rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Nelder, John A. and R. Mead. 1965. "A Simplex Method for Function Minimization." Computer Journal 308-313.

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Reinhart, Carmen, Graciela Kaminsky and Saul Lizondo. 1998. "Leading Indicators of Currency Crises." IMF Economic Review 1-48.

Ross, M. 2004. "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? ." Journal of Peace Research 41, 337–356 .

Ward, M, Brian Greenhil, and Kristin Bakke. 2010. "The perils of policy by p-value: Predicting civil conflicts." Journal of Peace Research Vol 47, Issue 4, 363 – 375.

Weidmann, Nils B. and Michael D. Ward. 2010. "Predicting Conflict in Space and Time." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (6): 883-901.

World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2011. The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium". World Bank.

World Bank. 2016. Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts. Washington, DC: World Bank.

32
correlates better with schooling, compared to using different cutoff points. Similarly, the use of a dichotomous instrument, thus defined, in the IV regressions results in higher precision of the schooling coefficient estimates, compared to definitions using a different cutoff point.

<u>Estimation and interpretation of results. Preliminary evidence on the time trends</u> of the returns to schooling in Venezuela, using OLS, seems to document falling returns to schooling until the mid-1990s, followed by slightly increasing returns thereafter (Patrinos and Sakellariou 2004). OLS estimates of overall returns to an additional year of schooling were about 8 percent in 2000.

The estimated (OLS) schooling equations are presented in Table 1. In column (1) the covariates are only the binary “compulsory schooling” dummy and the trend in secondary enrollments in Venezuela. Column (2) includes other covariates but omits age and its square. Finally, column (3) includes all covariates. The results show that, after controlling for age and its square, as well as the trend in secondary enrollments and other characteristics, individuals (male children of the head of household) who were affected by the reform, consistently, have one more year of schooling, and the beneficial effect does not distinguish between family backgrounds. These results suggest that the “monotonicity” assumption is satisfied. One should also note, however, that if the identification assumption – namely that there is no other major reason why the cohorts affected by the reform would have different earnings than cohorts which are not affected, except for their having higher years of schooling (after controlling for a quadratic in age 11
intention-to-treat effects, using the initial assignment as our treatment indicator.

In each location, all baseline survey and screening activities were concluded in four weeks. Implementation was rolled out so that activities in a given location were completed before moving to the next, in order to minimize attrition due to subjects forgetting about the screenings, travelling or relocating. Online Appendix B reports the timeline of activities.

# 3.2 Experimental design

Since individual-level randomization would run a significant risk of contamination, we implemented a clustered randomized trial where our study locations were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The experiment was designed to allow us to study the impact of MTV Shuga screenings alone as well as that of being exposed to Shuga plus information on beliefs and values of peers. We created different treatment arms and stratified the sample so that each town would have an equal number of locations in each arm (where possible).

Prior to the actual intervention, we piloted the Shuga screenings in some urban and periurban locations outside our sample frame. We used these pilots to shoot short videos with interviews of participants, and to administer short ‘exit surveys’containing selected attitudinal questions.

T1. Treatment T1 consisted only of MTV Shuga screenings and was administered in 27 randomly selected locations. Participants were shown the Shuga TV drama in two screenings of four 22-minutes episodes each. We did not organize any discussion at the end of the screenings, to ensure uniformity of the treatment and to make the experience more comparable —albeit not perfectly—to that of a viewer watching TV at home.

T2. The second treatment (T2) involved another 27 randomly chosen locations and was the same as T1, except that after the MTV Shuga episodes we showed video-clips containing information on beliefs and values of peers in other communities who had watched Shuga. These video-clips were assembled using material from the pilot screenings and included interviews of youth condemning negative behaviors and praising positive ones after watching Shuga, as well as ‘smart graphs’with statistics. The intent was to raise awareness about how common certain beliefs and attitudes are among other participants, and how willing they may be to change them. T2 thus embeds a first type of ‘social referents’, namely young people from other communities who look similar to our respondents and who watched MTV Shuga.

