rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
expansion of social program provisions.<sup>3</sup> The cost of health insurance through employment in Colombia is often cited as anecdotal evidence of a powerful disincentive for formal employment. However, prior to this paper, no systematic empirical evidence has been presented to confirm or reject this hypothesis.<sup>4</sup> To determine whether the SR expansion generated incentives for informal employment, we use two datasets and different identification strategies. The first comes from repeated crosssections of the Colombian Household Survey. Using individual-level data and controlling for municipality and year effects, we estimate whether there was an increase in informal employment after the municipality started conducting the interviews needed to determine eligibility for the SR (known as SISBEN interviews). These interviews were implemented at different points in time across municipalities, which allows us to disentangle the effects of the expansion of the health insurance provision from other labor market reforms and macroeconomic shocks occurring at the national level during the same period of time. In section III, we show that pre-existing informality rates are uncorrelated with the timing of the SISBEN, and we find robust and consistent effects of an increase in informal employment of approximately 4 percentage points. This finding corresponds to approximately 8% of the labor force not entering the formal sector and an increase in the government’s health expenditures of approximately 11%.

Our second dataset is a panel of people interviewed in the first and second SISBEN. Using information about an individual’s eligibility status (as determined by her Poverty Index Score from the first SISBEN)<sup>5</sup> and individual fixed effects, we corroborate the increase in informal employment found with the household survey dataset. Additional estimations that account

> 3See Grosh (1994) for a review of 30 social programs in 11 Latin American countries.

> 4For example, in a news article reported by _Presidencia de la Rep ́ublica_ (Feb. 2006), the Minister of Social Protection indicated that people’s valuation of the public health insurance program (the Subsidized Regime (SR)) was high enough to create incentives to discourage formal employment. A study by Santamaria et al. (2008) reports that almost half of SR recipients (49%) indicated that they were not willing to switch to formal employment because it would mean losing their (SR) benefits.

> 5We use data from 1994–1997 for the first SISBEN and from 2003–2007 for the second SISBEN. The algorithm used to determine eligibility changed from the first to the second SISBEN.

3
16 Diarrhea is no doubt one of the main sources of infant mortality. The World Health, Organization estimates that every child under five years of age in the developing world suffers from, on average, 2 to 3 episodes of diarrhea a year, and that acute diarrheal diseases cause some 4 to 5 million deaths each year.<sup>9</sup> According to Levine and others,10 condition **s** uch as poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of education facilitate the widespread transmission of the pathogens that cause diarrheal disease, dysentery, and enteric fever in young children. In addition to promotion of breast feeding and other nutritional interventions, one of the best interventions against diarrhea so far -- except in extremely severe cases --, and the one which has probably had the most impact on decreasing the death toll due to diarrhea, is the Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT).

ORT is the treatment of dehydration due to diarrhea by the use of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) provided through local primary health care infrastructure. ORS are composed of sodium chloride, 3.5 g; trisodium citrate, 2.9 g; potassium chloride, 1.5 g; glucose, 20g; dissolved in one liter of drinking water.11 9J.D. Snyder and N.H. Merson, "The magnitude of the global problem of acute diarrheal disease: a review of active surveillance data,' World Health Organization, 60:605-613, 1982.

1%M.M. Levine, G. Losonski, and others, "Pediatric Diarrhea: the Challenge of Prevention," Pediatric Infectious Diseases, vol. 5, no. 1 (1986) pp. S29-S43. 11M.H. Merson and R.C. Hogan, "The World Health Organization Diarrheal Diseases Control Program," in Public Health and Prevoentve edicine, ed. John Last (Norwalk, CT: Appleton Century Crofts, 1986).
index of civic engagement appears most strongly driven by the relationship between economic hardship and protest, which is significant at the 90% level. The results are robust to using the “Econ Hardship” variable instead, where hardship estimate is statistically significant for the overall index at the 95% level, although in this case we find a significant relationship in the volunteering model rather than the protesting model (Appendix Table A10). Finally, we again examine the robustness of these findings when correcting for multiple hypothesis testing. Tables A9 and A11 show that the Romano-Wolf adjusted p-values are just outside standard significance levels for these economic variables on the civic index outcome. The relationship between economic hardship and volunteering does remain significant (p _≤_ 0.598).

