rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
infrastructure development accompanied these reforms with the aim of closing the gap between urban and rural areas, and developing the growth potential of more remote areas.

On the social and microeconomic side, a number of programs with the objective of reducing poverty have also been launched. These include the 2000-2004 development plan, the fund for the fight against droughts and desertification, the fight against analphabetism, the work of the foundation Mohamed V for solidarity, the work of the agency for social development and the national agency for employment and skills promotion, several initiatives for microcredits promotion and the national charts for education and health. In addition, the launch of the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) in 2005 – an ambitious national plan to develop the poorest areas of the country – marked an important step forward in addressing the wider spectrum of deprivation.

To our knowledge, none of these measures and programs has been fully evaluated, in part because it is difficult to tease out the impact that any particular program had on poverty. Moreover, estimates of poverty for the full period are simply not available. It is believed that Morocco has responded well to the 2007-2009 global shocks thanks to the countercyclical agricultural performance, but poverty estimates are available only for 2001 and 2007 (the two years for which household consumption surveys are available). This leaves policy makers unable to assess whether their policies have been effective in sustaining economic growth and poverty reduction against the backdrop of the global crises. This motivates the use of cross-survey imputations using Labor Force Surveys (LFSs) to fill this vacuum.

# **3. Methodology**

We adopt a standard imputation approach that is commonly used in the case of missing data. If a variable in a data set is missing altogether, but is available in a second data set representative of the same population, this second data set can be used to estimate the missing variable in the first data set. A prerequisite is that the two data sets share a set of regressors that are sufficiently correlated with this missing variable.

Consider the following standard linear model for household log expenditure: where _x_ denotes a vector of independent variables (e.g. variables on demographics, education, employment, housing conditions, asset ownership) including the constant, _u_ denotes a zero expectation error term, and where the subscripts _i_ and _t_ indicate household _i_ and time _t_ . The superscript ‘T’ indicates matrix transpose.

We have two types of data sets: Household Expenditure Survey (HES) data and Labor Force Survey (LFS) data. Both types of surveys contain the regressors _x_ but only the HES contains the household expenditure _y_ , and only for selected years. In our case, we will consider the period 2001-2010 for which we have two years of the HES (2001 and 2007) and the full period of the LFS. The objective is to use 8
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**Table 1: Women Labor Force Participation by Economic Activity in Bangladesh**

|**S.No**|**Sectors / Economic**<br>**Activity**|**No.**<br>**of**<br>**Men**|**No. of**<br>**Women**|**2010**<br>**Share of**<br>**women in**<br>**sectoral**<br>**employm**<br>**ent (%)**|**Share of**<br>**the sector**<br>**in total**<br>**women**<br>**employme**<br>**nt (%)**|**No. of**<br>**Men**|**2**<br>**No. of**<br>**Women**|**013**<br>**Share of**<br>**women**<br>**in**<br>**sectoral**<br>**employ**<br>**ment**<br>**(%)**|**Share of**<br>**the**<br>**sector**<br>**in total**<br>**women**<br>**employ**<br>**ment**<br>**(%)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|Crop and animal<br>production, hunting and<br>related activities|14430|10461|42.0|76.9|16240|8965|35.6|65.7|
|2|Manufacture of wearing<br>apparel|2114|1118|34.6|8.2|1292|1703|56.8|12.5|
|3|Manufacture of textiles|682|282|29.2|2.1|965|884|47.8|6.5|
|4|Manufacture of food<br>products|387|181|31.8|1.3|579|652|52.9|4.8|
|5|Retail trade, except of<br>motor vehicles and<br>motorcycles|5987|1012|14.5|7.4|4965|415|7.7|3.0|
|6|<br>Wholesale trade, except<br>motor vehicles & cycles|297|13|4.2|0.1|1581|354|18.3|2.6|
|7|Human health activities|237|72|23.2|0.5|391|242|38.2|1.8|
|8|Food and beverage<br>service activities|742|51|6.4 t|0.4|736|115|13.5|0.8|
|9|Land transport and<br>transport via pipelines|3516|224|6.0|1.6|3242|84|2.5|0.6|
|10|Construction of<br>buildings|1630|90|5.2|0.7|1423|74|4.9|0.5|
|11|<br>Financial service<br>activities, except<br>insurance, pension|256|39|13.2|0.3|244|55|18.4|0.4|
|12|Fishing and aquaculture|641|41|6.0|0.3|867|38|4.2|0.3|
|13|Manufacture of<br>furniture|298|9|2.9|0.1|675|34|4.8|0.2|
|14|Manufacture of basic<br>pharmaceutical<br>products|44|3|6.4|0.0|69|9|11.4|0.1|
|15|Water collection,<br>treatment and supply|16||0.0|0.0|40|7|14.6|0.1|
|16|<br>Accommodation|26|3|10.3|0.0|14|4|21.1|0.0|
|17|Telecommunications|16|1|5.6|0.0|35|3|7.7|0.0|
|18|Insurance, reinsurance<br>and pension funding|41|11|21.2|0.1|23|3|11.1|0.0|
|19|<br>Employment activities|7|0|0.0|0.0|19|2|9.5|0.0|
|20|Manufacture of<br>beverages|7|0|0.0|0.0|37|1|2.6|0.0|
|Total e|mployees (in thousand)|31374|13611|30.3|100|33437|13644|29.0|100|

