rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
and upward movements in the world market price are not passed through to growers. A possible explanation is that excessive regulation discourages entry of private traders, which in turn curtails competition and obstructs upward movements of the grower prices when the world price is high. However, even with many traders operating on the market, the positive effect of liberalization on producer prices may be undermined if the traders engage in collusive behavior.

Finally it should be noted that greater price transmission of world market prices may in fact work to the disadvantage of producers in the short run. With world market prices on a steady decline since the end of 1990s, fixed domestic prices at a pre-crisis level would have been preferred by the producers. Moreover, this study shows that in some cases the impact of the reforms on price transmission has been somewhat asymmetric – the transmission has risen more for price decreases than for price increases in some countries, meaning that the growers now bear the full costs of price drops, while the transmission of the positive price shocks has not changed much. A greater pass-through of prices changes at the time of falling prices is unfavorable to producers who may lack resources to cope with price risks. In many post-reform systems the coffee growers are left entirely uninsured against low prices. Artificially high government-supported producer prices are, however, unsustainable in the long run because of the large public outlays such support schemes would require. An alternative approach would be giving growers access to price risk management instruments, such as an opportunity to buy futures and option contracts or offer them private insurance that would shield them against price falls. This approach is consistent with the recent initiatives by the World Bank to help the coffee authorities in the exporting countries to apply risk management techniques. Pilot price insurance schemes have been launched in several countries and more are expected to be initiated in the near future<sup>4</sup> .

> 4 For more information see, for example, ITF(2002a), ITF(2002b), ITF(2002c) and Varangis _et. al._ (2003).

18
The results show monetary gains to the immigrants similar to the first year effects found by McKenzie et al (2010) and a little less than the impacts after four years reported by Stillman et al (2015). The economic payoff to migrating to a richer country seems to come immediately, and then not grow further, notwithstanding various investments by the immigrants in qualifications, internal mobility, and occupational change. Despite more occupational change than non-migrants, the average status of migrant occupations never returns to what it was premigration; in fact, much of the impact of migration on occupation occurs through the counterfactual group who reach an age for leaving public sector jobs in Tonga and become farmers and other such occupations.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, since the initial gains in income are so enormous, migrants derive very large lasting benefits from migration. They continue to earn almost 300 percent more than non-migrants, have better mental health, live in households with more than 250 percent higher expenditure, own more vehicles, and have more durable assets. We estimate a conservative lifetime gain to migration of NZ$315,000 in net present value terms (approx.. US$237,000). These gains seem to accrue mostly to the migrant and their immediate family who accompany them, with little significant measureable impact of this migration on extended family remaining in Tonga.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides context to our surveys and the sampling design; Section 3 discusses the empirical methods; Section 4 provides the results, and Section 5 concludes.

# **2. CONTEXT TO OUR SURVEYS**

The Kingdom of Tonga is an archipelago of islands in the Pacific, approximately three hours north of New Zealand by airplane. The resident population is just over 100,000, and the gross national income (GNI) per capita is $4,150 (in 2005 PPP $), which is similar to Indonesia

> 3 Early retirement is a symptom of the limited job opportunities in small, island, countries, as noted by a Fijian MP: “we have more people coming out of University and Polytechnic; they’ll need civil servants jobs...[does this]... suggest reducing the retirement age from 55 to 50”. <u>http://fijione.tv/motion-to-change-retirement-age-fails/</u>

5
|CapacityBuildingof the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics|Ghazala Mansuri|
|---|---|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|Mexico Dedicated Grant Mechanism for IP and LC|Katharina Siegmann|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|ELECTRICITY ACCESS EXPANSION PROJECT|Mitsunori Motohashi|
|PK FiscallySustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII|Enrique Blanco Armas|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|Urban Productive SafetyNet Project(UPSNP)|Samantha de Silva|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|TurkeyGeothermal Development Project|Ayse Yasemin Orucu|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Development Project|Manivannan Pathy|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
|Modernization of Real PropertyRegistration and Cadastre|Nadege Orlova|
# **VII. References**

Andre, C. and Platteau, J.-P. (1998). “Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap.” _Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization_ , vol. 34, pp.1 – 47.

