rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- King, Robert G., and Levine, Ross. "Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Tlheory and Evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, December 1 993b, 32(3), pp. 513-42.

- Kyei, Alexander. "Deposit Protection Arrangements: A Comparative Study," IMF Working Paper No. WP/95/134, December, 1995.

- Levine, Ross, and Renelt, David. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, September 1992, 82(4), pp. 942-63.

- Levine, Ross. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," World Bank inimeo, October, 1996.

- Levine, Ross, and Zervos, Sara. "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth," World Bank mimeo, December, 1996.

- Marglin, Stephien A. "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment," Ouarterly Journal of Economics, February 1963, 77, pp. 95-1 12.

- McKinnon, Ronald _I. Money and Capital in Economic Development,_ Washilgton, DC: Brookings Institution, 1973.

- Ministry of Economics and the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, "Experience and Lessons from Financial Market Instability: The Argentine Experience," Paper prepared for GI 0 Working Party on Emerging Market Instability, December, 1996.

- Pigou, Arthur C. _The Economics of Welfare._ 4th ed; Londoni: Macmillan, 1932.

- Quirk, James, and Terasawa, Katsuaki. "Choosing a Government Discount Rate: An Alternative Approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1991, 20, pp. 16-28.

- Schumpeter, Joseph A. _Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung,_ Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1912. _[The Theory of Economic Development,_ 1912, translated by Redvers Opie. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.]

- Sherif, Khaled. "Egypt's Public Enterprise Experience," Published in Arabic. Cairo: AlAhram. 1992.

- Sherif, Khaled, and Soos, Regina. "Egypt's Liberalization Experience and Its Impact on StateOwned Enterprise Industrial Performance," in lliya Harik and Dennis Sullivan, eds., _Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East._ Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993.

- Shirley, Mary, and Nellis, John. _Public Enterprise Reform. The Lessons of Experience._ Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.

- Stallings, Barbara, and Brock, Philip. "Economic Adjustment in Chile: 1973-90," in Robert Bates and Anne Kreuger, eds., _Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Evidencefrom Eight Countries._ Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Limited, 1993.

28
-jt

16

1. For early analysis see Hinds, 1990, Gelb and Gay, 1991, Braird, 1991, and BG3hm and Kreacic, 1991. A reent analysis is Phelps, Frydman, Rapaczynski and Schleifer, 1993.

2. For a proposal along these lines see Brainard, 1991.

3. In a worst case scenario, the total net worth of all former slate banks could be a negative 5-20% of GDP, depending on the level of debt outstanding.

4. Newly enterng foreign bankcs have mostly focussed an foreign trade related activities and have done littlo lending to domestic entrprises. And lack of domestic capital has prevented the emergence of new domestic banks.

S. A few other countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Estonia), have pursued a similar appa.

6. Central Bank of Russia regulations require that banks have at least three shareholders, and no shareholder can hold more than 35 % of a bank or credit institution.

7. This is not unusual. Japanese firms relied initially on their banks fcr financial management and services, as financial skills were scarce.

8. At times, the minimum was significantly less than US $10,000. An increase to ECU S million (and indexed) is to be phased-in over the next several years.

9. For more details and data see Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993.

10. Data from Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.

- I1. The state property funds bold the remaining 20%.

12. See Aoki, 1994.

13. The dismantling of the Zaibatsu' conglomertes in Japan in the late 1940s also involved Iarge employee ownership that was later reduced as workers sold their stakes (Miyajima, 1994).

14. Equity stakes can compensate losses with large capital gains. Commercial loass, by conarast, offer only downside risks and are appropriate only if losses can be held to very low levels. At high default rates, required intermediation margins become so large that only speculative or fraudulent borsowers will be willig to take loans at such high real interest rates.
Specifically, we used an adapted version of the Ages-and-Stages Questionnaire (ASQ) (Bricker et al., 1999) to collect child development measures relating to communication, gross and fine motor coordination, problem solving, and personal-social development.<sup>10</sup> The ASQ was primarily administered by enumerators specially trained for this activity, with the exception of items relating to child behaviors, which are typically difficult to observe during a household visit. These items were reported by the primary caregiver of the target child. We report an aggregated ASQ score and scores for each of the domains. Scores are standardized using the means and standard deviations of the control group.

