rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table B3.1 Sectors in which Obtaining Authorization is De Facto Difficult**

||**Sectors i**|**n which O**<br>|**btaining**<br>|**Authori**<br>|**zation is De**<br>|**Facto Dif**<br>|**ficult**||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||FDI R|**B**|**en Ali S**|**are 2010 (**|**%)**||**Sector T**|**otal 2010**||
||||||Net||||Net||
||||Firms|Y|Profits|L|N|Y<br>Million<br>USD|Profits<br>Million<br>USD|L<br>Jobs|
|64202|Telecommunications (other)|Yes|2%|95%|100%|76%|266|939|200|4107|
|62200|Non-regular air transport|Yes|67%|92%|135%|84%|3|217|-9|850|
|16000|Production of tobacco||14%|73%|-131%|27%|7|58|-1|230|
|92200|Radio & TV|Yes|33%|9%|-82%|33%|6|12|0|125|
|62100|Air transport|Yes|||||2||||
|26510|Cement manufacturing||14%|5%|15%|20%|7|494|82|1820|
|26110|Manufacture of flat glass||0%|0%|0%|0%|3|2|0|32|
|26520|Lime Manufacturing<br>Recycling of metallic||0%|0%|0%|0%|2||||
|37100|materials<br>Recycling of non- metal||0%|0%|0%|0%|9|10|1|86|
|37200|materials||0%|0%|0%|0%|87|37|3|757|
|60220|Taxis and bus operators|Yes|0%|0%|0%|0%|60|31|0|939|
|60300|Transport via pipeline|Yes|0%|0%|0%|0%|1||||
|74600|Security|Yes|0%|0%|0%|0%|153|86|4|18130|
|Total|||2%|60%|73%|15%|606|1923|276|27724|

Note: USD:TND exchange rate1:1.5146, data for 2010, L=wage workers, Y=output, Net profits=pre-tax profits declared to the tax authorities (all firms). Empty cells indicate that the number of observations was too small to safeguard statistical anonymity.

48
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Das and Desai (2003) and Das (2006) had argued that in fact, cultural and structural factors are mutually reinforcing and the context that arises of the reinforcement hinders both women’s labor supply decisions as well as the demand for their labor.

The puzzle we focus on in this paper is why urban mothers in the 25-55 age group, who are more likely to be educated, have fewer children and reside in locations that are considered hubs for jobs, have had labor force participation rates consistently below 25 percent. It may entirely be possible that these women want to stay home with their children, but we believe that reality is more complex than that. There is little empirical evidence on the manner and extent to which urban mothers’ caregiving roles impede their ability to undertake market work. This paper therefore fills a critical gap in policy research on women’s employment in India. Situating the discussion in the normative construction of motherhood and gendered nature of caregiving in India, it uses pooled data from six rounds of the NSS to examine the effects of having a young child on mothers’ employment in urban India over the period 1983-2011. Second, it looks at household structure and analyzes the effects of other household members on women’s labor supply. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is a review of studies on the construction of motherhood, employment and the care of young children. Section 3 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 lays out the analytic strategy and methods, section 5 describes the empirical findings, while the sixth and final section presents a discussion of the findings and implications for policy and action.

# **2.  Motherhood, the Care of Young Children and Women’s Work**

Constructions of motherhood vary across cultures, but for the most part, mothers are the primary caregivers of young children. Globally, women with a child of pre-school age are less likely to be employed, provided other conditions remain the same.<sup>2</sup> The competing demands of market work and child-rearing lead women to make tradeoffs, especially during children’s infancy and preschool years when the latter require intense supervision.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, motherhood places a “penalty” on almost all female workers, unless formal or informal institutions step in to share care

> 2 For a literature review of empirical studies, see Del Boca (2015); Kalb (2009); Anderson and Levine (2000) and Deutsch (1998).

> 3 Borrowed from socio-demographic literature, the so-called “maternal role incompatibility” argument posits that roles of mother and worker may be inherently incompatible (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996).

