rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# 3. Debt 14anagement and Debt Reduction

To stabilize total public debt ratios, easy alternatives to fiscal adjustment do not exist. The taxation of domestic bond returns would dampen debt dynamics only if the tax did not raise the bond yields required from the savers (OECD Survey of Ireland, 1988). Under this unlikely condition, governments cculd increase the tax base by the amount of public interest outlays on domestic debt. But if there is perfect foresight and if assets are perfect substitutes, taxing interest payments has no effect on budget deficits. Changes in tax rates on any assets bring about an equal change in their equilibrium returns and hence leave after-tax yields unaltered (Giovanni, 1988). Italy, however, may have succeeded in dampening the rise in bond yields with a total tax exemption of interest on public securites, allied to the withholding tax on near substitutes of treasury bills like bank deposits (Spaventa, 1988). The process of directing savings towards government debt was helped by initially Lhgh financial savings in Italy and the decline in the relative price of real estate.

Export credits and World Bank lending are and will be the major source of foreign finance to heavily indebted countries. This will increase the risk exposure of debtor countries to swings among the dollar. the yen and other key currencies. To hedge against these foreign exchange risks, countries should borrow in currencies in which they run a trade surplus (Black. 1976). This reverses the typical practice of trade finance and is not consistent with the World Bank currency pool either. Rather than using currency swaps to undiversify its lending into hard currency, the Bank should use the swaps to diversify its original currency structure in accordance with the cash flows of the given developing country, at least within the limits set by the Bank's credit status on world financial markets.

The World Bank's new debt report stresses the importance of voluntary debt-reductions. D'accord, under one important condition: foreign debt reduction has to go along with the reduction of total government debt. With domestic bond yields largely exceeding the effective cost of foreign debt, the outcome can be different. Debt-equity swaps, for example, are usually financed by the debtor government (or the central bank). If this finance does not come from printing new money, and if the swap does not increase tax collections, the government has to issue new domestic debt. Reduced foreign

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increased to 71.1 years and under-5 mortality per 1,000 live births reduced to 33.6 by 2017.<sup>1</sup> Despite these significant improvements, the burden of chronic diseases is growing.

Tajikistan’s health system is heavily centralized. Health services are provided overwhelmingly within the public sector, focusing historically on hospital-based curative care. The share of public health expenditure is only 2% of GDP, among the lowest of countries in the Europe and Central Asia regional group.<sup>2</sup> In rural areas, rural health centers (RHCs) provide primary care services that are matched against the available resources and infrastructure. A rural health center typically has at least one physician in its staff, but most centers do not provide laboratory and inpatient services. The RHCs often manage affiliate health houses (HHs), which provide more basic services (immunization, first aid, referrals) in remote areas. Services of both RHCs and HHs are often provided through home visits.

The Tajikistan Health Services Improvement Project (HSIP), financially supported by the World Bank, and the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund were designed to improve the coverage and quality of basic primary health care services in selected rural districts in the regions of Sughd and Khatlon. The main component of the project was a pilot of Performance-Based Financing (PBF) at the RHC and HH levels, launched in January 2015. Additionally, the project financed trainings of primary health care providers in family medicine, maternal and child health, and noncommunicable diseases.

Performance-based financing in Tajikistan incentivizes maternal, child, and hypertension health services, and general quality of care. RHCs and HHs receive quarterly financial rewards according to the volume of services delivered and an overall quality score. Quantity and quality are linked to prevent providers from providing higher volumes of low-quality services. Quantity indicators are reported by health facilities and verified by district health teams and the State Health Activities Supervision Services (SHASS) agency by review of registers and patient records. Quality of care is scored by a quality checklist conducted during the SHASS agency visits. The UNICEF country office was contracted to conduct additional external independent counter-verification to confirm performance indicators. A maximum of 70% of the quarterly PBF payments to the facilities can

> 1 World Bank, World Development Indicators.

> 2 World Bank, World Development Indicators, the latest estimation available is for 2016.

5
The results are reported in Table 12. Only low-skill FDI has significant effect on structural transformation. High-skill FDI is concentrated in aerospace, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, machinery and equipment, electronics, and transportation equipment. Low-skill FDI is primarily in leather, textile and apparel, plastic products, wood and furniture, and food manufacturing. Low-skill FDI employs much more workers than high-skill FDI, thereby magnifying the pull effect of structural transformation. On the contrary, high-skill FDI promotes college enrollment much more than low-skill FDI. FDI in skill intensive services could play a bigger role in stimulating college enrollment, as documented by Xue and Han (2006). Unfortunately this paper cannot study the effect of services FDI on structural transformation and school enrollment due to lack of data.

Table 12. Heterogeneity: Skill intensity of FDI shock

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Panel A<br>||Panel<br>|B<br>|
|Dependent var|∆agri_emps|∆indu_emps|∆serv_emps|∆Highschool|∆College|
|∆FDI_skills_H|-1.933|0.422|1.245|1.091*|0.755**|
||(1.353)|(0.826)|(0.875)|(0.628)|(0.321)|
|∆FDI_skills_L|-2.707***|1.430*|0.916**|1.337***|0.458**|
||(1.047)|(0.811)|(0.444)|(0.429)|(0.182)|
|Observations|609|609|609|609|609|
|R-squared|0.553|0.574|0.494|0.818|0.735|
|Prov-Year FE|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Lagged city characteristics|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|SOE reform|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Tariff shocks|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Excludingmigrants|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|

Note: This table shows the heterogenous effects of FDI on city level structural transformation and school enrollment by skill intensity of FDI. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

# 6.3 School enrollment by age group

In previous regressions, school enrollment is calculated for individuals aged between 15-25. However, in China one makes education decisions at two critical junctures: around 15-16 years old for high school enrollment and around 18-19 years old for college enrollment. The labor market shock induced by FDI could affect different age cohorts differently. Children aged between 16-18 are more likely to be affected for high school enrollment, while young people aged between 19-22 are more affected for college enrollment. To see how FDI shocks affect school enrollment of different age groups differentially, we run separate regressions for three age groups: 16-18, 19-22, and 23-25. The results are reported in Table 13. As expected, FDI shock has the largest effect on high school enrollment for teenagers between 16-18 (column 29
transaction costs to meet the end-of-day “deadline,” that is, they pay a price to increase the speed of their trades to comply with their investment style. Meanwhile, other investors with more discretion over their flows appear to time their transactions to take advantage of the common order flow by passive funds. In our sample, even foreign active funds —which are known to under-perform passive strategies, execute better trades and display higher risk-adjusted returns than passive foreign funds.

