rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
accounts per 10,000 adults and bank branches per 100,000 adults. Both indicators are substantially lower in the median African country than in the median non-African developing country. Specifically, there are only 15 bank accounts for every 100 adults in the median African country, while there are 42 outside Africa. There are 3.1 branches per 100,000 adults in Africa, while there are 9.6 outside Africa. Second, the more limited outreach of Africa’s banking systems is also reflected in indicators of use of formal finance by enterprises and households. While in the median African country, only 21 percent of firms indicate that they have a line of credit or loan from a formal financial institution, this share is 43 percent outside Africa.<sup>v</sup> Similarly, 16.5 percent of adults in the median African country indicate that they have an account with a formal financial institution, while this share is 21 percent outside Africa.

**Figure 3: Access to and Use of Financial Services in International Comparison**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br>45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15 Non-African developing<br>10 countries<br>5<br>0 Sub-Saharan Africa<br>Bank Bank Firms with Adults with<br>accounts branches line of an account<br>per 100 per 100,000 credit to at a formal<br>adults adults total firms fin. inst. to<br>(all firms) total adults<br>(%), 2009- (%)<br>11<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Global Financial Development Indicators, World Bank Africa’s banks are, on average, less efficient, but more profitable and operate in less competitive environments. Net interest margins in the median African country stood at 5.9 percent in 2011, while they stood at 4.7 percent outside Africa. Similarly, the interest rate 8
# **4.3. The Tradeoffs**

The possible tradeoffs between the two financing options warrant further research. Under the constant tax rate approach public and national saving increase and efficiency rises as a result of tax smoothing, but the government is left to manage large financial assets. Under the balanced budget tax revenue approach, private saving increases, efficiency rises as a result of low tax rates (during the next twenty years), and financial assets are managed by the private sector, but tax rate adjustments that may create uncertainty in the economy and be inequitable from an intergenerational perspective are necessary.

To examine intergenerational equity in the cost-benefit analysis of the different financing scenarios it may be advisable to apply the baseline assumptions and sensitivity tests to the New Zealand generational accounts (Kotlikoff 1995). A quick look at the tax cuts and tax increases under the balanced budget financing option suggests that the generation entering the work force at the end of this century would enjoy relatively low taxes, retire just in time to avoid the tax increases and enjoy a greater life expectancy with pensions as generous as the previous generation but financed from the higher taxes of following generation.

Options that would allow for tax smoothing at lower tax levels and without requiring the government to manage large public assets could be achieved by containing demographic pressures on future spending. The sensitivity tests and scenarios presented in the previous sections indicate that effective strategies for containing the fiscal effects of an aging population involve tight control over spending on health and pensions.

Policies that offer further tax cuts in exchange for a reduction in future benefits are also likely to bring economic gain. For example, international evidence (section 2) suggests that the expected size of public pensions is negatively correlated with private saving. Thus, a lower expected level of NZS benefits is likely to induce the current generation to use any additional disposable income from tax cuts for private saving for retirement. Individuals could invest their funds according to their own risk preference. The resulting investment level is likely to be higher (compared with the balanced budget 48
returning he heard that someone had offered Halim Rp. 8 million for land he believed still belonged to his father.

