rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table 3: Co-movements Across Variables**

||**gdp**|**gdp**<br>**agri**|**gdp**<br>**non-agri**|**inv**|**int rate**|**int rate**<br>**US**|**gdp**<br>**foreign **|**tot**|**gov**<br>**cons**|**gov**<br>**inv**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|gdp|1||||||||||
|gdp agri|0.39|1|||||||||
|gdp non-agri|0.97|0.17|1||||||||
|inv|0.89|0.33|0.87|1|||||||
|int rate|-0.17|0.00|-0.18|-0.23|1||||||
|int rate us|0.13|-0.15|0.18|0.00|0.41|1|||||
|gdp foreign|0.82|0.30|0.80|0.74|-0.23|0.24|1||||
|tot|-0.56|0.08|-0.63|-0.35|0.25|-0.44|-0.74|1|||
|gov cons|0.85|0.01|0.91|0.86|-0.09|0.09|0.65|-0.42|1||
|gov inv|0.10|-0.18|0.16|0.02|0.14|0.02|-0.03|0.07|0.26|1|

_Source_ : Authors.

Overall, several findings from the unconditional moments of Paraguayan data are worth emphasizing:

- Real GDP is less volatile than investment, private and government consumption, with investment being the most volatile variable among them. Agricultural GDP is over 40 percent more volatile than aggregate GDP.

- The terms of trade and real interest rate are more volatile than aggregate GDP.

- Aggregate investment and government consumption are strongly pro-cyclical, while the terms of trade and the real interest rate are countercyclical. Public investment is weakly positively correlated with GDP, which implies that the strong pro-cyclicality of aggregate investment is driven by the private and not by the public component of investment.

# **Structural vector autoregression analysis**

While unconditional correlations are useful to summarize the relationship between various variables, they do not allow us to discern the effects of various shocks on domestic output. Therefore, next, we turn to vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to gain a better understanding of the dynamic relationships between various domestic and external variables over the business cycle in Paraguay. Since we are interested in a causal interpretation of these relationships, we will use a structural VAR guided by economic theory.

We are interested in identifying and quantifying the effects of both domestic and external shocks on Paraguayan output. Our empirical model has the following form: tt tt−1 tt where is a vector of domestic and external variables; and AAww = BBww + εε _A_ and _B_ are parameters matrices. We are using a first-order SVAR since this is the order chosen by the Schwarz’s Bayesian information tt criterion (BIC) for selecting the lag length. The vector ww consists of two blocks of variables. A u foreign block is [ t , ]′, while the domestic block is composed of , t ]′. tt Here _tot_ is the terms of trade, ff is the real (3-month) T-bill rate in the US, and ww if the (log) tt tt tt tt tt tt tt tt tt rr , yy [gg , ii yy , rr , yy rr<sup>u</sup> yy<sup>ff</sup>
TABLE 7: regressions on multiple outcome and binary borrower

||OLS (1)|FE (1)|FE (2)|
|---|---|---|---|
||MultipleOutcome|MultipleOutcome|MultipleOutcome|
|Borrower<br>Size<br>GDP p.c.|1.915***<br>(0.096)<br>0.012<br>(0.017)<br>-0.000007<br>(0.00001)|1.905***<br>(0.047)<br>-0.025<br>(0.019)<br>-0.000001<br>(0.00001)|1.896***<br>(0.048)<br>-0.025<br>(0.019)<br>-0.000001<br>(0.00001)|
|Volatility<br>Growth|0.0001<br>(0.0001)<br>0.327*<br>(0.113)|-0.00005<br>(0.00002)<br>0.116<br>(0.179)|-0.00005<br>(0.00002)<br>0.116<br>(0.179)|
|Infrastructure|0.512<br>(1.173)|-0.000<br>(0.475)|-0.000<br>(0.475)|
|Bureaucracy|0.105<br>(0.077)|-0.120*<br>(0.065)|-0.157*<br>(0.068)|
|Corruption<br>Accountability<br>Stability|0.004<br>(0.077)<br>0.034<br>(0.031)<br>0.027<br>(0.038)|-0.026<br>(0.017)<br>0.115***<br>(0.035)<br>-0.001<br>(0.006)|-0.026<br>(0.017)<br>0.108***<br>(0.036)<br>-0.001<br>(0.006)|
|Ethnic<br>Ext. conflict|0.009<br>(0.041)<br>0.037*<br>(0.015)|0.015<br>(0.016)<br>-0.007<br>(0.008)|0.015<br>(0.016)<br>-0.007<br>(0.008)|
|Country FE||Yes|Yes|
|Year FE<br>|Othe<br>|r Statistics<br>|Yes<br>|
|Observ.<br>|1710|1710|1710|
|Adj. R<sup>2</sup>|0.534|0.550|0.552|
|Prob(F)|0.00|0.00|0.00|

Note: both the project outcome variable and the borrower performance variable are reported on a 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 (successful) scale. For further references, see the text.

