rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Figure 19: HHI of World GVC Exports, 1988‐2014**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.35<br>Apparel ‐ Intermediate Good<br>0.3<br>Apparel ‐ Final Good<br>0.25<br>Motor Vehicles ‐ Intermediate Good<br>0.2<br>Motor Vehicles ‐ Final Good<br>0.15 Electronics ‐ Intermediate Good<br>Electronics ‐ Final Good<br>0.1<br>Footwear ‐ Intermediate Good<br>0.05<br>Footwear ‐ Final Good<br>0<br>Textiles ‐ Final Good<br>1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014<br><!-- End of picture text --> <u>Notes: Values in ratios from original variables expressed in thousand current US$ and calculated on the total number of 181</u> countries/geographies with available data on the variables necessary for the construction of both indexes and non‐missing normalized GDP, in at least some years of the period 1988‐2014, even though some have missing data in some years over the GVC mirror data series over the period 1988‐2014 (HS 1988/92 nomenclature, six‐digits). Normalized GDPs are calculated for each country and year as a ratio relative to the USA GDP in the fixed year 2001, with both countries' GDPs measured in constant 2005 USD (normalized GDP for the USA equals 1). All trade data is drawn from Comtrade on WITS, and countries' GDP data comes from WB WDI.

<u>Sources: Trade: World Bank MC‐GVC database (http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/GVC/GVCQueryDefination.aspx?Page=GVCIndicator).</u> World GDP: World Bank WDI (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world‐development‐indicators

**Figure 20: HHI of World GVC Exports, 1988‐2014**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.25<br>0.2<br>0.15<br>0.1<br>0.05<br>0<br>Intermediate Goods Final Goods<br>1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br><!-- End of picture text --> <u>Notes: Values in ratios from original variables expressed in thousand current US$ and calculated on the total number of 181</u> countries/geographies with available data on the variables necessary for the construction of both indexes and non‐missing normalized GDP, in at least some years of the period 1988‐2014, even though some have missing data in some years over the GVC mirror data series over the period 1988‐2014 (HS 1988/92 nomenclature, six‐digits). Normalized GDPs are calculated for each country and year as a ratio relative to the USA GDP in the fixed year 2001, with both countries' GDPs measured in constant 2005 USD (normalized GDP for the USA equals 1). All trade data is drawn from Comtrade on WITS, and countries' GDP data comes from WB WDI.

<u>Sources: Trade: World Bank MC‐GVC database. (http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/GVC/GVCQueryDefination.aspx?Page=GVCIndicator).</u> World GDP: World Bank WDI (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world‐development‐indicators 34
indebtedness (both demand-and supply-side factors). Section 6 discusses the results of the ultimate factors causing indebtedness including the possible effect of multiple program membership. Section 7 uses the household panel data to estimate the long term effect of microcredit on indebtedness, after controlling for household and community level explanatory variables of indebtedness including the extent of MFI competition measured by the density of MFIs at the community level. The final section concludes the paper and recommends actions for redressing or preventing over-indebtedness.

# <u>2.   Concepts and drivers of over-indebtedness</u>

Over-indebtedness is a complex concept that has been defined in multiple ways. Haas (2006) defines over-indebtedness as the inability of borrowers “to repay all debts fully and on time”. Others suggest that a household is over-indebted if it cannot meet its payment obligations arising from all debt contracts (Maurer and Pytkowska 2010; Wisniwski 2010). But overindebtedness is a situation that occurs chronically over a period of time (Wisniwski 2010), and is often beyond the borrowers’ control (Schicks 2010). To count one as over-indebted, the debt problems need to be at least structural and persistent over a period of time (Canner and Luckett 1991; Fisher 1933; Faruqee, 2013).<sup>4</sup> Researchers differ in assessing what level of repayment problems would be considered “over-indebted”. Some would count only legally bankrupt borrowers as over-indebted. Others would include, in the category of over-indebted, cases of defaults or arrears, or even all borrowers who struggle with an unhealthy debt balance. Other scholars have therefore proposed several indicators as proxies for indebtedness, such as multiple borrowing and asset debt ratios (Schicks and Rosenberg 2011). An operational definition of over-indebtedness can be constructed either as a continuous variable or a categorical variable. That is, while indebtedness

> 4 This paper’s literature review draws heavily from Faruqee (2013).

