rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
27

**Table 4. Popular votes in Chilean presidential elections, 1952-89**

|Year|Candidate (party or coalition)|Percent of<br>vote|
|---|---|---|
|1952|Carlos Ibanez (Independent)|46.8|
||Arture Matte (Right: Conservative, Liberal)<br>Pedro E, Alfonso (Center: Radical)<br>Salvador Allende (Left: Socialist)|27.8<br>19.9<br>5.5|
|1958|Jorge Alessandri (Right: Conservative, Liberal)<br>Salvador Allende (Left: Socialist, Communist)<br>Eduardo Frie (Center: Christian Democrat)<br>Luis Bossay (Center: Radical)<br>Antonio Zamorano (Independent: Left)|31.6<br>28.9<br>20.7<br>15.6<br>3.3|
|1964|Eduardo Frei (Center-Right: Christian Democrat,<br>Conservative, Liberal)<br>Salvador Allende (Left: Socialist, Communist)<br>Julio Duran (Center-Right, Radical)|56.1<br>38.9<br>5.0|
|1970|Salvador Allende (Left: Socialist, Communist,<br>MAPU, Radical Left)|36.6|
||Jorge Alessandri (Right: Independent, National)<br>Radomiro Tomic (Center: Christian Democrat)|35.2<br>28.1|
|1989|Patricio Aylwin, (Center-Left: Christian<br>Democrat, Radical, Socialist, PPD)|53.8|
||Hernan Buchi (Right: UDI)<br>F. J. Errazuriz (Center: Independent)|28.7<br>15.0|
|Sourc|e: 1952-70: Falcoff (1989); 1989: Mendez (1990).||

Notwithstanding the resilience of Chile's political institutions in general, Chilean politics between 1925 and 1973 made it possible for a president to be elected by a minority of the electoral vote."/ Of the five presidents elected between 1946 and 1973, only one was elected by an absolute majority--and even then, only because the right-wing candidate withdrew from the race. As a result, the president had to face an opposing majority in Congress. The tension between the two branches of government escalated following the constitutional reforms of 1958, which reduced the room for bargaining by abolishing joint electoral lists to eliminate corrupt deals among candidates of different parties at the local level (Shagart and Carey 1992). What are the implications for the credibility of regulatory contracts of the stability of political _"/_ From 1891 to 1925, Chile had a hybrid of a presidential, parliamentary, and assembly (congress) type of government: presidential because a president with some executive power was elected every five years, parliamentary because the cabinet remained in power only as long as it was supported by the majority of congress, and a government of congress (assembly) because the legislative branch had the greatest power. The era was also characterized by a highly fragmented political party system dominated by conservative forces. For details regarding the Chilean politics before 1925, see Arriagada (1984).
1. To display the list of the directly available ICIO tables and their releases:<sup>4</sup>

``` .icio_load,info ```

|`table`|`version`|`from`|`to`|
|---|---|---|---|
|`wiodn`|`2016`|`2000`|`2014`|
|`tivan`|`2018`|`2005`|`2015`|
|`eora`|`199.82`|`1990`|`2015`|
|`wiodo`|`2013`|`1995`|`2011`|
|`tivao`|`2016`|`1995`|`2011`|

In this way the user can always recover which ICIO tables are directly available via the `icio` command. As can be seen from the previous output, at the time of writing, the following tables have been made available: the “2013” and the “2016” releases of the WIOD tables, the “2016” and “2018” of the TiVA tables, and the “199.82” version of the Eora Global Supply Chain Database tables.

