# **4.1 Incidence and frequency of conflicts**

Table 5 presents results from the cross sectional analysis of determinants for contemporaneous conflict (equation 1). The first two columns refer to the cross section where the dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one if the plot was affected by a conflict that started after 1998 and was still pending in 2001. We note a number of results of interest. Lands under customary tenure are significantly less likely to be affected by dispute; their probability of having conflict is 11% lower than that of otherwise identical plots. To address concerns that this result may be due to the lower values of customary lands which are normally located farther from infrastructure and may be of lower quality, we include the median land price per acre in the village to capture these effects. One possible explanation for this is that, in many instances, customary arrangements continue to function well and allow quick resolution of conflicts at the local level, similar to what is observed in other countries (Lavigne-Delville 2002).

Home plots are also less likely to be affected by conflict; the point estimate for the coefficient indicates a probability of conflict for such plots that is lower by 17%, other things constant, than on others. One of the reasons for this result could be that continued occupation makes it more difficult to dispute a household’s ownership of a given plot, in addition to the fact that equity concerns would make it more difficult to dislodge a household from the home plot. Interestingly, other plot characteristics, including plot size, type of acquisition, and -most surprisingly- the length of previous plot ownership, are not significant determinants of a plot’s conflict status.

Concerning the gender dimension of land conflicts and land rights, we note that, everything else constant, the probability of female headed households to be affected by a land conflict is about 11% higher than that of households headed by a male. To explore possible channels of transmission, we further distinguish between female heads who are married, separated, and widowed. Column 2 of table 3 illustrates that, whereas being a married female head (e.g. due to migration of the husband) does not increase the probability of having a land conflict, widows are 14% and separated women 48% more likely to have a land conflict. Although the magnitude of the coefficient on separated females may partly be endogenous if women separate from their husband because of conflicts over land, this is not a concern in the case of widows. It implies that, in an environment where HIV/AIDS-related mortality is high, measures to increase widow’s tenure security (and that of women in general) will be especially important.

The fact that the age of the household head is negatively related to the probability of having conflict suggests that generational transition, possibly but not necessarily related to formal inheritance, makes it more likely for a plot to be affected by conflict. In this context, it is not surprising to find that the probability of having a land conflict decreases significantly with age. One reason could be that young people are more likely to be involved in inheritance-related disputes with their parents whose probability of being alive is inversely related to the age of their children. Also, older people may have higher standing in the community, thus decreasing the likelihood of being involved in land disputes.

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