rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Methodology**

Ideally, one would examine the introduction of case-based payment systems by comparing outcomes between valid treatment and comparison groups. Since case-based payment systems are often introduced by policy across all hospital providers in a country at the same time, it is difficult to identify a scientifically valid comparison group.<sup>4</sup> In the United States, DRGs were introduced first under Medicare, which made it possible to compare certain types of hospitals. In Croatia, however, case-based payment systems (PPTP and DTS) were introduced across the whole system at the same time, with the same payment scheme for all hospitals.

This study uses a time series approach to examine the impact of case-based payment systems. Building on the work by Kahn et al. (1990) and Shmueli et al. (2002), we select five procedures to examine outcomes at the hospital level. Unlike those studies, however, which use a before and after comparison of the average level effect from the prior year compared to the post year, we use an interrupted time series (ITS) approach to examine changes in both the _level_ and _slope_ (see Shadish et al. 2002). The benefit of capturing the change in the slope is to examine changes over time due to the introduction of case-based payment systems— hospitals are likely to adapt and learn about efficiency improvements incentivized by casebased payment systems over time, and focusing only on the average change from one year to the next would not accurately quantify the improvements over months or years. For example, the ITS approach allows us to quantify the effect of DTS over a full 12 month implementation period, rather than estimating only the level effect of 2008 average compared to 2009 average.

The 5 procedures selected are cataracts, pneumonia, coronary bypass, appendectomy, and hip replacement. These 5 procedures were selected because they were common procedures, a mix of different types of cases, and the procedure codes existed through all the different payment methods. Four are surgical, and pneumonia is a medical procedure. Table 2 shows how the procedural codes correspond across the different payment systems from 20002009.<sup>5</sup> Hospitalization claims data over 10 years (2000-2009) were collected from HZZO for

> 4 A few studies have used a differences-in-differences approach between treatment and comparison providers such as Yipp and Eggleston (2001) and Dafny (2005). Serra and Wagstaff (2010) use a differences-indifferences approach to examine treatment and comparison countries.

> 5 Pneumonia did not have a code in the 2002-2005 PPTP period, so codes for pneumonia were based on the World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). Fortunately, our analysis focuses on the impact of the PPTP period beginning in 2005, when all five procedures had PPTP codes.

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Patrinos, Harry, and Chris Sakellariou. 2006. “Economic Volatility and Returns to Education in Venezuela: 1992-2002”. _Applied Economics_ 38:1991-2005.

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Psacharopoulos, George, and Ying Ng. 1992. “Earnings and Education in Latin America: Assessing Priorities for Schooling Investments”. _Policy Research Working Paper_ WPS1056, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, The World Bank.

Psacharopoulos, George, and Harry Patrinos. 2004. “Returns to Investment in Education: a Further Update”. _Education Economics_ 12(2):111-136.

Psacharopoulos, George. 1989. “Time Trends of the Returns to Education: Cross-National Evidence”. _Economics of Education Review_ 8(3):225-231.

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Riveros, Luis. 1990. “The Economic Return to Schooling in Chile: An Analysis of its Long-term Fluctuations”. _Economics of Education Review_ 9(2):111-121.

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Policy Research Working Paper 6564

# **Abstract**

This paper examines whether the Colombian government’s expansion of social programs in the early 1990s, particularly the publicly provided health insurance, discouraged formal employment. Using household survey data and variation across municipalities in the onset of interviews for the SISBEN, the instrument used to identify beneficiaries for public health insurance, it shows robust and consistent estimates of an increase in informal employment of approximately 4 percentage points. Similar results are obtained using an alternative dataset, consisting of a panel of individuals interviewed for the first and second SISBEN. The findings suggest that marginal individuals optimized when deciding whether to participate in the formal sector.

