rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
24

# Team Systems

A second important Innovation of many new work systems is the shift to various forms of shopfloor and office teamwork (Windolf 1989). Traditional assembly-line organization based on isolated work stations, it tums out, contains built-in limitations on worker participation and flexibility. Traditional 'fragmentedt job assignments limit worker contributions to production improvements, commitment to product quality, and capacity for flexible deployment in the workplace. Japanese team organization, by contrast, including cross-training, job rotation, integration of tasks, and regular team meetings, has demonstrated dramatic potential for productivity and product quality gains.

At the same time, unions in Germany, especially IG Metall, have been promoting "group work," both for its production improvements and as a more humanis<sup>t</sup> ic form of organization (Tumer 1991, pp.111-17). The German version places an emphasis on broad work assignments, broadened responsibility and autonomy for the groups, as well as enhanced skills training and broad upgrading of group members.

Although experience with teamwork in the U.S. and Britain shows mixed results, evidence from Japanese plants, from Japanese-run plants in the U.S. such as NUMMI, and from German pilot projects indicates that considerable gains are possible in productivity, quality, and flexibility, with or without newtechnology (MacDuffie and Krafcik 1992; Katz, Kochan and Keefe 1987). Gains are especially likely when new work organization is associated with extensive skills training, so that workers are able to integrato tasks and solve problems that arise, and with cooperative, participatory labor-management relations. Team or group systems are thus most likely to work well in countries such as Japan and Gerrnany, that already have strong institutional underpinnings for training and for worker/union participation. In other countries, it is necessary to establish such underpinnings, to promote cooperation. participation and training, along with the introduction of more flexibleteam or group forms of organization. The necessary underpinnings can range from joint labor-management committees at the plant level to national legislation to promote training and to establish some nationally appropriate version of works councils.
Mazumdar (1994) and Mullins and Pyle (1994)). The detailed and comprehensive dataset exploited here permits us to assess the impact of capital regulations while simultaneously controlling for other important features of the policy environment.

Before concluding this subsection, we note that capital regulatory policies do not fit easily into the helping-hand/grabbing-hand taxonomy. Capital regulations may be designed to align incentives, and also reflect the 'govermment knows best' orientation of the helping-hand view, On the other hand, onerous capital regulations may reflect excessive government involvement, according to the grabbing-hand view, unless the capital regulations are part of a regulatory package that empowers private-sector oversight of banks.

# **II.D. Deposit insurance design**

Countries often adopt deposit insurance schemes to provide protection for unsophisticated and small depositors, who face coordination and free-rider problems.<sup>7</sup> If too many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds at once, an illiquid but solvent bank can fail. Moreover, monitoring banks is expensive and there is an externality associated with monitoring to curtail risk-taking behavior. Therefore, depositors will have a tendency to free ride, so that there is a socially suboptimal level of monitoring. To ameliorate these problems, a helping-hand proponent would favor deposit insurance to protect payment and credit systems from contagious bank runs _plus_ tight official oversight to augment private-sector monitoring of banks.

Potential gains from a deposit insurance scheme come at a cost, however. Even in the 1930s, there were concerns that deposit insurance would encourage excessive risk-taking behavior [Barth (1991)]. Indeed, this argument helped defeat the 150 legislative attempts to institute formal deposit guarantees prior to the establishment of one in 1933 in the United States! The moral-hazard problem, which is aggravated by deposit insurance, continues to be a concern today. Thus, even those subscribing to the helping-hand view may argue that the adverse-incentive costs of deposit insurance outweigh the benefits. Yet, many believe that official regulation and supervision can control the

> 7After the adoption of a national deposit insurance system in the United States in 1934, in other countries explicit systems grew slowly for the first 30 years, with only 6 being established. Then adoptions accelerated: 22 formal systems existed by the 50t anniversary of the U.S. system, about 70 systems were in place by the close of 2000, and many other countries are planning on adopting an explicit deposit insurance scheme.

