rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
For both women and men in the poorest decile, in-kind education and PSNP transfers account for a large share of market income (Figures 2a and 2b). The first and the second top 10 percent (top two deciles) pay more direct taxes relative to their market income. This holds for both genders, although women in the top income group lost a larger percentage of their market income than men (Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c). The net impact of the fiscal system is progressive for both groups: all but the top two deciles received more benefits relative to their market incomes than they paid out (see figure 2d). For the bottom 10 percent the impact appears to be stronger for women than men.

**Figure 2c: Direct Transfers Net of Direct Figure 2d: Net Benefits by Income Decile and Taxes by Income Decile and Gender Gender**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10 50<br>7.7<br>42<br>6.7 40<br>30<br>40.3<br>0 20<br>-2.4<br>-4.5 10<br>-3.5<br>-2.6<br>-4.8 0<br>-4.3<br>-10 -10<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br>Market income decile Market income decile<br>Women Men Women Men<br>Source : Authors’ calculations; ESS 2018/19 data. Source : Authors’ calculations; ESS 2018/19 data.<br>Share of market income, percent Share of market income, percent<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **4.2. Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers**

We assess the progressivity and pro-poorness of interventions by comparing the cumulative distribution of a tax burden or transfer benefit with the cumulative distribution of market income and the cumulative share of total population ranked by incom <mark>e (Duclos and Araar 2006).</mark> Concentration curves are used to show the impact of tax and transfer policies by mapping the cumulative share of taxes paid or benefits received from a particular category of taxes or transfers on the vertical axis against the cumulative share of the population, ordered by pre-fiscal income, on the horizontal axis <mark>(Duclos and Araar 2006)</mark> . The progressivity of fiscal interventions is also examined using the Kakwani coefficient (Annex 3). Figure 3 illustrates the progressivity of different taxes and transfers measured using the Kakwani index.<sup>8</sup> A positive Kakwani coefficient

> 8 The marginal contribution analysis for poverty reduction is based on the absolute poverty line, and the redistribution effect is measured using the Gini index.

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improved or build new links between locations. We assume trade costs to be iceberg costs, such that the costs between the origin location _o_ and destination _d_ are given by _dod_ = _max_ (1 _,time_<sup>_τ_</sup> ). Border costs are also added to travel costs, as detailed below.

We calibrate the model using spatial data for land, population, and sectoral shares from the sources used earlier. Because of the complexity of a three-sector model to converge in order to recover the initial sectoral productivities, we reduce the spatial disaggregation to fewer locations. Such aggregation also smoothed measurement issues of sectoral employment based on the DHS data. We divide the Horn of Africa into 32 regions, including 11 first-order administrative divisions in Ethiopia, 5 in Djibouti, 8 groupings of first-order administrative divisions in Somalia, and 8 groupings in Kenya. Figure A11 shows the share of agricultural employment and the population for each subnational region.

# **5.3.1 Productivity shocks from electrification in the Horn of Africa**

The counterfactual consists in providing access to electricity for all in all regions based on the current coverage measured by night time lights as described in previous sections. We calibrate the increase in productivity using the estimated productivity increase of 28.4 percent for Ethiopia from Moneke (2020) and the current coverage of electricity per location. The lower the existing coverage, the higher the productivity increase in the counterfactual. The new productivity levels _A_<sup>∗</sup> are given by : _A_<sup>_i_</sup> _n_<sup>∗=</sup><sup>_Ai_</sup> _n_<sup>+</sup><sup>_Ai_</sup> _n_<sup>×(1−</sup><sup>_Elecn_)×0</sup><sup>_._284</sup><sup>_,_</sup> _n_ = _M,S_ with _Elecn_ the current ratio of electrified population. Figure 2 shows the percent of productivity increase per location. The shock is the highest in most regions of Ethiopia and in the Northern part of Somalia.

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**Figure 30: Share of Mineral Exports in Total Exports and Real Per capita GDP**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 20<br>18<br>16<br>14<br>12<br>y = 3.2871x ‐ 6.149<br>10<br>R2 = 0.1544<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>2 3 4 5 6 7 8<br>ln per capita income,2003 rubles<br>000<br>ln mineral exports per capita, U.S.<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Rosstat.

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As we have emphasized with past releases of the WGI, the composite indicators we construct are useful as a first tool for broad cross-country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time. However, they are often too blunt a tool to be useful in formulating specific governance reforms in particular country contexts. Such reforms, and evaluation of their progress, need to be informed by much more detailed and country-specific diagnostic data that can identify the relevant constraints on governance in particular country circumstances. We therefore view the WGI as complementary to a large number of other efforts to construct more detailed measures of governance, often just for a single country. Furthermore, due to the complementarity between the composite governance indicators and their disaggregated individual inputs (and the value of reviewing the detail on the latter), we continue our past practice of publishing virtually all of the disaggregated source variables underlying the WGI.

