rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
stratification by firms’ location, sector, and size.<sup>5,6</sup> Since the onset of the pandemic, two rounds of the COVID-19 Follow-up Surveys (COV-ES) were conducted in both countries, re-contacting all of the ES respondent firms and asking questions on a wide range of topics, including whether they have received any government support during the pandemic. We use these three sets of data in both countries, and we merge them through the unique firm identifier.

Table 1 shows the timing of all three surveys. The latest ES in El Salvador was conducted between March and August 2016, interviewing 719 firms, whereas the Georgia ES was implemented between March 2019 and January 2020, covering 581 firms. The first round of the COVID-19 Follow-up Surveys (COV-ES, R1) started in June 2020 in both countries. It took almost two months to complete it in El Salvador, but Georgia COV-ES, R1 was completed within the same month. The second round of the COVID-19 Follow-up Surveys (COV-ES, R2) was completed in October 2020 through January 2021 in El Salvador and October-November in Georgia. Importantly, the reference period for many questions appearing in ES is the last completed fiscal year prior to the survey implementation. This means that the reference year in ES is 2015 and 2018 for El Salvador and Georgia, respectively. The reference period for many questions appearing in COV-ES is the last completed month.

Both ES and COV-ES contain a rich set of information on firm characteristics, covering topics of sales, employment, finance, among others. As per the standard methodology, the ES data is obtained through face-to-face interviews with firm owners or top managers, lasting on average one hour, while COV-ES interviews were conducted by phone through much shorter interviews, lasting on average 25 minutes. All three datasets of each country contain sampling weights. COVES data combines the information contained in the ES sampling weights with the information about firm closures obtained during the implementation of COV-ES survey and provides updated sampling weights. Since the panel estimation method requires time-invariant sampling weights,

> 5 See details of the survey methodology here: www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/methodology.

> 6 Although the unit of observation is an establishment in ES, we refer the establishments in ES as firms following the common convention in literature.

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2 In **sp.** e of the effort devoted to these initiatives there appears to have been no consideration given to whether certain complementarities exist between the two policy approaches. Specifically, if prices for semiprocessed or processed commodities oehave differently than those for the primary form then shifting the structure of exports will alter the level and<sup>stability of export</sup> earnings. One possibility is that markets for some processed commodities (such as leather, chocolate, or iron and steel) may be more stable than those<sup>for raw-</sup> form goods, particularly if administered pricing is used in the former or if the demand for these items is relatively more stable. A related question of importance is whether major differences exist in longer-term trends in primary and processed commodity prices. If the latter are more stable and also have a greater secular increase (or less of a decrease) this would be a further attraction for natural resource-based industrialization strategies.

This study has a threefold objective relating to these points. First, an attempt is made to quantify the magnitude of change that occurred in developing country commodity exports from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s. Here, an effort will be made to identify important factors--such as differential changes in demand or develocing countries' competitive position--which produced the structural trade changes. Second, intercountry and interregional differences in export performance will be examined in an attempt to determine whether there were major differences in developing countries' experience. This section also examines longer-term changes in individual developed country import statistics in order to determine if some markets were relatively more open (or closed) to processed commodities. Third, import price (unit value) statistics for primary and processed commodities are analyzed in order to determine whether the structural trade changes which occurred lead to greater (or less) stability and growth in export earnings.
surveys.) The average poverty gap index rises from 9.4% for the $1.25 line to 18.6% for the $2 line and 70.4% for $13. These reflect both the differences in the proportions of the population under each line (the headcount index of poverty)—the mean values of which are 15.2%, 41.6% and 93.8% for $1.25, $2 and $13 respectively—and the differences in mean incomes of those under each line relative to the line.

