rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- 31 -

# Table (3.3) Sudan's Real Exchange and its Determinants

||RER 1/|TOT|tx|tm|DC/GDP|H/GDP|(M-X)/GDP|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1970|100.00|100.00|0.08|0.52|0.29|0.12|-0.02|
|1971|94.43|100.06|0.09|0.52|0.31|0.11|0.02|
|1972|89.36|100.59|0.08|0.49|0.34|0.12|0.02|
|1973|80.21|100.53|0.07|0.39|0.35|0.14|-0.00|
|1974|64.62|103.18|0.08|0.42|0.32|0.13|0.04|
|1975|55.46|98.69|0.08|0.30|0.42|0.12|0.13|
|1976|53.62|99.31|0.09|0.38|0.45|0.12|0.11|
|1977|40.83|101.82|0.16|0.68|0.46|0.15|0.07|
|1978|43.00|102.87|0.12|0.51|0.46|0.18|0.09|
|1979|39.89|97.83|0.13|0.46|0.50|0.21|0.07|
|1980|40.14|90.42|0.09|0.38|0.49|0.19|0.13|
|1981|46.30|82.46|0.16|0.41|0.53|0.23|0.15|
|1982|52.17|79.54|0.17|0.22|0.42|0.19|0.16|
|1983|44.04|90.70|0.02|0.22|0.40|0.21|0.16|
|1984|40.79|99.30|0.05|0.48|0.39|0.20|0.08|
|1985|40.79|93.12|0.03|0.54|0.41|1.53|0.09|
|1986|41.45|95.74|0.05|0.37|0.37|0.25|0.08|
|1987|38.57|90.57|0.05|0.36|0.39|0.24|0.03|
|1988|28.48|85.38|0.04|0.36|0.39|0.23|0.09|

Notes: 1/ RER=exchange rate for exports/price of nontradables. (decrease indicates a real appreciation) Source: Elbadawi (1988)
� where, for any variable _x_ , _x_ = _x_<sup>_′_</sup> _/x_ , and _x_<sup>_′_</sup> is the value of _x_ after the shock. The change in intranational trade as a share of income is given by (see Proposition 2 in Arkolakis et al. 2012): Hence, in order to calculate the change in welfare associated with a partial ’death of distance’ offline, we need an estimation of the change in trade costs ( _t_<sup>�</sup> _ij_ ), as well as an estimation of the change in wages ( _w_ � _j_ ) in all _n_ countries. The former can be obtained using the estimates of the distance online and We use the _βD_ coefficients reported in columns (4) and (8) of Table 1 which have been consistently estimated using importer and exporter fixed effects specific to online and offline flows and a Poisson estimator to control for heteroscedasticity. We can then easily compute � _tij_ using an estimate of _ε_ for aggregate trade flows from the existing literature. Eaton and Kortum (2012) suggest that the current best estimate sets _ε_ = _−_ 4.

The estimation of _w_ � _j_ requires solving the general equilibrium wages of all countries in our sample. Taking the change in wages in the United States as num ́eraire ( _w_ �USA = 1), the change in wages in all other countries are implicitly given by (see Arkolakis et al. 2012): We solve the _n_ non-linear equations for the changes in wages ( _w_ � _j_ ) numerically using the Matlab solver. Substituting these and the estimates of the changes in trade costs in equation 16
Figure 12: Distribution of the US population across the world income distribution, in 2012 and 2030 <!-- Start of picture text --> 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100<br>Percentiles of Global Income Distribution<br>2012 2030<br>.1<br>.08<br>.06<br>Density<br>.04<br>.02<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations.

Notwithstanding the potential pressures on high income countries, overall the education wave will be pushing down inequality within countries. The Gini index is lower for almost all countries in the education wave when compared to the case of the no education wave. Figure 13 plots the difference in the Gini index by 2030 between the education wave and no educationwave scenarios for each country. A negative number denotes less inequality (an improvement) brought about by the education wave. For most of the 117 countries covered, changes in the within-country inequality are clearly more favorable with the education wave. Although the improvement did not completely reverse the increase in the overall withincountry inequality by 2030 (as shown in Table 6), it clearly ameliorates the deterioration.<sup>30</sup>

> 30 Even if the Gini indices in both scenarios would have deteriorated in 2030 from 2011, as long the index for the education wave is less than the other case, the result would come out as favorable towards reducing inequality.

