rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table 2.  Economies with Significant Exports Subject to Foreign-Imposed TTBs: 2011 vs. 2001**

|||**_T_**|**_TB-affecte_**<br>**_in_**<br>**... G20**|**_d share of ex_**<br>**_2011 to..._**|**_ports_**|**_T_**|**_TB-affecte_**<br>**_in 2_**<br>**...G20**|**_d share of ex_**<br>**_001 to..._**|**_ports_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||**...All**<br>**(1)**|**high-**<br>**income**<br>**(2)**|**... G20**<br>**emerging**<br>**(3)**|**...Other***<br>**(4)**|**...All**<br>**(5)**|**high-**<br>**income**<br>**(6)**|**...G20**<br>**emerging**<br>**(7)**|**...Other***<br>**(8)**|
|**_Em_**<br>|**_erging economy_**<br>**_exporters_**|3.0|3.3|3.3|0.7|2.5|2.6|2.9|0.6|
|1.|Vietnam|6.2|8.1|1.3|<0.1|0.2|0.2|0.4|<0.1|
|2.|Russia|5.8|6.3|5.5|1.4|7.0|7.6|6.2|1.6|
|3.|Ukraine|5.7|7.9|1.8|0.7|12.8|12.2|18.8|1.3|
|4.|China|4.9|4.7|10.8†|1.0|3.2|3.4|4.2|0.2|
|5.|India|2.5|2.8|2.5|0.5|4.4|5.1|1.8|<0.1|
|6.|Thailand|2.5|2.7|3.0|0.5|3.2|3.9|1.4|0.1|
|7.|Pakistan|2.4|1.6|5.3|1.3|7.8|9.1|0.4|<0.1|
|8.|Mexico|2.1|2.3|0.5|<0.1|1.1|1.1|2.1|0.4|
|9.|Kazakhstan|1.7|2.8|0.2|36.9|4.1|5.0|2.4|11.4|
|10.|<br>Indonesia|1.7|1.2|3.4|1.1|3.7|4.6|1.5|0.4|
|11.|<br>Brazil|1.1|1.5|0.7|<0.1|2.1|1.9|3.4|0.4|
|12.|<br>Malaysia|0.9|0.9|1.2|0.3|1.2|1.5|0.2|<0.1|
|13.|<br>South Africa|0.4|0.3|0.4|1.0|1.0|1.1|0.8|<0.1|
|14.|<br>Argentina|0.4|0.4|0.2|0.8|3.5|2.2|2.7|10.4|
|15.|<br>Turkey|0.1|0.1|<0.1|0.3|1.1|1.0|2.4|0.8|
|16.|<br>_Other emerging_|0.2|0.2|0.4|0.1|0.7|0.6|1.9|0.3|
|**_Hig_**<br>|**_h-income economy_**<br>**_exporters_**|1.6|1.0|2.8|0.4|3.1|4.3|0.8|0.1|
|1.|South Korea|4.4|3.0|6.2|0.5|2.7|3.6|1.9|0.3|
|2.|Taiwan, China|2.9|2.9|3.4|0.4|9.6|13.9|0.3|0.3|
|3.|Japan|2.2|1.5|3.8|1.0|7.1|10.1|1.3|0.2|
|4.|European Union|1.4|1.4|1.6|0.3|2.0|2.8|0.8|0.2|
|5.|United States|1.3|0.6|3.1|0.1|0.6|0.7|0.5|0.1|
|6.|_Other high-_<br>_income_|0.3|0.2|0.5|<0.1|2.5|3.0|0.6|0.1|

Notes: Shares of nonoil exports. Ranked by column (1) within each category of exporting economy. “All” is the 24 policy-imposing economies described in Table 1. *“Other” policy-imposing economies includes Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Colombia, Malaysia, Philippines, Chile, New Zealand, Israel, and Taiwan, China. †To be consistent with Table 1, this does not include exports to Mexico; including exports to Mexico changes the value to 8.1.

