rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Hedging cotton price risk in
            Francophone African countries
Cotton exports account for a significant
            share of total commodity exports in francophone African
            countries, suggesting that these countries have a large
            exposure to volatility in cotton prices.  An analysis of the
            cotton marketing systems in these countries revealed that
            most of the price risk is borne by the parastatals and
            ultimately by the government.  This has led to problems in
            years of low cotton prices when the government maintained
            high producer prices.  In recent years, these countries
            introduced some flexibility in their pricing policies to
            deal with that problem.  As a means of managing their cotton
            price risk, francophone African countries have been using
            forward sales.  Between a quarter and a third of exported
            cotton has been sold forward before harvesting.  Forward
            sales have provided only limited coverage against price
            risks.  The use of cotton futures and options could increase
            this risk coverage.  Futures and options contracts can also
            give these countries flexibility in their sales strategies.
            Countries planning to privatize their cotton marketing
            sectors should consider the use of futures and options
            because forward sales are likely to decline significantly in
            a privatized system. The authors examined the feasibility of
            using New York cotton futures and options contracts as
            hedging instruments and found that there were benefits of
            reduced price volatility.  Simulations for 1989, 1990, and
            1991 show in every case that hedging was effective in
            reducing price risk from 30 percent to 60 percent.  For
            every 1 percent reduction in risk, the reduction in income
            ranged from 0.66 percent to 1.12 percent.
Does results and development (R
            & D) contribute to economic growth in developing countries
Using UNESCO data for research and
            development (R&D) expenditures and personnel, the
            authors document international differences in R&D
            activities and assess the determinants of these differences
            and the link between R&D and economic growth. For a
            group of OECD countries, R&D activity and economic
            growth are correlated for one of their two proxies. Contrary
            to the findings of Romer and Lichtenberg, however, they are
            not correlated across all (including developing) countries.
            Moreover, even for OECD countries, it appears likely that
            economic activity affects R&D activity rather than vice
            versa. First, there is no evidence that R&D in the OECD
            in the early years of 1970-85 contributed to growth during
            the whole period. Second, the analysis of determinants of
            R&D activities suggests that level of income affects
            R&D activities; apparently R&D becomes important
            only after a country reaches a certain stage of development.
            For developing countries, the authors' results are
            consistent with the widespread view, first proposed by
            Gershenkron, that countries that are behind grow by catching
            up technologically, not by advancing the technological frontier.
Developing countries and the Uruguay
            Round : negotiations on services
In the late 1980s many developing
            countries experienced something of a pardigm shift:
            governments began to pursue more market-oriented domestic
            policies. There was an increasing perception that
            liberalizing access to service markets was a potentially
            low-cost, effective method for improving the quality and
            efficiency of domestic service sectors. These unilateral
            policy developments increased the incentives for developing
            countries as a group to participate in a multilateral
            agreement to liberalize trade in services. The author
            explores the extent to which the initial negotiating
            positions of developing countries are reflected in the draft
            General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that has
            emerged from the Uruguay Round negotiations. He investigates
            whether the unilateral policy changes implemented by many
            developing countries in the late 1980s had a discernible
            impact on the draft GATS for developing countries. Many
            developing countries are pursuing regulatory reform and
            liberalization. To what extent will signing the GATS help
            governments trying to make their service sectors more
            efficient? Is the result of the defensive negotiating
            strategy that was pursued consistent with the shift toward a
            policy of liberalizing service markets? This issue is of
            particular relevance insofar as recent
            liberalization-plus-privatization programs in developing
            countries were driven by external forces rather than
            domestic pressure (industry) groups - which might reduce the
            credibility of liberalization policies. Membership in a
            binding multilateral agreement could help bolster reform
            efforts by increasing the costs of backsliding.
