rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table 2: Philippine’s export and import shares pre and during the lockdown**

|**Product**|**Exports (% **|**shares)**|**Imports (% **|**shares)**|**Dife**|**rence**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Pre-lockdown**|**Lockdown**|**Pre-lockdown**|**Lockdown**|**Exports**|**Imports**|
|Components/Devices|41.80|44.40|8.12|10.75|2.60|2.63|
|Electronic Data Processing|9.37|8.68|3.47|4.60|-0.69|1.12|
|Consumer Electronics|1.19|1.37|1.14|1.01|0.18|-0.13|
|Ignition wiring|3.30|2.94|0.07|0.07|-0.36|0.00|
|Machinery & Transport Equipment|3.76|3.47|15.73|11.12|-0.29|-4.61|
|Other Products|40.58|39.14|71.47|72.45|-1.44|0.98|

Note: Lockdown represents months trading partners of the Philippines imposed restrictions Source: Authors’ compilation using PSA data import trade partners of the Philippines before and after the lockdown. Approximately 79% of exports from the Philippines were to these countries before the lockdown. The share rose to 82% after the lockdown. As for imports, these countries made up to 77% and 80% of imports by the Philippines before and after the introduction of the lockdown, respectively. The dominance of East Asian countries in the list of top trading partners suggests that international trade in the Philippines is mostly regional.

Of these countries, we observe from the upper right quadrant of Figure 3 that the share of total trade (imports and exports) with China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Japan; and Singapore increased after the lockdown. Since these countries are neighbors of the Philippines, we infer that geographical connectivity factors of the gravity model (like distance, contiguity, and language) shaped the international trade of the Philippines during the pandemic. Malaysia and Taiwan, China are in the top left quadrant, indicating that the share of imports from them increased during the pandemic but that of exports dropped. The United States, Republic of Korea, and Thailand are in the left bottom quadrant implying that their export and import trade with the Philippines simultaneously contracted after the lockdown. The Rest of the World (RoW) is located in this quadrant and could be the reason for the drop in both import and export trade as shown in Figure 2.

11
during the last census period (see Figure 2 below). The employment opportunities created by foreign firms, which generated more jobs for females than for males (Fukase, 2013a) might have contributed to this trend. <mark>Since Todaro’s (1969) seminal paper, many researchers have explored the idea that, in addition to earnings differentials, migrants may move responding to a higher probability of obtaining a modern sector job. Foreign-owned firms might have created such jobs.</mark> This paper explores the role of employment opportunities created by foreign-owned firms as a determinant of internal migration and destination choices using the _Vietnam Migration Survey_ (VMS) 2004 and the _Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey_ (VHLSS) 2004. The _VMS_ is an intercensal survey between the 1999 and 2009 censuses and includes information on about 5,000 migrants who moved to eleven cities and provinces<sup>5</sup> during the five years prior to the survey. The year 2004 and preceding years coincide with the time when employment in foreign firms expanded substantially from 0.41 million in 2000 to 1.04 million in 2004, spurred by the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). When the BTA came into effect in December 2001 with the United States granting Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to Vietnam (Fukase and Martin, 2000), <mark>Vietnam’s exports to the United States, in particular, those of laborintensive manufactured goods, expanded dramatically and this appears to have accelerated the expansion of foreign employment (Fukase, 2013ab). S</mark> ince the U.S. tariff cut against Vietnam’s goods was exogenous (Fukase, 2013b; McCaig, 2011), the event provides an opportunity to analyze how “exogenous trade shock” may have influenced Vietnam’s labor market, including its impact on migration patterns.

The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, the paper particularly focuses on the role of foreign firms in creating “formal’ job opportunities (hereafter “foreign job opportunities”) as a determinant of migration. As a proxy of the probability of obtaining a job in

> 5 These eleven destinations were selected based on the high levels of _in_ -migrants in the 1999 census (GSO, 2005).
# **Figure 6 Cost of infrastructure catch-up**

Investment required for halving the infrastructure quantity gap with other regions <!-- Start of picture text --> 18%<br>15%<br>12%<br>9%<br>6%<br>3%<br>0%<br>West Africa LICs East Africa LICs South Africa LICs Central Africa LICs Sub-Saharan Africa<br>UMCs<br>Percent of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> 46
28 outstanding EMDE credit). The impact is smaller (€68 billion) if only 50 percent of the necessary asset deleveraging occurs via the loan book (Scenario 3).

