rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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# ABSTRACT

The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database, launched by the World Bank in 2011, provides comparable indicators showing how people around the world save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk. The 2014 edition of the database reveals that 62 percent of adults worldwide have an account at a bank or another type of financial institution or with a mobile money provider.

Between 2011 and 2014, 700 million adults became account holders while the number of those without an account—the unbanked—dropped by 20 percent to 2 billion. What drove this increase in account ownership? A growth in account penetration of 13 percentage points in developing economies and innovations in technology—particularly mobile money, which is helping to rapidly expand access to financial services in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Along with these gains, the data also show that big opportunities remain to increase financial inclusion, especially among women and poor people. Governments and the private sector can play a pivotal role by shifting the payment of wages and government transfers from cash into accounts. There are also large opportunities to spur greater use of accounts, allowing those who already have one to benefit more fully from financial inclusion. In developing economies 1.3 billion adults with an account pay utility bills in cash, and more than half a billion pay school fees in cash. Digitizing payments like these would enable account holders to make the payments in a way that is easier, more affordable, and more secure.

> THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE vI
LIBERIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE losses are reported to be close to 25 percent, well below benchmark levels. The very limited physical extension of the distribution network undoubtedly helps to minimize losses.

# **Challenges**

Power tariffs in Liberia are probably the highest in Africa at $0.43 per kilowatt-hour. This is about three times the average power tariff in Sub-Saharan Africa of around $0.14 per kilowatt-hour, and about six times higher than typical power tariffs elsewhere in the developing world of around $0.07 per kilowatt-hour. Chad has the second highest power tariffs in Africa at $0.30 per kilowatt-hour (figure 8).

**Figure 8 Liberia’s power tariffs are the highest in Africa (average effective tariff)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> effective residential tariff at 100 kWh (US$ cents)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Derived from Eberhard and others 2009.

Although power tariffs in Liberia are very high, they are still substantially lower than the true cost of producing power _._ The exceptionally high cost of generating power in Liberia is a result of several factors, including very small scale of production, the high cost of importing diesel, and the destruction of facilities for the import of more cost-effective heavy fuel oil (HFO). As a result, the true cost of generating power for Liberia’s public grid stands today at around $0.77 per kilowatt-hour, of which $0.63 per kilowatt-hour relates to operating costs alone. Therefore, power tariffs are in fact being subsidized. There is a capital subsidy provided by donors who grant funded the installation of the diesel plant, and an operating subsidy from government, which covers the $0.20 per kilowatt-hour difference between the tariff and the operating costs.

18
and sex crime. Second, in Panels B and D, the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is large, eliminating concerns about weak instrumentation. For brevity, we focus on the 2SLS (panel B) results, since those estimates control for total crime and robust to endogeneity concerns. As such they are, in our view, the most robust results. In particular, the results of column (6) show that in the months after the roll-out of the PEP program, municipalities that had double the number of PEP holders (per 100,000 inhabitants) saw an increase of 0.1 in the rate of crimes reported by Venezuelans, on average. Considering that the rate of total crimes reported by Venezuelans is 0.79 (as documented in Table 2), this constitutes an increase of 12.5 percent, a sizable effect. In terms of specific types of crimes, we observe statistically significant effects of the program on reports of domestic violence, and sex crimes. Considering the point estimates for the outcome of reports by Venezuelans, the results are also economically significant. For example, a city with double the number of Venezuelan migrants who received the PEP program compared to the mean (relative to the local population), experienced an increase in the rate of sex crime reports by Venezuelans of 0.05. Since the average rate of reports by Venezuelans of these types of crimes is 0.08, this corresponds to more than an 62.5 percent increase in reporting after Venezuelans received regular migratory status. The same number for domestic violence crime reports is about 53 percent.

Note that the purpose of controlling the total number of reports _CrimeReports_<sup>_TOT_</sup> _ct_ —a proxy for _all_ crimes committed in that municipality every month—implies that our main estimator in this specification, when positive, does not represent an _increase in crimes_ but rather an increase in crime reports by Venezuelans. Naturally, the estimators for _CrimeReports_<sup>_TOT_</sup> _ct_ are all positive and statistically significant, since this variable explains a huge deal of variation of the dependent variable: the more crimes there were, the more crime reports Venezuelans made. Reasuringly, the results in Panel D are similar to the ones presented in Panels B. Yet, in those estimates we not only document increments on migrants reports of domestic violence and sex crimes but also homicides. Since the effects in homicide rates are not consistently observed in the 2SLS squares estimates we only see them as suggestive evidence.

