rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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Dupas, P., Robinson, J. (2013): “Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya," _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 2013, 5 (1), 163-192.

Everest-Phillips, M. (2008): “Business Taxation as State Building in Developing Countries: Applying Governance Principles in Private Sector Development,” _International Journal of Regulation and Governance_ , Vol. 8(2), pp. 123–54.

Fafchamps, M., McKenzie, D., Quinn, S., Woodruff, C. (2014): “Microenterprise Growth and the Fly-paper Effect: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Ghana”, _Journal of Development Economics_ , 106: 211-226.

Fink, G., McConnell, M., Vollmer S, (2014): “Testing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Experimental Data: False Discovery Risks and Correction Procedures” _Journal of Development Effectiveness_ Vol. 6 , Iss. 1,2014 Galiani, S., M. Meléndez and C. Navajas Ahumada (2017) “On the effect of the costs of operating formally: New experimental evidence”, _Labour Economics_ 45: 143-57.

Gollin, D. (2002): “Getting Income Shares Right.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 110(2): 458-474.

IMF - International Monetary Fund (2011): “Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries,” (Washington: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet: <u>www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf.</u> Kling, J., Liebman, J., Katz, L. (2007): “Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects”, _Econometrica_ , Vol. 75. No.1 (January 2007), 83-119 La Porta, R., Shleifer, A. (2014): "The Unofficial Economy in Africa," NBER Chapters, in: African Successes: Government and Institutions National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

McCaig, B., Pavcnik, N. (2015): "Informal Employment in a Growing and Globalizing LowIncome Country." _American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,_ 105 (5): 545-50.

McKenzie, D. (2012): “Beyond Baseline and Follow-up: The Case for more T in Experiments”, _Journal of Development Economics_ , 99(2): 210-21.

McKenzie, D., Puerto, S. (2017) “Growing markets through business training for female entrepreneurs: A market-level randomized experiment in Kenya”, _World Bank Policy Research Working Paper_ no. 7993 Schaner, S. (2018): “The Persistent Power of Behavioral Change: Long-Run Impacts of Temporary Savings Subsidies for the Poor.”, _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 10(3): 67-100 World Bank (2009): “Tanzania: Country Brief”. World Bank.

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25 In 1970 PLDT's costs shot up, primarily because of a 65 percent devaluation. The company had borrowed heavily in foreign markets. and the higher value of the dollar made repayment difficult (see figure 4.11). In addition, the tighter labor markets of the late 1960s and greater labor militancy had substantially increased real wages and PLDT's labor cost. However, in contrast to events following the 1962 devaluation, the Public Service Commission gave provisional approval for rate increases for public utilities almost immediately after the devaluation in 1970. Meralco, the power company owned by the family of the vice president, received an automatic 3 percent adjustment for every P0.30 change in the peso-dollar exchange rate (which had jul.aped from P3.90 per dollar to P6.44). PLDT received a 40 percent rate increase on all its local telephone services. Permanent approval of the rate adjustments came more than a year later, delayed by challenges from business user groups. The opposition could not get the approved rate increases rescinded, and only managed to postpone consideration of additional increases in the following two years. The liberal attitude toward rate increases was not accidental; events would have transpired differently had the companies not had patrons in the administration. Indeed, as events under martial law demonstrated, Meralco received very different treatment once its owners were expelled from the ruling coalition.

Although the increase in telephone tariffs in 1970 enabled PLDT to remain profitable for the year, the impact was short-lived. The real rate of return on equity fell significantly, becoming negative in 1971-72. Investment dropped sharply, and real capital stock stopped growing (see figure 4.4). The decline in PLDT's profitability during 1971-72 could have been due to undercompensation in the face of high inflation following the 1970 devaluation, while slow investment could have been a consequence of the low profitability and the high cost of foreign exchange, which caused difficulties for foreign financing. But the company's annual reports do not make such claims.<sup>26</sup> The relative stability of the peso after the 1970 devaluation and the slow growth of nominal wages also suggest that the sudden drop in profitability could not all have been due to continued significant cost increases.

