rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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# Concluslons

The old price system, along with constraints on marketing and Input supply, Ilmits the attractiveness of new tenurial relations to producers, and distorts the values of agricultural land. The multipllilty of prices complicates the contractual negotlations and leads to monetizatlon of current distorted asset values.

Lithuanlan farm accounts for 1986 and 1987 suggest that farms at that time received on average between 40 and 100 rubles annually In producer rents for use of e hectare of average quality land. Producer rents on Individual farms varied according to the prices received on that particular farm. If prices were standardized and changed to border prices converted at two rubles to the dollar, the marginal value product of average quality land would be higher (146 rubles per hectare In the 1986 data, and 90 rubles In the 1987 data). Farms coWd be asked to pay that amount In rent without exceeding land's contribution to net output.

If prices were aligned with world prices at two rubles to the dollar, however, most Lithuanlan farms would not have Increased their Incomes very much, and payment of 100 rubles per hectare would have worsened financial stress. If prices were standardized and Increased to border prices converted at three rubles to the dollar Instead of two, the marginal value product of average quality land would be approxhmately 150 rubles per hectare (1987 data). Producers could pay that much without additional financial stress, although movements In prices of other Inputs are also relevant.

If all agricultural users pald land use fees and had access to the same prices for Inputs and output, state and collective farm managers would be more eager to offer land lor lease or private proprletorship or ownership. Agr!cultural price reform would thus facilitate changes In land tenure and land management.

Producer prices corresponding to border prices converted at three rubles to the dollar would present a shock to retall prices. Consumers probably could not be fully compensated for the Increase, and targeted compensation would be appropriate.
so it does not appear to be the case that female communicators are only better at teaching other women.

In line with our results on the “private task” (technology adoption by the communicators), male communicator villages gain more with incentives, erasing female communicators’ advantage in producing higher yields. While female communicator villages retain an advantage overall in the full sample, the difference is no longer significant.

Columns 4-6 show that the likelihood of crop failure is smaller (but statistically indistinguishable) in the female communicator villages. Crop failure is a relatively rare event that year (5% in control villages), and there is no evidence that female communicators cause more disasters or are less able to transfer skills to other farmers.

We are reporting results on yields and failure on a random sample of all recipient farmers, not conditioning on adoption, to avoid any selection issue regarding who the male or female communicators choose to target. The fact that yields are the same or greater in female communicator villages suggests that when women manage to teach and convince others to adopts, the recipients do just as well with the technology. It does not appear to be the case that women are worse than men at teaching. Even if women are less confident as teachers, or in terms of the beliefs they express about the new technology, it does not undermine their performance as teachers. The differential gender performance in the private versus public tasks therefore does appear to be related to something else: social frictions, or perceptions of women, or willingness to accept messages when equally able or more able women are asked to complete a task that requires them to interact with and persuade others in society.

# **5. Mechanisms**

In this section we explore what types of communication inefficiency can explain why female communicators, despite being as knowledgeable and achieving better command of a new technology, are not as convincing as men in getting others to learn and adopt a new technology. First, women may be worse as teachers. The yield data strongly suggest otherwise. Second, there may be some “gender frictions” if farmers learn more from others of the same gender. Then our results could stem from a gender composition effect: there are more male farmers in our sample, 19
Policy Research Working Paper 8945

# **Abstract**

Using firm-level survey data for a large cross section of countries, the paper assesses the gap in labor productivity between formal and informal firms in developing countries for which comparable data are available. It also investigates the impact of competition from informal firms on the labor productivity of formal firms. The results show that on average, the labor productivity of informal firms is about one-fourth that of formal firms. Moreover, the labor productivity of formal firms that face competition from informal firms is about 75 percent of the average labor productivity of formal firms that do not experience informal competition. This suggests that competition from the informal sector can erode formal firms’ market share and the resources available to boost productivity where formal firms shoulder the additional cost of regulatory compliance. These findings are robust to a range of firm and country characteristics as well as checks for endogeneity concerns.

