rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
23 a high degree of social consensus about necessary reforms. In that case, the wage indexation mechanism helped to moderate wage inflation.

# E. **Conclusions** And Policy **Implications**

There is ample evidence of the high efficiency costs of public sector pay and employment interventions in economies where this sector overshadows and affects all formal private economic activity. Therefore, much effort has been devoted to reducing the size of the public sector, increasing its efficiency, and lessening its effects on private economic activity. The partial success of reform efforts has focused greater attention on the political economy of public sector pay and employment reforms. This review of several recent cross-country comparisons of reform efforts points up some lessons about the importance of political considerations for effective public sector analysis. In addition although further research is needed in several areas, some important policy messages can be drawn.

# Reforms in sestor pay and employment

Because of the primacy of labor markets to economic competitiveness -- and the negative effects a large or inefficient public sector can have on labor market competitiveness and the overall economy -- recent World Bank lending programs have focused on these issues. Indeed, public and parapublic sector pay and employment issues are at the top of the policy agenda in Africa (Lindauer 1991a:831). A recent World Bank review of the macroeconomic implications of public sector deficits (Easterly and Schmidt .Hebbel 1991:30) found that a loss of control over public sector wages and employment levels was a major contributor to fiscal deterioration, and that regaining control was essential to adjustment in eight of ten countries studied. Another World Bank survey of some adjustment programs found that civil service reform was addressed -- in all of the countries studied (Stevenson 1991:21-22). Reforms may focus on the entire public sector, the ,ivil service, public enterprises, or on parts of these -- only teachers and health care workers, for example.

In the environment of fiscal stringency, a major policy objective in recent years has been to stop or slow the growth of the civil service. This focus is a major policy shift, in that the initial response to economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s in many countries was to expand the public sector.' The new emphasis on public sector retrenchment has met with limited support in most countries where it has become policy. A common outcome, observed before and during managed reforms, has been wage flexibility without labor mobility. As discussed, in many countries, the real wage and the real exchange rate have fallen substantialy during managed or ad hoc adjustment, creating as environment conducive to the movement of labor from the production of nontradables to tradables. In many of the -- mostly African -- countries studied by Nunberg and Nellis (1990:
Daniels, P.W. (1985), _Service Industries: A Geographical Appraisal_ , New York: Methuen & Co.

- Dantzig, George and Alan Manne (1974), "A Complementary Algorithm for an Optimal Capital Path with Invariant Proportions," Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 312-323.

- Dee, Philippa, Kevin Hanslow and Tien Phamduc (2003), “Measuring the Costs of Barriers to Trade in Services,” in Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger (eds.), Trade in Services in the Asia-Pacific Region, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,” _American Economic Review,_ 76(1):297-308.

- Ethier, W.J. (1982), “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade,” _American Economic Review,_ 72(2):389-405.

- Francois, Joseph, Bradley McDonald and Hakan Nordstom (1996), "Assessing the Uruguay Round," in Will Martin and L. Alan Winters (eds.), _The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries_ , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables (1999), _The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade_ , Cambridge: MIT Press.

- Hansen, Terje and Tjalling Koopmans (1972), "On the Definition and the Computation of a Capital Stock Invariant Under Optimization,"  Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 487-523

- Harrison, Glenn, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr (1997), “Quantifying the Uruguay Round,” _Economic Journal_ .

- Harrison, Glenn, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr (1993), "Trade Reform in the Partially Liberalized Economy of Turkey," The World Bank Economic Review, May.

- Helu, Samuel (2007), “Maritime Services in Kenya,” paper presented at the Trade in Services Workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, sponsored by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Kenya and International Lawyers and Economists against Poverty, Nairobi, March 26, 27.

- Holmes, T. (1995), “Localization of Industry and Vertical Disintegration,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

Hummels, D (1995), “Global Income Clustering and Trade in Intermediate Goods,” Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

- Ikiara, Gerrishon K., Moses I. Muriira and Wilfred Nyangena (2000), “Kenya’s Trade in Services: Should the Country Fully Liberalize,” in Services in the International Economy, Robert Stern (ed.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Jensen, Jesper, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr (2007), “The Impact of Liberalizing Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: The Case of Russian Accession to the World Trade Organization,” _Review of Development Economics_ . Available as World Bank Policy and Research Working Paper number 3391 at:

25
# Capital Requirements and Business Cycles with Credit Market Imperfections

P.-R. Agénor<sup>∗</sup> , K. Alper<sup>∗∗</sup> , and L. Pereira da Silva<sup>∗∗∗</sup> JEL Classification Numbers: E44, E51, F41.

