rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
“ _People made fun of me because I used different words; despite the fact we all spoke Spanish, they could tell something was different as soon as I opened my mouth. Hence, I learned to speak Colombian fast, I had to. It was not a choice._ ” Venezuelan migrant child in Colombia (age 16), Dec 2023

# **I INTRODUCTION**

Approximately 3% of the global population are migrants (World Bank, 2023). Of this share, almost 9% are children under 14 years of age, amounting to about 23.3 million individuals. While significant, these numbers do not account for all the children impacted by migration—including those left behind and native-born children in hosting countries—which highlights the relevance of this issue. It is crucial to understand the effects of migration on children because this significant event can profoundly shape life trajectories. Moreover, specifically for children whose origins or destinations are in developing countries, migration can alter their mobility out of or into poverty. Although migration destinations are balanced between the northern and southern hemispheres, only 15% of the world’s migrant children originate in the north, whereas 85% migrate from the south (World Bank, 2023). There is substantial research on the impacts of migration on adult migrants and hosts but considerably less regarding its effects on children.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive review of research findings on the impact of migration on children’s development with an emphasis on insights from Economics and Psychology. It summarizes migration effects on various groups of children by category based on their relationship to the migratory journey, including:

1. _Left-behind children:_ Children who remain in their home country while one or more parents migrate. We focus on how the absence of a parent impacts their outcomes.

2. _Migrant children:_ Those who have migrated themselves or in some cases are second-generation migrants. We examine how the experience of relocating to a new environment affects their outcomes.

3. _Native children:_ Non-migrant children in the host country who interact with migrant children. We assess how their exposure to peers from different backgrounds influences their outcomes.

2
20 Type II reforms, on the other hand, are more institutional in nature. Many of them, such as divestiture, face legal and other hurdles. They take time. Reorienting public expenditure requires first that an adequate expenditure monitoring and control mechanism be put in place-otherwise budgets and actuals bear no relation to each other. At the same time, the costs of many of the Type II reforms come through almost immediately, while the benefits remain in some unquantified future. The costs of public sector downsizing are palpable-they will probably be demonstrating outside the door of the responsible minister the day aftr (o- the day before) the announcement. The same is true of layoffs brought about as a result of divestiture. Yet the benefits of divestiture in terms of the expected surge in investment and so on are always in the future, and difficult to quantify. This is very different from the revenue effects of exchange rate liberalisation- which can be forecast accurately and which come through quickly.

I have referred to Type I and Type II reforms also as Phase I and Phase II reforms because, by and large, this is the sequence that African countries in general, and Ghana in particular, seem to be following. I have also argued that this is, broadly speaking, the right sequence to follow. The Welfare Economics evaluation of Phase I reforms for Ghana suggests strongly that, overall and on average, they have been a success. But it also suggests that Phase II reforms are needed because without them we will not get the growth with equity needed to make a significant dent in poverty within a lifetime. However, it should be clear that the political economy of Phase II reforms is different from that of Phase I reforms. Many of the costs of the former are upfront, while the benefits do not necessarily
l POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2760

# **Summary findings**

In recent years foreign bank participation has increased tremendously in Latin America. Some observers argue that foreign bank entry will benefit Latin American banking systems by reducing the volatility of loans and deposits and increasing efficiency. Others are concerned that foreign banks might choose to extend credit only to certain customers, leaving some sectors-such as small businesses-unserved.

Clarke and his coauthors examine this issue. Using bank-level data for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru during the mid-1990s, they empirically investigate whether bank origin affects the share and growth rate of bank lending to small businesses. They find that although foreign banks generally lent less to small businesses (as share of total lending) than private domestic banks, the difference is due primarily to the behavior of small foreign banks. The difference was considerably smaller for large and medium-sized banks. And in Chile and Colombia, large foreign banks might actually lend slightly more (as share of total lending) than large domestic banks.

This paper-a product of Finance, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of entry by foreign banks on domestic banking systems in Latin America. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Sintim-Aboagye, room MC3-422, telephone 202-473-7644, fax 202-522-1155, email address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at gclarke@worldbank.org, rcull@worldbank.org, mmartinezperia@worldbank.org, or ssanchez@worldbank.org. (36 pages)

> **_The Policy Research Working Paper Seoies disseminates_** _the_ **_findings_** _of_ **_work in progress_** _to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polisbed. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclzssions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the autbors. They do not necessarily represent the vie.w of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent._

Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
- Frey, B.S. and Jegen, R.(2001): “Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence”. Working Paper No.26. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper Series. Zurich University.

- Frey, B. and Osterloh, M. (2002): _Successful management by Motivation_ . Springer. Swiss Association for Organization and Management.

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- Kruse, D. (1992): “Supervision, working conditions, and the employer size-wage effect”. _Industrial Relations_ , 31, pp.229-249.

