rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
developing regions, and the region’s share of private capital flows to developing regions has continued to remain small and undiversified (table 1).

Table 1: Financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries, 2006

|_(US$ billions)_|**1990**|**1995**|**2000**|**2005**|**2006**<br>**estimate**|**_Growth rate,_**<br>**_2000-06 ( %)_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_Sub-Saharan Africa excluding_**<br>Official flows|**_South Africa_**||||||
|ODA<sup>1/</sup>|17.0|17.4|11.7|30.1|37.5|_220%_|
|Official debt|4.3|3.5|0.7|-0.7|-2.5|..|
|Private medium and long-|||||||
|term flows|0.8|3.9|5.1|12.4|14.8|_189%_|
|FDI|1.3|3.3|5.8|10.8|17.2|_197%_|
|Portfolio equity|0.0|0.1|0.0|0.2|0.1|..|
|Bond|0.0|0.2|-0.2|0.0|-1.4|..|
|Bank lending|-0.5|0.3|-0.5|1.4|-1.1|..|
|Private short-term debt<br>|2.3|1.1|-1.4|1.0|4.6|..|
|Migrants' remittances<sup>2/</sup>|1.7|3.1|4.3|8.7|9.6|_124%_|
|Institutional remittances|1.4|2.3|2.9|5.4|6.2|_117%_.|
|Capital Outflows|3.2|5.3|6.3|7.5|3.6|..|
|**_South Africa_**|||||||
|Official flows|||||||
|ODA<sup>1/</sup>|0.0|0.4|0.5|0.7|0.7|_47%_|
|Official debt|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.0|..|
|Private medium and long-|||||||
|term flows|0.3|4.0|6.2|17.4|16.1|_160%_|
|FDI|-0.1|1.2|1.0|6.5|-0.1|_.._|
|Portfolio equity|0.4|2.9|4.2|7.2|15.0|_257%_|
|Bond|0.0|0.7|1.2|1.3|1.6|_32%_|
|Bank lending|0.0|-0.8|-0.2|2.4|-0.4|..|
|Private short-term debt|0.0|1.9|0.3|1.8|5.6|_1940%_|
|Migrants' remittances<sup>2/</sup>|0.1|0.1|0.3|0.7|0.7|_114%_|
|Institutional remittances|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|..|
|Capital Outflows|0.2|4.1|3.3|2.5|10.5|_214%_|
|**_Other developing regions_**|||||||
|Official flows|||||||
|ODA<sup>1/</sup>|37.3|41.0|41.5|76.1|65.7|_58%_|
|Official debt|19.8|35.4|-6.6|-69.9|-13.8|..|
|Private medium and long-|||||||
|<br>term flows|30.9|158.9|183.3|465.5|639.2|_249%_|
|Private short-term debt|11.5|54.1|-5.3|86.8|84.1|..|
|Migrants' remittances<sup>2/</sup>|29.2|54.3|79.9|181.9|211.0|_164%_|
|Institutional remittances|15.7|14.0|26.9|58.1|63.0|_134_%|
|Capital outflows|34.6|79.9|163.3|364.7|545.4|_234%_|

1/ / Development Assistance Committee donors only. 2/ Migrants’ remittances are the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers (World Bank 2005).

_Source:_ Authors’ calculations; _Global Development Finance_ database, March 2008.

5
# **1 Introduction**

Can corruption accelerate policy implementation? This question is part of the larger debate regarding the role of corruption in private sector development. Most studies conclude that corruption retards economic growth by distorting incentives, increasing transaction costs and aggravating uncertainty, leading to misallocation and underinvestment (Murphy et al, 1991, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, RoseAckerman 1997, Mauro, 1998, Fisman and Svensson, 2005). Yet, some have argued that corruption can enhance efficiency by enabling entrepreneurs to circumvent burdensome business regulation, or by incentivizing bureaucrats to work harder with bribes working as a piece rate (Leff 1964, Huntington 1968, Lui 1985, Lein 1986).

