rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Rethinking Study and those of three Indian states. An overall performance index is constructed by taking averages of the different sub-components.<sup>45</sup> Performance of regulation is assessed on: regulatory governance, represented by accountability and autonomy aspects (table 16); on regulatory substance, represented by tariff regulation, quality regulation and market-entry regulation (table 17).

# _3.4.2.1 Accountability_

NEPRA’s performance on regulatory accountability is comparable to the global sample, although it lags somewhat behind India, primarily due to the more limited scope of regulatory oversight (Table 16). Independent third-party evaluation of the regulator and requirements to involve nongovernment stakeholders in regulatory decision making process are the main differences between the two countries.

According to the 1997 Act, NEPRA shall prepare annual reports. The report shall be submitted to the Council of Common Interests and to the federal government, but there have not been independent non-governmental evaluations of NEPRA.

With respect to **legal appeals** , there are legally established processes to allow regulated companies or other affected parties to challenge or appeal decisions of the regulatory entity. The process is established under the NEPRA (Procedure for filing appeals) Regulations, 2012. However, the appeal organism is the same regulatory authority, which, at the very least, casts doubts on NEPRA ́s accountability. However, entities dissatisfied with the NEPRA appeals process can resort to the courts, and the case law established has a significant effect on what NEPRA does.

As regards the regulator’s **transparency** , the annual report is also available on their website, along with the state of industry report. Moreover, according to NEPRA Act, the regulator shall maintain public files open in convenient form for public inspection. This Act also establishes that NEPRA shall maintain complete and accurate books of accounts of its actual expenses and receipts, which shall be audited annually by the Auditor General of Pakistan.

There are also several rules, procedures and guidelines which provide transparency to the distinct regulatory processes. For tariffs, NEPRA issued in 2015 Guidelines for determination of consumers end-tariffs, containing the methodology and process (Annex). Once companies file their tariff petitions with NEPRA for the determination of their consumer end-tariffs, the regulator invites the public to make comments on the submissions of the companies. Afterwards, when necessary, it conducts a public hearing to enhance transparency and accountability. In the case of licensing, the procedures to apply, modify, suspend or revoke a license, as well as other provisions regarding their issuing, are clearly specified in the law and in specific rules and regulations.

> 45 Scores in this section are based on the index developed for the Rethinking Power Sector Reform Project. For more details, go to project website at http://www.esmap.org/rethinking_power_sector_reform.

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**The Impact of Chilean Fruit Sector Development on Female Employment and Household Income**

# **Abstract**

Modern fruit sector development in Chile led to agricultural employment for women, though usually only as temporary workers and often at a piece rate. Nonetheless, fruit sector employment offered women access to income and personal fulfillment previously lacking. This paper links the fruit sector to improving female and family economic welfare in rural Chile and changing gender relations. Using a unique longitudinal data set, we examine women’s decisions regarding labor force participation and employment, their earnings and contributions to household income, and their attitudes toward employment to understand how new opportunities are changing women, their households, and the rural sector.

_Keywords: South America, Chile, female temporary labor, fruit sector, gender, welfare_

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ernment consumption minus social security contribution and capital consumption allowances. Government investment spending is de...ned as development expenditure from the Ministry of Finance government spending accounts. The data on tax revenues, Tt, are also taken from the same source, and is de...ned as the sum of total indirect taxes , direct taxes on households, social security contributions and other capital transfers received. Finally Yt is the cyclical component of real output extracted by a Hodrick-Prescott ...lter. Following the de...nition laid out in Stock and Watson (2002), growth below trend is classi...ed as a growth recession.<sup>14</sup> The real GDP data is taken from Abeysinghe and Gulasekaran (2004).

The ordering of the variables in Xt assumes that shocks in tax revenues and real output have no contemporaneous e¤ect on government spending. As argued in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), this identifying minimum-delay assumption may be a sensible description of how government spending operates given that in the short-run government spending may be unable to adjust to spending in response to changes in the ...scal and macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, Barro and Redlick (2011) argue that the government spending shock in a structural VAR is likely to be endogenous, as a higher GDP leads to higher taxes and therefore to more government spending. However, Barro and Redlick (2011) use yearly data and their argument, thus, is unlikely to hold at the quarterly frequency. Due to decision lags, contemporaneous discretionary government spending is unlikely to respond within a quarter to any news about the economy.

