rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
signaling effects. Turkey’s level of net stock of FDI (20 percent of GDP) is significantly lower than the average level of stock in other Eastern European countries (50 percent of GDP). This may help partly explain significantly smaller FDI inflows to Turkey, a country that may not be perceived as a cradle for long term investment.

Second, foreign direct investment attraction is found to be negatively affected by exchange rate risk. It may be argued that, by introducing macro-prudential measures to mitigate _exchange rate variability_ caused by volatile capital flows, Turkey would gain attractiveness for long term foreign direct investment attraction. Some macro-prudential measures are already under implementation (see Fendoglu, Kilinc, and Yörükoglu, 2014).

**Figure 1. Evolution of foreign direct investment and the exchange rate risk index**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 12 8<br>7<br>10<br>6<br>8<br>5<br>6 4<br>3<br>4<br>2<br>2<br>1<br>0 0<br>1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br>FDI % GDP EU2005 new members FDI % GDP Turkey<br>Exchange rate risk EU2005 new members Exchange rate risk Turkey<br>Source: authors' elaboration from UNCTAD, ICRG<br>Net FDI inflows to GDP<br>Exchange rate risk: 1(highest) to 12 (lowest)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Another significant determinant of foreign direct investment is the proxy for _telecommunications infrastructure_ . Data from the World Development Indicators suggests that the penetration of mobile and fixed lines in Turkey, very fast until 2008, has stagnated, as shown in Figure 2. This implies an expansion in the phone line subscriptions gap with respect to new EU members, which could also suggest slower technology adoption. Public policies aimed at fostering the penetration of telecommunications at competitive rates could be helpful in terms of foreign direct investment attraction. Public investment in other types of infrastructure (e.g. roads, ports) not included in our econometric analysis, may also contribute to the arrival of foreign multinationals.

24
balance sheets or how to ask banks for credit. The support of accountant technicians is crucial for these services but there are not enough technicians to serve the SMEs. The shortage of technicians is particularly acute outside of Maputo (even just 50 kms outside) and in the provinces their presence could also help improve public financial management at the municipal level.

**_Table 6: Auditing and Finance in Manufacturing Firms_**

||Percentage of<br>Firms with Annual<br>Financial<br>Statements<br>Reviewed by An<br>External Auditor|<br>Percentage of<br>Firms with Access<br>to Bank Loan|Percentage of<br>Working Capital<br>Financed by<br>Commercial<br>Banks|Percentage of<br>New Investment<br>Financed by<br>Commercial<br>Banks|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Mozambique**|**16%**|**43%**|**7%**|**13%**|
|Ethiopia|35%|46%|0%|0%|
|Benin|43%|25%|12%|14%|
|Madagascar|45%|18%|0%|0%|
|Mali|51%|24%|9%|12%|
|Uganda|59%|20%|7%|14%|
|Senegal|67%|23%|14%|18%|
|Tanzania|80%|19%|13%|16%|
|Malawi|80%|29%|17%|22%|
|Zambia|85%|43%|16%|17%|
|Mauritius|88%|52%|0%|0%|
|Eritrea|90%|38%|22%|31%|
|Nigeria|93%|9%|0%|0%|
|South Africa|97%|64%|16%|17%|
|Kenya|97%|35%|27%|32%|

Source: Investment Climate Surveys and Mozambique/DANIDA Enterprise Survey 2006. Note: The surveys were conducted for different countries in different years. For Mozambique we use the investment climate survey data in columns 1 and 3-4 and the DANIDA Enterprise Survey 2006 in column 2.

Some of the services providers complain that there are stark differences between firms that abide by international rules and regulations (such as the big 4) and those that do not. For example the big 4 use an electronic system to perform audit reports that requires a wrap-up of every phase before moving to the next phase. Abiding by international rules and regulations makes the services of those big 4 firms more expensive.

