population is weakly negatively correlated with PEFA scores, but can identify no clear pattern. He notes, however, that “binary associations are not necessarily significant from a statistical point of view and could therefore be potentially misleading”. Perhaps more usefully, De Renzio (2009) also presents a basic multivariate regression analysis, including assessment of the impact of population size. Results from the multivariate, in contrast to findings from the bivariate analysis, show that population is positively correlated with PEFA scores. No causal explanation for the observed relationship is suggested, other than that “there could be economies of scale in investing in budget systems in larger countries” (De Renzio 2009: 10).

Andrews (2010c) confines his analysis to Africa, investigating patterns in PFM performance and relationships between PFM performance and country characteristics using PEFA data. Through coding PEFA indicators according to different categories of process, Andrews reaches a series of powerful conclusions regarding the political economy of PFM reform in Africa and the tendency of PFM systems to take on the “form” of international good practice, without necessarily altering underlying and politically-influenced functions (see also Andrews 2009). For African countries, scores for budget preparation processes are comparatively stronger than those for budget execution and oversight processes, reflecting the fact that it is easier for developing, and especially fragile countries, to develop a budget than to ensure its effective and accountable implementation. Actual practices also tend to lag the implementation of new laws and processes, with stronger scores against indicators that can be improved by stroke-of-the-pen measures than those that impact on the way things are done and resources allocated on the ground. Finally, scores are generally higher against indicators for processes that can be implemented by a narrow, concentrated set of actors. Conversely, processes are generally weaker when they involve multiple players, especially outside of central agencies, such as Ministries of Finance. Andrews (2010c) also reaches some broader conclusions regarding country characteristics influencing PFM performance in Africa, showing correlations between improved PEFA performance and sustained economic growth, stability, and higher non-resource domestic revenues. Andrews (2010c) also identifies some possible impacts of colonial heritage.

Porter, Andrews, and Wescott (2011), drawing on Andrews’ earlier analytical framework, use PEFA data to reach various conclusions regarding the particular characteristics of PFM systems in fragile and post-conflict settings. They show that the disconnect between the “laws, rules, and procedures adopted for better public finance and procurement and their actual functionality” noted by Andrews (2010) is particularly pronounced in post-conflict environments.

No research to date has focused on patterns in PEFA scores across PICs, despite increased programming support and policy attention to this area. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the relatively recent availability of PEFA data and the small population of these countries. Further, no analysis undertaken to date has specifically addressed the potential impact of human capital shortages on PFM performance.

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