rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
34 Table 5. Income transfers to urban consumers from subsidized food by expenditure quintile group, 1997

|Subsidized food|Mean per c<br>Lowest<br>Quintile<br>[1]|apita incom<br>by: (in LE<br>Second<br>[2]|e transfer<br>a per capita<br>Third<br>[3]|s from subsi<br>per week)<br>Fourth<br>[4]|dized food rece<br>Highest<br>Quintile<br>[51|ived<br>All|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Baladi bread|1.36|1.33|1.35|1.22|1.04*|1.26|
|Baladi wheat flour|0.10|0.14|0.11|0.07|0.08|0.10|
|Edible oil|0.16|0.20|0.27|0.24|0.18|0.21|
|Sugarb|0.21|0.17|0.24|0.22|0.30|0.23|
|Total income transfers|||||||
|from subsidized food|1.83|1.85|1.96|1.75|1.60|1.79|
|Total income transfers from<br>subsidized food as percent of<br>total per capita expenditures|8.74|6.20|4.81|3.10|1.43|3.12|
|Mean total per capita<br>expenditures per week (on all<br>food and nonfood items)|20.94|29.78|40.78|56.19|112.00|57.38|

# Source: IFPRI Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997.

- Notes: N = 1,078. Urban population is divided into quintile groups on the basis of total per capita fitted expenditures.

a In 1997,1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$0.295. All expenditure figures are in nominal terms.

- b Includes expenditures on fully and partially subsidized sugar.

Difference between lowest and highest quintile groups is significant at the 0.05 level.
Arslanalp, Serkan, Fabian Bornhorst, Sanjeev Gupta, and Elsa Sze. 2010. “Public Capital and Growth,” IMF Working Paper 10/175.

Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers. 2006. “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries,” pp. 91-116 in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter.

Easterly, William. 2007. How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa. Global Economy and Development Working Paper 14, November. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Foster, Vivien, and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Eds. 2010. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for <u>Transformation. Agence Française de Développement and World Bank.</u> Goldman-Sachs. 2006. “China’s Investment Strength is Sustainable.” Global Economics Paper No. 146.

Heller, Peter S. 2005. Understanding Fiscal Space. IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/05/4.

Henderson, Vernon. 2003. “The Urbanization Process and Economic Growth: The So-What Question.” Journal of Economic Growth. Vol. 8, pp. 47-71.

IMF. 2008. Burkina Faso: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No. 08/169.

Jedwab, Rémi. 2012. Why Is African Urbanization Different? Evidence from Resource Exports in Ghana and Ivory Coast. Unpublished paper.

Lipton, Michael. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study Of Urban Bias In World <u>Development. Australian National University Press.</u> Lofgren, Hans, Martin Cicowiez, and Carolina Diaz-Bonilla, 2012. “MAMS – A Computable General Equilibrium Model for Developing Country Strategy Analysis”. pp. 159–276 in Dixon, Peter B. and Dale W. Jorgenson, D.W. (Eds.), Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium <u>Modeling. Volume 1A. North Holland, Elsevier B.V.</u> Lofgren, Hans. 2010. What determines the evolution of MDG indicators? A Selective Review of the Literature. Unpublished paper.

Lopez, J. Humberto, and Luis Servén. 2006. A Normal Relationship? Poverty, Growth, and Inequality. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3814.

20
**Table 3 –Description of the sample of firms that survived at least 5 years**

