|Observations|6,612,011|6,459,551|6,459,551|6,459,551|6,459,534|6,459,468|6,452,778|6,452,778|6,452,778|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|R-squared|0.685|0.689|0.689|0.697|0.702|0.715|0.718|0.718|0.718|
|Country FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Sector FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Year FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Country-year FE|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Sector-Year FE|No|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Country-Sector FE|No|No|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Country-Sector-Year||||||||||
|FE|No|No|No|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Clustered errors|No|No|No|No|No|No|No|Firm|Sector 2d|

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Labor Productivity is estimated as the log of total revenues per worker. The reference (excluded category) refers to Privately-owned Enterprises (POEs), so results should be interpreted as compared to private firms within the same sector, size, and age, and sector and controlling by the respective fixed effects. Capital refers to lagged values of the log of total assets of the firm (year t-1), age refers to the lagged number of years in the market in t-1. Listed status is a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the company is listed in the stock market, 0 otherwise. Fixed effects are included to absorb for potential shocks including time-bound shocks (year-FE), sectoral shocks (sector-FE), time-varying sectoral shocks (sector-year FE), country specific shocks (country-FE), country time varying shocks (country-year FE), and country, sector specific and time varying shocks (country-sector-year, FE). Clustered standard errors are used to control for potential autocorrelation within firms (column 8 to capture potential serial correlation) and sector (column 9).

# **_6.1.2 Profitability: Profit margin_**

When comparing financial performance, results in Table 7 highlight that BOSs achieve, on average, relatively lower profit margins when compared to private counterparts. After controlling for the firm’ size, age, and listing status, results in column (6-9) indicate that BOS profits are, on average, 6.3 percentage points lower compared to private peers. Listing status, however, does not seem to have a statistically significant effect on performance differentials. These findings are aligned with former empirical analyses that confirm government-owned firms tend to be significantly less profitable than privately owned firms (Kathryn, Dewenter, & Malatesta, 2001) (Phi, Taghizadeh-Hesary, Tu, Yoshino, & Kim, 2019) (Panizza, 2021).

_Table 7. Results for profit margins_

||||**_Profit m_**|**_argins_**||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
|BOS|-6.018***|-6.238***|-6.232***|-6.213***|-6.094***|-6.346***|-6.318***|-6.318***|-6.318***|
||(0.0548)|(0.0561)|(0.0562)|(0.0561)|(0.0560)|(0.0570)|(0.0572)|(0.110)|(0.323)|
|Size|-0.539***|-0.611***|-0.609***|-0.620***|-0.605***|-0.597***|-0.599***|-0.599***|-0.599***|
||(0.0071)|(0.0075)|(0.0075)|(0.0075)|(0.0075)|(0.0076)|(0.0076)|(0.013)|(0.058)|
|Age||0.0281***|0.0282***|0.0287***|0.0270***|0.0157***|0.0160***|0.0160***|0.0160***|
|||(0.00077)|(0.00077)|(0.00077)|(0.00077)|(0.00078)|(0.00078)|(0.0013)|(0.0061)|
|Listing status|||-0.610***|-0.600***|-0.637***|-0.0725|-0.0301|-0.0301|-0.0301|
||||(0.183)|(0.183)|(0.182)|(0.186)|(0.185)|(0.356)|(0.285)|
|Constant|7.513***|7.389***|7.380***|7.411***|7.380***|7.510***|7.512***|7.512***|7.512***|
||(0.0259)|(0.0269)|(0.0270)|(0.0270)|(0.0269)|(0.0271)|(0.0271)|(0.0443)|(0.169)|
|Observations|6,500,636|6,354,633|6,354,633|6,354,633|6,354,614|6,354,541|6,347,824|6,347,824|6,347,824|
|R-squared|0.068|0.064|0.064|0.066|0.074|0.096|0.105|0.105|0.105|
|Country FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Sector FE|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|

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