rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Measuring True Sales and Underreporting with Matched Firm-Level Survey and Tax office Data We also observe underreporting in the survey albeit at a lower level. Underreporting in the survey is especially high for firms in Darkhan and Edernet (23.2% and 24.8%), in the tourism sector (37.6%), and for large firms (32.7%). The high level of underreporting for

**TABLE 4**

**Mean % of Total Sales Underreported by MIMIC Approach**

|**Und**|**erreporting in**|**Sales**|**To tax**|**office**|**In the s**|**urvey**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Obs.|Mean|Std. Dev.|Mean|Std. Dev.|
|**_City_**|_Ulaanbaatar_|126|36.9|22.4|9.4|38.0|
||_Darkhan_|50|46.6**|24.7|23.2**|29.9|
||_Edernet_|38|46.2**|22.4|24.8**|29.2|
||_Hovd_|17|38.0|20.5|9.5|38.6|
|**_Industry_**|_Manufacture_|125|42.4|24.0|13.3|32.0|
||_Construction_|62|33.9**|18.4|5.3*|44.4|
||_Service_|30|36.7|21.7|14.1|26.3|
||_Tourism_|14|43.7|24.2|37.6**|24.8|
|**_Size_**|_Small_|57|42.8|24.4|0.9|30.7|
||_Medium_|152|37.4*|21.8|12.6**|39.3|
||_Large_|22|37.6|16.4|32.7**|19.9|
|**_Corruption payment_**|_no_|121|35.3|20.2|8.7|39.8|
||_yes_|110|41.9**|23.3|15.2*|33.8|
|**_Credit constrained_**|_no_|151|37.8|21.3|17.0**|35.3|
||_yes_|80|39.9|23.4|2.8|38.4|
|**Total**||231|38.6|22.0|11.9|37.0|

Note: * and ** denote significance of two-sample t-tests for equal means with different observations and variances at 10% and 5% level respectively; figures are weighted by sampling weights; _Source_ : _calculated using MIMIC estimation results of Table 3 (column (4))_ firms in Darkhan and Edernet may reflect the perceived lower quality of the survey team in these locations.<sup>34</sup> The high level of underreporting in the survey by large firms may be explained by the fact that the estimated sales are based on the three main products (see Appendix A) while large firms are more likely to have more than 3 product lines. Underreporting is also relatively high for firms that pay bribes and/or provided informal gifts when dealing with government authorities (15.2%) and for firms that are credit constrained (17.0%).

Table 4 shows the bivariate relationship between underreporting behavior and firm characteristics (and investment climate constraints). It is therefore useful to investigate 34 Based on personal communication with supervisor of the survey.

31
2

# 1. Background

Low levels of engagement among women in MNA’s labor force vary from country to country yet female unemployment is consistently high across all nations. Female labor force participation (FLFP) is as high as 58% in Qatar, 57.5% in Kuwait, 55% in Djibouti, and as low as 14% in Jordan, 12% in the Syrian Arab Republic and 6% in the Republic of Yemen.<sup>1</sup> In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), according to the labor force and demographic surveys conducted in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017, FLFP was 12.2%, 12.7%, 13.1%, 14.8% and 13.8% respectively.<sup>2</sup> Female unemployment in nearly all countries in MNA is at least twice as much as that of their male peers. For example, the unemployment rate for women in Iraq is 3 times higher than men, at 31% compared to 10% in 2017.<sup>3</sup> Social norms and cultural beliefs dictate behavior in ways that affect important development outcomes for women, including their participation in public life, access to economic opportunities, control of finances, educational attainment, and ability to choose their health care (Bernhardt et al, 2018, Field et al, 2016, Outhread et al, 2013, Banerjee et al, 2018). Although the MNA region began to intensify their efforts to get more women to join the workforce in 2009, studies have hypothesized that social and cultural barriers to female employment participation persist. Gender and Development and the ensuing Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in MNA reports were instrumental in identifying such informal institutions as key binding constraints on the achievement of gender equality in MNA (World Bank, 2012, 2013).

Responsibilities towards family are also central in women’s decision-making processes when it comes to the world of work. For example, familial obligations may prevent them from working longer hours, which may be further curtailed after marriage. A recent study describes how the beliefs of both men and women regarding gender roles may hinder women’s participation in the workplace. Using data from the Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza, the study reveals that two-thirds to more than three-quarters of men support the notion that a woman’s most important role is to take care of the household, and the majority of men believe that it is their role to monitor and control women’s movement. In some countries, majorities of women appear to accept male guardianship, showing evidence of the internalization of these beliefs (El Feki et al, 2017).

