rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
SPLIT DECISIONS

|band-<br>width|2_._087<br>2_._275<br>1_._967<br>2_._151<br>1_._955|1_._612<br>2_._033<br>1_._895<br>2_._010<br>1_._782<br>n(2012),|
|---|---|---|
|ted effect<br>_p_-val.|0_._486<br>0_._415<br>0_._0297<br>0_._502<br>0_._0130|0_._00278<br>0_._192<br>0_._00671<br>0_._286<br>0_._00223<br>Kalyanarama<br>ach subject.|
|t-on-trea<br>s.e.|0_._236<br>0_._239<br>0_._129<br>0_._245<br>0_._127|0_._212<br>0_._446<br>0_._214<br>0_._406<br>0_._208<br>Imbens and<br>-maker on e|
|Treatmen<br>_μs↓_0_−μs↑_0<br>_τs↓_0_−τs↑_0|_−_0_._165<br>_−_0_._195<br>_−_0_._281<br>_−_0_._164<br>_−_0_._315|_−_0_._635<br>_−_0_._582<br>_−_0_._579<br>_−_0_._432<br>_−_0_._635<br>lection follows <br>r joint decision|
|effect<br>_p_-val.|0_._484<br>0_._410<br>0_._0286<br>0_._501<br>0_._0119|_<_0_._001<br>0_._136<br>0_._00211<br>0_._264<br>_<_0_._001<br>. Bandwidth se<br>s the primary o|
|-to-treat<br>s.e.|0_._107<br>0_._108<br>0_._0618<br>0_._111<br>0_._0601|0_._0870<br>0_._165<br>0_._0910<br>0_._164<br>0_._0898<br>ber in Korea<br>pplicant wa|
|Intent<br>_μs↓_0_−μs↑_0|_−_0_._0748<br>_−_0_._0889<br>_−_0_._135<br>_−_0_._0747<br>_−_0_._151|_−_0_._307<br>_−_0_._246<br>_−_0_._280<br>_−_0_._183<br>_−_0_._307<br>d_ever_ had a mem<br>for whether the a|
|_μs↑_0|0_._367<br>0_._377<br>0_._451<br>0_._456<br>0_._416|9)<br>0_._510<br>0_._508<br>0_._608<br>0_._589<br>0_._588<br>= househol<br>tor variable|
|Outcome|_Applicants_(_N_ = 875)<br>Decisions:_childcare_<br>Decisions:_home repairs_<br>Decisions:_major purchases_<br>Decisions:_entrepreneurship_<br>Decisions:_weekend activities_|_Married applicants only_(_N_ = 38<br>Decisions:_childcare_<br>Decisions:_home repairs_<br>Decisions:_major purchases_<br>Decisions:_entrepreneurship_<br>Decisions:_weekend activities_<br>Observations are individuals. Treatment<br>triangular kernel. ‘Decisions’ is an indica|

43
# **5.8 Limits to Pro-Local Policies**

One interesting question is how much discretion would county level cadres have in choosing pro-local policies in an authoritarian regime? It is reasonable to hypothesize that there are limits to what local leaders can do to promote local growth; and that the pro-local policies that local leaders may implement are limited to those not easily observed by upper-level leaders, especially if they only have loose tie to upper-level leaders. As in our theory, the local leaders’ behavior relies on two factors: connection with upper-level authority (the factional connection) and connections with the grassroot (local accountability). Since the higher level government holds the power of promotion/demotion or even political survival, the local leaders dare not overtly disobey the center. Therefore, we implicitly assume that YRD cadres are likely to take policies favorable to local residents only when doing so does not openly defy their superiors. In other words, two types of cadres will perform in the same way when they implement tasks that are easily monitored by the upper-level authority.

<!-- Start of picture text --> YRD<br>FA3<br>0 .5 1 1.5 2<br>Population Growth Rate<br>1.5<br>1<br>Density<br>.5<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 5: Kernel Density Estimation of Population Growth Rates Among Counties Led by YRD- and FA3affiliated Cadres, 1984-1998.

## **5.8.1 One Child Policy**

We use the population growth after One-Child policy to test the above hypothesis. First, the One-Child Policy was launched as a national policy by the central government in 1979; it is a highly visible policy. Second, at all levels of the government hierarchy, Population and Family Planning Commissions were established after this policy, which made enforcement of the policy easily observable. Due to these reasons, even though taking a loose birth policy would increase the local cadres’ popularity among the local population, we expect that YRD-affiliated cadres would not openly defy the central government’s national policy.

