rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Probably the most ambitious example yet of a mashup using development data was released by Newsweek magazine in August 2010. This tries to identify the ― _<u>World’s Best Countries</u>_ <u>,‖ using a composite of many indicators (many of them already mashup indices)</u> assigned to five groupings: education, health, quality of life, economic competitiveness and political environment. The education component uses test scores. The health component uses life expectancy at birth. ―Quality of life‖ reflects income inequality, a measure of gender inequality, the World Bank‘s poverty rate for $2 a day, consumption per capita, homicide rates, the EPI, and the unemployment rate. ―Economic dynamism‖ is measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita, non-primary share of GDP, the World Economic Forum‘s Innovation Index, the DBI and stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. The ―political environment‖ is measured by the Freedom House ratings, and measures of political participation and political stability.

The rest of this paper critically reviews the main claims made about the benefits of these and other mashup indices of development. Rather little seems to be known about their costs. The teams working on these indices appear to range from just a few people to 30 or more. The web site for <u>Doing Business</u> lists 33 staff on the team who produced the 2010 edition, on top of the 8,000 ―local experts.‖<sup>6</sup> However, it should be recalled that this team is collecting the primary data, so this does not imply a high cost of the mashup index _per se_ . The labor inputs to producing prevailing mashup indices are probably small.

# **Questions to ask about any mashup index**

One can readily sympathize with the motivation for a mashup index. No single data series captures the thing one is interested in, so by adding up multiple indices one may hope to get closer to that truth; in principle there can exist an aggregate index that is more informative than any of its components. It is another matter whether this sympathy survives a closer inspection of what is done in practice. What goes into the mashup and how useful is what comes out?

Four main issues can be identified: the need for conceptual clarity on what is being measured, the need for transparency about the tradeoffs embedded in the index, the need for robustness tests and the need for a critical perspective on policy relevance. These are not solely

> 6    The DBI project does not apparently pay these local experts, though, of course, their time has value, and so it should be included in assessing the full cost of the DBI.

7
Bound, John, Clint Cummings, Zvi Griliches, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Adam B. Jaffe. 1984. “Who Does R&D and Who Patents?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 908, in Z. Griliches ed., _R&D, Patents, and Productivity_ , (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 21-54.

Branstetter, Lee G. 2001. “Are Knowledge Spillovers International or Intranational in Scope? Microeconomic Evidence from the U.S. and Japan.” _Journal of International Economics_ 53: 53-79.

Caselli, Francesco, Gerardo Esquivel, and Fernando Lefort. 1996. “Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics.” _Journal of Economic Growth_ 1:363-390.

Chamberlain, Gary. 1992. "Comment: Sequential Moment Restrictions in Panel Data." _Journal of Business and Economic Statistics_ 10: 20-26.

Evenson, Robert E.. 1984. “International Invention: Implications for Technology Market Analysis.” In Zvi Griliches, ed., _R&D, patents and productivity._ University of Chicago Press. Chicago.

Evenson, Robert E., and Yoav Kisleve. 1976. “A Stochastic Model of Applied Research.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 84:265-281.

Furman, Jeffrey L., Michael Porter, and Scott Stern. 2002. ”The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity.” _Research Policy_ 31:899-933.

Griliches, Zvi. 1990. “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey.” _Journal of Economic Literature_ 28(4):1661-1707.

Grossman, Genne E., and Elhanan Helpman. 1991 “Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth.” Review of Economic Studies, 58(1) 43-61.

Hall, Bronwyn H, Jerry Hausman and Z. Griliches. 1986. “Patents and R&D: Is There a Lag?” _International Economic Review_ 27(2):265-83.

Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches. 1984. “Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship.” _Econometrica_ 52(4): 909-938.

Jaffe, Adam B.. 1986. “Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits and Market Value.” _American Economic Review_ 76: 984– 1001.

