rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
of migrants increases, the amount of money sent home per migrant is found to decrease due, partly, to the family reunification effects.

Further analysis is obviously required to examine the robustness of the findings presented in this paper. Despite the limited availability of data, a panel data analysis certainly merits future work. Moreover, our empirical estimation was conducted based on the officially measured remittance data. We are therefore not able to generalize our findings on the determinants of remittance flows to the case of remittances transferred through informal channels. Because of their particular relevance to the economic development of developing countries, more empirical work on informal remittance flows is certainly required. This in turn indicates the need for further efforts in collecting data on migration and remittances.

13
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report (Malawi) actually presents data on unit cost per graduate, rather than per studentY Instead, the reports concentrate on gross versus net enrollment and drop-out and/or repeater rates as indicative of the gap between cost per student and cost per graduate.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 11.5: Sector Priorities<br>Postprimary Education<br>6 of countries in each category<br>60-<br>50- . ..... ......... ........ ........................ .....<br>4 0- .................... ...... ... . ...... . ......... unt y<br>3 0 - - .................... _.All Categories<br>All<br>20 . , ....... ................ ...3.... HZ igh SR]I/Htgh PE<br>.igk H SRIIILow PE<br>1.0 ~~~~~~~~~. .. Low SRIfIIlliq PE<br>10-L _ow SR1/Low PE<br>Access Eqaily EilecDal efficiency<br>Quality lnternal ettictency<br>S ectoi Priorities<br><!-- End of picture text --> 2.28 All of the countries where public spending per student (rather than total unit cost per student) is considered excessive are advised to reduce it, usually by increasing internal efficiency. As is the case with equity issues, concern for internal efficiency is most common in countries with an imnbalance between sector resources and output (either high SRM/low PE or low SRM/high PE countries). At the primary level, internal efficiency is most important in high PE countries--that is, countries where high enrollment has already been achieved, perhaps at the expense of quality and cost-efficiency of output (figure I1.4).

2/Per graduate expenditure is the cost of producing a graduate of a particular education program, taking into account the total number of years of educational output required at the prevailing internal efficiency rate. Total educational output, at a given annual per student cost, includes wastage from repeaters and drop-oi vs.

15
participating in group discussions due to employment demands, two additional domestic worker case studies were selected and interviewed in‐depth, although their family households were not visited.

Each activity provided unique insight into the lives of Basotho female migrants and their families. While the sample was not representative, we endeavored to minimize bias by applying objective criteria to the choice of locations and within those locations, choosing respondents as randomly as possible. The survey provided a more nuanced and detailed picture of the migration experience than the nationally representative data, but on a larger scale than the qualitative methods allowed. It also provided context for the qualitative interviews and focus group discussions. Case studies involving in‐depth interviews with selected respondents provided a fuller picture of the internal female migrant experience, both the process of migrating, and of living and working away from the family home, including work conditions, living arrangements, financial activities, and sexual behaviors and relationships. Focus group discussions with textile and domestic workers complemented these detailed stories, providing broader, migrant‐level perceptions of these women’s everyday realities. Next, in‐depth interviews with the case study families shed light on to the migration decision process – how the decision to send or not send someone is made, who makes the decision, why is the decision made regarding who/where/what/when – as well as how households manage their finances and household members’ health and education (particularly children). Interviews also provided detailed history of household migration and future migration plans, and captured the sending household’s perspectives on how it is to have a female member working away from home. Last, rural focus group discussions provided insight into communities’ attitudes toward and perceptions of migration, particularly perceived risks involved, challenges migrants and their households might face, and how migrants and their families are perceived in their sending communities.

13
Then, between January and April 2001, Wave 1 localities were visited once _a month_ and administered a similar survey based on monthly recall. At the same time, households in the three Wave 2 localities were visited weekly and given the same weekly recall survey as had been used with Wave 1 during the previous four month period. Following a break in the summer months, the process was repeated for a second year. Thus, between August and December 2001, Wave 1 households received a weekly survey while Wave 2 households received a monthly survey and then, between January and April 2002, Wave 1 households received a monthly survey while Wave 2 households received a weekly survey.

In both weekly and monthly surveys, information was collected separately on chronic and non-chronic conditions. Chronic conditions were identified through initial interviews, and these illnesses were individually followed up upon each week/month. In the case of chronic illnesses, once identified, individuals would be recorded as sick (with a chronic illness) in every survey (weekly or monthly) and asked about his or her chronic condition during each subsequent visit. Consequently, recall periods, by design, have no effect on the reporting of chronic illnesses or their duration. Therefore, we examine the effects of recall only on doctor visits and self-medication for chronic conditions<sup>7</sup> . Additionally, a general question (''Were you sick last week/month?'') was used to screen for acute illnesses, and conditional on a positive response, questions were asked about the duration of the morbidity and the resulting treatment, including visits to doctors and selfmedication.

