rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
collected in early 2001 indicated that powerful groups outside the public sector had an undue influence in shaping the policies, laws, and regulations of the state.

This incipient empirical evidence from some countries in Latin America, as well as the empirical results from other regions, permits us to speculate as to the role of capture in explaining the 'growthwithout-governance 'puzzle. To the extent that state capture is important, higher incomes may be appropriated by the monopolistic captors or elites. This, in turn, can lead to additional demand for private purchase of laws and regulations ensuring the continued dominance of the elite. The net effect is to erode overall governance, particularly the public protection of property rights, the incidence of corruption, and more broadly, rule of law.

This increasing demand for capture in a situation of economic growth may be further abetted by the fact that the A la carte supply of laws, regulations, and policies offered by politicians to powerful elites is less likely to be subject to checks and balances in such an environment. This is due to the widespread complacency about governance in economies with good performance contributes to relatively lax internal and external pressures to improve governance. This was the case in Indonesia under Suharto throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, but Indonesia is not alone. Argentina in the 1990s is another extreme illustration, while Mexico during the previous captured political era of crony capitalism serves as a more nuanced example.<sup>35</sup> Russia during different historical periods are also telling, as well as the recent events related to major failures in corporate governance and regulatory oversight of very powerful U.S. companies are also suggestive.

Thus far, the links between state capture and the negative feedback between incomes and governance that we have documented are of a speculative nature, and they call for further research. As data become available on the degree of capture by elite interests in a large number of countries in Latin America and other nontransition regions, it will be possible to put this preliminary hypothesis through further empirical tests. In particular, it will be possible to empirically investigate the socioeconomic costs of various dimensions of capture in Latin America, as has already been done among transition **36** economies.

> 34. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2001).

> 35. Haber (2001); Haber, Maurer, and Razo (2001). For a general treatment of the negative implications of crony capitalism for growth, see Krueger (2001).

> 36. The media in Latin America is increasingly taking up the issue of state capture, as has been the case for years now in the former Soviet states. See, for instance, the editorial entitled "El Estado Capturado" in the leading Colombian newspaper, _El Tiempo,_ 21 February 2002.

29
_Table 3: Main empirical findings from studies on ICT adoption and household/individual welfare_

|**Welfare**|**Main conclusions**|**Sample**|**Time coverage**|
|---|---|---|---|
||ICT create opportunities to foster human|||
|Prado et al. (2011)|<br>development through several channels such as the<br>creation and communication of new knowledge.|Brazil|2010|
|Heeks (2010)|Survey: ICT are showing a progressive contribution<br>to development|Global|1990-2010|
|Chew et al. (2010)|Business growth in female-owned micro-enterprises is<br>positively affected by ICT access.|India<br>(Mumbai)|2009|
||Poor users of mobile phones in India, Mozambique,|India,||
|Scott et al. (2005)|<br>and Tanzania spend higher shares of income on<br>mobile phones than the top income quintiles.|<br>Mozambique,<br>Tanzania|2004|
|Jagun et al. (2008)|In Nigeria, there are mixed signs about the role that<br>DT have played on inequality reduction.|Nigeria|NA|
|Mpogele et al. (2008)|People in Tanzania do not perceive financial benefits<br>from the usage of mobile phones.|Tanzania|NA|
|Gebremichael and<br>Jackson (2006)|To foster development SSA countries and other<br>developing nations should bridge the digital divide,<br>and thus, alleviate information poverty|Global-<br>developing|1991-2005|
|Mwanthi, 2009|The governments should focus on targeting the<br>determinants of ICT adoption such as the education<br>level of the household head.|Kenya|2008|
||The adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and|||
|Jensen (2007)|<br>wholesalers reduced price dispersion and increased<br>social welfare in the south Indian fisheries sector.|India (Kerala)|1996-2001|
||Positive effect of mobile phone adoption on the|||
|Aker (2010)|<br>reduction of price dispersion in the grain market in<br>Niger.|Niger|2001-2006|
||Although mobile phones have been recognized by the|||
|Aker (2011)|<br>literature as means of poverty reduction, there is a risk<br>that the poorest may fall behind.|Global|1985-2011|
|Aker and Mbiti<br>(2010)|Gains in development (through fair prices, job<br>opportunities, etc.) from the increased usage of<br>mobile telephony in SSA.|SSA|2006-2009|
|Baabdullah et al.,<br>2019|Mobile broadbands have allowed for the creation of<br>mobile banking, one of the most promising<br>technologies of recent years.|Saudi Arabia|2017|
|Asongu and<br>Nwachukwu, 2018|Mobile banking promotes inclusive development<br>through a decreasing effect of poverty and income<br>inequality.|Global|2011|
|Carabregu et al.<br>(2019)|Positive correlation between MBB and the reduction<br>of income inequality in the Western Balkan countries.|5 Balkan<br>countries|NA|
|Iqbal et al. (2019)|Positive effect of mobile phone usage and human<br>development.|5 South Asian<br>countries|1990-2016|

