The implementation of the projects was done by the PPH, under supervision from the Ministry of Housing. No specific evaluation of the administrative simplicity is known. However, the responsible unit within the ministry of Housing consisted in an administrative, project-by-project, follow-up. At the beginning of the 1990s, a computer database was developed at the Ministry of Housing which included all project records. However, no permanent evaluation and monitoring framework existed.

As often, slum upgrading projects generated incentives for households which affected the program efficiency. First, the government’s public commitment to dealing with slums gave households an incentive to migrate to slums, in the hope of finding cheap housing in future. Locally, when a State program was initiated in a particular slum area, the resident population would suddenly increase, which made budget and physical forecasts obsolete. Furthermore, households granted _relogement_ units had strong incentives to sell them immediately and return to living in the slums. Frequently, _relogement_ and _recasement_ operations were not accompanied by sufficiently rigid measures to prevent redevelopment of the vacated slums. In this regard, lack of coordination with municipalities whose responsibilities were not clearly defined, became a definite problem. Local governments had no incentives to eradicate slums because these were seen as a trigger for State intervention measures, resulting in construction of housing units in their jurisdictions through national budget financing.

Efficiency was also low. A study by the Ministry of Housing on the projects managed by the PPH from 1983 to 1995 revealed the following: projects included distribution of serviced land plots ( _recasement_ ) and completed housing units ( _relogement_ ). Although 80% of the land plots had been distributed to beneficiaries before 1987 and 96% before 1990, 29% of the parcels were not constructed in 1997, and only 46% included completed and occupied dwellings. The population living in the parcels represented only 30% of initial program projections. In the case of _relogement_ programs, the rate of completion was higher (80% of the projected housing units had been constructed) and vacancy rates were lower, but the units housed only 70% of the projected population. From the social point of view, evaluation studies undertaken by the Ministry of housing showed that the programs were focused on the physical dimension, and failed to take into account potential problems which might arise from relocation of former slum dwellers into new neighborhoods. Loss of a social network, lack of services in the newly urbanized zones, and lack of public transport networks were quoted as the most pervasive problems for the newly relocated families.

The programs were also badly targeted because of the _péréquation_ system of cross-subsidization mentioned above, under which the bulk of government spending on those programs eventually benefit medium and high-income households. From a horizontal equity point of view, the programs gave preferential treatment to households living in slums, de facto encouraging the development of informal housing.

The two other main issues were coverage and sustainability. Spatial coverage was problematic because of the land availability issues in some cities, as described above. Sustainability issues also arose because the investment budget of the Ministry of Housing was subject to arbitrage each year, and appeared insufficient to seriously address the issue of informal housing development.

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