rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_Table 8. Estimation results for the tailoring sector_

||||ln(C|A)|||||ln(rev|enue)|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||OLS||Rand|om effe|cts||OLS||Ran|dom eff|ects|
||Coef.|SE|P>|z||Coef.|SE|P>|z||Coef.|SE|P>|z||Coef.|SE|P>|z||
|woman|0.00|0.25|0.99|-0.01|0.34|0.97|-0.22|0.17|0.21|-0.22|0.22|0.31|
|can read|0.35|0.32|0.27|0.31|0.43|0.48|-0.08|0.22|0.72|-0.08|0.28|0.76|
|education>2|0.76|0.37|0.04|0.73|0.50|0.14|0.16|0.25|0.53|0.14|0.32|0.65|
|age 30-39|0.12|0.25|0.62|0.09|0.34|0.79|-0.22|0.17|0.20|-0.25|0.22|0.25|
|age 40-49|0.13|0.36|0.71|0.08|0.48|0.86|0.27|0.25|0.27|0.26|0.31|0.40|
|age>49|0.07|0.78|0.92|0.03|1.07|0.98|-0.23|0.62|0.71|-0.25|0.80|0.76|
|age unknown|-0.43|0.51|0.40|-0.44|0.66|0.50|-0.62|0.38|0.11|-0.70|0.46|0.12|
|exp. 5-10|-0.49|0.44|0.26|-0.49|0.59|0.40|-0.11|0.30|0.72|-0.12|0.38|0.75|
|exp.>10|-0.26|0.47|0.57|-0.25|0.62|0.69|-0.04|0.32|0.90|-0.02|0.40|0.96|
|PB|0.31|0.27|0.25|0.35|0.28|0.22|-0.38|0.19|0.05|-0.37|0.20|0.06|
|PA|0.39|0.28|0.16|0.40|0.28|0.15|-0.02|0.19|0.92|-0.04|0.20|0.85|
|NPB|-0.12|0.22|0.58|-0.10|0.09|0.28|-0.52|0.15|0.00|-0.50|0.10|0.00|
|constant|11.39|0.54|0.00|11.40|0.70|0.00|11.82|0.36|0.00|11.81|0.45|0.00|
|PB-NPB=0|2.51||0.11|2.47||0.12|0.49||0.48|0.47||0.50|
|PA-PB=0|0.07||0.80|0.22||0.64|2.95||0.09|5.61||0.02|
|PA-PB=-NPB|0.01||0.91|0.07||0.79|0.35||0.55|0.98||0.32|
|B&P LM-test||||22.09||||||47.51||0.00|
|Hausman-test||||0.33||0.89||||0.72||0.70|
|N|336|||336|||336|||336|||

Finally, the results for the electronics sector are presented in table 9. From the results of the random effects model it can be seen that CA of the older and more experienced workers are higher than for the younger and less experienced. Living in Abidjan also results in a higher level of CA than for those in the electronic sector living outside Abidjan. The coefficients of the PB and PA variables are significantly positive and this leads to the conclusion that the participants have higher CA both before and after PAFPA than the nonparticipants have after the program. Furthermore, nonparticpants had a higher CA before the program than after. The nonparticipants did not experience this decline in their CA, and these facts together lead to the conclusion that the participants have experienced a positive impact from PAFPA (at least at a 9% level of significance). The results from the random effects model of revenue also shows positive effects from age, experience, and living in Abidjan. The coefficient of PA is significantly positive indicating that the participants have higher revenues than nonparticipants do after PAFPA. It is also seen that the revenues of the participants have risen, however, it cannot be concluded that this rise differs significantly from the development of the nonparticipants. Hence, we cannot conclude that there has been any impact of PAFPA on the revenues in the electronic sector.

20
Section 4 concludes with a proposed roadmap for reforms with strong catalytic impact for debt market development in MENA.

# **2. Overview of Government Debt Markets in the Non-GCC MENA Region**

## _2.1. Selected MENA markets and macroeconomic conditions_

**The paper focuses on five countries in the non-GCC MENA region that have government bond markets with minimum size and greater potential for market development: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia (MENA-5).**<sup>**6**</sup> These countries have sizable debt-to-GDP ratios and domestic tradable debt (Figures 1 and 2) and have, to different degrees, implemented measures to develop their debt markets. They are all middle-income, oil-importing countries with diversified exports. These macroeconomic characteristics help explain their greater need to issue debt and rely on domestic debt markets<sup>7</sup> .

