rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
systein, the change in stocks is the current supply-demand imbalance. Thus one has an equation of the form

# (17) Apt = _cvo_ - oq&t = % - oq(Ot - Co

(The equation Is likely to contain additional terms relating to inflation, exchange rate changes etc. but this does not affect the basic principle). The REH suggests that models of this sort may be inadequate in two contexts:

- i) In forecasting: agents may have information on or may be able for other reasons to predict future production and consumption levels and hence stock movements; this will have implications for the current price.

- ii) In policy analysis: if one wishes to analyze the efiects on commodity prices of different demand management or price control policies, one should take into account the fact that agents will anticipate these policies, and that this will have implications for the current price.

# D2. Soeculative Stockholdinf Models

27. The extent to which commodity prices in different periods are linked depends on the extent to which a discrepancy between current and expected future prices results in additional stockholding. The incentive to carry an additional unit of stock is given by

## (18) Pet+11t - (1+rt+6)pt + C(st)

where rt is the interest rate, 6 is the rate of stock depreciation and c(so is the marginal convenience yield on stock. The convenience yield function c(.) is generally taken as 17
population should be more sensitive to the monetary cost of travel compared to the richer developed economies. We set the average elasticity with respect to monetary cost as -0.43.

We fix the value of � to 0.25 and take the value of �� as 0.04. We calibrate �� and � from equations (10) and (11). We use these parameters to derive the value of the marginal utility of income given in Table 2. We then use these parameter values in (3b) to calculate the Value of Time (VOT) as 26 MAD/hour which is around 58% of the hourly wage, and within the range suggested in the empirical literature<sup>13</sup> , that VOT is around one-half of the wage rate for commute trips, highest for business trips and lowest for discretionary leisure travel. In the bus waiting time function, the parameter � is from Meignan, Simonin and Koukam (2007) and the constant, �, is calibrated to match the base data on bus waiting times. The constant parameter for the bus occupancy function, ��, is calibrated from (8). The waiting time for taxi and tram remains invariant to its changes in supply. The average waiting time for taxi, bus and tram are 5, 11.5 and 6 minutes respectively.

**Table 2:** Other calibrated parameter values (2014 baseline)

|Congestion (traffic load to capacity ratio),<br>����<br>�∗����� �����|11.9|
|---|---|
|BPR congestion function parameters:��,��, ��|1/60,0.15,1.21|
|Bus occupancy parameters:��, ��|25.83,0.80|
|Bus waiting time parameters:�, �|110.9,0.335|
|Average seating(seats)for bus and tram:�����|45,118|
|Average standing (sq. met.)capacityof bus tram:��|10.7,84|
|Standing passenger density per square meter for bus and<br>tram: ��|5.75, 2.45|
|Total Number of taxis|15,000|
|Total Number of buses,_B_|866|
|Total Number of tram, TRAM|37|
|Total kilometers of tram lines|31|
|Total tram kilometers traveled (VKT) per day|8500|
|Share of monetary cost of transportation with respect to<br>annual income (probability weighted)|0.135|
|One-way daily person trips by bus|359,829|
|Elasticity with respect to own-mode travel time|-0.68|
|Elasticity with respect to own-mode monetary cost|-0.43|
|Value of time, probability weighted (MAD/hour)|26|
|Fuel tax rate (in the baseline),�|0.54|
|Pre-tax price of fuel,�(MAD/liter)|6.12|
|Lengths of a taxi, bus routes,��,������|11.69,15.60|
|Road Area (sq. km)|22.7|

> 13 See Small and Verhoef (2007).

16
the evolution of development policy. Next, the second section contains four case studies, each of which asks what view of development policy within the World Bank emerged during the Bank president's historical period, and how was it informed by actors in the US presidential administration and major figures in Congress active on World Bank policy. The primary evidence to be evaluated will be the oral histories each man conducted with the World Bank archives and their archival correspondence files available. I supplement this information with further primary and several excellent histories of the men, their work and contributions to the institution and development policy. The third section explores the notion that the two presidents with the most extensive political networks prior to their appointment made use of these connections to introduce greater institutional independence to the Bank as a development agency. Thus, partisan politics in the US do not necessarily tie the Bank more closely to the hegemonic power within it through the process of presidential selection by the US. The paper concludes with considerations of how current arrangements differ from those in the past and keep the topic salient as the international economic context remains in a constant state of transition.

# THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND THE SELECTION OF THE WORLD BANK PRESIDENT

The US selects the president of the World Bank according to an informal arrangement made in 1946. European countries choose the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The informal method of selecting these leaders has been challenged over the history of both organizations by many stakeholders, but in recent years it has come to represent how the international system operates at its most essential level, that is, how resources are allocated, and how international law will be interpreted. In this regard, the US and industrialized countries exert disproportionate influence overall.<sup>5</sup> For this reason and others related to weighted voting mechanisms within them, the IMF and World Bank have been perceived as operating within the framework of a US postwar hegemonic, liberal regime, underpinned with norms advocating market-oriented modes of allocation as a particular approach to development. Conversely, the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, particularly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with leadership selection biased towards 4
# 1   Introduction

How do feedback mechanisms affect users’ demand for services? Empowering users to demand better services has become a keystone of social programs. International development organizations such as the World Bank (WB) advocate the use of participatory users’ surveys to enhance service provision in their projects.<sup>1</sup> The idea is that users are best placed to monitor service delivery, and that their involvement in giving feedback will lead to higher empowerment, thus closing the accountability loop (Banerjee et al., 2010; Björkman and Svensson, 2009; Ringold et al, 2012). The spread of users’ feedback tools is not restricted to public interest programs; customer surveys are widely used by the service industry as a way to retain customers and boost satisfaction.

Despite this enthusiasm for beneficiary monitoring, little is known as to whether establishing feedback loops can in fact affect users’ demand for services. Even less explored are the channels through which feedback mechanisms increase demand for services. Typically, theories of change associated with users’ feedback loops assume that satisfaction and demand for the service improve through both supply-side effects, resulting from improved accountability, and demand-side effects, as users are empowered to demand better service (World Bank, 2003). However, there is little evidence on the respective roles of pure monitoring relative to users’ empowerment in improving service delivery.

> * Development Economics Research Group, World Bank. Maria Jones, <u>mjones5@worldbank.org, and Florence</u> Kondylis, fkondylis@worldbank.org. We thank Jasmeen Batra and Cindy Sobieski for superb management of all field work, and Paula Gonzalez for excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources in Rwanda and the staff from the Land Husbandry, Water Harvesting, and Hillside Irrigation Project for their leadership in this work. We thank One Acre Fund Rwanda for their hard work in implementing the feedback interventions and granting us unlimited access to their data. The Global Agriculture and Food Security and the i2i fund provided generous funding. We thank Jishnu Das, David Evans, Marcel Fafchamps, Xavi Gine, Steve Haggblade, Stuti Khemani, Arianna Legovini, Emilia Soldani, Daniel Stein, for their comments at various stages of the study, as well as numerous seminar audiences.

> 1 This approach is often referred to, in policy circles, as Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E),and includes Citizen Report Card and Beneficiary Assessment, as outlined here: <u><mark>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCENG/0,,content MDK:20509352~menuPK:1278203~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html.</mark></u>
user fees, with some additional, but declining, off-budget donor support (equivalent to 2.1% of total health expenditure in 2004)<sup>11</sup> .

**Table 1 Share of public health sector revenues from social health insurance contributions** **<u>and general revenues, 2005</u>**

||**Social health insurance**|**General revenues**|**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Albania|24.8|75.2|100|
|Bosnia and Herzegovina|95.6|4.4|100|
|Macedonia, FYR|96.1|3.9|100|
|Serbia and Montenegro|75.7|24.3|100|
|Kosovo|0|100|100|
|Croatia|88.3|11.7|100|
|Slovenia|91.4|8.6|100|

Source: WHO NHA database Private, voluntary health insurance is not well-developed in the Western Balkans. Serbia is the only country in the sub-region where private insurance schemes constitute a significant, if small, share (3%) of total healthcare revenues. There, the Health Insurance Act of 2005 allowed for the development of voluntary health insurance of a substitutive or complementary type, but the number of subscribers is small and concentrated in large cities. A limited number of commercial insurers are also active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro have a legal framework in place that will facilitate the insurance market’s emergence (Langenbrunner _et al._ forthcoming). In all countries, however, there are some major obstacles to the development of private voluntary health insurance. Most prominent among these are the generous benefit packages offered by compulsory health insurance, the fairly limited number of private providers that can offer alternative care, and low co-payments – all of which reduce the incentives to develop supplementary and complementary insurance plans.

