rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Ministry of Transport in Japan. Standard international use air transport agreement (December 1, 1990). Ministry of Transport Notification No. 594 Molinuevo. M, Sáez. S. (2014) Regulatory Assessment Toolkit. Washington DC. World Bank.

Ojha p. Nepalese Experience in Liberalization of Trade Logistics Services, Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, Nepal. Accessed at http://artnet.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/tfri_s3ojha.pdf Philippine Shippers’ Bureau (PSB) (2005) PSB ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 6 SERIES OF 2005– Revised Rules on Freight Forwarding.

Seidler, V. (December 2011) Colonial Legacy and Institutional Development – The case of Botswana and Nigeria. Dissertation Forum 52, Australian Foundation for Development Research. Accessed at http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/foren/Forum52.pdf on September 4, 2013.

Schramm, H. (2012) Freight Forwarders Intermediary Role in Multimodal Transport Chains a Social Network Approach, Physica-Verlag Springer Company.

Singapore logistics Association. Singapore Registry of Accredited Multimodal Transport Operators Background paper on multimodal transport. Singapore. Accessed at <u>http://sla.org.sg/documents/10181/15857/Multimodal%20Transport%20Operators/daab0205-e1e0-4bbb-8b35f358b2189119?version=1.0</u> The South African Revenue Service. Licensing. Accessed at - - <u>http://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Customs Excise/Processing/Pre assessment/Licensing/Pages/default.aspx</u> UNCTAD (April 2011) Trade and Transport Facilitation Project 2 (TTFP-2) Freight Forwarding - Regulation and Procedures Advice to NTTFC.

United Nations (1981) The United Nations Conference on a Convention on International Multimodal Transport, 1980, Volume 1, Final Act and Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods. New York. Accessed at <u>http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdmtconf17_en.pdf</u> UNESCAP (2011) Guideline for Minimum Standards and codes of Professional Conduct for Freight Forwarders, Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers and Multimodal Transport.

UNESCAP (2009). Towards an appropriate regulatory environment for the multimodal transport and logistics industry.

US International Trade Commission (May 2005) Logistics Services: An Overview of the Global Market and Potential Effects of Removing Trade Impediments. Publication 3770, Washington DC, USITC.

World Bank (2014) Doing Business Report 2015 Going Beyond Efficiency Economy Profile 2015 Singapore. Washington DC, World Bank.

World Bank (2013). Greek Logistics – Unlocking Growth Potential through Regulatory Reform and Complementary Measures, 82569, November 2013, Washington DC. World Bank.

World Bank. Logistics Performance Index 2014. Accessed at <u>http://lpi.worldbank.org/</u> World Trade Organization. Definition of Services Trade and Modes of Supply as a part of GATS TRAINING MODULE: CHAPTER 1 Basic Purpose and Concepts. Accessed at <u>https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s3p1_e.htm</u> 36
- 18-_

Table 6: AVERAGE PRICE RATIOS IN MARKET SHARE RANGES /a

|Market<br>share|Develop<br>1982|ed countries<br>1984|Developin<br>1982|g countries<br>1984|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|0.00-0.05|0.86|0.88|0.96|0.82|
|0.06-0.10|0.64|0.60|0.77|0.63|
|0.11-0.25|0.69|0.62|0.71|0.79|
|0.26-0.50|0.63|0.60|0.74|0.62|
|0.51-1.00|C1.78|0.63|1.21|0.76|

# /a Including only products which were not subject to discriminatory NTBs.

As the table shows, there does not appear to be any systematic relationship for any given export commodity between the level of relative prices, that is the export prices of socialist countries relative to those of their competitors, and the market share of that commodity. Prices of socialist countries' exports were generally lower than the prices of their competitors, irrespective of the market share. To put it differently, the relative "underpricing' of socialist countries' exports in the EEC market was characteristic across all market share ranges and not only in markets where their share was small.