As an additional robustness test we also estimate the effects of the program by aggregating the national data at the department-month level. We initially decided to only account for cities as rural 22
coincided with improved capital allocation or healthier banks (See discussion in Section IV).

The "group" explanatory variables in the regression tables are dummies that correspond to the country groups described in Table 2.3. The omitted category is group IV, countries that had relatively developed financial sectors and high inflation in the two years leading up to the intervention. The coefficient on group I, therefore, indicates that low-development, low-inflation countries experienced, on average, M2/GDP increases 7.5 points higher than did group IV countries. As is evident in the tables, the group I coefficient is statistically significant across a wide array of alternative specifications. For the intermediate countries (low-development, high inflation or high-development, lowinflation), the coefficients are positive, though less pronounced. When OED reform area dununy variables are included (Tables 3.2 and 3.3), the group II and m coefficients become positive in some specifications.

One might suspect that the results in Table 3.1 are sensitive to the way the country dummies were derived. To mimic these results using continuous variables, we replace the group dummies with an interaction variable that multiplies DBPC/GDP by inflation (Model 2). The coefficient on the interaction term enters negatively and significantly, as expected. When DBPC/GDP and inflation enter the model additively, DBPC/GDP provides most of the explanatory power; as predicted, it enters negatively and significantly across specifications (See Figure I for a visual display of these results). However, overall 26
Annex 2

# Conceptual Approach to Converting GNP into US$ for FSU

# The Atlas Method

1. The Bank's Atlas method stipulates that when the domestic prices embodied in national GNP data are replaced by the corresponding international prices, the resulting GNP figures are comparable across countries ("law of one commodity-one price"). This procedure is equivalent to converting national currency GNP at the market exchange rate, provided that all the products included in GNP are tradables and the price system including the foreign exchange market works without government intervention. Even if the GNP includes non-tradables, the above conversion procedure would still produce internationally comparable GNP figure, when we further assume that domestic prices are undistorted and resources are efficiently allocated for production of different products (see below).

# QtPt(d) + QnPn(d) = GNP(d) ..... (1)

where Qt=composite quantity of tradables, Pt(d) = average domestic price of tradables, Qn=composite quantity of non-tradables, Pn(d)=average domestic price of nontradables, GNP(d)= GNP in national currency; Pn(d) = KPt(d) ..... (2) where K is a parameter, which may vary with the general income level of the economy; E = Pt(d)/Pt(w) ..... (3) where E= free market exchange rate, Pt(w) = international prices of tradables in U.S. dollars.

Substituting (2) into (1), QtPt(d) + QnKPt(d) = GNP(d) ...... (4).

# Converting GNP(d) in (4) at E in (3),

GNP(d)/E = [QtPt(d)]/[Pt(d)/Pt(w)] + [QnKPt(d)]/[Pt(d)/Pt(w)] = QtPt(w) + QnKPt(w) = GNP(w), where GNP(w)=GNP in international prices.

33
# **References**

- Arnold, Jens, Aaditya Matoo and Beata Javorcik (2006), “The Productivity Effects of Services Liberalization: Evidence from the Czech Republic,” The World Bank, mimeo.

- Broda, Christian and David Weinstein (2004), “Variety, Growth and World Welfare,” American Economic Review, 94 (2), May, 139-144..

- Brown, Drusilla and Robert Stern (2001), “Measurement and Modeling of the Economic Effects of Trade and Investment Barriers in Services,” _Review of International Economics_ , 9(2): 262-286.

- Caballero, R. and R. Lyons (1992), “The Case for External Economies,” in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, eds., Political Economy, Growth and Business Cycles, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

- Ciccone, A. and R. Hall (1996), “Productivity and the Density of Economic Activity,” American Economic Review, 86(1):54-70.

Daniels, P.W. (1985), _Service Industries: A Geographical Appraisal_ , New York: Methuen & Co.

- Dee, Philippa, Kevin Hanslow and Tien Phamduc (2003), “Measuring the Costs of Barriers to Trade in Services,” in Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger (eds.), Trade in Services in the Asia-Pacific Region, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 76(1):297-308.

- Ethier, W.J. (1982), “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade,” American Economic Review, 72(2):389-405.

- Feenstra, R., D., Madani, T.H. Yang and C.Y. Liang (1999), Testing Endogenous Growth in South Korea and Taiwan, Journal of Development Economics 60, 317-341.

- Findlay, Christopher and Tony Warren (eds), Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, (London: Routledge), 2000.

- Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables (1999), The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press.

- Harrison, Glenn, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr (1997), “Quantifying the Uruguay Round,” _Economic Journal_ .

- Harrison, Glenn W, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr (2002), “Trade Policy Options for Chile: The Importance of Market Access,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 16, Number 1, 2002.

