rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
participation of employees in pension schemes. The case of Italy is also used to illustrate one of the most relevant “successful failures” in the implementation of automatic enrollment.

This comparative study can be useful to countries deciding on the different features of automatic enrollment. As these comparisons reveal, the outcomes of automatic enrollment can be substantially different depending on various policy decisions that are associated with the implementation.

# **Main Features of Automatic Enrollment**

While the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, the United States, and the Quebec province have adopted the principle of automatic enrollment in their voluntary funded schemes, their implementation has been very different (Table 2). In the case of the United Sates for example, employers may choose whether to offer an automatic enrollment facility or not, but providing one gives employers a “safe harbor” in complying with the non-discrimination test. Between one-quarter and one-third of the pension plans have automatic enrollment provisions. While Italy has a _de jure_ automatic enrollment system, the plan has _de facto_ been implemented as an opt-in system. As Rinaldi (2010) points out, employers are required to ask each employee if he/she is comfortable with the default option, and each employee needs to sign an agreement. In addition, automatic enrollment was created to substitute existing unemployment insurance (TFR) benefits, and the system is such that the benefits for the employees of substituting the existing TRF benefits by the pension accumulation with the automatic enrollment are not evident. Employers, especially from smaller companies, are not indifferent either as the automatic enrollment implies for them to fund contributions that otherwise can be used as working capital. In other words, the automatic enrollment scheme is not designed in a way that is attractive for employers and employees.

**Table 2. Selected Features in Collective Voluntary Pension Plans**

||**United Kingdom**|**New Zealand**|**Italy**|**USA**|**Canada/Quebec**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(2012)|(2006)|(2007)|(2012)|(2014)|
|Automatic<br>Enrollment|Mandatory|Mandatory|Mandatory, but<br>implemented as<br>"opt‐in"|Optional,<br>but<br>considered<br>a<br>safe<br>harbour<br>(mandatory<br>in<br>Simple plans)|Mandatory|
|Requirement on the<br>minimum<br>number<br>of<br>employees<br>for<br>opting for a plan|250+<br>2012;<br>50+<br>2014;<br>30+<br>2016;<br>30‐ 2017|No|No|No, but 100‐ can<br>opt for SIMPLE<br>plans|5+|
|Period<br>for<br>opting<br>out|30 days|Between 14 and<br>56 days|180 days|90 days|60 days|

Source: national sources As shown in Figure 4, coverage of funded schemes in Italy is inferior to the rest of the countries with automatic enrollment. In fact, only a small percentage of participants in voluntary pension schemes in 14
The ZNPF has not been able to provide adequate retirement benefits to its members. In part, this is due to weaknesses in the provident fund system which has no insurance element protecting members from the consequences of invalidity, unemployment or (except to a very limited extent) death. Further, for most people a lump-sum benefit represents an unsound basis for long term income security. But these inherent weaknesses have been compounded by deficiencies in the management of the Fund.

Firstly, the contribution ceiling has not been regularly adjusted to take account of inflation. Until 1995, employers and employees were required to each contribute 5 percent of gross monthly earnings up to an income ceiling of K.15,000 resulting in a maximum monthly contribution of only K.1,500 (approx. US$ 2 at end-1994). The level of average earnings, however, increased by 700 percent between 1992 and 1994 alone. Due to the failure to revise the ceiling regularly, the scheme has been effectively operating on a flat-rate basis with very low real contribution receipts and consequently low members' balances. The volume of contributions fell by about 90 percent in real terms between 1981 and 1995. In 1995, the ceiling was increased substantially to K 150,000 (approx. US$ 180); at the same time, due to strong resistance from both employers and employees the contribution rate was lowered from previously 10 to 7 percent of wages.

