rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# Improving the Measurement of Rural Women’s Employment: Global Momentum and Survey Research Priorities

Gayatri Koolwal<sup>*</sup> JEL Codes : C8, J16, J21, J22, J24, J46. Keywords: Gender, Agriculture, Employment, Unpaid Work, Labor Underutilization, Household Surveys.

> *Consultant, Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), Survey Unit, Development Data Group, The World Bank, Rome.  email: <u>koolwalg@gmail.com</u> .  This work was supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development.  I am very grateful to Kathleen Beegle, Valentina Costa, Sam Desiere, Cheryl Doss, Talip Kilic, Paula Nagler, Joann Vanek, Kieran Walsh and Alberto Zezza for their detailed comments on the paper, as well as feedback from participants in the ICID/IFAD/C4D2 workshop on “Improving the Availability and Quality of Individual-Level <u>Data on Women and Youth in Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Surveys” , November 2018, Rome.</u>

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Policy Research Working Paper 6421

# **Abstract**

This paper investigates the differential impacts of foreign ownership on wages for different types of workers (in terms of educational background and gender) in Vietnam using the _Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys_ of 2002 and 2004. Whereas most previous studies have compared wage levels between foreign and domestic sectors using firm-level data (thus excluding the informal sector), one advantage of using the Living Standards Surveys in this paper is that the data allow wage comparison analyses to extend to the informal wage sector. A series of Mincerian earnings equations and worker-specific fixed effects models are estimated. Several findings emerge. First, foreign firms pay higher wages relative to their domestic counterparts after controlling for workers’ personal characteristics. Second, the higher the individual workers’ levels of education, the larger on average are the wage premiums for those who work for foreign firms. Third, longer hours of work in foreign firm jobs relative to working in the informal wage sector are an important component of the wage premium. Finally, unskilled women experience a larger foreign wage premium than unskilled men, reflecting the low earning opportunities for women and a higher gender gap in the informal wage sector.

This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at efukase@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
1983). Table 2 presents the differences in under-5 mortality by educational status of the mother derived from forty-five Demographic and Health Surveys which imply that, for the average of this sample, mothers who have secondary schooling in addition to primary schooling (with usually about four years between levels) have child mortality rates 35.8 percent lower. Our cross country results, where mean female schooling is 4.97 years, imply increasing female schooling by 4 years would lead to 39.2 percent fall in under-5 mortality.

Table 2: Mean (standard deviations) under-5 mortality by education level of the mother: DHS results

||Mothers<br>with no<br>schooling|Mothers<br>with<br>primary<br>schooling|Change<br>(percent)|Mothers with<br>secondary<br>schooling|Change<br>(percent)|Number of..<br>countries|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|East Asia and<br>Pacific|119.0<br>(40.3)|69.9<br>(18.1)|41.3|39.2<br>(16.0)|43.9|3<br>___|
|Latin America and<br>Caribbean|110.9<br>(52.5)|79.3<br>(43.1)|28.5|49.4<br>(26.1)|37.7|10|
|Middle East and<br>North Africa|94.5<br>(34.3)|62.1<br>(14.7)|34.3|41.4<br>(15.6)|33.3|6|
|South Asia|127.7<br>(41.5)|84.8<br>(29.9)|33.6|70.9<br>(22.9)|16.4|<br>4|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|179.8<br>(60.8)|139.9<br>(43.0)|22.2|87.5<br>(24.0)|37.5|22|
|All|144.4<br>(62.8)|106.5<br>(49.9)|26.2<br>.|68.4<br>(30.1)|35.8|45|

Notes: Compiled from a set of DHS Final Reports from 1987 to 1995. Where there was a choice, the value for "4completed primary" and/or "completed secondary" was chosen. In other cases the group may include mothers who have attended but not completed the educational level.

