rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Many countries have tried to coordinate tax expenditures and direct expenditures while considering the priority and the effectiveness in resource allocation. Germany, for example, uses the “Subsidies Report” (which includes both budgetary subsidies and tax expenditures), which facilitate the government’s decision in increase or decrease resource allocation either in tax expenditures or in direct budget expenditures.

Canadian’s envelop method, for example, integrates tax expenditures into budget allocation. According to a budget spending ceiling assigned to a ministry, the ministry must decide to use either tax expenditures or direct expenditures within the assigned budget (that method was stopped due to political reasons).

At the third level, to ensure the accountability of individual tax expenditure programs, programs must be evaluated individually for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

Relevance concerns whether a tax expenditure is consistent with policy priorities and if it realistically address an actual need. Typically, consideration of the circumstances that led to the implementation of a tax expenditure is essential to determine if the measure continues to address a real need in a manner consistent with current social and economic conditions, as well as with policy priorities.

Relevance is also important in determining whether other policy instruments can be used to achieve the same - or similar – objectives. Alternatively, the nature of the economic or social goals and policy objectives may favor one type of instrument over another. To the extent that alternatives exist, it is necessary to ascertain whether the tax expenditure uniquely achieves some outcome that the alternatives cannot.

Effectiveness concerns whether tax expenditures are meeting objectives effectively, within budget and without unwanted outcomes. This includes the target population, changes in economic behavior or conditions, and the cost of the tax expenditures. Unintended or unforeseen effects, either positive or negative, may be important considerations in assessing effectiveness.

Efficiency concerns whether tax expenditure is the most appropriate and efficient means of achieving objectives, relative to alternative design and delivery approaches. Evaluating efficiency focus on the allocation of resources in an economy (or the level and mix of goods and services produced). When an economy is operating efficiently, resources are fully employed and producing as much output as possible.

The economic efficiency of tax expenditures can, in principle, be quantified and summarized as an overall change in real income. By influencing prices or costs, tax expenditures reallocate resources and real income among markets. They also impose compliance costs on taxpayers, as well as administration and financing costs on government. The net effect of those various influences on overall real income signals an improvement or reduction in economic efficiency and can only be determined empirically 25
<!-- Start of picture text --> 5<br>4<br>=<br>£3<br>=<br>oh<br>a 5<br>o<br>1<br>0<br>2011 2012 2013 2014<br>ES Acriculture EEE Garmentand footwear<br>GEES Construction and real estate MN] Wholesale and retail tradp<br>(Qs Hotels and restaurants<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 6,000<br>5,000<br>Cc<br>= 4000<br>E<br>B<br>2 3,000<br>2<br>3<br>a<br>& 2,000<br>1,000<br>0<br>2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br>HE = Ee US) «= Other<br><!-- End of picture text -->
the publicly available data from the Mexican Institute of Statistics do not allow for more than two cross-tabulations, we use the Census microdata samples from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2008) to estimate labor market indicators for more detailed socio-economic groups. For example, when using publicly available Census counts to calculate the number of workers aged 12 years or older by type (wage and non-wage) and sector (private and public), we cannot further disaggregate by age. To test if the inability to restrict the sample to workingage individuals affects the results, we estimate the indicators by age using Census sample microdata (which we can disaggregate in multiple ways), or using a different cross tabulation of the Census counts (for example, by worker type and age) and re-estimate the regressions.

When considering labor market impacts, we focus on wage employment (i.e. paid individuals working for a firm) as this is the category most likely to be affected by automation, as opposed to self-employed, employers or family workers. We also analyze changes in the composition of employment by looking at the share of informal workers in total employment, where informality is defined as being self-employed, unpaid worker or day laborer.

We use data on the number of employees by sector of economic activity and municipality from the 1999 Economic Census to estimate the employment weights _μm,i,_ 1999, which are used to construct the measure of exposure to local automation. These data allow for a higher level of sectoral disaggregation than the 2000 Census of Population of Housing.

