receiving. The key characteristics of crisis‐vulnerable households, relative to the rest of the population, are as below (see Annex 2, Table F for all results).

_Firstly_ , the crisis‐vulnerable households have much higher incidence of external remittances than the general population– 46% of the crisis‐vulnerable households receive remittances from abroad in the benchmark scenario compared to 10% of the general population. _Secondly,_ the crisis‐vulnerable have larger household size and dependency than the rest of the population. _Thirdly_ , they have lower skills on the average – 89% of household heads have education of 0‐9 years compared to the national average of 79%. _Fourthly_ , a much higher share of adults in crisis‐vulnerable households are employed in industry and services (73% of total adults employed) compared to the general population (61% of total adults employed). _Finally_ , they look fairly similar to the general population in terms of their rural‐urban composition, with 80% from rural areas compared to 75% for the general population.

How do the crisis‐vulnerable households compare with the permanently or _structurally poor_ (defined as the households who are poor in _both_ benchmark and crisis scenarios in 2010)? Crisis‐vulnerable households have, on the average, lower dependency and higher skill level than the structurally poor. Their employment rate in industry and services is also much higher – 73% of all employed adults in crisis‐vulnerable households are employed in these two sectors compared with 54% in the case of the structurally poor. The crisis‐vulnerable households are also significantly _less_ rural than the structurally poor households (see Annex 2, Table F).

In sum, the loss of (or reduction in) remittances from abroad is the most significant channel of impact for households who are predicted to become _poor_ as a direct result of the crisis. In fact, nearly 60% of the aggregate poverty impact of the crisis in 2010 is due to the loss in remittances. It is important to note that “loss of remittances” actually refers to the reduction in _potential_ remittances in 2010 – remittances, while still growing even during the crisis, will do so at a lower rate than what was expected without the crisis (resulting in 10% lower remittances).

The profile of crisis‐vulnerable households is consistent with our _a priori_ intuition. Compared to the general population, households vulnerable to the crisis are disproportionately employed in the non‐ agricultural sectors because output and income losses are expected to occur in these sectors. They also have “worse” attributes (larger households, higher dependency and lower skills) compared to the general population – attributes that would make them vulnerable to being poor as a result of the crisis. The crisis‐vulnerable or the “newly poor” households as a result of the crisis are also different in a number of key aspects from the more permanently poor. Compared to the structurally poor, they have “better” characteristics (lower dependency, higher skills, receiving remittances, living in urban areas and employed outside agriculture) – characteristics that our simulations indicate would have taken them out of poverty had there been no crisis.

**Growth incidence between benchmark and crisis scenarios** . We use growth incidence curves (GICs) to examine how the reductions in per capita consumption and income between benchmark and crisis scenarios in 2010 are distributed. GICs are commonly used to look at the distribution of growth over time; however the same concept is useful to see changes between two “states” of the world as well, in

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