This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice and the Development Economics Global Indicators Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at mamin@worldbank.org, fohnsorge@worldbank.org, and cokou@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **1. Introduction**

Two qualitatively distinct activities are induced by climate change: _mitigation_ of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to limit emissions and thus future climate change; and _adaptation_ to lessen the negative impact on human societies of any given climate change.<sup>2</sup> These activities are usually viewed as substitutes: more mitigation (leading to less GHG emissions) implies less climate change and thus less need to adapt; conversely, more adaptation reduces the damage from climate change, thus reducing the “need” to mitigate.<sup>3</sup> For _the effect of increased mitigation on adaptation_ , such a view appears robust. In this paper we are concerned with reverse relationships: _Given that the process for future damages resulting from given climate change is dampened or shifted down, what is the impact on optimal mitigation?_ Increased adaptation to climate change is likely to reduce the damages to human societies for any given mitigation level, thus the two relationships may seem similar. But while much of adaptation activity is likely to come _later_ , in _response to_ given climate change, mitigation is always _anticipatory_ , aiming to pre-empt anticipated but uncertain climate change.

The uncertainty part is here crucial. Two countervailing effects follow from more mitigation. First and most obviously, expected climate damages are reduced, which reduces the “need” to mitigate. But when adaptation causes the process describing climate damages to society to be dampened, uncertainty about future climate impacts (represented by the variance on the stochastic damage process) is also reduced.

This uncertainty is here modelled as a geometric Brownian motion process with positive drift. _Expected_ damages from a given (increased) concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs)

> 2 When climate change results in welfare improvements, which is frequently the case, adaptation is the process by which these welfare gains are maximized.

> 3 See Tol (1998, 2005); Tol, Fankhauser and Smith (1998), Fankhauser, Smith and Tol (1999); Burton (1997). Ses also the wider discussion on interrelationship between mitigation and adaptation, in IPCC (2007).

2
**Table 10. Benchmark Estimates of the Impact of the IHC Program on Outcome Variables**

|||||Hodg<br>|esLehmann<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Median<br>treatment<br>effect|Mean<br>treatment<br>effect|Mean percentile<br>rank statistic(�)|Estimate|95% confidence<br>interval|
|Median clearance time|-0.073|-0.192|0.434|-0.064|(-0.216, 0.067)|
|Clearance time: 75<sup>th</sup>pct|-0.401|-0.434|0.310***|-0.404|(-0.618, -0.167)|
|Clearance time: 90<sup>th</sup>pct|-0.362|-0.410|0.377*|-0.261|(-0.626, 0.004)|
|Inspection rate|-0.007|-0.008|0.484|-0.002|(-0.021, 0.015)|
|Import Value|0.106|0.043|0.588|0.117|(-0.049, 0.253)|

Note: * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

While the confidence intervals in Table 10 look wide in percentage terms, for clearance times at least the large variability in percentage terms applies to a very small base. In order to better understand the practical importance of our estimates we conduct some back-of-the-envelope calculations and report them in Table 11. Table 3 showed that the distribution of clearance times in 2010 for firms that would become IHC firms by 2013. Application of the HL estimates to the median 2010 clearance time for firms that would become IHC firms (0.84 hours, or 50 mins) implies an estimate of the change in median clearance time of 3 minutes, with the 95% confidence interval stretching from a reduction of 11 minutes to an increase of 3 minutes. At the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of clearance times, the HL estimate suggests a 42 minute reduction in clearance times (relative to a 103 minute benchmark). The 95% confidence interval puts the true reduction somewhere between 17 and 64 minutes. At the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of the clearance time distribution, the HL estimate suggests a 57 minute reduction, and the 95 confidence interval is bounded between a 137 minute decrease and a 1 minute increase.

|**Table 11. Implied Effect of the IHC Program on Clearance Times (In Minutes)**|
|---|

||2010 benchmark<br>clearance time|Implied reduction, HL<br>estimate|Implied reduction 95%<br>HL confidence interval|
|---|---|---|---|
|Median|50|-3|(-11, 3)|
|75<sup>th</sup>percentile|103|-42|(-64, -17)|
|90<sup>th</sup> percentile|218|-57|(-137,1)|

Notes: Changes in clearance time calculates by applying percentage change estimated in Table 10 to relevant locations in the distribution of 2010 clearance times for firms that would become IHC firms by the end of 2013. `HL’ stands for Hodges-Lehmann estimate.

