_Table 1.02 Extensive Regression Analysis (High-Income Democracies)_

||||**Corr**<br>|**uption Percep**<br>|**tions Index (C**<br>|**PI)**<br>|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**1**|**2**|**3**|**4**|**5**|**6**|**7**|**8**|
||<br>**(GLM)**|<br>**(GLM)**|<br>**(GLM)**|<br>**(OP)**|<br>**(OP)**|<br>**(GLM)**|<br>**(IRLS)**|<br>**(GLM)**|
||**Additive**|**Additive**|**Factor**|**Additive**|**Factor**|**Additive**|**Additive**|**Factor**|
|**Higher EDD/**<br>**NEDD***<br>**DEM**||||||||-0.58*<br>(0.34)|
|**Higher EDD/**<br>**NEDD Ratio**|-0.55***<br>(0.08)|-0.51***<br>(0.12)|-1.21***<br>(0.28)|-1.91***<br>(0.43)|-3.22***<br>(0.84)|-0.31***<br>(0.10)|-0.31***<br>(0.06)|-0.31***<br>(0.06)|
|**High-**<br>**Income**<br>**Democracies**||||||||-0.78**<br>(0.31)|
|**Coordinated**<br>**Market**<br>**Economies**||-0.35<br>(0.50)||||||-0.17<br>(0.35)|
|**Standard**<br>**Controls**|√|√|√|√|√|√|√|√|
|**Additional**<br>**Controls**||||||√|√|√|
|**Sample**|High-<br>Income<br>Dem|High-<br>Income<br>Dem|High-<br>Income<br>Dem|High-<br>Income<br>Dem|High-<br>Income<br>Dem|All|All|All|
|**Number**<br>**of Observations**|19|19|19|19|19|52|52|52|
|**(Pseudo**<br>**Log)-**<br>**Likelihood**|-6.04|-6.03|-6.10|-35.78|-39.59|-19.81|NA|-19.97|

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable converted into fractional form for GLM estimations. OLS results are: - 1.94** (0.71), -0.046** (0.021) for models’ (1) and (5) respectively Standard controls: age of democracy, education attainment, latitude, (log) per capita income, and economic openness (long-term). Additional controls: Ethno-linguistic fragmentation, income inequality, (log) population, size of extractive industries, democratization (current), demographic dummy variables, economic openness (current), religious make-up variables, regional dummies (see Appendix A for details). Varieties of Capitalism Control is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for ‘Coordinated Capitalist Economies.’ (see Appendix A for details).* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.<sup>34</sup> _Source: The Author_ The results in Table 1.02 do not only hold for high-income democracies, but also for democracies in general<sup>35</sup> . As Table 1.03 indicates, when replicating the regression models using the sub-sample of all effective democracies, rather than just high-income democracies (Regression Models 1-5), the results remain qualitatively the same. Namely, the EDD/NEDD ratio is robustly and negatively associated with less rent extraction. The magnitude of this effect, though, is diminished in all the regression models (compare Regression Models 1-5 in Tables 1.02 and 1.03), and, with respect to the ordered probit models (Regression Models 4 and 5), the results are significant at the 5% rather than the 1% level. In summary, independent of the sub-sample of countries used, the robust negative association between the EDD/NEDD ratio and the level of rent extraction predicted by the model remains robust.

> 34 Running the regressions to include bureaucratic salaries controls increases the robustness of the EDD/NEDD index. Running regression 4 using a ranking of bureaucratic salaries (n=18) yields an EDD coefficient of -2.41 (0.80), significant at the 5% level. The rank on bureaucratic salaries is not significant.

> 35 All countries in the dataset classified, by Freedom House (2011) as democracies.

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