# **Section 2: Context**

From 2014 to 2017, Iraq experienced a displacement crisis of unprecedented national severity, with more than 5 million people (roughly 15% of the Iraqi population) displaced by ISIL’s violent insurgency and the responding military campaign.<sup>10</sup> Ethno-religious minorities were targeted with brutal violence that caused the displacement of whole communities, particularly in Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains (where Yezidi and Christian communities historically live). While the atrocities committed against ethno-sectarian minorities were among the most grievous of this period, the majority of people forcibly displaced during 2014-2017 were Sunni Arabs originating from the Sunni-majority western and northern governorates of Iraq (including Anbar, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din),<sup>11</sup> since these areas were targeted and subsequently occupied by ISIL and later became the focus of the military campaign. Across these areas, some Sunni Arab residents fled immediately upon ISIL’s arrival, while others remained throughout the occupation, for diverse reasons: <mark>economic resources, social networks, family structures, information, threat perceptions, ideology, and – particularly in the early days – a perception that the quality of governance under ISIL would improve relative to the Iraqi state.</mark><sup>12</sup> <mark>Residents who remained in ISIL-held territory typically displaced with the start of the military campaign to retake each location.</mark><sup>13</sup> <mark>This meant that whole communities ultimately became displaced across A</mark> nbar, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din, but the timing and circumstances of their displacement differed, and this difference created deep intra-community divisions and shattered community cohesion.<sup>14</sup> This had serious implications for the return of IDPs, which we discuss further below.

Since <mark>the end of the military campaign in December 2017, more than 3.5 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin.</mark><sup>15</sup> <mark>Yet still, in 2021, some 1.2 million IDPs remain displaced.</mark><sup>16</sup> Many IDPs face material barriers to return such as damage to housing, lack of livelihoods, and lack of basic services,<sup>17</sup> but what appears even more difficult to overcome are the social and security-related

> 10 IOM Iraq (2018) _Iraq Displacement Crisis: 2014-2017._

> 11 For a full overview of the ISIL displacement crisis see: IOM Iraq (2018). _ISIL Displacement Crisis: 2014-2017_ .

> 12 Revkin, M. (2021). Competitive Governance and Displacement Decisions Under Rebel Rule: Evidence from the Islamic State in Iraq. _Journal of Conflict Resolution,_ 65(1), 46-80.

> 13 For detailed information on displacement patterns during the war with ISIL in Iraq, see: IOM Iraq (2018). Iraq Displacement Crisis 2014-2017. Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/DurableSolutions/20203224827300_IOMIraq_Displacement_Crisis_2014-2017.pdf

> 14 For detailed information on the need to reconciliation and a correlation of reconciliation indicators to residential destruction, illegal occupation of private residences, concerns over revenge, the multiplicity of security actors see: IOM Iraq, Social Inquiry, RWG (2019) The growing role of reconciliation in return movements. Return Index Thematic Briefing Series. Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIndex/20203145217451_iom_returnindex_thematic_seriesNov2019.pdf

> 15 For detailed information on IDP return in Iraq see: IOM Iraq (2021). An Overview of Return Movements in Iraq. 16 A breakdown of the ethno-sectarian identity of IDPs is not available, since this data is not typically collected by humanitarian actors due to the potential stigmatization or discrimination it may cause. Overall, as of 30 April, 2021, according to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Mechanism (DTM), there are 1,198,940 IDPs displaced across Iraq, and 4,867,050 returnees. IOM Iraq (2021) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/

> 17 For example, an IOM study reported that IDPs perceived the greatest barriers to return as damage to housing (affecting 71% of IDPs), lack of livelihoods (53%), and lack of basic services (62%.) IOM Iraq (2021). _Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers._

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