rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
available to Russian firms, from the Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors. In general, we found that multinational service providers use mostly Russian primary factor inputs and only small amounts of expatriate labor or specialized technology. In particular, the estimated share of foreign inputs used by multinationals in Russia is: telecommunications, 10% plus or minus 2%; financial services, 3%, plus or minus 2%; maritime transportation, 3%, plus or minus 2%; and air transportation, 12.5%, plus or minus 2.5%.

# **Tariff and Export Tax data**

Tariff rates by sector are taken from the paper by Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov (2006). Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov estimate the tariff rates by sector in our model based on the following data and methodology. For the purpose of calculating the tariff rates, we obtained data on the quantity and value of imports for 2001, 2002 and 2003 from the electronic database of the commercial company Academy-Service.<sup>14</sup> This dataset provides information on the Russian tariff structure at the tariff line level, i.e., the 10-digit level. The source of information on tariff rates is the Decree of the Government of Russian Federation on import duties #830.<sup>15</sup> The decree is available, for example, at <u>www.consultant.ru.</u> The average MFN tariff in Russia has increased between 2001 and 2003. On an un-weighted simple average basis it increased from 11.6% to 12.9%; on a weighted average basis it increased from 11.4% to 14.5%. This average is calculated based on MFN tariffs.

Collected tariffs are less than MFN tariffs because of a several exemptions in the Russian tariff structure. Most notably, CIS imports usually enter tariff free (although there are exceptions to this rule), and personal and private imports also enter tariff free for sufficiently small values of imported shipments. We also provide estimates of the tariff rates where we adjust for zero tariff collections on CIS imports. That is, in our formulas for calculating the tariff on a tariff line, we set ad valorem and specific rates on imports from the CIS countries equal to zero to take into account the special trade regime within the CIS _. We call these calculations our estimated collected tariff rates._ We find that overall estimated collected tariff rates are lower than the MFN rates by about one percent.

Our overall estimated collected tariff rate was equal to 10.4% in 2001, 10.9% in 2002, and 11.5% in 2003. On the other hand, based on Ministry of Finance and Customs Committee data, the actual

> 14 <u>http://www.ftinform.com</u>

> 15 We looked at three editions of the decree: first, dated by 11.30.2001 for 2001; the second, dated by 02.06.2003 for 2002 rates, and the third, dated by December 2003 for 2003 rates.

13
innovative phosphorus efficiency methods and recovery systems. In 2012, world prices of fertilizers were 250 percent above their 2005 level, reflecting these growing pressures (see Figure 13). Large windfalls of phosphate revenues might serve to alleviate many economic problems; however, Morocco needs to address the dangers of over‐dependence and mismanagement of its mineral resources, not only because the well‐known risk of Dutch disease, but also because of the risks of corruption and state capture.

In terms of the PS measures, “Fertilizers” and “Phosphatic Fertilizers” (SITC 5629 and 5622) have some of the lowest PCI values (rank 564 and 648 respectively), reflecting their extractive nature and the few forward‐linkages that they can generate. _Density_ is high but the _PRODY_ values of these two products are low, suggesting that it is difficult for Morocco to aspire to become an upper‐middle income country if it is focused on fertilizer extraction. (The _PATH_ values are 137 for SITC 5629 and 97 for SITC 5622.) Figure 13: World Price of Fertilizers, 2005 = 100 Source: World Bank, GEM Commodities

# 4.4.2 Electronics

Some exports related to the assembly of electronic components have gained importance in Morocco. In “Diodes and transistors” (SITC 7763), “Switchboards and relays” (SITC 7721) “Electronic microcircuits” (SITC 7764), and “Electric wire” (SITC 7731) – with complexity‐index rankings of 86, 120, 125, and 464 respectively – Morocco has attracted important R&D investments in the last decade: SQLI (France) set up an R&D platform in the country in 2003l Eolane Electronics Manufacturing Services (France) opened an R&D center in 2004 next to its manufacturing and distribution unit; STMicroelectronics has had a chip design Centre in Casablanca since 2000; and Gespac Maroc Usine Novatech, which is present in the city of Temara since 2001, manufactures electric wiring for aviation equipment. Nevertheless, Morocco is still considered an extension to Europe’s industrial capacities and it is still an open question whether the country can be upgraded to become a significant manufacturing center, especially given fierce competition, both from large emerging economies (such as India, China, and Brazil) and regional competitors (such as 19
stage, the Heckman model leads to the incidental parameter problem. Helpman et al. (2008) also develop a two-stage estimation procedure that accounts for both the extensive (decision to export from _i_ to _j_ ) and the intensive (volume of exports conditional on exporting) margins of trade. Although this approach offers a better understanding of the determinants of trade flows, it provides biased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2009). The RESET test (Ramsey 1969) performed on our data suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in our sample. Therefore, to avoid biased estimation results, the Poisson estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used. The Poisson estimator provides estimates that are comparable to elasticity estimates from the standard linear-in-logs specification and corrects for heteroskedasticity in the error term. The performance of the Poisson estimator has been challenged in the literature on the grounds that Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) do not consider the case in which the dependent variable has a substantial proportion of zero values. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) show that even in the presence of many zeroes, the Poisson estimator is well behaved. In addition, our data are aggregated, which reduces the proportion of zeroes in our sample.

