program impacts on investment over and above a significant and positive trend (with an estimated increase of about 21 m<sup>2</sup> or about 30% of the pre-project mean for the narrowest band).

# **4.2 Results from administrative data**

To see whether insignificant results are attributable to lack of program success or methodological and data limitations, we use administrative data. Results from estimating (2) as reported in columns 1, 3, and 5 of table 5 illustrate that, before policy reform, registration of new leases was strongly biased against women with point estimates for 1 in regressions for female vs. male (-0.25), joint vs. male (-0.48) and joint vs. female (-0.23) registration indicating size of female disadvantage. The combined actions taken as part of ββ the program reversed this pattern. Point estimates for 1 2 , the joint effect of policy reform and systematic registration are all positive and large with coefficients of 0.18 for the female vs. male and 0.37 ββ + ββ for joint vs. male individual as well as 0.18 for joint vs. female rights. While the likelihood of a plot being registered in the name of a woman individually did not change (as an estimated marginal gain of 0.18 was outweighed by a commensurate increase in joint registration), the project is estimated to have changed the marginal likelihood of a newly registered plot to be held (registered) in the name of women - individually or jointly- by 0.55, a meaningful and rather big effect. Table 5 cols. 2, 4, and 6 provides results from (2’) to separate the net effect of policy change 1 2) from that of systematic registration 3 1 2)�. It suggests that 35% and 29% of changes in female (γγ + γγ and joint vs. male individual registrations and 22% of the change in joint vs. female individual registration �γγ −(γγ + γγ can be attributed to policy changes and the remainder to systematic first-time registration. The importance of first-time registration to enforce policy changes on female land ownership is consistent with the notion that changes in women’s legal rights to land alone may not become fully effective -and may even result in effects opposite to what was intended (Anderson and Genicot 2015)- unless they are disseminated in a way that makes them socially acceptable (Bhalotra _et al._ 2018). Systematic registration increased the share of jointly registered land plots by reducing the share of those registered individually by either men or women.

Results from estimating (3) for the number registered mortgages at block level are in table 6 panel A with estimates for all registered plots in column 1 and those owned exclusively by men, women, or jointly in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In contrast to results from the DID specifications using household survey data, estimated coefficients for sporadic and systematic registration are precisely estimated with point estimates suggesting significant impacts. Focusing on sporadic registration first, we note that 2, the estimated marginal effect for plots sporadically registered after 2010 is, with 0.0273 well above 1 (0.0160), the effect for plots sporadically registered θθ before 2010 which is also the upper bound of the ‘pure’ effect of reducing the transaction costs of mortgage θθ 15