An alternative explanation based on weak commitment seems to better fit the facts. In the early 1970s the main contender for the presidency after Marcos was Senator Benigno Aquino, whose relationships with the Marcos group were adversarial. The Lopez family, which could have presented an alternative candidate rromising continuity with the Marcos regime, broke with Marcos in the early 1970s. As a result the probability of adverse regulatory action after 1973 was quite high. In this situation it makes sense for a business to transfer its assets abroad and turn from equity to debt. This

> 26However, Meralco's 1971 _Annual Report_ presents financing problems as the main cause of its investment restriction in those years.
channel and 0.2 to the investment channel. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) using the dataset and the specification of Barro (1991), which does not include investment as a regressor, find that 10 percent inflation reduces growth by 0.5 percentage points. They show that the continental dummies used by Barro (1991) are reduced substantially when inflation is included, arguing that an important explanation for the poor growth performance of Latin America and Africa is their high inflation rates. Easterly (1994) finds quantitavely similar results (10 percent inflation reduces growth by 0.4 percentage points), but he argues that the result is not robust to the inclusion<sup>of</sup> other policy variables.

Fischer (1993) extends the previous results analyzing a wide variety of indicators of macroeconomic policy. Regarding inflation he finds that an inflation rate of 10 percent induces a total decline in the rate of growth of 0.3 percentage points (regression (39)). Based on his estimates for the rate of growth of capital, and assuming that the capitaloutput ratio is 2.5, it can be concluded that 10 percent inflation reduces investment by 0.8 percentage points, which in terms of growth would be around 0.1 percentage points. Therefore, only one third of the effects of inflation on growth would be through the investment channel.<sup>1 9</sup> An important handicap of the empirical analysis on inflation and growth is the endogeneity of inflation. Consider, for example, an economy that is hit by a negative supply shock. This shock would reduce output, but also would result in an increase in inflation, and hence, the coefficient on inflation cannot be interpreted as the effects of inflation on growth. Similarly, consider a central bank that follows a constant money growth policy. A negative shock to the rate of growth would increase the rate of inflation, and hence the causality would go from growth to inflation. Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993) address this issue by using indices of central bank independence (discussed in more detail in the next subsection) as instruments for the rate of inflation. They conclude that there is still a negative relationship, although statistically not as strong as that found in OLS regressions. However, the point estimate in their OLS regression implies that 10 percent inflation

**1**<sup>**9**</sup> **Fischer (1993) separates the effects of inflation on its effects on factor accumulation and productivity growth, which is slightly different to the distinction between investment and efficiency of investment, the difference being the capital-output ratio. He finds (table 9) that 10 percent inflation reduces capital accumulation by 0.3 percentage points, which implies (with a share of capital equal to 0.4) that the capital accumulation effect explains about 0.12 of the 0.3 reduction of growth, and the remaining is explained by the reduction in total factor productivity growth.**

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(under existing 1xCO2 condition) will reduce to 12 forest types. The report indicates changes in vegetation pattern in 38 out of 80 meteorological stations considered in the study (MoPE, 2004). Using Atmosphere Vegetation Integrated Model (AVIM20) under SRES B2 scenario, Wu et al. (2007) analyzed ecosystem vulnerability with a set of indices based on net primary production of vegetation. The vulnerability of the Tibetan Plateau ecosystem at baseline period (1961-1990) increases in all considered periods between 1991 and 2080. Climate change impact assessments in Bhutan are mostly limited to a few local observations and perceptions and speculate potential future impacts based on studies elsewhere (NBC, 2011).

# **4.5 Impacts on hydropower**

Climate change could impact hydropower for the Himalayan regions in multiple ways. First, a projected increase in monsoon rainfall and rainfall extremes in the region (APN, 2005; Rupa Kumar et al., 2006) is expected to increase sediment load in streamflow with potentially severe impacts on the operating life of hydropower plants (e.g. reduced live storage and turbine life). Sediment loads in Himalayan rivers are already very high. Second, many small or micro hydropower systems could be damaged or washed away due to floods (riverine or GLOFs). Both temperature and monsoon precipitation projections have negative implications for GLOF risks. Increased temperature would contribute to expansion of both supra- and pro-glacial lakes, leading to favorable conditions for large scale damage (Richardson and Reynolds, 2000). Increased monsoon rainfall would increase glacier melt contribution and GLOF risk (Rathore et al., 2009).

