rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
within the group. Among female members, older females and household heads are likely to have a higher level of bargaining than other female members in the family. Table (A.4) presents 2SLS results of the impact of migration on total labor supply by women's age (Panel A) and women's household head status (Panel B). Consistent with the hypothesis, older women from migrant-household supply substantially less overall labor hours (16) mostly by reducing their hours in wage and self employment (13). In contrast, migration has no eect on younger women. At the same time, when a household sends its members abroad, it negatively aects overall labor supply of women who are head of the household but has no eect on other female members' labor supply (Table A.4, Panel B). It is plausible that depending on each member's bargaining power within a household, the decision to send members abroad has dierential impacts on each left-behind members' labor supply decision.

# 5.1 Heterogeneous Eects

As with the sex of the left-behind members, households' migration decisions are likely to aect dierent groups within the household dierently. I divide the sample by skill level, age, and the household head status to analyze the potential treatment eect heterogeneity. Table (6) presents the 2SLS estimates by skill level. Adults with school leaving certicate (SLC) or more are dened as high skilled.<sup>13</sup> It is only the low skilled left-behind members that are aected by the migration. There is statistically zero eect on labor supply of high skilled adults. While less likely to participate in market jobs, low skilled adults are more likely to be involved in self employment activities. At the same time, low skilled adults, if employed, supply fewer weekly hours for both wage-employment and self-employment. The dierential impact by skill level is reasonable as high skilled workers are likely to be already involved in more formal and permanent jobs that have higher opportunity costs of switching.

Tables (7), and (8) present the eect of migration on labor supply from the 2SLS estimation using IV1 as an instrument by age and household head status respectively. Adults with ages between 18 to 40 are dened as young adults. Irrespective of age, migration aects the left-behind members

> 13All the students whether in private or public schools that follow the Nepali education system, have to take the school leaving certicate (SLC) exam at the end of tenth grade. All schools in the country follow the system with very few exceptions, which follow the Indian or American system. It is mandatory that students pass the exam to continue their studies further within the country and qualify for most of the government and private jobs.

16
# 1. INTRODUCTION

As the world’s poor in developing countries are disproportionately engaged in agriculture, increasing agricultural productivity and income is key to raising rural living standards <mark>(Castañeda et al. 2018; World Bank 2007)</mark> . Women comprise a large share of the agricultural labor force in developing countries – e.g., 49% in Africa, 37% in South Asia and 21% in Latin America (FAO 2011). Yet there is overwhelming evidence of a gap in agricultural productivity that is in favor of male farmers, which could lead to missed opportunities for improving the earnings of poor rural households.

A large body of earlier literature explored the sources of the gender productivity gap and found that women tend to have less access to productive resources such as land, labor, other inputs (e.g., fertilizer, improved seeds), credit, or extension services; experience lower quality inputs (e.g., inferior soil quality); <mark>have lower access to transport and markets; and face greater institutional constraints such as</mark> inadequate land rights, low tenure security <mark>, unequal gender norms and discrimination (e.g., Croppenstedt, Goldstein and Rosas 2013; FAO 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2014;</mark> and Udry 1996). Most studies found that the gender gap is reduced or even disappears, once controlling for input usage and other factors of production. It was subsequently argued that gender gaps could be overcome if female farmers had the same level of access to inputs and other agricultural resources as men. However, with a few exceptions, most of these earlier studies were limited in geographical scope.<sup>1</sup> A set of recent papers revisited the issue using nationally representative data (e.g., <mark>Aguilar et al.. 2015; Ali et al. 2016;</mark> Backiny-Yetna and McGee 2015; <mark>Carletto, Savastano and Zezza 2013; de la O Campos, Covarrubias and Patron 2016; Kilic, Palacios-Lopez and Goldstein 2015; Oseni et al. 2014; and Slavchevska 2015). These studies relied on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method (O</mark> axaca 1973; Blinder 1973) <mark>to decompose the gender gap in agricultural productivity into two portions: a component explained by differences in observable attributes (endowment effect) and an unexplained component of differences in the returns to endowment (structural effect). Compared to earlier estimates in the literature, these studies found a larger magnitude of the fraction of the (unexplained) returns to endowment, implying that even if female farmers had access to the same inputs as male counterparts, a productivity gender gap would still remain. That is, simply equalizing access to productive resources may</mark>

> 1 For instance, using nationally representative data from Burkina Faso, Akresh (2005) was able to replicate the Pareto inefficient intrahousehold resource allocations found by Udry (1996) in the areas examined in the paper but not in other parts of the country.