Jaffe, Adam B., and Manuel Trajtenberg. 2002. _Patents, Citations & Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge Economy_ . Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

22
31 Figure 5: Zimbabwe, shift in welfare distribution, 1990-1995 <!-- Start of picture text --> 1995 D .... ly 1 990 D.n..ly<br>30 100 1000 S000<br>1;% O*oDifference 1995 and 1990<br>0~ o - 0<br>Per-Capita Consum,ption Expendit-re<br>.1 - _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 30 , 100 , 1000 . 0oo0 I__ _<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Alwang and Mills (2001) Figure 6: Zimbabwe, simulated effects of rainfall and household characteristics on changes in the welfare distribution, 1990 - 1995.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Panel A Panel B<br>Effects individual and household characteristics,<br>Effects of rainfall (rural distribution only) including location changes<br>0 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 OA<br>00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>1- 0 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-0<br>05~~~~<br>A Observed difference between 1990 and 1995 o Difference with distributions adjusted to 1995<br>conditions<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Source: Alwang and Mills (2001)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **I. INTRODUCTION**

The cessation of hostilities in May 2009 presents an historic opportunity for Sri Lanka to embark on an economic trajectory filled with new and abundant promise for all its citizens. In this paper, we define policy priorities designed to convert the momentum from Sri Lanka‘s peace dividend into a sustained growth acceleration. By a ―sustained growth acceleration‖ we mean growing at rates substantially higher than the historical average of 5.0 percent (see Figure 1) for a prolonged period of time. Indeed, the centerpiece of the government‘s economic vision is attaining and maintaining a medium-run target of 8 percent growth or more.<sup>2</sup>

**Figure 1. Sri Lanka: Real GDP Growth**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>Compound average<br>2<br>0<br>-2<br>Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL)<br>%<br>1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> %<br><!-- End of picture text --> The economic growth literature distinguishes between growth accelerations that are sustained and those that are unsustainable (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005). Sustained growth accelerations are associated with fundamental economic reform, while unsustainable growth accelerations are associated with positive external shocks and financial sector liberalization. Nevertheless, both types of growth accelerations are driven largely by

> 2 In fact, real GDP growth touched 8 percent in 2010 compared to an average of 5 percent over the previous 10 years 2000-09;  but this was in part because of a rebound from the effects of the global financial crisis. Similarly, while growth in 2011 is estimated at a little over 8 percent, the compound average growth rate over the three years 2009-11 is around 6.5 percent.

2
- <u>https://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/employment reports/WCMS_216909/lang--en/index.htm</u>

<mark>Islam, A. M. and M. Amin (2023). The gender labor productivity gap across informal firms,</mark> _<mark>World Development</mark>_ <mark>, 167: 106229.</mark> Islam, A. M, D. Moosa, and F. Saliola (2022). Jobs undone: Reshaping the role of governments toward markets and workers in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. <u>https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/jobs-undone-reshaping-the-role-ofgovernments-toward-markets-and-workers-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa</u> <mark>Iyer, R. J.-L. Peydro, S. da-Rocha-Lopes, and A. Schoar (2014). Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007–2009 Crisis.</mark> _<mark>The Review of Financial Studies</mark>_ <mark>, 27(1): 347–372. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht056</mark> Kitagawa, E. M. (1955). Components of a difference between two rates. _Journal of the American Statistical Association_ , 50(272): 1168–1194.

