rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
to Islamic inheritance law after their death - but the gender discrimination in the final wealth allocation is attenuated. Collecting novel survey data, I first provide correlational and descriptive evidence to assess to what extent gifting represents a second-best alternative to legal reform. Second, within a survey experiment I test whether providing information on public support for inheritance law reform and/or the possibility to gift one’s daughter has a causal impact on attitudes regarding women’s inheritance.

The primary data necessary for answering these research questions was collected in Tunisia between February and April 2023 via the phone. The total sample size in the first survey round was N=1,505. Respondents were randomly allocated to control (C), or to two different treatment arms where they received information on gifting (T1) or information on public reform support and gifting (T2). The second treatment T2 included a belief correction: respondents were told whether they underestimated, overestimated or correctly guessed public support for the introduction of gender equal inheritance law. I test the effect of the provided information on a set of inheritance-related gender attitudes, which are measured in a first endline directly following the treatment and in a second endline about four weeks later. I hypothesized that both treatments would increase respondents’ awareness of gender discrimination in inheritance and should thus lead to more gender equal attitudes. Yet, I conjectured that reform support may decrease in the treatment groups if gifting is viewed as a substitute for legal reform. Moreover, assuming that the perceived social norm functions as a constraint on individuals’ gender attitudes, the belief correction in T2 was expected to render the views of respondents who underestimate public reform support more gender progressive.

The observed treatment effects are mixed: T1 significantly increases respondents’ likelihood to favor a gender equal bequest allocation. Treatment effects on the other main outcomes - reform support and willingness to use gifting to achieve a more gender equitable bequest allocation - are positive but shy of statistical significance. Furthermore, these effects largely disappear when the gifting information is paired with reform information in T2. Firstand second-order beliefs are strongly correlated: underestimating the public’s support for legal reform is the best predictor of an individual’s own gender attitudes, including support for inheritance law reform.<sup>1</sup> Almost 60 percent of the respondents in the survey underestimate

> 1Here and in the following I use the term “first-order belief” to refer to an individual’s own beliefs. i.e. “I am favorable to introducing gender equal inheritance law.” I use the term “second-order belief” to refer to an individual’s perception of what others believe. i.e. “I think that the majority of Tunisians are opposed to introducing gender equal inheritance law.”

3
**Table 9. Restricted Co-Integration Relations, Aggregate Model**

||O-eigenvec|tors||a-coefficie|nts||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Countiy|Industry|Agriculture|Services|Industry|Agriculture|Services|
|C6te d'Ivoire|1.000|-1.000|-0.248|-0.240|0.646|0.000|
|Zimbabwe|1.000|-1.000|-1.000|-0.1054|1.049|0.000|

_Source:_ Authors' calculations.

**Table 10. Restricted Co-integration Relations for Ghana, Sub-sectoral Specification**

|Manufacturing|Agriculture|Services|Mining|Construction|Gas and<br>water|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_i eigenvectors_<br>1.000|-0.2494|0.8591|-0.2293|-0.7479|-0.0178|
|-2.657|1.000|-1.283|-3.720|3.762|2.959|
|_a-coefficients_<br>-1.224|0.000|0.000|-0.3475|0.000|0.000|
|0.07737|0.000|0.000|0.4215|0.000|0.000|

_Source:_ Authors' calculations.

For Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, we find an elasticity of unity between industry and agriculture, indicating full sectoral spillover from agriculture to industry following agricultural expansion. For Zimbabwe, service sector growth also spills over with a factor of unity. In the case of CMte d'Ivoire, the impact of the service sector is less than unity (25 percent). For both Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, the service sector is weakly exogenous to the system, implying that we may condition on services when modeling the 1(0)-space. The disaggregated specification for Ghana is found to be driven by agriculture, services, construction, and gas and water since these sectors are weakly exogenous to the system. Therefore, we may reduce this system to consist of only the equations for manufacturing and mining (we do that in the next subsection).

These findings imply the existence of a sectoral feedback mechanism; sectoral expansion or productivity gains in either the industrial or agricultural sector feed back into the other sector. Additionally, these findings support the hypothesis that economic growth in these countries is partly led by the service sector (see Glasmeir and Howland 1994). One explanation of the positive link between agriculture and industry is that a 15
6. Trade Linkages between China and other B&R Economies

**Source:** Author’s calculations based on GVC indicators extracted using the Wang et Al. (2013) methodology on the Tiva database.

