rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
June 2018-October 2018: Prior Elicitation from Policymakers, Academics, and program firms.

November 2019-May 2020: Follow-up survey of Management Practices conducted by IPA Colombia.

# **B More Details of the Consulting Interventions**

One of the challenges with consulting interventions is understanding exactly what was done by consultants when working one on one with firms. We used qualitative fieldwork, the administrative agreements used to contract the consulting firms, interviews with the consulting companies, our own observations, and data collected from firms, and summarize key details of each component.

The **Commercial consulting** began with a lengthy diagnostic (10 hours). This included asking firms to provide data on their five main products and then identifying their star product, defined as the one they thought would have highest profitability in the future, and examining the market for this product. This was followed by an implementation phase of 23 hours, which largely focused on developing a plan for commercial strategy and exporting for the firms. For example, a cosmetics factory making many products identified sunblock as its star product. The consultants worked with them to go through their costs and client list, and suggested the firm was offering too many discounts that were incurring losses, leading the firm to cut down on promotions. A key part of this strategy was segmentation of clients, and deciding where to focus more of their sales efforts. For example, a firm making uniforms for businesses and schools was advised to focus more on the domestic market, but also to work with other Colombian agencies like Impulsa and Procolombia to develop the export market, and to take steps like setting up a webpage in English to help reach overseas buyers.

The implementing consultants for commercial management were a consortium of two companies. There were delays in starting the commercial strategy, with implementation starting in December 2018 for many firms, in part because they had not hired enough consultants. The consulting company was very focused on diagnostics, saying there is a myth that firms in Colombia are over-diagnosed, but firms we talked to complained about the amount of time and length of the diagnostic. The consulting companies had the view that before firms export, they need to know their local clients, and then that their role was to help prepare firms to work with ProColombia for any direct efforts to export. They expressed the view that they believed the majority of firms could not consistently produce the capacity to go to external markets (despite over half the sample already exporting). For some firms with more developed commercial strategies, they did 47
10 interest rates. It should be noted that for the purpose of savings and investment, most countries are closed, as Frankel's survey (1992) shows. If the economy adopts an unfunded pension system while in the transition path of capital accumulation towards the steady state, a few additional generations can also gain (Femdndez, 1980), but also at the cost of reducing the welfare of future generations.

Of course, it may be desirable to redistribute in favor of those currently alive. One standard argument in favor of this is that future technical progress will make future generations much richer. However, technical progress is uncertain, and other factors may make future generations worse off. For example, oil-producing kingdoms have decided to save a substantial portion of their oild revenue, as future depletion of reserves wili make future generations worse off. As it is not desirable to consume the capital stock by refusing to replace depreciated equipment, it follows that redistribution toward the current generation must be undesirable at some point.

It is well known that the same type of inter generational redistribution is obtained when the goverunent issues public debt and spends part or all the proceeds to benefit current generations (Diamond, 1965). This implies that PAYG-finaced pension systems confront a signiificant competitor for fulfilling the aim of inter-generational redistribution, namely the issue of public debt coupled with the distribution of the proceeds through targeted transfer programs. The financing of the associated debt service can be assigned to progressive income taxation in the future.

The use of explicit government debt rather than implicit social securjiy debt exhibits two advantages: (1) Greater Transparency. Welfare losses suffered by future generations are much more evident and transparent when public debt is issued than when an unfunded pension system is started or expanded. To see this, one must recognize that issuing more public debt is equivalent to the following policy combination in a PAYG-financed social security: (a) raise the contribution rate transitorily, for one year; (b) raise the benefits promised to the generations that increased their contribution according to (a); (c) spend the transitory cash surplus that results to improve the welfare of some group in the present. The PAYG presentation hides the cost of meeting promise (b) that will force a tax increase on the generations alive in tie future. It appears as if nobody pays.