TABLE 2: ZNPF Indicators <!-- Start of picture text --> 1982/83 1985/86 1987/88 1990/91<br>Real rate of return on - 5.8 - 5.9 - 39 - 32<br>assets<br>Real interest to - 14.0 - 32 - 32 - 47<br>members<br>Real contributions 88 60 39 21<br>(1981/82 = 100)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: ZNPF Actuarial Review 1992 Secondly, from the introduction of the Fund in 1966 until 1992/93, a nominal interest rate of only 4.5 to 5.5 percent was credited to the statutory contributions in members' accounts. But over the same period, annual inflation increased from 33 to 200 percent and commercial deposit interest rates rose from 15 to 84 percent. In 1993/94, the 5,000 fund retirees received on average a lump-sum of only K 10,000 (US$14 at the end of 1994). The credibility of the scheme has suffered considerably from such low benefit levels.

Concern about the low balances in members' ZNPF accounts led to a decision to increase the interest rate for members' accounts to 50 percent for 1992/93 and then 100 percent for 1993/94. This increase was made possible mostly through a revaluation of real estate owned by the ZNPF and through yields obtained from investment in Treasury Bills. But investment income is insufficient to meet current administrative and benefit expenditure. In the following two years, interest to members' accounts was reduced again to 50 and 35 percent, respectively. There was an excess of expenditure over income in each of the last four years but this result is not surprising considering the negative real return on assets linked with the fact that personnel and other management expenditure has been rising with inflation.

2For a discussion of the role of provident funds for old age security see Dixon 1989, Gruat 1990 7
and uniform producer price (Mali border; the Malian survey only records physical cotton output). We also extract data on wage incomes earned by household members.

Second, height stature is available for children from six months to four years (59 months) of age, and only for 6-35 months in some DHS. We construct heightfor-age Z-scores using the World Health Organization standards (WHO 2006) and code children as stunted when the Z-score is below -2.

Third, from both types of surveys, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether the household uses electricity as the main source of light in the house. The surveys do not distinguish between being connected to a network or using a private generator.

Fourth and last, a second dummy variable codes whether the household has access to a man-made source of water (i.e., any source of water other than rivers, lakes, pools, or rainfalls) (Ghana border only).

# **The border with Ghana**

For the 1986–8 period, both national accounts and income surveys provide similar figures for consumption per capita in the two countries. Cˆote d’Ivoire appears wealthier than Ghana by a large 344-375 USD gap at 1988 prices and exchange rates (table 2, upper top panel). Cocoa and coffee income figures computed from FAO data and from surveys are also quite consistent. When restricting the comparison of survey means to the sub-sample of administrative districts lying along the boundary, the gap in consumption is slightly reduced but remains as large as 282 USD, whereas the cash crop income difference widens to +174 USD because 20
Kaufman, Robert R. and Joan M. Nelson (eds.) 2004. _Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives: Social Sector Reform, Democratization, and Globalization in Latin America_ . Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Keusch, Gerald T., Olivier Fontaine, Alok Bhargava, Cynthia Boschi-Pinto, Zulfigar A. Bhutta, Eduardo Gotuzzo, Juan Rivera, Jeffrey Chow, Sonbol A. Shahid-Salles, and Ramanan Laxminarayan. 2006. "Diarrheal Diseases," in Jamison, Dean T., Joel G. Breman, Anthony R. Measham, George Alleyne, Mariam Claeson, David B. Evans, Prabhat Jha, Anne Mills, and Philip Musgrove (eds.), _Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries_ . New York: Oxford University Press, 371-387.

- Koenig, Michael A., David Bishai, and Mehrab Ali Khan. 2001. "Health Interventions and Health Equity: The Example of Measles Vaccination in Bangladesh." _Population and Development Review_ 27(2): 283-302.

Kolsky, Pete, Eddy Perez, Wouter Vandersypen, and Lene Odum Jensen. 2005. "Sanitation and Hygiene at the World Bank: An Analysis of Current Activities." Water Supply & Sanitation Note 6. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Kremer, Michael. 2000. "Creating Markets for New Vaccines.". Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, The Brookings Institution, and NBER.

