rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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# Comparison of the Direct Binary Quantity Ratios with the Inferential Ratios

It is not possible to make an exact comparison between the quantity ratios for Mexico/Brazil in this chapter and those one can inferentially derive from the Brazil/USA and Mexico/USA comparisons in chapter III. The latter are what Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982) refer to as a "star system of binary comparisons". The United States, the country at the centre, was compared separately with each of the points of the star, Brazil and Mexico. A comparison between points of the star, i.e. between Mexico and Brazil, will show identical results with those of the direct Mexico/Brazil comparison in this chapter, only if there is "transitivity"' . In practice complete transitivity can not be expected.

Another reason for the incongruity between the present direct Mexico/Brazil results and the inferential results derived from chapter III, is that we were able to use the more refined national accounts concept of value added throughout the present chapter.

Table 4.11 compares the quantity relatives for manufacturing value added as a whole of the present chapter with the binary ratios and the inferential ratio that can be derived from chapter III. In fact our direct Mexico/Brazil ratio is very similar to the inferential comparison.

-----------------------------------------------------

__--------------------TABLE 4.11

|Comparison<br>of Direct<br>and Inferential<br>Quantity<br>R<br>as a Whole, Mexico/Brazil,<br>---------------------------------------------------------<br>Brazil/USA<br>Geometric<br>Average|elatives<br>for<br>1975<br>__-------<br>Mexico/USA<br>Geometric<br>Average|Manufacturing<br>----------<br>Mexico/Brazil<br>Geometric<br>Average|
|---|---|---|
|Inferential Relatives Implicit in the<br>Binary Comparisons of Chapter III) (10.55)|(3.76)|35.64|
|Direct Binary Comparison<br>---|---|37.71|

Note: The figures show the numerator country as a percent of the denominator country's value added at the former national accounts concept.

Source: First line from tables 3.15 and 3.16; second line derived from table 4.10.

" "Transitivity" requires that the Mexico/Brazil quantity ratio equals the product of the Mexico/US and US/Brazil quantity ratios i.e.: with Q = quantity of product y P y= price of product y M = Mexico B = Brazil U = United States
# **References**

Angelucci, F, Gourichon, H, Mas Aparisi, A and Witwer, A. 2013. _Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies in Africa_ . MAFAP Synthesis Report. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

Anríquez, G, Foster, W, Ortega, J, Falconi, C and De Salvo, C P. 2016. _Public Expenditures and the Performance of Latin American and Caribbean Agriculture_ . IDB Working Paper IDB-WP-722. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Ascott, M. J., Gooddy, D. C., Wang, L., Stuart, M. E., Lewis, M. A., Ward, R. S., & Binley, A. M. (2017). Global patterns of nitrate storage in the vadose zone. _Nature Communications_ , _8_ (1), 1-7.Basu, N. B., Van Meter, K. J., Byrnes, D. K., Van Cappellen, P., Brouwer, R., Jacobsen, B. H. et al. (2022). Managing nitrogen legacies to accelerate water quality improvement. Nature Geoscience, 15(2), 97-105 Bojnec, Š and Fertő, I. 2019. “Farm household income inequality in Slovenia.” _Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research_ 17(4): e0112–e0112.

Cassou, E., S. M. Jaffee, and J. Ru. 2018. _The Challenge of Agricultural Pollution: Evidence from China, Vietnam, and the Philippines._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

Castaneda, R, Doan, D, Newhouse, D L, Nguyen, M, Uematsu, H and Azevedo, J P. 2016. _Who are the Poor in the Developing World?_ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (7844).

<mark>Chibwana, C, Fisher, M, Jumbe, C, Masters, W A and Shively, G. 2010.</mark> _<mark>Measuring the Impacts of Malawi's Farm Input Subsidy Program</mark>_ <mark>. Available at SSRN 1860867.</mark> Chibwana, C, Fisher, M and Shively, G. 2012. “Cropland allocation effects of agricultural input subsidies in Malawi.” _World Development_ 40(1): 124–133.

