rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
5 to hold sufficient capital to support their overall 'oss exposure. Second, the suppliers (i.e., owners) of whatever mix of private and governmental capital each bank actually deploys look for informadon with which to monitor the loss exposure their stake in the bank passes through to them. In developed and developing countries alike, the great ('anger is that taxpayer stakes in explicitly and implicitly nationalized banks remain at least partly hidden from view. Defects in the incentive systems governing public service are supported by blockages in the flcw of information on the quality of job performance. In any country where the private monitoring sector of the financial infrastructure is weak or nonexistent, regulatory performance can be improved by an inflow of skilled resources into independent prvate auditing and credit-rating industrics.

The fact of countercyclical and idiosyncratic fluctuationm in a society's political willingness to enforce restrictions on the deal-making opportunities of its banks calls for lawyers, accountants, and economists to develop information, contracting, and regulatory technologies that can permit capital stndards to be tightened or relaxed over the business cycle in an economically efficient manner. In practice, supcrvisory efforts often offset rather than reLninorce the market pressures that would ordinarily discipline the risks to which bank lending, funding, and other ;)usiness strategies expose various stakeholders. Brock concludes from surveying banking policy in Latin American countries (1992, p. xiii) that "government shielding of banks from the hazards ... and influence of thL free market fosters unsound, crisis-prone banking systems." Government supervisory mechanisms that are intended to assure prompt corrective action from economically insolvent banks cannot be stopped from responding to pol-1cal and macroeconomic pressure. Nevertheless, economic efficiency would be served if governments would commit to fostering unbiased and nonsecretive measurement of private and governmental contributions to bank capital. If infornationally disadvantaged bank stakeholders are to be protected throughc'tt the globe, individual country banks must be monitored and disciplined by reliable parties who can make it difficult for politicians and regulators to renege surreptitiously on their commitment to informational adequacy and transparency.
Political Stability (percentile rank : 0 to 100) <!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA<br>2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020<br><!-- End of picture text --> _<mark>Source:</mark>_ <mark>Worldwide Governance Indicators (WB).</mark> _<mark>Definitions:</mark>_ <mark>Percentile rank ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest).</mark> _<mark>Regions:</mark>_ <mark>EAP (East Asia & Pacific); ECA (Europe & Central Asia); LAC (Latin America & Caribbean); MENA (Middle East & North Africa); SA (South Asia); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa).</mark> The next sections delve more deeply into the region’s governance record. They look at four building blocks of inclusive and effective governance, namely: (i) state effectiveness and capability; (ii) inclusive and accountable political institutions; (iii) civic capacity; and (iv) political stability. More disaggregated data provide some nuance to the governance diagnostic. It helps identify some positive trends that are hidden by aggregate variables, such as the progress made on selected fundamentals of government effectiveness (including public financial management and revenue generation), the durability of democratic (and electoral) processes, and the decline in interstate wars. Yet, it also shows that, despite this trio of advances, progress has often been subject to reversals and stagnation, and many areas of governance continue to lag behind.

# State effectiveness and state capacity trends

**<mark>Long-term trend 1. Effective state institutions, capable of maintaining peace, fostering growth and delivering services, have developed unevenly since 2000.</mark>** <mark>There has been some progress in reforming state institutions, including on ‘fundamentals' such as public financial management or revenue mobilization in selected countries. Yet, overall progress on building strong and effective state institutions, including public administration and regulatory capacity implementation has stagnated and reformers have had to contend with repeated reform failures and reversals, in particular in fragile and resource-rich countries. This subpar progress on institutional development underlies the persistence of petty and grand corruption, and the low performance of public service delivery.</mark>

Overall progress on state effectiveness and capacity has stagnated since the early 2000s. On the whole, the SSA region has performed poorly on the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) cluster on public sector management and institutions (Figure 5). Data indicates that there has been marginal to no progress on critical dimensions of public sector management and institutions such as the 8
richest prefectures. This qualifies the previous finding of a slight divergence trend in real incomes. The very poorest areas have, after all, gained from the NEN; just not as much as the initially wealthier ones.

