rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
about 52 percent from 17,300 rupiahs in 1984 to 26,300 rupiahs in 1996 (Friedman 2003).

Table 3.2. A Profile of Poverty in Indonesia in the 1990s

|PovertyMeasures|1993|1996|1999|2000|2002|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Headcount|61.55|50.51|55.30|55.38|52.42|
|Poverty Gap|21.03|15.33|16.56|16.15|15.68|
|Squared PovertyGap|9.16|6.02|6.49|6.23|6.09|

Source: Computed<sup>12</sup>

# **_3.2. The 1997 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath_**

Both the GICs and the data presented in table 3.2 show a significant increase in poverty between 1996 and 1999. This reversal of the track record of Indonesia in strong growth and poverty reduction is attributed mainly to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The full impact of this crisis, which hit Southeast Asia in April 1997, began to be felt in Indonesia late in 1997 and early 1998. The crisis took the form of rapid currency depreciation. The exchange rate went from it pre-crisis level of 2,200 rupiahs per dollar in mid 1997 to 6,000 in December of the same year, and then to 17,000 in January 1998 (Pritchett et al. 2002). To avoid a complete collapse of the financial system, the central bank provided a massive liquidity support to banking system while the government offered a guarantee of all its liabilities. Cole and Slade (1998) explain that political factors made this financial crisis much worse and more difficult to deal with. The exchange rate responded more to political perceptions or expectations than to changes in the interest rates.

> 12 Our empirical analysis is based on a parameterization of the Lorenz curve using the general quadratic model as described in Datt (1998).

18
^:--: i ~ ~ ,'''t **I 1)** : ' . t.S)}ti 'l it **.i** t ' k ', I: ; ' *'il **cI a** bo it sed to _calIculate_ **LoW ibank va 'ue** is **at Ic td** O'; av (o I r' ilc rease ot developing country k-:9,p05'1r Which j **'In1** he a'll t'1 the .arginal discount. The evidence, in support ot the FDIC hvpothesis, indicates that heavily exposed banks value dv.eloping countrv debt more hit,hlv **at** the margin than the less **exposed** banks (as reported in Table 9) The calculated marginal discounts are consistent with the trend that the smaller, regional banks are more aggressivelv using the secondary market to reduce their developing country exposure. The wide disparit; of marginal discounts also indicates that There are large profitable trading opportunities for interbank trades, as U.S. banks can inicrease their combined expected claim on the deposit insurance agency bv trading developing country debt.

The varying valuation of developing countrv debt across banks cannot be explained bv any differences in treatment of indebted countries by national governments or multilateral lending agencies that may give rise to differing repa';ment prospects across countries. As banks tend to hold developing countrv loan portfolio's of more or less equal composition, such differential treatment of countries can not explain different valuation of developing country debt across banks.<sup>2 5</sup>
to improve energy efficiency would be €356 billion over the next 35 years. For the power sector, this scenario needs 63% higher investment from the baseline when both scenarios includes energy efficiency investments. This is an expensive scenario for Romania’s energy sector.

This analysis recommends Romania to stay in the low demand green scenario (i.e., green scenario with implementation of energy efficiency measures in the demand side). Yet, the low demand green scenario requires 9 GW of intermittent resources (6 GW wind and 3 GW solar) and realization of this scenario would still be challenging. Note further that if energy efficiency in the demand side is not realized, the requirement of new intermittent capacity would be 11 GW, increasing the challenge further. Realizing energy efficiency measures is itself tough considering the hidden and transaction costs involved with them. Often, energy efficiency measures look very attractive in an economic analysis but their deployment in the real world is slow due to several barriers.

# **References**

Baloi, I.-C. (2010). Diagnosing the Potential of Renewable Energy in Romania. Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 237-46.

British Petroleum (BP). 2015. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. BP, London.

Carstea, V. G., A.I. Danciulescu and I.G. Fintina (2010). Alternative Energies' Management in Romania--Member State of European Union. Romanian Economic and Business Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 114-20.

European Commission (EC) 2015a. Carbon Market Report 2015. Annex 1: Report on the functioning of the European carbon market, EC, Brussels. <u>http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress/docs/com_2015_576_annex_1_cover_en.pd f.</u> European Commission (EC) 2015b. Submission by Latvia and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its member states: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. <u>http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf</u> European Union (EU) 2012. Energy Roadmap 2050. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. <u>http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2012_energy_roadmap_2050_en_0.pdf</u> 27
fragility of the mechanisms governing public sector works and the difficulty in controlling for multiple conflict of interests.

Concessionaires led by the Autostrade group try to block any government intervention aimed at the introduction of a more harmonious tariff system. In 2006 Autostrade provocatively threatened to sue the government and ask for compensation in case a new tariff law would be enacted.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, statistical data on this subject are less univocal. As Figure 4 shows, the evolution of the tariff before and after 1999 (the dotted line) does not seem to show a significantly different trend, although from 2003 onward tariffs seem to be growing more than inflation.

