rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_H7_ : Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) find that foreign-owned enterprises experience larger declines in energy intensity. Therefore, we expect foreign-owned enterprises in these four industries to have lower energy intensities than other ownership types.

## <u>Scale economies</u>

_H8_ : Since larger enterprises have many advantages over smaller enterprises—most importantly, scale economies—we expect that China’s policy of “grasping the large, letting go of the small,” discussed in the previous section, will lead to lower energy intensity in these four industries.

## <u>Regional effects</u>

_H9_ : Since the onset of economic reforms in 1979, the industrial structure in China has become more decentralized, with variations in the implementation of market reforms and exposure to international markets across regions. Given this, we expect firms in the more developed regions, such as the North and East, will have lower energy intensities than firms in other regions.

# **IV. Data**

The data set used in our analysis is the combination of three firm-level data sets collected annually by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The first data set consists of economic and financial variables, comprising approximately 22,000 large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises. The second data set comprises science and technology (S&T) variables and includes the same number of enterprises as the economic and financial data set. The third data set contains a number of energy variables for the most energy intensive enterprises (approximately 1500 enterprises).

14
ii

# 'APIER IV. THE PHN RESEARCH AND SPECIAL GRANTS PROGRAMS: A FOCUS ON ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN PHN SECTORS

|24|
|---|

POPULATION 24 HEALTH 24 NUTRITION 25

# CHAPTER V PROSPECTUS

26

# FY91-94 LENDING PROGRAM

26

|Continued Growth|26|
|---|---|
|Nature and Focus|26|
|SUES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK|27|
|chnical Issues|27|
|Internal Bank Issues|28|

ISSUES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

# TEXT TABLES:

1. PHN Projects Approved in FY90 2. Co-financing in PHN Projects Approved in FY90

3. Social Development Projects with PHN Components, FY9Q 4. PHN Sector Work Completed by Region, FY81-90

|3<br>4<br>_5_<br>7|
|---|

# ANNEXES

1. PHN Lending, FY86-90 32 2. Major Sectoral Components of Social Development Projecs, FY90 33 3. Description of Selected Sector lbsks Undertaken During FY90 34 4. Summary Desciptions of PHN Projects Approved in FY90 39 _5._ Highlights of Innovative Project Work Undertaken During FY90 42 6. Lending for Population in FY90 Projects 49 7. Population Lending in PHN Projects, FY90 So & Nutrition Components in PHN Sector, Population, Health and WID Operaticns, Approved FY89-90 51

9. Description of Work Undertaken by PHRHN During FY90 58 10. PHRHN Publications During FY90 68
Service users ́ associations and civil society organizations reported that, on occasions, some EPSs of the subsidized regime refused to grant the ELISA<sup>52</sup> test to their affiliated persons—on the grounds that it was excluded from the POS-s. This practice would be illegal. Paradoxically, the available data about tutelage actions produced by the Ombudsman Office seems to suggest otherwise: that effective access to diagnostic tests is not currently the problem that it used to be a decade ago.

# **Efforts to Target Vulnerable Populations**

One of the five key objectives of the PEN focuses on preventive actions for vulnerable populations, including Men who have Sex with Men (MSM), Sex Workers (SW), members of the Armed Forces, inmates, domestic and international migrants, former guerrillas, and ethnic minorities.

As explained above (Section IV: Research Findings; Programmatic Dimension), many DTSs have not yet identified the most at risk populations within their areas—and as a consequence, those DTSs have not developed specific programs or interventions for preventing HIV infection and treating these groups more effectively. Among those DTSs that have identified their vulnerable populations, more could be done to target those groups through specific strategies and interventions.

On the other hand, the Study Team did find a number of examples of good practice. In particular, the health secretariat at the local council of Bogotá (Secretaría de Salud del Distrito Bogotá) reported: (i) regular monitoring studies of their most at risk populations; (ii) preventive and formative activities with those groups (including visiting places where MSM and SW concentrate and domestic migrants reside); and (iii) distribution of condoms among those groups.

In addition, prevention and control of HIV/AIDS among one of the groups that is most at risk—the Armed Forces and Police—is done through a special Committee called COPRECOS, supported by health information systems that allow for a continuous epidemiological vigilance for HIV/AIDS.

> 52 Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). This test is usually the first one used to detect infection with HIV. If antibodies to HIV are present (positive), the test is usually repeated to confirm the diagnosis. If ELISA is negative, other tests are not usually needed. This test has a low chance of having a false result after the first few weeks of infection.