The degree .f "underpricing" differed from one market share range to another, but this pricirg behavior undoubtedly reflected balance of payments exigencies as much as a systematic policy to penetrate those Western markets that had been partially lost in the past. The socialist countries responded aggressively to the generally deteriorating balance of payments situation during that period by expanding export volumes even when export markets were depressed and prices were falling. Temporarily, at least, their supply curve was quite likely downward sloping.13/ Moreover, their effort to secure foreign markets by relative "underpricing" of their exports was directed not only into those exports that suffered from major quality deficiencies, but also into exports that were fairly competitive.14/

- 13/ The extent to which the price behavior represented a movement along a (downward) sloping supply curve or a shift in the supply curve is not entirely clear. The indications are, however, that the former was more likely. For evidence, see for example Financial Times, October 5, 1982, p. 5 and Stepanek (1988).

- 14/ As a result of their aggressive behavior, several socialist countries faced increased number of court actions for dumping, some of which resulted in the imposition of antidumping duties. Viz., for example, the imposition of antidumping duty of almost 30? by the EEC on East German chemical exports. Romania undertook to raise its export prices of chemicals to eliminate the injury to Community producers. See Financial Times, August 18, 1982, p. 5.
Beine, Michel, Frédéric Docquier, and Caglar Ozden. 2011. “Diasporas.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 95: 30–41.

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Defoort, Cecile. 2006. “Tendances de Long Terme en Migrations Internationales: Analyse à Partir de 6 Pays Receveurs.” Université Catholique de Louvain (mimeo).

Docquier, Frédéric, and Aldeslam Marfouk. 2006. “International Migration by Educational Attainment (1990–2000) - Release 1.1.” In _International Migration, Remittances and Development_ . Ed. C. Ozden and M. Schiff, pp.151-199. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Docquier, Frédéric, B. Lindsay Lowell, and Abdeslam Marfouk. 2007. A Gendered Assessment of the Brain Drain.” IZA Discussion Papers No. 3235.

Dustmann, Christian, Francesca Fabbri, and Ian Preston. 2005. “The Impact of Immigration on the British Labour Market.” _Economic Journal_ 115: F324–41.

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Friedberg, Rachel M. 2001. “The Impact Of Mass Migration On The Israeli Labor Market.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 116: 1373–1408.

Freeman, Richard B., and Remco H. Oostendorp. 2000. “Wages Around the World: Pay Across Occupations and Countries.” NBER Working Paper No. 8058.

26
Policy Research Working Paper 7367

# **Abstract**

This paper analyzes the impacts of selected trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. A gravity model is used to estimate four equations: a pooled cross-section model; a fixed-effects model; a random effects model; and a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the analysis uses a recent data set, a panel that includes trade data from 2011 and 2012 for 72 countries. Second, to measure the impacts of trade facilitation measures, the analysis includes dummy variables for the presence of an authorized economic operator program, the existence of a single-window program in the countries in the sample, and the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement between pairs of countries in the sample. The results show that the presence of an authorized economic operator program and the existence of a single-window program will improve countries’ trade performance. By contrast, the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement will not necessarily improve countries’ trade performance. These results suggest that, in general, trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at ocanuto@imf.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Implementing mileage tolls is highly challenging at present—the optimal toll analysis presented here is really to provide a metric for the size of congestion and accident externalities, rather than as a guide to actual policy.

One interesting caveat of the study is that even a small level of fuel tax or vehicle toll, could reduce transportation externalities significantly. For example, an auto toll of 5 cents per vehicle mile reduces auto mileage by 11% and generates a net social benefit of $3.0 per capita, or 70% of that from the optimized toll. Ideally, a portfolio of pricing reforms would be implemented. According to illustrative calculations this would involve a fuel tax of 81 cents per gallon and a per vehicle-mile tolls of 12.1 cents and 18.9 cents for autos and microbuses, respectively.

The study also shows that, unlike for auto and microbus, current prices for public bus and rail do not appear to be too far out of line compared with optimal prices. Efficient transit fares are below marginal operating costs per mile because lower fares entice people away from automobiles and microbus and hence, indirectly and albeit moderately, they reduce externalities from those vehicles which are currently under-taxed. In this sense, and given the existing pricing structure for automobiles, the current practice of subsidizing transit is correct. Although our estimates are rudimentary, this finding is conservative in that we omit economies of scale, which are another key rationale for transit fare subsidies.

