rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
We explore underlying mechanisms using a cross-cutting experiment with performancebased incentives for the women and men, detailed micro data on social interactions, perceptions, effort expended, and finally, farm yields to obtain an objective measure of success in the field. We find that women teach better and expend more effort, but others do not perceive them to be as good at farming and teaching, and pay less attention to their message and trainings.

These gender gaps are more pronounced in the no-incentive arm, and assigning a performance-based incentive helps to mitigate these issues. Both male and female-assigned communicators exert more effort with incentives, making gains on different margins. Male communicators do relatively better in the private task with incentives, closing the gap with women. Conversely, incentives allow women to close the gap with men in terms of teaching and convincing others. Both males and females intensify their interactions with other farmers in their village.

Our data do not support a generalized gender communication gap in our study setting (e.g. “nobody talks to women”), nor is it consistent with gender frictions in communication (e.g. “women prefer talking to women, men to men”). Instead, our findings support the notion that farmers in general are less likely to pay attention to and accept a message from a female communicator. Incentives appear to close the gender gap by improving the accuracy of farmers’ perception of the communicator’s skills. This is further validated by a significant gender perception gap against female communicators that disappears when incentives are provided.

Our results illustrate the cost that gender discrimination imposes to society. Women transmit information about a productive new technology more successfully, and others taught by women experience greater farming yields in a poor, rural society where increases in productivity hold large welfare consequences. Yet, gender-based discrimination leads to inefficiencies in their transfer of this information to others. Talent is wasted, as communication and perception barriers prevent relatively more zealous and accomplished female communicators from efficiently spreading their knowledge.

Can a policy of assigning female farmers to teach others help overcome such inefficiencies? We show that a small in-kind incentive can induce female communicators to expend more effort and overcome demand-side biases. Differences in performance in the field stem from gaps in perceptions, so a class of policy actions where women are empowered to take 24
26 were united into high malaria risk zone (mean PfPR higher than 5%); the first and the second category were united into low malaria risk zone (mean PfPR lower than 1%); the third group is the intermediate malaria risk zone. In the final classification, there are three categories with similar observation shares in each category.

# **Analysis remark**

All the analysis was conducted under consideration of the sampling design of the DHS survey, particularly of the weighting and clustering. However, an alteration was made to the stratum variable in the DHS 2003. Overall, there are 190 strata and 400 clusters in the DHS 2003. This design leads to strata with single cluster in our sample and makes it impossible to calculate standard errors. The DHS 2008 has 15 strata, defined as rural and urban provinces, and 398 clusters. We replaced strata in the DHS 2003 by the stratus definition from the DHS 2008 in order to be able to calculate the standard errors.

# **Assessment of costs per ITN**

The following strategies for delivery of ITNs have been in operation in Kenya since 2002: retail sale of ITNs at full cost, social marketing campaigns selling ITNs at a subsidized price, routine distribution through antenatal and child health clinics, and free mass distribution campaigns (Division of Malaria Control 2010). The overall costs of ITN delivery programs in Kenya are, to our best knowledge, not known. As for costs per ITN delivered, the experience shows that the costs vary greatly among the different delivery channels, with the amount of subsidy per ITN, between the type of bednet (traditional ITN or LLIN), and over time. Social marketing campaigns can be more costly than distributions through antenatal clinics (De Allegri 2009) or through commercial sector (Sexton 2011). Mass distribution campaigns deliver at a lower cost if integrated with other campaigns, e.g. with measles vaccination campaigns. In terms of types of bednets, there was a shift towards distribution of LLINs over time. Unlike traditional ITNs, LLINs do not need to be retreated with insecticides every 6 to 12 months. Furthermore, LLINs provide more ―treated net years‖ than ITNs which leads to protection at lower annual costs in spite of LLINs‘ higher provision costs (Yukich et al 2008). Over time, ITN delivery initiatives
in certain existing trade flows (121 percent). In Brenton and Newfarmer’s analysis, this contribution appears similar to that of the average across all countries in the sample. Argentina appears to differ somewhat from the average in terms of a much greater impact from the decline of some existing flows (-55 percent for Argentina compared to -35 percent on average) and the complete loss of some trade flows (-19 percent in Argentina compared to -5 percent on average). An important source of export growth in Argentina has been its ability to export existing products to new markets, while exports of new products have contributed little to export growth in this period.

