# **4.2 Results**

# **4.2.1** **_Do post-TTB export values reach pre-TTB levels?_**

Table 3 presents one set of results, in which we define _Exportshijk_ as _ln(1+real exports_ **_hijk_** _)_ .<sup>12</sup> Specification (1) uses the full sample of 746 antidumping cases and ten years of data. Specification (2) uses the subsample of 126 antidumping cases targeting China’s exporters, while specifications (3) and (4) use the subsamples of 352 cases targeting high-income exporters and 268 cases targeting other emerging exporters (non-China), respectively. For each of the four specifications, the first column presents information on the average level of exports associated with a given year for antidumping imposed by high-income trading partners _i_ , and the second column addresses antidumping imposed by emerging economy trading partners _i_ . The superscripts denote whether average exports that year were statistically different from zero. The third column provides additional information from a _t-test_ regarding whether the averages within a year across the two categories of policy-imposing countries are statistically different _from one another_ .

Consider Table 3 specification (1) which covers the full sample of data. Overall, average annual exports are always statistically greater than zero, even during the years that the antidumping import restriction is in effect. Furthermore, average annual exports to high-income markets are always higher than exports to emerging markets. More importantly, the time trends across the two categories of policy-imposing countries are the same and they align with expectations. First, average exports increase considerably between _t-2_ and _t-1_ and then fall beginning when the TTB is imposed in year _t_ , declining again in _t+1_ and _t+2_ while the TTB is in effect. While expected, this result is important as it confirms that the HS-06 import data is sufficiently disaggregated for this context so as to capture the trade-impacts of the antidumping policy which itself is sometimes applied at an even more disaggregated level.

Our main results begin by comparing what happens to annual exports once the TTB is _removed_ in year _T_ . In specification (1), average exports to both high-income markets and emerging markets

> 12 First, we transform the data by adding 1 to real exports so we do not lose observations when taking logs. Application of antidumping could result in product-level exports going to zero, thus dropping observations for which trade flows disappeared would introduce sample bias. Second, we take logs because the distribution of export data is bounded below by zero but includes a handful of outliers at the high end that severely distort the mean, relative to the median. In light of these two issues, Appendix Table A2 presents summary statistics which confirm the basic pattern of results when focusing on medians as opposed to means. Third, we use the US consumer price index to deflate the product-level bilateral trade flows from UN Comtrade reported in current US dollars. Table 4 (discussed below) addresses this potential limitation by reporting estimates from changes in product-level export market shares for which no price deflators are required.

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