rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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31

## 2. MAIAYSIA: DIESEL AND KEROSENE PRICE INCREASES **1954485**

# Entroduction

Malysia coons oft mainn pennula and the stats of Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Boneo. The country, siuated in South-East Asia, has an equatorial climate and covers a total area of 329,293 square kilometers. Et has a total population of 17.9 million and GNP per capita of USS 2320, placing it amongst the middle-income countries in the region.<sup>2</sup> 1

# The Economy

Malaysia is one of the faste growing economies with annual growth rates of per-capiincome during the last decade averging over _5.2_ percent per year. During the 1960s it was a traditional primarycommodity supplier of rubber, tin, timber and palm oil and since the mid-1970s it has developed into a diversified, net oil-exporting country. The average annual growth rate of GDP was 5 percent during the 1960s, when rubber and tin sectors contributed 40 percent of the GDP, accounting for 80 percent of the export eamings and absobi 35 percent oft e work force. Ever since mdependence in 1957, the five-year economic develop=mt plms bave emphasid diversif and of agricuft and miineral secon and dave1opment of heexport-oriented asector, especially resource-based industries. The results of this stategy have been quite encouragin& During the 1970s economic growth aveaged a record high of 7.2 percent per year. Major changes during this period were a fail in te share of t. agrculue sectorfrom 32 prcent in 1970 to 25 percent of GDP in 1979, expansion im the ufng sector from 12 percent in 1970 to 19 percent in 1979, and an increase in the importance of the oil sector share in export earings from 4 percent in 1970 to nearly 16 percent in 1979. Ihese achievemens were a result of active govement policy and te commodity boom, both for oil and other primary c outl in the<sup>1</sup> optimistic development plans of the government for the 19B0s. Basic to these expectations was the assumpton of a continued upward trend in comnmodity pnces. MaLysian economic perfonnance during the 1980s has been determined by periods of shock and adjustnent Two importan shocks began ihe decade. An extemr shock arose from the general decline in wodd trade and a recession **in** ihe OECD, which also resulted in a deteriorafion in the extetna terms uf trade An internal shock arose from the Malaysian governmenrts attempt, dunng 1980-84, to counter the

> 21 Do fir 199.
rate for offshores was raised to 10%, while the rate for onshore firms was reduced to 25%. Importantly, all other institutional features that benefited export-oriented firms remained unaffected.

We employ a differences-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the CIT rate increase on firms by comparing outcomes of interest for offshores versus onshore firms before and after the shock. The comparison is based on the universe of registered Tunisian firms, for which we collect administrative data from registries, social security, customs and tax records, to estimate the causal impact of the CIT reform on economic activity.

The key identifying assumption is that trends in the offshore and onshore sectors would have been similar absent the reform. We provide evidence in favor of that assumption, showing that onshore and offshore sectors often had very similar pre-reform trends, and also by documenting that our results are robust to a wide battery of aggregate and firm-level tests. These include robustness checks based on alternative samples which maximize the comparability of treated and untreated firms, as well as on a propensityscore matching estimator re-weighting firms on their observable characteristics. The results are also robust to controlling for possible shocks which could have differential impacts on offshore and onshore firms, including EU import demand, exchange rate and domestic demand.

The results at the extensive margin show that the number of firms in both the offshore and onshore sectors were growing significantly in the four years before the reform.<sup>2</sup> However, these trends diverged starkly in 2014, the first year of the reform. We estimate that relative to the counterfactual growth proxied by onshore firms, the number of offshore firms dropped by 20% four years after the reform. This effect is almost completely driven by a reduction in entry of new offshore firms after the change in policy, not by an increase of exit among incumbents.

The stark relative decrease in the number of offshore firms did not translate into a relative decrease in economic activity in the offshore sector. The differences-in-differences

> 2This growth in entrants was not associated with an equally robust growth in overall economic activity, which instead was sluggish in line with the macroeconomic performance of the Tunisian economy in those years.

3
we evaluate one such interviewing technique which is known as Audio Computer Assisted SelfInterviewing (ACASI). In ACASI, respondents listen to pre-recorded questions via headphones and respond using a touchscreen (in this case, a tablet).<sup>4</sup> The enumerator has no interaction with the respondent during this part of the survey, other than to explain the module at the beginning, and to be available in case the respondent seeks clarification.<sup>5</sup> The intent of ACASI is that it will destigmatize IPV reporting, which is expected to lead to an increase in reporting. However, there are two other factors which may muddy the waters (especially when benchmarked against a professionally-administered survey with a trained enumerator). One, self-interviewing lacks any human element, and it is conceivable that respondents may actually be more likely to report sensitive behaviors to a human interviewer since the respondent may perceive the enumerator to be empathetic or build a rapport with her over the course of the survey.<sup>6</sup> If this channel is present, ACASI will actually understate IPV.

