rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
buy off rebels and prevent them from perpetrating future violence. This, together with the fact that post-conflict societies often lack the institutional and economic means to carry out fair and impartial justice without compromising other aspects of peace building, creates doubts about the practical value of PCJ in the crafting of post-conflict peace and stability. A lack of systematic empirical research regarding the effect of PCJ on peace combined with mixed findings in a number of case-studies exemplifying the process of justice in one or two post-conflict societies at a time (e.g. Pinto 2001, Aguilar 2001, Reyntjens & Vadenginste 2004, Skaar 2004), contribute further to the ongoing debate.<sup>1</sup> For our examination of the effects of PCJ on the prospects for post-conflict peace and stability, we focus on ‘what works’ rather than what is morally or legally appropriate. In doing so, we rely on a recently collected dataset from Binningsbø, Elster & Gates, (2005), reporting the presence of various forms of PCJ (trials, purges, reparations to victims, and truth commissions), as well as processes commonly associated with post-conflict impunity (amnesty, exile), in the aftermath of each conflict, 1946-2003, present in the Uppsala-PRIO Conflict Data Base (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The Binningsbø, Elster & Gates (2005) dataset is one of the first attempts to systematically collect information on post-conflict justice on a global scale.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, it offers a unique opportunity to quantitatively investigate the influence of PCJ in a variety of situations, complementing previous case studies of post-conflict justice.

When focusing on PCJ in post-conflict settings, we are aware that we compromise the concept of _justice_ or _legal justice_ (Elster, 2004), as justice is associated with being fair and impartial.<sup>3</sup> Note that trials and purges, in particular, may more correctly be described as _winners justice_ (e.g. Minnow 1998, Gloppen 2005) or _political justice_ (Elster 2004), directed at the conflict’s losing party, with the intention of repression and deterrence rather than forgiveness and reconciliation. Also keep in mind that these processes mostly pertain to what Mani (2002: 7-8) refers to as _rectificatory justice_ , dealing with injustice in terms of direct physical violence suffered by people during conflict. This is not _distributive justice_ , which entails addressing the underlying cause of conflict, such as social, political or cultural injustice. The absence of

> 1 An exception to the case-study framework is the comparative study of Long & Brecke (2003). 2 Sikkink & Wallin (2005) present a data set on trials and truth commissions in 192 countries. However, they do not investigate as many efforts as Binningsbø, Elster & Gates (2005), and their primary focus is not on post-conflict sustainable peace.

> 3 Elster (2004: 135-139) describes _legal justice_ as justice based on unambiguous laws, a judiciary insulated from other branches of government, unbiased judges and jurors, and an adherence to the principles of due processes.

2
**Table 5: Probability regressions for new specializations in routine task intense activities**

||Dependent<br>|variable: wheth<br>|er country_c_has<br>_t+5_(xj,j<br>|a comparative a<br>,t+5= 1)<br>|dvantage in act<br>|ivity_j_at time<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|ASj,j,t<br>|0.071**|0.236***|0.051**|0.248***|0.218***|0.267***|
|ωj,j,t|(0.030)<br>0.089***|(0.009)<br>0.029***|(0.024)<br>0.109***|(0.009)<br>0.053***|(0.012)<br>0.055***|(0.014)<br>0.055***|
||(0.008)|(0.005)|(0.007)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|Routine manual|0.001|0.009***|-0.001||||
||(0.002)|(0.003)|(0.003)||||
|Routine cognitive||||-0.016***|-0.030***|-0.008**|
|||||(0.003)|(0.006)|(0.004)|
|Country-Year FE|X|X|X|X|X|X|
|Industry-Year FE|X|X|X|X|X|X|
|Sample|Total|Advanced|Developing|Total|Advanced|Developing|
|N|56,697|23,982|32,715|40,227|15,901|24,326|
|Adjusted R<sup>2</sup>|0.074|0.098|0.078|0.112|0.093|0.132|

_Notes_ : see Table 3. Results in columns 1-3 only include observations where the routine manual task intensity of the activity is above the mean, and results in columns 4-6 where the routine cognitive task intensity is above the mean. Accordingly, the regressions control for manual (columns 1-3) and cognitive (columns 4-6) routine task intensity of the activity. Routine task intensity constructed following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see Appendix F.

