rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text --> City Cost of water per cubic metre (US$)<br>House connections Public taps Water vendors<br>Bandung (Indonesia) 0.38 0.26 3.60<br>Bangkok (Thailand) 0.30 ~ 28.94<br>Chennai (India) 0.30 0.58 -<br>Chonburi (Thailand) 0.38 ~ 19.33<br>Colombo (Sri Lanka) 0.04 0.02 -<br>Dhaka (Bangladesh) — 0.08 0.84<br>Hanoi (Vietnam) 0.09 0.55 ~<br>Karachi (Pakistan) 0.10 — 1.14<br>Kathmandu (Nepal) 0.18 0.24 2.61<br>Lae (Papua New Guinea) 2.20 5.96 —<br>Malé (Maldives) 5.08 - 11.20<br>Manila (Philippines) 0.29 - 215<br>Mumbai (India) 0.07 0.07 0.50<br>Phnom Penh (Cambodia) 0.13 - 0.96<br>Port Vila (Vanuatu) 0.42 0.86 8.77<br>Seoul (South Korea) 0.25 14.13 2152<br>Shanghai (China) 0.08 0.06 -<br>Tashkent (Uzbekistan) 0.01 0.02 =<br>Thimphu (Bhutan) 0.03 0.05 -<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: UN-HABITAT (2003) Water and Sanitation in the World's Cities. Local Action for Global Goals. Earthscan, London, Table 2.8. Based on consumer surveys by Asian Development Bank, reported in McIntosh, A.C. and Yfiiguez, C.E. (1997) Second Water Utilities Data Book. Asian Development Bank, Manila.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Source Price/payment Shillings/ USS/m*<br>litre<br>Own connection Monthly lump sum, flat rate, based on: 0.27 0.34<br>Neighbour’s tap / water 20 shillings per 20-litre container 1.00 1.25<br>kiosk<br>Pushcart water vendor 70-200 shillings per 20-litre container 3.50—-10.00 4.38-12.50<br>Tanker truck (10,000 litres) 60—80,000 shillings per truckload 6.00-8.00 7.50—10.00<br>Sources: Kjellén, M. (2000a) Complementary water systems in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: The case of water<br><!-- End of picture text --> vending, Water Resources Development 16(1): 143-154; and Kjellen, M. (2000b) Uuzaji wa Maji katika Jiji la Dar es Salaam. Environment and Development Studies Unit (EDSU), Stockholm. Data source: Water Vendor Survey 1998/1999,
- 3 **-**

- Money market interest rates: certificates of deposit, offshore or euro-deposits (e.g., LIBOR-based), and Treasury bills.

Bonds and notes: Treasury securities.

- Currencies: yen, deutschemark, pound (against the dollar or crosses) Equity indices: S&P500, Nikkei 225, NYSE Composite.

Some of these financial futures contracts will be discussed at length below. Chapter II will present short-term interest rate futures, especially futures on international bank ("euro") deposits. Chapter III will present Treasury note and bond futures. Futures on currencies and equity indices will be treated in Chapters IV and V, respectively.

# B. Forward vs. futures contracts

Overview. Futures and forward contracts are similar in the sense that they both establish a price and a transaction to occur in the future. However, there are several significant differences stemming from the differences in cash flows alluded to earlier.

Cash flows and margining. As discussed above, in forward markets cash changes hands only on the forward date. The credit risk embedded in forward contracts depends on price movements spanning the duration of the forward contract. In futures markets, gains and losses are settled daily in the form of margin payments. This serves to reduce credit exposure to intraday price movements. The drawback of such frequent marking-to-market of futures contacts is the unpredictability of cash flows and the transactions costs involved with maintaining adequate margin accounts.

Tradabilitv. The relatively high potential credit exposure of forward contacts makes them less easily tradable since the value of the forward contract is dependent on the identity of the counterparty (the nature of the potential credit risk involved). In other words, forward contracts will trade on the basis of price _and_ credit characteristics of the counterparty. For this reason, forward contracts tend to be traded in _over-the-counter_ (OTC) markets, so that implicit credit charges can be factored into pricing in a discretionary- negotiated basis. In contrast, margin requirements on futures contracts make them sufficiently immune to credit risk so that credit exposure is not a significant factor in pricing. This makes futures contracts particularly wellsuited for trading in organized exchanges.