- Leonard, J. S. (1987): “Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision and Turnover”. _Journal of Labor Economics_ , vol.5, issue 4, part 2, pp. 136-152.

- Lepper, M., Greene, D. and Nisbett, R. (1973): “Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Reward”. _Journal of Personality and Social Psychology_ , october, 28(1), pp. 129-137.

- Murdock, K.(2002): “Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contract”. _Rand Journal of Economics_ ; 33(4), pp.650-671.

- Nagin, D. S., Rebitzer, J. B., Sanders, S. and Lowell, J. T. (2002): “Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment”. _The American Economic Review_ , September, pp. 850-873.

20
- Rajan, G. R., and Subramanian, A. (2011). Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth. _Journal of Development Economics_ , 94(1): 106-118.

- Razin, O., and Collins, S. M. (1997). Real exchange rate misalignments and growth. NBER Working Paper 6174. Cambridge: NBER.

Rodrik, D. (2008a). The real exchange rate and economic growth. Brookings Papers No. 2.

Rodrik, D. (2008b). Notes on the Ethiopian economic situation. Mimeo, December 22.

Rodrik, D. (2013). Unconditional convergence in manufacturing. _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , 128(1): 165-204.

- Rodrik, D. (2014). An African Growth Miracle? NBER Working Paper No. 20188, June. Washington, D.C.: NBER.

Stone, M., Roger, S., Shimizu, S., Nordstrom, A., Kisinbay, T., and Restrepo, J. (2009). The role of exchange rate in inflation-targeting emerging economies. IMF Occasional Paper No. 267. Washington, D.C.: IMF.

Subramanian, A. (2010). Ethiopia’s Experiment. Blog entry available at <u>http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/09/ethiopia%E2%80%99s-experiment.php.</u> United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2009). The global economic crisis: systemic failures and multilateral remedies. Geneva: UNCTAD.

Timmer, P. and S. Akkus. (2008). The structural transformation as a pathway out of poverty: Analytics, empirics and politics. CGD Working Paper No.150. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.

- Williamson, J. (1982). A Survey of the Literature on the Optimal Peg. _Journal of Development Economics_ 11 (August).

- Williamson, J. (2005). A currency brief for East Asia, not just China. Policy Brief No. 05-1. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

- World Bank. (2014). Strengthening export performance through improved competitiveness. Third Ethiopia Economic Update. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: World Bank.

- World Bank. (2015). Overcoming constraints in the manufacturing sector. Fourth Ethiopia Economic Update: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: World Bank.

22
# **Table C2:  Average rating of severity of constraints**

||Bolded coe<br>|fficients indic<br>|**Severity of**<br>ategender dif<br>|**Different Co**<br>ferences are st<br>|**nstraints**<br>atisticallysign<br>|ificant at the 5<br>|% level.<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Bang **|**ladesh**|**Ethi**|**opia**|**Indo**|**nesia**|**Sri L**|**anka**|
||**Women**|**Men**|**Women**|**Men**|**Women**|**Men**|**Women**|**Men**|
||mean/se|mean/se|mean/se|Mean/se|mean/se|Mean/se|mean/se|mean/se|
|electricity|**0.65**|**1.28**|0.87|1.00|1.17|1.1|**0.87**|**1.2**|
||0.81|1.12|1.27|1.36|1.28|1.29|1.15|1.29|
|public<br>utilities|**0.00**|**0.06**|1.21|1.06|1.03|0.79|**0.62**|**1.01**|
||0.06|0.37|1.33|1.35|1.3|1.18|1.01|1.24|
|finance|1.50|1.27|2.11|1.84|1.8|1.78|1.24|1.40|
||1.40|1.23|1.27|1.38|1.38|1.38|1.39|1.40|
|transport|1.38|1.36|**1.33**|**1.81**|1.32|1.26|1.13|1.17|
||0.95|1.18|1.40|1.37|1.35|1.33|1.32|1.36|
|markets|2.09|2.08|2.31|2.29|1.21|1.25|1.39|1.25|
||0.82|0.98|1.11|1.07|1.28|1.33|1.35|1.36|
|labor|0.02|0.03|**0.15**|**0.47**|0.5|0.49|0.11|0.2|
||0.16|0.23|0.63|1.04|0.99|0.99|0.56|0.72|
|land|0.11|0.14|0.65|0.52|0.46|0.49|**0.04**|**0.11**|
||0.55|0.51|1.14|1.10|0.99|0.99|0.28|0.54|
|governance|**1.48**|**2.05**|**0.24**|**0.61**|1.13|1.19|0.13|0.22|
||1.00|0.96|0.71|1.06|1.38|1.34|0.58|0.74|
|registration|**0.00**|**0.11**|**0.03**|**0.22**|0.62|0.61|**0.08**|**0.17**|
||0.06|0.38|0.24|0.71|1.09|1.07|0.49|0.66|
|taxes|**0.00**|**0.02**|**0.10**|**0.47**|0.68|0.65|**0.07**|**0.15**|
||0.05|0.18|0.45|1.04|1.11|1.12|0.44|0.62|

Note: In each country managers were asked about the severity of different obstacles to investment. Constraints were grouped by theme and the maximum value of the different constraints in a given category was used as a measure of the severity of the constraint. For example, public utilities covers problems with water, telecommunication and postal services. Different country scales of severity were converted to the following common scale: 0=no problem, 1=a minor problem, 2=somewhat of a problem, 3=a major problem. Statistics are weighted.