50
**Table 8: Characteristics of male and female self-employed workers, 1987-91.**

**(in percent)**

|Characteristics|1987||1988||1991||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Male|Female|Male|Female|Male|Female|
|**Age**|||||||
|under30|58.54|51.55|57.29|49.09|43.51|39.01|
|30-40|14.01|17.66|14.51|19.23|20.79|25.26|
|40-49|10.19|13.03|9.73|12.32|15.19|17.23|
|over50|17.26|17.76|18.47|19.36|20.51|18.49|
|Period of residence|||||||
|less than I yr|93.71|93.90|92.11|92.35|84.09|83.36|
|2-4 yr|3.31|2.00|3.29|3.67|2.95|3.35|
|5-9 yr|1.99|2.66|2.48|1.87|3.81|3.77|
|10-19 yr|0.87|0.78|1.06|1.29|5.25|5.57|
|over 20 yrs|0.17|0.67|1.06|0.83|3.89|3.95|
|**Education**|||||||
|None|1.98|1.08|1.99|1.42|2.41|2.60|
|Primary|37.68|43.30|39.32|43.49|16.90|25.91|
|Middle|51.60|52.31|49.87|51.26|73.01|67.40|
|Secondary|7.31|2.94|8.11|3.56|7.38|4.02|
|Post-secondary|1.42|0.36|0.71|0.27|0.31|0.06|
|**Industry**|||||||
|Agri/forestry|87.34|69.37|82.45|61.07|84.82|64.00|
|Mining/Manufact.|5.00|8.94|6.28|12.37|5.46|8.73|
|Elec./Water/Const.|0.58|0.01|1.45|0.03|0.98|0.02|
|Wholesale/retail|3.96|20.82|5.08|25.19|4.37|25.96|
|Transportation|0.81|0.03|1.07|0.07|1.19|0.02|
|Finance/Community|2.31|0.84|3.67|1.26|3.18|1.26|

Source: Authors' **own** calculations using **GLSS 1,2,3.** 19
where wg weights the groups equally or according to their relative frequencies in the sample of treated provinces. The associated event study plots can be used to see whether treated and control provinces were in parallel trends in the period before the shock.

All of our estimates were obtained using a doubly-robust inverse probability weighting (Sant’Anna and Zhao, 2020) over a balanced panel of provinces with a maximum length of time, _e_ , of five years around the first drought shock. We used clustered bootstrapped standard errors at the provincial level and accounted for autocorrelation in the data (Kline and Santos, 2012).

# **4 Results**

## **4.1 Main Estimates**

We begin by presenting plots of the dynamic _ATTs_ in an event study setting. Our preferred estimation focuses on the 12-month SPEI shock as the treatment, and the never-treated provinces as the control group. Panel A in Figure 2 shows the effect on workers employed in the agriculture sector, the sector most exposed to climate change and therefore the sector in which most of the workers are at risk when there is a drought shock. The _ATTs_ support our hypothesis. We observe a significant drop in the share of agricultural workers after the drought shock, which remains statistically significant at 5 percent in all the post-event periods. The magnitude of the impacts increases over time up to the fourth year, when it reaches about 6.5 p.p, then it loses in intensity in the fifth year dropping back down to 5 p.p. Importantly, we also observe the absence of a significant trend in the pre-treatment period; this strengthens the causal interpretation of our results.

We now present the results on the employment rate in other sectors, and on the unemployment rate, which helps to explain the labor market dynamic concurrent with the displacement of 12
has hovered around 10 to 11.<sup>37</sup> Likewise the value of λU, or the underdeclaration factor, is difficult to know with certainty. However, market participants suggest that 25 percent is not an unreasonable estimate, and many would argue that 50 percent is closer to the mark.

Substituting the lower of these values into (γT * λU * VB) indicates that, for every 1 rupee in total real estate transactions, 37.5 percent of the tax is lost due to the infusion to the black economy. If the stamp tax rate is 12.5 percent, then a total of 9.4 percent in stamp duty revenues is actually collected in the transaction. Therefore, using these illustrative figures, the taxes lost due to the black economy effect are four times the actual revenues earned from stamp duties.

This substantial leveraging effect occurs for two reasons. First, the “blackening” of money to complete the real estate transactions gives rise to a range of other “black” transactions that also escape the tax net. Second, the underdeclared value goes rupee for rupee into the black economy, while only a fraction of the declared value is paid to the tax authorities.<sup>38</sup> This result is important because it suggests that if, underdeclaration can be reduced via a reduction of stamp duty rate, whether or not stamp duty yields themselves improve with a Laffer curve effect, other fiscal benefits may accrue as one of the sources of funds to the black economy is constricted. Indeed, even if stamp duty collections decline with a significant rate reduction, overall tax collections may improve.

Clearly, one can question the values used for the parameters in the illustrative calculation, since robust empirical estimates cannot be obtained readily. Thus, we have prepared in Table 17 a sensitivity analysis varying the two key parameters for this calculation: the velocity of black currency in circulation and the percentage underdeclaration of property transaction values. We show this sensitivity analysis for two different illustrative stamp tax rates: 15 percent and 10 percent.

