rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# _Legal form_

Because of the idiosyncratic risk that they bear, firms with single owners bearing unlimited liability (such as proprietorships) are less likely to invest and grow their firms in poor legal environments where the returns to their investments are poorly protected. Firms with limited liability and multiple owners (such as limited partnerships and corporations) diversify the risk of owners to a greater extent. In countries or regions with lower quality legal systems, we therefore expect firms to be smaller, and we expect this effect to be more pronounced for proprietorships, where the owners bear unlimited liability.

To explore the differential effect of the quality of the legal system on firms with differences in the degree of idiosyncratic risk, we construct a variable measuring the number of firms with limited liability and multiple owners as a percentage of all firms in a particular industry. We will refer to this variable as the incorporation intensity measure. We construct this measure both for Mexico and the United States. The category of firms with limited liability includes corporations and limited partnerships in the United States, and _sociedades anonimas_ (SAs) and _sociedades de responsabilidad limitada_ (SRLs) in Mexico. For simplicity, we refer to these as the corporate legal form, though in both the US and Mexico they include limited partnerships as well. The total number of firms includes these as well as individual proprietorships. We exclude other type of legal forms from these total figures. For Mexico, we also report the share of employment in firms with limited liability and multiple owners.

> industries and firms of different sizes. As a result, we use state level data on the total amount of credit extended as a measure of access to finance.

26
de...ne rice yield per acre as the average of yields of Boro, Aman and Aus rice. The upazila (subdistrict) level yields are the average over villages surveyed within a upazila. Since the number of villages within a upazila are limited, the estimated yield may involve signi...cant measurement error. We compared yield growth estimates from HIES aggregated to the district level to the corresponding estimates from the o¢ cial agricultural statistics, and they show comparable growth during the decade of 2000. The yield estimates at the upazila (subdistrict) level used in this paper thus are useful as a measure of productivity.

Rainfall data are drawn from Bandyopadhyay and Skou...as (2012). The original data on rainfall come from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. The CRU reported estimates of monthly rainfall for most of the world at the half degree resolution from 1902 to 2009. The CRU estimation combines weather station data with other information to arrive at the estimates.<sup>15</sup> To estimate the sub-district (upazila/thana) level rainfall from the CRU data, Bandyopadhyay and Skou...as (2012) use area weighted averages.<sup>16</sup> Travel times to the metropolitan cities are computed using GIS software and the road network from mid-1990s. Data on ‡ood prone areas are drawn from the Bangladesh Water Board database. All population variables are drawn from the population censuses.

Over the years, a number of larger upazilas were split to form new upazilas, thus increasing the total number of upazilas from 486 in 1990 to 507 in 2000 to 543 in 2010. We use upazila maps to identify the borders of upazilas over time and matched all upazilas

> 15Previous versions of the CRU data were homogenized to reduce variability and provide more accurate estimation of mean rain at the cost of variability estimation. The version 3.1 data is not homogenized and thus allows for better variability estimates. The estimates of rainfall near international boundaries are not less reliable as compared with those in the interior of the country, as the CRU estimation utilizes data from all the weather stations in the region.

> 16For example if an Upazila/thana covers two half degree grid cells for which CRU has rainfall estimates, then upzila/thana rainfall is estimated as the average rainfall of the two grid-cells, where the weights are the proportion of the area of the upazila/thana in each grid-cell. For details, please see Bandyopadhyay and Skou...as(2012).

21
Table 8: Decomposing Targeting Performance of VL Expenditures _(percent)_

||_Parti_<br>|_cipants_<br>|_Valueoftr_<br>|_ansfer_<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Datasetandyear_|_Intradistrict_|_Interdistrict_|_Intradistrict_|_Interdistrict_|
|_Targetingbasedonp _<br>|_overtyamonghou_<br>|_seholdswithkidso _<br>|_fage6 andunder..._||
|ENNIV1994|46.7|53.3|||
|ENNIV1997|42.2|57.8|67.1|32.9|
|Enaho1998|40.2|59.8|||
|Enaho1999|39.7|60.3|||
|Enaho 2000|21.6|78.4|||
|_Targetingbasedonp_<br>|_overty amongallh_<br>|_ouseholds..._<br>|||
|ENNIV1994|48.1|51.9|||
|ENNIV1997|47.6|52.4|73.0|27.0|
|Enaho1998|46.1|53.9|||
|Enaho1999|44.6|55.4|||
|Enaho2000|29.7|70.3|||
|_Targetingbasedonc _|_hildmalnutrition_||||
|ENNIV1994|25.4|74.6|||
|DHS1996|14.6|85.4|||
|ENNIV1997|26.8|73.2|||

A plausible explanation for greater interdistrict targeting in terms of population coverage and leakage, and greater intradistrict targeting in terms of the value of transfers received by the poor, could be that the Mother's Committees feel compelled to distribute at least some food to as many people as possible, but give larger transfers to the poor.<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, since relatively high percentages of the district populations participate (i.e., receive at least some transfers), the choice of the district matters in terms of maximizing coverage of the poor participating while minimizing leakage (i.e., nonpoor participating). This manifests itself in the interdistrict contribution to targeting dominating. On the other hand, among those that receive transfers, the average value of transfers to the poor is almost double of that to the nonpoor. Thus the intradistrict allocation of food items among recipients matters to the degree of targeting of the poor - i.e., intradistrict targeting dominates interdistrict targeting.

