Page 32 96. Table 10 reports regression estimates for all five school performance measures, controlling for all categories of independent variables. Therefore, the estimates presented in Table 10 check for the robustness of the results highlighted in Tables 7, 8 and 9.

**Table 10. Correlates with School-level Education Outcomes**

|||**De**<br>|**pendent vari**<br>|**ables**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Drop-out**<br>**rate**|**Repetition**<br>**rate**|**Failure**<br>**rate**|**% students**<br>**excelling in**<br>**Albanian **|**% students**<br>**excelling in**<br>**math **|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|**Rural school**|-0.00|-0.01|0.01|**-0.07***|-0.02|
||(0.015)|(0.005)|(0.013)|**(0.039)**|(0.024)|
|**Poor facility and resources (first factor)**|-0.01<br>|0.00<br>|-0.00<br>|0.01<br>|**-0.02****<br>|
||(0.008)|(0.002)|(0.009)|(0.023)|**(0.009)**|
|**Teacher experience**|-0.00|0.00|0.00|**0.01****|-0.00|
||(0.001)|(0.000)|(0.001)|**(0.002)**|(0.002)|
|**Motivated teachers**|-0.02|**0.02***|-0.02|**0.19****|0.03|
||(0.017)|**(0.009)**|(0.023)|**(0.086)**|(0.038)|
|RED inspections|-0.00|0.00|0.00|0.01|0.00|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.001)|(0.003)|(0.002)|
|SD not subject to sanctions|0.00|0.00|0.01|0.03|0.03|
||(0.011)|(0.003)|(0.012)|(0.039)|(0.018)|
|**Teachers not subject to sanctions**|-0.01|0.00|0.01|-0.01|**-0.05***|
||(0.015)|(0.004)|(0.014)|(0.066)|**(0.028)**|
|**Teachers absence-May09**|0.00|**-0.00****|**-0.01***|-0.01|-0.00|
||(0.003)|**(0.001)**|**(0.005)**|(0.013)|(0.008)|
|**School has a teacher absence register**|-0.00|0.00<br>|0.02<br>|0.03<br>|**0.05****|
||(0.020)|(0.005)|(0.016)|(0.056)|**(0.021)**|
|Corruption in teachers‟ appointments|0.03|0.01|**0.05***|-0.00|-0.04|
||(0.028)|(0.008)|**(0.030)**|(0.131)|(0.064)|
|**N. of SB meetings**|**-0.01****|**-0.00****|-0.00|-0.02|-0.01|
||**(0.004)**|**(0.001)**|(0.007)|(0.027)|(0.012)|
|No information about participatory organs (parents)|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.01|-0.02|
||(0.016)|(0.008)|(0.012)|(0.032)|(0.019)|
|No information about names of teachers (parents)|-0.01|-0.01|0.01|-0.03|-0.01|
||(0.009)|(0.007)|(0.014)|(0.033)|(0.020)|
|N. of meetings with teachers|-0.00|0.01|-0.01|0.04|0.03|
||(0.006)|(0.007)|(0.016)|(0.033)|(0.021)|
|**Lack of parental involvement in the school**|0.02|**0.03****|0.02|-0.09|**-0.09****|
||(0.034)|**(0.013)**|(0.029)|(0.097)|**(0.042)**|
|Mother years of education|0.00<br>|0.00<br>|-0.00<br>|0.02<br>|0.00<br>|
||(0.005)|(0.002)|(0.007)|(0.020)|(0.011)|
|**Father years of education**|<br>-0.01|<br>-0.00|<br>0.00|<br>-0.01|<br>**0.02***|
||(0.005)|(0.002)|(0.006)|(0.023)|**(0.010)**|
|N. of books in the household|-0.00|-0.00|0.00|-0.00|-0.00|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.001)|(0.000)|
|Economic status|-0.00|-0.01|-0.01|0.05|0.00|
||(0.010)|(0.007)|(0.012)|(0.040)|(0.029)|
|**Extent of divide in the community**|0.00|-0.00|-0.01|**-0.07****|**-0.04****|
||(0.006)|(0.004)|(0.008)|**(0.031)**|**(0.019)**|
|Constant|0.13**|0.02|0.03|0.12|0.00|
||(0.053)|(0.020)|(0.072)|(0.244)|(0.127)|
|RED fixed effects|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|R-squared|0.298|0.188|0.194|0.391|0.433|

Note: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for clustering within districts. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

97. The estimates for drop-out, repetition and failure rates are not very informative as most of the variables are rendered statistically insignificant a large set of controls are included. Where variable appear significant, their substantive relationship to outcomes is difficult to interpret. For example, teachers‟ motivation appears positively correlated with repetition rates, possibly suggesting that more motivated teachers are more demanding of students. Along the same lines, repetition and failure rates are lower in schools where teachers‟ absence was more severe in May 2009. Drop-out and repetition rates appear respectively higher and lower the higher the number of school board meetings; repetition rates are also higher in the case of lack of parental involvement in