rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the averaged elasticities of factor demand (Behar, 2004).<sup>26</sup> In the aggregate, the modern-sector wage was predicted to decrease from USD 1,652 to USD 1,485 and the traditional-sector wage was predicted to increase from USD 1,030 to USD 1,084. The modern sector remained more productive than the traditional sector by about 18 percent. Overall, the aggregate output, per-capita output and per-worker output were projected to increase and reach USD 4.15 billion, USD 820 and USD 2,178, respectively.

We do not present results for sectoral distributions that approximate those of OECD or SubSaharan Africa. For OECD, we could not find complete and reliable statistics that differentiate the informal sector shares by gender. The Sub-Saharan Africa benchmark was not deemed valuable since the share of women and men in Liberia who are traditional sector workers is similar to that in Sub-Saharan Africa. Calibrating the model with SSA data gave results of a similar magnitude to the Liberia status quo.<sup>27</sup>

**Figure 5. Selected macro-economic changes due to complete convergence of gender-sector gap (in USD, growth in %)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> $4,500 4,264 80.1% 90%<br> $4,000<br>70%<br> $3,500<br>50%<br> $3,000<br> $2,500 30%<br> $2,000 5.3% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 10%<br> $1,500 1,298<br>-20.9% 958 -10%<br> $1,000 786 736<br>513<br>-30%<br> $500<br> $- -50%<br>GDP Female Trad. Mod. Trad. Mod.<br>Female Male<br>Source: author’s calculations<br>Millions<br>Growth (in %)<br><!-- End of picture text --> If non-tradable production were included in the aggregate production calculations, GDP would be 19.3 percent higher, reaching USD 4.83 billion. The value of non-tradable production is estimated at USD 780 million – equivalent to nearly 16.1 percent of GDP – with women responsible for 68 percent of the total value. In the first parametrization – which can be considered the status quo - the female population aged 15+ is estimated to allocate 8.1 percent of their time to non-tradable activities (or 1.95 hours a day) compared to 3.9 percent (or 0.93 hours a day) allocated by men. The estimated opportunity cost of the non-tradable production is USD 530.2 million for women compared to USD 250.3 million for men. Women’s contribution to GDP would be USD 1.61 billion if their non-tradable production were accounted for, as compared to USD 1.08 million when only measuring market-based output. The full accounting would increase women’s contribution to total output to 33.4 percent to GDP (compared to 26.8 percent without accounting for non-tradable production).

> 26 With a 1 percent increase/decrease in the share of a given sector, the respective wage decreases/increases by 0.35 percent. 27 Estimates on this benchmark are available upon request to the authors.

20
of world FDI flows<sup>13</sup> —an impressive figure that demonstrates quite convincingly that a change is underway.

**Figure 5. National FDI policy changes, by region, 2007**

<!-- Start of picture text --> More favourable to FDI Less favourable to FDI<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>World Developed Africa LAC Developing Transition<br>countries Asia economies<br>Per cent<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : James X. Zhan, “Recent global trends: FDI flows, TNCs and policies” (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), mimeo.

While it is clear that something is happening, not every measure that makes the investment climate less welcoming for foreign direct investors is protectionist. Basically, there are two situations that qualify as FDI protectionism: in the context of inward FDI, FDI protectionism involves new measures by public authorities that are taken to prevent or discourage foreign direct investors from investing in, or staying in, a host country. In the context of outward FDI, FDI protectionism involves measures directed at domestic companies that require them to repatriate assets or operations to the home country or discourage certain types of new investments abroad. In fact, the situation is more complicated because, for instance, measures taken in the interest of legitimate public policy objectives – e.g., protecting national security, seeking to increase the contribution of FDI to the host or home economy – are not necessarily instances of FDI protectionism, even if they make the investment climate less hospitable for foreign investors.

Even with this caveat, it is clear that the regulatory framework is becoming more restrictive. It predates the current financial crisis and recession, suggesting that a reevaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI had already been underway. The financial crisis and recession may dampen the rise of FDI protectionism as countries seek capital to

> 13 Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces,” in _Investment Yearbook_ , op. cit., pp. 239-240.

