Roberts and Arce). What effect did these massive shifts in Fujimori's constituency have on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures?

Table 5 below reports results from a set of regressions of per capita FONCODES expenditures between November 1993 and March 1995 on the results of the 1993 referendum. Columns (i) through (iii) are based on regressions of expenditures on measures of core support and non-marginality from the 1993 referendum. These specifications therefore test a model similar to that which was found to have had an important effect on the 1991-1993 distribution of FONCODES expenditures, updated with the results of the 1993 referendum. Columns (iv) through (vi) are based on regressions of expenditures on the change in the pro-Fujimori vote.<sup>25</sup> These specifications therefore test a genuine buy-back model. One shortcoming of this approach is the fact that the 1990 presidential election and the 1993 referendum were different in character: in the 1993 referendum voters could "safely" express opposition to part of Fujimori's programme without having to choose an alternative (Graham and Kane, p. 82, Roberts and Arce, p. 229).

|**Table 5: The impact o**<br>**expenditures**|**f the 1993 r**<br>**on commu**<br>|**eferendum on**<br>**nity-based pro**<br>|**the distribu**<br>**jects, Novem**<br>|**tion of per c**<br>**ber 1993-M**<br>|**apita FONC**<br>**arch**1995<br>|**ODES**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Lev|el of pro-Fujimo|ri vote|Chang|e in pro-Fujim|ori vote|
||(i|(ii)|**(iiii)**|**(iv)**|**(v)**|(vi)|
|1993referendum: % vote for<br>**Fujimori**|-0.005<br>(1.16)|-0.005<br>(1.30)|-0.010*<br>(1.91)||||
|**1993**referendum: abs. vaL<br>|-0.006<br>|-0.011**|0.0o|-|-|-|
|**(%forFujimori-50)**|(1.15)|(2.22)|(O.C1)||||
|**Change**<br>**in pro-Fujimori**<br>vote<br>(vote 90-vote 93)/vote 90|-|-|-|-0.283*<br>(1.76)|-0.391***<br>(2.58)|-0.560***<br>(2.93)|
|In(FONCODES<br>index)|1.01***<br>(17.47)|0.746***<br>(9.11)|-|0.879***<br>(9.57)|0.554***<br>(4.59)|-|
|In (population)|_|-0.087<br>(1.33)|0.037<br>(0.48)|-|-0.101*<br>(1.82)|0.010<br>(0.17)|
|Proportion rural|--|0.007***<br>(2.89)|-0.005<br>(0.97)|-|0.007***<br>(2.95)|-0.007<br>(1.27)|
|**Additional**<br>**controls**|No|No|Yes|No|No|Yes|
|F-test (1)|0.86|2.57*|1.95|-|-|-|
|R-squared|0.514|0.548|0.759|0.529|0.567|0.803|
|**Number of**observations|230|230|230|205|205|205|

* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the 1% level.

Note: Absolute t-statistics are reported in brackets, and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A constant was calculated but not reported.

F-test (1): F-test on the measures of non-marginality and core support from the 1993 referendum. For a list of controls, see note at the foot of Table 3.

25 "Change" is defined as the 1993 pro-Fujimori vote minus the 1990 pro-Fujimori vote, divided by the pro-Fujimori vote in 1990. Dividing through by the results of the 1990 presidential election recognizes that, say, a 5% reduction in the pro-Fujimori vote is unlikely to mean the same thing in a province in which 70% of the population had voted for Fujimor **i** n 1990 as in one in which the origina **l** evel of support in 1990 was only 20%.

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