rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
all _p_ ), there is first-order dominance of the distribution in the presence of migration, compared with the counterfactual scenario of no migration. If the GIC is above the zero axis at all points up * * to some percentile _p_ , poverty has fallen for all headcount indices up to _p_ (for all poverty lines * up to the value that yields _p_ as the headcount index) and for all poverty measures within a broad class. If the GIC switches sign, whether higher-order dominance holds cannot be determined by looking at the GIC alone.12

# **5 Data**

The data used in this study come from a Survey on the Resettlement of _Shiyan-Manchuan_ Highway Project in _Hubei_ province, collected in January 2003. The _Shiyan-Manchuan_ Highway Project is financed by a World Bank loan (The World Bank, China: _Hubei Shiman_ Highway Project).<sup>13</sup> The survey contained 1208 households with complete information. The surveyed households are located in 42 villages across 9 towns in 4 counties (districts) at the north-west mountainous areas in _Hubei_ province. The households lie in the zone extending 60 meters far from the highway over 106 kilometers long transept. Location of the highway is more concerned with technical problems than with the socio-economic status of the households involved. For this reason, we can consider the 1208 households as a quasi random sample of those across the above counties (districts). As highway by rule cannot pass through any towns or cities, the villages concerned in our survey are exclusively rural. Information on family members, household assets, and household income was recorded in the survey in 2002, before construction of the highway.

12 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/.

> 13 _Hubei_ province, situated in central China, had a population of over 59.9 million in 2002. Its economy is dominated by heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. In terms of socio-economic development, _Hubei_ is in the mid to upper range among Chinese provinces. The _Shiyan-Manchuan_ Highway Project is financed by a World Bank loan. In China, if resettlement is required for a project with the World Bank funding, managed resettlement is required to make sure that the living standard of people affected by the project will not be diminished. Hence, once a preliminary design has been made for the project, a census is conducted on all households, profit and non-profit institutions, public facilities, and physical items within the affected area. This survey, implemented under the supervision of a World Bank team, was done by the _Hubei_ Provincial Communications Department and Wuhan University.

13
# **4.1 Socioeconomic conditions**

## **4.1.1 Labor market conditions**

Refugees who arrive at the country of destination during a recession or are placed in areas with lower employment rates within the country have worse labor market outcomes, which then persist over time (Aslund and Rooth, 2007; Azlor et al., 2020; Barth et al., 2004; Braun and Dwenger, 2020; Fasani et al., 2022; Godøy, 2017). The literature shows this correlation consistently but is focused on high-income countries due to data availability. The results are corroborated by a larger literature on migrants more generally. Potential channels for the persistence of these worse labor market outcomes are scarring effects at the individual level. In addition, for those placed in areas with worse employment conditions within countries, the reason might be persistent differences in employment conditions combined with limited geographical mobility of those forcibly displaced, even where they are allowed to settle elsewhere.

Economic outcomes are also worse when the skills of those displaced do not match those demanded in the labor market. For example, a study of refugees in Switzerland found that the greater the language distance between the country of origin and the area asylum seekers were assigned to, the lower the positive impact of an open labor market access policy on the employment rate of asylum seekers (Slotwinski et al., 2019). These results were corroborated by another study on Switzerland that showed that, controlling for other observable characteristics, refugees randomly placed in areas with languages most similar to their own were more likely to find employment (Auer, 2018). A simulation for the United States and Switzerland using machine learning to place refugees finds that it would improve the employment outcomes of refugees by 40 percent to 70 percent through better matching compared to the current procedure of randomly assigning where to settle them without taking potential labor market outcomes into account (Bansak et al., 2018).

## **4.1.2 Networks with co-nationals**

Beyond labor demand for their skills, social networks at the destination are important for economic and social integration. A sizeable literature looks at the role of networks with 8
making sure that the road was extended till it "ended at the church." Once again we hear reports that youth are disaffected, and do not participate in community activities.

