provides evidence for the causal link between GVC and female empowerment (measured by ownership and employment).<sup>10</sup> – <u>Table 8. GVCs and Female Labor Force Participation IV Approach</u>

|||||(a) All<br>|regions<br>||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Fem. O|wnership|Fem. Top|Manager|Fem. E|mployees|Fem. Produc|tion Workers|
|Variables|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|
|Ln(Age)|0.047***<br>(0.003)|0.047***<br>(0.003)|-0.005**<br>(0.002)|-0.005**<br>(0.002)|0.076***<br>(0.008)|0.080***<br>(0.008)|0.007<br>(0.011)|0.023**<br>(0.012)|
|Ln(Gov own.)|0.015***<br>(0.004)|0.016***<br>(0.004)|0.001<br>(0.003)|0.001<br>(0.003)|0.014<br>(0.012)|0.010<br>(0.012)|0.082***<br>(0.016)|0.085***<br>(0.017)|
|Main city<br>Medium|<br>0.015***<br>(0.004)<br>0.00136<br>(0.004)|<br>0.015***<br>(0.004)<br>0.00482<br>(0.004)|<br>0.011***<br>(0.003)<br>-0.0347***<br>(0.003)|<br>0.011***<br>(0.003)<br>-0.0336***<br>(0.003)|<br>0.112***<br>(0.010)<br>0.995***<br>(0.010)|<br>0.108***<br>(0.011)<br>0.978***<br>(0.012)|<br>-0.044***<br>(0.015)<br>0.654***<br>(0.020)|<br>-0.028*<br>(0.016)<br>0.703***<br>(0.022)|
|Large|0.009<br>(0.007)|0.017<br>(0.011)|-0.056***<br>(0.006)|-0.050***<br>(0.009)|2.459***<br>(0.017)|2.381***<br>(0.029)|2.024***<br>(0.042)|2.013***<br>(0.085)|
|GVC|<br>0.019<br>(0.020)|<br>-0.143<br>(0.136)|<br>0.001<br>(0.016)|<br>-0.072<br>(0.109)|<br>0.130<br>(0.0816)|<br>3.297***<br>(0.895)|<br>0.767***<br>(0.102)|<br>2.965***<br>(0.820)|
|Observations|82,937|82,937|83,307|83,307|40,812|40,812|40,628|40,628|
|||||<br>(b)MEN|<br>A region||||
||Female O|wnership|Female To|p Manager|Female E|mployees|Fem. Produc|tion Workers|
|Variables|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|GVC1|GVC4|
|Ln(Age)|0.036***<br>(0.006)|0.039***<br>(0.007)|-0.002<br>(0.004)|0.003<br>(0.004)|0.059**<br>(0.025)|0.081***<br>(0.027)|-0.066***<br>(0.025)|-0.018<br>(0.034)|
|Ln(Gov own.)|-0.018<br>(0.011)|-0.017<br>(0.011)|-0.006<br>(0.007)|-0.008<br>(0.007)|0.053<br>(0.042)|0.092**<br>(0.043)|-0.015<br>(0.044)|-0.080<br>(0.059)|
|Main city|<br>0.020**<br>(0.008)|<br>0.023***<br>(0.008)|<br>0.016***<br>(0.005)|<br>0.016***<br>(0.005)|<br>0.163***<br>(0.036)|<br>0.202***<br>(0.033)|<br>-0.045<br>(0.034)|<br>-0.041<br>(0.040)|
|Medium|<br>0.011<br>(0.010)|<br>0.0238***<br>(0.009)|<br>-0.00554<br>(0.006)|<br>-0.00407<br>(0.005)|<br>0.796***<br>(0.038)|<br>0.835***<br>(0.037)|<br>0.330***<br>(0.045)|<br>0.452***<br>(0.042)|
|Large|<br>0.00530<br>(0.022)|<br>0.0358<br>(0.029)|<br>-0.0283**<br>(0.013)|<br>-0.0413**<br>(0.018)|<br>2.209***<br>(0.066)|<br>2.245***<br>(0.094)|<br>1.062***<br>(0.105)|<br>1.187***<br>(0.150)|
|GVC|<br>0.156***|<br>0.349|<br>0.0524|<br>0.523*|<br>1.051***|<br>3.559|<br>1.320***|<br>6.101***|
||(0.059)|(0.476)|(0.036)|(0.296)|(0.354)|(2.831)|(0.232)|(2.029)|
|Observations|11,610|11,610|11,626|11,626|4,820|4,820|6,797|6,797|

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: - All the regressions include country, year, and sector fixed effects. - The intercept is included.

# **6. Conclusion and Policy Implications**

This paper aims at examining the impact of GVCs on women’s trade participation as entrepreneurs and employees. We also analyze how this effect is moderated through external (gender provisions in trade agreements) and internal (investment climate variables) factors. To do so, we use firmlevel data for 154 developing economies and emerging markets with a special focus on the Middle East and North Africa region. Our main findings show that GVC integration increases the likelihood of being a female owner and the share of female employees, especially production ones. A less robust negative effect is found regarding the impact on being a female top manager. These effects are moderated by the inclusion of gender provisions in trade agreements and by some characteristics of the investment climate, namely corruption, access to finance and tax policy. These results remain robust after we control for the endogeneity of GVC using an instrumental

> 10 Results of the first stage are in Table A16 in Appendix 4.

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