rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Contingent liability in banking :
            useful policy for developing countries
Bank owner contingent liability has been
            important in the development of many industrial countries.
            Unlimited liability on bank owners was an important element
            in the success of Scottish banking, which led Scotland to be
            free of the banking and monetary upheavals that occurred in
            Britain and the United States.  The unlimited liability
            provision effectively minimized the losses suffered by bank
            noteholders and other creditors.  Three factors were vital
            to the success of unlimited liability in Scotland: 1) the
            identities of bank owners were made publicly available, and
            their level of wealth could be verified; 2) under Scottish
            bankruptcy law, owner liability extended to both personal
            and inheritable wealth; and 3) the transfer of ownership
            claims in private and provincial banks required that
            ownership first be dissolved before a new bank could be
            formed.  A contingent liability system has three advantages:
            1) because double liability imposes postclosure losses on
            bank stockholders, it increases incentives for banks to hold
            capital and decreases moral hazard incentives; 2) a
            contingent liability system can ameliorate asymmetric
            information problems between bank creditors and owners; and
            3) contingent liability can lead to more efficient capital
            formation if potential capital sources are predominantly in
            the form of fixed wealth, as is true in many developing
            countries.  But a free-rider problem arises when
            less-wealthy stockholders rely on the monitoring efforts of
            wealthier stockholders, who have more incentive to monitor.
            And in a free and anonymous exchange market, investors with
            less personal fixed wealth will outbid those with greater
            wealth, so the value of double liability could collapse overtime.
Free banking : the Scottish
            experience as a model for emerging economies
The notion of free banking is at least
            as difficult to define as the notion of central banking.
            The author focuses on a relatively unregulated banking
            system that operated in Scotland in the eighteenth and
            nineteenth centuries.  He argues that a relatively
            unregulated system is a wise option for emerging markets
            today.  In terms of private institutions and monitoring: 1)
            a private clearing system is feasible; and 2) so are private
            development and enforcement of capital and liquidity
            standards.  Financial institutions have strong private
            incentives to create their own clearing system, to benefit
            both banks and the public, and will develop standards for
            capital, liquidity and prudential management by doing so.
            Competition is generally compatible with prudence and
            coordination.  There are private alternatives to deposit
            insurance or to a central bank to maintain confidence in and
            foster the stability of the financial system: 1)
            sophisticated note and deposit contracts are feasible; 2)
            free entry is important to encourage innovation; and 3)
            branching and portfolio diversification can substitute for
            deposit insurance to stabilize the banking system.  So can
            "extended" liability.  Another alternative is the
            "option clause" or other contingent or equity-like
            contracts, which can solve or minimize the problem of bank
            runs.  Therefore, an explicit central bank may not be
            needed, but rather mechanisms to provide added liquidity,
            perhaps through the clearing system, in times of trouble.
Universal banking and the financing
            of industrial development
In universal banking, large banks
            operate extensive networks of branches, provide many
            different services, hold several claims on firms (including
            equity and debt), and participate directly in the corporate
            governance of firms that rely on the banks for funding or as
            insurance underwriters.  In this paper, the author contrasts
            the cost of financing industrialization in the United States
            and in Germany during the second industrial revolution.  He
            explains that large production is typical of modern
            industrial practice, so the lessons from that period apply
            broadly to contemporary developing countries.  The second
            industrial revolution involved many new products and
            technologies.  Firms were producing new goods in new ways on
            an unprecedented scale.  Therefore, they needed quick access
            to heavy financing.  Finance costs for industry were lower
            in Germany than in the United States, because U.S.
            regulations prevented the universal banking from which
            Germany benefited.  High finance costs retarded U.S.
            realization of its full industrial potential.  The potential
            to expand quickly and reap economies of scale was greater in
            German industrialization.  The cost of industrial financing
            began to decline when institutional changes came about that
            increased the concentration of financial market
            transactions.  In recent decades, a combination of
            macroeconomic distress, international competitive pressure,
            and the creative invention of new financial intermediaries
            has helped the U.S. financial system overcome the regulatory
            mandate of financial fragmentation.
Regulation and bank stability :
            Canada and the United States, 1870-1980
Canada and the United States are
            probably as similar as any two countries in the world, but
            they have always had very different banking systems.  First,
            the United States has had a unit banking system due to the
            restrictions on branch banking, which created many small
            banks.  Canada, however, has always had unlimited branching,
            which led to the emergence of a few large nationwide banks.
            The author contends that, if one system performs better (in
            terms of stability and efficiency), this is due to their
            different regulatory system.  Indeed, the two countries are
            different in terms of: 1) reserve requirements; 2) capital
            ratios; and 3) requirements to opening a new bank.  When the
            United States has eliminated the barriers to interstate
            branching, U.S. banking will follow a route similar to that
            taken earlier by Canada and earlier yet by the United
            Kingdom.  However, since problems may arise during the
            merger, the monetary authorities must protect the payment
            system at large as well as small depositors.  Canada's
            banking system may be both more stable and more efficient
            than the U.S. banking system, but the United States has
            compensated by developing more open and deep capital markets.