However one possible explanation may be given for the “tariff rage” of both concessionaires and users. Before 1999, tariffs were linked to the highest one imposed by Autostrade, so the whole network would have a nationally-fixed tariff system, either directly or through shadow-tolls. After 1999, a new system was introduced, which linked the tariff applied on each highway both to general aggregates (inflation) and to concession-specific variables (quality and productivity). For this reason, the geography of the highway tariff has evolved unevenly since 1999. This may also explain consumer aversion and the haste against the new concession system.

Figure 4: Tariff and Inflation Rate Evolution<sup>24</sup> <!-- Start of picture text --> 130<br>125<br>120<br>115<br>110<br>105<br>100<br>95<br>90<br>85<br>80<br>1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005<br>Inflation Rate Tariff<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Italian Statistical Institute, ISTAT. Inflation refers to variation in the consumer price index (CPI); the base year for the two series is 1995=100._ Other transport economists, such as Marco Ponti (Ragazzi and Werner : 2005), argue that highway tariffs should reflect the initial lump sum and maintenance costs, plus a minor remuneration for the operating company. In his opinion, the construction costs have been largely covered over the years and the current maintenance costs do not justify the current tariff level. Therefore, he supports the argument that tariffs should be significantly reduced.

> 23 <u>http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2006/ottobre/08/Autostrade_soci_rivolta_governo_ora_co_9_061008023.shtml</u>

> 24 Source: Italian statistical institute, Istat. The base year for the two series is 1995=100.

10
**1 Introduction**

During the 2007/08 global food crisis, the world average price of staples more than doubled; perhaps one of the most serious consequences of the crisis was its disproportionate effect on the world’s most vulnerable populations. For those who spend the majority of their budgets on food, the crisis led to a severe erosion of purchasing power, pushing households into poverty and crippling the already poor. Poor households cope with negative shocks in many ways, for example, by relying on family assistance, selling off assets, borrowing money, or – in the most desperate cases – reducing intake of food and nutrients. Such coping mechanisms can have both short and long-run consequences for a family’s wellbeing and livelihood.

This paper investigates the impact of the global spike in food prices on household welfare in Afghanistan – one of the world’s most food-insecure countries.<sup>1</sup> The analysis in this paper provides one of the very few empirical assessments of the effects of the global food crisis based on data collected prior to and during the crisis and using direct measures of household consumption; further, it is the first analysis on this topic from a conflict country, Afghanistan. It is rare to have high-quality household data from conflict countries, where many of the world’s most vulnerable live, and even rarer to have such data collected during a largely unanticipated shock. In countries like Afghanistan, shocks like the food crisis can compound the deleterious effects of years of conflict, drought, and economic hardships.

The estimates provided in this paper are based on direct measures of food security and food-based coping strategies, e.g., moving to cheaper foods, based on observed household behavior prior to and after the spike in food prices. Most studies on the global food crisis use pre-crisis national household survey data to simulate the short-run effects of price increases on poverty. See for example, Robles and Torero (forthcoming) who examine simulated results from four Latin American countries,<sup>2</sup> Woden _et al._ (2008) who summarize simulations for 12 African countries,<sup>3</sup> Ul Haq _et al._ (2008) who simulate welfare changes in

> 1 According to the Economic Research Service ( _Food Security Assessment, 2008-2009_ ), in 2008 Afghanistan had a nutrition gap – the difference between available food and food needed to support a 2,100 per capita calorie intake – of 1,999 thousand tons. Only North Korea was estimated to have a larger nutrition gap in that year. 2 The countries are Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Nicaragua.

> 3 The countries are Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Their findings suggest overall increases in poverty as a result of the food crisis, with a large share of the increases in poverty due to a worsened situation for the already poor.

2
Sheffer, M.L; Grantham-McGregor, S.M; & Ismail, S.J. "The Social Environment of Malnourished Children Ccnpared with that of other Children in Jamaica." J of Biosocial Science 13(1) 1981:19-30.

Simm,ons, Willam K; Jutsum, Peter J; Fox, Kristin; Spence, Margaret; Gueri, Miguel; Paradis, Rejean; Gurney, J Michael. "A Survey of the Anemia Status of Preschool Age Children and Pregnant and Lactating Wcmen in Jamaica." The American J of Clinical Nutrition 35(2) 1982:319-326.

Simmons, W.K. "Programmes for the Prevention of Anemia in Jamaica." West Indian Medical Journal 29(1) 1980:15-21.

Singh, Shusheela "Evaluation of the Jamaica Fertility Survey, 1975-1976." Scientific Reports No.34 World Fertility Survey London: International Statistical Inustitute, July 1982.

