rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
treat a standardized patient correctly compared to when they are working in their public clinic ( Das et al. 2016). Despite the importance of incentives, whether pay-for-performance can reduce the know-do gap remains unclear; while there were promising early results from Rwanda (Basinga et al. 2011), these have failed to replicate in a broader set of countries (See Diaconu et al. 2021 for an overview of 59 studies). In addition, research into the “know-do” gap is new, with open questions regarding the relative importance of financial incentives versus patient expectations (Currie, Lin and Meng, 2014), doctors’ beliefs about patients (Banerjee et al. 2021) and/or behavioral biases among physicians (Groopman 2007; Mullainathan and Obermeyer 2022; Kovacs, Lagarde, and Cairns 2020) in contributing to this gap.

**Patient-doctor mismatch.** A second subtle source of inefficiency arises from the misallocation of patients to doctors. If there is considerable variation in quality but a low correlation between market share and quality, then the average quality received by patients will increase by inducing more visits to higher quality providers. This possibility has been explored by Daniels, Das and Gatti (2022) for 11 Sub-Saharan African countries and by Das et al. (2020) for Indian states using tests of medical knowledge (which understates the variation in clinical practice).

Two results stand out. First, there is indeed considerable variation in medical knowledge as measured by clinical vignettes. A general pattern is that a one standard deviation increase in a standardized index of medical knowledge increases the likelihood of knowing how to correctly treat any given vignette scenario by 10 percentage points. Thus, the difference in the general knowledge of correct treatment between a provider at the 5th percentile of the quality distribution and the 95th percentile is 40 percentage points. About 80 percent of this variation in competence is within-country or within-state. Second, the correlation between workload and clinical competence is weak. Across 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, against a mean of seven patients per provider per day, higher-knowledge providers have higher caseloads only in Tanzania (two additional patients per standard deviation in competence) and in Kenya and Sierra Leone (one additional patient). In Mozambique and Malawi, each additional standard deviation of provider competence is associated with two _fewer_ patients per day. The remaining countries all exhibit effectively no relationship between provider knowledge and outpatient caseload.

Daniels, Das and Gatti (2022) use the data from Sub-Saharan Africa and India to present a mechanical calculation of the potential gains from relocating doctors, whereby the highest quality doctors are posted to the busiest clinics, the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest to the 2<sup>nd</sup> busiest and so on, always ensuring that the relocations are within country (or state in India) and sector. They find that patient-weighted quality could increase by 0.75 standard deviations in the Sub-Saharan Africa sample and by 0.5sd in the Indian sample, which 17
# **4.1 Tax progressivity and revenue collection**

Improving the reporting of foreign assets can have important implications for the progressivity of the tax system, as offshore wealth is concentrated at the top. To examine changes in tax progressivity, Figure 13 plots the effective wealth rate between 2010 and 2021 by bins of increasing fortune, as defined previously. Improving tax compliance and raising tax rates on foreign assets substantially enhanced tax progressivity. Indeed, the effective tax rate increased significantly for all groups in 2019, but the change was particularly substantial for the wealthiest 0.1% of adults. For instance, the wealthiest 0.01% experienced an eightfold increase in their effective tax rate, which jumped from 0.25% in 2018 to 2% in 2019. Similarly, the effective tax rate increased significantly for the next 0.09%.

