rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
allowing users to deposit and withdraw cash from an account that is accessible by mobile handset. Users can store value in the account and transfer value between users via text messages, menu commands, and personal identification numbers (Aker and Mbiti, 2010). M- transfer arrangements therefore enable users to make payments and transfer funds at relatively low cost across much wider geographic areas than is possible using localized informal payment solutions. More recently, the use of mobile money systems has been expanded to access other non-payment and deposit financial services, including credit and insurance.<sup>16</sup> As already discussed above, Africa is the continent where the adoption of mobile money accounts has had its biggest impact in terms of improving financial inclusion. By the end of 2021, there were more than 1.35 billion registered mobile money accounts globally, with nearly half of all accounts registered in Sub-Saharan Africa (GSMA 2022). By now, most countries in Africa have mobile money systems in place, although there is large variation in penetration across countries. For example, Kenya’s adoption rate is 67%, while Nigeria’s is only 9% (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2022). Among the success factors, the literature has focused on a trusted mobile telephony business and reliable mobile phone network, a good relationship with regulators and an extensive agent network (see Lal and Sachdev, 2015, among others). Mobile banking spread quickly in Kenya thanks, in part, to the fact that the operator of M-Pesa (M is for mobile, “pesa” is Swahili for “money”), Safaricom, controlled two-thirds of the telecoms market in Kenya. By 2023, there were over 140,000 agents serving both M-PESA and other mobile money providers (Suri et al., 2023).

> 16 For a recent literature survey, see Suri et al. (2023).

32
the findings of PE studies for the implementation of projects and policy dialogue in Zambia. Section 5 addresses the remaining challenges and identifies the way going forward.

# **2. Why is it useful to carry out PE studies?**

For several years now, the World Bank and other cooperating partners (CPs) like UK-DFID, OECD-DAC, EU, and the UN have been concerned about better understanding the political context and process in developing countries and the role of the overall environment in building capacity. For example, over the past ten years, UK-DFID has funded four research programs<sup>4</sup> on governance, which have generated extensive research findings on a range of governance issues. The key message highlighted by this research is that politics is central to shaping development outcomes and building effective states, i.e. legitimate, capable, accountable and responsive states (DFID, 2010).

In low-income countries, the failure to catch up with developed economies have been linked to concerns about the political and institutional foundations on which societies are built and on the economic policy choices that emerge. In the African context, institutional failures have been linked to traditions that embed such failures in systems of personal and group rule (Adam and Dercon, 2010). The heavy use of patronage and the emasculation of competing centers of political power appear as “rational” strategies for African leaders, especially in the context of weak political legitimacy and tenuous bureaucratic control (Bates, 1981, 1986; Sandbrook, 1985).

Therefore, a better understanding of the political economy context of reforms has been recognized as crucial for supporting the design and implementation of more effective and feasible policies and strategies, as this results in more realistic expectations of what can be achieved, over what time period, and sheds light on the risks involved given the prevailing interests of different groups in the society. Moreover, CPs increasingly recognize that successful development requires reforms to improve overall governance (both political systems and public institutions) in order to fight corruption and deliver more effective policies and services (DFID, 2001). Institutional reforms, in particular those needed to combat corruption, often generate considerable political opposition as they reduce opportunities for vested interests to benefit financially (Campos and Syquia, 2006). These vested interests of groups involved in the policy reform process are likely to influence the pace and direction of

> 4 The Centre for Future States and the Citizenship, Accountability and Participation Programmes (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex); the Crisis States Research Centre (London School of Economics); and the Centre for Research on Inequality and Ethnicity (CRISE, Oxford University).

4
_Low-Income Countries’ Access to Private Debt Markets_ Nigeria issued bonds in 2007 even though the Nigerian government has not yet accessed the international bond market. In fact, corporate issues preceded sovereign issues in almost one-third of the developing countries that gained access to the international bond market since 1990.<sup>9</sup> However, some of the first-time corporate issues entailed relatively small amounts for project financing, backed by collateral and/or guarantees.

Most developing countries that have accessed private debt markets have done so on an infrequent basis (Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris 2004). Only 2 of 48 low-income countries (Ghana and Vietnam) accessed syndicated bank loans in each of past 18 years, while 12 countries did not receive any (table 3). Most low-income countries (41 of 48) did not access the international bond market over the period 19902007, compared to 6 of 35 upper-middle-income countries.