28
# **3.2 Sample size and data collection**

## **3.2.1 Sample size**

In each country, around 3,000 respondents completed the survey. This number of survey respondents was determined by examining the sample size of other cross-country randomized survey experiments in this field and conducting statistical power calculations (see Appendix A for details). The split between the control and treatment groups was not even, as the control group received a higher share of respondents (40 percent in the control group and 20 percent in each of the three treatment groups). This arrangement ensured greater statistical power for the analysis because the treatment groups were pooled together for a lot of the analysis (see the following subsection for more details).<sup>11</sup> Specifically, in each country, there were at least 1,200 respondents in the control group and 600 respondents in each of the three treatment groups (1,800 in total). Seminal cross-country randomized survey experiments by Alesina et al. (2018, 2023) also had around 900 to 1,000 respondents in each treatment group in each country. Other studies in this field have had smaller sample sizes (Cruces et al. 2013; Karadja et al. 2017) and have still detected significant heterogeneous treatment effects based on prior beliefs. Furthermore, Haaland et al. (2023) summarize best practices in online randomized survey experiments that provide information interventions, and they suggest that having in the order of 700 respondents per treatment/control group should provide adequate power to detect an effect that is commonly observed in the literature.

## **3.2.2 Data collection**

The sample of respondents was collected via an online survey. Online surveys are a convenient way of collecting information rapidly, allowing for the use of visual stimuli and reducing the risk of experimenter demand and social desirability effects (Stantcheva 2022). However, there are challenges with representativeness in middle-income countries that need to be

> 11If respondents had been randomly allocated into the four groups equally (25 percent into each group), there would have been 750 respondents per country, which would have resulted in slightly lower statistical power to detect effects between the control group (i.e., 750 respondents per country) and the combined treatment groups (2,250 respondents per country) (25 percent control versus 75 percent any treatment).

23
rapidly. This expectation is also fed by a similar analysis of land prices in Krakow, Poland which shows that in that city the land price differential has already reached a market city differential of about 10 to 1. Polish urban reforms, in particular the restoration of private land ownership rights has been more thorough that what has been done so far in Russia. At this early stage in the development of the land market, location values are not yet being fully capitalized into property values. A morc normal price differential will only emerge when investors have more certainty about land tenure. when real estate information institutions become more proficient. and when economic and political conditions stabilize.

**FIGURE 3**

<!-- Start of picture text --> EMERGING MARKET LAND PRICE GRADIENTS<br>in Moscow and Krakow, Poland<br>100 s<br>I 9$S. . . ... .... ... ..... . . ... .. .. .... . ..... .. . ... . .. .... ... ...... .... . -.-....... .. .. .. . .... . . .. .... ... .. ..... . .... ..<br>10X 1 90 j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . - .. K X-_..... .. .. ... ...... .......... ......... ...... ... .. .. ... ..... ...... ........ ... .... .... . .......... ... ...... ... ............. ..... .......... ......................... -. - - .-- -----------<br>80 ........... . .. ............ ......... .......... ................................ - ............... .<br>l ...... -. \ -. - + - -- - 1h Me, rWr-- 1992<br>7 5 .. . ...... ....... .... ....... . .................. ... .. .. .. ...<br>70 5 . .. ..... f...... ur............h....<br>E 60 . .....................-.- ---- ---- --- ~............. _ - Uuscaw.-t99 -<br>50... . . ...... ....<br>4 0 ........- .- .5. . . . . ...... . ........<br>2 0 -.......-............................<br>30. .. .... ..<br>25 -. .- . .......... 7......... -<br>12 5 - - ..... .... ............. ..... .... .. ........... ...... ................... 20 _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~KSkow. ....... ....... .............................. ............. ........................................ _ ............. .................... Pohni ..... _ ...<br>15 lW * *4. - .4 -2 - -<br>10-<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22<br>Distance from City Center (Km)<br>(Source: Joseph K. Eckert)<br><!-- End of picture text --> 8/ This rapid rotation is confirmed in the analysis of different Moscow housing price data by G.S. Madalla, Y. Toda, and N.N. Nozdrina in "The Price of Apartments Auctioned in Moscow: A Heeding Approach" (unpublishe **d** raft paper, May 1993).

