rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **VI Summary, Policy Implications, and Future Research**

This paper has used a new data set to test a number of theories of return migration with respect to Romanian migrants. This research is particularly interesting in the context of how migration is perceived within the European Union now that restrictions have been lifted further. The paper finds that an earnings gap, having invested in a business in the host country and investment in human capital abroad, particularly in speaking the host-country language, significantly reduce the likelihood of Romanians returning. The intention to learn a foreign language is a clear signal of intent to integrate into the host country and in this regard is something to be welcomed by the host country itself. We do find strong evidence of personal ties with Romania predicting a greater likelihood of returning as well as remittances and previous investment in Romania, while there is also evidence that having many Romanians living nearby in the host country also positively effects return likelihood.

Romania’s declining population and the accompanying negative consequences could be partly moderated by encouraging migration to Romania or return migration. This paper has focused on the latter option which, for a country without a recent history of attracting migrants and speaking a language few outside the country learn, could be more viable in the short term. Nearly half of Romanian migrants surveyed planned to return home but this study has shown that several factors are related to this choice. Higher expected earnings in Romania and investment in (likely small) enterprises are positively correlated with plans to return to Romania. This suggests that policies that increase productivity and therefore wages could encourage Romanians abroad to return-migrate. In addition, policies that make it easier to begin and run a profitable firm could also attract return-migration. Improving the business climate would be a good step in the right direction. Finally, the Romanian government could improve both tracking of and connections to Romanians abroad. Currently, this is left to private groups such as the League of Romanian Students Abroad but there could be benefits to making this more systematic. For example, the Malaysian government tracks its ex-patriots and is able to attract some high-caliber individuals to return to positions in the public service or SOEs.

There are several areas of research that need exploring on the basis of this study. Firstly the role national identity plays in return migration is likely to be important but as yet is relatively unexplored. Recent work by Georgellis and Manning (2013) suggests that the more educated tend to have less of an identity while poorer people have stronger national identities. This study finds that education plays no role in return intentions but the negative sign on the highly educated variable is consistent with the identity literature.

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lending and borrowing, but also through granting guarantees and **subsidiuing** project speclflc private borrowing. While the formor would be treated **as** deficit spending, the second wouldn't; **a** change **in** the form in whLch the government supports private investment will jeopardize any Lnterpretation of fiscal deficits that included net lending above the line. What is recommended then is to rely simultaneously on two deficit definitions. One is supr^sed to exclude development lending to the private sector from expenditures, leaving only cashed interest income **an** genuine revenue. To adjust the Central Bank's income and lose statement to this approach will imply elLminating al) non cash (capitalized) interest income, and any write offs or contingent reserves originating in bad loans to the private sector. The second definition will include net lending **as** deficit spending. To move to this second definition it will suffice to add the difference between new lending and amortization and non-cashed interest income on lending to the private sector. The treatment of inflation Whether inflation adjusted or non-adjusted public sector deficits are a better measure of fiscal pressure has been a largely debated issue. The position of this paper is that having both measures will provide more information than any of the two alone and therefore both measures should be attained. The appendix elaborates on the adjustments necessary to adjust Central Banks' results for inflation. In summary the required adjustment me is A . (MB -NCPS)r - (MB + DL - CPS)F

# where A - inflationary adjustment MB - monetary base

NCPS - net credit to the private sector
<u>Table 1a: Sample Means and Balance</u>

||Cash Only<br>(mean)|Mother Leaders|Mother Leaders<br>and Affirmation|Mother Leaders<br>and Planning|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Male (%)|0.49|0.00|0.01|0.00|
||(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.01)|
|Age|18.77|0.44*|-0.17|-0.14|
||(0.34)|(0.37)|(0.33)|(0.37)|
|School (Ever Attended)|0.63|0.06|0.03|0.01|
||(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|
|Ever Married (1=yes)|0.72|-0.00|-0.01|-0.01|
||(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|
|HH Size|6.00|-0.07**|0.16|0.19|
||(0.18)|(0.16)|(0.17)|(0.17)|
|Total Food Consumption<br>|68964|477|6864|1870|
|in the last 30 days (_ariary_)|(4043)|(3553)|(7002)|(4029)|
|Non-Food Consumption in<br>|8772|411|-302|130|
|the last 30 days (_ariary_)|(711)|(666)|(704)|(663)|
|Proportion of<br>|0.74|0.01**|0.01**|0.00|
|Consumption on Food|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.02)|
|General Consumption in<br>|77726|888|6562|2000|
|the last 30 days (_ariary_)|(4439)|(3891)|(7298)|(4388)|
|Livestock Index|0.60|-0.05*|-0.01|-0.05*|
||(0.09)|(0.08)|(0.08)|(0.08)|
|**N**|1204|1200|1205|1197|