**Figure 1**

**Figure 2**

<!-- Start of picture text --> TotalCentral Government Debt: Domestic vs. External TotalCentral Government Debt: Domestic vs. External<br>200 2004-2009 (% of GDP) 160 2004-2009 (USD Billion)<br>Domestic External Domestic External<br>180 140<br>160<br>120<br>140<br>120 100<br>100 80<br>80<br>60<br>60<br>40<br>40<br>20 20<br>0 0<br>Lebanon Egypt Jordan Morocco Tunisia Syria Algeria Lebanon Egypt Jordan Morocco Tunisia Syria Algeria<br>Source: World Bank LDB Working Database Source: World Bank LDB Working Database<br>% of GDP USD Billion<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Other countries in the non-GCC MENA region have had, in general, fiscal and current account surpluses and have less developed debt markets (Figures 3 and 4).**<sup>**8**</sup>

> 6 A separate background paper for the MENA Financial Sector Flagship study will cover debt markets in GCC countries.

> 7 Although these macroeconomic characteristics make a clear case and explain the need for domestic debt markets, assessing the desirable share and trade-offs of cost and risk between domestic and external debt is out of the scope of this study.

> 8 IMF (2007).

8
Trehan-Waish and Hakkio-Rush findings is no coincidence. If the auxiliary assumptions two approaches are satisfied, the two tests are equivalent. That is, if Gt + r,B,, is cointegrated with Tt and the cointegration vector is (1,-i), then must be stationary. The cointegration of G, + rB,l and T, with a cointegration vector (1,-1) means that the left-hand side of (38) is stationary. Under the assumption that r, is stationary with unconditional mean r, r, - r and hence (r,-r)B,1 are stationary. Therefore, G, + r,B, -T is stationary if and only if rBt,- - SURP, is stationary.

What if the assumption of a constant expected real rates of return on government debt is not provide a good characterization of the data?'<sup>6</sup> The Hakkio-Rush and Trehan-Walsh cointegration tests, as well as the Hamilton-Flavin test, are no longer valid.

Wilcox (1989) presents a stationarity test that does not require expected real interest rates to be constant. In the presence of stochastic expected real rates, one can use the _ex post_ real rates to discount the government debt outstanding in period t to a fixed point, say, period 0. Then the time series characteristics of the discounted debt series q,,iB,+i can be examined. If this series is stationary with mean zero, then the NPG condition (25) must hold. Applying this test to US fiscal policy for the period 1960-1984, Wilcox finds that the discounted debt series is not (mean) stationary. We can not be sure from this evidence that recent US fiscal policy is not sustainable, however, since mean-zero stationary of q,,iB,,i is only _a sufficient,_ 6 Using data for eighteen OECD countries, Rose's (1988) econometric examination of nominal interest rates and inflation rates implies that _real_ interest rate are, in fact, nonstationary. Even if the real rate was stationary, the assumption of a constant expected rate implies the absence of serial correlation in the series, which is clearly contradicts the facts for U.S. T-bill rates.

27
12 was unbalanced across treatment arms in Ekiti, we include it as a control in regressions in Appendix Table A3. The pattern of results, in terms of magnitude as well as statistical significance, remains unchanged.

The outcome in Table 3 is a scoring scale that runs from a minimum percentage score of zero to a maximum of one. While the “score” on the checklist is the basis for the Social Recognition incentive, on its own it may not translate or compare meaningfully to other contexts; underlying behaviors may translate better. To clarify this, the impact in Ekiti can be broken down into effects on each of the ten key components of the score, as shown in Figure 2.

As can be seen in Figure 2, Social Recognition motivated staff in Ekiti to complete all sections of the forms, to do so prior to enumerator arrival, and to check the forms for their accuracy and completeness. These changes on the first seven checklist items are all near 20 percentage points, which in some cases is a very large fraction of the Control group value: only half of the Control group facilities, for example, had the form checked by the treasurer or officerin-charge prior to the enumerator’s weekly visit.