10
|Shallow Tubewell and Low Lift PumpIrrigation Development Proje|c HenryP. Gassner|
|---|---|
|Shallow Tubewell and Low Lift PumpIrrigation Development Proje|c HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Flood Control and Drainage Project(04)|HenryP. Gassner|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Fourth Dhaka Water SupplyProject|Zahed Hossain Khan|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Agricultural Research Management Project|Robert S. Epworth|
|Flood Rehabilitation Project(02)||
|Flood Rehabilitation Project||
|Flood Rehabilitation Project||
|Flood Rehabilitation Project||
|Flood Rehabilitation Project||
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project|Thampil Pankaj|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Dhaka Water SupplyProject(03)|Jonathan S. Kamkwalala|
|Integrated Nutrition Project|Michele Gragnolati|
**Table 4  Bhopal: Estimated MWTP and confidence intervals (INR)**

||_OLS_|_BHOPAL_<br>_LAG- Direct_|_LAG – With Multiplier_|
|---|---|---|---|
|MWTP – water (dpw)|44|41|54|
|Confidence Intervals||||
|Classic|13 - 69|14 - 69|19 - 90|
|White|13 - 70|14 - 70|19 - 90|
|HAC-epanechnikov|11 -72|12 -71|16-93|

**Table 5  Bangalore: Estimated MWTP and confidence intervals (INR)**

||_OLS_|_BANGALORE_<br>_LAG- Direct_|_LAG – With Multiplier_|
|---|---|---|---|
|MWTP – water (dpw)|101|89|117|
|Confidence Intervals||||
|Classic|48- 153|37 - 140|49 – 185|
|White|46 - 155|35 - 142|46 - 188|
|HAC-epanechnikov|41 - 160|33- 144|43- 191|

Since local public service provision was one of the main concerns in the two household surveys, the survey instrument also included a standard WTP questionnaire. Households were asked how much they would be willing to pay for improved water access using a stochastic payment card (e.g., Wang and Whittington 2005). Rather than presenting households with only one charge, this design starts with a very high charge which is then gradually reduced. At each step, the household is asked whether they would be willing to pay this charge with answers precoded as _definitely not_ , _probably not_ , _not sure_ , _probably yes_ , and _definitely yes_ . For Bangalore, the resulting point estimate of WTP for “definitely yes” is INR 119.62, while for Bhopal it is INR 45.14. For “probably yes” they are INR 170.12 and INR 119.34 respectively. This suggests a surprising degree of consistency between our estimated WTP and the survey responses. Although evidence from only two surveys is insufficient to draw general conclusions, the similarity of the two estimates lends credence to the hedonic estimation approach and also suggests that residents are able to quite accurately judge the value of water supply services.

# **VII. Simulations and Policy Analysis**

As an alternative to the traditional analytical derivation of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) presented in the previous section, we also implement a simulation approach following a methodology similar to the one outlined in Anselin and Le Gallo (2006). The essence of the approach is that valuation is based on the computation of predicted values for individual observations given their actual household characteristics. Average valuation of a given policy
- availability and quality of documented procedures for borrowing in local currency in the domestic market; and

- availability and involvement of legal advisor in external borrowing.

At the other end of the spectrum the dimensions of debt management where small states assessed were found to have the greatest weakness were:

- availability and quality of documented procedures for borrowing in foreign markets;

- quality and timeliness of the publication of a debt statistical bulletin (or its equivalent) covering total central government debt (external and domestic);

- frequency of internal and external audits on debt management activities, policies, and operations and publication of an external audit.

Significant weaknesses were also observed in the quality of the debt management strategy and the lack of an operational risk management plan, including business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements. In each of these Debt Management Performance Indicators (DPIs) only one small state was able to satisfy the minimum requirement of the DeMPA.

**Figure 5: Number of Small States Meeting Minimum Requirements of DPIs**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Legal framework<br>90<br>Debt Reporting Managerial Structure<br>80<br>70<br>Debt Records 60 Debt Management Strategy<br>50<br>40<br>Segregation of Duties, Staff 30 Evaluation of Debt<br>Capacity and BCP 20 Management Operations<br>10<br>0<br>Debt Administration and<br>Audit<br>Data Security<br>Cash Flow Forecasting and Coordination with Fiscal<br>Cash Balance Management Policy<br>Loan Guarantees, On Coordination with Monetary<br>lending Derivatives Policy<br>External Borrowing Domestic Borrowing<br>Non-small states Small states<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: DeMPA reports for 17 sample small states and 42 non-small states A more detail analyses of the DeMPA findings in small states reveals the following.

