rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
assessment, could be achieved by the same means?

Secondly, given their differing perspectives, can<sup>the needs of</sup> developing country institutions, donor organisations and the research community all be identified and accommodated within the same study design? It will be argued by the research community<sup>that the</sup> muitifactorial nature Gf many health problems in the developing world, particularly those associated with poverty, means<sup>that better</sup> knowledge of determinants can only come irom research aimed at elucidating the processes whereby environmental, behavioural and economic factors interact to cause disease and mortality: to the extent that this view is correct, it would seem that a<sup>survey approach</sup> is either inappropriate, or that at least it should be regarded as only one part of a more extensive strategy aimed at understanding mecharisms and processes. Consideration of the requirements of the other users, points to the need to decide on the emphasis to<sup>be placed</sup> on achieving internationally comparable data on health, particularly for those indicators which are considered to be useful for advocacy, or for allocation of aid resources between countries. This might conflict with the need of countries themselves for information which could improve their own policy-making capacity, or<sup>assist in the</sup> management of their own health infrastructure.

Finally, however these issues are resolved, there would need to be consideration of the relationship between any proposed strategy for a WHS, and existing international and national initiatives providing information on health and on health interventions, in particular:- surveys such as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), UN Household Survey Capabi'.ity Programme (UNHSCP) and World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) - internatLonal and national initiatives to develop and strengthen routine and continuous collection and analysis of informatior. on health (eg development of primary health cara (PHC) reporting, use of sentinel monitoring, nutrition surveillance systems etc.) - methodologies and studies designed to measure the impact<sup>of</sup> 6
on-going at the time of the interview.<sup>_A_</sup> _i_<sup>is a vector of time-invariant community characteristics</sup> such as region indicators and commune accessibility indicators interacted with time to allow different time trends in labor supply associated with these community traits. Commune accessibility and region indicators cannot be included without year interactions, because the commune fixed effect already captures time-invariant commune characteristics such as the region in which the commune is located and commune’s accessibility. In all regressions, the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the level of variation of rice prices (psu/survey round).

# **4.3 Remaining Conceptual Issues**

There are four remaining conceptual issues not addressed in the empirical framework that should be raised. The first three issues (migration, attrition, and types of child labor) are dataset specific and the fourth issue (endogenous household composition) is more conceptual.

First, the panel in the VLSS is not an individual panel. No effort is made to track individuals that move out of the household. The out migration of children will be missed in the dataset. This might raise a problem in the analysis below if children move in or out of households because of rice price movements. Edmonds and Turk (2004) consider how large a problem children missing for work might be in VLSS panel households. They find that at most 36 out of 6003 children who are 0-10 in the first round of the VLSS may be missing from the second round of the VLSS for work reasons. Thus, at least for children, missed changes in labor supply owing to migration are not likely to significantly distort the results below.

Second, the VLSS does not track households that move. Thus, if rice price increases affect household movements and thereby child labor, this type of dynamic is missed entirely. Mobility restrictions in Vietnam are rather severe, so this data limitation is not as much of a 24
**Table 1.** List of Variables and Data Sources

|**Indicator**|**Description**|**Source**|
|---|---|---|
|Social trust|Percentage of respondents stating that, “Generally speaking,<br>most people can be trusted”; survey waves mapped to 4-year<br>periods as follows: survey 2005-2009 (period 1), survey 2010-<br>2014 (period 2), survey 2017-2019 (period 3)|World Values Survey|
|WBG engagement|WBG own commitment (% of GDP): Total amount committed<br>for projects related to domestic resource mobilization by<br>approval fiscal year as a share of the recipient country’s GDP<br>(scaled by factor 1,000 for better readability)|World Bank (public and internal<br>data) as reported in Table A3 in<br>the appendix|

_Source:_ Authors’ compilation.

