**Table 2. Institutional arrangements for power sector planning and procurement in Kenya and comparators, 2015**<sup>**12**</sup>

|Planningand Procurement|**Kenya**|**Senegal **|**Tanzania **|**Uganda**|**International**<br>**Benchmark**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Generation Planning**|86%|43%|43%|43%|56%|
|**Transmission Planning**|75%|100%|75%|75%|72%|
|**Procurement of Generation**|100%|50%|100%|95%|85%|
|**Transmission Procurement**|67%|42%|92%|92%|64%|

Note: Scores based on index developed for the Rethinking Power Sector Reform Project. For more details go to project website at http://www.esmap.org/rethinking_power_sector_reform However, there have been times when clear tensions emerged between pragmatic, technoeconomic plans (such as the LCPDP) and “political visions,” such as President Mwai Kibaki’s _Vision 2030_ and President Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2013 5,000 MW Power Plan _._ Though the latter plans are not in line with the LCPDP methodology, the pressure to adopt optimistic assumptions around demand growth (and other factors) has seeped into power sector plans. For example, the 2011–2031 LCPDP was modified to support the MoEP's 5,000 MW program. The subsequent scaling back of that program in the face of the sector’s projected surplus of supply is the result of undue political influence on planning. Different perspectives are possible on balancing the pragmatic and the visionary, but it is clear that the ERC’s LCPDP process is undermined by the ambitious political targets and pressure to push those targets into technical plans.

The LCPDP was originally meant to be updated annually (and then biennially). An update of the 2011 plan did not come until 2016, and this was updated again in 2018 (before being recalled for more consultations with government. These updates have been fed into the regulator’s periodic cost-ofservice study. The review process for these plans has provided an opportunity to challenge technical assumptions. Nevertheless, linkages between planning and implementation could be further strengthened.

Kenya also scores well against other countries with respect to procurement (table 2). Procurement of generation projects can be done in several ways, as discussed in Part 2. Some projects identified in the LCPDP are earmarked for development by KenGen, which then floats tenders for engineering, procurement, and construction contracts. Alternatively, KPLC (the off-taker) issues tenders for IPP projects, especially for fossil-fuel-fired thermal technologies. In either case, the procurement is conducted in good time, taking into account projected online dates and project lead times.

Interventions to accelerate renewables began in 2008, with the development of a feed-in tariff policy. Under the policy, KenGen or IPPs develop projects according to the milestones stipulated and ultimately negotiate PPAs with KPLC. The MoEP can also offer private companies geothermal power concessions or generating licenses; timelines are stipulated in the concession agreement or license. Similar scenarios apply to coal and gas concessions.

More recently, Kenya’s county governments have been given a mandate to undertake planning and development with respect to the regulation of electricity and petroleum. Following the promulgation of the current constitution in 2010, MoEP formed an Energy Sector Committee on the

> 12 For the detailed planning and procurement index, see the Annex.

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