rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# SPAIN'S SUCCESSFUL ACCESSION TO THE EU

After Franco's death in November 1975, Spain was confronted with a mixed economy that was administered and controlled by the state to a much greater extent than it was free market. Business organizations depended on the state and the state bureaucracy was a power of the first order.

The industrial structure inherited at this time was obsolete and remained isolated from world markets. Under Franco's autarkical and dirigist objectives, it was highly protected and subsidized.

There were similar problems in factor markets. The labor markets were extremely rigid. Interest rates were controlled by the Ministry of Finance, and Spain's dependence on energy was among the highest in Europe.

Although's Spain's industrial development of the 1960s and early 1970s was capital intensive, unemployment did not increase owing to a tide of emigration to the EU. After the energy crisis it became difficult for Spanish emigrants to find work and many returned to Spain. This greatly augmented unemployment and social tensions.

Thus, at Franco's death, Spaniards found themselves in an economic crisis of enormous proportions for which the Spanish economy was poorly equipped to react. Starting from this extremely weak position, after three decades of economic autarky first and state intervention and regulation later, the new democratic governments elected after 1977 chose in a rational and coherent manner to integrate with Europe, open up the economy, and reduce the role of the state in the domestic economy. While some other Western European governments desired to maintain strong state intervention to correct market failures, in Spain reduction of the role of the state in the economy was regarded the only viable option to release the economic potential of the economy. Thus, despite the Spanish left's traditional fears of capitalism, the Socialist and Communist parties voted unanimously with all other parties to accede to the EU and to declare in the new constitution that Spain is a market economy.

Despite the fact that Spain did not become a member of the EU until 1986, liberalization, both external and domestic, began in earnest in 1977 due to anticipated accession to the EU. It was not until 1986, however, that Spain actually became a member of the EU. Despite its difficult starting position, Spain is regarded as the most successful of the "Southern" countries in integrating with Europe. On the negative side, in the mid-1990s Spain was struggling with an excessive unemployment problem.

Sources: Dehesa, 1991; Bliss and Macedo, 1990; Vinals, 1990; Blanchard et al. (1995).

8
<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 3b: Number of Countries Entering Default<br>14<br>12 . .t r I : .<br>102<br>E - '4 , ' :.. 1 , Commercial-In<br>z 64i- -IX - w f ; + ffipB RD-In<br>2 i<br>0<br>v~ v~ i . . s s & x~ -<br>cD <D co cD cD tD (a c' (D<br>Co OD 0 Co CD co co CD cD<br>-. C.. 0 -_ CO - .. Ut -J<br>year<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Tables A3.2, A2.3 Global Development Finance 1999: Analysis and Summary Tables. Washington DC, The World Bank and FINCR internal records.

Given that the number of countries defaulting to the IBRD, the Paris Club and to Commercial Banks is at a level much lower than the giddying heights of the late 1980's, one may question the need for a study determining the proximate causes of such default at the present time. However, to the contrary, we suggest that this is precisely the time to carry out such analysis, as only after having observed a period where countries are going into default, and a period where countries are leaving default status, can we hope to discover the true relationship between default and the plethora of explanatory variables used in the literature. Moreover, events following the East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises of 1997-98 together with a recent crop of Paris Club reschedulings have once again turned our attention to the issue of sovereign default.

# **2. Theoretical Explanations of Sovereign Default**

Cline (1984) highlights the fact that there are two sides to a debt rescheduling, or in our case to a default on an IBRD loan. The "demand" side reflects the decision of a country to seek rescheduling or to go into nonaccrual status. Such a decision has an adverse effect on a country's credit rating, reducing the ability to borrow in the future at favourable terms, so a country will reschedule only if the opportunity cost of continued debt servicing is perceived by policymakers to be prohibitively high. This view of default is described by Ul Haque et al. (1996) as the "cost-benefit" approach, as countries contrast the costs of rescheduling or default against the benefit windfall gain. Cline suggests this demand for rescheduling will depend on the debt-service ratio, ratio of reserves to imports, rate of per capita income growth, level of per capita income and on the current account deficit. Countries incur sovereign debt for consumption-smoothing purposes, for investment purposes given an expectation of relatively high productivity, and for adjustrnent purposes, based on current account sustainability. Ul Haque et al. then 6
# **APPENDIX S1: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure S1.1b: Carbon monoxide, ITO 2004-2006<br>Summer Winter<br>25000 25000<br>20000 20000<br>15000 15000<br>10000 10000<br>5000 5000<br>CPCB standard CPCB standard<br>0 0<br>Hour of the Day Hour of the Day<br>μg/m3 μg/m3<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Based on pollutant data from the Central Pollution Control Board <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure S1.1a: Nitrogen dioxide, ITO 2004-2006<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Summer Winter<br>1500 1500<br>1000 1000<br>500 500<br>CPCB standard CPCB standard<br>0 0<br>Hour of the Day Hour of the Day<br>Source: Based on pollutant data from the Central Pollution Control Board<br>μg/m3 μg/m3<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24<br><!-- End of picture text --> 50
Table 13

