in the selection and introducing a check on leader behavior from a group outside the customary leadership, mandated female participation will improve targeting, reduce diversion, and increase participation.

The aforementioned hypotheses are formalized in tests spanning five dimensions, grouped in three categories: (i) targeting; (ii) diversion; and (iii) participation. The three hypothesis categories – and the constituent hypotheses – are presented below. Note that as the direction of the hypothesized effects is the same for all three interventions, the hypotheses are identical regardless of whether the intervention is defined as: (i) mandating that the elected councils oversee the management of the food distribution in a randomly-selected half of council villages under evaluation; (ii) creation of elected councils without explicit requirements on who manages the distribution; (iii) mandating female participation in villages with customary leadership.

# _IV.1 - Targeting_

Targeting assesses the extent to which the food aid provided to the village leaders for distribution reaches the intended beneficiaries – that is, the most vulnerable households in the village. While some aspects of vulnerability can be captured by objective measures, the limitations of household surveys - as well as differences in how vulnerability is defined - imply that villagers’ subjective assessments may sometimes be more accurate (Alatas et al. 2012). For this reason we include both objective and subjective measures of targeting.

The quality of objective targeting is assessed by the characteristics of benefit recipients through observable measures of a household’s economic welfare, such as asset ownership or whether the household is a member of a vulnerable group (e.g. widow-headed household or otherwise without an able-bodied, working age male member). Better targeting implies that aid recipients score lower on measures of economic welfare compared to other villagers. The respective hypothesis is as follows:

- _Hypothesis 1_ :  The interventions (mandating council management of the aid distribution; creating elected councils without their mandated involvement in the distribution; mandating female participation) will improve the targeting of provided benefits to vulnerable populations in the village, as measured by characteristics of benefit recipients.

- Subjective targeting is assessed by asking community members directly whether they consider wheat recipients as vulnerable or not.

_Hypothesis 2_ . The interventions will improve the targeting by village leaders of provided benefits to vulnerable populations in the village, as assessed subjectively by villagers.

# _IV.2 - Diversion_

Another important measure of food aid distribution outcomes is the extent to which aid provided for vulnerable households is diverted for the private benefit of village leaders. This may manifest itself either in embezzlement or nepotism.

Embezzlement represents the direct transfer of aid to the households of village leaders, either those directly involved in the distribution or who otherwise form part of the village leadership. By increasing the accountability of village leaders and by improving checks and balances, the interventions should reduce the diversion of resources by village leaders. The respective hypothesis is as follows: _Hypothesis 3_ . The interventions reduce embezzlement by village leaders.

Nepotism represents the distribution of aid to relatives and friends of village leaders and is captured by the following hypothesis: _Hypothesis 4_ . The interventions reduce nepotism in distribution of benefits by village leaders.

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