Decentralizing water resource
            management : economic incentives, accountability, and assurance
Private sector involvement and user
            participation in water resource management are not new, say
            the authors.  They give examples that demonstrate how
            willing users and the private sector are able to improve
            water use and play a larger role in water resources
            management.  User participation and private sector
            involvement, if properly structured, can provide the
            incentives needed to stabilize and improve the efficiency of
            irrigation and water supply systems.  They can add
            flexibility, transparency, and accountability and can reduce
            the state's administrative and financial burden.  A
            1989 World Bank review of 21 impact evaluations of
            irrigation projects, for example, found cost recovery to be
            excellent in those projects in which water management and
            operations and maintenance had been entrusted to water
            users.  Greater private sector and user participation can
            effectively increase user responsibility for managing and
            financing water projects while freeing governments to focus
            on broader water resource management concerns. The authors
            provide examples of decentralized water management in
            developing country water supply and irrigation systems.
            Governments should: more actively regulate private sector
            exploitation of groundwater, especially for irrigation; take
            measures to encourage price competition among private
            suppliers of water for both domestic and agricultural uses;
            and play an active role in organizing water user
            associations, especially for irrigation and rural water
            supply systems, and in giving them technical assistance.  As
            numerous examples highlight, such activities should be
            designed to reduce the transaction costs of organizing and
            to establish a sense of assurance and accountability within
            the water user community.  Once this is done, the community
            can deal with problems associated with excludability and
            unwillingness to pay.
Determinants of value - added tax
            revenue : a cross section analysis
Value-added tax (VAT) has become a major
            tax instrument in over 50 countries and an important element
            in tax policy advice to developing countries.  But few
            studies have empirically tested some basic hypotheses about
            the performance and key feature of VAT as a revenue-raising
            instrument. The authors examine the main determinants of VAT
            revenue in a simple cross-country framework using data from
            34 countries to answer certain key questions:  What
            empirical relationship emerges from existing data on VAT
            revenue and VAT rates for countries with a single VAT rate?
            How much, on average, can a 1 percent increase in the VAT
            rate be expected to raise VAT revenue as measured by
            VAT-to-GDP ratio?  What key determinants of VAT revenue
            emerge from a cross-country analysis of the full sample of
            countries?  Is there a statistically significant difference
            in VAT revenue performance between countries with a single
            VAT rate and countries with multiple VAT rates?  The results
            of their regressions generally confirm the conventional
            views on the key variables influencing VAT revenue
            performance:  the rate, the base, and rate dispersion.  The
            rate and the base coefficients are significant and with the
            expected positive sign in all of the estimated versions of
            the model.  An estimated model is used with appropriate
            cavaets to predict VAT revenue potential in countries (such
            as Bulgaria) that are thinking of introducing a single rate
            VAT. They also find that - other things being constant - VAT
            generates higher revenue in countries with a single VAT rate
            than in countries with multiple VAT rates.  The difference
            in the estimated models for the two country groups is
            statistically significant, indicating a structural change.
            However this change in the pattern of VAT revenues cannot be
            explained exclusively in terms of differences in rate
            structure.  A satisfactory explanation must include other
            factors, such as the base and tax administration capacity.
            The key policy implications are simple:  to provide superior
            revenues, VAT should be levied in a single rate on as broad
            a base as possible.  And tax administration and enforcement
            must be tough to ensure compliance.
The taxation of natural resources :
            principles and policy issues
Natural resources are typically subject
            both to taxation under the income tax system and to special
            resource taxes.  Properly designed income taxes attempt to
            include capital income on a uniform basis.  But in most
            countries the income tax treats resource industries more
            favorably than most other industries - through favorable
            treatment of such capital expenses as depletion, exploration
            and development, and the cost of acquiring resource
            properties.  The case for special resource taxes is
            precisely to tax resource rents over and above the levies
            implicit in general income taxes.  There are two
            justifications for this:  (a) the efficiency-based argument
            that a tax on resource rents is nondistorting and
            complementary; and (b) the equity argument that the property
            rights to resources ought to accrue to the public at large
            rather than to private citizens since the rents represent
            the bounty nature has bestowed on the economy rather than a
            reward for economic effort.  If the main purpose of a
            resource tax is to capture rents for the public sector, the
            base of resource taxes should be economic rents (or their
            present value equivalent), contend the authors.  Actual
            resource taxes differ from rent taxes in significant ways.
