of these households, (1) pre-fiscal incomes were below the poverty line and net contributions to the fiscal system were larger than net receipts and so total purchasing power was reduced even further. For others, (2) pre-fiscal incomes were above the poverty line, net contributions to the fiscal system were larger than net receipts, and total purchasing power was reduced such that post-fiscal incomes (through Consumable Income) were below the poverty line.

Fiscal policy in Zambia impoverishes more people than do the fiscal policies of lower middle and middleincome countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Table 4 indicates that Zambia’s FI index puts it at the bottom end of the distribution of FI performance: only Tanzania generates impoverishment (via fiscal policy) at a rate comparable to Zambia. Column 5, which presents FI among the individuals who are poor (rather than in the population at large), shows that even in Sri Lanka, where FI is negligible when measured as a percent of the total population, approximately one-third of the consumable-income poor have been impoverished by the (net) fiscal system. In Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia, however, approximately 85 to 100 percent of the population measured as post-fiscal poor were impoverished by the fiscal system.

**Table 4. Fiscal Impoverishment, ca. 2010**

|**Country**, survey year|(1)<br>Market<br>income plus<br>contributory<br>pensions<br>poverty<br>headcount<br>(%)|(2)<br>Change in<br>poverty<br>headcount<br>(percentage<br>points)|(3)<br>Market<br>income plus<br>contributory<br>pensions<br>inequality<br>(Gini)|(4)<br>Fiscally<br>impoverished<br>as % of<br>population|(5)<br>Fiscally<br>impoverished<br>as % of<br>consumable<br>incomepoor|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Armenia, 2011|12.8|-1.0|40.3|6.2|52.3|
|Bolivia, 2009|10.0|-0.2|50.3|6.6|63.2|
|Dominican Republic, 2013|5.7|-0.8|51.4|1.0|16.3|
|<br>Ethiopia, 2011|31.9|1.3|32.2|28.5|83.2|
|<br>Ghana, 2013|6.0|0.8|43.7|5.1|76.6|
|Guatemala, 2010|5.6|0.1|51.3|7.0|62.2|
|Indonesia, 2012|12.1|-1.5|39.4|4.1|39.2|
|Sri Lanka, 2010|5.0|-0.7|37.1|1.6|36.4|
|<br>Tanzania, 2011|43.7|7.8|38.2|50.9|98.6|
|Uganda, 2012/13|17.9|0.1|41.3|12.2|67.7|
|Zambia,2015|36.0|2.8|55.0|52.6|84.3|

_Sources_ : Zambia: authors’ calculations based on LMCS 2015; Uganda: Haas and others (2016); all others: Higgins and Lustig (2016).

The FGP index is the mirror of FI. The FGP index tracks _pre-fiscal_ poor households receiving (net) benefits to determine much their incomes are increased from this receipt. The _pre-fiscal_ poor are those whose market incomes (including pensions) are below the poverty line. At Consumable Income, and using the same $1.25 PPP [2005] poverty line as in table 4, 16 percent of the **_pre-fiscal_** poor receive (net) positive transfers from Zambian fiscal policy. The fiscal system adds an average of approximately 21 percent to the pre-fiscalincome of the poor individuals who receive positive net transfers.

Overall, the fiscal system adds less income to fewer of the pre-fisc poor and takes away more income from more of the post-fisc poor. By now, the result is familiar: on net, the poverty headcount increases between Market Income plus Pensions and Consumable Income.

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