rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Alongside the expansion of non-farm jobs has come a significant increase in the contribution of non-farm income to village income (Table 4). In 1983/4, non-farm sources accounted for roughly a third of village income. By 2008-9 this had increased to more than half. Of particular interest, in light of the discussion above about differential access to non-farm opportunities across caste groupings, is the evidence that suggests that Jatabs have seen a particularly significant increase in the share of income deriving from non-farm sources. In 19834, non-farm income accounted for only 17% of the total income of Jatabs. This had more than doubled, to 40%, by 2008-9. While Table 4 shows that most castes have seen a significant rise in income from non-farm sources, the increase amongst Jatabs has been particularly dramatic.

**Table 4:  Share of Income from Non-Farm Sources  1983/84 and 2008/09**

||Number o|f Households|Per Capit<br>(1960/1 R|a Income<br>s.)|Share of In<br>Non-Farm|come from<br>Sources|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1983/4|2008/9|1983/4|2008/9|1983/4|2008/9|
|Thakur|30|56|200|488|32%|67%|
|Murao|27|58|231|430|14%|35%|
|Dhimar|13|18|181|262|51%|60%|
|Gadariya|12|16|202|533|41%|63%|
|Dhobi|4|8|159|141|2%|30%|
|Teli|16|21|147|421|47%|60%|
|Passi|14|6|218|370|69%|55%|
|Jatab|19|38|85|180|17%|40%|
|Other|8|9|185|396|58%|52%|
|Total|143|230|194|382|34%|52%|

# _Income Mobility_

We turn now to a further examination of the improving circumstances of the Jatabs. In Tables 5-8 we divide the village population, in turn in 1983-84 and 2008-9, into fractiles of economic well-being, and consider how over time Jatabs have lifted themselves out of the lowest margins of the welfare distribution. We proceed in two steps. We first revisit a concept of “observed means” described in Lanjouw and Stern (1991, 1998) whereby Palanpur households are ranked on the basis of their “apparent prosperity” by the field investigators directly involved in the intensive fieldwork for each respective year. The point of departure here is that the affluence of a household in a small Indian village is, to some extent, a matter of common knowledge in the sense that its asset position and purchasing power is widely known. For the 1983-4 data, Jean Drèze and Naresh Sharma, first classified households into seven ‘groups’ of increasing prosperity labelled ‘Very Poor’, ‘Poor’, ‘Modest’, ‘Secure’, ‘Prosperous’, ‘Rich’, and ‘Very Rich’. The investigators classified households in this way independently, without consultation. It is of some comfort that Drèze and Sharma agreed to a considerable extent in their ranking of households, confirming the view that the relative position of households in the scale of economic affluence is in many cases fairly clear to informed observers. A final stage of 16
# **2. Data and Descriptive Statistics**

This analysis uses data from three waves of the India NFHS (1992/1993, 1998/1999 and 2005/2006)<sup>1</sup> . NFHS is a survey of representative households, covering states and territories of India containing approximately 99 percent of its population (Kashmir and Sikkim, as well as some remote territories, are not covered). The survey structure corresponds to the typical structure of demographic and health surveys (DHS) conducted in several other countries. Our main sample contains information on 45,279 children from the 1992/1993 India NFHS; 30,984 from 1998/1999; and 48,679 from 2005/2006<sup>2</sup> . These children were residing correspondingly in 33,032; 26,056; and 33,968 households<sup>3</sup> .

The NFHS uses three types of questionnaires: the household questionnaire, the woman’s questionnaire and the village questionnaire. The household questionnaire collects information on the family structure and background; caste/tribe of the household head; age, gender, education, employment, and health status of household members; information on public services utilization; and other topics. The woman’s questionnaire covers dates and survival status of all births; current pregnancy status; childbearing intentions; and childcare practices—for women aged 15 to 49. The village questionnaire gathers information on village area and population; diverse infrastructure characteristics such as distance to the nearest town, roads, public transportation (bus); and presence in village or distance to schools and health facilities. Information was also collected on the number of cars, trucks, motorcycles, and TV sets in the villages, as well as whether they have electricity and what the main sources of drinking water are.

Because the NFHS registers no information on household income or consumption, we use a constructed household wealth. The wealth index is the first principal component of a number of household assets—such as clocks, radios, TVs, VCRs, refrigerators, bicycles, motorbikes, cars, as well as the types of utilities used by

> **1** Detailed information on NFHS methodology and sample design is made available by the International Institute of Population Sciences (IIPS) at: http://www.nfhsindia.org/. The data is available from MEASURE DHS, Macro International Inc.: http://www.measuredhs.com.

> **2** The number of observations in the 1998/1999 round is smaller because NFHS-2 collected height and weight information for only the last two children, under three years of age, of ever-married woman interviewed.