Income inequality and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are each associated with worse under-5 mortality. Flegg (1982) finds that the elasticity of infant mortality with respect to the Gini coefficient is 0.77 when female illiteracy is controlled for. Our results suggest that the 11
Table 15: IV estimates of the effect of ICT use on other outcomes: Manufacturing

||∆ln(numbe|r of workers)|∆ln(|sales-per-wo|rker)|∆ln(Val|ue added-per|-worker)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|∆Share of labor that uses computer|0.0084***|0.0123***|0.0438***|0.0403***|0.0166***|0.0425***|0.0392***|0.0170***|
||(0.0020)|(0.0023)|(0.0052)|(0.0050)|(0.0019)|(0.0053)|(0.0051)|(0.0020)|
|F- frst stage|40.43|38.71|40.43|38.71|106.26|40.43|38.71|106.26|
|Sargan p-value|0.4137|0.2936|0.1546|0.1742|0.2502|0.1762|0.1681|0.3080|
|∆Share of labor that uses Internet|0.0070***|0.0102***|0.0363***|0.0333***|0.0216***|0.0341***|0.0314***|0.0220***|
||(0.0016)|(0.0017)|(0.0035)|(0.0033)|(0.0026)|(0.0034)|(0.0033)|(0.0028)|
|F-frst stage|73.39|70.25|73.39|70.25|73.93|73.39|70.25|73.93|
|Sargan p-value|0.5762|0.4487|0.3640|0.4110|0.3865|0.2352|0.2604|0.1884|
|∆ln(stock of computer equipment/worker)|0.3553***|0.2527**|1.3811***|2.3675***|1.9703***|1.3042***|2.1288***|2.1130***|
||(0.1080)|(0.1181)|(0.1948)|(0.5891)|(0.5887)|(0.1879)|(0.5256)|(0.6284)|
|F-frst stage|26.34|11.11|26.34|11.11|6.69|26.34|11.11|6.69|
|Sargan p-value|0.4106|0.6836|0.6361|0.9283|0.1110|0.6682|0.6002|0.3160|
|**Controls**|||||||||
|∆ln(capital/worker)|No|Yes|No|Yes|Yes|No|Yes|Yes|
|Age dummies|No|No|No|No|Yes|No|No|Yes|
|Size dummies|No|No|No|No|Yes|No|No|Yes|
|Observations|11,438|11,438|11,438|11,438|11,438|11,438|11,438|11,438|

Standard errors in parentheses * _p <_ 0 _._ 1, ** _p <_ 0 _._ 05, *** _p <_ 0 _._ 01 Source: Authors’ calculations with data from the 2009 and 2014 Economic Censuses, INEGI.
Policy Research Working Paper 8521

# **Abstract**

Can financial education delivery be successfully decentralized? This paper studies a large-scale field experiment with 200 Savings and Credit Cooperative Associations (SACCOs) in Rwanda, and tests competing models of local financial education delivery. One-third of SACCOs, randomly selected, were invited to a comprehensive training-of-trainers (TOT) workshop and stipulated to send the SACCO manager, a loan officer, and a board member to be trained. Another one-third were invited to the same workshop, but allowed free selection of trainers. The latter resulted in significantly more community members and fewer loan officers being trained as trainers. Within a year, these trainers successfully disseminated content to 68,000 households, with higher session attendance in the autonomous selection group. Analysis from follow-up surveys finds stark differences in behavior change: recipients in the autonomous selection group show significant improvements in financial attitudes, rules of thumb, and planning, as well as budgeting and savings behaviors. In contrast, recipients in the fixed selection group show no significant improvements on any of the outcome measures. These results underscore the importance of community-led delivery of financial education programs.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics and the Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at bzia@worldbank.org and drandall@ worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
_Table 1A: Program impact on anthropometry of beneficiary children aged 6-36 months_

||(1)<br>Height-<br>for-Age Z<br>score|(2)<br>Stunting|(3)<br>Severe<br>stunting|(4)<br>Weight-<br>for-Age Z<br>score|(5)<br>Underweight|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A: Program impact_||||||
|Program village|0.256*|-0.035|-0.093**|0.125|-0.023|
||(0.15)|(0.05)|(0.04)|(0.15)|(0.05)|
|Control observations|162|162|162|186|186|
|Treated observations|181|181|181|201|201|
|Control mean|-1.800|0.481|0.216|-1.207|0.280|
|_Source: Kandpal et al. (2018)_||||||

