rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Does voice matter : for public
            accountability, yes
Recent theory posits that accountability
            in public service can be enhanced by the use of
            "exit" and a "voice" mechanisms.  With
            exit mechanisms, users of public services can choose
            alternative sources of supply.  Exit mechanisms are viable
            when there is competition.  They are not viable for
            essential services for which government is the sole
            provider.  Voice mechanisms are the more likely option when
            the service providers is a monopoly.  With voice mechanisms
            - for example, public meetings, local representation on
            public committees, or collective action by user groups - the
            public seeks better performance from public service
            providers without opting for alternative sources of supply.
            Considerable research has been done on how and whether exit
            mechanisms improve organizations' performance and
            accountability.  Little research has been dome on whether
            voice mechanisms make service providers more accountable.
            The author addresses that issue by investigating whether
            providers of irrigation services in Indonesia were more
            accountable when the public used voice mechanisms.  The
            author asked these questions: Did the use of voice improve
            public accountability in irrigation services?  If
            accountability improved, did service outcomes also improve?
            The author focused on how voice works and the mechanisms
            through which it influences accountability.  The author
            found that water user associations did make providers of
            irrigation services more accountable and that crop intensity
            increased as a result.
EU Bananarama III
On July 1, 1993 the European Union (EU)
            adopted a unified banana policy that is even more
            distortionary and costly than some of the disparate national
            policies it replaced. Before, some EU countries gave
            preferred market access and high prices to banana producers
            from selected developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean,
            and the Pacific, and from EU territorial suppliers. This
            preferential status was regarded as a form of aid to
            countries with historical ties to certain EU countries
            (France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Other
            EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland,
            Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) granted no preferences and
            either had free trade policies or imposed only low tariffs.
            The earlier quota-based national policies were inefficient
            because the main benefits of the quotas and high prices were
            enjoyed by importers, wholesalers, and retailers in the
            quota-restricted countries. Under the unified EU policy,
            quotas, high prices, and preferential access provide aid to
            preferred suppliers, but cost EU consumers dearly and the
            quota restrictions hurt nonpreferred suppliers (mainly Latin
            American countries). But the main problem with the new
            policy is that it extends protection (and consequent
            inefficiencies) to countries where it didn't exist
            before. As the costs of the new EU policy become better
            understood, new forces are emerging that will probably
            create pressure for change over the next decade. Banana
            producers who now receive aid through preferential access to
            the EU banana market are likely to lose those preferences.
            This could deal a hefty blow to several small Caribbean
            island economies and some African countries. But much more
            efficient alternative mechanisms exist through which the
            European Union could grant aid to these economies. The
            European Union and the favored Caribbean countries could all
            gain much by shifting from banana aid to formalized,
            targeted general development aid.
A typology of foreign exchange
            auction markets in sub-Saharan Africa : dynamic models for
            auction exchange rates
In this analytical sequel to "A
            Typology of Foreign Exchange Auction Markets in sub-Saharan
            Africa", the authors compare the micromanagement of
            different foreign exchange auctions in sub-Saharan Africa.
            Multi-unit auctions for foreign exchange were introduced in
            a number of countries in the 1980s and 1990s, in a
            transitional step toward a credible, sustainable, unified
            regime, such as efficient interbank market. But there is
            little understanding of how auction markets function in
            sub-Saharan Africa, and there has been virtually no research
            on the causes of frequent policy reversals or of auction
            failure. One possible cause of failure -- apart from thin
            markets, macroeconomic laxity, and vulnerability to
            terms-of-trade shocks and fluctuations in the disbursement
            of foreign aid -- is the inappropriate design and management
            of auctions. The authors estimate models for the
            microdeterminants of the auction rate, using weekly data on
            foreign exchange auctions for Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and
            Zambia. Among the policy lessons: 1) Nigeria and Zambia
            failed to unify and stabilize the exchange rate partly
            because there was no reserve price rule. When bidders learn
            such a rule, speculative bidding diminishes. 2) The
            management of a credible, sustainable reserve price policy
            requires an efficient secondary market. A simple underlying
            model, synthesized from the theoretical literature on
            auctions, specifies the auction rate as a function of
            fundamental variables and structural shift dummies. The
            repeated, sequential nature of these multi-unit auctions and
            the nonstationary nature of most of the auction variables
            are captured empirically by a cointegrated (error
            connection) framework. In addition to consistently
            estimating long-run and short-run parameters of auction
            fundamentals, the error correction model allows
            asymptotically efficient testing of three policy hypotheses
            deriving from auction theory: the competitiveness
            hypothesis, the effect of uncertainty on the
            auction-determined rate, and the revenue-equivalence
            hypothesis. In other words, they used these models to test
            the impact on the level of the auction rate of increased
            comptetition among bidders, of the effect of uncertainty
            (proxied by a volatile supply of foreign exchange), and of
            different pricing mechanisms.
