_presuntos_ had not completed high school.<sup>17</sup> Even if, as Chioda (2015) has alerted from the study of Mexican homicide data, the quality of employment—and not only the availability of jobs, plays an important role in the dynamics of murder rates, the coincidence of a sudden labor market shock in the maquila sector and the demand for criminal activities (originated by the government’s crackdown and the war for territorial control among DTO’s) dramatically shaped the opportunity costs ninis faced in relation to getting involved in legal or illegal activities.<sup>18</sup> We believe that the similarities in characteristics between workers in the manufacturing maquila sector and the alleged criminals help explain the significant correlation between male ninis aged 19 to 24 and homicide rates during the period 2007 - 2013, particularly in the north of Mexico.

# **_5. CONCLUSIONS_**

The results presented here suggest that ninis, on their own, are not associated with crime and violence in Mexico. However, during the period 2007-2013, the relationship is positive and significant. The association between ninis and homicide rates is stronger in states located along the border with the United States, a region particularly affected by organized crime and the international financial crisis of 2008-2009. During the period 2007-2011, which saw a massive rise in violence, the increase in the number of male ninis in Mexico accounted for a quarter of the total escalation in the homicide rate observed during that period. In border states, the share of male ninis almost doubled during the period 2007-2011, a change sufficient to explain a third of the total increase in homicide rates in that region.

> 17 The dataset excludes those below 16, the legal minimum age in Mexico to be processed by conventional penal courts. The administrative records of alleged criminals provide part of the legal statistics on crime. This information is captured during all three stages of the criminal justice procedures: preliminary investigation, pre-instruction, and sentencing. In particular, data from alleged offenders is captured after the prosecutor has substantiated the accusation on the existence of a crime and the presumed responsibility of the subject. At this time, the offender is brought before a judge, who will determine his legal status by evaluating the elements linking him to the commission of the offense.

> 18 In any case, if we take into account anecdotic evidence on DTO’s wages, opportunity costs between the legal and the illegal labour market involves significantly higher wages in the criminal spectrum. While an average monthly salary in the maquila sector is around $4,000 pesos, DTO’s starting salaries begin around at 8,800 pesos:

> i. A 31 page Payroll found in documents confiscated from Los Caballeros Templarios established that those working in the administrative “area” of the organization earned between $12,000 and $16,000 pesos per month; those in the Communications office earned between $16,000 and $20,000 pesos per month; those in the area of Operations were divided in different groups: Sicarios earned between $12,000 and $16,000, falcons or vigilantes between $8,800 and $15,200 pesos per month, depending on weather they had vehicles or were established in a single place, and if they were following someone in particular or taking care of an area (Aristegui Noticias, Jan 21, 2014, http://goo.gl/z7KOgK, with information from La Razón).

> ii. In an interview with Vice Magazine, a women working for Los Zetas (another DTO) explained how she recruited 50 falcons (the lowest position in DTO’s conformed by people in charge of alerting about activities of security forces or other gangs). and gave them $12,000 pesos plus 1,500 in expenses and a 500 credit for mobile phones  (Méndez Lozano, Jorge Damián, Vice, August 24, 2015, http://goo.gl/itz4rL).

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