rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
productivity and earning in countries with different macro environment and protection of property rights.

Another important economic question is how to finance general and specific human capital investments in firms (Willis 1986, Becker 1962, Oi 1962). General human capital raises a worker's productivity regardless of whether she stays at one firm or moves to another. Specific human capital, on the other hand, is lost if she moves to another firm. Efficiency dictates that the employer should sho-ulder much of the costs for specific training, since the worker could not benefit from the training if she moves to another firm. Likewise, there may be little reason for the employer to pay for general training, since the worker could benefit from it even if she moves to another firm. In this case, the worker may pay for the training since she benefits from it wherever she works. It also makes sense for the government to subsidize general training since the economy benefits from more productive workers wherever in the country they work. We have little empirical evidence, however, about the relationship of productivity to labor market experience and how training is financed in different countries. The finding would have policy implications for how governments and firms should approach worker training.

Many Bank surveys cover human capital issues quite well (for instance, RPED and ICS). Most surveys contain the primary measures, although they tend not to explore the distribution of workers in term of labor market experience and seniority structure, and quit rates. Such questions can be important. The turnover rate, for example, can provide an indication of how vigorous a labor market is in one developing country compared to another, or cornpared to industrialized nations. Quit rates may indicate the importance of match-specific human capital and the vitality of a country's labor market (Tybout, 1998). Involuntary turnover rates could indicate the extent to which workers are disciplined or how firms adjust employnient in response to changes in economic conditions.

# **C. Technology**

In the long run, technological progress is largely responsible for growth. It is therefore important to measure it in developing countries. But what determines technological progress and how can we measure it? These questions are exceedingly difficult to answer, even for large firms in industrialized countries. A common input necessary for technological progress is research and 10
# **II. A simple theoretical framework**

We first introduce a New Keynesian model, following Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003), to motivate our empirical exercise. The model consists of the following system of equations: where x� ≡[r�, d�, s�]<sup>�</sup> is a vector of exogenous driving processes that follow the normal distribution of zero mean and a diagonal covariance matrix _._ y� is defined as the deviation of output from its trend-path, π� represents inflation, and R� is the nominal interest rate. π� and R� are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady state values.

Equation (1) posits that the central bank adjusts the policy rate in response to inflation. r� stands for the monetary policy shock, representing an unexpected deviation from the policy rule. Equation (2) is the IS curve derived from the household’s intertemporal problem driven by consumption and bond holdings. The exogenous process, d� , captures aggregate demand shocks such as changes in government spending. Equation (3) implies Calvo-type price setting, with firms adjusting prices with a constant probability in each period and independently of the time elapsed from the previous adjustment. The discrete price setting leads to larger price adjustments in response to higher expected future inflation. The parameter 0 < β < 1 is the firms’ discount factor. Inflation is driven by an exogenous process, s� , typically associated with aggregate supply shocks such as changes in commodity prices or exchange rates. The literature presents various approaches to address the price puzzle arising in this framework, as discussed below.

**_Model misspecification._** Many studies claim that the forward-looking component of monetary policy shocks is not correctly identified in standard empirical models, which typically exclude variables that help central bankers forecast inflation. Equations (1)-(3) imply that standard VAR models do not incorporate expectations for inflation and output gap. These models typically assume that the lagged output, prices, and financial variables—including interest rates, stock prices, and FX rates, which tend to incorporate news shocks on future economic developments— adequately capture inflation and output expectations. However, if the central bank considers a larger information set than VAR models capture, the estimated policy shock is then a combination of a genuine policy shock and an endogenous policy response. If the policy response only partially offsets current inflationary pressures, the VAR would deliver a spurious correlation between policy tightening and a rise in inflation.

The standard solution to this price puzzle was to include commodity prices in models estimated with U.S. data, as they help forecast inflation (e.g., Sims 1992). Other variables considered as potential correlates of future inflation include the output gap, house prices, and global variables.

4
The pure PPP effect on the poverty count can only be properly isolated by using the same set of national poverty lines. For this purpose, we need to focus instead on the $1.45 a day line at 1993 PPP, rather than the $1.08 line, which was based on the old RDV compilation of poverty lines. (Recall that, using the new RCS data set on national poverty lines, the mean for the poorest 15 countries is $1.45 a day at 1993 PPP.) The 2005 poverty rate using this line, and the 1993 PPPs, is 29.0%. Thus the pure effect of the PPP revisions is to bring the poverty rate down from 29% to 25%. Following the discussion in section 3, the fact that the PPP revisions on their own bring down the overall poverty count is not surprising, given that the poverty line is set at the mean of lines for the poorest countries and that the proportionate revisions to the PPPs tend to be greater for poorer countries. Working against this downward effect of the new PPPs, there is an upward adjustment to the overall poverty count coming from the new data on national poverty lines, which (as we have seen) tend to be higher for the poorest countries than those used by RDV for the 1980s. The updating of the data on national poverty lines moved the global poverty rate from 17% to 29%, while the PPP revisions brought it back down to 25%.

