rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
poverty line but are still vulnerable due to climate hazards and disaster risk. In the Dominican Republic, only 29% of vulnerable households receive social assistance, and around 33% of the vulnerable households’ CRI receive benefits. In Peru, 95% of those that are CRI receive social assistance, while in Chile and Guatemala, around 51% and 56%, respectively, are receiving assistance. However, in Brazil 45% of such households receive benefits; in Mexico 39%, and in Ecuador, only 29%.

**Table 4.** Vulnerable population with social assistance.

|**Country**|**Total vul**<br>**social**|**nerables with**<br>**assistance**|**CRI w**<br>**assi**|**ith social**<br>**stance**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|
|Argentina|48%|2,171,105|52%|300,582|
|Bolivia (Plurinational State of)|84%|2,551,026|81%|165,486|
|Brazil|46%|37,345,797|45%|3,222,014|
|Brazil - cities|38%|5,078,187|36%|157,934|
|Chile|43%|375,818|51%|29,350|
|Colombia|0%|6,134|0%|648|
|Dominican Republic|29%|755,186|33%|42,408|
|Ecuador|41%|2,455,263|29%|118,453|
|El Salvador|1%|23,885|1%|350|
|Guatemala|62%|7,939,265|56%|197,752|
|Honduras|17%|1,181,143|12%|44,253|
|Mexico|42%|12,679,045|39%|748,155|
|Panama|30%|240,230|35%|32,272|
|Paraguay|25%|326,955|36%|35,001|
|Peru|95%|13,858,743|95%|1,331,120|
|Uruguay|86%|316,021|93%|12,640|

Note: Columns (1) and (3) the percentage of households with social assistance and columns (2) and (4) present the number of individuals with social assistance. Total vulnerables and CRI with social assistance are those vulnerable/vulnerable climate risk induced that report having at least one family member beneficiary of a social program or assistance. The indicators correspond to the latest available household survey year of each country. Source: Own elaboration.

Moreover, Figure 16 illustrates the two sides of social assistance for vulnerable households in two large countries in the region. In Peru, the percentage of CRI households who report having received benefits from social assistance is very high in all regions but decreases as we move towards the coastal region (although still large). On the other hand, in Mexico, this percentage is lower throughout the country, particularly in the north. In the southern part of Mexico, despite the high potential natural disasters and vulnerability, only half of the vulnerable households' CRI receive social assistance.

26
- 12 -

manufactured exports increased from less than 1% of GDP in 1978-82 to more than 5% in 1986-89, while in Mexico, it increased from 1.2% to 6.4% during the same period. Ghana is the only intensive trade adjuster where the share of mamnfactured exports in GDP did not increase (0.6% of GDP).

Table 6 MANUF&CrURED EXPORTS AS A PERCENrAGE OF GD?

|1973|19|ism3|1931|iP|l293|1934|193S|19t6|1937|1938|197B-92|<br>t-|19364|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|(A)lIrembetadeadhutem||||||||||||||
|Gna<br>0.7|0.5|0.6|0.1|_OA_|0.4|02|0.2|0.4|0.6|7|0.6|0.3|0.6|
|lusl1nea51<br>0.4|0.9|07|01|0.9|1.9|2.5|2.8|3.6|5.7|6.6|0.7|2.4|s3|
|Ma.<br>1.6|1.3|1.|1L|1.0|2.2|2.4|2.5|5.5|7.0|67|12|2.4|6.4|
|M<br>2.6|2.9|3.0|43|4.6|517|6.9||6.2|7.2|8.2|3.5|_6.5_|7.2|
|Tusrk<br>_I0_|CS|_IA_|3.0|4.9|**_5.6_**|L3|**9.8**|7.7|**9.9**|10.6|**2.2**|**7.9**|9.4|
|**Avge**<br>1.2|**1.3**|1.4|2.0|2.4|3.2|4.1|44|4.7|6.1|6.6|1.7|3.9|LB|
|**(1B) LanileniveSns**||||||||||||||
|Colubia<br>2.3|2.6|2.4|2.3|**.9**|15|1.6|i.9|2.3|3.|29|2.3|17|**27**|
|**Cae diwire**<br>2.0|**23**|**2.8**|3.1|33|**3Is**|**3.0**|3.|3.1|2.7|2-9|2.7|.5|2.9|
|**_aLi**<br>17.1|17.7|<br>**2.9**|23.8|25.0|14.1|**72**|17.5|16.2|**14***|13.3|19.3|17.3|15.0|
|**Pakistan**<br>4.B|5.9|5.4|53|4.6|611|5.1|5.6|**7.2**|9.1|**82**|52|6.1|**8.1**|
|Ave-<br>65|7.1|_SA_|8L6|6.2|6.5|7.6|7.2|7.2|7.4|**6.9**|**7.4**|7.1|**7.2**|
|**AveageC**<br>3.0|**3.6**|**3.5**|3.6|3.3|4.0|3.5|3.3|4.2|4.9|4.6|3.4|3.7|**4.61**|
|(C) AU Siyns||||||||||||||
|A<br>eW<br>3.6|3.9|**4.5**|**4.9**|4.1|4.7|5.t|**5.7**|**5***|6.7|6.7|42|**53**|6.4|
|_No-_||||||||||||||
|**1.**<br>**Maeufrssrd ecM ind.&Ish**<br>**dssMe4 cdaEagfnn-ea**|**atcal****_an_**<br>**nab.**|**_dre.nAI._**|<br>**ba**|**sic mencm**|.<br>ac|shitay tutt|eeQL.|alr|<br>**luaan**|**rdl ase**|**d**<br>**Sopds**|neo||