24
Bluffstone, R, E. Somanathan, P. Jha, Harisharan Luintel, R. Bista, M. Toman, N. Paudel, B. Adhikari. 2018. “ _Does Collective Action Sequester Carbon? Evidence from the Nepal Community Forestry Programme,_ ” <u>World</u> _<u>Development</u>_ 101: 133–141 Bluffstone, R., E. Robinson and P. Guthiga. 2013. _“REDD+ and Community Controlled Forests in LowIncome Countries: Any Hope for a Linkage?” Ecological Economics_ , 87: 43-52.

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many firms, it must be the case either that there are important external effects so that the increasing returns are external to any individual firm, as suggested by Alfred Marshall, or that firms do not sell gord& that are perfect substitutes, as emphasized by Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin. These alternatives have implications for other observations about industry and firm behavior that can be compared with data. Thus, formal theories of market equilibrium show how evidence about industrial organization and firm behavior can be brought to bear on the fundamental questions about growth. Absen **t** hese theories, economists were free to assume whatever they wanted about returns to scale. On these grounds, a complete, general equilibrium model is to be preferred. It is much harder to relate a model like the Harrod-Domar model to industry data. At the aggregate level, the reference standard for an equilibrium model is the neoclassical model, amodel that has fallen out of favor in studies of development. In part, this is because it has littl **e** xplanatory power in comparisons ofgrowth rates across countries; most of the action is in the exogenous variation in the rate of technological change. Apparently because of dissatisfaction with this model, the modeling strategy in development has beeA to use models that are less restrictive but that therefore have much less power to integrate evidence from many different quarters. Because they are less restrictive, Harrod-Domar models that emphasize fixed coefficients for labor and capital in the production of output and assume that a supply of unemployed labor is available, or disequilibrium models that focus on exogenously given differences inthe marginal productivity of inputs in different sectors and on the reallocation of resources acros **s** ectors offer richer and more suggestive ways to summarize the data than the rigid growth accounting framework of the neoclassical model. Withou **t** hese less rigid models, it is hard to motivate examinati **o** fa variable n like trade policy or to entertain the possibili **t** hat y variation in the rate of investment might play a
options exist for producing energy from biomass, LCA studies should adopt a double-difference approach, i.e., differencing the reduction in emissions when biomass is used to displace both gasoline and grid electricity. The utilization of biomass for provision of electricity or clean cooking fuels like biogas in rural and remote areas of developing countries will also have other important social impacts.

5. The literature on crops and production conditions in developing countries is scarce with the exception of a few studies on sugarcane in Brazil, India, Thailand, and Morocco. Therefore, if much of the demand for biofuels in the EU is going to be met through imports from developing countries, then there is little basis to conclude about the climate or other benefits of biofuels.

6. Lastly, studies seem to focus largely on carbon and energy intensity, while ignoring other indicators such as those related to human health, soil erosion, nutrient loading in rivers, the health of the ecosystem, etc. These are important environmental impacts that need to be considered in evaluating the environmental impacts of biofuels (Andrews 2006). A recent study comparing the impact of gasoline and E85 (85% ethanol fuel, 15% gasoline) on cancer risk and ozonerelated health consequences found a scenario that includes projected improvements in gasoline and E85 vehicle emission controls may increase ozonerelated mortality, hospitalization, and asthma by about 9% in Los Angeles and 4% in the United States as a whole (relative to 100% gasoline), while it was estimated to cause little change in cancer risk. As a result, the study concluded that E85 might be a greater overall public health risk than gasoline (Jacobson 2007).

# **2.5 Caveats of LCA**

Several aspects of LCA, including the choice and definition of indicators and the methodology itself have been controversial and the subject of intense debate (Pimentel and Patzek 2005; Farrell 2006; Macedo, Leal, and de Silva 2004; Mattsson, Cederberg, and Blix 2000; Delucchi 2004).

