rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
This version: 15 Feb 2024 53 <mark>Dumont, Louis. 1966.</mark> _<mark>Homo Hierarchicus, essai sur le systeme des castes.</mark>_ <mark>Paris, Editions Gallimard.</mark> Easterly, William, Life During Growth, _Journal of Economic Growth,_ Volume 4, Issue 3, September 1999, pp. 239-275 Graham, C., and S. Pettinato. 2006. Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers, and Subjective Well-Being in Peru’s Emerging Economy. _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_ , _606_ , 128–153.

Graham, Carol, Shaojie Zhou, and Junyi Zhang. 2017. "Happiness and Health in China: The Paradox of Progress," _World Development_ , 96(C), 231-244.

Harrison, Elizabeth, and Christian Seidl. 1994. “Perceptional inequality and preferential judgment: An empirical examination of distributional axioms,” _Public Choice_ , 79, 61–81.

Harrod, Roy Forbes. 1958. “The Possibility of Economic Satiety,” in _Problems of United States Economic Development_ . New York: Committee for Economic Development, Pp: 207-213 <mark>Henderson, J., D. Hulme, R. Phillips, and Noorul Ainur M Nur. 2002. Economic Governance and Poverty Reduction in Malaysia. Manchester Business School Working Paper. Vol. 440. 2002. 36.</mark> Hirsch, Fred. 1976. _Social Limits to Growth_ . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (A Twentieth Century Fund Study). _Revised edition_ (1995) with an Introduction by Tibor Scitovsky, reprinted by Routledge, London and New York.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. International Financial Statistics. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC. Accessed February 16, 2024.

<mark>Kanbur, SM Ravi, ed. 2003.</mark> _<mark>Q</mark> -squared, combining qualitative and quantitative methods in poverty appraisal_ <mark>. Orient Blackswan.</mark> <mark>Khalid, Muhammed Abdul. 2018. "Climbing the Ladder: Socioeconomic Mobility in Malaysia,"</mark> _<mark>Asian Economic Papers</mark>_ <mark>, vol. 17(3), 1-23, Fall.</mark> <mark>Khalid, Muhammed Abdul and Li Yang. 2021. "Income inequality and ethnic cleavages in Malaysia: Evidence from distributional national accounts (1984–2014),"</mark> _<mark>Journal of Asian Economics</mark>_ <mark>, vol. 72(C).</mark> 53
# **Table 2.1. Data sources by country and year**

||**Country**|**Date**|**Survey**|
|---|---|---|---|
|1|Albania|2002|Living Standard Measurement Study|
|2<br>3|Armenia<br>Azerbaijan|2001<br>2001|Integrated Living Conditions Survey<br>Household Budget Survey (new design)|
|4|Belarus|2001|Income and Expenditure Survey (newer design|
|5|Bosnia & Herzegovina|2001|Living Standard Measurement Study|
|6|Bulgaria|2001|Integrated Household Survey|
|7|Georgia|2001|Survey of Georgian Households|
|8|Hungary|2000|Household Budget Survey|
|9|Kazakhstan|2001|Household Budget Survey|
|10|Kosovo|2000|Living Standard Measurement Survey|
|11|Kyrgyz Republic|2001|Household Budget Survey|
|12|Lithuania|2000|Household Budget Survey|
|13|Moldova|2001|Household Budget Survey|
|14|Poland|2001|Household Budget Survey|
|15|Romania|2002|Family Budget Survey|
|16<br>17|Russia<br>Serbia|2001<br>2002|Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Study Round X<br>Poverty Household Survey|
|18|Tajikistan|1999|Living Standard Measurement Survey|
|19|Turkmenistan|1998|Living Standard Measurement Survey|
|20|Uzbekistan|2000|HouseholdBudget Survey|

# **2.2. Selected indicators of income and non-income dimensions of well-being**

For the purpose of this study, three different types of indicators were constructed, each representing a different dimension of poverty. The first type of indicator refers to income poverty and economic opportunities and includes the national absolute poverty rate, the relative poverty rate, and the householdhead unemployment ratio. The national absolute poverty rate refers to the percentage of households whose consumption lies below a pre-defined country--specific poverty line. The relative poverty rate corresponds to the households in the bottom quintile of national consumption per capita and is useful to assess the relative position of different groups in society. The household head unemployment ratio is the proportion of unemployed heads of household.

The second type of indicator relates to very approximate aspects of human capital and includes the incidence of activities interrupted due to health problems and the incidence of household heads with less than secondary education. These are very narrow dimensions of well-being but the advantage is that they can be easily constructed for, and compared across, a large number of countries.