15
|Table1.Munic<br>|ipality-levelsc|hool restricti|onsfromwar|ningindex|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Color|2018|2019|2020|2021|
|Red|n.a.|n.a.|Virtual|Virtual|
|Orange|n.a.|n.a.|Virtual|Hybrid|
|Yellow|n.a.|n.a.|Virtual|Hybrid|
|Green|n.a.|n.a.|Virtual|Inperson|

_Source_ : Authors’ elaboration from Guatemalan legislation _Notes_ : n.a.-Not applicable.

Districts classified in green could resume in-person instruction without any distancing restrictions; those in yellow and orange were obliged to use hybrid instruction, with the main difference being the social distancing requirements between yellow (2.5 square meters between individuals) and orange (4 square meters between persons); and municipalities classified in red were only allowed to conduct virtual schooling activities. Table 1 summarizes these measures and how they have changed over time.

Figure 2 maps the average warning index by municipality for pre-COVID-19 years (2018 and 2019) and post-COVID-19 years for which we have available data (2020 and 2021). Given that the index was unavailable before the pandemic, we assign a value of zero for pre-COVID-19 years. We observe that infection rates varied across the country, with some districts more exposed than others to infections from the virus. Mean warning levels increased across the entire country from 2020 to 2021. While 86 municipalities had a low warning index in 2020 (below 5), this number was only 4 in 2021. On the opposite end, 2 municipalities had a warning index above 8 in 2020, which increased to 31 in 2021. We leverage this district-level variation over time to estimate whether students in districts with greater warning indices have different outcomes than students in municipalities with lower indices, estimating the differential effects of exposure to COVID-19.

9
Taking Stock of Wholesale Power Markets in Developing Countries: A Literature Review energy‐auctions‐experience‐brazil‐china‐india

- Batlle, C. (2013). Electricity Generation and Wholesale Markets. In I. J. Pérez‐Arriaga (Ed.), _Regulation of the Power Sector_ (pp. 341–395). London: Springer‐Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978‐1‐4471‐5034‐3

- Batlle, C., Pérez‐Arriaga, I. J., & Zambrano‐Barragán, P. (2012). Regulatory design for RES‐E support mechanisms: Learning curves, market structure, and burden‐sharing. _Energy Policy_ , _41_ , 212– 220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.039

- Batlle, C., & Rodilla, P. (2010). A critical assessment of the different approaches aimed to secure electricity generation supply. _Energy Policy_ , _38_ (11), 7169–7179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.07.039

- Besant‐Jones, J. E. (2006). _Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned?_ Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from http://www‐ wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/03/07/000310607_ 20070307122641/Rendered/PDF/380170REPLACEMENT0Energy19.pdf

- Besant‐Jones, J., & Tenenbaum, B. (2001). _The California Power Crisis: Lessons for Developing Countries_ (ESMAP Discussion Paper No. 1). Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www‐ wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/25/000090341_ 20040325143555/Rendered/PDF/280840California0Power0crisis0EMS0no.01.pdf

- Borenstein, S. (2000). Understanding Competitive Pricing and Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets. _The Electricity Journal_ , _13_ (6), 49–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1040‐ 6190(00)00124‐X

- Brandstätt, C., Brunekreeft, G., & Jahnke, K. (2011). How to deal with negative power price spikes?—Flexible voluntary curtailment agreements for large‐scale integration of wind. _Energy Policy_ , _39_ (6), 3732–3740. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.03.082

Brennan, T. J., & Boyd, J. (1997). Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts. _Journal of Regulatory Economics_ , _11_ (1), 41–54. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007998128416

- Brown, A. C. (2002). _Privatization of Brazil’s Electricity Industry: Sector Reform or Restatement of the Government’s Balance Sheet?_ Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/ACB brazil update 21 Jan.pdf

- Bushnell, J. (2005). Looking for Trouble: Competition Policy in the U.S. Electricity Industry. In J. M. Griffin & S. L. Puller (Eds.), _Electricity Deregulation: Choices and Challenges_ (pp. 256–296). The University of Chicago Press.

