rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
With regard to the income classification, the low income threshold corresponds to the procurement related “civil works preference”<sup>5</sup> operational guideline for IDA countries; it was introduced in the first _World Development Indicators_ , then the statistical annex to the _World Development Report_ (World Bank, 1978). For FY16, it was set at US$1,045, below the IDA eligibility threshold of $1,215. The lower middle income threshold is based on the operational guidelines cutoff for determining access to 17-year IBRD repayment terms (although these terms are no longer available), and appears to have first been introduced in the 1983 edition of _World Development Indicators_ (World Bank, 1983c). The high income threshold does not relate to a cutoff derived from the operational guidelines, but was set at a GNI per capita of US$6,000 in 1987 prices in a paper presented to the Board of Executive Directors in January 1989 (World Bank, 1989), which also reconfirmed the low and lower middle income threshold levels. The choice of the high income threshold was made to address anomalies in the classification of high income and industrialized economies used in _World Development Indicators_ prior to that point.

A few rules are applied regarding rounding, data collection, and revision management. First, the GNI per capita estimates are rounded so that they end with 0, and the threshold values are rounded so that they end with a 5: this is done for the practical reason of avoiding ties. The threshold values, rounded as just described, are the basis on which the thresholds, applicable for the forthcoming year, are then updated: that is, adjusted for the impact of inflation. Second, to provide consistency for users, the groupings for the analytical classification are set on July 1 of each year and are not revised until the following July, even if there are revisions to GNI or population estimates. Third, countries are reclassified into a higher or lower group once their GNI per capita crosses any of the three thresholds; there is no “settling” period, unlike the operational guidelines. Fourth, the current income classifications are applied to historical series in the _World Development Indicators_ database. That means that historical data aggregates reflect the country classification groupings in force at the time of the latest database update; while this occasionally confuses some users, since it means that aggregates for past years are subject to revision, it is not clear whether there is any other workable alternative.

> 5 These are countries with an income level below which civil works can be awarded to eligible domestic contractors for bids procured under a competitive, international bidding process.

9
The result is that when firms weigh the potential benefits of formalizing against the costs, most may choose to be informal.

The standard government response to this firm comparison of the costs and benefits of formalization has been to lower the costs of formalizing, by making it easier for firms to register. The World Bank’s _Doing Business_ project notes that “Since its inception, _Doing Business_ has captured at least one reform making it easier to start a business in almost 95% of economies.”<sup>2</sup> However, in practice, the majority of informal firms have remained informal after these reforms (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2014), and existing randomized experiments have found low take-up rates to interventions which provide information, assistance, and cost discounts in registering for national taxes. This includes de Mel et al. (2013) who find no impact of information and free registration costs on registration with the tax authority in Sri Lanka; Andrade et al. (2016) who find no impact of information or free registration costs on registration for taxes in Brazil; Galiani et al. (2017) who find a small and temporary effect of personalized assistance and a temporary tax holiday on tax registration in Colombia; and Benhassine et al. (2018) who find 9.6 percent of firms register for a new tax status in Benin. Somewhat larger impacts have been found for municipal registration, where one-quarter of firms registered in Peru (Alcázar et al, 2010), and through expensive interventions that offer additional benefits for formalizing (de Mel et al, 2013 and Benhassine et al, 2018).

One of the most popular types of reforms has been to set up “one-stop shop” service points, in which a single registration covers registration of both the company name, as well as for tax purposes and other licenses required. This approach has been implemented in 115 countries,<sup>3</sup> including throughout West Africa, and attempts to achieve all four reasons for governments to formalize firms at once. An alternative approach, used in Malawi and prevalent in most of the rest of Africa (Figure 1), is to separate the process of business registration from that of tax registration. This separates the first reason for formalizing firms from the other three reasons. But it is then still an open question as to whether formalization without tax obligations offers meaningful benefits to firms, or whether additional policies are required.

> 2 Doing Business (2017), page 25.

> 3 Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/starting-a-business/good-practices#Creating [accessed 27 July, 2018].

3
constraint. In fact, various studies of preschool interventions in low-income settings have found null or only modest effects on child development (Bouguen et al, 2013; Arbour et al, 2016; Ozler et al, 2016; Behrman, Cheng and Todd, 2004; Rosero and OOsterbeek, 2011), raising questions about the viability and cost-effectiveness of this type of intervention in resource deprived settings.

