**_How Fad Has CAsa Inr4ustry Oro,?_** _17_

We can investigate the consistency of the data for energy consumption<sup>(not shown) and</sup> energy consumption per unit of GVIO by extracting the implicit branch figures<sup>for GVIO and</sup> comparing them with GVIO data from other sources. Tis is done in Table<sup>10, which uncovers</sup> unacceptably large discre)ancies for branches 9-14 in the 15-branch clasification.<sup>Fortunately,</sup> data for the sectors that consume the largest quantities of energy, namely<sup>metallurgy, power,</sup> chemicals, building materials, and machine-building, are not involved in these inconsistencies.

Table 11 presents a recalculation of EIGVIO and of annual percentage changes<sup>in GVIO/E</sup> for 1980/85 based on published branch data for E and on information from<sup>other sources giving</sup> branch time series of GVIO. These revised data show fewer improbable entries<sup>(readers should</sup> ignore the problems in branches 13 and 14, which should be merged<sup>in a future recalculation).</sup> These results suggest that, among the major energy users, machinery, chemicals<sup>and, to a lesser</sup> extent, metallurgy, have achieved considerable success in raising<sup>energy productivity, while</sup> electricity and building materials have recorded much smaller<sup>gains.</sup> The veracity of these data, however, depend substantially on the accuracy<sup>of GVIO data</sup> for chemicals and machinery - exactly the sectors for which comparison<sup>of physical production</sup> and value data indicate the possibility of upward bias in the value totals.<sup>Since energy</sup> productivity in these sectors, alone among the major using branches, rises<sup>much faster than the</sup> reported national avenge, this dependence is considerable. Removal of the<sup>chemical and</sup> machinery branches, which contribute over half of the overall energy<sup>savings attained during</sup> 1980/85 (Table 16) reduces the cumulative growth of energy productivity<sup>during 1980/85 from</sup> 28.6 percent to 17.3 percent (Table 16, Panel 1). If we were to assume<sup>that the growth of</sup> energy productivity in machinry and chemicals was limited to this<sup>lower amount, rather than</sup> the much larger figures shown in Tables 1lB and 16, the average<sup>annual growth rate of the</sup> entire industrial sector (excluding village enterprises) during 1980/85<sup>would be reduced by two</sup> percentage points, from 10.8 to 8.8 percent annually.<sup>7</sup> Note, however, that the World Bank anticipates large reductions in unit<sup>consumption of</sup> electricity in the chemical brarich because of slow relative growth of synthetic<sup>ammonia,</sup> "dramatic reductions' in unit power requirements for synthetic<sup>ammonia, and the international</sup> trend toward reduced power intensity in chemical manufacture<sup>(1985-A3, pp. 47-49].</sup> Furthermore, Chinese specialists regard the materials contained in Energy (1986]<sup>as preliminary;</sup> this book was never released to the general public. However, it is my<sup>impression that data</sup> issued in subsequent publications (notably Energy [1989]), will support<sup>similar results.</sup> The importance of energy issues and the major differences in<sup>scale and technology</sup> separating state and collective industry makes it important to provide<sup>separate analysis of energy</sup> consumption in state and collective industry. As far as<sup>I can determine, China's statistical</sup> agencies have made no effort to do this. Industrial census data giving<sup>energy consumption for</sup>

> 7. Thi calculzion **is based** on **first** column of **Table 2B,** following **a** **_separae_** worksheg<sup>**'What**if</sup><sup>**Energy Savings ate**</sup> **Trimmed?' dated** 7-4-1989.