first- or second- degree relatives, although in some communities, it even reaches up to fourth-degree relatives.<sup>23</sup> The perception that a family supported ISIL ha <mark>s serious repercussions for return prospects</mark> . Families with perceived affiliation to ISIL often find their return blocked by security actors,<sup>24</sup> experience community rejection and stigmatization,<sup>25</sup> <mark>and are at high risk of revenge attacks and violence.</mark><sup>26</sup> <mark>Female returnees to ISIS-affected communities are also at a higher risk of SGBV, particularly female-headed houses and those in rural areas</mark><sup>27</sup> <mark>. At the same time, it is common for people living in the area of return to fear that the return of families they believe supported or continue to support ISIL will destabilize their communities and create new risks for security and social relations. In this context, t</mark> he buy-in of community members has been vital to avoid revenge attacks or the start of new conflict when families with perceived ISIL affiliation return,<sup>28</sup> and communities across Iraq have adapted a range of strategies to navigate this issue, often relying on tribal structures and customs.

The reliance on tribal structures to address community conflict is not surprising: an estimated 75% of Iraq’s population identify themselves with a tribe,<sup>29</sup> and tribal lineage is a key determinate of identity, status, and social relations in many communities (particularly in Sunni Arab areas).<sup>30</sup> Tribes often play a very practical role in daily life, with many Iraqis relying on their tribe for physical protection, economic resources, and dispute mediation on a day-to-day basis,<sup>31</sup> not only in rural areas (where adherence to tribal customs, traditions and hierarchies is typically strongest) but also in urban areas, particularly where rural-to-urban migration is common.<sup>32</sup> Tribal justice and formal justice often work in a complementary manner in Iraq, and coordination occurs regularly between tribal leaders and security forces to address criminal behaviour;<sup>33</sup> in some cases, law enforcement officials and courts choose to refer cases to the tribal system for settlement.<sup>34</sup> Conversely, in controversial or

> 23 Genat, M. 2020. _Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS_ . IOM Iraq.

> 24 Blocked returns are commonly enforced by security actors on the ground, usually on the grounds of the IDPs families not possessing the required documentation (mostly a security clearance) to leave the area if displacement or re-enter the area of origin (IOM Iraq, 2021).

> 25 Genat, M. (2020) and IOM Iraq (2018).

> 26 See for example Human Rights Watch (2017). _Iraq: Looting, Destruction by Forces Fighting ISIS._ Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/58a5b4344.html

> 27 Oxfam (2021). _Community perceptions of Sexual and Gender Based Violence._

> 28 Aymerich, O., 2020. Community Resilience and the Return of Iraqi IDPs with Perceived Affiliation to the Islamic State. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 39(4), pp.552-563.

> 29 Hussein H. (2007) _Iraq: Tribal structure, social, and political activities._ Otterman, S. (2005). _Iraq: The Role of Tribes_ . Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-role-tribes

> 30 <mark>Gospodinov, I. D. (2015).</mark> _<mark>The Sunni Tribes of Iraq</mark>_ <mark>. Leiden: Leiden University</mark> _<mark>.</mark>_

> 31 IOM Iraq (2020). _Perceptions of Security and Police in Iraq. Baseline survey findings_ . 32Ibid.

> 33 <mark>Bobseine, H. (2019).</mark> _<mark>Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq</mark>_ <mark>. The Century Foundation, 1-24.</mark>

> 34 <mark>Carroll, K. B. (2011). Tribal Law and reconciliation in the new Iraq.</mark> _<mark>The Middle East Journal</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>65</mark>_ <mark>(1), 11-29.</mark>

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