_Note: The coefficients for the Cash-only represent the mean for the group. The figures for all treatment groups represent the added difference from the control mean. ‘*’ denotes significance at p≤0.1; ‘**’ at p≤0.05._ 21
thermal efficiency of a power plant; it refers to the amount of heat needed to produce one unit of electric power (MJ/kWh). Thus, the fuel cost (FC) is calculated as: Finally, the CRF is derived by using the discount rate (r) and the economic life (n) of a plant as follows:

# **_2.2 Data and assumptions_**

As implied by Equations (1) to (5), we need data for investment costs or overnight construction costs, capacity availability factors, economic life, fuel prices, heat rate, discount rate, fixed O&M costs, and variable O&M costs. The big challenge is that the values of these variables not only change across locations and technologies but also within the technology for a given location (e.g., capital costs) and in the same location for a given technology (discount rate, fuel prices). O&M costs would be different across the type and the size of technologies. The discount rate is another critical factor to influence the LCOE. The quality of energy sources (e.g., solar irradiation, wind profile, water flow in hydropower plants) measured in terms of plant efficiency and capacity availability factors are different across locations even within the same country. A technology found cheaper in certain conditions may not hold in other situations. Therefore, calculating LCOE for technology in the global context is challenging.

One technique to resolve this situation is applying multiple values for the most crucial input variable for a given technology and using a single reasonable value for each of the remaining variables corresponding to the technology. Capital cost is the largest component in all renewable energy technologies and nuclear. The same is true in fossil fuel-based technologies. However, the share of capital costs in the LCOE is relatively smaller in fossil fuel-based technologies as compared to that in renewable technologies. In the first set of LCOE calculations, we use multiple values of capital costs for each technology. The capital costs are taken from five sources: Lazard 8
|Manufacturing Sample<br>l Output Price<br>Informal<br>(4)<br>0.00748<br>(0.00555)<br>0.952<br>413,198<br>0.00578<br>(0.00622)<br>0.952<br>413,198<br>0.0226<br>(0.0169)<br>0.952<br>in Working Age)<br>0.325***<br>(0.0200)<br>255.36<br>441,206<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>and i) armed attacks by illegal armed groups<br>ment transfers to health, education, and other<br>2000 GDP share in agriculture, services, and<br>eported in parentheses. _∗∗∗_signifcant at the|
|---|
|ctors (cont’d) -<br>Nomina<br>Formal<br>(3)<br>0.0184<br>(0.0116)<br>0.939<br>305,008<br>0.0224*<br>(0.0125)<br>0.939<br>305,008<br>0.0475<br>(0.0298)<br>0.939<br>IDPs (% Pop<br>0.389***<br>(0.0257)<br>313.34<br>346,081<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>of year dummies<br>) central govern<br>s in 1995, viii)<br>ors by frm are r|
|nd Formal Se<br>Input Price<br>Informal<br>(2)<br>-0.00133<br>(0.00412)<br>0.506<br>236,513<br>0.00522<br>(0.00531)<br>0.506<br>236,513<br>-0.00478<br>(0.0148)<br>0.506<br>ble: Share of<br>0.278***<br>(0.0177)<br>246.09<br>236,513<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>Yes<br>de interactions<br>tures in 1995, v<br>ollection offce<br>ed standard err|
|**Table (X)**<br>Impacts of IDP infows on Firms in the Informal a<br>**Dependent Variables (in logs)**<br>Nominal<br>Formal<br>(1)<br>**Panel A. Reduced Form**<br>0.00314<br>Predicted IDP Infows<br>(0.00657)<br>R-squared<br>0.447<br>Observations<br>146,234<br>**Panel B. OLS**<br>Share of IDP (% Pop in Working Age)<br>0.0179*<br>(0.00945)<br>R-squared<br>0.447<br>Observations<br>146,234<br>**Panel C. 2SLS**<br>Share of IDPs (% Pop in Working Age)<br>0.0108<br>(0.0226)<br>Observations<br>0.447<br>**Panel D. First Stage**<br>Dep Varia<br>Predicted Infows 1993<br>0.291***<br>(0.0169)<br>First Stage F-statistic<br>296.44<br>Observations<br>146,234<br>**Controls for all Panels**<br>Year FE<br>Yes<br>Firm FE<br>Yes<br>Additional Controls<br>Yes<br>_Notes:_ Each coeffcient corresponds to a separate regression. Additional controls inclu<br>in 1995, ii) fatal victims of attacks in 1995, iii) homicide rates 1995, iv) public expendi<br>expenditures in 1995, vi) number of fnancial institutions in 1995, vii) number of tax c<br>industry, ix) municipal tax income in 1995, and x) night light density in 1995. Cluster<br>1%, _∗∗_signifcant at the 5%, _∗_signifcant at the 10%.|

