rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
sector, as benefits are likely to be low regardless of the level of contributions. Below, we provide the detailed descriptions of the social protection programs of interest.

# **2.1 Ndihma Ekonomike**<sup>**4**</sup>

Albania is divided into 12 administrative regions (prefectures), 36 districts and 374 municipalities (65) and communes (309). As currently administered, the NE program requires the elected councils of communes to submit their requests for social assistance funds to the Regional State Social Service Office Administration based on their own assessments of their households’ needs. These requests are considered by the State Social Service Administration (SSS), which assesses and submits each commune’s request for financial assistance to the Directorate for Programming and Development (DPD) in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA). The DPD then decides on the final allocation to each commune, in accordance with the national budget adopted by the parliament.<sup>5</sup> Subsequent to the decision of the DPD and the distribution of NE funds to municipalities and communes, the _intra-commune_ allocation process has three steps. First, the head of the household applies for social assistance at the local NE office and undergoes an interview with a social administrator. Filing of applications for social assistance occurs _monthly_ whereas the interview by the social administrator is renewed _annually_ . Monthly application requires the head of the household to re-state the income sources of the household as well as any updates regarding the employment status of household members or household property ownership. This

> 4The details of the NE program presented in this section are obtained from Albanian Council of Ministers (2005). 5The DPD’s determination process of communes’ final NE allocations is not as transparent as it should be. None of the official MLSA documents clearly defines the specifics of the inter-commune allocation process. However, it is known that the commune councils provide the Ministry information on a range of socio-economic variables at the commune level that are relevant to the NE program. The weight assigned to each variable is determined by the SSS specialists.

6
# Table 1: Comparison of Pricing Methods with Efficiency<sup>**/**Equity</sup><sup>_I_Water Quality Management</sup>

|Pricing<br>Scheme|Implementation|Potential<br>Efficiency<br>Achieved|Time Horizon<br>of Efficiency|Ability to<br>Control Demand|*Affect on<br>Intra-Sectoral<br>Income<br>Distribution|Adaptability to<br>Water Quality<br>Conditions|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Single-rate<br>Volumetric|Complicated|First-best|Short-run|Easy|Small / None|Easy|
|Output / Input|Less Complicated|Second-<br>|Short-run|Relatively Easy<br>|Small / None|Difficult|
|Per Area|Easy|best<br>None|N/A|Through Variable<br>Cropping<br>Restrictions/ Fees|Small / None|Difficult|
|Tiered|Relatively<br>Complicated|First-best|Short-run|Easy|Moderate|Relatively<br>Easy|
|Two-Part|Relatively<br>Complicated|First-best|Long-run|Relatively<br>Easy|Moderate|Relatively<br>Easy|
|Water<br>Markets|Difficult|First-best|Short-run /<br>Long-run|Depends on<br>Type of<br>Market|Depends on<br>Type of Market|Easy|

## Source: Adapted from Tsur and Dinar (1995).

- The potential for redistribution depends on the assumption of<sup>homogenous farmers. In cases where farmers are employing</sup> different technologies and are growing different crops, pricing mechanisms<sup>can target certain agricultural sectors to pay more</sup> or less than other sectors.

41
<!-- Start of picture text --> T*=1.7 °C T*=2°C<br>a b<br>6<br>x<<br>wo<br>xe}<br>£<br>>5<br><<br>8<br>u4<br>Cc<br>a]<br>oS<br>2 3<br>U<br>ry<br>Cc<br>22<br>2<br>xe}<br>xt<br> VVCVoOV030303 0 VVCVoOCV0505u0u030C 0<br>2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 #2050 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 £2050<br>Year information is revealed Year information is revealed<br>— Pre-2030 Spending — Post-2030 Spending<br><!-- End of picture text -->
42 possibility of using land as collateral), when governance controls on necessary communal resources are maintained, and where significant environmental externalities are absent.<sup>60</sup> More theoretical and empirical studies of the types described are needed to discover the complex cause and effect links between property rights, different kinds of complementary (or conflicting) institutions and investment. It is important that measures and proxies for property rights and institutions be based on a realistic theoretical framework that recognizes the complex nature of property rights and the multidimensional ways in which different kinds of property rights can affect incentives for different kinds of productive and non-productive (or redistributive) activities. Such proxies are inherently difficult to construct and must rely on painstaking surveys of the participants or on widely known features of the institutional environment. This is what was essentially done by Besley. With better and more contextspecific data, more accurate tests can be conducted to determine how changes in specific property rights institutions implemented in various cultural and environmental contexts will affect different kinds of investments. Ultimately, which policies and institutions will promote and which will hinder growthenhancing investments will depend on the existing cultural, political and economic circumstances of particular societies. Policies and institutions that are effective in specific societies under particular historical circumstances may not be effective in other societies with widely differing social norms and administrative capabilities.

