rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Policy Research Working Paper 10025

# **Abstract**

Previous literature found overwhelming evidence of an agricultural gender gap in favor of male farmers. The case of Sri Lanka is unique as agricultural productivity, measured by yield per unit of land, is 25.4 percent higher among female farmers than male farmers. Using the nationally representative 2016 Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure Survey and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique, the paper explores the sources of this unconditional female productivity advantage. The analysis finds that the smaller plot size cultivated by women is the leading source of female productivity advantage, reflecting the inverse relationship between cultivated area and productivity. However, this productivity advantage does not translate into women’s higher crop earnings. Another important source is the gendered pattern of crop mix as women tend to cultivate more high-value, export-oriented crops, while men are more likely to grow paddy with low productivity. Once controlling for plot size and crop mix, a conditional male productivity advantage emerges, reflecting men’s greater access to agricultural resources and potentially an unequal pattern of division of labor associated with social and gender norms. Policies to promote equitable access to resources and address other constraints to women’s productivity in agriculture continue to be important in promoting gender equality.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at ykim8@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
expenditure, Table 1 shows that there has been an increase in allocation to priority areas since 1998 (both during the period of decline in aid, between 2002 and 2003, and from 2004-2005 when aid flow increased again).

**Table 1: Rwanda:  Priority Spending, 1998-2005**

_(In percentage of GDP)_

||1998|1999|2000|2001|2002|2003|2004|2005|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Total Budget|18.9|19.7|18.7|21.0|21.3|21.9|25.2|26.2|
|Total priority expenditure of which:|2.8|3.9|5.3|5.3|6.4|6.9|7.0|8.4|
|Education|2.2|3.2|3.5|3.5|3.6|3.8|3.9|3.9|
|Health|0.4|0.5|0.7|0.7|0.8|0.8|0.8|0.9|
|Agriculture|0.0|0.0|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.4|
|Export promotion|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.5|
|Transport and communication|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.1|0.4|0.5|0.4|0.9|
|Infrastructure(Energy and water)|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.3|
|Common Development Fund|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.3|0.3|0.3|
|Other*|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.9|0.5|1.0|1.3|1.3|

_Source:_ Rwandese authorities and World Bank (2007).

* This category includes spending on internal affairs, local government, commerce, and youth and sports.

In addition, since 1998, the government has adopted reforms to improve the efficiency of tax administration and revenue. The Rwanda Revenue Authority, charged with tax collection, was established in 1997. Four years later, the value-added-tax was implemented and a year later, in 2002, the tax code was revised. The result was that government revenue, estimated at about 13 percent of GDP in 1992, and which had fallen to below 4 percent in 1994, began to increase gradually to reach an average of around 10 percent per annum between 1996 and 2001. By 2002, revenues stood at 12.2 percent of GDP, reflecting the increase in the VAT rate from 15 to 18 percent, and the substantial strengthening of revenue administration. Revenue as a share of GDP rose further in the following years and is now just under 15 percent. Thus, the increased share of tax 7
<!-- Start of picture text --> YRD YRD<br>FA3 FA3<br>0 2 4 6 8 0 5 10 15 20 25<br>growth rate of ag and ind real output PC, 1952-1998 growth rate of ag and ind real output PC, 1978-1998<br>guerrillaYes guerrillaYes<br>guerrillaNo guerrillaNo<br>0 2 4 6 8 0 5 10 15 20 25<br>growth rate of ag and ind real output PC, 1952-1998 growth rate of ag and ind real output PC, 1978-1998<br>.5 .25<br>.4 .2<br>.3 .15<br>Density .2 Density .1<br>.1 .05<br>0 0<br>.3 .15<br>.2 .1<br>Density Density<br>.1 .05<br>0 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 2: Kernel Density of Annual Growth Rate of Real Agriculture and Industrial Output per Capita: YRD vs. FA3 (Top) and Guerrilla vs. No Guerrilla (Bottom), and for the period 1952-1998 (Left) and 1978-1998 (Right).

period of 1952-1998, and 3.72 percentage points in 1978-1998 (or 0.95 SDs). Both differences are statistically significant at 5% level.

In Panel B, we examine the differences in average annual real GVO growth in guerrilla versus no-guerrilla counties within the groups of counties led by FA3- or YRD-affiliated cadres. During 1952-1998 and within the group of FA3 counties, there is no difference in growth rates with respect to the local guerrilla presence. In contrast, within the group of YRD-affiliated counties, those with guerrilla presence outgrew those without by 0.98 percentage points (or 0.7 SDs). Similarly, during 1978-1998 and within the group of FA3 counties, we do not find statistically significant differences in annual GVO growth rates between those with and without guerrilla presence, though the grow rates remain higher in counties that had guerrilla presence. In contrast, within the group of YRD counties, those with guerrilla presence outgrew those without by 3.74 percentage points (or 0.95 SDs). It should be noted that, as shown in the last two columns in Panel B, the numbers of counties in the FA3 group with and without guerrilla presence are small, 3 and 8, respectively.

