rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
4. _Prosocial behaviors and attitudes towards migrants:_ this module collected information on our five main outcomes of analysis and additional secondary outcomes for exploratory analysis. Our five main outcomes include two measures of altruism: one was a self-reported measure and the other measured policy altruism related to voter support for public aid to migrants. The other three outcomes measured native attitudes towards migrants (described in detail in the next section). We also collected information on respondents’ perceptions of Venezuelan migrants (the share of Venezuelans in the Colombian population and their levels of education) and elicited native perceptions about migrants’ impacts on Colombian labor markets, culture, and crime.

5. _Social desirability:_ this module included four questions to construct a social desirability scale for each individual. We measure social desirability bias by using four questions from Crowne and Marlowe’s social desirability scale (see Crowne and Marlowe, 1964 for details). The questions assess whether or not respondents are concerned with social approval. A high number of socially desirable responses suggests the respondent is concerned with social approval. Particularly, we used four of the 33 questions of the scale to construct an index from one (no social desirability) to four (maximum social desirability) and standardize it for ease of interpretation. We used only four questions in order to minimize the duration of the survey and increase response rates. Each answer was assigned a score of one or zero depending on whether the scale identified the respondent as someone who wanted social approval. The four questions—with possible answers of true or false—were:

- It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (False was associated with social desirability).

- There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (False was associated with social desirability).

- I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (True was associated with social desirability).

- I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (True was associated with social desirability).

Descriptive statistics for all survey variables are in Table I. Figure I offers a timeline illustration of the different pandemic shocks and survey rounds.

8
_Figure 6.11: Rural household consumption (poorest quintile Q1)_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Change in Rural-HH consumption (as % change from base case)<br>for poorest quintile (Q1)<br>2018 2022 2026 2030<br>(5.0 USD/ton) (13.3 USD/ton) (21.7 USD/ton) (30.0 USD/ton)<br>0. 3%<br>0.2%<br>0.1%<br>0.0%<br>-0.1%<br>-0.2%<br>-0.3%<br>-0.4%<br>-0.5%<br>-0.6%<br>-0.7%<br>STAX DTAX SAVING CORPORATE TRANS<br>0.2% 0.2% 0.2%<br>0.2% 0.2%<br>0.1%<br>0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%<br>0.0% 0.0% 0.0%<br>0.0%<br>-0.1%<br>-0.2%<br>% change from base<br>-0.4% -0.4%<br>-0.6%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **7 Concluding Remarks**

Over 90 percent of Ethiopia’s GHG emissions comes from sources other than fossil fuels. This is because (a) energy use in general is relatively low, including in transport, although it is expected to grow as the economy expands; (b) most of Ethiopia’s electricity comes from hydro; and (c) biomass remains the overwhelming choice of energy source for cooking. Consequently, application of carbon pricing to fossil fuels use in Ethiopia necessarily will have a somewhat limited effect on total GHG emissions.

Nevertheless, since motorization increases as incomes rise, the carbon price on fuels can contribute to mitigating a “lock-in” of high levels of individual vehicle use and high demand for road expansion by limiting vehicle use and creating support for expanding well-performing public transit and smaller, efficient cars in more densely populated areas. The carbon price on fossil fuels limits fuel use and associated GHG emissions cost effectively compared to what might result from a patchwork of different regulatory standards on various emissions sources. It creates incentives for increasing energy-efficiency including in transport choices. By moving away from carbon, Ethiopia may benefit in the long run from energy efficiency and relatively cheaper sources of energy, providing a competitive advantage over those countries that did not make the transition and have locked-in inefficient technologies. In addition, revenue-neutral reductions in other taxes can be made to spur investment and productivity gains.

