that we observed at midline disappeared completely by the time of the endline survey. Looking at income, we see that neither treatment is associated with a significant increase in income at endline, and the point estimates for both treatments are negative. Moreover, the lack of significance is not simply the result of noise. The 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of grant treatment is [ _−_ 2 _._ 4 _,_ 2 _._ 3]; this range does not include the point estimate (of 3.153) for the impact of the grant treatment after 7 to 10 months.<sup>17</sup> There is also no evidence that either treatment had a significant impact on hours worked (in the last week) 14 to 22 months after treatment. The coefficients on both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment are small and not statistically significant. Moreover, once again we find that the point estimate for the impact of the grant treatment on hours worked at midline is outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact at endline: the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of the grant treatment on hours worked at endline is [ _−_ 3 _._ 7 _,_ 6 _._ 1]; the point estimate for the impact on hours worked at midline was 6.8.<sup>18</sup> Looking across the range of labor market outcomes, the clear pattern that emerges is that, by the time of the endline survey, impacts on hours and income had disappeared; however, impacts on occupational choice persisted. Both the franchise and the grant treatments increased the likelihood of self-employment at endline. The franchise treatment caused an 11.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of self-employment (p-value 0.001) while the grant treatment led to a 12.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of self-employment (p-value 0.003). Both effects are large in magnitude relative to the rate of self-employment in the comparison group, which is 24.3 percent. Both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment are also associated with large increases in self-employment hours and, to some extent, increases in income from self-employment (we observe significant impacts on log self-employment income, but not on the level of self-employment income).

Thus, the overall picture at endline is that the impacts of both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment are confined to the domain of occupational choice. Both treatments shift young women into self-employment, but have no overall impact on income or labor supply. One somewhat anomalous finding is that assignment to the franchise treatment is associated with a significant increase in the likelihood of reporting any income-generating activity. Though the increase is relatively large in magnitude (the coefficient estimate suggests a 7.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of involvement in any IGA), it is difficult to interpret since the franchise treatment does not lead to increases in the total number of hours worked or the likelihood of reporting any income over the seven days prior

> 17Similarly, the point estimate for the impact of the franchise treatment at midline, 1.6, is near the extreme end of the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of the franchise treatment on incomes at endline. The 95 percent confidence interval is is [ _−_ 2 _._ 2 _,_ 1 _._ 7].

> 18The franchise treatment did not have a significant impact on hours worked at midline — so, of course, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the non-effects at midline and endline are identical.

19