br>**engineer**<br>**must be**<br>**licensed for**<br>**issuing**<br>**constrn**<br>**permits**|**Domicile**<br>**required**<br>**for**<br>**Licence**<br>**to**<br>**practice**|**Foreign**<br>**constrn**<br>**engineers**<br>**required**<br>**to**<br>**practice**<br>**locally**<br>**for at**<br>**least 1**<br>**year**|**Foreign**<br>**constn**<br>**engineers**<br>**required**<br>**to take**<br>**local**<br>**exam**|**Foreign**<br>**profes’nals**<br>**required**<br>**to practice**<br>**locally for**<br>**at least 1**<br>**year**|**Foreign**<br>**profes’nals**<br>**required**<br>**to take**<br>**local exam**|**Foreign**<br>**providers**<br>**reqd. to**<br>**completely**<br>**re-do**<br>**university**<br>**degree,**<br>**practice**<br>**and exam**<br>**in the**<br>**domestic**<br>**country**|**Labour**<br>**market**<br>**tests:**<br>**CSSs **|**Labour**<br>**market**<br>**tests:**<br>**ISSs **|**Labour**<br>**market**<br>**tests:**<br>**ICTs**|<br>**Laws/**<br>**regulations**<br>**establish**<br>**process for**<br>**recognizing**<br>**qualifications**<br>**gained**<br>**abroad**|<br>**Laws/**<br>**regulations**<br>**establish**<br>**process for**<br>**recognizing**<br>**qualifications**<br>**in engng.**<br>**gained**<br>**abroad**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|AUS|0.5|0|0|0|0|0.5|0.25|0|1|1|1|<br>0.57|1|
|AUT|0|1|0.5|0|1|0.25|1|0|1|1|1|<br>0.38|<br>0|
|BEL|0.25|0|0.33|0|0|0.25|0.5|0|1|1|1|<br>0.36|<br>0|
|BRA|0.5|1|0.67|0|1|0|0.5|0|1|1|1|<br>0.21|<br>0|
|CAN|0.5|0|0.17|1|1|0.75|1|0|1|1|0|<br>0.43|<br>0|
|CHE|0.5|0|0.17|0|0|0|0|0.33|1|1|1|0.46|<br>0|
|CHL|0.5|0|0.17|0|1|0|0.25|0|0|0|0|<br>0.21|<br>0|
|CHN|1|1|0|0|1|0|0.5|0|1|1|1|<br>0.43|<br>0|
|COL|0.5|0|0.33|0|0|0.25|0|0|0|0|0|<br>0.21|<br>0|
|CRI|0.5|1|0.33|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|0|<br>0.00|<br>0|
|CZE|0.25|1|0.33|0|1|0.5|0.75|0|1|0|0|<br>0.23|<br>0|
|DEU|0|1|0.33|0|0|0.25|0.25|0|1|1|0|<br>0.57|<br>1|
|DNK|0.75|1|0.17|0|0|0.25|0.25|0.17|1|1|1|<br>0.50|<br>1|
|ESP|0|1|0.17|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|<br>0.43|<br>0|
|EST|0.5|1|0|1|0|0|0|0.5|1|1|1|<br>0.64|<br>1|
|FIN|0.75|1|0|0|0|0.25|0.25|0|1|1|1|<br>0.57|<br>0|
|FRA|0.75|0|0|0|0|0.25|0.5|0.17|1|1|1|<br>0.43|<br>0|
|GBR|0.5|0|0|0|0|0.5|0.5|0.17|0.89|0.89|1|<br>0.57|0|
|GRC|0|1|0.5|0|1|0|0.5|0.17|1|0|1|<br>0.21|<br>0|
|HUN|0|0|0.33|0|0|0.5|0.25|0|1|1|1|<br>0.38|<br>0|

