Table 5. Effects of Guerrilla Control on Public Goods Provision

|_Panel A: Supply of St_|_ate Services and Public_<br>|_Goods_<br>||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Public Investment<br>(1995-2015)|Hospitals per 100k<br>Population (2015)|Schools per 100k<br>Population (2007)|Road Density<br>(2014)|Public Buildings<br>per 100k (2020)|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|Guerrilla control|0.127**|-2.938|27.76***|0.246*|-7.243|
||(0.0614)|(4.626)|(10.07)|(0.128)|(139.1)|
|Observations|1,068|3,668|3,668|3,681|3,275|
|Dependent mean|0.320|15.21|96.61|1.200|1930|
|_Panel B: Demand for_|_State Services_<br>|2007 - Share o<br>|f Households that re<br>|port having<br>||
||Sewerage|Garbage|Water|Electricity|Daily Water Frequency|
||(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|Guerrilla control|-0.0255|-0.0523***|-0.0392**|-0.0290***|0.000661|
||(0.0180)|(0.0185)|(0.0193)|(0.00862)|(0.0196)|
|Observations|3,668|3,668|3,668|3,668|3,622|
|Dependent mean|0.400|0.510|0.780|0.910|0.740|
|Bandwidth (Km)|2.266|2.266|2.266|2.266|2.266|

_Note:_ The table presents the results of estimating equation 1 for our outcomes related to public goods provision. Panel A presents results related to the supply-side provision of public goods and services. Panel B shows outcomes related to household demand for public goods and services. Column 1 shows whether the canton has received public investment for any social project (FISDL), mostly related to construction or infrastructure updates. Columns 2, 3, and 5 report the number of hospitals, schools, and public buildings per 100k inhabitants, respectively. Column 4 shows the road density in each census tract, which is measured as the length of all roads in the unit divided by their area. Columns 6–9 report the treatment effect on the share of households with any of the marked services within each census tract. Column 10 shows whether the household receives water daily or not. Information in the latter columns comes from the Population Census of 2007. Information in Columns 2 and 4 comes from Google maps. The unit of observation in Column 1 is the canton, but for the rest of the columns it is the census tract. Controls not shown include a linear polynomial of the distance to the boundary of guerrilla territory, its interaction with whether the tract was under guerrilla control or not, and up to 400 fixed effects that represent the closest evenly spaced break in the guerrilla-controlled boundary. The estimates use triangular kernel weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1.

Second, in terms of demand, citizens report less access to and utilization of public services in former guerrilla areas relative to other areas (Columns 6–9). Importantly, we see less demand for the exact services in which we observe an increase in public investment. Third, we also examine how access to and utilization of public services is affected by the quality of these services. Column 10 shows no differences in reported daily water frequency across the boundaries. In Table D.15, we also analyze whether the quality of education, measured by the education of teachers and the number of teachers, is lower in former guerrilla areas than in others. This might explain why there are worse education outcomes despite the larger presence of physical schools inside treated areas. However, we do not find evidence of significant differences in either of these variables; this 32