health and education outcomes. Having said that, again echoing the findings on aid and growth, some studies have found a conditional impact of aid flows in good policy and institutional environments (World Bank, 2003). 52 OED (1999b). 53 OED (2004). See also Bhaumik, 2005. 54 OED (1999c). 55 OED (1999a).

56 For example, Live-Aid supported NGOs in the forced resettlement and 'villigization' of up to 3 million Ethiopians during the 1984-85 famine. Oxfam and others turned a blind eye to the resettlement program despite the fact that it accounted for 50,000 or more deaths.

57 Masud and Yantcheva (2005). See also Boone (1996).

58 Wane (2004), World Bank (1998), OED (2003).

59 See Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003).

60 Originally suggested in Kanbur and Sandler (1999).

61 The recommendation of OED (2000b).

62 Suggested by World Bank (1998).

63Another method to ensure ownership would be to follow a ‘foundation’ approach, where donors would respond to proposals from governments rather than themselves proposing and shaping programs (Suggested by Birdsall, 2004). It is not clear how well this would work for large pilot or global public good projects, however.

64 Meltzer (2000) suggests a similar approach.

65 The argument that IBRD can provide long term financing for human development which is not available through markets is weak. The significant costs of human development are recurrent, and need to be financed through recurrent budgets, suggesting that investment financing is an unsuitable support mechanism.

66 Sachs et. al. (2004) argue that African institutions are no worse than would be expected given their income levels –although note that they assume income levels cause institutions with no feedback from institutions to income.

67 Barder (2005). See Fink and Bell (2004), for a theoretical discussion of the benefits of considerably increased global funding for vaccine research specific to developing country diseases. 68 Kenny, (2005).

69 OED (2005d).

70 Suggested by Birdsall (2004).

71 As recommended in the Bank’s MIC financing task force, OED (2005d) and elsewhere. 72 OED (1999a).

73 Suggested by Birdsall (2004).

74 Bannerjee and He (2003b).

75 For example, why are donors supporting the rollout of networked computer centres in schools in lowincome countries when there is little evidence of pedagogical cost-effectiveness and strong grounds for believing such interventions are unsustainable when there are strong, repeated and rigorous evaluations if interactive radio instruction suggesting significant educational returns and favorable benefit-cost ratios (see Grace and Kenny, 2003).

76This last calculated from data in Chen and Ravallion (2001).

77 Collier and Dollar (1999).

78 Bannerjee and He (2005a). Lankester (2004) points out that the moral case for aid may be strongest in the cases where they cannot rely on their own governments at all to act as their economic guardians – suggesting the strength of the need-efficacy tradeoff. Gunning (2005) notes that the last ten years have seen aid going increasingly to countries with low CPIA ratings, and this applies especially to multilateral institutions. Perhaps this reflects a stronger poverty focus.

79 See also Moss and Subramanian (2005).

80 Moss (2005).

81 A final suggestion: for the World Bank in particular, the institution has its own views on the purposes of aid and the best methods of delivery. Given that, it might be that the institution has a role as a ‘countercyclical giver’ –providing more programmatic resources to countries which, due to political and historical 21