rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **3.2.2 The likelihood of success in a dispute**

Another element relating to the size of the expected benefits are factors affecting the probability of a successful economic resolution to a potential WTO dispute. Due to the self-enforcing nature of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, exporting countries can only enforce their rights through actual or implicit threats of retaliation against offending trading partners.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, we hypothesize that a U.S. remedy is more likely to be challenged if the affected foreign country is bilaterally powerful (with respect to the U.S.) because this positively affects the probability of a successful economic outcome. Conditional on a “guilty” Panel and/or Appellate Body ruling, the U.S. may be more likely to bring its WTO-inconsistent policy into conformity with its obligations if there is a credible retaliatory cost for failing to do so. We therefore measure the capacity for the foreign country to credibly threaten a tariff retaliation by using the share of U.S. total exports sent to the exporting country. To construct this measure, we use the U.S. bilateral export data provided in Feenstra et al. (2002).

Finally, in an additional specification that serves as a robustness check, we utilize additional explanatory variables designed to capture whether the affected country can contribute economic evidence of the U.S. failure to show injury to the domestic U.S. industry in the initial trade remedy investigation. The failure to find injury would be evidence to support the claim that U.S.-imposed remedy was WTO-inconsistent which, ceteris paribus, would result in a higher probability of winning the case by having a DSU panel find in the complainants’ favor.<sup>20</sup> We will discuss details of variables used for these measures in section 4.2 below.

# **3.3 Expected Costs to Initiating a Dispute Against the U.S.**

In this section we consider the basic litigation costs to filing a formal complaint against a U.S. trade remedy.<sup>21</sup> When would the expected resource costs to an exporting country of formally initiating a dispute against 19 Using a sample of GATT/WTO disputes initiated and completed over the 1973-1998 period, Bown (2004a) has shown that the more powerful is the complainant exporter with respect to its capacity to engage in tariff retaliation against the respondent, the greater are the trade liberalization gains that the respondent yields to the complainant at the conclusion of the dispute.

20 As Sykes (2003) and Irwin (2003) point out in related safeguard cases which also have an injury requirement, merely showing evidence of injury is not sufficient, the WTO Appellate Body in particular has been concerned with evidence attributing injury to imports.

21 In our robustness checks described in section 5.2.4 below, we also investigate measures of political economic costs that may affect the litigation decision as well.

12
Education and Productivity in Developing Countries: An Aggregate Production Function Approach Lawrence J. Lau, Dean T. Jamison and Fr6deric F. Louat

# 1. Introduction

Education is well known to have a direct and positive effect on economic development,<sup>economic</sup> growth and productivity. For examples: Denison (1967, 1979), using a growth-accounting framework, found that between ten and fifteen percent of the growth in the real national income of the United<sup>States</sup> can be attributed to education'; Jamison and Lau (1982), summarizing more than thirty<sup>studies of the</sup> relationship between agricultural output and education around the world, estimated that<sup>each additional</sup> year of education achieved by the head of an agricultural household increases its annual<sup>agricultural</sup> output, holding the agricultural inputs constant, by an average of slightly less than two percene;<sup>Lau and</sup> - Yotopoulos (1989), on the basis of three years of intercountry data<sup>-</sup> 1960, 1970 and 1980 assembled and constructed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985), estimated that every increase in the<sup>number of</sup> agricultural college and university graduates per ten thousand of the agricultural population of<sup>a country</sup> 'Denison also attributed similar, but somewhat smaller, percentages of the growth in real national income to education in other countries. See also Bowman (1980).

'See Jamison and Lau (1982), pp. 35-38.
World Bank have highlighted salinity intrusion in coastal Bangladesh as a critical part of adaptation to climate change (Dasgupta et al. 2014a and Dasgupta et al. 2014b).<sup>5</sup> Resources will remain scarce, and mobilizing a cost-effective response will require an integrated spatial analysis of salinity diffusion, its impacts, and the costs of prevention, adaptation and remediation. This paper attempts to contribute by addressing two critical components of the problem: salinity changes in the coastal region of Bangladesh, and their consequences for maternal and child health in the region. The paper focuses on the salinity of drinking water consumed during pregnancy, which extensive medical research has linked to maternal hypertension, preeclampsia and post-partum morbidity and mortality.<sup>6</sup>

# **Methods**

# _<u>Previous Research</u>_

Recent micro-level research on drinking water salinity in the coastal region of Bangladesh and its impact on hypertension in pregnant women (Khan, et al. 2008, Khan, et al. 2011) draws on numerous international observational studies and clinical trials that establish a strong link between higher salt intake and elevated blood pressure (Alderman 2000; Calabrese and Tuthill 1981; Hallenbeck, et al. 1981; He and MacGregor 2007; Midgley, et al. 1996; Welty, et al. 1986). The current state of the art has been established by Khan, et al. (2011), who focus on the links between drinking water salinity and

