rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- 18 -

increased to 650 million dwt in 1980. In the process the collective carrying capacity of the fleet doubled again, but this time in less than ten years. However there is no market in which expectations of future profitability do not sooner or later stimulate the introduction of excess capacity.

26. When the resumed growth of annual seatrade volumes came to a sudden end in the late 1970s, the previous expansion pattern of the world merchant fleet changed considerably. The collective carrying capacity of the fleet remained within a limited band between 620 and 650 million dwt during the following ten years. In view of the fact that the annual growth rates of seatrade turned negative and continued that way for several years, many ocean transport operators adopted for the first time a more cautious approach to fleet development and managing their assets. But there were differences of opinion and in approach among shipowners serving the different trade segments (see Figure 2 below).

<!-- Start of picture text --> Development of the World Merchant Fleet<br>Variations in Tonnage Composition<br>( Vessels over 100 grt/gt )<br>million dwt (fleet capacity) million tons (seatrade)<br>750 -<br>-3500<br>550 -- 3000<br>500-<br>450 -- 2500<br>400-<br>350 -2000<br>300 10<br>250 1500<br>200-<br>100 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~10<br>100 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~500<br>50-<br>71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 64 85 86 87 88 89 90<br>- Total Tonnag - Oil Tankers Dry Bulk Carriers<br>---- All Other Cargo a Total Seatradle<br>Ship Categories<br>Source: Lloyd's Register of ShipDlng. 8no Feernresearch Figure 2<br><!-- End of picture text --> 27. After the global recession of the 1980s bottomed out in 1986 international trade intensified again, and when the annual seatrade volumes started to grow at rates which had been characteristic for the heydays during the years before the first oil crisis, shipowners took this as indications of a future bullish seatrade market. A common belief was that this trend would continue unabatedly. The number of orders placed for newbuildings rose again. The accumulated tonnage on order in 1990 exceeded 60 million dwt and thus reached the highest level since 1977.
|(12)<br><br>D1<br>3<br>1<br>0<br>1<br>-1<br>-2<br>-3<br>-1<br>0<br>2<br>0<br>0<br>0|0|Column 4<br>difference<br>shows the<br>mn and the<br>0 report the<br> = (6) - (8).|
|---|---|---|
|(11)<br>Control<br>6<br>1<br>6<br>4<br>5<br>3<br>4<br>7<br>9<br>5<br>2<br>4<br>2|58|llocation. <br>reports the<br> Column 6<br>vious colu<br>umns 9-1<br>one: (11) <br>(3).|
|(10)<br>D2<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0|0|tment a<br>umn 5<br>List 4. <br>the pre<br>ing col<br> sub-z<br>(11) -|
|**List 4**<br>(9)<br>D1<br>1<br>0<br>-1<br>-1<br>0<br>0<br>3<br>1<br>-3<br>-1<br>0<br>0<br>0|-1|by trea<br>s. Col<br>efer to<br>tween<br>follow<br>ages by<br>: (12) =|
|(8)<br>Treated<br>4<br>2<br>5<br>5<br>5<br>2<br>12<br>8<br>3<br>3<br>2<br>2<br>4|57|, divided <br>ying team<br>ns 6-12 r<br>ference be<br>ages. The<br>ontrol vill<br>for List 1|
|(7)<br>D1<br>4<br>1<br>-1<br>0<br>-1<br>-2<br>0<br>0<br>-3<br>1<br>0<br>0<br>0|-1|ub-zone<br>the spra<br>). Colum<br>s the dif<br>ated vill<br>ber of c<br>column|
|(6)<br>Total<br>10<br>3<br>11<br>9<br>10<br>5<br>16<br>15<br>12<br>8<br>4<br>6<br>6|115|r each s<br>used by<br>(4) - (2<br>report<br>r of tre<br>he num<br>onding|
|(5)<br>D1<br>1<br>0<br>-1<br>-1<br>0<br>0<br>3<br>1<br>-3<br>-1<br>0<br>0<br>0|-1|ges fo<br>to be<br> (5) =<br>lumn 7<br>numbe<br>ports t<br>corresp|
|**List 2**<br>(4)<br>Treatment<br>4<br>2<br>5<br>5<br>5<br>2<br>12<br>8<br>3<br>3<br>2<br>2<br>4|57|umber of villa<br>ded in List 2,<br>mn for List 1: <br>e fnal list. Co<br>8 reports the<br> Column 11 re<br>lumn and the|
|**List 1**<br>(2)<br>(3)<br>Treatment<br>Control<br>3<br>3<br>2<br>0<br>6<br>6<br>6<br>3<br>5<br>6<br>2<br>5<br>9<br>7<br>7<br>8<br>6<br>9<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>2<br>2<br>4<br>4<br>2|58<br>58|orts in columns 1-3 the n<br>villages that NMCP inclu<br>d the corresponding colu<br>sub-zone according to th<br>: (7) = (6) - (2). Column<br> fgure for Lists 1 and 2. <br>e between the previous co|
|(1)<br>Total<br>6<br>2<br>12<br>9<br>11<br>7<br>16<br>15<br>15<br>7<br>4<br>6<br>6|116|able rep<br>eatment<br>lumn an<br>for each<br>or List 1<br> and the <br>ifferenc|
|Sub-zone<br>Akurdet<br>Barentu<br>Dighe<br>Forto<br>Gogne<br>Goluj (Omhajer)<br>Haykota<br>Laelay-Gash<br>Mensura<br>Mogolo<br>Mulki<br>Shambko<br>Tesseney|Total|Note. For List 1, this T<br>reports the number of tr<br>between the previous co<br>total number of villages<br>corresponding column f<br>difference between that <br>Column 12 reports the d|