> **3** In 1992/1993, measurements of height were not collected in Andhra Pradesh (AP), Himachal Pradesh (HP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Tamil Nadu (TN), and West Bengal (WB).

4
claimants in specific instances. The LLSV theory focuses on the differences between five influential legal traditions: the British common law, the French civil law, the German civil law, the Scandinavian civil law and the Socialist law countries. To identify the legal origin of the country, we use five different dummy variables to capture each type of legal system using data from LLSV (1998, 1999). We refer to the effect of legal origin on property rights as the **_Law and Finance view._** Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (henceforth AJR) argue that in many countries, especially former colonies, the legal system was not designed to protect property rights. Instead, its purpose was to facilitate the extraction of resources from the indigenous population. Thus, two systems with the same legal origin may in practice offer very different protections. AJR (2001, 2002) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) contend that European colonization offers a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. Europeans set up extractive systems in colonies which were not attractive for colonial settlement because of high settler mortality due to natural causes at the time of colonization or because the indigenous population was relatively large. In colonies where settlement was feasible the judicial systems were set up so as to protect the property rights of the settlers. This theory emphasizes the role of geography (latitude and natural endowments) and disease environment (which affected the settler mortality) in shaping property rights. We refer to this theory as the **_Endowment view_** .

To measure geographical endowments, we use Latitude, which is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between 0 and 1, from LLSV (1999). Countries closer to the equator tend to have a more tropical climate that was inhospitable to European settlers and therefore fostered “extractive” institutions. We use data on Settler Mortality from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) where settler mortality is a measure of the death rates faced by European settlers in former colonies and is calculated by the logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand Europeans. Since we have data on settler mortality for a smaller sample, we use latitude for our main results and present the results on settler mortality as a robustness test<sup>4</sup> .

> 4 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) note that a second channel through which geographical endowments shape initial institutions is through openness and competition. They show that agriculture in southern North America and much of South America is conducive to large plantations. Thus, colonialists developed longlasting institutions to protect the few landowners against the many peasants. In contrast, northern North

6
The data collected in 59 countries revealed that entrepreneurs tend to choose the simplest legal form available, usually one that requires only one shareholder and has low capital requirements. Yet, while these simplified legal forms might be adequate for single-employee establishments, they may not be suitable for the future growth of the business as they generally impose restrictions in the transferability of shares and cannot be publicly traded. Moreover, the data suggest that those countries that have more flexible legal business forms enjoy a higher entry rate density, with an average of 0.36%, than those that impose more requirements, such as limitations in the number of shareholders, with an average entry density of 0.15%.

It is also notable that the equivalents of Joint Stock Companies (more rigid and usually associated with bigger businesses) prevail in developing countries, while limitedliability corporations (LLCs) and sole proprietorships (more flexible and generally used by SMEs) dominate in industrialized countries. This fact does not entail that the average size of the businesses in developing countries is bigger, but rather that only the bigger business of these countries transition to the formal economy, while the equivalents of the LLCs and sole proprietorships (small and micro enterprises) in these countries tend to remain, unregistered and in the informal sector.

An analysis of the variety of legal business forms across countries suggests that industrialized countries have a rather homogeneous business regulation that share equivalent legal forms, as opposed to developing countries, where endemic business legal forms that do not have equivalents in other countries abound. Although we cannot rule out reverse causality – that greater private sector activity and higher levels of new firm creation lead to legal reform – the evidence suggests that more flexible legal regime encourage greater formal sector participation.

# **4.  Data on business registry modernization**

The first step for entrepreneurs joining or transitioning to the formal sector is to register their business at the registrar of companies. A modernized, quick, efficient, and cost-effective business registry is therefore critical to enabling 13
encounter each other infrequently, as in large organizations not involved in co-production. One such large organization is the government, in which bureaucrats have to co-operate with a large number of other bureaucrats and citizens whom they may never see again to deliver public goods. This argument holds equally true for the performance of large firms who must trust their employees (Fukuyama, 1995).

La Porta et al (1997) find the effects of trust on government performance (as measured by efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, bureaucratic quality, tax compliance and civic participation) to be both statistically significant and quantitatively large. In addition they test Fukuyama's thesis that family loyalty is detrimental to the growth of large corporations, and that trust beyond the family has to become the basis for co-operation for this transition to occur. La Porta et al find a positive coefficient between the relative share of the top 20 firms and trust in people, 0.654 (t=4.1), and a negative coefficient with trust in family, -.563 (t=-3.1). This appears to confirm Fukuyama's thesis that for the development of large corporations, trust has to transcend the primary group of the family. The authors also found a small but significant effect of trust on infrastructure quality and adequacy, infant mortality and on educational achievement.