Baten, J., and Juif, D. (2013). “A story of large landowners and math skills: Inequality and human capital formation in long-run development, 1820–2000.” _Journal of Comparative Economics_ , <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.11.001</u> Bezu, S. and Holden, S. (2013). "Unbundling Land Administrative Reform: Demand for Second Stage " <u>Land Certification in Ethiopia, CLTS Working Papers</u> 3/13, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Bogaert, P., J. Delincè and S. Kay. (2005). “Assessing the error of polygonal area measurements: a general formulation with applications to agriculture.” Meas. Sci. Technol. 16 (2005) 1170–1178 doi:10.1088/0957-0233/16/5/017.

- Carletto, G., Gourlay, S., and Winters, P. (2015). “From Guesstimates to GPStimates: Land Area Measurement and Implications for Agricultural Analysis,” _Journal of African Economies,_ first published online May 29, 2015 doi:10.1093/jae/ejv011.

Carletto, G., Savastano, S., and Zezza, A. (2013). "Fact or artifact: The impact of measurement errors on <u>the farm size–productivity relationship,"</u> _<u>Journal of Development Economics</u>_ , Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 254-261.

- Carletto, G., Gourlay, S., Murray, S., Zezza, A. (2016). “Land Area Measurement in Household Surveys: A Guidebook, Empirical Evidence and Practical Guidance for Effective Data Collection”. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

- Carter, M. (2000). Land Ownership Inequality and the Income Distribution Consequences of Economic Growth. UNU Wider Working Papers 201. Helsinki: UNU Wider Institute for Development Economic Research.

- De Groote, H. and O. Traoré. (2005). “The cost of accuracy in crop area estimation”. _Agricultural Systems_ . 84 (2005) 21–38.

Deininger, Klaus and P. Olinto (1999). Asset Distribution, Inequality, and Growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2375. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

- Deininger, K., and Lyn Squire. (1998). “New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth _.” Journal of Development Economics_ , Volume 57, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 259-287.

Desiere, S., and M. D’Haese. (2015). “Area Measurement in Agricultural Surveys: GPS or Compass and Rope?”. In Desiere, S. _From raw numbers to robust evidence. Finding fact, avoiding fiction._ Doctoral dissertation, Ghent University.

29
Policy Research Working Paper 9515

# **Abstract**

The informal sector is an important source of livelihoods and jobs for a vast majority of people in developing countries. However, there is concern that the informal sector may undermine job creation in the formal sector. According to the “parasite” view of informality, informal firms can compete against formal firms, and often “unfairly” so as they do not have to comply with costly regulations and pay taxes. This “unfair” advantage makes it difficult for formal firms to compete against informal firms, implying a significant loss of formal sector jobs. Using firm-level survey data for manufacturing small and medium-size enterprises in 109 mostly developing countries, this study estimates the impact of competition from informal firms on the growth rate of employment among formal sector small and medium-size enterprises. The results show that the growth rate of employment declines significantly as competition from informal firms rises. According to the baseline specification, for each one standard deviation increase in informal competition, the employment growth rate declines by 1 percentage point. Consistent with the parasite view of informality, the negative impact on job growth is much larger when the business environment is less conducive to operating formally versus informally due to factors such high corruption, weak rule of law, more burdensome regulations, and high profit tax rate. Several checks are provided against endogeneity concerns.

This paper is a product of the Global Indicators Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at mamin@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Figures 13, 13A and 13B: Maternal, child and infant mortality and GDP per capita: Relationship by province in China and by country internationally**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10000 Maternalmortality<br>(per 100,000 live births,<br>log scale)<br>1000<br>Countries, 2006<br>100<br>China's Provinces,<br>2006<br>10<br>1<br>300 3000 30000<br>GDP per capita (US$, log scale)<br>Under‐five mortality<br>(per 1,000 of live<br>births, log scale)<br>350<br>Countries,<br>35 2006<br>China's<br>provinces,<br>2006<br>3.5<br>400 4000 40000<br>GDP per capita (US$, log scale)<br>Infantmortality<br>(per 1,000 live births,<br>log scale)<br>100<br>Countries, 2006<br>China's provinces,<br>10 2006<br>1<br>300 3000 30000<br>GDP per capita (US$, log scale)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Gapminder (www.gapminder.org) 25
As discussed, the 2000s, particularly the latter half, saw high growth rates and improving fiscal positions. During this time ECA countries were very outward focused integrating with global markets. Higher integration meant also that changes in the external environment became very important for fiscal policies and outcomes. Many countries acceded to the EU adopting EU reforms, while other countries saw change to various degrees. The crisis of the late 2000s brought certain weaknesses in fiscal management to the forefront of policy discussion during this period of fiscal adjustment. The 2008/09 crisis tested the readiness of some of the institutions ECA countries had put in place and highlighted areas in which countries need to move forward.

