rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
examples of models where such beliefs and attitudes play a key role in generating multiple equilibria with very different objective economic characteristics.

Second, there is a widespread normative view that inequality of opportunity matters for the design of public policy, since only differences due to opportunities should be the object of compensation by the state. This is the view in Arneson (1989), Roemer (1998) and Peragine (2004), to mention but a few. Third, it has also been suggested that inequality of opportunity might be a more relevant concept (than income inequality) for understanding whether aggregate economic performance is worse in more unequal societies (and if so, why). In addition to the role of beliefs and attitudes to redistribution, it is possible that the kinds of inequality that are detrimental to growth (such as inequality in access to good schools, or to financial markets) are more closely associated with the concept of opportunities, while other components of outcome inequality – such as those arising from differential returns to effort – may actually have a positive effect on growth (World Bank, 2006; Bourguignon et al. 2007). Perhaps one of the reasons why the crosscountry empirical literature on inequality and growth is so inconclusive is that it conflates the two kinds of inequality.<sup>3</sup> But in order to make any empirical use of the concept of inequality of opportunity, whether in the design of taxation and public expenditures or in the study of the determinants of cross-country growth differences, it is first necessary to measure it. Some progress in that direction has been made. Bourguignon et al. (2003, 2007) parametrically estimate inequality of opportunity for various cohorts in Brazil, in 1996. Checchi and Peragine (2005) apply a non-parametric decomposition to measure inequality of opportunity for both income and educational achievement in Southern and Northern Italy.<sup>4</sup> Lefranc et al. (2006) use stochastic dominance rankings to compare the degree of inequality of opportunity among a set of OECD countries.<sup>5</sup> Barros et al. (2008) associate inequality of opportunity for children with unequal access to a set of basic services, and compute indices for a set of countries in Latin America. Cogneau et al.

> 3 See Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003).

> 4 See also Cogneau and Gignoux (2007), on earnings in Brazil.

> 5 See also Hild and Voorhoeve (2004) on the philosophical implications of using stochastic dominance criteria for evaluating the extent of inequality of opportunity.

3
Table 6: Robustness Checks – Fixed Effects

||FE1|FE2|
|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|
|Estimate|0.013|0.013|
||(0.059)|(0.058)|
|Contract|-.035|-.034|
||(0.077)|(0.077)|
|Length>than 50km|-.139<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.041)|-.139<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.041)|
|ACD Confict||0.195<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.116)|
|ACD Post-Confict||0.069<br>(0.106)|
|Foreign frm or JV|0.189<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.102)|0.186<sup>_∗_</sup><br>(0.103)|
|World Bank|-.108<br>(0.096)|-.104<br>(0.095)|
|Bilateral Donor|0.081|0.081|
||(0.138)|(0.138)|
|Obs.|3322|3322|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.909|0.909|

_Notes_ : Dependent variable is the log of cost per km; all models control for work activity fixed effects, year fixed effects, an interaction between work type and five-year period fixed effects and region fixed effects; base categories are actual costs; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country;<sup>_∗_</sup> ,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> ,<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.

35
LIBERIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 19. Liberia has done relatively well at capturing private investment in infrastructure**

# Power ICT Transport Water

Note: Average annual private sector commitments to infrastructure projects for the period 2002/07. Source: Derived from World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, 2008.

There is also scope for integrating national infrastructure development with substantial privately funded infrastructure development by concessionaires. A number of large multinational companies are taking on the country’s numerous mineral, forestry, and agricultural concessions and will need to invest heavily in the necessary transport and energy platforms to support their operations. It is estimated that power demand from mining, natural resources, and agriculture could climb to 1,000 mega-watts by 2040, about 84 percent of it associated with mining (table 17). A recent study by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs estimates that mining sector investments over the coming years could amount to around $5 billion in railways and $1 billion in power. Liberia has a policy of ensuring that such investments are done in such a way as to benefit the broader national economy, avoiding the formation of enclaves with high quality infrastructure that are insulated from and fail to benefit the broader economy. In the case of transport investments, a principle of open access to roads, railways, and ports developed by private concessionaires has been established, and this will help to ensure that these assets become integrated with the national transport network.

