rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the old communist party, has won clear majorities in three elections (1992, 2000, and 2008). The parties are not particularly distinguished by ideology — for example, both have campaigned on broadly populist platforms of redistributing mining wealth to the people in the form of large, untargeted cash transfer programs, and of investment projects distributed across the country — and both are characterized by factionalism.

**Figure 6: The formal budgetary authority of Mongolia’s parliament stands out in comparative perspective**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Index of Formal Legislative Authority<br>United States<br>Sweden<br>Norway<br>Hungary<br>Netherlands<br>Austria<br>Mongolia<br>Argentina<br>Germany<br>Denmark<br>Belgium Upper quartile: 66.7<br>Uruguay<br>Turkey<br>Spain<br>Portugal<br>Mexico<br>Japan<br>Indonesia<br>Iceland<br>Finland Median: 55.7<br>Czech Republic<br>Bolivia<br>Slovenia<br>South Korea<br>New Zealand<br>Italy<br>Suriname<br>Slovakia<br>United Kingdom Lower quartile: 33.3<br>Israel<br>Greece<br>Canada<br>Australia<br>Ireland<br>France<br>Chile<br>South Africa<br>0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Author‘s calculations based on Wehner (2006). The index is a sum of three indicators normalized to range between 0 and 100: legislative powers of amendment; consequences of non-approval of the budget; and executive flexibility on budget appropriations The parliament in Mongolia exercises unusual budgetary powers. As shown in Figure 6, Mongolia‘s parliament ranks in the top quintile in formal budgetary authority (powers of budget amendment, consequences of non-approval of the budget, and executive flexibility in budgetary appropriations). As noted above, this formal authority has been repeatedly used by MPs to amend the budget in general and the capital budget in particular. Equally important is the informal political interference in the execution of the overall capital budget through in particular the influencing the contracting process. As discussed above, the most egregious example of this influence was the large number of contracts awarded without competitive bidding in 2007. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a prime motivation for these contracts was to generate political support from wealthy and influential individuals ahead of the national elections in 2008. In general, political interference in the award of contracts is known to be considerable even when competitive bidding is done de jure, in particular given the small size of the formal sector in Mongolia, and the close personal links between parliamentarians and the business community.

11
In this study we focus on the effects that rainfall variability and weather shocks have on young children’s health, and more importantly on shedding light on the channels through which climate affects health. We focus on health outcomes, and particularly on children’s health status, due to data constraints. An alternative approach would consist in using income or consumption data. Unfortunately, there is no nationally representative survey in Nigeria with such data that could be linked to climate data at a fine geographical scale.<sup>1</sup> To carry out such analysis one would be forced to rely on the rather restrictive assumption that the same weather shock affects all households living in the same state. In contrast to the NLSS, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) provide information on infant and child health status accompanied by geographic coordinates of the cluster in which they reside.

The link between weather shocks and child health has received little attention in the empirical literature, although in recent years there have been substantial advances in our understanding of the complex interrelationships involved. Most of the existing literature for developing countries has focused on a rather extreme health outcome, child mortality (for example Rose, 1999; Wang, Kanji and Bandyopadhyay, 2009; Pitt and Sigle, 1997; Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson and Greenstone, 2010; Baird, Friedman and Smitz, 2010; Bhalotra, 2010; and Kudamatsu, Persson and Stromberg, 2011). However, little is known about the effect that weather variability has on those children that have survived; which are the majority. Fewer papers have analyzed the impact of weather variability on child morbidity (Wang, Kanji and Bandyopadhyay, 2009), or have used anthropometric measures as a proxy for children’s health status (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Wang, Kanji and Bandyopadhyay 2009; Bengtsson 2010; Portner 2010; and Skoufias and Vinha, 2012). We follow this last set of papers by using two rounds of the Nigeria DHS to assess the effect of rainfall shocks on child anthropometrics.

# **Weather and Child Health in Africa**

Not surprisingly, the existing literature suggests that weather variability has an impact on child health. Three recent papers have used the Demographic and Health Surveys to analyze the effect of weather fluctuations on child mortality rates in Africa. Wang et al. (2009) show that excess rainfall and extreme temperature increase under-five child mortality rates in 19 Sub-Saharan countries, although the magnitude of the reported impacts are rather small. Baird et al. (2010) find that excessive heat around the month of birth is predictive of an increased likelihood of death, particularly for newborns. However, the effect of rainfall is undetermined. While rainfall during the third trimester of pregnancy increases

> 1 The 2003 Nigeria Living Standard Survey (NLSS) -the last available consumption survey- does not provide the precise location of the sampled households, or even the Local Government Area (district) in which they reside.