Lambert, Craig. 2004. "The Way We Eat Now." _Harvard Magazine_ (May-June): 48-99. Landers, John 1993. _Death and the Metropolis: Studies in the Demographic History of London, 1670-1830_ . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lau, Lawrence J. 1996. "The Source of Long Term Economic Growth: Observations From the Experience of Developed and Developing Countries," in Landau, Ralph, Timothy Taylor, and Gavin Wright (eds.), _The Mosaic of Economic Growth_ . Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Levine, David I. and Dov Rothman. May 2006. "Does Trade Affect Child Health?" _Journal of Health Economics_ 25(3): 538-554.

Lichtenberg, Frank R. 2003. "The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence From Longitudinal Disease-Level Data From 52 Countries, 1982-2001." NBER Working Paper 9754. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

49
child’s ability genetically transmitted from parents, or the measurement error in reported income that results from human fallibility.

Note also that it is very unlikely that there are any signi...cant systematic errors in reporting corruption in schools by households, because the households have little incentive to misreport; people in Bangladesh do not worry about being prosecuted for paying bribes to teachers or health providers.<sup>22</sup> The NHSC surveys administered by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) also ensure that the respondents remain anonymous.

We discuss a number of potential objections to our identi...cation below and provide evidence in support for our identi...cation assumption. The NHSC 2010 survey used for the analysis of corruption contains only limited information on household characteristics. We take advantage of a nationally representative household survey (Household Income and Expenditure Survey, HIES 2010, conducted by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) for the same year as the NHSC survey (2010) to provide supplementary evidence. We also provide evidence from a falsi...cation exercise.

# E¤ects of Rainfall on Wages

It is certainly plausible that heavy rainfall may a¤ect the wage rate negatively, and one might wonder whether the estimated income e¤ect from the IV regressions partly re‡ect the substitution e¤ect of lower wages for child labor in heavy rain areas. It is, however, important to appreciate that the focus of our study is on who pays bribes and how much among the households with children in school (recall that about 50 percent of the households with children in school do not pay bribes). Thus the fact that lower child wage might a¤ect the cost-bene...t of going to school is not relevant for our analysis where the children are in school at the time of the survey. Also, the available evidence shows that the net e¤ect of a negative weather shock is to increase child labor, implying either an insigni...cant substitution e¤ect, or a low substitution e¤ect swamped by a strong income e¤ect (see, for example, Hyder et al. (2012), Beegle et al. (2006)). To assuage any lingering doubts, we report IV estimates that control for agricultural wages and prices (spatial cost of living index) in section (8) below.

# Rainfall and Migration

> 22 All three authors grew up in Bangladesh and have continuous involvement there. From their experience, it seems that people do not hesitate at all to reveal when they fall victim to corruption.

17
8 trade. The model suggests that factor usage in different sectors should be examined to determine if labor will benefit from increased incentives towards exports. Bourguignon and Morrisson (1989) provide country studies that show how the analysis can be done. They are partial equilibrium studies and are discussed further in the next section.

# 2.2 Qualitative Approaches: Partial Equilibium

If countries have little data, then a qualitative, partial equilibrium analysis may be a useful supplement to the general analysis discussed above. Furthermore, tome countries may have specific issues that need to be examined in more detail, and this may warrant a partial analysis.

a. Sectoral Analysis Bourguignon and Morrisson (1989) provide detailed case studies on external trade and income distribution." These studies do not analyze adjustment policies directly, but to the extent that adjustment policies often encourage a strategy of openness to foreign trade, these studies are relevant. The case studies include substantial data analysis, but since they do not come up with a quantitative measure of the change in the income distribution due to expanding trade, they are categorized as qualitative research. The authors first lay out a theoretical background to describe a model. which implies that a sectoral analysis of policy ,fects on income distribution can be used. They then measure the impact of the export sector on distribution, relative to sectors oriented towards the domestic market for nontradable commodities or import substitutes. They suggest using a summary measure of the income distribution that is "The country studies are on Costa Rica, Malaysia, Malawi, Morocco, Peru and Taiwan.
- Medeiros, Marcelo, Souza, Pedro Herculano Guimar ̃aes Ferreira de, & Castro, F ́abio  ́Avila de. 2015. The stability of income inequality in Brazil, 2006-2012: an estimate using income tax data and household surveys. _Ciˆencia & Sa ́ude Coletiva_ , **20** (Apr.), 971–986. Publisher: ABRASCO - Associac ̧ ̃ao Brasileira de Sa ́ude Coletiva.