In the case of power, similar issues arise but their resolution is more complex due to the absence of a transmission grid to integrate private power development with the national system. In principle, both the country and concessionaires could benefit from coordinated development of larger, more cost-effective power generation options (including power imports). Capturing these benefits will require a clear national energy plan that explicitly provides for the inter-connection of Monrovia, the key power generation sites, the key mining sites, and the West Africa Power Pool. Private power development could then be required to be consistent with the national plan.

34
151. HKTDC Research. Prospects for the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park and Kuantan Port. HKTDC.com. s.l. : Hong Kong Trade Development Council, May 16, 2017.

152. Smyth, Jamie. Australia port project highlights schism over Chinese investment. FT.com. Darwin, Australia : Financial Times, July 17, 2017.

153. Murray, Lisa. Chinese-owned Darwin Port struggling to pay back debts. AFR.com. s.l. : Financial Review, July 17, 2018.

154. L.G. What is the Northern Sea Route? Economist.com. [Online] The Economist, September 24, 2018. https://www.economist.com/the-economistexplains/2018/09/24/what-is-the-northern-sea-route.

155. Louppova, Julia. Russia to build a new deep-sea port in the north. Port.today. [Online] Port Today, June 19, 2018. https://port.today/russia-build-new-deep-portnorth/.

156. Xinhua. Norway's Arctic town envisions gateway on Polar Silk Road with link to China. China.org.cn. s.l. : China Internet Information Center, March 10, 2018.

157. Lifang. Feature: Norway's Arctic town envisions gateway on Polar Silk Road with link to China . XinhuaNet.com. [Online] Xinhua, March 10, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029125.htm.

77
policies and delivering services. Modules available from the literature to measure integrity, altruism, cognition, risk-aversion, personality traits, and public service motivation, were administered to 1,357 district bureaucrats and 770 district politicians. Administrative data available on the implementation of nationally mandated public health programs serve as a measure of productivity of the district organization. These data reveal that the integrity of politicians is a robust predictor of district productivity in delivering health services. The size of the correlation is substantively large: a 1 standard deviation higher average integrity among local politicians is associated with a 0.2 to 0.4 standard deviation higher measure of performance in health service delivery. In terms of concrete indicators of health coverage, an increase of 1 s.d. in the average integrity of politicians is correlated with a 4.4 percentage point increase in child delivery at government facilities (9% increase at the mean); a 4.7 p.p. increase in share of households with latrines (6.2% at the mean); a 3.8 p.p. increase in share of pregnant women preventively treated for malaria (6.7% at the mean) and a 2.8 p.p. increase in pregnant women having at least 4 antenatal care visits (8.2% at mean).

In contrast to the correlation with political quality, we find no significant correlation of service delivery with measures of electoral competition such as the concentration of vote shares of competing candidates and the margin of victory. At the same time, we find that political integrity tends to be higher in places where there is greater electoral competition. This is suggestive evidence that competition can play a role through improving selection (such as, by enabling the election of politicians of higher integrity) rather than through incentives alone. Our results are consistent with other research that incentives generated by electoral competition may play an ambiguous role in public service delivery.<sup>3</sup> Our evidence also brings into the fore a hitherto neglected reason why quality (selection) of politicians might matter beyond incentives – because public sector bureaucracies are complex orga-

> 3Other research has cast doubt on the role of electoral incentives in improving outcomes. For example, political incentives to seek re-election can distort the allocation of public funds from what a benevolent social planner would choose (Finan and Mazzocco, 2017). Political parties can respond to greater electoral pressures by fielding criminals as candidates (Aidt, Golden and Tiwari, 2015), or by increasing vote-buying (Cruz, Keefer and Labonne, 2016; Khemani, 2015), rather than by improving services. Afridi et al (2017) provide both theory and consistent evidence that corruption in developing countries can increase with electoral competition. Consistent with our results, Grossman and Michelitch (2018) find that Ugandan local politicians do _not_ respond to increased incentives (through a transparency intervention) in competitive constituencies by improving service delivery.