On the other hand, our costing analysis<sup>50</sup> yielded an estimated cost of US$3,09 per student per month, which translated into a 1.14 standard deviation improvement in the ASQ test score per $100 investment, and places the Mozambique preschool intervention studied here on par with other cost-effective educational interventions for improving learning outcomes in Africa.<sup>51</sup> In addition to child development benefits, we found that the community preschool model increased school enrollment and generated positive spillovers on caregiver abilities, labor supply and older sibling’s school enrollment, further increasing the likely benefit-cost ratio.

While encouraging, our results motivate several research extensions for the scale up of low-cost preschool models. First is whether the results of the well implemented program studied here can be reproduced at scale, including for example at a national level by a public agency. This question should be tested using rigorous evaluations of similar interventions at larger scale in Mozambique<sup>52</sup> and in other countries and contexts. Second, enrollment in the preschool model studied here was demand driven, with just over half of eligible children enrolling in treatment communities. Since children who voluntarily enroll in preschool differ from those who do not, the effects of extending preschool coverage to achieve higher (or even universal) coverage in such contexts remains an open question. As documented in the paper, several demand-side constraints prevented children from participating in the preschool program even when these were available in their communities. Further research will be needed to better understand how to alleviate these constraints to ensure that all targeted children, especially the most vulnerable, can benefit. Finally, the long run effects of a preschool based child development model in a lowincome setting remain largely an open question, as preschoolers’ long run educational and

> 50 See Supplemental Materials section 8.

> 51 ‐ See Supplementary Materials Table 38 and <u>https://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy lessons/education/increasing‐test‐score‐performance (accessed July 29, 2017).</u>

> 52 Follow‐up data were collected on this sample of children in 2014, while children were between the ages of 9 and 11 years, and further longitudinal data could be collected subsequently to address this question in the Mozambican context.  A separate ongoing study aims to do precisely that by assessing the impact of a national program currently being rolled out by the government across five provinces.

26
COUNTRIES, ECONOMIES, AND TERRITORIES 83 Summary Projection for 25-Year Periods CIU1BA

|AGE GROUP|1985|2000|2025|<br>2050|2075|2100|2125|<br>2150|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|TOTAL M+F|10098|11615|13461|14127|<br>14064|<br>14146|<br>14234|<br>14283|
|MALES|||||||||
|0-4|401|463|435|426|424|425|425|425|
|5-9|390|466|423|421|424|425|425|425|
|10-14|575|455|409|420|425|426|425|425|
|15-19|606|391|408|426|427|426|425|425|
|20-24|562|379|428|433|427|424|424|424|
|25-29|362|557|453|431|423|422|423|423|
|30-34|363|582|454|419|417|420|422|422|
|35-39|337|538|441|404|415|420|421|421|
|40-44|299|343|375|400|419|421|420|420|
|45-49|263|345|362|418|425|419|417|417|
|50-54|206|317|529|438|419|412|412|413|
|55-59|190|277|<br>543|432|401|401|405|407|
|60-64|155|234|487|408|378|391|398|399|
|65-69|146|173|294|334|362|382|386|387|
|70-74|116|143|272|301|356|367|366|366|
|75+|162|204|438|912|831|822|844|860|
|TOTAL|5134|5867|6750|7023|6973|<br>7005|7039|7058|
|FEMALES|||||||||
|0-4|375|439|411|403|402|402|403|403|
|5-9|365|442|401|399|401|403|403|403|
|10-14<br>|542<br>|432<br>|388<br>|398<br>|402<br>|403<br>|403<br>|403<br>|
|15-19|568|365|387|403|405|403|403|403|
|20-24|545|354|406|411|405|403|402|402|
|25-29|360|525|431|410|402|401|402|402|
|30-34|361|547|433|400|398|400|402|402|
|35-39|341|526|421|386|396|401|402|402|
|40-44|299|346|354|384|401|403|402|402|
|45-49|257|349|342|402|408|403|401|401|
|50-54|204|328|508|425|406|399|399|399|
|55-59|188|284|525|423|393|393|396|398|
|60-64|146|239|497|407|377|389|396|397|
|65-69|142|182|318|336|370|391|395|395|
|70-74|116|156|305|316|380|391|390|389|
|75+|154|234|582|1201|1145|1156|1198|1224|
|TOTAL|4964|5748|6711|7103|7091|7141|7195|7225|
|BIRTH RATE||17.0|13.2|11.9|11.8|11.8|11.7|11.6|
|DEATH RATE||6.4|7.0|10.0|12.0|11.6|11.5|11.5|
|NET MIGRATI|ON<br>RATE|-1.2|-. 3|.0|.0|.0|.0|.0|
|GROWTH<br>RATE||.93|.59|.19|-. 02|.02|.02|.01|
|TOTAL FERTI|LITY|1.933|1.982|2.069|2.067|2.066|2.064|2.064|
|eCO)<br>**-** BOTH|SEXES|76.30|79.83|82.79|84.31|85.15|85.78|86.03|
|**IMR-** BOTH S|EXES|11.0|5.7|2.9|2.4|2.2|2.0|1.9|
- 17 -

