rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
and Reuter (2004) present figures for seizures and flow that suggest the rate is less than 5 percent. Nor do smugglers face much threat of incarceration from law enforcement, requiring high payments to smuggling labor. Perhaps the border guards seizing a small share of the flow have the capacity to do so and are charging high prices for withholding their authority. Detailed descriptions of smuggling activities are inconsistent with this. There are multiple border control agencies (including, until recently, a Russian military division, staffed by Russian officers and Tajik soldiers) thinly spread out along a border that has many difficult-to-guard mountain passes.

Perhaps the market for smuggling is characterized by cartel or monopoly control. This would account for both the high margin and the lack of sensitivity to the higher interdiction (i.e. tax rate). This is possible in some markets but the best known ones, for shipment to the United States, have been characterized, since the fall of the Cali and Medellin cartels in the early 1990s, by large numbers of small smuggling enterprises. Perhaps they continue to co-ordinate but there is no obvious mechanism for them to accomplish the discipline that legal cartels have rarely managed over sustained periods of time.

I can offer no good account for the high margins charged by drug smugglers in so many settings. The data on risks (seizure, incarceration) and prices (the difference between import and export prices) are not nearly precise enough to allow formal empirical modeling. The apparent lack of response to increased interdiction severity also remains a puzzle.

# **4. NON-TRADITIONAL DRUG CONTROL METHODS**

In addition to the supply and demand interventions noted above, there are a variety of approaches – which I broadly label ‘non-traditional’ – that have not been widely discussed, but which probably bear closer examination: de facto legalization of production or trafficking, buying up the crop, and choosing a strategic location to allow production for the global market. Each has substantial operational or political risk but explicating these risks helps clarify the considerations involved in policy toward drugs and development.

# **De Facto Legalization of Production or Trafficking**

Can a nation simply ignore drug production and trafficking? Both for treaty reasons, and because legalization is so shocking to other nations, legalizing and openly taxing or regulating the production and distribution of these drugs for international markets is clearly not a possibility.

> 38 That price series did not distinguish transactions by size but assumed a fractal distribution for transactions along the chain from import to wholesale

24
Policy Research Working Paper 7097

# **Abstract**

This paper examines support for reducing inequality and for income redistribution to specific groups in Europe and Central Asia. The paper uses the Life in Transition Survey to analyze cross-country differences in redistributive preferences and the determinants of individual-level differences in such preferences. The analysis tests for various possible motivations, such as self-interest, beliefs about the fairness of the income-generating process, past social mobility experience, or expectations of future social mobility. Fewer people wanted to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in 2010 than in 2006 in transition countries. Support for redistribution toward specific groups is highest for the disabled and the elderly, but there is high heterogeneity across countries in support for various redistributive policies, as well as in the alignment between average beliefs and actual policies. The empirical analysis confirms the importance of beliefs about fairness in influencing redistributive preferences, together with self-interest and past and expected social mobility in European Union member states (Western European and new member states), but only to a limited extent in the non-European Union member state group of transition countries. Regarding redistribution to specific groups, self-interest appears to be an important motivation for support for the elderly and families with children, whereas values and beliefs are important drivers of support for the working poor and the unemployed. Although framing matters, the results are broadly robust to alternative measures of support for reducing inequality.

This paper is a product of the Poverty Global Practice Group and the Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at acojocaru@worldbank.org and mfdiagne@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# PPR Working Paper Series

