rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
The planners were tried through economic policy and central planning to prevent the transmission of inflation from the investment sector to the consumer market, as well as to put an end to the origin of inflationary pressures. Politically, this was not always possible in view of the close links between enterprise managers and the Party. Nevertheless, thanks to measures mentioned above (control of money supply, income and wage regulation), planners partly succeeded. As shown in Section 2, there was a difference between suppressed and hidden inflation in the investment sector (estimated at roughly 5 percent annually in the 1980s) and in the consumer market (2 percent annually)."

# 2. Inflation Estimators

# 2.1 Official Indices

Changes in the price level are typically measured by consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI) and GNP (GDP) deflator. The first two indices are published in Czechoslovakia by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), whereas GNP deflator was not available in the past because the GNP has not been computed until recently. However, by comparing net material product (NMP) - an alternative indicator used by central planners - in current and constant prices, one can compute an NMP deflator. CPI remains most popular, because it reflects the impact of prices, on the standard of living. (All available indices from 1980 are shown in Tables I and It in the appendix.) CPI was computed as "full"-- that is to say it covered all retail sales, and weights were taken (until 1991) from expenditures in retail trade. The methodology has been changed recently, due to the discontinuation of data on retail expenditures. The weights are estimated from "family surveys."I<sup>2</sup> The problem of weights is clearly most important because the use of Laspeyers index leads to comparing aggregates with different weights. In the past the weights have been regularly changed, typically once every five years. Tne current weights use 1989 as the base year and will be kept until 1993. The FSO carries out a sensitivity test each quarter by recalculating the Laspeyers indices with Paasche indices to assess the importance of weights. The most recent test at FSO showed that the differences between both series are rather small and the Paasche index is slightly lower, with differences ranging from 1 to 3 points. However, it must 11The differont rates of inflation in these two sectors could also reflect different rates of productivity growth. In brief, the inflation pattem was most likely determined both by the effects of policy and by different growth rates of productivity. It should also be kept in mind that there were always some "markets" for stocks of unsalable products, and that some capacities were not always fully underutilized. This was particularly the case of the intermediary sector, in which a simultaneous presences of shortages and excessive stocks could be often observed.

12The surveys provide cross-section data and are based on the family budget data; the size of the sample is 5,500 households.

9
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|△p�,�<br>�|0.15***|
|∆p�,���<br>�|0.06|
|YGAP�,���|0.08**|
|α��|0.012***|
|n∗t|4029|

Notes: *,**,*** signify statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

For most countries the equation correctly identifies a common stochastic trend. The dispersion in the output gap is mainly positive – suggesting that there is some evidence of a short-run Phillips curve. However, the small output gap coefficient might imply that retail mark-ups are small for many of the countries in the sample or simply that the output gap is not the most robust explanatory variable, especially for data poor countries and countries with under-developed markets where external shocks (such as food prices) are the principal determinants of inflation. In the case of MFMod, when estimates fall outside the 80 and 20 percentile bounds, they are calibrated to the closest boundary, while parameters for data poor countries are calibrated to the modal parameter value. In the case, where the estimated parameter for the output gaps is negative it is calibrated to 0. Appendix B summarizes the short-run and ECM parameters for the countries that hit the bounds in the sample 18
1984) pp.1185-1208 Loungani, Prakash and Paolo Mauro. 2001. "Capital Flight from Russia" _The World Economy_ 2001 Volume 24, Issue 5 Matsuura, Katsumi, and Colin McKenzie. 2001. _Eviews ni yoru Keiryo-Keizaigaku_ (Econometrics with Eviews) Tokyo: Toyo-Keizai Sinposya Mehrez, Gil and Daniel Kaufman. 2000. "Transparency, Liberalization and Banking Crises" World Bank Moreno, Ramon and Bharat Trehan. 2000. “Common Shocks and Currency Crises” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Non-Aligned Movement Ad Hoc Advisory Group of Experts on Debt. 1994. _The Continuing Debt Crisis of the Developing Countries._ Jakarta: Non-Aligned Movement Ad Hoc Advisory Group of Experts on Debt Osband, Kent and Caroline Van Rijckeghem. 2000. “Safety from Currency Crashes” IMF staff papers Vol.47, No.2 Sachs, Jeffery D. (Eds.) 1989. _Developing Country Debt and the World Economy._ Chicago: The University of Chicago Press Sachs, Jeffery D. 1998. _Alternative Approaches to Financial Crises in Emerging Markets_ in Kahler, Miles (Eds.) Sachs, Jeffery D. and Wing Thye Woo. 2000. _Understanding the Asian Financial Crisis_ in Woo, Wing Thye, Jeffery D. Sachs and Klans Schwab (Eds.) Seddighi, H. K. A. Lawler and A. V. Katos. 2000 _Econometrics: A Practical Approach._ Routledge: London Thirlwall, A. P. 1999 _Growth and Development 6_<sup>_th_</sup> _Edition._ London: Macmillan Press Wonnacott, Thomas H. and Ronald J. Wonnacott. 1990 _Introductory Statistics for Business and Statistics Fourth Edition_ New York: John Wiley & Sons Woo, Wing Thye, Jeffery D. Sachs and Klans Schwab. (Eds.) 2000. _The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for A Resilient Asia._ London: The MIT Press World Bank (2003) _World Development Indicators 2003._ Washington: World Bank 26
THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE When all operating and capital costs are taken into account, the average historical cost of producing electricity in the Republic of Congo has been $0.28 per kilowatt hour. By comparison, the average effective power tariff in the country has been $0.15 per kilowatt hour, which covers only 53 percent of costs. This is similar to other utilities in resource-rich countries. In the water sector, the average total cost of producing utility water is an estimated $0.80 per cubic meter, while the average effective tariff is only $0.26, which broadly covers operating and maintenance costs. As a result, the main utilities in the sector cover only 33 percent of their costs—significantly worse than other resource-rich countries (figure 15).

