rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Appendix 1: Registration Process in Belo Horizonte**

A firm wishing to formally register must undertake the following steps:

**Step 1** : Access the Chamber of Commerce (JUCEMG) website (www.jucemg.mg.gov.br) and fill out a Consulta de Viabilidade (feasibility consultation). The main purpose of this step is to find out if the desired business name is available and if they can open their firm at the desired address. This step will also show the licenses needed and the costs involved, based on the main activity of the business.

**Step 2** : Once a positive response is received, access the Receita Federal do Brasil - RFB (Federal tax service) website (https://www14.receita.fazenda.gov.br/cadsincnac/inicioAction.do) - CadSinc (Synchronized Database) and fill out the Coleta WEB. CadSinc brings together the cadastral (land ownership) procedures of agencies and entities involved in the process of formalization and legalization of companies.

**Step 3** : After receiving the response from step 2, print the DBE (Document Basic Input).

**Step 4** : Go to the website of JUCEMG (www.jucemg.mg.gov.br) and click on Portal de Serviços (Serviços WEB/Integrador). Click on the link Integrador and then the link Gerar Novo FCN/REMP. This step will integrate the Consulta de Viabilidade data with the CadSinc data and generate the documents that will be the base of the Contrato Social (state registration for limited liability companies (LLC)) or REMP (state registration for individuals).

**Step 5** :  Click on DAE and print it. The DAE is the document with the amount the entrepreneur should pay to continue the formalization process. All the steps up to now are online and free of charge. If the firm is a LLC the entrepreneur will pay R$ 165.53 and if the firm is a sole proprietorship the entrepreneur will pay R$ 82.11.

**Step 6** : Deliver all documents to the Minas Fácil office in Belo Horizonte, including a document evidencing the payment of the DAE, in person. In this step JUCEMG will check and validate all documentation delivered.

**Step 7** : Look on the website of JUCEMG (www.jucemg.mg.gov.br) for a decision on the application for registration of the firm under the link Consulta de Protocolo.  If the request was approved, go to the Minas Fácil office to pick up 2 authenticated copies of the REMP or Contrato Social and the micro or small enterprise declaration, in person.

**Step 8** : Go to the RFB (IRS) website to print the CNPJ (federal tax registration), and to get the Inscrição Estadual (State Tax Registration) and Inscrição Municipal (Municipal Tax Registration).

**Step 9:** Go to the municipal website (http://www.pbh.gov.br) to get the Alvará de Localização e Funcionamento (Municipal License). This costs R$ 154.60.

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**Figure 1: Regulatory Transparency Index (RTI) by Region**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00<br>1.0<br>0.8 0.88<br>0.77<br>0.6 0.63 0.63 0.65<br>0.59<br>0.4 0.47 0.46 0.50<br>0.25<br>0.2<br>0.25 0.25<br>0.00 0.00 0.00 0<br>0.0<br>Entire Sample Sub-Saharan Middle East & South Asia Latin America & East Asia & Europe & High income:<br>Africa North Africa Caribbean Pacific Central Asia OECD<br>Mean Minimum Maximum<br>Average Aggregate Index<br><!-- End of picture text -->

_Source: Doing Business 2013 surveys_ The relatively rich Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (the average country in the region has a GNI per capita of over 13,000 USD) is the most opaque region in terms of providing access to regulatory information. None of the economies in the region scores positively on all four fee accessibility indicators. This finding is consistent with the findings of other studies that have highlighted lack of transparency as one of the biggest constraints to private sector growth in the region (Williams (2009), World Bank (2009)). For example, Rocha et al. (2011) show that lack of corporate information and poor credit information systems are among the main reasons why small and medium-size firms receive little lending in the region.

Aside from interregional variation, accessibility to regulatory information also varies positively and significantly by income groups (Figure 2 below): low-income economies have the worst degree of regulatory transparency while high income economies score the best.

