rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**5.1 Private and Social returns to education**

On the basis of the earnings profiles of the individuals, one can estimate the private rate of return by using the short cut method (Psacharopoulos, 1995):

# **Private rate of return = Yb - Y, / S * Y,**

where the mean earnings by level of education are used. Yh refers to the mean earnings at the higher level of education and Y, the mean earnings at the lower level of education. S is the number of years spent at the higher level of education. Thus Yh-yl is the earnings differential between the two levels of education, and Y, refers to the student's foregone earnings or indirect costs.

In order to estimate the social returns to education we have to include the full resource cost of investment (direct cost and foregone earnings). These costs will be added to the denominator so that the formula becomes:

**Social rate of return** = _(Yh - y4)_ / _S * (Yj + Ch)_

Where Ch is the annual direct cost of the higher level of education. Since the costs are higher in a social rate of return calculation relative to the private rate of return, the social returns are lower than the private returns. The difference between the private and social rates reflect the degree of public subsidization of education.

**Table 33: Unit costs of public education by levels, in Ghana (in cedis)**

|Educational Level|1987-88|1991|
|---|---|---|
|primary|3199|17071|
|middle|4561|27648|
|Secondary|12624.5|53979|
|Higher|178954|554000|

**Note: The** costs **are per student by level.**

**Source: Staff appraisal report,** No. , West **Africa Department, The Worldbank.**

As elsewhere, primary education exhibits the highest private and social rates of return than any other level of education. In 1991 the return to higher education is almost the same as that of the primary level. Also, we can see that higher education is most heavily subsidized, with a public subsidization of index ( the percent by which the private rate exceeds the social rate) of 255.1 as opposed to 125.8 for primary education. The results are similar to those found elsewhere (Psacharapoulos et al, 1994) 45
decrease domestic violence to keep a woman from leaving the relationship. Other studies show mixed results on the correlation between labor force opportunities and domestic violence (Vyas and Watts, 2009).<sup>4</sup> This paper looks for evidence of this heterogeneity within a peri-urban population in Bangladesh that is particularly diverse in population and job characteristics. While I will not be able to provide causal impacts of work opportunities, I can take advantage of detailed household survey data to explore the validity of potential stories – both causal and non-causal – that could explain the observed descriptive relationship between domestic violence, household bargaining, and work.

# **3 Empirical Strategy**

## **3.1 Data**

The data for this paper come from a survey of 1395 households outside of Dhaka, Bangladesh that I conducted, along with Mushfiq Mobarak. The survey took place from August to October, 2009. The sampling frame of the survey was every household<sup>5</sup> in 60 villages located in four subdistricts (Savar and Dhamrai in Dhaka District; Gazipur Sadar and Kaliakur in the Gazipur District). On average, each village has 1782 people living in 465 households. These villages are close to Dhaka but not within the city; the average reported travel time into Dhaka is 30 minutes.

This area is a heavy garment-producing area: 34 percent of sampled women between the of 18 and 35 work in the Unlike factories within ages garment industry. garment cities, though, the factories in which survey respondents work tend not to have dormitories. Instead, garment workers commute (commuting an average of 18 minutes one-way) to factories but live in standard household arrangements. Many households are migrants from other districts of Bangladesh<sup>6</sup> ; only 34.1 percent of male household heads and 11.2 percent of female household heads were born in the village in which they are now residing.

> 4Specifically, as detailed by Vyas and Watt, the correlation between work and domestic violence is positive and significant in Peru (Flake, 2005) and Iran (Kishor and Johnson, 2004), negative and significant in Egypt (Kishor and Johnson, 2004), varies depending on the type of employment in India (Panda and Agarwal, 2005), and varies by location in Bangladesh (Naved and Persson, 2005). No correlation was found in studies in Haiti, the Philipines, Zambia, or Cambodia (Kishor and Johnson, 2004).

> 5The actual unit sampled was the _bari_ , an extended family compound, because one of the other purposes of the data was the study of social interactions between extended families in the garment industry. Additionally, households with garment workers, consanguineous marriages, or women born between 1975 and 1980 were oversampled. For details of the sampling strategy, see Heath (2011).

> 6Only 6 of the 1395 household heads were born abroad.

9
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4790

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the impact of trade facilitation on intra-African trade. The authors examine the role of trade facilitation reforms, such as increased port efficiency, improved customs, and regulatory environments, and upgrading services infrastructure on trade between African countries. They also consider how regional trade agreements relate to intra-African trade flows. Using trade data from 2003 to 2004, they find that improvement in ports and services infrastructure promise relatively more expansion in intra-African trade than other measures. They also show that, almost all regional trade agreements have a positive effect on trade flows.

