outcomes in the schools.<sup>85</sup> Finally, Awortwi and Nuvunga (2019) investigate the role that information disclosure regimes in the extractives sector—such as the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)—can play in improving accountability. Surveying 17 different empirical factors, the authors find that unless there is a risk of a ruling party losing power, information disclosures are unlikely to make governments more accountable on their own.<sup>86</sup> Relatedly, there is a relatively large literature that supports the proposition that the users of OGD—for instance the press, academia, and civil society—can use this information to hold governments to account. For instance, Mungiu-Pippidi (2014) investigates—among other variables—press freedom and corruption. Using a large-n cross-country analysis, as well as many of the same corruption indexes used by this present paper, the author finds a robust correlation between the variables.<sup>87</sup> Similarly, Ferraz and Finan (2008) find that in Brazil, the proactive disclosure of audit outcomes significantly impacted electoral performance of incumbents, particularly when corrupt practices were uncovered. Interestingly, these effects seem to be amplified in places where public radio was active in transmitting this information, which suggests the importance of the media in perpetuating the accountability-enhancing effects of OGD.<sup>88</sup> Similar results were obtained in Mexico by Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder (2015), who studied the performance of infrastructure grants that targeted the poor. The authors found that when provided information on the use and outcomes of these funds, voters tend to punish poorly performing politicians, but only in areas covered by local media—again, suggesting the key role that the media can play in disseminating information to hold government to account.<sup>89</sup> In addition to investigating the role of OGD, the present research also seeks to build on previous efforts (Joshi 2013) investigating the efficacy of transparency and accountability initiatives, the findings of which are mixed in terms of service delivery.<sup>90</sup> To be sure, Gaventa and McGee (2014) have evaluated the efficacy of a number of transparency and accountability mechanisms,<sup>91</sup> and note that where there is “positive evidence in one setting, this is often not corroborated—and sometimes even contradicted—by findings in another setting where different, or even similar, methods have been used.”<sup>92</sup> Likewise, Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014, 2018) note that evidence on the impact of accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion is “often long term, indirect, and difficult to isolate from other factors, and the evidence base to date is still too thin to arrive at firm conclusions.”<sup>93</sup>

> 85 Priyanka Pandey, Sangeeta Goyal, and Venkatesh Sundararaman, “Public Participation, Teacher Accountability, and School Outcomes: Findings from Baseline Surveys in Three Indian States,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series (November 1, 2008).

> 86 N. Awortwi and A. Nuvunga (2019) Sound of One Hand Clapping: Information Disclosure for Social and Political Action for Accountability in Extractive Governance in Mozambique, IDS Working Paper 523, Brighton: IDS

> 87 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Quantitative Report on Causes of Performance and Stagnation in the Global Fight against Corruption.” available at http://anticorrp.eu/publications/quantitative-report-on-causes/ (2014).

88 Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits On Electoral Outcomes." _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ (2008).

89 Horacio A. Larreguy, John Marshall, James M. Snyder, Jr. "Revealing Malfeasance: How Local Media Facilitates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico." NBER Working Paper No. 20697 (2014).

90 A. Joshi, “Background Paper on Service Delivery: Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives,” Institute of Development Studies (2013).

91 These include, among others, citizen report cards, organizational score cards, and asset discloures of public officials, as well as more “participatory” mechanisms such as community monitiring, social audits, public expenditure tracking surveys, and participatory budgeting processes.

> 92 J. Gaventa and R. McGee, “The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives,” _Development Policy Review_ 31: s3–s28 (2013).

93 T. Carothers and S. Brechenmacher. “Accountability, Transparency, Participation, and Inclusion: A New Development Consensus?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014). p. 26.

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