**2.** - **csdoirs** _umic. 3. **J9734f2** h Is prem pmnot 193345 is adjutanti **ad** 19B6U n **pn rmfima** period.

**Semn: LVort** (O) in **cawn** u **in basseS** US dsiln: Wed Tables; GDP at o prim in haut **US** ddl: **IEC Mtinal AaS.**

13. Indonesia's dependence on oil was substantialy reduced by the expansion of traditional manufactured exports of textiles and plywood products. While these exports were important, the nontraditional manufactured exports also increased, e.g., plastics, ceramics, basic metal products, glass, paper, rubber products and footwear. The growth in non-traditional exports was accompanied by a shift in the export destination-away from industrial countes markets to other developing counties. The share of export to industrial countries decreased from an average of 75.1% during 1978-82 to 73.3% during 1986-89, while the share of developing countries increased from 22.8% to 26% during the same period.

14. In Mexico, the growth in non-oil exports was also outanding. Prior to the trade reform, - export earnings were mostly concentrated on natural resources agriculture, mining, oil and tourism. Trde reform encouraged the exports of manufactured goods. These exports grew by 33% in volume
# **<u>Figure 3:</u>**

## **Internet Use in the World**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 16<br>14<br>12<br>10<br>Actual data<br>8<br>Predicted<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br>Year<br>Internet Use in Low and Lower-Middle Income Countries<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>3 Actual data<br>Predicted<br>2<br>1<br>0<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br>Year<br>Percentage of Internet Users<br>Percentage of Internet Users<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**<u>Figure 4:</u>**

9
2. λ = 0. This requires that the instrument, Zi,t−1 be uncorrelated with the error terms ωi,t, vi,t and vi,t−1. This condition will be violated if the true data, Yi,t<sup>∗containindividualfixedeffectswhicharecorrelatedwith</sup> the instrument, or if the dynamic process governing the evolution of the instrument itself contains an individual fixed effect. Again, this restriction appears problematic when using expenditure as an instrument for income, since one might expect individual fixed effects in income and expenditure to be correlated.

3. The degree of autocorrelation in the instrument must perfectly match the degree of autocorrelation in income, that is, ρ = β. This condition is unlikely to be met by many of the instruments used in the literature. In particular, there is no reason to expect the degree of autocorrelation in asset holdings or in body weight to be the same as in earnings. Note that if conditions 1 and 2 hold, then That is, the instrumental variables estimator will converge to the autocorrelation coefficient in the instrument. Hence, if one uses an instrument which does not vary over time, such as education of adults, then ρ = 1, and β<sup>b</sup> IV will converge to unity.<sup>4</sup> If one uses an instrument which is white noise, then β<sup>b</sup> IV will converge to zero.

These three conditions are unlikely to be met simultaneously by most of the candidate instruments used thusfar in the literature. Instruments such as repeated measures of income are most likely to display the same degree of autocorrelation as true earnings, but also therefore likely to have correlated measurement errors and also potentially have individual fixed effects correlated with those in genuine earnings. Instruments such as body weight, education, and land

> 4 Glewwe and Nyugen (2002) also show that the correlation coefficient between current and lagged income will be unity in their IV method when using an instrument which does not vary over time.

10
Labor supply has to equal demand, such that This condition again determines the value of the constant k that clears the labor market. Aggregate output is now given by Both labor demand and aggregate output depend on the price level and the ...xed cost of registration.

# 3.6 Di¤erences in Occupation Division Across Assumptions

Note that the main di¤erences generated by the di¤erent assumptions about productivity in the informal sector lie in the relative income and ability levels of wage earners and informal ...rms. Under the low productivity assumption, informal businesses earn less than wage earners and are also of lower ability. Under the high productivity assumption, informal businesses earn more than wage earners and are of higher ability.

