gate impact or not is still unclear. It could be that, for instance, that the largest firms, accounting for the bulk of trade, are not much affected by trade policy; in that case aggregate pass-through would be unaffected. As a first step, in Section C.18 of the online appendix we show that, at the firm-level, the effect of trade policy is stronger for large firms in the case of NTMs, and similar across in the case of Table 9: NTMs, tariffs and pricing-to-market: Product-level results

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dep. var.||||ln unit|values||||
|ln RER|0.108<sup>_a_</sup>|0.051<sup>_a_</sup>|0.121<sup>_a_</sup>|0.050<sup>_a_</sup>|0.109<sup>_a_</sup>|0.019|0.126<sup>_a_</sup>|0.037<sup>_c_</sup>|
||(0.009)|(0.016)|(0.011)|(0.018)|(0.010)|(0.018)|(0.012)|(0.020)|
|_×_ NTM AVE||0.096<sup>_b_</sup>||0.097<sup>_b_</sup>||0.116<sup>_a_</sup>||0.125<sup>_a_</sup>|
|||(0.039)||(0.039)||(0.045)||(0.045)|
|_×_ ln(tarif +1)|||-0.235<sup>_a_</sup>|0.015|||-0.340<sup>_a_</sup>|-0.341<sup>_b_</sup>|
||||(0.075)|(0.137)|||(0.079)|(0.155)|
|ln(dest. GDP/cap)|-0.051<sup>_a_</sup>|0.017|-0.048<sup>_a_</sup>|0.017|-0.010|0.028|0.005|0.033|
||(0.017)|(0.038)|(0.017)|(0.038)|(0.018)|(0.042)|(0.019)|(0.042)|
|Observations|1484792|429382|1395738|427557|1395264|367012|1310037|365205|
|Adj. R<sup>2</sup>|0.738|0.717|0.732|0.716|0.761|0.750|0.756|0.750|
|Orig._×_product_×_dest. FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Origin_×_year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|No|No|No|
|Origin_×_product_×_year FE|No|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

> _c_ significant at 10 percent; _b_ significant at 5 percent; _a_ significant at 1 percent. Unit values computed from BACI at the exporter-importer-HS6 product-year level. Standard errors clustered by product-origin-destination-year are in parentheses. ln RER is the real exchange rate of the destination country vis-a-vis the USD.

In this section we test whether our results on the effect of trade policy on market power obtained at the firm-level hold at a more aggregate level. To do so, we perform two additional exercises. We start by replicating our analysis using BACI data at the HS 6-digit product-country pair level. The results are reported in Table 9 below. At the product-level, we still find that NTMs magnify pricing-to-market while tariffs reduce it. Although the magnitude of the effects is lower than what we found at the firm level, it is still economically meaningful. The coefficient in column (1) suggest that moving from zero to a 10 percent ad valorem equivalent NTM raises the price elasticity to exchange rate from 5 percent to 6 percent, i.e. by 20 percent (against one third in Table 4). For tariffs, moving from a zero to a 5 percent tariff, would reduce the price elasticity to exchange rate by 10 percent (against 50 percent in Table 5) from 1.2 percent to 1.1 percent. Online appendix Section C.19 shows that these results are not specific to our sample of origin countries: we expand the database for all countries for which tariffs / NTMs are available, i.e. a total of 169 exporters serving 146 destinations (43 in NTM estimations). Despite the very different composition of the sample on the exporter side, the results are similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively (Table A.37).

We next examine the link between trade policy and market power at an even more aggregate level and regress country-level export and import pass-through coefficients on weighted measures of NTMs and tariffs, where the weights are defined according to beginning-of-the-period shares of each country-product in total exports or imports. The aggregate pass-through coefficients come 26