rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
occupations. Doubling the calorie intake of males who are not engaged in HEIO and of females will increase their weight for height by 0.54% compared to that by 0.67% for males in HEIO based on IFE estimates. Third, comparison of IFE results with that of PRH (in which, doubling calorie intake will increase the weight for height of individuals by about 13.6% in 2SLS estimate and 3% in OLS estimate), implies that PRH’s 2SLS estimate of calorie elasticity could be potentially biased upward. As discussed above, the validity of PRH instruments is questionable as head’s schooling seems to have a significant direct effect on males (non-HEIO) health outcome, while wife’s education (not controlled in PRH) seems to positively and significantly<sup>18</sup> affect females’ health outcomes in OLS estimates. These effects are not identifiable in IFE estimates as they are absorbed in household fixed effects. Another PRH instrument, household landholding seems to significantly affect males’ (in HEIO) health outcomes in IFE estimate. All these in turn may imply that perhaps the inequality in calorie distribution due to inequality in energy intensity of labor market activities is overemphasized in PRH analysis.

As regards other variables, economies of scale (in terms of household size, holding the household composition constant) in health production is observed for males (particularly for those in non-HEIO) but not for females. Health outcomes for males in HEIO only slightly worsens (by 3%), while that for males not in HEIO and females slightly improves (by 1-3%) in round 1 and 2 compared with round 4 (results not shown). As discussed above, IFE estimates of the coefficients of the health technology are used to construct a measure of unobserved health endowment, _κ_ , which is used in the nutrient demand equations discussed below.

# **6.2 Intrahousehold Bargaining and Nutrient Allocation**

**Calorie, Protein, and Vitamin A** : Table 4 presents the _SURLS_ and _SURHFE_ estimates of intrahousehold bargaining and allocation of calorie, protein, protein from animal sources (i.e., good quality protein), and vitamin A for boys, girls, male adolescents, female adolescents, female adults, male adults (omitted category), pregnant, and lactating females. As _SURLS_ estimates could be biased (see Section 4), the analysis focuses on _SURHFE_ estimates, while _SURLS_ estimates are provided for comparison purposes. Spouses’ assets at marriage and schooling are interacted with each of these age-gender-physical status categories to analyze whether a head’s bargaining measures have significantly different effects on intrahousehold allocation of these nutrients than the corresponding bargaining measures of a wife. Given the caveats associated with education as a bargaining measure, I focus on bargaining based on assets measures although

> 18Throughout the paper, ”significant” implies statistical significance at 10% level or lower, unless specifically mentioned otherwise.

22
# **Societal Poverty: A Relative and Relevant Measure**

Dean Jolliffe & Espen Beer Prydz* _Keywords:_ Relative poverty, global poverty, poverty measurement, inequality. _JEL Codes_ : I3, O1, D63

* Jolliffe (djolliffe@worldbank.org) and Prydz (eprydz@worldbank.org) are with the World Bank Group, Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC), in the research and data groups. Authors listed alphabetically. Jolliffe is also a Research Fellow with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn and a Research Affiliate with the National Poverty Center at the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.

_Acknowledgements:_ This paper builds on recommendations from the Global Poverty Commission’s report on measuring poverty. The authors wish to thank members of the Global Poverty Working Group on alternative measures of poverty, which includes staff from the Poverty Global Practice, Data, and Research Groups of the World Bank. We thank Francois Bourguignon, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Stefan Dercon, Francisco H.G. Ferreira, Stephan Klasen, Aart Kraay, Ana Revenga and participants at a World Bank Policy Research Talk for their feedback and advice. Support for this work came in part from the World Bank’s Knowledge for Change Program for the study “National Account vs Survey Based Welfare (TF018077-KCP II)”. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank Group or its member countries.
out not by entrant SMEs but by large established firms, while the Doing Business indicator on entry is relevant to the former.

