rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Zaki, 2020), political connections (Kruse et al., 2021 and Aboushady and Zaki, 2022) and the presence of different trade barriers (whether tariffs or non-tariff measures, see Karam and Zaki (2021)).

As it was mentioned before, this paper attempts to examine the nexus between women’s labor participation and GVCs integration. LAC has the highest share of full-time female employees followed by EAP and ECA and on the other extreme South Asia and the MENA region. In addition, for all the regions production workers are much higher than non-production ones (see Table A2 in Appendix 3). While the former are mainly working in the manufacturing sector, the latter are in the services one. This is confirmed by Table 1 that shows that being integrated in a GVC is positively associated to a larger number of females, whether production or non-production workers but more production ones. This result applies to the different GVCs definitions bearing in mind that for the most restrictive definition, the results are also driven by the firm size (as larger firms are more likely to be part of GVCs). Such a positive association is rather good news given that GVCs should mainly take place in the manufacturing sector, which is likely to create more jobs for female production workers (blue collars) that are abundant in emerging economies.

<u>Table 1. The Average Number of Female Employees and GVCs</u>

||**GV**|**C1**|**GV**|**C2**|**GV**|**C3**|**G**|**VC4**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|
|Female Employees|19.81|43.19|20.60|79.27|21.12|87.86|21.30|108.81|
|Female Production Workers|14.35|72.83|21.45|85.13|23.95|129.54|26.50|126.43|
|Female Non-Production Workers|5.30|18.48|6.20|25.86|7.66|28.18|7.90|35.07|

Source: Constructed by the authors using the WBES.

Note: GVC1 refers to firms that export and import simultaneously, GVC2 = GVC1 + international certification, GVC3= GVC1+ share of its capital owned by a foreign firm, GVC4 combines the four criteria altogether.

Yet, it is important to look at women’s participation from a broader lens by taking into consideration, not only female workers, but whether the owner or the manager of the firm are females. These two measures can give a clearer picture of women’s empowerment as they are associated to more female power within the firm. Thus, Figure 1 compares firms that are part of GVCs whose owner or manager are women. Three remarks are worth mentioning. First, generally, the share of firms that are owned or managed by females is limited, compared to those owned or managed by males. Second, females that own a firm that is part of a GVC are higher than those who just manage it. This is closely related to the concept of empowerment as it captures the effect on women’s empowerment more than management given that the manager is, at the end of the day, an employee in the firm that takes orders from the owner, while the owner is an entrepreneur that takes financial and business risks on his/her own (Karam and Zaki, 2021). Third, these shares decrease with more restrictive definition of GVCs (for ownership it decreased from 36% to 26% of firms and for management from 13% to 12%).

5
payments) changes the nature of the game from a social dilemma into a coordination game. Existing theory predicts that threshold group payments are (weakly) more likely to result in better conservation outcomes (Isaac _et al._ , 1989; Andreoni, 1998; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2014); we develop new theory to prove that conservation outcomes can actually be worse under threshold group payments – if and only if uncertainty about the relationship between conservation effort and tree survival rates is sufficiently large. We find that trees survival rates are higher with linear than with threshold group payments – possibly due to the harsh circumstances for saplings to survive in Burkina Faso. We use both endline surveys as well as a lab experiment to gain more insight into the underlying mechanism.

We find that the threshold incentives can significantly improve the conditions for cooperation (as they induce higher trust among group members, result in more equal effort contribution and give rise to more frequent group meetings for maintenance planning). Our theory suggests that the fact that the thresholds have not outperformed the linear group payment scheme may have been due to two reasons. One is that not all thresholds are equilibria – it may not be optimal to coordinate on reaching the highest ones – and hence cooperation may have started (too) late. The second is that uncertainty about the effectiveness of maintenance activity in ensuring tree survival is substantial, and hence that the marginal benefits of putting in effort may actually become lower under threshold group payments than in the presence of a linear group payment scheme.

We find suggestive evidence in support of both mechanisms in our field-experimental data, but additional evidence for this also comes from the lab experiment, which shows that with threshold group payments initial survival rates are lower but also that they are declining less fast over time than in the linear group payment scheme. The laboratory experiment also provides (suggestive) evidence for the claim that threshold group payments might have outperformed the linear group payment scheme had our participants in the field been given regularly updates on survival rates during the intervention period.

