rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
illustrates the value of commitments to bind (cap) permitted levels of support – lower levels of permitted subsidies and other forms of support would have constrained the ability of governments to increase assistance levels.

# **_Trade facilitation_**

Trade facilitation is a critical dimension of leveraging the market access dimensions of the DDA: if a focus on the trade costs agenda stimulated by a Doha agreement catalyzes a reform program in this area, it can have large positive trade effects. Pursuit of trade facilitation is particularly important for lower-income countries, especially LDCs, that otherwise may not benefit significantly from the Doha market access negotiations – because they have duty-free, quota-free access to major markets and will not be asked to reform their own trade policies. Negotiations on a trade facilitation agreement have been progressing well. An agreement offers great prospects for real income gains – indeed, as discussed below, analysis suggests that this is an area where the potential gains for developing countries are higher than what might emerge from any other part of the DDA. The reason is that domestic trade costs in many countries constitute a major tax on firms (Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2006). This agenda is of particular importance to landlocked developing countries, as their trade costs depend critically on the efficiency and cost of transit through neighboring states.

# **_Aid for trade_**

For many low-income countries, the binding constraint to export growth is a lack of competitiveness. This makes it particularly important that DFQF access be associated with liberal rules of origin, to allow firms to use imported inputs from the lowest cost source of supply anywhere in the world. But more generally, what is now increasingly recognized is that competitiveness is a function of the domestic business environment in the exporting countries. This is the major driver behind the “aid for trade” initiative, which is playing a valuable catalytic role in mobilizing trade-related assistance. Such aid has already increased – according to WTO/OECD figures and definitions, aid for trade grew by more than 10 percent in real terms in both 2006 and 2007, with total new commitments from bilateral and multilateral donors reaching US$ 25.4 billion, with an additional US$ 27.3 billion in non-concessional trade-related provisions while only marginally lowering the target price for upland cotton and creating a new cotton-user payment of 4 cents per pound. Although the latter applies to cotton of any origin, given that the US imports very little, in practice most payments will accrue to domestically sourced cotton (Schnepf, 2008).

12
police), but this threat is significantly more frequent for crossovers. In addition, crossovers experience more frequent vandalism of their premises. Both of these could be because crossovers stand out within their sectors. However, these could also be features of the sectors within which crossovers operate. For example, compare a metal fabricator and a caterer. A caterer can pack up most of her capital and move her business quite easily, while a metal fabricator is more likely to have larger machinery that makes her business less mobile.<sup>25</sup>

**Table 10: Harassment in the past 12 months (%)**

||**Crossover**|**Non‐crossover**|**Difference**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Threats to shut down business|33.9|20.0|13.9**|
|Shouting, scolding, making a nuisance in or<br>near enterprise premises|21.0|15.0|6.0|
|Vandalism of premises or merchandise|8.1|2.5|5.5*|
|Confiscation of property or merchandise|8.1|6.7|1.3|
|Pushing or shoving|14.5|11.8|2.8|
|Sexual proposals|29.0|16.8|12.2*|
|Fondling or inappropriate touching|3.2|2.5|0.7|
|Beating|6.5|2.5|3.9|
|Arson|3.2|0.8|2.4|
|Witchcraft|19.4|14.5|4.8|
|N|62|119|181|

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The third significant difference in harassment unambiguously indicates the vulnerability of women who choose to cross over ‐ they are almost twice as likely to experience unwanted sexual proposals than those who do not cross over<sup>26</sup> ‐ although they are equally likely to report sexual harassment to be among the three most prominent problems faced by business women in Uganda 25 The KASSIDA data set (table 4) provides some support for this fact as there are no significant differences between men and women in the crossover sectors across the forms of harassment. However, this is not a primary focus in the KASSIDA data collection and some numbers appear less reliable (e.g. much lower rates of sexual harassment). 26 These findings on sexual harassment are not confirmed in the KASSIDA data set, where reporting of sexual harassment is lower in general and in particular for crossovers. This is likely partly related to methodological differences (as Ellsberg et al (2001). Ellsberg and Heise (2002) show when comparing differences in reported experiences of violence that these issues are very sensitive to methodological factors such as type and structure of the survey, interview setting and privacy levels, sex of the interviewer, and if the instrument is quantitative or qualitative. The mixed methods survey design and implementation ‐ including a more personal approach to individual’s own experience in the form of a dialogue ‐ was better suited to learn about these issues. UN (2014) and Ellsberg and Heise (2005) also note that underreporting of violent experiences in questions related to violence inserted in surveys about other unrelated issues is of frequent occurrence.

