rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
emerging from Townsend's studies of poverty (1995), refers to the rules and customs that govern de facto equal participation in the society in which one lives. Inclusive citizenship, a term used by Kitschelt (1993) or low intensity citizenship (O'Donnell, 1993) also draws attention to the fact that presence of voting rights does not ensure equal access or equal participation in society. Basic freedoms are of fundamental importance in all societies. Political scientists and economists such as Sen have particularly noted the importance of a free press, free information flow and the freedom to associate in informal or formal groups, associations and networks for full participation as citizens in society.

It is the exclusion of many from equal participation in society, even when they have equal political rights, that at some points in history gives rise to social protest movements. While modernization theory had predicted the disappearance of solidarity groups based on religious, ethnic, national or cultural identities, the reality is that such social movements (sometimes including armed conflict) have actually increased in the last few decades. One of the few valid generalizations in the literature on social protest and collective mobilizations is that social movements arise when aggrieved groups cannot work through established channels to communicate new claims into the political process of authoritative decision making (Kitschelt, 1993). The closure of existing avenues of participation, such as those provided by political parties or interest groups, is a necessary though not sufficient condition for the emergence of collective, sometimes violent, mobilization of groups. The intensity of deprivation, the resources of the mobilizing actors, the leaders' strategic skills and the counter strategies of opponents all contribute to the success of mobilization efforts.

To analyze the nature of state-society interactions, Peter Evans (1996), drawing upon the work of several others,<sup>13</sup> introduces the idea of synergy between government and citizen action. This synergy is based on _complementarity_ and _embeddedness. Complementarity_ means mutually supportive relations between public and private actors. Examples might include a framework of rules and laws which protect rights to associate, freedom of assembly, or the state providing public information or transportation to facilitate associations. _Embeddedness_ refers to the ties that connect citizens and public officials. The classic examples are from irrigation, in which local irrigation officials are from the community being served, and hence are enmeshed in local social relations and pressures to perforn. Note, however, that this enmeshment only works positively when the overall institutional context is performance oriented and accountable.

> 1 In particular Tendler (1997), Fox (1996), Heller (1994), Ostrom (1996), and Wade (1985).

11
physical role of a container terminal (transfer area) and the creation of an independent customs area dedicated to physical/scanning inspections is being discussed. The _comité FAL_ advocates in addition the performance of physical inspections on the truck to avoid double re-handling but this would probably immobilize trucks to the detriment of trucking companies. Obstacles to an efficient gate exit also include poor connectivity of customs booth and redundancy in document controls after the release has been issued.

# _Cumbersome clearance procedure: not anymore an issue?_

<!-- Start of picture text --> Completion of<br>Domiciliation & Establishment Payment of clearance<br>Transactional Pre-shipment and Lodging of port charges procedures &<br>dwell time inspection process declarationCustoms and inspection bodies taxes & dutiespayment of<br>1 to 3 days 1h to 1day 1/2 <6h <2h<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 4 - Sequence of port clearance operations in the Port of Douala and typical times** (derived from reference times, Source: GUCE)

Trade facilitation has been at the forefront of trade policy in Cameroon for almost ten years with initiatives and investments aimed at increasing trade performance through improvement of transport infrastructure, removal of corruption and informal practices, modernization of customs administration, reduction of non-tariff trade barriers, improvement of revenue collection performance and border controls, and in wider terms reduction of transaction and administrative costs. A multi-donor transit and transport facilitation project is being co-financed by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Commission to help Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad address these trade facilitation challenges.

Much has been achieved in the course of last ten years. The modernization of customs administration and the introduction of a one-stop shop for clearance procedures (the GUCE, _Guichet Unique du Commerce Extérieur_ ) have arguably led for example to a saving of more than 11 days in the average clearance time as can be seen in graph 7.

18
as Texans become more aware of the increased ease of openly carrying guns.