55
Research on services embodied in traded goods, based on the Leontief inverse, can be traced back to Grubel (1988) who examined Canadian exports in 1973 and 1983. He found that, over that decade, Canadian embodied services exports had increased substantially to the point where Canada enjoyed a surplus in embodied services trade but had a deficit in direct trade in services. Urata and Kiyota (2003) examined the embodied services in total gross trade for several major services categories of five Asian economies – China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand − in 1990. They found that embodied services accounted for a large share of total services trade for each country. Francois and Woerz (2008) examined the role of services as inputs in manufacturing sectors. They found a significant and strong positive effect of increased business services openness (i.e. greater levels of imports) on some industries, supporting the notion that offshoring of business services may promote the competitiveness of the most skill and technology intensive industries in the OECD countries. Recently, Francois et al. (2013) demonstrated that the ratio of value added exports to gross exports is significantly higher than one in services sectors, suggesting an important role of services sectors in downstream sectors through forward inter-industrial linkages. Their studies cover many countries and provide some interesting insights.

These early studies used single national input-output tables, rather than an international input-output table as in this paper, so they could not break down the inputs according to their origins or consider the mismeasurement in services inputs due to two-way trade in intermediate products. In addition, they can only consider how much a service sector’s value-added is embodied in manufacturing exports regardless whether parts of the exported value-added return back to the exporting country or not. In the current paper, we make use of the newly constructed international input-output tables by the WIOD team to measure more precisely the embodied services and indirect trade through other sectors. With the multi-country input-output table and the information about the origins of inputs, we can study embodied domestic and foreign services and their interaction with domestic services development. Stehrer, Foster, and Vries (2012) and Timmer et al. (2013) also use a similar method and the WIOD data to estimate the shares of services, income and jobs in a country that are directly and indirectly related to the production of manufacturing goods, but their work is primarily descriptive without connecting embodied services to the performance of manufacturing sectors.

5
Policy Research Working Paper 6222

# **Abstract**

This paper shows that the top 1 percent of exporters critically shape trade patterns, using firm-level data from 32 countries. In particular, variation in average firm size (the intensive margin) explains over two thirds of the variation in the sector distribution of exports across countries, the remaining share is explained by variation in the number of firms (the extensive margin). Variation in average firm size across sectors is largely driven by variation in the sectoral distribution of exports from the top 1 percent of firms in a country—export superstars. In contrast, the sectoral distribution of exports from the remaining 99 percent of firms is more similar across countries, and the distribution of the total number of firms across sectors is very similar across countries. This paper also finds that current export superstars typically entered the export market relatively large, reached the top 1 percent after less than three years of exporting, and account for more than half of a country’s total exports, export growth and diversification. The results underscore the role of individual firms in determining both trade volumes and trade patterns.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cfreund@worldbank.org and mpierola@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# FIGURE 2 INFLATION **AND** THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE

<!-- Start of picture text --> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8S<br>Cl<br>87S<br>200 - A<br>0<br>C,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00<br>010.<br>10000<br>86<br>100 31.0 120<br>RP.AL EXCIHANGE RATE (1975=100)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**-** 35 **-**
**<u>Table 7. Log earnings returns to cognitive skills</u>**

||||**Men**|||**W**|**omen**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**O**|**LS**|**Selectivit**|**y corrected**|**O**|**LS**|**Selectivit**|**y corrected**|
||[1]|[2]|[3]|[4]|[1]|[2]|[3]|[4]|
|**All countries**|0.039**|0.029|0.041**|0.030|0.055***|0.046**|0.075***|0.063***|
|**Armenia**|0.073|0.054|0.092|0.073|0.059|0.068|0.045|0.056|
|**Bolivia**|0.122**|0.124**|0.121*|0.116*|-0.031|-0.022|-0.045|-0.042|
|**Colombia**|-0.047|-0.044|-0.047|-0.037|-0.038|-0.051|-0.032|-0.039|
|**Georgia**|0.080|0.076|0.081|0.064|0.118**|0.103**|0.218***|0.192***|
|**Ghana**|-0.019|-0.053|-0.043|-0.067|-0.024|-0.022|0.029|-0.018|
|**Kenya**|0.049|0.052|0.058|0.062|0.110**|0.104*|0.152**|0.143**|
|**Serbia**|0.019|0.029|0.022|0.031|0.002|-0.000|-0.104|-0.129|
|**Ukraine**|-0.002|-0.007|-0.062|-0.057|0.005|-0.002|0.004|-0.001|
|**Vietnam**|0.059|0.037|0.051|0.030|0.117***|0.087**|0.136***|0.100***|

