rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Several key findings emerge from our analysis of technology transfer and indigenous innovation in East Asia. First, technology transfer from abroad and indigenous R&D complement each other at all levels of income, although the balance between the two may change. Even in poor economies, some indigenous innovation effort increases the country’s capacity to absorb knowledge from abroad. No matter which channel or - more accurately - which combination of channels is employed, the extent and quality of technology transfer from abroad is highly dependent on the absorptive or learning capacity of the domestic economy, which in turn depends on the education and training of the labor force, the extent of domestic R&D and domestic innovation effort more generally. Conversely – a point less well known - cutting-edge innovation that advances the global frontier of knowledge itself remains highly dependent on access to the accumulated stock of knowledge worldwide, through technology transfers or knowledge spillovers of various kinds. It seems there are strong positive feedback loops between domestic innovation and acquiring knowledge from abroad, with each being necessary for and enhancing the other.

Second, East Asian experience confirms that sound fundamentals such as macroeconomic stability, financial sector development, protection of property rights and adequate provision of core public goods are as important for innovation as for general investment. In addition, knowledge itself has strong public good characteristics which create a theoretical rationale for more direct government interventions in support of innovation, including not only the creation of a specialized system of intellectual property rights (IPRs), but also public funding for basic research and, possibly, fiscal incentives for business R&D.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines evidence on knowledge adoption and adaptation in East Asia in particular that drawn from the World Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys. Section III tracks trends in indigenous knowledge creation within East Asia, in particular the growth and distribution of R&D. We use patents as an indicator of innovation output to investigate the extent East Asia is approaching the world technology frontier in Section IV, which also summarizes results from estimating a knowledge diffusion model using citation data. The last section concludes by drawing implications of policies and institutions that may help foster domestic innovation as well as absorption of knowledge from abroad.

5
decade. In most cases, missed payments start piling up years before a debt restructuring is arranged, suggesting that the typical default spell on Chinese debts may be particularly protracted.

Yet in many cases there is no evidence of prior arrears, despite the fact that the government restructured its debts with China amid a situation of financial distress. One possible explanation is that some of these debt restructurings were preemptive, meaning that no payments were missed before the debt exchange. Preemptive restructurings are not unusual in the context of external bank or bond restructurings, but “strictly preemptive” cases with no missed payments account for only 13% of cases between 1970 and 2010 (Asonuma and Trebesch 2016). According to DRS data, in the case of China, almost half of the restructurings occurred with no prior arrears. This points to alternative explanations for the absence of arrears.

Horn et al. (2021) document a substantial hidden debt problem, with DRS aggregates underreporting liabilities to China by about 50%. If individual loans are missing altogether from the DRS data in the first place, arrears on those loans will be equally absent. Thus, a “hidden debt’ problem becomes a “hidden default” problem. In addition, Gelpern et al. (2021) and others have shown that Chinese lending contracts are special in several dimensions and make it less likely that a payment default is recorded. In particular, contracts involving China’s state-owned banks regularly ask loan recipients to pay project revenues into escrow accounts in China, or to repay loans through proceeds from commodity exports. In case of late payments, Chinese lenders may first seize the cash collateral in the established escrow account, so that no arrears occur – despite a formal payment default. Similarly, a default by a commodity exporter may not show up, because missed commodity deliveries are not recorded as a default and, accordingly, not formally registered.

In sum, we lack an encompassing and precise empirical basis to measure the start and end dates as well as the size of sovereign defaults on Chinese overseas debts. This gap remains a major shortcoming for debt sustainability and risk analyses.

**_“Hidden defaults” as a general problem (including South-South lending)._** The problem of “hidden defaults” is not limited to debts owed to China. In fact, there is no systematic dataset of debt defaults toward trade creditors and suppliers or toward other official creditors. This is true for Paris Club member governments and also very much for “South-to-South” lending, which has increased in recent years, with India, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia figuring prominently among the newer creditors.