||2001<br>(<br>01<br>_~~y~~_and<br>01<br>_X_<br>)|2005<br>(<br>05<br>_~~y~~_and<br>05<br>_X_<br>)|Difference<br>( _y_<br>∆<br>and<br>_X_<br>∆<br>)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Productivity volatility|43.60|42.74|-0.86|
|Firm size (%)||||
|Less than 50 workers|10.68|10.95|0.27|
|50-100 workers|17.64|20.40|2.76|
|100-500 workers|52.16|51.73|-0.43|
|More than 500 workers|19.51|16.92|-2.59|
|Firm age (%)||||
|Less than 5 years|16.93|19.86|2.93|
|5-10 years|33.49|35.72|2.23|
|10-20 years|20.43|29.17|8.74|
|More than 20 years|28.95|15.25|-13.7|
|Main part of paid-in capital (%)||||
|State capital|26.46|9.60|-16.86|
|Collective capital|20.47|8.86|-11.61|
|Corporate capital|17.15|23.62|6.47|
|Private capital|21.99|40.42|18.43|
|Hong Kong SAR, China; Macao SAR, China; and||||
|Taiwan, China, capital|9.74|10.25|0.51|
|Foreign capital|8.96|10.48|1.52|
|Ratio of long-term investment to output value (%)|4.53|3.12|-1.41|
|Ratio of intangible assets to output value (%)|4.48|4.30|-0.18|
|Ratio export delivery value to sales total output value||||
|(%)|18.17|21.54|3.37|
|Ratio of new product to output value (%)|3.17|4.31|1.14|
|Ratio of labor, unemployment insurance to output<br>value (%)|0.12|0.09|-0.03|
|Ratio of medical and retirement insurance to output<br>value (%)|0.80|0.25|-0.55|
|Coastal province (%)|71.16|76.95|5.79|
|Number of observations|49167|78186||

Table 4 presents the results of productivity volatility, as in equations (4) and (5). A negative (positive) sign of the coefficient indicates the factor plays a role in reducing (enhancing) productivity volatility. The size of firms has a negative effect on productivity volatility (or, more directly, it means large firms are less volatile); however, the negative effect of the size of firms on volatility seems to weaken over time. This is consistent with the results that we observed in the previous section when we examine the sample of firms that survived the entire ten year period: large firms are less volatile compared with small firms, but over time, the gap of volatility between large firms and small firms tend to decline. The age of firms has a negative effect on volatility, and this effect has become stronger from 2001 to 2005.

14
PLN in 1998, growing from just under 1 billion PLN in 1993, at an annual average growth rate of over 32% during the period of 1993 to 1998. For the same period, the direct budget spending grew at an average rate of 19% annually. The cost of tax expenditure programs has therefore grown much faster than the direct spending programs.

# V. **Strengthening the administration of tax expenditure programs**

Strengthening the administration of tax expenditure programs is an important first step toward ensuring their effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. It will also help limit the costs of these programs, avoiding shrinking of the tax base and complications to the tax system. This section examines therefore these two issues. It first examines options to raise the level of scrutiny of these tax expenditure programns to the levels that direct expenditure programs are currently subject. It turns next to measures aimed at defining the opportunity costs of tax expenditure programs, highlighting their effect on the tax system.

The main point about raising the level of scrutiny over tax expenditure programs is that they enjoy a funding advantage over direct expenditure programs. Tax expenditures are fully funded before any discretionary programs, and they are open-ended entitlement programs. Once tax expenditures are enacted, they usually come under very little scrutiny, and only in rare instances have been repealed. Tax expenditures also reduce the revenue base available to fund spending programs. Finally, tax expenditure programs are not subject to systematic review, as opposed to direct expenditure programs that are appropriated annually. Indeed, tax expenditures are described separately from their budgetary functions, and are not included in the budget tables or added to total outlay.

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positive supply effects. In the case of non-traded energy products, in particular electricity, demand may be supply constraint. Removing subsidies, or price ceilings, may therefore increase consumption. We do not take this into account, but recognize the importance of this fact.

Reductions in fossil fuel demand in subsidizing countries may also reduce world prices and thus result in increased consumption in non-subsidizing countries. We will estimate carbon reductions assuming no change in world prices, although this assumption may be unrealistic if all fossil fuel subsidies were removed simultaneously.

