rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
value of a property is, or should be, closely related to its capital value, as revealed in the market sale of the property. Indeed, many urban local bodies use estimates of market values as “guidance values” in establishing annual rental values for different types of properties in different locations within the jurisdiction, and some are also experimenting with the move to a property tax based on capital value. In all of these cases, the declared value of the transaction as used to calculate stamp duties has direct relevance to the tax base used to calculate these other taxes. Of course, the information conveyed in the stamp duty transaction must be connected in some way to the collection of these other taxes if administration of stamp duties is to affect collections of other taxes, and at present it appears that these connections are seldom if ever made. In part, this failure to link the various taxes may occur because the taxes are the responsibilities of different levels of government: State governments of stamp duties, the central government for the individual income tax, the gift tax, and the wealth tax, and local governments for the property tax. As discussed in more detail below, it is also possible that State sales and central excise taxes are affected in more indirect ways by the declared value of the market transaction.

# **B. Administrative Problems with Stamp Duties**

There are many serious administrative issues that arise with the stamp duties. Various reforms that address these administrative problems have also been suggested by these studies.<sup>13</sup> <u>Valuation.</u> There is widespread agreement that the values declared for stamp duty transactions are grossly understated, due largely to the extremely high duty rate on conveyances. For example, in Maharashtra it is estimated that 70 percent of stamp duty documents are undervalued by 20 percent or more. Other observers claim that undervaluation may approach 50 percent for many kinds of transactions.

<u>Avoidance.</u> Because of the high stamp duty burdens, individuals have found a variety of ways to avoid legally the tax burden. For example, the use of general power of attorney under which a sale deed is replaced with a sale agreement without possession allows an individual to transfer effective ownership to another without becoming liable for stamp duties. The use of transfers with cooperative housing has a similar effect. Other common avoidance methods include:

- The use of an instrument of lease for the long term payment of rent;

- The use of a declaratory suit filed in court under which property is transferred under the court decree;

- The use of an instrument of dissolution of a partnership in which property is taken as payment for the ending of a partnership;

> 13  See National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), _Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act_ (New Delhi, India); Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (New Delhi, India); and the Government of Karnataka, Finance Department (2001), _1_<sup>_st_</sup> _Report of the Tax Reforms Commission_ (Karnataka, India).

6
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||||_y2_hhid_and_plot number_(wave 2)_,_<br>concatenation of_y3_hhid_and_plot_<br>_number_(wave 3)_,_concatenation of<br>_y4_hhid_and_plot number_(wave 4)_,_<br>concatenation of_sdd_hhid_and_plot_<br>_number_(wave 5)<br>UGA: concatenation of_Hhid, parcel_<br>_ID_and_plot ID_(wave 1)_, HHID ,_<br>_parcel ID_and_plot ID_(wave 2)_,_<br>_HHID, parcel ID_and_plot ID_(wave<br>3)_, HHID, parcel ID_and_plot ID_<br>(wave 4)_, HHID, parcel ID_and_plot_<br>_ID_(wave 5)_, hhid, parcel ID_and_plot_<br>_ID_(wave 7)_, hhid, parcel ID_and_plot_<br>_ID_(wave 8)|
|---|---|---|---|
|_parcel_id_obs_|Parcel ID<br>(panel<br>identificator)|Variable created by assigning<br>a numeric code to each unique<br>parcel. The first number of<br>the code determines the<br>country<br>UGA: plot is equal to the<br>parcel ID in the**Plot-level**<br>**dataset.**Parcel ID is set to<br>missing to prevent confusion|<br>Only tracked through waves in<br>Ethiopia and Malawi.<br>NGA, TZA, MWI w1: absent|
|_parcel_id_merge_|Parcel ID (to<br>merge with<br>raw data)|<br>ID to merge with raw LSMS<br>data<br>UGA: plot is equal to the<br>parcel ID in the**Plot-level**<br>**dataset.**Parcel ID is set to<br>missing to prevent confusion|NGA, TZA, MWI w1: absent<br>Can be merged with the following<br>variables in the raw data<br>(concatenated variables are separated<br>by hyphens):<br>ETH: concatenation of_holder_id_, and<br>_parcel_id_(waves 1 to 5)_,_absent for<br>households answering section 12c<br>(wave 5)<br>MWI: concatenation of_y2_hhid_and<br>_garden ID_(wave 2)_,_concatenation of<br>_y3_hhid_,_garden ID_(wave 3)_,_<br>concatenation of_y4_hhid_,_garden ID_<br>(wave 4)<br>MLI: concatenation of_grappe_<br>_menage, bloc_(wave 1 concatenation<br>of_grappe_ _menage, bloc_(wave 2)<br>NER: concatenation of_hid, field_<br>_number_(wave 1)_,_concatenation of<br>_GRAPPE, MENAGE, EXTENSION,_<br>_champ_(wave 2)<br>UGA: concatenation of_Hhid, parcel_<br>_ID_(wave 1)_, HHID , parcel ID_(wave<br>2)_, HHID, parcel ID_(wave 3)_,_<br>_HHID, parcel ID_(wave 4)_, HHID,_<br>_parcel ID_(wave 5)_, hhid, parcel ID_<br>(wave 7)_, hhid, parcel ID_(wave 8)|

