rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **A. Data**

Under the Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development Project (RERED), the World Bank has been supporting Bangladesh’s efforts to increase access to electricity in rural areas through both grid and off-grid options since the mid-1990s. This study is based on two rounds of World Bank-sponsored household survey intended to assess the impacts of the RERED project. The surveys were carried out under the auspices of BREB. The first-round survey, carried out in 2005, has a nationally representative sample of 20,900 households from about 1,300 villages. The survey covers a wide geographic area, including 45 of 70 PBS, operated by BREB. Details of the survey design can be found in Khandker, Barnes and Samad (2013).

A follow-up survey in 2010 retraced 16,236 households from the original population. A stratified random sample of 7,352 households was then drawn based on village level attrition rate – a village is selected if at least 10 and no more than 25 original households remain in the panel. After data cleaning 7,018 households representing all 45 original PBS are used for the analysis.

Both rounds of surveys contain detailed questions on households’ social and economic characteristics, income, expenditure, and energy use patterns, such as monthly electricity consumption, the status of grid connection, and households’ appliance ownership. The 2005 survey also contains information on quality of electricity services. Specifically, households were asked to report daily average duration of electricity supply in hours.

# **B. Descriptive analysis**

Table 2 describes the geographic distribution and electricity access rate of the surveyed population. The sample size of each division is. in general proportional to the electrification rate of that division. Rajshahi division accounts for the largest share of the sample, followed by Chittagong division. Barisal division has the lowest electrification rate and the smallest sample size. The household electrification rate has gone up significantly over the 5-year period between the two surveys, from 32 percent to 46.7 percent on average. Across the divisions, Sylhet and Chittagong have undergone the largest expansion of electric grid Households reporting having access to grid electricity increased from 35.1 to 54.5 percent in Sylhet, and from 35.5 to 53.6 percent in Chittagong, between 2005 and 2010.

Table 3 compares mean outcomes of households and individuals by electrification status. It shows that households with access to grid electricity on average consume less kerosene than off-grid households in both survey years, and the differences are statistically significant. Grid-connected households are also 6
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# AIpnendix- Some Working Definitions

# Paradigm:

- (1) an accepted model or pattern ...as an object for further articulation and specificadon under new or more stringent conditions;

- (2) a criterion for choosing problems ... that can be assumed to have solutions. Other problems are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or someines as just too problematic to be worth the time;

- (3) the endre constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community, or one element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-soludons which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science;

- (4) a dme-tested and group-licensed way of seeing;

- _(5)_ not the same as shared rules; the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists.50

Development: a process of progressive societal (therefore involving equity and political issues) and economic transformation, the major objective of which is the satisfaction of human needs and aspirations, usually achieved by increasing productive potential (growth) and equality of opportunity.51

# Sustainable Development:

- (1) "a pattern of social and structural economic transformations which optimizes the economic and other societal benefits available in the present, without jeopardizing the likely potendal for similar benefits in the future."<sup>52</sup> or,

- (2) "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. ...A process of change in which exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the reorientation of technology development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations."<sup>53</sup>

- (3) Related terms: Hicksian _income:_ "the maximum amount that a person or nation could consume over some time period and still be as well off at the end of the period as at the beginning. Income equals maximum sustainable consumption."<sup>54</sup> This does not consider the phenomena of time lags between activities and ecological effects, however, hence, the issue of economic discount rates is still a serious matter to be resolved. Ecology and economics presently have very different concepts of what _production, capital, health,_ etc. mean. These need to be integrated into a common discipline. Also, the distinction between _"sustainable"_ and _"sustained" is_

_5_ Kuho, Ihomas S., 1970. _The Structure of Scient#fkc Revolutions, 2nd Edition._ U of Chicago Press, Chicago.

_51_ World Commission of Environment and Development, 1987. _Our Common Futur,_ Oxford University Pross, Oxford & New YoL _52_ Goodland, Robet, and George Ledec, 1987b. "Neoclassical Economics and Principles of Sustainable Development" _Ecological Modelling, 38:_ 19-46; p. 36.

