barriers in areas of return.<sup>18</sup> One group to emerge as particularly vulnerable to protracted displacement is IDPs with perceived affiliation to ISIL, an issue that predominantly affects the Sunni Arab (and Sunni Turkmen) population. The precise number of such families is difficult to quantify, in part because humanitarian agencies do not record this perceived status,<sup>19</sup> and in part because the concept itself is defined differently in each community and has changed over time.

The perception that a family is affiliated to ISIL has little to do with legal definitions but draws upon community understandings of who is considered guilty and deserving of punishment. ISIL’s offensive and occupation divided communities and tribes into two broad groups, linked to the circumstances under which families displaced and their experience during the war: on one ‘side’ is those who fled ISIL’s arrival and occupation – and sometimes participated in the military campaign to retake territory from ISIL via area-based tribal mobilization forces<sup>20</sup> – and on the other, those who remained under ISIL occupation and displaced when the military campaign arrived. For those who remained and lived under ISIL occupation, communities differ in the perception of what ‘level’ or ‘type’ of collaboration warrants an accusation or perception of affiliation to ISIL. Many communities recognize <mark>the complex reality of living under ISIL occupation: although some residents</mark> in ISILoccupied territory undoubtably collaborated with the group, this collaboration was extremely diverse and ranged from simply paying taxes (per regulations enforced by ISIL) to committing horrific acts of violence.<sup>21</sup> Immediately after the war ended, it was more common for communities to judge all those who lived under ISIL rule as affiliated in an indiscriminate and sweeping fashion; however, as time has progressed, the perception of affiliation has typically narrowed to those who held certain roles under ISIL (such as senior leadership) or committed serious crimes on behalf of the group.<sup>22</sup> Typically, the accusation of affiliation goes beyond the individual to the kin level and attaches to

> 18 IOM Iraq, Social Inquiry, Returns Working Group (2021). _Home Again? Categorizing Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq._

> 19 To avoid stigmatization and discrimination, the humanitarian community does not collect data on the number of people considered to be affiliated with extremist groups such as ISIL. In mid-2018, some estimates placed the number at several hundred thousand. See: Interaction, ‘Moving Forward Together, Leaving No One Behind: From Stigmatization to Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Iraq,’ August 2018, available at: https://protection.interaction.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/2018-10-31-InterAction-Iraq-report_Moving-Forward-Together.pdf.

> 20 Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a conglomeration of 60 to 70 armed groups, formally recognized by the Government of Iraq, which rose to prominence in 2014 for halting the expansion of ISIL and retaking Iraqi territory from its control. It includes Sunni units known as the Tribal Mobilization Units, composed of fighters from the Sunni tribes from the areas occupied by ISIL. van Veen, E., Grinstead, N., & El Kamouni-Janssen, F. (2017). A house divided; EASO (2021). Popular Mobilisation Units and Tribal Mobilisation Militias. Country Guidance Iraq 2021. Available at https://easo.europa.eu/country-guidance-iraq-2021/12-popular-mobilisation-units-and-tribal-mobilisation-militias.) 21 Kao, K., & Revkin, M. R. (2018). To Punish or to Pardon?: Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators After Conflict in Iraq. Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators After Conflict in Iraq (November 1, 2018). The Program on Governance and Local Development Working Paper Series at the University of Gothenburg, (17).

22 For example, in the governorate of Anbar, some communities consider as ISIL affiliates those who cohabited with the group, whereas other communities have a more nuanced understanding of affiliation and consider as affiliated families those with one first-degree relative allegedly was a full-fledged member of the group, meaning the person was an ISIL combatant or was appointed by ISIL to a core civil servant post such as mukhtar. Certain actions are also considered as redlines for returning to the community, which tends to apply to those families whose first-degree relatives killed other community members or burn their properties as part of ISIL. For more information see: Aymerich, O. (2020). _Managing Return in Anbar: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived Affiliation_ . IOM Iraq.

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