Pricing, and fees. An implication of these different trading schemes is that the prices of OTC forwards are often not publicly observed whereas the prices of exchange-traded futures are continuously disseminated. Commission fees on exchange-taded futures are explicit and are
# PokyUPnnlng, and Re3uch

# World Developmwnt Report

In many devnloping nations, tax administrators often make their own policy because they are unable to enforce the laws.

criminates against the most accessible target: the modem sector of the economy, which is crucial to growth and development.

Administrators face major problems: A large portion of the economy is at a subsistence level and does not keep records. Where records are kept, accounting is not reliable. Axpayer cooperation is also low for a variety of reasons: shortage of trained officials, a tradition of corruption, and because taxes are not often seen to produce better govemment services.

These problems induce governments to rely heavily on trade taxes. But this is costly. Export taxes tie revenue to unpredictable export commodity prices which aggravates fiscal stabilization problems. Import duties lead to excessive protection of inefficient domestic industry.

Acministrative problems also lead to the selecdve collection of income tax. This disGovernments should shift away from trade taxes to consumption taxes, such as sales tax, particularly of the valuc added variety. They should also move toward more broadly based income taxes (including interest and dividends - not just wages), with _realistic_ rates. Assessment based on "presumptive" rather than actual calculation methods can also help extend the tax base to the self-employed, to subsistence farners, to traders, and to smaller firms.

The single most effective way to improve tax administration is to use a system of income withholdings (for aU components of income). Another important tool is computerization. This can simplify withholding and collection by giving each taxpayer a number in a master file. Computers also facilitate information gathering, cross checking. and audits.

This is a background paper for the 1988 World Development Repor. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact the World Development Report office, room S13-060, extension 31393 (38 pages).

The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank'. Policy, Planning, and Research Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The ftndings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.

Produced at the PPR Dissemination Center
9 One striking facts concerning the maturity structure of financing is that there is a large number of firms that appear to be cut-off altogether from any access to long term debt. In the SC 1 sample, which is the one to be used to draw inferences about access given the more detailed figures on debt, 214 firms (29.3% of the total) never received long term financial credit, 311 firms (42.5% of the total) had long term debt during some years, while only 211 firms (28.2% of the total) always had long term debt (see Table 6, Part I). In the SC2 sample, which, because of the more aggregate nature of the debt variables is bound to present a rosier picture, 25 firms (2.9% of the total) never had long term liabilities, 538 firms (63.3%) had long term liabilities during some years, and 287 (33.8% of the total) had it during the whole period.

It is interesting to note that according to the SC1 sample, access to long term financing improves over time (see Table 6, Part II). In 1984, only 37% of firms had long term debt. This number increases to 59.2% in 1987 and decreases slightly to 58.9% in 1988. Unfortunately, we cannot track the question of access in the more recent years because the SC2 sample is less informative in this sense; If we split the SC1 sample by size, we can see that access to long term credit varies positively with size (see Table 7, Part I). Among the largest group of companies, 58% had long term debt in every year of the period. Conversely, only 11% of the micro firms and 17% of the small firms had similar access to long term financing. Half of the micro firms and 44% of the small firms never had long term debt, while only 1.9% of large firms never had long term debt. Similar conclusions concerning the correlation between access to long term debt and size are derived from sample SC2.
# Policy Research Working Paper Series