**Local labor market (LLM) definition** : Given that we estimate impacts at the LLM level, we group municipalities into functional territories following Berdegu ́e et al. (2017). This methodology allows to increase the sample of LLMs significantly with respect to the official number of 59 Metropolitan Areas defined by the Statistical Institute (INEGI). Using a combination of commuting flows and satellite night light data, the authors group 2,446 municipalities into 1,534 functional territories. The assumption is that groups of municipalities that exhibit high levels of commuting flows among them, and that represent a single geographical unit according to the night light data form a functional territory. These functional territories include large metropolitan areas such as Mexico City, which contains 88 mu-

12
# **The Exposure, Vulnerability, and Ability to Respond of Poor Households to Recurrent Floods in Mumbai**

## Archana Patankar<sup>1</sup>

Keywords: floods, household survey, urban poverty, disaster risk management JEL: Q54, I32, I38, Q56

# Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Stephane Hallegatte and Mook Bangalore for their ideas, valuable inputs and support in completing the case study. I am also grateful to Prof. Anand Patwardhan, University of Maryland, for his inputs and feedback at each stage of the work. Special thanks to Ms. Sravanthi Rallabandi of MP Ensystems Advisory Pvt. Ltd. for preparing the GIS maps to understand flood exposure. I would also like to thank Saurabh Dani, World Bank, for an in‐depth review of this paper, Bernice Van Bronkhorst, World Bank, for providing valuable inputs during the workshop held in Feburary 2015, and Laura Bonzanigo, World Bank for useful comments on a previous version of this paper. Dr. Potdar, Ms. Madhura Palnitkar and their entire team from the Centre for the Study of Social Change (CSSC) need a special mention here for successfully carrying out the field work in Mumbai. I am also grateful to Mr. Mahesh Narvekar, Chief Officer, Disaster Management Cell, MCGM and his entire team for their immense support for the research work on Mumbai, timely inputs in understanding flood exposure and vulnerability and carrying out the required field work.

> 1 Independent Consultant. Contact: archana.patankar09@gmail.com
Bridging the Targeting Gap: Assessing Humanitarian Beneficiaries’ Likely Eligibility for Social Protection in Iraq<sup>1</sup> Lokendra Phadera, Dhiraj Sharma, & Matthew Wai-Poi World Bank Lotti Douglas & Vladimir Jovanovic Mercy Corps Oliver Westerman CLCI / Oxfam Safwan Aziz Khan CWG / UNHCR

**Keywords** : Social Protection and Growth; Proxy Means Tests; Targeting in Social Protection; Humanitarian Assistance; Cash Transfer; Internally Displaced Persons; Iraq

**JEL Classification** : D04, H53, I32, I38

1 Acknowledgment: We acknowledge the contributions of the UK government’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which convened the initial workshop and launched this collaborative effort. This work was supported by the Iraq Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Fund (I3RF) trust fund. We are grateful for the guidance of the two peer reviewers Sharad Alan Tandon and Phillippe George Leite, and for the continuous support and feedbacks from Rene Antonio Leon Solano, Gabrielle Fox, Virginia Leape, Maria Ana Lugo, and the World Bank’s Iraq Social Protection team. Our thanks are also due to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office (KRSO) for data sharing and collaboration. This work was undertaken under the overall guidance of Ramzi Afifi Neman, Johannes G. Hoogeveen, and Benu Bidani. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the government they represent.

1
fiscal discipline) on which the case for hard pegs had been predicated.<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, the debate in the new millennium appears to have converged to an inverted unipolar view, whereby flexible regimes are seen as the only sensible (and durable) choice as economies grow financially integrated and sophisticated.<sup>7</sup> To evaluate whether this shift towards the flexible pole is actually taking place, in this paper we update and extend Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) dataset (LYS) on de facto exchange rate regimes. Based on this evidence, we find that the convergence to the FIT paradigm is not taking place across the board: the share of non-floats (intermediates, conventional and hard pegs) represents 75% of the sample, exactly the same share as in 2000.

Does that mean that fear of floating has continued to be prevalent despite the favorable context and the reduced currency exposure? To get a full answer to that question, it is crucial to note a semantic nuance that has been surprisingly understated in the recent exchange rate regime literature: fear of floating, as originally defined by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), entails a clearly asymmetric exchange rate policy. Since only depreciations trigger fears of financial distress or inflation pass-through, under fear of floating the intervention response should be stronger for (if not limited to) upward exchange rate movements. More generally, the incentives and implications to intervene in order to avoid an appreciation are radically different from those related to avoiding a depreciation: where the latter focus on short-run financial crises, the former is usually predicated on long-term economic growth. Similarly, the context conducive to one or the other differs: whereas fear of floating would tend to arise in times of financial turmoil, fear of appreciation will likely be triggered by economic bonanzas. At any rate, treating interventions in a symmetric way –in particular, attributing any intervention to fear of floating as has been previously the case in the literature– may lead to overstate the incidence of financial factors –more so in recent years when fear of appreciation appears to have prevailed.

