rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
in spite of very substantial external investments. After ten years, it had become clear that Ivory coast would not be able to sustain the immense add-on cost of educational television.

Similarly, a 198717 review of Bank experience found little additional benefit for distance learning programs designed for enrichment purposes. Where distance education was used for improvement of instruction in core subjects by complementing or replacing face-to-face teaching, evidence of learning gains has been found. Where broadcasting is complemented by printed materials, the addit-onal cost are, however, not insignificant.

Distance education has encountered significant implementation problems at the school level in many countries, especially when the technology is unfarmiliar to the teacher and difficult to adapt to classroom specific instructional imperatives. Replication beyond the pilot stage has often been difficult, especially in countries with weak administrative structures. The most successful applications have been at the secondary and higher levels and for inservice teacher education where the learners are more self-motivated than primary school pupils. Since 1985, few Bank projects have included provision for distance education programs to support primary education.

_In-service teacher training_ is increasingly recognized as a crucial element of instructional improvement programs. About 60% of the primary teacher training projects reviewed by Haddad and 85% of the FY89-90 teacher training projects, included support for in-service teacher training. Verspoor found that successfully implemented educational reform programs made ample provision for permanent and locally available in-service training and professional support. Whether carried out in the school itself, or at a local learning resource center within easy reach of area teachers, training provided to teachers as they go through the process of implementing reform programs has played an important role in the success achieved in a number of countries.20 Three mechanisms for delivering in-service training stand out as the most efficient in these reviews. First, distance education, used mainly for general skill-upgrading programs, often include correspondence courses and radio programs. Good examples are Bank supported projects in El Salvador and the Philippines. Second, the "ripple," "echo," or "cascade" method has been found to be successful. This method targets at first a small core of personnel for training. They will, in turn, train a larger group, who will then train an even larger group and so on. The provision of well developed training materials is essential to ensure the maintenance of standards in these programs. Bank projects 17 Hawkridge, "General Operational Review of Distance Education." 18 Verspoor, "Pathwayo to Change." 19 Haddad, "Teacher Training." 20 Verepoor, "Pathways to Change." 15
nutrition. But in Household A, 2/5 eligible persons are deprived, whereas in Household B, it is 4/5. Furthermore, in terms of gender, in Household A both deprived persons are female, and no males are deprived. But in Household B, the only non-deprived person is female. Household-level information would code both situations as identical, but we can use the underlying microdata to go further. the matrix below illustrates this example.

||HH-A|||||HH-B|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Deprived|**D**|**D**|ND|ND|ND|**ND**|**D**|**D**|**D**|**D**|
|Gender|**F**|**F**|M|M|M|F|**F**|**M**|**M**|**M**|

When both individual and household metrics are analyzed in tandem, this rather simple methodology creates very powerful information for policy design. The MPI analysis can show what proportion of eligible individuals who are deprived in that indicator are MPI poor, meaning this deprivation is compounded by other simultaneous predicaments. It also shows _which_ deprived individuals live in _non-poor_ households, thus unmasking individual deprivations within the household. More broadly, the MPI also provides information on the composition of deprivations that individually deprived persons experience, and whether there are different regularized patterns or clusters among deprivations, and how these vary across household types. This can inform policy responses. By way of comparison, if one only knows the gendered patterns of nutrition but does not know the multidimensional profile of deprivations, the depth of understanding of deprived persons’ conditions is more limited.

# **_3.2 The MPI structure_**

The AF method allows flexibility around the selection of dimensions, indicators, deprivation cut-offs, weights, and poverty cut-off to reflect different contexts and priorities. After discussion with experts in both multidimensional poverty and forced displacement and testing of several trial measures, the structure shown in Table 1 was selected. This MPI measures deprivations in education, health, living standards, and financial security, with 15 indicators across these four dimensions. All dimensions are weighted equally, receiving a quarter of the total weight, with indicators within each dimension also receiving equal weights. The poverty cut-off is defined as _k_ =50%, with 7
# 11. Appendix: model and methods

The objective of this methodology is to find some future economic conditions that would lead to optimistic or pessimistic scenarios in terms of poverty eradication and shared prosperity. It builds on methodologies used for decision‐making under uncertainty, which explore large numbers of scenarios in order to find the common conditions that lead to desirable or undesirable outcomes. It uses the I2D2 household surveys database, formatted for the GIDD model.