two GDPs of _i_ and _j,_ respectively, the latter are crude approximations at best, raising issues about the validity of simple gravity specifications and results. The specification used here is more consistent with theory and involves the use of fixed effects by importer, exporter, and year (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Feenstra 2004). The fixed effects incorporate size effects as in gravity as well as other origin and destination determinants, including the price and the number of varieties of the exporting country and the demand size and price index (often referred to as a remoteness term) of the importing country.

Third, trade costs enter the (unobserved) price level in each country. Without correction, the omitted variable can be correlated with trade-cost variables on the right-hand 13
“Climate Change and Global Agricultural Potential: A Case of Nigeria“ Centre for World Food Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.

- Washington,W., J. Weatherly, G. Meehl, A. Semtner, T. Bettge, A. Craig,W. Strand, J. Arblaster, V. Wayland, R. James, and Y. Zhang, “Parallel Climate Model (PCM): Control and Transient Scenarios” _Climate Dynamics_ 16(2003), 755-774.

- World Bank. 2003. Africa Rainfall and Temperature Evaluation System (ARTES). World Bank, Washington DC.

21
regional offices lack the operative capacity to implement labor inspections. By 2010, there were 406 labor inspectors for the whole country. By contrast, once a firm registers with SUNAT, it becomes subject to regular oversight, notifications, and visits from tax inspectors. Such interpretation is consistent with previous studies that show a tax detection probability of around 60 percent and a labor detection probability of around 4 percent (Chacaltana 2001).

We also find that enforcement is relevant at both margins: the estimated coefficients for the enforcement proxy variables are statistically significant and of meaningful magnitude. The estimated coefficient for the distance to SUNAT in the 2SLS regression in column (2) implies that the probability of complying with business regulations drops by 5 percent for a firm located 2 kilometers farther from a SUNAT office. Similarly, the larger is the fraction of firms already registered in the Electronic Payroll Registry, the higher is the probability of complying with labor formality regulations. The estimated coefficient for the fraction of firms in the Electronic Payroll Registry in the 2SLS regression in column (4) implies that a 10 percent increase in this proportion increases the probability of complying with labor formality regulations by 3.4 percent.

The legal status of the firm is also relevant at both margins: incorporated businesses are more likely to comply with business and labor regulations. The estimated coefficients in the 2SLS regressions in columns (2) and (4) imply that the probability of complying with business and labor regulations increases by 21 percentage points (or by 12 percent) if we compute the effect with respect to the average fraction of incorporated businesses.

Finally, we find that the firm’s age matters for business formality, but not for labor formality. The 2SLS estimated coefficients for the age dummies in column (2) show that the probability of complying with business regulations increases with the age of the firm. By contrast, no clear pattern emerges from the estimated coefficients for the age dummies in column (4).

# _Sample Split_

The legal status of the firm correlates positively with business and labor formality compliance. The legal status of the firm could conceal a higher propensity to formalize for several reasons, including better organizational structure or higher productivity potential. We further explore whether the relationship between the two formality dimensions is different when the legal status of the firm changes. To this end, we rerun the analysis separately for two sub-samples: unincorporated firms and incorporated firms. We report the results in table 5.

20
with high GVC participation and for sectors with low backward GVC participation (columns 3 and 5 to 8).

# **Table 8: The FDI Facilitates the Productivity Growth of the Sectors with Low Forward GVC Participation**

||Low|GVC particip|ation combin|Low<br>ations|High G|VC particip|ation combi|High<br>nations|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent. Variable: ln<br>diff in labor productivity<br>(d**_ln Y_**)|Low GVC<br>particip.|Low<br>forward<br>GVC<br>partic.|Low<br>backward<br>GVC<br>particcip..|forward<br>and<br>backward<br>GVC<br>particip.|High GVC<br>particip.|High<br>forward<br>GVC<br>particip.|High<br>backward<br>GVC<br>particip.|forward<br>and<br>backward<br>GVC<br>particip.|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|_ln FDI_|0.003|0.006**|0.003|0.005**|0.002|0.002|0.002|0.004|
||(1.45)|(2.16)|(1.48)|(2.19)|(0.64)|(0.93)|(0.78)|(1.53)|
|_Constant_|-0.019|-0.038|-0.06|-0.024|-0.184**|-0.159*|-0.123*|-0.163**|
||(-0.581)|(-1.109)|(-1.596)|(-0.695)|(-2.140)|(-1.844)|(-1.682)|(-2.082)|
|Country-sector FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Country-year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Sector-year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of country-sector|1,011|621|790|460|896|907|896|670|
|Observations|3,770|2,178|2,857|1,587|3,292|3,402|3,224|2,431|
|R-squared|0.547|0.676|0.641|0.721|0.475|0.49|0.511|0.545|

