rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Figure 1 illustrates how a mixed method approach can be used for multiple-level analysis of a complex education program that must be assessed simultaneously at the level of the school district, the school, the classroom and the individual student or teacher. Similar multi-level analysis could be used for the analysis of multi-component national level programs.

Figure 1 Multi‐level nested mixed methods design: Evaluating effects of school reforms on student attendance and performance <!-- Start of picture text --> School district QUANT analysis<br>of school records<br>QUAL interviews<br>with head teacher Sample of schools QUANT analysis<br>and administrators of test scores<br>and attendance<br>QUAL observation<br>of teaching style Sample of classes QUANT observation of<br>class behavior<br>QUAL interviews with teachers Sample of teachers Sample of students Students fill-in QUANT questionnaire<br><!-- End of picture text --> 4 One of the emerging questions is whether there are alternatives to the statistical counterfactual that can be used in attribution analysis when it is not possible to use a quasi-experimental design with a well-matched comparison group. Most of the alternatives to the strong statistical designs rely on mixed method approaches that often combine case studies of households, communities or organizations with key informant interviews and/or focus groups, with the synthesis of available quantitative data sources being used to ensure that the qualitative data is adequately representative and to permit the extrapolation of the findings to other populations. The development of valid alternatives to the statistical counterfactual is still a new and emerging field, one that usually relies on a combination of methods to “reconstruct” a hypothetical scenario absent the project intervention. Some of the techniques that are used include: using two or more program theory models to compare expected outcomes under the intended project design and alternative hypotheses; participatory techniques such as PRA to obtain beneficiary perceptions on causality; concept mapping (Kane and Trochim 2007); and techniques such as Theory of Change (Morra and Rist 2009: 150-169). All of these approaches rely on combining different types of data collection and analysis. This field is still in its infancy, but to the extent that strong statistical designs can only be used in a small minority of evaluations, is a potentially very important area for which mixed method approaches are well suited. Assessing how well these methods work in comparison to randomized impact evaluations is an important area of future research.

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# **Adults’ Cognitive and Socioemotional Skills and their Labor Market Outcomes in Colombia**<sup>∗</sup>

Pablo Acosta, World Bank and IZA Noël Muller, World Bank Miguel Sarzosa, Purdue University _Updated October 2020_

**JEL codes** : J24, J31, I24.

**Keywords** : Colombia, returns to skills, cognitive skills, socioemotional skills, Big Five personality traits, latent skills, labor market outcomes, education, unobserved heterogeneity, structural estimations.

>  This paper previously circulated under the title “Beyond Qualifications: Returns to Cognitive and Socio-Emotional Skills in Colombia.” We thank Wendy Cunningham, Margaret Grosh, Mónica Parra Torrado, and Sergio Urzúa for discussions and feedback while developing this paper and related work. We gratefully acknowledge constructive comments from two anonymous referees from the _Revista de Economía del Rosario_ , where the paper was published in March 2020. We also benefited from comments from participants in the 9th IZA/World Bank Conference on Employment and Development (Lima, Peru), the 13th IZA/SOLE Transatlantic Meeting of Labor Economists (Inning am Ammersee, Germany), the IZA/OECD/World Bank Workshop on Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills and Economic Development (Bertinoro, Italy), the 2014 LACEA Annual Conference (Sao Paulo, Brazil), and the 2nd IZA Labor Statistics Workshop (Bonn, Germany). Correspondence about this article should be addressed to Pablo Acosta (pacosta@worldbank.org), Noël Muller (nmuller@worldbank.org), and Miguel Sarzosa (msarzosa@purdue.edu).
# **Figure  5.   Demand for Representative Business Service** **_s_ (Dixit-Stiglitz) Sectors in Regional Market (RM) m**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Business Service s<br>CES σ =1, 5<br>Rest of World<br>Own Regional Market Services<br>Cross Border Services<br>CES σ =3 = esub<br>Multinational Service Russian Service<br>Providers in RM m Providers in RM m<br>CES σ =3 = esub CES σ =3 = esub<br>Multinational firms in RMm Russian firms from RMm<br><!-- End of picture text --> 56
Figure 2 Trends in Maize Productivity Reform Provinces versus Non-Reform Provinces <!-- Start of picture text --> 7.2<br>7<br>6.8<br>6.6<br>1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: The graph reports the trends in maize productivity in reform provinces (solid line) and non-reform provinces (broken line). Estimates based on the Post Harvest Survey.

