rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Wage and pension pressure on the
            Polish budget
After Poland's remarkable
            stabilization and liberalization in 1990, the economy faced
            three related problems: high wage and pension claims, a
            rising number of pensioners and unemployed workers, and a
            budget crisis, especially in 1991 and 1992. The author
            studies the role that wage and pension pressures played in
            this crisis. He also explains the persistence of the high
            tax wedge that later helped overcome the budget crisis. The
            positive effect on revenues of higher wages and higher tax
            rates could not compensate for both the inevitable loss in
            profit taxes and the excessive growth of spending on
            replacement income. Counterfactuals constructed for revenue
            and spending show the rising number of social benefit
            earners (pensions, unemployment) to be responsible for much
            of the budgetary burden. But they also show that the better
            protection of social income (over other income) explains
            part of the burden. Part of the employment loss and social
            spending can be ascribed to the excessive wage recovery of
            late 1990 and 1991. Insiders set wages ignoring the
            unemployed and exploiting the pension system in a context of
            uncertainty about profits and productivity, at a time when
            there was strong popular support for the protection of
            replacement income. The author recommends pension reform and
            caution about wages: the current economic recovery should
            create jobs, not raise wages, he says; and ensuring
            equitable opportunities for all requires moderating the
            income claims of the best-protected groups.
The causes of government and the
            consequences for growth and well-being
Using a large cross-country data set,
            the authors examine the factors that cause governments to
            grow, and analyze how the size of government affects growth,
            whether measured as income growth or other measures of
            well-being, such as infant mortality and life expectancy.
            They find no robust link between government size and per
            capita income. The factors they find to be important in
            explaining government size are relative prices, the
            age-dependency ratio, how long a country has been
            independent, relative political freedom, and openness in
            trade. Their results also partially support the view that
            governments use consumption to buffer external risk,
            especially in low-income countries. As for how government
            size affects growth, they find a robust and significant
            negative relationship between growth and government size, as
            measured by consumption. Policy distortions, predictably,
            also have a negative effect on growth. But the positive
            effects of well-functioning institutions and high quality in
            government bureaucracies can offset the negative influence
            of large government size alone. Finally, they find that
            social-sector spending can exert a positive influence by
            reducing infant mortality and raising life expectancy.
            Better income distribution, higher per capita income, higher
            per capita income growth, and more political freedom have
            the same positive effect on those two measures of well-being.
Are wages and productivity in
            Zimbabwe affected by human capital investment and
            international trade
To analyze what determines wages and
            productivity in Zimbabwe, the author analyzes an
            employer/employee data-set from Zimbabwe's
            manufacturing sector. The author finds that: * Formal
            education, training, and experience positively affect wages
            and productivity positively. * Women are paid roughly 37
            percent less than men although they are not measurably less
            productive. * There is no strong indication of ethnic
            discrimination among employees, but Europeans are being paid
            more in larger firms, although they are marginally less
            productive than workers of African origin. * The wage
            premium for workers who completed secondary school does not
            necessarily reflect greater productivity but may indicate a
            shortage of educated workers. * Workers trained in-house
            earn more although in-house training does not instantly
            affect productivity. Training by outside trainers does
            improve productivity but is not rewarded with higher wages.
            * Apprentices are paid more than non-apprentices. Perhaps an
            apprentice diploma serves as a screening device, when
            hiring. * Temporary workers are more productive than
            permanent workers, perhaps hoping to get a permanent
            contract. * Union members earn less than non-union members
            despite being more productive. Perhaps union members fight
            more to have skills upgraded than for wage increases. *
            Larger exporting firms are marginally less productive and
            pay marginally less than the average firm, but ar more
            productive than smaller firms (and their wages match
            productivity). Workers in larger woods and metals are paid
            less than workers in smaller firms, although they are not
            less productive. * Exporting firms benefit more than
            employees do from trade openness and greater productivity. *
            Foreign-owned firms are more productive than other firms
            (perhaps because of new technology). * Firms that employ
            more expatriates tend to pay more. The more expatriates
            there are in metals firms, the more productive the employees
            are, perhaps because the expatriates bring knowledge about
            new technology to the enterprise. * Employees in the metal
            and textile sectors are paid more than those in the food
            sector, but employees in metals are less productive than
            employees from other sectors.
