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**Table 3. Top-down Accountability**

(School averages)

|||**Full s**|**ample**||**Sch**|**ools in **|**rural**<br>**ar **|**eas**|**Sch**|**ools in**|**urban**<br> **ar**|**eas**|**Urban**<br>**vs.**<br>**rural**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Mean**|**Min**|**Max**|**sd**|**Mean**|**Min**|**Max**|**sd**|**Mean**|**Min**|**Max**|**sd**|**p-value**|
|**Top-down accountability**||||||||||||||
|N. of inspections from RED|**5.04**|0.00|36.00|5.52|**3.90**|0.00|35.00|4.06|**7.02**|0.00|36.00|7.00|**0.000**|
|Underperforming school director is<br>not subject to penalties (self-<br>reported by school director)|**0.20**|0.00|1.00|0.40|**0.21**|0.00|1.00|0.41|**0.18**|0.00|1.00|0.39|0.698|
|Underperforming teachers are not<br>subject to penalties (self-reported<br>by teachers)|**0.49**|0.00|1.00|0.26|**0.48**|0.00|1.00|0.27|**0.51**|0.00|1.00|0.25|0.233|
|Teachers' days of absence in May<br>2009|**0.18**|0.00|5.17|0.70|**0.22**|0.00|5.17|0.83|**0.13**|0.00|2.25|0.37|0.203|
|**Transparency**||||||||||||||
|School keeps a teacher absence<br>register|**0.91**|0.00|1.00|0.29|**0.90**|0.00|1.00|0.31|**0.92**|0.00|1.00|0.27|0.546|
|Public display of teachers' absence|**0.12**|0.00|1.00|0.33|**0.15**|0.00|1.00|0.36|**0.08**|0.00|1.00|0.27|0.163|
|Public display of students' final<br>grades|**0.56**|0.00|1.00|41.50|**0.70**|0.00|1.00|0.46|**0.82**|0.00|1.00|0.39|**0.079**|
|% respondents who perceive<br>corruption in the appointment of<br>school directors|**0.28**|0.00|0.82|0.18|**0.26**|0.00|0.82|0.17|**0.32**|0.03|0.77|0.18|**0.008**|
|% respondents who perceive<br>corruption in the appointment of<br>teachers|**0.20**|0.00|0.64|0.15|**0.19**|0.00|0.64|0.15|**0.22**|0.00|0.64|0.15|**0.099**|

Note: The p-values reported in the last column are generated by either one-tailed tests of equality of means or Chi-square tests.

77. Simple pair-wise correlations between the different measures of accountability and transparency reveal that not keeping a teacher absence register is associated with underperforming school directors not being subject to penalties. Table A.2.3, in the Appendix, compares the schools in the different REDs with respect to accountability and transparency of school administrations. The data show that the number of RED inspections is on average significantly higher in the REDs of Fier and Shkoder, and significantly lower in Korce, where it is also most likely that a bad performing school director is not subject to penalties. Perceptions of corruption in the appointments of school director and teachers are most severe in Vlore, Diber and Elbasan.

78. To contrast with the indicators above, Table 4 provides information about the bodies that have been established for participatory “bottom up” accountability and parental involvement in the school. The top panel of the table reports statistics on the composition and meetings of the school board (SB). The number of SB meetings in the previous semester (January – May 2009) varies from a minimum of zero to a maximum of five, with no significant differences between rural and urban schools. Contrary to the MoES directives, in about 30% of schools, the school director participates in school board meetings and expresses his or her vote, again with no significant differences between rural and urban schools. In about 81 percent of the schools, according to the answers of parent SB members, parent class representatives are elected by parents rather than appointed by teachers; and in 43% of the schools teacher school board members are elected by teachers rather than appointed by the school directors. These proportions are significantly higher in urban schools as compared to rural schools.

79. The second panel of Table 4 reports the proportions of parents who are not informed about: the existence of the school board; the existence of parent class representatives; the name of their child‟s math teacher; and the name of their child‟s Albanian teacher. About 43% of the parents do