**Table 1: Baseline and scenarios with five dividend-enhancing interventions**

|**Scenario**|**Key features**|**Purpose**|
|---|---|---|
|_Baseline_|Population projections from UN (2015)<br>medium fertility variant scenario;<br>economic growth projections from<br>World Bank (2015b) and Dellink et al.<br>(2015); employment ratios held<br>constant; constant education attainment<br>rates|Establish business-as-usual for<br>comparison with counterfactual<br>scenarios; already incorporates impact<br>of greater working-age population<br>share on labor supply and relatively<br>pessimistic savings behavior based on<br>age-structure changes|
|_No demographic_<br>_effects_|Same as baseline except labor supply<br>grows at the same rate as the total<br>population, the skill share remains<br>fixed at 2015 values, and changes in<br>child and aged dependency ratio have<br>no effect onsavings andinvestment.|This is used to identify the impact of<br>changing age-structure on growth in the<br>baseline through the labor supply and<br>savings.|
|_Faster_<br>_productivity_<br>_growth_|Same as baseline, except labor<br>productivity growth rates are 0.5<br>percentage points higher|Considers case where countries get<br>more from their possible first<br>demographic dividend by having more<br>productive workers|
|_Education_<br>_convergence_|Same as baseline, except educational<br>attainment is higher; skill shares in<br>Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa<br>converges with that of high-income<br>OECD economies by 2050; skill shares<br>in Lesotho and Swaziland converges to<br>that of upper-middle-income countries<br>by 2050|Considers case where countries get<br>more from their possible first and<br>second demographic dividends by<br>having better educated workers that can<br>be absorbed into skill and capital-<br>intensive higher value sectors.|
|_Mobilized savings_|<br>Same as baseline, except the marginal<br>propensity to save is higher and so<br>investment is also higher|Considers case where countries try to<br>get more from their possible second<br>demographic dividend for longer by<br>saving more, and with subsequently<br>greaterdeepening capital.|
|_OECD ER_<br>_convergence_|Same as baseline except the<br>employment ratios of male and female<br>converge to that of OECD male and<br>female median employment ratios of<br>62.7 and 51.0 percent by2050.|Considers the case of countries with<br>employment ratios that are too high<br>(due to low educational attainment) or<br>too low (due to high unemployment or<br>lowlabor force participation)|
|_OECD ER_<br>_convergence with_<br>_gender parity_|Same as baseline except the<br>employment ratios of males and<br>females converge to that of OECD<br>male median employment ratios of 62.7<br>by 2050.|Considers the case of countries with<br>employment ratios that are too high<br>(due to low educational attainment) or<br>too low (due to high unemployment or<br>low labor force participation), while<br>also considering the effect of gender<br>disparities thelabor market.|
|_All interventions_|Same as baseline, with mobilized<br>savings, faster labor productivity<br>growth, andimproved education|Illustrates the synergies when countries<br>implement all measures together.|

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