rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
World Bank adjustment lending and
            economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s : a
            comparison of early adjusters, late adjusters, and nonadjusters
Using a methodology that allows for
            endogenizing decisions to participate in World Bank
            adjustment lending programs, and for testing the validity of
            assumptions about program participation, the author studies
            the effectiveness of these programs in sub - Saharan Africa.
            He shows that adjustment programs in sub - Saharan Africa
            had no statistically significant effect on growth in the
            second half of the 1980s, compared with the first half, but
            they have had a significant and deleterious effect on
            investment. Adjustment lending has significantly improved
            export performance in sub - Saharan Africa, at least
            compared with nonadjusting African countries. The perceived
            increases in export competitiveness and in the efficiency of
            investment (supposed to be generated by reform programs) has
            not been sufficient to counterbalance the ensuing decline in
            investment and hence to restore economic growth in sub -
            Saharan Africa. These findings must be qualified: the
            methodology for classifying countries as adjusting or
            nonadjusting does not allow for different degrees of
            implementation - so, strictly speaking, the findings reflect
            an assessment of the effectiveness of a proxy (adjustment
            lending) for the adjustment programs.
An exact approach for evaluating the
            benefits from technological change
It is commonly believed that taxing
            agricultural commodities in developing countries, and
            subsidizing agricultural commodities in industrial
            countries, reduces incentives in the developing countries
            for both current production and longer-term investments in
            capital, knowledge, technology, and infrastructure. It is
            argued that distortions in agricultural markets have kept
            investments in research and development, and productivity
            rates low in agriculture in developing countries. Martin and
            Alston lay the theoretical foundation for empirical studies
            of how such distortions affect returns to agricultural
            research and development in developing countries. Earlier
            studies of the benefits from technological change have
            typically used partial equilibrium models with Marshallian
            welfare measures. Such models have not allowed for a general
            set of market distortions and market interactions.
            Techniques recently developed for evaluating welfare in the
            context of general equilibrium models better measure the
            implications of trade distorting policies. Martin and Alston
            describe how to harness these approaches to evaluate the
            benefits and costs of technological changes. They show that
            a modified trade expenditure function can be used to measure
            welfare changes exactly, with a model consistent with the
            optimizing behavior of both producers and consumers. They do
            so in a general setting that allows for multiple market
            distortions and multiple paths of general equilibrium
            feedback. They illustrate this approach using a quadratic
            form for a profit function that is a component of the trade
            expenditure function. They spell out, in principle, how to
            apply this approach with minimal requirements for additional
            information, using the results from a computable general
            equilibrium model. They provide a diagram to illustrate the
            application of the technique.
An economic analysis of capital
            flight from Nigeria
Unlike Latin America, there have been no
            detailed estimates of capital flight or its determinants in
            Africa. The author addresses this problem and, using several
            concepts, provides "bands" or a "range"
            for capital flight in Nigeria. A significant proportion of
            capital flight can be estimated from recorded data in the
            balance of payments and debt statistics - but these
            estimates are only as good as the data are reliable.
            Significant amounts of capital flight, relative to external
            debt, took place between 1970 and 1989. Trade-faking was an
            important vehicle: exports were under-invoiced to the tune
            of about US $8.1 billion and imports were over invoiced
            about US $6.0 billion. Econometric analysis shows that the
            culprit to be domestic macroeconomic policy - in the form of
            inflation, exchange rate misalignment, fiscal deficit, and
            the lack of opportunities for profitable domestic
            investments - combined with the relative attractiveness of
            foreign investments. Eliminating distortions in the economy
            could minimize substantially externally held foreign claims
            and minimize capital flight. Among things that need to be
            done: (a) ensure that the nation's currency is not
            overvalued; (b) establish an integrated, unified tariff
            structure to reduce the rewards for trade-faking; (c)
            establish fiscal discipline, to maintain macroeconomic
            stability and reduce inflation; (d) ensure a positive real
            rate of interest - high enough to attract funds but not so
            high as to stifle investment initiatives; (e) adopt a
            realistic exchange rate determined by market forces; and (f)
            foster attitudinal changes that contribute positively to
            honest government.
Regional integration, old and new
After lying dormant for two decades,
            regional integration is on the rise. Recent initiatives
            suggest that the world trading system may be moving toward
            three trading blocs clustered around Japan, the European
            Community, and the United States. Some view this development
            as a move toward a less fragmented world trading system;
            others, as a threat to multilateralism. For a typical
            developing country, the issue is whether to enter into a
            regional integration arrangement or to choose unilateral
            trade liberalization. Two questions must be asked: Is a
            preferential approach likely to enhance economic efficiency?
            And are substantial benefits attainable more easily through
            regionalism or through unilateral trade liberalization? The
            authors address these issues first by reviewing past and
            recent regional integration arrangements. They note that
            recent arrangements are occurring in a more liberal trading
            environment than those in the past, and that developing
            countries are now seeking integration with developed country
            partners (for example, Mexico and the United States). So the
            context is different from past arrangements, when regional
            integration was viewed as an extension of
            import-substitution industrialization at the regional level.
