the two sources of data are minor, and the estimated program effects are similar regardless of whether treatment status is defined with the household data or the banking records.<sup>4</sup> One possible concern with the analysis in this paper is the extent to which respondents might answer strategically during the survey. For example, households could mis-represent their socioeconomic status if they believe that this makes it more likely that they will receive transfers in the future, or they could over-state investments in schooling if they think this is a condition for transfers. Note that this concern is not particular to this evaluation—it could be an issue for any evaluation of a program that requires beneficiaries to comply with certain conditions, and for which data are collected on the basis of household responses in a survey (for example, Schultz 2004, Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2005, and Todd and Wolpin 2003 on PROGRESA; Ravallion and Wodon 2000 on the Food for Education program in Bangladesh). We cannot fully rule out such concerns, although we believe they are unlikely to be a serious problem for our analysis for a number of reasons. During training, enumerators were instructed that they should not identify themselves as associated with the BDH program or its evaluation under any circumstances; if questioned, enumerators were to state that the information given by households would in no way affect eligibility for social programs, including the BDH program. Both of these were verified during spot visits in the field. Moreover, questions about the BDH program were included in the last module of the survey, well after respondents had provided information about household characteristics and (critically) schooling and work of children. Finally, reducing child work is not a stated BDH program objective, and child work was not a focus of the BDH information campaign. Nonetheless, we find that BDH transfers led to significant reductions in child work. We also find that households that were randomized into the treatment group had larger increases in expenditures on schooling than other households. It is not obvious

> months.  In the study sample, 92 percent of households who ever withdrew transfers according to the banking records did so at least 10 times over the 19-month period, and more than three-quarters of recipient households received a total amount equivalent to 19 monthly transfers.

> 4 Of the 1309 households in the sample, 494 (38 percent) are untreated by both measures, and 672 (51 percent) are treated by both measures.  Only 22 households (2 percent) appear as treated in the banking records but not the household survey, and 121 (9 percent) appear as treated in the household survey, but not the banking records.  The national identification number was used to merge the surveys and the banking records.  Discrepancies could arise if enumerators failed to collect the identification numbers of all household members, or made errors copying the numbers.  In addition, the banking records do not cover the small fraction of households, approximately 2 percent, who generally collect transfers from the _Banco Nacional de Fomento_ , rather than the consortium of private banks in _Banred_ .

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