Colombia's small and
            medium-size exporters and their support systems
The authors evaluate the role of dynamic
            small and medium-size manufacturing enterprises and
            entrepreneurs (SMEs) in Colombia's development. They
            also evaluate SME policy in Colombia, especially as it
            affects the country's export potential. The SME sector
            has received little attention from Colombia's
            policymakers despite its substantial weight in
            manufacturing, its importance as a seedbed for important
            future companies, and its demonstrated capacity to grow
            rapidly under favorable circumstances. After the recent
            shift to a more open economy, people are asking how the
            sector will fare under the more intense competition to come.
            Recent changes in Colombia reflect strong pressure from
            those outside the traditional elite - especially the
            somewhat marginalized class of SMEs - to play a greater role
            in the political process. The authors interviewed
            entrepreneurs from 124 SMEs - all of them exporters - in the
            garments, leather goods, and nonelectrical machinery
            sectors. Some had been exporting for many years; many had
            begun to do so only in the late 1980s. Firms typically
            employed up to several hundred workers but average size at
            start-up was small (a median of eight workers). The leather
            goods industry is mainly export-oriented; the other two sell
            mainly in the domestic market, although all but a few were
            exporting. Nearly three-quarters of entrepreneurs had some
            university training (90 percent in the machinery industry).
            Most exports were to nearby or easily accessible
            (same-language) countries. International marketing was
            handled mainly by the private sector, but the public sector
            and other nonfirm organizations play a facilitating role in
            that process, especially for very small firms and first-time
            exporters. Trade fairs have been especially useful to the
            leather goods and nonelectrical machinery industries.
            Collective support mechanisms - mainly industry
            associations, especially for smaller firms and the leather
            goods industry - have helped firms develop technological
            capabilities (in finishing and design, for example,
            workplace organization, the use of sophisticated equipment).
            Education and training - especially "learning by
            doing" - have helped improve productivity.
Technical and marketing support
            systems for successful small and medium-size enterprises in
            four countries
Studies of successful and medium-size
            enterprises (SMEs) and their marketing and technical support
            systems were undertaken for Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, and
            the Republic of Korea. Three to four subsectors were
            examined in each country. The sample worldwide amounted to
            445 firms. Mechanisms to support export marketing varied
            across countries and subsectors. How they varied depended
            greatly on whether SMEs operated within well-developed
            private networks. When market penetration begins,
            transaction costs are high and collective marketing support
            can be important. As markets "thicken,"
            initiatives by foreign buyers become more important.
            Generally the most effective collective marketing support
            was of the kind that can be provided more effectively by
            decentralized organizations - such as industry associations
            or local governments and chambers of commerce (support
            firms' participation in trade fairs, for example) -
            than by central government institutions. Private mechanisms
            were more important than collective mechanisms for helping
            firms improve their technological capability. Demand for
            collective mechanisms tended to be greater when
            technological requirements of production were complex or
            when the endowments of private technological networks in
            certain countries or industries were weak. Broad-based
            collective technical support facilitates the emergence of an
            information-rich environment for firms, and may be worth
            pursuing in many settings. Examples of such support include:
            1) sponsoring courses in specialized topics; 2) facilitating
            the use of expert consultants (either directly, by making a
            consultant available to a broad array of firms, or
            indirectly, by providing financial support for the use of
            consultants); and 3) promoting information-sharing among
            firms. Countries that already have strong broad-based
            collective support and that are moving into technologically
            more advanced activities might consider
            "high-intensity" support, but should proceed with caution.
