rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
||||||disaggregated|panel GMM|cons.,<br>Inflation,<br>openness,<br>terms of<br>trade, econ.<br>Dev. Stage,<br>legal system,<br>property<br>rights, rule of<br>law.|not<br>penetration for<br>life and non<br>life.<br>Importance of<br>legal system<br>identified.<br>Supply<br>leading effect<br>weaker in less<br>developed<br>countries.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Han, Li,<br>Moshiran and<br>Tian|2010|77<br>countries|1994-<br>2005|Real GDP/<br>capita<br>growth|Insurance<br>density, life<br>and non life<br>disaggregated|Dynamic<br>panel GMM|Income/<br>capita,<br>tertiary<br>education,<br>inflation,<br>trade<br>balance,<br>investment.|Insurance<br>plays a more<br>important role<br>in developing<br>countries.|
|Ching,<br>Kogid,<br>Furuoka|2010|Malaysia||Real GDP<br>growth|Total life<br>insurance<br>assets|Granger<br>causality/<br>VECM||Life insurance<br>is long run<br>supply<br>leading, short<br>run demand<br>following.|
|Njegomir and<br>Stojic|2010|Former<br>Yugoslav<br>ia – 5<br>countries|2002-<br>2008|Real GDP/<br>capita<br>growth|Insurance<br>density, life<br>and non life<br>disaggregated<br>,|Fixed effects<br>panel<br>regression|Insurance<br>investments,<br>bank lending,<br>SX<br>capitalization<br>, gov’t cons.,<br>physical<br>capital,<br>exports,|Positive<br>impact of<br>insurance as<br>both risk<br>carriers and<br>investors,<br>insignificant<br>impacts from<br>banking and<br>capital<br>markets.<br>Reflect the<br>greater<br>resilience of<br>the insurance<br>sector to<br>crisis.|
|Ege and<br>Sarac|2011|29 mainly<br>OECD<br>countries|1999-<br>2008|Real GDP/<br>capita<br>growth|Growth in<br>total premium<br>income|Panel<br>regression<br>after unit root<br>test.|Employment<br>growth rate,<br>openness,<br>share of fixed<br>cap. Exp. In<br>GDP|No causality<br>tested but<br>clear link<br>between<br>insurance and<br>growth.|

10
Development Goal by 2015, so that malaria is no longer a major cause of mortality and no longer a barrier to social and economic development and growth anywhere in the world.<sup>4</sup> With less than five years from the internationally agreed deadline for achieving near-zero malaria deaths, the next few years will call for a massive international effort for a rapid and sustained scale up of malaria control measures. In 2006, the World Health Organization issued a statement recommending wider use of **DDT** (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane) through IRS to reduce the prevalence of malaria on basis of high insecticidal activity, low acute mammalian toxicity, wide spectrum use, low price, and long duration of activity (WHO 2011b).<sup>5</sup> However, WHO’s endorsement and consequent increase in the use of DDT has been criticized heavily on grounds of potential ecological harm and chronic adverse health effects due to the persistent and bio-accumulative nature of DDT (Cone 2009).

It is undeniable that a rapid control of malaria is vital to free malaria-prone countries from the scourge of this debilitating disease. A number of studies have quantified the economic benefits that these regions can derive by controlling malaria and has therefore been propagating a more widespread use of DDT in IRS. However, little analysis has been done to quantify the unintentional impacts (externalities) caused by DDT. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap by

- 4 In particular, the targets of the Global Malaria Action Plan sponsored by The RBM are to:

- _<u><mark>Achieve</mark></u>_ **<mark>universal coverage</mark>** <mark>for all populations at risk with locally appropriate interventions for prevention and case management by 2010 and sustain universal coverage until local field research suggests that coverage can gradually be targeted to high risk areas and seasons only, without risk of a generalized resurgence;</mark>

- _<u><mark>Reduce</mark></u>_ <mark>global malaria</mark> **<mark>cases</mark>** <mark>from 2000 levels by 50% in 2010 and by 75% in 2015 (In 2000, there were between 350 and 500 million cases of malaria);</mark>

- _<u><mark>Reduce</mark></u>_ <mark>global malaria</mark> **<mark>deaths</mark>** <mark>from 2000 levels by 50% in 2010 and to near zero preventable deaths in 2015 (In 2000, there were at-least one million deaths from malaria worldwide);</mark>

- _<u><mark>Eliminate</mark></u>_ <mark>malaria in 8-10 countries by 2015 and afterwards in all countries in the pre-elimination phase today; and</mark>

- <mark>In the long term,</mark> _<u><mark>eradicate</mark></u>_ <u><mark>malaria world-wide by reducing the global incidence to zero through</mark></u> progressive elimination in countries.

