**Table C4.2: Impact of political turnover on firm market share – Suharto Family Firms – Robustness**

||Addi||Depe|ndent variable|: market share||T 50|Fi h||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Robustness_<br>_check/Sample_<br>_restriction_|ng<br>district-<br>year and<br>industry-<br>year FEs|Firms<br>surviving<br>until 2009|Firms<br>already<br>active in<br>1993|All firms|Firms<br>already<br>active in<br>1993|Firms<br>with L<br>(1996)<br>>100|op<br>firms<br>within<br>industry<br>(1996)|rms tat<br>ever<br>issued<br>stocks or<br>bonds|Matched firms<br>(Alternative)|
|PC measure|Family|Family|Family|Broad|Broad|Family|Family|Family|Family|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
|PC*1993|0.008|0.009|0.008|0.010*|0.008|0.008|0.008|-0.000|0.007|
||(0.007)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.019)|(0.008)|
|PC*1994|<br>-0.000|<br>0.000|<br>-0.001|<br>0.006|<br>0.005|<br>-0.001|<br>-0.002|<br>-0.014|<br>-0.001|
||(0.006)|(0.007)|(0.006)|(0.004)|(0.004)|(0.006)|(0.006)|(0.015)|(0.007)|
|PC*1995|0.002|0.003|0.001|0.005**|0.004|0.002|0.001|-0.003|0.002|
||(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.004)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.004)|(0.004)|(0.008)|(0.004)|
|PC*2000|<br>-0.008|<br>-0.005|<br>-0.011|<br>-0.006|<br>-0.011**|<br>-0.013|<br>-0.011|<br>-0.040*|<br>-0.013|
||(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.024)|(0.009)|
|PC*2001|-0.016**|-0.011|-0.017**|-0.005|-0.010*|-0.019**|-0.017**|-0.051**|-0.021**|
||(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.025)|(0.009)|
|PC*2002|-0.010|-0.008|-0.011|-0.005|-0.010**|-0.011|-0.010|-0.029|-0.015**|
||(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.007)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.019)|(0.007)|
|PC*2003|<br>-0.005|<br>-0.002|<br>-0.006|<br>-0.004|<br>-0.006|<br>-0.006|<br>-0.005|<br>-0.014|<br>-0.010|
||(0.007)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.004)|(0.005)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.020)|(0.007)|
|PC*2004|<br>-0.011|<br>-0.007|<br>-0.012|<br>-0.005|<br>-0.008|<br>-0.011|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.020|<br>-0.016*|
||(0.008)|(0.010)|(0.009)|(0.005)|(0.006)|(0.010)|(0.009)|(0.026)|(0.009)|
|PC*2005|<br>-0.013|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.012|<br>-0.007|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.012|<br>-0.010|<br>-0.021|<br>-0.017*|
||(0.008)|(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.006)|(0.007)|(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.025)|(0.008)|
|PC*2006|-0.007|-0.002|-0.005|-0.004|-0.005|-0.006|-0.003|-0.019|-0.011|
||(0.008)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.006)|(0.007)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.024)|(0.008)|
|PC*2007|-0.006|-0.001|-0.003|-0.003|-0.005|-0.006|-0.003|0.000|-0.010|
||(0.009)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.011)|(0.010)|(0.029)|(0.010)|
|PC*2008|<br>-0.013|<br>-0.008|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.007|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.013|<br>-0.009|<br>-0.032|<br>-0.016|
||(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.010)|(0.007)|(0.008)|(0.010)|(0.009)|(0.020)|(0.011)|
|PC*2009|<br>-0.007|<br>-0.002|<br>-0.004|<br>-0.001|<br>-0.004|<br>-0.006|<br>-0.003|<br>-0.034*|<br>-0.008|
||(0.011)|(0.011)|(0.012)|(0.008)|(0.009)|(0.012)|(0.011)|(0.020)|(0.013)|
|Firms|22,985|8,734|16,071|22,999|16,071|6,157|6,776|1,746|888|
|Share of total output<br>accounted for by<br>|<br>99.8%|<br>84.0%|<br>86.3%|<br>100.0%|<br>86.3%|<br>92.9%|<br>87.4%|<br>24.9%|21.7%|
|firmsinthe sample||||||||||
|Observations|193,770|116,509|146,449|194,096|146,449|67,386|69,960|18,182|9,533|
|R-squared|0.795|0.759|0.775|0.766|0.775|0.774|0.747|0.739|0.788|

_Note_ : Table reports results of estimation of baseline specification (1) for different sample restrictions and measures of political connections. The sample period spans 1993–96 and 2000–09. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects, firm and industry controls interacted with year fixed effects. Firm controls include foreign and state ownership, the logarithm of firm age, and indicators for whether a firm imports or exports. Industry controls are a dummy indicating whether the industry in which the firm is operating is subject to entry restrictions, dependence on external finance and asset tangibility. Both firm and industry controls are averaged over the Suharto era (i.e. 1993-1996) Appendix A defines all the variables. Column 1 is a baseline specification with additional district-year and industry-year fixed effects. Column 2 confines the sample to firms surviving up until 2009; columns 3 and 5 confine the sample to firms already active in 1993. Column 6 restricts the sample to firms with more than 100 employees in 1996. Column 7 restricts the sample to the top 50 firms, in terms of market share, in each sector. Column 8 limits the sample to firms that ever issued stocks or bonds. Column 9 restricts the sample to politically connected firms and comparator firms identified using propensity score matching on the basis of their firm age, foreign and state ownership, indicators for being an exporter and importer, industry and year fixed effects during the 1993-1996 period and on firms that exist since 1993. Balance tests for matching are presented in the online Appendix, Table C4.1. In columns 4 and 5 politically connected (PC) firms are firms with broadly defined political connections, while in other columns politically connected firms are defined as being owned by a Suharto family member. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** - at the 5 percent level, and *** - at the 1 percent level.

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