The third type of indicator refers to other non-income dimensions of well-being: adequate shelter, light, heat, running water and sanitation. In urban areas where light, heat, running water and sanitation depend on access to local utilities, the surveys can be used to identify "delivery-based" indicators which show basic access to infrastructure services, level of service reliably available, living conditions and spending on payments for services. Since most of the surveys used in this study track access to network services, the data are of much less relevance for understanding living conditions in rural areas. As one example, a rural household that does not have access to piped water, may have a well in the front yard to meet its water needs.

6
Policy Research Working Paper 9259

# **Abstract**

This paper identifies gaps in availability, access, and quality of household budget surveys in the Middle East and North Africa region used to measure monetary poverty and evaluates ways to fill these information gaps. Despite improving public access to household budget surveys, the availability and timeliness of welfare data in the Middle East and North Africa region is poor compared to the rest of the world. Closing the data gap requires collection of more HBS data in more countries and improving access to data where it exists. However, when collection of consumption data is not possible, a variety of other second-best strategies can be employed. Using imputation methods can help to measure monetary poverty. Constructing non-monetary poverty and asset indexes from less robust surveys, using non-traditional surveys such as phone surveys, and “big data”—administrative records, social networks and communications data, and geospatial data—can help substitute for, or complement data from existing traditional survey data.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at aatamanov@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
In column 1, we examine whether the impact of adult death on labor outcomes for the elderly varies by the age of the deceased adult. We split (co-resident and non-coresident) PHHM deaths into deaths of young (15-29 years) and not young (30-50 years) adults. The results show that the impact of adult death varies both by residence status and by the age of the deceased adult. For co-resident PHHM deaths, younger adult deaths are associated with greater increases in labor hours. The increase (5.5 hours) is statistically significant. The opposite is true for non-co-resident PHHM deaths: the death of older prime-age adults is associated with an increase of 8 farm hours. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that co-resident younger adults are providing more in-kind support to their elderly relatives through farm labor, while non-co-resident older adults are providing monetary support from outside the residence. Older adults adjust to each of these deaths with an increase in work burden.

In Table 4b column 2, we break the PHHM death variables into whether or not the deceased adult was the elderly respondent’s own child. The coefficients reported in column 2 show a similar trend to the results in column 1 (and the same hypothesis above would be consistent), although the PHHM not living with the older adult is not statistically significant.

In column 3, we decompose the death variables by gender of the deceased adult. We find no statistically significant evidence that female deaths, for co-resident or non-coresident PHHM adults, are associated with different changes in farm labor hours for elderly respondents than male deaths. However, the size of the increase in work (although statistically not significant) for females co-resident deaths is similar to that of the male non-resident deaths (about 3 more hours per week). Again, this is suggestive that the contribution of these prime-age persons before their death to the economy of the household of older adults is in-kind (labor-sharing) in the case of co-resident females other support for non-resident males.

In the last column in Table 4b, we break down the PHHM death variables by spousal status. Since there are no instances of spouses who died aged 15-50 who were not living with the elderly individual at the time of death, this category is omitted from the regression. We find evidence that non-spouses’ deaths are associated with bigger increases in labor hours than spouses regardless of living arrangement. In the case of co18
Policy Research Working Paper 5965

# **Abstract**

Using data collected in rural Burkina Faso, this paper examines how children’s cognitive abilities influence households’ decisions to invest in their education. To address the endogeneity of child ability measures, the analysis uses rainfall shocks experienced in utero or early childhood to instrument for ability. Negative shocks in utero lead to 0.24 standard deviations lower ability z-scores, corresponding with a 38 percent enrollment drop and a 49 percent increase in child labor hours compared with their siblings. Negative education impacts are largest for in utero shocks, diminished for shocks before age two, and have no impact for shocks after age two. The paper links the fetal origins hypothesis and sibling rivalry literatures by showing that shocks experienced in utero not only have direct negative impacts on the child’s cognitive ability (fetal origins hypothesis), but also negatively impact the child through the effects on sibling rivalry resulting from the cognitive differences.

This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at akresh@illinois.edu, ebagby@mathematica-mpr.com, ddewalque@worldbank.org and harounan.kazianga@okstate.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Minten, B., L. Randrianarison and J. Swinnen. 2007. "Spillovers from High-Value Agriculture for Exports on Land Use in Developing Countries: Evidence from Madagascar." _Agricultural Economics_ , **_37_** (2-3), 265-275.

Moretti, E. 2004. "Workers' Education, Spillovers, and Productivity: Evidence from Plant-Level Production Functions." _American Economic Review_ , **_94_** (3), 656-690.

Nolte, K. and L. Voget-Kleschin. 2014. "Consultation in Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: An Evaluation of Three Cases in Mali." _World Development_ , **_64_** , 654-668.