> 5 Sarwar (2005) and SRDI (1998a,b, 2000, 2010) have documented changes in salinity that have accompanied coastal subsidence and thermal expansion of the ocean.  Detailed assessments of salinization have employed two principal methods.  One approach focuses on simulation of salinity change in rivers and estuaries, using hydraulic engineering models whose results are compared with actual measures (Bhuiyan and Dutta 2011; Mohal et al. 2006; Aerts, et al. 2000; Nobi and Das Gupta 1997).  Another approach focuses on local salinity impacts, using surveys and descriptive statistics (Mahmood, et al. 2010; Khan, et al. 2008, 2011; Haque 2006; Sarwar 2005; Rahman and Ahsan 2001; Hassan and Shah 2006; Karim, et al. 1982, 1990).  In the most comprehensive study to date, Dasgupta, et al. (2014a) develop detailed projections of river salinity through 2050 in Bangladesh’s coastal region.

> 6 This is a serious public health issue because hypertension in pregnancy is associated with numerous maternal and infant health threats, including impaired liver function, intrauterine growth retardation, preterm birth, and maternal and perinatal deaths (Sibai, 2002).

3
|**Label**|**Short description**||**Source**|**Mean**|<br>**SD**|**#Obs**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Medium model_|||||||
|lcredit|Log (domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP)||WDI|3.29|1.04|1,162|
|lFDIstock_ipol|Log (inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP)||UNCTAD|2.73|1.52|1,480|
|lEDI_ipol|Theil index for export diversification||IMF & UNCTAD|1.19|0.38|1,493|
|lEDI_ipol_sq|Squared Theil index for export diversification||IMF & UNCTAD|1.55|0.85|1,493|
|actotal|Political violence (magnitude of major events)||Systemicpeace|0.75|1.73|1,389|
|_Large model_|||||||
|lhc|Log of human capital index||PWT10.0|0.72|0.35|1,329|
|dgini|Change in the Gini coefficient of market incomes||SWIID|0.18|1.17|940|
|_Additional vari_|_ables available in the data set_||||||
|emprate|Employment-to-population rate||PWT10.0|0.39|0.09|1,491|
|agri_valadded|Agriculture,<br>forestry,<br>and<br>fishing,<br>value<br>(% of GDP)|added|WDI|15.29|13.77|1,299|
|remittances|Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)||WDI|3.66|10.31|1,196|

-10-
**Figure 5.7. Cross-plot between demeaned aggregate productivity and GDP per capita (% of US)**

**Figure 5.8. Cross-plot between Figure 5.9. Cross-plot between demeaned aggregate productivity demeaned aggregate productivity and ranking on the ease of doing and quality of overall business* infrastructure from ACR 2007 ***

<!-- Start of picture text --> 3.0 2.5 2.5<br>2.5 R2 = 0.66 R2 = 0.6<br>2.0 2.0<br>R 2 = 0.58<br>2.0<br>1.5 1.5<br>1.5<br>1.0 1.0<br>1.0<br>0.5 0.5 0.5<br>0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 0.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5<br>GDP per capita (relative to U.S) Ranking Ease of Doing Business 2007 Quality of overall Infrastructure ACR 2007<br>Demeaned Aggregate Productivity<br>Demeaned Aggregate Productivity Demeaned Aggregate Productivity<br><!-- End of picture text -->

*Rank is computed as: (total number of firms in DBR-Rank)/ total number of firms in DBR Source: Authors ́ calculations with IC data, Doing Business Report (2007) and Penn World Table.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 5.10. Cross-plot between Figure 5.11. Cross-plot between Figure 5.12. Cross-plot between<br>demeaned aggregrate productivity demeaned aggregate productivity demeaned aggregate productivity<br>and firms ́ perceptions on and percentage absolute and percentage absolute<br>infrastructure as an obstacle contribution of infrastructure to contribution of infrastructure to<br>average log-productivity average productivity via<br>simulations<br>2.5 2.5 2.5<br>R2 = 0.47<br>2.0 2.0 2.0<br>R 2 = 0.25<br>1.5 1.5 1.5<br>1.0 1.0 1.0<br>R 2 = 0.36<br>0.5 0.5 0.5<br>0.0<br>0.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>8 13 18 23 28 33 Percentage Absolute Contribution of Infrastructure to Average Log- Percentage Absolute Contribution of Infrastructure to Average<br>Firms' perceptions of infrastructure as an abstacle Productivity Productivity via simulations<br>Demeaned Aggregate Productivity<br>Demeaned Aggregate Productivity Demeaned Aggregate Productivity<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors ́ calculations with IC data.

Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the linear correlations between demeaned aggregate productivity and percentage absolute contribution to allocative efficiency TFP in logs and allocative efficiency via simulations, correspondingly. There is a negative relation in both figures. But the linear correlation is smaller in the case of the average log productivity (correlation coefficient equal to -0.31) than in the case of allocative efficiency with TFP in levels (correlation coefficient equal to -0.49).

40
They have higher cost ratios due essentially to higher wages. This implies that they recruit and maintain a more skilled workforce, required to develop more sophisticated and profitable business lines. Therefore, they have higher cost ratios but this is more than compensated by larger revenues and profits. They also tend to have lower ratios of loan loss provisions, which reflect better credit allocation policies and asset quality, and also contribute to their profitability. Listed banks are subject to stricter corporate governance and disclosure requirements, and these factors could be driving their better performance. These results are consistent with a recent survey of bank governance in MENA (OECD (2009)) that report the poor corporate governance of family-owned banks, especially non-listed banks, and stresses the extent of lending to close relatives and other connected parties that ultimately results in their poor financial performance.

# _Policy Implications_

As mentioned in the introductory sections of this paper, the arguments that have been put forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks include market failures resulting from asymmetric information and poor enforcement of contracts that restrict access to credit; the provision of essential financial services in remote areas (where supply may be restricted by large fixed costs); and the provision of counter-cyclical finance to prevent an excessive contraction of credit during a financial crisis.

These arguments may justify the presence of state banks in some MENA countries. In particular, the weak financial infrastructure in MENA (weak credit reporting systems, weak creditor rights) is a major factor hindering access to finance in the region and provides a rationale for policy interventions, including partial credit guarantees and the use of state banks. Ideally, these institutional and legal weaknesses should be addressed head on, and policy interventions should become more targeted and limited in volume, but in some countries it may take time to correct these deficiencies, due to technical limitations, political limitations, or both. During this period, state banks may make a contribution to access in areas such as SME finance, housing finance, infrastructure and agriculture.

At the same time, this paper shows that state bank interventions may come with a significant cost. These banks are much less profitable than private banks, due inter alia to more government financing, excessive employment, larger costs, and lower asset quality. The profitability of state 25
fields in the mid-1990s. Thus we can only suggest the factors that lead to specific countries acquiring important production roles.

One might ask whether the new republics of Central Asia are likely to become major players in the international heroin business, providing more than transshipment to the Russian and Eastern European market. They certainly have low cost land and labor, as well as apparently favorable agricultural conditions for growing opium and a traditional expertise. Some governments, such as those of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are desperate for foreign currency, have few alternative sources and little concern about their standing in international organizations; they are unlikely to aggressively enforce prohibitions against growing opium poppies or to have the capability to do so even if they desired to. They are certain to be low cost producers.

But are they advantaged, compared to current low cost producers, notably Afghanistan and Myanmar? Though closer to Europe and with significant populations resident in Russia and perhaps even in Western Europe, the commercial connections with Western Europe are likely to be weak compared to Myanmar, which has established Thai and Chinese trafficking networks. The Central Asian republics will probably only become major players in the European opiate markets if there are disruptions (including rapid economic development) in the current major supplier countries.

This discussion has identified factors that might make a nation attractive for drug production and trafficking but not why the numbers actively participating are so small. It may be that drug-related corruption shows sharply declining marginal costs per transaction, or that there are high fixed costs to establishing international trading networks. The literature is silent on this matter, though Thoumi (2003) offers some suggestions on those non-economic factors that are most likely to affect national participation in the drug trade.

The modest share of Western retail prices associated with cocaine smuggling and illustrated in Table 6 is also easily explained.<sup>20</sup> Cocaine travels in large bundles at that stage; seizures suggest that shipments of 250-500 kilograms are quite common. Though large sums may be paid to American pilots for flying small planes carrying cocaine or for Honduran colonels to ignore their landing, these costs are defrayed over a large quantity. A pilot who demands $500,000 for flying a plane with 250 kilograms generates costs of only $2,000 per kilogram, less than 2 percent of the retail price. Even if the plane has to be abandoned after one flight, the capital cost of replacing the plane adds only another $2,000 to the kilogram price. For shipments in container cargo, seizure constitutes little more than a random tax collection; replacement cost

> 20 This analysis draws heavily on Reuter (1988).

13
(78.1% treatment, 80.4% control, p-value of test of equality 0.666). We believe this response rate to be excellent given the difficult conditions, and given there is no statistical difference in response rates by treatment group, assume attrition is at random for the purposes of analysis.

The survey asked questions about employment during 2014 to capture the time of the internship, and then questions about employment in the months of December 2014 and February 2015 to capture post-treatment employment outcomes.

# **5. Results**

We begin with descriptive information on what took place during the internships, followed by analysis of the impact of these internships on employment outcomes.

