Another desirable aspect of the system is that frequent reporting on environmental target fulfillment strengthens the Party’s performance legitimacy. At the end of the 11th FYP, frequent announcements on environmental targets communicated to the Chinese public that the central government is doing everything possible to realize announced goals. For example, when, during the last months leading up to the end of the 11th FYP, it became clear that China was not on track to meet its national energy intensity target of 20%, former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly called for local officials to use an “iron hand” when implementing the energy intensity targets. Such announcements communicate to the Chinese public that the central government takes the implementation of environmental policies very seriously and if targets are not met, it is likely because of policy shirking by local governments. Therefore, authoritarian regimes can exploit binding environmental targets to enhance trust in central authorities and enhance the appearance of effective governance, thus ultimately furthering the Party’s legitimacy.

While the introduction of binding environmental targets has, to date, resulted in a number of positive outcomes, the target system also generates multiple _undesirable_ (and often unanticipated) results. Heavy reliance on binding environmental targets can also be problematic as allocated targets can be (a) inappropriate to local circumstances and units of protection, (b) unscientific, (c) rigid, (d) arbitrarily inflated as they get passed down the administrative hierarchy, and (e) difficult to verify.

# _(a) Inappropriate to local circumstances and units of protection_

## **Box 1: Inappropriateness of targets to protection units**

After targets are set at the national level, provinces allocate environmental targets to different departments within administrative boundaries of a province, municipality or county. These departments are responsible for just one section of the units in need of protection. However, lakes, rivers or wetlands are complete ecosystems that should be managed as single entities rather than parceled out to different administrative units.

- For example, governance of **Dongjiang Lake in Chenzhou** is shared between four counties, one of which is poor and cannot afford to close mining enterprises at the lake. The remaining three countries have committed to limiting pollution since they perceive the lake as an asset for tourist promotion. In the context of this common pool resource problem, a lake commission using a process of ecological compensation mechanisms would be more effective than targets tied to county governments (see discussion in Section 5).

- Another example is recent **PM 2.5 pollution in Beijing** . Beijing’s air pollution results partly from coal burning in Beijing’s neighboring provinces, especially Hebei province which burns 200 million tons of coal every year. Without cross-provincial joint efforts in the greater Beijing area, Beijing’s municipal government can do little to stem local pollution.

Aside from cross-administrative coordination problems, allocating binding targets to administrative units gives rise to “ **gerrymandering” practices** , wherein local governments manipulate jurisdictional boundaries for their own ends. For example, in one municipality in Shanxi, the municipal Mayor relocated polluting factories to a nearby county and then cut a deal in order to obtain part of the tax income without having the pollution show up on the municipality’s environmental record.

_Source: Kostka (2014)_ 10