rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **A.4. Unrestricted Irrigation:** **_Ascaris_ Infection Risks**

_Ascaris lumbricoides_ parasitizes ~1.2 billion people in developing countries (de Silva _et al_ . 2003). Female _Ascaris_ worms produce ~200,000 eggs per day and, although most _Ascaris_ eggs only survive for a few weeks on crop surfaces, some remain viable for several months and so represent a risk to health when they are ingested with wastewater-irrigated foods eaten uncooked (Strauss 1985). It would be very useful to be able to quantify _Ascaris_ risks as its properties (pathogenicity, development and survival in the environment) are very different from those of viral and bacterial pathogens, despite it having an overall feco-oral environmental transmission route.

_Ascaris_ dose-response data were published only in 2009 (Navarro _et al_ . 2009), so it was not possible to have used _Ascaris_ as a reference helminthic pathogen in the 2006 WHO Guidelines. Even though the 2006 WHO guideline value for helminth eggs of ≤1 egg per liter of treated wastewater is based on epidemiological data, it is nevertheless very useful to be able to determine required log unit reductions of _Ascaris_ (which is generally the commonest helminth and the eggs of which are able to survive for very long periods of time in the environment) by QMRA and thus to split these between wastewater treatment and post-treatment health-protection control measures (Table A.2), as is done for viral, bacterial and protozoan pathogens, since this allows a lower level of wastewater treatment.

For a tolerable DALY loss of 10<sup>–4</sup> pppy, a DALY loss per case of ascariasis of 8.25 × 10<sup>–3</sup> (Chan 1997) and, as a worst-case scenario, an _Ascaris_ disease/infection ratio of 1 (i.e., all those infected with _Ascaris_ develop ascariasis), the tolerable _Ascaris_ infection risk is given by: Median _Ascaris_ infection risks pppy from the consumption by children under 15 of raw carrots irrigated with wastewaters containing specified numbers of _Ascaris_ eggs were determined by a QMRA-Monte Carlo computer program based on the Karavarsamis-Hamilton method and using the values of _N_ 50 and α determined by Navarro _et al_ . (2009) for the beta-Poisson equation (these authors found that the betaPoisson equation was better for _Ascaris_ than the exponential equation). The resulting estimates of median _Ascaris_ infection risk are given in Table A.8, which shows that 1 egg per liter results in an _Ascaris_ infection risk of ~6 × 10<sup>–3</sup> pppy, which is just below the tolerable _Ascaris_ infection risk of ~10<sup>−2</sup> pppy determined above. Thus, in ascariasis-hyperendemic areas (~1000 eggs per liter of raw wastewater) a 3- log unit reduction of _Ascaris_ eggs is required. This could be achieved, for example, by a 1-log unit reduction by treatment and a 2-log unit reduction by produce peeling ( _cf_ . Table 4.2).

86
Devarajan (2013) and Jerven and Johnston (2015). Like them, we think that the quality of national accounts data is intimately linked to Africa’s growth and prosperity. Over the past decade or so, as growth in gross domestic product (GDP) has picked up in Africa, there has been a renewed focus on the quality of data—even leading to a rebasing of national accounts data for some countries. This is important, because of the rapid growth in small business activity that had previously been unrecorded. As a result, economies that did rebase saw significant gains in GDP per capita. In view of these issues, the authors of this book’s African chapters have tried to collect data from a wide range of sources and to account for inconsistencies. For example, in the case of Botswana, the authors consider two scenarios for structural change in recent years, depending on assumptions about the share of the labor force in agriculture.

**Failure to distinguish location.** Most agriculture takes place in rural areas, and most manufacturing and services take place in urban areas. Given the higher costs of living in urban areas (particularly high cash rents), urban wages must typically exceed rural wages simply because of higher living costs. Thus, comparing nominal urban service and industrial wages with nominal rural farm wage rates inevitably leads to higher urban prices and wages. A more appropriate and purely sectoral comparison would involve comparing farm with rural nonfarm earnings or urban agriculture with urban unskilled manufacturing and service sector wage rates. We would guess that rental costs alone would require a 20 percent higher wage in urban areas, simply to maintain a standard of living comparable with rural areas.

In summary, while all of the measurement issues discussed above are important, we think that there is adequate evidence to support the approach taken by the authors of the country studies in this book. Adjusting average productivities for measurement error may diminish the labor productivity gaps uncovered, but it is highly unlikely that it would overturn any of the results.

# **Country Studies: Findings**

## **Significant Structural Changes, Different Outcomes: Vietnam and Ghana**

On the surface, Ghana and Vietnam appear to have much in common: big pools of labor in agriculture that over time move primarily into services, rather than manufacturing. But a closer look reveals how different their paths have been and, thus, why Vietnam is further along in its economic convergence.