> 60 See Deininger and Feder [2000]; and Binswanger et. al. [1995].
<!-- Start of picture text --> Trends in censorship (2001-2015)<br>2000 2005 2010 2015<br>Year<br>Evolution of the constraints of media freedom (2001-2015)<br>2000 2005 2010 2015<br>Year<br>Political constraints Economic constraints<br>Legal constraints<br>800<br>600<br>400<br>Total number of censorship events<br>200<br>19<br>18<br>17<br>16<br>15<br>Mean scores of media constraints 14<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: Global trends in the total number of salient censorship events (2001–2015) Figure 2: Censorship versus other forms of capture: global trends in three media freedoms over time (2001–2015) It is worth noting that the increasing trend in our objective count of censorship events is corroborated by the subjective indicator of political constraints of the press that worsened significantly during the last 15 years. In comparison, the economic constraints indicator - an inducement-based proxy of media capture – remained relatively constant over time (Figure 2). Non-coercive media capture achieved via economic means also seems to affect some outlets more than others, as a function of the political importance of their audiences, in line with our theoretical hypotheses. In one of the most systematic studies of bribes ever conducted, the ‘price’ that 12
- 15 -

In the livestock income equation, land areas for grazing ( _G_ ) is used instead of rain-fed or irrigated areas. Fertilizer and pesticides are, of course, irrelevant and removed. To estimate the impacts on nonagricultural income, all these agricultural input variables are excluded.

