rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
17

# VI. Conclusion

While the level of intemational migration and remittances continues to grow between countries, data on the whole process of international migration remains fragmented, scattered and unreliable. At the international level, there is no consistent set of statistics on either the number or skill characteristics of international migrants. At the national level, labor-exporting countries do not typically keep track either of the number or the skill characteristics of migrants. And while some labor-receiving countries do keep track these issues, they often miss the large numbers of migrants who enter their borders on an illegal basis.

Using a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting countries, and employing estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and OECD records, this paper has tried to overcome these data problems to answer such policy questions as: How pervasive is the brain drain from labor-exporting countries? Which countries or regions of the developing world are most affected? Does international migration deprive labor-exporting countries of a sizeable fraction of their "best and brightest," or are their numbers too small to worry about?

Five conclusions to these, and similar questions, emerge from this paper. While these conclusions are often based on estimates of migration which are rough and in need of further refinement, they are still suggestive.

The first finding is that the level of international migration continues to grow annually. While no accurate, time-series data exist on changes in the total level of international migration, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does keep annual records on the level of official remittances sent home by migrant workers. Over the last twenty
25 TAaLII

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Th. flwu w tinsh eo1m suflr to she _aumbwd_ sauna in ths Rfehrm liet at the mod. _Mfeta_ 9. _IvS__ U If. apital spAawmnt a is £l e ao hork period of ax hoiday is 2 yasm U amiul than m . 3 yam 12. _Malaysia._ f apit n mal mmis MU50.000 sx oliay pod il2ysom ifusP toMS500.000.3 y=eaf up so MSI O,mli. 4 yz if amw M1 mAi]on yms r 13. _MmwMaheIf_ 100 ipkqyed.2w,u ywa tan hliaTif 200empoysd3 exuaym aifupto3sSi-p'lnynd4Ex,a _ya4_ if _oS_ w 350 binl 4 _upa t_ - _y . _w._ 15. _NIf_ia._ f capil. _Indd_ smthMam N. IO . _n0_ boliday. 21. _Sri Lo*&a_ 20 pw ous addkitiea tax .lif if ovw 50 ipnployed 22. Sbw4wm If capita ezpmdiftuv _amnad_ SI10 fi milin bax oiay windsd to 10 yam. 23. _Sudm._ if capita expedmmitsa up **to** £50.000 paee of tax holiay is3 yinm if capita apindsmisw up to £150000. pot"isd a yenm Holiday is ixtmdahi by a fesIn _S yem_ 24. _S&wwins_ Pero of uax holiay is up to 1O yam. dupaudig an themn of the capita ia,v s 26. _?)iaidudeTohq.o._ Period ofu tax oiay as a sidiogsapuht m 5 nd 9 yen.I l0; an saaholiday forempita _intei NWd ew catpi_m_ _Sot*;_ SL,m<L ctJ _ToSe ( q a)_
measures are calculated). In most cases, the poverty line was also calculated from the same survey (though there are some exceptions, for which pre-existing national poverty lines were updated using the consumer price index). About 80 percent of these reports used a version of the “cost of basic needs” method in which the food component of the poverty line is the expenditure needed to purchase a food bundle specific to each country (or region) that yields a stipulated food energy requirement.<sup>13</sup> To this amount an allowance is added for nonfood spending, which is typically anchored to the nonfood spending of people whose food spending (or sometimes total spending) is near the food poverty line.

While there are similarities across countries in how poverty lines are set, there is much scope for discretion. The stipulated food-energy requirements are similar, but the food bundles that yield a given food energy intake can vary enormously (such as in the share of calories from starchy staples and the share from meat). The nonfood component will also vary. The judgments made in setting the various parameters of a poverty line are likely to reflect prevailing notions of what poverty means in each country setting, with more frugal lines in poorer countries.

There are some notable differences between the old (RDV) and new (RCS) data sets on national poverty lines. The RDV data were drawn from sources for the 1980s (with a mean year of 1984) while the new and larger compilation in RCS is post-1990 (mean of 1999); in no case do the proximate sources overlap. The RCS data cover 75 developing countries while the earlier data included only 22 countries (plus 11 developed countries). The RDV data set used rural poverty lines when there was a choice, while the RCS data set estimated national average lines. And the RDV data set was unrepresentative of the poorest region, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with only four countries from that region (Burundi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia), while the RCS data set has a good spread across regions, including 23 countries in SSA. The sample bias in the RDV data set was unavoidable at the time (1990) but it can now be corrected.

Figure 1 plots the poverty lines compiled by RCS in 2005 $PPPs per month against log household consumption per capita also at 2005 PPP; there are 74 countries with complete data. The Figure also gives a nonparametric regression of the national poverty lines against log mean consumption. Above a certain point, the poverty line rises with mean consumption. The overall elasticity of the poverty line to mean consumption is about 0.7. However, the slope is essentially

> 13 This method, and alternatives, are discussed in detail in Ravallion (1994, 2008a).

