rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **References**

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We next look at returns at the country level. Table 6 reports yearly real average returns for all countries for which we have more than 10 years of bond price data. Countries are ranked by average real returns. We also show the standard deviation of returns, average excess returns (above UK/US bonds), as well as the number of sovereign default events and the share of years in default. The country comparison is complicated by the fact that some countries, including most advanced countries, no longer issue government bonds in London or New York. Moreover, some countries only entered international capital markets recently and, for individual countries, there are years or even decades without pricing data, resulting in an unbalanced sample. Appendix B1 provides details on data coverage.

The results in Table 6 are consistent with our findings so far. Sovereign bonds of countries with a history of serial default tend to show higher returns, but also higher volatility.<sup>43</sup> The returns look surprisingly high even for countries that have defaulted multiple times and over long periods, such as Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Mexico, Ukraine, or Venezuela. These countries feature long-run excess returns between 4% and 12%. It is also remarkable that not a single country in Table 6 shows a negative arithmetic return, on average, and only two countries have negative excess returns (Bolivia and China).

Figure 8: Sovereign risk-return profiles: Returns and standard deviations, 1815-2016 <!-- Start of picture text --> 15 CIV ECU<br>CHE PAK<br>EST<br>NGA<br>IRQ UKR<br>FIN MEX<br>10 CRSR IB PO DEUL<br>VEN<br>FRA CZK<br>PHL<br>LBN ZMAWEPAN R NIC HC TUB IURY BRPR CHLJPNTURATARGITA CO GRC G SLVLTM DOMPRY<br>5 MYSNLDUS bondsHRVVNMEGYIDNSWEBELDNK ESPPERHUNAUTHND RUSBGR<br>ZAFIRLTHANOR ROU<br>AUS<br>NZL<br>CANUK bonds<br>CHNBOL<br>t-statistic:5.37<br>0<br>p-value:0.00<br>0 10 20 30 40 50<br>Standard deviation<br>Serial defaulters All others<br>Mean annual real return in %<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ This figure plots real, average total returns on country-level portfolios of sovereign external bonds against their standard deviation. The data come from Table 6, covering countries with 10 years or more of bond price data.

To visualize the risk-return patterns, Figure 8 plots the mean annual real ex-post return against its standard deviation by country. The typical serial defaulter (marked in red) features average yearly returns in the range of 5%-10% and a standard deviation of returns above 20%. For other periphery countries (without a history of default), the average returns are lower, as is the standard deviation. We also show observations

> 43 In the current environment of near zero interest rates in advanced economies, coupons on many of the serial defaulters are in the 6-10 percent range.

32
appraisal, selection and implementation that could significantly increase the productivity of the investment in the selected projects. According to Figure 7, the highest average annual growth rate (of almost 7 percent) is achieved with scenario INF-BL(45), i.e. by gradually scaling up investment and ensuring high productivity gains. Compared to the baseline scenario this implies an additional 1.2 percent of real GDP growth per year over 15 years. Figure 8 shows that the unemployment rate in 2025 will be lowest for that scenario as well.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 7: Real GDP growth rate Figure 8: Unemployment rate in 2025<br>(average 2010-2025, percent) (percent)<br>7.0 13.6<br>6.0 13.4<br>5.0 13.2<br>4.0 13.0<br>3.0 12.8<br>2.0 12.6<br>1.0 12.4<br>0.0 12.2<br>Source: Authors’ calculation Source: Authors’ calculation<br><!-- End of picture text --> In addition to the increased productivity, another reason for the better outcome for the scenario with a delayed expansion of investment spending is the lower pressure on domestic markets and the resulting lower price increase for relevant investment commodities, concluding construction services. This adds to the effectiveness of the spending in terms of generating new capital. The timing of investments for infrastructure improvement therefore needs to be considered carefully and measures taken to ensure that the country’s resources are used as productively as possible.

**Figure 9:** Front-loading investment versus back-loading with improved productivity (Average real GDP growth 2010-2025; public external debt as percent of GDP in 2025)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 7.0 33.5<br>33.0<br>6.8<br>32.5<br>6.6 32.0<br>31.5<br>6.4<br>31.0<br>6.2<br>30.5<br>6.0 30.0<br>29.5<br>5.8<br>29.0<br>5.6 28.5<br>INF-FL INF-BL INF-BL(15) INF-BL(30) INF-BL(45)<br>Real GDP growth rate (percent, left-hand side)<br>Public external debt (percent of GDP, right-hand side)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors’ calculation 11
transition countries, it is important to take into account that many seemingly new parties were spun off from the former communist parties, and their political leaders were former communists that shared the same ideology. Hoff, Horowitz and Milanovic (2004) take this into account when calculating the share of seats held by the former communist party. Because it is inherently difficult to code the ideologies of political parties and their leaders during transition – after all, most newly emerged political leaders were former communists or at least had connections to the communist party – we use the more general and objective indicator of Executive Constraints as our base measure of initial political structure. Importantly, with the exception of a few countries such as Croatia that experienced a civil war, the nature of the political regime has not changed much during the transition period, despite the fact that many countries have seen multiple governments since the start of transition (World Bank 2002).<sup>17</sup>

