similar in regions that have had very different experiences with violence during the conflict. For example, more violent regions might have more school buildings closed by previous fighting and some of the students that might have been affected by the violence might have already been taken out of school; or households might be less affected by changes in violence if they have experienced more of it over the course of the conflict. However, the results demonstrate that the sudden change in violence did not affect attendance in regions that have experienced relatively little violence over the course of the conflict (e.g., Aden) and also did not affect attendance in regions that have experienced some of the most intense violence (e.g., Sa’ada; etc.).

Importantly, although the shocks to violence analyzed here had little effect on school attendance, there is evidence that at least one of these shocks did significantly impact households. Table 4 re-estimates the month-to-month changes estimated in table 3 (columns 3, 6, and 9), but for each shock the table uses the household’s subjective assessment of safety and primary sources of income as the dependent variables.36 Although not all shocks had a significant impact on households, the capture of regions by secessionist forces did have an immediate impact on subjective well-being and sources of income that lasted throughout the capture. Columns (1)-(3) demonstrate that in the districts captured by secessionists, there was a significant increase in the share of households that reported the primary difficulty that they had faced in the past month was violence; there was a significant decrease in the share of households that reported receiving their primary income from wage labor; and there was a significant increase in the share of households that reported having no income. Importantly, all of these impacts only began in the month that the regions were captured.

However, columns (4)-(9) demonstrate that the other two shocks- the partial ceasefire and the capture of Al Jawf- did not have similar impacts on households. In the regions that were affected by these shocks, there was little evidence that there was any change to households’ primary income source or subjective well-being. Only in one of the specifications can one reject the hypothesis that there was no change in the months leading up to and following the shocks (change in share reporting wage labor was primary income source in Al Jawf).

# **Section 5b. Teacher Strike in IRG-Held Territory**

Estimates of specification (2) following the teacher strike in regions controlled by the IRG are presented in table 5.37 Despite the lack of change in any measure of violence described in figure 2, the teacher strike in response to conflict-related issues had a large impact on school attendance. Column (1) demonstrates that there was a 19.5 percentage point increase in the share of households in which not all children attended school prior to before the strike. This change is a more than doubling of the share of households with poor school attendance prior

> 36Given the non-schooling outcomes analyzed, the specifications also include summer months when children were not attending school.

> 37The sample for estimating the impact of the teacher strike includes all surveys completed during the school year between September 2019 and February 2020.

17