A second factor, which is the focus of our paper, is that self-interviewing requires the respondent to understand the questions on her own, and to use the tablet, which may not be easy. This is an especially salient concern in the case of IPV as the standard set of questions for measuring IPV has fairly complex and nuanced language, and therefore it may not be straightforward to grasp without the surveyor helping with interpretation. In almost every setting, misunderstanding will tend to cause IPV to be _over_ -reported. This is because IPV is measured through a module containing 20 questions which are later indexed into 4 main categories (controlling behavior, emotional violence, physical violence, and sexual violence). Typically, the mean of each of these individual yes/no questions is well under 0.5, so a woman who does not understand the module and randomly answers yes or no will tend to bias the level of reported IPV on any given question upwards. This problem will be exacerbated in the indexing (which is set equal to 1 if the respondent reported any form of IPV).

To shed light on these various channels, we conduct a measurement experiment within surveys

> 4Another reason to recommend ACASI is that it is virtually impossible for the interview to be overheard by anyone in close vicinity. However, this is not relevant in our experiment (or in any survey which uses best practice face-to-face interviewing), since the survey is always conducted privately.

> 5In our survey protocol, the respondent could pause the module to ask questions, and the enumerator could help her to resume from where she left off.

> 6Indeed, Ellsberg et al. (2001) compile anecdotes from debriefings of IPV survey enumerators in Nicaragua recounting how they were moved or distressed by the respondents’ IPV experiences, and some even reported that respondents sought their counsel during or at the end of the IPV module.

2
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46. Over time, debt managers will have to rebalance the relative weights of financial cost vs. longer maturities, and accept the higher cost of issuing longer maturities to reduce roll-over risk. In taking steps to lengthen duration and reduce the indexation of debt to foreign currency, the authorities will face some difficult choices. As progress continues on fiscal consolidation and debt ratios fall, it should be possible to replace indexed debt with fixed-rate, domestic currency debt with equal or longer maturities. This should be done in a way that would not significantly erode the average life of outstanding debt. The authorities’ ability to issue such debt will be limited by the degree of market acceptance of longer maturity fixed-rate debt and the steepness of the yield curve, which in part is caused by a lack of liquidity in longer-term fixed rate issues owing to the lack of issuance of these securities over the past few years. Models such as those developed by Missale and Giavazzi (2003) are useful for debt managers to quantify these tradeoffs .

**Table 3 Exposure of Brazilian Public Debt to Exchange Rate Risk  2000- 2003**

||Treasury Dollar<br>linked debt<br>(R $ bi.)<br>(1)|Central bank<br>swaps<br>(R $ bi.)<br>(2)|Total exchange<br>rate exposure<br>(R $ bi.)<br>(3)|Percentage of<br>domestic debt<br>(in %)<br>(4)|Exchange rate<br>(Reais/US$)<br>(5)|Total exposure<br>in dollar terms<br>(US$ bi)<br>(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|December 00|114|-|114|22|2.0|58|
|December 01|179|-|179|29|2.3|77|
|March 02|179|-|179|29|2.3|77|
|May2002|179|14|193|30|2.5|77|
|September 02|191|77|268|41|3.9|69|
|December 02|139|91|230|37|3.5|65|
|November 03|82|92|174|24|3.0|59|

(1), (2), (3) , (4) Source; Relatorios da Divida Publica (5) Average exchange rate for the month (6)=(3)/(5)

# **III. FISCAL RULES: POLICY ELIMINATED AS SOURCE OF INSTABILITY**

47. The Brazilian experience of 2001-2003 shows that the coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is necessary to stabilize the economy. When monetary policy is not able to react to a given shock, then fiscal policy has to be more responsive. There may be circumstances when fiscal events, or expectations of them, are determinants of price changes or of interest rates, and these expectations might not be consistent with the central bank’s objectives. Functional independence of the central bank, meaning its ability to guarantee that its actions will influence inflation expectations and keep them within certain bounds to meet an inflation target, can only exist if fiscal expectations are not inconsistent with price stability. Hence, functional independence of the central bank is a necessary complement of legislative independence which isolates monetary policy form political interference.

