the partial reform scenario to global free trade. Thus, it is a two-step distance from the initial point to full liberalization, and, if the partial reform is perfectly compatible with free trade, this distance should be exactly equal to the one-step distance of moving from the initial point to full liberalization directly. This measure of congruence is normalized so that it is equal to one when a partial reform is perfectly compatible with global free trade, and is greater than one when additional labor market “churning” is required to reach the desired outcome in two steps. Congruence _δ_ is formally expressed as follows: where _LDi_ is labor demand by sector, _LD_ is total labor demand, and 0, _p_ , and _f_ denote the base year, final year of the partial reform, and final year of the full reform, respectively. It should be noted that this measure of congruence is sensitive to the level of aggregation of the model (i.e. the number of sectors), and, _ceteris paribus_ , is likely to be higher in models with finer levels of sectoral detail.

Table 9 summarizes this congruence measure for some of the simulations described in the earlier sections. In all cases, preferential reform implies a pattern of sectoral adjustment that is inconsistent with full liberalization against all trading partners ( _FL_ ). The largest differences between partial liberalization and full reform are observed for the _CBL_ and _CBL_<sup>_hi_scenarios.Thisisbecausetariffs</sup> in Honduras are already low and biased against the rest of the world (excluding the US and the EU). Therefore, further liberalization vis-`a-vis the US results in an additional deepening of this bias, which must be corrected when tariffs against all trading partners—and their tariffs against Honduras—are eliminated. In particular, trade reform in the _CBL_ and _CBL_<sup>_hi_scenarios heavily favors</sup> agricultural production, while full liberalization ( _FL_ ) benefits manufacturing relatively more. On the other hand, in a scenario where the DR-CAFTA preferences are phased in with regard to all trading partners, the congruence metric is significantly lower. This result is not surprising since section 6.3 has shown that _CML_ benefits manufacturing production relatively more, and this brings the country closer to the full multilateral outcome ( _FL_ ).

Table 9: Congruence between DR-CAFTA and Full Trade Liberalization

||_CBL_|_C_<sup>_hi_</sup><br>_BL_|_CML_|
|---|---|---|---|
|Distance: baseline (_BaU_) to partial|1.23|1.23|1.04|
|Distance: partial to global (_FL_)|0.45|0.41|0.22|
|Congruence|1.67|1.63|1.25|

_Source:_ Author’s calculations.

Since the movement of workers across sectors is rarely frictionless, these results suggest that the implementation of DR-CAFTA as a hub-and-spoke arrangement between the US and CACM partners (together with the Dominican Republic) could be very costly in terms of subsequent transition to global free trade, should it occur. Although we lack a truly global model with which to contrast the patterns of regional and global comparative advantage for Honduras, this result implies that the products Honduras sells to the US may not represent its global comparative advantage if 29