2. To load a specific year of the ICIO table of interest; for example the following syntax allows to load the year 2014 of the WIOD tables released in 2016 (i.e. `wiodn` ):<sup>5</sup> ``` .icio_load,iciot(wiodn)year(2014) ``` 3. To load a user-provided ICIO table, by specifying `user` , instead of a specific ICIO table’s code, in the `iciotable(` _table_ _~~n~~ ame_ `)` option. The user-provided ICIO table and the related country list must be provided using two different comma separated files (i.e. files with extension `.csv` ). For example: ``` .icio_load,iciot(user,userp("path_to_the_table_folder")tablen(ADB_2011.csv)// countrylist(adb_countrylist.csv) ``` The syntax above shows that additional information has to be provided in order to instruct `icio` to load the user-provided table: _i_ ) the path to the folder where the `.csv` file containing the user-provided table is located, via the

> 4The ICIO tables directly available in `icio` are automatically downloaded the first time the user requests them through the `icio_load` command. These files are saved within the Stata system folder `"../ado/plus/i"` using a `.mmat` format (notice that the _filename_ begins with the prefix `icio_` ). For further details on the last release directly available through `icio` , run `icio_load, info` or visit the official websites `oe.cd/tiva` for the OECD TiVA database, `wiod.org` for the World Input-Output Database and `worldmrio.com` for the Eora Global Supply Chain Database. Please, also remember to cite the reference to the ICIO database you are analyzing through `icio` .

> 5Multiple years have to be loaded sequentially and then the results should be appended.

5
pollution) and not by less visible ones (groundwater pollution). Sporadic events generate less concern than their probability warrants on average, but more than they deserve in those rare instances they occur (people get frantic if a bridge collapses, but neglect investing in maintenance). These tendencies are confirmed by polls showing that individuals rank climate change lower than other environmental issues closer to home.<sup>20</sup> Even if we were indeed fully rational, knowledge would not necessarily lead to action.

- First, our “finite pool of worries” might prevent us from acting on existing information because we prioritize between a set of needs.<sup>21</sup>

- Second, we assess both market _and_ nonmarket costs of our decisions. For individuals called on to engage with adaptation options challenge core value systems related, say, to traditional sources of livelihoods, culture, and identity (such as calls for resettlement and migration, or switching from traditional crops and farming customs to new climate-resilient agricultural practices).nonmarket costs can be high— particularly when

- Third, the very act of ‘interpreting’ or ‘mediating’ adaptation needs is costly.  To make rational decisions, individuals and communities facing adaptation choices incur transaction costs collecting and interpreting new and additional information.  For a household having to decide whether to keep rebuilding on a flood-prone area, these costs can be real and substantial.  The same can be said for a local authority official in charge of designing and enforcing building codes in low-lying coastal areas.  When the interpretation and decisionmaking costs are excessive, individuals can fail to act on available and already registered information.

- Fourth, problems of mitigation—and, very often, adaptation—present themselves as tragedies of the commons requiring collective action.  Rational and self-interested individuals notably face structural disincentives to cooperate in solving these problems.<sup>22</sup>

- Fifth, game theory shows that cooperation in these conditions requires the payoffs to be clear, obviously not the case with climate change impacts and responses.<sup>23</sup>

Understanding barriers to behavior change also requires going beyond psychological explanations based on the individual as a unit of analysis and embrace the way social factors influence perceptions, decisions, and actions. People naturally tend to resist and deny information that contradicts their cultural values or ideological beliefs, such as information challenging notions of belonging and identity, but also of rights to freedom and consumption. Notions of “needs” and priorities deriving from them are socially and culturally constructed.<sup>24</sup> This might explain why awareness of environmental problems normally increases with levels of wealth, but not for concern about climate change.<sup>25</sup>

> 20 Moser and Dilling 2007; Nisbet and Myers 2007. 21 Maslow 1970.

> 22 Olson 1965; Hardin 1968; Ostrom 2009.

> 23  Irwin 2008.

> 24 Winter and Koger 2004. 25 Sandvik 2008.

5
For Senegal our universe includes 9,631 establishments. We collected data for 1,786 establishments randomly selected from the RGE-ANSD. Table A.6 and Table A.7 provide the information on the distribution of firms in the population and the sample for Senegal.

