rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text --> period period<br>upper/lower coef upper/lower coef<br>(a) Average distance (b) Share contiguous<br>period period<br>upper/lower coef upper/lower coef<br>(c) Average Herfindahl (d) Share wealthy OECD<br>.8 0<br>.6<br>−.1<br>.4<br>−.2<br>.2<br>0 −.3<br>1987−1991 1992−1996 1997−2001 2002−2006 2007−2011 2012−2017 1987−1991 1992−1996 1997−2001 2002−2006 2007−2011 2012−2017<br>0<br>.2<br>−.1<br>.15<br>−.2 .1<br>−.3 .05<br>−.4 0<br>1987−1991 1992−1996 1997−2001 2002−2006 2007−2011 2012−2017 1987−1991 1992−1996 1997−2001 2002−2006 2007−2011 2012−2017<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 4: Trends in refugee reach, time effects controlling for source effects, 1987-2017 Note: This figure plots the time effects on the average distance traveled by a refugee, the share of refugees finding themselves in a contiguous country, the average Herfindahl index of refugee shares by source country, and the share of refugees finding themselves in a wealthy OECD country. Throughout, source country effects are netted out.

– where _Outcomest_ is one of the four outcomes reported above log average distance traveled by a refugee, share of refugees going to a contiguous country, the Herfindahl – index of destinations, or share in a high-income OECD country from country _s_ in time period _t_ , and _δt_ and _δs_ are time and source country effects.

Source country effects imply that we are exploiting time variation within a source country over time in how far refugees travel. The coefficients of interest are the time effects _δt_ . The regression is weighted by total refugee stock, to obtain estimates of how outcome variables changed at a refugee, rather than country level. Standard errors are clustered at the source country level.

Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the time effects for the average distance traveled along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Since the distance traveled is in logs, the coeffi13
Our results also highlight the importance of sufficient guidelines and training in programs that are implemented through multiple institutions at scale. Heterogeneity in implementation can arise when multiple entities implement a program, and without effective communication, this heterogeneity can create confusion and frustration for program recipients and increase challenges in oversight. Our findings reveal that KUR borrowers did not always have a clear understanding of loan terms and conditions and their rights and responsibilities as borrowers, raising consumer protection concerns. Standardized templates that harmonize the presentation of loan terms and conditions in simple language could help mitigate these consumer protection risks. These types of templates could also be adopted for other commercial lending products to enhance transparency and ensure borrowers have sufficient information to make decisions about loan product adoption.<sup>36</sup> To facilitate oversight of the program and ensure that the program is reaching the targeted borrowers, improvements to the program’s monitoring and evaluation system can ensure data are reported in a harmonized and systematic way.

Our results also identify several areas of future research to better understand the optimal design of public credit schemes for small businesses. While this study is informed by one of the largest databases of beneficiaries of public credit schemes in the world, the analysis relies on descriptive statistics and inferences and cannot conclusively answer questions about the additionality of access to subsidized credit. Importantly, we cannot detect what would have happened in absence of the program. Experimental studies with a valid counterfactual exploring the impact of subsidized credit schemes are needed to assess the additionality of these types of programs. Moreover, rigorous cost-benefit analyses of public credit schemes such as KUR could help determine optimal budget allocations and the fiscal costs of helping unbanked firms enter the financial system. Additionally, further research is needed to understand how policy changes that limit repeated access can influence graduation from subsidized to unsubsidized commercial credit over time. More evidence is also needed about how partial credit guarantee mechanisms can be optimized to ensure they reach borrowers with limited collateral. Finally, further research on how public credit schemes can effectively target firms in green segments of the economy could help connect programs like KUR with broader global initiatives around green and sustainable finance.

> 36  Harmonization in the way both subsidized and unsubsidized loan product information is presented could also facilitate graduation, as borrowers will already be familiar with interpreting the disclosed information.

