rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
were registered to handle vouchers for the NAIVS program. Prior to the program, most agro-dealers were located in towns.

# _4.2.3 Elite capture_

Being a decentralized institution, the VVC may be subject to elite capture, that is, members of the VVC or their friends and relatives could have influenced the allocation of vouchers, tilting it to their own benefit. In non-lottery villages, therefore, the VVC may have targeted their own members, or their relatives and friends who may also happen to be more educated and richer as seen in Table 2.

To assess the extent of elite capture, we use two variables reported in Table 2 that were collected at baseline and that capture social connections between respondents and local authorities. In column 4 of Table 5, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the respondent holds the position or is related to Ward Executive Officer (WEO), the VEO, the District Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer (DALDO) or any VVC member or village influential such as the hamlet, village or ward chairs. In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the respondent has social interactions with office holders and other authority figures. Finally, in column 6, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value of one if the individual reports having paid to become a beneficiary of NAIVS at the time of the intervention in 2010/11.

In columns 4-6, the point estimates are neither economically large nor statistically significant at conventional levels. All these government officials and influentials would be classified as formal elites in Alatas et al. (2019). They find some elite capture of formal elites but that eliminating it would result in less than 1 percent of welfare gains. These results contrast those in Pan and Christiansen (2012) who observed that households with members holding elected positions or in the VVC in the Kilimanjaro region were significantly more likely to be selected as beneficiaries during the 2008/09 season, the first season of NAIVS. Table 2 reports the percentage of beneficiaries that were related to government officials or influentials both for the initial 2008/09 season as well as the 2010/11 season when the intervention was implemented. Interestingly, in the Kilimanjaro region we find that 43 percent of beneficiaries in 2008/09 were related to government officials or influentials. This number is comparable to the 58 percent in Pan and Christiansen (2012). In the 2010/11 season the percent of beneficiaries that are connected is 30 percent. In contrast, in our study villages, only 21 percent of beneficiaries were related to government officials or influentials in 2008/09 and 22 percent in 2010/11.

21
operations, low-value minerals, and engagement in minerals’ transformation activities. Overall, the findings indicate that, except for the welfare effects, China’s influence on Africa’s local economic development was rather limited in 2002–2007, invalidating the widespread anecdotal claims in favor of China’s positive economic influence in Africa.

To summarize, the present study provides important insights that can be useful for influencing policy, mostly because China’s influence in Africa has been widespread but mired with scant empirical evidence on its effects on Africa’s development. Thus, the finding that China has less influence on economic growth than on welfare in Africa can indeed be useful for African policy makers. However, this study has certain limitations. The analysis is somewhat limited by the lack of data on mineral production at the mining sites. Also, the lack of accurate information on the precise opening and closing of mining sites years has limited our analysis, compelling us to make a rather strong implicit assumption that all active mines were open between 1997 and 2007. Going forward, we propose that future research should focus on isolating the individual minerals and investigate their respective roles in explaining local economic development outcomes in order to uncover the specific effects that these mineral commodities bring to bear in Africa.

# **REFERENCES**

Addison, T. Boly, A. Mveyange, A. (2015). "The Impact of Mining on Spatial Inequality: Recent Evidence from Africa." mimeo Addison, T. (ed.) (2003). _From Conflict to Recovery in Africa_ . Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER.

Andersen, T. B. Barslund, M. Hansen, C.W. Harr, T. Jensen P.S. (2014). "How Much Did China's WTO Accession Increase Economic Growth in Resource-Rich Countries?" <u>China Economic Review 30: 16–26.</u> Alesina, A. F., S. Michalopoulos, and E. Papaioannou (2015). "Ethnic inequality". <u>Journal of Political Economy 123(3): 547–724.</u> Aragón. F. M. (2013). "Natural Resources and Local Communities: Evidence from Peruvian Gold Mine." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 5(2): 1–25.