4
# Referencos:

Agenor, P-R (1990a), "Parallel Currency Markets in Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications", _Unpublished, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC ._ (1990b), "Monetary Disequilibria and Parallel Market Exchange Rates", _Unpublished, International Monetary Fund, Washlngton DC._ Ansu, Y. (1991), " Macroeconomic Aspects of Multiple Exchange Rate Regimess The Case of Ghana", _Unpublished, The World Bank. Washington DC ._ Bhandari, J.S. and C.A. Vegh (1990), " Dual Exchange Markets Under Incomplete Separations AN Optimizing Model", _Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund), Vol 37 (March 1990), pp. 146-167._ Blejer, M.I. (1978), " Exchange Restrictions and the Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate", in _"The Economics of Exchange Rates", edited by J.A.Frenkel and H.G.Johnson (Addison-Wesley)_ Chhibber, A. and N.Shaffik (1991), "Devaluation and Inflation with Parallel Markets: An Application to Ghana", _Unpublished, The World Bank, Washington DC._ Culbertson, W. (1975), "Purchasing Power Parity and Black Market Exchange Rates", _Economic Inquiry, Vol 13, pp. 287-96._ Dornbusch, R., D.V.Dantas, C.Pechman, R. Rocha and D.Simeos (1983), " The Black Market for Dollars in Brazil", _Quarterly Journal of EconomiCs, Vol 98, pp 25-40._ Edwards, S. (1989), "Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policies in Developing Countries", _MIT Press (Cambridge,Mass.)._ Elbadawi,I.A. (1991), "The Black Market for Foreign Exchange and Macroeconomic Management in Sudan", _Unpublished, The World Bank, Washington DC._ Engle, R. and C. Granger (1987), "Co-integration and Error-Corrw ctiont Representation, Estimation and Testing", _Econometrics, Vol 55, pp. 251-276._ Hausman, J.A. and W.E. Taylor (1981), "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects", _Econometrica, Vol.49, pp. 1377-1398._ Hausmann, R. (1991) , Adoption, Management and Abandonment of Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes with Import Controls", _Unpublished, Caracas, Venezuela._ Kamin, S.B. (1991), "Argentina's Experience with Parallel Exchange Markets: 19811990", _Unpublished, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Washington,DC._ (1988), "Devaluation, External Balance and Macroeconomic Performance in Developvig Countries: A Look at the Numbers", _Princeton Studies in International Finance, Number 62 (Princeton, NJ)._ Kaminsky, G. (1991), "Dual Exchange Rates: The Mexican Experience 1982-1987", _Unpublished, University of Callfornia, San Diego (La Jolla, CA) ._ Kaufman, D. and S.A. O'Connell (1990), "The Macroeconomics of the Unofficial Foreign Exchange Market in Tanzania", _Unpublished, The World Bank, Washington DC._ Kiguel, M.A., and J.S. Lizondo (1990), " Adoption and Abandonment of Dual Exchange Rate Systems", _Revista de Analisis Economico, vol. 5, pp. 2-23._ Lizondop S.J. (1990) " Multiple Exchange Rates and Black Market Exchange Ratest A Nontechnical Survey of Theoretical Results", _Unpubllshed, University of Tucuman, Argentlna._ (1987) " Exchange Rate Differential and Balance of Payments Under Dual Excchange Markets", _Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 37-53._
**Table 1:** Measures of household saving behavior

|1) [<br>can<br>etc.<br>toge<br>Yes|ASK ALL] There are several ways in which one can hold savings. For example, one<br>hold cash, use bank accounts, have life insurances, hold mutual funds, pension funds,<br>Do you currently have any savings? Please refer to savings you hold personally or<br>ther with your partner.<br>/ No / Don’t Know / No Answer|
|---|---|
|2) [I<br>you<br>you<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–<br>–|f 1=Yes] Please take a look at this card that lists various savings instruments – could<br>please select the ones you are currently using and rank them according to the amounts<br>have saved on the respective instrument.<br>Cash<br>Current Account / transaction account / wage card<br>Savings deposits / savings accounts (in foreign or in [LOCAL CURRENCY])<br>Life insurance<br>Mutual funds<br>Stocks<br>Pension funds (voluntary contributions)<br>Bonds<br>Other (e.g. gold)<br>Do not know<br>No answer|