The relationship between fear of crime and civic action is negative but weaker (Table 5). Although the model coefficients for fear are consistently negative, there is no overall significant relationship between changing one’s behavior out of fear of crime and civic engagement. We also do not find a significant relationship for any of the constituent variables of our index in columns 2 to 5. This suggests that, when people make behavioral choices to avoid risk of crime victimization, it does not have a large impact on other forms of civic participation. We find a similar null result when modeling perceptions of violence in Guatemala rather than fear of crime (Appendix Table A12).

We use mediation analysis<sup>7</sup> to explore whether economic and fear factors mediate the direct positive relationship between extortion and civic action. Of course, extortion is not assigned with perfect randomness, and our mediators do not conform to the sequential ignorability assumption, so results from mediation analysis are suggestive at best. Analysis finds some support for both pathways, with the average conditional mediated effect (ACME) just short of 90% significance in both models. For the economic pathway, economic hardship mediates about 7% of the overall relationship between extortion and civic action. Fear attenuates the positive direct relationship between extortion and civic action by about 6%.

Thus, in summary, we find suggestive evidence that extortion affects civic action through economic hardship (mobilizing) and fear (demobilizing). In this case, the economic pathway appears stronger, leading to an overall positive relationship between the experience of extortion and interest in civic action. However, since our results on these mechanisms are only marginally significant at conventional levels and generally do not survive corrections for multiple hypothesis testing, we interpret mediation effects with caution and highlight the importance of additional research in this area.

> 7Using the “mediation” Stata package

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4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that increased market orientation was followed by increased discoveries across continents and types of natural resources (see Table 1). The increase in discoveries after countries open up to the global economy appears to be quite stark. In Peru, for example, discoveries more than quadrupled, in Chile they tripled, and in Mexico they doubled. In Ghana, discoveries only started to occur after the opening of the economy.

**Table 1: Number of discoveries before and after opening – Country Examples**

|Country|Chile|Ghana|Peru|Indonesia|Mexico|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Date of Opening|1976|1985|1991|1970|1986|
|Number of Discoveries 10 years before opening|5|0|5|3|12|
|Number of Discoveries 10 years after opening|15|6|23|15|21|

Source: Based on data from MinEX for natural resource discoveries and Mike Horn for hydrocarbon discoveries. Dates of opening are from Wacziarg and Welch (2008).

To motivate our empirical analysis, we put forward a simple two-region model of endogenous reserves based on Pindyck (1978) where multinational corporations are faced with an implicit tax which proxies for how closed market orientation is, and seek the lowest cost location. The model explores the interplay between market orientation and other channels such as the increase in the marginal cost of discoveries and (demand driven) natural resource price shocks. In turn, key model predictions of our model are then taken to the data.

For our empirical analysis we build a unique and hitherto unexploited dataset of the universe of world-wide major natural resource discoveries since 1950, covering 128 countries, 33 types of natural resources and over 60 years. Our main explanatory variable is a _generic_ measure of market orientation. We provide OLS results as a benchmark but to account for the endogeneity of the market orientation variable, we then use an instrumental variable approach based on Buera et al (2011): a country’s choice to liberalize its economy depends on the policies of neighbouring countries in general, but also on how successful other countries with liberalized and closed economies, respectively, performed. We include country fixed effects as well as year-by-resource fixed effects in our panel estimates to control for time-varying resourcespecific factors such as technological progress in extractions of the different types of minerals
Table 8

# Estimated Tranirng Effet on Employment - Female.

# Trainees vs. Controls

|1nco*rectsd .o.<br>.'.r:ed.l.o**..**<br>.<br>.|C&.<br>.|r||
|---|---|---|---|
|FROM UNWEIGHTED<br>PROBITS:||||
|After 3 months<br>0|.083"|0|0|
|After 6 months<br>.07|.137"|C|.07|
|After 12 months<br>0|.t13"|0|0|
|FROM WEIGH4TED<br>PROBITSP:||||
|After 3 months<br>0|.051*|.069"|.067|
|After 6 months<br>.O9s|.106-|.079|.087-|
|After 12 months<br>.096-|.092|.090|.090|

* Difference between predicted employment probabilities due to training dummy. Estimated from probit equations shown in Tables-. Column (1) is based on uncoffected probits. Column (2) is based on probits with sleetivity correction.

> b Controls selected according to selection criteria used for trainees.

' Sample weights are constructed to match proportion of trainees in total population of unemployed age 15-54 (1988).