The Social Recognition intervention, however effective at encouraging staff to complete the cash book form, did not change the likelihood that documentation was available to substantiate the sections of the form that pertained to cash receipts. It also did not change the likelihood that the different forms relating to drug acquisition agreed with one another, though the Control group already performed relatively well on this particular component of record keeping. This may have occurred because while record keeping officers were themselves able to enhance completeness and accuracy of the records, documentation of cash receipts and drugs relied on the participation of all health workers in the facilities.

The bulk of the analysis shown here is conditional on nonzero transaction data: that is, that there is any information to record in the cash book form, and thus for which the checklist can assess completeness and accuracy. Any changes in the rates of nonzero transaction data that are induced by the intervention could pose a potential threat to validity. In Appendix Table A1, we test for changes in the rates of nonzero transaction data on the cash book form in both states, and find no significant difference between experimental study arms.
_COTE D’IVOIRE: Competitiveness, Cocoa, and Real Exchange Rates_

# **Figure 6: New Non-Traditional Non-African Non-EEC Export Destinations**

**Core d'Ivoire: New Non-African Non-EEC Export Trade Partners**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 12%<br>Taiwan<br>Russia<br>10%<br>India<br>Korea<br>Mainland China<br>8%<br>Hong Kong<br>Brazil<br>6%<br>4%<br>2%<br>0%<br>Years 1960-2003<br>Percent of Cote d'Ivoire's Total Exports<br>1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 7: New Non-Traditional Non-African Non-EEC Import Sources**

**Cote d'Ivoire Trade: Imports from New Non-African Non-ECC Trade Partners**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10%<br>9% Taiwan<br>Russia<br>8% Korea<br>India<br>7% Mainland China<br>Hong Kong<br>6%<br>Brazil<br>5%<br>4%<br>3%<br>2%<br>1%<br>0%<br>Years<br>Percent of Cote d'Ivoire's Total Imports<br>1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002<br><!-- End of picture text --> 8
We implement the methodology developed by Cusolito and Vranic (2020), which recreates the ownership trees of all firms in the ORBIS database, endowing us with the firm-level financial and ownership information required for our investigation. We focus on direct ownership links, as this is the most prevalent public-related ownership link for the European countries under study.<sup>1</sup> Our primary explanatory variable measures the percentage of direct shares owned by all the public authorities (PAs) that govern the country where a firm operates. Thus, it takes into consideration span-of-control issues.

Equipped with a distribution of firm-specific financing wedges, we use fixed-effect regressions to assess the role of state ownership in the cost of finance. Controlling for lagged values of firm size, age, physical productivity, firm, sector-time, and country fixed effects, we regress the idiosyncratic cost of finance (i.e., the wedge) against the lagged fraction of state ownership in a firm. Next, we leverage the theoretical foundations of our methodology for identifying financial wedges to assess the economic significance of SOEs’ subsidized access to capital markets. To this end, we conduct a series of counterfactual reforms, where SOEs are removed from their sectors of operation, and their financial resources are reallocated to surviving enterprises. How much would the aggregate productivity of the economy increase or decrease from these interventions?<sup>2</sup> The first reform imposed the shutdown of all SOEs in the economy and the reallocation of their financial resources towards their sectoral counterparts. Since these firms also face capital-market distortions, we reallocated the financing while preserving these distortions.<sup>3</sup> Next, we explored a reform that dismantled poorly performing

> 1We do not consider indirect linkages where the state is a shareholder of another company that holds shares in a particular firm. From this point of view, our results should be considered conservative estimates of the actual degree of financial subsidies confronted by state-related enterprises.

> 2Notice that our reforms could be considered a privatization exercise where the physical productivity and the idiosyncratic financial distortion of the firm post-privatization are drawn from the joint distribution of productivity and financial wedges across surviving firms in the sector.

3 Under a CES aggregator of individual varieties, there is a mechanical variety channel through which productivity would fall if the number of varieties is reduced, which would occur under a shutdown of SOEs. To abstract for this channel, we normalize TFP by the number of firms.