            Unlike a general income tax - which allows the resource
            industries to understate capital income - resource taxes
            often overstate rents.  This is because they typically do
            not offer full deductions for all costs, especially capital
            costs. Some systems tax revenues without allowing any
            deductions for costs; others allow the deduction of current
            costs only.  As a result, they discourage investment
            activity in resource industries, encourage the exploitation
            of high-grade relative to low-grade resources, and make it
            difficult to impose high tax rates for fear of making the
            marginal tax rate higher than 100 percent.  The authors
            discuss three alternative ideal ways for the government to
            divert a share of rents to the public sector:  levy a tax on
            rents, ideally in the form of a cash flow tax; require firms
            to bid for the rights to exploit resources; and take a share
            of equity in the firm.  They discuss these options in terms
            of their implications for the ability of firms to obtain
            finance, the allocation of risk, the share of rents accruing
            to the public sector, the extent of involvement of foreign
            firms, and other factors. The time has come in many
            countries, they say, when gains from further refinement of
            imperfect existing taxes on resources are less than
            replacing them with simpler, more efficient forms of pure
            rent taxes.
Should East Asia go regional No, no
            and maybe
The author studies the case for three
            different approaches to regionalism in East Asia. First, he
            examines closely the only serious attempt at preferential
            trading in the region - the Association of Southeast Asian
            Nations (ASEAN), which has recently announced plans to form
            the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Conclusion: the costs of
            such subregional schemes far outweigh their expected
            benefits. Second, he evaluates the case for a formal East
            Asian trading bloc along the lines of the European
            Community, and concludes that although the threat of such a
            bloc may serve some purpose, its actual execution might be
            difficult, given the diverse levels of protection across
            different countries in the region, and the possibility of
            retaliation from the United States through increased
            protection against East Asian goods. Third, he examines the
            case for simultaneous, most favored nation-style,
            nondiscriminatory regionwide liberalization. The author
            argues that although such a regional approach may be
            feasible, the case for it is far from airtight. On the one
            hand, this approach will face less resistance from the
            United States, and is likely to promote an open world
            trading system in the long run. On the other hand, in the
            short run it is likely to be resisted because of the adverse
            effect on terms of trade in the participating countries.
Structural adjustment, economic
            performance, and aid dependency in Tanzania
Tanzania embarked on a structural
            adjustment program in 1986 after a decade of protracted
            economic decline. Its program was supported by the
            International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and was
            accompanied by a substantial increase in foreign assistance.
            After seven years of adjustment the environment for higher
            economic growth has improved, but the results are only
            partially encouraging: economic growth has only slightly
            exceeded population growth, and officially measured domestic
            savings have deteriorated. Meanwhile, Tanzania's
            dependency on foreign assistance has increased, reflected in
            a deterioration of the current account of the balance of
            payments. This has led to an increasingly heated debate
            about whether real adjustment is in fact taking place in
            Tanzania, or whether foreign aid has served to postpone
            adjustment instead of supporting it. The authors shed light
            on the relationship between adjustment and aid dependency on
            the basis of Tanzania's experience. Tanzania's
            weak database is adjusted in several respects to correct for
            the most glaring deficiencies in it. After adjustment of the
            database, Tanzania's performance is compared in the
            period 1981-85, prior to when reforms were launched, with
            that in the period 1986-90, which followed the launch of the
            Economic Recovery Program in 1986. To put the Tanzanian
            experience in context, its performance is also compared with
            that of four sub-Saharan African countries - Ghana, Kenya,
            Malawi, and Uganda - which embarked on similar reform
            programs during the 1980s. The adjustment of the
            macroeconomic data shows that, contrary to traditional
            interpretation, Tanzania's increased dependency of
            foreign assistance did not lead to a deterioration in
            domestic savings performance. Most of the foreign assistance
            was used for investment rather than for consumption. But the
            principal difference between Tanzania and the four
            sub-Saharan African countries sampled was the efficiency
            with which the foreign assistance was used. Using a measure
            of macroeconomic return on investment, the comparison shows
            that Tanzania is getting very little return on domestic
            investment even after the introduction of structural
            reforms. There are several reasons for this, including the
            dominance of the Tanzania economy by a large and highly
            inefficient parastatal sector. If Tanzania is to generate
            the accelerated growth that it so urgently needs, one of the
            key areas of policy reform needs to be the increase in
            productivity of domestic investment.