# _4. Initial Political Structure and Institution Building in Transition Economies - Results_

The results in Table 2 provide evidence that natural resource reliance and time spent under socialism critically influence the openness of the political system at the beginning of the transition. Both Years under Socialism and Initial Raw Exports enter negatively and significantly at the 6% level in the regression of Executive Constraints in 1992 indicating that countries with a longer socialist heritage and more reliant on natural resources had less open political systems at the beginning of transition. Together, these two variables are jointly significant at the 1% level and explain 45% of variation in political openness at the beginning of transition (column 1).

> 16 Following Falcetti et al. (2002), we use the following starting years of transition: 1989 for Hungary and Poland, 1990 for Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR of Macedonia, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, 1991 for Albania and the Baltic States, and 1992 for the remaining FSU countries.

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FAO (2018). _Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan 2018._ FAO: Rome. URL: http://www.fao.org/3/ <u>I8514EN/i8514en.pdf</u> <mark>George, J., Adelaja, A., and Weatherspoon, D. (2020),</mark> _<mark>Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity: Evidence from Boko Haram's Attacks.</mark>_ <mark>American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 102: 114-131. URL: https://doi.org/ 10.1093/ajae/aaz039</mark> Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) and Peace Research Institute Oslo. (2019). _Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20: Tracking sustainable peace through_ - _inclusion, justice, and security for women. URL:_ <u>https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp content/uploads/2019 /12/WPS-Index-2019-20-Report.pdf</u> Grünenfelder, J., and Schurr, C. (2015). Intersectionality–A challenge for development research and practice?. _Development in practice, 25(6),_ 771-784. URL: <u>https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2015.1059800</u> Hanmer, L. C., Rubiano Matulevich, E. C., and Santamaria, J. (2021). Differences in Household Composition: Hidden Dimensions of Poverty and Displacement in Somalia. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9818. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. URL: <u>http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/163081635436026650/Differences-inHousehold-Composition-Hidden-Dimensions-of-Poverty-and-Displacement-in-Somalia</u> Hartman, A. C., Morse, B. S., and Weber, S. (2021). Violence, Displacement, and Support for Internally Displaced Persons: Evidence from Syria. _Journal of Conflict Resolution_ , _65_ (10), 17911819. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211011523 Heckert, J. et al. (2019). _Building livelihoods for rural youth: A gendered perspective._ In 2019 Annual trends and outlook report: Gender equality in rural Africa: From commitments to outcomes, eds. Quisumbing, A. R.; Meinzen-Dick, R. S.; and Njuki, J. Chapter 7, Pp. 97-110. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). URL: https://doi.org/ <u>10.2499/9780896293649</u> Holpuch, A. (2018). _Stolen daughters: what happened after #BringBackOurGirls?._ The Guardian. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/oct/22/bring-back-our-girls- <u>documentary-stolen-daughters- kidnapped-boko-haram</u> IOM (2020). _IOM Nigeria Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) North East Nigeria Displacement Report 34._ URL: <u>https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/DTM%20Report%20Round%2034% 20.pdf ?file=1&type=node&id=10647</u> Jayachandran, S. (2020). _Microentrepreneurship in Developing Countries,_ NBER Working Paper Series, 26661. URL: https://doi.org/10.3386/w26661 Kapilashrami, A., and Hankivsky, O. (2018). Intersectionality and why it matters to global health. The Lancet, 391(10140), 2589-2591. URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31431-4 Klugman, J. (2022). The Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement: A Synthesis of New Research. Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement Report 168165. Washington, D.C.: World - Bank Group. URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/895601643214591612/The <u>Gender-Dimensions-of-Forced-Displacement-A-Synthesis-of-New-Research</u> 19
Infrastructure Matters: Complementarities with the Quality of Health Service Delivery in Kenya<sup>1</sup> Laura Becerra Luna*, Mathilde Lebrand*, Nino Pkhikidze*, and Andres Yi Chang*

*World Bank

JEL: I18, O18 Keywords: health facilities, infrastructure, Kenya, roads, electricity, ICT.