- Harrison, Glenn W, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr (2001), “Chile’s Regional Arrangements and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas: The Importance of Market Access,” World Bank Working Paper Number 2634, August.

31
**Table 8. Comparison of Indicative Transport Costs from Central Asia to Antwerp/Rotterdam for Large and Small Exporters**

|**Origin**|**Freight tariff**<br>**(including un**|**s in USD/ton**<br>**official payments)**|
|---|---|---|
||**Full Unit**|**One Ton Parcels**|
|**Dushanbe (TAJ)**|230|500|
|**Khujand (TAJ)**|220|480|
|**Tashkent (UZB)**|175|300|
|**Almaty (KAZ)**|180|300|
|**Ashgabat (TKM)**|200|400|
|**Baku (AZB)**|163|280|
|**Tbilisi (GEO)**|150|300|
|**Yerevan (ARM)**|170|420|
|**Chisinau (MOL)**|100|280|

Source: Ojala 2005, prices as of Spring 2004. Large exporters use full 40’ containers; small exporters rely on consolidated parcel shipments of 1 ton.

While the supply chain may be optimized for large and routine shipments (e.g. consumer goods (imports) or commodities (exports)), it seems that small or exceptional shipments face additional constraint in terms of cost and delays because of the current practice of logistics<sup>46</sup> .

Advanced logistics services for small shipments face serious trade facilitation constraints. In LDCs, applicable procedures under customs control constrain logistical optimization at sub-regional or corridor levels. Furthermore, given a lack of modern Supply Chain Management culture, shippers may prefer to organize consolidations themselves and use traditional transport means rather than pay for professional services.

# _Diseconomies of Scale_

Some routine trade processes, such as placing international orders or arranging finance (e.g. letter of credit), might be more difficult and expensive in landlocked countries which are smaller economies with less developed trade supporting services. While transit

> 46 The causes of these shortcomings have yet to be fully clarified in case studies.

42
Hence, in the remainder of the paper, we proceed with the Heckman method and the full sample.

# B. Data and Stylized Facts

The Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) has 37,000 observations for 2006, while the 1998 (ELMS) surveyed 23,995 individuals. We start by showing stylized facts of the labor force to provide some context for the econometric results presented in the next section. Table 1 shows that female labor force participation is low, but increased from 31 percent in 1998 to 38 percent in 2006. Male participation rates increased from 47 to 65 percent between the two years. The labor force is mostly composed of males: 63 percent are males, up from 61 percent in 1998 (see Table 1).

Table 1 - Labor Force Participation and Gender

|Labor Force Participation Rates, by<br>Gender|1998|2006|
|---|---|---|
|Male|47%|65%|
|Female|31%|38%|
|Labor Force Composition,byGender|1998|2006|
|Male|61%|63%|
|Female|39%|37%|
|Total|100%|100%|

_Source_ : Authors’ calculations using ELMS 1998 and ELMPS 2006.

Regarding the composition of the labor force by level of education (Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix), illiterates are the major category for both genders. However, while 19 percent of all participants were illiterate, females reached 36 percent (Table A3). Most of the illiterate population is composed of females (Table A2). At other education levels, the distribution between females and males is more balanced, except in vocational education for agriculture and industry, and 5-year university (mostly engineering), where males are the majority. Almost 15 percent of males had primary education, and 11 percent of females.<sup>6</sup> Table 2 shows the median wage in each sector of employment in 1998 and 2006. Males received higher hourly wages than females in state-owned enterprises (“public”) and the private sector (“private’), but the reverse happened in the government. These sample statistics show that the median wage of the private sector is lower than in the government or the public sector. This result will change in a multivariate setting that adequately controls for the level of education, experience, and other individual characteristics.

> 6 These figures are significantly lower than those in China, where the numbers are 30 and 25 percent  for males and females, respectively.

6
- 29 -

recommendations on tax policy necessarily depend on what is assumed about other policy changes in the economy.

# IV. INDIA

# **The Problem**

The move towards an outward-oriented development strategy, with its attendant benefits, requires lowering tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade. However, many developing countries rely on tariffs to a significant extent to raise public revenue.<sup>25</sup> Thus, while conversion of quantitative restrictions into tariff equivalents would be revenueraising, the reduction of tariffs could be expected to be revenuereducing. In what follows, we draw on preliminary findings from an ongoing study to examine the kinds of fiscal adjustments that would be required to offset tariff reductions in India, a country where import duties as a proportion of imports were 632 in 1987/88.26 In common with many other countries, tariffs in India comprise (i) a protective element (known as basic and auxiliary customs duties) and (i') a purely revenue-raising element (known as the additional or countervailing customs duty, CVD) that matches the domestic excise tax.

