rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
sound judgment in deciding on<sup>thetypesofactionneededacrossthevarioussectors.</sup> Good science and technology<sup>policyisthe aggregateofappropriatedecisionson</sup> frameworks, incentives, direct<sup>support,andevaluation/policyanalysisacrossthis</sup> spectrum.

**_Lessons from Previous Experience_**<sup>**_WorldBankExperienceinPromotingS& T_**</sup> **_Capacity_**

In a variety of forms, improving<sup>S&T hasbeenaconcernof the WorldBankfor</sup> decades. It is worthwhile to extract the lessons<sup>of thepast whenconsidering directions</sup> for future action. However, analyzing<sup>previousexperienceof donorsand multi-lateralsis</sup> difficult because S&T is a cross-cutting<sup>theme.Lessonsmust be mined froma continuum</sup> of sector-specific initiatives in<sup>agriculture, health, education, energy,environment,</sup> private sector development, and<sup>other domainsin whichS&Tis a key ingredientbut not</sup> the dominant concern. Nonetheless,<sup>analysisof previousexperience doeslead toseveral</sup> lessons specific to the four policy<sup>areasaswellassomeoverall cross-sectoral</sup> conclusions.

The World Bank has supported<sup>S&Tcapacityin(i)educationprojects;(ii)</sup> industrial technology development<sup>andotherprivatesector developmentprojects;(iii)</sup> agriculture research and extension<sup>projects;and,(iv)informationandcommunication</sup> technologies projects. Still, apart from Agriculture/Rural<sup>Development,andselect</sup> middle-income countries in East<sup>AsiaandLatin America,RegionsandNetworkshave</sup> not treated S&T in development<sup>inaconsistentandsystematicway.</sup> A number of activities outside of lending operations<sup>havebeensupportedbygrants fromthe</sup> Development Grant Facility, but<sup>againwithnosystematicattentionto S&Tcapacity</sup> building for the long term.

Specific quantitative analysis of<sup>WorldBank operationalsupporttoS&Treveals</sup> that:

- Between 1980 and 1999, the World<sup>Bank lent $7.8billion todirectly support S&T</sup> activities across 590 projects, though<sup>fewerthan100ofthesecontaineda</sup> significant S&T capacity building<sup>component.Annually, 30S&Tprojectswere</sup> sponsored, with average lending<sup>forS&Ttotaling$390million.Fiveprojectsa</sup> year provided major support for<sup>S&T (greaterthan$10million)andtwentyfive</sup> projects a year provided minor support<sup>forS&T (less than $10 million).</sup>

- Most major support for S&T<sup>(outsideof agriculture) went toahandfulof large,</sup> middle-income countries.

- Regionally, East Asia received half<sup>ofallmajorS&Tloansduring thereview</sup> period. The next most frequent S&T<sup>borrower,LatinAmerica,tookoutnearly</sup> one-fifth of the loans.

- The DGF provides close to $100<sup>millionannuallyforprogramsthatare S&T-</sup> related.

- The World Bank itself is a<sup>funder.ofglobalpublicgoodsresearchfor</sup> development. In some disciplines,<sup>suchasdevelopmenteconomics,fundingand</sup>

19
# **Appendix C : Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Kenyan  Imperfectly Competitive Goods**

**Formatted:** Right:  0.63"

It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 countries. Among the 73 countries, there were four in sub-Saharan Africa: the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. We judged that Madagascar was the country closest in characteristics to Kenya, so we took the values of the elasticities estimated for Madagascar as a proxy for the elasticities for Kenya.

