rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
artificial lake that covers 8,502 square kilometers within Ghana. Some cells are partially outside Ghana, or partially covered in water or by the sea, something we capture with dummies. We also construct a dummy equal to one if there is a large body of water on any of the eight adjacent cells _n_ 1, and another one for the next 16 adjacent cells _n_ 2. This is done to investigate whether proximity to a lake or lagoon attracts human settlement, e.g., if the lake is use to fish or transport goods. The same thing is done for proximity to the sea and to a land border, for similar reasons.

The last piece of information that we integrate into our analysis is road data. For 1976 and 1986 we have information about the location of all roads in Ghana. These roads are classified into four categories, from 1 to 4.<sup>6</sup> Class 1 roads are the highest quality, and class 4 roads the poorest. Typically, a class 1 road is paved and hence usable all year round. In contrast, a class 4 is a dirt track and many of these roads are seasonal. Class 2 and 3 occupy an intermediate position. Road availability in 1976 is of particular interest for our purpose because these roads predate our period of analysis and thus cannot be construed as caused by buildings constructed after 1976. The same can be said of 1986 roads regarding new buildings constructed afterwards.<sup>7</sup> For each cell we construct a dummy _rkit_ equal to 1 if there is a road of class _k_ in cell _i_ in year _t_ = 1976 or _t_ = 1986 and 0 otherwise. We also calculate the proportion of immediately adjacent cells that contain a road of each particular class, which we denote _rkit_<sup>_n_1.Mirroringwhatwedidforbuilt-uparea,we</sup> construct a similar proportion of roads in the _n_ 2 neighborhood of _i_ , which we denote _rkit_<sup>_n_2.</sup>

# **3 Conceptual framework**

The objective of this paper is to make predictions about the evolution of buildup patterns over time at the high level of geographical disaggregation allowed by our data. While we do not attempt to pinpoint where any construction will occur in the future, we wish to uncover patterns that are relevant for regional planning. Indeed, the population of Africa continues to grow at a rapid pace and this will undoubtedly translate into more buildings. Where these buildings locate will have large consequences for public service delivery as well as for economic growth – two issues that we

> 6There is also a class 5 which is labeled ’unknown road’. Our of an abundance of caution, we ignored these roads in our analysis.

> 7We also have data on roads in 2008, divided into primary, secondary, and tertiary roads. Unfortunately, these categories reflect administrative definitions, and they do not overlap with those used in 1976 and 1986, which focus on the physical qualities of the road. Since we are interested in predicting settlement patterns starting in 1975, this data is less relevant and is ignored in most of the analysis.

8
A Welfarist Theory Unifying Monetary and Non-Monetary Poverty Measurement.<sup>∗</sup>

# Benoit Decerf

## **JEL** : I32.

**Keywords** : Multidimensional Poverty, Poverty Identification, Poverty Measurement.

> ∗Acknowledgments : I am grateful to Francisco Ferreira for several helpful discussions and suggestions. I thank James Foster, Maria Ana Lugo, Berk Ozler and Natalie Nairi Quinn who provided useful comments. I am grateful to Martin Ravallion for an insightful exchange at an early stage of this project. I thank all the participants at the internal seminar of the research departement of the World Bank. All errors remain mine. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
method by exploiting the spatial and temporal variation in market sales of AFVs and incentive policies while controlling for vehicle model characteristics and consumer demographic variables.

The effectiveness and efficiency of subsidy programs hinge on several factors. The first is the lack of additionality: the notion that incentives do not always result in additional AFV sales, because many buyers who receive the subsidy might still have purchased AFVs without it. This problem may be pronounced during the early deployment stage because early adopters of AFVs are consumers who embrace new technologies, and who have the strongest environmental awareness and, usually, higher incomes. Therefore, their purchase decisions do not heavily rely on the provision of subsidies; these people would probably have purchased AFVs without the subsidies.