Most low-income countries heavily depend on official sources to meet their financing needs. Net ODA disbursements exceeded ten percent of GDP in 25 countries on average over the period 2003-07, all but four of which were low-income countries. Net ODA disbursements exceeded private debt and equity flows over the same period in 27 of 39 low-income countries for which data are available, compared to just 9 of 65 middle-income countries.

# **3. Underlying Determinants**

The stylized facts outlined above indicate that governments and corporations in large middle-income countries receive the bulk of private debt flows. Most low-income countries depend on official creditors to meet most of their external financing needs. This reflects several supply and demand factors.<sup>10</sup> On the demand side, governments and corporations take into account the costs and benefits of borrowing from external versus domestic sources. Countries with ample domestic savings and welldeveloped domestic capital markets provide more scope for domestic borrowing. Although domestic capital markets tend to be less developed in countries with lower income levels, there is a high degree of variation across countries. This is illustrated by Figures 10 and 11 which show that conventional measures of financial sector development―monetary and credit aggregates as share of GDP―vary substantially across income levels. Moreover, monetary and credit aggregates are statistically insignificant when added to the regressions of the form reported in Table 2, implying that conventional measures of financial sector development cannot explain the cross-country variation in private capital flows.

> 9 This calculation is based on the Dealogic Loan Analytics database which begins in 1980. “First-time” bond issuance is defined as a situation where a government or corporation issues a bond in the international market after 1989 in a country that had no external bond issues during the 1980s.

> 10 For a more detailed discussion and empirical analysis of the various supply and demand factors, see Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996), Mody and others (2001) and Hale and Arteta (2007).

13
income for the following reasons: (i) distribution of non-farm income is more unequal than that of farm income; (ii) richer households have higher chances to participate in migration and local non-farm activities; and (iii) households with higher income are characterized by a higher participation rate in non-farm activities and a higher share of non-farm income in total income.<sup>2</sup> Using data from a survey of rural households in _Hubei_ province, we examine impacts of ruralto-urban migration on rural poverty and inequality. Taking into account of household nonobservable characteristics, we consider remittances as a “potential substitute” for household earnings, and simulate the counterfactual of how rural household incomes, rural poverty and rural inequality would have been in the absence of migration for rural households. Our results show that: (i) migration is selective across households, the best farmers remained in local agricultural production; (ii) remittance largely increases rural household income and reduces poverty; (iii) remittance also reduces rural inequality as it disproportionately benefits the poorest households.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 studies economic reforms and rural labor mobility in China from a historical perspective. Section 3 reviews the literature on migration and income distribution. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 specifies the participation and income equations. Section 7 presents the results, and section 8 concludes.

# **2 Economic reforms and rural labor mobility**

Economic autarky and traditional agriculture have characterized the Chinese countryside for a long time. Following the model of the former USSR, China gave priority to the development of heavy industry at an early stage of industrialization. Farmers were heavily taxed; a large amount of agricultural surplus was transferred to industrial investments. The real income of farmers was hence artificially lowered due to the socialist price system, which over-priced manufactured products to raise profitability in industry while squeezed agriculture through the “price scissors” (Naughton, 1999).<sup>3</sup> Before the reforms, in order to stabilize agricultural production, farmers were

> 2 See, for example, Bhalla (1990), Hussain et al. (1994), Knight and Song (1993), Liu (2006), Wan (2004), Wan and Zhou (2005), Yao (1999) and Zhu (1991).

> 3 See also Carr and Davies (1971).

4
measured by per capita GDP.<sup>17</sup> To what extent we pick up development related effects related to bilateral trade with the Park and Ginarte index remains open to discussion.

For high technology trade in Tables 4 and 5 the evolving pattern is different. For both exports and imports, the Park and Ginarte index has a significantly negative impact on the probability that countries trade with each other. The impact of IPRs on positive trade flows, in turn, is slightly negative but not statistically significant. This result is somewhat surprising. If IPRs influence trade flows, we would expect this influence to be most visible for trade in knowledge-intensive goods. Several explanations can be brought forward. First, strong market power effects in the case of high technology goods may offset positive market expansion effects caused by stronger IPRs regimes. Second, stronger IPRs regimes may cause high technology firms to serve foreign markets by FDI, in-part substituting for trade flows. Third, it may be that the Park and Ginarte index does not correctly capture the IPRs effect (see below for a discussion) or that development related effects interplay with stronger IPRs protection. Fourth, our high technology aggregate may include many knowledge-intensive goods which are insensitive to the destination country's IPRs regime; for these goods other than legal means may be more important in appropriating investment in R&D (e.g., first mover advantage or rapid movement down the learning curve). Finally, we omitted important explanatory variables in our gravity equation such as tariff and non-tariff trade barriers; this type of specification error may bias our estimated results.

