rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
capacity demands a higher guaranteed rent to get firms interested in the business. But focusing on the degree of incentive of the regulation may not be the only tool. Nationalization is an option allowing governments to control the rent. This is perhaps why average prices may be higher under public provision.

# **_2.3 What happens when accountability is limited?_**

Accountability does not mean the same thing to all WSS actors. For politicians, the next election is when accountability is possible. For regulators, the rules are more ad-hoc. This increases the risks of arbitrary and/or corrupt decisions. De facto, it reduces the sense that regulatory interactions with government and regulators are subject to checks and balances. The outcomes are again quite predictable. Lower accountability translates into higher risks which show up as higher average prices and rent as well as lower outputs and, usually, quality. Lack of actual (vs formal) checks and balances increases the cost to the government to cut the ease with which bribes can be made, making corruption problems more likely. One of the interesting but daunting results of theory is that when corruption becomes too big, it is too costly to try to fix, which may explain why some governments may seem sanguine about the issue (Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) and Soreide et al. (2014)).

When the accountability problem is both with the politicians and the regulator, theory suggests that it is best to also consider reducing the payoffs to information asymmetry favoring any of the actors. This reduces incentives to renegotiate on either side as new information is being generated and the size of potential rent is re-evaluated. It also reduces the scope for corruption since it reduces the margin for cost padding by allowing cost benchmarking. This is usually best achieved by adopting a cost-plus regulatory regime anchored in a rigorous baseline benchmarking exercise to track the evolution of costs. In the process, it reduces the perception of risks and hence expected return (and average tariff) since expected return is driven by risk perception, but this may require a trade-off of efficiency gains, as discussed below.

But cost-plus may not be the best solution when the problem is largely driven by weak regulators. In that case, the most obvious solution is actually to out-source partially, at least enough to increase the transparency, the quality and the accountability of specific regulatory functions. But there are often political limits driven by sovereignty concerns to this option. In which case, the best solution is linked to the specific source of the regulatory weakness.

If the main issue is that regulators do not have the necessary information (e.g. because accounting practice are poor or because willingness-to-pay or household consumption surveys are not available), or if these regulators are not yet expert in processing this information, it seems reasonable to pick a 9
# **1. Introduction**

Economic inequality – usually measured in terms of income or consumption – is neither all bad nor all good. Most people view income gaps that arise from the application of different levels of effort as less objectionable than those that are due, say, to racial discrimination. Attitudinal surveys attest to this. When asked to place their views on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 implied agreement with the statement that “Incomes should be made more equal,” and 10 implied agreement with the statement that “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort”, respondents in the 1999-2000 World Value Survey were evenly divided.<sup>1</sup> The median answer was 6. The two modes of the distribution, with approximately 20% of respondents each, were 1 and 10.

Attitudes to inequality vary for a number of reasons, but an important factor is whether inequalities are seen to be driven by differences in factors for which the individual can be held morally accountable (i.e. where he or she had a choice), or by factors that lie beyond the individual’s responsibility. In an influential contribution, John Roemer (1998) calls the former “efforts”, and the latter “circumstances”. He describes “equality of opportunity” as a situation in which important outcomes – which he calls “advantages”, and which would include measures of economic welfare such as earnings or household consumption – are distributed independently of circumstances. A situation, in other words, where the distribution of economic welfare _within_ groups of people with identical circumstances would not vary _across_ such groups.<sup>2</sup> The distinction between inequality of opportunity and the more standard concept of inequality of outcomes is of interest to economists for at least three sets of reasons. First, if inequality of opportunity does affect attitudes to outcome inequality, then it may affect attitudes to redistribution and beliefs about social fairness. These beliefs may in turn affect the extent of redistribution actually implemented, and the level of investment and output generated. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) are

> 1 The World Value Survey is conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, based at the University of Michigan, and contains responses from representative samples in 69 countries.

> 2 Roemer (1998) was not, of course, the first economist or philosopher to argue that the space of opportunities was ethically the right one to focus on. Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and, to some extent, Sen (1985) had made broadly similar points. By providing a simple, yet powerful, formalization of the definition of equal opportunities, however, Roemer contributed to an increase in interest in the concept from applied economists.

