rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Bibliography**

The word “processed” describes informally reproduced works that may not be commonly available through library systems.

- Banister, J., and E. Paige Johnson. 1993. “After the nightmare: the population of Cambodia.” In B. Kiernan, ed., _Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community_ . Monograph Series 41. New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.

- Brück, Tilman. 2000. “The Economics of Civil War in Mozambique.” In J. Brauer and K. Hartley, eds., _The Economics of Regional Security: NATO, the Mediterranean and Southern Africa._ Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam.

- Brück, Tilman. 2001. “Mozambique: the Economic Effects of the War.” In F. Stewart and E.V.K. Fitzgerald, eds., _War and Underdevelopment_ . Vol. 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Chandler, D. 1996. _A History of Cambodia,_ 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., updated. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.

- Collier, Paul. 1998. “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” _Oxford Economic Papers_ 50(4):563-73.

- Collier, Paul. 1999. “On Economic Consequences of Civil War.” _Oxford Economic Papers_ 51: 168-83.

- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2001. “Greed and Grievance in Civil wars.” Working Paper Series 2002-01. Center for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, U.K.

- Collier, Paul, Lani Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. _Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy_ . World Bank and Oxford University Press.

- Desbarats, Jacqueline. 1995. _Prolific Survivors. Population Change in Cambodia 19751993_ . Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University.

- EA Meng-Try. 1981. “Kampuchea: A Country Adrift.”, _Population and Development Review_ 7 (2): 209-28.

- Giles John, Albert Park, and Juwei Zhang. 2004. “ The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Disruptions to Education, and Returns to Schooling in Urban China.”. Processed.

- Heuveline, Patrick. 1998 (a). “ ‘Between one and three million’ : Towards the demographic reconstruction of a decade of Cambodian history (1970-79).” _Population Studies_ 52: 49-65.

- Heuveline, Patrick. 1998 (b). “L’insoutenable incertitude du nombre : estimation des décès de la période Khmer rouge.” _Population_ 53(6) : 1103-17.

17
||purchaser shall pay 100% of face value for each<br>stamp, label, or other indicia at the time of the<br>purchase.||
|---|---|---|
|**Vietnam**|**Transfer Taxes**<br>Vietnamese law provides that it is mandatory to<br>register the ownership of certain types of property.<br>Registry fees, known in Vietnamese as "le phi truoc<br>ba," are imposed on the purchaser of such property<br>when it registers the ownership of the property. This<br>fee is applicable only to transfers in ownership of<br>certain types of property, including buildings and<br>houses, vehicles, vessels, and guns.<br>Registry fees equal to 2% of the property value must<br>be paid on land, buildings, and vessels. The rate is<br>4% on vehicles and guns. However, in no case will<br>the registry fees for one asset exceed VND 500<br>million, which is approximately equal to US $35,714.<br>1)|1)http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/r<br>eadingsintaxpolicy.nsf/0/1D537D4C2<br>06E166685256B820080661F?Open<br>Document|
|**Yemen**|Revenue stamp is levied on the following documents<br>and deeds in the following manner:<br>a. Contracts as of the time they are signed<br>b. Registers as of the time of their being utilized<br>c. Correspondence and papers as of the time of<br>their being utilized<br>d. Proceedings and transactions immediately upon<br>being realized<br>The revenue stamp tax is of two types:<br>a. A proportional revenue stamp tax.<br>b. A qualitative revenue stamp tax.<br>The price of the qualitative revenue stamp ranges<br>between YR 2 and 50 for certificates, extract copies,<br>applications, contracts, commercial shipping<br>documents, minutes of the meetings of the Boards<br>of companies and internal transactions of banks with<br>their clients. The price of the proportional revenue<br>stamp tax ranges between 0.1% and 5% on<br>insurance, banking and commercial documents,<br>amounts disbursed by the government and the<br>corporations, advertisements and notices. A<br>qualitative revenue stamp tax is levied on each<br>company upon its founding ranging between<br>YR1,000 and YR3,000. A qualitative revenue stamp<br>is levied at the rate of YR 3-500 on transport and<br>mail services, permits, licenses, subscription to<br>telephones, weight certificates, entry in registers and<br>auditors' reports.|http://www.bisnetworld.net/bisnet/co<br>untries/yemen11.htm|

