rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the business community, others focus on the opinions of expatriates, and some are broad-based surveys of citizens.

The two types of sources of governance data each have their advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of polls of experts is that they are explicitly designed for cross-country comiparability, and considerable effort is placed in the benchmarking process which ensures this. However, the difficulties with such measures are also clear. Typically they are based on the opinions of only a few experts per country, and the quality of the country ratings depends to a great extent on the knowledge of experts regarding the countries they are assessing. The ratings are particularly prone to two types of feedback: countries with good economic outcomes may be more likely to receive favourable ratings, and country rankings by other organizations are frequently an input into the rating process of each organization. Country ratings may also be affected by the political or ideological agenda of the organization producing the ratings. Despite these difficulties, we believe that there are at least two reasons to think that on average, such sources provide valuable information on governance. First, we find that the indicators produced by such organizations generally correlate strongly with measures based on surveys of residents and entrepreneurs. Second, we find the fact that commercial rating organizations such as EIU, DRI and PRS are able to consistently sell their assessments to commercial subscribers for considerable feies to be convincing evidence that these sources are in fact producing useful information.<sup>6</sup> The advantage of surveys is that they reflect the opinions of a larger number of respondents that are more cloisely connected with the countries they are assessing. Nevertheless, they suffer from two disadvantages. First, survey questions can be interpreted in context- or culture-specific ways. For example, a response regarding the prevalence of "improper practices" is coloured by country-specific perceptions of what uimproper practices" are perceived to be. This will hinder the cross-country comparability of responses to otherwise identical questions.<sup>7</sup> Second, cross-country 6 For example, as of May 1999 an annual subscription to EIU's Country Risk Service costs $625 US per year, an annual subscription to PRS's Intemational Country Risk Guide on CD-ROM costs $4500 US per year.

7 A related problem is that residents of particular countries may have a broad-based predisposition to overstate or understate governance problems in that country (see Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobat6n (1999) and Kaufmann and Wei (1999)).

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> 800<br>9<br>o 600<br>a<br>=<br>=<br>c<br>D<br>CcS 400<br>a<br>w<br>wo<br>=<br>as}<br>><br>200<br>=<br>0<br>Oinov2014 Otjan2015 Oimar2015 Oimay2015 Otjul2015 Oisep2015 O1tnov2015<br>Oidec2014 Olfeb2015 Olapr2015 O1jun2015. Olaug2015 Oloct2015 Oidec201<br>Trivia date<br>— Nutrition& Stimulation — Nutrition<br>—— Stimulation<br><!-- End of picture text -->
13 Although no single definition of nutritional risk exists, it can be considered "the chance of death, ill health, malfunction, poor achievement in body size or hunger due to insufficient food" (McLean, 1987). To that end, we specify a set of structural relationships which are assumed to portray the nutritional and health aspects of household behavior. In the paradigm of partial equilibria, the microeconomic study of nutrition has focused on several critical relationships. These relationships, as portrayed in Figure 1, depict an economic view of common factors affecting the diet and nutritio- 1 status:

-

- (a) Incomes and prices purchasing power and food availability in the household;"

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- (b) Tastes food preferences, education, etc.

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- (c) Family size and composition per capita purchasing power and food availability;

- (d) Food consumption, quantity and quality;

- (e) Health care and practices;

- (f) Environment;

- (g) Development and policy

The type of intervention that will be most efficient in alleviating malnutrition will depend on whether, and to what extent, the above-mentioned causal factors contribute to the problem at the household level. This would help identify the means and the social cost of the intervention. Clearly, n Situations of famine in which food is not available in sufficient quantities for the entire community are not considered here explicitly, in part because the situation is beyond household control.
Beyond the estimated per capita GDP turning point, PM 2.5 concentration levels start to fall as per capita GDP increases. This shows that even though pollution arises as a consequence of growth, cities that continue to develop above a certain threshold learn to manage its effects and are able to reduce pollution levels while still growing. However, the willingness to address these issues may depend on which population group (or country) faces the major burden of the negative externality (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992). In this section of the EKC we find a variety of cities at different stages of development, with no clear pattern regarding geographical location. However, as we approach the minimum turning point, most of the cities, as expected, are located in OECD countries.

The fact that different sections of the EKC can sometimes be associated with a particular region is shown in Figure 4. The only region that contributes to the first section of the curve (positive slope) is Sub‐Saharan Africa. As discussed before, cities in this region are experiencing rapid growth and increasing pollution levels. Cities at the top of the curve are located in South Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa, with some cities beyond the turning point, experiencing lower levels of PM 2.5. The negative slope section of the EKC includes a mix of cities from almost every region: East Asia Pacific and Middle Eastern and North Africa extend throughout all this section, while Latin America, Europe and Central Asia concentrate on the middle part. As mentioned before, cities in OECD countries are at the bottom of the curve, highly developed with the lowest pollution levels.

