rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P., 1995. Does Heterogeneity hinder collective action?. Cahiers de la Faculte des Sciences Economoques Sociales No. 142, Namur, Belgium, Facultes des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix.

Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P., 1999. The ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management. _World development_ , _27_ (5), pp.773-788.

Bandyopadhyay, S., S. Dasgupta, Z. Khan and D. Wheeler. 2018. Cyclonic Storm Landfalls in Bangladesh, West Bengal and Odisha, 1877-2016 : A Spatiotemporal Analysis. Policy Research Working Paper No. 8316. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Bardhan, P., 1993. Symposium on management of local commons. _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ , _7_ (4), pp.87-92.

Bardhan, P. and Dayton-Johnson, J., 2000, May. Heterogeneity and commons management. In _Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Common Property, IASCP. Bloomington, Indiana_ .

Beck, T. and C. Nesmith. (2001). Building on poor people’s capacity: The case of common property resources in India and West Africa. World Development, 29, 119–119.

Chakraborty, J., T. Collins, S. Grineski and A. Maldonado. 2017. Racial Differences in Perceptions of Air Pollution Health Risk: Does Environmental Exposure Matter? International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 14(2): 116.

Chen, M. 2017. Job versus environment: an examination on the attitude of union members toward environmental spending, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. 19(4): 761–788.

Dasgupta, S., Md. I. Sobhan and D. Wheeler. 2017. The Impact of Climate Change and Aquatic Salinization on Mangrove Species in the Bangladesh Sundarbans. Ambio. Vol. 46, No. 6, 680694.

Dasgupta, S., M. Huq, Md. G. Mustafa, Md. I. Sobhan and D, Wheeler 2017. The Impact of Aquatic salinization on Fish Habitats and Poor Communities in a Changing Climate: Evidence from Southwest Coastal Bangladesh”. Ecological Economics **_._** 139, pp 128-139 _._ Gaspart, F. 2003. The risk of resource misappropriation in community driven development. World Development, 31: 1687–1687.

Ghertner, D. 2011. Gentrifying the State, Gentrifying Participation: Elite Governance Programs in Delhi. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 35(3): 504–532.

Janmaimool, P. 2017. Investigating pro-environmental behaviors of well-educated people in Thailand. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 37(13/14): 788-807.

Jones, R. and R. Dunlap. 1992. The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: Have They Changed Over Time? Rural Sociology. 57(1): 28-47 14
commitments guarantee unrestricted market access, and a similar proportion guarantee unqualified national treatment. In all professional services, there are commitments from 74 Members, but less than a fifth assure unrestricted market access and national treatment, respectively. There clearly remains considerable scope for widening and deepening commitments.

# _G. Government procurement_

There are many good reasons to liberalise government procurement. Some benefits are analogous to those arising from the liberalisation of trade, but to these must be added the budgetary benefits of efficient procurement and significant reductions in rent-seeking which is rampant in procurement. Thus, both the consumer and the taxpayer will benefit. But WTO experience shows that most countries (developed and developing) are reluctant to immediately accept full liberalisation of procurement.

For India, Srivastava (1999) estimates that the total value of purchases by the central and state governments and public enterprises, which could in principle be subject to international government procurement rules, varies between 3.4 and 5.7 percent of GDP. For certain procurement contracts, a price preference of 15 per cent is given to indigenous equipment suppliers, requiring that at least 20 per cent value must be added in India. In the shipping sector, price preferences up to 30 per cent apply to Indian bidders on procurement contracts. If more efficient procurement practices can be implemented domestically, Srivastava (1999) calculates that the total savings could be as much as 1.7 percent of GDP or about US$ 8 billion. Even if only a fraction of the estimated savings is realized, the gain can be substantial.

It is clear once again that India has exercised the freedom to choose in ways that are probably very costly for consumers and taxpayers. Even if it had chosen wisely, it is reasonable to ask whether a multilateral agreement can add to national legislation which often contains similar provisions to mitigate agency problems? One of the biggest problems in procurement is that of moral hazard on the part of the procurer. For instance, a recent survey conducted by the Confederation of Indian Industries shows that procurement contracts frequently involve corruption. The significant benefit of a multilateral agreement is in helping to overcome national agency problems in procurement by creating mechanisms for reciprocal international monitoring supported by multilateral enforcement. It achieves this by shifting the legal scope for monitoring from dispersed taxpayers, who may have little interest in monitoring individual procurement decisions, to the bidders for contracts who have a significant stake.

