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This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Yemen context and various manners in which the capture of territory from the government might affect households in non-violent settings; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 describes the empirical strategy; Section 5 presents estimates of the change in expenditure and the change in coping strategies following the capture of the city; Section 6 presents estimates of the change in intra-household decision making; and Section 7 concludes.

# **2. The Capture of Sana‘a and the Potential Effects on Households**

The causes of the conflict in Yemen are complex and involve a number of factors. The Houthi rebels, originating from the northern governorate of Sa’dah, had repeatedly fought against the national government beginning in the mid 2000‘s. The Houthis’ movement began as a theological movement that protested the national government. However, following this protest, the government used the military to try and arrest their leader, which led to a a number of wars during which the group made few gains, and was repeatedly beaten back by the military.<sup>8</sup> However, following the Arab Spring in 2011, the government led by Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to hand over power to his vice president and a transitional unity government. Using this political vacuum and the unpopularity of the transition government, the Houthis began making military gains against the internationally-recognized government after its formation in 2012 in the hopes of having more representation in the transitional government. These military gains eventually led to the quick capture of the capital Sana‘a in September of 2014, and then eventually an attempt to capture the southern part of the country.<sup>9</sup><sup>_,_10</sup> The capture of Sana’a resulted in a number of shocks that could have affected households. First, the political uncertainty likely significantly impacted economic activity and investment. Although the evacuation of foreigners accelerated at the beginning of 2015<sup>11</sup> , it is possible that the climate immediately following the capture of Sana’a could have caused many international

> 8See (accessed July 2017): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadiprotests-201482132719818986.html.

> 9See (accessed July 2017): http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.

> 10Some have posited that one of the potential reasons that the capture of the city was accomplished so quickly and with little violence is that it is possible that the military gains were aided by the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who might have directed loyal military forces to stand down in the face of the Houthi aggression (see (accessed July 2017): http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-securitysaleh-idUSKBN0MM1MV20150326). Although it seems unlikely that the former president who waged many wars against the Houthis would then form an alliance with them, some have speculated that they each had a set of common rivals and could develop a mutually beneficial arrangement (see (accessed July 2017): https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/05/11/houthi-saleh-alliance-convenience/). This potential alliance is further corroborated by the targeting of enemies of both the Houthis and the former president by Houthi forces after the capture of Sana‘a (see (accessed July 2017): http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/25/houthiyemen-takeover.html), the relative ease with which the Houthis were making military gains against a government that were elusive before Saleh was forced out of office, reports of the Yemen army fighting along the Houthi rebels (see (accessed July 2017): http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-salehidUSKBN0MM1MV20150326), and a formal announcement of an alliance after the conflict escalated in March of 2015 (see (accessed July 2017): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/cloneofcloneofcloneofstrikes-yemensaada-breach–150510143647004.html).

> 11See (accessed August 2018) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32162364.

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