rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
The dataset of RZ includes 42 countries. When we merge it with the countries for which we estimate the competitiveness measure, the number of countries included in our dataset drops quite a bit; we are left with 17 countries. For the growth regressions, as in RZ, we need to drop the benchmark country (the United States) and hence are left with 16 countries. In all regressions, we use country dummies to control for country differences and use industry dummies to correct for industry-specific effects.

Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the country-specific variables (Appendix Table I presents the same statistics for growth, total capitalization, concentration, and competition— but by individual country). The average sectoral real growth rate is 3.5%. The average sector requires some 31% of external financing for its investments. Total capitalization to GDP is on average some 38% but with large variations across countries, from a low of 75% to a high of 219%. The top-three banking concentration measure is on average 55% but also with significant variation, from a low of 21% (Japan) to a high of 87% (Jordan). The average competitiveness measure is 0.72, with a low of 0.46 (Egypt) and a high of 1.0 (Netherlands), indicating that some form of monopolistic competition is most typical of the 16 banking systems.

**Table 2:  Summary statistics.**

|Variable|Mean|Standard<br>deviation|Minimum|Maximum|Number of<br>observations|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Growth|0.0349|0.0920|-0.4474|1.0000|1251|
|Share in value added|0.0156|0.0208|0.0000|0.2244|1297|
|Financial dependence|0.3136|0.3971|-0.4512|1.4915|1412|
|Total capitalization|0.5803|0.3889|0.0704|2.1903|1452|
|Concentration|0.5518|0.1797|0.2100|0.8700|1452|
|Competition|0.7181|0.1449|0.4615|1.0123|575|

<u>Note:</u> This table reports the summary statistics of the main regression variables. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1.

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# **4.3 Survival and Exit**

Our interest in the productivity of non-farm enterprises is also based on the assumption that more productive enterprises are more likely to grow, survive and create the quantity and quality of employment necessary for development and structural change in rural Africa. In this section we analyze, to the extent possible, the survival and exit of these enterprises. As mentioned, the LSMS-ISA data set is not ideal to study this area of enterprise behavior as the surveys were not designed as enterprise surveys. We therefore present a set of descriptive statistics to learn more about the patterns of survival and exit of enterprises in our sample.

The LSMS-ISA surveys capture the number of months per year a rural non-farm enterprise was operating in the year preceding the survey. Figure 3 shows a significant proportion of rural enterprises operating less than 6 or 12 months per year. Only between 42 and 64 percent of all enterprises operate continuously during the whole year, with the highest percentage found in Nigeria. As we found in the previous section, enterprises that operate for shorter times during the year are less productive.

**Figure 3:** Months in Operation

<!-- Start of picture text --> 41.56<br>48.34<br>52.87<br>57.00<br>63.98<br>29.84<br>28.85<br>24.42<br>24.10<br>26.06<br>28.60<br>22.71 22.81<br>18.90<br>9.96<br>Ethiopia Niger Nigeria Tanzania Uganda<br><6 months 6-11 months 12 months<br>100<br>80<br>In Percent 60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes_ : Survey weights included; Malawi not reported due to lack of data; Enterprises that are less than one year in operation are excluded; Rural areas only.

