rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
the information from the freight fare received by shipping companies. However, the formal regression analysis below suggests some other possible economic reasons.

Table 3 also suggests that _ad valorem_ transport costs are generally higher than nominal tariff rates both in the United States and Japan. The simple average rates of nominal tariff of the United States and Japan are only 3.5 and 5.6 percent in 2006, respectively, according to the World Trade Organization Home Page. This underscores the relative importance of the trade facilitation to reduce such costs in the transportation sectors to promote the international trade.

# **3. Determinants of Transport Costs: Empirical Analysis**

We conduct a formal regression analysis on transport costs in East Asia, using available data on transport costs, taken as import charges, of the United States and Japan. In line with our research interest, we include in the regression the explanatory variable representing the physical capacity of ports in the transport cost model to measure their effects. This section discusses the specification of the regression and the infrastructure indicators, and examines the results.

# _Port-related Costs Reflected in Import Charges_

International transport costs between ports, defined by CIF minus FOB values, include only freight and insurance costs. But import charge statistics may cover the costs of services associated with transport: for example fees paid to port and storage brokers and freight forwarders. The comprehensive port efficiency index of Blonigen and Wilson, covering transport costs, is estimated from import charge statistics. If ports are congested not only do freight and insurance costs increase<sup>18</sup> , but also miscellaneous costs to traders, such as idle time at ports<sup>19</sup> , around the ports may further accumulate. Our empirical interest exists in the effect of expansion of physical port capacity which would reduce such costs.

> 18 Costs for the fright companies may increase, due to longer waiting time for disembarkation and loading, and the increased uncertainty of the waste of time. These increased costs should pass on to the users. 19 See Simeon, et.al (2008).

18
Deaths by region, however, also depend on the nature and pattern of human settlements, and on preventive measures to reduce deaths in the event of a disaster. As noted above, building strengthening measures have greatly reduced deaths per earthquake in high income countries, and early warning systems have reduced deaths due to storms and floods. It is, indeed, the fact that some deaths are preventable that motivates the analysis below.

_Deaths by Cause, Age, Gender_ Understanding what causes disaster-related deaths is important from the perspective of designing measures to reduce deaths. In earthquakes, the majority of deaths are caused by the collapse of buildings, causing crushing injuries to the head and chest and/or internal injuries.<sup>6</sup> Noji (1997) reports that for the period 1900-1949 and the period 19501990, approximately three-quarters of earthquake deaths were due to building collapse.<sup>7</sup> There were, however, fewer deaths during the latter period, as a result of building strengthening, and changes in building materials. Earthquake-related deaths can also result from drowning (when tsunamis occur as the result of an earthquake) and from stress associated with the earthquake, which may result in deaths due to heart attacks or cardiac arrest (Noji, 1997). Most storm deaths are due to drowning, as are flood deaths. In high-income countries, the majority of deaths associated with floods are motorists whose vehicles are swept away by flood waters. It is also true that more deaths are associated with flash floods (floods caused by extreme rainfall) than by riverine floods (Milaly, 1997b).

Less is known about the distribution of deaths by age and gender. Noji (1997) reports that in earthquakes people over 60 years of age, children, women and the chronically ill are at increased risk of death compared to other population groups. Armenian et al. (1997) in the first population-based study of earthquake injuries and deaths, report that persons over 60 had a death rate twice that of persons below 60 in the December 1988 earthquake in Armenia—an earthquake that killed 25,000 persons and injured 130,000. The death rate was, however, approximately constant between ages 0 and 59.

Deaths by gender vary by country and disaster type. In the US and Europe the death rate in floods and hurricanes is higher for men than women (Jonkman and Kelman, 2006). However, in developing countries women often account for a higher proportion of disaster deaths than men. The ADB reports that 61% of the deaths in cyclone Nargis were women, as were 70% of the deaths in the Indian Ocean Tsunami and 91% of the deaths in the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh (ADB, 2008).

> 6 Some building-related deaths may be due to asphyxia, as a result of dust released during building collapse.

> 7 Noji (1997) reports that three-quarters of the 795,000 fatalities occurring between 1900 and 1949 and approximately 77% of 583,000 fatalities occurring between 1950 and 1990 were due to building collapse— over 60% due to the collapse of unreinforced masonry buildings.