Using the responses to the above questions, we employ seven binary variables of households’ saving choice: _any savings_ takes the value one if the respondent has savings, _cash_ takes the value one if the respondent has savings but only saves in cash, _formal savings_ measures whether the respondent has any savings excluding cash; _bank savings_ captures whether the respondent has savings in a savings deposit or current account; _contractual savings_ shows whether the respondent saves using a life insurance or pension fund; _capital market savings_ measures whether the respondent has stocks, mutual funds or bonds; finally, _>1 formal savings_ indicates whether the respondent holds more than one of the saving instruments excluding cash. We consider cash as an indicator of informal savings as the amounts are saved outside the formal financial system.

As the question in Table 1 shows, in contrast to household wealth surveys, the surveys contain information on the existence of savings and assets but not on amounts. Thus, percentages reflect participation rates only and not amounts invested in the respective assets. A further difference in comparison to household wealth surveys is that the questionnaire focuses on individuals rather than households. However, the questionnaire partly accounts for this issue by asking whether individuals hold financial assets alone or together with their partner. Also, in contrast to wealth surveys, we do not impute missing values but assume that non-response is random. For household income, we take this into account by including a dummy variable for those respondents who refuse to answer the question on income.

# **3.3. Household savings are low in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe**

There are substantial heterogeneities between countries in the percentage of individuals with savings – with the highest percentage of savers in a European Union member state (Czech Republic) followed by a candidate for accession (FYR Macedonia) (Figure 1). In the European 6
In Table 2 I give price averages for cocoa, coffee, sugar and tin annually from the time of the cessation of intervention.<sup>2 0</sup> In each case the prices are measured relative the World Bank 33 Commodity Index, over the period from one year before the lapse (cocoa, coffee, sugar) or collapse (tin) of the economic clauses of the agreement to the present. The horizontal axis measures the time, in years, since the breakdown of support (and therefore corresponds to a different date for each of the four commodities). In each case, the end of the agreement is associated with prices of around 40% lower than during the final year of the agreement. Furthermore, these lower prices are seen to persist for at least four years. Taken at face value, this exercise suggests that the ICAs may have raised prices quite substantially.

Nevertheless, even where it is possible to attribute these lower prices to the ending of the ICA, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that the ICA resulted in a price premium of this order. The four commodities considered in Table 2 form two pairs. In the case of cocoa and sugar it is arguable that the agreements lapsed because the extent of over-supply in the market implied that it was no longer possible to attempt to stabilize prices at historic levels. In these cases, the lower post-ICA prices are the evidence of this over-supply and were not caused by the collapse of the relevant agreement. Neither is it possible to argue that in either case was this over-supply due to the operation of the ICA. In coffee and tin, by contrast, the lower postICA prices are attributable to the collapse of stabilization, and result largely from the release of stocks accumulated during the stabilization period. In both cases it seems likely that stabilization did result in prices above long run production costs, but the release in stocks will have depressed the price to beneath this level. Over time, one would expect the price to rise towards its long run as stocks run down. This has happened to some extent, but in coffee the process has been interrupted by the developments I will discuss in section 4.2, and in tin demand growth has failed to reach expectations.

20 Sources: Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit, International Trade Division, World Bank (Washington D.C.). The date for lapse of the ISA is somewhat arbitrary: I use May 1982 when the sugar price fell beneath the floor of the target range.

