rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
debtor country in terms of the time spent by their key officials in Government at negotiations with external creditors and donor Governments. There remains the need for further debt stock reduction in these countries, most of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa, on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, it is important to take into account their significant differences in indebtedness and ongoing policy reforms in these countries.

**Table 1. Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries**

|||_Deb_|_t Restruc_|_turing_||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_1988_|_1989_|_1990_|_1991_|**_1992_**|_1993_|**_1994_**|
|Total amount rescheduled|7,282|13,262|6,414|6,206|6,081|2,027|3,572|
|Debt Stock rescheduled|1,877|5,941|358|714|2,060|261|0|
|Principal rescheduled|1,253|4,533|3,898|3,284|2,177|1,054|2,061|
|Official|788|1,839|2,846|1,856|1,431|588|1,359|
|Private|465|2,694|1,052|1,428|746|466|702|
|Interest reschedule|707|2,141|1,827|1,744|1,109|566|1,442|
|Official|566|1,391|1,507|1,406|710|378|1,167|
|Private|140|750|320|339|399|188|275|
|Principal forgiven|510|2,105|1,409|1,396|685|800|2,064|
|Memo: interest forgiven|14|102|95|346|101|158|358|
|Debt stock reduction|261|305|354|546|3,632|181|476|
|of which debt buvback|0|0|0|190|1.335|26|8|

_Source:_ World Bank, _World Debt Tables, 1996._ Volume 1, pp. 223.

# **II. Was the "Lost Decade" really a loss?**

The advent of the international debt crisis, which started with Mexico declaring a moratorium on debt service payments to it foreign commercial bank creditors in August 1982 led to what is often termed as the "lost decade" in terms of new international financial flows to developing countries. The period of the late 1980s was one of financial consolidation and retrenchment by private creditors (mainly commercial banks) from lending activities in developing countries. Their developing country exposure was reduced and loan-loss reserves were enhanced. A secondary market for developing country debt began to show signs of emerging as banks who wanted to "unload" their positions on developing country liabilities began to seek buyers of these discounted securities. In the debtor economies two forms of adjustment to the cutoff of external finance became necessary: (i) generating a trade surplus in the balance of payments and thereby increasing 9
|P073488|2003|2011|6/29/2011|14 Closed|Philippines|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|P073488|2003|2012|1/28/2012|15 Closed|Philippines|
|P073488|2003|2013|7/30/2012|16 Closed|Philippines|
|P073488|2003|2013|3/25/2013|17 Closed|Philippines|
|P073488|2003|2014|12/31/2013|18 Closed|Philippines|
|P073488|2003|2014|5/27/2014|19 Closed|Philippines|
|P073507|2002|2002||0 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2003|4/16/2003|1 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2004|6/9/2004|4 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2005|6/7/2005|6 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2006|1/14/2006|7 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2007|1/3/2007|8 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2008|8/31/2007|9 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2008|1/12/2008|10 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2008|5/21/2008|11 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2009|8/28/2008|12 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2009|10/27/2008|13 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2009|5/9/2009|14 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2010|12/31/2009|15 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2010|6/30/2010|16 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2011|5/4/2011|17 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073507|2002|2020|7/15/2019|18 Closed|Congo,Republic of|
|P073525|2002|2002|4/3/2002|1 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2003|5/25/2003|4 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2004|6/28/2004|7 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2005|4/25/2005|9 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2006|10/25/2005|10 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2006|12/20/2005|11 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2006|6/9/2006|12 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2007|3/2/2007|13 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2007|6/27/2007<br>|14 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2008|11/5/2007|15 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2008|4/17/2008|16 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2009|8/31/2008|17 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2009|3/16/2009|18 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2009|6/30/2009|19 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2010|12/19/2009|20 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2010|6/28/2010|21 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2011|2/22/2011|22 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2012|12/17/2011|23 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073525|2002|2012|3/31/2012|24 Closed|Central African Repub|
|P073526|2004|2004|5/17/2004|2 Closed|Paraguay|
|P073526|2004|2005|4/13/2005|4 Closed|Paraguay|
|P073526|2004|2006|11/7/2005|5 Closed|Paraguay|
|P073526|2004|2007|11/22/2006|6 Closed|Paraguay|
|P073526|2004|2007|6/22/2007|7 Closed|Paraguay|
|P073526|2004|2008|12/18/2007|8 Closed|Paraguay|
between 2011 and 2021.<sup>1</sup> The social and security context are the main ways of public sector growth by the recruitment of staff and the regularization of contract workers (Brockmeyer _et al_ ., 2015). The service sector absorbs 58% of the female employment and 49% of the male employment. On the other hand, despite the rapidly falling gender gaps in educational attainment and the positive cultural effect caused by the Arab spring, the female labor force participation rates have been stagnating and the cultural effect is heterogenous across the country (Bargain et al., 2019).