5
compensatory education will be equally effective. It may be that CONAFE’s decentralized spending and management structure, its involvement of parents in local decision-making, its targeting scheme, or other unique aspects of its design cause CONAFE to be effective, and that those design aspects are absent from other compensatory programs.

Furthermore, at this stage we are unable to determine precisely which of CONAFE’s interventions make it effective. Further research could help to draw lessons from CONAFE that would apply to similar programs in other countries. Therefore, future research using data on CONAFE support disaggregated by type of support should focus on determining what aspects of CONAFE’s interventions make CONAFE effective. That research would allow broader generalization of our results to other countries.

Future research could also focus on the long-term effects of CONAFE intervention. Early research on the Head Start program in the United States found that Head Start increased test scores and decreased dropout and failure rates. Later research on Head Start, however, found that it had insignificant effects on college enrollment and adulthood earnings. We use test scores and short-term dropout and failure data as predictors of total schooling and lifetime earnings. But since the purpose of compensatory education is to help people escape poverty, the most telling evaluation should consider not merely whether CONAFE increases test scores, but whether CONAFE improves outcomes 10-15 years after a student attends a CONAFE school. Although CONAFE has existed for over 30 years, such evaluation may require panel data that is currently unavailable.

39
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1436 |POLICY

# Summary findings

Exports respond unpredictably to a change in real exchange rates, suggests evidence from the 1980s.

Recent theoretical work (Paul Krugman and Richard Baldwin) explains this as a consequence of the sunk costs associated with breaking into foreign markets. Sunk costs include the cost of packaging, upgrading product quality, establishing marketing channels, and accumulating information on demand sources.

Roberts and Tybout use micro panel data to estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of participation in export markets, a model derived from the Krugman-Baldwin sunk-cost hyster --is framework.

Applying the model to data on manufacturing plants in Colombia (1981489), they test for the presence of sunk entry costs and quantify the importance of those costs in explaining export patterns. The econometric results reject the hypothesis that sunic costs are zero.

The results, which control for both observed and unobserved sources of plant heterogeneity, indicate that prior export market experience has a substantial effect on the probability of exporting, but its effect depreciates fairly quickly. The reentry costs of plants that have been out of the export market for a year are substantially lower than the costs of a first-time exporter. After a year out of the export market, however, the reentry costs are not significantly different from the entry costs.

Plant characteristics are also associated with export behavior: Large old plants owned by corporations are more likely to export than other plants.

Variations in plant-level cost and demand conditions have much less effect on the profitability of exporting than variations in macroeconomic conditions and sunk costs do. It appears especially difficult to break into fereign markets during periods of world recession.

- - This paper a product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department is part of a larger effort in the department to describe the micro foundations of export supply response. The study was fundedby the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Micro-Foundations of Successful Export Promotion" (RPO 679-20). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H StreetNW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contactJermifer Ngaine, room R2-052, extension 37959 (37 pages). March 199S.

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_For labor or for divorce?_ making their divorce threats more credible in case of conflict. Moreover, altered marriage contracts arguably provide women with incentive to supply labor and remain in the labor market through many channels. Chiappori et al. (2002) find evidence of a shift to higher female bargaining power intra-household and El Lahga and Moreau (2007) suggest lower degrees of specialization in domestic production. Drawing on this strand of literature, our central hypothesis is that divorce legislation reform should increase women’s bargaining power during the marriage, potentially, allowing more women into the labor market.

To test this argument, we construct a pseudo-panel of mothers that we assign to treatment and control groups based on the ages of their youngest child. Using data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) program that spans over decades and a quasiexperimental difference-in-differences design, we assess how the implementation of the right to unilateral divorce affects women's labor outcomes in Morocco, The Arab Republic of Egypt, and Jordan. We follow cohorts of “treated” mothers for several periods before and after the reform thus including the short-term and long-term effects of legislative reforms on women’s socio-economic position. Our findings suggest that there are two main mechanisms: a power-shift effect and an anticipatory effect.

