rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
while in parallel negatively and indirectly increases the impact effect through a greater sentiment of investor uncertainty. The United States Federal Reserve System (Fed) theory presumes that higher inflation increases yields on bonds. Higher-yield bonds, in theory, compete directly with equity for investor interest and demand, and thus capital flows from stocks to debt securities at such times. Hence, higher inflation is expected to lower stock prices.

An increase in industrial production indicates greater activity in capital markets through the direct effect of better financial performance by listed companies, or through the indirect effect contribution of greater disposable income for purchases in the market (and vice versa). The result: greater industrial production theoretically implies stronger stock prices.

In the theoretical rational, the comparative value in the local currency indicates the competitiveness of the domestic economy and domestic companies in international markets. In addition, when determining the risk of currency fluctuations on the level of macroeconomic stability, foreign investors consider not just the current exchange rate, but also its change in value and the risk of regulatory control on capital flows. A decrease in the value of a local currency is expected to imminently and negatively affect investor returns and their determination in both equity and debt, thus reducing the performance of capital markets (and vice versa) under the portfolio balance perspective. Even so, under the flow-oriented theory, export-based companies benefit in competitiveness and performance in the longer run, and these companies then go on to become key drivers of an improvement in the performance of capital markets.

Lower money market interest rates boost liquidity in the market and, hence, a higher flow of funds to investments. In the flow-on effect, higher investments increase activity and performance in the real sector, which is then reflected in an improvement in stock prices. Before that, lower money market rates create a disincentive to invest in debt securities, spurring a rebalancing of investment portfolio positions because of the inherent valuation change, which, all things being equal, contributes to an immediate rebalancing in favor of new funds investing in equity instead of debt securities.

The balance of payments net financial account (BOPNFA) indicator tracks broad implied economic activity under net acquisition and the disposal of financial assets and liabilities. This indicator tracks how net lending to—or borrowing from—nonresidents is financed. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) proved that more developed financial markets absorb 14 | P a g e
Gilbert, N. D., and J. F.M. de Jong. 2017. “Do European Fiscal Rules Induce a Bias in Fiscal Forecasts? Evidence from the Stability and Growth Pact.” Public Choice 170: 1-32.

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Ha, J., and G. Kindberg-Hanlon. 2021. “Financial Market Effects of Asset Purchase Programs in Emerging Markets: An Early Assessment.” Mimeo, February 3.

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17
- The explanatory variables at the country level obscure important dimensions of heterogeneity such as variations across different regions _within_ a country<sup>16</sup> and/or across different types of firms (by firm size, firm age and so on).

- The limited number of countries restricts the sample size of country-level analyses, especially cross-sectional ones, and thus the robustness of the results.<sup>17</sup>

- Aggregate business climate indicators are often imprecise, rely on _de jure_ information, or subjective judgments about the weighting of variable components, and lack direct input about actual conditions as experienced by affected parties such as firms.

- Many country level indicators ‘contain little or no variation over time and thus are completely or almost indistinguishable from country-, sector- or region-specific effects that may reflect other features than the business environment.’<sup>18</sup>

- The instruments most often used consist of geographical or historical pre-conditions (latitude, colonial history, settler mortality, etc.), which limits the ability of the empirical models to identify the consequences of institutional change for growth.<sup>19</sup>

Thus Durlauf et al. (2008) state that ‘it is most likely the case that the limits to what information can be extracted from aggregate regressions requires more attention to microeconomic and historical studies’<sup>20</sup> . Similarly, Straub (2008) argues that ‘the main limitation [of the macroeconomic literature] is ...the fact that the interesting questions cannot be addressed with data at that level of aggregation’<sup>21</sup> . Pande and Udry (2005) highlight that ‘this [macro] literature has served its purpose and is essentially complete’ and argue for the necessity of ‘empirical research based on micro-data in development economics’ to ‘make progress’<sup>22</sup> . The World Development Report 2005 underlines that these ‘limits [of macroeconomic analyses] inspired the search for more disaggregated evidence on the quality of a location’s business climate and ...the impact of that climate on the investment decisions and performance of firms.’<sup>23</sup> The crucial pre-requisite for finding ‘more disaggregated evidence’ is the availability of raw disaggregated data. The following section will introduce the main firm-level datasets on which almost the entire micro-literature on business climate is based.

