_τ_ 1<sup>_TFPR_</sup> = 0 _._ 009 (0 _._ 005), a statistically significant increase in productivity of about 1 percent per year. In Column (2) the outcome is the annualized change in the unweighted average of the log of TFPR _jk_ . Here the result is similar with _τ_ 1<sup>_TFPR_</sup> = 0 _._ 011 (0 _._ 006), suggesting that the increase in productivity was broad-based, across all establishments in the industry, rather than just a few. In both columns the coefficient _τ_ 0<sup>_TFPR_</sup> is a precisely estimated zero, indicating investigations do not target industries with specific productivity trends.

The next columns present estimates where the outcomes are changes in alternative moments of the productivity distribution. In Column (3) the outcome is the change in the correlation of market share and the log of TFPR _jk_ (Olley and Pakes, 1996) and in Column (4) the outcome is the change in the variance of the log of TFPR _jk_ (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). These measures proxy for changes in the extent of factor misallocation relative to the output maximizing allocation. In both columns, we see no evidence that sanctions increase or decrease misallocation. Sanctions do not increase the correlation between market share and revenue productivity or reduce the variance of revenue factor productivity. Rather than a model in which antitrust changes industry concentration leads to a significant reallocation of factors, these results are consistent with a model in which antitrust sanctions change in the industry equilibrium from a joint profit-maximizing cartel to a competitive equilibrium, and that new equilibrium incentivizing a broad-based increase in productivity across the productivity distribution, as firms benefiting from monopolistic practices move away from a ‘quiet life’ of limited innovation (Hicks, 1935, pg. 8).

Interestingly we do find that industries targeted by closed cases appear to be having an increase in the variance of revenue productivity. This is consistent with the evidence that closed cases have increasing informality. Since informal firms are numerous and less productive, greater informality increases productivity dispersion (Levy Algazi et al., 2018). At the same time, these industries also experience an increase in the correlation of market share and revenue productivity, which can reflect a greater mass of informal low-productivity firms with little scale or market share.

One concern with these results is that measures of TFPR may conflate profitability and productivity. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) distinguish TFPR, which is measured using revenues, from total factor quantity productivity (TFPQ), which is measured using physical output. If high markup firms are also the most productive, consumers will substitute away from high markup firms, and aggregate productivity will be less than if all firms had the same markup. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that it is possible to infer price vs. quantity, and therefore TFPR vs. TFPQ using an assumed demand function. Though only sales (revenues) are observed in the Economic Census, establishments with high physical output must have a lower price to explain why buyers would demand more 31