=, produced. That is, welfare will be reduced. The exporter's goverunent should therefore support the enforcement of its competition laws in these circumstances. Similarly, the importing country government has an interest in ensuring that an antidumping complaint is not sinply being used by the domestic industry as a mechanism to create or enforce a cartel or similar non-competitive market structures.'<sup>8</sup> Given that it is in the interest of both the parties to seek enforcement of antitrust laws, the main issue is which antitrust laws are to be enforced. In anttrust case-law, initially in the US and then in the EU, the "effects" doctrine has led to an expansion of the reach of domestic jurisdictions when addressing antitrust issues. Summarzing, under the 'effects" doctrine, domestic courts have jurisdiction to judge actions of foreign parties to the extent that the latter have a direct, immediate (or reasonably foreseeable) and substantial effect on the market of the importing country. These three conditions can be (and in practice have been) stretched to encompass actions that could be, at best, described as borderline cases.'<sup>9</sup> This approach was exemplified by the Bush Administration: "Applying the antitrust laws to anticomptitive conduct that harms U.S. exports is consistent with [previously followed] enforcemen.t policy ... Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to be limited to cases based on direct harm to consumers. Today, when both imports and exports are of importance to [the US] economy, we would not limit our concern to competition in only halt of our traie. "2 The ainton Administation appears to follow the same approach. Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman recently "reaffirmed the Department of Justice's policy to take enforcement action against foreign conduct that falls within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, even where the restraints do not hav{e a direct impact on US consumers. 21 Recendy, a proposed bill was introduced for discussion in the US Congress which would give the President new powers to take action to open foreign markets. The proposed Bill would add a new Section 311 to the existing Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (as modified in 1988). Under Secion 311 "(a) The President shall have the authority to impose civil penalties on foreign or domestic persons that engage in restrictive business practices, including price-fixing, bid rigging, joint restint on output, _181_ As has been noted by Messerlin (1990), in practice firms have used antidumping as a cartel enforcement mechanism in the EU context. Wood (1989) and Boltuck and Kaplan (1993) argue that many US antidumping cases are attempts by US firms to protect rents, i.e., to main supra-competitive prices that result from imperfectly contestable makers.

19/ In 1983, the Antitrust Division of the US Justice Department recommended criminal prosecution against Japanese trading compaies that had allegedly reached agreements concering how much US seafood they would buy and at what prices. See Davidow (1993) for a discussion of the United States v. C. Itoh & Co. case and its influence on the rent US administration.

20/ Stament by James Rill, Assistant Attoney-eal, Antitrust Division, as cited by Ohara (1994, p. 50).

21/ buemarional _Trade Reporter,_ 11, 1994, p. 374.

22/ See H.R. 4206, 103d Congress, 2nd Session.

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