rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
one-price (LOOP): in the absence of trade costs, prices of identical goods should be equalized across locations. Due to differences in the cost of non-tradables (e.g., rents) that affect retail prices, one would typically not expect the strong form of LOOP (equal price levels) to hold. The weak form of LOOP allows prices levels to differ but contends that prices should co-move. Using a panel of prices, the typical estimating equation for this method is where the dependent variable is the variance (or standard deviation) of log price differences ln( _pot/pdt_ ) over time. In using this specification, the main focus of the literature has been explaining cross-country price differences and real exchange rates (Engel and Rogers, 1996). In these applications, researchers use a panel of prices from various regions/cities in two countries, and include a border dummy to distinguish location pairs within the same country from those that are in separate countries. The same method can also be used to gauge the so-called ‘border effect’ across administrative regions within a country as Borraz et al. (2016) do in the context of Uruguay. In a recent contribution, Before introducing in detail a notable exception that estimates intra-country trade costs from spatial price differentials (Atkin and Donaldson, 2015), let me first discuss methodological issues that researchers have to be mindful of while using this approach. The first challenge is the high data requirement to obtaining prices of _identical goods._ In recent years, prevalence of bar-code level scanner price datasets have enabled researchers to circumvent this issue and use price dataset containing information for a high number of consumer goods. Such data, however, is typically available for a handful of developed markets. Another recent innovation is to scrape online prices, but this also remains limited to countries where online shopping has a non-trivial market share (Cavallo and Rigobon, 2016).

Second, even with a competitive trading sector, the absence of arbitrage or perfect price comovement does not imply this condition to hold with equality. Rather, the true no-arbitrage condition consistent with competitive trading is _pd ≤ po_ + _tod_ ; that is, buying a good at _o_ , and incurring transport cost _tod_ should not enable the trader to profit. For instance, in a competitive market, there may be no trade between two locations and the condition may hold with inequality. Since estimation requires equality, while the true condition may be a strict inequality, price differentials only provide a lower-bound for trade costs. The problem can be alleviated if the researcher knows that there is trade, which would unambiguously be the case if one of the locations is where production takes place. The third and perhaps the main challenge is the perfect competition assumption itself. The presence of market power and spatial variation in market structure implies that observed price gaps will reflect not just trade costs but 16
Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution Act provides for the creation and maintenance of local governments through the enactment of a local government act. The decentralization laws of 1999 and 2004 and associated regulations are the basis of Indonesia‘s current local government system. The Second Constitutional Amendment Act, passed in 2000, has embedded parts of the decentralization reforms—for example, the democratic elections of mayors and governors—into the constitution to ensure the long-term stability of the system and to provide political safeguards against arbitrary reversals.

The resources that local governments have at their disposal have been increased through the enactment of article 7 of Law 25/1999, which requires the central government to transfer at least 25 percent of domestic net revenues (total domestic revenue minus revenue sharing) to subnational levels of government. Law 33/2004 has increased the subnational share to a minimum of 26 percent of net domestic revenue beginning in 2008. Ten percent of that amount accrues to the provincial governments, and 90 percent to the local governments, which carry out the bulk of expenditure responsibilities.

Overall, in 2008, the Central Government accounted for 95% of revenue collection and 67% of direct spending . Provinces and local governments account for 5% of revenue collection and 33% of expenditures. Provincial governments are relatively less important than local governments and command only 8% of national expenditures. Local government expenditure share (25%) in Indonesia compares favorably with most developing and industrial countries (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Expenditure, Employment and Revenue collection shares by order of Government**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Indonesia -<br>Indonesia - Indonesia -<br>Revenue Collection<br>Expenditure shares<br>Employment shares Prov by Order of<br>by order of - 2002 -<br>Government -2008<br>government- 2008 local<br>5%<br>Loca Cent<br>l ral<br>25% 24%<br>Prov<br>Prov<br>incia<br>l Cent - Cent<br>8% ral Local ral<br>67% 76% 95%<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Ministry of Finance , Indonesia and Eckardt and Shah (2007)