From the point of view of backward linkages, B&R Economies have a trade structure with China that is increasingly reliant in GVCs. This is reflected in Figure 42, which report the indicator of GVC positioning in terms of the composition of the Vertical Specialization index. In 2010, double counting has accounted for 36 % of China’s vertical specialization index for exports to B&R Economies. In contrast, non-B&R economies have only a share of double counting of 21 %.

FIGURE 42: COMPOSITION OF THE VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION INDEX, CHINESE EXPORTS TO B&R AND OTHER ECONOMIES <!-- Start of picture text --> 13 16 19 21 21 31 41 36 10 14 11 10<br>49 48 56 58 56 55<br>47 44 51<br>45<br>38<br>34<br>38 36 34 35 35 33 36<br>28 24 25 26 28<br>1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010<br>non-B&R B&R ROW<br>FVA in Intermediate Goods FVA in Final Goods<br>Double Counted<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>Share of VS 40<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** Author’s calculations based on GVC indicators extracted using the Wang et Al. (2013) methodology on the Tiva database.

Forward GVC linkages of China with B&R Economies are also stronger than with non-B&R economies. As shown in Figure 43, 20% of Chinese exports to other B&R Economies is domestic value-added from China that serves as intermediate goods to generate exports of the importing B&R Economies. China is therefore contributing to the development of GVCs in B&R Economies.

FIGURE 43: DOMESTIC VALUE-ADDED OF CHINA RE-EXPORTED, BY DESTINATION (% OF GROSS EXPORTS) <!-- Start of picture text --> 21<br>20<br>19<br>17<br>12<br>11<br>10 10<br>9 9<br>8<br>7<br>1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010<br>non-B&R B&R ROW<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>Domestic Value Added Re-Exported (Forward, VS1) 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> 34
The 2001 water law, with 220 articles, is quite detailed and specific concerning water management generally, and river basin management in particular. It reformed the RWMAs, dissolved the DDWMs, and added a consultative structure for basin stakeholders. Each RWMA must establish a Regional Council of Water Management (RCWM), composed of water users and representatives of the other governmental units in the river basin.<sup>10</sup> The new water law contains a statement of priorities for the nation as a whole, and of priorities among water uses. Public drinking water is the highest priority use. The law further specifies that groundwater resources should be protected and preserved for public drinking water supplies and other uses that require clean water (e.g., certain industries). All other consumptive uses (i.e., industrial, urban non-potable, and irrigation) are secondary, and their relative priorities depend on basin circumstances. Water use conditions and priorities at the basin scale are to be determined by RWMA directors in basin plans that must meet with the RCWM’s approval after wide public consultation.

The new water law also required the establishment of a National Board of Water Management (NBWM), which will be the principal water management entity at the national level, displacing that responsibility to some degree from the Minister of Environment and the Department of Water Resources within that ministry. Board members will include the RWMA directors, who will no longer relate directly to the Ministry of Environment but to the NBWM. The NBWM, headed by a president, will also assume responsibilities such as:

- supervising the activities of the RWMA directors, harmonizing their activities, approving their basin plans and progress reports, and recommending occasional inspections concerning water management in a region;

- elaborating plans of water management for the territory of the state (i.e., lands beyond the jurisdictional reach of the RWMAs), taking into consideration the river basin divisions;

- drafting flood protection and drought mitigation plans on the territory of the state;

- keeping a water cadastre for the nation, taking into consideration the division into the river basin districts;

- approving projects concerning water use in the river basins;

- supervising the operation of hydro-meteorological and hydrogeological surveys;

- representing the State Treasury with respect to property related to water management and in particular, overseeing the performance of tasks related to maintenance of waters or water works; and

- adjusting, with respect to matters related to water management, draft lists of priority projects of the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management.

> 10 These councils are to consist of about 30 persons, with half of them being water users.  The others would be representatives of various self-governmental/administrative bodies (e.g., provincial and/or local offices) and of other organizations.  The regulations for the establishment of these regional advisory councils were finalized in December 2002, so they have just been created recently.

17
_Annex 2 Table 4: Food prices (ln) and program saturation in nationally representative data; Linear model_

