rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
INFRASTRUCTURE AND GROWTH IN AFRICA

**Figure 6. Changes in growth per capita in Africa due to changes in infrastructure development, 2001–5 versus 1991–5, using [IK1] index of aggregate infrastructure services**

# a. North Africa

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>-0.5<br>Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia<br>Main telephone lines Electricity-generating capacity Length of road network<br>Quality of telecommunications Quality of electricity Road quality<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- b. West Africa (ECOWAS)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5<br>2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>-0.5<br>-1.0<br>-1.5<br>Benin Burkina Côte Ghana Guinea Gambia Guinea- Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo<br>Faso d’Ivoire Bissau<br>Main telephone lines Electricity-generating capacity Length of road network Quality of telecommunications Quality of electricity Road quality<br><!-- End of picture text --> 33
# **References:**

Ali, A. (1999). Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Assessment in Bangladesh. Climate Research, vol. 12, pp.109‐116.

Bengtsson, L., K. I. Hodges, and E. Roeckner, 2006. Storm tracks and climate change. _Journal of Climate_ 19: 3518‐43.

Cropper M. and S. Sahin. 2009. Valuing Mortality and Morbidity in the Context of Disaster risks. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper # 4832.

Dasgupta S., B. Laplante, C. Meisner, D. Wheeler and J. Yan. 2009. The impact of sea‐level rise on developing countries: A comparative analysis. _Climatic Change,_ Vol. 93, No. 3, 379‐ 388.

Emanuel, K., 2005. Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years. _Nature_ : 436, 686‐688.

Emanuel, K., R. Sundararajan, J. Williams. 2008. Hurricanes and Global warming: Results from Downscaling IPCC AR4 Simulations. Available at ftp://texmex.mit.edu/pub/emanuel/PAPERS/Emanuel_etal_2008.pdf Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2009): Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009.

Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2008): Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh: Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction.

Hoque, M. Mozzammel. “Strategies and Measures to Reduce Cyclone Damage.” In Cyclone Disaster Management and Regional/Rural Development Planning: UNCRD‐CIRDAP Seminar, Phase III, 27‐29 January, 1992, Chittagong, Bangladesh, 25‐45. Nagoya, Japan: UNCRD, 1992.

IMD 2010, http://www.imd.gov.in/section/nhac/dynamic/faq/FAQP.htm#q42 (accessed March 15, 2010) International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones (IWTC). 2006. _Statement on tropical cyclones and climate change_ . November, 2006, 13 pp. Available at: <u>http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/~tk/glob_warm_hurr.html</u> IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers. Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report. IPCC, Geneva.

Keim, M. E. 2006. Cyclones, Tsunamis and Human Health. _Oceanography_ 19(2): 40‐49.
network. Closely related to this is the fact that relatives and friends may not have much to lend if there has been an adverse shock that has affected everybody contemporaneously. Another issue that a microentrepreneur who leverages his informal network for business funds might face is that of reciprocity – having to lend money to someone else during their time of need might starve the lender‟s business of much needed funds. This risk of having to lend to family and friends is well documented. For instance, Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007) present evidence from Cameroon, where a large number of individuals borrow money (and pay interest on it) from credit cooperatives for no other reason other than to appear poor in order to avoid having to lend to family and friends.

The potential benefit from promoting access to formal lending institutions is high in SSA since there are a substantial number of small and micro enterprises. According to calculations from Schneider (2002), the informal economy accounted for 43.2 percent of GNP for SSA in 1999-2000 and 81 percent of those employed in the informal economy in SSA (excluding South Africa) are self employed (ILO, 2002). Add to this the fact that women, either by choice or by necessity, work disproportionately more in the informal sector – according to the World Bank Development Report (2004), the proportion of the female non-agricultural labor force that works in the informal sector is more than 95 percent in Benin, Chad and Mali, and more than 80 percent in Guinea and Kenya. These are the very people who run corner grocery stores and small tailoring shops – the small entrepreneurs, especially women, that microfinance set out to target. Since less than 3 percent of them borrow from MFIs today (CGAP and MIX, 2010), it is imperative for development practitioners and policy-makers to understand the reasons behind these low levels of adoption.

