This considers refugee numbers based on the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) populations of concern data up to March 2017 and builds in refugee returns over 2020‐2035.<sup>25</sup> There is a possibility though that the above numbers might still understate fatalities and migrants. The cumulative number of fatalities from the war is hard to ascertain. A source currently relied upon, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) puts the death toll at 560,000 (civilians and combatants) over March 2011 – 10 December 2018 (with 367,965 documented victims). Netting off foreign combatants of 65,108, we would get a total of 494,892 Syrian fatalities.<sup>26</sup> This is higher than what the UN population statistics suggest in terms of conflict‐related deaths – 303,451, based on our calculations when we take the difference of average deaths between 2011‐2020 and 2001‐2010 (multiplied by eight years).

The UNHCR populations of concern data show that compared to 2016 total registered Syrian refugees and asylum‐seekers increased in 2017 by 746,811 (Graph 8(a)). While the equivalent 2018 data are not available, from the UNHCR Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan database specifically on refugees in selected neighboring countries ‐ Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and North Africa,<sup>27</sup> we note that when compared to 2017, refugees had increased by 184,398 to 5,663,675 in 2018 (patterned bars in Graph 8(a), with the age and gender profile of these refugees shown in Graph 8(b)). Based on this, the UN population statistics may be understating refugee movement by about 900,000. But if we discount the 1 million refugees born in displacement/exile supposedly included in the UNCHR data, then the under‐representation of population “loss” in the UN population statistics due to the use of outdated UNHCR data disappears.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps of greater concern then is that the UN population statistics likely do not include non‐registered Syrians in neighboring countries, for which estimates vary but tend to go up to more than a million (see for instance, Vignal (2018) and World Bank (2019)). UNDP and UNHCR (2019) put the difference between estimated total Syrians<sup>29</sup> and registered Syrian refugees at about 1.6 million in December 2018. The difference is wholly accounted for by Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

Consequently, as a possible lower estimate to population growth estimates, we calculate an added decline in the Syrian population of 1.8 million, building in additional conflict deaths of 200,000, and unregistered Syrian migrants of 1.6 million. This would reduce the 2018 population from 18.3 million to 16.5 million giving a negative average growth of ‐3.0% over 2011‐2018.<sup>30</sup>

> 25 The UNHCR data available up to 2016 indicate a change of 5,688,897 in the number of refugees, asylum‐seekers (pending cases) and others of concern based on the 2010 and 2016 stock positions. UN data on the international migrant stock for 2017, show net migration for Syria of 5,784,696 over 2011‐2017 (2017 stock compared against 2010 stock).

> 26 Source: http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=108723. Civilian casualties totaled 111,330 (22.5% of the 494,892 total Syrian casualties), and were mostly adult males (70.1%), as 20,819 were children under 18 (18.7%) and 13,084 were women over 18 (11.8%).

> 27 Syria Regional Refugee Response. <u>https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria</u>

> 28 <u>https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the‐refugee‐brief‐11‐december‐2018/</u>

> 29 Total estimated number of Syrians are government estimates which include registered Syrian refugees, unregistered Syrian refugees and Syrians residing in host countries under alternative frameworks.

> 30 UN population statistics suggest that births remained relatively high at 4,339,946 over mid‐2010 to mid‐2020 (about 434,000 births/year) versus 5,275,028 the previous decade (about 528,000 births/year). Some news reports (for example: <u>http://english.alarabiya.net/en/variety/2015/11/17/Births‐in‐Syria‐down‐more‐than‐50‐since‐war‐media.html)</u> suggest that births have fallen substantially, but absent more sources of concrete analysis, we do not make any adjustments to birth rates. Further, World Bank (2019) notes that adolescent fertility rates have only dropped to 40 per 1,000 women aged 15‐19 in 2016 compared to 45 in 2010, amid child marriages as a conflict coping mechanism.

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