of the strike to the impacts of the violent campaigns described above, one can reject the hypothesis that the impacts are equal at conventional significance levels. Overall, this event caused attendance to go from better than other more conflict-affected regions to significantly worse in a matter of 2 months, and the regions with the worst school attendance actually had the least violence at the end of the survey period analyzed (February 2020). Importantly, in specifications that do not properly account for the strike, the strong impacts of the strike can actually be misattributed to particular types of violence in this setting that have a strong geographic overlap with regions affected by the strike.

There are three primary contributions of these results. First, although the majority of articles addressing education during conflict focus on the relationship between proximity to violence and education outcomes, this setting also incorporates other conflict-related shocks. These findings also demonstrate that conflict-related shocks aside from proximity to violence can be more important to explaining variation in school attendance, and the effects of these other shocks can be misattributed to the local impact of violence if not properly incorporated. Given the possibility that other unexplored events could be obscuring the relationship between violence and schooling outcomes in other settings as well, these results offer an additional explanation for significant variations in the impact violence has on education across contexts, where the magnitude and sign of the impact often depends on the type of violence, the characteristics of children, and the conflict setting (e.g., Blattman and Annan 2010; Chamarbagwala and Morn 2010; Shemyakina 2011; Leon 2012; Akbulut-Yuksel 2014; Justino et al. 2014; Swee 2015; Monterio and Rocha 2017; Michaelsen and Paolo 2018; Bertoni et al. 2019; Bruck et al. 2019; etc.).5 Second, these results demonstrate that the sensitivity of school attendance to living in close proximity to violence can change during conflict. Relative to pre-conflict levels, school attendance in Yemen had significantly declined by the early years of the conflict (e.g., OCHA 2017; WFP 2019; etc.). Evidence suggests that at least a portion of this decline was due to households being in close proximity to violence, where the most often cited reason parents took their children out of school was safety and there is evidence that violence had damaged school buildings in the country (e.g., OCHA 2020; World Bank 2020a).6 However, as the violence in the country surged to levels much higher than at the beginning of the conflict, there was surprisingly little sensitivity of school attendance to changes in violence. This is further in line with aggregate displacement patterns, where the vast majority of displacement occurred at the beginning of the conflict when violence was far from its peak (e.g., TFPM 2017).

And lastly, even in the conflict in Yemen, where news and humanitarian organizations are reporting many events in real time, these results demonstrate that there can be consequential events that have a strong impact on the ground that are not widely reported. The teacher

> 5Additionally, the possibility that conflict can significantly affect school attendance beyond the geographic location of violence is consistent with a growing literature demonstrating similar results with food security outcomes (e.g., D’ Souza and Jolliffe 2013; Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2018; etc.). 6As of 2020, 32 percent of school buildings in the 16 largest cities in Yemen were partially damaged and 3 percent were destroyed (e.g., World Bank 2020a).

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