rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
consider having collaboration with IT providers to attempt building antidotes to such act with consideration on relative marginal cost and marginal benefit.

# **7 Conclusion**

This paper examines the impact of POS distribution on tax payment among hotels and restaurants in the Indonesian districts of West Manggarai and Gorontalo. Using Allingham and Sandmo’s tax compliance framework as cited in Naritomi (2019), we find that the POS distribution has various impacts on tax compliance. While some POS machines have proven to improve tax compliance in both districts, RPOS has consistently showed insignificant impact on tax compliance.

We have identified several key takeaways from this varying impact of POS devices. First is the capacity of the receiver matter. POS receivers must sacrifice their resources to accommodate the machines. Without any personal benefit gained from the device, it is hard to imagine that taxpayers with low resources will voluntarily utilize the POS machine given to them. Second, interventions that require minimum adaptation are likely to succeed. Minimum adaptation means less resources needed to operate the POS machines. Again, without personal benefit, taxpayers tend to be more open to devices that require minimum resource allocation.

Finally, third-party data and informality play a vital role in increasing perceived probability of detection. This explains why big hotels and restaurants, which are TMD and WS users, were more compliant than small hotels and restaurants, which are RPOS receivers. We suggest that national scalability should be considered based on several factors.

First, district governments should not solely rely on POS machines to increase compliance. Without a strong and effective tax enforcement system, POS distribution will not be effective. Given their limited resources, district governments should manage their enforcement efficiently and effectively. This calls for the second, that is utilization of a risk-based enforcement system.

Next, district governments ought to have a clear legal framework on POS distribution. This can help district governments to enforce POS usage and oblige receivers to maintain the devices properly. Fourth, district governments must conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis to determine the actual benefits of implementing POS, before deciding to finance such intervention. This analysis needs to be done because POS implementation comes with costs. Finally, the governments need to be aware of the technology that makes it possible to tamper with POS systems. The risk from such technology will rise along with the utilization of POS machines.

Future research may need to examine closely the POS uptake pattern in the subnational setting, as this will confirm whether the muted effect of the POS distribution program studied in this paper stems from businesses’ resistance in adopting POS units. The potential findings will provide a clearer picture of an effective incentive structure that the local governments might want to consider in encouraging POS usage. Also, with better data availability on the observed businesses, one can have more covariates to produce 31
1997). Ethnic fractionalization has been suggested as an important explanation for poor African performance (see Collier and Gunning (1999) and Easterly and Levine (1997)).

The second component is basic property rights protection. Cross-country evidence suggests that countries with worse property rights have lower aggregate investments, worse access to finance, and slower economic growth (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find evidence that property rights institutions (i.e., those related to government expropriation) tend to be more important than contracting institutions (e.g., those safeguarding private transactions). Some new firm-level evidence also points to the importance of property rights (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002; Cull and Xu 2005) and the adverse effects of corruption. Potential mechanisms for the property rights effects include better external finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), better asset allocation (Claessens and Laeven 2003), and a higher share of large formal firms (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006). To capture the protection of property rights, we rely on political competition, in particular, the number of years that the ruling party has been in power from the Data of Political Institutions (DPI, based on Beck et al. 2001 and Keefer 2007). Our reasoning is that the longer a ruling party has been in power, the more absolute power the ruling party has, and the higher the risk of unconstrained government expropriation.<sup>11</sup> There are clearly alternative explanation for this party monopoly variable. For instance, a ruling party with

> 11 This intuition seems to capture the reality of most developing countries well.   However, some argue that several East-Asian countries also have low political competition as measured by this variable but seem to have performed well in the past several decades.  Gehlbach and Keefer (2010a, 2010b) suggests that this may be due to much better ruling party institutionalization in East Asian countries relative to other countries.  Institutionalized ruling parties facilitate development in autocratic countries for two main reasons.  First, they tend to have broad party bases so that the party represents broad rather than narrow constituent interest.  Second, there are institutionalized rules about removing incompetent or shirking party-leading rulers.  Thus the party can credibly commit to remove bad leaders, and leaders as a result work hard and perform well.  As Acemoglu and Johnson (2012) argue, an effective state machinery, that is, a bureaucracy that is effective and competent and has centralized power to tax and implement infrastructure investment, can bring about growth by itself, and the question is whether such growth are sustainable due to the lack of incentives for innovations.

9
8 Detailed description of the evolution of public agricultural extension in Nicaragua since 1942 can be found in Keynan et al. (1997). The last restructuring of the extension services, created the _Instituto Nicaraguiense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria_ (LNTA)<sup>5</sup> in 1993, which brought agricultural and livestock research and extension under one roof. INTA is divided geographically into five regions with its headquarters in Managua. The regions are all located in the western (Pacific) and central parts of the country where there is a larger concentration of economic and agricultural activity.

