rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
2 program, given initial conditions in the country, the external environment facing it and policies in the pAriod before the program was initiated. We approach tte. construction oi a counterfactual scenario by using three alternative statistical approaches: the standard before-after comparison, the standard control group comparison and the modified control group comparison, in which we **_assess_ the** effects of adjustment lending using not only techniques to control for conditions that influence the effectiveness of adjustment measures but also for country characteristics that help determine the decision to participate in an adjustment program. In sum, the initiation of an adjustment program with World Bank support is seen as ea endogenous decision that is based on **the** benefits **the** country expects from the program.<sup>1</sup> We use these three approaches to assess if countries that undertake a program with the World Bank have performed better than they would have in the absence of the adjustment program. Performance and the effectiveness of adjustment lending are evaluated using four indicators: rate of growth of GDP, ratio of &aving to GDP, ratio of investment to GDP, and ratio of exports to GDP. We compare the value of the performance indicators in 1985-88--a period after adjustment was initiated--with performance in two base periods, 1970-80 and 198184, for three groups of countries: intensive adjustment lending (EIAL), countries that have received two or more structural adjustment loans (SALs) or three or more adjustments loans (SALs or sectoral adjustment loans, SECALs), starting in 1985 or before; other adjustment lending (OAL)--countries that started a program after 1985 or have received fewer than two SALs or fewer than three adjustment loans in 1985 or before; and no adjustment lending (NAL),<sup>2</sup> countries that have received no adjustment loans.

I Econometric or CGE-type models are usually used in individual country studies of program effectiveness. See, for example, Corbo and de Melo (1989), Condon, Corbo and de Melo (1990), and Bourguignon, Morrisson and Suwa (1990).

2 Table A.1 in the Appendix A lists the countries in each group.
to exploiting the potential upside of large domestic business groups for development and upgrading of the domestic economies at large.

In sum, industrial policies have returned to Latin America and their character is quite different from the much maligned (not totally fairly) policies of the ISI era. But the secret of successful industrial policies still depends on doing it right. Advances in this regard are significant, but there is considerable room yet for improvement.

# **Bibliography**

Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, L.Du, A. Harrison and P. Legros (2012), “Industrial Policy and Competition” Agosin, Manuel, Christian Larraín and Nicolas Grau (2009), “Industrial Policy in Chile”, Documento de Trabajo No. 294, Department of Economics, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Alarco, German y Patricia del Hierro (2010)” Crecimiento y concentración de los principales grupos empresariales en México”, Revista de la CEPAL No. 101, August.

Almeida, Mansueto and Ben Ross Schneider (2012), “Globalization, Democratization and the Challenges of Industrial Policy in Brazil”, Korean Development Institute, July.

<u>AméricaEconomía, (2010), “Ranking Multilatinas 2010”.</u> Apaza, Carmen (2011), “Estudio comparativo sobre proceso de reforma de estructuras públicas en países seleccionados “, Departamento para la Gestión Pública Efectiva, Organization of American States, Washington, D.C.

Baruj, Gustavo, Bernardo Kosacoff and Adrían Ramos (2006), “Políticas nacionales y la profundización del Mercosur: el impacto de políticas de competitividad”, Project Paper 74, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile.

Bizberg, Ilan (2008), “Alianzas public-privadas, estrategias para el desarrollo exportador y la innovación: el caso de México”, Economic Commission for latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico City (June).

