rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **<u>Table 4: Determinants of Change in ln(c) From Sooner to Later</u>**

Ordinary least-squares estimates

|Dependent variable<br>: Change in ln(c) from sooner to later<br>delayof 1 v|s. 31 days|<br>delayof 61 v|s. 91 days|
|---|---|---|---|
|Interest rate (r)<br>0.948***|0.949***|0.935***|0.937***|
|(0.029)|(0.029)|(0.029)|(0.029)|
|Male|0.026||0.024|
||(0.040)||(0.042)|
|Age 35 or under|0.061||0.061|
||(0.056)||(0.058)|
|36-56 yrs old|0.056||0.041|
||(0.044)||(0.047)|
|Some primary school|0.008||-0.012|
||(0.047)||(0.050)|
|Primary school|-0.038||-0.087|
||(0.072)||(0.072)|
|More than primary school|0.030||-0.010|
||(0.097)||(0.089)|
|Have adequate maize|0.020||0.046|
||(0.047)||(0.046)|
|log(Baseline wealth)|0.021||0.033**|
||(0.015)||(0.015)|
|Words recalled|0.022||0.022|
||(0.014)||(0.015)|
|Raven's Tests Correct|-0.027||-0.039*|
||(0.020)||(0.021)|
|Financial Literacy Questions Correct|0.020||0.032|
||(0.026)||(0.025)|
|Number of relatives in the village|0.005*||0.007**|
||(0.002)||(0.002)|
|Constant<br>0.384***|0.224**|0.414***|0.279**|
|(0.030)|(0.084)|(0.030)|(0.089)|
|N<br>8937|8937|8931|8931|
|Adjusted R-squared<br>0.09|0.09|0.08|0.09|
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32
|by the type of aid. The<br>n Columns 4-6); and the<br>quarterly disbursements<br>arterly disbursements of<br>rcentage change in GDP<br>sit and aid variables are<br>_<_0.05, * p_<_0.1)<br>(9)<br>5.7869**|(2.2563)<br>4.7044**<br>(2.0598)<br>1,645|0.0756|YES|YES|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|tion varies <br>deposits (i<br>_%GDP)_ is<br>_DP)_ is qu<br>arterly pe<br> The depo<br>0.01, ** p<br>(8)<br>**ratio**|4.8174**<br>(2.0509)<br>1,645|0.0737|YES|YES|
|ine specifca<br>n non-haven<br>_sbursement (_<br>_sement (%G_<br>ol for the qu<br>n log-levels. <br>eses (*** p_<_<br>(7)<br>6.1377**|(2.2126)<br>1,645|0.0708|YES|YES|
|the basel<br>ge change i<br>_IPF Aid di_<br>_Aid disbur_<br>sions contr<br>diference i<br> in parenth<br>(6)<br>-0.4345|(1.5635)<br>-1.9729<br>(1.3227)<br>1,652|0.0923|YES|YES|
|sults from<br>percenta<br>ns 7-9). <br>P. _DPF _<br>All regres<br>with the <br>-level are <br>(5)<br>**non-haven**|-1.9810<br>(1.3159)<br>1,652|0.0922|YES|YES|
|how the re<br>s 1-3); the<br>s (in Colum<br> annual GD<br>ual GDP. <br>oximated <br>he country<br>(4)<br>-0.5744<br>|(1.5390)<br>1,652|0.0900|YES|YES|
|e documents <br>ts (in Column<br>haven deposit<br> a fraction of <br>raction of ann<br>nges are appr<br>clustered at t<br>(3)<br>5.1225***|(1.7077)<br>2.6971*<br>(1.3483)<br>1,648|0.1002|YES|YES|
|The tabl<br>en deposi<br>and non-<br> Bank as <br>nk as a f<br>ntage cha<br>rd errors <br>(2)<br>**haven**|2.7929*<br>(1.3731)<br>1,648|0.0978|YES|YES|
|**y type of aid.** <br>tage change in hav<br>e change in haven<br>g from the World <br>rom the World Ba<br>xed efects. Perce<br>percentile. Standa<br>(1)<br>5.3149***|(1.6668)<br>1,648|0.0977|YES|YES|
|**eterogeneity b**<br>iable is the percen<br>ween the percentag<br> Project Financin<br> Policy Financing f<br>ountry and time f<br> the 1st and 99th <br>id (% of GDP)|Aid (% of GDP)<br>vations|ared|ry FE|FE|
|**Table 5: H**<br>dependent var<br>diference bet<br>of Investment<br>Development <br>and include c<br>winsorized at <br>IPF A|DPF<br>Obser|R-squ|count|time|

