|le is is based<br>a scale from<br>e robustness<br>mple, which<br>usly defned.<br>ndard errors,|Informal<br>lenders<br>(12)|0.10<br>[0.06]<br>2,439<br>0.34<br>0.16+<br>[0.08]<br>1,544<br>0.37<br>0.09<br>[0.08]<br>1,791<br>0.36<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>Yes|
|---|---|---|
|dent variab<br>unity?’” on<br>icted sampl<br>ndwidth sa<br>e as previo<br>banks. Sta|Banks<br>(11)|-0.12**<br>[0.06]<br>2,459<br>0.44<br>0.01<br>[0.09]<br>1,556<br>0.46<br>-0.06<br>[0.12]<br>1,807<br>0.47<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>Yes|
|n. The depen<br>age or comm<br>2 report restr<br>a reduced ba<br>t controls ar<br>cooperative|Model 4<br>Overall<br>(10)|-0.01<br>[0.04]<br>2,436<br>0.48<br>0.08<br>[0.07]<br>1,542<br>0.49<br>0.01<br>[0.06]<br>1,788<br>0.5<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>Yes|
|ate regressio<br>n in your vill<br>ls B.1 and B.<br>imates from<br>. Responden<br>or loans from|Informal<br>lenders<br>(9)|0.10<br>[0.06]<br>2,319<br>0.34<br>0.16+<br>[0.09]<br>1,468<br>0.37<br>0.09<br>[0.08]<br>1,693<br>0.36<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No|
|nts a separ<br>r reputatio<br>olds. Pane<br>reports est<br>ram cutoff<br>ual to one f|Banks<br>(8)|-0.14**<br>[0.06]<br>2,338<br>0.45<br>-0.02<br>[0.09]<br>1,480<br>0.46<br>-0.09<br>[0.11]<br>1,708<br>0.48<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No|
|lumn represe<br>o tarnish you<br>eyed househ<br>s. Panel B.2<br>ove the prog<br>y variable eq|Model 3<br>Overall<br>(7)|-0.02<br>[0.04]<br>2,316<br>0.49<br>0.07<br>[0.06]<br>1,466<br>0.5<br>0.00<br>[0.05]<br>1,690<br>0.51<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No|
|fault. Each co<br>would this be t<br>sample of surv<br>ng land record<br>bservations ab<br>s and a dumm|Informal<br>lenders<br>(6)|0.10<br>[0.06]<br>2,439<br>0.35<br>0.17+<br>[0.09]<br>1,544<br>0.37<br>0.10<br>[0.08]<br>1,791<br>0.36<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>Yes<br>No|
|ences of de<br>how likely<br>ng the full<br>and matchi<br> 25% of o<br>tment statu|Banks<br>(5)|-0.12**<br>[0.06]<br>2,459<br>0.44<br>0.01<br>[0.09]<br>1,556<br>0.46<br>-0.07<br>[0.12]<br>1,807<br>0.47<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>Yes<br>No|
|onal consequ<br>wing source,<br>estimated usi<br>with audited<br>w and the top<br>ion with trea<br>** p_<_0.01.|Model 2<br>Overall<br>(4)|-0.01<br>[0.04]<br>2,436<br>0.48<br>0.09<br>[0.07]<br>1,542<br>0.49<br>0.01<br>[0.06]<br>1,788<br>0.50<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>No<br>Yes<br>No|
|t the reputati<br>om the follo<br>panel A are<br>housheolds<br>vations belo<br>d its interact<br>** p_<_0.05 *|Informal<br>lenders<br>(3)|0.05<br>[0.06]<br>2,795<br>0.36<br>0.11<br>[0.07]<br>1,784<br>0.37<br>0.07<br>[0.05]<br>2,053<br>0.38<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>No<br>No|
|eliefs abou<br>on a loan fr<br>ressions in<br>sample of<br>% of obser<br>the loan an<br> + p_<_0.10|Banks<br>(2)|-0.03<br>[0.06]<br>2,822<br>0.44<br>0.06<br>[0.08]<br>1,798<br>0.45<br>0.03<br>[0.06]<br>2,074<br>0.46<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>No<br>No|
|relief on b<br>e to default<br>ffect). Reg<br>s from the<br> bottom 25<br>isbursal of<br>and district.|Model 1<br>Overall<br>(1)|0.01<br>[0.04]<br>2,792<br>0.49<br>0.08<br>[0.05]<br>1,782<br>0.49<br>0.05<br>[0.03]<br>2,050<br>0.51<br>Yes<br>No<br>No<br>No<br>No|
|This table reports the effect of debt<br>on the survey question “If you wer<br>0 (no effect) to 5 (severe negative e<br>checks. Panel B.1 reports estimate<br>excludes observations outside the <br>Loan controls include years since d<br>in brackets, are clustered by bank|_Panel A: Full Sample_|100% Relief<br>Observations<br>R-squared<br>_Panel B: Restricted Samples_<br>Audited accounts<br>100% Relief<br>Observations<br>R-squared<br>Reduced bandwidth sample<br>100% Relief<br>Observations<br>R-squared<br>Interviewer effects<br>Bank*district effects<br>Respondent controls<br>Local linear control function<br>Quadratic control function|

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