The identi...cation of tax shocks is more problematic in the framework outlined in this paper. As noted in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identi...cation of tax shocks depend on purging innovations in revenues of automatic responses to output. This could be achieved by imposing a contemporaneous coe¢ cient on the elasticity of revenue with respect to real output. However, as noted in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2011) this elasticity is likely to vary over the cycle, thereby, introducing a bias of unknown magnitude and direction in our time-varying speci...c estimates. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) have shown that output responses to tax shocks in di¤erent regimes are sensitive to the assumed elasticity.

Unlike monetary policy decisions, changes in government spending and taxes are typically decided and communicated well in advance of their implementation.

> 14Robustness tests indicate that the fundamental conclusions remain unaltered should one use the detrended GDP growth rate.

9
**Figure 25.  Estimated Age – Unemployment Risk Profiles. Latvia, 1997 and 2002**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Unemployment risk for economically active population,<br>1997 and 2002<br>0.35<br>0.3<br>0.25<br>0.2 1997<br>0.15 2002<br>0.1<br>0.05<br>0<br>15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74<br>age<br>Unemployment risk for economically active persons<br>with work experience, 1997 and 2002<br>0.12<br>0.1<br>0.08<br>1997<br>0.06<br>2002<br>0.04<br>0.02<br>0<br>15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74<br>age<br>unemployment risk<br>unemployment risk<br><!-- End of picture text --> Notes: Upper panel is derived from logit models, controlling for education, gender, ethnicity and region. Lower panel is derived from models which control also for sector of economic activity and ownership (last job is used for unemployed). _Source:_ Calculation based on LFS data.

**Regional disparities have increased.** Table 11 summarizes information on regional effects from Appendix Tables 32-34. It shows clearly that the gap in labor market conditions between Riga region (excluding Jurmala) and the rest of the country, as well as the gap between Latgale, on one hand, and Riga, Vidzeme, and Zemgale, on the other, have increased during last 5 years (a finding which was not evident when registered unemployment rates and officially reported wages were considered in Section B). Unfavorable developments have been especially significant in terms of activity of both genders in Kurzeme and men’s activity in Latgale. Disparities in unemployment and earnings have increased because in Riga and Riga district unemployment rates were falling and wages growing much faster than elsewhere. As far as the main cities are concerned, earnings rankings of Ventspils and Daugavpils have gone down substantially.

43
Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles

# **Table 14: Summary of the key** **<u>performance indicators for alternative reform scenarios</u>**

|||**Scenarios**|**Replacement rate, % of group**<br>**average wage***<br>**(government/teachers)**|**Government**<br>**expenditures,**<br>**% of GDP***|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Baseline|Existing DB scheme|68/70%|4.5%|
|**d) Reform**|Reform I.1|Pure DC reform with immediate switching. Price indexation<br>for switchers and current retirees.<br>Variant I.1.A: high rate of return on assets<br>Variant I.1.B: low rate of return on assets|42%/33%<br>27%/21%|1.1%****<br>1.1%****|
|**rovident Fun**|Reform I.2|Pure DC reform for only new entrants with wage indexation<br>for grandfathered employees and current retirees. Price<br>indexation for switchers. Assumed high rate of return on<br>assets.|42%/33%**|1.1%**|
|**Pure DC (P**|Reform I.3|Pure DC reform for only new entrants with price indexation<br>for grandfathered employees and current retirees. Price<br>indexation for switchers. Assumed high rate of return on<br>assets.|42%/33%***|1.1%***|
|**(two pillars)**<br>**eform**|Reform II.1|Hybrid reform with immediate switching. Price indexation for<br>switchers and current retirees. Assumed high rate of return<br>on assets.<br>Variant II.1.A: high rate of return on assets<br>Variant II.1.B: low rate of return on assets|42%/40%<br>34%/35%|1.1%****<br>1.1%****|
|**Hybrid**<br>**r**|Reform II.2|Hybrid reform for only new entrants with wage indexation for<br>grandfathered employees and current retirees. Price<br>indexation for switchers. Assumed high rate of return on<br>assets.|42%/40%|1.1%|

