Page 41

**Table 12. Parents’ Preferences for Accountability**

||**D**<br>**Dummy**<br> **part**<br>|**ep. Variable**<br>**equal to 1 if**<br>**icipates in fi**<br>|**:**<br>**parent**<br>**ning**<br>|**De**<br>**Minimu**<br>|**p. Variable:**<br>**m un-fined o**<br>|<br>**ffer**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Probit|Probit|Probit|OLS|OLS|OLS|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Parent representative|0.02<br>(0.025)|0.03<br>(0.025)|0.03<br>(0.024)|-0.02<br>(0.012)|-0.02<br>(0.013)|-0.02<br>(0.013)|
|Parent representative appointed by a teacher|0.05<br>(0.069)|0.05<br>(0.074)|0.06<br>(0.065)|**-0.09*****<br>**(0.035)**|**-0.09****<br>**(0.035)**|**-0.08****<br>**(0.035)**|
|Voted in the last parent rep elections||-0.03<br>(0.022)|-0.02<br>(0.023)||0.01<br>(0.011)|0.01<br>(0.012)|
|No information about participatory organs|||0.02<br>(0.017)|||0.01<br>(0.008)|
|Perceptions of corruption in the appointment of teachers|-0.01<br>(0.024)|-0.01<br>(0.025)|-0.02<br>(0.025)|**0.02***<br>**(0.012)**|**0.02***<br>**(0.012)**|**0.02***<br>**(0.012)**|
|Economic status|**0.03***<br>**(0.014)**|**0.03***<br>**(0.014)**|**0.03***<br>**(0.014)**|-0.00<br>(0.007)|-0.00<br>(0.007)|0.00<br>(0.007)|
|Years of schooling|**0.01***<br>**(0.003)**|**0.01***<br>**(0.003)**|**0.01****<br>**(0.003)**|0.00<br>(0.001)|0.00<br>(0.001)|0.00<br>(0.001)|
|Rural location|0.02|0.01|0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.02|
||(0.029)|(0.029)|(0.029)|(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.015)|
|Female|0.01|0.01|0.01|-0.01|-0.01|-0.01|
||(0.022)|(0.022)|(0.022)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.010)|
|% parents among friends and relatives in the session|0.04<br>(0.032)|0.05<br>(0.032)|0.05<br>(0.032)|-0.01<br>(0.011)|-0.01<br>(0.011)|-0.01<br>(0.011)|
|Constant||||0.36***<br>(0.034)|0.36***<br>(0.034)|0.35***<br>(0.035)|
|RED dummies|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|Observations|900|900|900|752|752|752|
|R-squared(orpseudo)|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.31|0.31|0.31|

Note: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within sessions conducted in different schools. Columns 1 to 4 report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Serra, Barr and Packard (2011) 122. The estimates presented in Table 12 suggests that the decision to actively participate in the accountability system and -conditional on participating- the extent to which parents hold teachers accountable, are motivated by different sets of factors. Parents‟ decision to participate in fining in the game appears to depend primarily, and positively, on parents‟ economic status and education. Parent representatives, no matter whether they were elected or appointed, and parents who participated in voting are no more willing to participate in holding teachers accountable in the game; conversely uninformed parents are no less willing to participate in the game.

123. The results obtained from the linear regressions taking the minimum un-fined offer as the dependent variable highlight how effective participatory accountability also depends on the extent to which the existing institutions are _de facto_ participatory. Indeed, the estimates in Columns 4 to 6 indicate that parent representatives that have been appointed to their position are relatively less demanding of teachers (i.e. their minimum un-fined offer is significantly lower). Although it is unclear if appointed parent representatives have become less demanding as a result of being appointed by teachers/school directors, or have been appointed because they are less demanding, the negative coefficient on the “Appointed” variable is evidence of a conflict of interest in parent representatives who are put in place in accordance with _de facto_ institutions that do not match the _de jure_ governmental provisions. This interpretation is supported by another important result: parents who believe that teachers are always or often appointed to positions owing to personal connections rather than their qualifications, are more demanding of teachers (i.e. their minimum unfined offer is significantly higher).

124. To summarize the results from the LTE, parents‟ willingness to take an active role in participatory accountability, as measured by the game, is positively associated with parents‟ economic status and education. Parents who are uninformed about the participatory accountability