Broda et al., estimate 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors, but there are 34 goods sectors in our model, It was necessary to map the sectors estimated by Broda et al. into the sectors of our model. In table C1 of this appendix, we show the mapping for the imperfectly competitive sectors. (These elasticiteis are not relevant in our model for perfectly competitive sectors.) Next, since there are often multiple sectors from Broda et al. mapped into a single sector in our model, it was necessary to determine a method of weighting the Broda et al. elasticities. There are reasons to use both export shares as well as import shares. A larger share of a subcategory in imports reflects more imports, and more likely there are more varieties of imports. So weighting by the import share of a subcategory is better than an unweighted measure. Domestic varieties are also important. Since we do not have production data for the subcategories, we use export shares as a proxy for domestic production by subcategory. Analogously, weighting subcategories by export shares is better than unweighted categories. Since both import shares and export shares are useful in the weighting, we take one half the shares of both exports and imports as the weights. The resulting elasticities are reported in table C1.

Broda, Christian , Joshua Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006), ―From Groudnuts to Globalization: A Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth,‖ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12512. Available at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.broda/website/research/unrestricted/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities .html.

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Survey descriptive statistics from the baseline and from the first wave of the panel survey are included in table (13).

# **Table 13: Survey Sample and Descriptive Statistics**

||Baseline|Share of<br>Sample|Avg.<br>Cons Per<br>Capita|Med.<br>Cons. Per<br>Capita|Panel|Share of<br>Sample|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_N_|_%_|_1000s Som_|_1000s Som_|_N_|_%_|
|Andijon|304|7.6%|3395.5|2396.8|1,402|7.7%|
|Buxoro|361|9.0%|4568.9|3511.2|1,572|8.6%|
|Fargona|360|9.0%|4325.8|3354.8|1,619|8.9%|
|Jizzax|162|4.0%|5108.5|4384.3|708|3.9%|
|Namangan|320|8.0%|4694.1|3569.8|1,470|8.1%|
|Navoiy|201|5.0%|4584.7|3428.8|924|5.1%|
|Qaraqalpaqstan|440|11.0%|3145.2|2681.2|1,973|10.8%|
|Qashqadaryo|384|9.6%|4966.9|3851.3|1,771|9.7%|
|Samarqand|321|8.0%|4139.8|3096.3|1,440|7.9%|
|Sirdaryo|100|2.5%|3398.1|2811.6|456|2.5%|
|Surxondaryo|203|5.1%|3642.5|2877.4|899|4.9%|
|Toshkent|300|7.5%|4835.3|3958.3|1,342|7.4%|
|Toshkent_city|281|7.0%|5918.0|5045.5|1,368|7.5%|
|Xorazm|280|7.0%|4056.2|3091.5|1,280|7.0%|
|Total|4,017|100.0%|4373.8|3396.9|18,224|100.0%|

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Table 24: The Development of National Training Systems (cont Inud)

|Reglon/Coun|Year<br>of<br>try<br>Initiati|on Agency<br>N|E<br>ation|MI<br>al<br>Sector|al Financing<br>Policy|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|MexIco|1978|CONALEP|X||Goverrnent<br>Financing<br>Student fees cover 3% of<br>recurrent costs<br>Productionfunds<br>In-kind contributions from|
|Ecuador|1966|SECAP|X||0.5% Payroll Tax Levy|
|Bwanladesh|1979|National Couci I for<br>Skills Development|X||Goverrunent<br>Financing|
|Sr I Lanka|1988|National itstitute for<br>Constructlon Training<br>and Development||X|Goverrnent Financing|
|Malaysla|circa<br>1980|National Cotmcil for<br>Vocational<br>Training<br>(to<br>be reorganized)|X||Goverment Financing<br>Payroll Tax Levy<br>(to<br>be Introduced)<br>Student<br>fees<br>(offset<br>by<br>2/3<br>scholarships)<br>Study on Incentives for<br>Enterprise<br>Tralning|
|Korea|1976|Korean National Vocational<br>Training Management<br>Ageriy<br>Korean institute for Researc<br>on Vocational Training<br>Technician Education<br>Research<br>Institute|X<br>h X||Goverrment<br>Financing<br>Enterprises train 10% of<br>workforce anrually or pay<br>training levy<br>Contract training<br>Sibsidized<br>loans<br>for<br>private<br>schools|
|Indonesla|1983|National<br>Ministry<br>of PubilC<br>Works Training Center||X|Cost<br>recovery<br>from<br>private<br>sector firms|
||1986|National Vocatlonal Training<br>System|X||Goverment Financing|
- Balla, Steven J., and Zhoudan Xie. 2020. “Online Consultation and the Institutionalization of Transparency and Participation in Chinese Policymaking.” _The China Quarterly_ : 1–24.