On average, the effective wealth tax rate saw a significant increase, rising from 0.25% in 2018 to 1.46% in 2019 (Figure A.17). This increase had a substantial impact on wealth tax revenue, which escalated from Arg$4.9 billion in 2018 to Arg$35.4 billion in 2019, representing a shift from 0.14% of GDP to 0.75% of GDP (Figure A.18). Notably, this places Argentina’s wealth tax among the most successful in the world in terms of generating tax revenue. Compared to the anticipated tax revenue in 2019, the significant disclosures of offshore wealth led to a remarkable increase in revenue, surpassing threefold growth, as illustrated in Figure 10.<sup>14</sup> The expanded wealth tax base was timely as the COVID-19 crisis struck in 2020. The government used progressive wealth taxation to finance health expenses and expand the social safety net, levying a one-time wealth tax surcharge on the wealthiest 12,500 Argentines with assets worth more than Arg$200 million or US$2.4 million (Law 27.605). The marginal tax rates ranged from 2% to 3.5% for domestic assets and 3% to 5.25% for foreign assets. Official reports from AFIP informed that 10,000 people paid the tax by April 2021 with approximately US$80 billion in taxable assets, of which 50% were located abroad.<sup>15</sup> This value is more than twice the US$30 billion tax base declared by the wealthiest 11,700 Argentines before the amnesty, based on our tabulations. As a result, the government collected US$2.8 billion in revenue, roughly equivalent to one month of Argentina’s valueadded tax, the country’s largest revenue source (AFIP, Serie Anual 2021).

> 14 To simulate the counterfactual tax revenue in 2019, absent the disclosures, we assume that all domestic and foreign assets faced the top tax rates. This assumption is conservative because, in practice, many smaller assets faced lower tax rates, making our counterfactual revenue an upper bound and, correspondingly, our estimated revenue gain a lower bound.

> 15 The remaining 2,500 non-filers were actively audited by the tax authority and threatened with prosecution. About 1,100 taxpayers filed a lawsuit against the government and are currently being treated in court (https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202112/ 577043-afip-aporte-solidario-extraordinario-recaudacion.html).

18
# **Table 12**

# **8-year and 10-year Panel Growth Regressions**

|||**8-ye **|**arpanel**|||**10-ye **|**arpanel**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
||**OLS**|**IV**|**FE**|**GMM**|**OLS**|**IV**|**FE**|**GMM**|
|Log of GDP pc, beg. period|-0.015***|-0.028***|-0.037***|-0.017***|-0.017***|-0.028***|-0.043***|-0.016***|
||(0.003)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.003)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.005)|
|Log of EXPY, beg. period|0.033***|0.068***|0.017|0.048***|0.036***|0.068***|0.015|0.044***|
||(0.005)|(0.014)|(0.011)|(0.012)|(0.006)|(0.016)|(0.010)|(0.016)|
|Log of % secund. school years attained., beg. period|0.006***|0.003|-0.002|0.007|0.005***|0.002|-0.004|0.003|
||(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.003)|(0.005)|(0.002)|(0.003)|(0.004)|(0.008)|
|Constant|-0.142***|-0.338***|0.204**|-0.269***|-0.156***|-0.334***|0.288***|-0.229*|
||(0.030)|(0.083)|(0.085)|(0.082)|(0.034)|(0.096)|(0.092)|(0.115)|
|Observations|387|377|387|377|308|300|308|301|
|Number of group(ecode)|||79|77|||78|77|
|Instruments||||34||||26|
|R-squared|0.50|0.42|0.62||0.56|0.50|0.70||
|First stage F-statistic of excluded instrument p-value (H0:<br>underidentified/weakly identified)||0.000||||0.000|||
|Hansen J statistic p-value (H0:overidentified)||0.004||0.192||0.005||0.269|
|Stock-Wright S-statistic p-value (H0: all endogenous<br>regressors==0 and overid. rest. valid, weak-instrument-robust<br>inference)||0.000||||0.000|||
|AB test for AR(2) in first diff. (p-value)||||0.829||||0.454|

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

All equations include period dummies. IV regressions use log population and log land area as instruments. FE regressions include dummies for countries. GMM is Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator using lagged growth rates and levels as instruments as well as log population and log land area.

