rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Appendix A Educational attainment**

Table A1: The Comoros - Educational attainment of children and their parents by five-year birth cohort

|Cohort|Average years<br>|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||of schooling|No schooling|Primary|Secondary|Tertiary|
|Son||||||
|1934-1939|1.7|75.0|15.6|7.8|1.6|
|1940-1944|1.2|83.3|11.5|3.4|1.9|
|1945-1949|1.9|75.3|14.2|8.0|2.5|
|1950-1954|2.1|77.5|9.3|10.1|3.1|
|1955-1959|3.3|63.4|15.4|14.7|6.5|
|1960-1964|4.4|55.7|13.1|22.7|8.5|
|1965-1969|5.8|38.3|19.9|32.6|9.2|
|1970-1974|5.1|39.7|26.1|28.4|5.8|
|1975-1979|4.1|52.2|20.6|22.8|4.4|
|1980-1984|5.1|42.7|17.5|37.2|2.6|
|Daughter||||||
|1934-1939|0.4|95.7|0.0|4.3|0.0|
|1940-1944|0.1|97.4|2.1|0.5|0.0|
|1945-1949|0.2|97.2|1.1|1.1|0.6|
|1950-1954|0.3|94.8|3.9|1.3|0.0|
|1955-1959|1.2|83.2|9.7|6.3|0.8|
|1960-1964|2.3|74.4|10.4|11.0|4.2|
|1965-1969|2.5|70.4|12.0|15.1|2.6|
|1970-1974|3.7|54.4|20.3|22.0|3.3|
|1975-1979|2.6|67.8|13.9|16.7|1.7|
|1980-1984|3.6|57.4|14.5|26.3|1.8|
|Mother||||||
|1934-1939|0.1|98.5|0.5|1.0|0.0|
|1940-1944|0.1|98.9|0.8|0.3|0.0|
|1945-1949|0.0|99.7|0.3|0.0|0.0|
|1950-1954|0.2|97.5|1.9|0.6|0.0|
|1955-1959|0.2|96.7|2.3|1.0|0.0|
|1960-1964|0.2|96.8|2.0|0.8|0.5|
|1965-1969|0.2|96.6|2.4|0.9|0.1|
|1970-1974|0.3|95.9|2.8|1.1|0.3|
|1975-1979|0.3|94.5|4.0|1.2|0.4|
|1980-1984|0.7|90.4|6.5|3.2|0.0|
|Father||||||
|1934-1939|0.3|96.5|2.0|1.5|0.0|
|1940-1944|0.2|97.3|2.4|0.3|0.0|
|1945-1949|0.1|98.4|1.3|0.3|0.0|
|1950-1954|0.3|97.2|1.7|1.1|0.0|
|1955-1959|0.8|92.4|3.5|2.5|1.7|
|1960-1964|0.7|92.2|5.5|1.5|0.8|
|1965-1969|0.8|90.2|6.7|2.8|0.4|
|1970-1974|1.1|87.3|7.8|3.1|1.8|
|1975-1979|1.4|84.3|9.5|4.6|1.7|
|1980-1984|1.5|82.9|9.2|6.5|1.5|

33
residents of each country in the “global” distribution, but we do not mix the new PPPs with those from previous ICP rounds. We will, however, discuss the salient differences between the new results reported here using the 2005 ICP and our past estimates.

Some dramatic revisions to past PPPs are implied, not least for the two most populous developing countries, China and India (neither of which had actually participated in the 1993 ICP). For example, the 1993 consumption PPP used for China was 1.42 Yuan to the $US in 1993 (updating an earlier estimate by Ruoen and Chen, 1995), while the new estimate based on the 2005 ICP is 3.46 Yuan (4.09 if one excludes government consumption). The corresponding “price level index” (PPP divided by market exchange rate; US=100) went from 25% in 1993 to 52% in 2005. So the Penn effect is still evident, but the size of this effect has declined markedly, with a new PPP at about half the market exchange rate rather than one quarter. Adjusting solely for the differential inflation rates in the US and China one would have expected the 2005 PPP to be 1.80 Yuan not 3.46. Similarly, India's 1993 consumption PPP was Rs 7.0, while the 2005 PPP is Rs 16, and the price level index went from 23% to 35%. If one updated the 1993 PPP for inflation one would have obtained a 2005 PPP of Rs 11 rather than Rs 16.

