rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%<br>Extractive industries 18% 17% 19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 15% 15% 13% 14% 12% 12% 11% 11%<br>80%<br>Utilities 18% 20% 20% 20% 19% 19% 21% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 25% 25% 25%<br>Construction<br>60%<br>Public administration<br>Manufacturing 40%<br>Services 59% 58% 57% 59% 61% 62% 61% 60% 59% 60% 60% 61% 60% 60% 61%<br>20%<br>Agriculture, forestry<br>and fishing<br>0%<br>2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** Authors’ élaboration based on the Enquête Nationale sur l’Emploi (ENE; Labor Force Survey)

Labor market outcomes in Morocco reflect a unique circumstance in which trade shocks came along with a decrease in FLFP<sup>7</sup> and a reduction in informality.<sup>8</sup> Over the past 15 years, both female and male labor force participation in Morocco decreased, in contrast to trends elsewhere following trade growth. At the same time, informality rates for both men and women decreased. These trends might be associated in part with policies promoting formalization but deterring female participation in specific sectors. Informality rates in top exporting sectors (Figure 2.11) are relatively low compared to the overall informality rate of 74 percent in 2018. At the same time, the female share of employment is higher in industries losing the most jobs (Figure 2.12) compared to the 23 percent female share of employment in 2018.

**Figure 2.11: Top exporting sectors have relatively lower informality rates** Percentage of workers

**Figure 2.12: Female share of employment in top job-losing industries is relatively higher**

Percentage of workers <!-- Start of picture text --> Manufacture of Chemicals 100.0% 100.0%<br>Machinery and Equipment 80.0% 80.0%<br>Motor vehicles<br>60.0% 60.0%<br>40.0% 40.0%<br>Agriculture<br>20.0% Textiles 20.0%<br>Apparel<br>0.0% 0.0%<br>2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018<br><!-- End of picture text --> 7 Defined as the active population (employed and unemployed women) divided by the working age female population.

8 Defined as the percentage of workers with access to social security.

8 | P a g e
WPS 3489

# **Environmental Factors and Children’s Malnutrition in Ethiopia**

# **Patricia Silva World Bank, Environment Department**

## **Abstract**

Ethiopia has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world. A considerable effort to monitor child malnutrition rates over the last two decades shows that, despite some improvements, approximately half of the children under five are still malnourished. Much of the burden of deaths resulting from malnutrition, estimated to be over half of childhood deaths in developing countries, can be attributed to just mild and moderate malnutrition. Several biological and social economic factors contribute to malnutrition. Using the 2000 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey data, this study examines the impact of access to basic environmental services, such as water and sanitation, on the probability children are stunted and underweight. The focus is on the impact of externalities associated with access to these services. We find that biological factors, such as child’s age and mother’s height, and social economic factors, such as household wealth and mother’s education, are important determinants of a child’s nutritional status. This is consistent with the findings of most studies in this literature. With respect to the environmental factors, we find that there are indeed significant externalities associated with access to water and sanitation at the community level. The external impacts of community level of access to these services are an important determinant of the probability a child is underweight. Our results also show that the external impact of access to water is larger for children living in rural areas.

## World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3489, January 2005

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

## **Acknowledgements**

We are grateful to the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development for generous financial support. Thanks also goes to Kirk Hamilton, Team Leader, Policy and Economics Team for his support, and to Harold Alderman, Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, Rama Chandra Reddy, Luc Christiaensen, and Limin Wang for useful discussion and valuable comments provided.
correlation between yearly flows and the end-of-year share invested in short-term assets. The second limitation to the documented correlation are the potential effects from confounding factors that might simultaneously affect flows and short-term holdings. To deal with this concern, sections 3.1 and 3.2 use a parametric approach to estimate the effect from outflows on portfolio holdings.

**Table 2. Correlation between short-term assets and fund flows (2005-2015)**

||**Across Fund**<br>**Providers**|**Across Portfolios***|**Benefit Payouts**|
|---|---|---|---|
|LAC||||
|Chile|0.53|0.58|0.00|
|Colombia|0.63|-0.36|-0.25|
|Costa Rica|0.23||-0.81|
|Mexico|0.80|0.45|-0.84|
|Peru|0.05|-0.31|0.14|
|EEC||||
|Estonia|0.46|-0.19|0.76|
|Romania|-0.07||-0.87|

Contemporaneous correlations between yearly fund flows and the share invested in short-term assets.

