rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Bartel, Ann, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw. 2007. “How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 122 (4): 1721–58.

Baumol, William J. 1967. “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis.” _American Economic Review_ 57 (3) 415–26.

Beaudry, Paul, Mark Doms, and Ethan Lewis. 2010. “Should the Personal Computer Be Considered a Technological Revolution? Evidence from U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 118 (5): 988–1036.

Blinder, Alan S (2006), “Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?”, _Foreign Affairs_ 85(2):113-128.

Blinder, Alan S. 2009. “How Many US Jobs Might Be Offshorable?” _World Economics_ 10 (2): 41–78.

Blinder, Alan S., and Alan B. Krueger. 2013. “Alternative Measures of Offshorability: A Survey Approach.” _Journal of Labor Economics_ 31 (2): S97–S128.

Baldwin, Richard. 2011. “Trade and Industrialization after Globalization’s 2nd Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain are Different and Why It Matters.” NBER Working Paper 17716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Barro, Robert J. 2012 “Convergence and Modernization Revisited.” NBER Working Paper No. 18295, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Battaile, Bill; Chisik, Richard; Onder, Harun, 2014, Services, inequality, and the dutch disease, <u>Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 6966</u> Behrman, Jere R., and Hans-Peter Kohler. 2013. “Quantity, Quality, and Mobility of Population.” paper prepared for the Global Citizen Foundation project on “Towards a Better Global Economy.” Bourguignon, François, and Christian Morrisson. 2002. “Inequality among World Citizens: 1820– 1992.” _American Economic Review_ 92(4): 727–44.

Bhagwati, Jagdish N (1984), “Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations”, _The World Economy_ , 7:133-144.

Bloom, David E., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998, ‘Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia’, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 419–55.

Commission on Growth and Development. 2007. _The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development_ . Washington, DC 22
<!-- Start of picture text --> 300 60<br>All ships All ships<br>Small ships Small ships<br>250 Large ships 50 Large ships<br>200 40<br>150 30<br>100 20<br>50 10<br>0 0<br>0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8<br>Strength of Onboard Security in 2011 Strength of Onboard Security in 2011<br>(a) Number of attacks (b) Number of hijacks<br>Number of Attacks in 2012 Number of Hijacks in 2012<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 10: Marginal effects of armed private maritime security Note: The graph plots the marginal effects of _κ_<sup>2011</sup> ( _S_ ) on the number of attacks and hijacks. The value of _k_<sup>2011</sup> varies between 0.5 and 1, while all other parameters of the model are set to their benchmark value. We have omitted the values of _k_<sup>2011</sup> greater than 0.8 because the number of attacks and hijacks are all zeros. The dashed vertical line indicates the baseline value of _k_<sup>2011</sup> = 0 _._ 75.

inated for every 4.6 private maritime security teams hired in 2011. To arrive at this interpretation, we carry out a simple calculation using the Suez canal traffic as a rough proxy for the traffic volume through the piracy-affected waters. In 2012, 14,765 large ships passed through the Suez canal.<sup>10</sup> A one percentage point increase in private maritime security hires (148 hires) leads to 32 fewer attacks (35.3 percent of the 91 attacks in 2012), which in turn implies that 148 _/_ 32 _≈_ 4 _._ 6 private teams can reduce the number of attacks by 1 through the mechanisms outlined in our model. On a side note, the cost of 4.6 security teams, as estimated by (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2015), is between $92,000 and $220,800.

Even though private maritime security reduces the number of pirate attacks, it also results in a significant displacement externality towards smaller ships. Figure 10 highlights this effect by showing the number of attacks and hijacks to ships below (red dashed) and above (black dash-dotted line) the median size. Around the baseline estimate, a onepercentage-point increase in protection lowers the number of attacks (hijacks) on large vessels by 42.9 (43.8) percent, and at the same time, increases the number of attacks (hi-

> 10We classify the following vessel types in the published traffic data as “large”: tankers, LNG ships, bulk carriers, combined carriers, container ships, and car carriers.

