rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the lack of labor supply effect at endline, no income gains or extra intra-household transfers are observed several months after the program ended.

Did having their own bank accounts enable women to manage their own earnings? The administrative data that we obtained from the paying agency show that women do not use their accounts to save their income. Instead, female beneficiaries withdraw almost all of their earnings shortly after deposit. This finding is not necessarily surprising, since the participating households were cash-poor. In addition, participating women are not likely to be familiar with financial institutions, so merely having a bank account might not be a sufficient reason for them to use other financial services or strategies like saving money. This explanation is more compelling because, even though the participating households were poor, their expenditures do not increase by nearly the full amount of their public works income. This result echoes Field et al.’s (2021) findings that providing individuals with access to a bank account alone, without training them on how to use it, does not result in greater use of a bank account. This is especially salient in our setting where women have very low literacy levels.

Next, we documented the program’s effects on women’s perceived decision-making power, which we proxied by five alternative indicators (see Table 8). We do not find that public works employment changes women’s decision-making power. While we detect some marginal program effects contemporaneously with public works employment, such as increases in expenditures on women’s personal goods like clothing, these increases are dwarfed in comparison to the share of income spent on items like khat and tobacco for men. Therefore, the program’s insignificant impacts on women’s decision-making power are consistent with the temporary nature of the employment offer.

## **5.6. Well-being**

We use two indicators to assess the program’s impacts on the well-being of the female beneficiaries and their husbands. The five-item Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5) developed by Veit and Ware (1983) is a measure of overall emotional functioning. Data on the MHI-5 were collected for part of the sample at midline for part and for the whole sample at endline (only the latter is reported here). Second, we compute Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale.

Our contemporaneous results show that both women and men do not experience any changes in their mental well-being or self-esteem due to the public works program (Table 9). As expected, given the absence of effects contemporaneous to the public works activities, there are no statistical differences several months after the program ended between women and men in households that are offered the program and those that do not receive the offer.

# **6. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity**

Our study sought to document whether there is any relevant heterogeneity in treatment effect by baseline socio-economic characteristics and explore whether any subgroups 24
-2-

table 1. External Balance of Japan: Current Account, Merchandise Exports and Imports, 1968-1987 Billions of US Dollars

||Merc|handise|Trade|Current|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Year|Exports|Imports|Balance|Balance|
|1968|12.8|10.2|2.5|1.0|
|1969|15.7|12.0|3.7|2.1|
|1970|19.0|15.0|4.0|2.0|
|1971|23.6|15.8|7.8|5.8|
|1972|28.0|19.1|8.9|6.6|
|1973|36.2|32.5|3.7|-0.1|
|1974|54.4|53.1|1.4|-4.7|
|1975|54.7|49.7|5.0|-0.6|
|1976|66.0|56.2|9.8|3.7|
|1977|79.2|62.0|17.2|'0.9|
|1978|95.3|71.0|24.3||
|1979|101.1|99.4|1.7|.7|
|1980|126.7|124.6|2.1|-±0.8|
|1981|149.5|129.6|20.0|4.8|
|1982|137.7|119.6|18.1|6.9|
|1983|145.5|114.0|31.5|20.8|
|1984|168.3|124.0|44.3|35.0|
|1985|174.0|118.0|56.0|49.2|
|1986|205.6|112.8|92.8|b5.8|
|1987|224.4|128.0|96.5|86.7|

Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly, various issues.
**Figure 4:** Percentage increase in market volatility between turbulent and normal periods

<!-- Start of picture text --> 1 2 3 4 5<br> FGI quintile<br>Source: Authors’ computations<br>200<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>% change in volatility: turbulent vs tranquil periods<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Table 4:** Financial globalization and market volatility in tranquil and turbulent times

||(1)<br>_σR_|(2)<br>_σR_|(3)<br>_σR_|(4)<br>_σR_|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|_σR t _-1|0.469***|0.368***|0.493***|0.467***|
||(0.016)|(0.036)|(0.023)|(0.021)|
|_FGI_-1|-0.100***|-0.035*|-0.090***|-0.166***|
||(0.012)|(0.020)|(0.021)|(0.041)|
|_σGF_|0.060***|0.115***|0.080***|0.048***|
||(0.006)|(0.017)|(0.012)|(0.007)|
|_FED_|0.694***|0.469***|1.027***|0.507***|
||(0.068)|(0.093)|(0.126)|(0.109)|
|_FGI_-1× _σGF_|0.111***|0.047**|0.076***|0.138**|
||(0.010)|(0.021)|(0.025)|(0.066)|
|Constant|0.054***|0.030**|0.044***|0.053***|
||(0.005)|(0.014)|(0.008)|(0.006)|
|Obs.|19,294|6,359|6,537|6,398|
|R-squared|0.464|0.670|0.471|0.334|
|Countries|84|23|26|41|
|Country FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Type|All|Developed|Emerging|Frontier|
|Clustered standard|errors at countr|ylevel inparentheses.|***p<0.01,**|p<0.05,*p<0.1.|

