rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table 9**

# CAte d'lvoire: Mean Per Capita Total Household Expenditures with and without Household-Size Weights by Region. 1985-1988

|||1985|||1986|||1987||1988|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||A.|B.|**%**|A.|B.|**%**|A.|B.|**%**|**A.***|
||||Diff.|||Diff.|||Diff.||
|Abidjan<br>|357,410<br>|376,108<br>|5.23<br>|291,316<br>|312,859<br>|7.40|361,544|372,361|2.99|288,708|
|Other Cities<br>|240,638<br>|271,864<br>|12.98<br>|235,810<br>|270,540<br>|14.73|237,570|250,010|5.24|178,165|
|East Forest<br>|156,342<br>|164,472<br>|5.20<br>|162,980|172,341|5.74|165,271|167,974|1.64|152,501|
|West Forest<br>|225,277<br>|239,134<br>|6.15<br>|184,427<br>|204,457<br>|10.86|170,298|169,776|-0.31|143,947|
|Savannah<br>'|148,156<br>|152,573<br>|2.98<br>|147,466|154,676|4.89|133,947|136,061|1.58|120,684|
|Cte dlvoire|221,313|237,853|7.47|204,183|223,905|9.66|210,286|216,965|3.18|173,072|

- A. Mean per capita expenditure computed without household-size weights. B. Mean per capita expenditure computed with household-size weights.

- Since 1988 data were obtained entirely under the revised sampling frame and sampling procedures, no household-size weights are applied.

18
# **I. Introduction**

There has been an active literature in recent years on the world distribution of income. Some discussions focus on the “inter-country” distribution of income; that is, a distribution where countries are weighted equally, with China having the same weight as Barbados (for example, see Jones 1997). Other studies, like Theil and Seale (1994), still treat countries as the unit of analysis, but weigh their influence on world income distribution by population size. In what follows, this method is said to refer to the “international” distribution of income. Still other papers, such as the latest _World Development Report_ of the World Bank (World Bank 2005b), combine estimates of within country inequality with those of international inequality to arrive at a more complete picture of income distribution, referred to as the “global” distribution of income.

In this paper<sup>1</sup> , we focus on the international distribution of income, abstracting from the admittedly critical element of within country inequality, since the purpose of our study does not allow us to take satisfactory account of the latter component of global inequality.<sup>2</sup> Practical reasons for overlooking within country inequality are twofold. First, the calculations are much simpler. In particular, we can abstain from the recent debate on whether weighted inequality measures should be based on household survey data or national accounts data (Sala-i-Martin 2002, Bhalla 2002 vs. Milanovic 2002, Ravallion 2001). Furthermore, it has been shown that international inequality accounted for approximately 60 percent of overall inequality across the world’s citizens as recently as 1992 (Bourguignon and Morrison 2002)

> 1 Some of these results were presented at the World Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE), Washington D.C., May 3rd, 2004 and at the “ABCDE-Europe”, Brussels, May 10<sup>th</sup> 2004. 2 Elsewhere (Bourguignon et al. 2004) we have shown that a more detailed analysis of individual countries’ mobility along the income per capita scale provides an interesting perspective on the two seemingly contrary streams of the literature:  the economic divergence literature, and the literature showing that inequality across countries has decreased over the recent period.

1
**B. Economic Activities**

|||Percent households working in:|
|---|---|---|
|Community|Agriculture|Migration<br>Commerce/handicrafts|
|Melan|100|55<br>_15_|
|Jatun Era|100|20<br>10|
|Maca Chico|90|53<br>20|
|Apunag|100|0<br>0|
|Bellavista|59|46<br>8|
|Membrillal|96|80<br>0|
|Villano|100|0<br>0|

Source: Field Intervies of Rural Qualitative Assessment (1995).

||**C.**<br>**E**|**ducation**|**al profile of**|**three comm**|**unities.**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Percent of||Adul|t<sup>2 </sup>educational|levels (%)|
|Community|children'<br>in school|---------<br>None|--------------<br>Primary|-----------------<br>High school|--------------------<br>-<br>High school graduation|
|Membrillal|96.4|21.5|64.5|10.8|3.2|
|Melan|100.0|40.4|57.4|2.1|0.0|
|Villano|100.0|14.3|65.5|13.1|8.3|

Age 8 to 12. 2 Age > _15._ Source: Field Intervi&Ns of Rual Qualitative Assessment (1995).

