rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **3. Quasi fiscal deficits of state owned enterprises**

Romania has a large public enterprise sector, comprising 722 state owned enterprises (SOEs) which account for 8.9 percent of employment and 10 percent of GDP.<sup>6</sup> The most important SOEs, in terms of size, are in the energy and transport sectors. Comprehensive financial data on all SOEs are not available. Based on the data which are available, the SOE sector in aggregate was barely profitable in the mid-2000s. Its performance deteriorated from 2007 and the SOE sector in aggregate incurred losses in 2008 and in subsequent years. However, the financial performance of SOEs is heterogeneous; about 70 percent of SOEs are both profitable and solvent, although some nevertheless receive budget subsidies, including cancellation of debts owed to the state. The remaining 30 percent of SOEs are making losses and/or are insolvent. These losses represent quasi fiscal deficits (QFDs); deficits incurred off budget by public agencies in the pursuit of public policy objectives. The trends in profitability should be interpreted with caution, however, because the financial statements of the SOEs, from which these data are drawn, sometimes disguise hidden subsidies or costs.

> 6 These are World Bank estimates. Official data on the exact number of SOEs and their contribution to the economy are not available.

11
Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs. "The Onset of the East Asian<sup>FinancialCrisis."</sup> Currency Crises. Ed. Paul Krugman. Chicago: The Univ. of<sup>Chicago Press, 2000.105-</sup> 161.

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales. "Financial dependence<sup>andgrowth". American</sup> Economic Review 88.3 (June 1998): 559-586.

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Richardson, Michael. "Asia Looks To Zones of Free<sup>TradeRegionUnlikelyto PushFor</sup> a Monetary Union." International Herald Tribune 03 Jan.<sup>2002.08 Jan.2002</sup> <http://www.djinteractive.com>.

Robinson, Joan. "The Generalization of the General Theory."<sup>The Rate of Interest,and</sup> Other Essavs. London: Macmillan, 1952. 67-142.

Rodrik, Dani. "Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?"<sup>Should theIMFPursue</sup> Capital Account Convertibility? Essays in International<sup>Finance no.207. Ed.Peter</sup> Kenen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, May 1998.

Rornijn H., R. Van Assouw and M. Mortimore, with J. Carrillo,<sup>S.Lalland N.</sup> Poapongsakorn. "TNCs, industrial upgrading and competitiveness<sup>inthe automotive</sup> industry in NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN." The Competitiveness Challenge: Transnational Corporations and Industrial Restructuring in Developing<sup>Countries. New</sup> York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000.

Rose, Andrew K. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases<sup>Trade?"CEPR</sup> Discussion Paper 3538. London: Centre for Economic Policy<sup>Research,Sept.2002.</sup> 143
system since companies would try to transfer to other taxable entities that have taxable income to absorb tax losses.

(2) Ontario Hydro's privatization is partly motivated by the deregulation of the electricity industry. However, an open-border electricity market implies that the privatized Ontario Hydro will have to compete with not only domestic firms but also major US electricity exporters along the border. As our estimates show, the US generators and distributors certainly possess tax advantages over a taxable Ontario Hydro if it is privatized.

# 3. **Revenue Impacts**

It is not possible for us to provide an estimate of the amount of taxes Ontario Hydro's new entities will pay to the Ontario government. It is clear that a number of transition issues would need to be considered and there is no data that would allow us to make such an estimate easily. However, if it is assumed that the current value of book profits and assets (excluding one-time changes) are the base for the amount of taxes to be paid, Ontario would pay about $235 million in federal and provincial corporate and capital taxes and $180 million in property taxes.

As part of its reform, the Ontario government rejected the option of privatizing Ontario Hydro. Prior to its election, the government proposed privatizing a number of provincial Crown corporations but decided not to proceed with the program. It seemed that the government had a rather large agenda for change in the province and was less willing to undertake privatization during its restructuring of government services. However, as a result of large losses incurred by Ontario Hydro with its nuclear program, the government undertook significant reform of the power industry but without the privatization of Ontario '9 See also the report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation [1998] that showed that the effective tax rate on capital as well as costs of production is much higher in Canada compared to the United States. 30
as imposing time limits, providing training on case flow management techniques, and convincing judges to adopt case-level first-in-first-out policies to the extent feasible, has been shown to increase the speed with which a case moves through the system and, in turn, to have a beneficial effect on the economy and society.<sup>2</sup> So far in this section we have provided some case study evidence suggestive of positive reform outcomes. This evidence is insufficient to make a generalized claim. It is more instructive to gather cross-country empirical evidence of when justice reforms happen, for example by using the extension of the database of court reforms in Djankov et al (2003). Such an analysis can provide evidence beyond ad-hoc country cases. The reader is referred to Chemin (2020), the first study that attempts such an enormous task. A triple difference is used by Matthieu Chemin to compare firms in countries with or without judicial reforms, before and after reforms, and in sectors more or less reliant on contract enforcement mechanisms, due to their need for relationship-specific investments. The study finds that comprehensive judicial reforms improve perceptions of judiciary efficiency (for all firms) and firm productivity (for sectors relying on relationship-specific investments), respectively.

