rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
financial sectors of many developing countries.<sup>2</sup> Second, in such settings the impact of information provision depends critically on the pre-existing equilibrium. Canonical models of asymmetric information recognize that prices adjust endogenously to mitigate the adverse impacts of poor information environments. As outlined below, depending on the initial equilibrium, additional information provision may lead to diametrically opposite effects on provider price, quality and the new market equilibrium. Our setting allows us to more broadly test the theoretical predictions derived from such models and thereby better understand the impact of information provision in these more complex, but realistic and increasingly prevalent, environments.

We analyze data from a market-level experiment in 112 Pakistani villages that increased information exogenously through the dissemination of school and child level test scores. Importantly, these villages contain both public and private schools, with an average of 7 schools per village. We provided households and schools in treatment villages with a report card that displayed the test scores of their own children and all schools in the village. Each village can be regarded as an “island economy,” as children rarely attend schools outside of the village. This context combined with limited central regulation means private school prices are independently determined within each village. Thus, each village forms a unique competitive market. Since the village is also our unit of treatment, we are therefore able to study the average impact of information on the schooling market as a whole in addition to the heterogeneous impact on particular schools.

We first confirm that parental knowledge indeed improved as a result of the intervention. In treatment villages, perception of quality became better aligned with school test scores than in control villages. Learning also greatly improved:

> 2 In India and Pakistan, 40% of primary enrollment is in private schools (ASER India, 2012; ASER Pakistan, 2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa, private primary enrollment is estimated at 16.5%, despite these administrative data having been shown to underestimate participation in private schooling (Dixon, 2012).

2
For a second set of analyses using total numbers of salient censorship events, we transformed our data set into a country-panel format in order to be able to test the factors leading to the magnitude of censorship, and not only to its intensity. Table 5 shows the marginal changes in the magnitude of censorship events induced by demand (news consumption). Robustness checks included in the online appendix also test supply factors (total numbers of radio stations, TV channels, and print publications). For print media and TV, a one unit increase in audience size triggers significant increases in censorship events (around 2% and 10% respectively), whereas supply factors are insignificant. These results need to be interpreted with caution given that we have a smaller sample size with reliable data on the supply and demand of news compared to the salient censorship events data set, but overall they strongly confirm the importance of the audience size in censors’ decision to control information.

40
Table 3: Treatment Effects: Borrower Expectations

||Expects|forbearance|Expects lax enforcement|
|---|---|---|---|
||<br>from banks|<br>from government||
||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|[1] Relationship offer|-0.074|-0.023|0.049|
||(0.196)|(0.122)|(0.221)|
|[2] Regulator offer|-0.024|-0.030|0.143|
||(0.185)|(0.156)|(0.298)|
|Test: [1]_−_[2]|-0.049|0.007|-0.094|
||(0.191)|(0.140)|(0.262)|
|Test: Any_−_No Offer|-0.042|-0.026|0.085|
||(0.085)|(0.075)|(0.114)|
|Month FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Treatment day x caller FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Survey day x caller FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|<br>Control group mean|0.67|0.68|0.36|
|<br>R-squared|0.71|0.65|0.84|
|Observations|320|325|259|

Notes: This table shows treatment effects of debt forbearance on expectations of future debt relief. Each column shows results from a separate regression. The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent answered that they expect another round of debt forbearance to be extended by private lenders. The dependent variable in column (2) is an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent answered that they expect another round of debt forbearance to be extended by the government. Both outcomes were elicited in separate incentivized belief elicitation exercises (i.e. each borrower received one or the other randomly). Robust standard errors at the individual borrower level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

37
**Figure 4. Indonesian PISA 2018 scores**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 410<br>400<br>390<br>380<br>370<br>360<br>350<br>340<br>330<br>Mathematics Science Reading<br>Boys Girls<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: EdStats World Bank 2018, processed.

A World Bank study of 56,000 male and female grade 8 students on the islands of Sumatra and Java found that boys receive lower grades. Across all seven academic subjects, boys’ grades are 2 to 3 percentage points lower than girls’, which is equivalent to 0.34 to 0.55 standard deviation. The study found that girls not only have higher grades than boys, but that they have better grades all along the distribution. The survey also found that boys are more likely to miss school than girls, with 55 percent of boys reporting missing school at least one day a month, compared with 44 percent of girls (World Bank, 2018). As yet unpublished analyses from the study show that boys' lower grades and higher absenteeism rates are correlated with lower socioemotional skills, demotivating mindsets, and low perception of classroom environments.