11
**Table 13: Organized Sector Log (Employment): Lag Specification**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
||Lead=2|Lead=4|Lead=9|
||_Other-sec_|_tor Employment_|_Spillovers_|
|Horizontal Employment Spillovers||||
|from Unorganized Sector|0.0157|-0.0150|-0.0100|
||(1.31)|(-0.93)|(-0.68)|
|Forward Employment Spillovers||||
|from Unorganized Sector|4.700***|-5.396***|-3.590***|
||(5.55)|(-3.84)|(-3.41)|
|Backward Employment Spillovers||||
|from Unorganized Sector|3.140**|2.252***|1.125**|
||(3.08)|(4.68)|(2.84)|
||_Other-sec_|_tor Productivity_|_Spillovers_|
|Average TFP of Horizontal-linked||||
|Unorganized Plants|0.00870|0.0471|-0.0400|
||(0.28)|(1.00)|(-0.92)|
|Average TFP of Forward-linked||||
|Unorganized Plants|2.552***|-0.577|-0.944|
||(3.57)|(-1.24)|(-1.86)|
|Average TFP of Backward-linked||||
|Unorganized Plants|-0.992|0.470|0.458|
||(-1.90)|(1.88)|(1.51)|
||_Own-sec_|_tor Employment S_|_pillovers_|
|Forward Employment Spillovers||||
|from Organized Sector|-2.159**|0.659|1.096*|
||(-2.78)|(1.36)|(2.05)|
|Backward Employment Spillovers||||
|from Organized Sector|2.984***|0.0256|-0.698*|
||(4.10)|(0.07)|(-2.56)|
|Constant|-99.69***|33.71|29.75*|
||(-5.19)|(1.92)|(2.47)|
|Observations|5888|4416|4416|

_Note: All specifications contain panel (state-industry) fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. All specifications include state-year and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***._ 42
<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>N<br>c<br>o<br>2<br>fe)<br>®<br>2<br>5<br>2011 2012) «= 2013 2014. 2015) 2016 )Ss 2017) 2018 »3=— 2019 2020. 2021 = 2022<br>(5) Buyers<br>[1 Suppliers<br><!-- End of picture text -->
were made by country. The damages were them summarized by continent. The probability distribution of global damages for storms was also calculated.

# IV. Results

The climate changes in 2100 predicted by each climate model vary even though they share the same A1B emission scenario. CNRM predicts a global warming of 2.9<sup>◦</sup> C, ECHAM predicts 3.4<sup>◦</sup> C, GFDL predicts 2.7<sup>◦</sup> C, and MIROC predicts 4.5<sup>◦</sup> C. These changes in climate increase warm sea surface temperatures which in turn fuel the tropical cyclones. However, there are other changes in wind shear and wind direction that can reduce tropical cyclone intensity as well.

The 17,000 storms in each scenario have different properties. Table 1 presents the average minimum pressure and wind speed of all the global storms at landfall. It is clear from Table 1 that average wind speed has increased and average minimum pressure has fallen in the future climate relative to the current climate in every scenario except GFDL.

Table 1: Average Global Minimum Pressure and Wind Speed at Landfall by Scenario

|Climate Model|Climate|Minimum<br>Pressure|% Change<br>Pressure|Wind<br>Speed|% Change<br>Wind Speed|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CNRM|Current|990.0||52.5||
||Future|990.0|-0.005%|52.8|0.406%|
|ECHAM|Current|989.1||53.8||
||Future|988.2|-0.097%|55.2|2.576%|
|GFDL|Current|988.0||55.1||
||Future|989.5|0.151%|51.2|-7.032%|
|MIROC|Current|989.2||53.6||
||Future|988.1|-0.110%|55.0|2.664%|

9
16

|Mexico-Costa Rica|1995|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|---|---|---|---|
|Mexico-Peru|1996|Econ Integration Agreement|Implemented|
|Chile-Canada|1997|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Nicaragua|1998|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Chile-Peru|1998|Econ Integration Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Israel|2000|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Cuba|2001|Econ Integration Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-El Salvador|2001|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Guatemala|2001|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Honduras|2001|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Mexico-Brazil|2002|Econ Integration Agreement|Signed|
|Chile-Costa Rica|2002|Free Trade Agreement|Implemented|
|Chile-El Salvador|2002|Econ Integration Agreement|Implemented|
|Costa Rica-Canada|2002|Free Trade Agreement|Signed|
|Chile-Korea|2003|Econ Integration Agreement|Signed|
|Mexico-Uruguay|2003|Free Trade Agreement|Signed|
|El Salvador-Panama|2003|Free Trade Agreement|Signed|
|Chile-United States|2004|Econ Integration Agreement|Signed|

Sources: WTO web data and various info from the web.

