# **2.1 Aggregate evidence on the effects of the invasion**

Given the historically strong integration of Ukraine as well as Russia into global commodity markets,<sup>5</sup> the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, together with the economic blockade of its export routes through the Black Sea, resulted in a spike of grain prices and led to major concerns about effects on global food security. A key reason was the economic blockade of Ukraine’s main seaborne export routes via the Black Sea that limited Ukraine’s ability to generate export revenue and forced a costly shift to overland routes with much lower capacity but high physical and transaction costs. The ‘grain deal’ agreed under the auspices of the UN in July 2022 and extended twice since then, allows a limited quantity of grain to be exported from Ukraine through the port of Odessa, albeit at higher cost and risk than before the invasion.<sup>6</sup> Yet, while it may have avoided food insecurity in countries heavily dependent on Ukrainian imports (FAO 2022a), higher transaction cost of this export route may translate into lower prices for farmers in Ukraine.

Trade models have been used to highlight likely impacts of different conflict scenarios on global wheat markets, especially for African countries (Balma _et al._ 2022), the resilience of the global food system (Ihle _et al._ 2022), or countries that have historically been characterized by heavy reliance on wheat imports from Ukraine (e.g., the Arab Republic of Egypt, Türkiye, Mongolia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan). A global model drawing on satellite imagery for different scenarios concludes that, even in the most optimistic case, reductions in welfare and shortages of food and energy are likely unless production gaps are compensated by increased production elsewhere (Lin _et al._ 2023). One concern has been that countries could use the crisis as a pretext for adopting protectionist policies (Ben Hassen & El Bilali 2022) that, while possibly yielding political benefits in the short term, could create negative externalities that would make achieving global food security more difficult (Glauben _et al._ 2022).

The results of macro models depend significantly on the quality and granularity of the data used which are often derived from satellite imagery or household surveys. Remotely sensed imagery allows to identify changes in crop cover over time and separate direct conflict effects due to active fighting, mining, explosion of ordnance, heavy vehicle movement, and deliberate burning of agricultural fields from indirect ones at a granular level. Kussul _et al._ 2023 infer direct effects for 2-week intervals since the start of the war using satellite imagery and interpretation by means of machine learning as well as manual classification.<sup>7</sup> Using this information together with a 4-year panel (2019-2022) of cropped area for 10,125 village councils aggregated up from the field level, points to an area reduction of slightly less than 1 mn. ha (or 10%), well

> 5 Ukraine accounts for 10% of world trade in wheat, 42% trade in sunflower oil, and 16% of maize.

> 6 In March 2023, 3.5 million tons of grain and oilseed crops were exported through the Black Sea, adding to 2.8 million tons exported via rail, road, and river, bringing the total amount of crops exported in the 2022/23 marketing year to 44.7 million tons about 70% of the potential of 64 million tons (84% grain and 16% oilseeds), comprising the 2022 harvest as well as stocks that had been in storage in February 2022.

> 7 High resolution imagery is needed to detect craters from ordnance explosion, a measure correlated with presence of unexploded munitions (Duncan _et al._ 2023).

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