27
It was against this background that in 1993 the government introduced a health insurance scheme, known initially as Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI). Civil servants, state enterprise workers, the military, Communist party officials and pensioners who were previously in one of these government jobs were (and continue to be) covered, and private firms with more than 10 employees were (and still are) required to enroll their workers. Table 1 gives a breakdown across the categories for 1998, the first year for which a full breakdown is possible. The contribution for compulsory workers is split between the worker and the employer, and the coverage is generous: the fees for inpatient and outpatient care are covered, as are the costs of drugs used in inpatient care (World Bank et al. 2001); prior to 1998 (the year of the follow-up survey used in the analysis below), no copayments were required. A voluntary component of the VHI program also exists, aimed at the rest of the population. However, in practice the scheme has succeeded only in enrolling students, who account for 92% of the voluntarily insured (see Table 1). Schools are pressured by local governments to enroll their students, and the schools in turn pressure parents, who pay the contribution (World Bank et al. 2001). The proportion of students covered varies considerably across provinces (Government of Vietnam 2002b), presumably reflecting the varying pressure applied by different local governments. Coverage is much less generous for the voluntarily enrolled, including typically only inpatient benefits. However, students who are enrolled in VHI can obtain care at a school clinic which VHI helps large schools establish.

_Table 1: Breakdown of insureds in Vietnam’s health insurance (VHI) scheme, 1998_

|# people % p|opulation%|insureds|% group|
|---|---|---|---|
|Population<br>77,046,000||||
|VHI insureds<br>9,758,015|12.7%|||
|_of which_||||
|Compulsory<br>6,069,309|7.9%|62.2%||
|_of which_||||
|Civil servants<br>1,367,768|||22.5%|
|State enterprises<br>1,561,710|||25.7%|
|Private enterprises<br>310,757|||5.1%|
|Pensioners<br>1,179,102|||19.4%|
|People of merit<br>1,212,048|||20.0%|
|Commune administration staff<br>37,924|||0.6%|
|Voluntary<br>3,688,706|4.8%|37.8%||
|_of which_||||
|Students<br>3,402,328|||92.2%|

Source: Government of Vietnam (2002a).

4
perspective regarding the relationships between the agency and the other branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) and no further division is made of its different indicators.

The dissection of the variables into different elements gives a better picture of the composition of each category and the position of the agencies in each of the indexes that represent them. It is also useful to compare agencies’ scores in the variables indexes ( _e.g.,_ the Autonomy Index) and their performance in each of their components ( _e.g.,_ the Political Autonomy Index).

We conduct a three-level analysis of each variable. First, we define the governance variable and identify countries’ position in the index. Second, we compare countries’ position in the main variable and the scores in the different components of that variable. A third level of analysis consists of analyzing the formal and informal dimensions of autonomy, transparency, and accountability. In all the three level of analysis we also make use of our ̈Tiers ̈ approach. The variable “tools” is excluded from the formal vs. informal analysis. The mere existence of the instruments included in this variable assumes their actual implementation.

# **4.3.1 Autonomy:**

The autonomy variable considers the procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the agency from political authorities (political autonomy), the autonomous administration of its resources (managerial autonomy), and the regulation of the sector (regulatory autonomy). Its indicators reflect both formal and informal regulation capturing a wide range of aspects related to the autonomy of the agency. The variable is represented by the Autonomy Index, which gives us the scores of LAC electricity agencies.

**Figure 7: Autonomy Index**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Autonomy Index<br>Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.<br>1<br>.8<br>.6<br>Index (0-1)<br>.4<br>.2<br>0<br>BOL NIC R D PER BRA ARG ESV T1 C R T&T BAR PAN GUA URU JAM MEX HON ECU T2 COL CHI<br><!-- End of picture text --> Tier 1 shows countries with a “desirable” governance level to guarantee an autonomous functioning of the agency. Countries grouped under Tier 2 are those that meet those requirements we consider minimum to achieve a certain degree of autonomy in its functioning. Finally, countries in Tier 3, below T2, are those that lack the minimum preconditions to carry out their roles as autonomous agencies.