Halim’s older brother, Ali, offered to help mediate the disagreement. Three meetings were held at Ali’s house to clarify rightful ownership. At these meetings the matter could not be resolved and so Halim reported the dispute to the village head. A week later the village head convened a meeting where Halim and Amir plus their witnesses were invited to discuss and resolve the problem. The village head now explains how the process worked: _Because [the problem] could not be resolved at the lower [hamlet] level, it was brought to the village level. In order to resolve the problem, I referred to the document_ [from out-of-date land record books, _Petok C,_ that were used during the Dutch colonial period] _I had in Halim’s father name. The witnesses’ explanations were somewhat confusing. They could not agree on a decision. It seems that [the land] was not purchased transparently in the past. It seems that the land was sold when he needed money, and he wanted to redeem it if he had the money. It was certainly bought cheaply. Amir’s side acknowledged this. According to Halim’s side, the transaction was a sale. The atmosphere of the meeting was tense. Amir threatened violence. Then I divided the land. I returned part of it to Amir. I put pressure on him. If he did not accept the solution, then the village would take the land. They were frightened. The community very much supported this method. The problem was resolved._ (World Bank 2008, p. 19-20) These case studies suggest that socially marginal individuals are less likely to receive support from local-level legal institutions. (The same is true, of course, in most state-centered formal legal institutions.) _Forging the Middle Ground_ reports cases in which members of disadvantaged groups, such as women (pp. 30, 31, 45), ethnic minorities (p. 27), newcomers to the village (p. 84), and alleged practitioners of black magic (p. 81) failed to gain support in local, informal legal venues. Conversely, the report describes a prominent male political figure who is believed to have violated proper _adat_ marriage procedures but who easily avoids paying fines levied by the local _adat_ council (World Bank 2008, p. 33). Many have noted that local legal institutions tend are typically composed of male elders elder males (the anthropologist Franz Von Benda-Beckmann has called _adat_ “the law of senior males” (quoted in World Bank 2008, p. 8)), and that these “judges,” like those in formal legal systems, tend to hold views that resemble 17
# **Related Research**

- Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, P. Rey. 1997. "Corporate Governance, Competition Policy and Industrial Policy", _European Economic Review_ 41, 797-805.

Anderson, James H., Young Lee, and Peter Murrell. 1999. "Do Competition and

- Ownership Affect Enterprise Efficiency in the Absence of Market Institutions? Evidence after Privatization in Mongolia," IRIS Center, University of Maryland.

- Anderson, James H., Georges Korsun, and Peter Murrell. 1999. "Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effect of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia", IRIS Center, University of Maryland, January.

- Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boyko, Andrey Shleifer and Natalia Tsukanova. 1996. "How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from Russian Shops," _Journal of Political Economy,_ 104: 764-790.

- Claessens, Stijn, and Simeon Djankov. 1999. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from the Czech Republic", _Journal of Comparative Economics,_ September.

- Claessens, Stijn and Simeon Djankov. 1998. "Politicians and Firms in Seven Central and Eastern European Countries," _Policy Research Working Paper No. 1954,_ World Bank.

- . 1999. "Managers, Incentives, and Corporate

- Performance: Evidence from the Czech Republic", _European Economic Review._

- Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. 1985, The Structure of Ownership: Causes and Consequences, _Journal of Political Economy_ 93, 1155-77.

- Djankov, Simeon. 1999, "Ownership Structure and Enterprise Restructuring in Six Newly Independent States", _Economics of Transition._

- Earle, John. 1998. "Post-Privatization Ownership Structure and Productivity in Russian Industrial Enterprises," _SITE Working Paper No. 127._ Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden.

- , and Saul Estrin. 1998. "Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints:

- Disciplining Enterprises in Russia," _SITE Working Paper No. 128._ Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden.

38
indicators with this objective (but more restricted) measure of objective cross-national corruption (albeit at only limited points in time).

The paper proceeds as follows: the next section, Section I, is a discussion of the main strengths and weaknesses, in terms of validity and reliability, of using the subjective-based versus the objective-based indicators of corruption to measure the dependent variable of interest (variation in actual corruption across time and countries). Section II is concerned with reviewing, in detail, the five major indicators of corruption, which have to a significant extent been found to be valid and reliable measures of this phenomenon. The paper concludes that the CPI and the CC are, broadly and with some caveats, good indicators for measuring variation in corruption in a valid and consistent manner.

# **_I. Measuring Corruption: The Costs and Benefits of Using Survey‐Based Indicators_**

In order to operationalize and use corruption indicators, it is necessary to identify a valid and reliable measure of corruption. That is, to identify a dependent variable of interest that has the following characteristics: (1) it is _substantively_ focused on measuring corruption ( _validity criterion_ ); and (2) it consistently measures this outcome across national contexts and/or across time ( _consistency criterion_ ).