2
- Teacher attendance and activity. Activity is a measure of whether a teacher is actively engaged in teaching when the survey team arrives unannounced. Teacher attendance is 1 if teacher is present in school, 0 otherwise. Teacher activity is 1 if teacher is teaching, writing on the board, supervising written work, teaching by rote, 0 if teacher is absent, chatting, sitting idle/standing outside classroom, keeping order in classroom but not teaching, doing other non teaching work. There are four observations per teacher on attendance and activity. Averaging across visits at the teacher level, these give the fraction of visits a teacher was present (or engaged in teaching).  Averaging the attendance (or activity) at the school level across the four visits gives the average fraction of teachers present (or engaged in teaching activities) in a school over the visits.

- Test scores of sample students based on a competency and curriculum based language and math tests that lasted approximately 20 minutes per child. The language test was a test of reading and writing skills. The math test was a test of number recognition, addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. Tables 2 to 7 present grade wise details of test items and performance on each item. The total test score in each grade is constructed separately for language and math tests as the percent of correct answers.  In MP and UP tests took place at the end of school year in 2006 while in Karnataka, these were held 4 months later at the beginning of school year in 2006.  Students receiving the same test in Karnataka are 4 months ahead in the year and hence in the next grade. For example, the test given to grade 4 students at end of school year in MP and UP was given to class 5 students at beginning of school year in Karnataka. And the test given to grade 3 students at end of school year in MP and UP was given to class 4 students at beginning of school year in Karnataka.

- Interview of parents of sample students on their knowledge about existence of school committees.

- Interview of VEC, PTA and SDMC members on participation in school oversight, knowledge of roles and responsibilities and knowledge about school funds.

- School facilities survey.

Additional data were collected on socio-economic characteristics of students such as parents’ education, caste, and wealth and on characteristics of teachers such as age, education, experience, wealth, type of contract and training.

# **4** .

## **Results from Baseline Surveys**

Table 1 presents a summary of the sample variables including learning outcomes and teacher effort. Karnataka stands out in comparison to MP and UP in that it has substantially higher learning levels, higher teacher effort, greater community awareness and participation (the latter is reported in later tables).

## **4.1 Learning Achievement**

**What is the benchmark?** We use the minimum level of learning (MLL) framework recognized by the government of India as a benchmark for the minimum that a child in a

6
I AL A I

# OF KOREAN TAX POIUCIES 196282

||Contributio<br>20 years of o<br>oriented tax p<br>using 1982 bas|n over<br>utward<br>olicies<br>e model|Contribution over<br>20 years of outward<br>oriented tax policies<br>using 1962 base model|Contribudon over<br>10 years of outward<br>oriented tax policies<br>using 1962 base model|Actual<br>annua<br>r<br>1962-82|average<br>l growth<br>ate<br> <br>1962-72|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Annual Average<br>Growth Rate**(%)**|||||||
|GDP|0.54||0.68|0.62|8.65|9.25|
|Exports o,<br>Manufactures using|||||||
|1982 base modeld|1.07||n.a.|n.a.|35.37|55.66|
|Imports of<br>Agriculture using<br>1982 base modeld|1.10|d<br>|n.a.|n.a.|1.94~<br>11.94|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a<br>a15<br>21.58|
||1982 base<br>year model|1982 base<br>year model<br>with tax|1962 base<br>year model|1962 base<br>year mudel<br>with tax||Actual|
||with 1982|policy|with 1962|policy|Di|stributionb|
|Distribution<br>of Employment**(%)**|policies|neutral mix|policies|neutral mix|1962<sup>c</sup>|<sup>1972 1982</sup>|
|Agriculture|67.35|70i.63|93.73|94.16|63.1|50.6 32.1|
|Manufacturing|32.67|29.37|6.21|5.84|36.9|49.4 67.9|

Notes: aFigures are based on imports of food and live animals.

bThe distribution is between agriculture and nonagriculture.