Overall, we conclude that even though in our RCT threshold group payments were less effective than linear group payments, more field tests are needed to determine whether threshold group payments are inferior to linear group payments, as well as to what extent the results are driven by, for example, group size, the group formation process or climatic 29
<!-- Start of picture text --> e<br>e<br>ve): e e<br>5 e<br>ae]<br>&eee<br>T©<br>oC bd e<br>g High concentration °<br>5 of power . e e e e<br>got] cept e nate nst ent sno seen --8-s regen e<br>I . e e e<br>c= Low concentration e e e<br>ec of power 0 e e e ;<br>NeCeCe<br>e<br>b ; e ee<br>®le<br>ro)<br>1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012<br>Year<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Policy Research Working Paper 9904

# **Abstract**

This paper evaluates the impact of an employment subsidy scheme covering employers’ social contribution costs on registered employment in small firms in Turkey. It utilizes a rich, firm-level administrative data set with monthly frequency, which allows for closely following the dynamics of registered employment in firms before and after the implementation of the subsidy. The empirical approach utilizes the geographically targeted implementation of the subsidy to estimate its effects using a difference-in-difference specification. The paper finds that the subsidy scheme had a sizable and positive impact on registered employment in small firms. The results are robust across specifications and to the choice of the control group. Positive effects on formal employment are also fairly constant and sustained over time. Corroborative evidence suggests that the positive effects on registered employment are mainly driven by the formalization of existing workers as opposed to new job creation. Therefore, the results indicate that social security contribution subsidies in small firms can be effective in reducing informality in contexts where informal employment remains common.

This paper is a product of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice and the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www. worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at gasik@etu.edu.tr, lbossavie@worldbank.org, Jochen.Kluve@kfw.de, snasozen@worldbank.org, mnebiler@worldbank.org, and aoviedo@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
The basic Mincerian earnings function links logarithm of average earning to the approximate determinants of earnings such as years of schooling (S), years of experience (EXP), squared experience, sex, North / South region, urban/rural location, seniority. The Mincerian earning funtion has the following semi-log form:

> mnYi = _a_ + PI _Si_ + P2 EXPi + 133 EXPi<sup>2</sup> **+ P34** SEXi + _135_ NORTH1 + **136** URBANi **+P7** SENIORi + **_Ei_**

where: Si stands for number of years of schooling that individual I had completed; EXPi and EXPi2 are number of years of experience and its square; SEXi presents sex of worker with value 1 for male and 0 for female workers; NORTHi is the residence location of worker which takes value 1 if the workers were from the north region (including the Northern Uplands, the Red River Delta, the North Central Coast, and the Central Coast) and value 0 otherwise; URBANi distinguishes workers from urban areas (value 1) from workers from rural areas (value 0); SENIOR, identifies whether worker has participated in the workforce for a period less than 5 years or more, which has value 1 if less than 5 years and 0 otherwise. In this semi-log earnings function specification the coefficient on years of schooling can be interpreted as the average private rate of return to one additional year of education, regardless of the education level to which this year of schooling refers to.

**Figure 7: Monthly earnings of Private and Public sector wage workers, 1993-98**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2000<br>1800 -.- A1193<br>1600 Pubhc93<br>1400 -_ -Private93<br>0 C A1198<br>X 1000 Private98<br>400<br>200(<br>0<br>None Primary L-secondary U-secondary University<br>Highest education level completed<br><!-- End of picture text --> As can be seen from Table 19, returns to one additional year of schooling, regardless of the level of education increased from 3% in 1993 to 4% in 1998. Despite this change, returns to schooling in Vietnam are still low by international standards and are below those of some other developing countries such as Philippine (6.2% in 1998) (Schady, 2001). Worldwide, one more year of schooling can bring about 10 percent increase in earnings. However, low returns to schooling were observed in some developing countries in 1980s, such as the estimates of returns to schooling in China ranged from 1 to 5 percent in the mid and late 1980s. It was 2.9 percent in Poland in 1986 and 4.3 percent in Hungarian in 1987 (Psacharopoulos, 1994).

