In order to evaluate the effects of the program, potential beneficiary households (henceforth referred as the “ultra-poor”) were identified by the program in 40 BRAC branch offices covering 1,309 villages. Within every village, BRAC conducted participatory wealth appraisals whereby community members assigned a wealth class for each household: poor, middle or upper class. Following this community appraisal, BRAC program officers identified eligible “ultra-poor” households among the poor.<sup>1</sup> A baseline survey was conducted on all of the ultra-poor households, as well as a representative sample of the rest of the community. Importantly, the survey included questions on informal transfer networks of respondents’ households. Using the baseline village census, the identity of any household with whom the respondent’s household interacted within the was recorded. After the baseline the was village survey, program randomly introduced in 20 branch offices in 2007, and the other 20 remained as controls until 2011. The same sample of households were re-surveyed in 2009 and 2011, after which the control communities were also treated. An additional followup survey was conducted in 2014, that is seven years after the baseline and three years after the control branches had also been treated, and I will use this data to examine long-run trends of outcomes for early versus late treated ultra-poor households.

I find that the program crowded-out informal transfers received by the ultra-poor households in treatment villages, but this was driven mainly by outside-village transfers. The ultra-poor in treatment villages were 13 percentage points (ppt) less likely to have received informal transfers (during the 12 months preceding the survey) relative to the control group, while the effect on the intensive margin is imprecisely estimated. When I disaggregate the transfers by location, I find that they were 4ppt less likely to have received transfers from within their village but the value of transfers received were 29% higher relative to the control group. Moreover, they were more likely to report receiving food transfers from other households within the village. On the other hand, outside village transfers were crowded out by 12ppt on the extensive margin and 23% in value.

Examining who the ultra-poor households exchange transfers with, I find that the program increased their likelihood to receive as well as give transfers from/to _wealthier_ households within their village. Here, as a proxy for wealth, I use the socio-economic wealth rank assigned to each household at baseline, during the community wealth appraisal. I find that, after the program, the likelihood that the ultra-poor in treatment transfers to other middle and class households increased. villages give poor, upper Moreover, middle and upper class households were more likely to report giving transfers to the ultra-poor in their communities, and this effect is maintained seven years af1Households who were in the poor class according to the community wealth appraisal, but not selected as potential beneficiaries of the program by BRAC are referred to as the “other poor” households throughout the paper.

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