> 1 We thank Vivien Foster and Roberta Gatti for getting this collaborative effort started and their continuous support and comments. We are indebted to Benjamin Steward for carrying out and facilitating some of the GIS analysis. We also thank Keith Hansen, Kathryn Andrews, Ruben Conner, Lydia Nakhone, Anne Margreth Bakilana; Peter Ngwa Taniform, Paul Elvis Onyango Ouma, the World Bank Kenya Human Development Team, and members of the Kenya Technical Working Group for providing useful comments on previous versions of this paper. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Index Value<br>| Average Specialization [J <s0<br>1989 - 2010 HE s.0- 100<br>MM 10.1- 15.0<br>f<br>fae See MM 15.1- 20.0<br>ASWe |BembyAt Ff >|] Ne200 Data r<br>rn re ee epee Ae)<br>a epee > SEES<br>ee EU hn Tbs8) Ne;<br>W So a<br>or ea ;<br>Bange Pek pte Chennai *<br>A 4 Oo 125 250 S500 750 1,000 ‘<br><!-- End of picture text -->
deployment of brokers and agents in explaining the relative advantages of life annuities over lump sums and phased withdrawals. Brokers tend to have strong incentives to influence the decision to annuitize and derive considerable benefits from channeling retiring workers to providers who offer the highest commissions and not necessarily the best prices and returns to annuitants.

4.63 The first requirement of an effective regulation of marketing in a decentralized competitive market is compliance with basic conduct rules, such as the ‘know-yourcustomer’ rule and an adequate disclosure of the terms and conditions of different products. However, because fixed life annuity products are highly complex as well as irrevocable and non-portable, there is also a need for extensive training of agents and brokers. In addition to adequate training, brokers need to pass a certification test as well as the standard ‘fit and proper’ test. Licensed brokers must be legally obligated to represent their clients, must generate their income from commissions on the sale of annuities, and must not be permitted to accept volume-related remuneration from insurers.

4.64 In the case of fixed annuities, adopting an electronic quotation system, such as the one introduced in Chile in 2004, merits serious consideration. This is a centralized service that compiles and validates individual data on retiring workers and solicits quotes from participating institutions. Such a system reduces the influence of brokers, lowers the search costs of retiring workers, enhances the quality of information available to them, and ensures broad access to competitively prices annuities.

4.65 The structure and level of commissions payable to brokers and agents need to be closely monitored and to be subject to caps if they become too high and give rise to market distortions. In addition to being subject to an upper limit, such as the 2.5 percent cap introduced in Chile in 2004, commissions could be made payable over the whole duration of the annuity contract and not concentrated in the first few years. One way to achieve this is by prohibiting upfront fees on retiring workers and only allowing regular fees on monthly payments.

4.66 With regard to pricing policies, providers of fixed life annuities in decentralized competitive markets should be free to determine their own prices and adopt aggressive or passive marketing campaigns as they see fit. The supervisors need to monitor the pricing and marketing campaigns of individual providers to ensure that they do not adopt deceptive policies that could harm pensioners in the longer run. They also need to ensure that providers maintain adequate technical reserves calculated on a sound basis (this topic is addressed in the next section on the regulation of risk management).

4.67 The ineffectiveness of price competition is underscored by the wide dispersion in the prices of fixed nominal or real life annuities. The range of annuity quotations exceeds 20 percent in most markets, including Chile and the UK.<sup>38</sup>

> 38 Annex 2 reviews the variation and dispersion of annuity prices in the UK on data obtained from the website of the FSA.

40
- Increase with the level of legal and regulatory property transaction costs, which raise the costs of homeownership

- Decrease in societies where the median voter is a homeowner, which is likely to introduce a bias in housing policy programs in favor of owning

- Decrease with the level of “hard” rent controls, such as fixed rent ceilings, typical for first-generation rent-setting policies

- Increase with the amount of units filtering down to uses affordable by household types predicted to be renters under demand-side utility maximization.

Can all these partial hypotheses concerning demand and supply aspects of tenure choice be condensed to arrive at a single measure that indicates the equilibrium likelihood of renting, and - aggregating over households - the equilibrium share of the rental sector? Obviously, such a theory does not yet exist, let alone empirical testing methodologies. The issue has been dominated by ideologically inspired paradigms of homeownership’s positive externalities on the one hand, and “nation of homeowners” political economy arguments on the other hand.

