rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
|**Table 2: Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Ou**|**tsiders under the**|**Factories Act, 1948, i**<br>**Firm Cate**|**n 2005-06***<br> **gories**||
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**A**|**B**|**C**|**D**|
|||**NSSO Firms with**|**NSSO Firms with 9**||
|**Firm Characteristics**|**ASI Firms**|**10 or employees**|**employees**|**NSSO Rest**|
|Number of Firms|124,710|248,265|62,980|16,700,000|
|Share of Firms|0.7%|1.4%|0.4%|97.5%|
|Total Employment**|8,809,946|4,042,081|566,821|31,800,000|
|Share of Employment|19.5%|8.9%|1.3%|70.3%|
|Mean Employment|70.6|16.2|9.0|1.9|
|Median Employment|20|12|9|2|
|Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)***|81,884|32,748|37,744|9,432|

* Usage of power is ignored and only the criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration under the Factories Act,1948. Excludes firms with missng or zero employment.

**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm.

***Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total employment

Some idea of the trends is given by comparing the 2010-11 NSSO survey and 2009-10 ASI with the 200506 NSSO survey and ASI in (Table 2). Share of formal firms went from 0.7% of all firms to 0.8% over this five year period, and their employment share increased from 19.5% to 24.8%. Thus, the employment share of total informality (B, C and D) declined correspondingly. The employment share of noncompliant firms (B) went from 8.9% to 9.8%, a clear upward trend. The share of employment of the avoiders (C) does not seem to have changed at all, while the share of the outsiders (D) went down from 70.3% to 64.1%. In 2005-06 the number of noncompliant enterprises was 248,265 compared with 124,710 compliant enterprises, a share of 66.7%, compared to a share of 64.2% in 2010-11. The corresponding share of the workforce was 31.5% in 2005-06, compared to 28.3% in 2010-11. There is thus only a very slight downward trend in this ratio of noncompliance to compliance, but it remains very high.<sup>10</sup> Focusing on 2009-10 (the patterns are similar for 2005-06) it is seen that the average size of enterprise falls from A through D—from 79.9 to 17.7 to 9 to 1.8. However, the standard deviation of employment is high, especially with the larger sized firms. The median in such cases becomes a better average for comparison. The trend of falling average employment from A to D holds true even for the median. The average labor productivity, measured as gross value added divided by total persons employed, of firms in category A is more than twice that of the firms in category B and C and nearly six times that of the firms in D.

> 10 Referring to a much earlier period, Nagraj (2002) finds that “In 1980, 53 percent of factories employing 10 or more workers did not register themselves under the Act **.** This proportion increased to 58 per cent in 1990”.

9
# TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics for urban and rural areas for both rounds

|||Rou|nd 1|||Rou|nd 2||Diffe|rence|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Variable|Ur|ban|Ru|ral|Urb|an|Ru|ral|Urban|Rural|
||Mean|S.D.|Mean|S.D.|Mean|S.D.|Mean|S.D.|Mean|Mean|
|Prob. of living in the area|65%|48%|35%|48%|69%|46%|31%|46%|4%|-4%|
|Prob. of being stunted|11%|31%|29%|45%|20%|40%|58%|49%|8%|26%|
|Z-score (height for age)|-0.49|1.24|-1.31|1.29|-1.20|1.05|-2.18|0.95|-0.67|-0.81|
|Z-score (weight for age)|0.18|1.13|-0.57|1.13|-0.29|1.04|-1.00|0.79|-0.43|-0.42|
|Age of child in months|12|3|12|4|65|4|61|4|53|50|
|Serious illness|0.31|0.46|0.33|0.47|0.19|0.39|0.23|0.42|-0.13|-0.09|
|Maternal education level|2.18|1.21|1.07|0.78|2.38|1.26|1.21|0.88|0.24|0.21|
|Number of children younger<br>than 5 yrs|0.35|0.58|0.58|0.64|0.59|0.71|1.11|0.84|0.23|0.48|
|Household size|5.58|2.32|5.96|2.35|5.25|2.04|6.08|2.05|-0.33|0.00|
|Household wealth score|1.14|2.26|-2.10|1.16|1.07|2.25|-2.42|1.19|0.10|-0.20|
|General physician|80%|40%|27%|44%|78%|31%|32%|21%|2%|3%|
|Pediatrician/gynecologist|50%|50%|4%|19%|39%|36%|3%|11%|-8%|-2%|
|Midwife in locality|88%|32%|50%|50%|79%|26%|52%|20%|-6%|-2%|
|Public health center|80%|40%|21%|41%|99%|4%|92%|9%|19%|69%|
|Immunization|92%|26%|72%|45%|99%|3%|95%|6%|7%|22%|
|Disease prevention program|93%|25%|78%|41%|99%|3%|95%|6%|6%|16%|
|Child growth|93%|25%|79%|41%|99%|3%|95%|6%|6%|16%|
|Highlands|38%|49%|72%|45%|36%|48%|77%|42%|-1%|-2%|
|Population in locality|6076|3933|2431|3368|21246|24190|1769|4382|17070|-836|

