|**Appendi**|**x Table 5. Cost a**<br>|**nd Return o**<br>**Sav**<br>|**f Financial P**<br>**ings**<br>|**roducts Offere**<br>|**d with Alterna**<br>|**tive Matchin**<br>**Cr**<br>|<br>**g**<br>**edit**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Total|Yield|Difference i|n Total Yield|<br>Tota|<br>l Cost|Difference<br>|in Total Cost<br>|
||||||On-time|One late|On-time|One late|
||No Usage|Usage|No Usage|Usage|repayment|payment|repayment|payment|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)<br>|(6)<br>|(7)<br>|(8)<br>|
|**_Panel A: Unmatched offered prod_**|**_ucts matched to_**|**_cheapest pro_**|**_duct offered b_**|**_y institution_**|||||
|HL * HI|-0.000|0.001|-0.000|0.001|-0.069*|-0.077|-0.019|-0.041|
|HL * LI|(0.014)<br>0008|(0.012)<br>0015|(0.002)<br>0001|(0.004)<br>0004|(0.037)<br>0025|(0.060)<br>0042|(0.018)<br>0017|(0.027)<br>0057|
||.<br>(0.015)|.<br>(0.014)|.<br>(0.002)|.<br>(0.004)|.<br>(0.048)|.<br>(0.080)|.<br>(0.019)|.<br>(0.048)|
|Inestment|0057***|0065***|0005**|0010***|||||
|v|.<br>(0.011)|.<br>(0.010)|.<br>(0.002)|.<br>(0.004)|||||
|High indebtedness|||||-0.036|-0.084|0.013|-0.010|
||||||(0.031)|(0.051)|(0.014)|(0.030)|
|Formal dress|0.005|0.004|0.001|-0.000|0.009|0.025|0.018|0.032|
||(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.055)|(0.077)|(0.021)|(0.037)|
|R-squared|<br>0.448|0.444|0.057|0.143|0.139|0.087|0.113|0.060|
|**Observations**|349|349|349|349|377|377|377|377|
|Peru|121|121|121|121|150|150|150|150|
|Mexico|98|98|98|98|83|83|83|83|
|Ghana|130|130|130|130|144|144|144|144|
|**Means for control auditors**|||||||||
|Dep. Variable|<br>0.050|-0.098|-0.010|-0.019|0.768|0.949|0.087|0.127|
|Peru|0.012|-0.030|-0.000|-0.002|0.663|0.803|0.161|0.195|
|Mexico|-0.008|-0.036|-0.022|-0.046|1.073|1.188|0.062|0.085|
|Ghana|0.102|-0.163|-0.007|-0.010|0.628|0.931|0.003|0.069|
|**P-value of test**|||||||||
|_HL * HI = HL * LI_|0.660|0.432|0.481|0.387|0.112|0.222|0.102|0.040|
|_HL = 0_|0.863|0.568|0.753|0.555|0.152|0.370|0.256|0.071|
|**_Panel B: Unmatched offered prod_**<br>|**_ucts matched to_**<br>|**_most expensi_**<br>|**_ve product of_**<br>|**_fered by institu_**<br>|**_tion_**<br>||||
|HL * HI|-0.001<br>(0017)|-0.002<br>(0015)|-0.001<br>(0009)|-0.002<br>(0009)|-0.054<br>(0044)|-0.045<br>(0065)|-0.004<br>(0023)|-0.008<br>(0035)|
|HL * LI|.<br>0.007|.<br>0.009|.<br>-0.000|.<br>-0.001|.<br>0.011|.<br>0.047|.<br>0.003|.<br>0.062|
||(0.019)|(0.017)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.049)|(0.078)|(0.018)|(0.047)|
|Investment|0.079***|0.088***|0.028***|0.034***|||||
||(0.014)|(0.012)|(0.007)|(0.007)|||||
|High indebtedness|||||-0.051|-0.115**|-0.002|-0.042|
||||||(0.036)|(0.055)|(0.018)|(0.033)|
|Formal dress|0.003|0.005|-0.000|0.001|0.005|0.042|0.014|0.050|
||(0.012)|(0.011)|(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.057)|(0.075)|(0.023)|(0.039)|
|R-squared|<br>0.306|0.397|0.083|0.107|0.151|0.093|0.098|0.044|
|**Observations**|349|349|349|349|377|377|377|377|
|Peru|121|121|121|121|150|150|150|150|
|Mexico|98|98|98|98|83|83|83|83|
|Ghana|130|130|130|130|144|144|144|144|
|**Means for control auditors**|||||||||
|<br>Dep. Variable|<br>0.025|-0.123|-0.036|-0.044|0.798|0.979|0.117|0.158|
|<br>Peru|<br>0.010|-0.041|-0.003|-0.013|0.663|0.803|0.161|0.195|
|Mexico|-0.042|-0.060|-0.056|-0.070|1.178|1.293|0.166|0.189|
|Ghana|0.071|-0.195|-0.038|-0.042|0.631|0.934|0.005|0.073|
|**P-value of test**|||||||||
|_HL * HI = HL * LI_|0.676|0.479|0.939|0.965|0.305|0.324|0.773|0.160|
|_HL = 0_<br>This table reports the results in T<br>database, are matched to either the<br>regression is an auditor-branch pai<br>gender, dummies for visits to com<br>had preference for a transaction a<br>Standard errors are clustered at the<br>*** p<0.01.|0.907<br>able 6 using all <br>cheapest product<br>r, each pair durin<br>mercial institution<br>ccount for saving<br>auditor level and|0.761<br>products offe<br>offered by th<br>g credit audi<br>s and provinc<br>s audits or a<br>are reported|0.991<br>red. Products <br>e institution (<br>ts could have<br>ial areas. Con<br> loan size of <br>in parenthesis|0.986<br> offered to aud<br>Panel A) or the<br> multiple visits. <br>trol auditors we<br> 20 percent of h<br>under coefficie|0.448<br>itors that could<br>most expensive<br> All regression<br>re assigned the<br>ousehold inco<br>nt estimates. L|0.603<br> not be matc<br>product (Pan<br>s include cou<br>script without<br>me (low inde<br>evels of signi|0.958<br>hed in the pr<br>el B). An obse<br>ntry fixed eff<br>experience (<br>btedness) for <br>ficance * p<0|0.340<br>oduct market<br>rvation in the<br>ects, auditor's<br>neophyte) and<br> credit audits.<br>.10 ** p<0.05|