rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Autor, D.H., L.F. Katz and M.S. Kearney (2008): “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists,” _The Review of Economic and Statistics_ , vol. 90(2), pp. 300—323.

Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and A. B. Krueger (1998): “Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market?," _Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ vol. 113(4), pp. 1169—1213.

Autor, D. H., F. Levy, and R. J. Murnane (2003): “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , vol. 118(4), pp. 1279—1333.

Aw, B.Y., M. J. Roberts, and D.Y. Xu (2011): “R&D Investment, Exporting, and Productivity Dynamics,” _The American Economic Review,_ vol. 101(4), pp. 1312—1344, June.

Bartelsman, E., P. Gautier and J. de Wind (2016): “Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation,” _International Economic Review_ , vol. 57(3), pp. 787—826, August.

Bartelsman, E.J. and J. Hinloopen (2005): “Unleashing Animal Spirits: Investment in ICT and Economic Growth”, in L. Soete and B. ter Weel (eds.), _The Economics of the Digital Society_ , Edward Elgar, pp. 272 – 304.

Berman, E., J. Bound, Z. Griliches (1994): “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ vol. 109(2), pp. 367—397.

Berman, E., J. Bound, S. Machin (1998): “Implications of Skill-Biased Technological Change: International Evidence,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ vol. 113(4), pp. 1245—1279, November.

Bernard, A. and B. Jensen (1999): “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?,” _Journal of International Economics,_ vol. 47, pp. 1—25.

Bloom, N., R. Sadun, and J. Van Reenen (2012): “Americans Do I.T. Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle,” _American Economic Review,_ vol. 102(1), pp. 167—201.

Bound, J. and G. Johnson, “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations,” _The American Economic Review,_ vol. 82(3), pp.371—392.

Bloom, N., M. Draca, and J. Van Reenen. (2016): “Trade induced technical change? The impact of Chinese imports on innovation, IT and productivity.” _The Review of Economic Studies_ , vol. 83(1), pp. 87—117.

Bresnahan, T., Brynjolfsson, E. and M.L. Hitt (2002) “Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pp. 339—376, February.

Brynjolfsson, E., and L.M. Hitt (2003): “Computing productivity: Firm-level evidence,” _Review of Economics and Statistics,_ vol. 85(4), pp. 793—808.

Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001): “Dropout and Enrollment Trends in the Postwar Period: What Went Wrong in the 1970s?,” in J. Gruber ed., _Risky Behavior among Youths: An Economic Analysis_ , University of Chicago Press for the NBER.

Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001b): “Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return to College for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ vol. 116(2), pp. 705—746.

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capital raised in their domestic markets per year before internationalization and this share increases to 0.3 percent afterwards. A similar pattern is visible in the case of developing economies, with the average share of domestic market activity accounted by each firm that raises capital in international markets increasing from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent following the first capital raising abroad.

The observed increases in the absolute and relative participation of international firms in domestic markets following their first capital raising abroad coincide with an increase in firm size. As discussed above, firms tend to expand following capital raisings in international markets. The results in Table 10 suggest that the corresponding expansion in financing needs is at least partially satisfied by domestic markets. Once we scale the amount raised at home by the firm’s assets, we do not find evidence of a significant change in firms’ capital raisings at home.

# **6. Conclusions**

In this paper, we characterize patterns of equity and debt issuance activities in domestic and international capital markets, and also document the dynamics of firm performance following these distinct corporate financing activities. To do so, we compile a new database on worldwide capital raisings that allows us to compare firms that issue securities abroad with firms that issue securities domestically. We also compare these capital raising firms with corporations that are listed in the local stock markets but do not issue new securities over our sample period. This provides new firm-level information about the patterns of international capital raisings.

Several findings relate to existing theories of international finance and motive future research. First, debt markets dwarf equity markets both in terms of how corporations raise capital and in terms of the internationalization of securities markets. Over the period 1991-2005, 30
<!-- Start of picture text --> ! . x. : Fe<br>4 ne<br>$ a, 4 can<br>y<br>2q+x qod fe .<br>”<br>ss | é >ia)<br>10 yg/m3 a espe amaa ® a1 ied:<br>— Bias<br>ME 50 pg/m3<br><!-- End of picture text -->
although a three decade lag implied enormous social losses due to the public sector failure. The first was general economic growth in the cities which served to augment the local tax base, and thus lower the effective tax rate. The second was more interventionist and the result of central government action; subsidized terms on loans fcr town improvements from the central government. In the absence of tax reform at the local level, what the central government loan subsidies served to do was to distribute the tax burden more equally. It served, therefore, to create a better matcb between those who gained from cleaning up Britain's cities and those who paid.