Table A.6: Population Distribution, Senegal

|Region|Size|Agri-<br>culture|Food<br>Processing|Wearing<br>Apparel|Other<br>Manuf.|Wholesale<br>& Retail|Other<br>Services|Total<br>Region|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dakar|Small|72|273|809|859|1126|979|4930|
||Medium|9|75|19|114|125|281||
||Large|9|22|0|48|26|84||
|Diourbel|Small|18|84|182|204|214|80|816|
||Medium|1|9|1|7|8|5||
||Large|1|1|0|0|0|1||
|Kaolack|Small|26|36|242|175|91|50|820|
||Medium|50|12|3|18|63|26||
||Large|11|1|0|0|8|8||
|Kolda|Small|480|28|74|87|64|51|819|
||Medium|21|1|1|1|4|6||
||Large|1|0|0|0|0|0||
|St. Louis|Small|125|43|60|116|96|70|688|
||Medium|65|3|1|5|21|31||
||Large|41|2|0|1|4|4||
|Thies|Small|26|66|229|237|292|217|1207|
||Medium|2|14|4|4|33|60||
||Large|6|3|0|1|5|8||
|Ziguinchor|Small|50|15|32|74|46|98|351|
||Medium|11|1|0|0|7|12||
||Large|1|1|0|0|1|2||
|Total||1026|690|1657|1951|2234|2073|9631|

54
# **Missing SDG Gender Indicators**

Kathleen Beegle, Umar Serajuddin, Brian Stacy, Divyanshi Wadhwa*

**Key words** : statistical indicators, gender, national statistical system **JEL** : C8, J16, I00, O1

All authors are with the World Bank. Corresponding author: Kathleen Beegle kbeegle@worldbank.org. The authors are grateful to comments from Hai-Anh Dang, Anna Fruttero, and Lauren Harrison. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
respectively, and when we account for global factors like the VIX and the corporate credit spread. The correlation in the distance to default between foreign subsidiaries and their parents varies between a maximum of 0.45, when no other variables are added, and a minimum of 0.27 when we include all controls. This correlation is not only statistically and economically significant, but also it is almost twice as large as the correlation of the distance to default of the foreign subsidiaries vis-à-vis all companies in the home and host countries.

We conduct three variants of Table 4 as robustness checks. First, we show the same estimations as in Table 4, but excluding some parents banks which own many of the subsidiaries in our sample (see Table 5). We find that the estimates of the association between the distance to default of foreign bank subsidiaries and their parents do not change much when we exclude parent banks with multiple subsidiaries. The correlation varies only between 0.26 and 0.29. Second, we repeat the types of estimations shown in Table 4, but using the simplified measure of distance to default proposed by Byström (2006). As shown in Table 6, the correlation between foreign subsidiaries and their parents is highly significant and ranges between 0.2 and 0.3. Finally, Table 7 shows the correlation between subsidiaries’ and parents’ synthetic ‘market comparable’ measure of distance to default following Falkenheim and Pennachi (2003). These regressions are done for the 310 foreign subsidiaries (both listed and unlisted) that operate in the host countries in our sample. In this case, the correlations between subsidiaries and parents continue to be significant, but are smaller in size, ranging from almost 0.09 to 0.19. The lower correlations are to be expected since, as mentioned earlier, we use annual accounting data and 15
<mark>schemes for current employees with co-financing from employers, but the numbers trained under such programs remain small.</mark> Employer assessments of the adequacy of available skills were elicited in the Enterprise Surveys for a large number of countries, including Tanzania, in 2013. Using a common format across countries, employers were asked whether inadequacies in education posed a major obstacle to their operations. Employers were also asked whether they provided formal in-service training to their current workforce, training that might be used to augment deficiencies in (or to upgrade) preemployment skills. Figure 3 presents estimates of the percent of firms reporting these two skill indicators in Tanzania and several other SSA countries, and for comparison, three other East Asian countries. Note that these figures pertain only to manufacturing firms in different time periods ranging from 2007 in Malaysia to 2013 in Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia.

