short‐term nature of these programs, and the lack of labor market opportunities in low income rural settings. The findings in Malawi appear to blend poor design (low transfer value, limited employment days), with weak implementation (irregular project delivery, low asset creation).

For earnings, our meta‐analysis finds a significant positive impact of increasing monthly earnings by 51% [95% CI: 15 to 87%]<sup>99</sup> , based on the results of 6 studies (see Figure 8). Increased incomes and higher agricultural yields also correlate with increases in productive assets. Increases in the yield of agricultural harvests and the value of sales were found in the Ethiopia SCTPP, the Malawi SCTP and the Zambia ZCGP, where beneficiaries also reported increased ownership of agricultural tools.<sup>100</sup> Higher earnings were also reported in the Lesotho GCP, where beneficiaries had purchased both seeds and fertilizers, and in the Kenya GIVE and Sierra Leone’s CFW, where there were increases in household asset ownership.<sup>101</sup> However, out of the 27 programs covered by this meta‐analysis, of which 20 reported some outcomes on productive assets, only 6 report significant earnings or productivity increases. This does call into question the ability for all safety net programs to obtain the desired productive impacts they may hope for.

# <u>Maximizing safety net interventions for improved outcomes</u>

**Explicit design modifications to motivate positive changes in behavior are critical** . To enhance the possibility of realizing program impacts on the emergence of new opportunities for improved human development and productive inclusion, additional messaging, a positive nudge to promote behavior change, or more fine‐tuned conditionality may be needed. The findings on school attendance and enrollment are illustrative. Several countries incorporated strong messaging so that beneficiaries would perceive the development intent of the programs, especially the cash transfers. This was so, for example, in the Lesotho Child Grants Program, the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program, and the Niger Safety Net Project.<sup>102</sup> It seems the safety net transfers alone will not be sufficient to shift household decisions on education investments, for instance. The nature and enforcement of conditionality can be quite soft in many cases, especially considering capacity constraints on adequately monitoring and enforcing the conditionality, as well as on ensuring reliable service delivery.

**Reducing supply‐side constraints is central to the identification of new pathways to longer‐term opportunities** . A recurrent lesson from the program evaluations and ongoing operations is that momentum is important within programs to shift from the provision of small, discrete cash transfers to large‐scale programs with complementary activities, primarily centered on human development and productive inclusion. To achieve such a shift, the access to and quality of local services become central as

> 99 Sources: Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP), Seidenfeld et al. 2013 (Zambia ZCGP), Abdoulayi et al. 2015 (Malawi SCTP), Rosas and Sabarwal 2016 (Sierra Leone CFW), Haushofer and Shapiro 2016 (Kenya GIVE), Asfaw et al., 2014 (Kenya CTOVC).

> 100 Berhane et al., 2015 (Ethiopia SCTPP), Abdoulayi et al. 2015 (Malawi SCTP), Seidenfeld et al. 2013 (Zambia ZCGP).

> 101 Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP), Haushofer and Shapiro 2016 (Kenya GIVE), Rosas and Sabarwal 2016 (Sierra Leone CFW).

> 102 Pellerano et al. 2014 (Lesotho LCGP), Abdoulayi et al. 2015 (Malawi SCTP), Premand and Del Ninno 2016 (Niger NSNP).

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