**Notes:** The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of labor productivity. The standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level. Country-year, sector-year and year fixed effects are included. Column (1) - (4) report the results for sectors with low GVC participation, while the rest of the columns is for sectors with high GVC participation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

# **When does the FDI effect peak?**

In Table 9, we include 1-year, 2-year and 3-year lag of FDI. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we report the results for the low GVC participation sectors. Column (3) includes the 2-year lag in addition to the 1-year lag in column (1), and column (5) further includes the 3-year lag. The results suggest that the FDI effect peaks one year after a country sector receives the FDI. The rest of the columns report the results for high GVC participation sectors, and the results are insignificant, which is consistent with what we have found previously.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 10: Placebo regressions on the sample of men<br>Labor Force Participation<br>% Internet<br>job searchers<br>Employment<br>% Internet<br>job searchers<br>Unemployment<br>% Internet<br>job searchers<br>-.2 -1 0 1<br>e 1988 ©1998 TM2006 4 2012<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# The of Prices on Firm Effects Energy Competitiveness: Evidence from Chile<sup>∗</sup>

Juergen Amann (University of Nottingham)<sup>†</sup> Arti Grover (International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group)<sup>‡</sup> JEL Classification: D21; D24; L60; O14; Q41; Q55.

Keywords: Energy prices; Fossil fuels; Firm productivity; Firm-level technology adoption, Competitiveness.

> ∗This research was completed under the guidance of Marianne Fay, Country Director for Chile. The authors are grateful to Doerte Doemeland and Yira J. Mascaro for their strategic guidance, and to Esperanza Lasagabaster, Vincent Palmade, Richard Record, Erik von Uexkull and several colleagues from the Ministry of Finance in Chile for their useful comments.

> †email: amannj.work@gmail.com

> ‡Corresponding author, email: agrover1@ifc.org
Policy Research Working Paper 9722

# **Abstract**

Short-cycle higher education programs (SCPs) can play a central role in skill development and higher education expansion, yet their quality varies greatly within and among countries. This paper explores the relationship between programs’ practices and inputs (quality determinants) and student academic and labor market outcomes. It designs and conduct a novel survey to collect program-level information on quality determinants and average outcomes for Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru. Categories of quality determinants include training and curriculum, infrastructure, faculty, link with productive sector, costs and funding, and practices on student admission and institutional governance. The paper also collects administrative, student-level data on higher education and formal employment for SCP students in Brazil and Ecuador and match it to survey data. Machine learning methods are used to select the quality determinants that predict outcomes at the program and student levels. Estimates indicate that some quality determinants may favor academic and labor market outcomes while others may hinder them. Two practices predict improvements in all labor market outcomes in Brazil and Ecuador—teaching numerical competencies and providing job market information—and one practice— teaching numerical competencies—additionally predicts improvements in labor market outcomes for all survey countries. Since quality determinants account for 20-40 percent of the explained variation in student-level outcomes, quality determinants might have a role shrinking program quality gaps. Findings have implications for the design and replication of high-quality SCPs, their regulation, and the development of information systems.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at mferreyra@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Table 5. EU and U.S. Quotas to Caribbean Sugar Producers and Deliveries in 2000/01** **<u>(metric tons)</u>**

||ACP-<br>Pr|EU Sugar<br>otocol|EU Speci<br>S|al Preference<br>ugar|U.S.|Sugar|Rest of<br>World|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Quota|Deliveries*|Quota|Deliveries*|Quota|Deliveries|Exports*|
|Barbados|50,312|50,312|0|0|7,372|0|0|
|Belize|40,349|40,349|8,067|8,067|11,584|11,616|44,237|
|Dominican|0|0|0|0|185,346|<br>181,708|45,522|
|Republic||||||||
|Guyana|159,410|159,410|41,715|41,715|12,637|12,755|42,038|
|Haiti|0|0|0|0|7,258|0|0|
|Jamaica|118,696|118,696|34,868|34,868|11,584|0|0|
|St. Kitts &|15,591|15,591|0|0|7,258|0|0|
|Nevis||||||||
|Trinidad<br>& Tobago|43,751|43,751|12,134|12,134|7,371|7,402|27|
|Caribbean|428,109|428,109|96,784|96,784|250,410|213,481|131,797|

Source: European Commission, International Sugar Organization, and USDA.