**Notes** : * In the long run (towards the end of the simulation period); ** Though in Reform I.2 replacement rates and expenditures at the end of the simulation period are the same as in Reform I.1.A, they are higher in the interim due to gradual transition to the new system (see Figures 26-29); *** Though in Reform I.3 replacement rates and expenditures at the end of the simulation period are the same as in Reform I.2, they are lower in the interim due to price indexation of pensions (see Figures 30-33); **** Government expenditure is identical under reforms I.1 and II.1 and under I.2 and II.2, respectively.

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countries started reforms programs, and GDP growth began to recover in the second half of the 1980s, but growth rates have remained below those ir. other developing countries except in 1989.

In 1965 Sub-Saharan Africa and Spain had about the same size economy (US$27 and 24 biilions respectively); 23 years later, Spain's US$ 340 billion output was more than double that of Sub-Saharan Africa's, with only 8 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's population and only 2 percent of its land mass. Spain graduated from the ranks of developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa became instead the Third World of the Third World.

Table 1 **Growth** of **GDP, 1967-89** (percent per year)

||1967-73|1974-80|1981-84|1985-87|1988|1989|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|7.0|2.7|-1.1|2.6|2.5|3.6|
|less Nigeria|4.4|2.0|1.9|3.1|_1.5_|2.2|
|Non-African developing countries|6.5|_5.4_|_3.5_|_5.4_|_5.8_|3.4|

Source: World Bank data files Performance has varied greatly from country to country. Average annual GDP growth during 1961-87 ranged from 8.3 percent for Botswana to -2.2 percent for Uganda. Oil exports greatly affected performance, with oil exporters doing well or badly according to fluctuations in the oil prices. Middle-income countries have, in general, fared better than low income countries and small economies better than large ones. Domestic policies also had a major impact on countries' economic performance and their external financing requirements.

_5_
# **1. Introduction**

The economic integration of developing countries into world markets is an important stepping stone for economic transitions and growth. This integration can be quite challenging, however, due to the many differences across countries in language, cultural understanding, legal regulations, and much more. As a consequence, business and social networks are valuable mechanisms for achieving this integration (Rauch 2001). Ethnicity-based interactions and diaspora connections are a prominent form of these networks. The benefits typically cited for diaspora networks include stronger access to information (especially very recent or tacit knowledge), matching and referral services that link firms together, language skills and cultural sensitivity that improve interactions, and repeated relationships that embed trust in uncertain environments and provide sanction mechanisms for misbehavior. Such traits are hard to construct yet crucial for business success in many developed and emerging economies. The history of these connections stretches back to the earliest of international exchanges (e.g., Aubet 2001), and studies continue to find diasporas important for trade flows, foreign investments, and knowledge diffusion.

Over the last two decades, the Internet has become a potent force for global economic exchanges. The Internet links customers and companies together worldwide, enables labor to be provided at a distance, provides instant access to information about foreign locations, and much more. How will the Internet affect the importance of diaspora networks? On one hand, the substantial improvements in connectivity and reduced frictions of the Internet may reduce the importance of diaspora connections. On the other hand, the online capabilities may provide an effective tool that complements traditional diaspora connections (e.g., Saxenian 2006). To shed light on these important questions, we investigate the role of the Indian diaspora in online outsourcing to India using data from oDesk. oDesk is the world’s largest online labor market, processing $30 million per month in contracts as of May 2012. It provides a platform for companies to post job opportunities, interview workers, monitor performance, and pay compensation. Workers worldwide bid on these jobs, complete tasks, and receive public feedback on their performance.