From the survey data we also calculate the same shares for enterprises operating in urban areas. As expected, Table 8 shows that proportionately more urban enterprises operate continuously during a year compared to rural enterprises. This suggests that seasonality has a potentially important impact on the dynamics of rural entrepreneurship in Africa, and might push households into non-farm activities during the off-season or during a poor harvest, for example to assist in consumption smoothing over the year, given that 25
<!-- Start of picture text --> KAZ: Growth Orientation of Products BLR: Growth Orientation of Products<br>Top 10 Products Top 10 Products<br>Non-ag Bars & rods coil<br>Ferro-chromium Semi-fin. Products<br>Potassium chloride<br>Zinc Agg. Iron ore Copper cathodes Wheeled tractors<br>6-HexanelactamStranded wire<br>Polyethylene<br>Casein<br>Dump trucks<br>Titanium unwrought; waste and scrap; powdersFlat rolled prod, i/nas<br>Aluminium oxide<br>Flat rlld prod, i/nas Ferrous waste Coniferous wood sawn<br>-20 -10 WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)0 10 20 30 -20 -10 0 10 20<br>WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)<br>RUS: Growth Orientation of Products GEO: Growth Orientation of Products<br>Top 10 Products Top 10 Products<br>Enriched uranium and<br>Copper ores<br>Semi-fin. Products steelNickel Ferro-silico-manganese Gold<br>Diamonds<br>Coniferous wood sawn Potassium c Ammonium nitrate<br>Spirits<br>Aluminium not alloyed Hazelnuts w.o. shellsMineral waters Ferrous waste<br>Untreated coniferous woodFlat rolled prod.coil<br>Waters (incl. mineral and aerated)<br>Ferrous waste Wine<br>-10 -5 0 5 10 15<br>WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) -20 -10 0 10 20 30<br>WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)<br>TJK: Growth Orientation of Products KGZ: Growth Orientation of Products<br>Top 10 Products Top 10 Products<br>Dried apricotsOnions and Shallots<br>Tobacco, not stemmed/strip<br>Aluminium alloyedMix dried fruit<br>Cotton<br>Antimony ores<br>Men's or boys' trousersAluminium not alloyedCotton Waste and s<br>Ferrous waste<br>Bovine leather<br>Electrical parts of machin.<br>Ferro-molybdenum Diesel trucks Carboys, bottles<br>Portland cement<br>-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20<br>WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) WLD: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)<br>20 20<br>10 10<br>0 0<br>-10 -10<br>KAZ: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) BLR: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)<br>-20 -20<br>30<br>10<br>20<br>5<br>10<br>0<br>0<br>-5<br>RUS: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) GEO: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) -10<br>-10<br>-20<br>20<br>40<br>20 0<br>0 -20<br>-20 -40<br>-40 -60<br>TJK: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%) KGZ: CAGR of Exports 05-10(%)<br>-60 -80<br><!-- End of picture text --> 17
exported on average in 1987 almost 60 percent of their total output compared to only 28 percent for non premium receiving firms.

No thorough analysis of the impact, or even the potential impact of this scheme, has yet been conducted. (The study by Noel and Gilles (1984) studied the impact of uniform export subsidy and import tariff within a general equilibrium SAM model.) Preliminary evidence, in the form of firm surveys conducted by the Government, indicates that to date the scheme has not had its desired effect. Firms currently exporting state that the subsidy has helped them to maintain their market share, but has not affected their plans for investment. Producers of import substitutes assert that the scheme has had very little effect on the prices of imports and, therefore, has not enhanced their competitiveness.

In the next sub-section we present the evidence regarding the performance of the exporting sector and of the premium-receiving firms after the implementation of the program. Since the firm data from the Banque des Donnees Financieres is incomplete for 1987 and 1988, we base the inference of changes only on firms for which data is available for pairs of adjacent years (t and t-1). The annual files are matched and merged for every two preceding years, allowing a comparison using identical firms in both t and t+1. Using information on the date of creation, surviving firms are distinguished from "true" entry and also from "true" exiting firms. This distinction is required in order to detect any response of entry into more rewarded sectors, and exit from less rewarded sectors as a response to the change in the trade regime. All the relevant nominal values were deflated by the appropriate price deflators.

