rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **<u>References</u>**

- Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes (2005). “The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 120, 173-222.

- Arena, Marco (2008): Does Insurance Market Activity Promote Economic Growth? A Cross-Country Study for Industrialized and Developing Countries.” _Journal of Risk and Insurance_ 75, 92146.

- Bank for International Settlement (several years). Quarterly Review on International Banking and Financial Market Development.

- Barth, Jim, Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine (2008): Bank Regulations are Changing: For Better or for Worse? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2725.

- Beck, Thorsten (2009):  “The Econometrics of Finance and Growth”, in: Terence Mills and Kerry Patterson (Eds.): _Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 2_ , Palgrave Macmillan.

- Beck, Thorsten, Asl ι Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine  (2000): “A New Database on Financial Development and Structure” , _World Bank Economic Review_ 14, 597-605.

- Beck, Thorsten, Asl ι Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine  (2007): “Finance, Inequality, and the Poor” (joint with Asl ι Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine), _Journal of Economic Growth_ 12, 27-49.

- Beck, Thorsten, Asl ι Demirgüç-Kunt and Sole Martinez Peria  (2007): “Reaching Out: Access to and Use of Banking Services Across Countries”, _Journal of Financial Economics,_ 85, 234-66.

- Beck, Thorsten, Asl ι Demirgüç-Kunt and Sole Martinez Peria  (2008): “Banking Services for Everyone?  Barriers to Bank Access and Use around the World”, _World Bank Economic Review_ 22, 397 - 430 _._

- Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine (2002):  “Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter?” _Journal of Financial Economics_ 64 _,_ 147-180 _._

- Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine (2004):  “Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence.” _Journal of Banking and Finance_ 28, 423-442 _._

- Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine, Ross and Norman Loayza (2000). “ Finance and the Sources of Growth”, _Journal of Financial Economics_ 58, 261-300.

- Beck, Thorsten, Michael Fuchs and Marilou Uy (2009): “Finance in Africa: Achievements and Challenges.” World Bank mimeo.

- Beck. Thorsten, Erik Feyen, Alain Ize and Florencia Moizeszowicz (2008): “Benchmarking Financial Development.”  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4638.

- Beck, Thorsten and Ian Webb (2003): “Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Determinants of

17
Table A3: Returns to technical upgrading within exporting firms, OLS estimates with restricted sample

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent variable: log hourly wage|||||||
|Received technical upgrading (=1 if yes)|0.056***|0.040***|0.033***|0.031***|0.029***|0.029***|
||(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)|
|Log employment||0.036***||0.023***||0.046***|
|||(0.008)||(0.001)||(0.000)|
|Worker controls|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|
|Worker effects|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Firm controls|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|
|Firm effects|No|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|
|State effects|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|
|Observations|11,958,984|11,958,984|11,958,984|11,958,984|11,958,984|11,958,984|

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects. Worker controls are: age, race, gender, schooling level, and skill level based on occupation. Firms controls are: log employment; average age of workers; average tenure; male to female workers ratio; share of workers with less than high school completed; share of workers with exactly high school completed; share of workers with more than high school completed; average log wage; share of white workers; share of workers in each of skill levels 1 to 4; and 2-digit industry dummies. Sample restricted to firms that exported in all years during 2009-2012.
-5

