When asked about targets, most boat owners report having a weekly target (rather than a daily target). While the nature of this weekly target is unclear, most boat owners report targets that are similar to their average weekly catches. This suggests that the weekly target may be a proxy of their income expectations, consistent with the work of K ̈oszegi and Rabin (2006), and not based on a minimum income needed for weekly expenses.

Previous studies that have analyzed whether hourly labor supply decisions are consistent with reference-dependent preferences have found mixed results. Camerer et al. (1997) was the first study to provide suggestive evidence in support of this hypothesis. They found that New York City taxi drivers work fewer hours on days with higher wages. Their econometric model and results were later disputed by Oettinger (1999) and Farber (2005).<sup>8</sup> In contrast, Farber (2005) found that the probability to stop working depends on cumulative hours worked on that day, but not on cumulative earnings, hence, at odds with the reference-dependent preferences assumption. However, Farber (2008) implemented a maximum likelihood estimation strategy allowing income targets to vary by taxi driver and shift. Farber estimated a substantial increase in the probability of stopping once the target was reached. More recently, Dupas et al. (2015) find that the probability that Kenyan bicycle taxi drivers stop working increases once they raise enough daily income to reach their self-reported cash needs for the day.<sup>9</sup> The paper closest to ours is Stafford (2015). She studies both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply of fishermen in Florida. Her study shows that failing to control for self-selection in the participation margin, wage endogeneity and measurement error can lead to downward biased estimates. Our participation and earnings data come from administrative records and are thus less subject to measurement error. In addition, while our participation elasticities are somewhat lower than those in Stafford (2015), survey data can explain the differences in estimates. In particular, boat owners in our sample are the main income earner in the household and their spouses make money selling the fish that their husbands are unable to sell to merchants in the local fish market. Boat owners thus behave more like single individuals than married individuals, which could explain the lower elasticities that we find.<sup>10</sup> Unlike Stafford (2015), our analysis includes the possibility of

> 8Farber (2005) argued that the specification of Camerer et al. (1997) suffered from downward division bias because log hours worked on a given day were regressed on log hourly wage, computed by dividing daily earnings by the reported number of hours worked that day. Oettinger (1999) argued that daily wage fluctuations in Camerer et al. (1997) might also have been driven by changes in total labor supply of taxi drivers, hence, leading to inconsistent estimates of the labor supply elasticity due to the wage endogeneity. 9Other papers that have tested the hypothesis of reference-dependent preferences are, Abeler et al. (2011); Crawford and Meng (2011); Fehr and Goette (2007).

> 10The literature suggests that labor elasticities are larger for married individuals than single individuals, presumably because household bargaining allows couples to take advantage of temporary increases in the wage rate.

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