rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# 1. Introduction

The Internal displacement monitoring center estimated that as of the end of 2020, about 55 million people globally were Internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 87 percent of them were fleeing from conflict and violence.<sup>2</sup> During conflicts, IDPs, unlike refugees, take refuge within their countries but away from their homes. In theory, they are expected to be protected and assisted by their government, irrespective of the cause of the conflicts or the IDPs' affiliation, whether with the state or the insurrection. In reality, IDPs are among the most vulnerable populations in any country (World Bank, 2017). Besides the psychological trauma of crises leading to their displacement and the loss of their livelihoods and social capital, IDPs experience disproportional social and economic exclusions, struggling to access basic services and assistance. The vulnerability of IDPs is exacerbated by the fact that they may be undocumented and live close to conflict areas and, in some cases, with hosts with whom they do not share similar political, social, or cultural alignments. Therefore, there is the possibility that some IDPs may voluntarily opt-out from government social protection due to fear of persecution or lack of documentation.

The need to protect the right of IDPs and provide the assistance they need has been championed by humanitarian agencies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), and other international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who assist IDPs through cash transfer programs. For many IDPs, the cash transfers delivered by these agencies are the only source or make up the most significant share of their household income. However, unlike the government social safety net (SSN), the humanitarian agencies’ cash transfers are usually transient, and most agencies are faced with fiscal constraints and shorter service terms. In a protracted crisis, IDPs may quickly fall back into extreme poverty with the cessation of aid, leaving a void which in many cases can only be filled by the government. More so, when the acute shocks subside, most returning IDPs come home to destroyed property, infrastructure, and lack of jobs, requiring substantial support from the government to set up their lives.

To this day, how to provide a lasting solution to the plight of IDPs in general and during their return is still a big challenge to governments, policy makers, and humanitarian agencies. At the forefront of proposed reforms for welfare improvement of IDPs is aligning the short-term humanitarian assistance system with the long-term government social protection system (Gentilini et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2019). Although there

> 2 IDMC 2020 displacement data. See link

3
# **3.1.2. Work differences**

Both monthly and hourly wages are strongly affected by the work effort of individuals. Figure 6 reports the kernel density distribution of men and women by usual (Panel a) and actual (Panel b) weekly hours of work. The two panels suggest a typical finding in the literature on gender differences in the labor market. Panel (a) shows that the average weekly hours of work of a large share of employed men and women is the same, namely, 40 hours. Nonetheless, many men tend to work more hours per week, as much as 60 hours or more. In other words, the main gender difference in average hours worked per week is that large shares of men tend to work more than the modal value. This finding is even stronger when we compare the kernel density distribution of men and women in terms of weekly hours actually worked.

Figure 7 report the hours worked by men and women along their age distributions. On the leftside vertical axis, we measure the hours worked per week, while on the right-side vertical axis we measure the gender gap in weekly hours worked. Interestingly, the gender gap in weekly hours is always in favor of women up to the age of 21 years, and is persistently in favor of men thereafter. It is notable that the gap in favor of women is much higher in absolute terms than that in favor of men.

Table A2 and A3 in the Annex provides descriptive statistics by gender for the entire sample and for each age group, whereas Table A4 does the same for the sample of employed young people. Women have lower log wages than men. The educational level of women is slightly higher in secondary general education, but lower in terms of general education and tertiary education. This is quite atypical for developing countries, where in general women have higher educational levels than men.

The actual work experience of women (about 1.6 years) is much lower than that of men (about 7.1 years). Note that, as explained in the data section, this measure takes into account also the number of children of men and women, subtracting some years to potential work experience to take into account maternity factors. This is the first evidence of the dramatic gender differences emerging in the labor market as a consequence of the commitment of women in reproductive activities in the country.

In the SWT survey data, the self-employed account for only a small share of the overall sample and about 11.9% of total employment. It is 12.5% in rural areas and 11.1% in urban areas.

The migration status is very similar by gender suggesting that migration is neither common nor an individual choice but rather a family choice. Only few individuals in the sample migrate to study or seek employment.

