labor supply (Odozi and Oyelere, 2021). Our paper differs from these existing studies in that, although we use a similar research design with similar data, we take advantage of the highly-granular nature of the geo-location data to define exposure to conflict within a very narrow window (as close as 10 km.), where earlier studies using a similar estimation approach have relied on exposure to violence at the level of the local governance area (LGA). Our approach allows us to narrowly define a set of comparison individuals and to test for sensitivity to the definition of treatment. Additionally, we provide more specific results that take into account the seasonality of herder-related violence and characterize how individuals respond to exposure throughout the agricultural season. Lastly, our results complement these studies by focusing on an additional dimension, the informal sector, which has previously received little attention.

This study makes three core contributions. First, we add to the literature on coping mechanisms in low- and middle-income countries. In the absence of adequately functioning markets for savings, credit, and insurance (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Cole _et al._ , 2013; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Karlan _et al._ , 2014), informal coping mechanisms in the form of, for example, intra-household transfers (Townsend, 1994), temporary migration (Bryan _et al._ , 2014; Morten, 2019), and selling assets such as livestock (Lange and Reimers, 2020) persist. Specifically, we add to a subset of this literature on coping mechanisms for households exposed violence and conflict (Verpoorten, 2009), and show that work in the informal sector can act as a safety net for individuals exposed to herder-related violence, specifically for those under a so-called “shadow of violence” that may heighten reactions to violence exposure.

Second, we add to the literature on the role of the informal sector in the process of economic development. This literature finds that the informal sector plays an important counter-cyclical role amid macroeconomic dynamics (Fiess _et al._ , 2010; Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). While recent research documents the informal sector acting as a ‘safety net’ in response to price shocks (Gunther and Launov, 2012; Epstein and Shapiro, 2017; Adhvaryu _et al._ , 2019; Colombo _et al._ , 2019), our study highlights that the informal sector can act as a ‘safety net’ for those exposed to violence and conflict. Notably, both price shocks and exposure to violence and conflict can reduce the expected earning potential of agricultural production. Since we are able to look at the effects of such violence in both planting and harvest periods, we are also able to show that, even temporary shifts to informal work can also be accompanied by lagged effects in the economic activity of households several months after exposure to violence has occurred. Such results are important since climate change will likely continue to exacerbate tensions between farmers and pastoralists both across Sub-Saharan African and specifically in Nigeria (McGuirk and Nunn, 2020; Eberle _et al._ , 2020).

Finally, we add to the literature on the consequences of exposure to violence and conflict. This literature documents adverse health effects (Camacho, 2008; Akresh _et al._ , 2012a,b; Grimard and Laszlo, 2014; Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2014; Weldeegzie, 2017), lower levels of educational attainment (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; Singh and Shemyakina, 2016; Brown and Velasquez, 2017; Weldeegzie, 2017), a diminished preference for risk (Bundervoet, 2010; Voors _et al._ , 2012; Moya, 2018; Jakiela and Ozier, 2019), shifts toward less risky agricultural portfolios (Rockmore, 2020), and reduced psychological well-being 4