Two elements of a possible multilateral agreement are crucial in this context. First, the agency problem is mitigated by creating obligations on the procurer to be transparent. Secondly, foreign suppliers are given the opportunity to challenge the decisions of the procurer before national courts or independent and impartial review bodies. As a starting point, it would seem both desirable and feasible for India to be open to commitments on 22
**Table 7: Main Conclusions of Reviews on the Most and Least Effective Interventions for Improving Student Learning**

||**Main conclusions**||
|---|---|---|
|**Study**|**Most effective**|**Least effective**|
|Conn (2014)|Pedagogical interventions<br>Student incentives|Health interventions<sup>19</sup>|
|Glewwe et al. (2014)|Desks, tables, and chairs<br>Teacher subject knowledge<br>Teacher presence||
|Kremer, Brannen, &<br>Glennerster (2013)|Pedagogical interventions to match<br>teaching to students’ learning<br>Accountability|Cost-reducing interventions<br>Health interventions|
||Incentives|Information interventions|
|Krishnaratne, White,<br>& Carpenter (2013)|Materials||
|McEwan (2014)|Computers or instructional technology|Monetary grants|
||Teacher training<br>Smaller classes, smaller learning groups<br>within classes, or ability grouping<br>Contract or volunteer teachers<br>Student and teacher performance<br>incentives<br>Instructional materials|Deworming treatments|
|Murnane & Ganimian<br>(2014)|Providing information about school<br>quality and returns to schooling<br>Teacher incentives (in very low<br>performance settings)<br>Specific guidance for low-skilled<br>teachers to reach minimally acceptable<br>levels of instruction|Reducing the costs of going to school<br>Alternatives to traditional public schools<br>Resources (unless they change children’s<br>daily experiences at school)|

> 19 Conn (2014) finds large health effects on cognitive assessments (e.g., memory or attention), but low effects on student learning assessments.

29
20

**D. Conclusion**

Private sector involvement and user participation in water resource management are not new. The examples given demonstrate the willingness of the private sector and users to play a larger role in water resources management and improve water use. User participation and private sector involvement, if properly structured, can provide the necessary incentives for stabilizing and improving the efficiency of irrigation and water supply systems. It can add flexibility, transparency, and accountability as well as lessen the financial and administrative burden on the State. For exarnple, 1989 World Bank review of twenty-one impact evaluations of irrigatio;i projects found cost recovery to be excellent in those projects, in which water management and O&M had been entrusted to water users (World Bank, 1980a). Greater private sector and user participation offers an effective means to increase user responsibility for managing and financing water projects while freeing governments to focus on broader water resource management concerns.

The examples of decentralized water management in developing country water supply and irrigation systems points out several important government activities. First, governments will need to play a more active role in regulating the private sector exploitation of groundwater especially for irrigation. Second, the governments will have to take measures to encourage price competition among private suppliers of water for both domestic and agricultural users. Third, governments should play an active role in organizing WUAs particularly for irrigation and rural water supply systems and in providing technical assistance. As highlighted in numerous examples, such activities should be designed to reduce the transaction costs of organizing and to establish a sense of assurance and accountability within the water user community. Once this is done, the community can deal with problems associated with excludability and unwillingness to pay.
Moulton, Brent (1986) “Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates” _Journal of Econometrics_ , 32 (3):385-397.

Platteau, Jean-Philippe (2000), “Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development,” Routledge. Chapter 5: Egalitarian Norms.

Robinson, Marguerite (2001), “The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Rubin, D. B. (1974), “Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies.” _Journal of Educational Psychology_ 66: 688–701.

Rutherford, Stuart (2000) _The poor and their money_ , USA: Oxford University Press.

Thaler, Richard H (1990), “Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts,” _Journal of Economic Perspectives,_ 4: 193-205.

World Bank (2008), _World Development Report: Agriculture for Development_ . Washington, D.C.

