are intrinsically motivated they might need only to be provided autonomy, and the provision of explicit incentives might crowd out their intrinsic motivation. Importantly, the partial correlations of these two dimensions of management can still be separately estimated from each other and from the CS-other practices index.<sup>9</sup>

# **2.4 Management Practices Across Civil Service Organizations**

Figure 4 shows the across-organization variation in management practices, using our preferred aggregation of survey responses over the most senior divisional-bureaucrats. As with bureaucratic performance on projects, there is high variation in the management practices bureaucrats are subject to across organizations. For practices related to the provision of autonomy, the 75th percentile organization has a CS-autonomy score that is 145% higher than 25th percentile organization. On management practices related to incentives/monitoring, the 75th percentile organization has a CSincentives/monitoring score that is 97% higher than 25th percentile organization. To reiterate, this variation occurs despite the fact that all organizations share the same colonial and post-colonial structures, are governed by the same civil service laws and regulations, are overseen by the same supervising authorities, are assigned new hires from the same pool of incoming bureaucrats each year, and are located proximately to each other in Accra.<sup>10</sup> It is this variation in management practices along the dimensions of the autonomy given to bureaucrats, and the extent to which they are provided incentives or monitoring, that we now link to variation in project completion rates.

9 The CS-autonomy (CS-incentives/monitoring) index has a correlation of _._ 59 ( _._ 70) with CS-other.

> 10To provide practical detail on what drives this variation in management scores, we go back to consider the raw management scores in Table A1. In relation to the component of the autonomy score based on the question, “When senior sta↵in your division are given tasks in their daily work, how much discretion do they have to carry out their assignments? Can you give me an example?”, we note that 45% of organizations score between 3 _._ 75 and 5 (and so are closer to practices where, “Officers in this division have a lot of independence as to how they go about their daily duties”, while the remaining 55% of organizations score below 3 _._ 75 (and so are closer to practices where, “Officers in this division have no real independence to make decisions over how they carry out their daily assignments. Their activities are defined in detail by senior colleagues or organizational guidelines.” Similarly, in relation to the component of incentives/monitoring that asks, “Does your division use performance, targets, or indicators for tracking and rewarding (financially or non-financially) the performance of its officers?”, we note that 52% of organizations score between 1 and 3 _._ 75 (and so are closer to the practice where, “Officers in the division are rewarded (or not rewarded) in the same way irrespective of their performance. The evaluation system awards good performance in principle (financially or non-financially), but awards are not based on clear criteria/processes”, and the remaining 48% of organizations score between 3 _._ 75 and 5 (and so are closer to practices where, “Rewards are given as a consequence of well-defined and monitored individual achievements.”).

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