|center - Urban set to 0|||(0.63)|||(0.63)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Distance to closest|||-0.0003|||-0.0003|
|Bus/Train Stop|||(0.63)|||(0.67)|
|Village Chief with Secondary|||.0001|||0.003|
|Education|||(1.00)|||(0.93)|
|Literacy Center Dummy|||0.048<br>(0.09)|||0.048<br>(0.08)|
|most common language L1|||0.014|||0.016|
|is the same in the village and|||(0.68)|||(0.64)|
|the commune|||||||
|Observations|4,194|4,194|3,658|4,194|4,194|3,658|
|R-squared|0.14|0.14|0.17|0.14|0.14|0.17|

Note: All specifications estimated with ordinary least squares, with commune fixed effects. Robust _p_ -values, with standard errors clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates of the following controls are significant and not reported: respondents with higher education and Bariba and households with more adults and mobile phones, are less likely to prefer the gifts candidate and households in villages with chiefs with a primary education are more likely; insignificant and not reported: ethnic dummies (Bariba, Yoa/Lokpa, Ditamari); gender and ages of household head and respondent; whether respondent has completed elementary or higher education; religion and marital status of respondent; number of adults in the household; whether the household has a mobile phone or TV; whether the village chief has a primary education; the population of the village; whether the village has a secondary school, literacy center or health or maternity center; presence of a paved road; number of functional private schools; the number of potable water sources; the probability any two households speak the same language at home.

To examine radio’s effects on citizen attitudes to gift-giving candidates, we estimate

- (2) Preferences for gifts candidatesijk = β0 + β1village access to community radiojk + β2village access to community radiojk ∗number of children+ β3number of children+ XijkB+ YjkΓ+ εij + μk ,

using the same controls as in Tables 4 and 5, but where the dependent variable is the answer to the gift-giving vignette: whether respondents agree with the group that prefers the candidate who makes gifts or with the group that prefers the candidate that does not. The results are reported in Table 6.

The first three columns of Table 6 confirm that community radio access has no direct effect on preferences for gift-giving candidates. The interaction terms in the second three columns indicate, though, that radio _increases_ the likelihood of support for the gift-giving candidate among households with more children. In the absence of radio, these households, with more children, are less likely to support gift-giving candidates; radio’s impact is therefore to reduce their distaste for gift-giving politicians. Given ambiguous priors about the effects of radio on preferences for giftgiving candidates in the absence of a tradeoff with services, this is a surprising result. It is consistent, though, with the earlier conjecture. Households with greater radio access are more likely to invest their private resources into the health and education of their children; they are not more likely to receive greater public benefits (Keefer and Khemani, 2012, 2014). These households may therefore be more inclined to prefer politicians who provide gifts, which allow them to procure health and education services privately, knowing that they do not receive other benefits that they demand, in health and education, from the public system.

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