# **5.4 Heat Impacts by Neighborhood Characteristics**

The impact of heat on individuals, and their psychological state, is likely mediated through their built environment. Changes in the built environment are likely to be a key adaptation to climate change. A detailed understanding of how the built environment mediates the effects of heat today provides insight into the capacity of adaptation to reduce the negative impacts of climate change.

While we do not have data on the specific structures in which defendants reside, we can study the characteristics of the census block groups in which they live. Block groups are the second smallest census unit and contain between 600 and 3,000 people. We assign the characteristics of these block groups to defendants who reside in them and analyze how variations in neighborhood characteristics mediate the impact of heat on crimes.

We focus our analysis on two neighborhood characteristics: the age of the housing stock and median income. We choose neighborhood housing age as the best proxy for the presence of air conditioning, a frequently suggested adaptation to mitigating the impact of heat on cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Park et al., 2020b).<sup>16</sup> We can and do examine whether housing age acts as a good proxy for the presence of air conditioning using CoreLogic data.<sup>17</sup> In Figure A9, we show that while more than 95% of new houses in Texas have central air, the penetration among houses built prior to 1980 averages around 80%. Conditional on having any air conditioning, older houses are also more likely to have window or other noncentral air conditioning units. Further, while we cannot test this directly, it is plausible that older houses have worse insulation and are less well sealed against the outside environment,

> 16Housing age is also correlated with other determinants of behavior, in particular lead paint. We examine whether there are larger effects in areas with houses built prior to the phase out of leaded paint and find no

> 17CoreLogic data are proprietary data on the U.S. property market that we access through Stanford University’s subscription. These data are assembled primarily from mortgage applications and include details about the financed properties. The data set does not include information on every property in Texas, but it does cover more than five million parcels there.

20
# **5.1.1.Direct effects**

The total impact of the 2014 subsidies reforms on households is estimated at 5.9 bn. MAD or 177 MAD per capita per year. The impact rises with income groups from 0.2 bn. for the poorest quintile to 3.1 bn. for the richest quintile. The largest contributor is water with 2.7 bn., followed by electricity with 2.4 bn. In terms of household welfare, the elimination of subsidies reduces welfare by about 1% on average with the impact being larger for the poorest quintile (-0.61%) as compared to the richest quintile (- 1.07%).

It is interesting to note that water has a greater effect than electricity despite the fact that the water sector had no subsidies and that tariffs per block have not changed. This is due to the change in tariffs structure. The transformation of the upper three blocks in VDT tariffs determined a change in the tariffs applied to the consumers in these blocks relative to the quantities consumed under the first two blocks. This change has been much more significant for water than for electricity. Hence, the change in tariffs structure towards a VDT system can have an even greater impact on welfare than the simple increase in prices. This is an important consideration for household welfare and future reforms for water and electricity.

**Table 8 – Welfare Effects of the 2014 Reforms (Direct effects, m. MAD.)**

||**Electricity**|**Water**|**Gasoline**|**Diesel**|**Total**|**Total (% of**<br>**expend.)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Quintile 1**|-118.0|-94.5|-0.3|-1.1|-213.9|-0.61|
|**Quintile 2**|-241.4|-263.7|-1.4|-4.5|-511.1|-0.87|
|**Quintile 3**|-366.5|-462.5|-6.3|-20.6|-855.9|-1.04|
|**Quintile 4**|-490.8|-677.8|-17.6|-57.1|-1,243.2|-1.05|
|**Quintile 5**|-1,182.0|-1,221.2|-154.1|-502.7|-3,060.0|-1.07|
|**Total**|-2,398.7|-2,719.8|-179.7|-586.0|-5,884.1|-1.01|

Source: Authors’ estimations using SUBSIM and household budget survey data.