> 1 All statistics are from the ILOSTAT database, the latest year for which data is available was 2018. Retrieved from <u>https://data.worldbank.org/</u> in October, 2019.

> 2 Labor force surveys were conducted in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, and a demographic survey was conducted by in 2017, the most recent source for the FLFP statistic. All surveys were conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office.

> 3 ILOSTAT database, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/ in October, 2019.
supervisory coefficients is also quite large. Regular onsite supervision is associated with increases in loan sizes almost two times the average income of the lowest quintile in model 2. Coefficients are even larger in the IV regression (model 3).<sup>21</sup> Comparisons between the OLS and treatment effects regressions suggest that those MFIs that are both outreach-oriented and supervised are driving the negative, nearly significant coefficient between supervision and average loan size in the OLS regression. Finally, our instruments are all highly significant in the selection equations and of the sign that we predicted, and we can reject the hypothesis that the errors for the selection equation are uncorrelated with those for the average loan size regression based on the likelihood ratio test near the bottom of the treatment effects regressions. Thus, some adjustment for the non-random assignment of supervision is necessary.

Excludability of our instruments is, however, a somewhat thornier issue for the average loan size regressions than it was in the profitability regressions. For example, the interaction between the _savings dummy_ and _big banks’ supervision_ is significant in the simple OLS regression at the p=.01 level, indicating that it is unsuitable for use as an instrument. The interaction between _non-NGO/NBFI_ and _big banks’ supervision_ is insignificant, but the p-value is a bit too close for comfort (.12). However, recognizing that excludability is a problem in the average loans size regressions, there are some in which the problem is less severe, and the results support the notion that profit-oriented MFIs that face onsite supervision extend substantially larger loans than those that do not face supervision.

Results for the control variables in Table 5 are different than in the profitability regressions. The MFI size indicator, based on total assets, is strongly positively associated with larger loan size. Premium is negative and highly significant indicating that MFIs require a wider margin between lending and borrowing interest rates to make small loans. All else equal, village banks and, to a lesser extent, solidarity group lenders

> supervisory powers) are also cross-sectional and more or less contemporaneous with the MFI performance data, so we are less concerned that there is a major problem, though we acknowledge that if the performance effects of supervision show up at a lag, results might be weak.

> 21 Results are also similar when we replace average loan size relative to the income of the bottom quintile with average loan size relative to income per capita as the dependent variable in the regressions.

20
# 7 WHY ARE SUPPLIERS COMPLEMENTARY IN THE

# - SHORT RUN?

Our estimates indicate that a buyer’s expenditure share for a given supplier rises with the input price of that same supplier in the short run. This suggests that buyers cannot easily substitute away from the input supplied by this specific supplier. Note that this does not necessarily mean that when the price of a seller’s input rises, a buyer purchases less from a different seller. Instead, it indicates that the buyer is unable to replace a sufficient amount of the input from the high-cost supplier with one from the lower-cost substitute to lower the expenditure share attributed to the high-cost supplier.

The inability of the firm to substitute suppliers in the short run goes in line with other studies arguing that it is hard for firms to substitute across different _products_ in the short-run (Boehm et al., 2019; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2018). We show that this inability to substitute exists even when we consider individual suppliers of the same product. In this section, we explore different possibilities that can explain this complementarity result. In the process of doing so, we document relevant heterogeneity in the elasticity estimates.

**Institutional Quality and Input Specificity.** Our complementarity result may arise if inputs are often sourced from specific suppliers and customized, rather than bought “off-the-shelf".<sup>28</sup> Relatedly, specialized inputs have a greater need for contract enforcement in trade, and so rely on stronger court institutions.

We test these two hypotheses. First, we study whether intermediate inputs that are differentiated (i.e., relationship-specific) display higher complementarity. To test this hypothesis, we estimate our firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers conditional on whether the seller offers an intermediate input classified as either “Differentiated" or “Homogeneous" according to Rauch (1999).

Second, we study whether intermediate inputs that require highly-specified contracts and, therefore, are likely to be traded in locations with better institutional quality display higher complementarity (Boehm, 2022; Boehm and Oberfield, 2020). To test this hypothesis, we use the geographic variation in institutional quality across Indian districts. We classify districts into terciles ( _Low_ , _Medium_ , and _High_ ) according to the average time it takes for courts in each Indian district until a first hearing from the DevData Lab database, and we estimate our firm-level elas-

> 28For instance, in Elliott and Golub (2022), firms need specific knowledge about input requirements and capabilities from their trading partners and therefore need an ongoing relationship to overcome moral hazard problems.