<mark>See Roll Back Malaria, 2012. GMAP- the Global Malaria Action Plan for details.</mark>

> 5 Other chemicals have also been used for IRS but DDT has been found to be generally superior to all other alternatives on a number of counts.

3
in developing countries. High-frequency phone surveys can shed light on aspects of the economic impact of the pandemic that are difficult to capture using more traditional data. They can be conducted more quickly than GDP statistics, which often rely on projections in real time and are significantly revised in subsequent years. Moreover, phone surveys can uncover dimensions of heterogeneity, as well as information on coping mechanisms and potential implications on the lives of respondents that are not captured by official economic statistics.

Of course, HFPS survey data have limitations too. Particular care and effort must be taken when comparing and harmonizing surveys from different countries. Further, the surveys are not nationally representative, as they can only reach phone owners and in many countries greatly over-represented heads. However, we see that measures of stopped work in the phone surveys are more consistent with reductions in household wage income, estimates of demand reduction in firms, and ILO employment estimates than GDP growth projections. Also, the initial round of the phone surveys contained few variables found in traditional face-to-face household surveys implemented before the crisis. As a result, the reweighting procedure could only utilize a few variables and did not have a large effect on the results. Despite these limitations, harmonized data from phone surveys appear to contribute valuable new information on how households in a broad cross-section of developing countries were affected by this severe shock. This is in line with recent findings by Heath et al. (2021) that comparing interviews conducted on the phone and in-person led to differences in measures of employment, hours and days worked for the self-employed in Ghana.

The rapid deployment of phone surveys to measure the socio-economic impacts of COVID19 was only possible because of an extraordinary effort around the globe. To be better prepared for such rapid deployment in future emergencies, National Statistics Offices can invest now to improve the speed of deployment and quality of data. Investments in statistical infrastructure (e.g., the preparation of representative sampling frames for phone surveys), physical infrastructure (e.g., setup of phone centers) as well as human capital (e.g., establishment of 26
**Table 2: Descriptive statistics on study** **<u>population</u>**

||(1)||(2)||(3)||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**SELECTED Sa**<br>Mean[SD|**mple**<br>]|**All informal bu**<br>Mean[S|**sinesses**<br>D]|**Formal busi**<br>Mean[S|**nesses**<br>D]|
|_Firm owner characteristics_|||||||
|Female owner|0.629|3600|0.632|7093|0.419|608|
||[0.483]||[0.482]||[0.494]||
|Age of the owner|39.454|3561|39.419|6959|43.637|589|
||[10.386]||[11.168]||[10.525]||
|Firm owner has at least some formal|0.712|3595|0.708|7085|0.884|606|
|education|[0.453]||[0.455]||[0.32]||
|_Firm characteristics_|||||||
|Trade|0.549|3600|0.518|7094|0.584|608|
||[0.498]||[0.5]||[0.493]||
|Services|0.262|3600|0.277|7094|0.26|608|
||[0.44]||[0.447]||[0.439]||
|Craft|0.16|3600|0.17|7094|0.09|608|
||[0.367]||[0.376]||[0.287]||
|Business created less than one year ago|0.144|3600|0.183|7094|0.137|606|
||[0.351]||[0.386]||[0.344]||
|Firm area in m2|18.72|3594|18.322|7082|52.479|606|
||[43.479]||[50.788]||[106.493]||
|Number of employee|1.176|3600|1.03|7094|2.961|608|
||[1.687]||[1.603]||[4.59]||
|The firm does any form of accounting|0.179|3598|0.156|7093|0.642|604|
||[0.383]||[0.363]||[0.48]||
|Amount of sales in an average week|60553.35|3600|82612.66|6643|542166.8|528|
|(FCFA)|[56492.2]||[298607.1]||[4434990]||
|Amount of profit in the last month|46671.9|3600|46419.43|6362|223041.2|490|
|(FCFA)|[46558.47]||[141379.5]||[726068.4]||
|Firm owner owns a bank account|0.222|3517|0.194|6931|0.789|582|
||[0.416]||[0.396]||[0.409]||
|Firm pays taxes|0.547|3564|0.466|7009|0.836|597|
||[0.498]||[0.499]||[0.371]||
|Amount of taxes paid in the previous|18742.54|3486|16655.86|6831|316636.4|533|
|year (FCFA)|[27265.45]||[30725.88]||[2591065]||
|Thinks that it's difficult or very difficult to|0.744|2669|0.765|4925|0.725|520|
|know in advance how much taxes he/she<br>|[0.436]||[0.424]||[0.447]||
|will have to pay|||||||
|Ratio tax/ annual profit for all businesses<br>|0.051|3486|0.072|6178|0.128|445|
||[0.089]||[0.174]||[0.221]||
|Ratio tax/ annual profit for businesses|0.094|1873|0.165|2862|0.169|372|
|paying taxes|[0.104]||[0.286]||[0.313]||

