rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
26 _national_ non-governmental organizations, but such data are not available on a cross-national basis. The data are estimated on the basis of data obtained from the Union of International Associations (UIA, annual; Wiik, 2002: 62). The variable was log-transformed.

Civil armed conflicts and international armed conflicts may have a negative relationship with democratization. We use the Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) to control for this. The variable _Civil conflict_ (including internationalized internal conflict) is a categorical variable with no conflict coded as 0, minor conflict coded as 1, and war coded as 2. The reference category for the variable is no conflict. The same procedure was applied for the _International conflict_ variable. Both these variables were lagged by one year in the analyses.

Finally, both the frequency and motivations for democratic interventions have probably changed after the end of the Cold War. Our _Post-Cold war_ variable was scored 1 in the years 1990–96 and 0 otherwise.

# **Democratic Interventions?**

The first question we investigate is whether democracies engage in frequent interventionary behavior. Figure 2 shows the trends in the _incidence_ of military interventions – the share of the world’s countries in which a democratic or a non-democratic country or alliance was intervening. The most striking trend is the decrease in non-democratic interventions after the end of the Cold War. This decrease is to a large extent due to the changes in the Soviet Union: The USSR ended five interventions in 1988 and a sixth one in 1991. Apart from a peak in early 1990s, there is no such trend for democratic interventions since the 1970s – around 10% of the world’s countries have been targets of democratic interventions in the last 25 years of the data material. In the 1990s, more than two thirds of all interventions have involved democratic countries. In the 1980s, almost two thirds of the interventions were non-democratic.
**<u>Table 1: The Development of Legislation, 1981-2000</u>**

|**YEAR**|<br> <br>**GATT/WTO**|<br>**LAW**|<br>**RESPONSIBLE**<br>**ENTITY**|**INSTRUMENTS**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1981|<sup>Subsidies Code/Tokyo</sup><br>Round/ GATT 1947|Decree<br>No 742|Central Bank|Compensatory<br>adjustments (CA);<br>minimum customs values<br>(MCV); surcharges.|
|1986|Subsidies Code/Tokyo<br>Round/ GATT 1947|Law No18,525|Central Bank|CA; MCV; surcharges|
|1989<br>1992|Subsidies Code/Tokyo<br>Round/ GATT 1947<br>Subsidies Code/Tokyo<br>Round/ GATT 1947|Law No<br>18,840 and<br>No 18,908<br>Law<br>No 19,155|Distortions<br>Commission<br>Distortions<br>Commission|CA; MCV; surcharges<br>CA; MCV; surcharges;<br>anti-dumping duties.|
|1995|WTO|Law<br>No 19,383|Distortions<br>Commission|CA; MCV, surcharges;<br>anti-dumping duties|
|1999<br>Sour|WTO<br>ce<br>: _Diario Oficial_, several i|Law<br>No 19,612<br>ssues.|Distortions<br>Commission|Safeguards; anti-dumping<br>duties;CA|

<u>Source:</u> _Diario Oficial_ , several issues. <u>Note: In 1999, both MCV and surcharges were removed from Chilean legislation.</u> In October 1981, the Subsidies Commission was created and installed in Chile’s Central Bank (BCCH). Its role was related to initiating, conducting and concluding investigations on subsidized imports, and to submit its conclusions to the Ministry of Finance, which could use them to adopt compensatory adjustments in the form of “tariff surcharges” which consisted in an increase in the tariff up to the maximum level of 35% consolidated by Chile in the Tokyo Round. Likewise, the Commission was entitled to recommend the adoption of minimum customs values (MCV).

In an attempt to increase its representativeness, at the end of 1985 the composition of the Subsidies Commission was modified to include members from the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs, the National Customs Service and the anti-trust authority (Fiscal Nacional Económico, FNE). The Commission continued to be chaired by the BCCH (see Table 1).

In 1986, Law N° 18,525 was passed. It created the “National Commission for Investigations on Imports Price Distortions”<sup>1</sup> , known as the National Commission for Price 1 Before Law 18,525, article 186 of Law 16,464 delegated the faculty to suspend, reduce or raise customs duties to the President of Chile. As from the entry in effect of the Constitution of 1980 6
The WGI project has evolved in several directions over the past decade. A key feature of the WGI is its effort to develop more precise or informative measures of broad concepts of governance by drawing on a diverse set of underlying indicators. One important dimension of this evolution is a basic one -- a steady expansion in the number of underlying data sources on which the WGI are based. In our very first effort (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a,b)) the WGI were based on just 13 data sources covering only 173 countries. Since then we have added sources each year as they have become available, and made backwards revisions to the earlier data as well to incorporate these sources, until the current round of the WGI which now covers 212 countries and is based on 35 separate data sources.