27
10 points higher than the survey-only estimate. Of course, by the same token, we may also be under-estimating inequality. Working with values of _θ_ toward the lower end of our estimated range yields estimates of inequality that are noticeably higher than the Gini coefficient of 47 _._ 0. Using our estimates for _θ_ (and _λ_ ) in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we find that there are approximately 170 households in Cairo whose household expenditure exceeds 1 million USD per year. Although no other information on the number of millionaires in Egypt is currently available, this estimate seems rather conservative.

# **5 Concluding remarks**

A growing literature has shown that household surveys provide only limited information about top incomes and therefore underestimate income inequality. This paper presents a method that corrects for this underestimation. We use the household survey for the bottom part of the distribution and combine it with another data source that provides a better coverage of the top tail. The existing literature has restricted itself to the use of tax record data to capture the top tail. Unfortunately income tax records are unavailable in many countries, including most of the developing world. Our method permits a much larger set of data for the top tail; the only requirements are that the data (i) contain a good predictor of household income, and (ii) provide a good coverage of the top tail.

We apply this method to Egypt, where estimates of inequality based on household surveys alone are low by international standards. Using publicly available data from real estate listings to estimate the top tail of the income distribution, we find strong evidence that inequality in Egypt is being underestimated. The Gini index for urban Egypt is found to increase from 36 to 47 after correcting for the missing top tail. A natural next step would be to use data on house prices to estimate the top tail of the wealth distribution, and extend the analysis to other countries.

# **References**

- Aguiar, M. and Bils, M. (2015). Has consumption inequality mirrored income inequality? _American Economic Review_ , **105,** number 9, 2725–56.

- Alvaredo, Facundo (2010). The rich in argentina over the twentieth century, 1932-2004. In _Top Incomes: A Global Perspective_ (eds Anthony B. Atkinson and Thomas Piketty), pp. 253–298. Oxford University Press.

- Alvaredo, Facundo (2011). A note on the relationship between top income shares and the gini coefficient. _Economics Letters_ , **110,** number 3, 274–277.

25
**Table 2:  Summary statistics of country endowments**

||Obs|Mean|Std. Dev.|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Rule of Law|103|2.650|1.002|1.043|4.425|
|ln(K/L)|103|9.422|1.504|5.763|11.589|
|ln(H/L)|103|0.613|0.291|0.072|1.215|
|LPI Infrastructure|95|2.779|0.746|1.400|4.290|
|LPI Timeliness|95|3.340|0.651|2.000|4.530|

**Table 3:  Summary statistics of industry intensities**

||Obs.|Mean|Std. Dev.|Min|Max|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|capital intensity|360|11.491|0.879|9.547|14.299|
|skilled labor intensity|360|0.286|0.114|0.087|0.682|
|institutional intensity intermediate|241|0.649|0.433|0|1|
|institutional intensity consumption|136|0.778|0.403|0|1|
|institutional intensity capital goods|89|0.966|0.169|0|1|
|timeliness intermediate goods|265|0.217|0.217|0|0.901|
|timeliness consumptiongoods|142|0.187|0.212|0|0.968|

**Table 4:  Pairwise correlations between industry intensities and the share of intermediates in industry exports**

||Intermediate export<br>share|
|---|---|
|capital int.|0.343*|
|skilled labor int.|-0.080|
|institutional int. interm.|-0.199*|
|timeliness interm.|-0.311*|

