between countries. The average number of procedures was 16 in rich countries, and 20 in low income countries, with the time taken to comply 157 days in rich countries and 229 in poor countries. It is not clear that this extra regulatory burden is improving outcomes - there is no correlation between the number of procedures and the number of worker accidents across countries, for example.<sup>22</sup> Alongside reducing the number of regulators, easing the process of regulatory compliance will also have a role in reducing corruption, through approaches such as consolidated clearances, time limits to license issuance (if a license is not issued or denied within a certain period, it is automatically granted), and risk-based inspections that occur at the completion of work but prior to the next stage (as opposed to time-based inspections).

Enforcement is a further considerable issue. Tanzania has strong laws regarding labor practices, yet the survey of large construction sites cited earlier suggested that despite the fact all of the projects were publicly-funded (three by donors) and all had been visited by regulatory officials, on only three of eleven sites were labor standards considered adequate (National Construction Council, Dar es Salaam, 2005). Working with industry, consumer and labor groups to craft codes and health and safety regulations that are (comparatively) easily and objectively verifiable, simple and enforceable will improve the likelihood of compliance. The capacity of regulatory bodies to enforce regulation also needs to be strengthened, and whilst this does not necessarily imply independence from concerned ministries, it may require comparative freedom regarding pay and conditions in order to ensure that agencies can attract and retain suitably qualified staff with the incentive remain uncorrupt, whilst removing corrupt enforcement agents. At the same time, the work of such bodies needs to be as open as possible to public scrutiny, with publication of licensing and regulatory principles and decisions.

These reforms will be difficult and, alone, are likely to be inadequate. For example, complex, context specific relationships between levels of corruption and bureaucratic requirements (as well as scarce, weak proxies) may help to account for the statistical insignificance of the relationship between measures of consistent enforcement of regulation and bribe payments amongst construction firms in BEEPS and between the number of procedures involved in getting permission to build a warehouse and the percentage of firms who pay bribes for construction permits in Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys (Tables 4 and 5).

In this regard, the Code of Hammurabi points to an important principle in the fight against corruption. It is often far easier to monitor and deter the _outcomes_ of corruption (a collapsed building) than the act of corruption itself (the theft of resources or a payment to avoid correcting a regulatory infraction). This suggests the importance of mechanisms which hold firms and senior management accountable for poor construction and its results. Whilst Hammurabi’s death penalty was extreme, ensuring that construction companies and their management teams as well as building owners are liable and held accountable for building code violations and resulting problems (from worker accidents

> 22 See Djankov, La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) for a broader discussion of the limited impact of regulation of entry on quality of service provision, but its stronger link with the extent of corruption, across a range of sectors.

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