rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
ILO & UNIDO. 1984. “Small-scale maize milling.” Geneva, International Labor Office, 1984. Technology Series, Technical Memorandum No. 7.

<mark>Ivanic, M. and Martin, W. (2008), Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries. Agricultural Economics, 39: 405–416</mark> Jayne and Argwings-Kodhek. 1997. “Consumer response to maize market liberalization in urban Kenya.” Food Policy. Volume 22, Issue 5, October 1997, Pages 447–458 Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro. 2005. Effects of Government Maize Marketing and Trade Policies on Maize Market Prices in Kenya. Tegemeo Working paper 15/2005, February 11, 2005, report prepared for the World Bank.

Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro. 2008. “The effects of NCPB marketing policies on maize market prices in Kenya.” Agricultural Economics 38 (2008) 313–325.

Jayne and Tschirley. 2009. “Food price spikes and strategic interactions between the public and private sectors: Market failures or governance failures?” Paper based on a presentation prepared for the FAO meeting on Institutions and Policies to Manage Global Market Risks and Price Spikes in Basic Food Commodities, Rome, 26–27 October 2009.

Kenya Sugar Board. 2010. Kenya Sugar Industry Strategic Plan 2010 – 2014.

Kirimi, Sitko, Jayne, Karin, Muyanga, Sheahan, Flock, and Bor. 2011. “A Farm Gate-toconsumer Value Chain Analysis of Kenya’s Maize Marketing System.” Temego Institue of Agricultural Policy and Development, WPS 44/2011.

Knutson, R., Westhoff, P., and Sherwell, P. 2010. “Trade Liberalizing Impacts of NAFTA in Sugar:Global Implications“. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, Volume 13, Issue 4, 2010.

Trade Map International Trade Centre, <u>www.intracen.org/marketanalysis.</u> Mghenyi, E., Myers, R. J. and Jayne, T.S. (2011), The effects of a large discrete maize price increase on the distribution of household welfare and poverty in rural Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 42: 343–356.

Mitchell, Donald, 2004. "Sugar policies: an opportunity for change," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3222, The World Bank.

Monroy L., Mulinge W., Witwer M., 2012. Analysis of incentives and disincentives for sugar in Kenya. Technical notes series, MAFAP, FAO, Rome.

OECD. 2012. “Competition and Poverty Reduction Background Note”. Global Forum on Competitiveness. [Accessessed online in September 2014 at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(20 13)1&docLanguage=En OECD. 2007. “Sugar Policy Reform in the European Union and in World Sugar Markets”.

34
Ivanyna M. and A. Shah (2011). "Decentralization and corruption: new cross-country evidence" _Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 2011,_ **29** (2) 344 – 362 Moore, M. (1996). _Creating Public Value_ . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Oates, W. ( 1972). _Fiscal Federalism_ . New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Shah, A. ed. (2006). _Local Governance in Developing Countries ._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

Shah, A. and S. Shah (2006). The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving Roles of Local Governments . In _Local Governance in Developing Countries_ , edited by Anwar Shah, chapter 1:1-46, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Shah, A., T. Thompson, and H. Zou (2004). “The Impact of Decentralization on Service Delivery, Corruption, Fiscal Management and Growth in Developing and Emerging Market Economies: A Synthesis of Empirical Evidence” . _CESifo DICE Report Journal for Institutional Comparisons,_ 2004, 2(1): 10-14.

Stigler, G. (1957). “The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government.” In _Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability_ , ed. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, U.S. Congress, 213–19. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) (2008). _Decentralization and local democracy in the world_ . USA.

White, R. and P. Smoke (2005). East Asia decentralizes. In R. White and P. Smoke (eds.), _East Asia decentralizes: making local governments work_ , Washington, DC: World Bank, 1–25.

29
Markov process. Because of this difficulty, and because we do not need a structural model to assess the role of sunk costs or to investigate the sensitivity of decisions to _s,,_ and p, we pursue the reducedform approach.

