rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
if others came within earshot or eyesight. Informed consent was obtained before both baseline and endline surveys.

# **3.2 Measuring Violence**

We measured IPV using the World Health Organization (WHO) Violence Against Women instrument, following WHO ethical protocols for IPV research (WHO, 2016). The study’s ethical protocols are summarized in a structured ethics appendix (Appendix C). This standardized instrument asks multiple behaviorally specific questions about a range of abusive acts, a technique shown to maximize disclosure (Ellsberg et al., 2001). Following the literature, we focused on three types of IPV: emotional (2 questions), physical (7 questions), and sexual violence (3 questions). Women reported how often their current husband perpetrated each act over the past six months at endline (to avoid overlap with program completion) or 12 months at baseline, with responses of ‘never’, ‘once’, ‘a few times’, ‘often’, or ‘skip/refuse to answer’.<sup>12</sup> Following our pre-analysis plan (Alik-Lagrange et al., 2017), we created binary indicators for each type of violence.<sup>13</sup> These indicator variables were coded as one if a woman reported experiencing any act within that category. When a woman refused to answer some questions but reported violence on others within the same category, the indicator was coded as one. If she refused one question and reported no violence or refused all others, the indicator was coded as missing. Results are robust to coding all refusals as either ”yes” or ”no” (see table A20 in the appendix).

To minimize reporting bias and increase privacy, we used audio computer-assisted self-interviewing (ACASI) when asking the most sensitive survey questions, including those on IPV, men’s likelihood of violence in hypothetical scenarios, alcohol consumption, and gender attitudes. With ACASI, respondents listen to pre-recorded questions through headphones and answer on a tablet touchscreen. Enumerators demonstrate the technology, then stand a short distance away to maintain privacy. This approach is designed to minimize reporting bias by increasing privacy and reducing the embarrassment respondents may feel about disclosing a sensitive answer face-to-face with an enumerator

> 12Examples of questions included: “In the past six months, how often has your husband said or done something to humiliate you in front of others”, “punched you”, or “physically forced you to have sexual intercourse with him when you did not want to.”

> 13Due to a coding error, one emotional and one physical violence question was only asked of a third of endline respondents and was dropped from the emotional and physical violence endline dummies. See Appendix D for deviations from the pre-analysis plan.

12
- Rao, Vijayendra, and Paromita Sanyal. 2010. "Dignity through discourse: poverty and the culture of deliberation in Indian village democracies." _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_ 629(1): 146-172.

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- Sen, Amartya. 1990. "Development as capability expansion." _Human development and the international development strategy for the 1990s_ 1.

