industry and agriculture. Sections 3, 4 and 5 focus on intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures, and services, respectively. They summarize the main elements of the disciplines as they will impact on Egypt. All three issues are not only important topics in themselves, but are likely to play a key role in the EMA context. To a large extent Egyptian commitments in these areas establish the point of departure for the EMA. Section 6 briefly surveys the areas where multilateral disciplines are weak or non-existent, and the possible role of an EMA as opposed to the WTO in addressing these lacunae. Section 7 concludes.

# **2. Impact** of Market Access Cornmitments in Manufacturing and Agriculture

# 1. Egypt's market access commitments

(a) Tariff Bindings: At the heart of a country's liberalization commitments in the WTO are tariff bindings, which are commitments by a member not to raise its tariffs beyond "bound" levels without consulting and/or compensatingl/ its trading partners. A binding contributes to greater predictability of trade policies and hence to greater certainty in trade and investment decisions that depend on these policies. As argued by Francois and Martin (1994), tariff bindings can also lead to significant improvements in market access conditions by simply truncating the range of protection that is permissible.2/ Prior to the Uruguay Round, Egypt had bindings on about 3 percent of tariff lines.3/ During the Round, Egypt agreed to bind 100 percent of its tariff lines in agriculture (as was required of all countries); and about 97 percent of its Harmonized System (HS) 4-digit tariff lines (1,015 out of 1,046) in the industrial sector (Table 1). This is a significant step forward in terms of Egypt's integration into the trading system compared both to the past, but also to other developing countries which bound on average only about 73 percent of their tariff lines in industry.4/ In terms of bindings, Egypt's commitments approach those of many OECD countries. This should provide some insurance against future reversal of trade policy, yielding efficiency benefits domestically and market access benefits to Egypt's trading partners.

Under the Uruguay Round, countries were also required to "bind" any other duties and charges applied to imports and list these in their Uruguay Round tariff schedules. Egypt has inscribed only a few other duties and charges on agricultural goods in its schedule, effectively committing itself to a relatively transparent tariff regime.5/ It should also be noted that, unlike some industrial countries, Egypt's tariff schedule has very few specific tariffs (on only 14 tariff lines), all relating to cigarettes and tobacco-related products. This too should contribute to a more transparent trade regime.

> I/ Compensation usually involves lowering other tariffs to offset tariffs that have been increased. 2/ Much depends in this connection on the holes and loopholes in the multilateral agreemen **t** hat allow for the imposition of protection in particular circumstances.

> 3/ Although Egypt had bound about 15 percent of its tariff lines prior to 1990, the tariffs announced in 1991 exceeded the bound rates on a number of tariff lines, effectively reducing the extent of real bindings. 4/ The 73 percent refers to the average of 26 developing countries included in the WTO Integrated Database. 5/ Egypt does, however, levy a customs user fee (some times called an import surcharge) at rates of 2 and 5 percent. The status of this fee/charge in light of the Round and Egypt's market access commitments is unclear.

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