- Bushnell, J. B., Mansur, E. T., & Saravia, C. (2008). Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets. _American Economic Review_ , _98_ (1), 237–266. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.237

- Chao, H., & Huntington, H. G. (1998). _Designing Competitive Electricity Markets_ . New York: Springer Science+Business Media.

- Chao, H., & Wilson, R. (1999). _Design of Wholesale Electricity Markets_ (Electric Power Research Institute working paper No. 990101). Retrieved from

38
Although the manufacturing sector in Mexico apparently had benefited from NAFTA for many years, things changed dramatically in the year 2001. This experience lends credence to the argument that Mexico has exposed itself to more economic volatility by linking its fortunes so tightly to the U.S. economy.

# **4.5 Gender Differences**

One attractive feature of our data is that we observe the gender of the vast majority of workers in our data. This allows us to calculate the job- and worker-flows statistics presented in table 2 separately for men and women. One might wonder to what extent women might tend to hold less stable jobs, which might translate into higher accession rates and separation rates. Perhaps surprisingly, statistics on worker flows and job flows are quite similar for men and women. These tables are available upon request.

When we interact gender with establishment age, however, we see an interesting result on the life cycle of establishments. In table 6, we divide establishments into six establishment-age categories. The difference between the establishment-age categories in table 6 and those in table 4 is that the oldest age category aggregates all establishments that are five years old or older. We present average net-growth percentages separately for men and women along with the average percentage of male and female employment in each establishment-age category. The averages are taken from the period 1990-2001.

(Table 6 here) We find the percent of men working in the youngest establishments (as a percentage of the male labor force) is larger than the analogous statistic for women. That is, men are more likely to work in establishments that are less than one year old (new establishments).

Establishments one to two years old, however, show an average net-growth percentage for men 18
# **Table 25: Loss analysis—number of firms covered**

||Full data<br>(firms)|Data on<br>ownership<br>form|Private<br>sector|Net<br>turnover ><br>100 000|Profit data<br>present|Employee<br>info<br>present &<br>matched|Present<br>before &<br>after<br>reform|Only<br>calendar<br>reporting|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|2004|426 141|371 632|369 703|335 276|314 001|192 918|143 358|88 234|
|2005|429 287|378 047|376 146|341 911|335 038|204 969|155 288|99 244|
|2006|437 960|387 290|385 286|350 523|346 596|210 817|170 100|107 377|
|2007|444 987|394 362|392 320|366 976|361 871|216 154|165 795|102 288|
|2008|457 788|403 508|401 462|373 944|370 431|219 820|167 416|103 675|
|2009|463 133|407 062|404 963|371 724|366 789|217 278|152 780|92 235|
|2010|476 458|425 439|423 341|391 842|385 070|228 897|144 841|87 764|
|2011|527 983|469 719|467 641|413 851|407 317|237 887|136 001|82 458|
|2012|535 130|475 433|473 352|415 777|411 027|243 621|127 443|77 335|
|Percent of all firms<br>& organizations|100 %|88 %|88 %|80 %|79 %|47 %|32 %|20 %|
|Percent of private<br>sector firms|||100 %|91 %|89 %|53 %|37 %|23 %|

**Table 26: Loss analysis—number of employees covered**

||Full data<br>(employee<br>s)|Data on<br>ownership<br>form|Private<br>sector|Net<br>turnover ><br>100 000|Profit data<br>present|Employee<br>info<br>present &<br>matched|Present<br>before and<br>after<br>reform|Only<br>calendar<br>reporting|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|2004|4 173 085|4 031 251|2 548 217|2 465 660|2 272 661|2 144 314|1 851 433|1 390 606|
|2005|4 184 556|4 041 994|2 572 007|2 499 949|2 361 935|2 224 101|1 954 006|1 477 681|
|2006|4 290 877|4 166 436|2 649 385|2 576 747|2 436 994|2 293 307|2 103 546|1 568 935|
|2007|4 401 126|4 276 355|2 760 842|2 704 245|2 552 284|2 398 451|2 202 378|1 634 995|
|2008|4 417 583|4 291 195|2 811 804|2 744 855|2 601 868|2 443 069|2 233 457|1 665 405|
|2009|4 291 088|4 157 063|2 700 389|2 628 536|2 494 731|2 337 658|2 056 147|1 532 600|
|2010|4 402 789|4 273 288|2 816 383|2 743 287|2 600 025|2 436 456|2 057 962|1 531 999|
|2011|4 515 371|4 376 197|2 924 899|2 829 853|2 686 811|2 509 633|2 044 618|1 541 344|
|2012|4 576 947|4 430 798|2 964 260|2 864 090|2 719 322|2 544 638|1 995 376|1 501 184|
|Percent of all<br>employees|100 %|97 %|63 %|61 %|58 %|54 %|47 %|35 %|
|Percent of private<br>sector employees|||100 %|97 %|92 %|86 %|75 %|56 %|

