rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# sectors).

Based on the findings in this paper, as well as existing empirical evidence, one could hazard the generalization that in countries where the market forces of demand for and supply of skills are prevalent in the labor market, where pay and productivity are linked (that is mainly in developed countries), we expect to find increasing returns with quantiles. There the relationship between education/skills and ability is towards increasing earnings inequality. On the other hand, in most developing countries where market forces tend to be severely dampened by labor market rigidities, low tolerance for wage inequality, family connections, and the combination of distorting pay and/or employment policies of the public sector and a large presence of the public sector in the economy (in general, labor market distortions), returns are expected to decrease with quantiles, especially in the public sector (Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and China), or both public and private sector (China).

Table 5: Pattern of Returns by Public-Private Employment- Males

|_Country_|_Overall_<br>_Pattern of_|_OLS Re_|_turn (%)_|_90_<sup>_th_</sup>_-10_<br>_differ_|<sup>_th_</sup>_quantile_<br>_ence (%)_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_Returns_|_Public_|_Private_|_Public_|_Private_|
|China|Decreasing|10.4|*|-6.3|*|
|Philippines|Decreasing|10.8|10.8|-6.5|-1.4|
|Thailand|Decreasing|14.6|14.4|-7.4|1.4|
|Vietnam|Decreasing|7.9|7.2|-6.6|4.8|
|_Mean of: _|_Decreasing_|_10.9_|_10.8_|_-6.7_|_1.6_|
|Argentina|Increasing|10.2|11.1|6.3|4.8|
|Bolivia|Increasing|13.3|8.7|2.8|8.2|
|Brazil|Increasing|16.8|13.1|5.6|8.8|
|Chile|Increasing|13.7|11.2|3.4|7.6|
|Colombia|Increasing|9.5|9.9|1.4|7.3|
|Guatemala|Increasing|12.3|11.5|2.8|7.7|
|Mexico|Increasing|13.3|9.2|0.3|4.6|
|Venezuela|Increasing|11.2|8.8|2.8|4.8|
|_Mean of: _|_Increasing_|_12.5_|_10.4_|_3.2_|_6.7_|

* Only 122 usable observations

<u>Returns by Education Level. When years of schooling are used in the wage equation, this</u> implies that the impact of one additional year of schooling on within-group earnings dispersion is the same, irrespectively of education level. Using education levels in the wage equation instead, 18
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study found that 62% of displaced peasants were worse off after land conversion (Rural Development Institute, 2005).

Furthermore, one reads in the press of many cases where peasants complain and demonstrate because the conversions have not been done in a transparent way, and there are accusations of corruption lining the pockets of local officials. The government has published statistics on violent protests involving more than 100 people, and that number grew steadily up to 2005 (84,000 incidents), before dropping a reported 20% in 2006. The government has been taking a number of measures, which I will return to in the policy section below; the drop in 2006 in violent protests suggests that the government’s actions may have improved the situation. But we can say that up until 2006, the way in which agricultural land was being converted to urban land probably contributed unnecessarily to increasing inequality. One of the good things about China is that virtually all peasants have land. If that asset could be used either as collateral for borrowing, or could be sold to provide some capital before migrants moved to the city, then it would have been helping those who were in the poorer part of the income distribution. The administrative, rather than market-based, conversion of land essentially reduced the value of the main asset held by the poor.

# **_D. Fiscal system and rural social services_**

I noted above that one effect of market reform in China was to dramatically increase the return to education. This should be a positive development, as it indicates that there are good opportunities for skilled people and as it creates a powerful incentive for families to increase the education of their children. However, there needs to be strong public support for education and reasonably fair access to the system. Otherwise, inequality can become self-perpetuating: if only high-income people can educate their children, then that group remains a privileged, high-income group permanently. China is at some risk of falling into this trap, because it has developed a highly decentralized fiscal system in which local governments rely primarily on local tax collection to provide basic services such as primary education and primary health care. China in fact has one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the world.

10
Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-term Investment<sup>1</sup>

# Background

Pension funds are rightly viewed as an important source of long-term capital in many countries. Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the theme of long-term investment and the role of institutional investors as providers of domestic capital for economic development has been high on policy makers’ agendas. Pension funds are seen as an important source of long-term, domestic capital as the balance sheets of governments and banks have become increasingly stretched.