Echoing the findings of the study noted above, during school visits for this study to East Java and South Kalimatan, principals, teachers and education officers who were interviewed reported that girls perform better than boys in most academic subjects, while boys tend to excel more in extra-curricular activities and sports. In many schools, girls perform better in STEM subjects in particular. In almost all schools, girls are said to be more diligent, mature and focused on their studies. At a senior secondary school in Surabaya that accepts students based on merit, the principal noted that more girls are accepted than boys due to better grades. The principal of a junior secondary school in Banjarmasin noted that girls perform better academically and that girls dominate the top 10 spots in every class. The principal suggested that this is because girls are more focused in their studies and are more willing to learn. At a junior secondary school in Sampang, several teachers noted that girls achieve higher grades across subjects, particularly those that are in the national exam (math, science, Indonesian and English). A district education officer in Banjarmasin noted that, at the junior secondary level, girls perform better in arts, sports, science, math, physics and social science. A district education officer in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, mentioned that boys tend to spend more time playing online games and are more likely to wake up late for school. Principals in Banjarmasin echoed the issue of boys playing sports and other activities rather than focusing on their studies.

11
MALI’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE Boutheina Guermazi. 2009. GICT Republic of Mali, Note sur le Secteur des telecommunications au Mali Etude des situations de concurrence sur le marche des telecommunications au Mali (TA p107– 128)

- Mayer, Rebecca, Ken Figueredo, Mike Jensen, Tim Kelly, Richard Green, and Alvaro Federico Barra. 2009. ―Connecting the Continent: Costing the Needs for Spending on ICT Infrastructure in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 3, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

# Irrigation

Svendsen, Mark, Mandy Ewing, and Siwa Msangi. 2008. ―Watermarks: Indicators of Irrigation Sector Performance in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 4, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- You, L., C. Ringler, G. Nelson, U. Wood-Sichra, R. Robertson, S. Wood, G. Zhe, T. Zhu, and Y. Sun. 2009. ―Torrents and Trickles: Irrigation Spending Needs in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 9, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

# Power

Briceño-Garmendia, Cecilia, and Maria Shkaratan, 2010. ―Power Tariffs: Caught between Cost Recovery and Affordability.‖ AICD Working Paper 21, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Eberhard, Anton, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Fatimata Ouedraogo, Daniel Camos, and Maria Shkaratan. 2008. ―Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 6, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Foster, Vivien, and Jevgenijs Steinbuks. 2009. ―Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies: In-House Generation of Electricity by Firms in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4913, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Rosnes, Orvika, and Haakon Vennemo. 2009. ―Powering Up: Costing Power Infrastructure Spending Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 5, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Rysankova, Dana. 2009. Mimeo. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

# Transport

Bullock, Richard. 2009. ―Off Track: Sub-Saharan African Railways.‖ AICD Background Paper 17, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- Carruthers, Robin, Ranga Rajan Krishnamani, and Siobhan Murray. 2009. ―Improving Connectivity: Investing in Transport Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 7, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

51
income incentive in attracting Italians and Spaniards, France had a generous open door policy for Portuguese nationals and it was particularly welcoming to illegal immigrants in the early 1960s at the time of the Angolan colonial war.<sup>5</sup> During the same period, in Yugoslavia, the Tito government which had been actively discouraging emigration for work purpose until the early 1960s, suddenly changed its approach as unemployment was growing. Starting in 1965, a new policy actively encouraged workers to go abroad primarily as guest workers and, in 1973, there was 1.1 million Yugoslavs living abroad, with 900,000 of them in Western Europe, mostly in Germany and Austria (Curtis, 1992). Nevertheless, 31,578 people were registered as permanent residents in Switzerland that is, held work/residence permits for more than one year and 3,362 held seasonal permits.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, seasonal workers from Yugoslavia clearly were coming to Switzerland before the change in policy in their home country as in 1973, 344 of them obtained the conversion of their seasonal permits (OFE, 2001a, Table 112.2R), implying they had been seasonal workers for at least 10 years without interruption.

From the early 1980s and during the following 20 years, the evolution of the Yugoslav population in Switzerland diverged from that of the other main source-countries for permanent residents mostly because of an unprecedented conjunction of events in Switzerland as well as in Yugoslavia. From about 44,000 permanent residents in 1980, the population rose to more than 337,000 in 2000 that is from hardly 5% to almost 25% of the foreign population in Switzerland. Open emigration policy by the Yugoslav government, the possibility of

> 5  See Blanc-Chéard (2001), Chapter 6, for more details. According to census data, in 1962, there were about 50,000 Portuguese nationals in France (i.e., 2.3% of foreign population); in 1968, there were more than 296,000, that is 11.3% of foreign population; and in 1975, they represented 22% of foreign French population with almost 759,000 residents (Weil, 1995, Annex VI).