# **2. Ingredients of Judicial Effectiveness**

Posner (1998) and Messick (1999) suggest that the factors that underpin judicial effectiveness are independence, access, efficiency and quality. When justice institutions operate effectively, accountability increases, trust in the government grows, and businesses can invest with confidence that their rights will be protected. Becker (1997), however, asserts that the emphasis on narrow technical issues to improve one of these factors has often come at the expense of more fundamental reform to change societal beliefs about courts.

Empirical findings establish that comprehensive reforms – i.e., those targeting all four characteristics of judicial effectiveness – affect firm productivity and from there economic growth. In contrast, partial reforms – i.e., those that do not target all characteristics at once – have passing

> 2 Carillo et al (2022) show evidence from Chilean courts on the benefits of information sharing for the speed of case disposition.

10
- Education: from question 10.5 of the household questionnaire (“How many standard years has [NAME] completed?”).

Follow-up <u>(2011/12):</u>

- Migration: we infer migration status from the current location reported in question 2.12 of the tracking questionnaire (respondent is migrant if reports living “somewhere else”). We further distinguish between intra-state migration, across-state migration, and international migration from the state of residence reported in question 2.23.

- Self-employment: question 2.15 of the tracking module reports the principal activity status. Respondents are classified as self-employed at destination if they report being artisan/independent workers, owning petty shop/small businesses, or owning organized trade/business (with more than 5 employees).

# **B.4 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)**

Notes: Employment status and occupation type are complemented with corresponding information from section TK of the Proxy Book. Employment status at destination is unreported for international migrants.

Baseline (wave 3 – 2000):

- Employment status: we use information from section TK (employment) of Book 3A. A respondent is classified as not working if the answer to question tk01 (“What was your primary activity during the past week?”) is different than “Working/trying to work/helping to earn income” and questions tk19aa and tk24a have missing answers.

- Self-employed and wage workers: based on answer to question tk24a (“Which category best describes the work that you do?”). Excludes workers that are primarily working in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (question tk19aa, “In what field of work is this job?”).

- Agricultural workers: those that are primarily engaging in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting according to question tk19aa.

- Income: sum of salary/wage in past year (question tk25a2) and net profit in past year (question tk26ayn). Use gross profit (tk26ayg) when net profit is missing.

51
<!-- Start of picture text --> 40 Oo 1 0.8<br>oh)<br>S<br>rs}<br>=<br>Co<br>< |<br>& 30 = 0<br>2 a<br>SS o)<br>pi ron) 03<br>>8<br>> -<br>g2<br>s<br>3<br>=<br>1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020<br>—— Historical numbers --*-- COVID-19 projection --*-- Counterfactual projection<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**_The oil sector._** The U.S. oil sector produces oil, _y_ 1<sup>_o_</sup> _t_<sup>,usingthefollowingproductiontechnology</sup>

where _n_<sup>_o_</sup> 1 _t_<sup>islaboremployedbytheU.S.oilsector,andtheproductivityshock,</sup><sup>_z_</sup> 1<sup>_o_</sup> _t_<sup>,isgivenbythe</sup> following stochastic process where _ρ_<sup>_o_</sup> 1<sup>isthepersistenceparameter,andthedisturbance</sup><sup>_εo_</sup> 1 _t_<sup>_∼iidN_(0</sup><sup>_, σ_</sup> 1<sup>_o_).</sup> The oil exporter’s production of oil consists of two components: (1) an endogenous component, ( _n_<sup>_o_</sup> 3 _t_<sup>)</sup><sup>_α_,and(2)anexogenouscomponent,</sup><sup>_z_</sup> 3<sup>_o_</sup> _t_<sup>.Inparticular,totaloilproducedbytheoilexporter</sup> at time _t_ is given as following where the endogenous component can be considered as oil supplied by non-OPEC oil producers that requires a labor input, _n_<sup>_o_</sup> 3 _t_<sup>,forproduction.Whereas,theexogenouscomponentcanbeconsidered</sup> as OPEC’s oil supply that reflects a stochastic endowment of oil (see Backus & Crucini, 2000). The exogenous component follows an _AR_ (1) process as following where _ρ_<sup>_o_</sup> 3<sup>isthepersistenceparameter,andthedisturbance,</sup><sup>_εo_</sup> 3 _t_<sup>,isindependentandnormally</sup> distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation _σ_ 3<sup>_o_.</sup>

**_The final goods sector._** All countries produce final goods that are used for consumption and investment by combining the tradable intermediates using a CES (or Armington) aggregator. More specifically, the final goods production function is as following

where _σ_ is the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediates (or Armington elasticity), _ωji_ is the weight on the intermediate good _j_ imported by country _i_ , where _j_ = _{a, b, c}_ .

