rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
adults said they could not use an account at a financial institution without help, and in some economies the proportion was even larger. Unbanked women in developing economies are 10 percentage points more likely than unbanked men to say they could use banking services confidently. Interestingly, it is not only the unbanked who lack financial confidence. As mentioned, nearly one-in-three mobile money account owners in Sub-Saharan Africa say they cannot use their account without help.

This finding points to a key area of concern related to financial inclusion: poor and financially inexperienced users may not gain as much benefit from account ownership and financial services access if they do not understand how to use their account or other financial products in a way that avoids consumer protection risks such as exploitation, high and hidden fees, overindebtedness, fraud, and discrimination.<sup>8</sup> For example, inexperienced account owners who must ask a family member or a banking agent for help using their account may be more vulnerable to financial abuse. Women in particular are more likely to report that another family member spent their government transfer funds and to say they had to pay a fee or a tip to an agent to get their money when, officially, there should have been no charge. Overall, one in five adults in developing economies receiving a wage payment into an account paid higher fees than expected to receive it.

Financial service institutions and supportive regulators can play a role in addressing some of the risks that financially inexperienced adults face participating in the financial system. For example, there is a significant opportunity around the world to increase product transparency and communication. Easy-to-understand product terms are important for everyone, but especially for those who lack financial experience. New account holders must be able to understand the fee structure for the account and receive ongoing support in using it. Financial service providers have a responsibility to ensure that staff and agents provide complete and accurate information. However, such information is not always provided. Evidence from a mystery shopper audit of 1,000 microfinance firms in Uganda found that information on account costs was inconsistent; inexperienced borrowers received less information than experienced borrowers; and printed materials with product specifications were missing or violated regulatory guidelines

> 8 For a discussion of consumer financial protection, see Garz et al. (2020).

19
8 has threatened to use Section 301 in<sup>more cases than those actually investigated.</sup> For example, under strong pressures, Korea passed legislation in 1986 that would allow patent protection for pharmaceutical products (Gadbaw, 1988). However, the attack on Korea's patent policies<sup>did not come only from the U.S. In</sup> December 1987, the EC removed<sup>Korea from the GSP because it did not provide</sup> adequate patent protection for the R&D<sup>intens.vA pharmaceutical</sup> industry (WIPR, 1988).

Unde. similar pressures, other countries<sup>have announced that they</sup> will introduce patent protection for pharmaceutical products; e.g., Mexico (Gwyn, 1988) and Argentina (Nogu6s, 1990).<sup>But retaliatory threats have not always</sup> ended with positive changes by<sup>developing countrias. Probably, the most</sup> notorious case has been the retaliatory<sup>action against Brazil undertaken after</sup> completion of a 301 investigation.<sup>Among other things, this investigation--</sup> initiated by the PMA -- estimated the<sup>injury to U.S. firms because of absence</sup> of patent protection for pharmaceutical processes and products. Because Brazil did not satisfy the demands by the<sup>PMA, the U.S. increased ad valorem tariff</sup> rates to 100% on an important number of goods imported from Brazil (U.S.<sup>Federal</sup> Register, October 24, 1988).5 It is quite clear from all this that<sup>developing countries have</sup> confronted, and continue to confront,<sup>significant pressures from industrial</sup> countries in order for t'em to introduce<sup>patent protection for pharmaceutical</sup>

> 5 Brazil used to be in the USTR watch<sup>list, but was deleted in 1990 for</sup> having made progress in a number of issues;<sup>trade liberalization</sup> policies were an important factor. On<sup>July 2, 1990 this progress also</sup> led the U.S. to lift the retaliatory tariff<sup>of the 301 pharmaceutical</sup> case. Finally it should be said that<sup>Brazil challenged thic U.S. 301</sup> action in a GATT dispute settlement<sup>panel.</sup>
as age 5, but participation in wage work does not begin until age 11. Only in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> welfare deciles do girls’ enrollment rates outperform boys’ enrollment rates, as reflected in the larger share of working boys.