27
|IDN|0|1|0.5|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|1|0.21|0|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|IND|1|0|0.33|0|0|0|0|0.33|1|1|1|0.71|1|
|IRL|0.5|0|0|0|0|0.25|0.5|0|1|1|1|0.36|0|
|ISL|0.75|1|0.17|1|1|0|0.25|0|1|1|1|0.31|1|
|ISR|0.5|1|0.17|1|1|0.5|1|0|1|1|1|0.36|0|
|ITA|0|1|0.83|0|1|0.5|1|0|0|1|0|0.43|0|
|JPN|0.25|1|0.67|0|0|0|0.25|0.17|1|0|1|0.36|0|
|KOR|0|1|0.5|0|1|0.5|0.75|0.5|0|0|1|0.50|0|
|LTU|0|1|0|0|0|0|0.25|0|1|0|1|0.29|0|
|LUX|0.25|1|0|1|0|0.75|0.25|0|1|1|1|0.15|0|
|LVA|0.5|1|0|0|0|0|0.25|0|0|0|1|0.07|0|
|MEX|0|1|1|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|1|0.14|0|
|MYS|0|1|1|0|1|0.25|1|0.17|0|0|1|0.29|0|
|NLD|0.5|0|0.17|0|0|0|0.25|0|1|1|1|0.29|0|
|NOR|0.5|0|0.33|0|0|0.5|0.5|0|1|1|1|0.36|0|
|NZL|0|0|0|0|1|0.25|1|0|1|1|1|0.36|0|
|POL|0.25|1|0.17|1|1|0.75|0.75|0.5|1|1|1|0.36|1|
|PRT|0|1|0.83|0|0|0.25|0.25|0.33|0|0|1|0.57|0|
|RUS|0.25|1|0.17|0|0|0.25|0.25|0|1|1|1|0.29|0|
|SVK|0.25|1|0.33|0|0|0|0.25|0|1|0|0|0.54|1|
|SVN|0.25|1|0.33|1|1|0.75|0.75|0.5|0|0|1|0.57|0|
|SWE|0.75|1|0.33|0|0|0.25|0.25|0.17|1|0|1|0.57|0|
|TUR|0.5|1|0.5|0|0|0|0|0|1|1|1|0.36|0|
|USA|1|1|0.17|1|1|1|1|0|1|1|0|0.36|0|
|ZAF|0|0|0.5|0|0|0.5|0.5|0|1|1|0|0.21|0|
|**Average**<br>**OECD**|**0.36**|**0.67**|**0.30**|**0.18**|**0.36**|**0.26**|**0.41**|**0.09**|**0.75**|**0.66**|**0.78**|**0.37**|**0.18**|
|**average**<br>**Non-**<br>**OECD**|**0.35**|**0.65**|**0.28**|**0.24**|**0.38**|**0.31**|**0.45**|**0.11**|**0.79**|**0.67**|**0.79**|**0.41**|**0.21**|
|**avg. **|**0.39**|**0.73**|**0.35**|**0.00**|**0.27**|**0.11**|**0.30**|**0.05**|**0.64**|**0.64**|**0.73**|**0.27**|**0.09**|

