rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
The IHS3 instruments included Household, Agriculture, Fishery, and Community Questionnaires. All sample households were geo-referenced and administered the multi-topic Household Questionnaire that collected individual-disaggregated information on demographics, education, health, wage employment, nonfarm enterprises, anthropometrics, and control of income from non-farm income sources, as well as data on housing, food consumption, food and non-food expenditures, food security, and durable and agricultural asset ownership, among other topics.

The sample households that were involved in agricultural activities (through ownership and/or cultivation of land, and/or ownership of livestock) were administered the Agriculture Questionnaire. Handheld global positioning system (GPS)-based locations and land areas of the plots were recorded. The Agriculture Questionnaire also solicited information on physical characteristics, labor and non-labor input use, and crop cultivation and production at the plot level, separately for the reference rainy and dry seasons. Depending on the timing of the interview, the reference rainy season could have been 2008/09 or 2009/10, while the reference dry season could have been 2009 or 2010.

Pertinent to our research, the Agriculture Questionnaire included a detailed module capturing coupon receipt and utilization dynamics, soliciting information at the household member-coupon type-level. The module allows us to observe the different types of coupons received, whether each coupon was redeemed, given away or lost, the type of input that was received upon redemption of a given type of coupon, the cost incurred by the household to redeem the coupon, whether the subsidized input was exchanged for another input or given away for free, and the input quantities associated with these arrangements, as applicable. Our focus is on the agricultural household sample reporting on the 2009/10 rainy season, accounting for approximately three-quarters of the overall agricultural household sample. Since the FISP does not operate in urban areas, urban agricultural households are excluded from the analysis. The final sample is 7,795 rural agricultural households and is representative of this population at the national level.

Table 1 presents summary statistics on FISP participation. The realized distribution of coupons across the beneficiaries was far from the ideal case scenario in which each beneficiary is entitled to four different types of coupons as outlined above. Of the 55 percent of households that receive any FISP coupon, the average number received is just over two, and less than a third (28 percent) report receiving 3 or more vouchers. The majority (86 percent) of those receiving any voucher receive the fertilizer coupon while much less (13 percent) receive the maize seed coupon. On average households that obtain a fertilizer voucher do receive more than one (1.7) while those that receive a maize seed voucher generally only receive one (1.04). The fact that the overwhelming majority of the FISP beneficiaries during the 2009/10 agricultural season were 11
The banking systern was apparently in a very solid position not only by 1998, before the Brazilian devaluation of January 1999, but also afterwards and through the end of 2000, despite the post-1998 continued economic contraction. In effect, through the year 2000 conventional indicators of financial health depicted a well-capitalized, strongly provisioned, and highly licluid banking system, although it was expenencing losses and increasingly burdened by bad loans after 1998 (Table 5.2).43 The banking system's prudential buffers were sufficient to enable it to withstand sizeable liquidity and solvency shocks-including a flight of more than one-third of the system's deposits as well as a sudden and complete deifault in up to 10 percent of the loan portfolio-without endangering the convertibility system.44 The important presence of reputable foreign banks in the domestic system (they accounted for over 70 percent of total banking assets in 2000) was broadly perceived to implicitly augment these liquidity and solvency cushions (Table 5.3). These banks were expected to stand behind the capital and liquidity of their affiliates in Argentina, at least in the context of bad states of the world associated with bad luck (few were thinking then of bad states of the world caused directly by confiscatory government policy).

**Table 5.2. Selected Banking System Indicators (Percentages at end-year)**

||**1997**|**1998**|**1999**|**2000**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|NetWorth/Assets|12.11|11.44|10.72|10.52|
|Capital/RiskWeightedAssets|18.13|17.64|18.56|21.18|
|NonPerformingLoans/TotalLoans(a)|8.23|5.98|7.14|10.21|
|Provisions/TotalLoans|7.70|7.10|7.82|8.65|
|Provisions/NonPerforming Loans(a)|108.64|140.40|122.25|77.13|
|SystemicCoreLiquidity(b)|42.98|39.58|40.89|38.69|
|Return onEquitybeforeProvisions|22.59|10.61|8.43|7.76|
|RetumonEquityafterProvisions|7.41|-2.24|-6.71|-9.42|
|Return onAssetsafterProvisions|1.04|-0.27|-0.77|-1.01|
|LeverageRatio(notinprecent)|6.11|7.26|7.74|8.33|

# Notes:

(a) Non performing loans is defined as the sum of loans with problems (category 3), loans with high risk (category 4) and non-recoverable loans (categories 5 and 6).

(b) Defined as the ratio of international reserves of the Central Bank in foreign currency and other liquidity requirements held abroad, and total deposits. Source: Central Bank of Argentina.

43 Profits had turned negative already in 1998, and became deeply negative during 1999-2000 mainly because of the need to constitute provisions in the face of rising bad loans. NPLs spiked to 10.2 percent of total loans in 2000, from 7.1 percent the year earlier, and the increase in provisions started to lag behind (Table 5.3).

**44** Table 5.3 puts systemic core li(quidity (disposable international reserves of the central bank plus foreign exchange in cash or near-cash held abroad by banks) at above 35 percent of banking system deposits. However, there was a significant variance in the distribution of such liquidity across banks. This may explain why the "corralito" was imposed at the end of 2001 before deposits had fallen by 30 percent.

43
# Engendering Trade<sup>_∗_</sup>

Quy-Toan Do, Andrei A. Levchenko and Claudio Raddatz<sup>_†_</sup> _Keywords: Gender gap, female discrimination, woman empowerment, trade integration, factor endowments, comparative advantage._ _JEL Codes: F43, J16, O11_

> _∗_ This paper is a background paper for the World Development Report 2012 on Gender Equality and Development. We thank Francisco Ferreira, Elisa Gamberoni, Gene Grossman, Carolina Sanchez-Paramo and seminar participants at the World Bank and Georgetown University for helpful comments.  ̧Ca ̆gatay Bircan provided outstanding research assistance. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and need not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

> _†_ World Bank, University of Michigan and NBER, and World Bank, respectively.

1
_Intertemporal Adjustment and Fiscal Policy in a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime_

# Figure 1.3 Net foreign assets in Argentina, 1991–2001

Millions of pesos at current prices <!-- Start of picture text --> 25000<br>20000<br>15000<br>10000<br>5000<br>0<br>-5000<br>-10000<br>1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: IFS-FMI.

# Figure 1.4 Public expenditures in Argentina, 1991–2001

Millions of pesos, current prices <!-- Start of picture text --> 56000<br>48000<br>40000<br>32000<br>24000<br>16000<br>8000<br>1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br><!-- End of picture text --> Based on data from IMF.

6
that the formal rule of law and institutional constraints on government are not always necessary for economic growth in a developing or transitional economy. In particularly, using a crosscountry panel data, Fan et al. (2009) find that FDI per capita is not robustly related to the rule of law once the analysis controls for a country‟s economic track record and its volatility. Their similar findings based on cross-country panel data that are completely different from our withincountry, cross-sectional regional data add to our confidence about the key results in the current paper.

# **References**

- Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S. (2005). „Unbundling institutions‟, Journal of Political Economy, 113, pp. 949-95.

- Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Volosovych, V. (2008). „Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?  an empirical investigation‟, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, pp. 347-68.

- Allen, F., Qian, J. and Qian, M. (2005). „Law, finance, and economic growth in China‟, Journal of Financial Economics, 77, pp. 57-116.

- Bai, C. and Tao, Z. (2004). „Local protectionism and regional specialization: evidence from China's industries‟, Journal of International Economics, 63, pp. 397-417.

- Blonigen, B. A. (2005). „A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants‟, Atlantic Economic Journal, 33, pp. 383-403.

- Bull, C. (1987). „The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts‟, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, pp. 147-59.

- Cai, H., Fang H., and Xu, L. C. (forthcoming). „Eat, drink, firms and government: an investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms‟,  Journal of Law and Economics.

- Chen, Q., Goh C., Sun B., and Xu L. C. (2011). „Market integration in China: a survey‟, Asian Development Review, 28, pp. 72-93.

- Cheng, L. K. and Yum K. K. (2000). „What are the determinants of the location of foreign direct investment?  The Chinese experience‟, Journal of International Economics, 51, pp. 379400.

- Cheung, K. and Lin, P. (2004). „Spillover effects of FDI on innovation in China: evidence from provincial data‟, China Economic Review, 15, pp. 25-44.

22
<!-- Start of picture text --> © CAF<br>500 a ee<br>oe a<br><<br>oe a<br>eal a<br>>o|<br>4i)<br>3 ail —_<br>3 a oSETH =<br>g&=<br>£<br>z i)@NGA |<br>(5 100 ge i<br>°<br>° ]<br>50 & PHL |<br>-<br>20 oe IND<br>19. “cp<br>0 K Countries ordered<br>from lowest to highest growth needed<br><!-- End of picture text -->
program’s first year, 2008/09) and the other 105 in Phase 2 (the second year of the program, 2009/10). In each phase, schools were randomly assigned to either poverty-based or merit-based scholarship targeting.

Schools using poverty-based targeting selected students based on a poverty index. All prospective recipients filled out a simple form with questions regarding their household and family socioeconomic characteristics.<sup>10</sup> These forms were scored according to a strict formula based on weights derived from an analysis of household survey data to derive a poverty index for each student.<sup>11</sup> The poverty index ranged from 0 (richest household) to 292 (poorest household). The application forms were scored centrally by a firm contracted specifically for this purpose, thereby reducing the probability of any manipulation of program eligibility. Within each school, the applicants with the highest scores (that is, those with the highest level of poverty) were offered a scholarship.

Schools using merit-based targeting selected scholarship recipients based on scores on a test administered at baseline. The test was adapted from the Grade 3 National Learning Assessment.<sup>12</sup> All prospective recipients took the test, and within each school the applicants with the highest test scores were offered scholarships. Again, the tests were scored centrally to minimize the risk of program manipulation.

The number of students within each school who would receive a scholarship was fixed exogenously, and set to half the number of registered students in the year prior to the program (as determined by an analysis of EMIS data).<sup>13</sup>

# _Evaluation design and data_

The identification of impacts relies on the fact that among the cohort of students studied, 4<sup>th</sup> graders in Phase 2 schools were not eligible for scholarships in the 2008/09 school year or later (Figure 2). Among those students, we identify the valid counterfactual group—a group that differs, on average, from

> 10 Table 1 reports the full set of variables included in the calculation of the score.

> 11  The weights were determined by estimating a model predicting the probability that a student would drop out of school during Grades 4 to 6—since addressing this dropout was the stated goal of the program. Strictly speaking, the score should be referred to as a “dropout-risk score.” However, the risk is essentially a set of characteristics that capture the socioeconomic status of a household, weighted to capture those elements that predict dropout best. For convenience and ease of exposition, the score is referred to in this paper, as well as in program documents, as a “poverty” score.

> 12 The National Assessment was implemented in a sample of schools nationwide in Grade 3 during the 2005/06 school year (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006).

> 13 The number of scholarships is not equal to half the number of applicants for two reasons: First, the rule was to allocate scholarships to all applicants who had scores _higher than_ or _tied with_ the cutoff score; second, there were Grade 4, Phase 2 schools that did not receive the scholarship (control schools).

8
14 to trade flows between other developing and industrial countries (Erzan and Svedberg (1989), for instance, show that sub-Saharan countries face few important trade barriers **in** industral country markets).

# IV. The Mansd Trade Alernative

While our assesment (Table 3) of the likelihood of FTAs being negotiated for the major trade flows currently 'unaffected' was not positive, this does not suggest that multilateral disciplines are, and will continue to be, binding as far as these flows are concerned. Drawing on trade intervention data for the U.S., Table 4 shows that a high proportion of these major inter-regional trade flows 'unaffected" by minilateral trade arrangements take place under "discriminatory" trade barriers reflecting managed trade conditions (particularly - VERs) and/or influenced by 'unfair trade" laws particularly, countervailing duties and antidumping cases."<sup>6</sup> It is also clear from Table 4, that Japan is the main target of U.S. managed trade initiatives. Specifically, some $68 billion of U.S. imports from Japan are subject to discriminatory measures - this is more than 13 times the combined imports from Germany, France and the U.K.

As Table 4 suggests, managed trade has a major role in shaping current international trade relations. One should not infer from this data 'that nles do not work and more managed trade must, therefore, be the way to go' (Bhagwati (1991, p.23). But an eventual failure, or less than satisfactory outcome, of the Uruguay Round would advance the cause of those who believe that a fix-quantity trading regime is an inevitable development. This could not only impede the rollback of the large array of already existing discrminatory trade barriers, but also foster their use in areas characterized by significant trade dynamism (e.g., high-tech trade).

Advocates of managed trade have used different rationales to justify govemment intervention. These "rationales," as far as motivations are concerned, can be classified as follows: macroeconomic, systemic, and 16 The NTBs Listed in Table 4 are discriminatory in that they are directed against anecific countries whereas other measures, like global quotas or variable import levies, do not differentiate among foreign suppliers. As - indicated, the U.S. discriminatory measures are very heavily concentrated on Japan particularly Japanese exports of high technology products. The authors have undertaken a separate analysis of EEC discriminatory trade barriers and also found that these restrictions are primarily directed at Japan (results available from the authors on request). With Canada, United States, and Sweden as the combined compartor group our results indicated that over 90 percent of EEC discriminatory protection was directed against Japanese exports. Laird and Yeats<sup>(1991) provide</sup> additional information on the application of NTBs by major trading nations.
# **3.5 Crime and Violence**

Living in an insecure neighborhood puts youth at risk of crime and violence and many young Argentines live with a feeling of insecurity (Table 3.9). While 30.0 (40.4) percent of female (male) youth feel secure or very secure in their neighborhood, 26 (20) percent of female (male) youth feel insecure or very insecure.

Table 3.9: Feeling of Security in <u>Neighborhood for Argentine Youth</u>

||Female|Male|
|---|---|---|
|Very insecure|7.2|6.0|
|Insecure|18.9|13.9|
|More or less secure|43.9|39.7|
|Secure|27.6|36.4|
|Verysecure|2.4|4.0|
|Proportion(percent)|55.1|44.9|
|_Source_: Own calculations o|n ESCVJA||

An insecure neighborhood increases the risk of being victimized and reduces the feeling of security with development damage as a consequence. Being victimized or witnessing violence leads to low ability to confront stressful situations and antisocial and self-destructive behavior, because of developmental damage (Barker and Fontes 1996). Moreover, crime and violence are risk factors, because they have long-lasting financial effects and erode human and social capital. Figure 3.10 shows that the likelihood of becoming a victim to crime is highly correlated with feeling the neighborhood is insecure. Fully 22 percent have experienced crime. Naturally, causality flows in both directions: An insecure neighborhood increases the risk of being victimized, but being victimized also reduces the feeling of security. Out of all youth in the sample, seven females in a thousand have been exposed to or committed forced sex; for males it is thirteen in a thousand.

Figure <u>3.10: Secure Neighborhood vs. Victim to Crime for Argentine Youth, 2005</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br>45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>Female Male Female Male<br>Insecure neighborhood Safe neighborhood<br>Victim to Crime (percent)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Own calculations on ESCVJA (four urban areas) 15
- 34 -

Embedded in the rhetoric of northern politics is a description of the Inuit and Indian as natural conservationists who are proper custodians of their own wildlife resources. According to this scenario, the southern-trained wildlife manager is an unnecessary and frequently unwanted obstacle. The wildlife manager on the other hand frequently sketches the northern native as the myopic, selfish cause of wildlife population declines. This clash of viewpoints is symptomatic of the fact that our conservation ethic, founded in Europe in the 16th. century, is relatively new to the barren-ground caribou hunter.

# Simmons et al 1979

The focus of the controversy was the decline in numbers of the Kaminuriak caribou herd, as indicated by intermittent aerial census. The estimates were: 150,000 in 1955, 63,000 in 19u3, 44,000 in 1977, 39,000 in 1981. Based on this tiend, biologists predicted 27,000 for 1982.

As the controversy deepened, a consultant was called in to treat the issue simply as a communication prcblem. He did so using video techiniques to expose the rival parties to each others' perspectives. This effort led to the formulation of Joint Management Board for the Kaminuriak herd.

This board was established just before the 1982 census results were analysed. These revealed that the calving ground, the focus of caribou censuses, had shifted to the west and the 1982 estimates were 134,000 instead of the predicted 27,000. This survey pioneered new methods of counting from aerial photographs which have since yielded even higher figures. In 1983 the photographic estimate was 230,000, a figure that appears to have remained fairly stable since then.

These results relieved tensions just as the caribou management board started its business. It formulates policy, proposes research and conducts education in the form of a bilingual newspaper circulated to all households. This example has been followed by other boards covering major caribou herds in Canada, the Beverly and Porcupine.

An inter-governmental attempt is now underway to internationalize the board for the Porcupine herd, which is hunted by the Indian community of Old Crow in Canada (see 2.2.) and related Kutchin communities in Alaska, where the herd's winter range is part of the Arctic Wildlife Refuge. This is not a new idea. In 1978 the Yukon and Alaskan communities met in Old Crow to develop a proposal for such an international management regime (Gwitcha-Gwitchen-Ginkhye 1978) but neither government responded with interest. Now, Canadian authorities are ready to move but the prospect of oil exploration being extended into the Arctic Wildlife Refuge has caused the Alaskan side to continue procrastinating.

# 4.2.4. Makivik Research Centre

The Makivik Research Centre originated from the Inuit Land Claim Settlement (the James Bay Agreement of 1975) but it was not until 1982 that
14 -

-

Representntive must retaliate. 10/ But, the section also allows the USTR to waive retaliation if the GATT dispute settlement process decides against the United States, the foreign government takes action to remove or offset the violation, or if retaliation would "backfire" or significantly harm US commercial interests or US national security. The law defines "unreasonable" as an act, policy or practice that is unfair and inequitable, though not necessarily a violation of explicit US legal rights. When the US Trade Representative finds actions or policies of this sort, she has the authority to retaliate, but is not required to do so.

The intent, and to a large extent the use of "301" has been to advance the interests of US exporters. Of forty-seven cases that had come to conclusion by December 31, 1988, twenty-seven ended with some liberalization of a foreign restriction, one with a liberalization by the United States, eleven ended when USTR found that the foreign practice was legitimate or did not burden US commerce and 8 ended with a trade restricting action by the United States. 11/ The menace of "301" is not that it serves US export interests but that it unchains them from the necessity to oppose US import competing interests. It arms the US negotiator not with the authority to remove US import restrictions, but with the threat to impose new ones. It provides the domestic political mechanics to press for export expansion without paying the price of removing US import restrictions.

- 10/ Since 1988, retaliation may not be on the case's subject product or service, e.g., if the subject practice affects US exports of rice, retaliation cannot be a restriction on US imports of rice.

- 11/ The numbers in this paragraph are from the author's tabulation of information given in US International Trade Cominvsion, Oieration of the Trade Agreements Proaram, 1975 through 1988 editions.
# **Table C1: Estimated Elasticities of Substitution for Varieties in Kenyan Imperfectly Competitive Goods Sectors**

|**Sector in our Model**|**Matching HS-3 Code from Broda et al estimates **|**weighted elasticity of substitution**|
|---|---|---|
|Beverages & tobacco|220,240|2.3|
|Petroleum|271|3.6|
|Chemicals|280-391,390,393|2.8|
|Metals and machines|720-854|16.7|
|Non metallicproducts|680-702|5.6|
|Grain milling|110|3.2|
|Sugar & bakery& confectionary<br>**Source: Authors calculations based on**|170<br>**estimates from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein(2006**|2.9<br>**). **|

106