rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Female - headed households, poverty,
            and the welfare of children in urban Brazil
The authors analyze the characteristics
            and behavior of households headed by women in urban Brazil
            and identify some of the consequences for child welfare on
            the growth of these households. The following was among
            their findings. First, households headed by women are a
            heterogeneous group, which varies strongly by region - as
            does the extent of poverty among them. Such households are
            more common in the northeast and increase with urbanization.
            Second, households headed by women are not, on average, a
            "vulnerable group" in Brazil, as some are quite
            well off. The subset of such households that are very poor
            is quite vulnerable. Households headed by women tend to be
            poorer in the northeast, especially around Recife, than in
            Porto Alegre in the south, where there is virtually no gap.
            Third, less than half the households headed by women contain
            dependent children, and only a third are headed by the
            stereotypical "single mother." When there are
            children in households headed by women, especially
            households headed by single mothers, the income gap is
            greater than in other households. As a portion of households
            in Brazil, households headed by women and containing
            children represent only 3.4 percent of urban households, but
            this group tends to be poor, which is worrisome for child
            outcomes. Poor children tend to live in households headed by
            women. These households are poor not because there are more
            children or fewer adults but because women earn less than
            men. Women heading households do not earn less than other
            women - on the contrary. However, it female heads of
            households earned as much as male heads of households, the
            average income in households headed by women would be above
            that for other households and fewer single mothers would be
            poor. The best interventions to eliminate poverty in this
            group are those that focus on: (a) ending wage
            discrimination; and (b) ending occupational segregation.
            Interventions that focus on raising skill levels and
            educational attainment for the whole workforce, including
            women, would also help alleviate absolute poverty, although
            not necessarily relative income differences.
            "Workfare" or public employment policies would not
            help this group since most already participate in the labor
            force. Programs targeted to this group would not be
            particularly progressive, given the heterogeneity and income
            spread among these households. But the results do suggest
            the need for special interventions for children in
            households headed by women, given those children's
            tendency to stay out of school.
Can competition policy control "301"
Should fair trade rules be replaced by
            national or international competition rules? A familiar
            argument for doing so is that more rigorously enforced
            competition standards might eliminate the basis for the
            burgeoning number of antidumping cases of recent years. A
            less familiar argument is that the implementation of
            internationally agreed competition standards might reduce
            the frequency with which the U.S government uses section 301
            of U.S. trade law. Section 301 lists foreign government
            toleration of systematic anticompetitive activities as one
            of the bases for taking retaliatory action against foreign
            uncompetitive practices but were taken up through other
            mechanisms; extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
            law or direct negotiations sometimes capped by an
            understanding at the presidential level. These negotiations
            often included the threat of initiation of antidumping,
            "301," or other trade remedies cases. (The
            structural impediments initiative negotiations with Japan
            are the most familiar example.) In several of these cases,
            the foreign government agreed to and implemented more
            rigorous antitrust enforcement, but these actions seldom
            ended the dispute. The U.S. government pressed on for
            tangible evidence of increased U.S. export sales. The
            authors conclude that removing the basis for these disputes
            -- alleged lax enforcement of competition policy -- did not
            remove the motive for them -- increased U.S. exports.
            Competition policy then is not the antidote for
            "301." The last section of the paper reviews the
            compatibility of "301" with the preservation of
            open international trading system. Of 70 "301"
            cases (through December 31, 1992) that have led to policy
            changes, 52 have led to liberalizations, and only 18 have
            led to increased trade restrictions. Viewed from the point
            of view of results, the major shortcoming of "301"
            is that the United States is the only country whose policies
            do not come under its scrutiny.
Difficulties of transferring
            risk-based capital requirements to developing countries
In principle, financial regulation seeks
            to remedy recognized deficiencies in a nation's
            economic, political, and bureaucratic incentive structures.
            But the social urgency of particular financial policy
            problems differ according to a country's stage of
            development.  Regulatory strategies that make sense for
            industrial countries are unlikely to work the same way in
            developing countries.  The author examines opportunities for
            transferring the framework of risk-based capital
            requirements negotiated by the G-10 countries under the
            auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.
            He finds that an unchanged transfer of the Basle framework
            to developing countries is economically inappropriate and
            politically infeasible.  And its voluntary adapation is
            difficult because the long-run economic appropriateness of
            the Basle framework of solvency regulations directly opposes
            their short-run political embraceability. The author
            believes that what most urgently needs to be transferred to
            developing countries are elements of supervisory technology:
            methods of information collection and management, legal
            processes for prompt and equitable default resolution, and
            mechanisms for controlling the incentive conflicts that lead
            bankers and government supervisors to resist the healthy
            exit or recapitalization of damaged institutions.  As a
            first step, the author recommends that the World Bank and
            the Bank for International Settlements promote economically
            beneficial reforms in information collection and management,
            reforms that do not preclude flexibility in current
            prudential standards in individual countries.