This paper is a product of the Partnerships, Capacity Building Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at econover@hamilton.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Policy Research Working Paper 8000

# **Abstract**

Measures of cognitive, noncognitive, and technical skills are increasingly used in development economics to analyze the determinants of skill formation, the role of skills in economic decisions, or simply because they are potential confounders. Yet in most cases, these measures have only been validated in high-income countries. This paper tests the reliability and validity of some of the most commonly used skills measures in a rural developing context. A survey with a series of skills measurements was administered to more than 900 farmers in western Kenya, and the same questions were asked again after three weeks to test the reliability of the measures. To test predictive power, the study also collected information on agricultural practices and production during the four following seasons. The results show the cognitive skills measures are reliable and internally consistent, while technical skills are difficult to capture and very noisy. The evidence further suggests that measurement error in noncognitive skills is non-classical, as correlations between questions are driven in part by the answering patterns of the respondents and the phrasing of the questions. Addressing both random and systematic measurement error using common psychometric practices and repeated measures leads to improvements and clearer predictions, but does not address all concerns. The paper provides a cautionary tale for naïve interpretations of skill measures. It also points to the importance of addressing measurement challenges to establish the relationship of different skills with economic outcomes. Based on these findings, the paper derives guidelines for skill measurement and interpretation in similar contexts.

This paper is a product of the Development Data Group and the Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at r.laajaj@uniandes.edu.co.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
gauging station data are summarized for each watershed. This includes dam location data (Food and Agricultural Organization on Africa dams 2006; Meridian Global Dam Database 2006; and hydro power plants (CARMA 2009). Global Lakes and Wetlands Database (Lehner and Döll 2004) identified areas of large bodies of water (which are usually impoundments) within the international river basins. After possible selection, the data are loaded into Google Earth (version 5.2.1.1329) for further visual inspection of impoundments from the imagery as well as georeferenced photos. In addition, we searched for 4 years from 1988 to present of available runoff data, yet there was an extensive search for periods of records that overlapped the 20+ years of the SSM/I instruments. Since the satellite resolution and a number of observations inside the basin should have structure, a restriction was imposed that the watershed should be at least 50,000 Km<sup>2</sup> .

We selected two international river basins that met the stringent set of technical assumptions and had significant previous international relations and socio-economic data upon which to draw: Mekong and Zambezi. A limited number of basins fit the technical criteria, which reinforces the notion that many international basins are significantly altered from natural flow and the other basins do not have sufficient gauging station information. More precisely, Nilsson et al. (2005) provide a global overview of dam-based impacts on large river systems that finds over half (172 out of 292) are affected by dams, including the eight most biogeographically diverse. Moreover, World‘s Water report (2010) has a global total of 47,655 dams (see 19981999, Table 12). With regards to gauging station information, Vörösmarty et al. (2001) highlight the need for additional river discharge data (especially since the mid-1980s).

# **River basin characteristics**

The two rivers included in this analysis vary in basin characteristics. The Mekong and Zambezi represent a magnitude of river lengths (4350 km and 2,574 km) and basin areas (788,000 km<sup>2</sup> and 1,390,000 km<sup>2</sup> , respectively). These basins are international and have a critical role in the socio-economics of the riparian states including: food, water, transportation, electricity, natural resources, and cultural identity. Both basins are governed by treaties (TFDD 2008). Table 2 summarizes and compares river basin statistics including: geographic and socio-economic calculated from the watershed delineation in ESRI ArcGIS, which we suggest is due to the level of precision in the coordinates compared to the HydroSHEDS flow accumulation grid.

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_the lower chart, the dark continuous line indicates the gap between actual and synthetic industrial value-added series (normalized to 0 in 2012), the dark dash horizontal line indicates a null gap, and the two red vertical lines indicates the period of Séléka occupation in Bangui (2012, excluded, up to 2014, excluded). The subsequent period translates into localized conflicts areas in Northwestern and Eastern parts of the country, outside of major cities._

**Figure 8: Differences between industrial value added (percent of GDP) for CAR and control countries and their respective synthetic controls, 2009-17**

<!-- Start of picture text --> We keep all placebo countries<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>-50<br>-100<br>2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17<br>Seleka occupation<br>Year<br>No pre-Industrial's MSPE five times higher than CAR's<br>150<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>-50<br>2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17<br>Seleka occupation<br>Year<br>Gap Industry value added (index 100 =2012)<br>Gap Industry value added (index 100 =2012)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Industrial value-added series are from the World Development Indicators_ (35) _, from 2009-17. Note: The dark dash line indicates the gap between actual and synthetic light series for CAR and the gray lines indicates the gap_ 19
educational attainment, the educational attainment of his spouse and fixed effect dummies for the age of the mother and the year of first child birth. I also include fixed effect dummies for the area and region of residence to account for regional differences in the characteristics and the time of introduction of the Indonesian family planning program.<sup>4</sup> Finally, I cluster standard errors at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level and weight the regressions using survey weights.

