rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
windows – i.e., one window timed around the _imposition_ of the original import restriction and one timed around its _removal_ .

Our results provide evidence of a number of previously undocumented features of the export response to TTB removals. On average and relative to other exporters, China’s exports resume quickly and aggressively after a foreign trading partner removes an antidumping import restriction. However, for all other exporters, the evidence is not nearly as positive. Other emerging economy exporters have a particularly difficult time regaining lost export sales and restoring export market share after a trading partner removes an import restriction, especially in the case of exports sent to _other_ emerging economies.

Section 5 concludes with a discussion of a number of questions these results raise for future research as well as policy implications.

# **2 Temporary Trade Barriers Imposed by Emerging Economies**

An increasing number of emerging economies have imposed antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards – collectively referred to here as temporary trade barriers (TTBs) – over an increasing share of their imports. Table 1 summarizes newly constructed indicators on TTB use through 2011 for fifteen emerging economies broken into two cohorts – members and non-members of the G20.<sup>4</sup> The approach follows the methodology proposed in Bown (2011), which reported data on policy use through 2009 for a more limited set of countries.<sup>5</sup> As a point of comparison, the lower third of the table reports policy use by nine high-income economies also included in the _Temporary Trade Barriers Database_ .

Consider first column (1) of Table 1 which reports the share of import product lines, at the 6- digit Harmonized System (HS-06) level, over which the policy-imposing economy had at least one import-restricting TTB in effect in 2011. To clarify, this measure captures the “stock” of products covered by the accumulation of TTBs over time and that were in effect in 2011. The emerging economy

> 4 The only G20 countries not included in the policy-imposing economy analysis are Russia, which had not yet acceded to the WTO and thus become subject to multilateral disciplines (and reporting requirements) on TTB use during this period, and Saudi Arabia.

> 5 The Appendix provides a more complete discussion of the methodology and data used to construct the two main measures reported in Table 1, as well as benefits and caveats associated with each approach.

4
Policy Research Working Paper 8185

# **Abstract**

How do international economic agreements influence the investment patterns of firms from emerging economies? This paper studies the ways in which bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements interact with geographic and cultural distance to influence firms’ investment patterns. _How does geographic and cultural proximity affect the impact of international economic agreements on foreign direct investment flows?_ This question is answered using data from an original survey of 700 firms from four emerging (or newly-emerged) economies: Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa. The findings suggest that bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements increase the likelihood of foreign direct investment. Yet, the effects of these agreements on foreign direct investment depend on the distance between the origin and potential destination countries. Moreover, trade and investment agreements appear to interact differently with distance. By providing guarantees to investors and signaling credible commitment from host governments, bilateral investment treaties mitigate the higher uncertainty and transaction costs associated with investing in faraway, unfamiliar markets. By contrast, the investment attraction effectiveness of preferential trade agreements fades with distance.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at gvarela@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Where do poor children live? Child poverty rates, like those for adults, are much high in rural areas. Nearly one out of three children in rural areas is extremely poor, and over 81 percent of poor children live in rural areas. Nearly 88 percent of poor children are located in Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia, and child poverty rates tend to be much higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the developing world. This illustrates the magnitude of the challenge of ensuring that children in rural areas, and in Africa and South Asia, benefit from valuable early childhood investments in human capital.

A fundamental question involves the robustness of these estimates of child poverty with respect to the use of alternative equivalence scales. The new $1.90 per day poverty line, like the $1.25 line that it is based on, is a per capita line. It is derived from the national poverty lines of 15 poor countries, which in turn are each developed using per capita consumption as the welfare measure. Following Ravallion (2015), we apply alternative equivalence scales to both the consumption aggregate and the poverty line, for a typical household in the neighbourhood of the poverty line. After making this adjustment, child poverty rates are quite robust with respect to the choice of two-parameter equivalence scale. Child poverty rates do not dip below 17 percent until children are given one-fifth of the weight of adults to account for their lower expenditure needs, which is not realistic. In short, higher child poverty rates are robust to any sensible two-parameter equivalence scale.