**Figure 2.** Economic Fundamentals and Revenues, 2016-2019

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100 100<br>80 80<br>60 60<br>40 40<br>20 20<br>0 0<br>6 8 10 12 0 20 40 60<br>Log GDP per capita Share of Agriculture in GDP<br>100 100<br>80 80<br>60 60<br>40 40<br>20 20<br>0 0<br>0 100 200 300 400 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Trade Openness Age Dependency Ratio<br>Revenue, excl. grants ( % GDP) Revenue, excl. grants ( % GDP)<br>Revenue, excl. grants ( % GDP) Revenue, excl. grants ( % GDP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ The sample consists of 182 countries. The dotted line represents the result of a bivariate linear regression of revenue on the indicator shown on the x-axis (see Table A2 in the appendix). _Source:_ Authors’ analysis based on the variables and data sources described in Table 1.

The indicator of technological readiness (see Table 1, Panel D) is countries’ score on the “Technological Readiness Index” from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.

10
# 3 Empirical Results

I exemplify the use of the method by estimating the responses of quantities consumed and agricultural wage income in rural Mexico. The case of Mexico is, in principle, a good case study because of the importance of the agricultural sector. Mexico is also close to the United States, and thus WTO reforms are likely to reach rural producers.

In Mexico, a good source of data is the Household Income and Expenditure National Surveys, ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares). During the 1990s, the data were collected every other year; I use data from the 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 rounds. The surveys are representative of the population at the National level, and cover rural and urban areas. Since I am focusing on the impacts of price reforms on wage agricultural income, I use the rural modules only. Table 1 reports some summary statistics.

I begin with sample sizes and number of clusters c. The ENIGH is carried out at different weeks in different districts. To make the assumption of common prices in a given cluster c reasonable, I define them as district-week pairs. There are between 3306 and 5007 rural households in the samples. There are 1095 clusters in the pooled sample, approximately 275 in each ENIGH round. The number of households interviewed in each “cluster” is typically larger than in other surveys, with at least 20 households in each of them.

On the consumption side, expenditure data include food and non-food items. Since quantities are only reported for foodstuff, I estimate the model for the following six goods: corn, wheat, dairy, oils & fats, meat, and fruits & vegetables. These goods are aggregates of differentiated goods within each category. For instance, corn includes own-consumption, corn grain, and finely grinded corn; meat includes different types of beef, poultry and pork. These varieties are considered homogeneous goods. Consumers choose different varieties of good, but report expenditures and purchases of consumption aggregates (see Appendix 1). In rural areas, food consumption includes market purchases and own-consumption. Following Deaton and Grimard (1992), for instance, we compute unit values using market purchases only, but budget shares using all expenditure (purchases plus home production).

Fruits & Vegetables, Corn and Meat are the major categories of food expenses in the sample. Notice that average unit values for all these food products increase in real terms 16
# **3 Econometric Model**

## **3.1 Impacts of Automation on Trade**

To estimate the impact of US automation on Mexico’s LLMs, we follow Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) and construct a measure of each area’s exposure to US automation by using a weighted average of the increase in the number of robots per thousand workers by sector in the US over time: Where _robots_<sup>_US_</sup> 2014 _,i_<sup>standsforthenumberofrobotsinindustry</sup><sup>_i_intheyear2014inthe</sup> US, and _emp_<sup>_US_</sup> 2000 _,i_<sup>denotesthenumberofworkers(thousands)inindustry</sup><sup>_i_intheyear2000</sup> in the US. Each weight _ωm,i,_ 2004 is the share of exports to the US from region _m_ and industry _i_ in Mexico in 2004, in the total exports from region _m_ to the US in 2004. This would give more weight to the automation of sectors where the LLM has a revealed comparative advantage (RCA). Thereby, if an area has a revealed comparative advantage in sectors where US automation is low, its exposure to the latter would be small as well. Hakobyan & McLaren (2016) use a similar approach to investigate the impacts of NAFTA on US employment.

