rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
12

|||M.D. Doshi<br>Securities<br>employee|respective access to BOLT and the M.D.<br>Doshi Securities system.<sup>25</sup>|
|---|---|---|---|
|July 1,<br>2001|Two unidentified<br>online brokerage<br>firms|Chang Shian-tang|NT$10 million—Chang Shian-tang used<br>decoding software to steal the passwords<br>and personal information of more than<br>2,000 customers; apprehended after the<br>brokerage companies complained of<br>unusually high incidences of short-<br>selling. <sup>26</sup>|
|Mar 15,<br>2000|Internet Trading<br>Technologies|Abelkader Smires|Denial-of-service attacks that caused<br>major disruption of trading on the<br>NASDAQ.<sup>27</sup>|
|1999|ETrade Group<br>(plus eBay and<br>Lycos among<br>others)|Jerome<br>Heckenkamp|Denial-of-service attacks that caused<br>more than $900,000 in damage.<sup>28</sup>|
|Nov. 14,<br>1999|Shanghai<br>Securities<br>Department|Zhao Zhe|Changed 5 transaction records, causing<br>turnover of 2 stocks to rise drastically and<br>resultingin direct loss of$355,000.<sup>29</sup>|

# **_Online Frauds_**

# **1. Investment Scams**

In the US and South Korea, where the penetration of e-finance in the capital markets have been the most wide-spread, seven out of the “top ten securities frauds” involve online investment scams.

**_Investment Scams_** are investment schemes created by illegitimate intermediaries to collect funds from inexperienced and small investors with false promises of extremely high returns in a very short time with little or no risk. Through the use of electronic means such as the Internet for securities transactions or dissemination of information, these individuals enjoy the advantages of anonymity and increased outreach to large groups of unsophisticated investors at minimal costs.<sup>30</sup>

**_Promissory notes scams or prime bank notes_** are investor scams that involve schemes where investors are told that they have access to "secret" trading programs that only a few privileged

> 25 The Cyber Crime Investigation Cell of the Criminal Investigation Department in Mumbai (Bombay), India reported this first instance of online security fraud investigated by the cell. <u>http://www.cybercellmumbai.com/Cyber%20Crime%20News/crimenews.htm.</u>

> 26 The Taipaei Times, “Hacker Arrested for Online Trading Scam,” accessed on 17 June 2004 at <u>http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/archives/2001/07/03/0000092498.</u>

> 27 National Infrastructure Protection Center Major Investigations Web site: www.nipc.gov.

28 USA Today, “Los Alamos employee may have history of hacking,” accessed on 17 June 2004 at <u>http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-01-26-los-alamos-hacker.htm.</u> 29 - Nando Times, “China Jails Hacker for 3 Years,” accessed on 21 June 2004 at <u>http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail archive/1999/Nov/0029.html</u>

> 30 See <u>http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm</u>
conflict mostly reported the unavailability of jobs (38 percent) (Figure 12).<sup>8</sup> Thus, it is likely that an increase in housework may have substituted income generating activities for girls in conflict affected areas.

**Figure 12: Most common reasons for being unemployed.**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 45%<br>40%<br>35%<br>30%<br>25%<br>20%<br>15%<br>10%<br>5%<br>0%<br>Have a job Housework Don't know No jobs Not interested<br>how to look available<br>Not affected Conflict affected<br><!-- End of picture text --> The entrepreneurial potential index increased for girls in conflict‐affected areas for both the internal and external conflict variables. The index is a score from 1 to 10 and comprises of self‐perceived scores related to various future business opportunities.<sup>9</sup> On average, conflict increased girls’ entrepreneurial potential index by about 10 percent. Conflict may lead to girls perceiving greater business opportunities and to consider entrepreneurial activities as a resilience mechanism. However, the negative impact of conflict on IGAs indicates that the entrepreneurial potential is – currently – not activated. A tension between expectation and reality can explain this disconnect, such that the expectation and interest in taking up employment opportunities increase but the ability and opportunity to undertake income generating activities decrease.

Conflict increased the likelihood of girls being married. Conflict increases uncertainty and insecurity, thereby incentivizing either voluntary or forced marriage as families marry off daughters or girls engage in marriage to increase safety and economic security. This is common practice in the context

> 8 An accurate comparison cannot be made as the baseline and endline surveys had different questions and answer options regarding unemployment. Furthermore, these responses are the top five most common responses from a range of many.

> 9 For more details, consult 6. Entrepreneurial potential index in the Appendix.