The analysis leaves open three main areas for future work. First, we plan to explore the characteristics of poor children in greater detail, and analyse the variation across child poverty rates across countries and, wherever possible, to also consider non-monetary aspects of child poverty. Second, we plan to explore in detail the relationship between welfare and school attendance. This will help shed light on whether there is a particular level of welfare at which school attendance rises sharply, and how this varies for boys and girls at different ages. Finally, a limitation of the current data set is that the lack of temporal coverage limits the analysis to a single cross-section. Subsequent improvement in historical coverage will allow us to document trends in child poverty to better understand which countries and types of households have most rapidly reduced child poverty.

19
which are incredibly data rich) have just as low a likelihood of publication in the top-5 as papers from Sub-Saharan Africa or East Asia and the Pacific. To put this in perspective, assume that a researcher’s output is a fairly large 5 papers a year. A researcher who works on the US will get a top5 journal publication every 3 years; one who works on non-US countries will have to wait _10 years_ for such an event to occur. If regular tenure clocks are between 6 to 8 years, this difference could essentially drive the entire evaluation process!

Columns 3-4 show some further characteristics of publications in the top-5 by considering the UKbased journals ( _Econometrica_ and _Review of Economic Studies_ ) separately from the US-based journals ( _American Economic Review_ , _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ and _Journal of Political Economy_ ). Immediately obvious is that the UK based journals place equal emphasis on papers focused on the UK and the US, but the favor is not returned among the US-based journals. For _Econometrica_ and the _Review of Economic Studies_ , a paper from the US or UK is twice as likely to be accepted as papers written about other countries. For the US-based journals, 6 percent of all papers from the US are accepted relative to 1.6 percent of papers from other countries; given the large volume of papers published in these journals compared to the UK-based ones as well as the summaries in Column 2, it comes as no surprise that OECD and UK-focused papers have as low a likelihood of publication in these journals as papers from Africa or South Asia.

To examine this relationship within a regression context, we estimated the following equation: where _Top5i_ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if article i is published in a top-5 journal; _USi = 1_ if the article focuses on the US; _UKi = 1_ if the article focuses on the UK and _Xi_ are the other controls used in the regression relating the volume of research to country characteristics. A causal interpretation of the coefficients b (or c) is equivalent to acknowledging a US (or UK) bias in the publication process. Clearly, the key omitted variable from this equation is the quality of the article. If US-focused papers are generally of higher quality, this would imply greater acceptance in the top-5 journals without any bias on the part of these journals. In particular, if different research institutions have different geographic foci, a positive value for b or c might just reflect the fact that 13
This paper sets its poverty bar very low. To define “extreme poverty” it uses the indigence or “food only” poverty line; those with sufficient income to buy a basic food basket are above the line. The poverty line is based on the monetary value of food items only. This measure is based on the cost of a “minimum food-basket” equal to a minimum caloric intake of 2,700 kcal daily per household member.

The poverty lines used for the rural household survey were constructed based on the consumption patterns of households located in the three lowest deciles of the consumption distribution. The observed consumption patterns were translated to a basic food basket (BFB) that fulfills the caloric requirement for an adult equivalent. Moreover, the basic food basket was expanded with nonfood services, considering the service consumption patterns of the total population. In this way, a total basic basket (TBB) was constructed. To place a value on the TBB, the weight of the food component in the TBB for the total population (Engel coefficient) was calculated. Finally, the BFB was multiplied by the inverse of the Engel coefficient. Thus, the poverty line was set at AR$118.61 (approximately US$40) per month and the indigence line or the extreme poverty line at AR$69.65 (approximately US$21) per month per adult equivalent (Gerardi 2003).

# **4. Poverty, Income Inequality, and Unmet Basic Needs**

Using the above methodology, this section addresses headcount income poverty and its depth, other poverty indicators, income inequality, and UBN. It does not attempt a more comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of other forms of deprivation or social exclusion. The broader issues of inequalities of assets and opportunities are addressed in Section 6.

In rural and urban Argentina, extreme monetary poverty has increased rapidly in the last decade and currently affects around 10.8 million Argentines. This means that around 28.7 percent of the Argentine population did not have sufficient income to buy a minimum basket of food in 2003. Around 15 percent of the extremely poor in Argentina live in rural dispersed areas. The following paragraphs present general information and analyses of rural and urban poverty that are behind the findings presented in this paragraph.

