rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the construction of the cohorts for analysis, and addresses the assumptions and concerns underpinning the construction. Girls are included in the treatment cohorts if they live in the stipend districts and in the comparison cohorts if they live in non-stipend districts. In addition, both groups have to meet one of the following criteria to ensure that the analysis is restricted to the relevant girls, namely those who could enroll in middle school for at least one year during the period of study: (a) girls who were enrolled in grades 7-12 in 2007-08 and/or grades 6-11 in the previous year (2006-07) are assumed to have been exposed for at least one year to the program; (b) for the rest of the girls who were enrolled in neither 2007-08 nor 2006-07, only those whose highest grade completed is at least grade 6 and at most grade 10, and who are likely to have been enrolled in a middle school grade between 2003-04 and 2005-06 (based on the age-grade distribution of the reference cohort at baseline) are assumed to have been exposed for at least one year to the program.

We use the household data to estimate the influence of the program on such longer-term outcomes as educational attainment and labor market, marriage, and fertility decisions. The general specification of the base regression equations for the DD analysis is as follows: where _i_ indexes individuals, _t_ is the time subscript, _T_ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for post-program year and a value of 0 for the pre-program year, _FSSP_ identifies the location of the girl between stipend and non-stipend districts, and X is a vector of baseline household demographics, community-level characteristics, and measures of education market place and school quality. _P_ is a vector of dummy variables to capture other programs that were introduced by the GoP along with the FSSP and sought to build school facilities, provide free textbooks, recruit contract teachers, and revitalize school councils.<sup>21</sup> The outcomes of interest ( _Y_ ) measure educational outcomes (middle school completion, middle to high school transition, high school

> distribution of girls in middle school in Punjab indicates that this cohort has errors of inclusion and exclusion. More specifically, the youngest girls of this cohort (10-11 years old) have a high probability to remain in primary school whereas a substantial fraction of girls 15-17 who attend school are enrolled in middle school.

> 21 These programs were _per se_ not targeted at stipend districts but could have been implemented differentially: for instance, girls’ schools in stipend districts were worse off and it is possible that any program on rehabilitation of school infrastructure would focus on schools with many missing facilities, many of which happen to be in stipend districts.

15
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the OLS estimates. We start from the original sample, which has a maximum of 7 periods before crossing the threshold and 7 periods after crossing the threshold. Columns 2 through 6 gradually narrow to at most 2 periods before and 2 periods after the crossing point of each country. As we narrow the window, the estimated coefficient associated with foreign aid monotonously and gradually increases. The coefficient in Column 6 is 0.0201, more than 50% larger than that in Column 1. A generalized Hausman test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated with Aid!"!! is the same in Column 1 and in Column 6 is rejected with a p-value of 0.07. These findings are consistent with the existence of significant measurement error in aid, reinforcing the supposition that the aid to GNI ratio is measured with substantial noise.

# **5.4 Bunching**

Our identification strategy hinges on the large decline in the amount of aid received following the crossing of an arbitrarily given and pre-determined threshold. If countries can manipulate their income data to remain below the IDA threshold, then threshold crossing may not be a valid instrument for aid. Countries with lower expected growth and hence a greater “need” for aid would presumably be the most likely to understate their incomes to remain IDA eligible.

Endogenous manipulation of the income level is not likely to be prevalent for several reasons. First, the GNI estimates used by the World Bank are by no means entirely within a government’s control. The national accounts data produced by national statistical agencies are merely one of several inputs into the World Bank’s income estimates (Jerven, 2013). Governments cannot perfectly predict (1) the adjustments to those national accounts data often made by World Bank staff, (2) the exchange rates used, or (3) the population estimates used in constructing GNI per capita. Second, crossing also depends on the current IDA threshold, and its annual adjustments for global inflation rates cannot be predicted perfectly either. Finally, income level with 24
# **Table 1.** Descriptive statistics