37
- 48 -

of actual and fitted values for the unrestricted version is a slightly better representation<sup>of the</sup> data than that from the Engle-Granger procedure. Both estimates confirm<sup>the core model</sup> hypothesized above which identified the role of derand, markups, and costs<sup>in investment</sup> determination. The long run multipliers in Table 2 reveal that the accelerator<sup>has the largest</sup> impact on private capital formation, followed by investment costs and the markup. The cointegration tests indicate that these best equations resulted in<sup>approximately stationary error</sup> processes at the first stage and white noise errors in the second.

The two stage and the unrestricted dynamic modelling provide strong evidence<sup>on the</sup> crucial role of the quantity of credit. The interpretation of this<sup>PVCRDY is as an indication of</sup> rationing in credit markets where banks face administered interest rates and have<sup>imperfect</sup> information about borrowers. In Egypt this was particularly problematic because of widespread tax evasion. As a consequence, banks often had to make decisions about<sup>loans without access to</sup> the firm's true balance sheets. Although government borrowing did not<sup>crowd out established</sup> private sector firms who had access to abu;dant amounts of<sup>credit, there appears to have been</sup> some crowding out at the margin of less established firms and perhaps<sup>of potential firms.</sup> Ultimately, this reflected weaknesses in the financial system which operated<sup>with highly imperfect</sup> information and in a climate of considerable uncertainty.

The more Keynesian ICOSTS variable consistently outperformed the<sup>interest rate variables,</sup> R and R/W. This is because the ICOSTS variable takes into explicit<sup>account the interaction of</sup> demand and supply in the capital goods market and includes the important<sup>distinction between</sup> tradable and non-tradable capital goods, thereby providing a<sup>more realistic measure of the user</sup> cost of capital. The combination of the ICOSTS variable and PVCRDY<sup>provides a much better</sup>
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# **<u>(d) Electricity</u>**

# _Before matching_

<!-- Start of picture text --> After matching<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 52%<br>45%<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 69%<br>51%<br>46%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **<u>(e) Telephone - fixed</u>**

_Before matching After matching_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 30% 28% 30% 28% Comparable<br>24% households not<br>receiving remittance<br>16% 16% (%)<br>Remittance-receiving<br>households (%)<br>No Remittances Remittances Remittances from Remittances from<br>remittances from Africa from OECD Africa OECD<br>(f) Telephone - mobile<br>Before matching After matching<br>69% 69%<br>Comparable<br>55% households not<br>39% 39% receiving remittance<br>33% 32% (%)<br>Remittance-receiving<br>households (%)<br>No Remittances Remittances Remittances from Remittances from<br>remittances from Africa from OECD Africa OECD<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ estimations based on Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey (GLSS-V) 2005.

Access to electricity and communication facilities such as fixed and mobile phones can significantly improve information on possible disasters and anticipatory 15
the district, which assessed the feasibility of the projects before passing them on to OPM for final approval and funding. The submitted projects fell under three categories: (i) public works, (ii) livelihood investment, and (iii) infrastructure rehabilitation.

Once projects were approved by OPM, funds were managed directly by the communities themselves through a variety of committees. The Community Project Management Committee and Community Procurement Committee were responsible for the delivery of the selected projects. Community Social Accountability Committees were created to oversee and monitor project progress and provide oversight within the community. Sub-county and district authorities were then expected to undertake monitoring and supervision in coordination with NUSAF2 project staff.

A highly decentralized project like NUSAF2 can create a range of transparency and accountability challenges.<sup>4</sup> Some concerns include that community and government officials may potentially misuse, or divert funds from community projects. Anecdotal evidence from a previous phase of the program suggests some cases of misappropriation of funds by officials. If transparency is limited, communities may lose control over how money is spent. Officials may insist on low-quality suppliers for community projects, potentially expecting kickbacks. Community elites may try to engage in similar behavior to attempt to manage funds with little oversight or to induce fellow community members to hire low-quality suppliers.

