rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table 2.7: Fertility Rate in Haiti, 1960-2002

||1960|1980|1990|1995|2000|2002|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Fertility rate,<br>(birthsper woman)|6.30|5.88|5.42|4.93|4.39|4.20|

_Source:_ WDI, World Bank, 2004.

Members of the Haitian diaspora send cash transfers and other resources back to Haiti, which has been identified as the world’s most remittance-dependent country. It is hard to estimate the exact amount of remittances to Haiti because of poor statistical information and informal channels of exchange, but the estimates currently available suggest that expatriates send home about US$700-900 million per year—about a quarter of the country’s GDP and about three times the foreign aid Haiti receives annually.<sup>7</sup> Hence remittances provide essential support to thousands of families living in Haiti (in Port-au-Prince, nearly every block contains an office of a money-transfer agent, underscoring the central role remittances play in the economy – see Section 4).

Many Haitians living abroad return regularly, for example for carnival and vacations. Although Haiti is still predominantly a society of peasant farmers, it is changing. The very slow improvements in telecommunications and urbanization are creating a population that is more closely linked to the global system. Moreover, Haitian expatriates conduct a large variety of micro-level and charitable activities in their towns and villages of origin. These activities span small public work projects, school canteens, school programs, health clinics, and library construction. Although these activities contribute greatly to social development, they do not make a significant contribution to the economic growth of the localities they serve. The challenges facing Haiti today are multiple and multidimensional, and meeting them requires a critical mass of educated people. Haitian expatriates, therefore, are not only important because they have projects in towns and villages, and send back remittances, but because Haiti’s future development is dependent on their human capital.

Table 2.8: Migration from Haiti during 1985-2005

||1985-1990|1990-1995|1995-2000|2000-2005|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Net migration(per 1000)|2.80|3.40|2.60|2.30|
||_Source:_IH|SI, 2003|||

# **ECONOMIC GROWTH**

Haiti is one of the world’s poorest countries and in the last decades the country’s real income or GDP has decreased. Between 1980 and 2003, the Haitian economy declined at a real average annual rate of -0.82 percent (GDP in constant 1995 USD based on WDI 2004). In 2003, the GDP of Haiti amounted to around US$2.8 billion. Poor economic performance is mainly due to political instability and lack of investments across all sectors.

> 7 The value is in 1995 dollars.

10
**Figure 5. Net Costs after Tax**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Netherlands<br>Finland<br>Sweden<br>Belgium (Flemish)<br>Ireland<br>Austria<br>Germany<br>Belgium (French)<br>France<br>Canada<br>High Income Average<br>Mexico<br>Italy<br>United States<br>Australia<br>Average<br>United Kingdom<br>New Zealand<br>Japan<br>Colombia<br>LAC Average<br>Brazil<br>Peru<br>0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%<br>Net Cost after Tax Expenditures/GDP per capita (%)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: Authors’ calculation for the LAC countries and (Usher and Cervenan, 2005) for high-income countries Note: Findings for Brazil and Peru are based upon tuition fees of a relatively small sample of higher education institutions. The findings for these countries should therefore be considered preliminary. Tax breaks only included for high-income countries Net education cost in LAC is about 60 percent while in high-income countries net education costs only reach slightly above 20 percent. There is a considerable difference between the most affordable to least affordable country. The most affordable is the Northern European countries, followed by Continental European countries, and thereafter Anglo-Saxon countries, Japan and LAC.

<u>Student loan</u> is another major policy tool for improving affordability of tertiary education (Figure 6).

17
44 RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA control of State Blousing Corporation were privately owned. The 1986 survey carried out for this project reveals that 62 percent of occupants in government built houses are either owners or occupy housing owned by their family.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 3.2 Distribution of Households by Tenure, Sector, House Type and Number of Rooms<br>Sector Tenure<br>Indigenous<br>Owners<br>9%<br>Sn bre tfl n,(<br>V)High Cost 3%<br>5%<br>FaiyHousers<br>Teneennt 25%<br>36%<br>House Type Number of Rooms<br>SS Compound FDah<br>52% 16%<br>.. Other<br>5% 4 or More<br>8%<br>\ E ] 9 / \ _ /T~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~hree<br>MS Compouna Two<br>27% 14%<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 3.2 summarizes some of the key data on housing stock utilization. The figure presents weighted estimates of how households are distributed by sector, tenure, house type, and number of rooms occupied.

