rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
absence of migration. For example, Basok (2000) conducted a snowball sample of Mexican workers in Canada’s seasonal worker program in one area of Canada and in one village in Mexico and asked them what they had spent their money earned on, finding that many said they had built houses and paid for schooling. Macours and Vakis (2010) look at the impact of seasonal migration on early childhood development, using a cross-sectional survey of Nicaraguan households near the border with Honduras, where half of the seasonal workers migrate to Honduras or neighboring Central American countries. They attempt to identify the impact of seasonal migration by using wage, price, and adult illness shocks experienced by the households as instruments, and find seasonal migration by mothers to reduce stunting and improve cognitive development in young children. However, these instruments seem likely to fail the exclusion restriction: as they acknowledge, the shocks could directly affect early childhood outcomes through other channels such as nutrition.

This paper seeks to provide credible evidence on the development impact of seasonal migration by means of a prospective multi-year evaluation of New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme. The RSE began in 2007 and aims to ease labor shortages in New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture industries and at the same time aid economic development in the Pacific Islands. The policy was developed taking account of lessons from previous seasonal worker programs elsewhere and is viewed as a possible model for other countries. For example, the ILO good practices database states “The comprehensive approach of the RSE scheme towards filling labor shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries in New Zealand and the system of checks to ensure that the migration process is orderly, fair, and circular could service as a model for other destination countries.”<sup>3</sup> Our evaluation was designed prospectively, alongside the launch of the program. Thanks to the World Bank’s strong support for this policy and close collaboration with the governments of New Zealand, Tonga, and Vanuatu, we were able to conduct baseline surveys of households and communities in Tonga and Vanuatu before workers left to work in New Zealand, and then reinterview these same households 6, 12 and 24 months later. Using this rich baseline data and institutional knowledge of how recruitment for the program occurred, we use propensity-score matching to identify an appropriate set of households to act as a comparison group for the households participating in the RSE, and then use panel difference-in-differences and fixed effects estimation to assess the impacts of the RSE on household incomes, consumption, durable assets and subjective well-being, and additionally measure broader community-level impacts.

The results show that the RSE has had large positive effects on sending households in Tonga and Vanuatu. We find per capita incomes of households participating in the RSE to have increased

> 3 <u>http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=48</u> [accessed August 11, 2010]

3
|Afghanistan|SAR|Low income|Living Conditions Survey|2011/12,<br>2013/14,<br>2016/17|No|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Armenia|ECA|Upper middle<br>income|Integrated Living Conditions<br>Survey|2010, 2011,<br>2012, 2013,<br>2014, 2015,<br>2016, 2017,<br>2018|No|
|Benin|AFR|Low income|Integrated Survey on Household<br>LivingConditions(EMICOV)|2011/12|No|
|Bhutan|SAR|Lower middle<br>income|Living Standards Survey|2012|No|
|Burundi|AFR|Low income|Household Living Conditions<br>Survey|2013/14|No|
|Cameroon|AFR|Lower middle<br>income|Cameroonian Household Survey<br>(ECAM-IV)|2014|No|
|Colombia|LAC|Upper middle<br>income|Integrated Household Survey<br>(GEIH)|2010, 2011,<br>2012, 2013,<br>2014, 2015,<br>2016,2017|No|
|Gambia|AFR|Low income|Integrated Household Survey|2010/11,<br>2015/16|No|
|<br>Ghana|AFR|Lower middle<br>income|Living Standards Survey|2012/13,<br>2016/17|Yes|
|Other<br>multi-<br> <br>Kenya|AFR|Lower middle<br>income|Integrated Household Budget<br>Survey|2015/16|Yes|
|topic<br>surveys<br>(LSMS-<br>d<br>Kyrgyz<br>Republic|ECA|Lower middle<br>income|Integrated Household Survey|2010, 2011,<br>2012, 2013,<br>2014,2015|No|
|tagge)<br>Lesotho|AFR|Lower middle<br>income|Continuous Multipurpose<br>Household Survey|2012/13,<br>2013/14,<br>2014/15,<br>2017/18|No|
|Mauritius|AFR|Upper middle<br>income|Continuous Multi-Purpose<br>Household Survey|2014, 2015,<br>2016,2017|No|
|Mongolia|EAP|Lower middle<br>income|Household Socio Economic<br>Survey|2010, 2011,<br>2014,2016|No|
|Nicaragua|LAC|Lower middle<br>income|National Household Survey on<br>Living Standards Measurement<br>(EMNV)|2014|No|
|Pakistan|SAR|Lower middle<br>income|Social and Living Standards<br>Measurement Survey|2010/11,<br>2011/12,<br>2013/14|No|
|Sierra Leone|AFR|Low income|Integrated Household Survey|2011, 2018|No|
|South Africa|AFR|Upper middle<br>income|Living Conditions Survey|2014/15|No|

