rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Appendix A. Picking indicators**

Developing indices has become a growth industry. The review by the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell and others (2009)) listed 82 sources, most with multiple subindicators. The indexes are collected for different purposes and they measure different things. The indicators are quantitative, qualitative, objective, subjective, descriptive and abstract.

To narrow the set of indicators, we used the following criteria:

- The indicator had to be comprehensive in the number of countries included.

- The indicator had to use comparable data across countries to insure comparability.

- The indicator had to have been used consistently over a long time period to insure comparability across years.

- The indicator had to relate to measures of individual freedom, whether in the economic, political or social realm. The best measures related to whether there were constraints placed on individual choice that could force the individual to make suboptimal choices of where to live, where to work, whether to open a business, whom to associate with, what to produce or what to buy.

- We had to be able to understand the description of the indicator sufficiently to know what it measures and to replicate the measure if necessary. This became particularly important when there was a need to interpolate or extrapolate beyond the available data.

Our selection was greatly aided by the data compilation made available by the Quality of Government Institute. Our included measures were: Economic Freedom: The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom is available from 1994-2006. We used the closest value to the year. The Index is the average of 9 subindexes, each of which varies between 0 (least free) to 100 (most free):

- Business Freedom: Rises with the ease of starting or closing a business;

- Trade Freedom: Rises as the levels of tariff and nontariff barriers are reduced;

- Fiscal Freedom: Increases as marginal tax rates on personal and corporate income and total taxes as a fraction of GDP fall;

- Freedom from Government: Rises as the importance of state-owned enterprises and government expenditure as a share of GDP are reduced;

- Monetary Freedom: Rises as inflation rates fall and as the imposition of price controls are reduced;

- Investment Freedom: Rises with quality of investment climate for both foreign and domestic investors;

- Financial Freedom: Rises as regulations on banking and other financial institutions are eased;

- Property Rights: Rises with legislation and enforcement that protect individual property;

- Freedom from Corruption: Rises with the country’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.

28
<!-- Start of picture text --> x 0.4 @ Coef.<br>& 03 = +1.64*S.E.<br>= 0.2 — -1.64*S.E.<br>8<br>zgS01 (3 £<br>6 -0.1<br>a<br>-0.2<br>PLSESES> & eX3 SiCESS x<br>eSFFGLK VF OKSF<br>KS “ RSJS<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2 0.25 m Coef.<br>S 979 = +1.64*S.E.<br>oo =-1.64*S.E,<br>E38 0.15<br>=:8 0.10<br>SE<br>@ 5 0.05<br>¢°<br>gvo 900<br>Ss FF SF SF <<br>eSCS: SF; a SF‘ SFer: SS¥ 4<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Figure 3: No Global Growth Convergence in Agriculture**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>Divergence in agricultural productivity?<br>1990-2010<br>1.5<br>China<br>1<br>Brazil<br>Thailand<br>Malaysia<br>0.5 Ethiopia<br>India<br>Tanzania<br>0<br>-0.5<br>-1<br>-1.5<br>4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13<br>ln(agricultural VA per worker), early 1990s<br>change in ln(agricultural VA per worker), early 1990s to late 2000s<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Development Indicators. Ethiopia data from Martins (2014). Labor productivity calculated by the ratio of total sector value-adde in sector. Underlying accounts are in 2005 constant international USD. Values taken from earliest year available from 1990-1993 and latest year Overall conclusions do not change if line is quadratic or cubic in ln(initial VA per worker).

<mark>Africa has about 60% of the world’s uncultivated cropland. The sector has the potential to become a major part of the global agricultural value chain through continued expansion of commercial farming onto uncultivated land, shifting some production from grain crops to highervalue crops such as horticulture and biofuels, and by improving the productivity and yields of smallholder finance. However, yields per hectare have been stagnating in much of Africa (Stiglitz, 2013).</mark> 8
increase in the fraction of informal business owners only in Azteca municipalities after Banco Azteca opened, while there were no differences in the two trends before Azteca opening.

Thus, our first set of results suggests that the opening of a new bank geared towards low income individuals has benefitted informal entrepreneurs. This is perhaps not surprising, as Banco Azteca targeted exactly this segment of the population (see Appendix).

