rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
||stamp tax as much as 0.15% of the sales price for<br>securities issued by a resident of Switzerland and<br>0.3% for securities issued by a resident of a foreign<br>country, on the sale or exchange of securities<br>through entities considered to be securities dealers,<br>such as the following :<br>Banks and other financial institutions subject to<br>federal banking legislation, including the Swiss<br>National Bank, business entities (including<br>permanent establishments of foreign entities) as well<br>as individuals whose principal activity is the<br>purchase and sale of securities for their own<br>account or for third parties (traders) or portfolio<br>management, manager of investment funds, and<br>corporations, limited partnerships or cooperatives<br>which own taxable securities with a book value of<br>more than CHF 10 million, taxable securities include<br>shares, bonds, debentures, promissory notes, bills<br>of exchange and long-term certifi-cates of deposit.||
|---|---|---|
|**Taiwan**<br>**(Hsiu Chu**<br>**City)**|**A. About Stamp Tax**<br>The Stamp Tax Law was amended in January<br>1986. After the amendment, only four items<br>remained taxable. The revenue generated from<br>stamp taxation amounted to only 0.6% of the total<br>tax revenue in 1997. This trend shows that the<br>stamp tax will be phased out in the not too distant<br>future.<br>**B. Stamp Tax Rates**<br>**Monetary receipts:**affix tax stamps at 0.4% of the<br>amount received, with the exception of 0.1% for<br>money deposited by bidders.<br>**Contracting agreements:**affix tax stamps at 0.1%<br>of the contract price.<br>**Contracts of deeds for sale, gratuitous transfer,**<br>**exchange or partition of the contract price or**<br>**value of the real estate.**<br>**Contracts for sale of movables:**affix tax stamps at<br>NT$12 per piece.<sup>1)</sup>|1.http://www.hcct.gov.tw/Eng/page_b<br>08.htm|
|**Taiwan**<br>**(Taipei)**|**Types of Document Tax Rate:**<br>Monetary receipts – Affix tax stamp at 0.4% of the<br>amount received, with the exception of 0.1% for<br>money deposited by bidders.<br>Dees for sale of movable – Affix tax stamps at<br>NT$12 per piece.<br>Contracting agreements – Affix tax stamps at 0.1%<br>of the contract price.|http://www.tpctax.gov.tw/english/gnd<br>stax_stamp.htm|

54
policy. Over time, SSA countries did not change their procyclical stance, while ECA and LAC reduced their procyclical stance, and MENA switched from a countercyclical to a procyclical stance, while South Asia and East Asia maintained their countercyclical stance on average (Table 1). In the remainder of the paper, we seek to explain why procyclicality is more prevalent in some countries and regions than in others and why some countries can switch from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy management.

**Table 1: Evolution of (pro)cyclicality at the regional level, over time**

|#|Code|Region|Corr(G, GDP) 2000-2008|Corr(G, GDP) 2009-2016|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|ECA|Europe and Central Asia|0.48|0.05|
|2|LAC|Latin America and Caribbean|0.20|0.09|
|3|MENA|Middle East and North Africa|-0.23|0.12|
|4|SEAP|South, East Asia, and Pacific|-0.07|-0.02|
|5|SSA|Sub-Saharan Africa|0.23|0.22|

# **Figure 1: Progress in Fiscal Policy Management 2009-2016**

(In red, resource-rich countries)