Fig 1 <!-- Start of picture text --> Real Pre-Tax Profits; 1991.1 - 1992.3<br>By branch (1991.1 prices)<br>10<br>9<br>B<br>7<br>6<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>91.1 91.2 91.3 Q1.4 92.1 92.2 92.3<br>0 Metol + Chem 0 Mochnbld A Build Met X Ught<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Real Pre-Tax Profits; 1991.1 - 1992.3<br>By bronch (1991.1 prices)<br>7<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>91.1 91.2 91.3 91.4 92.1 92.2 92.3<br>0 Food + Agrolnd O Constr A Trade & Serv X Science<br><!-- End of picture text -->
There is a negative relationship between firm size, as measured by employment, and productivity growth and the negative effect becomes larger with increasing firm size. Firms with 6 to 10 employees have 15.2 percent lower productivity growth than the comparator category (firms with 5 employees or less), while firms with more than 1,000 employees have 60.9 percent lower productivity growth than the smallest firms. A test on the equality of the coefficients on firm size confirms that the estimated size effects are statistically different from each other, thus confirming the productivity differential between different firm size categories. This is in line with recent results from Aterido et al. (2019), who found that larger firms were less productive, but it is opposed to Kreuser and Newman (2018) who find larger firms to be more productive than smaller firms. Unlike these previous papers, our results have the advantage of overcoming a common criticism of productivity studies whereby revenue-based productivity measures can be confounded by differences in markups across firms. Our findings confirm that larger firms are less productive even after controlling for markups. While further research would be needed to uncover the reasons for this, a possible explanation could be found in industrial policy support and protections for larger but relatively less efficient firms.

# Employment and wages

South Africa’s unemployment rate in 2018 stood at roughly 27 percent.<sup>22</sup> Young people are particularly affected, with national estimates suggesting that youth unemployment stood at 53.4 percent in 2018.<sup>23</sup> As a result, employment creation is a key priority for South African policy makers.

Both theoretical models and empirical work tend to suggest that a lack of competition in product markets stifles employment in the long term and/or on aggregate. The basic intuition is that less

> on land and offshore (e.g. agriculture, mining and fishing). Furthermore, there are smaller incentive schemes targeted explicitly at exporting enterprises, e.g. Sector Specific Assistance Scheme (SSAS) Project Funding for Emerging Exporters or the Export Marketing and Investment Assistance (EMIA) scheme. In addition, there are numerous additional financial incentives available through various agencies that do not appear as tax expenditures (e.g. grants or subsidized loads). 22 National estimates suggest that unemployment stood at 26.92 percent in 2018, while the ILO estimates unemployment for 2018 to be at 26.96 percent. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) Database (2019). 23 WDI Database (2018).

18
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**Table 8. Heterogeneous effects**

||Log sales|Log sales|Log sales|Log sales|Log sales|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent variable|per<br>employee|per<br>employee|per<br>employee|per<br>employee|per<br>employee|
|Interaction|Large<br>(100+)|Old (>5)|Female<br>majority<br>|Exporter|Foreign|
|Reference|Small|Young|Male<br>majority|Non-<br>exporter|Non-<br>foreign|
|Management practices|0.484***|0.612***|0.443***|0.328**|0.452***|
||[0.125]|[0.169]|[0.137]|[0.128]|[0.131]|
|Management practices Interaction|-0.309|-0.226|0.009|0.602**|-0.042|
||[0.357]|[0.206]|[0.244]|[0.278]|[0.290]|
|Skills|0.106|0.179|0.063|0.084|0.198|
||[0.123]|[0.264]|[0.120]|[0.123]|[0.122]|
|Skills Interaction|0.154|-0.044|0.376|0.186|-0.266|
||[0.303]|[0.279]|[0.350]|[0.297]|[0.276]|
|Controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Obs|650|647|646|650|648|
|R^2|0.145|0.146|0.146|0.165|0.145|
|Adjusted R^2|0.131|0.132|0.132|0.152|0.132|
|Adjusted R^2 considering strata|0.127|0.128|0.128|0.147|0.128|

Note: ES sample weighted. Controls include sector (extractive, retail, services, manufacturing), location, manager's age. Standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Can differences in the adoption management practices explain performance gaps seen between different groups of firms? An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, presented in Table 9, confirms that – apart from exporters versus non-exporters – confirms the finding from the regression with interaction terms that the _returns_ to management practices are similar across different groups of firms, implying that the productivity gap that can be attributed to management practices is mostly driven by differences in adoption. In other words, small, young or majority female-owned firms are not less productive because management practices affect performance in these firms differentially, but mainly because they adopt fewer management practices than larger, older or majority male-owned firms. The exception is among exporting firms: adopting management practices has higher returns in terms of productivity for exporters than for non-exporters.

