rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table A1: Using Dierent Rainfall Specications

||(1)<br>Baseline|(2)<br>No Rain<br>Lags|(3)<br>Only 1 Month<br>Lagged Rain|(4)<br>Only 2 Months<br>Lagged Rain|(5)<br>Quadratic Functional<br>Form of Rain|(6)<br>Logged<br>Rain|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Imported Incidence|1.094***|1.313***|1.338***|1.203***|1.087***|1.284***|
||(0.357)|(0.416)|(0.407)|(0.354)|(0.414)|(0.452)|
|Lag Incidence|0.563***|0.597***|0.598***|0.563***|0.510***|0.658***|
||(0.129)|(0.125)|(0.123)|(0.135)|(0.138)|(0.133)|
|Rain in cm|-0.000654|-0.00846|||-0.000416||
||(0.00790)|(0.00845)|||(0.0315)||
|Lag Rain in cm|0.0269||0.0170||-0.0602||
||(0.0181)||(0.0169)||(0.0518)||
|Lag 2 Rain in cm|0.0319**|||0.0228|-0.0395||
||(0.0156)|||(0.0142)|(0.0469)||
|(Rain in cm)<sup>2</sup>|||||-0.000200<br>(0.00174)||
|Lag (Rain in cm)<sup>2</sup>|||||0.00429<br>(0.00299)||
|Lag 2 (Rain in cm)<sup>2</sup>|||||0.00369<br>(0.00274)||
|Log Rain in cm||||||-0.0117<br>(0.0125)|
|Lag Log Rain in cm||||||-0.0232<br>(0.0204)|
|Lag 2 Log Rain in cm||||||0.0224**<br>(0.0111)|
|Constant|-0.0688**|-0.0532**|-0.0686**|-0.0555**|-0.00706|-0.0379|
||(0.0290)|(0.0237)|(0.0301)|(0.0222)|(0.0269)|(0.0308)|
|Health Post x Month Obs|432|432|432|432|432|283|
|Month FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|||Robust sta<br>*** p_<_|ndard errors in <br>0.01, ** p_<_0.05,|parentheses<br> * p_<_0.1|||

Notes: Augmented version of the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments estimator used in all specications.
||The tax deduction is 40 percent of expenses paid to a company, small<br>entrepreneur, or a nonprofit organization (60 percent until 2011) and 15<br>percent of wages paid for hiring an employee.<br>When employing an individual, the employer social contribution is exempt.|
|---|---|
|France|France allows 50 percent of expenses for cleaning, ironing, IT assistance, or<br>private lessons as deductions for income tax.<br>Tax deductions are given to households either directly employing an individual<br>service supplier at home or hiring a service company.<br>The ceiling of tax deduction is €12,000 per year, but it can be increased<br>depending on the number of children, of residents aged 64 or older, and of<br>disabled residents.<br>From 2007, if the eligible tax deduction surpasses the income tax, the difference<br>over the income tax is reimbursed to help low income households.|
|Germany|Tax credit is allowed up to 20 percent of the costs for household‐related<br>services, such as gardening, cleaning, laundry services, or childcare.<br>In addition, 20 percent of the wage costs for craft services, such as repairs or<br>renovations, can be offset with income tax.|
|Italy|Tax incentives are linked to purchases of vouchers, but the scope of covered<br>work is very broad. It includes maintenance of buildings, seasonal and<br>agricultural activities, organization of sporting events, and so on.|
|Luxembourg|Tax reduction for the expense of housework services and care services for<br>dependent persons or children is allowed but with maximum tax rebate of<br>€3,600 per year and €300 per month.|
|Sweden|The tax reduction system in Sweden has two components: RUT (cleaning,<br>maintenance, servicing) and ROT (home renovation services).<br>Tax credits are allowed up to 50 percent of labor costs (including VAT) for<br>household services. The sum of the tax credits for RUT and ROT must not exceed<br>around €5,500 per person per year.|

_Source:_ Authors’ summary from European Commission (2013).

