rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
(1999) and Frank and Hummer (2002) choose to treat migration and remittances as exogenous, and as a consequence, it is likely that their estimated effects of migration are contaminated by selection bias. This paper uses a broad representative survey on both health measures studied by these authors, and explicitly deals with the endogeneity of migration. In addition we also consider the impact of migration on preventative health care. Previous research has found an important role for migration networks in providing information about the border crossing process (Espinosa and Massey, 1997) and about labor market opportunities in the U.S. (Munshi, 2003). Our paper provides a first investigation of the channels through which migration affects child health, and shows that the migration process can also result in improved health knowledge.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the ENADID data to be used in this study; Section 3 outlines the possible selection effects arising from migration and the instrumental variables method to be used; Section 4 estimates the impact of migration on fertility; Section 5 provides the main results of the effects of migration on infant mortality, birthweights, and preventative care; Section 6 investigates the channels through which migration impacts health outcomes and Section 7 concludes. An appendix provides further details on the construction of our measure of health knowledge.

# **2. Data**

This paper uses data from the 1997 Encuesta Nacional de Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID) (National Survey of Demographic Dynamics) conducted by Mexico’s national statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) in the last quarter of 1997.<sup>6</sup> The ENADID is a nationally representative demographic survey providing information about fertility and contraceptive practices, mortality, and migration. As will be detailed below, our analysis uses existing migration networks within each community in order to control for the non-random selection of migrants. The theoretical foundations of our work apply most directly to migration networks in rural communities, so we restrict our analysis to households in municipalities with populations of less than 100,000. All women aged 15 to 54 in each household are asked detailed questions about their fertility history. This gives us an initial

> 6 A less comprehensive version of this survey was also undertaken in 1992. We restrict ourselves to the 1997 wave since the 1992 wave contains less information on the child health measures used in this paper. Survey methodology and questionnaires are contained in INEGI (1999).

- 4 -
# Colombia

The Colombian data base spans 1977-1987<sup>but, as with Chile, it is</sup> instructive to begin with a review of years<sup>preceditng. In 1967, the Colombian</sup> government began to abandon its<sup>traditional inward-looking</sup> development strategy in favor of export promotion<sup>policies, a modest degree of trade</sup> liberalization, and greater exchange rate flexibility.<sup>Exports were</sup> encouraged with duty drawback schemes,<sup>tax incentives,</sup> and special credit facilities. Imports were liberalized by scaling back prior licensing requirements, eliminating prohibited lists, anu reducing<sup>average nominal</sup> tariff rates.<sup>11</sup> During this period of export promotion<sup>and trade liberalization</sup> there was growth in the aggregate economy as<sup>well as in the volume of imports and</sup> exports. Real GDP grew at an annual<sup>average rate of 6.3 percent over the</sup> 1967-75 period, and the manufacturing<sup>sector grew at an annual rate of 8.8</sup> percent. But beginning in late 1975,<sup>significant</sup> changes in Colombia's macroeconomic environmenc began to influence<sup>trade policy and the real</sup> exchange rate. Specifically, substantial increases in world coffee<sup>prices and</sup> increased foreign borrowing contributed<sup>to large foreign exchange inflows</sup> which resulted in increased inflation.<sup>Substantial real appreciation</sup> resulted, which tended to hurt tradeable<sup>goods producers in the industrial</sup> sector. Accordingly, between 1976 and the early 1980s,<sup>efforts to liberalize</sup> the trade regime proceeded at a<sup>slower pace.</sup> The trend toward liberalization stalled completely in the early 1980s. In 1980, approximately 69 percent<sup>of all commodities did not require import</sup> licenses. But in 1981 only 36 percent<sup>of all commodities</sup> were classified in the free import category, and this percentage<sup>fell continuously through 1984.</sup>
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23
# **7.3 Evidence on alternative mechanisms**

