categorized themselves as having benefited from demobilization allowances. Indeed, many people helped the rebels during the war and they may have wrongly categorized themselves as demobilized ex-combatants. Similarly, some respondents may have claimed to be demobilized in expectation of rewards in exchange for their participation to the survey.

The short-run direct impact of the DDR program is measured by the dummies _Ri_<sup>_FNL_</sup> and _Di_<sup>_FNL_</sup> . In particular, the coefficient β1 measures the impact of having a FNL _returnee_ in the household who did not benefit from reinsertion allowances. The coefficient β2 measures the marginal impact of having benefited from the FNL reinsertion allowance.<sup>19</sup> We therefore compare the _returnee_ households that have received the grant (demobilized) to the _returnee_ households that reported having a member who was part of the FNL but did not receive reinsertion grants (hypothesis 1).

The variables _R_<sup>_CNDD_</sup> _i_<sup>+</sup> and _D_<sup>_CNDD_</sup> _i_<sup>+</sup> capture the long-run evolution of outcomes for CNDD+ households (hypothesis 2). To interpret the coefficients associated with these variables, we need to carefully consider the timing of the demobilization of CNDD+ combatants, which started before the first survey at the end of 2004. Thus, by the time of the QUIBB survey, which is used as our baseline, these ex-combatants had already benefited from reinsertion allowances. Then, they benefited from the in-kind reintegration grants between both surveys. Hence, we are not able to measure the long-term impact of the program on their economic outcomes. What we can assess however, is the evolution of their economic outcomes between the two surveys.

We explain this argument formally. In an ideal scenario in which we would have had data before the peace agreement, let σ denote the short-run impact of the demobilization program, that is, the one-year impact between the reception of the allowances and the QUIBB survey. Similarly, λ denotes the measure of the long-run impact of the demobilization program, that is, the five-year impact between the reception of the allowances and the 2010 panel survey. Unfortunately, we are not able to measure σ and λ separately. However, we can capture the difference η = λ − σ, which can be thought of as the long-run evolution of the economic outcomes of CNDD+ ex-combatants. Therefore, in equation (1), the coefficient η1 measures the evolution of outcomes for _returnee_ CNDD+ households that did not benefit from the DDR, and the coefficient η2 measures the differential evolution for CNDD+ _demobilized_ households.<sup>20</sup> We recommend caution when comparing the impacts of the DDR on FNL and CNDD+ demobilized

> 19Some of the returnees have benefited from the FBU 100,000 (US$ 91) allocated to “Gardiens de la Paix”, “Militants Combatants” and “Adultes Associés”. We do not have access to registers to verify which households benefited from these reduced grants. Our empirical analysis will therefore slightly underestimate the effect of the demobilization program.

> 20In table S.5 in appendix, we show descriptive statistics disaggregated by demobilization status and faction along with seven joint tests of equality of means between the nondemobilized households and the civilians, and the nondemobilized and demobilized within and between faction. The statistics related to the demobilized are computed considering the second definition in table 2.

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