In addition, we control for the confounding effect of domestic automation. Since local automation may affect exports through different channels, we experiment with different specifications of this measure. The first one is similar to that of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) and assumes that exposure to local automation would be higher in areas where employment is more concentrated in sectors that are adopting more robots: Where all the terms are similar to equation (1), with the exception of _robots_ _~~e~~ mp_<sup>_MX_</sup> _m,_ 2011 _,_ 2014 and _emp_<sup>_MX_</sup> 2000 _,i_<sup>, which denote the number of robots and total employment (thousands of work-</sup> 8
to international markets, and, therefore, wages are affected by external factors. Hence, training is necessary to keep up with international developments and it is an investment that does not (instantly) show up in wages, but does in productivity.

## **6.1.3 Differentials by experience**

Labor market experience is now considered. The worker's age is included in the<sup>wage</sup> equation both in level and squared allowing for non-linearities. The findings show<sup>that</sup> age both in level and squared is statistically significantly different from<sup>zero and of the</sup> expected sign (see Table 4). The estimated life-cycle wage<sup>profile has the quadratic</sup> shape known also from industrialized countries. The positive effect<sup>of experience on</sup> wages is increasing in the younger age and continues at older age but<sup>at a decreasing rate.</sup> The productivity profile follows the pattern of wages and the wage<sup>gap and productivity</sup> gap are equal in size.

|||||**Table 4**<br>**Exper**|<br>**ience**||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Prod|uctivity|||Wages||||
||Coef.|Std. Err.|t|P>Itj|Coef|Std. Err.|t|P>jtl|
|age|0.056|0.016|3.535|0.000|0.056|0.008|7.313|0.000|
|agesq|-0.001|0.000|-3.000|0.003|-0.001|0.000|-5.979|0.000|

# **Other individual characteristics**

## **6.1.4 Differentials by apprenticeship and contracts**

Does the type of contract and undertaking apprenticeship affect wages and productivity? It is of interest for both the employer and the employee to form a long-run employment relationship, thereby helping to build and retain firmn-specific skills. Table 5 shows the estimated wage differential associated with permanent employment. It is estimated to 12 percent and is statistically significant. Hence, workers with permanent contracts obtain 18
and Rama, 2001). This study compared output rates across countries with different degrees of labor market "rigidity". The latter was measured based on an index that combines the level of minimum wages, the generosity of social security benefits, the membership of the labor movement, and the government share of the labor force. The comparison was run over four periods: long before (i.e., ten to four years before) the launching of major economic reforms, short before, short after and long after. The timing of reforms was identified based on the accumulated volume of World Bank lending for structural and sectoral adjustment programs.

The results of this cross-country study are summarized in figure 10. The lines in this figure represent average growth rates for different groups of countries in the four phases of the reform process. The results are similar when controls for past performance and external shocks are taken into account. The figure suggests that labor market rigidity does not affect long-run performance, as the growth rates of all groups are almost identical long before the reforms. But countries with rigid labor markets have a much worse economic performance in the years preceding the launching of the reforms, and a much slower recovery afterwards. Interestingly, this pattern is not driven by minimum wages or mandated benefits but rather by unionization and, especially, by government employment.

**Figure 10. Labor Market "Rigidity" and the Success of Reforms**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 5<br>4<br>3-<br>|- Top 25%- -B - a<br>0)<br>.~~~ 0 -~~%<br>-2~~~~~~~~~~~<br>-3<br>Long before Right before Right after Long after<br>Period (relative to major reforms)<br>- - - Top 25% - -Top 50% ~Bottom 50%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

_Source:_ Constructed using data gathered by Forteza and Rama (2001).