28
|**Country**|**Lmtn.**<br>**on**<br>**duration**<br>**of stay**<br>**for CSSs**<br>**(months)**|**Lmtn.**<br>**on**<br>**duration**<br>**of stay**<br>**for ISSs**<br>**(months)**|**Lmtn.**<br>**on**<br>**duration**<br>**of stay**<br>**for ICTs**<br>**(months)**|**Membership**<br>**in prof’nal**<br>**association**<br>**closed to**<br>**foreigners**|**Memo:**<br>**Licence/**<br>**authorisat’n**<br>**reqd. to**<br>**practice**|**Nationality**<br>**/citizenship**<br>**reqd. for**<br>**constrn**<br>**engineers**|**Nationality/**<br>**citizenship**<br>**reqd. for**<br>**Licence to**<br>**practice**|**Other**<br>**restrictions**<br>**to MNP**|**Prior or**<br>**permanent**<br>**residency**<br>**reqd. for**<br>**Licence to**<br>**practice**|**Quotas:**<br>**CSSs **|**Quotas:**<br>**ISSs **|**Quotas:**<br>**ICTs**|<br>**Residency**<br>**reqd. to**<br>**practice**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|AUS|48|<br>48|48|0|0.56|0|0|0|0.17|0|0|0|<br>0|
|AUT|12|<br>12|36|0|0.53|0|0.13|0|0.17|0|0|1|0.33|
|BEL|12|<br>24|12|0|0.56|0|0.13|0|0.33|0|0|0|<br>0|
|BRA|12|<br>12|24|0|0.61|0|0.13|0|0.33|0|0|0|<br>1|
|CAN|36|<br>36|36|0|0.61|0|0.13|0|0.17|0|0|0|<br>0.33|
|CHE|12|<br>12|12|0|0.47|0|0|0.17|0.17|1|1|1|<br>0|
|CHL|12|<br>12|24|0|0.67|0|0.13|0|0.17|0|0|0|<br>0.33|
|CHN|60|<br>60|60|0|0.78|0|0.38|0|0.33|0|0|0|<br>0|
|COL|6|<br>24|24|0|0.61|0|0|0|0.17|0|0|0|<br>0.33|
|CRI|12|<br>12|12|0|0.56|0|0.25|0|0.83|0|0|0|<br>0.67|
|CZE|24|<br>12|36|0|0.47|0|0|0|0.33|0|0|0|<br>0.67|
|DEU|3|<br>36|36|0|0.50|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|<br>0|
|DNK|48|<br>24|48|0|0.33|0|0|1|0.17|0|1|0|<br>0|
|ESP|12|<br>24|36|1|0.56|0|0.25|0|0|0|0|0|<br>0|
|EST|12|<br>60|36|0|0.33|0|0|0|0.17|1|1|1|<br>0|
|FIN|12|<br>12|12|0|0.28|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|<br>0.33|
|FRA|12|<br>12|36|0|0.50|0|0.63|0.05|0|0|0|0|<br>0|
|GBR|55|<br>55|61|0|0.44|0|0|1|0|0.89|0.89|0|<br>0|
|GRC|24|<br>24|24|1|0.89|0|0.13|0|0|0|0|0|<br>0|
|HUN|36|<br>36|12|0|0.53|0|0.13|0|0.33|1|1|1|<br>0.33|
|IDN|24|<br>24|24|0|0.94|0|0.5|0|0.5|0|0|0|<br>0.33|
|IND|24|<br>24|24|0|0.56|0|0.5|0.05|0.33|0|0|0|<br>0|

29
|IRL|24|24|24|0|0.39|0|0|0.68|0|0|0|0|0|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ISL|0|23|12|0|0.41|0|0|1|0.17|1|0|0|0.67|
|ISR|12|12|12|0|0.61|0|0|0|0.17|0|0|0|0.67|
|ITA|24|24|36|1|0.67|1|0.5|0.05|0|0|1|0|0.33|
|JPN|60|60|60|0|0.56|0|0|1|0|0|0|0|0|
|KOR|24|24|36|0|0.89|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|LTU|12|12|36|0|0.50|0|0.13|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|LUX|36|36|36|0|0.76|0|0.25|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|LVA|60|12|60|0|0.33|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|MEX|6|6|48|0|0.78|0|0.125|0.16|0|0|0|0|0.33|
|MYS|12|12|24|0|0.83|0|0|0|1|0|0|0|0.33|
|NLD|12|12|36|0|0.39|0|0|1|0|0|0|0|0|
|NOR|24|24|24|0|0.44|0|0|0|0.33|0|0|0|0|
|NZL|12|12|36|0|0.56|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|POL|36|36|36|0|0.67|1|0.25|0.05|0.17|0|0|0|0.33|
|PRT|12|12|36|0|0.72|1|0.5|0|0.33|0|0|0|0.67|
|RUS|0|36|36|0|0.50|0|0.13|1|0|1|1|1|0.33|
|SVK|24|36|36|0|0.59|1|0.25|0|0|0|0|0|0.33|
|SVN|3|3|36|0|0.56|0|0.13|0.05|0|1|1|1|0|
|SWE|24|24|36|0|0.22|0|0|0|0.33|0|0|0|0|
|TUR|12|12|12|0|0.72|0|0.5|0.05|0.5|0|0|0|0.33|
|USA|36|36|36|0|0.67|0|0.13|0.11|0.17|1|1|0|0.33|
|ZAF|60|60|48|0|0.67|0|0|0|0.5|0|0|0|0|
|**Average**<br>**OECD**|**23**|**25**|**33**|**0.07**|**0.57**|**0.09**|**0.14**|**0.17**|**0.19**|**0.18**|**0.20**|**0.13**|**0.21**|
|**average**<br>**Non-**|**22**|**25**|**32**|**0.09**|**0.55**|**0.12**|**0.13**|**0.19**|**0.13**|**0.20**|**0.23**|**0.15**|**0.19**|
|**OECD**<br>**avg. **|**26**|**26**|**34**|**0.00**|**0.63**|**0.00**|**0.18**|**0.10**|**0.36**|**0.09**|**0.09**|**0.09**|**0.27**|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations 30
**Annex Table 3: Limitations on duration of stay (number of months) for different services providers by sector (2017)**

