exports. This is in line with results by Mork et al. (1994), who estimate an oil price increase to have a positive effect on Norwegian GDP.

However, running similar time series analysis as for the countries in our original sample, results suggest that Norway’s economic activity does suffer from increased oil price _volatility_ : The Granger-causality test confirms that oil price volatility has a causal impact on economic activity. The accumulated impulse response of industrial production to a realized volatility shock amounts to -0.0037 (similar to India). Intuitively, Norway’s economy is bound to be sensitive to oil price volatility, as the petroleum industry accounts for 48% of all exports and 33% of government revenue. This illustrates that countries can indeed benefit from an oil price increase under certain conditions, but not from increased price _volatility_ . The comparison of Malaysia and Norway illustrates how oil price uncertainty may negatively affect an economy through its international trading activities, as these cause consumption or revenue uncertainty respectively. While on the demand-side Norway is largely decoupled from global oil market fluctuations, its export revenues are highly exposed. Similarly, Malaysia is exposed to uncertainty due to significant oil imports _and_ exports. Overall this supports the claim that merely considering net-oil-exporter/importer status is not sufficient, and that country-specific transmission channels of oil price volatility need to be investigated.

|25000<br>USA<br><br>7000<br>Japan<br>3000<br>3500<br>Germany<br>4000<br>Norway|
|---|
|5000<br>10000<br>15000<br>20000<br><br>1000<br>2000<br>3000<br>4000<br>5000<br>6000<br><br>500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br><br><br>1000<br>2000<br>3000|
|0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010|
|500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>3000<br>3500<br>India<br>500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>S.Korea<br>200<br>400<br>600<br>800<br>1000<br>Malaysia<br>5<br>10<br>15<br>20<br>25<br>Iceland|
|0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010|
|0<br>2000<br>4000<br>6000<br>8000<br>10000<br>12000<br>14000<br>USA<br>0<br>1000<br>2000<br>3000<br>4000<br>5000<br>Japan<br><br>500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>Germany<br>500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>3000<br>3500<br>Norway|
|1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br><br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010|
|500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>3000<br>3500<br>India<br><br>500<br>1000<br>1500<br>2000<br>2500<br>3000<br>S.Korea<br>100<br>200<br>300<br>400<br>500<br>600<br>Malaysia<br>0<br>5<br>10<br>15<br>20<br>25<br>Iceland|
|0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br>0<br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010<br><br>1983<br>1986<br>1989<br>1992<br>1995<br>1998<br>2001<br>2004<br>2007<br>2010|

**Figure 7.** _Rows 1 and 2:_ Domestic oil consumption (blue solid line), production (red dotted line). _Rows 3 and 4:_ Crude oil imports (green solid line) and exports (purple dotted line) in 1000’s BBL/day (source: OECD IEA database.).

13