**Figure 3. Employers’ Views on Education and Firm Training:** **<u>Regional and Asian Comparisons</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>Malaysia<br>(2007)<br>Vietnam Chad<br>(2009) Kenya (2009)<br>(2013)<br>40 Ghana<br>(2013)<br>Philippines Tanzania<br>(2009) Niger (2013) Gabon<br>(2009) (2009)<br>Zambia<br>(2013) Cameroon<br>20 (2009) Mauritius<br>(2009)<br>0<br>0 20 40 60<br>Percent of Firms view Education as a major obstacle<br>Percent of Firms Providing Training<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Enterprise Surveys, various years <u>Note: East Asian countries are shown in the graph as red dots, African countries as black dots.</u> Two key observations can be made from this figure. First, Tanzania is about average among the SSA countries represented in the share of employers (41 percent) that rated inadequate education to be a major obstacle to their operations; these assessments ranged from 53 percent in Chad to 12 10
-2-

institutlonal forms could Improve the performance of credit policies, using the experlences from the fleld and promising developments In the thenry of credit and In the theory of Incentives and organizational design. 3 In this paper we Intend (I) to pinpoint the reasons behind the failure to achleve the stated objectives In rural credit allocatlon, many of them coming from within the Institutions which were created to channel credit; and (ii) to review the recent developments In the theory of Incentives and organizations In order to shed some light on the process of Institutional reform.

The structure of this paper Is as follows. In Section 11, we evaluate government Interventlon In rural cr-dit markets. In particular, the targeting of small farmers, the tolerated default, and the Imriact of subsidized credit. In Section III, we address the evidence of the development of formal financlal institutlons, Including the success stories. In Section IV, we address the Informational problems In rural credit markets, and the role of informal credit markets and Interlinked land, labor and credit contracts In llght of evidence and recent theory. In Sectlon V, we present a review and evaluatlon of the current developments In the theory of Incentives and organizations and how they have been Incorporated Into the analysis of Institutlonal reform to find more effective ways to channel credit to rural markets.

3Another direction in the Iterature, although not the main subject of discussion here, has focused on the interactive effects of credit with other, non-credi instruments to bring about the desired objectives. Significantly, many past analyses of evaluating credit policy have altogether ignored its comparison to alternative instruments. Two methods to compare alter.-Afive agricultural price policies (taxes and subsidies) in developing countries have been recently developed. One is theoretical (Sah &StiglRtz (1984]) and the other is operational by Braverman & Hammer. See Braverman, Hammer & Ahn [1983], and Braverman, Hammer & Gron (19871 for methodological discussions and kiferences to various country studies. In order to modify either of these approaches so that credi subsidies can be compared with other prica (tax) instruments, the fungibility of credi, the information failures and other imperfections peculiar to rural credi markets have to be properly incorporated.
