rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
bonds. A credit crunch can originate from weak financial institutions or from tightened<sup>regulation</sup> and supervision. Increased uncertainty about whether and at what price loans will<sup>be availablecan</sup> also result in a shortage of loanable funds (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). These effects<sup>can be</sup> particularly severe for bank lending because banks are more likely than other financial intermediaries or markets to lend to firms that suffer from a greater degree of informational asymmetries.

JU n audi-11ra z ll _A_ l.-,ce sheet **e,e** car **ltr ai.wplifi the** pffooft **of** shckhnsr nin corporations (see Bemanke and Gertier **(i995)** tor a review). Agenor and Aizenman<sup>**(Ii999),**Chan-</sup> Lau and Chen (1998), Kim and Stone (1999) in a domestic context and<sup>Greenwald (1999)inan</sup> international context show that generally weaknesses in the financial sector along with tighter regulation and supervision appear to contribute to corporate distress by curbing<sup>credit. Ding, Domac</sup> and Ferri (1998) and Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) provide some empirical evidence<sup>that tighter rules for</sup> 11i1llarlcal LllOtIL.^-JIOn zfetd h _upply MA larAU1,al L%nds%&_ insvrlco-;s ha.e n ntw. of corporates were also likely to have been important in reducing the supply of<sup>financing.</sup> Empirical research on identifying tools for the resolution and management of<sup>banking crises</sup> that are effective in resolving the crisis while limiting adverse economic spillover<sup>to the rest of the</sup> economy is sparse and most research in this area is limited to individual<sup>cases.Honohanand</sup> Klingebiel (2002) use cross-countrv evidence to determine whether specific<sup>crisis containmentand</sup> resoluLiVIn pol1icies syt...atiLcallJLLLy inluenceLL,JAV 141e fiscall costs _owf rewsolvir.g _a criisiss._ Tr1.-.e .fi.n.d hAct accommodating policies - such as blanket deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bailouts, and regulatory forbearance<sup>-</sup> significantly increase fiscal costs of resolving a crisis. Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2001) review<sup>the literature on crises</sup> resolution strategies.

5
child anthropometric indicators are typically considered to reflect shorter-term nutritional deprivation and morbidity, while stunting reflects longer-term conditions. It would therefore be useful for future research to examine lagged effects of gas flaring in prior years. It is important to note that our results may also be picking up other channels of pollution such as oil spillage which are rampant in this region, and which could adversely affect child growth through deleterious effects of on agricultural output.

Relatedly, an important caveat to associations between flaring and child health is that omitted variable bias may still be a problem. In future work, we will investigate the possibility of identifying a causal impact of pollution on health outcomes by comparing the health outcomes of siblings born to the same mother before and after flaring. Sometimes technical factors cause wells to stop flaring for a long period of time before resuming, and this gives an opportunity to compare outcomes of siblings born to the same mother before and after flaring for locations with long stoppages in flaring. By comparing siblings born to the same mother, we can control for a host of other unobservable characteristics that may confound the identification of the causal relationship between gas flaring and child health.

# 5. Conclusion

We use a newly available dataset on satellite detected gas flaring to examine the relationship between flaring and various child-health outcomes. Our results show a positive association between flaring and incidence of diseases (particularly cough, respiratory symptoms, and fever) and short-term nutritional outcomes (wasting and underweight). Our results are in line with earlier evidence from a smaller subset of flaring communities where flaring has been found to be associated with a host of diseases and poor agricultural production. Our analysis provides the first comprehensive overview of flaring and child health outcomes in the Niger-Delta region, one of the regions with the highest flare activity in the world and where earlier efforts to examine the impact of flaring activity were limited due to the lack of data. While the methods described above can be used to show an association between flaring and human health, omitted variable bias may still be a problem and the association presented by these methods does not necessarily imply causation. In future work, we will investigate the possibility of identifying a causal impact of pollution on health outcomes by comparing the health outcomes of siblings born to the same mother before and after flaring. The method and design described for this project can be extended to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as the Republic of Congo and Gabon that are like Nigeria in their practice of routine gas flaring but where unavailability of data has limited the examination of the health impacts of this practice. The extension of the approach described here provides an opportunity to build an evidence base on the impact of gas flaring on human health in Sub-Saharan Africa.