All providers in the accounting and auditing services sector consulted stated that the market for accounting services in Mozambique is extremely competitive – both among the big 4 as well as for domestic accounting firms. The size of the market is also expected to increase. First, retailers which traditionally had no accounts in Mozambique will eventually need to have formal accounting, though they tend to hire individual professionals for their accounts rather than accounting firms. Second, the plan to implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is also likely to increase the demand for accounting services, but the appropriateness of these standards for any but the largest Mozambican firms needs to be carefully evaluated.

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<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 10 20 40 60<br>ty ——— EEK<br>ee N + Airports.<br>Ec?ryL |A wi - B ——Routes Transport Maritime<br>HY s —— Routes Nationales<br>Gray on 4 “Gite ——— Routes RegionalesNon Classees<br>& — Autre pistes<br>N,<br>WIP<br>ay<br>ae<br>7<br>\uondh Hie<br>aR :<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>80%<br>60%<br>40%10, 03<br>20% =<br>1.3<br>RN RR RNC Non-classée<br>0% . 18<br>m=Bon mMoyen mMediocre mMauvais Unknown<br><!-- End of picture text -->
well as more micro-level evidence confirm the poverty-reducing and growth-enhancing impact of a better distribution of productive assets.

This apparent potential notwithstanding, actual experience with land reform has in many instances fallen short of expectations. Despite-or because-of this, land reform remains a hotly debated issue in a number of countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Colombia) some of which are spending considerable amounts of resources for this purpose. A mechanism to provide an efficiency- and equity-enhancing redistribution of assets that would increase overall investment at a cost that is comparable to other types of government interventions would be very desirable.

This paper describes a new type of _negotiated_ land reform that relies on voluntary land transfers based on negotiation between buyers and sellers, where the government's role is restricted to establishing the necessary framework and making available a land purchase grant to eligible beneficiaries. Section two discusses the land reform experience in general, thus providing the historical background and conceptual basis for the subsequent argument. Section three is devoted to a more detailed description of negotiated land reform in Colombia, covering the reasons for choosing a negotiated approach, its principles, and its implementation in a number of pilot municipios. Section four compares the mechanisms utilized to those adopted in Brazil and South Africa and briefly highlights some of the implications for monitoring the new approach. Section five concludes.

# **2 LAND** REFORM: POTENTIAL **AND** HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

While land reform has long been the subject of policy debate, the motivation for addressing land issues has shifted considerably over time. Initial discussions were largely motivated by political considerations, supported by the notion of the inverse farm-size productivity relationship. This notion had received empirical support from cross-sectional studies across states (Kutcher and Scandizzo, 1979), countries (Berry and Cline 1979), or individual farms (Barraclough, 1970). 1 More recent contributions have emphasized the importance of asset ownership in situations characterized by incomplete contracting (Bardhan et al. 1998), elaborating on models such as Dasgupta and Ray 1986 and 1987 and Moene 1992. The underlying idea is that, in situations characterized by credit rationing, individuals may not be able to undertake indivisible investments in human capital (schooling) or productive assets (wells, bullocks, or perennials with a long gestation period) that need to be financed through credit. This idea has been

> 'One _of_ the first studies to provide both a theoretical model and an empirical investigation of the potential impact of land reform indicates that, based on district level data from India, land reform can indeed have a positive impact on wages and employment (Rosenzweig 1978).

3
impacts of policy changes on these, _via_ their effects on household decisions, both steps are essential. In particular, the logical inconsistency of the approach that defines nonworking time as pure leisure, and then estimates household labor supplies and consumption demands on datasets that give only hours worked and income and expenditure data, was emphasized. This critique holds true regardless of whether a “unitary” or “collective” approach is taken to modeling the multi-person household. From this it follows that time use data are indispensable in allowing estimation of empirical models that correspond to the theoretically appropriate modeling approach.

However, time use datasets often fail to provide the data required for economic analysis, probably because of the lack of interest economists have until now shown in them. The paper has accordingly discussed at some length two time use surveys carried out in developing countries to illustrate some of the main limitations of the available datasets and to show how the problems could have been avoided without, on the whole, significant increases in cost. In particular, the paper demonstrates the deficiencies of consumption-based measures of living standards when there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the allocation of time to market and domestic work across households. The aim of this discussion is both to emphasize the importance of time use data for policy analysis and to point the way to better data collection in the future.

