rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
and income. A similarly stable, or even negative, trend was observed for gender attitudes relating to these categories.

This persistence of gender disparities and conservative attitudes is particularly remarkable when contrasted with the sustained economic development observed in the last two or more decades in most South Asian countries. Gender equality in the region does not seem to be an automatic byproduct of economic development, indicating that restrictive gender norms are constraining progress in gender outcomes. Stylized fact 4 highlights exactly this. Attitudes are related to gender outcomes, and conservative gender attitudes are linked to worse gender outcomes. However, gender norms are still poorly understood and measured, generally, with inadequate proxies. Attitudes may not always correspond with the norms prevalent in society, and do not adequately indicate the strength of a norm (which can potentially override individual attitudes in influencing behavior). To properly address these normative barriers, future research should be focused to: (i) measure gender norms more systematically, (ii) identify causal links between norms and outcomes, and (iii) inform norm sensitive policies and interventions.

# **7. References**

- <mark>Abramsky, T., Watts, C. H., Garcia-Moreno, C., Devries, K., Kiss, L., Ellsberg, M., ... & Heise, L. (2011). What factors are associated with recent intimate partner violence? Findings from the WHO multi-country study on women's health and domestic violence. BMC public health, 11(1), 1-17.</mark>

- <mark>Acemoglu, D., & Jackson, M. O. (2017). Social norms and the enforcement of laws. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(2), 245-295.</mark>

- <mark>Afridi F., Dinkelman T., Mahajan K. (2018). Why are Fewer Married Women Joining the Work Force in India? A Decomposition Analysis over Two Decades. Journal of Population Economics 31 (3): 783–818.</mark>

- <mark>Ahmed, T., & Sen, B. (2018). Conservative outlook, gender norms and female wellbeing: Evidence from rural Bangladesh. World Development, 111, 41-58.</mark>

- <mark>Akter, S., & Chindarkar, N. (2020). An empirical examination of sustainability of women’s empowerment using panel data from India. The Journal of Development Studies, 56(5), 890-906.</mark>

- <mark>Amir, S., Kotikula, A., Pande, R., Bossavie, L. L. Y., and Khadka, U. (2018). Female Labor Force Participation in Pakistan: What Do We Know?. World Bank, Washington, DC.</mark>

- <mark>Anukriti, S., & Dasgupta, S. (2017). Marriage markets in developing countries. The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy, 97-120.</mark>

- <mark>Arnab, A. T., & Siraj, M. S. (2020). Child Marriage in Bangladesh: Policy and Ethics. Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics, 11(1), 24–34.</mark> <u>https://doi.org/10.3329/bioethics.v11i1.49193</u>

27
Table 7: Simulation parameters - preferences

|Paramter|Value<br>So|urce|Original|
|---|---|---|---|
|_β_|0_._9999<br>Kydland and|Prescott [1982]|0.99|
|_γ_|-0.5<br>Kydland and|Prescott [1982]|-0.5|
|_φ_|0.3,0.4<br>Bell and|Hart [2003]|_s ∈_(0_,_50%)|
|_η_|0.0011<br>Kydland and|Prescott [1982]|0.1|
|_α_0|0.0057<br>Kydland and|Prescott [1982]|0.5|
|_α_1|0.00057<br>Kydland and|Prescott [1982]|0.05|
|_η_|0.0014<br>Hotz et|al. [1988]|0.4|
|_α_0|0<br>Hotz et|al. [1988]|0|
|_α_1|0.0035<br>Hotz et|al. [1988]|1|

Parameters are specified in a daily frequency. The original parameters are specified for a quarterly frequency in Kydland and Prescott [1982] and an annual frequency in Hotz et al. [1988].

week, there is some vector of admissible parameters that would suggest welfare losses from that week. When _φ_ = 0 _._ 4, there are two alternatives that strictly dominate the 5-2 workweek: 4-2 and 2-1.

Table 9 suggests that expected welfare is maximized by a 2 or 3 day workweek followed by a 1 day weekend. Expected steady state welfare gains vary between 3-7%. Note that 3-1 is associated with an expected 12% gain in output, while the expected output loss from 2-1 is only 3% (see Table 5). The increase in leisure is sufficient to compensate for this loss, resulting in a welfare gain. Whether the optimal schedule is 2-1 or 3-1 depends on the preference parameter _φ_ . However, conditional on _φ_ , the welfare gains associated with one of these alternatives are statistically significant at the 5% level.