**Figure 2: Regulatory Transparency Index (RTI) by Income Group**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1.0 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00<br>0.8<br>0.75<br>0.79<br>0.6<br>0.62  0.62<br>0.56<br>0.4 0.50<br>0.2<br>0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00<br>0.0<br>Entire Sample Low Income Lower middle Upper middle High income<br>income income<br>Mean Minimum Maximum<br>Average Aggregate Index<br><!-- End of picture text -->

_Source: Doing Business 2013 surveys_ 8
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|1.|INT|RODUCTION|1|
|---|---|---|---|
|2.|CHA|RACTERISTICS OF THE TRADE REFORMS|2|
||A.|The Pre-Reform Trade Regimes|2|
||B.|Ihe Trade Reforms|3|
||C.|Impact on the Trade Regimes|4|
||D.|Impact on Imports and Exports|7|
||E.|Sequencing the Elem,mts of Trade Reform|9|
|3.|THE|CONTEXT OF THE TRADE REFORMS|12|
||A.|Initial Macroeconomic Conditions|12|
||B.|Complementary Macroeconomic Policies|13|
||C.|Exchange Rate Policy|14|
||D.|The Political Economy of the Trade Reforms|_15_|
|4.|THE|LESSONS OF THE TRADE REFORMS|16|
|S.|CHA|LLENGES FOR THE FUTURE|18|
|6.|CON|CLUSIONS|19|
||APP|ENDIX|21|
||REF|ERENCES|30|
**Table 2 Expanding and contracting firms, 2001**

|Firm category|Share in<br>firms (%)|Share in<br>employment<br>(%)|Average firm<br>size (persons)|Chang|e in emplo<br>(persons)|yment|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||Median|Mean|Standard<br>Deviation|
|All firms|100.0|<br>100.0|57.7|0|-2.9|28.2|
|Contracting|42.0|<br>61.7|84.7|-5|-16.1|30.6|
|Stable|28.5|<br>6.6|13.4|0|0.0|0.0|
|Expanding|29.5|<br>31.7|61.9|4|13.0|29.3|

Source: Annual Survey of Enterprises, 2000 and 2001; author's calculations.

This pattern of widespread enterprise downsizing is quite typical of transition economies and Moldova is not an exception. The reason behind labor shedding during the economic transition is a drive toward greater economic efficiency. Firms shed redundant labor to eliminate the inherited overstaffing, to close low value-added jobs, and ultimately to improve productivity. For example, the proportion of firms in Moldova which reported overstaffing fell from 19 to just 6 percent from 2001 to 2002, which is a clear sign of better firm governance and performance (ProEra Group, 2003). As such, enterprise downsizing is a desirable process, resulting in firms being more efficient and competitive.

What is worrisome, is that this process of elimination of non-viable jobs is not accompanied by commensurate job creation. In contrast, successful transition economies managed to achieve “creative destruction”, whereby destruction of old, unproductive jobs is matched by the creation of new, more productive jobs. For example, while the proportion of shrinking firms in Moldova is virtually the same as in Lithuania, the proportion of expanding firms is significantly smaller (30 percent against 37 percent). Accordingly, the job creation rate in Lithuania is higher than in Moldova.

