Beyond agricultural production, demand is also expected to increase for land to provide green energy or environmental services such as carbon storage. An early program subsidizing afforestation in Chile in <mark>19862011 seems to have realized neither economic nor environmental benefits-it triggered a</mark> decline in rural population and increased unemployment (Jordán & Heilmayr 2022), reducing <mark>biodiversity without higher carbon storage in above-ground biomass (Heilmayr</mark> _<mark>et al.</mark>_ <mark>2020), suggesting that careful design and possibly a combination of such programs with safeguards on converting natural ecosystems will have benefits.</mark> <mark>Programs to provide environmental services can also increase l</mark> and demand and, if rights are ill-defined, dispossess current users (Kansanga & Luginaah 2019). Evaluations of PES schemes (Börner _et al._ 2017) suggest their performance can be maximized via (i) additionality, i.e., PES target areas that, without support, are at high risk of irreversible land use change; (ii) leakage is avoided, i.e., better conservation outcomes in target areas are not offset by worse ones in non-target areas instead; and (iii) effects are sustained over time (Chabe-Ferret & Voia 2021). While internal enforcement is a necessary precondition for conservation (van der Zon _et al._ 2023), it can be reinforced by external monitoring using remote sensing data.

Allocating PES subsidies via competitive auction can help reveal private information including on strategic complementarities between neighboring parcels (Lewis & Polasky 2018). Auctions have been implemented successfully in settings such as Malawi (Ajayi _et al._ 2012) where they increased effectiveness and reduced cost by about 30% (Jack 2013). PES also achieved temporary reductions in deforestation in Uganda (Jayachandran _et al._ 2016) that were economically viable at a cost of carbon of $39/t. If the size of incentives exceeds the opportunity cost of environmentally inferior uses and issues of collective action (Edwards _et al._ 2021) or political economy (Pailler 2018; Cisneros _et al._ 2021) can be resolved, competitively awarded PES based on clear rights could offer considerable potential.

Evidence from Brazil shows that even simplified ways of self-registration can be used to monitor land use but that associated incentive effects need to be considered carefully. Linking eligibility for subsidized credit to compliance with environmental regulation has been effective in reducing deforestation (Assunção _et al._ 2020). It also allowed to effectively monitor Command and control measures, by targeting a 'Priority List' of municipalities with more intense environmental monitoring and enforcement, were effective, reducing deforestation by 40% and cutting 39.5 million tons of carbon emissions, an amount that could be significantly increased by selection of ex post optimal municipalities (Assuncao _et al._ 2019).

To incentivize conservation of native vegetation on about 394 million ha of private land, the country established the rural environmental cadaster (CAR) as a tool for voluntary self-registration of rural properties whereby landowners geo-reference their property boundaries and remaining forests using satellite imagery at their own expense, possibly with NGOs support (Azevedo _et al._ 2017). Yet, to the extent that it allowed credit constrained small farms to access subsidized credit to establish pastures on previously 25