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# **TABLE VII. Heterogeneous effects of Maternal Mental Health on Children Vocabulary at Age 5 by the Mother's Marital Status and Partner’s Drinking Behavior**

|||**_Dep_**<br>|**_endent variab_**<br>|**_le: Standard_**<br>|**_ized PPVT_**<br>|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
||||IV with|PDS-selecte|d variables a|nd full regre|ssor set|||
||_Effects on_<br>_w_<br>|_children fro_<br>_ith a partn_<br>|_m mothers_<br>_er_<br>|_Effects on_<br>_with_<br>|_children fro_<br>_a drinking pa_<br>|_m mothers_<br>_rtner_<br>|_Effects on_<br>_with a he_<br>|_children fr_<br>_avily-drink_<br>|_om mothers_<br>_ing partner_<br>|
||MHI-1|MHI-2|MHI-3|MHI-1|MHI-2|MHI-3|MHI-1|MHI-2|MHI-3|
|Maternal Mental Health (-)|-0.889*|-0.433*|-0.465*|-1.070**|-0.518**|-0.556**|-1.150**|-0.549**|-0.587**|
||(0.459)|(0.222)|(0.239)|(0.511)|(0.246)|(0.264)|(0.573)|(0.270)|(0.287)|
|Constant|1.144***|1.147***|1.148***|1.195***|1.201***|1.200***|1.653***|1.642***|1.633***|
||(0.339)|(0.337)|(0.336)|(0.379)|(0.376)|(0.375)|(0.439)|(0.434)|(0.432)|
|Observations|963|963|963|770|770|770|486|486|486|
|Mother controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Child controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Household controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

Table VII presents estimated effects of maternal mental health on child vocabulary at age 5, separated by whether the mother lives with a partner and his drinking likelihood. We estimate the model selected from LASSO procedure. Selected control regressor set includes mother's age, wealth index, living in urban area, child's age, consumption of durable goods index, household size, number of children younger than 5 years in the household, and Height for age Z-score. Sample is restricted to children with available information on maternal mental health in 2002 and PPVT scores in 2006 and 2009. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

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registered a healthy 5.3 percent average growth. Correspondingly, exports grew by a mere 0.8 percent for the whole 1990s, but considerably rebounded to an average annual growth rate of 8.3 percent between 2001 and 2013. Despite these encouraging figures, the trade surplus fell from an average of US$ 478.3 million in 1990-2000 to US$101 million in 2001-2013, as imports rose even more than exports.

3. **The trade dependency of the country remains relatively high (Figure 1).** The trade surplus was 0.5 percent of GDP in 2001-2013, down from 6.5 percent in the previous decade, but the trade dependency was significantly higher. Indeed, trade dependency (trade/GDP) rose from 43 percent in 1990-2000 to 62 percent in 2001-2013. In terms of exports, trade dependency rose to 36 percent in 2013 from 11 percent in 2000. Even in the down years, trade dependence remained high. In 2009, for instance, DRC’s exports fell by 28 percent, but their share in GDP remained high at 24 percent.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1: Share of Exports and Imports in GDP Figure 2: Exports Composition<br>(in percent) (in percent)<br>60 90<br>80<br>50<br>70<br>60<br>40<br>50<br>30 40<br>30<br>20<br>20<br>10<br>10<br>0<br>0<br>Agriculture Ores and Metals<br>Exports Imports Manufacture Pearls and Precious Stones<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013<br>1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: calculated using data from UNCTAD database. Source: calculated using data from UNCTAD database.

4. **In the past four decades, trade volume increased more than tenfold, but the share of value-added has not changed as export composition remained commodity based** . The share of value added in DRC exports remained relatively constant at around 3 percent, and has not been 3
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# **Financial gas market**

The financial gas market in the U.K. came to existence relatively recently, but it has already experienced major developments. Initially, financial gas instruments were traded mostly by financial and trading institutions, which offeredl customized financial gas contracts to large customers, shippers or suppliers. The financial gas market was relatively unorganized and small, as only few instruments were traded"'. An increase in the volumes of natural gas traded in the spot market and corresponding volatility of spot prices have initiated demand for more financial instruments designed to hedge price risks.

The International Petroleum Exchange in London carried out the task of developing standardized financial gas contracts. Originally, the IPE intended to develop both physical and financial gas contracts for delivery to the Bacton terminal, but because of the increasing use and great potential of the on-system market, the delivery point has been changed to the National Balance Point. After complicated negotiations with BGT and OFGAS over an access to BGT's electronic network", the IPE finally introduced its Natural Gas NBP contract on January 31, 1997, as the first gas futures contract in Europe. This marked a start of trading of standardized financial gas contracts in the U.K.