**Figure 3. Home-ownership by Age in Some Market Countries**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 90<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>United States France<br>20<br>10 United Kingdom Germany<br>0<br>25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79<br>Age Group<br>Home Ownership Rate%<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Chiuri and Jappelli (2000).

9
|Share of activities partially outsourced|0.510|0.103|0.0%|
|---|---|---|---|
|Guateng provincial dummy|0.174|0.067|0.9%|
|Western Cape provincial dummy|-0.164|0.078|3.7%|
|sole proprietor dummy|-0.312|0.094|0.1%|
|close corporation dummy|-0.142|0.072|4.8%|
|Manufacturing|-0.197|0.089|2.7%|
|VAT|0.180|0.114|11.4%|
|PAYE|0.292|0.099|0.3%|
|Adj. R2|0.298|||
|Mean of the dependent variable|9.990|||

# **Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax compliance (+40% across the board)**

||Coeff.|Std. Error|Sig.|
|---|---|---|---|
|(Constant)|6.971|0.298|0.0%|
|LN full-time employees|0.127|0.030|0.0%|
|LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")|0.164|0.023|0.0%|
|Share of activities completely outsourced|-0.081|0.086|34.8%|
|Share of activities partially outsourced|0.537|0.103|0.0%|
|Guateng provincial dummy|0.176|0.067|0.8%|
|Western Cape provincial dummy|-0.161|0.078|4.0%|
|sole proprietor dummy|-0.314|0.094|0.1%|
|close corporation dummy|-0.145|0.072|4.4%|
|Manufacturing|-0.195|0.089|2.8%|
|VAT|0.183|0.114|10.8%|
|PAYE|0.290|0.099|0.4%|
|Adj. R2|0.296|||
|Mean of the dependent variable|9.940|||
|**Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax complian**|**ce (+30% acr**<br>|**oss the board)**<br>||
||Coeff.|Std. Error|Sig.|
|(Constant)|6.895|0.297|0.0%|
|LN full-time employees|0.127|0.030|0.0%|
|LN of q55 after imputed values were introduced (imputed "no answer")|0.164|0.023|0.0%|
|Share of activities completely outsourced|-0.021|0.086|80.9%|
|Share of activities partially outsourced|0.567|0.103|0.0%|
|Guateng provincial dummy|0.177|0.067|0.8%|
|Western Cape provincial dummy|-0.159|0.078|4.3%|
|sole proprietor dummy|-0.315|0.094|0.1%|
|close corporation dummy|-0.148|0.072|3.9%|
|Manufacturing|-0.193|0.089|3.0%|
|VAT|0.187|0.114|10.1%|
|PAYE|0.287|0.099|0.4%|
|Adj. R2|0.295|||
|Mean of the dependent variable|9.886|||
|**Dependent Variable: Sensitivity analysis: LN Total cost of tax complian**|**ce (+20% acr**<br>|**oss the board)**<br>||
||Coeff.|Std. Error|Sig.|
|(Constant)|6.811|0.297|0.0%|

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**Table 12 - Robustness analysis**

|**Threshold z**||**25**|**50**|**75**|**100**|**125**|**150**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CWI Poverty||||||||
|2001|Urban|0.3|1.2|3.9|9.4|19.3|34.4|
||Rural|3.8|13.4|27.9|42.3|55.3|68.1|
||Total|1.4|6.6|14.5|23.9|35.1|49.2|
|2007|Urban|0.2|1.1|3.4|7.4|16|31. 0|
||Rural|1.4|5.1|10|18.3|27.1|39.3|
||Total|0.7|2.8|6.3|12.1|20.8|34.6|
|Difference|Urban|0.1|0.1|0.5|2|3.3|3.4|
||Rural|2.4|8.3|17.9|30.2|28.2|28.8|
||Total|0.7|3.8|8.2|11.8|14.3|14.6|
|Expenditure Poverty||||||||
|2001|Urban|-- -|0.3|2.5|7.6|16.2|24.3|
||Rural|0.2|2.3|10.1|25.1|40.9|55.6|
||Total|0.09|1.2|5.8|15.3|27.1|38.1|
|2007|Urban|-- -|0.07|1.2|4.8|9.9|17.5|
||Rural|0.04|1.2|5.7|14.4|25.9|38|
||Total|0.02|0.6|3.2|8.9|16.8|26.4|
|Difference|Urban|-- -|0.2|1.3|2.8|6.3|6.8|
||Rural|0.18|1.1|6.9|10.7|15|29.2|
||Total|0.07|0.6|2.6|6.4|10.3|11.7|

Source: NSLS 2006/07. Totals are simple weighted averages of the urban and rural statistics.

37
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