especially where benefits are flat e.g. Zambia CG, and Kenya OVC.<sup>30</sup> An option in program design is often to vary benefits according to household size. This is the approach under the Malawi SCT, which also finds significant program impacts, even though on average the transfer size is 11% of pre‐program consumption.<sup>31</sup> Finally, a further theme across several evaluations is the rigidity of transfer sizes in high inflation environments. The value of the Kenya OVC, Lesotho CGP and Kenya HSNP transfers were eroded substantially over the two years of the evaluated exposure period. In these different scenarios, programs may look towards indexing the value of a transfer, both to household size and price inflation.<sup>32</sup>

**Programs with strongest impacts have clear target groups and strong targeting protocols** . For example, the Kenya CTOVC, Lesotho CGP and Malawi SCTP invoked clear eligibility criteria focused on the inclusion of children under 5 or households facing high dependency rations.<sup>33</sup> However, it is noted that even with clear target groups, programs may suffer to achieve desired outcomes owing to weak targeting arrangements. Malawi’s SCTP program encountered an uneven application of community targeting arrangements which were seen to dampen results. Under the MASAF program the characteristics of participants differed from eligibility criteria because of differences in how local officials’ selected beneficiaries and the opportunity cost of participation.<sup>34</sup> In practice the program was rationed and not targeted towards the food‐insecure and this may help explain its insignificant impacts.

**The predictability and timing of benefits can strongly determine whether outcomes are positive or negative.**<sup>**35**</sup> In Zambia, 98% of households received payments on time, and this – combined with short walks to payment sites and low transaction costs – helps to explain the program’s high success rate, even though transfer sizes were very modest. Similarly, in Kenya’s OVC regular payments, the use of post offices and the proximity to pay points were noted as factors leading to strong program impacts. Results in Kenya’s HSNP program appear to be heavily driven by the mobile payment logistics used within the program.<sup>36</sup> By contrast, the weak impacts experienced in Ghana LEAP and Lesotho CGP have been largely attributed to irregular payments, with beneficiaries reporting unclear expectations on transfer arrangements.<sup>37</sup>

**A growing evidence base suggests that unconditional cash transfers are an effective mechanism for boosting consumption.** The programs covered in the meta‐analysis are largely based on cash transfers, with just 3 programs imposing a conditionality of work for certain beneficiaries (PSNP, MASAF and SL CFW).<sup>38</sup> From a policy perspective, the findings on unconditional cash transfers are important: they confirm that benefits from this type of programs are overwhelmingly used by beneficiaries to improve the quality of their lives and not on temptation goods (Evans and Popova 2014; Handa et al 2017). Moreover,

> 30 Ward et al. 2010 (Kenya CTOVC), Seidenfeld et al. 2013 (Zambia ZCGP).

> 31 Abdoulayi et al. 2015 (Malawi SCTP).

> 32 Ward et al. 2010 (Kenya CTOVC), Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP), Merttens et al. 2013 (Kenya HSNP).

> 33 Ward et al. 2010 (Kenya CTOVC), Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP), Abdoulayi et al. 2015 (Malawi SCTP).

> 34 Beegle et al. 2015 (Malawi MASAF).

> 35 Seidenfeld et al. 2013 (Zambia ZCGP), Ward et al. 2010 (Kenya CTOVC), Handa and Park 2013 (Ghana LEAP), Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP).

> 36 Merttens et al. 2013 (Kenya HSNP).

> 37 Handa and Park 2013 (Ghana LEAP), Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP).

> 38 Hoddinott et al. 2012 (Ethiopia PSNP), Beegle et al. 2015 (Malawi MASAF), Rosas and Sabarwal 2016 (Sierra Leone CFW).

15