Various empirical studies document the challenge of additionality. Chandra et al. (2010) argue that the HEV tax rebates offered by Canadian provinces subsidized many consumers who would have bought HEVs in any case. Bereseteanu & Li (2011) find that HEVs sales in the United States would still be growing rapidly, even without tax incentives. Huse & Lucinda (2014) find that a substantial share of FFV consumers in Sweden would have purchased FFVs in the absence of the cash rebates because of the vehicles’ lower operational costs. Xing et al. (2019) find that federal income tax credits for purchasing plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs)<sup>20</sup> in the United States resulted in a 29 percent increase in PEV sales, but 70 percent of the credits went to households that would have purchased PEVs without the credits.<sup>21</sup> Replacing a one-size-fits-all policy with one that targets marginal buyers who are more responsive to the subsidy and would purchase AFVs only with the subsidy could improve effectiveness. Marginal buyers are those who consider the higher upfront cost the only obstacle to the adoption of AFVs, or those who view the subsidy amount as sufficient compensation for the utility loss from the other drawbacks of AFVs. Using the EV subsidy receipts data and vehicle transaction prices, Muehlegger & Rapson (2018) show that EV demand by low- and middle-income households is price elastic, and that the pass-through of the subsidy is complete among these consumers. Xing et al. (2019) find that cost effectiveness is greater for policies that that eliminate or reduce subsidies for high-income households, and provide more generous

> 20 Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) include both battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).

> 21 See DeShazo (2016) for a literature review on the effectiveness of US subsidy programs for plug-in electric vehicles.

23
# **Account penetration by gender**

Adults with an account at a formal financial institution (%) <!-- Start of picture text --> 92<br>FEMALE 87<br>MALE<br>58 MALE<br>50 52 55<br>44 47<br>41 40 FEMALE<br>35<br>27 25<br>23 22<br>13<br>MIDDLE EAST SUB-SAHARAN SOUTH LATIN AMERICA EUROPE & EAST ASIA HIGH-INCOME<br>& NORTH AFRICA AFRICA ASIA & CARIBBEAN CENTRAL ASIA & PACIFIC ECONOMIES<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012.

less likely to have a formal account than men across all income quintiles, with the differences in account penetration averaging between 6 and 9 percentage points (figure 1.8). In high-income economies, however, the average difference exceeds 4 percentage points only for women in the poorest income quintile.

Education level also helps explain the large variation in the use of formal accounts. In developing economies adults with a tertiary or higher education are on average more than twice as likely to have an account as those with a primary education or less (figure 1.9). The difference is particularly stark in Sub-Saharan Africa: adults with a tertiary or higher education are more than four times as **Account penetration by gender across** likely to have an account as those with a **within-economy income quintiles** primary education or less—though only Adults with an account 3 percent of adults in the region report at a formal financial institution (%) having completed tertiary education.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>MALE<br>F EMALE<br>80<br>HIGH-INCOME<br>ECONOMIES<br>MALE<br>60<br>FEMALE<br>40<br>20<br>DEVELOPING<br>ECONOMIES<br>POOREST Q2–Q4 RICHEST<br>Income quintile<br><!-- End of picture text --> These gaps underscore the importance of education, particularly financial literacy, in expanding financial inclusion—an issue that is receiving growing recognition.<sup>9</sup> Analysis shows that even after accounting for national income level, there is a strong relationship between investment in education (as measured by spending per student on primary education) and account penetration.<sup>10</sup> Age is another characteristic that matters for the likelihood of having an account. In both high-income and developing economies those ages 25–64 are more _Source:_ Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012.

**16**

MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION
# **TABLE 5**

# **1997 Tax Revenue Distribution Bosnia and Herzegovina**

||Total Rev|enue Dis|tribution (Mi|l. DEM)|Total<br>(Mil. DEM)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Revenues|State|RS|Federation|Cantonis||
|Customs Duties|25.00|39.70|<br>208.30|<br>0.00|273.00|
|Excise & Special Import Taxes|0.00|0.00|<br>173.00|<br>0.00|225.00|
|Wage & Income Taxes|0.00|60.00|<br>20.00|<br>20.00|100.00|
|Profits Tax|0.00|0.00|<br>70.00|<br>70.00|140.00|
|Sales Tax|0.00|78.00|<br>0.00|<br>500.00|578.00|
|Other Taxes and Fees|15.00|21.00|<br>0.00|<br>179.00|215.00|
|Total Revenues|40.00|198.70|<br>523.30|<br>769.00|1,531.00|
|Expenditures||||||
|Expenditures (Except Army,<br>Social Prog. & Debt Serv.)|40.00|116.70|<br>163.30|<br>769.00|1,089.00|
|Expenditures: Army, Social|0.00|82.00|<br>360.00|<br>0.00|442.00|
|Programs & Debt Service||||||
|Total Expenditures|40.00|198.7|<br>523.3|<br>769.00|1,531.00|

The Federation and RS data do not include special funds for health care, unemployment, and pensions. The RS data do not include municipal revenues.

