that have been selected primarily for illustrative purposes. We also present the results for 2010 only, when the relatively larger impact of the crisis is expected.

_Firstly_ , we examine the characteristics of the group we will call “crisis‐vulnerable”, which refers to households that would _not_ have been poor in 2010 had there been no crisis. _Secondly_ , we will use the well‐known analytical device of growth incidence curves to see how change in income, as a result of the crisis, is distributed across income groups and between urban/rural areas and regions. _Thirdly_ , we will construct a few transition matrices to look at upward and downward movement of households as a result of the crisis, compared to the benchmark. These are but examples of what is possible in the way of distributional analysis with the results of our model; the choice of what type of analytics needs to be done for a certain country would depend on the specific country context and policy concerns.

**A profile of the “crisis‐vulnerable”.** Households that are expected to be in poverty in the crisis scenario but not in the benchmark scenario in 2010, termed as the “crisis‐vulnerable”, are projected to suffer large income losses due to the crisis, relative to the benchmark scenario – with a 39% drop in average household income, which translates to a 45% loss in per capita income. Most of this loss is due to a massive loss in labor income, amounting to 48% of the benchmark income. Remittances are less important as a component of the overall income loss of the “crisis‐vulnerable” households. Although there is a 33% loss in remittance income for households conditional on receiving remittances in the first place, the absolute amounts are too small to have a significant impact on poverty.

The key characteristics of crisis‐vulnerable households, relative to the rest of the population, are as follows (see Annex 2, Table E for all results). Comparing the crisis‐vulnerable to the overall population, the crisis‐vulnerable are slightly more rural (57.1% as compared to the overall figure of 51.5%), have slightly larger household sizes (5.1 people per household as compared to the national average of 4.8) and have nearly identical dependency ratios. The crisis‐vulnerable have lower skills on average – 67.3% of household heads have education 0‐9 years compared to the national average of 55.9%. Although the employment rates are very similar among the two groups, the sectoral composition is quite different. Crisis‐vulnerable household heads are more likely to be employed in agriculture and manufacturing, and less likely to be employed in services or other industry. This result further underscores our initial assertion that the shock is likely to manifest itself through lack of demand for exports in the manufacturing sector and commodity price decreases in the agricultural sector.

It is also interesting to look at how these crisis‐vulnerable households compare with the permanently or _structurally poor_ (defined as the households who are poor in _both_ benchmark and crisis scenarios in 2010). In general, structurally poor households are larger, have higher dependency and are lower skilled. They are also far more likely to be employed in agriculture (64.0% of the structurally poor as opposed to 36.9% of the crisis‐vulnerable), and subsequently less likely to be employed in manufacturing (4.8% as compared to 11.3%) or services (27.4% as compared to 48.5%). This is understandable since those employed in manufacturing tend to be better off in general, even though they are the demographic most likely to be worse off as a result of the crisis. The crisis‐vulnerable households are also significantly less rural than the structurally poor households (see Annex 2, Table E).

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