Interestingly, firm capabilities do not explain the differences in performance by age of firm (no gap to start with), location (not presented in the table), and especially between foreign and local ownership. For the latter, the gap in business performance is large - the largest difference of all the categorizations explored in this table - but neither the management practices nor the skills explain the difference between foreign and local firms.

27
# **6 Task Reallocation Abroad versus Other Mechanisms**

In this section, we explore the consistency of our main results with alternative mechanisms: first, we examine whether Korean MNCs replaced domestic labor with either domestic capital or domestic labor with different skill levels within domestic entities; next, we investigate whether foreign demand shocks can explain the observed patterns of negative domestic employment effects for Korean MNCs.

## **6.1 Labor-Capital Substitution**

It is possible that, instead of reallocating tasks abroad, Korean MNCs replaced domestic labor with domestic capital in their home operations. Exploiting regional variation in minimum wage changes in China between 2002 and 2008, Hau et al. (2020) found that minimum wage hikes accelerated the input substitution of capital for labor in low-wage Chinese firms. If employment adjustment occurs through domestic capital instead of foreign linkages, then we would expect capital trajectories for the MNC group after the 2017 policy change to diverge from those of the non-MNC group. More precisely, if there had been input substitution of capital for labor within firms, we would expect the capital effects to be positive or zero for Korean firms with foreign affiliates.

Table 10: MNCs and Capital in Manufacturing, 2013~2019

|Panel A. Dependent Variable:|Logof Rea|l Capital St|ocks|
|---|---|---|---|
|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|MNC_i ×_Post_t_<br>0.0075<br>(0.0279)|-0.0598**<br>(0.0267)|-0.0587**<br>(0.0272)|-0.0525**<br>(0.0241)|
|Observations<br>41,009|41,009|41,008|41,003|
|R-squared<br>0.9456|0.9461|0.9464|0.9493|
|Panel B. Dependent Variable: Logo|f Real Capi|tal Stocksp|er Worker|
|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|MNC_i ×_Post_t_<br>0.0401**|-0.0282|-0.0253|-0.0226|
|(0.0184)|(0.0232)|(0.0233)|(0.0233)|
|Observations<br>41,009|41,009|41,008|41,003|
|R-squared<br>0.9022|0.9030|0.9035|0.9078|
|Fixed Effects:||||
|Firm<br>Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Year<br>No|Yes|No|No|
|Region-Year<br>No|No|Yes|No|
|Industry-Region-Year<br>No|No|No|Yes|

_Notes:_ MNC _i_ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm _i_ has foreign affiliates in the years 2013~2016 and 0 otherwise. Post _t_ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the time _t_ is after 2016 (i.e., 2017, 2018, and 2019) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

28
unobservable effects. If both modeling approaches lead to the same substantive conclusions, we can draw robust conclusions regarding our hypotheses.

The third challenge to drawing generalizable and robust conclusions regarding our hypotheses lies in potential selection bias; that is the sample used for the analysis may not accurately represent the entire population of interest. To address this, we use data from the whole population of published government contracts in Bulgaria from 2011 to 2019. We carefully identify green procurement contracts within this dataset through both market CPVs and tender text searches. Both green procurement contracts and the remaining Bulgarian public procurement contracts are expected to adequately represent the total population of contracts during this period, with the exception of small value contracts below mandatory reporting thresholds.

_The relation between GPP and firm productivity_ As with other types of public procurement contracts, the relation between GPP and firm productivity can be subject to reversed causality. For example, a positive relation can either be driven by more competitive procedures applied to green contracts, or by attracting more productive firms with more sophisticated technology or management practices to bid since they are able to better comply with the green criteria and technology requirements. Irrespective of the direction of causality, however, a positive relation implies that public procurement allocates resources to more productive firms improving the allocative efficiency of resources among firms in the economy which contributes to private sector productivity growth.

