11 The fit of the regressions is very similar across the prices series. As found by Mejstrik et al. (1994), sector dummies are significant for all equations, but not always the same dummies for all three price series.

The influence of frmn-specific, non-ownership data appears to be much less than previously reported. Several of the firm-specific variables found to be significant by Shafik (1994b) and Mejstrik et al. (1994) are no longer significant, e.g., the ratio of total liabilities to equity and the ratio of profit to equity are no longer significant. This is especially so for the non-voucher prices. For the PSE and RM prices, respectively only two and three frm-specific variables are significant.' The fact that more non-ownership variables are significant for the voucher prices is perhaps to be expected; at that time, no complete information about the final ownership was available and non-ownership variables were likely used more extensively to determine the relative value of firms.

The results for the ownership variables are the following. The degree of non-wide ownership, _nonwide,_ has for all three prices a significant, positive influence. And, the lower the dispersion of ownership (the higher _H),_ the higher the price. The regressions which combine H and _nonwide_ in one regression, indicate that both have simultaneously a positive effect for all three price series. In other words, higher concentration tends to have a positive effect on prices even when controlling for a higher degree of strategic ownership and vice-versa. But there is some evidence of collinearity as in case of the PSE and voucher prices, while still positive, H is no longer statistically significant. It appears that high strategic ownership _(nonwide)_ is more important than ownership concentration _(H)_ in terms of its effect on prices.

High ownership by domestic or foreign strategic investors _(dominv_ and _frnginv)_ also exerts a significant positive influence on prices, for all specifications reported. As the variable _nonwide_ is also included, this effect is on top of the positive effect of high ownership by all strategic investors combined. The relative effect of domestic and foreign ownership on prices is simiiar, but there is a slightly higher significance for domestic ownership for most equations. Effective control by a domestic or foreign strategic investor also exerts a positive influence on prices (results are not reported). _Controld_ and _controif,_ dummies which take on the values of one if the shares of the foreign or domestic investor among _nonwide_ is larger an 50%, are positive for all specifications used and, except for the PSE prices, almost always significant. The relative effect of domestic and foreign control on prices is again similar, but there is also a somewhat higher significance for domestic control. These results suggest that there are benefits from a single domestic or foreign controlling owner over and above the effects of concentrated and/or large total strategic ownership.

The share of state ownership--states-has consistently a positive and significant influence on the voucher price. For the other two price series, it is mostly positive but not always

> <sup>1</sup> ' Qualitatively, the regressions for the RM and PSE prices show similar results as for the voucher prices when using the same specification, but not all the same right hand side variables are significant.