34
# _Question 18: Limits on discretionary power of bureaucrats_

18. "If a government agent acts against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment." <!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>against the rules I can usually go to l<br>another official or to his superior and get<br>the correct treatment."<br>600<br>This is true<br>(1) always 40<br>(2) mostly 40<br>(3) fequently 30<br>(4) sometimes Li<br>(5) seldom 02<br>(6) never LI<br>10<br>World LDC DC SSEA MNA CEE LAC SSA Cis<br><!-- End of picture text -->

## **Percentage of firms who ticked (4), (5), or (6) for question 18**

This question asks about the extent of discretionary power in bureaucracies and gives a measure of how well "checks and balances" work within the public service. In a well functioning bureaucracy the discretionary powers of an individual official are limited by the ability of customers to complain to his superior or simply to go to another official and receive the correct treatment. In a discretionary setting this check does not work. For instance the other officials as well as the superior may be cooperating together.

Discretionary power within bureaucracies is perceived as lowest in developed countries followed by MNA. CEE and LAC are in the middle and highest is the CIS, Africa and Asia.

# _Question 19: Changes in discretionary power over time_

Question 19 asked if bureaucracies have become more or less discretionary over the past 10 years (over the last 5 years in the case of the transition economies). This is a summary question for the preceding 5 questions that addresses the change in overall bureaucratic discretion and corruption.

34
_The Dynamic Estimates._ Table 4 presents the Arellano-Bond one-step procedure GMM (heteroskedastic consistent) estimates of the per capita agricultural GDP function. Although the GMM procedure has the advantage over the static estimates of accounting for the inertia that is likely to exist in the determination of agricultural GDP and in mitigating potential endogeneity biases of the explanatory variables, it also has some disadvantages. In particular, the ArellanoBond estimates tend to have low efficiency and, while first-order autocorrelation is expected, if second-order autocorrelation exists it may lead to inconsistent estimates.

The estimates in Table 4 suggest that per capita agricultural GDP adjusts relatively fast, taking about two years to complete the adjustment to changing exogenous variables. The estimates concerning the level and composition of government expenditures are highly consistent with the static ones presented earlier. The sign pattern and significance and the relative magnitudes of the total public expenditures vis-à-vis the share of expenditures in subsidies is the same as in the static estimators. A problem with the GMM estimates in Table 4 is that they fail to pass the second-order autocorrelation test. This of course may lead to inconsistent estimators.

When we normalize the variables by land area, however, the resulting estimates are free from second-order autocorrelation. These estimates are shown in Table 5, where for comparison purposes we also include the land normalized RE and FE static estimators as well. We now cannot reject the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation, even at low significance levels. Moreover, the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments (a test of the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the residuals) is passed, meaning that the instruments are acceptable.

The implicit long-run elasticities (that is, the steady state effects) are obtained assuming that per capita agricultural GDP does not change over time. Given that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable coefficient is about 0.52, the implicit long-run elasticity of total government expenditures is about 0.097 (0.047/(1-0.52)), while the absolute value of the elasticity of the share of expenditures in non-social subsidies is almost three times bigger, equal to -0.26. These long-run estimates obtained using the Arellano-Bond dynamic approach are similar to the corresponding long-run estimates obtained using 5-year averages static random effects method, which were 0.055 and -0.228 (reported in Table 2). This high degree of 21
17 difficult measures, including many admittedly important matters involving institution-building and human capital development, could be undertaken gradually. In ail cases, ultimate decisions on sequencing and timing will have to be tailored to the realities of each country.

The problem is that the conditions required for this ideal synthesis are oft-n absent. It assumes a government which has a long-term strategic vision and is unified enough to avoid the inevitable efforts by those whose interests are damaged by the reform process to regroup and impair its success. It also assumes regime continuity. Some of the new Eastern Europe democracies may enjoy such unity of vision and mass backing, but most African societies have not experienced such a sharp break with the past.

