rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table 4:** Reformed LAC <u>countries: 40-year equivalent fee as a share of assets under management (percent)</u>

|**Country**<br>**Min**|**Max**|**Range**|**Weighted average**|**Standard**<br>**deviation**|**Coefficient of**<br>**variation**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Argentina<br>0.68|1.45|0.77|0.92|0.22|23.30|
|Bolivia<br>0.42|0.42|0.00|0.42|0.00|0.00|
|Chile<br>0.56|0.74|0.18|0.62|0.07|11.13|
|Colombia<br>0.46|0.58|0.12|0.52|0.05|9.84|
|Costa Rica<br>0.59|0.94|0.36|0.89|0.13|14.69|
|Dominican Republic 0.49|0.49|0.00|0.49|0.00|0.00|
|El Salvador<br>0.71|0.91|0.20|0.91|0.08|8.39|
|Mexico<br>0.48|1.08|0.60|0.78|0.16|20.36|
|Peru<br>0.67|1.04|0.38|0.88|0.15|16.90|
|Uruguay<br>0.46|0.75|0.29|0.57|0.13|23.04|

Source: Corvera et al. (2006).

The pension management charges of the most expensive plans are about two to three times higher than the least expensive one. Corvera et al. (2006) found that Argentina, Mexico, and Peru offered the most expensive plans in a 25-year horizon, and Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and the Costa Rica offered the most expensive plans in 40-year horizon. Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador, offered the least expensive plans and presented low price dispersion across administrators. In these three countries, either the regulator or the law stipulates price ceilings that have largely become price floors.<sup>22</sup> Corvera et al. (2006) showed that fees have stagnated over the years and are unlikely to decline in the medium term due to insufficient competition, especially in El Salvador and Bolivia where there is a duopoly market structure.

Mandatory DC funds in other emerging countries that have structures similar to those of DC plans in the LAC region also face high fees; in contrast, OECD fees are usually lower. In Poland, total fees amount to 160 basis points of assets, an outcome largely due to a highly regulated fee structure, but are expected to decline to 50-60 basis points by 2020 due to the caps and asset growth (IMF and World Bank 2006). The total fees charged by Hungarian pension fund managers are around 190 basis points of assets but expected to decline to about 50 basis points by 2025 (Rocha and Hinz 2007). The Swedish pillar, in operation since 2000, charges fees of about 77 basis points and authorities expect these fees to decline to less than 30 basis points by 2025 (Rocha and Hinz 2007). These charges compare to 50 and 100 basis points for large US occupational funds and mutual funds, respectively. The average fee for stock funds, bond funds, and money market funds – more relevant comparators given the portfolio structure of pension funds in LAC – hover around 30-70 basis points (Table 5). The annual fees charged by the Thrift Savings Plan in the US are only between 3 and 7 basis points.

> 22 The 2007 legal reform in Argentina sets a charge ceiling of 1 percent on workers’ salaries that has largely become a price floor.

- 14 -
one in six firms in the SLMS. In contrast, inputs received as gifts and owner salaries not included in profits were not very common.

The need to include separate questions on home consumption of business goods has been noted in previous literature. However, as our baseline questionnaire, based on the Mexican ENAMIN illustrates, this is not always followed in practice. Alderman (1993, p. 198) notes that “net profits could very well be negative if the household is eating up the business’s profits”. The bottom panel of Table 3 examines how much difference adjusting revenue-expenses and profits for these underreported categories makes. These adjustments do decrease business expenses, thereby raising the level of revenueexpenses. In the KMS August round these adjustments raise revenue-expenses from a mean (median) of 3246 (3183) to 6242 (5900), almost doubling the level. Making these adjustments also increases the mean and median of the second round SLMS revenueexpenses by 50 percent. However, the change in the number of firms reporting negative revenue-expenses is much more modest: from 30 to 25 percent in the KMS August round and 28 to 23 percent in the SLMS round 2.

These adjustments act to close the gap between the level of revenue-expenses and the level of reported profits, and take both measures closer to the levels that outside wages and firm’s reservation wages would suggest. However, these adjustments have only a slight effect on the correlation between the two measures. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation increases from 0.296 (0.143) to 0.320 (0.214) in the KMS August round, and from 0.308 (0.436) to 0.312 (0.482) for the retail firms in the second round of the SLMS. However, manufacturing firms show much less change from these adjustments, reflecting the fact that fewer households owning manufacturing firms consume goods they have produced.

