many countries in MENA have much lower labor shares, resulting in smaller adjustments, as we will see in quantitatively below.

**Quantitative Results** . Figure 2 shows the change in output per capita for each country in MENA under different scenarios when gender gaps in employment rates are closed. The blue bars show the increase in GDP per capita in the long run when capital fully adjusts (the basic GEGI of Pennings (2022)). For the 19 countries in MENA we examine in our paper (excluding Israel and Malta), the basic GEGI averages 49%, indicating that long-run GDP per capita would be 49% higher if gender employment gaps were closed—more than double the 19% average GEGI across all countries in Pennings (2022). However, this average represents substantial heterogeneity across countries.

The highest GEGI in our sample (and close to the highest in the world) is in the Republic of Yemen, where GDP per capita would be 86% higher in the long run if gender employment gaps were closed. Similarly high levels of GEGIs are found in Iraq (79%), the Syrian Arab Republic (74%), and Jordan (70%). In most countries, this is driven by very low employment rates of women in the baseline, typically around 10% or lower.

The most gender-equal country in the sample is Qatar, indicating that GDP per capita (GDPPC) would be 9% higher in the long run from closing the gender gap. These gains—and those for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE—are calculated using a modified version Equation 1, because these countries have much fewer women than men. Hence the gender gap in employment needs to be adjusted for the different population sizes of each gender.<sup>13</sup> While Qatar has the smallest GEGI in our sample even before adjustment (24%), the population-based adjustment greatly reduces the size of potential gains as employing more women mechanically has less effect on growth when women are a small fraction of the population.

The red bars in Figure 2 show the effect of closing gender employment gaps if aggregate physical capital remains constant, assuming that the labor share ( _β_ ) in each country is the same as that in the Penn World Tables 10. Note that for developing countries this averages around _β_ = 0 _._ 5, lower than the 2 _/_ 3 usually observed in developed countries. The labor share is even lower in MENA—averaging 41%—driven by very low labor shares in oil-rich countries (for Saudi Arabia, for example, it is only _β_ = 0 _._ 28). The lower labor shares in MENA mean that despite large long-term gains from closing gender gaps, the short-run gains could be more modest (even assuming that such a large reform could be implemented quickly).

The smallest short-run gains are again in Qatar, where a (relatively) small GEGI is further reduced very low labor share of 18%. Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE also have short-run GEGIs of 5%-7%, driven by a relatively modest long-run GEGI and a low labor share.<sup>14</sup> The largest short run economic gains from closing gender gaps are still in Yemen, but are around half as large as under the long run assumption ( _β_ = 0 _._ 5). Still these hypothetical short run gains are significant, at 43%

> 13See Appendix 4 of Pennings (2022).

> 14Oman and Libya also have low short-run GEGIs, but in those cases a very low labor share is more important.

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