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|Authors|Methodology|MainFindings<br>|
|---|---|---|
||theavailabilityofgoodsandservices.|Efficiencyandcompanyperformancehaveimproved.<br>Inthe hotelsectorinJamaica,forexample,<br>occupancylevelsinprivatzedhotelsare nowover<sup>85</sup><br>percent.asaresultofaggressivemarketng<br>strategies,<br>tghter<br>management,<br>and<br>physical<br>refurbishing.<br>Privatzation<br>has<br>contributed<br>significantlytothereductioninfiscaldefidts,not<sup>only</sup><br>because oftheinitialinjectonoffunds aftersale,<sup>but</sup><br>alsoduetotheeliminationofgovemmentfinancing<br>forunprofitableenterprises.Privatizationhas<sup>also</sup><br>brought foreignexchangefromforeignaswell<sup>as</sup><br>localinvestors.|
|Boubakri, Narjess,andJean-Claude<br>Cosset.<br>1998.'TheFinancialand<br>OperatngPerformanceofNewly<br>PrvatzedFirms:EvidenceFrom<br>Developing Countries.'<br>_Joumalof_<br>_Finance._53:1081-1110.|The studycomparesthree-yearaverage<br>post-privatizationfinancialandoperating<br>performancerabostothethree-yearpre-<br>privatizationvaluesfor79companies<br>from21developing<sup>countriesand32</sup><br>industries over theperiod 1980-1992.|Thestudyconcludesthatthereareeconomically<sup>and</sup><br>statistcallysignificantpost-privatizationincreases<sup>in</sup><br>output(realsales),operatingefficiency,<sup>profitability,</sup><br>capital investmentspending,dividendpayments,<sup>and</sup><br>employmentaswellas significant<sup>decreasesin</sup><br>leverage.|
|Boubakri, Narjess,andJean-Claude<br>Cosset.<br>1999.'DoesPrivatizaton<br>MeettheExpectaUons?<br>Evidence<br>FromAfricanCountries."<br>Working<br>Paper.Montreal:EcoledesHEC.|Thestudy examinespre-versus post-<br>privatzatonperformanceof16African<br>firms privatizedthroughpublicshare<br>offeringduring theperiod1989-1996.|Itfindsasignificantincreaseincapital<sup>spendingby</sup><br>pnvatizedfirms,but only insignificantchanges<sup>in</sup><br>profitability, efficiency,outputandleverage.|
|Jones,Leroy,YahyaJammal,and<br>NilgunGokur.<br>1999.'Impactof<br>Privatizaton<br>in<br>COte<br>D'lvoire."<br>_Mirneo._<br>Boston<br>Insttute<br>for<br>DevelopingEconomies.|The<br>study<br>covers<br>the<br>welfare<br>consequences of81privatizatonsin<br>COte<br>dilvoire,<br>covering<br>not<br>just<br>infrastructurefirmsbutarangeoffirms<br>alreadyoperaUngincompetivemarkets<br>(inagriculture,agro-industries,tradable<br>and non-tradablesectors).|Fortheentreprivatizedsector,theyconcluded<sup>that</sup><br>thereweresubstantialbenefits:<br>(i)thefirms<br>perfofmed<br>better<br>after<br>privatizaton;<br>(ii)<br>they<br>performedbetterthantheywouldhave<sup>hadthey</sup><br>remained underpublicownership;and(iii)<sup>thesetof</sup><br>transactonsasawhole contributedpositvely<sup>to</sup><br>economicwelfare,withannualnetwelfare<sup>benefits</sup><br>equivalenttoabout 25percentofpre-divestiture<br>sales. These resultsstemmedfromanumber<sup>of</sup><br>effects, includingincreasesinoutput, investment,<br>labor<br>productivity,<br>and<br>intermediate-input<br>productvity.|
|LaPorta, Rafael, andFlorencio<br>Lopez-de-Sibanes.<br>1997.<br>'The<br>Benefit~ofPrivatizaton:Evidence<br>from<br>Mexico.<br>_NBERR_<br>_Working_<br>_Paper6215._<br>Cambridge,<br>MA:<br>National<br>Bureau<br>of<br>Economic<br>Research.<br>http:/lraers.nber.ora/panersiW621<br>5Ddf|Critcismsofprivatzatonhavecentered<br>aroundthepossibilitythattheobserved<br>higher<br>profitability<br>of<br>privatized<br>companiescomesattheexpenseof<sup>the</sup><br>restof society.Inthispaper, theauthors<br>focusontwoofthemostlikelychannels<br>forsociallosses:a)Increasedpricesas<br>fimiscapitalizeon the marketpower;<br>and b)layoffs andlowerwagesasfirms<br>seektoroll<br>backgenerous<br>labor<br>contracts.This study usesdataforall<br>218non-financialprivatzatlonsthattook<br>placeinMexicobetween1983and1991.|Theauthorsfindthatprivatized<sup>fimnsquicklybridge</sup><br>thepre-privaizatonperformance gap<sup>withindustry-</sup><br>matched control groups.Forexample,<sup>privatzaonis</sup><br>followedbya24 percentagepoint<sup>increaseinthe</sup><br>ratioofoperatingincome tosales.<sup>Thosegainsin</sup><br>profitabilityareroughlydecomposedas<sup>follows:10</sup><br>percentoftheincreaseisdue tohigher<sup>product</sup><br>prices;33percentoftheincreaserepresents<sup>a</sup><br>transfer from laid-offworkers;andproductivity<sup>gains</sup><br>accountfor the residual57peroentTransfers<sup>from</sup><br>societytothefirmarepartallyoffsetbytaxeswhich<br>absorbslightlyoverhalfthegainsin<sup>operatng</sup><br>income. Finally,theyalsofind evidence<sup>indicatng</sup><br>that<br>deregulaton<br>is<br>associated<br>with<br>faster<br>convergencetoindustrybenchmarks.|
|Macedo,<br>Robert.<br>2000.<br>'Privatzatonandthe Distribubonof<br>Assets<br>and<br>IncomeinBrazil."<br>Working<br>Paper.<br>Camegie<br>EndowmentforIntematonalPeace.|Thispaperfocuseson the Brazilian<br>privationprogramundertakeninthe<br>1990s.|The paper concludesthat privaization<sup>contributedto</sup><br>softeningboththe fiscalandthe extemal<sup>constraints,</sup><br>by allowinganenlargedpublicdebt<sup>and aggravating</sup><br>foreignImbalances.<br>Becauseofmacroeconomic<br>mismanagement,theobjectives<sup>ofreducingthe</sup><br>public debtwasnotachieved.Inspiteofthesize<sup>of</sup><br>theprogram,<br>the govemment<br>ended upwith<br>increased<br>liabilItes.<br>Withrespecttoincome<br>distributon,thepapercondudes thatitwas<sup>also</sup><br>aggravated,sincethe poorestgroups<sup>didnothave</sup><br>accesstotheassetsand thegains<sup>ofprivatizadon,</sup>|