Panel B of Table 6 shows that, instead of the increase in female expenditures observed for the promoted women, the exposed women report a significant and large reduction of expenditures on men’s assignable goods of about 23% of the comparison group mean. While the share of income spent on other expenditure categories is also decreasing, the decline for men’s expenditures is the only significant coefficient and the largest in terms of the comparison group mean.<sup>73</sup> The reduction in men’s expenditures is primarily driven by a decrease in spending on men’s clothing and health care.<sup>74</sup> There are several other relevant outcomes which are not affected by the exposure to the new female managers.<sup>75</sup> I do not find an impact on the wives’ or the husbands’ likelihood of working, intimate partner violence (though point estimates may suggest some increase), outcomes from the economic games, and little effects on time use of the spouses. There is some indication that the wives decrease and the husbands increase their time spent on chores on non-workdays by 10-15 minutes. However, these effects are small in economic terms, especially considering that the nonexposed women on average spend more than 4.5 hours on chores on non-workdays, compared to only about 2 hours for the husbands.<sup>76</sup> These results show that the exposure to female supervisors allowed women to gain more say in intra-household decision-making, especially about their own autonomy. There are some suggestions that the exposed women are able to translate this increased bargaining power into reduced spending on men’s assignable goods and a small shift of chores from wives to husbands, though these last results are only tentative.

all seven questions about decision-making, at least 85% of women report being involved in decision-making. Nevertheless, their autonomy is low: only 10% of non-exposed women report that they on their own can make decisions about them visiting a friend. 8% of non-exposed women can decide alone whether they want to take a bus to run an errand; and 17% decide on their own about buying clothes and jewelry for themselves.

73Table C.27 in the Online Appendix confirms that the reduction in men’s expenditures is largest also as a fraction of the comparison group mean when expressed in monetary units (Taka), though the negative coefficients on women’s expenditures and remittances in units of Taka are also sizeable and significant.

> 74See Figure B.10 in the Online Appendix. Table C.28 in the Online Appendix investigates whether expenditures on other goods change, such as food, durables and housing. I observe a small and significant reduction in expenditures on recreation of a quarter of a percentage point, and a significant increase in expenditures on durables such as textiles and furniture of half a percentage point.

75See Tables C.29 and C.30 in the Online Appendix.

76I also investigate heterogeneity of effects by variables that have been found important in the literature, and find that exposed women who brought assets into the marriage or who earn more than their husbands have lower expenditures on women’s assignable goods (Tables C.31 and C.32 in the Online Appendix), in line with the results from the promotion analysis.

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