# **References**

Apps, PF (1982), “Institutional Inequality and Tax Incidence”, _Journal of Public Economics_ , 18, 217-42.

Apps, P F and R Rees (2002), “Household Production, Full Consumption and the Costs Of Children”, _Labour Economics_ , 8, 621-648.

Apps PF and R Rees, (2001), “ _Household Saving and Full Consumption over the Life Cycle_ ”, Discussion Paper 280, IZA, Bonn.

Apps, PF and R Rees (1999a), “On the Taxation of Trade within and between Households”, _Journal of Public Economics_ , 35, 355-369.

Apps, PF and R Rees (1999b), “Individual vs. Joint Taxation in Models with Household 58
21 J.E. Anderson Tariff Index Theory

# llI.The Cobb-Douglas Example

Under Cobb-Douglas preferences for imported final goods, the trade restrictiveness index can be written as a function of the trade-weighted moments of the tariff schedule. Mean-preserving eliminations of variance are then efficiency improving. The sufficient condition can be relaxed to the CES case, but it does not appear possible to go beyond this: for example, strong separability is not sufficient. Subsection 11.1 gives the details. Subsection 111.2 further develops the Cobb-Douglas structure to show that all mean preserving reductions in tariff variance are efficiency improving.

Import preferences which are Cobb-Douglas or CES are very restrictive, of course, but perhaps not quite as restrictive as they appear at first. If the Armington assumption is made, then no inport is a perfect substitute for a domestically supplied good. The reasoning is that packaging, advertising, and safety design segment all national markets. Moreover, undistorted nontraded goods consumer prices are invariant to trade taxes if a constant returns technology has more traded goods than nontraded goods and factors. Then imports are based on the representative consumer's expenditure function. A In contrast, it is not possible to extend the Cobb-Douglas model to tax-ridden exports and imported inputs. A Cobb-Douglas gross domestic product function arises only under joint production of a very special kind. Moreover, Lopez and Panagariya (1992) show that for tariffs on imported inputs, complementarity necessarily arises somewhere in the substitution effects structure. Thus the special case is offered mainly to illuminate how restrictive the circumstances are which yield the validity of the World Bank dispersion index. A second use of this section is that in offering a fully worked out example of the trade restrictiveness index, it provides more intuidon as to the general structure.
Research Comp,onents of World Bank Education Projects, since 1982.

|Area|Cotry<br>nd<br>Ihrber|approved|<br>l|<br>Research Cowponents<br>|Current Status of Studies,<br>including<br>Completed Oocuments/Data|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|AFRICA<br>AFRICA|Mali P-5010-MLI<br>Mauritania<br>CR 1214-NAU|1989<br>1982|Education Sector Consolidation.<br>(i)<br>Collection<br>and analysis<br>of educational<br>statistics;<br>(ii)<br>school mapping project<br>(para 79 p.28 Annex V);<br>(iii)<br>identify<br>gender issues (Annex 4-1);<br>'iv)<br>study secondary higher education<br>Annex S-3)<br>Second Edcation<br>|Noinformation<br>supplied|
|AFRICA|Mauritania<br>CR 1943-AU<br>|<br>1989<br> <br><br> <br><br>(<br>e<br>P<br>D<br>(|u.<br>Funding for sundry services<br>to prepare for future education projects<br>(para.<br>2.19p. <sup>19 </sup>).<br>Education Sector Restructuring<br>Project.<br>Studies<br>of:(i)<br>country wide primary school map;<br>(ii)<br>tracer<br>study of graduates from secondary<br>school;<br>(iii)<br>analysis<br>of cost functions<br>in secondary<br>schools;<br>iv)<br>measures likely<br>to increase female<br>nrollment.<br>art ofabroader plan to strengthen<br>the<br>irectorate<br>of Planning and Coordination<br>para.3.32<br>p.19<br>Annex-12).<br>|Following doctments available:<br>(i)<br>Alain Mingat and Jean-Pierre<br>Larousse (1986).<br>"Couts,<br>Financement et Politique<br>de l'education<br>en Republique Islumique de hauritanie"<br>(doc.<br>001661)<br>(ii)<br>Jewn Lamoure (1987).<br>"Structures,<br>Couts et<br>Financement de L'Enseignement superieur<br>en RIM"<br>(iii)<br>Ministere<br>de l'Education<br>Nationale,<br>RIM(1967)<br>"Projet<br>de Restructuration<br>du Secteur de<br>I'Education<br>enRIM"<br>(iv)<br>BacuurTaoufik<br>(1967).<br>"Etude sur l'Adequetion<br>entre<br>lEmploi,<br>L'Education<br>ettaFormtion<br>enRIM"<br>(v) Ministere<br>des Peches et de l'Economie Maritime<br>(1967). "Etude detaFormation danmtasecteur de<br>peches: Partie<br>I<br>- Etude global<br>et Partie<br>II -<br>Centre de Formtion<br>Professionelle<br>Maritime (MFPh)"<br>Study prepared byRDAInternational.|
|AFRICA M|lotambique CR 1907-hOZ<br>|1988<br>E|ducation andMaRvowerDevelog2ent.<br>Included in|ho studies yet available<br>for Education<br>Restructuring<br>Project.<br>Progress reports delayed one year to 03/90|

