rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **1. Introduction**

Fiscal policy can play an important role in fostering inclusive growth and advancing poverty and inequality reduction in a country. However, a comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of fiscal policy in Turkey is missing. A core objective of this paper is to fill in that knowledge gap.

Turkey has made significant progress in reducing poverty in the new century. The poverty headcount ratio is less than a third of what it was in 2003. The proportion of the population living with a budget below the poverty line for upper-middle-income countries decreased from 36.5 to 9.9 percent between 2003 and 2016.<sup>1</sup> Robust economic growth, through more employment and higher labor incomes, has been the main driver of poverty reduction (World Bank 2016). After the severe financial crisis of 2001, real domestic product grew annually at about 5.7 percent between 2002 and 2016.

Despite these valuable achievements, significant challenges remain. The poverty downward trend has stagnated in recent years and almost 8 million individuals still live in absolute poverty. In addition, Turkey has one of the highest relative poverty rates among OECD countries, with 17 percent of the population living below the relative poverty line.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, even though income inequality fell significantly in the 2000s, the trend was reversed after the global financial crisis. Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, increased from 0.39 to 0.42 between 2009 and 2016. Fiscal policy could be instrumental to strengthen the link between growth and inclusion in order to achieve further social gains going forward.

This paper assesses the effectiveness of Turkey’s fiscal policy in reducing poverty and inequality, examines its comparative performance, and identifies the constraints faced by the fiscal package in promoting equity. In essence, the paper aims to answer the following four questions: (a) what is the overall impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in Turkey? (b) how do individual taxes and transfers affect distributional outcomes? (c) how does Turkey compare with

> 1 Poverty is measured using the World Bank’s absolute poverty line for upper-middle-income-countries (UMIC), set at $5.50 per-person per-day in 2011 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (World Bank 2017). The data are publicly available in the Poverty and Equity Data Portal (World Bank 2018). Unlike other countries, Turkey’s Institute of Statistics (TUIK) does not publish a national poverty line using cost of food and non-food basic needs. It stopped doing so in 2009.

> 2 Measured as the share of people whose income falls below the OECD relative poverty line; taken as half the median household income of the total population (OECD 2018).

2
**Figure 11. Village Public Goods Investment and Migrant Share of the Village Labor Force**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Migrant Share of the Labor Force<br>-1<br>-1.5<br>-2<br>Per Capita Public Goods Investment (log)<br>-2.5<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Supplemental survey conducted with RCRE in survey villages and matched to the RCRE Village Survey.

**Table 2 Time Living with Parents Last Year**

||**0-2 Years**<br>**Old**|**3-5 Years**<br>**Old**|**6-12 Years Old**|**13-15 Years Old**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||**Panel**|**A: Rural Areas**||
|**Months lived with father last year**|6.66|7.1|7.16|6.31|
|**Months lived with mother last year**|9.14|8.85|8.55|7.07|
|**Number of obs.**|873|1107|2094|705|
|||**Panel B**|**: Urban Areas**||
|**Months lived with father last year**|7.51|9.03|8.9|8.42|
|**Moths lived with mother last year**|9.16|10.67|10.2|9.66|
|**Number of obs.**|713|858|1472|446|

Data source: CFPS 2016 Children Questionnaire 42
as biomass pellets using ZZK technology. Rising coal prices in recent years are likely to further contribute to this shift in the coming years. In addition, a positive environmental impact works in favor of using biomass briquettes and pellets as a substitute for coal.

**Table 5: Average energy costs per clay-fired brick for ZZK technology by province (NRs/brick)**

||Koshi|Madesh|Bagmati|Gandaki|Lumbini|Sudurpach|im|Nepal|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|50% coal and 50% pellet|6.7|5.5|4.7|5.1|4.5||4.7|5.1|
|75% coal and 25% pellet|7.7|6.4|5.4|5.9|5.2||5.5|5.8|
|18||50%|Coal and 50%|Pellet<br>7|5% Coal and 25|% Pellet|||
|9|15<br>8|11<br>6|16<br>8|12<br>6|14<br>7|13<br>7|||
|Koshi|Madesh|Bagmati|Gandaki|Lumbini|Sudurpachim|Nepal|||

**Figure 7. Percentage reduction in total costs of brick production using a combination of coal and biomass pellets compared to only coal by province (without carbon pricing)**

_Notes_ : These values are estimated based on the average price and the calorific value of coal as NRs 43.4 and 19.9 MJ per kg of coal, respectively, and the corresponding values for biomass pellets as NRs. 12.0 and 14.7 MJ per kg of pellet, respectively in 2022 based on information collected through a rapid survey by Timilsina and Malla (2023).

