Disaggregating the data further shows that, across the board, there are pervasive plateau effects. That is to say that once a certain level of penetration is reached for a particular type of reform in a particular region it simply seems to settle at that level for a number of years. This suggests that all the countries interested in reforming in that region have already done so. The level at which the plateau is reached differs across regions and according to the reform measure involved. In general, in Latin America the plateau is reached at the level of at least 80 percent of countries, while in less reform‐oriented regions such as Sub‐Saharan Africa and the Middle East, the plateau is reached at 40 percent of countries or less depending on the measure.

While a majority of developing countries have taken some measures related to restructuring, competition and private sector participation in their power sectors, only a minority of them have actually gone all the way on any of the dimensions of reform (Figure 7.5). While 70 percent of countries have taken at least one step towards competition, only 20 percent have succeeded in implementing a power market. And while 44 percent of countries have undertaken some measure of restructuring, only 20 percent have completed the full vertical and horizontal unbundling of the sector. As a result, the prevalence of countries with some intermediate stage of reform is much higher than the prevalence of countries that have reformed fully.

**Figure 7.5: Prevalence of differing degrees of power sector reform across developing countries**

|Percentage of countries|Some degree of reform|Full extent of reform||
|---|---|---|---|
|Restructuring|52||20|
|Competition|70||20|
|Private sectorparticipation|74||40|

Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank RISE 2015 and World Bank’s PPI 1990‐2015 databases

# **C. Some elements of the power sector reform agenda have proven far more popular than others**

While the various measures associated with the 1990s power sector reform model were originally conceived as a package, it is clear that developing countries have been quite selective in their adoption of these reforms. Some elements of the package have proved much more popular than others. Broadly, the different reform measures can be divided into three groups according to their level of popularity (Figure 7.6).

The most popular group of measures are applied by a majority of 60 to 70 percent of developing countries. Foremost among these is the creation of a regulatory entity. This measure is relatively straightforward in political terms, because it entails adding a new element to the sector rather than changing what is already there. While a regulatory entity could in principle represent a challenge to the political hegemony of the sector, in practice regulators have not always been given sufficient powers to provide such contestability. The next most widespread reform measure was private sector participation in generation, most often through BOTs or Independent Power Projects, although in many cases also through divestiture. Private sector participation in generation has proved less challenging to implement, in part because it can often be applied to new plants, thereby avoiding the need to change institutions that already exist; but also because it involves low levels of employment, is relatively straightforward to operate, is far removed from the customer interface, and lends itself to a simple ring‐fenced power purchase arrangement, either with a utility which may already be creditworthy or one whose creditworthiness can be enhanced through some form of state guarantee. Despite the high uptake of these policies, it is relevant to note that a full 45