rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
tax collections but also are accentuating the crisis of manufacturers facing fraudulent cnmpetition'. By most accounts, large quantities of heavily taxed categories of goods come in through neighboring countries -- a flow that is unlikely while the relationship of domestic to foreign prices (combined with full convertability) holds and high import tariffs are in effect.

Profits. Investment: There is a 40% tax on profits, to which until recently was added a 10% profit tax for a (theoretically refundable) National Investment Fund (FNI). As noted in the section on arrears, the government has withheld many payments owed to the private sector in recent years, induding tax rebates. The FNI is theoretically refundable to industries with a government-approved investment plan. In practice, access to this Fund has proved discriminatory against smaller enterprisese and may have introduced extraneous factors into private investment decisions. For whatever reasons, larger firms apparently have an easier time convincing the oversight committee of the value of their use of FNI funds.

Table 8: Tax/Value Added Ratio by Enterprise Type

||Enterprise Type|1982|1988|
|---|---|---|---|
|T<br>**Total**<br>**TaxesI**|**Smalland Nediun**|**.16**|**.27**|
|<br> <br>l<br>atLarge<br>**I**<br>**Value**<br>**Added**<br>|Private<br><br>|**.19**<br>**I**|.22|
|<br> <br> <br>|<br>Large Public|.16|.20|
||**Small and**Nedium|**.13**|**.18**|
|(Total Taxes - Profit**Tax)**<br>Value Added|Large Private|**.16**|**.19**|
|<br>j|Large Public|**.14**|.19|

Source: BDF/CECPS Payroll Taxes: Labor inputs also fall under substantial taxation. Entrepreneurs estimated that the taxes and mandatory benefit regulations applying to labor add between 30 and 50% to labor costs. Payroll taxes include a social security tax (CNPS) and a training tax (FNR). The CNPS is probably the most widely evaded tax (or quasi-tax) and an effort to enforce its payment more thoroughly (which appears to be wisely lacking) would undoubtedly result in further reductions in formal employment.

I Competition from a muggled manufactures is seen as a major threat by many large enterprises (see table 6). Domestic textile production, for instance, has declined by about _50%o_ over the last four - years due to the roughly equai effect of demand contraction and fraudulent imports. Similarly, formal (duty-paying) importers of many consumer items are instead procuring the same imported - items domestically cheaper.

" Helpful information on this was received from Klaus Lorch, then of AFlCO.

36
<!-- Start of picture text --> EMU<br>1<br>Greece<br>revised budget<br>deficit<br>0.8<br>Release of Fed<br>minutes on<br>Dec 2012<br>0.6 meeting<br>Lehman<br>collapse<br>0.4<br>ECB rates<br>up 25 bps<br>+<br>Portugal needs<br>0.2 assistance<br>Jun.02 May.04 May.06 May.08 Apr.10 Apr.12 Apr.14<br>1<br>18.01.2010<br>0.8<br>22.05.2013<br>15.06.2011<br>0.6<br>0.4<br>11.11.2008<br>0.2<br>Jun.02 May.04 May.06 May.08 Apr.10 Apr.12 Apr.14<br>Average cDCC<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 4: Average dynamic conditional correlation between EMU sovereign bond yields. Vertical lines in the upper sub-figure denote the dates when noteworthy economic incidents occur. Vertical lines in the lower sub-figure denote the dates when dynamic correlation shifts to another mean level according to penalized contrasts.

13
A prize scheme of the above kind is no doubt theoretically appealing. It is, however, vulnerable to a number of objections prominent among which is what might be labeled the ‘winner-takes-all’ objection (Pogge 2008c:128; Barder et al. 2005:4). The fact that a prize mechanism only awards a prize to the company that first reaches a specific pharmaceutical goal adds significant risk and uncertainty to companies that are entertaining the idea of engaging in a R&D of the specified product. The usual uncertainties that for-profit pharmaceutical companies have about whether or not their basic research will pan out and whether or not the various stages of clinical trials will be successful are now conjoined with the risk of not knowing whether or not they will win the race against competing companies in terms of being the company that first wins regulatory approval of a drug with the specified properties. Drug development is expensive, and it is therefore very undesirable for a company to enter into, and take second place, in a race in which the winner takes all.<sup>9</sup> In such a scenario, expenses to basic research and clinical trials are likely to be wasted.

An economically rational decision of a for-profit pharmaceutical company to enter into a winner-takes-all race therefore presupposes close to perfect comparative knowledge in the sense that a company must possess not only a good estimate of its own chances of reaching the pharmaceutical goal but also a good estimate of competing companies’ research efforts and degree of success in clinical trials involving their contender for the prize. Such comparative knowledge is difficult to come by, and companies that do not possess it are therefore likely to refrain from entering the competition for the prize. This reduces the number of for-profit pharmaceutical companies doing R&D on the target product, and it reduces the competitive

> 9 A commonly cited estimate of the cost of bringing a new drug to market puts the cost at US$800 million. See The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development: http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6 [Accessed August 2, 2009].

