rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
decision on whether a question was coded by promotion or prevention was made by the first author, who did not have access to the startup’s founder gender when making these decisions. We constructed a binary measure at the investor-dyad level to measure the incidence of a prevention focus, and used the same type of binary incidence measure for a promotion focus. Simply put, if an investor question to a startup did not have a promotion nor prevention focus, both variables would equal zero. If an investor question to a startup included both a promotion focus and a prevention focus, both variables would equal one.<sup>7</sup>

**5.5. Results.** We analyzed 1,341 decisions taken by 278 investors – combining 198 professional investors and 80 trainee investors – on 87 startups. As shown in Table 2, we assessed differences across all investor characteristics across treatment and control groups. As expected, given our randomized treatment assignment, here were no significant observable differences – using raw numbers, percentages or the p-value taken when regressing each characteristic on treatment.<sup>8</sup> As a result, any differences in evaluation practices between treatment and control groups are likely to be caused by our randomized treatments – not by the types of investors in treatment and control groups.

Investors in the control group scored startups with female founders significantly lower than those with all male teams. Startups with female founders received an average score of 3.7 out of 6, while startups with all male teams received 4.1. When including startup controls, investors in the control group gave startups with female founders significantly lower scores than startups with all male

> 7 Following Kanze et al. (2018), we also used a computerized method on English responses, utilizing a dictionary of 27 promotion and 25 prevention words developed and validated by Gamache et al. (2015), and uploaded these dictionaries into Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to determine their frequencies. Similarly to Kanze et al., this was not our preferred method, as the dictionary approach leaves LIWC vulnerable to a low detection rate; the software is not sensitive enough to capture intentions that do not directly overlap with the very specific 52 words in the regulatory focus dictionary (Gamache et al. 2015). We use this LIWC method as a robustness check for all responses in English, to verify the direction of results from the research assistants’ qualitative coding. We find the same directional results.

> 8 A small minority of professional investors met startups in multiple programs i.e., in the Middle East and Africa. As we randomized the investor according to the survey they received, 18 of the 276 investors encountered the treatment condition in one program, and the control condition in another program.

18
WPS3911

# **Evaluating Fiscal Equalization in Indonesia**<sup>*****</sup>

Bert Hofman Kadjatmiko Kai Kaiser Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir _This paper presents a methodology to evaluate fiscal decentralization focused on the potential mis-targeting of intergovernmental fiscal equalization transfers. The approach builds on an explicit comparison and the summary measurement of different (“horizontal”) allocation distributions across states or localities. Whereas formula based fiscal transfers have the merit of being transparent and promoting revenue predictability in fiscal decentralization, in practice, two challenges emerge: (a) What are the appropriate formula designs given the sub-national data constraints evident in most decentralizing developing countries?, and (b) How costly in terms of mis-targeting to the presumed expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are deviations from these types of benchmark formulas (e.g., due to historical factors or the need to meet establishment costs such as civil service wages)? We illustrate this approach through an assessment of Indonesia’s evolving intergovernmental fiscal system, instituted in the 2001 Big Bang decentralization. The discussion comes against Indonesia’s recent policy decision to fully fund sub-national civil servant wages as part of the base general allocation grant (DAU) transfers, raising questions about both incentive effects for local governments and potential mis-targeting. We identify potential efficiency losses from the DAU’s horizontal misallocation from half a dozen alternative scenarios found in the policy dialogue, ranging from 9 to 30 percent – on the order of USD 3.9 billion – of the overall annual size of this large intergovernmental transfer. The scale of these trade-offs highlights the importance of intergovernmental transfers in more general debates in public finance for decentralized countries._

### JEL Classification: H0

Key words: intergovernmental relations, fiscal equalization, decentralization, Indonesia

## World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3911, May 2006

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

> * Hofman, Kaiser and Suharnoko: World Bank, Kadjatmiko: Ministry of Finance, Indonesia.  Special thanks go to Javier Arze, Soren Davidsen, Wolfgang Fengler, Blane Lewis and Jeep Rojchaichaninthorn for providing comments on an earlier version of this paper.