_Notes:_

1. The rounds in bold were supported by the LSMS+ program. The LSMS+ program aims to improve the availability and quality of individual-disaggregated household survey data, and support 6 IDA countries in collecting intra-household, gender-disaggregated household survey data

2. Community questionnaire gathers the information on local conditions common to all households in the same community.

6
18 productivity growth in manufacturing was relatively low: 21 on average in 1985-87 and 2.81 in 1988-90. 39 Comparative measures of gross labor productivity growth are discouraging as well. For example, gross labor productivity growth was low when compared with South E.At Asian countries, Mexico's most relevant competitors in US markets. 20 Even comparisons with developed countries do not raise optimism: over the 1985-90 post-trade liberalization period, Mexico's gross labor productivity growth averaged 3.71, the same as the US but less than the 4.11 average rate of the U.K or the 4.51 average rate of Japan (Figure 8). Manufacturing labor productivity growth accelerated in the early 1990s. However, based on our simulations, even if productivity would have grown at twice the rate it actually grew over the 1980s, Mexico's manufacturing trade deficit (excluding maquila) would have only been 19% smaller in 1991.

In short, structural factors are unlikely to help reverse recent trends in Mexico's trade balance, at least over the short to medium term. While consolidation of reforms is likely to enhance average productivity growth, an improvement in Mexico's manufacturing trade balance will have to come from cyclical factors such as higher foreign demand and, particularly, an improvement in Mexico's real exchange rate.

**19** See F. CLavijo C1992).

20 our masure of gross Labor productivity is based on hours uorked in the manufacturing sector provided by the *Secretaria de Trab.jow and the mnnufacturing output index provided by the Bank of Mexico.
shares of the physical investment that have been financed through debt, equity, and capital grant from the government.

The total debt used to finance the 1,202 active greenfield and brownfield PPP projects in electricity and transport in our sample is estimated at $274 billion, and the total equity financing is estimated at $226 billion. The average leverage ratio at the time of financial closure is 2.25. Debt financing makes up 60–80 percent of total physical investments in most countries in the sample (figure 8). The two notable exceptions are Argentina and Brazil, which have debt financing ratios of about 30 and 50 percent, respectively. These ratios are lower because a significant portion of PPPs in these countries was implemented through the sale of shares of state-owned utilities, which translated into financing strategies that are different from those used to achieve financial closure in a project finance scheme.

# **Figure 8 Composition of public-private partnership financing for active projects in the sample, by country**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>Debt Equity Capital subsidy<br>AlbaniaArgentina Bhutan BrazilBulgariaBurundiEthiopiaGeorgia GhanaIndonesia KenyaKosovo PeruRomaniaSolomon IslandsSouth AfricaUkraine<br>Percent of total<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Authors, based on data from PPI database and own data collection.

# **_5.4 Value at Risk_**

The losses from debt and equity obligations in the case of early termination depend on the causes of termination. There are three major reasons for early termination of PPPs: the government’s default or voluntary termination of the project, the private partner’s default or breach of contract, and force majeure.