# **6. Synthetic Control Method Robustness Results**

We take three approaches to checking the robustness of the SCM estimates. First, we restrict the sample to the first 15 adopters of the IHC program, which allows us to measure impact 36
7 that household past migration experience exerts a positive impact on the probability of owning a non-farm business.<sup>4</sup> While an additional year in Greece increases the probability of household ownership by roughly 7 percent, a similar experience in Italy or further destinations raises the probability by over 30 percent.

In regards to estimating the effect of past migration experience on labor market outcomes upon return, which is the main focus of our study, the number of available empirical studies is equally scarce, and the evidence is mixed. Co et al. (2000) use panel survey data from Hungary, and estimate the impact of past migration experience on wages. The authors take into account the selection into migration and labor force participation separately. They show that while there is a considerable premium (40 percent) to work experience abroad among women, there is no statistically significant impact of past migration experience on earnings within the male population. In contrast, without accommodating the endogeneity of return migrant status, Barrett and O’Connell (2000) use non-representative data on Irish return migrants and stayers, and report that on average, male returnees earn 10 percent more than their non-migrant counterparts, whereas there is no wage premium for migration experience among females. Lastly, Wahba (2007) utilizes cross-sectional data from Egypt, attempts to control for selection into wageemployment as well as migration, and shows that on average, the wage gap between return migrants and non-migrants is 38 percent in favor of returnees.

# **3. Data**

The data come from the ALSMS05, conducted by the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), with technical assistance from the World Bank, between April and November 2005. The sampling frame for the survey was stratified into four regions –coastal, central, mountain and Tirana – and a total sample of 3,640 households from 455 census enumeration areas (EAs) was drawn based on a multi-stage cluster design. The ALSMS05 includes a typical household questionnaire covering general household demographics, education levels, asset ownership, expenditures and labor market participation. The questionnaire also contains an unusually rich module on migration, both internal and international, of current and former household members.

> 4 Despite these positive results, return migration continues to be associated with failure among Albanians (Labrianidis and Kazazi, 2006). In fact, using independent survey data from Albania, de Coulon and Piracha (2005) actually document the negative selection of return migrants compared to the native non-migrant population. The authors show that had they chosen to migrate and return, non-migrants would have earned more than twice the wages of return migrants.
# **Moving Up the Ladder: An Analysis of IDA Graduation Policy**

Anton Dobronogov<sup>†</sup> , Stephen Knack<sup>‡</sup> , and James Wilson<sup>§</sup> _Keywords:_ graduation from foreign aid, IDA, International Development Association, statistical model _JEL classification codes:_ F3, O29

> † World Bank. Corresponding author, email: adobronogov@worldbank.org

> ‡ World Bank.

> § Oxford University

> The authors are grateful to Stephane Guimbert and Phil Keefer for useful comments. Any remaining errors are our own. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and they should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
despite the voluminous literature on this topic,<sup>the debate is by</sup> no means resolved. Many studies do reveal a positive<sup>relationship</sup> between various measures of openness and growth.<sup>But nagging</sup> problems remain. Methodological shortcomings make<sup>it difficult to</sup> link performance outcomes with policies per<sup>se; causality tests</sup> and micro-level anaJyses yield mixed results.

Second, it should be evident that no independent<sup>measure of</sup> so-called "openness" is free of methodological<sup>problems. Even the</sup> most recent use of direct price comparisons,<sup>facilitated by the</sup> work of Summers and Heston (1988), is plagued<sup>by small sample</sup> size--the data l'as not been collected for the same<sup>setof</sup> benchmark countries over many years. This may<sup>be one factor</sup> which has led to an emphasis on the use of cross-section estimation. Even if panel data--which spans a number<sup>of countries</sup> over several years--was widely available for international<sup>price</sup> comparisons, there would still exist the possibility<sup>that price</sup> distortions reflect domestic market imperfections (such<sup>as</sup> oligopolistic marketing channels for imported goods)<sup>as much as</sup> tradre policy interventions.