20
valid also after several years, that is, when the poverty mapping is further updated with a third, more recently updated HBS. Otherwise, if a more recent HBS or LSMS is not available but, instead, there is a recent survey not covering consumption expenditure information, the proposed methodology could be complemented by the two methods proposed by Azzarri _et al._ (2006), or Dang _et al._ (2014, 2017).

The third issue covered in this discussion consists in the fact that the per capita consumption expenditure estimated at PSU level from the poverty mapping exercise is affected by (small) standard errors. Such variability should be taken into account in order to refine the original contribution proposed in this paper. We aim to develop this piece of new theoretical research and present it in a future paper.

# **References**

Azzarri, C., Carletto, G., Davis, B., Zezza, A. (2006), Monitoring poverty without consumption data: An application using the Albania panel survey, _Eastern European Economics_ , **44(1)** , pp. 59-82.

- Battese, G.E., Harter, R.M., Fuller, W.A. (1988), An error-components model for prediction of county crop areas using survey and satellite data, _Journal of the American Statistical Association_ , **83(401)** , pp. 28–36.

- Betti, G., Bici, R., Neri, L., Thomo, L., Sohnesen, T.P. (2018), Local poverty and inequality in Albania, _Eastern European Economics_ , **56(3)** , pp. 223-245.

- Betti, G., Dabalen, A., Ferré, C., Neri, L. (2013), Updating poverty maps between Censuses: a case study of Albania, in Laderchi C.R., Savastano S. (eds.), _Poverty and Exclusion in the Western Balkans_ , Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being 8, Springer Science+Business Media, New York.

Betti, G., Pavelesku, D. (2019), Calculation of the design effect and JRR standard errors in the 2015 Household Budget Survey in Tunisia, Report to The World Bank. Corral, P., Molina, I., Nguyen, M.C. (2020), Pull your small area estimates up by the bootstraps. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 9256. Washington DC: The World Bank.

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emerging markets and developing economies.<sup>5</sup> We contribute to the related literature in several ways. First, using a large cross-section of developing countries, we provide new evidence on the labor productivity gap between formal and informal firms and the impact of informal competition on the labor productivity of formal firms. Second, we pay due attention to potential endogeneity concerns in estimating the impact of informal competition on the productivity of the formal firm. To this end, we proxy the informal competition faced by a given formal firm, using the level of informal competition experienced by other formal firms in the same size-industry-location category. As discussed below and argued in the literature, this strategy helps substantially mitigate endogeneity concerns. Third, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys are conducted using a harmonized sampling methodology and questionnaire that facilitate cross-country comparability, while allowing to control for heterogeneity across data points within a country. Previous studies using micro data are largely restricted to a single country or a narrow set of countries for which comparable data are available. Thus, it is not clear whether the related findings are general enough to be inferred to other countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the data and main variables. Section 3 presents the drivers of productivity differential between formal and informal firms. Section 4 assesses the impact of informal competition on the productivity of formal firms. Section 5 concludes.

> 5 Table 1 gives a list of countries selected in the sample, for which data on formal and informal firms are available.

5
McCarthy, J. 2007. “Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Import Prices to Domestic Inflation in Some Industrialized Economies.” Eastern Economic Journal 33 (4): 511-37.

Melitz, M. J., and G. Ottaviano. 2008. “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.” Review of Economic Studies 75 (1): 295-316.

Mishkin, F. 2008. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy.” Norges Bank Conference on Monetary Policy, Oslo, Norway, March 7.

Mishkin, F., and K. Schmidt-Hebbel. 2007. “Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?” NBER Working Paper 12876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Nakamura, E., and D. Zerom. 2010. “Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through.” Review of Economic Studies 77 (3): 1192-1230.

Nogueira, R., and M. Leon-Ledesmab. 2009. “Fear of Floating in Brazil: Did Inflation Targeting Matter?” North American Journal of Economics and Finance 20 (3): 255-66.

Ozkan, I., and L. Erden. 2015. “Time-Varying Nature and Macroeconomic Determinants of Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” International Review of Economics & Finance 38 (July): 56-66.

Prasertnukul, W., D. Kim, and M. Kakinaka. 2010. “Exchange Rates, Price Levels, and Inflation Targeting: Evidence from Asian Countries.” Japan and the World Economy 22 (3): 173-82.

Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff. 2008. “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises.” NBER Working Paper 13882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Reinhart, C., K. Rogoff, and M. Savastano. 2014. “Addicted to Dollars.” Annals of Economics and Finance 15 (1): 1-50.

Reyes, J. 2004. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through Effects and Inflation Targeting in Emerging Economies: What Is the Relationship?” Review of International Economics 15 (3): 538-59.

