(including for production figures, as Customs do not have the facility and capacity to verify the weight and quality of gold independently), and does not have adequate expertise to check accounts and perform audits. A general review of exemptions conducted by the government in 2010 did not include the mining sector. Besides, if the Mining Act of 2006 grants responsibility to the Parliament to ratify large mining leases and contracts, the performance of these responsibilities is affected by executive dominance, and thus checks and balances supposed to secure independent control are rendered dysfunctional. Also, cases of conflict of interest have been occurring in the recent past, with members of the Parliamentary Select Committee directly involved in mining activities and sitting in boards of companies.<sup>16</sup> In recent years, budget laws have tried to improve revenue collection from the mining sector. This included raising in 2010 the royalty rate from the sliding 3-6 percent range to 5 percent and simplifying its computation to limit tax evasion. But stability clauses prevented their broad implementation, as the 2 largest mines, representing 2/5 of total output staid insulated. In 2012, the government introduced a windfall tax of 10 percent and a capital gain tax on mining concessions, increased corporate tax from 25 to 35 percent, limited yearly capital allowances to 20 percent of corresponding capital expenditures, and prevented companies to transfer costs from one mining site to another to inflate costs. A renegotiation team was also set up to harmonize agreements and accounting rules for assessing mineral revenue through legislative instruments for Act 703, and a mineral revenue task force to coordinate collection efforts.

The more recent fiscal and regulatory petroleum regimes also try to address some of the shortcomings encountered in the mining sector. The fiscal regime includes a 5 percent royalty on production, a 35 percent corporate tax, a 20 percent capital allowance, and a progressive windfall tax (additional oil entitlement) depending on the value of the rent (above the unit cost of US$50 per barrel). The Petroleum Revenue Management Act 815 of 2011 clarifies revenue collection provisions and responsibilities for the upstream oil and gas sector, while the Petroleum Commission Act 821 of 2011 clarifies regulatory responsibilities and confines the role of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation to commercial operations.

Progress is also being made in terms of defining and agreeing on realistic local content objectives and obligations. Regulations are now being developed, in consultation with the mining sector, to give effect to mining code provisions on local content. While the code requires preference to be given to local companies that can match the cost and technical aspects of imported products, these provisions have so far not been sufficiently developed, disseminated, monitored, and enforced. In the face of it, Ghana’s Chamber of Mines has undertaken a process of identifying opportunities for increasing supply and assessing support needs of local enterprises. To support realization of these opportunities, the Ghana Chamber of Mines has also identified collective actions by the mining companies to support local procurement.

In 2003, Ghana signed onto the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and was declared EITI compliant in 2010 for mining activities. In 2010, EITI principles were extended to oil and gas sectors. Transparency provisions included in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 815 were also considered satisfactory by most Civil Society Organizations. In this light, government has developed the draft Oil and Gas Reporting Templates for Ghana. The scope of reporting has also gone beyond government revenues and companies payments, to include information such as government expenditures at the national and sub-national level. With about seven publications, Ghana EITI reports

> 16 See Ayee et al. (2011).

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