11
|**Study**|**Country**|**Method**|**Intervention**|**Supply**<br>**vs.**<br>**demand**|**Individual**<br>**vs.**<br>**collective**|**Resource**<br>**vs.**<br>**Incentive**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Linden (2008)|India|RCT|computer assisted<br>learning program<br>(different<br>implementations)|supply|collective|resource|
|Muralidharan and<br>Prakash(2013)|India|DDD /<br>DDDD|bicycles for girls|demand|individual|incentive|
|Muralidharan and<br>Sundararaman (2010)|India|RCT|diagnostic tests and<br>feedback to teachers and<br>monitoring of classroom<br>processes|supply|individual|incentive|
|Muralidharan and<br>Sundararaman (2011)<br>and Muralidharan<br>(2012)|India|RCT|bonus payments to<br>teachers based on<br>improvement in<br>students' test scores<br>(individual- or group-<br>based)|supply|individual|incentive|
|Muralidharan and<br>Sundararaman<br>(2013a)|India|RCT|school choice program<br>featuring lottery-based<br>allocation of school<br>vouchers|demand|individual|resource|
|Muralidharan and<br>Sundararaman<br>(2013b)|India|RCT|extra contract teachers|supply|individual|resource|
|Parajuli, Acharya,<br>Chaudhury and<br>Thapa (2012)|Nepal|RCT|community-driven<br>development program<br>centered around income<br>generatingactivities|demand|collective|resource|
|Rao (2014)|India|DD|mixing wealthy and poor<br>students|supply|collective|incentive|
|Sarr Dan|||grants to schools|supply|collective|resource|
|, g,<br>Chaudhury, Parajuli<br>and Asadullah (2010)|Bangladesh|DD|grants to schools and<br>education allowances to<br>students|supply /<br>demand|individual /<br>collective|resource /<br>incentive|

Importantly, while all studies included in the systematic review are selected because they report interventions’ impacts on education-related outcome variables like enrollment, attendance or test scores, many also evaluate whether the interventions affected output variables such as teachers’ attendance or time spent on student-centric activities. Because of the importance to understand the mechanisms behind an intervention’s success or failure to address outcome variables, these output variables will also be part of the subsequent discussions. The same is the case for the cost-effectiveness of different types of interventions. In many ways, a program’s cost-effectiveness has much more policy relevance than its “pure” effectiveness. Therefore, whenever information on costs is available, it will be mentioned. It should be noted, however, that details on costs are only reported in 13 out of the 29

- 12 -
<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.0%<br>_~ 10.0% industry<br>SS<br>2 [| chm<br>Ae)2Cc7)= -20.0% |[|| .isnfm<br>oO<br>- | | nmm<br>i) | | oil<br>” |_| pep<br>-30.0%<br>-40.0%<br>LSR OBR ABR IBOR_ IBER<br><!-- End of picture text -->
”Share of recent immigrants with low prior exposure to Dutch”.

We compare the effect of this alternative treatment to that of the baseline estimate of immigrant concentration by duration of stay in Table 6. As shown in the table, the magnitude of the estimated effect increases from -3.05 to -3.70. This suggests that immigrants who are less likely to be familiar with Dutch upon arrival exert a stronger negative effect on native Dutch students, shortly after their arrival. For migrants who have been staying in the Netherlands for a longer period, however, spillovers are statistically insignificant, even when immigrants had low exposure to Dutch prior to migrating. Those findings are consistent with recent evidence from Diette and Oyelere (2017) or Frattini and Meschi (2017), which suggest that negative spillovers associated with the concentration of immigrant students in the classroom originate from limited language skills of foreign-born students, rather than from classroom ethnic heterogeneity per se.

# **6.4 Heterogeneous Effects by Natives’ Types**

We previously assumed that the effect of immigrant concentration was identical for all natives. However, some of the literature on classroom peer effects suggests that spillovers might be heterogeneous across student types. Hanushek et al. (2003) and Lavy et al. (2012a) find that the test scores of students in the lower end of the ability distribution are more negatively impacted by the presence of low-performing students in their grade. To investigate this possibility in our context, we look at the impact of immigrant concentration on two types of natives by estimating separately the impact on natives with low parental education and high parental education, as proxies for socio-economic status.

