The preliminary analysis in Appendix 7 suggests that trading firms have a higher probability of being majority‐female owned relative to non‐trading firms, and to a lesser extent also of having a female top manager. Female ownership and management could thereore also shape the female labor share premium. Following equation (2a), Table 6 (columns 1 to 4) shows the results for female ownership share. The interaction term is positive and significant across all four types of trading. That is, trading firms with a higher female ownership share show significantly larger female labor shares. For example, a 10 percentage point increase in the female ownership share for exporting firms is associated with an expansion of the female labor share premium by 0.9 percentage points from 3.8 to 4.7 percentage points, relative to non‐exporting firms. Both the labor share premium and additional gains from female ownership are slightly smaller for GVC participants relative to non‐participants.

**Table 6: Female labor share premium, trading vs. non‐trading firms, role of female ownership and top manager**

|Dependent<br>variable:||**_Female ow_**|**_nership share_**|||**_Female man_**|**_ager (dumm_**|**_y)_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_fem_shisrt_|(1)<br>**_exp_**|(2)<br>**_imp_**|(3)<br>**_gvc_**|(4)<br>**_fdi_**|(5)<br>**_exp_**|(6)<br>**_imp_**|(7)<br>**_gvc_**|(8)<br>**_fdi_**|
|ln_Yisrt_|0.4654***<br>(0.000)|0.7810***<br>(0.000)|0.5634***<br>(0.000)|0.7512***<br>(0.000)|0.2504**<br>(0.019)|0.5366***<br>(0.000)|0.3503***<br>(0.001)|0.5342***<br>(0.000)|
|ln_kisrt_<br>ln_tfpisrt_<br>**_expisrt_**<br>**_expisrt* firmisrt_**|‐0.0897<br>(0.521)<br>‐1.6845**<br>(0.011)<br>**3.8212*****<br>**(0.000)**<br>**0.0923*****<br>**(0.000)**|‐0.0167<br>(0.915)<br>‐2.1808***<br>(0.004)<br> <br>|‐0.0781<br>(0.577)<br>‐1.7162***<br>(0.009)|‐0.0258<br>(0.854)<br>‐1.7039***<br>(0.009)|‐0.1801<br>(0.176)<br>‐1.4923**<br>(0.016)<br>**3.9387*****<br>**(0.000)**<br>**3.9846*****<br>**(0.004)**|‐0.1187<br>(0.420)<br>‐1.8660***<br>(0.006)<br> <br>|‐0.1648<br>(0.216)<br>‐1.5918***<br>(0.009)|‐0.1114<br>(0.403)<br>‐1.5868***<br>(0.009)|
|**_impisrt_**||**0.9449***<br>**(0.063)**||||**1.0590****<br>**(0.023)**|||
|**_impisrt* firmisrt_**||**0.1007*****<br>**(0.000)**||||**7.7247*****<br>**(0.000)**|||
|**_gvcisrt_**<br>**_gvcisrt* firmisrt_**|||**3.5960*****<br>**(0.000)**<br>**0.0673****<br>**(0.018)**||||**3.5711*****<br>**(0.000)**<br>**3.9926****<br>**(0.031)**||
|**_fdiisrt_**||||**0.3374**<br>**(0.690)**||||**0.2353**<br>**(0.758)**|
|**_fdiisrt* firmisrt_**||||**0.1669*****<br>**(0.001)**||||**12.3424*****<br>**(0.000)**|
|_constant_|12.5661<br>(0.105)|‐13.1416<br>(0.128)|14.6106*<br>(0.060)|45.1399***<br>(0.000)|70.3351***<br>(0.000)|50.3306***<br>(0.000)|68.8912***<br>(0.000)|95.1718<br>(.)|
|Obs.|12,590|10,722|12,590|12,583|14,467|12,588|14,467|14,458|
|R‐squared|0.55|0.54|0.54|0.54|0.54|0.53|0.54|0.54|
|F-test<sup>1)</sup>|0.0000|0.0000|0.0000|0.0013|0.0000|0.0000|0.0000|0.0000|

Note: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 (p‐values in parentheses). All regressions include country‐sector, subnational region and year fixed effects.<sup>1)</sup> F‐test of joint significance between trade variable and interaction term.

In Table 6, columns 5 to 8, we look at the role of female management for the female labor share premium. The positive interaction terms suggest that having a female top manager can expand the female 23