Attrition of the sample was negligible—the survey lost 5 households over 2 years due to migration out of sample localities. Therefore, we have a large number of observations across time asking the same set of participants the same survey questions with varying recall periods (though, of course, with fewer observations for monthly rather than weekly recall periods). These data will be used to compare responses given for weekly versus monthly recall periods. The size of the discrepancies between survey responses in the weekly and monthly data indicates the magnitude of forgetting that takes place with the monthly recall period. Given the structure of the data, we will also be able to account for seasonal effects by including responses from the group of households administered a monthly survey concurrently. Finally, since monthly surveys were administered _after_ the completion of weekly surveys, we are able to avoid ―telescoping‖ effects (survey reports capture events preceding the recall period considered) in the monthly data as well.

Our second data source is an experiment carried out in 2008 to verify the large recall effects discovered in the observational data. For this survey, we began with a sub-sample of 205 households who could still be located from the original sample and surveyed them for a total of 2 months. In the first month, the entire sub-sample

> 7 See (Das and Hammer 2009) for more detailed discussion of how households identify and handle chronic illness.

6
wells and ponds in the summer season may pose a serious challenge for the fair allocation of water among group members. Some water user groups are responding to this problem by pooling resources to augment recharge by connecting the JCLIS well to a nearby river or reservoir. We did not come across any groups planning demand management strategies like investing in microirrigation or restricting the cropped area or crop choices to cope with water scarcity. Most JCLISs in our study had seen only one summer season. In the next few years, it will be interesting to see the strategies different water user groups follow to manage water scarcity.

Despite seasonal water scarcity, less than 10 percent of farmers and system managers in our sample reported any disputes related to water allocation, the quality of irrigation service, or fee collection. The few disputes that were reported in our survey related to the sequencing of irrigation among group members or to disagreements over whether the irrigation provided was adequate. In water scarce conditions, some farmers wanted more water in their fields than what they had received. Most of these disputes were mild and were amicably resolved without any external interference.

All JCLISs in our sample were operating at low capacity. There is scope to increase their command areas, their total hours of operation, and the number of beneficiaries they serve. Managing the group dynamics, water allocation, and sequencing of irrigation may become more challenging, and disputes may become more frequent with increases the size of water user groups and higher demand for irrigation – especially in times of peak demand or water scarcity.

In their early years of operation, JCLISs score high on the fairness of water allocation and the affordability, adequacy, and reliability of irrigation. Farmers value the irrigation assets, and they are keen to maintain them. Small group sizes (average 16 members/group), small and well-defined command areas (average size = 13.6 acres), and homogeneity of identities (same tribe or caste group) and interests of group members may also contribute to the successful management of JCLISs (Agrawal, 2001). In the past, poor electricity supply and the high cost of diesel have been the most pressing problems for community tube well irrigation systems in eastern India (Pant, 1984; Kishore, Joshi, and Pandey, 2017). Most JCLISs do not have these problems because they are powered by solar energy, which is both predictable and free.

A meta-analysis of 108 studies of water user associations (WUAs) in public irrigation systems from 20 countries in Asia by Mukherji et al. (2009) also found that pump based lift irrigation (LI) schemes, like the JCLISs in Jharkhand are more likely to be successfully managed than gravity 28
## —@—batch1 —@ebatch3

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# —s— matched comparison

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The main conclusions from this study are that fonnal education, training,<sup>and experience</sup> impact wages and productivity positively. However, there still exist<sup>some human capital</sup> gaps that need to be accommodated for the labor market to<sup>be characterized as</sup> competitive. Females are being paid less male employees despite<sup>that they are not</sup> measurably less productive. Hereof, there is at least two interpretations:<sup>first, this is poor</sup> discrimination against women; or second, that important data material<sup>has been left out of</sup> the analyses; hence the gender dummy variable pick up the impact<sup>on wages of these</sup> omitted variables. The findings show no strong indication of ethnic<sup>discrimination of</sup> employees in the Zimbabwean labor markets. Trade union members are<sup>found to be paid</sup> less than non-members despite that no gap is found in productivity. That wages are lower for union members can be explained by the fact that unions fight more for skill<sup>upgrading</sup> than for wage increases. Enterprise characteristics are also important.

