formulae applied without exceptions would result in a decline from 14.6 to 9% in average <u>applied</u> agricultural tariffs worldwide (Annex Table 3). In the WTO developed countries, the result is a cut of over 50% in applied rates, from 15.1 to 6.9%. In WTO developing countries other than the LDCs, the reduction is from 14% to 11.4%, a cut which is smaller than in the industrial countries partly because of key features of the formula—the smaller cuts and higher tier boundaries laid out in Table 1 in the text—and because of the greater binding overhang in many developing countries.

**Annex Table 2. Assumptions used to assess Agricultural Market Access Modalities**

||**Developed**|**Developing**|**LDCs**|**SVEs**|**RAMS**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Bands|0/20/50/75|0/30/80/130|no lib|<br>no lib||
|Proportional cut|50/57/|64/70<br>33.3/38/42.7/48.7|||-5% pts in<br>|
||Scaled prop<br>sensitive, trop<br>industri|ortionately if the average-cut (including<br>ical & tariff escalation products) <54% in<br>al countries; if > 36% in developing|||bands 1 &<br>2;<br>-10%pts if<br>in bands<br>3,4|
|Sensitive|5% of lines|6.7% of lines||||
|products|If>3|0% in top tier, 2%pts more||||
|Special products||14% lines; 40% no cut & 60% with 15%<br>cut||||
|Tariff Escalation<br>Products|Cut from nex<br>6 percentage|t higher tier applied. In top tier add<br>points to the cut||||
|Tropical products|t ≤ 10, Cut to<br>78%|zero; 10 <t≤ 75, 70% cut; t>75,||||
|Cotton|Cut to zero if|originating in LDCs||||
|Notes: Republic of Kor<br>treated as Small and Vu<br>Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,<br>Guatemala, Guyana, H<br>Panama, Papua New G<br>Trinidad and Tobago, U<br>identified as Cameroon<br>RAM treatment: China<br>VRAM treatment in ag<br>Republic of Macedonia|ea treated as a de<br>lnerable: Antigua<br>Cuba, Dominica,<br>onduras, Jamaica,<br>uinea, Paraguay,<br>ruguay and Zimb<br>; Congo, Cuba, G<br>, Croatia, Ecuador<br>riculture (no cuts)<br>, Saudi Arabia,T|veloping country for agriculture; a developed<br>& Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Bots<br>Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, F<br>Jordan, Kenya, Macau, Mauritius, Mongolia<br>Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vinc<br>abwe. Paragraph 6 economies (those with le<br>hana, Kenya, Macau, China; Mauritius; Nige<br>, Georgia (NAMA only) Jordan, Mongolia, O<br>. Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republ<br>onga, Ukraine, Vietnam. .|country for<br>wana, Brune<br>iji, Gabon,<br>, Namibia, N<br>ent and the<br>ss than 35%<br>ria; Sri Lank<br>man, Pana<br>ic, Moldova|NAMA. Ec<br>i Darussala<br>Georgia, Gh<br>icaragua, N<br>Grenadines,<br>tariff bindin<br>a; Suriname<br>ma, and Chin<br>, Former Yu|onomies<br>m, Cameroon,<br>ana, Grenada,<br>igeria,<br>Sri Lanka,<br>gs) were<br>; Zimbabwe.<br>ese Taipei.<br>goslav|

Without exceptions, the cut in the EU 27 applied agricultural tariff is from 15.2 to 6.2%—a cut of almost sixty percent of its initial value. In the United States, the corresponding cut is from 4.8 to 2.1%—a reduction of 56% from its initial value. The cut in Japan’s average applied agricultural tariff is almost 16 percentage points, from 29.8% to 14%—a reduction of over 50%. In Canada, the cut would be from 10.7 to 5.1%, a reduction of more than 53%. The impact of the basic developing country formula on applied rates differs considerably depending upon the initial level of binding overhang. In India, the formula would reduce average tariffs by almost 10% of their initial level while, in China, the reduction would be from 7.8% to 5.3, a cut of 32%. In Cambodia, another recently-acceded member, the cut in average agricultural tariffs from the basic developing-country formula would be from 16.5 to 12.7, a cut of roughly a quarter. By contrast, in many former GATT Contracting Parties, such as Brazil and Nigeria, binding 18