the Salvadoran Army was 80 percent (48,000 of 60,000 combatants) (Courtney, 2010). Likewise, most historical studies conclude that FMLN recruitment was mostly voluntary. A study UNICEF conducted shows that while 91.7 percent of FMLN recruits had joined voluntarily, close to 53 percent of underage Salvadoran Army soldiers were forcibly recruited (Courtney, 2010).

_Post-conflict investment in guerrilla areas_ — In terms of private investment, we do not find qualitative evidence that large agricultural producers or firms are less willing to invest in these locations. What’s more, several counterarguments suggest that lower private investment does not underpin our main results. First, control group areas are extremely close (just 2 km away); thus, it is difficult to argue why private investment would target nearby control areas but not guerrilla areas, since the guerrillas were gone by the post-war period. Second, it is highly unlikely that contemporaneous investors know of the boundary with former guerrilla areas in the 1980s. As mentioned above, these boundaries do not overlap with the country’s administrative division or its road network. In other words, they are not salient. Evidence from our focus groups supports this argument since few interviewees knew the exact boundaries of these areas. (If anything, they knew which municipalities were affected by guerrillas but not the exact boundaries). Third, there are no differences between treatment and control areas in the number of new businesses such as restaurants, malls, and markets across the boundaries.<sup>36</sup> Finally, we do not find evidence that fear of expropriation in former guerrilla areas explains the results. We observe that residents of these areas are as likely as those in the control group to believe that it is acceptable to invade private property or engage in antidemocratic behavior (See Table D.26).

_Spillovers in non-guerrilla areas during territorial control and in the post-war period_ — We also rule out that effects stem from counter-insurgency in nearby control areas during the period of guerrilla control. It’s possible that nearby control areas benefited from the lack of development or the agricultural focus in guerrilla areas. In this case, effects would be concentrated close to the boundary or just in the rd sample. First, evidence from the doughnut-hole analysis shows this is not so: effects are robust to excluding observations close to the boundary. Second, if we increase the sample beyond the bandwidth to 17 km, we see homogeneous effects on development.<sup>37</sup>

> 36We checked for this possibility by digitizing the number of commercial establishments 2 km around the boundary of past guerrilla presence using Google Maps. We could not distinguish any significant differences between treated and control areas in the number of commercial establishments. The estimates are available upon request.

> 37One potential concern (as with many rd designs) is that we observe cross-sectional differences today in development. Due to the lack of panel data, we cannot disentangle how much the effects originate in improvements in the control group and deterioration in former guerrilla areas over time versus just improvements in the control group and no changes in former guerrilla areas. Hence, we analyze heterogeneous effects based on distance to a main road, dis-

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