rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- **Labor legislation:  M** any countries have enacted laws that prohibit racial discrimination in the labor market.  However, little is know about adequacy, enforcement  and effectiveness of this legislation.

# **References:**

- Addison, J. and  J. L. Grosso. (1996). "Job Security Provisions and Employment: Revised Estimates." Industrial Relations. 35(4).

- Addison, J. and P. Teixeira. (2001). "The Economics of Employment Protection." IZA Discussion Paper No. 381. Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany.

- Addison, J. T., P. Teixeira, and J. L. Grosso. (2000). "The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment: More on a Vexed Theme." _Southern Economic Journal_ 67(1): 105-122.

- Akerlof, G. and R. Kranton (2000). “Economics and Identity” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 115(3):  715-53.

- Arbache, J. S.. (2002). "Unions and the Labor Market in Brazil". Background paper for the Brazil Jobs Report. The World Bank and Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.

- Arias, O. and W. Sosa. (2004). "Subjective poverty in Bolivia: a binary quantile regression approach, 2003." Work in process. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- Arias, O., Yamada, G. and L. Tejerina (2004). “Education, Family Background and Racial Earnings Inequality in Brazil.” International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 25, No. 314.

- Barrera, F. and L. Higuera. (2004). “Characterization of Training in Colombia Household and Firms surveys”, Background study for a World Bank study “Colombia Lifelong Learning”, Bogota, Colombia.

- Batra, G. (2001). “Skills Upgrading and Competitiveness in Developing Countries.” Labor Market Policies Course, April 23 - May 4. Washington DC: The World Bank.

- Behrman, J., N. Birdsall and M. Székely. (2003). “Aid policies and Growth" in Latin America. Center for Global Development.Working Paper (U.S.); No. 29.

- Bentolila, S. and A. Ichino. (2000) “Are Job Losses less painful near the Mediterranean?” CEPR discussion paper 2539. Oxford university.

- Blanchard, O. (1998). "Thinking about Unemployment" Manuscript. Department of Economics, MIT.

- Blanchard, O. and A. Landier. (2001). "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: Fixed Duration Contracts in France." NBER Working Paper 8219. NBER, Cambridge, MA

- Blau, F. and M. Ferber. (1992). _The Economics of Women, Men, and Work_ , Second edition PrenticeHall, New Jersey.

- Blau, F. (1998). “Trends in the Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995” _Journal of Economic Literature_ (23:1), 112-165.

- Bosch, M. and W. Maloney. (2004). " Comparative Labor Markets Analysis Using Continuous Time Markov Processes." Work in progress. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- Bosch, M. and L. Siga. (2004). "Surveying the Effects of Unions in Latin America" Work in progress. Workd Bank, Washington, D.C.

27
11 used in this paper, in order to give an idea of the variety of the types of "health insurance" coverage arrangement in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in Nigeria, five large parastatals provide extremely comprehensive care for their employees and their families, either through their own health-care facilities or through contracts, and the 2,751 registered private employers (out of a total of 8,794 registered employers), who responded to a Ministry of Health questionnaire, provided similar combinations of coverage for their employees and families (Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Health, 1988). The chief complaint from those employers who provided care for their employees either directly or on contract was the cost of the health care provided; it averaged about 6 percent of payroll for those employers who responded to the questionnaire. Also, many of the employers, who used contracts, thought that many of their employees were abusing their health-care privileges by toofrequent use. In general, these Nigerian plans cover all kinds of treatment, inpatient, outpatient, and drugs.

In Kenya, an estimated 2.1 million employees and their families participate in the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) that was established in an Act of 1967. Persons with a taxable income of Ksh 1,000 or more per month are required to contribute 20 shillings a month to the Fund. This 20-shilling amount has remained constant since 1967, with the result that, while only 40,000 persons qualified in 1967, inflation in wages and salaries had driven the number to 90,000 by 1988. Benefits include a fixed daily payment to the hospital of Ksh 200 with an upper limit of 180 days per year. There is no deductible, and the sole "copayment" consists of paying the difference between the maximum Ksh 200 per hospital day and any more expensive hospital care that is chosen. Only inpatient care is covered. In addition,
# DIAGR AM C4