However, the project has had a "tremendously positive" impact on the life of the community. The road is a "lifeline" that allows residents to take their produce to the market, access taxis and other transportation to connect to the main arteries. It seems obvious that the road has had a transforning effect on the community's economic and social life. Residents told us that participating in the project developed a sense of "ecumenism" in the community. It has energized various local community associations that were lying dormant for several years. The community is enthused enough that they want to apply for more funds to extent the road even further. They also wish to look for funds for a school or a clinic.

Shadow/Califomia is the matching pair of communities for New Valley/Orange. It is located in the same county as New Valley/Orange and has similar problems in that it suffers from the lack of a road, which cuts it off from the main Jamaican highways. This leads to several problems - high prices for water, lack of access to schools, and difficulty transporting cash crops. The community seems to have a sense that it is overlooked by its political representatives, a focus group discussion described themselves as a "rejected community." Yet, the community, also deeply religious and centered around the church, has a high degree of social cohesion and is eager to participate in collective action for the common good. A focus group discussion on their work towards maintaining the unpaved road that now exists reveals this succinctly, "We work together for the good maintenance of the road because all of us need it. We filled it with cement and other materials. We worked on it by ourselves." "We had a benefit from the experience. We leamed to work together." In fact, we recently received reports that the community had organized itself into protesting the lack of funds for a road by blocking one of Jamaica's main highways to bring attention to their plight. While not everyone would see this is as a constructive activity, it does indeed demonstrate a great deal of collective action capacity.

The data from these two sets of communities reveals that the social fund has clearly had a positive impact on New Valley/Orange by providing a desperately needed resource. While there was some resentment expressed against the project, this experience with collective action seems to have left the community thirsting for more.

Community Pair D Arnett Gardens - Union Gardens<sup>4</sup> 4The Arnett Gardens report is based upon fieldwork conducted by Ruel Cooke for the JSIF evaluation, and a separate study by Grace Imani Duncan (2001) commissioned for this paper followed up by work by Duncan and Woolcock (2002).

15
100

|**Country**|**Gasoline**|**Diesel**|**Kerosene**|**LPG**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Philippines|132|101|114|109|
|Russian Federation|49|74|―|―|
|Rwanda|82|84|―|―|
|Senegal|122|132|99|58|
|South Africa|168|177|124|143|
|Sri Lanka|17|77|111|91|
|Syrian Arab Republic|-20|-69|―|64|
|Tajikistan|143|202|―|―|
|Tanzania|105|61|187|―|
|Thailand|176|128|17|13|
|Togo|24|56|―|―|
|Tunisia|-18|-19|-5|-15|
|Turkey|127|175|104|165|
|Uganda|12|14|3|209|
|Uruguay|139|166|129|197|
|Venezuela, RB|-4|-3|―|-46|
|Vietnam|89|96|78|-18|
|Yemen, Rep.|72|90|91|94|
|Zambia|125|146|91|―|

_Sources_ : Author’s calculations based on sources cited in Tables A2.1 and A2.3 in Kojima (2012) and sources under “information” in Table A1.1.
Table 10: Ethnicity and Soft Skills