The transparency issue can be also be assessed from the following perspective: Do we observe relatively rich generations using PAYG financing n reverse, to helping altruisticaly the poorer generations ? Consider a generation which is unusualy wealthy (may be because of a transitory commodity boom). For it, inter generational equity would imply that it legislates a reduction in its own social security benefits for the same current contribution, permitting a reduction in the future contributions of its children, while maintaining the benefits of its children It is remarkable that no country has ever adopted these polices, in our knowledge.
# **5 References**

Armington, Paul. 1969. “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production.” IMF Staff Papers, 16, 159–178.

Becker, Elizabeth. 2004. “Amid a Trade Deal, a Debate Over Labor.” _The New York Times_ , April 6.

Brown, D., K. Kyota and R. M. Stern (2005) “Computational Analysis of the U.S. FTAs with Central America, Australia, and Morocco”, RSIE Discussion Paper, No. 527, University of Michigan.

Bussolo and Medvedev (2005) “What is the Role of Labor Markets in Making Trade Reforms ProPoor in Latin America” background paper for LAC FY06 Flagship “Virtuous Circles of Poverty Reduction and Growth”.

Bussolo, Lay, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) “Trade options for Latin America. A Poverty Assessment Using Macro-Micro Linkages” mimeo World Bank, Washington DC.

Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravallion. 2003. “Hidden Impact? Ex-Post Evaluation of an Anti-Poverty Program.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3049.

Deininger, Klaus and Pedro Olinto. 2000. “Why Liberalization Alone Has Not Improved Agricultural Productivity in Zambia: The Role of Asset Ownership and Working Capital Constraints.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2302.

Francois, J. F., L. C. Rivera and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2005) “Economic Perspectives for Central America after CAFTA: a GTAP-based Analysis”, presented at the GTAP Eighth Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Lübeck, Germany, 9-11 June 2005.

- Hertel, Thomas W., Maros Ivanic, Paul V. Preckel, and John A. L. Cranfield 2004, “The Earnings Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Implications for Poverty” World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 18: pp. 205 - 236

Hilaire, A. and Y. Yang (2004) “The United States and the New Regionalism/Bilateralism”, Journal of World Trade, Vol.38, No.4, pp.603-625.

- Ianchovichina, Elena, Alessandro Nicita, Isidro Soloaga, 2001, “Trade reform and household welfare the case of Mexico” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2667.

- Kehoe, Timothy J. (2003), “An Evaluation of the Performance of Applied General Equilibrium Models of the Impact of NAFTA”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 320.

- López, Ramon, John Nash, and Julie Stanton. 1995. “Adjustment and Poverty in Mexican Agriculture: How Farmers' Wealth Affects Supply Response.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1494.

- McCulloch, Neil, L. Alan Winters, and Xavier Cirera. 2001. _Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: A Handbook,_ London: Centre for Economic Policy Research

47
# **Table 1: National trends in per capita expenditure, inequality, and poverty**

|Indicators|||||Ye|ars|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||2002|2004|2006|2008|2010|2012|2014|2016|2018|2020|
|Per caita income (‘000 D)|4565.9|5335.9|6176.6|6414.9|9305.1|9680.7|10600.6|12044.0|14861.7|15156.3|
|p|(88.1)|(142.6)|(140.5)|(171.4)|(225.8)|(184.7)|(144.5)|(172.9)|(223.3)|(197.1)|
|P it dit ‘000 D|3476.1|4009.7|4519.2|4560.0|8520.3|8902.6|9586.5|11577.7|12376.8|14250.9|
|er capa expenure ( )|(63.0)|(113.1)|(113.9)|(93.6)|(147.5)|(121.9)|(128.9)|(190.7)|(170.4)|(218.8)|
|Poverty estimate using the|||||||||||
|national expenditure poverty line|||||||||||
|Povert rate (%)|28.8|19.5|16.0|14.5|20.7|17.2|13.5|9.8|7|4.7|
|y|(0.6)|(1.0)|(0.8)|(0.8)|(0.6)|(0.6)|(0.5)|(0.5)|(0.4)|(0.3)|
|Povert a index|0.069|0.047|0.038|0.035|0.059|0.045|0.037|0.027|0.02|0.011|
|y gp|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.001)|
|Poverty severity index|0.024|0.017|0.014|0.012|0.024|0.017|0.015|0.010|0.008|0.004|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.000)|
|Poverty estimate using the<br>|||||||||||
|poverty line of 3.1$ PPP/day|||||||||||
|Povert rate (%)|56.2|45.3|34.7|35.7|9.6|6.5|5.7|4.3|3.2|1.4|
|y|(0.8)|(1.7)|(1.5)|(1.4)|(0.4)|(0.4)|(0.3)|(0.4)|(0.3)|(0.2)|
|Povert a index|0.187|0.141|0.103|0.100|0.023|0.014|0.013|0.010|0.007|0.003|
|y gp|(0.003)|(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.000)|
|Povert severit index|0.081|0.061|0.042|0.040|0.008|0.005|0.005|0.003|0.001|0.023|
|y y|(0.002)|(0.003)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|Gini|0.370|0.370|0.358|0.356|0.393|0.357|0.348|0.381|0.357|0.368|
||(0.003)|(0.004)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.006)|(0.004)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.004)|(0.005)|
|Theil L index|0.221|0.224|0.212|0.208|0.259|0.213|0.205|0.246|0.219|0.231|
||(0.008)|(0.007)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.009)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.008)|(0.006)|(0.007)|
|Theil T index|0.249|0.241|0.227|0.227|0.294|0.230|0.216|0.265|0.226|0.247|
||(0.010)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.014)|(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.013)|(0.007)|(0.011)|

