Table 3 also reports comparisons for other classes of NTMs. The second most common NTMs are sanitary restrictions (Class A). These affect 65 4-digit manufacturing industries, mostly in the food sector. When comparing the distribution of NTMs across connected and all firms, politically connected firms are more likely to be protected by Class A NTMs in two of the three comparisons. They are also more likely to be subject to price controls (Class F), which are imposed on 60 manufacturing industries (the differences are significant in two of the three firm level comparisons). Export-related measures (Class P) exist in only 16 manufacturing industries. In only one of the three comparisons are there significant differences between the two types of firms in this small sample.

**Table 3: Percent of firms and products benefitting from Non-tariff Trade Measures**

||**Share of P**|**olitically Con**<br>**FIRMS**|**nected**|**Share**<br>**all**|**Share of P**<br>**P**|**olitically Co**<br>**RODUCTS**|**nnected**<br>|**Share of**<br>**NON-PC**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**CEO**|**Owner**|**Broad**|**firms**|**CEO**|**Owner**|**Broad**|**Products**|
|Technical import|89%*|78%**|82%**|56%|69%|74%**|76%**|55%|
|barriers (Class B)|(0.073)|(0.000)|(0.000)||(0.230)|(0.027)|(0.008)||
|Authorization|0%|5%|11%**|1%|6%|7%|8%|4%|
|required (B140)|(0.678)|(0.663)|(0.000)||(0.554)|(0.364)|(0.254)||
|<br>Quality inspection|67%**|63%**|67%**|22%|50%|54%*|51%|38%|
|required (B840)|(0.011)|(0.000)|(0.000)||(0.390)|(0.069)|(0.113)||
|Traceability|89%*|78%**|82%**|56%|69%|74%**|76%**|52%|
|required (B859)|(0.073)|(0.000)|(0.000)||(0.224)|(0.012)|(0.003)||
|Sanitary measures<br>Cl A|0%**|18%**|27%|28%|19%|28%*|31%**|15%|
|(ass )|(0.033)|(0.005)|(0.199)||(0.482)|(0.070)|(0.021)||
|Price-control (Class F)|44%|38%*|37%**|26%|38%|33%|34%|22%|
||(0.249)|(0.057)|(0.029)||(0.191)|(0.145)|(0.109)||
|Export promotion|0%|4%|5%*|1%|13%|7%|7%|3%|
|(CLASS P)|(0.776)|(0.291)|(0.078)||(0.147)|(0.231)|(0.226)||

Source: WITS; establishment census data; sample of politically connected firms. Note: The significance level (p-values) for the statistical difference between politically connected firms or industries (columns 1-3 and 5-7) relative to all firms or industries (columns 4 and 8) is reported in parentheses; it is based on a Pearson Chi2-test. We use the Fisher-test (instead of the Chi2-test) to test for the significance in differences between PC and NOT-PC industries (and for firms also managed by connected CEOs) for NTMs _CLASS P_ and _CLASS B140_ due to the small sample sizes. *, ** indicates that the coefficients are significant at the 5%, 10% level.

Malouche et al. (2013) highlight that the number of different NTMs imposed on a single product provides additional information on the intensity of trade protection. More NTMs are likely to offer greater protection from competition than fewer. Hence, if political connections matter for NTMs, we should also observe that the probability that a product is sold by a politically connected firm rises with the number of NTMs imposed on the product. The evidence in Table 4 demonstrates that this is the case for all three definitions of political connectedness.

Table 4 focuses on the most common type of Class B NTMs in Egypt (restrictions on imports). For example, 82 percent of connected firms of any type but only 27 percent of all firms are the firm level since we cannot identify the individual politically connected firms in the establishment census data.

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