rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
The study starts with a brief review of developing country trade performance in the 1990's. This uses WTO and World Bank data and covers major developments in developing countries' exporlis and imports utilising growth rates, shares of trade related to output and similar aggregate indicators. The main purpose of this section is to compare, in general terms, the performance of the 42 developing countries, on which the study is based. to that of developing countries as a whole; not to undertake a systematic analysis of trends in developing countries trade performance or the factors that affected it during this period.

The next section presents a comprehensive and detailed review of the state of developing courtry trade policies and institutions based on the latest available Trade Policy Review. For the 1 7economies, for which more than one TPR has been prepared, an effort is made to trace the evolution of various policies and institutions . er the whole period 1989-1997.

The third section is devoted to a discussion of the international environment facing developing countries. This is based on information developed from three main sources: (a) the TPRs of the deve loped - countries, their main trading partners; (b) information generated outside this project e.g. In the OECD/UNCTAD, regarding key indicators of access in developed country markets; and (c) special WTO analyses of market access issues for LDCs ( WT/COMITD/HL/14).

The final section summarizes the main conclusions of the study and their implications for action by the developing countries and the international community on steps that would enhance the integration of the developing countries into the multilateral trading system.

# **II.** Trends in Developing Countries' Trade, **1989-1997**

The period covered by this study, 1989-1997, witnessed a very rapid expansion of world trade, and an even more rapid expansion of developing countries' trade. Between 1989 and 1997, the vallue of country measures with WTO obligations; as well as constraints on what the WT0 Secretariat can accomplish with the limited resources devoted to TPR preparation.

4
# **Abstract**

The paper examines, taking into account the urban-rural divides, the changes and welfare implications of income diversification in Zimbabwe following macroeconomic policy changes and droughts of the early 1990s. Data from two comparable national income, consumption and expenditure surveys in 1990/91 and 1995/96, which straddled a period of economic volatility and natural disasters, show that the percentage of households earning income from private and informal sources grew considerably while that from government and formal sources declined in the aftermath of the drought and policy changes. We find that, in general, rural households tend to have a more diversified portfolio of income compared to their urban counterparts and the degree of diversification decreases with the level of urbanization. However, there are important differences in the level of diversification within the rural and urban areas depending on wealth: While the relatively better-off households have a more diversified income base in rural areas, it is the poor who pursue multiple income sources in urban areas. A decomposition of changes in welfare indicates that the total contribution of income diversification is large and increased between 1990/91 and 1995/96 in both urban and rural areas. On the other hand, there were significant declines in returns to human and physical capital assets during the same period. The findings suggest that households with a more diversified income base are better able to withstand the unfavorable impacts of the policy and weather shocks. The fact that relatively better-off households have a more diversified income base following the shocks implies that the poor are more vulnerable to economic changes unaccompanied by well-designed safety nets.

ii
2 viewed the objective conditions of their economy, how they proposed that strongly expansionary policies should and could be carried out, and how they rationalized that constraints could be dealt with.<sup>2</sup> And, of course, we are impressed by the fact that in the end, foreign exchange constraints and extreme inflation forced a program of violent real wage cuts that ended in massive political instability, coups and violence. There is no doubt in our mind about the sincerity of the policy makers who embark on these programs, and we shars their conviction that income distribution is unacceptably unequal. The very sincerity of these policy makers convinces us of the usefulness, and indeed the necessity of laying out exactly how and why the programs do go wrong.

The combination of external influences (debt crises,economic blockades etc.), domestic policies (socialization of firms, bank nationalization, etc.) and macroeconomic policies bring about an unsustainable economy where inflation is out of control, and the foreign exchange constraints force realism on policy makers. Accounts of these experiences by sympathizers often emphasize politics and, especially, external factors as central to the demise. Our purpose is not to belittle these factors. There is no question in our mind that external destabilization can be an important part of the unravelling of an economic program. But we want to emphasize that the extreme vulnerability that makes destabilization possible is, by and large, the result of 2See Sachs (1989) and Dornbusch (1988b) for this same theme.
education and health outcomes. Better transportation systems and safer roads help raise school attendance (Brenneman and Kerf 2002), while improved access to electricity allows more time for study and the use of computers (Leipziger et al. 2003). Cross-country research shows that enhanced access and use of basic infrastructure services reduces rates of child and maternal mortality. Likewise, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that the prevalence and duration of diarrhea in children under five in rural India is lower among households with piped water, although the impact on the poor is amplified if public investment in water and sanitation is accompanied by other interventions in education and income-poverty reduction. Analogous benefits resulted in Argentina when privatization expanded access to water and sanitation by the poor -- child mortality fell by 8 percent (Galiani et al. 2005).

