rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
electronics) included Japan in the 1970s and 1980s and South Korea in later decades. Profits on domestic sales then allow exporting at a price below average cost, i.e., dumping. Some of the emerging economies that have been recent targets of antidumping do indeed protect their domestic markets for like products, but with the notable exception of China, these exporters’ domestic markets are typically small relative to those of the importers. Thus, it is hard to imagine that domestic producers in the import-competing country suffer any significant scale disadvantage through exclusion from these markets.<sup>12</sup> A loss in overall economic well-being in the importing country due to strategic dumping also requires that foreign supply be highly concentrated or that the exporting country government control total export quantities. Otherwise, competition among exporters would force price down toward average cost. In this case, consumers in the importing countries rather than the foreign suppliers would be the main beneficiaries of the scale economies captured by exporters. Of course, import-competing firms would lose, and the domestic industry might even disappear, though this could be true regardless of the reason why exporters’ costs were lower. But the exporting countries most often alleged to be dumping (Japan in the 1980s, China today) have found effective ways to coordinate exporter behavior so as to limit total exports. The same potential for control might also exist when suppliers are subsidiaries in various exporting countries of the same multinational firm. Thus, predation supported by the cost advantage of scale economies cannot be ruled out a priori. Nonetheless, for most of the relevant products, prices have continued to fall even after domestic suppliers have left the industry, rather than rising as exporters attempt to exploit their increased market power. Documented

> 12 Although supporters of aggressive antidumping enforcement often cite the sanctuary market hypothesis, preliminary empirical results reported in Moore (2009) cast some doubt on its practical relevance, at least for U.S. firms facing antidumping actions abroad.  Moore examines cases of U.S. companies facing frequent antidumping actions and finds no evidence that their export success arose from a protected home market.  Rather, antidumping actions typically targeted successful exporters and ones from capital-intensive industries like steel, chemicals, and plastics, where fixed costs are high.  Steel products have also been among the foreign exports most often targeted by U.S. antidumping and other temporary trade barriers.

11
Impact evaluation of school feeding programs in Lao PDR<sup>*</sup> Alison Buttenheim University of Pennsylvania Harold Alderman The World Bank Jed Friedman The World Bank

* The authors thank the World Food Programme and the World Bank Research Committee for financial support. We acknowledge the Government of Lao PDR, and the Ministry of Education for their support of this research. particularly thank Ms. Yangxia Lee of the Ministry of Education . The Department of Statistics provided crucial fieldwork and data management services, under the expert guidance of Dr. Samayachan Boupha,  Mr. Thipsavanh Intharack, and Mr. Khamphanh Chaleunphonh . The World Food Programme Country Office in Vientiane provided support and technical expertise throughout the study. We are also indebted to our Survey Director, Robert McLaughlin. All findings, interpretation, and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors, and do not represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent, nor do they reflect the view of the World Food Programme. Contact: Alison Buttenheim, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health & Society Scholars Program, University of Pennsylvania, 3641 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA 19104. Phone: (215) 898-5456. Email: abutt@wharton.upenn.edu.
Table 2

- The site has become the largest “archive of audio recordings by African poets in the world. It is a significant step on this “mobile first” continent where, with limited landline infrastructure, most people access the Internet through their phones rather than on computers.”<sup>25</sup>

- As of December 2014 there were “nearly 400 African poets from 24 countries in 14 languages who can now be heard reading their work via mobile phones.”<sup>26</sup>

- The site receives about 3,000 visitors a month (2015).

- Many poets have built community here; they find the site a useful place to reflect upon their own work as well as see that of other poets.

Source: Badilisha.

# _The old meets the new_

Given the tentacles of modern technology, Badilisha appears to suggest as such: “Africa’s ancient tradition of oral poetry sits more comfortably in the 21<sup>st</sup> -century technology of the podcasts than in mainstream publishing.”<sup>27</sup> Linda Kaoma, Badilisha’s project manager presents her point: A lot of publishers are not publishing poetry, but it does not have to be confined to books. It’s alive. [Since Badilisha presents the poetry with audio files, the] voice adds texture, adds a different layer to the poems. A lot of people are enjoying listening to poetry rather than reading it. We need to change the way we present ourselves to audiences and audiences need to be aware of different ways of receiving poetry.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, even many Western poets would argue that poetry should not just be read on the page; it needs to be heard.