Despite generally positive findings linking pension system development and economic growth,<sup>2</sup> there have also been plenty of disappointments. In too many countries, pension fund investments remain highly concentrated in bank deposits and traditional government bonds<sup>3</sup> , contributing little long-term funding for development – as well as delivering disappointing investment returns and therefore pensions. OECD Global Pension Statistics show that around half the assets of pension funds around the world are held in bills and bonds – with the proportion significantly higher in non-OECD countries (at 58.6% of total assets under management (AUM)).<sup>4</sup>

> 1 This paper has been prepared by Alvaro Enrique Pedraza Morales and Fiona Stewart from the World Bank and Olga Fuentes and Pamela Searle from the Superintendencia in Chile.  This paper was produced in collaboration with the International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) and will also appear in their Working Paper Series on Effective Pension Supervision.

2 For theoretical and empirical evidence linking pension funds and economic growth see (Stewart, Despalins and Remizova forthcoming).

3 It should be noted that long-term investment can be also achieved via government instruments if these are of long duration and kept until maturity and/or if they are financing particular goals such as for example infrastructure or green bonds. However, in many countries, pension funds’ holdings of government securities are generally of shorter-term duration. It should also be noted that when pension systems are launched in some countries, government bond rates can be high (and remain so for persistent periods). While this is the case, it can make sense for allocations to these assets to remain stable. However, it would be expected that these would decline as macroeconomic conditions and the pension sector develop. While this has been observed in some countries (such as Mexico), others lag in their portfolio diversification trends.

4 See Pension Funds in Figures, May 2017 + accompanying statistical tables http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/privatepensions/pensionmarketsinfocus.htm. A more in-depth discussion of pension fund portfolio diversification and links to investment performance can also be found in (Stewart, Despalins and Remizova forthcoming ‘ _Pension Funds, Capital Market and the Power of Diversification’_ ).

2
# **Abstract**

A large body of empirical work in recent years has focused on measuring and explaining socioeconomic inequalities in health outcomes and health service use. In any effort to address these questions, analysts must confront the issue of how to measure socioeconomic status. In developing countries, socioeconomic status has typically been measured by per capita consumption or an asset index. Currently, there is only limited information on how the choice of welfare indicators affects the analysis of health inequalities and the incidence of public spending. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the potential sensitivity of the analysis of health-related inequalities to how socioeconomic status is measured. Using data from Mozambique, the paper focuses on five key health service indicators and tests whether measured inequality (concentration index) in the five health service variables is different depending on the choice of welfare indicator. The paper shows that, at least in some contexts, the choice of welfare indicator can have a large and significant impact on measured inequality in utilization of health service and on the perceived incidence of public spending. Consequently, we can reach very different conclusions about the “same” issue depending on how we define socioeconomic status. The results call for more clarity and care in the analysis of health-related inequalities and for explicit recognition of the potential sensitivity of findings to the choice of welfare measure. The results also point to the need for more careful research on how different dimensions of socioeconomic status are related, and on the pathways by which these dimensions affect health-related variables.

ii
as poor regulation, that prevent firms growing to take advantage of economies of scale are believed to hamper output and productivity growth (Conway et al, 2006), particularly in export markets (IMF 2015c). For example, in Spain, the productivity gap between small and large firms is very large. Yet low productivity firms stay in business‐ when they might exit or make productivity enhancing investments. Obstacles to growth may be regulatory, for example, size dependent thresholds in business regulation, labor regulations (see below) or financial constraints.

**Figure 15.a: Labor market regulation rank        Figure 15.b: Flexibility of wage determination rank** (higher rank means less regulation) (1= most flexible)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br>1 1<br>21 21<br>41 41<br>61<br>61<br>81<br>81<br>101<br>101<br>121<br>141 121<br>161 141<br>Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Portugal Spain<br>Figure 15.c: Hiring and firing practices rank Figure 15.d: Redundancy costs (weeks of salary)<br>2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 100<br>1<br>21 80<br>41 60<br>61<br>40<br>81<br>101 20<br>121<br>0<br>141<br>2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br>Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Greece Ireland Portugal Spain<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 15.c: Hiring and firing practices rank      Figure 15.d: Redundancy costs (weeks of salary)**

Source a: Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the World Database, b‐c‐d: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index. The redundancy cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of salary.