|Title|Author|Date|Contact|
|---|---|---|---|
|WPS97Export-Promoting<br>Subsidies and What<br>to Do About Them|Richard H. Snape|September1988|J. Sweeney<br>31021|
|WPS98Diversification<br>In Rural Asia|Agriculture and Rural<br>Development Staff|October1988|S.Barghouti<br>38408|
|WPS99 Trade Policies and the Debt Crisis|Sam Laird<br>Julio Nogues|September 1988|<br>S. Torrijos<br>33709|
|WPS100 Public Infrastructure<br>and Private<br>Sector Profitability<br>and Productivity||||
|in Mexico|Anwar Shah|September1988|A. Bhall:<br>60359|
|WPS11 Measuring the Impact of Minimum Wage||||
|Policies on the Economy|Luis A. Riveros<br>Ricardo Paredes|October1988|R. Luz<br>61762|
|WPS102 Effects of the Multifibre Arrangement<br>(MFA) on Developing Countries:||||
|A Survey|Junichl Goto|October1988|J. Epps<br>33710|
|WPS103 Industrial<br>Portfolio Responses<br>to Macroeconomic<br>Shocks: An||||
|Econometric<br>Model for LDCs|James Tybout<br>Taeho Bark|October1988|C.Cabana<br>61539|
|WPS104 Economic Effects of Financial Crises|Manuel Hinds|October1988|L. Horsepian<br>32979|
|WPS105Securing international<br>Market Access|Richard H. Snape|October1988|J.Sweeney<br>31021|
|WPS106Energy Issues In the Developing<br>World|Mohan Munasinghe<br>Robert J. Saunders|||
|WPS107 A Review of World Bank Lending for<br>Electric Power|Mohan Munasinghe<br>Joseph Gilling<br>Melody Mason|||
|WPS108Some Considerations<br>in Collecting<br>Data<br>on Household Energy Consumption|L. Leitmann|||
|WPS109 Improving Power System Efficiency in<br>the Developing Countries Through<br>Performance Contracting|Philip Yates|||
|WIFO Taxonomies||Taxonomy ||Taxonomy Il|
|---|---|---|---|
||NACE rev. 1|factor inputs|labour skills|
|Meat products|151|4|1|
|Fish and fish products|152|4|1|
|Fruits and vegetables|153|4|1|
|Vegetable and animal oils and fats|154|4|1|
|Dairy products; ice cream|155|4|1|
|Grain mill products and starches|156|4|1|
|Prepared animal feeds|157|4|1|
|Other food products|158|4|1|
|Beverages|159|4|1|
|Tobacco products|160|4|1|
|Textile fibres|171|3|1|
|Textile weaving|172|2|1|
|Made-up textile articles|174|2|1|
|Other textiles|175|1|1|
|Knitted and crocheted fabrics|176|1|1|
|Knitted and crocheted articles|177|1|1|
|Leather clothes|181|2|1|
|Other wearing apparel and accessories|182|2|1|
|Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur|183|2|1|
|Tanning and dressing of leather|191|4|1|
|Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness|192|4|1|
|Footwear|193|4|1|
|Sawmilling, planing and impregnation ofwood|201|2|2|
|Panels and boards ofwood|202|2|2|
|Builders’ carpentry and joinery|203|2|2|
|Wooden containers|204|2|2|
|Other products ofwood: articles of cork, etc.|205|2|2|
|Pulp, paper and paperboard|211|3|3|
|Articles of paper and paperboard|212|1|3|
|Publishing|221|4|3|
|Printing|222|4|3|
|Coke oven products|231|||
|Refined petroleum and nuclear fuel|232|3|3|
|Nuclear fuel|233|||
|Basic chemicals|241|3|3|
|Pesticides, other agro-chemical products|242|5|3|
|Paints, coatings, printing ink|243|1|3|
|Pharmaceuticals|244|5|4|
|Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes|245|4|3|
|Other chemical products|246|5|3|
|Man-made fibres|247|3|3|
|Rubber products|251|1|1|
|Plastic products|252|1|1|
|Glass and glass products|261|1|1|
|Ceramic goods|262|2|1|
|Ceramictilesandflags|263|3|1|
|<br>Bricks, tiles and construction products|264|2|1|
|Cement, lime and plaster|265|3|1|
|Articles of concret, plaster and cement|266|1|1|
|Cutting, shaping, finishing ofstone|267|2|1|
|Other non-metallic mineral products|268|1|1<br>(continued)|
within one‟s communities seem to increase the likelihood of political participation, whereas general trust in others seems to have the opposite effect on turnout. This is similar to the results obtained for participation at the school level. The measures of parental involvement with their children‟s education do not seem to affect the decision to vote; this suggests that participating in parliamentary elections represents a (maybe too) long route to holding teachers and school directors accountable.

# **5.2 District-level analysis**

In this section we investigate whether both parental participation in school accountability and participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections are higher in districts characterized by a higher fraction of individuals willing or able to cooperate with each other in collective action situations.

# _The short route to accountability_

We aggregate parents‟ decisions to invest in the group account in the public good game and parents‟ decision to participate in the election of parent class representatives at the district level, and investigate their correlation while controlling for district characteristics generated by the 2008 LSMS Albanian household survey.<sup>34</sup> The sample size is therefore reduced to 36 observations (i.e. the number of Albanian districts).

Table 8 reports estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of parents who participated in the school accountability system in a district, and the explanatory variable of interest is the proportion of parents who behaved cooperatively in the game. We control for the average income and average years of schooling in the district (column 2), district-level measures of social capital (column 3), and other district characteristics (column 4) discussed in previous section, i.e. religious heterogeneity, a northern region dummy, four geographical area dummies, whether or not the district is prevalently Muslim, and the standard deviation of income within the district. In all regressions we employ county fixed effects.