We build a micro‐simulation model that projects national household surveys into the future.

The model first attributes one of the following mutually exclusive categories to each people in the survey: (1) unskilled services worker; (2) skilled service worker; (3) unskilled agriculture worker; (4) skilled agriculture worker; (5) unskilled manufacture worker; (6) skilled manufacture worker; (7) adult not in the labor force; (8) elderly (above 65 years‐old); (9) child (under 15 years‐old). A worker is defined as skilled if he has more than nine years of education.

These categories are of course adaptable depending on the information available in the survey. For instance men and women could be separated, as well as different categories of adults that are not in the labor force (housewives, unemployed, self‐employed or informal workers).

It is however important to note that these categories are chosen because they will be used to drive income growth in the scenarios, and not necessarily because they explain current income well.

For each household, we calculate the number of people belonging to each of these categories ( ���� ) and we estimate current households’ revenue using these categorical predictors (with weighted linear least squares). Note that we exclude children ( �� �0 ) as they should not contribute to the family income, and that there is no intercept in the formula: For most countries the �� are all positive (see Table 1) and – since there is no intercept – they can be interpreted as the average per capita income brought to the household by each category of people, except children ( �� �0 ). Importantly, these coefficients will not be used to predict income using the regression. Instead, they will be used as a basis for applying different productivity growth rates to different categories of workers. In other words, in our scenarios the households will remain the same (only their weights in the economy will change) but the �� and the error terms will grow.

In some countries �� �0 or �� �0 in the regression. In that case we force �� �0 or �� �0 and we re‐ estimate the other �� .

Table A1. Estimated per capita income per category of people in Vietnam in the 2012 LSMS household survey.

45
Poh,Planning, and Ro r2L Fl nanl Policy and Syottma For a variety of reasons, most developing countries intervene extensively in financial markets. In the industrial countries, interest rates have been liberalized in the last two decades and restraints on competition between different types of financial institutions have been relaxed, but many developing countries still set ceilings on interest rates and spreads and most allocate much (often between half and all) of formal credit to "priority" uses.

The impact of interest rate controls and other repressive financial policies on investment, efficiency, and growth has been debated for some time. In this study, Alan Gelb reviews theories on both sides of the debate and investigates such relationships using a cross-section analysis of 34 countries between 1965 and 1985. He divides this 21-year period into two periods, breaking at the year 1973 to take into account the substantial change in growth relationships evident in many countries from about that time.

Real (deposit) interest rates in developing cour,tries were lower on average than world (dollar) levels, especially after 1973-despite these countries' supposed status as capitalscarce.

Gelb fnds a significant positive correlation between growth rates and interest rates as well as between efficiency (the inicremental outputl capital ratio) and interest rates-but little relationship between interest rates and investment levels and no relationship between interest rates and the current account.

These relationships partly reflect the influence of growth on profitability and thus int,'rest rates-but there also appears to be a causal link in the other direction: interest rates and the degree of financialization of savings flows (in terms of both flow and stock) affect efficiency and growth.

The average growth difference between the 17 higher-growth countries and the 17 lowergrowth countries was 3 percent. About half of one percentage point of that difference might have been due to the differential of 6 percent in the real interest rates of the two groups.

The evidence supports the need for liberalized financial markets, Gelb concludes--or at least supports an argument against severe financial repression.

That is not to say that abrupt liberalization is desirable or that certain interventions in financial markets may not be beneficial-at least until measures to improve information, supervision, regulation, and macrostability have become effective.

This paper is a product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division, Country Economics Department. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Maria Raggambi, room N9-03 1, extension 61696 (34 pages with tables).

