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**Table 1: Examples of de jure or de facto discretionary control of liquid fuel prices**

|**Fuel**|**Countries**|
|---|---|
|Gasoline|Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Gabon,<br>Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,<br>Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Zambia|
|Diesel|Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Arab Republic of<br>Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Malawi, Kazakhstan, Niger, Saudi<br>Arabia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, República Bolivariana de Venezuela,<br>Zambia|
|Kerosene|Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt,<br>Gabon, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,<br>Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Vietnam, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Zambia|
|LPG|Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Arab Republic of<br>Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Senegal,<br>Thailand, Tunisia, República Bolivariana de Venezuela|

_Sources:_ Government and oil company websites, government announcements, and news reports. _Note_ : Appearance in this table means that the government exercises discretionary control over the price for at least one consumer category or fuel grade. For LPG in Thailand, for example, the government has frozen the price of LPG for poor households and micro‐businesses. If the government reimburses consumers or marketers without setting official subsidized prices for sale to end users (such as LPG for households in India and Peru), they do not appear in this table. A country appears in this table if implementation of a fuel pricing formula has been subject to socioeconomic considerations, such as in Indonesia and Malawi.

# **Estimating price subsidies to reimburse fuel marketers is challenging**

The amount of information needed to set prices can be substantial, and how to share the cost components becomes a political decision. Some costs are specific to that market and require local data collection, such as transportation costs for delivering fuels to different parts of the country, allowable losses (from evaporative emissions or leaks), or days of wharfage considered reasonable in importing fuels. When cost information is being sought from fuel suppliers to determine subsidy reimbursement, those marketing fuels could very well cite the high rather than the low end of the cost range. If costs are high because the market is inefficient, the government has to consider the extent to which it is prepared to provide price support to producers to compensate them for their inefficiency in the near (if not medium) term, given inefficiency cannot be eliminated overnight. Domestic refineries that cannot compete with imports represent one example. To avoid a fiscal outlay, several governments protect domestic refineries through higher import duties on refined products than crude oil, restrictions on imports, or a requirement for oil marketing companies to source a portion of their supplies from the (high‐cost) domestic refineries, effectively forcing consumers to pay more.

Input subsidies add to the estimation challenges. For example, Algeria and Tunisia provide subsidized domestic crude oil to refineries. The price of the crude in Algeria is set in Executive Decree 07‐60 issued in February 2007, and there are two prices depending on the refinery. These prices have been below the equivalent of US$25 per barrel, signaling substantial price subsidies. The price of crude for the sole refinery in Tunisia has been lower than the equivalent of US$40 a barrel. Such input subsidies obscure the transparency and governance of the refinery operations, and exclude participation of the private sector in the supply chain, thereby reducing or eliminating competition. The Tunisian refinery exports