Of course, there remains the danger of designing reform programs that attempt to do everything, and ultimately prove too complex and ambitious. Older debates about the relative merits of “comprehensive” versus more piecemeal approaches to reform reflect this concern.<sup>47</sup> Seeking to focus attention on trust has the potential to generate expanded quasi-voluntary compliance, mobilize additional political support for reform, and strengthen the fiscal contract. However, it also introduces new points of potential resistance to reform. A push for greater fairness in tax implementation may be resisted by tax officials who fear a reduction in opportunities for collusion and corruption. An expanded emphasis on equity is likely to be met by resistance from wealthy taxpayers, who often escape their full tax liabilities. Finally, governments themselves may be supportive of increasing revenue collection – but resistant to constraints on their spending or to demands for accountability. More narrow approaches to reform have often been adopted because they have been expedient in the short term. However, stagnating reforms in many countries show the limits of pursuing short-term expediency.

Successful implementation of the framework laid out here is therefore likely to depend on tailoring reform to local contexts. This requires carefully defining local reform priorities, analyzing the local politics of reform, identifying binding constraints and focusing on developing evidence-based approaches to trust building. In most cases, it is unlikely that it will be practical for a reform program to simultaneously target all existing weaknesses, as doing so would be politically unfeasible and technically too ambitious. Tailoring reform to local needs is likely to mean answering four questions. First, what are the central objectives of reform? Is reform narrowly focused on increasing revenue, or does it also aim to increase equity, strengthen pro-poor economic growth or strengthen the fiscal contract? If the latter, what strategies can contribute to these broader goals? Second, what are the key political barriers to reform? Problem-focused political economy analysis aims to understand what kinds of reform are consistent with local political constraints, as well as what kinds of strategies could be adopted to enhance political support for reform. Third, what are the binding constraints on reform? Which potential reform targets are most essential to success, in that (a) they can immediately unlock improvements in performance; and (b) a failure to address them risks undermining other potential reform strategies? Fourth, how can investments in enforcement, facilitation and trust best be combined? In particular, how can trust-building strategies be developed that complement investments in enforcement and facilitation, reflect local sources of distrust, and are rooted in local evidence about how to build trust moving forward?

Overall the framework presented here seeks to refocus the goals of reform beyond a comparatively narrow focus on enforcement and facilitation – and beyond excessive reliance on international models of reform. It also raises a broader question: if governments are unwilling to enhance the fairness, equity, reciprocity and accountability of their tax systems, are international investments in tax reform justifiable? Making trust central to tax reform efforts not only presents a variety of opportunities and challenges, but also brings the broader social goals of tax reform more clearly into focus.

> 47 Gillis, M. (1989). Towards a taxonomy for tax reform. In Gillis, M. (Eds.) _Tax Reform in Developing Countries_ . Durham: Duke University Press.

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