# **_Sub-national Expenditure Responsibilities_**

Indonesia‘s decentralization policy shifted responsibility for all but five exclusive national functions to regional governments. According to Laws 22/1999 and 32/2004, the national government retained power over five functions that affect the nation: foreign relations, defense and security policy, judiciary and law enforcement, monetary and macroeconomic policies, and religious affairs. Sub-national governments are responsible for all residual functions. In addition, 5
Klaus Desmet and Marcel Fafchamps (2006). ”Employment Concentration across US Counties”, _Regional Science and Urban Economics_ , 36(4): 482-509, July Benjamin Faber (2014). “Trade Integration, Market Size, and Industrialization: Evidence from China’s National Trunk Highway System”, _Review of Economic Studies_ (forthcoming) Marcel Fafchamps and Forhad Shilpi (2003). ”The Spatial Division of Labor in Nepal”, _Journal of Development Studies_ , 39(6): 23-66 Marcel Fafchamps and Forhad Shilpi (2005). ”Cities and Specialization: Evidence from South Asia”, _Economic Journal_ , 115(503): 477-504, April Marcel Fafchamps (2011). ”Development, Social Norms, and Assignment to Task”, _Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS)_ , 108(Supplement 4): 21308-15, December Marcel Fafchamps (2012). “Reprint of Development, Agglomeration, and the Organization of Work”, _Regional Science and Urban Economics_ , 42(5): 765-78 Glaeser, Edward L., Sari Pekkala Kerr, and William R. Kerr. ”Entrepreneurship and Urban Growth: An Empirical Assessment with Historical Mines.” Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).

Jan von der Goltz, Jan and Prabhat Barnwal (2014). ”Mines: The Local Welfare Effects of Mineral Mining in Developing Countries”, Discussion Paper Number 1314-19, Department of Economics, Columbia University J. Vernon Henderson (1985). _Economic Theory and the Cities_ , 2nd edition, Academic Press J. Vernon Henderson, Adam Storeygard, and David Weil (2012). “Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space”, _American Economic Review_ , 102(2): 994-1028.

Walter Isard (1956). _Location and Space-Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, and Urban Structure_ , John Wiley and Sons, New York Jane Jacobs (1969). _The Economy of Cities_ , Random House, New York R ̈ı¿œmi Jedwab (2014). ”Urbanization without Structural Transformation: Evidence from Consumption Cities in Africa”, George Washington University (mimeograph) Andreas Kotsadam and Anja Tolonen (2013). ”Mineral Mining and Female Employment”, OxCarre Research Paper 114.

Guy Michaels (2008). “The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill: Evidence from the 28
tions in the destination state. Procedures for issuing documentation for the PDS are complicated and vary by state. They are also prone to corruption and administrative errors. For example, issuing officials in the destination state may refuse to accept prior identity documentation provided by poor migrants because they are looking for bribes (Planning Commission 2008; Abbas and Varma 2014).

Individuals moving across state boundaries risk losing access to the PDS, and a host of other public services linked to the PDS for a substantial period until their destination state issues them a new ration card. The loss of access to subsidized PDS food could be a significant issue for most households. According to household survey data, 27 percent of all rural households and 15 percent of all urban households were fully dependent on PDS grain, and most households in the country were eligible in 2004-05 (Kumar, Parappurathu, Babu, and Betne 2014). Despite widespread leakage to non-eligible households, the PDS subsidy is a particularly important source of calories for poor households. One study estimates that in 2004-05, access to PDS lowered the rate of nutritional deficiency in households officially categorized as “Below Poverty Line” (BPL) from 49 percent to 37 percent (Kumar, Parappurathu, Babu, and Betne 2014). Using survey data from 2009, another study estimates that the PDS reduced the poverty-gap index of rural poverty in Indian states by 18 to 22 percent (Drèze 2013). Therefore, the low inter-state portability of PDS cards and a host of other associated welfare benefits could act as an indirect barrier to migration in India.

A survey of seasonal migrant workers in the construction industry in Delhi suggests that the lack of identity documents also makes it difficult for low-skilled interstate migrants to claim the benefits that they are entitled to under labor laws (Srivastava and Sutradhar 2016). For example, the migrant workers surveyed were not registered under the Building and Construction Workers’ Welfare Act, a law that regulates social welfare, health care, and safety for construction workers. Lacking formal protection, the workers had to work long hours under poor health and safety conditions. Thus, poor inter-state portability of identity documentation leads to asymmetric enforce23
_H4: Participants receiving positive STI or HIV results are more likely to report changing their behavior compared to those receiving negative STI or HIV results, even if they did not intend to change their behavior at baseline._ _H5a: Participants in the cash award group are more likely to report having changed their behavior in the 4-month visit of the study even if they did not report intending to do so at baseline._ For women in particular, we argue that these above two components of the RESPECT study (new diagnoses and randomization to cash award group) may provide an opportunity to change by providing leverage for change and discussions for change with sexual partners in the form of money or information that previously did not exist.

_H5b: The effect of the cash incentive is stronger for women than it is for men because the promise of the money may provide increased leverage in sexual decision-making with partners._ This study offers an opportunity to observe the introduction of a clear incentive for behavior change and examine how individuals respond to that incentive given the constraints they might face in reducing their personal risk. The analysis that follows explores reported intended sexual behavior change strategies and their corresponding behavior change actions implemented to avoid unsafe sex among participants enrolled in a structural HIV prevention intervention trial taking place in rural Tanzania.

