Survey (ACS) one-year samples for 2010 and 2019 available from IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al. 2022). Data on educational outcomes of origin countries are from the updated Barro-Lee Educational Attainment dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013), and GDP data are from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 10.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015).

_Note_ : The figure traces the change in skill composition among migrants (panel a) and emigration probabilities to the United States by educational level (panel b) as low- and middle-income origin countries develop. The horizontal axis shows the increase, in percent, in per capita GDP in constant 2017 US dollars in purchasing power parity terms (2017 PPP$) of origin countries relative to the origin country’s baseline year. The vertical axis shows changes in educational composition (panel a) and emigration probabilities (panel b) relative to the origin country’s baseline year. The baseline year is defined for each origin country as the year with the lowest per capita GDP (2017 PPP$). Low-and middleincome countries were among the bottom two-thirds circa 1960 in terms of per capita GDP (2017 PPP$). CI = confidence interval.

# 4. Conclusion

This paper shows that the relationship between emigration and development is complex. The emigration response to development varies along a few dimensions. First, the income level of origin countries matters. Low-income countries have a more complex response than middle-income countries, which exhibit an “inverted-U” pattern whereby migration first rises, then plateaus, and then falls with development. Second, migration response differs by the type of destination. Migration from low-income origins to low-return destinations—neighboring countries or other low-income destination countries—falls in the initial stages of development. Emigration to high-return destinations increases steadily with income for middle-income countries but increases at a much slower pace for low-income countries. Third, the population size of the origin country does not matter in terms of the qualitative nature of the response. But the emigration response from middle-income origin countries to high-income destination countries is muted for larger countries compared to the response from smaller countries. Fourth, the composition of migrants to high-income destinations changes as countries develop. As countries develop, their population and the emigrants attain higher levels of education. In addition, the probability of emigration increases disproportionately for the highly educated. These patterns reflect the multiple transformations that accompany development, including rising incomes, rising global integration, demographic shifts, and rising human capital stocks.

The evidence presented in this paper has important policy implications, particularly for policies that intend to influence migration flows. First, migration policies need to recognize that the emigration response to development differs by the type of origin country as well as the destinations migrants choose as countries develop. Unlike the intentions of ‘root cause’ policies, emigration towards high-income destinations generally increases with development, but much less so from low-income countries.

Second, migration policies need to go beyond the absolute numbers of migrants and focus on the composition of migrants. _Desperate_ migration—low-return migration in response to lack of opportunities at origin—tends to fall while emigration of a more skilled workforce tends to increase, plausibly due to higher demands for such skills in the destination labor markets. This suggests that the nature of development matters. A development process that generates decent jobs for the poor and vulnerable and develops skills that are scarce in the global labor markets is likely to result in high-return migration with positive impacts for origin and destination countries.

Third, destination countries have significant ability to determine the nature of migration and migrants despite the forces of development or accompanying transformations. For instance, although low-income countries have strong demographic advantages relative to high-income destination countries, emigration in this corridor remains low and unresponsive to demographic divergence. High-income destination countries need to proactively facilitate the steady inflow of migrants to compensate for their demographic disadvantages, likely from low-income countries where a youthful workforce is still abundant. Such migration facilitation policies may need to be accompanied by relevant skills development in the origin countries.

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