this can be explained by the normative change experienced in the prior decade. Between 1991 and 2003, the proportion of women in the same birth cohort who reported that they “must have a son” halved. The probability that a woman stated that she “must have a son” in 2003 was one-third of the 1991 level, even after controlling for various socioeconomic characteristics (ibid).

Put differently, the relationship between economic development and son preference was non-linear in the case of Korea. Economic development can initially worsen sex selection as it can heighten pressure to reduce family size (and therefore heighten pressure to sex select), and it can facilitate access to technology to exercise son preference. This can explain the spike in SRB following the introduction of prenatal sex determination technologies in the 1980s. Over time, however, shifts in social norms brought about by the conditions of urban life, eroded preference for sons (Bhat and Zavier 2003; DasGupta et al. Forthcoming).

# _Legislative Measures_

Between the 1950s and the late 1980s, family law in Korea reflected the interests of patrilineal clans. Family headship was held by men, daughters did not have equal rights to property as sons in their birth clan, men were required to marry outside their lineage, and women were transferred to their husband’s lineage after marriage. After marriage, women did not have similar rights as their husbands. For example, in case of a divorce, women did not get to share child custody rights or property rights with their husband. Furthermore, husbands had the right to unilaterally determine where he and his wife should reside. This leeway practically ensured the continuation of patrilocal residence (Boer & Hudson 2017; Shin 2006).

Calls for revisions to Family Law were initially met with resistance. The authoritarian governments that were in place until the late 1980s sought to reinforce traditional Confucian principles of loyalty to the ruler and filial piety in order to maintain social and political stability. Following democratization in 1987, however, women’s groups gained the momentum necessary to push for key changes to Family Law. The 1989 revisions to Family Law stated that daughters and sons had equal rights to inherit property, that child custody rights and property rights in case of a divorce would not be automatically given to the father/husband, that married couples must jointly decide on the domicile, and that a husband could enter his name in his wife’s natal family register if he so chose (Shin 2006). Urbanization contributed to easy implementation of new inheritance laws as well; distribution of urban assets to daughters was easier than distributing lineage assets such as land (Chung & DasGupta 2007).

There are no rigorous evaluations of how this change in Family Law affected parents’ investments in or valuation of daughters. Such evaluations are complicated by the fact that the timing of these legislative changes broadly coincided with (and arguably, even followed) normative changes within civil society. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Korean population as a whole was increasingly starting to question and challenge traditional ways of organizing daily life (ibid).

Another significant piece of legislation in Korea in the 1990s was pension reform. This reform was/is important because the expansion of social insurance obviates some of the need for sons during old-age (Ebenstein & Leung 2013; Ebenstein 2014). Up until the 1990s, social protection expenditure by the state was limited, and the emphasis was on families to serve as the primary 42