rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Bertschek, I., Cerquera, D., & Klein, G. J. (2013). More bits – more bucks? Measuring the impact of broadband internet on firm performance. _Information Economics and Policy_ , _25_ (3), 190–203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.11.002 Brambilla, I. (2018). _Digital Technology Adoption and Jobs: A Model of Firm Heterogeneity_ .

Calvo, A. G. (2012). Universal Service Policies in the Context of National Broadband Plans. _OECD Digital Economy Papers_ , (203). https://doi.org/10.1787/20716826 Casas, C., & González, A. (2016). _Productivity Measures for the Colombian Manufacturing Industry *_ (Borradores de economía No. 947). Cali.

Colombo, M. G., Croce, A., & Grilli, L. (2013). ICT services and small businesses’ productivity gains: An analysis of the adoption of broadband Internet technology. _Information Economics and Policy_ , _25_ (3), 171–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.11.001 De Loecker, J. (2013). Detecting learning by exporting. _American Economic Journal: Microeconomics_ , _5_ (3), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.3.1 De Loecker, J., & Warzynski, F. (2012). Markups and firm‐level export status. _American Economic Review_ , _102_ (6), 2437–2471. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.2437 Eslava, M., Haltiwanger, J., Kugler, A., & Kugler, M. (2004). The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia. _Journal of Development Economics_ , _75_ (2 SPEC. ISS.), 333–371. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.06.002 Fabling, R., Grimes, A., & Grimes, A. (2016). Picking up speed : Does ultrafast broadband increase firm productivity ?, (November).

Gandhi, A., Navarro, S., & Rivers, D. (2016). On the Identification of Production Functions: How Heterogeneous is Productivity? _Mimeo_ , (May 2006).

Grimes, A., Ren, C., & Stevens, P. (2012). The need for speed: impacts of internet connectivity on firm productivity. _Journal of Productivity Analysis_ , _37_ (2), 187–201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123‐011‐0237‐z Haller, S. A., & Lyons, S. (2015). Broadband adoption and firm productivity: Evidence from Irish manufacturing firms. _Telecommunications Policy_ , _39_ (1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2014.10.003 Levinsohn, J., & Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables. _Review of Economic Studies_ , _70_ (2), 317–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467‐ 937X.00246 Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones. (2017). Proyecto Nacional de Fibra Óptica. Retrieved February 12, 2017, from http://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/vivedigital/612/w3‐propertyvalue‐647.html Olley, G. S., & Pakes, A. (1996). The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry. _Econometrica_ , _64_ (6), 1263–1297.

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domestically. New exporters also start small in terms of export volume. Figure 6 indicates that first-year exports account for only a small fraction of the firm’s total sales. The volume of exports increases in subsequent years, though less than firm’s total sales.

Figure 5: New exports start small - number of products (all firms) <!-- Start of picture text --> −3 −2 −1 0 1 2<br>Period Around Switching<br>Exported Products Sold Products<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>Mean Number of Products<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 6: New exports start small - values (all firms) <!-- Start of picture text --> −3 −2 −1 0 1 2<br>Period Around Switching<br>Exported Products Sold Products<br>80000<br>60000<br>40000<br>Average Value in 1994 Pesos 20000<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> These findings fits well with the theoretical model of Rauch and Watson (2003) and the recent evidence based on disaggregated trade statistics presented by Besedes and Prusa (2006). In Rauch and Watson’s (2003) model, search costs and information asymmetries lead heterogeneous firms to start small in order to “test” the credibility of the foreign partner. In an environment where firms are heterogenous and there is incomplete information 18
Policy Research Working Paper **Series**