Over the 25 year period, we find that the percentage of the population of the developing world living below $1.25 per day was halved, falling from 52% to 25%. (Expressed as a proportion of the population of the world, the decline is from 42% to 21%; this assumes that there is nobody living below $1.25 per day in the developed countries.<sup>38</sup> ) The number of poor fell by slightly over 500 million, from 1.9 billion to 1.4 billion over 1981-2005 (Table 5). The trend rate of decline in the $1.25 a day poverty rate over 1981-2005 was 1% point per year; regressing the poverty rate on time the estimated trend is -0.99% per year with a standard error of 0.06% (R<sup>2</sup> =0.97). This is slightly higher than the trend we had obtained using the 1993 PPPs, which was -0.83% per year (standard error=0.11%). Simply projecting this trend forward to 2015, the estimated headcount index for that year is 16.6% (standard error of 1.5%).

Given that the 1990 poverty rate was 41.6%, the new estimates indicate that the developing world as a whole is on track to achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 1990 poverty rate by 2015. The 1% point per year rate of decline in the poverty rate also holds if one focuses on the period since 1990 (not just because this is the base year for the MDG but also recalling that the data for the 1980s is weaker). The $1.25 poverty rate fell

> 38 The population of the developing world in 2005 was 5453 million, representing 84.4% of the world’s total population; in 1981, it was 3663 million or 81.3% of the total.

23
IV.5 The Effects of Temporary versus Permanent Changes in the Terms of Trade An important policy question is what should be done to the Real Exchange Rate in the presence of a temporary shock to the terms of trade. This is particularly relevant for countries with a little diversified export sector, a problem that seems common among countries in need of structural adjustment.

Conventional economic theory suggests that a temporary windfall in income should be saved and only gradually be spent over time. In terms of foreign trade, this analysis suggests that a temporary improvement in the terms of trade should be used to accumulate foreign assets instead of devoting the extra foreign exchange to immediately increase imports. This implies that the improvement in the Trade Surplus should be larger when the improvement in the terms of trade is temporarv rather than permanent.

our analysis is again confirmed using the Colombian data. We have opened up the terms of trade between a "predictable" component and the deviation from it. The "predictable" trend was obtained by an Arima(1,2) process. The results are shown in the regression shown in Eqn.(23). As expected, the coefficient on the temporary component of the terms of trade (DEV) is larger that the coefficient on the predictable component (PRED). This implies that the trade surplus increases by more when the changes in the terms of trade are above what can be considered normal.

# (23)

TS/GDP = 1.81 + 8.06 DEV + 6.55 PRED + 0.70 (Fiscal S./GDP) (T-Value) (2.9) (3) (2.7) (4.9) R2 Adj.=0.75 D.W.= 2.08 Annual data 1970-1986 Consider a 20% temporary increase in the terms of trade (DEV=0.2). This results in an increase in 1.61 % in the ratio TS/GDP as compared with the increase of 1.31% if the change had been permanent.

The fact that the terms of trade change can be temporary or permanent will also have an effect on the required adjustment in the level of the Real Exchange Rate. According to Eqn(20), an 50
Tanzania and females in Lesotho and Senegal (though all results are still statistically significant). In contrast, the confidence level went up for females from Guinea in the adjusted odds ratio.

The results for these adjusted regressions indicate that remarried females are at a significantly higher risk for being HIV positive among the currently married. The results are significant to the 1 or 5 percent confidence levels for females from all the countries examined with the exception of the adjusted odds ratio for females from Lesotho, which was significant to the 10 percent confidence level. Males are generally not at as great risk, with only remarried males from Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe at a statistically significant higher risk of being HIV positive.

# **Section 5: Discussion**

Remarriage in Africa has not been examined in a systematic way within the currently published literature. In an effort to fill this gap, we use nationally representative surveys from 13 African countries to both determine the percentage of remarried individuals and analyze their HIV prevalence rate in relation to widowed, divorced, and separated individuals. The data sets come from the most recent standard Demographic Health Surveys, which include HIV testing for a sub-sample of the population, from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Data sets for Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania are from the HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey, a lighter survey that focuses on HIV/AIDS, but provides the similar variables needed for this study.

