rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
16

**_Ta Arrears_** The trade opening in 1990 immediately put pressure on price-cost margins in Polish industrv. Type A firns were by and large most affected by import competition and suffered the largest relative price declines as pre-reform prices adjusted to international levels (Pinto e.a. (1993)). And as profits fell. payments discipline disappeared. Table 8 shows the results of a regression linking between enterprise profit margin and tax arrears.

_TAXARR.= x+PPRFI+4ei_ Table 8

||_______|}<br>9<br>|1990|1|991|1|992|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1-<br>Eimte<br>|t-stac|Estimate|t-stat|Estimate|i-satt|
|a|j0.089|3.473|0.269<br>-|5991|0_229|6-394|
|_._a -|j-0-240|-2.006|-1-205|4.478|-0.521|-3I40|

TAXARR: Tax arrears as a percentage of taxes due: PIRF: profit margin = pre-tax profits/sales.

Table 8 shows how tax arrears were largely a response to sagging profits With tax arrears available as a way of relieving liquidiy shortages. corporate governance was clearly underniined. But this could do only limited damage to imposing hard budget constraints: after all there is a natral limit to amx arrears as an escape from budget constraints: tax arrears cannot exceed tax liabilities. Low profits meant there were no tax liabilities under corporate income tax in the loss mnaking firms: also. loss making firms exercised more wage restraint than profitable firms so the PPWW liability was limited too; arrears were largely incurred on the miniimum asset tax to which Polish SOEs were subject (this tax goes under the name "dividend cax"). So the conclusion is that tax arrears did some damage to corporate governance; but the extent was limited by the fact that tax arrears cannot exceed tax liabilities.

_The Popzivek Scheme (PPWW)_ The PPWW was a tax-based incomes policy based on nonus for wage increases (cf Pinto e.a. (1993) and Pinto (1992) for a detailed description). Wage increases in excess of the norm led to tax liabilities that increased sharply with the size of the transgression. The effectiveness of this policy has been questioned by many, partially because of the existence of tax arrears see Coricelli
unspanned" and the remaining aggregate of restricted assets, with a factor of proportionality bp and the unique residual el*. The specification in (5) will be useful later in our attempt to make predictions about the impact of introducing a new generation of country funds on the discounts/premia of the existing funds.

# C. Portfolio and Market Equilibria

The technological specifications are adaptations of the frameworks utilized by MS (1992) in the context of underpricing anomaly of initial public offerings and by EL (1985) in the context of international asset pricing. While our motivation is specific to pricing of country funds, our basic environmental specification is similar to the earlier works motivated by different economic phenomena, particularly that of MS (1992) on the pricing of initial public offerings in the domestic market and of EL (1985) on international asset pricing under segmented markets. Consequently, the initial valuation that we wish to use as a starter follows from these works, and we will state it without proof. [See Appendix I for detailed proof along the lines of MS (1992)].

The approach is fairly standard in that individual investors are allowed to optimize their portfolio choices by picking fractional holdings in various categories of assets, depending upon accessibility of these assets. The efficient portfolio optimization is in a mean-variance paradigm, whereby individuals maximize their utility over current consumption, the expected value of portfolio wealth (or equivalently expected consumption) at a final date, and portfolio risk as reflected in the volatility of future consumption 11
stamp program in the US.<sup>3</sup> Thus the empirical estimates available are driven by the relative proportion of households in the sample analyzed for which the transfer is extra-marginal or infra-marginal. The majority of these studies have the shortcomings typically attributed to all nonexperimental studies: reliance on econometric methods and untested behavioral assumptions as a means of constructing counterfactual outcomes, functional form specification, potential biases arising from endogeneity, and selection into the program based on unobserved factors. With these caveats in mind, Senauer and Young (1986) try to distinguish econometrically between infra-marginal and extra-marginal food stamp recipients and present results that contradict the prediction of the traditional economic model by showing that food stamps have a significantly greater impact on food purchases than an equal amount of cash income, _even_ for infra-marginal recipients of food. Del Ninno and Dorosh (2003), using data from various food grain distribution and cash transfer programs in Bangladesh, find that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wheat transfers in–kind is significantly higher than the MPC out of cash transfers. In a more recent study, that takes advantage of the rollout of the food stamp program, Hoynes and Schazenbach (2007) find that the introduction of food stamps led to an increase in overall food expenditure.

To date, the only empirical evidence based on an experimental design is Fraker, Martini, and Ohls (1995). Using experimental data from four demonstrations of converting food stamps into a cash transfer, they conclude that food spending would be reduced by 18 to 28 cents per dollar of food stamp benefit cashed out. In contrast to the significant positive effects of food stamps on food expenditure, Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Hagstrom (1996), Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Hoynes and Schazenbach (2007) find that participation in the food stamp program

> 3 It should be kept in mind that food stamps are an unrestricted voucher, which is quite different from an in-kind transfer.  This difference is likely to have important implications for differences in the results across these two types of programs.

