A puzzling observation in light of the significant impact of reducing transaction cost documented above is that reform-induced reductions in time required for registration were not matched by commensurate drops in registration cost. In fact, with registration fees of 8.2% of plot value,<sup>18</sup> rents seem to persist and reform remains incomplete. Failure to eliminate such rents before starting systematic registration is likely to have reduced LARP impact by (i) pushing individuals who -had it been properly priced- would have opted for sporadic registration to demand systematic services; and (ii) reducing the likelihood that, without further reform, gender benefits of systematic registration documented above will be sustained as newly registered owners may be unable to afford the fees required for registering subsequent transactions and thus revert to informality. A tighter focus on regulatory and institutional reform could thus possibly have enhanced the program’s cost-effectiveness and sustainability, including by complementing systematic registration with targeted subsidies or nudges to improve gender equity along the lines suggested by Ali _et al._ (2016).

One explanation for policy-makers’ limited support for land titling is that many may see political benefits from embedding security of land rights in clientelist relationships that depend on a credible threat of withdrawal. Land reforms that, instead of giving secure rights and encourage investment, established rights that could be easily withdrawn and put political intermediaries in control of access to markets and services,<sup>19</sup> illustrate a willingness to tolerate significant economic losses for political gain. The extent to which land rights were formalized (Christensen and Garfias 2020), land was valued (Sánchez-Talanquer 2020), and the ability to provide social services (Fergusson _et al._ 2020) have been affected by political considerations. The attenuation of clientelist ties caused by urban land titling reduced local incumbents’ vote share in Mexico (Larreguy _et al._ 2018).<sup>20</sup> While further study is warranted, economic and political considerations thus seem to favor a focus on regulatory and institutional reform which would benefit all land owners rather than just a narrow set of the population; demonstrably enhance activity in land and financial markets; and be sustainable rather than short-lived.

# **5. Conclusion**

Although land titling programs are often seen as a way to improve land and financial market functioning and thus to contribute to urban structural transformation, we know of no study that would document credit market impacts of urban land titling. Employing administrative rather than household survey data to identify impacts of titling and regulatory as well as institutional reforms separately suggests that policy reform, but

> 18 See the 2020 ‘Doing Business’ figures at https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/registering-property. 19 Despite the associated productivity losses, rural reforms awarded insecure and often non-transferable rights in cases such as Zimbabwe (Deininger _et al._ 2004), Kenya (Hassan and Klaus 2020), Colombia (Albertus 2019), Peru (Albertus and Popescu 2020), Mexico (Albertus _et al._ 2016), and the Philippines (Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2020). Clientelist relationships were often reinforced by establishing vast bureaucracies dedicated to provide services to beneficiaries.

> 20 Fear of similarly negative consequences may explain why, rather than focus on urban areas with high land values and potential impacts, titling efforts supported by donors and IFIs were mostly directed to rural aeras with more limited potential and scope for sustained impact.

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