At the same time, it is often impossible to separate corruption from general mismanagement of resources. Communities and local governments may simply not have the capacity to make optimal decisions, and so funds may be used inefficiently or ineffectively. It is also possible that there may be issues with collective action, where communities may fail to implement a project well because it is too difficult to organize community members to complete the activities. This could be an especially large problem in the case of public works programs, which require local labor, or construction projects where monitoring of suppliers is difficult and time consuming. Finally, beneficiaries themselves may simply fail to take sufficient care of the public investments they receive.

To address these potential concerns, a Transparency, Accountability, and Anti-Corruption (TAAC) component was included in the design of the NUSAF2 project. We worked with the

> 4 Evidence from Fisman and Gatti (2002) suggests that decentralization can actually _reduce_ corruption. We do not take a position on whether decentralization in Uganda has increased or decreased corruption, only that a highly decentralized program can create a range of potential challenges.

8
**Table 6: Cross-Country Cost Comparisons**

||**Ethiopia**<br>**ESS**<br>**2018/2019**|**Tanzania**<br>**NPS**<br>**2019/2020**|**Cambodia**<br>**LSMS+**<br>**2019/2020**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Unit Cost of a Minute of Interview Time**<br>**(USD in 2019 Prices)***|**$1.71**|**$3.94**|**$0.87**|
|**Household Interviews**||||
|# of Completed Interviews|6,770|1,323|1,519|
|# of Modules in Household Questionnaire|15|16|11|
|# of Questions in Household Questionnaire|418|397|226|
|Average Duration of a Household Interview (Minutes)|77|120|82|
|Average Cost of a Household Interview|$131|$472|$71|
|**Individual Interviews**||||
|# of Completed Interviews|29,038|5,564|6,363|
|# of Modules in Individual Questionnaire|7|8|12|
|# of Questions in Individual Questionnaire|363|382|392|
|Average Duration of an Individual Interview|13|20|25|
|Average Cost of an Individual Interview|$23|$80|$22|

Notes **:** Unit cost of a minute of interview time is calculated as the ratio of total survey cost and total duration of all completed household and individual interviews in the country. Survey costs include the costs for household listing, piloting, recruitment of staff, training and field practice, fieldwork (field staff salaries and per diems, managerial staff per diems, vehicle rental and maintenance, and fuel), equipment, and office material purchased.

# **4 Interviewer Effects on Interview Duration**

Given the connection between interview length and survey costs, it is important that survey practitioners understand factors related to fieldwork implementation that may affect interview duration, especially those that can be improved with enhanced training and supervision to also improve the efficiency and quality of surveys. Interviewers are undoubtedly among these factors.

In view of the central role that interviewers play in face-to-face survey data collection, this section presents results from the analyses that seek to document potential interviewer effects on survey data collection, specifically interview duration. Given the complexity of multi-topic survey data collection that interviewers are entrusted with, interviewers should be subject to rigorous training and field practice to minimize heterogeneity across interviewers in all aspects of data collection from human subjects. If there are variations in interview length by interviewer, this could suggest that additional training, field practice and fieldwork supervision may be needed, including also a critical evaluation of the interviewer pool and the recruitment practices for future surveys. The type of analysis that we showcase can be conducted both during and after survey fieldwork – while 17
<!-- Start of picture text --> =<br>FaE<br>g2<br><<br>&<br>3<br>55 SE<br>a}<br>ae<br>©<br>i; re — : 5 i : =<br>s 3 os ° 3 o s °<br>z z<br>2001 2010 2018<br>HEE Employes ME Unemployed SM inactive (Inactive in school<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> =<br>FaE<br>g2<br><<br>&<br>3<br>55 SE<br>a}<br>5<br>© = : re = F rs = ; i<br>3 s 3 os ° 3 o s °<br>z z z<br>2001 2010 2018<br>HEE Employes ME Unemployed SM inactive (Inactive in school<br><!-- End of picture text -->
ii