It is important to note that both these data sets use nationally representative samples of the population. Previous studies in the literature have used non-representative samples either because they follow a specific cohort in a particular location (for example, Munguti et al. 1997; Boileau et al. 2009; Hosegood et al. 2009; Lopman et al. 2009) or they compare samples from 12
<!-- Start of picture text --> Graph 2.1: Average Catastrophe Rates on Commercial Properties<br>180<br>160 -<br>140 -<br>120<br>0..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~X<br>60<br>40-<br>20-<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000esL<br>|+ Barbados - * - Domiucan Republic - Jama,ca - Truudad & Tobago-4- -Caymmn<br>Soreg Poltner, 2001, p.25<br>Graph 2.2: Reinsurance Quantity (1990=100)<br>300<br>250<br>200-<br>150<br>100<br>50 L \f_E t<br>0-<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998<br>1-U- DoTmincanRepublic -*-Jamarca--Truudad&TobagoI<br>Source Background papers and catastrophe insance pnces from Pollner, 2001, p.25.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

10
the system is not under-identified. For birprobit, estimates for Murphy’s (2007) score test of goodness-of-fit show strong evidence (all with p-values<0.01) of bivariate normality, indicating that biprobit estimates are appropriate, as suggested by Chiburis _et al_ (2011). The rho value for both biprobit specifications are negative, suggesting that coefficients in a the singular probit are underestimated, although it is only significant in the NOWAGE specification; the latter point suggesting that the two-stage NOWAGE estimates are likely the most appropriate.

**Table 5: Effects on Pr(BRIBE=1)**

||NECESSITY|NOWAGE|
|---|---|---|
|Probit|10.1%***|16.5%***|
|(S.E.)|(4.10%)|(4.70%)|
|LATE (2SLS)|51.4%***|52.4%***|
|(S.E.)|(13.3%)|(13.0%)|
|ATE (Biprobit)|13.5%***|26.1%***|
|(S.E.)|(5.5%)|(5.7%)|

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: probit and biprobit estimates run using Stata’s svy: prefix, using stratum-clustered standard errors. 2SLS similarly use clustered errors on stratum. All estimates are survey-weighted. Probit estimates correspond to coefficients from Table 3, Cols. 2 and 4.

Turning to the results themselves, the effects of both NECESSITY and NOWAGE are positive and significant for the biprobit estimations; though with the caveat that only the rho for NOWAGE is significant, suggesting that an endogenous selection effect requires a two-stage estimate. The ATE then bears some interpretation. This estimate shows that, all else equal, the bribery rate faced by informal operators is 26% greater if no households had a member under contract (NOWAGE=0 for all) compared to the counterfactual where all households included such a steadier income source (NOWAGE=1 for all). The effect among those specifically without a contract income in the household (that is the LATE from 2SLS) shows a magnitude of 52%. Such magnitudes are substantial and have suggestive economic conclusions: that is the lack of an alternate, steady income such as under-contract employment has a notably large and significant effect on the overall incidence of corruption.

Appendix V shows the first- and second- stage results for these estimations, where the first stage is a probit estimation of each opportunity cost measure (D). The biprobit estimates for NOWAGE are most appropriate, as discussed above, though all estimates for all measures, including 2SLS and biprobit are given for completeness. The relative “uptake” probabilities implied by Eq. �5� (27)
1 **PULilC** RXESEARCH W iORKiNG P APER _28055_

# Abstract

Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner investigate the link ke-LW,een financial crises anA inAustr y g rowth. Thley analyze data from 19 industrial and developing countries that have experienced financiat crises during tne past 30 years to investigate how financial crises affect sectors dependent on external sources of finance. Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of a financial crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the depth of the financial system. They find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience **a grpntpr cnntrnction** of **valiuie** addelped **tduring n** rrisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. They hypothesize that the deepening of **the** financial systemL allows sectors dependent on external finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal perioas, so a crisis **in** sucn counrries wouia nave a disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent sectors. In contrast, since externally dependent firms tend to obtain relatively less external financing in shallower financial systems (and hence have relatively lower growth rates in such countries during normal times), a crisis in such countries has less of a **dispnronrtinnntelv** neantive effect on the grnwth of externally dependent sectors.

