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|**Authors**<br>|**Methodology**|**MainFindings**|
|---|---|---|
|_PoliticalEconomy._104:764-790.|||
|Black,Bemard,ReinierKraakman,<br>and AnnaTarassova.Forthcoming.<br>'Russian<br>Privatization<br>and<br>CorporateGovemance:WhatWent<br>Wrong?'_StanfordLawReview._|Adescriptivesurvey ofthehistoryof<br>privatzationinRussia. Severalspecific<br>casesareanalyzedinmore detail.|The authors findthatprivatizabonhascreateda<br>'kleptocracy"<br>andhasfailed.They emphasizethe<br>importanceofdecreasingincentvesforself-dealing<br>whenprogramsofprivatizabonaredesigned.|
|Brada,JosefC.1996.'Privatization<br>isTransition-Orisit?'<br>_Joumalof_<br>_EconomicPerspectives._10:67-86.|This study setsoutthedifferentmethods<br>ofprivatization.|Privatizationcanoccurinanumberofways, through<br>resUtution,saleofstateproperty,massorvoucher<br>privatzationandprivatizatonfrombelow. Theauthor<br>finds thatthereare twokeylessonswhenlooking<sup>at</sup><br>privatzationintransitoneconomies.<sup>Firstythe</sup><br>methodofprivatizabonmust vary according<sup>tothe</sup><br>specificSOE and no'granddesign"can<sup>be</sup>drawn<sup>up</sup><br>forpnvatizingahostofenterprises.In<sup>somecases</sup><br>themajorityofSOEs canonlyberealistically<br>privatzedby givingthem away.The second<sup>lessonis</sup><br>thatitisdifficultto achieveownershipbyoutsiders.|
|Claessens,<br>Stijn,<br>and<br>Simeon<br>Djankov.<br>1999a.<br>"Enterprise<br>Performance<br>and<br>Management<br>Tumoverin theCzechRepublic.'<br>_EuropeanEconomic_Review.<br>43:<br>1115-1124.|Thestudy usesasampleof706<br>privatzedCzechfirmsduring1992-1997<br>toexaminetheeffectofmanagement<br>tumoveronchangesinprofitabilityand<br>laborproductvity.|When newmanagersareappointedbyprivate sector<br>ownersthereisasignificant improvementin<sup>profit</sup><br>marginsandlabor productivity.New managers<sup>that</sup><br>areappointedbytheNabonalPropertyfund<sup>also</sup><br>improveperformancebut notbyasmuch.|
|Claessens,<br>Stijn,<br>and<br>Simeon<br>Djankov.<br>1999b.<br>'Ownership<br>Concentration<br>and<br>Corporate<br>Performance<br>in<br>the<br>Czech<br>Republic."_JoumalofComparative_<br>_Economics._27:498-513.|Usingthe samesampledataasabove<br>thisstudylooksat therelatonship<br>betweenownershipconcentrabonand<br>profitabilityandlaborproductivity.|Concentrated ownershipisfound tobe linked<sup>with</sup><br>higherprofitability andlaborproductvity.Theauthors<br>alsofind thatnon-bank-sponsoredinvestment<sup>funds</sup><br>improveperformancemorethanbank-sponsored<br>funds.|
|Djankov,<br>Simeon.<br>1999a.<br>'Ownership<br>Structure<br>and<br>Enterprise<br>Restructuring<br>inSix<br>Newly<br>Independent<br>States."<br>_Comparative_<br>_Economic_<br>_Studies._<br>41(1):75-95.|Theauthorexaminestherelationship<br>betweenownership structureandfirm<br>restructuringforGeorgia,Kazakhstan,<br>KyrgyzRepublic,Moldova,Russiaand<br>Ukraine. Thesample contains960firms<br>privatized between1995and1997in<br>these countries.|It isfoundthatwhen foreignownershipissignificant<br>(greaterthan30percent),itispositivelyrelated<sup>to</sup><br>restructuring.<br>Managerialownership ispositively<br>relatedtorestructuringatlowlevels(lessthan<sup>10</sup><br>percent)andhighlevelsofownership, but<sup>isnegative</sup><br>inbetween.<sup>Employeeownershipisfoundtobe</sup><br>insignificant exceptatlowlevelsofownership<sup>where</sup><br>ithasa positiveeffect.|
|Djankov,Simeon.<br>1999b.'The<br>RestructuringofInsider-Dominated<br>Firms:A ComparatveAnalysis.'<br>_EconomicTransition._7(2):467-479.|Usingthesamesurveydataasabove<br>thisstudylooksattheeffectsofdifferent<br>privatzationpattemsonthe processof<br>restructuring.Georgia(92firms)used<br>voucher<br>privatizaon,<br>while<br>most<br>Moldovanfirms(149firms) wereeither<br>purchasedbyinvestment fundsorsold<br>forcashtomanagers.|Managementbuy-outsarepositivelycorrelated<sup>with</sup><br>enterpriserestructuring.Firmsthatare<sup>privatized</sup><br>throughvouchersdonotrestructureanymorerapidly<br>thanstateowned firms.Thisimplies that incentives<br>torestructureareweakerwhenmanages<sup>aregiven</sup><br>firmsforfree,sincetheir incomeisnotwholly<sup>based</sup><br>onthesuccessofthe firm.|
|Djankov, Simeon,andPeter Murrell.<br>2000.<br>_The_<br>_Determinants_<br>_of_<br>_Enterprise_<br>_Restfucturing_<br>_in_<br>_Transition:AnAssessmentofthe_<br>Evidence.<br>WashingtonD.C.:The<br>World Bank(seealsoDjankov,<br>Simeon,andPeterMurrell.2000.<br>'Enterprise<br>Restructuring<br>in<br>Transition:AQuantitatieSurvey."<br>WashingtonD.C.:TheWorld Bank).|Theauthorsidentfiedmorethan125<br>empiricalstudiesthatexamine<br>the<br>determinantsofenterpriserestructuring.<br>Thepaperprovidesacomprehensive<br>reviewoftheempirical<br>results<br>of<br>privatizationin<br>transitOneconomies<br>usingthedatageneratedby these<br>studies.|Privateownershipproduces morerestructuring<sup>than</sup><br>state-ownershipinCentraland EastemEurope.<sup>In</sup><br>contrast, evidenceismixedfor theCommonwealthof<br>IndependentSates(CIS)countries. Theprivatization<br>effectinthenon-CIScountriesismorethantwice<sup>the</sup><br>sizeofthatintheCIScountrles. Privatization<sup>to</sup><br>foreign ownersisten timesasproductive<sup>as</sup><br>privatkationto diffuse indMdualowners.<sup>State</sup><br>ownershipwithintraditionalstatsfirmsisthe<sup>least</sup><br>effectivetypeofownership.<br>State ownershipin<br>commercialized<br>enterprises,<br>however,<br>isquite<br>effective.Productmarketcompetitionhas beena<br>majorforcebehind improvements<br>inenterprise|