This paper revisits this issue by examining the relationship between requests for bribes and the time it takes to complete various regulatory requirements – getting construction permits, operating licenses, electrical connections, and clearing customs – using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. More specifically, the paper tests three predictions implied by the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, which postulates that (i) firms confronted with bribes should get things done faster ceteris paribus. It also predicts that this relationship is heterogeneous both across firms and countries, with (ii) firms with a higher opportunity cost of waiting being willing to pay more and consequently facing shorter wait times, and (iii) bribing being more beneficial when regulation is onerous, such that the relationship between bribing and wait times should be starker in countries with more protracted _de jure_ regulations.

In spite of extensive theoretical analysis of the relationship between regulation, corruption, and bureaucratic efficiency (see e.g. Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, Aidt, 2003, Cadot, 1987, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993, Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1999), examining the relationship between corruption and the efficacy of policy implementation itself has largely been neglected to date. Previous studies using firm-level data have studied the determinants of the incidence of corruption (Svensson, 2003) and its 2
Niimi, Y., P. Vasudeva-Dutta, and A. L. Winters, 2004, Storm in a Rice Bowl: Rice Reform and Poverty in Vietnam in the 1990s, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 9(2):170-190.

Ravallion, M. 1990, Welfare changes of food price changes under induced wage responses: Theory and evidence for Bangladesh, Oxford Economic Papers, 42: 574–85.

Ravallion, M. and D. van de Walle, 1991. The impact on poverty of food pricing reforms: a welfare analysis for Indonesia, Journal of Policy Modeling, 13(2):281-99.

Rashid, S. 2002, Dynamics of Agricultural Wage and Rice Price in Bangladesh: a Reexamination, MSSD Discussion Paper No. 44, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.

Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss, 1986, <u>Agricultural Household Models: Extensions and Applications, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.</u> Sumarto, S., A. Suryahadi, and W. Widyanti, 2005, Assessing the Impact of Indonesian Social Safety Net Programmes on Household Welfare and Poverty Dynamics, <u>European Journal of Development Research, 17(1): 155-77.</u> Timmer, C. P., and D. Dawe, 2007, Managing Food Price Instability in Asia: A Macro Food Security Perspective, Asian Economic Journal, 21(1): 1-18.

Warr, P., 2005, Food Policy and Poverty in Indonesia: A General Equilibrium Analysis, <u>Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 49(4): 429-51.</u> Wodon, Q., and H. Zaman, 2008, Poverty Impact of Higher Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa and Policy Responses, mimeo, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Wodon, Q., C. Tsimpo, P. Backiny-Yetna, G. Joseph, F. Adoho, and H. Coulombe, 2008a, Impact of Higher Food Prices on Poverty in West and Central Africa, mimeo, World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank, 2008a, Addressing the Food Crisis: The Need for Rapid and Coordinated Action, Background paper for the Finance Ministers Meetings of the Group of Eight, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Washington, DC World Bank, 2008b, <u>Guidance for Responses from the Human Development Sectors to Rising Food and Fuel prices, Human Development Network, Washington, DC.</u> 12
and the evolution of risk management in these institutions. The last section offers some concluding remarks.

# **2. Overall Structure of the Pension and Retirement System**

## **2.1 The AFP System**

The AFP system was made mandatory for new entrants into the labor force starting in 1981 and voluntary for existing workers, but most workers opted to switch to the new system, as they received generous recognition of their accrued rights (in the form of recognition bonds issued by the government) and enjoyed a reduction in contribution rates. By 2008, the number of active contributors was 4.5 million workers or the equivalent of about 63 percent of the labor force, as shown in Table 1. This coverage ratio is much higher than the Latin American average of 28 percent, although still low by comparison with the OECD average of about 90 percent. In 2008, the government implemented reforms aiming at increasing coverage of the mandatory funded pillar and strengthening the solidarity of the Chilean pension system. These reforms are expected to reduce the coverage gap compared with other OECD countries.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1: Coverage in the Chilean Pension System, 1990-2008**

|Year|AFP<br>Contributors|Employment|Labor Force|Contributors/<br>Labor Force|Contributors/<br>Employment|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1990|2,642,757|4,539,040|4,896,680|54%|58%|
|1995|2,961,928|5,206,650|5,596,630|53%|57%|
|2000|3,196,991|5,366,570|5,993,550|55%|60%|
|2004|3,477,500|5,946,430|6,607,650|55%|61%|
|2005|3,784,141|6,170,340|6,798,410|56%|61%|
|2006|3,956,992|6,271,850|6,802,750|58%|63%|
|2007|4,329,412|6,448,860|6,944,390|62%|67%|
|2008|4,572,327|6,641,570|7,203,230|63%|69%|

Sources: SP, INP The number of pensioners under the new system has increased significantly, reaching 694,000 in 2008, the equivalent of 15 percent of the number of contributors and 47 percent of the number of total pensioners, as shown in Table 2.