||Share of food<br>expenditures|Saturation|N|
|---|---|---|---|
|Rice, raw regular milled|0.191|0.095 ***<br>(0.011)|8370|
|Other raw rice and grains|0.074|-0.185 **<br>(0.089)|8555|
|Roots and tubers|0.011|0.290 ***<br>(0.045)|8487|
|Eggs (fresh)|0.018|0.114 ***<br>(0.015)|8551|
|Eggs (processed)|0.001|0.102 ***<br>(0.024)|6449|
|Fish (fresh)|0.058|0.001<br>(0.012)|8530|
|Fish (processed)|0.023|-0.062 *<br>(0.034)|8479|
|Meats (fresh)|0.035|0.028 ***<br>(0.010)|8510|
|Meats (processed)|0.011|1.238 ***<br>(0.305)|8242|
|Fruits (fresh)|0.021|-0.136 ***<br>(0.028)|8512|
|Vegetables (fresh)|0.046|0.087 ***<br>(0.015)|8561|
|Rice and grains processed|0.021|0.111 ***<br>(0.043)|8555|
|Coffee, cocoa, tea|0.025|0.114 ***<br>(0.037)|8559|
|Sugar|0.016|-0.444 ***<br>(0.023)|8529|
|Milk Products|0.007|0.062<br>(0.053)|8117|

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Each row corresponds to a separate regression. Observations are at the village-food item-year level and pooled across the years 2009, 2012, and 2015. All models include year and village fixed effects. Prices are calculated as unit values, see text for details.

Source: 2009, 2012, and 2015 Family Income and Expenditure Surveys and Department of Social Welfare Administrative Data on _Pantawid_ Program Enrollment 75
is the most determining and influential one. Interestingly, some 74 percent of households with single parents are led by women. Only 10 percent of single-parent households have a child with a father not alive. That would point to single motherhood rather than orphanhood as the primary cause for parental absence.

Selected circumstances (as well as opportunities) must be congruently defined over time, that is, for the CWIQ 2007 and 2010. As the computation of HOI requires estimating a logistic model as a function of circumstances, changes in the definitions of circumstances or in the list of circumstances used over time may affect HOI measurement. The variables reported in Table 2 are confirmed to have comparable questions in both rounds.

# **[Table 2 about here]**

# **5. Results**

# **5.1 HOI School Attendance in Liberia**

The estimation of the 2007 HOI for school attendance among children 6-15 is 59.5 percent, four percentage points below the observed coverage rate of 63.5 percent, a difference that is statistically significant -- as shown in Figure 1. These two values remained largely unchanged for both the HOI and observed coverage rate in 2010 (60.3 percent and 65.3 percent, respectively).<sup>6</sup> In both cases, the difference between HOI and observed school attendance is statistically significant. The penalty (share of access to opportunities allocated in violation of the equality of

> 6 It is worth noting that decomposition between both years is conducted for an unweighted sample with no information on location of the household, given that at the time this paper was completed the information on weights and location of households was not available for CWIQ 2010. Subsequent analyses for CWIQ 2007 use population weights. A robustness check of the effect of weights on results shows that the level of the HOI seems to increase without weights, but that does not affect main conclusions.

19
reinsurance sector in which cross-border provision amongst firms is the dominant mode of supply. Formally, the sectoral scores are given by

> Sectoral scores are then aggregated across all sectors _j_  _J_ using weights _w j_ that reflect the relative importance of constituent services sectors in domestic value added.  Sector weights _w j_ are based on services sectors‘ standardized share in total services output for an  ̳average‘ industrialized country.  Overall country-level scores are obtained as

The complete weighting schemes used to aggregate modes, subsectors and sectors, respectively, can be found in Annex 1 Table A.1, including further details regarding the sectoral weights. All scores at any level of aggregation are available from the ̳STRI‘ section of the database; in particular, the full set of baseline values _s jmc_ is accessible so that users are free to devise alternative aggregation schemes if they so wish.

We recognize the subjectivity of this approach. Yet given data constraints and the wide range of sectors covered, there is no obviously superior method of quantification. We show below in Section 6 that the STRI assessments are broadly corroborated by other methods. The subjectivity of the STRI is somewhat mitigated by the extensive consultations we have conducted with the private sector representatives and regulators in making the assignments of weights to specific categories. We also checked the robustness of the assignments by moving border-line policy regimes across categories. We believe that the adopted approach is at this stage more suitable than any fixed algorithm to turn the rich and difficult-toquantify aspects of policy into broadly plausible if somewhat imprecise restrictiveness scores. In Paul Krugman‘s words, it has the virtue of being ―roughly right rather than precisely wrong.‖ 15
expenditures, examine changes in levels of local activism, and investigate other issues that were relevant to the political and economic life of the GP. In treatment GPs they were, in particular, asked to closely track the work of the KSIRD RPs, and to follow up on how their work percolated into the village, and the sequence of changes that were initiated by the work of the RPs. From 2010-2011, the team was reduced to three investigators who visited all the GPs on a rotating schedule sending in reports every three months. Consequently we have a total of about 400 reports divided equally between treatment and control GPs. These village reports, supplemented by regular field visits by the principal investigators, constitute our qualitative data that we distill and draw on for this qualitative section of the paper.

