Philippines, for example, the country team’s expectations were low at the outset due to the failure of previous reform efforts to gain traction. The Bank had tried to influence major opposition groups, such as large taxpayers and anti-reform elements in Congress, through dialogue, but to no avail. Through ABSM analysis, the team was surprised to find that a small group of previously overlooked stakeholders—the tax examiners working in the Bureau of Internal Revenue—would likely block reforms otherwise supported by the majority of stakeholders. This insight prompted the team to shift tactics, introducing into the NPSTAR program a more aggressive change management strategy aimed at helping tax examiners and other lower-level staff understand the potential benefits to be gained from improved taxpayer registration and broader tax administration reform.

Other cases demonstrated that shifts in the Bank’s own positioning on reforms might yield betterthan-expected results. In two cases, reflecting variance in internal views and expressing diverse Bank positions on reform led to a tightening of stakeholder consensus at a higher level of reform than initially anticipated. In one case, working toward a more moderate goal with greater inclusiveness yielded better-than-expected results, since key stakeholders for whom the reforms had high salience could drive progress. Maintaining a focus on tangible micro-reforms held the key to realizing limited but meaningful objectives in an otherwise stalled macro-reform environment.

**Table 4:  Key Insights from ABSM Evaluations**

|**Pilot**<br>**application**|**Ex ante**<br>**expectations**|**ABSM analysis and**<br>**recommendations**|**Immediate**<br>**outcomes**|**Impact over time**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Mongolia**<br>Budget<br>transparency| Pre-election timing<br>considered a window<br>of opportunity for<br>transparency reforms| Powerful officials<br>strongly opposed<br>greater public access<br>to budgets<br> Opportunities for<br>Bank to work with<br>civil society to push<br>for reform| Bank made an effort<br>to engage in<br>meaningful<br>consultations;<br>increased emphasis on<br>demand-side in<br>country program| Insights supported<br>by CGAC political<br>economy analysis<br> Achieved reform<br>level Bank team was<br>aiming for: better than<br>basecase, but short of<br>Bank’s stated position<br>(full reform)|
|**Mongolia**<br>Mining<br>transparency| Pre-election timing<br>considered a window<br>of opportunity for<br>transparencyreforms| No concrete<br>agreement expected,<br>despite support of key<br>counterparts| “Wait and see”<br>approach| Team may reapply<br>model in post-election<br>environment|
|**Philippines**<br>Tax<br>administration| Difficult project<br>implementation due<br>to disagreement over<br>design and failure of<br>past reform efforts| One overlooked<br>group of stakeholders<br>(tax examiners) could<br>block implementation<br> Revise project<br>approach| Bank introduced<br>change management<br>into project design;<br>slightly adjusted<br>timeline| Project still in early<br>implementation phase<br>due to other<br>unforeseen political<br>obstacles|
|**Timor-Leste**<br>Civil service<br>reform| Window of<br>opportunity on civil<br>service reform seen to<br>open; Bank still<br>forming its strategy| Some consensus on<br>setting up formal<br>architecture of civil<br>service management<br> Civil servants could<br>splinter consensus if<br>mobilized| Little role seen for<br>the Bank at the time<br> Conduct more<br>analytical work while<br>awaiting Parliamentary<br>action| Civil Service<br>Commission created<br>with expansive scope<br> Little movement on<br>broader civil service<br>agenda|

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