**36. The information contained in banks’ submitted capital plans to the EBA suggests a much smaller impact on EMDE credit in the short term.** The plans imply that only 23 percent of the shortfall comes from asset reduction measures, with only 10 percentage points of the total covered by asset sales. As a result, the impact is much smaller because a large portion of the shortfall is covered by capital-raising measures. A range of scenarios analyzed imply a decline of €11 billion to €27 billion (1–2 percent of banks‘ EMDE credit), concentrated mainly in Europe and Latin America. The impact would be €27 billion if deleveraging occurs fully via the loan book (figure 22, Scenario 4). If around 40 percent of deleveraging occurs via loan cuts (as the EBA capital plans imply), the impact would be an €11 billion cut in credit (Scenario 5).

**Table 1. Regional Breakdown of European Bank Credit in Emerging Countries (€Billion)**

|Country|Africa|Central and<br>Eastern<br>Europe|CIS|Developing<br>Asia (incl.<br>China)|Middle East|Western<br>Hemisphere|Total EM<br>credit|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Greece|0.0|9.4|0.3|0.4|0.0|4.4|14.5|
|Spain|1.2|29.2|1.8|3.0|1.9|293.9|331.0|
|Italy|2.1|128.9|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|131.1|
|Germany|4.9|25.9|10.7|13.1|6.8|48.0|109.6|
|France|56.1|74.7|40.2|76.4|58.2|51.2|356.8|
|Portugal|7.0|11.3|0.1|0.1|0.3|6.6|25.6|
|Belgium|0.9|53.9|2.3|2.4|1.7|10.3|71.5|
|Austria|0.6|101.2|14.9|3.5|3.0|0.8|123.9|
|Cyprus|0.5|2.2|6.5|0.9|0.4|0.4|10.8|
|Slovenia|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Netherlands|1.6|45.6|9.7|20.3|6.3|26.3|109.8|
|Denmark|0.2|1.6|0.2|0.4|0.2|0.3|2.9|
|UK|47.8|20.6|7.9|117.1|51.4|65.5|310.4|
|Hungary|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.0|
|Ireland|0.1|1.6|0.0|0.1|0.2|0.6|2.6|
|Luxembourg/||||||||
|1|2.5|22.4|4.4|3.2|2.0|10.5|45.0|
|Malta|0.0|0.3|0.0|0.0|0.1|0.2|0.7|
|Total<br>(€billion)|125.47|528.70|99.08|241.11|132.75|519.08|1646.19|
|Percent|7.6|32.1|6.0|14.6|8.1|31.5|100.0|

Source: ECB Consolidated Bank Statistics; IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators; Authors‘ calculations.

**37. Given that European bank leverage ratios remain high, deleveraging will likely continue, with an additional impact on EMDE credit.** European bank assets are still around 18 to 20 times equity, which is high internationally and may need to come down (to, say, 12 times equity). A further decline in leverage could happen through capital increases, but asset reduction may also be needed to reach a desired level. In a worse-case scenario (Scenario 1), banks would deleverage fully through loan reduction, in which case the impact on EMDE credit could amount to €978 billion, or 59 percent of outstanding EMDE credit (figure 23). If 50
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35
ownership that is with foreign individuals, entities, and organizations ( _Foreign ownership_ ), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has internationally recognized quality certification and 0 otherwise ( _Quality certification_ ); access to financial services captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has overdraft facility and 0 otherwise<sup>3</sup> ; financial transparency proxied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had its financial statements audited externally in the last fiscal year and 0 otherwise ( _Firm audited_ ), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was registered with the relevant authority when it started operations ( _Registered when started)_ ; a set of dummy variables indicating the current legal status of the firm (see table A2 for details); quality of the business environment proxied by a dummy variable equal to 1 if obtaining licenses and permits is a major or bigger obstacle for the firm and 0 if it is a lesser obstacle, losses from power outages in the last fiscal year as a ratio of total sales in the last fiscal year, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was visited or inspected by tax officials in the last year and 0 otherwise ( _Visited by tax officials_ ).

# 3.5.2 _Robustness_ c _ontrols_

We use additional controls for robustness purposes. Some of these controls involve a noticeable loss in sample due to missing data. We first check if replacing gender parity in primary education with that in tertiary education (data source is WDI, World Bank) affects our main result. Next, we add country-year level controls. The data source is WDI or as stated in brackets. The controls include the percentage of seats in the lower house of the parliament that are held by women (taken from IPU); fertility rate; percentage of women in total population; cost of starting a business as a

> 3 Results are unchanged if we use whether the firm has a checking or savings account instead of an overdraft facility. Having a checking/savings account is included as robustness control (see section 3.4.2).