To parameterize the reduced-form model, we assume that variation in ir;, - F: arises from three different sources: time-specific effects that reflect industry or macro-level changes in export conditions (A.i), observable differences in plant characteristics (Zi,), and noise (es,): (3) x,,- _F = , +_ , + e, The term **_jt,_** is an annual time effect reflecting temporal variations in export profitability and start-up costs that are common to all plants. These timne effects pick up the influence of credit narket conditions, exchange rates, trade policy conditions, and other time-varying factors captured by p, in the analytical model. The vector 4, controls for factors represented by _s,,_ and F, in the analytical model: exogenous plant-specific determinants of current operating profits and start-up costs. It includes a constant, a set of industry dumnmies defined at the three-digit SITC level, a dumnny variable to control for the ownership structure of the plant (proprietorship and partnership versus corporation), and a set of two locational dunmiies to distingish the Bogota and Medillin/Cali regions from all others.'" The vector Z, also includes several continuous variables lagged one period and measured in logarithms: the ratio of foreign to domestic prices for output, the wage rate, capital stock, and plant age." Relative prices and wages affect the atractiveness of domestic versus foreign markets. Capital stock and age proxy for efficiency: in addition to scale effects, studies of industrial evolution ' The base group for comparison is a plant in the food industry that is not a corporation and that is located in the Bogota area.

1 FPoreign prices are constructed using unit values of exports at the four-digit ISIC level; domestic prices were obtamied at the same level from die Central Bank of Colombia.

14
Orozco 2009, World Bank 2006b, UNDP 2009). Access to information through the diaspora and the skills learned by returning migrants can improve technology<sup>1</sup> , management and institutions in the sending country, and lower the fixed cost and knowledge requirements for setting up an international business (Carling 2005). Emigrants may also be an important supply of foreign investment, as their knowledge of their home country institutions (and perhaps a greater ability to maneuver within the home country regulatory framework) may mean that they incur lower investment costs and/or higher returns, compared to other international investors.

In the current environment of a credit crunch after the financial crisis several countries have started looking at the diaspora abroad as potential sources of capital (Ketkar and Ratha 2010). In the past, Israel and India have raised over $35 billion of development financing by issuing diaspora bonds (Ketkar and Ratha 2009). For the countries, diaspora bonds represent a stable and cheap source of external finance, especially in times of financial stress. Diaspora bonds have several advantages, both for the issuer and for the emigrant who buys the bond: Through retailing at small denominations, issuers can tap into the wealth of relatively poor migrants, although diaspora bonds are not necessarily limited to migrants. Migrants are expected to be more loyal than the average investors in times of distress. And they might be especially interested in financing infrastructure, housing, health and education projects.<sup>6</sup>

**Migration contributes to human capital formation.** There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the income from remittances is disproportionally spent on education and health rather than everyday consumption (Adams 2005, Adams _et al._ 2008, World Bank 2006b, p. 126, Valero-Gil 2008; see Nagarajan 2009 for South Africa). Once in school, the children of migrants may be more likely to finish their education, as the increased income from remittances provide additional financial resources and better prospects associated with migration influence social norms and incentives towards

> 6 Ratha et al. (2008) estimate that Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise $5-10 billion per year by issuing diaspora bonds. Countries that can potentially consider diaspora bonds are Bangladesh, Colombia, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (and also Greece, Ireland, Italy, South Korea and Spain). In September 2010 Greece announced a plan to issue diaspora bond to raise financing for debt servicing.

6
_Figure 2: Taxes and transfers as percent of market income by child deprivation status_ <!-- Start of picture text --> (b) Transfers, all children<br>(a) Taxes, all children<br>0 1 2 3 4 5<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 Count of multiple deprivations<br>Count of multiple deprivations Direct transfers Primary education<br>Direct taxes VAT Excise Secondary education Health<br>(c) Taxes, by gender: (c) Taxes, by gender: (d) Transfers, by gender: (d) Transfers, by gender:<br>Boys Girls Boys Girls<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 Count of multiple deprivations<br>Count of multiple deprivations Direct transfers Primary education<br>Direct taxes VAT Excise Secondary education Health<br>(e) Taxes, by location: (e) Taxes, by location: (f) Transfers, by location: (f) Transfers, by location:<br>Rural Urban Rural Urban<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 Count of multiple deprivations<br>Count of multiple deprivations Direct transfers Primary education<br>Direct taxes VAT Excise Secondary education Health<br>20<br>6<br>15<br>4<br>10<br>2 5<br>0<br>Tax to market income ratio (%) Transfer to market income ratio (%)<br>0<br>20<br>6<br>15<br>4<br>10<br>2 5<br>Tax to market income ratio (%) 0<br>Transfer to market income ratio (%)<br>0<br>6 30<br>20<br>4<br>10<br>2<br>0<br>Tax to market income ratio (%)<br>Transfer to market income ratio (%)<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**_Source:_** _Authors’ calculations; Data from ESS 2018/19._ **_Note:_** _Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals._

16
|Public Sector Management Adjustment Credit Project<br>John Macgregor|
|---|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Management of the Petroleum EconomyProject<br>Mamadou Lamarane Deme|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|Bangladesh Central Bank StrengtheningProject<br>Shamsuddin Ahmad|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM(First Phase: Mother and Child InsuranLivia M. Benavides|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Enterprise Export FacilityProject<br>Lloyd Edgecombe|
|Special Structural Adjustment Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
|Special Structural Adjustment Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
|Special Structural Adjustment Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
|Special Structural Adjustment Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
|Special Structural Adjustment Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
|Repurchase FacilitySupport Loan Project<br>Paul Levy|
concentration of PM10 in ambient air near the houses was monitored at regular intervals during the period of controlled experiments.