||Title|Author|Date|Contact<br>for paper|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|WPSI 102|Did the Debt Crisis or Declining<br>Oil<br>Prices Cause Mexico's Investment<br>Collaose?|Andrew M. Wamer<br>|February 1993|M. Divino<br>33739|
|WPS1 10|3 Capital Mobility in Developing<br>Countries:<br>Some Measurement<br>Issu<br>and Empirical Estimates|Peter J. Montiol<br>es|February 1993|R. Vo<br>31047|
|WPS**1**04|Trade Policy Reform in Latin Americ<br>and the Caribbean<br>In the 1980s|a Asad Alam<br>Sarath Rajapatirana|February 1993|J. Troncoso<br>37826|
|WPS**1**05|Estimating<br>Quasi-Fiscal<br>Deficits in<br>a Consistency<br>Framework:<br>The Case<br>of Madagascar|Philippe Le Houerou<br>Hector Sierra|February 1993|N. Velasco<br>34346|
|WPS**1**06|Improving<br>Women's Access to<br>Higher Education:<br>AReview of World<br>Bank Project Experience|Halil Dundar<br>Jennifer Haworth|February 1993|S. David<br>33752|
|WPS**1**07|Financial Reform Lessons and<br>Strategies|Gerard Caprib, Jr.<br>Izak Atiyas<br>James Hanson|February 1993|W. Pitayatonakarn<br>37664|
|WNPS1<br>108|Public Output and Private Decisions<br>Conceptual<br>Issues In the Evaluation<br>of Government<br>Activities and Their<br>Implications<br>for Fiscal Policy|: Thanos Catsambas<br>|February 1993|A. Correa<br>38549|
|WPS110|9 Risk Management<br>and Stable<br>Financial Structures|Andrew Sheng<br>Yoon Je Cho|March 1993|M. Raggambi<br>37664|
|WPS 111|0 What Would Happen I All Developin<br>Countries Expanded<br>Their Manufact<br>Exports?|g Will Martin<br>ured|March 1993|D. Gustafson<br>33714|
|WPS1 111|Foreign Investment<br>Law in Central<br>and Eastern Europe|Cheryl W. Gray<br>William Jarosz|March 1993|M. Berg<br>31450|
|WPS111|2 Privatization,<br>Concentration,<br>and<br>Pressure for Protection: A Steel<br>Sector Study|Ying Qian<br>Ronald C. Duncan|March 1993|S. Lipscomb<br>33718|
|WPS111|3 The Lucky Few Amidst Economic<br>Decline: Distributional<br>Change in<br>Cote d'lvoire As Seen Through Panel<br>Data Sets, 1985-88|Christiaan Grootaert<br>Ravi Kanbur|March 1993|E. Vitanov<br>38400|
|WPS**1**14<br> <br>|Does Price Uncertainty<br>Really<br>Reduce Private Investment?<br>A SmaUl<br>Model Applied to Chile|Anita George<br>Jacques Morisset|March 1993|D. Bievenour<br>37899|
33 TABLE 3 CAPITAL FLIGHT 1974-84 (S billion)

# Accumulated Value of Flight Capital up through 1984

Gross External Country Debt 1984 Argentina $468 Brazil 105.2 Chile 20.1 Korea, Rep. of 43.2 Mexico 96.4 Peru 13.1 Phillipines 24.6 Venezuela 36.2 Total Estimates of: Dooley Cuddington $31.0 $15.8 11.6 0.4 0.2 -2.0 9.0 42.8 38.8 3.0 1.3 4.8 1.4 28.0 13.7 69.3 Sources: World Debt Tables 1987-88; Dooley 1986; Cuddington 1986.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Shari’a influence on informal workouts<br>The prohibition on interest is one of the most well-known facets of Shari’a law as it<br>relates to finance. Interest issues are reported to inhibit workouts in UAE, Yemen,<br>Saudi, Oman, and in Qatar in relation to enforcement of claims, according to the<br>MENA Report . When a disputed amount involves what can be perceived to be<br>interest, if Shari’a is influential, the dispute can change from a straightforward<br>contractual dispute to one that is subject to interpretation. The influence of<br>Shari’a varies. In Saudi Arabia, shari’a compliant financing is widespread. Courts<br>enforce shari’a, which leads to effective rewriting of commercial contracts. This<br>undermines commercial certainty. The prohibition on interest can hamper typical<br>remedies during financial distress, such as when a loan term is extended in<br>exchange for higher interest—interest is not available as compensation in shari’a.<br>Conversely, in Egypt, shari’a compliant financing is not significant in the markets,<br>according to experts there.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **4. Institutions Implementing the Insolvency System**

## _4.1. Courts: Specialized courts, judges trained in bankruptcy_

**Judges trained specifically in bankruptcy and its procedures should hear and oversee bankruptcy cases, pursuant to best practice standard for implementation** .<sup>cv</sup> Insolvency is a complex procedure, distinct in its characteristics from general civil cases. Doing Business 2009 concluded that recovery rates in insolvency cases were much higher in countries that have specialized bankruptcy courts.<sup>cvi</sup> Doing Business reports include a broad mix of economies, both developed and developing, and also with broad ranges of bankruptcy experience. It is important to note, however, that the successful deployment of commercial courts requires significant commitment beyond their mere creation. Creation of commercial courts with insufficient training of personnel, and where the new commercial courts absorb the deficiencies of the general courts, has been shown to be ineffective at improving insolvency processes.<sup>cvii</sup>