As the number of data sources has expanded, the aggregate WGI have become more informative about the broad notions of governance they seek to capture. In particular, the average standard error associated with the governance estimates has declined by more than 1/3 since the first round of the indicators in 1996. Another important innovation three years ago was that we began to make the individual indicators underlying the aggregate WGI publicly available through the WGI website, including data from a large number of commercial sources. This makes the WGI project one of the largest cross-country datasets on governance available.

The WGI have also evolved in terms of the accompanying analytic work on relevant data issues. In our first effort (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a,b)) we extensively discussed alternative approaches to constructing aggregate indicators, and over the years we have addressed further aggregation issues. For example, in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006a, 2007a) we analyzed extensively the possibility that expert assessments might make correlated perceptions errors in their assessments of governance and that this would distort the weighting of sources in the aggregate WGI. We showed that there was in fact very little evidence for such correlated perceptions errors, and moreover that the WGI were very robust to simple alternative weighting schemes, including just straight unweighted averaging of the underlying data sources.

We have also investigated the empirical relevance of other potential problems with expert assessments, for example, the hypotheses that expert assessments are 4
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- Yeats, Alexander (1977a) "A Comparative Analysis of Tariffs and Transport Costs on India's Exports," Journal of Development Studies, 14 (October).

- Yeats, Alexander (1977b). "Do International Transport Costs Increase with Fabrication? Some Empirical Evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, 29 (November).

- Yeats, Alexander (1981). Shipping and Development Policy: An Integrated Assessment, (New York: Praeger scientific Publishers).

- Yeats, Alexander (1989). "Developing Countries Exports of Manufactures: Past and Future Implications of Shifting Patterns of Comparative Advantage," World Bank PPR Working Paper Series, (Washington: World Bank).
are set, realized costs by one company that happen to deviate from the standard-cost figures, will not affect the level of its next annual lump sum transfer. This gives the standard-cost model a flavor of yardstick competition (see Shleifer, 1985). The main characteristic of yardstick competition is that transfers be based on a benchmark estimated on the basis of cost performance of a larger set of companies. Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2002a) apply an econometric stochastic cost frontier approach to an 11-year panel of Norwegian bus company data and show that the yardstick type contract (standard cost model) increases cost efficiency of firms. In addition, there are dynamic effects to the use of yardstick contracts. Costs are lower the longer the contract has been in effect. However, the measured impacts tend to be small.

# **4.3 Offering menus of contracts to the operators.**

There may be occasions when neither tendering nor yardstick competition is feasible. In this case the problem faced by the regulator is identical to a natural monopoly situation where he must regulate a single natural monopoly under asymmetric information. The new theory of regulation offers a normative framework for regulatory policies in such contexts.<sup>41</sup> What are the implications of the theory for policymakers? The first is that offering just one type of contract is not optimal (such as a Price-Cap in some counties in Norway). Regulators should try to offer a menu of options and allow firms to self-select according to their private information. This has seldom been the case in practice. There are very few experiences where regulators formally offer a menu of options to firms.<sup>42</sup> However, it could be that informally, during a negotiation stage, the regulator offers a menu of such contracts.<sup>43</sup> It is interesting to note that several authors have tried to apply the theoretical results of the optimal second best contract under asymmetric information to the urban transport 24
48

|DEFPOS|0.40|_0.5_|
|---|---|---|
|TCHRPLAN|0.12|0.3|
|ASSETS (*10-3)|496.44|7.0|
|ASSETSSQ (* 10-9)|0.05|0.2|
|BOND|33.16|28.1|
|STOCK|36.09|17.3|
|BENNOCUT|0.52|0.5|
|BENTIERS|0.28|0.5|
|ISUNION|0.67|0.5|
|SPECTAX|0.15|0.4|
|UNEMPD90|-1.73|1.2|

(continued) Olivia S. Mitchell - Public Pension Govemance and Performance
treatment indicator variable set equal to one in all months after a major violent event. In column (3) we observe that when including district and month fixed effects and district linear and quadratic time trends, a major violent event is associated with a 5.7 percent reduction in number of active in a district.

