rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_Role of NGOs in Health Delivery Afrca Health Policy Study_ _- 19-_

# Case Studies

## _Ghana_

In Ghana, NGOs-particularly religious ones-play a major role in health care delivery.<sup>7</sup> As in many other African countries, the government provides substantial grants to NGO health facilities usually consisting of paying all salaries and allowances. Indeed, even during the recent sustained period of economic decline, government grants were increasing, unlike the situation in many African countries where government subsidies have not kept pace with inflation and the increases in public sector salaries' Twenty-four out of the 38 NGOs listed as being active In health and population in Ghana are churchrelated. Many of Ghana's hospitals are mission hospitals; in 1986 they provided more than 25 percent of the hospital beds and nearly half of the outpadent cae In the country. In the Ashanti region, 8 out of 10 district hospitals are run by missions. In addition, the Presbyterian hospital of Agogo has engaged in a joint venture with the Ministry of Health to support 3 out of 7 district PHC clinics in Ashand. Missions tend to be disproportionately represented in the less privileged areas. While in the country as a whole, missions provide 25 percent of the hospital beds, in the six underprivileged northern regions they provide 46 percent of the hospital beds Moreover, mission facilities have expressed Interest in expanding in underprivileged areas.

As elsewhere, the activities of NGOs often complement those of the government~ which recognizes that they provide a net increase In resources to the country. Moreover, NGOs in Ghana are often involved In complementary health activties, such as sanitadon, giving them an inter-sectoral effect on improving health. There is also evidence that the NGO facilities have lower costs per visit and may have dghter control over their expenditure than public sector institutions. This comparison of efficiency, however, is difficult to make.

Ghana has two coordinating bodies for NGOs Involved In health care-the Christian Hospital Association of Ghana (CHAG) and the Ghana Amociation of Private VGluntary Organizations In Development (GAPVOD). As an umbrela organizadon, CHAG acts as an intermediary, arranging for the transfer of govemment funds to missions and for the procurement of essential drugs. GAPVOD's role In the past was to represent NGOs 7. This case-study draws almost exclusively from Bradley 1989 and from an Interview with David Berk of the World Bank.

8. Dr. Samuel Ofosu-Amaah, African Health Policy Study Extemal Technical Advisory Group meeting, May 1989.
Table 19

|Dependent variable: Need|of fiscal ad|justment ba|sed on deb|t/revenue|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Variables|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|Rigid expenditure minus|0.012**|0.009*|0.013*|0.009|0.036***|0.030|-0.026|0.017|
|structural as % GDP|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.010)|(0.027)|(0.019)|(0.019)|
|**Economic factors**|||||||||
|GDP growth (t-1)||-1.504***||-1.999***|-1.750***|-1.967***|-1.910***|-1.992***|
|||(0.363)||(0.353)|(0.367)|(0.360)|(0.371)|(0.354)|
|Inflation (t-1)||0.026||0.285**|0.273**|0.273**|0.262**|0.288**|
|||(0.145)||(0.128)|(0.128)|(0.129)|(0.129)|(0.128)|
|U.S. Interest rate||-0.008||-0.016|-0.020|-0.017|-0.020|-0.016|
|||(0.012)||(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|(0.013)|
|**Political factors**|||||||||
|Gini|||0.007|0.007|0.007|0.010|0.007|0.007|
||||(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.007)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|Rule of law|||0.014|0.039|0.034|0.036|-0.033|0.039|
||||(0.044)|(0.050)|(0.051)|(0.050)|(0.061)|(0.050)|
|Margin of Majority|||-0.162|-0.143|-0.129|-0.149|-0.135|-0.067|
||||(0.153)|(0.157)|(0.154)|(0.156)|(0.158)|(0.248)|
|Election's year|||-0.010|-0.007|-0.004|-0.006|-0.005|-0.007|
||||(0.015)|(0.016)|(0.016)|(0.016)|(0.016)|(0.016)|
|**Interactions**|||||||||
|EMEs * Deviation|||||-0.044***<br>(0.013)||||
|Gini * Deviation||||||-0.001<br>(0.001)|||
|Rule of law * Deviation|||||||0.009*<br>(0.004)||
|Majority * Deviation||||||||-0.012<br>(0.027)|
|Constant|0.274***|0.384***|0.021|0.068|0.072|-0.039|0.328|0.019|
||(0.038)|(0.064)|(0.298)|(0.282)|(0.276)|(0.326)|(0.303)|(0.307)|
|Observations|2,799|2,738|1,949|1,918|1,918|1,918|1,918|1,918|
|R-squared|0.005|0.023|0.011|0.039|0.052|0.040|0.044|0.039|
|Number of ifscode|138|137|98|98|98|98|98|98|
|CountryFE<br>Robust standard errors cl<br>*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *|Yes<br>ustered by c<br>p<0.1|Yes<br>ountry in pa|Yes<br>rentheses|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