18
# On Interfuel Substitution: Some International Evidence<sup>∗</sup>

Apostolos Serletis<sup>†</sup> Department of Economics University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada Govinda Timilsina Development Research Group The World Bank 1818 H Street N.W. Washington, DC 20433 U.S.A.

and Olexandr Vasetsky Department of Economics University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4

## JEL classification: C2; D4.

Keywords: Flexible functional forms; Normalized quadratic (NQ) cost function; Theoretical regularity

> ∗We sincerely thank Erwin Diewert, Melvin Hinich, and Shahidur R. Khandker for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The World Bank Research Support Program provided financial support. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the World Bank and its affiliated organizations.

> †Corresponding author. Phone: (403) 220-4092; Fax: (403) 282-5262; E-mail: Serletis@ucalgary.ca.

1
# **Table 3: Estimating the Cointegrating Vector for Savings**

**Part** III: Dynamic GLS for _(s y),_ = **_,, +,61_** In **_y,_** +/36fli, _+ 65 govs, +u,_

||CHL|GHA|IDN|**KOR**|**MYS**|MEX|**TUR**|**ZWE**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Constant|-1.701|-1.747|-0.335|-8.083|-0.227|-1.877|1.362|-7.497|
||(2.246)|(-4.371)|(-0.354)|(-4.431)|(-0.301)|(-4.096)|(0.827)|(-5.082)|
|In yt|0.143|0.166|0.043|0.418|0.060|0.266|-0.083|0.443|
||(2.384)|(4.571)|(0.567)|(5.877)|(0.658)|(4.566)|(-0.716)|(6.154)|
|flit|0.003|0.003|0.003|-0.02|0.004|-0.01|0.015|-0.027|
||(0.274)|(0.132)|(0.326)|(-2.269)|(0.561)|(-3.544)|(3.020)|(-2.461)|
|govst|-0.206|-0.463|-0.719|-1.000|-1.014|-1.297|-0.180|-0.989|
||(-0.485)|(-2.329)|(-0.749)|(-2.905)|(-4.634)|(-8.804)|(-0.550)|(-2.844)|
|NOBS|23|23|22|22|23|23|23|18|

Notes:

1. t-statistics in parenthesis.

2. The dynamic GLS estimates have been obtained by adding the contemporaneous changes of all the RHS variables as additional regressors and by allowing for AR (1) errors.

45
# **Figure 10. Methodological quality of the compiled studies, by country. Andean Region; 2009**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>50<br>40<br>Limited<br>30<br>Intermediate<br>High<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Peru n= 57 Ecuador n= 40 Bolivia n= 25<br>Number of documents<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** Authors’ calculation using information from _Database and References for an Evidence-based Strategy_ in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

**Findings:** The distribution of the methodological quality scores presented a median value of 9 in Peru and 8 in Ecuador and Bolivia.  High methodological quality studies represented 82% of the total in Peru; 68% in Bolivia; and 52% in Ecuador.  There is a clear correlation between the proportion of published studies with peer review and those judged to have sound methodology.

# **Stratification according to priority populations and methodological quality**

ASAP categorized the studies according to the priority populations and analyzed the methodological quality found in each group.

