The results in Table 1 confirm the general picture in Figure 1. The electoral parameter in columns (i), (iii) and (v) is positive and significart at the 5% level or better in all three specifications. This suggests that expenditures on both comrnunity-based projects and special projects were significantly higher than expected in the three months leading up to elections. When the three elections enter into the regression separately, the influence of elections on the timing of expenditures is most apparent for the special projects, especially for the October 1993 referendum and the April 1995 presidential election.<sup>7</sup> The empirical analysis above suggests that Fujimori boosted FONCODES expenditures when it mattered most. But there are obviously other factors at work. Consider, for example, the expenditure spike in September 1994 (month=35), the second-largest in 1he data set. In August 1994, Manuel Vara Ochoa replaced Manuel Estela as the executive director of FONCODES. Estela was a technocrat who was highly regarded at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Prior to being appointed executive director of FONCODES, he had been the head of SUNAT, the govemrnment agency charged with the collection of taxes in Peru. Estela brought to FONCODES his advisors from SUNAT, and a working method which emphasized a rigorous screening of project proposals. This was not, however, to Fujimori's liking, and the president quickly became dissatisfied with Estela's unwillingness to meet "disbursement targets". Estela's replacement, Manuel Vara Ochoa, was a friend of President Fujimori's from their days together as professors at the Agrarian University in Lima, and was understood to be more sensitive to the political importance of a speedy approval process. The massive spike in expenditures in September 1994 may be a result of the wholesale approval of projects which had not been funded during the Estela period.

In conclusion, there is some evidence of a political expenditure cycle in FONCODES projects, but the electoral calendar is by no means the only determinant of changes in FONCODES expenditures between 1991 and 1995.

7 The changing political context in Peru may explain differences in the effect of elections on FONCODES expenditures. The Fujimori government had much at stake in the October 1993 referendum and the April 1995 presidential election. The referendum on the new constitution was widely seen as a referendum on three years of Fujimori government (Roberts and Arce 1998, p. 229). Moreover, the new constitution included a clause which would allow Fujimori to run for re-election--something which he could not to do under the 1980 constitution. The April 1995 election, meanwhile, would assure Fujimori five more years as president. By contrast, the November 1992 election to the constituent assembly took place at a time when the government was virtually unchallenged: the opposition was in disarray after Fujimori's "self-coup" of April 1992, and Fujimori's popularity was very high. Indeed, three of the four "historical" parties--Popular Action, APRA, and the United Left--did not even participate in the 1992 election, alleging that this would "legitinize" Fujimori's zoup. The Popular Christian Party participated, but won only 9.8% of the vote. Fujimori's Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria party won 49.2% of the vote, and 44 of the 80 seats in the constituent assembly. The remaining 41% of the vote went to smaller parties, many of which had been formed shortly before the election.

8 Author's conversations with staff at FONCODES and at the Ministry of the Presidency. One knowledgeable staff member described the relationship between Estela and Fujimori as "strained" and related a telephone conversation in which Fujimori gave Estela a serious warning ("un toque de atencion de palacio").

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