26
# **Appendix 1: Teacher earnings and student performance**

We use two approaches to explore the association between teacher earnings and student performance—first a cross-country approach building on our estimates, second a within-country approach using PASEC microdata from 10 African countries.<sup>37</sup>

# _Cross-country_

We carry out exploratory cross-country correlational analyses between teacher earnings differentials and other observed variables. Specifically, we examine the association with student achievement using two measures. The first measure of student achievement is the harmonized test scores from the Human Capital Index database, recently developed by the World Bank (2020).<sup>38</sup> This database harmonizes results from international and regional testing programs to make student achievement comparable across nearly 160 countries and economies in the world, and it covers all countries in our sample. The harmonized test scores range from 300 to 600 points and are expressed in the unit of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) testing program. The average score across countries is 431 points, with a standard deviation of 69 points.

Second, we use the rate of “learning poverty” defined as the share of children who are unable to read and understand a simple text by age 10 (World Bank, 2019a). The learning poverty indicator takes into account both the minimum reading proficiency of children in school as well as the proportion of children who are out of school. Compared to the Human Capital Index measure, the learning poverty measure captures a fuller view of student achievement (with its accounting for out-of-school children), but its data coverage is less comprehensive. Among the countries in our sample, only six have learning poverty data.

> 37 The mean and standard deviation of test scores for each grade level are reported in Table A4.

> 38 There are two regional testing programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) organizes the literacy and numeracy assessments of Grade 6 students in most Anglophone Sub-Saharan African countries; and the Analysis Programme of the CONFEMEN Education Systems (PASEC) leads assessments of Grade 6 students in Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries.

45
similar results using a wide range of alternative assumptions for the inference of standard errors, the construction of the hurricane damage function, and the calculation of mangrove width. We additionally show that our results hold among the sample of most affected countries, and that they are not driven by differential policy responses captured using state-year fixed effects.

# **4 Conclusion**

In this paper, we show that wide mangrove belts in Central America have the potential to mitigate the disruption to economic activity generated by hurricanes. We measure local economic activity using remote sensing data on nightlights; potential hurricane destruction using a damage index derived from a wind field model calibrated for Central America; and mangrove protection by calculating the cumulative width of mangroves along the closest path to the coast. Using these data, we estimate the impact of hurricanes on economic activity, under the assumption that hurricane strikes are exogenous conditional on cell and year fixed effects. We then explore, using a binning estimator, whether there is a negative, and plausibly non-linear, relationship between mangroves and hurricane damages.

We find that hurricanes have negative short-run effects on economic activity, with losses likely concentrated in coastal lowlands at risk of both wind and storm surge. Within the coastal lowlands, we further show that the impact of hurricanes declines with mangrove width, and specifically that the effect of hurricanes in our sample is entirely mitigated by one km or more of mangrove width. We additionally conduct various robustness checks and rule out that these findings are driven by the physical characteristics of the mangrove habitat or by the distance to the coast.

Our results are important for policy makers, because they highlight that mangrove conservation and restoration efforts can be used in coastal lowlands to protect economic activity against tropical cyclones. One important observation from this analysis, however, is that the benefit of protection is only accrued from wide mangrove belts. This observation implies that large-scale efforts will be required to achieve the benefits of mangrove protection.

Last, there are two important caveats of this analysis concerning the benefits of mangrove conservation and restoration over a longer time horizon. First, our estimates are 13
**Page** 25