In Figure 5, changes in the volatility are measured in the left vertical axes, while the right vertical axes measure _σGF_ ’s cumulative distribution function; the dotted lines denote 95 percent confidence intervals. When the _σGF_ is at the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution, the average increase in financial globalization (see top left panel) is associated with a (significant) decrease in volatility by 4 basis points (or 0.2% of the average volatility). Notice that such effects are quite large, as they stem from a 0.6 percent increase in the FGI. Instead, at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution, we report a statistically significant decrease in volatility of 3 basis points or 0.1% of average volatility. At the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile, instead, we report a significant increase of 2 basis points.

10
more consistent with the second (indirect) channel described above (column(3), row (2)) – given that district leaders do not have a say in the choice of public employment projects.

# **4.3 Public Sector Employment under Women Leaders**

We now examine evidence for the _direct_ channel by which women leaders influence the share of work allocated to women in public works. For this, we use data from India’s main public employment program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) – which is the largest existing public employment program in the world. We use data from district-level Implementation Status Reports collected from the MGNREGS website.<sup>9</sup> These data report person-days worked by sex, which we use to construct the percentage of total person-days worked by women in a given district and year.

The identifying variation in our analysis comes from state-level cross-sectional differences in the cumulative length of exposure to women leaders in the 73rd Amendment. Thus we use a crosssectional specification similar to equation 1 with the outcome as the share of person-days of work allocated to women in the first year in which MGNREGS was implemented in each district. Given the phased implementation of MGNREGS, our data for individual districts comes from the years 2006, 2007 or 2008, with each district appearing once. Because the phasing in of MGNREGS was not random across districts, we also estimate this specification separately by MGNREGS implementation phase to avoid correlation between the measure of cumulative years and the phasing selection criteria. In this context, it is useful to note that all districts within a state were not phased into the program at the same time.

Table 4 presents the results of these estimations. It shows that longer exposure to women leaders results in a larger share of work under MGNREGS being allocated to women: an additional year of exposure to women leaders as of the time of MGNREGS implementation increased the share of work allotted to women by 1.2 percentage points on average (column 1). Given that exposure to women leaders as of the MGNREGS initial implementation year ranged from zero to 20 (with a mean of 11 years), the magnitude of this impact is quite large relative to the mean share of person-days allocated to women (35 percent). That is, we would estimate that the average

> 9 See: http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.aspx

14
8 Data -Collection. Data collectors (enumerators) were dispatched to different sites with a stack of questionnaires, and followed between one and three patients at a time. Data collectors were equi.pped with a stop watch for each patient. Time allocation by staff and use of all equipment, consumables and orders for tests or drugs were recorded by that data collector, and attending medical staff interviewed. Supervisors reviewed completed fcrms after every shift, and filled out the codes for diagnoses, symptoms, drugs, and other goods, Each patient entering Aybar hospital was assigned a number and an enumerator to track the services received from the hospital in outpatient, wards and emergency. Supervisors reviewed completed forms after every shift, and filled out the codes for diagnoses, symptoms, drugs, and other goods. The information collected was the following: the time, type of personnel (e.g., level of physician or nurse, or other) and kind of service (attention, supervision/observation, and administration) received based on observation; use of other inputs (consumables, equipment) based on observation; the nature and reason for shortages according to the attending physician; socioeconomic information from the patient; and diagnoses and ordered tests or drugs from the attending physician(s).

Those patients who had other services indicated (drugs, tests) had a questionnaire filled out with the appropriate name and identification number. Those numbered questionnaires were used to follow up to determine if tests had been completed (and if not why not), and if ordered drugs had been obtained from the hospital's pharmacy or botica popular. Registries at each site for tests or drugs were used to determine whether the ordered item(s) had been obtained and the value of the service or product.

Surgery questionnaires were filled out for the 23 surgical procedures sampled based on observation and interviews with the surgeon(s) performing the operation. These were not linked to the patients on the wards. Although modifications in staff behavior were anticipated due to the study, no evidence of shifts in behavior surfaced when compared to pre-survey patterns.

Quality of Care Methodology. Cuality is captured in four ways in the study. First, the attending physician was interviewed during the patient survey to determine if any goods or services were unavailable for diagnosis, or if treatment protocols were modified because of expected or known shortages. Second, a set of clinical protocols for specific diagnoses was developed outlining Dominican norms for diagnosis and treatment.' Third, the level of attending medical staff and the time each spent providing medical care to patients was recorded. Finally, ordered and completed drug prescriptions and diagnostic tests were matched to measure the cost reductions due to quality lapses.