Principles of regulatory policy design
The author contrasts command-and-control
            regulation (tight control of water purification, for
            example) with more flexible forms, including incentive
            regulation (such as price cap regulation), potential
            regulation (providing for closer scrutiny if enough
            customers complain), and reactive rather than proactive
            policies (the firm proposing actions, the regulatory saying
            yes or no). He contrasts informing regulation (for example,
            requiring that consumers be informed about ingredients in a
            product) and enforcing regulation (for example, prohibiting
            the use of certain chemicals in foods). A country's
            institutional structure can limit the regulators'
            potential for commitment, he says -- especially if
            regulators are limited in their ability to deliver rewards
            or penalties. The scope and function of regulation may also
            be fairly limited when technological conditions allow
            competition to discipline producers. Sophisticated buyers
            with economic power may reduce the need for regulatory
            control, and rapid technological change can render
            comprehensive command-and-control regulation ineffective or
            debilitating. Many forces operate simultaneously, making
            regulatory design a complex undertaking. Inertia is one such
            influence. Regulatory policies that once served an important
            purpose sometimes persist even though they no longer serve
            that purpose -- sometimes because they favor a constituency
            that convinces the regulator to keep the control in place.
            Subsidies and tariff protection often continue long past the
            time needed to promote the development of an infant
            industry, for example. When there is limited public outcry
            against continuing the special treatment, and the affected
            firms strongly urge its continuance, the regulator may be
            convinced to continue special treatment that no longer
            serves the public interest. Regulation may also be affected
            by the regulators' personal ambition. When regulators
            are "captured" by regulated firms -- diverted from
            the goal of protecting consumers through the promise of
            personal rewards for favorable treatment of the firms --
            regulation may not serve society's best interest. Even
            if regulators are not motivated by self-interest, their
            ideas of what is best for society may differ from those of
            other government officials or of society at large. When that
            happens, which goals are pursued depends largely on the
            autonomy regulators that are granted and on the balance of
            power among government bodies. Regulation should be viewed
            in this large context to be understood fully.
Will GATT enforcement control antidumping
The authors try to gauge why the GATT
            dispute settlement process has, to date, been so ineffective
            in disciplining the use of antidumping measures. Focusing on
            the five cases in which panels have completed their findings
            and recommendations, the authors identify the sources of
            this ineffectiveness and evaluate the likelihood that the
            process will become effective. Changing the bureaucratic
            momentum of the system is possible, they contend, but would
            not be easy. It would require greater resolve by member
            countries' GATT delegates to see that GATT rules are
            enforced - a greater willingness to stand up to domestic
            pressures to bend GATT rules to suit the demands of national
            politics. Changing the legal momentum of the system will be
            even more difficult, say the authors. Interpreting the GATT
            in a legalistic way compels one to interpret it as a
            statement of rights to impose antidumping duties. The
            substantive criteria for action are broad: the injury
            concept justifies protection for anyone to whom it is worth
            the time to ask for it. The constraints on antidumping
            actions - loopholes and procedural technicalities - are
            artificial, so legal reform means getting rid of them. Where
            do the GATT articles on trade remedies lead? The authors
            contend that if you take a legalistic view, you come to a
            protectionist conclusion.
Price formation, nominal anchors,
            and stabilization policies in Hungary : an empirical analysis
The authors empirically explore the
            inflationary process in Hungary. Using monthly data, they
            provide econometric estimates of the determinants of
            inflation for 1990-92. Empirical estimates of price
            equations - both consumer price index (CPI) and producer
            price index (PPI) - show the exchange rate's
            quantitative importance and statistical significance in
            price formation in Hungary during the period of intensified
            reform as the economy became more open to international
            trade in both inputs and final goods. Their estimates show
            that the money supply affects consumer and producer prices
            with several lags; its impact on prices is small in the
            short run. Nominal wages have a more significant effect on
            the CPI than on the PPI. The authors present policy
            simulations of alternative rules for the exchange rate and
            the money supply and their effect on the rate of inflation
            and the level of the real exchange rate. They find that a
            rule of fixing the exchange rate entails a lower level of
            CPI inflation - 5 percentage points less of CPI inflation a
            year - than if the rule is based only on reducing the rate
            of money growth (to 1 percent a month). But a fixed exchange
            rate policy is associated with greater appreciation of the
            real exchange rate than is the policy of money-based
            disinflation - nearly 4 percentage points more real
            appreciation a year. A PPI-based exchange rate rule
            stabilizes the real exchange rate at the cost of a
            substantial acceleration in inflation. These exercises
            illustate the nature and magnitude of the tradeoffs between
            faster disinflation and the level of external
            competitiveness in an open economy such as Hungary that uses
            the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in disinflation.
