rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
exports have been increasing since the 1990s, except for brief interruptions during the global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic, so that exports now account for 50 percent of GDP. In the United States, exports have held steady at about 10 percent of GDP. In the rest of the world, exports are 30 percent of GDP, indicating greater reliance on the global economy for demand than China, India, or the United Sates.

These figures highlight diverse experiences with globalization. Globalization has allowed the United States to enjoy the consumption of foreign goods, borrowing to purchase the exports of the rest of the world. China and India have exploited this demand to fuel their own growth from a low income. They now rely less on the global economy, and instead on their own population, which is richer and can support domestic demand. Germany, which is nearly as rich as the United States, shows low wages are not a prerequisite for export success.

The imports of intermediate goods and services as a share of countries’ GDP are shown in Figure B of Figure 2. Such imports are essential inputs into exports, especially for countries participating in global value chains (GVCs), where different stages of production processes are located across different countries. The World Bank (2020) estimates that GVCs account for 50 percent of global trade, but that their growth has plateaued. Intermediate goods imports are a declining share of GDP in China and India, as both countries now produce more inputs domestically. These two economies are becoming less reliant on the global economy for inputs. Though it is less stark, there is also a downward trend in intermediate imports in Germany and the United States. In the rest of the world, the trend is instead slightly upwards.

Measures of globalization in factor markets provide a different perspective. The stock of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Panel C of Figure 2 measures the globalization of capital markets. In the United States and the rest of the world the stock of inward FDI investment accounts is valued at nearly 60 percent of GDP and shows no major downward trend. In Germany, inward FDI as a share of GDP grew until the global financial crisis but has not yet recovered from that peak. China experienced a boom in FDI during the that preceded it a boom in exports, as did India. Figure A1 shows positive trends are similar when counting the sum of debt and equity foreign investment, using the series of <mark>Coppola, Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2021) that also incorporates foreign investment through tax havens. Relative to Panel C of Figure 2, the level of inward foreign investment is greater in China and Germany relative to Figure A1, reflecting greater reliance on debt financing in these economies.</mark> 6
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McCalla, R., 1999, From St. John’s to Miami: containerisation at Eastern Seaboard ports, GeoJournal, 48: 21‐28 McDonald, J.F. and P.J. Prather. 1994. Suburban employment centres: The case of Chicago, Urban Studies, 31: 201–218.

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35
> - 18 -

# Fig 10

<!-- Start of picture text --> Russia: Unemployment inflow and outflow<br>Jonuary- October 1992<br>230<br>220 -<br>210<br>190 9<br>170-<br>IS0<br>150<br>140<br>8130<br>120<br>110<br>.100<br>90<br>80. *<br>70-<br>60<br>40-<br>30<br>Jon 92 Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct<br>1992'<br>a Inflows + OutsCJob finds) 0 Outs (ex.job finds) A Total Outflows<br><!-- End of picture text -->
more complex and requires more detailed analysis, but in our examples it appears to generate results that are quite consistent with those deriving from the former approach.

To operationalize our analysis, we build on a method recently proposed by Dang and Lanjouw (2014) to construct vulnerability lines that, together with existing national poverty lines, can help identify the poor and the vulnerable in each country. These vulnerability lines are associated with given vulnerability indexes— defined as the percentage of the population that are currently nonpoor but who face a significant risk of falling into poverty in the next period. For each country a socially acceptable vulnerability index has to be pre-specified— in the same way that countries have to specify national poverty lines that resonate within their respective societies.<sup>5</sup> Our method allows for shared prosperity to be defined both anonymously (i.e., for poor or vulnerable households in each period regardless whether they are different or the same) and non-anonymously (i.e., for the same poor or vulnerable households in the first period). Importantly, although the method focuses on dynamics and transitions in and out of specific population groups, it does not depend crucially on the availability of panel data. Instead, the method can build on methods to construct synthetic panels constructed from multiple rounds of cross-sectional data. The latter are far more frequently available in the developing country context and as a result, our method can potentially be applied to most developing countries.

For illustration, we analyze shared prosperity based on both the established approach, and our new proposed measure, using data from three countries from different income levels and geographical locations: India, the US, and Vietnam. Data from the US and Vietnam are actual panels respectively from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Vietnam Household

> 5 The vulnerability indices can be anchored to consideration of government budgetary constraints or to normative social welfare objectives. Also note that our proposed measure of shared prosperity is flexible enough to work with other definitions of the vulnerability line.