_Figure 4: Regional Environmental Kuznets Curve_ <!-- Start of picture text --> City PM 2.5 and GDP per Capita<br>Environmental Kuznets Curve, by Region<br>EAP ECA LAC<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>MENA OECD SAR<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0 2 4 0 2 4<br>SSA<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0 2 4<br>City GDP per capita (log)<br>PM 2.5 Annual Mean<br><!-- End of picture text --> 19
37 and stabilization programs. More specifically, according to these results inseitutional. reforms that reduce government's ability to engage in discretionary unexpected policies will increase their credibility and, thus, will tend to reduce political instability and the equilibrium level of inflation. Our results also indicate that reforms that take away from government's hand money creation, and thus the possibility of using the inflation tax as a residual source of funds, will reduce the reliance on seignorage ard inflation. At a more general level, these results indicate that any reform that limits government's ability to behave strategically in an intertemporal sense, will increase macroeconomic stability, reduce inflation and result in lower deficits and domestic debt. In that regard a particularly important reform is the creation of an independent Central Banks that cannot be manipulated at will by the party in office. The recent (late 1989) Chilean and New Zealand experiences in this direction are, in fact, promising and are likely to be an important material for analysis in the years to come. From a more specific political angle the results reported in this paper also suggest that institutional reforms aimed at generating reduced polarization and lower (perceived) political instability will tend to result in a more stable macroeconomic environment. For example, it may be argued that an institutional setting with a reduced number of political parties (although not necessarily two) will in general, and with other things given, tend to result in lower deficits and inflation. Also policy actions tending - at reducing the degree of polarization such as, for example, reducing the extent of income inequality or the level of poverty -- are likely to end up resulting in a more stable macro environment.

Finally, and at a more practical level, these results can also be interpreted as providing empirical support for World Bank conditionality.
significant at less than 5% level (column 3, Table 9). For the remaining variables, we find that the effect of development expenditure is much higher for the services sectors than for the manufacturing sectors (significant at less than 1% level). The remaining terms do not show any significant effect on output change. In all the specifications reported in Table 9, our instruments performed reasonably well as reflected by the overdidentification test statistics reported in Panel A and the Shea partial correlations in Panel B.

# **6. Conclusion**

We sought to identify some of the causal factors in the impressive performance of the Indian economy since early 1980s. We find that the endowments of the highly skilled had a significant effect on the services output of individual states. However, manufacturing and agriculture have been largely immune to the availability of the highly skilled. The results also show that the key reason for this differential impact is the skill intensity of the sectors with the more skill intensive services sectors being the primary beneficiaries of greater skill availability.

A key issue is the relative role of history and human capital. It is increasingly believed that the root cause of backwardness in many parts of the world lies in their history. For example, the quality of a country's institutions may be related to its (colonial) history. Many institutions are slow to change which prompts pessimism about the likelihood of coming out of the poverty trap. An interesting question is whether building effective educational institutions is feasible in the medium term with a combination of domestic policy action and external assistance. If this is indeed the case, then, our 16
Global Investment Costs for Coastal Defense through the 21st Century Report to the World Bank 13 Note that the protected length in 2015 is maintained or grows over time under Strategies 1 to 4. Under Strategy 5 (Cost-benefit analysis) an optimal defended length (and defense standard) is determined in 2015 and maintained to 2100.

# **3.8 Socio-economic and sea-level rise scenarios**

Adaptation costs are assessed for a consistent set of socio-economic and sea-level rise scenarios over the 21st century. These scenarios are summarized in Table 5.

For socio-economic scenarios, we draw on the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs), version 9 provided by IIASA and use three scenarios: SSP2, SSP3 and SSP5 (IIASA, 2016; O’Neill et al., 2014).

Three global mean sea-level rise scenarios are taken assuming relatively low, intermediate and relatively high emissions, respectively. They are use the HadGEM-ES2 model. These are the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile of RCP2.6, the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of RCP4.5, and the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of RCP8.5 (all taken from Hinkel et al., 2014). Henceforth these are just termed RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, respectively.