Although we cannot perform a direct test to rule out the possibility of a rebound, a number of analyses are inconsistent with a direct or indirect rebound in electricity consumption. For instance, in Figure 3 we provided an event-study graph of the impacts on electricity consumption by season. We found that following a winter spike, savings in electricity consumption returned to the expected amount in the spring.<sup>63</sup> If there were a rebound, a persistent change in behavior would be expected, and a reversal in the spring would have been unlikely. Furthermore, using our detailed baseline and follow-up survey data, we can test for impacts of treatment on appliance ownership and average monthly and daily use (results not shown).<sup>64</sup> We found no effects of treatment on lightbulb use (which would be the measure of a direct rebound) and only one significant effect of treatment on use of any household appliances (which would be a measure of an indirect rebound). In fact, treatment households were significantly less likely to report using electric heaters at follow-up. If anything, this finding is evidence counter to a rebound

# **7.4 External validity**

We implemented a randomized saturation design to study the impact of energy efficient lightbulbs on household electricity consumption and local electricity reliability in a lowermiddle-income developing country. A policy-relevant question that guides our thinking about external validity is to what extent our results are location-specific or technology-specific.

A feature of this study’s setting, the Kyrgyz Republic, is that essentially all households are electrified, formally connected to the network and metered individually. We believe that research in this context does not harm the external validity of our study, rather it just helps with the internal validity. It has the additional benefit of ensuring that we are not just studying the responses of the richest households. The Kyrgyz Republic also has an extensive electricity generation and distribution infrastructure. However, similar to other developing countries, the Kyrgyz Republic has a problem of insufficient infrastructure capacity relative

> 63This is also supported by the regression results by season in Appendix Table 4.

> 64In both survey rounds we ask a number questions regarding the household use of appliances, including (1) “On average, how many days per month do you use [the appliance]?” (2) “On average, how many hours per day does your HH use [the appliance]?” Important to note, these specific survey questions are asking about average use in the a month and in a day. In contrast, our survey question on outages asks about “the past month.” For this reason, that we find no impacts on the use of lightbulbs is not inconsistent with our aggregate reliability results.

26
-93-

TABLE 8.1 Confrontation of Our PPPs for Manufacturing with the Exchange Rate and with the PPPs of ICP for 1975

||Brazil/USA<br>(Cr./US$)|Mexico/USA<br>(Ps./US$)|Mexico/Brazil<br>(Ps./Cr.)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Our PPPs for Manufacturing<br>(weighted<br>by major branch)|7.42|12.77|1.62|
|ICP (Augmented Binary) PPPs for GDP|5.40|7.17|1.48|
|Exchange Rate|8.13|12.50|1.54|
|Our Exchange Rate Deviation Index<br>for Manufacturing|0.91|1.02|1.05|
|ICP Exchange Rate Deviation Index<br>for GDP (Augmented Binaries)|0.66|0.57|0.96|

Source: Our PPPs for Brazil/USA and Mexico/USA from table 3.17 and for Mexico/Brazil from table 4.10; ICP augmented binaries from Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982), pp. 225, 272 and 313. In fact the preferred ICP PPPs are multilaterally weighted, but we have shown their augmented binaries here because they are conceptually closer to ours. The multilaterally weighted PPPs of ICP were not very different, i.e. 5.20, 7.40 and 1.43 respectively for 1975 (see Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982, p.177); Exchange rates from IMF; The exchange rate deviation index is the ratio of the PPP to the exchange rate.