# **2.4  Driving forces of the recent development of regionalism in Latin America**

The development of regionalism in Latin America in the 1990s can be explained by several factors (Hosono, A., Nishijima S., 2003). The most significant ones are the following:

- Economic liberalization of the 1980s: Latin American countries started radical policy reforms in the middle of the 1980s, leaving behind interventionist policies responsible for economic crises in the 1980s. Upshots of these policy reforms were seen mostly in the trade and capital liberalization.

- Increasing regionalism of the US: The US foreign trade policy had been based on a mix of multilateralism and bilateralism until the end of the 1980s. From then on, the US showed an inclination towards regionalism with the formation of NAFTA and APEC. In response to these changes in the US attitude towards regionalism, Latin American countries adopted different behaviors:

- Some countries expressed strong impetus about joining FTA of Americas, on the US initiative and leadership;
Page 37

# PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY

91. Expanding invesrments in human capital for women will help in the longer run to integrate more women into the economy and improve their opportunities. Meanwhile, in the shorter run it is important to consider ways to help the current generation (particularly poorer women) produce and earn more. The economic argument is straightforward. An economy cannot run efficiently if half of the adult population has less access to information and the means of production and so faces more restricted choices.

92. Cultures vary but particularly in very traditional societies, women tend to concentrate on functions performed for the family, or within or near the household, whereas men are usually encouraged to vioge outside to more nontraditional activities. This "inside-outside" dichotomy holds more true for some cultures than others, but it is common -- perhaps because it has its roots in women's maternal role. Opening up information and the means of production to women can help them consider a wider range of "inside" and "outside" choices and find where their true comparative advantage lies. 93. Broader choice is a source of efficiency, as international trade theory so clearly demonstrates. The argument for broader options for women is analogous. Some anthropological studies also emphasize that improving income-earning capacity strengthens women's bargaining position in the family, whic helps them reach beyond the traditional sphere.

# For rural women,

the need to use income generation as an entry point can hardly be overemphasized.... Unless the time women spend away from the household and agricultural chores can bring some visible contribution to the family income, neither they nor their households will feel the time is justified.... Whether the concern is to accelerate growth or to achieve equity within the household, it is important to support the tradition of female entrepreneurship where it exists and encourage its development in the highly dichotomous communities where women have in the past been discouraged from market participation. (Acharya and Bennett 1982)

# The reason is plain:

Women's involvement in market activities gives them much greater power within the household in all aspects of household decision-making. At the same time, limiting women's involvement to domestic and subsistence sectors reduces their power vis-a-vis men.... Money earned is highly individualized [and allows] women to make a measurable contribution to household income and thus enhance the per-eption of women as equal partners. (Acharya and Bennett 1982)
The vast majority of IDPs, refugees and returnees report that their diet was better before the crisis than it was in June 2014 (Table 6). Since June 2014, the nutrition situation has improved markedly. Before the crisis, the majority of IDPs (94%) consumed three or four meals a day. By June 2014 only 54% had three meals a day. But by February 2015 90 percent had three meals a day (Figure 6). The findings for returnees and refugees in Mauretania are comparable. Only refugees in Niger are worst off in February 2015 than they were in June 2014 or prior to the crisis. 86% consumed three meals per day before the crisis; in February 2015 this had decreased to 30%.

**Figure 6: Number of Meals per day**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6 4<br>12<br>22<br>25<br>31 28<br>38<br>47<br>54 50 49 54 54<br>67<br>73 70 68 73<br>86 90 86 78 58 82 79 85 84 84<br>100 98 100 100 100<br>93<br>37 51<br>69 75<br>67<br>44<br>37 41 44<br>42 40<br>23 32 25 26 22<br>25 14 17 27<br>13 5 16 19 14 15 16<br>24 9 4 9 4 10 6 9 6 4 6 2 3 4 2 3 7 4 4<br>IDPs Refugees Niger Refugees Mauretania Returnees<br>1 meal 2 meals 3 meals 4 meals<br>Before 14-Jun 14-Aug 14-Oct 14-Nov 14-Dec 15-Jan 15-Feb Before 14-Jun 14-Aug 14-Oct 14-Nov 14-Dec 15-Jan 15-Feb Before 14-Jun 14-Aug 14-Oct 14-Nov 14-Dec 15-Jan 15-Feb Before 14-Jun 14-Aug 14-Oct 14-Nov 14-Dec 15-Jan 15-Feb<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Listening to Displaced People Survey, 2014 and 2015.