Agencies below T2 are those in Colombia and Chile. The positions of Chile and Colombia among countries below T2 levels are mainly explained by the weight of the government in the decisionmaking process of the agencies. In both countries, particularly at the level of the agencies with the

- 20 -
Household size is defined as the number of members living in the household. The mother’s primary education takes the value of 1 if the mother has at least a primary education and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the mother’s secondary education takes the value of 1 if the mother has at least a secondary education and 0 otherwise. Maternal education is included in this analysis due to its positive association with child educational outcomes as discussed in the literature. Given the evidence linking maternal education with child educational outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that it has a positive influence on a child’s primary school enrollment as well.

Household heads take the value of 1 if the head is female and 0 otherwise. The child takes the value of 1 if the child is female and 0 otherwise. The child’s age is the child’s actual age measured in months. The household’s access to improved sanitation takes the value of 1 if the household has improved sanitation and 0 otherwise.

Our data set is a pseudo-panel with children ages 6–9 sampled from three cohort pairs of independent repeated cross-sections of DHS 2000–07, 2004–11, and 2007–14, following Deaton (1985), Magadi (2016), and Ncube and Shimeles (2012), respectively. Unlike true longitudinal panel data, we replace cohort means with individual observations. If an additive individual fixed effect exists, a corresponding additive cohort fixed effect will also exist. The sample cohort means from the surveys are consistent. However, they are error-ridden estimates of the true cohort means. Such data are immune to attrition bias and can be used over long periods. For Bangladesh, the same individuals are not followed over time (unlike longitudinal studies), and histories of individuals are not available (Verbeek, 2008). The individuals sharing the year of birth are grouped into cohorts, and averages for each of the cohorts are treated as observations in a pseudo-panel. All tables and figures are presented in the Annex.

## **IV. Results**

# _(i) Descriptive Statistics_

Table 1 (Annex) presents the weighted mean values of the variables used in the logistic model. In our sample, 80 percent of all children between 6 and 9 years are enrolled in school at the time of the survey. About 11 percent of the children live in households headed by a female. About half of the children are female and the average age of the child in a household is 7.5 years. In terms of sanitation and water facilities, 41 percent of the children live in households with access to improved sanitation and almost everyone has access to improved water.

Data presented in Table 2 for children from rural areas indicate that 82 percent of all children ages 6–9 were enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Sixty-one percent of the children come from households that are in the top 60 percentile of the wealth distribution. Around 11 percent live in femaleheaded households. Half of the children are female, and the average age is 7.5 years. Regarding sanitation 11
emergence of voluntary information sharing in a laboratory experiment. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically test the relationship between banking competition and the voluntary emergence of a credit bureau with cross-country data. We use two recent, underexplored datasets on credit reporting institutions and bank entry barriers that allow us to study this relationship in a sample of close to 195 countries. In line with the existing literature, we find that countries with higher bank entry barriers (i.e. a lower threat of competition) are significantly more likely to have a credit bureau. However, we also show that where a credit bureau exists, the absence of competitive pressures is associated with less depth and transparency of the credit information that is made available by lenders.

We also test an additional set of related hypotheses. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) argue that banks may not join a credit bureau, or share only limited or incomplete client data, since they can capture monopoly rents by not sharing proprietary credit information. We point out that, due to increasing returns to scale, the disincentive for information sharing is particularly relevant for very large banks. This implies that barriers to credit information sharing may be particularly pronounced in markets characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. Our data support this hypothesis: countries with higher bank concentration are significantly less likely to have a credit bureau. We also find some evidence that bank concentration is associated with lower coverage of the information reported to existing credit bureaus, potentially because banks try to hold on to monopoly rents by sharing only partial information.

Finally, bank competition or concentration should not be correlated with the probability of having a credit registry since participation in a registry is mandatory and banks’ incentives are only relevant for voluntary information sharing. Confirming this hypothesis, we find no correlation between bank competition or concentration and the existence of a credit registry.

This paper contributes to the broader empirical literature on the relevance of bank competition and concentration for the efficiency of financial intermediation. One strand of this literature argues that _competition_ has a negative impact on systemic stability and the efficiency of financial intermediation since greater bank competition may weaken screening incentives (Boot and Thakor, 1993) and can lead to excessive risk-taking (Allen and Gale, 2000, and Hellman, 3
was significantly negative (p < .05) for all the years except 1988.