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- Burnett, Craig M., and Vladimir Kogan. 2017. “The Politics of Potholes: Service Quality and Retrospective Voting in Local Elections.” _The Journal of Politics_ 79(1): 302–14.

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against mitigation. For instance, firms may invest in solar panels to reduce their exposure to weather-related power outages, simultaneously contributing to adaptation and mitigation. Conversely, measures to protect existing investments that rely on dirty fuels may slow the transition to cleaner energy. Both cross-cutting themes again point to gaps that will be important for designing sensible private sector climate policies.

Finally, there are gaps in our understanding of the impacts of extreme temperatures on capital and potential firm adaptations. While the impacts of natural disasters on capital have received the most attention to date, extreme temperatures may affect the performance of certain types of capital or accelerate rates of capital depreciation. We have little evidence on the severity of these effects for different types of capital and the implications for firm adaptation strategies.

# **2.2.2 Incorporating Climate Risks into Financing**

A less direct impact of climate change on capital is how physical climate risk and transition risk will affect firm financing. Multiple studies of publicly traded companies suggest that investors are at least partially pricing in climate risk, causing firms to change their behavior (e.g., Kling et al. (2018), Ginglinger and Moreau (2019), Q. Li et al. (2020), Giglio, Kelly, and Stroebel (2021)), although Xu, C. Sun, and You (2022) argue that investors are not efficiently incorporating information on firms’ physical climate change risk. Importantly, investors appear to account for firm adaptations when pricing in climate risk. Q. Li et al. (2020) document that firms who are responding proactively to transition risk face a smaller valuation penalty than those who are not (e.g., Pérez-González and Yun (2013) Kling et al. (2018), Bai et al. (2021)). This evidence suggests that firms can limit the impact of climate change on financing by providing credible signals of adaptation, but it only speaks to publicly-traded companies, primarily in HICs.

Do lenders in LMICs price in climate risk and account for firm-level adaptive investments?

13
|**Table 14: Demand Side Prox**|**imate Determina**|**nts – Incomegrowth 1970-2000**|
|---|---|---|
|**Variables**|**1970**|**1991**|
|Intercept|0.155|0.1548|
||(11.37)|(4.23)|
|Income per capita|-0.2897|-0.3661|
||(15.27)|(7.15)|
|Income Market Potential|0.0016|0.0018|
||(2.83)|(2.06)|
|Transportation Cost|-0.0036|-0.0015|
||(4.82)|(1.57)|
|Piped Water|0.0041|0.0036|
||(0.98)|(2.32)|
|Light Bulb|-0.0024|0.0001|
||(0.43)|(0.32)|
|Years of Schooling|0.0061|0.0037|
||(4.77)|(1.88)|
|Adj. R|0.68|0.33|
|Number of observations|123|123|

t-values in parentheses

# **7. CONCLUSIONS**

In this paper, we have explored patterns of population and income growth across urban agglomerations in Brazil. In general, the Brazilian urban system follows a dynamic trajectory that has also been found in other countries. Urban growth happens throughout the urban system, but with regional differences in magnitudes. In particular, cities in the Central-West and North have recently grown faster than the already established urban agglomerations in the traditional industrial regions of the south. Per capita incomes tend to be larger in bigger cities, a pattern that has not changed over the three decades since 1970. However, there is some indication of income convergence with smaller, lower income cities experiencing relatively faster income growth.

