rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
## 4.3. Contextual Adaptation of CBT‐Based Psychosocial Support Curricula

Several curricula were identified that could be relevant to the objective of building psychological capital among entrepreneurs. However, the absence of a relevant, off‐the‐shelf psychosocial support intervention for entrepreneurs in developing countries means that any intervention for this specific population needs to be locally adapted to ensure suitability to the local context, and especially to the needs of the target population (Bernal 2006; Castro, Barrera, and Holleran Steiker 2010). The literature suggests that one way to do this would be to employ the Rapid Research Methods developed through the DIME Methodology (Design, Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation) to adapt interventions (Applied Mental Health Research Group 2013). The DIME model uses a series of activities that combine evidence‐based programming with rigorous monitoring and impact evaluation. The objective is to provide a rational basis and approach for local programming, while also generating information and lessons learned that can inform future services.

# 5. Concluding Remarks

The primary purpose of this literature review was to summarize the evidence about links between stress and the performance of entrepreneurs leading SMEs in high‐risk, FCV affected environments. The review then identified promising psychosocial support interventions that could be adapted and implemented to build resilience of SME entrepreneurs in FCV contexts.

According to the literature, entrepreneurship is arguably one of the most stressful occupational choices because entrepreneurs typically operate in competitive environments with high levels of risk and uncertainty. In other words, the psychological price of being an entrepreneur is high compared to other professions. Persistent stress can lead to ‘strain’ or burnout that negatively impacts health, well‐being, job performance, and job satisfaction at the individual level. In turn, the low functioning of the entrepreneur affects business performance through three key mechanisms: (a) depletion of psychological resources; (b) erosion of the entrepreneur’s influencing and motivating role; and (c) counterproductive work behavior(s). These effects are found to be more prominent for SMEs (over large firms), seasoned entrepreneurs, and those working in FCV‐affected environments.

The problem is more acute for SMEs in FCV‐affected environments. This is cause for concern in terms of economic development because SMEs are the lifeline of job creation, innovation and firm growth in FCV contexts. Across the five categories of stressors — maintenance, interpersonal, internal stressors, job‐/role‐related, and the external environment — stress periods are likely to be longer and persistent, and the intensity higher in FCV contexts. Since persistently high levels of stress can lead to health problems and negatively affect productivity, it is important to focus on the psychological well‐being of SME entrepreneurs in FCVs to improve their overall performance and resilience.

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context, in which trade liberalization is the policy lever --and the eventual culprit-- while market and institutional weaknesses are accepted as immanent characteristics.

The theoretical ambiguity on the effects of openness is reflected in the available empirical evidence. Some papers point to strongly positive growth effects by trade liberalization. This is the case of Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995), who run cross-country growth regressions on composite indices of the stance of trade policy; as well as Edwards (1998), who prefers to base his positive evaluation by examining the robustness of various individual indicators of trade liberalization in cross-country growth regressions. But others, most notably Harrison (1996) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) have cast doubt on the significance and robustness of the growth benefits of openness. Their critique starts with the openness measures used in practice; for instance, some purportedly openness indicators reflect general poor economic management (e.g., the black market premium) or are primarily affected by geographic characteristics (e.g., the trade volume). Other criticisms are based on econometric grounds, such as omitted-variable bias (particularly due to the exclusion of institutional and geography-related variables) and joint endogeneity bias (stemming from the effect of growth on certain policy regimes).

Recent empirical studies have addressed these criticisms by emphasizing the overtime variation in openness indicators and growth performance. (Harrison 1996 had already noted that panel studies rendered a more positive evaluation of the growth effects of openness than cross-sectional studies.) Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2005) run growth regressions on panel data of large samples of countries. Both papers use indicators fo openness based on trade volumes and control for their joint endogeneity and correlation with country-specific factors through GMM methods that involve taking differences of data and instruments. This implies that, although they continue to use cross-country data, these papers favor within-country changes as the main source of relevant variation. Both papers conclude that opening the economy to international trade brings about significant growth improvements. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) arrive at a similar, though more nuanced, conclusion from a methodologically different standpoint. Using an event-study methodology --where an event is defined as a year of substantial trade policy liberalization-- they find that liberalizing countries tend to experience significantly higher volumes of trade, investment rates, and, most importantly, 3
# **1 Introduction**

There is a large consensus in the literature that female empowerment improves women’s and children’s outcomes and plays a positive role in economic development overall (e.g. Duflo, 2003 and Allendorf, 2007). Women living in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region score lowest worldwide on most measures of economic empowerment, including access to property ownership (World Economic Forum, 2023). In the region, inheritance has historically been the primary way through which women access property and it plays a decisive role in allowing women to participate in the economy, e.g. by enabling them to start their own businesses (IFC, 2017). Property ownership can insure women against unforeseen misfortunes and increase their bargaining power within the household. However, most MENA countries apply Islamic inheritance law, which systematically favors sons over daughters. The bequest foreseen for an individual’s children is split unevenly by gender: a son always receives twice the share of a daughter. This arrangement is commonly justified with a man’s obligation to take care of his wife, daughter or sister. Social reality in the MENA region, however, is changing. In Tunisia, women represent more than half of the college student population (World Bank, 2022b) and marry increasingly late or not at all (Assaad et al., 2017). The “gender gap” in education has reversed: in the most recent panel survey, 71 percent of Tunisian women were as educated as or even more highly educated than their husbands (Assaad et al., 2017). Even though female labor market participation remains relatively low, household surveys suggest that women contribute a significant share to household budgets (ERF, 2014). The persistence of gender discriminatory inheritance law has been associated with women’s precarization not only in Tunisia, but also in Morocco and Egypt, and particularly when it comes to land bequests: if not entirely left out, women tend to receive the least fertile lands (Tanner, 2020; Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme, 2015; Khodary, 2018). Gender discrimination in inheritance is thus an urgent but so far understudied policy issue in the MENA region and beyond.