# _Logistics_

The platform can be searched (or browsed) in the following ways: Author’s name, Country, Language, Theme, Emotion, Top 10, and Latest Uploads. (In addition to poems in text and audio, the site provides a photo and biography of each poet.) Submissions can be sent in a variety of ways: 1) by uploading the MP3 file and related material on the Badilisha site itself; 2) by sending an MP3 via _Yousendit_ ; 3) by email; or 4) by mailing a CD copy of the

> 25 Ibid.

> 26 David Smith, “Poetry in Motion: Mobile Site Brings New Audience to African Writers,” _Guardian_ , December 29, 2014, accessed March 21, 2015, <u>http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/29/africa-poetry-badilisha-mobile-phone-site.</u> 27 Ibid.

> 28 Ibid.

9
**figure 2. Evolution of parity fertility by cohort in Turkey**

Data Source: Census (i-pums) 2000 Figure 3 confirms a low and stable proportion of childless women for the 1969 to 1974 cohort (SILC 2011) but suggests an increase in the proportion of women having one and two children in comparison to older cohorts illustrated in figure 2. The proportion of women havingr three children stagnates, while the proportion of women having at least four children has decreased (note however that the underestimation bias in the SILC data leads to an overemphasis of this decline). Most importantly, figure 3 illustrates that the majority of Turkish women of cohorts 1969 to 1974 either have two or three children. Just like on average in Europe, having two children is the norm for cohorts born around 1970 in Turkey, which was not the case for younger cohorts born before 1960. At the same time, the proportion of women having three or more children is larger in Turkey than on average in other European countries.

When calculating parity progression ratios<sup>5</sup> based on the proportions illustrated in figure 3, we find that 80% of women having one child pass on to have a second child in Turkey, while the EU(26) average is 72%. Among women having two children, 47% are likely to have a third child in Turkey, against only 23% on average in the EU (26) as reported by SILC.

Further calculations based on the proportions of figure 3 reveal that almost half of the gap in approximate completed fertility between the EU(26) and Turkey (1.7 vs. 2.3 children per women) can be explained by an overrepresentation of women having at least two children in Turkey, and almost a further third by the overrepresentation of women having at least three children<sup>6</sup> . More two- and three- child families in Turkey thus make the main difference in approximate completed fertility. The somewhat higher

> 5 Parity progression ratio (idem “transition probability”) from zero to one child: 89% Turkey and 85% EU; from three to four children: 40% in Turkey and 6% EU.

> 6 To identify which rank is most responsible for the fertility gap between Turkey and the EU (26), we proceed in two steps. First, we calculate for, Turkey and the EU, the proportions of women having at least _n_ children ("cumulated frequencies"). In demographic analysis, the sum of these cumulated frequencies yields the country’s approximate completed fertility ("calculation of components by rank"). In a second step, we calculate the differences between the countries’ cumulated frequencies. Per definition, these differences sum up to the gap in completed fertility between Turkey and the EU (0.6 children).

8
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Kubota, Isao. "Roles that Governments Play in Developing, Developed States." Japan Times, (June 17, 1996), p.<sup>1 5</sup> .

- Linz, Juan J., Seymour Martin Lipset, and Bunger Pool. "Social Conditions for Democracy in Latin America." Latin American Barometer Survey Analysis. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University.

- Magdoff, Harris. Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983.

- Marx, Karl. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. vol. 1., New York: International Publishers, 1966/1967.

- Mazumdar, Krishma. "An Analysis of Causal Flow Between Social Development and Economic Growth: The Social Development Index," in The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol 5, no 3, (July, 1996), 361-381.

Milliband, R. State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

- Mokoli, Mondonga M. "La Democratie dans le F6odalisme: Tout le Noeud du Blocage de la Transition Vers la Troisieme Republique au Zaire." in Bulletin de la Faculte de Droit, no 3, (septembre 1994), 83-104.

- Mokoli, Mondonga M. State Against Development: The Experience of Post-1965 Zaire. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992.

- Mokoli, Mondonga M. The Transition Towards Democracy in Post-1990: Contradictions and Dilemma. San Francisco, London, and Bethesda: International Scholars Publications, 1997.

- Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

- Mueller, Dennis C. The Political Economy of Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

- Nelson, Daniel N. (ed). After Authoritarianism: Democracy or Disorder. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995.

- Nelson, Joan M., Tilly, Charles, and Walker, Lee (eds). Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997.

- Ottaway, Marina. Democratization and Ethnic Nationalism: African and Eastern European Experiences. Policy Essay No. 14. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1994.