Poverty, inequality, and social
            policy in transition economies
In examining what happens to poverty and
            income inequality during the early period of transition to a
            market economy, the author covers the period up to 1993. His
            analysis includes almost all transition economies that were
            not affected by wars, blockades, or embargoes. (In economies
            so affected, the intrinsic issues of transition are
            overshadowed by more basic issues of war or quasi-war
            economy and survival). The two key issues of social policy
            in transition economies are pension reform and better
            targeting of social assistance. Pensions represent 70 to 80
            percent of cash social expenditures. No reduction of current
            levels of social spending (which is unsustainable) can be
            envisaged without pension reform. Better targeting of social
            assistance is needed because many universally or
            enterprise-provided benefits have been terminated, poverty
            has increased, and social programs lack funding. If poverty
            is on the rise and money is scarce, better targeting is the
            only option.
Concessions of busways to the
            private sector : the Sao Paulo metropolitan region experience
Roughly 16,000 buses serve the 16
            million inhabitants of the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region;
            12,000 of them serve the Sao Paulo municipality itself,
            where 8.5 million people live. Congestion is heavy at peak
            travel times, and traffic signal timing logic favors the
            flow of automobiles. Bus operations are also hampered by
            obsolete ticket collection systems and by poor access for
            bus passengers, which lengthens boarding and aligthing
            times. Average bus speed is about 13 kilometers per hour,
            headways vary greatly, and service is unreliable. But
            conditions are expected to improve soon as the private
            sector becomes involved in trunk-line bus corridors. Tender
            documents for ten bus corridors (one state and nine
            municipal) have recently been issued, defining rules for
            private concerns to bid for implementing and operating trunk
            line services. All costs to implement each service,
            including improvements in street systems and facilities such
            as transfer terminals, are to be born by the winning firm.
            Ten bids have now been awarded and contracts signed. This
            pioneer project demonstrates that private companies are
            ready to go deeper into public transport than they have gone
            before. Where the investment in busway infrastructure is to
            be repaid in installments to the private company which is
            awarded the concession, the use of multilateral agency
            guarantees (such as the recently approved World Bank
            guarantees) will probably entice private  entrepreneurs.
            Regulatory and controlling power remain in the government
            hands. The government will control tariffs, preventing undue
            increases harmful to low-income users, and monitoring the
            level of service offered against the pre-agreed targets.
            Supervision must be very objective, however, and users must
            be actively involved to gauge the quality of service offered
            by concessionaires. Sao Paulo municipal authorities were
            more successful in attracting the private sector than the
            State, because they devoted a considerable effort to the
            design remuneration formulas for the concessions.
Deposit insurance
Should deposit insurance be recommended?
            No.  History teaches us three lessons: 1) deposit insurance
            was not adopted primarily to protect the depositor.  There
            were many ways to increase the soundness of the banking
            system.  The leading alternative was to allow branching and
            the diversification of institutions by geography and product
            line.  But monetary contraction and the politics of the
            banking crisis empowered small banks instead; 2) the history
            of federal and state insurance plans shows that it is all
            but impossible to escape the moral hazard and other problems
            inherent in deposit insurance; and 3) in setting up banking
            regulations, including deposit insurance, a banking lobby
            will be created that will campaign to protect the industry
            as it stands, and the industry will be pushed on a course
            that will be difficult to alter.  The public is greatly
            concerned about the safety of its deposits.  The problem is
            one of information: for households and small businesses, it
            is costly to monitor the performance of banks and decide
            which is safest.  There is strong historical precedent for
            at least one alternative to deposit insurance and its
            perverse effects: regulators could require each bank to
            offer deposit accounts that are segregated, treasury-bill
            mutual funds.  This type of account is effectively insurance
            from the government, with the same guarantee as government
            bonds, but without the wrong incentives for financial
            institutions that arise from deposit insurance.
Thrift deposit institutions in
            Europe and the United States
The financial systems in most developing
            countries today have many features in common with the
            financial systems of the developing countries of the
            eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Whether they had
            unlimited liability (as in Scotland in the eighteenth
            century), or limited liability and special charters,
            commercial banks dominated European and U.S. financial
            systems. Moreover, they were typically established by
            wealthy people and oriented toward busineses and other
            wealthy people - they effectively represented "banking
            for the rich by the rich." Insurance companies were
            underdeveloped and pension and mutual funds did not yet
            exist. As a result, middle- and low-income people had
            limited access to formal financial services and relied on
            informal arrangements for borrowing. Meanwhile, financial
            savings were unproductively hoarded under the mattress. In
            developing countries today this gap in the provision of
            financial services can be explained by the low level and
            unequal distribution of income and wealth, high information
            and transaction costs, and weak enforcement mechanisms. In
            Europe and the United States, over time, different types of
            institutions - including savings banks, credit cooperatives,
            building societies, and credit unions - emerged to fill this
            market gap. Many developing countries have created
            institutions that specialize in lending to the poor, but
            more must be done to help these institutions reach the poor
            in rural areas and assist small farmers, artisans, and
            traders. An integrated program to build solid institutions
            requires 5 elements for success: 1) strong leadership.