_Source:_ Young Lives Study Round 1 and 2.

29
provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction.” (Barati and Szalai 2000, p.21) General-purpose transfers are termed bloc transfers when they are used to provide broad support in a general area of subnational expenditures (such as education) while allowing recipients discretion in allocating the funds among specific uses. Bloc grants are a vaguely defined concept. They fall in the grey area between general-purpose and specific-purpose transfers, as they provide budget support with no strings attached in a broad but specific area of subnational expenditures.

General-purpose transfers simply augment the recipient’s resources. They have only an income effect as indicated in figure 1 by the shift in the recipient’s budget line AB upwards and to the right throughout by the amount of the grant (AC=BD) and the new budget line becomes CD. Since the grant can be spent on any combination of public goods or services or used to provide tax relief to residents, general nonmatching assistance does not affect relative prices (no substitution effect). It is also the least stimulative of local spending, typically increasing such spending by less than $0.50 for each additional $1 of unconditional assistance. The remaining funds are made available as tax relief to local residents to spend on private goods and services.

**Figure 1 Effect of Unconditional Nonmatching Grant**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Spending on<br>other public<br>goods<br>C<br>A<br>O<br>B D<br>Spending on public good A<br>Source : Shah (1994)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Conceptually a one-dollar increase in local residents’ income should have exactly the same impact on local public spending as receipt of one dollar of general purpose transfer. Both tend to shift the budget line outward identically. Contrary to this, all empirical studies show that a dollar received by the community in the form of general purpose
up the discussion of governance. This coincided with new research on institutions, and gradually there was a shift in much of the policy content of IDA operations toward governance in Public Expenditure Reviews and Public Sector Reform Credits. The interest in institutions and governance was awakened for four reasons.

First, the failure of structural adjustment programs to spark growth in many lowincome countries in the 1980s focused attention on the role of institutions and governance in development.

Second, and perhaps most important, the end of the Cold War removed selfimposed blinders from the eyes of donor countries. Until the early 1990s, the United States and its allies had refrained from scrutinizing the governance failings of proxy states, for fear of undermining what they saw as the bulwark against communist expansion. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, both developed-country donors and developing-country citizens decried poor governance as a hindrance to development.

Third, the transition in the economies of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union in the early and mid-1990s—which was far more difficult than many observers had expected—underlined the great importance of the institutional foundations for markets and good policy.

Fourth, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 showed that even where policies had supported rapid growth and poverty reduction, weaknesses in institutional and governance foundations could threaten the whole edifice of development progress.

In the literature there was increasing evidence linking dismal growth and poverty to corruption, waste, and authoritarian practices in government. For example, in a survey of more than a century of comparative development experience in 40 developing countries, Reynolds (1983) wrote that “the single most important explanatory variable [of development] is political organization and the administrative competence of government.”<sup>55</sup> The contributions, in economic theory, of Douglass North and Oliver Williamson, and the literature on reform and political economy gave this new field a solid basis.<sup>56</sup>

> 55  Quoted in Lin and Nugent (1995), p.2333. 56 See Dethier (1999)

40
retained earnings as well.