> 6  Population numbers are for the end of December (IMES, 2004a, Table S1A.1850R; OFE, Table 182_220_1264R). It is worth noting that the number of seasonal permits is at the lowest in December since seasonal industries tend to have much higher employment in the summer.

10
# Bibliogralphz

- Agell, Nils J., "Subsidy to Capital Through Tax Incentives in the Asean Countries: An Application of the Cost of Capital Under Inflation Situations", International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Working Paper, 1982.

- Auerbach, Alan J., "Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital", Quarterly Journal of Econogics, 93, 1979, 433-56.

- Auerbach, Alan J., "Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital", Journal ot Economic Literature, 21, 1983, 905-940.

- Bartholdy, Jan, Gordon Fisher and Jack Mintz, "Taxation and the Financial Policy of firms: Theory and Empirical Applications to Canada", Economic Council of Canada, Discussion Paper, 324, 1987.

- Boadway, Robin W., "The Theory and Measurement of Effective Tax Rates", in The Impact of Taxation on Business Activity, ed. by Jack M. Mintz and Douglas D. Purvis, John Deutsch Institute, 1988.

- Boadway, Robin W. and Neil Bruce, "Depreciation and Interest Deductions and the Effect of the Corporation Income Tax on Investment", J^urnal of Public Economics, 11, 1979, 93-105.

- Boadway, R.W., N. Bruce and J.M. Mintz, 'Taxation, Inflation, and the Marginal Tax Rate on Capital in Canada', CAnadian Journal of Economics, 17, 1984, 62-79.

- Bond, Eric, "Tax Holidays and Industry Behavior", fe, Review of Economics and Statistics, 63, February 1981, 88-95.

- Bond, Eric W. and Larry Samuelson, "Tax lioldings as Signals", American Economic Review, 76, 1986, 820-26.

- Doyle, Chris and Sweder van Wijnbergen, "Taxation of Foreign Multinationals: A Sequential Bargaining Approach to Tax Holidays", Institute for International Economic Studies Seminar Paper No. 284, University of Stockholm, 1984.

- King, M.A. and D. Fullerton, The Taxation of Income FroM Caoital: A Comarative Study of the United States. the United Kingdom. Sweden and West Germany, University of Chicago Press, 1'84.

- Hintz, Jack M., "An Empirical Estimate of Corporate Tax Refundability and Effective Tax Rates", Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 102, February 1988, 225-231.
The variable indicating a high growth potential – expected growth – attracts a positive significant coefficient. Greater macroeconomic instability – indicated by a higher GDP growth standard deviation – attracts a significant negative regression coefficient. Overall, FDI responds to a government’s track record. In this sense, good government again clearly attracts FDI. Intriguingly, regime durability turns out to be insignificant. Interestingly, other variables are rarely consistently significant and robust. The two exceptions are, first, a higher telephone density is associated with more FDI inflow per capita, and second, a larger population is actually associated with a lower FDI inflow per capita. Since China has a particularly high telephone density relative to other similar countries, this infrastructure indicator has contributed toward China's high FDI inflow per capita.

# **6. FDI Allocation in China and the World, Compared**

We now use our Table 3 results to predict FDI inflows for China from 1990 through 2003. This comparison is conducted in the last row of Table 3, which reports the mean prediction error for each regression. That is, we use China’s right-hand side variables to predict its FDI inflow, actually to predict China's log(constant + _per capita_ FDI), for each year from 1990 through 2003. We then compare each prediction with the actual value of this variable for China each year and calculate the average of these differences – the model’s mean prediction error for China. The final row gives these test statistics.<sup>8</sup> Figures 8 and 9 present some of the same information graphically, by plotting the prediction errors of regression 3.2 and 3.4, using _responsible government_ in Figure 8 and _control of corruption_ in Figure 9 to predict FDI inflow each year from 1990 to 2003 for China and a range of other weak-institution countries.

> 8 While theoretically we can test the statistical significance of the mean of the prediction error, we have only 14 observed forecast errors (1990 to 2003) to carry out tests.  We therefore show the readers directly all forecast errors and how they graphically compared to within sample estimation errors of other countries.

19
- 21 -

from its policy instruments (money supply or specific short bank rates) to threc-month bank deposit rates is fairly direct. And, third, because short-term bank rates are used by many central banks if not as policy targets at least as policy indicators. For these reasons, the eurodeposit futures contract table, with a sequence of contracts three months apart in time, can be "read" as the market's view on likely central bank actions in the short-tenn. Contracts in the outer years are less linked to expected central bank actions because they tend to be dominated by expectations on a range of other economic variables like general economic performance and longer-term inflationary expectations.