Note: * denotes significant at 5%

# **IV.  Results**

# **_A.  Comparative Advantage in Intermediate and Final Goods Trade_**

Table 5 reports the OLS estimations of equation (1) for three sets of regressions. Columns A.1-A.3 show the results of the regression for total trade, columns B.1-B.3 report the results for trade in intermediate goods, and columns C.1-C.3 provide the results for trade in consumption goods. All regressions control for the traditional factors of comparative advantage: capital and skilled labor. For each dependent variable, we provide in the first column the estimates for the traditional sources of comparative advantage adding only the 9
<u>http://transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_09_23_cpi_20 08_en.</u>

- Lanjouw, Jean. 2005. Patents, Price Controls, and Access to New Drugs: How Policy Affects Global Market Entry. _SSRN eLibrary_ .

- Léger, A. 2006. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries: Evidence from Panel Data. In _International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference_ . Gold Coast, Australia, August 12-18.

- Levin, Jonathan. 2008. ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENT FOR PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINES: EXPERT GROUP REPORT. Geneva: GAVI Alliance.

- Locke, J. 1690. _Two Treatises of Government_ : New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Love, J. 2007. Would cash prizes promote cheap drugs? _New Scientist Magazine_ , 12 November, 24-25.

- Love, J., and T. Hubbard. 2007. The big idea: prizes to stimulate R&D for new medicines. _Chicago-Kent law review_ 82 (3):1519-1554.

- Maitland, I. 2002. Priceless goods: how should life-saving drugs be priced? _Bus Ethics Q_ 12 (4):451-80.

- Nozick, R. 1974. _Anarchy, state, and utopia_ : Basic Books.

- OECD. 2002. Agricultural Monitoring in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2002. Paris: OECD.

- Outterson, K., J. B. Samora, and K. Keller-Cuda. 2007. Will longer antimicrobial patents improve global public health? _The Lancet Infectious Diseases_ 7 (8):559-566.

- Park, W. G. 2005. Do intellectual property rights stimulate R&D and productivity growth? Evidence from cross-national and manufacturing industries data. In _Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy_ , edited by J. Putnam: Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

- Peterson, Matt, Aidan Hollis, and Thomas Pogge. 2009. A Critique in Need of Critique. _Public Health Ethics_ :-.

- Pogge, T. 2005. Human rights and global health: a research program. _Metaphilosophy_ 36 (12):182-209.

- ———. 2006. Harnessing the Power of Pharmaceutical Innovation. In _The Power of Pills: Social, Ethical and Legal Issues in Drug Development, Marketing and Pricing_ . London: Pluto Press.

- ———. 2008a. _World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. 2nd, expanded edition_ : Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

- ———. 2008b. Access to Medicines. _Public Health Ethics_ 1 (2):73-82.

- ———. 2008c. Medicines for the world: boosting innovation without obstructing free access. _SUR - International journal on human rights_ 5 (8):117-141.

- Pogge, Thomas. 2009. The Health Impact Fund: Better Pharmaceutical Innovations at Much Lower Prices. _INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer, and Kim Rubenstein, (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010_ .

- Power, E. 2006. Impact of antibiotic restrictions: the pharmaceutical perspective. _Clinical Microbiology and Infection_ 12 (s5):25-34.

- Ravvin, M. 2008. Incentivizing Access and Innovation for Essential Medicines: A Survey of the Problem and Proposed Solutions. _Public Health Ethics_ 1 (2).

45
with the evidence discussed earlier that the labor supply response to adult death increases over time, and may manifest itself in increases in acute illnesses.

Apart from the acute illness results, we find no evidence that the deaths of nonco-resident adults or children living outside the household impact health or food consumption. We discuss this result further in the following section.

