rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# Table 1 Regulations of the Tobacco Clubs

(percentage)

|Which of the following rules apply to the Club?|Yes|
|---|---|
|- Club members may incur a penalty if they do not attend or|99|
|send a representative to club meetings||
|- Members are not allowed to belong to more than one tobacco|99|
|Club at the same time||
|- New members are expected to pay registration|96|
|- No member should have prior cases of default|100|
|- Club members are expected to sell their tobacco as a team|96|
|(or at least the frst bales)||
|- Club members are not allowed to sell their tobacco to|100|
|intermediate buyers or any other outlet outside the Auction||
|Floors||
|- Club members are required to assist colleagues with farming|99|
|activities and to provide other social support in case of sickness<br>- The Club explicitly denies membership to never-married|40|
|women, widows, or divorced women<br>- The Club imposes restrictions to unmarried women|67|

Source: Tobacco Clubs Survey (2007). Weights based on the number of clubs in each district were used in the tabulations. See Appendix 1.

clubs interviewed in the TCS have regular meetings, impose fees to members who fail to show up at those meetings, do not accept members with previous default history, do not allow members to belong to other clubs, require members to assist colleagues with farming activities, and expect members to provide other social support in case of sickness. The vast majority of clubs (over 95 percent) charges a registration fee and expects members to sell their tobacco as a team (or at least the first bales) so that the club debt is canceled using tobacco belonging to all members. Finally, while 40 percent of clubs explicitly deny membership to unmarried women, an additional 27 percent accept them only under a series of very restrictive requirements. Overall, thus, over 67 percent of the clubs restrict access to unmarried women in one way or another. This last regulation will be important for our empirical analysis below.

The set of regulations uncovered by the Tobacco Clubs Survey is consistent with the general regulations described in Peters (1997) and Takane (2005). Other rules often found 9
_The Silent Revolution._ Eds. A. Chickering and M. Salahdine. International Center for Economic Growth, San Francisco.

Joreskog, K., and A. Goldberger (1975) Estimation of a Model with Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes of a Single Latent Variable. _Journal of the American Statistical Association,_ September.

Joreskog, K., and D. Sorbom (1985) _LISREL VI: Analysis of Linear Structural Relationships by Maximum Likelihood, Instrumental Variables, and Least Squares._ Uppsala: University of Uppsala.

Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1994) Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measure. IRIS Working Paper #109 _(Economics and Politics,_ forthcoming).

Loayza, N.

(1994) Labor Regulations and the Informal Sector. Policy Research Working Paper No. 1335, The World Bank, July.

Lucas, R.

-39-
|Adibasi & Janajati|0.33|
|---|---|
||(0.47)|
|Madhesi (Non dalit)|0.10|
||(0.29)|
|Dalit|0.27|
||(0.44)|
|Muslim (ethnicity)|0.02|
||(0.13)|
|Rural|0.26|
||(0.44)|
|Mountain|0.05|
||(0.22)|
|Hill|0.47|
||(0.50)|
|Terai|0.48|
||(0.50)|

Table A.5 Labor Market Outcomes of Household Working Age Members

|**Variable (in percent)**|**Full Sample**<br>**Mean**|**Male**<br>**Mean**|**Female**<br>**Mean**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Share of HH members who are of working age|57.78|52.97|67.18|
|Share of HH members who are of working age in labor force|67.78|86.66|57.83|
|Share of HH members who are of workingage out of labor force|32.22|13.34|42.17|
|_Out of those in labor force, share of those who are:_||||
|Self-employed/own-account worker (no employees)|29.72|25.23|38.44|
|Business owner/employer with at least 1 employee|0.45|0.53|0.27|
|Salaried/wage employee|45.63|58.82|26.40|
|Army|0.10|0.24|0.00|
|Student who also works|0.28|0.29|0.20|
|Unpaid worker in the family business|3.63|3.67|4.47|
|Paid worker in the family business|3.13|2.81|3.93|
|Does not work but is looking for work|17.06|8.41|26.29|

_Note_ : Working age is defined as 18-59 years.