# <u>Section 2: Quantitative Results</u>

First, we examine the trends in the quantitative data between 2007 and 2009 in Tables 1, 2 and 3 without distinguishing between control and treatment villages. Table 1 shows a sharp increase between 2007 and 2009 in levels of participation and knowledge about gram panchayat procedures and personnel. Participation in gram sabhas more than doubled. And there were large increases in the availability of information with improvements in the percentage of respondents of respondents who could correctly name their ward member or village president, who had heard of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, and had heard of gram or ward sabhas. Households also had greater access to other government transfer programs; their eligibility for a Below Poverty Line card, which provides access to subsidized food and other schemes went up from 53% to 85%. Tax compliance also significantly increased from 60% to 76%.

The village-level data in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that this increase in participation and knowledge was associated with improvements in the quality of government. Table 2 shows that participants report an increase in gram panchayat activity in almost every sector – roads, transportation, schools, health, sanitation and irrigation. However they also report a reduction in activities related to the provision of drinking water. Table 3, showing results from detailed maps of village infrastructure, also indicates increases in the availability of schools, overhead tanks, roads, anganwadis (crèches), but also a reduction in the number of operational tube-wells and the availability of other water sources. Overall, it is clear that information about village government, participation in village government activities, and the performance of village governments significantly improved in both control and treatment areas from 2007 to 2009.

We next examine whether the People’s Planning intervention had a significant impact on household and village level outcomes. First we analyze whether the data from the control and treatment groups are 10
- 4 -

# II. FREOUENCY. SCOPE AND DESIGN OF ID COMPONENTS

# Evolution of ID Work

A review of ID components in traditional projects in different sectors, sector loans and sector adjustment loans (SECALs) reveals some interesting trends in the evolution of their frequency and scope: (1) The vast majority of Bank projects across all sectors have ID components today. From 72 percent in 1978, the proportion of projects with ID components has increased to over 90 percent in 1989. Regional sample surveys show the ID coverage to be 100 percent in LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) (FY88), 94 percent in Africa (FY88), 93 percent in Asia (FY86) and 83 percent in EMENA (Europe, Middle East & North Africa) (FY89). A sectoral distribution of the share of projects with ID components and their growth in the early 1980s are given in Table 1 below.

Table 1 SECTORAL FREOUENCY OF PROJECTS WITH ID COMPONENTS

||**1978-1981**<br>**(Average)**|**1985-1987**<br>**(Average)**|
|---|---|---|
|SECTOR|||
|Agriculture|81%|83%|
|Industry|94%|88%|
|DFC|97%|98%|
|Public Utilities|79%|86%|
|Transport/Uxban/Tourism|77%|82%|
|Education|97%|94%|
|Population/Health|100%|78%|
|Non-Project Lending|8%|90%|
|Total|80%|83%|

Source: A. Paige Eaves, OED Analysis of Institutional DeveloRment, CECPS (mimeo), 1989.

(2) ID work in the Bank's lending operations is increasingly focusing on the more complex tasks of strengthening sectoral or subsectoral agencies, restructuring ministry level activities and functions, and aiding the process of capacity building at the sector level. Changes in project design which cause shifts from turnkey civil works to other more institutionintensive activities (e.g., road construction to maintenance, school building
37 the cointegration statistics are promising. Equation 2 considers the effect of government infrastructure investment and results in a significant coefficient as well as positive indications of cointegration. Similarly, the quantity of private credit which is included in equation 3 is significant and generates favorable cointegration statistics. This wouid seem to imply that there was some rationing in credit markets that served to crowd out private investment.

On the surface, this result would appear to be inconsistent with the survey findings and - interviews with banks that credit markets were very liquid throughout much of the **.iod,** except after the imposition of credit ceilings by the Central Bank as part of a reform package negotiated with the International Monetary Fund in 1987. Established firms never complained about a shortage of credit prior to the imposition of ceilings, implying that government borrowing did not crowd out some of the private sector through the financial system. In fact, some firms complained that the banks put pressure on them to borrow more. Because real interest rates were negative throughout the period, established flrms did tend to borrow heavily since credit was, in some sense, a "free good." However, credit was rationed at the margin, especially for new, poorly connected firms. Government borrowing may have crowded out these new borrowers but, given the conservatism of the financal system, it is not clear that the banks would have extended them loans anyway.

Other government spending variables, such as total government investment and noninfrastructure government investment, were also tried in all possible combinations and always appeared with an insignificant sign and generated no improvemnent in the cointegration