Due to data limitations along the time-series dimension of the _Trade, Production and Protection Database_ described below, we treat the nine country sample of 28 3-digit ISIC industries as a single cross-section. We examine whether a cross-section of industry characteristics in 1994 and measures of the change in market conditions in each industry in the post-1995 period can be used to explain industry pursuit of antidumping between 1995 and 2003. We thus seek to cumulate information accurately reflecting the intensity of industry antidumping use over the 1995-2003 period without using time-series variation or other such features in the antidumping data. Thus our approach generates a number of issues concerning appropriate variable construction, which we address in the next section.

# **3.2 The Global Antidumping Database and construction of dependent variables**

The antidumping data used in the empirical analysis is product-level information on antidumping investigations, outcomes and affected products constructed from original source national government publications and compiled in the _Global Antidumping Database_ (Bown, 2005a). Our analysis focuses on the nine developing countries whose antidumping use is documented in table 1. Although the database includes information on antidumping use by some of these countries before 1995, we focus on the 19952003 period because the Antidumping Agreement and the rules on DSU enforcement became consistent across countries with the establishment of the WTO in 1995.<sup>12</sup> Over this time period we match database information on the 6-digit HS-products that are the subject of antidumping investigations and imposed measures to the product-level import data from _Comtrade_ .<sup>13</sup> We define the decision to pursue an antidumping investigation in the first stage of the econometric model as a ‘1’ if the industry pursued at least one investigation during 1995-2003, and zero otherwise. One legitimate question is whether we are throwing away useful information regarding variation on the intensity of industry use of antidumping for those that pursued multiple investigations during this time period. To address this potential concern we make two observations. First, our secondCommission (ITC) injury decision. In the US, almost all investigations find evidence of dumping, so whether the domestic industry receives import protection under antidumping is determined de facto by the ITC’s injury decision. The primary difference between our econometric approaches is that Hansen’s second stage was also modeled as a binary outcome variable (the ITC’s affirmative or negative injury decision), whereas our second-stage outcome is the continuously defined coverage ratio which allows for additional variation by examining the portion of the industry’s potential imports from which the industry receives protection. Nevertheless, Hansen’s evidence that there is bias in the set of petitions received by the ITC in the US is an empirical motivation for our approach.

12 Prior to 1995, international enforcement varied across countries under the GATT given that not all GATT Contracting Parties were signatories to the Tokyo Round’s plurilateral Antidumping Code and thus subject to its dispute settlement procedures.

13 We concord the 6-digit HS import data to the 3-digit ISIC level, allowing the 6-digit HS product to be allocated to only one industry.

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