Table 4. Effects of Guerrilla Territorial Control on Attitudes towards the Government

|||_Inverse Covarianc_|_e Index (ICW)_|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Political<br>Participation|Engagement with<br>Politicians|Non-Democratic<br>Engagement|Trust in<br>Institutions|Distrust of Members of<br>the Community (Share)|
||(2004-2016)|(2004-2016)|(2004-2016)|(2004-2016)|(2004-2016)|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|Guerrilla control|0.166|-0.663*|-0.180|-0.734**|-0.161**|
||(0.218)|(0.349)|(0.370)|(0.335)|(0.0738)|
|Observations|270|275|199|273|295|
|Bandwidth (Km)|2.266|2.266|2.266|2.266|2.266|
|Dependent mean|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.118|

_Note:_ The table presents the results of estimating equation 1 for our outcomes related to political discontent and mistrust. Column 1 shows the political participation scope that includes questions regarding whether the citizen votes, attends protests, and attends government meetings. Column 2 reports the engagement with politicians scope that measures the extent to which citizens contact state authorities and/or bureaucracies to solve issues and attend government/political meetings. Column 3 shows the nondemocratic engagement scope that measures the extent to which citizens approve the use of alternative or violent means to engage in politics. Column 4 reports the trust in institutions item that measures the extent to which citizens trust different types of Salvadoran institutions, including the police, the powers of state, and local government. The table reports the inverse covariance-weighted average index as dependent variables. Column 5 reports the share of individuals who report believing that the members of their community are not trustworthy at all. The unit of observation in all columns is the census tract. The information was obtained from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey. Controls not shown include a linear polynomial of the distance to the boundary of guerrilla territory, its interaction with whether the tract was under guerrilla control or not, and up to 400 fixed effects representing the closest evenly spaced break in the guerrilla-controlled boundary. The algorithm of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) was used to set the bandwidth and the estimates weight using a triangular kernel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1.

We also examine attitudes towards out-groups such as agricultural elites by conducting focus groups in these communities with key actors in the agricultural and private sector. One common pattern is that individuals from former guerrilla areas are more likely to distrust external actors. Many farmers in these areas associate external actors and agricultural investment with the largely repressive elites of the 1950s. As one farmer stated: _“There is a lot of prejudice towards the private sector and large landowners and they are not welcomed in the area since they are not part of the community and want to change the way the community works, which is based on popular arrangements.”_ Peasants living in the community also supported this view. One said: _“Here we all know each other and rely a lot on family networks for production.”_ However, as one private investor noted: _“This model of family or communal agriculture did not work since these areas are poorer today.”_ Overall, distrust of out-groups still exists in these areas even though the self-governing institutions 30