Irrespective of the growth, poverty projections show sizeable differences depending on the baseline year used: 2003, 2007 and 2009. In particular, estimates based on the latest HIES 2009 deliver consistently higher levels of poverty projections. This finding is not surprising however, as none of the projection approaches is able to match actual pre-conflict poverty dynamics (Table 10). _Accordingly, to make best use of pre-conflict data, preferred poverty projections should be based on HIES 2009 baseline poverty estimates_ .

_Table 10: Comparison between baseline poverty estimates and projections in 2009_

||**Poverty**<br>**line**<sup>**32**</sup>|**Poverty estimates**<br>**based on grouped data**<br>**from HIES 2009**|**Distribution neutral**<br>**poverty projections**<br>**baseline 2003**|**Distribution neutral**<br>**poverty projections**<br>**baseline 2007**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Constant pc GDP**|$2.15|2.4%|0.9%|2.7%|
|**Current pc GDP & CPI**|$2.15|2.4%|0.7%|2.8%|
|**Constant pc GDP**|$3.65|16.0%|10.2%|16.1%|
|**Current pc GDP & CPI**|$3.65|16.0%|9.5%|16.3%|

_Source_ : World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI and CBS data The analysis further reveals the substantial sensitivity of results to the choice of the NA aggregate growth to be used in the projections, with poverty projections based on the growth rate of constant per capita GDP being sizably different compared to those in which growth is estimated using per capita GDP in current prices (LCU) deflated using CPI. In particular, the while projections based on growth in constant pc GDP show a monotonic increase in poverty over the period 2011-2020, projections based on current pc GDP deflated using CPI show a marked increase in poverty between 2011-2016 – which corresponds to the most intense phase of the Syrian conflict – a decline in poverty between 2016 and 2019 – which correspond to a subdued phase of the conflict and pick up again post 2019, reflecting the compounding impact of the Lebanon financial crisis. _Based on considerations related to the reliability of constant GDP estimates_<sup>_33_</sup> _and a better match with observational accounts regarding the evolution of welfare in Syria based on non-monetary indicators, poverty projections based on current pc GDP growth deflated using CPI are preferred._ Lastly, Figure 13 and Figure 14 show poverty projection results using preferred poverty baseline (HIES 2009) and growth estimates (per capita GDP in current prices, deflated with CPI) at different values of the pass through: unitary, “conflict-adjusted” (which varies over the conflict years from 0.7 to 0.48 - see Box 2), as well as the pass through observed between 2007 and 2009 (0.29), a period characterized by drought and regressive welfare dynamics.<sup>34</sup> As expected, employing a lower pass-through rate leads to considerably lower poverty estimates possibly reflecting household capacity to smooth consumption in face of a shock. However, the possibility for households to continue smoothing their consumption over a prolonged conflict spell is dubious. Given the amount of uncertainty around the most appropriate passthorough rate to be used in the case of Syria, we can use the poverty projections based on different values of the pass-through as providing likely lower and upper bounds for the extent of poverty in the country.

> 32 Corresponding estimates obtained using poverty lines in 2011 PPP  ($3.2  and $2.15) are provided in Annex 5. 33 See section 4.1.1.

> 34 Corresponding estimates obtained using poverty lines in 2011 PPP  ($3.2  and $2.15) are provided in Annex 5.