rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
ferences. _Journal of Economic Growth_ , 17(2):143–170, June 2012. doi: 10.1007/s10887-006-9007-6. URL `https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ jecgro/v17y2012i2p143-170.html` .

- Francisco J. Buera and Roberto N. Fattal-Jaef. The dynamics of development : innovation and reallocation . Policy Research Working Paper WPS 8505, World Bank Group, 2018. URL `http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/273571530327069374/pdf/WPS8505.pdf` .

- Francisco J. Buera, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Yongseok Shin. Finance and development: A tale of two sectors. _American Economic Review_ , 101(5): 1964–2002, August 2011.

- Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout. Global market power. Working Paper 24768, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2018. URL `http: //www.nber.org/papers/w24768` .

- Jan De Loecker and Frederic Warzynski. Markups and firm-level export status. _American Economic Review_ , 102(6):2437–71, May 2012. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2437. URL `http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10. 1257/aer.102.6.2437` .

- Pablo N. D’Erasmo and Hernan J. Moscoso Boedo. Financial structure, informality and development. _Journal of Monetary Economics_ , 59(3):286 – 302, 2012. ISSN 0304-3932. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.

- 2012.03.003. URL `http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ pii/S0304393212000372` .

- Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. The Regulation of Entry*. _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , 117(1):1–37, 02 2002. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.1162/003355302753399436. URL `https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399436` .

- Chris Edmond, Virgiliu Midrigan, and Daniel Yi Xu. How costly are markups? Working Paper 24800, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2018. URL `http://www.nber.org/papers/w24800` .

52
6

||Table 1<br>A One Sector Small-Countrv<br>Model with Differentiated<br>Trade|
|---|---|
|(1)|Q*F(M,Dd)<br>Impurt aggregation function|
|(2)|- G(E,D<sup>5</sup>)<br>Export transformation<br>function|
|(3)|pm<br>-r ;m<br>Import price|
|(4)|pemr we<br>Export price|
|(5)|Pq. f1(p¶ pd)<br>Consumer price|
|(6)|p<br>*_g(pe,pd_<br>)<br>Producer price|
|(7)|Md. f 2(pmpd)<br>Import demand equation<br>Dd|
|(8)|Es<br>g2 Pe=P<br>Export supply equation<br>D|
|(9)|-<br>M - w E =B<br>Balance of trade constraint|
|(10)<br>where:|Dd-<br>Ds=0<br>Domestic demand-<br>supply<br>equilibrium|
|M,E|=<br>imports, exports|
|Dd,Ds|=<br>demand and supply of the domestic good.|
|Q|=<br>composite consumer good|
|X|=<br>composite production|
|-m|world price of imports|
|we|world price of exports|
|r|Conversion factor; "nominal" exchange rate|
|pm|domestic price of imports, M|
|pe|=<br>domestic price of exports, E|
|pd|=<br>domestic price of domestic sales, D|
|pq|=<br>domestic price of composite consumer good,Q|
|px|=<br>domestic price of composite output, X|
|B|exogenous balance of trade, or net foreign capitaL inflow (or<br>outflow for negative B).|
linked to the broader concern of robustness, which requires results derived from the index to be robust to allowable changes in its components.

The fifth characteristic brings real world data collection and choice into the picture, requiring that the index can actually be implemented using available data. This carries with it restrictions on the qualities of the data to be used, such as the following considerations. Clearly the purpose and the coherence desiderata require the coverage of the data to be sufficient across countries and dimensions. Data should be homogenized across countries to ensure that the individual variables are comparable and be suitable for evaluating countries at all levels of statistical capacity. This criterion also suggests that the index should be based on publicly verifiable data compiled, collected, and disseminated by the NSS. As such, the actual NSS products—such as the census, key SDG indicators, and other variables—could provide a reliable and cost-effective basis for an index designed to measure its statistical capacity.<sup>8</sup> Implementability requires a verification that this is true.

