rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
However, it is not clear how much comfort one should get about robustness from even such high correlation coefficients, which can still be consistent with some sizeable re-rankings. In the case of the DBI (which provides a useful graph of the results for the alternative methods), the largest change appears to be a country (un-named) whose rank falls from about 50 using the ordinary DBI to 80 using the unobserved components ranking.

In the case of the CPIA, the country rankings do not play any role in the World Bank‘s aid allocations, which are based on the aforementioned ―governance-heavy‖ index based on the CPIA. This re-weighted index turns out to be highly correlated with the original (equallyweighted) index; the correlation coefficient is 0.96 using the 2009 CPIA.<sup>31</sup> This is not surprising given that the components of the CPIA are highly correlated amongst themselves. Across the 77 countries receiving concessional loans under IDA, the correlation coefficients with the CPIA are 0.86 for its ―economic management‖ component, 0.87 for ―structural policies,‖ 0.91 for ―social inclusion/equity,‖ and 0.90 for ―public sector management.‖ Given these high correlations, the index is affected little by changes in its weights.

The fact that the ordinary CPIA and this re-weighted index have a correlation coefficient of 0.96 might be taken to suggest that extra weight on governance is largely irrelevant. However, that reasoning ignores the fact that, in attempting to reward good policies (particularly on governance), the IDA allocation per capita is highly elastic—an elasticity of five—with respect to the index (International Development Association, 2008, Annex 1). Then changes in the weights will matter to aid allocations. This is evident if one compares the actual aid allocations under IDA with those implied by the ordinary (equally-weighted) index based on the CPIA. To make the comparison (approximately) budget neutral I have rescaled the equally-weighted index to have the same mean as the actual index used by IDA. Then I find that the implied proportionate changes in IDA allocation in switching from the equally-weighted CPIA-based index to the governance-heavy index range from 0.68 to 2.49. Of the 77 countries receiving concessional loans under IDA, I estimate that 16 would have seen their allocation increase by at least 20% with the higher weight on governance, while 15 countries would see it fall by 20% or

> 31  In calculating the re-weighted index I used a weight of 0.74 on governance and 0.26 on the mean of the other three components; the relative weights are the same as used for IDA allocations, though the absolute weights differ slightly given that another variable enters into the allocations, as noted above.

20
- 18 -

Figure 5. Estimated Economies of Customer Density Depending on Number of Connections <!-- Start of picture text -->
1.4<br>Economies of customer density<br>+2 S.E.<br>1.3 -2 S.E.<br>1.2<br>1.1<br>1.0<br>0.9<br>0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0<br>Number of water connections (in millions)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **IV. DISCUSSION**

The estimated degree of economies of scale has a direct implication for designing watersector PPP transactions. Solely from the point of view of economies scale, there is no rationale for auctioning the water operation with annual water delivery of more than 400 million m<sup>3</sup> , presumably in the case of metropolitan and large urban areas. When the size exceeds this level, auctioneers should consider the possibility to unbundle the transaction to several zonal contracts. Although there is no such case in our sample, the whole PPIS Database includes 103 utilities with annual water sales of 400 million m<sup>3</sup> or above.

Recall that large contracts cannot fully exploit the competition effect because they usually require prospective firms to have had similar experiences in the past. There are a few operators that are involved in large-scale PPP transactions in the water sector. The unbundling strategy is conducive to enhancing competition and improving auction efficiency.

Conversely, auctioneers may have to adopt the bundling strategy, if each contract involves water supply of less than 40 million m<sup>3</sup> . Such small transactions would suffer from unrealized economies of scale. One policy guideline is to put into a single contract several small-scale operations in small cities or rural areas. However, it is worth noting that this
is larger. A 10 percent nominal exchange rate appreciation among the top 10 percent is associated with a 0.19 percent decrease in export prices in dollars. A similar depreciation in the top 10 percent is associated with a 0.43 percent increase in export prices, more than doubling the reaction. Among the top 5 percent NER changes the asymmetry further increases. The reaction of export prices is almost four times larger for depreciation than for appreciations.

