rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**_Early numeracy_** _(_ ��.73, ��� �.56� _._ The tests for early numeracy includes a test for measurement concepts, e.g. if the child understands concepts such as tallest/shortest. In a test for verbal counting, children had to count up to 30. Numbers and operations are also administered with a quantitative comparison test, a number identification test analogous to the letter name knowledge test and a shape recognition test where children have to identify basic geometric shapes.

**_Socio-emotional problems_** ���.69, ��� �.26�. To test for behavioral problems, we use the total difficulties score of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ). The score is composed of 5 questions for each of the four categories: emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity/inattention, and peer relationship problems. This test for socio-emotional problems is the only child development measure that is based on the caregiver survey instead of the direct child assessment.

# **3) Results**

The analyses plan was designed to test the three main research questions: 1) are there gradients in child development based on family wealth for children three to five years of age; 2) does parenting show unique components and if so, how do they differentially affect child development, and how is parenting associated with family wealth and child development; 3) how do parenting and nutrition status jointly contribute to child development, and do they account for a portion of the variance in child development due to wealth gradients? We are also interested in looking across these three questions to estimate the proportion of child development accounted for by variations in family wealth, parenting quality, and nutrition status.

13
revenue from both manual and eGP tenders) – 150 such firms were selected; (iv) Always Losers (the remaining firms that were not a part of eGP, manual or always winners).

# 4.2 INDICATORS

41. This section sets out how the three major outcomes of interest— access, economy and efficiency— will be measured. Table 1 provides an overview of the indicators used for each concept.

42. Measuring limited access in public procurement directly follows from the idea of an unjustified restriction of access. Consistent with a set of objective proxies used in the economics and political science literature (Charron et al., 2017; Chong et al., 2015; Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017; Fazekas & Kocsis, 2020; Fazekas & Tóth, 2016; Klasnja, 2016), we proxy access through (i) the number of bidders participating in each tender, through (ii) the share of tenders with only one bidder (single bid), and by (iii) identifying if a tender is won by a local or non-local firm. Non-local firms are firms that are not from the district where the tender was invited.

43. Economy measures crucially depend on an adequate conceptualization of quality which is marketspecific and contestable in the case of many services. As we lack reliable quality measures, we will focus predominantly on prices which are more readily observable. Whereas for highly homogenous goods, such as office equipment, absolute price comparisons are useful (Bandiera et al., 2009), this is impossible for public works. We hence rely on the winning rebate as a relative measure, which compares the original engineer’s estimate with the awarded contract price and refers to the percentage of costs saved relative to the former (Coviello et al., 2018; Decarolis, 2014).

44. We further use delays and cost overruns in contract execution as proxy indicators of economy. Delays are captured by time overruns, that is by how many days the contract was extended beyond the original deadline. Such delays are typically associated with economic costs—for example, because citizens cannot use new infrastructure. They also often signal quality problems requiring corrections. Cost overruns are defined as the ratio of the final amount paid to a firm and the original contract price. Given that both measures capture performance during the contract implementation stage, which was not digitized by the e- procurement system during the period of study, they are indicative of potential displacement effects.

45. Administrative efficiency can be measured by monetizing and summing the government’s total costs of administering tenders and monitoring the implementation of contracts. These costs primarily include staff time, but also advertising costs, costs for printing and mailing tender documents and costs incurred by misprocurement due to administrative errors. The survey of procurement officials served to gather proxy measures of these costs which are not easily observable. The only efficiency-variable available at the tender-level is the time spent on the procurement process. We consider both the overall time required 15
erosion of wage rents whether they were accrued through protection or unionization.<sup>13</sup> Greater opening to foreign investments and trade should result in dp>0 for rich countries and, according to theory (although not always empirical evidence), in dp<0 for poor countries. In any case, we can posit that the increase in the demand for skilled labor is an increasing function of country’s income level _y_ (in accordance with Heckscher-Ohlin), and is also increasing in the extent of trade reform (approximated by dt). The rationale for this second effect is that the greater the reform, the greater the opportunity for the comparative advantage, and in our case, demand for skilled labor to manifest itself. Notice that the distinction between the “pure” skill premium (p) and the observed skill premium (π) allows us to let the first behave as the theory would imply while the second, the observed premium, captures also the effects of union bargaining and sectoral protection. In other words, even if the “pure” premium follows the theory, what we observe may look quite different. The change in the observed premium will then be and the change in inter-sectoral wage differential We would therefore expect that the observed premium will go up because of the dismantlement of pro-unskilled labor regulations (ds<0) but the role of increased demand for skilled labor is ambiguous. In higher-income countries, dp(y)>0 as trade is opened up, but in low income countries, dp may be negative, that is the skill premium may decline if there is an increase in demand for unskilled labor (relative to skilled).<sup>14</sup> Unless this effect is very strong (which, based on the empirical evidence, is unlikely), we would still expect dπ>0 in both poor and rich countries. Wage inequality _within_ each sector and the observed wage inequality between various skills would go up. At the same time, inter-

