rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
> <sup>15</sup>

There are no independent measures of constituency-level voter attachment to parties in India.<sup>14</sup> Our measure is the degree to which parties have won repeated elections in a constituency, irrespective of which candidate they nominate to the party’s ticket. The best, though not the only explanation of why the same party persistently wins in a constituency, irrespective of the candidate they field, is that voters in the constituency are more strongly attached to the party compared to voters in other constituencies where the party is less successful. This is true regardless of the source of the attachment. It is also true regardless of whether voters are positively attached to the party or simply hostile to all of the party’s competitors.

One alternative explanation for party strongholds, other than voter attachment to the party, is that the successful party has chosen a popular candidate to nominate to the constituency ticket. If, in turn, the candidate’s popularity is built on ascriptive (e.g., religious, ethnic or caste) or other appeals that are unrelated to local public works provision, low MPLADS disbursements would be unrelated to party influence. However, we control for candidate dominance in the estimations below.

Disproportionate voter attachment to a single party gives rise to apparently noncompetitive elections – that is, party strongholds. However, elections may be noncompetitive for other reasons. It is possible, for example, that a party has enjoyed a string of favorable electoral shocks. This should not necessarily reduce political incentives to provide constituency service, though, since a positive shock in the current election does not affect the probability of such a shock in the next election. A string of favorable shocks is also

> 14 For example, in the party identification literature, voter attachment is identified by survey results indicating how close voters say they are to particular parties. Although such questions began to be asked in the 1990s through small sample national exit polls at election times, there is no survey-based data on voter attachment at the level of the 483 electoral constituencies we examine.
An important negative influence on satisfaction levels is unemployment, and unemployed individuals suffer in excess to the decrease in income resulting from job loss (for instance, Clark and Oswald, 1994; Oswald, 1997; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Di Tella _et al._ , 2001). Research also shows that inflation has substantial negative effects on well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; Di Tella _et al._ , 2001; Graham and Pettinato, 2001) as has crime (Powdthavee, 2005; Kingdon and Knight, 2007). Most studies have found that individuals with higher absolute income report higher life satisfaction at a point in time (Graham and Pettinato, 2002b; Frey and Stutzer, 2002a).

A large number of empirical findings indicate that framing income utility as an absolute concept does not adequately reflect reality. For time-series, for instance, Easterlin has described the so-called ‘Easterlin paradox’ by showing that the positive relationship between income and life satisfaction does not hold over time (Easterlin, 1974, 2001).<sup>2</sup> An explanation for this phenomenon could be that individuals adjust their aspirations with growing prosperity. Another likely reason is that income influences life satisfaction in a relative sense. The model estimated in Section 4 therefore includes relative income variables in addition to absolute income.

# 1.2 _Positional Concerns in Previous Research_

The idea that individuals derive utility from their position relative to a specific reference group goes back to Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949). In an empirical survey of 257 Harvard University faculty, students and staff, Solnick and Hemenway (1998) confirm relative concerns by showing that half of respondents preferred to have 50% less real income but high relative income. Frank (2005) argues that the significance of

> 2 In the United States per capita income over the period 1946 to 1991 more than doubled, but self-reported happiness stayed approximately constant. Similarly paradox results have been described for member countries of the European Union (Di Tella _et al._ , 2001), Switzerland, and Japan (Diener and Suh, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002b).

5
# **_Table 12: Saving account sign up rates_**

|Signing up for a savings account|Expressed interest in<br>signing up for a<br>savings account<br>(1)|Did not open an account<br>at the screening but<br>plans to follow up<br>(2)|Opened an account on<br>the day of the screening<br>(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|_Treatments_||||
|Movie + MFB|‐0.05*|‐0.09***|0.05***|
||(0.024)|(0.019)|(0.017)|
|_Gender disaggregated interaction_|_effects (female base)_|||
|Movie + MFB|‐0.07**|‐0.10***|0.03|
||(0.029)|(0.022)|(0.020)|
|_Gender disaggregated interaction_<br>|_effects (male interacti_<br>|_on)_<br>||
|Male|‐0.04|‐0.02|‐0.02|
||(0.040)|(0.030)|(0.027)|
|Male*(Movie + MFB)|0.09*|0.02|0.07**|
||(0.054)|(0.041)|(0.037)|
|p‐values for F‐tests: δ1+γ1≠0|0.73|0.02|0|
|Observations|607|607|607|
|_R‐squared_|0.08|0.09|0.10|
|_Controls_|YES|YES|YES|
|_Restricted Model_|YES|YES|YES|
|_Control Mean:_|0.128|0.108|0.0203|