# Correlation Coefricients of Per Capita Expenditures with Capacity and Need Variables

|||Current Ex|penditure|Capital Ex|penditure|Total Ex|penditurc|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||5|<br>I992|**1993**I|<br>7|**1993**||**1993**|
|A.|Variable Representing "C|apacity'||||||
|1.<br>pric|Per capita GDP (1989<br>es)|0.574*|0.338*|0.3660|0.282**|0.543*|0.327*|
|2.|Per capita aigricultural<br>productmin|.0.424*|_-0.354*_|-0.351*|-0.388*|-04426*|-0.368|
|_3._|Per capita industrial<br>production eicr capita|0.479*|0.243**|0.279"*|0.207|0.445*|0.236**|
|4.<br>Ag|Per capita production<br>(Industry +<br>zriculturc)|0.493*|0.179|0.216|0.136|0.368*|0.170|
|B.|Variable Representing 'N|eed'||||||
|5.|Population deLnsity|0.324*|0.349*|0.132|0.239**|0.2R3*"|0.323*|
|6.|Road len-thisq. knm.|0.050|0.122|-0.008|0.10|0.035|0.092*|
|7.<br>prt|Agricultural<br>ductivily|-0.228**|-0.282**|- 0.277*|-0.350'|-0.257**|-0.305**|
|S.|Infant Mortality Rate|0.093|0.144|0.053|0.244''|0.086|0.174|
|9.|Illiteracy Rate|0.160|0.214|0.140|0.365'|0.163|0.259**|

1992 - Actuals 1993 - Budget Estimates Significant at I per cent level Significant at 5 per cent level Source: Staff Estimates based on information provided by the Ministry of Finance and State Planning Committee, Government of Viet Nam.

34
13 bootstrap sampling error.

The set of wealth indicators common to the DHS and HBS surveys contains 14 variables for ownership of durable goods, and four variables for housing characteristics and access to utilities. A variable indicating the ownership of agricultural land, and nine variables for demographic controls and regional dummies are also included. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for those variables in the two samples. The results for the regression of per capita household consumption on these variables in the HBS sample are then presented in Table 3. We use a log linear specification because of the likely nonlinear relationship between the ownership of assets and consumption.

Per capita consumption is then imputed using the fitted coefficients β and γ ˆ presented in Table 3 and the draws of the residuals. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that the set of regressors used for the imputation have similar distributions in the two samples.<sup>17</sup> Figure 2 depicts kernel density estimates of the distributions of total household consumption observed in the auxiliary HBS sample, and imputed in the main TDHS sample.<sup>18</sup> The two distributions have reasonably similar shapes, and the levels of inequality in actual consumption in the HBS and in imputed consumption in the TDHS are also close: for the sample of 30-49 year-old women, on which our analysis focuses below, the E(0)s are 0.337 and 0.360 respectively.

# **4. Estimating inequality of opportunity with missing data**

We have now constructed two alternative economic advantage variables for each household in the TDHS sample. Both are based on information on “wealth” (as proxied by a vector of ownership indicators for assets and durable goods, housing quality, and access to amenities), although the second variable also uses information from an auxiliary survey on how those assets and a few other covariates correlate with measured consumption. (Crucially, this information includes the residuals of the consumption regression on the covariates common to both surveys.)

