rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
depend heavily on verbal skills, making it relatively “culture free” (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Weel 2008). In Figure 1 Panel A, we show two sample problems from the Raven’s test (Raven, Raven, and Court 1998). The child respondent is asked to select the image that is missing in order to complete the picture. This type of question is novel to the children in Nahouri Province, thus providing a more natural or true measure of problem solving skills.

We ask 18 questions from the Raven’s CPM and on average, children in our sample answer 4.9 questions correctly.<sup>5</sup> Younger children answer fewer questions correctly than older children (the average number correct for children age 5 is 2.8 and for children age 15 is 7.6).<sup>6</sup> To control for this relationship between age and raw test scores, we calculate a z-score for each child measured as the child’s raw test score minus the average score for the same age children divided by the standard deviation of test scores for children of that age.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the mean of the Raven’s z-score is zero and the standard deviation is one for each age and across all ages.<sup>8</sup> The WISC Digit Span is a measure of working memory and ability to concentrate and has both a forward and backward component. The respondent repeats a string of numbers to the enumerator and is scored by whether or not they repeat the full string correctly as shown in Figure 1 Panel B (Weschler 1974). In the Digit Span Forward, the child must repeat the string of numbers exactly as stated by the enumerator. The string of numbers increases in length as the child answers correctly. With the Digit Span Backward, similar strings of numbers are to be repeated in the reverse order from that stated by the enumerator until the child can no longer

> 5 During extensive pretesting of the Raven’s test, results were consistent whether children were asked the entire set of 36 questions or only the odd-numbered questions, so to save interview time we only administered the 18 oddnumbered questions (Sets A, Ab, and B).

> 6 The average number of questions answered correctly for children ages 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 is respectively 2.8, 3.6, 4.4, 5.1, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.5, and 6.4.

> 7 We did not use the international Raven’s norming standards since we asked a subset of the Raven’s test and what is most important here is how the children in rural Burkina Faso compare to each other, not internationally.

> 8 Note that in Section 5.2, we estimate alternative specifications to test the robustness of using the Raven’s ageadjusted z-score instead of the raw test scores.

8
higher the vulnerability arising from poor debt structures. The IMF has calculated that given greater vulnerability of emerging market economies, the maximum sustainable debt level in these countries was much lower than the equivalent for OECD countries.<sup>36</sup> Future work can usefully extend the analysis to test its empirical relevance. For example, Herrera (2004) describes the sequence of policy actions and evolution of the macroeconomic policy mix including debt management in Brazil, and Pinto, Gurvich, and Ulatov (2004) describe this for Russia, which can be useful in identifying the timing of policy shifts and changes in the composition of debt and their relationship with fiscal and monetary policies. Another area of research is a closer examination of the cyclical characteristics of monetary policy and its impact on debt management. For example, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) showed that monetary policy tends to be conducted pro-cyclically in developing countries. Coupled with the pro-cyclical tendency of fiscal policy (see for example, Gavin and Perotti: 1997, and Talvi and Vegh: 2000 in Latin America), it would be useful to examine the implications of debt management on procyclical monetary policy.

> 36  See for example, IMF (2003) _World Economic Outlook,_ ‘Public Debt in Emerging Markets’, September.

32
crops grown by households and the timing of their harvests. Crop income is added to income from other sources to obtain total per capita income. Figure 2 shows seasonality in both total income and total consumption per capita. It shows that income, especially crop income, is very much seasonal and follows a similar pattern of seasonality as consumption. The income of Rangpur is much lower as well as more seasonal than that of other regions. Like consumption, per capita income falls sharply during the _monga_ period in Rangpur. There is seasonality in income of other regions but it is less pronounced compared to Rangpur.

There is a distinct pattern of income and consumption seasonality in Rangpur and other regions. As shown in figure 2, although food consumption, on an average, is far below the monthly income in all regions, total income falls short of total consumption during the _monga_ period in both regions. More strikingly, however, in greater Rangpur the income falls short of consumption during other seasons as well, particularly during pre- _monga_ and to some extent in the post _monga_ period.

The fact that seasonality influences household’s consumption does not mean that seasonal poverty will result as a consequence. Similarly, even if consumption smoothing varies by region, it does not tell us how much poverty is actually caused by seasonality (either idiosyncratic or aggregate). More specifically, as shown in Figure 2, we do not know how many households cannot smooth consumption and thus fall into seasonal hunger or poverty.