For purposes of sample design, the city was divided into f.tr sectors; the predominant house form being the major parameter for assigning eas to sectors. These sectors are referred to in the analysis in ]ater chapters. While further details of areas assigned to sectors can be found in Tipple (1984a and 1987a), it is sufficient here to state that areas dominated by multi-story compounds were assigned to the "tenement" sector, areas dominated by single story compounds were in the "indigenous" sector, government built areas were in the "government"
literacy is lagging behind, given the level of knowledge necessary to effectively participate in this economic system.

It is likely that most young Russians did not grow up with parents who had bank loans (i.e., they did not learn financial skills at home), did not receive formal financial literacy courses in school (there is no curriculum requirement for financial education in Russia), and do not have long personal banking relationships or experience with financial products.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, there is known to be a widespread perception among the young of ubiquitous unfairness in economic processes and a lack of trust in the rule of law and institutions (Gächter and Herrman, 2006; EBRD, 2007).

Our paper extends the extant literature in a new direction, analyzing results of a detailed survey of financial literacy administered to a nationally representative sample of about 1,400 Russian individuals. The survey includes questions on financial literacy, retirement planning, and the use of various financial products as well as detailed demographic and socioeconomic information. We address some novel questions: for instance, what is the level of financial literacy in a country without a legacy of consumer credit or a precedent of financial education? What is the level and asset mix of retirement planning in Russia, in view of the demographic situation, the fears for the future, and the recent pension reforms? Is financial literacy linked to the use of different types of pension funds, and, importantly, are higher levels of financial literacy related to participation in individual private pension plans? Finally, because Russia is a country with pronounced regional inequalities and gender gaps, we are very interested in examining whether there are significant differences between certain population segments with respect to financial literacy and retirement planning.

We find that even though consumer borrowing is increasing very rapidly in Russia, only 36.3% of respondents in our sample seem to understand the workings of interest compounding and only half of the sample was able to answer a simple question about inflation. Only 12.8% can answer a question on risk diversification in asset investments.

> 2 Consumer debt was almost non-existent before 2001, but recently grew at an astonishing rate: Consumer loans (excluding mortgages) grew from about US $10 billion in 2003 to over US $170 billion in 2008— accounting for over 10% of GDP in 2008 versus less than 1% in 2003.

3
Policy Research Working Paper 5064

# **Abstract**

Does foreign aid spent on trade facilitation increase trade flows of developing countries? There is an on-going and high profile discussion of aid-for-trade associated with the Doha negotiations of the World Trade Organization. There continue also questions about how best to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The analysis in this paper explicitly considers how to target aid most effectively to increase trade – a fundamental question related to the crisis and policy debate over restarting the world trading system. Using detailed data on aid flows from the OECD, the analysis here estimates the responsiveness of trade flows to specific types of foreign aid. The findings indicate that aid directed toward promoting trade enhances the trade performance of recipient countries: a 1 percent increase in aid directed toward trade policy and regulatory reform (amounting to about US$11.7 million more such aid) could generate an increase in global trade of about US$818 million. This yields a “rate of return” on every dollar of this type of aid of about US$697 in additional trade. As the dollar aid flow is relatively small, such targeted aid mitigates concerns about absorptive capacity and real exchange rate appreciation, which may accompany larger disbursements.

This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to explore the linkages between trade costs, facilitation, and economic development with support through the Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development. The project website is accessible at: http://econ.worldbank.org/ projects/trade_costs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at helblem@who.int, clmann@brandeis.edu , and jswilson@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Appendix Table A2 provides an impact assessment at the country level, sorted regionally by percent change. Current trade summarizes IMFDOT data for 2000-03; upgraded trade reflects the change attributable to road network improvement. In West and Central Africa, predicted trade growth is very rapid in several coastal states near Nigeria (Benin (436%), Togo (294%), Ghana (223%), Cameroon (264%)), as well as countries that have been largely isolated by bad roads (e.g. Chad (507%), Central African Rebublic (445%), Sudan (1,027%). The model predicts similar overland trade growth for Angola, Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo. However, their predicted growth rates in Table A2 are smaller because current export values are inflated by bulk minerals whose enclave production and export (by rail or ship) does not depend on road quality. In Southern Africa, road upgrading induces substantial trade expansion for Mozambique (168%) because of its proximity to the South African market. Predicted expansion for Zimbabwe (15%) is very modest because its road connections to most trading partners already meet the standard for Africa-wide network upgrading.