9
NIGER’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

# **Table 12. Power indicators, benchmarked against select country groups**

|||**Niger**|**Low-income**<br>**nonfragile**<br>**countries**|**Middle-income**<br>**countries**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Access (national)|% of population|8|33|50|
|Access (urban)|% of population|41|86|101|
|Access (capital city)|% of population|53|81|81|
|Access (rural)|% of population|0|12|32|
|Installed generation capacity|MW per million people|105|651|36,971|
|Installed generation|MW per million people|8|20|799|
|Generation capacity, operational|MW|92|917|35,917|
|Firms that find power a constraint for business|% of firms|41|52|31|
|Firms with own generator|% of firms|20|41|18|
|Power outages|Days/year|5|10|6|
|Power outages|% of sales|5.6*|6|2|
|Collection rate|% of billing|96|92|91|
|System losses|% generation|17|24|20|
|Cost recovery|% of total costs|100|89|85|
|Revenue per unit|US cents per kWh|19|14|13|
|Total hidden costs|% revenue|10|69|0|
|**US cents**||**Niger (2006)**|**Predominantly**<br>**thermal**|**Other developing**<br>**regions**|
|Effective power tariff|Residential at 100 kWh|18.17|10.27||
|Effective power tariff|Commercial at 100 kWh|15.75|11.73|5.0–10.0|
|Effective power tariff|Industrial at 50,000 kWh|18.17|11.39||

_Source:_ Fragile and nonfragile countries’ figures as of 2005, calculated using the AICD power database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), which contains household data. For the CAR, national access is for 2008 (World Bank 2010a); power outages are for 2005 (Rosnes and Vennemo 2009); collection ratio is for 2010 (World Bank 2010b); cost-recovery ratio, system losses, and revenue per unit are for 2009 (NIGELEC 2009).

_Note:_ kWh = kilowatt-hour; MW = megawatts.

# **Challenges**

Despite the fact that its cost-recovery rates are high at present, NIGELEC’s financial situation is threatened by the potential increases in Nigeria’s power costs since Niger relies highly on Nigeria for power. Under an agreement made between Niger and Nigeria dating back to 1977, Nigeria’s state electricity company supplies 90 percent of Niger’s electricity needs to NIGELEC, with a preferential pricing of $0.03 per kWh (World Bank 2007b); Nigeria offers Niger a $0.05 subsidy for every unit of power imported. In 2009 Nigeria subsidized an estimated $26.5 million (or around 3 percent of its revenues) for power imports. In the long run under a scenario where Nigeria increases the price of power to its recovery levels ($0.08 per kWh), cost recovery for NIGELEC will be jeopardized as current tariffs would be unable to recover total costs. Hidden costs would then increase to 40 percent of Niger’s revenue—four times what Niger encountered in 2009—as NIGELEC would be saddled with an additional $26.5 million in losses a year due to underpricing.

28
16 Table A.1: Provision of Remote Learning Modalities by Income Group

|Modality_\_Income Group|LIC|MIC|HIC|
|---|---|---|---|
|Online Platform|64|93|95|
|Television|92|98|63|
|Radio|93|76|22|
|Take-Home Packages|64|88|89|
|Highest|Radio|Television|Online|
|2nd Highest|Television|Online|Take-Home|
|2nd Lowest|Take-Home|Take-Home|Television|
|Lowest|Online|Radio|Radio|

_Notes:_ Sources - UNESCO (2020b).

Table A.2: Access to the Internet, the Television and the Radio, 2010s

|Mean|Share with Internet (%)|Share with TV (%)|Share with Radio (%)|
|---|---|---|---|
|HIC|86|98|99|
|MIC|34|69|47|
|LIC|6|35|35|

_Notes:_ Sources - Internet: World Bank (2020) (among 3-17 y.o.); TV & Radio: ITU (2010); UNICEF (2020) (for all households).

Table A.3: Implied Effectiveness Rate for Each Remote Learning Modality

|Modality_\_Income Group|LIC|MIC|HIC|Global|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Online Platform|65|80|89|78|
|Television|63|77|74|75|
|Radio|65|69|54|67|
|Take-Home Packages|48|80|82|75|

_Notes:_ Sources - UNESCO (2020b). Effectiveness rate = percentage share of _Very Effective_ + 0.8 _×_ percentage share of _Fairly Effective_ . We arbitrarily assume 80% given the lack of information on what _Fairly Effective_ implies in UNESCO (2020b).