A single IPE Natural Gas NBP contract is for delivery of 1,000 therms of natural gas per day at the NBP'<sup>2</sup> . Trading takes place in multiples of 5,000 therms per day through the IPE automated Energy Trading System or in the over-the-counter market. Contracts can be traded in groups of individual days on a monthly basis up to 12 months into the future. The IPE has also introduced a Balance of the Month contract which for delivery in all days remaining in the current month. If delivery is to occur, traders are required to follow BGT's nominations process and coordinate with the London Clearing House to fulfill their obligations.

The IPE natural gas futures contract has become increasingly popular among gas traders in the U.K. It was widely accepted by the gas industry because of its central delivery location and smooth administration. For exarnple, total volume of traded gas on July 31, 1997. was almost 30 million therms, representing about 40% of total U.K. daily production of natural gas (IPE 1 997b). The IPE also facilitates trading of the Exchange of Futures for Physicals, a popular contract that allows traders to liquidate equal and opposite physical and financial positions in natural gas, and intends to introduce a natural gas options contract. Although some say that the sole U.K. natural gas market may not be large enough to allow efficient trading of natural gas futures contracts, the success of the "There have been only 1O to 15 swap transactions so far, according to Colin Bryce of Morgan Stanley International in London.

" For more details on IPE's activities in preparation of natural gas physical and financial contracts, see European Natural Gas Daily, September 23, 1996, published by Petroleum Argus Ltd., London..

**12** This paragraph draws on (IPE 1997a).
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the two efficiency problems mentioned for CDS – wrong ultimate holder and market manipulation.

# _Correcting agent incentives_

There is of course a broader critique of finance which rightly points the finger at distorted incentive structures for agents. This would include both traders and other operational officers of financial intermediaries and of CEOs and other senior staff who should be supervising operations and ensuring that the institution is set on a prudent course. Tax structures could be used to alter the incentive profile of senior staff, but so far attempts to design such structures have not been successful. For example, the cap since 1993 of USD 1 million on tax deductibility (for the firm) of senior directors’ remuneration seems to have had little effect (Rose and Wofram, 2002). Clearly, while transactions taxes could have a significant effect on the profits of various lines of business that could indirectly affect the incentive structure facing individual traders and CEOs, they could not easily be fine-tuned to achieve the desired re-alignment of the private incentives of these individuals with public goals.

These considerations cast doubt on the potential for achieving a double-dividend coming from a financial transactions tax that would somehow discourage the accumulation of toxic debt, while still yielding sizable revenue.

# **4.  Some statistics on the starting base of a comprehensive transactions tax**

Data on financial transactions (as distinct from financial stocks) has been growing rapidly in the past decade or so, but are still rather patchy.

# _Payments transactions_

Payments data, covering both the number and the aggregate value of payments is available on a annual basis for some 13 countries in the so-called CPSS Red Book.<sup>20</sup>

> 20 CPSS, (2009), The first cross-country publication including statistics on payments systems covered the Group of 10 industrial countries and Switzerland and referred to 1977-78.  Since then, an annual survey, now conducted under the auspices of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, has expanded

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**16**

# **4.2 Data**

We exploit three sources of data to analyze the impact of land demarcation in Benin: administrative data compiled from the PFR implementation units help us establish the intervention roadmap and verify execution of the land demarcation activities; secondary national household survey data provide pre-intervention balance checks; and primary national household survey data formally document impact.

**Figure 2:** PFR implementation and data collection timeline

<!-- Start of picture text --> EMICoV 2006 WB–IREEP survey<br>Aug. – Nov. Mar. – Apr.<br>EMICoV 2010<br>Feb. – May.<br>2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br>Public lotteries to<br>select 300 PFR<br>Issuance of<br>villages<br>2007 Rural Land Land Certificates<br>Jan. – Dec. from Feb. 2011<br>Act passes<br>recognizing PFRs<br>Oct. 2007<br>Information Campaign PFR land demarcation in<br>Jan. 2008 – Jun. 2009 300 villages<br>Jun. 2009 – Feb. 2011<br><!-- End of picture text --> <u>Source:</u> Author’s illustration based on data collected during the field survey.

