the inputs upfront. The removal of what was essentially an interest-free loan on the cost of the inputs had some financial costs for farmers. Due to the relatively small real price increase in cocoa and cotton, one cannot necessarily conclude that all export crop farmers were better off as a result of the devaluation. Cocoa farmers whose incomes also depended heavily on domestically produced staple food crops or who consumed a higher than average share of imports could well have suffered a decline in real expenditures.

On the food crop side, the real price of locally produced staple food crop prices declined. If one looks at the staple food component of the blue collar CPI, between December 1993 and December 1994, the real price of staple foods actually decreased (table 15). Between 1994 and 1995, the staple food index had essentially caught up to the overall price index. Breaking it down into the importable and nontradable foodstuffs, however, shows that most of the price increase was in the price of importables rather than nontradable foodstuffs. Between December 1993 and December 1995, the price of imported staple foods (essentially rice and wheat products) increased by 67 percent, compared to a 29 percent increase in locally produced staple foods. Over the same period, the CPI increased by 44 percent, so there was actually a decrease in the real price of locally produced foodstuffs of about 11 percent (table 15). Our analysis of the staple food price data collected across ten markets in CMte d'Ivoire shows that real staple food prices declined anywhere from 0 to 20 percent depending on the particular product between 1993 and 1995 (table 11). Only the real price of plantains remained stable, according to the market price data. In view of the decline in staple food crop prices, one would expect an increase in poverty among farners specializing in staple food crop production.

Table 15 Index of Prices of Staple Foods, **1993-1995a)**

|_Expenditure item_||_CPI price index_||
|---|---|---|---|
||_December 1993_|_December 1994_|_December 1995_|
|Tradable staple foods|100|129.2|166.7|
|Rice|100|126.2|178.3|
|Macaroni|100|189.5|194.0|
|Bread|100|127.9|127.9|
|Non-tradable staple foods|100|114.0|128.8|
|Maize|100|117.1|123.5|
|Millet|100|117.7|121.0|
|Manioc|100|94.1|111.8|
|Attidke|100|133.0|172.9|
|Yams|100|144.8|137.1|
|Potatoes|100|164.0|120.7|
|Plantain|100|101.4|121.7|
|Staple foods|100|120.4|144.9|
|CPI|100|132.2|142.4|

> a) Indice des prix (ouvrier, employe qualifee ou artisan traditionnel.)

These observations suggest that the impact of the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc is likely to be less favorable than suggested by Goreux (1995). He argues that in the presence of good rainfall in the year following the devaluation, it is reasonable to think that consumption of home production did not diminish in the rural areas. Export crop producers would have benefited, particularly those producing coffee. Furthermore, it is likely that food crop producers benefited as well, since the CPI indicates that staple food prices went up at the same rate as the devaluation, and transport costs did not. All in all, he argues that it is likely that the monetary revenue of the rural population increased after the devaluation.

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