In terms of housing, most families continue to live in traditional chozas, which have dirt floors, adobe walls, and straw roofs. Only recently has this type of construction begun to be supplanted by cement block waUlls and zinc roofs.

Virtually all young children attend primary school, but secondary school attendance is extremely rare. Rates of functional adult illiteracy range from 70 percent to 78 percent, and tends to be higher for omen and, in particularly, the elderly. There are no health centers in any of the communities, and health care can only be obtained (when transportation is available) in towns that may be several hours away.

Table 1 also shows that virtually all households depend primarily on agriculture. Corn, barley, and potatoes are the basic subsistence crops in the Sierra; potatoes are the most common market crop. Secondary crops include onions, beans, quinua, broad beans _(habas),_ lentils, and native tubers _(ocas, mellocos, mashua)._ The farming system combines the production of these crops using shifting sets of techniques, including rotation and intercultivation, with small animal husbandry (sheep, pigs, chickens, and guinea pigs). Labor responsibilities are commonly divided on the basis of age and sex, and may include exchanges within extended families and communities.

Because access to land is so limited, agricultural production alone (whether for consumption or sale) can not sustain the family, and other income must be obtained. The most frequently used mechanism is off-farm employment, and in these communities, up to 55 percent of households include temporary migration in their survival strategies. Handicraft production and commercial activities are also important mechanisms for supplementing household income.

9
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_18_ _PROF. BRADFORD: To summarize Professor Boltho's paper in a concise way so as to be able to make some remarks, the question. I guess, ls: What does thls longer-run historical perspective give us? And I think It gives us some useful Insights._ _I thlnk the problem Is when he gets down to what could be done that It is not clear to me that the longer-term perspective is so helpful. Basically what you examined, it seems to me, is a set of Issues that had to do with: one, whether or not there were any physical capacity constraints to longer-term faster growth, and you came up with the conclusion that, no, there were no physical constraints._ _Smooth transition from Imbalances t' long-term growth?_ _The longer-term perspective leads to, I think, a hopeful Inquiry into whether or not it Is possible to get what you called an ordinary or smooth transition from the current set of Imbalances to a longer-run growth path and to explore positive system shocks as a mechanism for getting there and to meeting the kind of expectational Investment-growth linkage that you find there._ _I have some difficulties with that, because it seems to me that the nature of the world economy since 1973 at least is quite the contrary from what It had been prior to 1973. I think what we see is not a smooth path but rather, a sequence of disequilibria. In fact what you have is a klnd of Jolt to the system which sets up some disequillbrium forces, which have led to over-correction in a next phase, and on and on. So that rather than there being some conver-gence back to a smoother path, what you really have is eratic trends and more cycles._ _During this period, despite all the academic fussings and debates about macroeconomics, there has beer-, as we all know, an extraordinary consensus, ln analytical economics and internationally, about the one fundamental cause of world Imba.aices, namely the U.S. fiscal deficit. And what we see there is, I 1-hink, the place where the crucial capacity question comes to bea-, and that physical constraints are not the dilemma. The real capacity constraint is a political one._ _If you believe that the world economy since 1973 has some intrinsic and policy-induced sequences of disequilibria, and if you think that where we are short on capacity In the world economy today Is on the political side, then the more logical conclusion to draw is that perhaps the way to change to a regime toward greater international coordination Is not by some sort of positive policy whiplash, which doesn't seem to be in the offlng, but rather by a negative system shock, namely a further downturn of sufficiently dramacic dimensions to induce a political change._ _Otherwise, I think, the scenario that you paint, where you have actually assumed away the imbalances, one of long-term sluggish stagnation or stagflation, is perhaps the more likely scenario. But_ WPlPROC/SF:jsq
**<u>Table 16: Extra-Regional Traffic for the Caribbean Member Countries</u>**