> temporary labor contracts for young workers and increase in the maximum proportion of workers allowed under temporary contracts; see World Bank, 1996 and 1992a and IMF, 1998).

> 13 Ravenga (1997), for example, finds erosion of union rents to explain the fall of manufacturing real wages in Mexico after trade liberalization.

> 14 The change in the premium is not a policy change but depends on what is country’s comparative advantage and how increased openness (or its reverse) affect it.

16
# **_HHS – NAS gaps, levels_**

With these being some key reasons for the observed gaps between national accounts and household surveys, we now turn to empirically estimating their magnitude. Following the approach of Ravallion (2003) and Deaton (2005), we calculate a set of ratios of the survey to national accounts means. By subtracting one from the ratio, we get a measure of the proportional gap, between the HHS mean and the NAS mean. A negative (positive) gap suggests the survey mean is lower (higher) than the corresponding national accounts mean.<sup>20</sup> The distribution of the gap in our sample of matched survey and national account means is illustrated in Figure 2. Both the unweighted histogram and the country-weighted density functions show that, on average, the gap is well below zero, indicating that survey means on average are lower than national accounts means. The gap is substantially larger with regards to GDP than with HFCE, moreover consumption shows larger variation than income, as reflected in the wider density functions seen for consumption surveys. We estimate the average gap for various subsamples and calculate standard errors clustered at the country level.<sup>21</sup> Table 1 shows the value of the gaps for various sub-samples, by region and survey type. Overall, our estimates suggest that survey means are 20 percent lower than national accounts means for HFCE. There is no statistically significant difference in the gap observed for consumption (22 percent) and income (20 percent). Notably, we find the gaps are substantially larger than the corresponding estimates from Ravallion (2003) and Deaton (2005). Deaton found a gap of 14 percent for consumption and 10 percent for income, while Ravallion estimated a gap of 33 percent for income and 7 percent for consumption, with the difference between income and

> 20 For example, a ratio of 0.9, gives a gap measure of -0.1, suggesting that the survey mean is 10 percent lower than the national accounts mean. 21 Specifically, we estimate an OLS regression of the observed gap on a constant: g n = α + ε for various subsamples and weighting schemes, where α gives us the mean gap. We cluster the variance estimates at ii the country level allowing for errors to be correlated across observations within countries.

14
-?7-

owned enterprises. Further, control over most categories of government expenditures almost disappeared.

As a result, the fiscal deficit exploded to about 42% of GDP in the first siC months of 1992. Money was printed to fmance the deficit and the resulting inflation rate in early 1992 was 14% on a monthly basis. Actual inflation for all of 1992 was 237%.

||**'Talb**|**le**I**Albania rAe**<br>|**nummie**<br>Tndliea<br> <br>|nters<br> <br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||_=9%|14')<br>U|<br>I'OP<br>_._<br>.|1993|
|| GDP<br>Grow*.<br>(Percent<br>Change)|10|-10|-28|-10|11|
|Revenues<br>% GDP|48|47|31|25|28|
|**Expenditres**<br>% GDP<br>_|57<br> <br>_<br>_|_61_<br>_<br>_<br>_|62<br>_<br>_<br>_|47<br>_<br>_<br>_|45|
|DeSickt-9||-15|44|-22|-16|
|(Pern<br>Cbange).<br>|o<br>|O<br>|104|237|31|
|_Indudes_speding are|sfrom199|0.||||