# **4.4 Factions, Local Accountability and Famine Severity During 1959-1961**

Our second piece of descriptive evidence on the impact of factions and local accountability on development performance is how counties fared during the Chinese Great Famine (1959-1961). An estimated total of 16.5 21
Policy Research Working Paper 10006

# **Abstract**

Informal public transport has been growing rapidly in many developing countries. Because urban infrastructure development tends to lag rapid population growth, informal public transport often meets the growing gap between demand and supply in urban mobility. Despite the rich literature primarily focused on formal transport modes, the informal transport sector is relatively unknown. This paper analyzes the demand behavior in the “informal” minibus sector in Antananarivo, Madagascar, taking advantage of a recent user survey of thousands of people. It finds that the demand for informal public transport is generally inelastic. Essentially, people have no other choice. While the time elasticity is estimated at −0.02 to −0.05, the price elasticity is −0.05 to −0.06 for short-distance travelers, who may have alternative choices, such as motorcycle taxi or walking. Unlike formal public transportation, the demand also increases with income. Regardless of income level, everyone uses minibuses. The estimated demand functions indicate that people prefer safety and more flexibility in transit. The paper shows that combining these improvements and fare adjustments, the informal transport sector can contribute to increasing people’s mobility and reducing traffic congestion in the city.

This paper is a product of the Transport Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at aiimi@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Table 7: Linear probability estimates of the impact of the PSNP on maternal and child** **<u>consumption of animal source foods and vegetables</u>**

||(1)<br>Animal source<br>food consumed by<br>the mother|(2)<br>Vegetables and<br>fruits consumed<br>by mothers|(3)<br>Animal source<br>food consumed<br>by the child|(4)<br>Vegetables and<br>fruits consumed<br>by the child|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Post COVID-19 round|-0.116<sup>***</sup>|0.041|-0.009|0.352<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.024)|(0.026)|(0.040)|(0.047)|
|PSNP*Post COVID-19 round|0.033|0.015|0.029|0.071|
||(0.034)|(0.033)|(0.055)|(0.063)|
|Constant|0.272<sup>***</sup>|0.692<sup>***</sup>|0.228<sup>***</sup>|0.360<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.010)|(0.011)|(0.009)|(0.011)|
|Control for locust invasion|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household fixed effects|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Sampling weights applied|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|R-squared|0.05|0.01|0.00|0.29|
|No. observations|2,994|2,994|1,781|1,781|

_Notes_ : The outcome variables in columns 1 and 3 are dummy variables that take value 1 if the mother (child) consumes dairy products, flesh foods, or eggs in the last 24 hours. The outcome variables in columns 2 and 4 are dummy variables taking value 1 if the mother (child) consumes vitamin A rich vegetables and fruits in the last 24 hours. PSNP participation is defined as: Reported receiving PSNP payments in 2019. Child estimates are based on children between 6 and 24 months old. Standard errors clustered at the kebele level in parentheses.<sup>*</sup> _p_ < 0.10,<sup>**</sup> _p_ < 0.05,<sup>***</sup> _p_ < 0.01.

28
# **References:**

Baltagi, B. H. (1985), "Pooling Cross Sections with Unequal Time Series Lengths" _Economics Letters,_ 18 p. 133-136.

Baltagi, B.H. (1996) _Econometric Analysis of Panel Data,_ John Wiley and Sons (New York).

Baltagi, B. H. and B. Raj (1992), "A Survey of Recent Theoretical Developments in the Econometrics of Panel Data," in Bjom, Erik,(1981) Estimating Economic Relation from Incomplete Cross Sectional/Time Series Data, _Journal of Econometrics_ 16:221-236.

Bjom, E. and E.S. Jansen (1983) "Individual Effects in a System of Demand Functions, _Scandinavian Journal of Economics_ 85:4 1983.

Berninghaus, B. and H G. Seifert-Vogt (1993), The Role of the Target Saving Motive in Guest Worker Migration, _Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control_ 17, p181-205.

Eckstein, Z. and K I. Wolpin (1989) "The Specification and Estimation of Dynamic Stochastic Discrete Choice Models, a Survey, _The Journal of Human Resources, 24:4_ Evans, D.S. and B. Jovanovic (1989), "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints, _Journal of Political Economy_ 97:4 pp. 808-826 Evans, D.S. and L. Leighton(1989), "Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship," _American Economic Review_ 79.