## **A. Entire sample**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Back to procyclicality Still procyclical<br>LBYGHA IRN SDN CIVECUNICCAF BOLIDN UKR<br>IND BRA HUN SWZ VEN<br>YEM OMN MLI MOZ UZB ERI URYUGAMDG<br>BDITCD THABGDCZEPOL MNG HTIBFANERBEN GAB PAN HRVMDA AGOBIHARGROM<br>NAM COL<br>NGA JOR ETHKAZMUS ISRZMBSLETZAJAM TURAZEPAK MMR<br>MKD SEN CMRNPL TGO<br>DZA COGPHLGNB KEN<br>MAR<br>SAU VNM ZARMEX HND TJKLBRGMBLKAEST BGRALB<br>LAO LBNSLV PER RUSGTM LVA<br>PNG CHNKHM KGZ SVK TTO TUN DOM EGY LTU<br>SVN RWA BLR<br>LSOKWT MWI<br>CRI MYSGIN<br>ARE SRB GEO<br>PRYSGP ZAFBWA<br>CHL<br>KOR<br>Established countercyclical Recent countercyclical<br>-1 -0.50 0 0.50 1<br>Corr(G, GDP) 00-08<br>1<br>0.50<br>0<br>Corr(G, GDP) 09-16<br>-0.50<br>-1<br><!-- End of picture text --> 4
24 economic and political issue but was brought to a head in Australia during 2006 following the country’s worst drought on record. There has been substantial reform in recent years, but much remains to be done to make the most of this resource, particularly in rural Australia where most of it is used. Proposals for reform and several national enquiries are currently under way (Productivity Commission 2006). More efficient pricing of that resource may lead to substantial reallocations of resources within the agricultural sector, with possible declines in Australian production of cotton, rice, and milk as horticultural industries (and urban areas) bid away water from those farmers.<sup>22</sup> The remaining big frontier for policy reform that would boost farm incomes in Australia is the dismantling of agricultural subsidies and import protection abroad. A successful conclusion to the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO provides the greatest promise for achieving that outcome: on a per capita basis, Australians – and especially their farmers – would be among the major beneficiaries of a significant agricultural reform outcome from that round. According to global Linkage Model results reported in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006, Table 13), removing all merchandise trade barriers and agricultural subsidies globally would raise agricultural value added or net farm incomes in Australia and New Zealand by 26 percent. Even using the GTAP Model, whose supply response elasticities are lower than in Linkage, a similar study by Anderson and Valenzuela (2007, Table 4) reports agricultural value added in Australia and New Zealand would rise by 15 percent, compared with a rise of just 2 percent in value added by their non-agricultural industries.

> 22 The impact of past under-pricing of water for agriculture on farm returns has not been incorporated in the NRA estimates reported in this paper. Nor does the OECD include it in its PSE calculations.
6

# **Te** Producfivity Effects of **Labor** Force Structure, Enterprise Ownership, and Foreign Trade Variables

In this chapter we analyze quantitatively the determinants of productivity in the 80 sampled firms. The data set is in the form of an annual panel covering 80 firms during the 1980-1985 period. Our focus is on the evolution of total factor productivity over time and the productivity effects of the following variables: (1) the composition of the enterprises' labor force (in terms of skill, nationality and permanent versus temporary employment); (2) enterprise ownership, as determined by the percentage of enterprise shares owned by Senegalese citizens, the Senegalese state, or foreign individuals and companies (in 1984 or 1985); (3) the effective rate of protection and enterprise export orientation. As we pointed out in Chapter 5, employers often complain that the low productivity of Senegal's workers is one of the main reasons for the poor performance of the country's industrial sector. Employers also argue that the enormous wage differentisals betveen Senegalese and non-African employees are (more than) justified by their different productivities. In contrast, the trade unions argue that such differentials are frequently unwarranted and constitute a siphoning-off of profits that ought to be reinvested or used for the remuneration of Senegalese workcers.

These arguments have been aired for decades, but the issue has remained unsettled. To provide a more solid background for examining this question, we have collected detailed firm-level data on production, labor cost, and employment variables, and on a variety of enterprise and worker characteristics. With these data, we estimate augmented production functions and assess the extent of overutilization of different types of labor as well as the effect of the aforementioned structural and policy variables on output.
dynamics which could give rise to a poverty trap. Pseudo-panel analysis reveals more persistence in labor earnings, suggesting that measurement error is rather large in the panel data. Nevertheless, although we find some evidence of non-linearities in income dynamics, we estimate that the mapping from lagged income to current income always crosses the 45 degree line with a derivative less than unity. Hence, there is no evidence for a poverty trap in labor income. This result is robust to allowing different education groups to exhibit different income dynamics, and to using full income or expenditure in place of labor earnings.

In related work, Antman and McKenzie (2005) show that absolute mobility in Mexico is very low, suggesting that the high level of cross-sectional inequality in incomes will persist over time. Thus although the lack of a poverty trap suggests that poor individuals can experience income growth little by little over time, and not be trapped below some threshold level, this will be a rather slow process. The “Mexican dream” may therefore take a long time to be realized.

# 7 References:

Antman, F. and D. McKenzie (2005) “Earnings Mobility and Measurement Error: A Pseudo-Panel Approach”, Mimeo. The World Bank and Stanford University.

Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991) “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies 58: 277-97.

Azariadis, C. and J. Stachurski (2004) “Poverty Traps”, forthcoming in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.) Handbook of Economic Growth.

Bardhan, P., S. Bowles, and H. Gintis (2000) “Wealth Inequality, Credit Constraints, and Economic Performance”, pp. 541-603 in A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution, North-Holland: Amsterdam.

Banerjee, A. and A. Newman (1993) “Occupational Choice and the Process of Development”, Journal of Political Economy 101(2): 274-298.

23
# **Gone with the Storm: Rainfall Shocks and * Household Well-Being in Guatemala**

Javier E. Baez Leonardo Lucchetti Maria E. Genoni Mateo Salazar JEL Classification: I3, J2, O1 Keywords: Economic development, natural disasters, consumption, poverty, human capital.

___________

> * Javier Baez is a Senior Economist with the Poverty Global Practice, World Bank and a Research Fellow at the Institute of the Study of Labor (IZA) (jbaez@worldbank.org). Maria E. Genoni is an Economist with the Poverty Global Practice, World Bank (mgenoni@worldbank.org). Leonardo Lucchetti is an Economist with the Poverty Global Practice, World Bank (llucchetti@worldbank.org). Mateo Salazar is a Research Assistant with the Poverty Global Practice, World Bank (mateosalazar@worldbank.org). Special thanks go to Claudio Castañón and Mauricio Garita for facilitating access to rainfall data from the Guatemalan Institute of Seismology, Volcanology, Meteorology and Hydrology (INSIVUMEH). We thank insightful comments from Emmanuel Skoufias, Alan Fuchs and Louise Cord.
Policy Research Working Paper 8614

# **Abstract**

This paper studies the impact of transport infrastructure projects of the Belt and Road Initiative on shipment times and trade costs. Based on a new data on completed and planned Belt and Road transport projects, Geographic Information System analysis is used to estimate shipment times before and after the Belt and Road Initiative. Two sets of data are computed to address different research questions: a global database based on an analysis of 1,000 cities in 191 countries and 47 sectors and a regional database that focuses on more granular information (1,818 cities) for Belt and Road economies only. The paper uses sectoral estimates of “value of time” to transform changes in shipment times into changes in ad valorem trade costs at the country-sector level. The findings show that the Belt and Road Initiative will significantly reduce shipment times and trade costs. For the world, the average reduction in shipment time will range between 1.2 and 2.5 percent, leading to reduction of aggregate trade costs between 1.1 and 2.2 percent. For Belt and Road economies, the change in shipment times and trade costs will range between 1.7 and 3.2 percent and 1.5 and 2.8 percent, respectively. Belt and Road economies located along the corridors where projects are built experience the largest gains. Shipment times along these corridors decline by up to 11.9 percent and trade costs by up to 10.2 percent. The paper also shows that these effects are magnified by policy reforms that reduce border delays and improve corridor management.

This paper is a joint product of the Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice; the Office of the Chief Economist, Middle East and North Africa Region; and the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/ research. The authors may be contacted at fdesoyres@worldbank.org; amulabdic@worldbank.org; smurray@worldbank.org; nrocha@worldbank.org; mruta@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Table 8: Data sources and models used in the estimation of the number of accounts in commercial banks**

This table shows the distribution of data sources and models used to estimate the number of accounts in commercial banks around the world. The third column represents the percentage in terms of countries. The last column represents the percentage in terms of accounts.

|**Data Source**|**# countries**|**% sample**|**% final count**|
|---|---|---|---|
|FA Survey '09 (Reported Data)|91|59%|48%|
|BTP '08; BDM '07, CGAP<br>internal numbers*|25|16%|22%|
|Model 1 (branches volume)|17|11%|9%|
|Model 2 (branches)|2|1%|0%|
|Model 3 (volume)|6|4%|5%|
|Model 4 (with private credit)|7|5%|1%|
|Model5 (without private credit)|6|4%|14%|
|Totals|154|100%|100%|

* BTP = Banking the Poor (2008); BDM = Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez-Peria (2007), CGAP numbers were gathered in email exchanges between other CGAP staff and national regulator staff.