> 34 The 2008 LSMS is the third household survey conducted by the Albanian National Statistics Office with the technical assistance of the World Bank. The LSMS sampling relies on a stratification scheme based on four regions: Coastal Area, Central Area, Mountain Area, and Tirana; and included 450 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and 8 households in each PSU, for a total of 3600 households. The sampling is designed to be representative of Albania as a whole. The survey provides information about household characteristics, including demographics, education, as well as measures of social capital. Finally, we also collected data, from official records, on district-level voter turnout in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

23
# III. COST ESTIMATES OF MAJOR PROB<sup>T</sup> ,EMS

Damage and Control Costs. In estimating the benefits<sup>of improving the level of</sup> environmental quality, it is important to distinguish between damage<sup>and control costs. In the case</sup> of pollution, control costs are located at the source (typically a filter);<sup>in the case of erosion, they are</sup> the costs of soil conservation practices. Damage includes both<sup>mitigation (preventive) costs and costs</sup> from the impacts remaining after mitigation and control (typically,<sup>the costs from pollution after filters</sup> have been installed and medication has been used to treat pollution-related<sup>diseases; in the case of</sup> erosion, the yield losses after both boil conservation measures<sup>have been implemented and</sup> compensatory fertilizers have been applied). As discussed previously,<sup>we concentrate on damage costs</sup> in this exercise.

The estimation of such costs, however, presents complications.<sup>For instance, how to</sup> estimate the benefits associated with the control of air pollution--which<sup>will avoid some cases of</sup> asthma? The benefits measured in terms of danages avoided are<sup>large, say US$50 per case per day</sup> (suffering and pain, work loss days, and loss of productivity); however, if measured<sup>in terms of control</sup> costs they may be extremely low, say US$1 per case (as low as medication<sup>costs). So in this case,</sup> what is the economic benefit associated with the elimination of pollution<sup>and reduction in the</sup> incidence of asthma?

The damage should be given by the opportunity cost of controlling pollution<sup>by the</sup> least cost altertative, in this case medication. However, in measuring<sup>such opportunity cost, both</sup> direct and indirect costs must be taken into account. Thus, along with medication,<sup>the opportunity</sup> cost of time (work loss days) is also included. Indirect costs more difficult to<sup>assess, such as suffering</sup> and pain, are not estimated. The same argument applies to control of<sup>water pollution. The</sup> procedure adopted for soil erosion is discussed below.

# Soil Erosion

Soil degradation and its negative impact on water retention, runoff,<sup>and aquifer</sup> recharge is one of the most serious environmental problems confronting Mexico.<sup>A 1988 Bank study</sup> stated that 66 percent of the national area (112.8 million hectares) had moderate<sup>erosion and 13</sup> percent (22.4 million hectares) severe erosion. Comparisons with limited<sup>but more detailed aerial</sup> photographic coverage indicate that the situation may well be even<sup>worse, with s(.me 42 percent of</sup> land totally or severely eroded. At "moderate" levels (in Mexico), losses may<sup>be as much as 10 tons</sup> of soil per hectare per year; at "severe" levels, such losses are from 10<sup>to 15 tons.</sup> 7
with the establishment of a new firm. Hopenhayn shows higher entry costs, by deterring entry, can lead to larger average firm size.

Regional data from India and Russia provide some evidence on the connection between the regulatory environment and investment tendencies of firms. For example, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that the burden of labor regulations on businesses varies greatly across states in India, and that more burdensome labor regulations are associated with lower investment, employment, productivity, and output among firms in the manufacturing sector. Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2002) show that in Russian oblasts in which the legislature grants a greater number of benefits to specific firms, the growth rate of small firms is slower. Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002) find that in Indian states that are perceived by firm managers to have a poor investment climate, value added per worker is as much as 44 percent lower than in states with better investment climates.