In 1995, INTA employed about 160 extensionists (INTA, 1996), serving nearly 21,500 producers in its five regions<sup>6</sup> , under the Assistencia Tecnica Publica-basico (ATPb) program. A large portion of INTA's budget is funded by foreign sources. In the same year, the national budget was reduced, and INTA's management began to realize that donors' support for public research and extension services was waning. Under these conditions, it became obvious to INTA that serious efforts should be made to use existing international assistance in order to establish a decentralized, client-oriented, accountable, and efficient extension system. In this context, it was also clear that such a system would be sustainable only with the finance commitment of the producers. Under the new approach, producers became clients instead of beneficiaries. To the surprise of all involved, these clients understood that without their sharing of costs, the system would not endure. Under these circumstances, the national agricultural technology transfer services were re-designed to include, three main modules for service provision: mass media and demonstration free of charge (ATPb); co-financed (Assistencia Tecnica Publica Cofinanciada-ATP1); and private (Assistencia Tecnica Privada-ATP2). While the first two are provided by INTA's staff, the third is carried out by private extension firms. At this stage ATP I and ATP2 are still subsidized by INTA.

> 5INTA's mandate is to reach small and medium farmers. These include some 170,000 out of a total of 243,000 rural families.

> 6 However, based on FIDEG (1995) Only 8.1% of the 313,845 farmers in Nicaragua received extension of any kind from any source. Ofthe 8.1% receiving extension, 24.1% (6126) were served by INTA. This discrepancy is explained by improper documentation of producers served by INTA prior to the 1993 reorganization. For example, INTA's 1997 budget targets 26,000 producers through ATPb and over 5,000 producers through ATPI. Additional 15,000 producers are targeted via ATP2.
Similarly to AJ (2005), we classify institutions into contracting institutions and property rights institutions. However, we differ by having more measures of institutions in each category. For contracting institutions, we rely on five measures: CPIA legal framework, CPIA legal quality, (Doing Business, or DB) contracting procedures, (DB) creditor rights, and WEF auditing quality. Table 2 contains the list and definitions of the institutional variables. The list includes both _de jure_ measures (CPIA legal framework, DB contracting procedures, DB creditor rights), and _de facto_ measures such as CPIA legal quality and WEF auditing quality. For property rights institutions, we rely on Heritage Foundation index of property rights protection, CPIA accountability, (Polity IV) executive constraints, WEF financial freedom, WEF access to stock market, and DB minority shareholder protection. Here, DB minority shareholder protection is a _de jure_ measure, while the rest are _de facto_ (and comprehensive) measures. With the availability of more proxies, we are perhaps in a better position to establish the robustness of our key results.

A further advantage of having multiple measures of contracting and property rights institutions is that we have instruments available for each measure of institutions. To correct for measurement error, one needs a second measure that is conceptually related but with measurement error that is uncorrelated with measurement error on the first indicator. A measure based on the same theoretical construct but measured using different methods (from independent surveys, for instance), therefore, is a natural candidate (Greene, 1997). Having multiple measures of contracting institutions and property rights institutions thus serves two important purposes: to deal with the measurement error contained in each institutional indicator, and to establish the robustness of key results using multiple proxies.

An additional advantage of using firm-level micro data is that we can investigate heterogeneous effects of institutions across different groups of firms. A key concern for understanding the effect of institutions is whether the elite and non-elite benefit differently from institutions, and whether institutions level the playing field between the elite and non-elite (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). To this end, we classify firms into micro, small, medium and large firms. Smaller firms, especially micro and small ones, are likely to be non-elite. How institutions affect micro and small firms differently from large firms, therefore, sheds light on how institutions affect the elite and the non-elite.

Our main data set is the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), which are collected using a standard and rigorous approach across countries. The surveys provide representative samples of each 5
# D. Sector Financing Strategies

xii. The financing strategies that emerge from the PERs are based on an explicit, though sometimes equivocal, sector diagnosis. Spending recommendations are not always consistent with the overall economic assessment. Many PERs--particularly in countries that spend a lot on education--fail to follow up the sector diagnosis with conc - e policy options. Reports focus on intrasectoral rather than intersectoral resource reallocation. The assumption--usually without clear justification--is that intersectoral reform is less feasible than intrasectoral reform.

xiii. Just as public expenditure reviews for resource-rich countries tend to avoid making specific sectoral financing recommendations, so those for resource-poor countries tend to emphasize the need for intrasectoral reallocation and more efficient resource use. The logic of this difference is clear: the more severe the resource constraint, the greater the need to maximize efficiency and to find other sources of financing. But the implicit corollary--that efficiency and equity of resource use are less serious concerns in countries with more resources--is questionable.