**Table 17. Ratio of  Lost Revenues due to Black Economy Effect to Stamp Tax Collections**

|**Stamp Du**|**ty tRE= 1**|**5%**||**Stamp**|**Duty tRE**|**= 10%**||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_λU_**<br>**_VB_**|<br>**_10%_**|**_25%_**|**_50%_**|**_λU_**<br>**_VB_**|<br>**_10%_**|**_25%_**|**_50%_**|
|**_2_**|0.2|0.7|2|**_2_**|0.3|0.7|3|
|**_5_**|0.6|1.7|5|**_5_**|0.8|1.7|7.5|
|**_10_**|1.1|3.3|10|**_10_**|1.7|3.3|15|
|**_15_**|1.7|5|15|**_15_**|2.5|7.5|22.5|

These scenarios indicate that, under a wide range of assumptions, it is plausible that the tax revenues recovered from reducing the black economy effects of underdeclaration of real

> 37  See the Revenue Bank of India, _Bulletin of Statistics_ , various issues.

> 38  We relax this strong assumption below.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that a fraction of the undeclared value larger than the 10 to 15 percent stamp duty rates in effect is likely to seep into the black economy.

28
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risky sex, since there is now a potential loss of cash associated with risky behaviors. This theory assumes rational decision-making in the sexual domain (Philipson and Posner, 1995). The idea that individuals make tradeoffs between price and the riskiness of sex is consistent with Gertler et al. (2005) who find Mexican sex workers charge higher prices for sex without condoms, and Robinson and Yeh (2011) who find that sex workers charge more for anal sex. This of course does not indicate that individuals are _perfectly_ rational in such decisions, but lends credence to the idea that people do respond to sex prices. However, this price effect may be muted by the fact that not all risky behaviors will result in a positive STI test, so the expected loss may be lower than the reward value. In the RESPECT trial, approximately ten percent of individuals tested positive at each timepoint, thus a person of average risk who mixes with average risk partners could have an expected loss of only one-tenth of the reward amount. For example, the RESPECT study‘s higher cash reward amount of $20 might yield only a $2 ―price‖ of risky sex during a four month period, which by itself could be a weak spur to behavioral change.

# **_Neoclassical Income Effects_**

To the extent that health is a normal good, the rewards may change behavior through income effects, particularly with increasing value of cumulative repeated rewards. However, in many CM applications, the reward amounts are sufficiently small as to preclude neoclassical income effects. In the RESPECT study, the rewards over one year can be as high as 25% of mean annual earnings, which is a substantial amount. For some lower income women this could indeed ameliorate immediate economic pressures to engage in transactional sex, although there is mixed evidence on the size and even sign of the income effect on risky sexual behaviors. For men in particular, it is often hypothesized that higher income will lead to more transactional sex, which over time would mute the incentive effects on male sexual behaviors.

# **_Systematic Cognitive Errors_**

Some individuals may not be able to accurately perform the expected value calculations discussed above. Limited numeracy, availability heuristics, and bounded rationality may make some people particularly prone to systematic over-estimation of 12
# Is There A Positive Incentive Effect from Privatizing Social Security? Evidence from Latin America*

**Truman** G. **Packard** Department of Economics University of Oxford

I would like to thank Abigail Barr for her supervision and suggestions, as well as Jan Dehn and Shanaka J. Peiris for their guidance on panel estimation methods. Comments from Robert Holzmann, Anita Schwarz and Aniruddha Bonnerjee, the participants at the Latin America Economic Research Network Workshop on June 4, 2001, the Gorman Student Research Workshop on June 8, 2001, and the workshop on Coverage and Contribution in Pension Systems hosted by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue on September 4, 2001, are also greatly appreciated. Enrique Mezzanotte and Elizabeth Dahan provided valuable assistance gathering data.
(3), where _εij_ is a random error term and all the other terms as explained before. It is the presence of conflict, which we observe, that allows us to detect a discrepancy between desired and actual sovereignty. By construction, conflict enters (3) with a negative sign.

A complication in estimating such a model is that conflict is determined endogenously by the interaction of factors influencing sovereignty demand and supply. In a sense, conflict is the ―price‖ of freedom. The model should thus be estimated via instrumental variables regression to identify the effect of conflict on sovereignty, but we do not believe that a valid instrument can be found. No prior study of the effects of decentralization on any number of outcomes has proposed a valid instrumental variables approach to estimate the effects of conflict on decentralization or vice versa. Thus, we are unable to make causal claims, but still believe that it is informative to present correlations on the correlates of decentralization, and the negative correlation between conflict and actual (observed) sovereignty would serve as a plausibility check on our model.