# **Table 9: Prediction model of the number of deposit accounts in mutually owned institutions**

This table shows the estimates of OLS regressions of the number of deposit accounts in mutually owned institutions (cooperatives, credit unions, and Mutuals) per thousand adults on several covariates. The dependent variable in each regression is ln(Number of accounts in mutually owned institutions/1000 adults).

|ln(GDP/capita)|-0.93***<br>(0.20)|
|---|---|
|ln(Value Deps./Population)|0.97***<br>(0.11)|
|Constant|7.44***|
||(1.49)|
|Observations|22|
|R-squared|0.804|
|Note: Standard errors in pare<br>p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1|ntheses; ***|

46
**29**

parallel market rates from the official exchange rates reveals half of the countries with such egregious deviations are characterized **by** the maintenance of dual or multiple exchange systems (see Table **7** below). The significance of these relatively large deviations is Table **7:** Ratio of Parallel/Black Market to Official and Atlas Exchange Rates

|BlacktoOfficialRate<br>(Official**=1.00)**<br>**1987**<br>**1988**|TotalTrade<br>**%GDP**<br>(Avg.1987-88)|
|---|---|
|Algeria<br>7.64<br>na|**28.7**|
|*Romania**/1**<br>**_5.70_**<br>6.42|na|
|*SyrianArabRep.<br>**5.66**<br>**1.98**<br>|**31.5**|
|Burma<br>4.32<br>4.50|na|
|* Afghanistan**/1**<br>**3.95**<br>na|na|
|Iraq<br>**3.76**<br>**3.76**|na|
|*Poland**/1**<br>3.40<br>4.10|41.6|
|***Egypt/1**<br>**3.13**<br>**3.58**|**_50.0_**|
|Zambia<br>**3.06**<br>3.04|64.0|
|* Bangladesh**/1**<br>**2.91**<br>2.84|**23.2**|
|* Nicaragua<br>**2.81**<br>na|na|
|<br>Ethiopia<br>2.54<br>_2.54_|**33.9**|
|Zimbabwe<br>2.42<br>**2.83**|**_51.5_**|
|Libya<br>2.34<br>2.41|na|
|<br>*Peru**/1**<br>**2.27**<br>**2.27**|**23.8**|
|*Guyana<br>**2.05**<br>**3.58**|149.5|
|* Venezuela**/1**<br>**1.93**<br>**2.32**|46.8|
|Tunisia<br>**1.68**<br>**1.62**|**78.2**|
|South Africa**/1**<br>**1.61**<br>1.14|**50.8**|
|*Paraguay**/1**<br>1.46<br>**1.69**|54.6|
|Trinidad andTobago**/1**<br>1.46<br>**1.33**|**72.5**|
|<br>*Hungary**/1**<br>1.46<br>1.43|74.4|
|<br>*Nigeria<br>1.44<br>**1.58**|**53.0**|
|Morocco<br>1.42<br>1.46|49.6|
|*Kenya<br>**1.32**<br>**1.32**|44.8|
|Zaire<br>**1.31**<br>**0.86**|**73.9**|

***** Countries identified in IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions as maintaining multiple exchange systems.

/1 Principal, secondary or tertiary rates for these countries are available in **IFS.**
pected to care for their parents (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2005). Further, Kosec et al. (2016) note that these allocations through inheritance reflected birth order, with older brothers typically obtaining larger and more productive plots. The 2005 proclamation also allowed for land rental but land sales and mortgaging remained prohibited (Abza 2011; Deininger et al. 2008; Kosec et al. 2016). However, land use rights remained contingent on physical residence (Dessalegn 2003) and all regions apart from Amhara had legal provisions that limited the amount of land that could be rented out to (usually) 50 percent of holding size (Deininger et al. 2001). Concerns that uncertainty regarding tenure status was limiting investments in land led to efforts to provide farmers with land certificates (Deininger, Ali, and Alemu 2011). In Afar and Somali, these proclamations reaffirmed that land was owned by the state but land access remained communal based on clan and sub-clan membership (Abza 2011; Hundie and Padmanabhan 2008).

The continuation of land distribution policies, the ban on land sales and mortgaging, limitations on land rentals and customary land inheritance practices mean that land access and fragmentation in Ethiopia are conditioned by history, location and demography. We argue that land fragmentation due to government allocation or inheritance is therefore orthogonal to farmer ability.

