rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
after therapy, GC announced and held a private draw for $200 grants among the full sample, in blocks of roughly 50 men. Finally, a third organization (Innovations for Poverty Action) ran endline surveys 2 and 5 weeks, and then 12 and 13 months, after grants.

The sample were very mistrustful of authority, and we randomized by individual draw rather than computerized assignment to maximize trust, transparency, and staff safety. Men in each block took turns drawing colored chips from a fabric bag.<sup>18</sup>

**Balance** This resulted in 25% assignment to cash only, 28% to therapy only, 25% to both, and 22% to neither (Table 2).<sup>19</sup> Treatment is balanced along covariates. Table 1 reports tests of balance for teach treatment, for selected covariates (see Appendix A.1 for all, and for endline respondents only). Of 57 covariates over three treatments, 14 (8.2%) have a difference with _p < ._ 05, and within treatment arms the covariates are not jointly significant.

**Compliance** Both interventions had high compliance, in part due to NEPI’s persuasive efforts and street credibility. Of men assigned to the grant, 98% received it. Of men assigned to therapy, 5% attended none, another 5% dropped out within the first 3 weeks, and two thirds attended most sessions (>80%) (Appendix A.4). Those who dropped out early had less schooling, less self control, and were less likely to exhibit antisocial behaviors like substance abuse or stealing (Appendix A.3). Thus the highest-risk men seem more likely to attend over poorer, noncriminal men.

**Phased implementation** For logistical reasons we recruited, treated, and studied the men in three phases, as seen in Table 2. A pilot phase recruited 100 men, to ensure that the therapy and cash grant caused no harm, to assess statistical power, and to allow us to refine experimental protocols. The pilot showed no indication of harm, and so we scaled to a further 900 with only minor changes to the interventions and protocols in two phases.<sup>20</sup>

# **3 Conceptual framework**

Both interventions aim to reduce crime and violence. To structure our thinking and highlight key mechanisms, we start with a model of the effects of therapy and cash on economically-

> 18The order of selection was deliberately unsystematic but not randomized. The number of chips in the bag generally exceeded the number of draws, partly to avoid a correlation between order of the draw and treatment assignment probabilities, and partly to avoid having late-drawing men receive their status by default. See Appendix B.2 for full details.

> 19The excess therapy assignments is in part chance, and is in part driven by two blocks where excess treatment chips were accidentally used. All regressions include block fixed effects to account for this.

> 20Appendix B includes the power calculations behind our experimental design.

10
blogosphere might be causing “group polarization” and creating “information cocoons” – making it unlikely that blogs would cause a significant change in the knowledge and attitudes of their readers.<sup>3</sup> Bell (2006, p.75) summarizes another common perception of blogs, as “...a largely harmless outlet for extroverted cranks and cheap entertainment for procrastinating office workers.”<sup>4</sup> Combined with the possibility that blogging gives scholars the freedom to write about topics outside their area of expertise (what Jacob T. Levy called „public-intellectualitis‟ in his blog) this would suggest that impacts of blogs are likely to be negligible.

Second, it also seems plausible that blogging might enhance the reputation of the blogger. Kahn (2011) states: “The shrewd academic uses his blog to market his ideas and to „amplify‟ his new academic results. This is a type of branding.” Reading bloggers talk about the reasons they blog produces a list of benefits to themselves: blogging is an outlet for ideas and observations not suitable for other media; blogging takes the blogger, at least the successful ones, from relative obscurity to being well-known; instant feedback allows the scholar blogger to sharpen her arguments by having to defend them publicly; it‟s fun to interact with other economists; blogging may lead to regular writing gigs or other professional opportunities, etc. Furthermore, blogging by individual scholars may have positive spillover benefits for their institutions. Conversely, almost every scholar blogger seems to have questioned at some point on his blog about why he is spending so much time blogging instead of revising that manuscript.

> England Journal of Medicine received 73% more citations than control articles during the first year after publication.

> 3 Although there is some evidence that polarizing traditional media can affect voter behavior. For example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find that the introduction of Fox News had an impact on voter turnout, as well as the vote share in Presidential elections between 1996 and 2000.

> 4 In response to a post by Henry Farrell on the blog “Crooked Timber” asking academics why they started blogging and/or reading blogs, one responded: “I started reading blogs for news and to fill the downtime while I‟m pondering the next sentence to write (what used to be filled with Minesweeper and other logic-based games).”