# **3. Data**

As units of analysis, we use the primary administrative subdivision (provinces, states, republics, departments) of decentralized countries, which we define as all countries with multitiered political systems or unitary systems with significant economic decentralization.<sup>30</sup> Forty eight countries meet our decentralization threshold, yielding 876 regions. We have one observation per region for the period from the mid-1990s to the early 2000’s. The number of regions in each country ranges from 2 in Serbia-Montenegro to 89 in Russia (we correct for this 30 The list includes all countries that are not identified as having centralized systems in Polity III database and we add countries according to other criteria and our own research to expand the period coverage of Polity III. The coding procedure is explained at length in a supplement. Coding notes for this dataset are too lengthy to present here and will be posted online upon publication. All variables are coded for a single year and that year was determined by available economic data on regional taxes and revenues and the date of the household surveys that we use to code regional income.

16
6 and entrepreneurial base; to of the top 40 private groups are pribumi. Whether Chinese or pribumi, the large firma tend to owe their success in significant degree to their having good ties with the state, since the high degree of government involvement in regulation, protection, licensing, etc., and the corruption which typically goes with some of these functions make such ties mandatory for success. Most medium size firms are also Chinese, it appears, though here there appear to be no very accurate date. As our results will show, the Chinese firms tend to need less positive support from government since they are relatively well hooked into financial, marketing and informational networks of their ethnic group at the national or regional level; they do need "protection" from political and/or bureaucratic attack however. Medium and large pribumi tend to depend in a-more positive way on government for special favours, for subsidized credit, etc., since they do not have an ethnic network on which they can draw as the Chinese doMuch of the interest in microand small-scale industry (as opposed to middle-sized _SHEs)_ has derived from the policy objectives of equity, promotion of pribumi firms and support for weak economic groups. Although successive - _enciJta~_ have placed great rhetorical emphasis on this sector, most of the programs implemented have been less than impressive. With a high share of available capital channelled to the large, capital-intensive firms, those parts of the manufacturing sector producing at the other end of the size structure have traditionally had to make do with nothing but the tiny amounts of capital they themselves can accumulate. The highly touted sub-contractinog programs and the foster-parent scheme have been Ovirtually shelved"'. Various 'Hal Hill, "Indonesia's Industrial Transformation: Part II", Bulletin ot Indonesian Economic Studies. Vol. 26, No. 3, December, 1990, 23.
The estimation period is from 1983 to 1992. The period is limited to ten years so that the model reflects characteristics of the most recent economic structure. The model has also been restructured from the original EPA model to some extent in order to capture the economic dynamics surrounding the creation and bursting of the bubble.<sup>2</sup> '

# _B._ **_Fall_** _in Land and Equity Pnces_

As discussed in preceding sections, the financial sector problem in Japan is deeply connected with the collapse in land and equity prices.22 Furthermore, in the absence of major publicly funded bailouts, possible bank runs would force the sale of land and equities held by these financial institutions, causing a further decline in asset prices and exacerbating the problem.' With this in mind, simulations were conducted for the cases of 25 percent asset price deflation in land and equities, respectively.

The land price is defined in the model as the land value index of residential sections in city areas. Its variation affects private consumption and money demand (cash and time deposits, in particular) through changes in the household sector's net worth at the outset. The equity price is defined as that in the Tokyo Stock Price Index, since that reflects the market condition better than other average prices (e.g. Nikkei 225). Its forward linkage starts from the price earnings ratio (PER), which influences investment decisions of the corporate sector and is one of the crucial factors determiniing the user cost of capital (relating to Tobin's q). The variation of the equity price also directly affects the household sector's net worth, and thus changes consumption pattems and money demand behavior.

Tables 15 and 16 collect the computation results from simulated declines in land and equity prices, respectively. Although the percentage decline in prices is the same in both simulations (25 percent decline from baseline values), the magnitude of the impacts seems to differ greatly in these two cases. This is due largely to size effects. Roughly speaking, the total value of land property was 21 The simulations used the period 1983 to 1992 for two reasons. First, EPA's baseline projections were strictly confidential. Second, using this period enabled us to concentrate on analyses of the multiplier process rather than speculating on an arbitrary baseline forecas **t** hat would need to be adjusted in response to financial sector developments and policy initiatives.

22 Collateral banking is the typical form of bank lending in Japan. The custom of using land as collateral saves evaluation and monitoring costs as compared to costs under project banking. Japanese banks require sufficient land property as collateral, particularly in the case of loans to small- to medium-sized enterprises.

23 Heavy sales of equities by financial institutions, however, may not be a likely outcome since holdings and cross-holdings of equities that involve financial institutions are usually structured for a long-term business relationship _(Keiretsu)._ 16