rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_The Creative Wealth of Nations_

**Appendix E ||** The Two Main Areas of Intellectual Property, as defined by the WTO

# “ **(i) Copyright and rights related to copyright**

The rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author.

Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as “neighbouring”) rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work.

# **(ii) Industrial property** .

Industrial property can usefully be divided into two main areas:

- One area can be characterized as the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks (which distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings) and geographical indications (which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin).

The protection of such distinctive signs aims to stimulate and ensure fair competition and to protect consumers, by enabling them to make informed choices between various goods and services. The protection may last indefinitely, provided the sign in question continues to be distinctive.

- Other types of industrial property are protected primarily to stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall inventions (protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets.

The social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development activities.

A functioning intellectual property regime should also facilitate the transfer of technology in the form of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing. The protection is usually given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents).

While the basic social objectives of intellectual property protection are as outlined above, it should also be noted that the exclusive rights given are generally subject to a number of limitations and exceptions, aimed at fine-tuning the balance that has to be found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users.”<sup>258</sup>

**Source:** WTO

258 “What Are Intellectual Property Rights?” World Trade Organization, accessed June 22, 2014, <u>http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm.</u> <mark>72</mark>
Having established that the relationship between the level of democracy and the oversight potential is possibly bi-directional, let us focus on one of the two aspects of the relationship, that is on the fact that as oversight potential increases, so does the level of democracy. This finding has important practical consequences for the international community and those international organizations seeking to reduce global poverty and promote good governance. If democracy is “a condition without which development and poverty reduction strategies could not be properly implemented”<sup>15</sup> , and if oversight tools are the institutional devices that are associated with the transition of countries to full democracies, then it becomes of considerable importance for the international community to better understand the dynamics of parliamentary oversight, the role that oversight tools can play in the promotion of government accountability (and thus, democratic development and good governance) and to identify and disseminate examples of good practice practices. By doing so, the international community contributes to creating the conditions for sustainable long-term development.

This paper contributes to such an understanding by explaining the _incidence_ of parliamentary oversight tools and relating this to important economic and political variables. Further research needs to be undertaken on the _effectiveness_ such tools – but given the difficulties of measuring parliamentary performance across countries<sup>16</sup> such research should perhaps first be through the development of country case studies, attempting to measure changes in effectiveness over time.

> 15 The quote is taken from Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst, “Legislatures and Oversight: A Note”, Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 7-10 January, 2004.

> 16 Laurentian Seminar Proceedings, Parliamentary Centre, 1997

21
# Piecemeal Trade Reform in Partially Liberalized Economies: An Evaluation for Turkey

by Glenn W. Harrison Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr'

# Table of Contents

|1.|Introduction|I|
|---|---|---|
|2|A Small Open Economy Model|4|
||2.1<br>General Model Structure<br>2.2<br>The Turkish SOE Model|4<br>6|
|3.|Policy Analysis|10|
||3.1<br>Uniformity|10|
||<br>3.2<br>Across-the-Board Liberalization|12|
||3.3<br>Sectoral Liberalization|19|
||3.4<br>Harmonization with the European Communities|24|
|4.|Sensitivity Analysis|26|
|5.|Conclusions|30|
|Refe|rences|32|
|Appe|ndix A: Algebraic Formulation of the Model|A-1|
|Appe|ndix B: The Trade Regime in Turkey-<br>A Quantitative Assessment of<br>Tariff, Nontariff Barriers, and Export Incentives|B-1|
|Appe|ndix C: Calibration of the Model|C-1|
|Appe|ndix D: Sensitivity Analysis of Results|D-1|

* Dewey H. Johnson professor of economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina; assistant professor, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario; and senior trade economist, World Bank. This study is part of the World Bank's research on "The Impact of EC 1992 and Trade Integration in Selected Mediterranean Countries," supported under RPO 675-64. The authors would like to thank Deborah Bateman, Marylou Uy, Omer Karasapan, and Michael Klein for helpful comments on the data appendix.
its inverse hyperbolic transformation, median tax paid, as well as self-reported tax paid). Standard errors are, however, large and we cannot reject small positive or negative impacts. As described in the conceptual framework, we expect that the impact of e-filing on firms will differ based on firms’ experiences at baseline: firms for which meeting with a tax inspector served as a constraint on the minimum payments they could make would reduce their tax payments, whereas firms that received support from tax officials to reduce their tax liability would increase their tax payments. Our heterogeneous analysis of tax payments by firm risk of evasion at baseline provides evidence for this hypothesis, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 5.

