**Demographics and the labor force** . The growth rates of total population and the working‐age population share averaged 2.5% and 0.8% respectively over 2001‐2010 based on latest United Nations (UN) estimates (United Nations 2017) ‐ Graph 3(a). As a gauge of projections prior to the conflict, United Nations (2011) indicated average growth rates for these two variables of 1.7% and 1.0% respectively over 2011‐2020 and 1.5% and 0.3% over 2021‐2030 compared to 2.5% and 0.5% over 2001‐2010 (Graph 3(b), dashed lines with markers).<sup>7</sup>

The labor force participation rate (LFPR)<sup>8</sup> meanwhile, had been on a moderating trend, declining from 54.5% in 1995 (Male: 84.3%; Female: 24.4%) to 44.9% in 2010 (Male: 75.6%; Female: 14.0%), with an average growth over 2001‐2010 of ‐1.5% (Male: ‐0.9%; Female: ‐3.9%) (Graph 4(a)). This phenomenon occurred despite relatively strong economic growth, distinguishing Syria from other countries – no other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economy had a similar rate of decline in the LFPR over the same period, except Yemen. Nasser and Mehchy (2012) note that a sizeable portion of the economically active population that went out of the labor force in the 2000s consisted of women in rural areas, and workers becoming students. Women in the agriculture sector became jobless with the drought and higher fuel prices in the second half of the 2000s, and were unable to find other work, thus returning to domestic services in their homes. In the case of the increase in students, this was partly affected by the easing of entry into universities, and the development of the financial sector (entry of private banks and insurance companies) that required high‐skilled workers. It is not clear though, if the developments cited in relation to student enrollment were expected to have a long‐term impact on the LFPR. Early in the conflict, International Labour Organization (ILO)‐ modelled estimates and projections suggested a stabilizing participation rate after 2010 (Graph 4(b)), though some caution needs to be exercised in taking this at face value given uncertainty surrounding the underlying data.<sup>9</sup>

**<u>Graph 3: Pre‐Conflict Population Growth Rate and Projection</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) 2017 Vintage (b) 2011 and 2013 Vintage<br>Average annual Average annual<br>growth growth<br>4.0% 4.0%<br>3.0%<br>3.0%<br>2.0%<br>2.0%<br>1.0%<br>1.0%<br>0.0%<br>0.0% 1991‐95 1996‐00 2001‐05 2006‐10 2011‐15 2016‐20 2021‐30 2031‐40<br>1991‐95 1996‐00 2001‐05 2006‐10 Total population (UN 2011)<br>Working‐age population/total population (UN 2011)<br>Total population (UN 2017) Total population (UN 2013)<br>Working‐age population/total population (UN 2017) Working‐age population/total population (UN 2013)<br>Note: Dashed lines indicate projections for years beyond UN report dates.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> 7 This is based on the medium fertility variant – “...considered the most likely future scenario and that is widely used by the literature” (Barro and Lee 2015). This variant has “normal” fertility, mortality and migration rates.

> 8 Percentage of total population aged 15‐64.

> 9 Labor force participation rates for 2013‐2014 are projections. ILO‐modeled estimates and projections are based on estimates and projections for GDP‐related variables and population structure. The 2013 estimates and projections draw on the IMF WEO April 2013 and United Nations (2013). However, the IMF stopped publishing projections for Syria effective 2012, and ILO uses the regional median growth to extrapolate GDP growth for Syria.

6