# 8 Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of electoral rules on voting behavior and by extension on the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy. The paper specifically compares two alternative electoral rules: district elections, with multiple single-member districts, and at-large elections, with a single multi-member district. Employing a theoretical model which builds on a citizen-candidate model with free entry of candidates and which assumes that voters value both competence and preference representation in electoral candidates, the paper posits that elections with a single multi-member district will result in the election of more competent representatives, with this effect becoming stronger in more heterogeneous communities. Empirical results from a field experiment conducted across 250 villages in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Ancillary evidence suggests that these results are driven by strategic voting behavior informed by a voter’s anticipation of policy bargaining and not by alternative mechanisms such as incumbency advantage or comparative advantages in political campaigning.

The paper’s theoretical model imposes a series of simplifying assumptions. For instance, in order to enable a focus on the choice of voters over an exogenous set of candidates, the model assumes that candidates face zero entry costs.<sup>53</sup> In addition, the model assumes only a portion of candidates are competent to hold offi ce.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, the experiment used to test the model”s predictions was conducted in a special institutional context that differed from those in which elections are ordinarily held, particularly in the absence of political parties, campaigns, or canvassing; the limited role of long-term considerations for candidates; and the limited mandate of the representative body. These assumptions and contextual peculiarities notwithstanding, the results of the paper provide a number of general implications.

First, the paper establishes the general result that electoral rules, by structuring the strategic incentives facing voters, condition voting behavior. The theoretical model demonstrates that rational voters will behave differently according to the district magnitude of the election in which they are voting and the results of the experiment align with how voters should behave given the incentives presented to them by electoral rules.

Second, the paper shows that strategic voting results in the selection of candidates with relatively extreme policy preferences. The theoretical model suggests that voters anticipate bargaining over policy and seek to elect candidates with relatively extreme policy preferences in order to ensure a policy outcome that is more likely to be favorable to the voter’s specific interests. The results of the experiment confirm that voters engage in such strategic behavior.

Third, the paper demonstrates that voter preferences for candidates with relatively extreme policy preferences increase with heterogeneity over policy preferences of voters across electoral districts. That is, in cases where there is high dispersion of policy preferences among voters, voters anticipate other voters’more extreme preferences and the deleterious consequences of the achievement of their policy ideal point, resulting in a preference for candidates with more extreme policy preferences.

> 53 The endogeneity of candidate selection is addressed in the existing literature (Myerson, 1993).

> 54 The assumption of a scarcity of competent individuals is consistent with previous work positing negative selection of candidates (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007). Our finding that strategic voting reduces the election of competent individuals suggests an additional mechanism for negative selection.

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