rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2285

# **Summary findings**

Little empirical research has been done on monitoring and enforcement issues in environmental economics, especially to analyze the impact of monitoring and enforcement on polluters' environmental performance. No studies have been done in developing economics.

Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi, and Wang explore the impact of inspections, and the potential impact of pollution charges and citizens' complaints, on the environmental performance of polluters in China.

Their analysis of plant-level data from the city of Zhenjiang shows that: Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance.

Pollution charges do Ilot have **a** statistically - significant effect oll firms' performance although the lack of variation in pollution charges in Zlhenjiang precludes effectively capturing their impact.

Complaints have a significant impact on inspections and therefore on pAllutinn control.

Currently available data do not allow analysis of whether the cost oi- addirional inspections is justified, but it is reasonable to speculate that additional inspections would improve social welfare in Zhenjiang and that information and ecucation campaigns are probably a good way to encourage citizen complaints.

- This paper -a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Pollution Control in China: The Role and Impact of inspection and Complaints" (RPO 682-44). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Yasmin D'Souza, room MC2-622, telephone 202-473-1449, fax 202-522-3230, email address ydsouza@vxworldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at wwv.worldbank.org/researchI workingpapers. The authors may be contacted at sdasguptaCkworldbank.org, blaplantec@?worldbank.org, or hwangl(cworldbank.org. February 2000. (25 pages)

_The Policy Research WI'orking Paper Series disseminates the findiings of work in progress to_ **_encoziiigc_** _the exchanzge of ideas ahozot development issues. An objective of the series is toget the findings out quickly, even if the presentatiois are less than folly polished. The papers carry the names of the aothors anzd should he cited accordinzgly. The findings, inmerpretations,_ **_aind_** _conclusions expressed_ **_in_** _this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do nlot necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent._ Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
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# Table 2: DEVELDOPIG (0NrRIES - GRf a/ OF GDP, ECPOES AM) DOMS (percent)

||||1965-81|||1982-86|b/|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Co|untry Group|GOP|Export c/|Iiport<br>d|GDP|Export c/|Iqiort_c/_|
||Developing Cotntries||||||-.|
||Low<br>(<2.5)|2.3|2.9|4.0|-0.1|3.1|-5.9|
||Moderate<br>(2.6-5.0)|<br>4.2|<br>1.1|5.2|3.1|4.5|-1.1|
||High<br>(5.1-7.5)|6.3|5.6|7.5|4.9|7.5|5.5|
||Very High<br>(>7.5)|7.6|10.3|12.3|10.4|12.5|12.9|
|II.|Pogons|||||||
||Afrlca|4.3|3.5|6.3|-0.7|n.a.|-9.6|
||Africa (exclNigeria)|4.0|3.0|4.3|0.3|n.ea.|_-z.9_|
||Asia|6.2|9.3|11.0|6.9|9.8|.0|
||EMENA|5.7|5.1|6.9|2.9|5.2|1.7|
||Latin America|4.7|2.3|7.4|1.3|3.6|-7.7|
|III.|Other|||||||
||Low Income|5.0|3.7|3.8|7.6|8.7|9.1|
||High Debt|5.7|2.9|7.9|0.9|2.8|-8.6|
||35 SAL Countries|5.9|6.9|8al|2.2|5.0|-3.1|
||15 Major SAL Countries|6.2|7.8|6.3|2.3|8.6|0.1|
|EV.|Average d/|5.7|4.8|7.3|3.9|6.5|0.8|

# n.a. !'bt available.

At constant prices. Preliminary. Goods and NFS frm national accounts. 90 country average.

# Source: 1ESD, World Bark.

do for growth continues to be raised, but the positive association between export and GDP growth cannot be denied (Table 2).

The replacement of quantitative restrictions (QRs) by tariffs is also a fairly common policy-proposal. For major recipients of adjustment lending, nearly two-thirds of the loans included the goal of
The regressions results are less striking for the freedom of information<sup>lawbutthey</sup> essentially tell the same story: the more access to information<sup>thebetterthequalityof</sup> governance. There are three outliers for these sets of<sup>regressions.Switzerland, Norwayand</sup> Luxemburg have no FOI law/act but have very good scores on governance. In the most parsimonious specification, I find that countries that have<sup>FOI lawsaremuchmorelikely to be</sup> well governed as shown in Table 13a below.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 13a.** FOIA **and Governance (no outlier for FOI)**