**_Equilibrium._ Definition 1.** An equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, ( _{cit, kit, oit, Bit, xit, yit}_<sup>_∞_</sup> _t_ =0 for _i_ = _{_ 1 _,_ 2 _}_ , _{n_<sup>_o_</sup> _it_<sup>_, y_</sup> _it_<sup>_o}_</sup> _t_<sup>_∞_</sup> =0<sup>for</sup><sup>_i_=</sup><sup>_{_1</sup><sup>_,_3</sup><sup>_}_,and</sup><sup>_{nit, ait, bit, Git}∞_</sup> _t_ =0<sup>for</sup><sup>_i_=</sup><sup>_{_1</sup><sup>_,_2</sup><sup>_,_3</sup><sup>_}_),andprices,</sup> _{wit, rit, Qit, wit_<sup>_o, q_</sup> _it_<sup>_a, q_</sup> _it_<sup>_b, p_</sup> _t_<sup>_o}∞_</sup> _t_ =0<sup>,suchthat</sup>

1. Households

• In the U.S., the representative household maximizes utility by choosing consumption, 26
-6-

who received the hlghest prices were pald between 352 and 410 rubles per ton. The base price for milk In Lithuanla at the tine was 310 rubles p'.,r ton.

Comparison of Lithuanlan prices with those In Latvia, Estonla, and Belorussba Indicates some significant differences. Belorusslan prices for milk and meat are slgnificantly hlgher, as shown In Table 2. The price dispersion across repubiics within this relatively small region Illustrates the adjustments that reform would bring. These adjustments would facilltate better use of resources specific to each locality, and expanded gains from Interregional trade within the country.

Procurement organizations have traditionally pald dlfferent prices to different farms for the same product. Price differentlation enters through zonal pricing and through the bonus system. Several bonuses can raise received prices above base prices. The most Important are quality differentlals, bonuses for sales In excess of a moving average of past years, and premia for farms In financial stress.<sup>1</sup> The Lithuanian data show price differentiation, but the degree appears to be less than reported In other parts of the Soviet Union. In 1987 15 percent of Lithuanlan state and collective farms had profitability (rentabel'nost) of 10 percent or less (which would qualify them for bonuses of up to 75 percent of base prices In many parts of the country). The data do not show that these farms received high bonus prices for meat or milk, suggesting that special bonuses for financlally weak farms were not widely used In Lithuania.

A strong negative correlation between meat prices and land quality In 1987 Is shown In Table 3, Indicating that farms on poor quality land were paid higher prices for livestock products. The 1986 data also show a strong negative correlation between meat and milk prices and land quality. Dlfferentiated prices for livestock products appear to be the mechanism through which Implicit land rents were ecollected In this region.
<!-- Start of picture text --> Canada<br>105 Output 105 Labor<br>100 100<br>95 95<br>90 90<br>1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985<br>30 Investment Net Exports<br>10<br>25<br>5<br>0<br>20<br>−5<br>15<br>−10<br>1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985<br>Model with No Efficiency Wedge Model with No Labor Wedge Data<br>Canada<br>105 Output 105 Labor<br>100 100<br>95 95<br>90 90<br>1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985<br>30 Investment Net Exports<br>10<br>25<br>5<br>0<br>20<br>−5<br>15<br>−10<br>1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985<br>Model with No Investment Wedge Model with No Risk−Premium Wedge Data<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 5: Data and counterfactual models with four wedges.

32
presented above. Note also that village exogamy interacted with whether the groom's family has land increases wedding expenses by 2,600 rupees and is significant at the five per cent level. Similarly an additional year of groom's schooling in families that practice exogamy increases marriage expenses by about 280 rupees. Thus, groom quality significantly matters only for those families practicing village exogamy, where the bride's village has no knowledge of the groom's familyl°. These results are therefore consistent with the notion that wedding celebrations are driven by a desire to provide information about the bride family's enhanced social status.