- 48 -
Policy Research Working Paper 6730

# **Abstract**

Scholars have often argued that crime deters growth, but the empirical literature assessing such effect is scarce. By exploiting cross-municipality income and crime data for Mexico—a country that experienced a high increase in crime rates over the past decade—this study circumvents two of the most common problems faced by researchers in this area. These are: (i) the lack of a homogenous, consistently comparable measure of crime and (ii) the _small sample_ problem in the estimation. Combining income data from poverty maps, administrative records on crime and violence, and public expenditures data at the municipal level for Mexico (2005–2010), the analysis finds evidence indicating that drug-related crimes indeed deter growth. It also finds no evidence of a negative effect on growth from crimes unrelated to drug trafficking.

This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lflopezcalva@worldbank.org or crodriguezc@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Appendix B: Decentralization Indicator**

The indicator of decentralization is developed as part of a doctoral dissertation project (Vincent, 2020). The dataset informs on the discretionary power of sub-national and central governments over the tax system. It is built through in-depth reviews of more than two thousand legal and policy documents that inform on the distribution of power over the tax system across layers of government in each given country. The dataset considers the latest information available for each country based on the publication or ratification date of the most recent legal provisions on local taxation or the general tax codes. As such, not all countries listed in Table 10 are included in estimations with the decentralization variable. For instance, Benin is included in all rounds provided that the Afrobarometer was conducted as the primary law on local finance dates back to 1998 (Law No. 98-007). On the other hand, Madagascar's intergovernmental tax system is most recently defined by 2014 on local government finance and is therefore excluded from the analysis using the local government taxing rights variables. The sources of information are summarized as follows:

**Table 11: Sources of information – A summary**

|Legal Provision|Tax Codes, Local Government Acts, Laws and Decrees on Local Public<br>Finance and Taxation, Constitutions|
|---|---|
|Archives and<br>Policy<br>Documents|Archives from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBRD,<br>Access: 2015-2017), Decentralisation Policy Document, Territorial and Public<br>Administration Reforms documents, Development Strategies, Public<br>Financial Reports, Regional and Local Council Reports|
|Scientific and<br>Grey Literature|Peer-reviewed publications, edited volumes, working papers and<br>multilateral organization reports (IMF, World Bank, UCLG, UN, ...)|
|Existing<br>Databases|OECD Tax Autonomy, Regional Authority Index, Local Public Finance<br>Datasets (when available); IMF Government Finance Statistics Manuals<br>(Institutional Structure of Government)|

# **Coding Procedures**

Using the following matrix (Table 12), the discretionary power of each layer of government is coded for each identified tax and revenue source, and across four types of decisions: instrument, base, rates and administration.

- a. _Instrument_ refers to the ability of each government tier to establish or alter an existing instrument.