Source: ILOSTAT database, International Labor Organization 12
legislation and then federal), there were not specific rules regulating RMs until 2012, as part of the enhanced responsible lending obligations for reverse mortgages which were introduced into the _National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009_ (National Credit Act).The market regulator ASIC reviewed the market in 2018, examining data on 17,000 RMs.<sup>7</sup> The review found that borrowers had a poor understanding of the risks and future costs of their loan – including the fact that depending on house prices and interest rates, they may not have enough equity remaining in the home for longer-term needs (i.e. elderly care). Under the new Code of Banking Practice, approved by ASIC in 2018, banks will be required to take extra care with customers who may be vulnerable, including those who are experiencing elderly abuse.

# **_Countries in Asia_**

Estimates provide an upbeat account of the RM market potential in Taiwan, China. Using Taiwanese census data and estimation methods derived from the US market, Chan & Liu (2015) estimate that a tenure payment for 65-year old single homeowner would amount to NTD 280,000, ca. 64% of average income for this age group. The authors recommend the Taiwanese authorities to promote the introduction of RM in the country (Chan & Liu, 2015).

Empirical research in Korea casts a more skeptical light on the benefits of RM **.** Koreans in their 40s and 50s start increasing their savings rate as they prepare for higher costs of children’s education, home purchase, and to assume greater responsibility for their own retirement income than previous generations. In this context, RM may enhance welfare and contribute to macroeconomic growth because it allows homeowners to consume excess savings when they are older. Yoo & Koo (2008) approach the subject from a novel perspective, asking 290 children (aged between 25-35) of homeowners whether they would support their parents’ RM application: only 37% of the respondents do. This lack of enthusiasm is in part explained by the economic situation of the respondents: 78% of them say they cannot afford to buy their own house, and 55% of them still live with their parents. A third of respondents explicitly admit that they desire their parents’ house as an inheritance (Yoo & Koo, 2008). This research sheds light on the cultural challenges to a financial product that may be seen as

> 7 <u>https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2018-releases/18-248mr-asic-publishes-areview-of-reverse-mortgage-lending/</u> See also the related infographic.

15
‘funding requirement’ on a _net basis_ , taking into account existing funding sources and transfers. In this respect it should be noted that the table captures cost and funding information in three separate sections: ‘New Funding’, ‘Existing Funding’ and ‘Transfers’.

Lastly, as a side note it should be noted that although desired, accrual accounting and budgeting is not a prerequisite for producing cost information. Of the countries surveyed, only Australia has full accrual accounting and budgeting practices in place. Austria has accrual accounting and budgeting, except for public service pensions, while Canada has implemented only accrual accounting. The Netherlands, by its turn, has neither accrual accounting nor budgeting.

