rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Investment climate reform - going
            the last mile : the bulldozer initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The author examines the Bulldozer
            Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an innovative reform
            methodology that successfully overcame the lack of political
            will and capacity at the government level through a
            bottom-up approach. Using an innovative grassroots and
            public awareness methodology, the initiative mobilized the
            local business community to bulldoze barriers by identifying
            concrete legislative changes and advocating for their
            adoption and implementation. By delivering fast results-50
            reforms in 150 days-the initiative won the confidence of
            entrepreneurs and empowered them to institutionalize
            permanent grassroots reform committees. The force of this
            lobby group created political will by putting public
            pressure on the politicians to do their part to enact the
            reforms. Most important, it carried investment climate
            reform the last mile by delivering concrete, quantifiable
            results in all sectors of the economy. Over time, the
            initiative is establishing a dynamic of reform and
            public-private partnership that will facilitate the tackling
            of more complicated structural reforms. Complementing the
            systemic approach and framework reform efforts of
            governments and international agencies, competitiveness
            partnerships mobilize the local business community to
            catalog concrete problems across the full spectrum of
            investment climate concerns, pinpoint solutions, campaign
            for their adoption, and follow up on reform implementation.
            The author attempts to determine the applicability of
            competitiveness partnerships to different settings by
            modeling the interactions between several key success
            factors, thus providing a pertinent tool for development
            professionals, government officials, and private sector
            advocates who wish to establish a renewed implementation
            dynamic through this kind of results-oriented reform process.
Why do emerging economies borrow
            short term
The authors argue that emerging
            economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium
            charged by international capital markets on long-term debt.
            They first present a model where the debt maturity structure
            is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the
            government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the
            government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis,
            transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk
            is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost.
            Therefore, the government faces a tradeoff between safer
            long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term debt. Second, the
            authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices
            and issuance. They show that emerging economies pay a
            positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term
            bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term
            premium increases, with issuance shifting toward shorter
            maturities. This suggests that changes in bondholders'
            risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises.
A unified framework for pro-poor
            growth analysis
Starting with a general impact indicator
            as an evaluation criterion, The author offers an integrative
            framework for a unified discussion of various concepts and
            measures of pro-poor growth emerging from the current
            literature. He shows that whether economic growth is
            considered pro-poor depends fundamentally on the choice of
            evaluative weights. In addition, the author's framework
            leads to a new indicator of the rate of pro-poor growth that
            can be interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent
            growth rate. This is a distribution-adjusted rate of growth
            that depends on the chosen level of inequality aversion.
            Illustrations based on data for Indonesia in the 1990s show
            a strong link between growth and poverty reduction in that
            country. A decomposition of the observed poverty outcomes
            reveals the extent to which changes in inequality have
            blunted the poverty impacts of both growth and contraction.
            Finally, the results also demonstrate that absolute and
            relative indicators of pro-poor growth can lead to
            conflicting conclusions from the same set of facts.
Teachers' salaries and
            professional profile in Mexico
Teachers' salaries have often been
            highlighted as an important issue in discussions on school
            improvement. The level and structure of teacher remuneration
            affect morale and the ability to focus on and devote
            adequate time to teaching. The author examines who teachers
            are, whether teachers are underpaid, and whether teachers
            face higher compensation uncertainty than their counterparts
            face. The results show that teachers in basic education
            consistently work fewer hours than their occupational
            counterparts. Regression analysis shows that teachers in
            basic public schools are better paid early in their
            professional lives than are other comparable individuals.
            Because retirement benefits are usually generous, teachers
            stay within the profession.
Teachers' salaries and
            professional profile in Mexico
WPS3394

# **Teachers’ Salaries and Professional Profile in Mexico**

Gladys Lopez-Acevedo (LCSPP)* Gacevedo@worldbank.org Latin America and the Caribbean Region Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division The World Bank JEL Codes: D00

# <u>Abstract</u>

Teachers’ salaries have often been highlighted as very important issue in discussions of school improvement. The level and structure of teacher remuneration affect morale and ability to focus on and devote adequate time to teaching. This paper examines who teachers are, whether teachers are underpaid, and whether teachers face higher compensation uncertainty than their counterparts face. The results show that that teachers in basic education consistently work fewer hours than their occupational counterparts. Regression analysis shows that teachers in basic public schools are better paid early in their professional lives than are other comparable individuals. Because retirement benefits are usually generous, teachers stay within the profession.

