rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
The emergence of markets in the
            natural gas industry
As countries have deregulated prices and
            lowered entry barriers in the natural gas industry, many new
            participants have emerged, promoting competition in the
            newly created markets. The increased competition has
            benefited everyone through more efficient pricing and
            greater choice among natural gas contracts. Four distinct
            structural models have emerged in the industry's
            restructuring. The traditional model (a vertically
            integrated industry) has been increasingly replaced by
            models that decentralize the industry along horizontal and
            vertical lines. With increasing decentralization, regulation
            of the industry focuses on the pipeline transportation and
            distribution, the industry segments with natural monopoly
            characteristics.  Regulation aims to protect both end users
            and participants in the deregulated segments from the market
            power of companies operating in the monopolistic segments.
            As a result of deregulation, two major markets emerge: the
            natural gas market (which facilitates the trading of natural
            gas as a commodity) and the transportation market (which
            enables market participants to trade the services needed to
            ship natural gas through pipelines). Competition and open
            entry are crucial for these two markets to function
            efficiently. The transportation market is affected by the
            market power of pipeline companies, but resale of
            transportation contracts brings competition to this market
            and facilitates the efficient allocation of contracts.
            Intermediaries and spot markets promote efficient pricing
            and minimize transaction costs. Markets have become more
            complex with deregulation, and trading mechanisms are needed
            to ensure the simultaneous clearing of natural gas and
            transportation markets at minimum cost to the industry. Two
            main trading models guide transactions: the bilateral
            trading model (which relies on decentralized bilateral
            negotiated between market participants) and the poolco model
            (which relies on a centralized entity to coordinate
            transactions). Properly applied, both models lead to the
            same outcome. The bilateral trading model has dominated
            because of its simplicity of implementation, but the poolco
            model has great potential once problems of sharing and
            processing information are addressed.
Development of natural gas and
            pipeline capacity markets in the United States
Deregulation of the U.S. natural gas
            industry has been under way since the late 1970s.  The
            industry was deregulated to create competitive markets in
            natural gas and its pipeline transportation, in the
            expectation that competition would guide transactions toward
            a more efficient outcome.  The author provides an overview
            of the deregulation process and its effect on the
            development and functioning of natural gas and gas
            transportation markets in the United States.  He analyzes
            the trading of pipeline capacity in primary and secondary
            markets and the regulation of pipeline transportation,
            identifies mechanisms that pipeline companies use to
            coordinate bilateral transactions, and summarizes
            deregulation's main achievements in the U.S.  natural
            gas industry.  Industry achievements in the past 15 years
            show that expectations were not realistic.  The United
            States enjoys a highly competitive interstate transportation
            market.  Both markets have benefited from the deregulation
            of natural gas production and marketing and the
            liberalization of natural gas prices.  Introducing open
            access to interstate pipelines and their unbundling from gas
            sales has allowed end users to participate in the efficiency
            gains in upstream markets. All this has contributed to
            declining retail prices for all major consumer categories.
            Deregulation is far from complete, however. Current
            regulation of interstate pipeline companies and the
            secondary transportation market does not promote efficient
            allocation of transportation contracts.  Flexible pricing of
            transportation contracts should be introduced in both the
            primary and secondary transportation markets.  But
            deregulation of retail markets remains the most important
            task and the bigger challenge facing industry regulators.
            Small-volume end users (such as residential or commercial
            customers) are captive to local distribution utilities,
            without access to competitive wholesale markets.  All end
            users should be able to choose a natural gas supplier and
            receive natural gas at the minimum cost to society.
Congestion pricing and network expansion
Over the past decade network industries
            (such as gas, electricity, and telecommunications) have
            undergone a dramatic transformation. Competition has been
            introduced in industries that had long been viewed as
            textbook examples of natural monopolies. Production and
            transport have been unbundled to foster the introduction of
            competition: the capacity provider (the owner of the
            infrastructure) now often differs from the service provider.