In rural areas too, most jobs, including informal employment for the youth population, are in the service sector (David et al., 2023). This trend is partly explained by the low wages in the traditional laborintensive construction and agriculture, despite that the minimum nominal wage was recently equalized to other sectors. Further, internal migration from low-earnings regions to higher-earnings regions is not common with around 2% of workers in the southwest region and 5% from the southeast region moving to Grand Tunis each year (World Bank, 2015).

In this context, climate change and weather shocks are increasingly affecting households’ income stability. According to a recent survey by the European Investment Bank,<sup>2</sup> the rising occurrence of droughts, coastal erosion and floods had a negative impact on the livelihoods of Tunisians, with 52% claiming that their income has been affected. In 2023, Tunisia introduced water rationing and suspended water distribution in some areas of the capital and other cities for seven hours each night, as the country suffered its fourth year of severe drought. In addition, the Agriculture Ministry imposed a temporary quota system on water for irrigation.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, Tunisia represents an important case study for assessing the severe impacts of drought on the labor market in a country that, like many others, is increasingly destined to face the impacts of a changing climate. Future scenarios project rising temperatures, decreasing precipitation, increasing evapotranspiration and decreasing availability of water resources with detrimental effects on agricultural productivity (Abdelmalek and Nouiri, 2020; Verner et al., 2018).

# **3. Data**

> 1 INS statistics at https://www.ins.tn/enquetes/caracteristiques-des-agents-de-la-fonction-publique-et-leurs-salaires-2010-2021

> 2 The survey is available at: <u>https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2022-561-84-of-tunisians-say-climate-change-is-already-affecting-their-everydaylife#:~:text=The%20survey%20results%20confirm%20that,such%20as%20floods%20and%20hurricanes.</u>

> 3 <u>https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisia-introduces-water-quota-system-2023-03-31/</u>

5
56 Moreover, in recent years the central authorities have abolished or reduced a number of local fees and taxes on farmers, and have also introduced explicit production subsidies, as in the case of grain production (from 2004).<sup>110</sup> It is not clear, however, if the basic purpose of the reductions of local taxes is to support farmers without raising food prices for consumers, or if the purpose is instead to “starve” local authorities on tax revenues, in order to force them to cut the often very high administrative costs in local administration.<sup>111</sup> Clearly, if China contemplates relying on price regulations in housing and agriculture in the future as tools of distribution policy, the experiences in developed countries are worth taking into consideration. This point is strengthened by the observation that it has frequently turned out to be politically difficult to remove such price controls after they have been in force for some time – even when overwhelming evidence of harmful economic and social consequences has accumulated. The political cost of removing a privilege for a specific group of citizens is often higher than the political costs of not introducing such a privilege in the first place.

Naturally, not only the level but also the _stability_ of factor income is vital from a social point of view. This holds, in particular, for the poorest sections of the population, since their margins in terms of misery are especially narrow. Policies that smooth macroeconomic fluctuations may therefore be regarded as a first line of defense against income instability.<sup>112</sup> So far, however, it would seem that the Chinese government has not been very active in the field of short-term macroeconomic stabilization policy. In so far as such policies have been pursued at all during the last decades, they mainly seem to have taken the form of direct quantitative regulations of investment and credit flows rather than monetary and fiscal incentives, presumably because public-sector firms have been regarded as quite insensitive to economic incentives. However, as the economic system gradually becomes more incentive-oriented, stabilization policy can rely increasingly on such incentives.

> 110 According to OECD (2005b), total agricultural support in China today amounts to 6-8 percent of gross farm receipts.

> 111 For instance, the Tax-for-Fee reform a few years ago (which shifted tax revenues from local governments to the central government) seems to have had this purpose; see, for instance, Luo et al. (2006). 112 On the basis of a dynamic simulation model of the Chinese macroeconomy, Zhang (2001) reports that temporary external shocks tend to reduce the growth path of the economy for a considerable period of time (several years). Of course, this is not unique for China.
# region.