Aragón. F. M, P. Chuhan-Pole, C. B. Land, (2015). "The Local Economic Impacts of Resource Abundance: What Have We Learned?" The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (WPS 7263) Arezki, R. and F. Van der Ploeg (2011). "Do natural resources depress income per capita?" Review <u>of Development Economics 15(3): 504–521.</u> <mark>Beny, L. N. and L. D. Cook (2009). "Metals or Management? Explaining Africa's Recent Economic Growth Performance." American Economic Review, 99(2): 268–274.</mark> 22
there, makes it all the more likely than emerging markets will be particularly affected by greater volatility. Banking is also important because for most countries it is the primary channel to break the link between domestic investment and savings, thereby permitting a morer eff.icint alloartiosn oef.capital wowrldoide.

So now can countries achieve a banKing sector - more 'good' banks and fewer bad ones -- that mitigates, rather than magnifies economic volatility? Here the answers are thought to be well-known: adopt international best practices for everything from accounting and corporate governance to bank regulation and supervision. In addition to suffering from some circularity (essentially telling developing countries that they would become richer if only they adopted the institutional framework that advanced countries evolved over many generations), these recommendations for best practices are based exclusivelv on 'armchair emnpircism='

**_'.Jll aL1VV%,I_ iiiiLIJIL UI., LV** **_V%AA%J1LI~.111U_ V 1UJ~Li11W1CLL%1C.L)L..4** ~ "Ai~U~~UJM ~~~~.-U .U. _ApA_ . :-t T _.A.' -- A_ ..... Majnoni (2001) find that although real sector shocks are dampened as financial systems develop, monetary shocks are amplified: firms depend more on external resources with significant financial sector development, which exposes them more to monetary or financial shocks. 2 But this still begs the question of whether countries with deep financial systems are equally capable of dampening even some forms of volatility. Are some types of deep financial system more effective in this respect than others?

To fill this void, Barth-Caprio-Levine (2001b) collect data on regulatory and sup1rvisory pra ti^es aroulnd the world and find that nuimerous regculatory featulres, such as regulatory barriers to baik entry, regulatory restrictions **on** bank activities, greater

> **2** Easterlv. Islam and Stizlitz. (2000) found that volatilitv decreased with financial sector development until very high levels of development are reached when volatility appears to grow.

8
for some businesses. Survey data shows that most registered businesses were unable to calculate basic percentages and a non-trivial share did not have extensive transaction records. Instead, it appears many small businesses rely on heuristics to determine their tax liability, as a non-trivial share consistently pays the same amount in TOT each month despite numerous policy changes altering their tax liability up and down (consistent with similar findings in other settings such as Tourek (2022) in Rwanda).

To test an alternative design of an STR that aims to better balance the trade-offs inherent in these types of regimes, we implemented a randomized experiment across over 10,000 registered TOT payers in Kenya. Treated businesses were encouraged to pay a set fee in TOT that was customized based on their business type and location.<sup>3</sup> This alternative the for small businesses the design simplifies process by proposing amount of tax required to be paid. Ex-ante, there is a concern that a set fee may be less equitable than requiring a proportion of turnover to be paid, but customizing the TOT amount is more equitable than a single set fee being required across the country as there is much less variation in turnover of small businesses within the same location and business type. On average, taxpayers allocated to the alternative design of the TOT regime paid a much larger amount of tax (and slightly increased the share of taxpayers who filed). The intent to treat effect was in the order of a 11.7 percent increase in the amount of tax paid, and the treatment on treated effect was a 19.8 percent increase. These sizable effects were almost exclusively driven by taxpayers who were below the median in the distribution of the previous months’ tax payment amounts. In other words, encouraging taxpayers to pay a set fee led to relatively smaller businesses<sup>4</sup> paying more tax and had no meaningful effect on relatively larger businesses. Consequently, introducing greater simplicity into the TOT regime came at the cost of reducing vertical equity between taxpayers.

Collectively, the insights presented in this study highlight just how challenging it is

> 3This fee was the equivalent of the amount of TOT that the average business with these characteristics was expected to pay under the existing regime based on previous filing behavior (as such, if compliance were identical, then the alternative and the existing regime would yield the same amount in revenue).

> 4This assumes that the amount of tax paid by taxpayers is a reasonable proxy for business size.

