rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **3. Background**

## **3.1 Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh**

Our study area, Cox’s Bazar, is a district in the Chittagong Division situated in Bangladesh’s southeastern corner (Figure 1) between the River Naf to the east and the Bay of Bengal to the west and south (Hassan et al., 2018). The study area has a total land area of 213,639 ha (2136.39 km2). The area is elongated in shape, stretching about 135km in the north-south direction and 30km in the east-west direction– from the upper northern part, narrowing down to less than 3km around the lower southern part.

Cox’s Bazar is home to an estimated 2.7 million Bangladeshis. The majority of the residents depend on natural capital assets and ecosystem services derived from agriculture, forests, marine and cultured fisheries resources, and eco-tourism services for their livelihoods (Tallis et al., 2019; Tani & Rahman, 2018). A study before the 2017 refugee influx shows that 57 percent of households, including their refugee counterparts in the region, “totally depend on forests” for their livelihoods (Uddin & Khan, 2007). According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, about 63 percent of the area’s total population is involved in the agriculture sector, 25 percent engaged in the service sector, and about 12 percent employed in the industry sector (Hassan et al., 2018). Several studies have indicated the involvement of many of these residents in crop production at subsistence level, betel leaf and betel nut gardening, salt extraction, fuelwood production, as well as capture and cultured fisheries production (Hassan et al., 2018; Mukul et al., 2019; Tallis et al., 2019; Tani & Rahman, 2018; UNDP & UN Women, 2018).

The study area falls under a subtropical climate characterized by different seasonal variations with relatively high temperatures (average 78.98 ◦F (26.1 ◦C)/year) and receiving significant precipitation events (average rainfall estimated at 4,000 mm/year). The four most common seasons known to the area are a hot-humid summer/pre-monsoon season (March to May), a cool-rainy monsoon season (June to September), a cool-dry winter/post-monsoon season (October to November), and the dry season (December to February) (Hassan et al., 2018; Tani & Rahman, 2018; UNDP & UN Women, 2018).

Cox’s Bazar is mostly floodplain (Alam, Huq, and Rashid, 1999) with a mean slope of 4 degrees and a mean elevation of 17 meters above global mean sea level (MSL). The area’s geomorphological features include flat floodplains, mudflats, dunes, tidal creeks, hillocks, and 7
40

# REFER.NCES

- Andrews, William D., "A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Persoral Income Tax," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 87, April 1974.

- Bahl, Roy, Tan Reform in Jamaica: Executive Sunmary, Syracuse University, September 1988.

- Bahl, Roy, and Matthew N. Murray, "Income Tax Evasion in Jamaica," Staff Paper, Syracuse University, November 1986.

- Harberger, Arnold C., 'On the Indexing of Income Taxes," memorandum prepared for the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia, August, 1982.

- International Monetary Fund, "Tax Reform in Morocco," mimeo, March 22, 1979.

- Musgrave, Richard, "Tax Reform in Developing Countries," in Newbory, David and Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 1987.

- Pechman, Joseph A., ed., What Should be Taxed: Income or Exnenditure?, Brookings Institutions, 1980.

- Tanzi, Vito, "Quantitative Characteristics of the Tax Systems of Developing Countries," in David Newbery and Nicholas Stern, flb Theory of Taxation for Develoning Countries, Oxford University Press, 1987.

- World Bank, Bangladesh: An Agenda for Tax Reform, Yellow Cover Report, April 12, 1988.

- World Bank, China: Revenue Mobilization and Tax Policy, Green Cover Report, March 20, 1989.

- World Bank, Fiscal Policy and Tax Reform in Turkey, Gray Cover Report, July 7, 1987.

- World Bank, Pakistan: Medium-Term Economic Policy Adjustments, Green Cover Report, February, 1989.

- World Bank, PhilipDines: Toward Sustaining the Economic Recoverv, Gray Cover Report, January 30, 1989.

- W'orld Bank, Study on Tax Policy in Asia, Yellow Cover Report, N&rch 31, 1989.