According to the SWT survey data, about 54.7% of young people found their jobs through friends and relatives while only 3.9% found theirs through Public Employment Service (PES) offices. The second most important channel is direct hiring (17.8%, which could be also associated with 8
WPS4001

# Superstition, Family Planning, and Human Development<sup>∗</sup>

Quy-Toan Do<sup>†</sup> Tung Duc Phung<sup>‡</sup>

## Abstract

Are “wanted” and “unwanted” children treated equally by their parents? To address this question, we rely on the observation that, according to Vietnamese astrology, dates of birth are believed to be determinants of success, luck, character and good match between individuals. We then examine fertility decisions made in Vietnam between 1976 and 1996. We fi nd that birth cohorts in auspicious years are signi fi cantly larger than in other years. Children born in auspicious years moreover do better both in health and education. While parental characteristics seem to affect fertility choices and human development simultaneously, our analysis suggests that family planning is one key mechanism leading to the observed differences in outcomes: in a society in which superstition is widespread, children born in auspicious years are more likely to have been planned by their parents, thus bene fi ting from more favorable fi nancial, psychological, or emotional conditions for better human development.

Keywords: superstition, astrology, horoscope, fertility, education, health.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4001, August 2006 (Revised September 2006).

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the fi ndings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the fi ndings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The fi ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org.

> ∗We would like to thank Harold Alderman, Jishnu Das, Monica Das Gupta, Do Ngoc Bach, Jed Friedman, Daniel Goodkind, Rema Hanna, Lakshmi Iyer, Ghazala Mansuri, Martin Rama, Biju Rao, Martin Ravallion, Klaus Rohland and Zurab Sajaya for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are ours.

> †Development Economics Research Group. The World Bank. Email: qdo@worldbank.org

> ‡General Statistics Office. Government of Vietnam. Email: pdtung@gso.gov.vn

1
# 1 Introduction

Remittances to developing countries have been growing in the last decade, reaching $431.6 billion in 2015, which represents an increase of 0.4 percent over $430 billion in 2014 according to World Bank records. Although the growth pace of remittances has diminished since the global financial crises, remittances have become an important component in total international financial flows to developing countries, and currently, are more than three times the size of official development assistance and have become the second largest source of external finance behind foreign direct investment (FDI). The magnitude of remittance flows, especially to developing countries has given rise to questions pertaining to the potentially undesirable consequences they may be associated with, as was the case during periods of massive capital inflows to emerging market economies in the 1990s. For example, in spite of some of the documented benefits, remittances could cause a real exchange rate appreciation and loss of international competitiveness, and eventually lead to resource reallocation away from the tradable sector and toward real estate and other nontradables that tend to experience rising prices in the face of capital inflow, which could potentially hurt economic growth (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Lartey et al, 2012).

There is evidence to suggests that remittances, in general, have either financed the consumption of goods and services or capital accumulation, directly through investments or indirectly through savings. To this end, remittances should be expected to influence the behavior of the current account in recipient countries, in the same fashion as private capital inflows did in the 1990s. There has, however, been very limited research on the impact of remittances on the current account.

The aim of this paper, therefore, is to conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of remittances on the current account balance. Remittances can improve the current account when directed toward domestic investments, particularly in exporting firms in the manufacturing sector. Remittances can also serve as additional source of foreign income that can go towards financing trade deficits, thereby improving the current account. On the contrary, should remittances go toward financing an increase in the consumption of imports, the current account will deteriorate. Other channels through which remittances could affect the current account include the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate following the inflow of foreign currency, and through the Dutch disease phenomenon, both of which would serve to decrease demand for exports, increase imports and consequently worsen the current 2
transfers. Facilitating local credit market access can also reduce the need for beggar-thyneighbor policies by local governments. Local access to credit requires well functioning financial markets and credit worthy local governments. These pre-requisites are easily met in industrial countries. In spite of this, traditions for assisting local governments by higher-level governments are well established in these countries.