Recent evidence shows that the benefits to the poor of improved access to water may go beyond the conventional health effects. Better access reduces time devoted to water collection, and thus it frees up time for additional leisure or production. It reduces important sources of stress and tension within the household and/or community. Moreover, it provides women greater mobility and opportunity to socialize and improve their well-being. Overall, welfare gains may result even in the absence of income or health gains; see Devoto et al. (2011) for evidence from the city of Tangiers.

Finally, evidence from Latin America shows that privatization of infrastructure sectors often benefited the poorest groups by granting them access to services. For instance, Chisari et al. (1999) and Navajas (2000) find that the privatization of infrastructure services in Argentina hurt the middle class relatively more than the rest of the income groups through the elimination of existing subsidies. However, it benefited the poor by improving their access to services. Estache, Gomez-Lobo and Leipziger (2000) show that the less-favored segments of the population in Latin America had very limited (or no) access to many utility services, and thus did not benefit from their expansion prior to the privatization. However, the extent of the benefits from privatization reaped by the poorest differed across sectors. In many countries, the rapid expansion of mobile telephone networks led to increased access to a wide array of service suppliers. The power sector, on the other hand, moved at a slower pace post-privatization, and reforms often failed to provide low-cost solutions to remote households in rural areas (Foster, Tre and Wodon, 2001). More broadly, an encompassing review of Latin America’s experience offers several examples of improved access to infrastructure post-privatization (World Bank 16
be lower for younger women, whose circles of friends may adhere less to traditional social norms, who may not yet have children or have fewer children, thus needing lower income to survive, or possibly even have more energy for finding employment or engaging in entrepreneurial activities.

# **6. Policy discussion and conclusions**

This paper attempts to estimate the impact of women’s police stations in Brazil – DEAMs – on one of the manifestations of domestic violence – homicide rate among women aged 15 to 49. The high fraction of deaths in this age group due to domestic violence makes this indicator the best available proxy for domestic violence. Given that police stations staffed by women are becoming an increasingly popular element in the national anti-domestic policy programs in a number of countries, the authors hope to provide useful and relevant inputs into the policy discussions.

We hope one of the first policy goals will be to work to improve data on domestic violence. First, as we rely on the data on homicides only, we are unable to say anything about the effectiveness of the women police stations with respect to lesser aggressions. We are testing an impact on only the most violent form of domestic violence and are not be able to provide any evidence of DEAM’s effectiveness (or lack thereof) in managing non-fatal forms of domestic violence. The homicide variable is a noisy outcome, as well, as we cannot distinguish intra-familiar violence from violence outside the home. Likewise, homicide reporting is an issue. We recall that our sample covers only 35% of the country, those with best practices in data reporting. We cannot say if our results would be applicable to the rest of the country; we are agnostic about how homicide data administration and DEAM effectiveness may be related.

In spite of these data challenges, while we do not find an association between female homicide and establishment of DEAMs on average, DEAMs appear to have strong effects in some groups of women: among women living in larger metropolitan areas and among younger women (aged 15 to 24). Notably, the effects are the highest among young women living in metropolitan areas: establishment of a DEAM triggers a reduction in homicide rate roughly amounting to 70 percent of average homicide rate in that group.

A combination of a heterogeneity analysis with qualitative interviews suggests a number of potential areas of improvement in the administration of DEAMs and anti-Domestic Violence policy more generally. To make DEAMs as effective for overall populations as they are for young urban women, measures addressing social stigma and facilitating women’s economic autonomy 17
ante or ex-post than other firms raising equity or bonds. Fourth, the results are robust to splitting the sample in 2007. Fifth, the results are qualitatively similar when using the Worldscope data, as reported in Appendix Table 6.

# **4.4.  Implications for the firm size distribution**

The evidence on firm size and firm growth has important implications for the FSD and its evolution across publicly listed firms. To study this, we estimate four density estimates: two for the distribution of firm size as of 2003 (one for users and one for non-users of capital market financing) and two analogous ones as of 2010. Figure 5A shows the results for total assets as a proxy for firm size, whereas Figure 5B reports the estimates for sales. In this sub-section, users are the firms that raise equity (Panels A and C) or bonds (Panels B and D) between 2004 and 2010; all firms with capital raising activity in 2003 are excluded from the sample in this figure. Non-users are the other firms in our sample. The figure shows that the nonparametric density estimates of the Kernel distributions of firm size, measured by total assets, are indeed different between users and non-users of capital markets.

The distribution of users of capital markets as of 2003 is located to the right of that of the non-users, indicating that the firms that use capital markets are typically larger than the other firms. The differences in the density functions between equity or bond users and non-users in both China and India are all statistically significant according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Figure 5, bottom panel).<sup>30</sup> These patterns indicating differences in firm size at the beginning of our sample are consistent with the evidence presented thus far that larger firms are more likely to use equity or bond financing.

