# **TABLE 2c** : City Performance by Levels of Globalization and Governance – OECD Sample (138 Cities)

|**CITY PERFORMANCE**|**GL**|Averag<br>**OBALIZ**|e Ratin<br>**ATIO**<br>|gs<br>**N**<br>||**G**<br>|**OVER**<br>|**NAN**<br>|**CE**<br>**Cou**|**ntry**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**City Glob**<br>**Taylor**|**alization,**<br>**2002**|<br>**Cou**<br>**Globali**<br>**Kea**|**ntry**<br>**zation,**<br>**rney**|**Bribe**<br>**Utility**<br>**20**|**ry in**<br>**EOS**<br>**03**|**St**<br>**Cap**<br>**EOS**|**ate**<br>**ture,**<br>**2003**|<br>**Cont**<br>**Corru**<br>**KK**|<br>**rol of**<br>**ption,**<br>**02 **|
||Low|High|Low|High|Poor|Good|Poor|Good|Poor|Good|
|Access to Sewerage (%, UN)|98%|100%|99%|100%|98%|100%|98%|100%|99%|100%|
|Access to Water (%, UN)|99%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|99%|100%|
|Access to Electricity (%, UN)|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|100%|
|Access to Telephone lines 1 (%, UN)|92%|96%|92%|99%|93%|100%|93%|99%|92%|99%|
|Access to telephone lines 2 (1-7,<br>EOS)|5.9|6.6|6.2|6.7|6.2|6.8|6.2|6.7|6.0|6.8|
|Access to Cellular phones (1-7, EOS)|<br>6.5|6.7|6.5|6.8|6.5|6.8|6.5|6.8|6.4|6.8|
|Access to Internet in schools (1-7,<br>EOS)|4.8|5.4|4.8|5.9|5.0|5.6|4.8|5.8|4.5|5.9|
|Quality of Infrastructure (1-7, EOS)|4.8|5.7|5.1|5.9|4.9|6.1|4.9|6.0|4.6|6.1|
|Quality of Electricity (1-7, EOS)|5.5|6.3|5.8|6.6|5.8|6.6|5.7|6.7|5.6|6.6|
|**Overall Number of Cities**|**64 **|**62 **|**90**|**42**|**34 **|**33**|**34 **|**33**|**73**|**65**|

_Note: Each column variable was segmented into two equal samples, below and above the median value of the full sample._ The significance of the results of the link between governance and city performance is also summarized in Table 3 below, which presents both the magnitude (numerical) and significance (asterisks) of the coefficient of a regression of service performance on governance. As we see in the table, it does suggest the extent to which governance is important when utilizing the full sample, as well as when dissecting whether it matters in particular for local and global cities. We note that the results are large and significant for both local and global cities (with very rare exceptions), further supporting the chart results illustrated in Figures 1a through 1i and Tables 2a, 2b and 2c above.<sup>16</sup> The results also suggest that these substantial additional benefits of improving governance generally do not differ significantly depending on whether the city is of a global or local nature (as indicated in the table by small magnitudes and lack of significance of the ‘difference’ row for each service). The exception is the case of control of corruption and access to water and to telephones, which seem more important for local cities than global cities, and bribery in utility and quality of infrastructure and access to internet at schools, which is more important for global cities. These results may hint at the possibility of differential weights on the type of service that matters for local versus global cities. The results for sewerage are also quite high, and could be due to other efforts. More details on the technological and network aspects of services can be found in section 6.

> 16 Telephone access in Tables 2a and 2b seems to show overall a higher difference than other services.  This may be because telecommunications, which is also a voice enhancing tool, is rather important—a more globalized city with better telecommunications services may offer better opportunities for voice, both local and international, and hence derive more transparency.  Such a result has been envisaged by some researchers (see Sassen 2002).

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