those households experiencing one or more types of food insecurity and 0 otherwise. The outcome variable in the last column stands for raw sum of the responses to the eight FIES questions. All estimations use sampling weights to capture systematic non-response and attrition in phone surveys. Standard errors, clustered at district (woreda) level, are given in parentheses.<sup>*</sup> _p_ < 0.10,<sup>**</sup> _p_ < 0.05,<sup>***</sup> _p_ < 0.01.

Next, we study the impacts on the eight FIES variables that constitute the aggregate indices shown in Table 2. We find that the war increased households’ experience of alternative forms of food insecurity (Table 3). For example, the conflict increased the share of households who skipped meals by 39 percentage points and those who reduced food consumption by 36 percentage points. It also increased the share of households who reported being worried about lack of food by 25 percentage points. The number of households who were unable to eat healthy/nutritious foods increased by 34 percentage points. We find no impact on the outcomes in columns 6-8, although some of these coefficients turn out to be statistically significant in our disaggregated DID estimations (see Section 5.2).

**Table 3: The Impact of violent conflict on experience of food insecurity**

||(1)<br>Worried<br>not enough<br>food|(2)<br>Unable to<br>eat healthy<br>foods|(3)<br>Ate few<br>kinds of<br>food|(4)<br>Skipped<br>meal|(5)<br>Ate less<br>food|(6)<br>Run<br>out of<br>food|(7)<br>Hungry<br>but did<br>not eat|(8)<br>Didn’t<br>eat all<br>day|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Wartime dummy|-0.004|0.001|0.003|-0.049<sup>***</sup>|-0.053<sup>***</sup>|-0.011|-0.015|0.005|
||(0.015)|(0.018)|(0.021)|(0.015)|(0.019)|(0.022)|(0.019)|(0.020)|
|Tigray × Wartime dummy|0.251<sup>***</sup>|0.344<sup>***</sup>|0.343<sup>***</sup>|0.388<sup>***</sup>|0.364<sup>***</sup>|-0.025|0.046|-0.041|
||(0.047)|(0.055)|(0.051)|(0.081)|(0.087)|(0.036)|(0.040)|(0.044)|
|Household fixed effect|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|R-squared|0.003|0.006|0.006|0.010|0.008|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Mean dep. var (pre-war)|0.387|0.429|0.427|0.221|0.287|0.183|0.098|0.062|
|No. observations|14524|14524|14524|14524|14524|17196|17196|17196|

Notes: the outcome variables in this table are raw responses to standard FIES questions on whether the respondent or household member (1) was _worried_ about having enough food to eat, (2) ate only a _few kinds_ of foods, (3) unable to eat _healthy_ and nutritious foods, (4) _ate less_ than should have eaten, (5) had _skipped_ a meal, (6) _run out_ of food, (7) was _hungry_ but did not eat, (8) went without eating for a _whole day_ . All estimations use sampling weights to capture systematic non-response and attrition in phone surveys. Standard errors, clustered at district (woreda) level, are given in parentheses.<sup>*</sup> _p_ < 0.10,<sup>**</sup> _p_ < 0.05,<sup>***</sup> _p_ < 0.01.

Table 4 presents the impacts of the war on access to food as measured by households’ ability to purchase a variety of foods. In columns 1-4, we show results for commonly consumed staples and oil followed by results for more broadly defined access to food in column 5. Columns 1-3 show that the war led to 30, 24 and 5 percentage points increase in households’ inability to 26