rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Not all poverty–related indicators follow the income poverty pattern. The fall in Argentina’s social indicators such as infant mortality during 1991–2002 contradicts the deterioration in measured income poverty. The infant mortality rate dropped dramatically from 24.7 per 1,000 live births in 1991 to 16.7 per 1,000 live births in 2002 (Figure 4.2). Today the infant mortality rate in Argentina is one of the lowest among middle-income countries and mainly a rural phenomenon. The positive trend in the falling infant mortality rate from 1991–2002 occurred in all provinces. However, the poorer provinces, such as Chaco and Formosa, experienced a short-run trend that may be characterized as a slippery slope. These provinces experienced an increase in infant mortality after each economic crisis occurred in Argentina and in some provinces children died of hunger (see Box 2). Major, steady advances have taken place in richer provinces such as Mendoza. Advances may be attributed to an improved health care system, increased access to water, urbanization, past investments in education (see Section 6), and other social programs. Thus, to further reduce the infant mortality rate in order to reach levels of Uruguay (13.5), Chile (8.9), or high-income OECD countries (5.0), especially in rural areas, further actions are called for.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 4.3: Share of Argentines with Unmet Basic Needs in 1991 and 2001<br>45 1991<br>2001<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>Source: INDEC. National Population Census 1991 and 2001.<br>Total ArgentinaBuenos AiresCatamarcaCdad. Buenos AiresChacoChubut Corrientes FormosaJujuyLa PampaLa RiojaMendozaMisiones R. NegroSaltaSan JuanSan LuisSanta CruzSantiago del EsteroSanta FeT. del Fuego<br>% of population with UBN<br><!-- End of picture text --> The share of the Argentine population with UBN took the same declining path as infant mortality. During 1991–2001 the share with UBN fell 2 percentage points (Figure 4.3), reaching 17.7 percent of the population (6.3 million Argentines or 1.4 million households) in 2001 before the greatest and deepest crisis in Argentine history. The number of people and households with UBN fell in all provinces including the poorest 19
Policy Research Working Paper 9433

# **Abstract**

This paper studies the dynamic sorting of workers prior to labor market entry that leads to skill differences across cities of different sizes, as well as its consequences on the estimation of agglomeration effects. Using rich administrative data for young, college-educated workers in Colombia, the paper shows that the most talented and best trained sort to big cities primarily because they attend college there and remain for work. The availability of colleges in an individual’s high school city, parental resources, and high school city size are the most important determinants of the decision to move for college. The relatively less able remain in medium and small cities or move there for work after attending college in big cities. Pre–labor market sorting thus concentrates population and skill in big cities. As a result of this sorting, agglomeration effects are stronger for college than work city size, even after controlling for mediating factors such as individual ability or college selectivity.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at mferreyra@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
- [4] Bernstein, J. and D., Weinstein, 2002. Do Endowments Determine the Location of Production? Evidence from National and International Data. Journal of International Economics, 56 (1), 55-76.

- [5] Calder ́ _o_ n, C., and L, Serven, 2004. Trends in Infrastructure in Latin America, 1980-2001. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3401, Washington, DC.

- [6] Caselli, F. and J., Coleman, 2001. Cross-Country Technology Diffusion: The Case of Computers. American Economic Review P & P. 91 (2), 328-335.

- [7] Chiburis, R. and M., Lokshin, 2007. Maximum Likelihood and Two-Step Estimation of an Ordered-probit Selection Model. The Stata Journal. 7 (2), 167-182.

- [8] Davis, D. and D., Weinstein, 2001. An Account of Global Factor Trade. American Economic Review, 91 (5),1423-54.

- [9] Dobbelaere, S. and J., Mairesse, 2008. Panel Data Estimates of the Production Function and Product and Labor Market Imperfections. NBER Working Paper N. 13975.

- [10] Drandakis, E. and E., Phelps, 1965. A Model of Induced Invention, Growth and Distribution. Economic Journal, 76, 823-84.

