well as the weak state capacity in the vast majority of countries in the developing world. National and subnational states generally do not provide tax data at the individual or firm level. There are some public opinion surveys that link specific tax behaviors to public opinion (Alm 2012), but these studies are conducted in wealthier democratic countries and do not provide leverage on explaining tax compliance in the developing world (e.g., nonOECD countries). Wealthier countries tend to have more capable states, less corruption, and higher government legitimacy than those in the rest of the world. We lack basic knowledge of tax compliance in countries where corruption is high, state capacity is fragmented, and governments must contend with low legitimacy.

Researchers have turned to survey data and laboratory experiments to better understand what factors condition citizens’ willingness to pay taxes without excessive coercion or high investment in state capacity because observational research has been so difficult to successfully carry out. James Alm has been at the forefront of research that uses laboratory experiments to better understand citizens’ levels of tax compliance. In an early contribution to this area, Alm and his co-authors report “experimental results provide strong evidence that individuals are more likely to respond positively - and so to increase their tax compliance - when faced with a public sector expenditure program that they select themselves and that they know enjoys widespread approval. In contrast, compliance suffers when individuals have no control over the use of their tax payments, when their taxes pay for public goods that are unpopular, and when they do not know the level of support for the government program” (Alm et al. 1993: 201). This experimental finding is in line with our expectation that the direct engagement of citizens in policy making venues is associated with a change in the policy environment, which then leads to changes in tax compliance.

Torgler conducted a field experiment among ordinary citizens in Costa Rica to side-step the criticism that too many lab experiments rely on college students. Torgler found evidence that participants were influenced by the decisions of other participants. “It is interesting to notice that taxpayers do not behave as free-riders, but are willing to comply. Thus, it seems that _tax morale_ is important for a satisfactory explanation of tax paying behaviour” (Torgler 2003: 43). This finding suggests that citizens look to their fellow citizens for cues regarding the extent to which they should comply with the existing tax regime. Casal et al. (2016) also found that the “availability of voice reduces the frequency of the implementation of the exit option” in a similar lab experiment. Feld and Tyran argue that “(d)irect voter participation in the political decision making process in the form of referenda might be a beneficial condition increasing tax compliance by citizens” (Feld and Tyran 2002: 218). Lamberton, De Neve, and Norton also find that providing individuals with the ability to express policy preferences makes them much less likely to underpay their taxes or to use a questionable loophole in another experiment (2014). Wahl et al. find that giving respondents greater voice in the decision-making process leads to a greater willingness to support higher cooperation and taxation (2010). Finally, in an online survey experiment spanning 50-countries, Sjoberg et al. (2019) finds sizeable improvements in tax morale when the salience of anti-corruption efforts is increased and when citizens are able to state their expenditure preferences to the government.

Several recent studies, including RCTs, provide support for the idea of reciprocity in tax 5