This reduction in welfare does not have any significant impact on poverty given that the poor do not really consume gasoline and diesel while the tariffs of water and electricity for this group (structure and prices) have not changed. They also had an insignificant effect on inequality (Table 9). The 2014 reforms saved the government about 5.5 bn. MAD assuming that the benefits of the average increase in prices due to the change in tariffs structure accrues to the government and not to producers or distributors (this is an implicit assumption of the model used for simulations). These savings come for the most part from the richest quintile (52.6%) and progressively less from the other quintiles with the poorest quintile contributing by only 3.7%.

As there is no increase in poverty, there is also no need to provide a compensatory cash transfer. If the government would have provided a poverty offsetting universal cash transfer, this would have cost 0.54 bn. and most of these transfers would have gone to the non-poor. Hence, by removing subsidies on gasoline and increasing prices for diesel, electricity and water with no compensation, the government has chosen a good mix of reforms from a poverty and budget perspective.

14
to the following condition holding: RHS of the inequality is the bene fi t to host from lower illegal migration due to the increase in p under cooperation while the LHS is the total loss to host from the expanded GW scheme. From C2 we know that the fi rst term on LHS is strictly positive implying that LHS is strictly increasing in Es<sup>∗.It is easy to verify that the inequality isstrictly violated at</sup> Es<sup>∗= 0 and strictly satisfied at E</sup> s<sup>∗= E1.Thus, there is exists a critical value of E</sup> s<sup>∗at which</sup> LHS=RHS implying that the host is indifferent between the cooperative outcome and the Nash equilibrium. Now consider the case when Es<sup>∗isequaltothiscriticalvalue.Whatwe</sup> have now is no-cooperation in the GW regime when η = η<sup>T</sup> = 0. Since all these conditions are consistent with C1 − C3 and Assumptions 1,2, the structure of cooperation if transfers were available is same as in section 3.

We are left to show that the host can achieve some cooperation by raising η and that doing so is optimal for it. To see this suppose that the host moves from no-cooperation and η = 0 to a cooperative outcome with p = p<sup>∗</sup> , L = L(p<sup>∗</sup> , 0) fi rst and then revises η upwards by a small amount. The change in p and L with η = 0 will have no effect on host’s welfare as stated above. The marginal impact of the revision in η on host’s welfare evaluated at η = 0, p = p<sup>∗</sup> , L = L(p<sup>∗</sup> , 0) is given by: where |dL(.)/dη| =<sup>2λ(p∗−</sup><sup><u>p ̄) + 2L(1 −p∗)</u></sup> > 0. The fi rst term on RHS is the bene fi t to λp<sup>∗</sup> host due to a lower L needed to induce the source to cooperate when η rises and the second

29
\ The third category of indicators on labor-market distortions concerns the ack ofmechanisms for peaceful resolution of labor disputes, measured by the amount, per worker, of annual hours not worked due to strikes in the modern sector.°° The prevalence of labor strikes indicates not only that labor legislation does not provide the means to settle labor conflicts, but also that such legislation may induce labor stoppage by making one party (usually the firm) bear most of its costs. For instance, in countries such as Ecuador and Nicaragua, legislation requires that workers be paid even when they are on strike. Both workers and firms should have something to lose if delays in reaching agreement occur; in this way, the bargaining process will move more speedily toward compromise.”’ The last category of labor-market distortions is related to the prevalence ofpublic employment in the economy, measured by the ratio of public to total employees in the non-agricultural sector. In most Latin American countries, public employment has traditionally been used both as a way to solve unemployment problems during economic downturns and as a political tool to reward allegiance to the governing party; therefore, the process of hiring public employees has often neglected to adequately match workers to the needs of public administration. This overstaffing and excessively high remuneration in public administration (relative to productivity) has bid up labor costs in the private sector; the ensuing welfare loss is caused by the fact that the marginal productivity of labor in the public sector has not equaled that in the private sector. Apart from this static distortion, low productivity in the public sector has had harmful consequences on the development of human capital of those employed by the state. Generally, public employees have lacked incentives to remain welltrained, so their preparation and training have soon become obsolete, which has made them unfit to compete with their private-sector counterparts. This contention is supported by preliminary findings of studies on public downsizing:*” these studies indicate that former public employees find it hard to adjust to the demands of the private sector, even when their human capital is generally sufficient to be applied to both private- and public-sector jobs.