Regarding economic impacts, GDP continues to grow substantially, albeit at a modestly lower rate. The direct effect of the carbon price is likely to be felt more by higher-income households since they are more intensive consumers of fossil fuels. Indirect effects through adjustments in the economy to higher fuel prices can lead to modestly slower growth for the urban poor, but the size of that effect will depend on 23
25 percentage of GNP for these countries.14 If the resource constraint were binding, one would expect the countries with the highest ratio of outward transfer of resources to GNP to have the lowest growth rates. As indicated in figure 1, just the opposite appears to be the case. During 1986-88, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile had the highest ratios of outward resource transfer to GNP among the six large Latin American debtor countries (an unweighted average of 4.6 percent of GNP), yet they had relatively favorable growth rates (averaging 5.2 percent annually). In contrast, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had lower outward resource transfers (an average of 2.4 percent of GNP) but nonetheless had lower growth as well (an average of 1.9 percent annually). While few would conclude that larger outward resource transfers generate faster growth (although the notion of export-led growth tends in that direction), the data do contradict the view that it is outward transfers of resources that are causing economic stagnation in Latin America.

RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND INFLATION -- The obvious explanation for low recent growth in countries such as Brazil and Argentina is the adverse impact of their inability to control inflation. Truly high inflation, in the range of several hundred percent annually, is inimical to growth. It makes investment decisions difficult by making economic projections highly unstable. Figure 5 provides support to the idea that high inflation is a major cause of 14 The resource transfer estimates refer to the excess of net payments of interest and profits over net inflows of capital. The data are from ECLA 1988.
Our port congestion index takes a significantly positive coefficient. This is the expected result by our partial equilibrium framework, illustrated in Future 2 above. The estimated value implies that the expansion of port capacity by 19 percent in China, which is the annual average growth rate of the estimated port capacity from 2001 to 2006, would _ceteris paribus_ reduce the international transport cost, measured by import charge, by 2 percent.

The other two indicators of port performance reflect opinion survey results. The _GCR_ port infrastructure quality index reflects the responses on what degree port facilities and inland waterways in a country are developed, and the _WCY_ water transportation index reflects the responses on to what degree water transportation (harbor, canals, etc.) meets business requirements. These indicators reflect the perceptions of the respondent executives in a particular country and generally cover a wider range of the scope than simply physical congestion of ports. Both of these indicators have significantly negative coefficients in the second and third specification of the regression, as expected. The estimated parameter on the _GCR_ index, -0.074, is about double to that estimated by Clark, Dollar and Micco, -0.043, while there is difference in the _GCR_ indexes with the latter being a discontinued index of the “port efficiency”.

A one point increase in the port infrastructure quality index of the _GCR_ would reduce transport cost by 7.4 percent. However, no country/region in our Asia Pacific sample could achieve the improvement as large as one point in this index between 2001 and 2006. The third specification using water transportation index of _WCY_ results in similar estimates. The containerization ratio in the latter two specifications has positively significant coefficient, against the expectation. A possible explanation of this is that the two survey indicators may reflect the wider perception on water transportation, including the information of containerization. In fact, both of them positively correlate to the containerization ratio with coefficients around 0.5. After controlling the information in the survey indexes, the containerization ratio may just reflect the higher charges of containerized liners.

23
- 39 -

foreign exchange availability. There was also evidence in India of firms resorting to illegal closures and delaying subsequent legal proceedings while gambling on the serious possibility of the existing law being declared unconstitutional.

Suarez (1987) is largely ambivalent about the effects of JSR in Peru. There does seem to be evidence, however, that JSR has led to an increased tendency to use temporary workers and may have hampered attempts at liberalization by reducing labor mobility. Similarly, JSR in Mexico have been an important stumbling block for the success of the industrial restructuring derived from the opening up of the economy tRiveros (1988c)]. Likewise, the effect of substantial financial contributi.ons to a severance payments fund, has significantly increased the non-wage cost of labor in Colombia, thus harming employment growth.

Another institutional labor market aspect refers to non-wage cost regulations (NWC), such as fringe benefits, medical insurances, social security contributions, bonuses, etc. Riveros (1988d) has studied this issue in 21 LDCB, the main conclusion being that governments have not attempted to furthez intensify such regulations during the late 1970s and the 1980s. In general, and despite the wide dispersion seen across countries, the distortive effect of NWC -- as measured against the per-capita income -- has tended to diminish in time (Table 7), the only exception to this pattern being Colombia. This is also complemented by evidence indicating that total unit cost of labor have also generally decreased during the 1980s. Hence, as in the case of MW regulations, the evidence seems to ind<sup>4</sup> .cate the existence of a deregulatory trend through time across LDCs.