53 WCED, 1987, Qp. cit, p. 43,46. Ss Daly, Heman E., 1989. "Sustainable Development from concept and the towars opertional principle", _Populion and Development Review,_ Hoover Institution, in press.
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# **<u>References</u>**

Acosta, P., Calderon, C., Fajnzylber, P., and Lopez, H. (2006). “Remittances and development in Latin America.” _World Economy_ , 29, 957-987.

- Adams, Jr., R.  (2004).  “Remittances and poverty in Guatemala.” _World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3418._ Washington, DC:  World Bank.

Adams, Jr, R. (2006). “International remittances and the household: analysis and review of global evidence.” _Journal of African Economies,_ 15, 396-425.

Adams, Jr., R. and Page, J. (2005). “Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries?” _World Development_ , 33, 1645-1669.

Agarwal, R. and Horowitz, A. (2002). “Are international remittances altruism or insurance: Evidence from Guyana using multiple-migrant households.” _World Development_ , 30, 2033-2044.

- Banerjee, B.  (1984). “The probability, size and uses of remittances from urban to rural areas in India.” _Journal of Development Economics_ , 16, 293-311.

Barro, R. and Lee, J. (2000). “Data set on educational attainment of the total population, aged 25 and older.” Available on the web site of the Center for International Development at Harvard University (www.ksg.harvard.edu/cid).

Cox, D., Eser, Z., Jimenez, E. (1998). “Motives for private transfers over the life cycle: An analytical framework and evidence for Peru.” _Journal of Development Economics_ , 55, 57-80.

Docquier, F. and Marfouk, A. (2005). “International migration by education attainment, 1990-2000.” In _International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain,_ eds. C. Ozden and M. Schiff (pp. 151-199). Washington, DC: World Bank.

El-Sakka, M. and McNabb, R. (1999). “The macroeconomic determinants of emigrant remittances.” _World Development_ , 27, 1493-1502.
POVERTY AND INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS IN SLUMS

# References

Foster, V., and M. C. Araujo. 2004. “Does infrastructure reform work for the poor? A case study from Guatemala.” Policy Research Working Paper 3185. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Davis, M. 2006. _Planet of Slums_ . London and New York: Verso.

Gulyani, S., and D. Talukdar. 2007. “Inside Informality: The Links between Poverty, Micro-enterprises, and Living Conditions in Nairobi’s Slums,” Working Paper, Africa Urban and Water 1. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- ———. 2008. “Slum Real Estate: The Low-Quality High-Price Puzzle in Nairobi’s Slum Rental Market and Its Implications for Theory and Practice,” _World Development 36(10)._

UNFPA. 2007. _State of world population 2007._ New York: United Nations.

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focuses at the country level – i.e. in the Grossman/Horn view, Toyota can affect only its own reputation in foreign markets whereas in Mayer’s model, the experience with Toyota also determines how foreign consumers view other Japanese companies such as Honda. The difference matters because returns to reputation acquisition are appropriable in the Grossman and Horn model whereas they are not in the Mayer model.

It is worth noting that the conclusions of Grossman and Horn (1988) are not the ones reached by Bagwell and Staiger (1989) who argue that if asymmetric information blocks the entry of high quality firms, export subsidies can improve welfare by breaking the entry barrier facing high quality firms. Thus, whether or not an export subsidy is desirable hinges very much on the nature of the distortion that is caused by the presence of asymmetric information.<sup>10</sup> Now we discuss how an argument for industrial policy might arise in the context of FDI. Policy intervention with respect to FDI has a long history and the rationale for such intervention has frequently been the effects of FDI on productivity of local firms via technology transfer as well as linkage effects. The literature on FDI, technology transfer, and linkages has been surveyed extensively in Saggi (2002) and here we confine ourselves to those aspects of FDI that relate intimately to local industrial development and its linkage effects since these correspond quite well to the coordination failure rationale for industrial policy.

