rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Box 1. How regional cooperation can help: DTIS recommendations about SPS for Tanzania**

The 2005 Diagnostic Trade Integration Study conducted in Tanzania under the Integrated Framework finds that a regional approach and cooperation for SPS and quality standards can:

- increase trade through harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of conformity systems (avoiding duplication);

- spread knowledge and good practices (creating positive information <u>externalities);</u>

- more effectively manage trans-boundary risks (avoiding negative <u>externalities);</u>

- serve to realize economies of scale and scope in the delivery of conformity assessment;

- better enable regional enterprises to comply with extra-regional standards where collaboration facilitates international accreditation;

The DTIS recommendations prioritize the following areas of regional cooperation:

- Streamlining of regulations (simplification and improved transparency) and mutual recognition;

- Resource pooling (‘centers of excellence’ for the testing, registration or other monitoring of inputs or outputs for specific products such as pesticides, condoms or cosmetics);

- Multi-country collaboration for problem solving (surveillance and contingency planning, but also research, pilot programs and training).

_Source: Tanzania DTIS (2005: 91-98) and author_ Positive externalities also arise – beyond the mere realization economies of scale described earlier – from the provision of international finance and insurance. International provision of such services offers the possibility to mutualize risks across a region, and contribute to positive network effects, such as linking banks that usually do not do business with each other and diffusing skills through the network. The principle of mutualization is applicable for other trade related financial instruments specifically relevant to trade facilitation and transit such as guarantees for payment of taxes and insurance. COMESA introduced the Yellow Card or Third Party Regional Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme which allows traders to purchase insurance covering transport in the region (Arvis, 2005). The region also plans to set up a regional transit bond scheme. Regional guarantees (to secure the payment of duty and taxes) can address the failure of national organizations to set up such systems, because they often do not have the sufficient size, have only access to underdeveloped national financial services, and international insurers are not willing to face the political and commercial risks of developing markets. In Uganda, the cost customs bonds is estimated to add up to 4% to import and export costs and a recommendation of the Integrated Framework diagnostic study is to use a regional approach to reduce their incidence (Uganda DTIS, 2006). Arvis (2005) argues that the lack of a regional customs guarantee explains why transit initiatives to replicate the success of the European TIR system have failed so far.

13
**Figure III:** Fan regressions of height-for-age z-scores by month of birth, raw and fully adjusted treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals

Panel A: Baseline Dropouts, CCT <!-- Start of picture text --> Raw and Direct CCT Dropout effect on Child HAZ<br>With 95 % Confidence Intervals<br>During Program Utero After P rogram<br>2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br>Month & Year of Birth<br>Adjustments include propensity weighting, child and maternal age, maternal and paternal attributes<br>Raw Fully Adjusted<br>1<br>.5<br>0<br>-.5<br><!-- End of picture text --> Panel B: Baseline Schoolgirls, CCT <!-- Start of picture text --> Raw and Direct CCT Schoolgirl effect on Child HAZ<br>With 95 % Confidence Intervals<br>D uring Program Utero After Program<br>2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br>Month & Year of Birth<br>Adjustments include propensity weighting, child and maternal age, maternal and paternal attributes<br>Raw Fully Adjusted<br>1<br>.5<br>0<br>-.5<br><!-- End of picture text --> Panel C: Baseline Schoolgirls, UCT <!-- Start of picture text --> Raw and Direct UCT Schoolgirl effect on Child HAZ<br>With 95 % Confidence Intervals<br>During Program Utero After Program<br>2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br>Month & Year of Birth<br>Adjustments include propensity weighting, child and maternal age, maternal and paternal attributes<br>Raw Fully Adjusted<br>1<br>.5<br>0<br>-.5<br><!-- End of picture text -->
level surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 for over 10,000 firms in 81 countries.<sup>20</sup> This database has several advantages over other firm-level databases. First, the survey includes a broad variety of firms of different ownership structures, sectors, legal forms, and – most importantly – different sizes; 80% of the surveyed firms are small or medium-sized, with fewer than 500 employees. Second, firm managers were asked about the obstacles they face in their operation and growth, including several questions related to the financial system.