|**Route Type**<br>**Typology**|<br>**Country**|<br>**Seats 2013**|<br>**Share**|**Annual**<br>**Growth**<br>**01-13**|**Annual**<br>**Growth**<br>**08-13**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Antigua and Barbuda|575,679||1.6%|-3.2%|
||Dominica|64,259||-0.2%|-3.8%|
||Grenada|109,096||-0.3%|-3.4%|
|Small Island States|St. Kitts and Nevis|227,019||-2.7%|-9.4%|
||St. Lucia|591,305||3.1%|-0.6%|
||St. Vincent and the Grenadines|No Direct Conn|ections due t|o Airport Li|mitations|
||**Subtotal**|**1,567,358**||**0.9%**|**-3.6%**|
||Bahamas,The|3,515,369||-2.6%|-3.0%|
|Et|Barbados|1,280,344||1.4%|-2.6%|
|xra-<br>Reional<br>Hub Countries|Dominican Republic|10,473,723||6.6%|6.7%|
|g<br>Routes<br>|Jamaica|4,963,829||3.6%|1.6%|
||Trinidad and Tobago|1,329,861||3.5%|-0.8%|
||**Subtotal**|**21,563,126**||**3.2%**|**2.5%**|
||Belize|709,787||4.3%|3.2%|
|Ctitl Cibb|Guyana|94,562||0.3%|3.9%|
|onnena arean|Suriname|440,869||3.6%|6.4%|
||**Subtotal **|**1,245,218**||**3.7%**|**4.3%**|
|Fil S|Haiti|1,312,636||3.2%|2.1%|
|rage tates|**Subtotal**|**1,312,636**||**3.2%**|**2.1%**|
|**Total**||**25,688,338**|**100%**|**3.0%**|**2.1%**|

_Source: Authors’ calculation based on data by Diio (2014)._

# <u>Small Island States</u>

The extra-regional air market of the small island states is dominated by the routes with North America (Canada and the US) with traffic of about 1.2 million seats per year. In a distant second, routes to European destinations (primarily the UK), and to other Caribbean islands generate traffic of about 850 thousand seats each. The most important routes are with London, Miami, and the East Coast of the U.S (Figure 14a). In the next sections the characteristics of these routes will be discussed. Four airports with long runways, namely Antigua, St. Lucia’s Hewanorra, St. Kitts, and Grenada, get direct traffic from Europe and North America.

# _Traffic with the American Continent_

North American traffic (including traffic out of San Juan) rose by 43% from 2004 until it suffered a slight decline in 2011 (Figure 19a). As of 2012, about 40% of international travel outside the small island states is either with the U.S. or via San Juan. On the other hand, traffic with Central and South America is orders of magnitude smaller and shows erratic behavior with a clean decline trend after 2007 (Figure 19b). The reasons for the decline are not yet known at the writing of this report; however, it is known that tourism out of South America is relatively undeveloped, and that plans to market some of the small island states in countries like Brazil are now being actively considered. It must also be noted that thinner markets with low volumes are inherently more volatile.

48
- 19 -

in the citios, where they are likely to be made with plywood boards.) The boxes, like old burial pots, are evidence of something contrary to the 'liquidity preference" that foreigners sometimes assume. Just as important, or more, is an "illiquidity preference".

# Rural Deposit-Takers

Another widely-used strategy is the money-keeper.20 Some rural Gambians give money to others in their villages to hold for them. They may choose any trusted person--there are no specialized deposit-takers--but often the depositor will choose a relative or other person who is likely to have other cash available for his or her own urgent needs.

In the 1988 survey, 46 percent of the women and 20 percent of the men respondents had entrusted money to other individuals in 1987 and 1988.21 More had given deposits than taken them: in the same period, 16 percent of men and 15 percent of the women respondents had received deposits from others. An individual may hold money for several people simultaneously, as these figures suggest; and more occasionally, an individual deposits with more than one keeper at a time. The great majority of depositors of both sexes had made their deposits in January and February, in the season of groundnut harvesting and marketing, and more than half said they had made only one deposit in a year. 63 percent had withdrawn their deposits in Hay and June, reflecting tne importance of land preparation and planting expenses as a purpose of saving. Otherwise the withdrawals were spread about evenly through the year. Only rarely does an individual leave money in deposit with another for more than a year.
Traditional Medicine In Sub-Saharan Africa S Table 1. Ratios of General Population to Health Care Provider

||Population per Single Health Care Provider|
|---|---|
|Country|Traditional<br>Modem|
|Nigeria|532<br>14,810|
|<br>Ghana|421<br>10,200|
|Tanzania|393<br>18,490|

Source: Compiled from table 2.2, Akin, _et. al._ 1985; Tanzania traditional population ratio calculated from Gottlieb 1975, p. 21.