Broadly, attempts to measure corruption can be divided into two major categories: (1) objective indicators – which use ‘real’ data (costs, materials used, etc.) to calculate the magnitude of waste and abuse in public works and/or services; and (2) subjective indicators – which use survey data (of experts/elites/the public) to try and measure the perceptions and/or experience of corruption by different groups country specialists, business people, voters etc.).

Given that the focus of this paper is on trying to account for variation in corruption in general rather than in one specific policy domain (e.g. infrastructure or procurement), it will now be shown that the composite subjective measures of corruption are the most appropriate sub-set of indicators for this purpose. This is because, despite being based on perceptions, the major subjective indicators are highly correlated with narrower objective indicators, as well as outcomes associated with corruption (trust in government etc.), making it difficult to argue that objective indicators enjoy a ‘validity-based’ comparative advantage. Furthermore, subjective 3
consecutive months.<sup>11</sup> Since, this is the only of our three surveys that allows for observations over a very short time period, i.e. month by month, we limit our panel to monthly transitions. Again, to avoid summer vacations, we do not include observations that make the transition in the December to March period. This gives us a sample size of more than 340,000,000 over the 20 year period. We primarily focus on the first month that the observation is included in the sample, but later in the paper we take advantage of a three or four month transition window. The structure of this data set is particularly useful to our analysis since the time between observations is so short that it is unlikely that there are intermediate transitions between states that we are not observing. Thus, we are likely capturing all the movements that people make in the short run.

The Mexican _Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano_ for 1987-2003 is designed similarly to those in Brazil and Argentina, but there is a three month period between each interview, for a total of five interviews per cohort. We do not include transition from the second to the third quarter or the third to the fourth quarter since those overlap with the school “summer vacation” period, leaving us with a sample size of 952,664.

We define three different age groups for analysis. _Youth_ are defined as those age 15-18 years of age. They are still of secondary school age, so they are the newest entrants to the labor force of any age group and they are more tied to school than any other group. _Young adults_ are those who are age 19-24 years of age. They are beyond secondary school age (though, due to grade repetition, they still may be attending secondary school) and are, as a group, the most likely to be new entrants to the labor market. Finally, we consider _prime age adults_ , who are age 25-44, and are in the prime of their working life. We choose to only include those younger than age 45 to avoid the age when retirement starts becoming an option. This last group is included in our analysis to serve as a counterfactual against which we can compare youth and young adult transition patterns.

The analysis disaggregates the youth population by gender and poverty status. The gender disaggregation is necessary due very different time use patterns by men and women,

> 11 The full panel has a 4-8-4 structure, where the sample is interviewed for four consecutive months, not interviewed for the following eight months, and then interviewed in another four consecutive months. Due to attrition bias arising after the eight month hiatus, we choose to only use the information from the first four months.

9
panel estimators that preserve the temporal dimension often lost in previous studies that pool observations. We then test the predictions of both the target zone and the Calvo-Mendoza framework.

We tightly restrict the number of variables included in the regressions. This is primarily because our goal is to test the importance of a few heretofore unexamined variables, rather than to predict crises per se. However, it is also the case that the choice to work over a relatively short interval at high frequency necessarily implies that many of the variables that have appeared important in other studies are unavailable for many or all the countries in the sample at the required frequency.

# L **Theoretical Background from the Target Zone Literature**

In the Krugman-Rotemberg framework, the nominal exchange rate is assumed to follow a simple, although standard, log linear monetary model of the exchange rate where _s_ is the log of the spot exchange rate, m the log of domestic money supply, v a shift term capturing shocks to money demand including those to real income, velocity etc., and the expected rate of depreciation times ,A the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. The term v is assumed to evolve as a random walk with drift: where z is a wiener process: _dz-IN(O,l),_ and p is the rate of drift. Money supply is assumed to be 3
Table 12: Heterogeneous Effects - By Parents English Language skill