- World Bank, "Tax Policy for Malawi," mimeo, November 1985.
-

11 In mid-1981 a private investment company, International Finance Advisors (IFA), began work on a clearing system. And in April 1982 IFA first approached the dealers. The company would clear cheques maturing every 15 days on two fixed settlement dates each month. Cheques up to six months maturity would be deposited with trhe system. Within a month, 60 dealers, who handled more than half the market's volume, joined the system. Because those dealers had cheques for and against them from dealers outside the system, it was finally possible to arrive at the positions of most dealers Ij .

Toward late June information on the amount of outstanding cheques and the dealers' future positions was available. IFA estimated that cheques with a nominal value of KD I billion matured every month, for an expected net of KD 200 million. Of this amount, KD 150 million was estimated to be normal deficits and surpluses, that is, dealers with net overbought in one month could cover either with net oversolJd in another. The remaining KD 50 million represented net overall overbought positions, mainly in the parallel market. These dealers had bought at very high premiums and had insufficient assets.

Prior to a netting-out system, the full KD 1 billion had to change hands in cash, which meant that dealers had to liquidate substantial amounts of shares. If a dealer had to pay KD 100 million in the first 15 days, even though he had KD 98 million coming in in the next 15 days. he would have to liquidate RD 100 million in shares without a clearing system. With a clearing system he would only need KD 2 million in cash.

The clearing problem was how to handle the net payout from the dealers of KD 100 million a month that required liquidating assets. The remaining KD 100 million a month could be handled within the system by moving balances from one dealer in surplus for a settlement period to another dealer in deficit for the same settlement period -- assuming that prices of securities and property held firm. And, how was the system to handle the chronic deficits that were not backed with good assets, if any? ,* _Government Interventlon._ When the information was relayed related to the accing Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce, the immediate priority was to avoid a liquidity crisis, since by this time the first default of a major dealer was already causing delays for other dealers. The Minister of Finance asked IFA to meet with the banks and the investment companies to discuss possible bridge financing requirements / . It became clear after a number of meetings that the financial institutions would not be able to meet funding requirements of almost KD 100 millioft a month. In fact, they were not sure that this was the best approach si<sup>7</sup> nce the dealers' financial positions were unknown. And because the dealers were heavily linked, it was difficult if not impossible to tell which dealers were illiquid and which were insolvent.

l/ Based on files from International Financial Advisors KSC. Kuwait. JA/ The author served as chairman of IFA.
studying the role of education systems and institutions in determining student performance across countries [Wössmann, 2016]. Many recent papers use PISA data and have looked at this issue through the lens of autonomy [Hanushek et al., 2013, Wössmann et al., 2007], competition [West and Wössmann, 2010], student tracking [Hanushek and Wössmann, 2006, Ruhose and Schwerdt, 2016], external exams [Wössmann, 2005], and instructional time [Lavy, 2015]. Our PISA-based index enables researchers to consider school management in such studies.

Our second contribution—a framework to explain why management matters in schools—relates to the literature in personnel economics exploring incentives and selection. These channels have featured in prior work seeking to explain the performance of private sector employees [Bender et al., 2018, Cornwell et al., 2019, Lazear, 2000], public sector employees [Finan et al., 2017, Prendergast, 2007] and politicians [Besley, 2004, 2006, Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013, Martinez-Bravo, 2014]. Most closely related is Lazear [2003], who emphasises the potential selection margin of teacher performance pay, albeit without fully working up a formal model.<sup>3</sup> A selection margin also features in the dynamic occupational model of Rothstein [2015] and the Roy model of Biasi [2019]. We study a wider range of management practices (beyond just performance pay) and provide an intuitive decomposition of the impact of these practices on student learning into incentives and selection.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out our approach to measure management practices in schools, illustrating with the construction and validation of PISA-based and Prova Brasil-based management indices. In Section 3, we describe our theoretical framework, its testable predictions, a series of corroborative descriptive analyses from across Latin America, and the policy implications of these results. Section 4 concludes.

