rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
after 2009 in the apparel sector while in agribusiness the use of the procedure follows cycles increasing after 2009 but declining in 2012.

**<u>Figure 8. Imports of Intermediates under Advance Clearance Procedure by Sector</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Imports under Advanced Clearance, By Sector Imports under Advanced Clearance, By Sector (as a<br> 14 share of imports)<br> 12 20%<br> 10<br>15%<br> 8<br> 6 10%<br> 4<br>5%<br> 2<br> ‐ 0%<br>2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br>Apparel Agribusiness Apparel Agribusiness<br>Millions of $US<br><!-- End of picture text --> To gauge the importance of the advance clearance procedure for Peruvian exporterimporters import outcomes we estimate a simple premium regression defined as: where _i_ stands for an exporter-importer firm, ��������� indicates that the firm is an advance clearance user, that is, the firm uses the advance clearance procedure for a positive share of its imports of intermediate inputs, other variables are defined as above and Y is either import value, import growth, the number of imported products (in logarithms), or the number of imported varieties (in logarithms).

The estimates presented in Table 10 show that exporter-importers that use the advance clearance procedure exhibit significant premia in their import outcomes: they import more intermediates in total as well as more products and more varieties than those that do not use the procedure. This finding is verified for all exporter-importers in Peru as well as for those in the agribusiness and apparel sectors (in the case of the agribusiness with slightly weaker results for the number of products). Regarding import growth, a significant premium for firms that use the advance clearance procedure relative to those that do not is found when considering all exporterimporters in Peru and those in the apparel sector. In agribusiness import growth does not differ significantly across firms depending on their use of the customs procedure. All in all, the evidence suggests that the use of this faster modality of customs clearance benefits imports and variety of imports of intermediate inputs for exporter-importers in Peru.

27
we use for our core analysis average management scores over the most senior divisional-bureaucrat reports where there are multiple directors.

The scores on each question are converted into normalized z-scores (so are continuous variables with mean zero and variance one by construction) and are increasing in the commonly understood notion of ‘better management’. For example, we assume greater monitoring corresponds to better management practice. We then take unweighted means of the underlying z-scores to aggregate the questions on monitoring shown in Table A3 and separately all other management practices.

We complement our measure of alignment with a second measure by asking civil servants directly about the extent of alignment they feel to the organization and their daily activities. In the civil servants survey, we asked officials, “To what extent do you believe that the organization’s mission is aligned to your own mission?” and “How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?” To measure the extent to which the organization as a whole and the individual tasks assigned to the civil servant are consistent with her own mission, we create an alignment index that is the mean of the organization average response to the former of these questions and the proportion of employees in the organization that state “I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis” to the latter.

# **Basic Determinants of Bureaucrat Errors**

What are the descriptive determinants of these errors? Table A4 undertakes complementary ANOVA and OLS analyses where the dependent variable is the z-score of errors across variables outlined above. We focus on variables related to the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy, and the marginal costs and benefits of information acquisition. Column 1 of Table A4 presents partial sum of squares for these variables with corresponding F-statistic p-values presented in parentheses. Column 2 provides coefficients for the corresponding variables within a formal regression framework for consistency with our later tables.

The first panel tests whether the hierarchical structure of government matters for the quality of officials’ information along three margins. We see that tier of government is of substantial importance, and has a higher partial sum of squares than any of the other ‘structure’ variables. Its p-value is 0.00, which is consistent with the notion that the structure of formal authority is a critical determinant of information absorption. In column 2, where the coefficients are from a regression of the variables listed in Table A4 on the z-score of errors, we see that the district government binary has a p-value of 0.02, previewing future results.

