rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
|Treatment 2|0.025|0.034*|0.015|0.041*|0.000|0.280***|0.037|0.038*|0.011|0.053**|0.032|-0.010|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|“Teacher|_(0.017)_|_(0.020)_|_(0.018)_|_(0.021)_|_(0.032)_|_(0.054)_|_(0.033)_|_(0.022)_|_(0.022)_|_(0.022)_|_(0.028)_|_(0.009)_|
|Delivery”|||||||||||||
|N|29,303|15,135|14,168|17,851|9,253|928|1,271|14,757|14,546|9,723|9,782|9,798|
|N Control|10,607|5,480|5,127|6,304|3,554|340|409|5,497|5,110|3,350|3,622|3,635|
|N Treatment 1|9,716|5,034|4,682|6,072|2,932|225|487|4,793|4,923|3,305|3,230|3,181|
|N Treatment 2|8,980|4,621|4,359|5,475|2,767|363|375|4,467|4,513|3,068|2,930|2,982|
|_R2_|0.855|0.852|0.843|0.853|0.822|0.797|0.900|0.851|0.864|0.468|0.424|0.227|
|||||* p|< 0.05, ** p|< 0.01, *** p <|0.001||||||

_Notes:_ All regressions control for pre-treatment outcomes, demographic controls (including dummies for age, gender, academic year, and ethnicity), and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level in parentheses. All figures are rounded to three decimal places. _Source:_ Administrative data, school year 2015/2016, own calculations.

45
development, such as the provision of basic public goods and the establishment of new institutions to gain support from local communities. The Salvadoran context suggests one particularly relevant feature: the creation of alternative governing authorities that relied on community initiatives and promoted distrust of the state (Pearce, 1986; Binford, 1997; Wood, 2003, 2008). In areas controlled by the FMLN, guerrillas eliminated local state authorities and promoted communitybased organizations to address health, education, and economic problems. These peasant-run participatory institutions were autonomous and ideologically founded on community values, altruistic solidarity, and distrust of the state and elites. These organizations flourished as an alternative to state institutions, distancing local communities from national politicians and further eroding trust in the state. Moreover, guerrillas also substituted subsistence crops for large-scale agricultural production to foster economic self-sufficiency among peasants. In contrast, during the same period, nearby areas remained under state control without changes in governance.<sup>3</sup> We examine the effects of the FMLN’s temporary territorial control by comparing areas around and near the boundaries of its zones between 1985 and 1992, as documented in the United Nations map used during peace talks between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. Figure 1 illustrates these areas and boundaries. The Salvadoran government and the FMLN jointly approved the map and submitted it to the United Nations during the peace talks from 1990 to 1992. We assess the effects of FMLN territorial control on development 20 years later by examining current changes in economic activity (proxied by night light luminosity), human capital (measured as years of education), and a wealth index that approximates average household living standards.

Our empirical strategy employs a spatial regression discontinuity design and uses geospatial data on night light luminosity for 2013 and census tract data on education and wealth for 2007. Moreover, to disentangle mechanisms, we combine information from multiple sources on measures of social capital, land markets, and trust.

A review of the validity of the empirical design shows that all geospatial and economic variables observed prior to the Civil War vary smoothly around the boundaries of rebel-controlled areas. In particular, the use of geocoded data from multiple sources—including covariates that proxy state capacity, violence, demographics, agricultural production, and land concentration—confirm

> 3The only counterinsurgency strategy promoted by the Salvadoran government was the CONARA (Commission for the Restoration of Areas) in 1983. This initiative was implemented in two departments (San Vicente and Usulut ́an) but did not target guerrilla territory. It was similar to the Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam and aimed to halt the influence of communism. However, the plan failed to produce the expected results and was quickly discontinued.