Starrs, A. "Preventing the Tragedy of Maternal Deaths." A report on the International Safe Motherhood Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, Feb., 1987. Stycos, JM & Back, KW The Control of Human Fertility in Jamaica Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press, 1964.

Vadies, Eugene & Clark, Jeremy. "Ccmprehensive Adolescent Fertility Project in Jamaica." PAHO Bulletin 22(3) 1988:240-249.

Walker, Godfrey J.A; Ashley, Deanna E.C; & Hayes, Richard J; "The Quality of Care is Related to Death Rates: Hospital Inpatient Management of Infants with Acute Gastroenteritis in Jamaica." American J of Public Health 78(2) 1988:149-152.

Walker, G.J.A & Wint, B. "Quality Assessrment of Medical Care in Jamaica." World Health Forum 8 1987:520-524.

Walker, Godfrey J.A; Ashley, Deanna E.C.; McCaw, Affette M.; & Bernard, G. Wesley. "Maternal Mortality in Jamaica." The Lancet 1(8479) 1986:486-488.

Walsh, J; Naschak, C; Measham, A; & Gertler, P. '\Maternal and Perinatal Health Problems." IN Jamison, ed. Health Sector Priorities Review World Bank, in process.

Weston, L. 'Reducing Maternal Deaths in Develcping Countries." PHN Terhnical Note 86-19., World Bank, May 1986.

World Bank. "Staff Appraisal Report, Jamaica: Population and Health Project." Report No. 6162-JM, Population, Health & Nutrition Department, Div III, May 1, 1987.

World Health Organization. Maternal Mortality Rates: A Tabulation of Available Information WHO, Div. Family Health, Geneva 1986.

27
has two components: hazard probability and building vulnerability. First, tenants must be made aware of the risks of living in buildings close to active fault lines and on vulnerable soils. This requires investment in geological surveys and seismic monitoring technology and dissemination of the resulting information as a public good. Secondly, and more complicated, is the assessment of building quality. This requires an engineering assessment of each structure. This is costly, so the question is whether the landlord or the government should cover the cost. A compromise is where an initial public engineering inspection yields a simple vulnerability score. If the score is below a certain threshold, the building owner is required to obtain a more thorough inspection that proves the buildings integrity.<sup>14</sup> Adequate hazard risk information would increase awareness of the probability of disaster, as well as potentially mitigate the problem of selective fatalism discussed earlier by enabling tenants to realize that the choice of residential housing can mitigate the extent of earthquake risk they face. Since price is often the most easily processed signal of underlying quality, public disclosure of idiosyncratic earthquake risk could also generate a rental market with an informative price gradient (Brookshire et al. 1985).

Providing information to landlords may boost the chances of retrofitting, as well. Landlords may revise their cost-benefit calculations based on more precise probabilities of earthquake risk. However, if the revised (accurate) probability does not change the outcome of this calculation, the public disclosure of the fact that building owners decide to build in relatively high-risk areas or that they do not retrofit buildings in those areas appropriately, could spur the development of a social cost on such negligence in the form of public shaming. This added cost further boosts the probability of undertaking appropriate disaster mitigation investments. Such strategies have been implemented successfully in the control of industrial pollution through public disclosure of emission levels of firms using a simple rating system (Wheeler 2000). The driving forces behind these efforts have been national environmental agencies as well as non-governmental organizations.

> 14 New Zealand, a country with high seismic activity, uses this approach.

36
This rapid income growth led to a surge in the demand for home equipment and mobility, hence for infrastructure services such as water, electricity connections, and transport, and for related durables such as electric appliances and vehicles. Yet, as of 2012, access and ownership rates still vary widely, as can be seen in Figure 1, which graphs Latin American average access and ownership rates by deciles, as well as average rates in the worst- and best-performing countries of the sample respectively.<sup>7</sup> For water, Latin American averages, which go from around 71% in decile 1 to 98% at the top of the distribution, mask wide differences, from an abysmal 19% of the poorest decile households in El Salvador having access to a source of water in the house or lot (a measure akin to basic access as defined in the MDGs) to 99% for households of similar income in Argentina. Beyond El Salvador which could be considered an outlier, three countries, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, have barely more than half of the bottom decile households with access to water.

The situation is more critical for sanitation. In 2012, only 1% of households in the poorest decile lived in a dwelling connected to a public sewerage system in Paraguay. With the exception of Chile, where 82% of the poorest households are connected, no country has more than 46% connections, for a Latin American average of 35% in the poorest decile. The range narrows only slightly when moving up the income distribution. At the eighth decile, roughly the lower limit for middle class households according to Ferreira et al. (2013), average Latin American access rates are still only 72%, hovering below 80% for 9 out of 14 countries.