We can also assess these unconditional results graphically. Figure A3 presents the average errors of centralized and district in their claims about each of the 42 districts on which we focus our core 39
Industry Restructuring and Regulation -Building a base for sustainable growth

- enforcement of these rules is an effective regulatory system which ideally requires the establishment of an independent agency; and

- ownership - reforms are often associated with a change in the ownership of previously state-owned enterprises to some form of private sector ownership 5

A further reform that is often linked to the above reforms is pricing. Traditionally, since governments have effectively used infrastructure companies as an arm of the social welfare system, few of these companies have been able to charge cost-reflective prices. As part of the reform processes, many countries have included a move, possibly phased over time, to costreflective pricing, since this helps ensure the long-term viability of an efficiently operated industry.

Most reforms that have been undertaken involve a package that is comprised of a mixture of the three key aspects, as well as pricing. In fact, as will be seen later, the greatest overall impact is observed when the reform involves all three key aspects. A typical package is shown in Figure i _6_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Introduce Incentives for<br>competition Greater<br>Efficiency<br>Increase Industry Private Sector<br>Transparency Restructuring Participation<br>Mobilize New Sources<br>Finance AL of Finance<br>Protect<br>Consumer I increase<br>Interests Efficiency<br>Regulation Cost-Relectiv<br>I Pricing<br>Protect Industry<br>Industry Viability<br>Interests<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Source: London Economics<br><!-- End of picture text --> When ever regulation is considered, the narrowly defined aspect of conduct regulation is usually investigated-often because conduct regulation is an ongoing activity while structural regulation

- 5 One aspect of this investigated by D'Souza and Megginson (1999) relates to the impact of privatization when a majority of the Board of Directors or the Chief Executive Officer are replaced. Box 3 reports some of the results relating to this.

- The way in which different aspects of this reform package works to create incentives are discussed in Alexander and Mayer (1997). It is interesting to consider the 'corporatization' debate that has been underway in the UK for the past few years concerning the postal service and air traffic control.

3
O.A.M.D.G.

factors that may influence the occurrence of violence, in order to avoid the violence variable picking up the effect of other, correlated, features.

# **DATA**

The main dataset used comes from the baseline survey to evaluate the _Familias en Acción_ program in Colombia (‘ _Familias_ dataset’), conducted in 2002 with approximately 11,500 households in 122 municipalities. Two types of surveys were applied: an extensive questionnaire for households of the lowest income stratum (i.e. registered with ‘SISBEN 1’<sup>11</sup> in December 1999) and a questionnaire to the mayor in order to obtain municipality level variables.<sup>12</sup> We merge this dataset at the municipal level with two further databases, a violence database assembled by Medina et al. (2001), and a database of municipality characteristics compiled from different official sources, like the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF), the Planning Ministry (DNP), and the Administration of Courts (CSJ).

The municipalities in the violence dataset do not completely match those in the _Familias_ dataset, so that close to 3,000 household observations are lost through matching. _Familias_ , while covering households in the lowest national welfare stratum near exhaustively, does not reach all municipalities. And the violence database misses the departments of Antioquia, Choco and Guajira, which are nonetheless included in _Familias_ . Please note that our results will therefore only have external validity for the lowest national welfare stratum in the area _excludin_ g the above departments. While excluding Choco and Guajira should not have a noticeable effect on the average and median prevalence of violence in the sample, excluding Antioquia may miss the upper

> 11 SISBEN 1-6, sixtiles of the population income distribution, is a basic welfare indicator routinely collected for all families in Colombia. Its level determines welfare entitlements and utility prices.

> 12 Familias covers the first income sixtile exhaustively. It is therefore not representative for Colombia as a whole, but covers the poorest households in their entirety.

10
15 diffe-ences may reflect different physical conditions, or differences in the demand for a cleaner environment. Population densities, for example, tend to increase the severity of environmental problems. The sparsely populated Nordic countries may have a much higher pollution absorptive capacity than densely populated Japan. This may explain their lower level of expenditure despite high shares of the sensitive goods in total exports and in economic activity.

Data on environmental expenditures in developing countries is sparse. Their present expenditures can be ass -ned to be lower than those in industrial countries, because of lower demand for a cleaner environment. One available estimate (World Bank, World Development Report, 1992) calculated that to do away with the main pollutants and to reach the present level of environmental technology in industrial countries, developing countries would have to invest annually 0.6 to 0.8 % of their GDP over the next ten years. This gives a rough yardstick on how their present costs and standards compare with those in industrial countries.