In the first case, the private party expects to be compensated for the full amount invested in the project (debt and equity) plus the equity return it had forecasted (World Bank 2019). In the 21
# 3.9.1 No Asymmetric Information in the Developed Market

In this section, we relax the previous assumption that the proportion of informed investors versus uninformed investors is the same in all three countries. Instead, we assume that all investors are uninformed in the developed market. The assumption is consistent with the findings of Frankel and Schmukler (1996) that investors in emerging markets may be better informed about assets in their country than international investors. One explanation might be that local investors are on site and hence are more able to monitor the firm as well as the economic environment of the country. Using country-funds data, Frankel and Schmukler (1996) show that during the 1994 Peso crisis, local investors lost in the market before investors in New York.

In order to illustrate the importance of the differential in market transparency between emerging countries and developed countries, we solve the simplified case where there is no asymmetric information in the developed country. The results are presented in Figure 4. They are similar to those related to the case of asymmetric information. We do not find that information asymmetry reduces the sensitivity of the developed market prices to order flow, and therefore reduces their exposure to contagion. This suggests that investors in the developed market are less affected by contagion, as suggested by Kodres and Pritsker (2002), only if they are all informed as opposed to a situation where they are all uninformed.

# 3.9.2 More Information Asymmetry in Emerging Markets

In this section, we investigate the impact of relaxing the assumption the variance of all information shocks is set to one on our results. Indeed, the amount of information asymmetry for asset 02 can be measured by the variance of the information shock to the international asset in country 2, V ar(θ02).

More specifically, we consider the effect on the price responses of an increase in the amount of information asymmetry for asset 02, when V ar(θ02) take any value in the interval [0, 5].

Figure 5 presents the graph of the price response of international asset 02 and pure domestic asset 2 to an information shock and a liquidity shock from international asset 01, as a function of V ar(θ02), which varies from 0 to 5 The graph illustrates that the price response of asset 02 to an information shock from asset 01 increases with the information asymmetry in stock 02. However the price response of asset 2 is not much affected by information asymmetry for stock 02. The price response to liquidity shock follows the same pattern. Indeed, uninformed investors in country 2 first think that the order flow is due to expected low values for the asset rather than investors’ portfolio rebalancing, and they increase the price response. The graph suggests that information asymmetry for stock 02 increases transmission of information and 21
Little, A.D. (1986). Opportunities for Private Sector Power Generation in Pakistan - 1986, USAID, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABI953.pdf

- Littlechild, S.C. (2013). “Foreword” in Sioshansi, F.P. and Pfaffenberger, W. (eds) _Evolution of Global Electricity Markets: New Paradigms, New Challenges, New Approaches_ ; Elsevier Global Energy Policy and Economics Series.

- Min, B. and Golden, M. (2014). Electoral Cycles in Electricity Losses in India, _Energy Policy_ , Vol. 65, pp. 619-625.

Mittra, S. (2012). Impediments to India-Nepal Corporation over Hydropower, Analysis, Vol. IX, Issue 14, Observer Research Foundation.

- Mukherji, B. and Chaturvedi, S. (2013). India Plan to Export Power to Bangladesh to Benefit Both Sides, India News, The Wall Street Journal, September.

- Nayar, Reema, Pablo Gottret, Pradeep Mitra,Gordon Betcherman, Yue Man Lee,Indhira Santos, Mahesh Dahal, andMaheshwor Shrestha (2012). _More and BetterJobs in South Asia_ .  Washington, DC:  World Bank.

NEA (2013). Annual Reports 2012-2013, Nepal Electricity Authority, Kathmandu, Nepal.

- NEA (2014). Community Electricity Distribution Bye Laws, 2060, Nepal Electricity Authority, Kathmandu, Nepal. Accessed in October 2014 from <u>http://www.nea.org.np/images/supportive_docs/Community%20Electricity%20Distributio n%20Bylaw.pdf</u>

- Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2012a). Reforming Small Electricity Systems under Political Instability: The Case of Nepal, _Energy Policy_ , Vol. 40, pp. 242-251.

Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2012b). Reforming the Power sector in Transition: Do Institutions Matter?, _Energy Economics_ , Vol. 34 (5), pp. 1675-1682.

NEPRA (2014). News and Updates, National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Islamabad, Pakistan.

- Newbery, D. (2002).Issues and Options in Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0210, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

- NTDC (2014), Power System Statistics 2013-2014, 39th edition, Planning (Power), National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC), Lahore

Oseni, Musiliu O. and Michael G. Pollitt. (2014). Institutional Arrangements for the Promotion of Regional Integration of Electricity Markets: International Experience. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6947.

- Palit, D. and Chaurey, A. (2011). Off-Grid Rural Electrification Experiences from South Asia: Status and Best Practices, _Energy for Sustainable Development_ , Vol. 15 (3), pp. 266278.

Paudyal, M. (2013). Role of Private Sector in the Growth of Power Infrastructure in South Asia, Investment Board, Government of Nepal, October.

25
food price changes on poverty: account also needs to be taken of the shares of household income obtained from the sale of food to obtain the net expenditures on food by the household.

The first two columns of Table 1 report the weighted-average shares of particular types of food in aggregate food expenditures and in total expenditures by the poor for the thirty developing countries for which we have detailed data on household expenditures and income sources.<sup>1</sup> Columns three through nine of Table 1 net out household production, and so are the most relevant for present purposes. Six countries’ shares are shown as examples, together with the weighted average for all thirty countries. The bottom row reveals that, for our sample of 30 countries, food accounts for 61 percent of the gross expenditures of their poor. While we would like to consider all food expenditures, only a few of these products are homogenous enough to have reasonably representative international prices so we focus on four—rice, wheat, oilseeds and maize—that account for 41 percent of those gross expenditures.

Table 1 also shows that the poor are, on average, net buyers of food in most poor countries. In only one of the countries shown (Vietnam) are the poor, as a group, net sellers of the listed foods in aggregate, and there are only a few other cases where the poor are net sellers of particular foods. Over the full sample of thirty countries, column 3 shows that the poor are net buyers for all of the food items listed except maize. That column also reveals that rice, wheat, oilseeds and maize account for 39 percent of the net food expenditures of the poor in our sample.

> 1 The household survey years are Albania 2005, Armenia 2004, Bangladesh 2005, Belize 2009, China 2002, Côte d’Ivoire 2002, Ecuador 2006, Guatemala 2006, Indonesia 2007, India 2004, Cambodia 2003, Sri Lanka 2007, Moldova 2009, Mongolia 2002, Malawi 2004, Nepal 2002, Nigeria 2003, Nicaragua 2005, Niger 2007, Pakistan 2005, Rwanda 2005, Tajikistan 2007, Timor Leste 2001, Tanzania 2008, Uganda 2009, Vietnam 2010, Yemen 2006 and Zambia 2010.

5
degree line. As expected, we see that the majority of the observations of SPREAD2 are higher (lie above the 45 degree line) than the SPREAD1 observations. An average higher value of SPREAD2 derives from eliminating non-performing loans and all the assets different from bank loans in the denominator of the average lending rate. Although the majority of SPREAD2 values is higher than those of SPREAD1, this is not always true. In fact, some composition effects are also at work, by which the spreads charged by smaller banks – included in SPREAD1 – are larger than those of the ten largest institutions that are the base of the SPREAD2 computation.

# _2.2 The explanatory variables_

We use two broad measures to capture the efficiency and enforcement practices of property rights by the judiciary (and other legal institutions). The first variable is PROP which captures the degree of property protection in the country. This variable is gathered from the Index of Economic Freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating more protection of private property (we reverse the scale of the original index). This variable captures (1) the freedom from government influence over the judicial system; (2) commercial code defining contracts; (3) sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; (4) government expropriation of property; (5) corruption within the judiciary; (6) delays in receiving judicial decisions; and (7) legally granted and protected private property. We use this variable as a proxy for the degree to which property rights are enforced in general, and the value of collateral for bank loans in particular.