37
- Royston, Patrick, and Paul C. Lambert. 2011. _Flexible Parametric Survival Analysis Using Stata: Beyond the Cox Model._ College Station, TX: Stata Press.

- Rozenberg, Julie, and Marianne Fay. 2019. _Beyond the Gap: How Countries Can Afford the Infrastructure They Need while Protecting the Planet._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

- World Bank. 2019. _Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

- ———. 2018. _Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships Report 2018: Assessing Government Capability to Prepare, Procure, and Manage PPPs._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Yehoue, Etienne B. 2013. “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises and PPP Market Structure.” In _The Routledge Companion to Public-Private Partnerships_ , edited by Piet de Vries and Etienne B. Yehoue, 349–370. London: Routledge.

- Yescombe, E. R., and Edward Farquharson. 2018. _Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure: Principles of Policy and Finance, 2nd ed._ Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

34
**<u>Appendix table A3: Changes in prices & use of outputs and total area cultivated 2021-2023</u>**

||<br>**2021**|<br>**2022**|<br>**2023**|<br>**Δ21-22**|**Δ21-23**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Panel A: Output prices (US$/t)_||||||
|Winter wheat|240|137|129|-0.43|-0.46|
|Winter rapeseed|675|360|302|-0.47|-0.55|
|Spring barley|214|120|100|-0.44|-0.53|
|Corn|224|132|123|-0.41|-0.45|
|Sunflower|657|348|303|-0.47|-0.54|
|Soybean|602|336|381|-0.44|-0.37|
|_Panel B: Input prices_||||||
|Seed (EU variety)|403|480|432|0.19|0.07|
|Fertilizer (Ammonium nitrate)|383|615|410|0.61|0.07|
|Fertilizer (Urea)|490|734|524|0.50|0.07|
|Pesticide|8.7|10.2|9.4|0.18|0.09|
|Plowing (1ha)|19.7|21.1|19.7|0.07|0.00|
|Harvesting (1ha)|38.7|41.0|38.3|0.06|-0.01|
|Grain transport (t/30 km)|4.0|5.9|4.5|0.48|0.13|
|_Panel C: Area cultivated (mn. ha)_||||||
|Total|26.69|25.43|24.88|-0.05|-0.07|
|Winter|9.45|8.38|6.76|-0.11|-0.28|
|Summer|17.23|17.06|18.12|-0.01|0.05|

Source: Own computation based on UCAB data (panels A & B) and satellite crop monitoring (www.cropmaps-ua.com).

28
well established, an area where govemment intervention is particularly crucial. To this end, the land reforms in 1950 endorsed the equal entitlement of land between men and women. The marriage law, introduced in 1957 and further modified in 1985, was geared towards the protection of women's welfare both within and outside the family. In addition, various programs were implemented aimed at raising the awareness of women's legal rights and providing women with legal information and advice services (Wu and Cheng, 1997). School attendance both for boys and girls was made mandatory as early as the 1970s. This has had a profound impact on increasing female school enrolment and reducing intra-household gender bias, as reflected in the fact that female enrolment rates in primary and middle schools increased from 33% to 45% and 25% to 40%, respectively, between 1950 and the early 1990s.

The Chinese government has also emphasized women's participation in political life. According to statistics published by the Research Institute of All China Women's Federation (1998), the proportion of female parliament members was around 12% in the 1950s and rose to over 21% in the 1990s. Female political party membership has been as high as around 40% of total membership since the 1970s, and women accounted for over one third of political carders.<sup>5</sup> Another indicator, t".e proportion of female staff engaged in scientific research, which reflects both female educational achievement and gender equality, shows that women have accounted for over one third of the staff in this profession since the 1970s.

Clearly, China's success in improving women's status is undoubtedly associated with its long history of implementing gender-focused public polices and programs. Thus, there are likely to be important policy lessons to be learnt from the Chinese experience. Empirical research, in particular focusing on evaluating public programs, is extremely valuable in this regard. Unfortunately, empirical research in this area has been sparse, partly due to data limitations. However, even when data sources were available, the studies carried out (e.g. Peng and Dai,

> _5 A cadre_ is a high-ranking political appointee.