The impact of environmental standards and expenditures on competitiveness can also depend on who bears the financial costs. By absorbing part of the cost, government can reduce the static impact of higher standards. Table 9 shows that many governments have borne a large part of total environmental expenditures. The **public'** share of total environmental expenditure in the mid-1980s was highest in Japan, over 90%. In other industrial countries the government's share fluctuated around _50%_ - with the US having the lowest share at 40%. In the Nordi - countries a large share of environmental expenditures, nearly two-thirds in Sweden and Norway - has been incurred by the government.

> ' Public expenditure **in** the OECD(1990) survey include **all budgetary d** extra-budgetary expenditure by **all** levels of government (central, local, **state** or provincial). Public enterprises whose nuin function **is** to provide pollution **control** services **such as waste water management** etc. **are** included in the public ector. For **more** detailed definition **ee** OECD(1990).
# **Table 6:  Competition, Innovation, and Regulation and Family Management Practices**

|**Model**||**OLS w**|**ith Country**|**FE (Cross-sect**|**ion)**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Outcome Variable**||**O**|**verall Mana**|**gement Score**|||
||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|**(5)**|**(6)**|
|All Family Management x No or One Competitor<br>(domestic)|-0.100**<br>(0.042)||||||
|Family Management share x No or One Competitor<br>(domestic)||-0.119**|||||
|||(0.047)|||||
|All Family Management x Introduced Process<br>Innovation|||0.047**<br>(0.022)||||
|Family Management share x Introduced Process<br>Innovation||||0.056**|||
|||||(0.023)|||
|All Family Management x Labor Regulations<br>Major/Severe Obstacle|||||0.092***<br>(0.032)||
|Family Management share x Labor Regulations<br>Major/Severe Obstacle||||||0.125***<br>(0.033)|
|All management is family Y/N|-0.037**||-<br>0.050***||-0.054***||
||(0.016)||(0.013)||(0.013)||
|Share of family management (0 to 1)||-0.035||-0.048***||-0.058***|
|||(0.021)||(0.017)||(0.018)|
|No or One competitor (Y/N) (domestic)|0.038|0.051|||||
||(0.034)|(0.038)|||||
|Introduced a process innovation|||0.057***|0.050***|||
||||(0.014)|(0.016)|||
|Share of same family ownership (0 to 1)|0.009|0.012|0.007|0.007|0.014|0.018|
||(0.019)|(0.022)|(0.014)|(0.017)|(0.015)|(0.018)|
|Owner, Manager or Board Political Connection Y/N|-0.013|-0.015|-0.011|-0.011|-0.011|-0.011|
||(0.023)|(0.023)|(0.020)|(0.021)|(0.020)|(0.020)|
|Female top manager Y/N|0.022*|0.021*|0.009|0.008|0.011|0.010|
||(0.012)|(0.012)|(0.011)|(0.011)|(0.011)|(0.011)|
|Firm Formally Registered when Started Operations|0.043*|0.042*|0.053**|0.053**|0.048**|0.049**|
||(0.024)|(0.024)|(0.022)|(0.023)|(0.022)|(0.022)|
|Top manager experience in sector (years)|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|Log of age of firm|-0.018**|-0.019**|-0.013*|-0.013*|-0.014*|-0.014*|
||(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.008)|(0.008)|

24
-2 -

education, especially in countries that now have low female secondary<sup>enrollment levels. The elasticities</sup> of fertility and infant mortality with respect to female education<sup>substantially exceed those with respect</sup> to family planning and health programs when the elasticities are<sup>estimated with appropriate controls. The</sup> results from these cross-country regressions should be interpreted cautiously<sup>as they may not be</sup> representative of a particular country's experience and reflect the usual<sup>problems of relying on national</sup> averages. Although endogeneity of services may be less of a problem in<sup>cross-country data, using cross-</sup> country data imposes a common structure on the econometric reladonship<sup>between the variables.</sup> However, the results are broadly similar to a number of micro studies (e.g.<sup>see Schultz 1989 for a</sup> review) and with another cross-country study, Mauldin and Ross (1991) which<sup>found that the direct effect</sup> of family planning effort is less than the total (direct and indirect effects. -,f<sup>socio-econonlic factors</sup> (including education).