Exhibit 4. Budgetary costing presentation for budget and forward years

|**Cost, Funding Requirements an**|**d Source of**|**Funds Tabl**<br>**Fiscal**|**e by Estim**<br>**Year – Doll**|**ates Vote St**<br>**ars**|**ructure**|**Oi**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**2013–14**|**2014–15**|**2015–16**|**2016–17**|**2017–18**|**Total**|**ngon**<br>**g**|
|**New Funding (inclu**<br>**[Provide breakdown by org**|**ding adjust**<br>**anization, v**|**ments to vo**<br>**ote and inp**|**te-netted re**<br>**ut factor, a**|**venue)**<br>**s applicabl**|**e.]**||
|**Vote[insert operating vote number] – Ope**<br>|**rating Expe**|**nditures an**|**d Employ**|**ment Benefit**|**Plans(**|**EBPs)**|
|**Personnel**|||||||
|**Other operating costs**|||||||
|**EBPs @ 20%**|||||||
|**Total Vote [insert operating**<br>**vote number] and EBPs**|||||||
|<br>**Vote[insert capital vote number] – Capita**|**l Expenditu**|**res and EB**|**Ps**||||
|**Personnel**|||||||
|**Other**|||||||
|**EBPs @ 20%**|||||||
|**Total Vote [insert capital vote**<br>**b d EBP**|||||||
|**numer] an s**|||||||
|**Vote[insertgrants and contributions vote**<br>|**number] –**|**Grants and**|**Contributi**|**ons**|||
|**Grants**|||||||
|**Contributions**|||||||
|**Total Vote [insert grants and**<br>**contributions vote number]**|||||||
|**Total Votes**|||||||
|**PWGSC accommodation**<br>**premium @ 13%**|||||||
|**Other statutory items**|||||||
|**Adjustments to Vote-Netted Revenue**<br>**[Provide a breakdown by input factor as a**|**pplicable]**||||||
|**Personnel**|||||||
|**Other operating costs**|||||||
|**EBPs @ 20%**|||||||

26
Policy Research Working Paper 9707

# **Abstract**

Using individual data from over 400 surveys, this paper compiles a global database of intergenerational mobility in education for 153 countries covering 97 percent of the world’s population. For 87 percent of the world’s population, it provides trends in intergenerational mobility for individuals born between 1950 to 1989. The findings show that absolute mobility in education—the share of respondents that obtains higher levels of education than their parents—is higher in the developed world despite the higher levels of parental educational attainment. Relative mobility—measuring the degree of independence between parent and child years of schooling—is also found to be greater in the developed world. Together, these findings point to severe challenges in intergenerational mobility in the poorest parts of the world. Beyond national income levels, the paper explores the correlation between intergenerational mobility and a variety of country characteristics. Countries with higher rates of mobility have (i) higher tax revenues and rates of government expenditures, especially on education; (ii) better child health indicators (less stunting and lower infant mortality); (iii) higher school quality (more teachers per pupil and fewer school dropouts); and (iv) less residential segregation.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at rvanderweide@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Currently, over 107 countries have some form of explicit deposit insurance, up from 93 in 2013 according to the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) conducted by the World Bank. Figure 1 shows the number of countries in each income group with explicit insurance in the 2013 and 2016 BRSS surveys. Figure 2 shows the percentage of countries with explicit insurance in 2016 as well as the increase compared to 2013, which are indicated by dashed lines on the graph. Over 80% of the countries in the high-income group have some form explicit deposit insurance in place. There has been an increase in the percentage of countries with explicit deposit insurance since 2013, especially in the low-income group. Figure 3 shows the average percentage of total bank liabilities that are covered by deposit insurance within each income group. Over 40% of liabilities are covered for the high and upper middle-income countries, while less than 10% of liabilities are covered in low income countries.