Note: Specifications [1] and [3] do not include noncognitive skills; specifications [2] and [4] are full models that include noncognitive skills. Schooling is measured as spline variables. Results for all countries pool the samples of Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Ukraine and Vietnam and are estimated with country fixed effects. See Appendix Table 4 for complete results. Statistical significance is denoted as * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data sources: STEP data, 2012-13 46
The analysis presented in this paper is meant to draw attention to a potentially important relationship, rather than to establish a definitive connection. First, it is hard to infer a causal relationship between policy uncertainty and trade because policy itself responds to economic circumstances and is likely to be forward looking. Second, when studying GVCs, it is hard at this stage to disentangle the contrasting forces that link global value chains and uncertainty. This does not allow us to properly test whether the consequences of uncertainty are more serious for GVC trade. Finally, we would want to separate different types of economic policy uncertainty and their effect on trade and global value chains. However, the available data do not allow for a precise test. Addressing these data and conceptual issues should be the focus of future research in this area.

# **References:**

Ahir, H., N. Bloom and D. Furceri. 2018. “World Uncertainty Index. Stanford, mimeo.

Ahir, H., N. Bloom and D. Furceri. 2019. “Caution: Trade uncertainty is rising and can harm the global economy”, VoxEU.org, July 4.

Al-Haschimi, A., M. Gächter, D. Lodge, W. Steingress. 2016. “The Great Normalization of Global Trade”, VoxEU.org, October 14.

Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta. 2018. “The Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical or Structural?” World Bank Economic Review. Published electronically May 23. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhx027.

Baker, S. R., N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis (2016). “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (4), 1593-1636.

Bernanke, Ben S. (1983), “Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 85-106.

Crowley, M, H Song, and N Meng (2018), "Tariff Scares: Trade policy uncertainty and foreign market entry by Chinese firms," Journal of International Economics, 114 (September), 96-115. Ebeke, C. and J. Siminitz (2018), “Trade uncertainty and Investment in the Euro Area.” IMF Working Paper.

Handley, K (2014), "Exporting under trade policy uncertainty: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, 94 (1): 50-66.

Handley, K, and N Limao (2017), "Policy uncertainty, trade and welfare: Theory and evidence for China and the U.S." American Economic Review 107(9): 2731-83.

Handley, K, and N Limao (2015), "Trade and investment under policy uncertainty: Theory and firm evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(4): 189-222.

16
I next examine the relationship between these variables and the intermediate outcome of autonomy. In a theory of intra-household bargaining such as that of Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), a woman with higher bargaining power before entering the labor force is less likely to face domestic violence upon entering the labor force. That is, if education is associated with a lower increase in domestic violence among women who work, this is not because work is associated with higher increases in autonomy among educated women, but rather because their autonomy is higher even if they do not work. So we would expect to see a higher rates of autonomy among women who work, and women with more education, but not a positive interaction between the two.

Table 4 uses three measures of self reported decision-making power–as well as a the first principal component from principal components analysis that combines the first three–to test this theory. Overall, the three main patterns that emerge support the Eswaran and Malhotra theory. First, panel A shows that work is associated with higher autonomy. Second, panels B and C show that education and age at marriage are each associated with as is found in various other con- higher autonomy, generally developing country texts (Lloyd et al., 2009). Third, there is no evidence that work is associated with differentially higher autonomy in women with more education or higher education. In fact, the interaction term between work and education is negative in the column 4 regression that uses the composite autonomy measure, suggesting that work and education are closer to being substitutes than complements in raising a woman’s bargaining power.

# **4.2 Alternative Explanations**

Having established a relationship between a woman’s status, bargaining power, and domestic violence incidence, I next look for evidence for mechanisms other than an instrumental violence model than can explain the observed relationships. I first examine whether there is evidence that assortative matching in the marriage market pairs empowered women with husbands unlikely to resort to domestic violence to reassert control after a wife enters the labor force. If this story were true, we would expected that controlling for a husband’s characteristics (his education or age at marriage relative to his wife’s) would decrease the of the interaction term between the wife’s education or magnitude age at marriage and work. However, columns 1 and 2 of table 5 show that, conditional on wife characteristics, both the main effects of the age difference between a husband and wife and his education, as well as the interactions between these variables and whether the wife works, are uncorrelated with domestic violence. Instead, the wife characteristics remain almost identical to the magnitude of those in table 3 which are unconditional on 14