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|Authors|Methodology|MainFindings|
|---|---|---|
|||productvityintransitoneconomies.Privatzabon,<br>hardenedbudget constraints,andproductmarket<br>competitionallappeartobeimportantdeterminants<br>ofenterpriserestructuringinnon-CIScounbies,while<br>theyareless obviouslysointheCIS.Theevidence<br>suggeststhatthedifferenceinimpactisdueto the<br>varying degreeofinstitutionaldevelopmentbetween<br>theregions.|
|Djankov,<br>Simeon,<br>and<br>Gerhard<br>Pohl.1997.'Restructuringoflarge<br>FirmsinSlovakia.'<br>The William<br>DavidsonInshtuteWorkingPaper<br>No.73.The UniversityofMichigan<br>BusinessSchool.|Thispaper recordstherestructuring<br>actionsandownershipchangesoffirms<br>inSlovakia. Thecase studieswere<br>selectedtogiveawiderangeofinitial<br>conditions,andprivatizabontechniques.|TheauthorsfindthatthemajorityoflargeSlovak<br>firmshavesuccessfullyrestructuredwithouttheneed<br>for<br>foreign<br>investors<br>and<br>govemment-led<br>restructuring<br>programs.<br>Also<br>they<br>find<br>that<br>privatizabonto insidersdidnothamperrestructuring<br>asthemanagers investedheavilyinnew technology,<br>laidofflargenumbersofworkers, lookedforforeign<br>partners and wereprepared tosellcontrollingstakes<br>to outsidersin retumfornewfinancialresources.<br>These findingssupportthe viewthatprivatzabon<br>programs<br>should<br>aim<br>to<br>speedily<br>transform<br>ownershipandnotbeoveriyconcemed withthe<br>selectionofperfectowners.|
|Earle,<br>John.<br>1998.<br>'Post-<br>Privatizabon<br>Ownership<br>and<br>Productivity<br>inRussianIndustrial<br>Enterpnses.<br>_SITE WorkingPaper_<br>_127._<br>Stockholm,<br>Sweden:<br>Stockholm<br>InstituteofTransibon<br>Economics.|Looksintotheownership structureand<br>its impactuponlaborproductivityin<br>Russian industrialfirms.Thesurvey<br>sample<br>indudes86 firmsthatwere<br>100%<br>state-owned,<br>299<br>that<br>were<br>partiallyprivatizedand45thatwere<br>newlycreated.The1994surveydata<br>examinestheimpactsofinsider,outsider<br>or<br>state<br>ownership<br>upon<br>the<br>performanceofthefirm.|Theauthors use ordinaryleastsquaresregressionto<br>showapositveeffectofincreasedprivateownership<br>uponlaborproductivity.<br>Howeveronlyoutsider<br>ownershipissignificantiyrelated withsuchchanges.<br>The authorsconcludethatplacinginsidersin control<br>ofafirm hasnegativelong-runimplicabonsfor<br>restructuring.|
|Earle,JohnS.,andSaulEstrin.<br>1998.'Privatization,<br>Competition,<br>andBudgetConstraints:Disciplining<br>Enterprises<br>in<br>Russia.'<br>_SITE_<br>_WorkingPaper128._<br>Stockholm,<br>Sweden:<br>Stockholm<br>Institute<br>of<br>TransitionEconomics.|Theauthorsuseda 1994survey datato<br>examine<br>whether<br>privatization,<br>competitionandhardeningof budget<br>constraints<br>play<br>efficiency-enhancing<br>rolesinRussia.|They findthat10percentagepointincreaseinprivate<br>share ownership raisesrealsalesper employeeby<br>3-5<br>percentage<br>points.<br>Subsidies(soft<br>budget<br>constraints) reducethepaceofrestructuringinstate-<br>ownedfimis.|
|Dyck,<br>I.J.<br>Alexander.<br>1997.<br>'PrivatizationinEastemGefmany,<br>Management<br>Selection<br>and<br>EconomicTransition.'<br>_Amrencan_<br>Economic_Review._87:565-597.|This study looks intotheTreuhand'srole<br>inrestructuringandprivatizingeastem<br>Germany's<br>SOEs.<br>The Treuhand<br>is<br>uniqueinthatitprivatizedmorethan<br>13,800firmsandpartsoffirms andhad<br>the resourcestopayfortherestructuring<br>itself,but neveractuallydidso.Insteadit<br>soldquicklytoexistingwestem firms<br>ratherthangivingtheSOEsawayor<br>sellingthemtocapitalfunds.|Theauthorattemptstorabonalizethis approachand<br>findsthatthosefirms ownedbywestemfirmswere<br>much morelikelytobringinwestem managersinto<br>key positionthanSOEs.Treuhand isalsofoundto<br>haveattemptedtoopensalestoallbuyersrather<br>thanfavoringeastem<br>Germans.<br>Incondusion<br>privatization plansthatareopentowestembuyers<br>andallowmanagementchangearemorelikelyto<br>exhibitimprovedperformanceinthefirm.|
|Fischer,Stanley,andRatnaSahay.<br>2000.'TheTransitionEconomies<br>AfterTenYears.'<br>_IMFWorking_<br>_PaperWP/O/30._WashingtonD.C.:<br>IntemabonalMonetaryFund.|Thepaper<br>summarizes<br>the<br>macro-<br>economicperformanceofthetransition<br>economies,accountingforthewidely<br>differing outcomesinthe25countries<br>coveredinthestudy.|Themostsuccessfultransitoneconomiesarethose<br>that havebothstabilizedand undertakencon-<br>prehensivereforms,andthemoreandfasterreform<br>isbetterthanlessandslowerreform.<br>Thestudyconcudesthatbothstabilizationpolices<br>andstructuralreforms,inparticularprivatization,<br>contributetogrowth.|
|Frydman,<br>Roman,<br>Cheryl<br>Gray,<br>Marek<br>Hessel,<br>and<br>Andrej<br>Rapaczynski.<br>1998.'TheUmitsof<br>Discipiine:<br>Ownershipand<br>Hard|A<br>sample<br>of<br>medium<br>sized<br>manufacturing<br>firms<br>in<br>the<br>Czech<br>Republic,Hungaryand Polandisusedin<br>ordertodiscovertheimpactoffinancial|SOEs are foundtorepresentsignificantlyhigher<br>credit risksthan privateorprivatizedfifnsdueto<br>inferiorrevenueperformanceandthesofterbudget<br>constraintstheyface.Sincebothofthese factorsact|