All four measures of tax payments show a similar pattern of impact from e-filing: there is a decrease in tax payments among low-risk firms and an increase in taxes paid among high-risk firms. These differences are statistically significant for the median and inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for low-risk firms (measures that are sensitive to having long tails in the distribution) and for the mean, median, and self-reported survey mean for high-risk firms.

These impacts are quantitatively large. Taking the total taxes for the year from the administrative data as an example, column 4 reveals an increase of TJS 25,357 ($3,600 USD) as a result of e-filing among high-risk firms (p=0.046). In contrast, among lowrisk firms e-filing adoption results in firms paying TJS 15,099 ($2,160 USD) less in taxes, but this amount is not statistically significant (for this variable). The estimated impact on firms with above-median risk scores is significantly different than that for firms with below-median risk scores at the 10 percent level (p=0.078).

An important implication of these opposite impacts is that e-filing eliminates the tax gap that would otherwise exist between low-risk and high-risk firms. Among firms in the combined control group, high-risk firms pay substantially lower taxes than low-risk firms, a 29
than 40 percent of aid is used for investment. Without financing increases in productivity, aid risks doing long-term damage to growth by appreciating the currency and creating disincentives in the export sector. Because of the centrality of the export sector to Malawi’s economy and its sensitivity to the real exchange rate, it is vital that the use of aid is realigned to support export-led growth.

The most binding constraint on the economy is thus the real exchange rate which can only be ameliorated by a careful managed devaluation to ensure that price stability is maintained. In addition, the analysis further identifies other constraints using the HRV framework which are binding on marginal investment in Malawi: _Financial Binding_ . High overheads have created high real lending rates which _Intermediation_ currently constrain investment. Very limited access to formal finance for smallholders reduces the production response of rural farmers to price signals.

_Power Binding_ . The lack of reliable power source significantly lowers social returns, and deters new investments in manufacturing and mining. The lack of rural power additionally exacerbates deforestation.

_Education Binding or imminently binding_ . Extremely weak performance in quality and access, and evidence of high returns to primary education from cash cropping and tertiary from formal sector employment. Moderate signals of skills shortages from business surveys. The long lead time of reforms suggest that the quality of primary education in Malawi should be addressed with urgency.

_Export value Binding_ . An increase in farm-gate prices achieved through efficiencies _chains_ in input or product marketing chains stimulates growth by increasing the production response _and_ the domestic multiplier. Efficiency improvements are probable from regional infrastructure improvements, administrative barriers to trade, and the domestic input and marketing chains (particularly tobacco). _Micro policy Secondary_ . Government policy facing the firm generally performs well against peers with the exception of administrative barriers to trade and the unpredictability of interventions in agricultural prices. Price interventions are likely to have raised ex-ante risk, creating monopoly rents and in turn raising the cost of inputs to farmers.

- 43 -
births fell because of an increase in spontaneous abortions of male fetuses. Given this, the health endowment of girls born would on average then be lower than that of boys, and this could result in higher mortality of girls _after birth_ .

To investigate this possibility, we calculated the ratio of male to female births when deviations in per capita GDP was negative, and compared it to cases where it was positive; when per capita GDP was below -1 standard deviations, and compared it to cases where it was above this value; and when per capita GDP was below -1.5 standard deviations, and compared it to cases where it was above this value. (In each case, a cubic trend is first removed from GDP, as before.) In each of these cases, the ratios of female to male births were very similar, and we can never reject the null that they are the same. For example, the ratio of male to female births was 1.031 when deviations from GDP were negative, and 1.019 when positive. Similarly, the ratio of male to female births was 1.022 when deviations from trend GDP were less than -1.5 standard deviations, and 1.026 when above. In neither comparison is the difference in the ratios statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, and consistent with the results we present above, the ratio of male to female deaths in the first year is always higher when detrended GDP is negative, especially when the negative shocks are large. We conclude that the data are not consistent with a selection story along the lines described above. Rather, they are likely to reflect differences in behavior towards boys and girls by parents or health providers at times of economic distress.