- Michel, Veronica, & Walker, Ian. 2020. Honduras Jobs Diagnostic. Feb. Publisher: World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Morgan, Marc. 2018. _Essays on Income Distribution: Historical, Methodological and Institutional Perspectives_ . Phd dissertation in economics. Paris School of Economics.

- Neef, Theresa, & Robilliard, Anne-Sophie. 2021. Half the Sky? The Female Labor In.

- come Share in a Global Perspective. _World Inequality Lab – Working Paper N° 2022/22_

- Nelson, Susan. 2016. Paying Themselves: S Corporation Owners and Trends in S Corporation Income, 1980-2013.

- Piketty, Thomas. 2001. _Les Hauts revenus en France au XXe si`ecle_ . 0 edition edn. Paris: Grasset.

- Piketty, Thomas. 2003. Income Inequality in France, 1901–1998. _Journal of Political Economy_ , **111** (5), 1004–1042.

- Piketty, Thomas, & Saez, Emmanuel. 2003. Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998. _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , **118** (1), 1–41.

- Piketty, Thomas, & Zucman, Gabriel. 2014. Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700–2010. _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , **129** (3), 1255–1310.

- Piketty, Thomas, Saez, Emmanuel, & Zucman, Gabriel. 2022. Rethinking Capital and Wealth Taxation. _World Inequality Lab – Working Paper N° 2022/18_ .

- Smith, Matthew, Yagan, Danny, Zidar, Owen, & Zwick, Eric. 2022. The Rise of PassThroughs and the Decline of the Labor Share. _American Economic Review: Insights_ , **4** (3), 323–340.

- S ́anchez, Jos ́e Carlo Berm ́udez, & Urrea, Eduardo Enrique Pineda. 2019. La Distribuci ́on sectorial del ingreso regional en Honduras para el per ́ıodo 2001 - 2018. _Econom ́ıa y Administraci ́on (E&A)_ , **10** (2), 30–59.

- WID. 2022. _World Inequality Report_ . Report. Paris School of Economics.

- World Bank. 2020. _The Gradual Rise and Rapid Decline of the Middle Class in Latin America_ .

- _and the Caribbean (English)_ Report.

24
FIGURE 2: GEOGRAPHIC PATTERN OF **SSA** NON-OIL EXPORTS' <!-- Start of picture text --> United States<br>ROW 7%<br>Rest oif OECD<br>4%<br>Canada]<br>1%<br>-- - ~ European Union<br>67%<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> aFigures exclude service exports<br>Source: Version 4 of GTAP database.<br><!-- End of picture text --> As can be seen from Figure 3, agricultural products dominate SSA exports with a value of around 8 billion dollars - accounting for 42 percent of non-oil exports. Within agriculture, the main export products from the region are crops, consisting mostly of cocoa, tea, coffee and spice exports to the EU, worth almost 4 billion dollars. Mineral and mineral products (mostly non-metal) are also significant, and the bulk again go to the EU (see Table 3). Food products, mainly consisting of fish preparations, constitute important exports to the European Union and Japan. In the light of the US proposal offering unrestricted access for exports of apparel, note that textiles and clothing represent only about 3 percent of SSA's non-oil exports, suggesting that the gains for SSA from the US initiative would not be large - unless of course the levels of protection in the US were particularly high.

