absent and transfer teachers to more desirable schools and posts.<sup>39</sup> Although comparable data are not currently available to show if regularization of contract teachers in India follows similar clientelist models, several have suggested that that such regularization is at times politically motivated.

Finally, contract teachers, at least in India, generally have received less formal education and training than regular teachers. The 2010 PROBE Revisited report indicates that 28% of permanent teachers in the Indian states they surveyed had post-graduate degrees, while only 16% of contract teachers did. 34% of contract teachers reported having no training compared to 9% of permanent, while only 11% of contract teachers had degree training (B Ed) compared to 27% of regular teachers. 18% of contract teachers had a diploma in education compared to 56% of permanent. Still, fewer contract teachers (3%) had reached only a class 10 education than regular teachers (15%), but this difference is likely because in the states surveyed 62% of contract teachers were under 30, while only 10% of permanent teachers were, meaning many regular teachers were educated in a time when many more Indians did not reach class 10. Contract teachers in the states surveyed were young and educated, but generally not as educated as the regular teachers, nor did they necessarily have a background in education. The PROBE report finds “. . . by and large, contract teachers are underpaid and unprepared for fulfilling the expectations of teaching children, particularly first generation learners from remote, poor and disadvantaged communities.”<sup>40</sup> Overall, the available evidence to date suggests that the use of contract teachers can enhance access to education in some settings, and that contract teachers may have incentives to work harder than civil service teachers, at least in the short-term. But there is no evidence that the widespread and sustained use of contract teachers is likely to improve educational outcomes. Indeed, evidence from organizational psychology, experimental economics, and microeconomics suggest that individuals want to be treated fairly and generally seek to create a reliable and secure life plan for themselves, in the absence of which they become less committed to their work. Individuals treat others reliably if they feel their own lives are reliable.<sup>41</sup> As a result, the policy challenge is to motivate contract teachers with the prospect of a career – and not just the loss of a job – in the way that lawyers, doctors, and other professionals are motivated with a variety of professional opportunities. One summary assessment finds: “In the case of contract teachers, the absence of opportunities for career development in some countries resulted in increased turnover and loss of the most competent contract teachers. Those countries that defined contract teacher positions within the teaching profession and clearly

> 39 Tara Beteille, Absenteeism, Transfers and Patronage: The Political Economy of Teacher Labor Markets in India, Executive Summary at http://blogs.worldbank.org/files/africacan/beteilleexecsummary(1).pdf 40 CORD India, PROBE Revisited 2010

> 41 See, for instance, Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1986. “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” In: _Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology._ Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1986, pp. 101-16; Rabin, Matthew. 2003. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics” _American Economic Review_ 83(5), pp. 1281-1302; and Fehr, Ernst. G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Rieldl. 1993. “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-460.

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