permit, the _zan zhu zheng_ ) in 1985 (Liu 2005) and making these permits widely available to migrants starting in 1988 (Mallee, 1995). These policies provided a legal status to migrants, whose presence in cities would otherwise be illegal under strict _Hukou_ regulations.<sup>23</sup> Since then, the stock of rural _Hukou_ migrants has continuously risen, reaching over 295.62 million in 2023, with 171.90 million migrating outside their home townships (National Bureau of Statistics, 2023).

Due to their agricultural _Hukou_ and relatively low educational attainment, migrants generally hold different jobs than local urban residents (Meng and Zhang 2001; Meng 2012), typically working in lessskilled, blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, construction, services, and textiles, which are unattractive to urban residents (Naughton, 2018). The _Hukou_ system has not only segmented the urban labor market, but also denied migrants access to social security and medical benefits, education for children, and housing. Migrants also face discrimination from urban residents (Kuang and Liu, 2012) and the _Hukou_ system has raised migration costs and sustained regional wage differentials (Whalley and Zhang, 2007).

Obstacles to switching one’s registration from rural to urban areas, compounded by lack of access to urban health, education, and social insurance, have prevented entire rural families from moving to cities (World Bank, 2009).<sup>4</sup> Given prevailing gender norms, women are more likely than men to stay behind in rural areas with their families (Mu and van de Walle 2011). Recent policy changes in response to labor market segmentation and the growing number of migrants in cities have coincided with and likely encouraged changes in family migration patterns. Even before the 2014 _Hukou_ reform, a growing number of young migrant workers were migrating with their children (Wang et al. 2019). This new pattern was supported by the emergence of private schools for migrant children in some large cities (Pong, 2014), the new generation’s adaptability to urban life and desire to settle in cities (He and Wang 2016) and migrant parents’ view of urban education as a path to social mobility for their children (Kwong, 2004).

> 2Many rural migrants continue to work in cities without temporary residence permits. Evidence from the 2001 China Urban Labor Survey (CULS) suggests that nearly half of the rural migrant population in 2000 were working without temporary residence permits (appendix materials for de Brauw and Giles 2017). Migrants with legal guest worker status have more secure employment and tend to be more established in cities.

> 3Since 2016 based on _The Interim Regulations on Residence Permits_ issued by the State Council, migrants with stable employment or residential place and residing in a city for more than 6 months are encouraged to apply for residence permits ( _Ju Zhu Zheng)_ , which replaced temporary residence permits issued in earlier years. Like the previous regulatory measure of temporary residence permits, this regulation is not enforced.

> 4Individuals with rural _Hukou_ status can now purchase non-agricultural _Hukou_ status from urban governments, yet in many cases the system continues to work against more permanent migration flows (Fan, 2008). Further, since implementation of the Labor Contract Law in 2008, it has been feasible for migrants to enroll in urban social insurance programs (including both health insurance and pensions), but confusion over enrollment procedures and lack of portability still contribute to low participation rates (Giles et al., 2021).

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