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in the first group identified in the table -- Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, and Mexico -- the scope of entry reform has been modest. Prior to 1989, Mexico made little effort to ease the nation's substantial bureaucratic obstacles to entry, although there are indications that the country is about to embark"' on a far-reaching effort in this area. Both Kenya and Ghana have endeavored to put in place 'one-stop shops' to ease the bureaucratic hurdles for putative entrants. While the verdict is still out on the Kenyan experience, so far implementation has been weak in Ghana: new investments remain subject to requirements of prior approval; despite some efforts at streamlining, the approval procedures of Ghana's National Investment Commission remain time-consuming and cumbersome. As for Jamaica, the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles to entry -- although they apparently are quite substantialP - has not yet found its way onto the reform agenda.

- In the second group of countries comprising Bangladesh, Pakistan, Tunisia and Guinea-- significant efforts were made to ease direct bureaucratic obstacles to entry. [Thailand, Morocco,2 Mauritius and the Philippinesn permitted free entry prior to the initiation of the reform process; hence the absence in those countries of any reform measures in this area.] In Tunisia, clearance requirements for putative new entrants were abolished entirely; in Bangladesh i negative list was established, with free entry permitted for all but explicitly restricted sectors and other investments in excess of a (relatively large) minimum size; in Pakistan, the investment ceiling above which clearance for new entrants was required was increased from Rs6O million in 1984 to Rs 500 million in 1988. No evidence was uncovered in Tunisia, Bangladesh or Pakistan of difficulties in either adoption or implementation, although it should be noted that at least in Tunisia even after the reform of entry regulations other obstacles continued to inhibit entry by new firms. By contrast, in Guinea (the only country in the third group) reforms that were very extensive in scope were undermined by severe problems of implementation.

It is instructive to contrast the Tunisian and Guinean experience in eliminating direct bureaucratic obstacles to entry. Subsequent to Guinea's 1987 reforms, most firms formally were free to establish themselves by the routine act of incorporation at the Trade Registry. In practice as of early 1989, incorporation procedures continued to be onerous and time consuming; individual ministries continued to require prior approval for all investments falling in their domain of responsibility; and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry continued to require "9 In a first move, a sweeping deregulation of the hitherto monopolistic Mexican trucking industry went into effect in September 1989.

20 See, The World Bank Jamaica: Adjustment Under Changing Economic Conditions Report No. 7753-JM, April 26, 1989, p. 39

**21** In practice, difficulties with land titles, with the issuance of construction permits and in obtaining access to finance represented real impediments to mntry by Moroccan firms. See The World Bank, Morocco: The Impact of Liberalization, Report No. 6714-MOR, March 15, 1988 p. 59.

22 Philippine firms that failed to register with the Board of Investments both were excluded from investment incentives (discussed in the next section) and were denied access to foreign exchange. Some efforts apparently were made to open access to foreign exchange to both registered and unregistered firms, but no information is available as to subsequent experience.