3
sector, the average number of bidders in an auction is about five.<sup>8</sup> However, the distribution is skewed. Half of the auctions have only two or three bidders (Figure 1). Our data composed 69 procurement auctions in 12 developing countries may represent approximately 4 percent of total official development assistance (ODA) disbursement in the water supply water and sanitation sector; however, the general trend in this sector is not considered dramatically different from this.

Figure 1. Degree of Competition in ODA-Financed Water-Sector Projects <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.45<br>0.40<br>0.35<br>0.30<br>0.25<br>0.20<br>0.15<br>0.10<br>0.05<br>0.00<br>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16<br>Number of bidders<br>Source: Author’s calculation.<br>Fraction<br><!-- End of picture text --> The decision about whether to bundle or unbundle treatment and distribution lots appears to impact on bidders’ auction participation and their submitted bid. If a treatment plant work is auctioned separately from any distribution work, the average number of bidding firms is 5.4, and the bids relative to their engineering cost estimates would average about 1.2 (Table 1). Similarly, about 5.2 bidders would participate on average if only distribution network work is contracted out. The average bid is about 1.1. These look all normal. Note that the distribution of the normalized bids is centered on unity (Figure 2). However, when both treatment and network works are procured simultaneously, the realized bids would be much higher and the bidder entry tends to be limited.

> 8 This level does not seem to be exceptional in general infrastructure procurements. The averages are 6.1 and 4.6 for road and electricity projects, respectively (Estache and Iimi, 2008a). The currently observed degree of competition is limited by and large.
# **Methods**

This paper infers orphan numbers using data on (1) the gender and age distribution of cases and mortality from Ebola, (2) the number of living children for adults, and (3) data from previous epidemics on the probability of infection for spouses and children of Ebola patients. The process of calculating the number of orphans is presented in Figure 1.

First, we apply the country-level distribution of cases by gender and age to the most recent country-level mortality estimates (not available by gender and age), and then adjust for the gender- and age-specific mortality/infection differential using the three-country distributional data reported in October 2014<sup>**2**</sup> to estimate, for a given number of EVD deaths, how many are likely to be male and female in the following age groups: under 15 years old, 15-44 years old, and 45 and older. Second, we use these results to estimate how many of the deaths in each country occur among women aged 15-49. For example, because 52% of Guinea’s EVD cases were female and 57% were aged 15-44, we multiply the total 1,995 EVD deaths in Guinea to date<sup>**11**</sup> by 52%*57%, and adjust by 0.99*0.93, the mortality/infection differential for women times that for 15-44 year olds<sup>**2**</sup> to find that 540 or 27% of deaths in Guinea would be women aged 15-44. Repeating this for each of the most affected countries, of the 1,995 deaths in Guinea, 3,826 deaths in Liberia, and 3,341 deaths in Sierra Leone as of February 11, 2015,<sup>**11**</sup> 27% would be women between the ages of 15 and 44.

**Figure 1: Process of Estimating the Number of Children Orphaned by Ebola**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1. Divide Ebola<br>deaths by age &<br>gender<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2. Estimate deaths<br>among women<br>aged 15-49<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 3. Calculate<br>surviving children<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 6. Adjust for dual<br>parent mortality<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 5. Repeat process<br>for men aged 15-<br>59<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4. Subtract<br>children over age<br>15<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 7. Adjust for child<br>mortality from EVD<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 8. Estimate of total<br>number of orphans<br><!-- End of picture text --> Third, we use data from recent demographic and health surveys (DHS) in the three countries (2012 in Guinea and 2013 in Liberia and Sierra Leone) to inform the mean number of living children for women aged 15-49.<sup>**12**,</sup><sup>**13**,</sup><sup>**14**</sup> Fourth, adult children and children over age 15 are subtracted from the total number of orphans, since they are the least dependent on their parents. Fifth, the same process is repeated for men aged 15-59.

3
- <mark>Caplow, S., P. Jagger, K. Lawlor and E. Sills. 2011. ‘Evaluating Land Use and Livelihood Impacts of Early Forest Carbon Projects: Lessons for Learning about REDD’,</mark> _<mark>Environmental Science & Policy</mark>_ **<mark>14</mark>** <mark>(2): 152–67.</mark>

- Carter J, and Gronow J. 2005. Recent Experience in Collaborative Forest Management: A Review Paper. _Occasional Paper_ No. 43. Indonesia: Centre for International Forestry Research.

- Chaturvedi RK, Tiwari R and Ravindranath NH. 2008. Climate Change and Forests in India. _International Forestry Review_ . **10(2)** : 256-268.

- Chave, J, C. Andalo, S. Brown, M. Cairns, J. Chambers and D. Eamus. 2005. Tree Allometry and Improved Estimation of Carbon Stocks. _Oecologia_ , 87-99.