We run the same regressions as in Table 4 separately for these two groups of natives. Results 28
government to build cheap and affordable houses for rural migrants who have been living in shacks at the periphery of cities for years).<sup>35</sup>

# _3.2.4) Consequences of migration for the economy as a whole_

Some empirical studies have been more ambitious and have tried to measure the national changes in production, income and inequality resulting from internal migration. The issue at stake is whether migration allows workers to move to areas where they are more productive and if efficiency gains occur at the cost of rising inequality. From an applied point of view, only structural models of internal migration or calibrated computable general equilibrium models can pretend to shed some light on this complex issue.

Several works have integrated internal migration in their assessment of trade barriers reduction. Taylor, Yunez-Naude and Dyer (1999) investigate the impacts of NAFTA on rural employment and wages and rural out-migration in Mexico following a reduction in the government support price of corn. This is done using a village-town model which blends microeconomic household farm models with economywide modeling.<sup>36</sup> The model is estimated on survey data from households located in towns and surrounding villages in the Michoacan province. The authors find only a small impact of trade liberalization. Zhai and Wang (2002) simulate the effects of a reduction in trade barriers on rural-urban migration and urban unemployment in China. Their simulations show that there is a great need to co-ordinate trade, labor and internal migration policies. In the context of trade liberalization measures (a gradual reduction of import tariffs), if ruralurban migration controls are relaxed (increasing labor mobility) without a labor-market

> 35 It should be noted, however, that _accommodationist_ policies conceal an important ambiguity. In South Africa, there is a tension between preventing ‘land invasions’ (informal settlements appearing on vacant land within the city) and helping informal settlers ameliorate their housing conditions. Pakistan facing a problem of squatter settlements, was confronted with a similar tension between legalizing such settlements and evicting them. A recent Peruvian program aiming at entitling urban squatters with property rights made sure that only current squatters could be included in the program and that demands from new squatters would be turned down in the future (see Field, 2003). It is doubtful whether such announcements can be made to be completely credible.

> 36 For computable general equilibrium  techniques used to explore the impacts of policy changes on village economies and migration, see Taylor and Adelman (1996).

45
Peer pressure is unlikely to be the most important explanation for some donors’ willingness to use country systems, even when using them entails significant risks. Donors’ tolerance of risk will depend heavily on their domestic constituencies and institutional mandates. Aid management practices of some donors are constrained by the need to convince their sometimes-skeptical principals (elected officials and voters) that aid produces visible and measurable results. Even if its domestic constituents were concerned solely with maximizing development outcomes, a donor agency’s need to provide them with tangible evidence of results, directly attributable to its funding, can make it more reluctant to delegate aid implementation to recipient systems, regardless of their quality.

Aid agencies want to be able to identify their own contributions, often through distinct projects, to facilitate feedback to taxpayers and sustain political support for aid flows. A new hospital is easier to showcase than the outcome of policy reform or budget support. (World Bank, 2004: 216) Donor agencies benefit from the visibility associated with separately managed and “branded” projects. They assist in defending the aid budget to parliamentary committees and audit authorities...In contrast, where more programmatic multidonor ventures are introduced, visibility is lost and the attribution of development results to the particular donor’s support becomes problematic. (Williamson and Agha, 2008: 34).

These political imperatives of donors may not always distort aid delivery in ways that reduce its development effectiveness, but they will be more easily satisfied when donors micro-manage their aid projects. To this point we have assumed donor agencies and their domestic constituents are concerned only with development effectiveness.<sup>3</sup> When bilateral donors use aid to advance diplomatic or commercial objectives, incentives to rely on their own parallel systems for aid delivery will be further aggravated. For example, using their own procurement rules will likely advantage donor-country contractors.