# **5. Mismatching Input Purchases and Sales**

A second major source of discrepancy between reported revenue-expenses and reported profits can lie in the timing of transactions. Firms report the amount of cash revenue received and cash expenses incurred during a month. However, inputs purchased in one 9
# Table 1 Basic VARX Model: Variance Decompositions <u>Variance Decomposition of GAP_HT_BK:</u>

|Period|S.E.|GAP_HT_BK|GAP_DR_BK|DLINFL_DUS_HT<br>DLINFL|_DUS_DR|GAP_US_BK|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|0.024|100.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|2|0.025|96.484|1.521|1.080|0.647|0.269|
|3|0.028|79.095|3.499|11.022|4.016|2.368|
|4|0.028|75.700|3.612|13.209|5.020|2.459|
|5|0.029|72.533|3.580|15.659|5.053|3.174|
|6|0.029|71.021|3.491|16.930|4.952|3.606|
|7|0.030|70.694|3.479|17.256|4.982|3.589|
|8|0.030|70.446|3.471|17.374|5.033|3.676|
|9|0.030|70.300|3.469|17.487|5.039|3.704|
|10|0.030|70.224|3.470|17.569|5.037|3.700|
||||Variance Deco|mposition of GAP_DR_BK:|||
|1|0.025|0.000|100.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|2|0.028|3.934|94.649|0.038|0.371|1.008|
|3|0.028|3.792|92.035|0.969|2.156|1.048|
|4|0.030|3.791|87.786|3.772|2.196|2.454|
|5|0.031|3.778|85.400|4.859|2.128|3.835|
|6|0.031|3.840|85.031|5.106|2.186|3.837|
|7|0.031|3.823|84.319|5.089|2.157|4.612|
|8|0.031|3.816|84.070|5.080|2.280|4.754|
|9|0.031|3.833|83.818|5.064|2.407|4.878|
|10|0.031|3.825|83.579|5.061|2.413|5.121|
|||V<br>|ariance Decomp|osition of DLINFL_DUS_HT:<br>|||
|1|0.083|0.697|4.207|95.097|0.000|0.000|
|2|0.095|1.214|5.121|93.185|0.416|0.064|
|3|0.107|2.522|5.431|91.126|0.586|0.334|
|4|0.112|2.796|5.514|90.544|0.697|0.449|
|5|0.115|2.886|5.341|90.431|0.911|0.431|
|6|0.116|2.887|5.240|90.232|1.200|0.441|
|7|0.117|2.858|5.213|89.971|1.517|0.441|
|8|0.117|2.837|5.238|89.691|1.728|0.505|
|9|0.117|2.826|5.255|89.545|1.816|0.558|
|10|0117|2823|5255|89509|1850|0564|
||.|.<br>V|.<br>ariance Decomp|.<br>osition of DLINFL_DUS_DR:|.|.|
|1|0.100|0.108|5.524|5.732|88.637|0.000|
|2|0.119|0.573|5.704|6.318|87.265|0.140|
|3|0.138|2.218|11.025|4.735|79.468|2.553|
|4|0.145|2.376|11.664|4.266|75.545|6.149|

27
104 Caldwell, 1987).

1/In principle there might be a superior Pareto efficient allocation of husband and wife labor that would yield **a** larger output for both **members** of the family. But in practice, thero are costs in monitoring labor ivputs over scattered plots and transaction costs In exchange of inputs and outputs that mig)ht be required to provide both persons with the incentivos needed to achieve Pareto efficiency. These transaction costs might absorb most of **the** output gain.

A/The overall determinant-condition of maximization theory in the fmily deimnd model is also rejected by Hecl=tan in the staiLc case (1971: Chapter 2, pp. 32-33). Both the static **and** 'life cycle' estimation approachos pursued by Heckman lead to rejection of the syoetry condition. Ultimateoly, however, he imposed the restriction to obtain his preferred estimates (Chapter 2, p. 37-38). One possible explanation for the rejection of the domand systeu parameter restrictions is the difference in spouse-specific nonearned income effects that may be used to infer individual compensated cross-wage effects.

2/Aggregate data were analyzed, for example, in Chilo (DaVanzo, 1972), relative education in Thailand (Maurer at &I.. 1973), the U.S. (Frieden, 1974; Becker at **al.,** 1977), and in Puerto Rico (Nerlove and Schultz, 1970).

/For example, Rosenhouse (1988) illustrates from the 1985 LSMS from Peru that 90 percent of the male headed households are currently married, while
<!-- Start of picture text --> T*=17°C T’=2°C<br>5.0 a b<br>4.5<br>x<<br>oO<br>2 4.0<br>ray<br>isc 3.5<br>©<br>2 3.0<br>a<br>025<br>wn<br>[o)<br>U<br>7% 2.0<br>Cc<br>2<br>3Ww 1.5<br>me}<br>x<br>0.5<br> ee ee | |<br>2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 £2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 # £2050<br>Year information is revealed Year information is revealed<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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are robust to this alternate methodology.