1.2 The paper is organized as follows. The basic analytical framework and<sup>the models to be</sup> tested are described in Section 2. Definitions, data sources, and<sup>limitations are discussed briefly in</sup> Section 3. The results from cross-country equations are discussed in<sup>Section 4. Some policy simulations</sup> are attempted in Section 5. Last, the concluding section draws some inferences for policy.

**2. AnalytIcal** Framework **and the Reduced Form Equations**

A. Analytical Eram=yrk 2.1 For most couples, achieving a pregnancy does not require a deliberate decision,<sup>but</sup> avoiding a pregnancy does. Following Hen (1984), this section outlines<sup>a structual amework focusing</sup> on the factors determining the number of children parents want and<sup>their ability to limit births to that</sup>
asset management. The single provider would not have to be a public agency; it could well be a regulated public utility, jointly owned by participating asset managers.

Fourth, promoting the market for fixed real annuities would address the needs of people with long life expectancy and low levels of risk tolerance. Offering this option would permit retiring workers to reveal their preferences. If the demand for fixed real annuities is relatively weak it could be easily satisfied by the limited supply of inflation-linked bonds issued by the public sector. If the demand for such annuities is revealed to be strong then policy measures would need to be taken to promote the issuance of inflationlinked debt instruments by both the public and private sectors.

Fifth, the offer of fixed nominal annuities that is envisaged in Lithuania does not provide protection against inflation. The authorities should consider the case for promoting more aggressively the use of escalating annuities that are included in the current plan, until the market is able to offer more sophisticated products.

Sixth, the offer of government guarantees to cover the guaranteed benefits provided by fixed or variable annuities is highly advisable and this is envisaged in the four transitioning countries. However, these government guarantees may need to be supplemented with special measures to address annuitization risk. The provision of a government guarantee covering a specified lifetime minimum real rate of return during the accumulation phase would also be advisable.

Seventh, the marketing and pricing policies of annuity providers in decentralized competitive markets would need to be closely regulated and monitored. Every effort should be made to provide effective protection to pensioners by deterring deceptive practices, preventing excessive fees, promoting sound valuations of portable balances and ensuring a fair distribution of profits. Centralized agencies require a high level of transparency and public accountability.

Eighth, for fixed nominal and real annuities an electronic quotation system should be created to lower search costs and minimize the influence of brokers. For variable annuities, a central register needs to be maintained compiling comparative data on a consistent and informative basis on the performance and bonus policies of different providers and enhancing the transparency of the system. The register should focus on profit-sharing policies, levels of operating costs, levels of entry and exit fees, valuation of portable balances and consistency and soundness of investment policies. A very important challenge is to find ways to standardize this information and make it comprehensible by retiring workers.

Ninth, the market fragmentation that would be caused by the offer of a wider but still constrained choice of products could be addressed by adopting a clear division of responsibilities: the use of a centralized agency to offer variable annuities along the lines suggested above; and by channeling through a decentralized competitive market the supply of fixed real and nominal annuities.

58
agreements with shipping lines now stipulate a 96% accuracy of information provided<sup>22</sup> . Failure to do so attracts sanctions. Enforcement of CTOC agreements has been critical for success.

The interesting thing about the CTOC is that staff can commit to these targets as well and at the moment about 5% of TPT staff have committed to a service level performance of 28 moves per hour. Further incentives include a commitment to specific customers to be afforded an agreed level of service, be it reduced, during periods of disruption such as labor strikes, etc. while the customer commits to clearing cargo from the port within agreed times. With the bigger customers agreements may even involve doing bulk runs at night.