There is no evidence that the stepped-up awareness campaign was effective for the close-in health centers. The enrollment rate of villages about _75_ km away was _35_ percentage points higher than it would have been based on patterns from other years. The squares in Figure A.l show the actual observations for 1989 as an indication of the variability about the overall pattern. Each observation corresponds to one of the 21 health centers.

<!-- Start of picture text --> DISTANCE AND INSURANCE MEMBERSHIP<br>Btauunda Inurance Plan<br>90 r<br>70 - 0 O<br>60<br>50 =<br>j<br>0C 40-<br>30-<br>20-<br>10<br>0 r<br>0 20 40 80 10 100<br>DiStance frcm kMrMs (km)<br>o 1969 i. 1999 o Igo A 1987 x lsee<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure A.l The Bwamanda plan has two important controls on covered expenses. First, all covered services are provided only by referral. Second, the flat rate charges limit the plan's expenses for each admission.

Since the insurance system is offered by the provider, there is no reimbursement system and thus no "cap" on spending use by the member. There are no limits placed on care-givers regarding the maximum number of services (patient days, laboratory tests, etc.) or expenses used to treat a patient. Standard treatment protocols do exist, and the doctors and other medical staff make efforts to follow them. There are no systems for utilization review or case management, however.

The insurance plan is voluntary; however, if one member of a family wishes to join, all family members are required to pay the premium. This is intended to reduce adverse selection, where only those who know they will probably need insurance subscribe to the plan.

16
<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) All PTAs (b) US PTAs<br>100<br>100<br>80<br>80<br>60<br>60<br>40<br>40<br>20 20 CAFTA-DR<br>NAFTA<br>0 0<br>1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015<br>(c) EFTA and EU PTAs (d) Other PTAs<br>100 100<br>80 80<br>60 EC-CARIFORUM 60<br>40 EEA 40<br>20 20<br>0 0<br>1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015<br>Number of IPAs Number of countries in IPAs<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note that these IPAs, while increasing the scope of protection over time, do not treat all elements of IPRs the same, nor do they have the same depth, meaning numbers of specific IPRs provisions. Countries joining PTAs make different decisions about IPRs and other policies based on their own political-economic interests. To illustrate, the United States places great importance on assuring patent and copyright protection for its own nationals’ inventions and creative works in foreign markets and negotiates its international agreements accordingly. The EU and EFTA do so as well but particularly prioritize establishing strong systems to register GIs, which protect the rights to use place names in wines, spirits, and other products. Japan and South Korea have focused on extending patent rights, while Australia prefers weaker standards governing copyrights. Developing countries might work to sustain access to international technologies and information, perhaps through more limited patent standards or weaker trade secrets protection. Indeed, it may seem surprising that emerging and developing economies increasingly agree to strong IPRs chapters in PTAs, a point we exploit in our econometric analysis. We simply posit here that different countries, in negotiating PTAs, likely seek to emphasize particular aspects of IPRs.

8
they occur.<sup>12</sup> In this section we attempt to at least provide modest evidence that the reputation of economic bloggers in the economics profession exceeds that of non-bloggers with similar publication records.

Davis et al. (2011) conducted a survey of academic economists in the U.S., with 299 (15%) responding. The survey asked these academics to list up to three living economists over the age of 60 and up to three under the age of 60 who they “regard with great respect, admiration, or reverence”. Gary Becker, Ken Arrow and Gary Solow were the top choices among the over 60s, and Paul Krugman, Gregory Mankiw and Daron Acemoglu the top choices among the under 60s. The under 60s list of 23 names contains a number of regular bloggers – in addition to Krugman and Mankiw are Steven Levitt, William Easterly, Nancy Folbre, Dani Rodrik, and Tyler Cowen.

We merge this list with a list of the top 500 economists according to the RePEc rankings (based on paper downloads, citations) and also code each of the RePEc top 500 according to whether they blog or not.<sup>13</sup> This data is then used to estimate a probit model to see whether, conditional on RePEc ranking, individuals who blog are more likely to appear on the list of favorite or admired economists. Table 2 shows the results, for the pooled sample in column 1, and separately for under 60 and over 60 economists in columns 2 and 3 respectively. In all three columns we see that, conditional on their RePEc rank, regular blogging is strongly and significantly associated with being more likely to be viewed as a favorite economist. The point estimates are just over 0.4 in all three columns, indicating a 40 percentage point higher likelihood of being on the favorite economist list for economics bloggers. Blogging has the same size impact as being in the top 50 of

> 12 See for example Daniel Drezner (http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/000727.html) and Scott Sumner (http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=4058).

