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# **5. Conclusion**

New anti-poverty programs implemented by governments across the world often have similar predecessor programs. Taking evidence from India’s public works programs, this article highlights the need to be cautious while using the initial roll-out of “new” programs as quasi-experimental research designs. This article shows how ignoring an older public works program, SGRY, can substantially underestimate the general equilibrium effect of the new employment policy, NREGA, on a variety of outcomes. The underestimation of program impact can be attributed to the actual gap in employment provision between the treatment and control districts, which is lower than what is initially assumed. Using a novel dataset of program expenditure at the district level for SGRY, I find that ignoring the older program underestimates the general equilibrium impact of public workfares on labor market outcomes for adults by 30-40% in most instances. This paper, therefore, shows how ignoring the continued existence of a similar older program can have first-order effects on measuring the true impact of the policy. A key area for future research is identifying the exact mechanisms through which public workfares affect the private labor market.

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