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# **1 Introduction**

Firm informality, the most dominant form of which is lack of registration with tax authority, is pervasive throughout the developing world. According to available data, 60-80% of micro, small and medium businesses in developing countries are informal (IFC 2013). Bangladesh is no exception with about three quarters of firms not registered with the tax authority, resulting in a substantially reduced tax basis and therefore impacting the provision of public goods. At the same time formal and informal firms might coexist in a given market and sector and therefore compete with a substantially different costs structure.

Why do firms remain informal? A view, popularized by de Soto (1989) and which has substantially influenced developing country policies and donor-funded aid programs, is that these firms are willing to formalize but costly and cumbersome regulatory processes and bureaucratic red tapes are inhibiting them to formalize. This in turn has inspired simplification and streamlining of business entry and tax registration in recent years in a number of developing countries, including Bangladesh. For instance, according to the World Bank Doing Business database, 368 regulatory reforms took place in 149 economies between 2003 and 2012 resulting in a decline in the world average time to start a business from 50 days to 30, while the cost of starting a business is one-third of what it was prior to the reform (World Bank, 2013). Yet, we still see the majority of the firms in many of these countries remain in the informal sector.

A number of randomized controlled trials provided carrots in the form of lowering or eliminating the costs of registration and providing free information about the registration process but found no impact of such interventions on formalization (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2012); De Giorgi and Rahman (2013)). Only paying cash-grants equivalent to one-half to one month of the median firm’s profits leads to registration of around one-fifth of firms (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2012)).

Firms may choose to remain informal simply because they do not perceive formalization as leading to better business outcomes and public goods provision. Also firms might perceive that the cost of remaining informal is relatively low, the expected value of penalties might simply be too low either because of the low probability of getting caught or the magnitude of the penalties. De Andrade, Bruhn, and McKenzie (2013) is one of the first studies that we are aware of that investigates the effect of stricter enforcement on formalization in a middle1
_credit institute_ (MCI), created throughout Europe and most common in Northern Europe. 2 The structure of these banks reflected the tradeoff between credit risk on one hand and interest rate and liquidity risk on the other hand. Its German version (the Hypothenken Bank), for example, minimized credit risk by making mortgage loans with loan to value ratios below 60%. Although this reduced the credit risk faced by the bank, it forced the borrowers to delay their first home purchase until they had accumulated the substantial equity required for the downpayment.

In the United States and England, until recently, most home loans have been made by depository institutions, including commercial banks, Savings and Loan Associations in the United States, and Building Societies in England. How the various risks are shared between the lender and borrower then depends on the particular form of the mortgage instrument. For example, in the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s, many borrowers suffered the unexpected loss of their homes when lenders suddenly stopped renewing short-term mortgage loans. On the other hand, in the United States during the early 1980s, the Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls) suffered massive losses and many of the institutions ultimately failed when interest rates rose unexpectedly while the institutions were following a short funding strategy using fixed-rate mortgages.

A key advantage of the _depository institution system_ is that three distinct mortgage market functions can be vertically integrated within the depository institution: Mortgage origination is the process through which mortgage debt is created, comparable to the underwriting function for other capital market securities.<sup>3</sup> 2 See European Mortgage Federation [1990] for further background. The MCIs made mortgage loans to various borrowers including households, commercial enterprises, and local governments.