# 3. **On Festivals"**<sup>**1**</sup> **:**

Festivals are also centrally important to the lives of Indians (Fuller 1992). Weddings may cost more, but they occur only two or three times in the lifetime of a household head, while festivals take place every few months. Festivals are different from marriages in that they are collective behaviors where everyone celebrates an event simultaneously. A description of the first time I saw a village festival might be instructive: My team and I had spent several days in a village interviewing poor families from the potter caste. On the sixth day we were warned that it would be "difficult to find people in their homes tomorrow because they will all be at Mariamma's<sup>12</sup> festival." When we arrived the next morning the village had been transformed beyond recognition. The women had put on gold and silver jewelry and had jasmine flowers in their hair. There were colorful fragrant garlands strewn on poles around the village and on the pillars of the local temple, along with festive decorations and balloons. Two loudspeakers tied to the temple's roof blared film songs. And then, at about 10 in the morning, the procession began. It was led by a group of traditional musicians by a followed a brightly painted bullock cart carrying an image of the goddess, swathed in silk, gold and flowers and tended by two priests. Immediately behind the bullock cart was a group of about ten important looking men and women followed by hordes of dancing children. I asked some people in the crowd who these important looking people were and was told that they were from the families who had made the largest contributions and had helped organize the celebrations. The festival was obviously a very '° The village exogamy effect could also occur because husbands from outside the village would increase the size of the wedding party due to the greater number of potential guests who may have to be invited. However, the interaction effects do not necessarily follow from this explanation and are far more consistent with a signaling motive.

" This section is derived from Rao (forthcoming).

2 A local village goddess.

10
Policy Research Working Paper 8579

# **Abstract**

Decades of services trade negotiations have produced a plethora of rules and commitments but limited real liberalization. One reason is a form of “negotiating tunnel vision,” which has led to a focus on reciprocal market opening rather than on creating the regulatory preconditions for liberalization. This paper makes four points. First, current trade disciplines are a useful but inadequate restraint on regulatory protection. Second, proposed disciplines on domestic regulation would add value but would not solve problems with the application of existing trade law and could create a hold-back problem in securing new liberalizing commitments. Third, insulating domestic consumers from international market failure is a precondition for further liberalization in many services sectors, and the relevant international bargain needs to be an exchange of regulatory commitments by exporters in return for market access commitments by importers. Fourth, such bargains create a risk of exclusion for nonparticipants that can and should be addressed. The paper illustrates these arguments drawing upon recent developments relating to data privacy, financial services, labor mobility, and competition policy.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The author may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# Appendices

Appendix Table 1: WHO recommended items for health service pandemic preparedness planning and corresponding SDI indicators from Kenya, Sierra Leone or Tanzania

|**WHO**|**recommended items**|**Relevant indicators in current SDI***|
|---|---|---|
|**Healt**|**h service facilities**||
|1|Define the levels of health-care facilities where patients should ideally<br>be treated during a pandemic situation, and assess the availability of<br>these facilities (primary, secondary and tertiary referral, including<br>emergencyand intensive care unit capacity).|Facility level and ownership, hospitalization capacity;<br>Chronic respiratory illness management capacity;<br>Availability of regular and backup electricity;<br>Appropriate water,sanitation and hygiene facilities|
|2|Develop detailed regional and facility-level plans for providing health<br>services during a pandemic, including the type of care to be delivered at<br>the specific levels and types of health-care facilities.|Relevant indicators not available in current surveys|
|3|Determine triage and patient flow between health-care facilities at<br>various levels, and develop mechanisms for coordinating patient<br>transport and tracking/managing beds, such as central bed registries,<br>call centers and a centralized ambulance dispatch.|Facility operation hours and patient volume;<br>Availability and occupancy rate of in-patient beds;<br>Protocol for sick patient triage;<br>Availability and functionality of ambulance or other emergency<br>transport services|
|4|Determine potential alternative sites for medical care. Possible sites<br>could include schools, gymnasiums, nursing homes, day-care centers or<br>tents in hospitalgrounds or at other sites.|Relevant indicators not available in current surveys|
|5|Coordinate clinical care and health service plans with bordering local<br>authorities to avoid migration to centers where enhanced services are<br>perceived to exist.|Geolocation of the facilities (which can be used to estimate travel<br>distance to the nearest city);<br>Availability of functional radio, internet access, fixed or mobile<br>phone and intercom|
|**Healt**|**h servicepersonnel**||
|6|Estimate the numbers of health-care workers by professional group at<br>the level appropriate for the country (national, provincial,local).|Clinical and non-clinical staff availability, clinical personnel<br>education level and cadre|
|7|Determine sources from which additional health-care workers could be<br>recruited, for instance among those who have retired or who have<br>changed careers.|Relevant indicators not available in current surveys|

23