however is that Dictator _R_ is intrinsically less benevolent than _M_ . In particular, we assume that _R_ ’s preferences are less congruent with those of his citizens than _M_ ’s, while we also assume that _R_ is sadistic (while _M_ is assumed not to be). We model this by setting _R_ ’s preferences equal to _uR_ ( _ct, rt_ ) = _αR_ log( _ct_ ) + _ρR_ log( _rt_ ), where _αR >_ 1 (as a result of which _R_ is more inclined to extract rents from his country than _M_ ) and _ρR >_ 0 (this turns _R_ into a sadist, taking direct pleasure in repressing subordinates). _M_ ’s utility function on the other hand continues to be given by _uM_ ( _ct, rt_ ) = log( _ct_ ). Another important difference is that we assume that the location of the Mogadishu lines in the various countries is such that _SR_<sup>_D>S_</sup> _R_<sup>_∗_(asinCaseII),while</sup><sup>_S_</sup> _M_<sup>_D<S_</sup> _M_<sup>_∗_(so</sup> Dictator _M_ falls under Case I).<sup>23</sup> As a result of _αR >_ 1 and _ρR >_ 0, Dictator _R_ makes a rather unpromising start - repressing his population from day 1 and extracting large rents from the country. But because he comes to face significant opposition before his stock of wrongdoings has crossed _S_<sup>_D_</sup> , he does not end up in the repressive equilibrium where a high stock _S_ has to be accompanied by heavy repression _r_ , but is disciplined instead. Dictator _M_ , on the other hand, walks the reverse route: he makes the better start of the two, but stoops to a heavy use of repression later on - his non-sadistic preferences notwithstanding. So despite the fact that _R_ ’s preferences are “worse” than _M_ ’s, and despite the fact that _R_ makes a rather unpromising start, he will still end up as the “better” autocrat. In this respect, our model supports the wider notion that external circumstances are perhaps more important in determining whether a particular individual will display “good” or “bad” behavior, than intrinsic preferences.<sup>24</sup> Leap-frogging does not seem to be merely a theoretical curiosity: when reading newspaper accounts from the early 1980s, Jerry Rawlings is very much portrayed as the bad guy, while Robert Mugabe was simultaneously being characterized as a relatively good guy (even being considered for the Nobel Peace Prize). By the late 2000s, however, these

> 23Such a difference in the location of the _S∗_ ’s could for example stem from a lower start-up cost for the opposition-movement in _R_ ’s country, than in _M_ ’s. Alternatively, it could also be driven by cultural differences (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2014), or by a difference in the geographical structure of the two countries. As for example argued in Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013), successful revolutions are harder to organize in countries with isolated capital cities, as a result of which those countries will have a higher _S_<sup>_∗_</sup> (and dictators in those countries can get away with more wrongdoings, which is in line with the empirical results reported by Campante et al.)

> 24In very different contexts, this idea is supported by many psychological experiments, such as the Milgram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment (see Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2007)).

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