# **Table 9: Corruption**

## **Dependent Variable: Completion Binary [yes=1] Standard Errors: Clustered by Organization Interactions in Deviation from Mean OLS Estimates**

||**(1) Superior**<br>**Shares In**<br>**Corruption**|**(2) Proportion of Projects that**<br>**Bureaucrats Report Observing**<br>**Corrupt Practices On**|
|---|---|---|
|**CS-Autonomy**|0.28***|0.33***|
||(0.06)|(0.04)|
|**CS-Incentives/Monitoring**|-0.13**|-0.20***|
||(0.07)|(0.07)|
|**CS-Other**|-0.07***|-0.14***|
||(0.02)|(0.03)|
|**CS-Autonomy x Superior Shares In Corruption**|-0.01<br>(0.03)||
|**CS-Incentives/Monitoring x Superior Shares In Corruption**|0.02<br>(0.05)||
|**Average Proportion of Corruption Rents Received By Superior**|0.05**<br>(0.02)||
|**CS-Autonomy x Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report O**<br>**Practices On**|**bserving Corrupt**|0.00<br>(0.02)|
|**CS-Incentives/Monitoring x Proportion of Projects that Bureaucra**|**ts Report**|0.11**|
|**Observing Corrupt Practices On**||(0.04)|
|**Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report Observing**||0.04|
|**Corrupt Practices On**||(0.03)|
|**Noise, General and Capital Controls**|Yes|Yes|
|**Project Controls**|Yes|Yes|
|**Fixed Effects**|Project Type,<br>Sector|Project Type, Sector|
|**Observations (clusters)**|3620 (30)|3620 (30)|

**Notes:** *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by organization throughout. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the project is completed and 0 otherwise.The variable with which management scores are interacted is z-score defined across the 30 organizations we study. In Column 1, 'Superior Shares in Corruption' represents the average proportion of corruption rents received by a unit superior within an organization. In Column 2, 'Other Breaking' refers to the proportion of recent projects and/or programmes on which officials report observing others engaging in corrupt practices. Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is 'Advocacy and Policy Development', 'Financial & Budget Management', 'ICT Management and Research', 'Monitoring, Training and Personnel Management', 'Physical infrastructure', 'Permits and Regulation' or 'Procurement'. Sector fixed effects relate to whether the project is in the administration, environment, finance, infrastructure, security/diplomacy/justice or social sector. Project controls comprise project-level controls for whether the project is regularly implemented by the organization or a one off, whether the project is a bundle of interconnected outputs, and whether the division has to coordinate with actors external to government to implement the project. Capital controls comprise a count of the number of interviews undertaken, which is a close approximation of the total number of employees. In both countries, general controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications, and the span of control. Noise controls are averages of indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of all respondents, the average time of day the interview was conducted and of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.