Managers of the surveyed firms were asked to rate how problematic general financing obstacles are for the operation and growth of their firm. Responses varied between a rating of one (no obstacle), two (minor obstacle), three (moderate obstacle) and four (major obstacle). 36% of all firms rate financing as a major obstacle, 27% as moderate, 18% as minor and 19% as no obstacle. In addition to growth obstacles and firm size, the survey also provides general information on firms such as size, sector and ownership.

Self-reported financing obstacles might be subject to biases if slow-growing firms or firms with low efficiency and productivity report higher obstacles. Using the WBES database, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) show that firms reporting higher financing obstacles indeed grow more slowly, but that this relationship is not due to reverse causation. Further, as reported in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004), firm-reported financing obstacles are negatively and significantly correlated with the efficiency of investment, as measured by Wurgler (2000).<sup>21</sup> While our outreach indicators are available for up to 99 countries and the WBES dataset covers 81 countries, there is no perfect overlap, so that our outreach indicator regression sample contains data for at most 7,000 firms in 71 countries.

> 20 For a detailed discussion of the survey see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002).

> 21 This is an investment elasticity that gauges the extent to which a country increases investment in growing industries and decreases investment in declining ones.

20
1989, 1991) that the fraction of the consumers are liquidity constrained varies with the degree of financial liberalization.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the main channels through which financial liberalization may affect savings and briefly reviews the relevant empirical literature. Section III describes the financial reform process as it occurred in each of the eight countries being studied here. This section also explains and graphs our index of financial liberalization and provides summary statistics and bivariate correlations with financial depth and savings. Sections IV and V present the econometric results based on the saving function and on the augmented Euler equation for consumption, respectively. Section VI concludes.

# II. Financial Liberalization and Savines: Theoretical Back2round and Review of **the** Empirical Evidence

Although financial liberalization can enhance the efficiency with which saved resources are channeled into productive use, the effect on the quantity of savings is theoretically ambiguous.2 The mechanisms at work here include both long-term and short-term effects. Once it has settled down, a competitive liberalized financial system will typically be characterized by improved savings opportunities, including higher deposit interest rates, a wider range of savings media with improved risk-return characteristics, and in many cases more banks and bank branches, as well as other financial intermediaries. Bank lending rates will typically be higher for those borrowers who had privileged access in the restricted regime, but access to borrowing should be wider. These long-term effects of liberalization on aggregate private saving will be felt through changes in rates of return and in the degree of credit restrictions. Moreover, if financial liberalization also has a

- 2 It should be stressed at the outse **t** hat our evidence is based chiefly on national accounts definitions of saving. These need to be distinguished from intennediated saving or from capital flows. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) observe that capital flight through mis-invoicing of trade serves to conceal saving that is being hidden abroad: an apparent increase in saving may really be a reduction in capital flight. Furthermore, they note that, as durable goods purchases are usually treated as consumption in the data, a shift from these to accumulation of financial assets tends to be misleadingly recorded as saving.

4
substitute for material background **character±sties, and** (b) more valid and culturally relevant indicators of social class and mAterial family background characteristics of children.

The Thailand study provide strong evidence that motivational variables influence achievement. Holding constant conventional indicators of student backgtound (gender, parental education and occupation) we found that student educational expectations, attitudes, motivation and effort were positively related to student achievemsnt gain in both urban and rural settings. In both urban and rural settings, conventional family background characteristics that were significantly related to initial levels of achievement were unrelated to gain, except insofar as they operated through the motivational **variables.** The Malawi study demonstrates that indicators of family background more relevant to the Third World setting, such as labor demands placed on children, basic attributes of houses, and mother-tongue, were more consistently related to pupil achievement than were conventional indicators of parental eduzation and occupation.

