rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
10 to its nearest SAI. All distance computations used in constructing the distribution network are based on rectilinear distance.

The HCPM incorporates a number of explicit optimization routines in both the distribution and feeder algorithms. It selects the appropriate feeder technology (fiber, digital T-1 on copper, or analog copper) on the basis of cost minimization subject to engineering constraints defined by user inputs. The model also selects loop electronics by examining every feasible combination of large and small terminals and selecting the costminimizing outcome. In the feeder network, the model optimally determines whether to splice two fiber cables or run multiple cables at each junction point. All technology decisions are made on the basis of life cycle costs, based on a table of technology specific annual cost factors.

In this way, the loop design module determines the total investment required for an optimal distribution and feeder network by building loop plant to the designated customer locations represented by populated microgrid cells.

# Applicability"<sup>1</sup>

A key concern in developing countries is the importance of ensuring that the poor users or regions get access to services. These concerns are typically built in through the inclusion of service obligations in the concession or other types of privatization contracts signed between the governments and the private operators. The main challenge for the regulators is to ensure that the financing requirements claimed by the operators do not result in excess profits or grossly inefficient cross subsidies. An independent cost modeling approach can be a significant advantage in addressing this concern. For lowincome build-out programs and universal service initiatives, the unbiasedness property thwarts the 'cost-plus' inefficiency inherent in using accounting costs, since cash outlays are not based on monetary claims under the recipient's control. Because the HCPM approach involves economic optimization, the programs will be delivered at a lower cost (or level of subsidy) than the alternatives when comparable input values are used. The following table compares the HCPM with the more traditional accounting approach.

" More on the topics in the remainder of this Section can be found in Sharkey et al. (1999).
_21_ _Ways Out of Povertv - Diffusinz Best Practices and Creatiniz Capabilities_ manufacturing sectors in Mexico shows in each sector that some firms add value while some barely contribute and others destroy value.<sup>50</sup> The average productivity of firms in different sectors in India varies substantially, and remains significantly below best practice (figure 12).

**Competition and the dispersion of productivity.** In general, bringing average practice closer to best practice is of enormous value for wealth creation. Individual firms often have similar opportunities to learn and improve, but fail to do so for the reasons given above. Competition turns out to be the key to bringing average practice closer to best practice. Hence competition is a key part of the diffusion mechanism for best practice. A number of studies support this for countries such as Brazil, India, Korea, Japan, Russia and Thailand.<sup>5</sup> "

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 12: Indla - Current and potential labor productivity<br>(Indexed to US, 1998 = 100)<br>Current productivity Expected productivity in 2010<br>Software 44 Software 85<br>Retal barking Ml 12 Reai bwig 62<br>Reail iN 12 Retail 32<br>io.ising cornstruction i 15<br>Powr T&D Housing construtlon 28<br>Power Geneatlon 9 Power T80 9<br>Telecom 25 Power Generation 52<br>Appard 26 Telecom 100<br>Wheat miling 7 Apparel at 65<br>Daityprocessing is 16<br>Autonotiveasseibly 24<br>Steel i 11 Daltyprocessing 46<br>Automotive assem'bly 78<br>Sted 1 7<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Figures for expected productivity are derived on the assumption that all productivity barriers are removed. Most of the productivity improvements are expected to come from rationalizing the workforce, improving the organizadon of funcUons and tasks and investing in viable assets. Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2001).

Entry and exit patterns. The key element in competition is the freedom to enter the market and to fail. Free entry means that exit from markets must be possible for substandard enterprises. Where inefficient but politically well-connected firms are sustained through protection or subsidies by governments or through bail-outs by

> _50_ Harberger, 1998.