Table 7: Impact of demand and supply side of corruption on tax evasion and public procurement - ATT

|||Matching|Methods|||Obs|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Nearest-neighbor|Three nearest<br>neighbor|Radius|Local linear<br>regression|Kernel||
|Dependent variable:|||Tax evasion||||
|Demand side|6.662***|6.820***|6.319***|7.394***|7.080***|16,214|
|of corruption|(0.961)|(0.833)|(0.636)|(0.762)|(0.730)||
|Supply side|1.11|1.41|2.002***|1.164|1.77**|16,455|
|of corruption|(1.01)|(0.840)|(0.712)|(0.724)|(0.714)||
|Dependent variable:||Public co|ntract proc|urement|||
|Demand side|2.493***|2.549***|2.842***|2.708***|2.735***|15, 113|
|of corruption|(0.226)|(0.191)|(0.154)|(0.171)|(0.167)||
|Supply side|2.121***|2.073***|2.556***|2.297***|2.514***|15, 278|
|of corruption|(0.237)|(0.199)|(0.173)|(0.176)|(0.174)||

26
<!-- Start of picture text --> 1400 35%<br>~ Oo<br>7 1200 Oo 30%<br>3. O S<br>~» 1000 Oo 25% ~<br>e re) e<br>2 3<br>eo 800 20% &<br>£ £<br>$0 oO +<br>=Oo 600 2) O 15% &uv<br>w Cc<br>» a<br>S 400 10% &<br>3v<br>°<br>2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020<br>m Number of Charging Ports ©OShare of Fast Charging<br><!-- End of picture text -->
4 new economic opportunities that African countries may derive from the dynamics of globalization. It then offers a simple analytical framework for identifying opportunities for labor arbitrage in the global economy, and suggests a practical policy framework for exploiting them. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.

# **2. The Limits of Existing Theoretical Frameworks**

This section outlines some of the basic conceptual issues that have not yet been addressed satisfactorily by theories of unemployment. It also examines some of the most promising approaches, such as the search for an aggregate matching function, and discusses whether the dominant frameworks in the existing literature apply to developing countries.

# **_Basic Conceptual Issues and Manichean Approaches_**

Economists have long struggled to make sense of involuntary unemployment and to come up with convincing theories that explain a phenomenon still hard to grasp conceptually. The basic intellectual obstacle they have not been able to overcome satisfactorily is to reconcile the popular, intuitive conception of unemployment with the official definitions commonly used by government statistical agencies and the ILO.<sup>2</sup> That intellectual gap, which has never been filled adequately, has always been the source of theoretical confusion and frustration. Most people would probably define involuntary unemployment as situations where workers are unsuccessfully looking for jobs at the prevailing wages when they are as qualified as those holding these jobs, or where workers are willing to work at less than the prevailing wages for jobs which they could usefully fulfill, but are unable to find such jobs. Such situations (let’s call

> 2 According to ILO’s standard definition from the 1982 Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, the "unemployed" comprise all persons above a specified age who during a reference period were: (a) "without work", i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment; (b) "currently available for work", i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; and (c), "seeking work", i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified reference period to seek paid employment or self-employment. The specific steps may include registration at a public or private employment exchange; application to employers; checking at worksites, farms, factory gates, market or other assembly places; placing or answering newspaper advertisements; seeking assistance of friends or relatives; looking for land, building, machinery or equipment to establish own enterprise; arranging for financial resources; applying for permits and licenses, etc. The national definitions used vary from one country to another as regards inter alia age limits, reference periods, criteria for seeking work, treatment of persons temporarily laid off and of persons seeking work for the first time.
Table A.7: Clinic visits for family planning services during the intervention period

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**A: Visited the ADC**|||||
|Own Voucher|0.213***|0.211***|0.210***|0.208***|
||[0.036]|[0.036]|[0.036]|[0.035]|
|BAF Voucher|0.175***<br>[0.033]|0.174***<br>[0.032]|0.173***<br>[0.033]|0.190***<br>[0.033]|
|Observations|615|610|606|606|
|Endline control mean|0.015|0.015|0.015|0.015|
|p-value: Own = BAF|0.430|0.440|0.439|0.702|
|**B: Visited any clinic**|||||
|Own Voucher|0.174***<br>[0.047]|0.174***<br>[0.047]|0.176***<br>[0.047]|0.179***<br>[0.047]|
|BAF Voucher|0.104**|0.103**|0.104**|0.125***|
||[0.043]|[0.043]|[0.044]|[0.045]|
|Observations|613|608|604|604|
|Endline control mean|0.193|0.193|0.193|0.193|
|p-value: Own = BAF|0.201|0.205|0.198|0.336|
|Balancing controls|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Other balancing covariates|No|No|Yes|Yes|
|Village FE|No|No|No|Yes|