Table A.4: COVID and Mortality in the U.S., 2020-2021

|COVID<br>Age|Deaths as % of<br>Deaths|Pop.|COVID<br>Age|Deaths as % of<br>Deaths|Pop.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|0-17|0.97|0.00|50-64|13.3|0.22|
|18-29|2.67|0.01|65-74|13.7|0.55|
|30-39|7.63|0.03|75-84|13.2|1.23|
|40-49|12.4|0.08|85+|11.4|3.20|

Sources: US Center for Disease Control, US Census Bureau and authors’ calculations Table A.5: Projected Dropout Rates due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, UNESCO

||N<br>Pri|umber of At-<br>mary Educat|Risk Studen<br>ion|ts / Number<br>Seco|of Pupils * 1<br>ndary Educa|00<br>tion|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||HICs|MICs|LICs|HICs|MICs|LICs|
|Total (%)|0.0|0.3|0.7|1.9|1.4|1.8|
|Male (%)|0.0|0.3|0.7|1.8|1.4|1.9|
|Female (%)|0.0|0.3|0.7|2.0|1.4|1.7|

Sources: UNESCO (2020a), World Bank (2022) and authors’ calculations
# **2. Recent trends in child mortality in Vietnam**

A number of sources are available for estimation of recent trends in infant and under-five mortality in Vietnam. In this section, we assemble published estimates and report our own estimates derived from the 1993 and 1998 VLSS.

Published estimates include those based on the 1989 Census, the 1994 InterCensual Demographic Survey (ICDS), the 1997 USAID-funded Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (Government of Vietnam 1999), the 1999 Census (Central Census Steering Committee 2000), and the 2000 UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) (Government of Vietnam 2000). In addition, fertility histories were collected in the 1993 and 1998 VLSS, and in what follows we also report infant and under-five mortality rate estimates based on these surveys. In the censuses, the ICDS and the MICS, incomplete fertility histories were collected-i.e., women of fertile age were asked how many children they had ever given birth to and how maLy of these were still alive, but not the dates of birth and death (if applicable) of these children. Such data require that mortality estimates be estimated using the so-called indirect estimation method, which involves taking the data on fertility and proportions of children surviving and superimposing them on model life tables. In the DHS and VLSS, by contrast, complete fertility histories were obtained-i.e., women reported when each child was born and when each died if applicable. With such data, mortality estimates can be obtained using standard life table methods (the "direct" method of mortality estimation) and standard errors can be computed for the estimates. The complete fertility history is clearly more demanding in terms of recall than the incomplete fertility history, but potentially leads to more accurate estimates. Of course, since the data also contain the information collected in the incomplete fertility history, the indirect method can be used as well, so that one can compare the direct and indirect estimates for the DHS and VLSS.

In this section we compare the published estimates from the 1989 and 1999 censuses, the 1994 ICDS and the 2000 MICS with indirect estimates we have computed from the 1997 DHS and 1993 and 1998 VLSSs. We then compare these indirect estimates with estimates obtained using the direct method from the DHS and the two VLSSs.

# **_Indirect estimates of infant and under-five mortality in Vietnam_**

Figures 1 and 2 show the infant and under-five mortality rates obtained from the censuses and the household surveys using the indirect method (United Nations 1983). This involves superimposing on model life tables the data on live births and deaths.

> 3In this paper, data from the 1989 Census and the 1994 ICDS were taken from the other sources listed here.

3
where _vs_<sup>_full_</sup> ( _a, z_ ) for _s ∈{_ 1 _,_ 2 _}_ is the individual value function in steady state of the benchmark model of agent of type _s_ , and _gs_<sup>_full_</sup> _∞_<sup>(</sup><sup>_a, z_)for</sup><sup>_s∈{_1</sup><sup>_,_2</sup><sup>_}_isthejointprobabilitydistributionfunction</sup> for agents of type _s_ in the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model.