Contradictory assessments have been put forward regarding monetary support for household services. The European Commission (EC) in 1998 issued a positive evaluation of such policies, stating, “Tax‐deductions and subsidies for re‐furbishing and improvements of houses have been 12
learning externalities (learning by watching<sup>onesparentsandlearningbydoingthroughinfor-</sup> mal apprenticeship), role model effects (both<sup>throughinducedpreferencechangeandrevelation</sup> of information about the unknown innate<sup>abilityparameterOi),relaxationof creditconstraints</sup> through financial transfer, inheritance<sup>of reputationcapitalandbetteraccessto agivenoccupa-</sup> tion due to the network created and<sup>cultivatedby the parentsworkinginthesameoccupation</sup> (For a more complete discussion see<sup>BeckerandTomes(1979,1986),Mulligan(1997),Lentzand</sup> Laband (1983)).

The optimization problem faced<sup>byan individualiof generation0atthe beginningof first</sup> period (to) is to choose an optimal level<sup>of education(ei)given the information set Q9°summarizing</sup> all relevant information including the estimated<sup>innateability,parental occupation(dP'),9and costs</sup> of education or acquired ability Ki(ei,<sup>dPi).l°Ahighereducationlevelincreasestheprobability</sup> of getting a better paid non-farm job<sup>inthe next period. Atthe beginningof secondperiod(tl),</sup> he/she takes the education level _e,_<sup>asgiven,andsolvestheoptimaloccupationchoiceproblem</sup> utilizing the relevant information set<sup>Q1l.</sup> Note that due to information revelation<sup>inthefirst</sup> period,<sup>1</sup> 1 the information set at the<sup>beginningoftheoccupationalchoiceisricher,implying</sup> Q° C 1i4.

# The **optimal Schooling Decision:**

Let the possible education level ei E<sup>[0,31,ViwhereSismaximum numberof yearsof</sup> schooling possible. Each level of education<sup>inducesaconditionaldistributionof incomeYithat</sup> incorporates the optimal choice of occupation<sup>inthefollowingperiodgiventheinformationset</sup> Q9°. Let _F(Yil I_ ei; 09?) be the conditional<sup>distributionof secondperiodincomewhenindividual</sup> i chooses education level ei given the<sup>informationset129.</sup> The associated probability density function is denoted as _P(Yil I_ ei;<sup>Q12).The optimalschoolingchoiceis asfollows:</sup>

> 9We denote the parental variables with the superscript p.

> '<sup>0</sup> The cost of acquired ability depends<sup>onparentaloccupation duetoin-houselearning externalities.</sup>

> "There are many types of information<sup>revelationthatmightoccurduringthe first period,likesucess/failurein</sup> formal education might reveal information<sup>aboutonesinnate ability</sup><sup>_Oi,_parentalnetwork mightexpandor contract</sup> etc.

5
In order to calculate profiles at the national level, equations analogous to (1) and (2) were estimated without province dummies (Table 7). The results indicate that characteristics are more important in explaining differences between urban and rural sector at the national level. Characteristics explain around 72 percent of the differential in welfare ratio, while returns explain 28 percent.

**Table 7.  Welfare Ratios at National Level by Urban/Rural Area (logarithms)**

|Profile|Urban|Rural|
|---|---|---|
|Geographic|0.527|0.326|
|Concentration|0.625|0.112|
|Unconditional|0.689|-0.024|

_Source:_ Own calculations based on ECV Survey.

# Poverty Measures

This section presents the same analysis as above, but based on poverty rates instead of log welfare ratios. Assuming normally distributed errors, and conditioning on national sample means, the conditional probabilities of being poor for a household living in province _j_ of urban and rural areas are represented as: where  _U_ and  _R_ are the standard deviations of the errors in the urban and rural regressions and  is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. Similarly, to calculate the simulated poverty rates based on the concentration profile, the weighted average of urban and rural parameters are used.

The sources of the differences between simulations and the unconditional (actual) poverty rates are characteristics or changes in returns to those characteristics, and the assumption that logarithm of welfare ratio follows a normal distribution. Thus, the poverty rates for the unconditional profile were calculated assuming a normal distribution.

