2.1). Output is positively correlated with the female wage share, suggesting that more output benefits the wage bill of female workers more than proportionally. Capital intensity and TFP show negative coefficient signs, but are uncorrelated with the female wage share.

**Table 4: Female wage share premium, trading vs. non‐trading firms**

|Dependent<br>variable:|||**_Exporter, ex_**|**_p_**||||**_Importer, i_**|**_mp_**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_S_<sup>_F_</sup>_isrt_|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|ln_Yisrt_||0.0826|0.1369|0.1887*|0.1897*||0.2387***|0.2835**|0.3485***|0.3503***|
|||(0.256)|(0.181)|(0.078)|(0.077)||(0.010)|(0.016)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|ln_kisrt_|||‐0.0665|‐0.0708|‐0.0704|||‐0.0091|‐0.0215|‐0.0212|
||||(0.573)|(0.593)|(0.595)|||(0.947)|(0.892)|(0.893)|
|ln_tfpisrt_||||‐0.6686|‐0.6676||||‐0.9439|‐0.9484|
|||||(0.256)|(0.259)||||(0.185)|(0.186)|
|ln_(w_<sup>_M/_</sup>_w_<sup>_F_</sup>_)srt_|||||‐6.6697***<br>(0.000)|||||‐7.3527***<br>(0.000)|
|**_tradeisrt_**|**2.3514*****|**2.1271*****|**2.5869*****|**2.5507*****|**2.5542*****|**1.1885*****|**1.0835*****|**1.2834*****|**1.1058****|**1.1052****|
||**(0.000)**|**(0.000)**|**(0.000)**|**(0.000)**|**(0.000)**|**(0.001)**|**(0.007)**|**(0.010)**|**(0.033)**|**(0.033)**|
|_constant_|2.5657***|1.5367|0.3800|0.2899|37.4914***|<br>2.3465***|‐0.7318|‐1.3844|‐1.4560|39.5517***|
||(0.000)|(0.154)|(0.793)|(0.851)|(0.000)|(0.001)|(0.611)|(0.447)|(0.450)|(0.000)|
|Obs.|16,481|15,774|10,392|9,668|9,651|2,891|2,707|2,323|2,214|2,210|
|R‐squared|0.58|0.59|0.57|0.58|0.58|0.54|0.54|0.56|0.56|0.55|

Note: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 (p‐values in parentheses). Regressions include the 30 countries highlighted in bold in Appendix 1. All regressions include country‐sector, subnational region and year fixed effects.

**Table 5: Female wage share premium, global vs. non‐global firms**

|Dependent<br>variable:||**_GV_**|**_C participan_**|**_t, gvc_**|||**_Fore_**|**_ign owners_**|**_hip, fdi_**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_S_<sup>_F_</sup>_isrt_|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|ln_Yisrt_||0.1433**|0.2144**|0.2650**|0.2661**||0.1957***|0.2879***|0.3447***|0.3459***|
|||(0.043)|(0.033)|(0.012)|(0.011)||(0.005)|(0.003)|(0.001)|(0.001)|
|ln_kisrt_|||‐0.0498|‐0.0612|‐0.0608|||‐0.0251|‐0.0325|‐0.0324|
||||(0.673)|(0.644)|(0.646)|||(0.831)|(0.806)|(0.807)|
|ln_tfpisrt_||||‐0.7544<br>(0.196)|‐0.7548<br>(0.198)||||‐0.7347<br>(0.204)|‐0.7390<br>(0.204)|
|ln_(w_<sup>_M/_</sup>_w_<sup>_F_</sup>_)srt_|||||‐7.2412***<br>(0.000)|||||‐7.6126***<br>(0.000)|
|**_globalisrt_**|**2.1226*****<br>**(0.000)**|**1.8750*****<br>**(0.000)**|**2.1212*****<br>**(0.000)**|**2.1308*****<br>**(0.001)**|**2.1364*****<br>**(0.001)**|**1.8849*****<br>**(0.004)**|**1.1683***<br>**(0.088)**|**1.2561**<br>**(0.120)**|**1.0626**<br>**(0.198)**|**1.0638**<br>**(0.198)**|
|_constant_|3.0038***<br>(0.000)|1.1113<br>(0.301)|‐0.2216<br>(0.878)|‐0.2293<br>(0.882)|40.1618***<br>(0.000)|<br>3.0178***<br>(0.000)|0.4143<br>(0.696)|‐1.1767<br>(0.409)|‐1.2822<br>(0.399)|41.1818***<br>(0.000)|
|Obs.|16,481|15,774|10,392|9,668|9,651|16,481|15,774|10,392|9,668|9,651|
|R‐squared|0.58|0.59|0.57|0.58|0.58|0.58|0.59|0.57|0.58|0.58|

Note: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 (p‐values in parentheses). Regressions include the 30 countries highlighted in bold in Appendix 1. All regressions include country‐sector, subnational region and year fixed effects.

Exporting firms show a female wage share which is on average 2.5 percentage points higher than non‐ exporting firms in the fully specified model (column 5). Similarly, importing firms show a female wage share premium of 1.1 percentage points. For GVC participants, the female wage share premium is 2.1 percentage points compared to non‐participants, while the regressions do not find a female wage share premium for FDI firms relative to non‐FDI firms (Table 5). Note that these patterns hold controlling for the 21