# **_Monitoring_ PM10** **_Concentrations_**

Our controlled experiments used two types of equipment: air samplers that measure 24hour average PM10 concentrations, and real-time monitors that record PM10 at 2-minute intervals.

- The Airmetrics MiniVol Portable Air Sampler (Airmetrics, 2004) is a more conventional device that samples ambient air for 24 hours.  While the MiniVol is not a reference method sampler, it gives results that closely approximate data from U.S. Federal Reference Method samplers.  The MiniVols were programmed to draw air at 5 liters/minute through PM10 particle size separator (impactors) and then through filters. The particles were caught on the filters, and the filters were weighed pre- and post exposure with a microbalance.

- The other instrument used in the study is a real-time monitoring instrument: the Thermo Electric personal DataRAM (pDR-1000) (Thermo Electron, 2004).  The pDR-1000 (pD-RAM) uses a light scattering photometer (nephelometer) to measure airborne particle concentrations.<sup>7</sup> At each location, the instrument operated continuously, without intervention, for a 24-hour period to record PM10 concentrations at 2-minute intervals.

The readings of the pD-RAM and MiniVol air samplers provided a detailed record of IAP concentration in each controlled experiment.

Table 2a: PM10 (μg/m<sup>3</sup> ) concentrations recorded by MiniVol Portable Air Samplers (24hour average)

|Season|Location of the<br>Monitor|Mean|Median|Minimum|Maximum|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|High-Dust|Kitchen|221.63|212.92|38.75|472.5|
|High-Dust|LivingRoom|160.85|155.42|44.86|320.42|
|Low-Dust|Kitchen|128.97|124.72|30.42|310.83|
|Low-Dust|LivingRoom|69.33|63.88|21.53|183.61|

Table 2b: PM10 (μg/m<sup>3</sup> ) concentrations recorded by pD-RAM (2-minute intervals)

|Season|Location of the<br>Monitor|Mean|Median|Minimum|Maximum|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|High-Dust|Kitchen|585.10|404|8|93900|
|High-Dust|LivingRoom|468.44|370|1|403200|
|Low-Dust|Kitchen|284.17|146|1|109900|
|Low-Dust|LivingRoom|843.00|132|1|195500|

> 7 The operative principle is real-time measurement of light scattered by aerosols, integrated over as wide a range of angles as possible.

8
# **Appendix B:  Reported Son Preference**

Data on reported son preference are available from the Caucasus Barometer 2010 Survey, which asks "If a family has one child, what would be the preferred gender of the child?". Reported son preference is the highest in Armenia, and lowest in Azerbaijan (Figure B.1.a), which is not consistent with actual outcomes (Figure 1). This discrepancy could be due to the wording of the question, posing a hypothetical scenario which may not be meaningful to respondents who know that people can and do have more than one child. This may especially affect responses in Azerbaijan, since it had considerably higher fertility than Georgia and Armenia in the recent past (Figure 6). A clearer question would be “How important is it to have a son?” (e.g. Very important / Somewhat important/ Not important).

In all three countries, reported son preference is higher in rural areas, among the less educated, and among men (Figure B.1.b). Interestingly, it rises with frequency of attending religious services. Attendance of religious services is much higher amongst respondents in Georgia and Armenia than in Azerbaijan (Figure B.2). Reported son preference is lower among older respondents than among younger ones in Armenia and Azerbaijan, which corresponds with the rise in sex-selection after 1991. This contrasts with reports from East and South Asia that the older generation puts pressure on their children to have sons.

**Figure B.1: Reported preferred gender of the child, if a family has one child**

## **(a) Overall response**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70<br>60<br>50<br>40 A girl<br>A boy<br>30<br>Does not matter<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia<br><!-- End of picture text --> 30
it is unclear how much racial or ethnic heterogeneity matters once economic inequality has been controlled for.