4
## **19d. Presence of impact unit By type**

## **Across granular regions**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Commercial Development Benchmark Europe WEST ECA EAST ECA<br>100% 100%<br>80% 80%<br>Percent Yes 60% Percent Yes 60%<br>40% 40%<br>20% 20%<br>0% 0%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **6 Concluding remarks**

While the theoretical and empirical debate on state ownership in finance continues, the GFC renewed the interest of policy makers in SOFIs as a policy instrument. This is particularly visible in ECA, where the debate over SOFIs has had a long history, but recent initiatives suggest that the policy pendulum may have swayed in favor of SOFIs. This paper presents the main take-aways of a survey deployed to take stock and analyze Commercial and Development SOFIs in ECA and its sub-regions. Based on the replies of 41 institutions distributed across 21 countries, some interesting patterns emerge - although results need to be interpreted with caution as with any survey undertaking.

_Evolution._ Despite the liberalization policies that followed the transition from centrallyplanned economies to market economies, over 60 percent of the SOFIs in the sample were created after 1990, and three of the four SOFIs created post-GFC were established in Benchmark Europe. The focus has increasingly been on Development SOFIs, as shown by the number of newly established institutions that more than doubled after 1990 and have sustained post-2007.

_Mandates._ Development SOFIs tend to have narrower mandates. All Commercial SOFIs established before 1990 had a specific policy mandate, but none did post 1990. SME financing dominates among sectoral objectives, and Development SOFIs appear significantly more focused on infrastructure. The Exim function is particularly pronounced in West ECA, aiming to benefit from the EU’s geographic proximity. Furthermore, over half of ECA’s SOFIs have a mandate that includes financial sustainability, and these SOFIs tend to have lower profitability and significantly 41
# **Technological Learning, Energy Efficiency, and CO2 Emissions in China’s Energy Intensive Industries**

# **I. Introduction**

# **A. Background**

Since the onset of economic reforms in 1978, China has been remarkably successful in reducing the CO2 intensity of GDP and industrial production (figure 1) despite a rising share of energy intensive industries in industrial value added (Fisher-Vanden et. al 2004) and a rising CO2 intensity of fuel use (figure 2). Most analysts attribute the rapid decline in the CO2 intensity of industry to rising energy prices, increased openness to trade and investment, and increased <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1<br>China<br>CO2 Intensity of GDP and Industry<br>(Kg per Real $ of GDP and Industry)<br>18<br>16<br>14<br>12<br>10 CO2 Intensity of Industry<br>CO2 Intensity of GDP<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010<br>Source: WDI Online, 2012 and IEA Data Services Online, 2012<br>CO2 Intensity<br><!-- End of picture text --> competition.<sup>1</sup> Given the large inefficiencies in energy use in China’s industrial enterprises at the beginning of China’s reform program, there is little doubt that these policies presented enterprises with the possibilities of reaping large scale energy savings. But, as we argue, actually realizing those savings has been highly dependent on policies and institutions that encouraged enterprises to build their technological capabilities.<sup>2</sup> Hu et al. (2005) demonstrate that success in technology transfer, and hence in building more robust technological capabilities, in a large sample of Chinese enterprises is conditional on own enterprise investments in technological upgrading. We study how China’s industrial and technology policies affecting four energy intensive industries—aluminum, cement, iron and steel, and paper—have transformed the industrial structure within these industries and technological capabilities within enterprises in these industries, and how both types of changes have contributed to lower CO2 intensities,

> 1 Most analysts also attribute some of the decline in the CO2 intensity of GDP to shifts in the composition of GDP away from energy intensive industries.

> 2 For an example of firms in a country (Indonesia) adopting state of the art technology in an energy intensive industry (cement), yet failing to capture win-win environmental (or energy) technique effects because the country lacks a viable technology policy see Rock (2012).