Damania, R, Berg, C, Russ, J, Federico Barra, A, Nash, J and Ali, R. 2017. “Agricultural technology choice and transport.” _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_ 99(1): 265–284.

<mark>Damania, R, Desbureaux, S, Rodella, A S, Russ, J and Zaveri, E. 2019.</mark> _<mark>Quality Unknown: The Invisible Water Crisis</mark>_ <mark>. World Bank Publications.</mark> <mark>Dorward, A. 2009.</mark> _<mark>Rethinking Agricultural Input Subsidy Programmes in a Changing World</mark>_ <mark>. Report prepared for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome.</mark> Duflo, E., Kremer, M., & Robinson, J. (2011). Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: Theory and experimental evidence from Kenya. _American economic review_ , _101_ (6), 2350-90.

El Benni, N. and R. Finger (2013). “The effect of agricultural policy reforms on income inequality in Swiss agriculture: An analysis for valley, hill and mountain regions.” _Journal of Policy Modeling 35_ (4): 638–651.

<mark>Ellis, F. 1992.</mark> _<mark>Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries</mark>_ <mark>. Cambridge University Press.</mark> Fan, S, Gulati, A and Thorat, S. 2008. “Investment, subsidies, and pro-poor growth in rural India.” _Agricultural Economics_ 39(2): 163–170.

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policy and management affairs in the Guadalquivir basin facilitated the site visit, arranging interviews and preparing a background paper on the basin prior to the visit (Giansante et al. 2002). Background papers for all case study visits are based on a common outline. During the site visit, team members met with and interviewed 12 individuals, including basin-level stakeholders, past and current regional and local government officials, and basin authority staff.<sup>2</sup> The interviews were focused on understanding the processes of institutional change and the performance of water management institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, matters that were closely within the knowledge of the interviewees. After the visit, team members combined their notes from the interviews, revisited and revised the basin background paper, reviewed other materials, and composed this paper summarizing and analyzing the river basin management situation in the Guadalquivir basin.

The following analysis of the Guadalquivir basin case is therefore based on a combination of sources—documentary materials on Spain and the Guadalquivir basin, the background paper prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site visit. The findings and conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a single individual or organization, but emerge from a composite of data collected and reviewed by the research project team.

# **4. Guadalquivir Basin Water Management Issues**

# **_4.1 Physical Characteristics_**

The Guadalquivir River Basin<sup>3</sup> extends westerly across southern Spain, and nearly all (90.2%) of its 57,017 km<sup>2</sup> area lies within the region ( _Communidad Autonoma_ , or CA) of Andalucia. The entire 640-km main stem of the Guadalquivir River itself is located within the CA of Andalucia.

As is the case throughout southern (or Mediterranean) Spain, the Guadalquivir basin has a relatively small share of the nation’s water resources, despite having a substantial share of Spain’s population. The southern river basins of Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Sur, Segura, and Jucar contain 37% of Spain’s population and represent 41% of the Spanish land surface, but receive 19% of the country’s total precipitation and runoff.

2 Organizations from which individuals were interviewed include the Confederacion Hidrografica del Guadalquivir; the Public Works and Transportation ministry of the Andalusian regional government; EMASESA, the municipal water supply utility for the city of Seville; Consorcio del Huesna, the water and wastewater service provider for several suburban portions of the Seville metropolitan area; the Conferacion Hidrografica del Tajo; the irrigation community of Valle Inferior del Guadalquivir; Feragua, the federation of irrigation communities in the Guadalaquivir basin; and the Spanish Ministry of the Environment.

> 3 See map at the beginning of the paper.

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GDP prior to the adjustment – a very modest fraction of the public sector’s primary spending. To put it differently, in Latin America’s fiscal adjustment investment as a ratio to GDP fell much more abruptly than public consumption. Indeed, in a majority of the countries for which data is available, public consumption rose relative to GDP, while public infrastructure investment fell, implying that the public investment cuts partly financed an expansion of public consumption.