- [11] Elias, V., 1992. Sources of Growth: A Study of Seven Latin American Economies. San Francisco: ICS Press.

- [12] Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R. and H., Bowen, 1997. World Trade Flows, 19701992, with Production and Tariff Data. NBER WP _♯_ 5975.

- [13] Fitzgerald, D., and J.C., Hallak, 2004. Specialization, Capital Accumulation, and Development. Journal of International Economics, 64(2), 277-302.

- [14] Gollin, D., 2002. Getting Income Shares Right. Journal of Political Economy, 90, 458-474.

27
International Sourcing and Firm Learning: Evidence from Serbian Firms<sup>_∗_</sup> Mason Reasner<sup>_†_</sup> Shawn W. Tan<sup>_‡_</sup>

**Keywords:** Imports, Peer effects, Learning, Spatial spillovers

**JEL Codes:** F1, R12, L25

> _∗_ The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank, their Executive Boards, or management.

> _†_ Purdue University, mreasne@purdue.edu

> _‡_ World Bank, swtan@worldbank.org
<!-- Start of picture text --> X Quality across all Exports: Small States<br>5 - eat ped sea es Fe “<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> eS to ;<br>-<br>0 5000 10000 _ 15000 20000 25000<br>Exporter GDP per capita (2010 constant Dollars)<br>* HIC + MIC<br>* LIC ——— Lowess Fit<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Quality across all Exports: Commodity Exporters<br>‘<br>= 4 :" 6<br>2”"o AN NE.© Sessaeatntyt'8 ¢ # “*: Pade ee yi i "<br>eater Tte We wee<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Ssa 4 .<br>os]<br>:<br>0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000<br>Exporter GDP per capita (2010 constant Dollars)<br>* HIC * MIC<br>*Lic —— Lowess Fit<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> ~ Unit Values across all Exports: Small States<br>5 Bien . ag ie .<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> S| t=. Mae e<br>o<br>0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000<br>Exporter GDP per capita (2010 constant Dollars)<br>* HIC * MIC<br>~ LIC —— Lowess Fit<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> Unit values across all Exports: Commodity Exporters<br>N<br>0<br>=oow=5 ee. . .<br>aah fe eye :<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Ze5 famee+ Sgteae ia<br>i<br>i=]<br>Lt) 10000 20000 | 30000 40000 50000<br>Exporter GDP per capita (2010 constant Dollars)<br>* HIC + MIC<br>* LIC + ——— Lowess Fit<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> N<br>9 * ® e<br>WETS<br>&<br>o<br>520)<br>2 °<br>Se 8<br>a<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> e<br>®<br>“f<br>cree”es? aie ae?) eee ane? ca? on<br>poo? tet exe a0) noe” or yeni<br>oO gow \es ® ore? ex mo re<br>wer ves2? Paeso<br>® Quality ® Lower Bound(5th percentile)<br>® Upper Bound(95th percentile)<br>pwt 9.0; Categories at the 4-digit level of disaggregation<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Chod et al. (2019) offers a theory of trade credit and supporting empirical evidence that starts from the proposition that, in the presence of multiple suppliers, the benefit of providing trade credit is not fully internalized by a trade creditor. After obtaining trade credit, a retailer can use freed-up liquidity to buy more goods from other suppliers as well as the one who provided the credit. This leads to a free rider problem because a given supplier bears the full cost of providing trade credit, but the benefits of larger spending by the retailer are shared among all suppliers. Thus, Chod et al. (2019) hypothesize that a supplier that is responsible for a larger share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a larger part of the benefit and is therefore willing to offer a larger proportion of its goods on credit. This is similar to the equity stake idea from Petersen and Rajan (1997) except that it emphasizes the importance of the supplier’s position among firms selling to the _same customer_ rather than its competitive position (market power) among all firms in its industry.