India is the largest country destination for outsourced contracts on oDesk, with more than a third of the worldwide contract volume. We investigate the role of the Indian diaspora using 2
coordination problems) and, hence, foster structural change and spur growth. Aizenman and Lee (2007), on the other hand, suggest that RER undervaluations may be used to internalize a learning-by-doing (LBD) externality in the traded sector if the LBD calls for subsidies to labor in tradables. This debate has led to a heated argument about the desirability of undervaluations and the likelihood to support them through economic policies.

Official intervention on the foreign exchange market is one of the crucial issues in the subject of academics and policy-related literature. It has been suggested that intervention may tend to introduce a deviation of the exchange rate relative to its long run equilibrium. An abundant body of research has been conducted on the effectiveness of FOREX market intervention in stabilizing exchange rates. For instance, Taylor (2004) estimated a Markov-switching model to examine the effectiveness of intervention on the US$-DM exchange rate (from 1985 to 1998) and found that intervention increased the likelihood of stability when the real exchange rate is misaligned, and that this influence grew with the degree of misalignment. However, intervention can also generate greater instability. According to Sarno and Taylor (2001) overall, the evidence on the effectiveness of official intervention, through either the portfolio balance channel or the signaling channel, is still mixed on balance, although the more recent literature does suggest a significant effect of official intervention on both the level and the change of exchange rates.

Doroodian and Caporale (2001) support the view of Friedman and Schwartz that exchange rate intervention destabilizes the foreign exchange market by introducing additional level of uncertainty. They test the effectiveness and the impact of Federal Reserve intervention on US dollar against German mark and Japanese yen of daily data from January 3, 1985 to March 19, 1997. Their results from GARCH suggest that the intervention causes significant increase in the conditional variance of spot exchange rates.

Why is this study of real exchange rate misalignments so relevant? Real exchange rate misalignments help to signal distortions in relative prices. Measuring the misaligned currencies (in real terms) would permit us to assess and monitor the behavior or real exchange rate as well as examine the consequences of either overvaluation or undervaluation of the currency in real terms. It has been documented in the literature that a real overvaluation of the currency may have an adverse impact on economic performance –especially, if this is associated with poor macroeconomic 3
**Table 1: Measuring Access at the State Level**

“Needed (%)” is the percentage of all adults “Of whom: Applied <u>(%)” is among the subsample of adults that needed the corresponding good or service</u>

|**State**|**Se**|**rvices**|**G**|**oods**|**Ut**|**ilities**|**All G**<br>**Se**|**oods &**<br>**rvices**|State GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Needed<br>(%)|Of whom:<br>Applied<br>(%)|Needed<br>(%)|Of whom:<br>Applied<br>(%)|Needed<br>(%)|Of whom:<br>Applied<br>(%)|Needed<br>(%)|Of whom:<br>Applied<br>(%)|(INR<br>Million)|
|Andhra Pradesh|62|17|85|62|67|40|72|42|464,200|
|Bihar|92|12|73|22|70|19|80|17|343,700|
|Chhattisgarh|94|18|99|40|99|35|97|31|185,700|
|Himachal Pradesh|89|49|91|40|93|48|91|45|82,590|
|Jharkhand|85|36|87|34|87|36|86|35|172,800|
|Kerala|85|54|91|49|91|64|89|54|396,300|
|Madhya Pradesh|55|43|55|44|65|58|57|47|434,700|
|Maharashtra|55|44|66|42|67|56|62|46|1,510,000|
|Odisha|70|33|77|62|64|38|72|47|273,000|
|Punjab|82|42|73|50|95|85|81|55|317,600|
|Rajasthan|64|45|76|54|79|55|72|51|517,600|
|Uttar Pradesh|63|24|74|33|70|26|69|28|862,700|
|West Bengal|88|8|76|30|100|13|86|17|706,600|
|**Average**||**33**||**43**||**44**||**40**||

_Note_ : “Of Whom: Applied” is used to measure ‘Access’—e.g. 42% of respondents in Andhra Pradesh have ‘Access’ to the goods and services they ‘Needed’.