# **3. Empirical Evidence**

## 3.1. **The** Data

The period chosen for econometric analysis, 1960-1986, was, to some extent, determined by data availability. The sample encompasses two different periods in Egypt's economic history, especially in terms of the relationship between the public and private sectors. Prior to 1974, Egypt followed an essentially statist import substitution policy whereas after 1974 the government sought to encourage the private sector under the banner of the "open door policy," or "infitah.'' The evolution of private investment over the sample period is depicted in Figure 1. Whether the underlying determinants of investment were stable under these two subperiods will be explored econometrically.

The data in Egypt, like that in most developing countries, are limited in terrs of both quantity and quality. Quarterly observations are not available for the vast majority of economic variables and methods for their estimation are sometimes shrouded in mystery.29 Consequently, a number of different sources were used and cross referenced whenever possible. Even when reasonably reliable series are available, there is the perpetual problem of matching theoretical concepts in economics to the statistics compiled by governments. Nevertheless, while the precise magnitudes of the variables are debatable, the general trends are confirmed by the historical experience as well as by the survey results.

"For a useful description of data sources and causes of discrepancie **s** , ee Mabro and Radwan, 1976, pp. 242-65. For a more recent discussion of the idiosyncrasies of Egyptian economic data, see Hansen, 1988.
Table 3: Global analysis at the country level

||Pane|l A: ln(SO2|) and|
|---|---|---|---|
||ln(<br>|GDP per ca<br>|pita)<br>|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|ln(GDP per capita)|1.002<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|3.319|-41.365<sup>_∗_</sup>|
||(0.188)|(2.606)|(22.904)|
|ln(GDP per capita)<sup>2</sup>||-0.130<br>(0.146)|5.054<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(2.644)|
|ln(GDP per capita)<sup>3</sup>|||-0.198<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.101)|
|Observations|166|166|166|
|R-square|0.147|0.152|0.171|
|Y-mean|2.289|2.289|2.289|
|Y-sd|2.947|2.947|2.947|
||Panel B:|ln(SO2) and|ln(GDP)|
|ln(GDP)|0.931<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-2.084<sup>_∗_</sup>|-6.628|
||(0.160)|(1.174)|(12.545)|
|ln(GDP)<sup>2</sup>||0.056<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.230|
|||(0.021)|(0.479)|
|ln(GDP)<sup>3</sup>|||-0.002<br>(0.006)|
|ln(Population)|-0.348<sup>_∗_</sup>|-0.270|-0.252|
||(0.180)|(0.180)|(0.187)|
|R-square|0.298|0.326|0.326|
||Panel C:|ln(SO2) an|d ln(HDI)|
|ln(HDI)|14.144<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|23.110|-156.958|
||(2.159)|(23.560)|(176.894)|
|ln(HDI)<sup>2</sup>||-8.978|361.847|
|||(23.493)|(361.809)|
|ln(HDI)<sup>3</sup>|||-248.442|
||||(241.890)|
|Observations|166|166|166|
|R-square|0.207|0.208|0.213|
|Y-mean|2.289|2.289|2.289|
|Y-sd|2.947|2.947|2.947|

_Notes:_ ln(GDP per capita)<sup>2</sup> is the square of log of GDP per capita. Unit of SO2: nano gram/m<sup>3</sup> , unit of GDP and GDP per capita: constant 2011 international US dollar.

23
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**-** 33 -

> Table 19: Pakistan--Private Sector Pinancing of Public Tnvestmen: A/ (S of GDP)

||m<br>Average<br>1972-80|m_<br>Average<br>1980-85|-<br>1986<br>|1987|19B8|1989|1990|1991|1992|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Public Investment|11.2|9.3|9.3|9.7|3.8|<br>9.0|8.3|<br>8.2|7.7|
|Flinced By:||||||||||
|- Foreign Savingsh/|5,0|3.6|1.7|1.9|3.3|4.0|S.I|3.2|2.1|
|-Public<br>Saving|1.3|0.6|-0.4|-1,8|-1.6|-1.4|0.1|-2.2|-0.3|
|- Private Net Surplus|4.9|_5.1_|8.0|9.6|7.1|6.4|_5.1_|7.2|5.9|
|Private Investment|_5.2_|9.3|9.5|9.4|9.2|9.9|10.6|_10.5_|<br>10.9|
|Private National Saving|9.6|14.0|15.3|18.7|15.2|_15.5_|14.1|16.1|13.7|
|Private Foreign Saving|_0.5_|**0.4**|**2.2**|0.3|1.1|**0.8**|**1.1**|1.6|0.9|

**al** Stock changes are assumed to be financed by the private sector. h/ Defined as public sector's share of current account deficit.