- Parain, Charles. Les Caracteres Generaux du Feodalisme. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1971.

34
# **Developing Economies and International Investors: Do Investment Promotion Agencies Bring Them Together?**

Torfinn Harding<sup>*****</sup> and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik<sup>******</sup>

* Statistics Norway and Norwegian University of Science and Technology, P.O.B. 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway, Email: torfinn.harding@ssb.no.

** The World Bank and CEPR, Development Economics Research Group, 1818 H St, NW; MSN MC3303; Washington D.C. 20433. Email: <u>bjavorcik@worldbank.org.</u>

We would like to thank Naotaka Sawada and Geoff Revell for assistance with data collection. We are indebted to Kelly Andrews Johnson and Andrew Charlton for helpful suggestions on how to conduct an IPA Census. We are grateful to Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Lucy Payton for sharing the information on export promotion agencies and to Simon Bell, Johan Gott and Janet Pau for giving us access to the AT Kearney FDI Confidence Index. We are thankful to Rita Almeida, Gabor Bekes, Wim Douw, Jon Fiva, C. Fritz Foley, Holger Görg, Bernard Hoekman, Leonardo Iacovone, Aart Kraay, Phil Levy, Molly Lipscomb, Bob Lipsey, Timo Mitze, Ted Moran, Jørn Rattsø, participants of the 2007 Empirical Investigation in International Economics conference in Ljubljana, participants of the 2007 Spring Meeting of Young Economists, seminar participants at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Statistics Norway, the World Bank and the U.S. International Trade Commission for useful comments. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
households data is missing for one or more variables, in which case we impute missing values iteratively as a function of other variables. No single variable is missing more than 11 times, and our empirical results are almost unchanged if we restrict the sample to households without missing data, rather than impute missing values. Specific details of each variable’s construction is presented in Appendix C.

Demographic and wealth data confirms our sample consists of poor and middle-income smallholder farmers. Mean landholdings are 5.8 acres (median = 4 acres). Household heads have an average of 3.3 years of formal education, although the median household head has no formal education. 97% of household heads have spent their entire life in the village. Mean household liquid assets are Rs. 14,100 (median = Rs. 8,300), equivalent to US$300 (US$200), the sum of cash, bank account deposits, jewelry, silver, gold, revolving funds and miscellaneous liquid assets.

There are significant differences between the characteristics of insurance buyers and nonbuyers. Buyers report around 50% more land and nearly twice as much in liquid assets. Buyers are also less risk averse than the overall sample. Around a third of insurance purchasers belong to borewell user associations (BUAs), compared to only a small fraction (4%) of the overall population. 46% of buyers have outstanding credit from BASIX at the start of the Kharif, compared to 7% of the overall population.

Summary statistics in Table 5 include several variables intended to elicit parameters of the household head’s utility function. The variable “risk aversion” is measured on a 0 to 1 scale, and is constructed from a game where the household head chooses between a series of gambles indexed by increasing risk and return; the household is then given a cash payout of between 0 and Rs. 200 based on their answer and the outcome of a coin toss. A related question is used to elicit a dummy variable for ambiguity aversion. The variable “patience” indicates the proportionate amount that a household head must receive today for them to be indifferent to a fixed amount promised in one month’s time. The average for this variable is 0.8, suggesting a high monthly discount rate for the households in the sample.

16
Table 3 shows a fuller specification where legal origins are included as explanatory variables as are other indices reflecting greater transparency in the financial sector, namely, the adjusted private monitoring index (apmindex) and the credit registry index (creditregind). In all cases, economic transparency is strongly correlated with better financial performance, though interestingly, neither apmindex nor creditregind are.<sup>12</sup> Calculations (based on the regressions in the first columns)<sup>13</sup> indicate that a one standard deviation increase in T raises the private credit to GDP variable by .47 standard deviations and reduces the share of non-performing loans by .32 standard deviations.

