Differences in the incidence of effects generated by moving from market income to disposable, consumable and final income are related not only to the progressivity of fiscal interventions, but also to the scale of redistribution, caused by them and the modeling of separate income concepts. The large size of the pension system compared to other social expenses determines the higher scale of effects if post-fiscal income is compared to the base of market income by the PGT approach, rather than by the PDI approach. A more positive effect at the level of final income compared to consumable income is rooted in the modeling, as total modeled final income is 9.3% higher than total market income by the PGT approach (9.0% by the PDI approach, see Table 9), while consumable income is 9.5% lower (9.8% lower by PDI approach).

**Figure 14. Distribution of individuals by market and disposable income**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150<br>market income (PGT), USD PPP market income (PDI), USD PPP<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : own estimates based on CEQ methodology.

Overall, the progressivity of fiscal interventions and the average positive effect observed for lower deciles, does not necessary imply that everybody from low income groups automatically benefits from fiscal interventions (see dots below 45-degree line). Differences in the incidence of effects generated by moving from market income to disposable, consumable and final income are related not only to the progressivity of fiscal interventions, but also to the scale of redistribution, caused by them and the modeling of separate income concepts. The large size of the pension system compared to other social expenses determines the higher scale of effects if post-fiscal income is compared to the base of market income by the PGT approach, rather than by the PDI approach. A more positive effect at the level of final income compared to consumable income is rooted in the modeling, as total modeled final income is 9.3% higher than total market income by the PGT approach (9.0% by the PDI approach, see Table 9), while consumable income is 9.5% lower (9.8% lower by PDI approach).

# Figure 14).

On the one hand, distribution plots of net recipients and donors overlap to a rather small extent if they are ranked by market income modeled according to the PGT approach (see Figure 15a). Around 45% of all net beneficiaries within the system of direct taxes and transfers (that includes the pension system) have market incomes below 10 USD PPP (which is a proxy for the national poverty line). Moreover, 97.5% of population with market incomes below 10 USD PPP benefit from this system. The donors, in turn, are largely people with market incomes above 20 USDD PPP, which may be interpreted as a good targeting of the system. On the other hand, ranking people according to disposable (post-fiscal) income changes the situation dramatically. Distribution plots of net recipients and donors within the system of direct taxes and transfers largely coincide (see Figure 15b). As the result, 60% of population with disposable incomes below 10 USD PPP per day faces a reduction of income due to the system of direct taxes and transfers that includes the pension system. Hence, direct transfers and taxes, and the pension system in particular, substantially reduce poverty and inequality, but generate significant reranking effect as well.

If the pension system is excluded from the analysis, the number of net beneficiaries becomes much lower. Their distribution by income bins coincides to a significant degree with the distribution of net donors even if people are ranked by market income (see Figure 15c). The share of people benefiting from the system of direct transfers and taxes among the population with pre-fisc market income (PDI approach) below 10 USD PPP is 82.3%. However, they constitute only 14.6% of all net beneficiaries from the system of direct taxes and transfers. Furthermore, 26