11
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4725

# **Abstract**

There have been important developments in the decentralization of the government structure in Turkey since the early 1980s. This paper examines economic development and growth in Turkish provinces. Although there is a rich literature on the economic effects of government decentralization from both developed and developing countries, these effects have not been examined widely in the context of Turkish local governments. The authors first describe changes since the early 1980s and recent reform efforts. They then provide an empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches. The panel dataset consists of 67 provinces from 1976 to 2001. The analysis examines whether variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time have had a significant impact on economic development and growth in those provinces. The findings suggest a weak negative economic effect of decentralization through a number of municipalities per capita. However, the findings do not show any significant impact from the creation of new provinces by separation from the existing ones.

This paper—a product of the Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to study local governance systems and decentralization in the client countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at syilmaz@ worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
17 living In cities Is socially much more destabilizing.

To realize this we need only focus on what It In reality means, and how It differs from urban poverty Induced by rapid structural change. Descent Into poverty for the already established urban population Is associated with inability to procure replacement for the worn-out consumer durables (TV sets, washing machines etc) that suddenly become out of reach for an ordinary household. Increased rents or electricity bills sharply compress the affordable standard of living below the accustomed level. This represents a process of reversal, In terms of standard and culture of llving, to a level that household might have had some 20 years earlier. Social Implications of such a decline are probably much greater than social implications of a temporary deterioration In one's standard of living following migration to city. There are at least two elements which render the first deprivation (subjectively) much worse: (1) absence of expectation that situation would Improve, a feeling pervading most of Eastern Europe In the 1980's, and which, by definition, cannot exist In a rapidly industrializing developing society; and (2) this was not a _voluntarily_ accepted temporary decline In the standard of living as among migrants.

_Table 9. The Composition of the Poor in 000; (in percent)_

||Rural|poor|Urban|ooor|Tot|al|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Poland, 1978<br>Poland, 1987|1760<br>2441|(52.0)<br> _(29.3)_|1627<br>5879|(48.0)<br>(70.7)|3386<br>8321|(100)<br> _(100)_|
|Yugoslavia, 1978|2592|(75.6)|837|(24.4)|3429|_(100)_|
|Yugoslavia, 1987|2707|_(52.9)_|2411|(47.1)|5118|_(100)_|

Note: Data In brackets give the percentage breakdown of the total number of the poor. Rural poor are farmers' and mixed households. Urban poor are workers and pensioners for Poland, and non-agricultural households for Yugoslavia.

The changing composition of poverty Is Illustrated In Table 9. Before the crisis, the rural poor accounted for 52 percent of total poor In Poland, and three-quarters In Yugoslavia. About 10 years later, urban poor represent 70 percent of all the poor In
Policy Research Working Paper 7947

# **Abstract**

This paper studies the impact of deep agreements on United Kingdom–European Union trade relations. A standard gravity model is applied to assess the effect that European Union membership had on the United Kingdom’s trade. The paper uses new information on the content of trade agreements to build a measure of “depth” based on the number of provisions the agreements cover. The analysis relies on information on goods, services, and value-added trade from the World Input Output Database. Deep trade agreements are found to increase goods and services trade by 42 percent, and value-added trade by 14 percent on average. European Union membership had a particularly strong effect on United Kingdom’s services and global value chain trade. Because of its membership, the United Kingdom’s services trade more than doubled, and the country’s backward and forward participation in global value chains increased by more than 30 percent each. The paper uses these estimates to evaluate the future of United Kingdom–European Union trade under different scenarios. The findings show that United Kingdom–European Union trade declines under all scenarios, ranging between 6 and 28 percent for trade in value added. This drop is sharper (particularly for services and global value chain trade) the lower is the depth of the future arrangement relative to the depth of the European Union agreement. As trade flows adjust slowly to changes in trade costs, these effects are expected to emerge over time. But the trade-off between the depth of trade agreements and trade intensity will delimit policy choices going forward.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mruta@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
||(0.125)|(0.080)|(0.120)|(0.079)|(0.129)|(0.087)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|EU|0.869***<br>(0.220)|0.156**<br>(0.062)|0.854***<br>(0.220)|1.001***<br>(0.159)|0.852***<br>(0.219)|1.025***<br>(0.159)|
|Internal trade x prot. Dummy|||0.185|0.351|0.184|0.342|
||||(0.255)|(0.277)|(0.262)|(0.281)|
|Internal trade x WTO w/out GPA||||0.990***||0.854***|
|||||(0.259)||(0.265)|
|Internal trade x GPA||||1.293***||1.234***|
|||||(0.395)||(0.403)|
|Internal trade x EU||||0.208||0.189|
|||||(0.234)||(0.234)|
|Internal trade x Ln(GDP cap)||||-0.097||-0.221|
|||||(0.135)||(0.146)|
|Internal trade x Ln(GDP)||||-0.251***||-0.259***|
|||||(0.086)||(0.088)|
|Internal trade x Institutions WGI||||-0.014**||-0.009|
|||||(0.007)||(0.008)|
|Obs|496570|496676|496570|490371|496570|490371|