<u>Calculation of “excess deaths”: In Table 6, we present some basic calculations of the</u> number of excess infant deaths that are likely to take place in Africa in 2009. To do this, we first calculate the number of children born in each country (using the total population and crude birth rates for 2008 taken from the World Bank DDP database). We then calculate excess deaths corresponding to three scenarios. In the first scenario, we compare the April 2009 IMF projected growth rates for 2009 with _actual_ growth rates in 2008—see Table 2. The difference between these two values then gives the decline in per capita GDP that can plausibly be attributed to the global financial crisis. This difference, multiplied by the coefficient in Table 3 (or Table 5, for the spline specification), and scaled by the number of children born in a given country, gives a country-specific estimate for excess deaths. (In the table, we report the sum for all of Africa.) These calculations, summarized in the top row in the table, suggest that, using the most recent IMF projections, we could expect there to be somewhere between 28,000 and 49,000 excess deaths in Africa in 2009.<sup>9,10</sup>

> 9 All of these calculations make a number of important assumptions. First, that negative shocks to GDP do not have an effect on aggregate fertility rates. This is because the number of deaths depends not only on the

8
# **Table 4 Working Hours and Earnings in China from September 2008 to February 2010**

||Weekly w orking<br>hours|Monthly earnings<br>(yuan)|Hourly earnings<br>(yuan/hour)|
|---|---|---|---|
|L ocal workers||||
|Sept. 2008|43.50|2,104|11.96|
|Mar. 2009|43.69|2, 319|13.12|
|Feb. 2010|44.88|2,4 54|13.53|
|Migrant workers||||
|Sept. 2008|55.13|2, 290|10 .81|
|Mar. 2009|55.69|2, 466|11. 61|
|Feb. 2010|56.98|2, 5 91|11.94|

# _Source_ : China Urban Labor Survey (CULS3, 2010)

1. China’s labor contract law, effective January 1, 2008, mandates contract terms, severance conditions, and payment of social insurance benefits. After two fixed-term contracts or 10 years of employment, whichever is shorter, the law requires firms to provide employees with open-ended contracts. The probationary period for new hires is limited to one to three months, depending on contract length, and regulations were placed on temporary work agencies (labor service companies) to prevent using them to circumvent the labor law. Finally, severance provisions require that employees receive 30 days written notice before termination, one month’s severance pay for each year of service (half-month’s pay if less than six months), and double severance pay for unfair dismissal.

2. In its first year, the survey was conducted in 59 cities and has expanded gradually over time to 159 cities in 2009.

3The Rural to Urban Migration in China and Indonesia project assembles comparable survey data on migrants in China and Indonesia. In contrast to household and other geographic approaches to sampling migrants in China, the migrant sample for this survey was conducted by first developing a sample frame of enterprises likely to employ migrants. In a second stage, enterprises and migrants were then sampled. The project surveyed 5,007 rural-tourban migrants who worked in 15 cities and responds to a common concern that surveys centered on households will oversample stable migrants and miss migrants living in work units and at work sites. An important drawback of the sampling approach is that it is difficult for researchers to know the characteristics of the population from which the sample is drawn.

4This survey was designed and implemented in collaboration with researchers from the University of Oxford, the China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University, the Institute for Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Development Research Group at the World Bank.

30
required to take a local examination (16); Foreign professionals are required to take a local examination (20); and Labor market tests for CSSs (34), ISSs (30) and ICTs (35).

Not surprisingly, labor market tests for service professionals were the most onerous regulatory requirement for service providers in 2017. Eliminating such tests altogether or making them sufficiently less burdensome would clearly liberalize Mode 4 trade. In contrast, the least restrictive STRI measures include: Membership in the professional association is closed to foreigners (3); Nationality or citizenship required for construction engineers (4); and Prior or permanent residency is required for license to practice (5). Table 3 summarizes this information for all the measures, including the average restrictiveness score for each measure.