What about housing? From the social reform debates of the .830s and 1840s to the early 20th century, overcrowding in Britain's cities has received much attention. The pessimists in the standard of living debate felt certain that overcrowding in tenaments and cottages was at the beart of bigh morbidity and mortality in the cities, and that things bad gotten worse from the 1790s to the 1840s. The issue was sufficiently important that overcrowding was highlighted in the 1842 Sanitary Report and in the 1844 Report of Larue Towns. It was also central to the 1885 Royal Commission on the Rousing of the Working Classes, indicating that little progress had been made on the problem over the four decades from the 1840s to the 1880s. Nor had the problem disappeared by the turn of the century. Indeed, the immense empirical inquiry of the Board of Trade into town cost of living in 1905 w4s motivated primarily by high rents, housing scarcity, crowding and its impliciations on the health of the poor. In short, qualitative reports such as these suggest that Britain had made little or no progress on decrowding in her cities from the French Wars to World World I.

Modern revisionists have shown that it is simply not enougb to point to various manifestations of poverty in making assessments of Anglo-American treatment of their poor. Nor is it enough to point to rapid industrialization

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# **1. Introduction**

Zambia is well known for its mineral riches, which naturally endow the country with a highly successful export industry. This lucrative asset, however, also implies an internationally exceptional degree of export product concentration. We show that, even controlling for its level of economic development, Zambia has one of the world’s highest degrees of export concentration, as copper and cobalt account for more than 80% of the value of formal exports.

Zambia’s exports are in addition characterized by a large degree of churning. Analyzing new transaction-level trade data covering the period 1999-2011, we find that Zambian firm-level export spells are numerous but short.

The Zambian authorities have long been aware of these features of their economy, and efforts at diversifying and stabilizing exports are ongoing.<sup>1</sup> For such efforts to be effective, it is important that the main impediments to export diversification and stabilization be understood. Interviews with Zambian exporters bring up two recurrent themes: problems with unexpected exchange-rate movements and constraints on foreign exchange transactions, and impediments to importing inputs required for export-oriented production – in addition to a number of well-known challenges linked to human capital shortages, bottlenecks in transport and telecommunications infrastructure, erratic policy changes, and political favoritism. We therefore analyze the export micro data with a view of substantiating these frequently heard explanations for the fragility of Zambian exports. The data are consistent with what many business people say: exchange-rate volatility and problems related to the importing of inputs contribute to destabilizing Zambian firm-level export spells.

Our paper is structured as follows. In the first two sections, we present the results of a statistical analysis based on the transaction-level trade data. Section 2 summarizes trade patterns at the level of destination countries, products and firms, in particular presenting new results on firm-

> 1 See, for example, IGC (2012).

2
The analysis of individual dimensions of the JQM shows substantial variations across countries in all dimensions (figure 3). The highest average values for the four dimensions range from 0.91 to 0.98, and the lowest values span from 0.07 to 0.21. The dimensions with greater variations are benefits and stability. The countries with the largest averages for the benefits dimension are Mongolia (MNG) and Uruguay (URY), with values of 0.84 and 0.95, respectively, while the countries with the lowest averages are Peru (PER) and Rwanda (RWA), with values of 0.07 and 0.08, respectively. For the stability dimension, the countries with the largest averages are Ecuador (ECU) and Mongolia, with values of 0.98 and 0.96, respectively, and the countries with the lowest averages are India (IND) and Kenya (KEN), with values of 0.14 and 0.28, respectively.

Figure 3. Job Quality Decomposition among the Wage Employed, by Country <!-- Start of picture text --> 4 100%<br>80%<br>3<br>60%<br>2<br>40%<br>1<br>20%<br>0 0%<br>Income Benefits Stability Satisfaction Share of wage employees<br>JQM<br>Share of Wage Employees<br>BRA MNG URY TUR GEO LAO BOL BWA ECU CRI DOM VNM COL EGY PRY LBN PAN LKA IDN MOZ BGD MEX PAK NPL PER MMR HND NER MLI BEN TGO GNB PHL CIV BFA THA SEN RWA IND KEN<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Estimates based on multiple labor force and household surveys (see annex table A1).

_Note:_ This figure shows JQMs by country for the wage employed only. The JQM is comprised of four dimensions, and the highest possible JQM attainable for an individual is equal to 4.