Figure 5 shows that the kernel density plot of the population growth rates among counties with YRDaffiliated leaders and those with FA3-affiliated leaders between 1984-1998. The two density plots do not exhibit 47
**Table 2: Aggregate Costs of Conflict for Rural Households in Northern Uganda, 2004**

||Preferred model|Full controls|Conservative<br>estimates|
|---|---|---|---|
||Location of loss|es (% of total)||
|Never‐attacked<br>households|30.0|35.4|17.5|
|Attacked households|70.0|64.6|82.5|
||Disaggregation of|costs (% of total)||
|Exposure to violence|37.1|28.3|43.7|
|Exposure to risk|62.9|71.7|56.3|
||Cost as %|of GDP||
|Overall|0.9|0.7|1.0|
|From risk|0.5|0.5|0.6|

<!-- Start of picture text --> From risk 0.5 0.5 0.6<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Rockmore 2016 _Note:_ GDP= gross domestic product.

Most of the evidence on understanding the factors that contribute to stress exist for developed countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but there is limited information available from developing countries (Johnson 1995; Kirkcaldy and Furnham 1999; Kivimaki and Lindstrom 1995). Only a few studies have focused on the experience of stress, as well as coping mechanisms among entrepreneurs, in developing countries and FCV‐affected areas — places in which ordinary stressors are compounded by extraordinary conditions. As such, this is an area ripe for future empirical investigation.

In a forthcoming rapid needs assessment report for the conflict‐affected northern territories of Pakistan called the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/Federally‐Administered Tribal Areas (KP/FATA), there is evidence of the unacknowledged mental well‐being issues experienced by SME entrepreneurs and their common causes (World Bank 2018). Based on in‐depth interviews with 17 entrepreneurs in KP/FATA, the study explores the nature of the problem, perceived causes and effects, as well as current practices to deal with the impact of these challenges. According to the report, SME entrepreneurs described many depressive‐type symptoms such as “ _agitated mood, disturbances in diet and sleep, nervousness, loss of interest and inability to concentrate on work_ ”. They recognized the impacts of these symptoms on their productivity and sense of well‐being, which in turn lead to a vicious cycle of more stress. Box 2 describes the experiences of these entrepreneurs and perceived stressors in their own words.

17
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<!-- Start of picture text --> CHINA tt.\4j )aaRGCHONG@INGL,Sonpycakga esas5 4 ead «4oe esenanehe ak ina 4<br>NON-FARM ACTIVITY AND 4h)OIews \, ¢FTE PRSre siitvmay £Cl Ee2 amanHUNAN 7J ganenNANCHANGS”al “Ltdegf Seo ee<br>RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY EI(oeeh ier 8 zlSNCS Ar2 ‘=:* FUJIAN baleietay sy<br>\ ‘s Z ae 2 ral ey a _ = oF<br>Project Provinces BS | OS’ ee. : = agB, fans \a= {TAIWaia<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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**Figure 8. Policy response in oil-exporting EMDEs**

<!-- Start of picture text --> A. Exchange rate pressures B. Change in fiscal balance since 2014<br>Index, Jan. 2014=100 Percentage-point change<br>Interquartile range<br>130 0<br>Average<br>120 -4<br>110 -8<br>100<br>-12<br>90<br>-16<br>Range Average<br>80<br>-20<br>70 Above Below Floating Pegged<br>Floating Pegged Floating Pegged average average<br>Foreign reserves Exchange rate Oil revenue Exchange rate<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Haver Analytics, International Monetary Fund, World Bank. A. B. Exchange rate classification is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions database, in which countries are ranked 0 (no separate legal tender) to 10 (free float). “Pegged” denotes countries ranked 1 to 6. “Floating” denotes countries ranked 7 to 10.

A. Nominal effective exchange rate and foreign reserved indexed to 100=January 2014. Last observation is March 2018. B. Change in overall fiscal balance as a percent of GDP from 2014 to 2016.