The mercantilist view that exchange rate policy –more precisely, a temporarily undervalued currency– could be used to protect infant industries as a development strategy has a long tradition in economic theory and have recently enjoyed a minor revival. The issue of undervalued exchange rates has received considerable attention as a result of China’s reluctance to float its exchange rate, a strategy

> 6 See De la Torre et al. (2002) for a discussion of the Argentine debacle and its implications for the exchange rate debate.

> 7 See Levy Yeyati (2005) and references therein. Rose (2006) makes an eloquent case for the new FIT paradigm.

4
<!-- Start of picture text --> Diarrhoea correctly diagnosed<br>Diarrhoea incorrectly diagnosed<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>Inappropriate prescription of antibiotics: diarrhoea (%)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 2: Overprescription of antibiotics**

Dots represent country-specific means, calculated using country-specific sampling weights, vertical bars indicate mean performance across countries, and boxes delineate the interquartile range. Data are from clinical vignettes from Kenya (2018), Madagascar (2016), Mozambique (2014), Nigeria (2013), Niger (2017), Senegal (2010), Sierra Leone (2018) Tanzania (2016), Togo (2014), and Uganda (2013). See Appendix Table S11 for the values in this figure.

32
improve allocative efficiency,<sup>1</sup> we know very little about the nature and impact of firm-level innovation activities in the developing world. Firm-level innovation activities such as R&D, or innovation outcomes such as patenting, tend to be negligible in poorer countries, and there is little understanding regarding the impact that existing innovation efforts have on performance or the main barriers to the adoption of innovative activities. Furthermore, while the benefits of innovation for productivity and economic growth are uncontested, very little is known about the short-term direct impacts of innovation on employment, especially in countries furthest away from the technological frontier. On the one hand, introduction of new product lines can generate direct positive impacts on employment; on the other hand the introduction of new processes or products with enhanced and more modern technologies can result in more efficient use of labor. Therefore, a critical question for policy is whether innovation generates a tradeoff between productivity increases and employment growth. Determining what the trade-offs might be (if any) is critical, especially in developing countries where the needs to absorb new entrants to the labor market in formal and higher productivity jobs are greatest. Understanding the dynamics of any trade-off might be helpful to better align policies towards maximizing potential gains to employment.

The objective of this paper is to empirically shed light on these issues and estimate the Our contribution to the liter- short-run direct impact of firm-level innovation on employment. ature is fourfold. First, we expand the existing evidence to a large number of low and middle income countries, taking advantage of a new wave of innovation modules that have been implemented in these countries by the World Bank Enterprise Surveys Unit. Second, since changes in employment can ultimately be closely related to any changes implemented in the organizational structure of the firm, we also consider the impact of organizational innovation on employment. Third, we disentangle the effects of process innovation from product innovation on employment when both are implemented simultaneously by using a two stage methodology with a random coefficients specification in the first stage. Finally, we study how the degree of novelty of innovation and the level of a country’s development affect the elasticity of innovation to employment. Given the nature of the data we use, our results focus on average effects

> 1Lentz and Mortensen (2008), using Danish firm-level data, find that up to 75% of productivity growth comes from reallocation of inputs to innovating firms, of which 25% is entry and exist of firms and 50% reallocation to growing innovative firms.

3
<!-- Start of picture text --> elsewhere in SVAR estimates of taxes on output for industrialized countries.<br>As in Perotti (2004), the effects are small and not statistically significant.<br>See also Caldara (2011) on the range of tax multipliers that are plausible<br>given reasonable assumptions on tax elasticities; these estimates are clus-<br>tered around zero as well. However, Favero and Giavazzi (2010) and Perotti<br>(2011) show that once narrative information from Romer and Romer (2010)<br>is incorporated into SVAR estimations, tax multipliers may be larger than<br>in standard SVAR estimates.<br>In contrast to high-income countries, we find that tax cuts in developing<br>countries do have the ability to stimulate output. A tax cut that decreases<br>revenues by $1 increases output by approximately $0.3, a multiplier that is<br>statistically different from zero. In the long run, the tax multiplier increases<br>to exceed 0.8, although error bands are wide around this estimate.<br>Figures 7-10 reaffirm additional results from IMV. Long-run government<br>consumption multipliers are large, statistically different from zero, and esti-<br>mated to exceed one in closed economies and when exchange rates are fixed.<br>In contrast, multipliers are essentially zero in open economies or those oper-<br>ating under flexible exchange rates.<br>In all these country groupings, tax multipliers appear to exceed zero only<br>slightly on impact, but to be zero or negative in the long run. One exception<br>is closed economies, where the long-run tax multiplier appears to exceed<br>one (although it is not statistically different from zero). Figure 12 shows,<br>however, that a simple interpretation of this result as implying that tax policy<br>is effective in stimulating output in closed economies is slightly misleading.<br>Government consumption decreases significantly in response to tax increases<br>in this group of countries. As the government consumption multiplier is<br>large in this group of economies, the estimated decrease in output in the<br>long run conflates the effects of government spending cuts with tax increases.<br>19<br><!-- End of picture text -->
accounts for the bulk of national poverty at the end of the period—72% of the total number of poor, 68% of the aggregate poverty gap and 65% of the aggregate squared poverty gap.