22
- Rea, Louis and Richard Parker. 1997. Designing and Conducting<sup>Survey Research: A</sup> Comprehensive Guide, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

- Recantini, Francesca, Scott Wallsten and Lixin Xu. 2000. "Surveying<sup>Surveys and</sup> Questioning questions: Learning from the World Bank Experience".<sup>_World Bank_</sup> _Policy Research Working Paper_ No. 2307, Washington D.C.: The<sup>World Bank.</sup>

- Seabright, Paul. 1993. "Managing Local Commons: theoretical issues in incentive design". _The Journal of Economic Perspectives._ 7-4: 113-134.

- Schein, Edgar H. 1996. "Three Cultures of Management: The key to organizational Learning" in _Sloan Management Review,_ Fall 1996.

- Selznick, Philip. 1957. _Leadership in Administration: A Sociological_<sup>_Interpretation,_</sup> University of California Press (1984, reprint version).

- Simon, Herbert A., "Organizations and Markets," _Journal of Economic_<sup>_Perspectives,_</sup> Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 25-44

- Stevens, Mike 1994. _Preparingfor Civil Service pay and Employment:_<sup>_a Primer in_</sup> _Rehabilitating Government: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa_ ed.<sup>David L.</sup> Lindauer and Barbara Nunberg, Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

- Shand, D. 1997. _The Role ofperformance Indicators in Public Expenditure_<sup>_Management,_</sup> Unpublished IMF document.

- Simon, Herbert A. 1974. _Administrative Behavior: A study of decision-making_<sup>_processes_</sup> _in administrative organization,_ New York: Free Press.

- . 1991. Organizations and Markets. _Journal of Economic Perspectives,_<sup>_Vol._</sup>

- 5, No. 2 (Spring 1991): 25-44.

- Tendler, Judith. 1997. _Good government in the tropics._ Baltimore, Md.: Johns<sup>Hopkins</sup> University Press.

- Weingast, Barry R. and Mark J. Moran. 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission"<sup>in</sup><sup>_Journal_</sup> _of Political Economy_ (U. S.); 91:765-800.

- Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. _Markets and Hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: a study in the economics of internal organization,_ New<sup>York: Free</sup> Press.

- Wilson, Jamnes Q., 1989. _Bureaucracy: what government agencies_<sup>_do and why they do it,_</sup> New York: Basic Books.

39
23

# Table I

|Developing Countries' Morc|handize Export. by D<br>World$|etination and Pr<br>(Percbentg<br> <br>|oduct (1989)<br>e<br>of world)<br>|
|---|---|---|---|
||(S bilons)|Developed<br>Countries|Developing<br>Countrhi|
|Food|84|64.3|22.6|
|Raw Materials|26|57.7|30.8|
|Ores &Minerals|18|72.2|16.7|
|Fuels|163|68.1|29.5|
|Non-Ferrous<br>Metals|16|68.8|31.3|
|Pruarby Products|307|66.1|27.0|
|Iron and Steel|15|53.3|33.3|
|Chemicals|26|38.5|50.0|
|Other semi-nmanufactures|40|70.0|25.0|
|Machinery & Trans. eq.|131|64.9|29.8|
|Textiles|30|33.3|46.7|
|Clothing|44|90.9|6.8|
|Other Consumer<br>Goods|54|77.8|16.7|
|Manufactures|359|62.4|25.6|
|Tota|65S|"f.I|27.2|

Includes destinations to centrally planned economies which the GATT places outside of the countries labelled as developed and developing. Hence the sum of the percentages will not add up to hundred.

_Source:_ International Trade 1990-91, GATT.

|||Shares of W|Tab<br>orld Higb-<br>197|le 2<br>Teebnolog<br> <br>0-89|y<br>Export (%)|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Country|1970-73|1973-76|1976-79|1979-82|1982-85|198547|1918689|
|OECD|95.57|93.93|91.52|88.79|86.80|85.30|83.64|
|NIC|1.30|2.28|3.18|4.06|6.05|7.56|8.76|
|Others|2.69|3.36|4.43|5.23|5.98|61.4|6.27|

NICs = newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong. Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. _Sourwce:_ Extracted from Table 2.3 of Tyson (1992). Refer to orig4n sources cited therein.
output was merely 2 percent. China introduced a series of policies and measures to encourage FDI in hightech manufacturing industries since 1992 and began to publish the “Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment” since 1995. The Catalogue classified foreign investment projects into encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited categories. Preferential policies were granted to encouraged industries. Most of the encouraged category belonged to the manufacturing sector, in line with China’s goal to expand manufacturing employment and participate in the global production networks. China updated the catalogue in 1997, 2002 and 2004 during our study period. Industry-level FDI deregulation is highly predictive of subsequent FDI inflows. Advanced technologies, industrial know-how, and managerial practices brought by foreign firms greatly accelerated China’s economic development.