Consequently, the approach adopted in this paper<sup>is to</sup> gather as many different measures of openness as<sup>are available</sup> for a cross-section of developing countries over<sup>time, and test</sup> whether these measures generally yield the same results. Unfortunately, we are forced to exclude a number<sup>of openness</sup> measures which are not available over time, such<sup>as the indices</sup> computed by Leamer (1988), and the comprehensive<sup>data on tariffs</sup> 9
# 4 GHANA COCOA Production and lagged prices

## Figure 4

<!-- Start of picture text --> '00,000 tons,'000 C/MT<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,<br>3<br>2<br>1eI<br>1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> crop years<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Total output + real price lag 1 lyr

Prices lagged **11** years
23 observations with zero unearned income.<sup>35</sup>

# **6 Conclusion**

Behavioral economists are calling attention to consumption phenomena that violate the income fungibility assumption, which has underpinned most micro-economic modeling and policy advice. This paper draws attention to one such phenomenon, the link between spending behaviors and the effort dispensed in earning income. This has received little attention in the literature so far, despite wide recognition of its practical relevance as reflected in the recurrence of the saying “Easy come, Easy go” across the world’s cultures and languages. If true, this would suggest that incomes are categorized in different mental accounts based the efforts involved in acquiring it, from which people then spend differently.

This is explored here empirically by examining whether the marginal propensity to consume from earned and unearned income differs across more and less basic consumption categories (e.g. staples versus non-staples food, clothing, tobacco, alcohol). To do so, it is people’s behavior in their natural environment that is examined here, unlike in most other studies, which rely on controlled experimental settings. In particular, the MPCs from earned and unearned income are estimated and compared across a series of (mainly nondurable) consumption categories using OLS and household fixed effect estimators applied to household panel data from four different rural, low income settings in two countries, Tanzania and China.

The results suggest that people are more likely to spend unearned income on clothing, alcohol and tobacco, transportation and communication, as well as gifts, while they are somewhat more likely to spend earned income on staple food and invest it in education. No systematic differences were revealed in spending from earned and unearned income sources on health and housing maintenance/appliances. While follow up investigation confirmed that gender preferences affect spending patterns, a larger inclination to spend more from unearned income on less basic goods than from earned income was also observed when controlling for the gender of the income recipient. This suggests that unobserved intra-household dynamics are not driving the outcomes. The results are also robust when controlling for possible differences in the expected or unexpected features of earned and unearned income or differences in their liquidity. Income levels appeared not to affect these overall patterns, but 35 To save space, these results are not reported here, though they are available from the authors upon request.
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should be, multifaceted. The principal is responsible for a range of activities including routine record keeping, local fund-raising, personnel management, student discipline and often teaching as well. Ideally, the principal would also provide professional support and feedback to the teaching staff. However, school principals in rural areas are usually no more prepared for their complex jobs than teachers. While they may be drawn from the ranks of the most qualified and experienced rural teachers, rarely are they trained in school administration. They are unprepared for both the administrative and professional support roles they should perform. This is cause for particular concern given the growing body of school effectiveness research which shows that the school site management or principal's leadership is a critical factor distinguishing more from less effective schools. (Cohn & Rossmiller, 1985)

# III. RURAL SCHC'OL SUPPORT SERVICES: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS

# Limitations of Existing Systems

14. Support service systems for rural schools, i.e., on site technical advice on teaching and school management, as well as on and off site inservice training for teachers and administrators during thse school year and vacation periods, do not exist in most countries of the developing world. What have existed on a long-standing basis in many countries are referred to as systems of school supervision and/or school inspection. Supervision/inspection systems are found widely throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. Usually established by a colonial administration, supervision and inspection systems have constituted a fluid administrative network which frequently takes the place of a more permanent local administration for the educational system. As will be illustrated below, these supervision/inspection systems have and continue to be quite limited in what they are able to provide to rural schools. At best, these systems were established as administrative surrogates to maintain standards, i.e. mechanisms of control. While these systems vary from country to country as to the details of what and how they operate, nonetheless, they have a core of common characteristics, including:

- (i) Emphasis on functions other than school support services. The typical functions of the inspection/supervisory system incltnie (a) handling personnel matters; (b) inspecting existing schools periodically; (c) certifying new schools at their request; (d) collecting data and disseminating information for central educational F!uthorities; and (e) trouble-shooting specific school problems on an ad-hoc basis.

- (ii) Centralizing of insRectors/supervisors in urban areas. Inspectors/supervisors almost invariably reside in urban areas and are stationed at urban administrative sites. In some extreme cases the inspectorate is centralized in a country's capital city; in other instances, the inspectorate will bc located at the departmental, provincial or district level. Inspectors/ supervisors, however, are not, in most instances, field staffers.