            In a discussion of the welfare economics of preferential
            trading arrangements, they show that a preferential approach
            to trade liberalization may not increase welfare. For a
            small country, unilateral trade liberalization will be
            superior to a preferential approach unless the world divides
            into trading blocs with mutually high barriers - in which
            case, a preferential approach ensures market access. In a
            discussion of the welfare economics of trading blocs, they
            note that the move to a few trading blocs may make a
            cooperative solution more likely - at the same time
            increasing the rewards of noncooperative behavior if
            bargaining fails. With an empirical evaluation, the authors
            show that - after controlling for differences in investment
            - countries that integrated grew no faster than their
            comparator group. But human capital contributes
            significantly to growth, suggesting benefits from regional
            integration arrangements that emphasize cooperation. And
            there is evidence of catch-up, suggesting benefits for the
            least-developed members of the new wave of arrangements that
            emphasize North-South membership. In short, regional
            integration arrangements are more likely to be a stepping
            stone toward a freer world trading system if GATT rules are
            strengthened, and if developing countries enter into
            arrangements with developed rather than other developing countries.
Strategies for creating transitional
            jobs during structural adjustment
The authors review world experience with
            creating transitional jobs through public work relief,
            public service employment, and subsidized private
            employment.  They argue that work relief is a critical
            component of any structural adjustment program, so long as
            the work relief projects are consistent with the
            capabilities of the targeted workforce.  The effectiveness
            of public works depends on timeliness, financing, providing
            good managers, choosing high-priority projects, and matching
            the skill needs of the project with the skills of the
            targeted workers.  Public works and work relief tend to
            provide transitional jobs mainly for male manual workers.
            Women and displaced white-collar workers may be better
            served by public service employment of subsidized private
            employment.  Public service employment is relatively easy to
            administer and quick to implement and disband, but it is
            difficult to focus geographically, rarely leaves anything
            permanent behind, and expands the public payroll - at least
            temporarily.  Subsidized private employment is easily
            targeted and is compatible with efforts at privatization.
            Its chief weakness is that its success, both quantitatively
            (in number of jobs placed) and qualitatively (how good they
            are), depends on the private sector's willingness to
            increase hiring.
Retraining displaced workers : what
            can developing countries learn from OECD nations
The governments of most industrial
            countries provide financial support for adult training
            programs intended to retrain displaced workers.  The author
            draws lessons from the experience of six industrial
            countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, Sweden, and
            the United States) on how to design and implement such
            retraining programs in low-income developing nations and
            middle-income countries.  By retraining, the author means
            both improving job skills and remediating deficiencies in
            basic education.  These are the lessons he emphasizes:
            Training programs should be independent of the educational
            system, with its rigid ties to degree requirements and
            academic schedules; links to employers must be developed and
            maintained so that trainees have marketable skills on
            completing the program.  Training programs should be
            designed to minimize trainees' foregone earnings; basic
            education should be relevant to the jobs the trainees might
            seek.  External providers of education must be made
            accountable - but with care; the system of accountability
            should also ensure that the needs of displaced workers most
            likely to suffer long-term unemployment are met.  Not all
            displaced workers require relatively expansive retraining;
            some may need only inexpensive job-search assistance
            services.  A permanent, institutionalized training system is
            preferable to short-term intervention.
How public sector pay and employment
            affect labor markets : research issues
Structurally, the public sector has a
            more important economic role to play in developing countries
            than in industrial countries, particularly in how it affects
            labor markets.  Evidence from many developing countries
            shows that public sector pay, employment, and performance
            are hurting the labor markets' ability to allocate
            workers among sectors and skill requirements.  In many
            countries, the civil service and the public sector wage bill
            have grown to unsustainably high levels.  The public sector
            is so big that interventions in the sector - with or without
            spillover effects into the nonpublic sector - make it more
            difficult for wages and employment to respond to shifts in
            demand and supply.  Nonwage benefits are seldom related to
            productivity, so they can be particularly distorting.  At
            the same time, a long-term drop in real civil service wages
            and the compression of wage ranges have caused critical
            shortages of managerial and technical workers in the civil
            service.  The resulting skill imbalances in the rest of the
            domestic economy reduce international competitiveness in
            some countries.  Policy reform has focused on the reform of
            large, inefficient public sectors because of their
            cumulative negative effects on economic growth and
            competitiveness.  Policies to adjust relative prices from
            nontradables toward tradables have led to some movement of
            employment out of the public sector, but significant
            rigidities remain. Workers are attracted to the public
            sector because of complex economic and social incentives
            that are difficult to change - and the relationship between
            public sector interventions and the underlying political and
            economic forces is an important area for research.  The slow
            progress in restructuring the public sector in many
            countries highlights the need to address more forcefully and
            more subtly how public sector policies affect the labor market.
