80s, coupled with high humidity. The elderly in senior public housing units, which had also been opened to low‐income substance abusers, were afraid to open windows or doors or leave their tightly sealed units to sleep outside, fearing to be attacked or robbed.

Lower social cohesion in Black neighborhoods, especially among elderly men, compared to social ties in white and Hispanic neighborhoods further heightened the death toll. Browning et al. (2009) build on Klinenberg’s analysis and confirm the role of commercial decline in entire disadvantaged neighborhoods as positively associated with heat wave mortality during the five‐ day period in July 1995. They argue that the decline in economic resources in particular neighborhoods over years coupled with other structural and infrastructural disadvantages encouraged middle‐class flight. This, in turn, further destabilized essential neighborhood institutions, lowered home ownership while increasing turnover rates among local residents, and eroded stable and viable social networks among neighbors. The result of such neighborhood deterioration only became visible in what the authors call “stifling hot, and ultimately lethal, residences” (675). As Klinenberg (1999) shows, slow medical and political response coupled with the media’s natural disaster narrative contributed their share to rendering invisible the dimensions of social tragedy, with which the general public still wrestles, even today.

<!-- Start of picture text --> day period in July 1995. They argue that the decline in economic resources in particular<br>neighborhoods over years coupled with other structural and infrastructural disadvantages<br>encouraged middle‐class flight. This, in turn, further destabilized essential neighborhood<br>institutions, lowered home ownership while increasing turnover rates among local residents,<br>and eroded stable and viable social networks among neighbors. The result of such neighborhood<br>deterioration only became visible in what the authors call “stifling hot, and ultimately lethal,<br>residences” (675). As Klinenberg (1999) shows, slow medical and political response coupled with<br>the media’s natural disaster narrative contributed their share to rendering invisible the<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> dimensions of social tragedy, with which the general public still wrestles, even today.<br>The European heat wave of August 2003 was among the worst since in‐depth records started in<br>1976. Table 4 lists reported heat waves in Europe with associated mortality between 1976 and<br>2003. The exceedingly high numbers of 14,802 within two weeks in France alone (other sources<br>speak of up to 14,947) represented an excess mortality of 60%, with +96.5% in the second week<br>(Robine et al., 2008). Similar to the Chicago heat wave, social inequality was the key driver.<br>Unlike more graphic extreme climate events such as floods, heat waves are not only silent killers<br><!-- End of picture text --> The European heat wave of August 2003 was among the worst since in‐depth records started in 1976. Table 4 lists reported heat waves in Europe with associated mortality between 1976 and 2003. The exceedingly high numbers of 14,802 within two weeks in France alone (other sources speak of up to 14,947) represented an excess mortality of 60%, with +96.5% in the second week (Robine et al., 2008). Similar to the Chicago heat wave, social inequality was the key driver. Unlike more graphic extreme climate events such as floods, heat waves are not only silent killers but also a socially attenuated risk (Kasperson in Klinenberg 1999). People often do not take heat seriously enough and fail to take early action. In the UK, elderly citizens are reported to have underestimated the severity of excessive heat, downplaying risk through their vital yet narrow social networks and failing to listen to heat warnings over the radio or TV (Wolf et al. 2010).

<!-- Start of picture text --> but also a socially attenuated risk (Kasperson in Klinenberg 1999). People often do not take heat<br>seriously enough and fail to take early action. In the UK, elderly citizens are reported to have<br>underestimated the severity of excessive heat, downplaying risk through their vital yet narrow<br>social networks and failing to listen to heat warnings over the radio or TV (Wolf et al. 2010).<br>Most detailed inquiries from the 2003 European heat wave stem from France (Poumadère et al.<br>2005; Fouillet at al. 2006), reporting economic poverty, social isolation at home, and age and<br>gender, coupled with sickness and other medical antecedents as responsible for the high death<br><!-- End of picture text --> Most detailed inquiries from the 2003 European heat wave stem from France (Poumadère et al. 2005; Fouillet at al. 2006), reporting economic poverty, social isolation at home, and age and gender, coupled with sickness and other medical antecedents as responsible for the high death rate. The large majority of elderly victims (>90%) lived alone and among those almost half in one‐room apartments as small as 10m<sup>2</sup> or less, known in Paris as ‘service rooms’ exposed to the sun and poorly insulated. Widowed, single, and divorced citizens were most affected by social isolation and deprivation, unable to reach out for help. Nonetheless, excellent organizational preparedness coupled with social care, such as in the case of a retirement home in Val de Marne south of Paris, illustrates that the high level of excess death could have been avoided. Unlike in Chicago, though, overall female mortality was 75% higher than for men, yet more working‐age men died than women.

<!-- Start of picture text --> rate. The large majority of elderly victims (>90%) lived alone and among those almost half in<br>one‐room apartments as small as 10m 2 or less, known in Paris as ‘service rooms’ exposed to the<br>sun and poorly insulated. Widowed, single, and divorced citizens were most affected by social<br>isolation and deprivation, unable to reach out for help. Nonetheless, excellent organizational<br>preparedness coupled with social care, such as in the case of a retirement home in Val de Marne<br>south of Paris, illustrates that the high level of excess death could have been avoided. Unlike in<br>Chicago, though, overall female mortality was 75% higher than for men, yet more working‐age<br>men died than women.<br><!-- End of picture text --> 26