**Table 2. Empirical Evidence on Selected Anti-corruption Programs**

|**Program**|**Empirical Evidence**|
|---|---|
|Anti-Corruption<br>Agencies|Anti-corruption agencies have been successful in Chile, Hong Kong, New South<br>Wales, Australia and Singapore (Allan; 1992, Clark; 1987, Holm; 2000; Doig;<br>1995; Klitgaard; 1998; Segal; 1999 and World Bank, 1999). Developing country<br>officials however do not see these as effective anti-corruption tools in countries<br>with endemic corruption (see Kaufmnann, 1997).|
|Public Opinion<br>Surveys|Public opinion surveys have served as a useful tool in articulating more precisely<br>citizens' concerns (e.g. Bangalore scorecard and a "corruptometer" by an<br>Argentine NGO). International surveys, such as those compiled by<br>Transparency International, highlight countries in which corruption is perceived<br>to be endemic.|
|Raising Public<br>Sector Wages|Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) find no short run impact (as the income from<br>bribery dominates total income). Gurgur and Shah (1999, 2000) find negative yet<br>insignificant effect. Treisman (1999) and Swamy et al. (1999) find no<br>relationship. The SDC experience in the forestry sector in Pakistan also<br>confirms this. In corrupt societies public positions are often purchased by<br>borrowing money from family and friends. Raising public sector wages simply<br>raises the purchase price and subsequent corruption efforts to repay loans. Of<br>course raising public sector wages which do not allow the employee to satisfy<br>basic needs of his/her family, are likely to reduce petty corruption.|
|Reducing Public<br>Sector Size|<br>Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), LaPalombara (1994), La Porta et al (1999) find that<br>reduction in public sector size leads to less corruption. Gurgur and Shah (1999)<br>find that this result only holds when important variables such as judiciary,<br>democratic institutions, colonial heritage, decentralization, and bureaucratic<br>culture are omitted. Elliot (1997) finds an inverse relationship between the<br>budget size and corruption. Privatization in some countries (e.g. Russia) has led<br>to increased corruption and exploitation. Thus appropriate role of the<br>__government<br>is the critical element for discussion on corruption.|
|Financial<br>Accountability|<br>Gurgur and Shah (1999, 2000) find a negative yet insignificant association.|
|Media<br>Independence|Freedom of press is negatively correlated with the level of corruption (see<br>Brunetti and Weder, 1998)|
|Judicial<br>Independence|Judicial independence reduces corruption as confirmed by Ades and Di Tella<br>(1996), Goel and Nelson (1998) and Gurgur and Shah (1999, 2000).|
|<br>Citizen<br>Participation|<br>Citizen participation leads to reduced corruption as confirmed by Kaufman and<br>Sachs (1998) and Gurgur and Shah (1999, 2000).|
|<br>Decentralization|<br>Huther and Shah (1998), Gurgur and Shah (2000) and Fisman and Gatti (2000)<br>finda negativerelationship between decentralization and corruption.|
|Bureaucratic<br>Culture|Gurgur and Shah (1999, 2000) find a positive relationship between command<br>and control type civil service orientation and corruption.|

# _Corruption in the Presence ofAltruism_

While the presence of wide-spread corruption suggests a lack of altruism among public officials, some may be motivated, in part, by a desire to perform civic duties or a desire to 7