||_E_|_thiopia 20_|_11-12_||_Malawi 20_|_10-11_||_Nigeria 201_|_0-11_|_T_|_anzania 2_|_010-11_||_Uganda 20_|_10-11_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_N_|_Mean_|_Std. Dev._|<br>_N_|_Mean_|_Std. Dev._|_N_|_Mean_|_Std. Dev._|_N_|_Mean_|_Std. Dev._|_N_|_Mean_|_Std. Dev._|
|**_Trees On Farm_**||||||||||||||||
|Trees On farm (yes=1)|3347|0.38|0.49|2272|0.24|0.43|2602|0.16|0.37|2621|0.55|0.49|1814|0.30|0.45|
|Fruit Trees (yes=1)|3347|0.17|0.36|2272|0.24|0.43|2602|0.06|0.23|2621|0.45|0.50|1814|0.05|0.21|
|Tree Cash Crops (yes=1)|3347|0.33|0.48|2272|-|-|2602|0.15|0.36|2621|0.22|0.41|1814|0.27|0.43|
|<br>Timber of Fuel-wood (yes=1)|3347|0.03|0.14|2272|0.00|0.02|2602|-|-|2621|0.18|0.42|1814|0.02|0.15|
|<br>Share of Farmland with presence of Trees|3347|0.18|0.34|2272|0.00|0.02|2602|0.08|0.25|2621|0.41|0.42|1814|0.35|0.65|
|Share of Farmland with presence of Fruit Trees|3347|0.05|0.19|2272|0.1|0.32|2602|0.04|0.17|2621|0.31|0.39|1814|0.05|0.26|
|Share of Farmland with presence of Tree Cash<br>Crops|3347|0.17|0.33|2272|-|-|2602|0.07|0.23|2621|0.15|0.32|1814|0.32|0.63|
|Share of Farmland with Presence of Trees for<br>Timber or Fuel-Wood|3347|-|-|2272|0.00|0.02|2602|-|-|2621|0.15|0.32|1814|0.02|0.16|
|**_Household Controls_**||||||||||||||||
|Household Size|3347|4.89|2.349|2272|4.85|2.30|2602|6.17|3.17|2621|5.34|3.18|1814|5.75|2.850|
|Number of Children (<14 years old)|3347|1.78|1.505|2272|2.37|1.68|2602|2.82|2.29|2621|2.38|2.09|1814|2.97|2.106|
|<br>Head's Age (years)|3346|44.33|16.050|2252|43.48|16.72|2596|50.24|15.11|2620|47.52|16.05|1811|47.71|14.968|
|<br>Head Female (yes=1)|3347|0.24|0.432|2272|0.24|0.42|2602|0.11|0.31|2621|0.23|0.42|1814|0.30|0.460|
|Head education (years)|3307|1.67|3.090|2249|5.04|4.02|2546|4.51|4.97|2569|4.98|3.92|1625|4.68|3.461|
|**_Assets and land_**||||||||||||||||
|Land Owned (area - ha)|2854|1.78|3.64|2272|0.85|0.75|2573|1.00|1.84|2212|2.61|4.02|1658|1.66|3.14|
|<br>Tropical Livestock Units (TLU)|3347|2.51|2.78|2272|0.39|1.74|2602|3.12|17.17|2621|1.53|3.30|1814|1.24|2.95|
|**_Geo-climatic variables_**||||||||||||||||
|Population Density around 20km (people/km<sup>2</sup>)<br>(2010)|3347|200.08|180.87|2272|205.15|144.64|2602|284.89|281.76|2586|93.14|132.65|1812|309.23|313.61|
|<br>Tree Cover % around 20km (mean) (2010)|3347|51.45|20.44|2272|65.62|11.74|2602|34.86|23.68|2586|59.91|24.29|1812|65.90|15.67|
|Fertile Soil % around 20 km (mean) (2010)|3347|0.73|0.27|2272|0.41|0.27|2602|0.53|0.31|2586|0.44|0.31|1812|0.20|0.23|
|Annual Mean Temperature (°C)|3347|18.42|3.18|2272|21.58|1.91|2602|26.36|0.99|2586|22.15|2.44|1812|21.79|1.86|
|Annual Precipitation(mm)|3347|1175|340|2272|1055|239|2602|1382|617|2586|1068|326|1812|1234|187|

_Note:_ Statistics are for rural areas only and reported with sampling weight correction. “-“ stands for missing information.