Table 9: Pricing to market in Pakistan, by NER change percentiles (2003-2017)

|VARIABLES<br><br>|Total<br>(1)|p75<br>(2)|p90<br>(3)|p95<br>(4)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|lNl<br>it<br><br> <br>|-0.034*|-0.033*|-0.034*|-0.034*|
|<br>|(0.018)|(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.018)|
|lNl<br>it<sup>× PFLFltilF dud</sup><br>I<br><br>||0.004|0.015*|0.023**|
|<br><br><br>||(0.003)|(0.008)|(0.010)|
|<br><br>lNl<br>it<sup>× d</sup>it<br><br> <br>|-0.005**|-0.004*|-0.004**|-0.004*|
|<br><br> <br>|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|
|<br>lNl<br>it<sup>× d</sup>it<sup>× PFLFltilF dud</sup><br>I<br>||-0.008|-0.020*|-0.028**|
|<br><br>||(0.005)|(0.011)|(0.012)|
|<br><br>llit|0.037**|0.041**|0.041**|0.040**|
||(0.018)|(0.018)|(0.019)|(0.019)|
|Time FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Trading-partner FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Product FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|369,916|369,916|369,916|369,916|
|R-squared|0.982|0.982|0.982|0.982|

***, **, * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

SE, adjusted for clustering at the HS6-year level, are reported in brackets.

(1) NER change percentiles considers absolute yearly variation in bilateral NER between Pakistan and trading partners.

Finally, we examine sectoral patterns in this PTM behavior. The dollar-price adjustment following changes in nominal exchange rates is not necessarily homogenous across sectors. To test the heterogeneity in the response, we estimated equation (6) for the 25 most relevant Pakistani export products, which represented half of total exports in the analyzed period (see Appendix Table A.14).

39
**Figure 1.  Population Aged 12-24, World and Major Developing Regions  (1950=100)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 900<br>Africa<br>800<br>Latin America and the Caribbean<br>Asia<br>700 World<br>600<br>500<br>400<br>300<br>200<br>100<br>0<br>1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050<br>Year<br>Population (1950=100)<br><!-- End of picture text --> 27
# Table 3: Estimating the Cointegrating Vector for Savings

Part II: Dynamic GLS for _(sl y), =_ A _+ A In y, + 82r, + 83fli, +84r, + 45govs, + u,_

||CHL|GHA|IDN|KOR|MYS|MEX|TUR|ZWE|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Constant|-4.066|-1.692|-2.337|-9.802|0.091|-1.766|0.914|-1.822|
||(-3 .081)|(-3.121)|(-4.289)|(3.47)|(0.14)|(-4.261)|(0.336)|(-0.525)|
|In yt|0.326|0.172|0.209|0.476|0.027|0.247|-0.050|0.346|
||(3.134)|(3.445)|(4.737)|(4.351)|(0.343)|(4.642)|(-0.259)|(0.683)|
|rt|0.138|-1.691|-0.818|-0.35|-0.639|-0.062|-0.068|-1.364|
||(1.454)|(-2.217)|(4.888)|(-1.606)|(-1.710)|(-1.038)|(-0.712)|(-1.338)|
|flit|-0.001|0.016|-0.005|-0.023|0.01|-0.009|0.019|0.063|
||(-0.107)|(2.024)|(-1.035)|(-2.365)|(1.345)|(-3.821)|(2.100)|(0.738)|
|nt|0.152|-1.203|-0.684|-0.383|-0.791|0.100|-0.087|-2.107|
||(1.585)|(-2.313)|(-3.649)|(-1.641)|(-2.172)|(1.639)|(-0.689)|(-1.450)|
|govst|-1.087|1.021|-2.66|-0.969|-0.976|-0.867|-0.173|0.184|
||(-2.017)|(1.218)|(4.200)|(-2.386)|(4.909)|(3.663)|(0.385)|(0.360)|
|NOBS|23|23|22|22|23|23|23|18|

44
We also examine the distribution firms by ownership (not shown). Approximately 70% of Ivorian firms are owned by foreigners from industrialized countries with the majority of these owners being French.<sup>15</sup> We find a nearly identical distribution of firm size, with the majority of both domestic and foreign owned firms having less than 50 employees. We also find very similar sector distribution, although foreign-owned firms are more likely service sector (50%, versus 45% of domestic firms) and manufacturing firms (19%, versus 14% of domestic firms).

# **5. Results**

# **_5.1 Firm and employment dynamics_**

In an effort to describe the entry and exit patterns of Ivorian firms, we begin by constructing measures of entry and exit as well as their size relative to other firms in the industry. We count a firm as a new entrant if it appears for a second year, that is, we exclude firms that survive less than a year.