8
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# **Appendix 1.5 Relationship between MODIS and VIIRs fire detection**

VIIRs is similar to the MODIS platform in that it is a source for satellite based imagery. However, VIIRs is newer than MODIS, with the imagery available starting in 2012, and has higher resolution. The lack of data prior to 2012 means I cannot use VIIRs for the primary analysis.

VIIRs and MODIS are able to detect roughly the same size fires but VIIRs provides data at a much finer pixel resolution than MODIS. VIIRs resolution is roughly 375m compared to 1km for MODIS. Both classify a pixel as having a fire if at least one fire is detected in that pixel. However, the finer resolution of VIIRs means it is able to count more pixels that contain fires. For example, two fires located 750m apart within a given square km would be counted as only one fire by MODIS but would likely be distinguished as two separate fires by VIIRs. Figure A6 shows clearly that MODIS detects substantially fewer individual fires than VIIRs.

Korontzi et al. (2006) shows that MODIS and VIIRs are both highly accurate in counting a pixel that should contain a fire as containing a fire. So while MODIS underestimates fires it does not appear to mis-classify pixels that include low numbers of fires as non-fire.

55
# **PART IV**

# **Concluding Remarks**

The silent revolution of the past two decades has attracted strong policy and research attention worldwide. The assessment of the impact of this revolution in moving decision making closer to the people, however, remains an unanswered question. This paper takes an important first step in this direction by providing a framework of comparative measurement and developing worldwide ranking of countries on people empowerment on various aspects of government decision making. While there is a crying need for systematic collection of quality data needed for the application of the comparative framework presented here, the integration of available diverse dataset as done here has yielded promising results. For example, the closeness indexes presented here show that one could have predicted well in advance with a fair degree of accuracy countries that were ripe for popular people revolt such as the one experienced through the Arab Spring or similar movements across the globe. The indexes also provide useful barometers of the enabling environment for doing business or promoting growth and economic development and good governance. Overall they provide useful aggregate measures of government closeness to their people. We hope this paper will stimulate further research to improve upon the data and the methodology presented here as well as facilitate building common consensus in countries poorly ranked here for fundamental governance reforms.

# **_References_**

Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003). Fractionalization. _Journal of Economic Growth_ 8: 155–194.

Boadway, Robin and Anwar Shah (2009). _Fiscal Federalism. Principles and Practice of Multiorder Governance._ New York and London: Cambridge University Press Dollery, B. and J. Wallis (2001). _The Political Economy of Local Government_ . Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Frey, B. and R. Eichenberger. (1995). “Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of FOCJ.” In _Competition among Jurisdictions_ , ed. Lüder Gerken, pp. 209-229. London: Macmillan.

Eckardt, S. and A. Shah (2008). Decentralized governance in developing and transition countries: A comparative review. In A. Shah (ed.), _Macro Federalism and Local Finance_ , Washington, DC: World Bank, 291–322.

Fan, C., C. Lin, and D. Treisman (2009). Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world. _Journal of Public Economics_ 93: 14–34.

Ivanyna, M. and A. Shah (2011). Citizen-centric governance indicators: Measuring governance by listening to the people and not interest groups, _CESifo Forum_ 12(1): 59-71.

28
power asymmetry facilitates cooperation especially when the stronger party is downstream and initiates and imposes a cooperative regime (Lowi 1993). Empirical studies have likewise found evidence for the links between power asymmetry, cooperation, and reduced conflict (Toset et al., 2000; Song and Whittington, 2004; Tir and Ackerman, 2009).<sup>9</sup> Authors associated with the neo-liberal institutionalist school of international relations have seconded the importance of hegemony for explaining international cooperation, but have argued that such asymmetry is not a necessary prerequisite for cooperation (Keohane, 1982; Keohane, 1984; Young, 1989: 353; Barrett, 2003). This argument has also been confirmed in some empirical works on international water treaty formation and negotiation onset, suggesting that even countries of equal power cooperate (Espey and Towfique, 2004; Brochmann and Hensel, 2009; Dinar et al., 2011).