# **V. Comparisons to related studies**

There are several related studies which also try to estimate the effects of intellectual property rights on bilateral trade flows. 1<sup>8</sup> Maskus and Konan (1994) also use a gravity model to estimate the effect of IPRs protection on bilateral trade. They regress the index developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) along with several other development-related variables on the residual of the gravity flow estimation. This approach, however, produces only valid estimates if these variables were uncorrelated with the independent variables of the gravity estimation. This is clearly not the case as both GDP and population '7 In our data, the Personian correlation coefficient between GNP per capita and the Park and Ginarte index lies around 65%.

" In addition to the studies survey in this section, Primo Braga and Fink (1997) and Ferrantino (1993) also provide econometric evidence regarding the IPRs-trade link.

9
Several studies focused on the influence of migration on specific issues, such as fertility choice. Beine et al. (2013) found that <mark>a 1 percent change in the fertility norm to which migrants are exposed changes home country fertility by about 0.3 percent, an effect that was positive and significant.</mark> For Egypt, Bertoli and Marchetta (2013) showed that return migration from the Middle Eastern countries had a positive and significant impact on pregnancy and childbearing. Finally, Diabate and Mespe-Somps (2019) showed a negative and significant impact of return migration from <mark>Côte d’Ivoire to Mali on female genital mutilation, which suggests a positive cultural influence.</mark> In contrast to the strands of literature summarized above, only a few studies have examined the impact of return migration on changes in gender norms in the migrant countries of origin. For Morocco, deHaas and Fokkema (2010) <mark>highlighted the role of intra-household power inequalities and conflicts in migration decision-making, as well as the effects of migration decisions for intra-household power relations.</mark> For Afghanistan, <mark>socioeconomic differences that existed before migration are reinforced by the migration experience, which results in strongly differentiated patterns of multidimensional embeddedness and transnational mobility (V</mark> an Houte et al. 2015). For Pakistan, Khalid (2011) found that <mark>returning migrant men and women either take on new patterns of behavior or maintain the traditional ones regarding gender norms only when these are congruent with financial concerns of the family or can be integrated into living conditions upon return.</mark> <mark>To our knowledge, only two studies considered the impact of migration experience on gendered norms. For Egypt, Samari (2021) examined h</mark> ow gender norms and household gender dynamics were modified as a result of male return migration from other Arab countries using data from the 2006 and 2012 Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. The study estimated treatment effects for 7,314 married couples in 2006 and 8,992 married couples in 2012, using regression models of gender norms and household decisionmaking and return migration. Egyptian women with spouses who migrated to an Arab country and returned, valued more traditional gender norms. Women in households with a spouse who returned also made fewer household decisions compared to women in non-migrant households. Women with spouses who had migrated multiple times also made fewer household decisions compared to women who had a spouse 9
Figure 2 illustrates how the age-specific average full-time male earnings of the LIFEMOD cohort compare with those of the actual 1985 cross-section drawn from the New Earnings Survey. The age-earnings profiles are very similar, although earnings at older ages in the LIFEMOD cross-section are consistently above those in the NES. This reflects the higher educational achievement of the LIFEMOD population compared with the actual UK working population in 1985. Both sets of earnings data show a decline from age 50, and so exhibit the hump-shaped pattern typical of :rosssection age-earnings profiles. Note that both these profiles refer to males in full-time employment. Figure 3 shows that average male earnings are consistently below fulltime earnings.