30
_Central America and NAFTA_ 23 where sRER and sTOT are the five-year forecast errors in percentage form. This regression allows us to decompose the RER uncertainty into that which is due to fundamental TOT uncertainty and a residual which may be mostly due to monetary shocks but may also be partly determined by other real shocks. According to this regression, 26 percent of the cross-country variability in RER uncertainty comes from the TOT fundamental. The estimated coefficient is both statistically significant and economically large. Almost 90 percent of the TOT uncertainty is translated into RER uncertainty.

85. Next we ask how important is the RER uncertainty as a determinant of economic performance". Here is a simple equation, which links growth of GDP with RER uncertainty and terms of trade changes: where g(GDP) is the average annual growth of real GDP from 1970 to 1990 and g(TOT) is the average annual percentage change in the TOT. The TOT effect in this equation is both statistically significant and economically large. This equation suggests that 53 percent of the percentage change in the TOT is translated into economic growth. In a static setting in which productive capacity is fixed and improvements in the TOT just mean higher earnings, this would be a very large number since the trade sector as a share of GDP is often much less than 50 percent. But, dynamically, an improvement in the TOT may allow higher savings which is the real determinant of growth over longer periods of time.

86. The effect of RER uncertainty on economic growth is also measurable (statistically significant) and economically important. An increase in the RER uncertainty from the level in Korea of 8 percent to the Costa Rican level of 28 percent is estimated to reduce the average annual growth of real GDP by 2 percent (0.20 x 0.11 = 0.02), or, equivalently, to reduce the total growth over this twenty year period by 40 percent which is a very substantial number.

87. What improvement can Costa Rica expect if all the variability in the RER is eliminated except the TOT fundamental? Using the first regression, sRER = 0.08 + 0.89 sTOT, and the Costa Rican sTOT of 0.14, the predicted sRER is 0.08 + 0.89 x0. 14 = 0.20 compared with an actual of 0.28. This reduction in the RER uncertainty of 0.08 is a little less than half the gap between the Korean value for sRER and the Costa Rican value. This 0.08 figure translates into an improvement in the growth rate of 0.080xO.110 = 0.009, which is almost 1 percent-small perhaps for a single year but equal to 20 percent over a twenty year period (neglecting issues of compounding).

> This relationship was studied originally by Edwards (1988).

2 In this formulation we also used as a measure of sRER the coefficient of variation, with very similar results.
Policy Research Working Paper 9656

# **Abstract**

Improving women’s economic status has been presented in theory as a protective mechanism against intimate partner violence. Using panel data from 2011–16 for the most populous 20 percent of municipalities in Brazil, the analysis tests if the gender wage gap is causally associated with three administrative measures of violence against women: homicides, overnight hospitalizations for assault, and incidents of domestic violence reported by attending health workers about patients. The analysis finds that a narrowing in the gender wage gap leads to a reduction of homicides of women, especially among younger women and in municipalities with a low Human Development Index. The impact on less severe forms of violence, also captured in medical reports, depends on the context. A reduction in the gender wage ratio triggers a decrease in reports in municipalities that have police stations specifically designed to address crimes against women, but it has the opposite impact in the absence of such services. The results suggest that while improvements in gender equality in the labor market curtail the most severe forms of violence against women, they need to be complemented by policies directly focused on women’s safety to reduce less severe violence effectively.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Gender Innovation Lab, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/ prwp. The authors may be contacted at eperova@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
15

**Table 4  Total Minimal Contribution Rates** **<u>under BVG law</u>**

|Age|Contribution Rates|
|---|---|
|25-34|7%|
|35-44|10%|
|45-54|15%|
|55-65|18%|

Source: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen Contributions, which are also called age retirement credits, are accumulated as retirement assets and bear an interest rate. The Swiss Federal Council determines the minimum rate of return. It remained at 4 percent for 17 years (from 1985 to the end of 2002). But due to the decrease in capital market returns, this rate has been reassessed so that now for the year 2005 it equals 2.5 percent. This minimum interest rate paid on the old-age insurance balances is one special feature of the Swiss system. Furthermore, it constitutes part of the regulation framework of the second pillar and is therefore discussed more in detail in section 3.2.

The accrued capital is fully portable (with minor deductions especially for short employment spells) when the insured individual changes employer. By law, an employee changing firms gets the accumulated total contributions accrued at the minimum interest rate. The law is silent as to how accumulated reserves have to be distributed. In practice this implied that job changers got less than their fair share during the high return periods. This feature was considered an important obstacle to mobility in the Swiss labor market in the 1990s.