# **5.1. What did an internship entail?**

The modal intern worked six months as an intern. According to the administrative data, 59 of the 198 interns placed did not work the full six months because either the firm decided to no longer retain them, or they decided to leave. In the follow-up survey, 64 percent worked in the internship position for 6 months, while 24 percent worked for three months or less.

Interns were typically working around 40 hours per week, Sunday to Thursday. The jobs appear very similar in terms of what they entailed to the types of jobs the control group was doing. Table 3 uses the survey data to compare the different characteristics of work for those who worked in the treatment group in 2014 to those who worked in the control group. This conditions on working at all (the next subsection examines the treatment effect on work).

We see that the two groups are statistically similar in terms of the characteristics of their jobs conditional on working. The jobs pay an average of 55,000-59,000 rials per month (approximately US$255-270). They are mostly with private employers, in jobs related to the studies of the intern. In at least 80 percent of the cases, the intern says the job involves using a computer, that they learned technical skills on the job, and that they learned organizational skills on the job. However, as with jobs taken by the control group, three-quarters of the interns also say that they spent at least two hours per day on tasks they considered beneath them, and 59 percent were idle at the job at least five hours or more per week. The internships therefore appear to have involved the same mix of learning opportunities and less learning oriented activities as a typical job for this group.

10
on a faster schedule than the Green scenario. The investment cost of the Super Green scenario to 2050 is €54 billion (present value) or an average annual of 1.7 percent of GDP.

Implementation of the same set of aggressive energy efficiency measures is a key part of the Green and the Super Green scenarios, as these measures deliver low cost abatement in the short term, require moderate upfront investment, and have modest implementation barriers. Improving energy efficiency across the board in all economic sectors, but especially in residential and nonresidential sectors, offers the most effective and also viable means for containing the growth of energy demand, limiting investment requirements to meet the growing demand, and reducing GHG emissions. Beyond the climate agenda, improving energy efficiency is also critical for Romania’s competitiveness in the European Union. While the energy intensity of Romania’s economy has been decreasing for the past two decades, it is still one of the highest in the EU, and greater efficiency will go hand in hand with modernized and more competitive companies and sectors.

A lower carbon path for Romania’s energy sector imposes significant costs and complex planning challenges on the sector, in particular on power generation. Achieving emissions reduction targets beyond the EU 2020 targets--the Green (likely EU 2030 targets) and the Super Green (possible EU 2050 targets)–will require Romania to abandon plans for new coal-based power generation capacity and life-extension of existing plants. It will also require significant additional renewable generation capacity and, therefore, a regulatory environment that would promote it.

While this assessment included a set of generally-agreed technologies at costs based on today’s best analysis, both technologies and costs will surely evolve, and updated analysis will be needed. The TIMES/MARKAL supply model and the Energy Service Demand Analysis tool constructed for this analysis remain available for further development and application by the government for current and future policy questions related to the energy sector, in particular questions related to low carbon. The Ministry of Energy has already taken on these models to apply to critical questions in support of the country’s new energy strategy. The usefulness of such tools and models will only increase into the future as Romania begins to take a more active role in contributing to EU climate and energy policy, as well as implementing it.

23
Appendix I.A.6 Historical Demographic Data, Canada 1851-1971

|**Year**|1851|1861|1871|1881|1891|1901|1911|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Population aged 15 to 64/<br>population over 65 years old|19.65|17.93|14.97|14.04|13.04|12.00|13.46|
|Population aged 20 to 59/<br>populationover60yearsold|9.65|8.50|7.56|6.87|6.51|6.16|7.08|
|Percentage of population<br>over 60 years old|4.10|4.84|_5.52_|6.37|7.04|7.70|7.11|
|Percentage of population<br>under 15 years old|44.93|42.50|41.60|38.74|36.36|34.82|32.98|
|Women over 60 years old/<br>Men over 60 years old|0.85|0.81|0.82|0.89|0.91|0.94|0.93|
|**Year**|**1921**|**1931**|**1941**|**1951**|**1961**|**1971**||
|Population aged 15 to 64/<br>population over 65 years old|12.67|11.31|9.83|7.98|7.59|7.70||
|Population aged 20 to 59/<br>population over 60 years old|6.49|5.95|5.12|4.46|4.33|4.18||
|Percentage of population<br>over 60 years old|7.53|8.40|10.20|11.36|10.89|11.69||
|Percentage of population<br>underl5yearsold|34.39|31.62|27.80|30.34|34.13|29.58||
|Women over 60 years old/||||||||
|<br>Men over 60 years old|0.93|0.92|0.92|0.95|1.04|1.17||

Ratios calculated using data found in Mitchell, B. R. 1983 "International Historical Statistics: The Americas and Australasia".