The results for China have naturally attracted much attention, given that they suggest that China’s GDP in 2005 is much smaller than we all thought; with the PPP revisions, China’s GDP per capita at PPP for 2005 falls from $6,760 to $4,091 (World Bank, 2008b). Keidel (2007) claimed that the new PPP for China adds 300 million to the count of that country’s poor. Some observers have gone further to claim that the new PPPs also cast doubt on the extent of China’s—and (hence) the world’s—progress over time against poverty. For example, the Bretton Woods Project (an NGO) claims that the new PPPs “...undermine the much-trumpeted claims that globalization has reduced the number of people living in extreme poverty”.<sup>12</sup> This would be surprising if it were true, given that rates of economic growth at the country level are not altered by changing the PPP benchmark; with China’s (remarkable) growth rates intact one must expect that progress over time will be similar using the new PPP, even if the poverty rate is higher (by international standards) at all dates.

While there were many improvements in the 2005 ICP, the new PPPs still have some limitations. Making the commodity bundles more comparable across countries (within a given region) invariably entails that some of the reference commodities are not typically consumed in

> 12 See http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-560008.

7
in the informal sector. Even though labor regulation is the same in all Brazilian states, its enforcement is highly decentralized. This generates considerable variation in the degree of government monitoring faced by fi rms in different areas (which can be explored econometrically). Finally, there are three good sources of data which we combine in our study. First, we use a fi rm level dataset collected by the World Bank with standard information on investment, employment, sales and value added, but with unique information on the employment of informal workers (and other types of illegal behavior of fi rms). Second, from administrative data from the Ministry of Labor we construct measures of the enforcement of labor regulation at the local level. Third, we use information on the economic and demographic characteristics of all the cities where the fi rms in our sample are located collected by two Brazilian statistical and research institutes.

We explore the within country variation in the enforcement of regulation to analyze how it affects the fi rm’s employment of informal workers and the fi rm’s performance. We argue that the main channel by which enforcement of regulation affects fi rm performance is by reducing the fi rm’s access to unregulated and fl exible labor. However, enforcement can vary across locations for several reasons, and not all of them can be considered exogenous in our empirical work. Therefore we control for an extensive set of fi rm and local level variables which are likely to be important determinants of informal behavior, fi rm performance and enforcement. In addition, we use a set of instrumental variables for enforcement which are measures of access of labor inspectors to the fi rms in their region, and a proxy for general law enforcement in the region.

We fi nd that increased enforcement in the area where fi rms are located leads to a substantial reduction in the amount of the informal workers they employ. We also fi nd that it leads to a large decreases in value added per worker, sales per worker, net wages and capital per worker. We do not fi nd any evidence that stricter enforcement changes total employment (suggesting that fi rms simply substitute informal for formal workers). The elasticities of informal employment and labor productivity with respect to enforcement are approximately -0.12 and -0.1 (respectively). These estimates imply that an increase in labor fl exibility due to an increase in informal employment by 1 percentage point increases productivity in 3.5%.

3
This study found that performance was not correlated with budget resources, or with the extent of reliance on TFs. Rather, knowledge products requested by the client and designed specifically to achieve client objectives were more likely to achieve their objectives than those of a more generic character. Knowledge services with fully or partly achieved outcomes also used local expertise, focused on specific sectors rather than broad topics, customized the analysis to local conditions, generated new data in support of policy making, and formulated actionable recommendations. Therefore, the “how” appeared to be more relevant than the “what” to the authors of this study.