*Excludes the year of introduction of multi-funds.

The correlation between flows from switching portfolios and short-term assets is mixed among the sample countries. For instance, in Chile, short-term holdings are strongly related to transfers between portfolios. Colombia and Peru on the other hand, display a negative relation between short-term holdings and flows across portfolios. There are several potential explanations for the observed differences across countries. For example, switches between portfolios is indeed most common in Chile. Moreover, flows across portfolios in Chile are also clustered in time (Section 3.2) exerting significant pressure on fund managers to liquidate positions in order to accommodate large transfers in short periods of time (e.g. within days). In such case, mangers are more likely to hold cash or cash-like securities to meet redemption needs. Finally, some countries allow managers to transfer securities across portfolios to avoid transaction costs altogether. However, whether managers are able to transfer securities instead of cash depends on the structural differences across portfolios and their individual limits on each asset class.

In summary, the evidence suggests that discouraging excessive switching, whether is between pension providers or between portfolios, should allow fund managers to hold more long-term assets.

_3.1 Switching between pension systems: The case of Colombia_ This section studies the effects on the maturity structure of Colombian pension funds in response to outflows from transfers across pension systems. The analysis is based on monthly information of fund flows provided by the Colombian Association of Pension Fund Administrators (Asofondos) and portfolio transaction data from the Securities and Exchange Market during 2006-2015.

Colombian workers can choose between a DC system based on individual accounts, and a DB scheme managed by Colpensiones, a government-owned enterprise. Switching between systems is allowed up to one time every 5 years, except in the last 10 years before the retirement age (57 for women and 62 for men). When a worker switches from the DC to the DB system, the balance of the retirement account is transferred by the pension 16
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER **2323**

# **Summary findings**

Schmukler and Vesperoni investigate whether integration with global markets affects the financing choices of firms from East Asia and Latin America. Using firm-level data for the 1980s and 1990s, they study how leverage ratios, the structure of debt maturity, and sources of financing change when economies are liberalized and when firms gain access to international equity and bond markets.

The evidence shows that integration with world financial markets has uneven effects.

On the one hand, debt maturity for the average firm shortens when countries undertake financial liberalization.

On the other hand, domestic firms that actually participate in international markets get better financing opportunities and extend their debt maturity.

Moreover, firms in economies with deeper domestic financial systems are affected less by financial liberalization.

Finally, they show that leverage ratios increase during times of crisis.

In an appendix, they analyze the previously unstudied case of Argentina, which experienced sharp financial liberalization and was hit hard **by** all recent global crises.

This paper product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Fa Reseach Group **-** is part of a larger effort in the group to understand financial development and financial integration. Copies of the paper are available free from tie World Bank, **18 18** H Street NW, Washington, **DC** 20433. Please contact Emily Khine, room MC3 -341, telephone 202-473-7471, fax **202-522-3518,** email address kkhineCIworldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers. The authors may be contacted at sschmuklercsworldbank.org or verperolbaziwam.umd.edu. April 2000. **(67** pages) _The Policy Research WVorking Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about det,elop,nent issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names oflthe authors and should e cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent._ dvlpetadfnnainerto.CpeothpaearaalberefomheW l Produced **by** the Policy Research Dissemination Center
improving welfare, these services allow families to keep their kids in school even when faced with adverse shocks to family income. Similarly, theory suggests that financial development that boosts economic activity will stimulate the demand for labor, boosting earnings and providing a richer array of economic opportunities.

Theory is not unambiguous, however. In particular, financial development that operates on the intensive margin and improves the financial services available to rich individuals and well-established firms can reduce the equality of opportunity, perpetuate cross-dynasty relative income differences, and widen the distribution of income. While theory provides guidance on the potential mechanisms linking inequality and the operation of the financial system, many of the core questions about the nature of the relationship between inequality and finance are empirical.

While far from conclusive, an accumulating body of empirical evidence -- cross-country, cross-country firm level and industry level studies, policy experiments, as well as general equilibrium model estimations -- suggests that there is a strong beneficial effect of financial development on the poor and that poor households and smaller firms benefit more from financial development than rich individuals and larger firms. Empirical research suggests that an improvement in financial development expands economic opportunities, particularly for those whose opportunities had previously been tightly curtailed.