The second variable is LAW which captures the rule of law in the country. This variable is the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country from the 9
# **A Control Function Approach to Estimating Dynamic Probit Models with Endogenous Regressors, with an Application to the Study of Poverty Persistence in China**<sup>*****</sup>

John Giles<sup>+</sup> and Irina Murtazashvili<sup>∗∗</sup> JEL Codes: C13, C33, O15, P25 Key Words: Dynamic Binary Response Models; Control Function Approach; Poverty‐Persistence; Migration; Rural China

> *The paper has benefitted from helpful comments and conversations with Alan de Brauw, Ana Maria Herrera, Martin Ravallion, Peter Schmidt, David Tschirley, Adam Wagstaff, Jeffrey Wooldridge, from seminar participants at Ohio State University and conference participants at the June 2007 UNU‐WIDER Conference on Fragile States held in Helsinki and the September 2009 Midwest Econometrics Group Annual Meeting. We gratefully acknowledge financial support for data collection from the National Science Foundation (SES‐0214702), the Michigan State University Intramural Research Grants Program, the Ford Foundation (Beijing) and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Academy Scholars Program) at Harvard University. The research discussion and conclusions presented in this paper reflect the views of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to any affiliated organization or member country.

> + Development Research Group, The World Bank. Email: jgiles@worldbank.org.

∗∗Corresponding Author. Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Tel: (412)648‐ 1762, fax: (412)648‐1793, and e‐mail: irinam@pitt.edu.
wage earners. Furthermore, Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira’s data does not include information on income. My paper, however, identi...es the e¤ect of the reform on the income of di¤erent pre-reform occupation groups.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the business registration reform. Section 3 develops a simple occupational choice model which provides the framework for analyzing the e¤ects of the registration reform. Section 4 discusses the identi...cation strategy and Section 5 describes the Mexican employment survey data. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.

# 2 The Mexican Rapid Business Opening System Reform

According to Djankov et al (2002), in 1999, the number of procedures required to register a business in Mexico was 15 and the number of days was 67. Both numbers were above the crosscountry average (10 and 48 respectively)<sup>6</sup> . Realizing that Mexico had rather heavy regulations by international comparison, in 2000, the Mexican government created the Federal Commission for Improving Regulation (COFEMER), charged with providing information about the state of regulation across Mexico and implementing possible reforms.

The COFEMER suggested a reform to simplify business registration procedures with the goal of stimulating investment and economic growth. Following this proposal, on March 1, 2002, the Mexican government passed a federal law stating that the number of federal procedures required for starting operation of most businesses should be reduced to a maximum of two procedures that could be administered within 72 hours. These two procedures are obtaining a tax payer number and incorporating the business in case it is a corporation. Once a ...rm starts operating, it has three months to take care of the other federal requirements that may apply, such as registering workers for medical insurance. This reform applied only to non-governmental ...rms in industries which do not require special permits or concessions and which do not present a serious risk to public health, public security, or the environment. These eligible “low-risk” industries made up 55 percent of all industries and 80 percent of operating ...rms, typically micro, small or medium size businesses. Another 10 percent of industries were governmental and 35 percent were classi...ed as “high-risk”or regulated. Appendix A lists examples of low-risk and high-risk/regulated industries as classi...ed by the COFEMER. Examples of low-risk industries are commerce and restaurants. Examples of high-risk or regulated industries are chemical production and transportation (including taxis).

However, simplifying federal regulations was not enough, since there were additional state

> 6 The minimum number of procedures (days) was 2 (2) both in Canada and Australia. The maximum number of procedures (days) was 21 in the Dominican Republic (152 in Madagascar). These numbers refer to business registration in the largest city of each country. For Mexico, this is Mexico City.

4