# **Table 2.  Robustness Checks**

||Dependent Va|riable: Numb|er of Days Ho|usehold Redu|ced Number o|f Meals||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|VARIABLES|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|Number of People Killed‐All Violence|0.000008|‐0.000419|0.002226|0.001623|‐0.001491|‐0.003240|‐0.000505|
||[0.000]|[0.003]|[0.004]|[0.003]|[0.004]|[0.003]|[0.003]|
|Number of People Killed‐Second Week of Month Before|‐0.000134<br>[0.000]|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
|Number of People Killed‐Third Week of Month Before|0.000194**|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
||[0.000]|||||||
|Number of People Killed‐Fourth Week of Month Before|0.000010|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
||[0.000]|||||||
|Number of People Killed‐AQAP Involved|‐|‐0.002025|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
|||[0.004]||||||
|Number of People Killed‐Coalition|‐|‐0.000086|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
|||[0.003]||||||
|Number of People Killed‐Yemen Forces|‐|0.002772|‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|
|||[0.003]||||||
|Number of People Killed‐Remote Violence|‐|‐|0.000037|‐|‐|‐|‐|
||||[0.004]|||||
|Number of People Killed‐Battle Violence|‐|‐|‐0.002536|‐|‐|‐|‐|
||||[0.003]|||||
|Number of People Killed‐2 Months Before|‐|‐|‐|0.002977|‐|‐|‐|
|||||[0.003]||||
|Number of People Killed‐3 Months Before|‐|‐|‐|0.000240|‐|‐|‐|
|||||[0.003]||||
|Number of People Killed‐4 Months Before|‐|‐|‐|0.002099|‐|‐|‐|
|||||[0.003]||||
|Number of People Killed‐5 Months Before|‐|‐|‐|‐0.000174|‐|‐|‐|
|||||[0.003]||||
|Number of People Killed‐All Violence x 2017 Indicator|‐|‐|‐|‐|0.002314|‐|‐|
||||||[0.003]|||
|Number of People Killed‐All Violence x 2018 Indicator|‐|‐|‐|‐|0.003234|‐|‐|
||||||[0.005]|||
|Number of People Killed‐All Violence x Houthi‐Controlled I|<br>‐|‐|‐|‐|‐|0.007553*|‐|
|||||||[0.004]||
|Observations|614|614|614|484|614|614|374|
|Include Food Assistance in Specification|N|N|N|N|N|N|Y|

Notes: This table estimates a number of robustness checks investigating the relationship between violence and food coping strategies. Column (1) estimates a specification breaking up the violence by week in the month before the survey; column (2) estimates a specification breaking up violence by the actors involved; column (3) estimates a specification breaking up violence by the type of event; column (4) estimates a specification investigating the relationship between more lagged events and food coping strategies; column (5) estimates a specification allowing the relationship to vary by year; column (6) allows violence to vary between regions controlled by the internationally‐recognized government and regions controlled by Houthi forces; and column (7) adds the share of respondents receiving food assistance to the baseline specification. All specifications include time and regional fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the governorate level are reported in parentheses; * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

Third, table 2 further demonstrates that the lack of a correlation in the past month is not being obscured by violence that occurred previously. Specifically, column (4) re‐estimates the baseline specification, but adds lagged conflict events up to five months before the WFP survey. However, again, there is little evidence of a correlation between food coping strategies and any of these variables describing past or future violence, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that all additional lagged violence coefficients are jointly equal to zero (p‐value 0.829).

Fourth, table 2 demonstrates that there does not appear to be any correlation between violence and food coping strategies in any of the years of available data. Specifically, column (5) re‐estimates the baseline specification, but interacts the violence measure with year dummies and includes all lower‐order terms in the specification. The results suggest that one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between violence and food coping strategies in 2016, 2017, or 2018.

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