28.6 percent of patients first consulted the "free" government health ^are system. The malority consulted pharmacies, private practitioners, or mission clinics. Approximately 6.5 percent of the patients in the sample sought out a traditional practitioner first. However, when health-seeking behavior was categorized according to symptoms (excluding psychological symptoms), a much higher proportion of first visits were with traditional healers for certain clusters of illnesses such as asthma, body pain, or joint pain (respectively, 40 percent, 29.4 percent, and 20.0 percent of first contacts, with 28.6 percent categorized as "other illnesses").

16. Dunlop and Donaldson's study of health financing in Ethiopia (1987) analyzed the pattern of health care utilization by provider. As table 2 shows, the proportion of people who reported illness to a traditional healer was similar to that which Mwabu found in Meru, Kenyaapproximately 6 percent of the patients who reported illness consulted traditional healers at the first contact. It should be noted, however, that approximately 70 percent of those who reported illnesses did not undergo any treatment. Therefore, of all those who underwent some treatment (at first or second contact), approximately 20 percent consulted traditional healers.

17. A similar categorization of health-seeking choices according to illness categoriesbroadened to include psychological symptoms-is needed for other countries to indicate the importance of traditional health care. In general, a pattern seems to emerge whereby patients tend to consult modern health care services for infectious or acute diseases--those for which modern health care has been shown to be highly effective. Other diseases remain within the domain of traditional medicine: chronic conditions, complaints related to psychological or social disruption, problems associated with reproduction (e.g., infertility, menstrual disorders), diseases caused by organisms which have become resistant to drugs (Katz and Katz 1981), diseases that respond slowly to modern treatments (e.g., tuberculosis), and those deemed to be 'magical" in origin. Most of these diseases are perceived to be caused by social problems rather than individual forces and to have social significance, as well. Much of the appeal of traditional practitioners derives the fact that they share an understanding and interpretation of the social origins and significance of these diseases with their patients.
_Development_ , 27 (9), 1531-51.

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Ruan, J. & Zhang, X. (2009). Finance and cluster-based industrial development in China. _Economic Development and Cultural Change,_ 58 (1), 143–164.

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Sonobe, T., Akoten, J. & Otsuka, K. (2010). Growth process of informal enterprises in 27
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conflicting evidence on intergenerational mobility from coresident samples; for example, in India, educational mobility has improved substantially after the 1991 reform according to the IGRC estimates, but remains largely stagnant according to the IGC estimates. Our analysis suggests that the conclusions based on the IGC estimates in such instances of conflict are more credible. Third, the evidence that the estimates are biased _downward_ can be helpful in understanding changes in intergenerational mobility over time. If the estimates from coresident samples show no change or an increase in persistence over time, we can be confident that mobility has declined, as the coresidency rate in a country usually declines over time, making the downward bias in the estimates for the younger generation larger in magnitude.<sup>11</sup> Fourth, our results have important implications for cross-country comparisons of economic mobility. Most of the available data sets suffer from coresidency restrictions, and the extent of truncation is likely to vary across countries significantly. Since the bias in IGRC is larger, and it responds more to changes in the coresidency rate, a ranking according to IGRC is more likely to be incorrect compared to a ranking based on IGC.<sup>12</sup> Fifth, the evidence indicates that the IGRC estimates in coresident samples are likely to underestimate the gender gap in intergenerational economic mobility, because coresidency rates for girls are much lower in many developing countries, especially where girls leave the natal family after marriage.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion on the related literature, especially focusing on developing countries, and puts the contribution of this paper in perspective. The next section (section 3) discusses the data sources and variables used in the analysis. Section (4) reports the estimates of IGRC and IGC in educational attainment for Bangladesh and India data, both for the full and the coresident our results suggest that when working with coresident samples, one should avoid measures that do not normalize for changing variances across generations.

> 11See, for example, Emran and Sun (2015) on China, Emran and Shilpi (2015) on India.

> 12The evidence below shows that, based on IGRC estimates from coresident samples, one would conclude, incorrectly, that intergenerational educational persistence is similar in India and Bangladesh, when the IGRC estimates from full samples show that persistence is substantially higher in Bangladesh. In contrast, the IGC estimates from coresident samples provide both a correct ranking, and a reliable estimate of the gap between the countries.

4