how through the RRI process “with a little effort, we changed our way of thinking and working to achieve more with the same resources... by increasing motivation through our urgent focus on the RRI objective within a strict, short timeline... and by working inter-ministerially, and more closely with leaders... and by having support of an external coach we succeeded”.<sup>36</sup>

# **<u>IV. Conclusion</u>**

There is increasing disappointment among multilateral development institutions, donor agencies, and developing country governments in the progress over the long term towards reducing poverty and sustaining economic growth, particularly among the world’s poorest countries. Despite billions in aid, many developing countries still struggle to win the race against poverty.<sup>37</sup> As Pritchett et al. (2012) argue, a major contributing factor to this conundrum has been the lack of attention to building the capability of government and non-government actors to implement development programs. Implementation is assumed to be something government and non-government actors must learn on their own and that they will eventually manage to figure out how to address implementation challenges. The experience and evidence to date suggests otherwise.

Recognizing this gap, a number of international development organizations have begun to turn their attention to helping their client countries deliver results through improving their capacity to tackle implementation challenges.<sup>38</sup> The “How” of development is finally, albeit slowly, getting much needed attention. This paper has attempted to contribute to the emerging discussion and debate. Through the lens of Burundi’s s experience since transitioning to a post-conflict state, it presents a practical approach for developing home grown implementation skills within the public sector over the long term, an approach that recognizes the importance of aligning the skills-building process with political incentives and that operationalizes the concept of PDIA. And it demonstrates how so-called “Small” Development efforts can be translated into larger-scale impact.<sup>39</sup> One question that arises at this point is how to assess the efficacy and cost efficiency of the approach – the Leadership for Results (L4R) program. There has been an initial attempt at addressing the first, employing an assessment methodology called Outcome Harvesting.<sup>40</sup> This methodology identifies links between the many different interventions, large and small, undertaken during an RRA process and establishes a logical path of how interventions have led to intermediate results and those results have led to further interventions and results down the line. The story line is then substantiated with third parties who were privy and witness to the various interventions. What emerges is a plausible

> 36 Field interview (Bujumbura, December 2011).

> 37 “In 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the extreme poverty rate (living on less than $1.25 a day) is above 60%, and in 4 countries, it is above 80%”. World Bank, The World Bank Group Goals: End Extreme Poverty and Promote Shared Prosperity, 2013. Examples in 2010: Madagascar 81.3%, Nigeria 68%, Malawi 61.6% of the populations were living on less than $1.25 per day. Data available at: http://data.worldbank.org

> 38 See for instance GIZ’s Capacity Works Program, http://www.giz.de/en/ourservices/1544.html

> 39

> See Swidler and Watkins (2009) on the concept and practice of Small Development. 40 See World Bank Institute (2013)

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