<mark>Kozeniauskas, N., P. Moreira, and C. Santos (2020). COVID-19 and firms: Productivity and government policies. CEPR Discussion Paper 15156, Centre for Economic Policy Research.</mark> <mark>Liu, Y., Y. Zhang, H. Fang, and X. Chen (2022). SMEs’ line of credit under the COVID-19: Evidence from China.</mark> _<mark>Small Business Economics,</mark>_ <mark>58: 807–828. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-</mark> <u><mark>021-00474-9</mark></u> <mark>Liu, Y., M. W. Peng, Z. Wei, J. Xu, and L. C. Xu (2021). Organizational resources, country institutions, and national culture behind firm survival and growth during COVID-19. Policy Research Working Paper Series No 9633, The World Bank, Washington, DC.</mark> Marconatto, D. A. B., E. G. Teixeira, G. A. Peixoto, and L, Faccin (2022). <mark>Weathering the storm: what successful SMEs are doing to beat the pandemic. Management Decisions, 60(5): 1369-1386.</mark> <u><mark>https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-11-2020-1507</mark></u> <mark>Meier, M. and E. Pinto (2020). COVID-19 supply chain disruptions, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.</mark> <mark>Mueller, E. F. and C. Jungwirth (2022). Are cooperative firms more agile? A contingency perspective on small and medium-sized enterprises in agglomerations and peripheral areas.</mark> _<mark>Small Business Economics</mark>_ <mark>58: 281–302 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-020-00410-3</mark> <mark>Muzi, S., F. Jolevski, K. Ueda, D. Viganola (2023). Productivity and firm exit during the COVID19 crisis: Cross-country evidence.</mark> _<mark>Small Business Economics,</mark>_ <mark>60: 1719–1760.</mark> <u><mark>https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-022-00675-w</mark></u> 43
**<u>Table 4: Key characteristics of households leaving land fallow</u>**

||**Left land**|**fallow?**|**If fallow**|**, reason?**|**If fallow**|**, length?**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**No**|**Yes**|**Economic**|**Structural**|**< 5 years**|**>= 5 years**|
|**Household characteristics**|||||||
|Household size|4.757|4.127|4.134|4.087|3.827|4.232|
|Members 14-60 years old|2.773|2.478|2.426|2.539|2.115|2.632|
|Head's education (years)|7.780|8.310|8.177|8.530|8.209|8.688|
|<br>Max. educ. In household|9.787|9.956|9.876|10.078|9.633|10.280|
|Toilet|0.498|0.554|0.584|0.504|0.583|0.640|
|Running water|0.310|0.380|0.392|0.339|0.403|0.440|
|<br>Telephone|0.077|0.120|0.129|0.096|0.108|0.176|
|TV|0.078|0.108|0.096|0.122|0.094|0.112|
|Poverty (%)|0.192|0.120|0.129|0.113|0.144|0.104|
|Cons. per capita (US $)|8914|10235|10210|10167|9923|10885|
|**Asset ownership**|||||||
|<br>Area of land owned (ha)|0.755|1.281|1.296|1.273|1.146|1.382|
|No. of plots owned|2.766|4.085|3.986|4.313|3.907|3.800|
|Any cattle|0.732|0.491|0.493|0.478|0.417|0.440|
|Value of all animals (US $)|914a|603|580|632|510|577|
|**Land tenure**|||||||
|Any privatized land|0.646|0.939|0.918|0.982|0.942|0.952|
|Any inherited land|0.341|0.142|0.158|0.104|0.151|0.128|
|<br>Any purchased land|0.077|0.035|0.043|0.018|0.029|0.048|
|Deed from 1991|0.706|0.915|0.914|0.922|0.914|0.904|
|Deed from 1946|0.243|0.070|0.082|0.044|0.051|0.073|
|**Ag. Output &productivity**|||||||
|<br>Total value of ag. output/ha|1061.4|737.4|662.9|847.3|647.8|764.2|
|<br>... share from livestock|0.507|0.352|0.329|0.373|0.351|0.315|
|Total profit/ha (US $)|1467.0|342.8|277.3|454.3|342.8|328.5|
|<br>**Income composition (%)**|||||||
|...from agric.|0.457|0.346|0.292|0.433|0.339|0.330|
|...from non-ag. wage|0.175|0.213|0.219|0.199|0.189|0.267|
|<br>...from non-ag. self|0.058|0.087|0.096|0.062|0.055|0.137|
|...from remittances|0.309|0.348|0.387|0.299|0.412|0.256|
|**Community char.**|||||||
|<br>Dist. to nearest bank (km)|4.009|3.753|3.914|4.070|5.201|2.784|
|Access to extension|0.203|0.241|0.206|0.313|0.216|0.200|
|Access to vet service|0.280|0.291|0.263|0.339|0.223|0.272|
|Migration share in comm.|19.948|22.437|22.231|22.974|22.492|21.984|
|<br>Shortage of labor in comm.|0.352|0.443|0.373|0.583|0.489|0.352|
|Share of hhs with credit|0.319|0.478|0.397|0.617|0.511|0.424|
|No. of obs.|1480|316|201|115|177|139|

