rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
ECOWAS‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 2.4  Comparative performance across West African railways (2005)**

||Labor<br>productivity|Locomotive<br>productivity|Carriage<br>productivity|Wagon<br>productivity|Average<br>passenger<br>yield|Average<br>freight<br>yield|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Benin, OCBN|40|3|900|74|2.0|5.8|
|Burkina Faso – Côte d‘Ivoire, SITARAIL|481|35||1,020|3.3|5.5|
|Ghana, GRC|84|7|416|458|2.4|4.4|
|Mali – Senegal, Transrail|339|40||804|2.2|6.4|
|Nigeria, NRC|37|13|737|59|─|─|
|SSA average for railways under<br>concession|387|24|2,945|510|2.2|6.3|

Legend: Labor productivity = ̳000s traffic units per employee; Locomotive productivity = millions of traffic units per locomotive; Carriage productivity = ̳000s passenger-kilometers per carriage; Wagon productivity = ̳000s net tonne-kilometers per wagon. Source: AICD railways database.

# Ports

Container and general cargo traffic moving through West Africa‘s ports increased substantially between 1995 and 2005. The annual average growth in container traffic was even higher than in other parts of Africa, whereas growth in general cargo, however substantial, was not as rapid as in southern Africa (table 2.5). Overall growth in containerized traffic growth was propelled by rapid economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, a rising tide of global trade, the privatization of ports, and the advent of modern container vessels.

With the rapid expansion of traffic, a few of the region‘s ports are beginning to experience capacity constraints (figure 2.8). This is most notable in the case of Cotonou (Benin), where both container and general cargo traffic significantly exceed design capacity. The port of Tema (Ghana) is also experiencing capacity constraints with respect to container traffic. There is some scope for easing those constraints by improving the efficiency of port performance, although new investments ultimately will be required.

**Table 2.5  Growth in containerized and general cargo traffic in West African ports between 1995 and 2005**

||TE<br>|CONTAI<br>Us<br>|NER TRAFFIC<br>Per<br>|centage<br>| ̳000s <br>|GENERAL<br>tonnes<br>|CARGOTRA<br>Pe<br>|FFIC<br>rcentage<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1995|2005|Overall<br>growth|Average annual<br>growth|1995|2005|Overall<br>growth|Average annual<br>growth|
|East Africa|505.1|1,395.0|+276|+10.7|13.8|38.4|+278|+10.8|
|North Africa|1,637.3|5,267.9|+322|+12.4|12.3|16.5|+134|+3.0|
|Southern Africa|1,356.0|3,091.8|+228|+8.6|2.7|14.5|+532|+18.2|
|**West Africa**|**1,035.4**|**4,082.0**|**+394**|**+14.7**|**23.1**|**61.2**|**+265**|**+10.2**|
|Total|4,533.8|13,836.7|+305|+11.8|52.0|130.7|+251|+9.7|

Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants Limited 2009.

31
of the URA. It focuses on two important dimensions of integration in the international trading system: developing countries' own trade policies and issues of market access for trade in goods.

The study has two main objectives: (a) to review and analyse trade policies and institutions of developing countries and conditions of market access in their main trading partners; (b) to use the results of the analysis in the development of a future agenda of topics for negotiation in the WTO as well as initiatives by the international community and the developing countries aimed at their more effective integration in the intemnarional economy.

-Trade policies and market access issues for developing countries have been extensively analy sed in the aftermath of the URA (Martin aL,J Winters, 1996; Finger et.al., 1996; UNCTAD/WTO, 1997; Drabek and Laird 1998; Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). The major innovation of this study is that it is based on a systematic review of the detailed information contained in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of developing countries prepared for GATT/WTO. The analysis utilises information from 61 TPRs prepared for 42 developing economies over the period 1989-1998' In-addition, the study updates trade policy information, e.g. regarding applied tariffs, and market access issues, such as anti-dumping, based on more recent WTO ,;otifications.

The main objective of the TPR mechanism is to " contribute to improved adherence by all WTO Members to rules, disciplines and commitments under the Multilateral Trade Agreements by achieving greater transparency and understanding of the trade policies and practices of members" (WTO, 1995, p 434). The reviews contain a significant body of detailed information on policies and institutions affecting both imports and exports on a consistent basis and over time which has been reviewed and discussed by the country and the WTO Members (and previously, the GATT Contracting Parties) and can therefore be 2
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0.18 between the years 1960-1989 to around 0.12 between the years 19902007.<sup>3</sup> This is consistent with the view that, at the aggregate level, financing reduces the equilibrium amount of real balances.<sup>4</sup>