To conclude, Moldova is undergoing a widespread process of the elimination of unproductive jobs, which to a varying degree is characteristic of all transition economies, and by itself is not a negative phenomenon. Actually, insofar as it leads to firms being more productive and more competitive, it is a positive development. However, the problem is that the old jobs are not being sufficiently fast replaced by new, more productive jobs. This causes the total pool of jobs to diminish, meaning deteriorating 10
|`IND`|`294.56`|_`0.23`_|
|---|---|---|
|`ITA`|`438.06`|_`0.34`_|
|`JPN`|`1293.39`|_`1.00`_|
|`KOR`|`541.96`|_`0.42`_|
|`MEX`|`1288.42`|_`0.99`_|
|`MYS`|`274.08`|_`0.21`_|
|`NGA`|`230.40`|_`0.18`_|
|`NLD`|`249.97`|_`0.19`_|
|`RUS`|`501.60`|_`0.39`_|
|`SAU`|`232.88`|_`0.18`_|
|`TTO`|`271.61`|_`0.21`_|
|`VEN`|`1547.39`|_`1.19`_|

``` Outputsavedas:wdr_4_9b.xlsintothecurrentworkingdirectory ``` As in Figure 1, we deliberately reported in the above Stata output only the 20 countries with the highest foreign value-added in the bilateral exports between the United States and China. Actually, by running the previous syntax, `icio` would report also the value-added of the other countries in the EORA MRIO database. Since the complete list is very long, the user may find it useful to exploit the `save()` option. As can be seen, by adding this option, the complete `icio` output has been saved into a file called `wdr_4_9b.xls` within the current working directory.

Lastly, we consider the analysis of value-added in the total imports of a country. To quantify the German GDP potentially exposed to US tariffs vis-`a-vis all partners, according to WIOD 2014 data, we can use the following syntax ``` .icio_load Loadingtablewiod2014...loaded .icio,origin(deu)imp(usa)output(va) Decompositionofgrossimports: Perspective:importer Importer:USA Origin:DEU Exporter:totalUSAimports Output:Value-Added ```

||`Millions of $`|`% of import`|
|---|---|---|
|`Value-Added`|`133064.91`|_`5.53`_|

The Stata output indicates that around $133 billion of Germany’s value-added are imported, directly and indirectly, by the United States (around 5.5% of the total US imports), and thus could be exposed to US trade barriers, according to WIOD 2014 data. German GDP exposure to these trade barriers can be computed taking the ratio with respect to the total German GDP - obtained with `icio, origin(deu)` . Thus, around 3.7% of German GDP could be affected by these 24
_25_

**_The Triffln I would like to come_** _back_ **_to_** _a couple of issues. One of_ **_paradox... them is the broadening_** _of the Triffin paradox Andrea Boltho referred to; what is its impact on the slowdown? And how does one resolve the current disequillbrla?_

_By broadening, I mean very roughly that what Triffin said is that the dollar exchange system was not tenable because it was built on the accumulation of deficits of one country, and at some point the financing of that would stop._ _But the desire for surpluses has not necessarily stopped. The problem was sort of circumvented in the 1970s by the dei'eloping countries becoming suddenly very desirable borrowers. Everybody at the time agreed that they were creditworthy, but we know how that ended. To some extent in the 1980s the U.S. came back and played the same role, but who can play the role now?_

**_SustaInability_** _If the surplus countries argue, in a sense, that disequi-_ **_of the_** _payments librium_ **_Is_** _desirable -- which is to some extent normal partly because imbAlances... of the aging of populations and partly for other reasons -- that to some extent, surpluses are desirable, how can one find corresponding solvable deficits, deficits which make this situation tenable?_

_If it is in fact tenable, what is the financing innovation, the financing mechanism which will allow us to go on in the mediumrun, without reducing the deficit?_ _The question is: How do we render this current situation sustainable, either by building up the financial means of maintaining the same deficits, or by reducing the imbalances, or by a combination of the two? And what are the implications of this for long-term growth in general? I see a common thread in the various statements. That is that the mounting of inflationary pressures through structural changes (possibly generated_ **_by_** _the Keynesian consensus) in fact prevent the appllcation of sufficiently stimulative macroeconomic policies, or pushes towards more restrictive macroeconomic policies. What are the relations of this to the unwinding of deficits?_ _MR. ARMINGTON: I would just add a footnote that perhaps there is a golden rule lurking in the woodwork here -- a 2-1/2 percent solution for growth. We just didn't do enough work on economic history to appreciate that ten years ago._

**_the 2-1/2_** _But just to throw out a question about that: it is true percent that there was a reasonable consensus, ten years ago, that the growth solution... trend of industrial countries was at least 3-1/2 percent. For example, the 1979 World Development Report was not outside the range of commonly-discussed estimates at that time, projecting an average growth rate in the 1980s of 3-1/2 percent to 4-1/4 percent. Now we_

WP/PROC/SF:jsq
_wholesale price may go up following the elimination of DOTs from the market._

# **(4.2) The Role of DOTs in Alleviating Credit Limits of Wholesalers**

In this section, we analyze a model in which the absence of DOTs following the reform led not only to an increase in the cost of borrowing by wholesale dealers, but also imposition of quantitative credit limits by alternative financiers. For simplicity, we assume that wholesalers faced no credit rationing prior to the reform, owing to long-term relationships with DOTs. The results derived below hold if the DOT provided credit is not enough to eliminate the credit constraint for some wholesale traders, as long as the trade credit relives the credit constraints substantially compared to the alternative sources such as banks.

As noted earlier, evidence from a survey conducted by the authors in 2013 indicates that about 30 percent of transactions between the DOTs and the wholesalers are on credit (32 percent of quantity). The reform constrained the use of the information capital accumulated by the DOTs (and brokers) over more than six decades. Unlike the DOTs, refiners had little or no information about the credit-worthiness of a wholesaler (dealer) and were therefore reluctant to provide oil on credit.<sup>13</sup> This forced the dealers to finance their purchases from other sources, possibly resulting in binding credit limits which restricted their ability to purchase oil from refiners. The resulting disruption in oil supply to downstream retailers would then raise the price at which the wholesalers would be selling to retailers. In order to derive implications for pass-through rates, we now work out an extension of the preceding model.