Mayer (1990) presents a comparison of the<sup>extent to which retained earnings, debt and new share</sup> issues were used to finance new investment<sup>in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the</sup> United Kingdom, and she United States between<sup>1970 and 1985. In all countries, despite varying tax</sup> treatment, retained earnings were the dominant<sup>source of finance, although its importance varied across</sup> countries. For example, retained earnings were the<sup>source of finance for virtually all net investment in</sup> the United Kingdom, while financing just<sup>over half of net investment in Italy.</sup> Cross country comparisons, however, were unable to find a<sup>correlation between the relative tax treatment of each</sup> financing source and its use.

In developing countries internal finance is also<sup>the primary source of funds for most enterprises.</sup> Studies surveyed in Kilby et. al. (1984) note<sup>that the original source of funds in rural manufacturing</sup> enterprises is predominantly from personal saving<sup>or informal loans from relatives. Future expansion</sup> is also largely financed from retained earnings.<sup>External finance is of limited importance and that which</sup> is received is frequently from customers rather than<sup>from formal lending institutions.</sup> Recent research has examined differences between<sup>investment financed from internal and external</sup> sources at the firm level. Auerbach (1984) finds<sup>that ex post rates of return are generally higher when</sup> financed with new share issues than when financed<sup>with retained earnings. The finding supports the idea</sup> that each source of financing has a distinct opportunity<sup>cost. For example, firms may only resort to new</sup> share issues if the projects are sufficiently profitable<sup>to cover the higher tax-costs of external finance.</sup> Auerbach's finding also suggests that certain firms<sup>may be unable to receive debt financing for these</sup> projects, since debt would otherwise be preferred to<sup>new equity from a tax perspective.</sup> Other research has examined differences in investment<sup>behavior across firms experiencing changes</sup> in cash flow. A tax-related theory would suggest<sup>little effect of cash-flow on investment behavior for</sup> firms which are presently paying dividends.<sup>For these firms, any investment opportunities could be</sup>

-10-
same response from 56 percent<sup>22</sup> to 78 percent (Table B3). This shift comes from a consensus towards the husband being the final decision-maker on the parcel of interest. Interestingly, we do not observe the same shift among households where the wife was the agrarian reform beneficiary of the parcel of interest; these show much lower levels of accord (56 percent), with a plurality of respondents agreeing that the wife is the final decision-maker (Table B4). This is only a negligible increase over the 49 percent agreement in our original variable where joint decision-making was an option. In other words, among households in our sample, the increase in agreement comes almost entirely from households with male land-owners, where both spouses agree that the husband is the primary decision-maker.

|**Table B3: Share**|**of couples’ responses regarding the**<br>**(all househ**|**final decision-**<br>**olds)**|**maker on the pa**|**rcel of interest**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Household<br>member||Wife|||
|bd|If there were a disagreement<br>between you and [spouse] on<br>whether or not to sell or lease<br>this parcel, whose opinion do<br>you think would most likely<br>prevail?|Wife|Husband|Don’t<br>know/not<br>sure<sup>23</sup>|
|Husan|Wife|28<br>(8.41%)|13<br>(3.90%)|3<br>(0.90%)|
||Husband|41<br>(12.31%)|231<br>(69.37%)|7<br>(2.10%)|
||Don’t know/not sure|2<br>(0.60%)|7<br>(2.10%)|1<br>(0.30%)|

Notes: N = 333 couples; question was only asked to respondents who defined the husband, wife, or both as decision-makers.

|**Table B4: Shar**|**e of couples’ responses regarding the final decision-maker on the parcel of interest**<br>**(households of female agrarian reform beneficiaries only)**|
|---|---|
|Household<br>member|Wife|

> 22 This percentage includes couples where one or both spouses responded “other” when asked who makes decisions on their parcel, including other household members and non-household members; these are not included in Table B1 above.

> 23 The majority of respondents who were unable to answer this variable insisted that decision-making was completely joint and were unable to identify whose opinion would prevail after a disagreement.