|**Country**|**Accounting**<br>**& auditing**|**Air**<br>**transport**|**Architecture**|**AV -**<br>**Broadcasting**|**AV -**<br>**Motion**<br>**pictures**|**AV - Sound**<br>**recording**|**Commercial**<br>**banking**|**Computer**|**Construction**|**Courier**|<br>**Distribution**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**AUS**||||||||||||
|CSSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|<br>48|
|ISSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|<br>48|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|<br>48|
|**AUT**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|<br>36|
|**BEL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|<br>24|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|**BRA**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|<br>24|
|**CAN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|<br>36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|<br>36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|<br>36|
|**CHE**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|<br>12|

31
|**CHL**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**CHN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|**COL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**CRI**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**CZE**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**DEU**||||||||||||
|CSSs|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**DNK**||||||||||||
|CSSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|

32
|**ESP**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**EST**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**FIN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**FRA**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**GBR**||||||||||||
|CSSs|6|61|6|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|ISSs|6|61|6|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|ICTs|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|**GRC**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**HUN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|

33
|**IDN**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**IND**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**IRL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**ISL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|12|24|24|24|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**ISR**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**ITA**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**JPN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|

34
|**KOR**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**LTU**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**LUX**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**LVA**||||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|**MEX**||||||||||||
|CSSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ISSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**MYS**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**NLD**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|

35
|**NOR**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**NZL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**POL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**PRT**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**RUS**||||||||||||
|CSSs|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**SVK**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**SVN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|
|ISSs|3|3|3|3|3|12|3|3|3|3|3|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|

36
|**SWE**<br>||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**TUR**||||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**USA**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**ZAF**||||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|

|**Country**|**Engineering**|**Insurance**|**Legal**|**Logistics**<br>**cargo-**<br>**handling**|**Logistics**<br>**customs**<br>**brokerage **|**Logistics**<br>**freight**<br>**forwarding**|**Logistics**<br>**storage**<br>**and**<br>**warehouse**|**Maritime**<br>**transport**|**Rail freight**<br>**transport**|**Road freight**<br>**transport**<br>**Telecommunication**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**AUS**|||||||||||
|CSSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48<br>48|
|ISSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48<br>48|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48<br>48|
|**AUT**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12<br>12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12<br>12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36<br>36|

37
12 24 12 12 12 24 36 36 36 12 12 12 12 12 24 60 60 60 6 24 24

|**BEL**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**BRA**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**CAN**|||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**CHE**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12|
|**CHL**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**CHN**|||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|**COL**|||||||||||
|CSSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|

38
|**CRI**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**CZE**|||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24||24|24|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|
|**DEU**|||||||||||
|CSSs|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**DNK**|||||||||||
|CSSs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**ESP**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**EST**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**FIN**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|

|12<br>12<br>12<br>24<br>12<br>36<br>3<br>36<br>36<br>48<br>24<br>48|
|---|
|12<br>24<br>36<br>12<br>60<br>36<br>12<br>12<br>12|

39
|**FRA**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**GBR**||||||||||||
|CSSs|6|61|6|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|ISSs|6|61|6|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|ICTs|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|61|
|**GRC**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**HUN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|36|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|12|12|
|**IDN**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|12|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|12|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|12|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**IND**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**IRL**||||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|

40
|**ISL**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0||0|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24||24|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12||12|
|**ISR**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**ITA**|||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**JPN**|||||||||||
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|**KOR**|||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**LTU**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**LUX**|||||||||36|36|
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|

|0<br>24<br>12<br>12<br>12<br>12<br>24<br>24<br>36<br>60<br>60<br>60<br>24<br>24<br>36<br>12<br>12<br>36<br>36<br>36<br>36<br>36|
|---|