|Title|Author|Date|Contact<br>**for**paper|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS1264 A Rock and a Hard Place: The Two<br>Faces of U.S. Trade Policy Toward<br>Korea|J. Michael Finger|March 199'4|M. Patenia<br>37947|
|WPS1265 Parallel Exchange Rates in<br>Developing Countries: Lessons from<br>Eight Case Studies|Miguel A. Kiguel<br>Stephen A. O'Connell|March 1994|R. Luz<br>34303|
|WPS1266 An Efficient Frontier for International<br>Portfolios with Commodity Assets|Sudhakar Satyanarayan<br>Panos Varangis|March 1994|D. Gustafson<br>33732|
|WPS1 267 The Tax Base in Transition: The Case<br>of Bulgaria|Zeljko Bogetic<br>AryeLHillman|March 1994|F. Smith<br>36072|
|WPS1268 The Reform of Mechanisms for<br>Foreign Exchange Allocation: Theory<br>and Lessons from Sub-Saharan<br>Africa|Eliana La Ferrara<br>Gabriel Castillo<br>John Nash|March 1994|N. Artis<br>38010|
|WPS1269 Union-Nonunion<br>Wage Differentials<br>in the Developing World: A Case<br>Study of Mexico|Alexis Panagides<br>Harry Anthony Patrinos|March 1994|I. Conachy<br>33669|
|WPS1270 How Land-Based Targeting Affects<br>Rural Poverty|Martin Ravallion<br>Binayak Sen|March 1994|P. Cook<br>33902|
|WPS1271 Measuring the Effect of External<br>Shocks and the Policy Response to<br>Them: Empirical Methodology Applied<br>to the Philippines|F. Desmond McCarthy<br>J. Peter Neary<br>Giovanni Zanalda|March 1994|M. Divino<br>33739|
|WPS1272 The Value of Superfund Cleanups:<br>Evidence from U.S. Environmental<br>Protection Agency Decisions|Shreekant Gupta<br>George Van Houtven<br>MaureenLCropper|March 1994|A. Maranon<br>39074|
|WPS1273 Desired Fertility and the Impact of<br>Population Policies|Lant H. Pritchett<br>Lawrence H. Summers|March 1994|P. Cook<br>33902|
|WPS1 274 The New Trade Theory and Its<br>Relevance for Developing Countries|Asad Alam|March 1994|A. Alam<br>87380|
|WPS1275 Female-Headed<br>Households,<br>Poverty, and the Welfare of Children<br>in Urban Brazil|Ricardo Barros<br>Louise Fox|March 1994|K. Binkley<br>81143|
then FSPit = 0: This is the lower bound for FSPit: On the other extreme, if a domestic ...rm i shares all its local input suppliers with all FDI ...rms, and there are a total of N local suppliers, then FSPit = N � IFPjt: This is the upper bound for FSPit: In general, FSPit increases with the number of local suppliers i shares with FDI ...rms, as well as the presence of these FDI ...rms in the industry. In short, a domestic ...rm i will have a higher FSPit; if it shares more local suppliers with FDI ...rms that have larger presence in the industry. Please refer to Figure 3 for an illustration of how Industry Foreign Presence and Foreign Sibling Presence are calculated in an industry with two domestic ...rms, four FDI ...rms, and four local suppliers.

Those domestic ...rms that have at least one FDI sibling is identi...ed by a dummy variable FDI Sibling, FDISit : In other words, FDISit indicates wether or not ...rm i<sup>0</sup> s foreign sibling presence is positive.

Note that, unlike IFPjt, which by construction is common across all ...rms in an industry in a given year, FSPit varies by ...rm and time. It depends on the foreign presence of each sibling of each ...rm as well as the number of common local suppliers with each sibling in each year. Moreover, while FSPit is typically less than IFPjt; mathematically it is possible for FSPit to be greater than IFPjt; if some siblings have multiple common suppliers with the ...rm. Moreover, by construction, given the set of suppliers is ...xed at 2003 level for the whole sample period (with the exception of 2 suppliers which only set up after 1999), the year to year within ...rm ‡uctuation of FSPit is mainly due to changes in the foreign presence of the sibling ...rms, and not the selection of suppliers. Hence the selection bias due to ...rms switching and selecting suppliers will be controlled for by ...rm ...xed e¤ects in within ...rm panel estimations.