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CLEMENS & TIONGSON

|band-|width|2_._108|1_._599|1_._732|2_._156|2_._109<br>1_._396|1_._930<br>3_._163<br>Korea.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ted effect|_p_-val.|0_._832|0_._0328|0_._0370|0_._556|0_._182<br>0_._316|0_._283<br>0_._489<br>a member in|
|t-on-trea|s.e.|0_._145|0_._190|0_._145|0_._237|0_._512<br>0_._0217|0_._144<br>2_._602<br>ld_ever_ had|
|Treatmen|_μs↓_0_−μs↑_0<br>_τs↓_0_−τs↑_0|_−_0_._0309|0_._405|0_._302|_−_0_._139|0_._683<br>_−_0_._0217|_−_0_._154<br>_−_1_._799<br>ent = househo|
|fect|_p_-val.|0_._830|0_._0202|0_._0300|0_._555|0_._159<br>0_._317|0_._279<br>0_._483<br>117. Treatm|
|-to-treat ef|s.e.|0_._0402|0_._0754|0_._0676|0_._0840|0_._322<br>0_._0105|0_._0690<br>1_._007<br>age⩾12,_N_ =<br>gular kernel.|
|Intent|_μs↓_0_−μs↑_0|_−_0_._00862|0_._175|0_._147|_−_0_._0496|0_._453<br>_−_0_._0105|_−_0_._0747<br>_−_0_._707<br>ns age_<_18. With<br>aman(2012), trian|
||_μs↑_0|0_._984|0_._275|0_._340|0_._144|0_._525<br>0_._0105|0_._537<br>11_._51<br>‘Child’ mea<br>d Kalyanar|
||Outcome|In school? (if age⩾6)|_if so, private facility?_|_Any awards at school?_|<br>Visited health facility past mo.?|_if so, private facility?_<br>Working?|Does anyone read to child?<br>Desired years of education<br>_N_ = 729. All variables at individual level.<br>Bandwidth selection followingImbens an|

44
<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>0<br>z= - = = = I<br>“ |<br>-4<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6 |<br>-10 J<br>Total Indirect Direct Subsidies All direct All in-kind In-kind Primary Secondary Tertiary In-kind<br>change in Taxes Taxes transfers education education education education health<br>Gini<br>Source: Authors’ estimates based on LCMS 2015.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Figure 9.   Distribution of DBs by levels of NPLs**

_(Percentage of DBs in each NPL range)_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90% 16% 17% 15% 15%<br>80% 4% 4% 8% 5%<br>8%<br>70% 14% 11% 16%<br>60% 14% 18% 14% 10%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>53% 53% 53% 55%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>2006 2007 2008 2009<br>Less than 5% 5% to 9.9% 10% to 19.9% 20% to 29.9% More than 30%<br><!-- End of picture text --> The survey found that in 2009, 14% of the surveyed DBs reported losses. The remaining 86% were profitable or broke even. The percentage of DBs reporting losses in 2006, 2007 and 2008 was 15%, 8%, and 9%, respectively.

Given that profit maximization is not the main objective of DBs, their returns tend to underperform the average return of the banking system. In 2009, 53% of the surveyed DBs had a Return on Assets (ROA) exceeding the average of their banking systems. This was up from 42% in 2006 and 2007, and 46% in 2008. In terms of the Return on Equity (ROE), 19% of DBs exceeded the national average in 2009 (up from 15% in 2006, 13% in 2007, and 18% in 2008).

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13 In the meantime, there have been significant changes in the domestic institutional environment since it was not dealt with at the time of the trade liberalizations. It must have become apparent that appropriate institutions were needed to deal with the pressures for protection. They are also needed to advance the agenda for further liberalization. In addition trade policy making institutions had to be adopted to the provisions of the Uruguay Round.