# 6. Conclusions

There seem to be five main conclusions that emerge from this survey:
from the PIP and what is provided by the applicant. Applications are considered on a first-come first-served basis, with no prioritization or selection criteria. To be accepted, a requested intervention must help to achieve product compliance with EU traceability and food-safety (pesticide residues) regulations. Upon acceptance, a protocol stating the actions to be implemented by each party on a cost-sharing basis (50% for each, except for smallholders who are expected to contribute only 20%) is signed. Wages and investment costs are _de facto_ excluded. The actions listed in the protocol are chosen among a menu offered by the PIP under its five components; however, the combination in each protocol is specific to a firm and varies across beneficiaries. So far, most of the financing has gone to training costs, technical support and the development of a food-safety toolbox containing crop protocols, GAP guidelines, and Hortitrace, a traceability software developed by the PIP. The program’s first phase has covered 21 countries<sup>13</sup> and 320 export companies. Out of those, 219 firms benefited from the ‘good company practices’ component (advice and assistance for setting up sanitary quality and traceability systems, and certification pre-audits). 153 benefited from training under the capacity-building component.

# **2.4 The PIP’s Evaluation**

An evaluation of the PIP’s first phase was undertaken in June 2008. The appendix’s valuation matrix summarizes the report’s findings and details objectives, expected results, performance indicators, and outcomes. Performance indicators are both quantitative and qualitative. The evaluation relies on trade data reported by the firms themselves and from Eurostat. Additionally, a survey was conducted among PIP beneficiaries and EU importers. As highligthed in the appendix’s evaluation matrix, program impacts are evaluated at the aggregate level. Outcomes for beneficiary firms are generally reported without controlling for location, size or experience in exporting FFV to the EU market, with the exception of specific objective (S1), for which outcomes are reported by ACP country or type of intervention (O1, O2, O3).

Overall, the evaluation report drew up a very positive image of the program’s impact, contributing to the launch of a second five-year phase in 2009. While fairly comprehensive, the PIP’s evaluation suffers from a typical drawback of this type of exercise—namely, the lack of a counterfactual to benchmark the performance of treated firms and products.

13The countries covered are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, Jamaica, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, the Dominican Republic, Senegal, Surinam, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

11
This pattern was replicated in China in the first 15 years of the reform period, but not since the mid-1990s. The share of agriculture in total employment declined from 70 percent in 1978 to 50 percent in 1996 (Figure 2). However, since the mid-1990s, only limited further movement has taken place, in part also because of the demise of the township and village enterprises. In particular, after rising during the 1980s, the share of employment in industry has remained fairly stable since the end of the 1980s, despite remarkable growth in industry. Labor relocation from agriculture to services has been modest since the early 1990s, at 3⁄4 percentage point of total employment per year. As a result, China now has a relatively high share of total employment in agriculture compared to other countries at a similar stage of development, although the shift out of agriculture in 2004 was significant.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 2. Employment share<br> (in percent of total)<br>80<br>70<br>60 Agriculture<br>50<br>40<br>Services<br>30<br>20<br>Industry<br>10<br>0<br>1978 1986 1994 2002<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Sources: NBS, and authors' estimates._ In the meantime, agriculture’s productivity gap with other sectors in China is high and rising (Figure 3). The ratio of productivity in industry and agriculture has been increasing spectacularly, from 5 in 1993 to a whopping 9 times in 2003 (in constant prices)—among the highest Figure 3. Labor productivity (1995 RMB, 000s per employee) <!-- Start of picture text --> 45<br>40<br>Industry<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20 Services<br>15<br>10<br>Agriculture<br>5<br>0<br>1978 1986 1994 2002<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Sources: NBS, and authors' estimates._ 5
|**Table 6: Impacts Post‐Interven**|**tion**<br>Dec 2014 <br>Worke|Feb 2015 <br>d at all|Dec 2014 <br>Weekl|Feb 2015 <br>y hours|Monthly i<br> Dec 2014|ncome<br> Feb 2015|Truncated<br> Dec 2014|monthly income<br>Feb 2015|Overall Employment<br>Index|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A: Intention‐to‐Treat Eff_|_ects_|||||||||
|Assigned to Intern Program|0.065|0.066|4.303|5.158*|3633|286|2869|698|0.285***|
||(0.054)|(0.056)|(2.722)|(2.848)|(3785)|(2268|(3676)|(1999)|(0.083)|
|_Panel B: Local Average Treatm_|_ent Effects_|||||||||
|Participated in Internship|0.159|0.163|10.581|12.683*|8894|695|7025|1694|0.700***|
||(0.132)|(0.138)|(6.738)|(7.202)|(9229)|(5505)|(8956)|(4851)|(0.208)|
|Sample Size|459|459|459|459|452|454|452|454|459|
|Control Mean<br>Notes:<br>Robust standard errors in pare<br>*, **, and *** indicate signific|0.472<br>ntheses, af<br>ance at the|0.496<br>ter control<br>10, 5, and 1|18.959<br>ling for str<br>percent l|19.374<br>ata fixed e<br>evels respe|27862<br>ffects.<br>ctively.|9538|27862|9050|‐0.213|