> **5'** Driemeier, 2001; McKinsey Global Institute, various years.
|**Table 1: Descript**|**ion of Main Variables**|
|---|---|
|**Variable name**|**Description of variable**|
|_Employment Growth_(log difference, %,<br>annual)|<br>Log of the total number of permanent full-time<br>workers at the firm in the final year (last fiscal<br>year) minus the log of the total number of<br>permanent full-time workers at the firm in the<br>initial year (beginning of the growth period<br>which is 2 fiscal years ago for most countries<br>and 3 fiscal years ago for other countries). The<br>log difference is then divided by the number of<br>years between the initial and final year and the<br>multiplied by 100 to covert to percentage<br>terms.<br>Source:<br>Enterprise<br>Surveys.<br>|
||www.enterprisesurveys.org|
|_Employment Growth_1|Total number of permanent full-time workers<br>in the final year (last fiscal year) minus the<br>same in the initial year (beginning of the<br>growth period which is 2 fiscal years ago for<br>most countries and 3 fiscal years ago for other<br>countries) divided by the average (mean<br>value) number of permanent workers in the<br>final and initial year. The ratio is divided by<br>the number of years between the final and<br>initial year and multiplied by 100 to convert<br>to percentage terms.<br>Source: Enterprise Surveys.<br>|
||www.enterprisesurveys.org|
|Informal Competition (Country level cell<br>average)|Proportion of firms in the country excluding<br>the firm in question that report competing<br>against informal firms.<br>Source: Enterprise Surveys.<br>www.enterprisesurveys.org|
|Initial Employment (logs)|Log of total number of permanent full-time<br>workers at the firm in the initial year<br>(beginning of the growth period which is 2<br>fiscal years ago for most countries and 3 fiscal<br>years ago for other countries).<br>Source:<br>Enterprise<br>Surveys.<br>www.enterprisesurveys.org|
|GDP per capita (lagged, logs)|Log of GDP per capita lagged by 2 years from<br>the fiscal year covered by the Enterprise. GDP<br>per capita values are in constant 2011<br>International Dollars and PPP adjusted. In<br>cases where the Enterprise Survey spanned<br>more than one calendar year, the GDP per|

37
the motivation for the bulk of transactions in securities markets has implications for revenue also.

# (iii)  Transactions taxes and complex derivatives

Following the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market and its knock-on effects on the rest of World’s financial and economic systems, asset price volatility has been somewhat overshadowed as a target for policy by comparison with imprudent or reckless lending and especially the use of over-complex financial derivatives as a means of apparently reducing risk while actually increasing it. Regulation of contract types and agent reward structures has been the focus of much policy attention here, but a tax solution – even if partial – could also be considered. The question is, what workable tax rule could be brought into play as a useful complement to regulation, by adapting incentive structures so as to ensure that they better aligned to social welfare in this area, and hence act as corrective taxes, reducing the adverse impact of market failures?

# _2.3 Revenue_

The financial sector has long been a reliable revenue source for governments – even though from time-to-time (as at present) bank failure events have triggered large fiscal outlays to limit depositor losses and protect the smooth functioning of the payments system. Revenue raising has been the objective of most of the financial transactions taxes that have been brought into effect, especially the bank debit taxes of Latin America.

# (i) Revenue from CTT

As mentioned above, the Tobin CTT tax was originally conceived of as a corrective tax, but it has increasingly been seen as a suitable revenue source for development assistance.<sup>7</sup> Because of the concentration of foreign exchange trading in just a few international financial centers (according to the latest BIS survey, fully three-quarters of

> 7 The influential Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development (http://www.leadinggroup.org), which was founded “after the Paris Ministerial Conference on Innovative Development Financing Mechanisms in 2006” and comprises 55 countries, together with IFIs (including the World Bank) and NGOs, has been looking at the CTT, and notes that it would generate “stable and predictable flows.” France and Belgium have already committed to the adoption of a CTT provided all of the other member states of the EU also adopt one.

9
environmental factors are contextual and very much depend on the agroclimatic setting of the villages. In this case, simply regressing indebtedness as a measure of welfare on household-, program-, and community- level variables using cross-sectional data would be biased in estimating what influences the degree of indebtedness. Panel surveys, especially long panel surveys, are useful in estimating the causal effects of these supply- and demand-side factors on the level of indebtedness.<sup>12</sup> This is what we discuss below.