Notes: sources: listing-baseline survey March 2014
> <sup>33</sup>

The two-stage least squares results in Tables 5b and 6b also suggest that historical forces associated with colonial heritage drive both subsequent political development and the evolution of legal institutions. Once this exogenous component of the political characteristics of countries is isolated the explanatory power of legal origin diminishes. Legal origins are clearly a good proxy for these historical conditions, but the significance of the proxies diminishes once the political channels are modeled more explicitly. Such a claim requires more investigation, however, particularly since colonial heritage is itself a black box when it comes to understanding these historical conditions.

It is, finally, instructive to ask why the political results here stand in such stark contrast to those in Beck, et al. (2001). The answer is likely two-fold. First, the subjective measures of political phenomena that they use may overweight the presence of competitive elections. As the evidence here suggests, among all political determinants, competitive elections by themselves form a weaker basis for financial sector development.

Second, although they are careful to test the role played by special interests both in theory and in their empirical work, the variables used here may be more apt for the task. Unlike the variables used here to capture special interest influence, theirs is never significant. The likely reason for this is simply that their proxy is noisier than the variables used here.

They use the variable _special_ from the _Database of Political Institutions_ (DPI), which records whether parties in government are committed to a nationalist, rural, regional or religious agenda. Despite the variable label, its best use is likely as a measure of the ideological orientation of governments rather of government willingness to reward narrow interests in society. This is the case with the nationalist and religious categories, for example, which are not traditional dimensions by which one evaluates the extent to which narrow groups in society seek economic benefits from government at the expense of society at large.
were determined by negotiation between seller and buyer. Where administered prices would cause losses, enterprises were compensated for the difference between the price and the actual cost of production.

Tablr 3 gives some idea of price levels in Poland for a number of chemicals in 1985. At the official exchange rate, domestic prices for these products were in general close to their respective economic prices, with the exception of caustic soda, melamine, MDI, polypropylene, and viscose pulp, whose domestic prices were about two-thirds of their economic prices. But if prices are calculated at an indicative rate of 400 zloty (ZL) to the U.S. dollar, which ia between the official rate of ZL 240/US$l in 1987 and the free market rate of ZL 1,000/US$i, not one of these prodttcts would be priced close to it economic cost.

# Polish foreign trade policies

Until 1982, producing enterprises in Poland could not ergage in export or import transactions on their own, but had to use the services or foreign trade organizations. The foreign trade organization actually took title to the goods and resold them on world markets. The trade organizations paid producers for their goods in domestic currency and received hard currency for their export sales.

Under the reform of 1982, enterprises with qualified staff and with exports worth over ZL 1 billion or accounting for at least 25 percent of total sales could obtain a foreign trade license.3 The reform also allowed producers more freedom in selecting a foreign trad- organization. This liberalization had little effect in the chemical sector, however, si.;ce only one trade organization (Ciech) specialized in services for chemicals (Parkola and Rapacki 1986, 13). But chemical producers did gain greater influence over export activities through another provision of the reform that permitted foreign trade organizations to form joint stock companies, and industrial and foreign companies to become shareholders. Ciech was transformed into a joint

-4
recent evidence suggests that gender equality is correlated with good governance and institutions. For instance, Kaufmann et al. (2008) find a positive correlation between a control-of-corruption index and the World Bank’s (2004) measure of gender equality. Branisa et al. (2009) find that social institutions that reduce gender inequality are correlated with institutions that reduce corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and offer good protection for property rights.