If family background is as salient in developing countries as it is in industrialized countries, what implications does this have for educational policy makers or development advocates in planning aducation programs in the Third World? These two studies suggest at least two important avenues for action.

First, education programs could be designed that specifically take into account the family background characteristics of students. This might involve early intervention programs, such **as** preschools; in-school intervention programs, such as changing school hours and calendars to better meet local patterns of child labor; or

- 22 -
103 RENT CONTROL, PROFITABILITY AND SUPPLY maintenance is assumed to reduce<sup>net depreciation</sup> one for one.11 Landlords pay an income tax of 5 percent on rents<sup>collected, rising to 10 percent for higher</sup> rents.9<sup>2</sup> Households at the median income are assumed<sup>to be willing to spend 8</sup> percent of their income on such<sup>a unit; the income elasticity, .6, assumes that</sup> lower income households spend<sup>higher fractions, and vice versa.</sup>

# Gains and Losses from Four Components<sup>and their Interaction</sup>

Five key components of landlord<sup>cash flow are: initial outlay, rents,</sup> maintenance, taxes, and capital<sup>gains. Initial outlay does not change when</sup> controls are removed, but the other<sup>four do. Rent control directly reduces</sup> profitability because it reduces the rents a unit<sup>can command. But reduced rents</sup> also affect maintenance (and depreciation), taxes, and capital gains. These "indirect" effects can be large and<sup>should be taken into account. Figure 6.3</sup> summarizes the changes.

Figure 6.3: **Change** in Components of Landlord's Present **V.xue** Rents. Ghana's current rent control regime fixes nominal and reduces **1,500** piesentelvlyes ('000 cedes) real rents. In the example presented in **1. 327** C Table 6.1 above, the reduction in real rents increases over time as inflation 1,000 takes a larger bite. Our "uncontrolled" or modified regime assumes rents rise with inflation. **500 156 4** Figure 6.3 shows that the present n value of real rents collected from this **.43** 15 room compound over lC years under<sup>the</sup> .133 decontrolled regime is about 1.3 million<sup>**-soo**</sup> cedis, compared to 158,000 under **Rent** Me,ntenance Taxes Ca,lt:l **Ga,** contrels.

Taxation. If taxes on rental income are collected from landlords, rent control reduces these taxes as it reduces<sup>rent. This partially offsets the</sup> reduction in rent to landlords, but also decreases government revenue.'of Tipple (1988) reports that effective<sup>property taxes for units of this type (when</sup>

- B.! One way the model could be<sup>extended would be to build in a more</sup> sophisticated production function relating maintenance<sup>to depreciation</sup> in a non-linear fashion.

- 2/ Tax on rental income rl-es with<sup>the monthly rent collected. See Tipple</sup> (1988, p. 34) for the full schedule.

- jQ/ If the household spends the extra<sup>cash on goods or services that are taxed,</sup> the reduction in government revenue<sup>will be partially offset. We assume</sup> this effect is small.
demographic growth. However, if we exclude China from the EAP estimation, the rest of EAP countries do have a positive investment gap.

**Figure 4. EMED Infrastructure investment requirements Vs. Actual**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 900<br>800<br>700<br>600<br>500<br>400<br>300<br>200<br>100<br>0<br>EAP EAP* SAR LAC SSA ECA MENA Total<br>Actual 356 35 68 41 28 35 52 580<br>Needs 212 87 309 141 58 62 53 836<br>Amount, in 2011 US$(billion)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ estimation Note: EAP*: Exclude China’s data from EAP region.

# **VI. Main Conclusions**

This study presents estimations of investment requirements over 2014-2020 accounting for the most recent changes in stock of infrastructure. The annual infrastructure investment requirements for EMDE countries is $836 billion or 6.1% of current GDP per year over 2014-2020.

The table below shows the investment gap for EMDE excluding China.<sup>16</sup> The annual infrastructure investment gap for EMDE countries is $452 billion over 2014-2020, which implies that EMDE countries should almost double their current spending.