In an environment where inefficiencies prevail, the private sector feeds from the public sector’s inefficiency, therefore creating a virtuous cycle of inefficiency and corruption on both sides. The basic issue here is really a need to establish rules of engagement and enforcement on both sides but the onus is on Transnet to enforce the rules while fulfilling its mandate of providing an efficient service to its customers. And so far, this arrangement seems to be working well.

TNPA also established port user forums for some of the key stakeholders, coordinated and chaired by TNPA itself. These have been divided into six clusters as follows: Automotive, Coal, Containers, Iron Ore, Liquid Bulk and Manganese. In the case of the DCT and Pier 1 there is a container terminal advisory board which meets on a monthly basis. These meetings provide TNPA and its customers an opportunity to discuss issues and try to find solutions together. While the process started off with both parties playing blame games, the partnership between TNPA and its customers appears to be working well as reflected by the recent Barloworld survey of 2010. At least, more than half of those in the automotive industry proclaim that logistics capacity of SA’s ports has improved in the last two years and they also think that the loading and docking capacity is now competitive and comparable to international practice. The Industry also gave customs a vote of confidence by confirming that compliance processes are being dealt with more efficiently than in the past and that corruption has decreased, and physical security of goods in the port has improved (Barloworld Logistics, 2010).

# **4. Why Was It So Important to Reduce Cargo Dwell Time?**

Aggressive policies against long dwell times are often pointed at by shippers as unfair and disproportionate. The complexity is to set tariffs and measures that are, on the one hand, strict enough

> 22 Some of the items stipulated in the agreements include Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA), Container lists or EDI capability.

16
**Table 6: Maternal Education, Preferences and Bargaining**

||OLS|IV|BiProbit|n|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Time Spent by Mother on Paid Work (Y/N)|-0.01<br>(0.02)|0.05<br>(0.19)|0.01<br>(0.09)|1437|
|Time Spent by Mother Outside the House (minutes/day)|-57.30<br>[8.28]a|-84.11<br>(105.93)||1437|
|Time Spent by Mother on Paid Work (minutes/day)|-10.89<br>(7.86)|58.74<br>(84.68)||1437|
|Was the Mother Responsible for the School Enrollment|0.02|-0.02|0.01|3307|
|Decision (Enrolled children only) (Y/N)|(0.03)|(0.17)|(0.07)||
|Was the Mother Responsible for the choice of School<br>(Enrolled children only) (Y/N)|0.02<br>(0.02)|0.05<br>(0.15)|0.05<br>(0.03)|3307|
|Is the Child Enrolled (Y/N)|0.17<br>[0.02]a|-0.01<br>(0.17)|0.09<br>(0.07)|4331|
|Is the Child enrolled in a Public School (Y/N)|-0.19<br>[0.03]a|0.07<br>(0.32)|0.02<br>(0.10)|3305|
|Total Education Expenditure per Child (Rs./month)|58.62<br>[6.49]a|19.85<br>(54.75)||3160|
|Books and Supplies per Child (Rs./month)|11.43<br>[1.51]a|11.75<br>(10.90)||3160|
|Uniforms and Shoes per Child (Rs./month)|7.09<br>[1.47]a|-17.92<br>(14.95)||3160|
|Time Spent by Mother on Children’s General Needs<br>(minutes/day)|-0.01<br>(7.83)|-30.25<br>(87.77)||1437|

_Notes:_ Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant at p<0.1. For discrete variables, we report both the IV coefficient and the Average Treatment on Treated using a biprobit specification. Girls’ school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded variable in the IV and the bivariate probit specifications. All expenditure regressions are presented in Pakistani Rupees (Rs.) per month. At the time of the survey, $1 was approximately (Pakistani) Rs.65. All regressions control for a full set of indicator variables for mother’s age and mother’s birth village _tehsil._ In addition, child level regressions control for full set of indicator variables for child’s age and child gender.

36