> 5 In February 2010 Chile was accepted as a new member of the OECD.

2
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saw a major shift in domestic investments towards real estate and speculation in equities. In the decae'a from 1976-85, the country showed signs of contracting the "Dutch Diseasen, where an appreciation in the exchange rate caused a shift towards non-tradeables, as represented by bank lending to property (Figure 3). Fuelled by strong corporate profits and speculation, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index saw a sustained bull run from 100 in 1977 to a peak of 427 in Malaysia: Exchange rate and early 1984. The influx of **_XUWW_** expatriate workforce, particularly arising from oil and other foreign investments, pushed quality **S0** office and residential rentals to unprecedented E \ peaks in the early 1980s. This resulted in a bout of speculation in property, D fuelled also by the ready availability of bank credit. Between 1975 to 1983, rental ._._._._._._._._._,_._-, and prices of good quality la"s **in in** n8 **in** **_i_ 464i** 16 **4** 1 * **41_** residential and commercial O ~a . to p"^"< property roughly tripled. A Bank Negara survey conducted Figure 3 in 1983 on property deveiopment in Kuala Lumpur indicated that prime commercial property projects completed in 1986 would be five times that completed in 1983. By the end of 1986, total new banking system loans to the broad property sector (construction, housing and real estate) amounted to 54.8% of total new loans, compared with 32.2% in 1980. The proportion of total property loans to total bank loans outstanding rose from 26.4% at the end of 1980 to 35.9% at the end of 1986.

10. In the third quarter of 1985, however, the gradual slide in commodity prices (evident since mid-1984) began to tumble, reducing total export income by 2.6% and 5.9% in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Crude oil price fell 62% from its peak, while palm oi'l prices fell 57% to M$579 per ton in 1986, below its cost of production. The couposite commodity index dropped by 9.8% in 1985 and a further 24% the following year. Real GDP growth became negative (-1%) in 1985 for the first time since 1975, while nominal gross national income declined by 2.9% in 1985 and 7.9% in 1986. The consequence of the recession was a sharp contraction in cash flow for many companies in Malaysia, since their income declined sharply in the face of weak export sales and poor domestic demand, including delayed debt collection, while committed outflows, particularly in the property sector, continued to drain resources. Share prices slid by 59.8% from their peak in early 1984, and total market capitalization declined by 44% to M$46.7 billion at its lowest point in April 1986. As inflation fell to almost zero level, the growth of narrow money, Ml, became negative by the end of 1984,
- 58 -

_59._ U-S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) (1990). Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead: Assessment of Scientific and Technical Information. OAQP.S Staff Paper. EPA-450/2-89-222. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC60. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) (1990). Toxicological Profile for Lead. United States Public Health Service. Atlanta. GA.

61. Victery W. (1988) Evidence for effects of chronic lead exposure on blood pressure in experimental animals: An overview. In: Victery, W., ed. Symposium on lead-blood pressure relationships; April 1987; Chapel Hill, NC. Environ Health Perspect. 78:71-76.

62. Harlan WR. Landis JR, Schmouder RL, Goldstein NG, Harlan LC. (1985) Blood lead and blood pressure relationship in the adolescent and adult U.S. population. 1. Am. Med. Assoc. 253:530534.

63. Pirkle JIL. Schwartz J, Landis JR, Harlan WR. (1985) rne relationship between blood lead levels and blood pressure and U.S. cardiovascular risk implications. Am. J. Epidemiol. 121:246-258.

- 64Schwartz (1985) Evidence for a blood lead-blood pressure relationship [memorandum to the Clean Air Science Advisory Comnuttee]. Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis. Available for inspection at: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Central Docket Section, Washington, DC; docket no. ECAO-CD-81-2 IIA C.60.