Using annual data from Compustat, complemented with the Compustat Industry Segment data set, which identifies firms’ principal customers and is used to identify customer-supplier relationships (following the method in Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), for a sample of U.S. retailers from 1996 to 1999, Chod et al. (2019) find a significant positive relationship between (a) the amount of trade credit extended by a supplier and its average share of retailers’ purchases and (b) the amount of trade credit that a retailer receives and the concentration in its suppliers, as reflected in the Herfindahl index of supplier shares of the retailer’s purchases. These findings provide support for a modified version of the Petersen/Rajan equity stake hypothesis, which highlights the importance of a buyer’s retail platform for a supplier in relation to that of other competing suppliers.

Suppliers may compete with each other not only for space on a buyer’s retail platform, but also in product markets, and evidence indicates that this competition, too, impacts trade credit relationships. In Chod et al. (2019), product market competition between suppliers to the same retailer exacerbates the free rider problem described above. Specifically, when suppliers offer substitutable products, “the additional output sold by the competing suppliers reduces the residual consumer demand for the trade creditor’s own product and, therefore, the price at which it can be sold.” (Chod et al, 2019, p. 489). Their model therefore predicts that as product substitutability increases, the disadvantage of providing trade credit becomes more pronounced and suppliers therefore offer less of it. To measure the degree of substitutability between 12
|P118540|2011|2013|1/27/2013|5 Closed|Brazil|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|P118540|2011|2013|6/19/2013|6 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2014|12/17/2013|7 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2015|7/2/2014|8 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2015|1/6/2015|9 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2015|6/29/2015|10 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2016|12/9/2015|11 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2016|5/26/2016|12 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2017|11/30/2016|13 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2017|6/3/2017|14 Closed|Brazil|
|P118540|2011|2018|11/21/2017|15 Closed|Brazil|
|P118552|2011|2011||0 Closed|Kiribati|
|P118552|2011|2012||0 Closed|Kiribati|
|P118552|2011|2013||0 Closed|Kiribati|
|P118552|2011|2020|3/9/2020|1 Closed|Kiribati|
|P118560|2010|2010||0 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2011|9/25/2010|1 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2011|2/13/2011|2 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2012|12/14/2011|3 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2012|4/2/2012|4 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2013|11/7/2012|5 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2013|4/8/2013|6 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2014|12/13/2013|7 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2014|6/24/2014|8 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2015|1/5/2015|9 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2015|6/15/2015|10 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2016|1/11/2016|11 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118560|2010|2017|7/11/2016|12 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P118561|2011|2011||0 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2012|9/19/2011|1 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2012|12/27/2011|2 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2013|7/4/2012|3 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2013|12/31/2012|4 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2013|6/26/2013|5 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2014|12/21/2013|6 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2014|6/30/2014|7 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2015|1/6/2015|8 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2016|7/13/2015|9 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2016|2/2/2016|10 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2016|3/29/2016|11 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2017|10/31/2016|12 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2017|3/29/2017|13 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118561|2011|2018|9/28/2017|14 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P118579|2010|2010|4/30/2010|1 Closed|South Sudan|
|P118579|2010|2011|11/14/2010|2 Closed|South Sudan|
|P118579|2010|2011|5/18/2011|3 Closed|South Sudan|
|P118579|2010|2012|2/25/2012|4 Closed|South Sudan|
In the 2002 ISD Proposal, it is proposed to expand the scope of the Directive to integrate some investor-facing activities or dealing activities that (1) are financial in character, (2) are widely offered to investors, clients, or financial market participants, (3) and/or which give rise to investor or market-facing risks which could usefully be addressed through the application of core ISD disciplines. The most notable changes are to regulate as investment service also investment advice, financial analysis, and commodity derivatives business.

The 2002 ISD Proposal also seeks to create a regulatory framework in which obligations are tailored to the specific risk-profile of different market intermediaries, and which takes account of competitive and regulatory interactions between different trading formats so as to maintain overall market efficiency. Table 1 summarizes the basic features of the suggested differentiated regulatory regime.

