analysis, the results should be interpreted with caution. Variables are included to control for age (AGE); whether the respondent is head of household (HEAD); or married (MARRIED); their years of education (YEDU); whether the respondent has ever been employed outside the home (WORKED);<sup>4 2</sup> whether their spouse contributes to the pension system (SPCONT); and whether the respondent entered the labor market prior to Chile's pension reform in 1981 (PAYGREG). Additionally, to control for the effect of constrained liquidity management on retirement saving I include a variable equal to one if respondents needed but were unable to get a loan in the year prior to the survey (CREDCON).

The remaining variables in the model are included to capture factors affecting individual and household demand for formal cover. Several variables are included to examine possible substitution between the mandated pension system, other pooling and savings instruments outside the system, as well as formal and informal prevention. These include variables to capture inter-generational household pooling, proxied by expected care from children (EXKIDS, LEDKIDS, FAMEX) and inter household transfers (GIVES, GETS); alternative forms of savings, captured by the log of imputed rent (LRENT), property and financial assets held in 1990 (COLATT, FINASST); and variables representing prevention measures such as investments in machinery and tools for household enterprise (WRKASST). The respondents' subjective life expectancy (SLIFEX), discussed in the previous section, is included to capture the effect on contribution behavior of the _perceived_ probability of needing to finance a period of life without earning-ability. Additionally, the (log of) incomes received by the household from contributory (LJUB) and non-contributory (LPASIS) retirement pensions are included to examine how the receipt of different types of benefits by elderly in the household - the benefits of formal pooling - might influence the behavior of the working-age sample.

For both sexes, a cubic polynomial on AGE is preferred, showing an initial increase in contribution density with age at the start of an individual's working life, that flattens midway through, only to increase again just prior to retirement. The negative and significant coefficient on AGE2 may be evidence of the competing demands of a growing family on discretionary income, or of a preference for investing in home ownership in early adulthood. Being head of a household significantly (10% level) increases contribution density among men, but has no significant effect among women. As in the wider range of countries analyzed in Packard, et al (2001), marriage significantly (10% level) reduces women's contributions to the pension system, since once entering into marriage, women in Chile are still more likely to allocate a greater share of their time to household production (Barrientos, 1998a, Montenegro, 2001).43 42 Cox-Edwards (2000) finds that the key determinant of gender differences in contribution behavior is affiliation - women are less likely to be affiliated to the system, since they are less likely to have worked, and if they worked, less likely to have ever held a contract job. She concludes that the sample of women affiliates is not a random sample of all women, but a sub-sample of women that have higher attachment of the labor force. The variable "WORKED" is included to control for unobservable factors that determine whether an individual chooses to be employed in activities outside the household.

43 Several authors have attributed the relatively low incidence of contribution among married women to the structure of most pension systems by which wives are covered against health, disability and the sudden 20