rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
status. Headey and Ecker (2012) is perhaps the closest relative of our paper: they also evaluate a set of food security indicators but do it at a much broader level using lenses of cross-sectional validity, nutritional relevance, and inter-temporal validity. Even though the countries they analyze and the food security measures they use do not entirely overlap with what we do here, the spirit of their work, particularly the component related to nutritional relevance, is identical to ours.

# **3 DATA**

In this section, we introduce the data and descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. For each country, height-for-age and weight-for-age z-scores are constructed using the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Anthro program, which uses the WHO multicenter growth reference study (MGRS) growth data as the reference population.<sup>8</sup> The value of the z-score indicates the number of standard deviations an individual child of a certain age and gender deviates from the median of a “healthy” reference population. Z-score’s cut-off point of less than 2 standard deviations from the median of the reference population is used to identify children with low height-for-age (stunting) and low weightfor-age (underweight). For all countries, following the WHO’s fixed exclusion range, we drop child observations with z-scores outside a certain range.<sup>9</sup>

## **3.1 Bangladesh**

For Bangladesh, we use data from the 2011 Bangladesh Food Security and Nutrition Surveillance Project (FSNSP) surveys administered by Helen Keller International (HKI) in partnership with the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and the James P. Grant School of Public Health of BRAC University. FSNSP is a comprehensive survey developed specifically to track seasonal variations and changes over time in key food security, nutrition and health indicators. The survey has three rounds of data covering the three major agricultural seasons in Bangladesh: the post-aman harvest season (February - April); the monsoon season (June - August); and the harvest season (October - December). Over the course of three rounds, the 2011 FSNSP survey interviewed more than 26,000 households and collected anthropometric and dietary information on more than 12,000 children under the age of five from 56 districts across Bangladesh.<sup>10</sup> The survey contains detailed information on child anthropometric measurements such as weight, height, and mid-upper arm circumference (muac). Restricting the analysis to the youngest child under the age of five for whom anthropometric measurements are available and dropping observations with z-scores outside fixed exclusion range gives a sample of 11,556 children. Summary statistics on the nutritional 13
42 the BVG law, the case is less clear for the latter. To the best of our knowledge annuities in other currencies have not been offered so far, very likely due to a lack of demand. Similarly, there are no guaranteed or deferred annuities in the second pillar. The market for these products outside the second pillar is simply too small to allow for a meaningful analysis.

By using the nominal yield curves, on the one hand, and a relatively high technical discount rate, on the other hand, the chapter provides reliable upper and lower bands for the MWRs of non-indexed annuities derived by using the legal conversion rate. For companies which use a lower conversion factor but promise inflation indexing, the situation is a bit more complicated. The effective MWR depends on how much inflation indexing offsets the fall in the MWR generated by a lower conversion factor. Nevertheless, we think that the exercise can deliver a reasonable approximation of the return to the accumulated pension capital for insured individuals in the mandatory part of the scheme.

The chapter first presents the underlying mortality rates and the discounting strategy. It then presents a variety of estimates for MWRs in the second pillar for women and men since 2000. As the survivor component of the second pillar benefits is free, we also present MWRs as a function of the marital status, demonstrating large differences in the present value of benefits between single and married individuals.

# **4.1 Mortality Rates**

Mortality rates are used from two sources, the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). In both cases, these are _period tables_ . The quality of these tables is regarded as high by pension fund experts.

# 1. _The Federal Insurance Fund (FIF)_

Every ten years, the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) provides detailed data on the evolution of mortality rates and other risks (disability, widowhood) based on the pool of insured individuals on pension funds under the control of the FIF. These are used by the vast majority of pension funds, including the large insurance companies.<sup>43</sup> The clear advantage of the FIF tables is that they are based on the annuitant population.