To estimate the net effects of both demand- and supply-side variables on indebtedness, consider the following indebtedness outcomes ( _Yijt_ ) of _i-_ th household living in _j-_ th village in period _t_ : where α measures the effects of demand-side variables ( _X_ ), including household-level program participation in a microfinance program, and ρ measures the effects of supply-side variables ( _B_ ), such as the presence of MFIs and commercial banks in the village as well as community-level variables including weather shocks. Also, η _ijt_ represents household-level time-varying heterogeneity, μ _jt_ represents community-level time-varying heterogeneity and ε _ijt_ is a nonsystematic error.

Calculating deviations of all variables from their respective mean values equation (1) can be written as,

> 12 The empirical model may not capture the role of all factors, including the institutional factors, that influence the extent of indebtedness because of lack of information available from the survey data used here. However, because of the panel data fixed-effects method, the bias due to such omitted variables may be minimal, as these omitted variables may not vary much over time. Hence, their roles are controlled by the fixed-effects method.

18
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_L. Fox and A.M. Oviedo_ _Are Skills Rewarded in Sub-Saharan Africa?_

**Table 12: Unionization rate by firm age (percentage)**

||Anglophone|Francophone|
|---|---|---|
|Less than 5 years old|10.5|6.7|
|5 to 9 years old|22.3|8.5|
|10 to 19 years old|21.6|17.1|
|20 to 39 years old|31.6|25.2|
|40years old and older|44.4|36.2|
|Total|24.0|14.8|

Source: Enterprise Surveys 38
while in contrast, cities like Dar es Salaam and Nairobi have large areas of industrial land or irregular residential (see figure 6 and 8).

This rapid expansion has also impacted the quality of the housing stock. Fast construction has led many buildings to be made with low quality and nondurable material. The UN Habitat estimated in 2007 that some 75% of all buildings had been constructed with mud and wood, and lacked a proper foundation. Furthermore, a startling 97% of all buildings were single story, and only 17% could be considered in good condition. Currently it is estimated that between 70% and 80% of housing units are considered slums, with a bulk of these dwellings located in prime central locations, thus preventing its use for more productive activity.<sup>5051</sup> The land cover classification map of Addis created in this study reflects many of the trends mentioned above. In Figure 14 irregular residential settlements are colored red, and appear to be highly concentrated in and around the city center. In contrast to Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kigali, a significant proportion of land in the city center is being occupied by irregular residential <mark>(Figure 14X)</mark> . Within the first 4 kilometers from the city center about 26% of the built‐up land is residential Irregular, with this number dropping off dramatically around to around 8% around 6 kilometers outside of the city center. Pockets of Irregular residential continue to appear towards the city’s periphery, but there are no single large sized slums like Kibera in Nairobi. Industrial and Commercial land (shown in purple in Figure 14) is also found in small pockets throughout the city rather than concentrated in large zones like in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. This pattern of small pockets of land cover might be indicative of the ‘urban village’ environment described in the literature.

> 50 Un Habitat. 2008. Ethiopia: Addis Ababa Urban Profile.

> 51 UN Habitat. 2007. Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Addis Ababa pg 28‐30.

23
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# **6. References**

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Bhagwati, J. 1968. “The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: Departures from Unified Exchange Rates.” _Special Papers in International Economics_ . New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Blundell, R., R. Griffith, and F. Windmeijer. 2002. “Individual Effects and Dynamics in Count Data Models.” _Journal of Econometrics_ 108: 113-31.

Ganslandt, M, and J.R. Markusen. 2000. “Standards and Related Regulations in International Trade: A Modeling Approach.” In _Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade: Can It Be Done?_ , pp. 95-135. Studies in International Economics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hausmann, R. and D. Rodrik. 2003a. “Economic Development as Self-Discovery.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 72: 603-633.