Eastern Europe's experience
            with banking reform : is there a role for banks in the transition
Are there lessons to be learned about
            how Eastern European countries have dealt with problems in
            their banking systems?  What role have these countries
            assigned to banks during the transition?  How have they used
            banks in dealing with the enterprise problem?  The author
            addresses these questions by analyzing experience in
            Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the former Czech and
            Slovak Federal Republic.  Most of these countries have made
            substantial progress in restructuring their banking systems,
            but few have used their banking systems to improve the
            allocation of credit and hence stimulate the supply
            response.  The author finds the following.  The problem is
            not whether banks hold nonperforming loans but how banks can
            avoid accumulating more nonperforming loans.  The underlying
            problem is how to close loss-making and nonviable
            enterprises.  The countries that have encouraged the
            establishment of new private banks, that have introduced
            regulation and supervision, and that have tried to make
            banks more competitive have been more successful at
            improving the allocation of credit and achieving more
            control over loss-making enterprises.  Banks must focus on
            assessing risk - and for this, capital, private ownership,
            and adequate regulation are crucial.  How quickly banks
            achieve independence in credit decisions depends on how fast
            new governance structures can be introduced.  In this, the
            five countries have been less successful. The objectives of
            bank recapitulation should be to prevent banks from
            accumulating more nonperforming loans (that is, dealing with
            the enterprise problem) and to give them the governance
            structure that would prevent them from incurring new
            nonperforming loans.  This requires introducing a system of
            risk and reward - by making banks comply with capital
            adequacy requirements, by privatizing a critical number of
            banks, and by introducing strong regulation and supervision.
            Government should see that banks provide efficient payment
            systems, the basis for trust in banking systems. Introducing
            adequate regulation and supervision has been difficult as it
            requires knowing what the banks' role should be.
            Evidence strongly supports the need to recapitalize and
            privatize a critical number of banks. Authorities cannot
            rely on banks to exert control on enterprises early in the
            transition.  In the early stages, control over state-owned
            enterprises should be exercised by a semipublic institution.
Making a market : mass privatization
            in the Czech and Slovak Republics
The author assesses the Czechoslovak
            mass privatization program for speed, equity, and corporate
            governance.  The program transferred claims on assets in
            1,491 enterprises - assets worth about $10.7 billion - to
            the 8.5 million citizens who participated in the scheme.
            The entire cycle of project preparation, public information,
            and nationwide simultaneous bidding took 14 months.  This
            was equivalent to privatizing more than three medium-scale
            and large-scale enterprises, on average, per day.  Equity
            objectives were achieved by transferring equal claims
            (equivalent to about $1,250 per person) to all participants
            and by putting in place a transparent and decentralized
            process. The government's role was simple to provide a
            framework and a set of rules for potential firms, managers,
            and shareholders to find each other.  The scheme's
            design - based on simultaneous sequential bidding rounds -
            worked to put information about enterprise values into the
            public domain by allowing increasingly informed bidders to
            interact.  The structure of ownership that emerged will have
            very different implications for corporate governance.
            Enterprises in the Czech Republic, and those that sold for
            high prices in the bidding rounds, are characterized by a
            greater concentration of shareholdings. Those in the Slovak
            Republic, and those that sold for lower prices, have more
            diffuse ownership structures. The mass privatization scheme
            served to quickly differentiate the enterprises with
            favorable prospects from those with unfavorable prospects
            under current conditions.  But enterprises that could have
            survived in some form, if they had been restructured before
            privatization, or enterprises that could have been viable
            but lacked effective governance, were sacrificed for the
            sake of speed and decentralization.
Assessing Bank performance and the
            impact of financial restructuring in a macroeconomic
            framework : a new application
The authors present a simulation model
            (applied here to Uruguay and implemented in Javelin) that
            permits analysis of the interaction between a financial
            system and the economic environment in which it operates.
            The model allows the user to compute and project the
            indicators necessary to monitor the performance of a
            financial institution and to examine how those indicators
            respond to economic change. Traditionally, economic analysis
            in the World Bank has focused on either the real or
            financial sector, but rarely on the interaction between
            them. The introduction of the extended Revised Minimum
            Standard Model, or RMSM-X, reflects the Bank's
            recognition of the importance of incorporating the financial
            system into the macroeconomy. Nevertheless, the monetary
            module in the RMSM-X is too aggregated to allow for any
            meaningful analysis of the viability of a country's
            financial system, or any institution in particular. By
            design, the RMSM-X provides only a generic framework, or
            platform, that then may be adapted to particular cases. The
            authors develop a tool that uses a time series that shows
            developing trend lines. The model requires an adequate level
            of detail and a consistency of content, interpretation, and
            presentation of the financial and economic data, plus an
            adequate grouping of banks to ensure that comparisons are
            between like entities. The model should be useful to
            financial analysts who need to plan for and forecast the
            growth and profits of a financial institution, or a group of
            institutions, and who are interested in capturing the links
            with the macroeconomy in a fully consistent framework. The
            model allows the user to compute and project indicators that
            are necessary to monitor the performance of a financial
            institution and to examine how these indicators change in
            response to changes in the macroenvironment. The model
            should also be valuable to economists interested in
            assessing the viability of the financial system,
            particularly in assessing the impact of financial
            restructuring. When major financial restructuring is
            involved, model simulations can help policymakers and
            supervisors to reassure themselves that bank rehabilitation
            is worth its costs.