rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the poor more because of their greater ability to mobilize resources (Narayan and Nyamwaya, 1996). Despite outbreaks of state initiated tribal violence in recent years, ethnic tension was not mentioned as a problem by people in any of 30 communities across the country.

Similarly, in neighboring Tanzania composed of over 300 ethnic groups, years of socialism and villagization programs have led to a strong sense of national identity which appears to supersede ethnic identity. Tanzania, despite acute poverty and a bankrupt state, has not experienced ethnic violence or polarization. In a participatory poverty assessment conducted in 87 communities across Tanzania, people explicitly linked peace and community economic levels to informal groups with cross-ethnic membership (Narayan, 1997).

In a study on entrepreneurship in Ghana, Barr (1997, 1998) finds that the small, cohesive solidarity networks of the Ghanaian entrepreneurs seem to function as a substitute for formal institutions and markets, while the larger more diverse networks of non-Ghanaian entrepreneurs provide better access to information about markets and technologies.

Several recent studies conducted as part of the World Bank's Local Level Institutions Study (Grootaert and Narayan, 1999) confirm the importance of heterogeneity in group membership and economic outcomes. This pattern of results is found in rural Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997) in Indonesia (Grootaert, 1998), and in Burkina Faso (Grootaert, Swamy and Oh, 1999).

Other studies, particularly from Latin America, show time and again that despite high ratings in community solidarity, indigenous communities remain poor with few connections to the powerful within or outside the community. While they may manage to attract government provided basic social infrastructure, this does not result in production opportunities. There is little evidence that indigenous social organizations are providing the foundation for indigenous groups to mobilize either for fundamental rights or for greater access to economic and political participation (Junho Pefia and Lindo-Fuentes, 1998; Gacitua-Mario, 1998). In the absence of outside allies, indigenous social capital of poor communities remains a substitute for the resources and services that are normally provided by the state.

All over the developing world, the poor and the middle class survive and have developed ingenious strategies to survive. Self-provision in water and sanitation services is still the norm, as one billion people remain without access to safe water and two billion people without adequate sanitation. Informal child care arrangements in urban slums as mothers go to work abound, 33
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|**Table 6: Impact on Sales**|M|onthlySal|es|I.H.S. Mo|nthlySales|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Individual Treatment*During Intervention|‐18|‐38|‐22|0.054|‐0.026|
||(29)|(35)|(30)|(0.044)|(0.044)|
|Individual Treatment*Post Intervention|‐54|‐75|‐38|0.049|0.029|
||(59)|(65)|(37)|(0.068)|(0.075)|
|Group Treatment*During Intervention|52|51|44|0.080|0.086|
||(52)|(59)|(53)|(0.061)|(0.069)|
|Group Treatment*Post Intervention|71|68|63|0.103|0.091|
||(46)|(50)|(48)|(0.084)|(0.093)|
|Balanced Panel|No|Yes|Yes|No|Yes|
|Winsorized at the 99th percentile|No|No|Yes|No|No|
|Sample Size (N*T)|7343|5940|5940|7343|5940|
|Number of Firms|145|99|99|145|99|
|P‐value: Individual=Group During|0.263|0.222|0.305|0.743|0.211|
|P‐value: Individual=Group Post|0.109|0.095|0.099|0.519|0.486|
|Control Mean in 2017<br>Notes:<br>Coefficients are from fixed effects regressio<br>clustered at the firm level.<br>*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, an|388<br>ns with tim<br>d 1 percen|407<br>e and firm<br>t levels.|407<br>fixed effe|5.994<br>cts, with stan|6.033<br>dard errors|

40
level than in other programs. For the rest, training is roughly split between **the** remaining programs of the Ministry of Labor. The apprentice attends school one day * **week, the** rest spent on practical training with **his employer; he** is typically a low academic achiever, with a low socioeconomic background. The industrial schools are located at the plants of major firms and provide three days a week of practical training in the firm's plant and 3 days of education in the school attached to the factory. The program is more practically oriented and less demanding than the vocational schools, no tuition is charged and trainoes receive payment for their output. One-year full-time training courses for 16 to 17-year-olds (many of whom are drop outs) are devoted almost entirely to practical training. Under a special agreement, the army provides both additional training and employment in the training specialty for completers of these latter courses during the 3-year compulsory army service following training.