14
Table A.3: The choice of how much to export

||OLS|OLS|OLS|OLS|OLS|IV|IV|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Subj. fnancial|-1.206|||0.267||||
|constraint|(1.310)|||(1.118)||||
|Unable to obtain a||-4.291*|||-1.435|-17.575|-17.962|
|loan? (Yes=1)||(2.334)|||(2.058)|(23.814)|(17.023)|
|Foreign shock|||0.114***|0.114***|0.114***||0.115***|
|(%∆GDP _×_ %Export)|||(0.021)|(0.021)|(0.021)||(0.021)|
|Domestic shock|||-0.058***|-0.058***|-0.058***||-0.053***|
|(%∆GDP _×_ (100-%Export))|||(0.005)|(0.005)|(0.005)||(0.007)|
|Capacity|0.086|0.081|0.083*|0.084*|0.080|0.055|0.050|
||(0.058)|(0.057)|(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.049)|(0.071)|(0.057)|
|Log(Labor|-3.380***|-3.484***|-2.666***|-2.663***|-2.698***|-3.830***|-3.067***|
|Productivity)|(0.792)|(0.785)|(0.671)|(0.673)|(0.670)|(1.067)|(0.817)|
|Firm Age|-0.256***|-0.249***|-0.125*|-0.124*|-0.123*|-0.230***|-0.104|
||(0.066)|(0.065)|(0.065)|(0.065)|(0.065)|(0.075)|(0.072)|
|Small Firm? (Yes=1)|-10.818***|-11.195***|-8.781***|-8.801***|-8.874***|-12.025***|-9.954***|
||(2.350)|(2.314)|(2.071)|(2.070)|(2.064)|(2.772)|(2.459)|
|Foreign Ownership?|14.775***|14.659***|15.199***|15.224***|15.134***|13.977***|14.381***|
|(1=Yes)|(2.941)|(2.909)|(2.855)|(2.854)|(2.857)|(3.118)|(2.904)|
|Industry F.E.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Year F.E.|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Mean dep. var.|43.293|43.293|43.293|43.293|43.293|43.293|43.293|
|F stat||||||13|34|
|Kleibergen-Paap LM test||||||0.044|0.022|
|Hansen J stat||||||0.000|0.001|
|Endog. test||||||0.493|0.081|
|N|4958|4958|4958|4958|4958|4958|4958|

The dependent variable is the _Share_ ( _ExportedSalesit_ ). Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The symbols ***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Under the null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test, the structural equation is underidentified, that is instruments are not relevant. Under the null hypothesis of the Hansen J test, the instruments are valid. The null of the endogeneity test is that the endogenous regressor(s) can be treated as exogenous.

23
There is, however, no theoretical ar empirical literature that distinguishes between the modalities of privatization to insiders, and their effect on enterprise restructuring. In principle, two modalities exist: a sale to incumbent managers (for the purposes of this paper we do not consider employee ownership) or a voucher scheme with concessions to managers that leaves the firms in their control, without any cash sale. A third modality (discussed in Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995) is voucher privatization that leaves ownership in the hands of private investment funds, where the _de facto_ control stays in the hands of managers as investment funds are either unable or incapable of monitoring. The Modlovan voucher-privatization program is a case in point - although investment funds were formed and acquired significant ownership stakes as early as 1994, they could not exercise control until 1997due to lack of legal rules on monitoring of privatized firms by their Board of Directors. Managers of such enterprises were thus able to retain control in the absence of property rights enforcement. The main focus of this paper is to investigate the relation between enterprise restructuring and privatization to insiders. We distinguish two types of insider privatization: voucher programs where managers receive large ownership stakes for free (Georgia) or which result in _de facto_ control by managers (Moldova); and management buy-outs. The working hypothesis is that both types of privatization result in similar restructuring efforts, as managers maximize profits to their own benefit.

