rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
effects) to different levels of environmental qudlity.' The last step then assigns costs to the predicted in.Adence of health problems (or loss of agricultural production, or damage to materials). In the case of the health effects, we tried to assess both direct costs (hospital and treatment costs, for example) and indirect costs (a mother's time).

This paper does not discuss the pros and cons of assigning monetary values to physical or to health effects from environmental degradation. There is a fairly vast literature on this issue. What is missing are applications of theory, particularly in the context of developing countries. The existing applications have been made almost exclusively for the U.S. and some European countries. Some methodologies used in the U.S. studies are not readily applicable elsewhere, because of geographic and socioeconomic differences. Even so, in some situations, simple first order estimates of the damage costs can be made by "direct" application of the U.S. experience; that procedure is not new here.

# Limitations

This study is limited in several respects. As indicated, dose-response curves are not necessarily applicable to all populations and all regions. In addition, (1) quantification methodologies are still subject to much debate. (2) Not all major problems have been considered in this study, and for those probiems analyzed, not all the effects have been estimated and a great deal of uncertainty is involved. (3) In the case of Mexico, there is a paucity of information on parameters. We have additionally opted for a conservative approach, so that estin-iates tend to be underestimates of the true costs of each problem.

(1) Estimating the economic effect of environmental improvement (or degradation) has been controversial. In some environmental problems, society incurs in "direct" costs-matetial damage, loss of agricultural production, and so on. It is necessary to incorporate these costs into decisions on investment projects. The costs associated to the health effects of pollution involve subjective pain, which cannot be readily quantified, as well as direct costs (hospital and treatment cost, loss of productivity). "Much research has been devoted to the area and several health benefit studies on the acute effects and the mortality effects [of air pollution] are now available" (Krupnick and Alicbusan 1990).

Cost studies on the mortality effects of environmental degradation involve estimating the "value of life" (premature death). This cannot be thought of in terms of willingness to pay by any _1. In the case of health effects, the incidence of problems is related to the exposure rather than to ambient concentration of pollutants. Models that attempt to determine exposure of individuals to pollutants require a considerably larger volume of information. For the population at large, it is questionable w.'.ether the results differ significantly._ _5_
In conclusion, while the development literature is ripe with technocratic ideas and flavor of the year slogans, in practice such ideas have not yielded demonstrable improvements in government performance anywhere. In the next section, we revisit a few ideas that have shown some, albeit limited, promise of success.

# **4. Approaches That Have Shown Some Promise of Success in Practice**

A number of innovations in government during the last two decades have demonstrated some potential for success. These are briefly highlighted in the following paragraphs:

## _Letting the Sun Shine in on Government Operations_

Enlarging the sphere of information on government operations available to citizens at large creates an enabling environment for government accountability. Two important examples are Citizens’ Report Card in Banglore, India where an independent citizens’ right to information advocacy group publicizes the service delivery performance of state and local governments and demands action to overcome bottlenecks (see Paul 2002). Another approach practiced in Uganda with some success was the expenditure tracking surveys which tracked government finances and its leakages (Reinikka 2006).

## _Subsidiarity_

The subsidiarity principle argues for assignment of responsibility to the lowest order of government unless a convincing case can be made for higher order assignment (Shah 2007). The European Union adopted this principle as a framework for jurisdictional design. Conceptually, this principle strengthens bottom-up accountability by moving public decision making closer to people. In practice some form of democratic governance is required for such accountability to work. Therefore success of such a principle requires comprehensive political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. Most developing 12
# 3.3 Results for the human capital equation

Table 1 reports the OLS and IV estimation results for human capital accumulation using the overall skilled emigration rate regardless of the age of entry of individuals. For each method, the ...rst column corresponds to the full speci...cation of the equation of human capital accumulation; the second column gives a parsimonious speci...cation in which unsigni...cant or weakly signi...cant variables such as I90 and R90 are excluded. Note that dropping these variables increases the size of our sample. For IV regressions, we report ...rst and second stage diagnostic tests.