Note: i) Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs. ii) Standard errors in parentheses. iii) Per capita income and expenditure in thousand VND, adjusted to constant prices in 2002 26
on growth, and (iii) aid with a long-term impact on growth. Clemens et al. (2004) classify budget support and actions relating to debt entirely as having a short-term impact on growth, which is not always the case.<sup>18</sup> Differing from them, we allocate budget support and debt relief similar to the composition of the budget, which is discussed in the following section. Following the budget composition between 2001 and 2007, we allocate 21 percent of budget support and debt relief to long-term growth enhancing sectors, while the remaining 79 percent are allocated to sectors that have a short-term impact on growth.

**Figure 5:** Allocation of aid by impact category (Gross disbursement, current USD million), 2001-2007

<!-- Start of picture text --> 160<br>Humanitarian aid<br>140 Short-run impact<br>Long-run impact<br>120<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br>USD million (current)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Authors’ calculation based on OECD – DAC data; 2001: commitments, no data on disbursements available.

The pattern of aid allocation between 2001 and 2007 (Figure 5) shows that there is not necessarily a contradiction between increased aid flows and low growth performance if a lagged impact of aid is taken into account.<sup>19</sup> The highest share of aid, about 41 percent has been allocated to emergency and humanitarian aid, in Burundi mainly consisting of emergency/distress relief and emergency food aid. As Clemens et al. (2004) point out, this type of aid is not directly growth enhancing, but might even coincide with a negative growth rate as it is disbursed in times of crisis. It is, however, a necessary condition for establishing peace and has a long-term stabilizing effect. The expenditure pattern observed in Burundi is typical for a country getting out of conflict where the humanitarian aid remains high immediately after the end of conflict when a fragile situation prevails. In the case of Burundi, the peacemaking process which started in 2000 with the Arusha agreement is only approaching closure in early 2009 when the last rebel group started disarming. Emergency and humanitarian aid has been declining since 2005, however, with improving security in Burundi.

> 18 At the time Clemens et al. (2004) carried out their analysis, the purpose code was termed ‘structural adjustment’ (CRS purpose code 51010), which has in the meantime been changed to ‘general budget support’.

> 19 The respective amounts are given in Table A-7 the appendix. Table A-8 details the breakdown of aid by classification for the total amount of aid disbursed between 2002 and 2007.

16
we find that approximately 67 million people, or 15% of SSA’s total rural population, reside within the corridors.<sup>43</sup> For abutting settlements, we believe that increased income and employment from construction, maintenance, and sales of goods and services would easily compensate for any loss of barricade-extracted payments. Since the network’s road monitoring teams would circulate daily, villagers would be constantly reminded of the link between income growth and barricade-free passage. As insurance, however, it is also worth thinking about direct payment programs that are explicitly tied to the absence of barricades. As an added incentive for local support, such programs could provide village development funds, micro-credit, or cash transfers conditional on barricade-free road conditions.<sup>44</sup> They would probably work best if organized around regular payments in small increments, tied explicitly to monitored traffic flow.