- b. _Base_ indicates which layer of government is involved in defining the taxable base or granting relief. While the tax bases are often defined single-handedly by central

37
**_Cliical_** _services_ **_and community-based_**

**_MadL_**

**_disbudon_**

_13_

# _3. Tbal lgation services_

A small number of tubal ligations were performed on women in Matadi prior to 1981, since in the 1981 survey 1.5 percent of the women in union reported having had this procedure. (Given that tubal ligation was not promoted for contraceptive purposes in Matadi prior to 1980, it is likely that these operadons were done for medical reasons.) In the early 1980s several local doctors were sent abroad for training in laparoscopy, and by 1985 tubal ligation was available from three sites in Matadi. Between 1985-1989, the three facilities combined performed a total of 379 tubal ligations, for an average of 76 per year.

# _4. Phannaces_

Pharmacies in Matadi continued to stock contraceptives in the 1984-89 period, totally independent of any of the above mentioned activities, as a standard private sector activity. By 1989 some of the social marketing products (condoms and spermicides) had found their way into local pharmacies, but the social marketing project had not formally begun distribution activities in Matadi at the time of the 1989 PRODEF followup survey.

There is no systematic monitoring of contraceptive sales in pharmacies, such as is done in the PRODEF and PSND/AZBEF outlets. Thus, it is difficult to assess the contribution of this source of services to family planning use in Matadi over this five year period. However, data from the 1989 followup survey do provide information on the percentage of users who obtain their supplies from this source.

# D. Indicators of Success In Matadi: Three Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys

# _1. Knowldge of_ **_Contraeptive_** _Methods_

Given the relatively limited availability of modern contraceptives in Matadi prior to 1981, a surprisingly high percentage of the population already knew at least one modern method: 86 percent of women 15-49 years old in the 1981 survey. This percentage increased to 97% by 1983 and remained at 97 percent in the 1989 survey (see Table 2). The percent of respondents who knew at least one traditional method was similarly high: 95 percent, 98 percent, and 94 percent on the 1981, 1983 and 1989 surveys respectively.

As would be expected, exposure to messages on family planning also increased dramatically over this eight-year period, as shown in Table 2. The percent having seen or heard something about family planning increased over 40 percentage points between 1981 and 1989 for radio, television and posters. Over this period radio was by far the most frequently mentioned medium, followed by television.

# _2. Ever Use of a Modern Contraceptive Method_

'Ever use' of a contraceptive method is an indicator of the degree to which the target population has experimented with family planning. While the ultimate goal of a program is to retain active users, it is also important to promote experimentation among a large part of the population as part of the adoption process.
**This expression can be evaluated for** the **stocks outstanding and** the

**interest rates** relevant at any moment in time, and summed **over time** to **get** annual **averages.** The approach adopted here was to take end-year stock figures and apply the implicit rates of tax in effect at end-year to these stocks<sup>12</sup> .

2.2.2 **Tax rates: percent of what?** Unlike the analysis of tariffs, excises or income taxes, for example, there are no conventional or generally accepted ways of expressing the burden of financial sector taxes in a simple or summary way. For example, in the case of an import tariff, if our main interest is in the effect on consumer prices, we will often use the statutory **rate** of tariff, i.e. the tariff expressed as a percentage of the net price of the good. A sales tax is usually expressed in the same way. Alternatively, if we are interested in the structure of protection which local producers receive from the tariff, we will carry out an "effective rate of protection" calculation, effectively expressing the tariff as a percentage of the local value added component of the locally produced good. For other purposes, it may be of interest to compare the revenue from a particular tax with total government revenue or expenditure, or with overall economic activity or national income.

The main problem in approaching the same question for financial sector taxes is not only the fact that there is no statutory rate of tax, but also the complication that most taxes may have their impact on suppliers of funds, on users of funds, and on the providers of specific factor services.

In practice we can report the taxes as a share of (a) the stock of financial assets affected by the tax, (b) the flow of income from those affected assets, or national income generally, or (c) government revenue or expenditure.

For (a) we report percentages of M2. The reader should bear in mind, however, that (as shown in the model of Appendix 1) different taxes are likely to affect borrowers and lenders differentially. Furthermore, in some countries a high proportion of the tax falls, at least in the first 12 Data sources are listed in the data appendix. In a few cases interpolations or extrapolations had to be made from published data.