14
cal gender shapes our subconscious attitudes in subtle and surprising ways. For example, Boroditsky, Schmidt, and Phillips (2003) conducted a study — in English — of native speakers of Spanish and German (all of whom were fluent in English); participants in the study were asked to provide (English) adjectives to describe (English) nouns that had been chosen because they had opposite grammatical genders in Spanish and German. Subjects tended to choose adjectives that aligned with the grammatical gender of the noun in their native language. For example, native German-speakers described a picture of a bridge (which is feminine in German) as “beautiful” and “elegant” while native Spanish-speakers described the same (masculine in Spanish) bridge as “big” and “dangerous” (Boroditsky, Schmidt, and Phillips 2003). Thus, the results suggest that grammatical gender shapes the way we think about inanimate objects without inherent biological gender. Grammatical gender also appears to shape gender attitudes — even within individuals. P ́erez and Tavits (forthcoming) conduct a survey experiment with Estonian/Russian bilinguals, randomizing the language in which they are interviewed. They show that bilinguals who are interviewed in Russian (a gender language) are less supportive of gender equality than those who are interviewed in (non-gender) Estonian, even though interview languages were randomly assigned.<sup>9</sup> Recent work also suggests that the influence of grammatical gender extends into the economic realm. Using the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS), a comprehensive data set on the grammatical structure of more than 500 languages, a number of authors have examined the links between grammatical gender and economic and political outcomes. For example, Mavisakalyan (2015) and Shoham and Lee (2017) use the WALS to examine the cross-country association between grammatical gender and gender inequality in the labor force. Santacreu-Vasut, Shoham, and Gay (2013) show that countries where the national

> 9There is also evidence that pronominal gender impacts the salience of gender distinctions. Guiora (1983) finds that children who grow up speaking Hebrew, English, or Finnish come to understand their own biological genders at different ages; those who grow up using different pronouns for males and females become aware of their own natural gender earlier. As discussed above, English has a system of pronominal gender while Finnish does not. Hebrew also uses a dichotomous system of grammatical gender (all nouns are either masculine or feminine), and male and female Hebrew-speakers must use grammatically correct verb forms, for example, that reflect their natural gender. Hebrew also uses different second-person pronouns for males and females.

11
so-called Equity Release Council, a self-regulatory industry group. Moreover, the Financial Conduct Authority requires prospective clients to seek independent counseling. Even though financial advisors must be independent from market participants, advisory fees for RM are higher than for other products such as standard mortgages. While comparing different mortgage products is difficult, there is concern that independent advisors thus have a monetary incentive to prioritize counseling on RM over other credit products.

# **_Europe_**

The RM market in other European countries is either small or non-existent. Many EU member states do not have the necessary legal framework for this mortgage product. In others, such as France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Hungary, legal and regulatory provisions are in place, but the market is relatively small and stagnant. Cultural aversion to mortgage credit, along with lower homeownership and lower home appreciation rates may account for the slow uptake. In 2009, three-quarters of transactions in the European RM market took place in the United Kingdom, according to an industry study (European Mortgage Federation, 2009).

# **_Australia_**

The Australian RM market is still recovering from the global financial crisis and remains stable. Private lenders started offering RM in the early 1990s. The industry grew to meet the demand for debt consolidation, additional income, and funding for home improvement among elderly homeowners. Even though the Australian banking system was largely spared from the 2008 financial crisis, the RM market was hit and the number of lenders decreased from over 20 to 4 (Seniors First, 2019). In contrast to the recent experience in the United Kingdom, the last remaining major bank exited the RM market, allegedly due to adverse market perceptions about higher interest rates (around 2% more than normal mortgages) and higher fees.<sup>6</sup> Australia’s market is sizeable with ca. 20,000 RM outstanding (APRA, 2019). Total exposure to reverse mortgages increased from $1.3 billion in March 2008 to $2.5 billion by December 2017.

Increased consumer protection oversight has been introduced to the market in Australia. Though stringent consumer credit laws have been in place since the mid - 1990s (first in the form of state

> 6 Currently it is understood there are only 3 smaller RM providers in Australia - Heartland Seniors’ Finance, IMB Bank and P&N Bank. See: https://www.theadviser.com.au/breaking-news/38395-cba-bankwest-withdraw-from- <u>reverse-mortgage-market-2 https://nationalseniors.com.au/news/latest/cba-decision-to-end-reverse-mortgages-disappoints-national-seniors.</u>

14
E-5 Gioxide and sulphur dioxide among air pollutants; biological oxygen demand and suspended solids among wa!.er pollutants). Across classes, however, intensity correlations are sometimes quite low.