7
revenue and it might entail vehicle acquisition and maintenance costs and utility losses from using more efficient vehicles As explained in the Introduction, the model treats the responses of consumers to policies along five margins: car ownership, commuting mode choice, total number of discretionary trips, share of discretionary trips by car and the allocation of disposable income between goods shopped by making discretionary trips and housing. The simultaneous treatment of these margins could significantly modify the quantitative and even qualitative results in a version of the analysis that takes into account geographic disaggregation by dividing the urban area into many subareas. As a minimum, a division into suburbs and central cities is needed. Geographic disaggregation would introduce a sixth margin: that of substituting proximal trip destinations for remote ones. In a geographically disaggregated setting, we would see how the consumers would change work and residence locations, and how the location of businesses would become endogenous in order to economize on rents and wages paid which would be altered by the pricing policies targeting car use. Such a geographically detailed model would be like an empirical version of the general equilibrium model of Anas and Rhee (2006), allowing a much more systematic analysis of the effect of urban spatial expansion on the fuel efficiency and emissions generated in an urbanized area. Most important is the fact that in a geographically disaggregated setting in which the areas are connected by a road network, the congestion toll would vary by road whereas the fuel tax rate would be a flat tax per liter (not varying by road or the geography). It would be interesting to see how the results would be modified in such a geographically disaggregated setting.

# **References**

Anas, A. and Rhee, H-J. “Curbing excess sprawl with congestion tolls and urban boundaries,” _Regional Science and Urban Economics,_ 36, 510-541, 2006.

Anas, A. and Pines, D. “Anti-sprawl policies in a system of congested cities,” _Regional Science and Urban Economics,_ 38, 408-423, 2008.

Asian Development Bank, _Energy Efficiency and Climate Change Considerations for On-road Transport in Asia_ : _Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities_ , Working Paper, March 19, 2006 Associated Press, “Beijing extends vehicle limits for another year”, April 6, 2009. Downloaded - on April 9, 2009 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009 <u>04/06/content_11139831.htm</u> 7
11 correlation of some unobserved characteristic of older or poorer democracies with our party variables can account for the results that we report. Rather, the results point to a possible mechanism that explains the association of democratic age and political budget cycles.

# **Data**

Our main party variable, from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck, et al. 2001) is the average age of the largest four political parties in a country (the largest three government parties and the largest opposition party, according to the number of seats they have in the legislature). This is _average party age_ . The previous section makes a series of arguments pointing to a theoretical effect of party age on political budget cycles, principally that younger parties are less likely to have developed the organizational characteristics that allow them to convey information about candidate quality and to bind politicians to their promises. Consistent with the view that party age captures fundamental aspects of party organization, Enikolopov and Zhuravaskaya (2007) also use party age as a measure of whether national parties can discipline local politicians. This is a key organizational prerequisite for parties seeking to boost the credibility of their candidates’ commitments.

We examine the robustness of our results to the use of two additional proxies for political party organization. One benchmark for whether party age is likely to be associated with a more organized party is the age of a party relative to the tenure of the party’s leader. If the party was created during the leader’s tenure, it is more likely that it is a personalized vehicle of the party leader, one that has few of the organizational characteristics that might attenuate political budget cycles. In contrast, the more years that the party has existed prior to the leader taking office, the more likely it is that the party has experienced leadership transitions and exhibits the organizational characteristics that promote party survival during transitions – the same characteristics that limit fiscal cycles around elections.

Such a variable, employed by Gehlbach and Keefer (2012), is available for only the largest government party, though this is the party that is most likely to control spending. Using the Database of
shown here). The results support that Grameen Bank and FFW have substantial contribution to both food and total consumption per capita during the lean season, showing that these programs help smooth consumption.

In short, _monga_ is caused substantially by seasonality of agriculture; yet policy interventions can be judiciously and selectively applied to reduce the intensity of both chronic and seasonal poverty by raising seasonal and overall income and productivity as well as food and non-food consumption.

# **7. Discussion**

_Monga_ is an acute form of seasonality in consumption and income that causes food deprivation. Households in an agrarian society face seasonality in income and consumption as part of the crop cycle in agriculture but they also learn how to manage seasonality through savings and other means. When _monga_ or seasonal food deprivation occurs, this indicates a failure of the traditional means. Monga is also a failure of public policies created to provide safety nets to manage seasonality and, hence, _monga_ .

Household data analysis of HIES 2000 and 2005 suggests that seasonality in consumption is acute in certain months of the year and that seasonal variations vary substantially by region. For example, overall consumption per capita is much lower and seasonal fluctuations in expenditures are much greater in Rangpur region than in other regions. The relative fluctuation in consumption is also larger for extreme than non-extreme poor and much more pronounced in greater Rangpur. Levels of consumption are, in general, lower overall in Bangladesh during _monga_ period (September-November) than other seasons, but the shortfall is much more pronounced in Rangpur than in other regions.