Vocational schooling is by far the most costly mode. Borus showed the average societal cost per completer of apprenticeship courses to be only one seventh of that of vocational secondary school nourses, yet these two major alternative training regimes yielded roughly equal earnings. Similarly, industrial schools and short teenager courses also resulted in similar earnings to vocational secondary schools, but courses completer costs were only from one third to one quarter of the costs in vocational schools.<sup>8</sup> Thus, apprenticeship courses were found to be the most cost effective by far of available alternative training programs for youth in Israel.

8/ Borus.

**5**
_Table 8: Double-difference estimates of VHI impact on contact probability among sick_

|Outcome|Treatment<br>effects|z-stat|F-test consumption<br>quintile differences|Prob> F|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Age 0-4 in 1992/93**|||||
|Hospital visits|0.0000|0.00|F(4, 432) = 0.60|0.66|
|CHC visits|0.0297|1.73|F(4, 432) = 2.31|0.06|
|Polyclinic visits|0.0000|0.00|F(4, 432) = 1.75|0.14|
|Private provider visits|0.0115|0.36|F(4, 432) = 0.79|0.53|
|Pharmacist visits for prescribed medicines|0.0252|1.81|F(4, 432) = 2.00|0.09|
|Pharmacist visits for advice & nonprescribed medicines|-0.2059|-1.69|F(4, 432) = 0.57|0.69|
|Visit to traditional healer|0.0000|0.00|F(4, 432) = 0.44|0.78|
|Total visits|-0.1830|-1.31|F(4, 432) = 0.56|0.69|
|Inpatient spell during 1997/98|0.0160|0.93|F(4, 432) = 0.39|0.82|
|**Age 5+ in 1992/93**|||||
|Hospital visits|0.0753|6.54|F(4, 2572) = 1.01|0.40|
|CHC visits|0.0211|2.13|F(4, 2572) = 5.27|0.00|
|Polyclinic visits|0.0085|3.15|F(4, 2572) = 1.06|0.38|
|Private provider visits|-0.0089|-0.35|F(4, 2572) = 0.83|0.51|
|Pharmacist visits for prescribed medicines|-0.0008|-0.06|F(4, 2571) = 1.87|0.11|
|Pharmacist visits for advice & nonprescribed medicines|-0.0237|-0.61|F(4, 2571) = 0.20|0.94|
|Visit to traditional healer|0.0008|0.12|F(4, 2572) = 0.38|0.82|
|Total visits|0.0472|0.82|F(4, 2571) = 0.93|0.45|
|Inpatient spell during 1997/98|0.0621|8.53|F(4, 2572) = 0.59|0.67|

These patterns do not seem inconsistent with the health status impacts of VHI. Many key interventions for young children—including vaccinations, vitamin supplements as well as the giving of advice on nutrition, hygiene and other home-delivered interventions such as oral rehydration therapy—can easily be delivered in a primary care setting (Bryce et al. 2003, Jones et al. 2003). Furthermore, Vietnam’s primary care providers scored well in a recent international study in terms of correctly diagnosing and treatment common childhood illnesses (World Health Organization 1998). Medicines—especially antibiotics—have a role to play in treating pneumonia, dysentery and other childhood illnesses, and while “irrational” drug use is known to be a problem even among professional providers, it seems likely that this problem and the problem of counterfeit drugs is greater among drug vendors. It therefore seems likely that in a country like Vietnam child health can only improve if mothers switch from using pharmacists as providers of advice to using them as suppliers of prescribed drugs. The large impacts on hospital use among older children and adults also seem consistent with the health impacts earlier. In the case of adults—in contrast to the case of young children—it seems likely that if the estimated BMI impacts derive from additional use of medical care, some additional use of hospital care would likely be involved.

16
# **1. Introduction**

The impacts of international emigration and remittances on incomes and poverty in sending areas are increasingly studied with household survey data. Empirical analysis is needed because the effect of emigration is _a priori_ unclear. Households with emigrants typically benefit from remittance inflows. There are also fewer mouths to feed amongst household members left behind. On the other hand, earnings and other household inputs that emigrants would have generated locally are lost. Since it is typically individuals of the most economically active ages who emigrate, foregone earnings and foregone own-production may outweigh the effect of fewer mouths and more remittances, potentially causing poverty to rise for those left behind, even if the migrants themselves become better off.

The biggest difficulty in estimating the impacts of emigration is posed by selectivity issues. A common research strategy in this literature is to use household survey data from the sending country to compare households where some members have emigrated to those where no one has emigrated. Such comparisons are complicated by a triple- or quadruple-selectivity problem: first, households self-select into emigration; second, in some emigrant households everyone moves (and thus are almost never included in survey data on the sending country) while other emigrant households leave some members behind; third, some emigrants choose to return home, so their household may (wrongly) be considered as not affected by emigration. And fourth, if researchers wish to examine how the impact varies with duration since migration, they also face selectivity into not just whether, but when households emigrate.

