**<u>Table 6: Simulation for Post‐Conflict Syria – Projected Variables</u>**

|**Parameter/Variable***|**Note**|**2018**|||||**Scenario**|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||**Optimisti**|**c**||**Moderate**|||**Pessimist**|**ic**|
||||||||**_Average_**<br>|<br>||||
||||**2019‐**<br>**2028**|**2029‐**<br>**2038**|**2039‐**<br>**2048**|**2019‐**<br>**2028**|**2029‐**<br>**2038**|**2039‐**<br>**2048**|**2019‐**<br>**2028**|**2029‐**<br>**2038**|**2039‐**<br>**2048**|
|Public investment‐to‐output ratioI<sup>�</sup>/Y<br>‐ voluntary mobility case|_(1)_|0.010|0.251|0.185|0.140|0.170|0.157|0.120|0.091|0.100|0.100|
|‐ forced repatriation case|||0.250|0.183|0.140|0.168|0.155|0.120|0.088|0.100|0.100|
|Private investment‐to‐output ratioI<sup>�</sup>/Y<br>‐ voluntary mobility case|_(1)_|0.040|0.376|0.277|0.210|0.255|0.236|0.180|0.136|0.150|0.150|
|‐ forced repatriation case|||0.374|0.275|0.210|0.252|0.232|0.180|0.133|0.150|0.150|
|Efficiencyof newpublic investmentθ<sup>�</sup>|_(2)_|0.570|0.625|0.724|0.769|0.615|0.697|0.734|0.570|0.570|0.570|
|Human capitalgrowthg�|_(3)_||0.013|0.014|0.011|0.009|0.013|0.011|0.004|0.010|0.012|
|TFPgrowthg�|_(4)_||0.001|0.021|0.020|‐0.003|0.015|0.014|‐0.009|0.009|0.009|
|Population growth rateg�<br>‐ voluntary mobility case|_(5)_||0.034|0.017|0.011|0.027|0.017|0.011|0.021|0.017|0.012|
|‐ forced repatriation case|||0.039|0.016|0.010|0.039|0.016|0.010|0.039|0.016|0.010|
|Workingage‐to‐population share, growthg�|_(6)_||0.009|0.002|0.000|0.009|0.002|0.000|0.009|0.002|0.000|
|Labor force participation rate, growthg�|_(7)_||‐0.001|0.000|0.000|‐0.001|0.000|0.000|‐0.001|0.000|0.000|

*Multiply by 100 to obtain parameter/variable values in percent share or growth terms (%).

Notes (source and calculation): _(1)_ The 2018 values are from the central projection under conflict. Values under the scenarios are derived using the saving‐investment‐external financing accounting identity, based on assumptions on reconstruction funds and the saving‐to‐output ratio. See Section 4.1.1.

- _(2)_ The 2018 value is from the central projection under conflict. A gradual rise from low‐income efficiency to lower‐middle‐income efficiency and upper‐middle‐middle efficiency are assumed under the moderate and optimistic scenarios respectively. Efficiency is unchanged at the low‐income level under the pessimistic scenario.

- _(3)_ Average years of schooling by age groups are projected based on assumptions on enrollment rates (with the moderate scenario as a simple average of the optimistic and pessimistic scenario). Overall average years of schooling is based on population projections across the scenarios. See Section 4.1.3.

- _(4)_ Based on the Kim and Loayza (2019) model, assuming the TFP overall determinants index follows a similar trajectory as that of Korea (over 1985‐2014) under the optimistic scenario, and the UAE under the pessimistic scenario. TFP growth under the moderate scenario is a simple average of the values under the other two scenarios. See Section 4.1.4.

- _(5)_ The optimistic scenario under the voluntary mobility case is based directly on projections from United Nations (2017). For other scenarios, the UN projections are adjusted to reflect higher or lower refugee returns. See Section 4.1.2.

- _(6)_ United Nations (2017).

- _(7)_ Based on ILO projections up to 2030 of the labor force participation rates, held constant thereafter.

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