**In most of the MENA countries, there is a significant institutional capacity gap due to the lack of insolvency knowledge on the part of the judges** _._ Several factors prevent specialization. When a general court hears cases, judges do not receive the critical mass of insolvency cases needed to build expertise. In some countries, judges are rotated between different courts, with different subject matter, so that any specialized training, or expertise gained from experience, ceases to be applied to insolvency cases once the judge rotates out of the court where he is hearing insolvency cases.<sup>cviii</sup>

25
Our results show that more gains in exports than in imports are expected should the values of three out of the four indicators (port efficiency, regulatory regimes and IT infrastructures) of the new and candidate member countries improve halfway to the EU15 average. They would expect large trade gains as well as improvements in trade balances as their integration into the EU continues. For example, the greatest absolute trade gains – $49 billion and $62 billion respectively – could be expected if their port efficiency and IT infrastructure reach half-way the average level of EU, and 70% of trade gains are associated with export expansion. It suggests that unilateral reforms in trade facilitation are not necessarily net import enhancing. Trade facilitation improvements can be, over time, to some extent self-financing.

Table 2 shows that improvements in behind-the-border factors also result in large _relative_ trade gains. Such gains reach around 11% if the capacity of the new and candidate EU members reach halfway the EU-15 average. For instance, Lithuania’s trade volume rises more than 25% if its IT infrastructure level reaches 50% of the EU level.

**Table 2 - Relative Trade Gains of New and Candidate EU Members– Raising Capacity Half-Way to the EU Level**

||port efficiency|customs regimes|regulatory policy|IT infrastructure|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**New members**|||||
|Czech Republic|13.40%|6.87%|5.54%|7.46%|
|Estonia|3.34%|1.30%|1.80%|NA|
|Hungary|17.46%|1.09%|7.25%|18.73%|
|Latvia|5.03%|10.22%|3.29%|18.28%|
|Lithuania|10.31%|4.33%|2.28%|26.13%|
|Poland|12.01%|9.01%|8.34%|23.63%|
|Slovakia|29.56%|3.73%|6.06%|11.37%|
|Slovenia|8.05%|2.94%|4.89%|10.10%|
|**_sub total average_**|**_12.40%_**|**_4.94%_**|**_4.93%_**|**_16.53%_**|
|**Candidate members**|||||
|Bulgaria|22.81%|9.89%|3.99%|25.16%|
|Romania|5.71%|15.74%|6.11%|13.40%|
|Turkey|8.34%|10.19%|11.68%|19.86%|
|**_sub total average_**|**_12.29%_**|**_11.94%_**|**_7.26%_**|**_19.48%_**|
|**AVERAGE**|**12.37%**|**6.85%**|**5.57%**|**17.41%**|

_Note: The IT infrastructure development level of Estonia is higher than the average of EU 15, so its trade gains are not displayed here._ 15
**Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs**

**Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development**

This paper -a product of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division, Country Economics Department-is part of a largereffortin PRE to (1) review pastefforts in institutional development, (2) determine where these efforts have succeeded and where they have done poorly, and (3) suggest how the World Bank and its borrowers can bcttercreate and strengthen an appropriate institutional framework for economic development. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on Institutional Developmentand the World Bank, held in Washington DCin December 1989. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Gloria Orraca-Tetteh, room N9-069, extension 37646 (43 pages with graphs ard tables).

After reviewing Bank support for divestiture in 70 operations in 35 countries, Kikeri concludes that divestiture operations are best tailored to country conditions. Other conclusions reached in this review of Bank experience: Sometimes divestiture yields minimal results. For example, small and medium-sized public enterprises (PEs) may be divested, reducing the government's burden (and increasing revenues) little; partial divestments may mean continued governmert interference; governments may assume liabilities higher than the sale price; or new investors may be given privileges and monopoly rights that produce more inefficiency, Kikeri spells out appropriate critcria and methods for better divestiture design and implementation.

Sometimes (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) the best policy may be to improve the environment in which PEs function, avoiding an overemphasis on divestiture. Ownership changes are only one element of broader PE reform, the implementation of which could create a better climate for divestiture later. And the threat of divestitu-e could improve PE efficicncy.

The Bank could assist by spelling out the institutional set-up for managing divestiture. Some guiding principles: avoid overbure-ucratization by limiting the number of institutions involved; ensure quick access to top decisionmakers; make available the necessary technical expertise; set up guidelines for the disposition process. Kikeri describes how the Bank can help as countries progress to more complex divestitures.