Welfare economics, political
            economy, and policy reform in Ghana
Welfare economics develops the logic of
            how the gains of the gainers and the losses of the losers
            should be weighed against each other, in a specific ethical
            framework. Political economy develops the logic of how they
            will be weighed against each other, in the context of
            sociopolitical institutions. The author applies the
            disciplines of both welfare economics and political economy
            in this evaluation of policy reform in Ghana. When
            considerations from both disciplines are aligned, he
            explains, policy reform not only should be enacted but is
            also likely to be enacted. Often, though, there is no such
            alignment, so reforms that might improve social welfare do
            not succeed. Analysts, says the author, should consider past
            reforms from both perspectives, and should learn from
            history, in evaluating proposed reform -- so they can assess
            both the desirability and the feasibility of reform. Policy
            makers, on the other hand, should work toward organizing and
            mobilizing the gainers from reform that would advance social
            welfare, so that resistance to such reform by the losers can
            be overcome. In an example from history, the author explains
            that Britain's debate over the Corn Laws -- basically a
            device for protecting domestic production of grain from
            cheap imports -- dominated for more than a decade in the
            nineteenth century. It eventually split the Tory party.
            Britain's transformation from an agrarian nation to a
            manufacturing one spelled the decline of the power of the
            landed aristocracy and the ascendance of manufacturing. In
            the end, the Corn Laws were repealed because of the growing
            power of the urban masses and their employers, and the
            debate soon turned to protection against imports from
            fast-industrializing France and Germany. Such episodes from
            history help us understand the protection of rice in Japan
            today, for example, and the focus of this paper -- the past
            decade of reform in Ghana, and the decade that awaits. The
            author argues that the political economy of policy reform in
            Ghana is likely to prove tougher in the second decade than
            in the first, for three reasons: 1) the economic situation
            in the second decade is no longer one of absolute disaster,
            with only one way to go; 2) in the second decade, policy
            reform will have to coincide with the transition from
            military to constitutional rule; and 3) the nature of the
            reforms to be undertaken in the second decade is different
            from that of those undertaken in the first.
Financing infrastructure in
            developing countries : lessons from the Railway Age
Arguments for financing infrastructure
            development through government subsidies and foreign
            borrowing meet with increasing skepticism.  Numerous
            "white elephants" subsidized by governments have
            strengthened doubts about the efficacy of public finance,
            and the debt-servicing problems of the 1980s have weakened
            arguments for foreign borrowing.  Recent innovative
            suggestions for financing infrastructure investments in
            developing countries have a back-to-the-future quality.  At
            the heart of the nineteenth century debate on financing
            infrastructure development - especially railways - lay
            certain concepts: relying on private finance, encouraging
            the growth of domestic financial markets, and choosing
            financial instruments that minimize the risk of dependence
            on foreign funds.  The author reviews the historical record
            in an attempt to glean lessons for developing countries
            today.  In the nineteenth century, much as in many of
            today's less developed and less liberalized economies,
            not all the informational and contractual preconditions for
            efficient private or commercial finance of infrastructure
            projects prevailed.  In some regions, it was difficult to
            tap investors at home or abroad.  Many countries lacked the
            private institutions (such as universal banks) and public
            ones (such as regulatory agencies) needed to facilitate
            monitoring, to discipline management, and to ensure an
            adequate flow of information to investors.   In places as
            diverse as Canada, India, Spain, and the United States,
            getting enough finance often required that the government
            provide collateral (land grants) and bond guarantees -
            especially where asymmetric information caused credit
            rationing.  The main lessons: exploiting nontraditional
            approaches to financing infrastructure investment requires
            action on two fronts.  First, liberalizing and developing
            domestic financial markets.  And second reforming
            administrative mechanisms that ensure accountability from
            enterprises enjoying government subsidies or guarantees.
