rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
cent studies by Akresh, Halim, and Kleemans (2018) and Mazumder, Rosales-Rueda, and Triyana (2019), which are also based on the same program. Departing from the literature that precedes us and these concurrent articles, we examine a broader set of developmental indicators as well as provide evidence regarding the role played by parenting practices on the transmission of policy impacts across generations.<sup>3</sup> We do so both in terms of activities parents carry out with their children but also in terms of interactions parents have with their children. Our analyses parallel those that focus on time use data, except that instead of focusing on the amount of time spent with the child (Andrabi et al., 2012; Bono, Francesconi, Kelly, & Sacker, 2016; Kalil, Ryan, & Corey, 2012) we focus on also characterizing the _quality_ of parent-child interactions.

Our identification strategy follows Esther Duflo’s seminal study on the causal impacts of INPRES (Duflo, 2001) by leveraging the timing and geographic (district/kabupaten) differences in intensity of this major school construction project launched in 1973 by the Indonesian government. INPRES led to the construction of 61,807 new primary schools within five years of its launching (Breierova & Duflo, 2004), corresponding to approximately one additional school per 500 Indonesian children on aggregate. With this historic context in mind, we use the caregiver survey module collected in 2013 as part of the Indonesia Early Childhood Education and Development (ECED) Project. Importantly, the survey contains detailed information about mothers of young children and captures where mothers were born and whether they had moved from their place of birth before completing primary schooling. As such, we are able to locate where the mothers in our data set grew up and characterize whether they potentially benefited from the expansion of primary education as a result of the INPRES program.

Our empirical estimates confirm that the INPRES program produced significant gains in educational attainment among the mothers in our sample. Mothers who grew up as part of cohorts in districts that were exposed to more intense doses of schooling expansion received an additional 1.3 years of formal education. These effects are particularly strong at lower levels of schooling, with

> 3The literature beyond economics establishes parenting practices as a critical mechanism by which parents influence their childrens development (Dornbusch, Ritter, Leiderman, Roberts, & Fraleigh, 1987; Jenkins & Handa, 2019; Kohn, 1969).

3
A Conceptual Framework For Retirement Products: Risk Sharing Arrangements Between Providers And Retirees

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- [23] **Fong, Wai Mun** , 2002, On the Cost of Adverse Selection in Individual Annuity Markets: Evidence from Singapore. _Journal of Risk and Insurance_ 69(2): 193-207.

- [24] **Holzmann, Robert, Indermit Gill, Richard Hinz, Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R. Musalem, Michal Rutkowski and Anita Schwartz** , 2003, Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century: The World Bank’s Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform. _mimeo_ .

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- 32 -
- 19 -

the three years for the former as opposed to 5 percent for the latter. The reason for this large discrepancy is quite unclear, and there does not appear to be any sound basis for deciding which is closer to the truth.

However, the results of Tables 3 and 4 also allow us to make an alternative assessment of how poverty changed during the period, avoiding the potentially contentious issues concerning the comparability of the levels of SUSENAS expenditures across the two dates. For this purpose we can use the SUSENAS to assess how overall inequality changed during the period. This assumes that the samples at both dates were representative of the populations, though this seems plausible (see Appendix 1 for further discussion). From Table 3 we can then conclude that there was no deterioration in overall inequality; indeed equity improved slightly and in a way which would have reduced poverty. This use of the SUSENAS data requires comparisons of consumption or income relativities across dates, not absolute levels. Since inequality did not increase, any positive growth in per capita consumption would (as a rule) have reduced poverty (and, indeed, since inequality fell slightly, a modest contraction in mean consumption would have been possible without an increase in poverty). From the point elasticity estimates in Table 4, the national accounts' growth rate for consumption per capita implies that the headcount index at the lower poverty line (for example) would have fallen by about 10 percent over the period (to a first-order approximation). The preferred poverty measure, on the other hand, would have declined by about 17 percent. While these figures are a good deal less than those implied by the SUSENAS, they still indicate a far from negligible impact on poverty. The above calculations also ignore the desirable effect of lower inequality on aggregate poverty. The qualitative conclusion that poverty declined is robust to relaxing the requirement that even inflation adjusted SUSENAS expenditures are level comparable over time.
# **2.3 PHYSICAL BARRIERS**

20. Another factor in access to financial services is the physical accessibility of formal financial sector services for low income clients. The limited economic literature available to date points to location as one determinant of access, while its relative importance compared to income and education is inconclusive<sup>34</sup> . Nevertheless, location is one of the barriers to enter formal financial sector services for low income households. The lack of bank branches in the neighborhood can prevent the unbanked from gaining access to formal financial sector services at all, while remote branch locations increase the costs of access for the poor. The following therefore takes a look at the geographical location of bank branches in Colombia and Bogotá drawing on the limited work conducted to date on this subject.