# **References**

Aldy, Joseph, Alan J. Krupnick, Richard G. Newell, Ian W.H. Parry and William A. Pizer, 2010. ―Designing Climate Mitigation Policy.‖ _Journal of Economic Literature_ 48: 903-34.

Anas, Alex and Govinda R Timilsina, 2009a. ―Lock-in Effects of Road Expansion on CO2 Emissions: Results from a Core-Periphery Model of Beijing.‖ Policy Research Working Paper: WPS5071. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Anas, Alex and Govinda R Timilsina, 2009b. ―Impacts of Policy Instruments to Reduce Congestion and Emissions from Urban Transportation: The Case of Sao Paulo, Brazil.‖ Policy Research Working Paper: WPS5099. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Anas, Alex, Govinda R Timilsina and Siqi Zheng, 2009. An Analysis of Various Policy Instruments to Reduce Congestion, Fuel Consumption and CO2 Emissions in Beijing. Policy Research Working Paper: WPS5068. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

26
absolute value is smaller than one, supporting the existence of the cointegration relationship among the variables under consideration.

|**Table A1:**Estimation results of the error correction representation for the<br>selected ARDL model (dependent variable:Δ ln ENE)<br>|
|---|
|<br>Variable<br>Coefficient<br>Standard Error<br> <br>|
|<br>Δ ln YE<br>0.0071<br>0.1294<br><br>|
|<br>Δff(%)<br>-0.0242**<br>0.0134<br>|
|<br><br>Δd<br>-0.0879<br>0.0528<br>|
|ΔConstant<br>1.5567<br>3.4694<br><br>|
|Et−1<br>-0.0865***<br>0.0412<br><br>|
|R<sup>�2</sup><br>0.0255<br>|
|E<br>= ln ENE−17.9960 −0.0816 ln YE+ 0.2794ff+ 1.0159d|
|<br>The asterisk *** and ** indicates the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.|

Table A2 shows the long-run or cointegration results. The table indicates the statistical significances of the coefficients of the US federal fund rate, _ffr_ , and the dummy variable, _d_ , at conventional significance levels. The coefficient of _ffr_ is -0.2794, implying that a one percentage point increase in the US federal fund rate leads to a 28 percent decrease in Cambodian exports to the EU. This negative impact of the US policy interest rate is in line with the impulse response result of our VAR-based estimation, which indicates that an increase in the US interest rate worsens Cambodia’s trade balance with the EU. However, the interpretation of this size impact of the US policy interest rate should be treated with caution, given our simple specification of the estimation equation.

|**Table A2:**Long-run estimation results(dependent variable:ln ENE) <br>|
|---|
|<br>Variable<br>Coefficient<br>Standard Error<br> <br>|
|<br>ln YE<br>0.0816<br>1.4785<br><br>|
|<br>ff(%)<br>-0.2794***<br>0.1221<br>|
|<br><br>d<br>-1.0159**<br>0.6052|
|Constant<br>17.9960<br>43.0503|
|The asterisks *** and ** are 1% and 5% of significance levels, respectively.|

23
# **1. Introduction**

Early sexual initiation puts adolescent girls at risk for early childbearing and marriage. To test the impact of policy interventions, researchers often rely on self‐reported sexual behavior data obtained from face‐ to‐face surveys [e.g. Duflo _et al._ 2015]. However, survey methodologists have long been concerned with respondents’ tendency to misreport sensitive behaviors to avoid embarrassment or possible repercussions of disclosing the truth [Tourangeau and Yan 2007].

To assess those threats and adjust responses accordingly, respondents must form impressions of and make inferences about the preferences, values, and intentions of the interviewer. Most research on the role of interviewer characteristics on misreporting of sensitive behaviors focuses on Western adult respondents and observable interviewer characteristics, such as race and gender [West and Blom 2016]. In contrast, we use data from adolescent girls in Liberia and examine how self‐reports of sexual behaviors vary by both observable (gender, physical attractiveness) and seemingly unobservable (attitudes, beliefs) interviewer characteristics.