5
# **Annex Table 11 Mincerian Rates of Return for Selected Countries, by Source**

|Country|Year|MRR|Source|
|---|---|---|---|
|||**(%)**||
|Argentina|1989|10.3|Psacharopoulos and Ng (1992)|
|Chile|1989|12.0|Psacharopoulos and Ng (1992)|
|Colombia|1989|14.0|Psacharopoulos and Ng (1992)|
|India|1980|4.9|Rao and Datta (1989), p.<sup>3 77</sup>|
|Korea|1986|10.6|Ryo (1988), p.<sup>2 70</sup>|
|Malaysia|1979|9.4|Chapman and Harding (1985), p. 366|
|Mexico|1984|14.1|Psacharopoulos and Ng (1992)|
|Pakistan|1979|9.7|Shabbir (1991), p.<sup>12</sup>|
|Philippines|1988|8.0|Hossain and Psacharopoulos (1992)|
|Taiwan|1972|6.0|Psacharopoulos (1985)|
|Thailand|1971|11.9|Psacharopoulos (1985)|
|Venezuela|1989|8.4|Psacharopoulos and Ng (1992)|

59
so ExRloring Possibilities is a gcd illustration of the approach adopted by IDS in regard to evaluation: For a consensus on 'What is the overall picture', a series of evaluation meetings and workshops have again been conducted at the district and State level. The groups have critically looked at their own processes and occasionally it has meant the spending of enormous energy over issues which might appear trivial to an 'outsider'. However, the assumption underlying this process has been to simultaneously correct the drifts and not just observe, record and report them. If rural women really need assistance to shake off their subordination and suffering, the processes of evaluation have to be simultaneously seen as processes for strengthening the activity. Again, if it is correct to assume that improvements in the human situation are possible not by ordering change but only through an internalization of change,the evaluation activity acquires an added responsibility for sharing of information and consolidated knowledge. Both these points have been taken as serious principles of direction in this evaluation study." (IDS and IDARA, 1986 Pg. 11) 6.8 In WDP, a distinct understanding of evaluation has begun to emerge. There are a number of significant ways in which it differs from the kind of evaluat_.on that is carried out in most programs. First, evaluation is not treated as external to the implementation process. Rather, it is viewed as part of a proszss which begins with training and moves to action -- > reflection -- > retraining ( or reorientation) -- > action.... and so on. Second, evaluation and the people connected with it, rather than being a threat, are accepted as a part of the support system. Hence, it follows that, the traditional notion of objective 'external' evaluation is discarded in favor of participatory, committed evaluation. This means that, evaluation
equivalent group in urban areas, while the losses among the moderate and near poor in urban areas are higher than that among the equivalent group in rural areas. The impact is lowest among the extreme poor in both urban and rural areas, just because the extreme poor are the least likely to receive remittances or work in industry even in the absence of the crisis.

GICs are also used to examine the incidence of change in per capita labor income in each sector (see Annex 2, Figure A‐1). As expected, there is no change in labor income for agricultural workers. Labor income in industry falls across the board, which suggests that losses are distributed at a similar rate (relative to their income in the no‐crisis scenario) among all those who are employed in this sector. The loss of income in the service sector is much lower and significant for only the bottom 10% of those who earn any income from this sector.

**Figure 8: Growth incidence curves (crisis vs. benchmark, 2010) by regions (East and West)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> (a) Per capita expenditure by region (b)Per capita labor income by region<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100<br>Percentile Percentile<br>West: Barisal,Khulna & Rajshahi East: Chittagong, Dhaka & Sylhet<br>West: Barisal, Khulna & Rajshahi East: Chittagong, Dhaka & Sylhet<br>0.00 0.00<br>-1.00 -1.00<br>-2.00 -2.00<br>-3.00 -3.00<br>% Change % Change<br>-4.00 -4.00<br>-5.00 -5.00<br>-6.00 -6.00<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Own simulations based on HIES (2005) _Note_ : 1) GICs have been smoothed to eliminate sharp kinks in the original curves 2) The percentiles of consumption/income on the horizontal axis are for each region (East/West) Finally, Figure 8(a) shows how the change in consumption due to the crisis is distributed within the two regions (East and West). The results in Section 4.5 have shown that the adverse impact on incomes and poverty is projected to be larger in the East than the West, with the most significant impacts expected in Sylhet and Chittagong due to their high dependence on remittances. Figure 8(a) shows that the negative impact of the crisis on consumption is larger in the East all along the distribution and worsens sharply as one moves up the distribution, while the impact in the West is smaller and more evenly distributed. This implies that the East‐West gap with regard to impact of the crisis widens as consumption levels increase, and is particularly significant for the 60<sup>th</sup> ‐ 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the distributions.

