still, a decentralization policy can represent an abandonment of central government responsibility for resource management without a concomitant establishment of local level authority.<sup>6</sup> In better situations, stakeholders acquire both authority and responsibility for aspects of resource management.

These differences in the extent of actual devolution can be expected to affect the prospects for success. Symbolic or abandonment policies are at best unlikely to improve resource management, and at worst will undermine stakeholder willingness to commit to and sustain the active involvement necessary for success (e.g., Vermillion and GarcesRestropo 1998 on Colombia). Assessing the extent of actual devolution is a challenge, of course, and is more of a qualitative than quantitative undertaking. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the degree of actual devolution of resource management responsibilities to the basin level is associated with greater likelihood of success.

# _Financial resources and autonomy at the basin level_

As noted, decentralization of resource management means at least some assumption of financial responsibilities by basin organizations and stakeholders, and some acquisition and exercise on their part of decision making authority over at least some of the financial resources they commit. If they lack autonomy to determine how funds shall be spent on resource management activities, the question is open whether meaningful decentralization has occurred.

On the other hand, decentralization does not have to mean that basin organizations and stakeholders become solely responsible for all resource management funding. In many instances, a complete transfer of financial responsibility and support for resource management from the central government to local organizations would be catastrophic for the latter and for resource management. One of the indicators of central government support for decentralization can be the central government’s willingness to provide some financial assistance to basin-level organizations without intrusive control over basin-level decisions about the priorities on which those funds shall be spent.

Thus, while logic and experience suggest that basin organizations must have some financial resources and autonomy for decentralization initiatives to be implemented successfully, this is not a variable that can be arrayed unidirectionally. Rather, all other things being equal, we would expect to see the greatest prospects for success somewhere toward the middle of a spectrum where complete central government funding and control lie at one pole and complete basin-level funding and control lie at the other.<sup>7</sup>

> 6 This is distinct from the discussion in the previous section about the motivation for the decentralization policy.  A central government might adopt a decentralization policy out of sincere motivations and in consultation with local stakeholders, but nevertheless fail for other reasons to actually relinquish any control over resource management or establish local authority.

> 7 An optional further refinement of this variable would involve inquiring not only about the gross proportions of funding between central and local agencies but about how funding relates to resource management functions.  In this refinement, successful implementation of decentralization in water resource management would be linked to central government funding and control of functions that are best organized at a larger scale because of their high capital or technical requirements (e.g., conducting hydrogeological surveys or developing water quality standards) and basin-level funding and control of functions that are best organized on a smaller scale because of their time-and-place specificity or socio-

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