> 17 Significant differences are found only for the share of urban residence because of the difference in the definitions of urban areas in the two surveys (agglomerations with 20,000 inhabitants for the HBS survey and 15,000 for the TDHS one), and access to piped water (the definition is more restrictive in the DHS). 18 The distribution of imputed consumption in the TDHS that is shown corresponds to the first one of the R=20 draws.
# REFERNCES

- Alderson M.R. and Meade J.W. (1967) Accuracy of diagnosis on death certificates compared to hospital records. Brit J Prev Soc Med 21, 22-29.

- Alonso P.L., Bowman A., Marsh K. and Greenwood B.M. (1987) The accuracy of the clinical histories given by mothers of seriously ill African children. Ann Trop Paediatr 7 (3), 187-9.

- Ayeni 0. (1980) Causes of mortality in an African city. Afr J Med med jci 9, 139-49.

- Blacker G.C. (1984) Experiences in the use of special mortality questions in multi-purpose surveys: The single-round approach. in Data Bases for Mortality Measurement. United Nations.

- Borges da Silva G. (1987) Evaluation de la mortalite chez les ouvriers senegalais. Bull Soc Pathol Exot Filiales 80 (4). 698-703.

- Botha J.L. and Bradshaw D. (1985) African vital statistics - a black hole? SAMJ 67, 15 June, 977-81.

- Bradley A.K. and Gilles H.M. (.984) Malumfashi endemic diseases, research project XXI: Pointers to causes of death in the Malumfashl area, northern Nigeria. Ann Trop Med Parasitol 78 (3), 265-71.

- Essex B.J.. (1980) Diaanostic Pathways in Clinical Medicine. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone.

- Fargues P. and Nassour 0. (1987) Les saisons et la mortalite urbaine en Afriques: les deces a Bamako de 1974 a 1985. Paper presented to IUSSP seminar on mortality and society in sub-Saharan Africa, 19-23 October, Yaounde, Cameroon.

- Fuller J.H. (1985) Causes of death in diabetes mellitus. Horm Metab Res (SuDP1) 15, 3-9.

- Garenne M. and Fontaine 0. (1986) Assessing probable causes of death using a standardized questionnaire. Paper presented to the IUSSP seminar on comparative studies of mortality and morbidity, Sienna, 7-12 July.

- Ghana Health Impact Assessment Project Team. (1981) Quantative method of assessing the health impact of different diseases in less developed countries. Int J Epidemiol 10 (1), 73-80.

- Graham W., Brass W. and Snow R.W. (1988) Indirect estimation of maternal mortality: The sisterhood method. CPS Research Paper 88-1. Centre for Population Studies. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

- Greenwood B.M., Bradley A.K., Greenwood A.M., Byass P., Jammeh K., Tulloch S., Oldfield F.S.J. and Hayes R. (1987a) Mortality and morbidity from malaria among children in a rural area of the Gambia, West Africa. Trans Roy Soc Trop Med Hyq 81, 478-86.

29
# **4.  Descriptive Statistics**

In this section, we describe the participants’ characteristics and broadly summarize the results.<sup>7</sup> Table 1 shows that parents of H have much greater education than parents of L. For simplicity, the table groups together Revealed Mixed and Revealed Segregated as the “identity conditions.” The table shows that 45% of all H compared to 12% of all L have a mother with at least six years of schooling. (These are weighted averages across conditions, calculated using Figure 1.) For only 5% of H, compared to 28% of L, both parents are illiterate. Only 8% of H have fathers who are day laborers, compared to 18% in the case of L. These differences highlight the need to examine whether the correlates of caste can explain the differences between H and L in our results. We can do that because the distribution of parents’ characteristics for H shares a common support with that for L. For example, there are not only L who have mothers with no schooling; there are also H whose mothers have no schooling. We collected data on two other variables in the post-play survey: exposure to mazes, and number of participants in a session known that a subject knows.

Table 1 shows that the randomization between the control and identity conditions was largely successful. However, in the identity conditions, participants have parents with a significantly higher level of education and are significantly more likely to have had some exposure to mazes. These differences should, if anything, improve performance in the identity conditions compared to the control. An effect that goes the other way is that the low caste is on average slightly more likely to be in 6<sup>th</sup> than 7<sup>th</sup> grade in the identity conditions.<sup>8</sup> We control for 7 In each time period in which we conducted the experiment (January and March 2003 and March 2005), we held at least six sessions under P/P incentives in the control condition. As shown in Web Appendix Table A1, there were no significant differences in output by time period. Therefore we pool the data across the three time periods. We also found no experimenter effects on the number of mazes solved per round.