# 2.2 Identification strategy

This paper uses Bartik approach to measure each city’s exposure to FDI deregulation. The Bartik shock for FDI inflows in each city c, province p in time t is constructed as in equation (1). ΔFDIit is the predicted change in foreign firms’ employment share in industry i from period t-1 to t owing to industry level FDI policy changes. emp_shareicpt−1 is the lagged share of employment in industry i, city c, province p.

As foreign firms were very scarce in 1990, this paper assumes foreign employment share in each 3- digit industry to be zero in 1990. The change in predicted national foreign employment share in each 3- digit industry from 1990 to 2000 is therefore simply the predicted foreign employment share in 2000.

This paper uses the predicted changes in foreign employment share instead of actual changes to isolate the effect of FDI deregulation from other confounding factors. A key identification assumption to Bartik IVs is that the differential effect of higher exposure of certain industries only affects the change in the outcome through the endogenous variable of interest, and not through any potential confounding channel (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2020; Adao et al. 2019; Borusyak et al. 2018). In this paper’s case, FDI growth across industries may reflect both domestic supply and demand factors, which could violate the validity assumption of Bartik instruments. To mitigate this concern, we use the component of industry level foreign employment share growth explained by China’s FDI deregulation during 1990-2005. Specifically, we use the “Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment” in 1997 and 2002 to measure FDI regulatory shocks at the 3-digit industry level. The process is explained below: (i) We first map each industry and product in the 1997 and 2002 Catalogues to the 4-digit industry level based on 1994 industry classification. In the 1997 Catalogue, FDI was encouraged or permitted in 368 out of 426 4-digit industries. As FDI was not allowed in almost all industries, we consider FDI became more 9
states where collecting firm-level data may prove challenging. By using CDR, researchers, businesses and policymakers can extend the temporal and spatial fidelity of traditional data sources at low cost. The application of CDR data to examine micro-level responses to the takeover of Kunduz by Taliban insurgents in September-October 2015 also increases our confidence that these data contain information that can expand our understanding of the relationship between conflict and economic activity, as we demonstrate in our district-month panel results.

We contrast our findings with those of Besley and Mueller (2012), who estimate the peace dividend using increases in housing prices in Northern Ireland at the end of The Troubles. The internal logic of their setting is a virtuous cycle of decreased killings, leading to increased asset values, which in turn motivates increasing public investment in security. Tragically, like many other conflicts in developing economies, Afghanistan suffers from a vicious cycle in which increases in killings lead to decreases in economic activity, which in turn undermine state capacity to deliver security and public perceptions that the situation will improve. In the case of Kunduz, public perceptions about the long-term ability of the government to protect the city may have been at least as important in explaining firm behavior as realities on the ground. In future work, we plan to more deeply explore the gap between security perceptions and realities, and the corresponding implications for business and public policy in insecure settings like Afghanistan.

Based on our research to date, we note three potential implications for policymakers to consider from this work, all of which deserve further consideration. First, given scarce resources for the provision of security, a potential tradeoff exists between providing security in urban areas where economic activity is concentrated and in rural areas where the insurgency maintains its strongholds. While both objectives are clearly important, most economic activity occurs in cities, so failing to secure the urban cores could have grave consequences for long-term development. Second, the costs of security provision raise costs for firms, with potential consequences for industrial organization and the size distribution of enterprises. If, 25
# **Table 2 Probit estimation of environmental performance model**