The results are also useful for evaluating alternative schedules that have been practiced or proposed. For example, the analysis suggests that the transition from 6-1 to 5-2 during the 1940s was almost certainly welfare improving. However, current proposals to transition to a 4-3 workweek are likely to be associated with welfare losses.

31
# **References:**

Aslam, M. (2009). "Education Gender Gaps in Pakistan: Is the Labour Market to Blame?" <u>Economic Development and Cultural Change, Forthcoming.</u>

- Bhalotra, S. and C. Heady (2003). "Child farm labor: the wealth paradox." The World Bank <u>Economic Review</u> **17** (2): 197-227.

- Duan, N. and L. K. Chau (1987). "Distribution-free and link-free estimation for the sample selection model." Journal of Econometrics **35** : 25-35.

- Edmonds, E. (2007). "Child labor." NBER working paper 12926. National Bureau of Economic <u>Research.</u>

- Ersado, L. (2005). "Child labor and schooling decision in urban and rural areas: comparative evidence from Nepal, Peru and Zimbabwe." World Development **33** (3): 455-480.

- Fasih, T. (2008). Linking education policy to labor market outcomes. Washington DC, The World Bank Group.

- Green, W. (2003). Econometric analysis, fifth edition. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Education Inc.

- Griliches, Z. (1977). "Estimating the returns to schooling: some econometric problems." <u>Econometrica</u> **45** : 1-22.

- Griliches, Z. (1979). "Sibling models and data in economics: beginnings of a survey." Journal of <u>Political Economy (supplement)</u> **87** : S37-S64.

- Hou, X. (2008). Labor market in Invesment Climate Assessment for Pakistan. Washington DC, the World Bank Group.

- Kingdon, G. and M. Soderbom (2008). "Education, skills, and labor market outcomes: evidence from Pakistan." Education working paper series number 11.

- Kolev, A. and C. Saget (2005). "Understanding Youth Labour Market Disadvantage: Evidence from South-East Europe." International Labour Review **144** (2): 161-187.

- Manning, W., J. Newhouse, et al. (1987). "Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment." the American Economic Review **77** (3): 251277.

Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York, London, National Bureau of Economic Research.

19
# **Table 3: Growth in surveys vs national accounts – no-constant regression results**