3
|**Table 19. Piecemeal Sensitivity An**<br>**Sector**|**alysis -- Welfar**|**e Impacts**<br>_change from_<br>National|**as a per**<br>_base year, (_<br>Northwest|**cent of GD**<br>_%), utilitarian_<br>Central|**P by Re**<br>_SWF_<br>South|**gion**<br>Volga|Urals|Siberia|Far East|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Reference Case:||**4.5**|**5.7**|**4.2**|**4.5**|**5.1**|**3.6**|**4.1**|**5.1**|
|Regional investment potential variation<sup>c</sup>||4.8|5.6|4.6|4.5|6.2|3.9|3.8|5.0|
|Elasticity of substitution in consumer<br>demand (1.0)|esubc=1.5|4.8|6.1|4.5|4.8|5.5|3.7|4.4|5.4|
||esubc=0.5|4.2|5.4|3.9|4.3|4.8|3.6|3.9|4.8|
|Elasticity of substitution between value-added<br>and business services (1.25)|esubs = 2.0|5.9|7.5|5.5|5.8|7.0|4.5|5.3|6.7|
||esubs = 0.5|3.5|4.5|3.3|3.6|3.6|3.0|3.3|4.1|
|"Armington" elasticity of substitution between<br>imports and domestic goods in CRTS sectors<br>|sigmadm = 4|4.5|5.7|4.2|4.6|5.1|3.6|4.1|5.1|
|(3.0)|sigmadm = 2|4.5|5.7|4.2|4.5|5.1|3.6|4.1|5.1|
|Elasticity of multinational service firm supply<br>with respect to price of output (15)|etaf = 17.5|5.4|6.7|5.2|5.5|6.1|4.4|5.0|5.8|
||etaf = 12.5|3.9|5.2|3.7|3.9|4.5|3.1|3.5|4.6|
|Elasticity of Russian service firm supply with<br>respect to price of output (7.5)|etad = 10|4.7|6.0|4.5|4.5|5.1|3.6|4.2|5.5|
||etad = 5|4.2|5.3|3.7|4.3|5.1|3.7|4.0|4.5|
|Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties<br>in imperfectly competitive sectors (3)|esub = 4|4.4|5.4|4.1|4.5|5.0|3.7|4.1|4.9|
||esub = 2|4.3|6.0|4.1|4.3|5.0|3.1|3.6|5.2|
|Elasticity of substitution in sectoral value added<br>(1)|esubva=1.3|4.5|5.7|4.2|4.5|5.1|3.6|4.1|5.1|
||esubva=0.7|4.5|5.7|4.2|4.6|5.1|3.6|4.1|5.2|
|Elasticity of transformation, domestic output<br>versus exports (5)|etadx = 7|4.5|5.7|4.2|4.5|5.1|3.6|4.1|5.1|
|Source: Authors' calculations.<br>**Notes:**<br>b. Hicksian equivalent variation as a percent o<br>a. The piecemeal sensitivity analysis employs<br>c We vary etaf by region as follows: North = 1|etadx = 3<br>f the value of cons<br>central values for a<br>0; Central = 12.5;|4.5<br>umption in th<br>ll parameter<br>South = 11.5|5.7<br>e benchma<br>s (see belo<br>; Volga=18;|4.2<br>rk equilibrium<br>w) other than<br>Urals = 14.3|4.5<br>.<br>the tested<br>; Siberia =|5.1<br>parameter a<br>10.8; Far E|3.7<br>nd lump su<br>ast = 10.8.|4.2<br>m tax repla|5.2<br>cement.|

62
Table A.2: Income levels - adjusted to National Accounts

||2012|2014|2016|2019|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Top 10%|167|178|187|213|
||[19]|[19]|[19]|[20]|
|Top 1%|504|526|554|590|
||[57]|[57]|[55]|[56]|
|Top 0.1%|2,031|2,166|2,905|3,004|
||[232]|[235]|[288]|[285]|
|Top 0.01%|16,357|19,357|26,423|33,582|
||[1,866]|[2,100]|[2,616]|[3,182]|
|Top 0.001%|385,428|397,163|567,116|642,270|
||[43,961]|[43,090]|[56,147]|[60,862]|

_Note:_ This table presents the average income for each quantile, across years, in local currency (1,000s Lempiras) in the main line and in 1,000s USD ppp in brackets. These averages are for small bins, the size of which vary (top 10% refers to those between the top 10% and 9%; top 1% between the top 1% - 0.9%; top 0.1% between the top 0.1% - 0.09%; top 0.01% between the top 0.01% - 0.009%; and top 0.001% for the highest 0.01% earners. These figures refer to the final distribution of income, after adjusting for national accounts’ aggregates.