_Notes:_ Balancing controls are the baseline variables used to balance randomization, i.e., whether a woman is currently using family planning, her years of education, whether she wants another child, and the number of peers she mentions in the social networks module. Other baseline covariates comprise baseline values of woman’s age, indicator variables for Hindu, SC-ST, OBC, whether the woman works, wears ghunghat, and had ever visited a family planning clinic, her mobility score, and asset index. FP denotes family planning. Variable definitions are in Online Appendix. Robust standard errors are in brackets.<sup>_∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 1,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 05,<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 01.

55
**Figure 4:  China’s Services Trade Policies in International Perspective**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Financial Prof Serv Retail Telecom Transport<br>China<br>Low/Middle income countries<br>High income countries<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Note: LMIC = 74 low/middle income countries (excl China); HIC = 28 high income countries.<br>Source: Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo, "Policy Barriers To International Trade in Services:<br> New Empirical Evidence", World Bank forthcoming.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Public procurement in China represents well over 20% of China‘s economy (Anderson, et al. 2011). A recent study by the European Union Chamber of Commerce of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) competing in China‘s public procurement markets found the regulatory framework governing this enormous and increasing amount of economic activity is fragmented, inconsistent and unevenly implemented. Common challenges encountered by EU businesses when competing for public contracts included ―difficulty in obtaining timely, accurate information about upcoming projects; lack of communication of detailed evaluation criteria for projects; decentralization of tenders leading to more costs, less transparency; unfair implementation of public procurement awards; and unsatisfactory appeals procedures.‖ The WTO‘s Trade Policy Review on China also finds that ―China continues to face challenges in implementing a consistent and transparent approach to procurement across all levels of government.‖<sup>11</sup> China is not yet a member of the WTO‘s government procurement agreement. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral Agreement which comprises only a subset of the full Membership of the WTO. China has applied for accession to the

> 11 WTO Trade Policy Review, China. Chapter 3, page 41, paragraph 70. WTO Document WT/TPR/S/230, World Trade Organization, 4 June 2010.

17
# **TABLE 16** (continued)

||1989-90|1990-91|1991-92|1992-93|1993-94|1994-95|1995-96|1996-97|1997-98|1998-99|1994-99|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Asia|**24.75**|**37.00**|**61.77**|**10.71**|**50.26**|**-19.39**|**16.54**|**27.20**|**13.86**|N.A.|N.A.|
|Korea|7.29|63.77|42.17|7.29|10.88|32.70|20.94|55.43|6.55|51.92|303.81|
|Taiwan|60.00|37.50|26.57|21.18|56.38|-30.42|24.44|27.61|34.30|1.96|51.31|
|Hong Kong|24.46|34.93|30.42|-84.62|303.23|-36.40|-18.87|46.51|14.29|17.13|1.20|
|Israel|70.00|41.18|79.17|4.65|88.89|-44.71|68.09|41.77|22.32|26.28|103.53|
|Japan|12.30|8.57|90.54|10.79|41.88|-17.32|4.55|4.89|4.68|12.03|6.34|
|Singapore|-6.12|86.96|20.93|51.92|34.81|35.68|32.53|11.23|15.73|9.53|153.52|
|China|N.A.|373.33|199.30|-16.94|21.25|21.73|45.87|64.08|29.67|18.80|348.83|
|Other|137.50|128.34|10.28|78.78|91.19|-47.46|35.09|49.11|17.56|N.A.|N.A.|
|**Africa**|40.58|-17.53|22.50|33.67|13.74|-13.42|71.32|22.62|35.79|N.A.|N.A.|
|**Oceania**|116.95|-41.02|70.86|3.88|18.28|-43.85|46.63|21.84|26.10|N.A.|N.A.|
|Australia|71.05|23.08|31.25|7.62|47.79|-40.72|29.29|29.69|46.99|N.A.|N.A.|
|Other|135.80|-62.30|112.50|1.31|-3.23|-47.33|68.35|13.53|3.31|N.A.|N.A,|
|**Rest of the World**|**-69.05**|**-92.31**|100.00|**600.00**|635.71|-49.51|109.62|**75.23**|39.79|N.A.|N.A.|

SOURCE: State of the Nation Report from 1989-98, **Secofi** for 1999, both with Banxico data.

