of schools to remain open, it is clear that access to schooling likely declined since the start of the conflict across the entire country (e.g., WFP 2019b). However, there has not been a thorough analysis investigating the relative importance of each of these possible factors that limited access to schooling, which makes it difficult to prioritize factors and regions in an intervention. As discussed above, the relationship between the location of violence and poor education outcomes has been well-documented in other settings. But given the lack of data collection in the midst of such fragile and volatile circumstances, the differential effects of living in close proximity to violence versus conflict shocks that affect regions beyond those experiencing violence are unknown.

# **Section 2a. Shocks during the Survey Period**

Between March 2019 and February 2020, the 12 months during which the WFP survey included questions on school attendance prior to the closure of schools due to COVID-19 in March 2020, there were a number of unexpected and plausibly exogenous conflict-related shocks that could have significantly affected access to schooling. The timeline of these shocks is illustrated in figure 1. First, in August 2019, southern secessionists captured Aden, the capital of the IRG, and the capitals of two additional governorates. The stated aims of the group, which were supporters of the Southern Transition Council, were to overthrow the IRG and claim South Yemen as a separate country from the north as it was prior to unification in 1990 (e.g., OCHA 2020). The capture was arguably a surprise,8 and figure 2 demonstrates that there was a large increase in both violent incidents and fatalities in the districts that were captured.

The capture of the territory began in August 2019, which is prior to the date that schools opened on September 15, 2019. However, the occupation continued through the start of the school year until there was a negotiated transition of power back to the IRG on October 15, 2019 (e.g., Al Jazeera 2019; Peoples’ Dispatch 2019; etc.). Despite the capture having occurred during August, figure 2 further shows that a higher number of fatalities occurred during the occupation than prior to the assault and this violence continued after the school year began.

The second major shock during the time period was a partial ceasefire that occurred in September 2019. Days after a drone strike on oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, DFA forces unilaterally announced a ceasefire without any agreement from coalition forces. Shortly after this, Saudi Arabia announced a ceasefire in Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Sana’a, and Sa’ada (e.g., Hatem 2019). Although there were continual reports of the partial ceasefire failing to hold, especially in Al Hudaydah where violence did not decline, figure 2 demonstrates that there was a large average decrease in violence in the regions covered by the ceasefire. After the ceasefire broke down at the beginning of January, there was a significant increase in violence.

The third major shock was the unexpected capture of the oil-rich governorate Al Jawf from the IRG by DFA forces beginning in February 2020 and completing on March 1, 2020 (e.g., 8Immediately prior to the capture in July 2019, the World Bank sent a delegation of senior officials to Aden to begin discussions with the IRG to re-open the World Bank office in the city given the relative safety of the city prior to the capture (e.g., World Bank 2019).

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