(Alloush and Bloem, 2022). Specifically, we add to a subset of this literature studying the consequences of exposure to conflict and violence on agricultural outcomes (Singh, 2013; Adelaja and George, 2019; Kaila and Azad, 2019; George _et al._ , 2020; Avuwadah, 2020; George _et al._ , 2021b). We find that individuals reduce agricultural work but increase informal work when exposed to violence. Although the informal sector can act as a ‘safety net’ by partially shielding households from the consequences of increased production costs and decreased farm profits, this diversification in economic activities can come at a cost and, in turn, amplify the economic consequences of violence and conflict (Colombo _et al._ , 2019). In particular, our results offer additional context to existing research on the relationship between conflict and agriculture in Nigeria specifically, which finds that exposure to conflict reduces agricultural output (Adelaja and George, 2019) and food security (George _et al._ , 2020).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss background details about herder-related violence and informal work in Nigeria. In Section 3, we present our empirical framework by discussing the data we use in our analysis, reporting descriptive statistics, and summarizing our identification strategy. In Section 4, we present our main results on the labor response to exposure to herder-related violence in the planting and the harvest seasons. We also report results on the use of agricultural harvest, agricultural marketing, and non-farm enterprise sales. Section 5 concludes.

# **2 Background**

Amnesty International estimates that between 2016 and 2018, there were more than 3,600 deaths recorded due to clashes and escalating violence between nomadic herders and agricultural-centered communities— with the largest surge in these attacks occurring in the early part of 2018.<sup>7</sup> Figure 1 shows the number of violent incidents associated with either Boko Haram or herder-related violence from 2004 through 2019.<sup>8</sup> While the absolute number of incidents involving Boko Haram is higher over the period, the vast majority of these attacks occurred in the epicenter of that conflict, Borno state. By contrast, the herder-farmer conflict grew in both intensity and its geographic reach over this period: in fact, the herder-farmer conflict became increasingly more deadly than violence involving Boko Haram, in part as the latter conflict was the focus of the Nigerian government’s enforcement efforts and as the spread of herder-farmer violence grew beyond areas where such clashes had been located previously, mainly in the country’s Middle Belt.<sup>9</sup> While some accounts have attributed this herder-farmer violence to ethno-religious tensions (e.g., based on the observation that nomadic herding communities, including those such as the Fulani, are predominantly Muslim, and farmers located in the southern regions of the countries are Christian), the tensions are largely driven by conflicts over scarce land and water resources (McGuirk and Nunn, 2020; George _et al._ , 2021a). Specifically, competition for these resources has been regarded as a violation of a long-standing understanding in and near the Middle Belt zone, which is comprised of the country’s

> 7Amnesty International. December 17, 2018. “Harvest of Death: Three Years of Blood Clashes Between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria.” available here. Last accessed: February 3, 2021.

> 8Additional details on definitions are included in the Data section and Data Appendix.

> 9The Middle Belt refers to North-central Nigeria and includes Abuja, Benue, Plateau, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger and Kwara.

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