rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Table** 16: **Impact of Decentralization on Preference Costs for the Case of Germany**

|Variable|State<br>Coverage|District<br>Coverage|Road<br>Accidents|User Charges|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**year**<br>|_.0020.0005_<br> <br>|06|000<br>..<br>|43|
|year|-<br>E|~~~~~~(.|)||
|**#**local governments|.|-0.002|OE||
|per GDP|(-0)(108)||2S(.M||
|Schleswigholstein|(311)|**0**( 03<br>_~(1.59)*_|-0.0008<br>(-0.80)|14*i<br>(20|
|Niedersachsen|-0 .01<br>(-1.60)*|0 .010<br>(11 I9)|-0.0004<br>(-1.07)|.. .. .<br>40|
|Nordrheinwestfalen|13||||
|Hessen|0|0|||
|Rheinlandpfal|021|47|||
|Saarland|||||
|Badenwurttemberg|0 1|.10Q||5|
|constant||_-0.53_||909|
||.Z7|(....**.**......<br>-0 33)|(~2|94|
|R-square|0.94|0.96|0.96|0.97|
|Observations|103|103|103|103|

Shaded coefficients significant at the 90% level of confidence.

* significant at the 85% level of confidence.

** significant at the 80% level of confidence.

The GDP per capita variable was dropped as the measure of depth of decentralization is a ratio of the number of local governments per state GDP.

37
> included with contributions and deducted as commissions paid with no effect on the total assets of the pension fund.

||ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIOIS|
|---|---|
||**%**of**GDP**<br>%ofNetChange|
|**1982**|**1.90**<br>**71.7**|
|**1983**|**1.73**<br>49.0|
|1984|**1.80**<br>54.7|
|**1985**|**1.77**<br>**38.0**|
|**1986**|**.91**<br>40.9|
|**1987**|**1.92**<br>**37.8**|
|**1988**|2.94<br>**65.9**|
|**1989**|**3.25**<br>49.7|
|**1990**|3.41<br>31.4|

## Sourcet Habitat **(1991)**

# 3.4 Recognition **Bonds**

Apart from annual contributions and investment income, another important inflow into pension funds are the proceeds of recognition bon.- paid to retiring workers. Because of the young age of the new system and the fact that few older people opted to transfer, the value of recognition bonds that have been paid so far is relatively small. They reached **0.5%** of **GDP** in **1990** and represented **_5%_** of the increase in the value of pension funds in that year. The proceeds from the payment of recognition bonds is likely to increase faster in the future as more transferees reach retirement age.

# **_3.5_** Investment **Returns**

**A** significant factor in the rapid increase in the total assets of the Chilean pension funds has been the realization of very high real rates of return. These reflect the high level of real interest rates that prevailed in the Chilean economy for most of the 1980s, but especially the downward trend of real rates that boosted capital values and resulted in very large capital gains.

The average real rate of return on pension funds amounted to **13%** over the 10-year period. Annual rates of return experienced large fluctuations, ranging from **28.5%** in **1982** down to a low **3.6%** in 1984. Real returns exceeded 20% in the first **3** years of the funds' existence, fell to less than **_5%_** in 1984, recovered to over 12% in **1985** and **1986,** fluctuated around **6%** between **1987** and **1989** and rebounded to over **_15%_** in **1990.** The fluctuation in investment returns has been caused **by** large fluctuations in the market values of investment assets and concomitant changes in capital gains and losses. Capital gains rn most marketable securities increase when interest rates are falling (and decline when they are rising) but returns on bank deposits rise when interest rates are rising. The net impact on investment returns depends on the portfolio composition of different funds. The growing importance of corporate equities in fund portfolios suggests a stronger relationship in future between rates of return and movements in stockmarket prices.

21
11 While these studies are useful to assist in specifying the costs models, they are not sufficient since they do not include any information on the prices of all inputs (including the price of capital) as is required by Cobb-Douglas or translogarithmic specifications typically found in the literature.

# **4. Data and estimation of the costs frontier for Asia**

The cost frontier for the Asian water companies was estimated from a database published by the Asian Development Bank (1997). Their sample covers 50 firms surveyed in 1995. The information included data on operational and maintenance costs (COST), number of clients (CLIEN), daily production (PROD), population density in the area served (DENS), number of connections (CONE), percentage of water from surface sources (ASUP), treatment capacity (CAPAC), market structure (STRU, represented by the relation between residential sales and total sales in cubic meters), number of hours of water availability (QUALI), staff (PERS), salary (SALAR) and a set of qualitative variables on the type of treatment used: conventional (DUMCONV, with a value of 1 when the treatment is conventional, 0 otherwise), rapid sand filters (DUMFRAP, with a value of 1 is the firms use the filter, 0 otherwise), slow sand filters (DUMFLEN, with a value of I if used, 0 otherwise), chlorification (DUMCLO, with value I if used with sand filters, 0 otherwise and desalinisation (DUMDES, in, fact only 1 does).