# **Methods**

_Trial design_ This study is a parallel group randomized trial. It has three separate arms – a control arm with an allocation ratio of 50% and two intervention arms (low-value cash award and high-value cash award) with an allocation ratio of 25% each. No important changes to methods were implemented after trial 6
case from Tables 4 and 3 are included for completeness. Except for total expenditures, all outcomes are estimated using Equation 1 and are similar to Model 2 in Table 3.

Table 5 further confirms the efficiency and cost-cutting story with a negative and strongly significant coefficient for drug value per case. Capitated hospitals incurred 8.3% lower drug expenditures per case compared to non-capitated hospitals. They seemed to also use fewer lab and image tests as well as having a shorter length of stay although the differences are small and not statistically significant. In particular, we see a small (0.81 percentage point) but significant increase in the C-section rate, suggesting that capitated hospitals have a tendency to perform C-sections themselves rather than referring the mothers to higher level. As noted earlier, since capitated hospitals are responsible for patient charges at referral hospitals, keeping patients will give them better control over costs. Unfortunately, we do not have information to investigate further whether the increase in C-section rates was medically acceptable or not.

# **_Clinical quality_**

For clinical quality of care (Table 6), capitation coefficients for all indicators are rather small. They also do not support one consistent story, i.e. whether capitation results in better or worse quality. For example, it appears that complications per surgeries and deaths per inpatients increased, yet the proportion of hospitalizations resulting in cure or improvement also increased. However, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. This result should not be surprising for several reasons. As pointed out earlier, adverse health outcomes are rather rare events, thus limiting our power to detect the true differences. There is also no uniformly applied definition of “better” or “worse” conditions, so these indicators are prone to random measurement error which could bias the results toward the null. Of course, it could be the case 20
57 (utilization around 10-18%)." Prices for commodides woud ihen be deternined by their scarcity and there were thus high levels of quota rents. An important part of the adjustment program was moblization of foreign resoures from bilaterl and muliateral aid programs, and changes **in** the incentive sucture in te cocoa sector.

Such changes result in relaation of the import constuaint, thereby improving the availabil of essential inputs to the industrial sector. Liberalzation of the economy via aboliton of most price controls may thus have been a key fictor affecting industial outpu The increases **in** domestic oil pnces may have bee absorbed via reduction in profit margins while output icaed. Figure 4.2 prvides a illusion of such a sitution. The dotted, upward-sloping marginal cost curve represents the curve shie upward by input price iase while the simultaneous outward shift in a bindig constaint (on imported inputs, say) explains why out expands.

_lRgure 4.2: Effecas ofan nare in Both Energy Prices and the Supply of RatonedProducton Factors (from scenario 0 to scenario 1)_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Pft MC: Me.<br>A<br>mheAmucmpi uA. MC<br>Ps ................... si.. .... C.E<br>Chp nmgcsaazuwe -- A.CD<br><!-- End of picture text --> SmWord B=k (MI9)p. 9, Tab4.
# **Online Appendix S5: Formula p-value correction**

padj = 1 −(1 −p(k))<sup>g(k)</sup> Where g(k) = M<sup>(1−r(.k))</sup> , with M as the number of tested outcomes in a family, r(. k) as mean correlation among all outcomes other than outcome _k_ , and p(k) as the unadjusted p-value for the _k_<sup>_th_</sup> outcome.

_Source:_ McKenzie (2012b), based on Sankoh et al. (1997) and used in Aker et al. (2016).

25
Policy Research Working Paper 6214

# **Abstract**

The effect of weather shocks on children’s anthropometrics is investigated using the two most recent rounds of the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey. For this purpose, climate data for each survey cluster are interpolated using daily weather-station records from the national network. The findings reveal that rainfall shocks have a statistically significant and robust impact on child health in the short run for both weight-for-height and height-for-age, and the incidence of diarrhea. The impacts of weather shocks on health are of considerable magnitude; however, children seem to catch up with their cohort rapidly after experiencing a shock. The paper does not find any evidence of nonlinear impacts of weather variability on children’s health, suggesting that a moderate increase in future rainfall variability is not likely to bring additional health costs. Finally, it appears that the impact of these shocks is the same for young boys and girls, which suggests that there is no genderbased discrimination in the allocation of resources within households.