.

3° This indicator may also vary as a result of events unrelated to the lack of proper dispute-resolution mechanisms. For example, it could increase in times of political unrest or macroeconomic shocks. At any rate, the fact that strikes can be used as means of political protest reveals excessive union power. 3! See World Bank (1995). *? See Rama (1997). ; 16
24 TABLE 11.3 HOLDING PERIODS AND REALIZED GAINS BY EXIT MIETHOD

|EXIT METHOD|AVERAGE<br>HOLDING PERIOD*<br>(years)|AVERAGE COST<br>(000)|AVERAGE<br>PROCEEU<br>(000)|S MULTIPLE|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|--<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-|.......<br>.<br>.<br>.|...........<br>.|..<br>...<br>.<br>.|..<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.|
|IPO|4.2|814|5804|7.1|
|Acquisition|3.7|988|1699|1.7|
|Company Buyback|<br>4.7|595|1268|2.1|
|Secondary Sale<br>|3.6<br>|715<br>|1431<br>|2.0<br>|
|Liquidation|4.1|1030|198|0.2|
|write-off|3.7|961|||

* Hotding period refers to the time elapsed between initiaL date of investment and date of the finaL exit.

source: Venture Capital Journals August 1988.
education does not seem to increase the likelihood of being in either farm based or non-farm selfemployment. There seems to be roughly equal distribution of men from different educational categories in non-farm self-employment. In rural areas, education also does not seem to affect men’s participation in farming and roughly one third of men from every educational category are in farming. This probably points to the existence of both landowners and workers in farming.

**Table 2:  Where does education take men in the labor market?**

_Bivariate associations between education level and employment type 2004/05 (_ Author’s Calculations Based NSS 61<sup>st</sup> Round for Men Age 15-59 Excl. Students)

|**_Men_**|_No_<br>_Education_|_Below_<br>_Primary_|_Completed_<br>_Primary_|_Post-_<br>_Primary_|_Total_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||Proportion|||
|**Rural**||||||
|Regular|0.05|0.07|0.09|0.22|0.14|
|Non-Farm Self-Emp|0.21|0.25|0.26|0.26|0.25|
|Self-Emp Farmers|0.33|0.35|0.37|0.33|0.34|
|Casual|0.37|0.29|0.25|0.12|0.22|
|Not In LF|0.05|0.04|0.04|0.07|0.06|
|Total|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|
|**Urban**||||||
|Regular|0.18|0.25|0.28|0.42|0.35|
|Non-Farm Self-Emp|0.37|0.39|0.38|0.37|0.37|
|Self-Emp Farmers|0.06|0.05|0.05|0.04|0.04|
|Casual|0.31|0.25|0.22|0.08|0.14|
|Not In LF|0.09|0.07|0.07|0.09|0.08|
|Total|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|1.00|

The multivariate results for labor force participation from the 61<sup>st</sup> round are broadly in keeping with our analyses based on previous rounds of the NSS. Muslim status has no significant association with labor force participation for men (but it has huge effects for women) in either urban or rural areas. Dalit status is on the other hand associated with higher labor force participation in rural areas but has no effect in urban areas. Higher levels of education are positively associated with men’s labor force participation (though not women’s as we have discussed elsewhere) and these effects are expectedly stronger in cities and towns than in villages since labor market opportunities are greater in the former. We have argued elsewhere that land is not merely an economic asset but also a marker of status and influences a number of outcomes. Here too we find that owning land is associated not only with greater likelihood of labor force participation but also the likelihood of being in non-farm ventures.

