|||exports, received state aid<br>or not...)||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Turkey|Taymaz (2010)|Changes in domestic<br>demand for passenger and<br>changesinexports|2008-2009|Special Consumption Tax reduction on<br>motor vehicles|Special consumption tax cuts increased automobile sales and<br>domestic automobile production|
|United Kingdom|Barrell & Weale<br>(2009)|Aggregate consumption<br>data (quarterly)|1992-2010<br>(with a focus on<br>2009-2010 period)|Temporary VAT cut|A2.5% reduction in VAT is likely to result in consumption<br>being augmented by less than 1% by the fourth quarter to<br>2009. GDP is likely to be raised less than 0.5% relative to the<br>case without the VAT increase.|
|United States|Taylor & O’Sullivan<br>(2017)|Real per capita federal<br>expenditures, government<br>revenue|11 postwar<br>recessions<br>(1948-2015)||Fiscal stimulus polices should follow three T’s—timely,<br>targeted, and temporary: (1) it took 10.9 months on average<br>before a recession’s start and the first major countercyclical<br>fiscal policy action. (2) The stimulus was not temporary in the<br>4/8 recessions where fiscal policy was attempted. (3) In many<br>cases recessions provided politicians an avenue in which to<br>implement policies that were part of their long-run reform<br>agenda rather than being carefully targeted countercyclical<br>fiscal policy.|
|United States|Mian & Sufi (2012)|957 U.S. metropolitan or<br>micropolitan statistical<br>areas (CBSAs) for|January 2004 -June<br>2010|The Car Allowance Rebate System<br>program - temporary subsidies to<br>encourage the trading in old cars and<br>buying new ones|<br>Program induced the purchase of an additional 370,000 cars in<br>July & August 2009.<br>reversal impact 10 months after the program expired|
|United States|Chodorow-Reich_et_<br>_al._(2012)|State level income and<br>employment|December 2008-<br>July 2009 (main<br>focus)|$88 billion of aid to state governments<br>through the Medicaid reimbursement|Positive relationship between receiving fiscal relief and<br>increases in employment|
|Europe<br>(17 countries)|Nickel and Tudyka<br>(2014)|Real GDP, government<br>consumption, private<br>investment, debt-to-GDP<br>ratio, trade balance|1970-2010||A one percentage point of GDP increase (expansionary fiscal<br>shock) in government consumption is first followed by<br>positive cumulative responses of real GDP and negative<br>responses of private investment and the trade balance as a<br>share of GDP|
|G20|Spilimbergo,<br>Symansky, and<br>Schindler (2009)||2008 Global crisis||The low set of fiscal stimulus multipliers included 0.3 on<br>revenue, 0.5 on capital spending and 0.3 on other spending|
|World|<br>Agnello_et al._(2017)|Panel of 157 countries<br>(Gini, real GDP growth<br>rate, fiscal stimulus<br>packages)|1960-2010||An increase in inequality increases the probability of<br>government crises. However, this impact is decreased when<br>expansionary fiscal stimulus episodes are in place.|
|World|Aizenman & Jinjarak<br>(2011)|<br>Size of fiscal stimulus,<br>exchange rate<br>depreciation, trade<br>openness,fiscalcapacity|2007-2009<br>(main focus)||A lower debt/average tax base is associated with higher fiscal<br>stimulus and lower trade openness is associated with a higher<br>fiscal stimulus and lower depreciation rate during the crisis|

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