stalling. The lesson from here is-given<sup>the high uncertainty about thelength of office of high</sup> officials in the FSU-to look for multiple<sup>championsduring project preparation.A good</sup> example is a new LIL in the Caucasuses<sup>where theSupervisory Council of the PIU will have</sup> several Government officials, the Rector<sup>of the Polytechnics, and representativesof the donors</sup> and the private sector.

# **_Building Mutual Trust and Understanding_**

For community organizing or consulting<sup>for institutional reformto be successful,it is</sup> advantageous for the external organizer<sup>or consultant to beable to see the client's actual</sup> beginning situation (e.g., not treat<sup>it asan imagined blankslate) and,indeed,tosee thatsituation</sup> through the eyes of the client.<sup>3</sup> That,<sup>in turn,isgreatly facilitatedby sharingsomecommon</sup> cultural and historical knowledge or<sup>experience(in addition to theobviousasset of being about</sup> to converse in the client's language). This<sup>shared knowledge extendsfrom the general</sup> understanding of life in a communist country<sup>to specific itemssuch as(inthis case)Radio</sup> Yerevan jokes or the cliches of Partisan<sup>movies.Cultural affinityallows an empathetic</sup> understanding of the client which<sup>allows theclient to buildtrust of the organizeror consultant.</sup> But trust needs to be mutual. The<sup>importanceof building mutualtrust is highlighted by</sup> considering the alternative approach<sup>of mistrust of the client evidenced by conditionalities.</sup> Research [e.g., World Bank 1998]<sup>has repeatedly shown the ineffectivenessof conditionalitiesin</sup> getting reforms of any depth implemented.<sup>The promiseof aid can only buy a false-motivated</sup> "intent to reform." If the policies were<sup>not adoptedby the government independently of the aid,</sup> then the policies would tend to<sup>be</sup> adopted by aid-hungry governments in<sup>spiteof continuing doubtsof the policy</sup> makers themselves, resistance from<sup>somequarterswithinthe government,</sup> onslaught against the "deal" from<sup>theopposition,andgeneral distaste forthe</sup> whole procedure.

Naturally, doubts and reservations are not<sup>voicedat the momentof theaid</sup> compact; hence the delusion on the part of<sup>thedonorthat therehasbeenafull</sup> meeting of minds. But soon after virtue<sup>has been"bought"throughaidunder</sup> these conditions, the reservations and<sup>resistanceswillfindsomeexpression-for</sup> example, through half-hearted implementation<sup>orsabotageoftheagreed-to</sup> policies-and relations between donor and<sup>recipientwill promptlydeteriorateasa</sup> result. [Hirschman 1971, 205] The genuine desire for reform and<sup>changecan only be found,not bought,and,once found,</sup> trusting the client will cement a better<sup>relationship than"just in case"conditionalities.</sup>

# **_Horizontal Learning by ARIA_**

There are two rather different models<sup>for theknowledge-relatedfunctions of the Bank,i.e.,for</sup> the Knowledge Bank. In one model,<sup>the Bank has the answersobtainedeither from economic</sup>

> 3 "The change agent must psychologically<sup>zip him or herself intothe clients' skins,and see their situationthrough</sup> their eyes." [Rogers 1983, 316]

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