candidates at the time of elections is obscure to citizens, especially where there are no clear or effective laws that regulate campaign finance, as in Benin. Campaign finance for vote-buying does not necessarily come out of public budgets, unlike spending on government jobs. There is also little information available about whether, or even why gift-giving around elections should influence the subsequent delivery of health and education services by the candidates that win elections.<sup>19</sup> Respondents therefore have no external reason to believe that vote-buying before the election _necessarily_ implies fewer resources for health and education after the election.

If the earlier results from the jobs vignettes were the result of radio programming aimed at directly reducing citizen preferences for clientelist benefits, radio access should unambiguously reduce citizen preferences for gift-giving. In our investigations into the programming content of community radio in Benin, we found no indication that it included messages directly related to votebuying at least at the time of our survey in 2009. In this case, if radio programming only influences clientelist benefits indirectly, by increasing citizen demand for non-clientelist benefits, the effects on preferences for gift-giving candidates are ambiguous. In particular, in the absence of a tradeoff, the effects of radio access depend on household perceptions of how gift-giving candidates influence their access to health and education services. As survey questions make clear, those perceptions are heterogeneous and largely unobserved.

For example, from Keefer and Khemani (2012, 2014), we know that in villages with greater radio-induced demand for health and education, there was little change in the government provision of these services and a significant effect on household efforts to acquire these services with their own resources. These households may be more skeptical about the likelihood that general promises about improving health and education will translate into more services, and have a greater demand for gifts to fund the private acquisition of these services.

The survey offers some evidence that respondents associate gift-giving candidates with a variety of other characteristics of both candidates and the political environment; these imply an ambiguous relationship with service delivery. Although in the vignette the gift-giving candidate appears to offer more to citizens (by giving gifts in addition to making the same promises to improve services), fewer than half – 44 percent – of respondents expressed preference for this candidate. The survey tries to elicit two respondent opinions about gift-giving candidates, asking whether they believed that gift-giving candidates would be more or less likely to be corrupt and more or less likely to keep their service delivery promises. Seventy percent of respondents believe that gift-giving candidates are likely to be more corrupt. However, half of these – 35 percent of respondents – also believe that gift-giving candidates would be as or more effective than the policyalone candidates in delivering health and education services.

> 19 Theoretical research is ambiguous about the consequences of vote buying for service delivery. Hanusch and Keefer (2013) embed vote-buying in a dynamic, probabilistic voting model. They show, first, that politicians tend to buy votes from individuals who, in the absence of vote-buying, would not otherwise receive transfers from government:  these individuals unambiguously gain from vote-buying.  Second, though, in their model, politicians do not finance votebuying by reducing spending on public goods, but by raising revenues. There is little empirical evidence on the consequences of vote buying for public service delivery. Khemani (2003) is the first to show a direct trade-off between vote buying and public health service delivery using uniquely suited data from the Philippines to test for such correlation.

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