When we split our sample by gender, we find that only men are more likely to work as informal business owners after Banco Azteca opened. The results for women are not statistically significant, while the results for men are strongly significant (Table 2 Panels B and C)<sup>16</sup> . Before Banco Azteca opened, 67.32 percent of informal business owners were men, and 12.63 percent of men owned an informal business. After Banco Azteca openend, the fraction of men owning an informal business increased by about 0.01, or 8 percent.

Next, we exploit the panel structure of the ENE data to split up the impact of Banco Azteca opening by the four different possible pre-event occupations: informal business owner, formal business owner, wage-earner and not employed (which includes the unemployed and those out of labor force). In other words, we study how the transition between these 4 categories changed due to Banco Azteca opening. Column 1 of Table 3 reports our results for the informal business owner dummy as the outcome variable. To save space, only coefficients on the interaction term Azteca* Post Dec 2002 are reported, along with their standard errors. The regressions include individual control variables and municipality specific time trends.

Column 1 shows that the increase in informal business is due to the fact that those that had an informal business before Azteca opened are more likely to continue operating an informal business after Azteca opened. Moreover, the other coefficients in Row 1 show that pre-event informal business owners were less likely to be not employed or wage-earners after Banco Azteca opened. This suggests that the increased availability of financial services helped existing informal business to continue their operations, rather than closing the business and transitioning into wage-earner or not employed status.

> 16 In our sample, 34% of all informal business owners are women, while 28% of all formal business owners are women.

13
|**_Table 7d. Co_**|**_ntribution_**|**_rates ne_**|**_eded to_**|**_genera_**|**_te a rer_**|**_placem_**|**_nent_**<br>**_rate _**|**_o700/_**|**_o of aver_**|**_age ma_**|**_l adult_**|**_earnin_**|**_gs_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**I**||dY|= 0%||dY =|1%||dY=|1.5%||dY =|2%|
|Contribution||||25|18|21|25|18|21|25|18|21|25|
|||IDeath__<br>_|||I|||||||_-_|-|-|
|Real i = 2%||||||||||||||
|Retire at 55|80|31|33|38|37|39|43|40|42||43|45|*|
||81|32|34|39|38|40|45|41|43|*|44|*|*|
|____________|83|34|36|*|40|42||43|_|_<br>|_<br>=|_||
|____________|85|35|38|*|42|45|*|*|*|*|*|*|*|
|**Retireat**60|8C|22|23|26|27|28|31|29|31|33|32|33|36|
||81|23|24|27|28|29|32|30|32|34|33|34|37|
||83|24|26|29|29|31|34|32|34|37|35|37|40|
||85|26|27|30|31|33|36|34|36|39|38|39|42|
|Retire at 65|80|15|16|17|19|20|21|21|22|23|23|24|26|
||81|16|17|18|20|21|22|22|23|24|24|25|27|
||83|17|18|20|21|22|24|24|25|27|26|27|29|
||85|18|20|22|23|24|26|26|27|29|29|30|32|
|Retire at 70|80|9|10|11|12|13|14|14|14|15|15|16|17|
||81|10|11|12|13|14|15|15|15|16|16|17|18|
||83|11|12|13|15|15|17|17|17|19|19|19|21|
|||**1**85<br>3|14|15|17|17|19|19|19|21|21|22|23|
|Reali<br>=3%||||||||||||||
|Retire at 55|80|24|26|29|28|30|34|31|33|37|33|35|39|
||81|24|26|30|29|31|35|31|33|37|34|36|40|
||83|25|27<br>|31<br>|30|32|36|33|35|39|36|38|42|
||85|26|28|T<br>33|31<br>|134|38|134|36|141|37|139|44|
|Retireat60|80|16|18|20|20(|21|24|22|23|26|24|26|28|
||81|17|18|21|21|22|25|23|24|27|25|27|29|
||83|18|1J9|22|22|23|26|24<br>|T2n|28|27|28|31|
||85|1 19|20|23|23<br>|1 25|27<br>|1 26|27|1 30|28|301|32|
|Retireat65|80|11|12|13|14|15|16|16|16|18|17|18|20|
||81|12|12|14|15|16|17|16|17|19|18|19|21|
||83|13|13|15|16|17|19|18|11|20|20|21|23|
||185|13|14|16|17|18|20|IQ1|20|22|21|22|24|
|Retire at 70|80|7|7|8|9|9|10|10|10||2|12|12|13|
||81|7|8|9|10|10|11|11|12|12|12|13|14|
||83|8|9|10|11|11|13|12|1|14|14|15|16|
||85|Q9|10|I11|1I2__|13|14|14|14|16|16|1|17|