# _2. Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO)_

We also use the mortality tables computed by the SFSO in ten years intervals. The advantage of the SFSO data is that it is computed from a much larger base than the FIF rates. As a consequence, improvement rates computed from this source are more reliable and less variable. SFSO mortality tables are also available by marital status (c.f. Figure 16 and Figure 17 for women and men, respectively). On the other hand, the SFSO mortality tables underestimate longevity to some extent, as they are based on the whole population and not just the annuitants.

> 43 In German: “Eidgenössische Versicherungskasse (EVK)”, in French: “Caisse fédérale d’assurance (CFA)”. Until recently the Federal Insurance Fund (FIF) also managed the Federal Pension Fund (FPF). Furthermore it created the new Federal Pension Fund PUBLICA. The latter was legally established in spring 2001 and began operating in June 2003.
In table 4 we explore the relationship by income groups. Using World Bank income classifications, economies are classified into (i) low- and middle-income economies and (ii) high income economies. We find that the share of management practices is negatively correlated with the quality of management practices, although this is statistically insignificant for high income economies, and barely statistically significant for low- and middle-income economies (10 percent level). However, the coefficient for fully family-managed firms is negative and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level across the income groups. Consistent with the other findings, results are stronger when we look at all management being family versus partial family management.

The nature by which internal operating environments and external business environments interact with family management may accentuate or debilitate the correlation with management practices. We explore interactions with the government in particular. We look at two types of interactions in terms of (i) political connections and (ii) corruption (bribes). Results are presented in table 5. The coefficient of the interaction between all family management and political connections is negative, but statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the interaction between partial family management and political connections is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, political connections, by further eroding exposure to competitive forces, may make family management even weaker in terms of management practices. Similar findings are obtained for _bribes_ . _Bribes_ is a binary variable that attains a value of 1 if firms are expected to make informal payments to get things done, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction between bribes and family management is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, regardless of whether the firm has full or partial family management. Thus, both forms of government engagement – political connections and bribes – seem to exacerbate the negative relationship between family management and the quality of management practices.

In table 6 we explore the interaction between family management and domestic competition, and also perceptions of stringency of labor regulations. Domestic competition is measured by a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm claims that it has one competitor or no competition in the main domestic market. The coefficient of the interaction between family management and domestic competition is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, regardless of whether full or partial family management is considered (columns 1 and 2 of table 6). Therefore, when family-managed firms face less competition in terms of fewer competitors, they have fewer reasons to innovate and adopt better management practices. Similarly, we explore whether perceptions of labor regulations being a severe or major obstacle matter for the relationship between family management and the quality of management practices. Given that one of 10
- Cai F, Giles J, O’Keefe P and Wang D (2011) _Old-Age Support in Rural China: Challenges and Prospects_ , _Directions in Development_ Monograph, the World Bank.

- Chan S, Stevens AH (2001) Job loss and employment patterns of older workers, Journal of Labor Economics 19: 484-521.

- Cho JM, Kim SW (2005) On using mandatory retirement to reduce workforce in Korea, International Economic Journal 19: 283-303.

- Coile, CC (2004a) Health shocks and couples’ labor supply decisions, NBER Working Paper 10810, October 2004.

- Coile, CC (2004b) Retirement incentives and couples' retirement decisions, Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 4(1): 1-28.

- Coile, CC and Gruber, J (2007) Future social security entitlements and the retirement decision, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2): 234-246.

- Dalen HPV, Henkens K, Joop S (2010) Productivity of older workers: perceptions of employers and employees, Population and Development Review 36: 309-330

- Davis-Friedman, D (1991) Long Lives: Chinese Elderly and the Communist Revolution, Expanded edition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (1991)

- Dong, Xiaoyuan (2010) Parental care and married women's labor supply in urban China, Feminist Economics, 16(3): 169-192.

- Dwyer DS, Mitchell OS (1999) Health problems as determinants of retirement, Journal of Health Economics 18: 173-193.

- Falkinger J, Winter-Ebmer R, Zweimuller J (1996) Retirement of spouses and social security reform, European Economic Review 40: 449-472.

