_For labor or for divorce?_ backing this conclusion, figure 2 in Appendix A illustrates how Morocco has had the highest increase in the WBLaw index over the full studied period, which corroborates the results we observe. The widely cited literature on collective labor supply models generally explains this type of decline in women's employment by a shift in bargaining power within the household in favor of women (Chiappori et al., 2002; Lise and Seitz 2011; Voena, 2015; Corradini and Buccione, 2023). In these models, women do not switch completely to employment if the utility cost of domestic work is as high as that of the labor market. Thus, we argue that while legislative reforms increased women’s bargaining power within the marriage, the lack of ‘women friendly’ jobs in the Moroccan labor market deterred many from labor force participation and made marriage more or equally attractive.

**Table 6 - Labor market outcomes of Khul' reform in Egypt, Arab Rep.**

||Khul' effe<br>|ct window 1 : 19<br>|92 to 2005<br>K<br>|L<br>Khul' effect<br>|window 2 : 19<br>|92 to 2014<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)<br>|(2)<br>Currentlywork<br> <br>|(3)<br>ing<br> <br>|(4)<br>|(5)<br>Currentlywor<br> <br>|(6)<br>king<br> <br>|
|Post x treated|0.0604**|<br>0.0603***|<br>0.0177|0.0479***|<br>0.0479***|<br>0.0271**|
||(6.82)|<br>(6.80)|(1.43)|(8.50)|<br>(8.48)|(3.04)|
|Household Size||-0.00755<br>(-0.99)|<br>-0.00566<br>(-0.78)||-0.00119<br>(-0.21)|-0.000743<br>(-0.13)|
|WB Law Index|||0.0701***<br>(6.12)|||0.00470<br>(0.61)|
|Observations|18838|<br>18838|18838|29589|29589|29589|
|Mean of outcome variable|0.23|0.23|0.23|0.22|0.22|0.22|
|WB p-value|0.002|<br>0.002|0.396|0.006|0.0140|0.006|
|N cohorts|45|45|45|58|58|58|
|Time trends|No|No|Yes|No|No|Yes|
|Controls<br>Source: Authors calculations|Yes<br>– Demograph|Yes<br>ic and Health Su|Yes<br>rvey (DHS) – Egy|Yes<br>pt 1992, 1993,|Yes<br>2005, 2008, 20|Yes<br>14.|

Source: Authors calculations – Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) – Egypt 1992, 1993, 2005, 2008, 2014. Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the interviewed woman is currently working. Columns 1 to 3 report results for a restricted period representing 13 years around the reform year between 1992 and 2005. Columns 4 to 6 report results for the full covered period between 1992 and 2014. The estimation samples are restricted to married women whose youngest child's age is around 5 years window around the custody cutoff and whom did not have children after the reform. The custody cutoffs are set to 10 for the first window (1992 to 2005), and to 15 for the second window to account for the custody. Wild bootstrap (WB) p-value using one thousand replications. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

In the case of The Arab Republic of Egypt, in the first post-reform window period, between 1992 and 2005, the effect is positive for the sample of married mothers of children aged below the age-cutoff for child custody (10 years for boys and 12 for girls), but it is not statistically significant. While multiple controls for age, time trends and socio-economic position of the woman and her spouse are included, it seems that the variable corresponding to the World Bank’s WBLaw_index has the most positive effect during this first period. These results are also in line with Hassani-Nezhad and Sjögren (2014). The increase in women’s labor outcomes likely happened through a power-shift effect (described above), meaning that married women sought their employment increase thanks to gaining higher bargaining24