To gauge which assumption ...ts the facts better, I look at averages in log monthly income and income residuals for di¤erent occupation groups from my pre-reform data. Table 2 reports these statistics for informal (non-registered) business owners, wage earners, and formal (registered) business owners. Registered business owners have the highest income on average (8.32), followed by wage earners (8.01), and ...nally non-registered businesses (7.52). The income residuals are the residuals of a regression that includes age, education dummies, a gender dummy, and a martial status dummy, as well as time and municipality dummies. The ranking of the average income residuals is the same as the ranking of average income, with registered businesses having the highest income residuals, followed by wage earners, and then non-registered businesses.

The pre-reform data thus suggest that the low productivity assumption is more appropriate, meaning that informal business owners are low-income/low-ability individuals who are in this occupation for the lack of better options. The data do not support the view that informal business owners are medium-range-ability individuals who choose informal production over wage work.

The next subsection analyzes what happens under each assumption when the cost of registration drops. I test the predictions generated by both assumptions in Section 6.

10
Amalgamation of existing jurisdictions leads to lower central transfers for amalgamating jurisdictions and break up of existing jurisdictions benefits all in terms of higher per capita central transfers (see Table 9 from Marwanto Harjowiryono, 2011). No wonder, three new provinces have been created and the number of cities /districts mushroomed from 336 in 2001 to 502 in 2010.

**Table 9. Existing DAU Allocation Rewards Jurisdictional Fragmentation**

|Province|Number<br>of<br>Kab/Kotas -2001|Number<br>of<br>Kab/Kota -2011|Total<br>DAU-20<br>Rp)|Kab/kota<br>01 (billion|Total kab/kot DAU<br>–<br>2011<br>(billion<br>Rp.)|% change in DAU<br>: 2001-2011|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Kalteng|6|14|0.9||5.5|528%|
|Yogyakarta|5|5|0.9||2.7|216%|

Source: Marwanto Harjowiryono (2011) _Inequity for large urban and rural jurisdictions._ Finally and most importantly expenditure need determination uses a one size fits all approach and assumes per capita fiscal needs of large cities are similar to those of a small town or a rural district when it uses aggregate per capita spending for all local governments as a reference point. This creates tremendous injustice for large urban and large rural areas.

_Complex, non-tranparent and inequitable allocations._ In sum, the gap filling approach is unnecessarily complex, non-transparent and uses a macro approach that is not well grounded in the local realities to ensure inter-jurisdictional equity. These manna from heaven transfers also create an incentive and accountability structure that is not conducive to responsible, responsive, fair and accountable local governance. Simpler alternatives as outlined in the following paragraphs have the potential to enhance efficiency and equity of such transfers mechanisms.

# **DAU Simplification Alternatives**

In the following three alternative options for the reform of DAU are presented. Common elements of these three alternatives are :

- One size does not fit all. Requires grouping (clustering) of local governments by population size, area and class of local governments.

- The adopted formula must have a sunset clause of five years but interim changes in the formula should not be allowed.

- The formula must have ceilings and floors to keep yearly entitlements stable and predictable.

- National average (by size and class) gap filling or equalization standard to replace Williamson‘s index. Pool can be adjusted by affordability and allocation determined by standard.

- Gap filling or equalization by size and class of local governments and possibly equal per capita grants to villages.

- Fiscal capacity measurement based upon potential revenues plus tax shares and other transfers and 50% of resource revenues.

- Fiscal needs measurement to discontinue wages compensation (basic allocation), discontinue use of HDI and the Williamson‘s index and other indexes. Instead consider need meesaurement based upon service/client population for each service category.

19
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_7_ The simple elasticity between the annual number of non-cash payments per person and real cash holdings per person is -.68, so a 10% reduction in cash holdings is associated with a 6.8% rise in non-cash transactions. A deeper analysis of these cross-country payment effects within a standard demand function framework suggested that while cash and non-cash payment instrument use are negatively related, the implied substitution between them is due more to differences in use across countries than it is to changes in use over the 1987-93 time period, a result that also applies to the substitution among the five non-cash instruments as well.

**Table 1: Correlation matrix for per person use of payment instruments** **_(14_** _developed countries. 1987-93)_

||_Paper_<br>_Ciro_|_Electronic_<br>_Giro_|<br>_Credit_<br>_card_|_Debit_<br>_card_|_Cash_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_(1)_|_(2)_|_(3)_|_(4)_|_(5)_|
|Check|-.37|-.39|.81|-.11|-.42|
|Paper Giro||-.09|-.23|.30|-.14|
|Electronic<br>Giro|||-.50|.12|.19|
|Credit<br>card||||-.17|-.38|
|Debit card|||||-.39|

_Source: Computed from time-series, cross-section data from Bank for International Settlements (May 1989, December 1993, July 1994, December 1994, and May 1995)_

**_Paymentprice elasticities._** Own prices, which are small in magnitude, vary little over time, and may not depend on incremental use, seemingly have exerted little influence on the choice or use of payment methods. Mean own price elasticities for paper giro, electronic giro, and credit card use ranged from -.09 to -.26 and, while significant, appear to be quite inelastic. Price elasticities for check and debit card use were slightly positive but insignificant. In contrast, the influence on payment instrument use from cultural and institutional factors, such as crime rates, bank concentration, and the availability of alternative payment methods, has been strong (Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala, 1996).

