valorem and specific tariff are indicated, and the actual tariff applied by Russian customs is the maximum of the two. To know the actual tariff, where specific tariffs are specified, we must calculate their ad valorem equivalents. This is a non-trivial task, and some previous efforts have simply ignored the specific tariffs, resulting in an underestimate of the actual tariff rates;<sup>2</sup> and (2) due to the lack of ten digit tariff line data on the value and quantity of imports, most prior calculations were based on more aggregate and less precise data.<sup>3</sup> The first study to accurately assess the structure of the Russian tariff structure, using trade and tariff data at the ten digit tariff line level was Shepotylo and Tarr (2008). They provided calculations for the years 2001-2005 and showed a trend of increasing protection for light industry and the food industry during this period. Jandosov and Sabyrova (2011) and Shepotylo (2011) both accurately showed that the average applied tariff of Kazakhstan would approximately double as a result of the imposition of the common external tariff of the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union. The initial Customs Union tariff in 2011 was the Russian tariff, and Kazakhstan applied the Customs Union tariff except for about 400 tariff line exemptions for Kazakhstan between July 1, 2010 and July 1, 2011.<sup>4</sup> In widely cited estimates, the WTO (2011) assessed that the un-weighted average bound tariff of the Russian Federation would be 7.8 percent after all commitments are implemented. The World Trade Organization, however, based its calculations on 8-digit trade data, which introduces imprecision.<sup>5</sup> Our estimate of the un-weighted bound tariff of the Russian Federation after all commitments are implemented is 8.6 percent. But the bound tariffs are only maximum tariffs, as Russia

> 2 See, for example, ATF Bank (2011).

> 3 The previous data available were the annual hard copy reports of the Russian Customs Committee. These reports aggregate information from the tariff line level, so that information is reported on about 1700 aggregated product codes out of about 11,000 tariff lines. Previously, World Bank staff manually entered these data annually in order to perform the calculations that were possible with those data. Earlier work based on these data includes the following. Tarr (1999; 2002) has assessed the average level of the Russian tariff and the degree of tariff escalation by stage of production using 1900 tariff lines.   Afontsev applied the Grossman-Helpman methodology to the Russian tariff structure in two papers. Afontsev (2002) assessed to extent to which industrial lobbying, consumer welfare or government revenue can explain the formation of Russian tariff policy in 1992-1997.  Afontsev (2004) assessed the motivation of the government for the tariff simplification policy of 2000-2001. See the chapters and discussions on Russia in Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994; 1996) for other early calculations.

> 4 The majority of exemptions were eliminated after July 1, 2011.

> 5 Further, the WTO Secretariat dropped specific tariffs when there was no match at the six digit level between the tariff classification and the trade data, which biases down the estimated tariff. Based on our three year base period (one year more recent than the WTO), we calculate this occurred in the case of 22 tariff lines in the years 2012-2020.

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