Most countries in the ECA region have made progress in reforming their fiscal institutions, but the pace of institutional change has been uneven. The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) attempt to measure the quality of policy and institutions in member countries in a number of areas. These assessments are based on both quantitative, monitorable indicators of policy and institutional reform, as well as judgments by country teams.<sup>16</sup> One of the indicators considered relates to the quality of public administration. Its evolution suggests that the majority of countries have made some progress over the past decade, and while some countries seem to have stagnated, none of the countries seems to have experienced a major deterioration in institutional quality. However, the quality of fiscal systems continues to differ across the region with differences in income levels. Figure 4 below shows the evolution of the CPIA indicator for ECA countries separated into three groups according to GDP per capita. The top third in terms of income per capita have much higher scores as might be expected, but countries at the lower and middle income categories have also been improving.

> 16 Countries are rated on a score of 1 to 6.

Page | 19
3 rights). But this has been. averted by a government decree in 1993, requiring independent share registries for enterprises with many employees. Worker-owners can now sell their shares fr-eely and are likely to do so.

Japanese or German practices labor practices, with lifetime employment and a strong voice - of labor in the management of enterprises, represent the most optimistic outcome and perhaps the model to follow. While managers have a strong position, they will have to tread carefulfly with respect to restructuring measures. Large reductions in the workforce appear unlikly, unless a privatized firm runs into financial difficulties. Thbis need not be an insurmountable obstacle to restructuring. If su'bsidies or external funding are not forthcoming, troubled enterprises will be forced to reduce wages, eventualy prompting a good part of the labor force to leave. Since the social safety net is largely provided by enterprises, open unemployment is likely to remain low, but with large wage differentials between profitable and unprofitable finms.

Improved corporate control will lairgely come about as a result of fbactor market pressures. With the present low level of financial internediation, banks have very little leeway (and incentive) to keep troubled enterprises afloat. Unprofitable and unviable enterprises will thus -not receive any new r-esources and will need be liquidated. For these enterprises, banks will mainly be the undertakers to the dead. In exchange for supporting viable enterprises with - - negative current cash flow through debt or equity injections banks will require significant changes in ownership. Similar, the creation of new ventures will strongly depend on bank financing. Banks are thus likely to become the main agents for capital and outside-control over managers, including ownership changes. Corporate governance wfi then be '<sup>M</sup> state contingent: **u12** managers of profitable enterprises wil remain unchallenged and de-facto owners, while bankcs (or other potential rescuers) will assume ownership and oversight roles for unprofitable enterprises. Unless limited by regulatory intervention, this will probably entail a development along the liries of Japanese, post-war experience.

One of the consequences could be rapid emergence of cross-ownership links between banks and enterprises. Indeed, this has already happened. If Japanese experience is a guide, it could
Table 3: Trade policy mechanisms for import market concentration

|Dependent variable|(1)<br>HHI|(2)<br>HHI|(3)<br>Evasion|(4)<br>HHI|(5)<br>HHI|(6)<br>Evasion|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||∈[−1,1]|||∈[−1,1]|
|Tarif ∈[0,1]]|3,514***|1,794*|-0.48***||||
||(1,019)|(1,073)|(0.13)||||
|Commodity export share x Tarif|-1,636||||||
||(1,399)||||||
|Fuel export share x Tarif||8,696***|0.36**||||
|||(1,907)|(0.17)||||
|Ores and metals export share x Tarif||1,459|-0.24||||
|||(1,827)|(0.18)||||
|Food export share x Tarif||-9,887***|-0.93***||||
|||(1,551)|(0.16)||||
|NTM ∈{0,1}||||35|1|-0.00|
|||||(40)|(47)|(0.01)|
|Commodity export share x NTM||||58|||
|||||(137)|||
|Fuel export share x NTM|||||146|-0.02|
||||||(186)|(0.02)|
|Ores and metals export share x NTM|||||532***|0.03|
||||||(201)|(0.03)|
|Food export share x NTM|||||-126|-0.04**|
||||||(174)|(0.02)|
|Number of observations|1,848,851|1,848,851|1,848,851|342,148|342,148|342,148|
|R-squared|0.47|0.47|0.19|0.52|0.52|0.17|
|Dependent variable mean|3,896|3,896|0.0439|3,429|3,429|0.03|
|Country-year fxed efects|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|Yes|Yes|
|Product-year fxed efects|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|No|No|

