rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
-24 -

to infer an effect of SOQ or a sulfur species highly related to SO. Below, a brief review of several relevant studies and available dose-response relaonships are provided.

Premature Mortaliy. Epidemiologic studies undertakcen in several locations indicate that S02, acting alone or as a surrogate for other sulfur-related species, is associated with increased risk of mortality- These includes studies in France,<sup>4</sup> England,<sup>0</sup> . Poland," and Athensu@ Unfortunately, most of the available studies do not provide dose-response functions. Our estimate is derived from latzais et al.Y5 A brief summary of the studies indicating an effec of S1 on mortality follows. It is also important to note that after oxidation in the atmosphere, some of the SO, will tun into sulfate. As reported in the earlier section of particulate mater, changes in sulfates are associated with both mortality and morbidity. Therefore, some of the benefits of reducing SO relate to the reductions in particulate matter described above, and one should be aware of potential double counting of health benefits from reduced polBution.

Derriennic et alYe analyzrzed daily mortality for individuals over 65 years of age in Marseilles and Lyons, France between 1974 and 1976. Daily averges of SO and suspended particulates were .03 Ppm and 106 pg/m3, respectively, but monthly SO2 averages were above .07 ppm during certain times of the year. These two pollutants were moderately correlated (r = .46). Seasonal influences were prefiltered from the data, which were also corrected for autocorrelation. The authors noted that temperature, which was inversely correlated with SO, was correlated with respiratory-related mortality in Lyons and with cardiovascular-related mortality in Marseilles. The results, based on multiple regression and controlling for temperature, indicated a statisticay significant association between S02 and respiratory deaths in both cities, and between SO, and circulatory deaths in Marseiles. The authors argue that fte SO effecs are independent of the impt of te m , since the regression coefficient relating SO, to respiratory mortality is similar for the two cities, but in only one is temperature correlated with mortality. Similarly, the association of SQ with circulatory deaths in Marseilles (but not Lyons) may be explained by the high
Table 9: Growth elasticities of poverty in low and high inequality contexts, 1992–2014

||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|**(5)**|**(6)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**1992-2014**|**1992-2000**|**2000-2014**|**2000-2005**|**2005-2010**|**2010-2014**|
|||**a. **|**Ordinary gro**|**wth elasticit**|**ies**||
|||_Municipalit_|_ies with relativ_|_ely low initial _|_inequality_||
||_−_2_._015***|_−_1_._569***|_−_1_._779***|_−_1_._738***|_−_1_._673***|_−_2_._261***|
|_gi_(_yit_)|(0.143)|(0.158)|(0.273)|(0.417)|(0.096)|(0.292)|
|Obs.|370|370|313|313|371|336|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.734|0.414|0.693|0.400|0.541|0.659|
|||_Municipaliti_|_es with relativ_|_ely high initial_|_inequality_||
||_−_1_._069***|_−_0_._924***|_−_1_._241***|_−_1_._184***|_−_1_._662***|_−_1_._613***|
|_gi_(_yit_)|(0.050)|(0.073)|(0.239)|(0.273)|(0.214)|(0.141)|
|Obs.|364|364|344|344|342|364|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.769|0.508|0.359|0.329|0.496|0.584|
|||**b. Pove**|**rty-adjusted**|**growth elas**|**ticities**||
|||_Municipalit_|_ies with relativ_|_ely low initial _|_inequality_||
||_−_2_._588***|_−_2_._357***|_−_1_._561***|_−_3_._904***|_−_3_._019***|_−_2_._561***|
|(1_−Pit−τ_)_gi_(_yit_)|(0.191)|(0.335)|(0.879)|(1.265)|(0.190)|(0.397)|
|Obs.|370|370|313|313|371|336|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.636|0.434|0.305|0.264|0.584|0.533|
|||_Municipaliti_|_es with relativ_|_ely high initial_|_inequality_||
|(1_−Pit−τ_)_gi_(_yit_)|_−_1_._676***<br>(0.062)|_−_1_._468***<br>(0.104)|_−_1_._829***<br>(0.420)|_−_1_._875***<br>(0.352)|_−_2_._611***<br>(0.339)|_−_2_._045***<br>(0.253)|
|Obs.|364|364|344|344|342|364|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.785|0.497|0.400|0.396|0.525|0.519|
|||**c. Distrib**|**ution-correct**|**ed growth e**|**lasticities**||
|||_Municipalit_|_ies with relativ_|_ely low initial _|_inequality_||
||_−_3_._042***|_−_2_._336***|_−_2_._383***|_−_2_._418***|_−_2_._403***|_−_3_._149***|
|(1_−Git−τ_)_gi_(_yit_)|(0.221)|(0.249)|(0.375)|(0.590)|(0.137)|(0.415)|
|Obs.|370|370|313|313|371|336|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.717|0.401|0.678|0.395|0.542|0.656|
|||_Municipaliti_|_es with relativ_|_ely high initial_|_inequality_||
||_−_2_._191***|_−_1_._905***|_−_2_._362***|_−_2_._301***|_−_3_._051***|_−_2_._709***|
|(1_−Git−τ_)_gi_(_yit_)|(0.106)|(0.154)|(0.452)|(0.518)|(0.385)|(0.236)|
|Obs.|364|364|344|344|342|364|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.769|0.515|0.367|0.339|0.479|0.579|

