The wave of LSLBI triggered by the 2007/08 commodity boom spawned many descriptive case studies. These studies generally support the notion that LSLBI can increase output and create positive external effects for small producers if (i) large and small farms do not compete for land or other resources but complement each other (e.g., by large farms providing ancillary infrastructure) and there are no negative externalities;<sup>9</sup> (ii) large farms increase productivity (Dubbert 2019) or labor demand (Nolte & Ostermeier 2017), e.g., through investment in irrigation (Schuenemann _et al._ 2017), high-value production <mark>(Negash & Swinnen 2013), or</mark> agro-processing; and (iii) institutional arrangements, such as contract farming (Hall _et al._ 2017) rather than increase skills and benefits beyond what is observed for wage labor -though better endowed individuals may still reap disproportional benefits (Boamah & Overa 2016). Case studies also suggest that public agencies may use LSLBI to pursue objectives other than that of increasing productivity<sup>10</sup> and that the type of rights large farms can access and the way to obtain them will affect potential benefits.

As case studies may be subject to selection bias, e.g., by focusing on foreign investors to the detriment of locals (Jayne _et al._ 2019) even if the latter comprise the vast majority of ventures and area (Hausermann _et al._ 2018), complete geo-referenced concession inventories, overlaid with existing household or farm surveys, provide a more representative way of exploring and testing welfare and productivity effects of LSLBI on neighboring households. Studies using this methodology have been conducted in Cambodia (Anti 2021), the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Nanhthavong _et al._ 2020), Mozambique (Deininger & Xia 2016; Glover & Jones 2019), and Ethiopia (Ali _et al._ 2019a). Notwithstanding an interesting approach, this leaves out farms not established through formal channels and, as it fails to provide evidence on productivity, cannot be used to ascertain determinants of large farm performance. Primary data collection is essential to provide evidence on these and below we focus on Zambia, one of Africa’s most eager adopters of LSLBI, to explore how mechanisms for large farms to access and use land, and in particular their possession of title, affect productivity, credit access, and investment.

# **2.2 Land tenure and large farms in Zambia**

With smallholders only cultivating a fraction of the country’s area of 74 million ha (of which 58% is of high or medium agricultural suitability) at rather low productivity, a desire to support development of a large farm sector has long been a central element of Zambia’s agricultural strategy. In fact, long before the 2007/08 commodity price boom, polices focusing on establishment of settlement schemes and <mark>‘farm blocks’</mark>

> 9 Potential negative externalities in terms of environment (Baumgartner _et al._ 2015) and health (Xia & Deininger 2019) will have to be accounted for. Similarly, even if economic effects are positive, women may lose out (Tsikata & Yaro 2014) although programs to enhance their agency to address this have shown success in Malawi (Adams _et al._ 2019).

> 10 Beyond aiming to improve productivity of land use, LSLBI has been used to support territorial control (Lavers 2016), provide political patronage (Bélair 2021), transfer resources to central or local government (Lanz _et al._ 2018) or support specific political actors (Widengard 2019). Moreover, if the prospect of LSLBI reduces security of existing rights but fails to put in place robust alternatives, net effects may well be negative, even if desired investments never materialize (Burnod _et al._ 2013).

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