2
# I. **Introduction**

Wage subsidies and training programs are often used by governments to help get ablebodied adults off the unemployment or workfare rolls into regular jobs. While there is some evidence that both interventions can help in the transition to regular work, results have varied greatly according to the setting and the method used to assess impact.<sup>2</sup> It has proved difficult to get robust estimates of impact using non-experimental methods.<sup>3</sup> This paper reports on the "Proempleo Experiment" in Argentina in 1998-2000. This was motivated by concerns about welfare dependency in "company towns" that had seen heavy retrenchments by their principal employer. The main form of welfare assistance provided to such towns in Argentina (as in most developing countries) is temporary work, at a relatively low wage, oriented to social infrastructure or community services. In the study towns, the heavy dependence on such workfare programs emerged in the wake of the privatization of the public oil refinery and subsequent sharp contraction in employment. Workfare participants in these towns may well need assistance in getting regular employment in the private sector. Wage subsidies and/or training programs seem obvious responses. But will they work, and at what cost?

The Proempleo Experiment was designed to assess the efficacy of providing a wage subsidy and specialized training in assisting the transition from workfare to regular work. The 2 An overview of the arguments for and against wage subsidies can be found in Katz (1996), and impact assessments can be found in Burtless (1985), Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) and Dubin and Rivers (1993). The theory and evidence on training programs are reviewed by Heckman et al. (1999), and empirical studies include Lalonde (1986), Heckman et al., (1997), Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Smith and Todd (2001).

3 A classic study by Lalonde (1986) found large biases in non-experimental methods when compared to a randomized evaluation of a US training program. On the same data set, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) found that propensity-score matching achieved a good approximation - much better than the non-experimental methods studied by Lalonde. However (again using the same data set), Smith and Todd (2000) question this finding, arguing that Dehejia and Wahba's PSM estimates are sensitive to choices made in sample selection and model specification.

2
-6-

Figure 2: The sugarcane sector is big <!-- Start of picture text --> Two thirds of sugarcane is used for ethanol and ethanol production is<br>dominated by the southern and central regions<br>Size of sector<br>1991192<br>230 million tonnes of sugarcane Amount<br>South Central North Nora Regions<br>east<br>Sugar Products<br>Mills with annexed distilleries produce most of the sectors output Nature of<br>production units<br>1991192<br>376 production plants Number<br>Autonomous distilleries Type by<br>number<br>Type by value<br>added<br>The sector is capital intensive and land extensive for an<br>agroindustrial industry Value added<br>1991192<br>Labour (approx 1m jobs) Gross return to capital Land Retur to<br>factors<br>Value added at domestic prices $4.5blyear Amount<br>Sugar ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Distribuion<br>by products<br>vCEm<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows:** A **New Perspective**

# **Mansoor Dailami and Danny Leipziger**

# **World Bank**

# **Washington, DC, USA**

The success with which middle income indebted developing countries have gained access to private international finance in the 1990s is a tribute to their own domestic economic performance, international policy in dealing with the debt crisis of the 1980s, and innovations in international financial markets. This paper emphasizes the role of private infrastructure investment as a vehicle for attracting foreign capital to developing countries in the 1 990s. The paper examines the determination of credit risk premium on infrastructure projects in the country risk environment of developing countries, and provides tentative quantitative evidence of the importance of macroeconomic and project-specific attributes of project risk. The key finding is that the market seems to impose a high risk premium on loans to countries with high inflation, and to projects in the road sector.

# I. **Introduction**

Recent debate on the causes of the upsurge in capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s has offered three different perspectives. First, it is argued that the main factors motivating capital flows have been external to developing countries and have been related in particular to decline in the US interest rates (Calvo et al. 1993; Fernandez-Arias, 1994). The second line of argument is that the surge in capital flows has been the result of domestic economic reforms, including privatization of public enterprises, liberalization of currency and capital accounts, and that these trends, along with macroeconomic stabilization, have improved creditworthiness and have expanded investment opportunities (Chuhan et al. 1994; and et al. 1996, U. Haque). Third, it is observed that financial innovations, including the securitization of creditor commercial bank loans by conversion into bonds, with partial multilateral guarantees, under the Brady Plan, were critical in lifting the "debt overhang," and stimulating investment and growth in debtor developing countries. (Claessens, et al. 1996; Dornbusch and Werner, 1994).

These perspectives have important implications for the sustainability of capital flows and hence for policy design both at the national and international level. Thus, if the surge in capital flows has been driven mostly by lower international (US) interest rates, as is argued by some researchers, then a reversal in such rates would threaten the 1