rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
51 percent “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the first public posting depends mainly on your contacts, and 56 percent that they could get their posting changed if they were not happy with it (Serneels 2008; Lindelöw and Serneels 2006). The fact that such a large share of final year students believe that assignment of posts depends primarily on your contacts, and can be changed, strongly suggests the existence of nepotism and favoritism in the assignment of public sector positions.

Results from national perceptions surveys suggest that purchasing of posts occurs in several countries for which relatively recent data are available (Table 7). The share of public officials who reported job purchasing in health as common or very common ranged from 9 percent in Benin and 14 percent in Indonesia to 25 percent in Ghana, and up to 50 percent in Zambia.

# **TABLE 7: PUBLIC OFFICIALS’ REPORTS ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH HEALTH PERSONNEL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY ILLEGAL PAYMENTS, 2000-2006**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Benin (2006)<br>Indonesia (2001)<br>Colombia (2002)<br>Guinea (2005)<br>Sierra Leone (2002)<br>Ghana (2000)<br>Zambia (2003)<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>% of public officials' reporting that job purchasing in health is common or very common<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Surveys (various years).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 75 percent of officials and citizens reported that bribes were required to obtain positions and be promoted in the health sector (World Bank 2001). Twenty percent of municipal officials in the health sector in Uganda reported bribes being paid to secure employment compared to 3 percent in the Philippines (Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 2001).

Interviews with health workers in Cambodia hint at the magnitude of illegal payments for public positions, with higher positions fetching higher prices. A director post at the Ministry of Health’s national and provincial offices reportedly cost close to US$100,000, whereas lower level positions cost around US$3,000 (Prevenslik-Takeda 31
**Table 1. Data description**

|**Variable**|**Description**|**Source**|**#ctry **|**Perio**<br>**d**|**Obs**|**Mean**|**SD.**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Domestic credit to<br>private sector|Domestic credit to private sector refers to<br>financial resources provided to the private<br>sector by financial corporations, such as<br>through loans, purchases of nonequity<br>securities, and trade credits and other<br>accounts receivable, that establish a claim for<br>repayment.Expressedinpercent ofGDP.|World<br>Development<br>Indicators<br>(WDI)|183|2000<br>-18|3,009|50.39|44.26|
|Commercial bank<br>branches|The number of commercial bank branches per<br>100,000 adults|WDI|183|2004-<br>18|2,591|17.44|16.41|
|Real GDP per capita<br>(in logs)|GDP per capita (constant 2010 U.S. dollars;<br>in<br>logs).|WDI|188|2000<br>-18|3,525|8.47|1.45|
|Control of<br>Corruption|Perceptions of the extent to which public<br>power is exercised for private gain, including<br>both petty and grand forms of corruption, as<br>well as "capture" of the state by elites and<br>private interests. A higher value corresponds<br>to bettergovernance outcomes.|World<br>Governance<br>Indicators<br>(WGI)|189|2000<br>-18|3,564|-0.07|0.99|
|Rule of Law|Perceptions of the extent to which a country s<br>citizens are able to participate in selecting<br>their government, as well as freedom of<br>expression, freedom of association, and a free<br>media. A higher value corresponds to better<br>governance outcomes.|WGI|189|2000<br>-18|3,580|-0.08|0.99|
|Regulatory quality|It captures perceptions of the extent to which<br>agents have confidence in and abide by the<br>rules of society, and in particular the quality<br>of contract enforcement, property rights, the<br>police, and the courts, as well as the<br>likelihood of crime and violence. A higher<br>value corresponds to better governance<br>outcomes.|WGI|189|2000<br>-18|3,551|-0.06|0.97|

17
abstracting from such considerations,<sup>61</sup> the results are far from being a full assessment of the investment implications of Pillar 2, but we believe are potentially instructive nonetheless.

The focus is thus on the impact of the minimum rate through two channels: the rate differential term ∆ _h_ in the host country—which, importantly, will capture not only any rate change induced by the minimum in the host country itself but also those induced in the much larger number of other potential host countries— and the host country _KF_ - _METR_ . Computing the effect of a minimum tax on the rate differential is simply a matter of replacing each _Tj_ by _max_ ( _m, Tj_ ). This is likely a reasonable approximation, notwithstanding the additional complexities noted above.<sup>62</sup> The post-minimum _KF_ - _METR_ is computed by simply recalculating it the minimum rate whenever it binds, which will generally imply an increase. This is somewhat problematic, because the structural base changes introduced by the minimum matter a good deal, and imply that the impact may be strongly circumstancespecific: In some cases, the _KF_ - _METR_ might even fall. The common expectation, however, appears to be that _KF_ - _METR_ s will generally increase, and this directional effect at least is captured by the recalculation just described.<sup>63</sup> Conceptually, the effect on FAI through the _KF_ - _METR_ in the host country is straightforward: any minimum-induced increase will reduce inward FAI. With _KF_ - _METR_ s seen above to have no role outside the host country, there are through this route no spillover effects on countries that are not themselves constrained by the minimum.

