rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Interviewers were assigned to visit each location during pre-specified blocks of time. Two field-workers were assigned to each location. One fieldworker carried out the interviews, while the other carried out a count of the number of people with Nikkei appearance who appeared to be 18 years or older who passed by each location. For the fixed places, this count was made throughout the pre-specified time block. For example, between 2:30pm and 3:30pm at the sports club, the interviewer counted 57 adult Nikkeis. Refusal rates were carefully recorded, along with the sex and approximate age of the person refusing. A note was made of the number of individuals who were asked to answer the questionnaire because they appeared Nikkei, but who replied they were not Nikkei. The proportion of falsely identified Nikkei was used to adjust the count taken by the fieldworker to obtain an estimate of the number of Nikkei passing the intercept location.

In the case of intercept surveys carried out at events, a possible concern was that the same person might circle past the location multiple times, thereby invalidating the count. Therefore the fieldworker instead counted the total number of individuals passing during a 10-minute period, and the number of Nikkei adults passing during this period. Estimates of the total number attending the event were obtained from the event organizers, and adjusted by the sample proportion observed to be adult Nikkei to get an estimate of the number of adult Nikkei attending the event.

Table 5 lists the sample size collected, number of refusals, time spent sampling, and approximate number of Nikkei at each sampling location for the São Paulo intercept survey. A target of 34 completed interviews was set for each location, in order to make sure the sample wasn’t too heavily concentrated in only one or two very popular locations. In practice slightly more interviews were taken in several locations, while only 4 interviews were completed at the art exposition. In all, 516 intercept interviews were collected, along with 325 refusals. The average refusal rate is thus 39 percent, with location-specific refusal rates ranging from only 3 percent at the food festival to almost 66 percent at one of the two grocery stores. The last column of the Table shows that the 22

-  -
# **Is the Global Economy Deglobalizing?**

**And if so, why? And what is next?**<sup>**1**</sup>

# **Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Tristan Reed**<sup>**2**</sup>

# JEL Classification: F1, F5, F6

Keywords: <mark>trade,</mark> trade war, resilience, <mark>international relations, national security, geopolitical risk, geoeconomic fragmentation, geoeconomics, international political economy, economic impacts of globalization, deglobalization</mark>

> 1 Prepared for the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), Spring 2023. The authors thank Jan Gabriel Oledan for exceptional research assistance, and Jan Eberly, Pol Antras, and Doug Irwin for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

> 2 Goldberg: Yale University, BREAD, CEPR, NBER and PIIE. Reed: World Bank, DEC Research Group.
cost recovery was even better, with a 9.2% profit margin, although the financial<sup>records show</sup> that the zone did not charge the health centers for supervision<sup>costs in 1986 and 1988.</sup> Hospital costs in the Bwamanda health zone are similar to those<sup>of other well functioning</sup> zones. Of the eight zones for which Bitran et al compiled per capita<sup>hospital expenditures</sup> in 1985, Bwamanda ranked third lowest (4). It3 per capita cost was $0.42<sup>(21 Z) compared to</sup> the eight-zone average of $0.65 (32 Z).

# 4. Utilization and Access to Services

Theories of insurance suggest that insured persons may use more services<sup>than uninsured due</sup> to both adverse selection (the tendency of persons more likely to need<sup>services to purchase</sup> insurance) and moral hazard (the tendency of persons to be more prolifigate<sup>in demanding</sup> services when they face few financial penalties). These phenomena make the development<sup>of</sup> insurance more difficult because they raise premiums, further discouraging health,<sup>low cost</sup> people from buying insurance. The authors examined whether these theories applied to Bwamanda and confirmed that they did.

The authors' analysis of utilization data showed that distance and membership status strongly affect hospital utilization. Hospitalization rates are higher for members and workers<sup>with</sup> employer-provided health care coverage than for Bwamanda residents who have no form<sup>of</sup> health insurance or employer coverage. The authors examined this pattern<sup>with two sets of</sup> data: monthly utilization statistics tabulated by each service, and a ten percent sample of entries from the hospital register for all admissions.

Table A.7 compares the insurance status of hospitalized patients with the insurance<sup>status of</sup> Zaire's population. While 77% of the patients are insured, only 60% of the health zone population are members of the insurance plan. Persons covered by an employer<sup>are even more</sup> overrepresented among the patients than in the population. There<sup>are three times more</sup> employed persons, and only a third as many uninsured patients hospitalized<sup>than expected</sup> from their frequency in the population.