The choice of this way of implementing T2 represented a compromise between a number of different imperatives. Announcing the post-screening average —which is what we opted for—is the right thing to do if the population expects that the rest of their peer group will also see Shuga eventually and they want to be close to that post-Shuga consensus. This is a plausible case since MTV is a well-known brand and our viewers may have correctly expected that Shuga would be shown on television eventually. Consistent with this interpretation, below we show 13
COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA

|Country|Utility|Wastewater<br>responsibility|Connection<br>cost|Tariff part<br>of water<br>bill|% of water bill|Fixed<br>fee|Block<br>tariff|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ZMB|KWSC|—|—|y|30|—|—|
|ZMB|LWSC|—|y|y|30|—|—|
|ZMB|NWSC|—||y|30|—|—|
|||Count= 18|Count= 8|Count=8|Average=53%||Count=6|

_Source:_ AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. — = data not available.

37
sub-national entities, given that direct sub-national measures of expenditure needs are too effort and information intensive.<sup>4</sup> The measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort is especially complex. The main principle here is that transfers to not discourage own revenue efforts. An egregious example includes Russia, where transfers in effect negated extra revenue efforts on the part of sub-national governments (Zhuravskaya 2000). However, measuring actual capacity and effort may be very information intensive. Formula based allocations need to strike a compromise that, at the very least, does not penalize localities that are collecting revenues at an average representative benchmark of collection. For example, the benchmark could be some function of regional incomes (RGDP).<sup>5</sup> In practice, there may be a significant degree of uncertainty about what the most appropriate distribution of resources would be, given the available data (i.e., design considerations). The choice of formula may also be inherently political, in the sense that it is driven by the extent to which individual players will gain from one type of formulation.<sup>6</sup> Debates about the formula may also be more technical. For example, questions of how to best measure expenditure needs may focus on the treatment of regional cost differentials. As we will see, in a large archipelago such as Indonesia this is

> 4 For example, World Bank (2003) shows that a sample of _communes_ in Madagascar were significantly under-resourced from the perspective of education financing in absolute terms.  These types of studies can be implemented for a sample of case studies, but cannot generate the information for allocating resources across all localities.

> 5 Fiscal capacity will be a function of both the revenue base assigned to local governments (e.g., property), as well as their autonomy over determining/rate setting within these parameters.  However, at the central level it will typically be very difficult to distinguish with exactness whether observed differences in revenue realization are due to differences in the base and/or fiscal effort.  Hence, from a formula basis, the emphasis will be on proxying anticipated realizations given some basic average level of effort (e.g., by exploiting the relationship between observed local income (GDP) and local revenues.

> 6 In Pakistan for example, the dominant province of Pakistan has staunchly defended the use of a population based distribution formula.  The remote and lagging provinces of Balochistan and NWFP argue for great weight for area and human development indicators (Kaiser 2005).

6
sector. From a theoretical point of view there is the work of Pedersen (1994). On the other hand, Wunsch (1994) actually attempts to derive the optimal contract for transit firms through a mix of econometrics and calibration. He uses data on 177 mass transit firms in Europe to estimate the distribution of the asymmetry of information cost parameters of firms. In his words “...the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the agent is assumed to be limited to the unexplained variance of a cost estimation based on a crosssection of 177 transit firms”. Therefore, he estimates a cross-section cost function conditioned on the characteristics of each transit system and obtains that the confidence interval around fitted values has a standard error of about 15% of costs. He the uses this information, plus some calibrated parameters for other functions to calculate the optimal menu of contracts to offer firms.

Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), in their study of the public transit system in France, use a structural approachpreviously explored by Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (1995)to recover firm’s underlying cost efficiency distribution. They then model the effects of the introduction of an optimal regulatory contract, including route tendering.

# **5. Towards a solution in the real world: the experience of Bogotá, Colombia**<sup>44</sup>

The case of Bogotá illustrates how with political will and a well-structured project it is possible to radically improve the transport system in a short period of time. The reforms in Bogotá took 36 months to implement.

During the nineties Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, struggled with many of the problems alluded to in the previous section. Buses competed vigorously for passengers in the streets (called the “the war of the cents” by Colombians) generating unnecessary traffic 25
over the past half-century. private enterprises-- both locally- and foreign-owned, have played important roles in certain sub-sectors.'" This study will focus on the organization of Kenya's horticultural export sub-sector as this has been dominated by private enterprises since the 1930s when horticultural products were first exported from Kenya on a regular basis. In contrast to most other components of Kenyan agriculture, the horticultural sub-sector (including fresh and processed fruit and vegetables and cut flowers) has never featured a parastatal marketing board with major trading or regulatory functions. The sub-sector is also one of the few components of Kenyan agriculture in which the government has allowed and even encouraged competition between and among private, cooperative, and parastatal enterprises, both in the domestic and export markets.

