rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
||PPR Working Paper Series||Contact|
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||Author|laor|paper|
|WPS320 Protection Facing Exports from<br>Sub-Saharan Africa in the EEC,<br>Japan, and the U.S.|Refik Erzan<br>Peter Svedberg|||
|WPS321 Econoniic and Policy Determinants<br>of Public Sector Deficits|Jorge Marshall<br>Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel|||
|WPS322 The Earmarking of Government<br>Revenues: A Review of Some<br>World Bank Experience|William McCleary|||
|WPS323 The Old and the New is Heterodox<br>Stabilization Programs: Lessons<br>from the Sixties and the Eighties|Miguel A. Kiguel<br>Nissan Liviatan|||
|WPS 324 Ethics and Human Values in Family<br>Planning: The African Perspective|F. Sai<br>K. Newman|||
|WPS325 Manufacturers' Responses to Infra-<br>structure Deficiencies in Nigeria|Kyu Sik Lee<br>Alex Anas|||
|WPS326 Do Exporters Gain from VERs?|Jaime de Melo<br>L Alan Winters|||
|WPS327 Making Noisy Data Sing: Estimating<br>Production Technologies in<br>Developing Countries|James R. Tybout|||
|WPS328 Europe, Middle East, and North<br>Africa (EMN) Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS329 Latin America and the Caribbean<br>(LAC) Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS330 Africa Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1Cd9|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS331 Asia Region Population Projections,<br>1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
# **I. Increased Use of Antidumping**

Over the GATT's first thirty or so years, antidumping actions by national governments were a minor problem. Few national actions were taken and only one was challenged at the GATT as illegal. This complaint, raised by Italy against Sweden in 1954, was resolved quickly by Sweden changing the regulations that had been questioned. (Hudec 1975, p. 284)

# **Increased antidumping**

Through the early 1960s, GATT member -ountries (in total) undertook fewer than a dozen antidumping actions per year. However, by the latter half of the 1970s the United States alone averaged thirty-five cases per year, and as Table I shows, the frequency across all GATT member countries is now more than two hundred per year. Some forty countries, including a number of developing countries, have antidumping regulations in place,<sup>3</sup> and in 1991-9,;, fourteen of them were active antidumpers.

The increased use of antidumping measures has raised questions about them. Three widely accepted conclusions are particularly troubling:<sup>4</sup>

1. National regulations allow antidumping action in a broad range of circumstances. The point is stated by different authors in different ways, e.g., that such regulations are biased toward finding dumping and toward

## 3 GATT Secretariat estimate.

4 The increased use of antidumping has occasioned a wave of research, focused more or less on learning how (administratively) the instrument work-s and of judging the appropriateness of the resulting actions. The findings of this research are surveyed in Finger (1993a) especially chapters 2 and 3, and in Finger (1993b). The conclusions reported in the text are substantiated in those surveys.

2
while on average relative inequality has been falling, appreciable inequalities remain. In the latest round of surveys used in this study (of which all but two are from the 2000s), the richest 60 percent of children in the developing world are, compared to the poorest 40 percent and based on a comparison of odds ratios, 1.2 times as likely to sleep under a bednet, 1.5 times as likely to be immunized, and 3.7 times as likely to have been delivered by a skilled birth attendant.

On the subset of issues that we address and previous authors have addressed, we see some similarities in results, but also some differences. Our results are broadly consistent with those of Victora et al. (2012) and Suzuki et al. (2012) who found pro-poor progress on most of the MDG intervention indicators that were also examined here; the exception is SBA which Suzuki et al. (2012) concluded had been pro-rich. On inequalities in health status indicators, our results on under-five mortality are consistent with those of Moser et al. (2005) who found that progress had been neither pro-poor nor pro-rich on balance, but our results on underweight are less encouraging than those of Suzuki et al. (2014) who found pro-poor progress in over 60 percent of countries. Differences in findings may be due to variations in the methodological approaches adopted, such as differences in the number of countries included, time period examined the definition of poor and non-poor and the measure of inequality.