# MARGINAL REVENUE PRODUCT OF CAPITAL SAMPLE VALUES: MIXED ENTERPRISES

<!-- Start of picture text --> f4 5 f.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.0153<br>1 t 0.0133<br>.. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .... . .. .. -..... .. .... -... .. ......... ..........- L<br>0.0103<br>A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br>l 0 / k:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.0093<br>.01~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I<br>Pl \/ 0.0073<br>o A t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.01033<br>Iz X ,,,,-- t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.0063<br>0.00.3<br>I~ ~~<br>0 -, - - , - - - -, ' T - 0.0023<br>0 loo 200 300<br>ENTERPRISES OROECRED SY KRP OF CAPITAL<br><!-- End of picture text -->
||0|.091|.091|.091|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||10|.44|.19|.44|
|The population|20|.49|.49|.50|
|mean ofis 13.86|30|.56|.53|.56|
||40|.65|.64|.82|
|The population|**50**|**1.49**|**1.28**|**2.14**|
|std ofis 57.53|60|4.11|2.53|4.67|
||70|6.30|5.55|8.82|
||80|12.30|9.72|15.23|
||90|26.55|18.99|38.03|
||100|910.16|910.16|910.16|
|**_Distribution of_****_under l_**<br>|**_og normal distr_**|**_ibution assum_**|**_ption_**||
|Distribution of|0|3.11e-09|3.11e-09|3.11e-09|
||10|.077|.051|.077|
|The population|20|.14|.077|.14|
|mean ofis|30|.26|.17|.29|
|16357.3|40|.72|.35|1.37|
||**50**|**2.51**|**1.56**|**8.98**|
|The population|60|22.65|13.08|36.70|
|std ofis|70|61.56|44.23|100.57|
|117542.5|80|263.76|152.54|473.11|
||90|2044.31|891.30|6439.32|
||100|1394095|1394095|1394095|

24
**Figure 7**

Dependent Variable: Female Employment <!-- Start of picture text --> A. No Controls B. Controls<br>-10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 10<br>Time Time<br>1 1<br>.5 .8<br>Coefficient 0-.5 Coefficient .6.4<br>-1 .2<br>-1.5 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Figures 2-7 plot, for each labor-market outcome, the estimated dummy variable regression coefficients from the regression specification: 1 10 i 0 1 i + P P P P i P P P P i i jj jj ii where denotes the country, YY = ββ denotes the year, + ββ XX jj=10�γγ denotes the labor-market outcome variable under consideration, (jj) + �γγjj=1 PP(jj) + vv + εε includes control variables if specified, P P P P is a dummy variable equal to 1 years prior to reform (0 otherwise), P P Pii P is a dummy variable equal to 1 PP YY years after reform (0 otherwise), is the country fixed effect and XX is the (jj) jj idiosyncratic error. Time is equal to -1 the year prior to reform, 0 the year of reform, 1 the year after reform, etc. The coefficient of each PP(jj) P P P P and P P P Pjj variable represents the average level of the outcome variable in its vv εε corresponding time period relative to the average level the year of reform. The controls in Panel B include real GDP and the (jj) PP(jj) working age population in all regressions as well as the labor force participation rate with the exception of the regression in which this appears as the dependent variable.

**Table 1**

Summary Statistics

|VARIABLES|(1)<br>N|(2)<br>max|(3)<br>min|(4)<br>mean|(5)<br>sd|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|UnempRate|860|70.86|0.04|10.34|7.77|
|Emp|1352|79.54|0.07|8.50|12.93|
|LFPRate|1431|91.60|43.03|68.38|9.79|
|FemaleLFPRate|1420|91.80|12.90|55.24|16.73|
|WageIndex|295|536.60|0.00|111.20|101.10|
|FemaleEmp|800|30.96|0.04|2.99|4.63|
|rGDP-|1638|1900000000|298806|89820000|200200000|
|WorkingAgePop|1723|115400000|126252|11320000|18510000|
|DebtTBill|1245|4.92|-9.99|-0.23|1.15|
|Debt|1245|10.65|0.00|0.80|0.82|
|TofT|1002|315.60|50.98|110.40|35.59|
|Dem5|1493|17.00|-15.00|1.47|4.74|