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

*Note that in this table the treatment being considered is Movie/MFB and the relevant comparison (control) is the MFB only group.

36
15

# Table ls THE ALLOCATION FUNCTION FOR KOREAN LEATHER FOOTWEAR EXPORTS

||Leather F|ootwear|
|---|---|---|
|p|1.311|(0.756)|
|7R|-0.0013|(0.0009)|
|7U|0.0024|(0.0010)|
|_6R1_|0.074|(0.022)|
|5u1|-0.076|(0.021)|
|_6R3_|0.060|(0.019)|
|6U3|-0.063|(0.018)|
|6R4|0.058|(0.019)|
|6U4|-0.060|(0.020)|
||0.401|(0.102)|
|r|0.137||
|R<sup>2 </sup>Row|0.80||
|USA|0.88||
|EC-unconstrained|0.75||
|Long-run|||
|elasticity of<br>transformation|2.19||

Subscripts R refer to the "rest of the world" and U to the USA. r is first-stage estimate of the autocorrelation parameter. Standard errors in parentheses.
In interviews with the World Bank, major commercial banks confirmed their business focus on clients of income strata 3 and above. While Colombia’s largest bank BanColombia has recently initiated a microcredit program which specifically caters towards low income entrepreneurs, this will remain a small proportion of the bank’s overall business. Banks that traditionally serve lower end clients from income strata 1-3, such as _Banco Caja Social_ and Megabanco, are the minority among Colombian banks. In fact, the five banks which have been identified as serving the lower income market<sup>37</sup> only account for 18% of financial system assets at the end of 2003.

**Figure 2. 4  Distribution of bank branches by income strata**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 4.50-5.00 2<br>4.00-4.50<br>6<br>3.50-4.00 14<br>3.00-3.50 5<br>- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15<br># of entities in each income strata<br>(*) Avg. income strata of banks is an average of the number of branches that each banking<br>institution has, w eighted by the income level strata of the neighborhood w here each brank is<br>located<br>Avg strata of banks (*)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Medina and Steiner (2002), based on Superintendencia Bancaria data_

**Figure 2. 5  Distribution of bank branches by income strata relative to population distribution**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 50%<br>48.4%<br>45% 47.5%<br>40%<br>35%<br>30%<br>25% 22.1%<br>19.7%<br>20% 17.5%<br>15% 11.7% 10.6%<br>8.9%<br>10% 6.7%<br>5% 0.9%3.4% 2.8%<br>0%<br>1 2 3 4 5 6<br>Population distribution per income strata<br>Distribution of bank branches per neighborhood income strata<br>Distribution of population per income strata<br>Population %<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Medina and Steiner (2002), based on Superintendencia Bancaria data_ 24. **Credit cooperatives have a higher presence in lower income areas than banks** . A separate analysis by Medina and Núñez<sup>38</sup> about bank representation in Bogotá compares branch presence of banks with financial credit cooperatives. The analysis shows that bank branches are concentrated in higher income areas. Medina’s analysis statistically 37 Includes Banco Popular, Banco Agrario, Banco Caja Social, Banco Colmena and Megabanco. 38Medina and Núñez, 2001.

42
attitudes are willing to sacrifice own life for their beliefs compared to just 30% for category 4, 1719% for categories 2-3, and only 12% for category 1.

**Figure 2: Distribution of responses to the radicalization question (Q1)**

(% of all respondents in pooled sample) <!-- Start of picture text --> 73.5<br>10.2<br>7.1<br>5.6<br>3.5<br>Cannot be justified at al l Mildly not justified Indifferent<br>Mildly justifiable Completely justifiable<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: The number of observations included is 144,200.

