- Strong commitments written into peace agreements are insufficient in themselves to bring about durable solutions, and the existence of a peace agreement alone cannot ensure return in safety and dignity. Rather, this depends upon the degree of compliance with the full range of provisions in the accord and requires sufficient follow up post-signature.<sup>60</sup>

- Finally, it is essential to understand how actors participating in a peace agreement are chosen, whose views they represent, and whether they have their own unstated interests.<sup>61</sup> Peace agreements do not necessarily empower IDPs and generate improved outcomes; in reality, they may in fact empower external actors, reproduce or reinforce power imbalances, or entrench marginalized actors.<sup>62</sup>

The existing scholarship thus expects that LPAs will be more likely to facilitate safe and sustainable IDP return if they include IDPs in the negotiation process; include a broader range of perspectives, including civil society actors and women; address complex issues that are of highest concern to IDPs and communities, beyond the issue of return; and establish a mechanism to implement and/or monitor implementation post-signature. Our study aims to contribute to this body of literature by mapping the characteristics of eight LPAs, in order to understand how each was negotiated, its terms and signatories, and how it was implemented and monitored. We then compare these characteristics with the scholarly expectations regarding what makes a ‘good’ peace agreement, according to the four key criteria listed above. Specifically, we ask: How did each LPA align with or diverge from the factors identified in the scholarship? Which factors or practices appeared to support safe and sustainable IDP return, and which practices potentially undermined durable solutions?

# **Section 4: Methodology and Research Design**

At the outset of this study, the authors identified and mapped all LPAs signed in Iraq between 2015 and 2021, reaching 11 LPAs in total.<sup>63</sup> Of the 11 LPAs originally identified, the authors could not find sufficient information about the negotiation, terms, and implementation of three LPAs, and therefore these agreements were excluded from the study.<sup>64</sup> The remaining eight LPAs are included in the study, and span the governorates of Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din.

> 60 Fagen, P.W. (2009).

> 61Taylor, D. (2014). Victim participation in transitional justice mechanisms: Real power or empty ritual. _Impunity Watch Research_ .; Cooke, B and Kothary, U. (2001). ‘The Case for Participation as Tyranny, in Cooke, B and Kothary, U. (eds.), Participation: The New Tyranny?, London, Zed Books, 13.

> 62 Hickey S. and Mohan G. (eds.) (2004) Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? London, Zed Books. Cooke, B and Kothary, U. (2001). ‘The Case for Participation as Tyranny, in Cooke, B and Kothary, U. (eds.), Participation: The New Tyranny?, London, Zed Books.

> 63 To the knowledge of the authors at the time of finalizing this study, these are the only LPAs in existence in Iraq from this period.

> 64 The excluded agreements are: the Ninewa Peaceful Coexistence Pact signed in March 2016; the Heet Pact signed in November 2016; and the al-Sabaawi Agreement of Qayyarah (Mosul) signed in May 2017.

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