The basic statistics are summarised in table 1. The costs refer to operational and maintenance costs and are expressed in thousands of US$. The client's numbers and the population are expressed in thousands. Treatment capacity is expressed in cubic meters per day. Average salaries are found as the ration of total salary cost to the number of workers The strategy adopted to estimate the model could be summarised as follows. In a first stage, all the variables likely to determine costs are included in the model. Next, going from the general to the specific, variables are eliminated as follows: eliminate sequentially the least
<!-- Start of picture text --> Mexico<br>110 Output Labor<br>110<br>105<br>105<br>100<br>100<br>95<br>95<br>90<br>90<br>85<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998<br>35 Investment Net Exports<br>10<br>30<br>5<br>25<br>0<br>20<br>−5<br>15<br>−10<br>10<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998<br>Model with No Efficiency Wedge Model with No Labor Wedge Data<br>Mexico<br>110 Output Labor<br>110<br>105<br>105<br>100<br>100<br>95<br>95<br>90<br>90<br>85<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998<br>35 Investment Net Exports<br>10<br>30<br>5<br>25<br>0<br>20<br>−5<br>15<br>−10<br>10<br>1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998<br>Model with No Investment Wedge Model with No Risk−Premium Wedge Data<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 3: Data and counterfactual models with four wedges.

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prices (Corollary 3). (iii) The correlation between expected stock price and investment is smaller when informed speculators behave strategically (Corollary 4).

# **4. Empirical Evidence**

In this section I present empirical evidence on the connection between ex-ante managerial uncertainty about firms’ fundamentals and stock price informativeness. I also study how the correlation between investment and stock prices varies for different levels of managerial information. The empirical analysis that follows is based on a sample of U.S. public firms from 1990 to 2010. For each firm I construct two measures of managerial information and uncertainty, and one measure of stock price informativeness. These measures are described below.

## **4.1. Managerial Information and Uncertainty**

When making corporate decisions, managers gather information about the outlook of their firms and the profitability of new products and projects. In the model outlined above, uncertainty about a firm’s fundamentals refers to the variance of the firm’s prior distribution of future profits. To measure firm uncertainty about fundamentals, one would need to know not only the firm’s point estimates of expected profits but the entire distribution. To my knowledge there are no surveys at the firm level with probability distributions on future earnings. For this reason, I rely on two proxies to measure managerial uncertainty about the outlook of their The first measure is based upon analysts’ earnings forecasts. At the firm level, surveys of analysts’ forecasts typically report first moments, e.g. expected earnings, profits or sales. As a proxy for firm uncertainty I instead use dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). Empirical evidence suggests that a large fraction of the information used by analysts comes from discussions with firm managers, which also suggests that analysts’ information is not news to the firm (Bailey et al. (2003)). Analysts collect information from each firm and issue their own forecast. The assumption is that managers with more precise information are more likely to convey such information to analysts covering the firm, and thus, one would expect less disagreement in the analysts’ forecasts. On the contrary, more uncertainty about fundamentals is likely to be reflected in more disagreement in the forecasts issued by the analysts covering a firm.<sup>14</sup> The caveat, of course, is that consensus among

> 14For instance, analysts might be talking to different managers within a firm, and dispersion among analysts’ forecasts could thus reflect disagreement within the firm. Alternatively, disagreement among analysts could reflect precisely the fact

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Policy Research Working Paper 10593

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the reshaping of supply chains using detailed US 10-digit import data (tariff-line level) between 2017 and 2022. The results show that while US-China decoupling in bilateral trade is real, supply chains remain intertwined with China. Over the period, China’s share of US imports fell from 22 to 16 percent. The paper shows that the decline is due to US tariffs. US imports from China are being replaced with imports from large developing countries with revealed comparative advantage in a product. Countries replacing China tend to be deeply integrated into China’s supply chains and are experiencing faster import growth from China, especially in strategic industries. Put differently, to displace China on the export side, countries must embrace China’s supply chains. Within products, the reorientation of trade is consistent with a “China + 1” strategy, as opposed to diversified sourcing across multiple countries. There is some evidence of nearshoring, but it is exclusive to border nations, and there is no consistent evidence of reshoring. Despite the significant reshaping, China remained the top supplier of imported goods to the US in 2022.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, East Asia and the Pacific Region and the Prospects Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at clfreund@ucsd.edu, amattoo@worldbank.org, amulabdic@worldbank.org, and mruta@imf.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
<!-- Start of picture text --> 8 Average incentive<br>ro)<br>©<br>&<br>2<br>is]<br>B fo)<br>ot<br>3<br>o<br>><br>if<br>o<br>N<br>°<br>vsCFAY < EF\ FSis< SFG2 EF&C) FSFES> SF& SF< SFXRY,Q <Ca FSoOo eoS<br>Ss ef 2 > e Rg <& ye Y oe oe y<br>RS @ o> s<br>ss ~ we<br>vs<br>| 2020 Ye EV Incentive at Global Average Level<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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the four specifications. It is insignificant in the other two R and D regressions. In this instance therefore, it does turn out that institutional ownership has a detrimental effect on the R and D expenditures of firms. This result also implies that institutional ownership contributes to the firm's underinvestment in R and D expenditures and therefore managerial myopia. In this regard, these results are contrary to the evidence in Jarrel et al. (1985) that was based on a sample of 324 companies for the 1980-83 period. Given that the results presented here are for the 1985-90 period, it could well be that these conflicting results are due to the different timeperiods involved.