We begin by describing the data used to construct this round of the governance indicators in Section 2, as well as various revisions to the data for previous years. These revisions have resulted in minor changes to our previous estimates for 19962007, and so the entire new dataset described here supersedes previous releases. In Section 3 we briefly describe cross-country differences and changes over time in governance as measured by our aggregate indicators. Section 4 concludes.

# **2.  Methodology and Data Sources for 2008**

In this section we briefly describe the latest update of the WGI. Our methodology for constructing aggregate governance indicators has not changed from past years, and a detailed description can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004), as well as in a technical Appendix D to this paper.

We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. The six dimensions of governance corresponding to this definition that we measure are: 5
# **Table 2: Breakdown of Disputes (by Sector)**

||**# of contracts in the**<br>**sample**|**# of dispute (incl.**<br>**expropriation)**<br>**# of B**|**OC dispute**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Agriculture, fishing and forestry|17|17|17|
|Construction|31|31|31|
|Electric power and other energy|2022|206|175|
|Finance|26|26|26|
|Information and communication|869|114|95|
|Oil, gas, and mining|406|84|75|
|Tourism|8|8|8|
|Transportation|1409|106|99|
|Water, sanitation, and flood protection|787|93|76|
|Other industry|60|60|60|
|Total|5635|745|662|

(Source) World Bank PPI database, UNCTAD database 27
that reductions in transport costs and input prices would have little effect on trade flows.<sup>16</sup> The third lesson is that innovation and adoption of innovations is very sensitive to incentives. By giving local producers an opportunity to tap into a larger market, and by insisting on steady price reductions for products that remain unimproved, Wal-Mart created a powerful incentive for SDS producers to improve product quality and/or productive efficiency. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to isolate the effects of this incentive on productivity in the SDS sector, value-added per worker clearly improved rapidly as Walmex gained market share.

Finally, industry-wide growth in value-added per worker reflected a combination of labor shedding and innovation, and much of the innovation that took place among SDS producers was traceable ⎯ directly or indirectly ⎯ to multinationals. For the multinational SDS subsidiaries, innovation was largely accomplished through the research efforts of their headquarters abroad. For the Mexican-owned SDS firms, innovation originated largely with their intermediate suppliers, who regularly brought them new compounds and suggestions for new products or processes. Many of these suppliers were themselves foreign-owned, and some of the inputs they brought to Mexican-owned firms were developed in response to the needs of the major multinational producers.

> 16 Das et al. (2006) quantify start up costs and export operating profits for several Colombian manufacturing industries. They find that among knitted fabric producers, many were near the threshold of probitable exports. Thus when the Colombian peso depreciated  in late 1980s,  large numbers began to penetrate foreign markets. In contrast, leather product suppliers were much more heterogeneous in terms of their payoffs from exporting, so only a few responded to the devaluation by initiating foreign sales

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# **3. Data Description, Family Planning and Tutoring in Vietnam**

## **3.1. Data description**

In this paper, we analyze data from three rounds (2002, 2006, and 2008) of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS). These are nationally representative surveys similar to the LSMS-type (Living Standards Measurement Study) surveys supported by the World Bank in many developing countries. The VHLSSs are implemented by Vietnam’s General Statistical Office (GSO) with technical assistance from the World Bank and cover around 9,200 households in approximately 3,000 communes across the country in each round. The surveys provide detailed information on education, including data on tutoring expenditures, as well as information on household demographics and consumption. In addition to a module collecting data on household members, these surveys include a community module that collects data on community infrastructure and facilities such as distances to schools or family planning facilities. Starting from 2002, the VHLSSs are implemented biannually and collect more data for rotating themes for each survey round; for example, the theme for the 2006 round is educational activities. These surveys are widely used for education analysis by the government and the donor community in Vietnam.

