for some indicators of contemporaneous socio-economic development (column 1), I add to the regression controls region fixed-effects (column 2), and province fixed-effects (column 3).<sup>26</sup> I find no significant effect of refugees on average. I then examine whether the effect is heterogeneous depending on the population size of the community as the presence of a sport association greatly varies with the population (almost all communities with more than 1,100 inhabitant have a association, while it is the case for only 58% of smaller communities). As columns 4 to 6 show, the effect of refugees becomes significantly positive among small communities with less than 1,100 inhabitants (which corresponds to the bottom two terciles of the distribution), while the effect is null in larger communities.<sup>27</sup> The estimates suggest that, among small communities, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of refugees is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability of having at least one sport association.

Importantly, this result is robust to using the distribution of refuges in 1923 (instead of 1928). At that time, refugees had been in Greece for less than 6 months and self-selection on unobservables is arguably less problematic as their principal worries were to find relief and shelter. Table A.7 in the appendix shows that, among small communities, the share of refugees in 1923 is positively correlated with the presence of a sport association.

This positive relationship is fully consistent with refugees’ higher civic engagement relative to natives, as evidenced in section 5.3. Interestingly, I find that Albanian immigrants – who are less socially integrated than refugees and rarely engage in public life – have no significant effects on presence of sport associations in the communities they live in (see Table A.8 in the appendix). This suggests that refugees’ positive impact on social capital is likely driven by their active participation in the civic and political life and by their efforts of assimilation in the Greek society more in general.

**Political fragmentation** Table 5 reports OLS estimates of the effects of refugees on political fragmentation across 325 municipalities of Greece in the 2010s. I find no evidence that refugees’ presence significantly affect political fragmentation, either in the 2012 or in the 2015 election. I continue to find insignificant effects when I use an alternative fragmentation index in which parties are grouped into a leftist and a rightist coalition (Table A.9), or when I estimate alternative specifications using a quadratic or a logarithm function of the refugees’ share (Table A.10). This null result is consistent with the fact that refugees’ voting patterns are extremely similar to natives. **Crime** Table 6 presents some suggestive evidence on the refugees’ impact on crime at a broad geographical level, i.e., across 55 departments of Greece. I find that a higher share of refugees is significantly associated with a lower number of crimes in 2015, with a 1% increase in the refugees’ share leading to a 2.4% reduction in the number of crimes.

> 26More specifically, regression controls in column 1 include terciles of the 1991 population, the share of secondary and tertiary educated individuals in the 20-65 population in 1991, the employment share of non-agricultural occupations and of the manufacturing sector in 1991.

> 27All regressions include a binary variable for small communities in the controls.

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