24
Union in 1989 and the adoption of market-oriented economic policy in China and India during the 1990s, the central planning approach to policy has largely been discarded. Almost all countries now rely on a public policy approach that augments and compliments market processes rather than substitutes for them. For Bank-supported shelter projects, these changes mean that the projects are no longer implemented by project specific Implementation Units which substituted for non-existent local governments, and which often paid little attention to resource costs. It also means that arguments about the comparative advantages of the public and private sectors are considerably less likely to cloud the discussion. Finally, most of the Bank’s borrowers now have more sophisticated and diversified economies and financial systems. For instance, many developing countries now have access to market rate housing finance to assist them. This was not the case in 1986.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, by no means have all of the changes been benevolent. There have been financial crises that led to capital flight and massive simultaneous mortgage defaults, as in Mexico where in 1995 most of the mortgage loans made under a Bank loan were forgiven. Indeed, in some cases, over-heated real estate markets seem to have precipitated the crises.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, urbanization is no longer thought of only as an engine of growth that occurs as societies grow and specialize. Instead, as argued by Fay and Opal (2000), in many Sub-

> world doubled to just over 120. Finally, the _World Development Report_ (World Bank 1999) reports that 95 percent of democracies had initiated some for of decentralization process by the year 2000.  As for macrostability, 23 countries had inflation rates over 30 percent in 1985 or 1986 as compared to 14 countries in 1999 or 2000, and the median inflation rate fell from 7 percent to 3 Percent.

> 3 In 1973 the per capita incomes in India and Senegal, two of the first shelter projects,  was $218 and $623 in 1995 dollars. In contrast, in the last year the Bank supported projects in Mexico and Latvia with per capita incomes more than seven times that level.  Similarly, in terms of financial development, in 1973, half of the Bank’s borrowers had financial systems smaller than the Bank’s credit union. In 2001, this share had fallen to less than one-third.

> 4 See Quigley (2001) on the role the property market played in the Asian financial crisis.

2
89

# Budget Doticit(-)/GDP Moderately Indebted Countrlos

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# Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate Moderately Indebted Countrles

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# Real GDP Growth Rates Moderately Indebted Countrlis

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# <u>1.  Introduction</u>

In the December 2000 issue of the _American Political Science Review_ , we published an analysis of the determinants of peacebuilding after civil war.<sup>1</sup> Our primary focus was to assess the impact of United Nations (UN) peace operations and we argued that UN operations made a positive difference, controlling for levels of war-related hostility and pre- and post-war levels of local capacities for development. We proposed a simple model in which post-conflict outcomes are determined by these three dimensions – hostility, local capacities, and international capacities measured primarily by the presence and mandate of a UN mission.

In this paper, we build on our earlier analysis in a number of ways: We propose new conceptualizations of peacebuilding success that are more consistent with the policy community’s understanding of peace: successful peacebuilding is the achievement of _self-sustaining_ peace; and we look beyond the short-term effects of UN missions to consider if countries that have had UN assistance do better than others over the long run. We analyze the UN’s effects on a complex definition of peace that includes a modest measure of democratization, but also analyze the determinants of peace duration defined simply as the absence of war. Finally, we use new estimation strategies that establish the robustness of our results.

We present several new results. One result becomes apparent when we analyze selection issues in the assignment of UN missions and mandates: some of the factors that might lead the parties to the negotiation table also make the implementation of peace agreements more difficult. In countries with deep hostilities (after long and bloody wars) factions are more likely to sign a treaty as they realize that they cannot win a military victory, but trust is so low and local capacities so depleted that it is in precisely such complicated peacebuilding ecologies that the parties need the UN’s assistance to implement a settlement. The UN can help by providing assurances, policing, and technical assistance in such cases.

