significant di↵erence in proportion of single parents between men and women. According to the data available on the occupation of the Venezuelan population, who entered as migrants in Brazil, at the time of registration approximately 16% worked in the households as governesses, butlers and cooks, 10% worked as vendors, 5% as teachers, 3% as engineers and 3% as administrators, suggesting most of the migrants work in semi-skilled rather than high -skilled jobs in Brazil but the dataset does not contain any information on education.<sup>12</sup> Brazil has maintained the same open entry requirements for Venezuelans over the years. Residence permit is available to any Venezuelan, who enters as long as they have some type of identity documents. Since March 2018, Brazil has also begun allowing Venezuelans with this special form of temporary residence to apply for permanent residence status three months before their temporary permits are set to expire. However, this opportunity is only available for Venezuelans with a legal source of income. Those, who do not have such proof of income are permitted to renew their temporary residence permits indefinitely. Brazil has also adopted a prima facie approach in granting refugee status to the Venezuelan asylum seekers since December 2019. This follows the decision in June 2019 by CONARE (Brazil’s National Committee for Refugees) to recognize the situation in the Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela as human rights violation as described under the broader refugee definition contained in the 1984 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. On a single day, 21,432 Venezuelan asylum seekers were granted refugee status in Brazil on December 6, 2019, making it the country with about 50,000 refugees and the most popular country for refugees in Latin America.

# **2.2 Past Research**

Our paper contributes to the literature on forced displacement, and economic and social integration of refugees and migrants in the host communities and aims to extend the literature in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to look into the recently displaced Venezuelans’ access to social protection programs and education in a Latin American country, which provides universal access to education, health care and social protection irrespective of legal status. Second, it provides the first evidence outside Europe on the association between education of children and concentration of forcibly displacement individuals.

Most past research on the recent episode of Venezuelan forced displacement has focused on the labor market. Descriptive statistics in Cavalcanti et al. (2020) shows that Venezuelans consisted of 12% of the total migrants and refugees working in the formal labor sector in 2019 in Brazil. Graham et al. (2020) find that Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, the country hosting the largest number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, work in lower-paid and more informal work and that before the COVID-19 pandemic, employed Colombians were earning 43 percent more on average than employed Venezuelans, despite the fact that Venezuelans are highly educated. Caruso et al. (2019) and Penaloza (2019) focus on the impact of the influx of Venezuelans on the labor market in Colombia and find that it reduces wages, especially for male workers in the informal sector. Olivieri et al. (2020) focus on Ecuador and report that although Venezuelans are more educated and more likely to be employed, they tend to work in low wage and informal work and experience significant occupational downgrading. Bahar et al. (2021) provides evidence of asymmetrical e↵ects of a large scale amnesty program that granted work permits to undocumented Venezuelans in Colombia that

> 12Race data is available only for a sample of the population showing that 25% of the Venezuelan population is white, while the rest being indigenous, brown and black. The dataset does not include information on the specifics of the source regions in Venezuela, where the refugees and migrants are from.

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