3
**Table 4: Changes in Inequality in Globalizers**

||GiniCoe<br>|fficient<br>|RealInc<br>|omeGrowth<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Initial|Final|Average|PoorestQuintile|
|**Argentina**|**#N/A**<br>|**#N/A**<br>|**#N/A**<br>|**#N/A**<br>|
|**Bangladesh**|**28.9(1989)**|**33.6(1996)**|**3.1%**|**1.8%**<br>|
|Benin<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|**Brazil**|**57.8(1980)**|**60(1996)**|**0.1%**<br>|**-0.8%**<br>|
|BurkinaFaso|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|Cameroon|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|
|CentralAfricanRepublic|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A<br>|
|**China**<br>|**32(1980)**<br>|**40.3(1998)**<br> <br>|**5.4%**<br>|**3.8%**<br>|
|**Colombia**|**54.5(1978)**|**57.1**<br>**(1996)**|**1.6%**|**1.4%**|
|CostaRica|47.5(1981)|47(1996)<br>|0.6%<br>|1.8%<br>|
|Dominica|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|DominicanRepublic|43.3(1984)|48.7(1996)<br>|1.3%<br>|-0.8%<br>|
|Ecuador|43.9(1988)<br>|43.7(1995)<br>|0.3%<br>|3.2%<br>|
|Eqypt|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A<br>|
|Ethiopia|32.4(1981)|40(1995)|0.2%|-1.1%<br>|
|Haiti|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|Hungary|24.2(1987)|24.6(1997)|-0.8%|-1.4%|
|**India**|**31.5(1983)**|**29.7(1994)**<br>|**3.2%**<br>|**3.8%**<br>|
|Indonesia<br>|33.1<br>(1987)<br>|31.5(1999)<br>|2.5%<br>|3.0%<br>|
|IvoryCoast|41.2(1985)|36.7(1995)|-3.4%|-1.2%<br>|
|Jamaica|43.2<br>(1988)|36.4(1996)|-0.2%<br>|3.2%<br>|
|Jordan|36.1<br>(1986)|36.4(1997)|-2.0%|-1.6%<br>|
|Kenya|#N/A|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|Malaysia|51(1979)<br>|48.5(1995)<br>|4.3%<br>|5.4%<br>|
|Mali|36.5.(1989)|50.5(1994)|-2.6%|.11.0%<br>|
|Mexico|50.6 (1984)|53.7(1995)<br>|0.6%<br>|-0.5%<br>|
|Nepal<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|**Nicaragua**|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A<br>|
|Pakistan|33.5(1987)<br>|31.2(1996)<br>|1.6%<br>|3.0%<br>|
|Paraguay|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|Peru|45.7(1985)|46.2(1997)|0.5%|-0.4%|
|Philippines|46.1<br>(1985)|45.1(1994)|1.2%|2.6%|
|Rwanda|#N/A|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|#N/A<br>|
|**Thailand**|**45.2(1980)**|**41.4(1998)**|**4.0%**|**4.7%**|
|Uganda|33(1989)|35.8(1997)<br>|2.9%<br>|1.6%<br>|
|**Uruguay**|**#N/A**|**#N/A**|**#N/A**|**#N/A**<br>|
|Venezuela<br>|55.6(1981)<br>|48.8(1996)<br>|-0.6%<br>|0.5%<br>|
|Zambia|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|
|Zimbabwe|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|#N/A|

Notes: Real income growth refers to constant price<sup>growthratesof realGDP per capita.</sup> Growth rates of incomes of the poor are equal to growth<sup>ratesof realper capita GDP plus the</sup> growth rate of the share of income accruing to the<sup>poorest quintile.Variable definitions and</sup> data sources are reported in Table 8.

Source: Based on data reported in Dollar and Kraay<sup>(2001).</sup> 39
Finally, our research contributes to the literature on trust and financial privacy. Greig and Bohnet (2007) run a public goods game in a Nairobi slum and find that men and women in same gender pairs make higher contributions in a one-shot game, while mixed gender pairings reduce the contributions of women but not men. Thus, women appear to have more trust in other women in experimental settings.

Our findings suggest that the increased availability of female agents could enhance the usage of financial services and the benefits of financial inclusion for women. These recommendations are in line with policy option 8 of the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) which emphasize the need to encourage and provide appropriate incentives for financial service providers to increase the representation of women working in financial institutions and financial access points (G20 GPFI, 2020). The findings also relate to the literature highlighting the potential of digital financial services (DFS) and agent banking to contribute to financial access of previously excluded or underserved populations. Suri and Jack (2016) exploit variation in service rollout and estimate that access to DFS was associated with significant gains in consumption–gains which lifted 2% of Kenyan households out of poverty. They find that womenheaded households benefitted more from DFS than male-headed households through increased financial resilience and changes in occupational choice, shifting out of agriculture and into business. In SubSaharan Africa, women are 7% more likely to be excluded from DFS and thus deprived of the social and economic benefits associated with the service (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018).<sup>3</sup> The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the study setting and data. The methods and results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes robustness checks of the results while Section 5 replicates the analysis in another market, Senegal. Section 6 discusses the implications of the findings and some limitations. Section 7 concludes.

# **2. Context and Data**

FINCA DRC is a subsidiary of FINCA international, an MFI operating in 23 countries worldwide which pursues women’s financial inclusion as part of its mission. FINCA DRC launched branchless banking in 2011 in an effort to expand outreach. FINCA’s network has grown rapidly from 322 agents in 2014 (Gutin, 2015) to over 1,200 agents by April 2018, the end of our period of study.

The data we obtained from FINCA DRC are comprised of 1,124,331 transactions performed by 104,237 customers through 1,250 agents linked to 21 FINCA branches. Transactions were performed over a period of one year, between May 2017 and April 2018. The transaction-level data contain the value of each

> 3 Barriers that impede women’s participation in DFS include limited access to phones and internet connectivity, lack of information and assets, limited participation in the salaried labor force and lower socio-economic status (Chamboko et al., 2018).