42
FUNDEF is associated with a rapid increase in enrolment rates in primary and lower-secondary education. Although this increase cannot be attributed solely to FUNDEF, there appears to be a strong association between changes in enrolment rates and in the composition of enrolment between the state and municipal school networks, which has been changing over time in favor of the municipal school network. Based on evidence for a data set including 26 state capitals in the period 1991, 1994, and 1998-2001, enrolment rates were estimated to have risen rose by more than 2 percent per year faster after the introduction of FUNDEF than in the period 1991-98.<sup>2</sup> _____________________

1. See de Mello (2001 _a_ , 2001 _b_ ), Afonso and de Mello (2002), and Ministry of Education (2003), for more information.

2. See de Mello and Hoppe (2005) and OECD (2005), for empirical evidence.

22. The municipalities face downward rigidities in their budgets, constraining their ability to reallocate funds to finance outlays on investment. The existence of minimum spending levels for education and health care impose downward rigidity in current spending, as in the case of the federal government, although revenue earmarking is less pervasive than at the federal level. The municipalities (as well as the states) are required by the Constitution to earmark 25 percent of revenue (18 percent for the federal government) to finance spending on education and 15 percent of revenue (12 percent for the states) to finance the provision of health care. At the same time, spending on personnel, including pensions to retired civil servants, places a heavy burden on municipal budgets (Figure 2). Outlays on debt service, consistent with continued compliance with the debt restructuring arrangements with the National Treasury, reduces the room for manoeuvre in indebted jurisdictions.

23. The ability of the municipalities to finance infrastructure investment is also constrained by their revenue raising capacity, which tends to be lower than at the state and federal levels. The municipalities tax services (except for communications and inter-state/inter-municipal public transportation), property and, to a lesser extent, raise revenue through user fees and charges (Box 3). Revenue sharing is another important source of revenue at the municipal level, particularly for the smaller municipalities, which have low revenue mobilization capacity (Table 3).<sup>22</sup> However, the formula for allocating shared revenue among the municipalities in a given state favors smaller municipalities to the detriment of larger jurisdictions and metropolitan areas, where the demand for public provision may be strongest.<sup>23</sup>

> 22 . The distribution of population is unequal across Brazil’s 5 560 municipalities. In the sample of municipalities used in this paper, three-quarters of the municipalities had population less than 22 405 in 2000. See IBAM (2001) and Souza (2004), for more information.

> 23 . According to Rezende and Garson (2004), the 10 main metropolitan areas, accounting for 30 percent of the population and 50 percent of GDP, received only 12.7 percent of FPM funds in 2002.

15
|**Table 4: Title Registration and Tenure Security**<br>Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses|||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Pooled<br>|Mean|Impact|byRound|(OLS)|Pooled<br>|
||N|R3|R1|R2|R3|Impact|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|**_Panel A: Plots Controlled by Women_**|||||||
|Land registered [yes=1]|1,569|.073|.127***|.136***|.199***|.155***|
||||(.031)|(.033)|(.034)|(.021)|
|Worried to lose plot if left empty [yes=1]|1,734|.349|.031|.005|-.074*|-.013|
||||(.042)|(.034)|(.042)|(.026)|
|Any disagreement ever over this plot [yes=1]|1,724|.065|.012<br>(.018)|.003<br>(.017)|.036<br>(.026)|.016<br>(.013)|
|**_Panel B: Plots Controlled by Men_**|||||||
|Land registered [yes=1]|2,362|.081|.158**|.104*|.134***|.131***|
||||(.056)|(.050)|(.036)|(.020)|
|Worried to lose plot if left empty [yes=1]|2,512|.312|-.106**|-.080*|-.029|-.070***|
||||(.037)|(.044)|(.039)|(.025)|
|Any disagreement ever over this plot [yes=1]|2,518|.066|.011|-.005|.004|.003|
||||(.010)|(.014)|(.022)|(.010)|

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by respondent and are shown in brackets. All outcome variables in Panel A (B) are measured conditional on the existence of a female (male) plot. Control variables include household structure, household size, number of females in the household, number of household members under five years of age, dummy variable for household head being male, age of household head, dummy for whether household head has ever been to school, three dummies for the predominant chieftaincy institution in the community, number of sampled households situated around respondents’ house within a 200m radius (household density), distance between the house of the respondent and the main road demarcation.