|EXPERIENCE FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES|17|
|---|---|
|**Marginal Cost Pricing**|17|
|Irrigation water in France|17|
|Household Consumption|19|
|Industrial Water Use|19|
|**Public Water Allocation**|**19**|
|Bureau of Reclamation and the American West|20|
|The PASTEN Mechanism in Indonesia|21|
|**Water Markets**|**22**|
|Water Markets in Chile|22|
|Drought Water (Market) Bank in California|23|
|Advanced Ground Water Markets in Gujarat India|24|
|Latent Water Markets in Cumbum Valley, Periyar-Vaigai Basin, Tainil Nadu|24|
|Transferable Water Entitlements In Australia|26|
|**Mixed Systems of Allocation**|**28**|
|California Groundwater|28|
|**User-Based Allocation**|**29**|
|Balinese Subaks in Indonesia|29|
|Tank Irrigation in India|30|
|WUA Management of the Tank in Vengal Village, Tamil Nadu|31|
|Operational Rules in a Communal Irrigation System in Portugal|32|

# REFERENCES

DISCUSSION 32 36
SIERRA LEONE‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 7.  Sierra Leone’s share of revenues forgone due to power losses is the highest in West Africa**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 200<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>Liberia Niger Mali Ghana Burkina Cote Sierra Senegal Benin Cape<br>Faso d'Ivoire leone Verde<br>Losses Underpricing Collection Inefficiencies<br>% of the revenues<br><!-- End of picture text --> Long-run cost recovery in Sierra Leone is still questionable in light of the high costs associated with emergency generation and low average revenue. The already high end-user power tariffs can cover the total cost of power production only if sufficient and reliable hydropower supply is secured. If, however, the need to rely on emergency thermal generation continues into the future, it will inevitably make cost recovery vulnerable to high generation costs and fluctuations in fuel prices (figure 8). Cost reduction is contingent upon expanding hydropower resources, increasing the customer base, and securing sustainable revenue flow, as well as exploring the option of importing power from other countries in West Africa.

**Figure 8. Sustainable cost recovery for Sierra Leone in the medium term is still a difficult proposition**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.6<br>0.5<br>0.4<br>0.3<br>0.2<br>0.1<br>0<br>Historical Emergency Effective Current total Average Hydro Long run<br>total cost, generation tariff, 2010 cost, 2010 revenue, generation cost of<br>2007 cost 2007 cost, 2010 imported<br>power<br>US cents per KwH<br><!-- End of picture text --> Imported power is an attractive option to address the growing demand and increase access in Sierra Leone. Assuming power-trade expansion, Sierra Leone could work to finalize the development of a transmission network linking the nation with C ô te d‘Ivoire and Guinea. To make this scenario a reality, Sierra Leone would need to develop over 600 megawatts of interconnector capacity. C ô te d‘Ivoire is one of West Africa‘s largest power exporters with a reputation as a reliable supplier in the WAPP today, providing Burkina Faso and Guinea with 1.8 terawatt-hours. Exploratory discussions with Côte d‘Ivoire could therefore help Sierra Leone to identify feasible trading possibilities. In the long term, Sierra Leone could also import power from Guinea, which has abundant low cost hydropower and an export potential 19
# **Trade Crisis and Recovery: Restructuring of Global Value Chains**

William Milberg and Deborah Winkler*

**Keywords:** Global Value Chains, International Trade, Crisis

**JEL Codes:** F15, F23, L22, O24

*Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research, and Consultant, The World Bank, respectively.  This paper draws on Milberg and Winkler (2009a).  The authors are grateful to Stephanie Barrientos, Olivier Cattaneo, Malcolm Dunn, Stephen Gelb, Mona Haddad, Deepak Nayyar, Anne Posthuma, Sanjay Reddy, Diego SanchezAncochea, Stephanie Seguino, Willi Semmler, Mallika Shakya, Cornelia Staritz and an anonymous referee for comments on a previous draft.  The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. Errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors alone.  Correspondence with the authors should be sent to milbergw@newschool.edu.