Expanding Putnam's (1993) argument that the Roman Catholic church lowers trust in society by imposing a hierarchical structure on society, La Porta et al include two other hierarchical religions, the Eastern Orthodox church and Islam. They find a strong negative correlation between hierarchical religions and trust (-0.61). Holding per capita income constant, they find that countries with more dominant hierarchical religions have less efficient judiciaries, greater corruption, lower quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participation in civic activities, lower importance of large firms in the economy, inferior infrastructure and higher inflation. The results remain unchanged when hierarchical religion is used as an instrument for trust. Developed industrialized countries are over-represented in the sample.

Finally, Knack and Keefer (1997), also using the same World Values Data set from 29 market economies, conclude that trust and civic co-operation are associated with stronger economic performance. However, associational activity is not correlated with economic performance, contrary to Putnam's findings about Italy. They speculate that any positive effects of groups may be balanced by the damage done by distributional coalitions - the Olson (1982) thesis. This speculation is not borne out by their analysis, however, since the measure of associations is weak and does not include intensity of participation in groups or the nature of 22
standardized the four sub-indicators LEGAL, METHODS-A, ACCESS-AB, and COMPLAINT-AB to have means equal to 0 and standard deviations equal to 1, and computed the average of these four values. We use this composite measure, INDEX, or one of its four components, in subsequent tests reported below.<sup>20</sup>

# **5. Disaggregating by Firm Size**

There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that procurement practices designed to reduce transactions costs, and encourage competition and transparency, will have greater effects on smaller than on larger firms. “High costs affect all bidders, but small and medium enterprises to a greater extent, hindering their participation and access to the public procurement market” (World Bank, 2016: 4). Greater public access to procurement information, as measured by ACCESS-AB, should reduce transactions costs, which will tend to be proportionately larger for smaller firms (OECD, 2009: 23). We therefore expect the effect of ACCESS-AB on the likelihood of bidding on contracts to be largest for small firms (those with fewer than 20 employees), and smallest for large firms (those with 100 or more employees). Similarly, a low-cost, independent complaints mechanism (as measured by COMPLAINT-AB) is likely to encourage participation more for smaller than for larger firms. Bidding tends to be more frequent for larger firms: about 16% of small firms in the sample report they tried to secure a government contract, compared to about 21% for medium-sized firms and 23% for large firms. Informal payments are higher on average for smaller firms, averaging 2.9% of contract value for firms with fewer than 20 employees, 2.0% for medium-sized firms, and 1.3% for firms with 100 or more employees.<sup>21</sup> Prevailing procurement practices on balance appear to disadvantage small firms, but systems that encourage transparency, competition, and trust, and that reduce transactions costs, can potentially level the playing field somewhat for smaller firms.

Accordingly, we ran the BID and KICKBACK regressions for each of three sub-samples - small, medium-sized, and large firms – as well as for the full sample, for comparative purposes. Results are summarized in Table 4. Each regression includes only one procurement sub-indicator (or the composite INDEX), and otherwise follows the specifications of Table 1 (for bidding) and Table 2

> 20 This index is correlated at .94 with an alternative index based on weights from a principal-components analysis, and results reported below are similar if this alternative index is used instead.

> 21 Small (21%) and medium-sized (18.6%) firms are more likely to report having to pay a bribe than large firms (13.5%). For those who report that bribes are needed, average size of bribes is also largest for small firms (13.9% of contract value), with modest differences between medium (11%) and large firms (10.4%).

19
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology used throughout the paper. Section 3 describes some of the patterns of trade concentration over the past four decades as a stepping stone to the introduction of our diversification measure. Section 4 introduces the notion of latent trade diversification, and contrasts it to standard diversification measures. Section 5 discusses the role of economic size (measured by size of the labor force) and the level of development (measured by GDP per capita), as determinants of latent trade diversification. Section 6 studies the role of latent trade diversification in determining income and terms of trade volatility. Section 7 explores the role of factor endowments as a possible determinant of changes in latent export baskets. Section 8 concludes.

# **2. Data and Variables of Interest**

Data on trade flows in merchandise goods come from UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database. The dataset, which is publically available, reports trade values for exports and imports at the product level for a large set of countries according to eight product classifications. In this paper we use the SITC Revision 1 classification, as it is available for the longest time period (1962-2012).<sup>5</sup> Most of the analysis uses the 5-digit breakdown, which is the most disaggregated data available and defines 944 goods (or export lines).<sup>6</sup> Data for trade in services, used in section 4, comes from the Consolidated Dataset on International Trade in Services v8.7 described in Francois and Pindyuk (2013). The data is disaggregated at the three-digit Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS) classification. For a detailed discussion about the classification schemes used in the Trade in Services dataset and their associated shortcomings, see Francois and Pindyuk (2013). Finally, data on GDP, population and other country characteristics come from version 8 of the Penn World Tables and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.

