of such codes varied significantly across countries –the two countries surveyed in Africa had a total lack of hazard-related codes (World Bank 2008).<sup>30</sup> Even where codes existed, they were frequently hard to access and their legal status was often unclear (as to being a guideline or a legal requirement).

Istanbul lacked significant seismic building codes until 1997, but even when enacted, Istanbul’s codes were rarely enforced – which suggests an additional problem with regulatory institutions. The Marmara quake in Turkey which killed 17,000 was of a magnitude and type accounted for by existing design specifications in the Turkish seismic code (Sezen et. al. 2002) – it was not lack of regulation but lack of enforcement which led to deaths. In Istanbul prior to the quake ‘amnesties’ for buildings known to be subcode were passed repeatedly, and municipalities responsible for enforcement lacked the capacity to do so. An estimated 70 percent of housing did not conform with extant standards of resistance to seismic risk (Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, 2007, Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, 2005, World Bank, 2005).

Problems went beyond official amnesties to limited capacities and rent-seeking. Correct construction of reinforced buildings is technically complex, and in many developing countries the requisite skills are scarce not only to construct but also to monitor construction (Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, 2005).<sup>31</sup> Municipalities including Istanbul had weak and underfunded municipal engineering and planning departments staffed with unaccredited engineers prone to corruption. In 2006, 40 municipal officials in three towns in Turkey were arrested for taking bribes in return for allowing unlicensed construction (Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, 2007) Again, this problem is far from unique to Turkey. Cross-country statistical analysis by Escaleras, Anbarci and Register (2007) suggests that, allowing for income and a range of other factors, countries perceived as more corrupt see higher earthquake fatalities. Jain (2005) discussing “the Indian earthquake problem” suggests why this may be the case. He notes that seismic code building certificates are “easy to procure, sometimes on payment of small money, and need not have any correlation with how a building is built.”<sup>32</sup> After the 2001 Bhuj quake in India, it emerged that no on-site inspection of the 30 This is not to say the problem is unique to developing countries. Counties and cities in the US located in states which have adopted comprehensive land planning requirements for local government have seen lower national flood insurance program claims and payments. This is true even if the requirements do not explicitly require attention to natural hazards. Despite this, less than half of US states have adopted such planning requirements (Burby, 2006).

31 Again, this is not a problem specific to developing countries. Dade County, Florida which suffered the greatest damage during Hurricane Andrew in 1992, had 60 building inspectors to police 20,000 new buildings constructed each year –suggesting an average of 35 inspections per inspector per day (IRC and IIPLR, 1995). Furthermore, as many as one half of local building officials working on the Gulf coast did not understand or did not enforce hurricane-related codes in 1992. Dade County’s failure to enforce codes alone accounted for $4 billion of additional damage to insured buildings caused by Hurricane Andrew. (Burby, 2006) 32 It is worth noting that, at least within countries, the causal relationship between corruption and natural disasters may run both ways. Leeson and Sobel (2008) find that in the United States, states which have more natural disasters see more corruption-related convictions per capita. They provide some evidence that this is because poorly managed windfalls in the form of Federal Emergency Management Agency relief 20