8 Unlike for L, the randomization in terms of grade in school is perfect for H across control and identity treatments. For L, the mean grade in school is 6.53 for control (Caste Not Revealed) and 6.34 for the identity treatments and this difference is significant, as Table 1 shows. Further disaggregating the data by treatment reveals that the problem of imbalance in grade for L lies with the control versus all other treatments, and that this is not so in the case of H. For H, for piece rate conditions, the means for grade in school (with standard deviations in parentheses) are 6.53 (0.50) for Caste Not Revealed, 6.53 (0.50) for Revealed Mixed, and 6.69 (0.47) 15
Table 2 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots. The findings of both tests show that log-returns of the peso and lira can be treated as stationary variables.

**- -** **<u>Table 2. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) unit root tests</u>**<sup>a</sup>

|Currency|A<br>(5)<br>|DF<br>(20)<br>|P<br>(5)<br>|P<br>(20)<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|US$/MXP|-15.19<sup>*</sup>|-7.52<sup>*</sup>|-37.29<sup>*</sup>|37.26<sup>*</sup>|
|US$/TL|-8.07<sup>*</sup>|-3.76<sup>*</sup>|-15.09<sup>*</sup>|-15.11<sup>*</sup>|

* Significant at the 1% level. a The order of augmentation is in parenthesis and the tests include a drift term.

Table 3 displays statistics on the Central Bank of Mexico daily foreign exchange market intervention. The average amount of put options at auction was USD 235.8 million. To put this into context, it is comparable to the mean sales or purchases of dollars carried out by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank during the period 1977 to 1994. The average amount of exercised options was, however, USD 9.6 million.

The amount and frequency of contingent sales is substantially smaller than that of purchases. There was a sale of dollars every 100 working days of about USD 1.7 million on average. The maximum amount of USD sales is 200 million, which took place on September 10, 1998, and is almost equivalent to the highest amount of exercised options. On that day, there was also a USD 278 million discretionary and unanticipated sale of dollars.

**Table 3. Statistics of foreign exchange daily intervention in Mexico, August 1996-** **<u>June 2001.</u>**

||Average Amount (m.d.)|Dispersion (m.d.)|Max. (m.d.)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Put Options|235.8|97.10|500|
|Exercised Options|9.6|37.03|279|
|Sales|1.7|17.36|200|

17
Doss, Cheryl. 2013. “Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries.” _World Bank Research Observer_ 28 (Oxford University Press): 52–78.

Doss, Cheryl R., Carmen Diana Deere, Abena D. Oduro, and Hema Swaminathan. 2011. “The Gender Asset and Wealth Gaps: Evidence from Ecuador, Ghana, and Karhnataka, India.” Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.

_Economic Times._ 2021. “Maharashtra Offers 1% Stamp Duty Concession to Women Homebuyers.” March 8, 2021. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/maharashtra-budgetconcession-in-stamp-duty-for-women-increased-tax-on-liquor/articleshow/81393614.cms.

Goldstein, Markus, and Christopher Udry. 2008. “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 116 (6): 981–1022. doi:https://doi.org/10.1086/595561.

Grosch, K., and H. A. Rau. 2017. “Gender Differences in Honesty: The Role of Social Value Orientation.” _Journal of Economic Psychology_ 62: 258–67.

Harding, Michelle. 2020. “In Tax, Gender Blind Is Not Gender Neutral: Why Tax Policy Responses to COVID-19 Must Consider Women.” _Ecoscope_ , June 1, 2020. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/06/01/intax-gender-blind-is-not-gender-neutral-why-tax-policy-responses-to-covid-19-must-consider-women/.

_Hindustan Times._ 2021. “October Saw the Highest Ever Revenue Collection of Rs3,200cre from Stamp Duty: Balasaheb Thorat.” November 13, 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/punenews/october-saw-highest-ever-revenue-collection-of-rs3-200cr-from-stamp-duty-balasaheb-thorat101636819430276.html.

Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (JCCD). 2017. Annual Survey of India’s City-Systems. https://janaagraha.org/asics/report/ASICS-report-2017-fin.pdf.