**Table A.7** Distribution of Payment Categories in the Population wnd Hospital Patients, Dec.1988 - Oct.1989 (maternity patients exctuded)

|PAYMENT|POPUL|ATION|HOSPITA<br>FROM|L PATIENTS<br>ZONE*|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**CATEGORY**|PERSONS|<br>X|SAMPLE|<br>X|
|Eaployed|6,176|<br>**4.61**|54|<br>**17.3X**|
|**Insured**|81,142|**60.2X**|240|<br>**76.7X**|
|**Total**not Insured|<br>47,362|**35.2X**|19|<br>**6.1X**|
|TOTAL|**134,680**|**100.0l**|<br>313|**100.01**|

* **Th. original smple** of 329 patients Included **16(4.9X)** from outside of

**_Bwmwds_ zone.** They **were removed** fro the onot insuredO **category,**<sup>**Leaving**</sup> the 313 petients **reported here.**

8 These were derived by dividing the total expenditures for hospitals in the zone by the zone's population. This calculation does not adjust for net border<sup>crossing.</sup> 23
# <mark>WPS3570</mark>

## **Taking Stock of Risk Management Techniques for Sovereigns**

### **_Stijn Claessens_**

#### _Abstract_

This paper reviews the current state of affairs and thinking on external risk management for developing countries. It tries to identify the reasons behind the limited risk management by sovereigns. Perverse incentives arising from a too generous international safety net, limited access to international financial markets by developing countries arising from low creditworthiness, a limited supply of financial risk management tools suited to developing countries, and a poor supply of skills have inhibited risk management. Another constraint has been the limited attention given to the strategic objectives for risk management. Going forward, the paper identifies actions by international financial markets, countries and international financial institutions that can help improve risk management.

#### World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3570, April 2005

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ University of Amsterdam and World Bank. Contact: phone 1- 202-473-3484, e-mail <u>SClaessens@worldbank.org. Paper prepared for the Sovereign Debt Project, organized by</u> Initiative for Policy Dialogue, headed by Joseph Stiglitz, and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, headed by Jose Antonio Ocampo, and presented on October 14-15, 2004, at Columbia University, New York, and presented at the International Policy Workshop on Debt Sustainability, External Shock and Financing Instruments in Low Income Countries organized by InWEnt, the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, the German Development Institute, and the World Bank on November 22-23, 2004, Berlin, Germany. I would like to thank the two workshop participants for their comments.
**Fig 2** . Energy Subsidies Decision Tree

Policy objectives **<mark>Step 1</mark>** <mark>: State the objective(s) of the subsidy</mark> <u><mark>policy</mark></u> Impact **<mark>Question 1</mark>** <mark>: Does the policy substantially achieve its</mark> No <mark>objectives?</mark> Yes Cost benefit analysis **<mark>Step 2</mark>** <mark>: Value costs and benefits of the</mark> Redesign or phase out Subsidy <mark>subsidy</mark> <u><mark>policy and its alternatives</mark></u> Cost effectiveness **<mark>Question 2</mark>** <mark>: Is the policy the most</mark> No <mark>socially efficient instrument to achieve its objectives?</mark> Yes No Global externalities **<mark>Question 3</mark>** <mark>: Does the policy avoid</mark> No Is the impact of the policy <mark>negative global externalities? consistent with the country’s</mark> overall strategy on GHG emissions? Yes yes **<mark>Question 4</mark>** <mark>: Is this use of funds a</mark> Priority of policy <mark>budgetary priority?</mark> objectives Yes No Retain (existing) or introduce (new) Redesign or phase out Subsidy subsidy Source: Bacon and others (2010) 22
- Hsieh, C-T., and M. Urquiola. 2002. "When Schools Compete, How do they Compete? An Assessment of Chile's Nationwide School Voucher Program." National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, Occasional Paper No. 43.

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- King, E., P. Orazem, and D. Wolgemuth,. 1999. "Central Mandates and Local Incentives: The Colombia Education Voucher Program." _World Bank Economic Review_ 13(3, September):467-91.

- Ladd, H. 2002. "School Vouchers: A Critical View." _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ 16(4): 3- 24.

- Ladd, H., and M. Armacost, eds. 1996. _Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education._ Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution.

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- Levacic, R. 2001. "An Analysis of Competition and its Impact on Secondary School Examination Performance in England." NCSPE, New York, NY. 1-58.

- Levacic, R., and P. A. Woods. 1999. "Polarisation and,Inequality Between Secondary Schools in England: Effects on School Practice and Performance." Paper given at the British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, University of Sussex.

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22
may not have full autonomy over how to spend them. Grants can be different though: formula-based unconditional grant gives most freedom to the LG, while earmarked grants give almost none. Therefore, vertical gap alone does not tell us much about true fiscal autonomy of the LG.

- LG taxation autonomy (lg ~~t~~ axaut): Do LG have powers to regulate (set rate and base, create new ones) local taxes? In other words, can LG raise funds through taxation independently from CG?

- LG unconditional transfers (lg ~~t~~ ransf): Are grants from SG or CG (or other LG, which is rare) formula-based? Are they unconditional? In other words, if LG depends on grants, how likely is that their availability does not depend on political situation, and how much discretion do LG have over spending the money received?