For each outcome, I compare Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which the man has a surviving brother (first difference), relative to Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which the man has no siblings or only sisters (second difference), before and after the 1994 compilation (third difference). The first difference between Muslim and non-Muslim men who have one surviving brother cannot be causally attributed to the doctrine or to the inheritance rules that regulate each religious group. Single differences between Muslims and non-Muslims may be explained by differences in socio-economic conditions, female agency, age at marriage, and biological pre-natal factors or post-natal child mortality. However, differences in those contributing factors are expected to remain the same between Muslim and non-Muslim couples in which the man has no brothers. By subtracting the second difference from the first one, the effect of the Islamic inheritance law can be estimated. Only the application of the inheritance rule is assumed to vary between Muslim men who have at least a surviving brother and those who have no brothers. No difference by sibling composition is expected among non-Muslim men.

One could still argue that the differences in other contributing factors, between Muslim and non-Muslim men, are not the same for those who have no surviving brothers and those who do have a brother. A large literature has found significant effects of sibling sex composition and family size on adult outcomes, in both developed and developing

> 4 The national family planning program was implemented in three stages; it was first introduced in the most populous provinces of Java and Bali and then spread to the remaining provinces. Moreover, since 2004, the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) was decentralized and has no longer authority over regional government’s family planning policies and budgets (Cammack and Heaton 2001, Herartri 2008).

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analysis using an un...ltered sample that includes both excessive importers and exporters. The magnitudes of the estimated year ...xed e¤ects are very close to those in column (2) when the ...ltered sample is used, suggesting that our ...ndings are not driven by the removal of excessive importers and exporters. In summary, we ...nd that the within-...rm increase in the DVAR is widespread and it is not driven by sample selection.

The within-...rm increase in the DVAR over time should arise from exporters’substituting domestic for imported materials, at both the intensive and extensive margins. To examine this claim, we estimate the following speci...cations: <u>P</u><sup>I</sup> <u>M</u><sup>I</sup> where<sup>theshareofimportedmaterialsintotalmaterialcostfor...rmiinyear</sup> P<sup>M</sup> M � �it<sup>is</sup> t, while ln(import_varietyit) stands for the (log) number of import variety, measured by the number of imported HS6-country pairs.<sup>34</sup> Firm ...xed e¤ects are denoted by �i and �i in the respective speci...cations, while �t and �t are the year ...xed e¤ects, with the year e¤ects for 2000 omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Control variables in Xit include ...rm’s wage-to-sales ratio, � PYwL �it<sup>,(log)capital-laborratio,ln</sup> � <u>KL</u> �it<sup>,andmaterial-to-sales</sup> ratio, <u>PPY</u><sup>M</sup> <u>M</u><sup>We include these controls to capture the e¤ects of changing labor costs and</sup> � �it<sup>.</sup> capital deepening of the ...rm on imports. The residuals for each of the speci...cations are �it and !it; respectively. If ...rms are using more domestic materials for imported materials, the year ...xed e¤ects are expected to be negative, signi...cant and declining (i.e., �t < �t�1 < 0 and �t < �t�1 < 0; 8t > 2000).

Column (1) in Table 5 shows that the share of imported materials is gradually declining

> 34The HS classi...cation has changed twice (2002 and 2007) during our sample period. We use the concordance ...le created by Cebeci et al. (2012) to de...ne a consistent set of varieties over time.

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Table 4. Effect of Extension of School Day in Maternal Labor Supply, Single and Married mothers of 8–13 year olds, without and with Younger Children (FSD Proportion of Enrollment)

