O.A.M.D.G.

||Tob|it||OLS|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Fixed assets definition (1)|Fixed assets definition (2)|Fixed assets|definition (1)|Fixed assets def|inition (2)|
|**Dependent Variable**|**Coefficient**<br>**z-statistic**|**Coefficient**<br>**z-statistic**|**Coefficient**|**z-statistic**|**Coefficient**|**z-statistic**|
|**Share of fixed assets**|||||||
|_Violence_|||||||
|public order problem<br>-|0.044<br> <br>***<br>4.22<br>-<br>-|0.048<br> <br>***<br>3.09<br>-<br>-|0.040<br>|**<br>-2.14<br>-|0.039<br> <br>*|-1.54|
|guerrilla attack rate<br>-|0.001<br> <br>0.46<br>-<br>-|0.005<br> <br>**<br>2.19<br>-<br>-|0.001<br>|-0.28<br>-|0.004<br>|-1.38|
|homicide rate|0.0004<br>***<br>4.21|0.0005<br>***<br>3.95|0.0003|***<br>2.90|0.0004<br>**|2.16|
|_Municipality controls_|||||||
|<br>grouped settlement<br>-|0.040<br> <br>***<br>3.88<br>-<br>-|0.101<br> <br>***<br>6.70<br>-<br>-|0.033<br>|**<br>-2.34<br>-|0.074<br> <br>***|-4.52|
|rural sparse settlement<br>-|0.004<br> <br>0.29<br>-<br>-|0.024<br> <br>1.06<br>-<br>-|0.003<br>|-0.14<br>-|0.031<br>|-1.17|
|Oriental Region|0029<br>*<br>190|0050<br>**<br>223|0033|143|0038|106|
|<br>Central Region|.<br>.<br>0.02<br>1.29|.<br>.<br>0.14<br>***<br>5.81|.<br>0.02|.<br>0.46|.<br>0.10<br>*|.<br>1.77|
|<br>Pacific Region<br>-|0.014<br> <br>0.70<br>-|0.087<br>***<br>3.06<br>-|0.011<br>|-0.36|0.064<br>*|1.68|
|altitude|2.13E-06<br>0.09|-1.12E-04 ***<br>3.04<br>-|-2.84E-06|-0.06|-7.22E-05|-1.22|
|altitude2|2.64E-09<br>0.26|3.08E-08 **<br>2.04|3.29E-09|0.19|1.96E-08|0.89|
|percentage of people in lowest two strata|0.010<br>0.40|0.076<br>**<br>2.11|0.000|0.01|0.053|0.98|
|index of quality of life<br>-|0.005<br> <br>**<br>2.33<br>-<br>-|0.004<br> <br>1.36<br>-<br>-|0.005<br>|-1.44<br>-|0.003<br>|-0.71|
|capture rate|1.96E-05 *<br>1.65|3.47E-06<br>0.20|1.92E-05|0.98|1.68E-06|0.06|
|_Household/ head variables_|||||||
|age|0.013<br>***<br>6.29|0.021<br>***<br>6.90|0.011|***<br>7.02|0.013<br>***|6.66|
|age2<br>-|0.0001<br> <br>***<br>3.63<br>-<br>-|0.0001<br> <br>***<br>3.92<br>-<br>-|0.0001<br>|***<br>-4.26<br>-|0.0001<br> <br>***|-3.32|
|married|0.053<br>***<br>5.53|0.083<br>***<br>5.85|0.052|***<br>5.37|0.057<br>***|4.78|
|female|0.031<br>***<br>2.80|0.059<br>***<br>3.61|0.028|***<br>2.52|0.049<br>***|3.89|
|some or complete primary education<br>-|0.010<br> <br>0.98<br>-<br>-|0.014<br> <br>0.93<br>-<br>-|0.008<br>|-0.81<br>-|0.015<br>|-1.17|
|<br>some secondary or more education<br>-|0.005<br> <br>0.34<br>-<br>-|0.028<br> <br>1.31<br>-<br>-|0.003<br>|-0.23<br>-|0.037<br> <br>*|-1.92|
|Inverted Mills Ratio||-|0.1226<br>|0.62<br>-|0.022|0.09|
|constant|0.405<br>***<br>5.20<br>-|0.152<br>1.32<br>-|0.640|2.08|0.108|0.29|
|Replications|50|50|||||
|Clusters|78|78|||||
|Wald test Inverted Mills Ratio (p value)|||0.53||0.93||
|Wald test violence variables (p value)|||0.01||0.06||
|Wald test welfare indicators (p value)|||0.35||0.46||
|Wald test access of the state (p value)|||0.13||0.0002||
|Adj R2|||0.07||0.08||
|Number of obs|7099|7099|7072||7072||

# Results-Table 3: Regression of the share of fixed assets in the portfolio of Colombian households

_Note: Dependent variable is the share (%) of fixed assets in the household portfolio. The first and the third columns use the asset definition (1) of Table 2, the second and the fourth asset definition (2) of Table 3. The first two columns report on a bootstrapped Tobit specification, the last two on an OLS approximation of the Tobit. Regressions are with robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on municipality._ _Default household education level is ‘none’. Default region is Atlantic, default rurality degree is ‘urban’. Stars mark significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels._ _The Wald tests (F-tests) examine joint significance of groups of variables, in this order of the violence variables: public order problem, attack rate, homicide rate; of the welfare indicators: the index of quality of life and the share of population in the lowest two income sixtiles; of the variables indicating access of the state: rurality, region, altitude, and capture rate, respectively._ The results confirm the predictions of our model, and are consistent with the results of the simultaneous regressions above. A public order problem, signaling that guerrillas or paramilitaries are present in the municipality, significantly reduces the share of fixed 35