_Source:_ Own computation from 2005 Albania LSMS 24
government. 2) I take the institutional quality of the country as exogenous. Countries with good institutions are those that either have powerful groups coordinating and acting as one agent or when a well-developed legal and institutional structure exists to limit the influence of powerful groups on central government fiscal and debt decisions. In both cases, a central planner’s solution that maximizes collective welfare is achieved. I call this the unified government case. In countries with weak institutions, the central government is weak and powerful groups have direct influence on central government decisions. Furthermore, groups act in a non-cooperative manner; each group maximizes its individual welfare and ignores the effect of its action on other groups. I call this the polarized government case. 3) I assume that failure to repay the full amount of the debt constitutes default, and borrowers are excluded from the capital market as part of the default penalty.<sup>18</sup> 4) International lenders know the quality of institutions of the country. They observe the number of powerful groups, the degree of polarization and how much debt the country (as a whole) demands, but they cannot match the group with the part of the debt that is allocated to it. When a default decision is made, lenders cannot discern whether the decision is made by all the groups or one group, and which group. Hence when one group defaults, all groups are shut down from the international capital market. A less extreme case is when one group (for example a state) defaults; investors perceive a higher risk of default in other states too, and therefore the risk premium increases for all groups. This means the behavior of one group has effects beyond its own.<sup>19</sup> The model structure is based on Vegh (2010) Chapter 2. There is a small open economy that takes the international price as given. The saving or borrowing decision is made in period one; the repayment or default decision is made in period two. Since this is a finite horizon model, debt is sustainable if and only if default does not occur with probability one. For this reason, I assume a default cost in period two. For simplicity, I assume _n_ =2. The two groups share the tax revenue Y collected by the central government. I denote  group 1’s and 1-  group 2’s share of government debt and revenue that they receive as transfers, as well as the weights their welfare

> 18 It is true that most defaults end up being partial, not complete, although sometimes after long negotiations. We do not model the renegotiation process or how long it takes. We simply assume that during this renegotiation process, the country lives in autarky.

> 19 The case of the Brazilian state Minas Gerais constitutes a clear example. The declaration of liquidation of its debt at the end of 1998 caused not only doubts about the ability of repayment of other states, but also produced a national crisis the following year.

16
7. Expansion of Electronically Traceable Payments: Electronically Traceable Cash Receipts After the introduction of tax incentives for credit card use in 1999, Korea introduced electronically traceable cash receipts (ETCR) and made them an eligible form of electronic payment for TIETP in 2005. ETCR makes even cash payments electronically traceable by NTS. People who for any reason prefer to pay in cash rather than using a credit card can ask retailers to issue ETCRs. The consumer provides a Resident Registration Number (Korean citizens’ ID number), a registered mobile phone number, or a credit or debit card number for personal identification purposes; the retailer then issues the ETCR through its credit card payment terminal. ETCR transaction data is automatically transferred to NTS. End‐consumers do not need to collect ETCRs for their income tax deduction; NTS provides ETCR transaction data to wage earners, together with credit card and debit card transaction information, through the Home Tax Service portal. Wage earners just confirm their prefilled ETCR, credit card, and debit card transaction data and submit the TIETP application to their employers as described above.