# _Correlates of Participation and Transfer Values_

While the stated targeting criteria (Tier I and II beneficiaries) are clear, participation may actually reflect decisions made by the eligible households in addition to those of the _5We_ thank Steve Younger for pointing this out.

_18_
Table 2: Taxation of the Financisl Sector (" of GDP)

|At End-Year<br>= === =zz<br>**=**=<br>==<br>......<br>an= ......<br>==<br>asaaasgs-X<br>s-as|1981<br>ssa<br>uss|1982<br>X8--ast-Sss-u--s--S<br>..|1963<br>swswssaxs-=s<br> <br>aon..|1984<br>.....|1985<br>on<br>|¶986<br>.........|1987|1988<br>s.. ssam=z =|Average<br>=<br>..... ss|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|COTE d'IVOIRE<br>Currency<br>Tax|0.8|1.0|0.9|0.9|0.8|0.7|0.8|0.8|0.8|
|-=======<br>Reserve Requirement<br>Tax<br> <br>|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Govt)|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Won-Govt)|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Ineirect<br>Tax|0.9|1.2|1.1|0.9|0.8|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.7|
|Total|1.7|2.2|2.0|1.8|1.6|0.9|1.1|1.1|1.6|
|of which to goverrment<br>|0.8|1.0|0.9|0.9<br>|0.8|0.7<br>|0.8<br> <br>|0.8<br>|0.8|
|...===<br>**= =**<br>**3=333=33=3=3=333=5333=3=**<br>**3--**<br>**3333-3----3-3**|**3-333**<br>**S**|**-as-S333S-333333**|**U3S-3**<br>**--**<br>**3**<br>**--**<br>**fl**|-sMangums...||.....<br>M|..=&<br>....<br>ss|s3===3......||
|GHANA<br>Currency<br>Tax|1.0|6.0|0.4|1.0|1.5|1.6|1.4|1.3|1.8|
|Reserve Requiremant<br>Tax|0.5|2.7|0.2|0.2|0.3|0.5|0.2|0.3|0.6|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Govt)|0.0|2.4|0.0|0.1|0.2|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.3|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Non-Govt)|0.0|2.1|0.0|0.1|0.4|0.5|0.2|0.2|0.4|
|Indirect<br>Tax<br>|0.0|0.0<br>|0.0|0.0|0.0<br>|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Total<br>|1.6|13.1<br>|0.6|1.4|2.4|2.8|1.9|1.7|3.2|
|ofwhich to government|1.6|11.0|0.6|1.3|2.0|2.3|1.6|1.5|2.7|
|KENYA<br>Currency<br>Tax|0.9|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.6|0.5|0.6|0.6|0.6|
|Reserve Requirement<br>Tax|0.3|0.3|0.3|0.2|0.3|0.3|0.4|0.3|0.3|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Govt)<br> <br>|0.3|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Mon-Govt)|1.7|0.1|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.2|
|Indirect<br>Tax|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Total|3.1|1.0|0.9|0.8|0.9|0.8|1.0|0.9|1.2|
|of which to government<br> <br> <br>|1.4|0.8|0.9|0.7|0.9|0.8|1.0|0.9|0.9<br>|
|= =s<br>s=<br>= ===-....................-,<br>=--=--<br>...<br>2...|||.......|-as----|.....<br>---.....|..--.<br>---------|................|-----|ssssasss===22=asss====sss|
|NIGE IA<br>Currency<br>Tax|0.4|1.9|1.9|0.5|0.7|0.5|1.8|1.3|1.1|
|Reserve Requirement<br>Tax|0.3|1.2|0.9|0.3|0.5|0.3|1.1|0.7|0.6|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Govt)|0.1|1.2|1.7|0.0|0.6|0.0|2.0|1.2|0.9|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Non-Govt)|0.2|3.7|3.1|0.0|0.7|0.1|3.7|3.1|_1.8_|
|Indirect<br>Tax|0.0|0.0|00|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Total<br>|1.0<br>|8.0<br>|7.5<br>|0.7<br>|2.5<br>|1.0<br>|8.6<br>|6.3<br>|4.5<br>|
|of which to government|0.8|4.3|4.4|0.7|1.8|0.9|4.9|3.2|2.6|
|ZAMBIA<br>Currency<br>Tax|0.7|1.0|1.2|1.7|1.1|1.4|1.9|3.6|1.6|
|Reserve Requirement<br>Tax|0.6|0.9|1.0|1.4|0.9|2.8|2.9|4.3|1.9|
|<br>Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Govt)|0.3|1.3|1.1|2.1|1.0|1.6|3.5|4.3|1.9|
|Int Ceiling<br>Tax (Non-Govt)|1.7|2.8|3.2|_5.3_|1.5|_2.0_|3.4|6.8|3.3|
|Indirect<br>Tax|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Total|3.3|6.0|6.5|10.6|4.5|7.8|11.7|18.9|8.7|
|ofwhich to government|1.6|3.2|3.3|53|3.0|5.8|8.4|12.1|5.3|