|**Table 7: Gender ITT Impacts Post‐Interv**|**ention**<br>Worke|d at all|Weekl|y hours|Monthly|income|Truncated mo|nthly income|Overall Employment|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Dec 2014|Feb 2015|Dec 2014|Feb 2015|Dec 2014|Feb 2015|Dec 2014|Feb 2015|Index|
|Assigned to Intern Program|0.063|0.092|5.188|8.000**|1364|630|662|1353|0.299***|
||(0.064)|(0.067)|(3.362)|(3.585)|(4684)|(3116)|(4626)|(2554)|(0.101)|
|Assigned to Intern Program*Female|‐0.025|‐0.120|‐5.548|‐12.321**|4115|‐2823|3670|‐3708|‐0.142|
||(0.121)|(0.120)|(5.636)|(5.853)|(9898)|(4798)|(8673)|(4304)|(0.182)|
|Female|‐0.098|‐0.055|‐6.230|‐3.256|‐15100**|‐4801|‐15800**|‐3732|‐0.264*|
||(0.105)|(0.106)|(4.999)|(5.192)|(7177)|(4295)|(6880)|(3663)|(0.156)|
|Sample Size|459|459|459|459|452|454|452|454|459|
|Control Mean Males|0.494|0.506|19.988|20.325|32110|10630|32110|9907|‐0.139|
|Control Mean Females<br>Notes:<br>Robust standard errors in parentheses,<br>*, **, and *** indicate significance at th|0.425<br>after controll<br>e 10, 5, and 1|0.475<br>ing for stra<br>percent le|16.825<br>ta fixed ef<br>vels respe|17.400<br>fects.<br>ctively.|19153|7273|19153|7273|‐0.369|

19
# **7 - Conclusion**

Some macro economic studies have shown that economic instability increases aid effectiveness or in other words that aid lowers the negative consequences of instability, because it dampens the shocks. This paper brings a micro economic confirmation of these results. It evidences that aid has a stabilizing effect, which is not directly perceived by the evaluators of each project since it cannot be easily observed at a micro economic level. Indeed the vulnerability of a country harms the success of the projects, but this is less when the level of ODA received by the country is high, which leads to the conclusion that aid reduces the negative effects of economic instability. These results substantiate the macro economic findings and provide further support that more aid should be given to vulnerable countries because it can dampen the negative effects of shocks. It can be done by taking into consideration a measure of vulnerability in the criteria used for aid selectivity, as suggested elsewhere (Amprou et al. 2006, Guillaumont 2006).

These results have not been rejected by the various robustness checks that we carried out but the size of the cushioning effect of aid can vary considerably with the choice of the model. Nonetheless, since we provided elements in favor of the idea that this stabilizing effect of aid extends to all the government expenditures and to some extent to the rest of the economy, the stabilizing impact of aid seems far from being negligible.

Our findings also raise the need for further studies on aid effectiveness in vulnerable countries. Because managing projects in an unstable environment is difficult, it is essential to take into consideration the vulnerability of the country during the conception of the projects: for example, some project performance assessment reports of the World Bank (2000) recommend more flexible short-term and small projects and an emphasis on monitoring in unstable countries in order to handle the lack of predictability. More studies may be required on how to conceive and carry out projects adapted to an unstable environment.

