approach to consolation that, albeit (Loumeau 2022) and implying that reinforcing markets with appropriate policy measures may be more appropriate, equitable, and sustainable.

_Tenant size effects:_ Beyond economies of scale at field size, larger tenants (with more than 10 ha of total area) also tend to pay a substantial rent premium: moving from the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile to the median, from the median to the 75<sup>th</sup> or from the 75<sup>th</sup> to the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile (from 75 to 215, 450, and 1,054 ha, respectively) would, according to regression, be associated with rent premia of 7.2, 6.7, and 9.5 percent, other covariates held constant. While production data for different farm sizes will be desirable to assess the extent to which this price increase mirrors cost reductions in production or economies of scale beyond the production stage and the share of such benefits passed on to landowners, it suggests lease market are reasonably competitive.

_Limited evidence of market power:_ For the approximately 60% of the sample where information on tenant characteristics is available, including the share of registered land cultivated by the tenant in the village in which the parcel of interest is located can be used to more directly test for market power. Tenants that cultivate less than 50% of the land in the village indeed pay lease rates 11% lower than those paid by nonresident bidders. The fact that this discount decreases to between 6 and 7% for parties cultivating more than 50% of village land suggests that either land rental markets remain relatively competitive or that concentration of land use at village level is not the most appropriate indicator to measure market power.

_External effects of informality:_ The significant and negative coefficient on the share of a field’s area not mapped in the cadaster suggests that informality generates negative externalities as registered parcels in fields that include unmapped parcels fetch lower lease rates. If, as seems plausible, informality is associated with higher costs of concluding or enforcing contracts, such lower lease rates are a real economic cost rather than a transfer.

Based on the point estimate, a program to map all the country’s agricultural land and thus reduce the level of unmapped but cultivated land from the current level of 5% to zero would imply a 1.7% increase in the lease rate. In other words, had such a program been implemented by 2021, it would have increased annual rental income received by landowners by US$ 8.71 million (118*0.017*4.34), implying a net present value of close to US$ 100 million. To the extent that it would cost less to map all agricultural land, a program to do so and, rather than charge the full cost to owners, recover them through a fee that takes into account the external effects from informality, may be more appropriate and effective.

Although registry data is only available for about 10% of our sample (table 5), it allows to consider other forms of informality, beyond checking the robustness of earlier estimates. Coefficients on policy reforms (10% for the short-term effects of lifting the moratorium and up to 8% for allowing participation of legal entities), positive effects of local competition (estimated coefficients of number of transaction in village 16