9
# **Table 2: Access to Credit**

|**Crisis and Context**|**Authors**|**Methodology**|**Main Findings**|**Comments**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Indonesia (1997)**<br>Performance of different parts<br>of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI<br>during the Indonesian crisis<br>(1997-2000)|Patten and<br>others. (2001)|<br>(Descriptive) Comparative analysis of the<br>performance of different parts of BRI during<br>crisis including corporate banking, retail<br>banking and micro-banking.|Microenterprise credit remarkably resilient<br>to the crisis and outperformed other parts<br>of RBI.<br><br>Microcredit repayment rates>97%<br><br>Average growth of microfinance<br>lending=14% p.a. (1997-1999)<br><br>Ratio of savings accounts to loan<br>accounts = 1 to 1(1997-1999)||
|**Bolivia (1998)**<br>Crisis performance of Caja Los<br>Andes, a registered savings and<br>loan company using<br>information on default and late<br>payments.|Vogelgesang<br>(2003).|Bivariate probit model of i) defaults and ii) late<br>repayment, correcting for selection due to no-<br>random characteristics of individuals with loan<br>approval . Exclusion restrictions: (i) for first-<br>time loans= the amount requested; (ii) for<br>prior loans = the length of prior loan<br>Sample: 76,000 clients and 28,000 rejected loan<br>applications (May 1992-June 2000).|The crisis had a negative, but insignificant<br>impact on the probability of repayment|According to Marconi et al. (2006) the<br>performance of Caja Los Andes was a<br>“positive outlier”. Most banks and<br>financial intermediaries witnessed<br>higher arrears and lower the value of<br>outstanding loans. Unfortunately, they<br>only present descriptive statistics<br>making it difficult to assess causality.|
|**Bolivia (1998-2004)**<br>Comparative analysis of<br>microfinance institutions|Marconi et al.<br>(2006)|(Descriptive) Comparative analysis of banks<br>and microfinance institutions + simulation<br>exercise. Focus on the value of the outstanding<br>portfolio and arrears rates Simulation based on<br>a structural macro-model that endogenizes the<br>microcredit sector calibrated by means of OLS<br>regressions estimated using a sample of 48<br>observations drawn from 8 microfinance<br>institutions (1997-2002) and parameter values<br>inferred from existing literature.|While banks and microfinance institutions<br>reduced their lending and witnessed<br>increasing arrears institutions providing<br>savings, training and quasi-insurance did<br>relatively well.<br>Simulation suggests: (i) microfinance<br>institutions acted as a crisis catalyst; (ii)<br>improvements in the design of microcredit<br>schemes (such as the introduction of<br>complementary insurance and savings<br>schemes) enhance the effectiveness of<br>microcredit institutions|The paper presents many useful<br>descriptive statistics. The simulation<br>relies on strong structural assumptions.<br>In addition, the econometric analysis at<br>the basis of the model calibration<br>suffers from small sample and omitted<br>variable bias.|

21
headcount ($1/day) arising in each stratum, for each of our 15 focus countries.

Agriculture specialized households and rural diversified households tend to dominate the poverty headcount, although exceptions are Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, where selfemployed, non-agriculture households contain a large share of the poor.

The change in the national poverty rate is calculated from the changes in the poverty headcount in each stratum, The latter depend on the density of the income distribution in the neighborhood of the poverty line. This can be usefully captured by the stratum-specific poverty elasticities which have been computed numerically based on the cumulative income distribution taken from the household survey data for each of the focus countries (Box 2). These are reported in Table 3, and they answer the question: If incomes in a given stratum rise by one percent, what percentage reduction in the poverty headcount will be achieved? They range from a low of 0.0006 in the self-employed agriculture stratum in Zambia, where nearly all of the population is well below the poverty line, to a high of 3.63 in the urban diversified stratum of Brazil, where the population density at the poverty line is quite high.

However, all income sources are not equally important for households in poverty. In most cases these households own few assets, and have few skills, so their primary endowment is unskilled labor. Increased returns to capital in the wake of trade reforms will do little to reduce poverty. However, a rise in the unskilled wage will make a great deal of difference. This fact is captured in our work by disaggregating the poverty elasticities by income source, as shown in Table 4 for the case of Peru. These elasticities measure the percentage change in stratum poverty headcount, in response to a one percent increase in returns to different types of household endowments.

16