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|**Authors**|**Methodology**|**MainFindings**|
|---|---|---|
|Dewenter,<br>Kathryn,andPaulH.<br>Malatesta.<br>1997.'PublicOfferings<br>of<br>State-Owned<br>and<br>Privately-<br>Owned Enterprises:AnIntemational<br>Companson.<br>_JoumalofFinance,_<br>52:1659-1679.|Usesdatafrom 8countries(Canada,<br>France,<br>Hungary,<br>Japan,<br>Malaysia,<br>Poland,ThailandandUK) tocompare<br>initial retumsfor109companieswith<br>nationalaverage<br>retums.<br>Alsotests<br>whetherPIPOsaremoreorless under<br>pricedthanprivatesectorIPOs.|Resultsvary according tocountry: theUKshows<br>significantlyhigherinitalretums on PIPOsthan<br>pnvatesector1POs,while Canadaand Malaysia<br>point<br>to<br>the<br>opposite<br>case.<br>Also<br>PIPOs<br>in<br>unregulatedindustriestendtobelessthanthose for<br>regulatedindustries.Thereistherefore noevidence<br>thatgovemmentssystematicallyunderpncePIPOs.<br>Relatively primitive capitalmarkets(inthis case<br>Hungary,Malaysia, PolandandThailand)leadstoa<br>tendencyforhigherinitial retumsthanoffersin<br>countneswith moredevelopedcapitalmarkets.The<br>authorssuggestthatthisisduetoan increased<br>uncertaintythataboutthevalueofpnvatzationoffers<br>leadingtolowerofferprices.Another suggestionis<br>thatthosecountrieswithrelativelyprimitivecapital<br>markets may trytobroadenprivateshareownership<br>by decreasingtheinitial offerprice.|
|Dewenter,Kathryn, and PaulH.<br>Malatesta.<br>Forthcoming.<br>'State-<br>OwnedandPrivately-OwnedFirms:<br>AnEmpirical AnalysisofProfitability,<br>Leverage,andLabourIntensity."<br>_American EconomicReview._|Thisstudy testswhetherprofitability,<br>laborintensityanddebt levelsofSOEs<br>variesfromthat ofprivatelyowned firms.<br>Theauthorsuseasampleofthe500<br>largestnon-US firmsin1975,1985and<br>1995.|Aftertakingintoaccounttheeffectofbusiness cycles<br>itis foundthatprivatefirmsaresignificantlymore<br>profitablethanSOEs,andhavelowerlevelsofdebt<br>andlesslaborintensiveproduction.|
|D'Souza,<br>Juliet,<br>andWilliam<br>L.<br>Megginson.<br>1999.'TheFinancial<br>and<br>Operating<br>Performance<br>of<br>Newly<br>Privatized<br>Firms<br>in<br>the<br>1990s."<br>_JoumalofFinance._<br>54:<br>1397.|Thepaperdocumentsofferingterms,<br>methodofsale,andownershipstructure<br>resulting<br>from<br>privatization<br>of<br>78<br>companies<br>(mostly<br>from<br>telecommunicationsandotherregulated<br>industries)from10developingand15<br>developed countries overtheperiod<br>1990-1994.|Thestudycomparesthree-year<br>averagepost-<br>pnvatizationfinancialand operatingpe;formance<br>ratiostothethree-yearpre-privatizationvalues fora<br>sub-sampleof26firms.Itcondudesthatthere were<br>economically<br>and<br>statistically<br>significant<br>post-<br>privatization<br>increases<br>in<br>output<br>(real<br>sales),<br>operatingefficlency,andprofitability,aswellas<br>significantdecreasesinleverage. Capital investment<br>spending<br>slighty<br>increased,<br>whileemployment<br>declinedsignificantly.|
|D'Souza, Juliet,RobertNash,and<br>William<br>L.<br>Megginson.<br>2000.<br>'Determinants<br>of<br>Performance<br>Improvement<br>in<br>Newly-Privatized<br>Firms:<br>Does<br>Restructuring<br>and<br>Corporate<br>Govemance<br>Matter?'<br>Working<br>Paper.<br>Norman,<br>OK:<br>UniversityofOklahoma.<br>Httoi//facult-<br>staff.ou.edu/MNVIIIvam.L.Meocinson-<br>1Iorvsources.odf|Usingasampleof118firms(from29<br>countriesand28industries)that were<br>privatized throughpublic chareoffering<br>between1961and1995 theauthors look<br>at<br>operating<br>performance<br>of<br>the<br>enterprises.|Theyfindthattherearesignificantincreasesin<br>profitability,<br>efficiency,<br>output,<br>and<br>capital<br>expenditure,<br>while<br>leverage<br>also<br>decreases<br>significanty.Lookingatthedeterminantsof these<br>improvementstheyfindthatstrongerprofitability<br>gainscome<br>from<br>firmswith<br>loweremployee<br>ownershipandhigherstateownership.Outputgains<br>arestrongerincompetitivemarketsandwherethe<br>economyisgrowingfasterandefficlencygainsare<br>higherwhenforeign ownershipishigh.|
|Galal, Ahmed, LeroyJones, Pankaj<br>Tandoon,<br>and<br>Ingo<br>Vogelsang.<br>1994.<br>_WeffareConsequencesof_<br>_Selling_<br>_Public_<br>_Enterprises:_<br>_An_<br>_Empirical_<br>_Analysis._<br>Washington<br>D.C.:WorldBank.|Thestudymeasures<br>theeffectsof<br>divestiturebycomparingactual post-<br>privatization performance of12large<br>firms<br>(in<br>aviation,<br>energy,<br>telecommunications,transportabonand<br>shipping)inChile,Malaysia, Mexico,and<br>U.K.withtheirperformancepriorto<br>divestiture.|The<br>authors<br>find<br>thatdivestiture<br>substantially<br>improvedeconomicwelfarein11ofthe12cases.<br>Thegainsweremainly duetoadramaticincreasein<br>investment,<br>improved productivity,morerational<br>priclng policles,and increasedcompetitionand<br>effectiveregulaton.<br>Despiteassuringthatpublic<br>managerswouldadoptnew technologyand more<br>rational<br>procedures<br>theyalso<br>concluded<br>that<br>privatizedfirmperformancewassuperiortothe<br>altemativeofstate ownership.|
|Jones,<br>Steven<br>L.,<br>William<br>L.<br>Megginson,RobertC.Nash, and<br>JeffryM.Netter.1999.'ShareIssue<br>Privatizations asFinancialMeansto<br>Polifical<br>and<br>Economic<br>Ends.|Thestudyfocusesonhowpoliticaland<br>economicfactors influenceinitialretums<br>ofSIPsusinga sampleof630SIPsfrom<br>59countriesbetween1977-1997.|Themeanlevelofinitialretumsarefoundtobe34.1<br>percentforSIPsand9.4percent for seasonedSIPS.<br>Theauthorsdonot compareSIPs withprivate sector<br>IPOsbecauseoftheirbeliefthatanyunderpriclngis<br>caused bydifferent factors(politicalconsiderations|