27
# **Table 4: Responses to Survey Vignettes contrasting Public versus Private Goods**

||**Governmen**<br>**Responses**|**t Official**|**Citizen Resp**|**onses**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Frequency**|**Percent of**<br>**total**<br>**responses**|**Frequency**|**Percent of**<br>**total**<br>**responses**|
|**_Vignette 1:_**|||||
|A: Jobs for a few selected people|38|7.92|583|37.96|
|B: Prevent malaria for everyone|442|92.08|953|62.04|
|**_Vignette 2:_**|||||
|A: Cash to a few selected people|42|8.75|560|36.46|
|B: Prevent malaria for everyone|438|91.25|976|63.54|
|**_Vignette 3:_**|||||
|A: Jobs for a few selected people|68|14.17|538|36.75|
|B: Improve roads for everyone|412|85.83|926|63.25|
|**_Vignette 4:_**|||||
|A: Cash to few selected people|66|13.75|515|35.18|
|B: Improve roads for everyone|414|86.25|949|64.82|

_Notes: The survey vignettes were administered to 480 respondents among government officials. Vignettes 1 and 2 were administered to 1536, and vignettes 3 and 4 to 1464 household respondents. Households were randomly assigned to which vignettes to respond._ Citizen support for leaders who make promises of populist policies, that go against the advice of technical experts, is a resurgent concern around the world, in both developed and developing countries. A large literature focusing on developed countries has examined citizen demands primarily along the single dimension of government size, and the ideological spectrum of Right versus Left. Ideological beliefs among citizens about the role of the state, and thence government policies, can be exploited by leaders who seek to win office on the basis of further polarizing citizens and nurturing ideological 36
which fell to about 4 percent during this period. Many borrowers opted for adjustable rate mortgages during this period (as 30 year fixed rate mortgages carried higher interest rates), and lenders accommodated the borrowers since it shifted interest rate risk to the borrowers. Fueled by these low interest rates, subprime mortgage originations rose dramatically from 8 percent in 2001 to 21 percent in 2005.<sup>3334</sup>

# **The Homeowner: Why Tax Laws and Homeowner Options Have Contributed to the Crisis**

The more equity a homeowner has in her home, the less likely she will want to walk away from a mortgage in a downturn in the housing market, and the more stable the housing market will be. Our laws, however, have induced a very low positive equity and now negative equity environment.

The right to refinance is rare in the commercial world, but state laws generally guarantee that right to homeowners without penalty. Moreover, home mortgage interest and home equity loan interest are deductible on federal income tax returns, while interest payments on car and consumer loans of all kinds are not deductible. (Since low and middle income earners pay little or no federal income tax, this does not make sense for the purpose of encouraging wider home ownership.) In this situation, it was rational for the homeowner to use a home equity loan rather than alternate financing for consumer expenditures. Combined with the gradual decline in lenders’ requirements for home mortgages, the result was the so-called “cash-out” refinancing, through which homeowners treated their houses like savings accounts, drawing out funds to finance cars, boats and other consumer expenditures. By the end of 2006, 86 percent of home mortgage refinancing was cash out refinancing.<sup>35</sup> Thus, with the collapse of the housing bubble, many homeowners found themselves with negative equity; and this was true not just for subprime mortgages, but for prime mortgages as well. In this situation, homeowners might prefer to default on the mortgage rather than make the payments.

> 33 Taylor (2007) provides econometric evidence for this story by estimating the impact of interest rates on housing starts. He infers that housing starts increased dramatically during this period due to the low interest rate policies. 34 As Taylor (2009) has explained, it does not appear that the low interest rates were due to a global savings glut, led by Chinese savings. World savings as a percentage of GDP was low during the 2002-2004 period, especially compared to the 1970s and 1980s. (See International Monetary Fund (2005). World Economic Outlook, chapter 2.) Savings exceeded investment outside of the United States, but this was offset by negative savings in the United States.

