The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients if area is included are higher by between 113% (for winter crops in 2022) and 16% (for summer crops in 2023) than for regressions with a VC-level conflict indicator alone.<sup>9</sup> We also note that the estimated elasticity of area loss with respect to crop damage differs across crops and years, with almost 80% of the damaged area in the growing season lost for summer crops compared to a much smaller size (25%) for winter crops.

Second, local impacts of direct and indirect conflict exposure persist over time. The tests in the bottom panel of table 4 suggest that estimated effect sizes increase significantly over time for both village-level ( _βt_ - _βt-1_ ) and field-level ( _δt - δt-1_ ) damages. More data could help understand what drives this, e.g., unexploded ordnance for damages at the field level or depopulation and damage to infrastructure at the village level.<sup>10</sup> The elasticity of substitution between summer and winter crop areas is large: based on the point estimate, nearly 75% of the reduction in winter crops is compensated by planting summer crops, although we are unable to discern whether this can be attributed to the weather, conflict, or relative price changes.

Finally, even under the assumption that time dummies for 2022 and 2023 capture the effects of the war entirely (controls capture all the non-war-related intertemporal variation), the general equilibrium effects of the war, proxied for by the difference between _λ22_ or _λ23_ and the pre-war average of year fixed effects, are sizable. Across time periods, the size of such macro effects is largest for 2023 winter crops, at 13%, but no longer significant for summer crops in 2023. This suggests that, in summer 2023, the effects on area cultivated were largely confined to VCs that were directly affected by the conflict, and their profitability or output may still be affected.

As a robustness check, we report results with coefficients for all the right-hand-side variables and interactions for the outcome variables of interest in three specifications in addition to the one reported in table 4. In different specifications, the conflict indicator is (i) a dummy of whether or not the VC was affected by any conflict (column 1), (ii) the normalized number of two-week intervals during which the VC was affected by conflict (column 2), and (iii) the measure of damaged area. The results are robust in all cases. Appendix tables A4 and A5 report the results, together with the same equations estimated using ACLED data on battles, explosions, and number of fatalities as indicators of conflict incidence and intensity. Although the signs of the estimated coefficients are mostly consistent (exception for intensity measures for winter crops), using imagery-based conflict indicators is preferable for agricultural outcomes.

> 9 For the 2022 winter crops, the area in conflict-affected VCs is estimated to drop by 80.37 or 171.07 ha (= 39.66 + 0.242 * 543) without or with accounting for damaged area, respectively. For the 2023 summer crops, the figures are 1,934 and 2,254 ha, respectively (595.39 + 90281 or 470.75 + 569.64 + 0.779 * 236 + 0.967 * 563).

> 10 In principle, shapefiles for the farmstead and all parcels cultivated by a farm would allow assessing damages at the farm level as well.

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