_Source_ : World Bank calculations.

_Note_ : The table presents estimates of the parameter _η_ in equations (5), (8) and (10), weighted by municipal population at the initial year of each period under study. The dependent variable is the annualized growth in the food poverty headcount ratios of municipalities over the period. The growth rates in mean per capita income are the annualized changes at the municipal level over the period at August 2014 prices. Municipalities with low (high) initial inequality are those with Gini coefficients at or below (at or above) one standard deviation below (above) the mean Gini coefficient for the whole sample. The intercepts are shown in table 48 in the ancillary file. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** _p < ._ 01, ** _p < ._ 05, * _p < ._ 1 33
Table 1: COMPARISON OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSES AT BASELINE

||Ultra poor|Other poor|Middle class|Upper class|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|_A. Socio-economic Status:_|||||
|Wealth (BDT)|5850.98|14544.02|152293.69|841129.07|
||(30655.60)|(72425.83)|(315650.26)|(964643.22)|
|Consumption (BDT)|9829.35|10127.50|12205.72|20664.38|
||(4518.74)|(4771.70)|(7112.22)|(36441.19)|
|Literacy|0.07|0.17|0.27|0.51|
||(0.26)|(0.37)|(0.44)|(0.50)|
|Height (cm)|148.71|149.13|149.82|150.13|
||(5.37)|(5.32)|(5.14)|(5.07)|
|_B. Informal Transfers Received:_|||||
|Received any transfers during last year|0.22|0.22|0.16|0.22|
||(0.41)|(0.41)|(0.37)|(0.41)|
|Value of transfers received (BDT)|270.08|328.30|513.29|3097.03|
||(1798.85)|(2708.87)|(4081.52)|(29555.99)|
|Ever receives food|0.92|0.92|0.83|0.42|
||(0.27)|(0.26)|(0.38)|(0.49)|
|Number of food transfer sources|2.17|2.24|1.94|0.90|
||(0.95)|(0.95)|(1.11)|(1.17)|
|Fraction of transfer sources within village|0.88|0.88|0.88|0.70|
||(0.24)|(0.24)|(0.26)|(0.41)|
|_C. Informal Transfers Given:_|||||
|Gave any transfers during last year|0.02|0.03|0.09|0.21|
||(0.14)|(0.18)|(0.28)|(0.41)|
|Value of transfers given (BDT)|45.20|62.69|251.40|691.21|
||(1044.62)|(1323.43)|(2993.95)|(4273.22)|
|Ever gives food|0.44|0.54|0.73|0.81|
||(0.50)|(0.50)|(0.45)|(0.39)|
|Number of food transfer recipients|1.00|1.27|1.70|1.91|
||(1.24)|(1.30)|(1.21)|(1.13)|
|Fraction of transfer recipients within village|0.95|0.94|0.92|0.87|
||(0.18)|(0.19)|(0.21)|(0.26)|
|_D. Reciprocity:_|||||
|<br>Reciprocity of transfers within-village|0.42|0.50|0.67|0.80|
||(0.44)|(0.44)|(0.42)|(0.35)|
|Received transfers from an employer|0.10|0.08|0.03|0.00|
||(0.30)|(0.28)|(0.16)|(0.00)|
|Observations|6,732|7,340|6,742|2,215|

**Source:** Author’s analysis based on original survey data.

**Notes:** The sample includes observations from the baseline survey. The sample is restricted to ultra-poor households in column 1, other poor households in column 2, middle class households in column 3 and upper class households in column 4. For variable definitions, see section 8. All monetary values are in Bangladeshi TAKAs. In 2007, 1USD=69BDT nominal and 1USD=18.5BDT at PPP. Appendix Table S1.2 reports p-values for tests of equality of means across the four wealth classes.