20
<!-- Start of picture text --> 2 2<br>cy<br>gS<br>©<br>+<br>©<br>n<br>° °<br>=2 oO Coefficient on Own Risk2 4 21 0 Coefficient on OwnFt) Risk 2 3<br>1)" Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups 1)" Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups<br>. Estimate . Estimate<br>2 2<br>cy<br>gS<br>©<br>+<br>©<br>n<br>° °<br>-1 O Pl a 3 =2 21 ) Bl 2 3<br>Coefficient on Own Risk Coefficient on Own Risk<br>1)" Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups 1)" Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups<br>. Estimate . Estimate<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>2<br>”<br>co<br>=| 0 Coefficiental on Own 2Risk 3 4<br>1) Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups<br>. Estimate<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>Cy<br>©<br>+<br>x<br>co<br>=I 0 Coefficient on silOwn Risk 2 3<br>1) Distribution Under Randomly Formed Groups<br>. Estimate<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **Figure 2 Trends in the composition of revenues**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina<br>100% 100%<br>80% 80%<br>60% 60%<br>40%<br>40%<br>20%<br>20%<br>0%<br>0%<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br>SHI General revenues Private OOP Private insurance NGOs<br>SHI General revenues Private OOP Private insurance NGOs<br>FYR of Macedonia Serbia and Montenegro<br>100% 100%<br>80% 80%<br>60%<br>60%<br>40%<br>40%<br>20%<br>20%<br>0%<br>0%<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br>SHI General revenues Private OOP Private insurance NGOs SHI General revenues Private OOP Private insurance NGOs<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: WHO NHA database As with most social health insurance schemes elsewhere in the world, contributions to health insurance funds in the sub-region are not related to individual or group risk, but are levied on earned income. They are compulsory for most employed groups, and are typically shared between the employee and the employer. The greatest share of healthcare funding is collected through compulsory payroll taxation, but there is also a direct transfer of contributions from the state budget to the health insurance funds on behalf of particular categories of people who are exempt from making contributions and to finance special programs and the administrative costs of the Ministry of Health.

In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, where payroll contributions account for at least threequarters of health sector revenues, health insurance contribution rates paid by formally employed workers are high, between 15 and 17% of payroll (see Table 2). Albania, where payroll taxes account for only 25% of health sector revenues, is entirely different: health insurance contributions amount to only 3.4% of wages, shared equally between the employer and the employee. This pattern reflects Albania’s heritage because countries of the former Soviet Union typically set the level at around 2-4% of payroll.

There is no consistent pattern in the sub-region regarding the employer-employee share of the burden of taxation. While both are equally taxed in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, in the FYR of Macedonia the employer pays the total cost of the health insurance contribution and in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the tax burden falls on the employee. Farmers and 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS

|I. Theories, Hypotheses, Variables<sup>. . . .5</sup>|
|---|
|II. Political Sources of Inflation<sup>over the Long-run . . . . . . . . . .</sup><br>14|
|Low Inflation Countries ......<br>.. .. .<br>.. .. .. .<br>.. .<br>.<br>17<br> <br>|
|Mixed Records: The Moderate Inflation<sup>Countries . . . . . . . . . .</sup><br>22<br> <br>|
|Indonesia, Jamaica, Turkey and<sup>Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . .</sup><br>23<br>|
|Korea and the Philipiines . . <sup>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</sup><br>26<br>|
|Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia<sup>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</sup><br>27<br>The High Inflation Countries:<sup>Argentina, Brazil, Chile and</sup><br>Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . <sup>. . .</sup><br>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br>30|
|III.How Inflations End:<sup>The Political Eccnomy of Stabilization</sup><br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>37|
|Stabilizing Moderate Inflations<sup>.....</sup><br>. . . . . . . . .. . .<br>.<br>44<br> <br>|
|Stabilizing High Inflations .....<br>.. . . .. . . .. . .. .<br>.<br>46<br>|
|Stabilizing Very High Inflations<sup>.....</sup><br>. . . . . . . . . . .<br>.<br>49|
|END NOTES . . . . . . . . . . <sup>. . .</sup><br>59|

We would like to thank Bela Balassa,<sup>Steven Webb and the other members of this</sup> project--Miles Kahler, Barbara<sup>Stallirigs,</sup> Joan Nelson, and Tom Callaghy--for comments on earlier drafts.