|Variable|Coefficient|Std. Error|z-Statistic|Prob.|Marginal<br>effect|Elasticity|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|C|35.89301|17.32669|2.071544|0.0383|0.16D-08||
|News|2.981974|1.628158|1.831502|0.0670|0.28D-07|0.13D-07|
|News*Anews|4.495794|2.751321|1.634049|0.1022|0.24D-08|0.49D-09|
|Cpp|-2.042458|1.038103|-1.967490|0.0491|-0.90D-10|-0.22D-09|
|Elaw|3.720739|1.690540|2.200918|0.0277|0.16D-09|0.59D-09|
|Edep|-6.209188|2.909432|-2.134158|0.0328|-0.28D-09|-0.34D-09|
|Tcn|-5.117058|2.236443|-2.288034|0.0221|-0.23D-09|-0.85D-09|
|Ltrai|2.264934|1.251730|1.809443|0.0704|0.10D-09|0.31D-09|
|Lemp|-3.974566|1.824889|-2.177976|0.0294|-0.18D-09|-0.55D-09|
|Nag|6.624002|2.695507|2.457424|0.0140|-0.29D-09|0.11D-08|
|Lmg|-7.195410|2.976004|-2.417809|0.0156|-0.32D-09|-0.12D-08|
|Bip|0.467101|0.675796|0.691187|0.4894|0.21D-10|0.56D-10|
|Cing|1.313406|0.694233|1.891882|0.0585|0.58D-10|0.12D-09|
|Wver|-2.737378|1.287684|-2.125815|0.0335|-0.12D-09|-0.24D-09|
|Cfpe|-3.949580|1.962414|-2.012613|0.0442|-0.18D-09|-0.35D-09|
|Cipc|1.866535|1.381612|1.350984|0.1767|0.83D-10|0.17D-09|
|Mean dependent var|0.734694|S.D. dependent|var|0.446071|||
|S.E. of regression|0.355976|Akaike info crit|erion|1.130634|||
|Sum squared resid|4.181727|Schwarz criteri|on|1.748371|||
|Log likelihood|-11.70053|Hannan-Quinn|criter.|1.365003|||
|Restr. log likelihood|-28.34817|Avg. log likelih|ood|-0.238786|||
|LR statistic (15 df)|33.29527|McFadden R-sq|uared|0.587256|||
|Probability(LR stat)|0.004272||||||
|Obs with Dep=0|13|Total obs||49|||
|Obs with Dep=1|36||||||

Note: Model (1) is of interest. Variables are defined as in Table 3. Except for two parameters, all parameters are significant at the 10% level of significance. _D_ stands for the number of zeroes after the dot. Marginal effects and elasticities are from Limdep 8.0.

As the _LR_ statistic indicates the model passes the global test. _News_ in media positively affects environmental performance. _News_ matters the most if firms are indeed aware of its publication in media or others. While “ _awareness of news publication_ ” did not appear directly in our final model because of problem of collinearity of covariance 13
# The Distribution of the Benefits from Social Services in Indonesia, 1978-87

# by Dominique van de Walle*

||Table of Contents||
|---|---|---|
|1.|Introduction|1|
|2.|Methodological Issues|3|
|3.|Utilization of Education Services|7|
||The Picture in 1987|7|
||Changes in Incidence between 1978 and 1987|8|
||<br>Explaining Changes in Incider :e|10|
|4.|Utilization of Health Services|12|
||The Picture in 1987|12|
||Changes in Incidence between 1978 and 1987|14|
|5.|Access to Education and Health Care: Availability and Costs|17|
||Access to Education Faciliiues|18|
||Access to Health Facilities|19|
||Household Expenditures on Education|20|
||<br>Household Expenditures on Health Care|22|
|6.|Who Benefits from Public Expenditures in the Education and Health<br>Sectors?|24|
||Government Subsidies for Education|27|
||The Incidence of Education Subsidies in 1987|29|
||Changes in the Distribution of Education Subsides between 1978 and 1987|31|
||Government Subsidies for Health Care|32|
||The Incidence of Government Health Subsides in 1987|35|
||Changes in the Distribution of Heai.h Subsides between 19,'8 and 1987|38|
|7.|Conclusions|39|
|Referen|ces|45|
|Tables||47|

* Public Economics Division, Country Economics Department, World Bank. Support from RPO 676-42 is gratefully acknowledged as well as help from AS5CO country operations. I would like to thank Anupa Bhaumik for her research assistance, Anil Deolalikar for providing tabulations of data from the 1987 SUSENAS and 1986-87 Potensi Desa, and Benu Bedani for providing tabulated numbers from the 1990 SUSENAS health module. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Shankar Acharya, Emmanuel Jimenez, Paul Gertler, Elizabeth King, Sandy Lieberman, Nicholas Prescott, and Martin Ravallion.