5
such cases are exceptional. Another difficulty is that domestic banks are often very important (captive) lenders to their government. Domestic default would severly deplete their capital and would risk to drive 'hem into bankruptcy. As a consequence, the government would be compelled to provide substantial support to the domestic banking system in order to avoid economic chaos, or otherwise it would face the negative consequences for domestic output.

# III. Possible remedies

# 1. How Much Fiscal Discipline is Needed?

How much fiscal discipline is necessary to restore a government's creditworthiness and credibility? Because of changing market perceptions and unstable lending conventions. this question cannot be answered. A more modest approach is to determine the required government budget in order to stabilize debt ratios and to make it consistent with other macroeconomic targets. This has been a concern for OECD Economic Surveys (see, in particular, OECD Economic Survey of Ireland, 1987) and the World Bank (Anand and van Wijnbergen, 1987) alike.

Solving the debt-dynamics equation (2) for the required non-interest surplus to get the debt/income ratio to decline, yields the stability condition

- t(t-g) + (t*-g*)e] > x t(l-f)r+f(r*+e)-n3 (p+n)m (3)

It tells us that more fiscal discipline is required to avoid inflation and rising debt ratios when the demand for base money is low, when GOP growth is low relative to real interest rates, when public debt is high"relative to GOP. and when real depreciation raises the real value of net foreign debt. Only when real GDP growth exceeds real interest rates and accumulated debt is low relative to seignorage, can the government run a primary deficit without rai4ing the debt ratio.

Tables 9 and 10 (from Reisen. 1989) provide detailed calculations for the required non-interest surplus in Brazil and Mexicz; which would be consistent with constant debt ratios, low inflation (S per cent per year) and real interest rates sufficiently high to make capital flight unprofitable. In

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2008 round. We check robustness of results to two alternative strategies to account for the missing years.

We use plant level outcomes from the Indonesian survey of manufacturing plants with at least 20 employees Statistik Industri (SI henceforth). SI is administered by Indonesia’s Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Agency on Statistics). The survey has extensive coverage: it is administered as a census every 10 years starting from 1996 and is very close to a census in the remaining years. Such coverage ensures high representation even at low levels of sectoral and geographic disaggregation. The data allow for different groupings of firms into sectors, based on definitions of Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha Indonesia (KBLI), a classification mostly compatible with ISIC Rev.3. We use 5-digit sector levels as our primary specification; however, our results are also robust to an alternative specification using 3-digit sector classifications. For the main analysis we use data from 2002 to 2014, the last year of data which allows us to compute TFPQ estimates. We also use the change between 2000 and 2002 to check our identifying assumptions.

Following Cali et al. (2021) we use SI data to estimate the plant-level performance measures: TFPR, TFPQ and markup. Unlike most existing studies using industry-level price indexes to deflate nominal variables, the granularity of our data allows us to calculate plant-specific output and input price indexes. This mitigates the bias deriving from inputs' price heterogeneity across plants and allows us to disentangle technical efficiency (TFPQ) and markups. To estimate plant-level production function parameters, we follow the control function approach and timing assumptions of Ackerberg et al. (2015), which are useful to mitigate the simultaneity bias affecting simple OLS coefficients. We slightly modify the standard estimator to allow for the presence of adjustment costs in materials. Then, using the estimated production functions, we calculate plant-level markups based on a model of profit maximization by firms, as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Finally, we combine our estimates of TFPQ and markup to obtain a measure of TFPR. Appendix I elaborates construction of these measures.

SI also provides additional time-variant control variables: raw materials and share of foreign ownership. We use variation in exposure to changes in preschool density to identify impacts of childcare on firm productivity. We construct a measure of exposure based on SI data using the average fraction of female employees in the firms in the same sector in 2002 - prior to 8
alternative. It involves allocation import quotas of a particular country among its producers and then allowing those quota allocations to be fully transferable within the country. This should help encourage the most efficient producers to take up quota and for less efficient producers to leave the induistry. Fewer resources would then be used to produce bananas, making the profits (and therefore the aid component) from preferential access greater for the economy of these countries. Profitable quota holders will pay taxes which can be used for infrastructure investment and profitable quotas holder will tend to invest some of their profits elsewhere in the economy anyway.