Electricity is clearly the dimension in which the region performs best. As of 2012, regional averages start at 89% in decile 1, and reach 99% from decile 6 up. At the bottom of the distribution coverage rates start at 67%, and all countries in the sample are providing above 90% coverage in all deciles, except El Salvador in the first decile, Bolivia in the first two, and Honduras and Peru in the first three.

But these rather encouraging electricity connections figures are not exactly mirrored in appliances ownership rates. Overall, less than 80% of households in the bottom three deciles

> 7 Average Latin American rates are simple averages over the total 420,204 households’ sample. Household survey weights are used, but we do not weight by country population or otherwise. Note however that bigger countries have larger samples: the number of households varies from 4,889 for Paraguay to 111,612 for Brazil, and looking only at 2012, the correlations of country sample size with population and GDP are .67 and .64 respectively.

7
skew their portfolios to liquid and other short-term instruments, the full benefits from pension savings on domestic capital market development could be limited.

This paper documents differences in regulation on switching in a number of countries operating DC pension systems. The paper also studies the extent to which switching between pension providers and across different portfolios affect asset allocation. More precisely, the paper analyses whether pension funds’ holdings in short-term assets is related to outflows resulting from transfers within and across pension fund providers. Data on pension funds’ portfolios were provided by the regulatory authorities in Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Estonia; Hong Kong SAR, China; Mexico; Peru; Poland; and Romania.<sup>9</sup> The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the aggregate trends in pension funds’ holdings at different maturities. Section 2 documents outflows from benefit payments and switching. Section 3 studies the relation between switching and portfolio allocations. In addition to analyzing the relation between fund transfers and short-term holdings for the group of countries, the section also presents two empirical exercises for Colombia and Chile where recent events in switching provide two quasi-natural experiments to study the causal effects on portfolio strategies and liquidity management. Section 4 concludes and presents several policy recommendations.

# 1. Holdings of short-term assets

Holdings of short-term and medium-term assets have declined in all Latin American countries over the past decade, with similar trends witnessed in the Central and Eastern Europe region. For the purpose of this paper, short-term assets have been defined as local government treasuries securities < 1-year maturity, local bank term deposits, foreign treasury securities < 1-year maturity and foreign term deposits. Medium term assets are defined as those with between 1-5 years maturity. For example, in Chile, while short-term investments accounted for 19% of AUM in 2005, they were only 6% of the portfolio in 2015. Medium term assets have also declined or at least stabilized during the sample period.

> 9 IOPS members from Nigeria and Slovak Republic also kindly provided information for this paper, but as no data were available on switching, it was not possible to include these countries in the paper.

5
(breakfast, lunch, dinner)?” As mentioned above, it then allowed to separately identify consumption among present household members, temporarily absent household members, and others. As a result, this structure not only aggregates across all household members, but also across all possible meal events, and snacks are not explicitly mentioned. The purpose of the one-line recall in this study was then to quantify the magnitude of the measurement error when asking about FAFH in one-line.<sup>8</sup> The second arm (T2, the individual diary) acted as the benchmark or comparison group. It consisted of a personal food diary provided to each adult member of the household which helped them track, item-byitem and day-by-day, consumption of all FAFH over a period of seven days.<sup>9</sup> Enumerators provided instructions to the respondent (and other household members who were in the house at the time) and left a booklet with the same instructions. To reduce non-compliance, fatigue, cognition, and motivation issues, enumerators were instructed to contact all adults in the household within two to three days of the first visit to verify that all members were filling out the diaries and to answer any questions from the respondents. Furthermore, interviewers asked all household members to leave their booklets at a pre-specified location so that the interviewer could review them in person in up to three more household visits throughout the week. Adherence to protocols was necessary to help ensure that this arm did indeed collect the most accurate data and could be trusted as the benchmark measure. This adherence was partially verified by paradata automatically collected by Survey Solutions (the CAPI software). The paradata recorded the date and time of interviewer log-ins, which is correlated with each visit or contact the enumerator made with the household. The analysis reveals that diary module households had the largest number of days of interviewer log-ins (around 5.11), which provides an indication that enumerators conducted the requisite number of visits. For more discussion on the implementation of the diary, see Appendix 9.2.

Like the individual diary module, the third arm (T3, individual-level recall) asked every single individual in the household separately about their FAFH consumption rather than relying on a single household informant to report FAFH consumption for all members. This arm, however, used a less intensive method than the diary to survey each member. The interviewer asked each adult respondent to recall his/her FAFH consumption over the last seven days. Those who were not at home while the interview was being conducted and would not be available while the interviewer was present in the EA were interviewed by

> 8 A second purpose of this arm is to analyze the impact of shortening the recall period from 30 days (current VHLSS design) to 7 days (international guidelines) on total consumption, by comparing T0 and T1. A separate paper analyzes this dimension.

> 9 The diary was also structured around the 9 meal events mentioned before, and then respondents had to list every item consumed under each meal event.

10