26
11 <!-- Start of picture text --> 700<br>GM M<br>Bus<br>540 -<br>1300-<br>3200 Ug rk<br>100<br>0<br>0 4 a 1 0 12 I6 20<br>Road Roughness (tffVm IRI)<br>Source: Paterson, 198S, Table 2.13.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**F%Mw 1:0** Relationship Between Vehicle Opermting Costs _in_ Tunisia and the Roughness of the Road Pavement

# 3.2 lSnaicwptable^mD1itfing Assumptiion

# 26.

26. Assumption V assumes that road maintenance costs consist exclusively of the variable costs of the periodic overlays (resurfacing) which are applied to the road pavement every 10 to 20 years. _The_ fixed costs of this periodic maintenance, which account for between 20 percent and 65 prcent of these costs, have been omitted..lQ/ These periodic expenditures are incurred at intervals greater **an** one year and consist of surface dressing and overlays for paved roads and re-graveling for un-paved roads. Note that, on an individual road, such expenditur would normally be treated as fixed costs. However, since between one-tenth and one-twendeth of the road network is resurfaced each year, these expenditures can be treated like <!-- Start of picture text --> 1Q/<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Thc** propodaau of the overlay cow **which** am **xd are** specifid **in** tems of **climatic** conditions **a** follow: dry non-froze - 20%, dry frez - 45X, _wet_ non-fiez - 30%, and wet freeze **_-_ 65%** (Newbery, **at** &I, **18.** p. 84).
# **Resilience and Critical Power System Infrastructure: Lessons learned from natural disasters and future research needs**

**Amy Schweikert**<sup>**1,2**</sup> **, Lindsey Nield**<sup>**2**</sup> **, Erica Otto**<sup>**2**</sup> **, Mark Deinert**<sup>**1,2**</sup>

- 1The Payne Institute for Earth Resources, Golden, Colorado, USA

- 2The Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado, USA

**Keywords** : Critical infrastructure, Resilience, Natural hazards

**JEL classification:** Q54, H54, O13
_25_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Asset Allocation of the Civil Service Retirement Plan<br>(Year-End 1995; Pension and THT combined)<br>Bank Deposits<br>70%<br>Direct Investmeent Equities<br>6% Bonds 12%<br>12%<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Bank deposits include certificates. Source: Pt. Taspen

# **Implementation of the Civil Service Retirement Program**

Unlike other employers, the national government is exempted from pension regulations. As a result, a few major issues arise, including:

**_Vesting and Portability_** Currently no vesting takes place under the pension plan until the worker reaches the age of 50, irrespective of the time of service. A civil servant who leaves the government before the age of _50_ would lose most of her accrued benefits, including her own contributions. The THT (lump-sum) benefits, however, are available upon termination of employment.

By making job changes more costly to the worker, such practice inhibits labor mobility. This policy may also constrain the government's ability to recruit more competent staff, since superior candidates tend to have more options and are more likely to avoid the one-way street offered by the civil service. Since labor mobility is of vital interest to the country, the government, as the largest employer in the country, should consider adopting the vesting rules followed by employer-sponsored plans.

**_Pension Base_** A common practice in the public sector is to use the final month's salary for the purpose of computing pensions. This seemingly innocuous practice has significant financial implications for the plan sponsor, especially the government. For example, an increase of Rph. 30,000 in the final month would cost the employer an additional Rph. 5,000,000 in the present value of extra pensions for an average worker.