The results in Table 1 show a positive and signi...cant association between skilled migration rates and human capital accumulation. This e¤ect is robust across different speci...cations and estimation methods. However, the magnitude di¤ers across methods. The size of the IV estimate is twice as large as the one obtained with OLS. Our estimates also indicate that an increase in public subsidies has a positive and stable impact on human capital formation. Another ...nding worth emphasizing is the negative and signi...cant impact of the initial human capital stock. This suggests the existence of a conditional convergence process between 1990 and 2000. The share of the young cohort S15=24 has negative sign. This can be explained by the fact that human capital formation is lower in poor countries with high fertility and population growth rates. The share of the older cohort S49=55 has negative sign, indicating that a lower turnover of the population reduces the growth rate of human capital. Urbanization has a positive and signi...cant impact on human capital formation. Regional dummies are not reported in the table. In all speci...cations, the sub-Saharan dummy is signi...cant and negative. The dummies for East-Asia and Paci...c and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are signi...cant and positive. There is no signi...cant e¤ect for Latin America and Middle East and North Africa.

17
set of proper choices from a distributional and budget perspective. Subsidies have been eliminated on those products, such as gasoline, that were more pro-rich and affected poverty the least, while the reform of products that would hurt the poor the most, such as LPG, has been delayed. Electricity tariffs have been increased in a sensible way by increasing the number of blocks (and thereby reducing the consumer surplus) and by raising tariffs only on the upper blocks, protecting in this way the poor and the middle class. The 2014 reforms had important indirect effects, particularly for diesel, and these had an impact on poverty but still modest overall. All reforms were implemented without compensatory cash transfers, and the reforms did not provoke any significant social backlash.

# Tunisia: 2012–14

As with the other reformist countries, Tunisia was forced to embark into subsidy reforms because of budget constraints. Between 2005 and 2013, the combined spending on energy, food, and transportation more than tripled, rising from 2 percent of GDP in 2005 to 7 percent in 2013. Energy subsidies, in particular, increased fourfold, reaching 4.7 percent of GDP in 2013. Due to the 2011 revolution and the economic decline and political instability that followed the revolution, reforming subsidies proved difficult between 2011 and 2012.

In 2012 the Government of Tunisia began implementing a gradual strategy of subsidy reduction and improvement in public spending targeting. As reported by the IMF (2014), the prices of gasoline, diesel, and electricity increased by 7 percent in September 2012, followed by similar increases in March 2013. Energy subsidies to cement companies were halved in January 2014 and fully removed in June of the same year. Electricity tariffs on low and medium voltage consumers were increased in a two-step process, by 10 percent in January 2014 and another 10 percent in May 2014. The government introduced a lifeline electricity tariff for households consuming less than 100 kilowatt hours (kWh) per month in 2014. Also in January 2014 the government established a new automatic price formula for gasoline to align domestic prices to international prices over time, but without a clear calendar.

The government also introduced other social reforms with the potential to mitigate the impact of subsidy reforms, although not designed specifically for that purpose. It launched a new social housing program (which was never really implemented), increased income tax deductions for the poorest households, and committed to creating a unified registry of beneficiaries of social 16
**Real effective exchange rate:** The nominal effective exchange rate divided by a price deflator or index of costs, where 2007=100. The real effective exchange rate was collected from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.

# **4. Summary statistics**

In Georgia, 8 percent of firms in the sample were exporters in any year, and 2 percent of total sales were represented by exports. The data however suggest that of firms that export, a significant and increasing share of their sales tend to come from exports. On average for Georgian exporting firms, 13 percent of sales came from exports. For firms that export to the EU or high-income countries, exports tend to represent a larger share of sales (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Share of exports and exporting firms**

||All firms|Exporters|EU exporters|HIC exporters|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Exported in at least one year|8.4|--|--|--|
|Share of exports in total sales|1.9|12.9|19.5|18.4|
|Number of firms|61,849|5,090|1,447|1,713|
|Number of observations|132,028|18,296|7,138|8,151|

Source: GEOSTAT Statistics Survey of Enterprises for 2006-2017. Note: HIC = high income country.