Rodriguez-Lopez, A. 2011. “Prices and Exchange Rates: A Theory of Disconnect.” Review of Economic Studies 78 (3): 1135-77.

Sadeghi, S., M. Feshari, M. Marvasti, and Z. Ghanbari. 2015. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Inflation in Dollarized Economies: Evidence from the Middle Eastern and North African Countries.” Iranian Economic Review 19 (2): 139-47.

Schmidt-Hebbel, K., and M. Tapia. 2002. “Monetary Policy Implementation and Results in Twenty Inflation-Targeting Countries.” Working Paper 166, Central Bank of Chile, Santiago.

Schmitt‐Grohé, S., and M. Uribe. 2018. “How Important Are Terms-of-Trade Shocks?” International Economic Review 59 (1): 85-111.

Shambaugh, J. 2008. “A New Look at Pass-Through.” Journal of International Money and Finance 27 (4): 560-91.

Shu, C., and X. Su. 2009. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through in China.” China and World Economy 17 (1): 3346.

Soto, C., and J. Selaive. 2003. “Openness and Imperfect Pass-Through: Implications for the Monetary Policy.” Working Paper 216, Central Bank of Chile, Santiago.

Stock, J. H., and M. W. Watson. 2012. “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007-2009 Recession.” NBER Working Paper 18094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

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Absolute and Relative Poverty Measurement: A Survey Benoit Decerf<sup>1</sup> World Bank Keywords: Poverty measurement, Absolute poverty, Relative poverty, Hybrid poverty line, Poverty index JEL Codes: D63, I32 1 World Bank, Development Research Group. Email : bdecerf@worlbank.org.

Acknowledgments : This survey will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Research Handbook of Poverty and Inequality (Wagle, 2022). I am grateful to Udaya R. Wagle and to an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, or members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
**39**

Effects of Tariffs and Subsidies on Conversion Factors

**_58._** The imposition of tariffs, surcharges and subsidies represents the use of "fiscal proxies" for exchange rate changes. Simply stated, such a policy may be designed to force imports competing with domestically traded goods to enter the country at a depreciated exchange rate (i.e.; at a higher domestic currency price) and/or to allow producers to export at a depreciated rate while preserving a higher exchange rate for other transactions. In essence, the imposition of import tariffs and export subsidies means that, effectively, importers pay more and exporters receive more local currency units per dollar than they would under free trade. It appears, then, that the price (i.e.; conversion factor) paid for or received under tariffs and export subsidies tends to overvalue the domestic currency as compared to the tariff-free trade situation and, in the process, raises the relative price of traded to nontraded goods.' On the other hand export taxes (and import subsidies) are regarded as negative tariffs.

> **_59._** The extent of the implications on international data comparability and on comparative analysis resulting from the reliance on the official exchange rate as a

> conversion factor depends on the incidence and magnitude of price measures and nonprice measures in international trade." How prevalent are import and export taxes and subsidies

> in developing countries? Are tariff structures and schedules prohibitive? This is examined below.

> 2 See para. **15** above for simple numerical examples illustrating this.

> 2 An overview of current developments in trade and exchange controls is presented in International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls, (Washington,D.C.; International Monetary Fund, **1989);** and International Monetary Fund, "Developments in International Exchange and Trade Systems," World Economic and Fir .ncial Surveys (Washington,D.C,: International Monetary Fund, September **1989).**
5 rate by another 4 or 5 percentage points and expect to get a major boost to growth.

**Figure 1:  Growth and Investment in India, 1966–2012**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 40 9<br>Gross Capital<br>Formation/GDP 8<br>35<br>GDP Growth (5 Year Moving<br>Average) (RHS) 7<br>30<br>6<br>25<br>5<br>20<br>4<br>15<br>3<br>10 2<br>1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the World Development Indicators.

The story of what happened behind the two graphs plotted in the figure has been told many times (see, for instance, Basu 2008). The question must now turn to how India can boost investment and, in particular, infrastructure investment by another, say, 5 percentage points. Clearly, this will involve both the private sector and the government. Fiscal support for the private sector in building up investment and infrastructure is a path fraught with risks. If one incurs excessive deficits, a crisis can cause the debt-GDP ratio to spiral upward, as observed in several Eurozone countries in recent years, and this could threaten a crash. If one is excessively cautious, then the country can remain trapped in a state of stagnation. The next section spells out the challenges for all emerging economies about to get on the turnpike.
# 12. Digital Financial Transactions Matter for Development

## _<mark>Leora Klapper</mark>_

Recent research has shown that a range of development benefits follow from using digital financial transactions instead of cash. This research has direct implications for World Bank work on safety nets, service delivery, and poverty reduction.