CBased on the 1963 distribution.

dTrade growth using the 1962 base model are unrealistically high because of the small manufactured export base involved, and are not reported.
of the NEN from those of railway lines would be difficult (especially since there is a substantial amount of overlap in the cities they connect).

While large scale transport infrastructure investments have been a fairly recent feature of China’s spatial policies, China’s population registration system, or Hukou, was introduced well over 50 years ago, primarily as a way to control population movements and the allocation of labor to state-controlled production (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chan, 2009; Bosker _et al._ , 2012). The main distinction was between agricultural (rural) versus non-agricultural (urban) residence status. It historically considered the rural population as self-sufficient, while providing food rations, housing and educational and health services to the urban population. This general distinction persisted even as urban dwellers became far better off during economic liberalization.

After policy changes in the 2000s, preventing population mobility is no longer the dominant motivation for maintaining the Hukou system. The reason for its persistence, despite frequent expectations that it will be abolished since at least the mid-1990s, is a concern that giving migrants equal rights will exceed the fiscal capacity of cities to provide public services and welfare benefits to everyone. This problem is made more severe because China lacks a mechanism to transfer fiscal resources from rural to urban areas in proportion to a changing population distribution (World Bank and DRC 2014). Further reforms of the Hukou system are currently debated (State Council 2014). These reforms would essentially abolish the Hukou system for smaller cities below 1 million population. Registration in larger cities would be increasingly more difficult, but the reforms would give cities flexibility, including using “point systems” to determine eligibility based on job qualifications, length of residence, and so on. The reforms would also strengthen the rights—including land use rights—of rural residents, ensure more equitable service delivery across rural and urban areas, and improve public finance transfer mechanisms between regions of outmigration and those whose population is growing.

Despite their restrictive nature, China’s registration policies have not prevented large scale migration to urban areas since the beginning of the reform era. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, an estimated 50 million people moved from rural to urban areas (Chan, 2013). In 2013, China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimated the total non-Hukou population (people living in a place without having a Hukou for that location) at 289 million (NBS, 2014). Nevertheless, by reducing or preventing access to benefits in the destination cities, and by limiting the portability of accrued benefits and monetization of assets in the rural areas, migration under the Hukou system has likely still been considerably lower than it would otherwise have been.

# **3. The model**

Our model introduces labor mobility into the NEG model developed in Roberts et al. (2012). We explicitly allow for people to migrate between prefectures as well as between the urban and rural part 7
36 RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA Since this time, many of those which have been purchased have also been extended to provide rooms for rent. In consequence, there has been a growth in legislation on rents for private lettings in government housing. The 1963 Rent Act prohibited sub-letting without the permission of the landlord. Thus the letting of parts of government owned housing was illegal. However, the act did not apply to "premises of which a public officer is a tenant by reason of his employment and of which premises the Government is the landlord;" (Sl(2)(a)).

For many years, tenants of houses owned by State Housing Corporation or other government agencies have been profiting from the very low rents by moving out and letting the whole of their dwelling to another household for a higher rent than they have to pay, or by subletting part of their house to another household for more than a fair proportion of their total rent. Sometimes the room rented has not been intended for habitation. As long ago as 1968, 93% of the detached kitchens in Asawasi were sublet to other households. While the tenants were paying between C1.3 and C1.8 for their dwellings, the subtenants paid between Cl.5 and C2 for the kitchen (BRRI, 1970, pp.<sup>1 6</sup> & 17).

In 1973, the Rent (Amendment) Decree sought to control this. By Section 7, occupants of houses built by TDC, SHC, or any government agency should not charge, demand, or receive on subletting, a monthly rent in excess of an aggregate of: (a) the installment payable per month to TDC, SHC, etc.; (b) the equivalent of property rates payable; and (c) 20% of the total of a and b.

In older properties, the resulting rents to sub-tenants would be very low. They would, however, guarantee the owner a 20% profit on the transaction, something that controlled rents in the privately owned stock never openly attempted to do. As the prices charged for the dwellings were subsidized, and there was sufficient land for extension, those fortunate enough to possess such a house were thrica blessed.

