rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Table A9. Descriptive Statistics for Programs in Ecuador** **_Using Program-Level Data from the WBSCPS and Administrative Sources_**

|**Variable**|**Progr**<br>**match**<br>**individ**<br>**Mean**<br>**(1)**|**ams not**<br>**ed with**<br>**ual data**<br>**Std.Dev.**<br>**(2)**|**Program**<br>**with in**<br>**d**<br>**Mean**<br>**(3)**|**s matched**<br>**dividual**<br>**ata**<br>**Std.Dev.**<br>**(4)**|**P-value**<br>**diff.**<br>**(1) – (3)**<br>**(5)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Panel A. Programquality determinants**||||||
|_Infrastructure_||||||
|Program offers at least one online class|0.37|0.48|0.35|0.48|0.78|
|>30% classes can be taken online|0.25|0.44|0.32|0.47|0.27|
|Number of workshops or labs available for practice|3.14|2.64|3.99|3.63|**0.03**|
|Has enough equipment or tools for practice|0.56|0.50|0.64|0.48|0.22|
|Maintenance of largest lab: every year|0.52|0.50|0.58|0.50|0.41|
|_Training and curriculum_||||||
|More than once per year||||||
|Analyze student performance to solve problems|0.86|0.35|0.85|0.36|0.88|
|Collect student satisfaction data|0.67|0.47|0.60|0.49|0.27|
|Important reasons to update program||||||
|Government standards|0.61|0.49|0.73|0.45|**0.05**|
|Employment outcomes or employers' requests|0.76|0.43|0.75|0.44|0.85|
|HEI perception of labor market|0.69|0.46|0.83|0.37|**0.01**|
|Enrollment trends|0.55|0.50|0.63|0.49|0.21|
|Student feedback|0.68|0.47|0.65|0.48|0.61|
|Teaches numerical competencies|0.80|0.40|0.80|0.40|0.88|
|Teaches a foreign language|0.62|0.49|0.68|0.47|0.28|
|Graduation requirements||||||
|Professional association test|0.52|0.50|0.71|0.45|**0.00**|
|Thesis or research project|0.95|0.22|0.91|0.28|0.26|
|Second language|0.13|0.33|0.11|0.32|0.76|

77
**Policy Research Working Paper Series**

|**Title**|**Author**|**Date**|**Contact**<br>**for paper**|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS2442 A Firms's-Eye View of Policy and<br>Fiscai Reforms in Cameroon|Bernard Gauthier<br>Isidro Soloaga<br>James Tybout|September 2000|L. Tabada<br>36896|
|WPS2443 The Politics of Economic Policy<br>Reform in Developing Countries|Richard H. Adams Jr.|September 2000|M. Coleridge-Taylor<br>33704|
|WPS2444 Seize the State, Seize the Day:<br>State Capture, Corruption, and<br>Influence in Transition|Joel S. Hellman<br>Geraint Jones<br>Daniel Kaufmann|September 2000|D. Billups<br>35818|
|WPS2445Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities|Pablo Serra|September 2000|G. Chenet-Smith<br>36370|
|WPS2446 Forecasting the Demand for<br>Privatized Transport: What Economic<br>Regulators Should Know, and Why|Lourdes Trujillo<br>Emile Quinet<br>Antonio Estache|September 2000|G. Chenet-Smith<br>36370|
|WPS2447 Attrition in Longitudinal Household<br>Survey Data: Some Tests for Three<br>Developing-Country<br>Samples|Harold Alderman<br>Jere R. Behrman<br>Hans-Peter Kohler<br>John A. Maluccio<br>Susan Cotts Watkins|September 2000|P. Sader<br>33902|
|WPS2448 On "Good" Politicians and "Bad"<br>Policies: Social Cohesion,<br>Institutions, and Growth|Jo Ritzen<br>William Easterly<br>Michael Woolcock|September 2000|A. Kibutu<br>34047|
|WPS2449 Pricing Irrigation Water: A Literature<br>Survey|<sup>Robert C. Johansson</sup>|September 2000|M. Williams<br>87297|
|WPS2450 Which Firms Do Foreigners Buy?<br>Evidence from the Republic of<br>Korea|Caroline Freund<br>Simeon Djankov|September 2000|R. Vo<br>33722|
|WPS2451 Can There Be Growth with Equity?<br>An Initial Assessment of Land Reform<br>in South Africa|Klaus Deininger<br>Julian May|September 2000|33766|
|WPS2452 Trends in Private Sector Developmen<br>in World Bank Education Projects|t<sup>Shobhana Sosale</sup>|September 2000|S. Sosale<br>36490|
|WPS2453 Designing Financial Safety Nets<br>to Fit Country Circumstances|Edward J. Kane|September 2000|K. Labrie<br>31001|
|WPS2454 Political Cycles in a Developing<br>Economy: Effect of Elections in<br>Indian States|Stuti Khemani|September 2000|H. Sladovich<br>37698|
Mastruzzi (2005).<sup>22</sup> Finally, we also include a dummy variable set to one for Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, where subsidies were provided to domestic project participants (Michaelowa, Dixon and Abron, 1999). All things equal, the subsidies are expected to have lowered the investment threshold criteria for firms in the four countries.