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|SYS<br>GMM<br>(8)<br>0.638***<br>(0.0682)<br>0.547*<br>(0.293)<br>1.120***<br>(0.370)<br>0.0531*<br>(0.0274)<br>0.833<br>(0.544)<br>-3.032***<br>(0.541)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.754<br>0.627<br>459<br>85<br>86<br>alanced sample<br>es reported for<br>ented for using<br>hows the same<br>e system GMM|
|---|
|SYS<br>GMM<br>(7)<br>0.639***<br>(0.0615)<br>0.516*<br>(0.268)<br>0.980***<br>(0.334)<br>0.0337<br>(0.0215)<br>0.997**<br>(0.448)<br>-2.527**<br>(1.023)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.742<br>0.605<br>459<br>85<br>90<br>ple is an unb<br>ons. The valu<br>y are instrum<br>, column (4) s<br>struments, th|
|SYS<br>GMM<br>(6)<br>0.594***<br>(0.0606)<br>0.643**<br>(0.309)<br>0.955***<br>(0.309)<br>0.0471**<br>(0.0226)<br>-0.163<br>(0.143)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.711<br>0.284<br>459<br>85<br>76<br>ator. The sam<br>erial correlati<br>rmined. The<br> In particular<br>on to these in|
|SYS<br>GMM<br>(5)<br>0.554***<br>(0.0664)<br>0.173<br>(0.557)<br>1.141***<br>(0.400)<br>0.0568**<br>(0.0265)<br>0.0420<br>(0.0418)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.663<br>0.243<br>412<br>79<br>76<br> GMM estim<br>ond test for s<br>d as pre-dete<br>her columns. <br>ck. In additi<br>riod.|
|SYS<br>GMM<br>(4)<br>0.560***<br>(0.0661)<br>0.565<br>(0.360)<br>1.486***<br>(0.450)<br>0.0928***<br>(0.0337)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.661<br>0.200<br>459<br>85<br>62<br>ne step system<br>s of Arellano-B<br>ables are treate<br>gs in all the ot<br> robustness che<br> lagged one pe|
|SYS<br>GMM<br>(3)<br>0.577***<br>(0.0675)<br>0.520<br>(0.349)<br>1.389***<br>(0.420)<br>0.0894***<br>(0.0307)<br>yes<br>0.000<br>0.664<br>0.279<br>459<br>85<br>74<br> parentheses. O<br> are the p-value<br>y. All the vari<br>rst to second la<br> second lags for<br> ...rst di¤erences|
|F.E.<br>OLS<br>(2)<br>0.365***<br>(0.0558)<br>-0.700<br>(0.693)<br>-0.470<br>(0.745)<br>-0.312**<br>(0.150)<br>yes<br>0.432<br>459<br>85<br>y country in <br> and AR(2) <br>ment validit<br> their own ...<br>ents till the <br>ables in the|
|Pooled<br>OLS<br>(1)<br>Polity2t�5<br>0.723***<br>(0.0415)<br>Human capitalt�5<br>0.662***<br>(0.213)<br>Total emigration ratet�5<br>0.219*<br>(0.127)<br>Log populationt�5<br>-0.00306<br>(0.00745)<br>Log GDP per capitat�5<br>Share tertiary ed. migrantst�5<br>Human capitalt�5*Soc. dummy<br>Total emigration ratet�5*Soc. dummy<br>Human capitalt�5*Soc. dummy*d90<br>Total emigration ratet�5*Soc. dummy*d90<br>Time dummies<br>yes<br>R-squared<br>0.660<br>AR(1) test<br>AR(2) test<br>Hansen J test<br>Observations<br>459<br>N. countries<br>N. instr.<br>*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered b<br>comprising data at ...ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1) <br>the Hansen J test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instru<br>their own ...rst to third lags in column 3. They are instrumented for <br>speci...cation as column (3), but now reducing the number of instrum<br>also uses as instruments for the level equations the explanatory vari|

19
**Table 15: External training-Gender**

|**Variable**||**1993**||||**19**|**99**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Trxgen**|**Wage-**|**P>Izl**<br>**Prod**|**uctivity**|**P>Izl**|**Wage**|**P>Izl**<br>|**Productivity**|**P>Izl**|
|Pooled|0.04|0.00|0.01|0.36|0.03|0.35|0.10|0.28|
|**Micro**|0.10|0.00|0.00|0.99|-0.01|0.96|-0.66|0.12|
|Small|0.03|0.01|-0.02|0.25|**_0.15_**|0.05|0.42|0.03|
|Medium|0.03|0.00|0.00|0.88|-0.02|0.75|-0.28|0.02|
|Large|0.05|0.00|0.03|0.00|0.02|0.74|0.10|_0.54_|
|_Source_Auth|or'scalculatio|ns based on ENT|RAM-ENE|STYC.|||||

# **v. Union Membership**

By siudying union membership in this analysis, it became apparent that union membership reduces wages in Mexico across all firms. In 1993 and 1999, union members earned lower wages than non-union members (see Table 16) by 24 and 28 percent, respectively. This finding is surprising because studies from wage analysis in developed countries usually show that union members earn more than their non-union member colleagues. However, in another World Bank study (1999), it was found that unionization does not increase wages in Mexico.