Interesting patterns emerge in comparing job quality across economic sectors using cross-country data (figure 4). Sectors with the highest job quality include public administration, finance and business services, and (often public) utilities. Jobs in these sectors generally score higher in each dimension, but particularly in the benefits and stability dimensions. The average scores in these dimensions of the three top sectors mentioned above are 0.25 and 0.33 points higher than the average scores in these dimensions in the remaining seven other sectors. In addition, their average scores in the income and working conditions dimensions are higher by between 0.09 and 0.15 points. These sectors are also the ones with the highest share of wage employed. In contrast, at the other end of the spectrum, the low-skill sectors of agriculture and construction have the lowest levels of job quality. Agriculture workers have significantly lower scores than the rest of the economic sectors in all dimensions except working conditions, while construction workers fare particularly poorly in the benefits and stability dimensions.

17
39 expenditures result in well targeted benefits. Geographically, urban areas appropriate much more than their fair share based on their population weight. If anything, this appears to have become more pronounced since 1978, and is particularly so in the Outer Islands. Conversely, the overall share going to the rural areas has dwindled, most dramatically in rural Java.

The distribution of health sector subsidies has become decidedly more equitable since 1978. To make this point more forcefully, it may be useful to contrast the paper's results, based on 1987 patterns of use, with the results of an exercise aimed at making a rough estimate of the distribution of health spending in 1985/86 using the 1978 pattern of use (Griffin, 1990). Griffin combines the 1978 utilization incidence with 1985/86 public health expenditures on hospitals and health centers, using essentially the same budget data as has been used in this paper.> Griffin's rough approximation produces an extremely skewed distribution which has the poorest 40 percent of the population capturing about 17 percent, the middle 30 percent 31 percent, and the wealthiest 30 percent some 52 percent of total health care outlays. Contrast this to the percentage shares in Table 21 of 31, 30, and 39 percent respectively. The bias in Griffin's results is due to his assumption that the pattern of utilization has been static.

of course, to emphasize that their distribution has improved is not to say that health sector subsidies are well targeted, or that the system is particularly well suited to reaching the poor. Much progress is still to be achieved.

# 7. Conclusions

The last fifteen years have witnessed concerted government effort to increase the aggregate provision of basic social services in Indonesia. Little is known, however, about differences in access and utilization of these 8 The budget data used by Griffin has not been updated to 1986/87 as done here, and it is not clear whether cost recovery has been withheld.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Sovereign Ratings and Spreads, 2003<br>20 1200<br>18<br>1000<br>16<br>14 800<br>12 600<br>10<br>400<br>8<br>6 200<br>4<br>0<br>2<br>0 -200<br>S&P Transformed Ratings Sovereign Spread (bp)<br>Linear (Sovereign Spread (bp)) Linear (S&P Transformed Ratings)<br>ChileHungaryKoreaPolandSouth AfricaChina TunisiaCroatiaMexicoThailandBulgariaEl SalvadorEgyptMalaysiaColombiaMorocoPanamaPhilippinesRussiaDominican RepublicPeruBrazilTurkeyUkraineLebanonUruguayVenezuelaEcuador<br>Ratings<br>Spreads (bp)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Data source: Rowland (2005).

<!-- Start of picture text --> Sovereign Credit Ratings and Spreads in Basis Points, 2003<br>1200<br>1000<br>800<br>600<br>400<br>200<br>0<br>0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21<br>-200<br>Sovereign Ratings<br>Sovereign Spread (bp) Linear (Sovereign Spread (bp))<br>Sovereign Spreads<br><!-- End of picture text --> Data source: Rowland (2005).

Cantor and Packer (1996) find that the market – as gauged by sovereign debt yields – broadly shares the relative ranking of sovereign credit risks made by the two rating agencies (S&P and Moody’s). Their study includes cases when rating announcements led to a change in existing spreads. However on average those changes are not that significant because many rating changes are anticipated by the market. Their analyses show that sovereign ratings effectively summarize and supplement the information contained in macro indicators and are therefore strongly correlated with market–determined credit spreads. Most of the correlation appears to 16
# **Informal Microenterprises in Senegal: Performance Outcomes and Possible Avenues to Boost Productivity and Jobs**

İzak Atiyas and Mark A. Dutz<sup>**1**</sup>

**Keywords:** microenterprise, informal, 2G/2.5G feature phone, smartphone, digital technologies, productivity, jobs, inclusion.