The removal of subsidies will not immidiately translate into reductions in fossil fuel consumption. Consumers will respond to higher prices over time, and we have thus estimated reductions as below projected baseline emissions in year 2010, i.e. below projected emissions if subsidies were not removed (table 6). Projected baseline emissions for the world as a whole is estimated to be about 50% higher in 2010 than in 1989. OECD emissions are assumed to be constant given that most OECD countries have committed to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by year 2000 and some to further reduce emissions to 80% of 1990 emission levels by year 2005. Baseline emission projections in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe are based on Baron (1992). His estimates incorporate the impacts of restructuring, i.e. compositional changes in aggregate output. Baseline emissioni projections for all other non-OECD countries are based on GDP projections less _0.5-1.0%_ annual autonomous energy efficiency improvements that may arise from less energy intensive capital, appliances and transport equipment, and compositional changes in aggregate output.

The magnitude of carbon reductions realized by removal of fossil fuel subsidies clearly depends on the price elasticities of demand. Bohi (1981) presents a comprehensive survey of 17
may diverge from their stated attitudes and intentions because they still lack the skills to enact change, despite wanting to.<sup>19</sup> One exception to the general pattern of improved attitudes concerns sexual autonomy: both treated men and women believe wives are justified in refusing sex in fewer situations than the control group. This unique domain where attitudes worsened across all groups aligns with qualitative evidence of strong public resistance to messages about women’s sexual rights.<sup>20</sup> While this consistent negative shift may not have increased friction within couples, it could have contributed to backlash through hearing messages on this topic in the training and community fora.

The program also increased treated women’s aspirations for agency, similar to spillover women. Treated women wanted more input in household expense and childbearing decisions (six and five percentage points respectively; table 4 and figure 5). While treated women’s husbands, unlike spillover men, did not seek more decision-making power, even this smaller increase in treated women’s aspirations for agency points to a potential shift in dynamics within the household power structures that may have been enough to trigger backlash.

We now turn to changes in treated men’s behaviors. Program effects on treated men differ markedly from spillover men, with some progressive changes. However, these new attitudes and behaviors adopted by treated men may have exposed them to community shaming, potentially pressuring them to reassert traditional identities through violence.

Table 3 reveals several progressive behavioral changes among treated men. Time-use diaries show both treated men and their wives increased time spent on domestic and care work, traditionally considered women’s responsibility. This was aligned with the program’s emphasis on positive parenting and active engagement in child development, and represented a behavior shift potentially visible to other community members. The program also enhanced treated women’s household decision-making power, as reported by both spouses (table 4).

Marriage formalization provides further evidence of publicly visible behavior change: among couples not formally married at baseline (50% of the sample), treatment increased formalization by 24 percentage points, with no effect for spillover couples. While mass weddings are common

> 19Another possibility is social desirability bias: men may have learned the ‘right’ answers during training. If so, the true attitude divergence between spouses could be even larger, assuming women’s responses face less such bias.

> 20Facilitators identified sexual relations as particularly controversial: “there’s a commonly held belief that a man should initiate sex. Men were resistant to the idea that women can initiate sex and that men don’t just have a right to sex whenever they want it”.

22
form of cross-border complementariness across host countries. (The idea of cross-country complementarities has attracted significant attention in the literature, but with a focus quite different from that here: there it is on the relationship between domestic investment and investment abroad;<sup>13</sup> here it is on the relationships between inward investment into alternative locations.) In the analysis that follows, while the possibility is left open that cross effects may indeed be positive between _h_ and some affiliates in the group, it is assumed, for definiteness, that the aggregate cross effect over affiliates is strictly negative, so that _N_ � _j_ = _h_<sup>_∂Rj/∂Fh<_0.</sup> The tax system in each country _j_ has two components. One captures the marginal effective tax rate in the tradition of King and Fullerton (1984); we refer to this as the _KF_ - _METR_ . Familiar from the analysis of investment in closed economies as a sufficient statistic for tax effects on investment, this is modeled as tax of _Mj_ (expressed as a proportion of the required return, which is denoted by _ρ_ and taken to be fixed) applied to the use of real capital in _j_ . The other is a ‘source-based’ statutory tax rate on the profit earned on investments in _j_ (against which _Mj_ is deductible) at rate _Tj_ . The multinational’s aggregate after-tax profit is thus it being assumed that the required return to capital is deductible where the associated capital is located. All this, it should be noted, relates to a multinational parented in some particular country _p_ ; that could be recognized by the clutter of an additional subscript, but the point only becomes material if residence-based taxes apply, and the implications of that are more readily developed when it comes to the later empirics.