This sort of bias, however, is not exclusive of Latin America’s experience. Indeed, the international evidence suggests that it is the rule rather than the exception. Cuts in public investment, and infrastructure in particular, often account for the lion’s share of fiscal deficit reduction.<sup>29</sup> And the phenomenon is observed also in rich countries. A case in point was the generalized compression of public investment witnessed across the European Union in the run-up to fulfilling the Maastritch deficit targets (see Balassone and Franco 2000).<sup>30</sup> This tendency towards compression of public investment at times of fiscal austerity underlies the fact that investment is the most volatile of all public spending items.<sup>31</sup> The seeming anti-investment bias of fiscal discipline likely reflects several factors. Among them, political economy considerations are surely important: it is politically much harder to cut pensions or public sector wages than to cancel infrastructure projects. However, another key factor behind the bias is the fact that fiscal adjustment programs typically focus on the short-term path of the government’s cash deficit and debt stock. These two magnitudes are closely scrutinized by multilateral institutions and private creditors and investors, and usually form the basis of loan conditions in the fiscal and macroeconomic dimensions.

However, debt and the cash deficit can be misleading as measures of solvency – which is the ultimate concern of fiscal adjustment programs. The reason is that they

> 29 For developing countries, this was documented by Hicks (1991) in a cross-regional context, and more recently by Estache (2004) for Sub-Saharan Africa. For industrial countries, Roubini and Sachs (1989) and De Haan, Sturm, and Sikken (1996) foud that capital expenditure falls disproportionately at times of fiscal stringency.

> 30 Of the nine EU countries that exceeded the deficit target in 1992, eight met it in 1997; in all eight public investment had fallen relative to GDP, and in seven of them it had also fallen faster than other primary expenditure. On the other hand, three of the six countries that met the target already in 1992 raised their public investment in the subsequent years.

> 31 This is shown by Talvi and Végh (2000) using data from developing countries, and by Lane (2003) using data from industrial countries.

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industrial composition allows for adjustment relative to changes in national output composition. For results in column 3, the instrument list readily passes the specification test. First stage regressions for the covariates have average partial _R_<sup>_2_</sup> ’s and _F_ ’s of respectively .52 and 2852, which are strong for differenced covariates. For differenced intercity-transport costs, we use the difference between 1995 and 1980 for 2000-1991; and the difference between 1980 and 1968 for 1991-1980.

We find that increases in rural population supply, market potential of goods, labor force quality improvements (measured by changes in educational attainment) increase the growth rate of city population. As a new effect, educational attainment in the base period increases city population growth rates afterwards, confirming spillover effects of knowledge accumulation. But as noted above, reductions in intercity-transport costs have a moderate effect on city population growth rate. A 10% decrease in intercity-transport costs increases city population growth by .9% over a decade. Initial city size has a negative coefficient, suggesting some conditional convergence in population growth across cities. Also, cities with high manufacturing ratios in the base period experience faster growth. We also find that once base period population and industrial composition are controlled for, state capitals are growing faster than other cities.

In Table 5-2, we introduce two additional local characteristics to the specification in Table 5-1, column 3. These are (1) ratio of public industry capital to total industry capital stock in 1980<sup>11</sup> and (2) base period homicide rates. The main difference between the GMM results in column 3, Table 5-1 and those from Table 5-2 is that the statistical significance for the change in market potential drops to 20 percent. Other results are

> 11 Total industry capital includes both public and private industry capital stocks. The capital stock data comes from Morandi and Reis (2004). Due to data limitation, we use capital stock in 1980, which is the most recent year available.