xiv. Few reports acknowledge that increased efficiency of educational processes usually requires prior investment in quality improvements, the incremental costs of which initially outweigh the resultirg savings. Furthermore, it is often unclear from the recommended efficiXncy measures whether realized savings are to remain within th'. subsecter or to be reallocated to another subsector. Consequently, the ultimate effect of such measures on the intrasectoral distribut.on of the education budget remains undetermined, even though the equity of this distribution is a stated area of concern.

xv. Crosscountry analysis of sector financing diagnoses and strategies confirms the need for a country typology linking sector financing and output criteria. The typology adopted for this review, though still crude, is useful in identifying exceptions and borderline cases that deserve closer scrutiny. In particular: a) Sector financing issues and strategies are relatively obvious in countries where the level of public spending on education and the sector output are both high or both low. Issues and strategies are more complex when there is an imbalance between the two criteria (for example, a high level of government funding and low sector output). In these cases, the interrelated issues of quality, efficiency, and equity predominate.

b) In assessing the resource situation in the sector, _public resource mobilization_ (the relative size of the budget) should be distinguished from _public resource allocation_ to education. When education sector funding is constrained primarily by the size of the public budget (relative to GDP), the credibility of sector financing recommendations would be enhanced by a more integrated treatment within the macroeconomic framework.

...
7 de-elopment of service sector infrastructure, and obligations on industrialized countries to bind and progressively reduce discrimination in government procurement practices.<sup>13</sup> It is noteworthy that much of this was eventually incorporated into the draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round.

The foregoing is not to say that negotiating positions remained i nchanged between 198791. On issues such as definition and coverage, developing countries became more accommodating, accepting **a** broad definition of trade in services and putting much less emphasis on the lack of **a** detailed databasc on service statistics. Indeed, the initial breakthrough was the developing country acceptance that the definition of trade in services irclude the four possible modes through which intemational transactions in services may occur, at the price of acceptance of a positive list approach to determining the coverage of specific commitments (see below)."<sup>4</sup> Bu. the summary of the provisions of the GATS contained in the next section illustrates that developing countries continued to insist on the inclusion of the "acquired rights" pertaining to preferential treatment embodied in the Montreal Ministerial declaration.

# **III.** An Overview **of the Draft GATS**

The draft GATS contains two sets of obligations: (1) a set of _general_ concepts, principles and rules that create obligations that apply to _all_ measures affecting trade in services; and (2) _specific_ negotiated obligations that constitute commitments that apply to those service sectors and subsectors that are listed in a member country's schedule, subject to sector-specific qualifications, conditions and limitations. The Agreement also contains a set of attachments that include annexes that take into account sectoral specificities and various institutional decisions and understandings.

The GATS applies to measures affecting trade in services, "services" being defined to
available data for _PFM Quality_ and _Transparency_ , presented in Equation 6, are stronger, compared to results for the full sample in equation 1. The coefficient for _PFM Quality_ is about two-fifths larger, and statistical significance improves for both _PFM Quality_ and _Transparency_ , despite the reduction in sample size. In this low-income sample, however, the coefficient for _HIPC completion_ is smaller and no longer significant.

Budget support by definition uses country PFM systems. Equation 7 returns to the full sample of observations, but differs from equation 1 in adding _DBS_ as a regressor. Conceivably, the other right-hand-side variables increase _PFM_ in equations 1-6 only by increasing _DBS_ . As expected, _DBS_ is strongly related to _PFM_ in equation 7. More importantly, _donor aid share_ , _HIPC completion_ and _PFM Quality_ retain their effects, indicating that they are associated with greater use of PFM systems for project aid and other non-budget-support aid. The coefficient for _Transparency_ is cut in half, however, and it is no longer significant when controlling for _DBS_ .

Table 7 replaces _PFM_ with the other two dependent variables, _DBS_ and _PBA_ . Righthand-side variables are somewhat different. For reasons explained above in Section 3, we add the regressors _aid/GDP_ and _Quality of Macro/Fiscal Policy_ . Rather than including three (somewhat collinear) CPIA variables, we drop _PFM Quality_ from the _DBS_ and _PBA_ regressions, where it is not significant. In equations 1 and 2, _donor aid share_ is positively and significantly associated with _DBS_ and _PBA_ , as in the two-way fixed effects tests of Table 3. In _HIPC completion_ countries, _DBS_ is 4.4 percentage points higher, and _PBA_ is nearly 16 points higher. Each 1-point increase in _Quality of Macro/Fiscal policy_ and in _Transparency_ is associated with, respectively, 7.3 and 5.9 percentage point increases in _DBS_ . However, their coefficients are not significant for _PBA_ in equation 2. Aid levels are significantly related to budget support (equation 1), but not to program-based aid (equation 2). Each 3 percentage-point increase in _aid/GNP_ is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in budget support.

