**Testing and challenging conventional wisdom.** The ABSM tests prevailing assumptions about a political or reform context. By formalizing the data collection process through interviews with experts, the ABSM can assess the degree of consensus on the generally accepted view of reform. In a political environment where the conventional wisdom has been quite static over time, i.e., where no new political dynamics have been revealed, the model can dig down into individual perceptions of issue-specific reform possibilities to reveal new insights that are not readily apparent through casual—or even close—observation. In gathering information from Bank and donor staff and core government counterparts, the analyst can gauge whether each individual’s on-the-ground experiences reinforce or challenge the conventional wisdom about relationships among stakeholders; their relative positions, influence, and salience; and reform processes and outcomes. Without such a check, there is a danger that donors are reinforcing conventional wisdom in a circular process amongst themselves without testing whether it is representative of reality. In the Timor-Leste pilot, for example, the analysis of the proposed Civil Service Commission’s mandate pointed out that a few key stakeholders who were originally thought to be relatively powerless instead held quite a bit of potential sway over the outcome of reform.

**Breaking into the black box of “political will.”** Another advantage of the ABSM is that it disaggregates down to individual stakeholders the concept of political will and thereby breaks into this ubiquitous “black box” of donor speak. Using the ABSM’s data and analytical tools, the Bank can potentially understand much more deeply the relationships among stakeholders that can either fuel or dampen reform progress, thus unveiling the contours and substance of political will. This knowledge can help to identify politically motivated factors that could improve impact or pave the way for greater reform consensus down the road. In the Philippines, after years of stalled initiatives, the NPSTAR team was surprised to learn how much desire there was for tax reform; at the same time, a wide array of pro-reform groups was unable to overcome the entrenched opposition of a few powerful stakeholders. In Mongolia, ABSM interviews and analysis revealed previously unseen splits within the major political parties and unexpected coalitions of stakeholders.

**Helping to prioritize and sequence reforms.** A critical lesson emerging in the Bank’s effort to improve the relevance and effectiveness of its development assistance is the need for greater selectivity and flexibility in its programs. The ABSM can help tease out the reform initiatives most deserving of donor attention and resources by illuminating the degree of political support and consensus in a given reform environment. While the Philippines pilot anticipated little tangible progress on proposed macro-level reforms, the analysis helped identify micro-level issues where there was enough traction to move forward in the meantime. The pilot experience also helped draw attention to important “no go” areas, where the Bank might inadvertently squander political capital by pushing for something prematurely. In Mongolia, the Bank learned that caution on mining transparency issues would be wise in the highly politicized pre-election environment. In the Philippines, pressing for implementation of a performance management system was shown to harbor the potential for a hostile response among staff who feared its effects on their jobs and wages. In Timor-Leste, taking a position on the type of civil service regime was considered counterproductive, as the Bank would not be able to help move the debate forward amid entrenched viewpoints on either side of the issue.

# **Analytical Limitations**

Although the ABSM can provide, for the reasons outlined above, a powerful lens through which to look at reform possibilities in client countries, it is not a silver bullet. As in any other modeling 26