In developing countries, undeveloped markets for long term credit and weak municipal creditworthiness limit municipal access to credit. Nevertheless, the predominant central government policy emphasis is on central controls and consequently less attention has been paid to assistance for borrowing. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia have cooperative controls on domestic borrowing and administrative controls on foreign borrowing. Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Peru have administrative controls on domestic borrowing. India, Indonesia, Korea and Peru have also administrative controls on foreign borrowing. Foreign borrowing is prohibited in Thailand, Pakistan, Armenia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. Domestic borrowing is prohibited in Ethiopia, Mexico, Thailand (see World Bank, 1999/2000 and World Bank, 2001). Almost all DTEs with the exception of South Africa and Hungary do not have a regulatory framework for declaring local government bankruptcy. In a few countries such assistance is available through specialized institutions and central guarantees to jump start municipal access to credit. The menu of choices available to local governments for financing capital projects are quite limited and available alternatives are not conducive to developing a sustainable institutional environment for such finance. This is because macroeconomic instability and lack of fiscal discipline and appropriate regulatory regimes have impeded the development of financial and capital markets. In addition, revenue capacity at the local level is limited due to tax centralization. A first transitory step to provide limited credit market access to local governments may be to establish municipal finance corporations run on commercial principles and to encourage the development of municipal rating agencies to assist in such borrowing. Tax decentralization is also important to establish private sector confidence in lending to local governments and sharing in the risks and rewards of such lending.

29
|(1)<br>PCE<br>Coef.|se|(2)<br>PCE +<br>vignettes<br>Coef.|se|(3)<br>PCE +<br>household<br>controls<br>Coef.|se|(4)<br>PCE +<br>household<br>controls +<br>vignettes<br>Coef.|se|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Gbao Rural||||0.036|(0.079)|0.006|(0.080)|
|_Vignette 1 (positions 3 to 6 omitted)_||||||||
|vign1==1||-0.385***|(0.126)|||-0.404***|(0.135)|
|<br>vign1==2||-0.184|(0.120)|||-0.231*|(0.129)|
|_Vignette 2 (position 1 omitted)_||||||||
|vign2==2||0.940***|(0.193)|||0.991***|(0.203)|
|vign2==3||1.345***|(0.199)|||1.449***|(0.209)|
|<br>vign2==4||1.525***|(0.230)|||1.693***|(0.240)|
|<br>vign2==5||2.842***|(0.363)|||2.882***|(0.314)|
|_Vignette 3 (positions 1 and 2 omitted)_||||||||
|vign3==3||-0.115|(0.243)|||-0.045|(0.281)|
|<br>vign3==4||-0.265|(0.249)|||-0.157|(0.287)|
|<br>vign3==5||-0.160|(0.257)|||-0.056|(0.294)|
|vign3==6||-0.636|(0.431)|||-0.698*|(0.423)|
|_Vignette 4 (positions 1 to 3 omitted)_<br>vign4==4||0.666**|(0.265)|||0.584**|(0.287)|
|<br>vign4==5||0.667**|(0.268)|||0.510*|(0.290)|
|<br>vign4==6||0.652**|(0.271)|||0.492*|(0.293)|
|Number of observations<br>4,771||4,77|1|4,771||4,77|1|
|Pseudo R<sup>2</sup><br>0.029||0.05|7|0.061||0.09|2|

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 23
regression. While this statistic is intuitive and easily calculated, results on its distribution are not provided in Shea (1997) and so this statistic does not lend itself well to formal tests of the null hypothesis of weak instruments.

More generally, Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) point out that the validity of the 1 1 normal approximation depends on the concentration matrix ^1 = y 2']F'Z'Zr **2** being large in the sense of the smallest eigenvalue of this matrix being large. Note that the concentration matrix can be small for a variety of reasons. All instruments could be nearly uncorrelated with the endogenous variables, i.e. all the elements of F are small relative to the variances of the errorterms in the first-stage regressions. The instruments could also be very highly correlated with each other so that Z'Z is not full rank, i.e. there are essentially fewer instruments than endogenous variables. Finally concentration matrix could also be small if the rank condition for identification fails, i.e. F. is not full rank. This can occur if, as is the case in some of the applications considered here, each of the instruments has strong explanatory power for both endogenous variables.

