rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
||Host Country|Number|Origin Country|Number|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|Turkey|2,715,873|Syrian Arab Rep.|4,914,718|
|2|Pakistan|1,566,950|Afghanistan|2,784,373|
|3|Lebanon|1,079,864|Somalia|1,059,490|
|4|Iran, Islamic Rep.|979,410|South Sudan|772,394|
|5|Ethiopia|732,018|Sudan|624,205|
|6|Jordan|680,952|Congo, Dem. Rep.|497,941|
|7|Kenya|555,291|Myanmar|481,467|
|8|Uganda|500,192|Central African Rep.|469,801|
|9|Germany|484,748|Iraq|381,491|
|10|Congo, Dem. Rep.|376,144|Eritrea|372,309|

Table 1: Top 10 host and origin countries by number of refugees at the end of 2015 UNHCR data show that there are 33 major refugee situations today which have been lasting five years or more (protracted situations). Yet, forced displacement situations are inherently dynamic and there are often significant variations in the number of refugees during a displacement period. This is often the reflection of the circumstances that cause refugee movements. To illustrate the extent to which UNHCR refugee statistics capture such evolving circumstances, Figure 2 displays refugee statistics for three situations: Somalis, Afghans, and Congolese refugees.

Panel 2a shows the number of Somalis who are hosted in Kenya. Refugees started to arrive massively around 1990, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime and the ensuing civil war. Their number declined slightly around the end of the United Nations intervention (1992-1995) as military clashes between factions became shorter, generally less intense, and more localized. It increased again after 2006, when the Islamic Courts Union challenged the Transitional National Government, leading to an Ethiopia-led military intervention. The combination of violence and food crises that plagued Somalia in late 2000s further pushed into exile large numbers of destitute Somalis. The relative stabilization of the situation since 2012 following the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia has led to a small decrease of the number of refugees.

The situation of Afghans in Pakistan follows a similar pattern of ebbs and flows as the political and military situation evolved. Panel 2b reflects the large number of Afghans who fled to Pakistan following the 1979 Soviet invasion, and remained in exile until the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 7
In terms of coverage on passive population, its measure does not present many difficulties since its relation comprises beneficiary population and older people. Figure 4 shows a percentage of the population older than 65 years receiving a social security benefit granted by the compulsory (contributory) insurance system during years 2003 to 2016.

The passive social security coverage in Ecuador has been one of lowest level in Latin America in the 1990s. Between years 2003 and 2007, there was an important increase in the percentage of older people earning a contributory social security benefit, which climbed up to 20% approximately. From that year on, the trend started climbing up slightly to achieve 25.8% in 2016.

Figure 4. Percentage of Older people over 65 Years of Age Receiving a Contributory Benefit. 2003 - 2016 <!-- Start of picture text --> 40%<br>35%<br>30%<br>25%<br>20%<br>15%<br>10%<br>5%<br>0%<br>2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# Source: author elaboration based on ENEMDU

This moderate increase is due to a program of incentives promoting worker retirements offered by the state, mainly those serving at the health and education systems, which consisted of payment of a fixed amount as a "bonus" plus payment of monthly benefits (Figure 5).

11
# **I.   INTRODUCTION**

While a large body of literature has examined the link between financial development and economic growth, far less attention has been paid to the relationship between finance and poverty. Theory provides conflicting predictions in this regard and empirical evidence has been equally mixed, being ambiguous even about the channels through which finance could effect poverty or inequality. Yet, lack of access to finance has been argued to be one of the main factors behind persistent poverty.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, research focused on Africa has been limited so far, despite the importance of poverty in this region. According to the latest measure of global poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with by far the highest headcount ratio of extreme poverty (with about 43 percent of its population falling below the poverty threshold of USD 1.90 a day in 2011 PPP terms). At the same time, the region has the shallowest financial sector in the world, with credit to the private sector amounting to less than 28 percent of GDP (compared to a ratio higher than 75 percent of GDP in East Asia and the Pacific). Cross-country studies have tended to favor broader samples and cover developing countries at best. Using a larger sample increases the degrees of freedom, but it may also introduce unwanted heterogeneity if factors explaining income distribution or poverty differ between country groups.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Poverty Headcount Ratio, 2012* Domestic credit to private sector, 2014*<br>(in percent of population) (in percent of GDP)<br>45 80<br>40 70<br>35 60<br>30 50<br>25 40<br>20<br>30<br>15<br>20<br>10<br>5 10<br>0 0<br>Europe and Middle East Latin America East Asia and South Asia Sub‐Saharan East Asia and Europe and Latin America Middle East South Asia Sub‐Saharan<br>Central Asia and North and Caribbean Pacific Africa Pacific Central Asia and Caribbean and North Africa<br>Africa Africa<br>Source: World Bank Source: World Bank<br>*2008 for Middle East and North Africa * or latest<br><!-- End of picture text --> Deepening the financial sector is also a complex process involving a number of intermediaries and instruments. In this regard, recent theoretical and empirical work has underscored the importance of institutions such as property rights. Yet these dimensions are not directly captured by the most common measure for financial development: private credit.