**Table 1:  Suggestion for a regulatory framework for different methods of trade execution.**

||_Market_<br>_integrity_|_Trading_<br>_processes_|_Conflict of_<br>_interest vs._<br>_Client orders_|_Best_<br>_execution_|_Post-trade_<br>_information_|_Pre-trade_<br>_information_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Regulated**<br>**Market**|Market<br>monitoring|Prior<br>supervisory<br>approval|N/A|N/A|Full reporting<br>of all trades on<br>mkt. Deferral<br>for large trades|Depth/range<br>to be<br>specified –<br>not for large<br>illiquid<br>trades|
|**MTF**|Capacity to<br>detect and<br>report<br>atypical<br>trades|Prior<br>supervisory<br>approval|N/A|N/A|As for reg.<br>Market|As per<br>regulated<br>market.|
|**Dealer**|Comply<br>with<br>market<br>Abuse<br>Directive|N/A|N/A|N/A|Same as per<br>trades on Reg.<br>Market|Quote<br>disclosure<br>for large<br>dealers|
|**Broker-**<br>**dealer**|Comply<br>with<br>Market<br>Abuse<br>Directive|Client order<br>handling<br>rules|Admin and<br>organizational<br>arrangements.|Reinforced<br>obligation|Same as per<br>trades on Reg.<br>Market|Client order<br>handling &<br>quote<br>disclosure<br>for large<br>B/Ds|
|**Broker**|Comply<br>with<br>market<br>abuse<br>Directive|(some)<br>client order<br>handling<br>rules|N/A|Reinforced<br>obligation|Same as per<br>trades on reg.<br>market|N/A|

Source: EC Commission November 2002 40
However, a limit of standard microeconomic work based on household surveys is that estimates of the short term effect of higher food prices through the identification of net producers and net consumers do not take into account a wide range of potential effects. For example, the increase in food prices may be partially compensated by an increase in wages for those workers who contribute to the production of food crops (see for example Ravallion, 1990; Boyce and Ravallion, 1991, Rashid, 2002; Christaensen and Demery 2007; and Ivanic and Martin, 2007). While the findings from the literature suggest that wage offsets compensate only in a limited way for the initial increase in food prices, this remains an empirical issue that must be resolved through detailed work at the country level. Changes in food prices may also lead to substantial changes in production and consumption patterns within a country as households modify their consumption patterns, and local producers aim to take advantage of new opportunities.

In this paper, our objective is to go one step further versus standard household survey analysis by relying on a dynamic CGE model in order to assess the broader impact of the shock on the economy. We focus on the impact of the increase in the price of rice, since this is the main commodity that is imported in Mali. In so doing, we follow among others on previous work by Warr (2005) and Sumarto et al. (2005) on Indonesia (on the Indonesia story as well as for a more general discussion on the experience of governments in Asia to stabilize the price of rice, see Timmer and Dawe, 2007), as well as Niimi et al. (2004) and Minot and Goletti (1998) on Vietnam. A key difference between our work and previous work is that we focus on the impact of the rice price increase in a country that is a net importer of rice (even though Mali also produces a lot of rice), while much of the previous work focused on net rice exporters.

In CGE work, a key empirical reference is the IFPRI standard model as documented in Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002), which is based on the classical work by Dervis, de Melo 3
of formal training. This modest difference in quantity of formal training is important and needs to be considered as at least a partial explanation, although the return to formal training must be especially large– perhaps incredibly so– if this difference of 4 hours of training is able to produce all of the observed differences in program effectiveness.<sup>6</sup> The final cause of divergence in results that we consider is the possible differential quality of implementer. Table 6 summarizes select key characteristics of each NGO. Comparing the NGO that implemented the intervention in Mayurbhanj (NGO-M) to the two that operated in Sundargarh (NGO-S1 and NGO-S2), we see that NGO-M had been active in the state prior to this study for significantly longer than the two implementers in Sundargarh (21 years, as opposed to 15 for NGOS1 and 15 for NGO-S2). NGO-M’s scope of experience extends beyond activities solely based in Mayurbhanj while the two Sundargarh NGOs have never operated beyond that district. Although NGO-M had less experience in malaria control than NGO-S1 or NGO-S2, they have significantly more staff-level technical expertise. NGO-M’s prior malaria control experience also aligned well with the intervention, given the NGO’s focus on capacity building, informational campaigns and direct service, including street plays and community awareness. NGO-S1 had previously participated in informational campaigns and direct service, but also spent time on DDT spraying, which was not directly relevant for this intervention. NGO-S2’s malaria control activities were restricted to net distribution and DDT spraying, so they had no experience in the supportive supervision or community mobilization aspects of the intervention.