28
(2002)). For the robustness analysis we will vary the capital share between the value of 0.4 considered by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1995), and 0.6.<sup>8</sup> The sum of the depreciation rate δ and population growth ( _n_ ) was set at 0.1, and the rate of intertemporal preference ρ at 0.05 which is consistent with the standard quarterly value of 0.99 for the discount factor used in the RBC literature. Finally, the coefficient of risk-aversion (or the inverse of the intertemporal rate of substitution) θ was set at 2, which is also standard.<sup>9</sup> The parameter _A_ was chosen to calibrate the unstable low equilibrium to the level of consumption per capita and capital per-worker of the poorest African country in 1996 (Democratic Republic of Congo with a consumption per capita of about $300 and capital per worker of $330). This seems like a reasonable lower bound for a subsistence level of consumption, and it is slightly smaller than the $300 in 1980 dollars computed by Ben-David (1998) as the least cost requirement for sustaining an individual’s minimum dietary needs.

i i The bottom panel of **Figure 2** shows the _c_ = 0 and the _k_ = 0 locus in the ( _c, k_ ) space for the benchmark economy. It also shows the stable manifold of the economy, which was computed numerically using the time-elimination method of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991). In this parameterization, the levels of consumption and capital per person at the high stable equilibrium correspond to $747 and $3,434 respectively. These levels are very low. So, a first quantitative implication of the calibration exercise is that the high equilibrium consistent with the poorest African country being at its subsistence level implies that, even after reaching the high equilibrium, per capita consumption will still be below that of the median African country, and well below that of middle income countries. Of course these magnitudes are sensitive to the specific parameterization, but, as will be shown below, taking them to more reasonable levels would require unlikely magnitudes for key parameters of the economy.

The effect of subsistence consumption on the pattern of growth for an economy that starts at an initial level of capital 1 percent above the low equilibrium is shown in **Figure 3** . For comparison, the figure also presents the evolution of capital per worker of an economy that starts

> 8 We cannot increase the value of α further and simultaneously being able to calibrate the unstable equilibrium of the economy with the values observed for low income countries keeping the rest of the parameters fixed.

> 9 Standard values for θ range between 1 and 3. As it will be pointed out below, the results are not significantly affected by varying θ within this range.

15
Second, another strand of the literature highlights a strong relationship between the quality of institutions and geography related factors (Gallup et al. 1998). Following this body of work, we use two sets of controls for geography. The first is the absolute distance of a country from the equator divided by 90 (Latitude). The second is region fixed effects where regions include East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), North America, South Asia, SubSaharan Africa (SSA) and the omitted category of Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Classification of countries into these regions is taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.

Third, micro-economic reforms are unlikely to be of much use and hence unlikely to be implemented if the broader institutional environment does not provide adequate security and protection of private investment. We control for this factor using the Rule of Law measure taken from World Bank’s Governance indicators (year 2003 values). The measure broadly captures respect for private property, incidence of crime and enforceability of private and government contracts.

Fourth, there is now substantial evidence showing that the legal tradition of a country is a strong proxy for various aspects of the institutional environment. For example, Djankov et al. (2002) show that entry barriers are much lower in English common law relative to the French civil law countries. Similar findings are reported for shareholder rights (Djankov et al. 2008), contract enforcement (Djankov et al. 2003) and the flexibility of labor markets (Botero et al. 2004). We control for the legal tradition of a country using dummy indicators for the legal tradition of a country. These traditions 9
The model assumes full-employment except for unskilled workers in developing regions. For workers in these regions, the unskilled wage is fixed and there is an endogenous supply of unskilled workers available to the at the The model is solved as economy fixed wage. a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) such that once the pool of available unskilled workers is empty, the economy operates at full-employment (i.e., wages are endogenous and the of unskilled labor is Current account balances are held constant so supply fixed). that real foreign exchange rates adjust.

The trade elasticities take the high Armington elasticities (between aggregate imports and the domestic good) from GTAP estimates for regions involved in the trade dispute. In contrast, low elasticities (0.5) are assumed for other regions. With this specification, it is assumed that imports are poor substitutes for domestic goods in developing regions.

Some caveats about the analysis are also in order. The version of the GLOBE employed in the analysis is a static global CGE model with neoclassical specifications. Since it is not a dynamic framework, it does not account for additional output growth that may come from factor accumulation in response to the trade shocks.<sup>5</sup> It does, however, reallocate existing capital stocks and labor across sectors for each region. The modeling framework does not account for the presence of imperfect competition, scale economies, and the entry or exit of firms that may broaden the effects of trade shocks (Rutherford et al. 2018; Devarajan and Rodrik 1989; Harris 1984). It also does not specify extraneous productivity effects of trade shocks. As a result, GDP effects will generally be small, which is normal for this type of trade model. Without incorporating these additional factors, the analysis is therefore conservative. The results are also insensitive to the assumption of excess unskilled labor in developing countries. Sensitivity tests indicate that the results from the specification do not differ much or qualitatively from a full-employment specification throughout.