22
Third, the data can inform on the changing depth of preferential trade agreements. Hofmann et al. (2017) construct synthetic indexes of “horizontal” depth, which measure the coverage of policy areas in PTAs. The first index of depth, referred to as “total depth”, is the simple count of (legally enforceable) provisions included in a PTA. Total depth increased from an average of around 8 in the 1990s to more than 17 in the last 5 years. An index of “core depth” can be constructed in a similar way by counting how many core provisions are included and legally enforceable in a PTA. Core depth increased from around 7 in the 1990s to almost 14 in the period 2010-2015. Finally, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can be used to obtain a third index of depth, referred to as “PCA depth”, that accounts for most of the variability in the data. PCA depth increased from around 1 in the 1990s to 2.8 in the 2010-2015 period.

Fourth, the wide country coverage of the new World Bank data set allows to analyze the heterogeneity of deep PTAs across regions and income levels. Europe is the region with the highest number of PTAs signed. Moreover, these PTAs are also the deepest mainly because of the EC-Treaty and the following enlargements of the EU. The average total depth of EU agreements is 25. Members of EFTA, Japan and the Republic of Korea also tend to sign deep PTAs with an average of 23, 21 and 20 provisions respectively. PTAs signed between developed and developing countries (i.e. North-South PTAs) included on average almost as many provisions as North-North PTAs. The depth of North-North PTAs in force is around 22 while the depth of NorthSouth PTAs is 20. However, legal enforceability is generally weaker in North-South PTAs relative to North-North agreements. Finally, South-South trade agreements tend to be shallower than other PTAs with an average total depth of 13.

# **3. GVCs and the Rationale for Trade Agreements**

In this section, I look at the rationale for trade agreements, particularly “deep” agreements, in a world with global value chains. There is a large literature that studies the motives for trade policy cooperation and the design of trade agreements in a traditional setting where production is not fragmented internationally.<sup>7</sup> The focus of this literature is generally on cooperation on tariffs, consistently with the idea that the main problem that trade agreements solve is to internalize the terms-of-trade externality created by unilateral tariffs. But as Figure 4 shows, there is a positive correlation between GVC trade (measured as trade in parts and components) and the “depth” of trade agreements (measured by the number of policy areas covered by the agreements). This relationship indicates that the rationale for trade agreements in the context of global value chains may be more complex than in settings where production is not fragmented internationally.

> 7 See Maggi (2014), Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2015), Bagwell and Staiger (2016) and Grossman (2016) for recent reviews.

6
3 particularly hi"h levels of stroke." (The World Bank, 1993a; eh. 6). In Hungary, where mortality rates are among the highest in the world, "...expenditures have not secured large gains in health standards, primarily because of unhealthy lifestyles and a bias toward curative hospital care." (Preker, 1993; p.4). Similarly, in a recent World Bank study of Romania, it was noted that morbidity patterns reflect "...(a) poor individual preventive health measures; (b) unhealthy behavior patterns (i.e., smoking)..." and that "circulatory diseases are the most impottant cause of death and disability, and account for 10 percent of hospitalizations.(The World Bank, 1992, p.107). Similar patterns exist in other Eastern European countries, but the incidence of behaviorally-induced diseases is also high in some Latin American countries. These problems have contributed to rising utilization rates and the escalation of health care costs, causing a number of countries (e.g., Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil) to embark on major hea)th reforms.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of this paper is not to discuss U.S. health care reform, about which much has been written, but rather to describe an innovative, more flexible, and more general form of health insurance that has been owerlooked in current discussions of reform. Some ideas about how this type of insurance might be adapted to a broad range of health care systems, regardless of whether insurance is privately or publicly funded, also will be given. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes a fundamental problem in most health insurance arrangements and poses a question that is central to the success or failure of proposed reforms. Properties of conventional health insurance are described in Section m, while Section IV outlines the essential features of an innovative plan that has operated successfully in one California county school system for more than a decadc. Adaptation of this plan to national health care systems is discussed in Section V, and some final remarks are offered in Section VI.

- **II.** A RECURRENT QUESTION: HOW CAN PATIENTS BE MADE MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE COST OF HEALTH CARE WITHOUT REDUCING INSURANCE PROTECTION?

To ensure greater access to services and reduce the risk of financial loss from illness, many health care systems have severed the link between the utilization and financing of health clre services. This severance occurs in systems of socially provided care, as in Britain, as well as in systems where government serves only as the principal insurer, such as Canada. In both cases, health care services ultimately are financed through general tax revenues rather than direct user charges. Under both arrangt .nents, effective prices at the time of utilization are negligible. The consumer is insulated from risk but also becomes less aware of the true social cost of providing health care. The fiully insure, consume; may have less incentive to undertake personal 7. See _World Development Report_ (1993b), chapters 3 and 7.
Policy Research Working Paper 5190

# **Abstract**

Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities’ input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.