_DATA SET: KAUFMANN, KRAAYAND ZOIDO-LOBATON_

||Howauthorities<br>_____<br>repla|are selectedand<br>__________<br>ced|Capacityoft<br>implementsou|hestate to<br>ndpolicies|Respectofth<br>thecitizensf<br>|estate and<br>ortherules<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Voiceand<br>Accountability|PoliticalInstability<br>andViolence|Government<br>Effectiveness|Regulatory<br>Burden|Ruleof<br>Law|Graft|
|Incomepercapita|.*39***|.54***|.49***|.38***|.60***|.54***|
||(5.58)|(8.37)|(7.67)|(7.21)|(10.52)|(8.45)|
|FOIA|.56***|.17|.30**|.15|.15|.29*|
||(3.72)|(1.3)|(2.13)|-(1.39)|(.20)|(1.95)|
|Constant|-3.34***|4.67***|.4.18***|-3.08***|-5.04***|4.63***|
||(-6.07)|(-8.66)|(-8.19)|(-7.13)|(-10.83)|(-9.11)|
|#obs|.134|121|122|128|128|121|
|Rz1|.46|.49|.53|.41|.61|.56|

**Table 13b. FOIA and Governance (no outlier for FOI)**

_DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997_

||ICRG|Corruption|Ruleof<br>Law|Bureaucracy<br>Quality|Contract<br>Repudiation|Expropriation<br>Risk|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Incomepercapita<sup>t 1t</sup>|.52***<br>(4.39)|.49***<br>(3.14)|.78***<br>(5.15)|.64***<br>(4.37)|.52***<br>(4.2)|.46***<br>(4.52)|
|FOIA|1.17**<br>(5.31)|L.39***<br>(4.90)|1.09***<br>(3.66)|1.46***<br>(5.08)|L.01***<br>(4.71)|.86**<br>(4.54)|
|Constant|-.63<br>(-.73)|-.84<br>(-.74)|-2.89**<br>(-2.64)|- .95*<br>(-1.84)|-.29<br>(-.34)|.50<br>(.67)|
|#obs|91|91|91|91|91|91|
|R2|.56|.44|.49|_.51_|.52|.48|
|_*indicatessignifcanc_|_eat.1level,** _|_at.05leveland_|_***at.01_|<sup>_level._</sup>|||

9 The three outliers are omitted from this table.

32
<!-- Start of picture text --> a<br>8Cc —-<br>-f=) =<br>—_ Sis<br>36 ~---- iE han.Tp I |<br>$2© oO eee See ee ~~ 4---- LLL -——<br>Er<br>o_—<br>D<br>2<br>oC;Ce<br>wo<br>-<br>r<br>-.2 0 2 A 6<br>Program effect on self-employment<br>@ Upto 2 years ——— Upto2 years, fitted line (coef: .025)<br>A More than 2 years —-—-—-—- More than 2 years, fitted line (coef: -.048)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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in the wage worker species (7.3 percent)<sup>12</sup> . On the other hand, the wage worker species is more likely to transition into wage work during the following quarters, compared to the formal business owner species. A sizable fraction of each species also ends up not being employed at all during the following quarters. Overall, the transition patterns are consistent with the species classification. Compared to the wage worker species, individuals in the formal business owner species are more likely to remain informal business owners or become formal business owners, as opposed to becoming wage workers or not employed.

As mentioned above, Bruhn (2008 and 2011) performs various tests that suggest that the identification strategy used to measure the effects of SARE is valid. Table 5 contains additional tests for the sample of informal business owners. Columns 1 and 2 display the results from taking only pre-reform data and running a regression of each occupation dummy on a variable that indicates in which quarter the municipality implemented the reform. The coefficients show that pre-reform transition probabilities are, for the most part, not statistically significantly correlated with the quarter of implementation. The only exception here is that, in the pre-reform period, individuals in the formal business owner species were more likely to remain informal business owners during the following quarters in municipalities that implemented the reform later rather than earlier. This correlation is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

Columns 3 and 4 test the parallel trends identification assumption more directly. They show the coefficients from a regression of each occupation dummy variable in the pre-reform period on a time trend, the quarter of implementation variable, and the interaction of the two (scaled by 100). None of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant, indicating that transition probabilities in the pre-reform period did not display time trends that varied systematically with the quarter of reform implementation.

# **5. Results**

Table 6 presents the estimated impacts of SARE on the occupational choices of informal business owners. Column 1 replicates the results from Bruhn (2008 and 2011), grouping all informal business owners together. The coefficients show no impact of SARE on the likelihood

> 12 The data does not allow me to determine for certain whether an owner registers the same business that was previously informal or whether they close the informal business and open a new, formal business. However, I assume that they register the business that was previously informal.