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but they can also disrupt the ability of _gram sabhas_ to make rational collective decisions. In other words, deliberation in low literacy settings raises the possibility that _gram sabhas_ are simply “talking shops” that bear no relationship to democratic dialogue. This hypothesis is explicitly tested by Ban, Jha, and Rao’s (2012) quantitative analysis of coded versions of the same _gram sabha_ transcripts examined by Rao and Sanyal (2010). Deriving hypotheses from rational choice models of group decision making under uncertainty, they analyze the transcript data to test three competing hypotheses of the types of equilibrium that characterize _gram sabha_ interactions: (a) “cheap talk,” in which discussions are not substantive even though they may appear equitable; (b) elite capture, in which discussion is dominated by the interests of landowning and wealthy citizens; and (c) “efficient democracy,” in which meetings follow patterns of good democratic practice. They find that in villages with more diversity in caste groups, and less village-wide agreement on policy priorities, the topics discussed track those of interest to the median household. In villages with less caste heterogeneity, the priorities of landowners are more likely to dominate the discourse (consistent with elite domination). The authors conclude that _gram sabhas_ are more than mere opportunities for cheap talk, that they more closely follow patterns observed in a well-functioning “efficient” democracy.

In addition to elite domination by landed and wealthy classes, scholars have also begun to examine whether deliberation in _gram sabhas_ is gendered in nature, and how policies aimed at inclusion might mitigate gender biases. This question is explored in a working paper by Palaniswamy, Parthasarathy, and Rao, who use text-as-data methods on an original sample of transcripts from Tamil Nadu to evaluate whether and how women participate in village assemblies. They find that despite the relatively high rates of attendance, women are the “silent sex” (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014); however, they also show that a state intervention which builds women’s networks and trains them to engage with village government dramatically increases both women’s presence and frequency of speech at the _sabha_ . Though the authors are optimistic about the potential 14
Most informal workers, and a fair share of formal wage employees, work in mediumskilled occupations (Figure 10). We define medium-skilled occupations as those that require job-specific skills, excluding highly skilled professionals.<sup>55</sup> About 64 percent of informal sector workers are in medium-skilled occupations, as compared to 49.5 percent of formal wage workers. High-skilled occupations generally increase with level of formality, where one-third of formal wage employees are employed in high-skilled occupations. Notably, both low- and high-skilled occupations are found across all employment types, both in the aggregate and at the country level. The conditional correlates find that medium-skilled occupations are particularly aligned with LE-SE, while low-skilled occupations are more aligned with being an informal employee (Table 2). As expected, more vulnerable workers have higher shares of employment in low-skilled occupations and lower shares in mediumor high-skilled occupations than workers with a high level of welfare (Figure 11).

**Figure 10. Jobs characteristics by employment types**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Sector Occupations<br>Total 11.8 18.5 46.9 22.8 Total 23.6 58.7 17.7<br>Total Inf 17.6 18.0 44.3 20.1 Total Inf 29.9 64.1 6.0<br>Unpaid 45.3 17.2 24.7 12.7 Unpaid 45.3 51.1 3.7<br>Paid Info 4.6 21.2 38.0 36.2 Paid Info 32.6 55.8 11.5<br>LE-SE 17.7 16.1 54.4 11.7 LE-SE 23.6 73.3 3.1<br>HE-SE 7.3 15.3 58.4 19.1 HE-SE 16.7 61.9 21.4<br>Paid Form 1.7 19.8 50.1 28.4 Paid Form 14.0 49.5 36.5<br>0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Agricultu re Industr y Servic e Other Low-skille d Medium-skille d High-skilled<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own elaboration based on GMD. Notes: Cross-country averages using population weights. Countries included in the sectoral averages: Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tomé and Principe, South Africa, Eswatini, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Countries included in the occupation averages: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sao Tomé and Principe, South Africa, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

> 55 Low-skilled occupations include <mark>agricultural, forestry and fishery workers and elementary workers; medium-skilled occupations include clerical and support workers, service and sales workers, craft and related trades workers, and plant and machine operators and assemblers; high-skilled occupations comprise managers, professional and technicians and associate professionals.</mark>