14
Policy Research Working Paper 10973

# **Abstract**

This paper investigates the parenthood penalty in Indonesian labor markets, with a focus on gender disparities. It uses longitudinal data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey from 1993 to 2014 and employs a difference-in-differences approach with staggered adoption to estimate the impact of parenthood on labor market participation for both men and women. The results reveal that the birth of a child has a significant and persistent negative effect on women’s employment, with the penalty extending up to six years after childbirth. In contrast, men experience only short-lived and insignificant changes in employment after fatherhood. The analysis further identifies substantial heterogeneity across different subgroups. Women in urban areas and those with higher levels of education experience larger and more prolonged penalties, while rural women, those with lower levels of education, and those with extended family support recover more quickly. The findings highlight the role of socioeconomic factors in moderating the parenthood penalty and offer critical insights for policies aimed at promoting gender equality in the labor market.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at jfajardog@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
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McKenzie, D (2004) “Aggregate Schocks and Urban Labor Market Responses: Evidence from Argentina’s Financial Crisis,” _Economic Development and Cultural Change,_ University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4): 719-58.

Menzio, G. (2005), “High-Frequency Wage Rigidity,” Northwestern University.

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28
8 provision. Indeed, liquidity problems never arise in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Borrowers and lenders are able to make fully contingent arrangements to insure against unanticipated short term needs for funds. Similerly, since information is perfect aid markets for all financial claims are thick, "distress" sales of assets always yield the true market value. For this reason, and also because a full set of contingent claims markets exists, there is no need for precautionary holdings of safe assets.

Relatedly, there is no need for a public lender of last resort as safeguard against a liquidity crisis. Here, the government cannot out perform the private sector. Through private contracts, individuals are able to obtain the efficient amount of insurance. In general, any public intervention in financial markets is only counterproductive since the private market outcome is fully efficient.

Finally, the perfect markets paradigm is silent about the role of financial contracts and institutions. The theory only makes predictions about real allocations. Financial structure is both irrelevant and indeterminate, in keeping with the Miller-Modigliani theorem. Growth accordingly depends only on real factors -- mainly, changes in technology and the supply of productive inputs. Because it is costless to obtain information and enforce contracts, individuals can enter financial relacionships without the aid of institutions. That is, financial intermediaries are not essential. The theory accordingly offers no particular predictions about the evolution of financial relationships and institutions in the growth process.

# 1I. Financial and Real Development: An Overview

Even in the most advanced economies, financial markets perform less well than the Arrow-Debreu model predicts. Studies of U.S micro data, for example, consistently suggest that frictions are present in loan markets which raise the cost of borrowing, particularly for low wealth consumers and small firms. Panel data studies of individual households, for example, indicate that consumaption spending by low wealth consumers is "excessively-sensitive" to
This finding is supported by another meta-analysis conducted by Dixon (2009). Furthermore, Lujala (2010) finds that the mode of resource extraction and its location matter: oil is only linked to civil war onset when produced onshore; offshore oil production is unrelated to the onset of civil war.

On the other hand, research has long suggested that oil might provide states with resources to deliver public or private goods and stabilize political regimes, be they democracies or dictatorships. Considerable work suggests that natural resource rents can, in fact, bring stability to the state-society relationship (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Smith, 2004; Morrison, 2009; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Fjelde, 2009; Morrison, 2010; Ross, 2012). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) point out that government spending decisions are strategic responses aimed at maintaining power. Regimes can offset oil-related or other conflict risks by generous and large-scale distributional policies, and as a result grievances are less likely to emerge. A large security sector, financed by oil money, also helps to render rebellion more difficult.

More specifically, Ross (2001) argues that oil wealth has two mechanisms through which governments provide goods that reduce social pressures against the government. First, natural resource wealth permits governments to buy off citizens using low tax rates and patronage (a “rentier effect”). The second is a “repression effect”: natural resources allow governments to strengthen the military and security forces to maintain social order.<sup>8</sup> Along the same lines, Smith (2004) and Morrison (2009) both demonstrate that natural resources or non-tax revenues tend to increase political stability by prolonging regime durability. Ulfelder (2007) and, more recently, Wright, Franz and Geddes (2014) also show that autocracy and individual autocratic leaders are more durable in natural resource rich countries.