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Rejected|Profle<br>viewed|N of profle<br>views|Contacted|Interview<br>requested|
|Malay|0.112***<br>(0.035)|-0.239***<br>(0.037)|-0.903***<br>(0.118)|-0.163***<br>(0.024)|-0.103***<br>(0.019)|
|Indian|0.167***|-0.325***|-1.030***|-0.174***|-0.099***|
||(0.036)|(0.035)|(0.118)|(0.023)|(0.019)|
|Teamwork|-0.022|-0.017|-0.193|-0.043|-0.006|
||(0.033)|(0.039)|(0.145)|(0.029)|(0.025)|
|Leadership|0.017|-0.034|-0.056|-0.020|-0.021|
||(0.034)|(0.039)|(0.151)|(0.030)|(0.024)|
|Indian _×_ Lead|-0.063|0.060|0.066|0.016|0.017|
||(0.051)|(0.050)|(0.165)|(0.032)|(0.026)|
|Malay _×_ Lead|0.002|-0.019|0.044|0.041|0.047*|
||(0.051)|(0.051)|(0.174)|(0.034)|(0.027)|
|Indian _×_ Team|-0.031|0.041|0.286*|0.059*|0.013|
||(0.051)|(0.050)|(0.165)|(0.032)|(0.027)|
|Malay _×_ Team|-0.037|0.009|0.255|0.070**|0.037|
||(0.049)|(0.052)|(0.165)|(0.033)|(0.028)|
|Constant|0.250***|0.521***|1.358***|0.196***|0.117***|
||(0.024)|(0.027)|(0.107)|(0.022)|(0.018)|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.018|0.075|0.082|0.059|0.032|
|N|2,995|2,995|2,995|2,995|2,995|
|_Malay × Lead_ =|_Indian × _|_Lead_||||
|_p-value_|0.228|0.093|0.835|0.201|0.070|
|_F-statistic_|1.455|2.820|0.043|1.639|3.292|
|_Malay × Team_ =|_Indian ×_|_Team_||||
|_p-value_|0.906|0.482|0.776|0.572|0.157|
|_F-statistic_|0.014|0.495|0.081|0.320|2.004|
|_Note:_ This table pr<br>Rejected takes the <br>Column 2 Profle vi<br>least once. Column <br>takes the value of 1 i|esents the r<br>value of 1 if<br>ewed takes <br>3 is the num<br>f the Comp|esults of speci<br> the company <br>the value of 1 i<br>ber of visits to<br>any contacted t|fcation 7.<br>The <br> disregarded the <br>f the profle was<br> the website pro<br>he candidate thr|outcomes are: <br> application as <br> visited by the<br>fle. In column<br>ough email. Fi|In column 1<br> not-suitable.<br> company at<br> 4 Contacted<br>nally, column|
|5 Interview requeste<br>an interview. Robus|d takes the v<br>t Standard|alue of 1 if the<br>errors. * p_<_0.1,|Company contac<br> ** p_<_0.05, ***|ted the candida<br> p_<_0.01|te requesting|

29
and institutional) available for the rural sector are exogenous and fixed. This allows us to concentrate the empirical analysis on various forms of crowding out of expenditures on public goods within a fixed rural budget. For the sake of keeping the issues in perspective, however, the remainder of this introduction and the next section will retain a broader level of generality in this respect.

The under-provision of public goods may have serious negative consequences for the _productivity_ of private investment, as public goods are important complementary assets with private capital. As we shall see below, non-social subsidies, often available only to selected individuals and firms, appear to contribute little to stimulate growth. Thus, the restricted supply of public goods (or higher taxes) necessary to finance spending in subsidies may involve a poor tradeoff as a policy to promote growth. A low supply of public goods means scarcity of human capital,<sup>3</sup> underinvestment in research and development (R&D), less infrastructure, insufficient sanitary and environmental protection, etc. (World Bank, 2000). All these are important assets that contribute to increase the productivity of private investments. Hence their scarcity is likely to constitute an obstacle to economic expansion.

The biased structure of public expenditure allocation may have important _social equity_ implications as well. For reasons to be discussed below, government expenditures in (non-social) subsidies and other private goods tend to be directed toward the wealthier segments of society and, at the same time, have little effect in promoting employment. The only significant assets of the poor are their labor force and, for the rural poor, their natural resources. The income of the poor is thus extremely dependent on their ability to enhance their human capital and to protect the natural assets, both important public or semi-public goods.

Over-taxation that spending in private goods may cause also has negative equity consequences. It is well known that in most developing countries the tax system is not progressive, especially because of its great reliance on indirect taxation and because of the prevalence of tax evasion.<sup>4</sup> So the additional taxes needed to finance subsidies to selected

> 3 Education and health care, though not pure public goods, have characteristics of public goods, especially in developing countries. Their positive externalities are well documented in the literature. The poor, who often constitute a large segment of the population in developing countries, are generally unable to finance even highly profitable investments in human capital due to imperfections of capital markets; so if governments do not intervene in some form, such investments are often not realized.