**Figure 3 Share of household chores and wage work by welfare decile, 2015**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>Wage work<br>20<br>Household chores<br>15<br>All type of work<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br>Welfare deciles<br>(%)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note: authors’ estimates using LFS 2015_ The majority of children (78 percent) in our sample were enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Furthermore, of those enrolled, the majority attended school regularly. Despite a very low share (1.2 percent) of children reporting missing school in the past week, those who did, missed over 2.5 days, a significant amount for a 5-day school week.

Of the remaining 22 percent not enrolled in school, 6.5 percent reported never having attended, with more boys (6 percent) than girls (5 percent) never having gone to school, while 15.5 percent were previously enrolled but had dropped out. For children reporting dropping out of school, the mean age at which they left school was 11.4, with girls leaving school slightly earlier than boys (11.3 vs 11.4). For boys, the main reason for dropping out was the inability to afford school (39 percent), followed by exam failure (18 percent) and need to help in family business (12 percent). For girls, inability to afford school was also the main reason for dropping out (41 percent), followed by having to help with household chores (15 13
96

**Table 41  PF Oerlikon Contraves AG:  Early Retirement Ages** **<u>and Conversion Factors</u>** Retirement Age 65 64 63 62 61 60 Conversion Factor (in %) 6.75 6.60 6.45 6.30 6.15 6.00 Source: Pensionskasse der Oerlikon Contraves AG (2005), p.7

The bridging pension equals the amount of the ordinary retirement pension payable under the AHV/AVS. Consequently, the accumulated old–age credit balance is reduced by the present value of the bridging pension.

_Example_ : A man retires at age 62, his old–age credit balance at age 62 equals to 650,000 CHF and he asks for a bridging pension of the maximum AHV/AVS retirement pension, i.e., 25,800 in 2005.

|Reduction in the credit balance:|650,000 - 25,800*2.855 = 576,341|
|---|---|
|Reduced Pension:|576,341*0.063 = 36,310|
|Total Annuity Payment (from 62 to 65)|36,310 + 25,800 = 62,110|
|Total AnnuityPayment(at age 65)|36,310 + ordinaryAHV/AVSpension|

Investment: The investment in securities follows a strategy with predefined weights, which are orientated on diversification. Additionally, to also participate in short– and medium–term market developments, a deviation margin from the fixed weights is defined. As a consequence, shares were increased (due to the positive market trend) and bonds were sold (due to unfavorable interest rates) in 2004. The management of securities is partly delegated to a specific and specialized institution, i.e., 65 percent are managed externally and the remaining 35 percent are managed internally. At 31.12.04 the biggest balance in the portfolio was real estate (35.9 percent), followed by bonds (17.2 percent), shares (17.2 percent) and other investments (29.8 percent). The return on investment was 6.4 percent. This was above the benchmark return of 5.5 percent.

# **CIA**<sup>**88**</sup>

_The pension fund of the employees of the canton Geneva was founded in 1929. Like other public pension funds it adopted a defined benefit system. In the best case, retirees are eligible for a rate of 75 percent of the last insured wage. Members that contributed for at least 25 years are eligible for early retirement at age 50. In all other cases, early retirement is possible at most 5 years before the ordinary retirement age. Retirement benefits are normally drawn in the form of pensions. The capital payment option is only available if pensions are small. In 2003, the CIA insured over 25,000 active contributors and almost 10 thousand retirees and its total assets were 4.9 billions CHF. In line with other public pension funds, the CIA exhibits a large underfunding. In 2002, its funding ratio decreased by 10 percent to 61.1 percent. Due to the good financial year 2003, the funding ratio rose slightly to 62.8 percent. To calculate future liabilities a technical interest rate of 4.5 percent was assumed._ Early Retirement: The early retirement scheme at CIA is a function of the age of the retiree and the length of the contribution period. The pension increases in both arguments, but it cannot exceed 75 percent of the last insured wage. In addition, the two arguments are 88c.f. CIA du Canton de Genève (2002)
traditional stoves not only emit CO2, but also other gases, including aerosols that are estimated to have negative global warming potentials (GWP) and black carbon, which is a short-lived, but potent greenhouse gas. Indeed, about 25% of black carbon emitted into the atmosphere comes from millions of small, typically traditional stoves throughout the developing world (Bond _et al._ 2013). Smith _et al._ (2000) indeed find that, depending on the timeline examined, the GWP of a meal cooked with biomass can be significantly higher than the GWP of a meal cooked using fossil fuels.