Over time, there have been marked shifts in the composition of revenues. These shifts have not exhibited a uniform pattern across countries, though (see Figure 2), and it is not possible to identify a particular trend. In Albania, the share of out-of-pocket expenditures has fallen slightly, and the share of social health insurance has grown. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the share of general revenues has dwindled, while the shares of social health insurance and out-of-pocket expenditures have grown by similar amounts. The opposite pattern is observed in Serbia and Montenegro where, following a fairly volatile period (due, in part, to conflicts in the region and, in part, to health sector reforms), by the end of the decade, general revenues had become a far more important financing source than ten years earlier, at the expense of the role played by social health insurance. The emerging importance of private health insurance as a source of financing in Serbia is also captured by the data. There has been very little change in the composition of financing in the FYR of Macedonia.

> 11 Discussion is ongoing as to whether social health insurance would be the best type of financing for the health sector in Kosovo.

8
Finally, we use several years of household surveys to investigate dynamic effects in the short and long terms and perform heterogeneous analysis to shed some light on the mechanisms underlying the main results.

Most studies that use dates of birth to estimate the long-term effects of a law or intervention, focus on the impact of early school enrollment. The literature outlines the educational channel as the main mechanism linking dates of birth to labor-market outcomes (see for example, Angrist and Krueger 1991; Bedard and Dhuey 2006; Black et al. 2011). A few empirical papers provide causal estimates for long-term effects of youth employment (or child labor) and outline the potential experience in the labor market as the plausible mechanism. This study therefore helps fill this gap in the empirical literature.<sup>3</sup> It is documented elsewhere (Piza and Souza, 2016) that the 1998 child-labor ban reduced labor-force participation rates of boys but not girls in the short term. This is so because the labor-market participation of girls was already low. They show that the decrease in participation rates of boys is driven by a fall in formal and informal work. Thus, Piza and Souza’s (2016) results suggest that the law was reasonably well enforced among males. In this paper, we will therefore concentrate only on the sample of males.<sup>4</sup> We find that, in the short term, the child-labor ban reduced the proportion of boys doing paid work and studying and increased the proportion of boys only studying. We also found that the ban reduced participation rates in the labor force and not just employment rates. We observe some persistence in these results until the affected cohort is age 18.

Our long-term analysis follows males between ages 22 and 29. Our estimates suggest that the ban did not have long-lasting effects on schooling attainment and labormarket outcomes of the affected cohort. We use distributional analysis in the long term to shed light on the potential impact of the ban on the subgroup of boys more likely to drop out from the labor force. Quantile treatment effect estimates suggest the law had a negative effect in the first quintile of log earnings distribution in the long term. We

> 3 There is some evidence of the impact of vocational training on labor-market outcomes (for example, Hanushek et al. 2015). The question addressed in this paper is different, as it aims to uncover the impact of formally hindering labor-market participation of 14-year-olds for up to two years.

> 4 Our short-term RDD estimates confirmed Piza and Souza’s (2016) findings for girls and are available on request.

4
level, and therefore term limits will not affect the outcome. For example, consider the 1988 US Presidential Election. George H.W. Bush was elected president, after Ronald Reagan served two terms. Since the Republican party remained in power, we treat that episode as the incumbent staying in power.

In cases of political coalitions, where multiple parties form the government, our measure of incumbency considers the political party of the chief executive. Second, we use data on the name of the political party incumbent, and the political party which wins the election. With that data, the political orientation of the incumbents and election winners are calculated based on party ideological orientation.