8. Expansion to Mobile Transactions Even without an additional mobile application, TIETP also allows the purchase of goods and services by using credit cards and debit cards on a mobile phone. Therefore, B2C mobile phone transactions in Korea now fall into the TIETP category. In addition, NTS has made efforts to reinforce its mobile tax service. Since 2005, NTS has provided a mobile tax‐related certificate issuing service, covering a range of documents, such as business registration certificates, tax payment certificates, and business closure certificates.<sup>47</sup> In 2014, NTS started a Mobile Newsletter Service offering tax news, tax return and payment notifications, and information on tax legislation and rulings.<sup>48</sup> In 2015, NTS began providing a mobile Home Tax Service allowing taxpayers to issue ETCR and e‐invoices and to receive other tax‐related services, including tax returns, tax inquiries, tax certifications, the tax news service, and many more.<sup>49</sup>

> 47. NTS, “Mobile Tax Certificates Service Launch,” NTS Press Release, December 27, 2005.

> 48. NTS, “NTS Mobile Newsletter Service Launch,” NTS Press Release, July 21, 2014.

> 49. NTS, “User Friendly Mobile NTS App Service Launch,” NTS Press Release, October 29, 2015.

29
rate exceeding the interest rate.<sup>3</sup>

* If the government runs a primary surplus (SURP, > 0), the stock of debt will grow more slowly than the interest rate. If the surplus more than offsets interest payments on existing debt (i.e. the conventional surplus, SURP, + r, B,, is positive), then the debt will actually shrink over time.

Both the PVC tests of sustainability and the accounting approaches to the consistency of macro policy targets begin from (3), or more generally (1).

# **2. The Accounting Approach to Sustainability or Policy "Consistency"**

The so-called accounting approach is sometimes viewed as an approach to fiscal sustainability. Other authors interpret it as a way to assess the mutual consistency among a number of macro policy targets. In any event, the approach focuses a particular debt _ratio,_ typically debt to GDP, b, = B, /Yt. Rewriting (3), which is in levels, in terms of the debt/GDP ratio yields: or: where g, is the growth rate in GDP between t-1 and t. Using (6), the change in the debt/GDP ratio equals: where surp, = SURPt/GDP,. It follows immediately that: If the primary surplus/GDP ratio is equal to zero, the debt/GDP ratio will grow (or

> 3/ For a constant deficit, however, the growth rate of the debt falls _asymptotically_ toward

**r.**

r
SNA, 1968).10 When these accounts are incomplete (e.g., a component of GDP is missing, or there is no data on depreciation), we recover missing values using accounting identities or by following the imputation procedures used in the World Inequality Database (WID, 2020). To ensure comparability with the more recent data, we recast the historical series into the 2008 System of National Accounts framework.11 To our knowledge, this is the first factor income shares dataset that harmonizes data from the 2008 and 1968 System of National Accounts. In countries and years when the two systems overlap (typically in the 1970s, when countries transitioned from the old to the new framework), the series match well.

Our work expands the dataset in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) along two dimensions. First, the integration of the 1968 System of National Accounts data extends coverage in time and space.12 Second, while Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) focuses on factor shares in the corporate sector, we compute factor shares of total domestic output.

# **3.2.2 Tax revenue data**

We construct a new tax revenue dataset that includes disaggregated tax revenue data by type of tax. Our database includes all taxes—personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, Social Security payroll taxes, property taxes, wealth taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, consumption and other indirect taxes —at all levels of government. We integrate previously unused historical data from developing countries to obtain a global coverage.

We first gathered existing high-quality data from OECD (2020) and ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020) for recent years, and from the IMF GFS (2005) for older years. Second, we retrieved thousands of country-year observations of historical revenue data from the Harvard University Library archives,13 as well as online data from national statistical offices and

> 10The variables include value added; compensation of employees; operating surplus of corporations; operating surplus of unincorporated enterprises; consumption of fixed capital; and indirect taxes net of subsidies.

> 11Specifically, 1968 SNA data always include compensation of employees and operating surplus of corporations, but do not disaggregate mixed income and operating surplus of the household sector (which are lumped into a single aggregate). We impute the split of mixed income vs. household operating surplus according to the split seen in the 2008 SNA at the time of switching (typically in the 1970s). We also follow the United Nations guidelines to stitch these series together (UN, 2018).

> 12Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) restrict their sample to online UN SNA 2008 data, and to countries with at least 15 consecutive years of complete-case data.

> 13Lamont Library, Government Documents section.

12