Protocols for hernia, appendicitis, cataract surgery, birth, cesarean section, hysterectomy, prenatal care, diarrhea, acute tonsillitis and 6/ Protocols developed for the project are contained in Appendix F of Lewis et al. (1990).
institutions granted prior to the crisis together with the late and not necessarily comprehensive resolution processes, imay have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the motivation and reviews the literature on financial institutions' distress and closure. Section 3 describes the data we use, provides a characterization of our sample of financial institutions, documents various financial data (balance sheet and income data for end1996), and gives an overview of the degree of financial distress among our sample. The next section analyzes the contribution of various factors in explaining financial distress and closure through logit models. Section 5 concludes.

# **2. Motivation and review of the empirical iterature**

The East Asia financial crisis has spawned a large literature on explaining its causes, onset and evolution.' Whether sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence were the primary source of the financial turmoil has been hotly debated. Proponents of the "sudden shift" view argue that, while perhaps macroeconomic and other fundamentals had worsened in the mid-1990s, the extent and depth of the crisis cannot be attributed to a deterioration in fundamentals, but rather to the panic reaction of domestic and foreign investors (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Stiglitz 1999). Others argue that the crisis reflected structural and policy distortions in the region-including weak macroeconomic and micro-economic policies-and that fundamental imbalances triggered the crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998).

Studies attempting to empirically identify the causes and origins of the East Asian financial crisis (and other crises) have mainly focused on the macro-economic factors that can help predict banking and currency crises.<sup>2</sup> Such early warning systems based on macro variables are important tools for timely detection of systemic crises; however, they do not allow one to analyze the importance of micro-economic weaknesses contributing to the occurrence of the crisis. In particular, they are unlikely to be able Ito discriminate between the view that distressed financial institutions were hit by exogenous shocks, or the view there were many weaknesses before the crisis which may have led to the systemic financial distress.

Macro-economic studies also leave policymakers with insufficient information as to which specific financial institutions are the most fragile and vulnerable within the system. This could lead policymakers to deal with financial sector problems at the aggregate level, with policies that might affect both weak and healthy financial institutions in less than optimal ways. So far, few studies have investigated in detail Nouriel Roubini's website, http://www.stern.nvu.edu/-nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepa-e.html, tracks the literature on this debate.

> 2 See, among others, DemirgUic-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1'999), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998).

3
attention in the literature.<sup>4</sup> Herander (1986) was among the first to study the implications of duty drawbacks for the structure of protection.<sup>5</sup> Using the standard framework for the analysis of effective protection<sup>6</sup> and assuming that foreign and domestic goods are perfect substitutes, he identifies the conditions determining whether domestic component producers or domestic final good consumers will bear the costs of export expansion following the introduction of duty drawbacks. He finds that when domestic final good consumption is low relative to domestic component production, domestic component producers are worse off, while domestic consumers are better off with duty drawbacks. When domestic final good consumption is high relative to domestic component production, domestic component producers retain their protection while consumers face a higher price if duty drawbacks are coupled with a large final good import tariff. This results in a protection structure of escalating tariffs, which is typical for many countries.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, domestic component producers lose, while domestic final good consumers benefit if final good tariffs are lowered or completely eliminated. This results in a protection structure of de-escalating tariffs and the emergence of two-way trade.

Panagariya (1992) analyzed the welfare implications of trade reform in the presence of duty drawbacks in a small open economy with perfectly competitive markets.

> economies have used duty drawback schemes effectively, whereas in many African countries poor execution of such schemes has led to very few benefits for exporters (Hinkle et al. 2003).

> 4 In January  2004 the ‘ECONLIT’ database contained 5 articles on duty drawbacks, 1 on export drawbacks and 1 on export linkages. Considerably more attention has been given to exploring the implications of different kinds of protectionism including voluntary export restraints (VERs), ‘strategic’ trade interventions, and more recently to EPZs. The ECONLIT database contained 133 references to ‘voluntary export restraints’,  324 to ‘strategic trade’ and 48 to ‘export processing zones’.

> 5 Balassa et al. (1970) discussed in detail the duty drawback policies of several developing countries, while Hufbauer and Erb (1984) surveyed such policies in developed countries.

> 6 The standard framework for the analysis of effective protection assumes a fixed coefficient, two-stage production process (component production and final good assembly), upward sloping supply curve for factors (value added) and intermediate inputs (components), perfectly competitive markets, exogenous world prices of components and final goods.