4 Other examples include Dollar and Gatti (1999), who find that gender inequality is negatively correlated with growth only in the sample of countries with high female secondary attainment (more than 10.35 percent of the population). In contrast, Klasen (2002) finds that the effects are stronger in sub-Saharan Africa, that is, among the poorest countries in the world. Heterogeneity across time appears to be equally problematic. For instance, Klasen (2002) shows that the correlation between gender inequality and growth disappears when using data from the 1980–90 period instead of the 1960–90 period.

5 We note that this is not because gender equality in educational attainment is a recent phenomenon and that newly educated women need time to gain economic and political parity. In their historical account of gender inequality using microlevel census data, Ganguli et al. (2010) show that for the two-thirds of their sample countries in which the gender gap (defined as the difference in years of education) was reversed, this reversal occurred for the cohort born in 1975 at the very latest. These women are past the age when occupational choices are made.

> 6 Data from the OECD family database ( _<u>www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database</u>_ <u>),</u> accessed October 6, 2011. The only countries that offer full-pay paternal leave for more than five weeks are Iceland (10 weeks), Sweden (nine weeks), and Norway (six weeks).

7 Duflo (2012) provides a comprehensive review.

24
To compute the normalized average cost of producing services from processed timber, _c_<sup>_o,s_</sup> _,_ we divide normalized expenditures by the output of services from processed timber produced in 2004.

# B.1.3.4 Ecosystem Services

The parameters for production of ecosystem services in production function A.20 are based on the estimates of Costanza et al. (1997), who estimated values for 17 ecosystem services from 16 ecosystem types at global scale.<sup>6</sup> We exclude the services from the production of food and timber, as well as from based climate abatement, as those are determined endogenously in the model. We also exclude the production of ecosystem services from ecosystems not represented in the model (e.g., marine, grasslands and deserts). We use agroecological zone (AEZ) representation of GTAP land use database to dierentiate between tropical and temperate/boreal forest land. Based on ecological literature (Ehrlich and Mooney 1983) we assume that there is a limited substitution between different land types in production of ecosystem services. Because eectiveness of protected land areas is very dicult to quantify (Chape et al. 2005), we set the parameter _θ_<sup>_R_</sup> large enough to make sure new protected areas are established.

We measure the non-land costs of managing protected natural areas based on GTAP v.7 database as public expenditures on outdoor recreation services per hectare of protected land,<sup>7</sup> and normalize them by the total expenditures on other primary resources. To compute the normalized average cost of producing ecosystem services, _c_<sup>_o,r_</sup> _,_ we divide normalized expenditures by the output of ecosystem services per hectare of protected land produced in 2004.

# B.1.3.5 Other Final Goods and Services

The initial values for the production of other goods and services are based on the value of output at agents' prices from GTAP v.7 database. The production of other goods and services is obtained from GTAP v.7 sectors 9-12, 14-15, 18-20, 22, 26-29, 33-42, 45, 47-54 and 56-57. The value of the total factor productivity index in 2004 is calculated as the ratio of other nal goods and services to other primary goods and services. We set total factor productivity growth rate using

> 6We are familiar with multiple criticisms of this approach National Research Council (2005, p. 188-189). However, there have been very few attempts to evaluate production of ecosystem services at global scale, and the work of Costanza et al. (1997) still remains most inuential.

> 7Following Antoine et al. (2008), we dene outdoor recreation services sector based on GTAP v.7 database. This sector comprises of hunting and shing, wildlife viewing in reserves, and other wildlife viewing activities.

18
2014-16 beyond the medium term, because this would require annual increases in labor productivity of 5 percent, which is unrealistic. Moreover, the adverse demographic trends will reduce domestic savings, because of the rise in the dependency ratio, which will undermine the economy’s capacity to undertake the investment in physical and human capital which will be needed to achieve rapid growth in labor productivity.