            Chief among the challenges this raises for economists and
            policymakers: to design institutions that lead to
            "optimal" network expansion. Different
            arrangements have been suggested, ranging from indicative
            planning to decentralization of investment decisions through
            congestion pricing. Two questions lie at the core of the
            debate: Is the infrastructure network still a natural
            monopoly? And what role should congestion pricing play in
            ensuring optimal network expansion? The author shows that
            simple economic principles apply to the use of congestion
            pricing to induce network expansion: a) If network provision
            is competitive, congestion pricing leads to optimal
            investment. b) If network provision is monopolistic,
            congestion pricing leads to underinvestment. He shows the
            model applying to power networks as well as to the Internet.
            Policymakers must therefore assess whether network expansion
            is indeed competitive and design institutions that ease
            entry, or design an appropriate regulatory framework.
The housing market in the Russian
            Federation : privatization and its implications for market development
The author reviews sociological data on
            privatization and the development of a housing market in
            Russia through 1996. Using data from urban surveys largely
            unknown outside Russia, she also considers demand for
            housing and household mobility in Russia. Since early 1997
            the Russian government has increasingly focused on housing
            reform. Current policy calls for a reduction (in stages) of
            housing subsidies (for which both owners and tenants of
            privatized apartments are eligible), with the goal of 100
            percent cost recovery by 2003. But household incomes are not
            expected to rise commensurately, so housing's share of
            the household budget is likely to grow for most Russians. By
            the end of 1996 about 55 percent of Russian housing was
            privately owned. The rate of privatization peaked in Moscow
            in 1993 and has since abated considerably, essentially
            coming to a halt in 1996.  The pattern was the same in
            smaller cities, but with a later starting date. Not
            surprisingly, high-quality apartments in city centers have
            much higher rates of privatization than lower-quality
            housing some distance from the center. Also affecting the
            decision to privatize are demographic characteristics of the
            occupants and household incomes, values, and education
            levels. Privatization has produced a far-from-uniform class
            of owners. The two groups most likely to have privatized
            their apartments--pensioners and the relatively
            well-off--have quite different effects on the housing market
            .  Pensioners--the larger group--are generally not inclined
            to move and thus exert a negative effect on housing
            mobility. The well-off--a much smaller group--can be
            expected to participate actively in the housing market.
            There has been some movement toward a more efficient
            allocation of housing. Because of economic forces, part of
            the mover households moved from their original apartments to
            apartments that were somehow inferior. Moreover the housing
            market allows poorer households to find housing more in
            keeping with their ability and willingness to pay for it.
            Many renters in Russia have chosen not to privatize their
            apartments, influenced largely by the sense of
            "occupation rights" inherited from the former
            Soviet Union. Many Russians have little incentive to
            privatize their housing, but data from Moscow and two
            smaller cities indicate that market ideas about searching
            for housing are beginning to penetrate the Russian
            public's mentality.
Market development in the United
            Kingdom's natural gas industry
The author shows how, in the United
            Kingdom, government and industry participants have responded
            to challenges created by opening the natural gas industry to
            competition.  He concludes that, as a result of cooperation
            between the government and industry participants,
            appropriate mechanisms can be established for operating and
            balancing system and for trading natural gas and
            transportation capacity.  The deintegrated natural gas
            industry in the United Kingdom is off to a promising start
            after a long gestation.  The author describes the processes
            of the Network Code, a market-based method for balancing the
            pipeline system and optimizing transportation by British Gas
            TransGo (BGT), the transportation and storage arm of British
            Gas (formerly the publicly owned monopoly transporter and
            supplier of natural gas).  The Network Code is a set of
            rules that determine how users of the pipeline system
            cooperate with the system operator when seeking
            transportation services.  The operator uses price signals
            generated through the flexibility mechanism to choose the
            balancing measures with the lowest cost to society.  The
            author analyzes the four mechanisms used in physical gas
            markets, describes developments in the U.K.'s financial
            gas market, and describes pipeline capacity trading in
            primary and secondary markets and BGT's pricing of
            capacity and transportation services. The most important
            issue today, says the author, is whether industry
            participants can reach a consensus on how to enhance the
            existing framework to make markets more efficient.