Source: Ministry of Finance Table 20: Financial Develonment in Pakistan Relative to Selected Countrie A/

||1|972|1|980|1|985|1|990|1|992|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||D|PC<br>GDP|D<br>GDP|PC<br>GDP||D<br>GDP|PC<br>**GDP**|D<br>**GDP**|PC<br>**GDP**|D<br>**GDP**|PC<br>**GDP**|
|Pakistn|31.9|27.9|27.5|24.0|281|31.0|24.1|27.5|28.8|26.7|
|Indonesia|||-12.0|_.5_|18.1|18.2|38.2|50.2|47.6|_55.0_|
|Malaysia|39.7|21.1|40.2|38.3|53.9|61.7|57.1|72.2|-||
|Thailand|25.9|_19.5_|31.2|30.6|54.3|49.5|78.2|79.3|-|-|
|Chile|19.6|9.7|21A4|43A|27.0|70.1|33.5|50.2|36.8|51.2|

**a/ D = Total** bank deposits; PC **=** private credit; GDP **-** gross domestic prodi.t. **Source: International Fiaial Sctdstics**

42. Not all public spending is at the expense of private spending. Public investment can and should play an important role in supporting private investment and economic growth. There is adequate empirical evidene which suggests that public spending in physical infrastructure and human capital play an important role in raising the productivity of private investment and increasing economic growth. Baffes and Shah (1993), for example, using cross-country data, found a strong positive response of GDP growth to human capital and infastructure investment for a large number of counties including Pakistan. As noted in para 34, there is a concern that Pakistan will need to
Taking Stock of Wholesale Power Markets in Developing Countries: A Literature Review

# 9. References

- ADB. (2015). _Assessment of Power Sector Reforms in Asia: Experience of Georgia, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam_ . Mandaluyong, Philippines: Asian Development Bank. Retrieved from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional‐document/161083/synthesis‐report‐ psr.pdf

- Adib, P., & Hurlbut, D. (2008). Market Power and Market Monitoring. In F. P. Sioshansi (Ed.), _Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance2_ (pp. 267–296). Elsevier Ltd.

- Allaz, B., & Vila, J.‐L. (1993). Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency. _Journal of Economic Theory_ , _59_ (1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1001

- Amundsen, E. S., Bergman, L., & Fehr, N.‐H. M. von der. (2006). The Nordic Electricity Market: Robust by Design? In F. P. Sioshansi & W. Pfaffenberger (Eds.), _Electricity Market Reform: an International Perspective_ (pp. 145–170). Elsevier Ltd.

- Andrews‐Speed, P. (2016). _Energy Security and Energy Connectivity in the Context of ASEAN Energy Market Integration_ . Retrieved from http://www.asean‐aemi.org/wp‐ content/uploads/2016/03/AEMI‐Forum‐November‐2015‐Andrews‐Speed‐Feb2016.pdf

- Araújo, J. L. R. H. de. (2006). The case of Brazil: reform by trial and error? In F. P. Sioshansi & W. Pfaffenberger (Eds.), _2Electricity Market Reform: an International Perspective_ (pp. 565–594). Elsevier Ltd.

- Arizu, B., Gencer, D., & Maurer, L. (2006). _Centralized Purchasing Arrangements: International Practices and Lessons Learned on Variations to the Single Buyer Model_ (Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 16). Washington, DC.