Some of the recent changes have been implemented in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. During the crisis, several countries including Australia and Singapore introduced explicit deposit insurance schemes for the first time. Other countries, like the United States and Spain, substantially increased the coverage limit, while others like Germany and Ireland introduced unlimited coverage in order to restore confidence in the markets. Figure 4 shows the percentage of countries that have implemented changes in their deposit insurance systems in response to the crisis. Most countries, especially those in the high-income group significantly increased both the limit and the type of accounts covered under deposit insurance.

Overall, explicit deposit insurance is widely adopted across the globe and is now a standard policy of bank regulators and supervisors. The recent crisis has reinforced the importance of deposit insurance in promoting stability and its role in the overall financial safety net provided to the banking sector.

# **4. Economic Benefits of Deposit Insurance**

As the preceding discussion suggests, banks are uniquely prone to runs because of the role they play in the economy in transforming short-term demand deposits into long-term assets. This maturity-mismatch is inherently unstable. In addition to causing individual banks to fail, bank runs can have a ripple effect and trigger full-blown contagion. Banks are connected 7
percent of GDP (while the median was about 71 percent of GDP). Note that the weighted average of public debt across LMCs in the region by 2018 is 53 percent. Excluding Nigeria, the public debt levels of LMCs totaled 83 percent of GDP in 2018, an amount that is 36 percentage points of GDP higher than its level in 2013 ( **Figure 3** ). The pace of public debt accumulation for low-income countries (LICs) and upper-middle-income countries (UMCs) was slower: the (weighted) average public debt of LICs increased by 15 percentage points to 50 percent of GDP in 2018 while that of UMCs increased by 12 percentage points to 54 percent over the same time period ( **Figure 3** ).

**Figure 3. Public Debt of SSA, by income level** **_(% GDP)_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>Low-Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income<br>2007 2013 2018<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: The figure reports GDP-weighted averages by region. LIC=Low income countries, LMIC=Lower-middle income countries, UMIC=Upper-middle income countries. IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018_ The increase in public debt levels affected both resource poor and resource rich countries in the region but that rise in public debt was the most pronounced in oil abundant countries ( **Figure 4** ). From 2013 until the end of 2018, the median public debt of resource rich countries increased by 20 percentage points (to 47 percent of GDP), as the commodity price boom came to an end and fiscal positions deteriorated. The debt dynamics were even worse for oil exporters, where median debt-to-GDP grew from 31 to 54 percent of GDP over the span of five years. The debt levels of Angola and the Republic of Congo more than doubled during the period 2013-18 whereas that of Equatorial Guinea in 2018 was more than five times as large that of 2013. Only Nigeria maintained public debt below 25 percent of GDP at the end of 2018.<sup>4</sup> Excluding Nigeria, the public debt level of oil rich countries increased by more than 40 percentage points since 2013 (to 73 percent of GDP

> 4 The debt numbers for Nigeria cover central government debt only, compared with general government debt for the other countries.

5
governance and institutional quality, including individual indicators as well as so-called ‘objective’ or fact-based ones -- if these are available at all. Unfortunately, typically little if any effort is placed in estimating, let alone reporting, the substantial margins of error in any other source of governance and/or investment climate indicators – objective or subjective, aggregate or individual. A key advantage of our measures of governance is that we are explicit about the accompanying margins of error, whereas in most other cases they are at best left implicit, and often ignored entirely.

In the third section of this paper we consider in detail a particular critique of expert assessments of governance (which account for 23 of our 31 data sources). Some of these expert assessments are produced by commercial risk rating agencies, others by governments and multilateral organizations, and yet others by nongovernmental organizations. We analyze whether each of these data sources provides independent estimates of governance, and if not, the extent to which one set of expert assessments is influenced by the views of other experts. Here we make three points. First, finding evidence of such correlated perception errors is intrinsically difficult. A high correlation in the rankings of two expert assessments could in principle be due either to highly correlated perceptions errors, or alternatively it could due to the fact that both data sources are actually measuring cross-country differences in governance well. Second, under certain reasonable assumptions that we detail below, we can solve this identification problem and separate out the extent to which expert assessments make correlated errors. When we do this, we find at best very weak evidence of correlated perception errors, suggesting that this critique of expert assessments has little empirical basis. Third, we note that even if expert assessments do contain correlated perception errors, this does not imply that we should discard such data sources entirely. Even with correlated errors, expert assessments do contain information about cross-country differences in governance and this information can usefully add to our aggregate governance indicators.