2
Table A7 : Comparison of present value of alternative gas subsidies

||**Natural Gas**|**LPG**|
|---|---|---|
|Annual subsistence consumption<br>(kcal)|4,650,000<br>(equivalente a 500m<sup>3</sup>)|4,650,000<br>(equivalente a 391 kg)|
|Price before tax (A$)|0.153/m<sup>3</sup>|1.68/kg|
|Annual expenditure (A$)|$123|$658|
|PV of annual expenditure (A$)|$937|$5,006|
|Connection costs (A$)|$1,326-$2,026||
|PV of subsidy (A$)|$1,326-$2,026|$4,069|

Note: PV- present value at 15% discount rate 59
38. For the United States, it has been estimated that US$165,000 worth of manufacturing exports in 2008 supported one job (U.S. Department of Commerce 2010). The OECD estimates that on average US$60,975 worth of manufacturing exports correspond to one job. These estimates suggest that closing the infrastructure gap in developing countries could create between 1.1 and 2.9 million jobs in advanced economies. While these figures might seem small when compared to total unemployment in advanced economies, they would constitute a significant increase in manufacturing jobs. In the U.S., exports currently support 2.7 million manufacturing jobs, and President Obama’s National Export Initiative aims at creating 2 million new jobs in the United States over the next five years by increasing exports.<sup>27</sup> The proposed global infrastructure investment initiative could significantly support this objective.<sup>28</sup> 39. Of course, these calculations are based on simple correlations. Ultimately the effect of infrastructure investments on exports and employment will vary across countries and sectors, and will differ depending on the technology used, the possible substitution effects, and the future changes in global trade patterns. Capital goods, for example, are increasingly produced in developing countries, particularly in China. As wages in China rise and as technology progresses, Chinese exporters are moving up the value chain. China’s global export market share of construction equipment has increased more than twofold from 4.4 percent in 2005 to 10.2 percent in 2010. In 2011, China may overtake Japan and Germany in construction equipment exports (EIU 2011). Most of the cranes, tractors and steam turbines from China go to developing countries. In general, low-income countries tend to import as much in capital goods from other developing countries, in particular from China, as from high-income countries (Table 1).

40. A good example is power generation, which is a highly capital intensive form of infrastructure investment. Estimates from different types of power plants in India indicate that more than 60 percent and sometimes up to 90 percent of the cost estimates of turn-key power plants and substations are related to a few key mechanical devices, such as turbines and

> 27 The National Export Initiative (NEI) was created on March 11, 2010, by Executive Order.

> 28 Of course, infrastructure investments will also create jobs in the developing countries where these investments take place. Schwartz et al. (2009) find that investments in energy tend to have low short-term impact on employment. creating sometimes no more than 1,000 jobs per US$1 billion spent. To the contrary, water and sanitation can create up to 100,000 annual direct and indirect jobs and road maintenance projects more than 250,000.

17
# **Appendix I. Sampling design of Taobao Village Survey**

In 2017, 2,118 Taobao Villages were reported to exist in China. The Taobao Village Survey uses a stratified sampling design to obtain a nationally representative sample of 100 villages. The 2,118 villages are first ranked according to their annual sales, then divided into five strata, and within each stratum 20 villages were selected randomly. Specifically, the strata are defined as follows:

- Stratum 1 includes the 20 Taobao Villages with the highest annual sales. All 20 villages in this stratum are selected with certainty.

- Stratum 2 includes 80 villages that rank from the 21st to the 100th Taobao Villages in the annual sales ranking. Within these 80 villages, 20 villages are selected randomly.

- Stratum 3 includes the next 200 villages in the annual sales ranking. Twenty villages are selected randomly, each with probability of 0.1.

- Stratum 4 includes the next 500 villages in the annual sales ranking. Twenty villages are selected randomly, each with probability of 0.04.

- Stratum 5 includes the remaining 1,318 villages. Twenty villages are selected, each with probability of 20/1318.

After the first round of listing, due to refusal of interviews and inability to get in contact, 14 villages (8 in stratum 2, 3 in stratum 3, 2 in stratum 4, 1 in stratum 1) are further selected into the sample as replacements. At the end, 80 villages complete the interviews, 12 villages from stratum 1, 18 from stratum 2, 18 from stratum 3, 14 from stratum 4, and 18 from stratum 5.

