information allows for better political participation and better policy decisions; (ii) it fosters coordination with other sectors (security has to be seen in a broad context); (iii) monitoring is important to ensure accountability and fight bureaucratic inertia; (iv) transparency encourages self-restraint (potentially desirable to avoid risk-mitigating reactions); and (v) overall, transparency supports better implementation (see Roberts, 2007). This is not to deny that there are areas where secrecy is desirable, for instance to protect judicial or intelligence sources or to create a strategic advantage of surprise vis-à-vis an enemy. But there is also the risk that secrecy directives would be excessive and carry consequences (according to Roberts, 2007, the ordinance on state secrets in Vietnam is so broad that some economic data generally available in other countries are classified). Hence security sectorspecific exceptions to transparency should be limited and clearly understood. In particular, there is little or no justification for withholding general information on agency budgets (including budgets of intelligence agencies).

The third dimension, **policy-based budgeting** , covers processes by which resources are allocated according to strategic priorities both within the security sector and across all sectors (including security). Sector strategies are critical in this regard, as are the broad priorities indicated in the overall national strategy for development. Figure 6 presents a generic process for defense policy and organizational reviews, which is broadly applicable to other parts of a country’s security sector as well. While the full complexity shown need not be followed in every case, the main elements need to be present.

**Figure 6: Process of Conducting Defense Reviews/Developing Defense Policy Frameworks**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Consultation/<br>Information<br>Depending on the issue under<br>consideration, input may be<br>sought from:<br>• Ministry of finance<br>• Other ministries not directly<br>involved in the review<br>process<br>• Legislators<br>• External expert review<br>panels<br>• Armed forces<br>• Informal groups of experts<br>from academia, industry,<br>policy community, interest<br>groups<br>• Relevant civil society<br>organizations<br>• Members of the public<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Force Structure Options within Context of<br>Financial Parameters<br>Including force structure, materiel, end strength,<br>procurement, infrastructure, readiness<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Economic Policy<br>Framework<br>Including national<br>development objectives,<br>defense budgeting<br>process<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Defense Policy Framework<br>Fundamental values<br>National/vital/strategic interests<br>Legal basis of defense policy<br>Foreign policy objectives<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Legal basis of defense policy Guidance on Review<br>Foreign policy objectives<br>Process<br>Overall policy direction<br>Issues to be addressed<br>Strategic Security Assessment Fiscal framework<br>Domestic, regional, international environment Required consultations<br>National commitments Due date<br>Potential risks/challenges<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Non-defence Security<br>Policy Process<br>Intelligence; public security;<br>intelligence, and so on<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Adapted from Ball, Bouta, and Goor (2003, p. 53)._ These policy development and organizational review processes need to be guided from the beginning by an indicative fiscal framework to promote sustainability (see Section 3 on fiscal affordability). Review processes should be as transparent and inclusive as possible. Insofar as they are based on broad consultations among the relevant stakeholders, and if the final product is made public, for example through the publication of a policy paper, their 22