We conclude the paper by summarizing the key findings in this fifth installment of the Governance Matters series and noting the policy implications of our work.

3
4 only relative to the historical level of 1913 but also relative to the prestabilization years of 1921-22 [see data in Garber (1982)]. A similar phenomenon is associated with the Greek stabilization of '945-47 [Makinen (1987)].

One of the few cases where a full fledged hyperinflation emerged in peacetime was the recent Bolivian experience of 1982-85. In this case GDP per capita fell below the prestab!lization level, and remained there at least till 1989 (see Morales 1990), lending some support to the view that even in hyperinflations the stabilization process is associated with a fairly long initial recessionary phase in output.

Examining stabilization programs in chronic inflation countries in Latin America, we found, as noted earlier, in most cases a rather different .cenario. After a small initial recessionary effect, or even with no effect of this kind, the reduction of inflation was associated withi an initial expansion of output above the historical trend, and with a drop in unemployment. The expansionary phase could go on for a number of years ending in a recession. It should be pointed out, however, that this pattern was characteristic of programs which made use of the exchange rate as anchor for disinflation (this category covers the major programs).

The different patterns of disinflation in chronic inflation countries is probably related in part to the use of the exchange rate as anchor. However this cannot explain the emergence of a demand-driven business cycle unless it comes in conjunction with such factors as lack of credibility, insufficient fiscal support and the like (more on this later). The highly developed technology of living with inflation, which is characteristic of chronic inflation countries,
and García-Pérez, 2014). Other than being morally objectionable, affording individuals of different race and gender different opportunities may lead to a sub-optimal allocation of talent and a wasting of human resources. These inefficiencies are arguably harmful for growth.

The IPUMS USA database is also used to construct selected control variables. Following van der Weide and Milanovic (2014) we compute: (i) the percentage with a graduate degree among individuals between the age of 21 and 39 (Edu_ms); (ii) the share of women between the age of 24 and 65 who are out of the labor force (Olf_fem); and (iii) the population shares aged 15 or younger (Aged 0-15) and aged 65 or older (Aged 65+). We expand the number of controls by also considering a selected set of the independent variables used in Marrero and Rodríguez (2013), which include: (iv) the share of (nonagricultural) employment in construction (Emp_cons), finance, insurance and real estate (Emp_finan), and government (Emp_gov); (v) the percentage change in nonagricultural employment over the preceding decade (Emp_growth); (vi) the fertility rate measured as the number of live births per 1,000 women 15-44 years old (Fertility); and (vii) public welfare expenditure as a percentage of state personal income (Welfare).<sup>11</sup>

# **3.2. A first look at the data**

The four panels of Figure 1 plot the time-trends of the income growth rates (topleft, top-right and bottom-left panels) for the poor (10<sup>th</sup> percentile), middle-class (50<sup>th</sup> percentile) and the rich (99<sup>th</sup> percentile) as well as the time-trend of total income inequality (bottom-right panel) over the 50-year period. Low- and middle-income households have experienced a visibly different trend in income growth rates compared to top-income households. The last decade denotes an outlier arguably due to the 20072010 global financial crisis. Between 1970 and 2000 the poor and the middle-class have seen their growth rates decline while the rich have seen their growth rates increase.

> 11 Employment data come from the Current Employment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics ( _U.S. Department of Labor_ : http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment). ‘Welfare’ expenditures are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments (yearly data): https://www.census.gov/govs/local/historical_data.html. Fertility is obtained from the Vital Statistics of the United States: <u>http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus.htm.</u>

8