> 16 Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae. 2005: 2.

> 17 _Ibid._

> 18 Commander and Svejnar. 2007: 3.

> 19 Pande and Udry. 2005: 8.

> 20 Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan. 2008: 344. 21 Straub, 2008: p.35. 22 Pande and Udry. 2005: 3 and 31. 23 World Bank. 2004: 21.

7
difference of the estimated consumption and the reference consumption (based on the full consumption module): The relative bias is the average of the relative error: The relative standard error is the standard deviation of the relative error: For estimation based on multiple imputations, �� is averaged over all imputations.

Each proposed estimation procedure is run on random assignments of households to optional modules. A constraint ensures that each optional module is assigned equally often to a household per enumeration. The relative bias and the relative standard error are reported across all simulations.

The performance measures can be calculated at different levels. At the household level, the relative error is the relative difference in the household consumption. At the cluster level, the relative error is defined as the relative difference of the average reference household consumption and average estimated household consumption across the households in the cluster. Similarly, the global level compares total average consumption for all households.

# **Results**

In this section, the rapid consumption methodology will first be applied to a data set including a full consumption module from Hargeisa, Somalia. This will be used to assess the performance of the rapid consumption methodology compared to the traditional full consumption. Subsequently, the results from the High Frequency Survey in Mogadishu are presented. Security risks restrict face‐to‐face interview time to less than one hour. Therefore, the rapid consumption methodology is employed to derive the first ever 9
15 18. Increased pubilc spending on agriculture In<sup>the 1970s (Cumilnating in the</sup> ambitkus SAM programme of 1980-82) led to<sup>some knprovement In crop output</sup> growth. Taking three-year averages (to reduce<sup>the hnpact of rainfall variatlons</sup> between crop years), and comparing equdistant<sup>periods, real crop GDP grew by</sup> only 1 1 percent between 1967-69 and 1973-75; however,<sup>from 1973-75 to 1979-</sup> 81, growth more than doubled, rising to 25 percent<sup>(World Bank,1989:74). However,</sup> the growth-iducing kmpact of goverrvnent Input subsidies<sup>was partlfay undercut</sup> by a pricing policy that discrkninated against the<sup>rural sector. Twokmportant</sup> studies have Independently reached a significant conclusion<sup>about 1970-'82 trends:</sup> aithough total Inter-sectoral resource flows (transfers through the price mechanism added to fiscal transfers and transfers<sup>via the banking system) showed</sup> a net gain for the countryside, relative price movements<sup>continued to favour the</sup> urban rather than the rural sector (G6mez Oilver,1984;Goodman<sup>et al,1985:Appendix</sup> A).

19. In the late 1970s and early 1980s public spending<sup>on the agricultural</sup> sector was fuelled significantly by the expansion<sup>of oil export revenues and</sup> overseas borrowing, a policy that was not sustainable<sup>after 1982. Significant</sup> cutbacks In Input subsidies contributed to a<sup>slowing of agricultural growth,</sup> although the growth rate remained somewhat higher<sup>than It was In the early 1970s:</sup> between 1979-81 and 1985-87, crop GDP increased<sup>by 13 percent In real terms</sup> (World Bank,1989:74). Post-1985 changes In exchange<sup>rate and pricing policy may</sup> ultinately stinulate agricultural growth, more than<sup>off-setting the Impact of cuts</sup> In Input subsidles: It Is too early to draw any concluslons<sup>In this respect.</sup> 20. What impact have these recent sectoral trends had<sup>on the ejido? After</sup> 1970, a larger share of pubiic resowrces were directed<sup>toward the small-farm</sup> sector and toward rain-fed agriculture. For example,<sup>irrigatlon schemes became</sup>
# _Relative magnitude of school participation deficits_