There exists a voluminous informal as well as empirical literature on backward linkages. For example, the 1996 issue of the <u>World Investment Report</u> was devoted entirely to the effects of FDI on backward linkages in host countries. However, analytical models that explore the relationship between multinationals and backward linkages in the host country are hard to come by. Two prominent examples of such models are Markusen and Venables (1999) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996a). Both these studies provide important insights regarding the two-way relationship between multinationals and linkages. In the models of Rodriguez-Clare (1996a) and Markusen and Venables (1999) the intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive so that the effects of foreign investment occur via altering the incentives for entry into such markets. In both models, Ethier's

> 10 See also Raff and Kim (1999) for further investigation of the export subsidy result in the presence of oligopoly into which there is no free entry.

22
2008) is consistent with this argument, and might help to explain why the demands for a better performing public sector have been traditionally low.

# **2.2 Dysfunctions by default**

While several PSR initiatives have been tried in the past 20 years, they have largely failed to address the functional problems described above. Successive administrations in Sierra Leone have since the end of the conflict, at least in their public announcements, have identified the resuscitation of the public service as a priority vital for stability, poverty reduction, service delivery and the creation of a capable state. This was clearly reflected in the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP I, 2005) and reemphasized in PRSP II (Agenda for change, 2009<sup>20</sup> ). Public sector reform has also been an integral part of the reforms that donors have been trying to achieve through sector investments and the provision of Budget Support. However, despite this rhetoric, until recently the public service reforms have not been a revealed priority in the GoSL‘s development agenda, with the result that previous reform attempts have been largely donor-driven<sup>21</sup> . Partially as a consequence of this, government initiatives have tended to focus around ̳ad-hoc‘ measures in response to immediate problems and issues, usually in response to pressures from different interests groups<sup>22</sup> , without adequate consideration of the long-term consequences of their actions. For example, the GoSL and its DPs have usually dealt with the ̳capacity gap‘ in the civil service by either bypassing government agencies and outsourcing their functions (working with NGOs and other non-state actors) or by ̳creating temporary capacity‘ through the use of

> 20  ―It _is our conviction that no economic transformation is possible without a transparent, accountable and effective public sector dedicated to providing supportive policies and actions. In this respect it is our intention to reform the public sector, support the private sector, modernize the financial sector, and take robust action on corruption"._ President Ernest Koroma, Opening Statement, Agenda for Change. 21 Among international donors, DFID has been actively engaged to support civil service reforms, until pulling out in 2010. An internal DFID report noted  ̳lack of ownership‘ of the reform agenda by government authorities as one of the reasons for the disappointing progress on PSR agenda.

> 22 A recent example is the ad hoc pay increases in 2010 and 2011 without any of the complementary reform elements identified in the government‘s strategy paper on pay reforms. The use of LTAs, donor funded lines agencies, PIUs, etc. has continued over the years without any long term strategy for finding sustainable alternatives. There are a large number of ―informal‖ arrangements such as the recruitment of staff by MDAs from retained resources outside of the formal recruitment systems.  Others include the recent Free HealthCare Initiative.

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unintended consequences on school leavers’ decisions to pursue or complete further education. Indeed, recent evidence from the U.S. suggests that active labor market policies targeted at students may delay or even reduce graduation rates among beneficiaries (Heller and Kessler, 2021).

Second, the incentive has large employment effects for graduates of vocational schools (and those planning to enter the labor market). Over the first year, average formal employment rates increase by 4.2 p.p. (16.8%). This effect is exclusively driven by a 5.1 p.p. (30%) increase in jobs with permanent contracts. Treatment effects persist after two years with average formal employment gains of 4.2 p.p. (14.5%), driven by a 5 p.p. (25%) increase in jobs with permanent contracts. These are intent-to-treat estimates of making youths _eligible_ to receive the bonus. In fact, more than half of youths who find formal employment fail to claim the incentive.

Third, we show that these results are due to employment gains on both the extensive and intensive margins. The share of vocational school graduates ever formally employed increases by 5.4 p.p. (10%) over the first two years. This average increase masks a shift between types of employment. The share ever working with a permanent contract increases by 8.6 p.p. (20.5%) while the share with temporary contracts decreases by 1.1 p.p. (4.8%). In addition, endline survey data suggests that about half of formal employment gains come from a reduction in informal employment. These shifts in employment types matter as formal jobs, especially those with permanent contracts, offer more training and social security benefits. We also find that workers in the treatment group are less likely to report adverse income shocks resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The effects on retention depend on the contract type. While there is no difference between the control and treatment groups for employment spells starting with permanent contracts, the hazard rate of leaving employment is 26% lower in the treatment group for employment spells that start with temporary contracts. This increase in retention is driven by the fact that among youth starting with temporary contracts, those in the treatment group are 70% more likely to transition to a permanent contract than those in the control group. Permanent contracts provide youths with more control over their career. The main reason for leaving a permanent position is for jobs with better working conditions and pay, while those with temporary contracts most frequently state that they stopped working because their jobs were 3
# Table 4: Regional Integration Sclenies: Openness (OP) aiid Inlra-Regional %iR) Exports