34
Policy Research Working Paper 6286

# **Abstract**

This paper presents the latest update of the World Bank Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, and explores two questions. First, were there significant differences in regulation and supervision between crisis and noncrisis countries? Second, what aspects of regulation and supervision changed significantly during the crisis period? The paper finds significant differences between crisis and non-crisis countries in several aspects of regulation and supervision. In particular, crisis countries (a) had less stringent definitions of capital and lower actual capital ratios, (b) faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, (c) were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans and loan losses, and (d) had weaker incentives for the private sector to monitor banks’ risks. Survey results also suggest that the overall regulatory response to the crisis has been slow, and there is room to improve regulation and supervision, as well as private incentives to monitor risk-taking. Specifically, comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, the paper finds relatively few changes: capital ratios increased (primarily among non-crisis countries), deposit insurance schemes became more generous, and some reforms were introduced in the area of bank governance and bank resolution.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Finance and Private Sector Development Network; and Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mcihak@worldbank.org, ademirguckunt@worldbank.org, mmartinezperia@worldbank.org, and amohsenicheraghl@ worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
A number of data points were used to create an ESE index which is used to find correlations with FDI flows in order to answer the question of whether skilled immigration regimes affect FDI. The ESE index is also correlated to external existing data from the Global Migration Barometer (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) to determine whether economies with a need to attract migrants (to spur economic growth) have in effect put appropriate skilled immigration regimes in place.

# **_4. Results_**

# **4.1 Restrictions that control the inflow of skilled immigrants**

# **4.1.1 Immigration quotas**

Quotas are limits on immigrants that cap the number of people who are allowed to move into a country during a specified period. Quotas therefore function as a funnel and impact foreign investors who seek to bring in skilled staff to start up a company.

Quotas can be nationwide, but can also be on a company- basis or even per industry sector. Forty of the 93 surveyed economies (or 43%) have quotas which restrict the inflow of immigrants and therefore impact all categories of skilled expatriates which are employed.

Figure 3 provides an overview of the applicability of immigration quotas to the surveyed economies. Figure 4 provides examples of quotas in surveyed economies.

**Figure 3. Applicability of immigration quotas to surveyed economies**

**<mark>Non-quota economies</mark>** **<u><mark>Quota economies</mark></u>** Afghanistan; Albania; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Algeria; Angola; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bolivia; Austria; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Brazil;  Brunei Darussalam;  Chile;  Cyprus;  the Burundi;   Cambodia;    Cameroon;   Canada;   Chad;  Dominican Republic; Ecuador; the Arab Republic Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte d’Ivoire; Croatia; the Czech of Egypt; Ghana;  the Democratic Republic of Republic; Ethiopia; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece;  Congo; Guatemala; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Hong  Kong  SAR,  China;  Japan;  Jordan; Kenya; Ireland; Italy; the United Kingdom; Kazakhstan; Madagascar; Malaysia; Mauritius; Morocco; Nepal; the Kosovo; the Kyrgyz Republic; FYR Macedonia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Pakistan; the Philippines; Mali; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Poland; the Republic of Korea; the Russian Federation; Mozambique; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Peru;  Romania; Rwanda; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore; the Slovak  Saudi  Arabia;  Tanzania; Thailand; the United Republic;   South  Africa;  Spain;  Sri  Lanka; Taiwan, States; República Bolivariana de Venezuela; the China; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; Vietnam; Republic of  Yemen. Zambia.

Source: FDI Regulations Database 8
19 Moffitt, R. 2008. “Estimating Marginal Treatment Effects in Heterogeneous Populations.” _Annales d’Economie et de Statistique_ 91 (91–92): 239–61.

Newey, W. K., J. L. Powell, and F. Vella. 1999. “Nonparametric Estimation of Triangular Simultaneous Equations Models.” _Econometrica_ 67 (3): 565–603.

Park, B. U., E. Mammen, Y. K. Lee, and E. R. Lee. 2015. “Varying Coefficient Regression Models: A Review and New Developments.” _International Statistical Review_ 83 (1): 36–64.

Rose, A. K. 2007. “The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade: Embassies as Export Promotion.” _World Economy_ , 30 (1): 22–38.

Sperlich, S., and R. Theler, 2015. “Modeling Heterogeneity: A Praise for Varying-coefficient Models in Causal Analysis.” _Computational Statistics_ 30 (3): 693–718.

Terza, J., A. Basu, and P. Rathouz. 2009. “Two-Stage Residual Inclusion Estimation: Addressing Endogeneity in Health Econometric Modeling.” _Journal of Health Economics_ 27 (3): 531–43.

