together with social and cultural norms, make self-cultivation by female headed households difficult and that this effect is exacerbated by ill-functioning markets for draught animals, the gender of the household head and the number of oxen have a significant impact on the nature and magnitude of rental market transactions and that estimated to have very large and significant effects (which is smaller in the Chamberlain specification) that discourage renting out but encourage renting in. The significant coefficient on possession of an iron roof in the rent-in equation reinforces this notion, suggesting that there may also be imperfections in other financial markets that make renting in easier for those with higher levels of wealth. To the extent that the certification-induced higher propensity to rent out implies greater freedom in the choice of transaction partner, certification could, by allowing women to choose more able partners, have an impact not only on the productivity of rental transactions and land use in general but also on the welfare of a vulnerable group, something left for future research. At the same time, older households are more likely to rent out and literate ones rent our larger areas of land.

# **5. Conclusion and policy implications**

This paper aimed to explore whether the land certification program in Amhara had positive economic impacts and could provide lessons for others. Despite its recent nature and clear gaps in the local policy environment, we find evidence of significant economic benefits, the magnitude of which exceeds program cost significantly. Follow-up research to assess non-economic effects from the program, especially on female empowerment, the channels through which specific program effects materialize, the path of their evolution over time, and how benefits are distributed across the population, would be of great interest. More immediately, our results give rise to a number of conclusions.

For Ethiopia, the evidence of clear benefits implies that completion of certification will be warranted, ideally based on review and possible adjustment with regard to institutional structure (EPLAUA vs. MOARD), specific rules for implementation (communal areas, women’s participation, spatial records), and the policy framework (leasing). Second, while tenure security and investment benefits can further increase over time, especially as other factors that are needed for such effects to materialize (e.g., nonagricultural employment opportunities or better marketing channels) come into place, they can easily be undermined if beneficiaries’ lose confidence in the value of certificates. Taking of land by government— whether for urban expansion, outside investors, or internal redistribution—without use of certificates to determine compensation levels or prompt award of compensation could jeopardize credibility of certificates. At a more technical level, failure to keep them up to date, e.g., because of deficiencies in record-keeping, would have the same effect and could result in them losing their value.

The evidence presented here suggests not only that implementation of a decentralized, transparent, and cost-effective process of land registration is possible, but also that failure to do so may in many situations 16