27
48

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# FIGURE 8: SHARE OF CONSUMER SERVICES (INCLUDING HOUSING FOR USSR) IN VALUE ADDED:

USSR AND OECD <!-- Start of picture text --> 15%-<br>GRC<br>IRL<br>GRC<br>USSR<br>10%-<br>USSR<br>\ ~~~~~GBRNi:D CAN<br>5%-FECAIL<br>N9R ~ DN<br>NiR ~NOR NI<br>PRT AUT AMT<br>0%- i I I<br>7 8L9 10<br>LOG OF PER CAPITA INCOME<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Table A1: Estimation results of selection equation

||Heckman<br>(1)|
|---|---|
|Duration of residence|_−_0_._011<br>(0_._010)|
|Duration of residence (squared)|0_._0001<br>(0_._0001)|
|Tax bill|_−_0_._709<br>(0_._368)|
|Evaluation of politicians: neutral|_−_0_._335<br>(0_._189)|
|Evaluation of politicians: positive|0_._157<br>(0_._163)|
|Land ownership: state/local|0_._556<sup>_∗∗_</sup><br>(0_._198)|
|Land ownership: central|_−_0_._386<br>(0_._198)|
|Log of distance from the city hall|_−_0_._344<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0_._139)|
|Constant|2_._460<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0_._474)|
|Observations|528|
|Log Likelihood<br>_ρ_|-515.122<br>-0.552<sup>_∗∗_</sup>(0.212)|

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. _∗∗∗p <_ 0 _._ 001, _∗∗p <_ 0 _._ 01,<sup>_∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 05. Dependent variable is a binary indicator about whether the household reported rent in the survey or not. See column (6) in Table 2 for outcome model. Reference categories are Evaluation of politicians: negative and Land ownership: private.

35
_78_ _Estimates and Projections of Mortality by Cause_ Because of the adjustment for Sub-Saharan Africa, the world mortality rate rises from .17 to .54 per 100,000, and deaths rise from 8,000 to 26,000, with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 75 percent of the total.

# _Malaria_

Numbers of malaria cases were provided by region, and rough estimates of deaths for Sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil were recommended by disease experts. The prevalence estimates, on the basis of 1985 data reported to WHO, are given below, together with ratios of the regression estimate of deaths to these cases.

||Reported cases<br>|Ratio of deaths<br>to 1000 cases|
|---|---|---|
|Industrial market economies<br>|7,353<br>|10.7|
|Industrial nonmarket economies<br>|<br>631<br>|12.7|
|Latin America and Caribbean<br>|883,451<br>|6.4|
|Middle East and North Africa<br>|394,969|39.3|
|Asia|3,560,432|29.5|

No 1984 or 1985 Sub-Saharan Africa reports were available, but cases were 4.8 to 7.8 million annually between 1976 and 1983. Since case-fatality rates may be anywhere from under 1 to 50 per thousand, the regression estimates of deaths appear broadly consistent with the case reports. The rate for Latin America, though lower than the others, is consistent with an analysis of deaths in 1977-82 in the Amazon and CenterWestern regions in Brazil, which gave a case-fatality rate of 5.8 (Fiusa Lima, n.d.).