We estimated that the total cost of producing a brick can be reduced in the range of 6% to 9% across the provinces simply by substituting one-third of the coal with biomass pellets (Figure 7). The percentage reduction in brick production cost is much higher (11% to 18%) with a higher share of biomass pellets (50%). However, it may be unlikely that these levels of cost reduction can be achieved if the market for large-scale biomass fuels across the country does not exist. Clayfired bricks can only be produced in a carbon-neutral manner if it is possible to completely replace the current primary energy source such as coal, with carbon-neutral energy sources, such as renewable biomass fuels. In our survey, we did find one brick kiln (FC BTK) in western Nepal 19
preferred method? Energy Policy. 2004;32:1131-9.

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[11] Hatzigeorgiou E, Polatidis H, Haralambopoulos D. CO 2 emissions in Greece for 1990–2002: a decomposition analysis and comparison of results using the Arithmetic Mean Divisia Index and Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index techniques. Energy. 2008;33:492-9.

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# Investment and income effects of land regularization:

The case of Nicaragua Klaus Deininger and Juan Sebastian Chamorro World Bank; University of Wisconsin, Madison'

> ' This paper is a part of the background studies undertaken for a Nicaragua land policy study. The material and intellectual support received from the project, especially discussions during two workshops in Nicaragua, are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are due to Michael Carter, Francisco Chevez, Alain de Janvry, Isabel Lavadenz, and Pedro Olinto as well as participants at the IAAE meetings in Berlin. Support from the Norwegian Trust Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
to trade liberalization. Growing skill premium is also puzzling because many have expected that the trade reforms would have lowered income inequality by raising the relative returns to relatively abundant factor of production in Brazilian economy, i.e. the poor, less educated, and unskilled workers.

In this paper, we investigate whether trade liberalization has affected wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in Brazil using data from 1987 to 1998. In particular, we combine detailed micro level worker level information from _Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego_ (PME) with industry level data on tariffs, import penetration, and export exposure to analyze several channels through which trade liberalization might have affected the growing skill premium.<sup>3</sup> We first analyze whether the growing skill premium could be explained by the mechanism proposed by the Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade. We test three implications of the model. First, is the growing skill premium consistent with the pattern of tariff reductions observed in Brazil from 1987 to 1988? If tariffs declined proportionately more in sectors that use unskilled labor relatively more intensively, tariff induced changes in product prices could have contributed to the growing in skill premium by increasing the demand for the relatively skilled workers. Second, the Hecksher-Ohlin model would predict labor reallocation from industries that experienced bigger tariff reductions (and hence price reduction and output contraction) towards industries with lower exposure to trade. We explore this mechanism by relating changes in industry share of total employment to tariff changes and other measures of trade exposure. Third, the Hecksher-Ohlin mechanism would predict a decline in the share of skilled workers in industry employment as firms substitute away from skilled labor when skill premium increases after trade liberalization. Our results suggest that Hecksher-Ohlin could in 3Our methodology follows closely the one used in Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2002) for Colombia.

3
peated sampling context.<sup>12</sup> As discussed, the model based Stress scenario, notwithstanding its benefits, is susceptible to the assumed parametric structure that is imposed on the data. We thus also propose an alternative non-parametric approach to construct the Stress scenario next.

# **3.3. Stress Scenario Based on International Experience**

There can exist circumstances when it is not possible or acceptable to employ a model based Stress scenario, due either to the lack of available data to formulate a sufficiently adequate statistical model, or due to a less favorable view of statistical models inside the policy environment in general. With this in mind, we propose an alternative model-free approach, which we label ” _Stress International_ ” (or _Stress Int._ for short). This approach looks at the actual historical evidence of countries that experienced a financial crisis in the past. Crisis periods are identified using the banking and currency crises dating database compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2008).<sup>13</sup> Given the crisis dates, we extract real GDP growth, CPI inflation, lending rates and changes in the exchange rate from the World Bank and the IMF’s IFS databases for the countries (and years) that went through a financial crisis, and then look at the values of these macroeconomic variables during the crisis years. There are a total of 161 countries,

> 12Note that the construction of the Stress scenario based on the adverse forecast confidence interval in (3) above relies on the assumption of _Ut_ being multivariate normal. This may or may not be appropriate. Should it not be appropriate, one can resort to re-sampling techniques such as bootstrapping to compute, say, 1000 bootstrapped forecast values, and then use the value corresponding to the 1<sup>_st_</sup> percentile as a stress value for real GDP growth and the 99<sup>_th_</sup> percentile for the lending rate.