- Chhatre A and Agrawal A. 2009. Trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood benefits from forest commons. _PNAS_ , **106** (42):17667-17670.

- <mark>Coomes, O.T., F. Grimard, C. Potvin and P. Sima (2008) The Fate of the Tropical Forest: Carbon or Cattle?</mark> _<mark>Ecological Economics</mark>_ **<mark>65</mark>** <mark>(1): 207–12.</mark>

- Gautam AP, Webb EL, Shivakoti GP and  Zoebisch MA. 2003. Land use dynamics and landscape change pattern in a mountain watershed in Nepal. _Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment_ 99 (1–3): 83.

- Gibbs H K, Brown S, Niles J O and Foley J A. 2007. Monitoring and estimating tropical forest carbon stocks: making REDD a reality. _Environmental Research Letters_ , Vol. 2: 1-13.

- Guthman, J. 1997. Representing Crisis: The Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation and the Project of Development in Post-Rana Nepal. _Development and Change_ , 28:45-69.

- Hausman, J. A., and W. E. Taylor. 1981. Panel data and Unobservable Individual Effects. _Econometrica_ , 49: 1377-1398.

- HMG/DoF. 2005. Forest Cover Change Analysis of the Terai districts, 1990/91 – 2000/01. Kathmandu: Department of Forest, Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation.

- HMG/MoLJ 1993. Forest Act, 1993. Kathmandu: His Majesty Government of Nepal/Ministry of Law and Justice.

- Hobley, M. 1996. Participatory forestry: The process of change in India and Nepal. _Rural Development Forestry Network_ , Overseas Development Institute, London.

- IPCC. 2013. _Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers_ , Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Switzerland.

- IPCC. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. The UNFCCC.

- IPCC. 2006. Good practice guidelines for National Greenhouse gas inventories. Switzerland: Intergovernmental panel on climate change.

- Kanel KR and Niraula DR. 2004. Can Rural Livelihood be Improved in Nepal through Community Forestry? _Banko Jankari_ 14(1): 19-26.

- <mark>Kindermann G, Obersteiner M, Sohngen B, Sathaye J, Andrasko K, Rametsteiner E, Schlamadinger B, Wunder S and Beach R. 2008.    Global cost estimates of reducing</mark>

**42 |** P a g e
Policy Research Working Paper 6027

# **Abstract**

There is general agreement that the existence of participatory institutions is a necessary condition for accountability, especially where top-down institutions are malfunctioning or missing. In education, the evidence on the effectiveness of participatory accountability is mixed. This paper argues that participation is a social dilemma and therefore depends, at least partly, on individuals’ propensity to cooperate with others for the common good. This being the case, the mixed evidence could be owing to society-level heterogeneities in individuals’ willingness and ability to overcome collective action problems. The authors investigate whether individuals’ propensity to cooperate plays a role in parents’ decisions to participate in both a school accountability system—a “short route” to accountability—and parliamentary elections—a “long route” to accountability— by combining survey data on 1,800 individuals’ participation decisions with measures of their willingness to contribute to a public good in the context of a very simple, clearly defined laboratory experiment. They conduct a study in a new democracy, Albania, involving parents of children enrolled in primary schools. The findings confirm that, both across individuals within communities and across communities, the decision to hold teachers and school directors accountable _directly_ through participation at the school level, and _indirectly_ through political participation correlates with cooperativeness in a simple public goods game.

This paper is a product of the Albania Accountability for Better Governance Program, conducted by the Human Development Economics Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at tpackard@worldbank.org.

_The Impact Evaluation Series has been established in recognition of the importance of impact evaluation studies for World Bank operations and for development in general. The series serves as a vehicle for the dissemination of findings of those studies. Papers in this series are part of the Bank’s Policy Research Working Paper Series. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Benchmark priors for _c_ = 1 (solid), _c_ = 0 _._ 1 (dashed), and _c_ = 0 _._ 01 (dotted) <!-- Start of picture text --> �8<br>c � 1 20<br>�9<br>�10 c � 0.1 15<br>�11<br>�12 c � 0.01 10<br>c � 1<br>�13 c � 0.1<br>5<br>c � 0.01<br>�14<br>�15 0<br>0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 0.9990 0.9992 0.9994 0.9996 0.9998 1.0000<br>g ∆� g ��1� g �<br>�� gp ∆�� p<br>log log<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Fig. 1.** Beta Benchmark Priors for _g_ and _δ_ ( _n_ = 72, _k_ = 41) Vertical lines correspond to _g_ = max _{n, k_<sup>2</sup> _}_

In fact, this would effectively correspond to taking the prior setting with the smallest _a_ of the two proposals in Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009). Note that even though the mean shrinkage factor is the same, this is a very different prior, where we achieve the mean shrinkage by a very small _c_ (with fixed _b_ = 1) rather than the benchmark choice of a very large _b_ (with fixed _c_ , chosen to give a reasonable prior spread of _δ_ ).