These results are consistent with a "political", rather than "economic", interpretation of labor market rigidity. The fact that minimum wages and mandated benefits do not matter much suggests that the problem is not the lack of adjustment of labor costs. The regulatory framework promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has a limited impact on performance as well. If labor market "rigidity' is measured only by the number of ILO conventions ratified, there is no significant difference in performance 27
they make monthly contribution to the funds raised by the society for repairs and maintenance. The structural measures are financed through the monthly or yearly contribution that member families have to make. Out of the 30 housing societies surveyed in flood‐affected areas of Mumbai (Patankar et al., 2015), majority have increased the height of the surrounding plot. Many have relocated the electrical meter rooms or have shifted individual electrical meters on the higher floors. For some societies, the local corporators (elected representatives) have used their official funds to put paver blocks in the compounds to increase the height of the surrounding plot. Most of the measures are financed by the members’ monthly or annual contribution and in some cases through the society corpus, which is also the members’ contribution at the time of forming a society.

Table 10: Long‐term measures undertaken by housing societies

|**Measure**|**% of HHs**<br>**undertaking**<br>**measure**|**Average cost**<br>**in Rs.**|**Source of finance**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Increase the height of the<br>surrounding plot|43.3|13000|Members' contribution/Society<br>corpus|
|Reconstruction within the building<br>and/or parking|13.3|50000|Members' contribution|
|Relocating electric meter room|26.7|9000|Members' contribution/Society<br>corpus|
|Relocating/ Elevating water pump<br>room|30.0|12000|Members' contribution|
|Elevating electric meters to a higher<br>level|20.0|10000|Members' contribution|
|Modifying/repairing water supply<br>network inside premises|30.0|5000|Members' contribution|
|Paver blocks|13.3|NA|Elected representative|

Source: Patankar et al., 2015 The structural measures undertaken by individual households and housing societies are essentially private efforts financed through individual resources. There are some critical points about these efforts that need to be mentioned here. Although the structural measures are believed to provide long‐term protection against flooding, almost half of the housing societies and individual households do not believe that they measures will be effective if another event like July 2005 strikes the city. Further, most of the households and even housing societies have not taken professional help to assess the technical specifications of the work undertaken. The decisions are purely based on what the households decide, individually or collectively. Further, technical and financial assistance from the local government or other entities is limited. Given that the decision‐making regarding the responses and measures is driven by individual needs with little guidance on what is appropriate, cost effective and beneficial in the long‐term, they may not be technically and financially the best possible solutions. Further, there is a strong possibility of mal‐adaptation given that the measures 23
A combination of unfunded mandates and extremely constrained taxing powers generate incentives for local governments to develop informal channels of taxation. This is evidenced by the high levels of extra budgetary funds (self raised funds) at the sub-provincial levels, comprising surcharges, fees, utility and user charges that are not formally approved by the central government while technically legal. A pilot experiment in Anhui province identified collection of per capita fees from peasants for local education, health, militia training, road construction and maintenance, welfare for veterans, and birth control (Yep, 2004). This type of quasi-fiscal income, which accounted for as high as 56% of total tax revenues in 1996 (Eckaus 2003: China Statistical Yearbook 2000, pp. 257, 271) or 8-10 per cent of GDP in 1995 (World Bank, 2000). This non-tax type of revenue extraction has often imposed excessive burdens in local constituents generating continuous confrontations between peasants and local officials (Lin and others 2002, Bernstein and Lu 2003, Yep 2004). As noted by Krug, Zhu, and Hendrischke (2005) subprovincial governments agencies _de facto_ control of the property rights of revenues not covered by the tax sharing system enables “sub-provincial governments at all levels to maintain their residual tax rights over the informal tax system.” (p.11). In fact, institutions ruling sub-provincial taxation are shaped as a complex and asymmetric system of contracts between the provincial government and lower layers of government. More recently the central government has abolished the agricultural income tax and rural fees and charges in 2002 through the “Tax-for-Fee program”. These prohibitions have deleterious consequences for county finances as compensating transfers do not fully cover these growing sources of county finance.

Promoting greater fiscal discipline at the sub-national level in China remains virtually an impossible task so long as local governments retain ownership of enterprises providing private goods, lack clarity in their spending and taxing responsibilities and obtain a disproportionate amount of local revenues from ad hoc central transfers. Thus fiscal policy coordination and fiscal discipline remains an unfinished challenge in China.

