Calvin _et al_ (2003) draw several lessons from the experiences of Guatemala. Firstly, that delays in addressing food safety and agricultural health problems may adversely affect an industry’s exports and reputation. Secondly, that an effective traceability system allows trade restrictions to be overcome through particular growers and/or exporters, rather than needing to enhance standards in an entire industry. Finally, strong grower organizations can improve an industry’s ability to respond to food safety challenges. Further, there is a wider lesson from Guatemala’s experience. Small countries and niche products are probably far more vulnerable to loss of markets and collapse of reputation in the face of food safety problems then would be the case with larger countries and more mainstream or generic products. One suspects that both international buyers and consumers would be more tolerant and patient with core and longstanding suppliers which have established a national ‘brand’ in which they have confidence.

# **_Kenyan fresh produce exports: some success_**<sup>**43**</sup>

Kenya’s fresh produce trade dates to the mid-to-late 1950s, when small quantities of temperate vegetables and tropical fruits were supplied in the European winter ‘off-season’ to up-market department stores in London. This off-season trade continued and was later joined by yearround-supplies of high-quality green beans and a broad array of vegetables that comprised part of the traditional diets of the UK immigrant population from South Asia. Most of the product was air-freighted (‘loose’) in two-kilogram boxes for sale through wholesale markets or to distributor/caterers.

For many years, the industry functioned with very simple supply chains, involving little investment in infrastructure, product development or management systems. Around a dozen medium-sized firms alongside large numbers of small, part-time operators handled the exports, frequently trading with relatives or similarly small-scale companies in Europe. Fresh produce was purchased from large numbers of small and larger growers. Produce was generally collected in cardboard boxes from farms or along roadsides, from where it was brought to a central (typically dingy) warehouse, sifted through and re-graded if necessary, cooled a little and trucked to the airport for shipment in the evening. Some limited inspection of produce was undertaken by Ministry of Agriculture officials at the airport. With relatively few exceptions this was more or less the ‘model’ of the industry from the 1960s through to the mid-to-late 1980s. The industry remained competitive in some markets and for some products, but not for others. While experiencing some growth in the 1970s, the Kenyan fresh produce export trade more or less stagnated in the 1980s.

Since the early 1990s, however, the industry has been reshaped and transformed, both in response to and in anticipation of commercial, regulatory and private governance changes within its core external markets. Commercial pressures came in the form of saturated markets for certain products and increased competition from various suppliers which had improved their supply capabilities and had less expensive sea or air-freight costs than did Kenya. Commercial changes within Europe also required a shift in the Kenyan approach. In many countries, large supermarket chains were in ascendancy while wholesale markets were declining in importance or taking on more specialized roles. Consolidation was also occurring among importers, packers and distributors. Hence, the growing segments of the fresh produce market were being managed by fewer players. On the regulatory front, there was a steady wave of activity geared toward

> 43 This discussion draws from Jaffee (2003).

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