65. Schwartz J1 (1985) Response to Richard Royall's questions on the blood lead-blood pressure relationships in NHANES II [memorandum to Dr. David Weil]. Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis. Available for inspection at: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Central Docket Section, Washington, DC; docket no. ECAOCD-81-2 ILA.C.5 66. Schwartz 1. (1986) NHANES II blood pressure analysis [menorandum to Dr. Lester Grant]. Washington, DC: US. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis. Available for inspection at: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Central Dock-et Section, Washington, DC; docket no. ECAO-CD-81-2 IA.C.10 67. Schwartz J. (1988) The relationship between blood lead and blood pressure in the NHANES II survey. Environ Health Perspect. 78:15-2.

68. Pocock SJ, Shaper AG, Ashby D, Delves HT. (1985) Blood lead and blood pressure in middleaged men. Irn: International Conference: Heavy metals in the enviromnent. ID Lekkas, Ed, Vol. 1, September, Athens, Greece. Edinburgh, United Kingdom:CEP Consultants, LtD; pp:303-305.

69. Pocock SJ, Shaper AG, Ashby D, Delves HT, Clayton BE. (1988) The relationship between blood lead, blood pressure, stroke and heart attacks in middle-aged British men. Environ Health Perspect. 78:23-30.
# **1. INTRODUCTION**

Until now, efforts to measure access to water and sanitation around the world have provided a certain level of aggregation at the subnational level, such as for particular government districts, but rarely do we encounter high-resolution maps for entire countries. Using survey data to map particular indicators is difficult for a number of reasons. First, the actual location of the surveyed establishment is usually unavailable. Second, due to cost constraints, and to ensure representativeness, surveys typically use cluster-based sampling techniques, which makes the distribution of observations uneven across a given area. The absence of reliable, granular, evenly distributed, geo-referenced data makes it difficult to accurately compare water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) access across a country, or to identify those areas in greatest need of investment.

The poor provision of safe, accessible water and sanitation services in Nigeria has commensurate public health and economic impacts. Evidence from Nigeria has shown that those sectors of the population with the worst water, sanitation, and hygiene conditions are also the ones most at risk of attaining diseases due to inadequate health. A majority share of the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) enteric burden – a common measure for estimating the health burden and risk factors of diseases – estimated for Nigeria is associated with inadequate WASH, and disproportionately borne by poorer children and those in vulnerable geographic areas. Approximately 73 percent of the GBD enteric burden estimated for the country is associated with inadequate WASH.<sup>2</sup> A recent, nationwide multi-sector assessment undertaken by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR) of the Government of Nigeria with support from the World Bank – the 2015 National Water and Sanitation Survey, NWSS – provides uniquely detailed information on access to WASH in Nigeria, as gathered from a wide-ranging set of surveys: a nationally representative household survey on access to safe water and sanitation which covered 201,842 households, a spatial inventory of 89,721 water points and 5,100 water schemes in the country, and a survey on the provision of WASH in over 50,000 public facilities, including health and educational centers.<sup>3</sup>

> 2 Andres et al (2017). 3 Please refer to Andres et al. (2017) for more information on the NWSS.

2
-4-

# II. The Methodological Approach

For a test of the potential influence of market structure on international prices, data on French exports of iron and steel products were compiled directly from United Nations Series D Commodity Trade Tapes. These computerized records provide detailed information on the quantity and value of shipments (f.o.b.) on a joint product-by-country basis which can be used to compute unit values for exports. 4/ The decision to examine French unit values was based on the fact that a number of former colonial associates are highly dependent on France for imports (See Appendix 1 for relevant empirical information on this point including French-African "trade intensity" ratios). In addition, some useful 1963-1973 data on French export unit values were available from an earlier study (Yeats 1978) that could now be extended to 1987. While France was selected as the main focus for both the present and earlier study due to a very high trade intensity with former colonies, this study will also show that the findings can be generalized (See Table 5) to

- 4/ The free-on-board (f.o.b.) export unit value for product i shipped to country j (Uij) is derived from:

- (1) Uij =vij t Qijl x 100

where V- is the value of the export shipment and is the quantity (normally measured in units, pound or tons) of goods iraded. Analyses based on unit values must generally be treated with caution since product differentials, quality differences or variations in type may be reflected as price differences. However, for homogenous five-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) iron and steel products the influence of these other factors should be relatively minor. In fact, studies by Stigler and Kindahl (1970), McAllister (1961), and others have used iron and steel unit values to assess the accuracy of wholesale price quotations employed by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A. **The Firm**

# **Corporate governance6**

The fast growth of the corporate sector throughout the world makes corporate governance increasingly important. However, we have an especially poor understanding of corporate finance in developing countries, largely because of the lack of firm-level data. For instance, what are the ownership patterns in the developing countries? How are firms financed? Do firms face financial constraints? How well are creditors and shareholders protected in these countries? The answers to these illustrative questions can have important policy implications. The recent East Asian Crisis, for example, has been attributed to the poor protection of minority shareholders rights. The policy implications of these questions call for the collection of such data.

Bank surveys ask many good questions about corporate governance, although the coverage varies greatly. Consider the contrast between what theory suggests we should measure and what Bank surveys actually collect:

1. Theory suggests that competition in the managerial labor markets and reputation concerns force managers to perform well for future career prospects, making it important to measure aspects of managerial labor market, such as turnover, performnance criteria, rewards and punishment. Such questions are hard to find in Bank surveys. _Suggested questions:_ What determines managerial pay (current profits, stock options, relative performance, regulators' evaluations, etc)? If profits increase by one percent, what percentage increase does the managerial wage? Has a manager ever been removed because of poor performance? Can shareholders replace the CEO when performance is bad? What was the worst performance in the past x years? What consequences did the then-CEO suffer (income losses, demotion, or others)?

2. A firn's board of directors can be an important disciplinary force. Theory suggests that because of the free-riding problem associated with monitoring by shareholders, concentrated ownership may emerge to internalize the benefits and costs of monitoring. Thus it is important to uncover the ownership stake of the largest shareholders. Most Bank surveys ask about ownership type, but ask few questions beyond that. _Suggested questions:_ What is the

- **6** This subsection draws heavily on Shleifer and Vishny (1996).

7
rates and debt crisis in developing countries, there is a process of rapid divergence in incomes between the countries. The “lost decade” (or rather two decades) in Latin America, stagnation and then substantial declines in income in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the disastrous performance of many African countries, have been the main factors behind the divergence (combined of course with a rather respectable performance of rich economies). This fact is not new: it has been amply documented and is simply reflected here in the increase in inter-country inequality.<sup>14</sup> The new GDP numbers do not change our interpretation of the recent past, in that regard. Divergence lasted for some 20 years. However, since 2001, we notice a change. For the first time since 1982 divergence between countries’ GDPs per capita has stopped and even become reversed. In effect, the period 2001-06 has been good not only for the global economy (which is driven by the largest and richest countries), but also for the African countries that have grown at the rate of more than 4 percent per annum, postCommunist countries (growth at more than 6 percent per annum), and Latin America (3 percent p.a.). These factors were behind the reversal of divergence which we observe after 2001. It is, of course, not obvious that the global financial crisis and its aftermath will allow these hopeful developments to continue. At the end, note that even with the favorable developments around the turn of the century, the level of Concept 1 inequality is now significantly greater than it was in the 1960s and 1970s.

The level of Concept 2 inequality is about 7-8 Gini points higher than with the “old” PPP data. This is, of course, mostly on the account of Chinese and Indian data revisions. Concept 2 inequality “enters” the 1960s with an extremely high level of 65 Gini points. There is then a mild slide until the mid-1980s, and after that, thanks to high growth rates first of China, and more recently of India, the slide becomes much steeper. By year 2006, when our series ends, Concept 2 inequality amounted to only 55 Gini points. This is a substantial decrease of 10 Gini points, or about 1/6<sup>th</sup> of international population-weighted inequality in 1960s. The line which shows Concept 2 inequality without China (Figure 1) allows us to notice an important change that occurred around the turn of the century. While until 2000, Concept 2 inequality was sliding downward

> 14 See Milanovic (2005a), Minoiu and Reddy (2009), Pritchett (1997).

10