# **4.3. Political economy network mapping of local-level teacher allocation**

In order to more clearly identify the local-level dynamics of teacher distribution in Malawi, and the potential mechanisms through which teachers influence allocations to exercise their preferences, we conducted a series of network mapping focus groups with headteachers, education officials, and non-education officials. In total, over 100 respondents participated in the exercise, with all regions of Malawi and 33 out of 34 education districts represented.<sup>12</sup> The participants were organized into panels of eight-ten people by their role and geographic origin<sup>13</sup> . Working in groups of two to three, participants carried out a stakeholder mapping exercise. Imagining the scenario of a teacher seeking to move from a remote school to a less remote school, the groups identified the major actors, both education officials and others, who the teacher might try to use to exercise influence over the outcome. They then identified linkages of influence between the actors and assigned each linkage a score out of 10 for overall influence.

The results of the mapping exercise and discussion are summarized in **<u>Figure 4</u>** . The network map of influence which emerges has several striking characteristics.

_Central role of DEMs as nexus of influence:_ In formal terms, DEMs exercise the most influence over local-level teacher allocations. Reflecting the findings of UNDP (2016), the mapping exercise revealed DEMs to also be subject to a large degree of influence, both “from above” – for example, from MoEST – and “from below”, from PEAs and community-level actors. DEMs were scored by participants as being subject to by far the most formal and informal influence, and DEMs themselves describe facing a constant stream of pressure through formal and informal channels from MoEST, community-level actors, and non-education and elected officials, as well as directly from teachers themselves. “The pressure comes from all over – friends, politicians, chiefs, the Ministry, PEAs,” said one DEM. “People want their friends to be at a school they feel is not remote. You have to be strong and be prepared to create enemies.” The result is that despite their substantial official or _de jure_ power within the system, DEMs’ _de facto_ power is limited by their willingness and ability to resist this pressure.

_Significant influence of teachers through informal networks_ **:** The situation with teachers is the inverse of that with DEMs: teachers lack formal power in the system, but exercise considerable _de facto_ influence through informal networks. The overall influence of teachers within local-level networks was rated as higher than that of any other single actor, including both MoEST and DEMs. PEAs estimated that in their zones, as few as 10 percent of teachers allocated to a remote zone may actually be successfully posted and maintained in that zone, suggesting teachers have effectively captured the system to prevent allocation to remote schools.

In particular, the context of overall and district-level teacher shortages means that teachers have considerable leverage. “Better to place all the teachers around the periphery of the town than to have them leave the district, or even teaching, altogether,” said one DEM.

Strikingly, the primary route of teacher influence does not appear to be through the Teacher’s Union of Malawi (TUM). Participants, including TUM district representatives, said that though

> 12 The remaining district, Likoma, is a small island off the coast of Mozambique with limited access to the mainland.

> 13 See **<u>Table 13</u>** , in Annex 1 (available online: see page 40).

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