Throughout the paper we analyze two measures of trade concentration, or equivalently of trade diversification, commonly applied in the literature (see for instance Klinger and Lederman (2006), Cadot, Carrère, and Strauss-Kahn (2009, 2011)). The first measure of concentration we analyze is the number of

> 5SITC Rev. 1 data is chosen over newer revisions or more disaggregated nomenclatures in order to maximize the time span of analysis. This is important since our measure of latent diversification uses a country’s history of trade flows.  In the analysis, we take all trade values below 1,000 in year 2000 US$ as zero.

> 6 Some parts of the paper use more aggregated data to check for robustness.

5
<u>http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/cpis/2002/pdf/cpis_index.pdf.</u> Jin, K., 2012. “Industrial Structure and Capital Flows.” _American Economic Review_ 102(5): 2111-2146.

- Ju, J. and S.J. Wei, 2011. “When Is Quality of Financial System a Source of Comparative Advantage?” _Journal of International Economics_ 84(2), 178-187.

- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny, 1998. “Law and Finance.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 106 (6), 1113– 1155.

- Lane, P. and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti, 2008. “International Investment Patterns.” _Review of Economics and Statistics_ 90(3), 538-549.

- Levchenko, A. and P. Mauro, 2007. “Do Some Forms of Financial Flows Protect from Sudden Stops?” _World Bank Economic Review_ 21(3), 389-411.

- Okawa, Y. and E. van Wincoop, 2012. “Gravity in International Finance.” _Journal of International Economics_ 87(2), 205-215.

- Sarno, L. and M. Taylor, 1999. “Hot Money, Accounting Labels and the Permanence of Capital Flows to Developing Countries: an Empirical Investigation.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 59(2), 337-364.

- Stein, E., and C. Daude, 2007. “Longitude Matters: Time Zones and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment.” _Journal of International Economics_ 71(1), 96-112.

- Vollrath, T., 1991. “A Theoretical Evaluation of Alternative Trade Intensity Measures of Revealed Comparative Advantage.” _Review of World Economics_ 127(2), 265-280.

World Bank, 2006. <u>Global Development Finance: The Development Potential of Surging Capital Flows. World Bank, Washington DC.</u> ———, 2011. <u>Global Development Horizons: Multipolarity</u> - The New Global Economy. World Bank, Washington DC.

- ———, 2013. Global Development Horizons: Capital for the Future <u>Saving and Investment in an Interdependent World. World Bank, Washington DC.</u>

23
In industrialized and deve!oping countries, governments are expected to continue their involvement in the financing and delivery of training where market imperfections and failures impede private delivery and where concerns for equity exist.' This involvement produces a need to ensure the efficiency of publicly supported training operations. Costs have to be kept under control and training offered that meets market needs. The improvement of planning techniques is important to achieving these objectives and providing information that enables training systems to be responsive to changing economic contexts and to the demand for different kinds of skills. This improvement is also important to the effective operation of a market economy where information about skills demand and supply is required as a guide to the efficient allocation of private spending on education and training.

Manpower planning as a guide to both public and private spending on education and training requires the monitoring of labor matkets and training incentives. Manpower planners need to become labor market analysts. The information manpower planning produces is essential to improving the efficiency with which resources are used in skills training. The information provided is a guide to public and private training decisions and the management of training systems. This paper introduces techniques for manpower planning that acknowledge the dynamic nature of market economies. It rejects manpower requirements forecasting, which continues to be used as a tool for planning in many planning agencies, and in its place, proposes the use of labor market signals developed by monitoring at the local level movements in wages and employment and the evaluation of training programs.

# A. Role, **of the** Manpower Planner

The manpower planner is most commonly identified with the role of guiding public sector training expenditures. In a market economy, however, the planner is confronted with other roles. There is a need for information: (i) to guide private training decisions; (ii) to improve the management of training ' See World Bank (1991:35) and Middleton, Ziderman, atid Adams (forthcoming).

I
# **Mortality Costs of and Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Côte d'Ivoire**

**Hermann Pythagore Pierre Donfouet**<sup>**1***</sup> **, Ndoh Ashken Sanogo**<sup>**1,**</sup> **Jean-Noel Amantchi Gogoua**<sup>**1**</sup> **, Opope Oyaka Tshivuila Matala**<sup>**1**</sup> **, Adama Traore**<sup>**1**</sup> **, Gaston Sorgho**<sup>**1**</sup>

1The World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Global Practice, 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 USA.

*Corresponding author’s email: hdonfouet@worldbank.org

**Keywords:** COVID-19 pandemic, value of statistical life.

**JEL codes:** D12, D61, I10