- 14-

**Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Selected Output Variables (Policy A)**

|ountry|Statistic|pvGDPI2000-20251<br>loss(%today's<br>GDP)|AverageGDP<br>growthrate<br>(2000-2025)|Population<br>change**In**<br>2025(%)|HIV<br>prevalence <br>year2015<br>(°/O)|Health<br>expenditures<br>2015(%<br>GDP)|<br>Loss<br>g<br>pvGDP|Loss<br>GDP<br>rowth<br>rate|**Pop**|HIV<br>|Health|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Ageria|mean|15.8%|-0.1%|-1.2%|1.2%|0.4%|-|0.20!|2.3/|-2.8!|-0.99/|
||std.dev.|12.70%|0.1%|1.0%|1.2%|0.4%|**_0.104_**|**_0.00_**|**_0.0"A_**|**_0.0"A_**|**_0.0_**|
||min|2.9%|-0.6%|-5.9%|0.0%|0.0°/°|-1.6°/|1.8"!|7.80/|-0.44!|-0.1"!|
||max|70.5%|0.0%|-0.1%|6.9%|2.3%|-151.6°/|_0.0"!_|0.5"!|-10.1"!|-3.4/|
|Djibouti|mean|155.8%|-0.8%|-13.5%|8.2%|2.90%o||0.8"!|8.7"!|-10.1"!|-3.5"!|
||std.dev.|69.5%|0.6%|5.8%|6.6%|2.3%|_1.60_|**_0.0S_**|**_0.0S_**|**_0.0S_**|**_0.O"_**|
||min|76.7/o|4.0%|-33.7%|0.8%|0.3%|-8.5"!|3.2"!|19.9"!|-1.7"!|-0.6"!|
||max|485.1%|-0.3%|-6.3%|31.9%|11.3%|-213.0!|0.1"|1.9"!|-23.4"!|-8.6!|
|**Egypt**|mean|16.8%|-0.1%|-0.9%|1.0%|0.3%|_ANN_|0.2"!|2.4"!|-2.8"!|-0.9"!|
||std.dev.|14.9%|0.1%|0.9%|1.1%|0.4%|0.2S|**_0.0"S_**|**_0.0"_**|**_0.0"_**|**_0.0"_**|
||min|2.4%|-0.6%|-5.5%|0.0%|0.0%|-1.9!|2.0"!|7.3"_|-0.4"|-0.1"|
||max|82.00o|0.0%|0.0%!0|6.6%|2.2%|-203.4"°|OO."|0.5Y|-9.5"!|-3.2"|
|Iran|mean|13.0%|-0.1%|-0.9%h|0.9%|0.3%|_|0.2"!|2.4"|-2.8"|0.9"|
||**std.**dev.|11.3%|0.1%|0.9%|1.1%|0.4%|**O.I"**|**_0.0"_**|**_0.0"_**|**_0.0"_**|**_0._**|
||min|2.0%|-0.6%|-5.5%|0.0%|0.0%|-1.30Y|2.1°!|7.3!|-.4"!|-0.1"|
||max|62.1%|0.0%|0.0%|6.5%|2.2%|-153.7"!|0.0"O|_0.5"_|-9.4Y|-3.2|
|Jordan|mean|12.4%|-0.1%|-0.7%|0.9%|0.3%||0.0.<br>2"!|1.9"!|-2.4!<br>|-0.8"!<br>|
||std. dev.|10.1%|0.1%|0.7%|0.9%/0|0.3%|**_0.1"_**|**_0.0"_**|_0.09_|**_0.0a_**|**_0.0_**|
||min|2.3%|-0.5%|-4.5%|0.0%|0.0%|_0.0"!_|1.7"!|6.00!|-0.3"!|4-0.!4|
||max|55.4%|0.0%|0.0%|5.8%|2.0%|-132.3"!|0.0"|0.3"!|-8.2"!|-2.8"!|
|Lebanon|mean|9.5%|-0.1%|-1.1%|1.1%|0.4%|**.;**|0.3"!|2.70!|-3.0"!|-1.0"|
||std.dev.|8.4%|0.1%|1.0%|1.2%|0.4%|**0.1"**|**_0.0s_**|**_0.0"_**|**_o0.0_**|**_0.0a_**|
||min|1.5%|-0.6%|-6.3%|0.0%|0.0%|-1.6"!|2.1"!|8.4"!|-0.4"!|-0.I|
||max|45.6%|0.0%|-0.1%|7.1%|2.3%|-116.3"!|0.0"!|0.5"|-10.4"!|-3.4"!|
|Morocco|mean|13.1%|-0.1%|-0.9%/|0.9%|0.3%||0.2"|2.4"!|-2.8Y|-0.9"!|
||std.dev.|11.2%|0.1%|0.9%|1.1%|0.4%|**_0.1"_**|**_0.0"_**|_0.0"_|**_0.0o_**|<br>**_.0o,_**|
||min|2.2%|-0.6%|-5.6%|0.0%|0.0%|-1.40"|2.0"!|7.59|-0.44!|-0.1"|
||max|62.6%|0.0%/0|0.0%|6.6%|2.2%|-148.9"!|0.0"!|0.4"!|-9.4"!|-3.2"!|
|Tunisia|mean|15.1%|-0.1%|-1.0%/|1.0%!o|0.3%|W|0.3%!|2.5"!|-2.8"!|-0.9"!|
||std. dev.|14.4%|0.1%|1.0%|1.1%|0.4%|**_0.2"_**|**_0.a0_**|**_"0.s_**|**_.o_**|**_a0_**|
||nmin|2.0%|-0.6%|-5.9%|0.0%|0.0%|-3.2"!|2.0"!|7.89!|-0.4"!|-0.1"!|
||max|80.8%<br>|.<br>0.0%!o|-0.1%|6.7%|2.2%|-205.3Y|0.0"!|_0.5"_|-9.6"!|-3.1"!|
|Yemen|mean|29.2%|-0.1%|-0.8%|1.0%|0.4%0/||0.1"!|1.7"!|-2.3"|-0.8"|
||std.dev.|16.7%|0.1%|0.7%|1.0%|0.4%|**_0.1"_**|**_0."_**|**_0._**|**_0.0"_**|**_o0.0_**|
|**_**|min|8.7%/|-0.6%/|-4.2%|0.0%/|0.0%/|6.0"!/|ISV|5.6Y~|-0.3"!/|<br>-0.1"!X|
||max|94.8%|0.0%|0.<br>**Om"**|5.7%|2.1%|-116.9"!j|0.|3°<br>**0.3**-|8.4"!|-3.1"!|

What are the social costs of delaying action? This a second question that policymakers would like to have answered. Here- we have simulated the impact of **a** relatively small delay in the policy intervention: 5 years. The new descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 5. The results suggest that delaying the intervention for 5 years could cost an equivalent of 4% of today's GDP in the case of Yemen and Jordan, to 8% in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, and 20% in the case of Djibouti. Five years of inaction would increase the average HP//AIDS prevalence rate in year 2015 by 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points. This represents more than 60,000 additional infections in the case of Algeria,