This paper aims to bring a contribution to the literature in several ways. First, it focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), reducing sample heterogeneity and reaching more conclusive results than studies with global coverage on the role of finance in the region. Second, it

> 2 There has also been a considerable literature on the impact of growth and poverty and on how best to reduce income inequality. This paper does not try to argue that financial deepening is the most effective and direct way to reduce poverty, but only discusses a possible association between these two variables.

2
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<!-- Start of picture text --> fH w = Oo<br>omensa oyOo} OMGoe :ola)aa0's7]<br>o@ o<br>oe E ot Ooo °C 9 ooo<br>ono o o tf oO i<br>\ a Oo: ee<br>2 ee) oO<br>od o oo<br>re ooWee “<br>o Obao<br>[s]<br>ao (ofc<br>7 oP.<br>oleso<br>oN.<br>an<br>,<br>' Sl<br>o 4<br>~ Vietnam rainfall stations [=<br>[_] National boundaries We<br>Rain from regressions, June 2006 “|<br><0.1 ' S<br>1 01-25 " 7 rl<br>(25-50 a<br>| 50-100 ta<br>me 100200 -- 200300 Je )<br>___ 300 - 500 oe<br>iy 500 - 600 oO<br>|_| 800 - 1200<br>>) 12001600 -- 20001600 iG)<br>He > 2000 . oe<br>| No Data oesro) iG .<br>. “| [s]<br>ry io} oF a,<br>cr ow “a ]<br>&<br>¢ . on a3 j<br>g yy & E( o t ‘" go &<br>» *<br><!-- End of picture text -->
observations by accounting for different phasing of the growing cycle at different latitudes, which is critical for making inter-regional comparisons. The specific data sources used to parameterize the model variables are briefly described below.

_Seasonal climate:_ The basis for the characterization of geographic and intra-annual (seasonal) climate patterns was a dataset of multi-decadal observations of temperature and precipitation made at meteorological stations throughout Africa. This data was preprocessed by the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia (Mitchell & Jones 2005). The time series recorded at each station were systematically screened for quality and consistency and also assimilated onto a mesh of 0.5° grid cells. To characterize salient intra-annual climate variation at each location, precipitation and temperature observations were converted to longterm (1961–2000) monthly averages.

_Growing period:_ The length of the growing season is a critical determinant of cropping systems, and captures the period during which ecological conditions permit plant growth (Woodward 1987). In addition to the amplitude of intra-seasonal climate variations derived from the long-term records, growing season length provides a simple index for delineating the cold and dry threshold dates during the growing season that cannot be resolved from monthly records. To estimate growing season length for each grid cell, time series of vegetation activity derived from multi-temporal satellite observations of vegetation greenness (Tucker et al. 2005) were used to determine the onset, peak and end of the growing period. Seasonal changes in the vigor of terrestrial vegetation reflect the combined effect of temperature, precipitation and day length on plant growth, and the resulting estimates of growing season length therefore provide a suitable quantity for defining the growing period of rainfed crops (Zhang et al 2004).

_Soil and terrain:_ Land characteristics were derived from a global soil dataset (Global Soil Data Task 2000) that captures edaphic properties at relatively fine spatial scales (~10 km<sup>2</sup> ). Chemical properties of soils were characterized using the ratio of organic and non-organic compounds, which are indicative of soil fertility, and are derived from carbon and nitrogen concentrations in the soil (C:N ratio). Hydraulic properties are important for the moisture supply of crops and were defined using estimates of field capacity derived from textural soil properties. Similarly, thermal capacity plays an important role in controlling biological processes in the soil and root system of crops and reflects how well soils provide suitable conditions for crop growth. Lastly, a digital elevation model was used to estimate topographic land features (Verdin & Greenlee 1996) such as slope angle.

_Population patterns:_ Estimates of population densities derived from national and sub-national population statistics were used as an additional input variable to explain spatial patterns of cropland (CIESIN/CIAT 2004).

7
# **1 Introduction**

Submarine cables (SMCs) are part of a global network of fiber optic cables that run through oceans to connect countries,<sup>1</sup> and therefore individuals and businesses, to the Internet. They form a crucial component of Internet access and are often considered the ‘first mile’ as all telecom operators need access to submarine cables to connect their customers to the global Internet. On average, 15 to 20 new submarine cables have been deployed across the globe annually over the past 30 years and a similar trend is expected to continue over the next decade.<sup>2</sup> Each new submarine cable typically requires several million dollars of investment and often requires additional investments in terrestrial digital infrastructure such as fiber optic cables, towers, and data centers, as well as digital innovation, entrepreneurship, and skills to benefit end-users. As such, they can support market and broader economic development in the landing countries and beyond.

Studies such as Hjort and Poulsen (2019), Simione and Li (2021), Houngbonon et al. (2022), Imbruno et al. (2022), and Cariolle and da Piedade (2023) have investigated the economy wide effects of SMCs, especially their impact on economic growth, employment, innovation, entrepreneurship, and trade. Other studies, such as Cariolle (2021) investigated the market outcomes of SMCs but focused on access to connectivity. Empirical evidence on the market outcomes of SMCs, especially the impact on price, and the role of competition and regulation is still not available. Yet, such evidence remains crucial to understanding the channels through which SMCs affect access to connectivity and generate the economy wide effects quantified in previous studies.

