**Table 5. Interest rate and APY / APR disclosure**

||**Savi**<br>|**ngs**<br>|||**Cr**<br>|**edit**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Intere|st rate|AP|Y|Intere|st rate|A|PR|
|All|Voluntary|All|Voluntary|All|Voluntary|All|Voluntary|
|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|HL * HI<br>-0.089|0.052|0.700***|0.076|0.107|-0.026|0.322***|-0.029|
|(0.056)|(0.099)|(0.081)|(0.045)|(0.064)|(0.055)|(0.073)|(0.033)|
|HL * LI<br>-0.071|0.052|0.634***|0.003|0.129*|-0.023|0.368***|0.010|
|(0.043)|(0.103)|(0.112)|(0.031)|(0.066)|(0.055)|(0.062)|(0.036)|
|Investment<br>0.006<br>|0.115<br>|-0.046<br>|0.003<br>|||||
|(0.044)|(0.085)|(0.090)|(0.033)|||||
|High indebtedness||||0.023|0.013|-0.028|-0.016|
|||||(0.056)|(0.049)|(0.058)|(0.031)|
|Formal dress<br>0.037|0.031|-0.073*|-0.012|0.041|-0.055|-0.002|0.010|
|(0.024)|(0.048)|(0.041)|(0.032)|(0.042)|(0.041)|(0.034)|(0.016)|
|R-squared<br>0.167|0.036|0.650|0.034|0.138|0.078|0.291|0.107|
|**Observations**<br>392|392|226|226|435|435|435|435|
|Peru<br>121|121|121|121|150|150|150|150|
|Mexico<br>105|105|105|105|115|115|115|115|
|Ghana<br>166|166|0|0|170|170|170|170|
|**Means for control auditors**||||||||
|Dep. Variable<br>0.918|0.330|0.023|0.023|0.584|0.158|0.089|0.079|
|<br>Peru<br>1.000|0.278|0.056|0.056|0.737|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Mexico<br>1.000|0.346|0.000|0.000|0.182|0.152|0.212|0.212|
|Ghana<br>0.849|0.340|||0.833|0.367|0.067|0.033|
|**P-value of test**||||||||
|_HL * HI = HL * LI_<br>0.708|0.998|0.456|0.030|0.725|0.954|0.469|0.277|
|_HL = 0_<br>0.208|0.856|0.000|0.087|0.125|0.873|0.000|0.500|
|**Panel A: Means**||||||||
|Commercial Banks<br>0.906|0.352|0.410|0.036|0.613|0.108|0.204|0.022|
|Peru<br>1.000|0.300|0.540|0.040|0.667|0.083|0.333|0.021|
|Mexico<br>0.939|0.394|0.212|0.030|0.211|0.053|0.105|0.053|
|Ghana<br>0.778|0.378|||0.808|0.192|0.038|0.000|
|Other Financial Inst.<br>0.894|0.424|0.364|0.056|0.762|0.211|0.228|0.059|
|Peru<br>1.000|0.380|0.563|0.056|0.676|0.029|0.324|0.000|
|Mexico<br>1.000|0.389|0.167|0.056|0.614|0.333|0.474|0.246|
|Ghana<br>0.769|0.471|||0.882|0.292|0.062|0.028|
|**Panel B: P-values of difference in means**||||||||
|Mexico-Peru<br>0.128|0.502|0.000|0.946|0.008|0.000|0.277|0.000|
|Mexico-Ghana<br>0.000|0.371|||0.000|0.262|0.000|0.000|
|Peru-Ghana<br>0.000|0.093|||0.000|0.000|0.000|0.226|
|Commercial Banks - Other Fin. Inst.<br>0.707|0.169|0.494|0.507|0.023|0.037|0.376|0.079|
|_Commercial Banks_||||||||
|Mexico-Peru<br>0.080|0.382|0.003|0.820|0.001|0.672|0.059|0.498|
|Mexico-Ghana<br>0.052|0.887|||0.000|0.181|0.386|0.247|
|Peru-Ghana<br>0.000|0.429|||0.204|0.176|0.004|0.466|
|_Other Financial Inst._||||||||
|Mexico-Peru<br>.|0.916|0.000|0.984|0.134|0.000|0.073|0.000|
|Mexico-Ghana<br>0.000|0.268|||0.000|0.481|0.000|0.000|
|Peru-Ghana<br>0.000|0.223|||0.000|0.000|0.000|0.090|

This table reports the estimation of the following specificaiton: _y ij = β 1 HL i * HI ij + β 2 HL i * LI ij + β 3 INV i + β 4 F ij + β 5 L i + β 6 C i + γ G i + ε ij_ , where _i_ indexes the auditor, _j_ indexes the visiting institution, _HL i_ is an indicator for high literacy or experience, _HI ij_ takes value 1 if auditor _i_ visiting institution _j_ quotes a high interest rate (high competition in case of savings), while LIij is an indicator for a low interest rate quote (low competition). In addition, _INV i_ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if auditor i has a preference for an investment account or fixed term deposit (0 if transaction account), for credit auditor-branch pairs it is replaced with the dummy _HD i_ that takes the value of 1 if the auditor asked for a loan amounting to 70 percent of its household income (0 if asked for a loan of 20 percent of its household income). The dummy _F ij_ takes value 1 if auditor _i_ visiting institution j was dressed formally. An observation in the regression is an auditor-branch pair, each pair during credit audits could have multiple visits. We report the voluntary and eventual disclosure of the interest rate and APY / APR. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the rate was disclosed. All auditors were instructed to ask for interest rate if staff failed to provide it, with the exception of control (neophyte) auditors in Mexico. Only experienced auditors asked about APY / APR. Because disclosure of APY in Ghana was not mandated, the survey did not record information on its actual disclosure by the staff. All regressions include country fixed effects, auditor's gender, dummies for visits to commercial institutions and provincial areas. Control auditors were assigned the script without experience (neophyte) and had preference for a transaction account for savings audits or a loan size of 20 percent of household income (low indebtedness) for credit audits. Standard errors are clustered at the auditor level and are reported in parenthesis under coefficient estimates. Levels of significance * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.