Our results highlight the importance of physical appearance and nonverbal communication in the social cognition processes that take place in a survey. In particular, interviewer’s physical attractiveness could evoke stereotypes among survey respondents, such as the belief that better‐looking individuals are sexually warmer or more trustworthy as long emphasized by the social psychology literature [e.g. Langlois _et al._ 2000]. Whether such stereotypes induce girls to report more or less truthfully is ambiguous. For example, if girls expect better‐looking interviewers to be sexually warmer, they may over‐report sexual activity to impress them. Or if girls see them as more trustworthy, they might feel more comfortable to disclose the truth to them.

Perhaps more surprising is the evidence that girls’ responses are also affected by seemingly unobservable interviewer attitudes, given the structured and scripted nature of the interview. This finding suggests that interviewers signal (possibly unconsciously) their views through nonverbal cues, such as subtle changes in gaze or intonation. Girls appear to pick up those cues and adjust their responses accordingly. Girls might be less likely to disclose sexual activity to interviewers who they perceive to judge more harshly such 2
transition matrix is “monotone” if a higher step can be obtained from a lower step by moving probability mass to the right (Conlisk (1990)). In other words, it stochastically first-order dominates the distribution represented at a lower step. This property is important in the current context, where states are ranked from worst to best: a monotone matrix preserves the disadvantage of originating from a low state into the future. Finally, I can compare the two transition matrices in terms of their upward-mobility assuming that the mobility structure as characterized by the matrix is constant over time. By multiplying P with itself sufficiently often, it converges to a unique equilibrium probability vector e regardless of the initial distribution. 1° 8.2 Results How has life changed since 1999 in the people’s own assessment? The TLSS asked people to assess the changes from 1999 to 2001. Table 1 displays the responses to “ladder questions” of individuals aged 15 years or older, where persons are asked to rank themselves on one of nine steps with regard to economic and power status, both for 2001 and in recall for 1999. Looking back to 1999, the vast majority viewed themselves as poor: about one third of the respondents believed they were on the lowest step, another third on the second lowest step, and another 30 percent between the third to fifth lowest steps. Less than two percent ranked themselves on the top four steps. By comparison, the situation in 2001 is improved, especially for the lowest third. The share of the lowest step decreased significantly, boosting the shares of the second and third lowest steps, with the rest remaining unchanged. Overall, the economic situation of the lowest two thirds improved or remained unchanged, while the one for the highest third remained broadly unchanged. The responses on power reveal a dramatic shift. In 1999, the bulk of the population viewed itself as powerless, with six in ten placing themselves on the lowest step, and another one in five on the second lowest step. Essentially nobody ranked herself on the top four steps. The situation in 2001 was fundamentally improved. Only one in 20 people in Timor Leste believe they were completely powerless, and close to three in ten ranked themselves on the top 10 More technically, P be the time-invariant mapping of a first-order Markov chain, such that with tg>t,. Under certain regularity conditions, there exists an unique “ergodic” equilibrium distribution p which is the unique solution to e’ = e’P where the components of e add up to unity (Quah (1993) and Kremer et al. (2001)). "1 Assuming that the means of the two distributions are unchanged, I can apply the concept of first-order stochastic dominance. The 2001 cumulative density function is not higher than the one for 1999 up to the 95 percentile, and therefore first-order dominates the 1999 distribution up to this percentile.
Figure 2: Remittances outflows to developing countries and foreign residents in Italy <!-- Start of picture text --> 7000 40<br>6000<br>30<br>5000<br>20<br>4000<br>10<br>3000<br>0<br>2000<br>Year<br>Remittance outflows Foreign residents<br>% change in remittances<br>Source: Bank of Italy and ISTAT.<br>Figure 3: Remittances by region of destination<br>100%  100%<br>90%  90%<br>80%  80%<br>70%  70%<br>60%  60%<br>50%  50%<br>40%  40%<br>30%  30%<br>20%  20%<br>10%  10%<br>0%  0%<br>2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011<br>East  Asia  and  Pacific  Europe  and  Central  Asia  La@n  America  and  Caribbean  East  Asia  and  Pacific  Europe  and  Central  Asia  La@n  America  and  Caribbean<br>Middle  East  and  Northern  Africa  South  Asia  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa  Middle  East  and  Northern  Africa  South  Asia  Sub-­‐Saharan  Africa<br>(a) Italy (b) World<br>2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br>Remittance outflows (millions, Euro)<br>Stock of foreign residents (thousands)<br>Annual change in remittance outflows (%)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Bank of Italy and World Bank Migration & Remittances Factbook 2011.

