participation follow the same special pattern of uneven distribution between the park systems. Elite capture of all the benefits from GMAs has been a long standing concern from the days of ADMADE. The local institutions such as CRB/VAGs were created to allow broader participation of households in GMA related community decisions and prevent elite capture of the resources. We find wealth, as measured by consumer durable assets, is not a significant factor in participation in CRB/VAGs. Other things being equal, the poor and non-poor households are equally likely to participate in CRB/VAGs. However, we find no evidence of welfare gains to the poor households associated with living in the GMAs or participation in CRB/VAGs. Rather, the top 40 percent of the households derive all the benefits from living in GMAs and participating in CRB/VAG s. Thus, while the poor are not prevented from participating, they do not derive any welfare gains from it.

Consumption expenditure measures welfare in a narrow economic sense for households. GMA institutions may concentrate on improving community infrastructure instead of distributing the gains to the households. Indeed, GMAs in some park systems have newer infrastructures than other. However, when we control for other factors, such as NGO and community labor contributions, we find no evidence of impact of GMA on the age of new infrastructure.

In conclusion, some GMAs are associated with significant welfare gains to those living in them and more gains to those who participate in CRB/VAGs. However, these gains are captured by the relatively elite households in the community. Community benefits as measured by newer infrastructure may not be associated with GMAs, but other contributing factors. The devolution of community rights and responsibilities for natural resource management in Zambia is not complete. The coexistence of traditional and modern local and national institutions makes the devolution of power and resource sharing a complex issue. Historically powerful national institutions like ZAWA and local elites have vested interests in maintaining the status quo in revenue sharing. More even distribution of gains from GMAs across households near different park systems and across the poor and the non-poor should be the continuing goal of the national policy makers.

# **References**

Astle, W.L., 1999. _A history of wildlife conservation and management in the mid Luangwa Valley_ , Zambia, British Empire & commonwealth Museum.

- Bandyopandhyay, S. and P. Shyamsundar. 2004. “Fuelwood Consumption and Participation in Community Forestry in India.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3331, June.

- Brandon, K.E. and Wells, M. 1992. Planning for people and parks: Design dilemmas. World Development,  20 (4), 557-570.

Emerton, L., Bishop, J. and Thomas, L. 2005. Sustainable financing of protected areas: A global review of challenges and options. Draft manuscript. Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN.

- Gilligan, D. O., and J. Hoddinott. 2007. “Is there Persistence in the Impact of Emergency Food Aid? Evidence on Consumption, Food Security, and Assets in Ethiopia.” _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_ 89 (2), 225–242

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