21. **On a national basis, banks have more branches in higher populated areas** **_._** An analysis by Medina and Steiner<sup>35</sup> based on data from the Superintendencia Bancaria shows that Colombia’s banks focus their branch network on municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Seventeen out of the 27 analyzed banks by Medina and Steiner do not have a branch office in a municipality with less than 20,000 inhabitants and most other banks have less than 10% of their branch offices in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. An analysis by the Superintendencia finds that over 70% of total loans are provided to and about 70% of total deposits are collected in municipalities with more than 2 million inhabitants.

22. **Bank branches are located in higher income areas** **_._** Medina and Steiner’s analysis of bank branch distribution by income strata<sup>36</sup> in Bogotá shows that all 27 of the surveyed banks focus on income strata 3 and above (see Figure 2.4). The average income strata for all bank branches is 3.6, showing an orientation of Colombia’s banks towards higher income clients. In particular, the analysis found that foreign banks cater towards high income clients, as about 50% of their branches are located in areas of income strata 4 and 5. As Figure 2.5 shows, these strata are over-served in terms of bank branch presence relative to their share of population. In contrast, income strata 1 and 2 account for 25% of the population but are only served by 10% of bank branches. This demonstrates that the low income population in Bogotá is underserved in terms of bank branches, highlighting one reason for their frequent exclusion from financial services.

23. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with banks supports these findings.

> 34 World Bank, 2004.

> 35 Medina and Steiner, 2002.

> 36 The income strata used in this analysis are the following: strata 1 (individuals earning less than half a minimum wage), strata 2 (half to one minimum wage), strata 3 (one to 1.5x the minimum wage), strata 4 (1.5x to 2x), strata 5 (2x to 4x) and strata 6 (more than 4x).

41
The fast and broad-based debt re-accumulation from 2013, and the increasing exposure to market risks raises concerns about debt sustainability. The number of Sub-Saharan African countries at high risk of debt distress, based on the LIC Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), increased significantly, from eight countries in 2013 to eighteen by the end of 2018.

This section discusses key trends of public debt in Sub-Saharan Africa drawing from annual data of 45 countries in the region.<sup>2</sup> For each of these countries, public debt refers to general government gross debt. Public debt is evaluated at three points in time: 2007, after the delivery of the first wave of debt relief under HIPC and MDRI to 17 of 30 countries; in 2013, before the plunge in commodity prices in 2014 and the year that marks a turning point in debt dynamics changing noticeably; and in 2018, for which the most recent data for most of the countries are available.

# **2.1. Public Debt Dynamics**

From 2013 to 2018, the level of public debt has increased on average from 38 percent of GDP to 59 percent of GDP while the median public debt increased from 34 to 55 percent over the same time period. Note that the (GDP-) weighted average public debt in the region excluding Nigeria (the largest economy in the region and with low debt levels after the GDP rebasing) increases from 42 percent in 2013 to 62 percent in 2018 ( **Figure 2** ).<sup>3</sup>

**Figure 2. General Government Gross Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa** _(% GDP)_

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>SSA Average SSA Median SSA Weighted Avg.<br>excluding Nigeria<br>2007 2013 2018<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018_ Public debt has been rising across all income groups in the region, with the largest increase recorded by lower-middle-income countries (LMCs), an average increase of 26 percentage points of GDP since 2013. By 2018, the (simple) average public debt of LMCs in the region reached 74

> 2 Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan are excluded due to the lack of reliable data.

> 3 Using GDP-weighted averages does not change this narrative. Although debt increased only moderately between 2007 and 2012, debt accumulation accelerated significantly in the region thereafter in GDP-weighted terms.

4
34 Table 10. Cost-effectiveness of nutrition, health and combined interventions. Narangwal. India.

|Awe|||TyRe of interve|ntion|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Nutri<br>only|tion<br>|Nutrition+<br>Medical care|Medicalcare<br>only|
|perinatal||570<br>(74)|710<br>(92)|1,010<br>(131)|
|infant (<1)||1,640<br>(213)|1,800<br>(233)|1,110<br>(144)|
|child (1-3)||23,540<br>(3,053)|31,030<br>(4,025)|7,690<br>(997)|

Source: Taylor et al (1984). Costs are in Rupees of 1971, wi,.h US $ amounts in brackets. To convert to US $ of 1988, multiply by 2.45.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Country Operations<br><!-- End of picture text --> WPS 824 This paper-a product of the Agriculture Operations Division, Country Department 11, Latin America and - the Caribbean Regional Office is part of a larger effort in the Bank to define a strategy for the environment in Mexico. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Josie Arevalo, room 1'7-100, extension 30745 (29 pages). January 1992.