Figure 7 displays the simulated impacts of AfCFTA on digital goods imports by country member, and for the whole region. The simulation results reveal that imports of digital goods are expected to increase only by 0.3% for the whole region. The small effect of AfCFTA on total digital goods imports of member countries is partly due to the absence of tariff reductions on extra-zone imports of digital goods, which constitute most digital goods imports, and the limited intra-regional trade in these products. Nevertheless, the impacts are higher for some countries in the region, including Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique, which had relatively high tariffs, low imports of digital goods to begin with, and a greater reliance on digital goods imports from the region. Figure 8 depicts the simulated change in the ratio of intraregional digital goods imports to total digital goods imports as a result of AfCFTA. While some low-income countries are expected to experience a noticeable increase in the share of intraregional imports of digital goods, the whole AfCFTA region is expected to observe a minor increase between the ex-ante and ex-post scenarios.

For comparison, in Figure A4 we report the simulated change in total imports due to AfCFTA, drawing once again on the framework of Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2002), but considering now tariff and trade data on all goods, not just digital goods. We find that AfCFTA is expected to have a larger effect on total goods imports (0.8 percent) than on digital goods imports (0.3 percent). The effects are once again significantly heterogeneous across countries, with Zimbawe, the Central African Republic, Zambia, the Republic of Congo and Mozambique displaying the largest increases.

Besides the quantity of imports, AfCFTA might also be expected to impact the quality of digital goods imports. Since higher income countries tend to export higher-quality products, the moderate increase in the share of digital goods imports sourced from relatively lower-income African countries would be expected to lead to a decrease in the quality of imports. We approximate these expected impacts by assuming that the quality of goods supplied from each country remains constant, but the share sourced from each country changes due to AfCFTA. We draw on the quality estimates by country from the previous section, and simulate the change in the shares using the simulations on the effects of AfFTA on digital goods imports presented above.

In Figure A5, we observe that the simulated change in average quality of digital goods imports is 0.4 percent, being higher in countries that observe a more significant increase in digital goods imports due to AfCFTA. It should be noted, however, that the quality of imported goods tends to be higher than that of goods produced domestically, and therefore the overall quality of digital inputs that is available to firms in the region need not fall.

12
wages, capital, and raw materials. Industry traits are measured at the national level using the 2000 data.

Three consistent themes emerge. First, as we observed at the district level, urban themes are again strongly linked to employment growth. An industry’s organized employment share in urban areas in 2001 is positively associated with overall employment growth in that industry, and the association is even stronger for the growth of 1-person firms. Second, apart from the urban trends we just discussed, lower unorganized sector shares of plants and employment, higher female ownership rates, higher rates of formal sector subcontracting, and more labor intensive production at the industry level have the most consistent connection to the growth of 1-person establishments, although the growth rates of 1-person establishments in these industries are not abnormally high. Third, apart from the correlations we just discussed, it is again quite difficult to predict the growth of 1-person firms, beyond our general depictions of tradable industries and the apparel industry in particular. It thus does not seem like our tradable definition is a proxy for something else like financial dependency or materials requirements.

# _Urbanization_

Figure 1b documents the main employment trends in urban areas only. Panel A shows that essentially all of the net employment growth in Indian manufacturing over the past two decades occurred in urban areas. Across the two decades, the employment in informal tradables increased by a little over 10 million jobs. Panel C shows that almost 8 million of these jobs were developed in urban establishments. Furthermore, Figure 1d shows that the main employment trends do not vary substantially across districts with different population densities in 2000, which suggests that the size of the urban population in particular, and not merely district population density, is closely related to the aggregate changes we observe.

Thus, numerical accounting suggests a key role for urban areas, and the urban share of informal tradables employment rose from under one-third in 1989 to over 60% by 2010. This connects strongly with the broader trend for the informal sector to be moving into urban areas in India (Ghani, Goswami and Kerr 2012, 2014). A second factor pointing to the importance of urbanization is the very close timing of the urban increases (1995 to 2000, 2005 to 2010) with 14
_Rural-urban gradient in Latin America and the Caribbean_ _page_ 8

**“Rurality” is a multidimensional concept.** There are many aspects or characteristics associated with the vague concept of rurality, including access to social and infrastructure services, linkages to employment and commodity markets, involvement with agriculture and natural resources.  These characteristics are correlated, but not perfectly so.  Rural policy analysis should seek to precisely specify and measure the characteristics of interest.

