rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
aged 35 to 39 in 2000, i.e. in their early teens in 1975, seems to be the shortest and the most likely to be stunted. It is not surprising, given that nutrition during adolescence is an important determinant of stature, that this birth cohort was especially vulnerable. However, it is somewhat surprising that women from birth cohorts that were young children in 1975-79 do not appear to have suffered from stunting compared to the other cohorts. One potential hypothesis to explain this could be that poor nutrition during the 1975-79 period in early childhood was likely to end in death, as evidenced by the very high under-five mortality rates (see figure 6), while for teenagers, it was more likely to result in stunting. It should be noted, however, as reported in table 5, that most of the differences in stature across birth cohorts are not statistically significant.

Figure 13 shows the rate of permanent disability and physical impairment by gender and birth cohort. The disability rate is much larger for males than for females for the birth cohorts who experienced the Khmer Rouge period as children, teenagers or young adults (older than 30 in 2000). This is explained by a greater exposure to landmines and weapons: the line with triangles in figure 13 shows the proportion of the disabilities among males that are due to a bomb, a landmine or a weapon and this proportion explains most of the gender differential in the disability rates after age 30. The data are in table 6 which also reports the percentage of individuals, by birth cohort and gender, who reported to have suffered from an illness or an injury in the last 30 days preceding the survey. There does not seem to be any particular pattern in the differences across birth cohorts and gender that would reflect the long term impact of the Khmer Rouge period on self-reported illnesses.

# **V. Education**

The Cambodian school system was ruined during the Khmer Rouge period. Only basic primary schools, with a curriculum centered on agricultural skills, were open and no secondary schools were in operation. Table 7, adapted from Kiljunen (1984) indicates how, right after 1979, the secondary school system was in despair, with only a few hundred teachers for the whole country. Desbarats (1995) also provide a similar account of a very low enrollment in secondary schools during the school year 1979/80 with a gradual increase over the 1980s.

Figures 14 and 15, using data from the 2001 Cambodia Labor Force Survey<sup>14</sup> , show that the individuals who were of secondary schooling age at the end of the 1970s have a lower level of educational achievement than the preceding and subsequent birth

> 14 The same result can be found using the Demographic and Health Survey of 2000 and the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey of 1997. Results available on request.

11
Policy Research Working Paper 8556

# **Abstract**

In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targets that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to elite audiences to report freely. Second, the paper hypothesizes that coercion and inducements are substitutes, with censorship being employed primarily when bribes and ownership fail to control information. To test these hypotheses, a new data set was built of 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. The study finds strong empirical support for the theory of media market segmentation.

This paper is a product of the Development Data Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at chammer@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
across all _NC_ channels (see previous section). Equation (14) not only controls for all unobserved fixed channel-level characteristics (as in Table 1), but also for observed channel-level characteristics ( _Zc_ ) that may be correlated with head-tail outcome _differences_ .

# **5.1.2 Clustering and inference**

Continuing with our two observations per channel (Head/Tail) set-up, let us now ask whether the standard errors from the channel fixed effects estimation should be clustered on channels. Abadie et al. (2017) show that the answer to this question, rather than depending on whether clustering the standard errors “makes a difference,” depends on whether there is clustering in _sampling_ or in _assignment_ . If either form of clustering is present and if there is treatment effect heterogeneity, only then should one cluster standard errors.

Clustering in sampling concerns how many clusters in the population are present in the sample. In our case, as noted, the term “sampling” of channels is really a misnomer. All channels in Punjab that met the selection criteria set out in Appendix B were chosen for analysis. Since there was no random selection within this universe, the cluster sampling probability is one. Clustering in assignment concerns the regressor of interest. Returning to the restricted version of equation (14) think of _Hpc_ as the treatment and consider the assignment process that determines its value within clusters (channels). In our case, trivially, Pr( _Hpc_ = 1) = 0 _._ 5 and hence the assignment process is the same across all clusters. Since the cluster sampling probability is one and there is no clustering in assignment of treatment, the fixed effects standard errors for regression equation (15) should not be adjusted for clustering on channels.<sup>26</sup>

> 26Another way to see this is by analogy to a two-period panel with _Hpc_ playing the role of time, in which case Stock and Watson (2008) show that clustering fixed effects standard errors is unnecessary.

