crimination of any kind on grounds of race, sex, religion, language, political opinion, membership in a union, national origin, social origin, disability, or any other situation.<sup>39</sup> Other results of the surveys related to access to institutions show that hidden forms of institutionalized discrimination can cause certain groups to have difficulty exercising their political rights and, as a consequence, equal access to public services. For example, in Bulgaria, regulations on the issuance of identification cards require a registered address. Those regulations adversely affect mostly Roma minorities, who often have problems obtaining housing and do not have a registered address. Also, the Bulgarian Act on Social Benefits for Children, introduced in 2015, suspends child benefits for children of underage girls, affecting mostly Roma women, who tend to have children at a younger age than do women in the rest of the population. Those laws, coupled with the widely reported economic underperformance of Roma minorities in Bulgaria (Gatti and others 2016), give rise to interesting research questions on the correlation between seemingly neutral laws and the disproportionate effect that such laws can have on the continual economic marginalization of minorities in the country.

Similar findings come from Morocco, where the Nationality Law of 1958, as amended in 2007, provides that Moroccan nationality is acquired by birth except when the minister of justice opposes it. The Amazigh people from the south, however, usually lack birth certificates. As a result, the law setting out the requirements for foreigners to obtain Moroccan nationality—including knowledge of the Arabic language, which those ethnic minorities often do not speak—also applies to them. That apparently neutral provision in the nationality law makes obtaining nationality harder for the Amazigh people than for the Moroccan Arabic majority and, as a consequence, hinders access to social services and the labor market (UNCERD 2010). In the area of cultural rights, however, Morocco has made some progress in the new 2011 Constitution by recognizing Tamazight, the language of the Amazigh people, as an official language.<sup>40</sup> All six economies have constitutional provisions that guarantee the freedom of religion or belief;<sup>41</sup> however, lack of harmonization with national legislation sometimes means that such rights are severely curtailed. In Morocco, although the law permits voluntary conversion, the authorities have used Article 220 of the penal code (see box 1) to actively prohibit attempts to proselytize Sunni Maliki Muslims.<sup>42</sup> In Vietnam, the Ordinance on Belief and Religion (Ordinance 21) and government Decree 92, which implements the law, have been criticized by international observers for the excessive discretion they give to the government in regulating, restricting, and forbidding the free exercise of religion or belief in the country.<sup>43</sup> Box 1: Article 220 of the Moroccan Penal Code Article 220 of the Moroccan Penal Code states that “anyone who has impeded or prevented one or more persons from worship or from attending worship services of any religion may be punished by six-months’ to three-years’ imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams.” Although Article 220 appears favorable to religious freedom, it applies the same penalty to “anyone who employs enticements to shake the faith of a Muslim or to convert him to another religion.” Source: Penal Code of Morocco, Art. 220 With regard to enforcement mechanisms, the surveys highlight an encouraging practice in Mexico, where the 2003 Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination requires the judiciary and the police to receive training on existing an-

> 39 Art. 34 of the Arab Charter of Human Rights, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/loas2005.html.

> 40 Art. 5, Constitution of Morocco, 2011.

> 41 Bulgaria, art. 37, para. 1; Mexico, art. 24; Morocco, art. 3; the Netherlands, art. 6, para. 1; Tanzania, art. 19 (1); and Vietnam, art. 24 (2013).

> 42 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/13/Mar/3, Summary Prepared by the Office of the high commissioner for human rights in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 Morocco, Para. 42.

> 43 United Nations Doc. A/HRC/28/66/Add.2, Report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, Addendum, Mission to Vietnam (July 21–31, 2014).

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