**Figure 15. Components of Export Growth in Argentina 1995-2004**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 120<br>100<br>80<br>60 121<br>40<br>20 47 6 0<br>0<br>-19<br>-20<br>-55<br>-40<br>-60<br>Increase in Fall in exports of Extinction of New exports of New exports of New exports of<br>exports of existing existing products exports of existing existing products new products to new products to<br>products to to existing markets products to to new markets existing markets new markets<br>existing markets existing markets<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Comtrade.

**The low or flat growth of new exports products is also parallel by poor growth in the sophistication of the Argentine export basket** , measured in Sanchez and Butler (2008).<sup>11</sup> The income content of Argentine exports has grown only 15 percent between 1975 and 2000, compared to 100 percent and 50 percent for Brazil and Chile respectively (Figure 16). Moreover, Argentina’s current per capita income lies above its export sophistication, a measure that—according to the authors—suggests that its current export basket will not offer a positive contribution to growth. Moreover, in the cases of Brazil and Chile, it was very important that export sophistication was significantly bigger than per capita GDP at the beginning of the observed period. Especially for Brazil, the sophistication of exports increased more than per capita GDP between 1975 and 2000, suggesting increasing opportunities for growth. In the case of Argentina, export sophistication was never much bigger than its per capita GDP, which may help explain its poor growth performance since 1975.

> 11 Sanchez, G. and Butler, I. (2008), Competitiveness and Growth in Argentina: Appropriability, Misallocation or Disengagement? IERAL - Fundacion Mediterranea.

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# **2. Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Education: Practice**

The analysis described in the preceding section to estimate the rate of return to education has been applied often to argue why nations ought to invest more national resources to education. The latest results indicate that the average private rate of return to another year of schooling averaged over 100 countries is 10 percent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). The returns are higher in lower income areas. The same diminishing returns apply across countries: the more developed the country, the lower the returns to education at all levels. The high returns to education in low-income countries must be attributed to the relative scarcity of human capital. The average private returns to another year of schooling by region are presented in Figure 3. The highest overall returns are found in Latin America, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. The lowest returns are in the educationally-advanced OECD and non-OECD Europe/Middle East/North Africa. Overall, women receive higher returns on their schooling investments; but for other reasons, in most countries, women receive less pay, regardless of occupation.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 3: Returns to Schooling by Region (%)<br>Schooling years Returns<br>12 12<br>8 8<br>4 4<br>0 0<br>Europe/ OECD World Asia Africa Latin<br> Mid-East America<br> N. Arica<br>Retur ns Years of schooling<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004 8
national poverty rate at $2 per day is only 17 percent, poverty incidence is much higher in the backward regions in the North East.

23. Sub-national poverty dispersion is closely related to the spread in per-capita income across geographical areas. Average per-capita incomes still vary considerably across sub-national regions despite a widespread absence of internal barriers to trade or factor mobility (Figure 8). Regional dispersion is much higher in large MICs and the lowest value in the coefficient of variation in income per capita obtained for any such country is higher than that observed anywhere in the developed world. The highest dispersions are usually in the larger (leveloping countries where transport costs are an <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 8. Dispersion in Sub-national<br>Per Capita Income<br>U 1950s *1990s<br>0 6-<br>0<br>t0<br>" 02<br>E<br>o<br>Developed countries Developing countries<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Sources:_ J.G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns," _Economic Developmtent and Cultural Change,_ v 13, no. 4, part 2, 1965, and World Bank staff important factor-Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa-but this is not always the case as dispersion is relatively low in India and high in Thailand where large income differentials persist between Bangkok and the rest of the country.

