instruments that finance – and thus focus on – inputs (World Bank 2012).<sup>3</sup> We suggest in this paper that the focus on results provides incentives for better coordination between different agencies within government as well as flexibility in the identification of reform approaches _ex ante_ (prior to initiating implementation). On the other hand, the instruments currently available do require specific indicators and thus do not allow for much flexibility _ex post_ (during implementation).

This paper documents the project preparation and early implementation experience from a World Bank-supported civil service reform project – the Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project (P&PP). The objective of the project is to improve the performance of the civil service in Sierra Leone, which still suffers from the legacy of the long civil war, by targeting a narrowly defined set of critical reforms.<sup>4</sup> The paper documents how a relatively agnostic approach to the choice of reform areas and reform paths and a PDIA-type process of engagement, supported by a results-based lending instrument, helped to create a more promising environment for reforms on which little progress had been made over the past several years in spite of donor efforts.<sup>5</sup> While it is too early to conclude how the reforms will eventually unfold, there is credible evidence that an intensive and sustained engagement process focused on the joint identification of problems _and_ solutions and the use of a results-based financing instrument has fostered better coordination among formerly fragmented actors in government by improving inter-agency trust and providing incentives for joined-up working. The flexibility at the design stage has also allowed solutions to emerge that are likely to be more politically and technically feasible than with traditional approaches.<sup>6</sup> We argue that other approaches, such as the traditional input-based modality, do not foster the required degree of coordination among implementing agencies and that “local” identification of reforms paths and results is more likely to “work with the grain” and allow the emergence of feasible reform paths.<sup>7</sup> Figure 1 displays the

> 3 See, among others: “A New Instrument to Advance Development Effectiveness: Program-for-Results Financing,” Operations Policy and Country Services, World Bank, 2011; “Results-Based Lending Approaches in Social Protection and Labor: World Bank Experiences,” Social Protection and Labor Policy Note, World Bank, 2011; “Results Based Financing Mechanisms: Experience from Output Based Aid,” CIF Partnership Forum, World Bank, 2011.

> 4 The PDO for the project is to “Improve competitiveness in pay, performance management and accountability of, and increase staffing of middle and senior staff in, the civil service in Sierra Leone”. See the Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project PAD, World Bank Report 67447-SL, 2012.

> 5 The story of Sierra Leone’s experience with “Deliverology” is told in: Scharff, M. (2012) Delivering on a Presidential Agenda: Sierra Leone’s Strategy and Policy Unit, 2010 - 2011, Princeton, Princeton University.

> 6 There is some early positive evidence of progress in implementation: since declaring project effectiveness in October 2012. Three out of 15 Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs) have been fully achieved and significant advances have been made on three additional DLIs.

> 7 A “companion” paper (Srivastava and Larizza 2012) reviews the same case to show how the reform solutions that emerged from the use of a results-based approach were more likely to “work with the grain” of political incentives and, thus, have a greater chance of success.

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