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quirements for most regulated products.<sup>5</sup> Available evidence suggests that harmonization within the EU tended toward the high range of initial standards. Vogel (1995) points out that the role of the Union’s richest and most powerful members, which imposed the most stringent standards, has been critical in setting the EU standards agenda; their political and economic importance has served to make EU standards progressively stricter.<sup>6</sup> In many other cases, neither mutual recognition nor harmonization of substantive standards may be deemed feasible or desirable. Countries may nevertheless choose at least to mutually recognize each other’s conformity assessment requirements, i.e. country A trusts country B to certify that the products made by country B conform to country A’s standards. Examples of such initiatives are the intra-EU MRAs on some unharmonized industries and the EU’s agreements with a number of other countries. A key element of these agreements is the rule of origin.<sup>7</sup> The MRAs between the EU and USA and the EU and Canada specify that conformity assessment done in one of the MRA countries, in which products are manufactured or through which they are imported, is accepted throughout the entire agreement region. Other agreements, such as the MRAs the EU has concluded with Australia and New Zealand, impose restrictive rules of origin which require that third country products continue to meet the conformity assessment of each country in the region.

As a prelude to our empirical investigation of the e¤ects of these agreements on trade patterns, a simple analytical model is used to generate certain testable hypotheses. The main analytical results can be explained by drawing a partial analogy between standards harmonization and mutual recognition, on the one hand, and a customs union and a free trade area, on the other. As in the case of a customs union, the economic impact of stan-

> 5 In practice, most of the broad manufacturing product areas where technical regulations are important have now been harmonized, particularly product areas where the mutual recognition approach was seen to be failing.

> 6 EC (1998) Single Market Review concludes that the harmonized standards in most reviewed industries have been set higher than initial levels in most member countries. The history of EU automobile emission, chemical, and packaging standards also demonstrates that these standards have frequently been harmonized at a level slightly lower than that preferred by the Union’s most stringent states, including Germany, Denmark, and Netherlands, but higher than favored by less strict members such as Italy, UK, and Spain (Vogel, 1995).

> 7 "Rules of origin" are de...ned by the WTO as "the criteria used to de...ne where a product was made. They are an essential part of trade rules because a number of policies (such as preferential trade agreements) discriminate between exporting countries."

4
- health and nutrition risks (high incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory infection, cholera and malaria) and HIV/AIDS;

- demographic vulnerability (high population growth, increasing numbers of households headed by women, children or the elderly).

# **3.2    The Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Program**

The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme represents one of the key elements of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, a nationally owned strategy for investing in both economic growth and development (Government of Malawi 2006). The overall goal of the Cash Transfer Scheme is to protect and promote the livelihoods and welfare of the poorest and most vulnerable people: in particular, it has been designed to reach 10% of all households. Recipient households must meet the criteria of being ultra poor and labor constrained (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010a). Ultra poor households are those living below the ultra poverty line and in the lowest expenditure quintile. They may only consume one meal per day and lack any valuable assets. Labor constrained households are those with no able bodied member between 19-64 who is fit for work or when one able bodied adult must care for more than 3 dependents (i.e. children, elderly, chronically ill persons).

The Social Cash Transfer Scheme was launched in 2007 and by February 2009 was operational in 7 out of the country’s 28 districts, distributing monthly cash transfers to more than 24,306 households. If brought to scale, the SCT would cover more than 300,000 families or 10% of all households and cost approximately US$68 million per year or 1.5% of GDP (Government of Malawi, 2009).

The dataset used in this paper is from the Evaluation of the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot. The Center for Global Health and Development (CGHD) at Boston University School of Public Health in collaboration with the Centre for Social Research (CSR) from the University of Malawi conducted the external evaluation of the SCTS pilot in Mchinji district.

By March 2007, approximately 29 village groups within four out of nine Traditional Authorities (TAs) in the district were included in the transfer scheme. Village groups contain multiple villages so that the combined number of households per village group is approximately 1,000. Among these, the poorest 10% of households (approximately 100 households) per village group were identified to 8
# **References**

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- Abramitzky, R., L. P. Boustan, and K. Eriksson (2014). A nation of immigrants: Assimilation and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration. _Journal of Political Economy 122_ (3), 467–506.

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- Altindaˇg, O. and S. D. O’Connell (2023). The short-lived effects of unconditional cash transfers to refugees. _Journal of Development Economics 160_ , 102942.

- Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and F. Antman (2017). Schooling and labor market effects of temporary authorization: Evidence from daca. _Journal of Population Economics 30_ (1), 339–373.

- Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and C. Bansak (2011). The impact of amnesty on labor market outcomes: A panel study using the legalized population survey. _Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 50_ (3), 443–471.

- Amuedo-Dorantes, C., C. Bansak, and S. Raphael (2007). Gender differences in the labor market: Impact of irca’s amnesty provisions. _The American Economic Review 97_ (2), 412– 416.

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This paper uses two samples. The first sample includes all women aged 19 to 30 who have ever experienced a pregnancy. This sample is used to demonstrate the differences in background characteristics and outcomes of interest between women who had a child during their adolescence and those who delayed childbearing until a later age. The second sample is limited to women aged 19 to 30, who experienced a pregnancy before the age of 19. This sample is used to establish the causal effect of adolescent childbearing by comparing women whose teenage pregnancy resulted in a live birth to women who miscarried. Although ENADID survey was administered to women aged 15 to 54, women under 19 are not included into the analysis. Even if they have not experienced a pregnancy by the time of the interview, they still may do so before turning 19. Thus, keeping women aged 15 to 18 in the sample may result in false inclusion of potential teenage mothers into the control group. The sample also exclude women who experienced more than one miscarriage, as repeat miscarriages may not be random and are likely to be associate with poor health status and other characteristics which may affect the outcomes (Wang et al., 2003).

The large sample includes 7,805 women aged 19 to 30. The teen pregnancy sample includes only 2,803 of these women. Among women who experienced pregnancy as adolescents, 2,543 had living children, the children of 26 women who had a live birth died; 142 women were pregnant at the time of the interview; for 85 women the pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage or a stillbirth. Only 7 women reported having induced abortion (we discuss the implications of this likely underreporting bias later in the paper).

Census data collected in 2000 is used to control for municipal-level characteristics. The respondents in the first sample live in 787 municipalities (with 10 observations per municipality on average), while respondents in the second sample come from 617 municipalities (with 5 observations per municipality on average). The number of municipalities provides sufficient variation to investigate the heterogeneity in the impact of early childbearing depending on various community characteristics. The census allows for the calculation of such community-level variables as the share of indigenous population and of the Catholic population, average access to medical services (captured in the fraction of people who have some form of medical insurance), average school attendance, educational level, the quality of employment (captured in the share of the employed working less than 32 hours a week and the share of employed earning less than minimal salary), and other characteristics. The complete list of municipal-level controls with their averages and standard 5
Chart 3 shows the evolution in India's and Mexico's exports to the US before and after NAFTA. Between 1990 and 1998, Mexico's manufacturing exports to the US grew by about US$46 billion, while India registered an increase of US$ 5 billion. In clothing where India is assured a certain absolute quantitative outcome by virtue of the MFA quotas, India's share of total US and Canadian imports declined after NAFTA: between 1994 and 1998, India's share declined by 0.5 percentage points, from 3.9 to 3.4 percent. Over the same period, Mexico's share rose from 4.7 percent to 11.8 percent, an increase of over 7 percentage points, translating into US$ 18 billion of _additional_ exports.

In the case of clothing, NAFTA opened up a preference margin for Mexico equal to the implicit tariff on India's export quotas. Even after the abolition of the MFA, when the implicit tariff comes down, the margin of preference will decline but will remain substantial, between 15 and 40 percent, depending on the product line. MFN tariffs must come down if this policy-induced advantage is to be leveled. India, therefore, has a strong interest in seeking to reduce tariffs on all industrial products, especially textiles and clothing.

Can these trade diversion costs be offset through alternative means, for example, by disciplining the use of Article XXIV? This is unlikely for two reasons: first, there are too many large preferential traders already who are likely to resist the fundamental changes to Article XXIV that are necessary to address the trade diversion inflicted on third countries. Second, even if these changes can be effected, they will not be applied retroactively. The effects of all past regional agreements, including NAFTA and the EUEastern European agreements, cannot be undone through rule-making; they will have to be addressed by eliminating the trade-diverting effects of regionalism at source - the MFN tariff.

_B. Agriculturel_<sup>_0_</sup> Agriculture illustrates most starkly the disjunction between India's domestic policies and its external negotiating position. High tariffs for manufacturing, combined until recently with restrictions on exports of agricultural products, have led to an incentive structure that taxes rather than protects agriculture. And although manufacturing tariffs have been reduced and most export restrictions eliminated, manufacturing continues to be favored relative to agriculture. Yet, India's multilateral position is one of defensiveness seeking the freedom to protect rather than exploiting actual and potential comparative advantage by seeking an open regime internationally.

India's agricultural trade policy regime is characterized by some import QRs, many of which are likely to be eliminated as a result of WTO panel rulings on disputes between India and trading partners over India's invocation of balance of payments grounds for maintaining QRs.

**'0** This section draws heavily on Gulati (1999)

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