|Details<br>Consumption may ultimately increase due to lower prices, but may decrease in the short<br>run (Cacciatore and Fiori (2016)). Consumption may increase due to trade liberalization<br>(Farrokhi and Pellegrina (2022)).<br>Multiple studies fnd employment increases over the short and long run (Bassanini and Duval<br>(2009),Bertrand and Kramarz(2002),Blanchard and Giavazzi(2003),Bordon et al.(2016),<br>Ebell and Haefke (2009), Felbermayr and Prat (2011), Gal and Hijzen (2016), Grifth et al.<br>(2007), Hong (2022), Kaplan et al. (2011), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005), Piton and Rycx<br>(2019), Rizzica et al. (2020), Spector (2004). However, Bassanini (2015) fnds lowering frm<br>entry barriers in service sectors might lower short-run employment. These efects depend<br>on the institutional and economic context Vitale et al. (2020). E.g., Bassanini and Duval<br>(2009),Grifth et al.(2007), andNicoletti and Scarpetta(2005) fnd PMR deregulation has<br>larger efects on employment when labor market policies and institutions are more worker-<br>friendly.<br>Piton and Rycx (2019) fnd highly educated individuals were less positively impacted in<br>terms of employment than low-and middle-educated workers after deregulation. De Serres<br>et al. (2012) fnd stronger efects for women and youth. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) fnd<br>more negative efects of higher entry barriers on female employment shares.<br>Studies fnd promoting competition can improve real wages in the short and long run (Argent<br>and Begazo (2015), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2009), Hong (2022)),<br>though some fnd lower nominal wages in the short and long run (Arnold(2022),Branstetter<br>et al. (2014), Spector (2004)). The efect may depend on the amount of bargaining power<br>workers have Spector (2004).<br>Causa et al. (2015) and Hong (2022) fnd competition policy/ PMR deregulation reduces<br>income inequality (for general earnings).<br>Increased competition leads to more production and decreased monopsony mark-up power,<br>leading to lower prices (Atkin et al. (2018); Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Bruhn (2011),<br>Busso and Galiani (2019)).<br>Positive efect found by Arnold et al. (2011); Asturias et al. (2017); Bassanini and Duval<br>(2009); Duggan et al. (2013); Fernandes and Paunov (2012); Hong (2022), yet Duval and<br>Furceri (2018) do not fnd signifcant efects on productivity. Branstetter et al. (2014) fnd<br>some evidence of less productive frms emerging after a program reduced the time, cost, and<br>bureaucracy of new business registrations.<br>Reallocation of labor from less productive to more productive frms (Aw et al.(2001);Meghir<br>et al. (2015); or towards more technologically advanced frms (Bloom et al. (2016)); or<br>towards the formal sector (Anand and Khera (2016)); or to new entrant frms (Cacciatore<br>and Fiori (2016)).<br>Some incumbent frms may cease operation in the short-run, but Duval and Furceri (2018)<br>fnd a positive impact of deregulation on GDP;Gal and Hijzen(2016) fnd PMR deregulation<br>raised output by 3% after 2 years. Anand and Khera(2016) fnd PMR deregulation increases<br>output in India in the long run.<br>In our review, we only found one study that loosely measures social cohesion outcomes (Autor<br>et al. (2013) measure, amongst other things, the efects on take-up of welfare services after<br>trade liberalization).|
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|Findings<br>Range of estimates<br>Increases in the long run; mixed<br>evidence in the short run<br>Reductions in global trade costs over 3 decades (1980–2007) increased food<br>consumption by 4% (Farrokhi and Pellegrina (2022)).<br>Increases<br>Messina (2006) estimate a reduction of one standard deviation in OECD indi-<br>cators for entry barriers would result in a 1.6 to 2.3 pp increase in the service<br>employment share for an average income country.<br>Calculations imply that<br>diferences in regulations can account for about one-ffth of the cross-country<br>diferences in service sector employment shares after controlling for income lev-<br>els. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) estimate going from the most regulated to<br>the most deregulated PMR OECD country would increase long-run employ-<br>ment rates by 2.5–5 pp. In contrast, Bassanini (2015) fnds a decrease in an<br>entry barriers proxy of 1 point (a large change only observed in about 5% of<br>the study sample) decreased service industry employment by 0.6–2.5% in 23<br>OECD countries.<br>Some evidence of heterogenous<br>employment efects<br>Mixed evidence<br>Some evidence of lower gender<br>pay diferentials. Some evidence<br>of lower income inequality.<br>Cooke et al. (2019) fnd a reduction in the gender pay gap by 1.0–1.7pp after a<br>program reduced the time, cost, and bureaucracy of new business registrations<br>in Portugal.<br>Decrease<br>Price decreases of 1% after a reform accelerated the business registration pro-<br>cess in MexicoBruhn(2011); and 1.9–6.0% after a program increased the num-<br>ber of supermarkets in the Dominican Republic (Busso and Galiani (2019)).<br>Increases<br>Decrease in an entry barriers proxy of 1 point (a large change only observed<br>in about 5% of the study sample) increased labor productivity by 1.7% in 23<br>OECD countries in Bassanini (2015). FDI liberalization (e.g., one standard<br>deviation increase in foreign presence in services industries) associated with a<br>7.7% increase in productivity of manufacturing frms relying on services inputs<br>in Czechia. (Arnold et al. (2011)). Other productivity increase estimates are<br>3% per standard deviation increase in FDI in Chile (Fernandes and Paunov<br>(2012)) and 3.5% following the relaxation of restrictive FDI policies in Indonesia<br>(Duggan et al. (2013)).<br>Increases<br>Increases<br>Gal and Hijzen (2016) fnd PMR deregulation in the short and medium term,<br>as measured by changes in several OECD PMR indicators, across 18 advanced<br>economies raised output by 3% after 2 years.<br>Not enough evidence|
|Indicator<br>**_Living standards_**<br>Consumption<br>Employment<br>Employment<br>(par-<br>ticular groups)<br>Labor earnings<br>Labor<br>earnings<br>(particular groups),<br>labor<br>earnings<br>inequality<br>Prices<br>**_Productivity_**<br>Productivity<br>Labor reallocation<br>Output<br>**_Social Cohesion_**<br>Social cohesion|

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