**Table 3. OLS Regression**

|**_Dependent_**<br>**_Var_**|**_P_**|**_rivate Credit_**||**_N_**|**_PL/total loan_**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Version 1|Version 2|Version 3|Version 1|Version 2|Version 3|
|T_245|19.2***|18.4***|30.2***|-3.02***|-3.01***|-4.04**|
||(6.59)|(4.85)|(5.2)|(-3.62)|(-2.67)|(-2.43)|
|legor_uk|-22.70|-12.8|-6.5|4.62|4.89|4.40|
||(-1.16)|(-.61)|(-.28)|(3.4)|(3.24)|(2.15)|
|legor_fr|-43.0|-40.9|-32.5|7.68|7.74|8.07|
||(-2.29)|(-2.03)|(-1.5)|(4.91)|(4.74)|(4.29)|
|legor_ge|9.68|7.84|18.8|2.28|2.3|3.16|
||(.48)|(.36)|(.76)|(3.35)|(3.11)|(3.56)|
|legor_so|-65.78|-68.|-66.0|7.26|6.7|8.35|
||(-3.56)|(-3.53)|(-3.1)|(4.2)|(3.55)|(3.96)|
|apmindex||2.35|||-.04|.31|
|||(1.47)|||(-.08)|(.47)|
|creditregindex|||-.38|||-.01|
||||(-.80)|||(-.09)|
|Constant|-8.85|-24.8|-62.8*|19.17***|19.5***|22.44**|
||(--.36)|(-.89)|(-1.79)|(3.87)|(3.49)|(3.25)|
|# obs|169|133|83|93|82|65|
|R<sup>2</sup>|.41|.49|.46|.21|.21|.21|

Note: _1) Legor_uk are those countries with English legal system origin, legor_fr – French legal system origin; legor_ge – German legal system origin; legor_so – socialist legal system origin. (see the appendix 2 for source and variable description)_ _(2): numbers in parentheses are t statistics._ _(3): Coefficients with * denote significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level and *** for the .01 level._

> 12 The private monitoring index is significant when T is excluded from the regressions.

> 13 As a check, the calculations were redone in regressions including the private monitoring index but there was no substantial difference.

18
TABLES & FIGURES

# **Table 6 – Which infrastructure help decrease the impact of negative rainfall shocks?**

|VARIABLES|(1)<br>2003 var<br>Distin km|(2)<br>2006 var<br>% of<br>barangays<br>within<br>less than<br>5km|(3)<br>2006 var<br>total<br>distance<br>of<br>barangays|(4)<br>2006 var<br>% of<br>barangays<br>within<br>less than<br>5km|(5)<br>2006 var<br>total<br>distance<br>of<br>barangays|(6)<br>2006 var<br>total<br>distance<br>of<br>barangays|(7)<br>2006 var<br>% of<br>barangays<br>within<br>less than<br>5km|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Positive rainfall shock|0.0181|0.0158|0.0170|0.0172|0.0166|0.0179|0.0182|
||(0.0120)|(0.0120)|(0.0120)|(0.0121)|(0.0120)|(0.0120)|(0.0121)|
|Negative rainfall shock|-0.0332*|-0.0081|-0.0088|-0.0324|0.0061|0.0114|-0.0473|
||(0.0187)|(0.0475)|(0.0227)|(0.0321)|(0.0280)|(0.0711)|(0.2120)|
|Negative rainfall shock*Distance to||||||||
|highway|-0.0000|-0.0580|-0.0003**|||-0.0001|-0.0715|
||(0.0000)|(0.0771)|(0.0001)|||(0.0002)|(0.0762)|
|Negative rainfall shock*Distance to fixed||||||||
|line phone||||-0.0193|-0.0009**|-0.0006|-0.0308|
|||||(0.0588)|(0.0004)|(0.0007)|(0.0704)|
|Negative rainfall shock*Distance to cell||||||||
|phone signal||||||-0.0005|0.0114|
|||||||(0.0010)|(0.2254)|
|Negative rainfall shock*Electricity||||||-0.0042<br>(0.0715)|0.0636<br>(0.0781)|
|Constant|5.5324***|5.5319***|5.5329***|5.5347***|5.5331***|5.5333***|5.5351***|
||(0.0052)|(0.0052)|(0.0052)|(0.0053)|(0.0052)|(0.0053)|(0.0053)|
|Observations|64,361|64,664|64,664|63,965|64,664|64,522|63,823|
|R-squared|0.0030|0.0029|0.0030|0.0029|0.0030|0.0031|0.0030|
|Number of mun_id_2011|909|908|908|896|908|904|892|
|MunicipalityFE|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|