# **5. Path-dependence in activity specialization and growth**

The cross-country average patterns found in the previous section are used to benchmark trade specialization patterns of individual countries in the vein of Coniglio et al. (2021), adapting their product-based methodology to the activity perspective. Coniglio et al. (2021) found that economic growth is weaker in countries with a higher degree of path dependence in their export specializations. We revisit this relationship using our activity export data. Following Coniglio et al. (2021) a country is denoted as “path-defying” when its new specializations are weakly related to its initial basket. For a particular country, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of proximity for new activity specializations between time _t_ and time _t + T_ is compared with a hypothetical random CDF of proximity for all possible new specializations, that is, activities in which the country did not have a comparative advantage yet.<sup>13</sup> Subsequently, stochastic

> 13 Specialization is also shaped by the exit of activities in exports, i.e., de-specialization. This paper focuses on the entry of activities in which countries gain specialization.

22
In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Korean dataset is missing several cases for which hard-copy documents were not available, although antidumping investigations had been notified to the WTO, and this problem is especially severe between 2000 and 2004. The data is also missing the details on the government publications related to antidumping investigations at the initiation, preliminary, and final stages. Finally, the database lacks some information on preliminary outcomes in certain cases and it does not contain information on when antidumping measures were revoked.

# **3.9 Mexico (MEX)**

In Mexico, determinations of dumping and injury are made by one body, the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit), which is part of the Secretaría de Economía. Unlike many other countries, the Mexican authority is quite likely to continue an investigation through the preliminary phase without placing duties. Mexico was one of the earlier Latin American countries to introduce a dumping investigation system, in place since 1987. The current law which governs this process can be found at the OAS SICE website, <u>http://www.sice.oas.org/antidumping/legislation/mexico/LCEXT.asp. The data for this set was found in</u> electronic copies of the Mexican case files. For a discussion of Mexico’s antidumping process see Leycegui and de la Torre (2005), as well as Niels and Francois (forthcoming).

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Mexican file contains additional data described in the table below.

**Table 3.9.1 : Additional Mexican Data Included in AD-MEX-v1.0.xls**

|**Column**|**Variable Name**|**Description**|
|---|---|---|
|**In AD-M**|**EX-Master :**||
|**U.**|**RELATED_CVD**|Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against<br>the same product and country, see MEX-CVD workbook|
|**V.**|**P_AD_DUTY**|The “all others” preliminary rate|
|**W.**|**F_AD_DUTY**|The “all others” final rate|
|**X.**|**NOTES**|Comments|
|**Y.**|**FURTHER NOTES**|Comments that wouldnotfitinthefirstnotes column|

27
**<u>Table 7. Structural Model Estimates</u>**

# **Dependent variable: Shock to Credit**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Fixed E**|**ffects**|**Instrumental**|**Variables(b )**|
|Currency ratio shock (a)|-0.414**||-1.529***||
||0.168)||(0.453)||
|Excess reserves ratio shock (a)||0.636<br>(0.469)||0.439<br>(0.300)|
|Anderson LR statistic Weak Instrument Test|||43.37|161.05|
|Chi-sq(4) p-value|||0.00|0.00|
|Hansen J statistic Overidentification Test|||0.38|1.48|
|Chi-sq(3) p-value|||0.54|0.22|
|Country Fixed effects|x|x|x|x|
|Year effects|x|x|x|x|
|Seasonal Dummies|x|x|x|x|
|Nbr. obser.|374|374|364|360|

Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level.

Shocks are residuals obtained after estimation of the system of equations (9) and (10) using seemingly unrelated least squares (a) The currency ratio is the ratio of currency in circulation (oustide the banking system) over demand deposits and the reserves ratio is the ratio of excess reserves held by private banks over total deposists.

(b ) We use the second and third lags of the liquidity preference shocks as instruments for contemporaneous shocks
Policy Research Working Paper 5348

# **Abstract**

Using enterprise data for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this study examines the effects of corruption on productivity. Corruption is narrowly defined as the occurrence of informal payments to government officials to ease the day-today operation of firms. The effects of this “bribe tax” on productivity are compared to the consequences of red tape, which may be understood as imposing a “time tax” on firms. When testing effects in the full sample, only the bribe tax appears to have a negative impact on firm-level productivity, while the effect of the time tax is insignificant. At the same time, unlike similar studies using country-level data, firm level analysis allows a direct test of the “efficient grease” hypothesis by investigating whether corruption may increase productivity by helping reduce the time tax on firms. Results provide no evidence of a trade-off between the time and the bribe taxes, implying that bribing does not emerge as a secondbest option to achieve higher productivity by helping circumvent cumbersome bureaucratic requirements. When controlling for EU membership the effects of the bribe tax are more harmful in non-EU countries. This suggests that the surrounding environment influences the way in which firm behaviour affects firm performance. In particular, in countries where corruption is more prevalent and the legal framework is weaker, bribery is more harmful for firm-level productivity.