            Development of the underdeveloped financial gas market will
            require cooperation between BGT and the Office of Gas Supply
            to give the International Petroleum Exchange access to
            BGT's electronic network, so that it can record and
            settle transactions.  Both BGT and its customers will need
            to contribute time and resources to developing an efficient
            tariff structure for pipeline capacity and transportation
            services in the contract and tariff markets.
Developing countries'
            participation in the World Trade Organization
In the 1960s and 1970s developing
            countries viewed UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade
            & Development) rather than the GATT (General Agreement
            on Tariffs & Trade) as the main institution through
            which to promote their interests in international trade. But
            beginning with the Uruguay Round in the mid-1980s, their
            attitude changed, many more of them became members of the
            GATT, and a significant number played an active role in
            negotiations. The author analyzes developing countries'
            representation and participation in the World Trade
            Organization (WTO) as of mid-1997 to determine how
            developing countries can effectively promote their interests
            and discharge their responsibilities under the rules and
            agreements of the new organization. He concludes that
            although many developing countries are actively
            participating in the new process, more than half of the
            developing countries that are members of the WTO participate
            little more than they did in the early 1980s and have not
            increased their staffing, despite the vastly greater
            complexity of issues and obligations. Institutional
            weaknesses at home are the main constraints to effective
            participation and representation of their interests at the
            WTO. To make their participation more effective, he
            recommends that the developing countries establish
            adequately staffed WTO missions based in Geneva; failing
            that, pooling their resources and representation in Geneva;
            and being sure to pay their dues, which are typically small.
            He also recommends that the international community place
            higher priority on programs of assistance in support of
            institutional development of poorer countries aimed at
            enhancing their capacity to participate in the international
            trading system and the WTO -- and that the WTO review its
            internal rules and procedures to ensure that inadvertently
            they do not make developing countries participation more difficult.
Child labor in Cote d'Ivoire:
            incidence and determinants
Child labor in Cote d'Ivoire
            increased in the 1980s because of a severe economic crisis.
            Two out of three urban children aged 7 to 17 work; half of
            them also attend school.  In rural areas, more than four out
            of five children work, but only a third of them manage to
            combine work with schooling.  Full-time work is less
            prevalent, but not negligible.  Roughly 7 percent of urban
            children work full time (an average 46 hours a week).  More
            than a third of rural children work full time (an average of
            35 hours a week), with the highest incidence in the Savannah
            region.  The incidence of such full-time work rises with age
            but is by no means limited to older children.  The average
            age of the full-time child worker in Cote d'Ivoire is
            12.7.  These children have received an average 1.2 years of
            schooling.  That child is also more likely to be ill or
            injured and is less likely to receive medical attention than
            other children.  Urban children in the interior cities are
            far more likely to work and their working hours are much
            longer.  Among rural children, those in the Savannah region
            (where educational infrastructure lags far behind the rest
            of the country) are most likely to work.  Five factors
            affect a household's decision to supply child labor: a)
            The age and gender of the child (girls are more likely to
            work, especially when the head of household is a woman).  b)
            The education and employment status of the parents (low
            parental education is good targeting variable for
            interventions).  c) The availability of within-household
            employment opportunities.  d) The household's poverty
            status.  e) The household's location (calling for
            geographical targeting).  With improved macroeconomic
            growth, it is hoped, child labor will decline -- but a
            significant decline could take several generations.
            Meanwhile, it is important to: i) Use a gradual approach
            toward the elimination of child work by aiming initial
            interventions at facilitating combined work and schooling.
            ii) Support the development of home enterprises as part of
            poverty alleviation programs, but combine it with incentives
            for school attendance.  iii) Make school hours and vacation
            periods flexible (accommodating harvest times) in rural
            areas.  This would also improve children's health.  iv)
            Improve rural school attendance by having a school in the
            village rather than 1 to 5 kilometers away.  v) Improve
            educational investment in the Savannah.
