outstanding agricultural performance of this country is to be partly explained by the successful land reform.<sup>26</sup> . Moldova and Azerbaijan both allowed private land ownership early in the 1990s by issuing land certificates but they converted such certificates into land plots only in 1998. Uzbekistan has also moved on with the same forms of privatization and land reforms but much later than the other CIS-7 pushing privatization of large state cooperatives only in the late 1990s and still struggling to complete the process and undertake comprehensive land reforms.

Land reforms have had the merit of providing large parts of the population with assets that enabled them to survive during the recession period and after. However, the transitional recession has severely debilitated agricultural infrastructure and extension services once organized around large state cooperatives. A 1999 summary of the situation in Georgia provided by the Ministry of Agriculture well capture the general situation that the CIS-7 faced at the end of the 1990s.

_"Transition to a market economy has been partial and sometimes stalled. Lack of access to markets (partly due to the high cost of fuel), scarcity of rural credit, as well as limited off-farm earnings have driven farmers to near subsistence economy, with a major shift towards staple food (wheat, potatoes and maize) and away from barley and fodder crops which affected the quality and volume of livestock output. This has also reduced the size of planted area. Despite some liberalization of prices and trade there is unfair competition, illegal imports and poor law enforcement_ (...). _Large areas remain neither leased nor privatized. Land tenure law and security of land ownership are poorly defined and many farmers lack the necessary documentation for their plots. Levels of investment in farms are generally low. Reasonably priced credit is unavailable. Delays in the registration of land has prevented farmers to use land as a collateral for loans. For lack of cash, barter is widely used. (...) Labor force is oversized and large amount of machinery is run down. The irrigation infrastructure needs to be repaired and re-organized to take account the need of small farms. The availability of power remains erratic. Severe drop in the use of fertilisers and fuel (due to their cost) and an increased use (90%) of poor quality farm saved seed (FSS) influenced crop yields. Loss of farmer expertise in seed production, poor machinery and lack of herbicides and spare parts was also reported..."_<sup>_27_</sup> With such a sharp and negative picture of the situation, one would expect that the same government of Georgia would be moving toward a comprehensive agricultural policy development. In reality, a review of the legislation passed by parliament to date shows that no laws have been passed to stimulate agricultural production and re-organization with the exception of land and privatization reforms and no policy agenda has been put forward by the Ministry of Agriculture or the Government of Georgia, at least until 2003<sup>28</sup> .

This is profoundly different from the Chinese experience. In 1978, a first small number of collectives were allowed to lease their land for private production to individual households. A year later, measured yields proved that private households were more productive than collectives and the authorities were encouraged to expand the system which became known as the 'household responsibility system'. In 1981, the system was officially recognized and, by the end of 1983, 98% of agricultural collectives in China had adopted it.<sup>29</sup> A rather 'big bang' approach to agricultural reforms.

> 26 World Bank (2003) Enhancing Pro-Poor Growth, Report No. 24638-KG

> 27 http://agroweb.home.ge/show.php?page=country#nap

> 28 See http://www.parliament.ge/LEGAL_ACTS/kanon_en.html, the government of Georgia and the Ministry of Agriculture websites.

> 29 Lin, Cai and Li (1996) _"The Lessons of China's Transition to a Market Economy"_ , the Cato Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, fall 1996

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