25
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- DUPAS, P., A. SASSER MODESTINO, M. NIEDERLE, J. WOLFERS, AND T. S. D. COLLECTIVE (2021): “Gender and the Dynamics of Economics Seminars,” Working Paper 28494, National Bureau of Economic Research.

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18
||Non<br>|-governme|ntal orga<br>|nizations|Non<br>|-bank fin|ancial ins<br>|titutions||B|anks<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||25<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median|75<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median if<br>profitable|25<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median|75<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median if<br>profitable|25<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median|75<sup>th</sup><br>pctile|Median if<br>profitable|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|(11)|(12)|
|1. Average loan<br>size/income at 20th<br>percentile (%)|27|48|135|60|71|160|247|164|110|224|510|294|
|2. Active borrowers<br>(thousands)|3.1|7.4|23.0|11.1|4.1|9.9|23.0|9.4|1.9|20.3|60.7|10.4|
|3. Women as a share<br>of all borrowers (%)|63|85|100|86|47|66|94|67|23|52|58|49|
|4. Real portfolio<br>yield (%)|15|25|37|26|12|20|26|20|9|13|19|14|
|5. Operating<br>cost/loan value (%)|15|26|38|21|13|17|24|16|7|12|21|11|
|6. Subsidy/borrower<br>(PPP$)|72|233|659|199|0|32|747|8|0|0|136|0|
|7. Non-commercial<br>funding ratio|0.31|0.74|1.00|0.53|0.16|0.46|0.83|0.41|0.00|0.11|0.22|0.03|

Table 1. Performance Indicators for NGOs, NBFIs, and Banks. Source: Cull et al. 2009a _, MicroBanking Bulletin_ dataset. Subsidy per borrower numbers are donations from prior years plus donations to subsidize financial services plus an **in-kind subsidy adjustment plus an adjustment for subsidies to the cost of funds.** 10
policy, leading to excess unemployment. An often applied policy response to these challenges is to remove labor market frictions that prevent a smooth adjustment (in terms of a downward correction of wages). Given that labor reforms are extremely unpopular (Reinsberg et al., 2019), policymakers often opted for social pacts that entailed clauses on wage restraint and piece-meal labor reform provisions (Hassel, 2006). To capture this e↵ect, we verify that CBI increases the likelihood that a country implements a social pact. The data come from Visser (2015). In terms of partial labor market reform, governments often targeted specific legal aspects governing labor relations (Hassel, 2006). For example, in the case of the Republic of Korea, initiating CBI reform in late 1997, the Korean government loosened firing provisions for firms and boosted the legal statutes of part-time and contract workers. At the same time, it left other labor regulations untouched (Pirie, 2007). Whereas these reforms render labor markets more flexible and lead to lower labor costs for firms, more flexible work arrangements often enhance the share of precarious forms of employment and erode workers’ bargaining power (Jaumotte and Osorio, 2015; Johnston and Regan, 2016). We complement this analysis using a composite indicator capturing the restrictiveness labor regulations towards part-time and contract workers. The data come from Reinsberg et al. (2019).