- Third, even in the prefectures in which the impacts on real urban wages have been the smallest (e.g., in the western parts of China), the most urbanized prefectures have still seen the largest gains.

- Fourth, impacts on real rural wages have been smallest in prefectures with low rural (i.e., high urban) shares. So, contrary to what might have been expected based on current development thinking (see, for example, World Bank, 2009), rural areas do not appear to have received a significant stimulus from the presence of a large and diverse urban economy in the face of falling transport costs.

- Finally, the initially more remote prefectures – as measured by the aggregate travel time to all other prefectures – have experienced larger impacts on real urban wages and smaller ones on real rural wages. So, the NEN may not yet have had a significant positive impact on remote rural areas.

# **6. Conclusion**

Over the last two decades, China has invested heavily in the upgrading of its road network, constructing a National Expressway Network which is second in its size only to the US Interstate Highway System. The construction of this network has formed an important part of China's national development strategy, which has been increasingly focused on promoting the catch-up of China's lagging inland regions with its prosperous metropolitan and coastal regions. However, although we have found that the NEN has brought sizeable aggregate benefits to the Chinese economy, increasing overall real income by roughly 6 percent in 2007 over the level that would have prevailed in the absence of the network, it has, as of yet, had little impact on regional disparities. The dispersion of the log of real income per worker levels across prefectures is essentially the same as would have existed in the absence of the network. And the largest aggregate gains have tended to be concentrated in what, in any case, would have been the most productive prefectures. The NEN has also had little impact on narrowing urban-rural disparities within prefectures.

30
|**Variables**|**Total**|**Extortion**|**Homicide**|**Vehicle**<br>**theft**|**Theft**|**Injury**|**Other**|**Robbery**|**Rape**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|PATI t+3|–2.750**|0.506***|0.504|0.011|-1.346***|–0.392|–1.410|-0.679***|0.057|
||(–2.169)|(1.663)|(1.193)|(0.044)|(–1.811)|(–1.270)|(–1.311)|(–1.742)|(0.415)|
|PATI t+4|3.250***|–0.133|0.040|0.238|0.607|0.017|1.909***|0.559|0.013|
||(1.832)|(–0.481)|(0.122)|(1.149)|(0.713)|(0.051)|(1.827)|(1.527)|(0.108)|
|PATI t+5|–4.963**|–0.044|–1.127**|–0.371***|–0.718|–0.084|–2.229**|–0.324|–0.066|
||(–4.013)|(–0.163)|(–3.297)|(–1.897)|(–1.176)|(–0.268)|(–2.884)|(–1.022)|(–0.668)|
|Time FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|District FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|R2|0.037|0.017|0.015|0.009|0.019|0.009|0.036|0.009|0.008|
|Observations|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|23,660|

_Note:_ Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** _p_ < 0.01, ** _p_ < 0.05, * _p_ < 0.1 We further check the existence of spillover effects of the program for municipalities within a radius of 50 kilometers. The magnitude of decline in violence in a given municipality may depend on the actions of neighboring municipalities; one municipality’s crime reduction efforts in one year spill over to future years and to neighbors (Chioda 2017). In our estimation, we find that spillover effects are sizable and significant for almost all types of crimes, except homicides, robberies, and rapes (Table 4). We find that proximity to a treated municipality also seems to diminish crime rates.