> 16 China is overinvesting in infrastructure, and including it in the calculation of the infrastructure investment gap will underestimate the gap for the rest of EMDE countries since investment is done at country level.

14
whole. Likewise, 3.1 percent of the population was HIV positive, versus 2.8 percent in Africa. Life expectancy at birth is 61 years versus 58 for Africa. Yet on some measures, Tanzania diverges significantly from the rest of the region. Its under-five mortality rate (5.4 percent of live births) is just over half that of Africa as a whole (9.5 percent). Its maternal mortality ratio is almost 20 percent lower than that of Africa. Yet the health workforce is weaker in Tanzania, with just 0.1 doctors and 2.4 nurses and midwives per 10,000 population (versus an average of 2.6 and 12.0, respectively, for Africa) (World Health Organization, 2014).

Recent evidence from Tanzania demonstrates significant health improvements for children utilizing formal public health facilities (Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2015). In the early 1990s, the Tanzanian government introduced a health insurance program called the Community Health Fund (CHF). It is a voluntary prepayment scheme; members pay a fixed annual fee – – of 5,000 10,000 Tanzanian shillings ($3 $6 US),<sup>3</sup> depending on the region. Their entire family is then exempt from co-payments for visits to primary health care facilities (Marriott, 2011).<sup>4</sup> As Tanzania’s CHF cross-subsidizes more costly to reach rural areas, it provides not only a risk-coping strategy, but also significantly reduces total out-of-pocket health expenses by the poorest (such as CCT program beneficiaries in our study regions) (Ekman, 2004; Mtei et al., 2007). This is especially so since the poorest are often credit constrained. Nonetheless, 10 years after the introduction of the CHF, only 10 percent of Tanzanians were enrolled; one of the reasons cited was inability to pay (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007).

# **2.2 Pilot CCT program**

Tanzania’s pilot CCT program, implemented by the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF, a social fund agency of the Tanzanian government), began delivering transfers in January of 2010. Its aims were to increase investments in health for young children (ages 0–5) and the elderly (ages 60 and over) and to increase educational investments for children aged 7–15. It

> 3In 2009 the exchange rate ranged from 1,280 to 1,467 per U.S. dollar (Bank of Tanzania, 2015).

> 4Up to 7 family members are exempt from co-payments—though tests and medications are subject to fees. Upon introduction of the CHF, child and maternal health services were already exempt from co-payments according to official government policy (Babbel, 2012).

6
- 27 -

The standard error of the estimated regression coefficient was 0.0059 and the mean incidence rate was one percent. Taking the derivative, converting into pglm<sup>3</sup> (1 ppm = 2,860 Ag/lm3). annalizing and substituting, we obtain the following functions for children: Upper change in the probability of cough per 1,000 kids per year 0.0262 * change in SOz Central change in the probability of cough per 1,000 kids per year = 0.0181 * change in SCQ Lower change in the probability of cough per 1,000 kids per year = 0.010<sup>t</sup> change in SQt Schwartz et al<sup>2</sup> - examined the effects of air pollution among a population begining nursing school in Los Angeles in the early 1970s. Daily diaries were completed and provided information on incidence of symptoms including cough, phlegm, and chest discomfort. PoUutant under investigation included oxidants, sulfiir dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide. In models corrected for autocorrelation, a signifi-cant association was found between SQ and chest discomfort. Daiy concentrations of _Sa_ averaged approximately 0.09 ppmr Specifically. the results indicated:

# logit (chest discomfort) = 1.88 * S% (ppm)

The standard error of the estimated regression coefficient was 0.094. Taking the derivative, annualizing, converting into pglm' and substituting the mean rate of chest discomfort of 0.04, the following fimcdons are obtained: Upper change in probability of chest discomfort per year = 0.015 * change in SQ2 Central change in the probability of chest discomfort per year = 0.010 * change in SQ2 Lower change in the probability of chest discomfort per year =0.005* change in SQ
# Health Insurance and the Know-Do Gap

Do health insurance schemes affect the know-do gap? We are not aware of any studies to date in LMICs that causally link health insurance to supply responses among providers, at least for inpatient care, where the bulk of the money is spent. It is difficult to use administrative claims data to come to any conclusion regarding quality in these settings; see Morton et al. (2016) on how claims data are recorded. Nevertheless, we will offer an educated guess based on a collage of evidence from newspaper reports, audits, and related studies on how doctors respond to price changes in LMICs.