_<u>Changing labor market regulation.</u>_ The evolution of structural indicators shows that the overall labor market regulation ranking, which had deteriorated for GPS, showed improvements in Portugal and Spain. Hiring and firing practices have improved substantially since 2010 for all. In this regard, the evolution of severance pay merits some attention. Surprisingly, even before the 2008 crisis, GI cut their severance pay requirements dramatically‐ it was not until 2012 that PS reduced theirs. The period 2012‐ 2014 shows continuing adjustment. All four countries made labor market adjustment easier by allowing firms to fire workers at low cost. Combined with large declines in wages in Greece, these changes, unsurprisingly, had long‐lived effects on the economy. Employment losses have been large. Recent research by the IMF addresses the impact of structural reforms in different economic contexts (IMF July 2016). They contend that the degree of slack in the economy should influence the choice of policy; job protection reforms (making it easier to sack people) can promote employment and output in good times, but further unemployment and output loss in bad times. In addition, together with wage declines, such reforms during fiscal contractions can be self‐defeating by depressing demand and output (and raising debt ratios).

36
analysis, we only consider patent applications filed after 2006.

Our sample primarily includes firms that engage in ongoing innovation activities. We exclude firms that have not filed patents and those with fewer than three years of patenting activities (which need not be consecutive) from 2006 to 2021. Additionally, firms that had not filed patents in the Chinese patent office during this period were also dropped. After the data cleaning, our final sample consists of approximately 28,000 Chinese firms.

To estimate the impact of U.S. sanctions, we rely on the Entity List issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Entity List is an important part of the U.S. export control system. It is used by the U.S. government to impose sanctions against foreign persons or entities, including government organizations, research institutes, companies, and individuals. Entities included in the Entity List need to fulfill U.S. license requirements to receive certain exports, reexports, or transfers of items (including technologies) from the U.S. We obtained the historical Entity List from the Federal Register from 1997 to 2021.

Entities/persons are typically included in the Entity List if they are believed to be involved in activities contrary to U.S. national security interests. After cleaning, we have 375 unique Chinese entities, including firms, universities, research institutes, and government agencies. The Entity List covers entities operating in various domains. For example, China’s biggest smartphone vendor, Huawei, and 68 of its non-US affiliates were added to the List in 2019. That year, HiSilicon, Huawei’s chip design arm, was also added to the List. These measures have cut access to newer chipsets from the most advanced chipset makers such as TSMC and Samsung, eroding market shares of Huawei and HiSilicon. In 2021, seven supercomputers manufacturers were added to the blacklist: Tianjin Phytium Information Technology, Sunway Microelectronics, Shanghai Center for High-Performance Integrated Circuit Design, and the National Supercomputer Centers of Jinan, Shenzhen, Wuxi, Zhengzhou.

We match the Entity List to the PATSTAT dataset using entity names. To identify the affected corporations, we match the exact entities on the Entity List, as well as their 7
to countries such as Kenya and Botswana (33%), while in South Africa only one quarter of the population is financially excluded. Only 25% of people have a formal savings account, excluding 66 million adults.<sup>2</sup> The use of Microfinance bank (MFB) accounts is even less widespread with only 4.6% of the adult population having a savings account with an MFB. This lack of access is not derived from a lack of interest or demand. According to recent survey results, almost 75% of the unbanked population in Nigeria report that they would like to have a bank account and over 80% of the population receives financial advice from family and friends.

<mark>Drawing from the studies and findings above, the question arises whether (i) commercial entertainment media could be used to combine information (education) delivery with (ii) b</mark> ehavioral treatment arms, such as nudges, varying choice architecture, and/or emotional stimulation. Could combining the two perhaps help improve literacy levels and at the same time overcome some of the psychological barriers that stimulate bad behavior? While commercial media has for a long time been associated with effective changes in social behavior (both positive and negative) it has rarely been used in the field of finance. In other sectors, such as health and education, these tools have been used with success for a long time. For instance, as Brazil’s Rede Globo network grew through the 1970s and 1980s, women also began having fewer children, experiencing the same decrease in fertility as with two extra years of education (La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea, 2012).