Birdsall, Nancy, Agusto de la Torre y Felipe Valencia Caicedo (2011), “The Washington Consensus: Assessing a ‘Damaged Brand’” in José Antonio Ocampo and Jaime Ros (eds.) The <u>Oxford Handbook of Latin American Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</u> 38
challenges associated with firms evading taxes in Indonesia are similar to those in other middle-income countries where tax revenue to GDP has remained stubbornly low (Alm, 2019; Basri et al., 2021). This study is particularly valuable for revenue authorities in these settings that face sizable challenges in accurately estimating levels of tax evasion and identifying non-compliant taxpayers. The results show that substantially more revenue could be collected if the government increased compliance by registered firms.<sup>2</sup> This study may also assist revenue authorities with their compliance activities by identifying the dimensions where the most significant heterogeneity exists in tax evasion between firms. For example, the higher rates of tax evasion among non-exporting firms suggest that many firms may perceive that the revenue authority lacks third-party information about economic activities that do not cross international borders. Furthermore, the notably higher rates of tax evasion by firms that see tax administration as a major obstacle to their business activities provide suggestive evidence that efforts to simplify the tax system may lead to increases in compliance.

This study contributes to two strands of the existing literature about tax evasion by firms and methods for surveying sensitive topics. Regarding research about tax evasion by firms, we make three main contributions. First, we focus on measuring levels of tax evasion in a middle-income country in a novel way compared to previous studies that have typically relied on tax administrative data for a subset of firms (e.g., see Pomeranz, 2015; Carrillo et al., 2017; Basri et al., 2021; Waseem, 2022; Waseem, 2023; Artavanis et al., 2016)<sup>3</sup> or survey questions that either directly ask about compliance or focus on tax morale (both of which are likely to underestimate tax evasion) (e.g., see Ali et al., 2014; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Hoy, 2022). Secondly, our focus is on the tax compliance behavior of almost exclu-

> 2However efforts by the authorities to increase compliance could raise the incentives for firms to remain informal.

> 3Some of these studies draw solely on tax administrative data to estimate evasion among taxpayers close to thresholds or between different sectors. While this work provides incredibly valuable insights into tax evasion among specific subsets of firms, it is rarely generalizable to all registered firms.

3
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to the project or by poor project management. Traditional projects, sector loans, and SECALs face both types of problems.

# Impact of Design

Gaps in institutional analysis have already been discussed in Chapter II. These weaknesses can be expected to adversely affect the quality of ID design. Inadequacies in sector work, also noted in Chapter II might have contributed to a weakening of the quality of ID design, especially when more complex designs are put in place. Complexity has increased not merely because of the multiplicity of agencies (beyond the implementing agency) targeted by the design, but also because of the sector-wide institutional implications of the policy reforms being addressed through Bank projects in recent years. OED findings do not yet fully reflect the complexity problem. ARIS, however, refers to the adverse impact of the widening scope of ID on the implementation of ID components.

# Implementati2n Problems

Managerial and institutional weaknesses in borrower countries are repeatedly identified as the major reasons for the poor ID implementation in Bank projects (Annual Review of Implementation and SunqMriAsion, 1988, 1989).29 They manifest themselves in inefficient public agencies, incentive problems in key governmental organizations, lack of autonomy and dearth of competent and experienced staff and managers. In the case of SECALs, the borrowers failed to take follow-up actions essential to the success of policy and institutional reforms even though they met the conditions of the loans. In Zambia, for example, an action plan for the rehabilitation of public enterprises was prepared, thus meeting a condition of the SECAL. But the holding company responsible for the program would not actively follow up and make it effective. In Hungary, a restructuring program office was set up as required by the SECAL, but supervisior. reports confirmed that restructuring was not fully understood by the Ministry of Industry staff.

Implementation is slowed down significantly by projects which are too complex in relation to the sector's implementation capacity, either in the technical design or in the managerial skills and structures required for implementation. Certain types of projects, especially those with multiple components, such as those in Urban, Population/Health and Agriculture sectors, required coordination of diverse activities, strong organizational framework and institutional management, but implementation reviews indicated these were more susceptible to problems than others. In the case of SECALs, the implementation of institutional reforms was delayed in several cases by internal coordination problems when multiple ministries were involved. This was a special problem in trade SECALs whose design envisaged multi-agency cooperation. Virtually all trade SECALs called for inter-ministerial coordination and about half of agriculture SECALs required such coordination.