Similar to Dunne et al. (1988), we define the following variables, where "bucket i" is equal to either 2-digit industry classifications (manufacturing, services, or trade) or size (micro, small, medium or large): _NEit_  number of firms that enter bucket _i_ between years _t-1_ and _t NTit_  total number of firms in bucket _i_ in year _t_ , including firms that enter bucket _i_ between years _t-1_ and _t_ _NX i_ ( _t_  1)<sup></sup> number of firms that exit bucket _i_ between years _t-1_ and _t_

> 15 While the large concentration of foreign ownership is likely higher than that found in other low-income countries, the result is reasonable in the Cote d‟Ivoire context given the colonial ties to France and the difficulty of foreign owned firms to evade registration. For example, in the 1970‟s, 40% of capital in the private sector was owned by French interests and many so-called domestically-owned firms were subsidiaries of French companies (Tuinder, 1978). Furthermore, since birth in Cote d‟Ivoire does not automatically confer citizenship (one parent must be an Ivorian citizen), the exclusion of some ethnic minorities active in the business community (such as the Lebanese population) may underestimate the number of Ivorian owned firms (Mundt, 1997). For instance, a 1989 study by the Gama Centre of Ivorian private sector firms finds that one-half were owned by local non-African expatriates and an additional one-third owned by non-Ivoirian Africans (Reuda-Sabater and Stone, 1992).

12
20

# _5.1._ Reforms of Limited Scope.

Previous studies of the Ukraine pension system (e.g., World Bank, 1994; IMF, 1996; Kane, 1996) have identified and recommended a number of short- and medium-term reforms which have as main objective to ensure fiscal sustainability. The proposed measures either aim at saving resources or at improving collection of revenues. The first set includes reducing pensions for working pensioners, establishing a uniform maximum pension (that is, eliminating some privileges for several categories of pensioners) and raising the retirement age. The second set of measures aims at raising revenues through enforcement of tax payments, the inclusion of income-in-kind in the taxable wage base, and the extension of the obligation to pay the 32 percent payroll tax to those engaged in entrepreneurial activity. In the medium-term, the main recommendations are to base the level of pensions on years of contributions rather than on years of service, and to increase the spread among pensions in order to restore some link between contributions and benefits.

The most significant of these measures is likely to be the increase in the retirement age. Simulations discussed below will show its impact. All the other short-term measures - although in the right direction - are unlikely to have a significant impact as they fail to take into consideration the main factors that make the whole system unsustainable. For example, raising the effective tax rate by including income-in-kind and improving tax enforcement may encounter enormous difficulties as the incentives to informalize productive activities will be even greater than before. Such measures would be more effective if introduced when distortions affecting labor supply and occupational choice are reduced or removed.

As for the increase in the spread among pensions, it amounts to raising the level of the maximum pension as it would be socially and politically impossible to lower the minimum pension which is currently only equal to about 20 percent of the average wage. Thus the average replacement ratio would increase. Simulations presented in the last section showed that, even with sustained growth, this would make the deficit of the pension fund grow rapidly in the absence of other reforms.

Raising the retirement age is often a difficult political decision which receives little public support. Most countries who take that decision opt for a gradual increase. Some, however - such as Georgia among FSU countries - choose to implement the change in one shot. To compare the different cases, various simulations have been run (see **Scenarios 4-9).** In **Scenario 4,** retirement age is raised from 60 to 65 for men, and from 55 to 60 for women in 1997. In **Scenario 5,** a further increase to age 65 is assumed for women. In addition in both scenarios, privileges given to certain categories of workers who can retire before the formal retirement age
2014, making it difficult for authorities to track foreign financial accounts. In contrast, Argentina became part of the OECD Automatic Exchange of Information initiative in October 2014 and committed to exchanging information through the CRS by September 2017. Furthermore, in 2016, Argentina signed bilateral TIEAs with key tax haven countries such as Uruguay and Switzerland, as well as with the United States, Chile, and Brazil. The announcement of these agreements played a crucial role in the tax authority’s efforts to encourage participation in the 2016 amnesty program and featured prominently in the administration’s advertisement campaign (Figure A.8).

Argentina’s TIEA announcement may have compelled evaders to declare their assets truthfully. Interestingly, a significant number of assets disclosed under the 2016 amnesty program were found to be located in these jurisdictions: 71% of foreign stocks were disclosed in the US, Switzerland, and the British Virgin Islands, 86% of foreign bank accounts were disclosed in the US, Switzerland, and Uruguay, and 86% of foreign real estate was disclosed in Uruguay and the US (Figure A.11), consistent with taxpayers responding to the perceived threat of detection. Additionally, the release of the Panama Papers a few months before the amnesty program began may have further heightened the perception that the opportunities for tax evasion had significantly narrowed in 2016 compared to previous years.