# _5.B. The Experience with the Program: 1986-1937_

During 1986-1987 the nominal (CFA) value of exports declined by 11 percent in 1986 and by 1.0 percent in 1987. However when exports are deflated by export prices the results are just the opposite: the volume of exports increased sharply both in 1986 and 1987 (15 and 22 percent respectively). To verify this result, we compared it with the volume of exports data obtained from the customs figures. This alternative source provides an independent series on the quantity of exports and its confirms our earlier results, suggesting also a significant increase in the quantities exported. This growth took place while export prices (in domestic currency) in most sectors declined, mainly as a result of the large appreciation of the CFA versus the U.S. dollar. Thus the total - 28 -
capturing household living conditions, wealth and assets (cf. World Bank, 2003). Here, these variables are the ownership of a dwelling, of different types of livestock and land as well as of 29 different consumer goods like mobile phones, rice cookers, composite bows or cars, and the presence of an electricity connection. Schultz (1995) and Tansel (2005) argue that higher household wealth – or rather the higher unearned income derived from it – should increase the shadow value of time spent working and therefore decrease labor force participation but should not influence wages through any other channels.<sup>6</sup>

# **4. Results**

# **4.1. Descriptive Statistics**

Basic summary statistics for various variables related to individuals’ earnings, labor market characteristics, socio-demographic characteristics, education and industry are summarized in Table 2. The table displays the means and standard deviations of all relevant variables separately for public and private sector workers. Additionally, results of t-tests for differences in characteristics between the two groups are presented. Appropriate sample weights are used for the descriptive statistics summarized in Table 2 and all other statistics presented in this section.<sup>7</sup> Table 2 makes it clear that there are many differences in the average characteristics of public and private sector workers that are statistically and economically significant. Maybe most strikingly, public sector employees have significantly higher average hourly wages than those in the private sector. On average, public sector workers earn _Nu_ 77.31 (that is approximately US dollar 1.22) per hour. Average hourly wages of private sector workers are _Nu_ 66.23 (or US dollar 1.04). The public/private wage differential is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

> 6 The practical implementation of the three-step procedure is greatly facilitated by a number of STATA ado-files programmed by different researchers: Below, _oaxaca_ by Jann (2008) is used for the Oaxaca type decompositions and code based on the one in _selmlog_ by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2007) for the numerical computation of correction terms. Besides, the quantile regressions of Section 4.3 rely on _rifreg_ by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007, 2009). 7 As mentioned above, the BLFS contains data on 23,587 individuals. 14,137 of these fulfill the restrictions underlying the baseline decomposition (as detailed in Table 1, this implies in particular that they are between 15 and 65 years old and are neither unpaid family workers nor graduates of institutions of religious education). Of these, 7,178 individuals work either in the public or the private sector. Finally, for 6,562 individuals valid information on all control variables is available in the BLFS. Accordingly, they form the basis of the analysis of this section. Table 2 shows that the unweighted sample of 6,562 individuals can be broken down into 3,180 observations for public sector workers and 3,382 observations for private sector workers. Using appropriate sample weights, this translates into 58,068 public sector workers and 118,853 private sector workers.

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reform improved the performance of Egyptian courts. The findings suggest that resolution rates in Egyptian courts have not improved markedly and delays persist. Similarly, Assegaf (2019) documents how a 2011 reform enabled the judiciary and the Supreme Court of Indonesia to strengthen their independence by having a freer appointment and removal process of Supreme Court judges, new power to manage the personnel and resources of the lower courts as well as expansion of their own organization and budget. Despite such progress, the Supreme Court did not establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and other state institutions, which pursued other venues – such as bringing cases to the Constitutional Court instead – to protect their rights and interest. In the end, many of the judicial reforms in Indonesia were reversed within five years.

Reform sometimes fails to improve court effectiveness even in countries with high human capital. Blank and Heezik (2020) for example apply a cost function model to time series data of the Dutch judiciary between 1980 and 2016 to show a decline of judges’ productivity over the entire period, despite various reform measures been undertaken. Heise (2000) and Voigt and El Bialy (2013) have qualitatively similar findings in the case of court reform in the United States and Council of Europe jurisdictions.

In contrast, Bielen et al (2015) find that simple procedural improvements reduce delays and costs in the courts. Using a sample of first-instance cases in Belgian courts, they show that the implementation of the “synthesis pleadings” accelerates the judge’s deliberation. Second, the obligation of a procedural calendar speeds up the exchange of pleadings since (1) deadlines become binding, (2) court hearings are requested before pleadings are exchanged and (3) intentional delays are impeded. Third, the Act reduces frivolous litigation in order to increase court speed. Also, regulating the length of adjournments has a significant effect on improving efficiency.