_Panel A. No-constant OLS regression of survey mean and HFCE mean_

|||**All**||||**Consumpti**|**on**|||**Incom**|**e**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Group**|**Obs.**|**Coeff**|**S.E.**|**r2**|**Obs.**|**Coeff**|**S.E.**|**Error**|**Obs.**|**Coeff**|**S.E.**|**Error**|
|All spells|15062 (133)|0.74 ***|0.05|0.46|5068 (108)|0.73 ***|0.05|0.73|9994 (61)|0.89|0.13|0.89|
|All 1 year spells|9588 (128)|0.71 ***|0.06|0.71|3064 (102)|0.68 ***|0.06|0.68|6524 (59)|0.88|0.16|0.88|
|All 1 to 3 year spells|3310 (97)|0.75 ***|0.09|0.75|1103 (54)|0.73 ***|0.09|0.73|2207 (60)|0.87|0.20|0.87|
|All 4 to 6 year spells|3066 (119)|0.80 ***|0.06|0.80|1133 (94)|0.76 ***|0.06|0.76|1933 (60)|1.01|0.07|1.01|
|Comparable spells only|7588 (122)|0.75 ***|0.05|0.75|2325 (80)|0.67 ***|0.05|0.67|5263 (59)|1.05|0.08|1.05|
|Comparable, bal, 1-3 year spells|2460 (82)|0.74 ***|0.08|0.74|747 (40)|0.62 ***|0.08|0.62|1713 (54)|1.05|0.07|1.05|
|Comparable, bal, 4-6 year spells|1880 (83)|0.81 ***|0.05|0.81|558 (42)|0.71 ***|0.05|0.71|1322 (55)|1.01|0.07|1.01|
|1980s|93 (23)|0.62|0.28|0.62|24 (6)|0.45 **|0.28|0.45|69 (18)|0.64|0.32|0.64|
|1990s|413 (71)|0.64 ***|0.10|0.64|153 (50)|0.64 ***|0.10|0.64|260 (39)|0.55 **|* 0.14|0.55|
|2000s|2010 (102)|0.85 ***|0.05|0.85|772 (62)|0.78 ***|0.05|0.78|1238 (53)|1.10|0.09|1.10|
|2010s|2418 (94)|0.67 ***|0.08|0.67|722 (68)|0.56 ***|0.08|0.56|1696 (56)|1.01|0.17|1.01|
|Low income|372 (39)|0.64 **|0.17|0.64|361 (38)|0.70 *|0.17|0.70|11 (2)|-0.13 **|0.49|-0.13|
|Lower Middle Income|2253 (65)|0.69 ***|0.07|0.69|1202 (53)|0.66 ***|0.07|0.66|1051 (18)|0.67|0.33|0.67|
|Upper Middle Income|3085 (45)|0.89 **|0.05|0.89|964 (32)|0.79 ***|0.05|0.79|2121 (26)|1.18 *|0.10|1.18|
|High Income|5872 (40)|0.78|0.20|0.78|811 (29)|0.67|0.20|0.67|5061 (38)|0.87|0.25|0.87|
|East Asia & Pacific|1029 (12)|0.78 **|0.09|0.78|856 (8)|0.77 **|0.09|0.77|173 (5)|0.70 **|0.13|0.70|
|Europe & Central Asia|8109 (47)|0.87 ***|0.05|0.87|2973 (45)|0.81 ***|0.05|0.81|5136 (33)|1.14 **|0.06|1.14|
|Latin America & Caribbean|4131 (19)|0.92|0.12|0.92|112 (3)|0.32 ***|0.12|0.32|4019 (19)|0.94|0.12|0.94|
|Middle East & North Africa|244 (9)|0.15 ***|0.21|0.15|196 (7)|0.44 ***|0.21|0.44|48 (2)|-0.16 **|* 0.21|-0.16|
|North America|1114 (2)|0.55 ***|0.17|0.55|496 (1)|0.27 ***|0.17|0.27|618 (2)|0.63 **|* 0.10|0.63|
|South Asia|170 (6)|0.68 **|0.14|0.68|170 (6)|0.68 **|0.14|0.68|#N/A ####|#N/A ##|# #N/A|#N/A|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|265 (38)|0.54 ***|0.14|0.54|265 (38)|0.54 ***|0.14|0.54|#N/A ####|#N/A ##|# #N/A|#N/A|
<!-- Start of picture text --> Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income<br>—t<br>on<br>D<br>3<br>o<br>Om<br>Cc<br>2<br>i]<br>Cc<br>gD<br>£<br>Oo<br>Zoos<br>Ww<br>oa<br>Ls lLhkeelU lOO oe<br>craiity ran olcyBs and Control of and Scrutiny<br><!-- End of picture text -->
16 proposed were only marginally viable, this drop caused over 90% to lose economic viability."7 ' Conversely, even though the cost of electricity supply in Kenya fell from 5.5e/kWh in October 1985 to 4.4¢/kWh in August 1986, all residential installations proposed in the original report (exclusively for the displacement of electric water heating in upper income urban homes) were still found to be economically viable.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Residential Sector SWH Application<br>IRR: Electric Water Heater Retrofit<br>SWH Internal Rate of Return<br>s0% .<br>60% /<br>40%<br>20% -<br>0% l I l<br>2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10<br>Economic Cost of Electricity (c/kWh)<br>Source: See Annex<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 7 Solar Hot Water Electric Water Heater Retrofit 47. The economic sensitivity to fuel prices of two representative SWH installations in the Kenya study are displayed in Figures 6 and 7. Under the assumptions used in the Kenya report,<sup>18</sup> ' it can be generally stated that if the economic price of displaced fuels remains above US$ 150/TOE (US$ 25/bbl fuel oil, 4e/kWh. or US$ 50/mt wood). state-of-the-art SWH installations in locations with good solar resources may be cost effective. As the landed cost of fuel oil dropped to around US$ 10/bbl in JuJr 1986 and are below US$ 15/bbl as of February, 1988 for most countries with a port and the price of fuelwood rarely exceeds US$ 50/mt, SWH installations that 17/ For purposes of this paper, installations with an economic rate of return above 15% are considered economically viable. 18/ Economic rates of return were calculated by comparing the economic value of displaced fuels to SWH system costs (including imported collectors and locally made balance of system components) calculated @ S103/m<sup>2</sup> of colector area for industrial applications and $126/m<sup>2</sup> for al others over a 15 year lifetime at 10% discount rate.
possible infertility as a result of many abortions in row without a birth. There is also the possibility that increased access to or knowledge of prenatal sex determination over time, which can lead women—who, for one reason or another, waited longer to have their next child—to be more likely to use sex-selective abortions. The result is that the sample of women who have not yet had a given parity birth may behave differently from the sample of women for whom we can observe the birth. These dynamic selection issues imply that ignoring birth spacing and the potential changes in the use of sex selection with longer spacing will lead the simple method to bias the predicted final sex ratio for a given parity.