<!-- Start of picture text --> 52 ° 48 ° BRAZIL<br>Uberlandiaˆ<br>ALTO TIETÊ RIVER BASIN<br>SELECTED CITIES<br>Araxá<br>B R A Z I L MAJOR ROADS<br>46 ° 44 °<br>20 ° Belo<br>Horizonte<br>São José<br>Tres Lagoasˆ<br>RibeirãoPretoˆ<br>Aracatuba S.João del Rei<br>Lins<br>Poços de<br>Araraquara Caldas<br>22 ° Presidente Marília Bauru 22 °<br>Prudente Pouso<br>Alegre<br>Assis<br>Campinas Guaratinguetá<br>S. José<br>Londrina dos Campos<br>Maringá Sorocaba<br>São Paulo<br>24 ° Santos 24 °<br>ATLANTIC OCEAN<br>BRAZIL<br>0 25 50 75 Kilometers<br>Alto Tietê<br>River Basin Ponta Grossa 0 25 50 75 Miles<br>This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.<br>The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information<br>Curitiba shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank<br>Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any<br>52 ° 50 ° 48 ° 46 ° endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.<br>Para<br>anema<br>Aqu<br>Peixe<br>ape<br>P<br>n<br>i<br>n<br>p<br>a<br>Grande<br>r<br>Iv<br>a<br>a<br>ai<br>a<br>n<br>a<br>á<br>ib<br>r<br>Alt<br>a<br>o<br>ê<br>et e<br>a<br>Ti<br>P<br>JANUARY 2005 IBRD 33727<br><!-- End of picture text -->
The new law<sup>14</sup> established that share transactions that result in a person’s or group’s acquisition of control of a corporation must be conducted through a tender offer. Additionally, when the target company has several classes of shares with different voting rights, the tender must be extended to all classes in proportion. Partial offers must be pro-rated.<sup>15</sup> The law also contains a mandatory offer provision, so that a shareholder who reaches the ownership level of 2/3<sup>rds</sup> of a corporation must tender for all outstanding shares and classes. An optional transitory rule shielded companies for a further three years from the new law, to allow learning, and most firms took advantage of that rule. The details of the law are presented in Appendix C. The securities regulator (Conasev) can enforce takeover law by issuing additional rules, imposing fines for noncompliance, demanding complete information about the transaction, and suspending tender offers procedures, even before they have started, in response to incomplete disclosure or a legal obligation default.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 14<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br><!-- End of picture text --> Following the implementation and enforcement of the new law, in 2000 and thereafter, one can note a new wave of IPOs on the Chilean stock market, and a healthy trend of takeover activity after the reform. The average number of takeovers has increased after year 2000 (see figure 1). The control premium paid over market prices, 23%, is now shared more equally between controlling shareholders and minorities.

**Figure 1. Annual takeovers in Chile**

7
|**Sanitation Status**|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Improved Sanitation, Shared_|‐0.080|‐0.084|‐0.079*|‐0.074*|‐0.098**|‐0.095**|‐0.075|‐0.070|‐0.076*|‐0.071*|
||(0.070)|(0.070)|(0.043)|(0.043)|(0.047)|(0.047)|(0.055)|(0.055)|(0.041)|(0.040)|
|_Improved Sanitation, Private_|‐0.136**|‐0.136**|‐0.130***|‐0.130***|‐0.141***|‐0.143***|‐0.124**|‐0.126**|‐0.137***|‐0.137***|
||(0.066)|(0.067)|(0.044)|(0.044)|(0.047)|(0.047)|(0.055)|(0.055)|(0.042)|(0.042)|
|_(baseline: Unimproved Sanitation)_|||||||||||
|Log Number of Household Members|‐0.167**|‐0.167**|‐0.045|‐0.048|‐0.030|‐0.033|0.009|0.008|‐0.033|‐0.038|
||(0.071)|(0.070)|(0.040)|(0.040)|(0.042)|(0.042)|(0.051)|(0.051)|(0.038)|(0.038)|