Arguments against the allocative efficiency result would thus need to be based on an omitted variable bias in that unobservable factors need to exist that are correlated with more productive firms being awarded GPP contracts for reasons other than those firms’ productivity drivers such as their technology or management. One such factor may be the application of more or less competitive procurement practices. In contrast to most previous studies, however, the combined firm-public procurement dataset allows to observe the degree of competition and corruption risk in the applied (green) public procurement procedures. As it will be shown later, we find that GPP is associated not only with higher firm productivity but also with the application of more competitive procurement practices in Bulgaria. Moreover, the lower the corruption risk of the awarded GPP contracts is, the stronger the positive GPP-productivity nexus is. This suggests that green public procurement contributes to the allocative efficiency of resources in the economy―also attracting more productive firms to bid for state contracts independent of the applied procurement practices would further strengthen the allocative efficiency channel.

15
# **A1.1 Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI)**

BERI S.A. is a private source of analysis and forecasts of the business environment in a number of countries. The firm was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. As of May 1999, BERI can be reached at http:I/www.beri.com.

BERI has two services that include variables of interest for the purpose of this paper: The Business Risk Service, and The FORELEND or Lender Risk Rating. We use data from the February 1998 version of Business Risk Service. Both services are supervised by Dr. F.T. Haner, founder and senior editor. Eighteen analysts analyze various data sources and produce initial draft reports, relying on an international network of sources for intelligence on countries. BERI convenes two permanent panetls of about 105 experts from all over the world. These panels provide country ratings and qualitative observations on the basis of these initial reports. One panel assesses political conditions, and the other offers perspectives on the business operating environment. These ratings are constructed using the Delphi method, in which panelists are also supplied with the ratings they produced in previous assessments as well as the panel average score for each measure.

BRS monitors 50 countries three times per year, assessing 57 criteria separated into three indices. The Political Risk Index (PFI) focuses on sociopolitical conditions in a country. Diplomats and political scientists rate the present condition of eight causes and two symptoms of political risk, using a scale from 7 (no problem) to 0 (prohibitive problem). The Operation Risk Index (ORI) identifies major bottlenecks for business development, rating 15 criteria on a scale of 0 (unacceptable conditions) to 4 (superior conditions). The R factor assesses a country's willingness to allow foreign companiles to convert and repatriate profits and to import components, equipment and raw materials. It is composed of 4 sub-indices, one of which assesses the quality of legal framework in terms of statutory laws and actual practice.17 The components of the PRI and ORI are reported in Table Al.1.

7 Unfortunately, this index has not yet been made available to us.

29
34 Distribution", in Bhagwati, opp.cit.

- Dixit, A.K. & Norman V. (1980) Theory of International<sup>Trade, Cambridge</sup> University Press: London.

- Feenstra, R. & Rose, A. (1991) "Trade with Mexico<sup>and Water Use in California</sup> Agriculture," miieo, University of California, Davis.

- Garcia y Griego (1989) "The Mexican Labor Supply,<sup>1990-2010," in Mexican</sup> Migration to the United States: Origins. Conseauences<sup>and Policy</sup> ORtions, edited by W. Cornelius, University of California:<sup>San Diego.</sup>

- Harris, J. R. & Todaro, M. P. (1970) "Migration, Unemploymnet,<sup>and</sup> Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," American<sup>Economic Review, vol. 60,</sup> No. 1, pp.<sup>126</sup> -<sup>42</sup> .

- Helpman, E. & Krugman, P. (1989), Trade Policy<sup>and Market Structure, M.I.T.</sup> Press, Cambridge.