**Figure 5: Projections of Dependency Ratios in Romania and the European Union**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060<br>EU 27 Romania<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Eurostat, EUROPOP2008 Convergence scenario, regional level, April 2011 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/metadata?p_product_code=PROJ_R08C_ESMS

# **4.2 Fiscal implications of population aging**

The EU Commission’s Ageing Working Group has prepared estimates of the age related fiscal costs for all EU members over the next 50 years. The Ageing Working Group has combined these costs with the current fiscal position of EU members to derive estimates of the upfront fiscal adjustment which is required to ensure long run fiscal sustainability. Two separate measures of the fiscal adjustment needed to achieve fiscal sustainability are estimated; the first 15
1989–2004.<sup>6</sup> The UCDP defines an internal armed conflict as a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory, between a government and an opposition organization, and which reaches the level of minor armed conflict, that is, at least 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year. The UCDP dataset covering the post-Cold War period is unique in that it includes yearly data on _all_ rebel groups involved in an armed conflict with the government that has reached at least this level of battle-deaths. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to have comparable yearly data on the conflict behavior involving the government and each of the rebel groups. Hence, this dataset will be used.

Each internal armed conflict consists of one or more dyads, where the government and each rebel group engage in violence reaching the level of 25 battlerelated deaths in at least one year. Hence, there may be two or more warring parties, of which one is always the government. In this study a party that _prior_ to the peace agreement met the criterion of ‘warring party’ is of interest, and the government and these rebel groups may, or may not, have signed a peace agreement in the conflict. The reason for focusing on the warring parties is that these have been active in the conflict and at some point had both the incentives and capabilities to use armed violence.

The UCDP also provides a comprehensive dataset of all peace agreements signed in the post-1989 period. Some other lists of peace agreements only focus on the settlements signed by all, or the major warring parties (e.g. Walter, 1999: 127– 128, 2002b: 52). For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to include all peace agreements and not merely those signed by certain rebel groups. The dataset from the UCDP includes agreements where only some of the rebel groups are signatories. Hence, this study covers all peace agreements that are signed by the government and one or several rebel groups, and which address the incompatibility by settling all or part of it (UCDP, 2006).<sup>7</sup> The data used consists in total of 82 peace agreements in 40 internal armed conflicts, and some of the conflicts stand out in terms of the number of

> 6 If not otherwise mentioned, the data in this study comes from the UCDP. For definitions of concepts, see UCDP (2006) and Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006). Note that since the conflict behavior of the parties is assessed the year after the signing of a peace agreement, and this data has been available up till 2004, only agreements up till 2003 are included in the study.

> 7 In line with previous research I do not study ‘peace process agreements’ since these are merely ‘outlining a process for regulating or resolving the incompatibility’ (Sollenberg, 2002: 14).

8
- 35 -

# VI. Conclusion

There is a broad consensus in both developed and developing countries that poverty should and can be reduced. However, there is much less consensus on how this can be done. One problem involves the difficulty of ensuring that efforts to assist the poor do indeed reach those who are poor, which is known as the targeting issue. This paper has examined the case where assistance to the poor takes the form of rations, money, vouchers, etc. given directly to individuals or households which have been directly identified as likely to be poor. A formal statement of the problem was presented in Section II.

The main reason targeting is troublesome is that one does not know the incomes of individuals, and there is a clear incentive for them to misrepresent their incomes in order to obtain more tranfers. The third section of this paper presented a simple method for targeting when income (more specifically, households expenditure) is not observable but other characteristics which are correlated with income can be observed. This method was applied using household data from C6te d'Ivoire in Section IV. Using the simplest of regressions techniques on accurate household survey data, one can predict incomes based on observable household characteristics and distribute transfers on the basis of these predictions. For the case of Cate d'Ivoire, substantial reductions in poverty can be made, in some cases relatively close to those possible if income were directly observable. Perhaps of greater interest to policy makers, substantial reductions can be made in the amount of money available for transfers without increasing aggregate poverty if this targeting technique is used, relative to untargeted transfer schemes. Of course, the implementation of this method entails certain costs for gathering information, which may at times outweigh these benefits.