Turkey experienced a remarkable fertility decline from 1960 to today, which comes hand in hand with greater access to contraception and family planning as well as later childbearing ages for women (Koç et al., 2010; Inan, 2007).

During the same period, women’s education has been increasing, which is often considered a main determinant of the fertility decline in many developing and transition countries (Cohen, 2008 ; Esteve et al., 2012) as well as in developed countries during the 20th century (Skirbekk, 2008).

Based on longitudinal data, Ince (2004) suggests that an increase in 1% of women’s education level reduces their fertility level by 1.55%. Gunes (2013) and Kirdar et al. (2011) show that the 1997 reform which increased the duration of compulsory education from 5 years to 8 years, has significantly increased women’s’ mean age at first childbirth, mainly by decreasing the number of teenage pregnancies. According to Kirdar et al. (2011, the 1997 reform on compulsory education had a higher impact on fertility than the Civil Code law of 2002 reporting the legal age of marriage from 15 to 17 years.

Birth postponement also implied an increase in women’s age at first marriage, as in Turkey, the arrival of a first child and marriage are still very time-close events and therewith enabled women to attain higher education levels (HIPS, 1979, 2009 and 2014).

Despite increasing education levels for women, they figure among the lowest in OECD countries (OECD Better Life Index). The gender gap in education has been decreasing in particular for primary education (95% enrollment rate for both sexes) (Turkey Demographic and Health Survey - TDHS, 2013).

Higher education and lower fertility lead to more women being active in the labor market in Turkey for younger cohorts (Ince, 2010). However, the evolution of female employment rates shows two distinctive trends: First, from the years 1980 until the middle of the 2000s, female employment rates (ages 15 to 64) actually decreased due to a reduction of the agricultural sector (from 36% to 25%; World Bank World Development Indicators, 2015 – modelled ILO estimates). Uraz and al. (2010) confirm that low educated women who formerly worked as contributing family workers in agriculture lose their jobs when migrating to <mark>urbana</mark> reas. Reducing female labor market participation coming hand in hand with initial economic development is generally known as being caused by an educational disadvantage for girls and women, weak formal child care support as well as a social stigma against married women working in the industrial sector (“feminization U”: c.f. Goldin, 1994; Luci, 2009). Second, in the past couple of years, women have been sufficiently catching up their educational disadvantage by engaging in secondary and tertiary education and thus increasingly find jobs in the service sector in urban areas (Dayıoğlu and Kırdar, 2010). As a consequence, since the mid-2000s, female employment rates have been re-increasing and reached 32.2% in 2013 (World Bank World Development Indicators, 2015). The increase happened in particular among younger cohorts and more educated women, but with only somewhat above 30%, it is evident that female employment is still way below its potential in Turkey.

At the same time, women’s labor market participation serves increasingly to stabilize household income, especially in times of high economic uncertainty and male unemployment (added worker effect; Karaoglan and Okten, 2012). However, the gender wage gap is considerable in Turkey and an important part is explained by pure discrimination. Cudeville and Gurbuzer (2007) emphazise that wages are particularly lower for married women with young children.

Discrimination coming hand in hand with traditional gender roles might explain in part why female labor market participation is still low on average. In line with the theoretical arguments by Goldin 4