The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research Complex. An objective of the series is to get these fndings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.

Produced at the PPR Dissemination Center
To sum up, our regression estimates suggest that regional integration schemes have not yet contributed significantly to stabilizing export spells, whereas exchange rate variability and imported input intensity are significant destabilizing factors.

# **4. Qualitative appraisal**

Transaction-level data reveal a large degree of churning among Zambia’s export firms. While firm entry rates into exporting are high compared to other countries, the export survival rates of these firms are uniquely low. Factors related to the domestic and the external policy environment, the specific export strategy adopted by firms and the organizational and managerial characteristics of firms influence the process of exporting and export survival rates. Interviews with firms engaged in exporting reveal a number of constraints to exports ranging from impediments to importing inputs required for export-oriented production, financial frictions, unexpected exchange-rate movements, inefficient and costly services inputs (finance, electricity, or infrastructure) to the emergence of new international competitors and political instability in destination markets.<sup>10</sup>

# _Starting to export and sustaining exports_

The majority of the interviewed Zambian exporters do not have a well-defined export strategy. Most respondents report that they export on an _ad hoc_ basis, mainly to neighboring countries. For example, more than one exporter of beverages revealed that the management of the firm does not set specific or conscious objectives to enter foreign markets. Instead, small wholesalers from neighboring countries come to the factory and load up their trucks to avoid driving back empty. Similarly, several detergent or confectionery export transactions seem to happen spontaneously and sometimes informally with traders picking up individual shipments to take back to their countries. Other firms follow their clients as those clients enter foreign markets. An

> 10 The interviews with 20 exporting firms from sectors such as agri-processing, steel, chemicals, plastics and other manufactures were conducted in Lusaka in January 2014.

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increased from 0.7% in 1997 to 1.1% in 2001; in Switzerland, cocaine use among 15- and 16-year-olds increased from 0.9% in 1994 to 2.5% in 2002; Germany experienced an increase of cocaine use of the population between 18 and 64 years of age from 0.2% in 1990 to 1% in 2003 (UNODC, 2004).

# **COCAINE PRICES**

The price per pure gram of cocaine decreased from more than $500 for purchases of two grams or less, and $200 for purchases of more than 50 grams in 1980, to about $200 and to about $38, respectively, in 2001.<sup>29</sup> Since 2001 the price of cocaine in the US has been increasing at a relatively slow pace. These patterns are observed for both the US and Europe for cocaine at street purity (Figure 11). According to UNODC, cocaine prices, at the retail and wholesale level, have followed similar trends over time (Figure 12).

# **THE MAIN PUZZLE (and its resolution...)**

According to most measures available until 2005, potential cocaine production showed a decreased of about 30% or more between 2000 and 2004, while demand in the consumer countries, if anything, had remained relatively stable. Yet, prices of intermediate inputs (coca leaf and coca base) in producer countries and of cocaine in the consumer

> 29 Caulkins and Reuter (1998) study the relative importance of the cost components in determining cocaine prices at the retail level. According to their estimates, a little over 50% of the cost can be attributed to risk (for incarceration about 24%, and for death about 30%), whereas import costs only account for about 12% of the retail value of cocaine, labor costs for about 13%, and costs of product and assets seizures for about 10%. The same study also highlights the huge variability of prices across time and market levels and explains why enforcement interventions create only temporary spikes in prices, due to the response (in their words, adaptation) of suppliers.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> Maternal Work & Child Development: Number of Findings by Outcome<br>Behavioral Cognitive Schooling Health Weight Height<br>9-<br>8-<br>7-<br>o 6- gs<br>&Ts= S- ||findingNegative<br>bet 4- | Positive<br>8 i<br>3-<br>2-<br>neg null:pos neg nullipos neg nullipos neg null+pos neg nullipos neg null+pos<br>40 findings from 26 papers<br>Source: Authors' systematic review of papers 2002-2022 without corrections for multiple hypotheses testing<br>Weight category includes BMI measures<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **V. Issues in current research**

The informal sector is more than just ‘the other part of the economy’ to which all traditional analysis equally applies. The sections below describe recent research exploring issues specific to informality.

