# **1 Introduction**

Throughout the developing world, informal work prevails. In many countries, the informal sector is large, persistent, and seems to react counter-cyclically to macroeconomic trends and immediate external shocks (Fiess _et al._ , 2010; Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). Although existing research includes analyses of the informal sector’s response to economic contractions, financial crises, trade opening, and environmental shocks (Gunther and Launov, 2012; Epstein and Shapiro, 2017; Adhvaryu _et al._ , 2019; Colombo _et al._ , 2019), the degree to which the informal sector acts as a safety net in response to conflict and violent unrest remains an open question. In particular, individuals may supply labor—that is make different decisions about where and how they work—based on the perceived threat of violence. The option of self-employment or an informal business run by a household member—as opposed to work for someone else, even if that work is informal—may present an available option for work if other types of work become limited or risky (Gunther and Launov, 2012).<sup>1</sup> Yet, despite being increasingly salient in many areas around the world, little is known about how households, and in particular agricultural households, turn to informal activity in the form of self-employment or in a household-run enterprise as a way to cope with increased risk of and violence.

Within Nigeria, the last decade has seen a sharp rise in violence propagated by Boko Haram in the northeast region and escalating inter-group conflict between farmers and Fulani pastoralists in the northcentral region. Severe violence led to states of emergency in both 2011 and 2013,<sup>2</sup> and despite Boko Haram dominating the news, conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and settled agricultural communities have proven to be more deadly.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, emerging evidence suggests that increased temperatures driven by climate change will likely lead to increased conflict between farmers and pastoralists across Sub-Saharan Africa and within Nigeria specifically (McGuirk and Nunn, 2020; Eberle _et al._ , 2020).

We study a specific series of shocks—namely, violence between Fulani nomadic herders and sedentary (largely agricultural) communities in Nigeria—and their effect on economic, primarily labor-related, activities. These violent incidents in the so-called ‘herder-farmer conflict’ led to over 3,600 deaths in a period of heightened violence between 2016 and 2018.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the loss of life, these conflicts also led to widespread destruction of property, displacement, and civil unrest. These conflicts are, in part, related to increasing competition for scarce land and water resources used by both farming and herding communities (George _et al._ , 2021a). Over time, nomadic herders have moved farther away from traditional routes and have remained in areas for longer periods of time, due to prolonged dry seasons

> 1The definition of informality is often broad and subject to some specific (and localized) criteria (Ohnsorge and Yu, 2022; Aga _et al._ , 2023). Generally, the informal sector is regarded as both informal work—employment not covered by publicly funded, social safety nets—and unregistered, often un-taxed, economic activity. While throughout we may refer to informality more broadly, in this paper we are particularly concerned with self-employment and/or work in a non-farm, household enterprise, as both present often readily available employment options in the face of adverse shocks.

> 2BBC News. December 31, 2011. “Nigeria’s president declares state a emergency.” available here. Last accessed: November 12, 2020.

> 3The Washington Post. July 26, 2018. “This little-known conflict in Nigeria is now deadlier than Boko Haram.” available here. Last accessed: November 12: 2020.

> 4Amnesty International. December 17, 2018. “Harvest of Death: Three Years of Blood Clashes Between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria.” available here. Last accessed: February 3, 2021.

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