From (1), the necessary condition<sup>14</sup> on the multinational’s choice of investment in the

> 13See for example Becker and Riedel (2012), using firm level data for EU firms, and Desai, Foley and Hines (2009) for the United States. Note too that, being rooted directly in commercial relations between affiliates, the complementariness in mind here differs from that which can arise indirectly as tax changes act on the cost of capital by affecting the gains from ‘paper’ profit shifting—that is the mechanism at work in Su ́arez Serrato (2019), for example, and is addressed in Section 5 below.

> 14It is assumed that Π is concave over non-negative **_K_** _≡{K_ 1 _, ..., Kh}_ .

7
Using Economic Policy to Improve Environmental Protection in Pakistan _Rashid Faruqee_ Paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, December 13-15, 1996, Islamabad. This paper is based on a World Bank gray cover report, Pakistan: Economic Policies, Institutions, and the Environment, December 15, 1996. The Bank report was prepared by Rashid Faruqee and Jonathan Coleman in consultation with Pakistani policymakers and experts. Background papers for the Bank report were contributed by Derek Byerlee, Laiq **Ali,** Vaqar Zakaria, and Akmal Siddiq.
16, its client base grew from 1 to 11 million people making Equity Bank the largest bank in Africa in terms of customers. Allen et al. (2021) use the case of Equity Bank to explore the relationship between bank branch expansion, financial inclusion, and bank profitability. They find that the presence of Equity Bank branches significantly increased the likelihood of having a bank account or a loan, especially for Kenyans who were less educated, did not own their own homes, and lived in rural and arid areas.<sup>13</sup> Branch-level data on the profitability, credit quality, and financial structure of Equity Bank branches revealed that it was able to achieve profitability, even in remote areas, through aggressive pricing (including on loan interest rates), reducing its delinquency rates, and securing stable, inexpensive funding from retail deposits in those areas.

In all, Equity Bank’s experience in Kenya and those of a handful of banks in other developing countries suggest that it might be possible to generate sustainable profits with a business model focused on the provision of financial services to population segments that are typically underserved by commercial banks.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, the number of studies is small (and most are not from African countries) making it hard to identify the factors that lead to successful adaptation of those strategies.

A government-supported microcredit expansion program can also help provide not only access to basic financial services to previously unbanked population segments, but also provide an entry

> 13 In their regression models, the presence of Equity Bank in a new district increased the probability of having a bank account by five percentage points. The share of Kenyan adults who had a bank account was 14% in 2006 and 23% in 2009.

> 14 For similar studies, see Bruhn and Love (2014) on the extension of Banco Azteca in Mexico, Burgess and Pande (2005) on an exogenous change in branching restrictions in India to identify the effects of increased branch penetration on poverty reduction, and Brown, Guinn, and Kirschenmann (2016) documenting substantial gains in financial inclusion associated with the expansion of a major microfinance provider (ProCredit) in Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia.

25
CCP and OCP settings only, in our central scenario using lower bounds flood damage estimates, as there is some evidence that housing ownership rates are high in Buenos Aires (Fay 2005).

Figure 5 shows the distribution of land value changes triggered by the flood protection investments in both CCP and OCP settings in our central exercise where we use flood depth-damage estimates from Hallegatte et al. (2013). While in both cases, the mean land value change is positive, 0.29$/m<sup>2</sup> for CCP and 1.74$/m<sup>2</sup> for OCP, signaling aggregate land value creation, the pattern of change is vastly different across both cities.