We utilize calculations from Somanathan and Bluffstone (2015), based on emissions factors and estimated GWPs taken from IPCC (2013), Pandey et al. (2014) and Grieshop et al. (2011), combined with the estimated nonrenewable biomass harvest estimate from Drigo et al. (2014) and Bailis et al. (2015), to derive 1.6047 tons of CO2e saved per ton of fuelwood not harvested. These calculations are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Emission Factors and 100-Year Global Warming Potentials in Tons of CO2e.

|Pollutant|Emission Factor (g of<br>Pollutant/Kg of wood)|100-year Global<br>Warming Potential<br>(tCO2e)|Tons of CO2e saved per<br>ton of wood|
|---|---|---|---|
|CO2|1358|0.52|0.7062|
|BC|0.7|900|0.63|
|OC|1.9|-46|-0.0874|
|SO2|0.1|-76|-0.0076|
|CO|76|1.8|0.1368|
|NMVOC|6.9|8.8|0.06072|
|CH4|4.9|28|0.1372|
|N2O|0.1|265|0.0265|
|**TOTAL**|||**1.6047**|

Sources: Emission factors: (Pandey et al. 2014), Table SI3. Global Warming Potentials: IPCC (2013), Appendix 8.A, except for SO2 which is from Grieshop et al. (2011). The GWP for CO2 is adjusted to account for an estimated 48% of all fuelwood that is sustainably harvested (Drigo et al., 2014 and Bailis et al., 2015).

20
**_Energy demand models for policy_** **_<u>formulation</u>_**

- Craig, P. P., A. Gadgil and J. G. Koomey, 2002, What can history teach us? A retrospective examination of long-term energy forecasts for the United States, Ann. Rev. Ener Envi., 27, pp. 83-118.

- Criqui, P., 2001, POLES – Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems, Information document, LEPII-EPE, Grenoble, France (see http://web.upmfgrenoble.fr/lepii-epe/textes/POLES8p_01.pdf).

- Crompton, P. and Y. Wu, 2005, Energy consumption in China: past trends and future directions, Energy Economics, 27(1), pp. 195-208.

- Dahl, C. 1991, Survey of energy demand elasticities in Developing countries, Energy Modeling Forum, Report 11, International Oil Supplies and Demands, Vol. 2, Stanford University, pp. 231-81.

- Dahl, C. and T. Sterner, 1991, Analysing gasoline demand elasticities: A survey, Energy Economics, 3(13), pp. 203-10.

- Dahl, C., 1994a, A survey of energy demand elasticities for the developing world, The Journal of Energy and Development, 18(1), pp. 1-47.

- Dahl, Carol A., 1994b, "A Survey of Oil Product Demand Elasticities for Developing Countries," OPEC Review, XVIII(1), pp. 47-87.

- Dahl, C. and A. Kurturbi, 1997, Estimating oil products demand in Indonesia using a cointegration error correction model, OPEC Review, March, pp. 1-25.

- Dahl, C. and M. Erdogan, 2000, Energy and interfactor substitution in Turkey, Opec Review, 24(1), pp. 1-22.

103
handling, and hauling corn stover to the conversion facility, in addition to a $10 per ton margin received by growers as payment for potential soil compaction, decreased surface organic matter, and return on their own effort. These studies highlight that the biofuel conversion plant size (determining feedstock demand) and density of residue availability can lead to significant differences in estimates through their impact on transport costs. This observation is also confirmed by the work of Petrolia (2008), who did not include a payment for farmers in his cost estimates, but acknowledged that some compensation may be needed for growers to make their stover available.

Opportunity costs depend on local conditions, including impacts of residue removal on expected yields and remedy costs (e.g., stemming from additional fertilizer or tilling), potential feed value of the residues, etc. Therefore, it is expected that these costs and the associated total costs of crop residues for biofuel production to vary across studies.