Our first finding – that in most countries the poor have not been left behind by the health MDGs – will be reassuring to donors, international development and technical agencies, national governments, NGOs, program implementers, and health care professionals. But our other two findings – that relative inequalities have grown in a sizable minority of countries especially on health status indicators, and that, despite reductions in most countries, inequalities are still appreciable – will be a cause for concern. Governments, 17
1

# 1 Introduction

Foreign capital inflows to developing countries constitute part of the world's saving. Over the past two decades, world saving as a proportion of world income has fallen. As world saving has shrunk, so the real interest rate measured in terms of U.S. dollar interest and inflation rates has risen from 0.8 per cent during the period 1971-1978 to 4.8 per cent in the period 1981-1991 _(International Financial Statistics,_ CD-ROM, September 1994).1 It is against this background that foreign direct investment (FDI) has appeared increasingly attractive to developing countries facing declining domestic investment and higher costs of foreign borrowing. Foreign direct investment seems an attractive form of capital inflow because it involves a risk-sharing relationship with the suppliers of this type of foreign capital. This kind of risk sharing does not exist in the formal contractual arrangements for foreign loans. Furthermore, as the World Bank (1993, 3) claims, there may be dynamic benefits: "Foreign direct investment is a large and growing source of finance that may help developing countries close the technology gap with high-income countries, upgrade managerial skills, and develop their export markets." Globally, FDI has increased dramatically over.the past decade. However, most of this increase has occurred in the industrial countries. In the developing countries, **FDI** has been heavily concentrated among a small number of countries; over 90 per cent of **FDI** inflows to developing countries in 1990 was received by only 18 countries. Half of this total flowed to eight Pacific Basin developing market economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand). Given that neither Korea nor Taiwan has shown strong interest in attracting **FDI,** it may seem surprising that these economies feature in this group of developing countries. Their appearance in this list may support the view that explicit incentive packages are not the key determinants of **FDI** flows.

In undertaking any analysis of **FDI,** one must recognize that **FDI** data record financial flows which may or may not correspond to changes in capital formation. Whether or not they do depends on (a) the extent of substitutability of this type of financial flow for other types of financial flows and (b) the extent to which **FDI** crowds out domestically financed 'The **real interest rate is proxied here by the London interbank offered rate on U.S. dollar deposits adjusted for the percentage change in the** U.S. **GDP deflator. During the period 1992-1995, this real interest rate averaged only** 1.5 **percent, but has been rising rapidly since** 1993 _(World_ **_Economic Outlook,_ May** 1994, **177).**
- [22] deserranno.e (2017) “Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Health Workers,” _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , forth.

- [23] dixit.a (2002) “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretive Review,” _Journal of Human Resources_ 37: 696-727.

- [24] easterly.w and r.levine (1997) “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 112: 1203-50.

- [25] finan.f, b.a.olken, and r.pande (2017) “The Personnel Economics of the State,” in A.V.Banerjee and E.(eds.) _Handbook of Field Experiments_ , Elsevier.

- [26] francois.p and m.vlassopoulos (2008) “Pro-social Motivation and the Delivery of Social Services,” _CESifo Economic Studies_ 54: 1-33.

- [27] gibbons.r and r.henderson (2013) “What Do Managers Do?,” in R.Gibbons and J.Roberts (eds.) _Handbook of Organizational Economics_ , Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- [28] gneezy.u and a.rustichini (2000) “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay At All,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 115: 791-810.

- [29] goldfinch.s, k.derouen and p.pospieszna (2012) “Flying Blind? Evidence for Good Governance Public Management Reform Agendas, Implementation and Outcomes in Low Income Countries,” _Public Administration and Development_ 33: 50-61.

- [30] hamermesh.d.s (2007) “Viewpoint: Replication in Economics,” _Canadian Journal of Economics_ 40: 715-33.

- [31] hasnain.z, n.manning and j.h.pierskalla (2012) Performance-related Pay in the Public Sector, _World Bank Policy Research Working Pa2per_ 6043.

- [32] hjort.j (2014) “Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 129: 1899-946.

- [33] kelman.s (1990) _Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Public Performance_ , Washington DC: American Enterprise Initiative.

- [34] khan.a.q, a.i.khwaja and b.olken (2016) “Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 131: 219-71.

- [35] leonard.d.k (2010) “‘Pockets’ of E↵ective Agencies in Weak Governance states: Where are they Likely and Why does it Matter?,” _Public Administration and Development_ 30: 91-101.

31
Policy Research Working Paper 9099

# **Abstract**

High-growth firms have been widely studied in advanced countries, but little is known about such stellar performers in Africa. Using establishment-level data from Ethiopia, this paper finds that the incidence of high-growth firms stands at an average of 7 percent, a figure comparable to that of advanced countries. High-growth episodes are short-lived, and the likelihood of survival or a subsequent episode is not any higher for high-growth firms. It is difficult for firms to sustain high growth, and the likelihood of a repeated episode is low. There is only a 6.5 percent chance that a manufacturing plant in Ethiopia will repeat a high-growth event in the subsequent three-year period. This likelihood is not greater than that of plants that did not experience high growth in the previous period. The paper explores the drivers of high growth and finds a tight link between exemplary performance and initial plant productivity, which is robust to many controls, including plant location. Plants located in Ethiopia’s capital city or agglomerations have a higher probability of high growth. And high growth in plant employment is found to be self-reinforcing, that is, past high-growth experience is positively and significantly associated with subsequent growth in firm productivity.