We base our order-of-magnitude cost calculation for such a program on our estimate of abutting settlement numbers for the network, which we have explained in footnote 40. As we report in Appendix Table A6, the total number of settlements within 5 km of the continental network probably lies within the range 19,000 – 42,000. If we assume that 20% of settlement areas require additional compensation, at $20,000 per settlement annually, the total outlay is between $76 million and $168 million. To be conservative, we double the high-range estimate to $340 million. We believe that such costs would plummet once the abutting settlements perceived the full benefits of the

> 43 This estimate is based on GIS analysis of the GRUMP spatial population map (Balk et al., 2004).  In this analysis, the rural population is estimated by masking urban areas, and then computing total population in remaining areas within 20-km corridors around network links. This approach assumes that the rural population is uniformly distributed in each administrative area, after urban areas are masked.  More detailed analysis of available datasets (e.g., for Mozambique) suggests non-uniform rural distributions, with higher population concentrations near network roads.  This implies that our analysis probably underestimates Africa’s rural population within the network’s 20 km corridor.

> 44 For a discussion of conditional cash transfer programs, see Das, Do and Ozler (2004).

42
property goods and low-intellectual property goods, raising questions about whether the effects of the trade aspects of these PTAs were sufficiently well controlled. Maskus and Ridley (2021) studied this question in an identification context, defining treatment trade agreements as those with elevated IP standards of various forms versus those without such rules. They found significantly positive impacts on the trade of members with third parties (those outside the IPAs), controlling for prior TRIPS membership, in biopharmaceuticals, medical devices, and other sectors that are highly reliant on intellectual property protection.

Unstudied to date is whether and how IPAs influence international knowledge flows, as measured by bilateral patent applications among member countries and between non-member and member countries. This is a remarkable omission in light of the evident intent of intellectualproperty chapters to reduce application costs and strengthen protection for patent holders. Our aim is to address this shortcoming by estimating the effects of IPA membership on bilateral applications, both at the country level and using various high-tech sectoral clusters. We make use of the World Bank’s extensive database covering regulatory provisions in comprehensive PTAs (Mattoo et al., 2020), employing various definitions of what constitutes TRIPS-Plus agreements.

Prior literature has emphasized the interrelationships between patent filings or grants and detailed trade flows. For example, countries that engage in unilateral patent reforms tend to find rapid increases in foreign patenting in their economies, relative to domestic patenting (Lerner, 2002). The essential reason is that foreign firms seek to sell products, whether exported or produced through local affiliates, in markets where their goods may be patented and those patents enforced. This correlation between patenting and trade has attracted significant attention in recent years, given the widespread availability of micro data on patents and trade. Brunel and Zylkin (2022), in an extensive panel-data study between 1974 and 2006, find that international patent grants have a positive impact on bilateral exports to the patent-destination country, though these effects varied across sectors. De Rassenfosse, et al. (2020) studied transactions data among French exporting firms between 2002 and 2011, concording patent categories with traded products. They found that owning patents generated a patent premium in exports to countries where patents were sought, which emerged primarily from greater export volumes rather than higher prices.

Again, neither strand of literature addresses the basic question of how IP-related PTAs influence bilateral patent application flows, which is our concern in this study. Rather than a 2
85; Lin 2009, 2010 and 2011). Kuznets (1966) identified these trends as the four stylized facts of modern economic growth.

According to the first Kuznets‘s fact, structural transformation occurs when the share of the nonagricultural sectors in an economy increases. A reconstruction of national accounts from a variety of sources for Western countries shows that such a transformation raised overall productivity and increased the returns to workers and capital. Between 1800-1849 and 19511960 for example, as a share of GDP, agriculture declined from 30 to only 5 percent in the U.K., and from 20 to 4 percent in the U.S. And, the share of industry inclusive of manufacturing increased from 23 to 56 percent in the U.K. and from 33 to 43 percent in the U.S. (Kuznets, 1966, Table 3.1). As industrialization progressed, the predominance of manufacturing was replaced by the services sector.