# **Men who have sex with men**

In **Peru’s** database, there were 15 studies done on populations of men who have sex with men. The distribution had a median of 9 points. Eighty percent of the studies had high methodological quality; 13% had intermediate quality; and 7% had limited quality. In Ecuador, there were nine studies done on MSM populations. The distribution had a median of 8 points. Fifty-six percent of the studies had high methodological quality; 33% had intermediate quality; and 11% had limited quality. In Bolivia, there were five studies done on MSM populations. The distribution had a median of 6 points. Twenty percent of 26
Participation in (a) the _desa_ legislative council (LMD), (b) the executive council (LKMD), (c) official neighborhood organizations (RT or RW), (d) official women's organization (PKK or _Dasawisma),_ or (e) official youth organization _(Karang Taruna)_ was counted as engagement in a _"desa_ government organization." Participation in all other organizations was classified as "endogenous" social organizations--even though some of these groups did have affiliation with the government (e.g. government sponsored cooperatives). The distinction is not therefore between "government" and "non-government" organizations but between organizations that are _part of the structure of local government_ and organizations with other purposes.

We differentiate the impact of the four types of social activities: sociability, network, and _desa_ government organizations, and other social organizations (see Tables 1 and 2). However, within each we simply add either activity or memberships--that is, there is no weighting within the categories to allow for different organizations to have a stronger or weaker impact in creating "social capital" or to have a stronger or weaker association with governance'<sup>2</sup> . The problem of how to properly aggregate the observed range of social activities pervades all work on "social capital" and is almost certainly intractable _in principle_ (see annex 1).

|Table2:Average engagemen|tbyanyhousehold|memberinfour|classesofsocial activ|ities|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|District<br>_(Kabupaten),_Province|Sociability<br>(number<br>visits)|Network<br>activities<br>(activitiesin<br>thelast<br>month)|Social<br>organizations<br>(numberofactive<br>memberships)|_Desa_<br>government<br>organizations<br>(participationin<br>theactivities)|
|Sarko(Jambi)|9.7|4.33|.387|1.80|
|Batanghari (Jambi)|10|4.35|.804|1.65|
|Banyumas(C.Java)|8.81|8.16|.859|2.17|

**12** Other studies of social capital have weighted membership in various organizations by characteristics of the organization thought to contribute to social capital (e.g. horizontal relationships among members, membership inclusive across social categories, frequency of participation)-see Narayan and Pritchett (1996), Grootaert (2000).

12
treatment 5 dominates all other treatments, except treatment 6 (no statistical difference), with additional savings in the 6 to 15 kilogram range. Treatment 4 is found to be the least effective, with statistically fewer fuelwood savings compared with all other treatments. Treatment 4 is estimated to elicit 3 to 15 kilograms less average fuelwood savings depending on the treatment comparator.

The pairwise comparisons of treatments 2, 4 and 6, which all have the network treatment aspect, and 1, 3, 5, which do not have networking, are especially instructive. For those with the networking aspect we find that <u>those who paid for the stove rather than receiving for free or receiving an incentive have statistically lower fuelwood savings, but free distribution and receiving a</u> small incentive for use during the first monitoring period are statistically indistinguishable. Comparisons of treatments 1, 3, 5 are somewhat less clear. We find that those who received their Mirt stoves for free have much larger fuelwood savings than the other two monetary treatment aspects. Those who paid 25 birr for their stoves (treatment 3) are estimated, however, to save 4.8 kilograms more per week than those who received the first-period use incentive. This finding corresponds with those from the Mann-Whitney tests in Table 7.

We are unable to draw robust conclusions about the networking treatment aspect independent of the financial terms. Comparing treatments 1 and 2 (small incentive payment in period 1) we find that households receiving the network treatment saved an average of 4.7 kilograms more wood per week. Those who received treatment 4 (paid ETB 25 with networking) had fewer fuelwood savings than all other treatments, including treatment 3 (Paid ETB 25, no networking). Finally, the effects of treatments 5 and 6 (free distribution with and without networking) are found to be statistically indistinguishable.

# _4.4 Pooled OLS Regression Results_<sup>_9_</sup>

We now discuss pooled OLS results with district (i.e. _woreda_ ) fixed effects and errors clustered by household. The dependent variable is quantity of fuelwood saved due to use of Mirt stove in kilograms per week. We also include interactions between treatment and round dummies where the interaction between treatment 5 and round 1 is the omitted category. We estimate five models, which differ in terms of the number of explanatory variables included in the analysis. Under the null hypothesis that _R_<sup>2</sup> = 0, the _F_ statistic follows the _F_ distribution with 58 and 749 degrees of freedom. We find for Model 5, which is the most comprehensive in terms of explanatory variables

> 9 The random effects estimation results with district (i.e. _woreda_ ) fixed effects are found in Appendix A.