9
~~~~~~~~~Policy Research|

> * , ^

* I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iI

## Country Operations

# WPS 939

This paper-aproductof theCountry Operations Division III, Country Department III, Europe and Central - Asia region was initiated during preparations for the _World Development Report 1991_ on development. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Dani Kaufmann, room H2-041, extension 37305 (July 1992,40 pages).

Kaufmann and Wang find that a country's economic policies significantly affect the performance of investment projects in the social sectors, especially education. Their findings underscore the need to link strategy in the social sectors - even at the project level - to a country's structural adjustment and broad economic policies.

It is important, they say, to fully integrate existing and expected economic policy into project preparation and project appraisal documents in the social sector.

The paucity of robust quantitative information on the costs and benefits of social projects may have perpetuated the false notion that social projects, unlike other types of projects, may be insulated from the effects of general economic policy.

Kaufmann and Wang present an analytical framework to suggest the mechanisms through which such policies affect each stage of a project cycle. They use statistical analysis and case studies from a broad range of sector reports and project documents.

Bivariate statistical analysis of the incidence of _unsatisfactory_ projects shows that social projects are two to three times as likely to be rated unsatisfactory where there is restrictive trade, overvalued currency, a fiscal deficit, and relative price distortions. The evidence is even stronger when data only for education projects are examined.

| The Policy Research Working PaperoSeriesdisseminates theifdings of work nderwayin therBank. Anobjectiveoftheseries is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The rindings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of ficial Bank policy.

Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
Elías, J. (1992). Sources of Growth: A Study of Seven Latin American Economies. International Center for Economic Growth. Processed.

- Feenstra, R., and H. Hanson. (1996). Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality. _AEA Papers and Proceedings_ , 86(2), 240–45.

Fields, G. (1996). Accounting for Income Inequality and Its Change. Cornell University. Paper prepared for presentation at the American Economic Association annual meetings, New Orleans, La. Processed.

- Fiszbein, A. (1991). _An Essay on Labor Markets and Income Inequality in Less Developed Countries._ Ph.D. diss. University of California, Berkeley.

- Hanson, H. (1997). Increasing Returns, Trade, and the Regional Structure of Wages. _Economic Journal_ , 107(440), 113–33.

- Hanson, H., and A. Harrison. (1995). Trade, Technology, and Wage Inequality. Working Paper 5110. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, Mass. Processed.

- Hernández Laos E, N. Garro, and I. Llamas. (1997). Productividad y Mercado de Trabajo en México. Processed.

- Inter-American Development Bank. Informe (1998 – 1999). América Latina Frente a la Desigualdad: Progreso Económico y Social en América Latina.

- Johnson, G. (1997). Changes in Earnings Inequality: The Role of Demand Shifts. _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ , 11(2, spring), 41–54.

- Juhn C., K. Murphy, and B. Pierce. (1993). Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill. _Journal of Political Economy_ , 3(3), 410–48.

- Knight, J. T., and R. H. Sabot. (1983). Educational Expansion and the Kuznets Effect. _American Economic Review_ , 73, 1132–36.

- Leibbrandt, M. V., Christopher D. Woolard, and Ingrid D. Woolard. (1996). The Contribution of Income Components to Income Inequality in South Africa. _Living Standards Measurement Study_ . Working Paper 125. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Processed.

- Londoño, J. L. (1996). _Poverty, Inequality, and Human Capital Development in Latin America, 1950–2025_ . World Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Washington, D.C. (June). Processed.

- Lopez-Acevedo, G, and M. Walton. (2004). Mexico Poverty Assessment. Washington: The World Bank.

- Lopez-Acevedo, Gladys. (1997). Learning Achievement and School Cost Effectiveness in Mexico: The Case of the Pare Program. Working Policy Research Paper, The World Bank.

- Lopez-Acevedo, Gladys and Angel Salinas. (1999). The Evolution and Structure of the Rates of Returns to Education in Mexico (1987-1997): An Application of Quantile Regression. The World Bank Group, Report No. 19945-ME.

- Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas. (2000a). Professional Development and Incentives for Teacher Performance in Schools in Mexico. The World Bank, Mimeo.

33
development of foreign exchange and derivatives markets as instruments to fund or hedge their investments in local currency.<sup>49</sup>

**However, foreign investment in domestic public debt cannot be taken for granted, nor can its leverage effect on market development.** Two aspects need to be taken into account:

- **First, there are minimum preconditions that need to be in place.** Aside from a stable macroeconomic environment, market access should be ensured: open capital account, a transparent foreign exchange and tax regime, no crowding out effect from local investors, and compliance with minimum custodial and settlement standards. Debt issuance also needs to follow minimum standards in terms of design, term structure and critical mass per benchmark, as well as some degree of liquidity.

- **Second, generally there are fundamental reasons justifying expected one-off higher returns, such as expectations of currency appreciation or structural macroeconomic change.** For example in Brazil and Mexico, foreign inflows were buttressed by currency appreciation expectations, higher yields and stronger macroeconomic fundamentals. In Eastern Europe, the expectation of joining the EU and the EMU has been a major driver for foreign capital inflows.