In addition to the contributions to the old–age credit balances, further contributions are needed to cover supplementary insurance or other services. These additional charges include:

- The mandatory insurance for the risks of _death_ and _disability_ . In the case of death the surviving spouse is eligible to an annuity of 60 percent of the level that the deceased worker would have received at retirement, orphans can claim a pension of 20 percent of this amount. In the case of disability, the insured is eligible for a disability pension. To calculate these benefits, the same conversion factor as for the calculation of the normal old–age provisions is used, but obviously based on a projected old–age credit balance at the age of 65. There are no restrictions on the contributions for these additional risks (disability and death). On average, these costs amount to 3 percent of the insured wage<sup>14</sup> .

- Special measures<sup>15</sup> : Since 1985, the mandatory premia for special measures have amounted to 1 percent of the total insured wage bill of all insured individuals in a pension fund. In the past these premia were used partly to finance the contributions of individuals without a second pillar prior to the BVG. The second use was the accumulation of reserves in order to adjust benefits to inflation or to reduce future risk premium. The first use is no longer relevant. Also, in practice the second use does not seem the most appropriate way of covering inflation. The federal council

> 14Source: www.vorsorgeforum.ch

> 15In German: Sondermassnahmen
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1.  Aggregate cross-sectional quantitative data. The analysis of aggregate data is a useful and often-neglected starting point for policy analysis, permitting answers to questions such as the following. Do workers participate proportionally in economic growth? More generally, how do labor market conditions change during times of growth and decline? How do the outcomes in one country compare with those in another? How do changes in labor market outcomes for one population sub-group compare with those of another? Is economic growth jobless, and if so, under what circumstances?

There is a long history of compiling and analyzing such aggregate data. A justcompleted World Bank project has put forward a list of recommended indicators, which were piloted in eight countries. The interested reader is referred to World Bank (2007a) for further information.

The general result that has come out of such aggregate data analysis for a limited number of countries is that economic growth has generally led to improved conditions in labor markets as gauged by such measures as the rate of unemployment, composition of employment, real earnings levels, inequality, and poverty. Conversely, when such labor market aggregates have not improved, typically it is because economic growth has not taken place.

The policy conclusion that comes out of this line of research is that economic growth should be sought as a way of improving labor market conditions, thereby enabling workers in general and the poor in particular to attain higher material standards of living. What we do not yet know is under what circumstances the improvements in labor market conditions are greater than in others.

2. Micro cross-sectional quantitative data. The literature analyzing micro data enables researchers to find out what makes a difference at the level of the individual worker or the individual household. Such data analysis forms the basis for most contemporary research studies on labor markets. Accordingly, the literature using such data is absolutely huge.

The question these studies typically answer is, which individuals or which firms have higher levels of the dependent variable Y? More specifically, the regression coefficients can be understood thus: when we compare those individuals or firms for which an independent variable X is one unit higher, on average how much higher is Y?

35
in the Kagera region of Tanzania (Kagera Health and Development Survey – KHDS) originally designed to assess the short-run impact of an adult death.

Studies of the baseline KHDS panel found that many households seem to recover from the shock in terms of consumption expenditure (see World Bank, 1999, Chapter 4). Lundberg, over and Mujinja (2000) study the various coping strategies that household employ, including private transfers, credit, and public assistance. As this is based on an 18-month panel and up to 2 years after the event, it is unclear if these outcomes reflect the long-term impacts. If households have short-run coping strategies (such as selling off assets, borrowing, increased remittances from relatives) that are not sustainable in the long-run, the true impact of these shocks may be quite different from the short-run outcomes. Long-run impacts could evolve if this shock results in changes in income or asset strategies, such as reluctance to engage in high-risk/high-return activities, holding more liquid and less productive assets, or lower investment due to lower access to credit.

This paper uses a 13-year panel of individuals to assess how adult mortality shocks affect both short and long run consumption growth of surviving household members. For a sample of households interviewed in 1991, we traced these members in 2004, including those who had relocated or formed their own household. For each baseline household member that died a special mortality questionnaire was administered, recording the year the person died, the reasons for their death, as well as who of the surviving baseline household members they were living with at the time of their death. Our analysis will focus on the effect of the death of these baseline household members on the households they were living in at the time of their death. We do this by regressing consumption growth between 1991 and 2004 on an indicator variable for whether any previous household member died while residing in the household. The nature of our data 5