# **5. Conclusion**

HIV/AIDS is drastically changing the demographic landscape in high-prevalence countries in Africa. Increases in prime-age mortality rates have resulted in “missing” working-age adults, which has implications on the well-being of surviving family members. This study focuses on one specific category, older adults, who may be especially vulnerable. This demographic group often cares for orphaned grandchildren; they may rely on remittance and other in-kind support from their adult children; and older women especially may have less secure rights to household assets when men die. The burden of deaths of household members and children may force older adults to work longer hours and suffer declines in well-being. Despite the potential pathways, few empirical studies explore these impacts.

We use panel data from Tanzania that spans 13 years to study the long-run impacts of prime-age mortality on older adults, paying attention to the gender dimension of mortality impacts. We find that adult death is associated with increased farm hours but this impact varies by the gender of the older adult and co-residency. Older women who suffer the loss of a co-resident member among their baseline household are working five hours more each week. For older men, we see a similar impact, although not statistically significant for deaths of non-resident members. These impacts are concentrated among the more distant death shocks—recent deaths are not associated with increases in labor supply. So even in regions with sharp declines in HIV prevalence, some groups, such as older women, may be vulnerable to death shocks as much as 13 years in the past.

As for health, we see few impacts associated with deaths of household members. Perhaps the most striking findings in this dimension are that adult deaths occurring in the recent past are associated with _increases_ in _per capita_ food consumption. The probability of acute illness decreases in the recent past, but subsequently rises for deaths in the 23
# **Figure 5: Determinants of Agricultural Productivity**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.80<br>0.54<br>0.60 0.49<br>0.39<br>0.33<br>0.40 0.29<br>0.17 0.18<br>0.20 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.05<br>0.00<br>-0.20<br>-0.12 -0.21 -0.13<br>-0.40<br>-0.60<br>-0.80<br>-1.00<br>-1.01<br>-1.20<br><!-- End of picture text --> While access to extension services increases agricultural productivity by 33 percent, only a few households have such access in Timor-Leste. In 2014, only about 5 percent of agricultural households had access to extension services, and the poor and FHHs had lower access than their non-poor and male-headed counterparts. Across regions, access is higher in the east (9 percent) than in the west (2 percent) and center (2 percent).

Agricultural mechanization also increases productivity. The estimates indicate that using a tractor in crop production increases productivity by 54 percent. However, less than 10 percent of agricultural households used (either owned or rented) tractors and other mechanized equipment in crop cultivation in either 2007 or 2014. These findings reveal that the thousands of free tractors that were handed out as part of the 2009–10 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries mechanization policy could not be maintained. In general, the low use of mechanized inputs was more pronounced among poor and FHHs than among their non-poor and male-headed counterparts in both 2007 and 2014. In 2014, farmers residing in the west used more mechanized inputs (15 percent) than those in the east (7 percent) or center (2 percent). The low level of mechanization could be due to the lack of operational and maintenance skills, and the lack of market incentives to entice farmers to increase outputs (World Bank 2017).

Labor utilization (both hired and family labor) has a positive effect on agricultural productivity, since agricultural workers are needed to weed, mulch, fertilize, and control pests in order to increase yields. All else being equal, a one-percentage increase in the hours of labor increases agricultural productivity by 8 - 12 percent depending on the kind of labor.

10
<!-- Start of picture text --> = 1990 2010<br>SAR<br>SSA<br>MENA<br>LAC<br>EAP<br>HIC<br>ECA<br>EU<br>0) 10 20 30<br>Rate of road injury deaths (per 100,000)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> WOther Vehicle occupant i Motocycle rider WBicyclist Pedestrian<br>100%<br>90%<br>80% —<br>10%<br>60%<br>50% -<br>40% ~<br>30%<br>20% -<br>10%<br>ox : : ‘ ‘<br>SAR SSA MENA LAC EAP HIC ECA fu<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **VI. CONCLUSIONS**

Changes of expected and unexpected loan losses over time and across different loan portfolios reflect differences in the underlying loan loss distribution. This paper has provided a measure of loan loss distributions for selected bank loan portfolios, based on data from the Chilean Credit Register, and has shown the different features of loan loss distribution of large and small loans as a possible guide to appropriate risk and access policies.