Nevertheless, an increase was recommended for Latin America, based on an informal estimate of 6,000 to 10,000 malaria deaths in Amazonia. (Brazil reports almost half the cases in the America 3.) With no more precise guidance, we simply doubled the number of deaths in each age-sex group for Latin America, effectively assuming that case-fatality rates are comparable to those in developed countries. Deaths in Amazonia would then be 50 to 90 percent of the revised regional total. The resulting age-specific rates are in the upper range for reporting Latin American countries. At age 0, the revised rate is 9 per 100,000; by contrast, the highest reported rates in the region are El Salvador 7.2 per 100,000 Guatemala 5.7 per 100,000 Ecuador 4.7 per 100,000.

For Sub-Saharan Africa. estimates of deaths between 405,000 and 952,000 were recommended. If 1985 cases were in the range of 4.8-7.8 million, these expert assessments would give deaths per thousand cases between 50 and 200-ratios that are probably too high, particularly if malaria is overall less lethal in this region than in other regions. (Malaria is believed to be most lethal among migrants moving into an area where it is endemic. Lower fatality rates in settled areas of fixed endemicity may be expected.) We therefore chose the lower expert assessment of 405 thousand and adjusted deaths in each age-sex group proportionally to reach this total. This implies a mortality rate 20 times the regression estimate.
- Explicit government regulation (for instance, Regulation Q in the United States prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits and capped interest rates on saving deposits);

- In many cases ceilings on banks’ lending rates were a direct subsidy to the government in cases where the government borrowed directly from the banks (via loans rather than securitized debt);

- The interest rate cap could be in the context of fixed coupon rate nonmarketable debt or it could be maintained through central bank interest rate targets (often at the directive of the Treasury or Ministry of Finance when central bank independence was limited or nonexistent).

Creation and maintenance of a captive domestic audience that facilitated directed credit to the government. This was achieved through multiple layers of regulations from very blunt to more subtle measures.

- Capital account restrictions and exchange controls orchestrated a “forced home bias” in the portfolio of financial institutions and individuals under the Bretton Woods arrangements;

- High reserve requirements (usually non‐remunerated) as a tax levy on banks;

- Among more subtle measures, “prudential” regulatory measures requiring that institutions (almost exclusively domestic ones) hold government debts in their portfolios (pension funds have historically been a primary target);

- Transaction taxes on equities also act to direct investors toward government (and other) types of debt instruments;

- Prohibitions on gold transactions.

Other common measures associated with financial repression aside from the ones discussed above are direct ownership (China or India) of banks or extensive management of banks and other financial institutions (i.e. Japan). Restrictions of entry to the financial industry and directing credit to certain industries are also features of repressed financial markets.

# 1.2. Financial repression in economic history

Most countries around the world—developing and developed alike—have experienced forms of financial repression at some point or another since World War II **_._**<sup>**_4_**</sup> Liberal capital market regulations and international capital mobility reached their heyday in the early 1900s. To deal with the debt accumulated during the two World Wars and the Great Depression, most advanced countries experimented with financial repression policies in the 1940s. These policies lasted in one form or another until the early 1980s when the move towards financial and capital account liberalization opened a new era of liberal capital market regulation.<sup>5</sup> Like with the advanced countries after WWII, many developing countries in Africa, East Asia and Southeast Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe experimented with financial repression between the 1960s and 1990s to support state‐led industrialization and import substitution

> 4 Hoffmann, Andreas (2017). Beware of Financial Repression: Lessons from History. Available at SSRN: <u>https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124184</u>

> 5 Reinhart, Carmen M. and M. Belen Sbrancia (2011). The Liquidation of Government Debt. NBER Working Paper No. 16893.