Macroeconomic adjustment to capital
            inflows : Latin American style versus East Asian style
In recent years, private capital inflows
            to some developing countries have increased sharply. This
            increase has provided the financing needed to enhance the
            use of existing capacity and to raise investment levels. But
            capital inflows produce their own problems. They can
            increase inflation and lead to exchange rate appreciation,
            for example. The authors review the macroeconomic
            repercussions of an increase in capital inflows. Generally,
            it will result in appreciation of the real exchange rate, a
            larger nontradable sector, a smaller tradable sector, and a
            larger trade deficit. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, it
            will also result in faster inflation and an accumulation of
            foreign reserves. Can government intervention minimize the
            size and effects of real exchange rate appreciation? The
            authors discuss different mechanisms that can be used to
            limit the appreciation - and discuss the difference, in this
            respect, between portfolio investment and external debt.
            Finally, they review and compare the recent experiences of
            four Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
            and Mexico) and five East Asian countries (Indonesia,
            Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and
            Thailand), and discuss how these countries have dealt with
            the macroeconomic side effects of capital inflows. The
            authors found the following: All nine countries have avoided
            a permanent, significant increase in inflation, it can be
            argued. In Argentina and Mexico inflation has been
            decreasing for three or four years, and in the other seven
            countries it has remained stable. The countries that
            received the largest average capital inflows (as a
            proportion of GDP) in 1989-92 are not those that experienced
            the greatest exchange rate appreciation. In fact, the
            countries with the greatest capital inflows (Chile,
            Malaysia, and Thailand) have experienced either depreciation
            or low appreciation of their currencies. (Appreciation was
            lower in Thailand than in Korea despite much greater capital
            inflows in Thailand.) Countries with decreasing government
            consumption as a percentage of GDP (Chile, Indonesia, and
            Malaysia) showed less appreciation of the real exchange
            rate. Countries with increasing government consumption as a
            percentage of GDP (Argentina, Korea, Mexico, and the
            Philippines) showed the greatest appreciation of the real
            exchange rate, despite not receiving the greatest capital inflows.
Mexico after the debt crisis : is
            growth sustainable
The story of Mexico's involvement
            in international capital markets is one of riches to rags
            and back to riches again. Four periods can be distinguished:
            stable, steady international borrowing through the 1950s and
            1960s; heavy reliance on international loans through
            commercial bank syndicates from the mid-1970s until 1982;
            massive capital flight, zero access to private lenders, and
            complete reliance on official sources from 1982 to 1990; and
            massive return of flight capital, a continued drought in
            syndicated loans, but heavy expansion of foreign direct
            investment, portfolio investment, and bond placement. Easing
            the transition from the third to the fourth period was the
            restructuring of Mexico's external debt under the Brady
            deal, which ultimately reduced - and smoothened - the net
            transfer to foreign creditors. The authors argue that
            smoothening the external transfer had far more impact on the
            domestic economy than the reduction of debt and debt
            servicing per se. The financing of the expansion that ensued
            in the fourth period differs dramatically from what was
            observed earlier in Mexico's history. Foreign capital
            inflows were dominated by foreign direct investment and
            especially portfolio investment and, unlike in the second
            period, most inflows financed the domestic private sector.
            Are the current rate and pattern of borrowing - at levels
            unforeseen at the time of the Brady deal - a cause for
            concern? Is growth sustainable? To answer these questions,
            the authors analyze the domestic macroeconomic counterpart
            of the large capital inflows and high current account
            deficits of the early 1990s. Whether growth is sustainable
            depends on the level of domestic saving. But even if
            domestic saving increases, the transition to sustainable
            growth is unlikely to be smooth because the slowdown in
            consumption growth (associated with improved saving) is
            likely to be contractionary. The outcome depends on how
            investment and net exports respond. The authors analyze
            cyclical and structural factors of investment and the
            external sector, and their interactions with Mexico's
            exchange rate and monetary policy, to interpret the
            recession in the second half of 1993. They emerge from their
            analysis with cautious optimism about Mexico's
            medium-term prospects.