* Near-Sijnificant (.10) Significant (.05)
# **Determinants of Long-Term versus Short-Term Bank Credit in EU Countries**<sup>**1**</sup>

Haelim Park Office of Financial Research, U.S. Treasury Claudia Ruiz World Bank Thierry Tressel World Bank JEL Classification: G21, E44, E51 Keywords: bank credit, credit maturity, EU countries, advanced economies, emerging markets

> 1 Author email addresses: haelim.park@treasury.gov; cruizortega@worldbank.org; ttressel@worldbank.org. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Treasury, World Bank, or their policies. All errors are our own.
If increasing labor income led to higher net earnings, both the blue and dotted red lines should rise. While this was the case up to 2015, after introduction of the 500+ program, earning more than 25 percent of AW (PLN 11,380 per year) creates an income loss for single parents. In particular, when earning is between 27 percent and 59 percent of AW,<sup>8</sup> every marginal increase in income leads to a reduction of net income (this is a ‘poverty trap’). The second small decrease in net income is caused by the cutoff of the housing benefit, which is considerably lower in generosity.<sup>9</sup> For a single parent, the difference between inactivity and working at MW full time with 500+ is PLN 6,000.<sup>10</sup> This is an increase by 27 percent of AW, where the difference was 47 percent of AW before 500+. This does not mean, of course, that the family is necessarily worse off but, rather, that the family attains a similar level of welfare without working.

**Figure 3: TBM for single parent with 1 child**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 50,000<br> 45,000<br> 40,000<br> 35,000<br> 30,000<br> 25,000<br> 20,000<br> 15,000<br> 10,000<br> 5,000<br> -<br>Percent of Average Wage<br>T_TAX_SS NETpl FBpl HBpl GROSSpl SApl NET+500 500+<br>Annual Income in PLN<br> 4 8<br> - 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 100<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors elaboration based on TMB for Poland 2016 Figure 4 provides a decomposition of the effects at play when a family moves from inactivity to an MW occupation, 0 percent to 48 percent of AW (vertical black dotted line in Figure 3). Foregone social transfers amount to 52.2 percent of MW.<sup>11</sup> In particular, the withdrawal of family benefits is equivalent to 11.5 percent of MW, the loss of housing benefits is 13 percent, and the 500+ benefit withdrawal represents 27.5 percent of MW. When working at MW compared to inactivity, the income of a single parent, therefore, only increases by 30.9 percent of MW (or PLN 6,751). Moreover, for a single parent with 1 child, working at an MW job likely requires having to find some form of care for the child. Accounting a conservative estimate of the average costs in

> 8 Once the Housing benefit is also withdrawn, the loss of income persists until 67 percent of AW.

> 9 Technically, the lowest possible amount to receive the housing benefit is 2 percent of the lowest retirement. Because the lowest retirement is fixed around PLN 880 (PLN 10,560 per year) now, this would mean that the lowest possible housing benefit should be PLN 212 per year. However, in practice the payment up to this amount is unlikely.

> 10 MW is indicated by the vertical dotted black line in figure 4.

> 11 All further percentages in this section refer to percentages of MW.

10
- 2.27 -

more plausble explanation Is that cocoa<sup>**famers**(or potential cocoa *armors and workers)</sup> withdrew their labor from the agricultural<sup>sector In response to more attractive</sup> alternatives elsewhere, either in the<sup>urban areas or In countrlos such as Nlgerla and the</sup> Cote d'lvolre, which enjoyed a decade<sup>of prosperity following the oil price rlse of 1974.</sup> This Interpretation Is supported<sup>by Thabatabal's careful analysis5.</sup> He argues persuasively that the declne In agricutural<sup>production In the 1970s was caused by the</sup> migration of between one and two<sup>million mainly rural workers, or roughly one-fifth of</sup> Ghana's population. An esthmatod 1.2 miUlon<sup>of these were expolied from Nigeria In 1983</sup> (followed by a further 150,000 In 1985),<sup>causing a large Increase In the rural populatlon</sup> coincident with the severe drought of<sup>1983. The large Increase In food production in</sup> 1984/5 (and the fall In real food prices)<sup>was a natural response to both the drought and</sup> the increase In labor supply.