For most of the provinces, the concentration, geographic, and unconditional measures of poverty are all lower for urban than for rural areas (Table 8). The correlations between the geographic and unconditional (normal) profiles are 0.72 for urban and 0.91 for rural, and are very close to the correlations between concentration and unconditional (actual) profiles, which are 0.69 and 0.88 for urban and rural areas, respectively. The conclusions are similar to those discussed above, meaning that both returns and characteristics explain the differences in welfare ratios within each province, while at the national level characteristics are more important.

12
# 6.4 Options for Domestic Tax Pol'cy In LDC's

A simple model for capital taxation Is presented in this section. No unique uniform tax system for all countries Is Implied by the preceding analysis. Thus this model is intended to serve as a framework for analysis rather than as a proposal. The model contains four elements: cash-flow taxes at the business level, uniform withholding taxes on all distributions, adoption of the residence principal, and tax treaties. Tax treaties may be optional depending on the particular circumstances. It should be emphasized that a combination of cashflow and withholding taxes on distributions can be consistent with either consumption or comprehensive income tax principals. (See below.) Cash Flow Taxation at the Business Level Cash flow taxation at the business level includes the following elements:

- Immediate expensing of all assets

- No deduction for Interest payments

- No tax Incentives

- Treatment of all accounts on purely a cash basis

A number of administrative difficulties are eliminated by this type of business taxation. First, ad hoc or point estimates of real economic depreciation are not necessary since all assets are Immediately expensed. Second, the bias toward debt finance is eliminated since interest is not deductible. Third, the system is automatically indexed 'or inflation. Fourth, capital gains are automatically Included in the system since asset sales are positive cash flows and thus are included in the base. The last two factors have two benefits for a developing economy. There is no need to make any adjustment for foreign exchange gains or losses. In addition, separate computations and schedules for capital gains and losses are not necessary.<sup>57</sup> Cash flow business taxes are generally easier to administer than traditional income taxes, but difficulties remain. For instance, transfer prices for Inputs and products would still have to be deterr.iined; however thin capitalization rules, etc. would not be necessary. In addition, from an economic perspective a cash-flow tax is a tax on economic rent and not a tax on the return to invested capital. Thus countries could suffer both a revenue loss and 57. Capital gains taxation is particularly difficult to administer in developing countries. In addition, countries which exempt certain capital gains (e.g. Malawi) risk revenue losses by having otherwise ordinary income artiftically recharacterized as capital gains as well as the revenue losses from the absence of the tax in the first instance.

- 22 -
conventional bricks, iii) providing investment subsidies, tax breaks or arrange carbon credits for alternative bricks, and iv) developing markets for alternative bricks through mandates and regulation and awareness, e.g., governments must use alternative bricks in public buildings and infrastructures, temples, and other public facilities, and local municipalities can also mandate residential buildings to use alternative bricks.

# **7. Concluding Remarks**

The brick industry in Nepal is one of the primary sources of CO2 emissions and local air pollutants. The main fuel used in the brick industry is coal, which is imported, mainly from neighboring India. Coal is responsible for about one-third of the current national CO2 emissions from fossil fuel sources. The reduction of CO2 emissions from the brick industry is crucial for meeting the country’s nationally determined contribution by 2030 and net-zero emission target by 2045. Similarly, brick kilns are one of the main sources of local air pollution, particularly PM2.5, around major cities where concentrations of PM2.5 exceed WHO standards by many folds. This study offers an economic analysis, from both private and social perspectives, of various alternatives to reduce coal consumption and corresponding emission reductions from the brick industry. The main data for the economic analysis is collected from primary sources through a field survey. The paper also offers policy discussion to reduce emissions from the brick industry in Nepal.