36
-2 -

Graph I Pakistan **--** Growth of GDP and Per Capita GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> pa<br>r . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .<br>B 8 .... ' ' ' ' 't......................... ...................... f i .. _<br>D<br>p /<br>d<br>S<br>0<br>r<br>tW<br>r<br>a 4 t I I I I I I I I I I I I I. I<br>* 72 r 74 76 7778 79 80 81 82 83 84 8S 86 87 88 89 90 91 92<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
-PFr  Capita  QDP  -+I-DP  growth  rat<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Social Development

4. The significant grow in per capita income coupled with iflows of remittances enabled a modest growth in per capita conmption (see Table 3). This in turn allowed a reduction in the xmmber of people living in absolute poverty as measured in income terms (see Maik (1994)1.

_5._ High growth, however, did not translate into sharp improvements in the quality of life. There is also a concern that the income distribution may have worsened.' Thus, along with high growth, an equally striking result is the rather dismal performance in terms of social indicators.

There i substnial debace on thc quesfion of the incince of porerty and its regional distnuton. Furdter work is undergoing in the Bank tO try to resolve some of the debate arising from data and methodology. Few, however, doubt the conclusion tat absolute poverty measued in income terms **has** been declining in Pakistan.

**2** See Economic Survey. 1992-93. Minis"ry of Fnance (1993).
# **SECTION VI**

# **Results**

(see Appendix VI for detailed regression results)

## **<u>Stage 1</u>**

The results from the probit estimation show that both mutual recognition agreements and harmonization of technical regulations have a significant impact on the selection of firms into export markets. Coefficients on the MRA variable are large, positive and significant at the 1% level for both telecoms and medical devices (1990 and 1993). It is worth noting that the coefficients on the telecoms MRA dummies are larger than the respective coefficients on WTO membership and in the case of telecoms MRAs more than twice as big as the coefficient on FTA membership. For medical devices, the coefficients on MRA and FTA are of comparable magnitude. The result that MRAs for telecoms and medical devices turn out to be significant, is also interesting in light of the fact that implementation of MRAs cannot be taken for granted. Results obtained here suggest that MRAs in the two sectors are indeed being implemented.

Coefficients on the harmonization dummy are insignificant (for medical devices) or negative and significant at the 10% level (for telecoms), which would suggest that no extra firms enter the market of a partner country after harmonization has taken place. This could be explained by the fact that countries which implement harmonization directives, generally already have very close trading relationships, such that the probability of their trading with each other cannot increase any further. As for excluded countries, the results indicate that export decisions of excluded OECD countries are affected in a positive way and strongly so. This would suggest that the market integration effect by far outweighs any cost disadvantages that arise from having to adjust one’s product to a foreign standard in the case of competitive third country producers. This effect can be expected to be particularly strong after a large group of countries such as the EU harmonize standards. According to the results obtained here, developing countries do not see such positive effects on their exports to a harmonizing region.

Using the cost interpretation for the first stage, results seem to indicate that conformity assessment procedures add a considerable amount of fixed costs for producers. Diverging national technical regulations, on the other hand, seem to be imposing fixed costs mainly on competitive third country producers. This is in line with the hypothesis by Chen and Mattoo (2004) that more advanced countries tend to cope with different national standards by redesigning the product, whereas developing countries tend to employ more labour instead, which would affect variable rather than fixed cost.<sup>22</sup>

## **<u>Stage 2</u>**

In order to ensure identification of the second stage, the WTO variable was dropped from the system, after it was established that WTO membership is only significant in the selection equation of the model. Heckman selection bias was corrected for by

> 22 Cf. also World Bank (2004) Technical Barrier to Trade Survey.

24
and assets. Also, formalization enables firms better access to credit, according to often heard claims. However, in our discussions with NGOs and government officials working on tsunami recovery programs, registration of the firm apparently was not used to identify firms as potential aid recipients, as a precondition for loans, or for verification of pre-tsunami asset levels. We therefore expect to see no significant effect of formalization on recovery, but include this variable as a check of the formality hypothesis.

Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Column 1 shows our base specification. Baseline and pre-tsunami profits are positively and significantly associated with profits in latter waves of the panel. Conditional on these, we see that profit recovery in the absence of the capital provided by our grants is slower for manufacturing firms, female-owned firms, and firms located closer to the coast. The speed of recovery is not significantly associated with the owner’s education, age, or marital status, or the age of the enterprise. We also find no evidence that formally registered firms recover more quickly. There is a sizeable positive point estimate on having previously had a loan, consistent with greater access to capital aiding recovery. However, the standard errors are large, so we cannot reject zero effect.

Columns 2 and 3 control for whether the firm has a major supplier or major customer accounting for 25 percent or more of inputs or sales respectively. We see a strong negative and significant effect of having a major customer. Firms with a major customer average 33 percent less profit growth over this period. Overall, the recovery of profits among the untreated sample suggests a consistent with the experimental results. Manufacturers appear to recover more slowly than retailers.

# **Section 5: Conclusions**

In large, well-publicized disasters affecting low-income countries, the flow of relief and recovery aid is often very large. This paper uses data from surveys of private enterprises and households in Sri Lanka in an attempt to understand how that aid might 28
21 constraints that reflect scale economies in providing services and weaker internal capabilities, such as access to finance. Certain aspects of the investment climate, such as finance, are likely to affect domestic firms more, whereas foreign firms are likely to complain about customs regulations or other regulatory barriers. Exporting firms may have particular concerns, such as macroeconomic instability, as evidenced by large swings in exchange rates.

Surveys include a number of “objective” variables that reflect firms’ experience of some of the constraint areas. For electricity supply, these include days and sales lost to power outages; for corruption, informal payments as a percentage of sales; for crime, theft and disorder, the cost of security as a percentage of sales (the cost includes wages to security guards, alarm systems etc), for tax administration, days lost due to inspectors’ visits, and for customs and trade regulation the number of days to clear exports. Views on the cost of finance can be compared with the interest rate paid by the individual firm, as derived from the surveys and whether the firm has a loan or overdraft, while views on access to finance can be tested against whether a firm has a loan or overdraft and whether its accounts are audited.

Many other drivers of perceptions are not captured in the model, such as popular opinion about the investment climate (whether the media is reporting heavily about corruption) or whether firms feel able to speak freely to evaluators about sensitive areas. To the extent that all firms within a country are influenced uniformly by this type of event or if firms in some sectors are influenced more than others, the country or sector dummies will capture these effects. However, if individual firms across sectors are influenced unevenly, or if perceptions are driven by the moods of individual managers, the effect would be captured in the residual.<sup>7</sup> As a first approximation, we assume that the firm-specific indicators pick up the main factors causing responses to different constraints to be related, and thus that error terms are independent across equations.

> 7 Firm-specific effects (such as unobservables related to managerial quality) can be measured only with panel data, which we do not yet have for our sample of countries.
# **5.2 ICT use and TFP**

As the Economic Censuses provide information on capital stock and other expenses, in order to analyze the relation between ICT use and performance, we construct a Total Factor Productivity Measure (TFP). In this case we follow Aw et al. (2000) and we construct a T ̈ornqvist index. Shares are calculated using data from the whole Census.

Where: _ln_ ( _TFP_ ) _i_ =TFP index _Yi_ =Revenue of firm _i_ _Y_ =revenue of average firm _Sij_ =Revenue share of input _j_ for firm _i_

- _Sj_ =Average revenue share of input _j_

_j_ =Payments to labor, capital stock and materials expenses (raw materials, fuel, electricity, etc.) _Xj_ =Average value of input _j_ The results of the effect of ICT use on TFP for the manufacturing sector are shown in Table 13 and indicate that ICT use has indeed an effect over firm-level productivity, even after controlling for other firm characteristics. In this case a 10 percentage point increase in ICT use is associated to an 18% increase in productivity. This result is consistent with what Iacovone et al. (2016) found using a much smaller sample of big firms and a different proxy for performance (sales-per-worker). As Table 14 shows, the results for the services sector are similar but in the case of commerce, the effects are not robust across specifications.