Similarly, Chemin (2012) analyzes data from Indian courts to show that mandatory time limits on plaintiffs and defendants at each stage of the litigation reduce delays. In the context of Spanish courts, Rosales-López (2008) found that procedural changes like the creation of a Common Procedural Services unit which registers, delivers and enforces judicial resolutions increases effectiveness and has a positive effect on the perception of the court’s output. Bray et al (2016) use the example of Italian courts to also show that simple procedural modifications, such 9
**Figure III.1**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br>Financial fragility In Asia: contributing factors<br>9<br>8<br>7<br>6.<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>0<br>Snmgap o Hong Kong hdi Phdipp-os hdondo. M.-s K. orna Th.iind<br>i Related party lending Weak under regulated non-banks<br>[:Weak regulations-accounting disclosure [Weak supervsion, compliance I<br>*Weak capital and loans reserves .<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Ramos, 1997 The lingering effects of past policies dealing with financial distress exacerbated the impact of these weaknesses. Specifically, several countries had experienced a financial crisis that was partly resolved through partial or full public bailouts. This includes Thailand (1983-87), Malaysia (1985-88) and Indonesia (1994). These bailouts reinforced the perception of an implicit deposit or even wider liability cover to the detriment of market discipline. Indeed, in some cases, management of the restructured financial institutions was not changed.

# **Weaknesses in Corporate Governance and Transparency**

While many East Asian countries had made rapid and substantial progress in developing their capital, especially equity, markets during the 1990s, both corporate governance and disclosure systems were still weak and capital markets played a limited role in the governance of firms. Perverse connections between lenders and borrowers were common and led to insider and poor quality lending (see Figure Il1.1), and the financing of prestige projects and other "white elephants." There were four, related problems in corporate governance: concentrated ownership; weak incentives; poor protection of minority shareholders; and weak information standards. But, most of these problems were not more severe in East Asia than in many developing countries.

- **Concentrated Ownership.** High ownership concentration is typically both a symptom and a cause of weak corporate governance. It is a symptom because in the face of weak legal and regulatory protection against abuse by corporate insiders, ownership concentration is a means for investors to be better able to monitor and control management. It is a cause because, given high ownership concentration, large, presumably politically powerful shareholders will not be a source of pressure for improvements in disclosure and governance as those may erode their corporate control and inside owner benefits. Reflecting both developments, Asian firms are

13
support the capital market failure hypothesis since low demand may have been the source. The public sector failure hypothesis is even more appealing, and recent work on German late 19th century experience with sanitation investment tends to support Wohl's view (Brown, 1988a, 1988b).

In the second half of the century, there were over 1,000 sanitary districts in England and Vales, but neither the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act nor the 1848 Public Health Act had a significant impact on the local groups responsible for health matters. Municipal franchise was based on rateable values, so the electorate was very narrow. In 1861, only 3 percent of the population of Birmingham could vote for members of the town council (and thus influence sanitary investment decisions), while the figure for Leeds was 13 percent. A survey taken in 1886 of about a fifth of the sanitary districts revealed that those administering the public health acts were mainly shopkeepers (30.8 percent of local sanitary officials), followed by manufacturers (17.5 percent), gentlemen (11.8 percent), merchants (8.6 percent), farmers (7.7 percent) and builders (7.6 percent). Most of these, especially shopkeepers and polluting manufacturers, stood to gain from low rates, and this was the main source of town revenues.

While the greatest opposition to the sanitary reforms marched under the banner of "Economy", the word was clearly misplaced. "Opposition to Unfair Taxes" would have been a more accurate banner. According to this view, the public failure lay with an inefficient and unjust tax system. Taxes were assessed on the rental value of property, and "thus a man whose sole income was derived from rents paid much higher rates in proportion to his total income than others" (Wohl, 1983, p. 171). No wonder "the economists" were hostile to sanitary improveaents. No wonder there was underinvestment in city social overhead.