Despite the decrease in wages that union members face, statistically significant numbers show that union members were more productive than non-members in both 1993 and 1999. The productivity gap is 17 percent in 1999 and 10 percent in 1993. However, further research is needed to establish whether union members themselves are more productive or if it is the firms they work for that are more productive.

|||T|able**16: **|**Union**me|**bership**|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Variable**||**1993**||||**1**|**999**|||
|**Lreg**|**Wage**|**P>Izl**<br>**Prod**|**uctivity**|**P>Izl**|**Wage**|**P>Izl**|**Produ**|**ctivity**|**P>Izl**|
|ooled|-0.24|0.00|0.10|0.00|-0.28|0.00||0.17|0.00|
|Micro|-0.08|0.34|0.73|0.00|-0.11|0.12||0.05|0.76|
|Srnall|-0.10|0.00|0.12|0.01|-0.19|0.00||0.30|0.00|
|Medium|-0.30|0.00|0.03|0.39|-0.30|0.00||0.07|0.20|
|Large|-0.29|0.00|-0.02|0.71|-0.36|0.00||0.23|0.00|

_Source:_ Authors' calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC 18
which is positive if �c0h<sup>�(1 �bij)ejv</sup> 20 � <u>fjNMiij</u><sup>; ejh</sup> � > wi � wj<sup>7</sup> . In the case of South-North migration, we have wj > wi and, therefore, above condition always holds. Hence, level of of migration increases with human capital levels and positive selection is observed. Positive selection is even stronger when 0 network e¤ects on moving costs ��ch� are large and when the host country has a selective immigration policy (i.e. ej is large). We should note that positive selection does not imply that there are more skilled emigrants than unskilled emigrants, but the higher-skilled have a higher propensity to migrate. If the proportion of the highlyskilled among natives is low (such as in Africa), there will still be more unskilled than skilled migrants in destination countries. However, the ratio of the skilled to the unskilled will be higher among migrants when compared to natives. For other types of migration (between rich and rich, between poor and poor, or from rich to poor countries), we might have wj � wi < 0. In that case, negative selection could emerge.

# 3.2 Diaspora Externalities

We now turn to diaspora e¤ects on the size and structure of migration ‡ows. First, from (4), a large diaspora in destination j unambiguously increases current migration ‡ows to j from i: The overall impact depends on the e¤ect of networks on migration costs (c0M<sup>)and</sup> on the generosity of family reunion programs (fj) together with the e¤ect on visa costs (vf0<sup>).Second,weshowthatalargerdiasporaincountryjreducethe’positive</sup> selection’of migrants to j from i:

# 3.3 Immigration Policies

What are the implications of these results for immigration policies? Obviously, a more generous immigration policy, both in terms of family reuni...cation and economic immigration programs, at destination increases the size of immigration ‡ows:

> 7In practice, some reported zeros might not re‡ect the actual absence of migrants. Due to con...dentiality and disclosure rules, some statistics o¢ ces report a zero when the diaspora size is lower than a threshold value. We are not able to distinguish these cases from "true" zeros.

13
Second, a commitment to eliminate barriers to foreign direct investment, either immediately or, in sectors where regulatory inadequacies need to be remedied, in a phased manner. The greatest benefits of securing openness to FDI, especially in infrastructure services, would accrue to the South while offering increased business opportunities to the North.

Third, agreement to allow somewhat greater freedom of international movement for individual service providers (mode 4 in WTO parlance) in order to fulfill specific services contracts. Research shows large potential benefits to both the North and the South from the liberalization of mode 4, as it offers a way to realize the gains from trade while averting social and political costs in host countries and brain drain losses for source countries. Progress on mode 4 is critical to overall balance.

For there to be a reasonable prospect of achieving these goals, more attention needs to be given to the regulatory context in which services liberalization takes place.

First, negotiators could focus primarily on securing “national treatment”, i.e. ending all discrimination on the entry and operation of foreign services providers, rather than on creating more intrusive disciplines. This will reassure regulators that multilateral commitments deprive them _only_ of the freedom to discriminate, and not limit their freedom to regulate in any other way or adopt policies that improve sector performance.