Unit costs, cost - effectiveness,
            and financing of nutrition interventions
The author summarizes what is known
            about unit costs, the cost structure, cost-effectiveness,
            and financing of eight nutrition interventions: maternal and
            child health (MCH) feeding, school feeding, nutrition
            education, the promotion of breastfeeding, targeted food
            subsidies, micronutrient supplementation, micronutrient
            fortification, and growth monitoring. Among items that she
            reports: (1) mass media nutrition education campaigns and
            the promotion of breastfeeding cost about $1 - $5 per
            beneficiary; face-to-face nutrition programs cost more ($23
            per beneficiary in the Dominican Republic). (2) Food
            distribution programs of different types have fairly similar
            costs. For distributing about 1,000 calories a day per
            beneficiary per year: $75 for untargeted food rations, $64
            for targeted food rations, $74 for MCH and school feeding
            programs, and $134 for highly targeted feeding programs.
            Micronutrient interventions cost from $0.04 to $4 per
            person-year of protection; supplementation is more expensive
            than fortification. (3) Medium-sized feeding programs
            (100,000 to 500,000 beneficiaries) are the least expensive.
            There is little difference in cost between programs operated
            by nongovernement organizations and those operated by
            governments. The more expensive programs are not necessarily
            less cost-effective, but may include more complementary
            inputs. (4) The cost per death averted was about 1,500 for
            both a targeted supplementary feeding program in Tamil Nadu
            and a vitamin A capsule distribution scheme in Bangladesh.
            (5) The cost per child removed from modrate and severe
            malnutrition ranged from $33 (Tamil Nadu) to $331 (targeted
            food subsidy, Philippines) to $493 (face-to-face nutrition
            program, Dominican Republic). (6) Nutrition expenditures
            seem to account for about 10 percent of health spending,
            both for donors and for individual countries (Chile is an
            outlier with 35 percent). Impact data on these topics are
            scarce, and these estimates should be interpreted cautiously.
Transition problems in economic
            reform : agriculture in the Mexico - U.S. free trade agreement
The authors use Mexican agriculture as a
            case study to analyze the transition problems that arise in
            most major economic reforms. They focus on the implications
            for policy design of the absence of efficient capital
            markets; on the welfare costs of reforming only gradually;
            on incentive problems created by trade adjustment policies;
            and on the redistribution aspects of policy reform in the
            presence of realistic limits on available intervention
            instruments. They emphasize that adjustment should focus on
            increasing the value of assets owned by the groups affected,
            and not on direct income transfers of programs targeted to
            output or other characteristics controlled by the
            beneficiaries. That is, they contend that adjustment should
            be targeted to improving what people have, as opposed to
            what people do.
Taxation, information asymmetries,
            and a firm's financing choices
This paper is intended as a survey of
            the effects of taxation and asymmetric information on the
            financing choice of the firm.  The literature on taxation
            posits a straightforward relationship between the pretax
            cost of funds and the required return on an investment
            project to cover the cost of finance which is a function
            only of tax rates.  The real decisions of the firm are
            assumed in these analyses to be affected only by the
            after-tax cost of funds.  The paper examines how
            differential taxation of retained earnings, new share
            issues, and debt finance affects the financing choice of the
            firm in the absence of asymmetric information.  It examines
            the problems of asymmetric information that arise with
            external finance and the mechanisms that have been created
            in rural sectors of developing countries to counter the
            problem of asymmetric information.  The final section of the
            paper examines policy options open to government to reduce
            the costs of the inefficiencies created by asymmetric
            information.  Unfortunately, policy prescriptions appear to
            be very dependent on the form of the information asymmetry.
            General government solutions to the problem of asymmetric
            information may not be possible without a precise
            understanding of the nature of the information problem.
Managing pollution control in Brazil
            : the potential use of taxes and fines by federal and state governments
The authors make a case for federal
            monitoring of state environmental agencies'
            (SEPAs') performance because of the tradeoff for the
            states between the need to raise revenue from taxes on local
            output and the need to limit pollution.  They also show that
            fines and taxes assigned respectively to the federal and
            state governments can improve firms' compliance and
            SEPA's performance, and hence environmental quality,
            without damaging state revenue, and perhaps even improving
            it.  For their analysis, the authors rely on numerical
            policy simulations based on an analytical framework designed
            as a multilevel Stackelberg game.  This framework reproduces
            the hierarchical structure of pollution control policies in
            Brazil, where the federal environmental protection agency
            relies on SEPAs to ensure that federally defined minimum
            ambient standards are met locally.  The numerical
            simulations are based on a case study of the food, and the
            printing and publishing industries.
How much to commit to an exchange
            rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility
The purpose of this paper is to identify
            the factors which determine the strength of commitment that
            policymakers choose to back up a fixed exchange rate system.
            In practice the commitment level is achieved by choosing a
            particular set of monetary and exchange rate arrangements.
            The authors develop a Barro-Gordon type model in which the
            policymaker has to decide how much to commit under
            uncertainty.  An important assumption is that the stronger
            the commitment to the fixed exchange rate the greater the
            political cost of reneging on it.  Thus, prior to deciding
            on the choice of exchange rate arrangements the policymaker
            has to weigh the benefits, to the disinflation program, from
            making a strong commitment against the potential costs of
            being forced to renege on it.  Some of the more technical
            details are presented in appendices.  The paper illustrates
            the results of the model with examples from Latin American
            countries and concludes with a comparison of the results of
            the authors approach with related work.