return provided they publicly condemn extremism and pledge to support the legal ruling against their family member.’ This approach of moving from collective ideas of guilt to a more nuanced approach had a positive effect on the scale of IDP return, since it allowed large groups of IDPs previously under collective suspicion of ISIL affiliation to return. IDP return also appeared to take place with fewer instances of revenge attacks.<sup>113</sup> The criteria and system recognized by each LPA were vital to this, since they generated community trust and acceptance of the process of return and thus prevented revenge attacks.<sup>114</sup> A political representative from Ayadhiya who participated in negotiations explained that: _Some Yazidi families (who live close to this area) faced issues with some Arab tribes who joined ISIL, and the Yazidi families refused to participate in the negotiation for this Peace Agreement, but we promised them all that anyone with a dirty hand (meaning anyone involved with ISIL) will never return._<sup>_115_</sup> However, by recognizing specific criteria and mechanisms to facilitate IDP return, the LPAs also introduced new barriers to return for some IDPs. If an IDP family was rejected by the mechanism associated with the LPA, it reinforced their inability to return. As one senior tribal leader in Anbar noted: _There were families who were proven guilty after the vetting process and proven to be one hundred percent affiliated to ISIL, and the agreement couldn't help them because of their direct support to ISIL._<sup>_116_</sup> The problem with this perception that the vetting process determined ‘one hundred per cent affiliation to ISIL’ is that the security vetting process has been widely criticized for its opacity and lack of due process; moreover, it is not clear which security body is entitled to screen IDPs and which criteria they should apply.<sup>117</sup> A Human Rights Watch report dated July 2019, for instance, listed five different actors involved in the security screening of 3,500 IDP families in Hamam al-‘Alil camp: military intelligence, national security, Special Weapons and Tactics (Ministry of Interior), local police, and, most controversially given their role in abuse of civilians and destruction of civilian property as well as interference in the process of IDP return, the Popular Mobilization Forces.<sup>118</sup> These different

> 113 There were some exceptions to safe returns. In Ayadhiya, interviewees reported that a small number of revenge attacks took place in the period after the LPAs signature, while secondary data also points at revenge attacks occurring in Anbar post-signature of the LPA, and that fear of revenge attacks continued to prevent IDP returns in Yathrib despite the LPA. For more information on each location please refer to the relevant Location Profile, at Annnex 1.

> 114 <mark>Other studies re-iterate the importance of community a</mark> cceptance to avoid revenge attacks or the start of new conflict when families with perceived ISIL affiliation return – for example, see: Aymerich, O., 2020. Community Resilience and the Return of Iraqi IDPs with Perceived Affiliation to the Islamic State. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 39(4), pp.552-563.

> 115 Interview with political representative, Ayadhiy <mark>a. 10 May 2021.</mark>

> 116 Interview with senior tribal leader, Anbar, 25 April 2021.

> 117 Genat, M. (2020).

> 118 HRW: Iraq: Military Enter Camp, Occupy School for ‘Screening’. Displaced People Fear Arrest over Actions of their Relatives. July 2019 ,18. Available from https:// www.hrw.org/news/18/07/2019/iraq-military-enter-camp-occupy-schoolscreening

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