Other new results refer to the long-term effects of UN missions. We find that the UN is not good at fighting wars and that the UN’s effects are felt more with respect to

> 1 Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Henceforth cited as DS2000.

1
<mark>WPS3535</mark>

# **REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS AND THE EMPIRICAL IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY GOVERNANCE**

**ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY CAPACITY AND EFFICIENCY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

## **By**

John Cubbin, City University, and Jon Stern, London Business School

### **ABSTRACT**

This paper assesses for 28 developing countries over the period 1980-2001 whether the existence of a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are significantly associated with superior electricity outcomes. The analysis draws on theoretical and empirical work on the impact of independent central banks and of developing country telecommunications regulators. The empirical analysis concludes that a regulatory law and higher quality governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity levels. In addition, this positive impact continues to increase for at least three years and probably for over 10 years as experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. The results are robust to alternative dynamic specifications and show no sign of any significant endogeneity biases.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3535, March 2005 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ 1
If each acre is viewed as an indivisible unit that must be allocated to one of the seven crop categories and the nine villages as random draws from a large population of villages that were provided with an all-weather road at some stage over the period 2006-2009, then the independence of the observed cropping patterns before and after such provision can be tested. The table yields _χ_<sup>2</sup> = 40 _._ 14, with the main contributions thereto coming from oilseeds and vegetables. Since _χ_<sup>2</sup> 0 _._ 01<sup>(6) = 16</sup><sup>_._81,thenullisdecisivelyrejected.</sup>

# **4 Education**

The provision of an all-weather connection to schools has a variety of effects, depending on their location in relation to the village. If, as is usual, the teachers live elsewhere, they should suffer fewer forced absences due to poor weather, especially in the monsoon season. At all events, those who take their duties lightly will lose an excuse. The same applies to those children who have to travel to a school outside their village. An easier trip for teachers and pupils alike will normally affect not only attendance conditional on enrolment, but also enrolment and graduation rates. Here, the only factor that might work to dampen the accumulation of human capital that results from better and more extensive schooling is over-crowding of classrooms, should there be inadequate complementary expenditures on additional staff and facilities.

A brief description of the school system in relation to age is needed at the outset. A child normally begins primary school (standard 1-5) on turning six. If he or she progresses normally, promotion to secondary school (standard 6-10) will follow on turning eleven, with the further prospect of continuing on to high school (standard 11-12) on reaching sixteen. In fact, some children start a year earlier, others a year or two later; and some have to repeat a class. Some children attending primary school will, therefore, be twelve or thirteen; likewise, some of those attending secondary school will have turned sixteen. To allow for all this, we have added one year to the ‘normal’ progression, so that nineteen-year olds are included.

## **4.1 The household survey**

The general position in _kharif_ 2009 was as follows. There were altogether 394 children aged six to nineteen, whose classification by age group, whether their village enjoyed an all-weather road, and whether they were attending school is set out in Table 8. All but two of the 30 villages had a primary school, and all but two of the 163 children of 18
**Table A8.** Decomposition results of the global emissions changes and contributions of various driving forces in the **LI countries** over the early period (1980-1990), late period <u>(2005-2015), and entire period (1980-2015).</u>

|**Period**|**1980-1990**|**2005-2015**|**1980-2015**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Emissions change (Mt)**||||
|Overall change|8.7|28.9|43.6|
|_EC_|0.1|4.1|6.4|
|_ECS_|2.8|9.6|7.5|
|_EI_|-0.9|-9.1|-8.2|
|_PCG_|-0.3|13.0|7.9|
|_P_|7.0|11.3|30.0|
|**Contribution (%)**||||
|Growth rate|42.9|82.6|214.8|
|_EC_|0.2|11.6|31.7|
|_ECS_|13.7|27.5|37.1|
|_EI_|-4.3|-26.0|-40.6|
|_PCG_|-1.5|37.1|38.9|
|_P_|34.7|32.4|147.8|

**_Note:_** _EC_ , _ECS_ , _EI_ , _PCG_ , and _P_ refer to emission coefficient, energy mix, energy intensity, income, and population, respectively.