The estimates also control for year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 27
## **Figure 14: Sri Lanka tariffs (percentage) in the full reform scenario with FTAs to China and India (difference between tariffs in 2028 and 2017)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Sri Lanka tariffs on China Sri Lanka tariffs on India<br>Vegetables and... Rice<br>Other Crops<br>Other Crops<br>Other Agric<br>Energy Other Agric<br>Food<br>Food<br>Other Food<br>Textiles Other Food<br>Wearing Apparel<br>Chemicals Rubber... Wearing Apparel<br>Motor Vehicles Other Machinery<br>Other Machinery<br>Other... Other Manufacturing<br>0 50 100 150<br>0 20 40 60<br>2017 2028 2017 2028<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Staff estimates based on LINKAGE CGE Simulations

**Table 2: Sri Lanka tariffs reductions (in percentage) in the combined FTAs to China and India (difference between tariffs in 2028 and 2017)**

|Item|China|India|Item|China|India|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Rice||-7|Other Food|-5|-18|
|Vegetables and fruits|-2|-2|Textiles|-4|-4|
|Other Crops|-1|-1|Wearing Apparel|-27|-12|
|Fishing||-3|Chem., Rubber, Plastic|-8|-10|
|Other Agriculture|-7|-80|Motor Vehicles|-3|-2|
|Energy|-7|-6|Other Machinery|-5|-7|
|Food|-7|-3|Other Manufacturing|-8|-9|
|Milk Products||-61||||

Source: Staff estimates based on LINKAGE simulations

# 5. Simulation results

**With the reduction of barriers to trade, all liberalization scenarios are expected to result in faster expansion of GDP and international trade compared to the baseline** . Our results indicate that 10 years after liberalization, the volume of GDP would be expected to be around 2 percent higher than in the baseline (Table 3). Exports expand under all scenarios, even when only import duties are reduced with no better access to other markets under the unilateral liberalization scenario. This is due to the availability of cheaper imported inputs, but also because of our assumption of fixed trade balance (as a share of GDP) that leads to adjustments in real exchange rate. When import duties decline and imports increase, the real exchange rate depreciates, and exports expand to keep the trade balance a fixed share of GDP. Overall, the

21
<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 11. Covariogram of built-up cells - Big tiles<br>s<br>Ke<br>os<br>o&<br>8S<br>7°<br>7<br>Ss<br>2<br>oS<br>Cc<br>3<br>°<br>"<br>i] Stee<br>0 20 40 60<br>Distance in Km<br>———_ Year 1975 ————_ Year 1990<br>————_ Year 2000 ———— Year 2015<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 12. Covariogram of built-up cells near road - Big tiles<br>a<br>Zu<br>fe<br>8<br>ow<br>a<br>S<br>i<br>Ss<br>geSs | |<br>o<br>fe) 20 40 60<br>Distance in Km<br>————_ Year 1975 ————_ Year 1990<br>————__ Year 2000 ————— Year 2015<br><!-- End of picture text -->
the estimated coefficients. We are therefore confident that our population criterion, while necessarily arbitrary, strikes an acceptable balance between detail and tractability.

# **3 Measuring the Quality of Road Networks**

The literature cited above generally uses the percent of paved roads in a country as a proxy for road quality (Limão and Venables, 2001; Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2006; and Cadot et al., 2006). Buys et al. (2006), by contrast, also include GDP per capita and a corruption indicator.<sup>2</sup> Such an approach is valuable insofar as it highlights the fact that upgrading road quality is not just about bitumen, but also requires maintenance capacity and the ability to control unofficial payments. However, aggregating all three dimensions into a single composite indicator makes it difficult to relate regression coefficients to specific policy actions. In particular, the relative importance of each dimension in relation to the others is determined by the researcher’s priors, and not by the data themselves. The desire to map our results directly to policy space motivates our decision to limit our consideration of “quality” to the percent paved roads criterion.

In constructing a road quality measure, we compare data from different sources to resolve (usually minor) disagreements amongst them. We have, however, found instances of apparently spurious time-series variation in percent paved roads data. Such instances appear to be related to definitional changes that can significantly alter the apparent percent of paved roads, even though no physical changes have in fact taken place. Table 6 provides our consolidation of the available data for ECA. In arriving at our preferred measures, we have been guided by expert opinion from

> 2 The Buys et al. (2006) indicator Qj combines the percent of paved roads (Pj), per capita GDP (Gj) and the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Capacity Index (Cj) such that _Q j_ = _Pj_ α 1 _G j_ α 2 _C j_ α 3 . Imposing slightly increasing returns, the alpha parameters are set to α1=0.8, α2=0.2 and α3=0.2.

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