The above discussion suggests a potential conflict between the “rentier state” argument and the resource curse argument, and research has been seeking background conditions that may condition the effect of oil on civil conflict. For instance, Humphreys (2005) finds that the presence of oil production significantly increases the likelihood of civil war in weak states and may lower conflict risk in strong states. Morrison (2010) finds similar results. Fjelde (2010) finds that oil wealth tends to mitigate civil war risk if political corruption is high enough to help buy off oppositions and placate restive groups by providing patronage in exchange for political loyalty.

> 8 Haber and Menaldo (2011) contest these claims, which are reinforced in Andersen and Ross (2013), particularly after the 1970s.

4
- 10 -

# Table 1: Price Determnination in Bidding Rounds.

|||CHANGE IN PRICE||
|---|---|---|---|
|ENTERPRISE CHARACTERISTICS 11|ROUND I|ROUND 2<br>ROUND 3|ROUND**4**|
|Ecuation|1.1.|1.3.<br>1.3.|1.4.|
|Constant|0.02<br>(17.06).*|0.05<br>-0.04<br>(6180)*<br>(-17.6)--|-0.03<br>(-18.35)-|
|Bookvalue|-0.00<br>(-1.33)|-0.00<br>0.00<br>(-3.05)"<br>(2.56)'|-0.00<br>(-0.14)|
|Employment In 191|0.00<br>(4.20)-|0.00<br>-0.00<br>**(11971-**<br>**(-8.50).**|0.00<br>MMI|
|EquitlyEnm)2oymant|0.00<br>(1.58)-|0.00<br>-0.00<br>(3.46)<br>(-4.49)}|-0.00<br>(-0.60|
|Equity/Output|-0.00<br>(-0.37)|0.00<br>0.00<br>(0.27)<br>M1GM|0.00<br>11.78)-|
|ProfhUOutput|<br>-0.01<br>(-4.87)"|<br>-0.00<br>-0.00<br>(-0.34)<br>(-0.73)|-0.00<br>(-0.32)|
|Profit/Equity|-0.01<br>(-8.46)..|0.00<br>-0.00<br>(0.40)<br>(-0.61)|0.00<br>(0.07)|
|Employment/Output|0.15<br>________<br>________<br>(1.18)|-0.53<br>-026<br>________<br>__<br>_<br>(-0.87)<br>(-1.31)|0.04<br>(0.30)|
|UabilitylEquity<br>_________________________________|0.00<br>(1.85)'|-0.00<br>0.00<br>(-2.46)<br>(0.76)|0.00<br>(1.74)-|
|Share of equity for<br>loreign owner|-0.00<br>(-7.67)"|0.00<br>0.00<br>(0.96)<br>(0.70)|-0.00<br>(-0.43)|
|Share of equity for<br>domestic owner|-0.00<br>(-7907)|0.00<br>0.00<br>(0.85)<br>(0.17)|-0.00<br>(-0.76)|
|Republic 21|0.01<br>(4.20)"|0.03<br>0.00<br>(3.60)*<br>(1.41)|0.00<br>(1.08)|
|Price deviation Irom average<br>prices In the previous round||-2.71<br>0.32<br>(-20.30)'<br>(42.37).|0.43<br>(55.04)"|
|Percentage of_dwres_old in<br>previous round (out of total<br>shareooffered in that round)|0.00<br>(1.07)|0.01<br>0.03<br>(0.81)<br>(p.75)"|-0.00<br>(-0.64)|
|<br>R-squared|0.17|0.30<br>0.70|0.74|
|Adjusted R-equared|0.16|0.35<br>0.09|0.73|
|<br>S.E. of regression|0.03|0.13<br>0.04|0.03|
|<br>Log likelihood|3066.97|835.35<br>2221.55|2465.53|
|Durbin-Watson stat|1.87|1.91<br>1.83|LOs|
|F-statistic|23.97|57.50<br>224.50|256.09|
|Numberolobservations|1421|1348<br>1295|1214|

## Note:

11 The lelt hand ide variable is defined as shares per points implying that cheaper shares have higher valuesa podve osign on a right hand sde variable should be interpreted **as** a negative effect on the share price while a negative sign indicates a posiUve effect on dsare price while a negative sign indicate a positive elect on share price.

2J The Republic dummy used was 0. 1. for Czech Rep and Slovak Rep for all the rounds.

## Indicates significant at 5% level of significance.

Indicates signifcant at 1% level of significance. The I statistcs are in parenthesis.