# 4 Data

Firm level survey was conducted from the period of November 2004 to April 2005, which covers a strati...ed random sample of 350 ...rms, which is about 10 percent of the total population of the domestic ...rms and 100 percent of FDI ...rms currently operating in the Bangladeshi garment sector. The sample is strati...ed to re‡ect the population distribution of ...rms by size, by industry (woven 11
equivalent of 2.0 percent of GDP<sup>6</sup> (Figure 10). In these circumstances, the credibility of the public on the authorities’ ability to control inflation faltered. It is interesting to note that the seignorage peak occurred in the first quarter of 2003, a few months after the public debt ratio had stabilized and the exchange rate had appreciated. This implies that interest rates could not be lowered as quickly as many would have desired.

**Figure 9 Figure 10 Monthly Inflation Rate in Brazil 2000-2003 Seignorage from Money Creation 2000-2003 (seasonally adjusted General Price Level (% of GDP) IGP-DI)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>0<br>-1<br>2001 2002 2003<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5<br>2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>-0.5<br>2000 2001 2002 2003<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: FGV Source: World Bank calculations described in text.

23. The monetary authorities reacted variously to the shocks during the 2001-2002 period. In the initial stage, from March 2001 to July 2001, the central bank raised the Selic rate from 15.25 percent to 19 percent.. From then on, it maintained the Selic at 19 percent, until February 2002, when it reduced it 25 bps, then lowered it again in March and July. In mid-October 2002, the central bank bumped up the Selic three percentage points to 21 percent and then raised it two more times until reaching 25 percent before the year’s end (Figure 11). As the Selic rose, the exchange rate partially reversed its depreciating trend, and the debt stock (as a percent of GDP) began decreasing. Looking (ex-post) at this behavior, it is legitimate to wonder why the central bank did not raise interest rates before October. Interestingly, it also raises the question of the applicability of Blanchard’s model to the Brazilian experience, since that paper presents the case for the _potential_ destabilizing role of monetary policy when interest rates are increased, but the crisis occurred in the context of stable policy interest rates.

24. Several factors might explain the central bank’s delayed reaction and some are related to considerations described by Blanchard’s model. The first reason is that, before September-October, the fiscal conditions were inadequate. Public debt to GDP increased from 49 percent to 53 percent in 2001, and climbed further to 57 percent by mid-2002 without any policy response. With the primary balance decreasing during the first semester of 2002, it is understandable that sustainability concerns dominated investor

> 6 The figures reported in the text and in the graph are estimated by multiplying the base money as a share of GDP times the growth rate on base money. Eliana Cardoso (1998) estimates the average inflation tax revenue in Brazil during the 50 years ending 1995 at 2 percent of GDP.

12
supervisory power, and government ownership of banks are positively associated with government corruDtion except when political onenness is pronounced: for most countries.. **_rn.fnfo risory_** sup. **ann,v snr** go **x,niths nroat.e:** **_narrnrt._ an** ar.d **n,vro:se iutran,** 00 **sfar onb** development and stability. More positively, they nnd that reguiaiory and supervisory strategies that focus on empowering the private sector (improving transparency and disclosure) and limiting the adverse incentive effects from generous deposit insurance work best to promote bank performance and stability. An additional feature of the regulatory environment that helps bank stability is found in their analysis to be the ability of foreign banks to enter the local market. In Barth-Caprio-Levine (2001b), the dimension in which stability is measured refers to banking crises. But even if no crisis oCniirz hbanking can nerfnrm an inRiilating fiinctinn- **_aq_ iq** examined figrther **helonw** Most+ **.VLVUOL** o*U'e **VUL&J1** approachLes **U LFGid1** tou: **Lv Ua1 cqueuvui** usinfcso **fUI..aU UULi UiLLuvLuu** n:vv **cU4I** as, **a.LUse** cud evenq. individual features of the regulatory environment. Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren (2000) find that U.S. banks which disclose less information then encountered more severe market reaction on eventual announcement and that this reaction was potentially contagious. In other words, better disclosure was at least consistent with lower volatility in the stock market prices of these banks. An earlier effort by Peek and Rosengren (1995) found that banks holding low capital ratios were forced to cut back more on their real estate portfolio in bad times, suggesting that bad banking can indeed exacerbate real Other research has examined The impact oI foreign banks, either in their offshore activities or onshore in industrial and emerging markets. Goldberg (2001) uses bankspecific data on U.S. bank lending to foreign countries, and finds that, while in general 9
Di ff erentials in income and consumption expenditures across districts are signi fi cant in univariate comparisons but are found to be less important than expected once we control for covariates. Income variables, whether measured in absolute or relative terms, are either not statistically signi fi cant or have the wrong sign. Consumption expenditure variables are signi fi cant with a positive sign in some regressions, but the data do not enable us to distinguish whether migrants respond to gains in absolute or relative consumption. Results are robust to di ff erent speci fi cations and datasets.