7. The balance of the paper comprises five sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the growth and development of Kenya's horticultural exports over the past quarter century. Section 3 examines the ownership and other characteristics of the private sector in Kenya's horticultural trade. Section 4 examines the extent and forms of competition in this sub-sector. Section _5_ examines the wide range of institutional arrangements adopted by private firms to coordinate their own processing and marketing activities with the farm-level production of horticultural commodities and raw materials. This section draws upon insights from transaction cost economics to develop and test a series of hypotheses regarding crop producer - marketer institutional linkages for different crops. The final section draws conclusions from the study.

8. The data upon which the empirical analysis is based were obtained from field interviews with Kenyan producers, processors, and exporters in 1985 and 1986, from published and

> '° On **the** history and significance et marketing boards in Kenya, see Heyer (1976) and Yoshida (1984).

4
where _TFPRs_ is the average TFPR of the sector _s_ . Thus, if _TFPRsi_ were equalized across firms, _TFPs_ would be distortion-free and equal to:

# **4 Data Description and Measurement**

This paper uses firm-level financial and economic data taken from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 2007 and 2013 (henceforth WBES2007 and WBES2013) for Morocco. To be sure, a more extensive survey (optimally a census) would have been preferable, the WBES however appears as a second-best option given the restricted access to the public of a recent government census of registered firms. Nevertheless, other papers in the literature have embraced this second-best option and it has been shown that WBES could give very similar results compared to census data (Inklaar, Lashitew, and Timmer, 2015).

Manufacturing data from the WBES consists of formal manufacturing firms with at least 5 employees. Since the smallest formal firms and all informal manufacturing firms are not part of the data, our measure of misallocation might underestimate overall resource misallocation in manufacturing (this key issue will be examined later in the paper). Sampling for the WBES is conducted using stratified sampling procedures to ensure representativeness. Only the most important industries are selected for sampling. Since the relative importance of manufacturing sectors changed between the two surveys, the selected industries are not the same in the two surveys as well. In the second stage, the sample size is chosen to ensure a representative sample for the proportion of firms and the average sales in the industry. Further stratification is made on firm size and geographical location to select the firms that are covered by the survey.

We regroup the selected manufacturing industries into 7 larger industries for each survey (see Annex). This regrouping represents a compromise between the required detailed manufacturing in the HK framework and limits to data availability (Inklaar, Lashitew, and Timmer, 2015, follows the same approach).

Our empirical approach requires firm-level data for production factors and value-added. Then, we only keep in our database firms with complete data on total production, cost of intermediate inputs, capital stock, and labor inputs. Value added is measured as the difference between sales and the cost of intermediate inputs. Cost of intermediate inputs is calculated by adding up three major cost categories: energy consumption (fuel, electricity and other energy costs), cost of raw materials, and overhead and other expenses. The capital stock is measured from the book value of assets, summed across the two categories “machinery, vehicles and equipment” and “land and buildings”. Following HK, we use labor cost rather than employment as a measure of labor inputs. The objective is to account for differences in both hours worked and human capital. In addition, we 11
# **Figures and tables**

Table 1: Data availability on tax records

||Observations|Individual yearly|||Witholding f|orms|||Other sources|Undistributed|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Tax data|tax flings|Wages|Services|Dividends|Interest|Capital Gains|Rental|Third-party info|Corporate income|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|
|2003|38,778|24,260|0|0|0|0|44|0|0|13,639|
|2004|50,126|25,445|0|0|0|0|165|0|175|23,354|
|2005|58,136|26,556|0|0|0|0|229|0|302|29,676|
|2006|62,439|28,159|0|0|0|0|200|0|290|21,957|
|2007|67,808|31,695|0|0|0|0|281|0|356|34,440|
|2008|71,471|33,342|0|0|0|0|371|0|255|35,395|
|2009|73,549|34,024|0|0|0|0|301|0|2,384|34,800|
|2010|80,770|37,363|464|399|16|68|355|103|5,783|38,046|
|2011|252,833|41,138|61,823|31,036|8,861|94,305|427|124|32,027|37,655|
|2012|324,752|43,454|81,640|42,022|52,095|102,308|551|130|39,054|39,252|
|2013|399,716|46,568|93,508|44,360|88,386|144,197|550|145|48,241|37,625|
|2014|396,242|52,631|90,443|50,063|84,094|142,983|10,131|179|50,248|41,292|
|2015|481,806|82,378|112,976|56,726|96,209|185,636|17,917|324|51,332|52,227|
|2016|519,660|104,144|100,765|57,120|119,188|209,695|19,806|374|57,098|49,834|
|2017|510,873|124,176|105,944|57,421|76,893|214,265|21,302|409|60,524|52,048|
|2018|606,656|132,134|116,777|60,464|144,161|253,841|30,729|444|107,240|54,611|
|2019|652,459|115,923|118,158|56,089|182,194|296,584|34,497|443|105,061|55,031|