Our results show that the power-shift effect is most prevalent impacting mainly married mothers with children below the legal age-custody cutoff, for whom divorce is less costly. However, this effect can be offset by higher costs in the labor market that remain barriers to women’s labor marketization. This study contributes to the literature on the effects of divorce, child custody and alimony legislation on women’s labor outcomes (Parkman, 1992; Gray, 1998; Bremmer and Kesselring, 2004; Genadek et al., 2007; Stevenson, 2008; Bargain et al., 2012; Hassani- Nezhad and Sjögren, 2014; Fernández-Kranz, 2022; Corradini and Buccione, 2023). Additionally, it shows how the effects of legislation are heavily dependent on context, be it social or economic. The following section briefly summarizes the institutional and legal background of the reform in Morocco, The Arab Republic of Egypt, and Jordan. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and data used, while section 5 summarizes the results and provides a discussion, and section 6 concludes.

5
Section 4 details the different institutional constraints facing firms in developing economies. First, we highlight research establishing the link between financial development and economic growth. An extensive body of work in this area included cross-country, industry-level, and firm-level empirical evidence establishing that access to external finance has a positive effect on growth. We then discuss the literature in law and finance that has established the importance of legal institutions and property rights protection for financial development and has shown that many developing countries have weak legal institutions that do not support the rights of investors or afford contract protection. Firms and investors in these economies are also impeded by information barriers arising from poor accounting standards and lack of adequate information sharing through credit bureaus and public credit registries. Compounding these constraints is the role of government intervention in the form of state directed lending programs, corruption, and favoring politically connected firms.

In Section 5, we focus on corporate finance issues related to the firm and how they are affected by the institutions we discuss in section 4. The empirical studies here have focused on the institutional causes of financing constraints faced by firms and how firm financing patterns and capital structure choices vary between developed and developing countries. Reviewing the evidence on firm capital structure, we find that legal institutions and the level of bank and stock market development are important determinants of firms‟ choices of leverage and debt maturity structures. There is an emerging debate on the role of cash holdings. While some studies find that cash and lines of credit are liquidity substitutes, others find that lines of credit are the dominant source of corporate liquidity, and that firms use cash only as insurance against future cash flow shortfalls. More research is needed to understand what role institutions play in determining the role of cash and if this varies across different types of firms in different sectors.

In this section, we also review the capital issuance activity across the world. With globalization, there has been a large increase in global capital issuances including initial public offerings (IPOs), suggesting that many domestic firms are able to leapfrog their domestic institutions and raise money in international markets. There is an active debate in this area on the motivations of firms going abroad and the ensuing valuation effects. The most recent evidence seems to suggest that lowering the cost of capital and market timing are key drivers of international capital issuances. The section concludes with a review of international private 3
Pap 39 70. The high level of profitability achieved by the sector, however, allowed the govemment to transfer the companies to the private sector without having to increase real prices. This made privatization politically feasible - in contrab **t** o the power sector where drastic real price increases would have been required to attract private participation (and where real returns on equity marginally in excess of 4% in trhe mid-1980s triggered intervention and real price declines. But even with the increased profitability, private sector participation in telecommunications would not have been forthcoming without a change in the regulatory system that eliminated the ability of the administration to expropriate the sector's specific assets. Once that was achieved. then, the ability of the govemment to use telephone prices for political wealth redistribution became limited.

!'

# V. The Regulatory and Structura,i Changes of 1987-1990.

71. The structural changes of 1987/1990 represent major changes in the way Jamaican telecommunicabons sector was regulated and organized. Not only were the insttutional changes the most important since the introduction of the JPUC in the mid 1960s, the sector subsequently has experienced an unprecedented vitality. The main hypothesis that we want to address empirically is that the performance of the sector responds to a large extent to the resolution of the government/firmn contracting problem through the writing of a regulatory contrac **t** hat was seen as credible and binding. Furthermore, this regulatory contract was designed so as to reduce short run politcal oppositon. In the next section we explore to what extent these regulatory changes could have been improved upon, given the political, contracting and structural consbtaints.

