the 1990s (figure 7a).<sup>29</sup> The combined use of the other G20 economy users of CVDs is much smaller – even despite the recent (well‐publicized) increase in policy activity, less than 0.2% of these other G20 economies’ HS‐06 imported products in 2009 were subject to imposed CVDs (figure 7b).<sup>30</sup> Second, in both the United States and in the broader use amongst the other CVD‐imposing economies in the G20, there is strong evidence of the simultaneous use of CVD alongside antidumping. It is relatively rare for a product to be subject to a CVD and not also be subject to antidumping.<sup>31</sup> This point has obvious important implications for potential TTB policy reform and for attempts to address the removal of TTBs through WTO dispute settlement. For example, any attempt to rein in TTB use by addressing antidumping or CVDs alone will overestimate the likely impact if the reform fails to account for the policy substitutability and redundancy. The removal of AD may have little market access impact on trade flows if it does not also remove the simultaneously imposed CVD, and vice versa.

# **6. Conclusions and New Directions for Research**

This paper examines the evolving, cross‐country use of temporary trade barriers (TTBs) – antidumping, safeguard, and countervailing duty policies – over the period 1990‐2009. I construct new measures of annual, product‐level stocks and flows of these TTBs with newly available data drawn from the World Bank’s _Temporary Trade Barriers Database_ .

I benchmark trends in historical use and establish a number of facts regarding use of the TTB policies in order to measure any changes in import protection taking place during the global economic crisis of 2008‐2009. I find that the 2008‐2009 economic shock mostly accentuates patterns already visible in the pre‐crisis data. While the major G20 users of such policies combined to increase the stock 29 Once again, because I define the measures consistently over time, measurement error at the HS‐06 level is much _less_ of a concern for the main questions of interest on the _intertemporal_ changes (i.e., whether the scope of imported products subject to U.S. use of CVDs of TTBs is increasing or decreasing over time). See again the discussion in section 2.1.

30 Furthermore, the United States has been and remains the dominant user of countervailing duties. While not shown in the figure, I can also confirm that the United States was responsible for roughly 50% of the stock of entire HS‐06 products that the G20 imported that were subject to CVDs during this period. The other G20 economies combined to contribute the other 50%. The other G20 users of CVD (shown in the lower panel of figure 7) are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, Mexico and Turkey. According to the WTO, South Africa also has some use of CVDs but I am unable to identify the HS‐06 product codes associated with its use and due to lack of publically available information details on this use are not included in Bown (2010a).

> 31 It is important to note, however, that the converse is not true, as most use of antidumping by the economies in my sample of data is not accompanied by a simultaneous CVD.

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