48. Fiscal policy could contribute to growth and mitigate debt sustainability concerns through at least three channels: First, by choosing a particular composition of public expenditures, the government implicitly may determine a specific growth pattern that affects its debt servicing capacity. For instance, Brazil has a composition and level of 21
Table 1. Contribution Rates per social insurance

|Insurance|Contribution Rate<br>(former)|Contribution Rate<br>(2015)|Difference (%)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Pensions|9.44%|5.76%|-3.68%|
|Health|5.71%|9.94%|4.23%|
|Labor risks|0.55%|0.20%|-0.35%|
|Total|15.70%|15.90%|0.20%|

Source: ILO (2018) The contribution rate aimed at financing the health insurance was increased by 4.23 percentage points, where 3.68 points came from the pension insurance tax rate, and 0.35 from the labor risk insurance. This measure was set temporarily, and it provided for a gradual increase in contribution tax rates into the pension system up to 10.36% by 2021. Simultaneously, the health insurance contribution rate would be gradually reduced until reaching 5.16% in that same year. The purpose of this rate adjustment was to overcome the financial deficits in the short term shown in health insurance.

In this way, the system is composed of five programs, three of which are strictly contributory in essence (the Compulsory General Insurance for formal workers and pensions for armed forces and police officers), a fourth program that is partly contributory (Farmer Social Insurance) and a fifth noncontributory program BDH (Human Development Bonus). While ISSFA and ISSPOL provide benefits similar to those of the Compulsory General Insurance, Farmer Social Insurance benefits are remarkably lower since they are formed by a minimum contribution made by rural workers and a statesubsidized and other formal workers-provided component (Rofman, 2008).

At present, the Disability, Old Age and Death Insurance, as part of the Compulsory General Insurance, provides retirement benefits for disability, transitory subsidy for disability, ordinary retirement for old age, pension for funeral assistance. Beneficiary eligibility is determined by a combination of age and contribution years. Regardless of gender, workers may retire at any age if a total of 40 years of contribution are achieved, at the age of 60 years with contributions made for 30 years, workers aged 65 who have contributed for less than 15 years or workers aged 70 having at least 10 years of contributions.

For its part, the pension amount is calculated as an average percentage of monthly wages during the top five years, based on the number of contribution years: 50% for those who have made 10 years of 6
- 5 -

From the institutional side, increasing attention has been paid to the notion that trade integration into global markets offers the potential for rapid agricultural growth and poverty reduction (IMF and World Bank, 2002). Various trade preferences have been granted to developing countries, despite the lack of theory linking trade preferences to productivity improvement. An implicit expectation shared by the international donor community is that beneficiary countries could improve their efficiency and competitiveness during the preference period. But, trade preferences alone may not warrant beneficiaries’ sustainable growth.

The potential benefits of the preferential access to industrial economies would be sizable, if such preferences are well designed. It could stimulate exportation and domestic employment and encourage economic diversification. The benefits may have outweighed official development assistance (ODA) particularly in recent years. While the imports of industrial economies from developing countries have doubled over the last decade, the total amount of ODA has increased more modestly (Figure 2).<sup>7</sup> Figure 2. Official Development Assistance and Exports to Developed Countries, 1985–2004 (In billions of U.S. dollars) <!-- Start of picture text --> 2,000 200<br>1,500 150<br>Total exports of developing<br>to industrial countries<br>(left scale)<br>1,000 100<br>500 50<br>Official development assistance<br>to developing countries<br>(right scale)<br>0 0<br>1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003<br>Sources: World Development Indicators ; IMF Direction of Trade .<br><!-- End of picture text --> Nonetheless, it cannot be overemphasized that proliferation of trade preferences poses risks that developing countries might continue to be passively involved into the world trade system.
Blimpo, M. P., S. D. McRae, and J. Steinbuks. (2018). “Why are Connection Charges So High? An Analysis of the Electricity Sector in Sub‐Saharan Africa”. _World Bank Policy Research Working Paper_ No. 8407.

Chaplin, D., Mamun, A., Protik, A., Schurrer, J., Vohra, D., Bos, K., Burak, H., Meyer, L., Dumitrescu, A., Ksoll, C. and Cook, T. (2017). “Grid Electricity Expansion in Tanzania by MCC: Findings from a Rigorous Impact Evaluation.” Report submitted to the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research.

EWSA (2012). “Rwanda Electricity Access Roll Out Program. Mid‐term review”. Final report.

GOGLA and A.T. Kearney (2014). “Investment and Finance Study for Off‐Grid Lighting.” Global Off‐Grid Lighting Association, A.T. Kearney. Available at [http://global‐off‐grid‐lighting‐association.org/wp‐content/uploads/2013/09/A‐T‐ Kearney‐GOGLA.pdf].

Foster, V., and J. Steinbuks (2009). “Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies: In‐House Generation of Electricity by Firms in Africa”. _The World Bank Policy Research Paper_ No. 4913.