The sixth characteristic also places constraints on data but focuses on the additional dimension of time. Not only should the index be able to be calculated and compared across countries at a given point in time but, consistent with its purpose, it should also be possible to construct the index across many points in time. Consequently, the data requirements should also be maintained through time to allow reasonably consistent estimates of progress and this should translate to a time path that is coherent and predictable. In contrast, if an index were to exhibit undue volatility through time this could suggest replicability problems stemming from the data, the aggregation method, or from both. It should be noted that replicability is also supported by the simplicity

> 8 Again, other sources, such as expert opinions or intensive studies carry with them a number of problems, including high monetary cost and increased measurement error due to country-specific orientation and idiosyncratic or irregular collection. The choice of data will be further discussed below.

11
buying and under-investment in a broad, untargeted public service which is particularly valuable for the poor: public health. It provides supporting arguments to interpret this correlation as arising from underlying conditions of clientelist political competition which generates weak incentives to provide broad, pro-poor public services. This evidence has implications for the design of various policy tools of transparency and accountability that are currently in vogue in international development programs.

# **References**

- Acemoglu, Daron. 2001. “Inefficient Redistribution,” American Political Science Review, 95(3): 649-661.

- Aker, Jenny, Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente. 2011. “Is Information Power? Using cell phones during an election in Mozambique,” Working Paper, Trinity College, Dublin

- Banerjee, Abhijit, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani, 2010. “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India,” _American Economic Journal: Economic Policy_ , 2(1): 1-30.

- Carizo, Jay, A. 2009. “A Background Paper on the Local Politics in the Province of Isabela,”, Mimeo, World Bank Country Office, The Philippines. Manila

- Chen, B. and M. Cammett. 2012. “Informal politics and inequity of access to health care in Lebanon,” _International Journal for Equity in Health_ , 11:23

- Cruz, C. 2012. “Social Networks and Electoral Strategies in the Philippines,” Working Paper, University of California, San Diego

Dal Bo, E. (2007), `Bribing voters', American Journal of Political Science 51(4), 789-803.

- Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O. & Wolinsky, A. (2007), `Vote buying: General elections', Journal of Political Economy 116(2), 351{380.

- De Dios, E. 2007. “Local Politics and Local Economy,” in A. M. Balisacan and H. Hill (Eds.), <u>The Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia, 2007, Edward</u> Elgar Publishing

- Devarajan, S., Stuti Khemani and Michael Walton, 2011. “Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa,” Policy Research Working Paper Number 5733, Development Research Group, The World Bank

- Fafchamps, Marcel and Julien Labonne, 2012. “Nepotism and Punishment: The (Mis-) Performance of Elected Local Officials in the Philippines,” Working Paper, Oxford University

- Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: the effect of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , 123(2): 703745.

26
Bangladesh and especially India have substantial presence of state‐owned banks. India also has large state‐owned non‐banks, insurance companies, such as LIC and GIC, and provident funds, which serve as significant investors into domestic sovereign debt. For example, in 2017 India’s banks (including the central bank), insurance companies, and provident funds together held around 85% of the total marketable securities issued by the government. Pakistan’s banks are mostly private owned and are not captive investors. However, the appetite of the successive Pakistani governments for increased borrowing made it an easy proposition for the banks to grow their sovereign exposures which require little effort in terms of risk underwriting compared to private sector lending (due to zero risk weights of sovereign exposures) and offered attractive yields leading to stable profitability of banks. Pakistan’s non‐bank sector, including institutional investors, has also kept high sovereign exposures.

Non‐performing loans (NPLs) pose challenges to financial stability and economic growth in India and Bangladesh. India has acted to put resolution mechanisms in place and has recapitalized its banks, at a considerable expense to taxpayers. In Bangladesh state‐owned banks hold more than half of the NPL stock and remain undercapitalized despite public capital injections of more than $1.2 billion over the past 7 years. Bangladesh has recently increased regulatory forbearance and eased loan classification standards, thus reversing progress made in adopting international regulations. Banks remain well capitalized in Pakistan yet carry a high concentration risk due to their large sovereign exposure; replacement of these with private sector exposures, or higher risk weights for exposures to sovereigns based on global rather than local risk ratings, as is being proposed under the emerging Basel IV framework, would significantly increase the banks’ capital needs.