Second, the development and trade community need to work together to establish a credible mechanism to provide regulatory assistance to support liberalization commitments by developing countries. This will reassure developing country policymakers that regulatory inadequacies that could undermine the benefits of liberalization will be remedied before any market-opening commitments take effect.

Third, it should be possible to make temporary entry of foreign services providers conditional on the fulfillment of specific conditions by source countries. Immigration authorities in host economies need to be assured that source countries will cooperate to screen services providers, to accept and facilitate their return, and to combat illegal migration.

The gains from properly managed liberalization of services trade are substantial. World Bank analysis has shown this to be the case even in very poor countries. An ambitious package in services may provide new dynamism to multilateral trade cooperation. Doing so may also allow the Doha Development Agenda to live up to its name.

13
- 9o -

Geisler, Charles C, Daniel Usner, Rayna Green, Patrick West (eds) 1982 Indian SIA: The social imact assessment of rapid resource development on native peoples U. Mich. Nat. Res. Soc. Res. Lab. Monogr. 3, 448p

# Glick, Dennis 1988

Key issues in tl.e relationship between wildland conservation and indigenous peoples in Latin America Contrib. Paper. World bank, 32p Unpubl.

# Glick, Dennis, Jorge Betancourt 1983

The Rio Platano Biosphere Reserves unique resource, unique alternative Ambio 12 (3/4) 169-73

# Glick, Dennis, Jorge Orejuela 1986

La Planada: looking beyond the boundaries WWF-US 8p Unpubl.

Comm, Roger 1974 The elephant men Ecologist 4 (2) 53-57

# Graham, Duncan 1987

Rudall National Park: no haven for aborigines The Age, Aug. 13

# Gray, Andrew 1987

The Amerindians of South America The Minority Rights Group, Rep. 15<sup>26</sup> p Gwitcha-Gwitchen-Ginkhye 1978 Proposal for community involvement in the international treaty for the management of the porcupine caribou herd Old Crow, Yukon, Unpubl. _17p_

# Herlihy, Peter H 1985

Settlement and Subsistence change among the Choco Indians of the Darien Province, Eastern Panama, an overview Conf. Latin Amer. Geog. Yearbook 11-16

# Herlihy, Peter H 1986

Indians and rainforest collide - the cultural parks of Darien Cult. Surv. Quart. 10 (3) 57-61
3 economic and political developments in the country over the past four decades seem to have brought about a wider distribution of power in recent years. This change has the poteintial to mitigate sUi..e of the main shortcomings of the telecommunications policy.

To make the task of the study manageable, the discussion focuses on the histor, of the sector's dominant firm, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). which owns about 90 percent of the working phone lines and has a virtual monopoly over domestic and international long-distance telephone circuits in the country. A government-owned company, TELOF, operates about 2 percent of the countr-'s telephones, and more than sixty small private and local-governmentowned operators control the remaining 8 percent. There are also several other **firms** engaged in providing telegraph, telex, paging, cellular telephony, and similar servict;s.'

# **Political structure and commitment capability**

Identifying the origins of weak regulatory commitment capability in the Philippines is critical to an understanding of the dynamics of telecommunications policy and performance and to the design of institutions that can contribute constructively to rapid deveiopment.

# _The making of basic Philippine institutions_

The Philippines became a U.S. colony in the closing years of the nineteenth century, scon after four centuries of Spanish rule had come to an end. An important legacy of Spanish domination was an open economy based on exports of primary products by large farms, a pattern that continued under U.S. rule. Over time, a strong patronage system arose headed by an agrarian elite with close ties to U.S. politicians and business leaders. The group's small size, common interests, and pervasive kinship network enabled it to overcome internal political and economic rivalries and promote the group's interests over those of the rest of the population. U.S. policy interests in thc region worked to foster the economic and political dominance of this group as well, since the U.S. government was interested in establishing a political system in the Philippines that would remain stable and friendly to the United States. Through a process of negotiated independence, this elite group gradually acquired 'Data on the performance of PLDT are based largely on information provided by the company and in its annual reports. Additional information has been obtained from annual reports of the National Telecommunications Commission and from the 20K forms the company has filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The macroeconomic data are based on the International Monetary Fund's _International Financial Statistics._
The information of Tables 1 and 2 provides some evidence in favor of using actual traded goods prices instead of a basket of price levels as measure of traded goods prices. Some additional studies are however, called for, as one of the three cases, Argentina, does not support this view , at least for the period under analysis. For the two other countries, the measure using actual prices of traded goods performs substantially better than the Basket measure.