However, the increase in taxpayers’ willingness to comply with tax regulations due to automatic TIEAs cannot fully explain the substantial rise in tax compliance. There are several key reasons for this. First, more than 3% of Argentina’s GDP was disclosed in _domestic_ assets, even though there were no changes in domestic enforcement measures. Second, Argentines disclosed 2% of GDP in foreign real estate assets (Table A.2) even though the CRS and other automatic TIEAs worldwide currently focus solely on financial accounts and exclude real estate from the scope of the information exchange. Third, approximately 5.8% of Argentina’s GDP was disclosed in assets held in the US, even though the US Internal Revenue Service only shares information related to _taxable income_ , with no effective enforcement mechanism in place for other disclosures. Fourth, the _actual_ impact of the automatic TIEAs on detecting and penalizing evasion remained minimal until _after_ the tax amnesty concluded in 2017 since CRS and all bilateral tax agreements did not become operational before 2018. In fact, it would take several years before the TIEAs would be used by Argentina to enforce taxes (La Nacion, 2021).

In summary, while the perceived threat of detection may have played a role, it is possible that taxpayers react to the mere announcement of a TIEA, regardless of its 15
- 20 -

Table 5: ProJections of Mexican Sugar Production, Consumption, Trade and World Prices, 1985-2004 01% Incom Growth Scenario)

|||||Year-End||World Price||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Year|Production|Consumption|Net Exports|<br>Stocks|World Price|<br>SiM. I|Cane Price|
||----------<br>|--------<br>...(Million|Tons)------|----------|- ------(1984|US*/lb)------|<br>(1980 pesos/ton|
|1985|3.45|3.30|0.74|0.76|7.90|6.90|448|
|1906|3.75|3.40|0.28|0.83|6.60|5.10|483|
|19i7<br>|3.98<br>|3.58|0.45|0.68|9.50|7.40|435|
|,',,a|4.29|3.60|0.63|0.94|10.60|12.50|330|
|Ag9|4.00|3.70|0.36|0.08|14.90|14.30|350|
|1990|3.94|3.81|0.14|0.87|15.30|18.40|393|
|1991|3.98|3.93|0.04|0.88|12.60|19.40|393|
|1992|4.01|4.05|-0.04|0.80|15.60|17.30|393|
|1993|4.25|4.17|0.03|0.94|26.30|17.70|393|
|1994|4.63|4.30|0.24|1.02|24.40|26.30|393|
|iM95|4.70|4.43|0.25|1.03|15.30|25.10|393|
|1996|4.l7|4.57|0.19|1.05|12.10|9.60|393|
|1997|4.88|4.71|0.15|1.07|13.00|9.60|393|
|199|4.98|4.85|0.11|1.10|15.30|15.90|393|
|1999|5.09|5.00|-0.21|1.12|15.80|20.30|393|
|2000|5.19|5.16|0.01|1.14|15.10|24.90|393|
|2001|5.07|5.31|-0.21|1.12|20.20|23.90|393|
|2002|5.40|5.48|-0.15|1.19|23.00|22.20|393|
|2003|5.50|5.65|-0.17|1.21|19.30|29.70|393|
|2004|5.60|5.82|-0.24|1.23|16.80|24.40|393|
|Mean o|f 1200 Observ|ations|||15.50|||
|Coeff|icient<br>of Vari|ation|||0.45|||
|Range<br>Sof O|Min-Max of 60<br>bservations in|simulations<br>the Range|||3.1-49.5<br>8.8-21.3-67|||

Source: IECC), World 8ank.
||||(0.43)||||(0.69)||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Power motivation|||-0.237|||||0.511|||
||||(-1.47)|||||(1.09)|||
|Organized|||-0.398***||||||0.315||
||||(-3.22)||||||(0.82)||
|Optimism|||0.902***|||||||-0.006|
||||(3.96)|||||||(-0.01)|
|Traditional*Impulsive||||0.011|||||||
|||||(0.81)|||||||
|Traditional*Work centrality|||||0.015||||||
||||||(0.89)||||||
|Traditional*Tenacity|||||-0.002||||||
||||||(-0.22)||||||
|Traditional*Polychronicity||||||-0.005|||||
|||||||(-0.38)|||||
|Traditional*internal control||||||0.022|||||
|||||||(1.20)|||||
|Traditional*Achievement|||||||-0.015||||
||||||||(-0.94)||||
|Traditional*Power motiv.||||||||-0.019*|||
|||||||||(-1.82)|||
|Traditional*Organized|||||||||-0.014*||
||||||||||(-1.77)||
|Traditional*Optimism||||||||||0.021|
|||||||||||(1.09)|
|_N_|2478|2478|2478|2478|2478<br>2478|2478<br>2478|2478|2478|2478|2478|