Appendix Table A3 presents results at the city level, sorted by region. Differences for cities in the same country reflect the differential impact of road quality improvements throughout the network. For example, trade growth in Nigeria varies from 850% for Maiduguri to 167% for Iwo.

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|_Cont. Table 2_||||
|---|---|---|---|
|Constant|0.06|0.13|0.06|
|p-value|0.48|0.16|0.37|
|_Innovation (Continuous_<br>_Variable)_|6.32|8.23|-1.85|
|p-value|0.15|0.23|0.59|
|N|7|7|5|
|Constant|0.08|0.17**|0.025|
|p-value|0.36|0.027|0.67|
|_Investment (Continuous_<br>_Variable)_|-0.92|-2.99***|8.00|
|p-value|0.35|0.01|0.52|
|N|7|7|5|

Note: ***, **, * Statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.

The coefficient for size of firms is positive and large in all three columns, though not statistically significant for labor productivity. The result in the second column could be picking up a mechanical effect since firm sizes are measured as numbers of employees.

MG programs that aimed at improving firm capacities to export and innovate showed positive effects on firm performance and employment creation, but negative on labor productivity. This result is puzzling and we interpret it as an indication that firms targeted by the type of interventions covered in this review were likely facing some constraint to increase output beyond the variable costs associated with extra hired labor. This could also reflect some distortion in case an intervention somehow incentivized firms to create jobs (for example, unpaid jobs through employment of family members) through different forms of subsidies (for example, wage subsidy).

Finally, the coefficient for the variable ‘investment’ was negative for firm performance and employment creation. Our interpretation is that the investments made by these firms might have been toward addition of capital goods.

In a nutshell, these findings suggest that matching grants serve different firm composition and business purposes. Export-oriented firms, for example, need to become more efficient to be able to compete in the external market while labor-intensive firms may use matching grants to hire extra labor.

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# **4 Main Impact of Irrigation Reform**

## **4.1 Pipeline strategy**

Our regression model for tail shortage, exploiting the pipeline variation, is where the _τit_<sup>_k_are indicators for whether channel</sup><sup>_i_is in the midst of its first (</sup><sup>_k_= 1) or second</sup> ( _k_ = 2) FO tenure during _kharif_ season of year _t_ . As noted, we control for channel fixed effects, _μi_ , which sweep out permanent channel characteristics, such as those correlated with the likelihood of receiving an FO earlier rather than later. We also include year dummies _δt_ and circle-specific time-trends, as represented by the penultimate term in equation (13). Difference-in-differences (or fixed effects) estimation of treatment effects is predicated on the parallel trends assumption, which is to say that, absent intervention, average outcomes would have evolved similarly for both treatment and control groups. Here, with the exception of LCC East, which has no pre-reform observations (see Table 1), we are able to estimate separate time trends, _γc_ , for each circle.<sup>16</sup> Thus, we directly control for differential preintervention time trends across the unit of policy choice (recall that Area Water Boards for the formation of FOs were established at the circle level). Nevertheless, our pipeline identification strategy maintains the assumption that intertemporal shocks to relative water — availability at channel tails, the _εit_ , are uncorrelated with FO operationalization i.e., do not _cause_ FOs to begin or end their tenures sooner or later. It is the threat posed by the possible failure of this assumption that motivates our second strategy below.

> 16Our analysis of pre-trends in the three late-reforming FOs (Bahawalnagar, LBDC, and Derajat; see Table 1) is summarized in Appendix Figure B.1. While parallel trends between these FOs and all non-FO channels from 2006-2010 can be formally rejected, this is no longer the case when 2006 data are dropped. Below, therefore, we check our estimates for robustness to the removal of the 2006 observations.