This paper presents a novel method that directly incorporates the fact that the use of sexselective abortions affects both the likelihood of having a son _and_ the duration between births. The empirical model is a competing risk non-proportional hazard model with two exits states: either a boy or a girl is born. This approach has three major advantages over the simple method. First, it models fertility and spacing decisions jointly with the birth outcome. This allows both progression to next birth and likelihood of using sex-selective abortions to be estimated. Secondly, by explicitly incorporating censoring of birth spacing it addresses any potential bias that may arise from changes in the use of sex selection as the duration from the previous birth increases. Finally, even without direct information on the availability or use of prenatal sex determination, the method can establish what factors determine the use of sex-selective abortions because it provides direct information on sex ratios for births at given spell lengths. In sum, for a sample of women the method makes it possible to estimate how many births they will have, what the final sex ratio of their children will be, and how many sex-selective abortions they will go through.

Analyzing birth histories from India’s National Family and Health Surveys for Hindu women covering the period 1972 to 2006, the method is used to examine three hypotheses that are important for understanding the use of sex-selective abortions. First, the reduced demand for children is the main factor in the decision to use sex-selective abortions for a given set of son preferences. Secondly, many parents have strong preferences for having only one son, rather than for a large number of sons. Finally, the legal steps taken to combat sex-selective abortions have not been able 2
level. Second, according to our results, the largest barriers to trade that are not captured by the standard gravity covariates are in Agriculture and in Services. We find this variation to be intuitive and it is consistent with localized consumption in the case of services, and more pronounced ‘home bias’ effects in the case of agricultural products.

Third, turning to the estimates on _BRDR_ EU_ CEFTA_ and _BRDR_ EU_ , we see that, without any exception, the additional barriers to trade between CEFTA and EU are larger as compared to the barriers to trade within the EU. This is reflected in the larger (in absolute value) estimates on _BRDR_ EU_ CEFTA_ as compared to the corresponding values for _BRDR_ EU_ , and is consistent with our expectations. Finally, we find that the differential in the borders between CEFTA and EU as compared to the borders within the EU varies across the four main sectors in our sample. In order to see this clearly (and also to be able to gauge whether the differences are statistically significant) in Panel B of Table 1 we report the difference between the estimates on _BRDR_ EU_ CEFTA_ and _BRDR_ EU_ . In addition, following (3), in Panel C of Table 1, we calculate tariff equivalents of the border differentials.<sup>20</sup> Standard errors in panels B and C are constructed with the Delta method.

The estimates from panels B and C reveal several interesting results. First, the border differences for each sector are statistically significant at any conventional level. Second, the tariff equivalents of the border difference are larger as compared to the existing tariff differences for the goods sectors. This supports our assumption that, in addition to tariffs, there are other barriers to trade between CEFTA and EU. For example, in the case of Agriculture, the trade weighted average tariff for the CEFTA countries is 11.58 percent, which is significantly lower as compared to the 19.65 percent border differential tariff equivalent that we obtain from the structural gravity regressions. The corresponding numbers for Mining are 1.68 percent weighted average tariffs and 10.62 percent tariff equivalent border differential. And for Manufacturing the numbers are 5.22 percent weighted average tariffs and 7.92 percent tariff equivalent border differential. Importantly, there is no tariff data that corresponds to the large (16.87 percent) tariff equivalent border differential that we obtain for services. This highlights the advantages and importance of using our estimation structural gravity approach to measure border differentials. Third, comparison between the tariff data and our border

> 20 Following the literature, we set _σ_ = 7. This value is also close to the corresponding meta-analysis index

> ( _σ_ = 6 _._ 13) from Head and Mayer (2014).