TABLE 8.2

|Confrontation<br>of Our PPPs for Manufa<br>from the**ICP 1 5**Au|cturing<br>with<br>gmented Binary|the Proxy P<br>Results|PPs Derived|
|---|---|---|---|
||Brazil/USA<br>(Cr./US$)|Mexico/USA<br>(Ps./US$)|Mexico/Brazil<br> <br>(Ps./Cr.)|
|Our PPPs for Manufacturing<br>(weighted by major branch)|7.42|12.77|1.62|
|Proxy PPPs for Manufact-.ring<br>Derived<br>from ICP Augmented Binaries|7.42|10.66|1.56|
|Ratio of Our PPP/Proxy ICP PPP|1.00|1.20|1.04|

Source: Top line from table 8.1; Second line derived from Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982), pp. 255, 272 and 313 as follows: the ICP III augmented binary PPPs for expenditure on the consumer items food, beverages, tobacco, clothing, footwear, furniture, appliances and transport equipment, and for producer durables were used to make the weighted average. These are the ICP PPPs which are conceptually closest to our type of comparison. The preferred PPPs of the ICP itself are in "international dollars".
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# **5. Empirical Methods**

Forest and plot-level analyses are conducted. At the forest level we estimate OLS regression models with dependent variables in logs and robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity. CFs are a form of local collective action that has been formalized by government, but CF communities are in no sense chosen and are rarely encouraged by the state. We therefore do not see CF designation as subject to endogeneity, but any tendency of CFs to be formed to take advantage of valuable forests should be captured by our 1990 NDVI variable. We complement our carbon and tree forest quality measures with percent canopy cover and regeneration, which are quality measures with few incentives to assert property rights.

We also note that simply being able to identify a forest user group formation year is a measure of collective action that is particularly immune to selection and endogeneity bias. Establishing a CF requires paperwork, time and negotiation outside the community that is generally costly; communities therefore have skin in the game when they apply for CF status. For example, using a survey of 309 households belonging to eight different forest user groups in the middle hills of Nepal, Adhikari and Lovett (2006) find that transaction costs for CF management as a percentage of resource appropriation costs are as high as 26%. The same is not true for NCFs engaging in collective action. Self-organizing to the level that community leaders can identify a user group start year is much less costly than forming an official CF. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that some NCFs are highly organized, but perhaps to avoid transaction costs choose to remain under the radar.

Viewing forest collective action in Nepal as exogenous to current forest quality seems particularly appropriate in areas where communities are stable and have traditionally controlled forests using customary methods. Indeed, having a core of households that were able to

**20 |** P a g e
transaction. Guatemala some months later tapped the market with the help of a new leading (non-U.S.) underwriter.<sup>12</sup> In terms of the implicit “cannot” list, plumbing attributes such as the safekeeping of assets and the registration of ownership can effectively bar a country. This impact is mainly felt for local currency investments. While the main international custodian banks over time have opened the vast majority of markets to international investments, there are still countries where international custodial services are not available. This may be because no interest has been shown from investors for the custodians to seek to open the countries, but, in a few cases, has to do with deficiencies in the plumbing. The minimum requirements set by the custodian banks before a country is considered investable from the custodians point of view are very basic. In general red flags are raised if a country does not legally recognize the concept of a sub-custodian; if the sub-custodian cannot represent the owner’s interest (absence of a legally recognized nominee concept allowing a third party to act on behalf of the final owner when it comes to e.g., corporate actions and proxy voting); if there is uncertainty about the finality of registration of ownership; if a process for control of assets is lacking; and/or if there is a lack of separation between client and proprietary assets at the level of the sub-custodian or broker.

Another segment of the “cannot” invest countries are defined through discretionary decisions made by the endinvestors. Much media attention has been given recently to the growing importance of “socially responsible” investing, for example. Advocates suggest that certain countries be blacklisted due to negligence in enforcing human rights, labor laws, etc., see Box 3: below. However, our investor sample only included one very small fund with specific criteria defining a set of non-investable countries according to their compliance with a set of “social” criteria. These “social” criteria may include social, environmental and ethical issues, encompassing topics such as human rights, labor laws, labor rights, corruption, and rule of law in general. These factors are all subjective in nature, but do form a part of whether a country is included on the investable list. The factors appear prominently both in the models and in forming the subjective opinions of the investors when at the margin they consider whether to invest in a country.