Self-employment and labor turnover -
            cross-country evidence
The author uses cross-country data from
            Latin America and OECD countries to test the predictions of
            a simple efficiency wage model (Krebs and Maloney 1998)
            about the share of the workforce in self-employment and the
            rate of labor turnover across the process of development and
            demographic transition. The model is supported, with
            numerous demographic, economic, and labor market
            institutions appearing as important determinants of both
            self-employment and turnover. Social security taxes on firms
            and barriers to firing workers appear to reduce the size of
            the formal sector, and barriers to firing do appear to
            reduce turnover. But the level of formal sector
            productivity, real interest rates, and education levels
            generally have a greater impact. A central lesson is that it
            is misleading to use the size of the informal
            self-employment sector and the rate of labor turnover as
            indicators of distortion or rigidity without first adjusting
            for these factors. Somewhat speculatively, the author offers
            adjusted measures that suggest that Latin American labor
            markets are not especially distorted and are about average
            in flexibility, with important exceptions. Central to the
            theoretical framework is the view that self-employment is a
            desirable destination for many salaried workers rather than
            the disadvantaged sector of a labor market segmented by
            union - or government - induced rigidities. To prevent the
            loss of investment in training to the informal sector, firms
            will pay above market-clearing "efficiency wages",
            in the process creating unemployment or segmentation that
            may cut across lines of formality.
A few things transport regulators
            should know about risk and the cost of capital
In reviewing contracts, establishing
            price limits, or arbitrating conflicts, regulatory agencies
            and policy advisors face significant information asymmetry
            in determining the appropriate allowed rate of return, or
            discount rate. The information gap is especially important
            in determining the degree of market risk - often a critical
            component of the cost of capital demanded by operators. The
            authors consider various methodological problems in the
            transport sector in establishing the link between regulatory
            regime and degree of market risk The results of quantitative
            studies confirm that even for the transport sector - where
            there is intermodal competition and where contracts are
            often shorter and regulatory decisions may be less pressing
            than for utilities - the choice of regulatory regime greatly
            affects the degree of market risk a company faces. This has
            important implication for regulatory agencies and actions.
            When a regulatory agency undertakes a price review, or when
            issues arise about concession contracts, it is important
            that regulators assess correctly the required rate of return
            and cost of capital. They must also assess correctly the
            level of risk, which affects the required rate of return and
            the cost of capital. Most regulators in developing countries
            have a problem: the regulated companies are unquoted or
            undertake many activities for a range of industries and even
            sectors. For them this methodology for measuring the cost of
            capital, calculating the measure of market risk, and
            estimating the impact of various regulatory regimes on
            market risk may be useful.
Aid dependence reconsidered
When foreign aid undermines
            institutional development aid recipients can exhibit the
            symptoms of aid "dependence" - benefiting from aid
            in the short term but damaged by it in the long term. The
            authors find that one equilibrium outcome can be high aid
            and weak institutions, even when donors and recipients fully
            anticipate aid's effects on institutional development,
            but don't take the drastic steps needed to put the
            country on the path to independence. Another equilibrium
            outcome can be low aid and strong institutions. Their model
            encompasses such diverse experiences as those of Tanzania
            and the Republic of Korea. When the development community
            ignores aid's effect on institutions, the outcome
            depends greatly on initial conditions. Where institutions
            are initially weak (as in many Sub-Saharan African countries
            at independence), institutional capacity collapses and
            foreign aid eventually finances the whole public budget.
            Where they are initially stronger, the result can be close
            to the institutions-sensitive equilibrium. The results
            suggest that, even for countries with similar per capita
            income, the foreign aid strategy should be designed to suit
            the country's institutional capacity. In some cases a
            short-term reduction in aid may increase a country's
            chances of graduating from aid.
Social capital, houshold welfare,
            and poverty in Indonesia
The author empirically estimates how
            social capital affects household welfare and poverty in
            Indonesia. His focus: household memberships in local
            associations, an aspect of social capital especially
            relevant to daily household decisions that affect welfare
            and consumption. The data suggest that households with
            higher social capital spend more per capita. They also have
            more assets, more savings, and better access to credit. To
            estimate how social capital contributes to household
            welfare, the author uses a reduced-form model of household
            welfare, which controls for relevant household and location
            characteristics. He measures social capital along six
            dimensions: density of memberships, internal heterogeneity
            of associations (by age, gender, education, religion, and so
            on), meeting attendance, active participation in
            decision-making, payment of dues, and community orientation.
            The strongest effects come from: A) Number of memberships.
            Each additional membership (an average of 20 percent
            increase) raises per capita household spending 1.5 percent.
            B) Internal heterogeneity. An increase of 20 percent in the
            heterogeneity index correlates with 3.3 percent more
            spending. C) Active participation in decision making. An
            increase of 20 percent in the participation index correlates
            with 3.2 percent more spending. The author also estimates
            structural equations and uses instrumental variable
            estimation and historical data to address the possible
            endogeneity of the social capital variable and to
            demonstrate that the causality runs from social capital to
            household welfare.
Capital flows, macroeconomic
            management, and the financial system - Turkey, 1989-97
Recent developments in a number of
            emerging economies have heightened interest in the
            relationship between macroeconomic management and financial
            regulation, in an environment of open capital accounts and
            large-scale movements of private capital. The authors
            analyze the Turkish experience with capital flows in a
            macro-economy characterized by chronically high inflation
            and fiscal deficits. They study the relationship between
            capital flows, macroeconomic management, and vulnerability
            in the financial system. Their analysis highlights the
            importance of fiscal policy in an era of large capital
            flows. Fiscal imbalances contributed both to real exchange
            rate appreciation and high real interest rates in Turkey.