In a similar study, La Ferrara (2002) looks at the influence of inequality on group participation using data from rural Tanzania. She also finds that higher levels of village inequality reduce the probability of participation in any group. She reports that groups in more unequal communities were less likely to take decisions by vote, were more likely to report misuse of funds and poor group performance, and were more likely to split up into homogeneous ethnic and income groups, to interact less frequently, and to be less motivated to participate.

In a random assignment evaluation of community-managed schools in Kenya, Gugerty and Miguel (2000) show that ethnic diversity results in fewer social sanctions against non-participants. This leads to low parental participation in school activities and poor attendance by teachers, which in turn reduce the funds available to the school and worsen school quality.

Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2001), in a survey of the evidence on communitydriven water projects in India, Mexico, and Nepal, conclude that heterogeneity has a negative impact on cooperation and commons management and weakens the cohesive effect of social norms and the application of sanctions for violating cooperative behavior and collective agreements. Bardhan (2000), examining the factors affecting irrigation maintenance in South India, also finds that inequality has a negative effect. Work by Ostrom, Lam, and Lee (1994) and Ostrom (1990) shows that farmer-managed irrigation schemes had more equitable water distribution. However, these studies can say little 39
structure can have an important impact on the incentives for banks to overcome these market frictions and efficiently intermediate society’s savings to borrowers. A number of recent papers have explored the relationship between foreign bank entry, market structure and interest rate spreads and margins (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Barajas, Steiner and Salazar, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004) and find a positive relationship between foreign bank entry and intermediation efficiency but no robust relationship between concentration and margins.

This paper explores the effect of bank privatization and foreign bank entry on intermediation efficiency, as measured by interest margin and spreads, in the Ugandan banking market over the period 1999 to 2005. We use a unique bank-level data set that not only includes income statement and balance sheet information, but also information on ex-ante contracted lending and deposit interest rates, loan portfolio composition and branch network. The privatization of the largest and last government-owned bank, UCB, to the South African Stanbic in 2002 not only implied a large increase in foreign ownership in the banking system but was also accompanied by an increase in concentration in the deposit market. Uganda thus offers a unique setting for studying the effects of financial market reform and market structure on interest rate spreads and margins in a low-income Sub-Saharan African economy. Further, these changes allow us to test and distinguish between two hypotheses: first, whether foreign-owned banks are more efficient than government-owned or privately-owned domestic banks, and second, whether there is a spill-over effect of foreign bank entry on domestic banks, forcing down spreads and margins of domestic banks.

Interest rate spreads, or the gap between lending and deposit rates, are due to market frictions such as transaction cost and information asymmetries. Transaction costs associated with 2
This section explains the empirical strategy adopted to examine the effects of FTA use on import prices, as described in <u>Proposition 1. We first introduce our equation to be estimated and our dataset,</u> and then we provide a brief overview of FTA use in our dataset.

# Specification

Our main dataset comprises transaction-level import data for Thailand from 2007 to 2011, obtained from the Customs Department of Thailand.<sup>10</sup> The dataset covers imports of all commodities for Thailand and contains data on the customs clearing dates, HS eight-digit codes, exporting countries, importing-firm codes, firm-branch codes, invoicing currencies, tariff schemes (e.g., FTA or MFN), and import values in Thai baht. We classify the tariff schemes into three categories: MFN schemes, FTA schemes, and other schemes. Other schemes include imports under the schemes of bonded warehouses, free zones, investment promotion, duty drawbacks under Section 19, and duty drawbacks for re-exports. Although it is interesting to take into account the choice of these other schemes, we do not include imports under such other schemes in our sample to keep our analysis simple.

During our sample period, Thailand had 10 FTAs, most of which overlap in country coverage.

Thailand had both bilateral and plurilateral FTAs with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India. With other ASEAN members, Thailand had six plurilateral FTA schemes: the ASEAN FTA, ASEAN–Australia–

> 10 We have been given permission to use these confidential data for academic purposes only.

19
**Figure 1  Firms and Employment by firm growth status, 2001**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Firms by Growth Status<br>2001<br>30%<br>42% Contracting<br>Stable<br>Expanding<br>28%<br>Employment by Firm Growth Status<br>2001<br>32%<br>Contracting<br>Stable<br>61% Expanding<br>7%<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Annual Survey of Enterprises, 2001; author’s calculations.

The expanding firms increase employment somewhat less than the declining firms decrease it. An average employment reduction is 16 workers, while an average employment expansion is 13 persons (Table 2). This is not a huge difference, however given the preponderance of shrinking firms, it translates into total job loses far outnumbering total job gains.

9