## **Conclusion**

Progress in developing the governments in Bosnia has been slower than was envisioned when the Dayton Agreements were penned. This is not surprising since there is little or no world experience with developing governments on the short time line presumed in the Agreements. There are positive signals in Bosnia, such as a number of government institutions becoming operative and revenues being passed to both the State and the Federation. Still, the challenge of achieving fully operational governments remains in place.

Traditional economic models of federalism, like the one on which this paper's analysis is based, suggest a government structure assuming there is an intent to achieve Pareto-efficiency for the entire country. Current attitudes in Bosnia appear consistent with the views that many people in each ethnic group see themselves as members of their group, rather than as Bosnians, and are not broadly concerned about welfare of the entire country or access to public services outside the group. The motivation for the fiscal federalism structure proposed in the Dayton Agreements is 24
sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries. In 2008 the chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee also held a “signaling exercise” among a group of ministers, at the time that “modalities” in agriculture and non-agricultural market access were being discussed. At the signaling exercise, participating ministers indicated that they might significantly improve their services offers.

**Figure 2: Existing commitments, Doha offers and actual policy by region**

<!-- Start of picture text --> S AR A FR LA C EA P MEN A OE CD E CA<br>O ffe r I mp ro v em ent (U ru gu ay R oun d c om mitm en t-D oh a O ffer)<br>O ffe r g ap (D oha O ffer-A ct ual policy)<br> A ct ual P olicy<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>Services trade restrictiveness index<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009). _Note:_ If countries have not made a Doha offer, existing commitments are used.

# **5. Initiatives to expand exports of low-income countries**

Key elements of the Doha Round from a development perspective are enhanced market access for LDCs; actions to facilitate trade (lower trade transactions costs); and the aid for trade initiative.

# **_Better market access for least developed countries (LDCs)_**

The proposed “duty free and quota free” (DFQF) initiative will improve existing access to foreign markets for the LDCs. But the initiative will add significantly to existing access only if industrial and more advanced developing countries do not exclude vital products such as garments or agricultural products. In most of the potential major markets that do not already offer 100% DFQF access, limiting such access to at least 97% of tariff lines – as called for in the 2005 Hong Kong ministerial declaration – implies that a large share of all exports may continue to be subjected to 10
<!-- Start of picture text --> Epidemic-level factors Community-level factors Individual-level factors<br>* Prevalence, severity, and * Health system * Health status, health history<br>transmission dynamics of illness * Social norms * Health system experience and<br>* Effectiveness and safety of discrimination<br>vaccine * Education, wealth/poverty<br>Proximate determinants of vaccine intentions<br>* Cost (financial and non-financial/hassle costs) Behavioral biases<br>Social norms message “== Confidence in vaccine safety and effectiveness and barriers<br>-_ Perceived benefit of vaccine Risk aversion:<br>* Intention-action<br>o<br>allfety, - gap<br>teI * Limited attention<br>mental models of<br>health and health<br>production<br>Sources: Quinn et al., 2019; WHO SAGE Working Group, 2013<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **Price Seasonality in Africa: Measurement and Extent**

Christopher L. Gilbert Luc Christiaensen Jonathan Kaminski<sup>1</sup>

**JEL** : O13, Q13, Q18

**Key words** : food price, maize, seasonality, Africa

1 Christopher L. Gilbert (corresponding author): SAIS Bologna Center, Johns Hopkins University <u>(christopher.gilbert@jhu.edu) ; Luc Christiaensen: World Bank (lchristiaensen@worldbank.org)</u> Jonathan Kaminski: Noble Agri (kaminski.jonathan@gmail.com). The paper forms part of the project “Agriculture in Africa – Telling Facts from Myths” – see <u>http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/africa‐myths‐and‐facts . A</u> preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Società Italiana degli Economisti dello Sviluppo, Florence, Italy, 10‐11 September, 2014. Shamnaaz Sufrauj and Lina Datkunaite assisted with calculations. The authors thank a referee, Daniel Gilbert, Denise Osborn and Wouter Zant for useful discussion. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
- 30 -