Prior to the reform, we suppose the analysis of the earlier section applies, with the wholesale price determined according to (8). After the reform, wholesale dealers have to borrow at an interest rate of (1+ _ib_ ) and are subject to a credit limit of _B_ (aggregating across all the dealers). For simplicity and tractability, we do not model the factors that give rise to credit rationing. Moral hazard (‘take the money and run’ as in Ghosh et al. (2001)), and difficulties in seizing collateral in the case of a default because of an antiquated and corrupt judical system may be important in the context of Bangladesh, among other things.

We assume the number of wholesalers (dealers) is fixed at its pre-reform level, which is

> 13Recall that only a small proportion of wholesalers bought oil from refiners directly before the reform, because they had to pay cash.

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Policy Research Working Paper 10239

# **Abstract**

This paper studies whether providing affordable childcare improves women’s economic empowerment and child development, using data from a sample of 1,990 women participating in a public works program in Burkina Faso. Of 36 urban work sites, 18 were randomly selected to receive community-based childcare centers. One in four women who were offered the centers used them, tripling childcare center usage for children aged 0 to 6 years. Women’s employment and financial outcomes improved. Additionally, child development scores increased. However, the analysis finds no significant effects on women’s decision-making autonomy, gender attitudes, or intrahousehold dynamics, suggesting the importance of considering multiple dimensions of childcare impacts.

This paper is a product of the Gender Innovation Lab, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at mkoussoube@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
with cultural fractionalization. Cultural fractionalization is negatively signed, but only statistically significantly related to military personnel as a share of the labor force and then only in GEE estimation, while being marginally insignificant in columns 1 to 3. Religious fractionalization remains insignificant.

Next, we also tested the hypothesis of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) that it is ethnic and religious polarization rather than fractionalization that matters. To do so, we replaced the fractionalization with their polarization measures (see table 8). Neither ethnic nor religious polarization has any impact on militarization, independent of which dependent variable is used. These results do not support the proposition that it is polarization as they have operational zed it rather than fractionalization that really matters for predicting militarization.

Finally, we analyzed the effect of Cederman and Girardin’s (2005) index of ethnonationalist exclusion on militarization – see table 9. Their index is never statistically significant. However, due to the limited country coverage of this index, one needs to treat this result with caution. If and once their measure becomes available for all countries in the world, it will be interesting to see whether it produces results that are contrary to the ones reported so far.

# **Sensitivity analysis**

We ran a large number of tests of sensitivity.<sup>8</sup> We dropped the contiguous militarization and conflict variables to assess the effects of ethnic heterogeneity without them in the model, since these variables might suffer from endogeneity bias. When these variables are dropped, the basic results on most of the heterogeneity variables change little, but the heterogeneity variables from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) and the linguistic fractionalization variable from Alesina et al. (2003) become statistically insignificant, while maintaining their negative coefficient sign. The government expenditure variable suffers from partial identity bias since current military expenditures form part of general government expenditure. Unfortunately, current military expenditures cannot be netted out from general government expenditure since the available military expenditure data include both capital formation and current expenditures for military purposes. If we drop government expenditures from the model, then our results are hardly affected. To see whether ethnic and religious heterogeneity exerts a non-linear influence on

> 8 All results available upon request.

14
countries has been used in the empirical analysis (see in _Annex 1_ the list of countries). We have also generated a broader set of private investment series which includes countries for which the distinction between private and public investment is not as satisfactory, but which can be used for robustness analysis (this data set covers 99 countries).

# **4.2. Nature of Data on Governance**

The data usually used in governance are produced by independent private firms who provide consulting services to international investors such as the International Country Risk Guide ( _ICRG_ ), the Heritage Foundation ( _HF_ ), the Freedom House ( _FH_ ) or the Fraser Institute ( _FI_ ). To a certain extent, these indices provide very similar information on various aspects of governance. These data sets have certain common features. First of all, they can be considered to be subjective. They measure the perceptions of governance quality rather its actual quality. They also measure outcomes rather than actual rules (see Glaeser et al., 2004). Finally, given that governance institutions do not change easily in theory, institutional indices are supposed to be rather persistent, even though they are relatively volatile in existing data sets.

All these factors appear contrary to using governance indices commonly used in the literature. In fact, these characteristics are very useful in determining investor perceptions on the quality of governance at the time of their investment. Indeed, what we are more concerned about is not the actual governance quality per se, but its perception by the private sector since our ultimate aim is to identify the determinants of private investment. This paper strongly shows that, in addition to the conventional determinants of private investment, governance institutions – whether perceived or real – are 18
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