rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
(interest rate spreads, etc.) as independent variables in growth regressions. Trade in financial services has not figured prominently until recently. One of the first papers to focus on the effects of barriers to financial services trade is Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). They ask whether the entry of foreign banks makes domestic banks more competitive. Using bank-level data for 80 countries for 1988-95, including data on the extent of foreign ownership in national banking markets, they compare net interest margins, overhead, taxes paid, and profitability of foreign and domestic banks. They note that the comparative functions of foreign banks and domestic banks is very different in developing and industrial countries, possibly because of a different customer base, different bank procedures, and different regulatory and tax regimes. In developing countries foreign banks tend to have greater profits, higher interest margins, and higher tax payments than do domestic banks. In industrial countries it is the domestic banks that have greater profits, higher interest margins, and higher tax payments.<sup>42</sup> Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga show that increasing the foreign share of bank ownership reduces profitability and overhead expenses in domestically owned banks. The number of foreign entrants matters more than their market share, suggesting that they affect local bank competition more on entry rather than after gaining a substantial market share. These effects hold even when controlling for the fact that foreign banks may be attracted to markets with certain characteristics, such as low banking costs.

Cho (1988) highlights some policy lessons from the opening of the Korean insurance market in the 1980s. Cho stresses the importance of market structure and policies that restrict competition, analyzing how the existence of limited competition in the Korean insurance market motivated efforts (successful) on the part of US companies to gain access to the market, in the process strengthening the coalition opposing more general (MFN) liberalization. This paper provides some empirical evidence for the theoretical framework developed in Francois and Wooton (2001a) to analyze the incentives for a domestic cartel confronting foreign pressure to open the market to competition to allow in only a few foreign firms.

Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) analyze the effects of deregulation and liberalization on consolidation in the Spanish insurance industry. Their sample period 1989-1998 spans the introduction of the European Union’s Third Generation Insurance Directives, which was aimed at integration of the EU insurance market, through, inter alia, the adoption of a single EU license for insurers and home country supervision. This led to major changes in the Spanish insurance market: the number of firms in the industry declined by 35 percent and the average firm size

> 42 Berger et al. (2004) study the determinants of entry by foreign financial services providers and conclude that a mix of traditional comparative advantage and firm-specific assets can explain these findings.

27
# **Participatory Accountability and Collective Action: Evidence from Field Experiments in Albanian Schools**<sup>**◊**</sup>

Abigail Barr Truman Packard Danila Serra<sup></sup> University of Nottingham World Bank Florida State University

## **JEL CODES** : C93, D72, H4, O12

**KEYWORDS** : education; accountability; participation; collective action; public good game

> ◊ We thank Klaus Abbink, Margaret McConnell, Ragan Petrie, John Ryan, Paula Cordero Salas, Tim Salmon, Sara Solnick, Pedro Vicente, Jane Zhang and seminar participants at Florida State University, Southern Methodist University, the University of Texas Dallas, Wesleyan University, the 2011 SEA conference, and the 2011 North-American ESA meeting for useful comments and suggestions. We are indebted to the Institute for Development Research Alternatives (IDRA), who collected the data, and especially Auron Pasha, Enkelejda Pashaj and Adela Gjergjani for their technical excellence and professionalism. Financing for data collection was provided as part of the World Bank‟s Accountability for Better Governance program, conducted by the Human Development Economics Group, in the Bank‟s Europe and Central Asia Regional Office.  The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the World Bank Group, its Board of Directors or the governments they represent. The usual disclaimers apply.

>  Corresponding author. Address: Department of Economics, Florida State University, 258 Bellamy, Tallahassee, FL 32306. Email: dserra@fsu.edu.
# **1 Introduction**

Innovation is the engine of creative destruction (Schumpeter et al., 1942) and a key ingredient of economic growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). At the micro/firm level, a growing empirical literature has documented the impact of innovation on productivity (see Hall (2011) and Mohnen and Hall (2013) for a survey of a large sample of studies in the OECD) and on employment (see Dosi and Mohnen (2018)). Less is known, however, about the relationship between innovation and wages, especially in developing economies where innovation intensity is lower than in advanced economies despite the potential gains from technological catch up (Cirera and Maloney, 2017).

