teaching labor force. The numbers redistributed were: 644 in 2008, 0 in 2009, 344 in 2010, 360 in 2011, 552 in 2012, 502 in 2013, 166 in 2014, and 331 in 2015. Some teachers who were transferred were moved to isolated parts of the district.

Importantly for our purposes, the first round of redistribution (2007-2008) happened just before the central government issued Government Regulation 74/2008 which made it compulsory for teachers to teach 24 hours face-to-face to be eligible for the professional allowance. In contrast to District A, then, redistribution does not appear to have been conceived from the outset as a way of ensuring that teachers receive the professional allowance. Rather technocratic concerns seem to have had a more significant influence reflecting two factors. The first relates to the personal capacities of the district’s _bupati_ from 2005 to 2015. Several informants described the _bupati_ as ‘educated’ and ‘capable of thinking’. The second factor is his apparent political strategy of seeking legitimacy for his education policies by securing the support of international donors. Under his rule, District B became home to a wide range of donor education projects including Bermutu, Prodep, and a UNICEF project on school-based management. As we note below, this meant that local education officials had access to technocratic ideas and policy solutions concerning teacher distribution at a crucial moment.

The politics of teacher redistribution proceeded in eight main stages.

- First, the _bupati_ was elected in 2005 on the basis of promises to transform District B into a ‘Clever District’ ( _Kabupaten Cerdas_ ). Teacher redistribution was not explicitly part of this agenda at this point. His five-year development plan for 2005-2010 identified education as a priority sector but made no mention of teacher redistribution.<sup>60</sup>

- Second, the government of District B applied for and was selected to be part of a World Bank-MoEC pilot study on teacher management. This study dealt with, among other things, issues of teacher distribution (see World Bank and MoEC 2010). This introduced the regional government, in particular the education agency, to relevant technocratic ideas.<sup>61</sup>

- Third, recognizing that the _bupati_ was open to ideas for reform—indeed, in all likelihood demanding them—education agency officials carried out a mapping of teacher distribution within the district and presented the results to him.<sup>62</sup>

- Fourth, education agency officials began to ‘socialize’ teacher redistribution among parliamentary representatives through working group meetings ( _rapat kerja)_ with members of the DPRD committee (Komisi 2) responsible for education.<sup>63</sup>

- Fifth, teacher redistribution was carried out in 2007-2008. This precipitated a lot of complaints, many of which were directed to the DPRD. According to the DPRD representative that we interviewed, the DPRD held firm, having agreed to the policy.<sup>64</sup> The Bermutu project started in 2008—District B was one of the project’s pilot regions. This project focused mainly on teacher training but also had a component related to the development of a teacher database.

- Sixth, teacher redistribution was subject to challenge in the local state administrative court (PTUN) around 2008-2009 (the dates are a little unclear). Only a small number of teachers were involved in the PTUN case (between 1 and 3 depending on the source of

> 60 Interviews with the current head of education agency in District B who was the head of the Basic Education branch in the mid-2000s, District B, July 2015; and the former rector of the local state university (former IKIP). District B, August 2015.

> 61 We wish to thank Susi Iskandar for her advice on this point.

> 62 Interview with the head of education agency in District B, July 2015.

> 63 Interview with a member of Komisi 2, District B, July 2015.

> 64 Interview with a member of Komisi 2, District B, July 2015.

43