TABLE 1

# EXPLANATORY REGRESSION FOR THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE

# USING A BASKET OF CURRENCIES

||U.S.A.|COLOMBIA|ARGENTINA|
|---|---|---|---|
|Constant<br>(T-Value)|11.61<br>(1.5)|4.441<br>(180)|4.32<br>(42)|
|Log(Terms of Trade)|-1.602|-0.381|-0.21|
|(T-Value)|(-0.97)|(-2.35)|(-0.8)|
|Trade Surplus/GDP|-0.047|0.041|0.054|
|(T-Value)|(_0.C)|(3^73)|(3.16)|
|AR(1)|0.936||0.655|
|(T-Value)|(16.4)|-|(3.55)|
|_____________________________||||
|R2 Adj.|0.81|0.37|0.84|
|S.E.of Regression|0.055|0.08|0.13|
|D.W.|1.23|1.26|1.62|
|PERIOD|75.IV-|1971-|1972-|
||85-III|1986|1987|

INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: Log.T.of Trade (0,-i),Fiscal Surplus/GDP (0,-l),Trade S./GDP(-1) Real Exch.Rate(-1). The USA regression is done with quarterly data seasonally adjusted at annual rates and does not include the current terms cf trade as instrumental variable.

The Terms of Trade variable corresponds to the ratio of internal prices of exports and imports.

38
our education enrollments variable. We assume twelve years of primary and secondary education, six years of tertiary education and add another ten to fifteen years of necessary work experience before being eligible for a managerial position. This implies a lag of 30 to 35 years for someone starting primary education to become a manager, and a lag of 10-15 years for someone completing tertiary education. So, taking the average of the minimum lag (average of 10 to 15 years) and the maximum lag (average of 30 to 35 years), we get a lag of about 22 years. A lag of 22 years from the time of Enterprise Surveys (2008 as the average year) gives us year 1986. In our baseline specification, we use five-year average values of _Enrollment_ as defined above and centered on 1986 ( _Enrollment_ 1986_ ).<sup>5</sup> Our estimate of 10-15 years of required work experience does involve some guesswork. Data from Enterprise Surveys shows that the median number of years of experience that the top manager has working in the industry equals 15 years. Note that this does not include work experience acquired in other industries and it includes experience acquired after becoming a manager in the current industry. Hence, actual experience of managers before becoming a manager could be higher or lower than the average of 15 years. To overcome this problem, we also report results use five year average values of _Enrollment_ centered on 1981 ( _Enrollment_ 1981_ ), 1976 ( _Enrollment_ 1976_ ), 1991 ( _Enrollment_1991_ ) and 1996 ( _Enrollment_1996_ ).

The mean value of _Enrollment_ 1986_ equals 1.004 and the standard deviation is 0.332. Across countries, the variable ranges between 0.22 (Chad) and 2.2 (Dominica).

It is important to note here that we have clubbed together primary, secondary and tertiary education enrollment levels and assumed the same lag (22 years for our baseline specification) for all of them. The reason for doing so is to get an overall measure of access to education for women

> 5 That is, we take the average over 1984 to 1988 values of enrollment ratios for primary, secondary and tertiary education and then take the average over the three resulting ratios. As mentioned above, for some countries, _Enrollment_1986_ is computed with data not available for all three education levels. Enrollment levels centered on other years (discussed below) are analogously defined.

13