38
24 years of Coocafé’s activity , cross-referenced data for seven harvests from 1993-2000 confirm that an average, in volume, of 50% of Coocafé’s coffee was exported to Fairtrade markets. These figures are higher in value terms. In 1997-98, for example, Fairtrade exports amounted to some 67% of their green coffee export revenue.

**Table 2 Proportions of Coocafé Exports to Fairtrade and Conventional Markets**

|HarvestYear|Fairtrade|Conventional|
|---|---|---|
|1993-94|55%|45%|
|1994/95|57%|43%|
|1995/96|52%|48%|
|1996/97|48%|52%|
|1997/98|49%|51%|
|1998/99|58%|42%|
|1999/2000|29%|71%|

_Source: Coocafé, author’s own work_ The difference between the Fairtrade and world price earned on a portion of the cooperatives’ combined harvest is divided equitably among the nine cooperatives: Half of the coffee destined for Fairtrade markets is divided into nine identical ‘solidarity quotas’. In addition to their solidarity quota, the remaining half of the volume exported to the Fairtrade market is distributed to the cooperatives in ratios based on their average volume of production of the last three harvests. Exactly 30% of Fairtrade premiums go to a capitalization fund from which the cooperatives can borrow, and the remaining 70% goes to the Producers’ Fund. Over the ten years of operation between 1989 and 1999, the producer’s fund has distributed over US$1.25 million of Fairtrade green coffee export revenues to some 4 000 affiliated small coffee producers and their families (Ronchi 2002a).

As with all Fairtrade interventions, the impact of Fairtrade on Coocafé and its nine cooperatives can be divided between the price effect (of Fairtrade premiums) and the impact due to its capacity building activities and producer support (Ronchi 2002a; Ronchi 2002b). Perhaps the most important impact of non-price Fairtrade producer support is the development and establishment of Coocafé’s own export arm. It was seen that commodity policy is increasingly concerned with facilitating more direct trading relations for coffee producers. Exporting to the conventional market, however, requires consistency in quality, efficiency, market access and professional trading capacity within a producer organization. Through extensive training and capacity support with the UK-based Fairtrade NGO, Twin, Coocafé achieved independence in 1997 from the Costa Rican exporters it had hitherto relied upon.

# **VI. The Model**

Fairtrade intervention in commodity markets takes the form of capacity-building for producer cooperatives and ‘fair price’ contracts for the commodity. From an information theoretic approach to development, successful intervention must be targeted to specific market failures. At the microeconomic level, the Fairtrade movement claims that factors such as market power and weakness or inefficiency in producer organizations contribute to low producer prices and poverty. This section outlines the model that will be used to test for the presence of the market factors used to justify Fairtrade intervention in the Costa Rican coffee market. The model provides three testable hypotheses that are then econometrically tested in the following section.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4301

# **Abstract**

The decade following India’s accession to the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ushered in numerous changes to the country’s patent system, culminating in a series of amendments in 2005. But a functioning patent system is more than a statute. This paper discusses the steps that India must still take to develop an effective, functioning patent system capable of attracting foreign direct investment, motivating domestic innovation and education, and filtering its benefits to all elements of Indian society, including the poor and the possessors of traditional knowledge. The analysis combines data studies of historical and recent patenting activity in India and by Indians, interviews with Indian government officials, intellectual property attorneys, industrialists, and researchers, and lessons gleaned from patent systems abroad. It identifies critical needs and concrete steps to meet them. Improving public awareness of the revenuegenerating potential of patents will enhance incentives for the participation of individuals and small and medium enterprises in the patent system. Formalizing guidelines for patents derived through government research funds—coupled with needed changes in institutional governance—will enhance prospects for technology transfer from laboratories to commercial markets. Compensation schemes for traditional knowledge will extend the benefits of intellectual property rights to the poorest members of society. This paper’s recommendations would help India achieve both a fully functioning patent system and a mechanism for ensuring that poor people living traditional lifestyles receive their share of the social gains that a working innovation system can confer..