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent Variable:|Time-use<br>Index|Efort<br>Index|Self-discipline<br>Index|Confdence<br>Index|Aspiration<br>Index|Math<br>Z-score|English<br>Z-score|
|||Pan|el A: Neither pa|rent can read|/write Engli|sh||
|Goal-Setting|0.232***|0.136*|0.121*|0.007|0.077|0.038|0.065|
||(0.060)|(0.074)|(0.067)|(0.057)|(0.058)|(0.066)|(0.067)|
|Goal-Setting + Recognition|0.136**|0.079|0.064|-0.012|-0.023|-0.002|0.059|
||(0.057)|(0.087)|(0.067)|(0.060)|(0.063)|(0.063)|(0.060)|
|Observations|2,940|2,737|3,036|3,026|2,782|3,150|3,150|
|Baseline Outcome Controlled|Yes|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|||Pan|el B: Either pa|rent can read|/write Englis|h||
|Goal-Setting|0.079*|0.097**|0.081*|0.020|0.000|0.061|0.059|
||(0.045)|(0.048)|(0.042)|(0.036)|(0.041)|(0.076)|(0.069)|
|Goal-Setting + Recognition|0.097**|0.046|0.074*|-0.006|-0.022|0.039|0.075|
||(0.049)|(0.054)|(0.044)|(0.048)|(0.039)|(0.075)|(0.063)|
|Observations|9,775|9,171|10,013|9,955|9,363|10,276|10,276|
|Baseline Outcome Controlled|Yes|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|

_Notes_ : This table reports the heterogeneity (by english language skill of Parents) of the impact of interventions on main outcomes of interest: Time-use Index, Effort Index, Self-Discipline Index, Confidence Index, Aspiration Index, Math test score, and English test score. Construction of these indices is discussed in Section 2. Panel A reports the results for the sample where neither parents can read/write in English. Panel B reports the results for the sample where either parents (at least one) can read/write in English. Standard errors are clustered at the level of school. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
# Policy Research Working Paper Series

|**Tithle**|Author|Date|Contact<br>**for**paper|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS1278 Regulation and Commitment in the<br>Development of Telecommunication<br>in Chile|Ahmed Galal<br>s|March 1994|B. Moore<br>38526|
|WPS1279 Optimal Hedging Strategy Revisited:<br>Acknowledging the Existence of<br>Nonstatlonary Economic Time Series|Ying Qian<br>Ronald Duncan|March 1994|S. Lipscomb<br>33718|
|WPS1280 The Economic Impact of Export<br>Controls: An Application to Mongolian<br>Cashmere and Romanian Wood Prod|Wendy E. Takacs<br> <br>ucts|March 1994|M. Pateha<br>37947|
|WPS1281 Human and Physical Infrastructure:<br>Public Investment and Pricing Policie<br>In Developing Countries|Emmanuel Jimenez<br>s|April 1994|L. Longo<br>37786|
|WPS1282 Copper and the Negative Price of<br>Storage|Donald Frederick Larson|April 1994|A. Kim<br>33715|
|WPS1283 Interest Rates in Open Economies:<br>Real Interest Rate Parity, Exchange<br>Rates, and Ccuntry Risk in industrial<br>and Developing Countries|Dipak Das Gupta<br>Bejoy Das Gupta|April 1994|B. Kim<br>82467|
|WPS1284 The Soviet Economic Decline:<br>Historical and Republican DiJa|William Easterly<br>Stanley Fischer|April 1994|R. Martin<br>31320|
|WPS1285 Capital Fundamentalism, Economic<br>Development, and Economic Growth|Robert G. King<br>Ross Levine|April 1994|P. Sintim-Aboagye<br>38526|
|WPS1286 Economic Transformation and the<br>Fiscal Crisis: A Critical Look at the<br>Central European Experience of the 1|Luca Barbone<br>Domenico Jr. Marchetti<br>990s|April 1994|S. Harbi<br>37143|
|WPS1287 Unstable Inflation and Seignorage<br>Revenues in Latin Ameriea: How Man<br>Times Can the Govemment Fool Peo|Jacques Morlsset<br>y<br>ple?|April 1994|D. Jenkins<br>37890|
|WPS "88 The Public Finance of Infrastructure<br>Issues and Options|: Vinaya Swaroop|April 1994|C. Jones<br>37699|
|WPS 1289 A Fiscal Needs Approach to Equali-<br>zation Transfers in a Decentralized F|Anwar Shah<br>ederation|April 1994|C. Jones<br>37754|
|WPS1290 Oil Price Instability, Hedging, and an<br>Oil Stabilization Fund: The Case of<br>Venezuela|Stijn Claessens<br>Panos Varangis|April 1994|D. Gustafson<br>33714|
|WPS1291 A Survey of Viet Nam's Legal<br>Framework In Transftion|Natalie G. Lichtenstein|April 1994|M. Rangarajan<br>81710|
- Requirements on the legal form of entry and restrictions on foreign equity;