But how exactly do the poor and micro and small firms benefit from financial development? For households, evidence suggests that financial development facilitates consumption smoothing and investment in human capital accumulation. For firms, increased access to finance is associated with higher returns and better performance, supporting the beneficial impact of direct access to finance. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the indirect effects of finance on inequality are substantial. General equilibrium estimations, policy experiments, cross-country regressions, and other methods suggest that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the poor by expanding labor market opportunities. For micro and small firms, the indirect benefits of financial development are also significant. Small enterprises not only benefit from increased direct access, but also from the increased growth opportunities generated by financial development.

39
40 in the 17 firm sample. Our data from the 17 firm sample give a somewhat different picture than those of the Directorate of Labor in that (during the 1984-1986 period) the average growth of the base wage of laborers and unskiled workers is not much (if at all) higher than that of high level managers. This difference in findings suggests that occupational difri-rences in wage growth may have moderated in recent (1984-1986) years in comparison to the earlier (1974-1983) period.

Nevertheless, from Table 4.12 it is clear that, because of the relatively rapid growth of the supplements of the two higher skill groups (especially the high-level managers), the average growth of total compensation has in recent years been substantially higher for the upper level technicians and middle to high level managers than for the two lowest skill groups-17.76 percent a year compared to 3.5 percent a year. Hence, our data from the subsample of 17 firms suggest that in the 1984-1986 period, the total compensation of the highest category of labor was keeping abreast of the cost of living whle that of the low level worker was falling behind.

_4.4.3 Evolution of Total Compensaion by National and Skill Groups_ Table 4.13 presents data from the large (80-enterprise) sample on the average compensation of the three National groups within four skill categoris- r i i980, 1984, and 1985. The data reflect the total cnmpensation of employees (including employer social security contnbutions) as reported by employers in the 80 sampled firms. In contrast to the 17-firm sample, these data come from employer records and they cover a longer time period as well as a larger group of employees. Like the data from the 17-firm sample, the 80 firm data in Table 4.13 indicate that total employee compensation has not risen as rapidly as the cost of living in the 1980s.

Table 4.13 also provides information about differentials in total compensation among the three national groups. The table demonstrates that the growth in the compensation of different categories of workers was not uniform across the national groups. The compensation of non-African employees has outstripped that of Senegalese and other African employees in almost every category and has thus slightly increased the substantial differentials between the compensation of non-Africans and
both to overcome market failures and to exploit its monopoly power on highquality (“Bourbon”) vanilla.

Thus, put in historical perspective the argument for reform was not a welfare one, as transparent cooperation between all domestic agents would have been ―taking the market-failure arguments at face value and putting the political environment’s realities aside― Madagascar’s first best. Instead, the argument was essentially (i) a comparison of second-bests and (ii) of a distributional nature.

It was a comparison of second-bests because the pre-reform state of play was very far from the cooperative optimum, as the marketing board simultaneously expropriated vanilla farmers through very low farmgate prices while setting the FOB price substantially above even the static revenue-maximizing level (de Melo et al., 2001). The marketing board’s irrational behaviour implied that the argument for reform was to relace the unsustainable over-exploitation of a dwindling market power by its under-exploitation in an imperfect-competition equilibrium on the domestic intermediation market.

The distributional aspect of the argument involved the redistribution of rents from urban elites (intermediaries and political beneficiaries) toward farmers. However even at this high level of simplicity the argument was less than straightforward as vanilla-growing farmers, although poor in absolute terms, were relatively high up in the distribution of rural incomes. So ironically reform, if successful, had the potential to _widen_ rural income inequality (although, according to our results, it did not).

We attempt in this paper to trace the reform’s effects on rural incomes through a two-pronged strategy. First, we look at price, quantity and income-distribution statistics in the vanilla region. It turns out that the statistically traceable impact is negligible for several reasons. First, the data is obviously spotty and the sample of vanilla farmers is small. Second, volatility in world prices is so large that it drowns the faint signal from the reform.