Exporting firms tend to be bigger and more productive than firms that sell exclusively to the domestic market (Bernard and Jensen 1995, Bernard and Jensen 1999, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2007, Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998). This holds true in our Georgia sample with respect to firm size in terms of employees, where exporters are four times as large as non-exporters. For example, the average number of employees in Georgian exporting firms was 83 as compared to 20 in non-exporting firms. The difference in turnover is even larger, with exporters seven times as large as non-exporters. Exports also pay more, with average wages (total compensation per worker) nearly twice as large for exporters than non-exporters (see Table 2). This difference may reflect a higher fixed cost of exporting in Georgia, which only larger or more productive firms can overcome.

On average, Georgian exporters hire more female workers than non-exporters, but the share of female employees is smaller in exporting firms, with 35 percent of the workforce being women in exporting firms compared to 51 percent in non-exporting firms (see Table 2). Exporters also pay 7
**Table A2: FPM transfers and preschool supply, controlling for fourth order population polynomial**

|||Reduce<br>|d form<br>|||IV<br>|||Obs.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Enrol|ment|#cen|ters|Enroll|ment|#ce|nters||
|Panel A: Municipal supply||||||||||
|Thresholds 1-7|3.946**|5.236***|0.242***|0.199***|4.934**|6.766***|0.302***|0.257***|21168|
||[1.558]|[1.424]|[0.083]|[0.061]|[1.944]|[1.684]|[0.103]|[0.072]||
|Thresholds 1-4|4.246***|5.018***|0.195**|0.187***|5.575***|7.065***|0.256**|0.268***||
||[1.471]|[1.228]|[0.080]|[0.060]|[1.930]|[1.571]|[0.106]|[0.078]|18365|
|Panel B: Private supply||||||||||
|Thresholds 1-7|0.786|1.467***|-0.000|0.000|0.982|1.898***|-0.000|0.001|21168|
||[0.712]|[0.386]|[0.012]|[0.007]|[0.890]|[0.458]|[0.014]|[0.008]||
|Thresholds 1-4|1.626***<br>[0.608]|1.188***<br>[0.379]|0.007<br>[0.012]|0.007<br>[0.007]|2.136***<br>[0.800]|1.573***<br>[0.484]|0.009<br>[0.016]|0.008<br>[0.008]|18365|
|State fixed-effects|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No||
|Municipality fixed-effects|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes||

_Notes_ : Reduced form regressions relate the relevant outcome to theoretical transfers. In the IV regressions, theoretical transfers serve as instrument for actual transfers. All regressions include a fourth order population polynomial and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
|**Table 5.2. Convergence Estimates for LF**|**PR, Pay-Gap, Sectoral a**|**nd Non-Tradable**<br>LFPR|Pay-|Gap|Sec|toral|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||3.1|4.1|4.2|5.1|5.2|
||Baseline|Closure|Closure|OECD|Closure|Closure+|
|**1. GDP**|||||||
|1.1. GDP (in USD)|$4,049,744,636|$4,142,044,348|$4,243,588,292|$4,130,475,421|$4,263,837,535|<br>$4,150,064,054|
|1.1.1. Growth (in %)||2.28%|4.79%|1.99%|5.29%|2.48%|
|1.2. GDP per capita (in USD)|$800.71|$818.96|$839.04|$816.67|$843.04|$820.55|
|1.2.1. Growth (in %)||2.28%|4.79%|1.99%|5.29%|2.48%|
|1.3. GDP per worker (in USD)|$2,125.44|$2,033.18|$2,227.17|$2,167.81|$2,237.80|$2,178.09|
|1.3.1. Growth (in %)||-4.34%|4.79%|1.99%|5.29%|2.48%|
|**2. Women's Contribution**|||||||
|2.1. in USD, bil.|$1,084,390,549|$1,252,334,304|$1,278,234,205|$1,165,121,334|$1,298,483,448|<br>$1,245,245,780|
|2.2. of GDP (in %)|26.78%|30.23%|30.12%|28.21%|30.45%|30.01%|
|2.2.1. Growth (in p.p. %)||3.46%|3.34%|1.43%|3.68%|3.23%|
|2.3. of Labor Output (in %)|39.04%|43.63%|43.01%|40.76%|43.40%|43.26%|
|2.3.1. Growth (in p.p. %)||4.60%|3.98%|1.72%|4.36%|4.23%|
|**3. Sectoral Value Added**|||||||
|3.1. traditional, female (in USD)|$647,951,018|$746,647,597|$813,208,892|$728,681,803|$512,652,499|$532,672,334|
|3.1.1. Growth (in %)||15.23%|25.50%|12.46%|-20.88%|-17.79%|
|3.2. modern, female (in USD)|$436,439,531|$505,686,706|$465,025,312|$436,439,531|$785,830,948|$712,573,446|
|3.2.1. Growth (in %)||15.87%|6.55%|0.00%|80.05%|63.27%|
|3.3 traditional, male (in USD)|$735,858,976|$809,219,818|$735,858,976|$735,858,976|$735,858,976|$764,595,353|
|3.3.1. Growth (in %)||9.97%|0.00%|0.00%|0.00%|3.91%|
|<br>3.4. modern, male (in USD)|$957,620,009|$808,615,124|$957,620,009|$957,620,009|$957,620,009|$868,347,818|
|3.4.1. Growth(in %)<br>_Source:_Authors’ simulation based on expand|ed version of CKW 2017 m|-15.56%<br>odel.|0.00%|0.00%|0.00%|-9.32%|