> 35 Joint Center for Housing Studies (2008, 37).
# **TABLE 14** (continued)

||1989|1990|1991|1992|1993|1994|1995|1996|1997|1998|1999|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Asia**|5.64|5.23|4.35|2.99|2.52|2.54|2.61|2.87|2.19|1.89|N.A.|
|Korea|0.20|0.28|0.15|0.09|0.05|0.07|0.11|0.21|0.06|0.06|0.11|
|Taiwan|0.26|0.17|0.18|0.09|0.04|0.04|0.06|0.04|0.04|0.04|0.07|
|HongKong|0.19|0.11|0.20|0.13|0.12|0.29|0.63|0.45|0.26|0.18|0.13|
|Israel|0.56|_0.53_|0.38|0.40|0.20|0.00|0.01|0.01|0.03|0.02|0.03|
|Japan|3.96|3.70|2.91|1.72|1.35|1.64|1.23|1.45|1.05|0.72|0.57|
|Singapore|0.03|0.08|0.09|0.23|0.25|0.11|0.22|0.24|0.35|0.38|0.35|
|China|0.00|0.02|0.15|0.04|0.09|0.07|0.05|0.04|0.04|0.09|0.09|
|Other|0.44|0.34|0.30|0.28|0.42|0.32|0.30|0.42|0.37|0.39|N.A.|
|**Africa**|**0.21**|**0.15**|**0.16**|**0.09**|**0.03**|**0.03**|**0.06**|**0.08**|**0.11**|**0.08**|**N.A.**|
|**Oceania**|**0.15**|**0.14**|**0.18**|**0.12**|**0.11**|**0.11**|**0.09**|**0.08**|**0.08**|**0.10**|**N.A.**|
|Australia|0.11|0.09|0.12|0.11|0.09|0.09|0.08|0.06|0.07|0.09|N.A.|
|Other|0.05|0.05|0.06|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.02|0.01|0.01|N.A.|
|**Rest of the World**|**0.11**|**0.02**|**0.00**|**0.00**|**0.4**|**0.09**|**0.05**|**0.03**|**0.05**|0.04|**N.A.**|

SOURCE: State of the Nation Report from 1989-98, Secofi for 1999, both with Banxico data.

*Exports includes transportation and insurance expenses.

**Figures may not add up due to rounding off.

42
<!-- Start of picture text --> &<br>= == NEWAUIELIM CHEER (17 eOSO0)<br>=a oo MERCERCREEK (171700)<br>-<br>SE is<br>A<br>26<br>=:<br>><br>25<br>By<br>=u 5<br>fn]<br>S<br>—EEEa<br>,<br>x 7 ? 3 4 5 é<br>JANUARY 200 FEBRUARY 2000<br><!-- End of picture text -->
302). While tax authorities legally have between 30 and 60 days to put in effect a decision on a tax appeal in Chile, Ghana, and Vietnam, this time frame is stretched to 365 days in India.

# **3.3.1. Deductions**

Tax deductions are applied automatically to taxpayers satisfying the criteria established through legislation (Barreix et al _._ 2017). Tax deductions are intended to compensate disadvantaged individuals or to encourage specific behaviors or expenditures that would be beneficial for society (Poterba 2011; Doerrenberg et al. 2015). In Ghana, India, and Vietnam, tax deductions are applied if an individual has dependents. In Ghana, tax deductions are defined as a fixed amount of 3.45% income per capita for an individual who has a dependent spouse or at least two dependent children.<sup>15</sup> In Vietnam, a deduction of 7.89% income per capita is applied for each dependent. In India, tuition fees paid for the education of any two children qualify for income tax deductions. In Chile, no deductions can be applied based on dependents (Table 3.2).

**Table 3.2: Taxpayer Eligibility for Deduction and Respective Amounts**

|**Country**|**Is the taxpayer eligible for any**<br>**deduction based on his dependents?**|**Deduction amounts (income per**<br>**capita)**|
|---|---|---|
|**Chile**|No|0%|
|**Ghana**|Yes|3.45%|
|**India**|Yes|Amount of tuition fees|
|**Vietnam**|Yes|7.89%|

_Source: Living Life data. Notes: Cost expressed as percentage of GNI per capita using the Atlas Method in current (2016) U.S. dollars._

# **3.3.2. Appeals**

The credibility of a tax appeal system is determined by the independence of the appeal body. When tax authorities are dealing with appeals, the possibility of conflict of interest is higher (Crawford 2013). In all four economies, appeals should be first submitted to tax authorities.