> 3See also Dohmen and Falk [2010] who briefly sketch out theoretical reasons why fixed wage contracts and piece rates might be expected to have different impacts on sorting by ability.

4
-2-

Table 1.1 Selected Statistics for tho Asian Rice Economy

||East|Asia|||Southe|ast Asia||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Japan|Korea|Taiwan|Malaysia|Thailand|Philippines|Indonesia|
|Population<br>(millions)||||||||
|1965|98.9|28.5|<br>12.6|<br>9.5|<br>31.5|<br>32.6|<br>109.5|
|1985|120.8|42.7|<br>19.2|<br>15.7|<br>52.7|<br>56.8|<br>168.4|
|Per Capita Income||||||||
|(US dollars)<br>1983|10,120|2,010|<br>3,570|<br>1,860|<br>820|<br>760|<br>560|
|Paddy Yields||||||||
|(tons per hectare)||||||||
|1960|4.86|2.79|<br>3.27|<br>2.05|<br>1.39|<br>1.16|<br>1.81|
|1984|6.35|6.47|<br>5.01|<br>2.66|<br>1.'8|<br>2.49|<br>3.87|
|Share of GDP<br>(percent)||||||||
|Agriculture<br>||||||||
|1965<br>|9|38|22.6|30|35|26|5<sup>la</sup>|
|1983|4|14|7.4|21|23|22|26|
|Rice||||||||
|1965|4.1|18.5|<br>13.2|<br>3.6|<br>11.3|<br>5.2|<br>18.8a|
|1982|1.4|5.6|1.8|1.7|5.1|3.4|7.8|
|Rice<br>in Agriculture||||||||
|(percent)<br>1965|46|49|58|12|32|20|3 7 <sup>a</sup>|
|1982-83|35|40|24|8|22|15|<br>30|
|Rice<br>Consumption<br>(kilograms per||||||||
|capita<br>per year||||||||
|1964-66|109|<br>112|132|105|162|86|83|
|1979-81|76|150|125|99|<br>145|<br>91|<br>126|
|Share of Staple Food||||||||
|Calories from Wheat||||||||
|(percent)||||||||
|1961-65|i6|<br>7|<br>__|<br>16|<br>0.6|<br>7|<br>0.3|
|1979-81|24|<br>14|<br>__|<br>18|<br>2|<br>7|<br>3|

Sources: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, i985 CIMMYT World Wheat Facts and Trends (Mexico, 1985); The International Rice Research Institute, World Rice Statistics 1985 (Manila, 1986); World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1985).

aFigures are for 1968.
Costinot, A., A. Rodriguez-Clare (2014). “Trade Theory with Numbers: Quantifying the Consequences of Globalization,” Handbook of International Economics, Edited by G. Gopinath, E. Helpman and K. Rogoff, Chapter 4, pp. 197–262.

Deaton, A. (1989). “Rice Prices and Income Distribution in Thailand: a Non-parametric Analysis,” Economic Journal, 99 (Supplement), pp. 1–37.

Deaton, A. (1997). _The Analysis of Household Surveys - A Microeconometric Approach to Development Policy_ . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Dix-Carneiro, R. (2014). “Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Dynamics,” Econometrica, vol. 82(3), pp. 825–885.

Dix-Carneiro, R., and B. Kovak (2017). “Trade Reform and Regional Dynamics: Evidence from 25 Years of Brazilian Matched Employer–Employee Data,” forthcoming The American Economic Review.

Dixit, A. and V. Norman (1980). Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium Approach, Cambridge University Press.

Dixit, A. and V. Norman (1986). “Gains from Trade without Lump-Sum Compensation,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 21, pp. 111–122.

Faber, B. (2014). “Trade Liberalization, the Price of Quality, and Inequality: Evidence from Mexican Store Prices,” mimeo, Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley.

Fajgelbaum, P. and A. Khandelwal (2016). “Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131, pp. 1113–1180.

Galle, S., A. Rodriguez-Clare, and M. Yi (2017). “Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Trade,” mimeo Berkeley University.

Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pp. 833–850.

33
# **Building Macro SAMs from Cross-Country Databases: Method and Matrices for 133 Countries**

Martín Cicowiez and Hans Lofgren<sup>*</sup> JEL classification: E01, E16, C82 Keywords: Social Accounting Matrices, National accounts, Macroeconomic data.

> * Martín Cicowiez is at the Center of Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS), Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina. Hans Lofgren is in the Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. The authors would like to thank the Strategic Research Program of the World Bank for funding. They can be reached at <u>martin@depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar</u> and hanslofgren01@outlook.com, respectively.

‐1‐
Policy Research Working Paper 10944

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the impact of implementing a carbon tax on aggregate total factor productivity in the Dominican Republic through the resource allocation channel. It incorporates energy inputs—electricity and fuel—into firms’ production functions, allowing predictions of potential changes in resource allocation due to the carbon tax. The theoretical implications of the model indicate that the carbon tax has a heterogeneous effect on firms’ input choices, contingent on the level of firms’ existing input market distortions. Moreover, the model suggests that in economies in which more productive firms are less distorted, the carbon tax can decrease aggregate total factor productivity. In contrast, when more productive firms are more distorted, the carbon tax can increase or decrease aggregate total factor productivity. Utilizing detailed firm-level data from 2009 to 2018, covering up to 118,000 firms, this paper finds that a carbon tax is more effective when levied on fuels rather than electricity. For the majority of sectors in the sample, the paper finds that existing distortions in energy consumption are positively correlated with firmlevel productivity. Moreover, the quantitative results show that the introduction of the carbon tax shifts the burden of market distortions from high productivity firms to low productivity ones, generating aggregate total factor productivity gains for most sectors in the Dominican Republic. Overall, this study underscores the importance of considering existing input market distortions when analyzing the impact of environmental taxes.

This paper is a product of the Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at fzeni@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
_-_ _<u>Figure 1: Growth incidence curves, BaU, all, agricultural, and non agricultural households</u>_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Cumulative population ranked by per capita income<br>All Agr<br>Non-agr<br>3<br>2.5<br>2<br>1.5<br>Annual per capita income growth in %<br>1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations.

These agricultural households specific distribution shifts also explain the pro-poor changes in the national distribution, since only minor distributional changes are registered in the non-agricultural distribution. However, richer non-agricultural households experience somewhat higher gains than poorer households. Non-agricultural poor household incomes increase by a meager 1 to 1.5 percent annually.

These more detailed analyses of the long term evolution of the Brazilian income distribution highlight the different roles played by changes in inequality and shifts in the growth rates of the average incomes. The following two questions then arise: if the current (2001) distribution of income were to remain unchanged, to what extent would the additional growth under the BaU scenario contribute to reducing poverty? And what is the poverty reducing role of the BaU differential in growth rates for the agriculture and non-agriculture segments?

Answering these questions requires performing two additional micro-simulations as follows. The first simulation generates a counterfactual distribution under the assumption that all incomes out of all sources grow by 1.5 percent annually. This implies shifting the entire income distribution “to the right” leaving its shape unchanged. Individuals do not change employment sectors and hence households retain their initial non-agricultural or agricultural classification. Results are presented in Table 6 and changes are given as percentage share of the BaU change (column I). In addition, we simulated a second 32
20 the incidence of the "tax" (premium) in tight labor markets for skilled personnel.

(4) AdMinistrative Aspects. Because the major policy goals of introducing health insurance into Sub-Saharan Africa dre to mobilize more resources for health care for the poor and to create incentives for greater allocational and internal efficiency within the health care system, a major design imperative for this health insurance is that it be one that can be administered as easily and inexpensively as possible. Otherwise, for a given amount of additional MOH expenditures for the poor, the implicit or explicit taxes that will have to be levied on the formal labor market will have to be higher, thus creating additional dead-weight losses to the economy from the implicit or explicit tax system used to finance the additional, unnecessary administrative costs.