Thus, in most African countries, donors and governments are going to have to make choices among the many reforms proposed in the _Long-Term Perspective Study._ Program priorities should be politically feasible and be based on realistic assumptions regarding the administrative capacity of governments and the likely response rates of producers and investors. Above all, for any reform agenda to succeed, the African government must feel that it "owns" the program. The design of adjustment programs should be the result of dialogue, not dictat, as actions taken primarily because of externally imposed conditions rather than domestic convictions are unlikely to be sustained.

It is important to recognize that while some of the convention wisdom of the economics profession is gaining ground in Africa and in many other parts of the world, this is not 'the end of history." Economists are in widespread agreement on some critical matters, such as the need for responsible fiscal and monetary policies, expanded savings and investment, and supply-side restructuring toward tradable goods through realignment of prices and other incentives. But
<!-- Start of picture text --> a a a<br>[Jo<br>{|} <10<br>[TM) 10 - 30 ee<br>(1MM 3050 -- so100 0<br>HB 100 - 150<br>MM—— GGD150 - regions246 o'<br>ao . 7.<br>oth~~ oe<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> PM2.5 PM10<br>(ug pm2,5/m3) ug pmio/m3)<br>BM7 8-10<s W7 7 <15<br>Boe on a BonsB® is-19 a £ _<br>12-1313-14 a . ~ 20-2119-20 LS” - ~<br>14-145 A<br>Mus -1s 6 | 22-2321-22 -6 4<br>|| 1515,5-15,5- 16 | 23-25<br>Bois HE| 2s>39 -39<br>— a ——<br>« co, P ‘ a oo<br>“ f ; el” oy<br>ts —<br>< " ‘ “gt ee Noses<br>z a F cat &<br>em, i id Oe. &8 ¥% te<br>* uy es ee ;<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **I. Introduction and conceptual framework**

Governments around the world are introducing a range of strategies aimed at improving the delivery of education services. One such strategy is to decentralize education decision making by increasing parental and community involvement in schools, which is commonly known as school-based management (SBM). The argument in favor of SBM is that decentralizing decision-making authority to parents and communities fosters demand and ensures that schools provide the social and economic benefits that best reflect the priorities and values of those local communities. An increasing number of developing countries are implementing SBM reforms aimed at empowering principals, teachers, and parents, or at strengthening their motivation, thereby enhancing their sense of ownership of the school. Many of these reforms have led to greater involvement of communities and parents and, in turn, have had a direct influence on educational quality. In particular, it has been found that increased participation, autonomy, and accountability are the three most important changes associated with improved quality of education and better learning outcomes.

The 2004 World Development Report (WDR) ―Making Services Work for Poor People‖ (World Bank 2003) provides a conceptual framework for this phenomenon. The framework is presented as a three-cornered relationship between citizens, politicians, and service providers. The service provision and accountability relationships between these actors is complex, as even within each group of actors there are usually heterogeneous sub-groups, and the incentives and accountability relationships that work for one group may be different from those that work for other groups. When accountability fails, the failure can be tracked either to the long route between providers and users through policymakers, or to the short route between service providers and users directly. Sometimes improving the long route is a long-term process and, in some situations, may not be doable. In these cases, the WDR 2004 suggests strengthening the short route between providers and users (Figure 1).