**25**
and conflict data when analyzing FDI in fragile developing countries. Second, institutions offering investment guarantees must recognize the differential exposure and sensitivity of MNEs to conflict when pricing risk. Third, FDI to resource-rich, conflict-affected countries can hamper rather than facilitate countries’ efforts to escape the conflict-resource trap. FDI flows to fragile countries are mostly financing resource projects, deepening resource dependence and thus threatening prospects for successful peace building (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Hence, the efforts of fragile developing countries to diversify and attract FDI into manufacturing and services sectors must be accompanied by efforts to improve political stability, governance, transparency, and institutional quality.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the previous literature, a theoretical framework building on the risk and economic geography literature, and several hypotheses, which are tested in section 4. Section 3 presents the econometric framework and the data. Section 4 discusses estimation issues and the main empirical results, and section 5 presents additional analysis exploring the robustness of the results. Section 6 discusses the mechanisms at play in the case of the oil and gas sector. Section 7 provides a summary of the findings and suggestions for future research.

# 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A large strand of the IB and economics literature has analyzed the role of risk in internationalization decisions (e.g., Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Kogut & Chang, 1996; Pennings & Sleuwaegen, 2004; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Most of the theory explaining and classifying risk and uncertainty can be traced back to the work of Frank Knight (1921). According to Knight, risk applies to situations in which an informed agent can make a reasonable judgment on the probability of the event occurring; as such, risk differs from pure uncertainty in which these probabilities are unknown. Miller (1992) distinguishes three main sources of business risk: the general environment, the industry, and the firm itself. A large body of literature is focused on one specific type of environmental risk, namely political risk (e.g., Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Burger et al., 2016; Darandeli & Hill, 2016; Henisz, 2000; Kobrin, 1979; Miller, 1992; Schneider and Frey, 1985). Although several definitions of political risk exist (Kobrin, 7
- Public availability of information on how budgets are prepared and executed and minimum content of budgets and financial reports; and

- Financial data meeting accepted quality standards and subjected to independent audit scrutiny (IMF, “Manual on Fiscal Transparency, 2001).

For tax expenditure, countries comply with fiscal transparency differently among group 1 (established tax benchmarks and estimated and projected tax expenditures), group 2 (no established tax benchmarks, but partially estimated tax expenditures), and group 3 (no established tax benchmarks, no estimated tax expenditures). The situation can be illustrated as follows: In group 1, all countries publish tax expenditure estimates and projections by types of taxes and by functional classification in the central government. Some countries also publish limited local governmental tax expenditures.

However, none of the countries has published imputed tax revenue from a normative tax structure to make comprehensive information publicly available even though that information is available during the process of estimating tax expenditures and is critical background for tax expenditures and the transparency of the size and magnitude of tax expenditures. Also, none of the countries has performed audits or published related auditing information. This group is not completely satisfied with the fiscal transparency criteria in tax expenditures.

For example, both the U.S. Treasury and the Congressional Joint Committee estimate and project tax expenditures. Both of them publish such information regularly. The GAO also publishes reviews and analyses of the effectiveness and efficiency of tax expenditures spending, their impacts on fiscal finance and the economy, and recommendations to improve them. However, neither Treasury nor the GAO publishes the imputed normative tax revenue.

In Germany the “Subsidies Report” includes both budgetary direct subsidies and tax provisions with estimates and projections. This publication is useful to assess the efficiency of total government financial assistance and to reduce overlap and conflict spending between tax expenditures and subsidies. Recently, Germany has studied and intends to audit tax subsidies. However, the imputed normative tax revenue is not published in any government documents.

In group 2, though some countries estimate partial tax expenditures and produce limited projections, they do not publish those estimates and projections. They do not compose a complete list of tax expenditures, either. Those estimates and some projections are not available to the public, but are only used for internal purposes by governmental agencies. Therefore, those countries have failed in fiscal transparency in tax expenditures.