For data on family planning facilities (and community characteristics), we use the 2002 round, since only this survey round collects data on the distance to family planning centers. Because this information is only available for rural communes, we restrict our analysis to rural households in Vietnam. The VHLSSs collect data on different households who reside mostly in the same communes, which allows us to match the commune information from the 2002 survey round to most of the households in the 2006 and 2008 survey rounds.<sup>14</sup>

> 14 This matching process is complicated by the fact that there were administrative changes resulting in changes to administrative commune codes between 2002, 2006, and 2008. For around 150 communes, we have to rely

9
Annex 11: <u>Sierra Leone - Detailed results for impact of food price increase on headcount index in sample of West and Central African Countries</u>

|**Food item**|**Share in**<br>**total**<br>**consumption**|**Proportion**<br>**of Consumers**|**Baseline**<br>**Headcount**|**25% increase**<br>**Upper**<br>**bound**<br>**Impact**<br>**(Cons. only)**|**50% increase**<br>**Upper**<br>**bound**<br>**Impact**<br>**(Cons. only)**|**25% increase**<br>**Lower**<br>**bound**<br>**Impact**<br>**(Cons.& Prod.) **|**50% increase**<br>**Lower**<br>**bound**<br>**Impact**<br>**(Cons.& Prod.) **|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||<br>||**Sierr**<br>|<br>**a Leone National**<br>|<br>|||
|Rice|11.7|96.4|**66.4**|67.8|69.6|67.2|68.5|
||||**Sier**<br>|**ra Leone Urban**<br>||||
|Rice|6.4|94.5|**47.0**|48.6|51.4|48.5|50.9|
||||**Sie**<br>|**rra Leone Rural**<br>||||
|Rice|18.2|97.7|**78.6**|79.9|81.0|79.0|79.6|

Source: Authors’ estimation using country household survey data 30
one or more children aged 0 to 36 months;<sup>10</sup> (ii) BDT 400 per household if eligible families had one or more children going to primary school; and (iii) BDT 800 for those households with children below 36 months of age as well as children going to primary school. These transfers were a flat amount and did not vary with the number of children in either category.<sup>11</sup> Thus the maximum benefit amount a household could receive was BDT800 per month. An innovative electronic payments system was developed with the Bangladesh Post Office (BPO), which provided cash cards to beneficiary mothers to make transfers electronically to their accounts with the Post Office. Payments were made using Point-of-Sales (POS) machines with the option of accessing the cash either at the village level with the help of a “mobile payments team” or at the Upazila level BPO branch office. The BPO arranged for a mobile team to travel with POS machines and cash to the village centers on a designated day during each payment cycle. Alternatively the beneficiary had the option to withdraw cash at any point in time from the Upazila BPO branch office. BPO received a small commission for this service – 1 percent of the transferred amount or BDT 10, whichever is higher. Payment verification as a result was made possible in real time and provided to the project management.

The average transfers under this pilot are relatively higher than other existing social safety net programs, but nevertheless low enough to not lower incentives to work. The maximum monthly amount was BDT 800, which is about 14 percent of the lower poverty line and 18 percent of the 2010 food poverty line (World Bank, 2013a). Evidence from CCT programs in other developing countries suggest limited labor disincentive impacts especially when the level of benefit is within 20 percent of beneficiary households’ income (Grosh et al, 2008). These transfers were linked to specific conditions on the part of beneficiary households. To ensure that households knew these conditions, each household received a booklet, which detailed the purpose

> 10 While the original target group was children below the age of 24 months, due to the delay between collecting the baseline data and the start of the project, program design was changed to increase the age limit of children to be eligible for the nutrition allowance.

> 11 This was a conscious decision so as to not provide incentives to increase the size of households, and counter the family planning policies of the Government.

10
- Obstfeld, Maurice (1999): "Foreign resource inflows, saving and growth", in Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Luis Serven (eds.), _The Economics of Saving and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Policy_ , Cambridge University Press.

- Prasad, Eswar, Raghuram G. Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2006). "Patterns of international capital flows and their implications for economic development," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 119-158.

- Razin, Assaf and Susan Collins (1999), "Real exchange rate misalignments and growth", in A. Razin and E. Sadka (eds.), _The Economics of Globalization: Policy Perspectives from Public Economics_ . Cambridge University Press.

- Rodrik, Dani (2000),<sup>“</sup> Saving Transitions,<sup>“</sup> _World Bank Economic Review_ , Vol. 14, No.1, pp. 481-507.

- Rodrik, Dani (2006),<sup>“</sup> Industrial development: stylized facts and policies,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, mimeo (August).

- Rodrik, Dani (2007), “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,<sup>”</sup> John F. Kennedy School of Government, mimeo.

- Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Martin Uribe (2003),<sup>“</sup> Closing small open economy models,<sup>“</sup> _Journal of International Economics_ 61, pp. 163185,

- Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, and Luis Serven (1999): " Saving in the world: the stylized facts", in Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Luis Serven (eds.), _The Economics of Saving and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Implications for Policy_ , Cambridge University Press.

- Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, Luis Serven, and Andres Solimano (1996), “Saving and Investment: Paradigms, Puzzles, Policies,” _World Bank Research Observer_ , Vol. 11, No. 1, 87-117.

- World Bank (1993), _The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy_ (New York: Oxford University Press).

- World Bank (1994), _Averting the Old Age crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth_ (New York: Oxford University Press).

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ESTIMATES OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 81 There is no question that these estimates could be improved with a still better cross country model. While these estimates are reasonable and we are confident of their utility for the rent control study, further improving the precision of these estimates can have a high payoff. 12I

# "Uncontrolled" Rents Compared to Predictions from the Cross-Country Model

Table 5.4 showed typical controlled rents to be less than 2 percent of total consumption. Median rent-to-consumption level for uncontrolled units was .05. Using the median income for Kumasi in 1986 cedis, Malpezzi et al. (1988) predicted that the median rent-to-income level would be .09 in the absence of controls. However, the median income in the "uncontrolled" sector is about 14,750 cedis, compared to about 12,500 for the city as a whole. Using an elasticity of .6 we therefore derived a slightly lower estimate of the typical uncontrolled rent-to-consumption ratio, .08.

**Figure** 5.5: Rent-to-Income Comparisons, Various Models Figure 5.5 presents a simple A 14% comparison of these results. The bottom e _12% -_ ..... .... line is derived from the actual Ito **Predicted** . controlled data (i.e. constrained ' 1.r......... estimates). The middle line is from the c **8%** - "uncontrolled" Kumasi sample Ors 6X - ................\ **.** ................ (unadjusted). The highest line is from u \ the "uncontrolled" demand estimates from V. the cross z-ountry model. In Kumasi a 1 **_2%_** _-_ household with a typical monthly income n **0%** of US$ 150 or more would have an actual 0 5 10 Cs _20_ 25 30 rent to income ratio of 0.025 in thePred 1 Monthly Consumption (1000s) controlled sector (see Table 5.1). Even Pred 2 From Cross Country Mode. in the uncontrolled sector with a

household monthly income of US$ 195, the rent to income ratio is still only 0.05. The prediction from the cross country model is .09 for the market, .08 for the slightly higher income group in the uncontrolled sector. It appears that the net effect of the biases on "uncont:rolled" rents discussed above and in Fallis and Smith (1984) i5 to lower "uncontrolled" rents.

Given data on household consumption, the average rent-to-income ratio, and an assumed elasticity (.6), estimating PmQm for each household with the cross country model -- free from such bias -- is straightfcrward. In addition, when we estimate the hedonic and demand relations below with the "uncontrolled" lJ/ Particularly since there are many other uses of these estimates, such as evaluating shelter projects and other government housing policies. See Mayo and Gross (1986) and The Urban Edge (1984).
In addition, we explore whether the characteristics of the environment in which banks operate affect the impact of competition on access to finance.<sup>9</sup> To do that, we interact our measures of competition with country-level measures of financial development, the availability of credit information, and government bank ownership. We find that countries with higher levels of financial development and better information availability experience a less pronounced decline in access to finance as a result of low levels of competition (high values of the Lerner index). The flip side of this finding is that low competition is more detrimental for firms operating in countries with low levels of financial development or lacking credit information. In addition, we find that significant government bank ownership exacerbates the damaging impact of low bank competition.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our multiple datasets and presents summary statistics. Section 3 outlines our regression model. Section 4 presents our baseline results. Section 5 discusses the results interacting the competition measures with different aspects of the environment in which banks operate. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A1 and A2 contain detailed descriptions of the construction of the firm-level measure of access to finance and the estimation method for the Lerner index, respectively.

# **2. Data**

We combine firm-, bank- and country-level data from various sources. Table 1, Panel A gives a list of all the variables used in the paper and details their sources. The firm-level data come from World Bank Enterprise Surveys.<sup>10</sup> The data are collected in several waves and contain repeated cross-sections for the countries in our sample. Because our goal is to isolate within country variation in competition across time, we only focus on countries that have survey data for at least two years.

We use firm survey data to construct our measure of access to finance and several control variables. A _ccess to finance_ is an indicator variable that equals one when a firm has a loan, overdraft, or line of credit, and zero otherwise. We prefer to use this objective measure of access

> 9 Beck et al. (2004) analyze how different aspects of the institutional and regulatory environment, as well as the ownership structure of the banking system, affect the impact of bank concentration on firms’ perceptions of financing obstacles.

> 10 The data are available at www.enterprisesurveys.org

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