in exchange for the reciprocal market access that had been granted to their exporters.<sup>84</sup> Second, because developing countries did not offer any market access of their own in exchange for special tariff cuts, they could not influence either the products or the countries from which they would receive these tariff cuts. And, as we observed already via Figures 9 and 8, countries typically did not offer unilateral tariff cuts for 100 percent of their imported products even to developing country exporters under PTAs. Furthermore, the comparative advantage of most developing countries had them involved in globally diffuse export sectors; the result was low-income countries had great difficulty in organizing negotiations among themselves to coordinate tariff liberalization ‘requests’ being made of major importing countries (Ludema and Mayda, 2013).

Overall, developing countries were not successful at getting their true export interests reflected as part of negotiated bargains. As such, one legacy of the GATT period is that agriculture, textiles and apparel, and footwear - sectors of production and export interest for developing countries - were essentially excluded from much of the trade liberalization that took place.

# **4.3.6 Antidumping in historical perspective**

The last trade policy exception from the GATT period that we introduce is antidumping.<sup>85</sup> As described in Section 3.1, the GATT system permitted countries to impose antidumping import restrictions against products sold at low (dumped) prices if such imports caused injury to the domestic, import-competing industry. Today antidumping is in use by a wide range of high-income and emerging economies.

Prior to the 1990s, only four economies - Australia, Canada, the EEC and the US - used antidumping import restrictions with any regularity.<sup>86</sup> In the 1980s, for example, the United States began to use antidumping with increased frequency to address the import growth in a number of different sectors from Japan, as well as some of the other newly industrializing economies of East Asia, such as Korea and Taiwan.<sup>87</sup> Here we take advantage of newly compiled data on historical use of antidumping by the GATT’s high income economies so as to compare their use of the policy during the 1970s with their more contemporary use. Figure 15 depicts the share of antidumping investigations across industrial sectors for three decades.<sup>88</sup>

> 84McCulloch and Pinera (1976) offer an early skeptical view of the benefits of GSP, for example. Subramanian and Wei (2007) provide empirical evidence that the GATT had relatively little impact on developing country trade, potentially due to the asymmetries implied by such preferences. See also Staiger (2006), Bagwell and Staiger (2014), and Ornelas (forthcoming).

> 85Under the GATT 1947, both antidumping and countervailing duties were permitted under Article VI. Additional provisions for these policies were put forward through ‘plurilateral codes’ as a result of the GATT’s Tokyo Round of negotiations in 1979.

> 86South Africa was also a major user of antidumping during the period between 1921 and the 1970s; for a discussion, see Edwards (2011).

> 87See Irwin (2005) for a presentation of the historical use of antidumping by the United States. Blonigen and Prusa (forthcoming) survey the literature on antidumping; most of the early empirical research in particular that had arisen in the 1980s and 1990s had focused on the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Economic Community.

> 88Data used to construct these figures for 1970-1979 come from the GATT digital archive series COM.AD, and for 1990-2000 from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database. For the 1970s, we mapped the verbal descriptions of

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