In the closed city model, more than 95% of grid cells (13,704 out of 14,465) see their land value decrease as a response to the resilience investments. Only 3.3% of grid cells (473) see an increase and the remaining 238 are unaffected. There is a vast transfer of land values toward areas that benefit from increased resilience to floods from the rest of the urban area. While the average increase in land value per m<sup>2</sup> is large (39.94$/m<sup>2</sup> ), the average decrease is mild (-1.07$/m<sup>2</sup> ). The top histogram of Figure 5 in particular, demonstrates the importance of accounting for land and housing market equilibrium effects. The positive variation in land values amounts to US$ 2.19 billion according to our central estimations in a CCP setting. The corresponding negative variation in land values is close to US$ -1.81 billion. The actual land value creation is the difference between these two amounts: US$ 379 million. Ignoring the land value transfer/destruction linked to land and housing market adjustments would vastly overestimate the aggregate land value appreciation in the urban area (US$ 2.19 billion vs US$ 379 million). These results strongly support the use of equilibrium models rather than hedonic pricing strategies when the objective is to understand aggregate land value changes from investments rather than purely local ones.

In the open city model, conversely, only 20 out of 14,465 grid cells (0.14%) experience a decrease in land value, while grid cells that show an increase in land values represent 98% of the urban area. The average increase in land value is much smaller than in the closed city case (+1.78$/m2) but spread across a much wider area, while the average decrease in land values is much higher (-7.25$/m2) for a limited number of grid cells.

17
The EEEP shows that 62.8 percent of the teachers in the sample are enrolled in _Carrera Magisterial_ . In addition, there is no significant difference in test score distribution between students with a teacher in _Carrera Magisterial_ and students without such a teacher.

**Table** **<u>9. Teachers' Share in</u>** **_<u>Carrera Magisterial</u>_ in 5**<sup>**th**</sup> **<u>grade</u>**

|**_Carrera Magisterial_**|**Number of Teachers**|**Share**|
|---|---|---|
|Yes|2420|62.8|
|Not|1139|29.6|
|No answer|292|7.6|
|Total|3851|100.0|

Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round. 1997 Non-weighted data Tables 10 and 11 present the distribution of test scores for those students in _Carrera Magisterial_ and those with a teacher not enrolled in _Carrera Magisterial_ , nationally and by stratum. Since there is no significant difference, one might infer that there is no selection bias with teachers in _Carrera Magisterial_ getting the best students and other teachers getting worse students.

**Table 10.  Test Scores of Students with a Teacher in** **_Carrera Magisterial_**

||**Num**<br>|**ber of st**<br>|**udents in the sample**<br>**Share of students with**<br>|**Ma**<br>|**themati**<br>|**Test**<br>**cs**<br>|**Scores**<br>|**Spanish**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Number**|**Share**|**Identified Teachers**|**Mean**|**Median**|**SD **|**Mean**|**Median**|**SD**|
|In_Carrera Magisterial_|19029|35.8|70.9|49.0|48.6|6.1|55.1|54.4|6.3|
|Not in_Carrera Magisterial_|7804|14.7|29.1|48.5|47.8|6.5|55.1|54.1|7.4|
|Not Identified*|26376|49.6||48.6|48.1|6.0|54.8|54.1|6.8|
|Total|53209|100.0|100.0|||||||

Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997. * "Not Identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective students.

**Table 11. Test** **<u>Scores by Teacher's</u>** **_<u>Carrera Magisterial</u>_** **<u>Status by stratum</u>**

|**Stratum**|<br>|**Teacher is enrolled in**<br> **_Carrera Magisterial_**|**Teacher is not enrolled**<br>**In****_Carrera Magisterial_**|**Teacher**<br>**not identified**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Community School|Mean|||47.3|
||Median|||47.2|
||SD|||5.7|
|Indigenous School|Mean|45.6|45.7|46.0|
||Median|45.5|45.5|46.3|
||SD|5.4|5.6|5.3|
|Public rural school|Mean|48.4|47.9|48.1|
||Median|47.8|47.8|47.8|
||SD|6.2|6.2|5.8|
|Public urban school|Mean|49.7|49.9|49.0|
||Median|49.2|49.2|49.2|
||SD|5.9|6.9|5.6|

Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997.

* "Teacher not identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective students.

21