**JEL codes** : D22, J24, L25, L86, O14, O33, O55.

> 1 Affiliations: Atiyas (Economic Research Forum and TUSIAD-Sabanci University Competitiveness Forum), Dutz (World Bank). Corresponding author: <u>mdutz@worldbank.org. This research has received funding from the joint Africa Chief Economist-Digital</u> Development Research Program on Technology Transformation for Jobs in Africa (project ID: P170151). The authors are grateful to Alison Gillwald and Onkokame Mothobi for making available the RIA (Research ICT Africa) ICT Access business data for 2017-18 and for their support in the use of these data.
# **1. Background**

The non-functionality of water schemes is a major problem in many developing countries, and this trend is particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases, breakdowns occur within the first year after implementation. Surprisingly, however, the causes of such failures have rarely been analyzed in a systematic way—a gap this study intends to fill. In this paper, we utilize information from the 2015 Nigeria National Water and Sanitation Survey (NWSS) to identify the reasons for the failure of water schemes<sup>2</sup> in the country. We seek to understand the interactions between various factors: (1) the extent and (2) timing of the failures; and (3) the type of scheme in question, including (4) its technology, (5) geographic location, (6) underlying hydrogeology, (7) type of promoter, and (8) management setup.

The non-functionality of water schemes has taken on considerable importance in recent years, with global freshwater ecosystems undergoing rapid change: amid urbanization and an overall increase in pollution, clean water will be increasingly unavailable, particularly in developing economies (Steele, forthcoming; Hoekstra et al., 2012). A lack of functional infrastructure, including for drinking water and sanitation, could constrain economic growth (Agenor, 2010; Barbier, 2004). Recent evidence also indicates that infrastructure—including water and sanitation—is likely to offset moderate macroeconomic shortcomings at the initial stages of development (Moller and Wacker, 2017; Gibson and Rioja, 2017). In recent years, several studies have documented the failure of water schemes in developing countries. In countries such as Ethiopia (Deneke and Hawassa, 2008) and Ghana (Fisher et al., 2015), 39% and 21% water schemes were found to be either non-functional or abandoned, respectively. The situation is similar in Mozambique (Jansz, 2011) and Kenya (Koehler et al., 2015).

In this paper, we use <mark>locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LWSS)</mark> (“Lowess Smoothing” of running-line least squares), logit regression analysis, and Shapley decomposition to analyze the reasons for the failure of water schemes in Nigeria. Our analysis indicates that, in the first year of operation, factors that can be controlled in the design, operational, and implementation stages contribute to the

> 2 Water distribution system from the point of origin to destinations such as households and farms.

2
|**Box 1.**<br>**The Effect of Government Provision of Pensions on Saving: A Survey of Literature**<br>Most studies of the impact of public pension plans on private saving have found little evidence to support<br>the contention that social security or public provision for retirement has reduced saving.'<br>In the United States, Italy, Sweden, and Japan, where publicly provided pensions were particularly<br>generous, rising social security benefits did seem to depress private saving. The offset effect of public<br>pension plans on private saving was significantly less than 100 percent, however. Thus, if public pensions<br>are financed by taxes rather than by government borrowing, the increase in public saving associated with<br>the public pension scheme is likely to exceed any reductions in private saving.<br>In Canada, India, Sri Lanka, Chile, Singapore, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain and France,<br>development of public pension systems has been correlated with an increase in voluntary private saving<br>and, possibly, with economic growth<sup>2</sup><br>(For references to specific country studies, see IMF 1996a, b;<br>Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel 1995; Vittas and Iglesias 1992.)<br>The differences in the effect of the introduction and development of a public pension scheme on<br>voluntary private saving may be partly explained by the initial conditions (the initial saving rates and the<br>pre-existing mechanism of support for retirement) as well as by the level of social development within<br>different countries. In developing countries, for example, industrialization, urbanization and the resulting<br>break-down of traditional networks of transfers may bring about the need to create a social safety net and<br>to increase individual private saving.<br>Cross-country comparisons of the effect of public pension schemes on private saving levels reveal<br>stronger effects than do time-series studies. The observed differences in both saving and public provision<br>for retirement may thus be caused by the same factors (such as traditional social preferences about both<br>saving and the role of government). The impact of public pension schemes on private saving may thus be<br>idiosyncratic to the traditions and the overall nature of policies within societies, a conclusion supported by<br>Jaeger (1994) in his two-equilibrium interpretation of the overlapping-generations model.|
|---|
|1<br>For a comprehensive list of references, see World Bank (1994) and IMF (1996 a, b).<br>**2**<br>For an explanation of this effect see World Bank (1994) and IMF (1996). The most common explanation is that government<br>discussion of providing a minimum pension to the elderly against poverty makes people more aware that they should make<br>provisions toward their own old age (recognition effect)<br>The IMF (1996c) concluded that "offering a general conclusion - one that applies across countries - on the impact of<br>pensions on saving is not possible " Changes in the friendliness of the existing tax system to household borrowing may outweigh<br>the saving effects of pensions policies, for example.|

8