Overall, the pattern of results suggests that household responses to these vignettes are shaped by what they learn from radio programming about the importance of health and education. We provide more direct evidence of this in the sections below.

Those who listen to community radio are less likely to prefer clientelist candidates A second question about mechanisms is whether respondents who report _listening_ to community radio are also less likely to prefer clientelist politicians. The data allow us to document a strong association, if not a causal relationship, between listening and candidate preferences.

In particular, the survey asked household respondents to list the radio stations to which they listen. We post-coded the response to match the reported radio station to the type of station (community, public, private commercial, or religious) and created an indicator variable for whether the respondent reported listening to a community radio station. We can therefore estimate:

- (3) Preferences for clientelist candidatesijk = β0 + β1HHs listen to community radiojk + β2HHs listen to community radiojk ∗number of children+ +β3number of children+ XijkB+ YjkΓ+ μk + εijk.

We use estimates of equation (3) to examine whether there is an association between the component of household listening behavior that can be explained by radio access and preferences for clientelist candidates. To do this, we instrument household listening with the four radio access variables – the number of community, public, religious and private radio stations that are received by the household’s village – and we instrument the interaction term (household listening *number of children) with the corresponding access variable (number of community radios * number of children).

# **Table 7:  Households with children that listen to community radio are less likely to prefer clientelist candidates**

|Dependent variable:|Jobs versu<br>Cand<br>|s Health<br>idate<br>|Jobs versus<br>Cand<br>|Education<br>idate<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Radio<br>controls<br>only|All<br>controls|Radio<br>controls<br>only|All<br>controls|
|Household listens to community radio|0.00229|-0.359|0.240|-0.172|
||(1.00)|(1.00)|(0.57)|(0.72)|
|**HH listens to community radio X number**|**-0.125**|**-0.106**|**-0.0965**|**-0.0769**|
|**of children**|**(0.04)**|**(0.06)**|**(0.05)**|**(0.08)**|
|Number of children listed|0.0798|0.0794|0.0601|0.0543|
||(0.05)|(0.03)|(0.06)|(0.07)|
|Observations|4,079|3,556|4,088|3,565|
|R-squared|-0.04|-0.15|0.04|0.00|

Note: All specifications estimated with two stage least squares, with commune fixed effects, instrumenting for household listenership. Robust _p_ -values, with standard errors clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates of the following controls are insignificant and not reported: ethnic dummies (Bariba, Yoa/Lokpa, Ditamari); gender and ages of household head and respondent; whether respondent has completed elementary, secondary or higher education; religion and marital status of respondent; number of adults in the household; whether the household has a mobile phone or TV; whether the village chief has a primary education; the population of the village; whether the village has a secondary school, literacy center or health or maternity center; presence of a paved road; number of functional private schools; the number of potable water sources; the probability any two households speak the same language at home.

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