# **2 Related literature**

In most models of financial intermediation, the price of inputs is essentially fixed, and pledgeability directly determines the quantity of inputs that can be employed. For example, in Holmstrom and Tirole [1997], external funds are direct inputs in investment - implicitly, the price of investment goods in terms of funds is fixed at 1. Under similar assumptions, Philippon [2008] considers a model of costly financial intermediation, and shows that (despite its costs) financial intermediation is efficient. The key difference in this paper is the endogenous determination of the relative price of inputs, that may reverse this conclusion.<sup>5</sup> This paper is related to other papers that study the welfare implications of financial intermediation. Arcand et al. [2011] show empirically that, beyond a certain threshold, there is a negative relationship between the size of the financial sector and economic growth. They present a model that attributes excessive financing to an implicit subsidy in the form of bailouts. This paper emphasizes a different mechanism through which the financial system may become overblown: in the spirit of Tobin [1984], the model highlights the dif-

> 3The corresponding numbers for M2 are 0.59 and 0.51 respectively. These figures are calculated based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis (FRED) database.

> 4In this paper, banks increase the amount of nominal bills in circulation - this will increase M1, but lead to a decline in real balances. There are other (more positive) ways to think about the role of banks in money creation. Stein [2012] presents a model in which real riskless claims provide money-like services. The ability of banks to diversify risk allows them to create riskless claims, which is equivalent to the creation of real balances.

> 5Similar to Philippon [2008] and other standard models, in this model, the final good can be used both for consumption and investment. However, physical capital is different from the final good; the emphasis is on the relative price of physical capital in terms of the final good. In this model, agents are not constrained in investment, but rather in the amount of production inputs that they can employ.

5
level education. Ninety percent were covered by _Mutuelle_ , Rwanda’s community-based health insurance program.

The average number of births given by women in the sample is three, and the women had on average 2.7 living children. Forty percent of the women reported ever using any modern method of family planning. Almost all women have received at least one antenatal consultation during their most recent pregnancy, but only 63 percent initiated antenatal care within the first four months of the pregnancy and 37 percent received four or more consultations (number of consultations recommended by WHO guidelines). Seventy-nine percent have delivered in a health facility, attended by a skilled health provider.

Table 3 presents the baseline characteristics of CHWs in charge of maternal and neonatal health. It is important to keep in mind that the community health program was going through a reorganization process at the time of the baseline survey. This is apparent in the CHW and cooperative surveys’ results. For example, although all CHWs in charge of maternal and neonatal health were supposed to be female, about 14 percent of those who declared being such community health workers were men. About 54 percent of CHWs reported being in that role for a year or less. The average reported years of experience is 2.7. Average age was 39, and 87 percent were married. All CHWs had at least primary level education, and 38 percent had a higher level of education. They reported having visited an average of 28 households in the month preceding the survey and spending an average of 17 hours per week on their community health duties. Seventy-seven percent reported receiving any training in the 12 months preceding the survey. About 52 percent were ever trained on antenatal and postnatal care, 53 percent were trained on referral for delivery or for danger signs, 6 percent were trained on safe home delivery, and 40 percent on newborn care.

As can be seen in Table 4, 84 percent of cooperatives were based in the grounds of the health centers. The corresponding catchment area consisted of an average of 37 villages with a population of about 20,000. At the time of the baseline survey, most cooperatives had less than the target amount of members (three per village) while many cooperatives had more than three CHWs per village.<sup>7</sup> The average number of members was 105.4. In the 12 months preceding the survey, the cooperatives had recruited an average of 35 members, dismissed two members and had two members resign. The cooperative leaders reported having had an average of 7.5 meetings during the preceding year. Average

> 7 Prior to the reorganization of the community health program many villages had CHWs in charge of social affairs or with HIV/AIDS specialization.

9
In Panel A, we find that poor adults are more likely to be food insecure, especially in the post-ISIS period. This is in contrast to the Iraqi national accounts figures that indicate a yearly average real growth for the agriculture sector of 7.3 percent over the three periods. This signals problems in access to the food distribution networks, as opposed to availability of food. Poor adults also have a weaker outlook on their standard of living improving. During the ISIS period, women are more likely than men to report not having enough money to purchase food. At the same time, men—who are more likely to be the household earner—are more likely to report weak job prospects. In the post-ISIS period, men are significantly more likely to report weaker job prospects and standards of living.

Panel B shows that men are more likely to report perceived corruption in government. In the pre-ISIS period, poor adults were less likely, relative to wealthy adults, to report confidence in national institutions or to approve leadership’s job performance. This flips in the post-ISIS period, when wealthy adults appear to lose confidence in government and leadership performance, and poor adults are relatively more supportive of the government and leadership.

Panel C reports that women are generally more satisfied than men with the education system and health care. The results find no relationship with income—both poor and wealthy adults are generally unsatisfied with the quality of government services.