Meanwhile, divestiture can be staff-intensive where the program is large - and Bank staff shortages must be addressed at the management level.

The PRE Working Paper Scries disseminates the findings of work undcr way in the Bank's Policy, Research. and Exicmal Afrairs Complex. An objcctive of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations **are** less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not neccssarily represent official Bank policy.

Produced at the PRE Dissemination Ccnter
# Table 4

# Poverty and Market Density Instrumental Variables

||Model 1|Model 2|Model 3|
|---|---|---|---|
|IV - Linear Model||||
|Export Market Density|_−_0_._56|_−_0_._27|_−_0_._28|
||(0_._11)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|(0_._13)<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|(0_._13)<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
|Export Price Index|–|_−_0_._01|_−_0_._01|
|||(0_._009)|(0_._009)|
|Food Market Density|–|–|_−_0_._011<br>(0_._02)|
|Household characteristics|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|District characteristics|No|Yes|Yes|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.11|0.21|0.21|
|First stage coefcient|_−_0_._038|_−_0_._027|_−_0_._028|
|Standard error|(0_._006)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|(0_._008)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|(0_._008)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.37|0.76|0.77|
|IV - Probit||||
|Export Market Density|_−_1_._71|_−_0_._97|_−_0_._98|
|Marginal efect|_−_0_._62|_−_0_._35|_−_0_._35|
|Standard error (marg. efects)|(0_._12)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|(0_._15)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|(0_._15)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.18|0.18|0.18|
|Observations|6734|6743|6743|

Note: The dependent variables is a dichotomous indicator of whether the household is poor or not. The main independent variable is export market density, which measures market availability for export agriculture produce. The first panel reports results from 2SLS of poverty on market density. We report the coefficient, the cluster-corrected standard errors, the _R_<sup>2</sup> , and results from the first stage regression. The second panel report estimates from a probit model with endogenous regressor (using the control function approach). We report the coefficient, the marginal effects with their cluster-corrected standard errors, and the pseudo _R_<sup>2</sup> _._ Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.

34
# **Empirical Application of the Ecological Risk Framework**

Most of the empirical testing of the ecological risk framework estimates correlations between risky behaviors and individual, micro, and macro factors of the youth population. The extensive public health literature in the US concludes that positive youth behavior is a result of a positive school environment, a supportive home life, absence of gender stereotypes, high self-esteem and self-efficacy, spirituality, peers with pro-social norms, trust in public institutions, and low levels of inequality and poverty (Rew and Horner 2003, Zweig et. al. 2002, Blum et. al. 2000, 2002).<sup>2</sup> The economics literature adds to the list the role of legal penalties, prices, and income (Gruber 2001). More recently, researchers have begun to take advantage of longitudinal data available in the US to demonstrate that many of those factors correlated with risk taking behaviors are actually causal factors (Resnick et. al. 2004).<sup>3</sup> The few studies that have tested the model using data from Latin American and the Caribbean find similar results to those in the US. They are unanimous in identifying “connectedness” – an emotional bond with parents or with schools (teacher, institutions) – as a strong and consistent correlate with a range of positive behaviors by youth (Blum and Irelend 2004 for the Caribbean; World Bank 2007 for Brazil; ESA Consultores, 2001 for Honduras; Brook et. al. 2001, 2002a, 2002b for Colombia). Other common correlates include macro variables - gender (Koller et. al. 2004), race, and urban/rural residence (World Bank, 2007) –; micro variables, including household poverty (World Bank 2007, Hutz and Silva 2003, Brook et. al. 2001, 2002a, 2002b, ESA Consultores 2001, Bagby and Cunningham 2007), household abuse (Blum and Irelend 2004, Koller 2004), and peer relationships (ESA Consultores 2001); and individual variables such as spirituality

> 2 The US National Library of Medicine and National Institute of Health maintains a web page (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez), that lists hundreds of published articles that have found similar results.

> 3The most commonly used surveys are the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (ADDHEALTH) that surveys students in grades 7-12 for the initial interview in 1994 with subsequent interviews in 1996 and 2002 <u>(http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design) and asks about risk and</u> protective factors and behaviors.  The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1997 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, surveyed males and females born in 1980-1984 (http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97.htm) and focuses primarily on educational and employment outcomes.

5