In addition to privatization, the literature on the microeconomics of transition identifies two other key determinants of enterprise restructuring. One stylized fact suggests that the imposition of hard budget constraints - elimination of easy access to bank lending - is necessary to ensure adjustments in management behavior. Without hard budget constraints, it may be rational for managers to spend more time lobbying the govermment for further support rather than undertake painful restructuring measures. The empirical evidence suggests that "enterprises subjected to financial discipline show more aggressive collection of receivables, a closer link between profitability and investment, and a reorientation of goals from output targets to profits" (World Bank, 1996, p.45).

A second stylized fact suggests that competition in the final product market enhances corporate restructuring (Nickell, 1996). Djankov and Hoekman (1998) use a large panel of Bul_5_
||Share of<br>censorship<br>events<br>targeting TV<br>broadcasters|Share of<br>censorship<br>events targeting<br>daily<br>newspapers|
|---|---|---|
|Political constraints|0.0163|-0.000478|
||(0.0299)|(0.0311)|
|Economic constraints|-0.0820*|0.121**|
||(0.0398)|(0.0455)|
|Legal constraints|-0.0736*|0.0110|
||(0.0338)|(0.0394)|
|GDP pc (log)|-0.445|0.0719|
||(0.322)|(0.367)|
|Population (log)|-0.735|0.649|
||(1.177)|(1.394)|
|Constant|16.94|-32.64|
||(23.44)|(27.76)|
|Country FE|√|√|
|Year FE|√|√|
|_N_|1646|1646|
|_Countries_|186|186|
|_Years_|12|12|
|_AIC_|0.680|0.452|
|_Log pseudolikelihood_|-359.20|-386.62|

Standard errors in parentheses ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 This finding may indicate that, on average, newspapers with high frequency are more unpredictable and harder to silence, despite bribes and changes in ownership, and that they are more politically threatening. In many places around the world, they are the main sources of investigative journalism and have a crucial spill-over effect on other media platforms despite a decreasing trend in direct readership.

# **7. Conclusion**

44
<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>95<br>85<br>80<br>75<br>70<br>65<br>5 8 GB PS DH SB H FH<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> stn110<br>100<br>80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>5 bb wD Be DPD SF MH 4 8<br>Months since peak<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br>80<br>.<br>5 © 1 BD 3 3 35 4 4 50<br>Months s ince peak<br><!-- End of picture text -->
identification and enrollment of eligible populations in towns and cities was strongly linked to the participation of the area’s provider, as providers were typically assigned this task. Once a provider was enrolled in the Plan, it was able to combine its efforts with the province’s to enroll eligible women and children into Plan Nacer. Since enrollment is not instantaneous, the longer the tenure of a provider on Plan Nacer, the more potential beneficiaries the provider was able to find and enroll.

**Figure 2: Beneficiary Enrollment in Plan Nacer**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Children Mothers<br>600,000 50,000<br>500,000<br>40,000<br>400,000<br>30,000<br>300,000<br>20,000<br>200,000<br>100,000 10,000<br>0 0<br>2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Area de Capita. National Ministry of Health (2005-2008).

# **2.5. Program Expenditures**

Between 2005–08 Plan Nacer was implemented in nine northern provinces, and total expenditures totaled $107 million. Plan Nacer resources supplement provincial public services financed through provincial budgets and through Obras Sociales, health insurance for those employed in the formal sector (table 3). Plan Nacer expenditures increased total public spending on health services in these provinces by 1.4 to 3.5 percent during this period. However, the percentage increase is substantially higher for maternal and child health care. Unfortunately, expenditure information broken down for maternal and child health services is not available in Argentina.

Capitation payments from national to provincial units come in two installments: (1) 60 percent of the maximum payment is disbursed monthly based on the number of verified registered beneficiaries; and (2) up to 40 percent of the maximum is transferred every four months after verification and certification that the province actually met the tracer targets. During the first eight months of the program, there existed a grace period for which payments were made 100 percent on the basis of enrollment. Figure 3 shows the total capitation payments from the 10
those estimated from national accounts data. Various factors may account for these discrepancies, as discussed by Deaton (2001) and Ravallion (2000). For instance, consumption in national accounts is typically determined as a residual and is thus contaminated by errors and omissions elsewhere in the accounts. In practice, researchers often end up treating one source or the other as the "correct" or "most reliable" one-despite the fact that it is likely that both sources of information are subject to error. In the present context, because both sources are used jointly, the issue of reconciling them arises. For instance, if it is believed that the national accounts data provide an accurate measure of the level of consumption, one approach could be to scale up. survey data so as to match the former, and use the rescaled data for poverty assessment. There are several potential problems, of course, with this approach-the assumption that household consumption levels as measured in the survey are correct up to a multiplicative constant is by no means a reliable one, given the likely discrepancies between urban and rural data. More generally, the decision as to which data are correct is a difficult one, and the reconciliation process is likely to be country specific.