> 7 World Bank data at <u>www.worldbank.org/trade</u> indicate that 48 out of 86 economies had escalating tariffs on industrial products between 1994 and 2000. One country (Bolivia) had de-escalating tariffs and the rest had a mix of increasing and decreasing tariff rates from one stage to another.

4
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disputes on behalf of their exporters suggests that availability of ACWL services has enhanced developing-country use of the DSU to enforce their market-access rights.<sup>17</sup> A second possible mechanism through which access to ACWL resources may affect developingcountry litigation behavior goes beyond what types of disputes are initiated to the way actual cases are prosecuted and litigated. Table 5 also provides evidence that the ACWL's sole-complainant clients were able to pursue the DSU process further once a case was initiated. The middle column of Table 5 documents that only India and the Philippines out of these thirteen ACWL sole-complainant client countries had ever previously pushed a sole-complainant DSU proceeding far enough to obtain a Panel ruling. The last column of Table 5 indicates that in ACWL-backed cases, seven “new” countries prosecuted their sole-complainant cases to a Panel ruling for the first time. In the other four cases involving sole-complainant ACWL clients that had not previously obtained a Panel Report, two countries (Bangladesh, Nicaragua) settled their disputes through “mutually agreed upon understanding” notifications to the WTO; the ACWL-backed disputes of the remaining two countries (Colombia, Panama) were initiated too recently to have yet been resolved.

Thus, while there is almost no evidence that the ACWL has introduced completely new countries without prior DSU experience to WTO enforcement, the data on the ACWL’s first seven years suggest that the ACWL has empowered developing countries with prior, though sometimes minimal, DSU experience to “do more” – i.e., to initiate cases on their own and to prosecute those cases further through the legal process to obtain (politically neutral) WTO legal rulings. Such rulings can be useful to the respondent country in mobilizing domestic support for the policy changes needed to comply with its WTO obligations.

> 17 Although the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that availability of AWCL services has allowed more developing countries to file sole-complainant cases, other factors for which we are not controlling here may also have affected countries’ decisions to pursue sole-complainant disputes.  An alternative hypothesis also consistent with the data is that these countries used their prior experience in co-complainant disputes to learn about the DSU process until they had acquired the expertise needed to initiate a dispute on their own.

19
- 16 -

# **_Trade preference margins for beef exporters_**

The calculated preference margins reveal that the EU preferences are very beneficial to countries classified under the protocol. The preference margin is defined as the percentage by which the unit price received by a preference beneficiary exceeds the world free-market price. Under the assumption that there are no other significant beef preferences than the Cotonou protocol, the margins for the major African exporters to the EU tend to exceed more than 200 percent for the period 1996–2004 (Table 6).<sup>26</sup> The U.S. beef import prices of Australian beef are used as a proxy for the world free-market price. Even if compared with the unit price of intra-EU beef imports, the preference margin still ranges between 30 and 50 percent. Significantly, such high preference margins bring about vulnerabilities of these favored countries, because the special beef and veal protocol would likely be replaced with more WTO-compatible trade arrangements in 2008. Thus, the above estimates mean that at least two-third of the current beef export revenues would sooner or later disappear. This seems much larger than McDonald’s (2002) assessment.

From the EU point of view, it also means that beef preferences are very costly. Through excluding low-price competitors from the market, EU residents are paying 4–5 times as high prices as the world price that could be offered without the beef protocol.

Table 6. Preference Margin for African Beef Exporters, 1996–2004

|||(|In perc|ent)||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1996|1997|1998|1999|2000|2001|2002|2003|2004|
|Botswana|317.9|391.6|420.6|447.2|529.0|500.8|607.0|501.8|532.8|
|Madagascar|257.0|340.9|183.0|||||||
|Namibia|144.5|168.2|199.4|337.7|339.1|435.3|465.3|162.9|611.3|
|Swaziland|318.3|1141.2|588.2|222.5|313.1|252.9|444.7|443.5|347.7|
|Zimbabwe|458.7|513.0|388.9|332.8|424.0|...||||
|Memorandum items:||||||||||
|U.S. beef import prices|0.37|0.38|0.36|0.38|0.40|0.44|0.43|0.41|0.52|
|(US$ per kg) 1/<br>Exchange rate (euro per<br>US$)2/|0.79|0.88|0.89|0.94|1.09|1.12|1.06|0.89|0.81|

Source: Author’s estimates based on _FAOSTAT_ and _Intra- and Extra-EU Trade Statistics_ . 1/ IMF Primary Commodity Prices.

2/ The ECU was replaced with euro at a rate 1:1 in January 1999.

26 As discussed above, the preference margin approach tends to overestimate the impact of trade preferences. But it is undeniable that countries under the protocol have been offered a significant benefit.