required. For example, Ethiopia’s PSNP was combined with the Household Asset Building Program, which may have led to the observed strong improvements in the use of fertilizer.<sup>63</sup> We again use partial equilibrium simulations to consider aggregate impacts of increased investments in productive assets by households, based on results from the meta‐analysis. Our simulations assume 10‐ 40% increase in the incidence of livestock ownership and 5‐10% increase in the incidence of land ownership (the meta‐evaluation revealed average increases of 34% and 8% respectively). Prior to interventions, agriculture was very prevalent in the livelihoods of the extreme poor, and many owned agricultural assets: 20% of the extreme poor in Liberia owned medium to large quantities of livestock, versus 8% among the non‐poor (respectively 47% and 17% in Ghana); 85% of the extreme poor in Ghana (97% in Niger) reported ownership of agricultural land.

Assuming programs are well targeted to the poor, simulations indicate that ownership of medium and large quantities of livestock among the extreme poor could rise from 47% to 51–62% in Ghana and from 20% to 22–28% in Liberia. Similarly, poultry ownership, often the first type of livestock acquired by the extreme poor, would increase from 53% to 57–69% in Ghana and from 48% to 53–67% in Liberia. Likewise, well‐targeted programs may raise land ownership from 85% to 89–92% in Ghana and from 97% to 100% in Niger.

# <u>Maximizing safety net interventions for improved outcomes</u>

**It is critical to build safety net programs and delivery capacity during ‘good times’ to ensure that transfers can be used to promote resilience and respond to shocks.** Many of the outcome noted above, were achieved against a backdrop of widespread drought or food price inflation, some of which was unforeseen during program design. For example, in 2012 Tanzania’s PSSN program was scaled up from the original plan of 275,000 to 1.1 million households reaching 15% of the total population (9.7% those below extreme poverty line and 5% those expected to experience a period of transient extreme poverty).<sup>64</sup> Similarly, the PSNP successfully scaled up during the Horn of Africa drought in 2011, supporting an additional 3.1 million beneficiaries for 3 months, and extending the duration of transfers for 6.5 million of the existing 7.6 million beneficiaries.<sup>65</sup> The PSNP’s response to the drought occurred within two months, contrasting with an average response time through the humanitarian system of eight months. The PSNP’s response to the 2011 drought was widely credited with preventing the worst impacts of the drought, leading to comparatively less severe drought impacts within Ethiopia relative to its neighboring countries. The policy implication suggests that a pre‐existing safety net will enable a quick and effective scale up of safety nets in times of greatest need.

**A reduction in the frequency of transfers and a corresponding increase in their value may secure improved resilience outcomes for productive assets.** As previously noted the value and structure of a transfer is critical and policy makers typically advocate for frequent transfers to smooth consumption. The

> 63 Hoddinott et al. 2012 (Ethiopia PSNP).

> 64 World Bank project documents – PSSN program. Evidence from Tanzania’s CB‐CCT was used to inform the design of the PSSN and CB‐CCT beneficiaries who fit the PSSN’s targeting criteria were mainstreamed into the PSSN. 65 World Bank project documents – PSNP program.

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