This paper—a joint product of the Chief Economist’s Office, Human Development Network, and of the Health, Nutrition & Population Unit, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort to evaluate the impact of innovative programs to improve human development outcomes. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cvermeersch@worldbank.org, asoucat@worldbank.org, and/or gertler@haas.berkeley.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
and b) some arguments are echoed and endorsed by authoritative voices while others only enjoy the support of outsiders or mavericks (Crawford 2004). States and national governments control access to the deliberative forums in which national development agendas are articulated; states and national governments also enjoy more prestige, authority, and legitimacy than international civil servants. In other words, states control political salience.

Certain development goals, such as educational attainment and social exclusion, are, in the first approximation, the outcome of national policies. For these, MDGs 2.0 could state that each country’s government is responsible for formulating, deliberating about, and implementing national targets. Some countries might wish to draw on, or request, the advice of the international development community; but in many countries such requests could jeopardize the perceived national “ownership” of the development targets. (The development goals that involve the global agenda, such as those currently included in MDG 8, would be formulated at the international level). These “national MDGs 2.0” might be more circumspect, in some cases, than what the international community might have endorsed. But from the point of view of political mobilization, gains in political salience from this approach would likely exceed the losses from little ambition. National processes in the formulation, deliberation, adoption, and implementation of MDGs 2.0 might create important focal points for social and political mobilization. Accountability for development outcomes still arises almost entirely from domestic mobilization, and national MDG targets might play a role in generating it.<sup>6</sup>

> 6 It is worth noting that the formulation of the post-2015 agenda is shaping up to be much more participatory and consultative than the process that led to the MDGs. There are expected to be 70-100 national consultations, open meetings involving international and interdisciplinary perspectives, spaces for online input from ordinary people, a global survey of poor people, and inter-governmental working groups on the Sustainable Development Goals (“The Post-2015 Development Agenda,” UNDESA presentation, Democratic Governance and Human Rights: Criteria and measurement proposals for a post-2015 development agenda OHCHR/UNDP Expert Consultation, 1314 November 2012, New York). But these processes are somewhat distinct from the point being made here, which is that national political institutions (legislatures, courts etc) control political salience, and that the processes for the formulation of MDGs 2.0, although participatory in many important respects,  have not given a central place to those institutions.

16
Table 15

# Non Tariff Mesures and Trade Remedies in Selected Major Developed Country Markets, 1993-1996

(Tariff Line Frequencies in %)

||Aust|ralia|Ca|nada|E|U|Jap|an|No|rway|Switz|erland|U.|S.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1993|1996|1993|1996|1993|1996|1993|1996|1993|1996|1993|1996|1993|1996|
|NTMS-TOTAL|0.3|0.3|1.4|1.2|9.4|4.2|3.8|2.6|24.0|3.8|3.5|0.2|10.3|2.9|
|Licencing|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|1.7|0.8|1.3|1.3|3.5|2.6|0.4|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|<br>Non-Automatic|||||||||||||||
|Export<br>Restrictions|0.0|0.0|1.4|1.2|5.6|3.0|0.0|0.0|13.8|1.2|0.0|0.0|10.1|2.7|
|Other'QRs|0.0|0.0|0.3|0.0|0.0|0.0|1.7|0.6|0.2|0.0|1.4|0.2|0.2|0.0|
|<br>Variable|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|1.5|0.1|0.8|0.7|5.4|0.0|1.6|0.0|0.0|0.1|
|Charges||I_|_<br>_|_<br>_<br>_<br>_I|_<br>__<br>_||_I__<br>_||||||||
|<br>Other PCMs|0.3|<br>0.3|<br> <br>0.0|<br> <br> <br> <br>0.0|<br> <br> <br>0.6|0.3|<br>0.0|0.0|1.1|0.0|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.1|
|TRADE<br>REMEDIES|||||||||||||||
|AD/CV and<br>VEPRs|0.4|0.4|0.8|0.7|1.3|0.2|0.0|0.0|1.9|0.0|0.0|0.0|7.3<br>_.|_-5.0_|

_Source: OECD. 1997, Table 5. 1._ 54