# **TABLE 3: Governance Effect on Service Performance/Access for Global and Local Cities**

|||**ACCESS TO WATER (%)**||
|---|---|---|---|
|**SAMPLE**|**Bribery in Utility**|<br>**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|0.11***|0.10***|0.11***|
|Global City|0.10*|0.04|0.06*|
|Local City<br>|0.09**<br>|0.10**<br>|0.15***<br>|
|**Differential**|**0.01**|**-0.06**|**-0.09***|
|||**ACCESS TO SEWERAGE (%)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|<br>**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|0.15***|0.13***|0.16***|
|Global City|0.13|0.07|0.08*|
|Local City|0.13**|0.11|0.21***|
|**Differential**|**0.00**|**-0.04**|**-0.13**|
|||**ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (%)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|<br>**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|<br>0.05**|<br>0.05**|<br>0.05***|
|Global City|0.05|0.06*|0.06**|
|Local City|0.05*|0.07*|0.07**|
|**Differential**|**0.00**|**-0.01**|**-0.01**|
|||**ACCESS TO TELEPHONES [1] (%)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|<br>0.19***|<br>0.15***|<br>0.24***|
|Global City<br>|0.17***<br>***|0.13**<br>|0.14***<br>***|
|Local City|0.16|0.09|0.32|
|**Differential**|**0.01**|**0.04**|**-0.18****|
|||**QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE (1-7)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|<br>0.99***|<br>0.98***|<br>1.10***|
|Global City|0.96***|0.86***|0.99***|
|<br>Local City|0.57***|0.82***|0.87***|
|**Differential**|**0.39*****|**0.04**|**0.12**|
|||**QUALITY OF ELECTRICITY (1-7)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample<br>Global City|1.06***<br>1.05***|0.92***<br>0.82***|1.10***<br>0.99***|
|<br>Local City|0.80***|0.79***|1.10***|
|**Differential**|**0.25**|**0.03**|**-0.11**|
|||**ACCESS TO TELEPHONES [2] (1-7)**<br>||
||**Bribery in Utility**|**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|0.87***|0.85***|0.82***|
|Global City|0.81***|0.53***|0.70***|
|<br>Local City|0.92***|0.78***|1.10***|
|**Differential**|**-0.11**|**-0.25**|**-0.40**|
|||**ACCESS TO CELL PHONES (1-7)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|<br>**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|0.43***|0.35***|0.44***|
|<br>Global City|0.39***|0.30***|0.34***|
|Local City|0.35***|0.21*|0.53***|
|<br>**Differential**|**0.04**|**0.09**|**-0.19**|
|||**INTERNET ACCESS AT SCHOOL (1-7)**||
||**Bribery in Utility**|<br>**State Capture**|**Control of Corruption**|
|Full CitySample|0.99***|0.93***|1.12***|
|<br>Global City<br>Local City|0.97***<br>0.64***|0.82***<br>0.78***|0.98***<br>1.21***|
|<br>**Differential**|**0.33***|**0.04**|**-0.23**|
|Note: Initial samle of 262 cities w|s divided into two eual samles|ccordin to whether the cit is lobal or local We then ran|a set of univariate ooled reressions of|
|p<br>service performance/access again<br>|q p<br>st selected governance variables(b<br>|g y g .<br>ribery in utility, state capture and control of corruption, as p<br>|p g<br>er columns). The results for the magnitude and<br>|
|significance of coefficients for glob|al and local samples are reported i|n the global city and local city rows, respectively. In each ec|onometric specification, we also included a|
|dummy (for global city=1, local city<br>performance between global and l|=0) to identify the two samples as<br>ocal cities. Last row reports the diff|well as an interactive term (dummy * governance) to captur<br>erential of the coefficients (bolded with significance levels)|e the differential impact of governance on city<br>along with coefficients on governance variables|
|Refer also to Annex A for correlati<br> <br>for full sample and subsets.|on matrix.<br>|,||

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