Gertler, P.J., O. Shelef, C. D. Wolfram, and A. Fuchs. (2016). ʺThe Demand for Energy‐Using Assets among the Worldʹs Rising Middle Classes.ʺ _American Economic Review_ , 106(6), 1366‐1401.

Gollin, D., & Rogerson, R. (2014). “Productivity, Transport Costs and Subsistence Agriculture.” Journal of Development Economics, 107, 38‐48.

Grimm, M., L. Lenz, J. Peters and M. Sievert (2018). ʺDemand for off‐grid solar electricity: Experimental evidence from Rwanda,ʺ _Ruhr Economic Papers 745_ , RWI ‐ Leibniz‐Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr‐University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg‐Essen.

28
income country.<sup>10</sup> Bangladesh has 55 loan and 229 deposit accounts per 1,000 people and the average loan-income (deposit-income) ratio is 5.2 (1.6).<sup>11</sup> While these indicators are only for the formal banking sector, limited data available for the microfinance sector suggest that access to and use of formal financial services is higher than in many comparable countries. Honohan (2004) shows that Bangladesh is the country with the highest microfinance penetration (borrowing clients constitute 13.1% of total population) in the world, twice that of Indonesia, the country with the second highest penetration rate (6.7%).<sup>12</sup> Other segments of the financial system are significantly less developed than the banking system. There is a small but growing non-bank financial sector comprising leasing and finance companies. The indicators of the size and activity of the stock market show the picture of a small, inactive and stagnant market. Bangladesh’s stock market capitalization relative to economic activity is miniscule as is trading on the exchange, which makes the turnover ratio – trading relative to capitalization – also lower than in any comparator country. The shares of financial institutions – mandated by law to list – dominate the Dhaka stock exchange<sup>13</sup> ; in November 2005, they constituted 56% of market capitalization and 62% of trading. There were only two Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of non-financial companies in 2005 and none in 2004. There are few incentives to go public and the share of stocks of a typical company traded freely is very small (Sobhan and Werner, 2003). The insurance sector is small and inefficient – life and non-life insurance penetration (premiums relative to GDP) are at 0.37% and 0.20%, respectively, below the average for both low-income and the South Asian country average (Table 4). Further,

> 10 Note that deposit and loan accounts per capita and deposit/loan-income ratio are not available for the other comparator countries in Figure 5.

> 11 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria also predict the share of households with bank accounts from their branch and deposit data. According to this prediction, around 17% of the Bangladeshi population has access to a bank account, compared to 16% in Pakistan and 37% in Malaysia.

> 12 Note that these data are an estimate as they are based on data from individual MFI; there could be a downward bias if not all MFIs in a country report and an upward bias if borrowers are clients of several MFIs.

> 13 There is a second smaller stock exchange in Chittagong.

9
complement these papers by documenting the main extensive and intensive margins of transport consumption that matter for predicting the increase in carbon emissions in low- and middleincome countries and simulate changes in carbon footprints as well as within-country carbon inequality for 18 low- and middle-income countries.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents data sources. Section 3 presents a series of stylized facts between income and the margins of transport consumption. Section 4 presents findings on income as a main determinant of transport consumption. Section 5 presents the results of the simulations of rising incomes and changes in transport carbon footprint and inequality. Section 6 concludes.

# **2 Data**

This paper relies on times series of country-level data to provide stylized facts across countries as well as micro-level data from household surveys to provide in depth analysis of the determinants of transport demand (Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of data sources and main uses

|**Source**|**Coverage**|**Aggregation**|**Main use**|
|---|---|---|---|
||Household|surveydata||
|Global<br>consumption<br>database|105 countries between<br>2000 and 2018|Averages at the quin-<br>tile/urban levels|Global stylized facts|
|LSMS|18 countries after 2010|Raw data - Household<br>level|Regressions for trans-<br>port expenditures and<br>vehicle ownership|
|World Bank SSAPOV|Sub-Saharan Africa|Countrylevel averages|Global stylized facts|
||Nation|al data||
|International Road Fed-<br>eration|Unbalanced panel for<br>194 countries|Country level|Global<br>stylized<br>facts<br>and Simulations|
|World Bank WDI GDP|Panel for all countries|Country level|Simulations|
|CEPII GDPprojections|Panel for all countries|Countrylevel|Simulations|

## **2.1 Household survey data**

We collect household information on transport expenditures and vehicle ownership from different sources.

**Global consumption database** The Global Consumption Database is a one-stop data source on household consumption patterns in developing countries, provided by the World Bank’s Development Data Group. It draws on a diverse set of household consumption or expenditure surveys covering various topics, including transport. This paper uses the most up-to-date harmonized cross-section consumption data covering 105 countries between 2000 and 2018. Data

7
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