The timely resolution of appeals should be ensured by making the appeals process time-bound. The typical timeframe for the relevant tax authority to put in effect a decision on tax appeals ranges from 21 to 90 days, according to an OECD survey of 44 countries, including Chile and India (OECD 2009). To file an appeal, a taxpayer must submit the required documents within 30 days after a tax notice is received in Ghana and India, and within 90 days in Chile and Vietnam (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3: Time Limits in Appeal Procedures**

|**Country**|**Time limit for filing appeals**<br>**after a tax notice is received by**<br>**the taxpayer (days)**|**Time limit for the relevant**<br>**authority to put in effect a**<br>**decision on the tax appeal (days)**|
|---|---|---|
|**Chile**|90|60|
|**Ghana**|30|60|
|**India**|30|365|
|**Vietnam**|90|30|

_Source: Living Life data_

> 15 According <u>to Ghana’s Income Tax Act (Act 896), one currency point is equivalent to one Ghana cedi.</u>

18 | P a g e
# **Figure 5.  Insufficient water**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Insuff. Water<br>Constraint level, conditional means; quadratic fit; 5% robust CIs<br>PAK<br>BTN<br>LKA<br>BGD IND<br>AFG<br>NPL<br>MDV<br>6 7 8 9 10 11<br>Log(GDP p.c.) at PPP<br>.8<br>.6<br>.4<br>.2<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure 6.  Labour Regulation**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Labour Regulation<br>Constraint level, conditional means; quadratic fit; 5% robust CIs<br>LKA<br>NPL<br>BTN<br>MDV<br>PAKIND<br>BGD<br>AFG<br>6 7 8 9 10 11<br>Log(GDP p.c.) at PPP<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> 68
**<u>Table 7. Impact on enrollment and child development outcomes using the DID methods for all children</u>**

|||OLS|:All|||FE|:All||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Midline*<br>Batc|Actual<br>h3<br>|Endline*<br>Batc|Actual<br>h3<br>|Midline*<br>Batc|Actual<br>h3<br>|Endline<br>Bat|*Actual<br>ch3<br>|
||Coeff|Robust<br>SE|Coeff|Robust<br>SE|Coeff|Robust<br>SE|Coeff|Robust<br>SE|
|**Enrollment in ECED Programs**|||||||||
|Was child enrolled in project playgroups in survey year (1=Yes)|0.153***|(0.019)|0.268***|(0.030)|0.153***|(0.015)|0.269***|(0.018)|
|Was child enrolled in non-project playgroups in survey year (1=Yes)|-0.044**|(0.018)|-0.071***|(0.026)|-0.044***|(0.014)|-0.069***|<br>(0.017)|
|Was child enrolled in Islamic Kindergarten in survey year (1=Yes)|0.019|(0.015)|0.037|(0.024)|0.019**|(0.009)|0.038***|(0.014)|
|Was child enrolled in Kindergarten in survey year (1=Yes)|-0.078**|(0.036)|-0.172***|(0.053)|-0.077***|(0.026)|-0.166***|<br>(0.028)|
|Was child enrolled in any ECED programs in survey year (1=Yes)|0.092***|(0.032)|0.065|(0.045)|0.093***|(0.028)|0.075***|(0.028)|
|Was child enrolled in Primary school in survey year (1=Yes)|-0.003|(0.006)|-0.002|(0.006)|-0.003|(0.006)|-0.002|(0.005)|
|Cumulated number of months of project playgroup|1.915***|(0.218)|3.839***|(0.417)|1.914***|(0.158)|3.855***|(0.254)|
|Cumulated number of months of non-project playgroup|-0.649***|(0.209)|-0.947**|(0.383)|-0.647***|(0.156)|-0.943***|<br>(0.238)|
|Cumulated number of months of Islamic Kindergarten|0.241|(0.210)|0.537|(0.451)|0.244**|(0.106)|0.537**|(0.224)|
|Cumulated number of months of Kindergarten|-0.846**|(0.405)|-2.127**|(0.841)|-0.834***|(0.264)|-2.083***|<br>(0.446)|
|Cumulated number of months of any ECED programs|0.661|(0.431)|1.302*|(0.791)|0.676**|(0.283)|1.366***|(0.443)|
|Cumulatednumberof months of Primary school|-0.027|(0.113)|0.310|(0.414)|-0.028|(0.066)|0.319|(0.343)|
|**Standardized Child Development Outcomes**|||||||||
|EDI: Physical Health & Well-Being|-0.030|(0.091)|0.113|(0.101)|-0.029|(0.083)|0.114|(0.082)|
|EDI: Social Competence|0.208**|(0.091)|0.017|(0.092)|0.208***|(0.070)|0.022|(0.070)|
|EDI: Emotional Maturity|0.014|(0.085)|0.172**|(0.082)|0.015|(0.075)|0.169**|(0.072)|
|EDI: Language & Cognitive Development|0.083|(0.051)|0.038|(0.047)|0.083*|(0.045)|0.036|(0.039)|
|EDI: Communication & General Knowledge|0.039|(0.054)|0.014|(0.105)|0.040|(0.042)|0.008|(0.070)|
|<br>SDQ: Emotional Symptoms|0.015|(0.078)|-0.117|(0.089)|0.015|(0.068)|-0.116|(0.074)|
|SDQ: Conduct Problems|-0.137|(0.084)|-0.061|(0.080)|-0.138*|(0.072)|-0.054|(0.071)|
|SDQ: Hyperactivity & Inattention|0.115|(0.088)|0.052|(0.089)|0.115|(0.074)|0.055|(0.077)|
|<br>SDQ: Peer Problems|-0.124|(0.098)|-0.134|(0.103)|-0.125|(0.083)|-0.134|(0.082)|
|SDQ: Pro-social Behavior|-0.029|(0.103)|0.065|(0.087)|-0.035|(0.079)|0.062|(0.072)|
|SDQ:Total Difficulties|-0.059|(0.087)|-0.108|(0.093)|-0.059|(0.070)|-0.104|(0.073)|

