one includes only the market access proxy. In the second specification, we control for the information spillovers and exporters location. In the last one, we add the weighted import tariff cut, the comparative advantage index and its interaction term.

Table 2: OLS estimates of the number of new exporters

|variables|**(1)**<br>new exp.|**(2)**<br>new exp.|**(3)**<br>new exp.|**(4)**<br>new exp.|**(5)**<br>new exp.|**(6)**<br>new exp.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|tariff cut|0.100**|0.097***|0.081***||||
||(0.040)|(0.036)|(0.027)||||
|tariff||||-0.017***|-0.018***|-0.016***|
|||||(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|nber of exporters, same product (t-1)||0.001|0.000||-0.000|-0.001|
|||(0.002)|(0.002)||(0.003)|(0.003)|
|nber of exporters, same prod. & mkt. (t-1)||0.126***|0.122***||0.126***|0.125***|
|||(0.012)|(0.011)||(0.013)|(0.013)|
|ez||-0.918***|-0.963***||-1.337***|-1.378***|
|||(0.177)|(0.189)||(0.302)|(0.310)|
|DR import weighted tariff cut|||-0.149***|||-0.123**|
||||(0.054)|||(0.061)|
|comparative advantage|||0.204***|||0.464***|
||||(0.070)|||(0.130)|
|comparative advantage_x_tariff cut|||0.126***||||
||||(0.039)||||
|comparative advantage_x_tariffs||||||-0.009<br>(0.006)|
|Observations|14,187|14,187|14,179|5,730|5,730|5,729|
|R-squared|0.301|0.437|0.452|0.281|0.402|0.403|

Time, country and sectors fixed effects are used in all specifications, but are not reported. Errors are cluster by product. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 As shown in Table 2, the coefficient of the tariff cuts is positive and statistically significant in all three specifications. Ten additional percentage points in the tariff cut will increase by one the number of new exporters of product _p_ . This implies that sectors with large tariffs cuts attracted a larger number of new exporters, but the effect is very small. On the other hand, the effect of the tariff levels is significant and negative as expected. This suggests that sectors with relatively low tariffs attract more exporters. The effect is however almost negligible. As for the effect of the information spillovers, the fact that other firms export product _p_ does not affect the behavior of potential exporters in the same sector. On the other hand, the number of new entrants selling product _p_ in a given destination rises with the number of Dominican firms in the same market. The behavior of other exporters in a market seems therefore to affect the decision of new entrants. As for the exporters’ location, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the number of new exporters and export zones. This suggests that the entry of new exporters takes mainly place in the national territory. This should not come as a surprise since the requirements needed to start a firm in an export zone are more demanding. The effect of the import tariff cuts is negative and statistically significant. Having access to cheaper inputs does not seem to benefit new exporters. One possible reason for this could be that sectors with large import tariff cuts were highly protected sectors in the past, and not necessarily competitive, thus explaining the lack of new entries. Finally, our results suggest that the number of new exporters is larger in sectors where the DR has a comparative advantage. As for the interaction term, only the interaction between the NCRA and the 16