In group 3 countries do not estimate tax expenditures or publish lists of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are a black box to the public. Therefore, they fail in fiscal transparency in tax expenditures.

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Table 2: Persistence in piped water consumption

|||D|ependent|variable: log|monthly pi|ped water c|onsumption|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||prev|ious 2 mont|hs|prev|ious 3 mon|ths|prev|ious 4 mon|ths|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
|Current month variables:||||||||||
|50 percent discount|0.0239|||0.0223|||0.0182|||
||(0.0186)|||(0.0182)|||(0.0184)|||
|75 percent discount|0.0582|||0.0601|||0.0603|||
||(0.0189)|||(0.0187)|||(0.0190)|||
|Any discount||0.0298|||0.0289|||0.0272||
|||(0.0171)|||(0.0168)|||(0.0170)||
|Water price|||-0.0400|||-0.0420|||-0.0441|
||||(0.0190)|||(0.0187)|||(0.0186)|
|Previous month variables:||||||||||
|#months with 50 percent discount|0.00665|||0.00585|||0.00543|||
||(0.00920)|||(0.00646)|||(0.00527)|||
|#months with 75 percent discount|0.0177|||0.0119|||0.00899|||
||(0.00931)|||(0.00656)|||(0.00537)|||
|#months with any discount||0.0175|||0.0131|||0.0108||
|||(0.00836)|||(0.00586)|||(0.00478)||
|Mean water price|||-0.0463|||-0.0480|||-0.0481|
||||(0.0189)|||(0.0202)|||(0.0221)|
|Signifcance tests (_p_-values):||||||||||
|All prev. month variables|0.137|0.036|0.014|0.186|0.025|0.018|0.246|0.024|0.029|
|75 percent discount only|0.057|||0.071|||0.094|||
|Observations|43,860|43,860|43,860|42,398|42,398|42,398|40,936|40,936|40,936|
|R-squared|0.663|0.663|0.663|0.666|0.666|0.666|0.668|0.668|0.668|
|Month dummies|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|HH fxed efects|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|

_Notes:_ Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at household level. All regressions include person-days (measured at quarterly frequency). Columns 1, 4, and 7 include dummies for whether household is currently receiving the 50 percent or 75 percent discount as well as number of previous months with 50 percent or 75 percent discount. Columns 2, 5, and 8 include dummies for whether household is currently receiving any discount as well as number of previous months with any discount. Columns 3, 6, and 9 include current water price inclusive of discount as well as mean water price over the previous months.
# Poverty in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia in the Years of Crisis, 1978-87

# by Branko Milanovic

# Table of Contents

|I.|Macroeconomic Environment|I|
|---|---|---|
|II.|Impact of the Crisis on Population Incomes|5|
|III.|Comparison of Subsisten*e Minimum Lines|7|
|IV.|The Size and Composition ot Poverty, 1978-87|11|
|V.|The ("Canging Composition of Poverty|16|
|VI.|Poverty, Income, and Redistribution|18|
|VII.|Conclusions|21|
|Appe|ndix 1-<br>Poverty Lines|23|
|Appe|ndix 2-<br>Sources of Data for Household Incomes|24|
|Refer|ences|26|
|End|Notes|28|
# _Appendix 5: Connection between performance and institutional environment'_

Figure 10. Effect of institutional environment on results focus in Bolivia <!-- Start of picture text --> 7<br>result focus =0.54 19 IE + 0.7997<br>R 2 = 0.2853<br>6 ____________________ bW king-regula ion<br>tax<br>5 ;c<br>] + ~~~~~~~~Santa Cruz central bank<br>;l jzglaria a~~~~~cu reform<br>4 __iinance __tele rn-regulation<br>* road<br>* agriculture<br>3 __Chuquisac i<br>5 6 7 8 9<br>institutional environment<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> 64 See footnote 48.