Argentina’s income poverty trend was fairly volatile during 1990–2003. During 1990–94, GDP expanded rapidly (25 percent during the period) and poverty declined in Argentina. When the Mexican crisis hit in 1994 and unemployment reached more than 18 percent of the active population, the declining trend experienced in the previous years reversed. The headcount poverty rate started climbing in tandem with the increase in the number of informal sector jobs and unemployment. The economic crisis was further aggravated during 1999–2001 and ended in a devaluation of the currency. Thus, poverty continued climbing at the end of the 1990s and in early 2000. The sharp rise in poverty after the 2001 crisis has in great part been due to the rise in food prices (prices rose with the devaluation), which represent a major portion of the poor’s expenditures (World Bank 15
Brikke, F. and Bredero, M. (2003). Linking Technology Choice with Operation and Maintenance in the Context of Community Water Supply and Sanitation. Geneva: World Health Organization and IRC Water and Sanitation Centre.

- Carter, R. C., Tyrrel, S. F., and Howsam, P. (1999), Impact and sustainability of Community water Supply and sanitation Programmes in Developing Countries, Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, 13, 292-296.

Chambers, Robert. 1983. Rural Development: Putting the First Last. London: Longman.

Cosgrove, W. J. (2003): ‘Water Resource Sector in the Coming Decades: Global Perspective’ in K. Prasad (ed.) Water Resource and Sustainable Development: Challenges of 21st Century. New Delhi: Sipra Publications.

- Dongier, P., J. V. Domelen, E. Ostrom, A. Ryan, W. Wakeman, A. Bebbington, S. Alkire, T. Esmail, and M. Polsky. 2003. “Community Driven Development.” In World Bank, PRSP Sourcebook. Vol. 1. Chapter 9, Washington, D.C.

- Haq, M.A, S.M. Hassan, and K. Ahmad (2014), Community Participation and Sustainability of Water Supply Program in District Faisalabad, Pakistan, Journal of Quality and Technology Management, Volume X, Issue II, Page 125 – 137.

Harvey, P. A., and Reed, R. A. (2004). Rural water supply in Africa: Building blocks for hand pump sustainability. WEDC, Loughborough University. United Kingdom.

Interco-operation Social Development India (ISDI), Impact Evaluation of the Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project, Jalanidhi Phase 1, 2014.

Isham, J. and Kähkönen, S. (1999) “Institutional Determinants of the Impact of Community-Based Water Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka and India.” Working Paper 236. University of Maryland, Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector.

Jalanidhi: A Project of Government of Kerala added by the World Bank, Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency, Online at: http://www.jalanidhi.kerala.gov.in/ Jones, S.; Abseen, A.; Stacey, N.; Weir, L. A life-cycle approach to improve the sustainability of rural water systems in resource-limited countries. Challenges 2012, 3, 233–260.

Kleemeier, Elizabeth. 2000. “The Impact of Participation on Sustainability: An Analysis of the Malawi Rural Piped Scheme Program.” World Development 28(5): 929–44.

Mazango, N., and Munjeri, C. (2009), Water management in a hyperinflationary environment: Case study of Nkayi district in Zimbabwe, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 34(1-2), 28-35.

Misra, S. (2008) Inefficiency of Rural Water Supply Schemes in India. Policy Paper number 44791 extracted from the World Bank Study on Review of Effectiveness of Rural Water Supply Schemes in India, June 2008.

Montgomery, M. A., Bartram, J., and Elimelech, M. (2009), Increasing functional sustainability of water and sanitation supplies in rural sub-saharan Africa, Environmental Engineering Science, 26(5), 1017-1023.