> 4 “Given the low importance of personal income taxes and property taxes in Latin American countries, the direct distributive leverage of the tax system in most countries should be expected to be very small or even negative” (World Bank, 2004, p. 254). According to the World Bank, while in developed countries income taxes and property

2
A Road to Trust

# _3.2. Where are roads constructed?_

We assess if prior to road construction, non-road villages in our sample were similar to road villages. This will help determine if what happened in those villages between 2003 and 2006 provides good estimates of what would have happened in road-villages had a road not been constructed there ( _i.e._ , the counterfactual).

A priori, one might expect road and non-road villages to differ before road construction. If more trusting communities are more likely to trade, roads will generate higher benefits, so these higher trust communities should be more likely to request a road. Alternatively, isolated communities are more likely to benefit from a road and thus to request one.

Those communities might also be less likely to be trusting, as they had little opportunities to interact with others outside of their communities.

We compare the 2003 distribution of generalized and bonding trust in road and non-road villages. Specifically, we test for equality of mean and equality of distribution using t and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Results are presented in Table 1. They indicate that nonroad villages provide an appropriate control group for road villages: there were no statistically significant differences between them in 2003.

9
compatible CDM framework allows for price differentiation between the two prices. At the macroeconomic level, the cost savings for non-Annex I countries are significantly less pronounced in the incentive-compatible framework than in the IET representation, since CDM transfers are used in the former to compensate the firm/sector which is implementing CDM projects.

Despite its advancements there are various aspects of the CDM which our incentive-based CDM representation still abstracts from. First, we impose that CDM hosting firms (sectors) must be compensated at their pre-CDM (reference) cost level. However, CDM-hosting firms might try to bargain for positive profits with CDM donors on the distribution of overall cost savings from the CDM – this would essentially call for a game-theoretic setting. Second, the top-down characterization of sector-specific production possibilities through continuous functional forms cannot address the project-level characteristics of CDM but describes a sectoral CDM policy – to capture discrete projects one would have to include bottom-up activity analysis in the top-down CGE framework. Third, the representation of the CDM market is relatively crude and, while focusing on the primary CDM market, it does not make a distinction between the primary and secondary CDM markets. While we defer appropriate extensions to future research, we note that although our modeling approach has been analyzed and presented with reference to the CDM, it can be generalized to other related issues, such as the impacts of climate finance and green-growth strategies.

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# **Abstract**

During the last quarter century, job tenure in Europe has shortened. Using data from Eurostat Labor Force Surveys of 29 countries from 1995 to 2020 and applying an age-period-cohort decomposition to analyze changes in tenure for specific birth cohorts, this paper shows that tenure has shrunk for cohorts born in more recent years. To account for compositional changes within cohorts, the analysis estimates the probability of holding jobs of different durations, conditional on individual and employment-related characteristics. The estimations demonstrate that, over time, the likelihood of having a medium- or long-term job decreased and holding a short-term job increased. The paper also finds that stricter job protection legislation appears to decrease the probability of holding a short-term job, and higher trade openness and ICT-related technological change are correlated with an increase of that probability.

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44 Table 2. RRAs to agriculture, Asian developing economies, 1960–2009 (percent)

||1960–69|1970–79|1980–89|1990–99|2000–09|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Korea|-13|42|126|180|148|
|Taiwan, China|-4|3|20|47|63|
|China|na|na|-54|-17|2|
|Indonesia|na|-19|-18|-20|-3|
|Malaysia|-14|-17|-6|-1|-3|
|Philippines|-10|-20|-5|16|10|
|Thailand|na|-31|-15|-11|-6|
|Vietnam|na|na|-19|-9|0|
|Bangladesh|na|-24|-15|-28|-19|
|India|-51|-41|-11|-13|0|
|Pakistan|-63|-47|-37|-29|-13|
|Sri Lanka|-67|-53|-45|-25|-16|

Source: Updated from Anderson and Martin 2009, Table 1.17, using estimates in Anderson and Nelgen 2012b.
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