The analysis reported here is based on one critical maintained assumption, namely, that income and consumption levels obtained by district residents in the recent past can be used as proxy for the anticipations of subsequent migrants. Undoubtedly it would be better to have direct measurements of what migrants actually anticipate to earn and consume in di ff erent districts upon migration. Unfortunately such data is not available — and would be di ffi cult to collect.

Taken together, our results suggest that an urban environment and access to amenities are key considerations when internal migrants choose a migration destination. Anticipated income and consumption expenditures, whether absolute or relative, appear secondary. This does not imply that income di ff erentials do not a ff ect the decision to migrate, an issue that we have sidestepped by focusing on the choice of destination conditional on migrating.

It is di ffi cult to draw causal inference from observational data. This study is no exception. The results presented here are nevertheless su ffi ciently suggestive to cast doubt on the theory that the choice of migration destination is driven primarily by income di ff erentials. Other factors seem to play a strong — and probably more important — role.

# References

1. Adams, Richard, Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan,

30
# **3. Employment in South Asia**

# _3.1. Current employment structure_

For the overview of employment in South Asia, we rely on information only from sources that allow the construction of comparable data.<sup>4</sup> As shown in Figure 3, agriculture continues to employ a majority of the working-age population across the region. This is especially so in Nepal and Bhutan, but the share is high in Afghanistan and India as well. The second most important source of jobs is the services sector. Sri Lanka is the only country in the region where the services sector employs more people than agriculture, and in Bangladesh the two sectors are even. On the other hand, the share of the manufacturing sector is relatively low across all countries in the region, ranging from 3 percent in Bhutan to 9 percent in Sri Lanka. In many countries in the region, construction employs as many people as manufacturing.

**Figure 3.** Employment rate by sector of activity.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Percent<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>Nepal Afghanistan Bhutan Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Pakistan<br>Agriculture Manufacturing Service Construction<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** South Asia Employment Dataset. **Note:** Period of reference specified in footnote 4.

Regarding the type of jobs, it is important to keep in mind that regular wage employment is not the same as formal employment. It only means that there is a stable and predictable employer-employee relationship, and that the worker can expect to still have the job the following month. But even with this definition, only around one-tenth of the working-age population has a regular job across South Asia, as shown in Figure 4. The share is higher in Bhutan, but it still reaches only 16 percent. Even casual wage work, which is defined as a temporary employer-employee relationship, is relatively uncommon across the region. The corresponding share of the working-age population is highest in India (15 percent) and in Sri Lanka (15 percent), and lowest in Bhutan (11 percent).

Except for Sri Lanka, the sum of self-employment and unpaid family work accounts for more than half of employment across the region. Among the countries for which a breakdown is possible, unpaid family workers account for a quarter of the working-age population in Bhutan and a fifth in Afghanistan. At around one-tenth, the share is lower in India and Pakistan.

> 4  For the analyses in this section we use the following surveys: Afghanistan 2013/14 ALCS; Bangladesh 2005-2015 LFS; Bhutan 2003-2012 LSS; India 2004/05-2011/12 NSS-Thick, Pakistan 2005/06-2014/15 LFS; and Sri Lanka 2006-2015 LFS.