Finally, we are concerned with analyzing how CBI impacts social policymaking. Given that CBI tightens the room for fiscal maneuvering and requires to remove downward rigidities in wages (that emerge from generous social transfers), governments have often tampered with social policy reform to accommodate CBI. For example, in the case of Germany, generous social benefits were believed to hinder necessary wage adjustment to equilibrate the labor market, triggering the socalled Hartz Reforms in the early 2000s (Manger and Sattler, 2019). Social and welfare state reforms are often embedded in social pacts or social contracts, which include clauses that relate to pension, health, and social benefit reform (Hassel, 2003; Rhodes, 2005). To verify that CBI leads to shifts in social policymaking, we use two indicators. Besides using information on whether a social pact entails clauses concerning social and/or welfare policy shifts, we analyze whether social pacts include clauses concerning pensions. Pension reform policies that incentivize investments in financial assets instead of making direct contributions to the public pension system have often been used to reduce overhead costs on wages, lighten the fiscal burden and bolster bond market 17
- 24 .

<!-- Start of picture text --> Filure 5. Cost Distribution of MSWM<br>Components, FY74-88 (S millions)<br>Number of Projects<br>29<br>[D 11.1.1....,.I.......<br>in . . . . . . . .. .... ........ .. .. ...<br>tIA 1.0.2.5 2.6.5.9 5.0.10.0 $5.25 25.50 '50<br>MSWM Component Cost Interval (S milIloni<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 6. Size of MSWM Components<br>as % of Total Project Cost, FY74-38<br>Number ol Projects<br>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~23<br>2.5 2.5-5 5.7.5 1.S.lS id-is 15-25 25-50 450<br>MSWM Component Size Interval ()<br><!-- End of picture text --> 3.23 In addition to the relatively low level of investment in MSWM, the Bank has carried out very few sector studies on solid waste management. In 1982, the Bank published Environmental Management of Urban Solid Wastes in Developing Countries: A Project Guide by Sandra Cointreau (World Bank Urban Development Technical Paper Number 5). The document provides information and procedures for planning and implementing solid waste management improvements but is not known to a surprising number of project officers questioned. In searching through the Bank's information systems, only two Regional sector studies were found that dealt with solid wastes. The EMENA Urban Solid Waste Management: Development of Strategies report, prepared in 1984, provides an in-depth review of regional lending and proposes a number of strategies to expand and improve program and project development. A 1982 LAC Water SupplV and Wastes Sector Strategy PaRer devotes a brief section to MSWM, indicating the growing importance of this subsector in the Region. The paper emphasizes the need to strengthen Bank and country capacity for dealing with this urban problem and identifies proposed activitius in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Also in LAC, country water and wastes sector studies for Brazil (1983) and Columbia (1986) include substantial analyses and discussions of the solid waste subsector. A LAC sector study to be initiated in FY89 will devote more attention to this topic. Given the potential growth of lending in this subsector, as reflected in experiences in Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, the development of Regional strategies, as carried out in EMENA, is recommended.

# Level of Borrowing

3.24 The discussion of MSWM issues to this point raises another important question: why the relatively low borrowing for the subsector? Several explanations can be suggested. First, solid waste collection operations tend to be labor intensive, and as viewed in several of the past small loan components, have a relatively low foreign exchange cost, primarily for vehicles.
Risk-Adjusted Rates of Return for Project Appraisal by Avinash Dixit and Amy Williamson*

# Table of Contents

|I.|A Brief Review of Current Theory and Practice|2|
|---|---|---|
|II.|The Basic CAPM Formula|6|
|III.|Adaptation for Project Appraisal|8|
|IV.|An Experimental Application|14|
|V.|Comments on the Results|20|
|VI.|Directions for Further Work|23|
|VII.|Some Suggestions for Project Design|25|
|Techn|ical Appendix|28|
|Annex|es|33|
|Refer|ences|39|

* We thank Whitney Newey of Princeton University and Diderik Lund of the University of Oslo for useful suggestions, Gene Grossman of Princeton University, and Jock Anderson of the World Bank for comments on a previous version, and Peter Hazell of the World Bank for discussions and advice.
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even fewer have two-year gaps). What the table shows is how many of the units that start together in one year make it through to subsequent years, both in absolute numbers (left) and the percentage of the class-size (right). Reading horizontally, we find, for example, that of the 329 firms that were exporting in 2006, only 206 (or 62.6 percent) of them were still active the following year. Vertically, we see, for example, that of the FPDs that are active in 2008, 1,764 of them are new, 399 of them had appeared in 2007 and 127 in 2006. Again, this paints an image of a very high degree of churning in the export sector, with many new faces each year and only a few survivors.