> ∗University of Manchester, United Kingdom, and Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research;<sup>∗∗</sup> Research Department, Central Bank of Turkey, Ankara, Turkey;<sup>∗∗∗</sup> World Bank, Washington DC, USA. We are grateful to seminar participants at the University of Manchester, the OECD, and the Banque de France for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are our own.

1
# **Table A2: Attrition**

## **Dependent Variable = 1 if girl is tracked from baseline to endline OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses P-values of joint-significance test in braces**

||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|**(5)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Treatment**|.007||.011|.001|.035|
||(.016)||(.018)|(.018)|(.101)|
|**High Disruption**||.024|.040|.029|.015|
|||(.023)|(.029)|(.029)|(.161)|
|**Treatment x High Disruption**|||-.021<br>(.032)|-.013<br>(.032)|.014<br>(.190)|
|**Individual Controls**|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|
|**F-Test**||||{.000}|{.000}|
|**Village Controls**|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|
|**F-Test**||||{.065}|{.062}|
|**Interactions**|No|No|No|No|Yes|
|**F-Test**|||||{.180}|
|**Mean of outcome variable**|||.829|||
|**Adjusted R-squared**|.004|.005|.005|.012|.018|
|**Observations**|5,734|5,734|5,734|5,734|5,734|

**Notes:** *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Data is all from the baseline survey, except PPI scores which were compiled during the village census prior to collection of the baseline survey. All regressions include dummies for each randomization strata (district) and errors are clustered at the unit of randomization (village). Individual controls include: age, enrolment at baseline, employment, PPI score, marital status, household size. Village controls include: village size (nr of dwellings), distance from secondary school, distance from PHU, whether the village is a political stronghold, number of NGOs active, average PPI score, share of Christians, whether the village received food or school relief, distance from Freetown and from Kailahun. Interactions include: enrolment, employment, age and PPI score.
# **Selected References**

Akyeampong, K. 2011. “(Re)Assessing the Impact of School Capitation Grants on Educational Access in Ghana.” _Center for International Education, University of Sussex,_ Research Monograph No.71.

African Development Bank et al. 2011. “Supporting Infrastructure Development in Low‐Income Countries”. Submission to the G20 by the MDB Working Group on Infrastructure.

Azevedo, J.P. et al.2013. “Is Labor Income Responsible for Poverty Reduction? A Decomposition Approach.” _World Bank,_ Policy Research Working Paper 6414.

Banerjee, A. et al. 2006. _Understanding Poverty._ New York: Oxford University Press.

Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. 2011. _Poor Economics._ New York: Public Affairs.

Beegle, K. et al. 2014. “Enhancing Africa’s Contribution to the Eradication of Extreme Poverty by 2010.” World Bank. Washington, DC. Processed.

Bhagwati, J. 1988. “Poverty and Public Policy.” _World Development,_ Vol. 6, No. 5, 539‐555.

Blanchet, N., Fink, G., and Osei‐Akoto, I. 2012. “The Effect of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme on Health Care Utilisation”, _Ghana Medical Journal,_ Volume 46, No. 2. 76‐84.

Byamugisha, F. 2014. _Agricultural Land Redistribution and Land Administration in Sub‐Saharan Africa._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

Center for Global Development. Undated. “Reducing Fertility in Bangladesh: Case 13”. Millions Saved: What Works in International Development?

Choudhary, V. et al. 2015. _Ghana: Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment ‐ Risk Prioritization_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.

Chow, G. 2006. “Rural Poverty in China: Problem and Policy.” _Princeton University,_ CEPS Working Paper No. 134.

Chuhan‐Pole, P. and Angwafo, M. 2011. _Yes, Africa Can: Success Stories from a Dynamic Continent._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

Claessens, S. 1993. “Interest Rates, Growth, and External Debt: The Macroeconomic Impact of Mexico's Brady Deal.” _World Bank,_ Policy Research Working Paper WPS 1147.

Coady, D. 2003. “Alleviating Structural Poverty in Developing Countries: The Approach of Progresa In Mexico.” _International Food Policy Research Institute._ Currie‐Alder, B. et al. 2014. _International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects._ New York: Oxford University Press.

Damrongplasit, K. and Melnick, G. 2009. “Early Results from Thailand's 30 Baht Health Reform: Something to Smile About”, _Health Affairs_ , 28, No. 3, 457‐466.

Darvas, P. and Balwanz, D. 2014. _Basic Education beyond the Millennium Development Goals in Ghana._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

Devarajan, S. 2014. “Growth Without Apology.” _World Bank_ . Future Development: Economics to End Poverty.

Dollar, D. et al. 2014. “Growth, Inequality, and Social Welfare: Cross‐Country Evidence.” _World Bank Development Research Group,_ Policy Research Working Paper 6842.