# **<u>Table 4. Summary statistics</u>**

|<br>Variable|Abb.|Obs.|Mean|Std. Dev.|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Household income from (Birr):|||||||
|Crop production (including own consumption)|Y<sup>Crop</sup>|1,877|9,722|22,162|50.00|800,000|
|Livestock (including own consumption)|Y<sup>Livestock</sup>|1,094|8,072|8,962|40.00|111,000|
|Nonagricultural activities (exc. remittance)|Y<sup>NonAG</sup>|3,157|19,519|30,251|36.00|754,000|
|Crop sales at market (US$)|SALE|1,044|573|4,318|1.03|133,919|
|Dummy variable for program beneficiaries:|||||||
|RSDP|D<sup>RSDP</sup>|4,639|0.20|0.40|0|1|
|URRAP|D<sup>URRAP</sup>|4,639|0.67|0.47|0|1|
|RSDP within 2km distance|D<sup>RSDP2mk</sup>|4,639|0.11|0.31|0|1|
|URRAP within 2km distance|D<sup>URRAP2km</sup>|4,639|0.33|0.47|0|1|
|Household labor force (16< age <60)|L|4,639|2.64|1.37|0|10|
|Rain fed crop production area (ha)|R|1,721|1.32|2.38|0.025|75.00|
|Irrigated land area (ha)|I|137|0.62|1.14|0.013|10.00|
|Land area for grazing (ha)|G|365|0.57|2.26|0.013|25.00|
|Fertilizer used (kg)|F|927|4.40|17.99|0.005|200.00|
|Pesticides used (litre)|P|441|5.89|57.78|0.003|1200.00|
|Size of household|SIZE|4,639|5.00|2.28|1|14|
|Dummy variable for male household head|MALE|4,639|0.78|0.42|0|1|
|Age of household head|AGE|4,639|45.72|15.00|14|99|
|Dummy for the level of education attained by hou|sehold head:||||||
|1 to 6 grade||4,639|0.19|0.39|0|1|
|7 to 8 grade|EDU2|4,639|0.11|0.31|0|1|
|9 to 12 grade|EDU3|4,639|0.14|0.35|0|1|
|Technical/ vocational certificate|EDU4|4,639|0.01|0.10|0|1|
|University/ college diploma|EDU5|4,639|0.05|0.22|0|1|
|University/ college degree|EDU6|4,639|0.03|0.17|0|1|
|Adult education program/ Non-formal|EDU7|4,639|0.04|0.19|0|1|
|Dummy variable for infrastructure services:|||||||
|Electricity for cooking|COOK|4,639|0.03|0.18|0|1|
|<br>Electricity for lighting|LIGH|<br>4,639|0.61|0.49|0|1|
|Time fixed effects:|||||||
|_t_=2013|T2013|4,639|0.20|0.40|0|1|
|_t_=2014|T2014|4,639|0.20|0.40|0|1|
|_t_=2015|T2015|4,639|0.19|0.40|0|1|
|_t_=2016|T2016|4,639|0.20|0.40|0|1|
|**Reconciliat**|**ion**<br>**of Pro**|**T**<br>**duction and**<br>(mi|**ABLE 1.1**<br>**Expenditure A**<br>llion<br>pesos)|**PProach toG **|**DP**-<br>**Axico 14**|**75**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||GDP by<br>Industry<br>of Origin<br>(1)|Intermediate<br>Inputs<br>(2)|Gross Value<br>of Output<br>(3)|Impozts<br> <br>c.i.f.<br>(4)|Distributive<br>Costs,**incl.**<br>import duty<br>(5)|Intermediate<br> <br>Uses<br>(6)|**Final**<br>Demand<br>(7)|
|Agriculture,<br>Forestry<br>& Fishing|123,153|48,232|171,385|9.303|37,770|112,325|106,133|
|Mining|31,730|12,896|44,625|3,304|5,006|39,734|13,202|
|Manufacturing|256,701|409,750|666,451|69,921|273,538|419,491|590,419|
|Electricity|9,793|<br>3.507|13,300|5|0|9,168|4,138|
|Construction|65,811|66,048|131,859|0|0|0|131,859|
|Commerce Restaurants<br>& Hotels|277,033|44,849|321,882|0|0|275,706|46,177|
|Transport,<br>Storage<br>& Communicatio|n 62,612|30,539|93,151|2,751|0|54,092|41,810|
|Financial<br>Services|104,286|12,436|116,722|3,028|G|44,312|75,438|
|Other Services|181,055|58,753|239,807|146|0|60,621|179,333|
|Total|1,100,05|0 699,133|1,799,182|105,821a|316,314|1,015,447|1.205.871'|

a) includes 17,363 million pesos of imports going directly to final demand.

Source: Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico, Tomo 1, Resumen General, pp, 106, 138. The figures include indirect taxes and subsidies. When imports are deducted from the total in the last column, it **is** equal to the total in the first column.
Figure 9: Global Growth incidence curves The education wave versus the no-wave scenario <!-- Start of picture text --> 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Education Wave No Wave<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>Per capita income/consumption<br>annual percentage change, 2012−2030<br>2<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations based on GIDD projections.

These GICs highlight several interesting points. First, the education wave provides its highest benefits for the population with incomes between the bottom 20 and top 20; growth rates for the groups at the two extremes of the distribution are 1 to 2 percentage points lower than for the group in the middle. Second, the no- education wave rates of income expansion are below those of the education wave scenario for everyone with incomes up to about the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile. This is expected as the education wave is mainly a wave in the developing world. Third, the distance between the two lines appears small but, for the middle of the distribution and the bottom 5 percent, the difference should not be underestimated. In fact, half a percentage point gap in growth rates accumulates to 10 percent larger incomes after 20 years, a non-trivial difference.

We also analyze the changes in the country composition of the bottom 20- and the top-20 percent of the global income distribution by 2030 (table A1 of the appendix). In 2012, eight countries made up three-quarters of the population in the bottom 20 of the global distribution. And India and China alone accounted for almost 50 percent of it. Most of the other countries in the bottom were from Sub-Saharan Africa. For some of these countries almost their entire national populations (or large shares of them) belonged to the global bottom 20. While only 15 percent of Chinese nationals occupied the global bottom 20, 97 percent of the South African citizens resided in the bottom 20, 82 per cent of those from Congo, and 60 percent of Nigerians. The composition changes significantly by 2030. Notably, China disappears while India still contributes one-quarter to the total world population in the bottom 20. India’s number corresponds to 23 percent of the total population of India, not 30 percent as in 2012. A similar evolution can be described for the top 20. With the arrival of China in 2030, a large percentage of citizens from the US and from Western European countries will lose their top positions.