- LG borrowing freedom (lg ~~b~~ orrow): Can LG borrow money to satisfy their needs? Can the borrowing be done without consent or regulation of CG?

Nine decentralization variables are depicted in Figure 1. Except for LG vertical gap, the darker color of a country for some variable means it is more decentralized in corresponding dimension (political, fiscal, or administrative). As expected, European countries and North America score high in most cases. African and Middle East countries are almost always at the lowest percentiles. Interestingly, Brazil is in the top 50th percentile by all dimensions. At the same time, China scores low in political decentralization, but very high in the fiscal one.

# 3.2 Decentralization indexes

Our main assumption is that decentralization should matter only when local governments have some expenditure discretion, i.e. the fiscal decentralization variables are dominant in our main measures of decentralization. Indeed, it is hard to believe that local governments - however politically or administratively independent they are from the center - have a significant influence on policymaking if their budget is close to nothing. We test this assumption later by contrasting fiscal variables with political ones, but our main measurement of decentralization - similarly to most empirical studies of the subject - is based on fiscal indicators.

The main variable used in the economic literature<sup>6</sup> to measure decentralization is sub-national expenditure decentralization (SNG expenditures as % of GG expenditures) , which was constructed by the World Bank based on the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics dataset. We update this variable for 2005, and add estimates for the countries, which are not reported in GFS. The resulting variable - LG expenditure decentralization (lg ~~e~~ xpdec) - is the basis for our decentralization index.

The way it is reported to IMF (or recorded in national accounts), expenditure decentralization does not fully reflect the actual expenditure discretion that local governments have. First, LG may be simple distributors of the funding transferred to them from an upper-tier government, and have little choice over how the money in their budget should be spent. If the LG vertical gap (difference between LG

> 6See for instance Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fan et al. (2009)

11
<!-- Start of picture text --> Chad Direct and Indirect Oil revenues 2003 - 2009<br>1000<br>900<br>800<br>700<br>600 Royalties (Direct revenues)<br>500 Dividends (Direct Revenues)<br>400 Taxes (Indirect Revenues)<br>300<br>200<br>100<br>0<br>2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br>Years<br>Million US$<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: Chadian authorities; World Bank and IMF.

In order to preserve the integrity of the annual budget and principle of sound budget management; it was agreed and specified in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law<sup>20</sup> that Fund deposited in special accounts to defray expenditures in priority sectors shall be earmarked in accordance with the public expenditure program prepared annually by the government<sup>21</sup> . The program is understood as a triennial development process and is a reference point for the Finance Act. And the government shall review the program annually. Indeed the principle of Program budgets and MTEF was directed provided by the law, hence consistent with the principles of budget integrity and comprehensiveness as well as with ongoing measures to improve budget management supported by the Bank.

Disbursement modalities were set to: (i) comply with the Finance Law approved by the Parliament; (ii) based on specific expenditure programs for revenues allocated to the priority sectors; and (iii) receive an ex ante visa from an independent institution – The Petroleum Revenue Oversight and Control Committee (CCSRP) or Collège de Controle et de Surveillance des Resources Pétrolières – created by the Act No. 001/PR/99 related to the Oil Revenues Management.

The Collège (CCSRP) mandate is to (a) verify the consistency of special accounts commitments with the Finance Law and (b) authorize and control disbursements from the special accounts, and the allocation of funds. The CCSRP composition is as follows: (i) a Supreme Court judge; (ii) a member of the National Assembly; (iii) a Senator; (iv) the National Director of BEAC; (v) the Director of Treasury; (vi) the Director of Petroleum; (vii) the Director of Planning and Development; (viii) a democratically-designated representative of local NGOs and; (ix) a Trade Union Representative.

The Oversight of oil revenue utilization is also to be exercised by: (i) Parliamentary approval of oil revenue allocation and utilization, through approval and monitoring of the general budget, using information provided by the administration and by the Auditor General’s Office and; (ii) the Auditor General’s Office in the Supreme Court (Chambre des Comptes de la Cour Suprême) controls the legitimacy of expenditures through (a) the official certification of revenue accounts and; (b) the control

> 20 (Law No. 001/PR/99 dated January 11, 1999).

> 21 Act No. 001/PR/99 – Oil Revenues Management Law – Section2, Disbursement criteria, Article 12.

17
significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes.

Two of the more significant shifts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century have been the increased attention to the delivery of public services on the one hand, and greater decentralization of responsibility for these services on the other. This chapter has attempted to identify the linkages between these two phenomena, emphasizing that the relationship is complex and far from being fully understood. Yet countries are taking decisions that affect the welfare of millions of people, many of them poor. The challenge to researchers is to provide the knowledge base so that these decisions will improve the welfare of these poor people.

# **References**

The word “processed” describes informally reproduced works that may not be commonly available through library systems.

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24
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