A similar pattern of structural transformation also evolved in the East Asian Tigers (South Korea; Singapore; Hong Kong SAR, China; and Taiwan, China) in the 1960s and 1970s, and the new growth poles – Brazil, China and India starting in the 1980s. Between 1965 and 2009, as a share of GDP, agriculture value-added decreased from 39 to 3 percent, while manufacturing increased from 14 to 28 percent in South Korea. Similar transformation occurred in China, the share of agriculture value added in GDP declined from 38 to 10 percent and manufacturing increased from 29 to 34 percent in the same period. In comparison, the slow pace of structural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa explains why it lags more prosperous countries by such a huge margin (Table 1.2). In Ghana for example, between 1965 and 2009, as a share of GDP, agriculture value-added decreased from 50 to 32 percent, but the transformation was not in favor of manufacturing which also decreased from 11 to 7 percent. In Tanzania, between 1990 and 2006, the share of agriculture decreased slightly from 46 to 45 percent and of manufacturing declined from 9 to 7 percent (World Development Indicators, 2011). These patterns also corroborate the empirical analysis by McMillan and Rodrik and are elaborated in Lin and Lin and Monga (2011).

Trends in the allocation of labor usually reflect value addition at the sector level as also noted by Kuznets. In the developed countries, in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution as the share of manufacturing increased, labor moved from agriculture to manufacturing to support growth in the latter. This pattern continued until the 1960s when rising wages in manufacturing dampened the sector‘s growth and created space for the service sectors. Today, the predominance of services is notable in all Western countries (Figure 1.4).

7
**Table 10: Comparative Cashew Processing Yields and Revenues**

|Grade|Price ($/lb.<br>FOB)'|Typical Prod<br>Tanzania<sup>2</sup>|uction Breakdown<br>India|Revenue Br<br>Composite<br>Kernels ($ F<br>Tanzania|eakdown for<br>Ton of<br>OB)<br>India|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Wholel||||||
|W210|3.09|1%|3%|34|204|
|W240|2.80|3%|7%|185|432|
|W320|2.70|27%|47%|1607|2797|
|W450|2.65|14%|14%|818|818|
|Scorched|2.62|3%|6%|173|346|
|Dessert<br>Sub-Total|1.93|7%<br>_55%_|6%<br>83%|298<br>3114|255<br>4852|
|Brokens||||||
|Butts|2.09|9%|_5%_|_415_|231|
|Splits|2.15|14%|**_5%_**|663|237|
|Large White Pc.|1.82|17%|4%|681|160|
|Small While Pc.<br>Sub-Total|1.71|_5%_<br>_45%_|3%<br>17%|188<br>1948|113<br>741|
|**Total Revenue**<br>**Per Ton of**<br>Kernels||||$5062|_$5593_|
|**Total Revenue**<br>**Per Ton of**<br>**Raw Nuts**||||**$9623**|**$1296'**|

1 December 1991 2 Oltremere system.

3 Assuming an average of 19% kernel yield from raw nuts. Likombe factory achieved 18.7% in 1990/91.

4 Assuming an average of 23% kernel yield from raw nuts.

Source: Modified from Agriconsult/AMEC (1992) While a few of the cooperative unions (including Ruvuma, Coast, and DSM) did obtain overdraft facilities, the others (including MARCU and LIRECU in the most important production areas) would need to obtain their financing through the TCMB, which finally obtained overdraft facilities in December and January. Relatively high inter-store TCMB buying prices of Tsh. 182-190/Kg. (depending upon region) were agreed to. In determining the guideline producer price, greatest consideration was given to the financial viability of the cooperative unions and to their ability to repay loans to the banks. Hence, the sample budgets constructed for the unions built in a sum of Tsh 20/kg. for finance costs. At the agreed guideline producer price of Tsh. 125/kg. for standard grade, it was expected that the unions would obtain 26