in USD 7 billion for 2018 as discussed in Section 2.1.1. Damages are apportioned between public and private capital based on their relative cumulative shares of damages as at end 2015, made available by ESCWA. We assume the same shares for each time t (that is, 40 percent of damages are attributable to public capital, 60 percent to private capital).

In Table 3, panel C, we present information on the central paths of projected variables based on the previous discussions. Under the central projection, both K<sup>�</sup> ⁄Y and K<sup>�</sup> ⁄Y are lower in 2018 (1.029 and 0.708 respectively) compared with 2010 (1.152 and 1.408 respectively) but more so for the former, since the damage for public capital was valued at less than for private capital.

**<u>Table 3: Simulation of Syria’s Conflict Years (2011‐2018)</u>**

|<br>**Parameter/Variable**|<br>**Note**|<br>**2010**|<br>**Average**<br>**2011‐18**|**2018**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**A. Constant**|**Paramet**|**ers**|||
|Labor shareβ|_(1)_||0.520||
|Aggregate capital depreciation rateδ|_(1)_||0.048||
|Public capital depreciation rateδ<sup>�</sup>|_(1)_||0.031||
|Private capital depreciation rateδ<sup>�</sup>|_(1)_||0.062||
|<br>**B. Capital‐to‐Ou**<br> <br>�|<br>**tput (K/Y**<br>|**) Ratios**<br>|||
|Initial public capital‐to‐output ratioK�<br>/Y�|_(1)_|1.152|||
|SimulatedK�<sup>�</sup>/Y (with damage)|_(2)_||1.141|1.029|
|Initialprivate capital‐to‐output ratioK�<br>�/Y�|_(1)_|1.408|||
|SimulatedK�<sup>�</sup>/Y (with damage)|_(2)_||1.144|0.708|
|**C. Projected Variables, C**<br>|**entral P**<br>|**ath (2011‐**|**2018)**||
|Public investment‐to‐output ratioI<sup>�</sup>/Y|_(3)_|0.090|0.025|0.010|
|Private investment‐to‐output ratioI<sup>�</sup>/Y|_(3)_|0.120|0.064|0.040|
|Efficiency of new public investmentθ<sup>�</sup>|_(4)_|0.734|0.632|0.570|
|Human capital growthg�|_(5)_||‐0.018|‐0.006|
|TFP growthg�|_(6)_||‐0.016|‐0.022|
|Population growth rateg�|_(7)_||‐0.017|0.001|
|Working age‐to‐population share, growthg�|_(7)_||‐0.001|0.011|
|Labor force participation rate, growth,gρ|_(8)_||‐0.005|‐0.008|

*Multiply by 100 to obtain parameter/variable values in percent share or growth terms (%). Note (source and calculation):

- _(1)_ Unchanged from Table 1. See Table 1 for further details on source and computation.

- _(2)_ Calculations follow the discussion in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.

- _(3)_ Based on World Bank (2017b). Their estimates of 1% and 4% for I<sup>�</sup> /Y and I<sup>�</sup> /Y respectively in 2015 are also assumed for 2016‐2018 in our simulations.

- _(4)_ Based on the average IEI for LMI countries for 2010 which is assumed to gradually decline to 0.570 (the average IEI for LI countries) by 2018.

- _(5)_ See Section 3.1.3. Given that enrollment rates fall, and the exodus of Syrians increases noticeably only from 2013, we keep the index of human capital unchanged from 2010 to 2012, such that the contraction mainly occurs over 2013‐2015 with average growth of ‐4.28% (average growth over 2016‐2018: 0.56%).

- _(6)_ TFP growth is calibrated using the empirical methodology in Kim and Loayza (2019). See Section 3.1.4.

- _(7)_ Based on United Nations (2017).

- _(8)_ Female and male LFPRs are based on ILO‐modelled estimates, May 2018 (ILOSTAT). Female and male shares of the working‐age population follow United Nations (2017).

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