market opening in the areas in which negotiations are ongoing (especially financial services, where the deadline is July 1995), and on their willingness to discuss and make changes to the structure of the GATS (Sauve, 1995).

The transparency value of shifting to a negative list cannot be overemphasized. A reference to the experience obtained in agreeing to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism is appropriate here. Although most countries did not have much desire to subject themselves to a transparency-based review of their trade policies, the benefit of obtaining information on trading partners outweighed the perceived cost<sup>of</sup> being subjected to review as well. The result of the agreement to create the TPR has been that domestic groups (and the Ministry of Finance) have access to a substantial amount of information regarding the trade policy stance that is pursued, and can more easily compare this with policies applied by other countries. Greater transparency and better information will help analysts determine the costs and benefits of current policy in services sectors. Without objective data, analysis is greatly impeded, and therefore the formation of interest groups that would favor liberalization." Objective attempts at tariffication and calculation of price-cost margins, even if not used as an explicit focal point for negotiations, can do much to expand the amount of information regarding potential market opportunities and relative restrictiveness of regulatory regimes. The WTO Secretariat or the OECD could be given the task to undertake such an effort (which should of course be adequately funded).

More generally it must be recognized that the problems involved in 'fixing' the GATS extend beyond services. Future multilateral efforts must center on eliminating the artificial goods-services distinction, and develop generic disciplines on FDI and labor movement. In this context attention could also be devoted to exploring whether and how market access commitments might be replaced with competition disciplines. Market access restrictions as defined in the GATS are, of course, not limited to services, although competition is often more restricted in these industries than in goods producing sectors. The subject of competition policy has been actively discussed as a likely topic for future multilateral negotiations under WTO auspices. The same applies to policies affecting investment. It will be important that attention is devoted to _both_ goods and services in this connection, and that the same rules apply to goods and services (see the Chapter by Low and Subramanian in this volume). The likely further expansion of the multilateral trading system to include rules on policies affecting investment constitutes an additional important reason for developing horizontal, generally applicable disciplines on a mode-of-supply basis. Extending the GATS approach of scheduling by mode of supply on a positive list basis to the GATT context when addressing investment-related matters would be most unfortunate.

34 A negative list approach to scheduling, while important and necessary, is not sufficien **t** o allow analysis. An additional requirement is that comparable production, consumption and trade data are available. Members should be required to report such data for at least the 11 major GNS service sectors, and preferably on a '2-digit' basis (see Annex 1). See Hoekman and Stem (1991) more generally on data needs.

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