*Exports includes transportation and insurance expenses.

**Figures may not add up due to rounding off.

46
Panel B. Center is open with two trained teachers in 2016 <!-- Start of picture text --> A. Finance<br>0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1<br>Prob. open w/ 2 trained teachers in 2016<br>Predicted: mean=0.347 sd=0.084<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Density<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> B. Quality<br>0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1<br>Prob. open w/ 2 trained teachers in 2016<br>Predicted: mean=0.347 sd=0.049<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Density<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> D. Supplementary services<br>0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1<br>Prob. open w/ 2 trained teachers in 2016<br>Predicted: mean=0.347 sd=0.102<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Density<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> E. Community support<br>0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1<br>Prob. open w/ 2 trained teachers in 2016<br>Predicted: mean=0.347 sd=0.066<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Density<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Predicted Observed<br><!-- End of picture text --> Notes: Panel A shows probability of open in 2016 and panel B shows probability of open with two trained teachers in 2016. Pink color indicates predicted probability ( _p-_ hat) and green color indicates observed values.

The results of the joint estimation are shown in Table 8 below. For both measures of sustainability, three categories are particularly informative and significant at the 5% level: finance, market condition, and supplementary services. In particular, local market conditions are the strongest predictor category of whether a playgroup is open in 2016. For whether a playgroup is open with two trained teachers in 2016, the provision of supplementary services is the strongest predictor category.

Table 8. Logistic regression of project playgroup sustainability on five categories

|<br>|(1)<br>Playgroup is open in<br>2016 (1=Yes)|(2)<br>Playgroup is open in 2016 with<br>two trained teachers (1 = Yes)|
|---|---|---|
|Adjusted_p-_hat from finance variables|0.03***<br>(0.01)|0.07**<br>(0.03)|
|Adjusted_p-_hat from quality variables|0.03*<br>(0.02)|0.03<br>(0.03)|
|Adjusted_p-_hat from market condition variables|0.04***<br>(0.01)|0.06**<br>(0.03)|
|Adjusted_p-_hat from supplementary services variables|0.02**|0.08***|
||(0.01)|(0.03)|
|Adjusted_p-_hat from community support variables|0.02|0.04|
||(0.02)|(0.03)|
|Observations|245|245|

* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by center. Coefficients are average marginal effects. For each category, adjusted _p-_ hat is the predicted probability (estimated from the regressions presented in Tables 3-7) divided by its standard deviation.

22
controls for unobserved effects. As already noted the five survey years are 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. This means the two periods overlap over the years 1997-2000. The value of δ therefore can change between the two periods only in as far as the value of δ for 1994-1997 is different from the value of the same for 2000-2004.

> We would interpret a higher value of δ for the 1994-2000 observation than that for the 1997-2004 observations as indication increase in the degree of segmentation of  the labor market over the survey decade. An alternative measure of change in the degree of segmentation is the corresponding change in the sensitivity of mobility to wage gaps that one observes over the period of interest. Considering equation (3),  let _wit_ be the

> earnings of person _i_ in the sector of current employment, and _w_ 0 _it_ the person’s potential earnings in the alternative sector. If workers respond to sector wage gaps in

> deciding where to work, then _wit_ − _w_ 0 _it_ should be one of the determinants of

> employment status, _yit_ . We assume that the relationship between pay gaps and sector choice is such that

where<sup>_a_</sup> 1<sup>is a constant;</sup> _Z_ 1 _it_ is a vector of exogenous individual characteristics, θ is a vector of parameters (including a constant term), and ξ _it_ is a zero mean iid error term orthogonal to pay gaps and to _Z_ 1 _it_ . The proposition that workers’ sector choice and mobility decisions depend on pay gaps can be tested by estimating equation (8) and testing for the statistical significance of<sup>_a_</sup> 1<sup>. More importantly in the present context, an</sup> increase in<sup>_a_</sup> 1<sup>over time would suggest that segmentation has increased in the sense that</sup> mobility has become more and more sensitive to sectoral earnings gaps. Conversely, if segmentation grows over time in the sense that workers have become less responsive to pay gaps this should be reflected in<sup>_a_</sup> 1<sup>diminishing over time.</sup> A problem that has to be tackled in trying to estimate<sup>_a_</sup> 1<sup>on the basis of (8) is that,</sup> although each worker might have a reasonable idea of what they would earn in alternative states of employment, we can observe only one of these, which is the wages of current employment. A commonly used solution to this problem is to replace the unobserved wage by a counterfactual pay rate implied by an estimated earnings equation.

17