# **4 Results**

The detailed results of the simulations are summarized in Table 1. Consistently throughout all scenarios, the decline in U.S. competitiveness resulting from higher tariffs and the loss of market access with major trading partners leads to significant adverse effects on the U.S. economy. Total U.S. exports are estimated to decline by 11-12 percent and translate into GDP losses of 0.3 percent relative to the baseline.

5For example, Freund et al. (2018) find more significant income effects due to additional assumptions about a potential increase in uncertainty and decline in investment in developing countries. Also, their results are reported in value terms, which, compared to real terms in this paper, tend to be more substantial given the significant shifts in relative prices.

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# **Table A2: Database**

|**Variable**|**Definition**|**Frequency**|**Source**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Output|Real gross domestic product (GDP)<sup>a</sup>|Quarterly|Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), OECD, Haver Analytics|
|Output|Nominal gross domestic product in US$ (GDP)|Annual|World Economic Outlook (October 2016)|
|EMBI|Emerging market bond index|Quarterly|J.P. Morgan|
|U.S. interest rate|Nominal yield on 10-year government bonds|Quarterly|Bloomberg|
|Oil price|Nominal oil prices|Quarterly|World Bank Pink Sheet|
|Commodity prices|Nominal commodity prices<br>Commodity exports defined using SITC 4th|Quarterly|World Bank Pink Sheet|
|Commodity exports|revision at 4 digits|Annual|World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)|
|Real effective exchange rate|Real effective exchange rate<sup>b</sup>|Quarterly|BIS, Bruegel datasets|
|U.S. CPI|Consumer price index|Quarterly|Haver Analytics|
|VIX|CBOE volatilityindex|Quarterly|CBOE|

_Note:_ The table describes the variables used in the model estimation and their sources.

a The main source for the quarterly series is Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013). This database which ends around 2008 is extended by splicing from different sources.

b The narrow index wherever available is taken while the remainder uses the broad index. Details are available upon request.

25
to the number of individuals with an account by using their estimate that, on average, each individual has 3 deposit accounts.<sup>4</sup> As a result of this exercise we revise the estimate by Kendall _et al_ . (2010) for the number of unbanked: as of December 2008, we predict that approximately 2.8 billion adults are unbanked, 175 million of which are in high-income countries, and 2.63 billion are in the developing world. These numbers imply that 58 percent of the world is unbanked (21 percent of adults in highincome countries, and 66 percent in developing countries). The numbers slightly improve by the end of 2009. A total of approximately 2.75 billion adults around the world are predicted to be unbanked, out of which 138 million live in high-income countries and 2.61 billion live in developing countries. Overall, 56 percent of the world is unbanked by the end of 2009, with 17 percent of adults unbanked in high-income countries and 64 percent in developing countries. Hence, about 50 million more adults in the world have bank accounts, and most of the improvement is seen in high-income countries. Note that, at the same time, the total adult population in the world increased by approximately 79 million.

# **3 Access to financial services**

This section presents the state of access to financial services in 2009. We consider deposit and credit services only, as these are the basics. For both deposit services and credit services, we provide an overview of the global picture and summarize the results of econometric analyses. We also compare banks to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in terms of deposit and loan penetration, although data on NBFIs are limited. Next, we consider the outreach of the financial system. An overview of the state of retail networks, including branches, ATMs, and POS terminals as well as urban vs. rural, and bank vs. non-bank divides are presented.

Note that due to limitations in data availability, especially in time dimension, it is not possible to control for potential endogeneity problems between financial service penetration and other indicators of growth and development. Hence, the econometric results reported below should be interpreted with caution, as they are likely not to point to causal effects but are rather partial associations. Furthermore, the data are from a crisis year, which may bias the results.

## **3.1 Deposits**

In 2009 as the global financial crisis unfolded, about 60 percent of countries experienced a decline in real per capita GDP, and for those that went through expansions, median growth was only 2.1 percent. Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions affected the deposit volume around the globe as individuals and firms had to tap into their savings. Seventy-seven percent of countries in our sample experienced a decline in deposit-to-GDP ratio, with an average decline

> 4 Kendall _et al_ . (2010) use household survey data together with _Financial Access_ data to obtain this estimate.

6