First, we use administrative monitoring and evaluation data from the MCC and Millennium Challenge Account-Benin to document the village-level eligibility for the PFR, the outcome of the program assignment lottery, and the implementation schedule across treated villages.<sup>20</sup> A . timeline of relevant implementation and data collection milestones is presented in Figure 2 Second, we exploit the 2006 national EMICoV survey data to establish pre-intervention balance between treatment and control communities. This survey was conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE), and its sample covers 3,900 households in 160 villages (91 treated and 69 control) of our experimental sample. We use the 2006 EMICoV

> 20Implementation data are only provided conditional on being selected in the lottery. From our field work and interaction with the implementation partners, we understand that no contamination took place in control villages.
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# TABLE 5 DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED GARMENT FIRMS, BY START-UP AND CURRENT SIZE

|*Ske<br>at -<br>Start-Up|||Current Siz|e (Numbe|r of Worke|rs)<br>.||Mean<br>Start<br>|Mean<br>Current||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|(Workers|**I1-**|100|101-250|| 251-500||500-999|1looo|T<br>_-AI_I|Size|||Sze|
|0-10<br>l_______|2<br>(2P)'|2<br> <br>(2P)|2|2<br>(1P)'.|0<br>.|0<br>.|8|4s|107||
|11-50|1<br>.___*_|0|4<br>(1P<br>)a|1<br> <br> <br>_ _ _ _|0<br>.__<br> <br>_ _ _ _|1<br>|7|36.4<br>._|431.<br>_<br>.__<br>_<br>.||
||100-250|b 0|0|lb|6|0|3|10|187|1185||
|251-500|<br>0|0|0|1|3|2|6|391|1217||
|>500|0|0|0|0|0|3|3|967|4733||
|All|3|2|7|10|3|8|34|218|1109||

Notes: Figure3 in parentheses refer to pribumi Irms.. **b** This category includes one fimT. -hich began with 70 workers.

- - :
message group, a personalized SMS message group, and a control group that received no text message. This randomization was stratified at the street level.

The 1,785 households were then randomly assigned to receive a plastic bin to store their recyclables, a plastic bin with a sticker, or no bin (that is, single-use plastic bags, which are normally distributed). We stratified this randomization on the SMS message treatment assignment. In total, 299 households received a bin with informational stickers attached, 300 received an unadorned bin, and 1,186 received no bin. Table 1, panel B shows how the sample was divided into randomly assigned treatment groups.

# **<<B>>** Outcome Collection and Measurement

The data collection phase of the participation intensity study lasted eight weeks. The first two weeks were dedicated to the baseline measurement before the bins were distributed or SMS messages were sent, and the following six weeks were dedicated to outcome data collection. During the data collection, an observer accompanied each recyclable collector on his route to track the participation intensity of each household and to measure the quantity and quality of the recyclables remitted.

On the basis of the data collected during these visits, we consider the following outcome variables: “Percentage of visits turned in bag” indicates the proportion of weeks in which the household had an opportunity to turn in a bag or bin of recyclables and in which they actually did so. In calculating this percentage, we treat an absence as not turning in recyclables.

22
<mark>novelty of information provided to the farmer with modern tools and the degree of competition in many markets. One explanation of weak effects is low take-up of fee-based price information services (Futch and Mcintosh 2009, Mitra et al 2015). But even when farmers are seemingly better informed, they may not necessarily be able to act on that information because of inaccessibility of alternative markets and the complex interlinked relationships between buyers and sellers in poor developing economies. Rather than assuming that an ICT approach will always be cost-effective and yield a better outcome, a more nuanced understanding of the underlying institutional environment and constraints is warranted.</mark> <mark>An important insight, building on the work of Paul Romer, David Autor and others (see World Bank 2016, Ch.5), is that usually only some part of a task or service can be automated using technology while the remaining part requires non-routine skills such as discretion or complex problem solving that cannot be done by machines. A better understanding of the interplay of what is automatable and what is not could help better explain why some technologies (such as mobile money) take off, while others seem to underperform expectations. Such insights could also help design better interventions that leverage technology for rural development.</mark> <mark>Third, technology-enabled interventions are no panacea in themselves, and need to be backed by complementary investments in physical infrastructure, electricity, literacy, and so on (Toyama 2015). The versatility and near-constant innovation that characterize digital technologies can sometimes be a distraction that can cause interventions to focus more on the technology than on the demands and priorities of the intended beneficiaries and the tradeoffs imposed by resourceconstrained environments.</mark> <mark>Finally, ICT policies and the broader regulatory environment in a country have to be discussed jointly. Whereas the expansion of mobile phone access has been rapid and commercially selfsustaining even among many of the poor, the same is not true of the internet. In the long run, the internet can have an even greater impact on rural growth and much depends on finding sustainable business models to encourage its spread in the poorest parts of the world.</mark>

# **References**

> Aker J. 2010. Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in Niger. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ . 2(3): 46-59.

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