> 30 Among the largest issuers (in terms of total assets) from China are a number of financial corporations, such as China Merchants Bank and Bank of Communications, as well as non-financials like Baoshan Iron and Steel Company and Huaneng Power International. In India, the top user firms also comprises financial and non-financial corporations, among which are ICICI Bank, Reliance Industries, Tata Steel, and Tata Motors.

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**Table 5:** _Values of governance index, EBRD-based structural reform index and FDI cumulative inflows per capita in 1990-2003_

||Albania|BiH|Bulgaria|Croatia|Czech R.|Estonia|Macedonia|Hungary|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Governance|-0.38|-0.75|0.10|0.25|0.78|0.88|-0.30|0.85|
|FDI cumulative per capita|343|280|835|2,147|3,771|3,013|476|3,697|
|EBRD-based Index|26|13|43|48|65|62|33|72|
||Latvia|Lithuania|Moldova|Poland|Romania|S&M|Slovak R.|Slovenia|
|Governance|0.44|0.50|-0.35|0.62|-0.12|-0.91|0.45|0.75|
|FDI cumulative per capita|1,461|1,091|156|1,431|482|260|1,647|2,028|
|EBRD-based Index|49|52|36|63|38|3|51|57|

Notes: EBRD-based index ranges between 0 and 100 (fully operational market structures; Governance ranges between minimum of – 2.5 (dysfunctional) and +2.5 (perfect quality). Source: EBRD transition reports various issues, IMF balance of payments statistics and derived from data available at <u>www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm</u>

**Figure 3:** _FDI cumulative inflows over 1990-2003 per capita (in US dollars) and EBRD-based index of progress in second-generation reforms_

<!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000<br>cumulative FDI per capita<br>Source and notes: See Table 5<br>Figure 4: Values of governance index and FDI inflows cumulative over 1990-2003 per capita (in US dollars)<br>4,000<br>y = 1432x 2 + 1616x + 668<br>R 2 = 0.82<br>3,500<br>3,000<br>2,500<br>2,000<br>1,500<br>1,000<br>500<br>0<br>-1.00 -0.80 -0.60 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00<br>Governance Index<br>EBRD-based Index<br>cumulative FDI per capita<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source and notes: See Table 5

**Figure 4:** _Values of governance index and FDI inflows cumulative over 1990-2003 per capita (in US dollars)_

Sources and notes: See Table 5.
**Table 3: Definition of main income concepts for distributional analysis**

|**Income Concept**|**Description**|
|---|---|
|Net taxable Income|In HSES, all reported wages, nonf-farm income and income from rents are assumed to<br>bein net terms (i.e., afterpersonal income taxes)|
|Other Market Income|Own food consumption,net farm income, gifts,financial and other incomes|
|SSC(employee contributions)|Social SecurityContributions made bythe employee<br>|
|**Market Income**|Grossed up Net Taxable Income + Other Market Income + SSC (employee<br>contributions)|
|Education expenditures|Education(tertiarylevel)expenditures can be deducted for tax reporting purposes|
|Deductions|SSC(employee contributions)+ Education expenditures|
|Taxable Income|Market Income - Deductions|
|Personal income tax (PIT)|Taxable income * flat personal income tax of 10% (If total direct taxes is<=94,000<br>per person then no taxes)|
|**Net Market Income (Market**<br>**income - contributions - direct**<br>**taxes)**|Market Income - PIT - SSC (employee contributions)|
|Direct transfers|Social Programs (social insurance such as pensions, unemployment benefits, etc; and<br>socialassistance suchasmerit programs, child program, etc)|
|**Disposable income (Net market**<br>**income + direct transfers)**|<br>Net Market Income + Direct Transfers|
|VAT|Flat 0.08623 rate on consumption expenditures excluding rent, health, education, and<br>alcohol/tobacco|
|Excise|Flat 0.174 rate on alcohol and tobacco expenditures|
|Mortgage Subsidy|average interest rate (19% in 2016) minus subsidized mortage rate (8%) by average<br>householdloanas of 2016,for householdsin HSESreporting amortgage|
|Electricity Subsidy|(Estimate production cost minus tariff) * kWh of consumption by household defined<br>according to type oftariff|
|Heating Subsidy|(Estimate production cost minus tariff) * heating consumption (in square meters of<br>household size) byhousehold defined according to type oftariff|
|**Consumable income**<br>**(Disposable income - indirect**<br>**taxes+ indirect subsidies)**|Disposable Income - VAT - Excise Taxes + Indirect taxes (mortgage, electricity and<br>heating subsidies)|
|Monetized In-Kind|Public education and public health are monetized (average expenditure per<br>student/patient) and allocated to households with students and/or patients|
|**Final Income (Consumable**<br>**income+ in-kind transfers)**|Consumable Income + Monetized In-Kind|