**27 |** P a g e
women, and youth are excluded from formal financial systems. Systematic indicators of the use of different financial services had been lacking for most economies.

The 2012 Global Findex database provides such indicators, measuring how people in 148 economies save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).<sup>3</sup> These new indicators are constructed with survey data from interviews with more than 150,000 nationally representative and randomly selected adults age 15 and above. The survey was carried out over the 2011 calendar year by Gallup, Inc. as part of its Gallup World Poll Survey and includes more than 40,000 interviews across 41 economies in Africa.

# **_3.1 Account Penetration_**

Overall, 23% of adults in the Africa region have an account. Within Africa, there is a large variation in account ownership: 24% of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa report having an account at a formal financial institution, though this ranges ranging from 51% in Southern Africa to 11% in Central Africa (Figure 1).<sup>4</sup> In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, more than 95% of adults are ―unbanked‖ (i.e. do not have an account at a formal financial institution). In North Africa 20% of adults have an account at a formal financial institution ranging from 39% in Morocco to 10% in Egypt.

> 3 The complete database and related reports are available at: www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.

> 4 Subregional classifications are based on those of the United Nations Statistical Division and the World Bank. In the analysis, Djibouti is excluded, and Sudan is considered part of Central Africa. The regional and subregional aggregates omit economies for which Gallup excludes more than 20% of the population in the sampling either because of security risks or inaccessibility. In Sub-Saharan Africa, these excluded economies are the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Somalia. In North Africa, Algeria is excluded.

4
# **Table 3. Bangladesh: Impact of receiving remittances on per capita household consumption one year after the flood after controlling for the endogeneity of remittances for flood affected-areas**

_Dependent variable: Per capita monthly household consumption (takas)_

||**(1)**|**(2)**|
|---|---|---|
|Average monthly remittances received by household in the last six months<br>(thousands of takas)|24.4*<br>(13.7)|24.6*<br>(13.6)|
|Average monthly public assistance received by household in the last six months|-269.9||
|(thousands of takas)|(509.4)||
|Log of pre-flood assets-consumer durables|30.9***<br>(8.2)|31.2***<br>(8.2)|
|Log of pre-flood assets-food stock|-5.0<br>|-4.9<br>|
||(7.0)|(7.0)|
|Log of pre-flood assets-livestock|0.7|1.0|
||(4.5)|(4.5)|
|Household has electricity|183.1***<br>(59.1)|183.7***<br>(59.1)|
|Per capita land of household|6.5***|6.6***|
||(1.3)|(1.3)|
|Maximum years of education in household|11.2*<br>(6.6)|11.5*<br>(6.6)|
|Number of primary educated in household|-25.8**<br>(11.8)|-26.4**<br>(11.8)|
|Number of secondary educated in household|18.6|17.9|
||(20.5)|(20.5)|
|Number of tertiary educated in household|1.7|0.8|
||(76.1)|(76.0)|
|Number of children below age 5 in household|-69.0***|-69.2***|
||(15.7)|(15.7)|
|Number of males above age 15 in household|73.2***<br>(18.8)|73.5***<br>(18.7)|
|Number of pre-flood migrants from household|-6.0<br>(15.9)|-6.1<br>(15.9)|
|Constant|180.8|174.1|
||(219.7)|(219.2)|
|Observations|469|469|
|R-squared|0.41|0.41|

Standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Source: Authors estimations based on household survey in Bangladesh conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute in 1998-99 (see del Ninno et al. 2001).