This paper is a product of the Private and Financial Sector Department, Europe and Central Asia Region. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dderosa@ worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Figure 3.8 Governance of Extractive Resources**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>2017 Resource Governmance Index.<br>Turkmenistan Gabon Saudi Arabia Sudan Bahrain Libya Equatorial Guinea Cuba United Arab Emirates Oman Qatar Iran Bangladesh Chad Uzbekistan Algeria South Sudan Uganda Kuwait Myanmar Democratic Republic of Congo Egypt Congo Russia Venezuela Timor-Leste Malaysia Azerbaijan Yemen Angola Nigeria Ecuador Iraq China Kazakhstan Vietnam Argentina Colombia Cameroon Tunisia Cote d'Ivoire Ukraine Bolivia Brazil Mexico Indonesia Trinidad and Tobago Ghana Tanzania United States of America (Gulf of Mexico) Mozambique Canada (Alberta) United Kingdom India Norway<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Natural Resource Governance Institute, _2017 Resource Governmance Index._ Note: Governance of Extractive Resources covers the governance of allocating extraction rights, exploration, production, environmental protection, revenue collection and state-ow ned enterprises. Score 0-100 where 100=best. If a country scores "No data / Not applicable" it w ill not show in the bar chart.

Exclusively state-owned corporations tend not to separate control from management. That typically limits the empowerment of managers, who are key not only to the success of the firm but to economic development in general. In fact, several developing countries have in the past criminalized business mistakes, especially for top executives of state-owned enterprises, which discourages employees from risk-taking and economic initiative.

In the past decades, there has been an important shift in opening the capital of state-owned oil corporations, including in China, Brazil and Mexico. In December 2017, Abu Dhabi National Oil Corporation (ADNOC) successfully launched an initial public offering (IPO), one of the first among large Middle East oil exporters. Saudi Arabia, as part of its ambitious plan to transform its economy, has announced that it would sell 5 percent of the state-owned oil company, ARAMCO, in an IPO. That appears to be a step toward emulating publicly owned Western companies such as Exxon, ENI, and BP that once concentrated on oil and gas, but have broadened their focus to become energy companies—balancing their oil and gas assets with other forms of energy.

But can IPOs help economic transformation and spill over to the rest of the economy? How should they be structured?

Publicly listed companies (also to a lesser extent privately owned firms) are typically more transparent. Also, because publicly listed companies have a more diffused ownership and hard budget constraints, management is typically more accountable (to shareholders). Publicly listed firms perform better and are more innovative (Gilje et al. 2016). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, many of these firms were able to significantly increase efficiency after the collapse in oil prices and continue producing at lower prices.

13
# **Figure 20. Unit value of fresh and chilled fish fillets by destination, 1996-2001:**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 4500<br>4000<br>3500<br>3000<br>2500<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br>European Union Other<br>Source: CBS (2002).<br>Figure 21. Unit price of frozen fish fillets by destination, 1996-2002:<br>4500<br>4000<br>3500<br>3000<br>2500<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br>European Union Other<br>US$/Tonne<br>US$/Tonne<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: CBS (2002)._ In 1998, the catch began to recover and by 1999 was greater than the period immediately prior to the restrictions, as demand from the industrial processing sector recovered with exporters exploiting alternative markets. Further, the landings of other fish continued to increase<sup>43</sup> . For example, the volume of _Tilapia niloticus_ increased from 10,765 tonnes in 1996 to 23,226 tonnes in 2000. Many fishers had no alternative source of cash income and had little alternative but to continue fishing despite any changes in local market conditions. However, once the ban was lifted and exports to the EU commenced, landings of other fishes declined. For example,

> 43 These four fish accounted for 97 percent of landings in 2001.