Furthermore, we find that enterprise characteristics are associated with wages and productivity. Employees in firms engaged in exporting activities are not fully compensated for their high productivity, indicating that firms benefit more than employees do from enhanced productivity following increased openness. Firms with foreign ownership are more productive than other firms and a relatively high number of expatriates employed in a firm are associated with higher wages. Hence, the labor<sup>market</sup> in Zimbabwe is not perfectly competitive but rather segmented. For example,<sup>wages of</sup> workers, with similar skills employed in different sectors, are not equal. Therefore,<sup>we</sup> conclude that there exist structural differences across sectors. The remainder of the paper is organized in eight sections. Section two briefly<sup>describes</sup> trends in employment, output and wages in Zimbabwe. Section three summarizes<sup>recent</sup> labor market studies and section four describes the methodology and data<sup>used in this</sup> study. Section five outlines the wage determination model and section six shows descriptive statistics. Section seven presents findings, and, finally, section eight concludes.

3
treatment are a large part of out-of-pocket expenditures (65 percent), and that private sector providers receive a large part of these non-hospital expenditures (56 percent).

Table 5: Demand for private sector health care in five Indian States

||Guja-<br>rat|Maha-<br>rash-<br>tra|Tamil<br>Nadu|Uttar<br>Pra-<br>desh|West<br>Bengal|Wgtd<br>Avg.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Rural areas|||||||
|(1) Pct of treated illness episodes to_private_providers|69|78|71|91|83|82|
|(2) Pct of out-of-pocket exp. to non-hospital treatment|62|64|74|59|74|_65_|
|(3) Pct of out-of-pocket exp. to_private_non-hospital trtmt.|48|55|68|51|_65_|56|
|(3) as a percentage of (2)<br>Urban areas|77|86|92|86|88|86|
|(1) Pct of treated illness episodes to_private_providers|82|75|69|85|78|79|
|(2) Pct of out-of-pocket exp. to non-hospital treatment|61|60|69|57|63|61|
|(3) Pct of out-of-pocket exp. to_private_non-hospital trtmt.|53|51|62|46|54|52|
|(3) as a percentage of (2)|87|85|90|81|86|85|

Source: Adapted from World Bank (1995) _The more that people see the private sector as a substitute, the smaller the impact ofpublic spending._ In addition to the size of the public sector, there is mounting evidence on the substitutability between the public and private health care providers in the demand for curative services. One source of evidence are estimates of the effect of increases in fees at public clinics on the probability that a sick individual will attend a public versus a private clinic. Table 6 summarizes the results of several studies which have estimated these crossprice effects. While results are not of the same size across all the countries, there is an effect of public prices on demand for care from the private providers. These are not negligible, especially if the effects are compared to the own-price effects. For example, in Nigeria 100 percent of those who are deterred by higher prices in the public sector seek care from the private sector, in Ghana 60 percent of those deterred go to private providers, while in El 35
P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standards errors allow for clustering at the country level. All models are estimated via two methods: ordinary least squares (OLS) model and robust regression model. In dropping outlier OLS model, top 5% samples on each dependent variable are dropped except % of Women Borrowers. Though we do not present the coefficients to conserve space, all models include all of the following controls; annual % of inflation rate (GDP deflator), annual % of GDP growth, Rule of law , Bank overhead costs / Total assets, Ease of doing business index, Bank Credit / GDP, regional dummies (Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, omitting Middle East and North Africa), lending methodology dummies (individual and solidarity lending, omitting village banking) and log of MFI's total asset values. Combined group dummy is 1 if one of the three status dummies (commercial bank, credit union / coop or rural bank) equals 1. NGO dummy is omitted in these models.

- - <u>Panel D: Regulatory framework for deposit taking (0 4)</u>

||V|<br>ersion 1(Ful sampl<br>De|<br>es)<br>pvar: Average loan s|Version 2<br>ize /per capita G|<br>(DroppingRural ba<br>NI|<br>nk samples)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||OLS|Robust Reg|OLS Dropping<br>top 5% of dep<br>var|OLS|Robust Reg|OLS Dropping<br>top 5% of dep<br>var|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Regulatory framework for deposit-taking (0-4)|0.1368**|0.0077|0.0106|0.1245**|0.0101|0.0038|
||[0.026]|[0.530]|[0.744]|[0.042]|[0.373]|[0.910]|
|NBFI dummy * Regulatory framework for deposit-taking (0-4)|0.1308|0.0656***|0.1399***|0.1403*|0.0629***|0.1417***|
||[0.105]|[0.000]|[0.007]|[0.072]|[0.000]|[0.007]|
|Combined group dummy *Regulatory framework for deposit-taking (0-4)|-0.0697|0.0327*|0.0077|0.0284|0.0258|0.0184|
||[0.636]|[0.079]|[0.858]|[0.903]|[0.242]|[0.765]|
|NBFI dummy|-0.1909|-0.0464|-0.1203|-0.1997|-0.0461|-0.1286|
||[0.331]|[0.137]|[0.163]|[0.294]|[0.110]|[0.136]|
|Combined group dummy|0.4256|0.0720*|0.1717|0.3119|0.0469|0.1556|
||[0.228]|[0.069]|[0.108]|[0.526]|[0.274]|[0.239]|
|Observations|641|641|616|583|583|560|
|Number of countries|39|39|39|39|39|39|
|R-squared|0.278|0.582|0.43|0.285|0.624|0.45|
|Adjusted R-squared|0.256|0.569|0.412|0.26|0.611|0.431|
|_Microscope index+ interaction term (P-value in brackets)_|||||||
|NBFI dummy|0.268***|0.0733***|0.151**|0.265***|0.073***|0.145**|
||[0.007]|[0.000]|[0.010]|[0.006]|[0.000]|[0.010]|
|Combined group dummy|0.0671|0.0404**|0.0183|0.153|0.0359*|0.0222|
||[0.625]|[0.025]|[0.721]|[0.496]|[0.092]|[0.754]|