Hausmann, R. and D. Rodrik. 2003b. “Discovering El Salvador’s Production Potential.” Mimeographed. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Ibeh, Kevin I.N. 2003. “Toward a Contingency Framework of Export Entrepreneurship: Conceptualizations and Empirical Evidence.” _Small Business Economics_ . 20: 49-68.

Imbs, J. and Wacziarg, R. 2003. “Stages of diversification.” _American Economic Review_ 93(1): 63-86.

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13
reduction differed for those persons who were shown the versions of the questionnaire with the higher baseline risks and risk reductions, but we did not detect any statistically significant pattern.

Taken together, these results suggest that the responses of people who will pay nothing to reduce their risk of dying in a traffic accident must be treated as serious responses rather than protest bids or indications of scenario rejection. We therefore include these individuals in our analysis of WTP responses.

# **V.  Analysis of Willingness to Pay Responses**

# **A.  A Model of Willingness to Pay**

> Willingness to pay, _WTP_ , is defined as the amount of money that must be taken away from an individual when his risk of death is lowered to keep his utility unchanged. Let _V_ ( _y_ , _p_ ) denote the individual’s indirect utility, which depends on income and the risk of dying in an auto accident, _p_ .  Formally,

where _y_ is income, _p_ 0 is the baseline risk and<sup>_p_</sup> 1<sup>is risk after the reduction. Willingness</sup> to pay should thus depend on the baseline and final risk, income, and individual characteristics. Since _p_ 1 = _p_ 0 − Δ _p_ , where Δ _p_ is the risk reduction, it follows that, conditional on individual characteristics, (2) We assume that for respondent _i_ :

- 14 -
**Table 3.  Stability: Percentage of Countries with More Stable Inflow A than B*, 1980-2007**

||||**series A**||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||**REM**|**REM**|**ODA**|
||**Number of**||**series B**||
||**countries**|**ODA**|**FDI**|**FDI**|
|ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES|116|27%|72%|91%|
|East Asia and Pacific|15|13%|67%|87%|
|Europe and Central Asia|20|20%|60%|95%|
|Latin America and the Caribbean|28|29%|61%|93%|
|Middle East and North Africa|10|70%|100%|80%|
|South Asia|6|17%|83%|83%|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|37|24%|81%|95%|
|low income|36|17%|75%|94%|
|lower middle income|45|20%|73%|93%|
|upper middle income|35|46%|69%|86%|

*Stability measured by CV

22
focus groups were conducted with the main implementing agencies (CGA, GUFE and both commercial banks).

A final in-person follow-up survey will be conducted in March 2016 to measure the mediumterm effects after two years from the beginning of the program, in particular the impact on business performance.

# **4. Program implementation**

Data from the implementing partner, in addition to quantitative and qualitative data, suggest that the program was implemented consistently with the study design. Treatment allocation was respected for all businesses, and all components of the program were effectively offered to almost all program beneficiaries.

The advisors from CGA delivered the program to each business owner following four main steps:

- (1) First visit: A CGA advisor conducted a first visit to each business to explain the benefits of becoming an _entreprenant_ , specific by group, and to distribute informational leaflets. If a business owner was not present on the day of the visit, the CGA advisor attempted to call the owner on the phone. If the owner could not be reached, the CGA advisor made another attempt by trying a visit or a call in different moments of the day. After four attempts (visits or calls), the business was considered as not interested.

- (2) Second visit: For businesses in groups 2 and 3, the same CGA advisor called, arranged, and confirmed a meeting, which took place approximately two weeks after the first visit, and provided 1-2 hours of personalized training. If a business owner was not present on the planned day of the second visit or could not be reached, the CGA advisor made another attempt by trying a visit or call in different moments of the day. After 3 attempts (visits or calls), the business was considered not interested. Registration at GUFE was not mandatory to be eligible to this second visit. In group 3, the CGA advisor devoted additional time in reviewing the procedures to calculate the taxes to pay, and the option of receiving tax mediation help, if necessary.

- (3) Formalization decision: After having received the first and/or the second visit, business owners decided whether or not to register as _entreprenants_ at GUFE.

17