|Gender|0.001|0.022|0.0007|0.001|0.0005|0.0012|0.001|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Conflict dummy t-1|(0.003)<br>**0.277****|(1.007)<br>0.801|(0.004)<br>**0.269****|(0.003)<br>**0.274****|(0.004)<br>**0.255****|(0.003)<br>**0.28****|(0.003)<br>**0.279****|
||**(0.09)**|(2.729)|**(0.091)**|**(0.091)**|**(0.095)**|**(0.09)**|**(0.09)**|
|Political stability|**-0.02****|-0.0005|**-0.001****|**-0.013****|**-0.002****|**-0.001****|**-0.002****|
||**(0.002)**|(1.418)|**(0.002)**|**(0.002)**|**(0.002)**|**(0.002)**|**(0.002)**|
|Hfinva|---|**---**|-0.128<br>(0.194)|---|---|---|---|
|Hfinconf|---|**---**|---|1.41<br>(3.85)|---|---|---|
|Hfinwealth|---|**---**|---|---|-6.29<br>(7.785)|---|---|
|Hfinlegal|---|**---**|---|---|---|-30.29|---|
|||||||(36.45)||
|Hfinsahel|---|---|---|---|---|---|-39.36|
||||||||(36.39)|
|Constant|5.1***|4.92***|5.13***|5.1***|5.16***|5.098***|5.1***|
||(0.292)|(0.055)|(0.296)|(0.292)|(0.302)|(0.292)|(0.292)|
|Countries|45|45|45|45|45|45|45|
|Observations|446|502|446|446|446|446|446|

_Source_ : Authors’ estimates. _Note_ : Hfinva (Housing finance depth*Voice accountability); Hfinconf (Housing finance depth*Conflict dummy t-1); Hfinwealth (Housing finance depth*Wealth- _dummy_ : wealth-based decomposition); Hfinlegal (Housing finance depth*Legal- _dummy_ : legal-based decomposition); Hfinsahel (Housing finance depth*Sahel-dummy: Sahel-based decomposition). *,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Values in bracket are standard errors.

Concerning the impact of housing finance depth, the non-significance of the impact has allowed us to verify the threshold effect. Our verification (in the table above and appendix) was conclusive since a higher value (squared values) of housing finance depth then became negatively and significantly correlated to inequality. However a very higher value (exponential value) presents a non-significant result again.

These results confirm the fact that there is a threshold effect. Indeed, above a certain threshold, higher values of housing finance depth conclusively reduce inequality, while lower and very high values do not have a significant impact. Well-developed housing finance systems are therefore associated with inequality reduction. Based on these findings, we can recommend the development of housing finance systems in African countries.

Turning to the control variables, the results are mostly in line with expectations. There is a strong negative but non-significant influence on inequality of inflation and of income per capita; and a significant negative impact of human capital on inequality, suggesting that higher levels of economic development and human capital are associated with lower levels of inequality. Additionally, the governance level indexed by political stability appears to reduce inequality. These results are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature, which assumes that investing in human and physical capital is a good tactic to reduce inequality.

However, the conflict dummy is contrary to inequality reduction objectives, since their coefficients are positive and significant. These last results suggest that the positive impact of the conflict dummy on housing finance development should be mitigated. While countries may expand housing finance after a conflict to boost reconstruction, the rich may be better positioned than the poor to take advantage of it, which risks increasing inequality. Additional measures may be needed to compensate for this effect.

Our composed variables are non-significant; however, all of them present the expected theoretical negative sign excluding housing finance depth interacted with conflict dummy_ . Housing finance depth is contrary to inequality reduction in a post-conflict country. The reason could be the same as highlighted above since there is unequal access to and distribution of money, favoring the wealthy more than the poor. The capacity 16