In Argentina, there has been an increase in the variance of protection while the average level of protection may have remained unchanged. There has been an attempt to extend the special regime accorded to the motor car industry to other industries. Thus, other industries are allowed reduced import duties for exports, if they enter into an agreement with the Ministry of Trade to convert their industries to export more. These industries are allowed to import capital goods at a lower tariff rate with an agreement with the Ministry of Industry. The statistical tax was raised from 3% to 10% and later returned to 3%. Anti-dumping activity had increased, specially directed against Brazil which had a depreciated exchange rate before the "Plano Real," relative to the Argentinean peso. The latter has been fixed in relation to the US dollar as a part of the Convertibility Plan. The final outcome of these reversals has not been so much an increase in protection, as much as an increase in the variance of protection. The three tier tariff rate which was adopted in 1991, became a seven tier tariff structure. There has also been an attempt to fine-tune export incentives, with different coefficients prescribed for different "production chains" to determine tariff reimbursement rates. Three basic reasons can be adduced for this partial reversal. First, the appreciation of the peso given its fixed nominal exchange rate, even though domestic inflation rate has remained unprecedently low for Argentina. Second, an incomplete trade reform had reduced automobile protection but did not eliminate it. This has given other industries the occasion to ask and receive special concessions. Finally, until last year, there has not been a transparent mechanism to provide exceptional protection. In other words, the absence of a proper safeguard mechanism had created the opportunity for sectoral interests to ask for sector specific protection when import threats appeared such as in the case of sports shoes and certain kinds of paper.
Global inequality recalculated: The effect of new 2005 PPP estimates on global inequality Branko Milanovic<sup>1</sup> JEL classification: D31; I3; 057 Key words: Global inequality, Purchasing power parity Number of words: about 4,000

> 1 World Bank, Research Department.  I am grateful for comments to Yuri Dikhonov, Peter Lanjouw and Thomas Pogge. The views expressed  are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations.
Figure 11: Trade Gains to South Asia (percent) from Its Own (unilateral) Capacity Building and Capacity Building by the Rest of the World <!-- Start of picture text --> %<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20 South Asia<br>15 Rest of the world<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>Ports Customs Regulation Services Total<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculation based on Wilson, Mann, Otsuki database 2004

# **5. Concluding Remarks**

The South Asia region has a significant opportunity in 2004 to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty through concrete actions to facilitate trade. These include taking steps to realize the promise of collective gains through platforms that advance regional integration. The drive to implement the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and initiatives of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) offer such opportunities. Based on the analysis in this note, there are significant potential gains to trade for South Asia associated with collective efforts to raise capacity in trade facilitation. These include specifically investments in upgrading ports and information technology infrastructure in the region.<sup>32</sup> There are also gains directly related with continued reform in customs clearance procedures and regulatory harmonization. The results of our analysis also show that steps to reduce barriers to trade logistics in the region promise expanded trade opportunities with the rest of the world. In this regard, collective action under regional initiatives is particularly important.

When considering intraregional trade, if the countries of South Asia raise their capacity halfway to East Asia’s average, their trade would rise by an estimated $2.6 billion. This is approximately 60 percent of the total intraregional trade in South Asia. The category of trade facilitation that will produce the greatest gains is service-sector infrastructure ($1,224 million), followed by efficiency in air and maritime ports ($712 million). South Asia also has a stake in the success of efforts to promote capacity building outside its borders. If South Asia and the rest of the world raised their levels of trade facilitation halfway to the East Asian average, the gains to the region would be an estimated $36 billion. Out of these gains, about 87 percent of the total gains to South Asia would be generated from South Asia’s own efforts (leaving the rest of the world unchanged). The

> 32 The SAARC members specifically decided on special projects in telecommunications and information technology at meetings in Islamabad in July 2004.