However, in newer estates, while rents were C10 per month, the hire-purchase payments were fixed considerably higher. Schmitter (1979) shows that purchasers paid anywhere between C39 and C81 per month for ownership within 10 to 25 years.

The provisions of the 1973 decree were further improved in 1974 by the Rent (Amendment) Decree (NRC Decree 250). By it, where a dwelling acquired from government had been extended or improved, a reasonable increase in rent was to be allowed. Disagreements or doubts could be referred to the Rent Magistrate.

In 1979, the "Ghanaian Times" (25th July) carried a list of rents of representative SHC properties. It showed that, though under review, rents were still very low. A single roomed dwelling in North Suntresu was still only Cl.9; a pair of rooms, C2.9; and a two roomed semi- detached bungalow with its own water and toilet was only C5.1 per month. More modern accommodation in a two story, three bedroom house in Kwadaso Estate could be rented for C45.
**Table 18: Interaction with Firm Size with by Types of Government Support, Georgia**

||Percentage<br>perm full-ti<br>since De|change of<br>me workers<br>c 2019|Decreased tot<br>temp w|number of<br>orkers|Decreased to<br>opera|tal hours of<br>tions|Anticipate<br>arrears on o<br>liabil|falling in<br>utstanding<br>ities|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|**(5)**|**(6)**|**(7)**|**(8)**|
|Received national or local|0.507|0.237|-2.519**|-2.337*|-1.442|-1.748|-2.288|-2.045|
|government support|||||||||
||(0.320)|(0.279)|(1.149)|(1.243)|(1.688)|(1.659)|(1.881)|(1.866)|
|Deferral of payments|-0.526|-0.228|2.911**|3.233**|0.430|0.052|0.522|0.712|
||(0.473)|(0.412)|(1.202)|(1.293)|(1.531)|(1.552)|(1.996)|(1.774)|
|Fiscal relief|0.828***|0.829***|-0.659|-1.123|0.695|0.751|2.921|3.037*|
||(0.263)|(0.214)|(1.126)|(1.473)|(1.167)|(1.061)|(1.871)|(1.666)|
|Wage subsidies|-0.605*|-0.756**|-0.178|-0.472|1.206|1.098|0.131|0.219|
||(0.336)|(0.300)|(1.186)|(1.448)|(1.178)|(1.198)|(1.267)|(1.198)|
|Support X ln of employment size<br>at ES|-0.147|-0.064|0.756**|0.769**|0.587|0.547|0.505|0.491|
||(0.120)|(0.095)|(0.354)|(0.360)|(0.494)|(0.483)|(0.585)|(0.571)|
|Deferral of payments X ln of<br>employment size at ES|0.220|0.126|-0.727**|-0.806**|-0.216|-0.105|-0.175|-0.203|
||(0.152)|(0.117)|(0.356)|(0.371)|(0.402)|(0.421)|(0.560)|(0.502)|
|Fiscal relief X ln of employment<br>size at ES|-0.282***|-0.273***|-0.029|0.072|-0.322|-0.367|-0.860|-0.876*|
||(0.093)|(0.076)|(0.341)|(0.404)|(0.313)|(0.292)|(0.554)|(0.496)|
|Wage subsidies X ln of<br>employment size at ES|0.217*|0.224**|0.006|0.049|-0.420|-0.411|0.110|0.104|
||(0.115)|(0.088)|(0.300)|(0.357)|(0.358)|(0.363)|(0.420)|(0.388)|
|Average change in monthly sales<br>compared to one year ago|0.165|0.178|-1.164*|-1.620**|-2.674***|-3.036***|-2.990***|-2.599***|
||(0.170)|(0.195)|(0.660)|(0.725)|(0.648)|(0.750)|(0.679)|(0.772)|

58
Several factors may contribute to the difference between these findings and ours, including (i) differences in the measure of inequality (all the previous studies consider the Gini index while we focus on the income share of the poorest quintile, although given the high correlation between the two this factor is least likely to be important); (ii) differences in the sample of countries (with the exception of the paper by Barro, all of the papers cited above restrict attention to considerably smaller and possibly nonrepresentative samples of countries than the 76 countries which appear in our basic openness regression, and in addition the paper by Spilimbergo et. al. uses all available annual observations on inequality with the result that countries with regular household surveys tend to be heavily overrepresented in the sample of pooled observations); (iii) differences in the measure of openness (Lundberg and Squire (2000) for example focus on the Sachs-Warner index of openness which has been criticized for proxying the overall policy environment rather than openness per se<sup>24</sup> ); (iv) differences in econometric specification and technique.