||||No youngerchil|dren||Withyoungerc|hildren|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||Coefficient on<br>share<br>(FSD)*Mother<br>8–13 (model 2)<br>comparison<br>group|||Coefficient on<br>share<br>(FSD)*Mother<br>8–13 (model 2)<br>comparison<br>group|
|||Pre-<br>initiative<br>mean<br>(1996)|Coefficient<br>on share<br>model 1|(Has) 6–7 year<br>old|Pre-<br>initiative<br>mean<br>(1996)|Coefficient<br>on share<br>model 1|(Has) 6–7 year<br>old|
|||1|2|3|5|6|7|
|A.|Single women|||||||
|a.|Labor participation (=1)|0.74|0.01|0.04|0.68|0.05|0.00|
|||(0.44)|(0.02)|(0.02)**|(0.47)|(0.03)|(0.02)|
|b.|Worked last week (=1)|0.70|0.04|0.03|0.62|0.02|-0.02|
|||(0.46)|(0.02)|(0.02)**|(0.49)|(0.03)|(0.02)|
|c.|Hours last week|44.45|-1.31|-1.37|44.17|0.66|-0.98|
|||(15.96)|(1.25)|(0.82)*|(16.90)|(1.73)|(0.91)|
|B.|Married women|||||||
|a.|Labor participation (=1)|0.38|-0.02|-0.01|0.30|0.00|-0.01|
|||(0.49)|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.46)|(0.01)|(0.01)|
|b.|Worked last week (=1)|0.36|-0.02|-0.01|0.28|0.00|-0.01|
|||(0.48)|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.45)|(0.01)|(0.01)|
|c.|Hours last week|43.39|1.13|0.10|43.05|-1.05|-0.5|
|||(18.15)|(1.08)|(0.73)|(18.53)|(1.30)|(0.85)|
||Controls|||||||
||Municipality fixed effects||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|
||Timefixed effect||Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|

_Notes:_ Each entry in panels A–B, rows a–c, columns 2–5 represents a coefficient from a different regression. All the regression include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, a vector of maternal background, and a vector of municipality characteristics. All the regressions control for cluster by municipality, and standard error are consistent for heteroskedasticity and error correlation within municipalities over time.

*** _p_ < .01   ** _p_ < .05  * _p_ < .1

_Source:_ Underlying data are from the Chilean socioeconomic household survey (CASEN) and administrative data from the Ministry of Education for 1990–2011.

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Altematively, firms may be required to reduce prices and firms with a dominant position may be required to divest parts of their operations.

The head of the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition is appointed by the President for 6 years on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and can only be fired 'if unfit for office on a lasting basis." The office is funded from dLe State budget, and is answerable to the Hungarian Parliament. It can impose fines ranging between 30 and 200 percent of the profits resulting from the violation of the law. The office has three parts: a Board of Experts responsible for investigations, a Competition Council which acts as an arbitration (administrative) court, and a Department of Competition Policy that is responsible for research and policy advice to ParliamentL The Council does not have competence to judge violations of 'unfair competition' (Chapter 1 of the Act), instead having to file suit in civil court. The Slovak Antimonopoly Office is a central government body. Its Chairman is appointed and recalled by the Govermnent. Decisions of the Office can be appealed before the Supreme Court.

The antitrust agencies in the CEE countries are all required to publish decisions. The Czech, Hungarian and Bulgarian laws allow for hearings to be held, but do not require it. The Hungarian enforcement agency is subject to the strictest time limits for investigations?25 Decisions by antitrust offices can be appealed in all the jurisdictions. In Poland appeals go to the special court created for this purpose; in the other three countries appeals go through the civil courts.

The number of cases brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic have been quite significant. In 1992, 255 cases were handled by the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition; in the Czech Republic out of 1,200 complaints filed in 1992, the Czech Office opened some 100 investigations. In Poland, 113 anti-monopoly investigations were launched in 1992, the total for 1990-1992 being some 300 (OECD, 1994). The Slovak Antimonopoly office investigated 158 and 164 cases in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and saw its case load rise to 274 cases in 1993.3

# _Ealuion_

A commonality of the CEE laws is that imple authorities are given a great deal of discretion as far as interpretation of terms is concerned. Much will depend on the case law that emerges from experience and the guidelines that are developed by the competiion offices. Although the leeway

## 24 Pogacsas and Stadler (1993).

5 Cartel, merger and aU other investigations mnst be concluded within _45,_ 90 and 60 days, respectively. Maximum extensions allowed for each category are _45,_ 180, and 60 days (Pogacsas and Stadler. 1993).

Fmancial Times Businmess Infornation, _Busuiss Law Brief,_ DIALOG database, October 1992, and private corrspondence with M. Banas.

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