was not be respected, because prominent political figures agreed (or were willing not to create any judicial problem) in order to secure the Autostrade’s largest shareholders. So in 2003 the initial hard-core shareholders expanded from 30 to 50.1 percent, eluding the fundamental mechanism meant by the _Consiglio di Stato_ for its opening to privates. The second stop occurred in 1997 and was due to _Corte dei Conti_ , which blocked the privatization for two reasons: the first was that by contract Autostrade (publically managed) had a concession until 2018, but the ministerial measure under attack was both extending it to 2038 and implementing the privatization. The main point was that the expansion of the concession had to occur through a tender (at the end of 2018) and could not be imposed by a ministerial act (which in the Italian legal system is much less important than a law of parliament, which could have made it possible). The second point, which warned the _Corte_ , was the introduction of a vast investment plan, for which no financial coverage was identified in the law and as a public finance judiciary, it could not avoid stopping the law.<sup>28</sup> The government passed this block after a complicated technical and judicial confrontation with the _Corte dei Conti_ , which ended up signing the measure in the financial registers of the state with reservation. However, in 1998 a new stop to the sale occurred because both the Italian Antitrust<sup>29</sup> and the European Commission Directorate on Competition<sup>30</sup> asked for the revision of the 2038 concession extension. Because of the European Treaties on the Economic Community, the government was forced to intervene and solve this conflict, reacting the following deal: the privatized part of Autostrade would only be responsible for the management and maintenance of the highway and some of its technical services would be the responsibility of a different public company.<sup>31</sup> In the same year, this “infinite story” seemed to be experiencing a new stop because Consob (the stock surveillance authority) noticed some suspicious pre-privatization fluctuations of Autostrade shares,<sup>32</sup> especially linked with the “privatization breaks” caused by Consiglio di Stato, Corte dei Conti, Antitrust and EU DG on competition. This caused a new slowdown and an investigation for insider trading, which alarmed the markets and the public authorities.

# **Final Considerations**

The Italian highway PPP experience is very complex and contains some positive elements amid several concerning points. Inevitably the new cycle of investments favored some remarkable quality gains and sparked a needed expansion of infrastructure. However, many issues need to be critically analyzed. The first is the “privatize now and regulate later” approach, which has proven to be detrimental to public welfare, as most of the public organizations have argued in their collective request for a stricter reform on tariff regulation and concession provision.

Table 4 reports the formidable rise in the profitability of Autostrade between 2004 and 2008. The NARS (a technical body of CIPE) is very critical regarding the behaviors of this large group and has asked for a profound revision of the tariff mechanism and a tougher regulation process. In its 2007 report, it argued that more than 80 percent of the concessionaires have implemented only a small percentage of the scheduled investments and have gained impressive profits by obtaining public subsidies while delaying the investments that these should have financed.<sup>33</sup> In its 2008 report, ANAS states that “by analyzing the December 31, 2008 concessionaire balance sheet, aggregate investment was 1,676 million euros, against a contractually planned

> 28 <u>http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/10/28/stop-della-corte-dei-conti-alla-vendita.html</u>

> 29 <u>http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/giugno/02/Autostrade_Antitrust_campo_co_0_98060211313.shtml</u> 30http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/giugno/09/Bruxelles_pronta_intervenire_sulla_vendita_co_0_98060910243.sht <u>ml</u> 31http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1998/05/23/autostrade-si-ue-alla-concessione-soltanto- <u>se.html</u>

> 32 <u>http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1998/febbraio/24/Insider_Autostrade_magistratura_indaga_co_0_9802245722.shtml</u> 33 Relazione al Cipe sull’Attività svolta dal NARS nel 2007, pages 16 to 24.

12