- Krugman, P. (1982), "Trade in Differentiated<sup>Products and the Political</sup> Economy of Trade Liberalization", in Bhagwati,<sup>opp.cit.</sup>

- Levy, S. and van Wijnbergen, S. (1991)<sup>"Maize and the Mexico-United States</sup> Free Trade Agreement," forthcoming, El Trimestre<sup>Economico.</sup>

- Sanchez Ugarte, F. (1991) "La Utilizacion Eficiente<sup>del Agua y los Derechos de</sup> Propiedad," in El Efecto de la Regulacion en Algunos Sectores<sup>de la</sup> Economia Mexicana, Gil Diaz, F. & Fernandez,<sup>A. eds., Fondo de Cultura</sup> Economica: Mexico City.

- Tornell, A. (1991), "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist<sup>Programs", Ouarterly</sup> Journal of Economics, Vol. CVI, pp.963-975.
# **5. The Magnitude and Importance of Preferences under AGOA**

The importance of US trade preferences varies immensely across African countries. For certain countries AGOA (including GSP preferences) is of little or no relevance under the current structure of exports since there are no or few exports of products eligible for preferences, that is that are legally eligible to enter the U.S. market with lower duties than other non-preferred suppliers. Figure 1 shows that there are nine AGOA beneficiaries for whom less than 5 percent of current exports are eligible for preferential access to the US. In part this reflects that these countries are producing and exporting products for which the MFN duty in the U.S. is zero. In this case it follows that benefits may flow from AGOA only if these preferences encourage and permit diversification into a broader range of exports. Most of the 9 countries are only eligible at present for basic AGOA preferences. Uganda and Zambia are exceptions in that they have been granted eligibility for clothing preferences, although, by 2002 this had not been reflected in substantial exports of such products to the United States. However, the data that are available for 2003 suggest that the preferences on clothing for Uganda which were granted from October 2001 are having an effect with exports of clothing to the United States rising from $0 in 2002 to $819,000 in the first 8 months of 2003.<sup>14</sup> Figure 1 then shows a further 14 countries, including South Africa, for whom the amount of exports eligible for preferential access to the U.S. market comprises less than 50 percent of total exports to that market. There are then 16 countries for whom AGOA preferences are more significant, with exports eligible for preferences amounting to more than 50 percent of the total. Within this group there are five countries for whom more than 90 percent of their current exports to the United States are eligible for preferences. Here it is interesting to look at Lesotho, where all exports to the U.S. are eligible for preferences, whereas in contrast only 28 percent of exports to the European Union in 2001 were eligible for preferences. In this case exports to the United States amounted to $321 million whilst exports to the European Union were only 14 million euro. This

> 14 See New York Times, 14 November 2003, concerning the job creating impact in Uganda of AGOA preferences on clothing products. (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/14/international/africa/14AFRI.html)

18
# **EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL WINDFALLS IN BRAZIL**<sup>**1**</sup>

Ole Hagen Jorgensen<sup>2</sup> JEL Classification: E22, O13, O31, Q33.

Keywords: Brazil; Natural Resources; Oil Revenue; Efficiency; Equity; Population Aging; Saving.

> 1 This paper was written for the World Bank Study _Pre-Salt Oil Discoveries and the Long-Term Development of Brazil_ by Pablo Fajnzylber and Daniel Lederman. The main parts of the paper were written when the author worked for Economic Policy, PREM in the World Bank. Insightful comments to this and the other papers prepared for the report _Pre-Salt Oil Discoveries and the Long-Term Development of Brazil_ was provided at the authors’ workshop in Washington D.C. on March 25, 2011. The author is grateful for valuable comments to the paper provided by Eduardo Engel, Norman Loayza, Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, Tito Cordella, Eduardo Haddad, Constantino Hevia, and Guilherme Lichand. Those comments have been incorporated in the paper. Michiel Paris and Tammy Pertillar provided valuable research and assistance. The views in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.

> 2 Ole Hagen Jorgensen; email: olehagenjorgensen@gmail.com.