**_Table_** **_<u>6. Pairwise correlation of known variables vs. latent variables</u>_**

||f1|f2|f3|f4|f5|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|GDPper capita(current US$)|-0.375|-0.434|-0.072|-0.102|-0.002|
|GDP,PPP(current international$)|-0.378|-0.288|-0.009|-0.125|0.112|
|Liner shipping connectivity index (maximum<br>value in 2004 =100)|-0.325|-0.371|-0.025|-0.135|0.162|
|Time required to start a business(days)|0.020|0.026|-0.023|0.085|0.075|
|Natural Capital, $ per worker|-0.001|-0.217|-0.044|-0.130|0.058|
|Physical Capital Stockper Worker|-0.390|-0.405|-0.001|-0.089|-0.069|
|Average Years of Schooling for 25 years and<br>over|-0.333|-0.256|0.015|-0.039|-0.075|
|Arable Land hectaresperperson|0.191|-0.031|-0.007|-0.123|-0.108|
|Arable Land hectaresper worker|0.212|0.008|-0.002|-0.100|-0.097|
|Governance: Political Stability and Absence of<br>Violence 2011|-0.177|-0.374|-0.097|-0.008|-0.112|
|Governance: Government Effectiveness 2011|-0.309|-0.458|-0.004|-0.074|-0.123|
|Governance: Regulatory quality2011|-0.294|-0.447|0.007|-0.105|-0.196|
|Governance Rule of Law 2011|-0.298|-0.454|-0.006|-0.047|-0.137|
|Governance: Control of Corruption 2011|-0.199|-0.423|-0.019|-0.027|-0.152|
|Governance: Voice and Accountability2011|-0.187|-0.376|0.005|-0.056|-0.249|
|energyexports as % total exports 2009|0.153|0.140|-0.180|0.010|0.392|
|energyexports as % total exports 2011|0.090|0.115|-0.041|-0.147|0.254|
|lpi score 2007|-0.399|-0.505|-0.058|-0.112|-0.132|
|lpi score 2010|-0.377|-0.482|0.010|-0.193|-0.159|
|tons equivalentper unit ofgdp|0.290|0.354|-0.146|0.079|0.191|

A number of patterns emerge from the pairwise correlation and the inspection of the correlation matrix as well as the reading of the distribution of countries and products in the first two dimensions:

- The first axis essentially distinguishes between labor intensive vs. resources intensive productions.

- The second axis distinguishes a greater degree of sophistication of manufacturing and the need for investment.

23
These case studies have been chosen in order to draw specific attention to the relationship between discriminatory elements of PTAs and TTBs. We examine details of the policies derived from the World Bank’s _Temporary Trade Barriers Database_ (Bown 2013c) and data matched to trade flows at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level from UN Comtrade. Because even use of the _same_ policy instrument can result in an entire range of discriminatory motivations and outcomes, these case studies reveal that policy details matter.

# _I. Argentina  - Safeguard on Footwear in 1997_

One extreme possibility resulting from PTA formation is that the PTA leads to an import surge from PTA partners that triggers demands for initiation of a TTB investigation, resulting in the policy-imposing country creating additional preference margins by imposing an additional import-restricting TTB on PTA _non-partners_ only. Argentina’s application of a safeguard on footwear products in 1997 arguably illustrates such an example.

In 1992, Argentina started implementing scheduled MERCOSUR tariff cuts toward PTA partners like Brazil. For imported products such as footwear, Figure 2 illustrates that the expectation under MERCOSUR was that Argentina would apply a zero tariff against imports from MERCOSUR partners by December 31, 1994. Meanwhile, Argentina’s most-favored-nation (MFN) import tariff applied toward footwear imports supplied by MERCOSUR non-partners was 22 percent in 1992. The average MFN applied tariff was reduced to 20 percent in 1993, before increasing to nearly 27 percent in 1995 and then to 33 percent in 1998.<sup>17</sup> At the end of the Uruguay Round, Argentina had committed to a 35 percent WTO legal binding tariff rate for imported footwear products over which it promised not to raise its MFN applied tariffs.