- @ IPPS parameters can be estimated differently, depending on the types of complementary data which are available. For the present purposes, we have used our U.S. factory sample to compute three basic types of indices. The first, or Upper Bound, estimates are computed from the subsample of factories which we have succeeded in matching between the EPA and Census data bases. Since no common ID codes are available, this has been a difficult process and inevitably entailed the loss of information fron many plants. EPA filles are kept only on firms which are significant pollutors, so we know that our matched sample provides an upward-biased estimate of general sectoral pollution intensity. Developing-country factories tend to be more pollution-intensive, however, so these estimates provide at least a partial correction.

- @ We have produced complemeatary Lower Bound estimates for U.S. plants Ey summing all EPA-recorded pollution by sector and dividing by all Census-recorded output or employment. This makes maximum use of the EPA sample (the Census data cover the whole population of firms), but implicitly counts pollution from all non-EPA-recorded firms as zero. This is an und2restimate, so the Lower Bound intensities should be conservative. In both Upper and Lower Bound cases, we know that the presence of large outliers in the data can have an important impact on sector-specific results. As an alternative, we have computed pollution intensities for all plants separately using the subsample of matched data, and then estimated Interquartile Mean intensities. This eliminates the possible influence of outliers and provides a robust measure of central tendency. Each set of statistics can be useful in particular contexts, as discussed in the paper.

IPPS has already been applied in several World Bank analyses, most notably in two recent World Bank publications:
(appendix A, table A2). In addition, it does not otherwise appear that women’s wages in the informal sector behave differently over time than the corresponding men’s wages.

# **REFERENCES**

Agüero, Jorge, and and Verónica Frisancho. 2017. “Misreporting in Sensitive Health Behaviors and Its Impact on Treatment Effects: An Application to Intimate Partner Violence.” IDB Working Paper IDB-WP-853 (December), Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.

Aizer, Anna. 2010. “The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence.” _American Economic Review_ 100 (4): 1847–59. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1847.

Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 115 (3): 715–53. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554881.

Amaral, Sofia. 2017. “Do Improved Property Rights Decrease Violence against Women in India?” ISER Working Paper 2017–13 (October), Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, Colchester, UK.

Anderberg, Dan, Helmut Rainer, Jonathan Wadsworth, and Tanya Wilson. 2016. “Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence.” _Economic Journal_ 126 (597): 1947–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12246.

Bennefield, Robert L. 1996. “Health Insurance Coverage: 1995.” Current Population Report P60-195 (September), Household Economic Studies, United States Census Bureau, Washington, DC.

Ben Yahmed, Sarra. 2018. "Formal but Less Equal: Gender Wage Gaps in Formal and Informal Jobs in Urban Brazil." _World Development_ 101 (January): 73–87.

Bloch, Francis, and Vijayendra Rao. 2002. “Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India.” _American Economic Review_ 92 (4): 1029–43.

Bobonis, Gustavo J., Melissa Gonz, and Roberto Castro. 2013. “Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control.” _American Economic Journal: Economic Policy_ 5 (1): 179–205.

Buller, Ana Maria, Amber Peterman, Meghna Ranganathan, Alexandra Bleile, Melissa Hidrobo, and Lori Heise. 2018. “A Mixed-Method Review of Cash Transfers and 21
# **Figure 17: Direct job content per $1 million of gross exports across macro sectors 2011**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Agriculture<br>Construction<br>Electricity, gas and water<br>Financial services<br>Manufacturing<br>Mining and Energy<br>Other commercial services<br>Public services<br>Real estate, renting<br>Trade, sales and accomodation<br>Transport and communication<br>0 100 200 300 400<br>Jobs per $1 mil. exports<br>ZAF BRA RUS CHL COL THA TUR<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors’ elaboration based on LACEX.

## **5. Labor Content of Exports in Global Value Chains**

In this section, we narrow our focus and measure the labor content of non-resources intensive manufacturing exports traditionally governed in GVCs, to examine how growth in non-traditional export sectors has impacted the level and nature of labor in South Africa. South Africa has become more integrated in GVCs, and is looking to upgrade in GVCs as an avenue to generating higher quality jobs (Farole 2015). GVCs are fundamentally about restructuring the location of economy activity: what used to be produced under one factory roof may now take place across a number of different countries. This has fundamental impacts on where jobs go, who gets them, and what types of jobs they are (Farole 2015). A priori, the net impact of joining and upgrading in GVCs on labor markets in developing countries is unclear and not well studied in the literature,<sup>16</sup> as it can occur in opposite directions through a variety of channels.<sup>17</sup> Separating the domestic content from the foreign content contained in a country’s exports—as achieved in the LACEX data—is a necessary step when disentangling the impact of production across multiple borders. However, when defining GVC-trade as value addition across different geographical locations governed by

> 16 Exceptions include Kucera et al. (2012).