# 5 Calibration

Assessing the properties of the model presented in the previous section requires calibration and numerical simulations. Given that the objective of the model is to analyze the poverty impact of adjustment policies in highlyindebted, low-income countries, we have calibrated it to reflect what we believe to be a "representative" country. While parameters and initial values for each of the variables in the model are provided in Appendix C, we also provide a brief summary for the key variables below. Many of these parameters (such as demand and supply elasticities) reflect conventional values .used in the literature. A financial social accounting matrix (FSAM), following the lines of Thorbecke et al. (1992), Easterly (1990), Rosensweig and Taylor (1990), and Thissen (1999, 2000), presents all initial values in a more pedagogical format.

We now provide a brief overview of the calibration of initial values and parameters. A detailed analysis is provided in Chen et al. (2001).

58
- Lange, F. (2007): “The Speed of Employer Learning,” _Journal of Labor Economics_ , 25, 1–35.

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- Lise, J. and F. Postel-Vinay (2020): “Multidimensional Skills, Sorting, and Human Capital Accumulation,” _American Economic Review_ , forthcoming.

- Lise, J., S. Seitz, and J. Smith (2004): “Equilibrium Policy Experiments and the Evaluation of Social Programs,” Working paper 10283, National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Lockwood, B. (1991): “Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment,” _Review of Economic Studies_ , 58, 733–753.

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- Malindi, K. (2017): “Imperfect Information and The Racial Wage Gap for South African Men,” Manuscript, University of Stellenbosch.

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36
_Presumption in favour offree entry_ _Section 3_ conventional solutions, the project organisers developed simplified design and construction methods. The community could carry out much of the construction itself, and costs were cut to a quarter of those of a conventional system;15 and

- in Laos, where electricity is a leading export, rural electrification is currently very low compared with other Asian countries, despite evidence of significant demand. The geography and patterns of rural settlement mean that conventional grid based extensions are difficult and not viable. Innovative off-grid systems such as diesel, microhydro and solar generation that can be supplied by private entrepreneurs are more appropriate. At present small private off-grid systems provide some such systems, and should be encouraged to expand.<sup>16</sup>

Technical innovations are often deployed by entrants, rather than incumbents. For example, a widely acclaimed small scale ultra-violet water purification unit developed in the US in 1996 is being deployed by small scale entrants in the Philippines, South Africa and elsewhere, not by large providers.<sup>1</sup> 7

# 3.3 Regulatory and government failure

Well tailored, effective interventions and regulation can in principle lead to optimal outcomes. However restricting entry, tailoring interventions and removing any competitive threat places high demands on govermnent or the regulator to:

- ensure customers' needs are met;

- limit monopoly inefficiencies; and

- determine when entry should be allowed to occur.

The risk of regulatory failure is high.l<sup>8</sup> The costs of regulatory failure are high even in developed countries such as the US and the UK, where regulatory ability is high

- 15 Solo & Snell (1998).

- 16 ESMAP 1997 _Institutional Developmentfor OFFGRID Electrification in Laos (Draft)._ UNDP and World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme. December 1997.

- 17 The system was developed by Dr Gadgil of the University of California at Berkeley and won Discover magazine's 1996 Award for Technological Innovation in the Environment Category, and Popular Science magazine's 1996 Best of What's New Award. Solo & Snell (1998).

- 18 We refer to a 'regulator', but we use the term broadly to encompass any agency of Government that tries to make a water, sanitation or power provider serve the public interest. In other words it includes truly independent regulators of private utilities such as ETOSS the water regulator in Buenos Aires. It also includes other bodies which are charged with regulating publicly owned utilities, such as Ministers, and Boards of Directors - where these are given a public interest role not a purely commercial objective (as do, for example, the Boards of State Owned Enterprises in Australia and New Zealand, which typically have a largely commercial function and are regulated by other Government agencies).

_23_
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|---|---|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|AFCC2/RI South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project|Xavier F. P. Vincent|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Economic Management Technical Assistance Project|Roberto O. Panzardi|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Second Population and AIDS Project|Aissatou Diack|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
|Northwest Mountainous and ForestryAreas Development Project|GarryCharlier|
<!-- Start of picture text --> Oo<br>©<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Oo<br>Te)<br>oO<br>T+<br>1880m1 1900m1 1920m1 1940m1 1960m1 1980m1 2000m1 2020m<br>Date<br>—- 20-Date Moving Average —— 20-Year Mean<br><!-- End of picture text -->