_Notes: The dependent variable is the value of bilateral imports. Annual data from 2000 to 2018. All columns include importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. Column (2) include country-pair (directed) fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) include interactions between the internal trade dummy and year dummies. Standard errors three-way clustered by undirected country-pair, importer and exporter in parenthesis. * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% percent level._ In Table 3, we show the results of the gravity estimations using each of the three indicators of protectionism in government procurement separately (lack of national treatment clause – “discrimination” ; preferential treatment and domestic sourcing). We report the coefficient on the internal trade dummy, but omit for brevity the coefficients on all the other bilateral covariates (the results are similar to Table 2). Like for the cross-country regressions, we find that preferential treatment provisions have strong and significant effect on protectionism in trade data, as measured by the difference between internal and international trade. The estimates suggest that for importers whose laws have preferential treatment for domestic bidders in government procurement, domestic purchases are around 16 times bigger on average than international ones, whereas for importers without a preferential treatment clause domestic purchases are 7 times bigger than international ones. Lacking a national treatment provision or having a domestic sourcing provision increases the border effect, but not significantly so.

17
# **<u>Table 5:</u> World Diffusion and Diffusion by Income Category: 1985-1998 and 1999-2004**

||Low and Lower|Middle Income|Upper Middle a|nd High Income|Wo|rld|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1985-1998|1999-2004|1985-1998|1999-2004|1985-1998|1999-2004|
||[1]|[2]|3]|[4]|[5]|[6]|
|Log real GDP per capita|-0.862|1.607*|2.476***|0.217|0.019|0.79|
||[2.311]|[0.826]|[0.707]|[0.728]|[0.925]|[0.557]|
|Log real cost|-0.099|0.077|0.055|0.002|-0.031|0.053|
||[0.158]|[0.072]|[0.089]|[0.089]|[0.112]|[0.063]|
|Log lines per capita|-0.049|0.16|-0.997***|0.305|0.053|0.327|
||[0.552]|[0.384]|[0.315]|[0.558]|[0.417]|[0.304]|
|Log computers per capita|0.052|0.173|-0.428|-0.114|-0.001|0.191|
||[0.445]|[0.186]|[0.337]|[0.227]|[0.308]|[0.152]|
|Lag Internet users|0.395***|0.611***|0.617***|0.859***|0.518***|0.736***|
||[0.109]|[0.063]|[0.092]|[0.078]|[0.084]|[0.052]|
|Constant|0.502***|0.083|0.252***|-0.032|0.282***|-0.016|
||[0.188]|[0.064]|[0.074]|[0.035]|[0.080]|[0.032]|
|Method of estimation|IV|IV|IV|IV|IV|IV|
|Fixed effects|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Number Observations|101|257|215|191|316|448|

Notes: The dependent variable is the log of Internet users per capita. The robust standard errors are in brackets. * , **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.

The regression uses countries with GDP per capita growth in the interval [-4.9 , 9.2 percent] and controls for country fixed effects.

18
programmatic despite the fact that the party organization to enforce the program is subordinated to maintenance of the party machine; or machine parties coded as nonprogrammatic, despite the fact that they are significantly better organized to curb free-riding within the party compared to loosely organized clientelist parties.

To show that noise in the DPI coding injects a bias _against_ our hypothesis, we examine the robustness of our results to plausible re-codings of the variables.<sup>10</sup> We also examine whether results are robust to dropping questionable cases altogether. Since the DPI coding of party programs are based on political almanacs and, therefore, likely to be noisy, but unbiased, re-codings based on more detailed and specific country knowledge should reduce noise and strengthen our results. In fact, the plausible re-codings that we undertook have this effect.