11
WPS3771

# **Labor Market Distortions in Côte d’Ivoire: Analyses of Employer-Employee Data from the Manufacturing Sector**

Nicolai Kristensen* and Dorte Verner* World Bank 1818 H St, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. dverner@worldbank.org

## **Abstract**

This paper investigates the extent and nature of distortions in the labor market in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (RCI) by using quantile regression analysis on employer-employee data from the manufacturing sector. We found that the labor markets in Côte d’Ivoire do not seem to be much distorted. Unions may influence employment through tenure but do not seem to influence wages directly except for vulnerable minorities that seem protected by unions. Establishment-size wage effects are pronounced and highest for white-collar workers. This may be explained by the efficiency wage theory, so that, even in the absence of unions, segmentation and inefficiencies will still be present as long as firms seek to retain their employees by paying wages above the market clearing level. The inefficiency arising from establishment-size wage effects can be mitigated by education. Furthermore, the premium to education is found highly significantly positive only for higher education, and not for basic education, indicating that educational policies should also focus on higher education.

## World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3771, November 2005

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

## **______________________________**

*We wish to thank colleagues from the Africa regional labor market study, Niels-Hugo Blunch, Wendy V. Cunningham, and Norbert M. Fiess, for their helpful comments and suggestions; and Eliana Cardoso, Helena Ribe, and Arvil van Adams for their invaluable support.
|(Respondents: 370 privacy<br>professionals from the<br>IAPP database located in<br>U.S. and E.U.)|Salary and travel (2018)<br>Salary and travel (2019)|47% of privacy budget<br>50% of privacy budget|
|---|---|---|
|**Paul Hastings, 2017**<br>Rdt 100 FTSE|Additional staff (U.K.)|$263,600 – $524,700|
|(esponens:<br>350 & 100 Fortune 500<br>companies)|Additional staff (U.S.)|$501,000 - $1M|

_<u>Note: Data figures have been converted from Euros to U.S. Dollar using XE’s currency converter and rounded.</u>_ Data from MW&E’s study reported that almost half of the organizations represented (48%) are either in the process or expecting to hire an average of almost four additional employees to provide ongoing assistance with the GDPR.<sup>86</sup> Despite the expected increase for some, 38% of organizations in the research group believe their organization lacks the human resources to fulfill their obligations and sustain GDPR compliance in 2019.<sup>87</sup>

# Privacy Team Responsibilities Reported to IAPP-EY, 2019

<!-- Start of picture text --> Privacy-related legal counsel (internal) 62%<br>Assuring proper cross-border data transfer 66%<br>Privacy-related vendor management 69%<br>Data inventory & mapping 74%<br>Privacy related investigations 77%<br>Design and implementation of privacy controls 81%<br>Compliance with the GDPR 83%<br>Incident response 85%<br>Performing privacy impact assessments 85%<br>Following legislative developments 85%<br>Company awareness and training 88%<br>Privacy polices, procedures, and governance 94%<br>0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%<br>2019 Responses<br><!-- End of picture text --> 88 The GDPR permits individuals to request the data that companies hold on them, a process that requires an inventory of the data that companies hold, and can require configuration of their databases. According to DataGrail’s survey findings, 58% of companies had received 11 or more data subject requests per month since the GDPR’s implementation and the survey’s closing in April 2019,

> 86 McDermott Will & Emery, _supra_ note 68.

> 87 _Id._ at 25.

> 88 Hughes & Saverice-Rohan, _supra_ note 74.

16
|Can borrow money from at least one<br>or multiple persons in case of emer-<br>gency||||0.388<br>(0.250)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Did not receive remittances in the past year|||||
|Received remittances in the past year||||0.956***<br>(0.299)|
|Constant<br>0.810***|2.312|1.029***|2.005|1.467|
|(0.117)|(1.674)|(0.249)|(1.771)|(1.879)|
|Observations<br>393|393|393|393|393|
|Prob > F<br>0.00957|0.0278|0.0140|0.0298|0.00136|

One caveat of this method is the fact that estimation results depend on how the matching is specified beforehand. When including more variables to match treated and control units, the estimate of the treatment effect sometimes changes, both in value and significance.