2
|**_UR_**|0.005<br>(0.46)|-0.005*<br>(-2.05)|-0.005<br>(-1.28)|0.001*<br>(1.99)|0.001**<br>(2.34)|0.001**<br>(3.32)|-|0.002*<br>(2.22)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_Debt_**|0.005<br>(1.66)|0.002<br>(0.57)|-0.014**<br>(-3.27)|-0.005*<br>(-2.01)|0.003<br>(1.51)|-0.009**<br>(-3.18)|-0.009*<br>(-2.61)|-0.01**<br>(-3.22)|
|**_SCST_**|||-0.02**<br>(-3.57)|-0.008**<br>(-3.01)|-0.001*<br>(-2.78)|-0.002**<br>(-3.47)|-0.002**<br>(-3.11)|-0.01*<br>(-2.75)|
|**_CRE_**|-0.002*<br>(-2.75)|-0.004<br>(-1.9)|-|-|-|-|-|-|
|**_PDEN_**|0.0003**<br>(3.82)|0.0004*<br>(2.55)|0.001<br>(1.69)|-|0.0002*<br>(2.38)|-|-|-|
|**_FINFRA_**|||||||0.05*<br>(2.11)||
|**_PINFRA_**||||||0.33*<br>(2.49)|||
|**_DUM_**|||||||0.17**<br>(3.12)|0.19**<br>(3.24)|
|AR (1) (p-<br>value)<br>AR (2)(P-<br>value)<br>Sargan test<br>(P-value)<br>No.<br>Instruments<br>Hansen test<br>of<br>Exogeniety|(0.02)<br>(0.49)<br>(0.17)<br>23<br>0.17|(0.02)<br>(0.29)<br>(0.14)<br>26<br>0.15|(0.03)<br>(0.425)<br>(0.46)<br>26<br>0.45|(0.06)<br>(0.15)<br>(0.17)<br>24<br>0.57|(0.00)<br>(0.12)<br>(0.45)<br>32<br>0.31|(0.00)<br>(0.33)<br>(0.19)<br>23<br>0.60|(0.00)<br>(0.18)<br>(0.41)<br>27<br>0.45|(0.02)<br>(0.36)<br>(0.72)<br>20<br>0.30|

Notes: ** and * denote significance at 1 and 5 % levels. The figures in the brackets are t-statistics.

The study also analyzes the role of capital expenditure on social infrastructure. The coefficient of capital expenditure is found to be positive and significant, indicating that an increase in capital expenditure by the state government leads to higher availability of social infrastructure. Like physical infrastructure, the internal debt ratio is found to have a significant negative impact on social infrastructure, indicating that a high level of internal debt is detrimental to social infrastructure development (Aizenman et al. 2007; Winter, 2017).

The impact of urbanization on social infrastructure is also found to be positive and statistically significant. The result is in keeping with existing literature which suggests that infrastructure facilities like education, health, and housing are important for the urban population, and thus, the supply of such facilities rises with urbanization (Biehl, 1989). It is not surprising to observe that more urbanized states, such as Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra, perform well in terms of their social infrastructure indices. The impact of population density is found to be positive and significant, implying that higher population density increases demand for social infrastructure leading to higher development. These findings are in line with previous findings on infrastructure (Glover, 1976, Frederiksen, 1981; Randolph et al.,1999).

25
of heterogeneity. Moving from a village that was ethnically homogeneous to the most ethnically diverse village in the sample was associated with a decrease in the level of missing expenditures of 26 percentage points. At least in this case, ethnic heterogeneity led to lower trust, perhaps as a result increasing monitoring which in turn reduced estimated corruption even as perceived levels of corruption were higher.

Furthermore, the presence of public interventions designed to reduce corruption in the roads projects (inviting villagers to community meetings and providing anonymous comment forms) increased the perception of corruption in the project while doing comparatively little to reduce actual corruption. The private threat of audits made to the project director did little to reduce perceptions of corruption but significantly reduced estimated corruption levels.

In other words, even at the level of the village project, perceptions of grand corruption are a weak guide to actual levels of corruption and subject to systemic biases. This problem is surely considerably larger at the level of the country, where the social distance between the corrupt individual or activity and the survey respondent is likely to be far greater.