# 5.3. <u>State Variables Affecting Agency Choice</u>

As discussed, the applied model considers whether the same factors that determine bilateral aid flows also determine agency rankings of AIJ projects in the applied model -- that is, both aid and agency approval are a function of a set of common state variables, _z_ . Consequently, estimation of the applied model requires both a measure of bilateral aid and measures of the determinants of aid.

For the first measure, we calculate an average value of real bilateral aid for the period 1992 to 2001 for each investor-host dyad. These are based on from pair-wise data on Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to recipient countries from OECD country members as reported to the Development Assistance Committee (2006). Observations on country pairs are set to zero when no official aid is reported over the study period. For the base model we use a dichotomous measure that indicates whether aid was given during the period. In subsequent analysis we consider a continuous measure.

Specifying the variables determining the bilateral aid component of the applied model is more challenging. Although an extensive literature surrounds the question of why countries provide aid, there is little agreement on how to characterize the determinants. Following Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), most studies start with the assertion that observed aid flows can be explained by donor-country demand for specific outcomes that foreign aid helps to achieve and by recipient country characteristics that determine aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, in practice, applied studies ascribe a wide range of benign and predatory objectives to donor countries.<sup>23</sup> A material consequence has been an expanding list of potential determining factors. For our purposes, we use a selective but representative set of variables meant to capture the following host country characteristics: need, size, hegemony, democratic institutions, civil order and bureaucratic integrity. Other studies using these or similar variables include Frey and Schneider

> 22 Because indicators were not available for all study years, averages for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 were used. 23 See, for example, Pronk (2001), and Petras and Veltmeyer (2002).

14
38.7 percent of children under 59 months were 2 standard deviations below the reference population for height-for-age, 18.6 percent for weight-for-height and 37.7 percent for weight-forage (INSD/ORC Macro, 2004). Similarly, 38 percent of children in that age group experienced some form of fever or respiratory infection in the two weeks preceding the national Demographic and Health Survey. Among children who had been ill, only 30 percent received any care from a health professional (INSD/ORC Macro, 2004).

We find that children under age five in families that received conditional cash transfers have 0.43 more visits to the health clinic for routine preventative care during the previous year compared to children in control households, a 49 percent increase compared to the mean in the control group. We find similar magnitude beneficial impacts for children in families where the mother or father received conditional cash transfers, indicating that at least when the transfers are conditional, the gender of the cash transfer recipient is not a critical factor influencing the frequency of routine health facility visits. In contrast, we do not find beneficial effects from unconditional cash transfers that are given to either mothers or fathers. This highlights the point that at least for this particular outcome of routine preventative health clinic visits, conditionality is more important than transfer recipient gender in increasing health clinic utilization for children.