3
22 (ii) acquisition by another company; (iii) repurchase of the venture capitalist's shares by the investee company; and (iv) secondary purchase of venture investor's shares by a third party.

The two most uesd exit vehicles for venture capital investors are IPOs and acquisitions. It is difficult for a small firm to go public in the main stock exchanges given the numerous and stringent listing conditions. 3 0 In some countries other exchanges which specialize in selling stock of smaller firms have developed, for example the Vancouver Exchange, in Canada, and the Denver Stock Market, in the U.S. Specialized brokerage firms have also emerged. In the United States, most venture-backed firms that go public first do so on NASDAQ, the over-the-counter exchange, which has been advantageous to small firms because they have less stringent listing requirements than the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. A similar role has been played in the U.K. by the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) which was established in the early 1980s. Its creation is considered to have been crucial for the development of the venture capital industry in that country. In Canada, venture-backed firms had a lot of difficulty accessing the public markets given that there is not a public market for small firms at a national level. 3 1 The development of stock exchanges which are receptive to small firms is crucial for investors but even more for the firms themselves as a way to access additional equity capital to finance their future growth.

IPOs have been the most profitable exit vehicle. Table II.3 shows the results of a study which analyzed the portfolios of 26 U.S. funds started between 1970 and 1982. It shows the difference in profitability associated with different exit mechanisms. The profitability resulting from IPOs is by far the highest. However, it seeme that, in order to realize those ga.ns, the funds had to hold those investments in their portfolios longer than they held investments exited via acquisitions.

While acquisitions generated a smaller average return than IPOs during the last decade, they have been a very popular exit vehicle for venture capitalists. In the U.S., this has been the most used exit mechanism, and has shown a steady growth. Table II.4 shows the number of IPOs and acquisitions that took place between 1981 and 1988 for a sample of U.S. VCFs. In some cases, acquisitions can be a more profitable exit vehicle than IPOs due to: placements, a firm may issue shares without the need for prospectus, registiation, etc.--i.e. almost no information disclosure requirements--if the shares are exclusively bought by corporations with assets of $100 million or more. Once these shares have been bought by an initial group of large corporations, they become tradeable but only among corporations fulfilling the size requirements. It will definitely be interesting to observe the development of this new market which may provide an attractive exit mechanism for VCFs.

- 30 This issue is further discussed later.

- 31 Section IV comments on second tier and over the-counter markets.
in high and lower income settings with magnitudes ranging from 12 to 38 percent (Kleven, 2022; Kleven et al., 2019, 2023). However, it can plausibly be argued that women have a comparative advantage in childcare relative to their husbands. We show that even before childbirth, marriage itself might already affect female labor force participation in settings with deeply entrenched gender norms. Our work provides some of the first evidence on the magnitudes of marriage penalties, rather than child penalties, and proposes a method for distinguishing between the two in cross-sectional data. We also directly link marriage penalties to skill levels, outside options, and social norms.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our findings, followed by an exploration of the determinants of the marriage penalty for women in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with policy implications.

# **2 Data and Empirical Strategy**

## **2.1 Data**

We use data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from Bangladesh, India, Maldives, and Nepal in the analysis (Table A1).<sup>1</sup> The surveys were conducted approximately every 5 years starting in the 1990s. These nationally representative surveys form a repeated cross section of reproductive age women between the ages of 15 and 45. The more recent surveys also include data on the men in the households, so there are fewer rounds of data for men. The final sample covers 1,780,854 women and 389,313 men residing in around 650,000 households in all level 1 administrative areas of the 4 countries.

The surveys include age, education, urban residence, employment status, and marital status. For women, the surveys include age at cohabitation, which we use as the age at marriage, and birth history, which includes the timing of the first birth. Importantly, these surveys contain complete household rosters with data on employment status for _both_ married and unmarried women, which will be essential to the pseudo-panel approach below.

> 1Other countries in South Asia are excluded because the DHS data lack sufficient information on employment status for both married and unmarried women.

6
that everything else for Switzerland remains unchanged. Thus, the change in neighborhood is assumed not to impact on any of Switzerland's observable or unobservable determinants of growth over the period 1970-2000.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, we assume that the impacts of the observed determinants of growth for Switzerland remain as estimated for the OECD sample. Finally, we assume no change in the underlying pattern of shocks experienced by Switzerland over the period 1970-2000.