A significant number of studies have analyzed the impact of skill-biased technological change on wages and employment in developed economies (see Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). More recently, in the same vein as Schumpeterian theory, some studies have analyzed more directly the relationship between innovation, invention and patenting on wages (Reenen, 1996; Aghion et al., 2019, 2018; Akcigit et al., 2017). These studies focus on the impact on wages via the extent of appropriation of the rents created by innovation. An additional channel through which innovation affects wages is via increased performance of innovative firms. When firms keep some degree of wage-setting in imperfectly competitive labor markets (Mortensen, 2003) and innovation increases firm productivity, workers may benefit from higher wages in innovative firms. Dickens and Katz (1986) find significant sector effects explaining wage setting in the United States. Card et al. (2018), reviewing different studies, find that the elasticity of wages to value added per worker is in the range of 0.05-0.15 and, more importantly, firm specific wage-premiums can explain up to 20% in total wage variation.<sup>1</sup> So, in summary, if innovation creates improvements in productivity or rents that can be appropriated by workers, one should expect a wage premium associated to innovation.

One important empirical question, however, is to what types of workers and for what types of innovation is there a wage premium. The scant literature on innovation in developing countries finds lower innovation activity in these countries (Cirera and Maloney, 2017), in some cases as a result of lower returns to innovation (Go ̃ni and Maloney, 2017). If these returns are lower, it is unclear what rents or productivity gains can be extracted by workers. Also, if different types of workers have different bargaining powers, one may expect an increase in within-firm wage inequality (Aghion, 2002) but not necessarily a positive wage premium in lower skill occupations. Therefore, it is important to understand if this wage premium applies to firms in middle- and low-income countries, and to what types of skills

> 1 Also, a large literature has analyzed the “decoupling” of wages with productivity (see Feldstein, 2008), which measures how much wage changes depart from labor productivity changes.

2
# **1.3 Remote sensing assessment of oil production with gas venting**

At any given moment, a site is in one of three _production states_ :

- _S_ 1 **: The site is producing with natural gas flaring** Iraq is among the countries with the highest volume of gas flared per unit of oil produced and like Syria, did not have any regulatory limits on flaring before the war [47]. Oil production with flaring is thus the generic production state when a site is producing oil.

- _S_ 2 **: The site is producing without gas flaring (i.e. venting)** A site that extracts crude oil could simply vent the accumulated natural gas. Although venting is wasteful and harmful to the environment, methane is lighter than air so that controlled venting (e.g. through a stack) would not constitute a fire or explosion hazard. Venting would happen on a site if (i) the operator voluntarily shuts down the pilot flame in the flare stack, or (ii) long periods of inactivity extinguish the pilot, which is not re-ignited as production resumes.

- _S_ 3 **: The site is inactive** A site might become inactive if fighting has damaged productive infrastructure or no qualified personnel are available to operate the site.

Distinguishing between these production states is important since the lack of RH does not necessarily imply an absence of oil production; venting remains a possibility. Because the narrow spectral bands used in the estimation of RH – the near-infrared (NIR) bands M7 and M8, the short-wave-infrared (SWIR) band M10, and the mid-wave-infrared (MWI) bands M12 and M13 – are not sensitive enough to detect low light from low-intensity flaring, we also make use of data from VIIRS’ Day/Night band (DNB). DNB is a wide, visible, and NIR imaging spectral band, designed to detect moonlit clouds. The DNB’s low detection limits make it possible to detect electric lighting present at the Earth’s surface [27, 7, 48, 31, 39], which cannot be sensed in the infrared spectral channels; it is even sensitive to moonlight reflection on the Earth.

8
10

# **_3.3 The financial cost of corruption_**

**Figure 5: Average bribes to “get things done” (% of sales) and to secure public contracts (% of contract)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 4.5<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4.4<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.8<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2.8 2.8<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Payments to "get things done" Payments to secure gov contracts<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006_ On average, Mauritanian firms make informal payments to “get things done” of about 4.8 percent of the annual sales and of 7.7 percent of the contract value to secure contracts with the government. Survey results show bribes in percentage of the sales increase with size up to a point and then decrease. Medium companies are the ones that pay a larger percentage of their sales (7.8 percent).<sup>8</sup> To secure government contracts, medium and large firms report to pay, on average, 7.8 and 7.0 percent of the contract value, respectively, while micro and small firms pay on average 4.5 and 6.2 percent (See Figure 5). Furthermore, the payment of bribes as a percentage of sales are, on average, larger for firms with foreign capital, and with accounts audited externally (see Annex 6).

