0 1<sup>+ θθ</sup> ii,uu,2015 uu ii,uu,2015 gg<sup>+ εε</sup> ii,uu,2015<sup>(3)</sup> following the notation introduced for model (1). yy = ββ + ββ dd + +γγXX<sup>TT</sup> Typically, all regressions include controls for governorate fixed effects, which implies that we are measuring the correlation between refugee prevalence and the specified outcome _within_ governorates. Moreover, governorate fixed effects also absorb systematic differences across governorates that influence outcomes, and control for the unknown true prevalence of refugees at the governorate level, while exploring the role of differences in local prevalence on outcomes. Other outcomes used are reported in the bottom part of the regression tables. Since the relevant variation to identify the parameters of interest comes from regional variables, inference and interpretation rely on standard errors clustered at the relevant geographical unit variable.

In essence, our empirical approach attempts to compare outcomes in localities exposed to a larger refugee (forcibly displaced) influx with outcomes in other localities with lower influx as a data-driven counterfactual. Given the data limitations, a reasonable framework for exploring impacts is to test if the occurrence of changes in relevant outcomes for host community members is more frequent or larger in magnitude in localities that received larger refugee influxes. Our preferred specification examines how outcomes are influenced by district-level estimates of Syrian refugee density (and IDP density in KRI) while accounting for time-invariant governorate (or province) characteristics, individual characteristics, and location characteristics.

# **3. Infrastructure Services**

As one may expect, access to infrastructure services is more limited for forcibly displaced persons than for the host community (Figure 1). Given their increasing urbanization, refugees often use public infrastructure provided by host governments, at least for electricity and garbage disposal. In Jordan, KRI, and Lebanon, refugees—and IDPs in KRI—receive fewer hours of electricity per day than host communities. Where this gap is wider, for example in Jordan, this is because host communities have electricity 24 hours a day, rather than because refugees have particularly low access to electricity. Host communities in Lebanon have electricity for 13 hours a day, on average, and hosts in KRI 18 hours a day. In KRI and Lebanon, almost all respondents reported using the public grid as their main power source; the same is true of out-of-camp refugees in Jordan, while in-camp refugees reported relying on the camp network and solar chargers. In all three countries, refugees and IDPs rely on the same modalities of garbage collection as the host community (government pickup in KRI and dumpster disposal in Jordan and Lebanon).

Camps theoretically should be able to deliver infrastructure services such as water, electricity, and sanitation for a large number of refugees without straining existing host country systems. However, services are worse for refugees inside camps than for refugees outside camps. Forcibly displaced persons in camps have access to fewer hours of electricity and enjoy less access to improved sanitation facilities than forcibly displaced persons outside camps. For example, in Jordan, refugees who live inside camps get about 9 hours of electricity each day, whereas refugees who live outside camps in Amman, 6