# **Perceptions, Surveys and Outcomes**

This may be why evidence from survey instruments suggests that perceptions indices are poorly correlated with other measures of grand corruption. Regarding country averages for the question ‘how often firms like yours need to make extra, unofficial payments to gain government contracts?’ answers to this question are correlated only weakly with Transparency International rankings (Table 4). Looking at business environment datasets (Table 5), the results suggest that surveyed corruption in contracting is insignificantly related to TI CPI scores. Transparency International corruption perceptions rankings correlate far more strongly with petty corruption questions in the BEEPS data than with grand corruption (the TI measure correlates better with payments for utility connections and licenses than with payments for government contracts, for example). Knack (2006) demonstrates this result for the WBI corruption index as well as the TI measures. But Knack also notes that, as measured by frequency and scale of reported bribes, petty corruption appears to be only weakly correlated to levels of grand corruption.

We have seen that survey evidence suggests that corruption in construction and infrastructure is weakly correlated with general corruption levels. Given in addition the weak relationship between surveyed general corruption levels and perceptions of corruption, it is perhaps unsurprising that there appears to be no link between surveyed measures of infrastructure corruption and general perceptions measures. Table 4 suggests no link between construction firm BEEPS survey responses regarding corruption and the CPI. Looking at petty corruption in infrastructure and CPI measures, the (little) available data suggests no significant correlation between perceptions of corruption in getting an electricity connection and CPI scores (Table 6).

10
<u>Figure 3. Decline in Inequality from Market to Final Income</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0<br>-0.05<br>-0.1<br>-0.15<br>-0.2<br>-0.25<br>-0.3<br>Pensions as deferred income Pensions as transfers<br>Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution, 2018 and references therein. Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016);<br>Croatia: Inchauste and Rubil (2014); Romania: own estimates using HBS 2016.<br>Pensions are treated as transfers in this figure to ensure comparability with Euromod.<br>The impact of indirect taxes Figure 4. Emerging markets: Gini Coefficient<br>is relatively important in all (pensions as deferred income)<br>cases. Once indirect taxes 0.50<br>are taken into account, the Argentina<br>redistributive effort is<br>0.45<br>somewhat reversed as the<br>Poland<br>Gini coefficient for<br>consumable income is 0.40<br>Russia<br>United States<br>slightly higher than what is<br>observed for disposable<br>0.35<br>income as indirect taxes<br>tend to be regressive and Romania<br>unequalizing (Figure 4). In 0.30 Croatia<br>the case of Romania, the<br>effect of indirect taxes is<br>0.25<br>less severe than in Poland<br>Market income Disposable Consumable Final income<br>and Croatia. Spending on plus pensions income income<br>Change in Gini<br>Argentina, 2012-13 South Africa, 2010-11 Poland, 2014 Georgia, 2013 Brazil, 2008-09 United States, 2011 Costa Rica, 2010 Uruguay, 2009 Croatia, 2014 Iran, 2011-12 Mexico, 2010 Tunisia, 2010 Chile, 2013 Ecuador, 2011-12 Colombia, 2010 Romania, 2016 Russia, 2010 Venezuela, 2012 Bolivia, 2009 Dominican Rep., 2006-07 Tanzania, 2011-12 Paraguay, 2014 Nicaragua, 2009 Armenia, 2011 El Salvador, 2011 Peru, 2009 Ghana, 2012-13 Uganda, 2012-13 Sri Lanka, 2009-10 Honduras, 2011 Indonesia, 2012 Guatemala, 2011 Jordan, 2010-11 Ethiopia, 2010-11<br><!-- End of picture text --> The impact of indirect taxes is relatively important in all cases. Once indirect taxes are taken into account, the redistributive effort is somewhat reversed as the Gini coefficient for consumable income is slightly higher than what is observed for disposable income as indirect taxes tend to be regressive and unequalizing (Figure 4). In the case of Romania, the effect of indirect taxes is less severe than in Poland and Croatia. Spending on education and health further reduce inequality, however, the redistributive effect is Source: Argentina: Rossignolo (2017); Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016); Russia: Lopez-Calvo et al (2016); Croatia: Inchauste and Rubil (2014); United <u>States: Higgins et al (2016), Romania: own estimates using 2016 Romanian HBS.</u> much lower than in other countries. This reflects the fact that education spending is less equalizing in Romania, as discussed below.

14