Overall, it is clear that environmental targets, while substantially more important now than previously, compete for space on the crowded agenda of local officials. In these circumstances, most local officials have adopted the attitude of doing the very minimum required.<sup>7</sup> One official in a county in Shandong said: The targets that we pay most attention to are GDP growth rate, fiscal income, value added, exports, and foreign direct investments. But these targets are not binding targets with vetopower ( _yipiao foujue)_ . Environmental and energy consumption targets are veto-power targets and we have to fulfill them, otherwise the Mayor, Party Secretary and the leaders of the bureaus cannot pass the end-of-year check. It is like a constraint maximization problem ( _youyue shue de jidahua_ ): We try to maximize GDP and fiscal income, but we meet only the bare minimum of environmental standards. This is of course not always efficient for the environment (INT08052012).

A leading EPB official further reflects: “Environmental and energy targets are binding targets but they are not our ultimate targets. No leader will be promoted because of their better achievements in environmental protection and energy savings. GDP growth is still the target that we work hardest to achieve” (INT14052012).<sup>8</sup> This attitude explains why all the three municipalities and six counties visited during fieldwork in 2012 set an annual GDP growth rate between 12% to 17% in the local 12<sup>th</sup> FYP, twice as high than the national 12th FYP growth rate of 7%. A local EPB official notes “in theory, all local departments should together decide about local GDP growth rates, but in practice it is finally decided by the local Development and Reform Commission (DRC), while the EPB does not have much say in this” (INT23052012). When asked why they selected such high growth targets, local DRC officials often replied that national or provincial figures are “average” figures and some regions will have higher growth and some regions will have lower growth (INT23052012). Naturally, no locality wants to “sacrifice” their economic development and have average or below-average growth.

The pressure to deliver “political achievements” might also result in the selection of suboptimal projects to fulfill particular environmental targets. Presented with a long list of central directives, promotion-hopeful officials tend to devote their energy and resources to select projects that they expect will most enhance their careers. So-called “political accomplishment projects” ( _zhengji gongcheng_ ), often in the form of extravagant construction initiatives, are at the top of local agendas. Such political accomplishment projects include large public squares, highways, industrial parks, and (oversized) government buildings. For example, in order to further reduce COD in the 12th FYP, one county in Shandong is planning to build one sewage treatment plant for each town and one official notes: Personally, I do not think that this is a good idea. It would be better to expand the existing sewage plant and build a better pipe network to collect wastewater rather than build many small plants in each town. This would be less expensive. For some towns, it is also financially infeasible to build their own treatment plant and their township government will face severe financial burdens in the future. But this is a political problem. Some leaders think that building a sewage treatment plant for each town sounds better and provides more “political accomplishment” value. In the short term, the plans sound impressive to their superiors but the next leaders inherit these financial burdens and have

> 7 The next three paragraphs draw from Kostka (2014).

> 8 Local officials do maintain minimum levels of environmental standards in order to avoid environmental-related mass protests and collective petitions. Keeping stability in their jurisdiction is still the highest ranked binding target on the cadre evaluation sheet and the occurrence of mass protests would certainly hinder a cadres’ career advancement (Wu et al., 2013: 23).

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