One concern about this result would be if firms that experience violent events are generally more violent and thus more likely to have experienced other major events or are more likely to experience additional major events in the future. If either of these are the case, the estimates in column (3) may not reflect the response to a discrete change in security. To address the concern of previous major violent events, we exclude 30 “pre-treated” districts from the sample who experienced what would have been a major event in the months for which we have violence data but before the CDR data begin in April 2013. Column (4) shows that the estimated effect increases in magnitude to 8.6 percent when excluding “pretreated” districts. The second concern would be that responses to future violent events are being attributed to the response to the first violent event that we observe (and around which we build our difference in difference treatment). In columns (5) and (6) we address this concern by using the number of major violent events as our independent variable. The magnitudes remain almost identical to those estimated in columns (3) and (4).

Table 5 explores heterogeneity in our main effects based on firm size to provide insights into which types of firms are most affected by violence. Given our unit of observation is a district-month, for size heterogeneity we calculate separate subtotals for the relevant subsample of firms across the panel of 10,642 district-months. Specifically, we divide our firms into two groups based on the total number of unique subscribers in a firm: firms with 1-4 subscribers and firms with 5 or more subscribers (4 is the median firm size in our data). In columns (3) and (6) we find evidence that our negative effects are concentrated primarily in the sample of larger firms.

To begin exploring mechanisms behind our results, Table 6 summarizes survey data from a subsample of over 450 firms that shows that larger firms are significantly more likely 22
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those women in the sentinel survey data. The second issue is investigated by comparing, for each sub-group of women, distributions for women from sentinel site districts with those for all women. The results are presented in Table 2.

We can draw several conclusions based on these results. First, the sample of all women in the DHS 2000 is clearly different in its age/education structure from all other sub-samples. Second, the sample of currently pregnant women in the DHS 2000 is very similar in terms of age and education distributions to the sample of the last year ANC attendees in the DHS 2000. The only exception is that the share of the youngest group (age 15 to 19) is higher for currently pregnant women (probably because the youngest are less likely to seek antenatal care). Third, the only difference between all ANC attendees and those ANC attendees who gave the blood sample is that the latter tend to be somewhat more educated. Fourth, the sentinel survey sample seems to be closest in terms of age and education distribution to the samples of currently pregnant women and ANC attendees in the DHS. Despite this broad similarity it is important to note that the sentinel survey sample is younger and more educated (it has similar share of women with primary education, but a noticeably higher share of women with secondary+ education).

The findings outlined above indicate that basing our predictions in the DHS2000 survey either on the sample of last year ANC attendees or on currently pregnant women should not lead to significant differences in results. However, the former sub-group is probably preferable due to its larger size, which is especially important considering that our predictions will be at the district level. In addition, since even the sample of ANC attendees is somewhat different by age/education distribution from the sentinel survey sample, we will need to re-weight the sentinel data to correct for this problem, i.e. to make both distributions match by age/education. It is noteworthy that comparing the distributions by age/education for districts with sentinel sites to the distributions for all districts we find no statistical difference between the samples (for all groups of women), indicating that the population of districts with sentinel sites reflects well the total population of women (Table 2).

The next step involves the calculation of weights that make the distribution by age/education in the sentinel survey reflect that of a specific group in the DHS. We construct two sets of weights. The first set forces the age and education distribution in the sentinel survey to mirror that of ANC attendees while with the second set the age and 9
capital formation decision calculus, raising the expected private return to education. Thus the indirect effect of the migration is to raise the proportion of the population willing to invest in education, concomitantly raising the level of human capital in the economy towards the social optimum level without the use of taxes or subsidies (Stark and Wang 2002).

The relative magnitude of these two effects of migration; the relocation versus creation of skilled labor—or the net brain effect—will have profound implications for the development of the origin country. If one admits for the possibility of network externalities a positive net brain effect may push an economy from a low equilibrium out of a poverty trap and onto a virtuous cycle toward a high education equilibrium<sup>6</sup> , higher productivity levels, and, given the assumption of positive externalities resulting from education, stronger productivity growth.<sup>7</sup> Recent literature has modelled the possibility of the brain gain; under assumptions of, heterogeneous labor (Mountford 1997), and under assumptions of imperfect information and return migration (Stark et al 1997). The model presented below is adapted from Stark et al (1998). Throughout the analysis that follows, education is assumed to be internationally transferable and a necessary but not sufficient condition for migration.<sup>8</sup> Represent the income choices of a two period lived agent as follows: Where we assume:

>  Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of labor per period.

> 6See Mountford 1997 for an analysis of this ‘big push’ in the context of heterogeneous ability

> 7If the average human capital level increases, raising p, this will raise initial stocks of p the following period. This in turn will increase the return for young agents considering investing in human capital, which will, in turn cause another rise in _p_ . This is potentially a perpetual process of endogenous growth.

