|**Table 6 : Impact on intermediate outco**|**mes**<br>(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Has a**<br>**bank**<br>|**Loan**<br>**contracted**<br>**in 2014‐**<br>**16**<sup>**Β**</sup>**(bank**|<br>**Attended**<br>**business**<br>**training**<br>**in the**|<br>**The firm**<br>**does any**<br>**form of**<br>**account‐**<br>|**Share of**<br>**business**<br>**practises**<br>**implement**<br>**ed (26**|**‐**<br>**Index of**<br>**tax**<br>**harass‐**<br>|**Has sold goods**<br>**to the public**<br>**administration**<br>**or to a large**<br>**company**|<br> <br>**In the**<br>**last**<br>**month a**<br>**client**<br>**asked for**<br>|
||**account**<sup>Β</sup>|**or MFI)**|**past year**|**ing**<sup>Β</sup>|**questions)**|**ment**<sup>**λ**</sup>|**(last 3 months)**|**a receipt**<sup>**Β**</sup>|
|**1st stage: impact of treatment allocation:**|||||||||
|Group1 X year1 (b1)|0.028|‐0.030|0.008|‐0.099***|‐0.046***|‐0.057|0.014|‐0.030|
||(0.031)|(0.024)|(0.018)|(0.026)|(0.012)|(0.040)|(0.023)|(0.029)|
|Group2 X year1 (b2)|‐0.008|‐0.018|0.081***|0.007|‐0.004|‐0.053**|0.008|‐0.027|
||(0.018)|(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.017)|(0.008)|(0.024)|(0.014)|(0.018)|
|Group3 X year1 (b3)|0.017|‐0.009|0.112***|0.023|0.004|‐0.030|0.026**|0.004|
||(0.016)|(0.013)|(0.012)|(0.015)|(0.008)|(0.022)|(0.013)|(0.016)|
|Group1 X year2 (c1)|0.054*|0.006|0.023|‐0.052*|‐0.018|‐0.067*|‐0.002|‐0.026|
||(0.031)|(0.025)|(0.019)|(0.028)|(0.015)|(0.039)|(0.022)|(0.031)|
|Group2 X year2 (c2)|0.011|0.051***|0.113***|0.020|‐0.005|‐0.031|‐0.006|‐0.017|
||(0.019)|(0.016)|(0.015)|(0.018)|(0.009)|(0.025)|(0.013)|(0.019)|
|Group3 X year2 (c3)|0.003|0.015|0.145***|0.047***|0.007|‐0.066***|0.008|‐0.014|
||(0.016)|(0.014)|(0.013)|(0.016)|(0.008)|(0.021)|(0.013)|(0.016)|
|Observations|6,211|6,215|5,949|6,166|6,169|5,217|5,361|5,394|
|Mean Dep. var in control year1|0.249|0.13|0.033|0.198|0.262|0.008|0.093|0.234|
|Mean Dep. var in control year2|0.257|0.173|0.056|0.234|0.273|00|0.083|0.25|
|Adjusted R‐squared|0.147|0.191|0.140|0.155|0.099|0.133|0.089|0.252|
|_Test for impact constant..._|||||||||
|...accross treatments, year1 (b1=b2=b3)|0.378|0.610|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.604|0.515|0.191|
|...accross treatments, year 2 (c1=c2=c3)|0.285|0.085|0.000|0.003|0.178|0.398|0.606|0.923|
|Coef. are jointly 0 (b1=b2=b3=c1=c2=c3=0)|0.561|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.003|0.037|0.388|0.538|
|**(IV) impact of Formalization:**|||||||||
|Formalization instrumented by 1st stage|0.053|0.031|0.669***|0.152**|0.009|‐0.255***|0.068|‐0.059|
|treatment variables|(0.074)|(0.061)|(0.048)|(0.066)|(0.034)|(0.091)|(0.050)|(0.067)|
|P‐values|0.469|0.613|0.000|0.022|0.782|0.005|0.172|0.377|
|Sharpened two‐stageq‐values<sup>μ</sup><br>Note : Panel data from midline and endline<br>each triplet). Standard errors (in parenthes<br>baseline value. μ: Sharpened two‐stage q‐va<br>the following questions: "Was asked to pay<br>inappropriate request from a tax inspector<br>6 months"; " Received more than 1 visit by a<br>inspector "; "Feel that he/she paid more tax<br>their duty and ask firms to pay too much ta|0.755<br>surveys i<br>es) are cl<br>lues as d<br>a bribe b<br>in the las<br>tax insp<br>es than h<br>xes". ***,|1<br>n 2015 and<br>ustered at th<br>escribed in<br>y a tax insp<br>t 6 months"<br>ector in the<br>e/she shoul<br>**, * indica|0.001<br>2016. All re<br>e firm level<br>Anderson (<br>ector in the<br>; "Was thre<br>last 6 mont<br>d have paid<br>te statistica|0.071<br>gressions<br>. α: trunc<br>2008) usin<br>last 6 mo<br>atened wit<br>hs"; "Rece<br>according<br>l significa|1<br>are controll<br>ated at the 9<br>g P‐values i<br>nths"; "Recei<br>h business<br>ived at leas<br>to the law"<br>nce at 1, 5 a|0.023<br>ing for str<br>9th percen<br>n table 6 a<br>ved a sexu<br>closure by<br>t one visit<br>; "Thinks t<br>nd 10%|0.402<br>ata dummies (d<br>tile. Β: controli<br>nd 7. λ: summar<br>al suggestion o<br>a tax inspector<br>by a labour or h<br>hat tax officials|0.755<br>ummies for<br>ng for<br>y index of<br>r other<br>in the last<br>ygiena<br>override|

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