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Prices are in natural logs. Child-level specifications include quadratic terms for child age (in months). Standard errors are clustered by village; there are 130 villages. Source: 2011 _Pantawid_ impact evaluation survey _Table 1B: Program impact on the budget share of food and children’s food intake for beneficiary households with children aged 6-60 months_

||(1)<br>Budget<br>Share of<br>Food|(2)<br>Whether<br>Eggs Were<br>Fed to Child<br>in Past<br>Week|(3)<br>Number of<br>Eggs Fed<br>to Child in<br>Past Week|(4)<br>Whether<br>Meat Was<br>Fed to<br>Child in<br>Past Week|(5)<br>Whether<br>Fish Was<br>Fed to Child<br>in Past Week|(6)<br>Whether<br>Dairy Was<br>Fed to<br>Child in<br>Past Week|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel B: Program impact_|||||||
|Program village|-0.029**|0.082**|0.21|0.027|0.029|0.069*|
||(0.02)|(0.03)|(0.17)|(0.04)|(0.03)|(0.04)|
|Control observations|328|405|402|406|406|399|
|Treated observations|335|437|434|437|436|433|
|Control mean|0.691|0.704|1.808|0.5|0.852|0.248|

44
from the TI index is at least partly redundant, because it includes the WEF, NIT and EIU measures discussed above.

The WBI index is constructed only for even-numbered years, so comparisons were made only over the period 2002-2004. Even over this shorter period, the average ranking for the 28 ECA countries improved from 111<sup>th</sup> to 106<sup>th</sup> . As with the TI index, evidence from the WBI index should not be interpreted as being fully independent from some of the trends reported above. The WBI index includes WEF, NIT, the CPIA, the ICRG, the EIU and the BEEPS. However, both the 2002 and 2004 WBI indexes use the same 2002 data from BEEPS, in theory imparting a status quo bias in WBI ratings for ECA countries. In practice, however, any bias is trivial, as the weight assigned to the BEEPS data by the WBI methodology is extraordinarily small in both 2002 and 2004.<sup>36</sup> Although the various data sources agree with each other – and with the BEEPS evidence - that corruption has tended to decline for ECA overall, there is less agreement on which countries in the region experienced the most improvement. Table 7 shows very modest correlations in changes from 2002 to 2005 among the expert-based assessments; not all of them are even of the “correct” sign. A closer look at the data reveals that:

- In **ICRG** , the largest increases from 2002 to 2005 were for Russia and Serbia/Montenegro (both from 1 to 2 on the 0-6 scale).  Czech Republic showed a decline from 3 to 2.5.  Poland and Hungary were unchanged.

- In **NIT** , the only improvement of 1⁄2 point or greater were all in the Balkans: Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania.  Poland and Belarus had the largest deterioration, of 3⁄4 point.  Czech Republic and Hungary improved by 1⁄4 point.

- The **CPIA** , consistent with NIT, showed improvements in the Balkans, but also showed increases for Belarus and Tajikistan.  Czech Republic increased by 1⁄2 point, while ratings were reduced for Hungary and Poland.

> 36 The BEEPS weight is about one-sixth the weight given to WEF or ICRG, and less than 1/20th the weight given to Nations in Transit.  In fact, the WBI corruption index is correlated with NIT at .96.

34
methodology, it is likely to generate ratings less correlated with the interdependent expert ratings than the latter are with each other.

The BEEPS is a good illustration of this problem. In the WBI indexes for 2002 and 2004, the weight given to Nations in Transit (covering mostly the same countries) is 24 times the weight given to the BEEPS. As one “expert”-based source among many in the index, it is unsurprising that Nations in Transit tends to be more highly correlated than a firm survey with most other sources. More defensible than the assumption that all sources are independent would be an assumption that the _types_ of sources listed in Table 1 are (largely) independent. This more conservative assumption would suggest giving equal weight to each type of source available for a given country, e.g. 1/4 each to firm surveys, household surveys, decentralized and centralized expert ratings.

Interdependence of expert sources can even undermine the main premise of the WBI index methodology that more information – more sources – produces more accurate and reliable estimates. The addition of another expert-based source containing little new information - relying on the same information sources as its competitors, or even checking their ratings - can reduce accuracy of the composite index, by further reducing the weight given to the few sources that do provide truly independent information.<sup>23</sup> The availability of the composite indexes themselves can aggravate these problems. Some expert-based sources providing broad assessments of corruption may, sensibly enough, agree with the premise underlying the TI and WBI indexes that more information is better, and adjust their ratings to conform better to the composites’ rankings. The ICRG appears to have done this in late 2001. It publishes monthly

> 23 Any additional source receiving a positive weight inevitably must reduce the collective weight of previous sources.  However, addition of a non-independent source will reduce disproportionately the weight given to an independent source, by reducing the latter’s average agreement with the other sources.