25
relationship from religious texts or colonial writings. To gain knowledge of the contemporary, we must rely on a growing literature of empirical studies that have been conducted largely in post-independence India. Below we summarize two types of empirical work: literature based upon large sample surveys of the relationship between caste and gender using broad caste categories and empirical literature using smaller observational studies that provide some granular understandings of the relationship between jati and gender.

# **2.1 Perspectives from Large Datasets**

Empirical work on caste and gender has frequently compared groups at the bottom of the hierarchy with the rest of the population. This comparison is problematic considering that the groups that have been grouped together at the bottom have changed over time.

The attempt to identify these groups began in the colonial period (Dirks, 2011). The Government of India Act of 1935 created lists of castes and tribes entitled to affirmative action policies throughout British controlled India. Castes and tribes included in these lists were called “Scheduled Castes (SC)” and “Scheduled Tribes (ST)”. In independent India, Articles 341 and 342 of the Indian constitution continued this practice and used the same terminology as during colonial rule (Revankar 1971).<sup>6</sup> However, the jatis who are deemed eligible for inclusion in these groups have shifted over time, and the decisions regarding inclusion in these categories have become increasingly politicized. For example, in 1935, 429 castes were listed as SC at the colonial government at the time. In the most recent census of 2011 however, 1241 castes and 705 tribes had SC and ST status respectively (Census of India, 2011), and there are additional lists at the state level. In recent years, affirmative action benefits have also been extended to groups such as EBCs and OBCs who have faced similar disadvantages to SCs and STs, but were not previously eligible for compensatory programs. The groups included in this category also vary across states and have changed over time.

Given these difficulties in making comparisons between broad groups over time, many studies have relied on cross-sectional approaches to examine the relationships between caste, class and gender. Boserup, for example, examines these broad categories during the 1956–57 period to argue that in India, most female agricultural labor is drawn from SC/ST groups, and they are largely employed on “family farms belonging to men with non-working wives” (Boserup 1970: 69). More recently, Deshpande (2001) uses data

> 6 Article 46 of the 1950 Constitution states, “The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.”

6
uncovered employment may have risen because employees and employers collude to avoid costly contributions to a social protection system that is perceived to be inappropriate, inefficient and poor value for the money.<sup>26</sup> In principle, then, a universalization of health care de-linked from the labor market may have changed the cost benefit analysis of being enrolled in, and hence contributing to, formal sector benefits programs. In the end, they conclude that this is unlikely, not only because public health services continued to be thought of as substantially worse than the formal sector product,<sup>27</sup> but also because the effective supply of these services was available even for non contributors several years before the reforms took place (see Table 8), and little progress had been made on implementing the measures contemplated in the 1991 Social Security Reform.

Second, there was an increase in the magnitude of flows from the rural to the urban areas across the 1990s that, in principle, were it all directed toward the informal sector, might explain part of the rise.<sup>28</sup> Two facts lead us to discard this hypothesis. First, while there was a decrease in the size of the rural sector relative to the urban across the period, the population growth of the “metropolitan” areas that the PME is representative of (see Table 9) was roughly equivalent to that observed in non-metropolitan areas. Hence, there cannot have been substantial net migration into our sample.<sup>29</sup> This is consistent with the fact that the average schooling of informal workers increased significantly over the nineties and the schooling gap between formal and informal

> 26 Their estimates suggest that the earnings premium needed in the marketplace to compensate covered workers for having to make social security contributions varies between 7.5% and 12.2% of the mean uncovered hourly wage.

> 27 The public system acts as a floor, available to all but used primarily by the lower classes (Jack 2000). Although evaluation of standards for minimum quality in infrastructure, human resources, ethical, technical and scientific procedures in hospitals have been implemented, these practices are far from being universal in the services network (PAHO 2005)

> 28 See Ramos and Ferreira (2005ab) for a comprehensive description of the regional patterns of the Brazilian workforce.