suggesting that Italy represents a relevant and representative case study (Figure 3). The East Asia and Pacific region is the main recipient of both Italian and global remittances to developing countries. The region’s share of remittances from Italy increased by 10 percentage points between 2005 and 2011. Europe and Central Asia’s share of remittances from Italy is twice as high as its share of global remittances, reflecting the relatively large number of migrants from Eastern Europe in Italy. South Asia accounts for a rising share of remittances from both Italy and the world. In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for a limited share of remittances.

10
**Table A.2:** Balance Checks on Village Characteristics: Administrative Data

||Latitude|Longitude|Altitude|Coastal|Forest|Agric.|Rice|Corn|Rubber|Palm oil|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|New village head|0.659|0.146|106.152|-0.009|0.013|-0.049|0.144|-0.190<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.026|-0.003|
||(0.725)|(3.019)|(161.475)|(0.073)|(0.089)|(0.085)|(0.127)|(0.083)|(0.060)|(0.008)|
|Observations|512|512|512|512|512|512|512|512|512|512|
|Control mean|4.76|110.6|179.6|0.093|0.14|0.92|0.56|0.17|0.034|0.012|
|Robust p-value|0.327|0.994|0.377|0.991|0.930|0.453|0.228|0.015|0.733|0.540|
|MSE-opt. bandwidth|23.1|19.4|17.0|22.6|20.5|23.9|28.5|19.4|18.7|11.5|
|Effective obs.|266|239|216|262|249|276|316|240|234|158|

_Notes_ : This table reports RD estimates of _γ_ in equation (1) obtained via the non-parametric method from Calonico et al. (2014). The dependent variable is: in columns 1 through 3, the latitude, longitude, and altitude of the village, respectively; in columns 4 and 5, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the village is located in a coastal area or a forest area, respectively; in column 6, a dummy equal to 1 if agriculture is the main economic activity in the village; and in columns 7 through 10, a dummy equal to 1 if rice, corn, rubber, or palm oil is the main economic activity in the village, respectively. All dependent variables are measured in the 2021 wave of the Podes survey.

* p _<_ 0.1, ** p _<_ 0.05, *** p _<_ 0.01. Robust bias-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

**Table A.3:** Balance Checks on Sampling of Citizens

||Listed byvillage offcial|Listed byBPD member|Degree of Connection|
|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|New village head|-0.006<br>(0.022)|-0.025<br>(0.020)|-0.213<br>(0.251)|
|Observations|14484|14484|14484|
|Control mean|0.16|0.12|1.98|
|Robust p-value|0.869|0.118|0.354|
|MSE-opt. bandwidth|18.7|19.2|19.1|
|Effective obs.|6680|6842|6768|

_Notes_ : This table reports RD estimates of _γ_ in equation (1) obtained via the non-parametric method from Calonico et al. (2014). The dependent variable is: in column 1, a dummy equal to 1 if a village official directly provided a citizen’s phone number; in column 2, a dummy equal to 1 if a BPD member directly provided a citizen’s phone number; in column 3, a variable measuring the degree of connections between citizens and village/BPD officials.

* p _<_ 0.1, ** p _<_ 0.05, *** p _<_ 0.01. Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by village in parentheses.

44