rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
country’s private sector including manufacturing, construction, services and retail and wholesale trade. Although Enterprise Surveys were conducted in earlier years, we include only data collected after 2006. Prior to that year, there was considerable heterogeneity across countries and regions in terms of sectors covered, questionnaire format, and sampling methodology. Moreover, the samples for surveys conducted before 2006 were not generally representative. In addition to the WBES, we use countrylevel institutional measures from several sources (with details to be provided below). Our final sample consists of approximately 60,000 firms in 119 countries. An advantage of this data is that we have a large number of small firms, thus allowing us to distinguish the elite from the non-elite. In particular, micro (i.e., 10 or less employees), small (i.e., 10+ to 50 employees), medium (i.e., 50+ to 150) and large firms (i.e., more than 150 employees) account for 28.8, 41.8, 16.7, and 12.7 percent of our sample, respectively.

We relate firms' access to external finance for both working capital and investment in fixed assets to firm characteristics, country-level institutions, and other country characteristics. Our investigation yields several key findings. We find that MSMEs (i.e, micro, small and medium firms), and micro firms in particular, have significantly worse access to external finance. In general, we do not find firms’ access to external finance is facilitated by financial development, nor by contracting institutions. In stark contrast, it is positively and strongly associated with property rights institutions. We also provide evidence that measurement errors in institutional variables are likely to be important: once correcting for such errors with instrumental variable estimations, the roles of property rights institutions become even more prominent. Correcting for measurement error does not alter our conclusion on the lack of importance of contracting institutions. Within property rights institutions, Executive Constraints and Minority Shareholders—two measures on limitations to the power of political and economic elites—prove to be particularly important for facilitating access to external finance. We also find that, overall, property rights institutions tend to level the playing field for access to external finance to a greater extent than contracting institutions or financial development. However, one specific component of contracting institutions, a measure of auditing standards and quality (i.e., WEF Auditing Quality), proves to be an exception to this generalization.

This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature of unbundling institutions (AJ, 2005). We differ in our reliance on micro data, our use of more detailed measures of both contracting and property rights institutions, the consideration of measurement error, the differential impacts of institutions on the elites and the non-elites, and our focus on a specific 6
- Rest of the world (RoW) savings are taken from national SAM, and imbalances in the account RoW are treated as savings. The total amount is equal to €52.5 billion and are reported with the negative sign in the regional SAM as representing a negative investment.

# **3.8 Debt**

The debit account is the sum of households’ debt, enterprises’ debt, central Government debt, and RoW debt.

In the specific, each element is calculated as follows:

- Households’ debt (€24.8 billion) is redistributed on interest shares (the same process seen in Equation 7). We assume debt payment and borrowing from households are distributed with the same shares;

- Enterprises’ debt (€234 billion) is calculated as

where _EntInterests_<sup>_macroSam_</sup> are the interest on debt payed by enterprise from national macro SAM. This value is regionalized by using regional enterprises’ savings as share;

- Government debts (€414.3 billion) from national SAM;

- Rest of the world debts (€146.4 billion) from national SAM.

# **3.9 Rest of the World**

We consider the Rest of the World (RoW) to take into account the relationships between Italy and all the other countries. In this context, a detailed description of how imports and exports were treated seems to be essential for replications.

- Import of goods: data refer to 2016 and are taken from the ISTAT-ICE yearbook " _Commercio estero e attività internazionali delle imprese_ ", edition 2017. Data refers to imports by economic activity and region. Data on imports of goods describe different sectors linked to the sectors of our interest. For the electricity/water category, we had to split them so that we used additional 2 digit ICE-ISTAT data for the water and electricity sectors. Specifically, the data are not divided between regions for the electricity sector, but we have only a national figure (about €1.6 billion). We

14
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

||Page|
|---|---|
|Introduction -Purposes of the Discussion ........................................|I|
|Potential Goals of Ul Programs-<br>and Rationales for Govemment Intervention .............|.<br>2|
|The Structure of Ul Programs ........................|5|
|Evidence on the Economic Effects ........................|17|
|Transferring Ul Programs to Developing Economies .................................|29|
|Some Suggestions for Research ............|39|
|Conclusions<br>...............................|41|
|References<br>..............................|42|
|Text Tables<br>Tablel .......................|2|
|Table 2 ..............................|10|
|Text Figures<br>Figure la ...............................|32|
|Figure1b ...............................|32|
|Figure 2a ...............................|34|
|Figure 2b ...............................|34|