The model’s explanatory power for _PBA_ is somewhat lower than for _DBS_ , likely due to greater measurement error in program-based aid. Although the criteria for determining whether aid qualifies as _PBA_ are more explicit in the 2008 SMPD than in the 2006 survey, there is still more room for subjective judgment in classifying aid as _PBA_ than in classifying it as _DBS_ .

Equations 3 and 4 in Table 7 drop the World Bank observations, but otherwise are identical to (respectively) equations 1 and 2. Results change only trivially.

Equations 5 and 6 drop middle-income countries, but otherwise are identical to (respectively) equations 1 and 2. The most notable change is that _Quality of Macro/Fiscal Policy_ and _Transparency_ are significantly related to program-based aid in this low-income sample (equation 6); their coefficients were somewhat smaller and not significant in equation 2.

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# Traditional Medicine in Sub-Saharan Africa: Its Importance and Potential Policy Options

_Jocelyn DeJong_

1. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines the "traditional healer" as a "person who is recognized by the community in which he (or she) lives as competen **t**<sup>o provide health care</sup> by using vegetable, animal and mineral substances and certain other<sup>methods based on the social,</sup> cultural and religious background, as well as on the knowledge,<sup>attitudes and beliefs that are</sup> prevalent in the community regarding physical, mental and social well-being<sup>and the causation</sup> of disease and disability" (WHO 1978).

2. Even such a broad definition, however, does not capture the<sup>tremendous variability of</sup> traditional health care either within or among countries. In China<sup>and India, for example, ancient</sup> traditions of Chinese medicine and Ayurvedic medicine in<sup>India are taught and practiced in</sup> separate medical schools and institutions. Other countries<sup>in Asia-such as Vietnam and the</sup> Philippines-developed their own systems of indigenous health care by drawing extensively<sup>on</sup> Chinese traditional medicine. Such coherent and institutionalized traditions are found primarily in Asia. Comparable bodies of systematized knowledge about the<sup>treatment of disease do not</sup> exist for Africa. Traditional health care in Africa includes<sup>a wide variety of practices carried out</sup> by herbalists, birth attendants, bone setters, faith healers,<sup>and diviners. Tremendous ethnic</sup> diversity contributes to further variability in healing practices.<sup>Moreover, many indigenous</sup> African healers combine modem health care technologies<sup>with traditional practices, making the</sup> modifier "traditional" somewhat inappropriate.' Because of<sup>the heterogeneity and fluidity of</sup> indigenous health care in Sub-Saharan African countries,<sup>one must carefully avoid over-</sup> generalization.

3. Information on Africa's rich heritage of indigenous health care<sup>is drawn primarily from</sup> ethnographic studies of healers in particular communities and<sup>from a few isolated findings of</sup> surveys intended to determine the demand for health care.<sup>Data on the numbers and activities</sup> of traditional healers does not exist for individual communities, let<sup>alone the whole of the region.</sup> I There is a notable absen:e of neutral terminology in the<sup>discussion of alternative forms of</sup> health care. For consistency in this paper, the term "modern<sup>health care" is used to distinguish</sup> "allopathic" or "biomedical" practitioners from traditional practitioners, although it is recognized that this terminology tends to disguise the dynamic nature of traditional<sup>health care.</sup>
Figure 11: Impacts on business practices by firm size on Chaldal <!-- Start of picture text --> Estimated coefficient on dummy for firm size <= 20 employees<br>with 95% CI, for various outcomes<br>Marketing Accounting Packaging<br>Digital technology Logistics Facilities<br>Index of business practices<br>.5<br>0<br>-.5<br>-1<br>-1.5<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **4.2 Heterogeneity in the Impact of Joining Daraz**

In the case of Daraz, too, the patterns suggest that smaller firms benefit equally or potentially more from participation in the e-commerce platform. A series of regressions compare Daraz sellers with fewer than 5 employees to larger sellers.<sup>14</sup> After controlling for time on Daraz in years, firm age in years, and country fixed effects, the coefficient on fewer than 5 employees is marginally significant only for the outcome of more flexibility after joining Daraz (figure 12).<sup>15</sup> For this particular outcome, smaller firms appear to benefit more from joining Daraz.

> 14The size threshold (5 employees) is different from that chosen in the case of Chaldal (20 employees) because of the difference in the size distribution of Chaldal and Daraz sellers. There are very few Chaldal sellers with 5 or fewer employees.

> 15The corresponding regression results for these outcomes are shown in table A.9. Table A.8 shows their raw associations with size.

18