The fourth and last group of studies involves conducting surveys to elicit _user views_ on World Bank knowledge products. Depending on the case, the users considered may be operational World Bank staff – for example, TTLs of lending projects – or external stakeholders – including government officials, members of legislatures, civil society, the private sector, academics, and donor representatives.

For example, one study by IEG (2009) sought feedback on the usefulness of 129 ESW and 64 TA budget codes that were deemed in line with the overall distribution of knowledge products delivered by the World Bank between 2000 and 2006. Responses were obtained from 91 TTLs of World Bank lending operations who had not been associated with the ESW and TA codes covered – roughly half of the TTLs approached – and from 353 in-country stakeholders.

The study noted that responses were generally consistent between the two groups. Technical quality received high ratings and dissemination less so, resulting in a mixed assessment of overall quality. ESW products such as global and regional reports were said to have informed lending operations, even when that was not their explicit objective. Loans that had been preceded by ESW products were also said to have better design than those that had not. Lending thus appeared as an important channel through which knowledge products informed developed policies and strengthened institutions at the country level. The effect of ESW products on informing World Bank strategies was significant as well, with “core” analytical products being particularly important in this respect.

In another study, a survey of senior World Bank operational staff was used to assess their awareness about research products, such as those produced by DEC (Ravallion and Wagstaff 2011). There were 2,900 recipients of the anonymous survey instrument used, and 555 respondents. Views were similar across regional units, but markedly different across sectors, with staff in areas of economic management and human development being more familiar with research products than their colleagues elsewhere.

10
# **4. Summary Statistics**

# **_4.1 Incidence of Bribes and Tax Evasion around the World_**

Given the lack of firm-level evidence on corruption and tax evasion, in this section, we first present detailed statistics at the firm level across countries on bribe payments and tax avoidance. We then discuss summary statistics.

Table 1 reports averages of Bribes and Tax Evasion and the distribution of firms as Abiders, Perpetrators, Victims, and Retaliators across different country classifications and different firm categories.<sup>22</sup> In the discussion below, we first focus on the incidence of bribes and tax evasion and then on the distribution of firm types. Panel A presents statistics across different regions. Col. 2 of Panel A shows that the average bribe payments are low across all countries ranging from 1.22% of revenue in Europe and Central Asia to 3.63% of revenue in Middle East and North Africa. The tax evasion numbers present an upper bound of tax evasion in each region since they are unadjusted for tax rates and show that tax evasion is highest in East Asia Pacific (29.42%) and lowest in Europe and Central Asia (14.70%).<sup>23</sup> In each region the amount of underreported revenue exceeds the proportion of revenue paid out as bribes.

In unreported results across country income categories, we find that the average bribe payments range from 0.3% in OECD countries to 2.3% in low income countries. The bribe payments are statistically different from zero and also between income categories. Note that our sample is dominated by developing countries so we only have seven high income countries of which six are OECD countries. Reported tax evasion is similarly lowest in OECD countries (7.1%) and highest in the low income countries (24.5%).<sup>24</sup> As a validity check of the survey data on bribe payments, in unreported comparisons, we compared our results to two widely used country-level indices, Transparency International’s (TI)

> 22 In panels A-B, the numbers are first averaged across countries and then across different country classification. In panels C-H, the numbers are averaged across firms in each firm classification.

> 23 Both bribes and tax evasion are lower in South Asia – 0.19% and 7.40% respectively but we only have data for Sri Lanka in South Asia.

> 24 We also computed tax adjusted measures of tax avoidance, multiplying the tax evasion measure by the country’s statutory and effective corporate tax rates from Djankov et al. (2009) respectively. We find similar results when we use 5-year effective corporate tax rates from Djankov et al. (2009) instead of 1-year effective corporate tax rates. Both the statutory and effective tax adjusted measures show that tax evasion is the highest in low income countries (5.49% and 3.42% respectively) and the least in high income countries (2.18% and 1.28% respectively). A t-test shows the magnitudes of the tax evasion measures to be statistically different across income group categories.