Besides implementer quality, another key determinant of performance is the availability of resources for intervention activities. In Table 7, we examine the average monthly budget dedicated to this project as reported by the NGOs.<sup>7</sup> Since NGO-M implemented the project in two sub-districts in Mayurbhanj, and NGO-S1 and NGO-S2 implemented it in one block each in Sundargarh, we report the average monthly per-village budget. As the budget breakdown shows, various items

> 6The higher levels of ASHA motivation and job satisfaction conveyed in Table 5 may also speak to more responsive and effective health system management in Mayurbhanj district. Since we don’t directly observe this information, it cannot be ruled out as a potential dimension of difference contributing to differential performance.

> 7The NGO-M budget data are for the periods January 2010 to September 2010 and October 2010 to March 2011. January, February, and March 2011 were not included in the intervention; hence, we apportion the share of different budget items in NGO-M’s October 2010 to March 2011 budget according to their share in the budget from January 2010 to September 2010, and calculate the average monthly budget based on the data for January 2010 to September 2010.

14
Colombia, and Uruguay have shown certaini departures from the earlier regimes, in the form of increases tarffs. Colombia has introduced reference prces for textiles and garments, as well as for eight agricultural goods. ln this sense trade policies are particularly dependant on the macroeconomic environment.

Government Doctrines: There are a numrber of outstanding government doctrines that provide immunity against certain anti-competitive actions or bzr suits against governments. For example, in the US there is the 'NoerrPenningon Doctrine' which holds that political activity is immune from antitrust laws. As a result, many actions by foreign trade associations which may have anti-competitive effects are protected on the grounds that they are part of a broader effort to affect government policy. Or the 'Act of State Doctrine,' which shields actions by foreign governments. This bars suits in which the alleged anti-competitive behavior is by a foreign government rather than a foreign private company.

# _4. Antidrumping, Countervailng, and Safeguard Measures: Issues, Risks, and Consequences_

Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are imposed in response to what governments consider to be 'unfair' trade practices initiated by their trading partners. The former are a reaction to dumping which refer to export sales at prices lower hn home market sles, while the latter are a response to subsidies provided by foreign governments to its industries. Dumping is considered an activity of a particular firm or enterprse, whereas subsidies are acts of the foreign government. Although the aims of these measures are to promote international trade on a level playing field, there exists the potential that they will become protectionist and in fact hinder the gains from trade.

Although these policies are theoretically transparent, in prctice they are plagued by a host of definitional and measurement issues which impede their effectiveness.

## **LIsues** in anti-dumping

Anti-dumping cases are increasing. GAIT records show that during 1985-92 there were 1,148 anti-dumping cases, an average of over 150 cases per year, while there were no more than 12 case per year from 1947-68. Between 1985 and 1992, the United States brought some 300 cases, Australia 282 cases, the European Union 242, Canada 129 cases, Mexico 84, and Brazil 13. The concen is that these measures have become protectionist devices.Dumping is defined as the sale of products for export at a price less than normal or fair value. Less than fair value pnrcing arises if: i) foreign firms price discriminate by charging a lower price on sales to foreign markets than on sales to their home market or to third countries; or ii) if foreign firms charge prices on sales to foreign markets hat are below cost of production ("constructed value"). The definition has been extended to refer to selling below cost in the export market, even if sales below cost are occurring in the firm's 14