Climate change impacts on hydropower will largely depend on future precipitation. Studies with medium- and large-sized catchments with unchanged or increasing future precipitation showed reduction and increase in river discharge. If the projected drier winter period flow (APN, 2005) were considered as a future scenario, it would imply a reduction in river discharge. Small-scale hydropower generators and countries with run-of-river hydropower systems would be more vulnerable to reduced dry season flow under climate change. Both Nepal’s and Bhutan’s hydropower systems are mainly run-of-river and thus vulnerable to reduction of streamflow.

While both temperature and precipitation changes would impact hydropower generation, one study (Rathore et al, 2009) has shown that even without a reduction in precipitation, a 1°C rise in temperature alone may reduce the contribution of glacier melt to streamflow in a tributary 20
account only goods and works contracts, and excluding non-core contracts (procurement of laboratory furniture, supply and installation of information systems and so on), we calculated relative market shares of each company. We calculated both standard HHI and normalized HHI. The latter index takes into account the number of firms in the market, and ranges from 0 to 1 (instead of 1/N to 1 for traditional HHI). The concentration ratio measures the percentage of project expenditures accruing to the largest four firms involved in contracting on the project.

**In order to ensure we are capturing actual levels of competition rather than project design idiosyncrasies, some comparator statistics were also collected** from Client Connection and bid evaluation reports of the contracts included in the sample:

- Average number of bidders per contract;

- Percentage of project expenditures accounted for by the largest and largest three contracts;

- Number of contracts;

- Unique bidders compared to all bidders across contracts.

Details of the results are presented in Table 5. In Table 6, we also provide the ranking of all seven projects. The ranking is from 1 to 7, where one represents the most limited competition on this measure across projects and seven the most competition. For instance, the smaller the HHI index for the project, the higher the rank score of that project.

**The result that is clear from the tables is that projects suspect projects do appear to stand out in having high HHIs and high concentration ratios** , sharing penultimate and last place.  Project six ranks only fourth in terms of contracts per company, but project seven ranks last on this measure as well.  The potentially suspect projects do appear to have seen less competition across contracts than our control projects.

**The competition measures should be placed in the context of each project** – perhaps, the project objectives were best achieved by a small number of large contracts.  The proportion of the total project value accounted by the largest contract and three largest contracts in the project allow us to see if this is driving our results.  The short answer is that it is not.  In particular, project seven sees the smallest percentage of total project expenditures accounted for by the three largest contracts. Furthermore, the potentially suspect projects do not stand out in terms of few bids per contract (suggesting that the results do not merely reflect a very small overall market size).

**To repeat earlier caveats, our whole database involves only seven projects, and we have only two projects where there are public reports of INT involvement** , which does not mean any (let alone all) contracts in these projects were corrupted.  These project-level results can be nothing more than illustrative.  But they might suggest the benefit of an (increased) focus on project-level red flags to complement contract-level red flags that have achieved the most attention to date.

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The tax cut was first publicly discussed in the Parliament on July 2, 2012, shortly after it was announced. The legislation was passed on October 15, 2012, and the tax change was effective from January 1, 2013. Due to the relatively short period of time between the announcement and enactment of the reform, anticipatory effects appearing before the implementation of the tax cut are likely to be negligible and we find no evidence of such effects in our empirical analysis.

In the main analysis, we study the impact of the reform among older men between 2010 and 2015. Throughout this period there were no other major labor market policy changes that affected older men. We focus on men to make sure that results are not driven by early retirement policy changes for women instituted in 2011.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, we find very similar results for women in Section 7.1 suggesting that our findings are not gender specific.