A complete accounting of which of these factors contribute to the differences in results is beyond the scope of this short section. However, several obvious extensions of our basic model can be deployed to make our specification more comparable to these other studies. First, we consider several different measures of openness, some of which correspond more closely with those used in the other studies mentioned above. We first (like Barro (1999) and Spilimbergo et al. (1999)) purge our measure of trade volumes of the geographical determinants of trade, by regressing it on a trade-weighted measure of distance from trading partners, and a measure of country size and taking the residuals as an adjusted measure of trade volumes.25 Since these geographical factors are time invariant, this will only influence our results to the extent that they are driven by the cross-country variation in the data and to the extent that these geographical determinants of trade volumes are also correlated with the share of income of the poorest quintile. Second, we use the Sachs-Wamer index in order to compare our results more closely with those of Lundberg and Squire (2000). Finally, we also consider

> 0.25, which still delivers very large estimated growth effects.

> 24 See for example the criticism of Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), who note that most of the explanatory power of the Sachs-Wamer index derives from the components that measure the black market premium on foreign exchange and whether the state holds a monopoly on exports. **25** Specifically, we use the instrument proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) and the logarithm of population in 1990 as right-hand side variables in a pooled OLS regression.

28
bolstered by cross-country evidence (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Dincecco and Prado 2012; Dincecco and Katz 2016), and within-country studies (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013; Bandyopadhyay and Green 2016).

This literature suggests that state capacity is often strengthened in fighting external wars, as in Europe and North America,<sup>24</sup> Latin America (Arias 2013), and East Asia (Paik and Vechbanyongratana, 2017). Moreover, the rise in state capacity associated with war, at least in European countries, tends to be associated with positive long-term development. Would _Likin_ , developed in the process of _civil_ war (rather than external war) and implemented in decentralized ways (as opposed to fiscal centralization as in the case of most studies of fiscal capacity), also have positive effects for long-term development?

Likin-financed gentry resistance reduced war violence, which should have contributed to positive long-term effects. Even in Taiping Army-held areas during the rebellion, the Taiping Army only had control over some cities, and a large share of rural areas were still controlled by local gentry-elites (Fairbank, 1992). The ability to raise _Likin_ allowed the gentry-elite to maintain stronger control in the local areas, to reduce property and life damages, and should have resulted in weaker long-term adverse Taiping-related effects. Furthermore, when the local gentry-elite was strengthened, they should have stronger capacity to offer protection for property rights, to improve local infrastructure, among others, all of which could have positive long-term effects.

More importantly, _Likin_ changes the tax structure drastically to the benefit of long-term development. Prior to _Likin_ , land taxes were the main source of government revenue. With the arrival of _Likin_ , which was levied on manufacturing goods in transit and commerce, the local officials had strong incentives to foster commerce and the manufacturing sectors. These local officials would then have offered support and special incentives to foster the modern sectors, much as what happened to local officials in recent decades in modern China (Cull et al. 2017). Capitalists would also have had stronger political voices in the local political processes, and this would have facilitated institutions such as public schools to complement their technologies (Galor, Moav and Vollarath 2009). This should have facilitated industrialization, raised income, and aided technological changes, which would have raised the return to human capital, reduced fertility, increased schooling, facilitated the Malthusian transition, further raised resources per

> 24 For a survey on recent advances of research on state capacity, see Johnson and Koyama (2017). For further references, see North and Weingast (1989), Brewer (1989), Tilly (1992), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), North et al. (2009), Dincecco (2009), Besley and Persson (2011, 2013), Dincecco and Prado (2012), Dincecco and Katz (2016), Karaman and Pamuk (2013), Gennaioli and Voth (2015), and Hoffman (2015).

20