Pearce, F. 2012. _The Landgrabbers: The New Fight over Who Owns the Earth._ Transworld Publishers, London.

Rahmato, D. 2011. "Land to Investors: Large Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia." Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa.

Rahmato, D. 2014. "The Perils of Development from Above: Land Deals in Ethiopia." _African Identities_ , **_12_** (1), 26-44.

Rulli, M. C., A. Saviori and P. D'Odorico. 2013. "Global Land and Water Grabbing." _Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America_ , **_110_** (3), 892-897.

Saenger, C., M. Qaim, M. Torero and A. Viceisza. 2013. "Contract Farming and Smallholder Incentives to Produce High Quality: Experimental Evidence from the Vietnamese Dairy Sector." _Agricultural Economics_ , **_44_** (3), 297-308.

Schoneveld, G. C. 2014. "The Geographic and Sectoral Patterns of Large-Scale Farmland Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa." _Food Policy_ , **_48_** (0), 34-50.

Söderholm, P. and N. Svahn. 2015. "Mining, Regional Development and Benefit-Sharing in Developed Countries." _Resources Policy_ , **_45_** , 78-91.

UNDP. 2013. "An Assessment of Operation and Performance of Commerical Farmers in Ethiopia." United Nations Development Program, Addis Ababa.

38
advantages implied by economic geography, contribute to reshaping the regional aspects of geoeconomic development.

The coastal-inland development gap and the rural-urban divide are the two major components of overall inequality in China. Urban to rural household per capita income ratio and coastal to inland GDP per capita ratio both increased by almost 50 percent from 2.2 times and 1.7 times in the late 1980s to 3.2 times and 2.4 times respectively in 2004. The Gini coefficient has also increased by about 50 percent, from around 30 to 45 over the past 25 years (Figure 1).

**Figure 1 – Income inequality in China**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 3.5 50<br>40<br>3<br>30<br>2.5<br>20<br>2<br>10<br>1.5 0<br>1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004<br>urban to rural income ratio coastal to inland GDP per capita ratio Gini (unadjusted)<br>Gini<br>Income (GDP) per capita ratio<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Huang and Luo (2008) Changes in the Gini coefficient are closely associated with changes in the urban-to-rural income ratio and the coastal-to-inland per capita GDP ratio (Figure 2). The evolution of reform focus and the policy inclination over coastal/inland region and rural/urban sectors play an important role in income distribution changes. For example, when rural income increased relative to urban income in the early 1980s due to the implementation of Household Responsibility System and mid 1990s due to the increase in grain purchase price, overall inequality dropped. When coastal income increased relative to inland income in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the regional policy inclination, overall inequality increased. The sharp increase in urban inequality is a main component of the increase in overall inequality. Inequality in rural China remained slightly higher than in urban China. However, inequality in urban China has increased so rapidly in recent years that it may surpass that of rural China some time in the future (Chotikapanich et al., 2007). In the mid/late-1980s, when the full employment or the so called “iron rice bowl” policy ( _tie fan wan_ ) came to an end as the restructuring of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) became the center of 1990s reform -- profitable firms tended to increase wages for skilled or able workers while laying off the rest -- the number of laid-off workers increased. Poverty started to become more of an urban issue in the 1990s (Wang et al., 2002; Wu, 2004). Fang et al. (2002), using 1992-1998 urban household survey, find that the incidence of urban poverty declined from 1992 to 1995 but increased from 1996 to 1998. Meng et al. (2005), using a cross section of household survey data 3
Urbanization and development are tightly linked. The strong positive correlation between the rate of urbanization of a country and its per capita income has been repeatedly documented (see, for instance, World Bank 2009; Henderson 2010; Henderson 2002). Much of the causation goes from economic growth to increased urbanization. As countries grow, they undergo structural change, and labor is reallocated from rural agriculture to urban manufacturing and services (Michaels, Rauch, and Redding 2012).<sup>1</sup> The traditional policy focus is to ensure that this reallocation occurs at the ‘right time’ and that the distribution of population across cities is ‘balanced’. Urbanization without industrialization (Fay and Opal 1999; Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2013; Jedwab 2013) and increased population concentrations in primate cities (Duranton 2008) are often viewed as serious urban and development problems.