Note: Based on Measure 1 39
An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda

**Figure 35: Hybrid reforms lowers Government expenditure for teachers but expenditures patterns are identical to the pure DC reform***

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5%<br>2.0%<br>1.5%<br>1.0%<br>0.5%<br>0.0%<br>2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052 2057 2062 2067 2072<br>Year<br>ref II.1A ref II.2 base<br>Expenditure (% GDP)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Notes: *** Comparison of Government expenditure for teachers – Reform II.1A, II.2 with baseline (as % of GDP). **Source** : WB calculations based on PROST.

It is very important to notice that Figure 34 is identical to Figure 26, and Figure 35 is identical to Figure 27. This indicates that since the first pillar remains in surplus throughout the simulation period, government expenditure in Reform II.2 will be the same as in Reform I.2. Similarly, government expenditures in Reform I.1A will be the same as in Reform II.1A. The reason for this is due to the fact that when the first pillar in surplus, the only source of expenditure is represented by: 1) wages; 2) the 10% contribution rate for the government to the new scheme; and 3) the pension expenditure for the grandfathered workers under the old scheme. Wages and the 10% contribution rate are identical under all reforms modeled here. However, the pension expenditure for the grandfathered workers under the old scheme is identical, for given expected rate of return on assets, respectively in Reforms I.2 and II.2, and in Reforms I.1A and II.1A. This is because the grandfathering rules are the same. Expenditure will be identically higher than in Reforms II.2A and I.2 because workers who are active on the date of reform will continue accruing pension rights until they retire under the old, more generous, rules.

While the hybrid and pure DC have the same impact on pension expenditure (for given grandfathering rules, of course), the hybrid is likely to produce higher replacement rates than the pure DC reform With gradual transition, replacement rates for non switchers are the same as for non switchers in the pure DC reform. This is true because accrued rights are calculated in the same way. However, for switchers replacement rates will be higher in the hybrid reform option, especially for lower income groups, due to the insurance

- 69 -
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30
The final check of robustness involves adding exogenous variables that vary by country and cohort at the time of birth, and substituting life expectancy at birth by life expectancy measured at older ages. The theory predicts that the effect of life expectancy at birth is exogenous to any random shock realized in a later period in life. To demonstrate the validity of this, we incorporate average temperature and average precipitation that was observed for a birthcohort at the time of birth in its country of origin. Note that similar to life expectancy at birth, average temperature and average precipitation also vary by birth-year and country. The results and discussion on this are presented in Appendix C. In sum, the estimates reveal that the statistically significant positive association of life expectancy at birth with schooling and earnings is not altered even after inclusion of these exogenous variables.

Concerns related to high infant and child mortality rates led some recent papers to argue against using life expectancy at birth. Hazan (2012) suggests that life expectancy beyond early childhood is more appropriate to capture its true effect on human capital investment decisions since parents make schooling decisions for their children at age five or later.<sup>22</sup> However, by the time a child reaches age five or ten, the parents have made substantive investments in the child’s health based on new information on the child’s survival prospects. That makes life expectancy at ages 5 or 10 endogenous responses to observed child survival, making their use inappropriate as explanatory variables for other parental investments in children. However, results using life expectancy at higher ages still have positive and significant effects on years of schooling and lifetime earnings, as reported in Appendix C. These findings contrast with Hazan’s (2012) finding that life expectancy at older ages does not exhibit any statistically significant association with schooling years using a cross-country panel database.

> 22 The argument is based on the observation that cross-country life expectancy at birth exhibits more variation compared to life expectancy at five due to high infant and child mortality.

23
6. On presentation of the instrument, if the RO finds that the instrument is inadequately stamped, only the admission of execution is recorded, and the instrument is impounded without registration and sent to the District Registrar who has been appointed as Collector for the purpose.