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. This analysis is based on the three rounds of data for 1,170 children in batch 3 and the comparison group.

38
also important to note that these reforms occurred in the midst of high political instability that eventually turned into civil war. If we consider the political climate, the government took bold and risky reforms during the period that could have further compromised the political environment.

# Jordan: November 13, 2012

The Government of Jordan introduced a major subsidy reform on November 13, 2012. This move occurred unexpectedly, despite a prolonged period of public discussion about subsidy reforms. The reform reintroduced the automatic pricing adjustment mechanism on petroleum products and thereby discontinued the practice of discretionary adjustments. The liberalization of prices caused immediate increases in the prices of 90 octane gasoline and kerosene (+14.3 percent, from 700 fils per liter to 800 fils per liter for both products), diesel (+33 percent from 515 fils per liter to 684 fils per liter), and LPG (+53.8 percent, from JD 6.5 per cylinder to JD 10 per cylinder of 12.5 kilograms). This rise followed an initial price increase of the other petroleum products, including 95 octane gasoline, introduced during the second quarter of 2012. The reform was accompanied by the precautionary measure of freezing the price of bread, but the Ministry of Transport was instructed to adjust public transport tariffs according to the new fuel prices.

The Jordanian reform also included a compensation of JD 70 per person per year with a maximum ceiling per household of JD 420 per year, an amount excluded from any form of taxation or deductions. The only eligibility criteria were Jordanian residency and an annual household income below JD 10,000. An estimated 70 percent of the population were expected to be eligible for the program, and the administrators used several public databases to exclude noneligible households, including the rosters of public sector employees and retirees, military personnel and retirees, and social security subscribers. Beneficiaries of the National Aid Fund (NAF) would receive the compensation without application, but all other eligible citizens (private sector employees, the unemployed, and the inactive) had to apply by filling out a specific form. The start of the compensation was set for November 18, 2012, and payments were scheduled to be made every four months. Payments were also anchored to the average international price of oil with an automatic discontinuation of benefits if the price of oil per barrel fell below US$ 100 in the four months preceding any payment. The generous cash transfer 13