            The high interest rates the government must pay on domestic
            debt have become one of the key issues of Turkey's
            macroeconomic management. Only by reducing its interest
            expenses can fiscal deficits be reduced and greater
            stability be achieved. The Turkish banking system, in
            becoming increasingly integrated with international
            financial markets, has become vulnerable to shifts in market
            confidence. Banks borrowed abroad in response to
            macroeconomic imbalances to benefit from high interest rates
            on domestic loans and government paper. In the process, the
            banks have exposed themselves to interest rate risk, to
            foreign-exchange risk, and to large credit risks. To reduce
            the Turkish economy's vulnerability to external shocks,
            financial regulation must be strengthened simultaneously
            with the achievement of macroeconomic stability.
Small states, small problems
Small states have attracted a good deal
            of research. The authors test whether micro-states are any
            different from other states in income, growth, and
            volatility. They find that, controlling for location,
            smaller states are actually richer than other states in per
            capita GDP. This income advantage largely reflects a
            productivity advantage--evidence against the idea that
            micro-states are unable to exploit increasing rates of
            return to scale. Small states do not have different per
            capita growth rates, with or without controls. Their annual
            growth rates are more volatile, partly because of their
            greater volatility in responses to terms-of-trade shocks--to
            which they are exposed because of their greater openness
            pays off positively in growth. The authors do recommend that
            small states diversify their risk by opening up more to
            international capital markets, although the benefits of
            doing so are still unresolved in the literature. In general,
            they conclude, small states are nor different from large
            states and should receive the same policy advice large
            states do.
Resolution of corporate distress -
            evidence from East Asia's financial crisis
The widespread financial crisis in East
            Asia caused large economic shocks, which varied by degree
            across the region. That crisis provides a unique opportunity
            for investigating the factors that determine the use of
            bankruptcy processes in a number of economies. The authors
            study the use of bankruptcy in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
            the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
            Taiwan (China), and Thailand. These economies differ in
            their institutional frameworks for resolving financial
            distress, partly because of the different origins of their
            judicial systems. One difference is the strength of creditor
            rights, which the authors document. They expect that
            differences in legal enforcement and judicial efficiency
            should affect the resolution of financial distress. Using a
            sample of 4,569 publicly traded East Asian firms, they
            observe a total of 106 bankruptcies in 1997 and 1998. They
            find that: 1) The likelihood of filing for bankruptcy is
            lower for firms with ownership links to banks and families,
            controlling for firm and country characteristics. 2) Filings
            are more likely in countries with better judicial systems.
            3) Filings are more likely where there are both strong
            creditor rights and a good judicial system. These results
            alone do not allow the authors to address whether increased
            use of bankruptcy is an efficient resolution mechanism.
Access to land in rural India -
            policy issues and options
Access to land is deeply important in
            rural India, where the incidence of poverty is highly
            correlated with lack of access to land. The author provides
            a framework for assessing alternative approaches to
            improving access to land by India's rural poor. He
            considers India's record implementing land reform and
            identifies an approach that includes incremental reforms in
            public land administration to reduce transaction costs in
            land markets (thereby facilitating land transfers) and to
            increase transparency, making information accessible to the
            public to ensure that socially excluded groups benefit.
            Reducing constraints on access to land for the rural poor
            and socially excluded requires five key issues: restrictions
            on land-lease markets, the fragmentation of holdings, the
            widespread failure to translate women's legal rights
            into practice, poor access to (and encroachment on) the
            commons, and high transaction costs for land transfers.
            Among guidelines for policy reform the author suggests: a)
            Selectively deregulate land-lease (rental) markets, because
            rental markets may be important in giving the poor access to
            land. b) Reduce transaction costs in land markets, including
            both official costs and informal costs (such as bribes to
            expedite transactions), partly by improving systems for land
            registration and management of land records. c) Critically
            reassess land administration agencies and find ways to
            improve incentive structures, to reduce rent-seeking and
            base promotions on performance. d) Promote women's
            independent land rights through policy measures to increase
            women's bargaining power within the household and in
            society generally. e) Improve transparency of land
            administration and public access to information, to reduce
            rent-seeking by land administration officers and to
            strengthen poor people's land rights (and knowledge
            thereof). f) Strengthen institutions in civil society to
            provide the awareness, monitoring, and pressure needed for
            successful reform and to provide checks and balances on
            inappropriate uses of state power. In a companion paper (WPS
            2124) the author addresses these issues at the level of a
            particular state - Orissa, one of India's poorest
            states - in an empirical study, from a transaction costs
            perspective, of social exclusion and land administration.