Figure 12: Tariffs by Stage of Production <!-- Start of picture text --> %<br>Cha d Central African ... Kenya Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Uganda Benin Burkina Faso Mali Niger Senegal Togo Ghana Nigeria Vietnam Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Brunei Singapore<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Pitigala et al. (2017, 2018).

The presence of a myriad of complex para-tariffs in MCNG countries results in increasing unpredictability and reduced transparency, while exacerbating the protective effect of tariffs. For example, Chad applies a range of other duties and levies such as Community Integration Tax (CIT), Community Integration Contribution (CIC), Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) levy, Statistical Fee levied on all imports, regardless of origin—all adding between 5 percent to 8 percent ad valorem. In Niger, various border taxes apply: (a) a statistical import charge (RSI): 1 percent; (b) a value- added tax set at 19 percent in WAEMU directives; (c) a WAEMU community solidarity levy (PCS): 1 percent; (d) an ECOWAS community solidarity levy (PC): 1 percent<sup>25</sup> ; (e) a special import tax (TCI) on some agricultural products: 10 percent of floor price; (f) an excise tax: between 15 and 45 percent depending on the product (for example, cigarettes and alcoholic drinks); (g) an import verification tax (TV1): 1 percent of the value of the goods, to finance fees paid to COTECNA; (h) a pre-shipment inspection service; (i) an advance on the tax on industrial and commercial profits (BIC): 5 percent of the value of the goods for operators who have no tax identification number (N.I.F.); and (j) a 3 percent tax for operators with a N.I.F. (DTIS, 2015). Similarly, a community solidarity levy of 1 percent, imposed by WAEMU member States on imports from countries outside ECOWAS, the ECOWAS community levy of 0.5 percent; and the statistical tax of 1 percent are also imposed by Niger. The absence of a domestic equivalent for these added duties and levies increases the protective effect of tariffs and exacerbates the escalated tariff structure, resulting in even higher rates of effective protection than suggested by the escalated tariff structure.

The currently applied tariff structures in MCNG economies worsens poverty and disincentivizes agriculture exports. This is so because high tariffs, amplified by para-tariffs imposed on basic agricultural goods, adds a substantial cost to consumers, especially the poor households that spend disproportionately on food. This may protect these West African farmers against imports from outside the customs territory but gives little protection for countries where the imports are largely non-competing within respective regional arrangements. Thus, Chad, Mali, Niger and Guinea have considerable opportunities to increase and diversify their agro-exports products and, in some cases, to export processed products of high quality. A necessary condition to promote higher value-added processing is for inputs to production, including tools and equipment, be allowed to enter at very low tariff rates, which also minimizes inter-sectoral distortion. And if the export is in highly competitive markets, which could be the case for meat and hides and skins, 12