Figure 8(b) shows that the East‐West gap is not primarily due to differences in the household labor income between the two regions, which are quite small. That said, richer individuals in the East (those in the 60<sup>th</sup> ‐90<sup>th</sup> percentile) suffer larger labor income losses than their counterparts in the West, most likely due to the concentration of industry in the East. The small gaps in labor income also suggest that 26
because of the migration of young males likely induced by conflict. 200,000 people are believed to have been displaced due to the conflict (US Agency for International Development, 2007). However, recent research investigating the direct effect of violence on migration decisions in one district of Nepal moderately affected by the conflict finds that conflict intensity does not increase the probability of migration _outside_ the district, and that there is a U-shaped relationship for migration _inside_ the district, after controlling for individual socio-economic and demographic indicators (Bohra Mishra and Massey, forthcoming).

Despite the existence of several studies of the impact of economic shocks on marriage (e.g., Caldwell et al., 1986; Palloni et al., 1996; Nobles and Buttenheim, 2006), to the best of my knowledge there are only two previous analyses looking into the effect of civil conflict on marriage. Shemyakina (2009) presents difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of exposure to the Tajik conflict on the probability of marriage at a given age and finds that women more exposed to violent conflict were 30% less likely to be married at a given age than women in areas less exposed to violence. In a less well controlled study, Jayaraman et al. (2009) find that women living in areas more affected by the 1994 Rwandan genocide married later compared to women with similar childhood rural or urban location, religion, education, and age category, but living in areas less affected by the genocide.

# 3. Nepalese Background

# 3.1. General

Nepal is a landlocked country located between China and India, that counted over 23.2 Million inhabitants during the last census in 2001 (28.6 Million estimated as of June 2008). Two-thirds of the population are employed in agriculture, nearly one third of the population lives below the poverty line, and Nepal is one of the 20 poorest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita (CIA Factbook). The average education level in Nepal is very low. In the sample used in this paper for the baseline analysis, which, as explained in Section 4.2, comprises children aged 5-9 or 16-19 at the beginning of the conflict, summary statistics in Panel A of Table 3 show that about three quarters of males, and just above half of females had completed primary education when observed in 2006, i.e., when aged 14 or older. Primary schooling completion is therefore a relevant cut-off when analyzing the impact of conflict. Related to this low educational level, summary statistics in Panel C of Table 3 show that between 16.7 and 20.7 percent of women aged 6-9 or 16-19 at the beginning of the conflict were married by the age of 15, depending on district conflict intensity.

7
**Table 1 Explanatory Variables Influencing Electricity consumption per capita (MWh/person)**

|**Variables**|**Definition**|**Expected Sign**|
|---|---|---|
||**PANDEMIC EVOLUTION**||
|**Covid cases**|= number of (new) infected cases reported daily (per million)|**-**|
|**Covid deaths**|= number of (new) deaths from Covid-19 reported daily|**-**|
||**LOCKDOWN EVOLUTION**<br>||
|**Stringency index**|= average value of the government response stringency index based<br>on the policy decisions taken, with the index ranging from 0 (less<br>stringent)to 1(most stringent).|**-**|
|**Mobility (working time)**|= time spent in work places, compared to a baseline (Google<br>communitymobility)|**+**|
|**Mobility (transit time)**|= time spent in workplaces, compared to a baseline (Google<br>community mobility)|**+**|
|**Lockdown (April dummy)**|= time spent in public transport hubs such as subway, bus, and train<br>d bl Gl bl|**-**|
||stations compare to a aseine (ooge community moiity)||
||**MACROECONOMIC FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES**||
|**Policy rate**|= interest policy rates reduction implemented by the Central Banks|**+**|
|**Fiscal measures**|= announcement of fiscal stimulus packages|**+**|
||<br>**DAILY CONTROLS**<br>= 1 if ki d||
|**Working days**|worng ay<br>= 0 otherwise (weekends or national holidays)|**+**|
|**Cooling**|= Min (temp -26C, 0), where temp is the average daily temperature|**+**|
|**Heating**|= Max (16-temp, 0)|**+**|
||**COUNTRY CONTROLS**||
|**GDP per capita (US$)**|= GDP per capita (US$ thousand)|**+**|
|**Electricity prices**<br>**(US$per MWh)**|= average business and residential electricity price (US$c per MWh)|**-**|
|**Affordability**|= average electricity tariff (in terms of GDP)|**+**|
|**Distance from equator**|= distance of the capital from the equator (in miles)|**-**|

15
_Cognitive Ability_ – The survey uses a digit span test to proxy for cognitive / memory ability. We use a similar module to Weaver (2016), I which the interviewer reads out a string of digits, starting with three, and the respondent has two chances to repeat them right. If they can’t, the test ends; if they do remember, they are given a longer string; the game goes on until the longest string with 12 digits. We code how many digits the individual could remember, given two chances. As discussed above, we also use mistakes in choosing the dominated option in the risk game as a measure of cognitive ability.

_Altruism_ – We measure altruism by the percentage of money shared in a hypothetical game in which the individual is given UGX 50,000 and has to decide how much to keep for themselves and how much to share with an anonymous person who received no money.