More concretely, our simulation methodology comprises of five steps. In **step 1** we calculate Switzerland's new growth rate of real GDP per capita, _y_<sup>_CHE_</sup> , for the period 19701975 given its change in neighborhood. In particular: where  ˆ _CHE_ , _OECD_ is the size of Switzerland's FE as estimated using the OECD subsample, _x_ 1970 _CHE_  75<sup>is the 1</sup><sup>_k_row vector of observations on the control variables for</sup> _OECD_ Switzerland for 1970-1975, <sup>ˆ</sup> is the corresponding _k_  1 column vector of _SSA_ , _j_ parameters estimated using the OECD sub-sample,  _wCHEj_<sup>_y_</sup> 1970  75 is the weighted average growth rate for Switzerland's neighbors in SSA now that it has taken the place of the Central African Republic in **W3,**  ˆ _SSA_ is the estimated value of the spillover parameter from our original SSA sub-sample, and _u_ 1970 _CHE_  , _OECD_ 75 is the estimated residual for Switzerland for 1970-1975 using the OECD sub-sample.

> 39 With the exception of _log(GDP per capita)initial_ (see below).

35
improvements make it unlikely that 1994 expenditures affected 1994 education outcomes. Similarly, we exclude 1997 expenditures because these expenditures should not have affected educational outcomes in 1997. A potential problem is that expenditures made in 1992 and 1993 affected outcomes in both 1994 and 1997, possibly in different ways. If this is the case, and if expenditures in 1992 and 1993 are correlated with _Fd,_ our results could be biased. We do liot think this is a large problem. We experimented with defining _Fd_ as expenditures from 1992' to 1996, and it made little difference to the results that follow. Separately, we also used the 1991 Peru LSMS to estimate the effect of FONCODES expenditures in 1992 and 1993 on changes in educational outcomes between 1991 and 1994. The results (not reported) are quite similar to those for the 1994-1997 period, although they tend to be more noisy because of the smaller sample size of the 1991 LSMS.

In all of our results, we do not control for expenditures on other school-based inputs We therefore estimate the "gross" effect of FONCODES expenditures on educational outcomes, inclusive of any "crowding in" or "crowding out" which may occur. For example, if the M:inistry of Education were more likely to supply teachers to a school renovated by FONCODES, the effect of these additional teachers would be included in our measure of the impact of FONCODES investments. Conversely, if INFES were less likely to invest in school facilities in a district in which FON CODES were working, the "net" effect of FONCODES investments may be larger than the "gross" effect that we estimate. We believe that this "gross" effect is the appropriate parameter to estimate for policy purposes: presumably, if FONCODES were to b. abolished, the resulting effect would be approximated by our results. Nonetheless, we do riot think that there are very large differences between the "gross" and "net" estimates of FONCODES investments. The Ministry of Education does not have a policy whereby schc ol s which receive FONCODES funding receive priority attention for other educational inputs as well. We also experimentecl with including district-level measures of iNFES expenditures in our regressions. The results (not reported) are virtually identical to those which follow, sugges zing that INFES and FON(CODES investments are orthogonal to each other once appropriate dis tri ctlevel controls are included in the model.

Finally, we were unable to use the 1996 INEI survey to construct cluster-level meastires of FONCODES "treatment" because of the low level of agreement amongst likely FONCODE S "beneficiaries" in a given community. The inability to accurately determine which childrer ial a community have and have not been treated, and the fact that most districts included in the I:iEI and LSMS surveys received some FONCODES education projects, precludes the use of sta:tistical matching as an estimation strategy (see, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1998).

15
_Chen and Kee: Knowledge and Endogenous Growth_ 19 Lederman, Daniel and William F. Maloney (2003). “R&D and Development.” _Policy Research Working Paper_ No. 3024, The World Bank.

Lloyd-Ellis, Huw and Joanne Roberts (2002). “Twin Engines of Growth: Skills ” and Technology as Equal Partners in Balanced Growth _. Journal of Economic Growth_ . Vol. 7, pp. 87-115.

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Oliner, Stephen D. and Sichel, Daniel E. (2000). “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ . Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall), pp. 3-22.

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Pilat, Dirk and Frank C. Lee (2001). “Productivity Growth in ICT producing and ICT-Using Industries: A Source of Growth Differentials in the OECD?” STI Working Paper 2001/4, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Romer, David (1996). _Advanced Macroeconomics_ . McGraw Hill.

Romer, Paul M. (1990). “Endogenous Technological Change.” _Journal of Political Economy_ . Vol. 98, No. 5, Pt. 2, pp. S71-102.

Schreyer, Paul (2000). “The Contribution of Information and Communication Technology to Output Growth: A Study of the G7 Countries.” _STI Working Paper 2000/2_ , Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

Segerstrom, Paul (1998). “Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects.” _American Economic Review_ . Vol. 88, No. 5 (December), pp. 1290-1310.