> 29 Even if all of the rural workforce contraction observed during the nineties would have been a consequence of emigration towards urban zones, it would have only explained 13% of the increase of the urban’s workforce (or 19% of the increase in the urban informal workforce under the assumption that all the rural incoming workers inserted to this sector exclusively). The size of the urban and rural workforce (as well as of the metropolitan and non metropolitan ones) and the size of the formal/informal sectors are computed using the PNAD. This survey covers urban and rural areas of the whole country except for the rural areas of the Northern Region (which comprises the following _Unidades da Federação_ : Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá).

24
# **Gender-differentiated impacts of tenure insecurity on agricultural performance in Malawi’s customary tenure systems**

# **1. Introduction**

In most African countries, land access continues to be governed by customary tenure systems. These have long been argued to provide high levels of tenure security and flexibility at a cost well below that of ‘modern’ arrangements (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994). Yet, studies also highlight that, with population pressure, these systems face increasing pressure: Unclear rules on how to deal with outsiders –whether migrants or foreign investors– can trigger disputes, undermining investment (Berry 2009; Fenske 2010) and productivity (Linkow 2016). Bias against women may further compromise tenure security and productive resource use (Fenske 2011; Goldstein and Udry 2006), with women more likely to be affected by disputes and to suffer productivity losses than men (Deininger and Castagnini 2006). Unclear institutional responsibilities may lead to proliferation and persistence of conflict (Eck 2014). To respond to this challenge, countries aim to either comprehensively formalize tenure or to carve out land deemed to be unutilized from customary arrangements sporadically. Yet, the limited sustainability of past efforts at systematic formalization is well documented (Atwood 1990; Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994) and although more recent efforts imply that lower-cost approaches may provide a viable option (Ali _et al._ 2014a), the verdict on their sustainability is still out (Ali _et al._ 2016a). Yet, the alternative of carving out land from the customary domain for ‘commercial’ development on a case by case basis raises equity and productivity issues (Sitko _et al._ 2014).

To contribute to this discussion, this paper assesses estates’ impact on productivity and neighbors’ tenure security decades after their establishment in Malawi, a country that underwent a burst of estate creation in the 1980s and is thus ideal for such an exploration. We use the 2006/07 National Census of Agriculture and Livestock (NACAL) that contains data on smallholders and estates for descriptive and analytical evidence. Descriptively, we find that, although estates occupy more than 20% of Malawi’s agricultural area, a large part of their land is left unutilized and, for most crops, their productivity remains well below that of smallholders. Data from digitizing estate leases suggest that legal uncertainty created by the expiration of most leases and failure to collect realistic lease fees lead to large loss of public revenue, beyond weakening incentives for more effective land use and land market operation: Even assuming that 40% of the area registered under agricultural estates is non-existent or unsuitable for agriculture, leasing the remainder at 2
# **V- Conclusions**

While a vast literature exists analyzing the cross-border and local activities of multinational banks across countries, the determinants and implications of the mix of international bank claims had not, to our knowledge, been explored before. Using data on the Italian, Spanish, and U.S. bank claims vis-à-vis more than 100 countries, this paper sought to fill this void in the multinational banking literature.

First, we estimated a reduced form empirical model of the share of local to total foreign claims across host countries. In particular, we modeled the share of local to total foreign claims as a function of entry requirements and startup costs, informational costs, regulatory barriers to banking activities and foreign bank participation (or what we call lack of banking freedom), taxation, as well as profit opportunities and risks. We found that regulatory barriers to banking and measures of business opportunities and scale economies have the most consistently significant impact on the share of local bank claims. This share is smaller in countries that limit banking freedom. On the other hand, the share of local foreign bank claims tends to be higher in larger countries with better business opportunities. Entry requirements and startup costs, as well as informational costs, also seem to be important determinants of the share of local claims, but their impact is smaller and less robust.

Second, we presented evidence that the mix or composition of foreign bank financing affects the stability of foreign bank claims to host countries. Countries where a larger share of foreign claims is extended through the local affiliates of foreign banks, rather than through crossborder loans, tend to enjoy more stable foreign financing.

Our findings suggest that in order to reduce the volatility of foreign bank financing, countries should try to increase the share of foreign claims channeled through the local affiliates 25