25
3 climate reforms proposed by the coordinating ministry of economic affairs. These proposed changes, however, were put on hold in April 2006, after large demonstrations were organized by labor unions (Manning and Roesad, 2007).

Given the controversy surrounding severance pay in Indonesia, an analysis of survey data can impart important information on the performance of the current severance pay regulations. We exploit two household surveys that contain information on the receipt of severance pay following job separation: The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2007, and the National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) which collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2008. These surveys provide a unique opportunity to conduct the first household-level analysis of severance pay in Indonesia, and to our knowledge, the developing world (Holzmann, et al, 2011).<sup>3</sup> The results show that compliance is low – only a third of workers entitled to severance pay report receiving it, and on average workers only collect 40 percent of the payment due to them. Eligible female and low-wage workers are least likely to report receiving payments. Widespread non-compliance is consistent with trends in employment rigidity, which essentially remained constant following the large increases in severance mandated by the 2003 law. Weak enforcement in practice suggests that workers may benefit from a compromise that relaxes severance pay regulations while establishing a system of unemployment benefits. Enforcement can also be improved by establishing an administrative entity dedicated to monitoring compliance with severance pay regulations can improve the existing system. Other countries with severance pay programs, such as Barbados and Slovenia, have established arrangements to oversee severance pay statutes.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two, we review the concerns of both the business community and employee representatives and present evidence on aggregate trends in labor market rigidity. Section three turns to the survey data, and demonstrates that not only are few workers eligibile for severance pay, but most eligible workers do not report receiving benefits. The descriptive analysis is followed in section four by suggestions for policy reform.

> 3 Vodopivec, et al (2009) finds that one third of all covered workers do not receive severance pay, in the high-income context of Slovenia, MacIsaac and Rama (2001) find that Peruvian workers that are more likely to be covered earn lower wage, but they are unable to observe receipt of severance pay directly.
- 38 -

rates and other incentives. Second, external migration of skilled and semi-skilled labor in the 1970s and early 1980s that tended to raise real wages.

- Greater trade liberalization, as measured by the increase in the ratio of total value of exports and imports to GDP, had a strong positive impact on Pakistan's growth performance. Once again, however, the statistical significance of trade policy surprisingly was reduced in the case of manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, the strong positive role of greater trade openness suggests that Pakistan needs to continue with further trade reforms to enhance competition and economic efficiency.

- The structural change dummy variable included to capture the impact of the change in the policy regime in Pakdstan from the interventionist policy regime of the 1972-77 period to the market-oriented economy since 1978 came up with a significant coefficient in the case of both aggregate and manufacturing sector growth equations- This result is explained by the major improvement in efficiency resulting from the reduction in controls and bureaucratic interventions. Estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) confirm this finding as well-TIP change was negative in the first period as compared with the positive contribution of TIP change to growth in the later period. Once again, this reinforces the importance of further progress with economic liberalization.

_52._ Can past growth rates be sustained in the medium-to longer term? The paper examined each of the three disconcerting factors in some depth. A key conclusion is that past growth rates winl be difficult to sustain without substantial progress in addressing these concerns. The analysis of consistency of macroeconomic policies of the past-especially fiscal policy was examined on the basis of a quantitative framework developed by Sweder van Wijnbergen (1988) and others. The key conclusions of this analysis are as follows:

- The main reason that Pakistan was- able to sustain high growth and avoid a fiancial crisis in the face of large fiscal deficits was that the real interest rates on both external and domestic debt were substanially negative during the 1970s. Mainly because of this factor, debt to GDP ratios continued to decline even though Pakistan ran substantial fiscal and current account deficits in the 1970s.

- lHowever, real intrest rates have been uning positive during the 1980s. This development has already impacted, as expected, quite adversely on Paldstan's debt situation. As a result, notwithstanding some reduction in fiscal and current account deficits, the interest burden of the domestic and external debt has been increasing significandy in the 1980s.

- The outlook is that both foreign and domestic real interest rates will become significantly positive in the 1990s. In this situation, if Palcistan were to ran fiscal and current account deficits of the same magnitude as in the past, a fnancial crisis is likely to emerge pretty rapidly.

- It is not possible to avoid a debt crisis by fimding larger fiscal deficits through money creation. The analysis shows that Pakistan's inflation target of 5% p.a. is consistent