Tunisia was the first MENA country where a large social movement demanded gender equal inheritance law. The reform proposal received presidential support in 2018, but it never reached a parliamentary vote. The legal status quo remains unchanged and the introduction of a gender equal inheritance law seems increasingly unlikely. But legal reform may not be the only way to weaken gender discrimination in inheritance. The Tunisian Code on Personal Status allows parents to make gifts to a person of their choice. If parents gift assets, property or land to their daughter while alive, the remaining wealth is split according 2
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(7) where _β0_ captures the reference location’s share in China’s migrant population. Moreover, the residuals can be interpreted as the unobserved part of each location’s amenities, _Ai_<sup>_unobs_</sup> = **�** �.<sup>25</sup> We use the above outlined strategy to estimate the relative importance of real wages, various geographical amenities, and different public amenities in determining individual location choices. The geographical characteristics of each location that we are able to include in our analysis are its ruggedness, temperature (number of heating and cooling days), rainfall, a dummy variable for location on the Yangtze River, and availability of natural resources. The public amenities we are able to include focus on the provision of tap water, sewage, and natural gas to households. Tables 1a and 1b below show the results of estimating different versions of equation (7). Table A1 in Appendix C provides some additional extensions to these results that show that people are more sensitive to real wage and/or amenity differences in nearby locations (i.e. within the same province).

We need to mention three details before discussing our findings. First, all regressions control for unobserved determinants of migration that do not vary between the rural parts of prefectures in the same province as well as unobserved factors that do not vary between the urban parts of prefectures in the same province (i.e. we include province-rural and province-urban fixed effects). In addition, each regression also includes longitude and latitude and a location’s area as controls. Including area as a control takes account of the fact that the same population on less land means a larger population density, and thus more congestion, whereas including longitude and latitude aims to control for unobservables that are related to absolute (and arguably also relative) location. Finally, we include dummies for four of the major languages spoken in China, to (roughly) capture possible language barriers to internal migration.<sup>26</sup> Second, in almost all specifications we allow the geographical amenities to differentially affect migration decisions in urban and rural areas. We do this as most of our geographical data reports the same value for each prefecture’s urban and rural part.

Third, and most importantly, by regressing our real wage and amenity data on log _migrant_ population relative to a baseline location, we effectively identify people’s willingness to migrate in response to real wage and/or amenity differences from the variation in location choices of people who did decide to migrate. This implies that in our counterfactual “no Hukou” scenario we make the implicit assumption

> 25 Using the residuals as a measure of each location’s unobserved amenities does assume: (i) that our linear utility model is well-specified (i.e. with real wages, observed and unobserved amenities entering utility in an additively separable way), and (ii) that these unobserved amenities are uncorrelated with both a location’s real wages as well as its observed amenities.

> 26 Full results are available upon request.

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Disruptions in the supply of inputs due to the pandemic are well documented, although their impact on firms remains to be thoroughly analyzed (see Butt 2021, Pitschner 2022, Meier and Pinto 2020). We capture supply disruptions with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s supply of inputs, raw materials, or finished goods and materials purchased to resell decreased in the last month (after the outbreak of the pandemic) compared to the same month a year ago (prepandemic). The data source is COV-ES.

Voluntary dropouts from the labor market due to health or family reasons may have resulted in firms facing a labor shortage (see Pitschner 2022, Forsythe et al. 2022). For instance, Forsythe et al. (2022) find that for the US economy, the labor market remained surprisingly tight throughout the entire pandemic, despite the dramatic job losses. A shortage of hard-to-replace skilled workers may be especially worrisome. The COV-ES did not ask firms about skilled shortages. We use a question in the ES that asks firms how severe (on a 0–4 scale) inadequately educated workers is as an obstacle to their current operations (Skills obstacle).