The economic analysis finds the costs of brick production vary across the provinces due to variations in input variables (e,g., cost of fuels, labor, land). The production costs of bricks produced from fixed chimney varies between NRs 16 and NRs 20 per brick across the provinces. In the case of the zig-zag chimney, which is more fuel efficient than the fixed chimney, the production costs are between NRs 17 and NRs 19 per brick. If a carbon tax of US$100/tCO2 is introduced, it would increase the current coal price by about 50%, thereby increasing the national average costs of fixed chimney bricks and zig-zag chimney bricks by 24% and 26%, respectively. If the use of coal in brick kilns is replaced with biomass fuels, the costs of bricks would reduce significantly apart from the reduction of CO2 emissions. If 50% of coal in a zig-zag chimney is replaced with biomass pellets, the national-level average costs of bricks would decrease by 13%. Moreover, the replacement of imported coal with domestic biomass would cause significant 33
# _Legal Traditions_

As individual income (and thus wealth) grows, the need to protect property rights likely becomes greater. Explicit deposit insurance may, therefore, be one example of improved property rights.1 Another view is that there is little point in adopting deposit insurance in a country where legal traditions are especially weak. In those instances, depositors are unlikely to believe that insurance coverage is meaningful. Countries that **scored high on the ICRG index of legal development should have been more likely than** others to adopt deposit insurance.<sup>14</sup>

# _External Pressure_

Some countries may be prodded into adopting explicit deposit insurance. For example. countries that joined (or were attempting to join) the European Union were required to adopt an explicit program. Similarly, countries may be required to adopt explicit insurance as parrof the IMF's or the World Bank's loan conditionalities. In addition, close links between countries may prompt some to mimic the policy choices of

- **13** Knack and Keefer (1995) argue the reverse, however. In their view, because the income gains associated with improved property rights are so high, it is more likely that changes in property rights drive income rather than the reverse. Co-determination between these variables is a difficult problem. one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Each of these variables is used in the models of deposit insurance choice that follow.

- **14** The index was created by a private international risk service, the International Country Risk Guide. Here we use only the "rule of law" component of their ratings. This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Upon changes in government in countries scoring low on this measure, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime." See Knack and Keefer (1995) for additional description.

13
These authors show the high persistence of such institutional traits. As a consequence, higher inequality of land holdings, access to education and political power characterized most of Latin America and the Caribbean through the nineteen and early twentieth century, as indicated in Table 1. As this Table shows, both levels of education and indicators of political participation evolved much slower in those countries in which large indigenous populations and mineral riches existed at the time of European colonization, or in which plantations based on slave labor could evolve, than on those countries in which these conditions were not present and European mortality rates were lower (Argentina, Chile<sup>15</sup> and specially, the US).

**Table 1. Education and Voice (Latin America and the US)**

|||Literacyra|tes(%)||Political instit|utions: Lack of secrecyin|balloting|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1860/1870|1890/1900|1920/1925|1940/1950|1840-80|1881-1920|1921-40|
|Bolivia||17||||||
|Colombia|||32|62||No|No|
|Ecuador|||||Yes|No|No|
|Guatemala||11.3|15|20||||
|México||22|36|48.4|Yes|No|No|
|Perú|||38|||Yes|No|
|Brazil|15.8|14.8 - 25.6|30|57||Yes|Yes|
|Jamaica|16.3|32||67.9||||
|Argentina|23.8|45.6 – 52.0|73|||1896: Yes/ 1916: No|No|
|Chile|18 – 25.7|30.3 - 43.0|66|76|No|No|No|
|Costa Rica||23.6 – 33.0|64||Yes|Yes|No|
|Canadá|82.5||||1897: Yes/ 1878: No|No|No|
|E.U Blancos Norte|96.9|||||||
|E.U Total|80|86.7|92.3||No|No|No|

Source: Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) Still today, asset inequality plays an important role in the persistence of high income inequality. In fact, whereas the gini coefficient for operational holdings of agricultural land is estimated at .81 for Latin America (see Deininger and Olinto, 2000), in other regions it tends to hover around .60.<sup>16</sup> More importantly, whereas the gini coefficient of the distribution of years of education in Latin America is around .42, in the developed countries it is closer to .27. See Panel A of Figure 10.

This high inequality in educational levels is particularly dramatic in Latin America because of the low intergenerational educational mobility illustrated in Section II 5. Indeed, differences in educational achievement among children from higher and lower income percentiles in the region are striking, as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 10 for Argentina, a country where the ample availability of schools and teachers do not appear to restrict access to kids from lower social strata.