Segerstrom, Paul (1998). “The Long-Run Growth Effects of R&D Subsidies.” _Journal of Economic Growth_ . Vol. 5 (September), pp. 277-305.

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Whelan, Karl (2000). “Computers, Obsolescence, and Productivity.” _Finance and Economics Discussion Series_ . 2000-6, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC.

World Bank (2003a). _Engendering ICT: Ensuring Gender Equality in ICT for Development_ . Washington, D.C., September.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Quintile 1: Quintile 1:<br>The Poorest The Poorest<br>Quintile 5: Quintile :<br>The Richest 7% The Richest 6%<br>11% 11%<br>Q2 Q2<br>a4 Q4<br>22% 22%<br>400 400<br>362 353<br>350 350<br>300 & 300<br>_ e<br>a<br>250 § 250<br>5<br>==<br>=200 178 > 200<br>2 150 5 —<br>2 120 g '°0 125<br>& 100 90 a 100 —<br>50 53 50 46<br>0 0<br>Ql Q2 Q3 4 Qs Qi Q2 Q3 4 Q5<br><!-- End of picture text -->
12 Political Institutions, they calculate the age of the largest government party at the time that the leader of the country took office, _ruling party age_ (calculated as the age of the largest ruling party minus the years in office of the incumbent, set equal to zero when this difference is negative).

We also examine the robustness of our results to an entirely different party variable, measuring confidence in parties, from the World Value Surveys (WVS) (Inglehart 2004). One of the questions in the surveys is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” One of the organizations that respondents evaluate is political parties. To construct the variable _party confidence_ we calculate the country-means for valid answers and construct indices where higher values imply higher confidence. In either of their roles, as solving information problems or in solving collective action and credible commitment problems, more organized parties should increase respondents’ reported confidence in political parties.

Survey responses regarding confidence in parties are endogenous to party performance. Still, there are two reasons to regard estimates with this variable as useful tests of robustness. First, the endogeneity should operate in the opposite direction of our hypothesis. If government spending, as is commonly argued, increases voters’ appreciation of parties, then we would expect high-spending parties – those that spend more around elections, for example – to be viewed with greater confidence. We find the opposite: political budget cycles are muted in countries where respondents report greater confidence in parties. Second, in placebo regressions, where we substitute confidence in parties with confidence in other government institutions, we find no evidence of an effect on political budget cycles. The spending and elections data are based on the original data set constructed by Brender and Drazen (2005) and expanded by us. We focus on the total expenditures of central government as our
customize the amount of harassment on firms to extract bribes and try to extract as high a bribe as possible from firms with a larger ability to pay. Irrespective of their size, more productive firms have a larger ability to pay bribes to cut through bureaucratic hassles, while less productive firms cannot do it. Our positive effect of corruption on firm TFP suggests that indeed the industries and locations with more productive firms are more targeted by government officials, thus the opportunities for bribe-seeking behavior are larger and firms end up paying more bribes.<sup>50</sup>

# **_4. Conclusion_**

This paper uses data from a recent survey of manufacturing firms in Bangladesh to obtain consistent firm time-varying TFP measures for the period 1999-2003 following Olley and Pakes (1996) and empirically investigate the determinants of firm TFP levels.

Our main findings are as follows. First, we find an inefficient allocation of resources _within_ the pharmaceuticals, leather/footwear, and textiles industries during the sample period, as less productive firms have a higher share of total industry output. Second, our econometric results identify important determinants of firm TFP, controlling for industry, location, and year fixed effects. Smaller firms are significantly more productive than firms in the largest size category (more than 500 workers). Firm age and TFP exhibit an inverse-U shaped relationship. Firms with a more educated or more skilled workforce and more educated or more experienced managers are more productive. Firm TFP benefits from the integration into world markets: foreign-owned firms and exporters have significantly higher TFP. Firms with staff engaged in R&D activities and firms with quality certifications have higher TFP. However, firms with more advanced technologies improve TFP only in the presence of significant absorptive capacity. While firms with an overdraft facility have significantly higher TFP, firms with access to a bank loan have significantly lower TFP. Power supply problems have a significant negative effect on firm TFP. The presence of crime in industries and locations hurts firm TFP.

Our findings point out to several key areas of policy relevance in which improvements are likely to bring benefits for firm TFP in Bangladesh. The acceleration of infrastructure development seems to be a crucial business environment reform to

> 50 This argument assumes that more productive firms can be identified by government officials.

27