**Table 12. Potential gains from Increased cost recovery**

|Sector|US$ million per year|Percentage of GDP|
|---|---|---|
|ICT|—|—|
|Power|56|0.92|
|Transport|5|0.08|
|Water|17|0.28|
|Total|78|1.28|

_Source_ : Briceño-Garmendia and others 2008. — = data not available.

**Figure 15. Power and water sectors: cost recovery**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Congo resource-rich countries<br>power sector water sector<br>% of total cost<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Briceño-Garmendia and others 2008.

Underpricing of utility services such as power and water is often justified by affordability concerns, but cost recovery tariffs for power and water would be affordable to the vast majority of the population. To determine the affordability of cost recovery tariffs in the Republic of Congo, it is assumed that a household can afford to spend 5 percent of its budget on utility bills. With cost recovery tariffs for water estimated at $0.80 per cubic meter, a monthly water bill would cost between $3.20 and $8.00, depending on whether 4 or 10 cubic meters is taken as the subsistence monthly consumption. Tariffs at this level would be affordable for between 95 and 100 percent of the population. In the power sector, cost recovery tariffs are estimated at $0.28 per kilowatt-hour. A monthly power bill would therefore cost between $7.00 and $14.00, depending on whether 25 or 50 kilowatt hours is taken as the subsistence monthly 32
the share of household members that reside in each destination country. Instrumenting remittances using economic conditions in the migrants’ destination countries is a similar procedure followed in other studies (Anzoategui et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Second, we use a measure of the employment status of the migrant member of the household residing abroad. For each household, we construct a measure taking the proportion of international migrants from the household that are currently employed. We expect the two variables to positively affect the propensity to remit and the size of remittances sent by migrants. For instance, migrants living in high income countries are, all else equal, more likely to send remittances. Similarly, the larger the proportion of migrants employed, the more likely they are to send remittances.

Table 5 provides estimation results of the first stage regressions, instrumenting the dummy for international remittances with the two variables described above. For each country, column (1) shows the first stage regression results using the weighted per capita income as instrument, column (2) presents the results using employment status of the migrant as instrument, while column (3) displays the results using both instruments. As can be seen, for all the countries in our analysis, the instruments enter with the expected sign and are statistically significant, both when entering the equation individually as well as jointly.

The bottom rows of the table provide some diagnostic tests for the validity of the instruments. We report the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic to test the relevance of the instrument, i.e., the extent to which the two instruments are correlated with international remittances. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are not relevant, this statistic follows a chi-squared distribution. In our case, the null hypothesis is rejected for all the countries, indicating that the instruments are relevant. We also report the Kleibergen-Paap transformed F statistic to test for the weak instruments problem. The test statistics rejects the null 10
production which faces import competition. This is in line with comparative advantage (as indicated by the production shares reported in Table 2) and hence contributes to the gain.

The effect is smallest for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which also see growth in the primary sector, however with a far smaller reduction in the cost of their imports. Prices remain relatively static, and real income growth is small. China‐3, Kazakhstan and Pakistan all experience growth in manufacturing, following reductions in their costs of exporting.

In the second column of Table 5, monopolistic competition allows manufacturing firms to enter, exit, and relocate in response to changes in their profitability. At the aggregate level this increases the real income gain to 1.9%, more than a third greater than the Armington effect. At the national level, the additional gain accrues principally to China‐3, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. These are all countries with a relatively large manufacturing base and, as is apparent from Table 6, they are countries that experience expansion of manufacturing output relative to primary (such countries flagged M in the tables). By contrast, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan experience contraction of manufacturing, and real income gains that are smaller in this monopolistic competition case than under the Armington assumption. Now the growth of manufacturing in other countries within the region has increased import competition, hurting the manufacturing sectors within these countries, which further specialize in primary good production.