31
Khandker, 1998; Zaman, 1999).<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, access to public safety nets is not a significant determinant of the household‟s assessment of whether they are able to cope or not. This result is not surprising since except for a few (e.g. Vulnerable Group Feeding and Gratuitous Relief) most of the safety nets are designed to mitigate the effects of chronic poverty and are not catered to mitigating the effects of shocks. These results need to be interpreted with caution as we do not account for the fact that those who access these services – both microfinance and safety nets – may have different unobservable characteristics relative to those households who do not (the „selection bias‟ problem).

Household poverty status is also a significant determinant of the ability to cope. We had earlier found poor households to be less likely to have experienced one or more shocks. Conditional on facing a shock however, we find that poor households are more likely to not be able to cope. This result is consistent with the results we find with regards to the division dummy variables: households living in poorer divisions are less likely to cope with shocks. Relative to households living in Sylhet, the results show that households in Rajshahi, Khulna and Barisal are more likely to not be able to cope with shocks. The results also show that households whose major source of income was from agriculture are more likely to not be able to cope relative to households whose major source of income was from casual labor. The results also show that households are more likely to be able to cope with health shocks but not climatic and asset shocks.

# **5. Conclusion**

We can summarize our main findings as follows. First, shocks of various forms affect a large share of Bangladeshi households – our survey of 2,000 households showed that more than half the sample claimed to have faced a shock over the previous year. Surprisingly, the non-poor face a larger share of these shocks compared to the poor – a closer look at this result shows that the non-poor report a significantly larger share of „asset-related‟ shocks than the poor which is consistent with the fact that the poor have fewer assets to lose. As one would expect, however, the poor are less able to cope with shocks compared to the non-poor. Importantly, the poor are

> 3 As a robustness check we also run a multinomial model where households face one of the following mutually exclusive outcomes – to not experience a shock; to experience a shock and cope with it; and to experience a shock and not be able to cope with it. This allows us to include the full sample as opposed to half the observations used in the logistic regression to look at household ability to cope. We find that the same variables that are significant in the logit model are also significant determinants of the relative probabilities of facing the above outcomes. Results are available from the authors.

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# 2.4.3. Indirect Subsidies

- <u>Water: Ugandan households receive indirect subsidies in the form of water infrastructure investment</u> contributions. Tariffs in urban areas are set to cover operating and maintenance costs, so consumption of water in urban areas is only subsidized indirectly by lowering the investment cost component that would otherwise have to be recovered through higher tariffs.  In the case of rural areas, the water supply is directly subsidized from the national budget, which funds part of the operating costs of water delivery. These data come from the Annual Budget Performance Report 2016/17 (MoF 2017) and the Uganda Water and Environment Sector Performance Report 2017 (MoWE 2017).