Volpe, C., and J. Carballo. 2008. “Is Export Promotion Effective in Developing Countries? Firm-Level Evidence on the Intensive and the Extensive Margins of Exports.” _Journal of International Economics_ 76 (1): 89–106. Volpe, C., and J. Carballo, 2010. “Beyond the Average Effects: The Distributional Impacts of Export Promotion Programs in Developing Countries.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 92 (2): 201–14.

Van Biesebroeck, J., J. Konings, and C. V. Martincus. 2016. “Did Export Promotion Help Firms Weather the Crisis?” _Economic Policy_ 31 (88): 653–702.
35

# **References:**

Aoki, Masahiko (1988), _<u>Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy</u>_ <u>,</u> Cambridge University Press.

Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky (1986), “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling,” _The Rand Journal of Economics_ , 17 (2):176-88.

> Barfield, Claude (2005), “Bush Administration Trade Policy: The Role of RTAs,” _mimeo_ , American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.

> Bhagwati, Jagdish (1991), _<u>The World Trading System At Risk</u>_ , Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

> Bhagwati, Jagdish (1992), “Regionalism and Multilateralism,” _The World Economy_ , vol. 15, N°5, September.

Cuyvers, L., De Lombaerde, Ph., Verherstraeten, S. (2005), “Current Status of East Asian Economic Integration,” _University of Antwerp Working Paper_ , Belgium.

> Ethier, Wilfred, J. (1998), “The New Regionalism,” _Economic Journal_ , v.108, no.499, July.

Fung, K.C., Hitomi Iizaka, Chelsea Lin and Francis Ng (2004), “Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the GATT and the WTO: Lessons for Asia,” _Asian Economic Papers_ , Fall.

Hertwel, W.T., Walmsley, T. and K. Itakura (2001), “Dynamic Effects of the ‘New Age’ Free Trade Agreement between Japan and Singapore,” _Journal of Economic Integration_ , 16, pp.446-484.

Hosono, A., Nishijima S. (2003), “Prospects for Closer Relations between Latin America and Asia”, _RIEB Discussion Paper Series_ , N° 121.

Limao, Nuno (2005), “Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence and Open Question,” _Mimeo_ , University of Maryland.

Mavroidis, Petros C. (2005), “If I don’t do it, somebody else will (or won’t): Testing the Compliance of PTAs with the Multilateral Rules,” _mimeo_ .

Ng, Francis and Alexander Yeats (2003), “Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are Their Implications for Regional Cooperation and Growth?” _Policy Research Working Paper, no. 3084_ , Washington DC: The World Bank.

Noland, Marcus and Howard Pack (2003), _<u>Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia</u>_ <u>,</u> Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.

Rajapatirana, S. (1994), “The evolution of trade treaties and trade creation: lessons for Latin America”, Paper presented at the annual regional _Conference of the International Cooperative Alliance_ , August 23-27, Ecuador.
helping with these two problems: by giving individuals more information and knowledge about savings strategies, and by providing tools and ideas to help resist temptations to spend.

In a recent review, Gale and Levine (2010) find that none of the traditional approaches<sup>8</sup> have generated unambiguous evidence of positive impacts of financial literacy efforts. The literature is now moving towards exploring whether innovative channels for providing financial education may affect behavior. Ongoing studies in India, Peru, South Africa and in the U.S. (among others) are testing whether the provision of information via videos, radio, mass media or video games are effective in improving individuals’ financial decisions.

This study builds on and complements this existing literature in several ways. First, we work with a population that is already banked. Thus, we do not study whether financial education makes individuals more likely to use formal financial products, such as savings accounts or credit cards, but rather on whether they use these products to their advantage and responsibly. Second, the financial education course we analyze covers topics that are relevant for a range of users of financial services and is delivered at scale by a financial institution, rather than being a pilot program or government program. Third, we examine interest for such training in a general population, and then focus on individuals who state an interest in attending a financial literacy course. We show that even among this population training attendance rates are low and we examine the barriers to participation experimentally through the use of different incentive treatments. Finally, we obtain administrative data on savings and credit card usage from a financial institution to validate the conclusions drawn from survey data.

# **3. The Financial Literacy Training Product**

The financial literacy training course studied in this paper is a large-scale program offered to the general public. The goal of the program is to convey basic knowledge and tools that individuals may need to manage their personal finances responsibly. It is targeted at adults and is offered free of charge. The program was first launched a few years ago and has trained over 300,000 individuals. In 2011, the course won a regional award for innovativeness in fostering financial education.

During the time of our study, the course was being taught at several locations in Mexico City, in a number of other cities in Mexico, as well as through an online platform. Our study focuses on

> 8 The authors mention four approaches: employer-provided financial education, state-mandated financial and consumer education for students, credit and mortgage counseling, and community-based programs providing general financial education.

9