Harris, J.R. and M. P. Todaro (1970), "Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two Sector Analysis," _American Economic Review,_ 60:1, 126-142.

Hsiao, C.(1986), _Analysis of Panel Data,_ Econometric Society Monograph no. 11, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

Jovanovic, B. (1979), "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover." _Journal of Political Economy_ 87:5 972-90.

Nijman, R., M. Verbeek, and A. van Soest (1991), "The Efficiency of Rotating-Panel Designs in an Analysis of Variance Model," _Journal of Econometrics ,_ 49:373-399.

Maddala, G.S. (1983) _Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics_ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

is
## **Table 10: IV regressions**

|Dependent variable: ln labor<br>productivity (**_ln Y_** )|Full S|ample|Low GVC<br>participation|High GVC<br>participation|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|_ln FDI (IV)_|0.058***|0.154***|0.126***|0.02|
||(0.02)|(0.04)|(0.03)|(0.02)|
|_ln FDI (IV) × GVC_|-0.132**|-0.322***|||
||(0.05)|(0.11)|||
|_GVC_|-3.410***|-1.545***|||
||(0.41)|(0.54)|||
|Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Stats||63.78|36.42|47.01|
|Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F||28.47|33.27|50.10|
|Country-sector FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number of country-sector|1,241|1,206|628|625|
|Observations|6,494|6,459|3,203|3,202|
|R-squared|0.266||||

**Notes:** The dependent variable is the log of labor productivity. The standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level. Country-sector and year fixed effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Using an IV that includes past years strengthens our result. In columns (2) – (4), we run two-stage least square regressions. The Kleibergen-Paap LM and Wald F-statistics suggest that the instrumental variable is valid; the IV passes the over-identification and weak-identification test since the values of the statistics are larger than 10. In column (2), the interpretation of the results is consistent with the main regression results: doubling FDI will lead to an 8 percent increase in labor productivity. Column (3) demonstrates that for a sector with low GVC participation, the effect of FDI is even higher; doubling the FDI leads to a 13 percent increase in labor productivity. Column (4) shows that the FDI effect is weaker among sectors with high GVC participation both in magnitude and in statistical significance.

# 5.3 Establishing the transmission mechanism of FDI spillovers

In this section we try to interpret the main result found earlier and find that a lower GVC participation increases the spillover effect of FDI through greater exposure of firms to domestic competition. We thus identify the mechanism through which the FDI effect is mitigated. Recall that recent studies on FDI spillovers focus on the interpretation of the spillover effect, whether due
TABLE 2

# EXPLANATORY REGRESSION FOR THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE USING ACTUAL TRADED GOODS PRICES

||U.S.A.|COLOMBIA|ARGENTINA|
|---|---|---|---|
|Constant|4.71|4.558|4.649|
|(T-Value)|(0.64)|(170)|(49.3)|
|Log(Terms of Trade)|-0.022|0.139|0.006|
|(T-Value)|(-0.01)|(0.79)|(0.03)|
|Trade Surplus/GDP|0.052|0.0445|0.042|
|(T-Value)|(3.69)|(3.77)|(2.02)|
|AR(1)|0.773||0.600|
|(T-Value)|(1.53)|-|(2.26)|
|_____________________________||||
|R2 Adj.|0.91|0.71|0.50|
|S.E.of Regression|0.023|0.091|0.14|
|D.W.|2.13|1.39|1.61|

INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: Log.T.of Trade (0,-i),Fiscal Surplus/GDP (0,-l),Trade S./GDP(-I) Real Exch.Rate(-1). The USA regression is done with quarterly data seasonally adjusted at annual rates and does not include the current terms of trade as instrumental variable.

39
Third, both the prevalence and level of fixed charges is much lower in electricity tariff structures than was the case for water. Whereas 94% of the water utilities surveyed have fixed charges, and 40% apply minimum consumption thresholds, only 68% of the electric utilities surveyed have fixed charges, and only 11% apply minimum consumption thresholds. Moreover, the average value of the fixed charge in the case of electricity is US$0.66 per month, compared to US$2.66 per month for the water sector. Thus, fixed charges on average represent about 20% of a typical household electricity bill, versus almost 40% in the water sector.

Thus, overall, the results suggest that IBT structures for electricity are in general much better designed than is the case for water. Furthermore, the correlation between electricity consumption and household income is somewhat stronger in the case of electricity than was found for the case of water (Figure 12). Thus, households in the top income quintile tend to consume 160% more electricity than households in the bottom income quintile, compared with 30% more water, although the variation between the bottom quintile and the middle quintiles is much less pronounced (Figure 13). This suggests that IBT structures in electricity have greater potential to redistribute income than IBT structures in water, to the extent that they are appropriately designed.