29 Obviously, these factors had an adverse effect on the overall project implementation too.
In fact this advice is fully consistent with a key policy recommendation that emerges from the literature on regional trade agreements,<sup>29</sup> specifically that benefits of regional agreements normally outweigh their costs when protection against outsiders is low. The poverty results produced in this paper appear to reinforce this view: to boost trade-induced poverty reductions, Nicaragua should consider enlarging its own liberalization to countries other than the U.S.

Another important conclusion is that factor price changes appear to have a more important role than goods price changes across the various transmission channels between trade reform and poverty. Therefore subsidizing consumption may be less effective than subsidizing employment or directly supporting income of the poorer, however, this should only be temporary and well targeted.

The results presented in this paper are broadly consistent with those obtained in other existing studies on DR-CAFTA, which illustrate the overall positive impact of DRCAFTA on Central American economies based on CGE models (e.g., Brown _et al_ ., 2005; Hilaire and Yang, 2004; Francois _et al_ ., 2005). Francois _et al_ . (2005), for instance, illustrate the further export specialization on the textile and apparel sector shifting resources away from agricultural sectors, which can generate significant adjustment strains. Given the increasing competition from China in the textile and apparel sector, they argue for the importance of implementing policies aimed at diversifying exports and increasing agricultural competitiveness. Moreover, Brown _et al_ . (2005) also find that Central American countries would enjoy a larger welfare gain from unilateral free trade than CAFTA as shown in our simulation analysis.

The main limitation of these studies is, however, that Central American countries are treated as one entity and the differences in the economic structures and endowments within the region are not taken into account. Among the countries, the poverty rates vary from 20% in Costa Rica to 60% in Nicaragua (Francois _et al_ ., 2005) and the GNI per capita of Nicaragua was only US$790 in 2004 while it was US$4,670 for Costa Rica.<sup>30</sup> The latter also has a larger fraction of its industrial exports classified as high-technology products unlike the rest of the member countries (Francois _et al_ ., 2005).

> 29 See for excellent surveys World Bank (2000): Trade Blocks, and World Bank (2005): Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism, and Development. 30 World Development Indicators 2005.

45
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coefficients can be differentiated between the two groups, for instance, male and female riders:

# **IV. DATA**

Our data come from a minibus user survey carried out around Antananarivo in March 2021. The survey covers 10 zones in 8 Antananarivo districts<sup>7</sup> and 2 adjoining districts<sup>8</sup> where about 3.2 million people live according to the latest 2018 census ( **Figure 17** ). For each zone, about 400 minibus users were randomly surveyed around major bus stops. In total, 4,124 responses were collected, including partial responses. With observations with missing values and outliers excluded, the following analysis uses 3,133 observations.

Despite the recognition of disparities in population, our survey attempted to interview the same number of minibus users in each district. To take this into account, each observation will be weighted by the inverse of its probability of being sampled according to the respondent’s origin. The sampling weights are calculated based on the total census population.

> 7 Antananarivo Renivohitra (comprised of 6 districts), Antananarivo Avaradrano, Antananarivo Atsimondrano. 8 Arivanimamo and Ambohidratrimo.
# **2.  Data**

For our analysis, we use data from a household survey conducted in 2002 by the Wildlife Integration for Livelihood Diversification (WILD) project and the Environmental Economics Unit of the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The survey includes 1,192 households in seven conservancies from two regions, Kunene and Caprivi.

The survey does not include any households living outside the seven conservancies. As a result, we cannot evaluate conservancies by comparing household living outside conservancies with those living within conservancies. To overcome this data limitation we utilize the fact that the full benefits from a conservancy can be achieved only after the conservancy has been in operation for several years. Thus, we distinguish between two types of conservancies, “established” and “comparator.” We then evaluate differences in income measures between these two types of conservancies.

