**Table A3. Gender and savings: Evidence from impact evaluations in Africa**

||**_Intervention_**|**_Country_**|**_Rural /_**<br>**_Urban_**|**_Author(s) &_**<br>**_year(s)_**|**_Method_**|**_Quality of_**<br>**_evidence_**|**_Gender_**<br>**_outcome(s)_**|**_Key gender findings for policy_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**counts**|Individual bank<br>account|Kenya|Rural|Dupas and<br>Robinson<br>(2013a)|Randomized<br>control trial|Strong|Account adoption<br>& use; investment;<br>expenditure|Individual savings accounts generate substantial<br>increases in women's savings rates, business<br>investment, and expenditure, relative to men and<br>controls.|
|**t savings ac**|Individual and joint<br>bank accounts|Kenya|Rural|Dupas et al.<br>(2015)|Randomized<br>control trial|Strong|Account adoption;<br>income;<br>expenditure; food<br>security; transfers|Men and women preferred individual accounts<br>over<br>joint<br>accounts.<br>Subsidized<br>accounts,<br>meanwhile, were used more intensively by<br>husbands than by wives.|
|**l and join**|ATM cards|Kenya|Rural|Schaner<br>(2015c)|Randomized<br>control trial|Strong|Account adoption<br>& use; bargaining<br>power|Both men and women with low levels of<br>bargaining power responded negatively to an<br>ATM card offer.|
|**Individua**|Individual and joint<br>bank accounts|Kenya|Rural|Schaner<br>(2015b)|Randomized<br>control trial|Strong|Investment;<br>expenditure;<br>decision-making|Couples<br>with<br>divergent<br>intertemporal<br>preferences are more likely than well-matched<br>couples to forego more deeply subsidized joint<br>savings accounts in favor of individual accounts<br>with lower rates of return.|
|**ent savings products**|Commitment<br>savings devices<br>(lockboxes),<br>labeling, and group<br>savings|Kenya|Rural|Dupas and<br>Robinson<br>(2013b)|Randomized<br>control trial|Strong|Account adoption<br>& use; preventive<br>health savings;<br>shocks|The provision of a soft commitment device (a<br>lockbox and key), as well as labeled group savings,<br>can generate substantial increases in health<br>savings. Married women benefit even more from<br>the provision of a lockbox and key than unmarried<br>women (though the reverse is true for ROSCA<br>health savings).|
|**Commitm**|Commitment<br>savings devices,<br>labeling, and index<br>insurance<br>_*The evidence for this ta_<br>_experimental (e.g., RCT,_<br>_counterfactual group to_|Burkina<br>Faso &<br>Senegal<br>_ble was drawn f_<br>_natural experim_<br>_account for sele_|Rural<br>_rom academ_<br>_ent) or quasi_<br>_ction bias an_|Delavallade<br>et al. (2015)<br>_ic and policy paper_<br>_-experimental (e.g._<br>_d other potential c_|Randomized<br>control trial<br>_s that meet the foll_<br>_, discontinuity desi_<br>_onfounders of prog_|Strong<br>_owing criteria: i)_<br>_gn, propensity sc_<br>_ram impact; and_|Account adoption<br>_evaluated the impact of_<br>_ore matching, differenc_<br>_iv) reported the impact_|Women were significantly less likely than men to<br>take up an agricultural index insurance product,<br>suggesting that men and women face different<br>risks.<br>_a land-related intervention in Africa; ii) employed an_<br>_e-in-difference, IV) design; iii) identified a credible_<br>_on women and/or gender differences in impact._|

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