# **_Fiscal Policy Coordination - Some Conclusions_**

Fiscal policy coordination represents an important challenge for federal systems. In this context, fiscal rules and institutions provide a useful framework but not necessary a solution to this challenge. Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response. Industrialized countries experiences also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on sub-national governments 24
# **Table 5(2): Robustness checks, with horizontal and vertical product differentiation**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
||Full|Non-diff|Diff|
|(t-r)|0.791**|1.682***|0.242|
||(0.372)|(0.511)|(0.522)|
|prc_sh|-7.828***|-5.872***|-11.528***|
||(1.582)|(2.055)|(2.616)|
|collpriv_sh|-14.089***|-17.993***|-9.811**|
||(2.604)|(3.567)|(4.014)|
|for_sh|-47.525***|-50.000***|-44.243***|
||(1.978)|(2.590)|(3.269)|
|Ad-R&D-Sales|-4.236*|-0.566|-4.726*|
||(2.328)|(5.160)|(2.678)|
|sigma|0.026|0.024|0.024|
||(0.019)|(0.024)|(0.029)|
|HS4 fixed effects|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|5,315|3,332|1,806|
|R-squared|0.489|0.519|0.460|

Notes: The regressions are at HS8 level. The dependent variable is the share of indirect exports (conservative measure), ranging from 0 to 100. The export shares by trade regime and firm ownership type variables range from 0 to 1. The omitted trade regime is normal trade. The omitted firm type is SOE. Ad-R&D-Sales refers to the advertising and R&D intensity. Sigma refers to elasticity of substitution. “Diff” refers to differentiated products according to Rauch’s classification. “Non-diff” products include both homogenous and referenced products. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

38
Table A1.5: United States; Numbers of tariff headings subject to SSG Actions, - <u>1995 2006</u>

||Tariff Lines subject to a<br>|ctions|
|---|---|---|
|Year|Volume-based<sup>a</sup>|Price-based|
|1995|0|24|
|1996|0|49|
|1997|0|74|
|1998|6|74|
|1999|0|35|
|2000|0|37|
|2001|0|44|
|2002|2|51|
|2003|0|65|
|2004|0|83|
|2005|0|65|
|2006|0|72|
|Memo ite<br>lines for<br>were not|m: Number of tariff<br>which trigger prices<br>ified‘up-front’|181|

Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the WTO documents website.

Notes: a Volume-based measures 1998 on sheep meat, 6 tariff lines, on 3,709 tonnes; 2002 on Cheese and curd, 2 tariff lines, 2,071 kg.

Price-based measures covered principally Cheeses and products, Milk and other dairy products, Sugar and products containing sugar, Beef, Peanuts and products, Short and long staple cotton.

55
this choice, reporting the post-lasso marginal effects in column 2. We see the strongest predictors of the accounting versus marketing choice are the gender of the owner, industry, and starting level of business practices. Among the different boundary of the firm covariates, there is suggestive evidence to support a role for task-verifiability and hold-up problems.

# _Grants_

The grants occurred after the period of our final follow-up survey, and were not guaranteed or anticipated by the firms. Matching grants were paid to 29 of the firms in our sample (4 insourcing, 4 outsourcing, 20 training, and 1 consulting). Performance grants were paid to 212 of the firms in the sample (67 insourcing, 81 outsourcing, 13 training, and 51 consulting). Most performance grants were for either 7 million or 12 million Naira, while most matching grants were for 10 million. Matching grants required fewer points for eligibility, needed the firm to contribute matching funding of 50 percent of total project costs, and were to be used for funding technical assistance costs such as external consultancy services. Performance grants required more points to be earned, but could be used for goods, equipment and technical assistance. The grants were made to firms right at the time of the closing of the project (in two tranches, starting in March 2019) and thus are after our final follow-up survey. The only role of the grants in the experiment is therefore as an incentive to encourage firms to participate in their assigned program.

54