political processes. This is commonly measured by the share of parliamentarians or ministers who are women. A second area is within the household, where the degree of women’s bargaining power can influence household decisions and resource allocations.

In the area of political voice, there is no empirical evidence that increased female participation affects growth.<sup>26</sup> While some recent research, for example, documents that women elected to village councils in India have systematically different preferences about the types of public goods which should be provided than do men—women prefer to invest in water, fuel and roads, while men prefer to invest in education (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004)—the consequences of these differential patterns of public investment for growth and poverty alleviation have not been explored.<sup>27</sup> At the household level, there is ample evidence of the impact of greater female bargaining power (proxied for by own-labor earnings or own-assets) translating into better health and nutritional outcomes for children. The impact of this type of voice is discussed later in the Section 9.

# _Gender equality of opportunity and growth_

The effect on growth of increased gender equality of opportunity has received far more attention than either equality of voice or equality under the law. Equality of opportunity in education has received particular attention, for two simple reasons. First, education—and, more broadly human capital—is easily incorporated into two frequently-used econometric models of economic growth: the augmented Solow model and endogenous growth models.<sup>28</sup> Second, educational inequalities are both easily measurable and these measures are widely available.<sup>29</sup> The first generation of panel regression studies examining the relationship between genderdisaggregated measures of educational attainment and growth in per capita GDP find little difference between the effect of male and female education. Two well-known studies (Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1994) even find that base-period female educational attainment is negatively related to subsequent rates of growth.

> 26 The reverse causality—that growth may affect voice—was examined by Dollar and Gatti (1999), who, in a panel study of more than 100 countries, found a convex relationship between increases in per capita GDP and political voice.  As countries move from low-income to middle-income, there is little increase in voice, but as income levels increase beyond middle-income, there is a rapid increase in political voice.

> 27 In contrast, Ban and Rao (2006) find in South India that female leaders in village councils are no more likely than male leaders to make decisions in favor of women’s concerns.

> 28 In the original Solow model (and other neoclassical growth models), the long run rate of economic growth is exogenously determined by rates of technological change and labor force growth.  Augmented Solow models add other exogenous determinants of growth rates.   In contrast, endogenous growth models treat technological progress as an endogenous variable determined within the model.  Feminist scholars have criticized the Solow model’s assumption of the exogeneity of labor force growth, arguing that any growth of the labor force requires inputs from the reproductive sector, _i.e_ ., households (Walters, 1995).

> 29 Note that greater equality in educational opportunities does not map solely to equality of opportunity; it also facilities exercising rights and voice.

34