Information from other sources supports the interpretation of the DPI indicator as a measure of a party’s ability to make credible programmatic appeals to citizens. The Duke political parties database has extensive information on parties in 80 democracies in 2009. One can compare these variables to the average DPI programmatic variable of sample countries with projects during period since 2000. The comparison points to a high correspondence between _rlc_avg_ and the more detailed party characteristics identified by expert respondents in the Duke database. For example, if parties are programmatic, one would expect them to have more stable factional groups in the legislature – party-switching is more difficult for politicians when ideological labels are attached to party affiliation. The

> 10 We did not undertake a comprehensive re-examination of the DPI party database, but we did observe three countries where our own country knowledge pointed to plausibly more accurate codings, at least relative to other countries in their regions.  However, our results strengthened when we recoded Mexican parties to be more programmatic than Argentine parties; Ghanaian to be more programmatic than other sub-Saharan African parties; and Golkar in Indonesia to be more programmatic than all Philippine parties.

23
been in place in Bogota for many years, with many adjustments made over time to increase its actual impact on private vehicle use, no such a scheme is yet in place in Buenos Aires although it has been contemplated for the City of Buenos Aires. In other words, while both central cities offered a “carrot” to non-motorized mobility in the form of well-developed cycleway infrastructure and public bikeshare systems, only Bogota also used a “stick” to deter private motorized vehicle use.

**_Figure 7:_** _Change in trips per person per day in October 2020 vs. 2019 on weekdays, by travelers’ income group (%)_

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Bogota b. AMBA<br>-5.9<br>-7.5<br>-21.5<br>-23 -23<br>-24<br>-26.8 -26.4 -26 -27<br>-31<br>-32.2<br>Low-Low Low Low-Middle Middle Middle-High High Low-Low Low Low-Middle Middle Middle-High High<br>Source: Authors based on CDR data<br><!-- End of picture text --> Daily travel patterns and mobility behavior were significantly different for the socioeconomically vulnerable population. Especially in Bogotá, the most vulnerable population had less flexibility to change jobs, telework or modify their mobility behaviors when the mobility restrictions were introduced. While the TGR among people residing in the high socioeconomic strata neighborhoods declined by about 30 percent, it was only 6-8 percent below the 2019 level among the residents of low strata areas. The effect of socioeconomic level on the reduction in the number of trips was more intense for “compulsory mobility” specifically, likely associated with a greater propensity to adopt telework among the upper strata. In AMBA, the correlation between income and TGRs was comparatively much smaller, with all income groups reducing travel rates by between 23 and 31 percent.

**_Figure 8_** _: Change in modal shares in October 2020 vs. October 2019,  by travelers’ income group (percentage points)_

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Bogota b. AMBA<br>10% 11% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9%11% 10%12%<br>7% 6%7% 6%8% 7% 7%<br>4%<br>1% 1%<br>0% -1% 0% -1%<br>-4%<br>-7%<br>-10% -10%<br>-11%<br>-12%<br>-13%<br>-14%<br>-16%<br>-17%<br>-20%<br>No motorizado Privado TP No motorizado Privado TP -22%<br>Low-Low Low (2) Med-Low Med (4) Med-High High (6) Low-Low Low (2) Med-Low Med (4) Med-High High (6)<br>(1) (3) (5)<br>(1) (3) (5)<br>Source: Authors based on CDR data<br><!-- End of picture text --> 13
ECCAS’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 2.9 . Ratio of current demand to reported capacity**

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. General cargo b. Container traffic<br>150% 150%<br>125% 125%<br>100% 100%<br>75% 75%<br>50% 50%<br>25%<br>25%<br>0%<br>0%<br>Source: AICD.<br>Ratio of current demand to reported capacity Ratio of current demand to reported capacity<br>Douala Cotonou Luanda Tema Durban<br>Cotonou Luanda Douala Dar es Salaam Cape Town Mombasa<br>Cape Town Port Sudan Mombasa Dar es Salaam<br><!-- End of picture text --> The performance and costs of Central African ports do not compare favorably with the rest of Africa, let alone with global best practices (table 2.5). Overall, Africa’s ports are expensive to use and subject to extensive delays. (Though southern African ports tend to perform somewhat better than those in other regions across a range of parameters.) The services provided by Central African ports generally cost twice as much as those in other global ports. Crane productivity in Central African ports—in terms of containers and weight—is less than half the international benchmark. While the global best practice for truck cycle time is 1 hour, it can reach up to 10 hours in Central African ports. The international standard dwell time is 7 days or less, but in Central Africa most containers spend more than 2 weeks in the terminal. The result is terminal congestion and port inefficiencies. Incentives for speedier pickup might include a daily storage charge after a given number of free days and specific rules to prevent the dumping of empty containers at the terminal. Unlike in Central Africa, most southern African terminals offer a given number of free days’ storage—typically up to 7 days—and thereafter apply a daily storage charge, sometimes on a sliding scale that increases with the number of days.

22