model that includes household size, location and housing infrastructure characteristics. Although the bills might not be paid directly,<sup>36</sup> the households still use electricity and water and so benefit from the subsidies, thus, we add the estimated un-paid bill to the total subsidy received.

We a cost-push model to determine the indirect tax or subsidy that consumers pay through the industrial tariffs.<sup>37</sup> For the electricity industrial and commercial tariffs, if there is an explicit tariff rate that applies to a particular sector listed in the IO table, we take this rate. For sectors where two tariffs could plausibly apply, we use a weighted average of the two, where the weight is the share of electricity consumption in the sector. For industrial sectors without a specific tariff we average the rates that apply to small, medium and large industries, weighted by share of electricity consumption for each size of firms. We apply the single water industrial tariff rate, which is marginally above the cost of production, to estimate the indirect household burden of industrial cross-subsidization of water tariffs.

# Allocating in-kind benefits: Education

The monetary value of public education is given by the unit cost per level of education (pre-school, basic, secondary, vocational, higher education) calculated from administrative budget data. This is a _government cost_ approach, in which the use-value to in-kind benefits is given by the average cost of service provision per beneficiary. This represents what the household would have to pay to use the service at the government’s cost. Budget information is taken from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education.<sup>38</sup> The estimated cost per beneficiary includes capital expenditure of JOD 50 million, which is allocated to each education level depending on the share of the budget spent in each level. Benefits are assigned to households who have members attending a government school, as reported in HEIS. We present benefits net of user fees, which are the self-reported household expenditures in education services in government facilities. This means that fees are treated as a tax paid to the public provision system on the service acquired.

However, households may not value these services at the cost of provision. For example, poor quality services may mean that households do not benefit as much and equally from ostensible services provided. Compared to the amount spent, Jordan’s achievements in education and health are substandard (Rabie _et al.,_ 2017; Abu-Ghaida, 2016). In both sectors, workforce performance (teachers and health professionals) does not meet standards of effort (Rabie _et al.,_ 2017). In education, overcrowded classrooms, high student-teacher ratios, low performance in international learning tests have also driven richer households towards private education (Abu-Ghaida, 2016). In the health sector, the absence of a national policy for quality improvement and patient safety, the lack of performance-based indicators for monitoring, benchmarking and accreditation, among others, limit recent efforts to improve quality of service provision (El-Jardali and Fadlallah, 2017). In a sensitivity analysis, we introduce a value-tohousehold adjustment which accounts for within-country differences in education and health outcomes across socioeconomic status. We use information from the Socioeconomically Disaggregated Human

> 36 Some cost might be included in the monthly rent, or the service might be provided as part of employer-supplied housing, for instance.

> 37 Electricity and water inputs to the production of final goods and services means consumers pay higher or lower prices depending on whether the utility tariffs to the producers are higher or lower than the cost of production. The difference is an implicit or indirect tax or subsidy.

> 38 The administrative data includes non-Jordanian students. Syrian children are mostly integrated into Jordanian schools (Abu-Ghaida, 2016).