shows that other poor households were 4ppt more likely to report receiving transfers from ultra-poor in treated communities, corresponding to a 46% increase relative to the control group. The middle classes were 2.5ppt (52%) more likely to receive transfers from ultra-poor, while the corresponding effect was 1ppt (71%) for the wealthiest class. The remaining columns in Panel A2 shows no significant effects for other wealth classes. This implies that the increase in likelihood of transfers from ultra-poor households observed in column 1 did not crowd out non-ultra-poor households’ likelihood of receiving transfers from other wealth classes<sup>26</sup> The lower panel of Table 6 shows the effects on transfers given by non-ultra-poor households to different wealth classes. On average, the non-ultra-poor households were 3ppt more likely to report giving transfers to ultra-poor in their communities (a 35% increase relative to the control group). Columns 2 to 4 show that the treatment effects on likelihood of transfers to other wealth classes are negative but small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. Panel B2 breaks down the effects by wealth class of the respondent’s household. Respondents from other poor and middle class households were 3ppt more likely to report giving transfers to ultra-poor households. While the corresponding effect for upper class households is also positive, it is imprecisely estimated.<sup>27</sup> The rest of the table shows that there were no significant spillover effects of the program on non-ultra-poor households’ likelihood to give transfers to households from other non-ultra-poor households.<sup>28</sup> In order to assess the long-run effects of the program, I use data from the third followup survey that was conducted in 2014, that is seven years after the baseline. At that point, 49% of control communities had also been treated by the program. Moreover, only the female respondents were surveyed and detailed network information was not collected. However, respondents from all wealth classes were asked whether they provided informal transfers to any of the ultra-poor households within their communities,

> 26Note that the point estimate of the “Treatment effect for upper class” in column 4 is large (-0.04) and border-line significant (p-value=0.109), suggesting that the program may have crowded out transfers received by upper class households from their own wealth class. In Appendix Table S2.4 I assess the differences between midline and endline treatment effects on non-ultra-poors’ likelihood of receiving transfers from different wealth classes. Two findings are of note: Based on the pooled specification (Panel A1), the midline treatment effect on non-ultra-poor’s likelihood to receive transfers from ultrapoor was 2ppt and significant, while this effect had increased to 3ppt by the endline (the difference is marginally significant at 10% level). This suggests that the effects are increasing over time as the ultra-poor are becoming more likely to provide transfers to the non-ultra-poor in their communities. Secondly, at midline, I find that upper class households were 6ppt less likely to receive transfers from other upper class households, but this effect had dissipated by the endline survey. This implies that in the short run, the program crowded out likelihood that upper class households receive transfers from their own wealth class.

> 27I cannot reject the null hypotheses that the treatment effects on middle and upper classes, or on other poor and upper classes are equal (p-values are 0.448 and 0.287 respectively).

> 28Appendix Table S2.4 presents the results of comparing midline and endline treatment effects. Overall, I do not find significant differences between the treatment effects measured at midline and endline.

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