29 MONGOLIA Distributional impact of taxes and transfers / November 2018
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) allows inventors file “international” patent applications that can then help them seek patent protection simultaneously in many countries. The treaty was concluded in 1970, amended in 1979, and modified in 1984 and 2001. It is open to all states that are parties to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883). The World International Property Organization (WIPO) administers the PCT through an Assembly to which all member countries belong. India became a party to the PCT in late 1998. By mid-2006 the PCT Assembly had 133 member states. The Assembly is responsible for issuing and amending regulations and for fixing fees for international filings.

The PCT also assigns various major national patent offices responsibility for conducting international searches for each international application. An office thus appointed assumes the status of an International Searching Authority (ISA). An ISA issues international search report listing citations that might affect the patentability of the invention claimed in the international application, and prepares a written opinion on patentability. These documents help applicants determine which national patent applications to pursue and which to withdraw. If the applicant decides to pursue an international application, WIPO publishes it, along with the search report, but not the ISA opinion.

The PCT confers significant advantages on patent applicants, national patent offices, and the general public:

- It extends filing deadlines up to 18 months in many member countries, and eases various formalities associated with the nuanced filing requirements that individual patent offices maintain.

- The ISA opinion provides valuable information that can help applicants make informed decisions about which national patents to pursue.

- The international search report can ease workloads on national patent offices, conserving public resources and speeding processing times. It can also help members of the public form well-founded opinions about the <u>patentability of the claimed invention, and conform their behavior accordingly.</u>

**Figure 1 Patent Applications Filed in India, 1999–2005**<sup>37</sup>

<!-- Start of picture text --> 17466<br>12613<br>10592 11465 10671<br>8503 6351 7049 7717<br>5076<br>4164<br>269<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 17466<br>12613<br>10592 11465 10671<br>8503 6351 7049 7717<br>5076<br>4164<br>269<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 17466<br>12613<br>10592 11465 10671<br>8503 6351 7049 7717<br>5076<br>4164<br>269<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 17466<br>12613<br>10592 11465 10671<br>8503 6351 7049 7717<br>5076<br>4164<br>269<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 17466<br>12613<br>10592 11465 10671<br>8503 6351 7049 7717<br>5076<br>4164<br>269<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> 37 Compiled by CSIR from Annual Reports of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks through 2001/02, and from the Patent Office, New Delhi, for subsequent years.

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markets. This at least partially, and often substantially, offsets the more direct losses from erosion of bilateral preference margins. Thus, preference erosion will be offset by the compensatory effect of broad-based multilateral liberalization, including by emerging market economies and by beneficiary countries themselves. However, research suggests that what matters most in terms of own reform by LDCs is the pursuit of complementary reforms and public investments that enhance the productivity of firms and farmers. Additional trade reforms on their own will not generate significant benefits in terms of poverty reduction (World Bank and IMF, 2005).

Finally, implementation and transition periods also matter, as does the depth and scope of the reforms. Total erosion is unlikely to happen in a short span—and any MFN reforms will be implemented gradually over several years. What follows briefly discusses some recent studies that quantify the potential income effects of preference erosion.<sup>8</sup> Focusing on the LDCs and using a global general equilibrium model and the latest version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database that incorporates data on the major OECD preference programs (Bouet et al. 2004), Francois, Hoekman and Manchin (2005) conclude that complete preference erosion due to MFN reforms in the EU—including in agriculture—would impose a welfare (real income) loss of some $460 million on African LDCs and an additional $100 million on Bangladesh. This assumes away compliance costs. Limão and Olarreaga (2005) also undertake an analysis of the welfare effects of complete preference erosion. They calculate what the income transfer to LDCs would need to be so as to be equivalent to the transfer implied by existing preference programs. They conclude that for LDCs the figure is $266 million. This is a one-year, short-run effect—all else equal the net present value will be several times higher. This brings their results in line with those of Francois, Hoekman and Manchin (2005), although the results are not strictly comparable given that Limão and Olarreaga use partial equilibrium methods.

Using a variety of techniques, Grynberg and Silva (2004) estimate the losses in income transfers to producers in trade-preference-dependent economies at $1.7 billion

> 8 Much of the literature focuses on trade effects—see e.g., IMF (2003) and Alexandraki and Lankes (2004). Our interest here is on the magnitude of the implied financial transfers as that provides the most straightforward measure of the value of preferences. This is not to argue that such transfers were the primary objective of preference programs. We return to the implications of this objective for policy responses to erosion in section 4 below.

8