48
|**ntries**<br>kman<br>Selection_a_<br>0.467<br>( 0.392 )<br>-0.020<br>( 0.487 )<br>0.716<br>( 1.347 )<br>-0.344<br>( 0.291 )<br>0.017<br>( 0.028 )<br>-0.126<br>( 0.453 )<br>0.663_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.267 )<br>0.761_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.260 )<br>-19.019<br>( 7.416 )<br>Yes<br>0.000<br>88<br>63<br>0.697_⋆_<br>( 0.381 )|gnifcance at the 10<br>the joint signifcance|ically diferent from|
|---|---|---|
|**loping cou**<br>Hec<br>Export eq.<br>0.126_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.061 )<br>0.710_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.242 )<br>-0.195<br>( 0.231 )<br>-1.625_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.502 )<br>-0.199<br>( 0.217 )<br>-0.009<br>( 0.014 )<br>0.481_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.177 )<br>-5.094_⋆⋆_<br>( 2.292 )<br>Yes<br>0.000<br>88<br>63<br>0.697_⋆_<br>( 0.381 )|stands for si<br>Wald test of|When statist|
|**Deve**<br>OLS<br>0.118_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.035 )<br>0.573_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.159 )<br>-0.117<br>( 0.127 )<br>-1.686_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.387 )<br>-0.206_⋆_<br>( 0.111 )<br>-0.012<br>( 0.009 )<br>0.598_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.115 )<br>-3.862_⋆⋆_<br>( 1.365 )<br>Yes<br>0.000<br>64<br>64<br>0.938<br>NA|level; and _⋆_<br>e report the|the sample.|
|**es**<br>man<br>Selection<br>0.467<br>( 0.392 )<br>-0.020<br>( 0.487 )<br>0.716<br>( 1.347 )<br>-0.344<br>( 0.291 )<br>0.017<br>( 0.029) )<br>-0.126<br>( 0.452 )<br>0.663_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.267 )<br>0.761_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.260 )<br>-1.051<br>( 7.416 )<br>Yes<br>0.000<br>103<br>78<br>0.769_⋆_<br>( 0.416 )|the 5 percent <br>an estimator w|s a problem in|
|**All countri**<br>Heck<br>Export Eq.<br>0.122_⋆_<br>( 0.065 )<br>0.838 _⋆⋆_<br>( 0.254 )<br>-0.194<br>( 0.247 )<br>-1.319_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.489 )<br>-0.187<br>( 0.239 )<br>-0.007<br>( 0.013 )<br>0.423_⋆⋆_<br>( 0.166 )<br>-5.063_⋆⋆_<br>( 2.432 )<br>Yes<br>0.000<br>103<br>78<br>0.769_⋆_<br>( 0.416 )|ignifcance at <br><br>of the Heckm|ich selection i<br>rected.|
|OLS<br>Log of Budget per capita<br>0.116_⋆⋆_<br>(ln _Bud/pop_)_a_<br>( 0.032 )<br>Log of GDP per capita<br>0.706 _⋆⋆_<br>(ln _GDP/pop_)<br>( 0.152 )<br>Log of Trade restrictiveness<br>-0.109<br>(ln _T_)<br>( 0.128 )<br>Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW<br>-1.308_⋆⋆_<br>(ln _MA_)<br>( 0.340 )<br>Log of Forex volatility<br>-0.193_⋆_<br>(ln _V ol_)<br>( 0.111 )<br>Days to comply with export<br>-0.011<br>regulation (ln _Reg_)<br>( 0.007 )<br>Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio<br>0.519_⋆⋆_<br>(ln _F_&_R_)<br>( 0.098 )<br>Log of GDP<br>(ln _GDP_)<br>Log of Aid per capita<br>(ln _Aidc_)<br>Constant<br>-3.76_⋆⋆_<br>( 1.269 )<br>Regional dummies_b_<br>Yes<br>_P −value_ of F or Chi-squared Wald-test._c_<br>0.000<br>Number of observations<br>79<br>Number of uncensored<br>79<br>R-squared<br>0.945<br>_λd_<br>NA|_a_ Standard errors in parenthesis are white robust. _⋆⋆_stands for s<br>percent level.<br>_b_ The regional dummies are LAC, OECD, EEA, MENA, and SSA.<br>_c_ In the case of OLS regressions we report the F-test and in the case<br>|of all coefcients.<br>_d_ The selection parameter _λ_ (Mills ratio) captures the extent to wh<br>zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be cor|

22
long work hours, low pay, and the risk of harassment, particularly when jobs require regular interaction with men. Interestingly, generalized social norms (understood as empirical expectations of whether other women work or as expectations that people frown upon women working) appeared to be less of a barrier, in the FGDs, than women’s interpersonal expectations of specific male family members. Both male and female participants consistently estimated FLFP in Jordan to be above 50% (in reality, it is around 14%).