_56_
exports plus imports to and from other EU countries divided by total trade, rather than the overall trade-to-GDP ratios. Running a system of seemingly unrelated equations, they find mixed explanatory results for this variable and conclude that European integration affects countries differently. Barrios and Strobl (2009) run fixed effects OLS analyses for the EU15 over the period 1975-2000. Their aim is to explain how a measure of regional inequalities within each country is influenced by the trade-toGDP ratio, as well as by trade over GDP in PPP terms. For the latter, they find a significant positive effect on regional inequalities among EU15 countries over 19752000.

The studies which have focused on this topic covering a more diverse sample of countries – involving both developed and developing ones – are rarer. Two such studies are Milanovic (2005) and Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2006). Milanovic (2005) addresses the evolution of regional inequalities across the five most populous countries of the world: China, India, the US, Indonesia, and Brazil over varying time spans during the period 1980-2000. The results of his static fixed effects and dynamic Arellano-Bover panel analyses point to an absence of a significant causal relationship between openness and regional inequalities. Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2006) map two sets of binary relationships – first between nominal trade openness and regional inequality, and second between a trade composition index and regional inequality – for eight countries, including Brazil, China, Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the US, over varying time spans between 1970-2000. They conclude that it is not trade openness _per se_ which has any bearing on the evolution of regional inequality, but its combination with the evolution of the manufacturing-to-agriculture share of exports which influences which regions gain and which lose from greater economic integration over time. As trade shifts from the primary sector to manufacturing, by virtue of manufacturing being more geographically concentrated – especially in emerging countries – than agriculture or mining, within country regional disparities tend to increase and they do so at a faster pace in the developing than in the developed world. They find indicative support for this hypothesis based on the coincidence between changes in the evolution of their trade composition index and changes in regional inequalities across countries.

7
pathways) and mentally (we document a high volume of mistakes made in early weeks, with work quality improving over time), and occupy a meaningful amount of time, with workers reporting 2.5 hours per working day on the job. We further sought to incorporate key features of employment as described in sociology (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel, 1971; Terkel, 1974): the work embedded a nominal social component, with workers needing to step outside their tents to complete their work. It also had a purpose, as sociological literature describes blue collar or service work to be perceived as valuable by most workers (Lamont (2002); Poll (2018); ISSP (2017)).<sup>8</sup> Given this precedence, we articulated the objective of the work to be that NGOs sought to better understand the refugee experience in order to provide services, and would therefore benefit from more accurate data on how refugees spend their time in the camps.

We sought to design a form of employment that was neither ‘too good’ nor ‘too bad’ in the context of the camps. While the task required physical and mental labor, it was not back-breaking, which would have precluded the inclusion of women in our sample. Given the multiple time-specific sheets per day, the work required attention throughout the day, but did not occupy the full workday, as most available work in the camps was likewise ‘part-time’. The task also involved daily accountability and quality control through the possibility of docked pay, as described in the following section, but employees were never at risk of losing their job nor of being severely reprimanded by their employer. On the margin of sociability, while the work required participants to step outside of their tents, it did not require any conversations with neighbors. Finally, the objective of the employment was framed to echo the purposefulness vis-`a-vis one’s community that is inherent to most employment in camp life (building roads, constructing latrines, assisting in children’s centers, and the like). As such, our aim was to construct a form of work that was representative of ‘employment’ broadly construed, and similar to the nature of work an individual in our context might engage in both in terms of effort cost and potential value.

**Logistics of employment intervention** In order to ensure that literacy was not an impediment to completing the work, we contracted an artist to design a time-use worksheet visually depicting daily activities in the camps (e.g., napping, eating, going to the market, sitting at a tea stall, sitting idle). We piloted the sheets extensively to ensure that all major activities were included (Figure 1). Upon being randomly assigned to the employment intervention, enumerators explained the work task to households and then showed the participant a five minute video designed by the artist and research team to reiterate the task.

> 8In fact, recent empirical work by Soffia, Wood, and Burchell (2021) finds that 94% of workers occupying positions perceived by the sociology literature to be ‘useless’ or ‘alienating’ regard their work as meaningful as well.

