children, while the positive effect for non-employed people of working age reduces. In addition, in-kind transfers result in increasing redistribution within the employed population of working age.

**Figure 16. Structure of net beneficiaries and payers of fiscal system by socio-economic status**

<!-- Start of picture text --> payers payers<br>beneficiaries beneficiaries<br>payers payers<br>beneficiaries beneficiaries<br>payers payers<br>beneficiaries beneficiaries<br>Population Population<br>0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%<br>children children<br>working age, employed working age, employed<br>working age, partly employed working age, partly employed<br>working age, non-employed working age, non-employed<br>above working age, employed above working age, employed<br>above working age, non-employed above working age, non-employed<br>Effect with relation to the market income according to the PGT Effect with relation to the market income according to the PDI<br>approach approach<br>Final Final<br>income income<br>income income<br>Consumable Consumable<br>income income<br>Disposable Disposable<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note_ . HBS does not contain information on social economic status of respondents. Employed where considered those receiving income employment for more than 6 months. Those receiving employment related income for less than 6 months and those reported income from self-employment where considered as partly employed. Those who did not report any employment related income were considered onoemployed. This group comprises unemployed and economically inactive, including housewives, students, disabled persons. _Source_ : own estimates based on CEQ methodology.

Despite generally benefiting from fiscal policy, children still have a higher risk of fiscal impoverishment than the population on average (see Table 11). An especially high risk is observed for large families with three or more children. The existing tax burden appears to be too high for households with several dependents and it is not fully mitigated by the system of child allowances. Other social vulnerable groups also face a high risk of fiscal impoverishment. In particular, fiscal policy may affect the welfare of partly employed or self-employed people. Being low paid and bearing tax obligations related to labor market participation determine the high risk of poverty for this group. The same applies to those living in rural areas, where employment opportunities are limited to low paid jobs in agriculture.

**Table 11. Fiscal impoverishment in relation to market income by social vulnerable groups, headcount, % of group**

||**Pensions asgov**<br>|**ernment transfer**<br>|**Pensions as d**<br>|**eferred income**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**disposable income**|**consumable income**|**disposable income**|**consumable income**|
|children|3.96|6.41|3.40|5.85|
|working age partly employed|3.98|6.56|4.28|7.37|
|working age non-employed|2.71|3.74|2.88|4.58|
|rural area household member|3.52|5.89|2.70|6.53|
|lone parent household member|3.54|5.37|2.81|4.59|
|large family (3+ children)member|10.68|12.89|6.43|10.65|
|average|1.89|3.25|1.89|3.56|

_Source_ : own estimates based on CEQ methodology.

# **4.2. Distributional impact and marginal contributions of fiscal interventions**

Concentration curves of fiscal interventions help understand whether a particular intervention is equalizing or not. If the curve of the intervention is above the 45-degree line (i.e. concentration coefficient is negative), it is progressive and equalizing. However, the intervention can be equalizing even if it is regressive and below the 45degree line. To be equalizing, the concentration curve of a transfer only needs to be above the selected income 29