Table 5: The socio-economic and sea-level rise scenarios applied in this study. Base year for sea-level rise is the 1985 to 2005 average.

|**Year**||**2015**|**2030**|**2050**|**2075**|**2100**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Global**<br>**population**|**SSP2**|7.4|8.4|9.4|9.7|9.2|
|**(billions)**|**SSP3**|7.4|8.7|10.1|11.6|12.8|
||**SSP5**|7.4|8.2|8.8|8.6|7.7|
|**GDP per capita**<br>**(US$, global**|<br>**SSP2**|14,400|20,800|30,000|46,700|72,600|
|**average)**|**SSP3**|14,300|18,500|20,800|23,000|26,000|
||**SSP5**|14,400|26,200|51,700|97,500|170,000|
|**Sea-level rise**<br>**(global coastal**|**RCP2.6 5th percentile**|0.02|0.06|0.11|0.17|0.23|
|**average, m)**|**RCP4.5 50th percentile**|0.03|0.08|0.16|0.29|0.43|
||**RCP8.5 95th percentile**|0.04|0.13|0.28|0.59|1.03|
3. _The government’s track record_ . A government that has generated impressive economic growth in the past is likely to interest foreign investors regardless of outsiders’ appraisals of its institutions. We therefore consider past economic growth as an implicit measure of government track record. Since past policies are most useful in predicting the future in countries with stable governments, we also include past government stability as a variable in our analysis.

Within this framework, we show that China’s track record of past growth goes far in explaining the magnitude of its FDI inflow, despite offsetting deficiencies in the quality of its government. This framework, estimated using country-level FDI inflows and national government quality measures, is applied out-of-sample to predict the allocation of FDI inflow to China, given analogous measures of its quality of government. The errors in this out-of-sample prediction exercise are comparable to those in the initial cross country data used to calibrate the model.

Repeating this exercise using different subsets of our “quality of government” measures is also instructive. If we calibrate the cross-country model using only "control of corruption" from the _International Country Risk Guide_ (ICRG), China actually seems to attract appropriate levels of FDI. But if we calibrate the model using only measures of the “strength of constraints on executive power” or "responsible government", China seems to attract “too much” FDI.

We draw three conclusions from these results:

1. “Good government” and expectations of stable and strong economic growth attract foreign direct investment.  China’s large FDI inflow, interpreted in this light, is not mysterious.  Indeed, if China had higher quality government, it would attract even more foreign direct investment.

2. The dimensions of “good government” that matter to FDI inflow do not seem to include general measures of the quality of government – limits on corruption, expropriation risk, 2
in M&A activity. Likewise, a surge is GF-led when more than half of the increase in FDI can be attributed to an increase in GF investments.

As indicated by Calderon et al. (2004), there are several potential problems with combining aggregate FDI inflow data with M&A data. First, FDI flows are measured on an accruals basis, while M&As are recorded at the time of an announcement or closure of a deal. As such, an FDI surge in a given year, for example, may be attributed to a sharp increase in M&A in the year before. Second, calculating GF FDI as the residual of FDI and M&A may possibly pollute the data with some international transactions that are not GF FDI. We control for these problems by verifying whether a FDI surge can indeed be attributed to either an increase in M&A or GF FDI and correct for anomalies in the data by accounting for the share of M&A activity in the year before the surge. When values for M&A activity are missing, it is assumed that the surge could be attributed to a surge in GF FDI. Exactly the same procedure is applied to identifying GF-led and M&A-led FDI stops.

Figure 1 on FDI surges and stops in Algeria illustrates how such events are identified. The left panel of Figure 1 assesses the first condition, namely that we speak of a surge if the FDI-to-GDP ratio increases more than one standard deviation above its five year rolling mean. We see that in Algeria this is the case in several years in the mid1990s and the early and late 2000s. Likewise, a stop is identified when the FDI-to-GDP ratio decreases more than one standard deviation below its five year rolling mean. This is the case in 1992, 2003 and 2010. However, in order to qualify for a surge, the increase should fall within the top 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of the entire sample’s FDI-to-GDP ratio growth, meaning an increase of at least 0.82 percentage points, marked by the top horizontal line in the right panel of Figure 1. Likewise, in order to qualify for a stop, the increase should fall within the bottom 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of the entire sample’s FDI-to-GDP ratio growth, 8
age of the eldest child under eight years old under their supervision. We used this information to assess respondents’ eligibility to participate in the parenting intervention.<sup>20</sup> _Midline survey._ The midline survey consisted of 22 questions, divided into two sets. The first set of questions asked about respondents’ knowledge of concepts and the use of techniques taught in the parenting intervention.<sup>21</sup> The second set included questions on respondents’ stress levels and their attitudes toward violent parenting. The average completion time of the survey was 10 minutes. As explained in the previous section, some individuals responded to the survey over the phone and others completed an online form assessed via Whatsapp. All answers were self-reported.<sup>22</sup> _Intervention’s baseline and endline surveys._ For the impact evaluation of the parenting intervention, we conducted baseline and endline surveys (Amaral et al., 2021). We use information from these surveys regarding respondents’ stress levels and their attitudes toward violent parenting practices.<sup>23</sup>

# **3.2 Outcomes**

For the survey-mode experiment, we focus our analysis on the following main outcomes: completion rate and consistency of responses to sensitive questions.<sup>24</sup>

**A. Completion rate:** It consists of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the survey was completed (either by phone or WhatsApp) within the three days it was open (through October 19, 2020). Both surveys were designed to make it impossible to skip any question. Information on completion status was obtained from administrative reports provided by the survey firm.