> 13Note at this point that there are other methods to classify financial crises in the literature. Further, the annual dating and resulting zero/one indicators can be appropriately normalized to pay more attention to the month of the year in which the event occurred for the purpose of a regression analysis. An analogous approach can be adopted for the purpose of an even study, like ours, that is to follow. Namely, one can calculate the effect of the crises having aligned the crisis dates on a given month rather than a year and then calculate the annual effect over subsequent 12 months. We leave this fine-tuning for future research given the problem with data availability. We address the issue of possibly counterintuitive crisis outcomes, such as positive GDP growth in a crisis year, by imposing certain priors (censoring rules) in our calculations.

19
# **Table A.4.4 Colombia: Innovation Output Determinants**

||**Product**|**Process**|**IPR**|**IPR**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**innovation**|**innovation**|**innovation**|**innovation 2**|
|Constant|-1.03|-0.95|-2.07|-2.17|
|**Firms characteristics**|||||
|Firm size (ln employees)|**0.20**|**0.17**|**0.06**|**0.07**|
|Capital location|**0.15**|0.02|0.01|0.03|
|**Absorption capacity**|||||
|R&D department|**0.46**|**0.27**|**0.40**|**0.36**|
|**Human capital**|||||
|Share of employee with<br>tertiary|**0.35**|**0.21**|0.08||
|Share of employee with high<br>education||||**0.53**|
|Share of employee with<br>secondary education|**0.14**|0.07|0.07|0.13|
|**Collaboration on innovation**|||||
|Universities|**0.44**|0.17|**0.51**|**0.50**|
|Research centres (private and<br>public)|**0.58**|**0.41**|**0.57**|**0.58**|
|<br>Suppliers|**0.50**|**0.69**|0.23|0.26|
|Internal|0.39|0.30|0.40|0.34|
|Other firms|0.20|0.09|0.12|0.11|
|**Training and Re-education**|||||
|Innovation and development|**0.48**|**0.55**|**0.14**|**_0.13_**|
|Organizational|**0.26**|**0.22**|0.13|0.12|
|Management|-0.07|**_-0.13_**|-0.04|-0.05|
|Observations<br><br>|6212|6212|6212|6188|
|Log likelihood<br>(<br>)<br>2<br>χ|-3872.58|-3958.72|-1221.09|-1221.09|
|2<br>_R_ (Pseudo)|0.10|0.08|0.05|0.05|
|**Test**|||||
|Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)<br>area under ROC curve|51.59 [0.0000]<br>0.72|55.76[0.0000]<br>0.69|8.26 [0.4084]<br>0.67|8.84 [0.4004]<br>0.67|

Note The model IPR innovation 2 includes share of employees with high education as explanatory variable 32
<mark>Hatchondo, J.C., Martinez, L., 2012. Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk. Working Paper 10-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.</mark> <mark>Hatchondo, J.C., Martinez, L., Sosa Padilla, C., 2014. Voluntary sovereign debt exchanges. J.f Monet. Econ. 61, 32–50.</mark> Kiyoung Jeony and Zeynep Kabukcuogluz (2014). “Income Inequality and Sovereign Default” mimeo University of Pittsburg <mark>Kaminsky, G. L., Vega-García, P. 2016. Systemic and idiosyncratic sovereign debt crises. Journal of the European Economic Association 14(1): 80-114. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12165 Kraay, A., 2006. When is growth pro-poor? Evidence from a panel of countries. Journal of Development Economics 80(1):198-227. DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.02.004</mark> <mark>Kuvshinov, D., Zimmermann, K., 2019. Sovereigns Going Bust: Estimating the Cost of Default. European Economic Review 119: 1-21. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.009</mark> <mark>Levy-Yeyati, E., Panizza, U., 2011. The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults. Journal of Development Economics 94(1): 95-105.</mark> <mark>https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:94:y:2011:i:1:p:95-105</mark> <mark>McDonald, J., 2008. Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income. In: Chotikapanich, D. (eds) Modeling Income Distributions and Lorenz Curves. Economic Studies in Equality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being, vol 5. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72796-7_3</mark> <mark>Medas, P., Poghosyan, T., Xu, Y., Farah-Yacoub, J., Gerling, K., 2018. Fiscal crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, Volume 88, November 2018, Pages 191-207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.08.001</mark> <mark>Mendoza, E.G., Yue, V.Z., 2012. A general equilibrium model of sovereign default and business cycles. Q. J. Econ. 127, 889–946.</mark> <mark>Mitchener, K. J., Weidenmier, M. D., 2010. Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment. Journal of International Money and Finance, vol 29(1), pages 19-36.</mark> <mark>https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:29:y:2010:i:1:p:19-36</mark> <mark>Morales-Arilla, J., 2021. Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks. Mimeo. https://scholar.harvard.edu/josemorales-arilla/publications/%E2%80%9Ckeep-</mark> <u><mark>your-friends-close-and-even-closer-crisis%E2%80%9D-strategic</mark></u> 38
# Abstract