<u>Middle East and North Africa</u><sup>16</sup>

# **Key characteristics and trends in public debt and financial sector exposures**

Among the oil‐based economies only Bahrain (90.6%) and Qatar (54.4%) breach the 50% public debt to GDP levels with Saudi Arabia (17.2%), United Arab Emirates (20.7%) and Kuwait (27.1%) with comfortable debt levels. The non‐oil based countries are characterized by relatively elevated levels of public debt to GDP with Lebanon (149%), Egypt (101.2%) and Jordan (95.6%) followed by Tunisia (69.2%) and Morocco (63%).

Bahrain’s higher debt profile is molded by a very high reliance on limited oil revenues that are insufficient to finance recurring subsidies and social schemes with the government finding it challenging to implement much needed economic reforms. The absence of reforms and continuing hemorrhaging of resources has led to ratings downgrade of Bahrain to non‐ investment grade in 2016, thereby further constraining access and increasing borrowing costs.

> 16 This regional section is based on substantive inputs provided by Syed Mehdi Hassan (FCI‐MENA), and Emmanuel Pinto Moreira (MTI‐MENA).

35
TABLE 7: REDUCED FORff EQUATIONS FOR SECTORkL SURPLUSES

|Explaining:|House|hold|Busi|ness|Gover|nment|For|eign|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Openness|4.1|(2.5)|-5.5|(2.8)|-1.8|(0.9)|3.6|(2.6)|
|Per capita GNP|2.4|(5.2)|-1.5|(2.7)|0.4|(0.7)|-1.2|(2.2)|
|GNP growth rate|-0.1|(1.0)|-0.2|(2.7)|0.2|(1.8)|0.0|(0.1)|
|Real interest dlffl.|-0.1|(0.0)|12.0|(2.8)|-5.0|(1.2)|-7.4|(..2)|
|Population (log)|1.4|(4.4)|0.3|(0.7)|-0.9|(2.4)|-0.7|(2.3)|
|RSQ|0.25||0.34||0.13||0.21||
|RBARSQ|0.22||0.31||0.09||0.17||
|Standard Error|3.4||4.1||4.0||3.2||

38
**<u>Table 2: Extent of large land acquisitions in selected African countries, 2004–09</u>**

|**Country**|**No. of**<br>**Investment**<br>**Projects**|**Total Area**<br>**(1,000 ha)**|**Median size (ha)**|**Share of domestic**<br>**investors in total area**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Ethiopia|406|1,190|700|49|
|Liberia|17|1,602|59,374|7|
|Mozambique|405|2,670|2,225|53|
|Sudan|132|3,965|7,980|78|
|_Source_: Deininge|r_et al._2011||||

25
supervisor of an international bank may not accept the local currency ratings of corporate or other clients.

Linked to this, if the subsidiary of an international bank lends to a developing country sovereign in own currency and funded in own currency the home supervisor must decide whether that will be treated with a zero risk weight by the consolidated entity. Further, the same issue applies to the more favorable treatment of short-term inter-bank loans in local currency. A set of further questions arise given the long list of items subject to “national discretion”. For example, if the local regulator chooses not to apply the 35% for mortgages (or the 75% for retail etc.) would the home regulator still allow the subsidiary of an international bank to adopt the 35%?

Many developing countries may apply the SA multiplying the risk weight obtained in the Basel II tables relevant to the local rating by the relevant basic requirement. Some developing countries currently have an 8% basic requirement but others have higher requirements. This implies that the SA may not be so Standardized when it comes to cross-country comparisons. First there is an issue as to whether one country’s local AA is the same as another’s and second that rating is then converted into a capital charge using different basic requirements (8%, 10%, 11 % etc). It seems further work is required here to consider the calibration issues involved across different countries where local ratings are employed.

# **_Pillar 1: Where the home country bank adopts IRB_**

A major concern with the advanced approaches of Basel II is that there will be an inappropriate application of the advanced approaches where supervision is not strong enough to be able to monitor the more sophisticated rules on capital appropriately. This fear is also relevant for the subsidiaries of foreign banks, especially where the foreign bank is large for the host country.

In these circumstances it would appear paramount that the host supervisor adopts a system that it can monitor effectively. Only if the foreign bank gives a broad and transparent guarantee to its subsidiary or branch, then it might be appropriate for the host supervisor to lean more on the work of the home supervisor. The home regulator clearly has to adopt an appropriate system for the consolidated international bank, however this should not imply a regulatory treatment by a host supervisor that the host is unable to monitor.