Different size agglomerations also vary in terms of the mix of economic activity taking place. Small urban areas are dominated by “ubiquitous” sectors such as non-tradables and lower level services. Some small and medium size agglomerations also host industries that depend on the natural resource base. Medium size cities are typically more specialized in a few industries such as textiles and pulp and paper products. Large agglomerations are much more diversified with a 33
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# III. THE RIO CASE

3.01 There have been several recent efforts to improve the performance of the property tax in Brazil. Some have been prompted by immediate fiscal crises; others by the persistence of low absolute levels of revenue. Their experience is relevant to efforts to improve property tax performance in other countries.

3.02 The lessons provided by their experiences are of two types:

- those arising from the specific technical or procedural innovation introduced under the reforms; and

- those concerned with the process of reform itself: the scope of reform, manpower and organizational aspects, and costs.

3.03 Rio's recent property tax reform illustrate3 the use of sophisticated technology to lower the labor costs and speed the implementation of a major resurveying effort.

3.04 The Rio reform was prompted by an immediate fiscal crisis. As a major center of Brazilian manufacturing, Rio was profoundly affected by the recession of the early 1980. The recurrent revenues of municipality declined by one third--in real terms between 1979 and 1983. Property tax revenues dropped by 40 percent. Re"urrent expenditure proved less flexible, due in part to the irreducibility of expenditure on primary education.ZI As a result, recurrent expenditure declined by only 12 percent between 1979 and 1983. By 1983, Rio was running a current account deficit equal to 8 percent of recurrent revenue.

3.05 The municipality's response was to make a major attempt to increase revenues. Its options were limited. In 1983, roughly 40 percent of recurrent revenues were derived from intergovernmental transfers, a source outside the municipality's control. Effort was instead focused on the property tax.

3.06 Rio's property tax reform had two components: (i) a major resurveying effort aimed at discovering and incorporating recent construction onto the tax rolls; and (ii) an increase int valuations, based initially on a steep increase in the annual inflation adjustment, and subsequently the introduction of new unit cost factors.

3.07 Prior to 1984, Rio's most recent general resurvey of property had been carried out in 1975. Products of the survey included orthographically corrected maps of the entire urbanized area and comprehensive property tax records. Subsequent maintenance, however, was haphazard. Preliminary surveys conducted in 1984 indicated that 60,000 recently constructed buildings were missing from the tax rolls. Undiscovered changes in use--which affect the tax _i/ Unlike most Brazillan municipalitles, Rio bears exclusive responslbility for expenditure on primary educatlon, a legacy of its former status as the capital of Brazil._
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011), “Regulatory Policy and Governance, Supporting Economic Growth and Serving the Public Interest”, OECD.

Palmer, J. and C. Cerruti, 2009, “Is there a need to rethink the supervisory process?” paperpresented at the International Conference “Reforming Financial Regulation and Supervision: Going back to Basics” Madrid, June 15.

Ponce, J., 2009, “A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability” Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No 2009–48. Available at SSRN.

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Quintyn, Marc and Michael Taylor, 2007, “Robust Regulators and their Political Master: Independence and Accountability in Theory, Chapter 1 in _Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability, andGovernance,_ eds. Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn (Cheltenham, U.K.).

Quintyn, Marc, Silvia Ramirez, and Michael Taylor, (2007), “Fear of Freedom – Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors,” Chapter3 in _Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability, andGovernance,_ eds. Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn (Cheltenham, U.K.).

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flexibility” and “special and differential treatment” in the WTO (and regional) trade agreements. Given the presumption that trade policy cannot do much to address the sources of market and government failure that impede supply responses, international cooperation (trade agreements) can help by creating institutional mechanisms to help identify what policies would be effective and efficient in attaining specific goals set by governments, and by increasing the transparency of policies and their effects (outcomes) through multilateral monitoring (Hoekman, 2005).

# **References**

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