10
31 joint stock company<sup>42</sup> . Some management companies were created by a financial institution (sponsor) and investment funds are therefore considered as 'bank affiliated'.

In the second wave of Czech privatization, however, investment funds could be set up as joint stock companies or unit trusts. In contrast to a fund organized as a joint stock company, a unit trust is not a separate legal entity, and may be organized either as openend or closed-end funds. Thus, management companies in the second wave of privatization in the Czech Republic had the possibility to choose among three legal options to set up a fumd (see Table 20).

Open-end funds must ensure enough liquidity to enable the redemption of investment fund shares for cash. Due to the illiquidity of most emerging stock markets in Central and Eastern Europe, however, this would limit the ability of a fund to play an important role in corporate restructuring. Unit trusts should therefore either be set up as closed-end funds or as open-end funds with a restriction to redeem shares during an initial period (Blommestein and Spencer, 1993, 28).

**Table 20: Legal form of investment funds** in **the second wave** in **the Czech Republic**

|Legal set up as:|joint stock<br>company|closed-end<br>unit<br>trust|open-end unit<br>trust|TOTAL|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Number of funds|195|38|120|353|
|Number of points|1,570|870|1,480|3,920|
|Source: Mejstrik (19|94).||||

Organized as a joint stock company, a fund has its own boards (management and supervisory board) and must have an annual shareholder meeting. Many management companies felt that annual shareholder meetings are costly, but do not offer real influence to shareholders in annual meetings since the ownership of an investment fund is widely 42 In Czech the term 'investicni fond' is only used for funds having a legal person (organized as a joint stock company). This is the reason why the designation 'investicni fond' has to be included in the business name of a fund organized as a joint stock company.
alike. As beginning a new job requires learning processes, technology and culture of the new workplace, a new employee will not reach peak productivity in a position immediately upon being hired. An employer may be less likely to consider hiring a worker who is close to mandatory retirement age simply because there is not sufficient time to earn a return on initial training and start-up costs relative to a younger worker. In the US, where many workers start to leave the workforce upon eligibility for social security benefits, difficulties finding new employment among older displaced workers are well-documented. Research using the US Health and Retirement Study (US-HRS), for example, has demonstrated that of workers who lose jobs after age 55, only 60 and 55 percent of men and women are employed again within two years, while 80 percent of non-displaced workers are employed (Chan and Stevens, 2001).

In China, and to some extent Indonesia and Korea, a mandatory retirement age for some occupations and types of employers is even more binding than social security eligibility in the US. Differences in mandatory retirement ages of men and women in China may have a significant impact on how employers view the relative returns to hiring male and female employees who are in their 40s and older.<sup>12</sup> In Korea and Indonesia, retirement ages are not mandated by the law, but employment laws allow for firms to set mandatory ages, and government employees and civil servants face mandatory retirement. Explicit rationales for mandatory retirement provisions and legal support for them in Korea is based recognition that firms have long promoted worker allegiance by paying employees below their marginal product early in their careers and rewarding them with a premium after significant tenure. As workers later in their careers earn significantly more than their reservation wages and thus have a disincentive to retire, mandatory retirement provisions implemented by firms and the government civil service provide a means of guaranteeing that less productive older workers will eventually leave the firm, and facilitate promotions for younger employees.<sup>13</sup> The Korean Supreme Court passed a ruling in 1978 which permitted employers to adopt a mandatory retirement age,<sup>14</sup> and firms have responded by setting 55 as the median mandatory retirement age, with some exemptions allowing later retirement for senior executives.

> 12Of course, employers may already perceive older workers to be less productive (Chan and Stevens, 2001; Dalen et al, 2010), but this is a problem faced by both older men and women when looking for work.

> 13Lazear (1979) presents a theoretical model which suggests that mandatory retirement solves an important agency problem by allowing firms to shed unproductive older workers. 14Ruling No. 78da 1046, 12 September 1978.

8