The potential for such costly increases could be avoided by adopting the final three- to five-year average salary as pension base. With this provision, the impact of sudden salary
Interestingly, the empirical literature suggests that while diverse societies tend to be more peaceful, situations of ethnic polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion can indeed spur violent conflict. This is tentatively consistent with our findings since it is exactly for measures of ethnic polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion for which we find no statistically significantly negative effect. Diverse societies are less militarized, but polarized societies are not. Neither are societies with strong levels of ethno-nationalist exclusion, but due to the limited country coverage of this measure, this finding needs to be treated as preliminary for the moment.

# **Conclusions**

Explanations of violent conflict often see ethnic diversity as problematic because it can lead to mutual hatred and fear stemming from historic legacies, and may lead to security dilemmas and domination and control by majority-controlled states of minority groups and vice versa. The question our study was concerned with is: if the pessimistic theories of ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict are true, then do states respond first and foremost with militarization to address security considerations believing that higher militarization leads to greater security? Our results simply do not support this view. Militarization is actually lower under conditions of greater diversity measured by several different indicators.

Clearly, wider coverage of militarization variables beyond spending, the size of military forces and arms imports will provide more opportunities of testing the effects of ethnic and other diversity on states’ response to real and perceived threats. Perhaps empirical studies in the future could include those expenditures classified as internal security expenditures on police and paramilitary forces, both public and private. Future research should also go beyond an aggregate measure of ethnic diversity and distinguish among ethnic minorities according to their degree of political activism and the extent to which grievances are expressed, their long-term political objective (equality of rights, autonomy, separatism and others) and the history of past violent clashes among ethnic groups in a country. One might be able to address some of these issues using data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, a task, which the current authors would like to take on in the future. Use of the dataset is not without problems, however, since the project only recognizes ethnic groups when some level of political conflict or repression exists. Since we are interested in how ethnic diversity relates to state militarization generally, not just in cases where 19
**Figure 13:  Conclusion – RG 01**

|**DKr mln.**|||
|---|---|---|
||**Red**|**Yellow**|
|1. Worst scenario on interest rates<br>2. Interest rate risk -assets-<br>3. Equity risk<br>4. Currency risk<br>5. Real property risk<br>6. Credit and counterparty risk<br>7. Subsidiary company risk|< decr./incr. ><br>< +/- 70 bp ><br>< -12% ><br>< VaR 99% ><br>< -8% ><br>< 8% of r.w.a.* ><br>< see note**>|< decr./incr. ><br>< +/- 100 bp ><br>< -30% ><br>< VaR 99,5% ><br>< -12% ><br>< 8% of r.w.a.*<br>><br>< see note**>|
|8. Total asset risk<br>9. Intrest risk on technical provisions<br>10. (only for non-life)|<+/- 70 bp>|< +/- 100 bp >|
|11. Capital base post scenario<br>12. Solvency margin post scenario<br>-<br>13. 3% of technical provision<br>+<br>14. Over-absorption<br>=|||
|15. Collective bonuspotential post<br>scenario<br>16. Bonus potential on Paid up<br>Premiums post scenario|||
|17. Risk adjusted solvency ratio<br>|||
|18. Company is in the .... zone|red / yellow / green||
|<br>* Risk Weighted Assets<br>** The effect on the (parent) capital base of an identic|<br>al scenario in the subsidiary company||

The required solvency margin (row 12) is based on the EU Life Directives, which include a solvency margin for the investment risks borne by pension institutions (4 percent of assets). As the investment risk is explicitly addressed in stress tests, the required solvency margin is reduced by adding back 3 percent of technical provisions (the difference between 4 percent that is required when the investment risk is borne by the pension institution and 1 percent when it is not, as is the case for unit-linked business). The allocation of losses to the collective bonus and the bonus potential on paid premiums is then calculated according to the terms of the underlying contracts before obtaining the net risk adjusted solvency ratio.

After receiving the final conclusion report from the pension institutions the DFSA takes into account some further information on qualitative risks as well as longevity risk in order to develop a more comprehensive and true picture of the situation of each pension institution.

# **11. Internal Risk Control and Market Discipline**

In addition to the use of the traffic light system, there has been a growing emphasis on the adequacy of internal risk control systems (solvency II) and greater reliance on market discipline. These do not represent specific initiatives of the DFSA but reflect a growing trend in most advanced countries. Nevertheless, they play a central part in the evolving risk-based approach to supervision as they address qualitative risks that are difficult to 27