65
<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.35<br>= 03 ARG*<br>=]<br>02<br>=<br>§ 02<br>=<br>5£ 0.15<br>g o1<br>es BRA<br>z3oE 0.055 UR OL ° PER BOL<br>oy3s 0.05 i2 14 16 18 oO CHL[2 22 24 e 26<br>as E<br>Average Real Savings Rate, 2005-15<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> ty)<br>0.02 0025 0.03 0085 0.08 0045 0.05 0055 0.06 0065 0.07<br>0.05<br>“0.1 Sea<br>PErR<br>2- 25 s Guma<br>= 02 c oe<br>2 me,<br>82S 0.25 — * ~, U<br>% 03 aon<br>a BRA”<br>0.35 i<br>0.4 wee Mare a<br>weeS ARG<br>“os «<br>Boom Appreciation<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 30<br>28<br>26<br>24<br>22<br>20<br>8<br>16<br>va<br>12<br>FPL> oO IFSy Sh LE> ILI2 LES© Sb FPS& D ndPPIob 0 SSPAO 9 SO NV PFOD OD<br>SA BCE SA DCE<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 28<br>s2wmp 26//ECUba, ePER<br>N<br>~ es<br>ecs BOL> ai<br>a eS<br>=<br>22a 18 BRA<br>o 16 COL<br>o URY<br>cry 14<br>zea> 12<br>40<br>-0.05 0 0.05 O41 0.15<br>Log(1+ Inflation Rate 2016)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Table S5.** Stability of Estimates

||(1)|(2)|
|---|---|---|
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)|2.342<sup>_∗∗_</sup>||
||[1.021]||
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)<br>��<br>_Iexp_=0||1.129<br>[1.538]|
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)<br>��<br>_Iexp_=1||2.839<sup>_∗_</sup>|
|||[1.499]|
|All Controls|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|1340|1340|

_Source_ : Author’s analysis based on AWI data (for field wages) and program expenditure data for SGRY and NREGA from 2001 to 2010. Program expenditure data is from the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. _Note_ : All estimates are of the order 10<sup>_−_2</sup> . Column 1 shows the wage elasticity as reported in column 4 of table 1. Column 2 reports separate elasticities for the sample of districts below and above the median value of average annual expenditure in a district. All other controls are the same as in table 1 in the main article. All regressions are weighted by district-level population. The standard errors reported in square brackets are clustered at the district-level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. SGRY: Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana. NREGA: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

_∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 10 _, p <_ 0 _._ 05 _, p <_ 0 _._ 01

**Table S6.** Effect on Field Wages for Men and Women

|Dependent variable:|_log_(_Mal_|_e Wages_)|_log_(_Fema_|_le Wages_)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)|1.861<sup>_∗_</sup>||2.500<sup>_∗∗_</sup>||
||[0.968]||[1.159]||
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)<br>��<br>_NREGAd,t_=0||5.733<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>||5.480<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
|||[2.152]||[2.144]|
|_sinh_<sup>_−_1</sup>(_ed,t_)<br>��<br>_NREGAd,t_=1||1.427||2.166<sup>_∗_</sup>|
|||[1.044]||[1.219]|
|All Controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|1340|1340|1340|1340|

_Source_ : Author’s analysis based on AWI data (for field wages) and program expenditure data for SGRY and NREGA from 2001 to 2010. Program expenditure data is from the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. _Note_ : All estimates are of the order 10<sup>_−_2</sup> . All other controls are the same as in table 1 in the main article. All regressions are weighted by district-level population. The standard errors reported in square brackets are clustered at the district level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. SGRY: Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana. NREGA: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. _∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 10 _, p <_ 0 _._ 05 _, p <_ 0 _._ 01
# **Appendix 6: Effect of participation in the non-farm activities on HHPCE in Malawi, FE estimates**