            (Support should be given to groups, such as the Church or
            local officials, likely to attract people with integrity,
            high ideals, and committment to the institution's
            success.); 2) a three tier structure; 3) strong emphasis on
            education and dissemination of information about the
            workings and benefits of the institution. (Culture can be an
            obstacle to a thrift institution's success, as the
            Irish experience shows); 4) an official policy that
            encourages self-help and avoids total reliance on external
            funding. External support could be made dependent on local
            resource mobilization and record of monitoring and
            repayment; and 5) most importantly, the encouragement of
            active peer monitoring and the enforcement of contractual
            obligations. The principal of unlimited liability may not be
            viable in most developing countries, but government could
            support only regional units and local institutions that have
            a good record of loan repayment.
The rise of securities markets :
            what can government do
Using U.S. securities markets as a case
            history, the author explores the role securities markets
            play in economic development, how they emerge, and how
            regulation can make them more effective. Why the United
            States? Two centuries ago, it was a small undeveloped
            country with serious financial problems. It confronted those
            problems and, guided by Alexander Hamilton, creatively
            reformed its financial system, which then became a
            foundation of the U.S. economic infrastructure and a bulwark
            for long-term growth. When Hamilton's program
            established public credit and securities markets in the
            1790s, U.S. citizens were immediately able to borrow from
            older, richer countries. U.S. wealth then increased until,
            by the end of the nineteenth century, U.S. residents began
            to lend and invest more abroad than they borrowed. During
            the 1820s and 1830s, the United States (usually state
            governments) borrowed large sums from foreign investors to
            build roads, canals, and early railroads, to make other
            transportation improvements, and to capitalize state banks.
            From the 1830s to the end of the century, still larger sums
            from overseas went into private U.S. railway companies that
            provided cheap transcontinental transportation. Most of this
            borrowing took the form of state and corporate bond sales to
            overseas investors. The pristine U.S. government credit
            established by Hamilton thus rubbed off on U.S. state and
            corporate debt. The British stock market did better than the
            U.S.  market until the United States adopted security-market
            regulation (including disclosuire rules) under the SEC. Then
            the U.S. market became a world leader. The U.S. stock market
            developed more slowly than the bond market, but it both
            aided and benefited from foreign investment in U.S. bonds.
            Foreign investors preferred debt securities to equities, yet
            equities create a safety margin for bondholders who, because
            of this margin, are more willing to purchase and hold bonds.
            Foreign investors preferred bonds; U.S. investors, after
            exporting bonds, held more stocks than bonds at home. Why?
            Because good stock markets permit the conversion of equity
            securities into cash.
The forgotten rationale for policy
            reform : the productivity of investment projects
Using economic rates of return from more
            than 1,200 public and private sector projects implemented in
            61 developing countries, the authors analyze determinants of
            investment productivity. Results from Tobit estimation
            demonstrate that the degree of countrywide policy
            distortions - macroeconomic, exchange rate, trade and
            pricing - critically affects the productivity of
            investments. Countries with undistorted policies are likely
            to be unproductive investments. In countries with distorted
            policies, investments are likely to be unproductive. And
            within a country, investments become more productive when
            economic policymaking improves. The productivity of projects
            in the tradable sectors are also affected (in a nonlinear
            fashion) by the size of a country's public investment
            program. The authors discuss possible selection biases in
            this data set, present tests of robustness, and highlight
            policy implications. In particular, donor financing for
            improvements in the policy climate is likely to pay off. A
            powerful rationale for supporting structual reform is that
            it raises the productivity of both public and private investments.
The relationship between farm size
            and efficiency in South African agriculture
Drawing on international evidence, the
            authors discuss the sources of economies of scale. Using
            representative farm-level survey data for South
            Africa's six major grain producing areas and one
            irrigation area for the period 1975-90, they: describe the
            the structure of South African agriculture, detailing the
            distribution of farm sizes and results from previous studies
            of farm-size efficiency. They also analyze the evidence on
            scale efficiency in the former homelands and analyze the
            relationship between farm size and efficiency in commercial
            farming and discuss how policy affects that relationship.
            Clearly policy has a crucial impact on the relationship
            between farm size and efficiency. The authors find that: a)
            farms in the former homelands seem to be scale-inefficient,
            which is unsurprising, given the historical lack of access
            to support services and infrastructure, policies that
            discriminate against farmers in the homelands, and the
            extremely fragmented and limited land-use rights of farmers
            there; b) there is an inverse relationship between farm size
            and efficiency in the commercial farming areas for the range
            of farms analyzed, regardless what method is used. This
            inverse relationship seems to become stronger and
            accentuated as policy distortions - which tend to favor
            large farms over small ones - are removed; and c) large
            farms tend to use more capital intensive methods of
            production, while smaller farms are more labor-intensive.
            And managerial ability seems to be better on larger farms.
            There is an inverse relationship between farm size and
            efficiency in South African agriculture despite South
            Africa's history of policies favoring relatively large
            mechanized farms. Clearly, efficiency gains could be
            significant if commercial farms became smaller. To encourage
            that trend, policies and distortions that favor large farms
            over small should be removed.