In this paper, we set out how these selectivity issues arise and their implications for existing migration studies. We then address these selectivity problems by using survey data designed specifically to take advantage of a randomized lottery that determines which applicants to the over-subscribed Samoan Quota (SQ) may immigrate to New Zealand. These data allow us to compare incomes and poverty amongst left behind members in households in Samoa that sent SQ emigrants with incomes and poverty rates of similar households that were unsuccessful in the lottery. This random lottery solves the problem of self-selection into migration. The SQ policy rules control who can accompany the principal migrant, enabling us to address the second selectivity problem. Finally, our survey includes a module on return migration allowing us to address the third selectivity problem. Differences among migrants in when they win the ballot lottery allow us to also explore duration effects and address this fourth selectivity issue.

2
be any number of de facto “international” standards—should be less costly for all concerned than complying with multiple national or regional standards, and help promote a relatively level playing field for exporters.

This paper presents the first empirical evidence to indicate the potential benefit in the approach taken by the WTO _Agreement on TBTs_ . We show that EU product standards harmonized with international standards restrict African textiles and clothing exports far less than do European Union standards not aligned with international norms. Thus, international harmonization of product standards could be seen as an important complementary policy in support of recent efforts to extend more generous and easily accessible preferences to the developing world (see e.g., Collier and Venables, 2007). As Brenton and Hoppe (2007) argue, expanding African exports of manufactured goods in traditional development sectors, such as clothing, is much more than just a question of preferential rates of duty.

Our results are consistent with a framework in which standards impact trade through at least two channels. Compliance with standards increases the marginal costs of exporting and thereby can reduce export flows (the intensive margin of trade). At the same time, exporters must also pay a fixed cost to adapt products to suit foreign standards. This can reduce the probability that a country will export at all (the extensive margin). Our results provide support for the proposition that it is possible to reduce the fixed and marginal costs associated with product standards by using de facto international standards as the basis for harmonization.

Our results build on and extend the existing literature in three ways.<sup>3</sup> First, we use the Perinorm database (Swann et al., 1999; Moenius, 2000, 2004, 2006) and the online catalogue of the

> 3 For a general review of the empirical literature, see WTO (2005). On the theoretical side, see, for example, Fischer and Serra (2000), Casella (2001), Gandal and Shy (2001), and Ganslandt and Markusen (2001).

- 3 -
# **Figure 1: Total dependency ratio, 1950-2030**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.95<br>0.90 Sub-Saharan Africa<br>0.85<br>0.80<br>South Asia - Middle<br>0.75<br>Income<br>0.70<br>0.65 South Asia - Low<br>0.60 Income<br>0.55<br>East Asia and Pacific<br>0.50<br>0.45<br>0.40<br>0.35<br>0.30<br>0.25<br>1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: East Asia and Pacific is only low and middle-income countries as classified by the World Bank. Middle income South Asia is India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; low income South Asia is Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives. The total dependency ratio is the ratio of the youth and elderly population to the working age population. Source: Authors’ calculations from UN (2012) Decomposing the total dependency ratios into youth and elderly dependency ratios reveals some additional dynamics. SSA’s high dependency ratio is driven by its consistently high youth dependency and its almost flat elderly dependency ratio (Figure A1 and A2). In contrast, the comparator regions are observed to have rising elderly dependency ratios over time, even as their youth dependency ratios fall. There are several factors explaining SSA’s sluggish demographic transition, such as the slow (but steadily rising) adoption of contraception, rising urbanization, and improvements in women’s education rates (Sharan et al., 2011).

Since Sub-Saharan Africa’s total dependency ratio (TDR) only peaked in 1987, the continent has yet to clearly see the effects of any demographic change on growth. Bloom and Sachs (1998) try to explain the slow growth of SSA in the 1965-1990 period by considering a range of geographic, health variables, and demographic characteristics (e.g. working age population share). The paper found that 19 percent of the difference between SSA’s growth (GDP per worker) to that of other regions over the same time period could be explained by the differences in demographics. In a comparison with East and Southeast Asia, the differences in demographics between the regions explained 26 percent of the lower growth in Africa.