Table 5: Real income gains by country.

||Rea<br>|l Income Growth<br>|
|---|---|---|
||Armington|Monopolistic Competition|
||(1)|(2)|
|China‐3|1.2%|2.0% M|
|Kazakhstan|1.6%|2.1% M|
|Kyrgyzstan|4.9%|4.4%|
|Pakistan|1.8%|2.3% M|
|Tajikistan|1.7%|1.5%|
|Turkmenistan|0.3%|0.0%|
|Uzbekistan|0.8%|1.0%|
|Aggregate|1.4%|1.9%|

14
<!-- Start of picture text --> CHART Ml CHART M2<br>EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION STOCK MARKET INDEX<br>25 1W_.<br>29 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1200<br>10 -90<br>s S 0 _ _ -- 0 \- :' 0 D-} - X . 00:: sw \Di000<br>odo 93b903 9.903 i6Odr 9903 99-1 9431 9,03 9103 97:07'0097 03 1 ss 0 o903 9,- o 0 9 9300 9 93s 9 90 9 391 93b. 91h 9 97b3 'z3gtz9701 oA :n9n s 3I, ,3~<br>I I nhatbon (year-on-year) - Lending nate by Comm. Banks<br>Lending rate by Merch. Bank _ D~eposit rare (6 months)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Banks are heavily exposed to portfolio investors who have used shares to securitize their debts. In fact, significant portion of the debt across the economy is collateralized in this way. The plunge in equity prices (Chart M2) has devalued the guarantees, obliging banks to demand that they be supplemented, or that the debts be acquitted.

The private sector is heavily geared: the average debt-equity ratio of Malaysian companies is reported to be close to **200%** -- well above international norms. As a result, the upward trend in interest rates in the wake of the crisis exerted tremendous financial strains on heavily leveraged companies by substantially increasing their debt burden. Furthermore, the Government recently ordered banks to limit lending, increase provisioning and adopt a stricter definition of non-performing loans as well as more transparent disclosure practices. All these developments led to a decline in lending activities and an increase in banks' excess reserves as illustrated by Chart M3 and Chart M4. It appears that there has been a marked increase in excess reserves held by commercial banks with the Central Bank in line with the government's above mentioned orders and perhaps banks' inclination to restore their liquidity to more comfortable levels in the event of large withdrawals.

24
The claims experience of the past five years demonstrates the large volatility of losses. In fire insurance, the gross claims ratio fluctuates around 30<sup>percent ofgross</sup> premiums. However, in 1999 as a result of the protracted drought it<sup>jumpedto242</sup> percent. Yet, because of the use of nonproportional reinsurance treaties,<sup>thenetclaims</sup> ratio did not exceed 100 percent of net premiums. Fluctuations<sup>in the net claimsratioare</sup> thus much smaller than in gross claims.

Like long-term business, general insurance also exhibits sound financial ratios (Table 9). Net claims ratios are low by intemational standards. Acquisition<sup>costsbenefit</sup> from the high commissions received from reinsurers. These exceed the commissions<sup>paid</sup> to local agents and thus cover some of the overhead expenses<sup>of localcompanies.Asa</sup> result, net administration and acquisition costs amount to about 15 percent<sup>ofgross</sup> premiums, although they represent 30 percent of net earned premiums.<sup>Investment</sup> income amounts to 25 percent of net earned premiums.<sup>Asalreadynoted,</sup> the profitability of general insurance business is affected by the volatility<sup>of claimsandthe</sup> need to build adequate reserves

**Table 9: Financial Ratios of General Insurance, 1997-2001**

|(percent)|1997|1998|1999|2000|2001*|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CededPremiums/GrossPremiums|48.8|47.0|48.0|49.1|47.3|
|NEP/GrossPremiums|50.2|53.4|52.7|49.3|51.3|
|NetClaims/Net Prenuums|55.8<br>|62.9<br>|74.6<br>|65.7<br>|62.5<br>|
|NIC/NEP|59.2|69.2|74.1|73.3|68.9|
|NetCommissions/NEP|-3.8|-4.4|-5.2<br>|-6.5<br>|-5.4<br>|
|AdminCosts/NEP|29.6|31.0|32.4|34.5|35.1<br>|
|CombinedRatio/NEP|84.9|95.8|101.4|101.2|98.6|
|UnderwritingResult/NEP|15.1|4.2|-1.4<br>|-1.2<br>|1.4<br>|
|InvestmentIncome/NEP|21.1<br>|23.8<br>|26.0<br>|25.8<br>|25.8<br>|
|Profit/NEP|36.1|28.0|24.6|24.6|27.2|

NEP: Net Earned Premiums; NIC: Net Incurred Claims

* excluding Secura

Source: Estimated on the basis of data collected by the FSC.