36
<!-- Start of picture text -->
-<br>te<br>o<br>&<br>eS° se . @IRNe .ooPte& ° ° oe?<br>S * oe” @ ARE<br>&= . . a i se PRR@ SAUgr<br>= . es .<br>Y<br>8“s<br>° y 8<br>we e<br>5 ss * ° ‘els "<br>= 08? gt Felon oe WDZA<br>E> . 8 _ . eTUN |.<br>£ . . «8 smree).<br>SB ae . @ PSE<br>oPc . °° es @iRQ<br>oO . . . . °<br>= . e 6<br>s°<br>° coy xv<br>Log of GDP per capita in 2017, PPP (current international $)<br>95% Cl ——— Fitted values<br>. ROW e MENA countries<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Rodrick, D, 1997, TFPG Controversies, Institutions, and Economic Performance in East Asia, NBER Working Paper 5914 Sarel, M. 1997. "Growth and Productivity in ASEAN Countries". IMF Working Paper No. 97/97.

Tinakom, Dr. P. and Sussangkarn, 1998, Total Factor Productivity Growth in Thailand-1980-1995.

Young, A., 1995, The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience, QJE, 641-680 World Bank. 1991. "Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Improved Income Distribution in Malaysia: Changing Focus of Government Policy Intervention", CEM, 1991, Report No. 8667-MA.

World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle, Washington D.C.

13
||Budget, yuan<br>billions|% oftotal|
|---|---|---|
|Total stimulus package, 2008©4to 201004|4,000|100|
|Central government new investments|1,180|30|
|Strategic investment|||
|Public housing|400|10|
|Rural infrastructure (electricity, water, and roads)|370|9|
|Transport and big infrastructure projects (railway, road, airport,<br>irrigations and electricity grid)|1,500|38|
|Health and education (including building schools and hospitals/clinics)|150|4|
|Energy and environment (including water and sanitation, sewage,<br>and restoration)|210|5|
|Technological innovation|370|9|
|Postearthquake reconstruction|1,000|25|
|Source:NationalReformandDevelopmentCommissionwebsite,http://en.nr|dc.gov.cn.||
Table 11. Under-reporting: Scapegoating effects

||(1)|(2)|
|---|---|---|
|Turnover|0.035<br>(0.023)|0.047<sup>*</sup><br>(0.027)|
|Scapegoatable|0.012|0.004|
||(0.030)|(0.043)|
|Turnover×Scapegoatable|-0.090<sup>**</sup>|-0.096<sup>*</sup>|
||(0.043)|(0.051)|
|Demoted|-0.011|0.006|
||(0.027)|(0.035)|
|Turnover×Demoted|-0.005|-0.032|
||(0.039)|(0.049)|
|Scapegoatable×Demoted|0.013<br>(0.050)|0.024<br>(0.081)|
|Turnover×Scapegoatable×Demoted|0.148<sup>**</sup>|0.192<sup>**</sup>|
||(0.064)|(0.086)|
|City Controls|Yes|Yes|
|Leader Controls|Yes|Yes|
|City FE|Yes|Yes|
|Province-Year FE|Yes|Yes|
|Pre-Post Dummies||Yes|
|# of Observations|3418|3132|
|# of Cities|281|281|
|Adj R<sup>2</sup>|0.48|0.49|

_Notes_ : This table presents the heterogeneous effects of the predecessor’s promotion status on GDP manipulation at the turnover year when the incumbent assumes office around the end of the year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the city’s reported real GDP growth is less than the predicted real GDP growth using the nighttime lights data, i.e., a dummy indicating under-reporting GDP growth. City controls include city-level time-varying economic controls (the share of industrial and tertiary value added in GDP, log population, and growth of nighttime lights), and leader controls are the same as the ones displayed in the table of baseline results. Pre/Post dummies indicate one year pre and post the turnover year respectively. In column 2, we further include the Pre/Post dummies and their interactions with _Demoted_ and _Scapegoatable_ dummies to control for the potential differential effects in these years. Standard errors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses.<sup>***</sup> ,<sup>**</sup> and<sup>*</sup> denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

49
she is better able to leave if she is treated poorly (Aizer, 2010). However, women who face very low baseline bargaining power may not realistically be able to leave a marriage. In this case, in the model of Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), a woman can actually face higher risk of domestic violence after her bargaining power increases, as her husband seeks to prevent her from asserting control over household resource allocation.