Regulation, institutions and
            commitment : the Jamaican telecommunications sector
The Jamaican telecommunications sector
            today is much more dynamic than it was before and provides
            much better service. There is widespread skepticism about
            the current regulatory framework, which is criticized for
            encouraging a tight telecommunications monopoly, little
            administrative discretion, and continous price adjustments
            to satisfy what many see as a high rate of return
            requirement. But the authors suggest that the regulatory
            framework is a "second-best" alternative, a
            pragmatic response to The Jamaican's institutional
            realities. The authors analyze why the reforms of the late
            1980s took the form they did, and whether they could have
            been better. They find that the changing nature of
            regulatory institutions, ownership arrangements, and sector
            performance in the past 50 years is traceable to intense
            contracting problems between firms or interest groups and
            the government. Attempts to resolves these contracting
            problems have continuously constrained the government's
            (and firms) ability to implement efficient pricing schemes.
            In the abstract, The Jamaican's regulatory structure
            looks inefficient. In the context of The Jamaican's
            political system, politics, judiciary, bureaucracy, and
            interest groups, the regulatory framework developed in the
            late 1980s emerges as a fairly pragmatic, welfare-improving
            set of policies. Perhaps it could have been better, but its
            current design reflects basic commitment problems the
            government has with public utilities.
How the market transition affected
            export performance in the Central European economies
Empirical studies have paid little
            attention to the supply-side forces behind the export
            performance of the Central and Eastern European countries of
            Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
            (CEE-5) in OECD markets after the collapse of central
            planning. The author examines export developments in these
            countries in 1980-91, focusing on how transformation
            programs affected trade. OECD markets now receive
            three-fourths of CEE-5 exports. Sustaining this market
            penetration is crucial for countries making the transition
            to market-based economies. The author provides insight into
            the impact of transformation-cum-stabilization programs on
            export performance. These insights are relevant to former
            centrally planned economies that have yet to restore
            marcoeconomic equilibrium and to liberalize prices. The
            author examines the export performance of the CEE-5 before
            and after the collapse of central planning. He finds a close
            link between export performance and the decision to move
            quickly to a market-based economy. Countries that removed
            administrative controls on prices, devalued currency,
            introduced unified exchange rates, and liberalized trade
            also expanded exports. Bulgaria and Romania, crippled by
            macroeconomic chaos and vacillating macroeconomic reform,
            registered drops in both exports and imports. The author
            suggests that differences among Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
            Poland (CEE-3) had little to do with previous trends in
            export performance, external economic factors, and earlier
            attempts at trade reform. The expansion of exports in
            1990-92 represented a dramatic reversal of trends prevalent
            in the prior two decades. The surge in exports is explained
            neither by the length of time experimenting with foreign
            trade under central planning nor by earlier trends in
            competitiveness in OECD markets. The driving force of export
            growth was manufactures, some of them redirected from CMEA
            markets, primarily to Germany. The severing of links that
            used to bind the economies of the CMEA had a less
            destructive impact on the foreign trade performance of the
            CEE-3 than one might have expected. The fact that exports to
            the CMEA fell at the same time that exports elsewhere (often
            of the same products) increased suggests a causal relationship.