The land law in Bulgaria was also passed in February, 1991, but political stalemate and administrative inertia delayed its implementation. The National Land Council, the main administrative organ of implementation, was not appointed until May 31, 1991, and appointment of local land commissions was attendant upon the formation of the national commission. As a consequence, people who wanted to claim land in the first half of 1991 had nowhere to take their claims. Many of the records showing who brought land into the collectives are held by the farms, and even managers who wanted to speed the restitution of land rights could not submit them to nonexistent local commissions. Some land has been returned under temporary use rights, but transfer of title is much delayed.

Administrative delay has slowed the implementation of the Bulgarian law. The philosophy of land distribution embodied in the law and the implementing regulations is by nature a slow one. Rather than relying on market trades to improve a quick and imperfect distribution of rights, the Bulgarian approach attempts construction of appropriate holdings through administrative assignment. Local land commissions accept and adjudicate claims, and when a substantial number of claims have been verified, turn them over to a team of specialists who draw up a local map of the allocated holdings.

ThS approachI1 is deemed niecessary for several reasons. ine iuiganans want to avoid parcelization, and doubt the efficacy of market based consolidation. Market based solutions are indeed unlikely to work, since the law prohibits purchase and sale of land by private individuals for three years. In many places the amount of land that can be restored is only a proportion of that claimed, since development has changed the contours and use of land, and agricultural area has declined. In these areas all claims will be prorated by the necessary proportionate adjustment. The effort to achieve justice and
# **Table 16:  Correlation Between Rural Road Investment Strategies and Current District Road Allocation Maintenance**

||**Para**|**meters (wei**|**ghts)**||**Correlation**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Agricultur**<br>**e potential**<br>**(α)**|**Populatio**<br>**n**<br>**(β)**|**Area**<br>**(δ)**|**Network**<br>**length**<br>**(Φ)**|**Network in**<br>**bad**<br>**condition**<br>**(η)**|**between actual**<br>**and optimal**<br>**district roads**<br>**maintenance**<br>**fund**|
|0|0|0|1|0|**0.78**|
|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.2|0.65|
|0.5|0.125|0.125|0.125|0.125|0.35|
|0.75|0.0625|0.0625|0.0625|0.0625|0.20|
|1|0|0|0|0|**0.11**|

Table 17 demonstrates that the agricultural potential varies tremendously between districts in Uganda. Districts in the North of the country such as Yumbe, Moroto, Kitgum seem to have a much higher potential than districts in the South-West, such as Kisoro or South-East, such as Bugiri. In terms of agricultural growth for Uganda, roads investment may be economically justifiable more easily in some districts in the North, such as Moroto or Kitgum and not necessarily in the South-West, such as Kisoro or Kabale (Table 18).

**Table 17: Agricultural potential per sq. km per district (in USD)**

|Yumbe|4,393|
|---|---|
|Moroto|4,393|
|Nakapiripiriti|4,289|
|Kitgum|3,688|
|Adjumani|3,404|
|Mukono|89|
|Bugiri|80|
|Mayuge|77|
|Kisoro|74|

Note: it is computed as the agricultural potential divided per the district area.

42
- From International Country Risk Guide Database: bureaucracy quality; civil disorder; democratic accountability; political risk rating.

- From the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators Database: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality.

- From Global Competitiveness Index Database: transparency of government policy making; burden of government regulation.