How large is the deficit in school participation relative to other sources of inequality? The multivariate models can be used to compare school participation gaps associated with disability, gender, urban/rural residence, as well as economic status. Figure 3 shows, for each survey, the school participation deficit among children with disabilities (relative to those without disability); girls (relative to boys), children in rural areas (relative to those in urban areas), and children in households in the poorest quintile (relative to the richest quintile).<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 3. Magnitudes of school participation deficits associated with: having a disability, being a girl, living in a rural area, and being in the poorest relative to the richest quintile. Percentage point differences for children ages 6 to 17**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Burundi 2000<br>Cambodia 1999<br>Cambodia 2000<br>Indonesia 2003<br>Jamaica 1998<br>Mongolia 2000<br>Mozambique 1996<br>Romania 1995<br>-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20<br>With disability Female Rural Poorest-Richest quintile<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note_ : Deficits shown are the marginal effects of dummy variables for each characteristic in multivariate probit models.

> 14 In each case the deficit is estimated at the means of the other variables.

13
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22
in flood‐prone areas. For instance, L Ward and M West have a large number of retail shops and markets located near the chronic flooding spots. Similarly, L Ward, K East, K West and F North have a number of industrial units located near chronic and localized flooding spots. In addition, there are educational amenities, including schools, which are located near flooding spots in almost all the selected wards. Among the medical facilities, the key public hospitals are located at the chronic flooding spot in F South. Similarly, a number of medical facilities are located near chronic spots in M West, L Ward and P North. Social amenities like places of religious worship or community centers are also in large numbers all along the flooding spots in the selected wards. Besides the other services and amenities, there are a large number of public utilities located in flood‐prone areas. These include electric transmission and receiving stations, power lines, water pumping stations, sewage pumping stations, public sanitary facilities, solid waste disposal sites, fire brigade, storm water pumping stations, etc.

The key findings from the flood exposure analysis are:

- A large number of households reside nearby and are directly exposed to chronic and localized floods across the flood prone wards in the city.

- The percentage of slum dwellers located near the flooding spots is quite high. These are the most vulnerable sections of the population and are directly exposed to flood waters due to their location on the roadsides or in low‐lying areas.

- Besides slum households, other poor, low and middle income households residing in chawls and apartments are exposed to recurrent floods in large numbers.

- Apart from the households residing in and near the flooding spots, people transiting through the areas for work or to use services and amenities are also directly and indirectly exposed to floods.

- The direct exposure of population in transit happens when they use the services and amenities located near the flooding spots. There are a number of shops, markets, educational and medical facilities, social amenities and public utilities which are located near these spots.

- The nature of all the land uses around the chronic and localized flooding spots highlights the significant amount of asset and wealth exposure to recurrent floods.

# 4.2 Vulnerability and impacts of floods

This section explores the vulnerability and impacts of recurrent floods on the households in Mumbai through the surveys carried out in six flood‐prone wards as described in the methodology section. The analysis focused on the socio‐economic profile of surveyed households, multiple stressors faced by them, vulnerability to recurrent floods, impacts of the extreme weather event of July 2005 and subsequent impacts of recurrent floods.

## 4.2.1 Socioeconomic profile

For the 200 households surveyed across six wards for this study, Figure 3 shows their socio‐economic status. Among the sample households, 11% have monthly income less than Indian Rupees (Rs.) 5,000.

12
Policy Research Working Paper 10249

# **Abstract**

This paper uses data on the near universe of job adverts posted online in the US to study the impact of the 2018 trade war on US job opportunities. It develops measures of labor market exposure to three key channels of impact from the trade war: import protection for US producers, the higher cost of imported inputs for US producers, and exposure of US exporters to retaliatory tariffs. It finds evidence that both tariffs on imported inputs and retaliatory tariffs led to a relative decline in online job postings in affected commuting zones. These effects were stronger for lower skilled postings than for higher skill postings. By contrast, it does not find any evidence of positive impacts of import protection on job openings. It estimates that the tariffs led to a combined effect of 175,000 fewer job postings in 2018, or 0.6 percent of the US total, with two thirds of this aggregate decline due to the imported input tariffs and one third due to retaliatory tariffs.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at kstapleton@worldbank.org, bkett@imf.org, beata.javorcik@economics.ox.ac.uk, and lokane@burning-glass.com.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team