of this pattern. Outside agreements are associated with a 4.2 pp increase in the use of this tool, while in firms with predominantly firm-level agreements the use of this adjustment mechanism increases by 7.4 pp with respect to firms who bargain with workers individually. Having instead a firm and a sectoral/national level agreement applying jointly reinforces this effect, up to 9.8 pp with respect to individual negotiations. The only exception regards changes in shift assignments. In this case, outside agreements increase their use by 5pp, and this is reinforced by the joint occurrence of firm and higher level agreements. However, firms that apply firm level agreements only do not use this strategy differently than firms characterised by individual negotiations.

**Table 5: Non-wage margins of labour cost adjustment: probit regressions**

|Depend|ent variable <br>Reduce<br>bonuses|equals oneif<br>Reduce<br>benefits|therespectiv<br>Change<br>shifts|emargin is us<br>Slow<br>promotions|ed<br>Cheaper<br>hires|Early<br>retirement|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Low skilled blue collar (%)<br>High skilled blue collar (%)<br>Low skilled white collar (%)<br>Exporting firm<br>Share of labour costs<br>Only outside agreement<br>Only firm agreement<br>Firm and outside agreement<br>Temporary workers (%)<br>Size=20-49<br>Size=50-199<br>Size=200+<br>Perceived comp – weak<br>Perceived comp – strong<br>Perceived comp – severe|-0.040*<br>(0.051)<br>-0.034<br>(0.151)<br>0.036<br>(0.217)<br>0.021**<br>(0.044)<br>0.048**<br>(0.044)<br>0.028<br>(0.110)<br>0.011<br>(0.536)<br>0.025<br>(0.233)<br>0.007<br>(0.784)<br>0.046***<br>(0.002)<br>0.068***<br>(0.000)<br>0.097***<br>(0.000)<br>0.033<br>(0.330)<br>0.045<br>(0.127)<br>0.038|-0.035**<br>(0.017)<br>-0.060***<br>(0.000)<br>-0.027<br>(0.206)<br>0.010<br>(0.175)<br>0.009<br>(0.624)<br>0.025*<br>(0.052)<br>0.033**<br>(0.013)<br>0.041**<br>(0.018)<br>0.032*<br>(0.070)<br>0.023**<br>(0.040)<br>0.035***<br>(0.001)<br>0.050***<br>(0.000)<br>0.052*<br>(0.064)<br>0.045**<br>(0.045)<br>0.053**|0.069***<br>(0.002)<br>0.051**<br>(0.046)<br>0.024<br>(0.462)<br>-0.007<br>(0.518)<br>-0.023<br>(0.364)<br>0.052***<br>(0.007)<br>0.015<br>(0.412)<br>0.085***<br>(0.003)<br>0.062**<br>(0.021)<br>0.049***<br>(0.002)<br>0.080***<br>(0.000)<br>0.070***<br>(0.000)<br>0.032<br>(0.356)<br>0.030<br>(0.313)<br>0.065**|-0.066***<br>(0.000)<br>-0.016<br>(0.445)<br>0.028<br>(0.307)<br>-0.003<br>(0.756)<br>0.045**<br>(0.032)<br>-0.021<br>(0.177)<br>0.016<br>(0.328)<br>-0.011<br>(0.588)<br>0.024<br>(0.300)<br>0.047***<br>(0.001)<br>0.071***<br>(0.000)<br>0.090***<br>(0.000)<br>0.005<br>(0.870)<br>0.029<br>(0.268)<br>0.035|-0.021<br>(0.378)<br>0.011<br>(0.671)<br>-0.035<br>(0.311)<br>0.017<br>(0.132)<br>0.055**<br>(0.035)<br>0.015<br>(0.417)<br>0.038*<br>(0.068)<br>0.011<br>(0.614)<br>0.031<br>(0.286)<br>0.097***<br>(0.000)<br>0.109***<br>(0.000)<br>0.156***<br>(0.000)<br>0.118***<br>(0.006)<br>0.115***<br>(0.002)<br>0.138***|0.034<br>(0.113)<br>0.029<br>(0.249)<br>0.091***<br>(0.002)<br>-0.008<br>(0.398)<br>0.004<br>(0.864)<br>0.042**<br>(0.033)<br>0.074***<br>(0.000)<br>0.098***<br>(0.000)<br>-0.066**<br>(0.015)<br>0.058***<br>(0.000)<br>0.068***<br>(0.000)<br>0.148***<br>(0.000)<br>-0.012<br>(0.666)<br>-0.034<br>(0.181)<br>-0.001|
|Observations|(0.206)<br>7634|(0.023)<br>7634|(0.036)<br>5689|(0.180)<br>7306|(0.000)<br>7306|(0.982)<br>6148|

Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. Regressions include country and sector fixed effects.

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