23
# 5. Concluding Remarks

Using a model with quite conventional ingredients, we have derived the novel prediction that, if investors exhibit constant relative risk aversion and have no labour income, favourable output shocks lead to current account deficits in debtor countries and surpluses in creditor countries. Under these assumptions, the marginal unit of wealth (the income shock) is distributed across assets in the same proportions as the average one. Since by definition the share of a debtor country's wealth devoted to domestic capital exceeds one, an increase in wealth (savings) results in a greater increase in domestic capital (investment), leading to a deficit on the current account. Conversely, in creditor countries the increase in wealth exceeds investment at home, as a portion of this wealth increase is invested abroad. This produces a current account surplus in creditor countries. We have also shown that, if investors' risk aversion varies with wealth and in the presence of labour income, there is a simple rule to determine when a positive output shock leads to a current account deficit: the country's debt has to exceed a threshold that can be either positive or negative, and is zero in the case of constant relative risk aversion and no labour income. We have also provided some suggestive evidence from thirteen OECD countries that is consistent with this prediction.

To make progress one must be willing to make assumptions, and we have not been shy about doing so. Sovereign risk and foreign investment are two important features of real economies that we have left unmodelled here. We feel confident however that our results would survive all but the most extreme versions of models that incorporate these elements. In our opinion, the most glaring omission of this paper is the absence of adjustment costs to investment. In real economies investment is not "bang-bang" as we have assumed here. Abstracting from adjustment costs greatly simplifies the analysis, while permitting us to isolate the 36
specific respondents, of the same gender, for the entirety of the survey. To convey interest in individuals’ welfare, interviewers asked questions about well-being before inquiring about labor market outcomes. The high-frequency interviews were also short; they were designed to take no more than five minutes. This was assisted by the use of Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) software that prepopulated time-invariant information, allowing interviewers to focus on questions that were expected to vary over the course of the survey. A log was kept of all calls made from the phones used for the survey. This allowed for verification of the date, time, and duration of calls and also maintained a record of call attempts, network problems, and other usage statistics. Information entered by enumerators in the hand-held device was also verifiable against data from the call logs automatically stored in the phone assigned to each enumerator, enabling better monitoring. During the baseline interview, respondents were also asked to indicate when they preferred to be interviewed. Finally, data quality checks were performed throughout the survey.

This approach was successful: The average phone interview took less than four minutes.<sup>6</sup> More than 95 percent of the interviews were matched with a record in the call logs; unmatched interviews largely reflected the fact that respondents asked to use a number that was not provided at the time of the baseline or endline interview. After completion of the endline survey, 5 percent of respondents were randomly selected for a verification survey. They were asked to verify whether they had received a phone, whether the phone was sealed in a box, how often they were interviewed, what their employment status at baseline was, and what economic activity they were engaged in at the time of the baseline interview. Their responses are highly consistent with their baseline responses and attest to the credibility of the collected data (see appendix table B2).

While phone interviews were associated with somewhat lower compliance than in-person interviews (consistent with earlier studies such as De Leeuw, 1992), survey compliance was very high overall: Only 6.4 percent of weekly in-person interviews, 11.2 percent of weekly phone interviews, and 10.8 percent of triweekly interviews were not completed (table 1 and appendix table B3). Interestingly, interviewing respondents more frequently thus did not induce higher noncompliance. Appendix table B4 analyzes the determinants of compliance with the high-

> 6 The duration of interviews did not decline over the course of the survey, suggesting that respondents did not (start) responding strategically to reduce the duration of the interview. (Namely, by responding that they had not worked, they could have reduced survey duration by about a minute.)

8
Policy Research Working Paper 7255

# **Abstract**

The Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database, launched by the World Bank in 2011, provides comparable indicators showing how people around the world save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk. The 2014 edition of the database reveals that 62 percent of adults worldwide have an account at a bank or another type of financial institution or with a mobile money provider. Between 2011 and 2014, 700 million adults became account holders while the number of those without an account—the unbanked—dropped by 20 percent to 2 billion. What drove this increase in account ownership? A growth in account penetration of 13 percentage points in developing economies and innovations in technology— particularly mobile money, which is helping to rapidly expand access to financial services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with these gains, the data also show that big opportunities remain to increase financial inclusion, especially among women and poor people. Governments and the private sector can play a pivotal role by shifting the payment of wages and government transfers from cash into accounts. There are also large opportunities to spur greater use of accounts, allowing those who already have one to benefit more fully from financial inclusion. In developing economies 1.3 billion adults with an account pay utility bills in cash, and more than half a billion pay school fees in cash. Digitizing payments like these would enable account holders to make the payments in a way that is easier, more affordable, and more secure.

This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team