As noted elsewhere, it is the case that the results from the multivariate analysis are more reliable than the results from the univariate analysis in that the latter incorporates a broader set of factors including fixed firm and year effects. Therefore, the evidence from here can be summarized as saying that institutional ownership has a positive effect on capital expenditures, negative effect on R and D expenditures, and no effect on advertising expenditures.

In order to study the effect of institutional ownership on firm performance in a univariate framework, firms were divided on the basis of median value of institutional ownership and the returns on investment were compared (table 8). In all instances, the returns are not significantly different across the two classes of firms and therefore implies that institutional ownership has no implications for performance. This finding is therefore consistent with the evidence of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in that institutional ownership is unrelated to accounting profits. On the other hand, the evidence in table 2 does show that firms with high institutional ownership tend to have high Q ratios compared to firms with low institutional ownership. This finding is consistent with the results of McConnell and Servaes (1990), though, as noted before, the 18
# **6.2 Employment Upgrading for Skilled Migrants**

Our empirical analysis has shown that over-qualification is a pervasive problem among Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador. As a result, their productivity and wage levels are well below those of Ecuadorans in the same region of residence and with the same education level. This is a waste of productive skills that lowers GDP and shifts the burden of the labor-market adjustment toward low-skill natives (as documented in Olivieri et al. (2020)).

A natural policy to consider is to facilitate the access of highly educated Venezuelans to skilled jobs. The main goal of this section is to conduct a simulation of the potential effects of such a policy. As a first step, we begin by analyzing some relevant information in the EPEC survey. In practical terms, a barrier that may be preventing skilled Venezuelan workers from applying to skilled jobs may be the lack of transferability of education credentials or even the lack of credentials altogether.

We estimate that around 51,000 Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador (completed) college education prior to migration. Among these, 76% report having received a college degree certification. Presumably, the remaining 24% left the country prior to receiving the certificate.<sup>19</sup> Our data reveal that only 17% of the 51,000 Venezuelan college graduates have registered their college certificate with the corresponding government agency in Ecuador (SENESCYT). The survey also reveals that among those graduates who have not registered their degree, about 90% state that they are interested in carrying out the registration but are unable to do so because they lack the required documents (47%), are not familiar with the procedure (35%), or lack the funds to pay for the associated fees (7%). In contrast, only 1.4% are currently in the process of registering their degree in Ecuador.<sup>20</sup>

## **6.2.1 Upgrading in Terms of Education**

We turn to simulating the effects on GDP, for Ecuador as a whole and for the main host provinces, from policies that successfully allow college-educated Venezuelan migrants

> 19In many countries these official certificates are signed by a high government official, introducing a substantial delay between graduation and actually receiving the official certificate.

> 20More specifically, among the 47% college-educated Venezuelans that have not undertaken the registration of their degree in Ecuador, 21% did not bring their college diploma to Ecuador and 26% did bring it but have not obtained the Apostille of the Hague. Obtaining the Apostille in Ecuador costs $20 and legalization of the document with the Ecuadoran government costs an additional $20.

17
means that establishments with net sales larger than a certain threshold are always selected.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the forzosa stratum allows to construct a data panel specification, where the starting year is reported but exit is not reported in the data. Exits could reflect establishments’ output falling below the threshold as well as real exit.

The survey includes information related to establishment location, industry classification (following ISIC revision 4), sales, value added, intermediate input costs, number of employees, wages and book values of assets. Our main variables of interest are establishment TFP and markups, which require information on the value added, the capital stock (tangible fixed assets), intermediate inputs, the number of employees, the total wage bill, and establishments’ age. All monetary variables are deflated using constant industry price indices (constant 2007) at the most disaggregated level available.

# **4.2 Subnational regulatory reform data**

We use a unique data set for Peru that captures the elimination of all regulatory barriers across more than 1,800 municipalities as a response to legislative changes in 2013 and 2014, strengthening the power of the national competition authority (INDECOPI) to enforce the elimination of regulatory barriers to market entry and competition that are inconsistent with national legislation. The initial list published by INDECOPI includes 613 and 1,577 different eliminated regulatory barriers in 2013 and 2014, respectively, the majority of which were eliminated by subnational governments. The list includes regulatory changes that apply only to consumers but not to firms. We thus restrict the analysis to eliminated regulatory barriers that impact firms by easing licensing requirements to operate in a specific location or economic activity, removing technical requirements to enter local markets or sectors (such as specifications for buildings or transport vehicles), and reducing charges and fees for regulatory procedures.

This leaves us with 594 (149) regulatory changes eliminating barriers by subnational governments in 2014 (2013), of which 473 (80) were implemented at the district-municipality level, 110 (60) at the province-municipality level, and 11 (9) at the state-level. Among these reforms, we are able to distinguish between different types of reforms which we will use

> 17 Firms with net sales greater than 1,700 Tax Units ( _Unidad Impositiva Tributaria_ , UIT) are selected. The UIT values vary each year.

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