Before discussing the implications for the question posed in the title, it is instructive to first consider a few country examples, and I will focus on Brazil, China and India for this purpose. For Brazil in 2005, covering the poverty gap for $1.25 a day would only require a MTR of 1% on those who are not poor by US standards. Even for the $2 a day line, the necessary marginal rate would only be 4% (Table 1). The required tax rates would also have been higher for Brazil in 1981 (say) than 2005, but still quite low; for example,<sup></sup> 1(2) would have been about 11% in 1981, as compared to 4% in 2005. Recall that these are international lines, and they are lower than the poverty line commonly used in discussing poverty in Brazil, which is about $3 a day at 2005 PPP; filling the poverty gap for this line would call for a MTR of about 12% on those living over $13 a day.

Next consider China, which actually has an anti-poverty program quite similar in spirit at least to the stylized program modeled here; I refer to China’s _Dibao_ program, which aims to fill the poverty gaps relative to (municipality-specific) poverty lines. The marginal tax on Chinese living above the US poverty line that would be needed to cover the poverty gap for $1.25 a day is 37% in 2005, i.e., all those living above $13 a day would need to pay a tax of roughly one third of the difference between their income and $13 to bring everyone in China up to the $1.25 a day line. China’s national poverty line is closer to $1 a day, which would only requite a MTR of 30%. However, the tax rate needed to cover the $2 a day poverty gap would require a prohibitive rate of 100%. Also, if one repeats these calculations in 1981 (the earliest available national surveys for China), covering the poverty gap through redistribution would have been impossible: the required MTR would have been far greater than 100%. The poverty gap was so large then, and the country so poor, that redistribution was not a realistic option.

The capacity for redistribution in India is far more limited than in China or (especially) Brazil. Indeed, it would be impossible to raise enough revenue from a tax on Indian incomes above the US poverty line to fill India’s poverty gap relative to the $1.25 a day line; the required 13
membership, and special deals have been approved (e.g., with Finland) or are pending with EFTA -nembers.8 Furthermore, it is worth remembering that, with reunification, the former German Democratic Republic was absorbed into the European Community -- a move that also provided duty free access for manufactured goods exported to EFTA markets.

Recent developments in Latin America such as MERCOSUR and the Chile-Mexico FTA were not explicitly accounted for in our tabulations.<sup>9</sup> The MERCOSUR process is intended to lead to the creation of a common market - encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay - by the end of 1994. The Asuncion Treaty, signed in March 1991, established this ambitious target based on the progress so far achieved in the context of the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Program initiated in 1986 (for a brief description of this program see Primo Braga (1990)). The September 1991 treaty for a Chile-Mexico FTA, in turn, established a framework for the gradual reduction of tariffs affecting bilateral trade over the next four years. Accordingly, 90 percent of the goods traded between Chile and Mexico are -xpected to be exchanged under duty free status by the end of 1995. A _first_ approximation of the impact of these arrangements can, however, be inferred from our data on LAIA 'affected" intra-regional trade (see Table 1).

We utilized the 'affected' trade concept in our tabulations due to a lack of precision in some export and import statistics. According to this concept, all trade that occurs between countries which are parties to a minilateral arrangement is affected (normally in a positive direction) by the terms of the agreement. This simplified procedure does not allow for exclusions and differential treatment by type of good that typically exists under these I The estimate of 'affected' trade flows between Eastern Europe and Developed Europe should be interpreted with care (see Table 1). It assumes that all trade between the former European COMECON member and highincome European countries would be covered by preferential arrangements. Since - at least in the near future - one should not expect such a broad array of FTAs, this assumption tends to introduce an upward bias in the estimate. On the other hand, it can be argued that the use of 1988 trade flows inserts a downward bias in this figure. After all, the trade potential of Eastern European countries was significantly hampered by the maze of controls which characterized their tm.' 2 relations with the West at that time.

