**5** SUMMARY **AND POLICY OPTIONS**

A number of guidelines for policy emerge from this review paper, and are briefly summarised below. More specific suggestions for policy are outlined in the companion paper with particular reference to Orissa (Mearns and Sinha 1998).

- _Selective_ **_deregulation_** _of_ **_land-lease (rental) markets:_** Under the Ninth Plan, the Government of India is considering the possibility of a middle ground between past, regulatory approaches towards tenancy reforms/ lease contracts, and total liberalization. Regulatory approaches came about within a particular post-Independence context in which lease contracts were perceived to be a means for the rich to exploit the poor. This situation was probably not typical even when 'land to the tiller' reforms were introduced, and evidence suggests that it is now rare in India. On the contrary, rental markets are an important means by which the poor gain access to land. However, evidence suggests that the deregulation of rental markets will benefit the poor only where there is a credible threat of ceilings enforcement, and where there is a possibility of clearly defined and enforceable contracts. Overall, still too little is known about land rental markets in particular states, and comparative empirical studies across several states are needed to identify the likely consequences of selective deregulation under varying conditions.

- _=_ **_Reduction_** _of_ **_transaction costs in land markets:_** Transaction costs in land sale-purchase markets include both the official costs (e.g. registration fees, stamp duties and surcharges) and informal costs (e.g. bribes to expedite transactions, fees to informal land valuers, etc), which together may amount to a third of the total value of the land transacted. These high costs are onerous for all, but are prohibitive for the rural poor, and explain in large measure why so many land holders do not hold effective title to their land. The risk of losing land through encroachment by others, and through lack of transparency in settlement and consolidation operations, is considerably higher where land holders lack clear title to their land. This is most likely to be true for the rural poor and other socially excluded groups. Measures to improve the efficiency of land records management and land registration generally focus on computerization. This is not a panacea, particularly if incentive structures within land management agencies are not simultaneously addressed. However, provided there is close coordination between the computerization of registration and of land records, it offers high potential for reducing transaction costs in obtaining title to land, and thereby helps facilitate access to institutional credit. Of utmost importance is the 'backwards integration' of land registration into land records management, so as to permit more or less simultaneous mutation of the official record.

- **_Critical reassessment of land administration agencies:_** Reforms in land administration will be ineffective if the incentive structures within which the relevant government officers work are not simultaneously addressed. Rent-seeking is widespread, and is usually a reflection of the fact that landholders are willing to pay a price to receive the kind of service they have a right to expect. Where this creates difficulties is that it tends to lead to the systematic exclusion of the rural poor from gaining more secure access to land, since the rural poor are least likely to be able to bear the high transaction costs involved in pressing for legal protection of their existing rights, or in acquiring new rights. Rent-seeking serves to ration access to government services. Day-to-day incentives and promotion opportunities for revenue inspectors and other low-level government officers are not performance-related. While reforms in land administration that aim to promote transparency and public access to

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