**Table 4: PATI Spillover Effects: Municipalities within 50 km of distance**

|**Variables**|**Total**|**Extortion**|**Homicide**|**Vehicle**<br>**theft**|**Theft**|**Injury**|**Other**|**Robbery**|**Rape**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|PATI|–8.275**|–0.826**|–0.539|–0.445**|–0.506|–0.531|–4.848**|–0.456|–0.124|
||–4.768|–2.664|–1.228|–2.295|–0.910|–1.405|–4.634|–1.059|–1.080|
|Municipalities|–2.973**|–0.386***|–0.193|–0.258**|0.838|–1.015**|–1.964**|0.005|0.001|
|50 km|–2.007|–1.889|–0.439|–2.211|1.219|–2.249|–2.086|0.011|0.006|
|Time FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|District FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|R2|0.041|0.019|0.018|0.012|0.026|0.011|0.039|0.013|0.009|
|Number of<br>observations|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|12,813|

_Note:_ Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** _p_ < 0.01, ** _p_ < 0.05, * _p_ < 0.1 12
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# INDONESIAN LABOR LEGISLATION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

# Table of Contents

|||Page Nos.|
|---|---|---|
|I.|INT|RODUCTION ................................................... I1|
|II.|A B<br>RE|RIEF BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL<br>LATIONS IN INDONESIA<br>.2|
|III.|IND<br>PE|ONESIAN LABOR LEGISLATION IN A COMPARATIVE<br>RSPECTIVE<br>.4|
||A.|Collective Labor Relations ..............................<br>4|
||B.|Minimum Wages .............................<br>20|
||C.|Non-Wage Compensation: Employer Mandated<br>Benefits and Social Insurance Systems .23|
||D.|Other Labor Standards: Hours of Work, Leave,<br>Minimum Age of Employment ............................<br>27|
|IV.|CO|NCLUSIONS ............................<br>27|
|REFE|REN|CES<br>..<br>29|
|Table|1:|Union Densities .31|
|Table|2:|Selected Data on Strikes .32|
|Table|3:|Major Causes of Strikes .33|
|Table|4:|Ratification of ILO Conventions .34|
|Table|5:|Union Registeration, Security, Collective Bargaining Rights .35|
|Table|6:|Dispute Resolution and the Right to Strike .37|
|Table|7:|Minimum Wage Legislation .39|
|Table|8:|Old Age, Disability and Dealth Programs .42|
|Table|9:|Sickness and Maternity Programs .47|
|Table|10:|Work Injury Programs .50|
|Table|1 1:|Other Labor Standards .53|
17 customer locations _(maximum information case)._ The telephone companies could provide such a database, in which customer addresses could be geocoded using a standard GIS package, like ArcView&. Each location could then be mapped using a simple custom computer program to the nearest wire center location.

Should this kind of information not be available, the regulator could resort to Census data at any level of (dis)aggregation (as discussed above). The question remains whether this would be a good substitute for the precise individual customer locations. To show that it could be so (at least in populated areas), we considered two wire centers (A and B) of Argentina's second largest city and compared the results using the geocoded locations of the customers'<sup>6</sup> served by those wire centers (geo-A and geo-B) with the results when Census data _(manzana_ level) corresponding to the area served by them is used (census-A and census-B). The estimates are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2**

||**Total lines**|<br>**Total**<br>**Investment**<br>**(in dollars)**|**Average**<br>**Investment**<br>**(in dollars)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Census-A|1,716|1,257,492|733|
|Geo-A||1,216,582|709|
|Census-B|5,169|3,113,898|602|
|Geo-B||2,964,068|573|

The table shows that there are no large differences between both data sources, so in principle, Census data could be used whenever geocoded customer locations are not available. Moreover, if the regulator wishes to measure the costs of serving a currently non-served area, she would have to resort to information from the Census, since customers do not exist by definition.

# V. **Conclusions**

Cost proxy models are promising regulatory tools, which can be used to assess the efficient cost of providing telephone services. These models could enable the regulator to

> 16 The source and description of this kind of information is also given in the appendix.
_Indicator 1.4.2:_ “Proportion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land, with (a) legally recognized documentation; and (b) who perceive their rights to land as secure, by sex and by type of tenure” _Indicator 5.a.1:_ “(a) Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land by sex; and (b) share of women among owners or rights bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure” Under indicator 5.a.1, an individual in the agricultural population<sup>7</sup> is considered to have secure land rights if they have either the right to sell, the right to bequeath, or their name on a legally recognized document. Accordingly, the sub-indicators for 5.a.1 are computed as follows, in line with the official metadata,<sup>8</sup> where the numerator includes the number of individuals with at least one of the rights mentioned above:

**5.a.1** ( **a** ) =<sup># people in ag. population with ownership or tenure rights over agricultural land</sup> ×100, by sex Total agricultural population

**5.a.1** ( **b** ) =<sup># women in the a</sup> Total in the ag. population with ownership or tenure rights over agricultural lan<sup><u>g. population with ownership or tenure rights over agricultural land</u></sup> d ×100, by tenure type

We also construct indicator 1.4.2 according to the indicator metadata, which is largely informed by the “Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests and Fisheries in the Context of National Food Security”.<sup>9</sup> The United Nations World Committee on World Food Security endorsed these guidelines in 2012, and thus they can be viewed as an internationally accepted standard (FAO, 2012). The sub-indicators for 1.4.2 are computed as follows: Sub-indicator 1.4.2 (b) is made up of two components, the perception of tenure security and the right to bequeath, where both are necessary conditions in order for an individual to be considered as having secure rights under the sub-indicator. In the ALTA study, perception of tenure security is asked on a scale from 1 to 5, ranging from “not at all likely [to involuntarily lose land]” to ‘extremely likely [to involuntarily lose land]”, in line with the joint module by FAO, World Bank, and UN-Habitat (2019). The appropriate threshold for what constitutes a secure perception on this scale is not identified in the metadata, leaving room for various interpretations. As this is a subjective dimension, we avoid any assumption about what the appropriate threshold for the secure perception of land would

> 7 The agricultural population is defined in the SDG 5.a.1 metadata as: “adult individuals living in agricultural households, i.e. households that operated land for agricultural purposes and / or raised livestock over the past 12 months, regardless of the final purpose of the production.”

> 8 SDG indicator 5.a.1 metadata is available here: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata?Text=&Goal=&Target=5.a.

> 9 SDG indicator 1.4.2 metadata is available here: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-01-04-02.pdf

9
concessions are regulated at both the federal and state level. In addition to federal road and rail projects we have data on state-level road projects from Parana and Rio Grande do Sul and rail projects from Rio de Janeiro.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

||All|Brazil|Chile|Colombia|Peru|Roads|Rail|Airports|Ports|Price<br>cap=1|Price<br>cap=0|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Observations<br>(Full)|1360|452|441|311|156|918|197|165|80|1174|186|
|Observations<br>(Financial)|1037|351|398|147|141|718|144|136|39|917|120|
|Projects|124|37|40|23|24|84|15|18|7|107|17|
|Leverage|0.69|0.81|0.66|0.52|0.62|0.67|0.96|0.57|0.47|0.69|0.62|
|LT Leverage|0.44|0.43|0.54|0.26|0.31|0.43|0.58|0.41|0.29|0.45|0.34|
|Net Leverage|0.64|0.76|0.63|0.49|0.51|0.64|0.90|0.48|0.35|0.65|0.57|
|Price cap (%<br>obs)|0.86|0.71|1.00|0.82|1.00|0.86|1.00|1.00|0.29|1.00|0.00|
|MIG (% obs)<sup>7</sup>|0.48|0.00|0.80|0.64|0.67|0.58|0.04|0.61|0.11|0.56|0.00|
|Flexible contract<br>(% obs)|0.11|0.00|0.24|0.16|0.00|0.14|0.00|0.15|0.00|0.13|0.00|
|Investment Size<br>($m, 2000)|268.84|459.56|211.81|140.27|133.79|252.16|527.09|77.56|218.86|244.97|419.51|
|Contract<br>Duration (yrs)|22.57|23.23|22.19|20.38|26.10|22.60|28.53|15.13|22.88|22.59|22.44|
|Return on<br>Assets<sup>8</sup>|0.10|0.10|0.10|0.08|0.10|0.08|0.00|0.24|0.21|0.09|0.17|
|Volatility<sup>9</sup>|0.11|0.13|0.08|0.11|0.11|0.09|0.11|0.22|0.12|0.11|0.11|
|GDP Growth|0.04|0.03|0.04|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.03|0.04|0.04|0.04|0.03|
|Inflation|0.11|0.19|0.06|0.10|0.04|0.13|0.08|0.06|0.10|0.07|0.36|
|Stock Market<br>Value|12.84|22.23|13.45|2.80|3.39|13.34|16.52|10.56|2.61|12.17|17.10|
|Pr. Bond Market<br>Capitalization|11.10|13.67|18.46|0.43|3.78|11.59|10.29|14.08|1.34|11.28|9.96|
|Renegotiations<br>per Project|3.22|1.46|2.73|7.57|2.58|3.37|4.60|1.44|3.00|3.57|1.00|
|Renegotiations<br>per Project-Year|0.29|0.12|0.25|0.56|0.40|0.31|0.35|0.16|0.26|0.33|0.09|