In turn, differences in education are today the most important predictor of differences in income levels among households in Latin American countries (see Perry et al, 2006, Chapter 8). Thus low educational mobility constitutes a major channel of reproduction of

> 15 Also Costa Rica

> 16 After Latin America the region with the highest land inequality would be the Middle East and North Africa with a Gini of .67.

14
for firm characteristics and country and time effects is required to be able to reach more definitive conclusions regarding the impact of introducing a registry for movable assets. We turn to this analysis next.

# **3. Empirical Methodology**

We examine the impact of introducing a collateral registry for movable assets on firms’ access to bank finance by estimating equation (1) below: _Access Finance Indicator_ i,j,t = β _Registry reform_ j,t + Xi,j,t + Zj,t + α j + γt + εi,j,t (1) where _Access Finance Indicator_ refers to seven different measures of firms’ access to credit for firm i in country j at time t: _Access to Finance_ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a line of credit, loan or overdraft; _Access to Loans_ is a dummy that captures whether the firm has an outstanding loan; _Financing Obstacle_ takes the value of 1 if the firm considers access to finance a major or severe obstacle to its operations and growth; _Working Capital Financed by Banks_ is the percentage of the firm’s working capital that is financed by banks; _Fixed Assets Financed by Banks_ is the share of the firm’s fixed assets financed by banks; _Interest Rate_ refers to the interest rate paid by the firm on the most recent loan and, finally, _Maturity_ is the maturity (in months) for the firm’s most recent loan. _X_ is a matrix of firm-level characteristics including firm size, ownership type (government or foreign owned), exporter status, and sector (manufacturing versus services). Z refers to a matrix of country-level variables that might influence firms’ access to finance, which includes the inflation rate, the GDP growth rate, and a measure of financial sector development (private credit to GDP), obtained from the World 9
**-3-**

# II. TAXES. OUTWARD ORIENTATION AND GROWTH IN KOREA<sup>-</sup> **THE** RECORD

The existing literature attributes the success of<sup>Korea's economic</sup> growth in large part to the policy shift<sup>in the 1960s from import</sup> substitution to export promotion.4 This is not to say that Korea's growth rates can be explained solely by changes in trade<sup>policy. In fact, the</sup> policy structure in Korea is substantially more<sup>complex than this, and</sup> there have been three distinct regime switches<sup>since the early 196c(s.</sup> Growth in Korea has also been more volatile<sup>than in other Asian NICs, such</sup> as Taiwan and Hong Kong, with prolonged periods<sup>of extraordinarily rapid</sup> growth followed by years in which growth rates<sup>have been zero and even</sup> negative.

The mean growth rate in Korea over the period<sup>from 1961 to 1986,</sup> has been very high--around 8.3 percent--but<sup>there have been repeated major</sup> and dramatic policy changes following perceived<sup>crisis as in 1973 and 1979.</sup> Policy from 1961 through to 1972 was markedly<sup>characterized by outward</sup> orientation, involving duty remissions,<sup>tax rebates on exports,</sup> registration schemes for importers and other<sup>elements of policy tied to</sup> export performance. This was followed by a period<sup>between 1973 and 1979 in</sup> which development of heavy and chemical<sup>industries, including iron and</sup> steel, non-ferrous metals, ship building,<sup>general machinery, chemicals and</sup> electronics, was stressed while many earlier<sup>export performance policies</sup> and tax holidays and other outward oriented incentives<sup>used for targeted</sup>

> _41_ For some useful Interpretive essays and research<sup>studies on the proximate causes of</sup> success, see Brown (1973), Hasan and Rao<sup>(1979), Kruger (1979), Kwack (1988) and</sup> Scitovsky (1985). Opposing the conclusions<sup>from these atuiles are the results from</sup> Chenery et al. (1986), Table 11-3, which<sup>seems to i%,Bcate that outward oriented</sup> policies have been relatively unimportant to Korean **grovti.**