This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between financial development and economic growth. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room MC9-624, telephone 202-473-3722, fax 202-522-2031, email address hvo 1 @worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/ /econ.-orldbank.org. The **author, may** be contacted at **llaevenunworldbannL orga** dlingebiel@aworldbank.org, or randy.kroszner@gsb.uchicago.edu. June 2002. (26 pages)

> _The aevelopment Th Policy Polic Research issues._ -- **_An_** _Working_ **_uobjective_** _- _Paper of_ - . _ie Series series disseminates is_ . **_w gei_** _ L **_the_** _the_ Z'___ irndngs findings_ **_ouI quic,kly,_** _of_ **_-'LI_** _work_ - **_even_** _in_ --- _progress if_ Z **_rL.-L thc_** -- -- **_pt,esent"tiUns -_** _to encourage_ **_-_** _ -- _are the_ **_les_** _exchange .han_ **_ful;y II_r .1._** _of_ **_pvoi'ed._** __ ideas 1.1 about_ -L **_The_ I** _papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this pape ar en:.-!y hoseof be-u,+-rs They, do no, n..eessan.l- rpent the viwf thelW..d Bank,,4 i- ts 17-,cutiv Drct, or-t_ **_the_** _countries they represent. l_

Produced by the Research Advisory Staff
# **Fears and Tears: Should More People Be Moving within and from Developing Countries, and What Stops This Movement?**<sup>*****</sup>

David McKenzie, _World Bank_ _Keywords:_ international migration; internal migration; constraints on movement; uncertainty; status quo bias.

_JEL Classification:_ F22, O15.

> * This paper is based on a talk given at Beloit College at the Fall 2021 Miller Upton Forum on Human Migration. I thank the editor, three anonymous referees, Diep Phan, Giovanni Peri, and conference participants for helpful comments, and Merle van den Akker, Zoe Chance, Alex Coutts, Johannes Haushofer, Naira Kalra, Dean Karlan, Ruth Schmidt, Richard Thaler, Tom Wein, and other commentors on twitter for references to the behavioral and psychological literature.
-63 -

# 6.6. AWA ETHNIC FOREST RESERVE - ECUADOR

In some respects, the Awa project is similar to PEMASKY in Panama. The assistance of international organisations has been enlisted in securing the indigenous land base, and simultaneously accomplishing the goal of environmental protection. It is interesting to note that both these projects, which nicely fit the notion of uconvergence" between indigenous peoples and conservationists, emerged from the indigenous side of the equation.

The Awa Ethnic Forest Reserve covers 120,000 ha along the border with Colombia. Preliminary studies have suggested that the reserve lands, together with similar habitat across the border, are a Pleistocene refugium - an area which escaped glaciation and served as a genetic reservoir for the region. The Awa reserve itself is also the largest area of Pacific rainforest surviving in Ecuador.

Until the late 1970's even the national Indian organisations were hardly aware of the Awas' existence. But in 1980, the prospect of a road through Awa territory was discussed with potential lenders, including the World Bank. In the same year, Cultural Survival assisted the Awa in a preliminary demarcation study (Macdonald 1986). In 1983, an intergovernmental commission was formed to study development issues along the Colombian border. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) became a member of the commission, which adopted as one of its first projects the demarcation of an Awa-Coaiquer Indian Reserve. Having had negative experiences elsewhere with Forest Reserves, CONAIE urged the Awa to demand a unique categorys Awa Ethnic Forest Reserve.

Cultural Survival provided further support for this process which was completed by 1986. CONAIE represented the Awa interest at the national level and assisted with the formation of the Awa Federation. The Awa obtained citizenship and therefore the right to own land. The actual process of demarcation required the settlement of numerous disputes with the timber companies and colonists who had been active in the area.

Having secured the legal basis of ownership, the Awa then proceeded to the next stage of territorial defence: contending with the perception of their land as "idle' and therefore a justifiable candidate for colonisation . First, a 12-15 metre strip was cleared around the entire perimeter of the reserve. The Awa then commenced planting this with a mixture of fruit and hardwood trees: cacao, coconut, coffee, citrus. Four tree nurseries have been installed at potential entry points and six more are slated for 1988 (Levy 1988).

The main concentration is at the western perimeter of the reserve which is exposed to a front of loggers and colonists advancing from the Pacific coast. From the east, the road through the reserve is still a prospect. This road is seen as the ultimate extension of an ambitious Brazilian project to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The initial surveying was recently completed and the Awa expect that construction will start in five years or so. The res?onse has already been determined; the Awa plan to colonise the road first (Levy p.c.).