identification of “red flags” in similar contexts (Ferwerda, Deleanu and Unger, 2017) and improve cartel screening by qualifying where to search (Adam _et al._ , 2022). The example of CDR shows that, in an otherwise well-functioning institution, corrupt deals might rarely be visible in the technical work of evaluating tenders and bids, or even to monitor the implementation of projects. Rather, they seem to be placed in the less technical pre-implementation stages in which a procurement agency retains a degree of discretion that has a higher likelihood to remain unchecked by accountability mechanisms. This discretion can include measures such as short-listing of eligible (often connected) design consultants, or the determination of which bids of contractors are eligible in the first place.

Future work can qualify such relationships. First, as our results highlight the complexity of the phenomenon of political connections, comparative studies can provide more insights on the enabling conditions for how they can be meaningful for rent generation. Second, we cannot ultimately exclude the possibility that connected contractors deliver higher quality work for their larger contracts. Although our results for designers being more likely to design projects that are overspent, our interviews, as well as extant literature (Baránek and Titl, 2020) strongly suggest otherwise, future work can leverage additional data on the quality of project implementation to investigate this relationship. Third, future work can also elaborate on the issue of sub-contracting, which can be another opportunity for elites to distribute rents.

One effective way to undermine the ability of cartels to coordinate appears to be to shorten the time horizons of elites. Implementing legal requirements of rotating a sufficiently large board of an implementing agency such as CDR makes trust relationships more difficult to maintain and defections from cartels more likely (see also Lambsdorff, 2007). As these connections have a significant economic value, even small improvements in undermining cartel coordination can have large welfare effects. In the case of Lebanon, this is of high contemporary relevance as significant amounts of donor aid are pledged to facilitate the improvement of public infrastructure (Atallah, Dagher and Mahmalat, 2019) to recover from a severe economic crisis.

# **References**

Adam, I. _et al._ (2022) _Public procurement cartels: A systematic testing of old and new screens_ . GTIWP/2022:01. Budapest.

Asian Development Bank (2013) _Outsourcing Public Procurement in the Public Sector_ . Available at: https://www.adb.org/publications/outsourcing-procurement-public-sector.

Atallah, S., Dagher, G. and Mahmalat, M. (2019) ‘CEDRE Capital Investment Plan: Scrutinizing the Allocation of Projects and Funds Across Regions’, _Lebanese Center for Policy Studies_ , 46.

Baránek, B. and Titl, V. (2020) _The Cost of Favoritism in Public Procurement_ . DPS20.07. Leuven. Available at: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/firma-kterou-vlastnil-ministr-rebicek-ziskalazakazky.

Berman, N. _et al._ (2017) ‘This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa’, _American Economic Review_ , 107(6), pp. 1564–1610.

Bosio, E., Djankov, S., Glaeser, E. and Shleifer, A. (2022) ‘Public Procurement in Law and Practice’, _American Economic Review_ , 112(4), pp.1091-1117.

Bussell, J. (2017) ‘When do middlemen matter? Evidence from variation in corruption in India’, _Governance_ , 31(3), pp. 465–480.

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