- Limits on licenses and discrimination in the allocation of licenses;

- Transparency and accountability of licensing;

- Restrictions on ongoing operations;

- Relevant aspects of the regulatory environment.

This core set of variables, which is available for every subsector, is supplemented with sector-specific variables, for instance whether in telecommunications foreign providers are allowed to operate their own international gateways or to offer voice-over-IP services.

# **2.2.2 Quantification of Policy Information**

It is notoriously difficult to gauge the restrictiveness of policies affecting services trade and investment because of their variety and complexity (see the survey by Deardoff and Stern 2008). In this paper we use the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) developed by Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2014). The STRI is a scalar measure of overall openness for a given subsector-mode combination, e.g. for accepting bank deposits (subsector) by establishing commercial presence abroad (mode). All applicable measures within each such combination are evaluated and the overall policy regime is judged to be one of five possible “types”: completely open, i.e. no restrictions at all; completely closed, i.e. no foreign entry allowed at all; virtually open but with minor restrictions; virtually closed but with very limited opportunities to enter and operate; and a final residual ”middle” category of regimes which allow entry and operations but impose restrictions that are neither trivial nor virtually prohibitive. Each of these five regimes is assigned a value on an openness scale from 0 to 1 with intervals of 0.25. Once a score has been attached to each category, STRI values can be aggregated across sectors using weights that reflect the relative importance of constituent services sectors in domestic value added for an average industrialized country. More detailed 8
considering that economic cycles would a priori be expected to make them move in opposite directions (e.g. low entry and high exit during economic contractions). Haddad et al. (1996) also found no significant correlation between real output growth and firm turnover in Morocco from 1984-89.<sup>16</sup> Table 2 presents a broader range of summary statistics. There are considerable size disparities amongst Moroccan firms. For example, the mean number of workers per firm is 71, yet the median is just 18. In terms of output, the median firm is less than onetenth the size of the sample mean. Approximately 8% of workers in a given a firm are employed on a casual basis. The average age of firms in the census data is 15, with the oldest firm having been in operation for 102 years.<sup>17</sup> Firm investment appears fairly sporadic, with the median firm in a given year investing nothing.

As discussed earlier in the paper, the agglomeration variables are available at two geographical levels – the commune and the province.<sup>18</sup> Commune-level information is only available from 1998-2001 while province-level information for the entire sample period (i.e. 1985-2001).<sup>19</sup> The average firm operates in a commune with over 20,000 (full-time equivalent) workers, climbing to almost 110,000 workers at the province level. Of these total workers, approximately 10% are within their own industry. The average firm has 49 other

> 16 Further discussion of trends in entry and exit rates during the period under examination can be found in Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006a).

> 17 Age is measured at the time a firm begins its operations rather than the time the firm is legally established. Comparing the two sets of figures suggests that in some instances there is a sizeable lag between the legal establishment of firms and the commencement of operations.

> 18 Data is actually available at the city level, but with over 90 percent of firms in most provinces in the largest city, there was not enough variation to differentiate the results from those of provinces more generally.

> 19 The agglomeration variables were constructed using all observations, however the imputed observations are excluded from the final analysis due to the concerns of measurement error, and only the descriptive results for the non-imputed results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

15