38
**Policy, Research, and External Affairs**

:,,0 **_A_ a0Is,**

# **World Development Report**

WPS 627 1hIU r pa;Per was prepared as aI back:rounld paper fortlre 1990 _vcopFn_ p v\er1. _rorldIl)' Ct o'pr(on ( 'o picN_ azre availhibc 1'ree from tihe W'orld Bank, 1818 III Street NW, Washington D )(' 20433. I'lezase conlact lt1 \\old Development Report **o01icc,** room SI 3-060, cxtension .31393 (71 pages).

lolt **conlten(s** thai institutionall developmnclt (11)) is critical to gro,wtl and sustainazble poverty red(uctioni.

Allihoughi there is no single model .,ar poverty-oriented inistitutional developmncit, and ID initiatives vary considerably across sectors and naticns, impotIaln1t comIm111oni lessons have becn learned about successful institutional development initiatives. Ifolt presents tihese in teni1s olf six componients: Botlh successf'Ll iland UllSUCCCSlul plro ms arc used to illustrate the importance ol thesc componncits. Drawing on evidence from lihc Managing Agriculturazl Development in Al'iica (MADIA) study, Ilolt shows. for example, tlihat because of a lack of adequatc institutional links and informaztion nows between small farnmeC!s and researchers, less **than** 5 percent ofl anners in MalaAwi have adopted hybrid maize despite m11oreC **tlhiain** 30 years ol mali/ze-bree(Iiig work and 20 years ol' agriculturall development projccis.

F oEoriming and strengthening local organizations.

* Supportiing institutional pluralism,.

* Buildint links betvwccn povert -oriented institutiol1s.

* Adopting ille appropriate organi/.ational structure and encou raging stronig leadership.

* Adopting tlhc leaining process approach.

* Mobilizing locaIl resources and thc participaion of poor people.

But institutional investments **oltenI** require unconventional, potentially costly programs an(i projects. ID initiatives have been critici/ed in **terms** of **thc** costs **zaIId** benelits **ol diilcircnt** approaches, the scale on which they can operate, their compatibility with conventional prioject frameworks, thc degree and tyres of'decentralization the) require, alnd tlheir political feasi bil it.

Using case studies f'romii dififerent productive sectors and subsectors suchi as tlc National Irrigation Authority in thic Philippines and tlhe Granieccn Bank in BallgladleshL slhe illus!rales how tilese objectioIns **may** be unwl; arrantcd or ovcrskeptical - that investments in institutional development can bc botlh cconoinicall\ z and politicallyl viable.

