19 Hugo Chávez advanced significant social programs that largely benefit the poor, his party, the _Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela_ (PSUV), is, correctly, not coded as programmatic in the DPI. Instead, the party is coded with a 0, non-programmatic, because it is organized around the personality of the leader, with little institutional basis of its own.

The results displayed in Table 1, taken from Tables 4 and 5 in Keefer (2011), illustrate the strong association between the absence of parties sufficiently organized to sustain a programmatic reputation and the corresponding absence of more developmentoriented policies. Panel A indicates that both gross primary and secondary school enrollments are significantly higher in countries that exhibit programmatic political parties (controlling for income and the presence of competitive elections, among other things). Stasavage (2005) and Baum and Lake (2003) argue that competitive elections, in and of themselves, increase access to education. The results in Keefer (2011), reported in Table 1, indicate that this effect is driven by the disproportionate presence of parties organized to sustain a programmatic reputation in democracies: the effect of competitive elections is largely insignificant after controlling for whether parties are primarily patron-client and nonprogrammatic.

The predominance of patron-client parties is also associated with lower bureaucratic quality and higher levels of corruption, as reported by the _International Country Risk Guide_ . Again, the effect of competitive elections is insignificant and appears to depend on the relative importance of programmatic parties relative to patron-client parties. Panels B and C demonstrate that these effects also capture within-regime variation in public policy. Among countries that with competitively–elected governments, and among countries that lack such governments, school enrollment and bureaucratic quality are significantly higher and corruption significantly lower in countries with more programmatic political parties.

The evidence in Table 1 indicates that the prevalence of non-programmatic parties – the pervasiveness of patron-client parties – is associated with worse public sector performance with respect to education, bureaucratic quality and corruption. This raises the question of whether countries that lack programmatic parties are also less likely to adopt institutional arrangements inside the bureaucracy that support better bureaucratic quality and lower corruption – in particular, transparent public sector financial management and meritocratic civil service recruitment.

Cruz and Keefer (2012) address this issue. They argue that politicians in political parties organized in the members’ collective interests are more likely to insist on management systems that allow them to supervise the public administration.<sup>9</sup> On the one hand, such parties are more likely to prefer policies (such as education, health and infrastructure) that are difficult to monitor without the assistance of adequate management systems (in contrast to policy goals of distributing patronage jobs that they can oversee by themselves). On the other hand, collectively-organized legislators and ruling party members can more effectively insist that the executive adopt such administrative reforms. Cruz and Keefer (2012) test this theory looking at independent evaluations of 511 public sector reform loans extended by the World Bank. They find that, among countries that accepted these

> 9 Kitschelt (2000, p. 852) also concludes that programmatic parties are more likely to require a “universalist legal codification of citizens’ entitlements and obligations”, which also demands a well-functioning public administration.