2009.<sup>16</sup> The survey included six vignettes to measure respondent political attitudes; these are all in the Appendix. Two of these vignettes are a particular focus of the analysis here because they are specifically designed to convey an explicit trade-off between allocating public resources towards clientelist benefits versus public services for all.<sup>17</sup> These vignettes (Vignettes 4 and 5 in the Appendix) ask respondents to indicate whether they agree with the group of voters who preferred presidential political candidates who promised jobs for some commune residents or with the group that preferred candidates who promised to spend those same resources instead on education or health to benefit all children in the commune. In the education versus jobs vignette, the candidate promises to purchase books and provide teacher training to all the commune’s schools in order to improve student learning. In the health versus jobs vignette, the promise consists of increased health funding to vaccinate and provide mosquito nets to all children in the commune.

These vignettes are designed to measure citizen preferences for the types of benefits that clientelist and non-clientelist candidates might promise with the same public resources. Promises of government jobs are, of course, only one of many possible clientelist strategies of electoral mobilization. However, jobs have been identified as an important and salient form of clientelist mobilization in prior work in Benin around actual election campaigns (Wantchekon, 2003). Jobs also satisfy the criteria of being a targetable benefit that can be offered using the same public resources that could have been alternately allocated to broadly delivered benefits in health and education. That is, vignettes on jobs as a clientelist benefit can be employed to posit a direct trade-off with nonclientelist benefits. Our survey data is consistent with the salience of jobs as the benefit that clientelist politicians may offer: more than 50 percent of our respondents, in the clientelist environment of northern Benin, expressed preference for the jobs candidate even at the expense of health and education.

Radio effects on responses to these vignettes are tested with the following general specification:

- (1) Preferences for jobs candidatesijk = β0 + β1village access to community radiojk + β2village access to community radiojk ∗number of children+ β3number of children+ XijkB+ YjkΓ+ εij + μk ,

where the dependent variable is either response to the question of candidates who promise jobs versus candidates who promise mosquito nets and vaccinations, or jobs candidates versus candidates who promise more school books and teacher training. The units of observation are household _i_ in village _j_ and commune _k_ ; μk is a commune fixed effect.

The health and education information broadcast on community radio and the promises of the non-clientelist candidates are particularly salient to households with children. This is straightforward to see in the case of education. Malaria, a focus of health broadcasts, is also a particular concern of households with children: children, along with the elderly, are particularly 16 The overall research strategy was to exploit the availability of a natural experiment in radio access to test several hypotheses in the literature on media influence. This, however, also means that radio’s effect could operate through multiple channels. For example, radio’s impact on child literacy (documented in Keefer and Khemani, 2014) could be at least partly attributed to radio-induced greater household investments to improve the health of their children (documented in Keefer and Khemani, 2013). In the next section we discuss the extent to which we can substantiate a particular mechanism for radio’s impact on household political attitudes, the subject of the current paper.

> 17 In section 6 below we discuss the relative pattern of radio effects on all the vignettes, arguing that the pattern supports a particular mechanism for radio’s impact on support for clientelism.

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