Simple linear distances between origin and destination poorly describe travel in Nepal, where rugged terrain, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, and diverse vegetation heavily influence favorable travel routes. In this context, expected travel times explain more about the remoteness of starting locations than geographic distance. Applied to service facilities, these time‐based measures of remoteness amount to measures of physical accessibility to services. However, traditional survey‐based measures of time suffer from problems of inaccurate reporting and standard survey error. Instead, this study built a geographic information system– based cost time model of travel that enables more accurate and generalizable assessment of accessibility. Having validated the generic model and compared it with other popular metrics, the study demonstrates its value by inputting a variety of services into it. This paper provides descriptive analyses of accessibility trends to these services at national, provincial, municipal, and geographic scales and suggests research possibilities unlocked by such a general purpose model. The paper concludes with thoughts for how the data and analysis, both freely available public goods, can enable additional research and better policy making.

### _JEL Classifications_

R41, R53, 021

### _Keywords_

Accessibility, remoteness, GIS, Nepal

## Acknowledgments

We owe a great debt to our reviewers, supporters and collaborators in this research. From within the World Bank, Hiroki Uematsu and Thomas Walker managed our efforts, provided critical feedback and ensured our work found a receptive audience. Advice and feedback from Biplob Rakhal of the World Food Programme, Michael Green, Arjun Poudel, Diva Malla and Bill Seal of the Rural Access Programme and Walker Kosmidou‐ Bradley and Gogi Grewal of the World Bank were instrumental in setting up the model, establishing its parameters, and validating our outputs. Thank you to our many data contributors, whom are too many to name here; a special thanks to the team at Kathmandu Living Labs for working long, tedious hours to improve OpenStreetMap roads data in Nepal. Prajula Mulmi, Ashutosh Dixit and Ganesh Thapa of the PKPS team helped us refine our work products and make them useful to a non‐technical audience; thank you for pointing out when we lost the plot. Finally, our reviewer’s insights much improved this paper: thank you to Hiroki, Thomas, Walker, Sri Tadimalla, Johannes Hoogeveen, and the RAP team for your time. We are grateful to the UK Department for International Development (DFID)’s Evidence for Development program in Nepal for supporting this work. All errors are our own; the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank.
- 34 -

# _24. Dispute Settlement_

The dispute settlement mechanism of GATT 1947 has often been criticized.1<sup>4 0</sup> The report of a panel set up by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in respect of a dispute could be blocked from being adopted by any Contracting Party to the dispute. In the case of antidumping, out of 5 cases in which panels submitted their reports only in 2 was the report adopted. Some pessimism about the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanism in relation to challenges to antidumping measures stems from the reports in two recent cases in which the panels while holding the antidumping measures inconsistent with the Tokyo Code nonetheless did not revoke the duty.<sup>141</sup> Finger and Fung say: "The conclusion is obvious - and ominous. The GATT dispute settlement process seems unlikely to provide discipline against the increasing number of antidumping restrictions against imports. Both the bureaucratic and the legal momentum of GATT dispute settlement are toward innocuous findings of procedural error that can be corrected without lifting the antidumping order in question.

Changing the bureaucratic momentum of the system is possible, but it would not be easy. Changing the legal momentum of the system will be even more difficult. Interpreting the GATT in a legalistic way compels one to interpret it as a statement of rights to impose antidumping duties. The substantive criteria for action are broad - the injury concept justifies protection for anyone to whom it is worth the time to ask for it. The constraints on antidumping actions are artificial - loopholes and procedural technicalities - so legal reform means getting rid of them.

In sum, where do the GATT articles on trade remedies lead us? If you take a legalistic view, you come to a protectionist conclusion." 142 A closer examination of the two panel reports which seem to have driven the two writers to the view that the panels would lean toward innocuous findings of procedural errors that can be corrected rather than lift the challenged antidumping

> 140 Hilf, Meinhard, "Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures" in Petersmann, ErnstUlrich and Meinhard Hilf, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal and Economic Problems, 285 at 300-1 (1991).

> 141 See Finger, J. Michael and Kwok-Chiu Fung, "Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping?" 9 Jn'l Econo. Integration, 198 (1994). The authors pointedly refer to the GATT Panel Reports in United States - Salmon from Norway (1992) and Korea - Polyacetyl Resins from the United States (1993), at 204. **T42** Id. at 211.