- 25/ The World Development Report 1988 estimates that the contribution of import taxes to public revenue is over 20Z in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa compared to 22 in the industrial countries.

- 26/ See Mitra and Go (1990). The effect of relaxing nontariff import licensing will also be the subject of that study. Available evidence, quoted in Kishor (1989), suggests that the premium on import replenishment licenses given to exporters had fallen to around 52 in the 1980s, largely due to a shift to a more active exchange rate policy and increased tariffs on imports. However, such licenses cannot be used to import goods on the so-called restricted list.
-18-

||| able**5:**Per-Capita Income and Sh<br>|ares of Major<br>|Sectors,<sup>19</sup><br>|<sup>92</sup><br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Per-Capita<br>Annual GDP<br>|Perc<br>Pr<br>|entage in Ag<br>oduction of<br>|gregate<br>Goods<br>|
||| ($)|Agriculture|**Minng**|Manufacturing|
|Argentina|6,050|22.9|5.8|71.3|
|Bolivia|680|53.9|18.6|26.5|
|Brazil|2,770|23.5|4.5|72.0|
|Chile|2,730|20.2|36.8|43.0|
|Colombia|1,290|38.0|14.0|48.0|
|Costa Rica|2,000|45.8|0|54.2|
|Ecuador|630|31.5|21.6|46.9|
|El Salvador|1,170|43.9|_0.5_|_55.5_|
|Guatemala|980|62.2|0.7|37.1|
|Honduras|580|56.0|4.0|40.0|
|Jamaica|1,340|20.1|24.9|54.9|
|Mexico|3,470|20.6|8.6|70.8|
|Nicaragua|410|61.3|1.1|37.6|
|Panama|2,440|61.7|0.4|37.9|
|Paraguay|1,340|63.2|1.0|35.8|
|Peru|950|20.5|_5.5_|73.9|
|Uruguay|3,340|32.0|0.4|67.6|
|Venezuela|2,900|18.8|31.1|50.2|
|U.S.A.|23,120||||

Source: World Bank data
capita income but also changes in the distribution of income.

Our main result is that the Dutch disease is more likely to arise when resource rent distribution is less equal. This result is intuitive. A natural resource find is like finding money. By itself, it should not generate lower long-run welfare unless it creates expenditure distortions. If the resource wealth is narrowly distributed, then, as will be shown below the distortions are greater. Hence, given two countries with identical technologies, labor supplies, skill development, and natural resources, but differences in income distribution (solely as a result of ownership of the rents generated by the resources) the country with the less equal distribution will have less production of manufacturing goods and less development of learning-by-doing in this sector.<sup>6</sup> A second important result of our paper is that the Dutch disease can occur without any movement of productive factors to the resource sector. This result is by design of the model. In particular, the natural resource sector is modeled in such a manner that it cannot hire factors from the rest of the economy.<sup>7</sup> Hence, we can see the paradox of plenty occurring only from the shift in demand that accompanies the new found wealth. A third important result of our model is that the wage in the country that has the resource boom (or the less equal income distribution) does not increase relative to that of the other country. In fact, it can decline over time. This result occurs mainly because international trade equalizes the domestic and foreign prices of manufactures, so that relative wages are given by productivity differences across countries. When the foreign production of manufacturing is increased by the home resource find, learning by doing generates long term productivity gains and real wage appreciation in the foreign country. Therefore, unlike traditional Dutch disease models, the manufacturing sectors does not need to be more costly production in the resource abundant country. It is simply not a priority in the short run.

In the next section we describe the economy of each country. We then consider trade when resource wealth is equally distributed. Our main results occur in the second part of this third section when the resource rents are unequally distributed in one country. Our conclusions are in the fourth section.

> 6In Corden’s (1984) survey he suggests (in footnote 5) that changes in factor prices could actually overturn the spending effect found in Corden and Neary (1982). His suggestion is very different from our result which shows how the spending effect can be magnified (and not overturned) if the distribution of the resource rents is less equal.

> 7We are not the first to consider the natural resource sector as an endowment. See, for example van der Ploeg and Venables (2013).

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1.1: Kernel density of MPCE, Bihar<br>003<br>—— 8 ST ets s** EBC<br>—— oBc——— Muslims —-—'- FC<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> iaay<br>oO5 HOW5 5<br>/ <<br>001 \<br>I aN<br>I WN<br>HW Qi<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Note: We use epanechnikov kemel to estimate these densities.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ illustration based on the data collected by Social Observatory, World Bank & Government of Bihar.

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