4
the presence of the SFD project and these variables; it finds an implausibly large reduction (of 2.2 percentage points) in the poverty rate.

**Table 6.  Results of Propensity Score Matching to Determine the Impact of SFD projects on the Headcount Poverty Rate, Comparing PSUs Having “Mixed” SFD and Other Interventions with PSUs Having only Non-** **<u>SFD Interventions</u>**

||Number<br>of PSUs|Headcount<br>Povertyrate(%)|Analytical Standard<br>Error /(t-statistic)|Bootstrapped Standard<br>Error /(t-statistic)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Nearest neighbor matching|||||
|Matched treated cases|202|4.07|||
|Matched comparison cases|170|4.83|||
|Treated – Comparison||**-0.76**|0.56(t=-1.37)|0.53(t=-1.43)|
|Kernel matching|||||
|Matched treated cases|202|4.08|||
|Matched comparison cases|1,044|4.48|||
|Treated – Comparison||**-0.39**|n.a.|0.32(t=-1.22)|

_Notes:_ Comparisons use propensity score based on equation in Table 4, and confined to the region of common support, where the propensity score is between 0.020 and 0.725. “Treated cases” refers to PSUs where there are both SFD and non-SFD potable water projects, and these constitute 16% of all 1,246 PSUs in the region of common support. “Comparison cases” refers to PSUs where there are only non-SFD potable water projects. Kernel matching uses Epanechnikov kernel functions with a bandwidth of 0.06. Bootstrapped results are based on 100 draws. _Source:_ Authors’ calculations based on HIECS and community survey 2004/2005.

A more complete set of estimates of the effects of potable water provision are shown in Table 8; in each case, we are comparing villages where there are both SFD and non-SFD water projects with villages where there are only non-SFD water projects. Surprisingly, the presence of an SFD water supply project does not appear to increase the number of households that have access to piped water, suggesting that for this type of project, the SFD substitutes for, rather than supplements, other potable water projects. On the other hand, when there is an SFD project, households spend less on water than they otherwise would; one possibility is that the SFD may not require as much cost recovery as other suppliers of water. The effects of SFD water projects on health are mixed; they appear to reduce spending on health care, and may reduce the child mortality rate, but the incidence of illness, especially diarrhea and renal disease but perhaps also malaria and bilharzia, actually rises. This merits further investigation; the presence of additional water, if poorly treated or disposed of improperly, could indeed increase the incidence of water-borne disease; if this is the case, then the provision of potable water would need to include provisions that deal with water quality and disposal.

# **Results 2: Summarizing the Impacts of SFD Projects**

The measured impacts of SFD projects are summarized in Tables 9-14. In each case we only present the relevant measures of impact, and not the complete (and voluminous) regression and other details. The _Impact Evaluation: Egyptian Social Fund for Development_ _Version of June 29, 2009_ _Page 16 of 36_
13 An interesting, albeit not surprising, phenomenon in Latin American countries is the increase in antidumping activity against each other. The most frequent use of antidumping in this respect was between Argentina and Brazil within MERCOSUR. Since many tariffs and QRs have been removed between the two countries with the increase in domestic price disparities arising from relative exchange rate movements, antidumping became a favorite instrument within these two countries. The nominal exchange rate anchor approach of Argentina and Brazil (until the abandoning of that approach by Brazil in mid-1995) led to a spate of antidumping actions (see Table 3). Argentina's antidumping actions dominated the 1996 intra-regional actions. They declined in 1997 as a backlog was cleared. Both MERCOSUR and the Andean Group have common 'normative" antidumping regimes-yet, there was antidumping within each group. Operationally MERCOSUR has not yet adopted any harmonization measures in the area of antidumping and courntervailing duties. The intentions are there are efforts are underway. Argentina and Brazil have formalized antidumping and counterveiling regulation and Paraguay and Uruguay have not. Similarly NAFTA allows the continued use of antidumping and counterveiling duties lby members against their free trade partners. This is indeed quite peculiar and paradoxical, and an anomaly among free trade areas in general. For example, neither the European Free Association, the European Union, nor the Australia-New-Zealand Closer Economic Relations 1Trade Agreement, allow such duties to be levied internally (they do allow the imposition of duties on outside countries). The principle behind free trade arrangements is to integrate markets so that domestic and foreign (those of treaty members) markets are considered one and the same with equal treatment. That allows for no room for antidumping actions. Competition policies should replace antidumping regimes, particularly within a trading block and also externally. If indeed there are anti-competitive actions, and dumping is generically not one of them, competition (arntitrust)policies and the corresponding agency is perfectly entitled to oversee and police them. Domestic and supranational (when existing) competition legislation can very appropriately deal with genuinely unfair trade practices and anticompetitive behavior by domestic and foreign industry alike.