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# **Figure 22: Number of Countries (34) Meeting Minimum Requirements**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Legal Framework<br>34<br>32<br>30<br>28<br>26<br>24<br>22<br>20<br>18<br>16<br>14<br>12<br>10<br>0 2468<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Priority Area (<10 countries meet min. req's)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations

**Figure 23: Percentage of Countries Meeting Minimum Requirements, by Income Group**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Legal Framework<br>90%<br>Debt Reporting Managerial Structure<br>80%<br>70%<br>Debt Records 60% Debt Management Strategy<br>50%<br>40%<br>Segregation of Duties, Staff 30% Evaluation of Debt<br>Capacity and BCP Management Operations<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>Debt Administration and<br>Audit<br>Data Security<br>Cash Flow Forecasting and Coordination with Fiscal<br>Cash Balance Management Policy<br>Loan Guarantees, On Coordination with<br>lending Derivatives Monetary Policy<br>External Borrowing Domestic Borrowing<br>Low Income Lower Middle Income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations<br><!-- End of picture text --> 13
**Figure 1.  Civil Rights vs. Political Liberties, 2007.**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 2 4 6 8<br>CL<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>PR<br>2<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Where 8 indicates the highest level of civil rights and political liberties, and the size of bubbles represent the number of countries. Source: Freedom House, 2007.

At a first glance the relationship between civil and political rights with the level of development in 2007 seems to be non-linear, where countries with low and high levels of CPR register slightly higher levels of GDP per capita as compared to countries with levels of CPR in the middle of the range (Figure 2).

**Figure 2.  Civil and political rights vs. per Capita Income, 2007**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 12<br>11<br>10<br>9<br>8<br>7<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8<br>CPR<br>ln GDP PPP per capita PPP<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Freedom House and World Bank.

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Page 2 of 6 with damaging, ill-thought-out, across the board cuts. Frequently, it will be found that the linkages between the macroeconomic framework and the investment program, and between both and the budget process, are fragile or non-existent. Many governments encounter considerable difficulty in formulating an investment program that is more than an aggregation of wishlists drawn up by the different spending agencies. Control over the external borrowings of government agencies is frequently less than desirable, and even where this exists, donor pressure can at times undermine attempts to exclude significant but economically unljustifiable capital expenditures from the investment program. Phasing of capital spending is often inadequate or non-existent, while the recurrent cost implications of public investments are rarely taken into account. Classifieation of bttdgetary items may not facilitate a policy or objectives oriented approach to public expenditure planning. Budgetary coverage, both in terms of institutions and major categories of expenditure, may be partial, impeding the ability of the core ministries to exercise effective control. On the other hand, the organization of the spending agencies, their technical capabilities for financial and economic analysis, and their linkages with core ministries may be such that an integratid and coordinated approach to revenues and expenditures is, at best, severely impeded. Accounting and financial information systems, which used to work reasonably well, have deteriorated in many couv-iies, and in some cases have disintegrated to the point where they ha come inoperable. Their restoration is a prerequisite, though far frok. fficient condition, for strengthened public expenditure management.

(iii) Government responses to these immense difficulties have been, perhaps inevitably, piecemeal. Most of them have concentrated on expenditure control with an inevitably short term perspes-ive. Others, however, have attempted major organizational reforms, combined, in some cases, with wholesale changes to the planning and budgetary systems. Success has been decidedly mixed.

(iv) While tightening expenditure control at the center may be a necessary and valid response, at least in the short term, it is far from synonymous with good public expenditure management. Even when it is accompanied by strengthening of core institutions, care should be taken not to neglect the sectoral ministries and line agencies where institutional improvements are equally vital. There are, moreover, important questions of accountability and autonomy at stake. Strengthened central control carries the danger of overdetailed intervention by core ministries. Long term institutional reform should concentrate on improving the capacities of both core and line agencies to manage expenditures in accordance with the objectives of economic policy. This, in turn, means developing measurable objectives and evaluation systems linked to appropriate rewards and penalties.