Generalized trust is a measure of the extent to which people in a society feel that “most people can be trusted.” Theoretically, the effect of generalized trust on firm size is not clear. Higher levels of generalized trust make cooperation easier to sustain, especially in interactions which are infrequent or occur between relative strangers. La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that such interactions are more likely to occur in very large organizations, and hence employment in large organizations should be increasing in the level of generalized trust. Firms which grow larger by increasing the volume of output they produce—that is, through horizontal integration—also interact with a larger number of trading partners. These interactions are more likely to be successful in environments with higher levels of generalized trust. But firms may also 15
|P129847|2013|2015|12/2/2014|3 Active|Mozambique|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|P129847|2013|2015|5/27/2015|4 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2016|12/1/2015|5 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2016|6/15/2016|6 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2017|9/30/2016|7 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2017|5/17/2017|8 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2018|12/8/2017|9 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2018|5/26/2018|10 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2019|12/20/2018|11 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2019|6/26/2019|12 Active|Mozambique|
|P129847|2013|2020|3/30/2020|13 Active|Mozambique|
|P129861|2012|2012||0 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2013|8/13/2012|1 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2013|5/15/2013|2 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2014|1/12/2014|3 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2015|7/1/2014|4 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2015|12/6/2014|5 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2015|6/10/2015|6 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2016|2/10/2016|7 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2017|8/8/2016|8 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2017|3/13/2017|9 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2018|12/5/2017<br>|10 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2018|6/2/2018|11 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2019|1/22/2019|12 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2020|7/27/2019|13 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129861|2012|2020|2/8/2020|14 Active|West Bank and Gaza|
|P129888|2012|2013|4/12/2013|1 Closed|Gambia,The|
|P129888|2012|2014|12/8/2013|2 Closed|Gambia,The|
|P129888|2012|2014|6/23/2014|3 Closed|Gambia,The|
|P129888|2012|2015|3/6/2015|4 Closed|Gambia,The|
|P129920|2014|2014|6/1/2014|1 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2015|11/28/2014|2 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2015|5/26/2015|3 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2016|12/7/2015|4 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2016|6/9/2016|5 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2017|12/28/2016|6 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2017|6/13/2017|7 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2018|12/21/2017|8 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2018|6/1/2018|9 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2019|12/11/2018|10 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2019|6/26/2019|11 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2020|12/24/2019|12 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129920|2014|2020|6/24/2020|13 Active|Bangladesh|
|P129929|2013|2013||0 Closed|Nepal|
|P129929|2013|2014|10/23/2013|1 Closed|Nepal|
|P129945|2012|2013|12/31/2012|1 Closed|Central America|
|P129945|2012|2014|1/4/2014|2 Closed|Central America|
# 1. Introduction

Conflict and displacement escalated dramatically after the civil war in South Sudan in December 2013. The December 2013 conflict between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar quickly became an ethnically‐charged conflict particularly between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Skirmishes as well as brutal violence against civilians were reported in dozens of locations. In the days following the start of the conflict, incidences were more isolated with violence against Nuer civilians in Juba, attacks by Nuer on Dinka and other civilians in these areas as well as incidences of armed groups of different ethnic backgrounds launching revenge attacks on community members. The civil war with high rates of violence resulted in high mortality and displacement, as well as worsening livelihoods, poverty and food insecurity (Shankleman, 2012; World Bank, 2014a; World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2015b).

More than 50,000 civilians have been killed since the resurgence of conflict in December 2013, in addition to various severe crimes including extrajudicial killings, abductions, rape, and torture. More than 2.2 million people have also fled the country or have been displaced internally, and it is believed that 4.8 million are at risk of famine (FAO 2017). The conflict has severely impacted welfare indicators and cost the country an estimated 6.3 percent of its GDP (World Bank 2016).

Violent conflict and instability affect men and women in heterogeneous ways, including differentiated impacts on economic, social, physical and mental well‐being. Research highlights that men and boys often confront direct, first‐round effects of conflict, including death and morbidity, while conflict contributes to indirect impacts on women and girls, including as related to health (e.g. to malnutrition, exposure to disease and lack of access to health services (Buvinic et al 2013). Children’s health and access to education are often severely affected by exposure to conflict.

In many countries, women and children frequently account for the majority of populations displaced by conflict; in South Sudan for example, 53 percent of the 2.43 million externally displaced due to the 2013 conflict are female while 63 percent of those displaced are children under the age of 18 (UNHCR 2018). While displacement generally contributes to a critical loss in assets, including housing, land and property and other productive assets, women confront particular constraints extending from social norms that restrict women’s ownership rights over land and other assets, and contributes to their exclusion from decision‐making processes (Brookings 2013). Displacement also often gives rise to or exacerbates serious protection challenges including increased exposure to gender‐based violence.

2
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Hanushek, E. and L. Wößmann (2005), “Does Educational Tracking Affect Performance and Inequality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence Across Countries”, _NBER_ , Working Paper 11124.

Kang, C. (2007), “Classroom Peer Effects and Academic Achievement: QuasiRandomization Evidence from South Korea”, _Journal of Urban Economics_ , Vol 61, No. 3, pp 458 - 495 Kang C, C. Park, and M. Lee (2007), “Effects of Ability Mixing in High School on Adult Earnings: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from South Korea”, _Journal of Population Economics_ , Vol. 20, No. 2, pp 269-297 Kim, T., J. Lee, and Y. Lee (2008), “Mixing versus sorting in schooling: Evidence from the equalization policy in South Korea”, _Economics of Education Review_ OECD (2003), _PISA 2003 Technical Report_ , Paris: OECD OECD (2005), _PISA 2003 Data Analysis Manual_ , Paris: OECD OECD (2007), _PISA 2006 Science Competencies for Tomorrow’s World Volume 1: Analysis_ , Paris: OECD Schneeweiss, N and R. Winter-Ebmer (2005), “Peer Effects in Austrian Schools”, Department of Economics, University of Linz, Working Paper No. 0502 Zimmer, R (2003), “A new twist in the educational tracking debate”, _Economics of Education Review_ , 22 307 – 315 22