# **_1. The_** _Creaton of Telecommunications of Jamaica_ **_and_** _the Dlvestiture of_ **_GOJ's Holdings._**

72. In 1985, in part for the reasons given in the previous section, but also because of the coming expiration of JAMINTELSs license and of the shareholders' agreement between GOJ and C&W, negotiations began with the intenbon of merging the domestic and intemational operating companies.
crop type, rather than a premium based on the actuarial expected payout in the local geographic area. This mispricing induces adverse selection; farmers in high-risk areas enjoy a larger subsidy than those in low risk areas, and are more likely to participate. Second, Kalavakonda and Mahul (2005) suggest that knowledge of the scheme is relatively limited among bankers and district administration officials, and that purchasing and claiming insurance involves sometimes burdensome administrative costs. Third, not all crops are covered by the scheme (for example, tea, coffee, rubber and sugarcane are excluded). Fourth, in some areas, the designated geographic unit is relatively large, generating excessive basis risk between the farmer’s yield and the yield on the crop cutting experiments. Fifth, claims can take a substantial period of time to be settled. Table 3 of Kalavakonda and Mahul (2005) shows that insurance claims are on average made available to households around 12 months after the end of the growing season. Given the credit constraints and high discount rates of households in developing countries, this delay is likely to be a significant disincentive to participate in the insurance program. Unfortunately, little systematic evidence exists to disentangle the relative importance of these and other explanations for the low NAIS participation rate.

Partially in response to the design problems outlined above, a number of private institutions have begun to offer alternatives to the NAIS crop insurance program. Several of these, including the product considered in this paper, provide a payoff based on rainfall at local rain gauges. Rainfall insurance presents several advantages relative to area-level crop insurance:

**1. Cost** . Rainfall data is already collected at a disaggregated level for other purposes by the Indian Meterological Department (IMD), and readily available at little or no cost. In contrast, areayield index insurance requires a large sample of crop-yield measurements, involving significant fixed costs. (These fixed costs are likely to be prohibitive for private insurers seeking to develop alternative products to NAIS).

**2. Availability of Historical Data.** Reliable daily rainfall data is available at the mandal level over a historical period of several decades. By modelling this data, it is possible to generate a relatively accurate estimate of the actuarial value of a wide variety of potential insurance contracts.

**3. Objectivity of index construction.** Maintaining a standardized methodology for measuring crop yields is not trivial, since yields depend on the seed type used, amount of fertilizer and other inputs applied to the crop and other factors. This subjectivity also introduces the potential for manipulation of the index. In contrast, the methodology for the measurement of rainfall is relatively well-agreed upon.

**4. Timely calculation and payment of returns.** Since rainfall data becomes available on an almost real-time basis, in principle it is possible to calculate payouts and pay policyholders in a

34
A plant may face an effective tax rate lower than the statutory tax rate because of loss carryforward, tax base revaluations, and other exemptions. Plants that face an effective tax rate that is higher than the statutory tax rate do so mainly for two reasons: late payment fines and tax base revaluations. Late payment fines range from 10 percent to 30 percent depending on how long it takes the plant to pay the amount owed. Plants also pay 1.5 percent interest per month on their debt. Taxes paid by tax base revaluations are technically called “deferred taxes”. These tax base revaluations arise from analyzing the differences, mostly temporary, between taxable and accounting profit.

<u>Table 1: Characteristics of Efective Proft Tax Rates</u>

|Year|Statutory Tax|Tax Rate = 0|Tax Rate < Statutory|St. Dev.|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Rate (percent)|(percent of frms)|(percent of frms)|(Percent)|
|1998|15|29.09|68.06|13.95|
|1999|15|33.24|67.66|13.90|
|2000|15|34.52|71.71|12.87|
|2001|15|38.21|72.40|12.79|
|2002|16|38.81|76.20|12.56|
|2003|16.5|34.04|71.81|13.44|
|2004|17|29.96|71.82|12.52|
|2005|17|28.89|71.26|12.86|
|2006|17|28.19|68.52|12.76|
|2007|17|30.44|69.89|13.19|

The last column of Table 1 presents the standard deviation of effective corporate tax rates for every year of our sample. As mentioned previously, exemptions, deductions, and deferrals inherent to the Chilean tax code allow firms to have effective tax rates that are different than the statutory tax rate, resulting in dispersion in effective rates. To understand whether this dispersion is driven either by innate firm ability to utilize the tax code to reduce their tax burden over time (i.e. firm fixed effect), exemptions targeted at specific firm groups (i.e. region, industry, among others), or idiosyncratic variation, we carry out the following exercise. Using the unbalanced panel of firms between 9