21
wide range of objective functions beyond the explicit form considered in the main body of the paper. However, as shown in other recent studies on geopolitics and international economic relations (especially, Clayton et al., 2023; Becko and O’Connor, 2024; Clayton et al., 2024), there are alternative approaches to capturing the nature of geopolitics that model the specific channel of dependency and how governments can leverage this as a tool to increase their relative power. As we discussed in the Introduction, our objective functions are flexible enough to address the essence of these forms of interdependencies in a reduced-form way. But a more explicit formalization may reveal insights beyond those captured by our relatively general approach. Extending our analysis of trade cooperation in the presence of geopolitics in each of these directions would appear to be a fruitful area for future research.

# **References**

- Aiyar, S., A. Presbitero, and M. Ruta (2023). _Geoeconomic Fragmentation: The Economic Risks from a Fractured World Economy_ . CEPR Press.

- Alfaro, L. and D. Chor (2023). Global supply chains: The looming “great reallocation”. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Antr`as, P. and R. W. Staiger (2012a). Offshoring and the role of trade agreements. _American Economic Review 102_ (7), 3140–3183.

- Antr`as, P. and R. W. Staiger (2012b). Trade agreements and the nature of price determination. _American Economic Review 102_ (3), 470–476.

- Bagwell, K., C. P. Bown, and R. W. Staiger (2016). Is the wto pass ́e? _Journal of economic literature 54_ (4), 1125–1231.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1999). An economic theory of GATT. _American Economic Review 89_ (1), 215–248.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2001a). Domestic policies, national sovereignty, and international economic institutions. _The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116_ (2), 519–562.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2001b). Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system. _European Journal of Political Economy 17_ (2), 281–325.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2002). _The economics of the world trading system_ . MIT press.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2005). Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of gatt/wto. _Journal of International Economics 63_ (1), 1–29.

- Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2016). The design of trade agreements. In _Handbook of Commercial Policy_ , Volume 1, pp. 435–529. Elsevier.

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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

||Pooled||2010||2013||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Mean|SD|Mean|SD|Mean|SD|
|Maize yield (Kg/ha)|1,401.66|1,071.56|1,240.61|920.973|1,536.273***|1,166.27|
|Nitrogen application rate (Kg/ha)|46.014|44.657|49.181|44.595|43.367***|44.599|
|Above recommended nitrogen application rate (1/0)|0.143|0.356|0.161|0.372|0.129***|0.341|
|Applied basal fertilizer on time (1/0)|0.284|0.456|0.355|0.482|0.224***|0.424|
|Applied inorganic fertilizer twice (1/0)|0.746|0.437|0.778|0.422|0.720***|0.448|
|Fertilizer used is basal fertilizer|0.507|0.5|0.484|0.5|0.527***|0.499|
|Applied organic fertilizer (1/0)|0.162|0.364|0.131|0.335|0.187***|0.385|
|Seed rate (Kg/ha)|25.019|21.447|22.814|25.273|26.863***|17.437|
|Used hybrid seed (1/0)|0.406|0.492|0.43|0.496|0.386***|0.489|
|Pure stand (1/0)|0.467|0.5|0.511|0.499|0.431***|0.499|
|Plot size (ha)|0.409|0.265|0.422|0.255|0.398***|0.272|
|Labor (days)|135.58|98.763|119.599|80.505|148.937***|109.886|
|Soil is of good quality (1/0)|0.444|0.496|0.457|0.498|0.433|0.495|
|Soil is of fair quality (1/0)|0.42|0.495|0.409|0.492|0.429|0.497|
|Plot is not flat (1/0)|0.449|0.497|0.451|0.498|0.446|0.496|
|Plot is swampy (1/0)|0.159|0.362|0.158|0.358|0.16|0.365|
|Soil is sandy clay (1/0)|0.548|0.495|0.554|0.495|0.542|0.496|
|Plot show signs of erosion (1/0)|0.378|0.486|0.38|0.489|0.376|0.482|
|Female plot manager (1/0)|0.309|0.457|0.297|0.453|0.318|0.46|
|Age of plot manager (years)|42.608|15.184|41.783|14.927|43.298***|15.353|
|Years of education of plot manager|4.822|3.84|4.735|3.83|4.895|3.847|
|African Adult Male Equivalent|3.961|1.648|3.843|1.597|4.059***|1.683|
|Dependency ratio (%)|122.008|90.398|124.345|92.688|120.054***|88.426|
|Distance to main district market (Km)|38.023|27.151|49.483|27.265|28.443***|23.413|
|Index of ownership of agricultural tools|0.289|1.354|0.508|1.695|0.105***|0.934|
|Index of ownership of durable goods|-0.793|1.552|-0.568|1.573|-0.981***|1.509|
|Annual mean rainfall (mm)|827.249|80.186|830.507|86.039|824.526***|74.715|
|Annual Mean Temperature (°C * 10)|215.331|17.816|215.482|18.045|215.205|17.625|