# Text Figures

This author is Professor of economics, Michigan State University, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper Is prepared as part of the Program of Studies on Employment and Labor Market Issues conducted by the Education and Employment Division of the Population and Human Resources Departm6nt of the World Bank.
Follow-up survey attrition rates are generally small to modest in size. One exception is the study on the Egypt Community program, where attrition was 23 percent due to an administrative issue and not because of migration (Croke et al., 2023). Attrition in the Urban DRC (17.2 percent) and Djibouti (11.4 percent) studies was also relatively high, perhaps because of the urban contexts where mobility tends to be higher. Finally, the Tunisia study also had a high attrition rate of 19.6 percent between the first and second follow-up surveys, plausibly explained by the long-time gap between rounds (about four years). The studies in Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia reported very low attrition rates of 4.00 percent, 6.20 percent at endline (2.60 percent at midline), and 2.94 percent, respectively.

Table 3 summarizes the key demographic characteristics of study participants. The median age of the participants is 33.2 years old (programs in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Egypt Community program explicitly targeted youth). The average household size varies between 3.9 and 6.9, and the median household size is 6.1. Except in Djibouti and Lao PDR, where the program targets only women, both men and women participate in most programs, but women account for less than half of participants in several countries, such as Comoros, Rural DRC, and Sierra Leone. In nine of the ten studies that report it, the median number of participants with no education is 33 percent.

12
longer, and parents may stop using the system if they find it fatiguing or challenging.

Based on these considerations, three intervention variants were chosen, (A) leveling on actual or imputed baseline scores, (B) providing the same sequence of intermediate-level exercises to all kids, and (C) giving parents a choice of exercises from a menu. Arm A uses observed fluency scores from the end of term 2 and assigns students with fluency scores of 0-29 into the “basic” group, 30-64 into the “intermediate” group, and 65+ into the “advanced” group. These cutoffs were used previously in a similar context (see Piper et al., 2018). Students with missing scores are assigned their class median. Whole classes with missing scores are assigned to the intermediate group (which also happens to be the full sample median). The exact exercise sequences in the basic, intermediate, and advanced groups are described in detail in Appendix A. Arm B assigns all students to the intermediate group, while Arm C allows parents to pick one exercise type (from basic letters, to letter combinations, to advanced text passages) out of a set of three.

**Varying delivery format.** We also test two formats that use the IVR functionality in different ways. In the first, the voice call explains to the parent how to do the reading exercises and asks them to carry them out with their child after the call (T1). In the second, the IVR asks parents to put the call on speaker phone, and then goes through the exercises with the parent and child on the call (T2).

A priori, either approach might work better for different reasons. In both call types, the parent is asked to take notes on the exercises during the call. The parent is instructed to point to the written letters or words while the IVR (or the parent) reads, and then again while the child reads. However, in T1, the parent may not pronounce letter combinations correctly from memory. She may also listen to the exercises during the call but then not carry them out with the child later. On the other hand, T2 may cause difficulty if the phone’s speaker is poor or the IVR moves too fast for the child or is not responsive enough. All parties may be more motivated when the child and parent practice together, rather than following instructions from an unknown and disembodied voice.

# **3.3 The Research Design**

A “standard” RCT of IVR for home reading would likely consist of extensive piloting, carrying out power calculations to determine sample size and number of tested intervention arms, randomizing at the cluster (school) level, and then administering an IVR program for at least a full school year, possibly accompanied by a home survey and independent tests of reading fluency. Based on the budget for delivering and deploying messages, the size of the sample, and the available staff time, such a comprehensive study was not feasible for NewGlobe. At the same time, at the outset, it was not even known whether parents would listen to the messages at all, and there is to our knowledge no existing guidance on how best to design such calls. In 15
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29
# Long-Term Mitigation Strategies and Marginal Abatement Cost Curves: A Case Study on Brazil

Adrien Vogt-Schilb<sup>1</sup> , St ́ephane Hallegatte<sup>2</sup> , Christophe de Gouvello<sup>3</sup>

> _1CIRED, Nogent-sur-Marne, France_

> _2The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA_

> _3The World Bank, Brasilia, Brazil_

Various technical options are available to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: fuel switch in the power sector, renewable power, electric vehicles, energy efficiency improvements in combustion engines, waste recycling, forest management, etc. Policy makers have to compare and assess these different options to design a comprehensive mitigation strategy and decide the scheduling of various actions (i.e. decide what measures need to be introduced and when). This is especially true concerning the emission-reduction measures that require government action (e.g., energy-efficiency standards, public investment, public planning).

One tool that has been largely used to assess and compare mitigation actions is the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. A MAC curve provides information on abatement costs and abatement potentials for a set of mitigation measures, and ranks them according to their cost, from the least to the most expensive (Fig. 1). The World Bank has collaborated and is collaborating with many countries to build national or local MAC curves (e.g. China, Poland, Mexico, Vietnam).