18
In Table 4 we show the estimated effects of unexpected demand shocks on the average monthly wages of high versus low earners within each firm, using three different earnings thresholds. Whereas the coefficients are statistically significant for both groups of workers, the magnitudes of these estimates display a very clear and consistent pattern. First, the estimated effect is consistently larger for the high earners than for the rest of the workforce. Furthermore, the estimated wage effect for the high earners, and the difference in the effects for high and low earners, are both monotonically increasing in magnitude as we move the high earner threshold further towards the top end of the distribution. This suggests that, on average, the division of revenues from unexpected demand shocks is quite unequal and disproportionately benefitting the firms’ top earners.

# **5.4 The importance of heterogeneity in managerial skill**

We now examine if and how the distribution of rents generated by these unexpected shocks vary systematically with the skill-level of the firms’ top managers (measured at the beginning of the sample period), which proxies for the exogenous heterogeneity in firm capabilities that features in Melitz (2003)-type trade models. The underlying assumption (which we explore and discuss below) is that differences in managerial skill are systematically linked with the adoption of different management practices, which in turn affect worker behavior and effort. For management practices that are likely to interact with worker behavior (e.g., monitoring, goal setting, and incentive schemes), it seems reasonable to assume that the effects of such practices depend on the characteristics of the workforce. Thus, we would expect that the adoption of different management practices is systematically related to differences in both the skill composition of the firm’s workforce and the structure of its pay system. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that the skills of top executives are important for management practices, employee selection and firm performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bastos and Monteiro, 2011; Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter, 2018). However, there is little evidence on whether and how managers matter for how revenues from exogenous demand shocks are transmitted to workers.

## **5.4.1 Measuring managerial practices and managerial skills**

Following Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter (2018), we first use the 2016 management survey to compute firm-level management _z-scores_ —an index of adoption of advanced management practices. We then link these data to the other data sets on workers and firms. This allows us to relate measured management quality to worker and firm observables, including 13
issue to their communities, and suggested that individual action is morally sanctioned, despite concerns for the efficacy of such action and the lack of government or industry support. She suggests that rather than focus on the provision of information, “policy attention should be directed to the social and institutional barriers that act to constrain public involvement in addressing global environmental issues.” Dunlap, Riley E. 1998. "Lay Perceptions of Global Risk: Public Views of Global Warming in Cross-National Context." International Sociology 13:473-498.

Dunlap reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey conducted in Canada, the U.S., Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, and Russia on public perceptions of global warming. Most respondents saw global warming as a problem, although it was not generally ranked as serious as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Most respondents did not understand climate science well. In particular the study, along with others, found confusion between climate change and ozone depletion. Despite limitations in knowledge, however, citizens in all nations except Russia believed that climate change would have consequences in their lifetimes. As predicted by the concept of a risk society, public perceptions of global warming do not vary consistently across differing social strata within nations. Dunlap makes the important consideration, however, of whether detailed public understanding of highly complex issues such as global warming is feasible or even necessary for effective policy making.

Freudenburg, William, Robert Gramling and Debra J. Davidson 2008. “Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt” Sociological Inquiry 78(1):2–38.

Science provides falsification, but not “proof.” The authors trace the increasing call for scientific certainty, or “proof”in public discourse before policies can be implemented. Given that all science contains a measure of uncertainty, if agencies can be prevented from imposing any regulations until they are unambiguously “justified,” most regulations can be defeated or postponed, often for decades. This practice has allowed profitable but potentially risky activities to continue unabated. Based on their review of previously documented controversies, the authors suggest that “such calls may reflect not just a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of science, but a clever and surprisingly effective political-economic tactic—“Scientific Certainty” Argumentation Methods, or SCAMs.” They further suggest that such SCAMs are both more widespread than has been previously recongnized and should be the focus of more attention in the future.

Grundmann, Reiner 2006. “Ozone and Climate: Scientific Consensus and Leadership” Science, Technology, and Human Values 31(1): 73-101.

70