Table 1 also gives the growth rates of the poverty measures. Over the 50-year period, the exponential trend—the regression coefficient of the log poverty measure on time—was 1.3% per annum for H, rising to 2.2% and 3.0% for PG and SPG respectively. For the period prior to 1991, the trends were 1.1%, 2.1% and 2.8% for H, PG and SPG, while the corresponding post-reform trends were 2.4%, 3.4% and 4.2%. So we find higher exponential trends in poverty reduction the post-reform period. However, the difference between the pre- and post-1991 trends can only be considered statistically significant for the headcount index and then only at about the 8% level.

Alternatively one might prefer to define the trend in the level of the poverty measure or mean consumption/income rather than its log. This again confirms the same finding of an acceleration of growth (in mean income and consumption) in the post-1991 period, but yields no evidence of a parallel acceleration in poverty reduction; see bottom panel of Table 1.

Growth and poverty trends in urban and rural areas reveal a pattern that is similar to the national level. While the (survey-based) mean consumption growth rates are higher (nearly twice as high) in the post-1991 period than pre-1991 in both rural and urban areas, only the acceleration in urban growth is statistically significant (Table 2). There are some indications of a faster poverty decline post-1991, more notably in rural areas, but the increase is often not statistically significant. For instance, there is no significant acceleration in the trend decline in PG or SPG in either rural or urban areas. Only for the headcount index is the increase in the trend rate of poverty decline significant—at the 10% level in rural areas, and at the 3% level in urban areas.

Given that an important link in the argument for reform is that it would make India’s growth more labor intensive, it is of interest to see what has happened to employment growth. The first large survey of employment by the NSSO after 1991 (for 1999-00) suggested a slight slow-down in the rate of growth of employment, although the latest available NSSO for 2004-05 suggests that the employment growth rate in the period 1993-94 to 2004-05 has been virtually the same as the preceding 10 years (Panagariya, 2008, p.146). These comparisons are clouded somewhat by the fact that a large share of employment is in the informal sector, for which 17
entrepreneurial activity and its business environment. Creating such a modernized business registry entails reforming inefficient or ineffective processes and automating the reformed registry.

The 2008 WBGES includes new data on the impact of modernization of business registries on business creation. The WBGES gathers extensive data on the functioning and structure of business registries in 71 countries directly from the registrars of companies. First, data were collected on the types of information firms are required to report to the registry, such as annual financial filings. Second, in order to asses the different degrees of automation of business registries, the survey collected information on the availability of electronic registration, which broadly includes the computerization of local registrars, the ability to register over the Internet, and electronic distribution of data via the Internet.

The findings show that while almost 80 percent of high- and upper-middle income countries require firms to file annual financial statements, only about half of lowermiddle and low-income countries require their firms to do so. Moreover, while most countries have regulations compelling business to notify the business registry if the business ceases operations, few countries have mechanisms to enforce such an obligation. As a result, most developing countries do not have accurate records on businesses that have ceased to exist. Correcting such ineffective functions and automating a reformed business registry remain important tasks of business registry modernization in many developing countries.

The benefits are multi-fold. Both businesses and governments can see reduced transaction time and costs through proper streamlining of registry processes and removal of the hurdles of in-person visits. These efficiencies include the extension of service availability to 24 hours, 7 days a week through online transactions rather than traveling to a physical location and waiting in line; improving data quality and accuracy through reduction of human error, providing real-time access to registry updates; automatic verification of identifies and roles; as well as facilitating anti-corruption efforts where needed by removing middle persons and providing full transparency of information. In Latvia, for example, reforming and automating the business registry reduced processing time of typical transactions from weeks to (with a rush-charge) four hours. In Bologna 14