The effects through the statutory rate differentials ∆ _h_ , both at country level and (especially) in aggregate, are more subtle. They are easiest to see by supposing that all countries carry the same weight _δhj_ , so that the weight attached to each tax rate is the proportion of countries setting that rate. Assuming further, for simplicity, a continuous distribution of tax rates prior to implementation of the minimum, with density _f_ ( _T_ ) and distribution _F_ ( _T_ )

> 61One issue that need not concern us, however, is the vexed question of which country collects the revenue from any top-up tax: from the perspective of the investor, that is immaterial.

> 62The operation of the carve out means that effective rates will generally be lower than the minimum rate itself—and for this reason we at some points below consider rates somewhat below the proposed 15 percent—but to the extent that the carve out covers financing costs, the minimum rate applies to rents and so is analogous to the statutory rate in the formalization above.

> 63The impact of the minimum tax on _KF_ - _METR_ remains to be fully characterized, though see for example International Monetary Fund (2023), Mintz (2022) and UNCTAD (2022).

37
# **Figure 5 Area and yield contribution to production growth**

<!-- Start of picture text --> A. By commodity B. By region<br>100% 100%<br>90% 90%<br>27.6%<br>80% 80%<br>50.3%<br>70% 70%<br>60% 60%<br>41.3%<br>50% 50%<br>Area Area<br>40% 40%<br>24.9%<br>30% 30%<br>13.6%<br>20% 20%<br>22.9%<br>10% 17.5% Yield 10% Yield<br>1.9%<br>0% 0%<br>Big-4 Other Big-4 Other AE EMDE AE EMDE<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure 6 Yield by country grouping**

<!-- Start of picture text --> KCal/hectare<br>20,000<br> AE All EMDE<br>15,000<br>10,000<br>5,000<br>0<br>1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021<br><!-- End of picture text --> _— 27 —_
We also find that trade balance and current account are more volatile in small countries. Exports are also more procyclical with GDP in these economies, which implies that their trade balance is less countercyclical than in larger economies. The higher comovement of exports with GDP could again be a reflection of highly specialized production structure and concentrated exports in small economies which, in combination with their greater trade openness, makes these economies particularly vulnerable to terms of trade, external demand shocks or natural disaster shocks. For instance, many small countries in our sample are service-based economies that export tourism services. Any weather-related disruption would lead to a significant exports drop in these economies. Adopting countercyclical expenditure rule or fiscal rule that forces these economies to save for the “rainy day” during good times will help to alleviate these vulnerabilities faced by small economies.

# **7. Conclusion**

In this paper we set out to provide a set of stylized facts about the business cycle dynamics in small economies. We assembled an annual data set covering a large set of countries (138 countries with GDP data) over the period of 1960-2014 and use it to document the volatility, persistence and cyclicality with GDP and real interest rate for the key macroeconomic aggregates. Our findings are as follows:  Volatilities of GDP, GNI, aggregate and private investment, government consumption, trade balance, and current account all significantly decrease with country size, as measured by the country population.

 Smaller countries have significantly less procyclical aggregate investment and private consumption; and significantly more countercyclical trade balance, with this correlation being largely driven by more procyclical exports. Public revenues are more procyclical in small economies, leading to a more procyclical fiscal balance. Inflation is also more procyclical in small countries.

 Correlations with real interest rate do not exhibit systematic patterns with country size. Only the correlation between terms of trade and real interest rate tends to decrease with country size.

 Current account, private investment, real interest rate and inflation exhibit a significantly lower persistence in smaller countries. The persistence of all other variables does not differ systematically across country sizes.

 These results are robust to controlling for various country characteristics, such as level of development, region of location, institutional quality, commodity exporting status, presence of fiscal rules and fixed exchange rate regime.

We also investigate whether the adoption of fiscal rules by various countries affects their business cycle moments. We find that different types of fiscal rules are associated with very different business cycle dynamics. For instance, in countries that have adopted expenditure rules, inflation volatility seems to be higher, while countries with revenue rules experience significantly lower volatility of GDP, GNI, trade balance, terms of trade and inflation. In the 42
**_15_**

Unlike these civil law countries, the English legal system is common law, where the laws were primarily formed **by** judges trying to resolve particular cases. Through colonialism it was spread to many African and Asian countries, Australia, New Zealand and North America.