10
<!-- Start of picture text --> 45 |<br>.4<br>.35 || Manufacturing<br>. 3 |<br>£ |<br>i° 2<br>56 2 nn | iAll firms<br>15 |<br>|<br>|<br>05 |<br>|<br>0 |<br>2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 7 |<br>| Manufacturing<br>6 |<br>o—_e—__——__e___,_|| «—_.__, ee *<br>Bos<br>: |<br>2 |i All firms<br>ui52 4 —>—+—_._|_.|\ __. - s 5<br>5 3 |<br>|<br>2 ||<br>|<br>|<br>1 |<br>2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

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|<br>Manufacturing<br>|<br>fo}is5 4 inane||<br>e |<br>oO<br>a |<br>\ .<br>een aan<br>2 ! All firms<br>1 |<br>2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> 9 | Manufacturi<br>|<br>ee ane<br>| II firms:<br>;fo}2 8 '!||<br>wi |<br>¢ |<br>|<br>|<br>G i<br>6 !<br>|<br>|<br>5 |<br>2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text -->
- **ISIE, Instance Sup ́erieure Ind ́ependante pour les Elections** , “R ́esultats finaux par circonscription pour les  ́elections l ́egislatives 2014,” `https://bit.ly/30AEnQ5` 2015. Accessed: 2021-09-20.

- **Jayakumar, Shashi and Cameron Sumpter** , “Southeast Asian Fighters from Islamic State Leaks,” _Perspectives on Terrorism_ , 2019, _13_ (6), 58–72.

- **King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts** , “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” _American Political Science Review_ , 2017, _111_ (3), 484–501.

- **Kleibergen, Frank and Richard Paap** , “Generalized Reduced Rank Rests Using the Singular Value Decomposition,” _Journal of Econometrics_ , 2006, _133_ (1), 97–126.

- **Krueger, Alan and David Laitin** , “Kto Kogo?: A Cross-country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism,” in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, eds., _Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness_ , 01 2008, pp. 148–173.

- **and Jitka Maleˇckov ́a** , “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connec-

- tion?,” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ , 2003, _17_ (4), 119–144.

- **Li, Quan and Drew Schaub** , “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A pooled Time-Series Analysis,” _Journal of Conflict Resolution_ , 2004, _48_ (2), 230–258.

- **Li, Xuecao, Yuyu Zhou, Min Zhao, and Xia Zhao** , “A Harmonized Global Nighttime Light Dataset 1992–2018,” _Scientific Data_ , 2020, _7_ (168).

- **Litan, Robert and Alice Rivlin** , “Projecting the Economic Impact of the Internet,” _American Economic Review_ , May 2001, _91_ (2), 313–317.

- **Manacorda, Marco and Andrea Tesei** , “Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa,” _Econometrica_ , 2020, _88_ (2), 533–567.

- **Mastrobuoni, Giovanni** , “Crime is Terribly Revealing: Information Technology and Police Productivity,” _The Review of Economic Studies_ , 2020, _87_ (6), 2727–2753.

21
specification with only OPORTUNIDADES transfers in equation (9) using the data only from the waves that collected both private transfers and other public transfers using potential transfers as the instrument. The second column reports the results when private transfers are added to OPORTUNIDADES transfers. There is no difference between the estimated coefficients in the two models. Column 3 reports the results when we additionally add other public transfers to the OPORTUNIDADES and private transfers. Again there are no differences. In Panel B we reestimate the specifications in Panel A using only other public transfers. The first column reports the base results using only OPORTUNIDADES transfers on data from the waves that collected other public transfers. The second column adds in other public transfers. There is no difference between columns 1 and 2 in Panel B. Finally, column 3 controls for whether the family also receives a public food basket. Again, the estimated coefficients do not change. These results imply that our estimates are not biased due to the exclusion of public and private transfers from the analysis.

# **5.5. Health Effects**

We also test the possibility that beneficiary productivity and consumption increased through improvements in health brought on by participation in OPORTUNIDADES. Panel CI of Table 12 estimates the effect of treatment on health, measured by activities of daily living (ADL)<sup>23</sup> . We show that the program does have small positive effect on health. Given this potential pathway, we again estimate our consumption model controlling for health status (ADL) of the head of household on a limited sub-sample where health data are available. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 13, and again we find that the estimated coefficients on current and cumulative lagged transfers do not change controlling for ADLs. This suggests that our main results are not biased by not controlling for health.

# **5.6. Length of Benefits Expectations**

> 23 Activity of Daily Living measurements are based on an individuals’ self-rating of ability to engage in normal daily activities, including ability to carry out vigorous and moderate activities, ability to carry groceries, ability to lift a piece of paper off the ground, ability to walk more than 2km and ability to use the bathroom and bathe unassisted.

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# _2.8 Summary of Findings and Recommendations_

Creditor protection through modern secured transactions legal regimes is associated with higher ratios of higher private sector credit to GDP. **Increasing the protection of creditor’s rights and enforcement mechanisms can lead to a considerable increase in private sector credit to GDP** .<sup>45</sup> As evidenced by numerous sources of data such as the World Bank Enterprise surveys, the Legal Rights Index of the Doing Business Report and the recent World Bank MENA SME Lending Survey, the MENA region lags clearly behind the rest of the world in firms’ access to private credit and in the robustness of secured transactions systems.