Contrary to common perceptions, extremely radicalized people and those who mildly support attacks on civilians (categories 4 and 5) tend to be less religious than other categories of respondents (categories 1-3). Almost three-quarters of all respondents say that religion is important in their daily life, but among the most radicalized respondents of our sample, less than a fifth think that religion is important in their daily life (Figure 8).<sup>8</sup>

> 8 The Gallup World Poll does not have sufficient information to allow us to identify the religious affiliation of respondents.

10
|Investment|Yes|10|29%|
|---|---|---|---|
|SPS|Yes|9|26%|
|Social matters|Yes|9|26%|
|Data protection|Yes|8|23%|
|Environmental laws<br>|Yes|5|14%|
|Labor market regulations|Yes|5|14%|
|Approximation of legislation|Yes|5|14%|
|Financial assistance|Yes|5|14%|
|Cultural cooperation|Yes|4|11%|
|Illegal immigration|Yes|4|11%|
|Audiovisual|Yes|3|9%|
|Energy|Yes|3|9%|
|Health|Yes|3|9%|
|Visa and asylum|Yes|3|9%|
|Consumer protection|Yes|2|6%|
|Economic policy dialogue|Yes|2|6%|
|Education and training|Yes|2|6%|
|Industrial cooperation|Yes|2|6%|
|Research and technology|Yes|2|6%|
|Statistics|Yes|2|6%|
|Terrorism|Yes|2|6%|
|Anticorruption|Yes|1|3%|
|Agriculture|Yes|1|3%|
|Mining|Yes|1|3%|
|Regional cooperation|Yes|1|3%|
|SME|Yes|1|3%|
|Taxation|Yes|1|3%|
|TRIMS|Yes|0|0%|
|Nuclear safety|Yes|0|0%|
|Civil protection|No|2|6%|
|Public administration|No|2|6%|
|Illicit drugs|No|1|3%|
|Information society|No|1|3%|
|Money laundering|No|1|3%|
|Political dialogue|No|1|3%|
|Innovation policies|No|0|0%|
|Human rights|No|0|0%|

# b. Trade relations

To illustrate the UK‐EU trade relations, we use the information available in the World Input‐Output Database (WIOD). There are two important advantages in using this data set: i) it covers trade in services at the bilateral level, and ii) it allows the decomposition of gross exports in value added terms. The main limitation of the data set is that it provides data for a restricted number of countries, 40 plus an aggregate for the rest of the world, limited to the 1995‐2011 period.

8
Policy implications. The ...ndings presented here have policy implications for both source countries in the South and host countries in the North.

Developing countries experiencing rapid population growth have typically looked at migration as one of the means of reducing population pressure and thus of reducing any social, economic and political problems associated with it. This paper has shown that South-North migration can also lead to a reduction in fertility rates, and thus to a more permanent reduction in population pressure in the South, by serving as a channel for the transfer of low-fertility norms and by raising the incentive to acquire education.

We can infer from this that an inter-temporal substitution (or tradeo¤) between present and future migration exists, with an increase in current immigration resulting in a decrease in future population pressure in the South and thus in a decrease in future immigration pressure in the North. Developed host countries would bene...t by taking the inter-temporal substitution in migration into account in the design of their immigration policy. Doing so should result in a more relaxed immigration policy.

Second, developing emigration countries could achieve a greater reduction in population pressure by ...nding ways of directing emigrants towards the OECD countries with the lowest fertility rates. This endeavor should be made easier by the fact that such countries would be likely to be more open to immigration than countries with higher fertility rates.

# 5 Conclusion

Though numerous studies have examined the impact of migration on the fertility of migrants and their household, this paper is the ...rst one to provide a systematic analysis of the impact of migration on fertility in migrants’home countries. Its main objective was to identify migration’s impact on the transfer of destination countries’ norms to migrants’home countries and hence its impact on home countries’fertility rates.