**Think of rural vs. urban as a gradient rather than a dichotomy.** For many of the rural characteristics of interest, there does not appear to be a natural dividing line or break point between rural areas and urban areas.  Behavior and conditions change drastically along the gradient, but there is no compelling reasons to segment it into just two categories.

**Population density and remoteness from large cities constitute two useful ‘general purpose’ indicators of rurality** _._ The use of population density emphasizes the continuous nature of the rural-urban gradient.  Arguably, the development challenges at 2, 20, 200, and 2000 people per square kilometer are qualitatively quite distinct, even though the former three categories are traditionally lumped together as ‘rural’.

**Traditional census-measures of rurality in LAC exclude villages embedded in agricultural areas** _._ Censuses tend to designate very small settlements as urban, implicitly using access to basic services (health clinic, school, paved road) as the criterion for urbanity. It is on this basis that LAC is designated as a mostly-urbanized continent.  In fact, a large proportion of the population lives in areas of ambiguous urbanity: small, farm-oriented villages (population< 5000) embedded in an agricultural countryside. And there are probably about as many people living in small towns (5000-50,000) outside metropolitan areas, as in megacities.

Ultimately this re-examination of measures of rurality leads us to question the utility of the concept of ‘rurality’ or ‘rural policy’. The simplistic notion of a rural-urban dichotomy, combined with implicit and inconsistent notions of what constitutes a dividing line between the two, may be a hindrance rather than an aid to formulating regionally-articulated development policies.
-6-

# EIg.w1: Schanatic of the Coupon Scheme

## Supply Side

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bidding inforastion Demand Side

## B. Ihe Couron Scheme: What was on Offer?

The Center for Coupon Privatization published a list of 1491 companies with a book value of Kcs 300 billion (about $10.6 billion) on May 13, 1992 which would be included in the coupon scheme (out of a total of 2744 enterprise **s** lated for privatization in the first wave). This publication included the following information for each enterprise: name, address, business activity, identificatio **n** umber, shares offered, book value, value of other enterprise assets, debts, output in 1989-91, book profit in 1989-91, number of employees in 1989-91, allocation of non-coupon shares (foreign investors, domestic investors, restitution, National Property Fund, state, or sale of shares through some third party such as a bank). Since the government's transformation program, including
# **Appendix: Child Assessments, Primary Caregiver Surveys, and CBCC Observation Tools**

# **Child measures**

The battery included the following measures:

1. _Malawi Developmental Assessment Tool (MDAT)(Gladstone et al., 2010)_ a test created and validated specifically for use in rural Malawi with Chichewa-speaking children 0-7 years of age.<sup>25</sup> The MDAT includes four subscales to assess _Language, Fine Motor/Perception, Gross Motor_ and _Personal-Social_ skills _._ The majority of the items were designed to be administered directly to the child using locally available materials. For example, a _Fine Motor/Perception_ question asks a child to copy a pattern using bottle tops (e.g., a square pattern with alternating green and red bottle tops), which are commonly available and used for various games. A _Language_ question asking a child to explain what objects are used for includes showing the child familiar objects widely found in rural households, such as a small, homemade broom (used for sweeping), and a matchbox (containing matches, used for lighting stove). For our study, only the _Language_ and _Fine Motor/Perception_ subscales were administered as these assessed skills most closely related to the interventions. We supplemented the original MDAT items in these subscales with questions that reflected the content of the preschool teacher and caregiver education trainings, including items asking about copying letters and naming colors. Items were scored as pass or fail, and a total summed score was calculated overall, and for each subscale. A _Total_ score was also computed by adding the _Language_ and _Fine Motor/Perception_ subscales. The _Language, Fine Motor/Perception_ , and _Total_ scores were then standardized at each round (Baseline and 18Month Follow-Up) using the control group’s mean and standard deviation.

2. _Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - IV (PPVT-IV, (Dunn, 1965)_ a test of receptive vocabulary that measures comprehension of words through picture identification for use with people 2.5 years

> 25 The original MDAT materials can be accessed online at <u>http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000273.</u>

56
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42