For developing countries, budget constraints help set the agenda on mitigating environmental dimage, one of the indelible marks of our era. And political considerations often dictate the measures taken. There are no firm analytical formulas to help even environmentally conscious policymakers rank needs and remedies.

A developing country such as Mexico - the - focus of this paper cannot afford an in-depth study of every environmental issue. Policymakers need to be provided with rough, "back-ofthe-envelope" estimates of the economic costs of various environmental problems. This allows them to rank the issues and act.

different environmental problems in Mexico. Although the examples are from Mexico, the method can be useful in other developing countries as well.

Margulis shows how creative use of U.S. and other data can help provide simple estimates of the likely costs of soil erosion, air pollution, mining of underground waters, and estimates of the health effects of water and solid waste polluton, lack of sanitation, and the ingestion of food contaminated by polluted irrigation. The assumptions underlying all calculations are conservative. Some environmental damage issues, such as loss of biodiversity, were too complex to permit quantification.

In this paper Margulis applied existing methods to estimate the costs stemming from The Policy Research Working Plaper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank. An objective of the series is to **get** these findings out quickly, cven if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.

Produced by the Policy Rcscarch Dissemination Center
Table 4: Excluding the 2008/2009 financial crisis

|||OLS|||IV||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent variable:|_log_(1 +_imp_)<br>(1)|_log_(1 +_exp_)<br>(2)|_log_(<sup>1+</sup><sup>_imp_</sup><br>1+_exp_ <sup>)</sup><br>(3)|_log_(1 +_imp_)<br>(4)|_log_(1 +_exp_)<br>(5)|_log_(<sup>1+</sup><sup>_imp_</sup><br>1+_exp_ <sup>)</sup><br>(6)|
|**A. Pre 2008**|||||||
|_log_(1 + <sup>_robots_</sup><br>_hours_ <sup>)</sup>|0.1016|0.3297**|-0.2280**|0.6520***|1.2577***|-0.6057***|
||(0.0728)|(0.1441)|(0.0848)|(0.2317)|(0.3405)|(0.1946)|
|First stage:|||||||
|_Replaceability_ * _initial GDPpc_ * _global robot stock_||||0.0035***<br>(0.0006)|0.0035***<br>(0.0006)|0.0035***<br>(0.0006)|
|Observations|417,799|417,799|417,799|417,799|417,799|417,799|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.6343|0.7777|0.3985|0.6297|0.7670|0.3953|
|Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat||||32.893|32.893|32.893|
|**B. Post 2009**|||||||
|_log_(1 + <sup>_robots_</sup><br>_hours_ <sup>)</sup>|0.1767**|0.4181***|-0.2414***|0.6058**|1.0963***|-0.4904***|
||(0.0747)|(0.1155)|(0.0658)|(0.2318)|(0.3318)|(0.1514)|
|First stage:|||||||
|_Replaceability_ * _initial GDPpc_ * _global robot stock_||||0.0026***|0.0026***|0.0026***|
|||||(0.0003)|(0.0003)|(0.0003)|
|Observations|351,008|351,008|351,008|351,008|351,008|351,008|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.6363|0.7725|0.3870|0.6327|0.7653|0.3852|
|Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat||||101.515|101.515|101.515|
|Importer-exporter-year efects|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Industry-year efects|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|

_Notes_ : Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, excluding 2008/2009 from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
**Figure 4: Impact of** **_Seguro Popular_ on Formality over Time:**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Regression Coefficients and 10% Confidence Intervals.<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 4a: Cross Section Estimation Figure 4b: Panel Estimation (Fixed Effects)<br>2.00 1.50<br>1.50<br>1.00<br>1.00<br>0.50<br>0.50<br>0.00<br>0.00<br>-0.50 -0.50<br>-1.00<br>-1.00<br>-1.50<br>-1.50<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors‘ estimates from _SP_ registry and household surveys.