Access measured at the state level indicates a state’s capacity to deliver goods and services. Governance and state capacity to deliver public goods and services have been measured in terms of teacher absenteeism in public schools (Kremer et al. 2005) and absenteeism among medical workers in public hospitals (Muralidharan et al. 2011). Absenteeism measures governance and state capacity from the supply side—whether delivery agents such as medical workers and teachers report to work or not. Access measures governance and state capacity from the demand side— whether or not citizens who need goods and service are able to procure them. Nonetheless, our aggregate measure of access to government provided goods (which includes access to government run schools and hospitals) follow trends similar to those observed for absenteeism in public schools and public hospitals. One would expect that if absenteeism is high, then access would be low—in access to the Public Distribution System; and 59% had access to public schools (access to public schools in urban areas was estimated to be 42%.) 14
**Figure 15. Simulated change in earnings as a result of the minimum wage increase a.  Low labor demand elasticity**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 3.2<br>2.0 1.8<br>1.3<br>1.1<br>0.50.3 0.50.3 0.60.4 0.80.5 0.50.3 0.30.2 0.20.1 0.7 0.70.4 0.20.1<br>Total Gender Age Education<br>Short-run Long-run<br>b. High labor demand elasticity<br>0.9<br>0.4<br>0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.10.0<br>-0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2<br>-0.6<br>Total Gender Age Education<br>Short-run Long-run<br>Male Female 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-54 55-64 Primary or less Secondary Post-secondary<br>Male Female 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-54 55-64 Primary or less Secondary Post-secondary<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Own estimates using the 2018 Kosovo LFS._

**Figure 16. Simulated long-run change in earnings as a result of the minimum wage increase by sector**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.56<br>0.05 0.05<br>0.00<br>-0.02<br>-0.20<br>-0.3 -0.7 -0.9<br>long-run elasticity for skilled labor; add -0.2 for unskilled<br>Private Public<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Own estimates using the 2016 Kosovo LFS. Note: the elasticity value refers to the elasticity for skilled workers. We add -0.2 for unskilled workers._ 28
Figure 15: Reforms 5 & 6 – Effects of Matching Contributions <!-- Start of picture text --> Matching = 75% Matching=225%<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4 4<br>2 2 Minimum retirement age = 65<br>Minimum retirement age = 65 Condition based on value of<br>0 0 pension (> min pension)<br>-0,10 0,0 0 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 -0,10 0,0 0 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50<br>-2 -2<br>-4 -4<br>No mininimum No mininimum<br>retirement age retirement age<br>-6 -6<br>-8 -8<br>-10 -10<br>-12 Change in contribuiton density -12 Change in contribuiton density<br>Note: Comparison is relative to Reform 3 (minimum pension at age 65 with claw-back rate of 100%).<br>Source: Simulation model.<br>Change in retirement age Change in retirement age<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 16: Reforms 5 & 6 – Costs of Matching Contributions <!-- Start of picture text --> 0,90 Minimum pension (42% AW)<br>0,80<br>0,70 Matching 225% no<br>Matching 225% age 65 minimum age<br>0,60 Matching 225% with<br>Minimum pension (25% AW) restriction in the<br>0,50 value of the pension<br>before age 65<br>0,40<br>Matching 75%<br>0,30 age 65<br>0,20 Maximum replacement rate in the absence of subsidies<br>0,10<br>0,00<br>0 1 2 3 4 5<br>Present value of subsidies<br>Average replacement rate<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note: Comparison is relative to Reform 3 (minimum pension at age 65 with claw-back rate of 100%). Source_ : Simulation model.

At the same time, in the majority of cases, the cost of matching contributions is lower than the cost of the minimum pension (i.e., for a given level of the replacement rate costs are lower for the matching<sup>15</sup> ). Indeed, in the case of the two minimum pensions graphed (42 and 25 percent of average earnings) the majority of workers retire with a pension at least equal to the minimum (there are a few exceptions of workers retiring before age 65 with no minimum pension), but this means that the pension system needs to subsidize a large part of the total pension received. The subsidy is by definition larger than in the case of matching contributions since workers contribute less (i.e., have lower contribution densities).

> 15 The exception is the case with matching and no restriction in the minimum age since individuals can receive a given replacement rate at an early age.

35