secondary school ( _primaria_ and _secundaria_ , or years 1 to 9), and a 0.3% decrease in the number of enrolled students in upper secondary school ( _preparatoria_ or _bachillerato_ , or years 10 to 12). Because our results are tightly estimated, we can conclude that the decreases are not steeper than 0.067% and 0.59%, respectively.

We find that these small effects are explained by migration of students rather than by changes in enrollment. We conduct a second set of analyses where the education variable comes from household surveys and censuses. In this case, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the individual is attending school or not. With these specifications, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no impact of violence (as proxied by the homicide rates) on enrollment rates.<sup>1</sup> At the 5 percent level, we estimate that the effect of an increase of 8 homicides per 100,000 individuals on the enrollment rates of 15-17 year olds is smaller than 0.032%, for example. We hypothesize that the small effect on the number of enrolled students but null impact on the rate of enrollment is explained by an impact on migration. We corroborate this by showing that increases in violence are associated with outmigration: municipalities with higher increases in homicide rates observed relative reductions in their population size. Thus, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that a small fraction of families reacted to increases of violence by moving out (with their school-age children) of their municipality of residence to less-affected municipalities, but that it did not affect the probability of being enrolled in school.

Several studies have found significant effects of violence on economic outcomes in Mexico in the same period, though none of these (to our knowledge) look at education outcomes. Using similar methodologies, focusing on the same population and using the same homicide data, Arias and Esquivel (2013), Robles et al (2013), Velásquez (2014), Dell (2014) and Enamorado et al (2014) find significant negative effects of homicide rates on labor market outcomes and economic activities. Given this evidence, we expected to find significant effects on education. However, we find evidence that this is not to be the case. By using several sources of data we show, at most, very small effects on total enrollment rates. A small number of students are being displaced from high violence municipalities to low violence municipalities, thus reducing the total _number_ of students in high violence municipalities; but the education decisions of individuals does not seem to be highly impacted. We explore whether the lack of effect on enrollment may arise due to a counteracting effect on the labor force. That is, we explore whether a reduction in employment frees some young individuals to enroll in school. We find no evidence of this: increases in violence were not associated with reductions in employment or labor force participation for school-aged individuals. Our results stand in contrast with the above-described literature finding negative effects of violence on short-term economic growth; since minimal to null

> 1 The terms violence and crime describe different concepts. According with the World Health Organization, violence refers to the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm or deprivation.  While crime includes actions that may or may not involve the use of any force or injury to another person— e.g. most property crimes such as theft, embezzlement, fraud, tax crimes, some forms of racketeering, and bribery—. This paper uses the term violence throughout, but does do not attempt to distinguish the impacts of types of violence or crime different than homicides.

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