This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to explore the linkages between trade facilitation, transparency, and trade costs as they affect development. The paper is part of a project funded through the Multi Donor Trust Fund on Trade and Development at the Bank on "Trade Costs and Facilitation" which received financial support from the governments of Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The trade costs project website is accessible at: http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/trade_costs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at jswilson@worldbank. org, njinkeu@ileap-jeicp.org, and bfosso@gmail.com.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **Figure 5: Impact of bank capital adequacy on the comovement between local and US stock market returns**

Figure shows result from regressing the comovement between local and US stock returns on bank capital adequacy ratios across countries.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5<br>CYP<br>2<br>CZE<br>KOR<br>VNM GRC<br>POL<br>1.5 EGYIND ZAF QAT<br>AUT TUR<br>IRL DEU RUS<br>BGR<br>ITAFRA HUNSWEHRV<br>AUS BEL HKG SAU MEX<br>LUX ESPTWNNLDSGP ROM BRA<br>NOR<br>1 GBR NZLCAN DNK IDN<br>JPN ISR COL KEN<br>PRT LVA<br>CHN CHEMUS KWTISL<br>LTU THA KAZ ARG MYS SRB<br>PERNAM<br>LBN SVN MNG TUNJOR MLT<br>0.5 PHL CRI<br>BGDMAR BWASVK VEN BIH UKRLKABHRARE JAMOMN CHL<br>PAK<br>NGA<br>0 BMU<br>0 5 10 15 20 25 30<br>ECU<br>-0.5<br>Bank capital adequacy ratio (%)<br>Comovement between local and US stock market returns (Period pre-Lehman)<br><!-- End of picture text --> 38
Do Community-Driven Development Projects Enhance Social

# Capital? Evidence from the Philippines<sup>_∗_</sup>

Julien Labonne and Robert S. Chase World Bank - Social Development Department July 2008

> _∗_ We thank Chona Cruz, Deon Filmer, Markus Goldstein, Gillette Hall, Stuti Khemani, Robin Mearns, Agnes Quisumbing, Emmanuel Skoufias, Susan Stout, Brian Wampler and seminar participants at the World Bank for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank the project task team leaders Bhuvan Bhatnagar and Andrew Parker, Arsenio Balisacan, Rosemarie Edillon, Sharon Piza and all the staff of APPC without which the field work would have been impossible. We are grateful to the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development for allowing us to use the data. All remaining errors are ours. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank or its member countries.

1
2. Are there inefficiencies in the provision of education according<sup>to external</sup> efficiency criteria (for example, employment or unemployment data by educational level)?

3. Summary of sector issues at time of report:

# E. Sector objectives and priorities

1. What are the sector objectives? Please specify educational<sup>levels.</sup> _expansion/restructuring education systems

-quality improvements

- .. equity/access improvements

.mproved internal efficiency

-improved external efficiency

2. Major policy instruments, if any?

3. Do the macro-priorities agree with the sector priorities? Yes/No Objectives in accord? Yes/No If not, how and why is there disagreement?

- Instruments in accord? Yes/No If not, how and why is there disagreement?

## **IIL** SECITOR **COSTS AND** FINANCING

1. Is government spending on education as a share of all government spending too high?_ too low?_ Or is the level of spending not a problem by itself?_

- As determined by what information:

- _falling trend of education spending/GDP or education spending/government spending?

- -rising trend of educatian spending/GDP or education spending/government spending?

# __regional or other intercountry comparisons?

59
the university or independent ones, also is a factor.<sup>22</sup> By and large, the comparative of the best research universities is in basic research and in early stage development. Second tier provincial universities, are less likely to engage in applied research and have fewer incentives to market their findings to the business community. Most often they have commercializable findings to offer and their faculties rarely enjoy the incentives to go beyond conceptual research which can be published in scientific journals, or at best to do early stage development<sup>23</sup> .

The preferences of firms in Penang – much like firms in the UK and the United States – to seek technology from sources other than universities are underscored by the results from the latest round of the investment climate survey24, and our interviews with firms. Firms in Penang acquire technology mainly through purchase of new vintage of machinery, especially the imported ones.<sup>25</sup> Only a handful of firms regard universities as a source of technology (see Table 10)<sup>26</sup> .

Even when the technologies were developed locally, firms do not regard universities and research institutes as their main collaborators. Instead, they identified other firms as the preferred collaborators (Table 11).27 On a more positive note, the few firms which collaborate with universities in Penang or elsewhere in Malaysia generally regard their services to be satisfactory, especially in identifying new technologies, in modifying existing technologies, and conducting R&D in technologies closer to the frontier. The problem lies in the small number of firms in Penang that regularly collaborate with universities and research institutes in general.