The crisis had a negative impact on income. In June 2014, 92% of the refugees, 74% of the IDPs and 65% of the returnees reported that their income had declined as a result of the crisis. While 70% of the IDPs, refugees and returnees were employed before the crisis, only 26% were employed by June 2014 – a drop of 44 percentage points. Breaking this down by group, refugees in Niger were the ones with the highest number of employed before the crisis (89%), followed by IDPs (79%) (Figure 7). IDPs are also the group with the highest number of employed during 13
# Research Components of World Bank Education<sup>Projects.</sup> since 1982.

|Area|Country andLoan/Credit<br>ilunber<br>l|Approved|Research<br>Components|Current<br>Status<br>of Studies,<br>including<br>Competed Documents/Data|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|AFRICA|Zaire CR 1519-ZR|1985|Educational<br>TechnicaL Assistance and Training.<br>Provision<br>ofMIS.Data gathering<br>and analysis<br>as part of planning section<br>(SO.7m).<br>Devetop school mapping<sup>project(SO.9m)</sup><br>(para.<br>47/8 p.l <sup>9 </sup>I.|(i)<br>Educational<br>database established;<br>Statistical<br>Yearbook 1986/7<br>(ii)<br>School mapping studyfor<sup>Mabinda finished;</sup><br>Goverrunent of Zaire (1985).<br>Seminaire de formation<br>surtamethodologie dela<sup>Carte Scotaire</sup><br>au Zaire<br>(doc. # 113.569)<br>also:<br>"Programme de formation<br>en planmification<br>de leducation<br>et statistiques<br>scolaires.<br>Rapport<br>Final<br>v. 1-3" (198)<br>(doc. # C01042)|
|AFRICA|Zaire CR 1839-ZR|1988|Higher Education Rationalization.<br>Analysis<br>of:<br>(i)<br>student<br>enrollment,<br>costs arnd financing<br>of<br>higher education;<br>(ii)<br>teaching and non-teaching<br>personnel;<br>(iii)<br>social<br>composition of the student body;<br>(iv)<br>pass and failure<br>rates.|Consuttants<br>to be hired 1990. This project<br>should<br>produce substantial<br>information<br>about the higher<br>education systemn.|

36
Thirdly, since an efficient revenue system almost inevitably means that locallycollected revenues will be lower than local expenditures - this is sometimes called the "vertical balance" problem - fiscal transfers from the central government are invariablv needed to finance some of the services that local governments should provide on efficiency grounds. Efficient local government thus has two "bottom lines" in terms of accountability. The first level of accountability is to local taxpayers for the use made of revenues collected from them, and the second is to the central goverrnent for the appropriate use of transfers intended to achieve such specific purposes as pcverty alleviation. Both local revenue systems and intergovernmental transfers need to be appropriately designed to provide local governments with appropriate incentives to carry out policies efficiently and to make full use of local resources.' Finally, there is considerable regional variation within most countries. Different regions (and subcentral political units) may have different rneeds and preferences in terms of poverty alleviation, and different capacities to meet those needs and preferences. Not all local governments are created equal: there are big cities and small ones, urbanized localities and rural ones, rich units and poor. Providing local services fairly and efficiently in this diverse setting r-ives rise to what is sometimes called the prcblem of "horizontal imbalance." If poverty alleviation is a national policy concern, but some key poverty alleviation policies are delivered by subnational governments, the capacity of different governments to finance such services out of their own resources is likely to differ greatly. Another critical element in the design of intergovernmental transfers may thus be to ensure that the poorer localities have sufficient resources to deliver the desired "package" of services at an acceptable level.<sup>3</sup>

- See R.M. Bird, "Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization," National Tax Journal, September 1993.

- ; Although widely accepted in federal countries (see A.Shah,"Perspectives on the Design of Intergoverrunmental Fiscal Relations" WPS 726, W.B, July 1991), the extent to which "equalization" in this sense should be an aim of policy is vigorously disputed by some: see, for example, William Oakland, "Fiscal Equalization: An Empty Box?" National Tax Journal, March 1994.

3