## **A. Informal employment**

## **1. MNA**

[This section is based on Gatti et al. 2011).] According to the Schneider index, informality has been increasing in the MENA region. It is highest among the working poor, and while informality generally decreases with wealth, it can even be found among wealthier segments of the population. Also, lower education is strongly associated with higher rates of informality, an association that seems driven by the dominant role of the public sector in hiring more educated workers.

Informal employment is highest among youth, a significant phase before an adulthood transition into public sector employment. For example, informality rates are very high for youth between the ages of 15 and 24 after which, informality decreases rapidly. These trends differ from Latin America, where a similar decrease in informality by age is associated with increases in other private sector employment or self-employment, in contrast to the dominance of the public sector in the Middle East.

Informal workers are concentrated in small firms with less than five workers, who are likely to be engaged in low productivity activities. Micro and small firms, which account for a large share of enterprises and private sector jobs in the region, are mostly unregistered and employ workers informally. And even among registered firms, approximately one-fifth of their sales and workers are not reported.<sup>4</sup> Informal workers earn lower salaries than formal workers with similar skills, with an estimated wage premium for formal jobs varying from 10 to 50 percent across the region. Most measures of job quality suggest poorer working conditions in informal jobs. Mobility from informal to formal jobs was found to be extremely limited. For example, between 2008 and 2009, an informal worker in Egypt had a 4 percent chance of moving to a private sector formal job and a 5 percent chance of moving to a public sector job.

Given the low mobility for workers, recommendations based on the MENA work highlight the importance of fostering more private sector competition, as well as reforming the civil service where generous benefits induce queuing among workers. Recommendations also include convening a broader segment of civil society to reform labor regulations in order to avoid replicating the status quo by those whom it favors. Finally, it recommends targeting some well-designed skills upgrading interventions, especially in the poorer countries and in rural areas where Informality’s low productivity dimension is especially pronounced.

> 4 According to Silva et al (2009) up to 55 percent of informal workers are employed by formal firms in Morocco where informal workers constitute the majority at firms with either business or tax registrations.

15
<!-- Start of picture text --> FIGURE IV-1: INCOME TAX DISTRIBUTION BY DECILE<br>99.91%<br>100% 94.21%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br>Estimated tax Self-reported tax<br>Source: World Bank Group staff estimates by based on EPNH 2017 and DIAN<br>Note: The deciles were created using market income + per-capita pensions<br>% of tax paid by each decile<br><!-- End of picture text --> If the income tax reported by households in the survey was used, a total estimated value for this tax of 152 billion pesos would be obtained, which is equivalent to only 4.4 percent of the value obtained using the DIAN information and income from the survey ($ 2,881 billion). As shown in the chart, the percentage of tax paid for each decile of income has a similar distribution; but in the case of the tax estimated with the income from the survey and the information from the DIAN, almost all the tax is paid by the highest decile.

# **_b) Indirect taxes:_**

In the previous version of the CEQ, the Quality of Life Survey (ECV) 2010 was used. Unlike the National Household Budget Survey (ENPH), the ECV expenses module does not include the product-by-product information on expenditures. Rather, the products were aggregated into groups. Likewise, the place of purchase question is not available in said survey. This limitation led to rural zones being considered an informal market in the previous version of the CEQ. In other words, people who lived in rural areas were considered not to be paying value-added tax. In ENPH, informality was defined based on the place of purchase.

Additionally, in work done in previous years, the indirect effects of VAT were not considered. Figure IV-2 presents the results of progressivity in relative terms (panel A) and progressivity in absolute terms (panel B) of the value-added tax, for three scenarios. In the first scenario, we seek to replicate the methodology used previously, that is, defining informality according to the place of residence of the household and without considering the indirect effects. In the second, the place of purchase is considered for the definition of informality, and indirect effects are not included. Finally, the third case takes into account informality according to the place of purchase and includes the indirect effects of the tax.

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