I Other prospective minilateral agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean appear to be in a formative basis. For example, in January 1991 both Mexico and Venezuela announced their intention to negotiate bilateral free trade agreements with several Central American countries by 1996; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have also signed in 1991 a trilateral framework for liberalization of trade and investment flows. There are also ongoing attempts to revitalize CARICOM, CACM, and the Andean Pact, although the proliferation of new minilateral arrangements is adding to the stress of the 'old' initiatives -- particularly, the Andean Pact.
and coffee.<sup>2</sup> We also note that cooking injera, though occurring every 2-3 days, uses a majority of the fuelwood consumed by households, suggesting that improving the cooking of injera could lead to HAP improvements. The design of the stove is shown in Figures 1 and 2.

# **Figures**

Figure 1 Figure 2 Mirt Stove with Injera Cooking Cook pouring Injera batter on Mirt Stove Source: ethiopiaethos.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/comp5.jpg Source: energypedia.info/wiki/Baking_with_Improved_Ovens In June-July 2013, 360 Mirt stoves were distributed to 360 rural households in Ethiopia. Households were randomly selected to receive the stove using stratified random sampling at the regional state level to be representative of the state population and forest cover. The three regional states are Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, which contain approximately 70 percent of the Ethiopian land area and 80 percent of the population. Households in these regional states generally cook injera and the traditional technology is the threestone tripod; the cuisines and baseline cooking technology are therefore similar across households.

A total of 10 stoves were distributed to 10 randomly selected households in each of 36 randomly selected villages.<sup>3</sup> As of November-December 2016, when data collection for this paper was conducted, 121 stoves were no longer in use. Approximately 1⁄4 of these were in storage and all except one of the others were discarded, with virtually all abandoned due to breakage. This finding is not surprising, because the stove has an estimated five-year lifespan.

> 2The Mirt stove also has a second burner to cook stews and coffee, which can be used in conjunction with when injera is being cooked.

> 3 Stoves were distributed under 3 different monetary treatments – given for free, pay a subsidized cost and paid if used regularly during first 6 weeks.  We observed no differences in initial uptake across the monetary treatment arms (Beyene et al., 2015b), so we group all households distributed a Mirt stove in a single treatment for this paper.

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PRE Wofrkng Par Series

||vb|Athor|DA|Contact<br>for gsQape|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|WPS581|How Successful is World Bank<br>Lending for Structural Adjustment?|Patrick Conway|January 1991|S. Fallon<br>37947|
|WPS582|Adjustment Programs and Bank<br>Support: Rationale and Main<br>Results|Vittorio Corbo<br>Stanley Fischer|January 1991|L. Oropesa<br>39075|
|WPS583|World Bank Lending for Education<br>Research, 1982-89|Marlaine E, Lockheed<br>Alastair G. Rodd|January 1991|C. Cristobal<br>33640|
|WPS584|Whither Hungary and the European<br>Communities?|Alfred Tovias<br>Sam Laird|January 1991|G. Ilogon<br>33732|
|WPS585|Financial Innovation and Money<br>Demand: Theory and Empirical<br>Implementation|Patricio Arrau<br>Jose De Gregorio|January 1991|S. King-Watson<br>31047|
|WPS586|The Challenging Akithmetic of Povert<br>in Bangladesh|y Martin Ravallion|February 1991|WDR Office<br>31393|
|WPS587|Quantifying the Magnitude and<br>Severity of Absolute Poverty in the<br>Developing World in the Mid-1980s|Martin Ravallion<br>Gaurav Datt<br>Dominique van de Walle<br>Elaine Chan|February 1991|WDR Office<br>31393|
|WPS588|Obstacles to Developing Small and<br>Medium-Sized Enterprises: An<br>Empirical Assessment|Brian Levy|February 1991|E. Madrona<br>37496|
|WPS589|To Prescribe or Not to Prescribe:<br>On the Regulation of Pharmaceutiral<br>in Developing Countries|Jeffrky S. Hammer<br>s|February 1991|0. Nadora<br>S6-065|
|WPS590|The Domestic Financial Market and<br>the Trade Liberalization Outcome;<br>The Evidence from Sri Lanka|Premachandra Athukorala<br>Sarath Rajapatirana|February 1991|M. Kienzle<br>30733|
|WPS591|Global Indicators of Nutritional Risk|Rae Galloway|February 1991|0. Nadora<br>31091|
|WPS592|Official Credits to Developing<br>Countries: Implicit Transfers to the<br>Banks|Asli Demirguc-Kunt<br>Harry Huizinga|February 1991|S. King-Watson<br>33730|
|WPS593|Risk Management in Sub-Saharan<br>Africa|Stijn Claessens<br>Ying Oian|February 1991|J. Carroll<br>33715|
|WPS594|Size Rationalization and Trade<br>Exposure in Developing Countries|Mark J. Roberts<br>James R. Tybout|February 1991|S. Fallon<br>37947|
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input costs) due to the pandemic (Figure 2, panel b) for the year 2020 as a whole relative to 2019.