# **Poverty Poses Substantial Challenges**

24. The MICs continue to face considerable challenges in eradicating poverty. While many MICs recently enjoyed high growth, others are stagnating or even declining. The poverty impact of growth has also varied considerably. Chile (1987-94), Egypt (197595), and Pakistan (1991-96) are examples of countries that enjoyed episodes of strong pro-poor growth; but in India (1991-97), Thailand (1981-88), and Peru (1986-94) the impact of growth on poverty was much weaker. While there is a reasonable degree of consensus about the policy framework needed to encourage economic growth, less is known about how to make growth more pro-poor.

25. Addressing the problems posed by sub-national pockets of poverty is likely to remain a particularly thorny issue. Experience suggests that the dispersion of per-capita incomes across the sub-national regions of developing countries is likely to remain substantial for some time to come. Relying on market forces alone to remove subnational inequality is not enough, yet long experience with regional policy in most developed countries suggests that there is no easy way of ironing out sub-national differences 9
# **8. Regression analysis**

OLS estimation was applied to search for a set of predictors of behavior using data from the experiments and the post-experiment survey.

# _8.1 Within-group behavior_

Table 4a shows results for within-group behavior. Columns 1-5 report the results for how much initiators sent. Columns 6-10 report results for how much receivers returned. In both cases, in (1) and (6), we begin by including generalized or social trust, gender, a dummy for the private university, and add age as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when subjects are older than 29. We then replace generalized social trust by particularized trust as measured by trust in friends and add a dummy indicating whether students are Montenegrin, their average trust in institutions, reported benevolent self-image, and a whether participants viewed themselves as utility maximizers. For receivers, we also include how much was received from initiators. The results are:

- P-participants were more trusting as initiators but there is no group difference for receivers.

- When account is taken of post-experiment declared identity as benevolent or being material utility maximizers, P-participants were also significantly more trustworthy in returning more.

- Reciprocity is indicated: for every euro received, on average 60 cents was returned, yielding an 80% return for initiators.

- Declared generalized trust was not significant in affecting actual behavior of initiators or receivers, but could be regarded as not applicable because participants knew that they were interacting within their own group.

- Declared particularized trust is significant in being associated with larger amounts returned by receivers and _smaller_ amounts transferred by initiators.

- Women as receivers returned significantly more. The gender difference is in general only significant for behavior as receivers. When account is taken of

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46. The exercise is admittedly mechanistic, and it is possible that both operating fees and asset management fees would be reduced over time, in line with asset growth. However, the exercise also illustrates the potential problems that may be caused by the maintenance of the mixed fee structure, combined with the lack of transparency and competition in the pension system. If the system remains as segmented as it is in the present time, some members might be penalized and suffer from relatively low replacement ratios at the time of retirement.

47. Figure 9 and Figure 10 replicate the exercise for the two MPFs with the highest and lowest total fees over assets or over contributions in 2004 reported in Table 18 and Table 19. Results are also compared with and the results obtained before for the average MPF. Notice that total fees over contributions would converge to 51% and 16% for the highest and lowest cost MPFs, respectively. Similarly, total fees over average assets would converge to 1.66% and 0.49% for the highest and lowest fee MPFs, respectively. The exercise suggests that it should be possible to reduce long-run fees to about 50 basis points, which is also the level of fees charged by large occupational funds in the US.<sup>16</sup>

**Figure 9:  Long-Run Fees over Contributions for Average, Highest and Lowest Cost MPF**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60%<br>51.01%<br>50%<br>40%<br>37.10%<br>30%<br>20%<br>15.79%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Average Cost MPF Lowest Cost MPF Highest Cost MPF<br>1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%. Source: Own calculations on HFSA data.