> 8This is an extreme and disputed assumption, (see Borjas (1990) for a model of negative self-selection of migrants) yet it nevertheless highlights a trend observable in empirical surveys (see Dustmann and Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004)) and has been justified on the grounds that skilled migrants generally face smaller costs due to informational advantages and secured jobs.

7
area is desert or semi-desert, which makes it particularly prone to droughts and increases its vulnerability to food price shocks. For example, in 2010, pastoral communities in northern Mali were affected by a food and nutrition crisis, associated with a shortage of rainfall during the 2009 rainy season (Touré et al., 2012).

In Mali, agriculture accounts for more than 35% of GDP and 80% of livelihoods. Cotton is the main cash crop, while cereal grains (maize, millet, rice and sorghum) constitute the main food crops. Animal husbandry contributes to 10% of the GDP and is the main resource for 30% of the population. The main constraints to agricultural production are low soil fertility, low and erratic rainfall exacerbated by climate change, and lack of irrigation infrastructure.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the structural problems mentioned above, Mali also has one of the highest fertility rates in the world, at 5.9, tied for second with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and behind Niger, which has a total fertility rate of 6.9 (World Bank, 2019). Over the years, the country has been experiencing a slow demographic transition, the result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and and low use.<sup>7</sup> empowerment, poverty, extremely contraceptive Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy. Yet, the country continues to be plagued by social factors known to increase total fertility. First, Mali ranks among the top five countries in the world, in terms of the prevalence of child ́ marriage among married women aged 20 24, with a prevalence of 54%, behind Niger (76%), the Central African Republic (68%), Chad (67%), and Bangladesh (59%).<sup>8</sup> Second, in Mali, polygyny is legal and 34% of individuals live in polygynous households, which is the second highest share globally, behind only Burkina Faso (36%). More precisely, according to the 2009 population Census, 20.2% of married people in Mali were in polygynous unions (Diamoutene, 2015). For married women, this proportion rises to 25.7%, while, for married men, it was 14.4%. Tertilt (2005) and Rossi (2019) link polygyny

> 6FAO, 2017. Dual purpose sorghum and cowpea intercropping in Mali. Available online at http://www.fao.org/agroecology/database/detail/en/c/1027957/.

> 7See CIA World Factbook, available online at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/.

> 8UNICEF global databases 2020, based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), and other national surveys.

11
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the elasticities vary greatly among authors, and some writers even suggested the elasticities well below unity.2/ The quality factor has played also a prominent role in the estimations by Marrese and Vanous (1983) of 'implicit trade subsidies" in CMEA trade. They accepted the notion that the socialist countries can sell their products in competitive markets only if they offer substantial price discounts. Even though there is considerable amount of anecdotal evidence and evidence provided from engineering and business studies of poor quality of manufactured goods produced by the CPEs (e.g. Hill, 1980), it is unclear how the poor quality is translated into the pricing policy and performance of these rountries. Marrese and Vanous could therefore make only assumptions about the (average) rates of price discounts for individual exports and different time periods.

# III. MANUFACTURING COSTS

In theory,the pricing behavior of the CPEs in world markets should not fundamentally differ from the practices of other countries, and the CPEs' export prices in these markets should not, therefore, significantly deviate from ruling world prices. The CPEs are typically considered to be "small countries", which face more or less perfectly elastic demand for their exports in world markets. Thus, prices at which they sell identical exports should be equal to world prices unless the CPEs producers/exporters fail to maximize profits.3/ In practice, however, countries are often strapped for foreign exchange, and they may try to sell their exports below the prices of their competitors. Under the "small country" assumption, they will gain market shares to the extent limited by their export capacities and their production costs. The cost-price relationship is particularly weak in the CPEs, which not only face considerable balance of payments difficulties and hence the need for additional foreign exchange, but they have specific constraints of their own. The general belief among experts on central planning is that foreign trade decisions are not, and indeed cannot be, entirely based on profitability considerations. The reasons are well known; domestic prices anl exchange rates are seriously distorted and cannot be used in the effici..ncy calculus, and shadow pricing on the level of each enterprise and fot each product is

- 2/ See, for example, Dlouhy and Dyba (1984). In cases of estimations leading to higher elasticities such as those reported in Maresse and Vanous (1983, p. 96), their authors interpreted their results as applicable only to marginal changes in the volume of trade. They suggested at elasticities would be considerably below unity for any sharp increase in the volume of exports.

- 3/ There are undoubtedly some markets which can be influenced by the entry of the CPEs. The example of Soviet oil and natural gas and other minerals come, of course, to mind. Nevertheless, these tend to be more the exception than the rule.