# **Data and Measurement**

We use data from the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Survey on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA).<sup>1</sup> These surveys collect socio-economic panel data

> 1. LSMS-ISA is part of an initiative to collect high quality, standardized data in developing countries in order to inform policy making. It was implemented by the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia with technical assistance from the World Bank’s Development Data Group and funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. To download the publicly available Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey data, one of several national panel surveys from the LSMS-ISA program, see: http://surveys.worldbank.org/lsms/programs/ integrated-surveys-agriculture-ISA

6
11

|Table 1.9 A Comarsn of I|nstitutional and oninti<br>l Credit M|akts (19885):|
|---|---|---|
||Institutional Maret|Noninstitutional<br>Market|
|...................................................................................................<br>Number ofborrowers|..........................................................................................................................<br>400,000|2 million|
|Total credit|Rs 18 billion|Rs 33.4 billion|
|Principal players|ADBP (55%)<br>Commercial banks (29.4%)<br>Cooperaives (15%)|Friends & relatives (58%)<br>Marketing intermediaries (16%)<br>Landlords (8.1%)<br>Money lenders (2.4%)<br>Factories etc.(4.8%)|
|Average interest rate (1973)|Mean 8.16 (3/6); SD 1.82|Mean 15.43 (%/6);<br>SD11.63|
|Source of funds|ADBP: SBP & foreign sources (87%)<br>Equity & retained earnings (12%)<br>Deposits (1%)<br>Commercial Banks<br>Deposits (92%)<br>Copgpeges:<br>SBP (78%)<br>deposits (18%)<br>Equity & eained earnings (40/%)|Mainly own funds|
|Collateal requirement|Stingent with complex procedures|None|
|Flenbility|Regulated terms|Very flexible terms|
|Subsidy|ADBP subsidy at 32%|None|
|Loan recovery|Below 50 percent|Excellent|
|Cost of credit delivery|9.1 percent for ADBP|Negligible transaction costs|

Source: 1985 Rural Credit Survey Finally, a word on the financial viability of Pakistan's rural credit market. The viability of a financial system is reflected in repayment of outstanding credit At the time of the 1985 survey, 82 percent of the credit was due for repayment but only 38 percent bad been paid off. Noninstitutional sources, with repayments at 61 percent, fared better. That repayments can be improved through tighter supervision can be seen in the evidence that most repayments (87 percent) are made from regular sources cf income and not through distress sales. This means that if properly supevised, borrowers can manage to pay. Distress sales of property acoDunt for only 8 percent of total repayments.
- History of national assessments, from UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report.

- Membership in the OECD and date of membership, from OECD.

# **B. Measures**

**Countries.** Countries are those identified by the World Bank. All countries that have existed or have come into existence since 2000 are included (World Bank 2015). The countries used in this study are those with populations greater than 30,000.

**Participation in PISA (the dependent variable).** Participation in each of the five completed PISA cycles was coded from various published reports (OECD 2001, OECD 2004, OECD 2007, OECD 2010, OECD 2014, Walker 2011); the identity of the countries participating in the sixth cycle, PISA 2015 which is on-going, was provided by OECD.

**Globalization.** Two indicators of globalization are used. The first relates to _level of economic development._ Time series data on each country’s economic status, 1997-2013 were accessed from the World Bank (2015). The World Bank classifies countries into four categories based on their GNP per capita: low-income, lower-middle income, upper-middle-income and high income. A country’s classification can change over time, in accordance with their GNP per capita, and these changes are reflected in the data. The country’s economic status at the outset of each PISA cycle in which the country participated, approximately two years before the date of the cycle, is used in the analysis. For example, economic data for PISA 2015 reflect the country’s level of economic development in 2013. Thus, the country’s economic status is “lagged” relative to PISA. Although differences in the _level_ of PISA participation according to a country’s level of economic development could be expected, similarities in the _growth_ of PISA participation for countries at all levels of economic development may indicate the globalization of assessment.

The other indicator related to globalization is the country’s _region._ The World Bank groups countries into seven regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, and Middle East and North Africa). This paper uses the World Bank’s country groupings as of 2015. Similarities in the level and growth of PISA participation across regions may also indicate the globalization of assessment.

**Assessment capacity** . A country’s assessment capacity is inferred from the country’s experience with three large-scale assessments: an international assessment, a regional assessment, and a national assessment.  Each country’s participation in the longest-operating _international large-scale assessment,_ Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), was coded from published reports from each cycle of that assessment (Beaton, Martin et al., 1997;

5