List and Price 2009; Parra 2011). However, the design of the present experiment was unique in the literature. In contrast to Jordan Gives, classic dictator games allow the principal to define transfer size.<sup>21</sup> Fundraising experiments, on the other hand, do not provide participants with any endowment, while Jordan Gives took measures to enhance the endowment effect for the voucher.<sup>22</sup> Another potentially important distinctive feature of the present experiment is the identification of direct recipients of the transfer as local poor families rather than more abstract notions of giving to charities.<sup>23</sup> Columns 1 to 4 of Table 2 show the results from equation (1). The point estimates of giving rates suggest that individuals in the treatment groups are slightly more likely to give up their vouchers than individuals in the control groups. Nonetheless, none of the average treatment effects reaches statistical significance at conventional levels (with the lowest p-value of 0.11 for the unconditional cash transfer proposal).

# 4.3 Heterogeneity of effects

Although the results for the full sample are not significant at the conventional levels, the treatment appeared to have significant impacts on two specific subgroups of participants: individuals with low trust in the delivery of safety nets and young people. In fact, as shown in Table 3, the level of trust in the delivery of social safety nets, as measured with a postexperiment attitudinal question, appears to mediate the effect of treatment, particularly with regard to the two unconditional cash transfer proposals (i.e. unconditional cash transfer and cash transfer with school financing).<sup>24</sup> The results are obtained by estimating equation (1) above separately for individuals that reported being completely or somewhat

> 21 In classic “dictator games”participants can determine the share of the received amount to distribute in a single-shot game. Parra (2011) found that Ghanaian participants shared 37 percent of the endowment in the baseline scenario. Forsythe et al. (1994) found a 25 percent giving rate in a dictator experiment where the donor knew the identity of the receiver. However, in our case participants had a discrete choice between giving up or retaining their vouchers, for a repeated number of proposals that were heterogeneous by design. We also had a full loss or full retention of the endowment in each proposal, approximating the experience of a subsidy reform which is also one shot. The design of both "whole versus part" and "one shot versus repeated" was adopted to approximate the experience of subsidy reform.

> 22 In fundraising experiments List and Price (2009) and DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) found, respectively, a 20 percent and a 25 percent giving rate in the United States. Our findings would also be consistent with individuals being more generous when their endowmente depends solely on a random shock (Cappelen et al. 2007 and Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002).

> 23 Interestingly, the proposal in which individuals could give up their voucher to both help the poor and to finance a public good (the local school) proved to be the least popular proposal among participants. Although other experiments have suggested that altruism could be enhanced by introducing a chance of personal gain (for instance, lotteries, as in Landry et al. 2006), in this case individuals may have thought that contributing such a limited amount of funding to the school was neither beneficial to themselves nor as impactful as a charitable transfer given directly to the poor.

> 24 The question was “How confident are you that the public funds allocated for social assistance reach the poor?”The response scale had four options: “completely confident,”“somewhat confident,”“not very confident,”and “not confident at all.”Low-trust individuals are defined as those who responded with the two latter options.

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