There are two conditions under which the legal origin variables serve as appropriate instruments for financial development. First, they have to be exogenous to economic growth during our sample period. Second, they have to be correlated with financial intermediary development. In terms of exogeneity, the English, French and German legal systems were spread mainly through occupation and colonialism. Thus, we take the legal origin of a country as an exogenous "endowment." In terms of the links between legal origin and financial intermediary development, a growing body of evidence suggests that legal origin helps to shape financial development. LLSV **(1998)** show that the legal origin of a country materially influences its legal treatment of shareholders, the laws governing creditor rights, the efficiency of contract enforcement, and accounting standards. Shareholders' rights enjoy greater protection in common law countries than in civil law countries, whereas creditors' rights are best protected in German origin countries. French Civil Law countries are comparatively weak both in terms of shareholder and credit rights. In terms of accounting standards, French origin countries tend to have company financial statements that are comparatively less comprehensive **than** countries with different legal origins. These legal, regulatory and informational characteristics affect the operation of financial intermediaries as shown in LLSV **(1997),** Levine **(1998, 1999),** and Levine, Loayza, and Beck **(1998).**
Table A.4: Deviation from Montreal Protocol Targets after Entry into Force of RTA

|||_Dep_|_endent variab_|_le: IHS Tar_|_get Deviati_|_on_||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||CFCs|Halons|CFCs (B)|CTC|TCA|HCFCs|MB|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|PostRTA|0.472<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.141)|0.345<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.096)|0.014<br>(0.031)|0.118<br>(0.075)|0.027<br>(0.050)|_−_0.401<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.088)|0.022<br>(0.094)|
|Post_×_ODS|_−_0.528<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.290)|_−_0.458<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.159)|_−_0.258<br>(0.164)|0.103<br>(0.228)|0.025<br>(0.055)|0.126<br>(0.222)|_−_0.178<br>(0.475)|
|Post_×_ODS_×_DS|0.434<br>(0.399)|0.269<br>(0.182)|0.304<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.170)|_−_0.484<br>(0.298)|0.193<br>(0.133)|_−_0.367<br>(0.291)|0.114<br>(0.492)|
|Observations|6,118|6,118|6,118|6,118|6,118|6,118|6,118|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.562|0.579|0.409|0.485|0.661|0.645|0.566|
|Mean(ODP tons)|-821|-218|-3|-472|-19|-128|10|

FE triple-difference regressions on a stacked country-level panel with a _±_ 3 year event window around RTA entry into force. All outcomes are the inverse hyperbolic sine of the difference between ODS emissions and emissions targets under the Montreal Protocol. DS is an indicator equal to 1 if the the ODS provisions are binding with dispute settlement under the RTA. All models include country-event fixed effects. Robust standard errors are (two-way) clustered at the country-event and country-year levels. We report the mean deviation from target across the entire sample in tons of ozone depletion potential (ODP). Statistical significance from two-sided _t_ tests are denoted by _∗_ p _<_ 0.1; _∗∗_ p _<_ 0.05; _∗∗∗_ p _<_ 0.01.

v
2

# I. **INTRODUCTION**

The developing world – and some of the developed world too – is in the midst of a major push toward universal health coverage (cf. World Health Organization 2010). A key objective of these universal coverage (UC) initiatives is to narrow gaps in coverage, and hence improve population health. Such health improvements would be of value in their own right. But they could also have an economic benefit: better health may enable people to work who would otherwise be too ill to work; it may allow people to take less time off work due to sickness; and it may lead to increased labor productivity.

It is certainly plausible that health insurance expansion might yield health benefits: cost-sharing at the point of use may lead people to delay seeking care, discontinue treatment prematurely, or forgo it altogether. Any or all of these could conceivably lead to worse health outcomes. Yet two recent reviews (Levy and Meltzer 2008; Giedion and Diaz 2011) conclude that there is surprisingly little hard evidence on whether health insurance does indeed lead to better health, and if so how large the impacts are. As Levy and Meltzer (2008) remark, “many of the studies claiming to show a causal effect of health insurance on health do not do so convincingly because the observed correlation between insurance and good health may be driven by other, unobservable factors.” People with adverse unobservables may deliberately seek out insurance coverage, or local government officials administering public insurance may successfully target those with adverse unobservables.

Random assignment of insurance would, of course, eliminate a concern over selection bias. However, randomized control trials (RCTs) of insurance are few and far
factors into account, the household jointly decides how much of their income to allocate to the human capital development of child _i_ versus household consumption.

This decision is further complicated by imperfect credit markets as the presence of credit rationing restricts the budget set of the household and, if binding, will generate an inefficiently low level of investment in human capital. Without access to credit, if a household receives a negative income shock, household income for that period falls, reducing the household’s budget for consumption and investments – including schooling. This effect is particularly pronounced for low-income households who face more limited liquidity due to lower access to credit markets. The key trade-off is hence between schooling—which is assumed to increase consumption tomorrow—and youth production—which increases consumption today.