Estimated costs of residues of the forestry industry as well as woody energy crops reported in the literature are presented in Table 8. The prices reported by NREL (1998) (which are for U.S. forest products industry residues) vary greatly with local conditions. An aggregate U.S. supply curve for primary mill residues, estimated by Walsh (2008), indicates that a large proportion of these residues could enter the market when prices move from $40 to $45 per dry ton (the quantities supplied double in that price range). In this price range, an increasingly large proportion of primary mill residues could be bid away from their current use (e.g., wood) Further price increases would have much smaller impacts on residue availability, indicating a lower supply elasticity for prices above $45 per dry ton. This indicates that higher price increases are needed for the other uses considered to release the raw materials needed for biofuel production. Additionally, lower quantities of residues remain to be bid away from these uses. A similar price range ($40 to $46 per ton) would also bring forth significant supplies of forestland feedstocks (including logging residues, removal residues, thinnings from timberlands, primary mill residues, etc) according to analysis performed by BR&D _i_ (2008).

19
|Tab|le 3. Infant and C|hildhood Mort|ality, 1970-198|7|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||____________|INFANT MOR|TALITY*|CHILDHOO|DMORTAITrY|
|YEAR|DIARRHEAL|OTHER|DIARRHEAL|<br>OTHER|
|1970|65.9|50.0|17.0|15.2|
|1971|48.6|54.4|11.6|15.4|
|1972|60.8|55.6|14.4|16.4|
|1973|_55.8_|42.2|11.6|12.0|
|1974|59.6|41.4|11.8|10.0|
|1975|49.3|39.7|10.3|11.2|
|1976|52.8|34.2|9.6|8.5|
|1977|49.0|36.3|9.7|9.1|
|DECLINE 1970-77:|4.2|4.6|8.0|7.3|
|1978|43.7|29.8|6.7|6.3|
|1979|42.3|34.1|9.5|7.6|
|1980|39.2|36.8|_5.7_|_5.5_|
|1981|36.0|34.3|4.9|6.3|
|1982|33.2|37.3|5.9|7.7|
|DECLINE 1977-82:|7.8|-0.5|9.9|3.3|
|1983|29.1|35.6|4.0|6.0|
|1984|25.8|36.3|4.0|6.4|
|1985|15.3|33.9|2.7|6.9|
|1986|15.2|32.0|2.6|5.2|
|1987|12.3|32.8|2.3|_5.5_|
|DECLINE 1982-87:|19.9|2.6|18.8|6.7|

Source: Figures in table (3) for 1982 to 1987 were based on detailed tabulations prepared specially for NCDDP by the civil registration authority.

* Figures reported here are different from the ones repornti in table 6, particularly for 1985 and 1987. Table (6) used the published official data not the special tabulations. The difference can be explained as follows: Diarrheal rates in table (3) excluded some diseases of digestive system. The official reports that are the basis of table (6) included these diseases and excluded Cholera and Typhoid fever. The difference in infant mortality rate for 1987 resulted from using preliminary data which seem to have included births occurring to Egyptians abroad in the denominator of table (3).

7
# **VII. DISCUSSION**

Given the fact that (termination-based) discriminatory pricing helps to achieve telecommunications network expansion, a real question to be asked from the policy point of view is how discriminatory prices are really regulated in Africa. To answer this question, a simple questionnaire survey was conducted in cooperation with regulatory authorities of sample countries; it simply asked how they regulate (i) general tariff changes, (ii) termination-based discrimination, and (iii) strategic pricing, such as “family plan.” Half the sample countries replied.

The answers show that the degree of price regulation varies from country to country (Table 11).<sup>31</sup> While Malawi responded that there was no control in these three aspects, Seychelles prohibits termination-based discrimination and obliges operators to obtain formal approval when adopting strategic pricing. Not surprisingly, telephone operators are more likely to differentiate their tariffs based on network terminations, if price setting is more liberalized (Figure 13). While countries with tight price regulation, such as Lesotho and Seychelles, have undifferentiated tariffs, those who more liberalized tariff setting, such as Malawi and Mauritius, tend to have larger tariff differentials between networks (also see Figure 10). Thus, price liberalization should be encouraged to expand the telecommunications network through price discrimination.