Table 3: Intra-LAC Antidumping Activity-Initiations, 1989-97 **Cou 1989...............I. 994.--.-I.1997** .19....0..19......1....2.jI.
facilitation policies. Investigating the effectiveness of such bilateral policies is an important avenue for future research.

# **References**

Ashenfelter, Orley. 2012. “Comparing Real Wages.” NBER Working Paper Series, No. 18006.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 2012. “Overseas Filipinos’ Cash Remittances by Country, by Source.” http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei_pub/Table%2034.pdf Bedford, Charlotte, Bedford Richard, and Elsie Ho. 2010. “Engaging with New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer Work Policy: The Case of Tuvalu”, _Asian and Pacific Migration Journal_ 19(3): 421-45.

Bryan, Gharad, Shyamal Chowdhury, and A. Musfiq Mobarak. 2011. “Seasonal Migration and Risk Aversion.” Working paper.

Center for Migrant Advocacy, 2012. “Bilateral labor agreements and social security agreements,” http://centerformigrantadvocacy.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/ <u>bilateral-labor-agreements-and-social-security-agreements1.pdf.</u> Clemens, Michael, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett. 2009. “The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the US Border.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, No. RWP09-004.

Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2012. “2008-2012 Overseas Employment Statistics.” <u>http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2012_stats.pdf</u> Fandrich, Christine. 2009. “Facilitated International Egyptian Labor Migration and Development: The integrated migration information system as case study”, The 22
- Kramer, B., Cecchi, F., Kivuva, B., and Waithaka, L. (2021). Improving agricultural productivity and resilience with cellphone imagery to scale climate-smart crop insurance. AEA RCT Registry. September 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7435-1.4000000000000001 .

- Kramer, B., Hazell, P., Alderman, H., Ceballos, F., Kumar, N., and Timu, A. G. (2022). Is agricultural insurance fulfilling its promise for the developing world? A review of recent evidence. _Annual Review of Resource Economics_ , 14.

- Kremer, M., Luby, S., Maertens, R., Tan, B., and Wi ̨ecek, W. (2022). Water treatment and child mortality: A meta-analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper.

- Lane, G. (2018). Credit lines as insurance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Mimeo.

- Marr, A., Winkel, A., van Asseldonk, M., Lensink, R., and Bulte, E. (2016). Adoption and impact of index-insurance and credit for smallholder farmers in developing countries. _Agricultural Finance Review_ .

- Meager, R. (2019). Understanding the average impact of microcredit expansions: A Bayesian hierarchical analysis of seven randomized experiments. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 11(1):57–91.

- Meager, R. (2022). Aggregating distributional treatment effects: A bayesian hierarchical analysis of the microcredit literature. _American Economic Review_ . Forthcoming.

- Meager, R. and Wiecek, W. (2022). _Baggr, an R package for Bayesian meta-analysis using Stan_ . Available at https://github.com/wwiecek/baggr .

- Michler, J. D., Viens, F. G., and Shively, G. E. (2022). Risk, crop yields, and weather index insurance in village India. _Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association_ .

- Miranda, M. J. and Farrin, K. (2012). Index insurance for developing countries. _Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy_ , 34(3):391–427.

- Mishra, K., Gallenstein, R. A., Miranda, M. J., Sam, A. G., Toledo, P., and Mulangu, F. (2021). Insured loans and credit access: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in northern Ghana. _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_ , 103(3):923–943.