- Arizu, B., Jr., W. H. D., & Tenenbaum, B. (2002). _Transmission System Operators‐Lessons from the Frontlines_ (Energy & Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 4). Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www‐

- wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/26/000090341_ 20040326105433/Rendered/PDF/280870Transmission0systems0EMS0no.04.pdf

- Bacon, R. W., & Besant‐Jones, J. (2002). _Global Electric Power Reform, Privatization, and Liberalization of the Electric Power Industry in Developing Countries_ . _Annual Review of Energy and the Environment_ (Vol. 26). Washington, D.C.: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.26.1.331

- Barker, J., Tenenbaum, B., & Woolf, F. (1997). _Governance and Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators: An International Comparison_ (World Bank Technical Paper No. 382). Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www‐

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/10/000178830_ 98101904161821/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

- Barroso, L., Khanna, A., Cunha, G., Elizondo Azuela, G., Wang, X., & Wu, Y. (2014). _Performance of renewable energy auctions : experience in Brazil, China and India_ (Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 7062). Washington, D.C. Retrieved from

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/10/20291035/performance‐renewable‐ 37
economies can take advantage of external economies of scale, increasing their productivity and providing better jobs to their populations. For instance, recent statistics, such as the road infrastructure index and the export market penetration index, suggest that the region is behind similar regions in other parts of the world. Then, it is critical to have a complete assessment of the aggregate and distributional impacts of these market integration policies.

To do that, we match the model to the data by recovering economic fundamentals such as total factor productivity measures and amenities. Then, we simulated in the model three different interventions:

1. Implementation of trade facilitation reforms

2. Accession to the EU 3. New infrastructure The results suggest that coordination among economies is imperative for some of these policies to be successful. For example, if there is coordination, the trade facilitation reform can generate 8% additional gains relative to a counterfactual in which each economy does it independently. Similarly, if these economies are part of the EU, the gains are amplified by an additional 6%. Both results indicate the importance of synergies from combining different interventions. Moreover, accession of the Western Balkans to the EU can positively impact some neighboring countries due to trade linkages. Countries such as Romania, Hungary, or Bulgaria can experience gains of around 0.2% because they will benefit more from trade with the Western Balkans. Thus, Governments from these countries need to coordinate with the Western Balkans to take advantage of these potential opportunities.

Finally, regarding the impact of infrastructure, we find that roads have a substantial effect on trade linkages and on welfare. However, roads seem to have a more significant impact when these economies are already part of the EU, suggesting that there are synergies in implementing the two interventions together and that governments can spur economic growth by combining the two policies.

In conclusion, as the world navigates an increasingly uncertain trade landscape, it is more important than ever to preserve and nurture international integration as a key driver of economic growth, job creation, and poverty reduction.

22
_Africa’s Macroeconomic Story_ In _Mozambique,_ the current account deficit is expected to widen from an estimated 27 percent of GDP in 2012 to 41 percent of GDP in 2014, mainly due to imported capital goods for megaprojects. The current account deficit is projected to narrow modestly over the medium term with an expansion in exports from the megaprojects and a decline in related imported capital goods. This is partially offset by higher dividend payments on the megaprojects. The composition of external financing is expected to shift from foreign direct investment in 2012 to net borrowing by the private nonfinancial sector. The external debt burden is projected to decline slightly in nominal terms, but increase in present value terms as the increase in net private borrowing reduces the average concessionality of total (public and private) external debt.

# **Mozambique, Balance of Payments, 2012-17**

||**2012**|**2014**|**2017**|
|---|---|---|---|
|_Percent of GDP_||||
|**Current account**|**-26.9**|**-41.0**|**-33.2**|
|Trade balance - goods|-21.5|-32.8|-14.4|
|_of which: megaprojects_|_-4.4_|_-15.9_|_-0.4_|
|Imports of goods|46.5|59.3|45.5|
|_of which: megaprojects_|_20.4_|_33.0_|_21.8_|
|Exports of goods|25.0|26.4|31.0|
|_of which: megaprojects_|_16.0_|_17.1_|_21.4_|
|Income balance|-0.7|-1.7|-10.9|
|_of which: divident payments by megaprojects_|_-0.1_|_-1.1_|_-4.5_|
|Current transfers|5.0|2.3|1.1|
|_Official_|_4.3_|_3.1_|_1.8_|
|**Capital account balance**|**2.7**|**2.5**|**1.9**|
|**Financial account**||||
|Foreign direct investment|21.2|10.7|4.7|
|Net foreign borrowing|2.9|28.8|28.4|
|by government|4.1|6.1|3.2|
|by nonfinancial private sector|-1.2|22.7|25.1|
|**External debt (nominal)**|**53.1**|**52.8**|**50.3**|
|Present value|22.5|27.6|28.5|
|_percent of exports_|_138.5_|_133.3_|_133.1_|

_Source:_ IMF Country Reports No. 13/1 (Jan. 2013) and No. 12/148 (June 2012).

_Note:_ estimates for 2012; projections for 2014 and 2017.

44