The expected advantages for survivors are experience and robustness. One would expect, however, that the survivors also grow, engaging in higher export volumes and USD value over time. Cadot et al. (2010) find that Senegalese FPDs grow by more than four times in seven years, conditional on survival, while in Tanzania they grow three times in four years. This effect, also noted in Eaton et al. (2008), can also be observed in Laos but is much smaller: four-year survivors increase their dollar value by 50 percent, much less than in the African countries for which we have comparable data. This indicates the possible existence of a barrier to growth, a “learning disability” which prevents successful exporters from taking advantage of their achievement in managing to survive from one period to another.

**Table 6:** Survival rates by cohort: absolute numbers (left) and percentage of initial cohort size (right)

|**firms**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**firms**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**2006**|329 206|139|105|**2006**|100% 62.6%|42.2%|31.9%|
|**2007**|228|135|101|**2007**|100%|59.2%|44.3%|
|**2008**||273|115|**2008**||100%|42.1%|
|**2009**|||248|**2009**|||100%|
|**products**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**products**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|
|**2006**|160 121|113|101|**2006**|100% 75.6%|70.6%|63.1%|
|**2007**|235|166|131|**2007**|100%|70.6%|55.7%|
|**2008**||279|127|**2008**||100%|45.5%|
|**2009**|||206|**2009**|||100%|
|**firm-prod**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**firm-prod**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|
|**2006**|645 231|126|86|**2006**|100% 35.8%|19.5%|13.3%|
|**2007**|706|336|207|**2007**|100%|47.6%|29.3%|
|**2008**||1151|349|**2008**||100%|30.3%|
|**2009**|||956|**2009**|||100%|
|**FPD**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**FPD**|**2006**<br>**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|
|**2006**|738 256|127|82|**2006**|100% 34.7%|17.2%|11.1%|
|**2007**|957|399|215|**2007**|100%|41.7%|22.5%|
|**2008**||1764|525|**2008**||100%|29.8%|
|**2009**|||1484|**2009**|||100%|

_Source:_ Authors‟ calculation based on Lao PDR customs data In order to have a more precise understanding of the learning curves related to export survival, we also present in Figure **8** the year-on-year survival rates for firms, products, destinations, firmproducts, firm-destinations, destination-products and firm-product-destination units. These _Exporting from a small landlocked economy_ _15_
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**-7-**

price and trwade liberalization, had begun in 1990, the data on entwrprist performance in 1950 and 1991 had some relevance. Howaver, the publication also included a warning that much of the data were of dubious qtlity and may not be relevant in a rapidly changing economic situation.

Of the 491 enterprices included in the first wave of coupon prlvatization, 943 with a book value of **Kcs** 206.4 billion were from tIe Czech Republic, 487 enterprises with a book value of **Kcs** 90.1 billion were from the Slovak Reriblic and 61 enterprises with a book value of Kcs 2.9 billion wete enterprises operating at the Federal level. The ratio of assets offered for voucher prlva?'zatlon across Republics was 2.29: 1, which corresponded to the ratio of voucher holders in the Czech Republic relative to those in the Slovak Republic. Within the group of 1491 enterprises in the coupon scheme, some shares were set aside for foreign ot domestic investors, restitution, the National Pronerty Fund, banks, and transfers to municipalities (able 1).

In both Republics

|the vast majority of shares were|Table 1: Coupon Scheme Dist|ributionof S|hares|
|---|---|---|---|
|available for citizens to bid under|I Foreign Invesors|1.6%|0.8%|
|the coupon scheme. In Slovakia,|DomstInvestors|3.8%|2.3%|
|the proportion of total shares offered|Restiution|0.4%|0.02%|
||NationalProperty Fund (temporary)|7.0%|2.8%|
|to citizenSwas much higZher at|National Property Fund (permanent)|O1.%|2.0%|
|92. 1% compared to that in the|Banks|1.5%|0%|
|Czech Republic. In both Republics,||Municipalities|1.2%|0%|
||Ciizn|84.3%|92.1%|
|thosesmall proportions of shares||<br>8-||

that were set a'4e for other purposes tended to be concentrated in a very small number of enterprises.'