These components of trust can be usefully divided into two broad types: elements that are specifically related to the tax system (“fairness” and “equity”), and elements related to the broad use of tax revenues by the government (“reciprocity” and “accountability”). The first set, which we refer to as “tax system outcomes”, falls within the traditional remit of tax reform efforts. Those with responsibility for tax policy and administration can, with the political license to do so, directly improve levels of fairness and equity in both policy and administration. By contrast, the latter set – which we refer to as “tax governance outcomes” – is not directly under the control of tax authorities. Instead, they depend on the broader actions of government beyond tax agencies in delivering reciprocal services or expanding the extent of political accountability. Even a politically-empowered tax agency cannot guarantee improved reciprocity in service delivery, as it depends upon the engagement of a broader set of government actors.

Underpinning these elements of trust is a basic requirement for competence. Classic accounts of trust in political officials distinguish between what have been labeled “judgements of integrity” and “judgements of competence”. That is, governments need to have both the intent (“integrity”) and the ability (“competence”) to increase fairness, equity, reciprocity and accountability.<sup>93</sup> However, in the context of this framework, “competence” is best understood not as a distinct component of trust, but as a partial pre-condition for it. A government can be highly competent without being at all trustworthy if that competence is not combined with positive intent. Meanwhile, a government with positive intent may fail to be entirely trustworthy if it lacks the basic competence to deliver reliably on its promises. Different “sources” of mistrust will, of course, require distinct types of strategies.

Ultimately, it is important to understand the construction of trust around tax compliance in active, reciprocal terms. Trust is not, in and of itself, socially beneficial. Blind trust in government can undermine long-term reform by reducing citizens’ demands for improved outcomes.<sup>94</sup> The central goal of reform is not taxpayer education to convince them to pay taxes. Trust is, instead, something to be constructed through reciprocal action by taxpayers and governments. In the language of political science and sociology, the goal is not simply to foster trust among citizens, but to foster the trustworthiness of governments.<sup>95</sup> Taxpayers will increasingly trust the government if the government can successfully deliver fairness, equity, reciprocity and accountability. Governments will increasingly trust taxpayers if taxpayers increase tax compliance in response to improvements in government performance and openness. Given very limited public trust in public authorities, improvements are likely to be incremental. The payoff for governments is clear: not only improved tax compliance, but also the construction of political support for continued reform and expanded enforcement.

Figure 8 presents an operational model of trust as it relates to tax compliance and tax reform. This deepens the “trust” component of the overarching conceptual framework presented in Figure 7. Here, expanded trust is driven by each of four components – fairness, equity, reciprocity and accountability – which can, in turn, be divided into two categories: “tax system outcomes”, which

> 93 Barber, B. (1983). _The Logic and Limits of Trus_ _<mark>t</mark>_ <mark>. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.</mark>

> 94 <mark>Hardin, R. (1999). Do we want trust in government? In Hardin, R. (Ed.)</mark> _<mark>Democracy and trust</mark>_ <mark>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22-41.</mark>

> 95 Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. _Annual Review of Political Science,_ 3:475-507.

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