- Mobarak, A. M. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2013). Informal risk sharing, index insurance, and risk taking in developing countries. _American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings_ , 103(3):375– 80.

- Ogden, T. (2020). RCTs in development economics, their critics and their evolution. In Bédécarrats, F., Guérin, I., and Roubaud, F., editors, _Randomized control trials in the field of development: A critical perspective_ , chapter 4, pages 126–151. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Olken, B. A. (2015). Promises and perils of pre-analysis plans. _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ , 29(3):61–80.

27
One important feature of the timing of village elections is that they are exogenously determined at the county level, or occasionally at the township level, by the “leading group for village elections.”<sup>18</sup> The leading group at the county level is the most important agent in planning, organizing and supervising elections in the villages under its administration, and in some provinces the leading group at the township level is charged with the same responsibility (CRLSRT 2000).<sup>19</sup> One of the major responsibilities of the leading groups is to educate villagers regarding election protocol and to encourage voter turnout. For this purpose, a county‐wide (or township‐wide) information campaign is typically launched before each election. Consequently, the timing of village elections, in terms of election year, is fairly uniform within one county (Zhang et al. 2004), although the timing of elections varies within a province (Table 1) and even more so across regions (O’Brien and Li, 2000).<sup>20</sup> Even though election years, specified by county or township leading groups, are generally exogenous to the characteristics of each village, one might be concerned that some village elections may be initiated by “endogenous leadership turnover.” Such a process may occur when a conflict between village residents and village leaders becomes serious enough that township or county authorities intervene, dismiss the leader and schedule a new election. The supplemental village survey used for our analysis helpfully allows us to exclude elections that occurred right after a resignation or dismissal of a village head. In our analysis, we exclude such elections and exploit the timing of “regularly scheduled” elections.

For two reasons, we might expect some measurement error in election year timing. First, election information is collected retrospectively, and may be prone to recall error. Second, in order to encourage

> 18 Appendix table A1 summarizes the regulations governing elections in the four provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu and Shanxi), including a discussion of their organizational structure and timing.

> 19 The leading group at the county or township level is composed of multiple county or township officials, often from different agencies including the bureau of civil affairs, the department of public relations and the bureau of public security.

> 20 The exact date of election can vary across villages within a county because an election committee at the village level has the right to decide on the voting date and location (see summary of related documents in Appendix Table A1).

_Land Tenure Insecurity and Migration, Page 19_
# _6.2.1.1. Cape Town_

# **Table 5 Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality**

_2004/05 Budgeted Income (R millions) (US$1:R5.70)_

|Propertytaxes|2,299.0|
|---|---|
|Business levies|850.2|
|User charges|4,376.0|
|Grants and Subsidies (includingCapital Grants)|1,193.5|
|Other external income (incl. rent, fines, asset sales<br>etc)|820.4|
|Internal income (including bulk charges, internal<br>transfers etc)|1,786.4|
|TOTAL|11,325.5|

|_2004/05 Budgeted Capital Sources (R millions)_|
|---|
|Capital Grants and Subsidies<br>630.6|
|Asset Financing Fund<br>258.3|
|External FinancingFund (i.e. borrowing)<br>685.0|
|Revenue<br>11.7|
|TOTAL<br>1,586.6|

Source: City of Cape Town budget Cape Town will need to borrow in the near future, and is considering, as are a number of other municipalities, the possibility of floating municipal bonds.

Cape Town, like most South African municipalities, is currently emerging from two hugely complex rounds of boundary changes and other institutional reforms. More than 30 municipalities in the metropolitan area, which existed in 1994, were first re-organized into a two-tier system with a metropolitan level and six sub-structures. In line with new legislation, this was replaced from early 2001 with a single metropolitan council. It is understood that the new amalgamated council is about to receive an unqualified audit from the Auditor-General for the 2003/04 financial year, the first after many years of restructuring. This is likely to be followed by the city seeking an independent credit rating, and depending on the outcome of this, the city may decide to go the bond route.

# _6.2.1.2. Johannesburg_

Table 6. shows the relative importance of the different sources of funding in Johannesburg’s capital budget.

12