# **9.2 Reliability of selection traits**

Here we briefly discuss the reliability of our three composite indices of selection traits: Public Sector Motivation, Integrity and Non-Cognitive ability. Below we report the number of items, Cronbach’s alpha<sup>37</sup> and the average inter-item covariance for each one of our composite indices. For Public Sector motivation, we report results for each of the six individual dimensions and for the overall PSM index; for Non-Cognitive ability, we separately report results for each of the Big Five Index dimensions and the overall Big Five Index; as well as for the remaining three dimensions of Grit, Decision-Making and Hostile Bias, and the overall Non-Cognitive Index comprised of the eight dimensions above.

For Public Sector Motivation, Cronbach’s alpha for each component varies from 0.2 to

> 37Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of reliability used for psychometric tests. It is formally defined as

> , where _K_ is the number of items; c ̄ is the average variance of items and  ̄v is the average covariance between all components. Cronbach’s alpha ranges from zero to one, and by construction if tends to one as the number of items increase.

66
# **2 Background and Data**

## **2.1 Regional trade agreements and agreement provisions**

Regional trade agreements have proliferated in the past three decades. The number of RTAs, which had remained low and stable since the 1950s, increased from 50 in the early 1990s to roughly 300 by 2020. Over this same time period, RTAs have also expanded their scope. While the average RTA in the 1950s covered 8 policy areas, in recent years they have averaged 17 (Hofmann _et al._ , 2017). Trade agreements that used to regulate areas such as tariffs, customs and trade remedies, increasingly cover non-trade areas such as competition policy, investment or intellectual property rights. The number of commitments that countries undertake in the context of RTAs has also increased considerably, most notably since 2000. And the deepening commitments have been accompanied by an increase in regulatory requirements, namely on enforcement. The changing nature of RTAs is documented by a new database by the World Bank informing on the detailed content of 295 RTAs signed between 1958 and 2018—i.e. all RTAs in force and notified to the WTO (Mattoo _et al._ , 2020).

Our data on environmental provisions in RTAs have been collected as part of the broader World Bank project on the content of trade agreements and are described in detail in Monteiro and Trachtman (2020). This is the most extensive effort to date to document environmental provisions in trade agreements. First, the coding covers environmental provisions included in the environmental chapter or in other chapters of trade treaties and, when present, in side agreements on the environment.<sup>4</sup> Second, the environmental provisions coded include environmental goals, specific commitments, compliance with multilateral environmental agreements, enforcement mechanisms, and external assistance and collaboration. Within this set of environmental provisions, we select two that are specifically important to protect forest resources: _•_ Does the agreement require measures to prevent deforestation and/or require sustainable trade practices in forest products?

> 4An example of a side agreement is the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) that promotes sustainable development among the signatories of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). An important caveat is that the World Bank coding does not cover other agreements that are not explicitly referenced in the RTA or secondary law that can emanate from the agreement.

6
26 and shore up capital and liquidity for the parent bank, it also reflects home regulators‘ preference that the banks under their oversight have limited exposure across borders and preserve the available funding and capital for stressful times at home.

- The parent‘s efforts to cut back its host operations and transfer resources from its affiliates may, in turn, threaten the financial condition of its affiliates. Such divestments had an impact on the value of the subsidiaries‘ share prices. Moreover, where global banks are systemically important in a host country and support provision of credit through their local offices (such as in CEE and, to some extent, in Latin America and Africa), scaling down a banking group‘s operations could destabilize the local financial system and, in turn, force the subsidiaries to deleverage and contract credit. The resulting credit crunch would harm corporate prospects, slow growth, and trigger a rise in nonperforming loans and corporate failures, which ultimately undermine the asset quality of the overall banking group.

- Moreover, nationalistic regulatory responses by host regulators to parent withdrawals (for example, in the form of ring-fencing or heightened scrutiny and constraints on intragroup capital and liquidity movements), in turn, make host operations less attractive, while hindering the group‘s ability to manage liquidity and credit risks. Some host countries are considering making foreign banks operate as subsidiaries, rather than branches, in order to have better control over local affiliates and to enhance their selfsufficiency (Fiechter et al. 2011). Some parent banks are reportedly planning to sell (parts of) these host operations. For EMDEs with shallow capital markets and weak deposit bases, such exits could have significant implications for credit and the economy, which would compound the impact of slowing capital inflows since 2011 (figure 20).

**Figure 20. Net Capital Inflows to Developing and Emerging Market Countries (Percent of GDP, 2004-2011)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>-2<br>2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br>Net FDI inflows Net portfolio equity inflows<br>Private creditors Total net private inflows<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank.