rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
drew up the equilibrium paths until 2008 based on the method described in the study. The credit to GDP ratio of the equilibrium level defined by the median fell short even during the period ending in 2008. This suggests that corporate lending was not subject to excessive growth.

**Chart 7. New disbursement of loans to SME sector broken down by currency**

<!-- Start of picture text --> HUF Bn Per cent<br>450 90<br>400 80<br>350 70<br>300 60<br>250 50<br>200 40<br>150 30<br>100 20<br>50 10<br>0 0<br>FX HUF Ratio of FX loans in total issuance Average<br>2004Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2005Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2006Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2007Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2008Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: MNB. Note: SME = small and medium-size enterprises.

As indicated above, actual level does not include direct foreign loans. For this reason, it is worth comparing the observed growth rate of credit to GDP with the growth rate of the indicator justified by the equilibrium path. Since the ratio of foreign direct loans to domestic loans is nearly constant, the dynamics of total loans (i.e. the sum of foreign loans and domestic loans) do not differ significantly from the dynamics of domestic loans. Another reason for doing this analysis is the fact that, owing to the large deviation of country constants, the definition of the equilibrium level is surrounded by greater uncertainty than that of the equilibrium dynamics. In addition, we also defined a rate of convergence.<sup>6</sup> The result: average corporate credit growth was found to exceed the rate seen along the equilibrium path; though it was only marginally higher than the dynamics defined by the convergence path (Chart 8). Consequently, we cannot certainly say that there was a credit boom in corporate lending; most likely the rapid growth observed in this segment was driven mainly by the convergence process. However, due to the clients without a natural hedge, risks have built up in the corporate loan portfolio before the crisis.

# **_Retail segment_**

The rise in retail foreign currency lending in 2004 was not an isolated phenomenon in the region. Therefore, numerous papers have been focused on its causes and consequences. Several of the papers dealt with the motivation of the demand side. Some conclude that one of the main reasons for foreign currency lending is the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates (Basso et al., 2007; Csajbók et al., 2010). However, a number of other factors may also contribute to the appearance and rise of foreign currency (FX) lending. In addition, Csajbók et al. demonstrate

> 6 To this end, we examined how much time the countries examined in the model needed to reduce deviation from the equilibrium by half. We considered the result as an appropriate rate of convergence. Since the period 2004–08 would have been too short for this analysis, we assumed that convergence started in 2000.

9
- 3 -

quality cover most countries in the world: the share of paved roads in total roads, the rate of telephone faults per mainline, and the rate of electricity transmission and distribution losses (e.g., Calderón and Servén, 2004). The last indicator may not represent the quality of electricity supply services perceived by consumers, because it measures technical losses unobserved by consumers.

The share of paved roads is clearly one dimension of quality in the road sector. By region, East Asian countries considerably improved the road quality in recent years, while Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries seem to be lagging behind in this area (Figure 2). The rate of telephone faults per fixed line represents the reliability of telecommunications services. Sub-Saharan Africa, again, had the highest fault rate in 2003. It is more than twice as high as other regions except South Asia (Figure 3). If the quality of electricity supply is measured by the transmission and distribution losses, the quality in East Asia is considered twice as high as South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 4).

Figure 2. Road Quality by Region <!-- Start of picture text --> 90<br>1998<br>80 2003<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>East Asia & Europe & Latin Middle East South Asia Sub-Saharan<br>Pacific Central Asia America & & North Africa<br>Caribbean Africa<br>Source: World Development Indicators .<br>Figure 3. Telecommunications Service Quality by Region<br>100 (140)<br>90 19982003<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>East Asia & Europe & Latin Middle East South Asia Sub-<br>Pacific Central Asia America & & North Saharan<br>Caribbean Africa Africa<br>Source: World Development Indicators .<br>Share of paved roads in total (%)<br>Telephone faults per 100 mainlines<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 3. Telecommunications Service Quality by Region
# **Technical Notes**

## **Conversion of units for specific tariffs**

For some tariff lines with non-zero specific tariffs, the unit of measurement of the quantity of imports is different from the unit of measurement of the specific tariff. In order to compute the ad valorem equivalence of the specific tariff, we need a conversion factor that would allow use to use a common physical unit of measure for the quantity of imports and the unit of measurement of the specific tariff. The company Academia Service provided us with these conversion rates based on additional data they have available on imports for 2003. We applied this conversion rates to other years as well.

For some tariff lines, it was not possible for Academy Service to provide us with conversion factors. Since this made calculation of the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff impossible, we dropped these tariff lines from the calculations. As a result of this problem, we dropped the following seven tariff lines: 9401301000, 9401901000, 9403301100, 9403603000, 9404211000, 6910100000 and 6910900. The observation was dropped only if the tariff line at the 10-digit level had a specific tariff different from zero, there was difference in the units of measurement and we did not have conversion rate. If a tariff line was dropped for one year it was also dropped for all years.

## **Tariff rates for Chapter 87 of HS.**

Specific tariffs for chapter 87 (vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock) are measured in Euros per 1 cc of engine volume. We do not have data to calculate the exact tariffs applied for each type of car. For tariff lines referring to cars whose engine capacity fall within a specified interval, we assume that engine capacity of each imported car is the average for this interval. For example, the tariff rate for tariff line 870322 **(** Other Vehicles, Spark-ignition Engine of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,000 cc but not exceeding 1,500 cc **)** was calculated based on the average capacity 1,250 cc. For categories with an open-ended range such as cars with engine lower than 1,500 cc or cars with engine higher than 3,000 cc, we took the highest and the lowest capacity, respectively. This will overestimate the tariff rate for the first category and underestimate it for the second category.

24
tropical disease relevant to the Himalayas. Dengue was first reported in 2004 in both Bhutan (Tschering and Sithey, 2008) and Nepal (Pandey et al., 2004).

# **2.8.2 Natural Disasters**

The Himalayas is subject to extreme temperature, weather events, and variable precipitation patterns. Extreme weather and climate events are an important cause of mortality and morbidity in the region. Flood accounted for 35% of natural disasters during 1975-2005 in South Asia (Shrestha, 2008). In Nepal, data from 1980-2010 shows that floods, landslides, and epidemics (in order) are the main causes for disaster-related human loss. Four types of floods are possible in the Himalayas: riverine floods, flash floods, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF), and breached landslide-dam floods. Flash floods are common in the foothills, mountain borderlands, and steep coastal catchments. Similarly, the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) showed that storms and floods were the first two major causes of disaster-related human loss in Bhutan over the last thirty years (1980-2010).

One impact of warming climate in many mountainous environments is glacial retreat and formation of moraine-dammed glacier lakes (Evans and Clague, 1994). Moraine-dammed glacier lakes are the most hazardous type of glacier lakes (Yamada and Sharma, 1993) as moraines can burst for several reasons such as sudden increased water volume; surge waves generated by glacier calving, snow, ice or rock avalances into the lake; earthquake; piping; and overtopping of dams (Kattelemann, 2003). Moraine-bursting events usually occur in the summer monsoon when temperature is high and inputs to the glacier lake can have multiple sources.

Of the many recorded GLOF events in the region (Bajracharya et al., 2007), several have caused severe socio-economic damages. In 1981, the Zhangzhangbo GLOF in China destroyed a large section of the China-Nepal road, a power station, and a bridge, with losses totalling more than USD 3 million (Bajracharya et al., 2007). The Dig Tso outburst in 1985 destroyed several infrastrucures, land, shops, and the nearly completed Namche Hydropower plant worth USD 3 million (Vuichard and Zimmermann, 1987). In 1994, the Luggye Tso GLOF in Bhutan caused loss of property (Richardson and Reynolds, 2000) and more than 20 lives (Bajracharya et al., 2007). A huge landslide in 2000, resulting from snow and ice damming the Yigong River (tributary to the Yarlung Zangbo River) caused 30 deaths and more than USD 22 Million of property damage in Arunachal Pradesh (ICIMOD, 2010).

9
**_Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries_**

- Chisari, O., Estache, A., and Romero, C. (1997). “Winners and Losers from Utility Privatization in Argentina: Lessons form a General Equilibrium Model”, World Bank Policy Research Working Papers 1824, September, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- Delfino, J. A. and Casarin, A. A. (2001). “The Reform of the Utilities Sector in Argentina”, World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Discussion Paper DP No. 2001/74.

- Delmas, M. and Tokat, Y. (2003). “Deregulation Process, Governance Structures and Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector”, Energy Policy and Economics No. 4, University of California Energy’s Institute (UCEI), Berkeley, California.

- Domah, P., Pollitt, M.G. and Stern, J. (2002). “Modelling the Costs of Energy Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries” Department of Applied Economics Working Papers CMI EP 11, University of Cambridge.

- Drillisch, J. and Riechmann, C. (1998). “Liberalisation of the Electricity Supply Industry – Evaluation of Reform Policies”, EWI Working Paper 98/5, Cologne/ Tokyo, December 1998.

- DTI (2000). “Energy Liberalisation Indicators in Europe”, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), October, London.

- EBRD (2001). “Transition Report 2001: Energy in Transition”, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), November, London.

- Ennis, H. M., Pinto, S. M. (2002). “Privatization and Income Distribution in Argentina”, paper presented at the Center for Global Development Conference on Privatisation and Income Distribution, February. Weblink:

http://www.cgdev.org/events/privatization/EnnisPinto_Argentina_paper.pdf 31
Policy Research Working Paper 4984

# **Abstract**

Migration flows are shaped by a complex combination of self-selection and out-selection mechanisms. In this paper, the authors analyze how existing diasporas (the stock of people born in a country and living in another one) affect the size and human-capital structure of current migration flows. The analysis exploits a bilateral data set on international migration by educational attainment from 195 countries to 30 developed countries in 1990 and 2000. Based on simple microfoundations and controlling for various determinants of migration, the analysis finds that diasporas increase migration flows, lower the average educational level and lead to higher concentration of low-skill migrants. Interestingly, diasporas explain the majority of the variability of migration flows and selection. This suggests that, without changing the generosity of family reunion programs, education-based selection rules are likely to have a moderate impact. The results are highly robust to the econometric techniques, accounting for the large proportion of zeros and endogeneity problems.

This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the impact of international migration on poverty and development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cozden@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
percentage points to minus 2.8 percentage points. As might be expected, these reversals at the commodity level are more striking than for food as a whole, because the elasticities of supply for individual commodities are larger than for agriculture as a whole.

We then move to a simulation in which the price impacts of the individual commodities are scaled up to yield a ten percent change in the World Bank’s food price index. The key finding from this analysis is that the impact of a 10 percent change in this index may be associated with radically different poverty impacts, depending upon the source of the change. If the increase in the index comes from rice or wheat prices, the short-run impact is likely to be quite adverse, while it would be small for an increase coming from the price of beef, which has almost as large a share in the index as wheat. It would be much smaller for a rise in the price of vegetable oils, largely because this commodity has such a large share in this trade-focused index that a much smaller change in its price is required to generate a 10 percent increase in the index. A key implication of this analysis is that great caution is needed when using trade-focused indexes of commodity prices as indicators of the likely poverty impact of food price rises.

# **Conclusions**

In this study, we address some of the issues regarding the differences between the short- and long-run impacts of higher food prices on global poverty. We find that even though short-run implications of higher food prices for poverty are adverse, raising poverty in most developing countries, the induced wage changes and the ability of farmers to adjust their production in response to changing output prices are able to largely offset these negative impacts, making the long-run implications generally favorable for poverty reduction. There is considerable heterogeneity in our country results, with Cambodia, China, Vietnam and Albania found to benefit from higher food prices even in the short run—most of our inferences for the global poor population have relatively low standard errors given the coverage of our country sample.

Even though we find that higher food prices in the short run generally tend to hurt the poor while the accompanying long-run adjustments in wages and agricultural profits appear to outweigh these losses and generate poverty reductions, we also note that these impacts are not distributed equally among all socio-economic groups. Most importantly, we find that even farmheaded households are hurt by sufficiently higher food prices in the short-run similarly to other household types; however, they benefit most from higher agricultural profits in the long run.

20
property taxes) on a per capita basis to local government. Other revenues include local property taxation (the council tax) and user fees (other income).

The same can be said about lack of local fiscal autonomy for the lower tiers (the boroughs) in London. As Table 3 shows, the main expenditures for the boroughs are education, social services, and housing. The main sources of revenue are grants from the central government. The council tax (residential property tax) accounts for only 15 percent of borough revenues.

**<u>Table 2: Municipal Expenditures and Revenues, Greater London Authority, 2006-07</u>**

|**Expenditures**|**%**|**Revenues**|**%**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Metropolitan Police Authority|33.9|Specific grants|33.6|
|London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority|4.5|Other income|34.9|
|Transport for London|55.9|Reserves|1.0|
|Greater London Authority|1.4|Police grant|10.4|
|London Development Agency|4.4|General GLA grant|0.4|
|Total|100.0|Revenue support grant/non-domestic rates<br>Council tax|11.0<br>8.7|
|||Total|100.0|

Source: The Greater London Authority’s Consolidated Budget and Component Budgets for 2006-07

**<u>Table 3: Municipal Expenditures and Revenues, London Boroughs, 2005-06</u>**

|**Expenditures**|**%**|**Revenues**|**%**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Education|37.8|Interest receipts|1.3|
|Highways and transport|1.8|Specific grants outside AEF (Aggregate External Finance)|27.5|
|Social services|20.7|Specific grants inside AEF (Aggregate External Finance)|12.5|
|Social housing|25.8|Use of reserves|-1.2|
|Culture|2.9|Revenue support grant|29.5|
|Environment|5.0|Redistributed business rates|14.3|
|Planning and development|2.0|Police grant|0.2|
|Police|0.5|Other items|0.9|
|Courts|0.1|Council tax|15.1|
|Central services|2.6|Total revenues|100.0|
|Other|0.8|||
|Totalcurrent expenditures|100.0|||

Source: Local Government Finance Directorate, UK. Local government finance statistics England no. 17.

53
**Table 2. Ordered logit models of perceptions of bribe frequency in tax administration (country and sector controls omitted from output)**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||<br>Dependent var<br>|<br>iable: Bribery is fre|<br>quent in tax adminis|<br>tration||
|Firm was visited/inspected by<br>a tax official in the last year|-0.0213<br>(0.855)|||||
|Bribe tax (all firms)|**0.0775*****<br>(0.00213)|**0.0770*****<br>(0.00233)|**0.0420****<br>(0.0317)|||
|Number of tax inspections<br>(all firms)||0.00884<br>(0.371)||||
|Number of tax inspections<br>(inspected firms only)|||0.00136<br>(0.885)|**0.119*****<br>(0.00752)|**0.0658****<br>(0.0384)|
|Bribe was expected during<br>tax inspection|||**1.898*****<br>(0)||**1.346*****<br>(0.00142)|
|Bribe tax (firms reporting non-<br>zero percentage)||||0.0887<br>(0.264)|-0.0111<br>(0.422)|
|Firm size: medium (20-99|-0.0486|-0.0585|-0.208|-0.509|-0.104|
|employees)|(0.739)|(0.689)|(0.238)|(0.439)|(0.777)|
|Firm size: large (>100|0.274|0.291|0.0470|0.323|0.0503|
|employees)|(0.126)|(0.110)|(0.877)|(0.797)|(0.925)|
|Constant|0.519**<br>(0.0278)|0.526**<br>(0.0237)|0.827***<br>(0.00168)|-1.489<br>(0.373)|-0.156<br>(0.800)|
|Constant|1.407***<br>(1.19e-08)|1.419***<br>(4.77e-09)|1.764***<br>(1.48e-10)|-0.184<br>(0.902)|0.608<br>(0.333)|
|Constant|2.524***<br>(0)|2.531***<br>(0)|2.871***<br>(0)|2.559*<br>(0.0656)|2.438***<br>(0.000354)|
|Constant|3.598***<br>(0)|3.601***<br>(0)|4.023***<br>(0)|3.853***<br>(0.00513)|3.598***<br>(7.89e-08)|
|Constant|4.260***<br>(0)|4.265***<br>(0)|4.986***<br>(0)|5.666***<br>(2.55e-05)|5.041***<br>(7.74e-11)|
|Observations|9,811|9,613|5,097|263|678|

The combination of findings suggests that simultaneously two theories of business corruption are plausible – corruption as a distortion and an obstacle, and corruption as an efficient mechanism to secure valued services.

The finding that more intense tax scrutiny tends to be associated, albeit tentatively, with heightened general perceptions of corruption as well as with the perception of bribery in tax administration also suggests that the practices of tax administration in relation to corruption may go beyond efficient arrangements for both firms and tax officials, and may be evidence of rent-seeking behavior from the side of government officials.

The extent to which tax scrutiny is associated with corruption appears conditional on factors _<u>not</u>_ clearly captured by country dummies.

12 | P a g e
# **INCREASING ACCESS BY WAIVING TUITION:**

# **EVIDENCE FROM HAITI**<sup></sup>

Melissa A. Adelman Peter A. Holland World Bank World Bank JEL Classification: O10, I21, L13 Key Words: School attendance, School fees, Haiti

>  Excellent research assistance was provided by Tillmann Heidelk.  This paper has greatly benefited from comments provided by several reviewers within The World Bank, including David Evans, Juan Baron, Raju Singh, and Gabriel Demombynes.  The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ alone, and in no way reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Adelman: madelman@worldbank.org; Holland: pholland@worldbank.org.  Corresponding author: pholland@worldbank.org