## World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3394, September 2004

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

> * Please send comments to gacevedo@worldbank.org. Special thanks to Vicente Paqueo, Guilherme Sedlacek, Eduardo Velez, Dulce Maria Nieto, Francisco Martinez, Daniel Lederman, Claudia Piras, William D. Savedoff, Marcelo Giugale, Kin Bing Wu, William Maloney and Laural Rawlings for valuable comments and discussion. Valuable comments were also received from the Impact and Evaluation Group, the Economic Policy Group in July 2000, the participants attending the CIDE seminar in September 2000 and the LACEA network in October 2000.
Basel II and developing countries :
            Sailing through the sea of standards
Despite recently announced delays, Basel
            II - the new standard for bank capital - is due to be
            completed this year for implementation in the 13 Basel
            Committee member countries by the end of 2006. Should the
            other 170 plus member countries of the World Bank also adopt
            Basel II? Basel II was not written with developing countries
            in mind, but that does not necessarily mean that there is
            nothing in it for developing countries or that it can be
            ignored. Basels I and II represent a wide Sea of Standards.
            This paper suggests five alternative island-standards and
            five navigational tools to help countries choose their
            preferred island within the sea. It is suggested that for
            some developing countries the standardized approach will
            yield little in terms of linking regulatory capital to risk,
            but that countries may need many years of work to adopt the
            more advanced internal rating-based approach. The paper then
            proposes a centralized rating-based approach as a transition
            measure. The paper also makes proposals regarding a set of
            largely unresolved cross-border issues.
Basel II and developing countries :
            Sailing through the sea of standards
WPS 3387

# **Basel II and Developing Countries:**

**Sailing through the Sea of Standards**

# **Andrew Powell**<sup>**1**</sup>

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and The World Bank World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3387, September 2004 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ 1 This paper was written while the author visited the Bank and Financial Restructuring (BFR) unit within the Financial Sector of the World Bank from Sept-Dec 2003. I would like to thank my colleagues in BFR including Laura A. Ard, Gabriella Ferencz, Joaquin G. Gutierrez, Jose De Luna Martinez, Patrick Honohan and Ruth Neyens. I also wish to thank Gerry Caprio, Oliver Fratzscher, William Britt Gwinner, Giovanni Majnoni, Susan Marcus, Margaret Miller, Michael Pomeleano, Larry Promisel and Marilou Uy for extremely helpful discussions and suggestions. I would like to thank the World Bank for providing support.

1
Tools for legislative oversight : an
            empirical investigation
Parliaments are the institutions through
            which governments are held accountable to the electorate.
            They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this
            oversight function, but until recently little analysis had
            been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools.
            This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in
            2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates
            to three variables, namely the form of government
            (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per
            capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The paper
            finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the
            form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of
            democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government,
            higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a
            greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight
            potential. While the oversight potential follows this
            general trend, the use of committees of enquiry,
            interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different
            pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is
            most common in high income countries, less common in low
            income countries and least common in middle income countries
            while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the
            ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries,
            less common in high income countries and least common in low
            income countries.
Tools for legislative oversight : an
            empirical investigation
WPS 3388

# **Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation**

## **By**

## **Riccardo Pelizzo**<sup>**1**</sup>

## **and Rick Stapenhurst**<sup>**2**</sup>

## Abstract

Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy.