# The 1 _1hwti_ of Grwh and SbbiCty

13. As noted, the first non-communist goverment in Albania was elected in March 1992. Its priorities were to launch structura reforms **to** establish a market economy and to introduce a comprehensive program of stabilization measur. Its success in the latter respect, coupled with high per capita foreign aid flows and remittances from the large numbers of Albanians who have moved abroad to get work, have contibuted to a remarkbly rapid economic unaround in inflation and output Mainly through reductions in expenditures, the budget deficit was reduced to 16% of GDP in 1993 by the new government, of which two-thirds was financed by concessional foreign aid. Remittances from those working abroad al.so contributed $200 million, and subsdanly eased the balance of payments. As a result of the stabilization program, the lek - which had been allowed to
household welfare comparisons,<sup>13</sup> implies a specialized treatment of household production that, as the sections to follow will show, allows it to be suppressed. The literature on models that do explicitly incorporate domestic production tends to be viewed as specializing rather than generalizing the standard approach to modeling the household, that is, as belonging to a subfield concerned with the detailed analysis of the household as a specific economic institution.<sup>14</sup> In much of the relatively new literature on the intra-household allocation of resources in multi-person households, an approach has been adopted that omits household production altogether. Referred to as the “collective” model, the approach reflects the pervasive view in the labor supply literature that non-market time is pure leisure. Models that attempt to address the multi-person nature of households directly will now be examined in some detail.

# **3 Multi-person households**

This section discusses the household utility function approach to modeling the decisions of a multi-person household, followed by an outline of explicitly individualistic models. In examining the latter, various strands in the literature are identified in terms of their assumptions on household production.

# **3.1 The household utility function approach**

In the developed economy literature, the household utility function approach replaces the basic model whenever it seems impossible to ignore the fact that households typically consist of two adult members. For example, in the analysis of female labor supply, surveyed in Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), the analysis of household taxation in

> 13 See, for example, Blundell, Preston and Walker (1994).  The editors of the volume make no mention of domestic time use, nor household production, and confuse the only paper in the volume that is on housework and family welfare with models on the sharing rule that ignore it.

> 14 The literature on household production is typically reviewed separately from that on labor supply and demand modeling. See, for example, the reviews of household production models by Gronau (1986) and female labor supply models by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986).

8
did not work in the last week. For the purposes of this paper, I consider all those who answer affirmatively to _any_ of the four quLestions to have been employed.<sup>20</sup> The Peruvian think-tank GRADE hias calculated comparable consumption and income aggregates for the 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 LSMS, as well as for an LSMS conducted in 1994. Specifically, GRADE used 1997 price deflators to adjust for price differences across natural regions, and the national CPI to deflate consumption and income over time. I use GRADE's income aggregates for the estimations in this paper, but do not use the 1994 LSMS for the analysis because the GRADE aggregates suggest that mean income in this year was lower than in 1991, while the national accoulnts show a clear improvement in income per capita during this period. It is therefore unclear wlhether 1994 should be treated as a "crisis" year.<sup>21</sup> In addition to income, I take variables from the LSMS on1 household composition and size, age, and access to credit.

Table 4 provides detai ls on the construction of the crisis exposure variable used for the OLS regressions in Table 3. Years of exposure is determined by the number of years a child was aged 6 to 17 during the 1988-92 period. For the age calculations, all children surveyed in 1985/86 are taken to have been surveyed in 1985, given that the majority of households were surveyed in 1985 rather thani 1986.

> 20 In the 1985/86 and 1991 surveys, working "on the farm" and working "for themselves, or as an unpaid family member" are asked separately, whereas in the 1997 survey both options are listed as part of the same question. Household chores are meant to be excluded from these categories, and are asked about in the following questions.

> 21 See Deaton 2000 for an analysis and possible explanations of such divergences between the survey and national accounts figures for India il the 1990's.

