segments of the population. The net effect of large outward movements of highly skilled workers may therefore be negative, at least in the short- to medium-term, when the supply of highly skilled workers is unable to respond to gaps created by large-scale emigration. Under such circumstances, the sending country may face a difficult choice between two alternatives; (i) the loss of high-skilled workers to critical sectors due to emigration, resulting in a situation often referred to as ‘brain-drain’, and (ii) the diminishing returns to high skills if high-skilled workers remain, as a form of “brain-waste” whereby human capital does not realize its full potential (Garcia Pires, 2015).

The terms on which high-skilled individuals in fragile settings may be willing to accept lowerskilled work are generally understudied. When under duress, skilled migrants may take up work abroad that they are overqualified for. This could be because like many economic migrants across different settings, their competencies and qualifications may not be recognized at destination. However, migrating under duress may also result in migrants having lesser bargaining power and time to secure jobs that are well matched to their skills and earnings potential. As a result, workers may end up in lower-productivity and less remunerative jobs, which in turn limits the full potential gains from migration. This could, at least in theory, and in the short- to mediumterm, result in simultaneous “brain drain” from the sending country, and “brain waste” at destination.

This paper seeks to understand better the motivations for migration among high-skilled youth in a complex setting simultaneously marked by economic and political instability. It also seeks to directly understand the extent to which migration choices respond to economic and political uncertainty, linking the discussion on ‘brain drain’ from fragile states to prospects of stabilization.

We situate our study in Myanmar, a fragile and low-income country in East Asia that has recently witnessed successive shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic beginning 2020, the military takeover of the government in 2021, ensuing and intensifying violence and displacement, global food and fuel price spikes, and continued economic slowdown. The World Bank has documented a weak economic outlook for Myanmar characterized by sluggish economic growth, slowdown in the demand for labor, a steep depreciation of the kyat resulting in high levels of inflation, poverty and food insecurity (World Bank 2024). The GDP is still 10 percentage points below prepandemic levels, and close to a third of the population was estimated to be in poverty as of December 2023. These mutually reinforcing adverse indicators have led to a downward revision of the project growth rate of the Myanmar economy to 1 percent. Conflict intensity has risen sharply since the military takeover of the government in February 2021, and had even shown a slight upward trend in the first half of 2024. These factors have resulted in both voluntary and forced movements of people within and across borders. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that between December 2021 and June 2023 alone, at least 18.5 percent 4