At endline, we measured child development using the direct assessment tool of the Measurement of Development Early Learning (MODEL) to asses the school readiness level of target children in our sample.<sup>11</sup> We collected information to measure domains related to early literacy and math skills, executive function (working memory), socialemotional motor skills for and interest in This as- development, fine writing, literacy. sessment was performed at home in the presence of the primary caregiver. We estimate scores separately for each of these domains. Scores are standardized using the means and standard deviations of the control group.

# **Outcomes on other household members**

_Parental Practices._ To measure the of we used an ver- quality parental practices, adapted sion of the UNICEF Multi-Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and its Family Care Indicator (Hamadani et al., 2010; Kariger et al., 2012) to collect data on (i) the provision of stimulation for children and (ii) the home learning environment (home play activities). The two outcomes were collected at follow up, and we also collected data on the stimulation provided by any member of the household at the beginning of the study. We estimate

> 10The ASQ is composed of age-specific sections, dividing children aged 36 to 59 months into 4 groups of 6-month age intervals. Versions of the ASQ have been extensively adapted and used in several different conditions all over the world including in Chile (Veramendi and Urzua, 2011), Ecuador (Handal et al., 2007), Cambodia (Bouguen et al., 2018), Tanzania (Fernald et al., 2009), and more recently, in a similar setting in Mozambique (Martinez et al., 2017).

> 11The MODEL module was developed through the Measuring Early Learning Quality & Outcomes (MELQO) initiative (UNICEF, 2017) and has been used extensively around the world, including in Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Sudan, and Tanzania (Raikes et al., 2019). In contrast to the ASQ assessment used at baseline, the MODEL tool is not age-specific and all target children were administered the same items.

13
# **Table I – Summary Statistics**

||**All**<br>**Observations**|**Observations**<br>**With Treaties**|**Observations**<br>**Without Treaties**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Observations|1599|426|1173|
|Observations with events|320|168|152|
|Mean BAR value for dyads with events|1.664|1.643|1.686|
|Average number of treatiesper dyad|0.802|3.004|0|
|Observations with alliances|881|283|598|
|Mean democracyscore|0.549|1.446|0.224|
|Coefficient of variation ofprecipitation|0.1406|0.1408|0.1399|

Table II presents the results with the **_Treaty dummy_** variable and Table III those results with the **_Number of Treaties_** variable. We present four models for each specification according to Equations 1 and 2: Geographic Controls (Columns 1 and 5), Political Controls (Columns 2 and 6), Political and Geographic Controls and no CoV (Columns 3 and 7), and Full model (Columns 4 and 8). In both cases, the regressions are presented in stepwise form beginning with a reduced form model and extending to a full form model including all independent variables.

The mere existence of a treaty seems to have a positive impact on cooperation in two of the four model specifications (Table II). The results for the number of treaties and their impact on cooperation are more robust than the results for the mere presence of treaties, showing a significant positive correlation across all model specifications (Table III). These two findings seem consistent with the findings of Brochmann and Hensel (2007; 2009; 2012). The authors find that while the existence of a river treaty does not necessarily prevent disagreements (operationalized as conflicting country claims) between states over their shared water resources, the presence of at least one treaty over the specific subject of the claim provides an important starting point that greatly increases the likelihood of negotiations over such claims. In other words, the existence of at least one treaty seems to provide the context for continued negotiations, which could take the form of additional treaties. Those subsequent treaties signed in a given basin may, in turn, suggest two possible trends. First, earlier treaties require updating to meet changing needs over time. Second, those subsequent treaties are often more specific in their application in comparison to the original treaty, which tends to be general in scope, and may have a more positive impact on cooperation (Dinar 2008).

14
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Sergio Firpo and Alysson Portella. Decline in Wage Inequality in Brazil: A Survey inequality in the 2000s, has possibly lost its potential of reducing it. The reason is twofold. First, the economic outlook in Brazil is still dire. Wages are stagnant, unemployment rose quickly, and growth is probably far from returning to the levels observed during the commodity boom. As argued by Ferreira et al. (2017) and Engbom and Moser (2018), the negative relationship between the minimum wage and inequality seems to depend on the economic context, and the current outlook may not be suitable for this sort of policy. Second, the minimum wage bite has increased to historically high standards, and are among the largest in the region, now reaching around 70% of the median wage.<sup>23</sup> It is possible that at such high levels, no room is left for the minimum wage to act as a compressor of the earnings distribution. In fact, recently the Brazilian government announced a stop on the policy of real increases in the minimum wage.