# _Intra-household dynamics_

We next explore if, within households, individuals have different incentives to become informal given the availability of _SP_ depending on their position in the household. These different dynamics could arise, for example, because coverage of SS is extended to eligible dependents of a contributor. Given the current design of SS, eligible dependents of a contributor who also contribute obtain exactly the same benefits as if they do not. Therefore, SS offers few incentives to contribute as a second earner. The availability of _SP_ may make switching to informality more attractive for a second earner if the switcher and her family can get coverage _by SP in addition to_ coverage by SS, thus maximizing access to different means of protection. In some municipalities, _SP_ may provide closer access to clinics or hospitals even if of lower quality, which make it convenient for families to have both and chose depending on needs. Another benefit of _SP_ is that it extends health insurance coverage to other members of the household, such as elderly relatives, not covered in _SS_ . While in principle, the rules of the program, state that coverage to _SP_ requires not being affiliated to SS it is unclear whether this condition is enforced in practice.

To assess this, in Table 6 we re-estimate specification _(1)_ at the individual level distinguishing by the relative position that a person occupies within a household, that is, head, spouse of head, son 22
In this case management is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if IT use has led to better communication within the firm, increased logistics efficiency, better activities management or to the implementation of automatized systems. These factors were selected as a proxy because ENTIC does not include specific information regarding management practices. The results of these regressions indicate that the interaction term is not statistically significant. However, these results could be driven by the limitations of our proxy.

Additionally, considering that business environment variables such as the ones included in the World Bank’s Doing Business reports could be factors explaining higher returns to IT use over productivity, we included an interaction of IT use with business environment variables such as the state Doing Business rankings from 2007<sup>12</sup> and its components (ease of starting a business, ease of registering property, ease of enforcing a contract, ease of obtaining credit) as well as distance to the U.S. border and financial inclusion (measured as the number of ATMs for each 10,000 adults in 2009).<sup>13</sup> The results indicate that only the interaction with the ease of enforcing contracts yields statistically significant results and only for the computers-per-worker and share of labor with computer variables. This is a research line that should be analyzed further using data sources.

As a robustness test of the interaction between IT use and Chinese competition, we considered competition in the U.S. market instead of the domestic measure of competition. The rationale behind this robustness test is that firms may not be facing pressure from Chinese competition in their domestic market but in the U.S. market and that should lead to the same kind of heterogeneity. As Table 11 shows, the effects are smaller but in the same direction as the ones observed in Table 10. Additionally the coefficients associated to Chinese competition solely are no longer significant, indicating that Chinese competition in the U.S. market only has effects over productivity when it is interacted with higher IT use.

Additionally, we tested other alternative instrumental variables, constructed as explained in equation 2, but using different measures of household IT use. The results do not change much, although in some cases it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of weak identification, which makes it impossible to compare those magnitudes to the results shown in previous tables.

> 12World Bank.

> 13Comisi ́on Nacional Bancaria y de Valores.

27
stock availability at time _t_ is expressed as _G_ ( _St_ − 1 ) (where<sup>_S_</sup> _t_ − 1<sup>is the stock left behind</sup> after harvesting in period _t_ ), and it depends on what is fished in the second area by the second fisher. The function: is the discrete variant of the logistic function, where _a_ is the intrinsic growth rate and _K_ is the carrying capacity.

It is quite obvious that there exists some kind of interaction between the actions taken by the two harvesters. Furthermore, we understand how this two-person, two-areas model can be extended to an _n_ -person model. The time setting of the game is discrete and the game is repeated with an infinite horizon.

Assuming that the costs of unit effort are inversely proportional to the size of the stock and that the discount factor δ is the same for both players, Hannesson analyzes different situations depending on the relative effectiveness of the players. It is found that, allowing for side-payments, the situation is well known and implies that the most efficient harvester takes care of the resource and divides his gains with the less efficient harvester. If side-payments are not allowed, there is a room for bargaining on the agreeable harvest program following the model proposed by Munro (1979).

A series of cooperative and non-cooperative examples are offered by the author: what determines the outcome of the interaction are the initial size of the stock and the relative fishing effectiveness of the harvesters. Without binding agreements, what makes cooperation reachable is the threat of having less abandon level of the fishery then a lower stock level for future harvest. Thus, also in this case a threat regime is necessary to allow cooperation.

What is reported above is a particular case of a situation in which several agents are involved in harvesting a transboundary fishery.

Hannesson (1997) studies, with a hypothetical example, the possibility of cooperation in the management of transboundary fisheries, analyzing four cases:

1. when the agents are identical;

2. when the agents are different in terms of costs (effectiveness); 3. when the harvest deals with a limited migrating stocks (the previous analysis of Hannesson (1995) could be relevant here); 4. when the harvesters are facing a straddling stock.

21