**Foreign investors ́ presence in government debt markets in MENA is negligible.** It is below one percent in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, with the exception of some foreign investment in Egypt at 10.5 percent in April 2010 almost entirely in Treasury bills (10.2 percent).  Two sets of factors may explain the current situation:

**First, MENA markets need to improve their investability.** As discussed in Section 2, only Egypt and Morocco reach the minimum investability criteria relevant to foreign investors that make them eligible to be included in the GEMX index, and they score among the lowest EMEs.

**Second, excess liquidity in the banking sector in MENA-5 and the lack of alternative investments have crowded out a more diversified investor base, including foreign investors.** As explained earlier, with banks being a “de facto” captive demand it is difficult to assess the competitiveness of government debt auctions<sup>50</sup> . The fact that in all countries, with the exception of Egypt, the bulk of debt is very long term and very illiquid reinforces the captive demand characteristic. Even in the case of Egypt, foreign investors are hardly present in medium and long term debt, mainly due to the low liquidity of these securities which is not reflected in their yield.

**Crowding-out of foreign investors due to a “de facto” captive demand by banks is even more severe for long-term securities in the context of fixed exchange rate**

> 49 See BIS CGFS Papers, No 28, “Financial stability and local currency bond markets”, June 2007.

> 50 There are no regulations that force banks to invest in public debt, but the limited alternative investments make them behave as “de facto” captive demand.

37
Overall, in Myanmar, women tend to face disproportionately more barriers to operating and growing their business (with the exception of conflict, which affects men entrepreneurs more), given the small size of their firms, additional household responsibilities, reduced access to finance and lack of family-friendly work environments. To overcome these challenges and foster business development, it is thus important that awareness is raised and that policies, products and services that encourage better business environments and development are put in place.

# References

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Bin Bae, Kwang and Yang, Gigeun. 2013. The effects of family-friendly policies on job satisfaction and organizational commitment: a panel study conducted on South Korea’s public institutions. Public Personnel Management (46): 25-40.

Bloom, Nick et al. 2011. Are family-friendly workplace practices a valuable firm resource? Strategic Management Journal (32): 343-367.

Boeckmann, Irene et al. 2010. Work–Family policy trade-offs for mothers? Unpacking the cross-national variation in motherhood earnings penalties. Work and Occupations (43): 119-177.

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Born, Nicholas and Kang, Seoung Kil. 2015. What are best practices in the space of employer branding that enable <u>organizations to attract and retain the best talent?</u> Cornell University ILR Review.

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De la Briere, Benedicte and Wodon, Quentin. 2018. Unrealized potential: the high cost of gender inequality in earnings. World Bank.

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37
residuals in levels. The Heckman model was not examined because it is challenging to correct for heteroscedasticity (Donald 1995), and its need for an additional variable in the selection equation makes model comparisons difficult. The Zero-Inflated-Poisson (ZIP) model was excluded because it was found to give the same results as truncated PPML in real-world regressions (Martin and Pham 2020) and because the inflation term requires an additional variable.

The analysis uses the 136*136 cross-sectional trade matrix for 1992 curated by Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997) and studied by SST (2006) and by Jochmans (2017). A cross check with UN COMTRADE revealed that 46 of these economies did not report their trade for 1992, including Iran, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa. Of the potential 2070 trade flows between these non-reporters 2059 were zero, with nine minuscule flows into St Kitts and Nevis, one to the Bahamas and one to Guyana. This made clear that the developers of the dataset had made no systematic attempted to predict flows between non-reporters. Given the possibility of bias from treating these missing data as zeros, trade between these non-reporters was omitted in the main analysis, with results from the full dataset presented in the Online Appendix. With these data excluded, the full sample was 16290 with 41 percent zeros.

The results for the Fixed Effects (FE) models in Table 1 show substantially different results between estimators. The critical distance elasticity, for example, ranges from -0.75 with the PPML estimator through -1.47 with the EK-H estimator to -1.88 with the Tobit model. Of the categorical variables, common language and colonial ties have consistently positive and significant effects, while the signs on FTA and Contiguity dummies are puzzlingly negative for the three models based on limited-dependent variable models.

13
disproportionately the well to do (generalized subsidies to energy consumption, pensions and higher education) and the still relatively minor importance of targeted transfers. Transforming the Latin American state, so that it becomes an agent of equalization of opportunities and efficient income redistribution, is perhaps the most significant challenge in our regional development agenda.

# **References**

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Bourguignon, F 2003. “The Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction; Explaining Heterogeneity across Countries and Time Periods.” In Inequality and Growth: Theory and Policy Implications, ed. T. Eicher and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Calderón, C and E. Levy-Yeyati. 2007. “Three degrees of vulnerability: External shocks in developing countries”, World Bank, Washington, DC.

36