48
# **Tatbe A.1 1: ComposItIon of Change** in **Rural hcome for a Panel of** Households **hIdia 1970/71** - **1981/82**

||1970/71<br>|Change I|n Incom|e 1970/71|to 1981/82||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Household<br>Income|Ag.|Wage|s<br>Other|Total|Other/<br>Total|
||||(Real|Rupees a/|per Househ|old)|
|Land Owners|6,979|-i06|106|905|959|_94%_|
|Marginal|4,468|369|94|961|1,425|67%|
|Small|6,757|-60|192|811|942|86%|
|Medlum|10,639|-392|248|956|812|118%|
|Large|19,105|-3,947|87|1,255<br>|-^,605|48%|
|Landless|4,309|885|101|614|1,601|38%|
|Ag.wage earners|3,580|627|-410|838|1,254|67%|
|Other|5,277|960|745|333|2,038|16%|
|Total|6,147|203|142|8,5|1,159|70%|

a/ All Income deflated to 1970/71 prices.

Source: NCAER (1986a).
total portfolio flows, the correlation coefficients for South Korea with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were high. The Q-Test for debt portfolio flows for each country show that there was serial correlation in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea (Table 8). This would partly account for the observed high cross-correlation coefficients in Table 7. Unit root test for each individual country were conducted and the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root could not be rejected in any case at the 5% level of significance (Table 9). At the 10% level of significance, only the series for debt portfolio flows to India was found to be stationary.

|TABLE 7.|Cross Correl<br>|ation - Debt<br>|Portfolio<br>|Flows<br>|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||ARGENTIN|A BRAZIL|CHILE|MEXICO|INDIA|INDONESI|A KOREA|THAILAND|
|ARGENTIN|A<br>1.000||||||||
|BRAZIL|0.781|<br>1.000|||||||
|CHILE|0.163|<br>0.502|<br>1.000||||||
|MEXICO|0.511|<br>0.500|<br>0.687|<br>1.000|||||
|INDIA|(0.573|) (0.517)|(0.196|) (0.402|)<br>1.00|0|||
|INDONESI|A<br>0.038|<br>(0.131)|<br>0.087|<br>0.140|<br>0.035|<br>1.000|||
|KOREA|0.726|<br>0.750|<br>0.286|<br>0.611|(0.554|)<br>(0.152|)<br>1.00|0|
|ITHAILAND|<br>0.574|<br>0.727|<br>0.602|<br>OA92|(0.357|)<br>(0.071|)<br>0.65|7<br>1.000|

TABLE S. Q Test - Debt PorifolIo Flows

|Country|Box-Pierce<br>QStat|Probability|Ljung-Box<br>0 Stat|Probability|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|ARGENTINA|<br>36.04|0.010|70.30|0.W00|
|BRAZIL|22.15|0.179|48.35|0.000|
|CHILE|1.25|1.000|4.99|0.99B|
|MEXICO|15.57|0.554|54.98|0.D00|
|KOREA|32.14|0.014|67.75|0.000|
|INDIA|10.54|0.880|24.47|0.107|
|INDONESIA|3.65|1.000|8.17|0.963|
|THAILAND|10.88|0.863|24.56|0.105|

23
33

# Chapter 3. Rural Credit for Poverty Alleviation

Policy-directed credit to the rural poor is justified on grounds of the equity objective as well as the markets' failure to assess the risk of lending to the poor and develop instruments for nmnaging that risk Access to policy-directed credit can help the poor by enabling them to acquire assets and support consumption in times of distress. The policy rsponse has been to provide cheap credit to poor households because it is believed that the poor cannot afford market interest rates, institutional lenders are too cautious, and professional moneylenders are exploitative. However, the international experience vith government schemes to provide cheap credit to the rural poor is not very encouraging (reviewed in World Development Report 1990). Only 5 percent of poor farmers in Africa and 15 percent in Asia and Latin America have had access to such credit Surveys carried out in Pakistan show that the poorest flumers obtain less than 6 percent of their credit from formal sources (see Tables 1.8 and 1.9).

The problem is twofold: First, targeting the poor has been difficult, so much of the subsidized credit has leaked to the relatively richer rural households. Second, because transaction costs of lending to the poor are high, the subsidy for such cheap credit becomes large and renders the programs unsustinable. Thus many countries, including Pakistan, have sought to create special vehicles for delivering credit to the poor in the form of direct income transfers or credit for income-generating activities. This chapter presents a profile of the rural poor in Pakistan and then reviews the existing mechanisms for delivering credit to them in order to derive lessons for policy reform.