We perform a k-to-k match, i.e. keeping only one control observation for each treated observation. Sample size for the matched sample when balancing on the 5% loss threshold dropped to 182 observations (91 pairs or matches) and to 78 observations when balancing the 10% loss threshold (39 pairs or matches). After proceeding to a k-to-k match in the sample of affected households, and running identical regressions, the significant negative relationship between the fact of having lost more than 5% (resp. 10%) remains, even when we do not control for other variables. This is independent of the matching specification done prior to the logistic regression.

_Table 31: Probability of having recovered after two years, as a function of various housing characteristics and magnitude of losses. N.B. Logistic regression is run after matching the data with CEM on a k-to-k match._

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Did not lose more than 5% of household<br>expenditure due to the flood||||||
|Lost more than 5% of household expendi-||||||
|ture due to the flood|-0.501|-0.543*|-0.564*|-0.589*|-0.664**|
||(0.309)|(0.307)|(0.318)|(0.317)|(0.318)|
|Log of real per capita expenditure||-0.168<br>(0.186)||-0.102<br>(0.197)|-0.0980<br>(0.209)|
|Main income source: Monthly salary<br>Main income source: Casual labor|||-1.145***|-1.129***|-<br>1.048***|
||||(0.393)|(0.396)|(0.406)|
|Main income source: Hawking|||-0.128|-0.150|-0.249|

56
- 67 -

Figure 2

# Fiscal Deficit, CPI Inflation and Official Devaluation

<!-- Start of picture text --> RRAZII.<br>9 . 5<br>8 A t X ~~~~~~~~~~so<br>_ 50<br>low8 foal 1982 19831 1904 loss lo low*<br>WEI i I' flo<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 71~ .,~ 100<br>O. ...... as<br>12.5 IS0<br>Jol"tRcus. Fl *NI IW Itmsom<br>100 [a25<br>1900 1981 1982 196:l 1984 t15 1to1s 19we<br><!-- End of picture text -->
2015 California auction price of $13.93 per ton,<sup>5</sup> this carbon would be worth about $27 million per year or $3.00 per household. At the voluntary carbon market price of $6.00 per ton these savings would be worth about $11.88 million or less than $1.50 per household per year.

Unless households use the _Mirt_ stoves more intensively (e.g. by cooking more than the four kilogram of _teff_ flour provided in the CCT), the carbon benefits generated – even if fully compensated at market prices – cannot drive adoption and use if households are motivated purely by financial benefits. Households must therefore also find the stoves to be appropriate for their private needs. In other words, _<u>Mirt</u>_ <u>stoves must offer users</u> - <u>significant private non carbon finance benefits if they are to be enticed to use them.</u> Our results suggest that such additional benefits exist. People seem to like the stove, which likely implies that in the field the stoves are regularly used, and reduced fuelwood consumption and less smoke are the most important services. Most participants even say they would buy the new stove at the full market price and would recommend that their neighbors do the same. There appears to be significant discussion of the _Mirt_ stoves, because about 90% of respondents say they gave others advice about the new stove and 42% had received advice. This is also interesting from the perspective of how to implement promotion programs, because it might be enough to teach people and allow others to get recommendations from others.

Respondents note that respiratory discomfort is much less with the _Mirt_ stove than the traditional one and they say that women and young children are the prime beneficiaries. The smoke benefit requires more detailed examination, however, particularly as it is not only an inconvenience, but also a major human health hazard. Remaining is to actually measure any reductions in indoor air pollution and draw potential inferences for economic outcomes and human health.

Much better than asking respondents how well they like the _Mirt_ stove is to document through measurement that they use them frequently enough that they probably are not cooking _injera_ on more than one stove. Such analysis would provide evidence

> 5 See http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/may-2015/summary_results_report.pdf downloaded May 29, 2015.

20 | P a g e