28
students and the second about teachers, classrooms and schools. Under the rst instrument, students were tested in language (reading, writing and listening), numeracy skills (math), and scholastic and verbal aptitude (Peabody) using test instruments adopted from international testing standards and piloted by a team of international and local researchers. Under the second questionnaire, observation sheets for schools, classrooms and teachers were completed to collect information on school resources, classroom conditions, and teacher qualications.

As mentioned above, ve assessments were administered: a Peabody vocabulary test adapted to the Mongolian context; a mathematics assessment, based on questions from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS); and listening, reading, and writing assessments based on the Mongolian curriculum. Validation measures for the mathematics and Peabody tests were carried out under the READ project. Prior to the mathematics assessment, an investigation of construct equivalence with Grade 4 TIMSS items was undertaken. A panel of Mongolian math experts, MECS sta and an international technical assistant reviewed the TIMSS 2003 mathematics items and identied items that were suitable for Mongolia. The panel used testcurriculum matching analysis to evaluate the degree of congruence between the international mathematics assessment and the Mongolian national curriculum. Since an item might have been in the curriculum for some but not all students in the country, an item was determined appropriate if it was in the intended curriculum for more than 50 percent of the students (World Bank, 2006).

The Peabody test administered was a norm-referenced instrument for measuring the listening vocabulary of children. For each item, the assessor would say a word, and the student responded by selecting the picture that best illustrates that word's meaning. Items were reviewed by the MECS panel to ensure they were appropriate for the Mongolian curriculum. The mathematics, reading, and writing tests used a balanced incomplete block design, with dierent item content across dierent test booklets. Dierent test booklets were then randomly assigned to to dierent students. Items were grouped into blocks, and each block was repeated in more than one test booklet to ensure balance across test booklets (World Bank, 2006).

An international assessment expert hired by the project used construct equivalence analysis to conrm that the assessments measured the same constructs between boys 8
that they were comfortable completing the task.

Our WTA format is also likely to be incentive compatible because it asks about a collective, rather than private good. Lloyd-Smith & Adamowicz (2018) modify the theory in Vossler et al. (2012) to show that incentive compatibility carries through under the same sufficiency conditions when the elicitation format is WTA in a public good referendum. They also show empirically that the WTA format for public goods is preference revealing. This finding is relevant for us because our household survey meets the conditions described by Lloyd-Smith & Adamowicz (2018): the local forest resource is a collective good, and the vote centers on the single issue of the community accepting payment for collectively giving up aspects of it. The audience for the vote is the community government, which enters into an enforceable contract if the vote is positive.

The question would also be incentive compatible for leaders if they respond to the referendum question with a public good in mind and on behalf of constituents. It is possible, however, that leaders could respond to the question as they might for a private good, in which case for the leaders’ survey there could be incentive to strategically overstate WTA. It is possible that leaders could view themselves as acting as a representative of the community selling an asset to an external party, with the audience for their vote the program administrator. Carson & Groves (2007) and Lloyd-Smith & Adamowicz (2018) describe two types of strategic responses in this type of private good stated preference WTA context: for existing goods, there is incentive to respond no to an offer to indicate more price sensitivity, and for new or future goods there is incentive to respond yes to secure a future chance to participate. Since this is an existing program, the former seems more likely in our case. This would cause leaders to be less likely to vote yes, which would cause us to overestimate the costs of program participation.

This issue could also possibly affect the more widespread use of referenda questions to solicit WTA. For example, respondents might strategically say “no” to low payments (that they would actually be willing to accept) in the hopes that it would convince the government to offer higher payments next time. Although this is possible, it seems fairly unlikely, as such strategic responses would require that respondents figure out and believe that their single shot, individual yes/no answer will influence federal policy. We do acknowledge that if this type of question and survey were conducted repeatedly with the same program applicants, then strategic behavior could become more likely as applicants learn the impact of their answers. For this reason, we suggest that 18