33
education was the primary obstacle, followed by the labor market (31%), their children (12%), or other reasons (15%), with 6% citing their husbands and another 4% citing their families as the primary obstacle. There is thus a substantial minority for whom family objections or obligations (especially childcare) are an impediment to labor market participation, along with a slight majority of working women who would prefer not to be in the labor force—potentially because of the burden of household labor they struggle to escape.<sup>9</sup>

# **5 Female Labor Burden Correlates with Perceived Male Attitudes**

Does this distribution of household labor reflect respondents’ preferences, their perceptions of social norms, or both? In this section, I show that the reported _female household share_ of labor introduced above does not correlate with respondents’ personal attitudes, but does correlate with respondents’ perceptions of men’s attitudes. These results are consistent with recent findings from Jordan that women’s labor force participation is correlated with expectations of husbands’ attitudes (Gauri, Rahman, and Sen 2019).

I hypothesized ex ante that respondents living in households with a more traditional division of labor would have more conservative personal attitudes and would perceive more conservative norms.<sup>10</sup> To test this expectation, I assess the correlation between the female household share (FHS) variable and (1) the personal attitudes score and (2) the perceived norms scores by estimating weighted OLS regressions where the outcome is either the PA score or the relevant PN score (on the scale of 0-3, where 3 indicates the most egalitarian position), and the predictors are the FHS variable and the set of standard covariates described in the Data section. The hypothesis was that the coefficient on the

> 9. The survey also asked currently employed female respondents who would prefer _not_ to work what compelled them to do so anyway. 92% stated their financial situation obliged them to work, and 8% cited other reasons. No respondent answered that their husband required them to work.

> 10. See pre-registered hypothesis H2(c).

16
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McKenzie, David and Anna Luisa Paffhausen (2019) “Small Firm Death in Developing Countries”, _Review of Economics and Statistics_ 101(4): 645-57.

McKenzie, David and Christopher Woodruff (2017) “Business Practices in Small Firms in Developing Countries”, _Management Science_ , 63(9): 2967-81.

McKenzie, David and Christopher Woodruff (2014) “What are we learning from business training evaluations around the developing world?”, _World Bank Research Observer_ , 29(1): 48-82 Williamson, Oliver (1979) “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, _Journal of Law and Economics_ 22(2): 233-61.

Young, Alwyn (2019) “Channelling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical Insignificance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results”, _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 134 (2): 557598 33
# Table of Contents

|Paae|
|---|
|Introduction.......<br>I|
|Characterizing Displaced Workers .............<br>.............................<br>2|
|An Overview of Displaced Worker Programs<sup>in Industrialized Countries ...............</sup><br>4|
|Sweden .......................................................<br>5<br> <br>8|
|Japan .......................................................<br><br> <br>|
|Britain .......................................................<br>8<br> <br>|
|North America and Australie .........................................<br>9|
|Retraining Displaced Workers: Who Needs<sup>it and How Should it be Done? ....</sup><br>....... 10|
|Screening" the Displaced from Other Unemployed<sup>Workers ....</sup><br>11.....<br>.....<br>I I<br> <br>|
|Basic Education Programs .<br>.........................................<br>12<br> <br>|
|How Should Training Be Done? ...........<br>..........................<br>15<br> <br>|
|Employer Involvement .<br>...........................................<br>18<br> <br>22|
|Performance-Based Contracting ...........<br>..........................<br><br> <br>|
|Training Allowances .<br>.............................................<br>3|
|Evaluation Studies of Retraining Programs<sup>..........</sup><br>.........................<br>25|
|U.S. Demonstration Projects .............<br>..........................<br>26<br> <br>|
|Canada ..................................................<br>35<br> <br>|
|Australia ...............................................<br>...<br>37<br> <br>|
|Sweden ...............................................<br>...<br>38<br> <br>|
|Britain ..................................................<br>39|
|Lessons for Developing and Middle-income<sup>Countries ...........................</sup><br>39|
|Agenda for Future Research .4..<br>......................<br>:<br>46|
|References .50|
|Text Tables|
|Table1 .4|
|Table 2 .6<br>|
|Table 3 .16<br>|
|Table 4 .26<br> <br>|
|Table 5 .......................<br>.<br>..<br>,,,..<br>29<br>|
|Table6 .33<br>Table7 .36|
Our study builds on and differentiates itself from this extant literature in several key respects. First, ours is the only study of which we are aware of to consider the impact of business training on a general population of female business owners, and on potential business owners, rather than solely on existing microfinance clients. This is important for generalizability, as well as for understanding the potential demand for such training among people who are not implicitly or explicitly compelled to participate by their lender. Second, our intervention employs the ILO’s SIYB program, which has been used to train over 4.5 million people in more than 95 countries worldwide. While the content of many of the training courses used in other studies appears similar in broad terms, each has some element of customization that makes comparability across studies difficult. Given that the SIYB program is the most widely applied microenterprise training program, evaluating its effectiveness is of particular interest. Third, we measure outcomes at four points in time post-training over the course of two years. This enables us to examine the trajectory of impacts, which turns out to be very important in practice, especially for potential business owners for whom we would infer very different impacts of the training in the short-term vs. medium-term. Finally, the use of grants along with training enables us to test whether the impact of business training differs with access to capital.<sup>2</sup> The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and randomization procedure; Section 3 the content of the training and determinants of training takeup; Section 4 provides a simple model for thinking about how training and grants might affect the selection of who operates a business; Section 5 provides our main results; and Section 6 concludes.