37
households are interviewed in both rounds, but we will ignore the panel aspect and consider the two surveys as repeated cross-sections. We drop observations corresponding to children born during the survey years, as the timing of the survey would imply smaller observed cohorts in these years. Finally, due to the mismatch between lunar and solar calendars, years of birth have been re-computed so that say 1986 henceforth corresponds to the year of the Tiger (from February 9th, 1986 to January 29th, 1987). The year of birth of a child born in January 1986 will hence be coded 1985.

Our empirical methodology is simple: we fi rst check at whether birth cohorts are signi fi cantly larger in auspicious years, and then look at how human development outcomes correlate with the horoscope. We will focus solely on individuals born in and after 1976, as the country was at war in the previous years. Moreover, birth timing is believed to be a fairly recent phenomenon as concerns for child quality started becoming more pressing. Goodkind (1991), while looking at whether fertility decisions during the auspicious year of the Dragon concludes “that the Dragon Year was not a salient factor in Chinese fertility-timing decisions until 1976” (p. 666). Finally, in all regressions, unless speci fi ed otherwise, standard errors will be clustered at the year-of-birth level (see Bertrand et al., 2004).

# 3.1 Astrology and Fertility Timing

A fi rst test of the effect of superstition consists of looking at whether the choice of the year of birth of children is driven by Vietnamese astrology: in which Nt is the national-level aggregate number of children born in year t, Gt is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if year t is an auspicious year according to Vietnamese astrology, and 0 otherwise.<sup>4</sup> As discussed in Section 2, male are “Yang” and female are “Yin”, so that horoscopes for boys and girls are likely to be different. We will thus adopt several speci fi cations for variable Gt : (i) whether year t brings luck to boys, (ii) girls, (iii) both, or (iv) either. We will henceforth designate G<sup>b</sup> t<sup>,Gg</sup> t<sup>,Gand</sup> t , and G<sup>or</sup> t the dummy variables that are equal to 1 when year t is auspicious for boys, girls, both and either respectively, and 0 otherwise. When Gt = 0, year t can be either neutral or

> 4 Nt is computed by aggregating information from VLSS98 only.

6
Total 28399 Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2017.

In order to attract the much-needed private investment, Pakistan introduced competition in the sector by unbundling WAPDA. Table 4 indicates that vertical unbundling has been extensively adopted in Pakistan, similar to the levels in the comparator Indian states but substantially higher than the benchmark Rethinking study average. The degree of horizontal unbundling, the key step for competition, is lower than the degree of vertical unbundling in Pakistan but is above the benchmarking value and two of the comparator Indian states. Private sector participation is below the benchmarking values both overall and for distribution and transmission.

**Table 4: Comparing the extent of utility restructuring in Pakistan and its comparators, 2015**

||**India, AP**|**India, Odisha **|**India, Raj**|**Pakistan **|<sup>**International**</sup><br>**Benchmark**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Utility Restructuring**|**57%**|**73%**|**57%**|**73%**|45%|
|Vertical Unbundling|80%|80%|80%|80%|55%|
|Horizontal Unbundling|33%|67%|33%|67%|34%|
|**Pvt sectorparticipation**|**13%**|**21%**|**14%**|**19%**|24%|
|_PSP in Generation_|39%|63%|39%|40%|41%|
|_PSP in Distribution_|0%|0%|1%|9%|16%|
|_PSP in Transmission_|0%|0%|2%|8%|14%|

Note: Scores based on index developed for the Rethinking Power Sector Reform Project. For more details go to project website at http://www.esmap.org/rethinking_power_sector_reform PSP = private sector participation While the 11 GW of capacity added by the IPPs in the two decades since the sector was opened has to be seen as a success for the power reform policy adopted, in fact it was inadequate to meet all of Pakistan’s needs. Despite this increase in capacity from the private sector and an increase of 4GW from the public sector, there have been power shortages and blackouts for much of the period.