> 16 Colins (ibid) and Investment Company Institute (ibid).
23 <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 5 Price Determination in the Flexibility Market with the<br>SRMC<br>Source of Imbalance a Change in Demand<br>6<br>Positive system Negative system<br>imbalance imbalance<br>System sell System buy<br>4<br>SMPbU -<br>3<br>PS0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Qw 1 Q1l=QW 0 Qw 0 Q1 2 Qw2<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Table 6: A Stylised Household SAM

|||Activities<br>||Commodit<br>|ies<br>|**Factors**||Household|ROUTotalSu|pplylincome|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||1<br>||3<br>|4<br>5<br>6<br>|<br>7|8|9<br>10|11||
|**Activities**<br>||SUB-A|CASH-A|SUB-C|CASH-CINPUT-C<br>NONFC|<br>LAB|CAP|LAND<br>HH|ROW||
|1.Subsistence activity<br>|SUB-A<br>|||40||||||40|
|2.Cashcropactivity<br>|CASH-A||||75|||||75|
|**Commodities**<br>|||||||||||
|3.Foodcrop<br>|SUB-C<br>|||||||60||60|
|4.Cashcrop<br>|CASH-C<br>||||||||7|75|
|5.Fertiliser<br>|INPUT-C<br>|10|20|||||||30|
|6.Non-food<br>|NONF-C|||||||25||25|
|**Factors**<br>|||||||||||
|7.Labour<br>|LAB<br>|10<br>|2|||||||30|
|8.Capital<br>|CAP<br>|10<br>|2<br>|||||||30|
|9.Land<br>|LAND|10|1|||||||25|
|**Household**<br>|||||||||||
|10.Thehousehold<br>|HH|||||30|30|25||85|
|**Otherinstitutions**<br>|||||||||||
|11.RestoftheWorld|ROW|||20|30<br>25|||||75|
|TotalDemand/Expend|iture|40|7'|60|75<br>30<br>25|<br>30|30|25<br>85|7||

Expenditures go from column to row (or equivalently, sales go from row to column). The row totals therefore represent the income of each account; column totals represent total expenditures of the accounts.

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share in Shenyang. We therefore assume that it will remain stable at its current level - perhaps overly conservative, but consistent with our approach for other cities.

# **5.2 Industrial Production**

<!-- Start of picture text --> InrKkibaial Outp MS): 198- 2M<br>1010--- .................................. ..... ....<br>eo.o 4, B*<br>Mao .x S<br>40o.<br>20.0 t ,<br>ao0. : I ,<br>198 1 4 zo l 2 Z10<br>Figure 23: Industrial Output Trends, 1988-2020<br><!-- End of picture text --> Total discharge for a pollutant is the product of pollution intensity (or pollution per unit of output) and output. Obviously, projected output scale is a critical predictor of future pollution problems. China's overall industrial growth rate has been among the highest in the world during the past decade, and we forecast that it will slacken somewhat in the early twentyfirst century. Again, an analysis of regional trends reveals considerable diversity within China (Figure 23). Shanghai's industrial economy is already huge, and its economy is shifting rapidly toward the service sector at the margin. Extrapolating from the trend during 1988-1994, we project a 4.1% annual growth rate for Shanghai's industry through 2020; an overall increase of about 180% during the forecasting period.

Guangdong has a projected industrial growth rate of 5.7% and an overall increase of 320%. Beijing and Liaoning are intermediate, with annual growth rates near 5% and overall increases of around 250%. The contrast between the coastal regions and the interior is evident in Sichuan's trend output growth. Although our projection (3.5% annual; 150% overall) would be respectable for many economies, it is clearly lagging by comparison with the coastal provinces.

Of course, these simple extrapolations cannot fully anticipate the dynamics of regional change during the next two decades. It is entirely possible that congestion and rising factor costs in the coastal region will reduce its comparative advantage for industrial location, leading to a shift toward interior locations. However, agglomeration economies are powerful and the coastal region is China's entrepot for international trade. On balance, extrapolations from recent trends seem to yield reasonable predictions.