4
-6

where vh _ (P1, .. Pn, Yh) is the indirect utility function Yh - money income received by the n'th household xh- amount of the J'th commodity consumed by the h'th household

- Pj consumer price for the jth commodity

h Xi - total consumption of commodity j (Xi - Zh **xj** For a distribution of H households the Utilitarian social welfare function can be expressed as: and it is assumed that Vy > 0 Vyy S 0. For simplicity of presentation we assume that initial producer prices are all equal to one.

Consider next the following hypothetical experiment. For a revenue neutral commodity tax substitution a small increment in the tax rate levied on the i'th commodity must be accompanied by a small decrement in the tax rate on the jth commodity. The first-order approximation to the change in social welfare is

**Massll#AlWelfare** Dawinance & the Design of **Excise** Taxation in **the** Cots D'Ivoir*/WThirsk:ab/5/18/88
The top panel of Table 2 provides summary statistics on the employment status of the various treatment groups and the control group in the baseline survey. In each case, the vast bulk (85-90%) of sampled workers were in temporary employment programs. While all were in such programs at the time the sample frame was constructed, there was an unavoidable two-month delay in doing the baseline survey. Some Trabajar projects terminated in that two-month period. There is a slight sign of higher participation in the temporary employment programs amongst the control group. This might reflect some contamination of treatment effects in the baseline survey. We will check robustness of our results to using a double difference estimator.

Table 2 also compares the various sub-samples in terms of other worker characteristics (age, sex, household size etc). There are no significant differences, suggesting that the randomization has adequately balanced observed characteristics. Similarly, observable worker and household characteristics were (individually and jointly) insignificant in regressions for whether an observation was in a treatment group or the control group.

As one would expect, there was sample attrition over the study period. 77.5% of those interviewed in the baseline stayed to the fourth round. We followed Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) in testing whether the selection out of the sample is based on observable characteristics in the baseline, including the outcome indicator ( _Y"_ ). The attrition indicator (whether an observation stays in the sample) is then regressed on _Y0_ and other baseline characteristics of the worker and household (gender, age and schooling). The test for attrition bias is equivalent to testing whether _Y0_ is significant. In our case, the fact that the beneficiary group is mainly workfare participants attenuates the observed variance in outcome indicators in the baseline survey. However, we have seen that there is still some variation in incomes and 12
# **1. Introduction**

The drivers of labor market participation and employment outcomes have been well documented in the literature (Baah-Boateng, 2014; Contreas et al., 2010). These determinants range from observed household and individual characteristics (Fadayomi et al., 2014), to the geographic location of an individual (Naudé and Serumaga- Zake, 2010), to the type and distribution of employment options (labor demand) in the local area. In addition, individuals’ cultural setting as well as their inherent traits play a significant role in shaping their decisions regarding labor market participation and employment choices (Reimers, 1985; Attasoy, 2017; Wichert and Pohlmeier, 2010). For instance, wage employment tends to increase with age in Nigeria, but is non-linear, slowing down as workers approach retirement (Aminu, 2010; Anyanwu, 2013).

In Ghana, unemployment rates are higher among women (Baah-Boateng, 2014). Broeck and Kilic (2018), using cross-country data from Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, similarly found that women are underrepresented in wage and self-employment, likely due to local norms that differentially affect their opportunities. Aminu (2010) also identified a positive relationship between and wage employment. Urban residence is associated with greater employment, owing to the larger capacities and job opportunities in these settings (Naudé and Serumaga-Zake, 2010). Male household headship, marital status and household size have all been found to improve employment outcomes (Sackey, 2005; Fadayomi et al., 2014). Giannetti and Andrei (2004) noted that household wealth serves as a positive driver of self-employment, as individuals may encounter fewer liquidity constraints when starting a business.

This study examines the drivers of labor market participation and employment choices, and how individual gender role attitudes and personality traits shape these decisions. We achieve this by pursuing the following specific objectives. First, we explore the gender differences in labor market outcomes. Second, we examine the determinants of labor market participation and employment choice (wage vs. self) in the absence of personality traits and gender role attitudes. Third, the study examines the effect of gender role attitudes and personality traits on these labor market outcomes, both with and without household, individual and geographic controls. Finally, we examine the interactions effects of gender role attitudes and personality traits and how individuals’ gender role attitudes could alter their inherent traits in making labor market participation and employment choices.