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power sector. Our findings therefore suggest that, when assessing the financial sector’s development of a country, private investors also take the country’s level of exchange rate risk into account. _Hence, the latter appears to be the most important risk factor that can hinder the private sector’s participation in power projects’ funding_ .

|SYS-GM|**Table 8**<br>M parameter estimates||
|---|---|---|
|Variable|Coefficient|Std error|
|_lag(privinvt)_|.6762986***|.0525712|
|_findev_|231.7872***|103.6243|
|Obs.|307||
|Fisher test|F(2, 28) = 86.86***||
|Arellano Bond test - Order 1|-2.31***||
|Arellano Bond test - Order 2|-0.07||
|Hansen-J|chi2(58) = 26.49||
|Dif-Hansen|chi2(30)= 4.09||

|SYS-GM|**Table 9**<br>M parameter estimates||
|---|---|---|
|Variable|Coefficient|Std error|
|_lag(privinvt)_|.6564802***|.0476423|
|_findev_|109.5548**|59.46446|
|_exchraterisk_|28.64363***|8.754116|
|Obs.|306||
|Fisher test|F(3, 28) = 90.35***||
|Arellano Bond test - Order 1|-2.35***||
|Arellano Bond test - Order 2|-0.03||
|Hansen-J|chi2(29) = 23.29||
|Dif-Hansen|chi2(15)= 7.05||

When investigating whether the existence of an autonomous energy regulator matters for private investors by adding the variable _indepreg_ as an independent variable in the previous model, our results (Table 10) show that the effects of _findev_ and _exchraterisk_ on private investment are not altered as both variables still significantly impact private investment in power projects. Our findings also highlight that the existence of an autonomous energy regulator matters for private investment as the variable _indepreg_ significantly increases the volume of private investment. It therefore appears that developing countries’ domestic financial sector’s development, their level of exchange rate risk and their regulatory framework, more specifically, the existence of an autonomous energy regulator, are all but important determinants of private investment in these countries’ energy projects.

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implementing the carbon tax in 2030. To check sensitivity to international commodity price and carbon tax rate assumptions, we also apply CPAT assuming international energy prices are lower at the time of the introduction of the carbon tax in 2024 as well as a CEPR scenario with a carbon tax rate of US$12.5/ton CO2e.

Finally, we touch upon why governments are oftentimes reluctant to introduce carbon pricing or phase out fossil fuel subsidies and provide some suggestions for the successful implementation of a reform like the CEPR. This also links to the international debate on who should share the burden of mitigating climate change. Some might suggest that it is unfair to impose carbon taxes on developing economies. After all, most of them emit but a small fraction of existing GHGs into the atmosphere in per capita terms, even as they face the most severe challenges from climate change. However, an increasing body of evidence (Hallegatte, 2022; Wollburg et al., 2023) shows that there are various direct benefits to adopting a well-designed green transition strategy to ward off climate damages. Our paper contributes to this literature.

To our knowledge, this is also the first analysis that quantifies economic and distributional implications of climate mitigation policies for the South Asia region as a whole. We contribute to the literature by using updated household survey data from economies that have not been considered for this type of analysis in the past. Similar studies either focus disproportionately on large emitters (IMF, 2019b; Parry, Mylonas, and Vernon, 2019; 2021) or lack granular coverage of South Asia (Alonso and Kilpatrick, 2022). Ohlendorf et al. (2021) use an ordered Probit meta-analysis framework to examine 53 empirical studies in 39 (mostly advanced) economies and find that, in the less wealthy economies of their sample, the likelihood of progressive distributional outcomes following the introduction of mitigation policies is higher. For developing economies, the literature is sparse. A notable study on Latin American and Caribbean economies finds that up to 30 percent of revenues from carbon taxes are sufficient to compensate poor and vulnerable households on average, which makes these taxes quite effective from the point of view of redistribution (Vogt-Shilb et al., 2019).

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the energy transition requirements in South Asia.<sup>1</sup> Section 3 describes the data and methods. Section 4 shows the main results. Section 5 discusses political economy considerations. Section 6 concludes.

> 1 South Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

3