Prior to 1997, Argentina’s total imports of footwear had increased considerably – Figure 3 reveals an almost 25 percent increase in the value of total imports taking place between 1993 and 1997. Major

> 17 Argentina had also imposed a policy of minimum specific duties on imports of footwear (in addition to textiles and apparel) in 1993; these remained in place until 1997. The specific duties were subject to a separate WTO dispute brought by the United States – one concern was that the ad valorem equivalent of the minimum specific duties applied during certain periods could end up being higher than 35 percent rate that was Argentina’s legal binding commitment for these products made at the end of the Uruguay Round.

16
# **6. Conclusion**

This paper has examined the relationship between changes in a country’s external trade policy offered toward non-PTA partners as a function of changes in the country’s trade policy offered toward PTA partners. Our empirical setting has focused on the two major economies of MERCOSUR – Argentina and Brazil – and we estimate different effects for the period in which MERCSOSUR was an FTA (1990-1994) from when it was a customs union (1995-2001). Our primary innovation is to consider measures of trade policy that are more expansive than tariffs and that also include the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. When considering all available policy instruments, we present evidence of an economically significant stumbling block effect arising during the customs union period, and our results also tend to reverse any potential evidence of a building block effect that may have been thought to arise (based on tariffs alone) during its FTA period.

These results are novel; however, they do not completely resolve the puzzles identified by the existing literature. Furthermore, our analysis of the highly detailed policy data raises a number of other interesting and yet unaddressed questions worthy of additional empirical research.

First, our results call into relief the need for additional work to construct more “complete” product-level measures of import protection that take into consideration all available trade policy instruments. This is something that we have also noted in other settings (Bown and Tovar, 2011) and for which some efforts have been made, albeit only in the cross section (e.g., Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 2008, 2009). One potential explanation behind why our estimates are not stronger is our reliance on categorical variables for some of the policy outcomes; construction of measures of the ad valorem equivalents for the imposed TTBs may improve upon the estimation considerably.

Second, we also take a first step toward examining the role of import market power on the interplay between the relative changes in trade policy affecting PTA partners and PTA non-partners. Given our desire in this paper to hew relatively closely to the Estevadeordal et al. (2008) approach so as to make our first set of results as comparable as possible, our market power variables may contain too much measurement error to have proven useful for this particular environment. The basic approach, however, could surely be improved upon in other empirical settings that are able to rely on more disaggregated trade policy data (typically made available after 1995) and further refinements to the elasticity estimates that seem to be improving over time.

Third, and more generally, examination of the patterns of the raw trade policy data and our results call into question whether it is accurate to _characterize_ that Argentina and Brazil have either a customs 29
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4454

# **Abstract**

The importance of land rental for overall economic development has long been recognized in theory, yet empirical evidence on the productivity and equity impacts of such markets and the extent to which they realize their potential has been scant. Representative data from China’s nine most important agricultural provinces illustrate the impact of rental markets on households’ economic strategies and welfare, and the productivity of land use at the plot level. Although there are positive impacts in each of these dimensions, transaction costs constrain participation by many producers, thus preventing rental markets from attaining their full potential. The paper identifies factors that increase transaction costs and provides a rough estimate of the productivity and equity impacts of removing them.

This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of land policies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.org and jins@anr.msu.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
44 found in F.W. Schneider and L.M. Coutts. "The High School Environment: A Comparison of Coeducational and Single-Sex Schools." Journal of Educational Psycholouy, 74 (1982):898-906.

1/ Dale; Feather; Jones, et al.; and Schneider and Coutts.

16 Studies by Jones, et al. and by E.J. Trickett, J.J. Castro, P.K. Tricket, and P. Shaffner ("The Independent School Experience: Aspects of the Normative Environments of Single-Sex and Coeducational Secondary Schools." Journal of Educational Psychology, 74 (1982):374-381] show a more academic orientation, whreas those by Dale and by Feather find no relationship.