Figure 2 helps us understand the differences between the various priors. It displays the log densities of _g_ and _δ_ for all the priors discussed here (using _n_ = 72 and _k_ = 41 as in the first growth dataset in Section 7). Interior modes for _g_ occur for the Zellner-Siow, MaruyamaGeorge, Forte _et al._<sup>2</sup> and benchmark priors. All other priors tend to a positive constant or infinity<sup>3</sup> as _g →_ 0. In order to get the same mean shrinkage factor as the benchmark Beta prior, the Feldkircher-Zeugner priors thus need to decrease very rapidly with _g_ in order to compensate for the mass close to _g_ = 0 and then have a very fat far right tail (almost of the order 1 _/g_ ). As a consequence, the prior probability assigned by the Feldkircher-Zeugner priors to _δ > d_ (with _d_ defined as in the beginning of this subsection) is large: over 0.9 when _a_ = 2 + 2 _/n_ and 0.9986 for _a_ = 2 + 2 _/k_<sup>2</sup> . For the benchmark prior this probability decreases from 0.96 to 0.63 as _c_ ranges from 0.01 to 1. Particularly small prior probabilities for large values of _δ_ are associated with the Bottolo-Richardson prior ( _P_ ( _δ > d_ ) = 0 due to the truncation) and the hyper- _g_ ( _a_ = 3 _,_ 4) and horseshoe priors, which have relatively thin right tails for _g_ . The Zellner-Siow prior for _g_ has the same right tail behaviour as the hyper- _g_ with _a_ = 3 and the horseshoe prior and also leads to relatively small mass on _δ > d_ (0.16). The Maruyama-George and Forte _et al._ priors are intermediate cases in this respect. Remember also that the latter two priors depend on the model _Mj_ through its model size, _kj_ . Thus, denoting model size by _W_ , we compute the marginal prior for _g_ as

> 2 Note also that the Forte _et al._ prior for _g_ is truncated away from zero, in that _g >_ (( _n_ + 1) _/_ ( _k_ + 3)) _−_ 1. In addition, this prior, computed as in (8), is multimodal, with the truncation leading to a saw-tooth effect for small and moderate values of _g_ (the last discontinuity is at _g_ = ( _n −_ 2) _/_ 3).

> 3 For the horseshoe and horseshoe/ _n_ priors.

8
estimation method. It has been argued that ANCOVA is more efficient than DID (Frison and Pocock 1992), and can lead to improvement in power so long as the autocorrelation is not equal to 1 (McKenzie 2012). We have used the following specification for ANCOVA: Where iP iP are the outcomes of household _i_ in GP _g_ and district _d_ after and before the PPtt PP intervention. Here, coefficients ii ii 1 2, a 3 are the ANCOVA estimates of the impact of the YY and YY program interventions for treatment arms 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and 2 1) estimates the ββ , ββ aa ββ incremental impact of the school interventions, and 3 1) estimates the incremental impact of the (ββ − ββ intensive follow-up campaigns. The model has been estimated using OLS with Huber-White robust (ββ − ββ standard errors clustered at the GP level.

# 5. Project Implementation

Project activities in the treatment GPs were implemented between November 2017 and the first week of November 2018. The BCC campaigns in treatment GPs started from December 2017 and continued until the completion of project interventions. During the implementation phase, eight GPs were dropped from the sample due to administrative reasons. So, the final sample for the study was reduced to 252 GPs – 58 GPs each in treatment arms 1 and 2, 59 GPs in treatment arm 3, and 77 GPs in the control group.

It was expected that project activities would be completed by the first week of April 2018. However, state assembly elections in Punjab in February 2017 resulted in the suspension of all new project activities from December 2016 onward. After the elections, a new government came to power and a temporary budget (vote-on-account) was passed at the end of March 2017, that would finance government activities from April to June but not any new project activities. A full budget was passed by the assembly in June 2017, but it was only in the first week of August 2017 that all districts received funds for the incentive money to support toilet construction in the treatment GPs.

This lack of funds substantially delayed toilet construction in the treatment GPs. The situation was further complicated by a political commitment made by the new government to declare Punjab “open defecation free” by March 2018. This left too little time and not enough funds to ensure that all households in Punjab owned a toilet. So, there was a shift in strategy at the government level, and focus was put on improving access to toilets. Many rural households in Punjab live in a joint-family setup and have access to shared toilets. The DWSS focused on those people without access to any toilet.

Though the World Bank evaluation team had an understanding with the government that Punjab could be declared “open defecation free” minus the control GPs, the evaluation team feared the possibility of contamination if the control GPs were withheld for too long. In a meeting with the DWSS, it was 21