**_Small states score well with regard to coordination with fiscal policy and monetary policy._** Coordination of debt management with fiscal policy has been strengthened by the overall improvements in the management of public finances that small states have undertaken, often in

15
connections, but concluded that the overall incidence of such problems is relatively small. The internal review estimated that the rate of incorrect/mistaken dibao benefits was 4% (Xinhuanet 2013). The basis of this estimate is not explained.

To address problems in dibao implementation, in early 2013 the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced some new policies that were to be adopted nationwide. The new policies include (1) allowing households to apply for dibao benefits directly to the county Department of Civil Affairs rather than having to go through the village and township levels, (2) requiring that county‐level officials visit and check at least 30% of applications, (3) instituting a filing and auditing system for close relatives of local officials and village leaders involved in dibao implementation, (4) establishing and improving systems for community feedback, and (5) establishing a systematic mechanism for checking information on dibao applications against information in other departments, e.g., vehicle registration data and savings account information (Xinhuanet 2013).

These sorts of reports reveal divergence between policies and implementation. Although it is difficult to know exactly the extent of such divergence, the reports raise questions about the rural dibao program’s performance, targeting, and impact on poverty.

# **III. Data**

For our analysis we use two types of data. First, we use rural household survey data for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 collected by the China Household Income Project (CHIP) in conjunction with the Rural Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) project. Hereafter we will refer to these as the CHIP data. During the years covered by the CHIP data, the rural dibao program expanded rapidly nationwide. As of 2009, coverage was about 90% of the program’s level at full implementation, which was attained after 2010 (Table 1). Second, we use administrative data published by the MOCA on rural dibao thresholds, transfers and expenditures. The MOCA data are available at the county level. We use the MOCA data for counties covered in the CHIP survey to create a matched dataset for the same years. The CHIP rural survey covers 82 counties, and for 77 we are able to match county‐level information from MOCA.

The CHIP rural survey sample is covers about 8000 rural households containing more than 30,000 individuals in nine provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, 8
Indeed, pests affected cashew plantations in 2007 but did not affect the 2013 harvest. In this context, access of farmers to inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers) may be important for the development and maintenance of stocks.

**<u>Sub-brokers:</u>** Sub-brokers (or intermediate traders) are local producers or agents who have established business networks with the producers, to facilitate interaction with traders. There are no statistics on sub-brokers, but the number is large enough not to pose competition concerns (it may range between 1,000 agents and over 5,000 agents depending on the source).

**<u>Traders:</u>** These agents buy cashew nuts from producers or intermediate traders to sell them to exporters and processors. There are 39 traders in GNB, small in size according to local sources. Assuming an even distribution of market shares among traders (about 2.56 percent each) the concentration in this segment can be summarized by value of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) equal to 256.

# **<u>Box 2.1. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)</u>**

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration, equal to the sum of the square of market shares of each firm competing in a market, which is multiplied times 10,000. This way, the index ranges between 0 and 10,000. That is, let _si_ be the market share of firm _i_ , for _i=1,...,n_ . Then n 2 si HHI= 10,000 × �i=1 Assume homogeneous goods. For a given demand and cost structure, when there are n symmetric firms, market share is 1/n and HHI =10,000/n. Then, HHI = 10,000 in the case of a monopoly; 2,500 in the case of 4 symmetric firms; 500 in the case of 20 symmetric firms, and so on. In a perfectly competitive market, HHI tends to zero.

When costs are asymmetric, firms with lower marginal cost get higher market share and HHI tend to reflect a concentrated market. To understand this result, assume two symmetric firms, so that their market share is 50 percent and HHI =5,000. Then reduce marginal cost of firm 1 and increase marginal cost of firm 2. Firm 1 will produce more and get a share over 50 percent, while firm 2 will produce less and get a share under 50 percent. HHI will go over 5,000.

A proportional reduction in marginal cost, or a demand increase for a given cost structure, does not change HHI in the symmetric case, but tends to decrease HHI in the asymmetric case because cost differences relative to the market size shrink. Source: Tirole (1990).

**<u>Exports and exporters:</u>** Total exports of raw cashews showed a positive trend during the last 15 years (see Figure 3) to reach 138,000 tons in 2013 (after peaking at 160,000 tons in 2011, when international prices also reached record levels).