2
# **Table 7** -a **Doing Business Indicators Comparison**

||**Ease of**<br>**Doing**<br>**Business**<br>|**Starti**<br>|**ng a Business**<br>||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Rank**|Rank|Procedures<br>(number)|Time<br>(days)|Cost (% of<br>income per capita)|Paid-in Min. Capital (%<br>of income per capita)|
|**OIC**|118|107|8|40|58|122|
|**GCC**|43|78|8|15|5|121|
|**OPEC**|110|114|10|43|41|25|
|**OECD**|30|56|6|14|5|15|
|**OIC-GCC**|128|110|8|44|65|123|
|**Low income**|140|119|8|41|108|149|
|**MENA**|96|97|8|20|38|104|
|**developing**<br>**countries**|100|98|8|39|32|42|

Source: Doing Business Report 2011, The World Bank Ease of doing business rank: World Bank index that measures business regulations and their enforcement across countries Index.

Starting a business: all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. Procedure is defined as any interaction of the company founders with external parties (for example, government agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries). Time is recorded in calendar days. The measure captures the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a procedure with minimum follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments. Cost is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. It includes all official fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are required by law. The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita.

52
WPS 3877

# **_PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING AND POLICY IMPACT ANALYSIS A Demonstration in EViews_**

B. Essama-Nssah<sup>*</sup> Poverty Reduction Group (PRMPR) The World Bank Washington, D.C.

# **_Abstract_**

Effective development policymaking creates a need for reliable methods of assessing effectiveness. There should be, therefore, an intimate relationship between effective policymaking and impact analysis. The goal of a development intervention defines the metric by which to assess its impact, while impact evaluation can produce reliable information on which policymakers may base decisions to modify or cancel ineffective programs and thus make the most of limited resources. This paper reviews the logic of _propensity score matching_ (PSM) and, using data on the National Support Work Demonstration, compares that approach with other evaluation methods such as double difference, instrumental variable and Heckman’s method of selection bias correction. In addition, it demonstrates how to implement _nearest-neighbor_ and _kernel-based methods_ , and plot program incidence curves in EViews. In the end, the plausibility of an evaluation method hinges critically on the correctness of the socioeconomic model underlying program design and implementation, and on the quality and quantity of available data. In any case, PSM can act as an effective adjuvant to other methods.

Keywords: EViews, Double Difference, Impact Analysis, Instrumental Variables, Kernel Function, Matching, Propensity Score, Sample Selection.

JEL: C14, C81, C87, I38.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3877, April 2006 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at_ _<u>http://econ.worldbank.org</u>_ <u>.</u>

> * The author would like to thank Glenn Sueyoshi (Quantitative Micro Software) and Jian Zhang (University of California at Davis) for very helpful suggestions.  He is also grateful to Pedro Olinto (LCSPP) and Markus Goldstein (PRMPR) for insightful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.  Finally, thanks are due to Martin Ravallion (DECRG) and Vijdan Korman (PRMPR) for information sharing and useful discussions.
- Becker, G., Kominers, S. D., Murphy, K., and Spenkuch, J. (2015). A Theory of Intergenerational Mobility. MPRA Paper 66334, University Library of Munich, Germany.

- Becker, G. S., Kominers, S. D., Murphy, K. M., and Spenkuch, J. L. (2018). A Theory of Intergenerational Mobility. Journal of Political Economy, 126(S1):725.

- Behrman, J. R. and Deolalikar, A. B. (1995). Are There Dierential Returns to Schooling by Gender? The Case of Indonesian Labour Markets. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(1):97117.

- Behrman, J. R., Foster, A. D., Rosenweig, M. R., and Vashishtha, P. (1999). Women's schooling, home teaching, and economic growth. Journal of political Economy, 107(4):682 714.

- Berman, Y. (2022). The long-run evolution of absolute intergenerational mobility. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 14(3):6183.

- Bjorklund, A. and Jantti, M. (2020). Intergenerational mobility, intergenerational eects, sibling correlations, and equality of opportunity: A comparison of four approaches. Research in Social Stratication and Mobility, 70:100455.

- Black, S. E. and Devereux, P. J. (2011). Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility. In Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 4, chapter 16, pages 14871541. Elsevier.

- Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J., Lundborg, P., and Majlesi, K. (2020). Poor Little Rich Kids? The Role of Nature versus Nurture in Wealth and Other Economic Outcomes and Behaviours. Review of Economic Studies, 87(4):16831725.

- Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J., and Salvanes, K. G. (2005). Why the apple doesn't fall far: Understanding intergenerational transmission of human capital. American economic review, 95(1):437449.

- Blanden, J. and Machin, S. (2013). Educational Inequality and The Expansion of United Kingdom Higher Education. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 60(5):597598.

- Breen, R. (2010). Educational expansion and social mobility in the 20th century. Social Forces, 89(2):365388.

- Calkins, R. and Sengupta (1992). Indonesia, Women in Development: A Strategy for Continued Progress. Report no. idp-112, east asia and pacic regional series, World Bank Group.

- Card, D., Domnisoru, C., and Taylor, L. (2022). The intergenerational transmission of human

32