The area of each selected village was then divided into a grid with equal sizes and estimated number of households within each grid. For large villages, we randomly select grids to do households listing. For small villages, all households are listed. Ten e-households and 10 none-households are randomly selected from the listing.

Sampling weights are calculated as the inverse of the product of non-response rate and the probability of being selected from the population.

28
paid work, more homework time, increase in grade 8 enrolment<sup>5</sup> and more pay incentives for teachers. The coefficients component for the covariates used in the model is towards an overtime decrease in both the mathematics and science scores; however, a large effect associated with changes in the constants is the main contributor to the over-time increase in TIMSS scores in Ghana.

Table 4a: Detailed decomposition of change in the 8<sup>th</sup> <u>grade Mathematics score at the Mean</u>

|Mean prediction for 2003: 281.2<br>Mean prediction for 2007: 316.6|**Characteristics**|**Coefficients**|**Total Change**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Total change**|**12.27**<br>**(9.6)**|**23.19**<br>**(14.5)**|**35.46**<br>**(23.1)**|
|**Characteristics component**||||
|Student and household characteristics||||
|Age|-0.99|-0.28|-1.27|
|Gender of student|-0.02|0.03|0.01|
|Speaks/not speak test language at home|0.05|0.29|0.34|
|Calculator at home|0.20|-0.04|0.16|
|Desk at home|0.00|-1.80|-1.80|
|Works/Not in paid job<br>|2.90|0.18<br>|3.08|
|Homework time|1.22|1.85|3.07|
|Highest education of parent|-0.45|-1.62|-2.07|
|Both parents born/not born in country<br>|0.46|0.43<br>|0.89<br>|
|Books at home|0.10|-0.16|-0.06|
|**Total**|**3.47**|**-1.12**|**2.35**|
|School characteristics||||
|Total enrolment, grade 8|3.29|-5.79|-2.50|
|Community size|0.06|-1.76|-1.70|
|Proportion of disadvantaged students|-0.16|2.18|2.02|
|Ability grouping yes/no|-0.07|0.86|0.79|
|Remedial lesson in Math Yes/no|0.04|0.91|0.95|
|Severe absenteeism in school yes/no|0.68|4.50|5.18|
|Shortage of buildings yeas/no|0.53|-0.14|0.39|
|Shortage of teachers yeas/no|0.00|0.17|0.17|
|Index of good attendance|-1.12|-3.18|-4.30|
|**Total**|**3.25**|**-2.25**|**1.00**|
|Teacher characteristics||||
|Teacher age|0.41|-2.55|-2.96|
|Teacher gender|0.66|-0.40|0.26|
|Teacher years of experience|0.08|-11.02|-10.94|
|<br>Teacher education|0.40|-3.25|-2.85|
|Teacher certificate yes/no|1.60|-0.26|1.34|
|Teacher feels safe/not safe|0.09|6.10|6.19|
|Teacher satisfaction|0.15|-1.98|-1.83|
|Pay incentives for teachers yes/no|2.16|-5.87|-3.71|
|<br>**Total**|**5.55**|**-19.23**|**-14.50**|
|**Constant**|**-**|**45.80**|**45.80**|
|**N**||11,892||
|**2003:**||5,100||
|**2007:**||6,792||

z-values in parentheses.

> 5 Results show that higher enrolment is associated with higher scores in Ghana.

22
number of firm-product-destination-year observations by about 800. Finally, given that we are interested in learning about Costa Rican firm dynamics in export activities, we received data from Procomer that excluded the observations corresponding to sets of products, namely infusion and transfusion equipment and electronic components for microprocessors. These products contributed a huge share to total merchandise exports during the sample period (over 26 percent of the total) and were dominated by the exports to a single firm in each sector.