Established conservancies include those that were started on or before 1998.<sup>2</sup> These comprise Torra and ≠Khoadi //Hoâs in Kunene, and, Salambala in Caprivi. In contrast, the comparator conservancies were started in or after 1999. Thus, Sorris Sorris, and EhiRovi Puka in Kunene and Mayuni and Kwandu in Caprivi are comparator conservancies. The difference in the starting date for comparator and established conservancies is one year in Caprivi, and 3 to 4 years in Kunene. As a result, we expect the differential impact of conservancies to be underestimated in Caprivi. We present the Caprivi results for completeness.

Table 1 summarizes household income, education, and other characteristics for each conservancy in the sample. The three high household income conservancies are Torra, Salambala, and Kwandu. These are also the three conservancies with a higher proportion of households with education of grade 10 or above. Table 1 also indicates that the dominant occupation in the two regions is subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing. Approximately 40% of the surveyed households are female-headed.

Table 2 shows the relationship between households and conservancies. This includes information on participation, income from conservancies, conservancy awareness, and benefits.

The WILD survey recorded the number of persons in a household who were conservancy members. Some households reported all infants and children as well as adults to be members of the conservancy, while others reported only adults to be members. To avoid problems from such data inconsistency, we define participant households as those with at least one member. The highest participation is in the oldest conservancy – 75% of households in Torra conservancy are participants. Overall, 34% of the households

> 2 While conservancies were formally registered only in the mid-nineties, community conservation activities had started in some of the conservancies in the 1980s.

5
# Table la

# Targeted Pension Rate with Pensions Indexed to Prices k=10%, n=40, m=20

||G<br>|rowth Ra<br>|teofRe|al Wages|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||0%|1%|2%|3%|4%|b%|
|Real Interest Rate<br>|||||||
|0%|20.0|16.6|14.0|11.9|10.3|9.0|
|1%|27.1|22.2|18.4|l5.5|13.3|11.5|
|2t|36.9|29.8|24.5|20.4|1.7.2|<br>14.7|
|3%|50.7|40.4|32.7|26.9|22.4|18.9|
|4%|69.9|55.1|44.1|35.8|29.4|24.6|
|5%|96.9|75.5|59.7|47.9|38.9|32.1|
|10%|519.9|387.5|292.0|222.5|171.6|133.9|

# Table lb

Targeted Pension Rate with Pensions Indexed to Prices ks=l0%, n=45, m=15

|||Growth<br>|Rata of<br>|Real Wag<br>|es||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||0%|1%|2%|3%|4%|5%|
|Real Interest Rate<br>|||||||
|0%|30.0|24.3|20.0|16.8|14.4|12.4|
|1%|40.7|32.5|26.4|21.8|18.3|15.6|
|2*|56.0|43.9|35.0|28.5|23.6|.19.9|
|3%|77.7|59.9|47.1|37.7|30.7|25.5|
|4%|108.9|82.8|64.0|50.5|40.5|33.0|
|5%|153.9|115.4|88.0|68.3|53.9|43.4|
|10%|945.2|672.5<br>9|484.4|353.5|261.6|196.4|
organizations also were more likely to be engaged in protest. The _net_ effect of higher engagement in social activities is generally positive.

We are self-consciously avoiding for now the obvious, but loaded and imprecise, term "social capital" and are first just reporting on the empirical outcome of a survey. Households were asked certain specific questions (often with limited<sup>possible answers);</sup> their answers were recorded; and it is a factual question whether households<sup>who</sup> reported more engagement in endogenous organizational activities were also more likely to report that they knew about the village budget<sup>6</sup> . What one makes of those empirical facts and how they potentially relate to concepts and theories about the world is another question entirely. Hence the sequence of the paper is: Indonesian context, data, estimation, findings, and then theory, literature review, and implications<sup>all together at</sup> the end.