Our experimental design has several distinctive features differentiating it from other studies. First, we randomly test conditional and unconditional cash transfers in the same environment, which allows us to determine whether the key factor driving impacts is an income effect or conditionality.<sup>3</sup> Second, unlike many cash transfer programs that pay the transfers to

> 3 A recent study by de Brauw and Hoddinott (2007) makes use of administrative errors in Mexico to try to untangle how much of any observed program impact is due to the program’s income transfers and how much is due to the conditionality forcing households to undertake specific behaviors in order to receive the funds. Baird, McIntosh and

4
more than one product to the same destination (up to a maximum of 17 products to the same market).

It is also important to study a variable that captures a firm’s _experience with importing_ . This variable is constructed from Customs import data, in which several of the firms have been matched (only a third of firms have no import experience, and there are three times as many importers as there are exporters). This categorical variable identifies transactions of the firm which have been preceded at any point in time by an import. It further defines if this prior import experience was with the same destination to which the FPD is exporting or with another. The expectation is that exporters that are also engaged in importing would have established trade connections outside the country, acquiring savoir-faire with international transactions and international quality standards, and possibly building a reputation for reliability. Additionally, it can be argued that imported inputs can be cheaper and more technologically advanced than domestic products (J. Wagner 2011). In the particular case of Laos, a small and nonsophisticated economy, domestically produced or traded inputs might simply not exist. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope for such an effect. Anecdotal evidence attests this: for example, a very successful exporter chose to import cardboard boxes for packaging directly instead of buying local to avoid certain taxes (personal interview by Stirbat, Vientiane, Laos, 2012).

The research hypothesis is therefore that having _import experience_ is beneficial for the odds of survival. Furthermore, in cases where the imports come from the same country as the export destination of a firm’s product, this experience should be more relevant for survival, at least to the extent that this would entail a better knowledge of that particular market.

Lastly, the firm’s _prior experience with the product in Thailand_ is a dummy variable which identifies FPDs for which the firm has sold the product in Thailand before anywhere else. Some theoretical models assume that firms learn fully about their profitability in export markets by entering a relatively easy one first. Thailand appears to be launch market for ~53% of the firm-product pairs compared with only 17% for the second largest launch market, the EU. Given the strong cultural ties between the two neighbors, the expectation is that many Lao exporters first test their products in Thailand. Moreover, Lao PDR is landlocked and depends on overland access through Thailand to most shipping routes. This would give them an easy stepping stone to other export markets and lead to more sustainable export relationships afterwards.

Trade networks are the other potentially important determinant of export survival which is analyzed in this article. They can take the form of regional agglomerations which help local firms start exporting to a given market (Koenig 2009) or centralized export promotion agencies (Volpe and Carballo 2008). Social and business networks in general can assist with matching international buyers and sellers (Rauch and Watson 13
**Table 4.6   Costa Rica: Summary Table of the Outcome of Safeguard Cases Dealt With by Investigating Authority**

|**Product**|**Firms**<br>**failed to**<br>**submit**<br>**information**|**Case dropped by**<br>**applicant**|**Initiation of**<br>**investigation**|**Withdrawal**<sup>**6**</sup>|**No injury**<br>**found**|**Precautionary**<br>**measure**|**Final re**<br>**Measure**<br>**applied**|**solution**<br>**No**<br>**measure**<br>**applied**<sup>**1**</sup>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Bast fiber sacks|||X|||X||X|
|Used apparel|||X|||||X<sup>2</sup>|
|Ceramic blocks and<br>tiles|X|X|||||||
|Sanitaryware|||||X<sup>3</sup>||||
|Milled and paddy<br>rice|||||X<sup>4</sup>||||

1 In cases where injury was found but no measure was applied, the existence of other non-import factors that were also causing injury was determined. 2 No measure was applied due to other reasons, such as underinvoicing and smuggling. 3 The Authority did not deem it necessary to apply any protective measure since the firm is internationally competitive. 4 No measure was applied since the increase in international prices rendered it unnecessary.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on the cases dealt with by the MEIC.