# **_4.3 Ex-ante preparedness of remittance-receiving households for disasters in Ghana and Burkina Faso_**

In this section, we explore whether households in Ghana and Burkina Faso that receive remittances ex-ante better prepared against natural disasters compared to other households. West Africa in general and the Sahel region in particular are characterized by households that don’t receive any remittances). This appears to be lower than the average propensity to consume likely because of the use of remittances for reconstruction after the flood.

12
desire to diversify energy portfolios and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, and concern about climate change caused by the build-up of atmospheric stocks of greenhouse gasses. Even politicians who view the movement toward low carbon alternatives as exogenous may support green industrial policies as a means of ensuring that domestic industries will be positioned to take advantage of future opportunities. Politicians may also see green industrial policy as offering an opportunity to increase domestic employment. These types of considerations are common to industrial policy in general.

While countries with a dirigiste tradition consider industrial policy to be a natural activity for governments, it tends to be viewed with considerable skepticism in the US. Even there, however, it enjoyed a kind of vogue during the 1980s and 1990s. Proponents of industrial policy sometimes agree that although governments are not well placed to pick winners, they can nevertheless intervene to promote well functioning markets. However, green industrial policy — like industrial policy of any hue — often does involve picking winners. This choice occurs at a micro and a macro level. As an example of the former, when a government decides to offer a particular company a loan guarantee, it makes a bet that this company will be a winner. The macro choices are more important. Brazil promotes sugar-based ethanol, and the US supports corn-based ethanol; Germany emphasizes solar power and China emphasizes wind power.

A broad based policy, such as a carbon tax or technology-neutral performance standards, allows the market to identify winners. Most economists prefer those types of policies, but political realities limit their applicability. Both taxes and increased regulation are currently in bad odor. They might also be ineffective because of the commitment problem described above. Unless mandated or subsidized, current investment and adoption decisions depend on the anticipation of future policies, over which current governments have limited control.

It would be helpful to have retrospective studies that determine whether past green policies have been successes or failures, but any such study would be quite subjective. Brazil’s ethanol policy illustrates the difficulties. This policy has been in effect for decades, and has resulted in a strong ethanol producing industry. On that ground it appears to be a success. However, we do not know what the counterfactual is; we do not know the opportunity cost of the resources devoted to Brazil’s ethanol policy. Brazilian ethanol currently has low production costs because of previous investments in production capacity and infrastructure. If it had to start from scratch 3
|Any HH member drank alcohol|1 if respondent from a HH with any HH<br>member who had a drinking habit|0.105|0.308|0.074|0.263|0.070|0.256|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_Household characteristics:_**||||||||
|Number of children under 5 years old|Number of children who were under 5 years<br>old|0.407|0.793|0.387|0.694|0.251|0.556|
|Number of current HH members|Number of HH members living in the HH|4.575|2.263|4.855|2.075|4.244|1.819|
|HH owned house|1 if HH owned the house|0.958|0.201|0.961|0.194|0.916|0.278|
|HH owned land|1 if HH owned any land|0.175|0.380|0.172|0.378|0.112|0.316|
|Urban residence|1 if HH was located in urban area|0.461|0.499|0.492|0.501|0.446|0.497|
|HH belonged to poor group (B40)|HH wealth index generated by Principal<br>Component Analysis. 1 if HH wealth index<br>belonged to lower two quintiles|0.271|0.445|0.328|0.470|0.489|0.500|
|HH belonged to non-poor group (T60)|HH wealth index generated by Principal<br>Component Analysis. 1 if HH wealth index<br>belonged to upper three quintiles|0.729|0.445|0.672|0.470|0.511|0.500|
|**_Districts:_**||||||||
|South|1 if HH was located at Southern Kerala state|0.328|0.470|0.293|0.456|0.272|0.445|
|Central|1 if HH was located at Central Kerala state|0.181|0.385|0.133|0.340|0.302|0.459|
|North|1 if HH was located at North Kerala state|0.491|0.501|0.574|0.495|0.426|0.495|

Source: Author’s calculations based on KMS 2013.

18