*** implies significant difference in mean between 2013 and 2010 at the 1% level

33
month.<sup>3</sup> The implication of this is that a very high percentage of total residential consumption benefits from these concessional ‘subsistence’ rates.

**<u>Table 9: Overview of residential water tariff structures</u>**

||Fixed c<br>Min.<br>cons.<br>m<sup>3</sup>/m|harges<br>Fixed charge<br>as<br>%<br>15m<sup>3</sup>/m<br>%|Block s<br>No. of<br>blocks<br>N|tructure<br>Size 1<sup>st</sup><br>block<br>m<sup>3</sup>/m|Size<br>block<br>m<sup>3</sup>/m|N<sup>th</sup>|Price<br>block<br>US$/m<sup>3</sup>|1<sup>st</sup><br>Price<br>block<br>US$/m<sup>3</sup>|N<sup>th</sup>|Gradient of<br>block<br>structure<br>US$/m<sup>3</sup>|Cost<br>recovery<br>threshold<br>m<sup>3</sup>/m|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Arequipa|6|40|4|15|60||0.14|0.51||0.008|∝|
|Bogota|0|31|3|20|40||0.53|0.69||0.008|∝|
|Cali|0|40|1|⎯|||0.27|0.27|||∝|
|Cochabamba|12|79|6|25|150||0.15|0.32||0.001|∝|
|Concepcion|0|15|2|40|40||0.39|0.80|||1,000|
|Costa Rica|15|100|4|25|60||0.31|0.70||0.011|∝|
|La Paz|0|0|4|30|300||0.22|1.19||0.004|208|
|Lima|0|23|5|20|80||0.26|0.98||0.012|200|
|Managua|0|6|2|20|20||0.24|0.54|||400|
|Medellín|0|32|1|⎯|||0.35|0.35|||∝|
|Panama|38|100|4|30|115||0.36|0.44||0.001|∝|
|Pernambuco|10|21|5|20|90||0.54|2.00||0.021|40|
|Santa Cruz|0|50|10|15|135||0.29|0.73||0.004|∝|
|Santiago|0|13|2|40|40||0.35|0.87|||340|
|Sao Paulo|10|30|4|20|50||0.26|1.17||0.030|36|
|Trujillo|6|30|3|20|100||0.27|0.69||0.005|∝|
|Valparaiso|0|9|2|40|40||0.74|1.39|||44|
|Average|6|36|4|25|88||0.33|0.80||||

Source: Adapted from ADERASA, forthcoming Second, the gradient of these tariff structures is generally very flat. As a result, the average tariff only reaches levels commensurate with the full average cost of service provision (of around US$0.80 per cubic meter) at extremely high rates of consumption amounting to several hundred cubic meters per month in most cases. Indeed, in 53% of the utilities considered that tariff structure was such that the average tariff never rises to the cost recovery benchmark level, however much is consumed. What this means is that these IBTs effectively subsidize the totality of residential water use.

Third, around 40% of the utilities analyzed incorporate minimum consumption thresholds into their tariff structures. This means that any customer consuming up to the threshold level pays the same fixed charge, and volumetric rates are only charged on consumption in excess of the threshold. As a result, customers using less than the minimum amount face very high average tariffs, with the magnitude of the tariffs being inversely related to the level of consumption. Given that the average value of the threshold is 14 cubic meters

> 3 This estimate is based on a household of five people consuming 50 liters per capita per day that is considered to be the minimum requirement to sustain human health, or alternatively 100 liters per capita per day equivalent to a modest level of consumption in urban areas.

24