## **Digital transactions improve service delivery**

In high‐income countries, most safety net programs – such as social security or subsidies for the poor – are delivered digitally. In low‐income countries, they are commonly made in cash. Using cash creates enormous costs. For example, governments must spend money bringing truckloads of paper currency to remote areas; these trucks also need to be insured and protected by armed guards. Cash payments also require people to spend time traveling and waiting in line to get their payments at government offices. Digital transfers improve efficiency and remove corruption opportunities—a relevant finding for the World Bank's efforts to promote safety net coverage and improve service delivery.

- When Andhra Pradesh used biometric smart cards instead of cash to distribute social security payments, the government saved nearly $40 million annually, which was nine times greater than the cost of implementing the program. Theft of funds went down, people spent less time collecting payments, and recipients got more money because less was being stolen.<sup>138</sup>

- In Niger, using mobile phones rather than cash to distribute payments for an anti‐hunger program reduced administrative costs by a fifth, lowered costs for recipients, and allowed households to feed their children more and purchase more protein‐rich food.<sup>139</sup>

## **Digital transactions help prevent people from falling into poverty**

Most development interventions aim to help people escape poverty. But escaping poverty is no guarantee of not falling back in. Every year millions of people fall into poverty due to unexpected shocks such as natural disasters, high medical bills, or sudden unemployment. In poor countries, safety nets are often absent, so people rely on their social networks for emergency funds. Mobile money accounts let people send money through simple text messages, which makes it easier to collect funds from faraway friends and relatives. As a result, they are less likely to become poor during an economic emergency. These findings are relevant to the World Bank's work on resilience and poverty reduction.

> 138 Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar. 2016. "Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India." _American Economic Review_ 2016, 106 (10): 2895‐2929.

> 139 Aker, J. C., R. Boumnijel, A. McClelland, and N. Tierny. 2016. "Payment Mechanisms and Antipoverty Programs: Evidence from a Mobile Money Cash Transfer Experiment in Niger." _Economic Development and Cultural Change_ 65 (1): 1‐37.

39
‘pure’ investment bank vehicle starting from the current situation in Colombia<sup>38</sup> . In practice, however, the relative importance of CFs has decreased substantially over time<sup>39</sup> . As can be seen in the Tables below, there are only 2 remaining CFs (down from 24 in 1995) that account for 2 percent of GDP. The bulk of the securities activity is currently shared between banks (mainly sovereign debt) and comisionistas (equities and corporate debt).

**Table 13: Size and Ownership of Corporaciones Financieras (February 2006)**

||**Total Assets**<br>**(Col$ billion)**|**Market Share**|**Ownership**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Corfivalle|4,986|93%|Grupo Aval|
|Colcorp|401|7%|Grupo Sindicato|

_Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis._

**Table 14: Size and Ownership of Five Largest Comisionistas (2005)**

||**Total Turnover**<br>**(Col$ trillion)**|**Market Share**|**Ownership**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Interbolsa|140|18%|Independent|
|Inversionistas de Colombia|77|10%|Independent|
|Correval|71|9%|Independent|
|Suvalor|64|8%|Grupo Sindicato|
|Alianza|59|7%|Independent|

_Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis._ _Note: Size is based on annual equity and debt turnover (both for third parties and for own account) for 2005._

**In addition to eliminating the figure of CFs, this recommendation would necessitate the regulatory revision and upgrading of comisionistas de bolsa** . In practice, comisionistas actually have three different levels of license, each with its own range of permissible activities (brokerage only, broker-dealer, broker-dealer plus foreign exchange intermediation) and related minimum regulatory capital level. Incorporating some of the aforementioned additional permissible activities will likely require a revision of the current three-level arrangement and stronger overall prudential requirements<sup>40</sup> . In addition, there might be a need to differentiate their names in order for the public to clearly distinguish among the different license levels – for example, by calling them _comisionistas de bolsa_ versus _sociedades de bolsa_ versus _sociedades de valores_ .

> 38 These include, for example, extending permissible activities of CFs and reducing those of comisionistas to brokerage; extending permissible activities of CFs and comisionistas so that both of them could provide investment banking services; and creating an entirely new figure for investment banking, thereby eliminating the need for CFs and reducing comisionistas to brokerage.

> 39 The CFs have not been helped by their historical emphasis on long-term financial intermediation (originally funded by international financial institutions) that is now unprofitable because of the lack of access to cheap funding.

> 40 These would build upon the 2003 reforms introduced by the SV, which strengthened regulatory capital requirements and upgraded the required professional capacity (including risk controls) of comisionistas.

29