The average payment of firms in Mauritania to “get things done” (as a percentage of total sales, 4.8 percent) is higher than in neighboring countries such as Senegal (1.7 percent) and Mali (3.4 percent), but around half the value for Niger (9.6 percent) and lower than Cameroon and Benin. Informal payments to secure contracts with the government (as a share of the value of the contract) are higher in Mauritania (7.7 percent) <!-- Start of picture text --> 6.2*<br>1.7***<br>12.7***<br>9.6**<br>5.9*<br>3.4*<br>6.5<br>5.5<br>8.8<br>5.0<br>7.7<br>4.8<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Payments to secure gov contracts<br>Payments to "get things done"<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: *Means statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 10% level. **Means statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 5% level. ***Means statistically different from Mauritania’s at the 1% level. _Source: Mauritania ICS, 2006._

> 8 The size categories are (number of employees): micro (1-5); small (6-10); medium (11-20), and large (more than 21). Employment is a variable with a left-skewed distribution, which makes it difficult to create an even distribution for the four size categories.
For instance, the 3ie gap map on climate change mitigation and adaptation was used as an input to a priority setting workshop for a proposed climate change thematic window (funding program) and included both primary studies and systematic reviews (Snilstveit et al., forthcoming). We knew the evidence base was relatively limited and we had several objectives with the gap map. Our aim was that it would inform a strategic approach to funding through a climate change research program, by highlighting areas where primary studies were needed and any areas with a sufficient numbers of primary studies for systematic reviews. Additionally, we aimed to develop a comprehensive collection of evidence on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation activities, continuously updated as new evidence emerges.

Another example is a gap map on agriculture. It had been established that there was a relatively large number of both primary studies and systematic reviews in this field. The objective of this gap map was to inform the commissioning of future research in a planned 3ie thematic funding program on agricultural innovation, as well as providing a resource for policy making. Therefore we included both primary studies and systematic reviews in the gap map.

# _Searching for relevant studies and assessing inclusion_

The next step is developing a strategy for populating the gap map framework with studies meeting the study inclusion criteria. The methods for doing so should draw on methods of systematic searching commonly used for systematic reviews and overviews of reviews, although the broad scope of the gap map necessitates some adaptations. The search effort depends on the time and resources available, as well as the intended use of the gap map. When the main purpose of the gap map is to inform commissioning of research, then the search can be tailored and less extensive. But if the main purpose of the gap map is to inform policy and practice, searching needs to be comprehensive and systematic.

If the gap map includes impact evaluations, the search for relevant impact studies will necessarily be more limited than in a systematic review, as gap maps have a broader scope and different purpose from systematic reviews. Therefore, while the search should be as comprehensive as possible, the search methods may need to be adapted for the research to be 11
reports the same regressions as in table 2 with stature instrumented.<sup>5</sup> The land holding of the father of the current employed individual (as this individual recollects it) is used as one of the instruments. The first stage regression is reported in table A1 of the appendix. As the survey obtained height information from all adults but earnings for only a subset, the full sample was used for instrumenting height and standard errors for the second stage IV were obtained by bootstrapping rather than running the IV estimates as a simultaneous set of equations. This approach was also motivated by the fact that the first step of the IV corresponds to equation 1 presented in the methodology while the wage equation is an estimate for equation 3. Time variant information that is observed at the time of employment does not pertain to the production of skills in equation 1 and thus is not appropriate in the estimation of height. The F statistic for the first stage regressions reported in columns 1-4 exceeds the rule of thumb for plausible instruments from Stock and Yogo (2005).

Columns 5 and 6 offer results using an alternative instrument, the residual of a regression for the child’s height. This residual is assumed to pick up common genetic factors as well as other elements of the child height regression which are orthogonal to other determinants of child height. Carslake et al. (2013) use a similar approach as an instrument for father’s height; however, in their study, son’s height rather than a residual is employed as an instrument. As only a subset of the sample had children who were measured, the regressions in columns 5 and 6 have fewer observations. This has a moderate effect on the significance of the height coefficient, but the point estimate is similar to that in columns 1 and 2. The point estimates are again similar when both potential instruments are included in columns 7 and 8 but the standard errors increase. The

> 5 As columns 2 and 3 in table 2 are not affected by the IV approach used here, these are omitted in table 3.

10
Table 5: Test of Simplified Krugman Model, 1987-1995 (Calvo-Mendoza with variance of velocity)

|Sample:|All|Europe<br>.I|Latin<br>Ameiica|
|---|---|---|---|
||M2|||
|Log(RlM2) E-03|-3.35<br>0.000|-0.732<br>0.001|-6.75<br>0.044|
|V[(YP)/M21 E-02|-2.38<br>0.689|-2.89<br>0.188|31.8<br>0.837|
|Constant E-03|-6.99|-0.622|-1.54|
||0.003|0.736|0.207|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.028|0.030|0.056|
|Observations|1192|960|232|
|Overall Significance|3.24|2.72|1.34|
|<br>_______________________|0.000|_0.001|0.198|