While using mass media to transmit educational messages is not a novel approach, using edutainment to improve financial capabilities is less explored. The telenovela “Nuestro Barrio” is a prominent example from the U.S. aimed at Hispanic immigrants, where research found that it successfully conveyed the importance of formal bank accounts to the largely under‐banked community (Spader _et al,_ 2007). Most recently, a World Bank supported study evaluated the impact of a South African soap opera with financial messages (“Scandal!”). The study made use of an encouragement design to compare outcomes between a randomly selected group that watched Scandal and another group that watched a “placebo” show without financial education content. Watching Scandal resulted in higher financial knowledge scores, increased borrowing from formal sources, and decreased the likelihood of entering into hire purchase agreements (Berg & Zia, 2017). In Ethiopia, a study showed that simple documentaries of relatively

> 2 ‐ ‐ ‐ <u>http://www.efina.org.ng/assets/Documents/Updated Documents/Key Findings 2012.pdf http://www.efina.org.ng/our‐work/research/access‐to‐financial‐services‐in‐nigeria‐survey/efina‐access‐to‐ financial‐services‐in‐nigeria‐2012‐survey/</u> http://www.cgap.org/blog/data‐action‐using‐finscope‐nigeria

3
Table <u>3: Association between household consumption expenditure per capita and wealth</u>

||OLS|OLS|FE|FE|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|Household Wealth|0.347***|0.329***|0.099***|0.090**|
||(0.027)|(0.030)|(0.037)|(0.044)|
|Constant|8.111***|8.130***|8.478***|8.646***|
||(0.031)|(0.033)|(0.031)|(0.311)|
|Round FEs|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|Fixed Effects (FEs)|WOREDA|EA|HH|HH|
|Controls|NO|NO|NO|YES|
|R-squared|0.348|0.362|0.021|0.069|
|# of EAs|433|433|433|433|
|N|13391|13391|13062|12937|

_Notes:_ This table provides estimates of the partial association between logarithm of total household consumption expenditure per capita and “started log” of household wealth score. Household sample weights from the ESS2 applied. All columns control for round fixed effects. Further, column (1) controls for woreda FEs, column (2) controls for EA FEs, and the other two columns control for household (HH) FEs. Column (4) additionally controls for 12 time-varying characteristics. The coefficient estimates for these 12 control variables are not reported here, but can be available on request. The overall and the within R-squared are given in the first and last two columns, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at EA level are given in parenthesis. Asterisks: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

41
- 1.34 -

# **Taft** LC.3& **Ajui D0oef Otf lUrtOd Mod Valdstton Perod**

|You|**C**<br>**c**<br>Prod'n<br>(000C MT)|**ooa**<br>(000<br>Trad.|**Acgs**<br>GAcius<br>Hyblid|**aborUufon**<br>(MWonManda)<br>Annuul Pown.<br>Total|Labor<br>(MiNors<br>Famnil|Sources<br>Marndays)<br>y Casal|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|198445<br>1906861<br>1966.7<br>1967.66|226.9<br>227.9<br>228.9<br>230.0|994.8<br>670.6<br>660.5<br>846.4|71.6<br>637.6<br>1066.0<br>1264.2|266.1<br>2107<br>476.6<br>271.4<br>239.3<br>510.7<br>279.4262.3<br>541.7<br>251.5<br>262.0<br>563.5|470.2<br>499.0<br>526.0<br>544.9|6.6<br>11.7<br>1s.7<br>18.6|

|Y|CrtpA<br>(00W <br>A_nnAua_|crae<br> **AncMe**<br>Peren.|Farm kcome<br>(ehllndof1067 Cedls)<br>C<br>Iet<br>1<br>CAXOCWe<br>2|
|---|---|---|---|
|196485|**4000**|2665|164.3<br>209.3|
|**19854.6**<br>1966-67<br>19874.6|4700<br>4640<br>4662|3201<br>3534<br>3639|174.2<br>223.4<br>197.0<br>230.2<br>171.8<br>227.9|

due to hproved icentives for cocoa productlon and investment. Of the 86 million manday increase in labor utilization over 1984-87, 71 million mandays wore for work on perennial crops, mostly cocoa. Only relative mnor amounts of casual labor were used, with family labor accounting for 97 percent or better of labor hput each year.

The resurgence of peronnial crops, ospecially cocoa, Is also shown In the estkinates of acreages in annual and perennial crops, with annual acreage Increasing by 280,000 and perennial by 930,000 acres, of which 630,000 are In cocoa. The Increase in future cocoa production potential Is even greater since all of the Increased acreage (and more) Is In hybrid cocoa, which **enjoys** a 50 percont yield differential over traditional varlties. As we shall see, the reolacement of acreage In traditional varieties by planting of hybrld varieties Is desthnd to be an heprtant feature of cocoa Investments over the next decade. This transition has already occurred In the other major cocoa producing countries.