**Livestock Insurance in Mongolia**

**Table** 6: **Estimates Annual Loss Ratios for All**<sup>**SpeciesGivenPure Premiums**</sup>

||Aggreate|Cattle|Sheep|Goat|Camel||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Loss Ratio|LossRatio|LossRatio|LossRatio|LossRatio||
|1969,1<br>|357|453|272|254|330<br>|404<br>|
|F19 <sup>7 </sup>0-i|82|86|45|77<br>|72<br>|128<br>|
|'197.1|288|309|267<br>|327<br>|280<br>|235<br>|
||48|0|90|102|25|28|
||**69**|10|90|126|34|94|
|i1974~-24||0|30|79|13|0|
|;1i976C|46|0|87|107<br>|5<br>|19<br>|
|~1977-j|282|227|389|327|145|228|
|1978|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|1e98<br>**_-;_**|107|115|80|101|273|103|
|i981.|52|72|18|35|28|81|
|19'82'-!|44|68|0|15|204|55|
|**I98**39|252|231|259|253|383<br>|255<br>|
|1984i|45|0|96|65|31|44<br>|
|:i985,|85|29|130|167|60|45|
||47|10|100|70|40|24|
|'1987'~<br>- -|60|51|64|67|209|35|
||98~-|68|46|66|122|69|50|
|I1989;.|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|199V0|79|61|110|109|62|44|
|1991s,|69|58|64|61|169<br>|84<br>|
|,i992,..|**44**|**47**|17|13|69|100|
|1993.|241|316|213|121|162|287|
|1994**_1-_**|**74**|88|80|25|176|77|
|1995|13|0|16|0|109|32|
|1996|5|0|0|0|0|26|
|**-1997**|57|44|78|34|2|90|
|1998:,<br> <br>|12<br> <br>|0<br>|20<br>|23<br>|14<br>|13<br>|
|k**999**<br>@-|**:L]**<br>6|7|0|0|0|18|
|**2000**|434|663|307|308|24|386|

in mind that the primary administrative cost is<sup>marketingand sales, collecting</sup> premiums, and making indemnity payments. All<sup>other statisticsand lossadjustments</sup> should occur within the existing system. Thus,<sup>14%may be well withinthe rangeof</sup> the cost needed. The total annual average position<sup>of the Mongolianinsurance</sup> company follows:

- V *Load premium by 40% to pay for other cost

- / *2.15 x 1.4 = 3% premium rate

- / *Revenue = Tg 30 Billion premium

- / *Reinsurance = Tg 13.6 B

- / *Loss paid by insurer = Tg 12.4 B / -AIl other costs = Tg 4.0 B
# **1.  Introduction**

Strong institutions, including a sound regulatory environment for private sector economic activity, are widely considered to be crucial to successful economic development. This consensus has been informed by a vast body of empirical evidence linking various measures of institutional and regulatory quality to development outcomes. Translating this empirical consensus into concrete policy advice for countries seeking to improve their institutional and regulatory environment has been much more difficult, however, as many of the empirical measures used in this literature have been short on specifics. For example, in one of the most influential papers in the “institutions matter” literature, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) proxy for institutional quality using the risk of expropriation, as perceived by analysts at a commercial risk rating agency. Similarly, in a seminal paper, Mauro (1995) documents the links between perceptions of corruption from a commercial risk rating agency and investment and growth rates across countries. Absent details on the specific policy interventions that might affect these perceptions of expropriation risk or corruption, providing policy advice based on such broad measures is a little bit like telling aspiring golfers that they should play more like Tiger Woods.

Recognizing this, a number of organizations have embarked on major efforts to develop much more disaggregated measures of specific details of the institutional and regulatory environment. The promise of such detailed and disaggregated indicators is to pinpoint specific areas in need of reform in order to improve institutional and regulatory outcomes. As noted by Global Integrity, which produces a very detailed set of over 300 indicators of public sector accountability mechanisms that we use in this paper, _“we view the [Global Integrity] Indicators' greatest strength as their ability to unpack governance challenges within a country into discrete, actionable issues rather than just single numbers or rankings. The richness of the data set ‐ more than 300 indicators for each country ‐ enables a discussion of how best to allocate limited political and financial capital when the challenges are many and the resources few._<sup>_1_</sup> _”_ . Global Integrity goes on to argue that “ _The Global Integrity Index and Integrity Indicators assist [foreign aid] donors by helping to prioritize governance and anti‐corruption challenges in a country, region, or globally. By providing an actionable roadmap for reform, donors can begin to sequence key governance interventions to tackle the most pressing anti‐corruption weaknesses in a country ‐ or help_

> 1 All of the quotations from Global Integrity are taken from their website, at this link accessed on November 12, 2009: <u>http://report.globalintegrity.org/methodology.cfm.</u>

2