Figure 2: Change in firm trade outcomes <!-- Start of picture text --> (a) Customs data: Change in value of exports and imports<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 10 10<br>2<br>0 0<br>-1<br>-4<br>-10 -10 -9<br>-13 -13<br>-20 -20<br>-30 -30<br>-29<br>-40 -40<br>-41<br>-50 -50<br>Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br>Quarter of 2020 Quarter of 2020<br>(b) BPS data: Change in share of exports and imports<br>0<br>-5<br>-8<br>-10 -9<br>-15<br>2020 vs 2019<br>Change in exports as share of sales (p.p.)<br>Change in imports as share of inputs costs (p.p.)<br>Change in firm exports Change in firm imports<br>Change in shares<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The sample includes in panel a 153,079 firm-quarter observations in the left plot and 579,221 firm-quarter observations in the right plot in 20 countries and in panel b 617 exporting firms in the left bar and 1,024 importing firms in the right bar in 13 countries.

_Second_ , the pandemic had a more adverse effect on firms participating in GVCs (Figure 3, panel a). This is in line with the evidence from Lafrogne-Roussier et al. (2021) on French exporters who were importing inputs from China during the current pandemic. Our data suggest that the declines in firm exports and imports are more persistent for GVC firms, being significant also in the last two quarters of 2020. GVC firms also experience larger and more persistent declines in their numbers of products and partner countries (Figure C6, panels a and b). Evidence based on the latest round of BPS data also show that the average decline in exports as a share of sales was worse for GVC firms in the second half of 2020 and thereafter, relative to 2019 (Figure 3, panel b). GVC firms whose inputs and products cross borders repeatedly have been particularly vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. Firms that participate in GVCs are more affected by sudden drops in demand of products manufactured along a specific value chain as they specialize in different stages of the production process and are often linked by strong and durable trading relationships. As a result, shocks that occur in any part of the GVCs propagate along the value chain, thereby magnifying the impact on 13
**_Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries_**

The multi-faceted nature of reform results in a variety of outcomes so effectiveness and impact can be measured through different performance indicators, e. g. operating efficiency or increased investment. There can also be linkages between sectoral performance and the driving forces that trigger reform. These forces can be internal (e.g. poor sector performance) or external (e.g. foreign debt). Figure 1 illustrates the main aspects of reforms and their inter-relationships.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Country/macro-level equivalents of the sector-level components<br>Institutions<br>(e.g. regulation)<br>Sector Structure Performance<br>endowment (e.g. market (e.g. private<br>(e.g. resource mix) concentration) investment)<br>Reform measures<br>(e.g. privatisation)<br>Motivation for reform<br>(e.g. private capital)<br>Economic Environmental Social<br>impact impact impact<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 1: A model of electricity sector reforms**

It is noteworthy that each of the components of this sector-level reform model can be thought of as having a counterpart in a higher or country-level model of an economy. This model is broadly along the lines of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation. The remainder of this section outlines these aspects of reform in some detail and is heavily based on Jamasb et al. (2004).

9