> 13 The economists from the favorite economist list who appear in RePEc outside the top 500 are coded based on their RePEc ranking. A small number of the favorite economists do not appear in RePEc. Their RePEc equivalent ranks were calculated based on total citation counts and publication h-statistics from Google Scholar.

12
——— . 2005. “The Role of Immigrant Scientists and Entrepreneurs in International Technology Transfer.” Ph.D. dissertation, MIT Cambridge, Mass.

Kerr, W., and W. Lincoln. 2010. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and US Ethnic Invention.” _Journal of Labor Economics_ 28 (3): 473–508.

Kovak, B. 2013. “Regional Effects of Trade Reform: What is the Correct Measure of Liberalization?” _American Economic Review_ 103 (5): 1960–76.

Kugler, M., and H. Rapoport. 2007. “International Labor and Capital Flows: Complements or Substitutes?” _Economics Letters_ 92 (2): 155–62.

Leamer, E., and J. Levinsohn. 1995. “International Trade Theory: The Evidence.” _Handbook of International Economics_ 3: 1339–94.

Levchenko, A., and J. Zhang. 2014. “Ricardian Productivity Differences and the Gains from Trade.” _European Economic Review_ 65: 45–65.

MacDougall, G.D.A. 1951. “British and American Exports: A Study Suggested by the Theory of Comparative Costs. Part I.” _Economic Journal_ 61 (244): 697–724.

——— . 1952. “British and American Exports: A Study Suggested by the Theory of Comparative Costs. Part II.” _Economic Journal_ 62 (247): 487–521.

Morrow, P. 2010. “Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence.” _Journal of International Economics_ 82 (2): 137–51.

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Rauch, J., and V. Trindade. 2002. “Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade.” _Review of Economics and Statistics_ 84 (1): 116–30.

Ricardo, D. 1817. _On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation._ London, UK: John Murray.

Saxenian, A., Y. Motoyama, and X. Quan. 2002. _Local and Global Networks of Immigrant Professionals in Silicon Valley._ San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Saxenian, A. 2006. _The New Argonauts._ Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Shikher, S. 2012. “Putting Industries into the Eaton–Kortum Model.” _Journal of_ _International Trade & Economic Development_ 21 (6): 807–37.

Simonovska, I., and M. Waugh. 2014a. “The Elasticities of Trade: Estimates and Evidence.” _Journal of International Economics_ 92 (1): 34–50.

——— . 2014b. “Trade Models, Trade Elasticities, and the Gains from Trade.” NBER Working Paper 20495. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Stern, R. 1962. “British and American Productivity and Comparative Costs in International Trade.” _Oxford Economic Papers_ 14 (3): 275–96.

Wilson, C. 1980. “On the General Structure of Ricardian Models with a Continuum of Goods: Applications to Growth, Tariff Theory, and Technical Change.” _Econometrica_ 48 (7): 1675–1702.
Policy Research Working Paper 6570

# **Abstract**

Household enterprises—usually one-person-operated tiny informal enterprises—are a rapidly growing source of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in lowerincome countries. Household enterprises tend to operate with limited interest or support from governments. This is the case in Mozambique, where neither the poverty reduction strategy nor small and medium enterprise development policies include household enterprises. Using multiple household surveys, including a recent panel data set, this paper identifies the characteristics of the sector and its development during the period in which Mozambique experienced rapid economic growth. The analysis finds that household enterprises in Mozambique are associated with higher household consumption, lower rural poverty, as well as upward mobility, particularly for rural and poorly educated households. But if the Mozambican government wants to tap this potential, it will need a different strategy than one designed to support small and medium enterprises, because creation and survival in this sector seems to depend on a set of factors related to the human capital in the household and development in the location, not the soft business environment constraints, such as licensing and permitting and corruption, which are cited by larger business.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lfox@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team