Table 2: Political cycle of GDP manipulation: Baseline results

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|PS YearsInOffice|0.131<sup>***</sup><br>(0.042)|0.116<sup>***</sup><br>(0.039)|0.121<sup>***</sup><br>(0.037)|0.141<sup>***</sup><br>(0.034)|0.096<sup>***</sup><br>(0.029)|0.104<sup>***</sup><br>(0.028)|0.116<sup>***</sup><br>(0.029)|
|PS YearsInOffice<sup>2</sup>|-0.014<sup>**</sup><br>(0.007)|-0.012<sup>**</sup><br>(0.006)|-0.013<sup>**</sup><br>(0.006)|-0.016<sup>***</sup><br>(0.005)|-0.009<sup>**</sup><br>(0.005)|-0.010<sup>**</sup><br>(0.004)|-0.012<sup>***</sup><br>(0.004)|
|Female||-0.024<br>(0.187)|-0.035<br>(0.171)|-0.141<br>(0.133)|-0.051<br>(0.127)|-0.135<br>(0.104)|-0.057<br>(0.133)|
|Minority||-0.021<br>(0.164)|-0.105<br>(0.155)|-0.024<br>(0.134)|-0.017<br>(0.118)|-0.016<br>(0.117)|-0.122<br>(0.143)|
|Age||0.210<br>(0.197)|0.168<br>(0.188)|0.088<br>(0.152)|0.155<br>(0.166)|0.174<br>(0.157)|0.121<br>(0.132)|
|Age<sup>2</sup>||-0.002<br>(0.002)|-0.002<br>(0.002)|-0.001<br>(0.001)|-0.002<br>(0.002)|-0.002<br>(0.001)|-0.001<br>(0.001)|
|Native||-0.006<br>(0.120)|0.005<br>(0.111)|-0.001<br>(0.101)|0.002<br>(0.099)|0.039<br>(0.102)|0.037<br>(0.111)|
|Connected to PPS||-0.260<sup>***</sup><br>(0.085)|-0.171<sup>**</sup><br>(0.079)|-0.142<sup>**</sup><br>(0.071)|-0.139<sup>**</sup><br>(0.069)|-0.089<br>(0.067)|-0.086<br>(0.076)|
|Prov Exper.||0.188<sup>***</sup><br>(0.065)|0.142<sup>**</sup><br>(0.064)|0.075<br>(0.057)|0.089<sup>*</sup><br>(0.048)|0.052<br>(0.048)|0.058<br>(0.048)|
|CYL Exper.||0.052<br>(0.076)|0.043<br>(0.074)|0.023<br>(0.063)|0.051<br>(0.057)|0.043<br>(0.053)|0.017<br>(0.060)|
|Years in the Party||0.015<br>(0.009)|0.017<sup>*</sup><br>(0.009)|0.013<sup>*</sup><br>(0.007)|0.011<br>(0.007)|0.010<br>(0.007)|0.013<sup>*</sup><br>(0.007)|
|Rookie PS||-0.070<br>(0.090)|-0.033<br>(0.090)|0.050<br>(0.083)|0.024<br>(0.068)|0.012<br>(0.068)|-0.070<br>(0.081)|
|City Controls|||<br>Yes|<br>Yes|<br>Yes||<br>Yes|
|Flexible City Controls||||||Yes||
|Provincial Controls||||Yes||||
|City FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes||||
|Province-Year FE|||||Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Provincial Trend<br>||||Yes||||
|City Trend|||||||Yes|
|<br>#of Observations|3642|3642|3642|3642|3642|3642|3642|
|#of Cities|281|281|281|281|281|281|281|
|Adj R<sup>2</sup>|0.15|0.15|0.27|0.38|0.60|0.66|0.65|

_Notes_ : The dependent variable is the difference between reported GDP growth and predicted true GDP growth imputed based on the nighttime lights data of prefecture-level cities. City controls include city-level time-varying economic controls, i.e., the share of industrial and tertiary value added in GDP, log population, and growth of nighttime lights. In column (6), we control these city-level economic variables flexibly by allowing for provincespecific coefficients. Leader controls also include a set of dummies indicating educational background, ranging from secondary school to Ph.D. in addition to the ones shown in the table. Provincial controls include the corresponding characteristics of the provincial party secretaries, provincial growth target, and three dummies indicating the timing of the provincial Party Congress as well as one year before and after the Congress. Standard errors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses.<sup>***</sup> ,<sup>**</sup> and<sup>*</sup> denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

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