Around this period the overall employment rate in Hungary was 64%, slightly below the OECD average (66%). The employment rate of older people (age 55-64) was only 46%, substantially below the OECD average (58%). The unemployment rate decreased steadily between 2012 and 2015, which reflected a substitution of welfare programs with a public work scheme (Cseres-Gergely and Moln ́ar, 2015). At the same time, employment in the private sector was relatively stable: the prime-age population share employed in the private sector increased slightly from 38% to 39% between 2012 and 2015. Still, to make sure our results are not driven by the improvement of labor market conditions, we show robustness to restricting the sample to local labor markets where the share of employment in the private sector among the prime-age population was stable throughout the whole period.

Since our primary focus is on the heterogeneous impact of the policy, it is worth discussing whether different types of firms face different labor market institutions. In Hungary, it is relatively easy to hire or dismiss workers (Tonin, 2009). Wage bargaining takes place mostly at the individual level. The rare collective wage bargaining is based on firm-level agreements and the coverage of these policies is low. The unionization rate was around 10% in this period, one of the lowest in the OECD (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2016; Borb ́ely and Neumann, 2019; OECD, 2022 _b_ ). The weak labor market institutions and the lack of any size-specific regulations imply that firms with different size or productivity face similar institutional constraints in setting wages and employment.

# **3.2 Data**

We use linked employer-employee administrative data from Hungary covering years 2010–2015 on a random 50% sample of the 2003 population. Since our sample is drawn from the whole

> 18A new pension policy for women was introduced in 2011, which granted an early retirement option for women with 40 years of work credits, regardless of age.

14
The OECD covers its member countries, numbering 34. Of the 40 countries the IEA considers to have subsidized fossil fuels in 2013, the only OECD members were Mexico and the Republic of Korea.

The IEA calculations are based entirely on the price-gap approach, making its subsidy estimations comparable across countries. The IMF, in contrast, uses different methods depending on the country (IMF 2013). For petroleum products, it uses mainly price gap but for OECD countries it also includes the PSE as calculated by the OECD. For electricity in 40 countries, the IMF uses the hidden-cost approach for the entire power sector, inclusive of power not generated from fossil fuels. In addition, the IMF takes the IEA’s power subsidy estimations for another 37 countries. As such, the IMF’s subsidy estimations are not comparable across countries for oil or electricity, nor are they comparable across different fuels and electricity. In addition, the hidden-cost approach and the PSE include costs or forms of support not considered subsidies in this paper. The OECD states that not everything in its _Inventory_ might be considered a subsidy, refrains from identifying subsidies, and generally refrains from aggregating estimations across countries, in part because tax expenditures cannot be directly compared from country to country. The coverage of energy and countries by the three organizations is shown in Table 3.

**Table 3 Coverage of energy and countries**

|**Item**|**IEA**|**IMF**|**OECD**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Method|Price gap|Price gap and PSE for oil<br>Price gap for natural gas<br>Price gap and budgetary<br>producer support for coal<br>Price gap and hidden cost for<br>electricity|Inventory<br>using PSE-CSE-<br>GSSE<br>framework|
|Types of energy covered|Oil, gas, coal,<br>electricity|Oil, gas, coal, electricity|Oil, gas, coal|
|Incidence|Consumer|Consumer for price gap,<br>producer with PSE and hidden<br>costs|Consumer and<br>producer|
|Countries, number||||
|Oil|40<sup>a</sup>|176|34|
|Gas|40<sup>a</sup>|41|34|
|Coal|40<sup>a</sup>|55|34|
|Electricity|40<sup>a</sup>|77<sup>b</sup>|NA|
|Last year for which<br>estimations available|2013|2011|2011|
|Sub-national subsidies|Limited|Limited|Many|
|Reporting frequency|Annual|Not fixed<sup>c</sup>|Biennial|

_Sources_ : IEA 2014b; Clements et al. 2013; OECD 2013a.

a. Each year the IEA undertakes a global survey to identify countries that subsidize fossil-fuel consumption through reduced end-user prices. The most recent survey identified 40 such countries.

b. Electricity includes electricity not generated from fossil fuels, such as hydropower in several countries and nuclear power in South Africa, among the 40 countries with hidden-cost calculations.

c. Calculations were carried out for 2000–2011 for petroleum products and for 2007–2011 for natural gas and coal. The results are presented by country for 2011.

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