> 17 For example, the requirement of GVCs to meet strict quality standards often leads to increased mechanization, and the scale economies possible from accessing larger global markets may make capital investments more viable. Less labor-intensive methods of production may result, lowering the number of jobs for a given volume of output/exports. GVCs may also have distributional consequences in terms of the nature of skills demand and their implications for wages. On the other hand, if greater foreign value added in exports leads to an increase in total exports, by complementing the domestically available intermediate products and skills, it may lead to higher demand for labor in an industry. However, if it substitutes domestic production, it can lead to a lower share of domestic value added in exports and thereby lower labor demand. As another alternative, it could substitute the direct labor within an industry, but complement the indirect labor (Farole 2015).

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nationals with complete Ivoirian parenthood. This transformed the exclusion into an ethnic and religious fault line between, firstly, the Muslim dominated North consisting of the majority of immigrants and descendants of the immigrants from neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali); and secondly, the Christian dominated south.

Notwithstanding the economic and social upheavals, the perception has been that the education system was central to Ivoirian identity and politics. Côte d‟Ivoire follows the centralized French education system, where the government plays a key role in curriculum development, coordination and allocation of resources and the organization of national examinations through the ministries of Education, Vocational Education and Higher Education. Prior to the civil war the education system was already struggling with a student-teacher ratio close to 40 (UNAIDS, 1998) while the net enrollment rate in primary education recorded around 60 percent (Côte d‟Ivoire Ministry of Education, 2003). In 2000, following the Education for All (EFA) initiative - a worldwide plan to meet the learning outcomes of all children, youth, and adults by 2015 - a number of educational reforms were initiated by the newly elected President Laurent Gbagbo. The proposed agenda addressed areas that needed much attention including improvement of the status of teachers, enactment of the free public schooling through tenth grade and a nationwide preschool system. Perhaps because of this the net national enrollment rate in primary education slightly improved to 64.2 percent in 2001 (Côte d‟Ivoire Ministry of Education, 2003).

While economic disparity between the North and the South and polarization of ethnicity and identity based on national origin were arguably the main causes of Ivoirian civil war, unequal access to education and uneven allocation of educational infrastructures between the North and the South also played a crucial role (Sany, 2010). Despite the improvement in country-wide net enrollment rates in the early 2000s, the enrollment rate in the Northern states of Korhogo and Odiene were below 40 percent. Overall, there was a marked disparity in enrollment rates between the Northern states (less than or equal to 50 percent) and the Southern states (close to 80 percent).

# **2.2 The period from 2002 to 2004: Education as a tactic of war**

5
Most migrants now living in Cairo were born either in Upper Egypt (49.1 percent) or Lower Egypt (45.4 percent), as shown in Table 4. Migrants to Lower Egypt arrive mainly from other governorates in Lower Egypt (53.75 percent). The majority of migrants now living in Upper Egypt came from either the same region (48.5 percent) or from Cairo (34.1 percent).<sup>4</sup> Table 4 – Direction of Migration – Region and Urban/Rural (classified according to destination)

|Previous Region|Cairo|Lower<br>Urban|Lower<br>Rural|Curre<br>Upper<br>Urban|nt Region<br>Upper<br>Rural|Frontier<br>Urban|Frontier<br>Rural|Total|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Cairo|4.0|23.0|20.1|35.3|29.8|7.6|3.1|20.3|
|Lower Urban|30.8|18.4|19.9|10.6|9.4|23.4|25.0|19.8|
|Lower Rural|14.7|32.8|41.7|6.4|4.1|9.1|15.6|26.2|
|Upper Urban|31.1|12.4|7.4|27.7|23.4|22.3|3.1|17.3|
|Upper Rural|18.0|12.9|9.8|19.2|31.0|19.3|28.1|14.9|
|Frontier Urban|1.3|0.3|0.3|0.8|2.3|17.8|9.4|1.3|
|Frontier Rural|0.2|0.2|0.7|0.0|0.0|0.5|15.6|0.3|
|Total|100|100|100|100|100|100|100|100|

Source: Authors’ calculations using Labor Force Survey Migrants now residing in Cairo came mainly from urban areas in either Lower (30.8 percent) or Upper (31 percent) Egypt. Aside from those now in Cairo, the majority of migrants stayed within their region, for example 32.7 percent of those living in Urban Lower Egypt came from different governorates in Urban Lower Egypt. Almost half (48.4 percent) of all migrants from all regions reside in Lower Urban Egypt. (See tables 3 & 4.) Urban governorates - except Cairo - absorb the highest inflows of migrants, followed by Frontier governorates (South Sinai and Red Sea) where tourism offers employment possibilities (Table 5).

> 4 The high migration rate from Cairo to urban Upper Egypt is due to the inclusion of urban Giza, which is part of Greater Cairo, within the urban Upper Egypt category.

6