where Yvit is the outcome of interest for individual i in village v at time t ∈{1, 2} which corresponds to the midline and endline surveys respectively; τ 1t and τ 2t are dummies for the midline and endline surveys; all other variables are the same as in (3). Thus, the coeffi cients γ1 and γ2 measure the effect of at-large elections on the outcomes of interest at the time of the midline and endline surveys, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Estimates using data from the endline survey, which was administered approximately 4 years after the election of the village developments councils and 1—2 years following the completion of NSP-funded projects, indicate that villages assigned at-large elections exhibited lower levels of diarrhea among children (see Panel A of Table 7) and thus had water sources more likely to be free of contaminants.<sup>49</sup> We also observe that at-large elections induced a marginally significant increase in revenue derived from the harvest prior to the endline, which may reflect more successful implementation of irrigation projects. The signs of coeffi cients for other indicators of the effectiveness of development projects (reported water quality, hours of electricity available, yield of the most recent harvest) are consistent with at-large elections producing better project-related outcomes, although none of these attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Overall, there is weak evidence that the quality of implemented development projects was higher in villages assigned to at-large elections and no evidence that the faster implementation of projects in at-large villages came at the sacrifice of project quality.

Estimates using data from the midline survey, which was administered approximately 2 years after council elections, indicate that female respondents in villages assigned at-large elections were more likely to express positive perceptions of the economic situation and were more likely to attribute positive economic changes to local leaders (see Panel B of Table 7). However, there is no such effect for male respondents at midline or endline or for female respondents at endline. Data from the endline survey also indicates that there is a marginally significant positive effect of at-large elections on household expenditures. The effect of at-large elections on household income at endline is also positive, although not statistically significant. Overall, there is weak evidence that at-large elections improve general economic welfare.

Estimates using data from the endline survey indicate that, in villages assigned at-large elections, male respondents were less likely to express a desire to change decisions made by village leaders and were more supportive of using democratic procedures to select the President of Afghanistan (see Panel C of Table 7). Data from the midline survey indicate that male villagers in at-large villages were more likely to support the election of the village headman, but that the effect decreases in magnitude and loses statistical significance at endline. The results for other indicators are not statistically significant, although the signs of all coeffi cients for measures of support among male villagers for local leaders and democratic processes are consistent with the hypothesis that at-large elections improve villager attitudes. Overall, there is weak evidence that at-large elections resulted in improved attitudes toward village leaders and democratic processes.

On the whole, estimates using measures of villager welfare and opinion from the midline and endline surveys are weakly consistent with the eighth empirical prediction. However, as the data

> 49 Note that not all villages implemented drinking water projects. However, restricting the sample only to villages that implemented drinking water projects would potentially confound the estimation of the effects of electoral rules given the endogeneity of project choice.

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