> **tIlh** I RE Worikini2 P **,ijxi** S0 r;e9( issel **iTidics thC** filndilng- of %kork **under** \ **!a** in tl B.an **Pk 1 ' 11** . **R,** . **nd F\In(t t1t1.1. Aftz:l (** ('omple. An **oh jetis* ot** the riti es is to get tliese indlng\o it (luicekl\. e.en ifprsttion' are **less thin I oils** ll.th rh,' loidiic'. **!** -v:.,:,,,. .i conclumins in tlese p*mlerS (lo not **neces.-aii** repre';,r ofik i.d **B.i:ik 1..!;** 1

**Pl ::,-d l's o'!** PRL **t)Dis enl.,i:1.:** (en:er
information was gathered on the price per kilogram of porter services (inclusive of in-kind payments) and of ox-cart transport, depending on which was available. If both modes were available, we always took the ox-cart price; human porterage is around 25% more expensive per hour of travel time than is transport by ox-cart. Transport costs are also somewhat higher during the wet season, but we use prices in the dry season when most transport occurs. For hamlets that do not ship directly to Antsirabe, we construct total costs per kilogram to the final market by summing the costs of each leg of the minimum cost route thereto.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 1761 sampled households according to transport costs to Antsirabe. The bimodality reflects the oversampling of households in the most remote areas; our sample is not designed to be representative of the spatial distribution of the region’s population. At any rate, for almost half of our sample, total transport costs lie in the range of 140-180 ariary per kilogram (2100 ariary = 1 USD) or around 75 USD per ton. By comparison, during harvest season 2006 (April-June), paddy rice sold for 300-350 ariary/kg in Antsirabe. Nonetheless, as we will see, many of these remote households still sell rice for export to Antsirabe.

## Figure 2: Distribution of Sample Households by Transport Costs

The data collection was split into two rounds to deal with seasonality issues. The first round survey was done in November-December 2005 with a 5-6 month recall to the previous July, and the second round took place in July-August 2006, covering the period from the preceding round to the end of June. Thus, overall, the survey has a 12 month recall from July 2005-June 2006, with main season agricultural production (principally rice) recorded in the second round and off-season production (often vegetables) recorded in the first round. Sales of rice and other staples occurring in July, for example, are from stocks held over from the 2005 harvest, whereas, starting in April, these sales come from the 2006 harvest. In the first round, 1798 households were interviewed, 37 of which, for various reasons, could not be followed up in the second round.

# 2.2 How heterogeneous is land productivity across space?

Our first task is to assess the exogeneity of transport costs with respect to the household behaviors and outcomes of interest. This can be done indirectly, by comparing land productivity across our study area. We have information on rice yield for about 3300 lowland plots cultivated by nearly 1700 households. There are, however, two confounding factors to consider: First, input use is likely to decline with transport costs. That there are indeed important differences in production practices by location is shown in Figure 3. Fertilizers and other modern techniques, such as improved transplanting and weeding methods, are much less likely to be used on more remote rice plots. A second issue is 4
When cities function efficiently, they attract firms in industries and services that value agglomeration economies. In fact, agglomeration economies are the reason that cities exist (Duranton and Puga, 2004). They can occur within a given sector, when firms in the same industry concentrate in a metropolitan area to enjoy access to specialized suppliers or expertise that could not be supported with lesser concentrations. Or they can occur across industries, as when firms from different industries benefit from collocating because the diversity of their skills and experiences encourages innovation.

Agglomeration economies can be in consumption as well as production, as large cities attract residents because of the wider variety of restaurants, museums and other forms of entertainment. Empirical research confirms that agglomeration economies are substantial. Studies show, for example, that average productivity increases by 4 to 20 percent with each doubling of metropolitan population, and that the productivity effects are particularly pronounced in certain industries, among them some services (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Graham, 2006).

Agglomeration economies change how households and firms respond to natural hazard risk. People are unlikely to stay away from cities and urban residents do not tend to move out even when faced with significant hazard risk. If cities deliver economies of scale and agglomeration, the stakes of being physically close to economic density will be high enough for people not to be deterred by hazard risk. Risk mitigation (e.g., retrofitting buildings) and risk transfer (e.g., insurance) will be the main responses to risk. Mitigation is likely to have a positive benefit-cost ratio, and will be the mainstay of efforts in countries with weak information. In the longer term, as credible information on risk becomes available, the large market will be attractive for risk pooling through insurance.

But if cities are inefficient—either due to weak institutions or bad policies—the economic gains from agglomeration will be low, making these locations less attractive to households and business owners. In those cases, growth may slow down further in cities facing risk from natural hazards. Data from global cities with more than 100,000 people suggests that population growth between 1960 and 2000 is slower in low income country cities at risk from earthquakes—middle income and high income country cities do not 10
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