This paper—a product of the Finance and PSD Division, South Asia PREM Finance and PSD Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to better understand and help support innovation and competitiveness in India. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Mark Dutz, room MC 10-145, telephone 202-473 4291, fax 202-522 1145, email address mdutz@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bdabramson@ gmail.com. August 2007. (104 pages) _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Table 1B. Food Dependency Ratios, Import, and Consumption Shares for 2010 (cont’d.)**

|Country /<br>Food Item|Net I<br>a Sha<br>Cons|mports as<br>re of<br>umption|Commodity<br>Import<br>Shares|Commodity<br>Consumption<br>Shares|Country /<br>Food Item|Net Imports<br>As a Share of<br>Consumption|Commodity<br>Import<br>Shares|Commodity<br>Consumption<br>Shares|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Oil Exporter|s||||GCC||||
|Grains||44%|46%|51%|Grains|89%|28%|30%|
|Oils||72%|18%|12%|Oils|91%|14%|14%|
|Meat||30%|15%|31%|Meat|69%|34%|49%|
|Sugar||87%|21%|12%|Sugar|132%|25%|10%|
|Food||49%|100%|100%|Food|83%|100%|100%|
|MENA|||||Oil Importer|s|||
|Grains||48%|44%|51%|Grains|46%|53%|59%|
|Oils||69%|19%|15%|Oils|60%|24%|16%|
|Meat||42%|18%|29%|Meat|38%|10%|20%|
|Sugar||78%|19%|12%|Sugar|53%|13%|12%|
|Food||53%|100%|100%|Food|48%|100%|100%|

_<mark>Source</mark>_ <mark>: Calculations using USDA data collected by C</mark> ristina Savescu. Note: „Oil exporters‟ denotes the developing oil exporters.

The impact on the import bill of these price increases in the MENA region is estimated at 0.6 percent of GDP, and 1.4 percent of international reserves, with grains making the largest contribution, followed by edible oils, sugar, and meat (Table 2). Oil importers are hardest hit by the increase in food prices. The increase in the import bill is estimated to be 1.2 percent of GDP, with half of the increase attributed to the impact of higher grain prices. This is consistent with the high share of grains in the import basket (Table 1B).

The expected increase in the import bill of the developing oil exporters as a result of higher food prices is estimated at 0.8 percent of GDP and 2.3 percent of international reserves. Increases in prices of edible oils and sugar account for more than half of the increase in the import bill. Dependency on imported edible oils and sugar is high; therefore, despite smaller shares in the import basket, these two groups have a large effect on the import bill.

The GCC countries are expected to be least impacted by the higher food prices at the macro level as they have small populations and high per capita incomes. The overall impact on the GCC is estimated to be 0.3 percent of GDP and 0.5 percent of international reserves, with the largest shock coming from the increase in sugar prices, reflecting a surge in prices of sugar and high sugar import dependency (Table 1B). In these countries, sugar is used not only for domestic consumption, but also as intermediate input into processed food exports.

-10-
residents must travel to reach a bank branch. Poor infrastructure and telecommunications, and heavy branch regulation, also restrict the geographical expansion of bank branches (CGAP, 2009).<sup>5</sup> Indeed financial inclusion is positively and significantly correlated with access points measured as commercial bank branches per 100,000 people (Figure 4). Sub-Saharan Africa economies are at the low end of the spectrum with low number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and low account penetration.

**Figure 4: Financial Use vs. Access Points**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>ROW<br>40%<br>SSA<br>30%<br>NA<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Number Of Commercial Bank Branches Per 100,000 Adults<br>Account Penetration<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012 and IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS). _Note_ : 2009 values from FAS are used as more economies are covered. Data excludes Mauritius.

