the number of conflict incidents, and column (3) demonstrates there is no relationship using the number of conflict fatalities. Importantly, these estimates are all precisely estimated and preclude large effects. Using the upper bound of the confidence interval estimated in column (3), one can reject the hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level of the increase in poor school attendance being larger than 0.015 in response to a doubling of conflict fatalities.25 Furthermore, the lack of a relationship between poor school attendance and the location of violence is robust to a number of different empirical specifications. Column (4) re-estimates the relationship in column (3) using a logit specification26; and column (5) incudes lagged violence and future violence in the specification. In each case, none of the estimated coefficients is statistically significant either individually or jointly.

Additionally, there is little evidence of a correlation between school attendance and the location of violence when estimating the impact of different types of violence separately. Column (6) separates conflict fatalities into those from remote violence (e.g., air strikes), violence against civilians, ground battles, and all other conflict fatalities (captured by the coefficient on the total number of fatalities). Additionally, column (7) estimates the relationship separately for violence in Taizz and violence in the rest of Yemen. As discussed in the background section, Taizz is divided in two by the conflict and people are living amid active fighting and snipers. Again, in both cases, there is little evidence of any relationship between school attendance and violence.

Related to potential differences in the effect violence has based on the type of violence, it is also possible that separating the violence severity by the actors involved or in the region of the country could also help to uncover an underlying relationship between school attendance and the severity of violence. However, there is little evidence of this being the case. Column (8) separates fatalities into those involving Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a prominent terrorist organization operating in Yemen (e.g., OCHA 2019a), and the rest of conflict fatalities; and column (9) estimates the impact violence has separately in regions controlled by the IRG and in regions controlled by DFA forces. However, again, there is little relationship between school attendance and the location of violence in either case.

Combined, there appears to be little evidence of school attendance being correlated with the location of violence in the year of surveys analyzed. However, it is important to note that following the onset of conflict, school attendance did significantly drop across the entire country relative to the last nationally-representative estimate from the 2014 Household Budget Survey (e.g., WFP 2019b). Thus, these results do not imply that the location of violence has no effect 25When using the number of fatalities as the independent variable instead of the natural logarithm, there is a positive relationship that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, this is entirely driven by 39 observations in one district that had 613 conflict fatalities in one month, which is the highest number of district fatalities for any month in the sample. If these 39 observations are dropped, the variable is right-censored at the second greatest number of fatalities in a month (483), or the independent variable is the natural logarithm of conflict fatalities, there is little evidence of any relationship between school attendance and the severity of violence. Importantly, this district with 613 conflict fatalities in one month is well-represented in every other survey in addition to the survey in which there were 613 conflict fatalities, and in each of those other surveys, the district remained one of the most violent in the country.

> 26All logit specifications estimated use only the most recent survey each household completes.

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