41
|**LVA**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|**MEX**|||||||||||
|CSSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ISSs|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|
|**MYS**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**NLD**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**NOR**|||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|**NZL**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**POL**|||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|

|60<br>12<br>60<br>6<br>6<br>48<br>12<br>12<br>24<br>12<br>12<br>36<br>24<br>24<br>24<br>12<br>12<br>36<br>36<br>36<br>36|
|---|

42
12 12 36 0 36 36 32 24 36 36 3 3 36 24 24 36 12 12 12 36 36 36

|**PRT**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**RUS**|||||||||||
|CSSs|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**SVK**|||||||||32|32|
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24||24|24|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36||36|36|
|**SVN**|||||||||||
|CSSs|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|
|ISSs|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**SWE**|||||||||||
|CSSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ISSs|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|24|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|**TUR**|||||||||||
|CSSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ISSs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|ICTs|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|12|
|**USA**|||||||||||
|CSSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ISSs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|
|ICTs|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|36|

43
|**ZAF**||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CSSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ISSs|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|60|
|ICTs|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|48|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations Note: CSSs = Contractual service suppliers; ISSs = Independent service suppliers; ICTs = Intra-corporate transferees 44
# **Annex A: List of countries covered by the OECD STRI data**

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.

# **Annex B: List of sectors covered by the OECD STRI data**

Accounting and auditing services; Accounting services; Air transport; Architecture services; Audiovisual – Broadcasting; Audiovisual - Motion pictures; Audiovisual - Sound recording; Auditing services; Commercial banking; Computer services; Construction – Engineering; Construction services; Courier services; Distribution services; Engineering services; Insurance; Insurance – Actuaries; Insurance - Broking and agency services; Legal services; Legal services - Domestic law; Legal services - International law; Logistics cargo-handling; Logistics customs brokerage; Logistics freight forwarding; Logistics storage and warehouse; Maritime transport; Rail freight transport; Road freight transport; and Telecommunication.

# **Annex C: List of restrictive regulatory measures on MNP covered by the OECD STRI data**

A temporary licensing system is in place; Appointed actuaries must be nationals or residents; At least one engineer must be licensed for the issuance of construction permits; Domicile required for License to practice; Foreign construction engineers are required to practice locally for at least 1 year; Foreign construction engineers are required to take a local examination; Foreign professionals are required to practice locally for at least 1 year; Foreign professionals are required to take a local examination; Foreign providers have to completely re-do the university degree, practice and exam in the domestic country; Labour market tests: contractual services suppliers; Labour market tests: independent services suppliers; Labour market tests: intra-corporate transferees; Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications gained abroad; Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications in engineering gained abroad; Limitation on duration of stay for contractual services suppliers (months); Limitation on duration of stay for independent services suppliers (months); Limitation on duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees (months); Membership in the professional association is closed to foreigners; Memo: License or authorization is required to practice; Nationality or citizenship required for License to practice; Nationality or citizenship required for construction engineers; Other restrictions to movement of people; Prior or permanent residency is required for License to practice; Quotas: contractual services suppliers; Quotas: independent services suppliers; 45
Quotas: intra-corporate transferees; and Residency is required to practice

# **Annex D: List of regulatory transparency measures on MNP covered by the OECD STRI data**

Cost to obtain a business visa (USD); Duration of visa for crew: number of months allowed by the visa; Duration of visa for crew: number of months allowed by the visa: aircrew; Duration of visa for crew: number of months allowed by the visa: seamen; Duration of visa for crew: number of months allowed by the visa: truck drivers; Multiple entry visa for business visitors; Multiple entry visas are allowed for crew; Multiple entry visas are allowed for crew: aircrew; Multiple entry visas are allowed for crew: seamen; Multiple entry visas are allowed for crew: truck drivers; Number of documents needed to obtain a business visa; Range of visa processing time (days); Visas on arrival or visa exemption are available for temporary entry/transit of crew; Visas on arrival or visa exemption are available for temporary entry/transit of crew: aircrew; Visas on arrival or visa exemption are available for temporary entry/transit of crew: seamen; Visas on arrival or visa exemption are available for temporary entry/transit of crew: truck drivers 46