# **2. Context, the sample and randomization**

The urban labor force participation rate for women aged 20 to 40 in Sri Lanka was 38 percent in 2009, compared to rates over 90 percent for prime-aged men (Department of Census and Planning, 2010). Twenty-eight percent of women in paid work were self-employed, mostly in small and marginally profitable enterprises. Our own representative survey of 795 female enterprises in 2008 in the 31 largest urban areas found median profits of only 5000 Rs per month

> 2 Berge et al. (2010) also consider the impact of training plus grants. However, their sample is of microfinance clients, who may be less credit constrained in the first place, and the grants they give average only approximately 20 percent of monthly profits (compared to 375% of mean monthly profits in our case), making it unlikely that the grants they give are sufficiently large to have an effect (and they find none).

4
- 8 -

# Table 1: BEHAVIOR OF MONETARY AGGREGATES AND INFLATION OVER THE 1958-84 PERIOD

||12958-72|1973-84|
|---|---|---|
|M1/GDP|> 0|< 0|
|M/GDP|0|><br>0|
|Mi/M|.85|.57|
|Mi/M|>0|< 0|
|e|.110|.235|

The . indicates a derivative with respect to time. In the latter period, the coefficients were of an opposite sign from the former period and the standard errors were greatly reduced.

2.11 In the pre-indexation period broadly-defined monetary balances, M, was a relatively constant share of GDP. In addition, MH share of total monetary balances showed an increasing trend. In the latter period, behavior was very different: Ml declined in importance (as a share of both GDP and M), as firms and households avoided the tax of the latter period's higher inflation rate. At the same time, broadly-defined monetary balances increased, as the return on these balances were better insulated from changes in the inflation rate.

2.12 To summarize, with the introduction of indexation, the Colombian financial system became competitive on the resource mobilization side. This competition for funds provided a way for households and firms to avoid much of the increase in the inflation tax on transaction balances that would have occurred as a result of the sharp increase in the inflation rate. On the other hand, this system can hardly be described as a liberalized system that competitively allocates resources. As Correa (1986) documents, the assets of the system are still targeted to a wide range of below market interest rate loans in agriculture, industry, and low-income housing./11 2.13 A financial system that encourages more competition for deposits and simultaneously requires lenders to make below market rate loans ultimately imposes the costs of the loans on the institutions rather than the depositors. V/ Indeed, recent work by Dailami (1989) suggests that Colombian corporations are making use of below market interest rate credit to buy market rate financial assets. His work shows that in 1983 financial assets accounted for 20 percent of total assets of non-financial corporations in Colombia. This figure is double the rate observed in developed economies.
**Figure 2: Developing countries will account for a larger portion of world output in the coming decade**

<!-- Start of picture text --> GDP, 2004 US$ trillion<br>90.0<br>80.0<br>70.0<br>2005<br>60.0<br>2010<br>50.0<br>2015<br>40.0<br>2020<br>30.0<br>2025<br>20.0<br>2030<br>10.0<br>0.0<br>World Developed Developing LAC<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank simulations using the Linkage model.

In the baseline growth scenario and using 2004 PPP exchange rates<sup>14</sup> , the speed of convergence between developing- and developed-country incomes would be rather slow and varying significantly across regions. In 2004, the average developing-country resident receives about 14 percent of the average income of a resident of high income countries—$4,460 versus $31,400 (see Figure 3). This ratio would rise to 25 percent in 2030. The convergence would be particularly modest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese incomes would rise much faster, from 11 percent of the average high income level to 53 percent, achieving an average income close to the lower range of today’s poorest high-income countries. Latin America would also see a noticeable convergence with the developed countries. Countries such as Argentina or Chile are expected to reach income levels of over half of the high income average, while citizens of Mexico and Peru will be earning on average close to 45 percent of the income of rich countries’ citizens by 2030.

> 14 Using the market dollar exchange rate of an economy provides a biased estimate of individual wellbeing because prices differ substantially across economies—particularly for non-traded goods such as personal and housing services. For this reason, it is more appropriate to use the PPP exchange rates, which take into account these differences in prices.

11