The international context may not favor reductions in inequality either. First, the commodity boom that seems to have favored the reduction in inequality will probably not return any time soon. Second, with the devaluation of the real, we should expect an increase in the employment in exporting firms, thus triggering an inequality-enhancing mechanism as described by Helpman et al. (2010). Moreover, if skill-biased technical change was actually acting in Brazil, but countered by other trends, with the retreat of these other forces, inequality may rise as a consequence.

Changes in the wage gaps among groups of workers should follow the underlying causes behind their decrease in the last decades. Therefore, changes that reduce interfirm heterogeneity and increase competition should reduce racial and gender gaps. Nonetheless, it is also possible that the current high levels of unemployment may penalize more these minority groups and increase gaps. It is not clear what is behind the gaps across formal and informal workers and whether more enforcement would increase or decrease them. Regional gaps probably vary according to overall economic dynamics that may be beyond the control of policy makers. However, based on the numbers reported by Ferreira et al. (2017), we should expect that the speed of convergence in the return among the groups will decrease, as it did during the 2000s compared to the 1990s.

Education expansion is a way of reducing inequality that may be effective, if the Brazilian economy manages to switch from a situation characterized by the “paradox of progress” and move to a phase of decreasing inequality in the “Kuznets curve”. Not only is there a long way until Brazil reaches the levels of schooling as other developed countries, but there is space for improvement in the quality of education, where Brazil lags behind even among developing countries. However, apart from improving the quantity and quality of schooling, there is little space for the government to act.

> 23Based on data from PNAD Cont ́ınua, third quarter of 2018.

30
Imports of tradable commodities in all provinces would drop when emissions allowances are distributed through auctioning, no matter allocating the revenue to local government or household, and also the negative impacts on imports of all provinces when emissions allowances are distributed through emission-based grandfathering. However, imports of tradable commodities in several provinces (e.g., Beijing, Gansu, Hunan, Qinghai) would increase slightly when emission allowances are allocated through output-based grandfathering. When considering the impacts on import by sector, every sector will decrease their imports when emission allowances are distributed through emission-based grandfathering, but some sectors (for example, non-metal sector, metal sector, electric power sector) will increase their imports under two kinds of auctioning schemes and output-based grandfathering scheme. In most of the provinces, negative impacts on imports are higher under auctioning as compared to grandfathering, and also negative impacts on imports are higher under emission-based grandfathering as compared to output-based grandfathering.

**Table 8. Impacts on Import (% change from the baseline in 2030)**

(a) By Sector

|Sector|Free All<br>(Grandfa|owances<br>thering)|Auctioni|ng|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||With L<br>|inkage|With Link<br>|age<br>|
||Emission<br>based|Output-based|Revenue<br>To LocalGovernment|Revenue<br>To Household|
|AGRI|-1.3|-1.0|-1.9|-1.7|
|COAL|-18.4|-12.3|-13.6|-13.5|
|OILNG|-1.8|-0.7|-2.1|-2.0|
|MINE|-0.1|0.0|-1.0|-0.6|
|FTPMF|-0.8|-0.3|-1.2|-0.9|
|PETRO|-3.0|-0.5|-1.4|-1.4|
|CHEMI|-0.2|0.7|0.1|0.3|
|NMETA|0.0|4.0|3.0|3.5|
|METAL|0.0|1.1|0.4|0.8|
|OTHMF|-0.4|-0.4|-1.0|-0.6|
|ELECT|-0.8|5.8|4.1|4.5|
|GAS|-5.7|1.2|-2.3|-2.0|
|WATER|-1.4|1.5|-1.1|-0.7|
|CONST|-0.4|-0.2|-0.9|-0.5|
|TRANS|-1.1|-0.5|-1.3|-1.4|
|SERVI|-1.0|-0.3|-0.6|-1.4|

52
Policy Research Working Paper 5824

# **Abstract**

This paper investigates the short-run consumption expenditure dynamics and the interaction of public and private arrangements of ultra-poor and labor-constrained households in Malawi using an original dataset from the Mchinjii social cash transfer pilot project (one of the first experiments of social protection policies based on unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa). The authors exploit the unique source of exogenous variation provided by the randomized component of the program in order to isolate the effect of cash transfers on consumption expenditures as well as the net crowding out effect of cash transfers on private arrangements. They find a statistically significant reduction effect on the level of consumption expenditures for those households receiving cash transfers, thus leading to the rejection of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis. Moreover, by looking at the effects of cash transfers on private arrangements in a context characterized by imperfect enforceability of contracts and by a social fabric heavily compromised by high HIV/AIDS rates, the analysis confirms the presence of crowding out effects on private arrangements when looking at gifts and (to a lesser extent) remittances, while informal loans seem to be completely independent from the cash transfer’s reception. From a policy perspective, the paper offers a contribution to the evaluation of the very recent wave of social protection policies based on (unconditional) cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that there might be an important role for public interventions aimed at helping households to pool risk more effectively.