7. The RO must also verify that the value of the property stated in the instrument is correctly set forth. If the stated value is the same or above the guideline market value, the instrument is registered and returned to the party. If the stated value is below the guideline value, the seller must pay the difference between the payable stamp duty as per the guideline value and the actual amount paid. If the deficit amount is paid, the instrument is registered; if it is not and there is disagreement regarding the amount of stamp duty payable, then the RO refers the instrument to the District Sub-Registrar for further review. If disagreement persists even after this review, the District Sub-Registrar refers the case to the Deputy Inspector General of Registration or the Joint Inspector General of Registration for disposal.

8. The RO must also ensure that applicable certificates have been furnished before registering a document. These may include one or more of the following:

- a. a no-objection certificate under the Income Tax Act;

- b. permission of the tahsildar under the Orissa Land Revenue Act or permission under from the Sub-Collector;

- c. permission of the Endowment Commissioner under the Hindu Religious Endowment Act;

- d. permission of the Government of Orissa or permission of the Collector in the case of government leasehold land; and

- e. permission of the Consolidation Officer for land under consolidation operation.

9. After the RO verifies that all the conditions required for admission of the instrument have been met, the document is registered on payment of the prescribed fees. Any refusal to register a document is governed by various sections of Orissa acts, and may be appealed to the District Register at the first instance.

10. The individual must receive permission for the transaction under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and also obtain a clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department.

In the case of the sale of a piece of land in a rural area of Orissa, the same general procedures must be followed, with the exception that it is not necessary to comply with the Urban Land Ceiling Act or the Income Tax Department. Complications are also introduced by the many rates in the stamp duty rate structures, as well as by the many different types of stamps that may be required and that may not be available. Similar procedures must be followed in most other States. These procedures are clearly complex, cumbersome, and burdensome on 9
major dimension of child activities is “inactiveness” (neither schooling nor working), especially among girls. Thus, another objective of this paper is to examine the association between wealth and child inactiveness. A straightforward hypothesis is that economic growth reduces inactiveness because in theory it generates more opportunities for schooling and child labor.

The paper finds that wealth is crucial in determining child activities but it is not sufficient to enroll children in school. This is especially the case for rural girls. Nonparametric analysis shows a universal increase in school enrollment for rural girls from 1998 to 2006 and this increase is rather independent of wealth (measured by per capita expenditure). Multinomial logit regression further shows that wealth is insignificant in determining rural girls’ activity decisions. Nonparametric analysis also shows that the relationship between wealth and child activities is contingent on poverty and survey rounds. Thus, conditional cash transfer or cash transfer programs alone cannot be sufficient to get children out of work and go to school. Rather, supply side interventions which focus on strengthening the education system are also crucial.

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the paper uses time-series, cross-sectional data to examine the relationship between wealth and child activities rather than one round of cross-sectional data. Thus, the findings are more robust. Second, the paper explicitly considers inactiveness as one of the activities children engage in. Thus, the interpretation is more refined. Third, the paper disaggregated ‘children’ into four groupings: urban boys, urban girls, rural boys and rural girls. These categories of children are examined separately in light of the fact that school and work opportunities vary among these four groups. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model for child activity decisions that underpins this study. This is followed in Section 3 by a description of the data and measurement employed. Section 4 then discusses the empirical method used in this 3
# **1. Introduction**

About 2 billion adults worldwide lack an account at a formal financial institution, despite mounting evidence that accounts help enable a wide range of development goals. This paper draws on new individual-level survey data from India – home to about a fifth of the world's unbanked adults – to explore the costs of opening an account, the efficiency of the account application process, and demographic differences between those who choose to apply and those who do not. These insights can help policy makers improve account application processes to foster greater financial inclusion.

The survey was carried out between January and March 2016, roughly a year and a half after the Government of India launched its flagship program aimed at achieving universal account ownership, known as the Jan Dhan Yojana (JDY) scheme.<sup>1</sup> The ambitious goal of the JDY scheme is to open one account per Indian household by offering zero-balance accounts with no opening fees. Our survey finds that the JDY program has made it easier to get an account. Compared to traditional applicants, adults who applied for a JDY account in the past year were half as likely to say the application process was difficult. JDY application rates are negatively correlated with wealth at the state level, unlike traditional application rates, which suggests the policy has disproportionally helped adults in poorer states.

Despite these initial successes, people who wish to apply for an account continue to incur a range of costs, including the cost of traveling to bank branches, the cost of collecting documentation and various other monetary costs. Most applicants face a combination of these costs, and their cumulative impact may be enough to dissuade unbanked adults from applying. For instance, on average applicants had to make two trips to the bank to complete the application process. In addition, more than half of JDY applicants reported paying a required minimum initial deposit, even though there is no such requirement under the program. The survey results suggest several recommendations to improve the account application process, including more effectively communicating the requirements for opening a JDY account.

Research suggests that financial inclusion helps facilitate economic development. Access to accounts has been shown to support women's empowerment as well as help people manage risk, 1 For additional information on the government roll-out of JDY accounts see Chopra, Prabhala, and Tantri (2017). 2