This reglatory process can proceed in small incremental stcps--each of which is relatively innocuous and apparently well-intentioned. The cumulative impact of many smail steps, however, can devastatc the independence needed for the effective operatioui of both VOs and POs.'<sup>2</sup> The threat that some governments perceive VOs to pose does not arise purely from their more overt efforts to spawn political competition in their societies. The legitimacy of many Third World govern-

**Box** 9: Cooperatives Legislation In India

The first Cooperatives Act was Introduced In India in 1904 "to encourage thrift, self help and cooperation among agriculturalists, artisans and persons of limited means, and for that purpos& to provide for the constitution and control of cooperative societies." It was a ten page document that left it to the cooperative members to use their own Initiative In rnanagement matters. The Registrar of Cooperatives was to provide for their legal registration, audit their accounts free of charge, and perform certain fairly minimal regulatory functions. Subsequent versions of the law dropped "to encourage thrift, self-help and cooperationr from the purpose, Increased the Involvement of govemment, and all but eliminated member control over their own organizations. The Act in force in Andhra Pradesh State In 1985 was over 80 pages in length and gave the Registrar of Cooperatives the power, among others, to: divkie and consolidate cooperatives, amend the by-laws of any cooperative, postpone management committee elections and appoint a "person-In-charge! to assume the management committee's functions, supercede the decisions of elected committees, and Issue Instructions that all cooperatives were required to follow - irrespective of the wishes of the cooperative's members. Due to application of these provisions, aii cooperatives throughout Andhta Pradesh were for several years managed by persons-incharge who had no accountability to the members. Free election of management coimittees by cooperative members was restored only as a result of a successful **court** action brought by Samakhya, a VO committed to restoring the independence of cooperatives in Andhra Pradesh.

Source: Samakhya ments is based on their ability to deliver scrvices. Any VO that delivers services more cffectivcly and efficicntly ihan government becomes a political thrcat, no matter how benign its intentions.

There are basically three options open to the regime so threatened. One is to position itself to claim credit for VO accomplishments. A second is to hinder VO operations to the point that they become ineffective. A third option is to displace the voluntary sector by creating captive organizations to assume the apparent functions of VOs, but as instruments of the regime.

# Captive Organizations: GONGOs and DONGOs

NGOs that are created as captives of government to substitute for true NGOs are commonly re"ferred to by NGO leaders as "CONGOs," which stands for government-organized NGOs. GONGOs are created and registered as NGOs by govcrmnental agencies as instrumcnts of governmcnt poticy with government deftned missions. An example is the Indonesian women's organization, the PKK. Its national chairman is the wife of the Minister of Home Affairs. Each provincial organization is chaired by the wife of the governor, and so on down through the hierarchy. It is made clear to wives of government officials that they are expected to participate.

The formation of a GONGO seldom reflects a spontaneous expression of a shared value commitment, and participation is often less than voluntary. The motives in forming such organizations may be positive, and they may serve useful social functions, but they are less likely than agencies more squarely positioned in the voluntary sector to serve as consequential agents of social innovation.' As donors become more interested in NGOs, they also find themselves tempted to create NGOs suited to their own perceived needs. Such agencies might be called 'DONGOs," or donor-organized NGOs. The mission of a DONGO will normally be defined by its sponsoring donor. Such organizations may serve useful functions for the donor, while offering a degree of flexibiiity in administration and funds disbursement that the donor's own procedures might not allow.<sup>74</sup> Since donors are particularly preoccupied with the disbursement of funds and usually find their own procedures and modes of working ill suited to making grants to dozens, or even hundreds, of small scattered organizations, the DONGOs they create are most often funding bodies. This does not create a particular problem in itself, unless a number of donors should decide to pool their funds and channel them through a single DONGO -- creating a single control point for funds in violation of the

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