Further challenging neorealist claims, examples may be cited to demonstrate that even the hegemonic downstream riparian acts in a rather benign nature whereby cooperation is not coerced or enforced, but rather it is encouraged and sustained (e.g. India-Bhutan hydropolitical relations). Cases where the upstream state is also the hegemon and cooperates willingly with an otherwise weaker downstream state can likewise be found in the literature (e.g. 1973 Colorado River Agreement between the United States and Mexico). As Linerooth writes in the context of pollution control, “the more developed upper riparian nations may wish to create ‘good will’ with their neighbors by contributing more to pollution control while [themselves] benefiting less” (1990; see also Shmueli, 1999). Finally, and based on this latter argument regarding power asymmetry, studies have claimed that cooperation in the environmental realm may be better encouraged and sustained using incentives rather than coercion (Young, 1994; Barkin and Shambaugh, 1999).

Given the varied expectations and empirical results regarding power and conflict and cooperation over water, we examine both power asymmetry and asymmetry in wealth (and the wealthier state’s proclivity to create goodwill through incentives). To reflect power and welfare asymmetry, we use annual country-level real GDP and per capita GDP data from Gleditsch (2004). Average values of these two variables were calculated for each of the dyad countries for the relevant time period. Ratios of these average values were then calculated for each dyad, with the

> 9 It is important to note that these results and arguments could also be supporting the ‘hydro‐hegemony’ school of thought, which argues that the most powerful state in the basin is able to determine the outcome of basin interactions, including cooperation, assuming the most powerful state will benefit from such a policy (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006)

11
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<!-- Start of picture text --> Index Average<br>‘<br>CS<br>, © Gas @<br>-2<br>- Bo Bo Bt Bit 8B<br>3Oo 2°'0§ 3 4.0§ 8 3/060§ 5 34/0& 8 48<br>1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Percent of GDP Average<br>150<br>» Fobolo*o"o<br>0<br>- si- sl- ble bit 8<br>oo434'0$6383/6048 3'034'0§ 5 & BG35<br>1970 1980 1990 2000 2010<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Index Average<br>1<br>me<br>4 gS oe Oo<br>2<br>Club1 Lower Club1 Lower| Club1 Lower<br>1990 2000 2010<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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# A Gendered Assessment of the Brain Drain

Frédéric Docquier<sup>a</sup> , B. Lindsay Lowell<sup>b</sup> and Abdeslam Marfouk<sup>c</sup>

> a National Fund for Scienti...c Research, IRES, Cath. Univ. of Louvain and World Bank

> b ISIM, Georgetown University c University of Brussels (ULB)

> c University of Brussels (ULB)

March 2008 Abstract This paper updates and extends the Docquier-Marfouk data set on international migration by educational attainment. The authors use new sources, homogenize de...nitions of what a migrant is, and compute gender-disaggregated indicators of the brain drain. Emigration stocks and rates are provided by level of schooling and gender for 195 source countries in 1990 and 2000. The data set can be used to capture the recent trend in women’s skilled migration and to analyze its causes and consequences for developing countries. The ...ndings show that women represent an increasing share of the OECD immigration stock and exhibit relatively higher rates of brain drain than men. The gender gap in skilled migration is strongly correlated with the gender gap in educational attainment at origin. Equating women’s and men’s access to education would probably reduce gender di¤erences in the brain drain.

JEL Classi...cation: F22, J61.

Keywords: Brain drain, Gender, Human capital, Migration.

This paper is a product of the World Bank research program on the international migration of women initiated in December 2005. It bene...tted from the ...nancial support of the World Bank (Contract PO. 7620076). We thank Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schi¤ for their support and suggestions, as well as Daniel Reyes and Mirja Sjoblom for their help. Corresponding author: Frédéric Docquier, IRES, Catholic University of Louvain, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: <frederic.docquier@uclouvain.be>.