The paper ...rst provided a theoretical analysis of the various channels through which international migration might impact fertility in migrants’home country. The model shows that migration raises adults’incentive to invest in their and their children’s education and thus reduces fertility, that it raises remittance levels and that these have an ambiguous impact on fertility, and that the transfer of norms from low(high-) fertility destination countries reduces (raises) fertility in migrants’countries of origin.

The model’s predictions are supported by the empirical results. Regarding the transfer of norms, we found that a one percent decrease in the fertility norm to which migrants are exposed reduces home country fertility by about 0.3 percent for developing countries as well as for all countries. Thus, migration from high-fertility home countries to low-fertility destination countries reduces fertility in the former ones.

33
# **2. Assessing Bureaucratic Complexity in Citizen-Government**

# **Interactions**

## **2.1. Aim and Scope**

Over the course of a lifetime, citizens interact with their governments to execute civic duties, to exert their rights, and to access basic services such as public goods. Just as governments have a key role to play in protecting citizens’ rights, they must also offer citizens the proper conditions to exercise their civic duties and responsibilities or to enable access to basic goods and services that they provide or guarantee. The experiences of citizens across the globe vary widely in terms of the ease of interaction with their government bureaucracies. These differences may play an important role in understanding the causes of poverty and inequality.

_Living Life_ assesses the regulatory framework and compliance burden for key citizen-government interactions, which can be grouped into civil registration and duties and access to basic services. Civil registration and duties include: registering a birth, registering a death, obtaining an identification document (ID), voting, and paying taxes. Basic services are those mentioned in the 2004 _World Development Report_ (WDR) as having the largest impact on human development and include health, education, water, sanitation, and electricity (World Bank 2003).

The _Living Life_ areas of study are designed to describe not only the relevant regulatory frameworks, but also the quality of interactions in terms of steps, time, and costs associated with a typical process for exercising rights or accessing services. In this study, procedures for exercising rights and accessing services are compared to recognized best practices, where available.

The study’s focus is to understand the bureaucratic complexity that exists in interactions between citizens, their governments, and their agencies, rather than to assess the quality of service delivery and outputs. For some areas, the study includes an aspect of accountability by collecting information on available redress mechanisms in cases of bureaucratic errors.

_Living Life_ attempts to fill the knowledge gap on interactions between citizens and governments. The pilot stage of the project has produced and tested a data collection methodology that could eventually be refined and scaled to a larger number of countries. Refining the methodology and expanding the data collection coverage can lead to the creation of a relevant set of indicators, can generate a global public database on bureaucratic quality, and can foster policy dialogue around key areas of public service provision.

## **2.2. Existing Evidence and Knowledge Gaps**

### **2.2.1. Literature on bureaucracy, regulations, and individual outcomes**

Citizen interactions with governments are regulated and managed by administrative bodies or bureaucracies, whose role in distributing government resources and administering policy can have a relevant impact on inequality. Low institutional or bureaucratic quality is often associated with higher inequality (Chong and Calderon 2000). Although very limited evidence exists, some studies have found that “bureaucracy is prone 3 | P a g e
**Table 5: Changes in National Populations Living Outside the Home Region, 2007-2050**

||**Lib**<br>|**eral**<br>Change in|**Fore**<br>|**casts**<br>Change in|**Addition**<br>**Endogenou**<br>|**al Effect of**<br>**s Migration**<br>Change in|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Change in<br>Number of<br>Expatriates<br>(millions)|<br>share of<br>Expatriates<br>in Total<br>Nationals (%)|Change in<br>Number of<br>Expatriates<br>(millions)|<br>share of<br>Expatriates<br>in Total<br>Nationals (%)|Change in<br>Number of<br>Expatriates<br>(millions)|<br>Share of<br>Expatriates in<br>Total<br>Nationals (%)|
||I|II|III|IV|V|VI|
|**China**|2.93|0.21|1.17|0.06|1.77|0.15|
|**Hong Kong**|||||||
|**SAR, China**|0.11|6.51|0.09|7.28|0.02|-0.77|
|**Indonesia**|0.59|-0.09|0.64|0.09|-0.05|-0.18|
|**Japan**|0.12|0.60|0.09|0.64|0.02|-0.05|
|**Malaysia**|0.19|-2.13|0.10|-2.36|0.09|0.23|
|**Philippines**|0.49|-1.57|0.51|-1.19|-0.02|-0.37|
|**Rest E. Asia**|0.19|-0.21|0.09|-0.56|0.11|0.35|
|**Rest S.E. Asia**|4.36|1.53|0.20|-0.27|4.16|1.80|
|**Singapore**|0.06|2.13|0.03|0.53|0.04|1.60|
|**South Korea**|0.14|0.05|0.12|0.06|0.02|-0.01|
|**Taiwan, China**|0.06|0.23|0.05|0.35|0.01|-0.12|
|**Thailand**|0.07|0.02|0.15|0.35|-0.08|-0.33|
|**Vietnam**|0.27|-0.64|0.26|-0.61|0.01|-0.03|

