case of Vietnam, the data show virtually no change in manufacturing shares of exports until the zone program was established (along with a range of other policy initiatives linked to the opening of Vietnam’s economy), followed thereafter by a radical shift in export structure toward manufacturing. Bangladesh experienced a similarly large shift, which only became apparent between 5 and 10 years after its EPZ program was launched. This was driven almost entirely by the growth of the garment sector, which grew from only about 50 firms in the 1980s to more than 4,500 firms employing over 2 million by 2009. In the case of Dominican Republic and Honduras, the structural changes were equally dramatic, although they only occurred after the programs had been operational for 10 years.

A glance at the African country data shows a very different story. Countries like Lesotho (a garment export mono‐economy) and Nigeria experienced no change in their national export structure. Export structures in Senegal and Ghana have fluctuated somewhat over recent decades, with no clear patterns discernable (at least none that appear to have any relationship with their zones programs).Only Kenya and Tanzania appear to show any broad patterns of sectoral adjustment over time. In Tanzania’s case, it is a story of increasing growth of non‐traditional exports, particularly services and minerals; again, with no real link to the EPZ program. Kenya is the only country to have shown a steady rise in manufacturing exports, with a corresponding decline in agricultural exports. However, most of this adjustment appears to have taken place prior to the establishment of their EPZ program, and, in fact, manufacturing share growth appears to have stagnated in the years following the launch of the EPZ program.

One factor at play here may simply be the timing of the launch of EPZ programs in the context of global trade and investment trends. With the exception of Senegal and Lesotho, the other African programs in the study were only operationalized well into the 1990s – probably too late to take advantage of the massive globalization of manufacturing that accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s. One hypothesis is that the structural adjustment seen in Honduras, Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Bangladesh is not a story of economic zones but rather of broader macro trends, which African countries were unable to tap into for any number of reasons (weak micro competitiveness, lack of fiscal and political stability, etc.). An alternative hypothesis is that African countries missed the boat on these opportunities _precisely because_ most African countries lacked an effective instrument like EPZs through which to channel trade and investment.

Analyzing structural changes _within_ the EPZs may provide a measure of the degree to which the zone programs facilitate sectoral adjustment, or instead hinder it. To this end, it is instructive to look at how EPZ programs have responded to changing competitiveness in the garment sector, particularly in the post‐MFA environment. In Jayanthakumaran’s (2003, p.64) seminal study on EPZs concludes that there is “ _a strong correlation between the growth of EPZs and the Multi‐Fiber Arrangement in general_ ” and that the phasing out of MFA and guaranteed market access “ _will eventually result in lower rates of return and will be a possible threat to the existing and new EPZs”_ . Figure 8 illustrates clearly, at a broad regional level, the winners and losers in the garment sector since the expiration of the MFA at the end of 2004. In terms of exports to the US market, East and South Asia (particularly Bangladesh) have grown rapidly at the expense of Central America, the Caribbean, and of Sub‐Saharan Africa, which has experienced declines of up to 40% over just four years. More recent trade data suggest that the crisis 21