1
_EU_ = _H_<sup>_o_The added value of a doctor visit comes from identifying effective treat-</sup> _i,t i,t_<sup>_−τi,tei,t_.</sup> ment through consultation but not from consuming _n_ itself. With Assumption 2, Bertrand competition among patients lead to _τi,t_ at which _EUi,t_ = 0 for all _i_ in every _t_ . Assumption 3 implies that the expected observed health outcome in period _t_ is the same as that in period _t −_ 1, i.e., _Hi,t_<sup>_o_=</sup><sup>_H_</sup> _i,t_<sup>_o_</sup> _−_ 1<sup>.Because</sup><sup>_EUi,t_= 0,wehave</sup><sup>_τi,t_=</sup> _Hei,ti_<sup>_o_</sup> _<u>,t</u>_<sup>=</sup> _Hei,ti_<sup>_o_</sup> _<u>,t−−</u>_ 11<sup>.Asaresult,patients</sup> <u>1</u> are indifferent over all doctors, and each doctor sees a continuum of patients of measure _N_ every period.

The timing of the events is the following:

1. In the beginning of period _t_ , a new set of patients enter the market.

2. They observe _Hi,t_<sup>_o_</sup> _−_ 1<sup>and</sup><sup>_ei,t−_1forall</sup><sup>_i_,and</sup><sup>_τi,t_isdeterminedby</sup><sup>_τi,t_=</sup> _Hei,ti_<sup>_o_</sup> _<u>,t−−</u>_ 11<sup>.</sup> 3. Given _τt,i_ for all _i_ , patients choose a doctor they want to visit.

4. Each doctor chooses their optimal _ei,t_ and _ni,t_ . Note that although a draw of signal _s_ is different for each patient, and so is the posterior mean, the choice of _ni,t_ is the same for all patients.

5. At the end of the period, _Hi,t_<sup>_o_and</sup><sup>_ei,t_forall</sup><sup>_i_isrevealed.Fromthelawoflarge</sup> numbers, _Hi,t_<sup>_o_isobservedwithoutanerror.</sup> 6. The current set of patients exit the market.

7. Period _t_ + 1 begins, and the same sequence of events repeat.

In the steady state, we have: where _τ_<sup>_∗_</sup> is a steady state piece rate for a given doctor and _e_<sup>_∗_</sup> and _n_<sup>_∗_</sup> are the optimal choices. Rewriting the first order conditions with market incentives by plugging the above expressions in (18) and (19), we have: 57
LA economies and China and India. Finally, we found that labor (both unskilled and skilled) was the factor that was most likely negatively affected in the period under study, while natural resources and scientific knowledge have benefited from the growing presence of China and India in world markets.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides _prima facie_ evidence regarding the level and evolution of the correlation between LA RCAs and those of the two Asian economies. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology used to identify the direction in which China and India are pushing the trade specialization of LA and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.

# **2. How similar are LA, Chinese, and Indian RCAs?**

We start by constructing an index of RCA for China, India, and 13 LA economies for which there is reliable trade data available at the sector level (ISIC 3 digit) from 1990 to 2004.<sup>5</sup> We then explore the evolution of Chinese, Indian, and LA RCAs over the last this period to provide _prima-facie_ evidence regarding the extent to which China and India’s specialization patterns are correlated with LA specialization patterns.

# _2.1 RCA indices_

Vollrath (1991) proposed a measure of RCA that corrects for three problems associated with the traditional Balassa measure of RCA.<sup>6</sup> First, it eliminates any double counting problem by excluding the sector and country trade values in the aggregates that are used as benchmarks to compare a country/sector RCA. Second, it is based on a measure of net exports, which allows the RCA to capture intra-industry trade. Third, Balassa’s index is asymmetric as it varies between 0 and infinity, with values between 0

> 5 The 13 economies are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Together they represent 98 percent of the Latin America’s GDP.

> 6 _c c c w w_ Balassa’s measure of RCA of country _c_ in sector _s_ is given by: _RCAs_ = ( _X s X_ ) ( _X s X_ ) , where are exports of country _c_ in sector _s_ , _X c_<sup>are total exports of country</sup><sup>_c_,</sup> _X sw_ is world trade in sector _s_ , and _X w_ is total world trade.

4