17
Consistent with what was observed through qualitative work conducted in the field as part of this impact evaluation, there is, however, indication of strong indirect effects of the program on school choice among boys. We find that families with daughters eligible to the FSSP tend to respond to the program by enrolling their sons in private schools. In fact, several econometric models show a statistically significant average increase in enrollment of boys in private schools of nearly 4 percentage points compared to a baseline level of 30 percent. Further analysis indicates that this increase in the share of male enrollment in private schools is largely driven by boys 6 to 12 years old who were sent to primary schools.<sup>34</sup> This behavioral response may be explained by reasons related to the supply, cost, and quality of private schools that offer primary-level education. First, there has been a significant increase in the number of private primary schools in rural and urban Punjab in the 2000s. Second, fees in private schools are often low and below the stipend provided by the FSSP (200 Rs. per month). In fact, a national census of private schools in 2000 found that the median rural private school charged 60 Rs. per month.<sup>35</sup> Third, there are also differences in quality; children who study in private schools score substantially higher in tests in all subjects (Andrabi and others 2006). Therefore, a potential indirect effect of the FSSP may introduce gender disparities in learning as more boys in eligible households are enrolled in better performing schools. More work, however, is needed to better understand this possible indirect effect.

# **7. Robustness Checks**

As eligibility to the FSSP was not assigned randomly, the analysis conducted in this paper has to rely on quasi-experimental techniques and their corresponding identifying assumptions. To assess the internal validity of this evaluation, we discuss the robustness of the results to a few issues that could contaminate the design of the evaluation. We start with the underlying assumption of the double-difference analysis, namely that the outcomes investigated were progressing along similar trends across stipend and non-stipend districts before the program began. Program impact estimates based on double-difference models may be biased if either of the outcomes for girls in stipend districts (who started from a lower base) was converging to the value in control districts even before the program was in place.

> 34 Aslam (2009) also finds that boys are more likely than girls to enroll in private schools in Punjab. 35 School fees in the private sector may increase by more than three-fold at the secondary level.

25
**20**

All firms in this sector will reduce their prices, otherwise they will lose their customers due to the low costs of switching between suppliers. However, this result does not hold for firms in the industrial and commerce sectors, at least not in the short-run. As the result of their collusive behavior, their initial response is to compensate the reduction in demand by higher prices --a 1 % transitory decline in demand will increase their inflation rate by 2.3% and 5.3 % respectively. Only over time, when the negative shock on demand is perceived as permanent, these firms will reduce their prices and, thus, adjust to the new demand conditions. Finally, the prices of the agricultural sector would not be directly affected by the changes in domestic demand for the reasons discussed in the preceding section.

**Table 6: Elasticities of Sectoral Inflation Rates**

||**Changes i**|**n Demand**|**Changes in**|**Foreign Prices**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Transitory**<br>**(Yt)**|**Permanent**<br>**(Xt)**|**Short-Run**<br>**(Ap*,)**|**Long-Runie**<br>**(Ap*,)**|
|**Industry**|**-2.28**|**0.60**|**0.11**|**0.17**|
|**Agriculture**|**0.00***|**0.00***|**0.20**|_0.55_|
|**Services**|**4.43**|**-1.00**|**0.20**|**0.08**|
|**Commerce**|-5.27|**1.10**|**0.00***|**0.00***|

**Source: First column of Tables** 2-5.

* **not statistically different from 0.**

**a/ Derived from the long-run markup equation**

A change in foreign prices, say an increase, would lead to higher domestic prices in most of the sectors, with the notable exception of the commerce sector. These firms will remain unaffected, at least directly, because they principally produce non-traded goods. Firms operating in tradables sectors such as industry and agriculture would increase their
of non-agricultural employment and skilled manual employment. The marginal effects are estimated on the whole sample as well as on the samples of only women and only men. Column (1) shows the average marginal effects of the probability to be employed in the non-agricultural sector. The relationship between the distance to the nearest road in good condition and non-agricultural employment, as expected, is negative: 1 unit increase in log distance to the nearest good quality road, or approximately 2.7 fold increase (e _≈_ 2.71828) decreases the probability of being employed in non-agricultural sector by 5.7 percentage points. The effects are consistent for women and men, showing, respectively, -5.8 and-6.2 percentage points likelihood of being employed in the non-agricultural sector.