Under all four variants proposed, government may have a special responsibility to ensure that the production and marketing environment is as efficient as possible and that realistic expectations about the eventual loss of preferences are established. Preferences which insulate producers from market -forces and international competition often lessen the urgency to adopt international best practices. This leads to featherbedding and technological stagnation. If government can succeed in establishing an efficient commercial environment, this would increase the value of preferences to the economy and increase the robustness of the industry for when it must face international prices for bananas. Part of ensuring a healthy commercial environment is established, may require support for policy, marketing and productivity research For Latin American exports hurt by the policies, direct aid in place of tied banana aid to ACP countries would be to their advantage. So, they too have an incentive to support ACP countries in any effort in this directiom But Latin American countries also have an incentive to keep up pressure on the European Union to fundamentally reform its distortionary policy. To this end, the Latin American countries need to keep up their pressures for reform by making transparent the costs of the policy and by forming coalitions of interest with other disaffected groups. An emerging concern is that the European Union wi keep trying to _buy off_ Latin American countries by also offering them Emited preferential access. In this regard the Latin American countries should familiarize themselves with the many long term problems which have emerged in ACP countries as a result of preferences and with protectionist, quotas based policy elsewhere in the world.

31
and reaches 0.31. This suggests that countries with digital GovTech platforms experience a 0.31 points increase in public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered compared with their peers that have not adopted a GovTech platform.

As regards the covariates, the results show a positive and significant effect of democracy on citizen engagement at the 1 percent threshold in both estimations. More democracy means more independent and wide public deliberations, freedom of expression and association, suggesting more opportunities to participate in decision-making. Citizen participation is generally agreed to be an essential ingredient of a healthy democracy (Bullock, 2014) thus, the level of citizen engagement might be closely related to the level of democracy in a country. The results also indicate a positive and significant impact of the equal distribution of political power variable on citizen engagement. Inequality leads to the exclusion of certain vulnerable people from meaningful participation in the decision-making process. So, when a region or a social group is systematically excluded based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, caste, race, religion, and other factors, this means less participation of these people in political activities and public consultations. Like the findings of Lee, Chang, and Berry (2011), the results show that public sector corruption has a negative impact on citizen engagement. However, the study highlights significant impacts of corruption only on the civil society participation variable. There are no significant impacts of the remaining control variables.

**Table 3: Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Estimations’ Results**

||**Civil society p**<br>**(20**<br>|**articipation**<br>**21)**<br>|**Engaged so**<br>|**ciety (2021)**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|
|**GovTech**|**0.0908***|**0.0908*****|**0.306**|**0.306****|
||(0.0485)|(0.0318)|(0.206)|(0.143)|
|Democracy (Polity 2)||0.0254***||0.109***|
|||(0.00338)||(0.0152)|
|GDP per capita (ln)||0.0102||0.0929|
|||(0.0363)||(0.163)|
|Fixed broadband||0.00206||0.00624|
|subscriptions|||||
|||(0.00287)||(0.0129)|
|Public sector||-0.137**||-0.253|
|corruption|||||
|||(0.0575)||(0.259)|
|Population 15 - 44||0.00803||0.00579|
|||(0.0103)||(0.0463)|
|Equal distribution of||0.0752***||0.260**|
|political power|||||
|||(0.0247)||(0.111)|
|Human capital index||-0.509||-0.760|
|||(0.319)||(1.436)|
|Constant|0.684***|0.432|2.819***|1.017|
||(0.0343)|(0.406)|(0.146)|(1.829)|
|Observations|145|145|145|145|
|R-squared|0.024|0.601|0.015|0.549|
|Covariates|No|Yes|No|Yes|
||Standard err|ors in parentheses|||
||*** p<0.01,|** p<0.05, * p<0.1|||

11
- Vicente, Pedro C. and Leonard Wantchekon. 2009 “Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from Field Experiments in African Elections”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, 2012. “What Wins Votes: Why some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism,” American Journal of Political Science, Forthcoming 2012.

World Bank, 2005. _East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Governments Work_ , Washington DC World Bank, 2004. World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People, Washington, DC 29
and 1.1—a 10% increase or decrease in the world mean production—where the country is respectively a structural exporter or a structural importer.

