POLICY RESEARCH WORKfNG PAPER 1725

# Summary findings

Recent theory increasingly emphasizes the association of short-term debt with higher-quality firms and better incentives. The possibility of premature liquidation, for example, may serve as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance. At the same time the role of longterm debt, especially when it is heavily subsidized, is being rethought because so many development banks are plagued with nonperforming loans and doubts about the selection criteria used in allocating funds.

Jaramillo and Schiantarelli explore empirical evidence about the structure of debt maturity in Ecuadorean firms. They discuss how it has been affected by government intervention in credit markets, and by financial liberalization. Using firnm-level panel data, they investigate the determinants of access to long-term debt in Ecuador. Finally, they provide evidence about how the maturity structure of debt affects firms' performance, particularly productivity and capital accumtulation. They find that: Long-term debt is very unevenly distributed. Almost

- 30 percent of firms never have access to it during the

period studied.

- **L** arge firms are more likely to have access to long term debt than small firms. The former are on average more profitable.

- Conditional on size, operating profits do not increase the probability of receiving long-term credit and may actually decrease it. This suggests that the mechanism used to allocate long-term resources in Ecuador mav be flawed.

- The allocation problem was worse for directed credit. There is some evidenct that, after financial liberalization, the problem was less severe.

- There is a strong positive association between asset maturity and debt maturity, a matching of assets and liabilities.

- Shorter-term loans are not conducive to greater productivity while long-term loans may lead to inmprovements in productivity.

- While long-term loans may positively affect the quality of capital accumulation, they do not have an impact on the amount of fixed investment.

This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - was prepared for the conference "Firm Finance: Theory and Evidence," Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department, June 14, 1996. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget<sup>under</sup> research project "Term I Finance" (RPO 679-62).Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank,<sup>1818 H</sup> Street NW, Washington DC 20433-0001. Please contact Bill Moore, room N9-038, telephone 202-473-8526,<sup>fax</sup> 202-522-1155, internet address gmoorec@jworldbank.org. Februiary 1997. (39 pages) _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of uwork in progress to_ **_encourage_**<sup>**_the exchange_**</sup><sup>_of_</sup><sup>**_ideas about_**</sup> _development issues. An objective of the series_ **_is_** _to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations_<sup>_are less than fully polished. The_</sup> _papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions_<sup>_expressed in_</sup><sup>**_this_**</sup> _paper are entirely those of the authors._ **_7'hey_** _do not niecessarily represent the uiew of_ **_the_** _World_ **_Bank, its Executive_**<sup>**_Directors, or the_**</sup> _countries they represent._ 1'roduced by the Policy Recarch Dissemination C.cnter