Al Jazeera 2020). This capture almost immediately followed the breakdown of the partial ceasefire and was unexpected by the IRG. As demonstrated in Figure 2, there was a decline in violence in Al Jawf following the ceasefire described above, and violence rapidly increased back to the pre-ceasefire levels during the assault in February. Thus, although violence suddenly and unexpectedly increased, the violence was at levels experienced by the population in the past year.

And lastly, the fourth major shock was the unexpected teacher strike in regions completely controlled by the IRG beginning in February 2020 in response to distrust of the IRG, low salaries for teachers, poor conditions of the schools, and inadequate teaching materials (e.g., World Bank 2020b). Each of these factors has either been caused or significantly exacerbated by the conflict and has affected the entire country rather than affecting only the most violent regions (e.g., OCHA 2019a). Further tying the strike to the conflict, there are reports that the strike was being instigated by secessionist forces in an attempt to use public frustration against the IRG.9 Although the strike was voluntary, there were reports of many teachers participating in a number of governorates. However, there were also reports of portions of some IRGheld governorates not fully participating in the strike- parts of Shabwah and Al Maharah.10 Importantly, figure 2 demonstrates that there was little change in violence in the time period of the strike.

Surprisingly, the strike was not widely reported in the international news media or by humanitarian organizations, but was covered by a number of local news organizations.11 One potential reason was the capture of Al Jawf and other events happening at the same time, which could have dominated the news cycle and captured the attention of humanitarian agencies.12 Despite limited coverage in the local media, the World Bank performed a number of key informant interviews with teachers, principals, and district and governorate officials in charge of education to discuss the strike (e.g., World Bank 2020b).

Using these four strong and arguably exogenous conflict-related shocks during the survey period that might significantly impact access to education, we investigate the impact each had on school attendance. In addition to investigating the impact each had individually, the effects of the four shocks are compared. Furthermore, the impacts of each shock on a variety of other household measures are investigated to better understand the range of potential impacts on households.

# **Section 3. Data**

Given the tumultuous environment during active conflict, it is very challenging to find data

> 9For example, see http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=110777. 10The districts that border the semi-autonomous governorate of Marib were reported to not participate, and districts in Al Maharah were also reported to not all participate. Al Maharah, which borders Oman, is removed from much of the conflict.

> 11For example, see http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=110777, https://almawqeapost.net/news/47124, http://adengad.net/news/435004/, https://www.alkhabaralyemeni.net/2020/01/08/75137/.

> 12At the same time, the north announced they would no longer accept new bank notes printed by the IRG beginning in 2016. However, reports suggest that this change had little change on markets or household welfare (including education) during the period under analysis (e.g., WFP 2020).

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