Joshi, Anuradha, Jalia Kangave, and Vanessa van den Boogaard. 2020. “Gender and Tax Policies in the Global South.” K4D Helpdesk Report 817, IDS (Institute of Development Studies), Brighton, U.K.

<mark>Kangave, J</mark> alia, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa, and Patrick Lumala Zzimbe. <mark>2016. “Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: The Case of Uganda.” ICTD Working Paper 45,</mark> IDS (Institute of Development Studies), Brighton, U.K.

Lahoti, Rahul, and Hema Swaminathan. 2016. “Economic Development and Women's Labor Force Participation in India.” _Feminist Economics_ 22 (2): 168–95.

Mehra, R. 1995. “Women, Land and Sustainable Development.” ICRW Working Paper No. 1, 31
# **_C. Additional robustness tests_**

In this section, we present results from two additional strategies aimed at countering concerns of endogeneity from the selection of treatment and control countries that undertake CB reform – propensity score matching and the RZ methodology.

First, in columns (1) to (4) of Table 7, we present results from estimating the same specification as before (equation 2), but modifying the sample of control countries as a result of matching. The one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement reduces the number of control countries used from 14 to 8 in the Orbis data. The regressions make use of frequency weights to produce an overall sample that is analogous to having an equal number of treatment and control countries. A test of the balancing property shows that the balancing property of the estimated propensity score is satisfied, i.e., countries with the same propensity score have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independently of whether or not they undertake CB reform.<sup>26</sup> In estimating the propensity score, we impose the Common Support condition, which ensures that matching is only conducted over the overlapping region of the distributions of propensity score in the treated and untreated groups, thus ensuring that conditional on observed characteristics, the probability of undertaking a CB reform or not is nonzero.

The regressions results with matching are qualitatively identical to the unmatched results in Table 6 above. Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 show that the point estimates for the overall effect of the introduction of CB on job growth are slighter lower than earlier, as are the effects among SMEs and MSMEs. Increased access to finance resulting from the introduction of CBs

> 26 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that to ensure a bias reduction the propensity score should satisfy two important properties: _Balancing Property_ which ensures that given the propensity score, the treatment and observables are independent and the _Unconfoundedness Property_ which ensures that given the propensity score the treatment and the potential outcomes are independent. We use the Stata routine psmatch2 to estimate the propensity score and test the balancing property. Note that the unconfoundedness property cannot be tested.

25
on GDP and on GDP per capita in constant 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) USD.<sup>17</sup> We also use data on determinants of bilateral trade – distance, contiguity, common language and common colonizer - from CEPII described in Mayer and Zignago (2011).

# **4.1 Export-Sector Characteristics and Country Characteristics**

Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of the number of exporters, average exporter size, and concentration against both income and income per capita, using country-year level data averaged for the period 2006-2008.<sup>18</sup> The figure shows that larger as well as more developed economies have a larger number of exporters and larger average size of exporters, and richer countries have greater concentration at the top of the firm-size distribution.

Using the yearly data from 2004 to 2008, we next explore these relationships in more detail, controlling for sectoral variation in exports, variation within destinations, and sector-destination variation, in addition to controlling for year fixed effects in all specifications. The standard errors reported in all tables are clustered by country (the most conservative type of clustering possible).<sup>19</sup> Table 4 reports the results from regressing log total exports, log number of exporters, log average exporter size, and share of exports accounted for by the top 5 percent of firms on log GDP per capita and log GDP. Columns (1)-(4) report the results using the country-sector-year level data for years 2004 to 2008 and controlling for year and sector fixed effects. Accounting for sector fixed effects is key as some sectors exhibit much larger average exporter sizes than others, for example due to their higher capital intensity or degree of returns to scale, as shown by the

> 17  Results presented in Tables 4-7 and Appendix Tables A2.1-A2.2 are robust to the use of GDP and GDP per capita in current USD or in constant USD.

> 18 For simplicity, all figures present relationships based on data averaged for the period 2006-2008 instead of being based on all years of data but the patterns are the same whether averages or all years of data are used.

> 19 Our results are, however, robust to clustering standard errors by sector for the country-sector-year data, by destination for the country-destination-year data, and by sector-destination for the country-sector-destination-year data.

16