Odds ratios reported; t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Errors clustered at cluster-level. Base category is “Not in the Labor Force” 34
history of bailouts; and the enactment of FRLs. During 2008–09 and 2009–10, countercyclical measures were taken by states to mitigate the impact of the crisis on domestic economic activity. These included relaxing the deficit levels to 3.5 percent of GDP (from 3 percent legislated under the FRLs). Further, the center allowed states a larger share of market borrowings to compensate for the unprecedented impact of exogenous factors on the fiscal situation. Concomitantly, states increased market borrowings by 34.6 percent and 28.6 percent during 2008–09 and 2009–10, respectively, compared with the increase of 23 percent during 2007–08. Interestingly, a positive impact of this was an improvement in the interest profile of states, with the share of high-cost market loans (with an interest rate over 10 percent) declining further during 2009–10.

It needs to be emphasised, however, that macroeconomic stabilization and countercyclical policy actions are the key responsibility of the center and not of subnational governments. Accordingly, the Thirteenth FC reccomended that instead of raising the borrowing limits for states in the event of such shocks, the center should assume the entire responsibility for the additional resource mobilization and pass these to states in the form of increased devolution. This (formula-based) devolution will meet the differential requirements of the states in terms of both fiscal capacity and fiscal need.<sup>47</sup> Much of the deterioration in the fiscal position of the states during that period was temporary, and thus could be attributed to deterioration in the share of central taxes because of the crisis and arrears of pay revision (Reddy 2011). Although the fiscal deficit had deteriorated to 3.3 percent of GDP during 2009–10, indications were positive for a turnaround in 2010–11, as reflected in the study of aggregate state budgets by the RBI. It also appears that fiscal discipline at the state level may have acted as a source of comfort for the market. This is corroborated by the fact that after witnessing some stress during the initial period of the global financial crisis, most states reverted to the path of fiscal consolidation, with lower deficit ratios during 2010–11.

In sum, even though the immediate impact of the global financial crisis on state finances was somewhat subdued, this has implications going forward. The challenges are likely to emerge through the reduced impact of central transfers, given that the center‘s deficit has not shown signs of abatement. The overall current transfers to states are budgeted to decline by 0.4

> 47 Thirteenth Finance Commission, Chapter 9, p. 136.

30
Table 4 shows the allocation of market shares among major exporters before and after the HPAI outbreaks of early 2004.<sup>16</sup> Table 4 – Bilateral trade in unprepared poultry (Market share pre- and post-HPAI)

|Importers||Brazil|China|European<br>Union|Thailand|USA|Others|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|European|pre|61%|1%||21%|7%|9%|
|Union|**_post_**|**_75%_**|**_0%_**||**_1%_**|**_4%_**|**_19%_**|
|Hong Kong|pre|19%|11%|9%|2%|56%|3%|
|(China)|**_post_**|**_36%_**|**_25%_**|**_16%_**|**_0%_**|**_21%_**|**_3%_**|
|Jaan|pre|24%|26%|3%|38%|6%|3%|
|p|**_post_**|**_80%_**|**_1%_**|**_9%_**|**_2%_**|**_4%_**|**_4%_**|
|Mexico|pre|0%|0%|0%|0%|94%|6%|
||**_post_**|**_0%_**|**_0%_**|**_0%_**|**_0%_**|**_91%_**|**_9%_**|
|Ri|pre|17%|3%|16%|0%|61%|3%|
|ussa|**_post_**|**_22%_**|**_0%_**|**_22%_**|**_0%_**|**_54%_**|**_3%_**|
|Persian|pre|59%|8%|25%|0%|3%|4%|
|Gulf States|**_post_**|**_71%_**|**_1%_**|**_25%_**|**_0%_**|**_2%_**|**_1%_**|
|Others|pre|10%|3%|23%|4%|31%|29%|
||**_post_**|**_22%_**|**_1%_**|**_30%_**|**_0%_**|**_33%_**|**_15%_**|

Source: COMTRADE Database Note: Excludes intra-EU trade. Three year averages are reported for 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 in bold italic.

Bilateral market shares indicate that Brazilian exporters, although increasing their presence in most markets, have done so particularly in countries which relied the most on Southeast Asian suppliers. In particular, Brazil’s market shares in Japan increased by about 56 percentage points, replacing most Chinese (-25%) and Thai (-36%) suppliers.

The Brazilian market share also increased in the Hong Kong (China) market (+4%) and in the European Union (+14%). To a lesser extent Brazil also increased its market shares 16 Market share is calculated as a three year average (2001-2003 and 2004-2006) 13