# **_<u>Horizontal inequality</u>_**

Aside from controlling for individual-level characteristics, our estimations also consider a set of ethnoreligious group classifications to explore changing perceptions among Iraqi adults. During the pre-ISIS period, there were no significantly different perceptions about the quality of life. However, during the period of ISIS-control and post-ISIS, Shias, Kurds, and adults in living in Baghdad were significantly more likely to report a poorer quality of life, as compared to Sunnis (Panel A).

Sunnis' confidence in national government and leadership approval was generally significantly lower than those of other ethno-religious groups in the pre-ISIS period and during ISIS control—but significantly higher than all other ethno-religious groups in the post-ISIS period. Notably, nearly all ethno-religious groups perceive the government to be corrupt, in all time-periods (Panel B).

19
potential effects on growth through private capital accumulation. In this group, we include variables to control for efficiency of financial markets, macroeconomic stability, public infrastructure, and risk factors.<sup>17</sup> The inflation rate is one of the most commonly used variables to control for macroeconomic stability. It is expected that higher inflation tends to reduce growth due to a high level of price instability. Three different variables are used in controlling for the efficiency of financial markets, which may play an important role in reducing the cost of borrowing for firms. These are the level of net interest margin, profits before tax, and overhead costs.<sup>18</sup> It is expected that as the level of these variables drops, the efficiency of banks increases, indicating a higher level of competition. The net interest margin is defined as the ratio of net interest income to total assets. This variable showing the difference between earnings from interest and expenses on interest is an important indicator of competitiveness since as a banking sector gets more competitive, the lending rate is expected to drop, but the deposit rate is expected to increase. The share of before tax profits in total assets is another efficiency indicator used in this study. In closed and imperfectly competitive banking sectors, the profit rate is expected to be higher. In such sectors, banks pay low interest rates for funds, and also charge higher interest rates on loans. They also require high service fees. Because of this, profits are expected to decrease with increasing competition. The ratio of overhead costs to total assets is also expected to fall with rising competition. Another control variable is the composite risk index from International Country Risk Index, introduced to capture financial, economic and political risk. This index is constructed in a way that higher numbers indicate lower risk. Thus, it is

> 17 Even though it would be important to include the level of human capital investment as a significant determinant of growth, any appropriate measure, such as the share of people with secondary education, could not be found due to missing data points.

> 18 These variables may also capture the effects of financial depth. Thus, variables such as liquid liabilities, private domestic credit are not included in the regression equation.

14
hypothesis for Malaysia: Fresh evidence from ARDL bounds testing approach. Renew Sust Energ Rev. 2017;77:990-1000.

[41] Pani R, Mukhopadhyay U. Identifying the major players behind increasing global carbon dioxide emissions: a decomposition analysis. The Environmentalist. 2010;30:183-205.

[42] Vinuya F, DiFurio F, Sandoval E. A decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions in the United States. Applied Economics Letters. 2010;17:925-31.

[43] Zhang Y, Zhang J, Yang Z, Li S. Regional differences in the factors that influence China’s energy-related carbon emissions, and potential mitigation strategies. Energy Policy. 2011;39:7712-8.

[44] O'Mahony T. Decomposition of Ireland's carbon emissions from 1990 to 2010: An extended Kaya identity. Energy Policy. 2013;59:573-81.

[45] Xie X, Shao S, Lin B. Exploring the driving forces and mitigation pathways of CO 2 emissions in China’s petroleum refining and coking industry: 1995–2031. Appl Energ. 2016;184:1004-15.

[46] Henriques ST, Borowiecki KJ. The drivers of long-run CO 2 emissions in Europe, North America and Japan since 1800. Energy Policy. 2017;101:537-49.

[47] Shahiduzzaman M, Layton A. Decomposition analysis for assessing the United States 2025 emissions target: How big is the challenge? Renew Sust Energ Rev. 2017;67:372-83.

[48] Chen B, Li J, Zhou S, Yang Q, Chen G. GHG emissions embodied in Macao's internal energy consumption and external trade: Driving forces via decomposition analysis. Renew Sust Energ Rev. 2018;82:4100-6.