This paper is a product of the Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at agrover1@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
differently, over time the benefits from e-filing (assuming perfect policy implementation) will increase while the costs diminish.

In a perfect world, one can estimate the average effect of e-filing (the first part of the equation) by conducting a controlled experimental design, where some firms (regardless of their characteristics) are randomly assigned to use e-filing while others (the control group) are assigned to not use it. In this way, one could simply go around the self-selection problem<sup>9</sup> by disentangling the decision of adopting e-filing and firm characteristics. Following the first step, one could then undertake a very simple regression analysis to estimate the average “causal effect” of using e-filing on TCC. In a world of empirical data lacking an experimental design, one needs to control for all firms’ characteristics, especially the ones that are particularly important for the decision of e-filing usage, to overcome the selection problem. Following the first step, one can then estimate the average effect of e-filing on TCC in a more complex regression setup. This could best be done in a panel setup by using firm’s fixed effects (including time invariant unobserved firm characteristics) and time trends in the regression model. The time frame is also important to understand the short-run versus medium to long-run impacts of using e-filing.

As we have, so far, only cross sectional firm level data sets, we are not in a position to apply the first two methods. However, using the data available to us, we can control for many firm characteristics such as turnover, employment, productivity, taxes paid by firms, bank accounts (formality in doing business) etc., and also, can control for industry, location and legal form of firms. As the analysis is done for each country separately, the government policy generally should have similar effects on all firms in the same country (although firms’ perceptions or experience with informalities generated by government officials within a country may be different). Finally, there are some perception variables, which can be used as proxies for governance quality and the efficacy of policy implementation at the firm

> 9 See Heckman, J. James (1979, 1990) and also for a recent reference, see Jacobs, Hartog and Vijverberg (2009) for further details. There are different types of selection bias problems, the one that is particular concern to us here is the possibility of a group of firms with certain types of characteristics (that are not observable in the data) self-selecting themselves to e-file.

7
**Annex 1** .  Approaches to Measuring Empowerment

|Study and Location|Definition of<br>Empowerment|Measurement<br>Concept|Data Sources|Focus|Conclusions|Implication|Scope|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Lokshin and<br>Ravallion (2003)<br>_Russia_|Taking actions<br>that selectively<br>empower those<br>with little power<br>to redress power<br>inequality|Respondents place<br>themselves on<br>Cantil ladder (nine<br>steps) for power; the<br>interpretation of the<br>meaning of the<br>lower and higher<br>steps is left to<br>participants|Data on Russian<br>adults from the<br>Russian<br>Longitudinal<br>Monitoring<br>Survey (1998<br>and 2000)|Comparability<br>of expressed<br>perceptions of<br>power and<br>economic<br>welfare|Significant but<br>seemingly weak<br>association<br>between power<br>and welfare in<br>levels and<br>changes over time|The scope of<br>empowerment is<br>not limited to the<br>poor|Individual and<br>household level.<br>Perceptions of status of<br>empowerment/outcome.<br>Economic domain.|
|Moser (2003)<br>_Columbia_|Expanding<br>assets and<br>capabilities of<br>poor people to<br>participate in,<br>negotiate with,<br>influence,<br>control, and hold<br>accountable<br>institutions that<br>affect their lives|Composite<br>indicators at the<br>individual level<br>(self-esteem,<br>importance of<br>gender identity,<br>attitude towards<br>peace, participation<br>in meetings, time for<br>conflict/peace<br>related activities),<br>organizational<br>(internal cohesion),<br>and inter-<br>institutional<br>(contact,<br>coordination) levels|Quantitative<br>descriptive<br>information on<br>inputs and<br>outputs from<br>written<br>documentation<br>and interview<br>sources;<br>qualitative<br>participatory<br>evaluation<br>workshop from<br>two projects|Empowerment<br>of local<br>communities<br>through<br>participation<br>in ongoing<br>peace<br>processes|Empirical issue<br>concerning<br>community<br>perceptions of<br>empowerment<br>such as the<br>difficulty to<br>conceptualize<br>indicators; their<br>context<br>specificity; or<br>delayed impacts|Problems of<br>context<br>specificity of<br>indicators, the<br>difficulty for<br>participants to<br>conceptualize<br>them; delayed<br>impacts; and<br>unpredictability<br>of the forms of<br>outcomes|Community-level<br>perception indicators<br>(individual,<br>organizational and<br>inter-institutional<br>level); changes in<br>inclusion/participation<br>and local organizational<br>capacity (agency).<br>Political domain.|
|Malena (2003)<br>_Pilot_|Enabling or<br>giving power to|Aggregated<br>empowerment score|Media review,<br>focus groups,|State of civil<br>society around|Description of the<br>CIVICUS Civil|Comprehensive<br>approach (social|Civil society/national<br>level; empowerment in|