||Founded'|1<br>oPb|960<br>IR'|19<br>OP|70<br>IR|197<br>OP|5<br>IR|19<br>OP|80<br>IR|19<br>OP|85<br>IR|1<br>OP|990<br>IR|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ANZCERTA<br>EC|1983<br>|30.3<br>|5.7<br>(2.4)<br>|27.8|6.1<br>(2.1)|26.4|6.2<br>(1.7)|32.1|6.4<br>(1.4)|33.0|7.0<br>(1.6)|29.7|7.6<br>(1.5)|
|<br>|1957<br>|31.3<br>|34.5<br>(24.9)<br>|41.0|51.0<br>(39.0)|48.0|50.0<br>(35.9)|55.0|_54.0_<br>(34.9)|51.7|_54.5_<br>_(35.6)_|46.5|60.4<br>(41.4)|
|EFrA<br>|1960<br>|37.3<br>|21.1<br>(14.9)<br>|39.9|28.0<br>(14.9)|48.3,|35.2<br>(6.3)|57.4|32.6<br>(6.1)|_59.0_|31.2<br>(6.3)|52.6|28.2<br>(6.8)|
|Canada-US-FrA<br>|1989<br>|8.8<br>|26.5<br>(21.9)<br>|10.7|32.8<br>(20.5)|16.1|30.6<br>(16.8)|20.8|26.5<br>(15.1)|17.4|38.0<br>(16.7)|19.5|34.0<br>(15.8)|
|ASEAN<br>|1967<br>|36.6<br>|4.4<br>(2.6)|46.0|20.7<br>(2.1)|58.2|15.9<br>(2.6)|73.6|16.9<br>(3.7)|64.0|18.4<br>(3.9)|97.5|18.6<br>(4.3)|
|ANDEAN PACT<br>CACM|1969<br>|37.2<br>|0.7<br>(2.9)<br>|30.6<br>|2.0<br>(1.6)|40.5|3.7<br>(1.6)|40.3|3.8<br>(1.6)|29.4|3.4<br>(1.2)|32.5<br>|4.6<br>(0-9)|
|<br>LAFTA/LAI|1961<br>|33.7<br>|7.0<br>(0.4)<br>|43.4<br>|25.7<br>(0.4)|55.0|23.3<br>(0.3)|53.7|24.1<br>(0.2)|32.5|14.7<br>(0.2)|43'|14.8<br>(0.1)|
|A<br>|1960/80<br>|21.0|7.9<br>(6.0)|17.7|9.9<br>(4.4)|20.8|13.6<br>(3.5)|21.9|13.7<br>(4.2)|22.1|8.3<br>(4.7)|19.4|10.6<br>(3.4)|
|ECOWAS<br>A|1975<br>|n.a.|n.a.<br>n.a.|37.4|3.0<br>(1.0)|42.3|4.2<br>_(1-4)_|44.4|3.5<br>(1.7)|32.2|5.3<br>(I. 1)|52.6|6.0<br>(0.6)|
|PT|1987|n.a.|n.a.<br>n.a.|56.1|8.4<br>(1.1)|51.7|9.4<br>(0.5)|47.8|8.9<br>(0.4)|37.9|7.0<br>(0.3)|50.2|8.5<br>(0.2)|

For definition of RI schemes, see appendix table Al.

a. Year the arrangement went into effect if different from year of foundation. Ratios refer to number of members in year of calculation [e.g. EC (6) in 1970, EC (9) in 19751.

b. Openness measured by the trade/GDP ratio.

c. Intra-regional trade measured by share of intra-regional exports in total exports (share of RI scheme in total world exports in parenthesis). Souirce: IMF Direclion of trade.

