Table 1: List of variables, source and summary statistics

|**Dummy variables, 1=Yes, 0=No.**|**Yes**|**No**|
|---|---|---|
|_Renegotiation_: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a<br>renegotiation of the concession contract.|162 (52.8%)|145 (47.2%)|
|_Renegotiation initiated by the firm_|53 (17.3%)|254(82.7%)|
|_Renegotiation initiated by thegovernment_|94(30.6%)|213(69.4%)|
|_Renegotiation initiated by both_|15(4.9%)|292(95.1%)|
|_Existence of regulatory body_: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not<br>a regulatorybodyat the time of the concession first cominginto operation.|180 (58.6%)|127 (41.4%)|
|_Regulatory body is part of the government ministry_: Dummy variable indicating<br>whether the regulatory body is constituted as a part of the government ministry or<br>not.|293 (95.7%)|13 (4.3%)|
|_Price cap_: Dummy variable indicating whether the tariff regulation imposed by the<br>regulator is aprice cap.|283 (92.2%)|24 (7.8%)|
|_Investment requirements_: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or not<br>investment requirements aspart of the concession contract.|235 (76.5%)|72 (23.5%)|
|_Private financing_: Dummy variable indicating whether the project is funded<br>entirely through private funds (without any financial investment of the state,<br>whether local or national)or not.|160 (52.1%)|147 (47.9%)|
|_Bidding process_: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a bidding<br>process to award the concession.|272 (88.6%)|35 (11.4%)|
|_Award criteria_: Dummy variable classifying award criteria (1 for highest price,<br>highest canon or lowest subsidy,0 for all others)|106 (34.5%)|201 (65.5%)|
|_Minimum income guarantee_: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a<br>governmentguarantee in terms of minimum incomepromissory.|63 (20.5%)|244 (79.5%)|
|_Arbitration process_: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a formal<br>set of arbitration processes stated in the contract providing for the settlement of a<br>dispute between the concession holder and the government, should such a situation<br>arise.|179 (58.3%)|128 (41.7%)|
|_Election_: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not national elections<br>(legislative or presidential) in any given year. Source: Political Database of the<br>Americas. Georgetown University/Organization of American States. Center for<br>Latin American Studies.|n.r.|n.r.|
|_Political Change_: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not a change<br>in power following national elections (legislative or presidential) in any given<br>year. Source: Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown<br>University/Organization of AmericanStates.Center for Latin AmericanStudies.|n.r.|n.r.|
|**Continuous variables**|**Mean **|**S.D.**|
|_Duration since award_: Indicates the number of years a concession has been in<br>operation since its award.|n.r.|n.r.|
|_Corruption_: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide;<br>annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6.<br>Higher value means less corruption.|2.94|0.69|
|_Rule of law_: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide;<br>annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6.<br>Higher value means better rule of law.|2.92|0.99|
|_Bureaucratic quality_: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country<br>Risk Guide; annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range<br>from 1 to 6. Higher value means better bureaucraticquality.|3.36|0.61|
|_Growth_: Yearly growth rate of GDP in real terms. Source: World Bank and Inter-<br>American Development Bank.|n.r.|n.r.|
|_Exchange rate_: Annual evolution of the real exchange rate (calculated as (index<br>rate of year t – index rate of year t-1)/index rate of year t). A positive value<br>indicates depreciation. Source: Inter-American Development Bank.|n.r.|n.r.|
|Note: For variables varying over time, like the election dummy, duration si<br>macroeconomic variables, the summary statistics are meaningless and are o<br>relevant).|nce award, an<br>mitted (denot|d<br>ed by n.r.: non|

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the incidence of the different types of renegotiations (led by firms, the government or both), crossing countries and years in the first case, countries, sectors and sub-sectors in the second case.

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