- Giles J, Park A and Wang D (2011) Social insurance coverage in China: Evaluating evidence from administrative data and urban household surveys, mimeo, The World Bank.

- Giles J, Wang D and Zhao C (2010) Can China’s rural elderly count on support from adult children? Implications of rural to urban migration, Journal of Population Ageing 3(3): 183-204.

- Giles J, Park A and Cai F (2006a) How has economic restructuring affected China’s urban workers? China Quarterly 185 (March 2006): 61-95.

- Giles J, Park A and Cai F (2006b) Reemployment of dislocated workers in urban China: The roles of information and incentives, Journal of Comparative Economics 34(3) (September 2006): 582-607.

26
|(1)<br>**Table 8: Average impact of EU a**|(2)<br>**ccession on po**|(3)<br>**st-communist**|(4)<br>**countries**|
|---|---|---|---|
|DiD<br>1.661***|1.430***|1.630***|1.428***|
|(0.495)|(0.532)|(0.545)|(0.552)|
|Cohort 1995<br>-0.554|-0.496|-0.601|-0.515|
|(0.853)|(0.823)|(0.905)|(0.876)|
|Cohort 2000<br>0.075|0.123|0.052|-0.053|
|(0.935)|(0.874)|(1.177)|(1.053)|
|Schooling<br>-0.143|-0.133|-0.245|-0.251|
|(0.266)|(0.249)|(0.296)|(0.270)|
|Polity|0.144*||0.159**|
||(0.077)||(0.078)|
|Trade||0.009*|0.010**|
|||(0.005)|(0.004)|
|1995<br>0.864**|0.904**|0.821*|0.904**|
|(0.428)|(0.416)|(0.445)|(0.433)|
|2000<br>0.911|0.870|0.855|0.835|
|(0.654)|(0.659)|(0.646)|(0.649)|
|2005<br>1.472***|1.415***|1.433***|1.382***|
|(0.421)|(0.421)|(0.413)|(0.419)|
|2010<br>2.050***|2.055***|2.014***|2.037***|
|(0.457)|(0.430)|(0.445)|(0.420)|
|Constant<br>7.995***|6.746***|8.225***|6.867***|
|(2.317)|(2.250)|(2.344)|(2.256)|
|Prob > chi2<br>0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Observations<br>158|155|155|152|
|Groups<br>40<br>Clustered standard errors at national level in par<br>*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1<br>DiD = Difference-in-Difference<br>Cohort 2000 comprises the post-communist cou<br>EU between 1998 and 1999, namely: Estonia, La<br>1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 are time controls.<br>Cohort 1995 comprises the post-communist cou<br>EU between 1994 and 1995, namely: Bulgaria, C|39<br>enthesis.<br>ntries that signe<br>tvia, Lithuania, S<br>ntries that signe<br>zech Republic, H|40<br>d their associatio<br>lovakia, and Slov<br>d their associatio<br>ungary, Poland, a|39<br>n agreement to the<br>enia.<br>n agreement to the<br>nd Romania.|

Since half of the post-socialist countries that joined the EU started their accession process just a couple of years after the fall of the Soviet Union, there might be an overlap of the effects of transitioning to a market economy and becoming part of the EU on their returns to education. To disentangle a potential overlap of both effects, we implement a triple interaction model that incorporates both treatments (i.e., transitioning and EU accession) in the same specification. In 22
# **Tables and Figures**

Table 1: Types <u>of early childhood programs in Indonesia</u>

|Type|Content|ResponsibleMinistry|
|---|---|---|
|Kindergarten<br>(_Taman Kanak-kanak, TK)_|Pre-primary education|Ministry of Education and<br>Culture|
|Islamic kindergarten<br>_(Radhatul Athal, RA)_|Pre-primary education|Ministry of Religious Affairs|
|Playgroups<br>_(Kelompok Bermain, KB)_|Early childhood education|Ministry of Education and<br>Culture|
|Daycare<br>(_Taman Penitipan Anak,_<br>_TPA)_|Care service for children of<br>working parents|Ministry of Social Welfare &<br>Ministry of Education and<br>Culture|
|Integrated health service<br>unit<br>_(Posyandu)_|Health care service for<br>children and parenting<br>information for mothers|Ministry of Health|
|Toddler family groups<br>(_Bina Keluarga Balita,_<br>_BKB)_|Parenting classes for<br>mothers|National Family Planning Board|

Note: This is a non-exhaustive list to show some of the most common types of early childhood programs in Indonesia.