Notes: Commodity, fuel, ores and metals, and food exports shares are measured in difference from their median value. Nontariff measures (NTMs) are those those in Chapters E and F of the UNCTAD classification. Standard errors clustered at the country-year and country-product levels are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

25
Table 6

|Minim|um Wages Ac|ross Countrie|s||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|<br>Explanatory variables|<br>Minimum w|<br>Dependen<br>age in 1985-93, i|<br>t variable:<br>n percent of per|capita GDP|
||(A)|(B)|(C)|(D)|
|CFA countries|109.9**|106.2**|153.6**|146.9**|
|(dummy variable)|(4.950)|(4.493)|(5.037)|(4.802)|
|Per capita GDP in 1993,|-10.66 *|-4.337|-13.29 **|-6.370|
|in thousand PPP dollars|(-2.304)|(-0.738)|(-2.821)|(-1.056)|
|Per capita GDP squared,|0.337|0.111|0.429|0.216|
|in million PPP dollars|(1.471)|(0.434)|(1.865)|(0.840)|
|Urban population,||-0.769||-0.717|
|in percent of the total||(-1.884)||(-1.742)|
|Mean years of schooling||0.250||-1.288|
|for ages 25 and above||(0.068)||(-0.344)|
|Countries in Latin America and|||-7.443|0.461|
|the Caribbean (durmmy variable)|||(-0.481)|(0.029)|
|Countries in Sub-Saharan|||-58.64 *|-54.30|
|Africa (dummy)|||(-2.100)|(-1.937)|
|Independen**t**erm||109.1**|128.3**|126.3 **|143.3 **|
||(7.126)|(6.406)|(6.629)|(6.537)|
|Number of observations|71|71|71|71|
|Adjusted R<sup>2</sup>|0.519|0.530|0.536|0.546|
|F test|26.15|16.80|17.16|13.07|

Note: Values in parentheses are "t" statistics. Significant coefficients at the 5 and 1 percent level are indicated by one and two asterisks respectively.

31
they did nothing but continued the business relationships with the defaulting parties. One possible interpretation of this is that there are insurance mechanisms in place, including long-term profit sharing, so that firms do not care as much about short-term gains and losses. Another interpretation is that the large and powerful firms can at times get away with violations. Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish between the possibilities.

To summarize, the general image of the business environment of the SME sector based on our survey is characterized by the presence of strong informal mechanisms. Family ties, reputation and trust are key elements in this environment. Legal remedies are not altogether absent, but are far less important than the rules of the networks in which they operate. Ownership and management are not effectively separated. Consistent with this environment, external finance comes mostly from family and friends, followed by trade credits. While some firms obtain bank credit others find it hard to get, indicating that bank loans are not made at arm’s length but are relationship driven.

# **V.5 Comparison of survey findings in New Delhi and Hyderabad regions**

The SME units in the two regions were surveyed independently. The surveys present a largely similar and consistent picture of SME financing and governance, inspiring confidence in our conclusions about the Indian business environment in general. However, there are a few important differences. For instance, trade credits appear to be far more important for the New Delhi respondents than for those in Hyderabad. Further, the New Delhi firms appear to be comparatively more dependent on family and friends for funding in both start-up and growth stages. On the other hand, bank loans seem to be more important for the Hyderabad firms. However, bank loans seem to be disbursed sooner in Delhi (90% received their loans within 2 months) than in Hyderabad (52%). Reinvestment of a large proportion of profits, however, seems to be more prevalent among Hyderabad firms.

35