**<u>Table 6: Impact of treatments on household size, transfers and fixed deposit</u>**

||<br>(1)|<br>(2)|<br>(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Dependent variable:**|Household size|Total transfers<br>made [MK]|Total transfers<br>received [MK]|Total net transfers<br>made [MK]|Transf. made,<br>biggest gift bf.<br>Oct09 [MK]|Transf. received,<br>biggest gift bf.<br>Oct09 [MK]|Net transf. made,<br>biggest gift bf.<br>Oct09 [MK]|Has fixed deposit<br>account|
|Ordinary Account|0.05|489.07|‐205.98|640.41|23.65|‐73.97|114.09|0.03**|
||(0.11)|(351.95)|(322.24)|(436.29)|(88.18)|(124.25)|(139.93)|(0.02)|
|Ordinary x Private Raffle|0.13|‐556.78*|‐45.58|‐445.06|61.94|‐54.88|133.00|‐0.03**|
||(0.11)|(333.92)|(310.05)|(442.32)|(86.25)|(126.50)|(120.59)|(0.02)|
|Ordinary x Public Raffle|0.16|‐511.68|‐201.28|‐297.40|123.71|‐97.25|205.43*|‐0.01|
||(0.11)|(372.17)|(297.76)|(401.70)|(99.23)|(113.73)|(120.24)|(0.02)|
|Commitment Account|0.06|275.41|‐490.66*|722.19*|79.47|‐272.32***|358.65***|0.06***|
||(0.11)|(330.32)|(290.30)|(405.26)|(83.72)|(104.66)|(128.14)|(0.02)|
|Commitment x Private Raffle|0.13|96.98|5.61|121.39|14.46|54.34|‐48.80|‐0.02|
||(0.12)|(380.60)|(251.89)|(403.43)|(94.88)|(97.73)|(120.26)|(0.03)|
|Commitment x Public Raffle|0.08|‐21.58|517.79**|‐593.28|44.13|83.10|‐35.76|‐0.01|
||(0.11)|(336.37)|(257.24)|(399.37)|(101.46)|(100.81)|(144.22)|(0.03)|
|Mean Dep Var in Control|5.72|2,871.70|2,492.13|417.89|358.53|641.98|‐297.32|0.04|
|Number of observations|2,835|2,835|2,835|2,835|2,835|2,835|2,835|2,835|
|P‐values of F‐tests:|||||||||
|Ordinary, No Raffle =|||||||||
|Commitment, No Raffle|0.952|0.553|0.299|0.846|0.525|0.064|0.050|0.250|
|Ordinary, Private Raffle = 0|0.115|0.819|0.424|0.644|0.291|0.297|0.045|0.972|
|Ordinary, Public Raffle = 0|0.051|0.948|0.185|0.374|0.123|0.127|0.009|0.276|
|Commit., Private Raffle = 0|0.114|0.325|0.105|0.053|0.312|0.064|0.022|0.018|
|Commit., Public Raffle = 0|0.231|0.444|0.928|0.753|0.219|0.115|0.038|0.011|

Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is ca. MK 145. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and the following baseline variables: Dummy for male respondent; dummy for married; age in years; years of completed education; number of household members; asset index; livestock index; land under cultivation; proceeds from tobacco and maize sales during the 2008 season; cash spent on inputs for the 2009 season; dummy for ownership of any formal bank account; amount of savings in bank or cash (with missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for hyperbolic (missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for "patient now, impatient later" (missing values replaced with zeros); net transfers made to social network over 12 months; dummy for missing value in savings amount; dummy for missing value in hyperbolic and "patient now, impatient later". For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B. F‐tests: "Ordinary, No Raffle = Commitment, No Raffle" tests the equality of means in ordinary and commitment treatment groups each without additional raffle treatments; "Ordinary, Private Raffle = 0" tests if the sum of the coefficient on "Ordinary" and the coefficient on "Ordinary x Private Raffle" is different from zero; "Ordinary, Public Raffle", "Commitment, Private Raffle"; "Commitment, Public Raffle" tests the same sums of the different combinations of savings and raffle