Nevertheless, there is a growing body of large-n impact evaluation literature which provides some empirical evidence of transparency and accountability initiatives impacting service delivery, particularly in the education sector. For instance, Reinikka and Svensson (2004; 2011) have estimated that the dissemination of budgetary information has led to less leakage of public funds in Uganda under certain conditions,<sup>94</sup> and Barr et al. (2012) have found that participatory monitoring has been linked to improved education outcomes.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, Pandey et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence from India which suggests that dissemination of budget information has improved teacher effort including reduced absenteeism.<sup>96</sup> In a seminal study in Kenya, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012) have similarly demonstrated a positive association between community-based hiring of teachers with improved attendance and test scores.<sup>97</sup> Just as in the education sector, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that similarly links transparency and accountability initiatives with improved provision and outcomes in the health sector. Bjorkman, de Walque, and Svensson (2009; 2014) have provided evidence that access to service delivery information and related outcomes can have an effect on how services are delivered.<sup>98</sup> Using a randomized controlled trial in the Uganda health sector, the study found that better service delivery and outcomes were associated with the treatment group that received a report card on staff and health center performance. Similarly, Mishra (2007) has demonstrated that community scorecards have improved satisfaction in health service delivery in India,<sup>99</sup> which suggests the importance of community members having objective and quantitative information regarding staff behavior in monitoring accountability. Additional work on these issues has likewise been completed by Ravindra (2004), who found that citizen report cards actually improved local service delivery in certain settings in India,<sup>100</sup> and Goldfrank (2006) who demonstrates that participatory budgeting initiatives have been shown to improve public service delivery in Brazil.<sup>101</sup> With respect to electoral accountability mechanisms, the present research seeks to confirm earlier evidence, which supports the proposition that elections can have a significant effect on citizens rewarding and sanctioning politicians for their performance in delivering services. To be sure, there is a significant body of literature that suggests that performance in service delivery is an important metric that voters use to choose politicians, and to vote out of office those who they believe are performing poorly. Using the Italian municipal level to test this hypothesis, Kendall et al. (2015) find that information on “valence” issues, such as past service delivery performance, increased support for candidates much more than information about their particular policy positions.<sup>102</sup> Similar work by Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) finds that the enfranchisement of women in elections during the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the United States

> 94 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, “The Power of Information:  Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ (2004: 119 [2]); Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, “The Power of Information in Public Services: Evidence from Education in Uganda,” _Journal of Public Economics_ (2011: 95).

> 95 Abigail Barr, Frederick Mugisha, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin, “Information and Collective Action in Community-Based Monitoring of Schools: Field and Lab Experimental Evidence from Uganda” Working Paper (2012).

> 96 Priyanka Pandey, Sangeeta Goyal, and Venkatesh Sundararaman, “Public Participation, Teacher Accountability, and School Outcomes: Findings from Baseline Surveys in Three Indian States,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series (November 1, 2008).

> 97 Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer, “School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil -Teacher Ratios: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17939, Cambridge, MA (2012).

98 M. Bjorkman, D. de Walque, and J. Svensson, “Information Is Power: Experimental Evidence on the Long-Run Impact of Community-Based Monitoring,” Policy Research Working Paper 7015, World Bank (2014).

99 V. Misra, “Pilot Study 1, Andhra Pradesh, India: Improving Health Services through Community Score Cards: Learning Notes,” Social Accountability Series, Washington, DC, World Bank (2007).

100 A. Ravindra, “An Assessment of the Impact of Bangalore Citizen Report Cards on the Performance of Public Agencies,” Evaluation Capacity Development Working Paper 12, Washington, DC, World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department (2004). 101 B. Goldfrank, “Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting,” Presentation at the Latin American Studies Association Meeting, San Juan, Puerto Rico (March 2006).

102 Chad Kendall, Tommaso Nannicini, and Francesco Trebbi, “How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign.” _American Economic Review_ 105 (1) (2015) p. 322–53.

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