There is little empirical evidence on the administrative costs of health insurance in the Sub-Sahara. The costs of administration of the Prevoyance Sociale in Mali may approach as much as 50 percent of revenues (Vogel, 1988), but MAMAS in Zimbabwe indicates that its member Medical Aid Societies' administrative costs are 3robably less than 10 percent of revenues. There are many practical problems to be solved in designing health insurance that is financially sustainable, including actuarial data on the costs of care and the -Amounts of **services** that will be d uanded (Borch, 1990).

(5) Political Accegtability. Finally, the design of the formal health insurance should take into account its probable political acceptability by employee-consumers, employers, providers, and government. If those employees/employers who are taxed (either implicity or explicitly) do not believo that they benefit from the health insurance, or do not believe that
annual basis for purposes of determining hospital class (standard) and granting awards for excellent hospitals. While earlier surveys suffered from lack of uniformity in questions and data entry errors, the more recent surveys have benefitted from efforts at ensuring uniformity of questions over time and computerized data entry at facilities.

The hospital inventory was meant to provide a complete census of all hospitals in the country although coverage fell short in the earlier years. The proportion of total hospital beds covered by the survey increased from 78% in 2005 to 93% in 2011. Coverage of district and inter-district regional hospitals, the sample of this study, reached 99% in 2011. In the 2005– 2006 survey, five provinces provided no district hospital data and ten provinces reported on less than half of their district hospitals, although the provinces with underreporting actually come from all regions of the country and represent a mix of economic status.

For data cleaning, the authors set up a system of hospital codes and did multiple checks on trends over time on key variables in order to detect miscoding of hospitals in the panel. Common problems with the data included misrecording of currency units (Vietnamese dong (VND) or million VND instead of the requested thousand VND) or the sum of the components not equaling the aggregate numbers reported. These were checked and only changed if trend amounts per bed or per patient were clearly deviating by large amounts (a magnitude of 1000 or 0.001). Checks were done to ensure consistency in definition and scope of variables over time. Costs and revenue amounts were adjusted to real 2004 prices using the General Statistics Office consumer price index for medical goods and services.

Table 1 shows the sample of district hospitals used in this study. The number of hospitals increased from 432 in 2005 to over 600 in 2010 and 2011. No hospital in the sample was contracted by capitation in 2005, and the number remains rather small throughout 2006-2008. A 13
can further undermine public oversight over how resource windfalls are spent (Heuty and al. 2009)<sup>5</sup> .

**Table 1:  Performance of countries by category on budget accountability**

|**Categories**|**Oil**<br>**Producers**|**Mineral**<br>**Producers**|**Non-Resource**<br>**Dependent**<br>**Countries**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Expenditure controls|22|52|48|
|Linkpolicy/ planning/budget|17|37|35|
|Extra budgetary operations|20|31|32|

Source: Heuty et al. (2009). Note: Categories are defined as average of questions of the Open Budget Index. For more information on the Survey, and the methodology used to calculate the OBI, see <u>www.openbudgetindex.org. 100 represents a fully open budget.</u> Low efficiency of PERs in these countries could also probably explained by the fact that these states usually do not need much external funding (except during a period of fall of international oil prices) and therefore, external pressure from donors is, in most cases, does not bring much results (despite decades of engagement).

# **3. The link between taxation, accountability and poor outcome of public spending: A cross-country analysis**

Having confirmed that oil producing countries have generally weaker expenditure efficiency and accountability, we now investigate how taxation may help strengthen them. We proceed in two steps. First, we show how accountability has an effect on the outcomes of public spending. Then we show how taxation can have a discernible effect on accountability in oil-dependent economies.

From the literature, we know that there is an inverse relationship between oil dependence and the level of spending in education, all other things being equal,

> 5 However, the OBI 2008 results also show that countries can be transparent and accountable to the public despite substantial natural resource endowments. For example, South Africa, Norway, Botswana, and Peru all show strong performance on the OBI relative to other hydrocarbon and mineral producers (Heuty et al. 2009).

7