> 22 USM is trying to change this with the establishment of the Malaysia Institute of Pharmaceuticals and Nutraceuticals in 2006.  The focus of the institute is to identify local compounds used in traditional medicine and explore the utility and effectiveness of such compounds as medicine.  Currently there are 10 Ph.D.s and 10 MA students working at the Institute.  Overall, there are only 350 Ph.D. in Malaysia with specialization in the life sciences.  USM produces about 150 Ph.D.s a year, of which 50-75 are in the life sciences.

> 23 See Wright and others (2008).

> 24 The second round of the investment climate survey was conducted in Malaysia in 2007/2008.  For the results on the first round, please see World Bank (2005).

> 25 Among the firms in Penang which purchased new machinery, more than half purchased imported machinery while about one third purchased domestic equipment.  Only few purchased second-hand machinery regardless of the origin.

> 26 See Hughes (2007).

> 27 In the last three years, only 12% of firms surveyed in Penang have collaborated with universities or research institutes when upgrading or acquiring new technologies.  The propensity to work with universities and research institutes in Penang is actually lower than the national average of 16%.

29
evidence that foreign bank entry from 1995 to 2002 did not precede crises (and drops in credit levels), but occurred largely as a result of those crises (Cull and Martinez Peria, 2008). Foreign banks often were brought in to acquire failed domestic banks and thus re-capitalize crisiswrecked banking sectors in this period. Ridding the balance sheets of the non-performing assets of those target banks likely contributed to lower overall credit levels, but this could hardly be blamed on the foreign acquirers. Second, we find that when foreign bank presence was not crisisinduced, meaning that it was relatively high and stable from the beginning of the period, private credit levels were significantly higher than in other countries, and this was true even during and after crises. In that sense, foreign banks could be seen as a stabilizing force, in line with some of the evidence from the previous section.

While the cross-country evidence on credit levels yields inconclusive results, the evidence on differences in lending styles between foreign and domestic banks is clearer. Foreign banks tend to have difficulties in lending to borrowers that lack the hard information to prove their creditworthiness. A study of 1600 banks across 100 developing countries from 1992 to 1999 concludes that foreign banks have access to external liquidity from their parent banks, but in return for that source of funding the local branch of a foreign bank has little discretion to make lending decisions based on anything other than hard information (Mian, 2003). Smaller, informationally opaque borrowers should therefore find it harder to borrow from foreign banks, and micro-evidence from a sample of 80,000 loans in Pakistan from 1996 to 2002 shows that as geographic distance and cultural dissimilarities between the headquarters of a foreign bank and its branches in the host country increase, lending is increasingly based on hard information (Mian, 2006). That distance also makes foreign banks in Pakistan less likely to renegotiate the terms of a loan and to recover in cases of default. Based on the borrowing profiles of over 60,000 non-financial firms in Argentina in 1997, large and foreign-owned banks are less likely to lend to small, informationally opaque borrowers than other banks (Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001).

Does the tendency for foreign banks to rely on hard information in lending decisions result in less overall lending to small and medium-sized businesses? The evidence here is mixed. A descriptive study of banks in eleven countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 1995 to 2006 concludes that while foreign banks contributed to the overall development and stability of banking sectors, those markets remain shallow and access to credit for SMEs limited (Marton 16
ZIMBABWE‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# Information and communication technologies

## **Achievements**

Despite Zimbabwe‘s political and economic situation, it has maintained parity with Sub-Saharan African averages for many ICT indicators. Fixed telephone line penetration exceeded the Sub-Saharan average in 2008 and Internet access penetration was about the same. Mobile penetration has lagged due to chronic network underinvestment as a result of the country‘s economic situation. But the market more than doubled in 2009, lifting mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants to 24, reducing the gap between Zimbabwe and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (table 14).