To compute the welfare change Θ from eliminating lobbying, I construct the permanent consumption compensation necessary to make an individual indierent between the benchmark stationary equilibrium and an economy with no lobbying but with nancial frictions and capital tax benets, accounting for the transition. This expression is given by where _WTr_<sup>_nlob_</sup> is the lifetime welfare of transitioning from the benchmark economy to an economy that forbids lobbying. This welfare value is given by where _vs_ ( _a, z_ ) for _s ∈{_ 1 _,_ 2 _}_ is the value function that takes into account the transition from the benchmark stationary equilibrium to the new stationary equilibrium. In other words, _vs_ ( _a, z_ ) is the instant value after the change in policy.

The quantitative results show that there is welfare gain of 0.3 % while banning lobbying, or a welfare cost of 0.3% of keeping it. By comparing steady states, we obtain that welfare decreases by 0.9%. The inclusion of the transition implies an osetting eect over the welfare calculation derived from comparing steady states.

In the case of the scal reform, if one looks at the steady state we observe that consumption increases. Then, welfare goes in the same direction as the transition and the scal reform generates a welfare gain of 1.1%.

# 7 Conclusions

In this paper, I document the increase in lobbying activity to aect the tax code that took place during the 2007-2009 U.S. nancial crisis. Based on Compustat data matched with lobbying expenditure at the rm level, I show that this increase in rent-seeking behavior was driven by large rms in sectors that rely more on external sources of funds to nance capital expenditure. Based on this evidence, and given the creation and extension of tax provisions during that time, I study whether lobbying amplies the misallocation created by the nancial frictions when the economy suers a credit crunch.

To address this question, I use a model with nancial frictions in the form of collateral constraint and a government that grants tax benets associated to capital and can be inuenced through costly lobbying pressure. In this economy, all rms can claim tax benets that are tied to capital. However, rms that decide to lobby can also modify the tax code to obtain preferential tax treatment on top 42
19 economic advantage: only one of six possible regional coefficients is significant: the one for birth in the West region, in the imputed consumption regression.

Our measures of inequality of opportunity among ever-married Turkish women (aged 30-49) are presented in Table 6. This table summarizes results for both of our alternative methods (“wealth index” and imputed consumption), and presents both parametric and non-parametric estimates. In order to facilitate the comparison between the two methods, a number of “intermediate” alternatives are also presented. The first and second columns present the estimates for the main and subsidiary wealth indexes. The next four columns present estimates for imputed consumption, both with imputed residuals (using the bootstrap procedure described in Section 3) and without, and using both the variance and the mean log deviation ( _E0_ or MLD) as inequality aggregators. For each column, the first line simply reports the total inequality in the outcome variable. The second line reports the non-parametric estimate of between-group inequality, while the third line gives its parametric analogue.

As discussed in Section 4, our preferred estimates of inequality of opportunity are those given in the first and sixth columns. The first column uses the full wealth index as the advantage indicator, and the ratio of variances as the measure of inequality of opportunity (equations 9 or 11). The sixth column uses full predicted consumption (with imputed residuals) as the advantage indicator, and the ratio of mean log deviations as the measure of inequality of opportunity (equation 13). These are two alternative meaningful advantage indicators that one might construct, given the data available in a Demographic and Health Survey and an ancillary household survey (in this case the HBS), analyzed with the measures ideally suited for each. Parametric (non-parametric) estimates of inequality of opportunity are 31% (36%) for the wealth index, and 26% (32%) for imputed consumption.

However, examination of the full set of estimates sheds useful light on the implications of the various methodological choices: (a) the use of a wealth index or imputed consumption as the outcome variable, (b) the use of a full or reduced set of asset indicators to construct the wealth index, (c) the inclusion of draws for the residual term when imputed consumption in used, and (d) the reliance on the variance or mean log deviation in the estimates of inequality of opportunity in consumption.
6 2002; Hoekstra and Hung 2005). ‘Virtual water’ is essentially the water used in the production process of goods and services, utilized by the riparian countries or imported/exported. For example, Hoekstra and Hung (2005:45) estimate that “...13% of the water used for crop production in the world is not used for domestic consumption but for export (in virtual form).”. Similar findings exist for other water-using goods and services (electronics, cars). In particular, by trading (e.g., importing and exporting virtual water) countries may reduce the pressure on their scarce water resources.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned point, riparian states sharing scarce water resources may address their water scarcity problem by relying on import or export of virtual water via traded goods. It is likely that the greater the trade between the riparian states, or the higher the trade level with the world,<sup>x</sup> the less likely it is that scarcity in water resources will require a formal negotiated agreement over a shared river’s water. Therefore, we also expect a negative sign for the trade variable with respect to the treaty variables. We do not rule out a-priori a concave or convex behavior. Our paper does not include specific quantification of virtual water in trade flows. This could be considered in future research.