The export segment of the raw-cashew value chain is relatively fragmented although it is dominated by Indians. There have been between 51 and 49 active exporters in the period 2011 5
**31**

# TAKLE 13 Debt Ratios in Key Years

||Total Debt As P|ercent of Expo|rts|
|---|---|---|---|
||<br>1978|<br>1982|<br>1986|
|LowIncose|2601|333Z|4261|
|NiddleIncose|183%|219Z|<br>284Z|
|Highly Indebted|222%|2871|3d9%|
|<br>Manufacturing<br>Exporters|201%|2242|239Z|
|<br> <br>**_Primary_**<br>Goods<br>Exporters|170%|2711|343%|
|<br> <br>Oil Exporters|191%|200%|<br>352Z|
|<br>LAC|257X|319%|<br>4321|
|Asia|128Z|156%|<br>1871|
|EHENA|2001|1812|241Z|
|SSAF|126X|205%|<br>343X|
is the cumulative share of exports of the ith product. The Gini coe ffi cient uses the trapezoid approximation to calculate the area between a 45 degree line and the cumulative distribution, weighting each industry as an equal share of the population of industries (1/n). A Gini coe ffi cient of zero indicates that export shares are equally distributed across all industry groups; an increase in the Gini coe ffi cient implies an increase in specialization.

Table 2 reports the Gini coe ffi cient for 1992 and 2005 for the whole sample of products and some sub-samples. The Gini coe ffi cient remained unchanged over the sample period at 0.85 when all products are included. However, when a sub-sample of the largest goods accounting for 70 percent of exports are included, the Gini coe ffi cient increases from 0.46 to 0.55. Similarly, when we only include the top 100 products, which account for 45 percent of exports in 1992 period and nearly 50 percent in 2005, the Gini coe ffi cient increased from 0.35 to 0.50. Thus, over the period we see enhanced specialization - a smaller number of products account for an increased size of China’s exports - though the bundle of goods exported has changed.

# 6. Intensive vs. Extensive Margin

Has the large export growth mainly been in new product varieties or existing varieties? A new variety is generally de fi ned as the export of a new product code, that is, a product code for which there are positive exports one period and zero exports in an earlier period. One of the main problems using this de fi nition is that there have been major reclassi fi cations in the trade data in 1996 and 2002 at the HS 6-digit level, thus a product might be classi fi ed as a new variety just because there has been a new product code or previous codes were split. For example, in one year cherry tomatoes were reclassi fi ed into a new product code rather than being part of the tomatoes category. In this case, cherry tomatoes would appear to be counted as a new variety even though they were exported in previous periods. In contrast, at screen televisions received a new classi cation and these are in fact new varieties.

8
gap after controlling for both log of GDP and year fixed effects. Sanitation initially appears to explain much of the Africa-South Asia gap in child height. Section 4.4 considers the decomposition of this difference in more detail, using child-level height data.

# **3 Evidence from within Indian districts**

How much of the change over time in Indian children’s height is accounted for by the increase over time in sanitation coverage? One challenge to answering this question well is that, unfortunately, improvements in sanitation in India have been slow. As an illustration, in its 2005-6 DHS, 55.3 percent of Indian households reported open defecation, and the mean child was 1.9 standard deviations below the reference mean; this combination is almost identical to neighboring Pakistan’s in its 1990-1 DHS 15 years earlier, when 53.1 percent of households did not use a toilet or latrine and the mean height for age was 2 standard deviations below the mean. This section studies change over time within India by constructing a panel of districts out of India’s 1992-3 and 1998-9 DHS surveys.

## **3.1 Data and empirical strategy**

The National Family and Health Surveys (NFHS) are India’s implementation of DHS surveys. This section analyzes a district-level panel constructed out of the NFHS-1 and NFHS-2.<sup>11</sup> Districts are political subdivisions of states. Some districts merged or split between survey rounds, so households in the survey are matched to a constructed “district” that may be a coarser partition than actual district boundaries. In particular, a primary sampling unit (PSU) is assigned to a constructed district such that all splits and merges are assigned to the coarser partition, creating the finest partition such that each PSU is in the same constructed district as all PSUs which would have shared a district with it in either period. Thus if there were two districts _A_ and _B_ in the first round, which split before the second round into _A_<sup>_′_</sup> ,

> 11The third and most recent NFHS does not include district identifiers.

15