multiple kinds of e↵ort to push forward projects. We first examine whether the impact of incentives/monitoring practices varies with the ethnic fractionalization of bureaucrats in the organization. Such ethnic di↵erences internal to an organization capture di↵ering policy preferences over how projects should be designed, prioritized, or implemented [Rasul and Rogger 2015]. In such environments, bureaucrats might then need to exert multiple types of e↵ort to negotiate around these concerns and get projects completed. Column 1 shows the marginal impact of incentives/monitoring on project completion rates is indeed even more negative if there is greater ethnic fractionalization of bureaucrats in the organization.<sup>16</sup> On multi-tasking concerns relating to external e↵ort, we next examine whether the negative impact of incentives/monitoring becomes exacerbated in organizations where a greater share of their projects require engagement with stakeholders outside of their organization. This set of stakeholders includes members of civil society, Ministers/Members of parliament, Member(s) of the Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assemblies (MMDAs - local government units), the private sector, traditional authorities, community or religious group(s), and the media. The result in Column 2 shows the marginal impact of incentives/monitoring on project completion rates is even more negative in organizations where there is a greater need to coordinate with such external stakeholders.

Both results suggest that when the environment faced by bureaucrats requires them to exert multiple forms of e↵ort to push forward projects - due either to a greater need to coordinate/negotiate internally or to coordinate with external stakeholders - it becomes harder to design and instigate e↵ective forms of incentives/monitoring. In such multi-tasking environments where not all e↵orts can be measured or monitored to the same extent, organizations tend to have worse outcomes because practices related to incentives/monitoring might be poorly designed and not be holistic enough to encourage all forms of e↵ort required for successful project completion.

# **4.2 Intrinsic Motivation**

A long established literature suggests those that self-select into public service might be relatively more _intrinsically motivated_ than those working in the private sector [Crowley and Smith 2014]. Performance incentives or monitoring might then be detrimental if such practices crowd out such intrinsic motivation. To measure civil servant’s intrinsic motivation, As part of our civil servants survey, we obtained individual measures of the public service motivation (PSM) of bureaucrats, using an abbreviated version of the standard Perry scale [Perry 1996]. This includes four sub-indices related to motivations related to compassion, public interest, policy making and sacrifice. We then examine whether the negative impacts of management practices related to incentives/monitoring

> 16An established macroeconomic literature documents a negative correlation between societal diversity and economy-wide outcomes [Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005]. In Kenyan private sector settings, Hjort [2014] and Macchiavello and Morjaria [2015] show ethnic divisions impact productivity due to worker discrimination.

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