Next, the study estimates the average marginal effects of the probability of being employed in skilled manual employment given distance to the nearest good quality road. The results are reported in columns (4), (5), and (6). Overall, one unit increase in log distance (or approximately 2.7 fold increase) decreases the probability of having skilled manual job by 5.1 percentage points. When the estimations are performed on men and women separately we see that average marginal effects for women are still negative but lose statistical significance, while the coefficient for men still holds at statistically significant at negative 6.6 percentage points. This could be explained by the distribution of men and women in skilled employment shown in Figure 7. Only 6% of surveyed working women are employed in skilled manual employment, compared to 31% of men.

Table 6 shows the average marginal effects of the probability of being employed in seasonal employment, and the probability of receiving cash earnings. Overall, living further from a road in good condition is negatively associated with seasonal employment, 1 log increase in distance from a good road decreases the probability of working seasonally overall by 5.5 percentage points. These findings are in line with the results of the analysis done on the ILCS data, presented in Table 2. When marginal effects are calculated separately for women and men, the coefficient of the average marginal effect of women having seasonal jobs becomes positive but statistically not significant. However, the marginal effect of the probability of seasonal employment on men is statistically highly significant - one unit increase in log distance decreases the probability of having a seasonal job by 10.7 percentage points. Unfortunately, limitations of the employment data in DHS surveys do not allow me to study deeply the seasonality outcomes. The descriptive statistics show 23
On education and health outcomes, Branisa et al. (2013) report a positive association between women’s property rights and their educational attainment and fertility, using a data set of 124 countries. This is also confirmed by causal evidence from India, where Deininger et al. (2013, 2018) and Roy (2015) estimate significant positive effects of legislating equal inheritance rights for women on their educational achievements. Mishra and Sam (2016) find that increase in women’s land ownership in Nepal boosted their empowerment through greater household decision-making in health care and household purchases. Similar causal findings have been obtained for Vietnam (Menon et al. 2014), India (Mookerjee 2017) and Kenya (Harari 2018).

Despite overall positive findings, Roy (2015) shows that legislation to provide equal inheritance rights to women in India resulted in some parents circumventing the law in order to disinherit their daughters from their rightful share. Bhalotra, Brule and Roy (2018) and Rosenblum (2015) find that the reform also increased female foeticide and female infant mortality, while Anderson and Genicot (2015) show that it increased marital conflict leading to greater suicides. These negative findings alert us to the possibility of unintended consequences of gender progressive legislation in developing economies, especially in the presence of multiple constraints that interact to perpetuate the status quo of gender inequality. For example, in the case of India, _patrilocality_<sup>7</sup> is a key social norm that perpetuates preference for sons over daughters, as it ensures provision of old-age care for parents in the absence of a viable social security system. Thus, focusing on alleviating one constraint (access to property) without addressing other related ones (informal insurance) might be counterproductive, and suggests that greater attention should be paid to tackling gender discrimination using a holistic approach.

In terms of legal rights to administer marital property, unilateral divorce laws (by affecting spouses’ outside options) have also been shown to impact labor market decisions of married women. However, the evidence in this regard is somewhat mixed. Gray (1998) finds a positive impact of such legislation on female labor force participation in the United States. In constrast, Voena (2015) finds the opposite effect, accompanied by an increase in leisure. This indicates that the divorce legislation led to an increase in women’s share of intra-household resources (in the presence of equal division of assets), leading to lower female labor supply and greater leisure. It is important to note that most of the literature on divorce laws is derived from

> 7 _Patrilocality_ (also known as _virilocality_ ) is the social custom that requires married women to leave their parents’ home and reside with their husband’s family post marriage (Bhalotra et al., 2018).

10