> 31 In order to keep the questionnaire simple, it was not specified at what level the authorities are regulating price discrimination (e.g., tariffs before or after the connection rate). Rather, it was simply asked whether “termination-based discriminatory pricing, i.e., different tariffs between own network calls and interoperator calls is (a) prohibited, (b) required to obtain approval from the authorities, (c) generally accepted but needs to report, or (d) not controlled. Therefore, the result may have to be interpreted with caution.

34
41

# Data Sources

Chun, Chin Pen, (1990): 'Energy for Sustainable Development. Te Case of Malysia". Paper presented at the Bergen Energy Conference 1990, Center for Applied Research, Bergen.

Demezy, D. and L Demeiy, (1992): "Adjustment and Equity in Malaysa, Development Studies Center, OECD, Paris.

Pyatt, G. and L and JJ. Rowd, (1984): Improving Macrecononic Data Base. A SAM for Mal*ysia 1970, World Bank Staff Worling paper No. 646, Table 3.9 pp. 297, The World Bank Washington,D.C.

World Bank, (1987): Mlaysia Power Sector Issues and Options, Report No. 6466-MA, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, Washington, D.C.

World Bank (1988): Malaysia, Matching Risks and Reward in a Mixed Economy, Report No. 7203-MA, Vol. L Washington, D.C.

World Bak (1988). Malysia, Matching Risk and Reward in a Mixed Economy, Report No. 7208-MA, VooL HL Staistical Annex, Washingtn, D.C.

# World Bank, (1992): World Development Reporl Washington, D.C.

World Bank, (1993): Stu on Impact of Energy Prices on ElectriciLy Twiffs amd Industi Development in Malaysia, Paper prepared for the Govemment of Malaysia, Economic Pl _ng Unit, Kuala Lumpur.
56 This presentation suggests that African countries could be classified in three groups as far as the Uruguay Round results are concerned. Those in the left side of the figure (like Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia or Mali) had very low coverage ratios before the Round so these countries' direct export prospects could not be much improved. They do have the potential, however, of being adversely affected by more aggressive completion with exporters who were formerly restricted by the MFA Agreement, or by "voluntary" export restraints (see Box 4). Second, the right side of the Figure identifies countries like Reunion and Mauritius which previously had high NTB ratios that will fall dramatically due to the Round. (note, however, that tariffs on sugar will afford higher levels of protection). These countries may have significant new export opportunities, although they too should prepare for more aggressive international competition. Between these two groups are a number of countries like Nigeria, Congo, Gabon or the Seychelles with relatively high pre-Uruguay NTB ratios that were largely unaffected by the UR agreement. In most cases, the failure of the Round to liberalize restrictions on energy products account for these results (as noted, the exclusion of fish explains the high post-Uruguay ratios for the Seychelles and a few other countries). However, even with these exceptions Figure 4, shows the Round had a major impact in lowering nontariff protection facing Africa.

# D. Protection Levels from Tariffied NTBs

Given the dimensions of rural poverty in Africa, and the potential contribution increased agricultural exports could make toward its alleviation, special attention should focus on the external "environment" for these exports in the post-Uruguay Round world. A recent World Bank study (Ingco 1995) attempted to estimate the levels of protection associated with the "tariffied" agricultural NTBs, and to assess their implications for developing country exporters. The initial conclusions concerning this exercise are not comforting since there is evidence that the "dirty tariffication" of the Round may have permitted higher levels of protection than previously in place.

As an illustration, Table 12 shows World Bank estimates of the levels of OECD protection for 8 agricultural product groups as a result of the tariffication exercise. In the European Union, post-Uruguay Round protection for sugar, beef and rice (all products of actual export interest to Africa) range from 125 to 360 percent. In Japan, sugar, coarse grains and rice face levels of protection that range from over 100 to 500 percent. Even a country like the United States, which is generally held to have low levels of agricultural protection, still registers