primary school by females of 7.7 points. While point estimates of the relevant secondary education is positive for females, compared to being negative for males, neither is significant.

For assets brought into the marriage (equation 4), table 7 presents results for young and old age groups as defined above in cols. 1-2 and 3-4, respectively. Estimates point towards a HSAA-induced increase in the level of assets brought into the marriage by females of about 50% (point estimates are 0.584 in col. 1 and 0.484 in col. 3, depending on the age cut-off used), compared to no appreciable change in the amount of assets contributed by husbands. To the extent that the share of assets brought into the marriage will affect individuals’ future bargaining power, this would be consistent with the notion that the HSAA empowered direct female beneficiaries, thus increasing the plausibility of downstream second-generation effects.

Using a similar specification, table 8 presents results for time allocation by females (panel A) and males (panel B) in generation II with basic and augmented specifications in cols. 1, 3, 5 and cols. 2, 4, 6, respectively. Coefficients in panel A suggest that, compared to those in non-reform states, females in the reform state affected by the HSAA reduced time spent on productive work by 3-4 percentage points (cols. 1 & 2) and increased time for leisure by roughly the same amount (cols. 5 & 6). The fact that results remain robust to inclusion of direct asset transfers and education suggests that this is over and above any HSAA-induced effects via direct transfers of human or physical capital. The interpretation of this being attributable to shifts in intra-household bargaining power is supported by coefficients in panel B which suggest that males whose wives benefited from reforms as defined above spent more time on household chores, although the magnitude of the estimated effect remains modest.

Results for the likelihood of females having a bank account or the household having a sanitary latrine in table 9 suggest that the HSAA increased the likelihood of females having an individual bank account by around 4% (4.8% for the base specification and 3.8% for the augmented one). Households where the female spouses had benefited from the HSAA were also by 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to have sanitary latrines, a good that is strongly preferred by women (Stopnitzky 2014). This is consistent with an intra-household externality whereby lack of authority may preclude women’s preferences from translating into action similar to what was found elsewhere for cook-stoves (Miller and Mobarak 2013), suggesting that external forces that empower women may help translate preferences into action, It has been suggested that, even if it improves outcomes for girls who are alive, the HSAA may affect reproductive choices and female mortality. To test for such effect, data on the number of children and the share born to 717 female spouses aged 15-60 in our sample as well as their sons’ and daughters’ survival rates. Results, in table 10, point towards a significant HSAA-induced reduction in fertility by 17 to 23 percentage points, consistent with female empowerment reducing fertility as found in the literature (Duflo 2012). While there is evidence of some reduction in the share of daughters born, possibly a result of 13