> in Bangladesh is seasonal and diverse across households.  Since, HIES collected households’ crop income by specific crop, it is possible to calculate the share of households’ seasonal crop income to total income.

9
having the highest female participation rate at 67 percent. In contrast, the BH female participation rate is 43 percent.<sup>4</sup> Table 1. Key Labor Market Indicators (In units as indicated)

||2001|2002|2004|
|---|---|---|---|
|Unemployment rate (in percent of labor force)||||
|All|16.0|21.6|22<br>.2|
|Federation|16.9|21.6|20.8|
|Republika Srpska|15.3|21.5|23.8|
|Men|15.3|19.6|21<br>.2|
|Women|17.5|25.1|24<br>.1|
|Employment rate (in percent of working age population)||||
|All|40.4|41.8|45<br>.9|
|Federation|34.6|36.4|43.4|
|Republika Srpska|46.4|47.5|47.3|
|Men|53.9|55.4|59<br>.1|
|Women|27.2|28.5|32<br>.8|
|Labor force participation rate (in percent of working age population)||||
|All|48.1|53.3|59<br>.0|
|Federation|42.2|47.1|55.8|
|Republika Srpska|55.4|60.9|63.0|
|Men|63.6|68.9|75<br>.0|
|Women|32.9|38.0|43<br>.1|
|Employment by sector||||
|Formal sector (in percent of total employment)|63.0|61.0|57.7|
|Federation|67.2|68.1|63.7|
|Republika Srpska|59.1|54.6|51.3|
|Informal sector (in percent of total employment)<sup>1</sup>|37.0|39.0|42.3|
|Federation|32.8|31.9|36.3|
|Republika Srpska|40.9|45.4|48.7|

Source: LSMS and staff estimates. Includes panel observations only. Note: Due to routing errors, a number of labor market indicator cannot be calculated using the 2003 wave. For simplicity, this table does not report any summary data from this wave at all.

1The informal sector consists of two groups, following the BH Labor Market study (World Bank 2002): (i) unpaid, contributing family members, farmers on own farm, and workers engaged in other activity (such as sale of agricultural products); (ii) workers not employed in the public sector or in international organization and whose pension contributions were not paid.

The unemployment rate increased between 2001 and 2002 and has been more or less stable since then. The unemployment rate was about 16 percent in 2001, rose to 21.6 4 This is based on a sample of transition economies using the latest available ILO (Key Indicators of the Labor Market) data. Data are available from the authors on request. See also Paci (2002) for a comparison of gender differentials in labor market outcomes, among other indicators, in the ECA region.

4
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|**Japan**|Stamp tax is levied on certain documents such as<br>contracts, bills and share certificates. As a rule, the<br>tax is levied by affixing revenue stamps covering the<br>amount equal to the stamp tax to those documents.<br>However, in certain cases, such as when many<br>taxable documents are processed repeatedly,<br>taxpayers may, for convenience, choose self-<br>assessment or payment in cash. Tax rates vary from<br>200 yen to 600,000 yen per document. Revenue<br>stamps are also used for payment of registration<br>license tax levied when registering the<br>establishment or transfer of property rights and for<br>payment of national examination fees.||http://www.nta.go.jp/category/outline/<br>english/1832/text/02/04_7.htm|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Kenya**||**23 October 2003**<br>Lands Minister Amos Kimunya<br>blew the whistle on a syndicate<br>involving his officers, land agents<br>and bankers. Kimunya revealed<br>that the syndicate has been<br>diverting<br>millions<br>of<br>shillings<br>received as stamp duty to their<br>pockets. Half of all stamp duty<br>paid to the Government ends up<br>in people's pockets. He said the<br>syndicate operates mainly in<br>Nairobi and Mombasa but was<br>slowly spreading to other areas.<br>1)|1)http://www.eastandard.net/headlin<br>es/news231003004.htm|
|**Malaysia**|**Rate of Stamp Duty on Transfer of Share:**<br>In Malaysia, stamp duty is payable on a transfer of<br>shares at 0.3 percent of the consideration paid, or<br>the market value, whichever is higher. The Stamp<br>Office uses as the market value the higher of the<br>pro-rata net tangibles asset value or a price-<br>earnings multiple of 11.<sup>1)</sup><br>**Rate of Stamp Duty on Property Transfer:**<br>1 percent on the first MYR 100,000, 2 percent on the<br>next MYR 400,000, 3 percent for the next MYR<br>1,500,000, and 4 percent on the balance of the<br>value of the property or the consideration given for<br>it, whichever is higher.<sup>1)</sup><br>**Stamp Duty on Charges**<br>A charge on property is an instrument created by<br>statue, namely the NLC. It affords the Chargee a<br>security for loan granted to the Chargor over the<br>property charged. Stamp duty is calculated at the<br>rate of about 0.5% of the loan amount.<sup>2)</sup>||1)http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/r<br>eadingsintaxpolicy.nsf/0/1D537D4C2<br>06E166685256B820080661F?Open<br>Document<br>2)http://www.propertylookout.com/st<br>amp.htm|