# **5.3 Economic Reform and Environmental Regulation: Possible Futures**

# **Prospects for 'Win-Win': Economic Reform Without Stricter Regulation**

China's economic reforms have generated powerful forces for reduced pollution intensity in manufacturing. The consolidation of production in large plants has lowered pollution intensity, because unit abatement costs and generation of waste residuals are lower in large facilities. Non-SOE factories have absorbed a growing share of industrial output, producing further reductions in pollution intensity from efficiency gains. Our econometric analysis suggests that these factors have accounted for much of the decline in air and 24
stages than on upstream stages. This may encourage more remote countries to specialize in upstream stages and more central countries to specialize in downstream stages. Ine¢ cient transport and logistics services and weak competition in these services amplify trade costs in many manufacturing GVCs with multiple border crossings and can o¤set other competitive advantages like low labor costs. Empirical evidence shows that bilateral GVC links are strongly positively correlated with geographic proximity and that countries’backward GVC participation is negatively associated with their higher distance to the closest manufacturing hub.<sup>13</sup> We expect geography - measured by geographical distance to GVC hubs China, Germany, and the US - to play an important role for GVC participation.

# 2.2.3 Domestic Industrial Capacity

It is well established by gravity models that countries with a larger domestic industrial capacity have more traditional trade.<sup>14</sup> However, for GVC trade, the relationship between domestic industrial capacity and GVC participation is not clear. On the one hand, to minimize cross-hauling of semi-processed goods in di¤erent stages, countries often specialize in contiguous stages of production in GVCs. Countries with a larger domestic industrial capacity may have a larger set of contiguous stages which reduce the use of imported inputs relative to domestic inputs in their exports. This may lead to lower backward GVC participation. On the other hand, countries with a larger domestic industrial capacity may demand more ...nal goods for domestic consumption, which may lead them to specialize in downstream stages of production embodying more foreign value added and thus could increase backward GVC participation. Finally, a larger domestic industrial capacity implies a larger domestic supplier base which reduces search frictions and facilitates the replacement of domestic suppliers in face of production disruptions and may increase domestic value added and forward GVC participation.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the overall e¤ect of domestic industrial capacity - measured by domestic manufacturing value added - on GVC participation is ambiguous and can only be determined empirically.

> 13See Kowalski et al. (2015) and Buelens and Tirpak (2017).

> 14See, for example, Arkolakis et al. (2012).

> 15See Kee (2015) for evidence of this mechanism in Bangladesh.

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# **References**

Barth, James; Caprio, Gerard; Levine, Ross, 2001. “The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World: A New Database.” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, Robert E. Litan and Richard Herring, Editors, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp.183-240.

Barth, James; Caprio, Gerard; Levine, Ross, 2004. “Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” _Journal of Financial Intermediation_ 13, 205-248.

Barth, James; Caprio, Gerard; Levine, Ross, 2006. _Rethinking Bank Supervision and Regulation: Until Angels Govern_ , Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Barth, James; Caprio, Gerard; Levine, Ross, 2008. “Bank Regulations are Changing: For Better or Worse?” _Comparative Economic Studies_ , 50(4), 537-563.

Barth, James; Caprio, Gerard; Levine, Ross, 2012. _Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us,_ MIT Press.

Caprio, Gerard; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Kane, Edward. 2010. “The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats,” _World Bank Research Observer_ 25, 125-55.

Claessens, Stijn; Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni; Igan, Deniz; Laeven, Luc, 2010. “Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis.” IMF Working Paper 10/44.

Dan, Kenneth, 2010. “The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives.” John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 517. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Serven, Luis, 2010. “Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications of the Financial Crisis for Macro- and Financial Policies.” _World Bank Research Observer_ 25(1), 91-124.

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