**<u>Table 12: Overview of IBT structures for residential electricity</u>**

||Fixed ch<br>Min.<br>cons.<br>kWh/m|arges<br>Fixed charge<br>as<br>%<br>100kWh<br>%|Block s<br>No. of<br>blocks<br>N|tructure<br>Size 1<sup>st</sup><br>block<br>kWh/m|Size<br>block<br>kWh/m|N<sup>th</sup>|Price<br><br>block<br>US$/kWh|1<sup>st</sup><br>Price<br>N<sup>th</sup><br>block<br>US$/kWh|Gradient of<br>block<br>structure<br>US$/kWh|Cost<br>recovery<br>threshold<br>kWh/m|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Brazil|0|0|3|30|125||0.025|0.070|0.0005|∝|
|Colombia|0|0|2|200|200||0.046|0.069||∝|
|Ecuador|0|20|6|50|300||0.076|0.112|0.0001|550|
|Honduras|20|50|3|100|300||0.047|0.079|0.0002|1|
|Mexico|0|18|3|50|100||0.112|0.149|0.0007|1|
|Nicaragua|0|0|6|25|1000||0.044|0.257|0.0002|75|
|Paraguay|0|0|3|50|150||0.053|0.063|0.0001|∝|
|Peru|0|6|3|30|100||0.072|0.099|0.0004|30|
|Venezuela|100|100|3|300|500||0.057|0.070|0.0001|∝|
|Average|13|22|4|93|308||0.059|0.108|0.0003||

Source: Adapted from Appendix 3 31
<mark>could have been confidently anticipated (Abadie, 2021). Because when applying the SCM there is no restriction on time variation in the effect of the treatment, de facto treating pre-treatment similar to post-treatment periods does not bias the estimators but allows one to see the difference of the effect of anticipation (if and when it sets in) and the effects of the actual treatment. We apply the backdated matching approach and confirm at least some anticipation seems to be at play in some instances, though even in these cases it is the actual occurrence of default that drives the lion share of the effects measured.</mark><sup>19</sup>

# **IV.** **<mark>Findings</mark>**

## **<mark>Output</mark>**

<mark>Based on a sample of 131 defaults since 1900, we find that, on average, sovereign default causes an economy to fall behind by a cumulative 8.4 percent gap relative to the synthetic control within the first three years of the default. This is mainly driven by growth-rates in the first two years of defaults being 3.6 and 2.4 percentage points below the counterfactual. And while GDP growth slows down relative to the control prior to the default – which likely includes effects from default-anticipation on investor- and business confidence, inter alia – the marked decline in output only begins with the default year. On average, GDP per capita growth returns in the third year – though it remains below the trend observed prior to default, on which the synthetic control continues forward. After four years, sovereigns reach their pre-default output level. However, over the decade following default the average annual growth rate is 1.7% below that of the control. So, there appears to remain significant scarring that precludes reconvergence to the prior trend. Note that despite the information-based weight, these results are not driven primarily by the weighting. As is shown in the appendix, filtering results by a NRMSE threshold and not weighting individual findings results in similar findings. Additionally, our results are robust to using the event study methodology pioneered by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), which results in similar findings for growth dynamics.</mark><sup>20</sup> <mark>As for all other aggregated results in this paper,</mark>

> 19 <mark>Note that because limiting the matching to periods well before the default requires longer time-series, in the case of poverty head count data, where the length of the time series is limited, we match on the seven periods immediately prior to the default instead.</mark>

> 20 <mark>See the appendix for a brief discussion and presentation of those results.</mark>

16
- 19 -

ones for exports to the world estimated from equations are, when the adjustment is made to all countries' indexes, more than a half per cent per year for all manufactures and a little over 1 per cent per year for SITC 7, slightly higher than the estimates from beginning to end years. The same relationship holds for exports to developing countries.

Given the rough nature of these adjustments and the incompleteness of coverage, these estimates must be subject to a considerable range of error. However, it seems as if quality adjustments could well be large enough to offset the supposed long-run deterioration in the terms of trade of primary products, as it has been estimated by supporters of the thesis that there has been such deterioration.

It is worth mentioning that these quality adjustments are much too gradual to offset the large short-term or medium term cycles in terms of trade, where the year-to-year movements are far greater than any conceivable offsetting changes in quality on the manufactures side. Thus they do little to alter the picture of deteriorating terms of trade for primary products during the 1980s.

# Comnarison with UN Unit Value Index for, Exorts of Hanufactures

If we want to get some idea of what difference the use of these manufactures price indexes would make in comparison with the movement of commodity prices over the same period, we can start by comparing the UN unit value index to the price index for all manufactured exports to the world by developed countries, without the adjustment for quality change. That difference