Konings (1986, p.117-122) argues,<sup>without quantitative evidence, that cocoa</sup> tarmers were increasingly shifting their<sup>efforts from cocoa production to food crops and</sup> other agricultural raw materials. Of<sup>the farmers he Interviewed In the 1979/80 season</sup> 79 percent Intended to expand food<sup>production, whilst the remalning 21 percent clahied</sup> that the switch was difficult because<sup>of transport and/or marketing difficulties. He also</sup> found that 59 percent of the cocoa<sup>farmers had abandoned weeding of cocoa on (at</sup> least a part of) their farms.

6 Hamd Thabatabal, **"Economlc** Declin, Access to Food and Structural<sup>Adjustment In Ghana",</sup> World Economic Programme Research<sup>Workhg Papr 10-6/WPSO, nternational Labor Organisation,</sup> 1986.
protection in most food crops. The highest levels of uniform ceiling bindings are in Nigeria (230 percent), Senegal (180 percent), Zimbabwe (150 percent), Kenya (100 percent), Cameroon (80 percent) and Gabon (60 percent). In contrast, relatively lower uniform tariff ceiling bindings (less than 50 percent) for all agricultural commodities were committed by other countries such as Congo (30 percent), Madagascar (30 percent) and by the South African Customs Union (South Africa, Swaziland, and Namibia). In South Africa, duties will decline by more than 40 percent on average, from more than 70 percent to 40 percent over six years. Very few of the African countries offered reduction in their ceiling bindings, with only Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, and Zimbabwe offering minimum reduction on several commodities. In some countries with previously bound tariffs, reduction commitments were made on their previous bound rates. but other duties and charges are then added. For example, the bound tariff for fluid milk in Cote d'lvoire was reduced from 7 percent to 6 percent, but a 200 percent was added for other duties and charges. Other countries did not offer to cut previous bindings, with additional duties and charges listed in their schedules.' If these other duties and charges are applied, the result will be a substantial increase in protection on these products. Other countries, such as Tunisia established tariff bindings in the range of 90 percent to 190 percent. As in other developing countries, these ceiling bindings define the maximum allowable protection in agriculture during the post-UR period. In the case of cash crops, where the pre-UR trade policy regime effectively taxed the sector, the UR did not provide direct disciplines.

In North Africa and the Middle East, some countries have moved from taxing agriculture to subsidizing the sector since the mid-1980s. Most countries have restricted imports through nontariff barriers such import bans and quotas, import licenses, state monopolies, and other similar

> 3 The other duties ancl charges listed in the schedules as part of the new bindings should be equivalent to the actual applied rates in April 15, 1994 (Article 11:1 (b)). Trading partners can challenge these rates during a three-year period af ter the enforcement of the commitment or the entry into force of the WTO. The other duties and charges were added to the post-Uruguay Round tariff bindings estimate in African countries.

39
close to one (0.96) health episode (see Table D.1); the treatments increase utilization by about 5 percentage points.<sup>25</sup> Maternal utilization — the use of clinics for ante-natal care, birthing, and post-natal visits — can only be measured among the 888 women who gave birth in the year preceding the endline survey. In this sample, we find that maternal utilization increases by 0.18 standard deviation units in CM, but there is no equivalent effect for NFA (or when we pool the treatments). As shown in Appendix Table D.2, increased maternal utilization in CM is driven by more deliveries at western-style medical facilities: the probability of giving birth in a western facility is 0.83 in control areas; CM boosts this rate by 0.09 percentage points, an 11 percent increase.

The health outcomes family also increases by 0.15 standard deviation units with CM. To a large extent this is driven by significant improvements in child health. As shown in Table D.3, the likelihood that a child under 5 dies in CM falls by 0.015 relative to the control mean of 0.039 — a 38.4 percent effect. In addition, child weight-for-length increases by 0.16 z-score and is significant at the 10% level, though this individual indicator loses significance after FDR adjustments. It is worth noting that the magnitude of these effects are qualitatively similar to those uncovered by Björkman and Svensson (2009) in their study of community monitoring in Uganda. Finally, the effect size for vaccine completion is also large, corresponding to a 10 percent increase in vaccine completion, though the indicator does not reach significance at conventional levels.

> 25 Our utilization measure includes the use of private or NGO-run clinics, in addition to the government-run clinics (PHUs) targeted by the treatments. These non-governmental providers constitute a small share of utilization (3 percent). When we focus attention on the utilization of just government-run clinics in Table D.21, our treatment effects increase to 7.3 and 6 percent for CM and NFA respectively, verifying that the interventions boosted utilization in the targeted clinics.

21
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