Aside from the pure arithmetic effect, the size of SSA’s demographic dividend will depend on a range of factors. Falling dependency ratios are expected to boost savings and investment (Higgins and Williamson, 1997; Loayza et al., 2000) and East Asia benefited from rapid capital accumulation during its high growth period. East Asia was also particularly successful in attracting foreign investment which had been coupled with their rapidly skilling and growing labor force. In order to have demographic dividends greater than merely the arithmetic dividend, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa will thus need to increase savings without sacrificing the consumption per capita critical for poverty reduction, boost foreign investment, and increase their human capital accumulation rates to be able to take full advantage of the restructuring economies.

5
In the tax fine model, the _rich people pay_ treatment makes respondents significantly more likely to endorse more robust tax enforcement than the _people pay_ treatment. This difference is only significant at the 10% level in the tax morale model. Overall, however, our evidence strongly suggests that the _rich people pay_ treatment is more effective than the more general _people pay_ treatment when considering the evidence across both measures.

||**Tax morale**|**Tax fine**|
|---|---|---|
|(Intercept)|2.64<sup>***</sup>|2.38<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.03)|(0.03)|
|_Treatment_|||
|People pay|0.06|0.01|
||(0.04)|(0.04)|
|Rich people pay|0.14<sup>***</sup>|0.30<sup>***</sup>|
||(0.04)|(0.04)|
|Companies pay|0.09<sup>*</sup>|0.10<sup>*</sup>|
||(0.04)|(0.04)|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.00|0.01|
|Adj. R<sup>2</sup>|0.00|0.01|
|Num. obs.|6054|6054|
|RMSE|1.00|1.04|

**_***_** _p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *_ p < 0.05

Table 2 Pooled Treatment Effects for Tax Morale Dependent Variable (OLS). Positive coefficients indicate a stronger belief that cheating on taxes is wrong.

The manipulation checks were not statistically significant in this study and the effect sizes were substantively small, although the coefficients are in the right direction. This does not disprove that the treatment worked, but it does leave open the possibility that our treatment could work through mechanisms other than the one we proposed. The full manipulation check results are shown in the appendix.

Although there was substantial attrition in this survey, models of retention and balance do not show any problems in this study (see appendix for details), with no detectable differences in retention or balance across the experimental groups.

We can also look at how consistent these results are across each country. Table 3 shows the treatment effects on tax morale within each country. We get positive and significant results of the _rich people pay_ treatment in three of the five countries and a non-significant and positive result in South Africa. The one outlier in the study is the United States where there is a small nonsignificant negative effect of the _rich people pay_ treatment. The _people pay_ treatment comes out as significant and positive in the Philippines but not in any other country context. The _companies pay_ treatment shows a significant and positive effect in Kenya but not in any other country. Again, the most consistent evidence is for the _rich people pay_ treatment, with more varied results for the other treatments.
We run a cross section OLS for 1995 – 05 on manufacturing and service growth against investment rate controlling for the factors associated with growth. We use controls for financial development (proxied for by percentage of domestic credit provided by banks), openness (proxied for ratio of exports and imports to GDP), initial level of development (proxied for by initial GDP per capita) and demographic features (proxied for by population growth). Results are presented in Table 3. We see that growth in manufacturing and services both depend positively on investment rate. However the interesting and striking feature is that the coefficient on investment rate is much higher for manufacturing than for services. It suggests that manufacturing growth is much more dependent on investment rate than service growth. This has a significant implication for the macro stability and recovery of South Asia. In the wake of slowing down of investments, it implies that the service sector which is the mainstay of growth miracle of South Asia is likely to suffer less and also the recovery is likely to be faster.

# **_South-South Trade_**

Another interesting feature of last decade has been a shift in the direction of trade. There is growing evidence that in the period of globalization developing countries are increasingly engaging in more South-South trade. The share of South-South trade is on the rise. Some kind of decoupling has started taking place between the business cycles of South and North (Prasad et al 2008).

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 10: Share of India’s Bilateral Trade with China and USA<br>20<br>18<br>China Share USA Share<br>16<br>14<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>Q1 2000Q3 2000Q1 2001Q3 2001Q1 2002Q3 2002Q1 2003Q3 2003Q1 2004Q3 2004Q1 2005Q3 2005Q1 2006Q3 2006Q1 2007Q3 2007Q1 2008Q3 2008Q1 2009<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Terms of Trade Database, IMF 2009 and authors’ calculations.

We plot the share of bilateral trade in the total trade between India and China, and India and USA (Figure 10). It shows that the bilateral trade between India-China has been on 21