38
# **3.1 Empirical Strategy**

The empirical analysis of this paper is structured in two main parts. The first part utilizes survey data on individuals and households to understand the implications of electricity access and reliability on tax compliance attitudes. Building on the findings from the household/individual analysis, we then proceed, in the second part, to simulate the potential tax-revenue gains from the provision of reliable electricity using available data

## **3.1.1 Electricity Provision and Tax Compliance**

To estimate the effect of electricity access and reliability of supply on our set of outcome variables, let us consider the following parsimonious model: where _yijdc_ is the outcome variable including indices of tax compliance and national identity of individual _i_ living in community _j_ , district _d_ and country _c_ ; _E_ is a measure of electricity access and/or degree of reliability of supply; _X_ and _Z_ are vectors of community and country characteristics; and _εijdc_ is the error term. Admittedly, estimation of the effects of electricity access and reliability on tax compliance attitudes and national identity require strong assumptions to assign causal interpretations. Factors such as simultaneity between electricity access and the outcome measures of tax compliance and national identity raise issues of endogeneity. The possibility of measurement errors in our measure of the tax compliance index poses an additional challenge to the identification of causal effects.

To address these concerns of identification, we adopt the instrumental variable (IV) approach, using the density of the electricity transmission network as an instrument for electricity access and reliability. The intuition behind the instrument is that households or communities located in a district (i.e. second administrative boundaries/regions) with high transmission network density have a higher probability of being connected to the grid and receiving quality electricity supply relative to being in a district with less dense transmission network (Brown and Sedano, 2004; Chakravorty et al., 2014). Arguably, the relationship between transmission density and reliability is less straightforward than the relationship with access. On the one hand, a high transmission density increases the probability of having an electricity substation that converts high-voltage electricity from the transmission lines into low (medium) voltage for onward distribution via medium- and low-voltage power distribution lines to communities and households. On the other hand, as argued by Chakravorty et al. (2014), without an increase in generation capacity, expan9
is likely to be an underestimate, since the process is ongoing and additional concessions could be renegotiated in the coming years. While some renegotiation is desirable, appropriate and is to be expected, this high incidence appears to be beyond reasonable levels, and raises concerns about the validity of the model. It might indicate poor design or excessive opportunistic behavior by the new operators, or by the government, in detriment of the efficiency of the process and of overall welfare.

At the theoretical level, the procurement and regulation literature<sup>4</sup> has been written for developed countries in which the quality of institutions yields a level of enforcement of contracts so high that renegotiations can be considered as secondary at least as a first approximation. On the contrary, for LDCs it appears that renegotiation is an important phenomenon calling for both theoretical and empirical analysis.

Imperfect enforcement leading to renegotiations is a major characteristic of LDCs which must be understood to provide a useful theoretical framework for procurement policy and regulation. This has been emphasized by the 2001 World Development Report (World Bank, 2001), which stresses that "there is a growing consensus that regulation, particularly in poor countries, must be designed with an appreciation of both information asymmetries and difficulties of enforcement".

The literature on regulation and procurement contracts has dealt with asymmetric information within the framework of mechanism design and complete contracts. Then, renegotiation never happens. If the regulator cannot commit not to renegotiate (Dewatripont (1986)) the optimal contract suffers from the ratchet effect, but is still renegotiation-proof (Hart and Tirole (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1990)). Indeed, optimal contracting commits to ex post inefficiencies to mitigate the costs of information rents. Any limitation of commitment yields potential renegotiation which can be anticipated in the initial contract; then, the anticipated outcome of renegotiation can be embedded in the initial contract which becomes renegotiation-proof, so that no renegotiation occurs along the equilibrium path. The analysis has been extended to cases where some contractual variables require costly auditing (Baron and Besanko (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Khalil (1997)). Auditing of effort levels or states of nature is incorporated into the contracts but does not yield renegotiation.

When can we have actual renegotiations? One way is to postulate that initial contracts are incomplete (Hart and Moore (1988), Green and Laffont (1992), Aghion et alii (1994), Segal and Whinston (2002)). The reasons invoked for these contractual incompletenesses are contractual transaction costs difficult to pin down, bounded rationality of players which are rarely explicitly modeled or some imperfections of the judicial system, which are assumed in a rather ad hoc way. Modeling more precisely the imperfections of the 4See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for a synthesis.

6