This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at fstrobbe@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
ties."InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnaly- Kneese, A. V. and B. T. Bower. _Managing_ Water _Quality:_ sis, Laxenburg, Austria, December, 1982. Mimeo.

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- Major, D. C. and H. E. Schwarz. _Large-Scale Regional WaterResources Planning._ Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

- Hufschmidt,M. M. andJ. A. _Dixon.EconomicEvaluation_ Mann, P. C. _Water 3?rvice: Regulation and Rate Reform. Techniquesfor the Environment._ Johns Hopkins Press, NationalRegulatoryResearchInstitute,Columbus,Ohio, 1986. 1981.

- NationalRegulatoryResearchInstitute,Columbus,Ohio, 1981.

- Integrating Water Sector Planning into Economy Wide Planing Models." Paper presentedat the l2thInterna- ' tional SymposiumonMathematicalProgramming,Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1985.

- _Pricing Policy for Development_

- _Management._ EDI Series in Economic Dew -ment, Johns Hopkins Press, 1983.

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World Bank. _Village Water Supply._ World Bank, 1976.

18
to third parties and nonparticipants (both experience a 1.9 percent decline). While these differences are not statistically significant, their ranking suggests that within the set of disputes over policies that negatively affect many exporting countries, suffering the largest price decline may contribute to why the complainant country is the one to step forward to initiate and potentially litigate the dispute at the WTO.

The impact on prices for the ‘partial’ policies under dispute is quite different, though this is also subject to caveats. Complainant export prices to the respondent increase by 0.9 percent on average, whereas third country export prices decline by 5.0 percent. This is consistent with an average outcome whereby third party exporters lower their price alongside the respondent’s policy imposition against the complainant, perhaps with the intention of increasing their shares of the respondent’s import market. While we do not speculate on explanations behind any such pattern, thereby leaving a formal investigation for future research, we do reiterate that confirmation would also require distinguishing between whether non-complainant exporters were subject to or beneficiaries of the allegedly WTOinconsistent respondent’s ‘partial’ policy.

# **_Complainants typically have lower-priced exports of the disputed products to the respondent than the other categories of exporting countries._**

Our final comparison concerns the relative levels of unit prices for the three different categories of exporting countries to the respondent. Interestingly, Table 5 reveals the complainant as the low-priced supplier to the respondent, on average, relative to the third party exporters as well as the nonparticipant exporters. There is evidence of this in the full sample of disputes – i.e., 1.1 for complainants, relative to 1.5 for third party exporters and 6.1 for non-participants – as well as in both the global policy and partial policy subsamples. While we again do not stress these results given the caveats associated with using HS06 unit values to proxy for exporter-received prices, it is still worth considering the potential implications of the complainant being the low-priced exporter.

First, such an empirical result would be mildly surprising for the sample of ‘global’ policy disputes for at least one reason. Recall in global policy disputes that the respondent’s alleged WTOviolating policy does not single out one exporter but is instead imposed on a relatively MFN-conforming basis that adversely affects all foreign sources of the disputed product similarly. The empirical evidence and intuition drawn from the ‘quality ladders’ literature (e.g., Schott, 2004; Khandelwal, 2010) suggests that higher prices across exporters within a HS-06 product category may be indicative of varieties that are of higher quality, and produced by firms that can potentially charge higher mark-ups and earn higher 27
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**Figure 3: Herfindahl Indices in the Nigerian Banking Market, 2000-2005**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2000q1 2001q3 2003q1 2004q3 2006q1<br>date<br>(mean) Herfindahl_loans (mean) Herfindahl_deposits<br>.08<br>.07<br>.06<br>.05<br>.04<br>.03<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own calculations based on CBN data The Herfindahl index is calculated as the summation of the individual banks’ market shares squared, scaled by 10,000. The Herfindahl in the deposit market is given by _herfindahl_deposits_ and in the lending market by _herfindahl_loans._ 33