This observation prompted us to complement the household-based appraisal with a counterfactual experiment in which we compare the current equilibrium with what would be obtained, ceteris paribus, with current market conditions but under the old export-monopoly-cum-export-tax regime. For this, we use a simple simulation model of the vanilla market in which two countries (Madagascar and 4
SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 6. Sudan’s spending needs for regional, national, rural, and urban connectivity**

||**Road length in go**<br>**(km)**|**od condition**<br>|**Spendin**<br>Exand|**g needs ($ mil**<br>Urade|**lion per year o**<br>Imrove|**ver a 10-year peri**|**od)**|As share|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Mode|**Actual**|**Required**|p<br>capacity|pg<br>category|p<br>condition|Maintenance|Total|<br>of GDP (%)|
||**Basic scenario**||||||||
|National|874|5,372|0|213|23|123|360|1.7|
|Regional|2,010|2,893|189|84|38|129|440|2.1|
|UAI|50|4,226|222|20|5|15|262|1.2|
|RAI|—|34,201|0|310|33|122|466|2.2|
|Total|2934|46,692|411|627|99|390|1,528|7.2|
|**Pragmatic s**|**cenario**||||||||
|National|874|5,372|0|160|3|119|282|1.3|
|Regional|2,010|2,893|113|33|4|117|268|1.3|
|UAI|50|1,839|63|17|5|15|100|0.5|
|RAI||34,201|0|116|2|258|376|1.8|
|Total|2,934|44,305|176|326|13|509|1,025|4.8|

_Source:_ Adapted from Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray (2009). _Note:_ RAI = Rural Accessibility Index ; UAI = Urban Accessibility Index

# Ports

## **Achievements**

The Sudanese Port Authority (SPC) has used its large revenues to invest in infrastructure improvements at Port Sudan. The SPC revenue per ton of throughput increased by 47 percent in dollar terms between 2000 and 2005. A combination of a higher realization per tonne handled and large increases in throughput has led to the generation of substantial surpluses. Information from the mid-2000s suggests that the SPC invested around $187 million in development projects. This resulted in the main areas being in good condition with a

**Figure 10. Port Sudan faces serious congestion problems**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 150%<br>125%<br>100%<br>75%<br>50%<br>25%<br>0%<br>Source: AICD ports database.<br>reported capacity<br>Ratio of current demand to<br>Cotonou Cape Town Luanda Port Sudan Douala Dar es Salaam Mombasa<br><!-- End of picture text --> number of new berths added and infrastructure projects commissioned. The SPC enjoys a monopoly in its role as the country’s main node for maritime trade, and its revenues appear high relative to the number of ships using the port and the volume of cargo it handles (World Bank 2008).

> <sup>17</sup>
leading up to displacement and how they evolved after. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the 1,116 households that were interviewed at least once in the six months leading up to displacement and surveyed at least once in the month of displacement or the following year. These displaced households were surveyed an average of 10.4 times over the course of the survey, with a minimum of two interviews and a maximum of 38. Figure 1 reports the number of households surveyed by month surrounding displacement. The highest number of interviews were in the month of displacement (932) and the month before displacement (757), while the number of household interviews declines for months further before or after displacement.<sup>14</sup> In addition to reflecting a large displacement crisis, the data further illustrate the dire food security situation just prior to displacement. Figure 2 demonstrates that the average FCS of households that later become displaced was stable for the six months prior to displacement and was between 46 and 49, which is significantly below the preconflict average; and the average rCSI was between 20 and 21, which also represents a significant increase from prior to the conflict.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, these averages for displaced households are lower than the average for non-displaced households in the same WFP survey (e.g., WFP 2019), which is consistent with a number of other data sources (e.g., FAO 2017; IPC 2017; World Bank 2017b; etc.).

However, it is difficult to attribute these patterns to the impacts of displacement alone and the difference is difficult to interpret. For example, if large changes in the humanitarian situation were causing a significant amount of migration, it could be the case that households that never became displaced might have been exposed to significant changes in the humanitarian situation that displaced households were able to avoid. Alternatively, even if forced displacement was only driven by violence, the difference in food access between displaced and non-displaced households could still be attributable to pre-displacement characteristics. Violence could tend to be concentrated closer to poorer households, or it might be the case that households without significant assets to lose

> 14 Results are qualitatively identical when we include additional observations either a year before or after displacement; however, given the rapid decrease in sample sizes, the precision of the estimates and the power of hypothesis tests decrease significantly.

> 15See Appendix 3 for pre-conflict FCS and rCSI for the population.

11