_For labor or for divorce?_ to reforms on women’s rights and labor outcomes (Gonzales et al. 2015, Hyland et al., 2020). It also shows how a positive and sizable effect was only recorded when there was reinforcement to legislative dispositions granting women more options outside the marriage after 2010. Additionally, a sample of divorced women is also considered. Interestingly, the results hint that the anticipatory effect (Bargain, et al., 2012) might be equally as important as the power-shift effect in the case of Jordan. This said, in the long run, there seem to be structural adjustment effects that favor the power-shift mechanism leading more married mothers to the labor market.

**Table 7 - Labor market outcomes of Iftida’ reform in Jordan**

||Iftida’ effect<br>|window 1: 1<br>|997 to 2007<br>|Iftida’ eff<br>|ect window 2: 19<br>|92 to 2017<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)<br>C|(2)<br>urrentlywork|(3)<br>ing|(4)|(5)<br>Currentlyworkin|(6)<br> g|
|Post x treated|-0.00134|-0.00123|0.166|0.0000315|<br>0.0000466|<br>0.0195*|
||(0.1077)|(-0.11)|(0.0125)|(0.00)|(0.00)|(1.75)|
|Household Size||0.00193<br>(0.23)|-0.0033<br>(0.0087)||0.000380<br>(0.06)|<br>-0.00167<br>(-0.27)|
|WB Law Index|||0;0534**<br>(0.0174)|||0.0189**<br>(6.40)|
|Observations|10124|10124|10124|19295|19295|19295|
|Mean of outcome variable|0.135|0.135|0.135|0.137|0.137|0.137|
|WB p-value|0.368|0.336|0.314|0.372|0.398|0.0940|
|N cohorts|42|42|42|59|59|59|
|Time trends|No|No|Yes|No|No|Yes|
|Controls<br>Source: Authors Calculations|Yes<br>- Demographic|Yes<br>and Health Su|Yes<br>rvey (DHS): Jord|Yes<br>an (1990, 1997|Yes<br>, 2002, 2007, 200|Yes<br>9, 2012).|

Source: Authors Calculations - Demographic and Health Survey (DHS): Jordan (1990, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2009, 2012). Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the interviewed woman is currently working. Columns 1 to 3 report results for a restricted period representing 10 years around the reform year between 1997 and 2007. Columns 4 to 6 report results for the full covered period between 1992 and 2017. The estimation samples are restricted to married women whose youngest child's age is around 5 years window around the custody cutoff and whom did not have children after the reform. Wild bootstrap (WB) p-value using one thousand replications. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

The case of Jordan is unique since Jordanian divorce laws have undergone significant changes in recent years, driven by ongoing discussions and reform efforts. El Muhtaseb, Brown, and Kayyali (2016) highlight the existence of disconnected spheres within the discourse on family law in Jordan, where different stakeholders hold varying views on divorce. However, despite these challenges, reforms have been able to address gender issues and promote women's empowerment within the existing legal framework. Supporting our results, from a qualitative point of view, Engelcke (2018) emphasizes the complex process of law-making and the obstacles faced in reforming divorce laws in Jordan. Perhaps, this complex process explains why positive results were only felt after 2010, when the age-cutoff for child custody was increased. Indeed, Jordan’s example shows how political considerations and resistance to change can result in slow progress.

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