36
Figure 4: Trends for Selected Emerging Moroccan Exports for Morocco and the World, 1990‐2010 Source: Authors’ calculations using UN‐Comtrade Data

# **4.2 Exports, GDP growth, and Morocco’s position in the Product Space**

As noted in Section 3, global export data combined with country data on GDP per capita may be used to define _PRODY_ (a global measure of the income potential of a product) and _EXPY_ (a country‐specific measure of income potential based on _PRODY_ and country export data). These concepts are of interest since empirical cross‐country analysis indicates that GDP per capita and _EXPY_ are highly correlated – countries with a high GDP per capita tend to have a high _EXPY_ and vice versa – and that increases in _EXPY_ tend to lead to increases in subsequent GDP growth.<sup>6</sup> As an illustration of this relationship with reference to Morocco, Figure 5 shows an estimate of the cross‐country relationship between country _EXPY_ and GDP per capita in 2010, to make some relevant country detail visible highlighting the positions of Morocco and other textile exporting countries.

In addition, Figure 5 shows that movements of Morocco’s _EXPY_ across the GDP per capita space closely follow the estimated cross‐country relationship throughout the period 1990‐2010 – in other words, the evolution of GDP per capita is consistent with changes in the sophistication of the export basket (marked by an increasing merchandise export shares of products with higher _PRODY_ values), supporting the validity of the PS approach to analyses of growth and trade for Morocco. The obvious implication that follows from this perspective is that, _ceteris paribus_ , for Morocco (or any other country), accelerated growth in the income potential of its export basket would propel stronger GDP growth. A key strategic question is: Can the current structure of exports and its underpinning production structure provide the base for a future rapid structural transformation? In general terms,

> 6 More specifically, Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) use Comtrade data to construct a panel of nearly 80 countries that start in 1962. Data is grouped into 5‐ and 10‐year intervals and results from four different estimators (OLS, IV, OLS with fixed effects, and GMM) suggest that, on average, a 10% increase in _EXPY_ in an earlier five‐year period raises per capita growth by 0.14–0.19 percentage points in the subsequent five‐ year period.

10
# ANNEX TABLE 1. LABOR MARKET DATA FOR OLDER ADULTS

||**Brazil**|**Chile**|**Colom-**<br>**bia**|**Costa**<br>**Rica**|**Mexico**|**Russian**<br>**Federati**<br>**on**|**South**<br>**Africa**|**EU27**|**OECD**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Demographic situation**||||||||||
|-- Old-age dependency ratio|14%|<br>18%|13%|13%|11%|23%|<br>9%|31%|<br>64%|
|-- Effective labour force exit age (years) Men|65|<br>68|70|70|70|63|<br>62|64|<br>66|
|Women|62|<br>63|63|64|66|61|<br>57|63|<br>64|
|-- Gender gap in exit (years)|3|5|7|6|4|2|<br>5|1|<br>2|
|**Employment**||||||||||
|-- Employment rate, 50-74 (% of the age group)|36|<br>49|51|45|50|38|<br>31|48|<br>51|
|_of which_50-54|62|<br>66|66|66|66|85|<br>57|81|<br>79|
|55-64|44|<br>56|54|50|52|51|<br>37|60|<br>61|
|65-69|22|<br>30|35|22|35|7|<br>10|15|<br>23|
|70-74|10|<br>18|23|15|25|..|..|7|<br>11|
|-- Gender gap in employment, 55-64 (% point gap)|26|<br>32|34|36|36|18|<br>13|12|<br>13|
|**Job characteristics**||||||||||
|-- Incidence of part-time work, 55-64 (% of total||||||||||
|employment)|-|19|17|35|28|13|<br>17|15|<br>19|
|_of which_involuntary 55-64 (% of part-time||||||||||
|work)|-|45|36|-|-|27|-|23|<br>20|
|-- Incidence of temporary work, 55-64 (% of employees)|-|19|18|6|-|6|-|5|<br>8|
|-- Incidence of self-employment, 55-64 (% of total||||||||||
|employment)|46|<br>29|63|44|47|8|<br>24|18|<br>22|
|-- Full-time earnings, 55-64 relative to 25-54 (ratio)|-|0.96|1.19|1.26|1.0|-|-|-|1.06|
|**Dynamics**||||||||||
|-- Retention rate for workers currently aged 60-64 (% of||||||||||
|employees t-5)|28|<br>43|-|37|46|-|-|53|<br>52|
|-- Hiring rate 55-64 (% of employees)|34|<br>16|24|14|13|-|-|6|<br>8|