_Note:_ This table presents counts of observations in tax records, by year and source of income information. Column (1) presents the total number of records in each year. Column (2) presents the number of individuals filing the yearly income tax declaration. Columns (3) through (8) present the number of individuals with withholding records for income from wages, services, dividends, interest, capital gain and rental, respectively. Column (9) presents the number of individual with some other record of third-party information, including exports, sales to the government and sales to firms declaring detailed VAT information. Finally, column (10) presents the number of individuals being assigned undistributed corporate profits. Since records might be available for the same individual from several different sources, the numbers of each source do not sum to the total observations in one year. Before 2011, all withholding forms were presented on paper and have not been digitized, so we do not observe those records in our sample.

26
skill content of jobs across countries but not over time. They find that ICT capital intensity, robot use and the position of the country in the global value chain (i.e. a high share of foreign value added in the production of final goods and services) are negatively correlated with the share of routine jobs.

This research contributes to this literature by analyzing trends in the skill content of jobs and their drivers, as well as the consequences for employment creation in developing economies. The use of multiple survey years per country allows us to increase the number of observations substantially, and thereby to increase the precision of our estimates in a cross-country regression setting and to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries.

# **3. Data**

The empirical parameters are estimated using several data sets. First, it relies on the STEP surveys to measure the task content of jobs. In addition to socio-economic, demographic, employment, education and family background information, the surveys contain a series of harmonized questions on specific tasks that the respondent uses in his or her job. We use the STEP surveys for 11 developing countries (Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, FYR Macedonia, Philippines, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Vietnam), collected between 2012 and 2016.<sup>2</sup> These surveys are representative of the working age population in urban areas. While it collects information on all individuals in the household, it randomly selects an individual between 15 to 64 years old to answer the complete questionnaire, which includes detailed employment and skills questions.

This research is also based on data from the International Income Distribution Data Set (I2D2). The I2D2 is a data set of harmonized household surveys which are comparable across countries and time. It currently covers more than 150 countries and has more than 1,000 surveys. The time coverage goes from 1960 until 2016, but it varies by country. Appendix 1 shows the country and time coverage of the sample used in this paper, which excludes the pre-1990 samples. Finally, we use several variables from the World Development Indicators (WDI), including GDP per capita

> 2 Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kenya, Kosovo and Lao People’s Democratic Republic are also covered by a STEP survey but, since we do not have harmonized repeated cross-sections with the required variables for these countries, they are excluded from the sample.

5
Policy Research Working Paper 5620

# **Abstract**

Although both domestic and foreign private banks have gained ground in MENA in recent years, state banks continue to play an important role in many countries. Using a MENA bank-level panel dataset for the period 2001–08, the paper contributes to the empirical literature by documenting recent ownership trends and assessing the role of ownership and bank performance in MENA while accounting for key bank characteristics such as size and balance sheet composition. The paper analyzes headline performance indicators as well as their key drivers and finds that state banks exhibit significantly weaker performance, despite their larger size. This result is mainly driven by a larger holding of government securities, higher costs due to larger staffing numbers, and larger loan loss provisions reflecting weaker asset quality. The results reflect both operational inefficiencies and policy mandates. The paper also provides a detailed performance analysis of foreign and listed banks. Foreign banks are fairly new in MENA, yet perform on par with domestic banks despite their smaller size and higher investment costs. Listed banks exhibit superior performance driven by higher interest margins even in the face of higher costs associated with listing. Taken together, the results do not reject the development role for state banks, but do show that their intervention comes at a cost. As such, there is scope to reduce the share of state banks in some countries and to clarify the mandates, improve the governance, and strengthen the operational efficiency of most state banks in MENA.

This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region; and the Financial Systems Department, Financial and Private Sector Development. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at efeijen@worldbank.org, sfarazi@worldbank.org and rrocha@worldbank.org _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team