Payment instrument price information is more suitable in Scandinavia as countries there are among those that actually charge all users a price per transaction for different non-cash payments and have also been increasing the relative price of paper-based instruments to reflect better the lower supply costs of most electronic payment alternatives. Based on survey information of bank prices for check and point-of-sale electronic payments in Norway between 1989 and 1993, the implied elasticity of substitution between paper and electronic payments is s = 4.13 (computed from Bank for International Settlements, May 1995). This implies that payment users are in fact very sensitive to relative payment prices since a 10% rise in the relative user price of checks seems to be associated with a 41 % reduction in their relative use. Although additional (and verifying) information is not available, the experience of Norway would likely be duplicated elsewhere as
## **A.3.2 Nigeria: Measuring Management Practices**

In the Nigerian context, RR also followed BSVR’s approach to measuring management practices, adapting their survey tool to the Nigerian public sector setting. Management practices were elicited from senior management in each organization. While each manager filled in their own questionnaire, enumerators looked for a consensus and recorded that in their own questionnaire. This is the information used to construct management practice indices for each organization. Enumerators held double blind interviews in the 63 organizations with project completion data. The management survey covered nine topics: roles, flexibility, incentives, monitoring, culture, targeting, facilities, skills and staffing. RR combined answers to the roles and flexibility questions to construct an index of management practices capturing bureaucrats’ autonomy (CS-autonomy). RR combined answers on the incentives and monitoring topic areas to construct an index capturing the incentives/monitoring management practices bureaucrats operate under (CS-incentives/monitoring). RR combined answers on all remaining topics to construct an ‘other’ management practices index (CS-other). The responses to each practice were converted into normalized z-scores by taking unweighted means of the underlying z-scores (so are continuous variables with mean zero and variance one by construction), where, as in Ghana, both are increasing in the commonly understood notion of ‘better management’.

# **References**

- [1] acemoglu.d and j.a.robinson (2012) _Why Nations Fail_ , Crown Business, New York.

- [2] alesina.a and e.la ferrara (2005) “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance,” _Journal of Economic Literature_ 43: 762-800.

- [3] ashraf.n, o.bandiera and k.jack (2014) “No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-social Tasks,” _Journal of Public Economics_ 120: 1-17.

- [4] ashraf.n, o.bandiera and s.s.lee (2018) Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services, mimeo LSE.

- [5] atkin.d, a.chaudhry, s.chaudhry, a.khandelwal and e.verhoogen (2017) “Organizational Barriers to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Soccer-Ball Producers in Pakistan,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 132:

- [6] baker.g.p (2002) “Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts,” _Journal of Human Resources_ 37: 728-51.

- [7] bandiera.o, m.c.best, a.q.khan and a.prat (2018) Incentives and the Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats, mimeo LSE.

29
contributions are a major burden on household income, and costs rise throughout the primary cycle. The Kenya and Nigeria reports argue that high fees for primary users have lowered enrollment among the poor. But the Zambia report advocates the introduction of user fees. It argues that, given a spending constraint, modest charges are less damaging than are deteriorating services. However, if the user fees are not perceived as the lesser of two evils, parents may simply attribute to schooling an unduly high opportunity cost. Tanzania's public expenditure review reports that primary enrollments are falling because parents are questioning the value of education.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure V1: Implications of Proposed<br>Sector Reforins Analyzed in Reports<br>% of countries in each category<br>70 -<br>60 _.................... r.<br>4 0 - .. .............. , .............. ......ntr<br>40 . t 4 _ g %Categories<br>3 0 - . .. ..... . W : . ^g . ... ............ _ All<br>2 0 - W W ............ . m ................ E HiLo PE<br>ME Low PE<br>............. ....... M High SRIf<br>71- Low SRM<br>0<br>Social Impact Polit/lstit Feasib<br><!-- End of picture text --> 5.29 In general, the reports recommend increased user fees at higher levels of education as the most equitable method of cost recovery. However, several reports note that user fees for secondary and higher education are inequitable if the few low-income students who reach higher education are not given scholarships. Specific population groups -particularly the rural poor and girls--have inadequate access to education. But figures for these groups are rarely included in the reports. Only the Pakistan report specifically recommends targeting girls. Several reports discuss regional imbalances and ethnic or language disadvantages (among the Indian population in Guatemala and Peru, for example).

_50_