The complexity of this analysis comes from the multinomial models, which estimate the probability of being in different employment categories compared to salaried work. Where the question of selfemployment is concerned, the results from urban areas are more relevant than for rural areas. In the 12
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The perpetrators of the two kinds of violence use different means. Guerrillas and paramilitaries rely on displacement threats, kidnappings, extortion, massacres, and combat, the common delinquents prefer muggings, carjacking, and vendettas to adjust accounts, mostly among themselves. Not all of this violence is officially, let alone exhaustively, measured.<sup>5</sup> Regarding violence challenging the state, data assembled by the Medina et al. (2001) from National Police records and other municipal data allows us to measure guerrilla actions directly. Through a ‘public order problem’ dummy in the Familias survey, we also pick up qualitatively whether paramilitaries are active in a municipality. To our knowledge, there is currently no source that quantifies paramilitary actions reliably. Also the official statistics can be challenged, as the National Police records only actions they have been notified of, which might not always be the case.<sup>6</sup> Regarding common delinquency, our data sources pick up the homicide rate. There are obviously further activities by the perpetrators of homicides, such as muggings, and some of these will be committed in conjunction with a homicide. But of the available statistics, homicides are the most reliable, as they are certified and tracked by the Forensic Medecine (Medicina Legal)<sup>7</sup> . All other indicators of common delinquency are likely to be strongly under-reported. From the above, we can detect two issues that will affect the interpretation of our empirical results. First, the uncertain measurement of some violence variables may entail an attenuation effect on the corresponding covariates. This may especially be an issue for common delinquency, given that we miss the department of

> 5 Because of this there have been efforts to measure the actions of the armed groups more precisely. Vargas, Restrepo and Spagat (2004) have recently put together a dataset of guerrilla, paramilitary and other militia actions and their victims, carefully handpicking from NGO and church databases and local press articles. However, their database relies on the judgment of the authors, and for example consciously leaves out armed encounters that cannot be attributed to actors in the armed conflict. We therefore prefer to rely on Medina et al. (2001).

> 6 For example, National Police statistics on paramilitaries appear less complete than for guerrillas; and the overwhelming majority of empirical studies on Colombia relies on guerrilla and homicide figures alone. Also, as the paramilitaries avoid combat situations, they have fewer encounters with the police, and are less likely to be tracked, compare Vargas et al (2004).

> 7 Levitt and Rubio (2000) for example consider only the homicide rate a reliable violence indicator in Colombia.
- 34 -

uncertainty had a relatively larger impact on productivity in<sup>the sector of</sup> tradeables. The reduction in government's domestic purchases of tradeables may have worked in the same direction. However, the<sup>verification of these</sup> hypotheses requires detailed research.

If the real appreciation was in fact due to structural changes then it need not be a cause of concern. There<sup>are however reasons to believe that.</sup> part of the real appreciation can be attributed to unduly strong attachment<sup>to</sup> the fixed exchange rate policy in face of inflationary expectations of the type described in the proceeding section.

In order to clarify this point we may suppose that in<sup>the course of</sup> 1986, and especially since the pegging of the exchange<sup>to the basket of</sup> currencies in August, people were expecting a corrective<sup>devaluation at some</sup> uncertain (but not very distant) date.<sup>20</sup> / The actual<sup>devaluation (of 1OZ)</sup> took place in January 1987. Therefore the expected labor<sup>costs in 1986 were</sup> lower (especially in the second half) than the observed ones and the opposite is trust of the real exchange rate. Therefore the<sup>data exaggerate the real</sup> appreciation in 1986. The correction in real wages<sup>and relative prices</sup> brought about by the devaluation can be seen in table 14.

The same consideration continued to work even more forcibly in 1987 because then the exchange rate was practically<sup>fixed with respect to the</sup> currency basket while domestic inflation continued<sup>unabated. This led to a</sup> rise in real wages and drop in relative prices of exports<sup>and imports during</sup> the year following the devaluation in the beginning of 1988 nor after that till this day (July 1988).

According to this view there is really no contradiction between the balance growth in 1987 the real appreciation because the expected real exchange rate may have remained constant.<sup>Indeed, as figure 1 shows, the</sup>