# **Geography**

While scarcity provides the main motivation for cooperation it may also be facilitated or impeded by geographical considerations. In fact, the physical geography of the river defines the possibilities for _where_ , _how_ , and _when_ the multiple uses of its water can be developed and utilized by riparian states (Elhance 1999:15).

Several studies have hypothesized about the relationship between the geographical configuration of a river and the likelihood of conflict and cooperation. Using various case studies, LeMarquand has explained that conflict is more likely in upstream/downstream situations where the upstream country may use the river to the detriment of the downstream country. Conversely, there is significant incentive for cooperation when the river creates the border between the riparians—the incentive to reach agreement is to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” (LeMarquand 1977:9 and 10). Toset et. al (2000) have come to a similar conclusion based on three river types: an “upstream/downstream” relationship, a “mixed” relationship and “river boundary” relationship. Above all, they find that the “upstream/downstream” relationship is indeed the most conflict-prone type (2000:989-990).
|**Topic**|**Country**|**Reference**|**Methodology**|**Intervention**|**Area**|**Child Labor Outcomes**|**Age**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CCT|Nicaragua|Del Carpio,<br>Loayza and<br>Wada (2016)|RCT|The Atencion a la Crisis program consists<br>of three packages of cash transfers to<br>poor households over a one year period<br>(1) a cash transfer conditional on children<br>attending school and health service<br>regularly (2) CCT plus a scholarship for<br>one member of the household (age 16 or<br>above) to attend an occupational training<br>course and (3) CCT plus a household<br>grant for the creation of a micro business<br>or a new economic and productive<br>activity.|Rural|The child labor measure is based on<br>a recorded diary<br>of various types of activities, which<br>are then aggregated into<br>hours of work per week devoted to<br>traditional farming, skill forming<br>activities, and household chores.|8-15|
|CCT|Nicaragua|Dammert<br>(2009)|RCT|The Red de Proteccion Social (RPS)<br>offered a flat transfer (irrespective of<br>household size) to poor household<br>conditional on children's school<br>enrollment and attendance as well as<br>health clinic attendance.|Rural|Child labor refers to children who<br>are engaged in market work, which<br>includes wage employment, self-<br>employment,<br>agriculture, unpaid work in a family<br>business, and helping on the family<br>farm|7-13|
|Business<br>Training|Pakistan|Giné and<br>Mansuri<br>(2011)|RCT|Microfinance rural clients were offered<br>an eight-day business training course and<br>access to a loan lottery where eligible<br>clients could borrow up to 7 times the<br>average loan size.|Rural|Economic activities for pay|9-15|
|Microinsurance|Pakistan|Landmann<br>and Frolich<br>(2015)|RCT|Analyzes the extension of an accident<br>and health insurance scheme offered by<br>the National Rural Support<br>Program(NRSP), a large microfinance<br>institution in Pakistan, which is a<br>mandatory insurance for all clients, their<br>spouses and their children below 18<br>years|Rural|ILO definition of child labor, it<br>includes: i)all children working in<br>hazardous occupations and ii) those<br>woking on non-hazardous<br>occupations depending on the<br>number of hours and age|5-17|
|Business<br>Training|Peru|Karlan and<br>Valdivia<br>(2010)|RCT|Pre-existing lending groups were offered<br>training on general business skills as part<br>of their mandatory weekly meetings.|Urban<br>and<br>Rural|Participation and hours worked, not<br>definition of work given|6-15|

36