The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries, less common in high income countries and least common in low income countries.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388, September 2004 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._ 1 Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University 2 Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank Institute An earlier abridged version of this paper was presented at the Southern Political Science Association conference in New Orleans, January 2004. A modified version of that earlier draft can be found in _Quaderni di Scienza Politica_ , vol. 11, n. 1, (gennaio) 2004, pp. 175-188.
Risk modeling concepts relating to
            the design and rating of agricultural insurance contracts
The authors identify the key issues and
            concerns that arise in the design and rating of crop yield
            insurance plans, with a particular emphasis on production
            risk modeling. The authors show how the availability of data
            shapes the insurance scheme and the ratemaking procedures.
            Relying on the U.S. experience and recent developments in
            statistics and econometrics, they review risk modeling
            concepts and provide technical guidelines in the development
            of crop insurance plans. Finally, they show how these risk
            modeling techniques can be extended to price risk in order
            to develop crop revenue insurance schemes.
Skilled migration: the perspective
            of developing countries
The authors focus on the consequences of
            skilled migration for developing countries. They first
            present new evidence on the magnitude of migration of
            skilled workers at the international level and then discuss
            its direct and indirect effects on human capital formation
            in developing countries in a unified stylized model. Finally
            they turn to policy implications, with emphasis on migration
            and education policy in a context of globalized labor markets.
Pro-growth, pro-poor : is there a tradeoff
Is a pro-growth strategy always the best
            pro-poor strategy? To address this issue, the author
            provides an empirical evaluation of the impact of a series
            of pro-growth policies on inequality and headcount poverty.
            He relies on a large macroeconomic data set and estimate
            dynamic panel models that allows him to differentiate
            between the short- and long-run impacts of the policies
            under consideration on growth, inequality, and poverty. The
            author's findings indicate that regardless of their
            impact on inequality, pro-growth policies lead to lower
            poverty levels in the long run. However, he also finds
            evidence indicating that some of these policies may lead to
            higher inequality and, under plausible assumptions for the
            distribution of income, to higher poverty levels in the
            short run. These findings would justify the adoption of a
            pro-growth policy package as the center of any poverty
            reduction strategy, together with pro-poor measures that
            complement such a package by offsetting potential short-run
            increases in poverty.
What triggers inflation in emerging
            market economics
Emerging market economies (EMEs) have
            experienced a noticeable decline in inflation since the
            mid-1990s. Whether this stable price environment in EMEs is
            likely to endure and what kind of policies need to be
            followed to ensure price stability, however, still continue
            to be questions of considerable policy relevance. The
            authors investigate the factors associated with the start of
            24 inflation episodes in 15 EMEs between 1980 and 2001. They
            use pooled probit analysis to estimate the contribution of
            the key factors to inflation starts. Their empirical results
            suggest that increases in the output gap, agricultural
            shocks, and expansionary fiscal policy raise the probability
            of inflation starts in EMEs. Their findings also indicate
            that a more democratic environment and an increase in
            capital flows relative to GDP reduce the probability of
            inflation starts.
What triggers inflation in emerging
            market economics
WPS3376

# **What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market Economies?**

**Ilker Domaç**<sup>†</sup> **and Eray M. Yücel**<sup>‡</sup>

## **Abstract**

Emerging market economies (EMEs) have experienced a noticeable decline in inflation since the mid-1990s. Whether this stable price environment in EMEs is likely to endure and what kind of policies need to be followed to ensure price stability, however, still continue to be questions of considerable policy relevance. This study aims at investigating the factors associated with the start of 24 inflation episodes in 15 EMEs between 1980 and 2001. The paper employs pooled probit analysis to estimate the contribution of the key factors to inflation starts. The empirical results suggest that increases in the output gap, agricultural shocks, and expansionary fiscal policy raise the probability of inflation starts in EMEs. The findings also indicate that a more democratic environment and an increase in capital flows relative to GDP reduce the probability of inflation starts.

## **JEL** **_classification_** : E31; E58.

**_Keywords_ :** Inflation starts; emerging market economies; price stability; probit analysis.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3376, August 2004 _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

> † Corresponding author. World Bank. Email address: idomac@worldbank.org.

> ‡ Central Bank of Turkey **.** Email address: eray.yucel@tcmb.gov.tr.
Pension funds and national saving
The authors conduct an empirical study
            on the effect of the accumulation of pension fund financial
            assets, on national saving, using a panel of 43 industrial,
            and developing countries. The authors find evidence
            suggesting that the accumulation of pension fund financial
            assets might increase national saving, when these funds are
            the result of a mandatory pension program. By contrast,
            national saving might be unaffected, when pension funds are
            the result of a public program, implemented to foster
            voluntary pension saving.
Special issues relating to corporate
            governance and family control
Control of corporate assets by wealthy
            families in economies lacking institutional integrity is
            common. It has negative implications on corporate governance
            and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a
            sufficiently large part of the country's corporate
            sector. The authors consider the reasons why family control
            and control pyramids predominate in emerging market
            economies and in some industrial economies. They also
            discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding firms
            predominate in the United States. The authors discuss
            policies that countries might adopt to discourage family
            control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but
            one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A
            concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is
            needed before diffuse ownership is desirable.