# **Appendix A**

**Table A1.** Selected prior studies on decomposition of CO2 emissions using the LMDI

approach (2008-2018). **_Source:_** Compiled by the authors.

|**Author [ref.]**|**Study area**|**Study period**|**Driving force**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Hatzigeorgiou et al. [11]|Greece|1990-2002|1, 2, 3|
|Tunç et al. [12]|Turkey|1970-2006|2, 4, 5, 6|
|Oh et al. [13]|Korea, Rep.|1990-2005|1, 2, 4, 5|
|Pani and Mukhopadhyay [41]|114 countries|1992-2004|1, 3, 5, 6|
|Vinuya et al. [42]|United States|1990-2004|1, 2, 3, 5, 6|
|de Freitas and Kaneko [14]|Brazil|1970-2009|2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7|
|Zhang et al. [43]|China|1995-2009|2, 4, 5, 6, 8|
|O’Mahony et al. [15]|Ireland|1990-2010|2, 4, 5, 6, 8|
|O'Mahony [44]|Ireland|1990-2010|1, 2, 3, 5, 6|
|Zhang et al. [16]|China|1991-2009|6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12|
|González et al. [10]|European Union|2001-2010|1, 2, 3, 5, 6|

28
previously existed. For our analysis, we test whether the share of these missing projects varies between treatment and control. For our measures of quality, we code these projects as zeros. Most importantly, the results are also robust when treating these projects as survey attrition and dropping them from the analysis entirely.

In addition to the primary outcomes, the project assessment also measures three sets of intermediary outcomes that capture the main underlying mechanisms that can explain changes in final outcomes. These include (i) the procurement and contracting process, (ii) community monitoring, and (iii) community interactions with local leaders. These three domains relate to some of the key areas covered by the social accountability training curriculum. Indicators on the procurement and contracting process include an index of challenges faced by communities in the procurement process, an index of satisfaction with suppliers of goods and materials, and whether the community hired a contractor. For communities that did hire a contractor, indicators also include an index of challenges faced by communities in the contracting process and an index of satisfaction with the contractor. The second main domain for intermediary outcomes includes indicators of community monitoring, such as an index of the intensity of project community monitoring, and an index of the intensity of social accountability committee (SAC) project monitoring. Finally, the third main domain for intermediary outcomes captures interactions between communities and local officials. This domain includes indicators of whether a payment was made to a district official or staff, and an index of satisfaction with the sub-county NUSAF2 official and district veterinarian officer.

The second source of follow-up data is an endline survey conducted with households in the sample communities in June and July 2016. The sample surveyed was a selection of individuals who directly benefited from the NUSAF2 project, as well as a sample of the broader community. Eight people per community were surveyed, including the chairpersons of each of the executive committees in the project, two members of the original community social accountability committee, two members from the expanded community accountability committee (called the CMG) in the social accountability training treatment group, and two regular members. In social accountability training control communities, the CMG does not exist and so this group was replaced with two regular members. The sample is thus composed of eight beneficiaries in social accountability training control communities and six in social accountability training 17
# Figure V

Sales distribution in procurement <!-- Start of picture text --> Rhône-Alpes Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur COMUNIDAD DE MADRID ANDALUCÍA<br>Nord-Pas-de-Calais Bretagne PAÍS VASCO CASTILLA Y LEÓN<br>.001 .01 .1 1 .001 .01 .1 1 .001 .01 .1 1 .001 .01 .1 1<br>Fraction of firms selling at least that much Fraction of firms selling at least that much<br>Firms located in Ile de France Firms located in Catalonia<br>(a) (b)<br>1000 1000<br>100 100<br>10 10<br>1 1<br>.1 .1<br>.01 .01<br>.001 .001<br>.0001<br>.0001<br>1000 1000<br>100 100<br>10 10<br>1 1<br>.1 .1<br>Sales in market relative to mean .01 Sales in market relative to mean .01<br>.001 .001<br>.0001 .0001<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Notes:** V plots the distribution of sales by firms in Ille de France and Catalonia, respectively, in their four largest destination markets.

_lower end of the distribution._ Figure V plots the distribution of sales by firms in Ille de France and Catalonia, respectively, in their four largest destination markets. As we can see in both figures, the sales distribution has a very similar shape across all destinations that seems to follow very closely a Pareto distribution.

We have seen that public procurement markets are not integrated: they present a high degree of geographical concentration in purchases and low cross-regional and cross-country participation rates of firms, with subnational governments driving these patterns. In the next section, we use these empirical facts to build a model of trade in procurement to quantify the role of the governments in deterring procurement market integration.

# **5 Model**

In this section, we present a multi-region static model of trade in procurement which is heavily built on Chaney (2008) and Breinlich and Cu ̃nat (2016). There are R regions indexed by _o, r_ . Each region is populated by _Lr_ consumers who inelastically supply one unit of labor. The utility of a representative consumer from region _r_ is given by: where _Cr_<sup>_q_is the consumption of a private perfectly tradable homogeneous good;</sup><sup>_C_</sup> _r_<sup>_n_is the consump-</sup> tion of non-tradable final good produced by the national government located in region _r_ ; and _Cr_<sup>_s_</sup> is the consumption of a non-tradable final good produced by the subnational government located in region _r_ . Given this utility function, _μ_ governs the share of expenditure on goods produced 18