# _I) Indonesian context_

Before describing the findings it is necessary to explain certain aspects of the structure of Indonesian government. We only cover the barest basics that<sup>arecrucial to</sup> understanding local governance in Indonesia and to interpreting the findings presented<sup>in</sup> this paper. This section draws heavily on the qualitative and ethnographic studies done in connection with the Local Level Institutions study. In particular, Evers (2000) is a<sup>rich</sup> 6 This simple minded approach to method is not naivety: we have read and considered the critiques of household survey methods, the dangers of attempting to impose empirical clarity on social complexity and even the dangers of the survey instrument itself as a tool of repression. The household survey was embedded in a larger study which used a range of qualitative techniques to address many of the same questions (Wetterberg 2002).

6
<!-- Start of picture text --> Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2001). Nursery cities: Urban diversity, process innovation, and the life cycle<br>(No. w24562). National<br>Ezcurra, R., & Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2014). Trade openness and spatial inequality in emerging<br>geography, institutions.<br>Fitjar, R.D., & Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2013). Firm collaboration and modes of innovation in Norway.<br>. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.<br>Foray, D., David, P.A., & Hall, B. (2009). Smart specialisation—the concept.<br>Frick, S.A., & Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2018). Big or small cities? On city size and economic growth.<br>Fritsch, M., & Wyrwich, M. (2018). Regional knowledge, entrepreneurial culture, and innovative<br>start-ups over time and space—an empirical investigation.<br>Fujita, M., Krugman, P.R., & Venables, A. J. (1999). The spatial economy: Cities, regions and<br>international trade (Vol. 213).<br>Ganau, R., & Rodriguez-Pose, A. (2019). Do high-quality local institutions shape labour productivity in<br><!-- End of picture text -->
|**COUNTRY**|**Duty**<br>**Drawback**|**Export**<br>**Subsidy**|**Export**<br>**Finance**|**Export**<br>**Marketing**|**Export**<br>**Insurance**|**Export**<br>**Processing Zones**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Thailand (91)**|3|1|.<br>2|1|.0|2|
|**Thailand (95)**|3|0||**1**|0<br>|0<br>|
|**Tunisia**|**...**|_<br>___...1|||**1**|**5**|
|**Turkey (94)**|3|**1**|2|1|1|2|
|**Turkey (98)**|2|**1**|**1**|**1**|**1**|**2**|
|**Uganda**|**2**|**3**|2|**1**|**0**|0|
|**Uruguay (92)**|2|**0**|1|1|1|2|
|**Uruguay (98)**|3|0|2|1|1|2|
|**Venezuela**|**3**|**2**|**2**|**1**|**1**|**2**|
|**Zambia**|3|3|2|**0**|...|2|
|**Zimbabwe**|**2**||2|1|1|**0**|

|Explanation:<br>For All measures<br>Duty Drawback<br>plus indirect|0 = no program;<br>=no in<br>I = duty drawback only;|formation; I=program in place<br>2 = duties plus domestic taxes;<br>3=duties, domestic taxes|
|---|---|---|
|<br>Export Subsidies:<br>Export Finance:|I = export subsidy<br>I = Market terms|2 = Production subsidies;<br>3= de minimis<br>2 = Concessionary tenns|
|<br>Export Processing Zones:|I = De minimis|<br>2 = Less than 20% of exports affected 3 = More than 20% of<br>exports affected|

_Source: GATT, TPR; WTO, TPR2._ Over three quarters of the countries reported the existence of one or more export processing zones or temporary admission schemes. While a significant number of countries has reported the establishment of such schemes, a much smaller number, including Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico and Tunisia derive more than 20 per cent of their exports from such schemes.

Finally, practically all countries have established some kind of an export promotion agency with responsibilities to help in marketing exports abroad. Unfortunately, there is little information on the specific aims of these institutions or their effectiveness.

# C. Other Institutions and Measures that Affect Trade

Beyond the institutions and policies that directly support exports, there are a number of other, usually governmental, institutions that affect trade in goods. These include institutions that ensure proper classification and valuation of products entering trade as well ensuring that such products meet technical and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. The strength of these institutions in developing countries is 39