MAC curves have proven powerful tools to highlight that large amounts of low-cost emission reductions are technically possible. They also show that some emission reductions can pay for themselves thanks to energy efficiency gains, provided implementation barriers can be overcome (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012). This information can help governments decide about the level of ambition of their mitigation strategy, and make informed domestic and international commitments (in the UNFCCC context, for instance). It is also helpful for policy makers searching for synergies and co-benefits between emission reductions and economic development.

In addition to its cost and potential, the speed at which an emission-reduction action may be implemented is a key parameter for decision makers. Indeed, some high-abatement-potential measures, such as switching to renewable power, will _Email addresses:_ `vogt@centre-cired.fr` (Adrien Vogt-Schilb), `shallegatte@worldbank.org` (St ́ephane Hallegatte), `cdegouvello@worldbank.org` (Christophe de Gouvello) We thank Pierre Audinet, Luis Gonzalez, Pedzi Makumbe and Supachol Suphachalasai for useful discussions on the work performed here. We thank the ESMAP (World Bank) for financial support. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.

_March 19, 2014_
26 The questions asked by this paper are whether, on balance, having a SHI system rather than a tax-financed system results in higher or lower health spending per capita, and whether having one system or the other ( _not_ holding health spending constant) results in better or worse outcomes with regard to amenable mortality, higher or lower levels of employment, and a higher or lower share of formal-sector workers in total employment. Econometric models are estimated on panel data from 29 OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. Particular attention is paid to the likelihood that whether a country has a SHI or tax-financed system in place at a particular moment in time may be correlated with excluded and potentially unobservable variables that also affect the outcomes of interest, i.e. SHI status may be endogenous. The models estimated include a generalized differences-in-differences model, a random trend model, and a differential trend model: the first assumes unobservables remain constant over time; the second allows them to change over time but linearly, albeit at a different rate in each country; the third allows them to grow nonlinearly, but at the same rate in all countries within a given health system group. The parallel trends assumption implicit in the first model is tested in the second two models. Where these assumptions fail adequately to capture the endogeneity of SHI status, as reflected in a significant coefficient on SHI status one year in the future, instrumental variables (IV) are used, and diagnostic tests are undertaken to assess the validity of the identifying restrictions.

The results are clear-cut on two questions: SHI raises per capita total health spending by 3-4%, and reduces the formal-sector share of employment by 8-10%. With regard to health outcomes, there is absolutely no evidence in the results that SHI systems achieve lower rates of amenable mortality. In fact, the evidence suggests that with regard to premature mortality from breast cancer among women, SHI systems perform worse, with 5-6% higher potential years of life lost (PYLL). The lack of positive health impacts in favor of SHI systems is despite their 3-
The fact that this argument calls into question the necessity of all-inclusive deals may at first glance seem discouraging. However, the argument rather implies that there may be many different paths to peace, since the signatories are expected to commit to peace, even if some party is left on the outside. Hence, agreements that exclude some actors may be one way forward when an all-inclusive deal is not possible.

There are several testable implications that follow from my theoretical argument. To begin with, focusing on the settlement as such, it is possible to draw out two implications. First, whether a peace agreement is all-inclusive or not, is not likely to affect the signatory peace (i.e. whether peace prevails in terms of all the signatories sticking to peace). The second implication is that since the excluded parties are likely to continue to fight, an agreement that leaves out one or more rebel groups should reduce the overall prospects for peace (i.e., whether peace prevails in the entire conflict taking into account the conflict behavior of both signatories and nonsignatories). In other words, if the agreement fails to include some rebel group, this should not affect whether the signatories stick to peace, but is likely to reduce the overall prospects for peace since the non-signatories may engage in conflict.

Furthermore, if we move the analysis to the dyadic interactions between the government and each of the rebel groups, there are some additional implications. The third implication is that the non-signatories, on average, should be more likely to engage in post-settlement violence than the signatories. Fourth, focusing specifically on the signatory dyads, the argument suggests that each of these should not be any more likely to resort to violence if the deal excludes some actor. The fifth and last implication takes this notion of exclusion one step further. Even if the signatories are faced with excluded parties that engage in conflict, we should not expect to see an increase in the risk of signatory violence. By examining these implications from my theoretical argument this article aims to shed light on the issue of whether allinclusive peace agreements can affect the prospects for peace.

# **Research Design**

## **_Data_**

The data are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and include all internal armed conflicts where at least one peace agreement has been signed during the period 7