gatherings (Brick, 2008). Local governance is thus a strictly male-dominated activity, with women only being allowed to participate in unusual circumstances, such as when they act on behalf of a deceased husband (Boesen, 2004).

# _II.3 – Elected Councils and Local Governance in Afghanistan_

Elected councils created by NSP differ from customary local governance structures in the mode of selection. While elected councils are composed by a secret ballot, universal suffrage election, the position of headman and other customary local governance positions are ordinarily inherited or otherwise derived on account of land holdings or other forms of economic authority. As elected councils implementing NSPfunded projects and thus have control over what is an unprecedented amount of resources for villages, elected councils assume substantial _de facto_ authority.

Evidence from the NSP impact evaluation indicates a substantial overlap between elected councils and preexisting elites. Specifically, 40 percent of council members and 70 percent of council leaders were previously identified by villagers as _de facto_ village leaders, although villagers elected to councils are on average younger and better educated (Beath et. al. 2012). While there is some shift of local governance responsibilities from customary leaders to elected councils, the magnitude of these changes is of limited practical significance (Beath et. al., 2010). Accordingly, the evidence indicates that elected councils do not fundamentally alter the activities of customary institutions. Councils do, however, improve the access of women to local governance services, as well as their perception of local governance quality (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2012).

Existing qualitative studies provide conflicting evidence on whether customary power-holders have captured elected councils and whether the new institution brings about changes in the identity of the village leadership. Various observers provide accounts of customary leaders attempting to subvert council elections (Boesen, 2004; Brick, 2008; and Noelle-Karimi, 2006), indicating that leaders indeed covet council positions but are not constrained by electoral accountability. Barakat (2006) also observes that, while some younger and more educated villagers are elected to councils, customary elites remain influential. Brick (2008) concludes, on the basis of qualitative and non-experimental quantitative research, that council creation degrades provision of local public goods due to a weakening of accountability structures between local elites and villagers.

# _II.4 - Wheat Distribution in Afghanistan_

According to the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), between a fourth and a third of the population of Afghanistan are considered food insecure.<sup>3</sup> To alleviate food shortages, WFP and other humanitarian agencies regularly deliver food assistance to poor or otherwise vulnerable communities. Due to Afghanistan’s varied topography and pockets of insecurity, local governance institutions (including both elected councils and customary local governance bodies) regularly facilitate distributions for WFP and other agencies.

The clientelistic nature of Afghan politics – and the difficulties of monitoring distributions given poor transportation and telecommunication infrastructure and the low capacity of sub-national institutions – results in alleged diversions of food aid by local governance actors, sub-national government figures, line ministries, and police. Saltmarshe and Medhi (2011) estimate that more than a third of food aid is sold in the local markets instead of being delivered to the intended beneficiaries.

Thus, despite the importance of food aid distributions to the welfare of the rural population, they are also a vehicle for predation and diversion. Measures of aid targeting and diversion thus capture outcomes critical

> 3 In a prior survey of a random sample of villagers in the 500 villages, 48 percent of respondents indicated that members of their household were hungry at least one day during the previous week.

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