Two important developments began to overcome tnis impass in the 1860s,

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healthcare providers from Sub-Sahara Africa--the world’s poorest region--and the Caribbean Consequently, policies to slow down or stop the exodus of skilled labor are urgently needed. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, though it might be worth examining the possibility of i) host countries supporting—both financially and with expertise--education in source countries in the areas where they expect to need skilled labor in the future, together with ii) instituting programs of temporary migration (possibly with migrant circulation). This should enable both source and host countries to benefit.

# **References**

Adams, R. 2003. “International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries.” _Policy Research Working Paper_ No. 2972. World Bank.

Alderman, H., J. Hoddinet and B. Kinsey. 2003. “Long Term Consequences of Early Childhood Malnutrition.” Mimeo. Deptartment of Economics. Dalhousie University. Halifax.

Beine, M., F. Docquier and H. Rapoport. 2001. “Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 64 (1): 275-89.

______, ______ and ______. 2003. “Brain Drain and LDC’s Growth: Winners and Losers.” _IZA Discussion Paper_ No. 819 (July).

Bhagwati, J. 1976. “The international brain drain and taxation. A survey of the issues.” In J. Bhagwati (ed.). _The brain drain and taxation. Theory and empirical analysis_ . North Holland: Amsterdam.

______ and J.D. Wilson. 1989. _Income Taxation and International Mobility_ . MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.

Carrington, W.J. and E. Detragiache. 1998. “How Big is the Brain Drain?” _IMF Working Paper_ No. 98. Washington, D.C.

______ and ______. 1999. “How extensive is the brain drain?” _Finance & Development_ (June): 46-49.

Commander, S., M. Kangasniemi and L. A. Winters. 2004. “The Brain Drain: Curse or Boon? A Survey of the Literature.” In R.E. Baldwin and L. A. Winters (eds.) _Challenges to Globalization. Analyzing the Economics_ . University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London.

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# **2. What is an evidence gap map?**

Evidence gap maps are evidence collections that map out existing and ongoing systematic reviews or primary studies in a sector or subsector, such as maternal health, HIV/AIDS and agriculture. They present a visual overview of existing evidence using a framework of policy relevant interventions and outcomes, and provide access to user-friendly summaries of the included studies. Box 1 provides a graphic illustration of a gap map on HIV/AIDS. The rows of the framework represent the key interventions of a particular sector, while the columns cover the most relevant outcomes structured along the causal chain, from intermediate outcomes to final outcomes and cost effectiveness. Taken together, the framework should represent the universe of important interventions and outcomes in the sector or subsector covered by the gap map.

The first 3ie gap map was produced in 2010 (Gaarder, 2010) and focused on the health and nutrition impacts of agriculture interventions. Building on this we have developed the methodology as a means of improving the presentation and usefulness of our evidence databases and to identify gaps in the existing evidence base. 3ie evidence gap maps have two main objectives: (1) To facilitate informed judgment and evidence-based decision making in international development policy and practice by providing user-friendly tools for accessing evidence and thereby enabling policy makers and practitioners to explore the findings and quality of the existing evidence on a topic quickly and efficiently.

(2) To facilitate strategic use of scarce research funding and enhance the potential for future evidence synthesis by identifying key “gaps” in the available evidence, thus indicating where future research should be focused.

A range of different approaches to evidence scoping, mapping and synthesis have been developed to support evidence informed policy making. These range from scoping studies (Anderson et al., 2008), evidence maps (Hetrick et al., 2010), the evidence-based policing matrix (Lum et al., 2012), systematic reviews (Cooper et al., 2009), overview of reviews (Becker and Oxman, 2011) and rapid reviews/ evidence assessments (Gannann et al., 2009; The Civil Service, 2008). Table 1 provides a comparison of evidence gap maps and other 3