With many local governments lacking in the technical know-how and resources needed to decide on differentiated targets, they are often not allocated in the most optimal way.

## **Box 2: The politics of target allocation**

Another unintended consequence of the target-based implementation system is that local politics tend to shape target allocation. The distribution of targets can become **a politicized and sensitive task** , since giving some localities higher targets than others can be perceived as “unfair”. The scope for negotiation of targets seems to vary from region to region.

Target allocation often gives rise to local debates about “common but differentiated responsibilities” and fairness. For example, in Weifang municipality, Shandong province, county leaders used different arguments to bargain for advantageous energy intensity targets during the joint committee ( _lianxi huiyi_ ) meeting at the municipal level, which is in charge of distributing energy intensity targets to counties and districts in Weifang:

- Shouguang, an **industry-heavy county** argued that it has a larger industrial base and it should not receive the same percentage-target as agricultural counties, because that would mean the county’s workload is much larger and becomes unrealistic.

- Leaders from **agricultural counties** like Fangzi on the other hand argue that for them there is very little room and scope for improvement. This is because their industrial base is small, the economy is not well diversified and it is therefore difficult to restructure, and because they have a more difficult time to attract new energy efficient enterprises from the outside.

In the end, the joint committee decided on only slightly differentiated targets for their counties.

_Source: Kostka (2014)_

# _(c) Rigid targets_

Targets also remain rigid. For example, one urban district in Hunan failed to meet its 11th FYP energy intensity target because a large-sized, central state-owned power enterprise moved into the district. District leaders escaped punishment only because the municipality still managed to meet its overall target despite the shortfall in the district.

# _(d) Inflated targets_

Moreover, as binding environmental targets get passed down to lower tiers of government and bureaus, sometimes unattainable targets are allocated to subordinate governments. Provincial and municipal government officials often inflate environmental targets when passing them down the administrative hierarchy in order to allow for slippage as they anticipate that some environmental projects and efforts will fail or that the results will be questioned by national inspection teams. For example, in one municipality in Shanxi, energy intensity targets among counties generally ranged from 27% to 30%, despite a municipal overall target of only 25% (Kostka and Hobbs, 2012). Receiving unattainable targets demotivates local leaders in charge of implementation and, in extreme cases, can trigger non-cooperation by local leaders.

# _(e) Verification difficulties_

In addition, because targets differ widely in terms of their ease of measurability, verifiability, and the extent to which they are tied to vital economic and social issues, the effectiveness and efficiency of binding environmental targets can vary widely. For example, forest coverage targets are easier to measure and verify due to existing GPS technologies, while energy intensity is more difficult to measure and verify since there are multiple ways to calculate 12