Notes: We report the sumnmation of the first six lags of each variable and below it the P-value of the test under the null that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. All models estimated are estimated as pooled regressions. F tests were used to evaluate the overall significance of the specification.
-9-

r Table 1 Current Structure ot Interest<sup>Rates</sup> (Annual Percentages)

|Agriculture/Industry<br>|||
|---|---|---|
|Sectors|Services|Commerce|
|I. Central Bank Rates for Lending<sup>and Disco</sup><br>Discount Rates<br>142|<sup>unts</sup><br>142|14S|
|II. Lending Rates to customersa/<br>|||
|One Year or Less<br>13% (152)<br>One to two Years<br>142 (162)|15% (17<br>162 18)|18% (N/A)<br>18% (N/A|
|III. Deposit Rates<br>Demand Deposits<br>0%<br>i|02|01|
||||
|1-3 months<br>7.5<br> <br>|7.5<br>|7.5<br>|
|3-6 months<br>8.5<br> <br>|8.5<br>|8.5<br>|
|6m-1 yr<br>10.0<br> <br>|10.0<br>|10.0<br>|
|7 ys and longer<br>16.0|16.0|16.0|
|Memorandum Items<br>FY87|FY88|FY89|
|Consumer Price Index<br>25.6<br>(Three month moving average)|15.1|20.8|

Source: Central Bank of Egypt,<sup>Memo 908/89 dated May 11. 1989</sup> a/ EEx-eptiona are export operations (11-142), import operations of GSAC, svocurnd lc.ans, loans for construction of low and middle income countries, loans to Government and puOl>c sector employees (not exceeding 2 months of salary, loans to NIB (11.52). Figures in parentheses are maximum rates.

There is thus more incentive to<sup>borrow than to hold deposits, which has</sup> resulted in a strong excess demand<sup>condition in thQ credit market, prompting ti'e</sup> Central Bank to resort to a rigid<sup>system of quantity rationing. The basic</sup> instrument employed has been a<sup>fixed loan-to-deposit</sup> ratio applied to each bank and supplemented by sub-ceilings<sup>for loans and advances extended to the</sup> commercial private sector. This<sup>ratio was set at 65 percent until Sentember</sup> 1988, and since then it has been<sup>lowered to 60 percent. While this mechanisu of</sup> relying on loan-to-deposit ratio<sup>seems to have been effective in the sense of</sup> controlling abgregate credit supply,<sup>it has implied severe limitations on the</sup> scope of banking businesses, including<sup>the incentive for product innovation. In</sup> addition, it has eliminated the<sup>need to resort to reserve requirement and open</sup>
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26

# Table 5. DEO S mONO THE SOCIAL RE RN OF CAPIAL

|||IKaiffRate<br> <br>||
|---|---|---|---|
|||_50%_<br>15%|0%|
|1.|Private returns of capital<sup>2</sup><br>without labor distortions|_0.53_<br>0.52|0.50|
|2.|Tariff efficiency correction|-0.11<br>-0.07||
|3.|Net social returns/<br>no labor distortions|0.42<br>0.45|_0.50_|
|4.|Effect of labor distortions<br>on private return of capital<sup>4</sup>|_-0.051_<br>-0.048|-0.043|
|_5._|Employment correction|0.08<br>0.09|0.098|
|6.|Indirect price efficiency<br>correction|0.02<br>0.01||
|7.|Net social returns of capital<br>with labor distortions|0.46<br>0.50|_0.555_|

1. The social return of capital measures the proportional increase of social income due to a one percent increase in the capital stock using expression (8).

2. The private return of capital measures the pwoportional effect of increasing capital on total income measured at domestic prices.

3. It is assumed that ,q = 0.25.
mean log deviation of durables income, the share of neighbors who own their residence, the share who feel the neighborhood is safe, the share who feel roads are dangerous, and the share who feel air is severely polluted.

Each of these categories contains a subset of variables that indicate the provision of public services. Of the dwelling unit characteristics, mains water and sewer, and the distance to the nearest bus stop, are amenable to policy; whereas the others reflect decisions either of builders or the households themselves. While every household in the city gets access to water using alternate sources, we focus on the capitalization effects of networked or piped water supply. In Pune, the municipal corporation (PMC) is responsible for providing water within the city limits. Our survey data however suggest that piped or networked supply coverage is not universal. Only 55 percent of surveyed households report receiving piped water directly from the PMC water network. Another 21 percent receive piped water by (illegally) sub connecting to households who have official access to the piped network. Other water sources include private mini water systems, handpumps, tubewells, community taps, and water tankers. Given the considerable variation in access to water, having a piped or network connection should make the dwelling unit more attractive than comparable units without piped access.

Of the neighborhood variables, the variables that reflect policy are the number of parks and schools within 1 km, and the mean property tax rate of neighbors. We include the opinions of neighbors to crime, road safety, and air pollution as indicators of policy. While these attitudes may not accurately reflect the actual state of crime, road safety and pollution, it is plausible that house prices are more likely to reflect attitudes rather than statistics. These attitudes are likely formed by a combination of the municipal 11