- <u>Agricultural Inputs: While the Government of Uganda (GoU) provides a variety of agricultural services</u> to rural households across the country, the core of its agricultural program is the provision of farming inputs (mainly seeds) to farmers. This is primarily implemented by the Operation Wealth Creation initiative, a Presidential program created in 2013 to distribute subsidized inputs by the military forces. This function was formerly performed by the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program that operated under the Ministry of Agriculture. Extension services are also provided at the local level (district) under the guidance of the Ministry’s Directorate for Extension, recently created in 2016, but the scope of the program is rather limited (World Bank, 2018b). The data included in this analysis come from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development’s Annual Budget Performance Report, MoF (2017).

_Table 3. Uganda Government Expenditures, 2016/7_

||**UGX**<br>**(billions)**|**% of**<br>**GDP**|**Included in**<br>**Analysis**<br>**(Yes/No)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Total Expenditure (expenditure and net lending)**|17,437|19.0%|...|
|Defense Spending|1,540|1.7%|No|
|Social Spending|3,854|4.2%|...|
|Social Protection|491|0.6%|...|
|Social Assistance_of which_|174|0.2%|...|
|Conditional or Unconditional Cash Transfers|174|0.2%|Yes|
|Social Insurance_of which_|353|0.4%|...|
|Pensions|353|0.4%|Yes|
|Education_of which_|2,197|2.4%|...|
|Pre-Primary and Primary|1,200|1.3%|Yes|
|Secondary|350|0.4%|Yes|
|Tertiary|448|0.5%|Yes|
|Other|200|0.2%|No|
|Health_of which_|1,167|1.3%|...|
|Outpatient Services|8|0.0%|Yes|
|Hospital Services|223|0.2%|Yes|
|Public Health Services|404|0.4%|Yes|

13
reflecting a combination of low revenue bases, sizable debt loads, and a shift toward nonconcessional terms. Effective debt management can help avoid excessive debt service costs by increasing awareness of the financial options available, enabling countries to borrow at competitive costs with a prudent degree of risk.

- Supports financial sector development. More developed local-currency bond markets can promote economic stability by reducing the reliance on external debt, facilitating the implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policies, and enhancing resilience to sudden reversals of capital flows. Public debt instruments can serve as a benchmark for pricing of private sector debt instruments. Local-currency bond markets can enable diversification from bank financing and provide a savings vehicle for a variety of investors to support growth (World Bank and IMF 2014).

- Reduces economic volatility. Effective debt management can reduce economic volatility by selecting debt instruments that help insulate the government balance sheet from uncertainties. Both currency and interest rate shocks can be mitigated in this fashion, making a country less susceptible to contagion and financial risks, and supporting cheaper and more stable funding for the private sector.

- Enhances public sector transparency and medium-term planning. A key element of sound public debt management is the public and comprehensive reporting of government debt, which improves the capacity of policy makers and the broader public to assess the fiscal position and appropriately weigh public balance sheet risks alongside spending and revenue priorities.

**Evolution of debt management in LICs.** Despite some improvements, debt management in LICs still suffers from substantial deficiencies. Weaknesses in debt transparency, notably in monitoring and reporting, are pervasive. Medium-term debt strategies are becoming more common but have shortcomings in quality and implementation. Capacity and institutional set-up are often lagging.

- Debt transparency. Better compilation and monitoring of public debt and guarantees are needed to ensure that risks are detected before they materialize (World Bank 2007). Recent examples of hidden debt and discrepancies among debt statistics point to continued low debt recording capacity, weak legal frameworks, and governance challenges. Debt Management Performance Assessments (DeMPA) suggest that, of the 17 LICs with available data, minimum requirements in debt recording are met by only eight, and monitoring guarantees are met by only four. Due to shortcomings in accuracy, timeliness, coverage and completeness of debt records, only four of these 17 countries met the minimum requirements for debt reporting and evaluation (Figure 5). Only a third of the 59 countries eligible for International Development Association borrowing report private sector external debt statistics (World Bank and IMF 2018d).

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