3
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29
- 120 -

In the rich and mainly industrial countries farmers are paid too much, so they produce too much. In the poor and mainly agricultural countries farmers are paid too little, so they produce too little. Europeans trample Cognac grapes into industrial alcohol; Americans fill Rocky Mountain caverns with butter; Japanese pay eight to ten times the world price for their bowl of rice. Meanwhile, many million Asians and African live in rural poverty and go hungry to bed. Do not despair. The mistakes are so large that these contrary policies will soon collapse. Properly staged and handled, that collapse will leave the whole world better off.<sup>35</sup> 4.61 The point is not that free trade is the better answer, which is the Economist's preferred solution, but that very large budgetary expenditures on behalf of stabilizing agricultural prices to keep farmers from having to adjust to external market realities are unsustainable in the long run. A more flexible agricultural system in the short run can alleviate much of the political and economic need for such large budgetary expenditures. Consequently, the time horizon for analysis of diversification must include the potential for such short-run flexibility and evaluate the investment costs of creating it against the costs to the budget of stabilizing domestic prices instead. While it is easy to say that there has been "too much, stability in Japanese rice prices, for example; most American farmers would argue (and seem to have convinced their Congressional representatives) that their prices have not been stable enough (at high enough levels of stability). A more diversified agriculture offers the potential to change the nature of this debate in rich countries and poor alike, but only if the diversification policy is able to focus long-run investments and research on the short-run flexibility of the system and to compare such costs with those of price stabilization programs.

# The Macro Economy and Agriculture

4.62 Macroeconomic policies have a significant impact on agriculture, and their effects can often overshadow those of sector-specific policies. Trade, exchange rate, fiscal, and moneta., policies are leading determinants of the movement of capital and labor between agriculture and 35/ The Economist (November 15, 1986), p.<sup>13</sup> .
Administration's Central Records and Subsidy Library in the Department of Commerce in Washington, DC. There were over 2000 petitions from firms that requested to have their products excluded from the safeguard.<sup>25</sup> Finally, we note again that a firm-specific product exclusion was typically granted to a product from a single exporting firm, which would be even more narrowly defined than a 10-digit HTS product category. Thus, not all products within a 10-digit product category would be excluded.

Table 4 provides the summary statistics for the yearly data that were used in the estimation of specifications that are reported in the next section.

# **4 Empirical Results**

This section considers the result of estimating variants of equation (2) on product-level imports and trade policy indicators for data that cover the period 1989-2003. Unfortunately our approach requires so many different policy variables that we are forced to split the estimation results of each regression into three _separate_ tables. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients for the variables that are associated with the application of the steel SG in 2002, and Table 6 reports the impact of the application of AD/CVD. In unreported results (discussed in section 4.4 below) we have coefficient estimates for a smaller set of SGs that were imposed in 2000 as well as estimates for the trade impact of AD/CVD policy removals. In our tables, we ultimately present results from eight different model specifications.

# **4.1 Results for the 2002 steel safeguard**

Table 5 presents results for our estimates of equation (2) with regard to the trade effects that were associated with various aspects of the 2002 application of a US safeguard on steel. The dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of US imports of product _h_ from country _i_ . So as to facilitate a comparison of results across different policy instruments, we use simple indicators for application and removal of TTB policies in lieu of the applied tariff rates found in equation (2).<sup>26</sup>

> 25 There is some measurement error with the survey data as there were a few instances in which petitioners left the entry for the relevant 10-digit HTS code blank, or instead entered an incorrect product code that was not subject to the safeguard. These exclusions were omitted from the empirical analysis.

> 26 We have also estimated model specifications in which we use the different tariff rates that were associated with the 2002 safeguard across different products; our results are broadly robust to using the tariff rates instead. For the 267 10-digit HTS codes that faced a tariff in the first year after the safeguard, 185 (69 percent) received a 30 percent tariff, 60 (22 percent) received a 15 percent tariff, 15 (6 percent) received a 13 percent tariff, and 7 (3 percent) received an 8 percent tariff in the first year. In March 2003, the tariffs for each of the categories were reduced to 24 percent, 12 percent, 10 percent, and 7 percent, respectively. Use of ad valorem tariff rates for AD/CVD cases is a bit

16