As mentioned above in section 3.2, lack of data, or problems with data quality, length of history and timely release, may also put countries on a non-investable list.<sup>13</sup> Many investors prefer data from independent sources, but this is not normally required. It should be noted, however, that some of the investors we interviewed actually preferred opaque environments; these were typically small (hedge) funds spending a lot of time investigating nascent markets, seeking out information from direct contact with counterparts in the countries under investigation.

> 12 Bloomberg, July 29.

> 13 Gelos and Wei (2003)

15
Table D.4 (continued): Program impacts on self-control skills, 12–13 month survey only

||||||ITT regres|sion (N=94|7)||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Control|Thera|py only|Cas|h only||Both|
|Outcome||mean|ITT|Std. Err.|ITT|Std. Err.|ITT|Std. Err.|
|||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
||If your best friend has some counterfeit<br>money that need to be washed with<br>mercury, will you join him in the search<br>of the mercury to get lots of money?<br>Is it wrong for someone in your<br>community to make money by entering<br>someone’s house at night and taking their<br>valuable things?|0.168<br>0.137|0.009<br>-0.070|[.042]<br>[.038]*|-0.002<br>-0.087|[.045]<br>[.035]**|-0.052<br>-0.042|[.042]<br>[.041]|
||After being down on luck, a man fnds a<br>wallet in a taxi cab with lots of money<br>and the driver’s license. Should he take<br>the money for himself before giving the<br>wallet to the police or a radio station?|0.365|-0.063|[.054]|-0.021|[.058]|-0.098|[.057]*|
||Your family has no money to pay rent<br>and will soon be homeless. You see $100<br>USD fall from a man’s back pocket. Is it<br>ok to take it and not tell him?|0.310|-0.022|[.053]|-0.019|[.053]|-0.048|[.054]|
||Is it okay for a man to hook up his house<br>to an electritity cable from his family<br>member to take free electricity behind his<br>back, even though his family member will<br>have to pay for it?|0.157|-0.026|[.044]|0.024|[.043]|-0.054|[.045]|
||A man’s wife was in labour pain but he<br>had no money. He came across a market<br>woman’s wallet flled with all her day’s<br>earnings. Is it okay for him to take the|0.360|-0.009|[.055]|-0.058|[.054]|-0.113|[.055]**|
||bag?||||||||
||If a man’s $100 USD bill is hanging out of<br>his back pocket and you have a clear<br>change to jerk it with no one catching<br>you, will you feel bad if you take it, even<br>if you don’t need it?|0.198|0.004|[.044]|0.001|[.044]|-0.067|[.043]|
||If a stranger left his room door open with<br>all his valuables in there and no one is<br>around, is it okay to correct his mistake?|0.107|-0.022|[.036]|-0.034|[.034]|-0.056|[.035]|
||Would you feel fne if your hustle was<br>selling diazepan, bubble, 10-10, or any<br>other drugs llike this?|0.137|-0.025|[.038]|-0.017|[.040]|-0.046|[.039]|
||If a friend left his room door open with<br>his money inside and no one is around, is|0.091|-0.042|[.031]|-0.030|[.031]|-0.070|[.030]**|
||it okay to take his money?||||||||
||If you are working in a business, and you<br>have access to your boss’s money, would<br>you feel fne taking that money for<br>yourself, if you plan to return it later?|0.244<br>xxx|0.026|[.049]|0.005|[.051]|-0.046|[.051]|

Continued on following page.
# **Conserving Wildlife through Demand Reduction and Supply Alternatives: Two Experiments in Restaurants in Kinshasa**

Abdoulaye Cisse,<sup>*</sup> Gabriel Englander,<sup>†</sup> Daniel J. Ingram<sup>‡</sup> Keywords: biodiversity conservation, wild meat consumption, Central Africa, randomized control trials JEL Classification: Q57, O13, Q21, Q56, D12, C93

> *Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley; California, USA

> †Development Research Group, The World Bank; Washington, USA. Correspondence: aenglander@worldbank.org

> ‡Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, University of Kent; Canterbury, CT2 7NR, UK