## **Joblessness**

40
35 balance and output. Additional supporting evidence is provided by Faini (1991) for six less developed countries (among them, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia).

Table 6: Long-run Estimates of Aggregate Agricultural Supply Elasticity in Developing Countries

|_Model_|_Range of Estirnates_|
|---|---|
|Cross-farm|(-0.02)- _0.15_|
|Time-series|0.13- 0.78|
|Inter-sectoral general equilibrium|0.09|
|Cross-country|1.27-<br>1.66|

**Source:** Chhibber, (1988) p. 10.

# **THE FALLACY OF** COMPOSITON ARGUMENT.

The fallacy of composition presumes that markets would not be -able to absorb all of the exports that would materialize if developing countries" jointly promoted an export-led strategy (for example, by a series of devaluations). Furthermore, if such markets were found, "they would be closed by protectionist measures, provoked by the import penetration and outcries of market disruption" (Bhagwati, 1988). The fallacy of composition argumen **t** akes account of the concept of aggregate demand behavior. In other words, it does not assume that countries are small and therefore international prices are fixed. Effectiveness of a devaluation in improving the external balance depends on the behavior of international competitors. It is often argued that, if a wide range of developing countries-commodity-exporter countries-devalued their currencies to increase the volume of their exports, the consequent expansion in the world commoditie **s** upply would deteriorate the country's terms of trade. A recent paper by Faini et a]. (1992) argues that the so-called fallacy composition argument applies to manufacturing products (in developing countries) as well. Can it therefore be inferred that the fallacy composition argument is relevant to SSA countries (and to various sectors in SSA)?
Table 3: Heterogeneous Impacts of Trade by Development Level

||_ETRK_|_ETRL_|CIT<br>rate|Capital<br>share<br>of in-<br>come|Self<br>em-<br>ploy-<br>ment|Mixed<br>in-<br>come|Corporat<br>profts|e<br>Corporate<br>value-<br>added|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|Trade|0.444**|0.145|-0.043*|0.182**|-0.252**|-0.124|0.219***|0.220***|
||(0.181)|(0.093)|(0.024)|(0.077)|(0.107)|(0.097)|(0.063)|(0.083)|
|Trade_∗_1(High-inc.)|-0.441|0.120|-0.032|-0.219|0.232|0.374*|-0.299**|-0.381**|
||(0.347)|(0.194)|(0.047)|(0.137)|(0.209)|(0.205)|(0.146)|(0.176)|
|Implied coef. for|0.003|0.265**|-0.075***|-0.036|-0.021|0.250*|-0.080|-0.160|
|Trade_∗_1(High-inc.)|(0.231)|(0.122)|(0.457)|(0.083)|(0.151)|(0.144)|(0.102)|(0.129)|
|_N_|_4518_|_4518_|_3810_|_4518_|_4518_|_4518_|_4518_|_4518_|

_Notes:_ This table presents results from the heterogeneous IV analysis based on estimating equation (8). The top row denotes the outcome variable: effective tax rate on capital; effective tax rate on labor; statutory corporate income tax rate; capital share of domestic product; self-employed share of workforce; mixed income as a share of domestic product; corporate profits; and share of the corporate sector in the economy. The regression coefficients for _Trade_ as well as the interaction with a dummy for high-income countries, _Trade ∗_ 1( _High − income_ ) are presented. The bottom row reports the coefficient for the linear combination of _Trade_ and the interaction term. Trade is measured as the sum of export and imports divided by net domestic product. We instrument for trade using the oil-price and the gravity-instruments from Egger, Nigai, and Strecker (2019). All estimates include country and year fixed effects and observations are weighted by net domestic product in constant 2019 USD at PPP. For more details, see Section 7. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

51