Mean values reported.

# **3.1 Renegotiations**

A renegotiation is considered to have occurred “if a concession contract underwent a significant change or amendment not envisioned or driven by stated contingencies” (Guasch 2004, p.80). There are a total of 399 renegotiations across the sample, with an average of 3.22 per project. The most significant

> 7 Minimum income guarantee.

> 8 Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by total assets.

> 9 Standard deviation of ROA by project.

9
# **Figure 16. WCCEs vs. SCCEs: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators**

<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) Fiscal Balances (b) Real Exchange Rates<br>6 0.10<br>4 0.08<br>0.06<br>2<br>0.04<br>0<br>0.02<br>‐2<br>0.00<br>‐4<br>‐0.02<br>‐6<br>‐0.04<br>‐8 ‐0.06<br>‐10 ‐0.08<br>WCCEs SCCEs SCCE e WCCE e<br>2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 20142015 2016 2017<br>2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Real exchange rates are computed taking the logs of the average yearly growth rates over ten-year moving windows. Fiscal balances are year to year data. _Source: WDI and WEO (IMF)._
introduce the professional civil service gradually, while eliminating the worst cases of corruption with his new personnel statute.

In Mexico the SAT’s Fiscal Career Service (SFC), intended to be a merit-based system, did not quite get off the ground during the initial reform period. Due to union opposition, entry into the SFC was made optional for existing employees and mandatory only for new employees. In addition, the SFC was to cover only a certain percentage (unspecified) of employees; that is, there would still be a category of “freely designated” employees, who would not have to fulfill any SFC requirements. This category not only included high level managers, but also specialists and technical professionals.

Survey data on the reforms in Latin America are consistent with the above evaluation of the extent of personnel reform. Indeed, the differences are highly pronounced. Perceptions of SUNAT’s and SENIAT’s human resources are much more favorable than those of the SAT’s. Eighty five percent of Peruvian respondents said that tax agency employees are _Frequently_ , _Mostly_ , or _Almost Always_ more qualified professionally than other public sector employees, as compared with 75% in Venezuela, and 52% in Mexico. In terms of the impact of the reform, 81% in Peru and 61% in Venezuela said tax agency employees were _Substantially_ or _Much More Qualified_ now than before the reform, as opposed to 16% in Mexico.<sup>20</sup> The African cases also show a mixed record in personnel management, from Kenya, where the reforms were consistently moving in the right direction, to Uganda, which showed forward as well as backward movement. The advent of the KRA is widely regarded to have increased the professionalism of the tax agency’s staff and reduced, though not eliminated, the level of corruption. KRA improved staff quality through a number of measures. The KRA increased salaries in real terms, which was a break from the previous salary policy, and actually reduced the total number of staff by over 30% over a five year period, with the major change coming from the retrenchment program of 2000. These reforms would not have been possible without autonomy.

The KRA instituted a merit-based promotion system and established a personnel regime in which staff can actually be dismissed fairly easily by KRA management. Managers are empowered with “day to day autonomy” that allows them to fend off

> 20 Taliercio (2000, 336).

16