Table 3 describes the main features of the resulting data set. Regarding export growth, the resulting data shows a weaker performance than the aggregate export data presented in Figure 1. The year 1998 remains an outlier with a real growth rate of 29 percent, even after excluding the aforementioned product categories.<sup>3</sup> This year was also an outlier in the aggregate export data. In the remaining years, the real export growth rates were rather mediocre when compared to the aggregate data, with negative real growth rates during the years of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999, the beginning of the U.S. slowdown in 2000-2001, and the incorporation of China as a full member of the World Trade Organization in 2001. Thereafter the real export growth rates were positive but modest, except in 2006 when it reached 10 percent.

The most striking feature of the data, however, is the low number of firms that reported exports in every year during 1997-2007, which were 554. This is a mere 6.2 percent of the total number of firms that appear in the sample during the eleven years. The number of continuing products, measured either at the 6- or 10-digit product categories, is also small relative to the total number of products exported at any time during this period (27.6 and 15.5 percent, respectively). The difference between these ratios also indicates that the level of aggregation of the product categories affects the accounting of the contribution of the new products. In contrast, the number of export destinations was relatively constant over time, and over 46 percent of destinations were serviced every year. Overall, the cleaned data suggest that the rate of turnover of exporting firms and products is quite high, with very few continuing firms and products, the latter being sensitive to the product nomenclature.

> 3 It is noteworthy that these excluded export products appeared in 1998.

6
From the population FOC in  (equation (19)) we have Using 1 = 2 In the Appendix we show that taking logs and differentiating with respect to time gives us the law of motion of population in  : From the FOC with respect to  (equation 25) we have But since we have Dividing both sides by 1 and using (25) we get This condition states that the planner sets the net marginal benefit of the public good  equal to the net opportunity cost of investment not used in the capital good. It is important to notice that this condition was not present in the decentralized equilibrium.

13
delays and illegal costs when they are not properly managed. Along the Northern Corridor, trucks can wait a day at the first weighbridge after Mombasa and truckers often bribe the weighbridge operators to go through it.

# _Mandatory Transit-Related Procedures_

These include bonds or guarantees, compulsory transport of customs documents, escorts, transit fees and compulsory insurances. Many transit related mandatory fees are overpriced and, in some cases unjustified and akin to rents (for instance, the various documents issued by freight organizations, transit documents of the Chambers of Commerce and compulsory insurance schemes). Some additional services in the public administration in landlocked countries may also add to costs. In Rwanda, Magasins Généraux du Rwanda had, until 2006, a monopoly for warehousing and added between three to five days to the clearance process, while collecting 4% of the goods value as a fee (3% directly in favor of the government’s budget, 1% as a cost recovery fee).

# _Agency Costs (freight forwarders)_

Transit logistics for many landlocked countries also tend to increase the rate charged by freight forwarders. In some cases in Central Africa, these rates may add 30% in overheads. The procedural complexity and multi-step processes imply that each shipment requires attention, staff, and costly intervention otherwise unnecessary in a seamless transit environment. Fixed operational cost (office and staff, including expatriate) become very significant on corridors where the number of shipment is low. On some corridors, weak competition means higher margin for high quality services.

# _Magnitude of Transit Overheads for LLDCs_

Overhead is seldom disentangled from transportation costs. So far, only facilitation payments at roadblocks have received attention from policy makers and trade facilitation advocates. The reason for the knowledge gap is the limited incentives for agencies and operators to be transparent in their cost breakdown. Even World Bank trade facilitation audits have not so far provided consistent information in that respect. While rent seeking mentality and facilitation payments are common in all regions, the degree of proliferation 35
_5_ other debtor countries? Why should the developing country debt market be affected by these spillovers? And why should it be more affected than the industrial countries debt market? What can we learn on traders' behavior in the Brady bond market?

**Mexico and Poland, Discount Bonds**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2000<br>18004<br>1600<br>* 1400<br>1200<br>CL<br>ft 800<br>600<br>400<br>200<br>0 11H1 ,H111111,111++ 1 +++l 1111111 1HHH li H+t+HHH<br>Time (7129194 to 7112196)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> NEX~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)DIS<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Figure 3_

**Mexico and Poland, Par Bonds**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2000 T<br>1800-A<br>1600<br>* 1400<br>e 1200 POLR -<br>iooo<br>a.800<br>600<br>400 -<br>200<br>Time (7129194 to 7112196)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Figure 4_