In the literature there are many studies focusing on the link between general corruption and its political and institutional determinants. Several studies find a negative link between corruption and bureaucracy quality,<sup>13</sup> while democratization has been identified as one of the main factors determining corruption.<sup>14</sup> The link is found to be negative. According to several empirical studies the link between corruption and political stability is also negative.<sup>15</sup> According to Tanzi (1998), higher transparency of government lowers corruption. Voice and accountability are significant determinants of corruption and as voice and accountability improve, corruption declines.<sup>16</sup> Since all these indexes indicate improvements with higher values, in our regression specifications the expected sign of all these variables’ estimated coefficients is negative as is the case in the literature. The regression results indicate that only bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, government effectiveness, and burden of government regulation are statistically significant determinants of tax corruption. In columns (6)-(11) of Table A2 in Annex, the results with the omitted political and institutional variables are reported. It can be seen that the estimated coefficients of the tax simplification variables, which are the main interests of our paper, is robust to the presence or absence of the insignificant determinants. Thus, only

> 13 For example, Tanzi (1998), Gurgur and Shah (2005), Brunetti and Weder (2003), and van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997).

> 14 Iwasakia and Suzukib (2012), Revier and Elbahnasawy (2012) Shabbir and Anwar (2007), Treisman (2000), Tanzi (1998),  Kunicova and Ackerman (2005), Braun and di Tella (2004), Knack and Azfar (2003), Paldam (2002), Swamy, Knack, Lee, and Azfar (2001), Wei (2000), and Goldsmith (1999).

> 15 Serra (2006), Evrensel (2010), and Park (2003).

> 16 Revier and Elbahnasawy (2012), Shabbir and Anwar (2007), Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005),  and Brunetti and Weder (2003).

20
|Motor veh<br>body parts|631,909|1.4|Brazil|35|Motor vehcl<br>parts|529,162|1.7|Brazil|43|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Medicam<br>nes packs|385,618|0.9|EU 25|42|Diesel<br>engines|248,537|0.8|Brazil|62|
|Motor<br>vehicle<br>gear boxes|379,644|0.8|Brazil|35|Piston<br>engines|207,713|0.7|EU 25|55|
|Diesel<br>engines|362,751|0.8|Brazil|73|Equipment<br>P&C|200,380|0.7|USA|50|
|Monoamm<br>onium<br>phosphate|320,240|0.7|Russian<br>Federation|44|Telecom<br>equipment|197,400|0.7|EU 25|33|
|Piston<br>engines|306,358|0.7|Brazil|58|Medicam nes<br>packs|181,853|0.6|EU 25|44|
|Motorcycles|301,377|0.7|China|83|Motor vehicle<br>gear boxes|147,862|0.5|EU 25|37|

_Source:_ COMTRADE and own calculations.

**Imports are comprised predominantly of manufacture products (specifically in the automobile sector), both in 1997 and in 2007, corroborating the fact that imports are highly technologyintensive and that the structure of imports has not changed much** . The import content of exports for Argentina<sup>5</sup> shows that manufacturing has the highest imported content, at 18.5 percent of total exports, followed by agriculture, with 7.9 percent of imported content (Table 3). For the country as a whole, the imported intermediate content of total exports amounts to 14.5 percent of total exports (US$4 billion).

**Table 3. Imported Intermediate Content of Exports, Argentina, 1997 ( US$ millions)**

|**Sector**|**Import content**|**Total exports**|**Imported intermediate content**<br>**of exports(%)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Agriculture**|289.7|3,665.1|7.90|
|**Mining**|94.6|2,311.5|4.09|
|**Manufactures**|3,487.8|18,908.3|18.45|
|**Services**|146.3|2,907.7|5.03|
|**Country total**|**4,018.4**|**27,792.6**|**14.46**|

_Source_ : Author’s calculations based on INDEC data.<sup>6</sup>

**Within manufactures, motor vehicles have the highest import content (45 percent), followed by radios and fertilizers (41 percent)** (Figure 10). These findings show that there is important scope for Argentina to develop new inputs (especially parts and components) for the production of exports. Even though there is no evidence of important changes in the structure of Argentina’s exports and imports, it would be important to repeat the same analysis with more updated data.

> 5 Following the “import-content” approach, Hummels et al. (2001) develop a measure of vertical specialization based on data from input-output tables, which measures imported inputs embodied in exported goods.

> 6 Input-output tables available for 124 production activities, corresponding to 18 sectors of economic activities, which can be in turn aggregated into four broad aggregates: agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. Data is used at basic prices, that is, not including taxes net of subsidies, trade and transportation margins or customs expenditures.

9