Two more major events shaped female employment further. First, another set of economic reforms took place through 2000-05 further liberalizing the economy. By the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, instead of boosting structural transformation with increased opportunities for productive employment in industry, these reforms combined with a general neglect of education and health have increasingly transformed Egypt into a rentier economy (El-Haddad 2015). Rents from oil and gas exports, remittances and Suez Canal proceeds have skewed the structure of the economy toward non-tradable sectors – such as construction - which are largely male dominated (Assaad 2002) and for a large part also informal. Second, the phaseout of the Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005 has gradually subjected the industry to normal (WTO) rules, thus bringing Egypt into direct competition in the international market with countries such as China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even Turkey; countries that were earlier quota constrained under the former MFA (El-Haddad 2016). This came at the expense of Egypt’s traditional export sectors particularly female dominated TC. Thus, the scaling down of TC SOEs was not offset by comparable growth of privately owned companies in the sector or in manufacturing more generally (El-Haddad 2009a). In less than a decade between 1997 and 2006 the TC industry has lost about 16% of its labor force, equal to over 50,000 jobs (El-Haddad 2012) causing an absolute decline in absolute female employment, though not relative employment in the sector ( _ibid_ .).

But liberalization in Egypt was _partial_ or _hybrid_ . The hybrid liberalization model adopted in Egypt from the 70s through to the early 2000s implied that the transition to a market economy was not preceded by the necessary regulatory framework such as the enactment of a competition law, the establishment of competition and consumer protection authorities, or the establishment of modern dispute resolution mechanisms (El-Haddad 2023).<sup>2</sup> These took place only decades later around 2005. This hybrid liberalization model supported the growth of crony capitalism in Egypt which further restricted decent employment opportunities for the masses (El-Haddad 2020). As a result, the informal sector emerged as a ‘survival sector’ in the country (Tansel and Ozdemir 2019; El-Haddad and Gadallah 2021). But with its growth as a survival sector, the dominance of the male figure as a bread earner (Hoodfar 1997; El-Feki et al. 2017), traditional stereotyping and the constraints women face in joining this sector (Assaad 2005), the informal sector has also been gradually ‘de-feminized’ (Assaad 2002). Similar to its formal sector counterpart, the sector has been overemploying men. In fact, the formal sector has been employing 10 times as many women on average compared to its informal counterpart.<sup>3</sup> This is true in absolute terms, in relative terms, however, men are on average four times more likely to be informally employed as women (EIFBS). As a result the informal sector has further entrenched the gender employment gap in the country.<sup>4</sup>

# **3. EIFBS Survey Instrument and Stylized Facts**

_EIFBS Survey Instrument and Sampling Design_ We use unique and recently collected data from the self-designed 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) of 2,383 Egyptian manufacturing firms. The data

> 2 See El-Haddad (2008) on dispute resolution in TC in Egypt

> 3 Calculated from EIFBS data.

> 4 Most recently there has been a very slight trend in increased female self-employment including in the household enterprise, especially in fashion and catering – also considered informal activities - triggered by increased access to digitization and online platforms. Data on these trends remain largely unaccounted for in establishment surveys but have resurfaced in results based on the Egyptian Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey.

4