20
|Coeffcients|Change in one local<br>train line speed|Change in all local<br>train lines speed|
|---|---|---|
|α,β,_a_and_b_|cf. Tab|. D.3|
|fraction of population with<br>signifcant improved accessibility|**2%**|**9%**|
|_R_0<br>τ|27<br>~~C~~/_m_<sup>2</sup><br>-3.7|/month<br>5%|
|δ_R_0as computed by Eq. 5, whenδ_P_=0.|-0.8<br>~~C~~/_m_<sup>2</sup>/year|-3.6<br>~~C~~/_m_<sup>2</sup>/year|
|Simulated values in Sec. 3.2and3.3|-0.8<br>~~C~~/_m_<sup>2</sup>/year|-3.8<br>~~C~~/_m_<sup>2</sup>/year|
|δ_P_<br>_P_ <sup>in the open city case, based on Eq. 5</sup>|3.5%|15.7%|
|<br>Simulated values in Sec. 3.2and3.3|3.2%|14.6%|
|_dR_<br>_R_ <sup>as computed by Eq. 4</sup>|12.26%|11.40%|
|<br>Maximum rent increase in NEDUM-2D simulations|10.76%|9.66%|

Table 2: To compute the value of τ, we assume that transport generalized cost typically represents 15% of income and that transport time, which represents the biggest share of transport generalized cost, decreases by 25%, therefore τ = _−_ 15% _×_ 25% = _−_ 3 _._ 75%. We choose the same coefficients α,β, _a_ and _b_ as in NEDUM-2D simulations (see Tab. D.3). _R_ 0 is taken as the maximum rent in NEDUM-2D simulation (see Fig. D.12a).

explanation is simple: as explained in Sec. 2.2, land value capture potential decreases with the scale of the investment, because of a greater impact on _R_ 0 of large investments.

In the open city case (Fig. 8b), the value which can be captured in the “all lines improvement” scenario becomes almost equal to the value which can be captured in the “RER B improvement” scenario. Indeed, the open city hypothesis cancels out the variation of _R_ 0, and this makes rent variation truly reflect accessibility variation, which is the same in both scenarios. The slight difference (3%) comes from the overlap between different transport lines, which makes that, as noted in previous section, improving all public lines is less efficient in terms of accessibility change than improving one given line.

_Timing of investments._ Let us finally imagine a third, intermediate, case. It is a scenario in which the speed of “RER B” line is increased, such as in Sec. 3.2, but after all other local train line speeds have been similarly increased. This means that after the speed increase of line “RER B”, the situation will be exactly identical to the situation in Sec. 3.3.

This scenario is also represented on Fig. 8: both in open and closed city cases. It leads to a potential land value capture which is smaller than in the first scenario, but bigger than in the second. The reason is that, due to the overlap between transport lines, accessibility gained through the improvement of one line is bigger if the other lines have not been improved yet.

This shows that, when analyzing rent creation, the timing of transport investment is important : when improving/creating several transport lines, land value increase along a given line will be proportionally larger if this line is the first to be improved/created than if it is the last. Land value 18
condition for an increase in manufacturing employment depends on the relative price elasticity of demand for manufactured goods. A rise in the pollution tax rate pushes up the manufacturing firms’ unit cost of production, and hence, the price of their product. Since the relative demand for it declines, the manufacturing firms lower their output level, and thus, labor employment tends to decrease by the scale effect while it tends to increase by the substitution effect between labor and the dirty input. If the demand for the manufactured good does not decrease much, the manufacturing employment would expand. Moreover, in the case in which rural-to-urban migration is promoted, urban unemployment would shrink if and only if agricultural technology exhibits sufficiently strong diminishing returns. More importantly, Daitoh demonstrates that there exists a range of welfare improving pollution tax rates, and the pollution tax rate would unambiguously improve social welfare if it is initially set in a sufficiently low range.

Barbier and Hochard (2017) consider a different aspect of the migration issue, looking at the behavior of households residing in remote, less-favored agricultural lands in developing economies. Using a theoretical model, they demonstrate that compared with a household located on favorable agricultural land, a poor household located on less favorable remote agricultural land is caught in a poverty-environment trap characterized by a steady-state level of low per capita output and capital stock. This occurs when the household is too poor to migrate out of the area and can engage only in agriculture. This is especially pertinent considering the World Bank (2003) study that estimates that about one-fifth of the world’s population lives on less favorable agricultural land, and their number has doubled since 1950. These people are especially susceptible to loss of income and employment due to climate change. Since their agricultural land holdings are underproductive, these households are often motivated to seek other sources of income, often through exploitation of the surrounding natural resources.

# _iii. Wage-Unemployment Curves_

An alternative approach is to assume a wage-unemployment curve, in which higher unemployment goes together with lower wages. This could potentially be rationalized as an outcome of efficiency wages (setting a wage above the market-clearing level to 31
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