43
through interbank lending and other risk-sharing arrangements. Fears about the insolvency of one bank can spread into a generalized contagion causing multiple banks to fail.

As banks remain the dominant source of financing for firms and households, a stable, well-functioning banking system is an important determinant of a country’s economic growth and development. A large number of bank failures can cause serious disruptions of a country’s economic activities and result in significant social and fiscal costs (Hoggarth et al. 2002; Smith 2016). Disruption in lending caused by multiple bank failures can result in lost output, lost investments and higher unemployment. In addition, there are long-term societal costs that result from lower economic activity and higher unemployment. More direct fiscal costs of banking crisis include tax-payer funded bailouts, liquidity support to various financial institutions and increased government spending on social safety net programs. More importantly, bank runs and panics can paralyze the payment system by causing failed banks to default on payments in transit. As most of the global economy relies on settlement systems without cash, lack of ability to service and honor demand deposit contracts can have a significant impact on daily commerce. Given the significant costs associated with banking crisis, deposit insurance, to the extent that it prevents contagious runs, can be highly valuable.

A number of papers document the economic benefits of deposit insurance in reducing bank runs. Martin, Puri and Ufier (2017), using account level data, examine the effect that deposit insurance has on inflows and outflows of distressed banks. They find that uninsured depositors flee banks following bad regulatory news and that deposit guarantees reduce the outflow of deposits, providing much needed liquidity. Iyer, Jensen, Johannesen and Sheridan (2017) study a run on uninsured deposits in Danish banks that resulted from a reform that limited insurance coverage. They show that the reform caused a 50% decrease in deposits above the insurance limit. DeLong and Saunders (2011) find that depositors were less prone to withdraw their deposits from weaker banks after the introduction of fixed-rate federal deposit insurance in the United States. Chernykh and Cole (2011) use the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment to examine the effects of deposit insurance. They find that the introduction of deposit insurance led to increased deposits and reduced reliance on state-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. They find that the effect was stronger for regional and smaller banks. Angkinand (2009) examines whether deposit insurance can reduce the output costs of banking crises. Using data from 47 crises in 35 countries during 8
|P075964|2005|2007|10/30/2006|4 Closed|Cameroon|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|P075964|2005|2007|4/20/2007|5 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2008|12/20/2007|6 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2008|6/18/2008|7 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2009|8/31/2008|8 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2009|5/6/2009|9 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2010|12/28/2009|10 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2010|6/27/2010|11 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2011|2/16/2011|12 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2012|10/11/2011|13 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2012|5/27/2012|14 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075964|2005|2013|9/9/2012|15 Closed|Cameroon|
|P075978|2002|2002||0 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2003|1/27/2003|2 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2004|6/3/2004|5 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2005|4/24/2005|7 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2006|12/22/2005|8 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2007|8/18/2006|9 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2007|5/12/2007|10 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2008|12/17/2007|11 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2008|6/27/2008|12 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2009|12/21/2008|13 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075978|2002|2009|5/31/2009|14 Closed|St. Kitts and Nevis|
|P075979|2004|2004|6/30/2004|1 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2005|5/25/2005|3 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2006|12/22/2005|4 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2006|4/9/2006|5 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2007|9/25/2006|6 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2007|5/4/2007|7 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2007|6/6/2007|8 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2008|12/21/2007<br>|9 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2008|6/25/2008|10 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2009|12/4/2008|11 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2009|6/1/2009|12 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2010|12/1/2009|13 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2011|5/3/2011|14 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2012|12/26/2011|15 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2012|6/27/2012|16 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075979|2004|2013|1/7/2013|17 Closed|Sao Tome and Principe|
|P075984|2002|2002|6/28/2002|2 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P075984|2002|2003|4/15/2003|4 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P075984|2002|2005|4/28/2005|6 Closed|West Bank and Gaza|
|P075994|2005|2005||0 Closed|Africa|
|P075994|2005|2006|12/13/2005|1 Closed|Africa|
|P075994|2005|2006|6/30/2006|2 Closed|Africa|
|P075994|2005|2007|12/28/2006|3 Closed|Africa|
|P075994|2005|2007|6/27/2007|4 Closed|Africa|
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# **Mandated Benefits, Employment, and Inequality in a Dual Economy**

