The estimates of these effects using Equation (2) show similar results. Consistent with the event study plots, Table 3 shows that in response to every migrant death, the average monthly migration outflow in the origin district- destination cell falls by 1.2 percent for the subsequent 6 to 12 months (top panel, columns 1, 2, and 3). Similarly, the average monthly migration outflows to other destinations increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent for every migrant death in a cell for the subsequent 6 to 12 months (columns 4, 5, and 6). This indicates that, as corroborated by event study plots, potential migrants substitute to other destinations. The second and third panels of the table show smaller but significant spillover to neighboring districts as well. The spillovers are limited to districts close to the district of migrant death. Migrant deaths in an origin district - destination cell have no effects on migration outflows from districts that are far (bottom panel, Table 3).

However, the increase in migration flow to other destinations does not fully offset the negative effect in the same origin district - destination cell. Table 4 shows that total migration from the district falls by 0.9 to 1.2 percent in the subsequent 6 to 12 months for every migrant death in the district (top panel, columns 1, 2, and 3). There are large spillovers of migrant death to the neighboring district, but the spillover is limited to immediate neighbors only. Migrant death does not have significant impact on the migration outflows from districts that are further away (bottom two panels).

The estimated effects are quite large and of significant consequence to the nation. During the period of analysis, the total monthly outflow of migrants from each district was 300. The total effect of 0.9 percent reduction for 12 months means 32.4 fewer migrants migrate over a year after the death of a single migrant from this district. If these individuals had migrated, they would have earned at least $6,100 on the net from a migration episode that lasts 2.21 years.<sup>9</sup> I assume that if they stayed back, they would earn $2,900 in 2.21 years, which is the average income per employed male.<sup>10</sup> With these assumptions, a single death represents a loss of $0.1 million in forgone earnings over the 2.21 year long migration episode. Accounting for spillover effects of the death to neighboring districts makes this figure as large as $0.8 million. During the period of the study, an average of 550 migrant workers died annually. This led to a total forgone income of $57 million ($460 million with spillover) which translates to 0.3 percent (2.7 percent with spillover) of the average annual GDP for this period.<sup>11</sup> Note that, however, these calculations do not adjust for cost of living without migration, or for other monetary and other costs associated with migration.

# **4.2 Effect of death on job composition and prices**

If migrant death makes potential migrants believe that a particular job category is more risky than others, then they may respond by changing the jobs for which they migrate. Additionally, intermediaries may anticipate this and offer potential migrants less risky jobs in response to a migrant death. However, this does not seem to be the case. The event study plots in Figure 7 confirm this (top and bottom plots in third column). For both the plots, I cannot reject the null that all effects before the

> 9This estimate is half of the net earnings (net of migration fees) inexperienced potential migrants expect to make from a migration episode lasting 2.21 years (Shrestha, 2017). I take half of the earnings to account for two major effects: misinformation and cost of living abroad that is not factored into the net earnings. In Shrestha (2017), I show that misinformation is at least 26 percent. In The World Bank (2011), returnees from these destinations mentioned that they saved 75 percent of their earnings. Hence, half of the net earnings is a conservative estimate of migrant income.

> 10Author’s calculations from the Nepal Living Standards Survey-III, of 2010.

> 11GDP figures taken from The World Bank.

10