# **2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Domestic Violence**

Empirical tests of these theories have examined the effect of several distinct types of income directed toward females: conditional and unconditional cash transfers, microfinance, and labor force opportunities. Since cash transfer programs or microfinance interventions are often randomized or implemented in ways that allow program evaluation via natural experiments, they provide invaluable information on the causal impact of a money given to a woman on domestic violence and important dimensions of heterogeneity of these effects.

There that is no conclusive direction of the overall effect of cash transfer programs, which have become especially common in middle income countries, on domestic violence, but that there are important dimensions of heterogeneity. Bobonis et al. (2009) use data collected two and six years after the Oportunidades conditional cash transfer proin Mexico to show that the decreased the incidence of domestic violence gram program suffered by women but increased the number of violent threats they receive from their husbands, consistent with an instrumental violence model in which the husband uses violence as a tool to regain control over household income after the wife’s outside option increases. These effects fade, however, by five to nine years after the implementation (Bobonis and Castro, 2010). Angelucci (2008) point out an important source of heterogeneity in these average effects: Oportunidades increased domestic violence in husbands who hold traditional gender roles, suggesting that the increased income in the hands of their wife threatens their identity. Perova (2010) also finds a reduction in domestic violence from a conditional cash transfer program in Peru.

Since conditional cash transfer programs typically have health components, their effects on domestic violence could either be due to income effects or contact with health facilities required by the conditionality of the programs.<sup>3</sup> Fernald and Hidrobo (2011) are able to isolate the effects of an income transfer to mothers by evaluating the effects of an unconditional cash transfer program in Ecuador. They find that the transfer decreases

> 3For instance, even though providing resources to domestic violence victims are not typically an explicit goal of CCT requiring visits to health facilities, if health care providers suspect a woman is being abused, they may seek to help the women when she brings her chidren in for check-ups.

6
one or a few enterprises which use them mainly as cheap sources of credit.<sup>30</sup> Nonetheless, about 20 to 30 banks appear to have developed into well-managed commercial banks. Within a few years these banks have come to dominate the commercial banking market while the role of the old state banks which are not involved in the distribution of directed credit has shrunk (see chart 3). Market entry has been rapid in the Czech Republic and also, though to a lesser degree, in Hungary. The number of banks with foreign participation (including joint-ventures, subsidiaries and branches) has increased substantially in these countries (chart 4). The new banks have contributed to heightened competition. In contrast, the issuance of new banking licences in Poland has been very restrictive.<sup>3 1</sup> <!-- Start of picture text --> Chart 4<br>Number of banks with foreign participation<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>1990 1991 1992 1993<br>| Czech Republic 0 Hungary * Poland<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Despite the entry of new banks, the "old" banks, whether privatised or not, continue to dominate the lending and deposit business. In the Czech Republic and Poland, the old banks hold more than 80% of loans and deposits and in Hungary about two thirds. Only in Russia do new banks dominate the scene, accounting for two-thirds of the banking system's assets.

Another element of competitive pressure, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary<sup>32</sup> , has been the access of enterprises to direct lending by foreign banks and of households to instruments denominated in foreign currency. The amounts borrowed by enterprises directly from abroad have risen substantially in the recent past and are likely to exceed $1 billion in the Czech Republic and Hungary. On the deposit side, foreign currency deposits have become available to households. They have used their newly-gained freedom to diversify their portfolios by increasing their holdings of foreign exchange accounts with domestic banks. As a result banks have to offer interest rates on domestic currency deposits which, after allowing for devaluation expectations, are competitive with those offered on foreign exchange accounts.

30 Many of these enterprise-owned banks appear to be plagued by bad loans. Reportedly, fraudulent and even criminal behaviour has been quite comrnmon.

31 After more than 50 new banks, mostly small and undercapitalised, had sprung up in the wake of reforms and presented the authorities with difficulties of supervision, the Polish authorities all but stopped issuing licenses.

32 Until recently, enterprises in Poland found it difficult to tap foreign sources of capital owing to the arrears on foreign debt. After a settlement was reached with commercial creditors in 1994 direct foreign lending and investment has tended to increase.

21