36
# **1. Introduction**

In this paper, we address the following two questions: Does the introduction of mandatory and voluntary standards affect Chinese exports significantly? What is the effect of international harmonization on agricultural products? The aim of this paper is to attempt to answer these questions by assessing econometrically China‟s development of mandatory and voluntary standards on its exports of agricultural and food products. We use new data that link Chinese food standards for seven groups of food products (meat, fish, vegetables, cereals, milk, tea, and sugar) to trade data.

Our research contributes to the existing empirical literature in at least three innovative ways. First, we focus on standards implemented by the _exporting_ country for its produced goods, whereas previous empirical studies mainly focus on standards used by the _importing_ countries. Second, we analyze the impact of standards harmonization in a developing country. Due to data availability, research on the impact of standards harmonization has so far been limited to industrialized countries. To our knowledge, there is no empirical study estimating the impact of national product standards and harmonization in exports from developing countries. Third, our dataset allows differentiation between mandatory and voluntary standards, whereas this was not possible in previous studies due to data limitations. In addition, each type of standard can be identified as being harmonized to international norms or not.

We use an extended gravity model to examine the impact of food standards in China on its agricultural exports. Although estimates vary slightly across products, the results confirm the export-promoting effect of standards. This is particularly true with regard to mandatory standards. In particular, based on our analysis, we confirm the positive impact of standards harmonization. We find that the impact of an additional standard that is based on international measures has a larger impact than the marginal impact of purely Chinese domestic standards. Thus our results provide new evidence on the positive impact of standards on export performance, especially when standards are harmonized to international norms.

The paper is structured as follows. In next section, we review the literature on the trade effects of standards in general, with a focus on the Chinese case. Section 3 discusses the institutional background and recent developments in China‟s standardization system for food products. In Section 4, we present our data, descriptive statistics, and empirical strategy. We conduct the empirical analysis and present the effects of standards and regulations in Section 5. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude with some policy implications.

2
where C<sup>ROO</sup> = f ~~h~~ �<sup>�(1��EU )</sup> (1�tdBD;EU<sup>EU</sup> )��EU � 1 ~~i~~ : If only some ...rms meet ROOs, C<sup>ROO</sup> > 1: If C<sup>ROO</sup> � 1; then all ...rms that enter the market meet ROOs. As expected, C<sup>ROO</sup> rises and the fraction of ...rms that meets the ROOs falls, as preferences become less attractive: i.e., as tari¤s are lowered, or the documentation costs or marginal costs of meeting preferences increase. Equation (9) points out that once we know cuto¤ v ('; PBD;EU ) ; we also know the corresponding one for meeting ROOs.

# 3.2.2 Stage 2

In Stage 2, we de...ne productivity '<sup>�</sup> BD;j<sup>of the marginal Bangladeshi ...rm in market j: For any</sup> '; the expected pro...t from selling in market j is the integral of pro...ts over v � v ('; PBD;j).

<!-- Start of picture text --> Firms enter the market<br>Firms choose<br>not to enter<br>and<br>do not pay<br>fm US Firms draw demand shock, but stay out<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 2: Demand Shock-Productivity Trade-o¤ for the US market.

The ...rm with '<sup>�</sup> BD;j<sup>is,byde...nition,indi¤erentbetweentryingtoaccessmarketjandnot</sup> doing so, i.e., its expected pro...ts from accessing market j are equal to the ...xed cost fm<sup>j.26</sup>

> 26As shown in equation (40) in the Appendix, the expected pro...ts for the EU market consist of 2 parts: the expected pro...ts from exporting without invoking EBA preferences plus the expected pro...t conditional

17