The theoretical account of social norms, described above, and the FGDs formed the basis of the quantitative survey instrument. The survey instrument examined normative influences across four related themes identified earlier: i) general views on whether women should work (which we called “working women”); ii) beliefs about gender roles as they relate to women’s ability and availability to work (“gender roles”); iii) beliefs about publicness and mixing of genders in the work environment (“public-ness and mixing”); and iv) beliefs about the link between women working and family status (“status”). All four themes were explored using a sub-group of questions, which were adapted as needed for male and female respondents (see Table 1).

**<mark>Table 1. Themes</mark>**

|**Working Women(WW)**|**Gender Roles(GR)**|
|---|---|
|_WW1. Women working from home_|_GR1. Married women working_|
|_WW2. Women working outside the home_<br>_WW3. Women working in Jordan (only SE)_<br>_WW4. Women working if husband not comfortable_<br>_(only PB/SN/IB)_<br>_WW5. Necessary for both husband and wife to_<br>_work to live comfortably (only PB)_<br>_WW6. Women can work if other women are too_<br> _(only IB)_|_GR2. Married women returning home after 5 PM_<br>_GR3. Leaving child<5 with relative during work_<br>_GR4. Appropriate age to leave child and go to_<br>_work_|
|**Publicness and Mixing (PM)**|**Status(ST)**|
|_PM1. Working in mixed-gender environment_<br>_PM2. Exposure to harassment_|_ST1. Family does not abide by traditions_<br>_ST2. Husband cannot provide for her_|
|_PM3. Reputation of working women_|_ST3. Husband not in charge of family_<br>_ST4. Family suffering fromfinancial need_|

For each question under a theme, the instrument first elicited the respondent’s own behavior and direct beliefs, followed by their corresponding social empirical and normative expectations. Table 2 provides an illustrative example this. This structure allowed an examination of how closely associated the main outcome of interest- women working outside their homes- was to expectations of whether others in one’s social group also work outside their homes, and to expectations of the acceptability of working outside the home.

**<mark>Table 2. Structure</mark>**

|**Personal behavior**|**Personal normative beliefs**|
|---|---|
|Do you/your spouse work?|Is it okay for women to work outside of their<br>homes?|
|**Social empirical expectations **|**Social normative expectations**|

7
monetary policy and to guide monetary policy decisions. Credit bureau information can also be used by the tax authorities to improve fiscal control and to analyze the effect of different tax policies on credit flows.

# **_4. Competition_**

A further set of objectives relates to competition and performance in the credit market. The effects of information on market structure and market conduct may be somewhat complex, however, more information regarding credit risk is likely to make a banking system more competitive and indeed as more credit information is made more publicly available, competition between banks and non-banks should also be heightened.

Arguably the very raison d’être of banks is to establish profitable lending relationships with clients where information is costly to acquire. Given that relationships tie borrowers in to particular lending institutions, that institution may then acquire a type of local monopoly power. However, relationship lending may still be preferable to issuing a security (non relationship lending), as the return that would have to be offered to the market (given the assumed poor information) may still be more than the price that the local monopolist bank would offer having invested in the relationship. Rajan (1992) computes an equilibrium in which firms may borrow from both banks and in the open (bond) market such that issuing in the market controls the local monopoly power of the bank. In a model that allows entry into the banking sector, if information is very poor and local monopoly rents very high, then we may expect a highly fragmented banking system with many banks, low economies of scale and a high cost of credit.

Typically, theoretical models assume some type of asymmetric information that a bank may overcome by investing (a fixed cost) in a relationship. However, as discussed above, a PCR may force banks to share this information. This may reduce the rents available to the bank and may lead to multiple and quite subtle effects. One concern is that banks will lose the incentives to search for clients thus potentially even having a negative effect on credit availability. On the other hand, making such information available cheaply may push more credits from banks to non-banks reducing overall intermediation costs and increasing credit availability. Perhaps more 20