The balance between the potential supply of electricity and the peak demand for it during a year is taken as an indicator of the adequacy of supply.<sup>25</sup> The data sources for Pakistan measure potential supply by generation capability (availability) rather than by capacity so that the difference between capability and peak demand is the system’s surplus or deficit.<sup>26</sup> Peak demand and generation capability are measured over NTDC’s system and KE’s system, and data were available for the 2007–2017. In addition, predictions made in 2017 for the period 2018–2021 are provided in the most recent State of Industry Report published by NEPRA. Figure 6 shows that since 2007 and until 2017 there had been a substantial and persistent deficit with a maximum of

> 25 Fuel shortages as well as capacity constraints also contributed to the deficit.

> 26 Availability includes plants that are both functioning and are not currently off-line for maintenance. The reserve margin equals 1 minus peak demand/available capacity.

25
of them can undermine the quality of care mothers provide to their children, the information gathered from the questionnaire is unusual and quite useful. Henceforth, we will use the term _mental_ health to refer to both cases of depression and/or anxiety.

Using the responses to the questionnaire, we estimated three mental health indexes: the simple average of all items and two standardized items using factor analysis and principal components analysis. As we explain below, we use information on maternal mental health from the first round of the YL survey.

# **_D. External shocks_**

We exploit the availability of data on exposure to external shocks in the first round of the Peruvian YL. Caregivers were asked about events or changes that negatively affected the household welfare and that occurred since the mother of the index child was pregnant until the day of the interview. Survey respondents described the event and the enumerator classified it among the 14 categories. We group these categories into 6 groups of shocks, including natural disaster, crop or livestock loss, decrease in food availability, job or income loss, death or severe illness, and birth/new household member.<sup>12</sup>

# **2.2 Descriptive statistics**

Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in this paper for the sample under analysis. We separate the variables in four panels by mother, child, household and community characteristics. Columns 1-3 present mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for the sample in the 2006/7 round. Similarly, columns 4-6 show same statistics for the third YL round (2009/10).

As presented in Panel A, mothers are 31-35 years old on average between the two rounds. Around 16% of them are of indigenous origin, and although 79% are literate, 57% has not completed primary school. Finally, 94% of mothers attended antenatal care while they were pregnant with the index child. In terms of children’s characteristics (Panel B), half of index children are boys and 16% of them are the eldest. Cognitive outcomes, as measured by PPVT Z- scores are practically unchanged between the two rounds, even if, as expected, the mean score increases as the children age, reflecting a larger vocabulary. The average child in the sample

> 12 We also created a group called “Others” for all shocks that were not classified by enumerators into the 14 categories. We do not use them in our analysis because this group includes a diverse and potentially unrelated set of events.

8
|**Function**|**Current**Situation|**Gaps**|
|---|---|---|
|Framing the National Water<br>Policy|Loosely defined|Formal National Water Policy|
|(a) Sectoral Objectives|Isolated and unrelated|Interrelated water objectives of<br>different sectors|
|(b) Flood and drought<br>management policy|Ambiguous and lacking<br>intersectoral considerations|Incorporation of flood and<br>drought management in the<br>national water policy.|
|(c) Water and the<br>Environment|EIA guidelines prepared|Formal EIA policy on water<br>development.|
|(d) Policy on public and<br>private water undertakings<br>and participation|None defined|Clear definition of pubic and<br>private sector domains in water<br>management.|
|(e) Water rights and<br>allocation policies|None defined|Clear definition of private<br>water rights.|
|(f) Water pricing policy|Loosely defined|Clear policy on water pricing<br>and cost recovery.|
|Laws, regulations and<br>administrative rules<br>concerning land-water usage|Scattered and conflicting|An omnibus water law<br>(National Water Act), uniform<br>regulations and administrative<br>rules for all sectors.|
|National water planning|Stagnant|A comprehensive water<br>development, use and flood<br>management plan.|
|Public sector water<br>investment planning|Ad-hoc and disjointed across<br>sectors|Public investment program<br>consistent with national<br>objectives and intersectoral<br>issues.|
|O&M planning and<br>implementation|Ad-hoc and ineffective|Implementable public and<br>private supported O&M plan.|
|Water resource data and<br>information collection and<br>processing|Scattered, insufficient and<br>uncoordinated|Comprehensive water data for<br>use of all agencies and<br>interested individuals.|

18