Due to space limitations, only one of the five cases in which an application for the imposition of safeguards was filed in Costa Rica will be described below for illustration purposes.

# **4.b.1 The Jute Sacks Case**

In September 1995, the National Cabuya Board filed an application for an investigation to impose a safeguard measure against imports of bast fiber sacks—classified under item 63.05.10.00 of the Central American Tariff System—originating in Nicaragua, Bangladesh and India.

The National Cabuya Board requested this measure because ofthe massive increase in imports of jute sacks, mainly from Bangladesh, arguing that this situation directly affected both the domestic production of cabuya sacks and the marketing of coffee, since jute and cabuya sacks are used to package coffee for export.

In the application, the requesting party mentioned that Bangladesh is the source of 55% of the world’s exports of jute, while Costa Rica’s production amounts to less than 0.2% of the Bangladesh production; this situation could cause serious injury to the domestic production of cabuya sacks. Furthermore, the National Cabuya Board noted that Bangladesh granted its exporters subsidies covered under the WTO agreements.<sup>23</sup> During the investigation of this case, the Investigating Authority found that most of the import flows affecting the sector originated in Nicaragua, but that in the year 1995 Bangladesh had been the origin of around 40% of Costa Rica’s total imports of this product, a significant figure since in 1994 Bangladesh had not exported a single sack to Costa Rica.

23 The MEIC indicated that when unfair trade results from the granting of a subsidy in the exporting country, the proper measure is a countervailing duty rather than a safeguard.

34
20 _Table 6: Results for 2000-2003 Gansu panel_

||High out-of-pocket payments<br>|Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments<br>|
|---|---|---|
|Health insurance|0.520|0.645|
||(3.76)|(4.26)|
||_0.126_|_0.155_|
|SAH good|0.287|0.314|
||(3.08)|(3.00)|
|SAH average|1.017|0.866|
||(10.15)|(8.08)|
|SAH poor|1.839|1.675|
||(12.13)|(10.78)|
|SAH very poor|2.263|1.946|
||(7.81)|(7.25)|
|Per capita income|-0.331|-481.037|
||(0.13)|(11.05)|
|Years of schooling|-0.013|-0.013|
||(1.48)|(1.57)|
|2000 wave|-0.690|-0.280|
||(11.67)|(4.30)|
|N|7580|7580|
|Av. no. waves|2.0|2.0|
|Log likelihood|-1158.29|-1005.97|
|Chi squared|403.33|457.043|

Note: Models are fixed effects logits, estimated on the two waves of the GSCF. The first number for each covariate is the coefficient, the second (in parentheses) is the _t_ -statistic, and the third (in italics) is the marginal effect (conditional on a zero fixed effect).
# **Table 2: Percentage of households who believe the government is poorly managing challenges faced by the population**

||**Gao**|**Kidal**|**Timbuktu**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Reconciliation**|47|97|48|50|
|**Security in the North**|55|100|65|62|
|**The process of decentralization**|52|79|62|58|
|**Improving access to electricity and d**r**inking water**|58|95|65|64|
|**Improving living conditions of population in the**<br>**north**|61|99|73|69|
|**Establishing a climate of trust between**<br>**communities and ethnic groups**|54|99|59|59|
|**Addressing the stigma against Toureg and Arab**|47|99|54|53|

Following the signing of the 2015 Peace Accord, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank were asked to conduct a joint identification and evaluation mission to identify the priority needs in the North, taking the actions outlined in the Peace Accord as point of departure. The World Bank subsequently commissioned a study to evaluate the socioeconomic situation of the population in the north and their priorities in the areas of security, peace, governance and socioeconomic development. Data were collected among 500 households (3,673 individuals in total) and 50 authorities/leaders in rural and urban areas of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in August and September 2015. The objective of the survey was to analyze perceptions and priorities with regard to the Peace Accord, to analyze perceptions of security, to determine access to basic infrastructure and school attendance, to understand nutrition levels, and to measure household asset ownership.