In the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, **the MENA region had the lowest percentage of firms with credit lines or loans from financial institutions** , at 25.07%, compared to 56.92% for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 54.97% for Latin American & the Caribbean (LAC), and 45.02% for South Asia. Moreover, enterprise survey data from 7 countries in MENA points out that **collateral requirements for firms requesting loans are substantial** . On average, 82% of loans require some type of collateral. Improving secured transactions regimes has helped alleviate this constraint in other countries and can reasonably be expected to do the same for the MENA countries.

# **Modern and efficient secured transactions systems have the objective of facilitating lending**

**to firms** , especially SMEs by creating the conditions for firms to be able to use movable property as collateral for loans. Modern secured transactions systems are built around the **following principles or pillars** :

- **Scope:** the types of legal structures that can be used to secure obligations (e.g. security interest, pledge, mortgage, etc.); the types of transactions that should be considered within the scope of the law (loans secured with movable property, retention of title, financial leasing, assignment of receivables, consignments, etc); the types of movable property that may be used as security; and the types of debtors who may give security in movable property.

- **Creation:** the legal requirements for giving and taking a right against movable property to secure an obligation.

- **Priority:** the rules that determine the relative rights among conflicting claims against movable property.

- **Publicity/registration of security interests:** the means of making a claim against movable property transparent to third parties, commonly provided by registration in a public registry, by taking possession or control of the movable property, by direct notice,

> 45 See ―Private Credit in 129 Countries‖, Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Schleifer, 2006.

33
**Figure 5: Stages of the Value Chain**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Input Farm Logistics /<br>Assembly Processing<br>Supply Production Distribution<br><!-- End of picture text --> 14. In value chain analysis, all inputs and outputs carry forward their inherited value from the previous stage. This concept is important to stress in value chain analysis where the focus is on accumulated costs at different stages as a key determinant of trade competitiveness. The competitiveness of any domestic product depends on the efficiency of input supply, farm production, assembly, processing, and logistics up to final delivery point where the good competes internationally as an export or import substitute. By looking at the cost composition at each stage of the value chain and comparing these costs with world standards, the methodology not only shows if the country is internationally competitive, but also helps identify key stages where costs could most effectively be reduced as a strategy for sector growth.

# **A. Analytical Framework**

15. Based on these guiding principles, the analysis of Malawi’s agriculture competitiveness was prepared using a specific methodology developed for a recent study of Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA).<sup>5</sup> The methodology is built around a set of interlinked Excel templates designed to calculate standard indicators of costs and profitability at each major stage of the production cycle. By filling in the elements of each template for individual commodities and farm systems, the methodology offers a practical way to establish benchmark prices that can be compared with international standards and identify specific areas where costs can most effectively be reduced through policy change or other types of investment.

16. According to the methodology, total costs are measured in terms of Domestic Value Added (DVA) and Shipment Value (SV), which constitute the main value chain indicators as follows.

= **Domestic Value Added (DVA)** Domestic costs and mark-ups [1] + Official duties and tax + Unofficial charges and extra costs **Shipment Value (SV)** = Domestic Value Added [2] + Foreign components 17. Because countries mainly have influence over prices within their own borders, the methodology is particularly interested in the composition of DVA as a leverage point for

> 5 Keyser, John C (2006). <u>Definition of Methodology and Presentation of Templates for Value Chain Analysis, Competitive Commercial Agriculture in Africa (CCAA), The World Bank, Environmental, Rural</u> and Social Development Unit, Washington DC.

8
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prudent fiscal and structural government policies — the identification of which is a key objective of this paper.

The main findings from the three complementary methodologies to assess the economic and policyrelevant implications of aging were the following: In relation to the _econometric evidence_ for Brazil, a higher saving rate is found to lead to higher income growth; or put more conservatively, there is no econometric evidence suggesting that an increase in the old-age dependency ratio has led to reductions in saving and growth. The _partial equilibrium_ results suggest that saving rates in Brazil are found to depend crucially on public pensions, and it is found that if inequality falls then saving will be further promoted because there will be even more high-savers since the non-poor are found to save more than the poor.

In a _general equilibrium_ setting, the three scenarios for financing the fiscal costs associated with aging were compared: Benefit-Financing was found to be strongly preferable as a financing method. Reforming the relatively generous Brazilian social security system could advantageously be combined with indexing to life expectancy the age of eligibility for such benefits.

The scope of this paper did not encompass all the transmission channels through which aging will lead to macroeconomic changes. Several issues for future research — both theoretically and in applied research — have been identified in the paper. Notably, the decisions over labor force participation; endogenous changes in effective retirement ages; the institutional settings for harvesting the demographic dividend; and other excluded issues remain for future research on the macroeconomic and economic policy implication of population aging.

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