As one example, media reports and field investigations from the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Chattisgarh, shortly after the introduction of the national health insurance program RSBY, showed that many women were getting hysterectomies based on rudimentary diagnostics and for conditions such as heavy menstrual bleeding that could be medically managed. <mark>As reported by A</mark> verill and Dransfield (2013): A study by a non-profit organization, AP Mahila Samatha Society, in 2009 of over 1,000 women in Andhra Pradesh found an increase of 20 percent in hysterectomy cases since July 2008. They also reported that doctors had told 30 percent of the women that they would die if they did not have the operation. A few months ago, the Chhattisgarh State Health Department initiated action against 22 nursing homes, which were carrying out hysterectomies without legitimate medical reasons in order to claim money from the national health insurance scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY).

Subsequent research indeed confirms much higher rates of hysterectomies in the states of Gujarat, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, but also cautions that causal claims on the impact of insurance are harder to establish (Desai, Sinha, and Mahal 2011; Desai et al. 2019).

Cataract surgery seems to be another area with sharp increases after the arrival of health insurance. For instance, Rana (2017) reports that in the Indian state of West Bengal: Private facilities were found to concentrate mainly on easy-to-handle services, like cataract surgery, and commission agents recruited patients for this surgery, often without indication that the patient even needed the surgery. From the 1,090 procedures performed under RSBY, I found that the actual treatment done by the private hospitals occurred not to provide health care for patients, but instead to profit for health care facilities. It also involved a huge informational 20
# Introduction

Participatory governance mechanisms have been widely promoted to empower ordinary citizens, promote government transparency, and improve public service delivery in developing countries (Speer 2012; World Bank 2017). The use of information and communications technologies (ICT), social media, and digital platforms have greatly enhanced the earlier patterns of public participation, creating a massive empirical ground for exploring the benefits of engaging citizens in the coproduction of local information and services. Enhanced by ICT infrastructure, cities are becoming increasingly “smart,” and local governments are working on involving citizens in shaping their urban environment, resolving urban problems, and monitoring policy implementation. These processes are underway in developed and developing countries (Caragliu, Del Bo, and Nijkamp 2011; World Bank 2016). The participatory mechanisms of governance enhanced by ICT and digital platforms have also blurred the boundaries between different political systems. Their use and extensions beyond classical Western democracies have attracted growing academic attention (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2017; He and Warren 2011; Toepfl 2018; Truex 2017).

This study explores the political effects of ICT-powered digital public engagement in the context of local politics in the Russian Federation. Specifically, we examine the political effects of ordinary Russians engaging with state officials through the digital platforms designed to draw citizens into local governance in Russia’s capital city and the largest urban center, Moscow. We look at the interrelationship between the usage of online platforms that allow Moscovites to complain about the quality of local roads by reporting the potholes in Moscow and the support for the incumbent in mayoral elections in Moscow. We leverage the geocoded data from these platforms as an indicator of digital public engagement with the local government in the process of co-production and analyze the effects of this engagement on voting using a panel of precinct-level voting data for 2013 and 2018.

Our findings suggest that local digital participation on the issue of local roads is associated with ‘political dividends’ to the incumbent. Engagement with the city government through digital technologies (measured in our study by pothole complaints) results in an increased number of votes and a higher margin of victory for the incumbent mayor. Our identification strategy is based on the engineering literature and direct evidence from the city authorities. It exploits arguably exogenous variation in intra-city weather conditions during the heating season, which differentially affects 2