Next, we account for the labor productivity of the firm prior to the pandemic using ES. It equals the log of total sales of the firm (in 2009 USD) in the last fiscal year divided by the number of full-time workers at the end of the fiscal year covered by the ES. Several studies have found a positive link between a firm’s pre-pandemic productivity and performance during the pandemic in terms of sales, employment, and survival (see Bloom et al. 2023, Bruhn et al. 2023, Muzi et al. 2022, Fernández-Cerezo et al. 2022, Kozeniauskas et al. 2020). Unlike earlier recessions, COVID19 resulted in a larger drop in women’s relative to men’s employment (Bundervoet et al. 2022, Adams-Prassl et al. 2020, Russell and Sun 2020, Bluedorn et al. 2023). One reason for this could be the mandatory closure of schools and the collapse of childcare facilities due to the pandemic. As a result, firms that are more dependent on women workers are likely to be more adversely 13
influence of the duration of communist rule is insignificant when alternation in included as a predictor in the regression. A tentative conclusion from our results is that the mechanism through which years of communism matters is through its effect on political alternation. When we exclude years of communism from the second stage regression (results not shown here), the estimated coefficient for alternation increases.

The coefficient for democracy is near zero and is statistically insignificant in two formulations, which is consistent with Treisman’s work using different measures of democracy. However democracy significantly reduces the quality of governance in the IV regression. Thus, political alternation seems to crowd out the putatively positive effect of democracy. It is more difficult to explain why greater democracy, for a given number of alternations in power, would make governance _worse_ .

Cumulative duration of war hurts governance: the variable has a negative sign in all regressions. In the IV regression, each additional year of war reduces the rule of law indicator by 12 percent , or one-sixth of a standard deviation of rule of law scores in our sample.<sup>22</sup> As predicted by our model, as well as the literature on the natural resource curse discussed above, a higher share of fuel exports in GDP worsens governance. The effect is particularly obvious in IV formulation where each 1 percent increase in fuel exports’ share in GDP reduces the predicted rule of law score by 0.14 points.

As a robustness check, we present in columns 4-6 of Table 6 regressions with another measure of governance from the KKM database, “control of corruption.” This measure is defined as “the exercise of public power for private gain.” This measure is also scaled so that the average and median for the world are zero and the standard deviation is one, with a higher score denoting better governance. We consider the control of corruption index a noisier measure of those aspects of the quality of governance affected by clientelism between firms and the government. To curtail 22 War has a more pronounced effect when the regressions are run up to 2002 or 2003. As wars on the territories of transition countries have ceased, the impact of the variable on governance has somewhat faded.

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A Road to Trust Individuals engage in face-to-face trade both with members of their community and individuals living in neighboring communities. Trade with the latter category is constrained by the transaction cost of interactions between the two communities. Thus, a reduction in transaction cost between two communities will lead to an increase in trade.

As a result, having assumed that diversity is more pronounced between than within communities, individuals will engage in exchange with member of groups with which they have no prior history of interactions. This will build generalized trust.

Available evidence indicates that rural roads might lead to more interactions. In Vietnam, rural road construction and rehabilitation had a positive impact on both the presence and the frequency of markets (Mu and Van de Walle, 2007). Further, in Bangladesh, rural roads led to significant savings of household transport expenses (Khandker et al. 2006). Some evidence also suggests that rural roads positively affect consumption through higher wages and higher output prices. Those impacts might take longer to materialize, however.

# **_3. The Setting and the Data_**

## _3.1. The Data_

We use a panel dataset that was collected in rural communities of the Philippines in the fall of 2003 and 2006. The sample covers 2,100 households in 135 villages (in 16 municipalities) of the Philippines. The data was collected for the impact evaluation of a 6
# **Results 5**

In this section, we estimate the effects of CAFTA-DR. We start with a comparison to the average RTA effect available in the literature, and then explore the heterogeneous effects of CAFTA-DR at the sector, country, and country-pair levels. We also examine the dynamics of these effects and consider the effect on GVCs indicators, including domestic value-added in trade.

## **5.1 The importance of including domestic trade flows**

In this section, we compare the estimated average effect of RTAs using our data, with and without including domestic trade flows, to the standard estimates established in the literature. The first column in Table (1) shows the average RTA effect using our data on only international trade flows. We identify a [exp(0.02) _−_ 1] _×_ 100 = 2.02 percent positive and significant effect. However, as discussed before, the inclusion of domestic trade flows in estimating the gravity equation provides significant benefits of adhering to the theory. Column 2 includes domestic trade flows and obtains a much larger effect, estimated at [exp(0.29) _−_ 1] _×_ 100 = 33.64 percent. But this estimation is biased upward due to not controlling for globalization effects (Bergstrand et al., 2015). Column 3 controls for globalization effects and estimates the average effect of RTA to be [exp(0.12) _−_ 1] _×_ 100 = 12.75 percent.

The finding that intra-national trade data are important for estimating the effects of RTAs is in line with several recent contributions in the literature (Dai et al., 2014; Baier et al., 2019). More importantly for us, the estimated coefficient in column 3, our benchmark average RTA effects, is in line with recent studies that include a large number of countries (including many developing countries), as we do. Very close to our benchmark result, Felbermayr et al. (2022) find an effect of 12 percent while covering 186 countries. Other recent studies that use a smaller sample of countries find slightly larger coefficients. Larch and Yotov (2023) find an effect of 24 percent with a sample of 70 countries.

## **5.2 Heterogeneous impact of CAFTA-DR**

This section presents the results of our analysis focusing on the impact of CAFTA-DR. In Table (2), we disentangle the additional effect (to the average RTA effect) of CAFTA-DR, 12