the lack of capacity and the need to collect sufficient tax for war financing (Bernhardt 1987).<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, the rebellion drastically disrupted the status quo of land ownership. Absentee landlords were commonplace, particularly for large properties. To gain peasant support, the Taiping Army often executed landlords with large holdings who were connected to the Qing government in their occupied territories, or the army confiscated these landlords’ properties.<sup>16</sup> As a result, a large share of landlords fled, and atrocities against landowners were reported inside all Taiping Army-controlled provinces (Guo 1991, p.188-201, 210). Emboldened by the army’s repression of the landlords, the anti-rent movement of tenant farmers spread in the areas it controlled (Luo 1955, p 210) **.** The burning of all Qing government buildings led to the loss of most land title deeds and the public title deed records in these regions (Wang and Wang 1902, Vol. 27, Part II, p. 4), leading to ambiguity of land titles after the war.

Over time, the Taiping Army changed methods of collecting land taxes and financing the war. _In the early stage_ from 1853 to 1859, the army expanded mainly in Jiangxi, Hubei and Anhui provinces. Partly because army officials did not have the administrative capacity to collect land taxes or to reconstruct land property rights, looting, confiscation, and contribution from residents in conquered land and members of the army were more important than land taxes in its war financing (Wu 1950). In the case of Anhui, for instance, farmers largely did not pay land taxes, but they instead paid all types of “contributions” to bandits, including both the Taiping and the Qing armies (Gu 2006). Farmers in these areas could thus be characterized as facing completely arbitrary taxation under “roving bandits.” With multiple parties who could use violence, expropriation’s costs are shared by these parties, and expropriation is too cheap and over-provided (Besley and Ghatak 2005). Starting in 1854, the Taiping Army’s land policy was to continue the land system used in the Qing Empire, and _to collect the land tax from the landlord as usual_ **(** Bernhardt 1987, p 394; Wang et al. 1952, Vol. 3, p. 203 **)** . Despite the intention, the old land system was destroyed due to the repression of the landlords and the massive loss of land title deeds. Moreover, the widespread anti-rent movement made landlords unable to collect sufficient rents to cover taxes. In other words, because Taiping Army officials did not punish those who did not comply with its land policy, no quasi-voluntary compliance with tax payment took place (Levi 1988), and landlords deliberately avoided registering their land with the Taiping Army. This caused ambiguous land property rights under the early

> 15 A more cynical view would argue that the TPHK merely tried to use it as a slogan to attract recruits. 16 The Taiping Army did not appear to be against all landlords. Indeed, some of the initial supporters and even some of its top generals such as Shi Dakai were sizable landholders. However, large landlords holding Qing government positions were treated brutally as enemies (Spence, 1996).

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