promotion program was indeed successful in advancing women’s careers. As column (1) in Panel A of Table 3 shows, the women selected for the program were 24 percentage points more likely than the nominated group to have been officially promoted to supervisor after the conclusion of the promotion program. This result remains significant after accounting for multiple hypothesis testing, as the sharpened q-values in squared brackets show. The women also saw some increase in their personal and household income. The women’s personal income rose by about 689 Taka, equivalent to about 7% of the income in the comparison group, as per column (2), and total household income increased by about 84 Taka (about 0.4% of the comparison group mean, see column 3).

However, for the women who did receive an official promotion, income increased more. When I employ an instrumental strategy and use the selected variable as an instrumental variable for being a supervisor in column (4),<sup>45</sup> I find that the personal income of officially promoted women increased by about 17% compared to the comparison group mean, though the estimate is noisy and remains insignificant. Recall, however, that all selected women were assigned to trial as supervisors for at least two months, and therefore had experience in a leadership position. A number of them were also still waiting to be officially promoted at the time of the household surveys. Of course, the official promotion is an endogenous outcome, and I therefore focus on the intent-totreat effects of being selected for the promotion program for the main results.

# **4.2 Decision-making**

The second step of the analysis suggests that the selected women’s power in intra-household decision-making increases, at least initially. As column (2) in Panel B of Table 3 shows, the impact on the decision-making index is large at 0.42 SD in wave 1 of the household survey and significant at the 10% level. However, the effect is insignificant if I pool both waves (column 1) and negative but insignificant in wave 2 (column 3).<sup>46</sup> This drop in effect size after wave 1 seems to be partly driven by attrition, since the attriters between wave 1 and 2 in the comparison group have lower involvement in decision-making at factory baseline and in wave 1 than the comparison group respondents that remain in the panel.<sup>47</sup> Note that this pattern of attrition works against finding a positive effect on women’s bargaining power in wave 2 and the pooled estimate.

The large effect on decision-making in wave 1 is mainly driven by women reporting more decision-making power about purchases of clothing for themselves, followed by decisions about

> 45This means that column (1) of Panel A in Table 3 shows the first stage.

> 46Note that I do not find a similar drop-off in effects for the other outcomes in Tables C.9 and C.10 in the Online Appendix, which show results separately for each household survey wave.

> 47The attriters between wave 1 and 2 in the comparison group have a mean decision-making index of -0.06 SD at factory baseline and -0.68 SD in wave 1. This compares to -0.01 SD at factory baseline and -0.44 SD in wave 1 for the comparison group respondents in the panel.

20