# A: Rural Poverty Profile

Pakistan's record in poverty reduction compares well with the star economic performers in Asia (Table 3.1). Between 1962 and 1984 poverty in Pakistan fell from 54 percent to 23 percent. The evidence on rural poverty, however, is mixed. Although the percentage of rural households in poverty has declined in recent years, rural areas now account for a greater proportion of the poor than in the past. The number of households in poverty declined from 21.1 percent to 15.5 percent between 1984/85 and 1987/88 (Table 3.2). However, 85 percent of all poor households reside in rural areas, a slight increase compared to 1984/85. Figure 3.1 presents a regional perspective of the concentration of the poor in rural areas. Table 3.2 also reports an index of poverty, which shows that the concentration of the poor in rural areis increased from 1984/85 to 1987/88.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4860

# **Abstract**

Since the early 1990s, several states in India have introduced financial incentive programs to discourage son preference among parents and encourage investment in daughters’ education and health. This study evaluates one such program in the state of Haryana, _Apni Beti Apna Dhan_ (Our Daughter, Our Wealth). Since 1994, eligible parents in Haryana have been offered a financial incentive if they give birth to a daughter. The incentive consists of an immediate cash grant and a long-term savings bond redeemable on the daughter’s 18th birthday provided she is unmarried, with additional bonuses for education. Although no specific program participation data are available, we estimate early intent-to-treat program effects on mothers (sex ratio among live children, fertility preferences) and children (mother’s use of antenatal care, survival, nutritional status, immunization, schooling) using statewide household survey data on fertility and child health, and constructing proxies for household and individual program eligibility. The results based on this limited data imply that _Apni Beti Apna Dhan_ had a positive effect on the sex ratio of living children, but inconclusive effects on mothers’ preferences for having female children as well as total desired fertility. The findings also show that parents increased their investment in daughters’ human capital as a result of the program. Families made greater post-natal health investments in eligible girls, with some mixed evidence of improving health status in the short and medium term. Further evidence also suggests that the early cohort of eligible school-age girls was not significantly more likely to attend school; however, conditional on first attending any school, they may be more likely to continue their education.

This paper—a product of the Gender and Development Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to is part of a larger effort in the department to explore the impact of conditional cash transfer programs on gender gaps. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank. org. The author may be contacted at nsinha@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **2.2 What do these demographic shifts means for economic development in SACU?**

The first step to understanding the impact of age-structure shifts in SACU economies is to examine the demographic trends themselves. The working-age population shares in the SACU economies have generally been rising over the past few decades and are expected to continue to do so for several more decades, under the medium fertility scenario of the UN (2015) (Figure 1). At the same time, the total dependency ratios of these countries have been declining, driven by reductions in the shares of children in their populations (Figure 2).

Botswana and South Africa are further along in the demographic transition process than the other economies. This is reflected in three ways. First, the trough of their working-age population shares is much shallower than the trough of the working-age population shares of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. This is a reflection of the higher fertility rates and subsequently greater population shares of children in these countries. Second, the working-age population shares of Botswana and South Africa will peak sooner than the others, in 2040 and 2045, respectively. Third, the total dependency ratios in these two economies peaked in the 1960s, while they peaked in the 1980s in the other countries.

The potential demographic dividends for these economies can be substantial, but their realization is not automatic and magnitudes are uncertain. Intuitively, it can thus be expected that workingage population share growth in these economies can boost GDP per capita through the “arithmetic” dividend mechanism. Due to the declining child dependency driving the shrinking dependency ratios, there is an opportunity for savings as a share of GDP to rise in all these economies. However, these impacts will only occur if the burgeoning working-age population enters the labor force and is able to find employment. Also, there is no guarantee that households with fewer children will save more and lead to greater investment. Additionally, the magnitude of the dividend will also depend on the characteristics of the labor supply. Declining child dependency ratios can lead to greater investment in human capital, reflected in more skilled workers with higher productivity. The interaction of capital deepening and more skilled workers can lead to greater growth, _ceteris paribus_ .

5
# **Sex, Lies, and Surveys: The Role of Interviewer Characteristics**<sup>*****</sup>

Tricia Koroknay‐Palicz Joao Montalvao<sup>†</sup>

**Keywords:** Sexual behavior, gender, interviewer effects, beauty, attitudes.

**JEL codes:** C81, C83, I12, J13

> * We thank all those at Innovations for Poverty Action for collaborative efforts in this project. We thank Virginia Ceretti, Shubha Chakravarty, Dackermue Dolo, Cecile Fanton D’Andon, Juliette Seban, and Malay Taylor for project support. We have benefited from comments from Julian Jamison. This paper is a product of the Africa Gender Innovation Lab. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the World Bank Umbrella Fund for Gender Equality. The study protocol was approved by the University of Liberia – Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation Institutional Review Board.  The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of the World Bank or its member countries. All errors remain our own.

> † Both authors are affiliated with the World Bank Africa Region Gender Innovation Lab. Emails: tgonwa@worldbank.org, jmontalvao@worldbank.org.