_11/_ Finn.

1-8 Lee and Bryk.

2/ Riordan.

_2.2/_ Bryk and Lee; Trickett, et al.; E.L. Vockell and S. Lobonc. "Sex-Role Stereotyping by High School Females in Science." Journal of Research in Science Teachine, 18 (1981):209-219.

21/ M.E. Lockheed. The Modification of Female Leadership Behavior in the Presence of Males. (Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service, 1976); E. Price and R. Rosemier. "Some Cognitive and Affective Outcomes of Same-Sex Versus Coeducational Grouping in the First Grade." Journal of Experimental Education, 40(4) (1972):70-77; and R. Winchel, D. Fenner and P. Shaver. 'Impact of Coeducation on 'Fear of Success' Imagery Expressed by Male and Female High School Students." Journal of Educational Psychology, 6 (1974):726-730.

_22/_ Jimenez and Lockheed.

2 Anderson and Bowman; Bowman and Anderson.

_ZA/_ Boserup; G.S. Eshiwani. A Study of Women's Access to Higher Education in Kenva With a Special Reference to Mathematics and Science Education (Nairobi, Kenya: Kenyatta University College. Bureau of Educational Research, 1983); R.H.L. Feldman. "The Relationship of School, Grade, and Sex to TraditionalModern Attftudes among Gusii Students in Kenya." The Journal of Social Psychology, 96 (1975):135-136; and E.F. Muckenhirn. Secondary Education and Girls in Western Nigeria. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1966).

# 2.5/ Boserup.

# Z./Eshiwani.
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Lewis and Lockheed

## **Table 1. Gender differences in primary completion rates, by region, 1990–2000 (percent)**

|||1990|||2005||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Girls|Boys|Difference|Girls|Boys|Difference|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|43|57|14|56|66|10|
|East Asia and the Pacific*|92|97|5|98|98|0|
|Europe and Central Asia|85|95|10|94|96|2|
|Latin America / Caribbean|71|64|-7|99|97|-2|
|Middle East and North Africa|71|84|13|87|93|6|
|South Asia|59|77|18|79|88|9|
|All developing countries|65|79|14|84|89|5|

_Source:_ Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala 2003.

*Data for 2005 not available. Data are for  2000.

# **2. Gender and Ethnic Differences in Schooling**

UNESCO recently estimated that nearly 78 million primary school-age children remain out of school, and a gap in school enrollment, completion and learning persist between boys and girls, and among various ethnic groups within countries (UNESCO 2007). Many countries in which the education gender gap remains acute are countries where historically women have been marginalized and secluded, such as the countries of South Asia. Marginalization of women <u>within ethnic subgroups</u> is also found in countries where gender parity in education has been achieved for the majority population. Thus, girls who belong to marginalized groups -- such as the hill tribes in Southeast Asia, indigenous and Afro-descendent populations in Latin America, the lowest castes in India and Nepal, the Roma in Eastern Europe, or the Akhdam in Yemen<sup>4</sup> -- suffer disproportionately in education relative to the mainstream populations and to boys in their own linguistic or ethnic group. Lewis and Lockheed (2006) estimate that such girls comprise

> 4 More than a million Akhdam, who are set apart by their African features, are concentrated in segregated slums in the major cities of Yemen (Worth 2008).