Nature of view being exploited. Despite the apparent simplicity of eurodeposit futures, they permit the expression of market views by traders on a range of dimensions. Eurodeposit futures are used most frequently to express views on the following:

- General market direction. Eurodeposit futures permit the lengthening or shortening of the duration of portfolios according to expectations on market direction. Bets on falling interest rates would be undertaken by purchasing individual contracts or strips of contracts, while bets on rate hikes would be expressed by shorting individual contracts or strips. These trades tend to be _outright,_ that is, with no offsetting positions.

- Timing of market changes. Eurodeposit futures trades can be constructed so as to bet on the direction as well as on the timing of expected changes in money market rates (e.g., following an anticipated central bank action). For example, buying the front June contract and selling the front September contract constitutes a bet that interest rates will rise _in the three months_ between June and September to the extent that the yield curve reflects expectations of future interest rates. More formally, this trade is premised on the expectation of a _steevening_ of the yield curve. Such _calendar spread trades_ are not affected by _parallel_ shifts in the yield curve (under which the price of all contracts move by the same amount), but do capture a flattening or steepening of the yield curve. If one wanted to bet on. the expected timely movement of a particular contract relative to its neighboring contracts rather than on a progressive flattening or steepening, the trade could be constructed as a _butterfly._ In this case, that contract would be bought (sold) and _both_ neighboring contracts would be sold (bought).

- Co-movement across intemational markets. Alternatively, cne can bet on what rates might do in one country _relative_ to what they do in another country by putting on a _country spread trade._ For instance, if rates are higher in Germany than in the US, a _convergence trade_ would consist of going long (a single or a strip of) euromark contracts and shorting (the same) eurodollar contracts. This trade wins if rates in Germany fall relative to trades
**Table 6. Gender, Residence, and Training (percent)**

|||G|ender|Re|sidence|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Training|Full sample|Female|Male|Accra|Other|
|In-house|28.0|33.0|27.0|25.1|34.2|
|By outside providers|36.2|24.7|38.7|38.0|35.4|
|None|35.8|42.3|34.3|36.9|30.4|
|Total||||||
|Percent|100|100|100|100|100|

_Note:_ The values show the percentage of each category of workers with each level of education. For example, 28.0 percent of the manufacturing workers in the sample received in-house training. _Source:_ Round Three of the 1994 Regional Program on Enterprise Development for Ghana.

The incidence of training is only marginally h:igher for firms in Accra, compared with firms outside the capital (see table 6). Fewer fem,ale employees receive training outside the firm and more receive training inside the firm than male workers do. Fortytwo percent of the female workers are not trained, conapared with only 34 percent of the male workers. Investigating sector differences in the incidence of training reveals that the wood sector trains relatively fewer workers than the other sectors. Only 24 percent of all employees do not receive any training, while 32-37 percent of workers in the wood sector do not receive training . More support staff receive training than workers in other occupations do.

**Table 7. Occupation and Training (percent)**

||Administr|Comme|Professi|Product|Support|Manager|Full|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Training|ation|rcial|onal|ion|||sample|
|In-house|11.6|14.7|8.6|35.7|29.6|20.4|28.0|

24
employment outcomes. They find that debt causes graduates to choose substantially highersalary jobs and reduces the probability that students choose low-paid “public interest” jobs. They also find some evidence that debt affects students' academic decisions during college. The authors offer two potential explanations from their findings: one being that young workers are credit constrained; the other that they are averse to holding debt.

Data from a recently collected survey amongst higher education students in the Netherlands indicate that debt aversion is significantly higher among students whose father has a lower level of education. A regression of debt aversion (measured on a scale from 1 to 4 with a standard deviation of 0.8) on level of father’s education (and controls for gender, age and ability) gives a coefficient of -0.028 (with a standard error of 0.008), suggesting that especially children from poorer backgrounds may benefit from the introduction of a graduate tax scheme.

_Human capital contracts_ . A human capital contract is a contract in which students agree to pay a percentage of their income for a specified period after graduation in exchange for funds to finance their education. Originally proposed by Milton Friedman (Friedman and Kuznets 1945; Friedman 1955), the idea of such contracts has re-emerged in recent years. The development of financial markets since the 1980s has created favorable conditions for private initiatives to invest in human capital.

An essential characteristic of human capital contracts is that investors determine the percentage of future income that students have to commit, which could vary depending on the type of learning undertaken and the investor’s judgment about the borrower’s likely future 24