**Table 14. Benchmarking ICT indicators**

|||**Zimbabwe**<br>**Zimbabwe**|**Lower-**<br>**income**<br>**group**|**Sub-**<br>**Saharan**<br>**African**<br>**region**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Unit|**2000**<br>**2005**<br>**2008**|**2008**|**2008**|
|GSM coverage|% population under signal|48<br>56<br>59|56|56|
|International bandwidth|Bits/person|1<br>4<br>10|24|34|
|Internet|Users/100 people|0.4<br>3.9<br>4.5|4.6|5.1|
|Landline|Subscribers/100 people|2.2<br>2.8<br>2.7|4.6|1.5|
|Mobile phone|Subscribers/100 people|2.7<br>5.9<br>9.6|28.5|33.3|
|||**Low-income**<br>**group**<br>**Sub-Saharan Africa**|**Zimb**|**abwe**|
|||**2008**<br>**2008**|**20**|**09**|
|Price of monthly mobile basket|US dollars|10.0<br>11.8|10.8||
|Price of monthly fixed-line basket|US dollars|9.8<br>11.6|9.8||
|Price of monthly fixed broadband|US dollars|102<br>100|200||
|Price of a call to the United States|per minute<br>US dollars|—<br>0.8|*Region<br>Intern<br>Group|al: 0.19<br>ational<br>1: 0.27|
|Price of an inter-Africa call per minu|te<br>US dollars|—<br>1.0|Group<br>Group|2: 0.47<br>3: 1.10|

_Source:_ Adapted from Econet, POTRAZ, Tel-One, AICD, and World Bank ICT At-a-Glance. _Note:_ * Country breakdown not available. — = Not available.

## **Challenges**

Zimbabwe has made some institutional reforms such as the creation of the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). The country has introduced competition in the mobile sector with three operators: Econet, Telecel, and Net-One. It is also moving toward a streamlined licensing system. Despite the reforms, the level of competition remains low. There is only one fixed-line operator and four Internet service providers (ISPs), and Econet dominates the mobile market. Fixed operator Tel-One and its mobile subsidiary Net-One are state owned.<sup>10</sup> Foreign investment is limited to Telecel, which is 60 percent owned by Orascom of Egypt.

> 10 The government is reportedly searching for a strategic partner. See: www.tmtfinance.com/reports/newreports/newreports8.aspx.

38
million foreign workers in total. As the MOHA work permit data indicate 1.77 million foreign workers during the period, the first estimate implies that the number of irregular foreign workers is approximately 1.39 million. Secondly, our robustness check (Step 5 under ‘Methodology’) estimates a foreign worker population of 2.99 million, of which 1.22 million are irregulars (see Figure 5 on the number by nationality).

**_Figure 5. Estimated number of foreign workers by nationality_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 1,200<br> 1,000<br> 800<br> 600<br> 400<br> 200<br> 0<br>Thousands<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : BNM remittance data, authors’ estimations.

# **The distribution of foreign workers by state in our estimates are in line with those reported in the MOHA**

**data** . Foreign workers are concentrated in Selangor, followed by Johor and Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory (Figure 6a). Interestingly, we find that Sarawak takes up a substantially lower share of the foreign worker population in our estimates compared to the MOHA data – 3 percent of the total versus 7 percent (Figure 6b). It may be that foreign workers in Sarawak have a lower propensity to use remittance outlets because of limited accessibility in Sarawak, or that foreign workers in Sarawak opt for alternative money transfer channels such as cash carried by a traveler going back home.

# **As in the MOHA data, Indonesians make up most of the foreign worker population in our estimates**

**(Figure 7a).** However, the second largest group as estimated from the remittance data is not Nepalese but Bangladeshis. This might be explained by two plausible scenarios: (i) not many Nepalese use MSPs, instead using alternative channels to send money, especially in Selangor, and (ii) a higher proportion of Bangladeshis are irregular workers than are Nepalese. Also, our estimates from the remittance data show smaller numbers of Myanmar, Thai, and Chinese foreign workers compared to MOHA’s data (Figure 7b). Chinese foreign workers are known to use banking channels, possibly because they tend to earn more than average foreign workers<sup>**</sup> and thus can afford higher remittance costs, or because the availability of MSP counterparts in China is limited. Filipinos take up a larger share in our results than in the MOHA data set, perhaps in line with anecdotal evidence that Filipinos in general have a higher level of financial literacy

** Based on our analysis of the average annual remittance amount by nationality, most of the individual remitters send home RM 3,000 and below per annum, except for remittance transactions to China and Vietnam.

10
**Table 5. Exporters to Kazakhstan Likely to Gain the Most from Kazakhstan’s Adoption of the CET**

|**Partner**|**Change in Import Value**<br>**(US$, millions)**|**Percentage of Total 2008 Kazakh**<br>**Imports from Partner**|
|---|---|---|
|Russia|205.4|1.6|
|Belarus|15.2|4.2|
|Kyrgyz Republic|2.7|1.5|
|Azerbaijan|1.7|0.6|
|Armenia|0.1|3.9|

_Source:_ World Bank .

RUSSIA’S TRADE POLICY CHALLANGES – THE WORLD BANK GROUP 32