This is also true for settings like Egypt that depend on a mix of resources, remittances, canal fees, and aid rents.

23. Much of the MENA region continues to be characterized by a limited degree of transparency, for example as captured by indices of press freedom and budget transparency presented in Table 3. The region‘s regimes at the end of 2009 were also characterized by a high degree of continuity. In part of buoyant commodity prices, basic rates of growth have been respectable. These indicators have however served to mask a number of the strains and figures that are now increasingly coming to light as part of the ―social media‖ contagions in the region, including around accommodating the aspirations of a new generation driven by relatively high rates of population growth, education, but limited jobs opportunities in the region. As we show, resource rents are likely to continue to condition the political economy trajectories of the region. Greater transparency are likely to be an important ingredient for reforms in the region, but a deeper challenge will be how to balance pressures for greater inclusiveness with the ability to strike new credible political bargains across groups and time.

**Table 3: Institutional Characteristics of MENA**

|||**Leaders**<br>Years in|**hip & Ins**<br>Capacity<br> <br>|**titutional**<br>Policy<br>Coordination|**Quality**<br>Political<br>Inclusiveness|Dev.<br>Orientation|**Opacity**<br>OBI 2008|FH Media|**Vulnerabi**<br>P<br>|**lity**<br>op Ch<br>% p.a<br> <br>|GDP<br>Grow|GDP<br>Grow|GDP<br>Grow|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Power|(IPD) (1-4)<br>|(PPA) (0-4)|(IPD) (1-4)|(IPD) (1-4)|(0-100)|(1-100*)|Unemp (%)<br>2|000-9<br>|2000-9|2005-9|2009|
|||(i)|(ii)|(iii)|(iv)|(v)|(vi)|(vii)|(xiii)|(ix)|(x)|(xi)|(xii)|
|N. Africa|**Algeria***|11|2.3|1|0.7|2.3|1|39|13.1|1.5|3.6|2.9|2.1|
||Dijbuti|11|...|...|...|...||||2.0|3.6|4.8|5.0|
||Egypt**|29|2.3|1.6|1.3|2|43|39|9.4|1.9|4.9|6.0|4.7|
||**Libya***|41|2.6|1.1|2.7|1.5||1||2.0|4.3|5.5|2.1|
||Morocco|11|2.6|1.7|1.7|2.7|27|39|9.6|1.2|4.8|4.8|5.0|
||**Sudan***|21|2.6|0.5|1.7|2.2||17||2.1|7.1|7.8|4.5|
||Tunisia**|23|2.6|2.5|1.7|2.7||1||1.0|4.7|4.8|3.1|
|Other|**Bahrain***|11|3.6|2.2|1|2.7||28||2.2|6.3|7.3||
||**Iran***|5|2|0.8|2.3|1.7||16|10.5|1.5|5.1|4.5|1.8|
||**Iraq***|4|...|0.6|...|...||29||2.6|0.7|4.1|4.2|
||Israel|4|4|2|3|3.5||72|7.3|2.0|3.6|4.2|0.8|
||Jordan|11|2.6|2|2|3|52|39|12.7|2.4|6.3|6.9|2.3|
||**Kuwait***|4|2.4|1.6|2.7|3.7||40||2.8|7.0|6.7||
||Lebanon|2|2.6|1.6|2.3|2.2|32|40||1.3|4.7|5.5|9.0|
||**Oman***|40|3|2.5|1.3|3.2||30||1.9|5.4|7.3||
||Palestinian Territory|5|...|...|...|...|||23.7|3.3|-2.0|6.3||
||**Qatar***|15|2.9||1|3.2||39||8.7|13.5|17.4|8.6|
||**Saudi Arabia***|5|1.6|1.1|0.7|3|1|21|6.0|2.3|3.4|3.0|0.2|
||**Syria***|10|2.3|1|1|1.5||16||2.7|4.2|4.6|4.0|
||**UAE***|6|3.6|2.3|1.7|3.3||35||4.1|5.8|5.5|-0.7|
||**Yemen***|32|1.9|1.3|2|1.7||19||2.9|4.0|3.9|3.8|
||**MENA**|**14.3**|**2.6**|**1.5**|**1.7**|**2.6**|**26.0**|**29.5**|**11.5**|**2.5**|**4.8**|**5.9**|**3.6**|
|_Source:_WB|**Global Average**<br>Database of Politic|**7.4**<br>al Institutions|**2.5**<br> (2010) (i),Af|**1.6**<br>D Instutional|**2.2**<br>Profiles Datab|**2.8**<br>ase(ii,iv,v),I|**39.7**<br>nsititute(vi),|**50.9**<br>Freedom H|**8.0**<br>ouse(vii),WD|**1.5**<br>I(viii)|**4.2**|**4.5**|**0.1**|

IaDB Public Policy Attributes (PPA) Database (iii), Open Bugdet Indicators (vi) _Notes:_ Unemployment for 2007-2008, as available. Freedom House Scores presented as 1-100, with 100 free (based on original 1-4 scale) * Net oil & gas exporters, ** Significant oil and gas exports. Global averages are unweighted.

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