|VARIABLES|(2)<br>HHPCE|(4)<br>Log HHPCE|
|---|---|---|
||FE|FE|
|Wage employment participation|4.476|0.102**|
||[0.158]|[0.022]|
|Self-employment participation|7.003***<br>|0.129***<br>|
||[0.000]<br>|[0.000]<br>|
|Age of the household head|-0.053|-0.002|
||[0.633]|[0.232]|
|Male-headed household (0/1)|2.895|0.063+|
||[0.269]|[0.101]|
|Highest level of formal education acquired by household head|||
|PSLC|6.198**|0.036|
||[0.048]|[0.401]|
|JCE|15.719***|0.187***|
||[0.005]|[0.005]|
|MSCE|20.869*|0.197**|
||[0.054]|[0.049]|
|Maximum level of formal education acquired in the household|||
|PSLC|-2.228|-0.011|
||[0.350]|[0.765]|
|JCE|-0.755|0.020|
||[0.814]|[0.667]|
|MSCE|-1.458|0.004|
||[0.774]|[0.950]|
|Number of infant (<5yo) in HH|-9.266***|-0.139***|
||[0.000]|[0.000]|
|Number of children (5-14yo) in the household|-8.872***|-0.136***|
||[0.000]|[0.000]|
|Number of prime adults (15-60yo) in HH|-6.768***|-0.094***|
||[0.000]|[0.000]|
|Number of elderly (60yo+) in HH|-7.836***|-0.118***|
||[0.002]|[0.001]|
|Household access to loan (0/1)|1.635|0.034|
||[0.436]|[0.221]|
|Normalized TLU index|<br>140.889**|<br>1.326**|
||[0.045]|[0.032]|
|Normalized agricultural asset index + Normalized land holdings|41.423***|0.689***|
||[0.000]|[0.000]|
|Household was affected negatively by some income Shock During the last 12|1.644|0.027|
|months (0/1)|||
||[0.473]|[0.446]|
|Household has a migrant network (0/1)|-1.124|-0.004|
||[0.585]|[0.906]|
|Rain - EA level CoV of Dec-Jan rainfall from 1983/84 - 2012/13|||
|Average 12-month total rainfall (mm)|0.064|0.001+|

50
11), strong employment generation, low inflation, and declining debt observed in recent years, Colombia has an opportunity to advance further on reducing inequality.

# **3. Taxation**

16. **Colombia’s tax system does not redistribute incomes in any significant way** . As argued in the literature<sup>11</sup> , this may not necessarily be a problem by itself as long as public monetary transfers are sufficiently progressive. In the case of Colombia, there are nonetheless two reasons to be concerned. First, public monetary transfers are not sufficiently progressive, as explored in more detail in Section 4. Second, given the very high level of income inequality by global standards, strengthening the redistributive role of the tax system also seems worthwhile.

## **3.1 Direct Income Taxation**

17. **The system of direct income taxation in Colombia does not exploit its redistributive potential.** Direct taxes hardly have an impact on the Gini coefficient. This is explained by a number of factors: First, direct personal income taxation raise a relatively low amount, implying a low redistributive potential. Second, the system is characterized by a high income threshold, implying that less than 2 percent of adult Colombians actually declare income and pay personal income tax. Third, a range of income tax exemptions, benefitting mainly high-income earners, further undermine the tax base. Finally, independent low-income workers are penalized as they are taxed presumptively at the source, without the right to reimbursements through the filing of annual income declarations. These factors are analyzed in further detail below.

**Table 1. Direct Personal Income Taxation: Incidence Analysis**

|Taxatio<br> <br>|n of income<br>|
|---|---|
|Household per<br>capita income decile<br>Percent of tax<br>revenues|Taxes paid / income<br>(percent)|
|1<br>0.53|1.75|
|2<br>2.33|2.38|
|3<br>3.22|2.15|
|4<br>3.43|1.73|
|5<br>4.22|1.69|
|6<br>4.98|1.60|
|7<br>5.69|1.45|
|8<br>6.78|1.36|
|9<br>8.56|1.27|
|10<br>60.25|3.97|
|Total<br>100.00|2.43|
|<br> <br>Redistributive effects of taxation||
|Gini coefficient before taxes|0.5931|
|Gini coefficient after taxes|0.5902|

Source: Jorratt (2010) using _Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos, 2006-07._ 18. **The impact on the Gini coefficient of direct taxation is very low.** Section 2 presented estimates that direct income taxation reduces the Gini coefficient by 1 percentage points, 11 The IMF (2011b), for instance, argues that a regressive tax may be the only way to finance strongly progressive spending. See also Bird and Zolt (2005), G20 (2011), Heady (1993), and Mirrlees (2010).

