**<u>Graph 4: Pre‐Conflict Labor Force Participation Rate and Projection</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) 2018 Vintage (b) 2013 Vintage<br>%, labor force %, laborforce<br>participation rate (LFPR) %, growth participation rate (LFPR) %, growth<br>60.0 60.0<br>54.5 4.0 54.8 4.0<br>50.0 44.9 2.0 50.0 45.8 2.0<br>40.0<br>40.0 0.0<br>0.0 0.2<br>30.0 ‐1.3 ‐2.0<br>30.0 ‐1.5 ‐2.0<br>20.0 ‐4.0<br>20.0 ‐4.0<br>LFPR (WDI Archive, ILO‐modelled estimates, 2013), LHS<br>LFPR (WDI, ILO‐modelled estimates, 2018), LHS Growth in participation rate<br>Growth in participation rate Average growth, 2001‐2010<br>Average growth, 2001‐2010 Average growth, 2011‐2014<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Human capital** growth, based on Penn World Tables (PWT) 9, which for Syria, uses Cohen, Soto and Leker (CSL) data for the average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and above (Cohen and Soto 2007; Cohen and Leker 2014), averaged 1.0% for the 10 years up to 2010.<sup>10, 11</sup> Graph 5(a) shows average years of schooling based on select age groups under both CSL and Barro and Lee (BL) measures. Barro and Lee (2015) projections indicate a continued rise in the average years of schooling absent conflict, for the population aged 15‐64:<sup>12</sup> 1.6 years over 2011‐2030. Graph 5(b) shows human capital growth, based on the schooling years under CSL and BL measures. While fluctuations and differences are obvious decade to decade, there is consistency in a long‐term average of approximately 1.5%.

**<u>Graph 5: Pre‐Conflict Human Capital and Projection</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) Average years of schooling (b) Human capital growth<br>Average years Average human<br>of schooling capital growth,<br>%<br>10.0<br>4.0<br>9.0<br>3.5<br>8.0<br>3.0<br>7.0<br>2.5<br>6.0<br>5.0 2.0<br>4.0 1.5<br>3.0 1.0<br>2.0 0.5<br>0.0<br>1981‐1990 1991‐2000 2001‐2010 2011‐2020 2021‐2030 2031‐2040<br>Cohen, Soto and Leker (25 and above) Cohen, Soto and Leker (25 and above)<br>Cohen, Soto and Leker (25‐64) Cohen, Soto and Leker (25‐64)<br>Barro and Lee (25 and above) Barro and Lee (25 and above)<br>Barro and Lee (25‐64) Barro and Lee (25‐64)<br>Barro and Lee (15 ‐ 64); dashed line indicates projection Barro and Lee (15 ‐ 64); patterned bar indicates projection<br>1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> 10 See the documentation, “Human Capital in PWT 9.0” (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/). Human capital, h� e<sup>����</sup> , where s is average schooling years. Φ�s� = 0.134 ∙ s if s ≤ 4, Φ�s� =0.134 ∙ 4+0.101 ∙ (s − 4) if 4 < s ≤ 8, Φ�s� = 0.134 ∙ 4+0.101 ∙ 4+0.068 ∙ (s − 8) if s>8 (based on Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999)). For the first four years of education, a rate of return of 13.4 percent is assumed, corresponding to the average, reported by Psacharopoulos (1994) for Sub‐ Saharan Africa. For the next four years 10.1 percent is assumed, the average for the world.  For education beyond the eighth year the OECD value, 6.8 percent is assumed.

11 Using PWT 8.1 data points to a human capital growth rate 0.5% over 2001‐2010, but this is based on a previous version of Barro and Lee data (version 1.3, which has since been updated).

> 12 Barro and Lee (2015) do not appear to capture the population loss in Syria from the conflict, as they use projections from United Nations (2013).

7