**Figure 3**

<!-- Start of picture text --> LIFEMIOD earnings<br>for males wIth any employment and with 52 weeks employment In any year<br>,5<br>10<br>C)<br>16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45--i9 50-54 55- 59 60-B4<br>W ales with any employment per year<br>Mmales with 52 weeks of employment per- year-<br><!-- End of picture text --> 13
# Can Preshipment Inspection Offset Noncompetitive Pricing of Developing Countries' Imports? The Evidence from Madagascar

by **Alexander** J. **Yeats**

# Table of Contents

|I.|Introduction||
|---|---|---|
|II.|Scope and Methodology of**the**Study|4|
|III.|<br>The Industry Pattern of Relative Prices|14|
|IV.|Summary and Conclusions|19|
|Refer|ences|22|
|Appen|dix 1: Analysis of Madagascar's Relative Import Prices<br>and Expenditure<br>--<br>Effects for Five-Digit SITC Iron<br>and Steel Products, 1979-82 and 1984-88|24|
|Appen|dix 2:<br>High and Low Tariff Products for Tests of False<br>Invoicing by Industrial Country Exporters and Countries<br>Covered by Madagascar's PSI Program|29|
The sample looks similar across the three groups and we cannot reject the joint orthogonality of baseline characteristics when comparing the treatment group to the spillover group, the treatment group to the pure control, or the spillover group to the pure control. The average woman in our sample is 36 years old, has 9 years of schooling, and has been running her firm for just over 6 years. Two-thirds of the women are currently married. The modal firm has no employees (only 20 percent have one or more employees). The mean firm earns 1,100 KSH (US$13) per week in profits on sales of 5,500 KSH (US$65), and has capital stock of 31,000 KSH (US$370).<sup>5</sup> Onequarter have ever received financing from a bank or microfinance organization and 45 percent are registered at the local level. Only 35 percent of firms keep business records at baseline, and on average firms are using just over half of the 26 business practices in the McKenzie and Woodruff (2015) index. This suggests scope for improvement from business training.

# **3. The Training and Mentoring Interventions**

# **3.1 The Get-Ahead Program**

The training provided is the ILO’s Gender and Entrepreneurship Together – _Get-Ahead_ for Women in Enterprise program. This program “differs from conventional business training materials by highlighting essential entrepreneurial skills from a gender perspective... It addresses the practical and strategic needs of low-income women in enterprise by strengthening their basic business and people management skills. It shows women how to develop their personal entrepreneurial traits and obtain support through groups, networks and institutions dealing with enterprise development” (Bauer et al., 2004). The program began in Thailand in 2001, and has now been used in at least 21 countries, serving approximately 400,000 women.

The program has four key modules, with the following themes:

- Module 1: Basics on Gender and Entrepreneurship. The module introduces _Get-Ahead_ and delivers basic concepts on the promotion of gender equality between men and women and the life cycle of people and enterprises.

- Module 2: The Business Woman and Her Environment. The module focuses on raising awareness among women about their strengths and weaknesses as well as current or future working environment and its effect on the business.

> 5 The exchange rate was approximately 1 US$=84 KSH in 2013 at the time of baseline.

6
students (Lucas and Mbiti 2012). South Africa’s experience was less successful, however, likely due to a context characterized by high enrollment rates and relatively low school fees (Borkum 2009).

In Haiti, over 90% of primary schools were non-public in the early 2000s, and the vast majority of these schools charged tuition. Coupled with the cost of mandatory uniforms, books, and other inputs, the direct costs of schooling were prohibitively high for many families. Estimates showed that average tuition in non-public schools was about $80 per child per year in 2004, with the total average costs (direct and indirect, including uniforms, transportation, and feeding) of sending a child to school at about $131/child per year (Merisier 2004; UNICEF 2006, as quoted in World Bank 2007). At a time when GNI per capita was estimated to be about $400, non-public education was essentially unaffordable. In addition, financial constraints were also believed to be a leading cause of the problem of overage students in school, as parents may have had to cycle children in and out of school, depending on their cash flow. The average age of students in grade 6, for instance, was 16 years old according to the 2003 school census, when the corresponding age for that grade should be 11 or 12 years old.

Given the importance of schooling costs as a barrier to access and the large role of the nonpublic sector, a demand-side response in the form of a program to abolish school tuition fees was initiated in 2007. This paper estimates the impact of this program on school enrollments, student-teacher ratios, grade advancement, and other indicators at the school level. We believe that the results of this evaluation are of interest beyond Haiti, as key features of the Haitian system – low state capacity and weak public delivery of education services – are common to many low-income countries, while the rapid growth of non-public schools in many of these countries makes the Haitian case, with a large and vibrant non-public sector, increasingly relevant. Section 2 of this paper describes the Haitian context and the program itself; Section 3 describes the program randomization, data and estimation method, and results; and Section 4 concludes.

# **2. AN APPROACH TO INCREASING ACCESS: TUITION WAIVERS**

3