(including award of contracts), or organs created (including the integrity committee itself) during the time that RDA did not have a formal Board, be challenged in a court of law. But more importantly, this situation significantly affects the possibility of effective, autonomous oversight for the agency.

However, mere appointment of a Board is not always a panacea to political interference. A board’s effectiveness depends greatly on its insulation from adverse political interference, and such insulation is very difficult to ensure. As Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2009) explained in the case of Uganda, which has also established a road agency and a road fund,: "pressures to [engage in illegal practices or for the Board to turn a blind eye to any evidence of corruption in the authority’s dealings with the private sector] are most likely to arise, sooner or later, as election times draw closer. Some or all of those concerned may resist the pressures, but past experience in other sectors suggests they may not be successful in doing so while also keeping their jobs. Experience [in Uganda] suggests that being formally answerable to a Board does not provide much protection per se [...]". The recent indication by the current President that he wishes to have some direct oversight of the agency may have further muddied the lines of authority in the RDA<sup>7</sup> .

**External influence:** Concerns over political involvement in RDA have been commented on in the past: during the 2009 road sector debate for example, it was pointed out that the real cause of the overcommitment issue was political. A Member of Parliament (MP) argued that the agency (RDA) merely carried out directives from authorities and could therefore not be blamed for over-commitment in procuring road contracts and that the problem at RDA was the result of some politicians demanding road works that were not budgeted for. Examples were given of the Kafulafuta-Luanshya Road; although the budget was only sufficient for a certain stretch of the road some politicians wanted the entire road be worked on, and this resulted in poor work. The MP defended engineers who supervised shoddy works, saying they received the instructions from politicians and that there was no way they could refuse them (Times of Zambia 2010). Despite such protestations it is notable that only RDA staff, and no politicians, were fired from their positions as a result of the debacle<sup>8</sup> .

# **3. Project selection analysis**

## **The importance of unplanned projects**

Political interference is usually recorded in project selection through unplanned projects. In Zambia, within the last few years the number of _unplanned_ projects has increased, thereby reducing the RDA’s adherence to its original work plan. Over the period 2008-2011, almost 40% of the total value of government-funded road projects was for unplanned projects. This has put an additional pressure on the institution and staff, leaving the door open for political interference and procedural shortcuts. In addition, the unplanned nature of some decisions on project selection raises serious doubts as to whether the funds are likely to be used effectively.

> 7 “President  Sata Launches Link Zambia and Declares That He Has Taken over RDA Contracts.” _LusakaTimes.com - Zambia :_ Set 2012. http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/09/20/president-sata-launches-link-zambia-declares-rdacontracts/.

> 8 A combination of factors may also contribute to explain some problems, such as lack of experienced staff or staff overload.

9