Stock and Yogo (2001) develop a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak based on this idea. In particular, they provide critical values for a test of the null hypothesis of weak instruments based on the minimum eigenvalue of _F_ = 7<sup>1/2</sup> vXvPz,71/2, where i = X'(l - Pz )X/(n - q) is a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of errors from the first-stage regressions.<sup>6</sup> In the version of the test we implement below, the researcher specifies a null hypothesis that the instruments are weak if the maximum size distortion of Wald tests about parameters of interest under the null of weak instruments is equal to some pre-specified value. Stock and Yogo (2001) then tabulate the critical values of the minimum eigenvalue of G for which the null of weak instruments should be rejected.

**6** When the instruments are weak, they show that E[G] = 2 / q _+_ I. One drawback of this test in our current application is that it is derived under the assumption of iid homoskedastic error terms in the structural equation. The same is true for the approaches to inference discussed below. We are unaware of tests for weak instruments which relax this assumption, and it is difficult to say how important deviations from this assumption are for the results we obtain.

8
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|---|---|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|SV - Earthquake EmergencyRecovery& Health Services Extension|P Rafael A. Cortez|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|Hubei Hydropower Development in Poor Areas Project|Yanqin Song|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|GEF-Western Java Environmental Management Project|Richard M. Beardmore|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
|YixingPumped Storage Project|Yanqin Song|
in Colombia encompasses a greater variety of institutions and yields a rich setting to investigate market dynamics. Colombia providers include public and (non-profit) private HEIs as well as SENA (National Learning Service). The latter is a decadesold public workforce training institution (not an HEI) with branches throughout the country, that only recently has begun providing SCPs. Since SENA’s decisions are made at the national level, outside the education domain, we focus on public and private HEIs’ supply, taking SENA’s offerings as given. Further, Colombia boasts rich higher education and labor market administrative data. We use data from the universe of SCPs and bachelor’s programs offered between 2003 and 2019, as well as individual-level data for all higher education graduates working in the formal sector between 2007 and 2013.<sup>4</sup> We study program entry and exit at the market level, defined as a combination of geographic location and field of study.<sup>5</sup> This definition captures entry and exit variation across locations and fields, and over time.

We show that SCPs have a high turnover rate—higher, in fact, than that of bachelor’s programs. In our sample, SCPs have a shorter average life than bachelor’s programs, as well as higher entry and exit rates. This leads to the question of whether the SCP “churn” might be in response to local labor market changes. Answering this question poses two problems. First, higher education indicators are typically reported by field of study whereas labor market indicators are reported by economic sector. Second, the correlation between the local SCP supply and the local demand for graduates might not be causal but rather driven by unobserved shocks to the local SCP market.

To bridge the gap between fields and economic sectors, we construct two measures of local labor demand by field of study. The first is a shift-share variable that measures local GDP by field. The underlying assumption is that aggregate, national shocks to a sector affect the local demand for field-specific graduates only to the extent to which the sector employs those graduates locally.<sup>6</sup> The second measure is a field’s relative employment by location, equal to the share of SCP graduates employed in a location who have a degree in that field. To address the endogeneity concern, our measures are based on the SCP graduates who are employed in a location rather than those who

> 4As described in detail below, a program is defined as the combination of an institution, program code, and location. Program examples are graphic design technician at _Corporacion Escuela de Artes y Letras_ in Bogota, and telecommunication and electronics technologist at _Corporacion Universitaria Centro Superior_ in Cali.

> 5Market examples are health in Medellin, business in Medellin, health in Bogota, and business in Bogota. Note that “entry” and “exit” always refer to programs and not to HEIs.

> 6Shift-share variables are commonly used to alleviate endogeneity problems (Bartik, 1991). For their use in the context of short-cycle programs, see Armona et al. (2022) and Grosz (2022).

3