Relative prices and inflation in
            Poland, 1989-97 : the special role of administered price increases
The author evaluates how much relative
            price shifts affected inflation in Poland between 1989 and
            1997. He uses a theoretical model that predicts a positive
            relationship between variance and skewness in the
            distribution of relative price changes and the general
            inflation rate. Regressions controlling for various shocks
            revealed that significant relative price changes --
            especially the large administered price increases associated
            with adjustment -- produced substantial upward inflationary
            pressures. Growth in money and wages were shown to fuel
            inflation. Appreciation of the real exchange rate lowered
            it. Administered price increases -- in utilities and other
            sectors controlled by the government -- dominated inflation
            from 1989-97. And the adjustment of many controlled prices
            is not yet complete. Ideally, future administered increases
            should be frequent and moderate to prevent the large price
            shifts that increase inflation. But because frequent price
            increases are likely to be politically unpopular, sizable
            increases may be in order so that the current
            underevaluation of numerous services will diminish more quickly.
Searching for sustainable
            microfinance : a review of five Indonesian initiatives
Expanding the microfinance market can
            promote economic growth and reduce poverty in many
            countries.  But expanding this market is advantageous only
            if the increased activity is sustainable.  The author draws
            lessons from five Indonesian microfinance initiatives in
            rural areas and proposes ways for governments and donors to
            support the microfinance sector.  Those programs demonstrate
            that microfinance initiatives can provide a valuable service
            to low-income people at a temporary, affordable cost to
            governments of donors.  Incentives for customers and staff
            are key features of successful microfinance operations that
            enable them to operate with low subsidies or on a
            self-sustaining basis.  Programs should also charge adequate
            real interest rates, aggressively pursue repayment, and
            achieve a significant volume of business.  To accelerate
            progress toward self-sustainability, programs can track the
            subsidies they receive, and their supporters can impose hard
            budget constraints and declining subvention support.
            Government-owned microfinance initiatives are vulnerable to
            political pressures that undermine their commitment to sound
            banking practices.  Granting these institutions autonomous
            status, imposing hard budget constraints, and privatizing
            them when they are financially sustainable, can reduce their
            susceptibility to political influences. Alternatively,
            governments and donors could support the sector through
            temporary subsidies to private sector initiatives to help
            them defray start-up costs.  Supervision can be improved if
            a country's microfinance industry, assisted by its
            central bank, establishes industrywide standards.
            Microfinance institutions could contract for supervision
            services from commercial banks.  The central bank could
            monitor supervisors to ensure that they exercise due
            diligence.  This study finds that institutions can
            efficiently reach clients in remote areas through
            subdistrict-based units and field staff.  They need not rely
            on group lending techniques, savings requirements, or
            intermediary organizations between banks and borrowers to
            boost efficiency.  Initiatives can serve female borrowers
            without targeted marketing if loan products meet
            women's needs and are accessible to them.  Governments
            could increase the usefulness of microfinance to agriculture
            by encouraging state-owned microfinance institutions to
            develop and pilot-test loan products that meet
            smallholders' needs.
Wage misalignment in CFA countries:
            are labor market policies to blame
It seems natural to attribute to wage
            rigidity (stemming from highly distortionary labor policies)
            the over-valuation of the CFA (Communaute Financiere
            Africaine) franc after the negative external shocks of the
            1980s.  Using a variety of data sources, the author assesses
            the actual rigidity of wages in CFA countries and the
            relationship of wage rigidity to labor policies.  He shows
            that: a) Workers' wages are higher in CFA countries
            than in similar countries outside the CFA zone and higher
            than the earnings of similar self-employed workers within
            the same countries.  b) Real wages are rigid (in the sense
            of closely following fluctuations in governmental wages and
            consumer prices) but there is no evidence of nominal wage
            rigidity.  c) Labor policies may not be the source of wage
            misalignment and real rigidity.  When compared
            internationally, minimum wages in CFA countries are not high
            enough to account for the observed wage misalignment, and
            their adjustment over time has been responsive to real
            shocks.  d) Unions in the private sector seem to have been
            more instrumental in creating wage moderation than in
            creating wage drift in CFA countries.  Their members usually
            get lower wages than similar nonunionized workers, probably
            because of the subordinate nature of the labor movement in
            CFA countries.  e) Government pay policies and (possibly)
            limited competition in product markets are the most probable
            causes of wage misalignment and real wage rigidity in CFA countries.