Anecdotal evidence abounds on how Internet access prices evolved following the arrival of major submarine cables (Appendix A). For instance, Nigeria experienced the arrival of five SMCs between 2010 and 2015.<sup>3</sup> These new SMCs have accelerated the growth of international Internet bandwidth used in the country, from an annual rate of 48 percent between 2010 and 2014 to 70 percent between 2015 and 2020.<sup>4</sup> Such an expansion in bandwidth was accompanied by a 5 percentage point drop in the price of mobile broadband over the same period.<sup>5</sup> Cameroon also experienced the arrival of three major SMCs during the same period, among the five which arrived in Nigeria: ACE, WACS and NCSCS. These arrivals were also associated with an ex-

> 1Some submarine cables may have some terrestrial segments.

> 2Telegeography, 2022.

> 3Glo-1 and MainOne in 2010; Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) and West Africa Cable System (WACS) in 2012, and the Nigeria Cameroon Submarine Cable System (NCSCS) in 2015.

> 4Based on bandwidth data from Telegeography.

> 5Price of 2GB of mobile broadband data in percentage of monthly income per capita - based on data from the ITU.

2
The most frequently reported factor that would help Singapore to become more innovative was openness<sup>3</sup> . Companies note the need for Singapore society as a whole to become more tolerant of diverse views and of failure, and a reduction of regulation. This extends to the business environment, such as deregulation of industry to ensure more level competition (particularly the media industry), and liberalizing laws regulating business (to allow for exit strategies for failed firms). It also extends to the education system, moving away from the focus on retention of facts and exam-based learning, toward encouraging creativity and problem-solving.

While the above findings need to be interpreted cautiously, given the subjective nature of the respondents’ interpretation of the question, they do appear to be consistent with other international benchmark indicators that Singapore scores high on efficiency but only moderately in innovativeness (see e.g. recent World Competitiveness Reports and Global Competitiveness Report). Several of the respondents who were more pessimistic in their assessment of Singapore’s chances to become innovative warned of a significant downside to Singapore’s future economic development, given the strong competition emerging from China and India. Indeed, similar concerns have been articulated in the Report of the Economic Review Committee (ERC 2002), and provided the impetus for its recommendations for major policy change in the future.

On the whole, the respondents indicated that the innovation infrastructure in Singapore most needed at this time is the availability of innovators and global linkages, the latter being particularly emphasized by the KIBS firms. Research institutes are also needed particularly by firms in the high-tech sector. Competitive markets and IP legal framework were perceived to be the least important, particularly by KIBS firms, perhaps the existing situation is already quite adequate. ( **Table 4.5.2** ).

About 80% of companies perceive the need for specific investments to attract innovative people to Singapore, particularly in venture capital/funding and education/training ( **Tables 4.5.3a** and **4.5.3b** ). These two factors accounted for 41.7% of responses from those who see the need for investments. Firms in the high-tech sector also note the importance of developing a critical mass of R&D in Singapore, with R&D institutions, facilities and firms conducting R&D. There is also a need for creative services. This can be seen from two perspectives: to improve the quality of life in Singapore through investment in art galleries, theatres, etc; and to further the development of the media/creative sector through investment in human capital.

Those who do not see the need for investments to attract innovative people point out that Singapore does not need further expenditure on infrastructure, but rather less tangible developments, such as changes in culture and people’s mindsets, and deregulation.

> 3 Answered only by those who gave Singapore a low chance of becoming an innovative city in the next decade

45
WPS4068

**Forests, Biomass Use and Poverty in Malawi**

**Draft Background Paper for the Malawi Poverty Assessment**

Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay<sup>1</sup> , Priya Shyamsundar,<sup>1</sup> Alessandro Baccini _Abstract: In this paper, we seek to answer three sets of questions about poverty and forests in Malawi: a) What is the extent of biomass available for meeting the energy needs of the poor in Malawi and how is this distributed? b) To what extent does fuelwood scarcity affect the welfare of the poor? c) How do households cope with scarcity? In particular, do households spend more time in fuelwood collection and less time in agriculture in response to scarcity? We attempt to answer these questions using household and remote-sensing data. We find that 80 percent of rural poor households in Malawi are likely to benefit from an increase in biomass per hectare in their community. Rural women respond to biomass scarcity by increasing the time they spend on fuelwood collection. However, the actual decrease in consumption expenditure and increase in time in fuelwood collection are small and biomass scarcity is not associated with a reduction in agricultural labor supply._ _Key Words: Deforestation, Fuelwood, Poverty, Labor Allocation_

# World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4068, November 2006

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

> 1 Policy and Economics Team, Environment Department, World Bank.  We would like to thank Kirk Hamilton, Peter Dewees, Kenneth Chomitz and Antonio Nucifora for their careful comments, Kathleen Beegle and other colleagues from DEC for their advice, and National Statistical Office, Malawi for providing us with the data from the second integrated household survey (IHS2). We are grateful to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency for their financial support for this work.
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