In columns 5 and 6, we run the regressions excluding from the sample the two countries, Chile and Brazil, in which they were no or few firm-led renegotiations. The general results are again robust. Furthermore, a similar effect as in the previous two columns occurs with the financing variable and again it disappears when running two-stage regressions. Observing that Brazil has no firm-led but 36 government-led renegotiations, this result is probably linked to the bargaining power effect discussed before.

Table 8: Random effect probit panel

||**(1)**|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Sample|Basic|Basic|Basic|Basic|Basic<br>without<br>Brazilard<br>Chile|Basic<br>wlthout<br>Braziland<br>Chile|Basic|Basic|Basic|Basic|
|Dependentvariable|Allreneg.|Allreneg.|Renego<br>**initiated**by<br>firmsor by<br>both|Renego.<br>initiatedby<br>firmsorby<br>both|Reneg.<br>initiatedby<br>firms|Reneg<br>initiated<br>byfirms|Reneg<br>initiated<br>byfirms|Reneg.<br>initiated<br>byfirmfts|Reneg<br>initiated<br>byfirms|Reneg<br>initiated<br>byfirms|
|Existenceof<br>regulatorybody|-1.13*<br>(-6.32)|0.12<br>(0.36)|-0.85*<br>(-4.38)|0.55<br>(1.45)|-1.67*<br>(-6 42)|-043<br>(-0.90)|-1.21*<br>(-5.88)|____<br>0.34<br>(0.83)|-0.82**<br>(-2.29)|-0.59<br>(-1.50)|
|Pncecap|0.28<br>(I18)||0.33<br>(1.24)||065***<br>(1.91)||0.54<br>(1.64)||0.61***<br>(1.80)||
|Pncecap(IV)||607*<br>(4.29)||744*<br>(4.16)||810*<br>(3.51)||8.22*<br>(3.84)||**_5.71***_**<br>(1.89)|
|Duration**since**<br>award|0.23*<br>(668)|0.24*<br>(6.71)|015*<br>(3.60)|0.17*<br>(3.76)|0.27*<br>(4.69)|0.33*<br>(488)|0.20*<br>(429)|023*<br>(4.31)|0.23*<br>(417)|031*<br>(444)|
|Investment<br>requirements|0.06<br>(0.33)|0.20<br>(1.18)|0.72**<br>(1.99)|0.91**<br>(2.45)|1.64*<br>(344)|1.47*<br>(3.18)|0.62***<br>(1.66)|0.60***<br>(1.68)|1.14*<br>(269)|1.06;*<br>(2.41)|
|Pnvatefinancing|-0.63*<br>(-448)||-006<br>(-0.33)||-0.02<br>(-007)||0.68*<br>(2.57)||-0.25<br>(-0.78)||
|Pnvatefinancing<br>(IV)||136<br>(1.61)||343*<br>(3.40)||2.43***<br>(1.83)||4.97'<br>(4.61)||-148<br>(-1.31)|
|Bureaucratic<br>quality|0.44*<br>(-4.62)|-044*<br>(-2.96)|-0.39*<br>(-3.20)|-0.71*<br>(-4.00)|-034"*<br>(-233)|-0.44**<br>(-2.06)|-0.70*<br>(-5.00)|-.1.12*<br>(-6.02)|||
|Election-I|034*<br>(2.85)|0.20***<br>(I67)|046*<br>(3.02)|041*<br>(259)|0.38***<br>(1.83)|0.23<br>_(I_07)|0.34**<br>(1.97)|028<br>(1.54)|0.27<br>(1.21)|0.20<br>(088)|
|GDP growth-I|-0.06*<br>(4.56)|-0.08*<br>(-5 32)|-0.04##<br>(-199)|-0.03***<br>(-1.84)|-0.08*<br>(4.22)|-0.10w<br>(4.27)|||-0.06'<br>(-2.87)|006*<br>(-2.75)|
|GDPgrowth-2|-01<br>(-6.00)|-012*<br>(-632)|-0.12*<br>(-589)|-013*<br>(-6.23)|-0.13*<br>(-5.32)|-0.15'<br>(-5.58)|||-0.13*<br>(-526)|-0.16*<br>(-5.27)|
|Exchangerate-I|||||||1.47"*<br>(2.27)|1.69**<br>(2.52)|||
|Exchangerate-2|||||||4.60*<br>(5.08)|5.46*<br>(541)|||
|Argentina dummy|||||||||7.25*<br>_(15.36)_|7.50**<br>(232)|
|Chiledummy|||||||||5.50<br>_(-)_|5.68***<br>(1.74)|
|Colombia dummy|||||||||673*<br>(11.11)|7.34'<br>(2.66)|
|Mexico dummy|||||||||5.72*<br>(10.05)|5.85***<br>(1.91)|
|Transportsector<br>dummy|0.38***<br>(1.79)|-1.37**<br>(-2.40)|1.19*<br>(3.88)|-1.13***<br>(-1.66)|0.27<br>(0.69)|-1.36***<br>(-1.66)|0.96*<br>(2 86)|-176"*<br>(-2.42)|-0.18<br>(-0.43)|-007<br>(-0.09)|
|Numberofobs.|1132|1132|1132|1132|908|908|1122|1122|1132|1132|
|LogiUkelihood|-314.25|31308|-188.84|-18105|-111.26|-10661|-144.92|-139.13|-109.09|-10405|

Note: **IV** in parenthesis denotes an instrumented variable. Coefficients sigmficant at the 1% _(*),_ 5% (**) and 10% (***) level.

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