6
<!-- Start of picture text --> 9<br>Time on Task 4 Po yy %<br>Supportive Learning _ 90%<br>Environment 91%<br>PositiveExpectationsBehavioral _ 42%43%<br>FacilitationLearningof _ 38%42%<br>UnderstandingChecks for _ 50%50%<br>Feedbackeeadbac! - a 33%34%<br>Criticritic a ll Thinking - 12%<br>Thinking — 12%<br>anyutonomy =Ha32%35%<br>Perserverance - 26%26%0,<br>CollaborativeSocialSkills& _ 7%7%<br>0% 25% 50% 75% 100%<br>Proportion of Segments<br>A i Classroom Culture i Socioemotional Skills _ Katchi<br>rea Hi Guided Learning i Time on Task Class Type i Grade 1<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Lastly, in addition to the performance indicators assessed here, survey data have also shown that corporate taxpayers in Latin America associate higher levels of autonomy with higher levels of performance.<sup>62</sup> That is, perceptions of higher levels of autonomy are associated with perceptions of better performance along key dimensions of administrative capacity in tax administration. These results, along with the objective performance indicators discussed in this section, provide support for the contention that semiautonomous revenue authorities are mechanisms to promote credible political commitments to reform in developing countries.

# **IV.  ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: HOW DOES AUTONOMY MATTER?**

The ARA reform model is a set of organizational features designed to enhance managerial and bureaucratic autonomy. Some features focus on general management, while others address financial or personnel autonomy. As the elements of bureaucratic autonomy are intertwined, the design features are inherently multifunctional, which means that a particular feature will have an impact on multiple dimensions of the organization’s autonomy. For example, greater financial autonomy, in addition to providing greater control over the use of resources, has the effect of increasing autonomy over personnel management.

The fact that the ARA model is actually a bundled set of reforms has three implications. First, there are many ways that an agency can be made more autonomous— there are a number of variations on the basic model. One agency might have more financial autonomy while another might have greater autonomy with respect to corporate governance. There is no set accepted best practice. Second, the impact of each particular design element cannot be easily isolated from the whole and evaluated rigorously on its own. This implies that an evaluation of each individual element must be analyzed _ceteris paribus_ . Third, given the plethora of design options and the difficulty in evaluating both each feature individually and the set of features taken as a whole, controversies have arisen over specific organizational characteristics that these agencies should have. The purpose, then, of this section is to set out the main issues in the organizational design of semi-autonomous revenue authorities and, based on country experience, offer hypotheses

> 62 Taliercio, 2001a.

45
Resids vs. linear pred.

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> oOo<br>><br>Oo<br>-2.0 -1.0 0.0 05 10 1.5<br>Residuals<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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NIGER’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 21. Patterns of capital investment in infrastructure, benchmarked against comparator countries**

Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5 Niger LIC-Non-Fragile<br>2.0<br>1.5<br>1.0<br>0.5<br>0.0<br>Public ODA Non-OECD Private<br>Percentage of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). _Note:_ Private investment includes self-financing by households. Non-OECD financiers include China, India, and Arab countries. ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and sanitation; LIC = low-income country.

# How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope?

Around $62 million of additional resources could be recovered each year by improving Niger’s utilities’ efficiency and raising rates of budget execution (table 19).

The largest potential source of efficiency gains for the roads and water sectors would be tapped by improving the cost-recovery rates of road fuel levies and water tariffs ($32 million). Ensuring that all bills are duly collected for the services rendered by power and water utilities, as well as by the road agency, could bring additional $12 million annually. Optimization of the staffing levels of power and water utilities could save $8 million per year. Around $6 million every year is wasted due to high distributional losses of power, which could be saved. More efficient execution of the capital budget could save another $4 million for transport and irrigation needs. Looking across sectors, roads can save the most—up to $28 million per year—by tackling inefficiencies in the sector. Potential savings in the water and power sectors are also significant—$17 and $16 million, respectively.

**Table 19. Niger’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency**

<u>$ million</u>

||ICT|Irrigation|Power|Transport|WSS|Total|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Underpricing|n.a.|—|0|20|12|32|
|Overstaffing|—|n.a.|6|n.a.|1|8|
|Losses|n.a.|n.a.|6|n.a.|0|6|
|Undercollection|n.a.|—|3|6|3|12|
|Low budget execution|0|1|0|2|0|4|
|Total|0|1|16|28|17|62|

_Source_ : Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). _Note:_ WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. — = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable.

38