For _μ_ = 0 _._ 9 the deterministic steady-state price in the world market is equal to 1.3, whereas in autarky the steady-state price is still 1 in the domestic market. Thus, when open to trade, the country exports and has a mean price higher than its mean autarkic price (see Table 4). Storage behavior is consistent with what was previously described for the trade/storage relationship: the mean stock level is very low when the country is an importer, and is much higher if it is an exporter. At the aggregate level, the parameter _μ_ does not seem to affect the optimal policy pattern, which consistently increases stock levels and produces very limited changes in average trade. As mentioned above, the optimal policy’s trade effect consists of distorting the distribution of trade, not in isolating the economy from the world market, which would be too costly. In the benchmark case, the distribution distortion is achieved mainly through the use of import subsidies and export taxes. With _μ_ = 0 _._ 9, export taxes and subsidies become the most important trade policy instruments. For prices higher than the mean price, export restrictions are used to avoid importing high prices from the world market. For prices below the mean price, exports are subsidized so as to move domestic price closer to its mean. For _μ_ = 1 _._ 1, the behavior is similar but applied to imports. Imports are subsidized when the domestic price is above its mean and taxed when it is below it. So the optimal behavior is to exploit the world market so as to stabilize the domestic price around its mean.

**Table 4. Sensitivity to the assumption of self-sufficiency**

||Structural e|xporter (_μ_=0.9)|Self-sufcie|nt (_μ_=1)<sup>a</sup>|Structural im|porter (_μ_=1.1)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||No<br>Policy|Optimal<br>Policy|No<br>Policy|Optimal<br>Policy|No<br>Policy|Optimal<br>Policy|
|Descriptive statistics|||||||
|Mean price|1_._230|1_._208|1_._045|1_._034|0_._915|0_._913|
|CV of price|0_._216|0_._134|0_._173|0_._121|0_._156|0_._109|
|Mean stocks|0_._090|0_._120|0_._033|0_._047|0_._013|0_._020|
|Mean imports|0_._003|0_._004|0_._018|0_._018|0_._050|0_._048|
|Mean exports|0_._074|0_._074|0_._028|0_._028|0_._008|0_._008|
|Welfare|||||||
|Consumers gains||1_._34||1_._05||0_._25|
|Producers gains||_−_1_._38||_−_0_._92||_−_0_._10|
|Government||0_._27||_−_0_._03||_−_0_._09|
|Total gains||0_._23||0_._10||0_._07|

_Notes:_ Columns No Policy and Optimal Policy display respectively results for the model without public intervention and for the optimal policy using the two instruments. a Benchmark The welfare analysis shows that policy intervention is more beneficial from a social point of view for structural exporters, while the gains to structural importers are sharply reduced in comparison to the benchmark. If anything, this only adds to the policy concerns surrounding the use of export 27
# **H2: Information about the negative impact of energy subsidies will increase respondents’ support for reform**

Third, heterogeneity in the levels of support for reform and the elasticity of preferences in response to information is explored across the broad dimensions that previous research has suggested for why support for subsidy reform may be limited. Ex ante, it is more straightforward to consider the direction of how prior beliefs and characteristics of respondents may relate to policy preferences in the control group (i.e., without information), as the existing literature about randomized survey experiments has shown there can be somewhat unpredictable differences between how subgroups of respondents react to information treatments (e.g., see Alesina et al. [2020]; Nyhan and Reifler [2010]). The two main dimensions of heterogeneity highlighted in earlier work are self-interest and the strength of the social contract (McCulloch 2023). Self-interest is expected to influence people’s support for reform, as higher energy prices are likely to negatively impact household purchasing power. Specifically, people are expected to be more likely to support reforms if they do not rely heavily on electricity or gas for cooking (or heating where necessary) or on fuel for transport, or if they do not believe their household has benefited from subsidies. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that respondents’ support for energy subsidies is likely to vary based on their actual and perceived income, as this is likely to influence whether they believe they can pay higher energy prices and whether they think they have relatively more or less to lose. The second dimension of heterogeneity, a weak social contract between citizens and their government, is also expected to undermine support for energy subsidy reform. While the concept of a social contract is multifaceted, at least three specific aspects are relevant to subsidy reform and are explored in this study: trust in the government, beliefs about the government’s capacity to help households with the cost of living, and beliefs about whether one’s household is entitled to receive subsidies. Finally, the study also explores heterogeneity based on respondents’ knowledge of energy subsidies and levels of education, as these factors may influence whether respondents change their views after receiving additional information.

12