# **Affect-based decisions**

Affect—particularly negative affect—is the wellspring of action (Peters & Slovic, 2000). The feeling of fear powerfully motivates us to remove ourselves from a dangerous situation (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The absence of any affective or visceral response to such environmental risks as radon contamination, coastal plains flooding, or climate change may well be responsible for the arguably less than optimal allocation of personal and collective resources to deal with such issues (Dunlap & Saad, 2001). Behavioral decision research over the past 30 years provides some answers as to why the general population and their public officials show typically less concern than relevant scientists to some risks, but overreact to other risks.

Affective reactions to risky situations often do not agree with more objective measures of risk that quantify either the statistical unpredictability of outcomes or the magnitude or likelihood of adverse consequences (Sunstein, 2006). Instead, visceral judgments of risk are determined by other (psychological) risk characteristics that elicit affective reactions as part of our evolutionary heritage. The psychological risk dimensions that strongly influence judgments of the riskiness of material risks in ways that go beyond their objective consequences (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978) are summarized by two factors (Slovic, 1997). “Dread risk,” the first factor, is experienced in the face of hazards associated with a perceived lack of control over risk exposure and with consequences that are potentially catastrophic: Terrorist attacks, nuclear reactor accidents, or nerve gas attacks. “Unknown risk,” the second factor, is associated with how much is known about the hazard, how easily exposure and adverse consequences are detectable, and whether it is natural or man-made. At its high (top) end, we find chemical hazards and radiation, which might kill exposed parties without their awareness, and DNA technology, which might have serious consequences not yet tested by time. Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984) suggest that these more affective reactions to risk are forward-looking in ways not always captured by the expected value calculations of experts based on actuarial figures or scientific models. A large accident portends possibly even larger future trouble, and concern about catastrophic potential or lack of control may play a useful societal function. While some of the perceived control may be illusory, the perceived ability or inability to take corrective action is an important component of vulnerability.

Without sufficiently strong visceral reactions to many environmental risks (if they are considered “natural” and well-known), people may not be motivated to take corrective or evasive actions. However, risks can be reframed, and environmental risks presented as more uncontrollable and/or man-made can be expected to activate the feeling that something is amiss, known to result in risk management actions.

Fear appeals are problematic for reasons beyond the fact that people do not naturally worry about environmental risks like climate change. People appear to 22