|Household in Urban Areas (=1)|‐0.019|‐0.022|0.027|0.022|0.044|0.039|0.045|0.039|0.034|0.028|
||(0.060)|(0.060)|(0.038)|(0.038)|(0.041)|(0.041)|(0.048)|(0.048)|(0.037)|(0.037)|
|**Wealth Index (Excluding Floor Material)**|||||||||||
|_Second Quintile_|‐0.036|‐0.040|‐0.089*|‐0.086*|‐0.088*|‐0.085*|‐0.122**|‐0.116**|‐0.055|‐0.052|
||(0.073)|(0.074)|(0.046)|(0.046)|(0.050)|(0.050)|(0.058)|(0.058)|(0.043)|(0.043)|
|_Third Quintile_|‐0.096|‐0.100|‐0.036|‐0.037|‐0.029|‐0.030|0.014|0.016|‐0.027|‐0.028|
||(0.074)|(0.075)|(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.053)|(0.052)|(0.061)|(0.061)|(0.046)|(0.045)|
|_Fourth Quintile_|‐0.070|‐0.071|‐0.047|‐0.044|‐0.029|‐0.026|‐0.042|‐0.036|‐0.037|‐0.034|
||(0.081)|(0.082)|(0.052)|(0.052)|(0.055)|(0.055)|(0.063)|(0.063)|(0.049)|(0.048)|
|_Richest Quintile_|0.074|0.072|‐0.099|‐0.095|‐0.098|‐0.092|‐0.180**|‐0.171**|‐0.086|‐0.080|
||(0.104)|(0.105)|(0.065)|(0.064)|(0.070)|(0.069)|(0.078)|(0.077)|(0.061)|(0.060)|
|_(baseline: First Quintile)_|||||||||||
|HH's Floor is made of Earth, Dung (=1)|0.124|0.128*|0.094**|0.101**|0.104**|0.110**|0.076|0.084|0.080*|0.089**|
||(0.078)|(0.077)|(0.047)|(0.047)|(0.051)|(0.051)|(0.056)|(0.057)|(0.044)|(0.044)|
|Functioning Handwashing Station (=1)|‐0.048|‐0.050|0.001|‐0.001|0.020|0.019|0.030|0.029|0.006|0.003|
||(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.031)|(0.031)|(0.034)|(0.034)|(0.041)|(0.040)|(0.030)|(0.030)|
|Unsafe Disposal of Child Feces (=1)|‐0.089|‐0.089|‐0.036|‐0.034|‐0.022|‐0.019|0.010|0.015|‐0.012|‐0.008|
||(0.056)|(0.056)|(0.045)|(0.045)|(0.051)|(0.051)|(0.070)|(0.070)|(0.042)|(0.042)|
|**Observations**|372|372|1,185|1,185|1,069|1,069|813|813|1,292|1,292|
|**Pseudo R2**|0.177|0.178|0.101|0.102|0.088|0.089|0.094|0.095|0.085|0.088|
|**Model VIF**|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|4.14|4.17|
|**Goodness of Fit Test**|13.53*|17.48*|1.66|2.54|4.28|10.63|5.80|8.97|5.89|3.36|
|Standard<br>Errors|are|Robust||Clustered||at|Househ|old|Level||

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *

16
# **5.1 Tail Hypothesis Parameter Estimation**

gap in educational attainment, while the mean hypothesis plays no role. From our conceptual framework, the tail hypothesis consists of a total of four parameters _{μm, μf , σm_<sup>2</sup><sup>_, σ_</sup> _f_<sup>2</sup><sup>_}_.Without</sup> any loss of generality, the parameters of the model under the tail hypothesis can be reduced to two, by normalizing one of the two probability density functions. We standardize the female probability density function such that _fzf_ ( ̄ _zt_ ) _∼ N_ (0 _,_ 1), and estimate the two moments of the male scholastic performance distribution _{μm, σm_<sup>2</sup><sup>_}_.</sup> The model under the tail hypothesis predicts a unique value ˆ _yit_ , conditional on the triplet _{xit, μm, σm_<sup>2</sup><sup>_}_.</sup> To fit the model under the tail hypothesis, we estimate the two parameters _{μm_ ; _σm_<sup>2</sup><sup>_}_from our sam-</sup> ple of countries observed in multiple years. From our model, the tail hypothesis after normalization of the scholastic performance distribution for females can be expressed empirically as: where _εit ∼ N_ (0 _, σε_<sup>2).Taking the logarithm of Equation</sup><sup>**??**and substituting</sup><sup>_z_ ̄</sup><sup>_it_=</sup><sup>_P −_1(</sup><sup>_xit, μ, σ_2)</sup> yields the final reduced form: Equation 7 is a non-linear mapping from _x_ to _y_ performance relative to the females’ distribution. As the error term _εit_ is normally distributed, the model under the tail hypothesis can be fitted numerically by finding the parameter values that minimize the sum of squared errors.

21