20See eligibility criteria for the impact evaluation in footnote 6.

21In Amaral et al. (2021), we use participants’ responses about the use and knowledge of different stressmanagement and positive-parenting techniques and concepts to assess their assimilation of the content provided in the parenting intervention. In addition to this midline survey, we conducted three other surveys with different samples of individuals. Each survey asked about techniques taught in the previous two to three weeks.

> 22Following information protection protocols, data collected from all the other surveys was stored on a private server of the survey firm. Only the project staff and researchers had access to this.

23To collect baseline data, we sent a text message to caregivers inviting them to self-complete the baseline survey by clicking on a link included in the message.

> 24See Table A8 for further details on the description and data used to estimate the main outcomes of this survey-mode experiment.

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# **1. Introduction**

There is an increasing concern in developing countries about competition from China and India in the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). The outstanding economic growth, together with the large populations and low wages in these emerging economies make them particularly attractive to foreign investors. In fact, China and India were ranked the two most attractive global business locations by transnational companies in UNCTAD’s survey of FDI prospects.<sup>1</sup> The emergence of China and India as potential competitors for FDI, together with a slowdown in FDI inflows to other developing countries at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century raised the alarm. For many, the relocation of production facilities from, for example, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to China and India has already begun. The World Investment Directory claims that “...[the] relocation of the maquila industry was largely, but not exclusively, due to fiercer competition from Asia”, when referring to the slowdown in Mexico’s FDI inflows.<sup>2</sup> A first look at the data reveals that foreign capital stocks (FCS) have become increasingly important in developing countries, including LAC, during the past 15 years. By 2004, aggregate stocks in LAC reached $600 billion dollars, about six times more than in 1990.<sup>3</sup> More than 80 percent of these stocks are concentrated in five countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. Over the same period, FCS in China grew at an even faster speed, from $20 billion in 1990 to $245 billion in 2004, the

> 1 UNCTAD (2005) FDI prospects survey.

> 2 UNCTAD (2004).

> 3 UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database (www.unctad.org). We do not include Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands in the Latin American figures as part of LAC.

1
harmonization of regulations. Second, as in NAFTA, the agreement itself can serve as a political anchor to the reformists. That is, if the PTA enjoys strong multi-partisan backing, it can be used as a justification for domestic reforms even when they hurt particular interests (e.g. the elimination of NTMs benefitting domestic producers). Third, as in ASEAN, regional institutions can provide a useful forum to exchange experiences, to suggest directions for further moves, and to motivate reformers by overcoming their isolation at home. Finally, a guillotine approach to reviewing, streamlining, eliminating and updating regulations without the need for lengthy and costly legal action on each regulation could be adopted as in Eastern European countries during their transition.<sup>20</sup>

**Streamlining unnecessary NTMs in PAFTA countries would aim at reducing compliance costs by avoiding unnecessary stringency; reducing red tape by streamlining procedures; and increasing predictability through better transparency.** When rule-setting processes risk slipping into hidden protectionism and regulatory proliferation, governments must rely on commitment mechanisms. International or regional agreements provide that commitment. They provide a framework for distinguishing product regulations from NTMs. Several mechanisms have been put in place to limit NTM proliferation and hidden protectionism, at the multilateral level (e.g. the WTO and OECD) and at the regional level (through free-trade agreements like NAFTA or ASEAN). PAFTA could become the framework for the following concrete policy initiatives:

- **Improving transparency on the prevalence of NTMs.** NTMs are technical and diverse in nature. Because of their complexity, little is known about them, not only by private-sector operators but sometimes even within governments, as they can originate from a wide array of agencies and ministries. A number of surveys convey information on private-sector perceptions of NTMs and their effects on business, but the information is rarely reconciled with government authorities and sometimes reflects misunderstandings or inaccurate information. A first step toward streamlining NTMs is to draw up national inventories of them, based on accurate information, vetted by government authorities. Yet, because of the potential vast array of NTMs, the inventory would need to be prioritized. Given the importance given to trade facilitation in the services agenda, an initial focus could be on barriers that have broad impacts across many products such as licensing and permit requirements for importers and exporters, rules of origin and rules affecting cross-border transportation.

> 20 The guillotine approach provides both a quick fix to the most critical problems of inefficient and anti-market regulations, and a permanent system for quality control of new business regulations to avoid re-occurrence of the same problems. It can be used to improve future legal security by establishing a central electronic regulatory registry with positive security.

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