We anticipate that similar findings are likely in other developing countries, or in small (illiquid) stocks in developed markets. In such cases, the costs of mechanical trading strategies to accommodate flows might outweigh the potential benefits of passive investing.

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24
<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>@ UK<br>90<br>B 80 Spain .<br>faa)3l70 |eMexico @+ BrazilChile. @ Israel<br>g * > Taiwan ;<br>5 60 o quevay @ Colombia<br>3 Costa Rica<br>= 50 @ Peru<br>40 3 Argentina<br>Dominican Republic<br>30<br>0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 0.30% 0.40% 0.50% 0.60% 0.70% 0.80%<br>VC/PE asa % of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Returning to the question on whether the social effects of peers are similar to the social effects of leaders, we estimate a similar regression as above, but now also include the outcomes of peers with the three different packages separately. These results show that in general the positive correlations between positive attitudes and outcomes of leaders with the productive investment package are larger and more significant than the correlations with the outcomes of peers with the same package (Table 12). However the differences between leaders and peers are only significant for some of the outcomes. Taking these results together with the results on peers in Table 9, we interpret this as tentative evidence that the outcomes of leaders generate more social effects than those of peers.

# **6. Underlying mechanisms**

The results in sections 4 and 5 show that the proximity to female leaders who received the productive investment package considerably strengthened program impacts on households’ investments and attitudes. There is also a strong relationship between leaders’ outcomes and other beneficiaries’ attitudes. This is consistent with our interpretation that leaders are affecting others by increasing their aspirations. We now explore this mechanism further, before turning to possible alternative mechanisms.

# _6.1 Social interactions and motivation of leaders and beneficiaries_

First, we analyze whether there is evidence on whether leaders and beneficiaries with the productive investment are more motivated and whether they share more information with each other. One indication of their motivation is the effort that either of them uses to communicate with the other. We therefore use information about the location of different houses and define a proximity metric based on the distance of a beneficiary’s house to the closest female leaders’ house.<sup>35</sup> We expect people to communicate less with each other as distance increases. This could be the case either because of increased transaction costs (time) that come with distance, or purely because they might be less likely to be close family or friends, and more likely to be different from each other along various dimensions, when they live farther from each other. We therefore

> 35 Since we do not have information about the exact physical distance between the different houses we use information on the order by which dwellings were numbered as an indicator of proximity. This information was obtained from detailed community maps that were updated during baseline data collection.

23
# **Figure 18. MNA: Investment growth slowdown**

_Investment growth slowed from 4.2 percent in 2010 to 0.5 percent in 2015. The slowdown reflects a severe terms-of-trade deterioration in oil exporters, spillovers from armed conflict, and political uncertainty in oil importers._

# **A. Investment growth**

# **B. Economies with investment growth below long-term average or negative**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Percent Percent<br>14 1990-2008 avg 2003-08 avg 75 Below long-term average Contracting<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6 50<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>-2<br>25<br>-4<br>0<br>MNA MNA oil MNA oil EMDE<br>2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br>exp. imp.<br>C. Composition of investment growth D. GDP growth<br>Percent Percent<br>Public Private 1990-2008 avg 2003-08 avg<br>12<br>8<br>8<br>4 6<br>0<br>-4 4<br>-8<br>-12 2<br>-16<br>0<br>Egypt, Jordan Lebanon United<br>Arab Rep. Arab MNA MNA oil MNA oil EMDE<br>Emirates exp. imp.<br>E. Terms of trade changes F. Political stability<br>Percent ICRG Index, inverted<br>20 68<br>66<br>10<br>64<br>0 62<br>60<br>-10<br>58<br>-20 56<br>-30 Oil exportersOil importers 5452 Oil exportersOil importers<br>50<br>-40<br>2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br>2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br>2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014<br>2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015<br>2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014 2010 2012 2014<br><!-- End of picture text -->

## Sources: Haver Analytics, PRS Group, World Bank.

A. Averages weighted by investment levels. Oil exporters include Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oil importers included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia.

B. Economy coverage is the same as for panel A.

- C. Figure shows growth rates of gross fixed capital formation in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.

D. Averages weighted by GDP levels. Oil exporters include Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oil importers include Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza.

E. Investment-weighted averages. Oil exporters include Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oil importers include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia.

F. Investment-weighted averages of ICRG. An increase denotes greater political stability. Oil exporters include Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oil importers include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia.

35
**Figure 1: Yields on semi-mechanized farms, Sudan, 1970–2007 (t/ha)**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1.00<br>0.90<br>0.80<br>0.70<br>0.60<br>0.50<br>0.40<br>0.30<br>0.20<br>0.10<br>0.00<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Sorghum Sesame _Note:_ Yields are for rainfed production. _Source:_ Government of Sudan 2009.

30
Bratti, M., Del Bono, E. and Vuri, D. (2005), "New mothers' labour force participation in Italy: The role of job characteristics", Labour: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, Vol. 19 No. S1, pp. 79-121.

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