We further implemented diagnostic tests with all candidates and then excluded women who did not pass basic literacy and numeracy tests. Only women who passed all screening criteria were included in the shortlist. In total, the 27 factories short-listed 243 eligible women. We conducted baseline surveys in the factories with all shortlisted women.

In each factory, only the top-ranked candidates in the shortlist were allowed to participate in the promotion program. We determined a factory-specific cutoff in advance in collaboration with each factory management team. The goal was to only include as many participants in the promotion program as the factory would be able to absorb as new supervisors in a few months, such that selected operators had a good chance of officially being promoted during the program duration.<sup>19</sup> Using the shortlists of operators, only the women with a better rank than the factory-specific cutoff were assigned to the promotion program. In this paper, these women are the “selected” group, consisting of 199 individuals. The women who passed all eligibility checks but whose rank was worse than the factory cutoff continued working as operators and form the comparison group. I call this group, which consists of 44 individuals, the “nominated” group. Only the selected group participated in the promotion program, which entailed trialing as an assistant supervisor with gradually increasing responsibility for at least eight weeks. Factories were encouraged to officially promote the selected women as soon as they felt that their quality warranted a promotion. This is similar to how factories promote new supervisors in the industry. Outside of any intervention, factories typically trial candidates for supervisor positions on the job. They first shadow existing supervisors, and then move to supervising a gradually increasing number of workers. If the factory is satisfied with their performance in managing a line or line section on their own, they receive an official promotion once a supervisor vacancy becomes available.<sup>20</sup>

> 19Half of the factories were randomly assigned to a two-hour “selection experiment”, which is discussed in detail in Uckat and Woodruff (2020). These factories were able to change their ranking of shortlisted operators once, after reviewing the diagnostic scores for all tested candidates. Nominees in the other half of the factories undertook the diagnostic tests, but the results were not revealed to the factory, and the original ranking could not be changed. For factories that were assigned to the selection experiment, the final shortlist is the last ranking after the selection experiment, after exclusion of ineligible operators and a potential re-ranking. For factories that did not participate in the selection experiment, the final shortlist coincides with the original ranking of operators, after ineligible nominees were excluded. To account for this selection experiment, I include all diagnostic scores and factory fixed effects in the vector of potential control variables, as discussed in Section 3.5.1. I also show that results hold if I limit the sample to the half of the factories that did not participate in the selection experiment in the Online Appendix.

> 20The selected women were also assigned to different training regimes. These varied in their timing of two different modules, which were designed to train the selected women in soft and technical skills to make them better production line supervisors. Online Appendix A provides details. The impact of the training on factory outcomes is analyzed in Uckat and Woodruff (2020), which finds limited effects on factory outcomes. For the analysis of promotions on intra-household bargaining, I pool all women assigned to be participants of the promotion program in the “selected” group, regardless of their training assignment. In the Online Appendix, I show that my results are robust to potential training effects.

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