Source: Authors’ results

# **4.3 The Macroeconomic Impact of the Liberalization of Migration**

Table 6 shows the impact on GDP decomposed into changes in capital, skilled and unskilled permanent residents and migrants, and technological change. The changes in real GDP depend on these changes in the workforce caused by the migration and on these changes and the importance of each of these in real GDP (shown by the initial shares). The results are also divided into forecasted changes in natural population growth and migration; and endogenous migration due to more liberal migration policies. Overall real GDP rises over the period due to forecasted changes in the labor force, increased capital accumulation and technological changes. Only Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; Singapore; and Taiwan, China experience declining skilled and/or unskilled forecasted labor growth, which would have adversely affected the overall positive growth in real GDP. The decline in technological change in Singapore stems from the 30
indicators for question 19 (on procurement) and its four sub-components.<sup>26</sup> The first two columns of Table 6 show, for bidding (column 6.1) and kickbacks (column 6.2), only the coefficient and standard error for the relevant PEFA indicator. None of the ten coefficients are significant: the largest test statistic is -1.64 and they are below 1 in every other case.

Second, we replicate the KICKBACK regressions from Table 2, including the question 19 procurement indicators, but substitute two broader outcomes for kickbacks. Column 6.3 reports results with the “time tax” – a measure of the regulatory burden - as the dependent variable: the percentage of top managers’ time spent dealing with government regulations, including taxes, customs, licenses, etc.<sup>27</sup> Of the five procurement indicators, only COMPLAINT is significant. In contrast, three of them were significant (including OVERALL at the .10 level) in Table 2 with kickbacks as the dependent variable. Column 6.4 reports results with the “bribe tax” as the dependent variable: total “gifts” or “informal payments” needed “to get things done” with regard to licensing, taxes, etc., as a percentage of firm revenues.<sup>28</sup> Of the five procurement indicators, again only one (METHODS) is significant.

To summarize, better procurement policies tend to predict more favorable procurement outcomes (more bidding, fewer and smaller kickbacks), but they do not predict other “good governance” outcomes very well. Nor do better PFM practices in other areas such as payroll controls predict more favorable procurement outcomes. Our findings thus appear to be reflecting particular relationships about procurement practices and outcomes, and not merely distinguishing well-governed from poorly-governed countries more broadly. Consistent with this interpretation, our main results are also robust to controlling for country-level measures of “good governance,” such as the Freedom House indexes of political freedoms and civil liberties.

# **9. Conclusion**

> 26 The procurement and payroll controls questions are grouped with several others in the PEFA questionnaire under the heading “predictability and control in budget execution.”  Of all the PEFA questions, payroll controls is conceptually the most closely related to procurement, as it measures the performance of systems for implementing and monitoring another, even larger, expenditure category: salaries of public employees.  As with procurement, deficiencies in payroll systems can result in corruption, in this case in the form of “ghost workers.”

> 27 The mean value in our sample is 10.7%. The manual for survey enumerators (World Bank, 2011) states that responses to this question “should not include time spent negotiating procurement contracts with the government – only time dealing with red tape and bureaucracy” associated with regulations, inspections, etc.

> 28 The mean value in our sample is 0.27%.  It is not possible to subtract kickbacks from this amount, because there is no measure of the volume of sales to government.

27