7
Graff Zivin and Shrader, 2015). In terms of direct health consequences of thermal stress, it is well established that the very young and the very old will bear an outsized share of the burden.

In general, demographic trends suggest that poorer countries will likely have a lower proportion of elderly individuals in the immediate future, but perhaps have higher densities of children and infants. However, there is significant uncertainty in the timing of climate‐change‐induced heat impacts, which means that it is difficult to assess even to a rough approximation which way the exposure bias may run ex ante. More research is clearly needed on this topic.

# VIII. Conclusion

This paper examines empirically the geographical and occupational exposure of poor and non‐ poor households to heat stress, using data from household surveys and climate measurements at the sub‐national level. We find that poorer households tend to be located in hotter locations across and within countries, and poorer individuals are more likely to work in occupations with greater exposure to the elements not only across but also within countries. This suggests the impacts arising from global warming – at least as they pertain to direct thermal stress of human beings – may be regressive.

However, we also find some evidence to suggest that part of the negative (and regressive) impacts of climate change may be offset by the fact that, in cold parts of the world, poorer populations tend to live in the more marginal (colder) environments, and that these populations may benefit from moderate warming.

There is, of course, a difference between mean‐shifts in the climate distribution and changes in the incidence of extreme heat and cold days, which seem to be more relevant for welfare. These results are also of course limited only to the context of thermal stress of human agents, so abstracts away from damages to crops, and damages arising from flooding, storms, disease vectors, etc. Our results also have a number of limitations (including the low resolution of the climate data, the fact that our survey coordinates are offset, the use of only a limited set of controls, and that we only use 2013 for the econometric analysis). More research is needed including these aspects.

35
# **References**

- 1 Kruk ME, Gage AD, Arsenault C, _et al._ High-quality health systems in the Sustainable Development Goals era: time for a revolution. _Lancet Global Health_ 2018; **6** :PE1196E1252. doi:10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30386-3

- 2 The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. Crossing the Global Quality Chasm: Improving Health Care Worldwide: Health and Medicine Division. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 2018.

- 3 Kieny M-P, Evans TG, Scarpetta S, _et al._ Delivering quality health services: a global imperative for universal health coverage (English) | The World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank Group 2018.

- 4 Kruk ME, Gage AD, Joseph NT, _et al._ Mortality due to low-quality health systems in the universal health coverage era: a systematic analysis of amenable deaths in 137 countries - The Lancet. _Lancet_ 2018;392:2203–12.

- 5 Björkman M, Svensson J. Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda. _Q J Econ_ 2009;124:735–69. doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.735

- 6 STROBE Statement: Available checklists. https://www.strobestatement.org/index.php?id=available-checklists (accessed 3 Sep 2020).

- 7 Miller GE. Invited Interviews: The Assessment of Clinical Skills/Competence/Performance. _Academic Medicine_ 1990;65:S63–7.

- 8 Kwan A, Daniels B, Saria V, _et al._ Variations in the quality of tuberculosis care in urban India: A cross-sectional, standardized patient study in two cities. _PLOS Medicine_ 2018;15:e1002653. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002653

- 9 King JJC, Das J, Kwan A, _et al._ How to do (or not to do) ... using the standardized patient method to measure clinical quality of care in LMIC health facilities. _Health Policy Plan_ 2019;34:625–34. doi:10.1093/heapol/czz078

- 10  Kwan A, Daniels B, Bergkvist S, _et al_ . Use of standardised patients for healthcare quality research in low- and middle-income countries. _BMJ Global Health_ 2019;4:e001669. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001669

- 11  Bold T, Gauthier B, Svensson J, _et al._ Delivering service indicators in education and health in Africa: a proposal. World Bank 2010.

- 12  Bold T, Svensson J, Gauthier B, _et al._ Service delivery indicators: Pilot in education and health care in Africa. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute 2011.

- 13 Atakhodjaeva R, Rockmore C. Service Delivery Indicators Report - Niger. World Bank 2017. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/833401504769240083/Niger-Servicedelivery-indicators-health (accessed 2 Mar 2020).

- 14  Martin GH, Pimhidzai O. Service Delivery Indicators Report - Kenya. World Bank 2013. https://www.sdindicators.org/countries/kenya (accessed 2 Mar 2020).

21
significance of TTB use across policy-imposing countries.<sup>3</sup> Second, we identify which emerging market _exporters_ are adversely affected by such policies, thereby highlighting the extent to which these policies affect South-South trade. Third, given that these trade barriers are supposed to be _temporary_ , we examine the important but previously unaddressed issue concerning the export response after the trading partner removes the import protection. _Do exports resume_ ?

Section 2 provides an inter-temporal, country-by-country assessment of emerging economy imports affected by the TTBs that their own governments impose. We use newly updated data from the _Temporary Trade Barriers Database_ and extend results first presented in Bown (2011) along three dimensions: additional time coverage through 2011, additional policy-imposing country coverage, and a more comprehensive depiction of impacted trading partner coverage. The analysis covers 24 policyimposing high-income and emerging economies that collectively accounted for more than 80 percent of global GDP and 86 percent of world merchandise imports in 2011, and it includes a number of smaller (non-G20) emerging economies for the first time. While there is evidence of a continued increase in TTB coverage of imports by emerging markets, and a number of major G20 emerging economies in particular, we also document substantial heterogeneity across policy-imposing countries.

Section 3 shifts perspective to emerging market _exporters_ impacted by foreign-imposed TTBs. First, we estimate that by 2011, 3 percent of emerging economy exports overall were covered by foreign-imposed TTBs, up from 2.5 percent a decade earlier. Second, a number of different emerging market exporters are adversely affected by trading partner use of TTBs; e.g., by 2011, nearly 5 percent of China’s total nonoil exports were covered by TTBs. However, China’s experience is not unique; by 2011, Vietnam, Russia, and Ukraine had a _higher_ share of their nonoil exports impacted by foreign TTBs than even China. Other exporters significantly impacted by foreign-imposed TTBs include India, Thailand, Pakistan, Mexico, Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Third, we identify for each exporter the extent to which this TTB coverage of its exports results from South-South protectionism.

Given the economic significance of South-South protectionism, Section 4 investigates the key issue of what happens to emerging economy exports once a previously imposed _temporary_ trade barrier is removed and exports become “free” (in theory) to resume. We construct a sample of nearly 750 antidumping import restrictions that G20 member economies had imposed and removed between 1992 and 2008. We trace the impact of import restrictions on product-level exports for _two_ different five-year

> 3 Antidumping and related TTBs have a much longer history of both policy use by high-income economies like the United States and European Union and research examining this use. See, for example, Finger (1992).

3
<!-- Start of picture text --> 6:07 Ee - NES 41 97%ll<br>@ Collect>WINB.. @ TM%<br>Q. Intimate Partner Violence > ACASI Intervie<br>> Physical/Sexual IPV<br>Did your man ever push you,<br>shove you, or pull yourhairin —~—<br>the past 12 months?<br>O Yes ¢<br>O No cS<br>O (Refuse to answer) Q)<br>© (Don't know) c)<br>Il O <<br><!-- End of picture text -->
- 18 -

# 4.2 Labor Demand

The broad picture that emerges in almost all of the countries is that during the 1970's, there has been a reallocation of total employment away from primary production and towards the secondary and tertiary sectors. Table 3 shows the sectoral shares of total employment for the countries in which regular labor force surveys are undertaken.7 In virtually every case, the employment share of agriculture and mining has fallen while that of services has increased.8 These results are also, with the ex..eption of Bolivia, consistent with the proposit:an echoed regularly through the country studies, that employment has been growing more quickly in nontradables producing sectors.

Of itself, these results may reflect little more than the trends that one would expect on the basis of the patterns approach suggested by Chenery (1960). The failure of the share of manufacturing employment to grow consistently among the country sample could then be explained in this context by a faster labor productivity growth and the development of highly inefficient capital-intensive industries protected through several policy instruments. This type of explanation is investigated in considerable detail and broadly valijated for Tunisia (Morrisson (1987)]. Here, however, as productivity growth in the manufacturing sector was not much faster than in other sectors, the share of manufacturing employment did, in fact, rise significantly over time.

Although the patterns type approach may be a useful way of analyzing long-term trends, there are two other explanations which are of undoubted importance. The first is that in most of the countries, public sector employment has grown disproportionately over the period. This has been particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, Mexico and India, but has been of less quantitative importance where the share of public sector employment is