# **_3.3 How and Why Are Formal Accounts Used?_**

The majority of adults with a formal account in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa make deposits or withdrawals only one to two times in a typical month. However, in North Africa 36% (29%) of adults report they do not deposit (withdraw) any money into (from) their accounts in a typical month. Automated Teller Machines (ATM’s) are the main mode of withdrawal for the majority of account holders in Eastern and Southern Africa (even excluding South Africa), while account holders in Western and Central Africa are more likely to make withdrawals over the counter at their financial institution. Across the region, 16% of adults (and 64% of account holders) have a debit card.

> 5 Data is available at: fas.imf.org.

8
due to actual differences of labor markets, living conditions, or culture, or to differences in studies, including divergence in skills measures (e.g. list of skills, validity) or surveyed populations (e.g. age group, national population or urban settings).

In broad terms, both cognitive and socioemotional skills matter for labor-market outcomes in Colombia, especially cognitive ones, and socioemotional skills have diverse effects, which align with studies on highincome countries. Longitudinal studies on nine high-income OECD countries generally find that children and adolescents with both higher cognitive and socioemotional skills, but particularly higher cognitive skills, are more likely to have better labor market outcomes (income and employment) and attend tertiary education (OECD 2015). In this context, cognitive skills reduce unemployment, which is the mark of those struggling in the labor market, by contrast to Colombia, where fewer people can afford it. The role socioemotional skills seem to play for labor force participation and schooling decisions is also found in some high-income countries (Carneiro, Crawford, and Goodman 2007; Almlund et al. 2011; OECD 2015). In line with our findings for raw measures of skills, while the impact of socioemotional skills can rival those of cognitive skills in some high-income countries, different socioemotional skills in a given country can also have opposite effects.

In this study, we find that, in Colombia, openness to experience correlate with labor earnings, which is in line with research in the United Kingdom (Heineck 2011). Yet, studies on high-income countries usually find that skills and personality traits related to conscientiousness and emotional stability are those impacting more labor-market outcomes such as wages (Nyhus and Pons 2005; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzúa 2006; Almlund et al. 2011). While grit—people’s perseverance and passion for long-term goals— is also considered as a predictor of education in the United States (Duckworth et al. 2017), and then possibly of labor outcomes, in Colombia, our measure of grit does not correlate with any outcome we look. Our measure of extroversion was neither correlated with any labor market outcome, but this result is in line with research in other countries, likely because more of this trait is not necessarily needed in a broad range of occupations. That might indicate that across countries’ cultures and labor, cognitive skills tend to be more universally rewarded in jobs and that the returns to socioemotional ones may differ across countries in part according to the structure of employment. But, again, we cannot conclude on the specific skills that the Colombian labor market rewards from our results: it is likely that the socioemotional skills measures of our survey do not properly capture what they are intended to, and thus are likely not too comparable with other studies so (Laajaj et al. 2019).

32
wage subsidy and training were provided to a random sample of workfare participants. At the time the sample frame was formed, all participants in the experiment were registered on workfare programs, mainly Argentina's "Trabajar" program. The design features of this program assured that it was well targeted. The wage rate on the program is deliberately set at a low level.<sup>4</sup> Taking account of foregone income from participation, 80% of participants coming from the poorest quintile nationally on the basis of estimated pre-intervention income per person (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001). Thus the Proempleo Experiment was implicitly targeted to lowwage workers who tended to come from poor families.

Under the experiment, one random sample received a voucher that entitled a privatesector employer to a wage subsidy that covered part of the total wages paid to the employee. A second sample was offered limited training as well. A third random sample formed the control group. After a baseline survey, there was a series of follow-up surveys spanning 18 months. We compare employment and incomes over time across these three samples. To our knowledge this is the first time that a randomized experiment has been done to assess options for promoting the private-sector employment of workfare participants, and it is one of only a handful of randomized evaluations of active labor market programs (ALMP's) more generally.

The following section discusses evaluation methods for ALMPs. We then describe the setting for our study (section III) and provide an overview of the data (section IV). The results are then presented in detail in section V, while section VI offers some interpretations. Section VII concludes.

4 Earnings data from the October 2000 Permanent Household Survey for Argentina indicate that 95% of workers in full-time jobs (3 5 hours or more per week) earner more than the prevailing wage rate on the Trabajar program.

3