Measuring the profitability and solvency of different classes of general insurance business depends not only on their claims and expense ratios<sup>butalsoontheadequacy</sup> and appropriateness of their of reserving policies. General insurance<sup>companiesin</sup> Mauritius are required to establish reserves for unearned premiums, for<sup>outstanding</sup> claims, and for claims incurred but not reported (IBNR).

On the whole, reserve levels seem both adequate and appropriate (Table<sup>10).</sup> The unearned premium reserve ranged between 48 and 53 percent of net earned<sup>premiums,</sup> while the reserve for outstanding claims fluctuated between 94 and<sup>110percentofnet</sup> incurred claims. This implied that claims were settled with an average delay of<sup>one year</sup> during this period.
# **2.2 ENLACE tests**

Between 2007 and 2013, all Mexican students in grades 3 through 9 were required to take a standardized test, the ENLACE ( _Evaluación Nacional de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares)_ . The test was administered at the end of each academic year and it assessed student knowledge in three areas: math, Spanish, and, starting in 2008, a third subject which rotated between Science (in 2008 and 2011), Ethics/Civics (in 2009 and 2013), History (in 2010), and Geography (in 2011). In the first year of implementation, ENLACE tests were normalized by subject and grade with a mean score of 500 and a standard deviation of 100; subsequent years’ tests were graded relative to the base year to allow for the comparison of results over time. Nationwide, take-up of ENLACE was close to 90 percent.

The ENLACE was designed as a low-stakes assessment that would not impact student grade progression, but it could be used to strengthen school accountability by informing parents and society at large about the levels and growth of students’ knowledge. Originally, teachers had no stake in the results of the test; but in 2008, ENLACE scores became one of the key criteria to measure teacher performance in _Carrera Magisterial_ (CM) program, a national teacher incentive program which offered salary bonuses for taking professional development courses and agreeing to be subject to yearly evaluations (Santibañez et al., 2007).<sup>5</sup> The use of ENLACE in the CM program possibly increased teacher effort, but as SEP required the use of external proctors, it is unlikely that teachers were able to directly manipulate student responses. Previous work (Avitabile and de Hoyos, 2018, De Hoyos et al., 2018) has shown that ENLACE tests in primary education are correlated with later learning and labor market outcomes.

ENLACE was not offered in 2014, and 2015 it was replaced by a new test, PLANEA _(Plan Nacional para la Evaluación de los Aprendizajes)_ . Unlike ENLACE, PLANEA only tested a random subset of students in schools and so is not useful for our analysis.

# **2.3 The PAL program and experiment**

The Programa de Apoyo Alimentario began in 2004 with the aim of increasing the nutritional intake of poor families, especially children and mothers. By 2009, it had expanded to operate in about 5,000 poor, rural villages throughout Mexico. Villages were eligible to receive PAL if they had fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, were classified as highly marginalized by the Census 5From 2008 through 2010, the ENLACE scores of a teacher’s students comprised 20 percent of the overall Carrera Magisterial score which was used to determine teacher bonuses, and this weight rose to 50 percent in 2011.

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> (A) Value of Issuance (reais, millions)? (B) Average Issue Size (reais, million)”<br>180,000 2,500 ———<br>150,000 2,000 =<br>120,000 1,500 =<br>90,000<br>60,000 1,000 = =<br>30,000 500<br>0 0<br>Units 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> m Public Offer @ Instruction 476 (Hybrid) m Debentures mPromissory Notes = CRIs @FDICs mLFs<br>a. Debentures, Promissory Notes, CRIs, FDICs, and LFs. b. Both public and hybrid offers.<br>(C) Number of Issuers*<br>400<br>300<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 200<br>100<br>0<br>2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 (Q3)<br>m@ Public Offer m Instruction 476 (Hybrid)<br>c. Debentures, Promissory Notes, and CRIs.<br>Sources: BrazilCVM, Anbima, and World Bank calculations.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|---|
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|Uganda Water Small Towns and RGCs<br>Samuel Dawuna Mutono|
|Naandi - India Foundation<br>Xavier Cledan Mandri-Perrott|
|Naandi - India Foundation<br>Xavier Cledan Mandri-Perrott|
|Naandi - India Foundation<br>Xavier Cledan Mandri-Perrott|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|GPOBA W3 - Honduras OBA Fund<br>Yoonhee Kim|
|Cambodia Telecoms<br>Peter Silarszky|
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|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|ExtendingTelecommunications in Rural Indonesia Project<br>Natasha Beschorner|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Senegal Sanitation- SupportingAccess to on-site sanitation services Matar Fall|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Bolivia Decentralized Electricityfor Universal Access<br>Lucia Spinelli|
|Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Project<br>Maurice Saade|
|Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Project<br>Maurice Saade|
|Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Project<br>Maurice Saade|
|Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Project<br>Maurice Saade|