less. However, teacher absence, instead of being tied to job security and pay, was instead more positively correlated with whether a school had been inspected recently, had better infrastructure, or was closer to a paved road.<sup>34</sup> Meanwhile, data analyzed by Geeta Kingdon and Francis Teal show that teachers who are unionized are paid more, but their students perform less well than those of non-unionized teachers.<sup>35</sup> The arguments against increasing the use of contract teachers focus on three principal concerns: long-term incentives amidst poor or uncertain working conditions, politicization and corruption, and inferior qualifications and training. Critics note that the long-term incentives of contract teachers may be distinct from short-term incentives. Although contract teachers are observed to exert more effort in experiments lasting a year or two, remaining without job security for a long period of time, and at a pay level much lower than their civil service counterparts, could reduce incentives for contract teachers to improve their skills, and could lead them to work less hard because they do not feel fairly treated. For instance, a study of cognitive psychological attitudes in Israel found that temporary teaching contracts were correlated with adverse work attitudes – lower commitment, inferior perceptions of organization support, stronger intentions to quit, and more resistance to change.<sup>36</sup> A longitudinal study in Sweden found that job insecurity seemed to cause lower levels of well-being and mental health. This in turn affected organizational goals.<sup>37</sup> In addition, the superior incentives that contract teachers face may be predicated on the expectation of an eventual permanent civil service contract – it may be the temporary nature of contract teaching status that drives them to work harder in the experimental interventions, rather than annual renewal of contracts per se. Pandey writes, “The aspiration to be ‘regularized’ some day appears to be the chief motivating factor for these teachers . . .”<sup>38</sup> There are also concerns related to politicization and corruption in teacher appointments. In Cambodia, for instance, concerns regarding corruption in the appointment of contract teachers contributed to a policy reversal and a decline in the use of contract teachers starting around 2002. Tara Beteille finds that membership in a political party and candidacy for office are more closely correlated with teacher absenteeism than union membership, which suggests that it is the political environment, rather than, or at least in addition to, labor market conditions, that are weakening performance incentives for teachers in India. In her account, teachers frequently informally campaign for politicians and their control of voting booths allows them to potentially manipulate elections. Meanwhile, politicians are able to protect teachers from punishment who are frequently

> 34 Michael Kremer et. Al., Teacher Absence in India: a Snapshot, (2004)

> 35 Geeta Kingdon and Francis Teal, TEACHER UNIONS, TEACHER PAY, AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE IN INDIA: A PUPIL FIXED EFFECTS APPROACH, CESifo Working Paper No. 2428, Oct. 2008

> 36 Zehava Rosenblatt and Ayalla Ruvio, Journal of Organization Behavior 17 587-605 (1996)

> 37 Johnny Hellgren and Magnus Sverke, Does job insecurity lead to impaired well-being or vice versa? Estimation of cross-lagged effects using latent variable modeling, JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 24 215-236 (2003)

> 38 Pandey, _supra_ note 16 at 331

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