|Distance to closest|||0.000|||0.000|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|urban center|||(0.87)|||(0.87)|
|Distance to closest|||0.00135|||0.0012|
|bus/train stop|||(0.03)|||(0.04)|
|Village chief has|||-0.053|||-0.057|
|secondary education|||(0.06)|||(0.04)|
|Most common|||0.041|||0.039|
|language same in<br>village and commune|||(0.18)|||(0.21)|
|Observations|4,079|4,079|3,556|4,079|4.072|3,556|
|R-squared|0.11|0.11|0.17|0.11|0.12|0.17|

Note: All specifications estimated with ordinary least squares, with commune fixed effects. Robust _p_ -values, with standard errors clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates of the following controls are insignificant and not reported: ethnic dummies (Bariba, Yoa/Lokpa, Ditamari); gender and ages of household head and respondent; whether respondent has completed elementary, secondary or higher education; religion and marital status of respondent; number of adults in the household; whether the household has a mobile phone or TV; whether the village chief has a primary education; the population of the village; whether the village has a secondary school, literacy center or health or maternity center; presence of a paved road; number of functional private schools; the number of potable water sources; the probability any two households speak the same language at home.

Table 4 shows a highly robust negative effect of access to private non-commercial or community radio on citizen preferences for jobs compared to public health benefits. The coefficient on community radio is stable s across the first three specifications, ranging from no controls at all to 41 controls. This supports our claim of exogeneity and that unobserved factors are unlikely to be spuriously driving the results we report. Fifty percent of all respondents prefer the jobs candidate. However, each additional community radio station reduces the fraction of respondents who prefer the “jobs” politician by 2.8 to 4 percentage points.<sup>18</sup> Table 5 shows that community radio has a similar negative effect on jobs when compared to public education, but this is robust only for respondents that live in households with children. In the first three regressions in Table 5 on jobs versus public education, the effects of community radio access on preferences for the jobs candidate are negative, but noisily estimated and insignificant at standard confidence levels. However, the second three regressions show this is because of highly heterogeneous effects of radio across households with and without children. An interaction term of radio with number of children is added to the final three specifications of the table, and has a large and significant negative coefficient. A one standard deviation increase in the interaction term (7.2) yields a 3.5 percentage point reduction among households with children in their support for the politician who promises jobs relative to education inputs.

In each table, the first column offers the cleanest test of the hypothesis that access to community radio programming reduces preferences for targeted jobs over broadly delivered health and education benefits. This first specification controls only for community radio access and commune fixed effects, which, as argued in section 4, allows us to identify the effect of community radio because of the characteristics of radio markets in Benin and our tailored village sampling

> 18 Going from the minimum (zero) to the maximum (seven) community radios therefore implies a reduction in support for clientelist politicians by at least 25 percent.  A one standard deviation increase in radio access - 1.5 stations – implies a 4.5 to six percent reduction.

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