All donor agencies face some combination of political and bureaucratic incentives to pursue objectives that may conflict with the goal of increased use of country systems. However, donors do not have homogeneous mandates and constituencies. From the standpoint of development effectiveness, trust in country systems is likely to be most sub-optimal for a bilateral donor representing constituents who are particularly skeptical of aid’s effectiveness. Aid from a global multilateral donor will more closely approximate the developmentally-optimal level of trust in country systems.

> 3 Public opinion surveys in donor countries suggest humanitarian and development motives are far more important than diplomatic or commercial objectives in explaining popular support for aid (McDonnell, Lecomte and Wegimont (2003).  Lower support for foreign aid among Americans is apparently due to perceptions that very little of it reaches the poor with much of it devoted to political objectives or diverted to corrupt officials in recipient countries (Lancaster, 2007:97; OECD, 2006: 22-23).

7
# **Lesotho**

||**Prevalence among**<br>|**females 15-24(%)**<br>|**Spectrum e**|**stimates**|**Indicator 1.6 -**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**National Antenatal**|**National Demographic**|||**HIV prevalence**|
||<br>**Sentinel Surveillance**<br>**Surveys **|<br>**and Health or AIDS**<br>**Impact Surveys **|**Incidence in**<br>**adults 15-49(%)**|**Antiretroviral**<br>**coverage (%)**|<br>**in young people**<br>**15-24(%)**|
|**1990**|-|-|0.49|-|-|
|**1991**|-|-|0.93|-|-|
|**1992**|-|-|1.62|-|-|
|**1993**|-|-|2.52|-|-|
|**1994**|-|-|3.57|-|-|
|**1995**|-|-|4.46|-|-|
|**1996**|-|-|4.98|-|-|
|**1997**|-|-|5.04|-|-|
|**1998**|-|-|4.72|-|-|
|**1999**|-|-|4.20|-|-|
|**2000**|21.7|-|3.75|-|-|
|**2001**|-|-|3.32|-|-|
|**2002**|-|-|2.95|-|-|
|**2003**|24.2|-|2.77|-|-|
|**2004**|-|15.4|2.66|4|-|
|**2005**|20.5|-|2.66|11|-|
|**2006**|-|-|2.67|22|-|
|**2007**|18.7|-|2.77|26|18.7|
|**2008**|-|-|2.85|-|-|
|**2009**|-|13.6|2.69|50|19.6|
|**2010**|-|-|2.38|56|-|
|**2011**|-|-|2.26|58|16.88|
|**2012**|-|-|2.26|54|-|

<u>ANC data sources: Lesotho ANC HIV and Syphilis Sentinel Surveillance Synopsis 2003, 2005, and 2007</u> <u>National DHS or AIS data sources: Lesotho DHS 2004 and 2009</u>

# **Malawi**

||**Prevalence among**<br>|**females 15-24(%)**<br>|**Spectrum e**|**stimates**|**Indicator 1.6 -**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**National Antenatal**<br>**Sentinel Surveillance**<br>**Surveys **|**National Demographic**<br>**and Health or AIDS**<br>**Impact Surveys **|**Incidence in**<br>**adults 15-49(%)**|**Antiretroviral**<br>**coverage (%)**|**HIV prevalence**<br>**in young people**<br>**15-24(%)**|
|**1990**|-|-|2.36|-|-|
|**1991**|-|-|2.44|-|-|
|**1992**|-|-|2.45|-|-|
|**1993**|-|-|2.49|-|-|
|**1994**|-|-|2.51|-|-|
|**1995**|-|-|2.48|-|-|
|**1996**|-|-|2.41|-|-|
|**1997**|-|-|2.30|-|-|
|**1998**|-|-|1.85|-|-|
|**1999**|-|-|2.03|-|-|
|**2000**|-|-|1.91|-|-|
|**2001**|9.3|-|1.76|-|-|
|**2002**|-|-|1.63|-|-|
|**2003**|18.3|-|1.49|-|-|
|**2004**|-|9.1|1.37|5|-|
|**2005**|14.3|-|1.25|11|-|
|**2006**|-|-|1.15|21|-|
|**2007**|12.3|-|1.04|35|12.3|
|**2008**|-|-|0.79|-|-|
|**2009**|-|-|0.88|47|12.3|
|**2010**|-|5.2|0.82|54|-|
|**2011**|-|-|0.79|67|8.21|
|**2012**|-|-|0.77|69|-|