In addition to this baseline survey, the World Bank was sponsoring a mobile phone survey among IDPs in Bamako, returnees in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu town and refugees in camps in Niger and Mauritania. This survey interviewed 500 respondents on a monthly basis. In the August 2015 round of this survey, questions about perceptions and priorities with regard to the Peace Accord were included. This paper also makes use of a subset of the responses obtained from that survey, particularly those from refugees in Niger (n=80) and Mauritania (n=100) as these sub-populations who live outside Mali’s borders are important stakeholders in the peace process whose opinions risk being ignored.<sup>15</sup> To select a household in a village or neighborhood for the baseline survey, random selection was used: the enumerator divided the locality into two parts and selected five

> 15 For a more elaborate description of this mobile phone survey, see: Etang Ndip, A., J. Hoogeveen and J. Lendorfer (2016). Socioeconomic Impact of the Crisis in Mali on Displaced People. _Journal of Refugee Studies._

7
In this paper we explain some of the above findings by examining the role of foreign currency (FC) denominated debt as a source of external capital. We argue, and find confirming evidence, that FC debt is an important _missing_ piece of the puzzle. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first to thoroughly examine the relation between foreign currency debt and legal effectiveness. We hypothesize that large publicly traded firms usually have access to FC debt, irrespective of the legal environment of the home country. This is because foreign loans often are structured to reduce the reliance on the local legal system (e.g., foreign jurisdictions apply, collateral is off-shore, guarantors’ assets are off-shore, etc.). Access to this market loosens borrowing constraints associated with poor legal systems so that the total debt of firms in these countries is comparable to that of firms in the best legal environments.<sup>2</sup> This also has implications for the maturity structure of debt since, consistent with the findings of DemirgucKunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003), local lenders in poor legal environments (the primary source of capital for smaller firms) prefer short-term loans. Consequently, legal factors are important for determining several aspects of debt, including the amount, the maturity, and the currency denomination of debt, but the importance of legal factors is obscured unless access to foreign currency debt markets is explicitly considered.<sup>3</sup> To test our hypotheses we examine the capital structure of over 1,600 firms in nine East Asian countries. We combine publicly available data from the WorldScope database with a proprietary database describing the currency denomination of debt. Although our sample of

> 2 A similar argument in spirit is made in Faulkender and Petersen (2003) regarding US firms, in which access to public bond market allows US firms to increase their debt level above that of firms without access to public bond markets. In our case, access to FC debt allows firms from poor legal systems to have higher debt than they otherwise would without access to FC debt.

3 Esty (2003) examines financing of greenfield project companies across 61 countries and finds that foreign banks provide a greater share of total funds in countries with strong creditor rights and strong legal enforcement. However, a greenfield project company from a country with low creditor rights protections differs from a typical foreign company in the same country in the way it seeks foreign funding. Most of these financing contracts are governed by UK or New York law, however, most of the operating contracts and virtually all of the enforcement of financial claims (e.g., seizure of collateral upon default) depends on the legal system in the country where the project is located. In contrast, as we describe in detail in the next 2
Other things being equal, an increase in remittances from migrants shifts remittance-receiving households’ budget constraints outward by the amount of the remittance transfer. This raises (decreases) the demand for normal (inferior) goods. In this model, the influence of migrant remittances is assumed to be limited to indirect effects operating through total income; income-source effects are ruled out.

Recent studies by Adams (2005, 1998, and 1991), Zarate-Hoyos (2004) and Alderman (1996) add a new explanatory variable to the right-hand-side of Equation 1: household income from migrant remittances _Rh_ , where _Rh_ is also included in _Yh_ . That is,

> Where as in most demand studies, total expenditures _Eh_ are used in lieu of income.  The marginal effect of a change in remittance income, _yhk_ ' , on household _h_ ’s expenditure on good _i_ is thus:

8