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operate in PR ( _n_<sup>_s_</sup> = 0) if The relationships in (3), (4), and (6) demonstrate how trade costs on inputs can affect the industrial structure of a region. If a given location _j_ (e.g. the U.S. mainland) hosts a large number of suppliers of upstream product _k_ , and trade costs from location _j_ are high, then _P_<sup>�</sup><sup>_k_</sup> (in PR) will be high. If the products _k_ with high trade costs have sufficiently large input shares in sector _s_ , _μ_<sup>_ks_</sup> , then _c_ ( _A_<sup>_s_</sup> ) will be high, leading gross output in sector _s_ ( _X_<sup>_s_</sup> = _n_<sup>_s_</sup> _p_<sup>_s_</sup> _q_<sup>_s_</sup> ) to be low, possibly even zero. PR can be an unsuitable location for sector _s_ if it would otherwise purchase high-cost inputs from the U.S. Sector _s_ varieties that might have been produced in PR are produced elsewhere, and products _k_ used as inputs into _s_ production are not imported into PR.<sup>25</sup> Like the conventional substitution effect, production location effects reduce trade, but they do so in different ways, and their effects might be expected to dominate those of substitution effects among upstream products. Hillberry and Hummels (2008)’s finding that intermediate input trade is a central reason for the extremely high distance sensitivity of freight shipments over short distances is important evidence in this regard.

The bilateral trade prediction for upstream products ( _k ∈ V_ ) takes the form: Variation in _τj_<sup>_k_affectsbilateraltradethroughsubstitutionaccordingto</sup><sup>_−σk_,but</sup> tions of minimum efficient scale are likely to be particularly important in small economies like PR’s. 25One possible example of industry composition effects due to the JA is the absence of viable sugar cane growing and processing sectors on the island. Global agronomic data (https: //gaez-services.fao.org/) shows that much of PR has high yield potential in the production of cane sugar if modern production technologies are used (e.g. the application of physically heavy fertilizers and the use of bulky capital goods). While the increasing returns to scale model proposed here may not apply directly to the sugar cane growing sector, it offers a reasonable treatment of sugar cane processing. Trade data from IEPR (2021) show that exports of processed sugar from PR are almost non-existent.

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true for manufacturing – this time with the exception of Spain, where this share is low, and somewhat higher shares in Germany and Slovenia. The share of agriculture among shadow employees exceeds 5% only in Eastern European countries (except the Czech R. and Slovenia), as well as in Spain and Portugal. This finding does not change even if the currently non-employed persons who were engaged in informal work during the year before the survey are included. However, one must keep in mind that much of the seasonal agricultural work is performed by legal or illegal temporary immigrants which are unlikely to be covered by the surveys.

**_Establishment size._** Figure 13 compares, for each country, distribution of informal employees and their formal sector counterparts by establishment size. As expected, in all countries the share of small (under 10 workers) units is much larger in the informal sector (recall that we have not used the firm or establishment size when classifying employees as formal or informal). Moreover, in most countries at least half of informal employees work in units of less than 10 workers, and only in four countries (Denmark, Israel, Belgium and the UK) this share falls below 40%.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Formal and Informal Employees by Establishment Size<br>In European Countries, by Region. 2004-2009<br>PL EELVBGHUUARUROCZ SI SK FI NOSEDK ES IT PTGRCY IL CHFRDEAT IE NLBEUK<br>East North South West<br>PL EELVBGHUUARUROCZ SI SK FI NOSEDK ES IT PTGRCY IL CHFRDEAT IE NLBEUK<br>East North South West<br>1-9 workers 10-24 workers<br>25-99 workers<br>Formal: Employee with a contract; Informal: Employee without a contract. Self-employed excluded<br>Source: Calculation with ESS data<br>100<br>75<br>50<br>25<br>0<br>100<br>75<br>50<br>25<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 13 Formal and informal employees by country and size of establishment**

However, in every country a substantial part (from one fifth to two thirds) of informal employees work in establishments of size exceeding the conventional ̳5 workers informality 33