35
right, suggesting it remains a potential concern.<sup>37</sup> The use of anchoring vignettes may provide a possible promising avenue to address different types of response patterns (Hopkins and King, 2010; Primi et al, 2016) and more research is needed to test this approach in large rural household surveys.

Finally, “social desirability bias” may lead a respondent to answer what he believes would give the best impression, or what the enumerator may want to hear. In surveys related to impact evaluations, respondents may also believe their answers could affect the probability to receive benefits and attempt to answer strategically. Such biases are difficult to avoid when using selfreports rather than observed outcomes and the extent to which they affect the measures and generate a non-random noise remains difficult to assess. While this holds for many outcomes other than skills, in the case of skills such response patterns provide an additional challenge for the interpretation of the findings, as the way of answering questions may be related to personality itself. The use of forced choice questions or situational judgment tests (Lipnevich, MacCann and Roberts, 2013; Kyllonen, 2016) may provide a potential answer to these concerns, but the extent to which they improve validity or reliability in large rural household surveys is an open question.

# **4.5 Anchoring and the use of other sources of information**

The previous sub-section raises the possibility of different response biases affecting the answers. Another important response pattern comes from the fact that each respondent may interpret the Likert Scale differently and use thresholds to decide between answer categories. Anchoring vignettes possibly can help to address this challenge too. Another way of breaking the relationship between answer patterns and skills is to ask another person about the skills of the person of interest, not unlike the use of recommendation letters to evaluate skills in other settings. A priori, the random measurement of a person’s skills should be noisier when asking somebody else, as the other person is likely to have asymmetric information about the true skill level. Yet if it helps to address the systematic bias, or if the introduced random measurement error is limited, this may constitute an alternative or complementary manner to measure skills. To test these tradeoffs, we collected proxy information from a number of different sources. First we asked the community health worker (CHW), a person well informed about different village members, based on her regular home-visits, to classify households according to their cognitive, noncognitive and

> 37 This was the case even after eliminating variables showing the least variation after the piloting.

27
As the flow approach to modeling labor markets has become the standard in the literature, a new generation of search models has incorporated an informal sector (See Zenou, 2007, Albrecht et al. , 2006, Bosch, 2004, Kolm and Larsen, 2002 and 2004, Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001 and 2006, and Fugazza, 2004. However, while early US focused search models were firmly rooted in micro evidence from job and worker flows,<sup>6</sup> this new generation of models has had to work with few stylized facts about how the LDC markets adjust along the margins of unemployment and informality.

This paper provides such stylized facts based on measures of gross flows of workers derived from the micro data on employment surveys in Mexico and Brazil over several business cycles. To capture and formalize the dynamics, we follow Geweke (1986) in estimating labor market transitions in a continuous time context to correct for time aggregation<sup>7</sup> and employ recent techniques to decompose the contributions of the inflows and outflows rates to movements in unemployment and relative sectoral employment shares. These decompositions generate several conclusions with implications for the modeling of labor markets in developing countries.

First, as in the US, the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical. The contemporaneous cyclical correlation with output is around -0.8 and its elasticity -4.3 for Mexico and -4.5 for Brazil. However, in contrast to the US, where estimates of the contribution of the job separation rate to unemployment movements are generally a fraction of that of the job finding rate, separations are strongly countercyclical and very volatile, especially in periods of deep recessions such as the 1995 tequila crises in Mexico and the 1981-1983, 1990-1992 and 1998-1999 in Brazil. Job separations can explain around 40% of all cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, almost twice as much as the explanatory power of fluctuations in the job finding rate. However, strikingly, the relevant separations are largely those from the informal sector. The formal sector shows muted cyclical separation dynamics more similar to those documented for the US.

Second, the sectoral composition of employment is also strongly cyclical. Informal (formal) employment as a share of working age population is generally

> 6 See for instance Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).

> 7 That is, we control for the fact that the data is collected a fixed time intervals while transitions occur in continuous time.

3