Source: Hasan, Hyson and Chang, 2013 18
6 network owned by the governrment and 1/2 Dinar/dunam of reclaimed land or orchard that is irrigated by non-government means (Arar, 1987).

**Jordan:** The country faces a severe water scarcity. Irrigation is the major user. Crop water requirements vary substantially between regions due to soil and climatic conditions. Upland irrigation is based mainly on ground water extraction. Private wells are not monitored. The cost of pumped water in 1993 is estimated at 50 fills/m<sup>3</sup> . In the Jordan Valley. water is provided through pipes to more than three quarters of the irrigated land. A volumetric pricing is used. Water is greatly under priced. In the East Ghore canal (Jordan Valley Irrigation Project) farmers were charged 3 fils/m<sup>3</sup> (1000 fils = 1 Jordanian Dinar = $US2.85 in 1986) for the first 1.5 meter of irrigation depth and 6 fils/m<sup>3</sup> for any additional amount. O&M costs alone are estimated at 20 to 30 filslm<sup>3</sup> (Arar, 1987). In 1993, all irrigation water in the Jordan Valley were priced at 6 fils per **m3** (in 1993 1 Jordanian Dinar $US1.5) irrespective of volume used (Hayward and Kumar, 1994).

Mexico: Volumetric, per unit area. and crop and tiered methods are used. The Volumetric method is used in 55 percent of the irrigated land. For each farmer, water rates vary with the total amount used as well as with the crop grown. In the other 45 percent of the area, the pricing method consists of a per unit area rate that varies with the season, the crop, the size of well from which water is pumped and the land tenancy structure (United Nations, 1980).

**Moldova:** Irrigation in Moldova is supplemental in some years, and used for drought mitigation in other years. Irrigated area is about 220,000 ha Currently, water charges are not paid by the agricultural sector and the irrigation water delivery cost is fully paid by the government (Herman, 1995).

**Morocco:** Agriculture uses 92 percent of water resources in Morocco. Most water originates in rainfall and snow melt that is harvested by big dams and delivered by a long canal system. Some areas have ground water supply to amend surface water. Volumetric pricing is mostly used, either measuring volume directly, or via conversion of flow time. Water rates do not cover the cost of water. Rates differ based on the region. They range according to Arar (1987) between Dh 0.22I/M<sup>3</sup> and Dh 0.27/m<sup>3</sup> (1 Dh = SUSO.113 in 1986). Recent information (World Bank. 1994d) suggests that rates range between Dh 0. 12/m<sup>3</sup> , for gravity irrigation and Dh 0.33/m3, for Sprinkler irrigation (1 Dh = $USO.111 in 1993).

Nigeria: Per area pricing is used. River Basin authorities are empowered to charge (in consultation with the government) a fee for irrigation water. Each River Basin Authority
strongest impact of a formal and enforced MW of 85 per month would be felt by smaller enterprises (which employ the bulk of self-employed persons), and enterprises outside Dili. Finally, those enterprises that would be most adversely affected by a MW of USD 85 per month that was enforced would be the ones owned by Timorese, rather than foreign or joint venture firms. Thus, the majority of the informal firms (63 percent) and a substantial chunk of formal firms (40 percent) would be adversely affected (in terms of not growing due to the MW), and this could have very negative effects on future employment in a labor market where there will be increasing cohorts of youth entering the labor force.