We believe that these estimates provide the first detailed evidence of how ELs and ULs behave over the cycle and across different loan portfolios for an emerging country. Moreover, the evidence presented in this paper suggests relevant regulatory developments that could better tailor solvency and provisioning rules to the risk of different categories of borrowers and sizes of loans. We suggest that a “distributionbased” approach could provide powerful tools to distinguish loan portfolios whose efficient management should rely on “relationship” lending technologies (characterized by asymmetric distributions) from those that should instead rely on “arm’s length” lending technologies (characterized by quasi-normal distributions).

While the implication of different loan portfolio payoffs appears to have been studied in depth by bank risk managers and supervisors, this does not appear to have been the case for policymakers interested in deepening the banking market. We claim that this is an important omission because the empirical evidence may help detect when loans reap the benefits of diversification and access can be broadened without negative profitability consequences.

We conjecture that the main features of loan distribution are linked to those of income distribution. Although this proposition can be tested only with a cross country dataset some of its implication may be anticipated. In the first place bank credit polarization around small loans may provide favorable conditions for cheaper and broader supply of credit to the low income segment of the population. In addition, it is to be expected that the growing inequality of income distribution that takes place during economic contractions may play an independent negative affect on the cost and 17
Coleman, 2001; Laitner and Stolyarov, 2003; Comin and Hobijn, 2004; Buchak et al., 2018).<sup>3</sup> It is one of several recent studies that investigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (see for instance Alon et al., 2020; Baker et al., 2020; Chiou and Tucker, 2020; Alfaro et al., 2020; Jones et al., 2020; Alber and Dabour, 2020; Jonker et al., 2020; Bounie et al., 2020b; Guerrieri et al., 2020; Piguillem and Shi, 2020; Bounie et al., 2020a).

The rest of the paper flows as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background of card payment and the chronology of COVID-19 crisis in France and describes the data and methodology. Results are presented in section 3. Section 4 checks the robustness of the results, and section 5 concludes.

# **2 Background, Setting, Data, and Methodology**

This section provides background information on the card markets, the COVID-19 crisis in France, and my various data sets and estimation strategies. I explain how I use the unique features of card sales transaction data for the study of the response of merchants with the latest payment technology to the COVID-19 pandemic.

## **2.1 Contactless Payments and the COVID-19 Crisis in France: A Chronology**

_French card market and new digital payment_ . France has a well-developed bankcard market, including Cartes Bancaires CB, the leading payment system, created by French banks in 1984.<sup>4</sup> In 2020, the latter had more than 100 members (including payment service providers, banks and electronic money institutions) and counted 73 million CB cards (including 64 million contactless cards) and 2 million CB-affiliated merchants (Cartes Bancaires CB, 2020). In order to make bank cards more attractive and easier to use, French banks have decided to launch massive quantities of cards with contactless technology in addition to standard contact technology.<sup>5</sup> Contactless payment allows to pay by bank card (or smartphone) in a dematerialized way without having to enter your four-digit confidential code on the electronic payment terminal. This payment method is recent, the first payment terminal was approved in 2011, and its adoption by the population began to become significant

> 3For literature on payment choice and usage of payment instruments see for example Ching and Hayashi, 2010; Jonker, 2011;Arango et al., 2015; Bounie et al., 2016;Wang and Wolman, 2016, Stavins, 2018.

> 4Cartes Bancaires CB is an economic interest grouping that defines the operating methods for payment by CB card (physical or dematerialized), in the various purchasing environments. CB cards are recognizable by the ”CB” logo that they carry.

> 5The development of contactless card technology in France was one of the main objectives of the French national strategy for cashless payments designed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts, the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs and the Bank of France. For more details, please see this following document National Strategy on Means of Payment, 2015-2018.

4