Rita Almeida<sup>1</sup> The World Bank and Pedro Carneiro University College London, Institute for Fiscal Studies and Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice 1 We gratefully acknowledge the suggestions of seminar participants at the World Bank, IFAU, the Stockholm School of Economics, Alicante, the OECD Development Centre, the 2007 IZA/World Bank Conference on Labor Markets, the 2007 EEA Meetings, the 2008 SOLE meetings, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, IPEA, especially those of Joe Altonji, Mariano Bosch, Miriam Bruhan, Carlos Corseuil, Per-Anders Edin, Francisco Ferreira, Martin Floden, Richard Freeman, Rita Ginja, Miguel Gouveia, David Kaplan, Chinhui Juhn, Adriana Kugler, Lars Ljunqvist, Joao Cesar das Neves, Amil Petrin, David Robalino, Stefano Scarpetta, Luis Serven, Rodrigo Soares, Kathy Terrell, and Emma Tominey. We thank the Brazilian Ministry of Labor for providing the data on enforcement of labor regulation and important information about the process of enforcement, especially Edgar Brandao, Sandra Brandao and Marcelo Campos. We are also very grateful to Adalberto Cardoso for valuable insights on the enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil. Renata Narita provided excellent research assistance in this project. Juliano Assuncao, Joana Naritomi and Rodrigo Soares kindly provided city level data on the quality of institutions. Carneiro gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council for the ESRC Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (grant reference RES-589-28-0001), from ESRC grant RES-00022-2805, and the hospitality of Georgetown University, and the Poverty Unit of the World Bank Research Group. This paper also benefited from financial support from a World Bank research grant. Corresponding author: Rita Almeida, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington DC, 20433. Email: ralmeida@worldbank.org
The frequency distribution allows policy makers to see the distribution of risks they face. The distribution indicates the level of damage and its chance of occurring. A more intuitive description of frequencies can be seen in the return rate (RR) function of storms causing damage (D). The return rate is defined: The return rate describes the average amount of time between storms causing each level of damage. Examining the tail of the return rate or frequency distribution is particularly helpful to calculate the amount of catastrophic insurance needed to cover large damage.

Damages are also broken down by region within the United States. We examine five regions: Gulf, Florida, Southeast, Mid Atlantic and New England<sup>2</sup> . State specific estimates are presented in Appendix A.

# III. Hurricane Integrated Assessment Model

The integrated assessment model has been constructed to project hurricane risks given different climates. The analysis integrates an emission path, the resulting climate change, the impact on hurricanes, and the resulting damage. The analysis relies on the A1B SRES emissions scenario generated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2000). The scenario assumes that mitigation is gradually tightened over time so that greenhouse gas concentrations finally peak and stabilize at 720 ppm.

We rely on four climate models: CNRM (Gueremy et al. 2005), ECHAM (Cubasch et al 1997), GFDL (Manabe et al. 1991), and MIROC (Hasumi and Emori 2004) in order to capture the wide range of plausible climate changes that this emission scenario might cause. Each climate model predicts both the current climate and the climate in 2100. Because of differences in the models, they generate a wide range of climate change predictions. The range of temperature outcomes across these four models

> 2 The Gulf states include Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The Southeast includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia. The Mid Atlantic includes Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. New England includes Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine.

6