Note: EU quotas are given in metric tons of white sugar equivalent and U.S. quotas are in metric tons of raw sugar equivalent. The standard conversion of raw cane sugar to refined white sugar is 1.087 units of raw cane sugar are required to produce 1.0 unit of white sugar. This assumes a standard sugar content of cane of 96 percent (96° polarization).

Deliveries to U.S. are given in the USDA’s Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook Yearbook, while deliveries to the EU and the rest of the world are author’s estimates. * Authors’ estimate based on International Sugar Organization data.

# **_Caribbean Dependence on Preferences_**

The sugar exporters of the Caribbean region are very dependent on the EU and U.S. sugar programs, with 85 percent of export quantities and 94 percent of export revenues coming from these programs in 2000/01 (Table 5). Without these preferences, and assuming world prices were unchanged, export revenues would have declined by 60 percent. The Dominican Republic is totally dependent on the U.S. preferences while most countries have both EU and U.S. quotas (Figure 4). Guyana has the largest EU quota and sent approximately 80 percent of its exports to the EU during 1998-2002.

Countries heavily dependent on the EU market also have a large currency risk because the guaranteed price is paid in Euros and currencies of the Caribbean region are closely aligned or pegged to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the sharp fall in the Euro following its introduction in 1999 reduced their export earnings in local currency and the rise of the Euro since 2001 increased currency export earnings for sugar. Some countries in the region do not hedge their risk and thus have experienced price swings of as much as 30 percent over a two-year period.

9
- HUMMELS, D., AND A. SKIBA (2004): “Shipping the Good Apples Out? An Empirical Confirmation of the Alchian-Allen Conjecture,” _Journal of Political Economy_ , 112(6), pp. 1384-1402.

- KRUGMAN, P. (1981): “Intraindustry, Specialization and the Gains from Trade,” _Journal of Political Economy_ , 89(5), pp. 959-73.

- KRUGMAN, P. (1980): “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade,” _American Economic Review_ , 70(5), pp. 950-59.

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- LINDER, S. (1961): _An Essay on Trade and Transformation_ , Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm.

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- MELITZ, M., AND G. OTTAVIANO (2005): “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity,” Harvard University, Department of Economics.

- MURPHY, K., AND A. SHLEIFER (1997): “Quality and Trade,” _Journal of Development Economics_ , 53, pp. 1-15.

- OKUBO, T. (2007):_“Intra-Industry Trade, Reconsidered: The Role of Technology Transfer and Foreign Direct Investment,” _World Economy_ , 30(12), pp. 1855-1876.

- OKUBO, T. (2008): “Firm Heterogeneity and Ricardian Comparative advantage within and across sectors”, _Economic Theory,_ forthcoming.

- SCHMALENSEE, R. (1978): “A Model of Advertising and Product Quality,” _Journal of Political Economy_ , 86 (3), pp. 485-503.

39
6 the actual costs of severance pay based on data from the two surveys examined in this paper are 10 to 14 percent of the costs suggested by the statutory regulations. Three possibilities could account for the discrepancy: employees are not aware of the statutory regulations; compliance by firms is low; enforcement of the regulations relating to severance pay appears to be low in Indonesia.

It seems likely that employers avoid paying severance by signing short-term contracts with employees, some of whom are unaware of their right to severance pay. Other employees may know of their rights but avoid involvement in the legal process to enforce their right due to delays and litigation costs. This paper does not examine these issues because we do not have the requisite data on knowledge, costs and delays. Gathering such information is an important direction for future research and could be achieved by adding supplementary questions into the surveys.

While the data do not permit us to directly examine the enforcement of severance pay regulations in Indonesia, we can explore the first two possibilities. Both surveys can directly address the concern raised by employee representatives: compliance of severance pay regulations by firms is low. Prior to the introduction of a set of survey questions about severance pay, the claims of employee representatives were speculative in nature. The two surveys that collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2007 and 2008 give us the opportunity to test the validity of this claim. The following section presents information on the scope of severance pay and compliance of pay regulations.

# **3.  Coverage and Scope of Severance Pay**

The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2007, while the National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) collected data for the first time in 2008. Three aspects of severance pay are described in the analysis below: coverage of and eligibility for severance pay; the scope of severance pay; and the compliance of current severance pay regulations.

# 3.1 _Coverage of and eligibility for severance pay_

Data from the work experience modules of the two surveys are used to address the question of who is more likely to experience a job separation. As wage-and-salary labor