This paper takes a different perspective and seeks to examine the extent to which growth and economic development are affected by urbanization. In this case, urbanization is no longer a change that follows from growth and needs to be accommodated. On the contrary, it is viewed as an integral part of the growth process. To evaluate how cities affect growth, it may seem natural to take a macroeconomic perspective and assess the effects of urbanization and its characteristics. Doing so involves taking a cross-country perspective and regressing growth on urbanization. Unfortunately, extremely few studies take this approach, and cross-country growth regressions have come under heavy criticism.<sup>2</sup> Instead, it is useful to reframe the question about the effects of urbanization on growth as a question about the effects of cities on worker productivity over different time horizons. Are workers more productive when they move to cities? Do they become more productive in cities? If yes, over what time horizon, how, and to what extent? The general answer is that workers in cities benefit from agglomeration economies, which take place through a variety 2
|Table G3|. Govemment E|ffective|noss|
|---|---|---|---|
|Code|Table|Row|Concepts measured|
||(Appendix 1)|||
|Represe|ntative sources|||
|EIU|A 1.5|6|Govemment policy (pro-business)|
|||7|Govemment/Institutional<br>efficacy|
|||8|Red tape / bureaucracy|
|DRI|A 1.3|29|Institutional failure: Institutional rigidities that hinder|
||||bureaucratic efficiency|
|||28|Govemment ineffectiveness: Quality of the govemment's<br>personnel|
|||27|Govemment instability: High tumoverthat lowers the quality|
||||of the govemments personnel|
|PRS|A 1.10|1|Govemment stability: Its ability to carry out programs|
|||12|Bureaucratic quality: Civil service's institutional strength, free<br>from political influences|
|WDR|A 1.13|18|Likelihood that when a govemment official acts against the rules,|
||||one can go to another official or a superior and get<br>correct treatment|
|||19|Management tme spent with bureaucrats|
|||20|The efficiency customs|
|||21|The general condition of roads you use|
|||22|The efficiency of mail delivery|
|||23|The quality of public health care provision|
|||24|Govemment efficiency in delivering services|
|||1|Predictability of changes in rules and laws|
|||2|Credibility of govemment's commitmen**t**o policies|
|Non-rep|resentative sour|ces||
|BERI|A 1.1|21|Bureaucratic delays|
|FHNT|A 1.6|8|Govemment and administration: Decentralization and transparency|
|GCS98|A 1.8|4|Competence of public sector personnel relative to private sector|
|||9|<br>Wasteful govemment expenditure|
|||29|Govemment commitments are honored by new govemments|
|||5|Managemen**t**ime spent with bureaucracy|
|||6|Public service vulnerability to political pressure|
|GCSA|A 1.8|4|Competence of public sector personnel relative to private sector|
|||9|<br>Wasteful govemment expenditure|
|||29|Govemment commitments are honored by new govemments|
|||41|Strength and expertise of the civil service to avoid drastic<br>interruptions in govemment services in times of<br>|
||||political instability|
|WCY98|A 1.12|14|<br>Effective implementation of govermment<br>decisions|
|||13|Bureaucracy as an obstacle to business development|
|||12|Exposure of public service to political interference|

55
over the sample period for the 19 major exporting industries In the Colombian manufacturing sector.' In general tenns, the macro environment in Colombia was not conducive to profitable exporting of manufactured goods in the early 1980's. Responding to illegal exports, foreign capital inflows, and a boom in the coffce market, the Colombian peso appreciated steadily between the mid-1970's and 1983. As shown in Table 1, this pattern was reversed aftr" 1983, with the currmncy losing approximately one-half of its value by lY89. This partly reflected central bank currency market interventions to ease competitive pressures on tradeable goods producers.

The time-series pattern of manufactured exports largely mirrors this movement in the exchange rate. The real value of manufactured exports from the nineteen major exporting industries declined slightly from 109.6 (billion 1985 pesos) in 1981 to 95.9 in 1984, for an average annual growth rate of -4.45 percent. F-rom 1984 to 1989 the pattern reversed and the quantity of exports grew at an annual average rate of 21.1 percent." Commercial policy sheltered import-competing producers throughout the sample period. Substantial tariff barriers were reduced slightly after 1984, but quantitative restrictions on the imports of products that competed with domestic industries were maintained. In addition to turning the terms of trade against exporters, these polices made it more difficult to import raw materials or capital goods that may have been necessary to increase the quality of manufactured products.'" 9 The nineteen industries and their SITC codes are: food processing (311/312), textiles (321), clothing (322). leathr products (323/324). paper (341), printing (342). chemicals (351/352), plastic (356). glass (362). non-metal products (369). iron and steel (371). metal products (381), nuchinery (382/383), transportation equipment (384), and miscellaneous nianuficuring (390). These industries account for over 96 percent of Colombia's manufacturing sector exports and 85 percent of manufacturing output in each sample year.

' The real value of exports is measured as the peso value of exports deflated by an export price index from the IMF International Financial Statistics. This measure will overstate the dependence of the physical v.;:ume of exports on the exchange rate because of valuation effects.

"0 The long-term promection of the domestic market from import competition appears to have alo contributed to the low product quality and low productivity that have made it difficult for Colombian exporters to compese in the intentional market (World Bank, [992).

8