<u>ANC data source: Malawi HIV and Syphilis Sero–Survey and National HIV Prevalence and AIDS Estimates Report for</u> 2007 <u>National DHS or AIS data sources: Malawi DHS 2004 and 2010</u> 57
borrowers to retain access to financial services. Stable economic conditions, including low inflation, also help by reducing uncertainty and raising returns on investment. Liberal interest regimes have proven to be important for the viability of micro-finance schemes. One of the critical factors contributing to the financial sustainability of Indonesia’s BRI program is that banks gave loans at market rates while keeping costs low. In many countries, reform of usury laws may be necessary to allow micro-finance institutions to charge rates that cover the costs of capital. In sum, the broad lessons about the design of financial products for private parties, and the basic rules of markets, also apply to microfinance institutions. Other factors which contribute to the success of micro-finance institutions include a high degree of management autonomy in the formulation of operational policies; low-cost delivery, innovative and flexible loan terms and conditions, close monitoring of loan performance and servicing of areas with high population density.

_World Bank micro-finance projects_ 21. A 1999 OED evaluation of the Bank’s micro-finance operations assessed the performance of 15 completed projects, including 3 stand-alone micro-finance projects and 12 projects with micro-finance components.<sup>17</sup> Only five of the fifteen projects were rated as successful. Evaluation results suggest that micro-finance projects were performing less effectively than Bank projects in general and that many of these were unlikely to be sustainable. However, the evaluation did note indications of performance improvements in relatively newer projects.

22. The evaluation found that the design of Bank projects had lagged behind advances in thinking on good practices in the micro-finance industry, in particular the need for a financial systems perspective, which emphasizes the sustainability of micro-finance institutions and gives priority to institution building over subsidizing borrowers. Only five of the 15 operations evaluated by OED had followed the financial systems approach. Four of them had a satisfactory rating while nine of the ten projects that did not follow this approach had an unsatisfactory rating.

23. The evaluation report concluded that the Bank’s comparative advantage lies in supporting policy change rather than direct lending. The Bank should thus help clients: a) improve the policy environment toward creating a more liberal financial sector by seeking to eliminate interest rate controls on loans and by introducing the necessary legal framework; b) encourage non-bank micro-finance institutions to access commercial funding and build liquidity management capabilities; and c) develop appropriate ways to regulate and supervise micro-finance institutions that mobilize funds from the public.

24. The evaluation report also argued for greater emphasis on the commercial viability of micro-finance institutions. Earlier micro-finance projects of the Bank had paid little

> 17 OED (1999).

8
> **FIGURE** 3: **PRODUCT COMPOSITION OF** SSA **NON-OIL EXPORTSA**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Manufacture n.e.c.<br>8%<br>Wood products<br>5%<br>Textiles and clothing<br>3% 11 Agriculture<br>42%<br>Minerals and metal<br>prod.<br>26%<br>Forestry Food Products<br>5% 11%<br><!-- End of picture text --> aFigures exclude service exports. Source: Version 4 of GTAP database.

The pattern of protection that SSA exports currently face is shown in Table 2 - the construction of which is described in the next section. A large number of products from SSA already enter the QUAD duty-free, either because the MFN tariff is zero or as a result of existing preferential schemes.<sup>6</sup> These schemes vary in the advantage that they confer on poor countries (Figure 4).7

> **6** There are in fact a large number of tariff lines for which MFN or preferential tariffs are zero - a fact that is hidden by the level of aggregation in Table 2.

> 7 Note that these average preferences are tariff-weighted, which gives a larger weight to preferences where MFN tariffs are higher. The simple average preferences are 53 percent in Canada, 69 in the European Union, 57 percent in Japan and 54 percent in the United States. The smaller magnitude of tariff-weighted preferences illustrates the fact that products with high MFN tariffs tend to have low LDC preferences.

10