24
# B) 90:10 Split

|Country|R<br>Basic<br>House<br>Price<br>_Apartment_<br>_(Current_<br>_USD)_|andom Fore<br>Ratio<br>predicted<br>and<br>observed<br>price<br>_(median)_|st-based Pr<br>Local<br>Ratio<br>predicted<br>and<br>observed<br>price<br>_(median)_|ediction<br>MAPE|Local<br>MAPE|Basic<br>House<br>Price<br>_Apartment_<br>_(Current_<br>_USD)_|OLS-ba<br>Ratio<br>predicted<br>and<br>observed<br>price<br>_(median)_|sed Prediction<br>Local Ratio<br>predicted<br>and<br>observed<br>price<br>_(median)_|<br>MAPE|Local<br>MAPE|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Albania|64,225.80|1.01|1.14|0.26|0.25|56,673.70|1.00|1.10|0.28|0.26|
|Costa Rica|118,500.52|1.00|1.09|0.23|0.32|117,152.50|1.01|1.11|0.28|0.33|
|Morocco|51,580.91|1.00|1.04|0.24|0.26|47,689.99|1.03|1.21|0.45|0.52|
|Pakistan|22,309.16|1.01|1.12|0.30|0.27|24,613.56|1.03|1.27|0.44|0.53|
|South Africa|62,322.08|1.02|1.04|0.29|0.28|85,833.20|1.14|1.26|0.56|0.57|

_Note_ : MAPE refers to mean absolute percentage error; local MAPE refers to the mean percentage error based on predictions accuracy of apartments sized between 50 and 60 square meters; local ratio refers to the ratio between observed and predicted values for apartments sized between 50 and 60 square meters.

45
# **1. Introduction**

Increasing tax collection in developing countries is challenging. The core issues encompass a broad spectrum, including inefficient tax systems, high levels of informality, and constrained tax bases, which lead to high levels of tax evasion and avoidance. In this paper, we present an evaluation of a tax enforcement program conducted in the City of Gorontalo, Indonesia, where the tax authorities sent officers to visit properties and engage directly with owners about their property tax obligations. By conducting visits to discuss tax liabilities and explaining the payment process, the program aimed to enhance tax compliance and augment revenue.

We had access to an administrative dataset encompassing all properties in the City of Gorontalo from 2014 until 2022. The data includes property characteristics, historical compliance, and some information on the ownership. This allowed us to use machine learning techniques to assess the program’s effectiveness and investigate heterogeneous effects. The techniques used allow us to assess the program’s effectiveness by contrasting the outcomes of visited households with comparable households that were not visited.

We are mainly interested in the program’s capacity to induce compliance in the absence of immediate penalties. More explicitly, our goals are to answer the following questions: (1) Are visited houses more likely to pay property taxes? (2) Does this effect persist over time? (3) What are the characteristics associated with higher/lower responsiveness to the visits?

We find a notable positive impact of the visits on tax compliance, underscoring the potential of direct engagement strategies in improving tax collection efforts. Specifically, these interventions increased the tax compliance on the extensive margin by 3.5% and on the intensive margin by 3.4%. Considering the baseline results for the visited properties, the program was responsible for a relative increase in the extensive margin of 4.3% and on the intensive margin of 5.1%.

Visited properties differ considerably from their counterparts, among many factors, they displayed much better historical tax compliance. The methods we use control for the unbalanced 2
it = uit(MCir) Bi it it fest <mark>= ait 6,[pf ee — Spit-1| + Biz [est + Big itt</mark> ere

~~(¢~~ a = In(u; - 1)) 6=1

-1<6,<0

i,2 1 ~~——-~~ = 1.19 ~~(=|~~ )

<!-- Start of picture text --> ee ee<br>it-1<br>a a<br>i<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> Fig 2: Morocco: simple average MFN tariffs<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>65.0<br>30<br>20<br>31.7 30.9 30.6 30.1<br>21.7<br>10<br>0 1993 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003<br><!-- End of picture text --> Hence a reduction in MFN rates would serve to reduce the extent of trade diversion that could take place from preferential liberalization, as well as allowing for more competition in both countries.

