exclusively to men from 73% to 29% with a somewhat higher mean loan size of US$ 54,000 in the postimplementation period. While the share of mortgages issued to companies remained more or less constant at 7%-8% of the total, the value of such loans was well above US$ 100,000.

To assess the impact of policy reform, we use annual data for the 20-year period (2000-2019 inclusive) that covers 10 years each before and after the intervention and present graphical evidence using nonparametric regressions on key outcomes as well as program characteristics. Figures 3 and 4 display results for the number of days required to register a mortgage or transfer, suggesting that the 2010 reform coincides with a clear break. The number of days to process the average mortgage declined from some 250 a decade before the reform (including 98 days on average to obtain consent, a requirement that was eliminated by the reform) to less than 50 days in the immediate post-reform period. With a reduction from 500 to some 250 days, reductions in the time required to register land transfers were less pronounced, though still significant.

To create spatial units that can serve as the basis for impact evaluation with block fixed effects, we define a total of 1,932 blocks each 250*250m in size and aggregate annual values of relevant variables as basis for panel econometric analysis. The principle is illustrated in figure 5 where grid cells indicate block boundaries and registered plots are colored depending on whether they were registered sporadically before (purple) or after (brown) the 2010 reform or systematically through LARP after 2010 (blue). Plots not registered in the name of a private individual including public spaces are white. This is overlaid with 2016 building footprints extracted from high resolution satellite imagery using machine learning.<sup>10</sup> Non-parametric regressions using plot and block level data on the share of newly registered parcels by gender support the notion of a discrete break in the reform year 2010, that is often followed by a change in slope. Figure 6 (plot level) suggests that eliminating restrictions on female land ownership significantly affected registered landowners’ gender:<sup>11</sup> the share of leases issued to males individually -which stood at 60%-70% before the reform- dropped to about 15% thereafter. The share of new leases issued jointly in the name of men and women increased from about 10% before reforms to more than 50% thereafter where it stabilized for the next 5-7 years. A less pronounced, though still statistically significant shift occurred for leases issued in the name of women only which increased from 29% before to 33% after reform.

Policy-induced changes extend beyond registered lessees’ gender to formal land and mortgage market activity. Figure 7 shows the number of registered transfers shifting upwards discontinuously with reform and accelerated thereafter to about 0.4 per block. Transfers of plots registered (individually or jointly) in

> 10 Hand labeling of structures in 2013 and 2016 to provide the basis for the regressions reported in table 2 was undertaken only for treatment and control areas. Support from Ecopia, led by Brandon Palin in generating these footprints, is acknowledged.

> 11 We focus on natural persons only, noting that, as indicated in table 1, companies’ share of registered leases dropped from 7% before and 1% during implementation of the systematic registration campaign before increasing to 14% thereafter.

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