9
40. The sample of students in the Angrist and Lavy study was not large enough to ensure that average characteristics in the randomly assigned program and comparison schools were similar. Third, in addition to test score outcomes, we collected data on student school attendance, teacher attendance, and a range of student attitudes and behaviors which allow us to explore the mechanisms through which merit scholarships affect learning, unlike Angrist and Lavy, who do not have such data, nor are they able to estimate externality impact of increased student effort.<sup>1</sup> The current study also contributes to the diverse literature on the impacts of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. In accordance with standard economic models, incentives should increase individual study effort. An alternative theory, from psychology, asserts that extrinsic rewards may interfere with intrinsic motivation and could thus actually reduce effort. A weaker version of this second view is that incentives may lead to greater performance over the short-run, but could lead to negative effects over the longer-term, and especially when the incentive is removed, by diminishing intrinsic motivation.

Early experimental psychology research in education supported the idea that reward-based incentives lead to increased effort in students, and this became a foundation for “positive reinforcement” teaching methodologies (Skinner 1961). Laboratory research conducted in the 1970’s studied behavior before and after individuals received extrinsic motivational rewards and found evidence that external rewards produced negative impacts in some situations (Deci 1971; Kruglanski et al. 1971; Lepper et al. 1973). Later laboratory research attempting to quantify the effect of external factors on intrinsic motivation has yielded mixed conclusions: Cameron and Pierce (1994) and Cameron et al. (2001) conducted meta-studies of over 100 experiments and found that the negative effects of external rewards were limited and could be overcome in certain settings – such as for high-interest tasks – but Deci et al.

> 1 Ashworth et. al (2001) study Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA), weekly allowances given to 16-19 year old students from low-income U.K. households based on school enrollment and academic achievement. Initial findings indicate that EMA raised school enrollment among eligible youth by 5.9 percentage points and by 3.7 percentage points among the ineligible, suggesting externalities. It is unclear how much of these impacts are due to rewarding students for enrollment versus achievement. Since program areas were not randomly selected – EMA was targeted to poor urban areas – the authors resort to propensity score matching to estimate impacts. Croxford et. al. (2002) find similar EMA impacts in Scotland. Angrist, Bettinger et al (2002) show that a Colombian program that made a certain minimum level of academic performance a requirement for receiving a high school voucher led to academic gains there.

4
Learning from Developing Country Power Market Experiences: The Case of Peru Monthly wholesale spot prices in Peru are volatile due to hydrological conditions and transmission congestions (see Figure 5-2). Volatility of monthly prices surged from 2001 to 2008, with the spot price reaching a monthly average of 235 USD/MWh in July of 2008, coinciding with low hydro generation.

<!-- Start of picture text --> US$/MWh GWh<br>250 4,500<br>4,000<br>200<br>3,500<br>3,000<br>150<br>2,500<br>2,000<br>100<br>1,500<br>50 1,000<br>500<br>0 0<br>1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9<br>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br>Hydro generation Thermal generation Solar generation Wind generation Marginal cost<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 5-2 Evolution of monthly electricity prices and technology-wise generation in Peru, from 2001 to 2017.

Source: COES As previously explained in section 3, from 2008 to 2017 the Peruvian power market was altered by disregarding transmission congestions in the calculation of marginal costs in the pool, thus lowering wholesale spot electricity prices. However, additional charges due to transmission congestions are levied upon retail customers. Furthermore, transmission losses have grown in the last decade up to 5.5% annual average (with respect to gross generation) in 2015, from 2% in 2005.

Market concentration has fallen steadily over the past decade in Peru, from 2,783 in 2005 to 1,509 in 2015 (see the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index evolution in Figure 5-3). Although competition has increased in the Peruvian power market, 68% of the market remains concentrated in four major actors as of 2017 (including government-owned power utilities) (OSINERGMIN, 2018).

18