This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at eskoufias@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Table 2. Predicted Mean (Log) Consumption Based on Imputation**

|||||**S**|**econd roun**|**d**||||**True rates**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Indicators**|**Model**<br>**1**|**Model**<br>**2**|**Model**<br>**3**|**Model**<br>**4**|**Model**<br>**5**|**Model**<br>**6**|**Model**<br>**7**|**Model**<br>**8**|**Model**<br>**9**||
|Bldh f 2015 2018/19|10.7|10.8|**10.8**|10.8|10.8|10.9|10.8|N/A|N/A|10.8|
|angaes, rom to|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|||(0.0)|
||12.1|12.1|**12.0**|12.1|12.1|12.1|12.1|12.1|12.1|12.1|
|Malawi, from 2016/17 to 2019/20|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|
||11.3|11.3|11.0|11.4|11.4|11.3|11.3|11.3|11.3|11.0|
|Nigeria, from 2012/13 to 2018/19|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|
||<br>**13.7**|<br>13.7|<br>13.7|<br>**13.7**|<br>**13.7**|<br>**13.7***|<br>**13.7**|<br>13.7|<br>13.7|<br>13.7|
|Tanzania, from 2019/20 to 2020/21|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|
||<br>9.6|<br>9.7|<br>10.0|<br>9.8|<br>**9.8***|<br>9.7|<br>9.7|<br>9.7|<br>**9.8***|<br>9.8|
|Viet Nam, from 2014 to 2016|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|(0.0)|
|Food expenditures|||<br>Y||||||||
|Non-food expenditures||||Y|||||||
|Furnishings and household expenses|||||Y||||||
|<br>Health expenditures||||||Y|||||
|<br>Education expenditures|||||||Y||||
|<br>Utilities expenditures||||||||Y|Y||
|<br>Household assets & house characteristics||Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|||
|Demographics & employment|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y||

**Note:** Normal linear regression with bootstrapped standard errors is used. The standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap replications and are adjusted for complex survey design. All estimates are obtained with population weights. The normal linear regression model with the theoretical distribution of the error terms employs cluster random effects. Imputed consumption per capita for the second round uses the estimated parameters based on the data from the first round. 100 simulations are implemented. True consumption per capita is the estimate directly obtained from the survey data. Estimates shown in boldface or with a “*” respectively fall within the 95% confidence interval or one standard error of the true rate.

38
**Table 5.4 Registrations and Increase in Private Companies, 1999-2000**

||**Sole**<br>**Proprietorships **|**Limited Liability**<br>**Firms**|**Shareholding**<br>**Firms***|**Total**<br>**Firms**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Registrations|8,276|8.863|877|18,016|
|Increase in<br>existing<br>companies|654|4,523|395|5,572|

Source: GSO and MPI, 2001 - * The GSO’s category of shareholding companies does not appear to include equitized firms [and registration numbers?] 45. Possible reasons for the growing gap between registrations and existing companies include:

- Flawed data collection methods by GSO

- Re-registration by existing companies<sup>30</sup>

- Consolidation of existing companies

- Death or bankruptcy of firms

- Firms registered but not yet operational

- Firms registered but temporarily not operational

- Firms registered and operational but too small and/or mobile to be noticed

- “Ghost” firms set up for non-productive, perhaps illegal, purposes such as receiving VAT receipts or money laundering

46. The fact that it is sole proprietorships that exhibit the largest discrepancy between registrations and accounted-for firms is consistent with a number of the above possibilities including re-registration, death or bankruptcy, and firms registered but not yet operational or temporarily out of operations. Sole proprietorships would be most likely to re-register under a new form if they wanted to access financing so that they could avoid full liability. The new ease of registration under the Enterprise Law would then have offered them the opportunity to do so at minimal cost.<sup>31</sup> Sole proprietorships’ small size also makes them most vulnerable to increased competition or other sudden market swings. Their small size could also make it easier for GSO to simply miss them. Finally, one of the defining benefits of registering as a sole proprietorship is the ability to legally avoid tax payments and potentially other official attention when not in operation.<sup>32</sup> 47. Consolidation of companies is also a possibility, but supporting evidence is scarce. The fairly closed, often family-centered nature of ownership among companies makes consolidation seem somewhat unlikely. There is reason to believe, though, that an

> 30 MPI keeps figures on the number of firms that have registered in order to increase their registered capital and/or to add or change their areas of economic activity.  In the first 23 months after implementation of the Enterprise Law, this number was 8,032.  CIEM researchers, however, warned against calculating the number of new start ups by simply subtracting this re-registration number from total new registrations (CIEM, 2002).

> 31 The SSE-NIAS survey in 1997 also showed that many firms close down and then re-open and re-register, with the specific aim of gaining access to tax holidays.

> 32 It is unclear whether this truly means that local officials treat sole proprietorships any differently than other company forms.

23