For the majority of elections and parties, data on left-right orientation are taken from the ParlGov Party Database (D ̈oring and Manow, 2019). This database contains information for over 1,600 political parties in 37 democracies in the EU and OECD. For each party, a time-invariant score between 0 and 10 is provided, classifying their political position from left-wing to right-wing, respectively. This score, in turn, is based on data from Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver (2006), and Bakker et al. (2015). For example, the UK Conservative Party has a score of 7.4, while the French Socialist Party has a score of 3.2. In our analysis, we do not use the continuous index, but rather split parties into left-wing and rightwing using the threshold value of 5. Overall, this dataset provides information for most countries in our sample. For countries outside the ParlGov sample (primarily South America), we also classify incumbents and election winners as left-wing or right-wing using various online sources. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, the winner of the 2018 Brazilian general election is classified as right-wing, based on his thenparty, Partido Social Liberal. In sum, of the 207 elections in our main sample, there are 91 left-wing incumbents and 116 right-wing incumbents. Separately, there are 82 left-wing election winners, and 125 right-wing election winners.

Finally, voter turnout data are collected, as well as an indicator for whether voting is compulsory for a given election. Most of the data are from the IDEA Voter Turnout Database; any gaps are supplemented using online sources.

The main source of shock is based on changes in international oil prices, weighted by the average country-specific oil import values. International oil prices are obtained from the World Bank “Pink Sheet” data. These data contain real and nominal crude oil prices; for our main analysis, we use real oil prices. Data on the value of oil imports and GDP in US dollars are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.

5
# **4. Conclusion**

In many small countries in the Caribbean, the shrinking labor force and high unemployment are among the main problems that governments face. This paper shows that the situation may be the same, but the causes may be strikingly different. The typical diagnosis for these problems is associated with the demand side of the labor market, such as job creation, investment climate, regulation and governance, and so on. This paper studies various aspects of the supply side of the labor market to find factors that prevent Jamaica from achieving lower unemployment rates.

The empirical analysis in this paper examines the effect of remittance income on the labor supply of households and some evidence was found to confirm that remittances contribute to high real wages while high unemployment persists. The cross-sectional analysis suggests that remittances have some impact on labor participation but little or none on the weekly working hours of employees. The pseudo-panel data analysis confirms the result that remittances have a strong impact on labor participation but not on weekly working hours. Households with a remittance income have a higher reservation wage and reduce labor supply by moving out of the labor force.

Increased remittance flows may negatively affect the competitiveness of the Jamaican economy. As suggested by the results discussed above, they may increase reservation wages and reduce labor supply. Sparked from the channel of the labor market, they can also affect the real economy, exports, investment and growth as shown in Bussolo and Medvedev (2006). World Bank (2006c) examines these complicated links and the direction and magnitude of the changes in the case of Jamaica. The results in this paper call for studies tracing these effects in other economies, because remittances are one of the major issues for development research (World Bank, 2006b).

16
28

# <u>Notes</u>

1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important source of external funding for developing countries. In 2003 the developing world as a whole received about $130 billion in FDI, and about $75 billion in official international remittances.

2 In this paper official international remittances are defined as “worker remittances,” as listed (code 2 391) in annual publications of the IMF, _Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook._ Official international remittances in this paper do not include other line items listed in the IMF _Yearbook_ -- items such as “compensation of employees” or “other current transfers” -- because it is not clear if these items are, in fact, “remittances.” Also, official international remittances in this paper do not include the large – but unknown – amount of remittance monies that is transmitted through unofficial and informal channels.

3 Several of the papers reviewed in sections (3) and (4) of this paper were written under the auspices of the Program on International Migration and Development at the World Bank. This World Bank program analyzes: (1) the development impact of remittances; (2) brain drain; (3) temporary migration; and (4) trade, FDI and migration.

4 While the Philippines and the Russian Federation both produce large number of international migrants, IMF, _Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook_ show that the Philippines received only $202 and $236 million in worker remittances in 1998 and 2003, respectively, and that the Russian Federation received zero in 1998 and $300 million in 2003.

5 In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, most of these international remittances came from workers working in the United States; for South Asia, most international remittances came from workers working in the Persian Gulf.

6In the data set, 28 of the 44 countries in the low income group are located in Sub-Saharan Africa.

7See, for example, Borjas (1987: 545-547).

8To avoid possible correlation problems between variables, the poverty (and inequality) variables are measured using data from household budget surveys, while the per capita GDP variables are measured using national accounts data.