**<u>Table 3: Count of countries for which average restrictiveness per measure is at least 0.5</u>**

|**STRI measure**|**Score**<br>**(avg.)**|**Number of**<br>**countries**|
|---|---|---|
|A temporary licensing system is in place|0.36|23|
|At least one engineer must be licensed for the issuance of construction permits|0.67|30|
|Domicile required for License to practice|0.30|10|
|Foreign construction engineers are required to practice locally for at least 1 year|0.18|8|
|Foreign construction engineers are required to take a local examination|0.36|16|
|Foreign professionals are required to practice locally for at least 1 year|0.26|14|
|Foreign professionals are required to take a local examination|0.41|20|
|Foreign providers have to completely re-do the university degree, practice and<br>exam in the domestic country|0.09|4|
|Labour market tests: contractual services suppliers|0.75|34|
|Labour market tests: independent services suppliers|0.66|30|
|Labour market tests: intra-corporate transferees|0.78|35|
|Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications gained<br>abroad|0.37|12|
|Laws or regulations establish a process for recognizing qualifications in<br>engineering gained abroad|0.18|8|
|Limitation on duration of stay for contractual services suppliers (months)|23|23*|
|Limitation on duration of stay for independent services suppliers (months)|25|31*|
|Limitation on duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees (months)|33|16*|
|Membership in the professional association is closed to foreigners|0.07|3|
|Memo: License or authorization is required to practice|0.57|14|
|Nationality or citizenship required for construction engineers|0.09|4|
|Nationality or citizenship required for License to practice|0.14|6|
|Other restrictions to movement of people|0.17|7|
|Prior or permanent residency is required for License to practice|0.19|5|
|Quotas: contractual services suppliers|0.18|8|
|Quotas: independent services suppliers|0.20|9|
|Quotas: intra-corporate transferees|0.13|6|
|Residencyisrequired to practice|0.21|6|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations Note: * indicates number of countries for which limitation on duration of stay is less than the respective sample average 9
11

# **5. NEW ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE**

This section discusses our econometric estimates of the impact of two of the main telecom reform policies (i.e. the presence of private capital and the establishment of an independent regulator) on access, affordability, quality and labor productivity based on the experience during the period 1990-2003. We also test the extent to which reform policies affect differently developed and developing countries.

Focusing on these two reform policies would however tend to ignore the fact that reforms do not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, there are wide differences in governance capacity and commitment across countries, whether developed or developing, which may influence the effects of reforms on performance. The extent to which private capital may be attracted to a country may be driven by more commercial considerations such as the investment risk of the country—and this is the case even if competition and support to private investors are formally part of the laws of the country. Similarly, the scope of action of an independent regulator may be quite different in a country with a high degree of corruption than in a country with a low degree of corruption.

To include corruption and investment risk in the explanation of telecom performance, we rely on two sets of data from the International Country Risk Guide. The first is a corruption index, defined as an assessment of corruption within the political system. It includes financial corruption (like bribes connected with trade, taxes or protection), but it focuses more on actual corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The second is an investment risk index, defined as the sum of three subcomponents with equal weights (contract viability or expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays). We have transformed the two original indexes so that they now vary continuously between 0 and 1, with zero meaning low value and 1 high value. Table 4 presents basic statistics for these indexes. Developing countries perform worse along both dimensions. Average corruption and investment risk during the period 1990-2003 are 0.54 and 0.47 respectively in developing countries and 0.25 and 0.31 in developed ones.

In our analysis, rather than simply adding corruption and investment risk as determinants of performance, we explicitly account for their interactions with the two reform policies assessed (introduction of private capital and establishment of an IRA).

**<u>Table 4: Average governance 1990-2003</u>**

||**Me**<br>**(standard **<br>|**ans**<br> **deviation)**<br>|**Number**<br>|**of Observatio**<br>|**ns**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Developing**|**Developed**|**Developing**|**Developed**|**Total**|
|Corruption Index (0=low 1=high corruption)|0.54|0.25|1373|482|1855|
||(0.17)|(0.21)||||
|Investment Risk Index (0=low 1= high risk)|0.47|0.31|1373|482|1855|
||(0.19)|(0.19)||||