Aggregate shocks have both income and substitution effects on households. The income effect originates from changes in the resources available to the household for investment in human capital and consumption. On the other hand, the substitution effect arises from changes in the wage rates (for both children and adults), thus affecting the opportunity cost of time going to school (see Ferreira and Shady 2009). Idiosyncratic shocks should induce only an income effect on households, as these should not affect the wage rates of the local labor market. This paper focuses on the role of the income effect in the response of households to idiosyncratic shocks, controlling for macroeconomic aggregate shocks.

# **3. TRENDS IN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT**

This section describes recent trends in upper secondary and tertiary education in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.<sup>7</sup> Educational attainment in Brazil and Mexico has increased markedly in recent decades while Argentina’s continues to be high by regional standards. Even so, upper secondary graduation rates in Mexico (49%), Argentina (65%) and Brazil (63%) lag behind those of OECD countries (85%).<sup>8</sup> These graduation rates represent a 10-year increase in completion rates of individuals ages 20-29 of 18 percentage points in Brazil and 13 percentage points in Mexico.

Secondary enrollment rates in Argentina and Brazil are higher than in Mexico, while Argentina has the highest tertiary enrollment rates (Table 1). In Mexico, a significant age of dropout is 1415, when students transition from lower secondary to upper secondary school ( _secundaria_ to _bachillerato_ ). This transition point is largely missed in our sample, which begins at age 15. Importantly, for the three countries, the most crucial year for exiting education is between 17 and

> 7 A more detailed description of the education system in each country is relegated to Appendix 3.

> 8 Estimates for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are own estimates from the SEDLAC database (CEDLAS and World Bank). The OECD average is from OECD/CAF/ECLAC (2016).

6
been similar to other major primary agricultural commodities as reflected by the World Bank’s index of agricultural prices. The decline has been caused by a number of factors such as improved sugar cane yields and higher production, greater factory efficiency, and overproduction of sugar in highly protected markets. Slower demand growth, due to declining income elasticities and slower population growth rates, have also contributed to the price declines. World sugar prices have historically been characterized by periodic sharp increases followed by long periods of low or declining prices. This price volatility pattern has been caused, in large part, by policies in both developed and developing countries that isolated consumers and producers from international prices and diminished their price responsiveness. However, this has been changing somewhat as some developing countries have reformed their policies during the past two decades and their share of global consumption and imports has increased due to rapid population and income growth. This has led to greater price responsiveness by sugar producers and consumers, and likely reduces the severity of future price spikes. The collapse of the former Soviet Union also led to the abandonment of dedicated sugar imports from Cuba and increased trade at world market prices. Many developed countries still maintain highly protected sugar industries and thus contribute to the likelihood of price spikes, but they now account for only one-third of consumption and one-half of imports compared to slightly more than half of consumption and 60 percent of imports when the last sugar price spike occurred in 1980.

**Figure 7. Real World Sugar Prices, 1950-2003**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000<br>Source: World Bank<br>US Cents/lb in Constant 2003 $s vs. MUV<br><!-- End of picture text --> About 80 percent of world sugar production and 60 percent of world sugar trade occurs at subsidized or protected prices. Only three major producers (Australia, Brazil, and Cuba) have sugar industries that produce and trade at world market price levels according to Borrell and Pearce (1999). These three producers account for a combined 20 percent of world production and 40 percent of world trade. The EU, Japan and the United States account for 20 percent of world production and have average producer prices which are more than double the world market. China and India account for another 20 20
19~~~~~~~~~.

s an example consit ( i ht **'y'r** 1975, the total outstanding and disbursed, public and publiclv guaranlneed medium an)d long term debt of Bolivia to its financial creditors was _211_ U.S. $ mill. The average spread Bolivia paid during 1968-1J81 was 1.90 percentage points. The parameter estimate associd,ed for defaults of the .930s is near .11. suggesting that Bolivia would have paid 1.70 percentage points on avf.rage had it not incurred this penaltv. The interest pavments on the loans considered here was 10 U.S $ mill. (spreads are form the Eurocurrency syndicated loans described in the data section of tthis piper, and all the remaining data are from the World Bank Debt Tables (1988-89 edition). Hence the **ratio** of renalty to interest payment for Bolivia was .042. **Similar calculations for** Peru and Chile in 1975 yield 017 and .024 respectively.

> 2 0Ozler(1989) demonstrates that the impact of **non-payment difficulties** on the market value of commercial banks differed when the expansion and crisis stages of the recent episode of bank lending **are compared.**