|**Figure 20: Impact**<br>**61.89**<br>**3**<br>**37.26**<br>**0**<br>**10**<br>**20**<br>**30**<br>**40**<br>**50**<br>**60**<br>**70**<br>**No Impact**<br>**Cont**<br>**Percent**|**of Enforcing the Informal MW on**<br>**0.11**<br>**4.63**<br>**44.79**<br>**4.0**<br>**inue to operate**<br>**Reduce emplo**|**Enterprises**<br>**3.**<br>**5**<br>**yees**<br>**Ceas**|**37**<br>**13.9**<br>**e to operate**|
|---|---|---|---|
|<br> <br>**but no**<br> Source: UES, 2004<br>**Table 13: Impact of Enforcing USD 85**<br>|<br>**t consider future**<br>**hiring**<br> <br>**Formal**<br>**Informal**<br>**MW on formal enterprises by**<br>|<br>**Annual Turno**<br>|**ver**(% of firms)<br>|
|No Impact|Continue to operate but not<br>consider future hiring|Reduce<br>employees|Cease to<br>operate|
|Micro<br>(< 1000 USD)<br>46.5|38.0|5.6|9.9|
|Small<br>(1000-10000 USD)<br>58.2|32.9|5.2|3.8|
|Small-medium<br>(10000-20000 USD)<br>67.9|21.4|10.7|0|
|Medium<br>(20000-50000 USD)<br>67.9|30.2|1.9|0|
|Large<br>(>50000 USD)<br>76.1|21.6|1.1|1.1|

Source: UES, 2004

**Table 14: Impact of Enforcing USD 85 MW on formal enterprises by number of employees**

<u>(% of workers)</u>

||No Impact|Continue to operate but not<br>consider future hiring|Reduce<br>employees|Cease to<br>operate|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Small employers<br>(<10 workers)|57.4|33.3|5.2|4.1|
|Medium employers<br>(10-20 workers)|76.1|19.6|2.2|2.2|
|Large employers<br>(>20 workers)|68.2|25|6.8|0|

Source: UES, 2004 26
per unit. Estache and Iimi (2008a) shows that infrastructure procurement exhibits significant economies of scale in the sense that procurement costs would decrease with physical attributes of development projects.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, however, it cannot be ignored that the bidder entry decision is potentially affected by the size of contract. For instance, it is shown that the larger electricity generators are procured, the fewer bidders can participate (Estache and Iimi, 2008d).

The current paper casts light on possible economies of scale in implementing infrastructure development projects. It uses data from official development assistance (ODA) projects. Specifically, the water supply and sewage sector is analyzed where there are basically two types of main components in ordinary development projects: treatment plant, and transmission and distribution network. These may require different expertise and technical skills but sometimes are auctioned together as a single package. If economies of scope are significant, the equilibrium bid should be low for contracts involving the two types of work. By contrast, if they are by nature too different to implement together and there is little room for economies of scope, then the bundling should bring no significant effect on bids. Rather, if only a few firms are able to implement both, the bundling approach would crucially limit bidder participation, undermining competition at the auction level.

To estimate the effect of the lot division on the bid function, it is necessary to explicitly address the endogeneity of bidder participation, rather than relying on the traditional fixed- _n_ approach where the number of bidders is assumed fixed and commonly known by bidders. This is obvious from the above discussion. The endogenous participation problem is a complex issue in auction theory, especially when other factors are involved, such as quality requirements and joint bidding practices (e.g., see Estache and Iimi, 2008b, 2008d). The following empirical analysis focuses on the endogeneity of the number of bidder _n_ by the

> 5 For instance, the predicted procurement cost of roads per km would be about 0.5 million U.S. dollars on average, but it would be prohibitively high at more than 2 million U.S. dollars per km when less than 10 km of roads are procured. Similarly, the predicted construction cost of a water treatment plant with a capacity of 500,000 m<sup>3</sup> per day is about 58 U.S. dollars per m<sup>3</sup> . However, it will cost 200 U.S. dollars per m<sup>3</sup> if the procured capacity is only 100,000 m<sup>3</sup> per day.