15 A newer class of theories incorporates more constitutional details, including the comparison of electoral rules and of different mechanisms for choosing and ousting the executive and for designing and making legislative decisions.<sup>19</sup> These theories predict that compared with majoritarian and presidential systems, proportional electoral systems<sup>20</sup> and parliamentary regimes<sup>21</sup> will be associated with broad forms of redistribution, such as welfare programs, as well as with higher levels of government spending and redistribution.<sup>22</sup> What are the implications of political institutions for the political economy of agricultural distortions? If those distortions mainly take the form of local-public-goods or redistributive policy instruments (for example, via special subsidies to agriculture), then we should observe relatively more distortions in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems for developed countries and vice versa for developing countries, where rural areas represent a larger proportion of the voting population. The theory also predicts that the countrywide public-good component of support to agriculture is likely to be stronger in parliamentary systems (Rausser and Roland 2010). In developed countries, everything else equal, one should observe relatively more distortions under majoritarian electoral rule than under proportional electoral rule. This result follows from the likelihood that agricultural voters will be pivotal under majoritarian rule but not under the proportional system. (It is much more likely that a farmer’s income would be the median in a rural district than for the entire country, and this reality has been pivotal in some elections [Rausser and Roland 2010].) Moreover, in all countries, we expect to see a larger number of parties, more coalition governments, and higher government expenditures under proportional electoral rule than under majoritarian electoral rule (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007).

Early econometric studies find mixed and often only weak evidence of the effect of democracy on agricultural protection (Lindert 1991; Beghin and Kherallah 1994; Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper 2001, 2007).<sup>23</sup> These studies predominantly rely on cross-section variation in the data and are subject to problems of reverse causality (policies may also influence governance structures) and omitted-variables bias. Studies using long-run historical data allow more careful measurement of the impact of shifts from one set of political institutions to another. Swinnen, Banerjee, and de Gorter (2001) show that changes in electoral rules that 19 Electoral systems can be classified across several dimensions, such as the electoral formula (how votes translate into seats) and the magnitude of the electoral district (the number of legislators elected in an average district). Because these dimensions are closely related across electoral systems, it is common to contrast majoritarian election (with plurality rule and smaller districts) with proportional election (where the seats are attributed in proportion to votes in larger districts). Regarding forms of government, the classical distinction is between presidential and parliamentary forms of government. In the former, citizens elect the chief executive directly. In the latter, the executive is appointed indirectly, through a vote of confidence from an elected parliament.

20 Persson and Tabellini 2000; Austen-Smith 2000; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; MilesiFerretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007; Ticchi and Vindigni 2010. 21 Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2000.

22 In terms of trade policy, Roelfsema (2004) identifies a positive effect of majoritarian elections on trade protection. Grossman and Helpman (2005) predict that tariffs will be higher under a majoritarian regime, because in a proportional system, all regional interests will receive equal support.

23 Empirical evidence on trade policy yields mixed results. Some studies suggest that democracy positively affects economic (trade) liberalization (e.g., Banerji and Ghanem 1997; Milner and Kubota 2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008; Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilinbergo 2010). Other studies argue that this effect depends on other factors. O’Rourke and Taylor (2007) find that although democratization generally reduces trade protection, it does so only in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade. Kono (2006) shows that democracy leads to liberalization of trade in wealthier countries but to increased protection in poorer ones. Several scholars have criticized the methodologies of these studies, citing data problems, spurious correlation between democracy and economic reforms (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008), and potential feedback effects (Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2009).