5
# 1. **Introduction**

This paper lays down the analytical framework that was used in designing a series of surveys of the views of public officials concerning their institutional environment and in analyzing the information that was generated in 15 countries. It describes how the survey results help to challenge preconceptions, map the strengths and weaknesses of a public sector, and identify potential pay-offs from reforrn interventions.

The need for an analytical framework emerged from the lessons of past experience in the World Bank. The Operations Evaluation Department reported that during 1980-97, only one-third of the Bank's closed civil service reforrn interventions had successful outcomes.' Other reviews of the Bank's public sector reform efforts have identified shortcomings of the Bank's approach in this area, pointing out the risks of a narrow and 'technocratic' view of what is needed for public sector reform, and of a reliance on 'best practice' models that have not been feasible in the particular country setting.<sup>2</sup> The Bank's most recent strategy for reforning public institutions has identified that for the approach to be effective: "... _we need to work with our partners to understand and address the broad range of incentives and pressures - both inside and outside of government - that affect public sector performance."'_<sup>_3_</sup> The strategy paper also points out that for the analytic work to be useful: _"We need to start with a thorough understanding of what exists on the ground and emphasize goodfit rather than any one-size-fits-all notion of best practice. And we need to work with our clients and other partners to develop and apply analytic tools effectively. "_ The framework laid out in this paper addresses both these needs. Public officials are not inherently rapacious rent-seekers; they respond to the incentive structure they face. There is ample evidence, both theoretical and empirical, to suggest that the performance of public officials is greatly determined by the institutional environment that they find themselves in. The framework recognizes that incentive systems are different in different countries - and vary across types of organizations and types of officials in the same country. Recognizing this, it offers a method for designing surveys that uncover the sanctions and rewards that drive behavior from those who may be subjected to them - the public officials themselves.

Surveys were designed to cover several areas. They elicit a contextual description of the public sector, including characteristics of respondents, their reasons for joining the public sector and the length of time worked in government. Second, they offer the possibility of I World Bank (1999).

2 World Bank (2000). http://www-wbweb.worldbank.orgfprem/prmps/ 3 Ibid, p.4-5.

1
# **5 Which Factors within Transmission Channels Support FDI Spillovers?**

## **5.1 Supplier Premia by Factors within Transmission Channel**

In this section, we evaluate whether suppliers that benefited from any demand or assistance effects are characterized by higher FDI linkages and spillovers than suppliers that don’t. Table 12 shows the supplier premia by transmission channel (see Appendix 5 for summary statistics). Focusing on FDI linkages first, firms that received assistance from the foreign customer to make improvements ( _assist_ ) supply a significantly higher share of their output to foreign clients than firms that don’t ( _outp_ column).

**Table 12: Supplier Premia by Factors within Transmission Channel**

|||**Meas**|**ure:**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Variable**|**Definitions**|**_outp_**|**_exp_start_**|
|_audit_|Dummy taking the value of 1 if supplier received technical audits|-0.6666|0.8551**|
||before or after signing a contract with the foreign customer, and 0<br>otherwise|(0.909)|(0.049)|
|_impr_|Dummy taking the value of 1 if the foreign customer required|1.9031|0.3366|
||the supplier to make improvements before or after signing the<br>contract, and 0 otherwise|(0.796)|(0.468)|
|_assist_|Dummy taking the value of 1 if supplier received assistance from|16.5684**|1.3256***|
||the foreign customer to meet any requirements before or after<br>signing the contract, and 0 otherwise.|(0.013)|(0.008)|
|_dev_|Dummy taking the value of 1 if supplier developed product jointly|10.7522|1.2506***|
||with the foreign customer, and 0 otherwise.|(0.129)|(0.006)|
|_license_|Dummy taking the value of 1 if supplier licensed technology|5.1151|1.2387**|
||from the foreign customer, and 0 otherwise.|(0.498)|(0.014)|

Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 (p-values in parentheses). Note: All regressions control for country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Besides FDI linkages, we also include _exp_start_ as our FDI spillover measure, which is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm started exporting as a consequence of supplying to a foreign customer, and 0 otherwise. The results confirm that several transmission channels matter for backward FDI spillovers. Suppliers receiving technical audits before or after signing the contract ( _audit_ ), suppliers receiving assistance from their foreign clients ( _assist_ ), suppliers with joint product development with their customers ( _dev_ ), and suppliers licensing technology from their foreign client ( _license_ ) are more likely to export as a result of their supplier-relationship ( _exp_start_ column). In sum, we find evidence of the existence of positive assistance effects (including technical 26
Policy Research Working Paper 8436

# **Abstract**

This paper presents a simple model with financial frictions where inflation increases the cost faced by firms holding liquid assets to hedge risky production against expenditure shocks. Inflation tilts firms’ technology choice away from innovative activities and toward safer but return-dominated ones, and therefore reduces long-run growth. The theory makes specific predictions about how the severity of this adverse effect depends on industry characteristics. These predictions are tested with novel harmonized firm-level data from 139 developing countries, overcoming small sample problems constraining previous work. The analysis finds that inflation affects the composition but not the overall quantity of investment. A one percentage point increase in inflation reduces the establishment-level probability of innovation by 4.3 percent but does not affect total investment. Moreover, innovating firms display a stronger dependence on liquid assets, which, in turn, are negatively related to inflation. Generalized difference-in-differences estimations corroborate the sector-specific predictions of the theoretical model.

This paper is a product of the Transport and Digital Development Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at mschiffbauer@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
that trade facilitation reforms could improve the export performance of developing countries at the extensive and intensive margin, especially investment in physical infrastructure and regulatory reform to improve the business environment. We also find evidence that the marginal effect of infrastructure improvement on exports seems to be decreasing in per capita income, whereas the impact of ICT on exports seems to be increasingly important for richer countries.

Drawing on the gravity estimates, we provide an illustrative assessment of enhanced trade facilitation for each developing country by computing the growth in exports and advalorem equivalent of improving each indicator halfway to the level of the top performer in the region. For instance, improving the quality of physical infrastructure so that Egypt’s indicator increases half-way to the level of Tunisia would increase exports by 10.8 percent. This is equivalent to a 7.4 percent cut in tariffs faced by Egyptian exporters across importing markets. Finally, we compare these illustrative exports growth and ad-valorem equivalents figures across countries.

From a policy standpoint, the findings of this paper are intended to contribute to a diagnostic assessment of the constraints on export facilitation along the “hard” and “soft dimensions, thereby contributing to the understanding of the potential gains in investment and reforms along different areas to improve export performance.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous empirical literature. Section 3 describes the primary measures used as inputs in our synthetic indicators, as well as the factor analysis to construct them. Section 4 addresses the augmented gravity model estimates and econometric strategy. In Section 5, we provide illustrative counterfactual estimates in terms of export growth and the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of improving the indicators for developing countries halfway to the level of the top performer in their region. Section 6 briefly concludes.

# **2. Trade Facilitation: Definition and Overview of Previous Work**

This section briefly discusses the definition of trade facilitation and surveys selected work on the impact of trade facilitation on trade. As trade facilitation has several dimensions, 5
40 ISRAEL Table 4. Durables and Non-Durables Consumption

||1980|1981|1982|1983|1984|1985|1986|1987|1988|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|An|nual In|crease i|n Percent|age term|s (at co|nstant p|rices)|||
|1. Durables Purchases|-8.4|37.6|17.9|8.1|-32.0|<br>-1.4|47.1|12.6|2.3|
|2. Non-Durable Consumption|<br>-2.0|7.8|5.9|6.2|-2.6|<br>-0.3|10.2|7.6|3.7|
|3. Real Disposable Income|1.7|14.2|-2.6|2.8|8.7|-10.7|3.4|7.1|5.4|
|||Annual|Increase|in Price|s (Perc|ent)||||
|1. Durables Purchases|89.3|98.1|102.1|135.5|409.2|297.6|41.1|18.9|9.4|
|2. Non-Durable Consumption|133.7|121.8|117.8|146.6|381.4|294.0|47.8|20.2|16.0|

Source: Bank of Israel Annual Reports