i
10 Figure 5. Average scores in transactions costs and quality of information by region <!-- Start of picture text --> Index Index<br>stock return synchroncity (left axis)<br>0.25 transactions costs (right axis) 14<br>12<br>0.20<br>10<br>0.15<br>8<br>6<br>0.10<br>4<br>0.05<br>2<br>0.00 0<br>N Am LAC SA EAP MNA ECA SSA<br><!-- End of picture text --> To study the determinants of transaction costs across countries, we use a set of institutional and physical infrastructure variables. Our hypothesis is that physical infrastructure as well as certain institutional characteristics, or what we call complementary infrastructure—the existence of repo markets, securities lending, margin trading and derivatives markets—affect transactions costs and liquidity (see Figure 1 above). In particular, we use dummy variables regarding the presence of derivative markets, short selling, and stock lending, to study if the presence of these crucial institutional arrangements are associated with lower costs of trading. We also incorporate a measure for the efficiency of the physical clearing and settlement infrastructure in the form of days until final settlement. We also include in the regressions, macroeconomic control variables in the form of inflation and the government budget balance, as well as the extent of equity capital inflows.

For the determinants of the informational quality of stock markets, we focus on indicators of the quality of investor protection for shareholders. We choose to use these variables only, since it is notoriously difficult to find variables that are able to explain synchronicity beyond GDP per capita (Morck and Yeung (2002)). In particular we take three measures from the World Bank Doing Business indicators: disclosure, director liability, and shareholder suits. The three of them are a measure of the strength of minority shareholder protections against director’s misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. In other words, by measuring how effective securities markets laws are regarding self-dealing, they serve as a proxy for the broader law and order environment in which stock markets operate. The disclosure index captures the transparency of disclosure and approval of related-party transactions. The extent of director liability index measure the degree of liability of those involved in self-dealing acts. And the ease of shareholder suits index captures the ability of shareholders to sue officers and directors for misconduct<sup>5</sup> .

> 5 We chose to use Doing Business indicators instead of the earlier measures from La Porta et al (2006) and Djankov et al (2005) on which they are based, because they have broader country coverage and a consistent methodology applied in each country.  In particular, the way the three measures are obtained is by assuming a specific business transaction that involves self dealing.  There are two companies B (for buyer) and S (for seller).  A hypothetical Mr. James owns
_10_ _Famnly Planning Success Stories in Bangladesh and Indfa_ around 50 percent in 1987-88 and above 57 percent by the end of 1990? At the initial stage of the Project village-wise variation in the Treatment Area was quite high but It gradually diminished. Most of the villages had prevalence rates of less than 10 percent in the mid-1970s; none had rates of over 20 percent. Many villages in the Treatment Area had prevalence rates of modem contraceptives in excess of 50 percent by the end of the 1980s.

The patterns of adoption and continuation of modern contraceptives in the Treatment Area reveal a close relationship between the phenomena of supply and demand (Phillips et al. 1988). Adoption rates for all methods included in the Project were high and discontinuation rates low at the initial stage, because it served those whose demand was most prominent: high parity women, women with closely spaced births or many sons, and the relatively well-educated (Bhatia 1981, 1983). As the Project progressed, adoption rates were not so high and discontinuation rates increased. Such a pattern of adoption and continuation has been found in other countries also (Ross et al. 1972).

The prevalence pattern of contraceptive methods in the Matlab Treatment Area has changed during the course of the Project (Table 2). One significant change is the relative decrease in the prevalence of injectables from 49 percent in 1979 to 37 percent in 1985 and increase in the prevalence of IUDs from 3 to 18 percent during the same period (Table 2).

The contraceptive prevalence for modern methods increased dramatically from around 7 percent in October 1977 when the Project services started to around 20 percent in a brief period of three months not only because an accumulated unmet need existed but also because of household provision of injectables and the acceptability of this modality to Bangladeshi women. During their fortnightly household visits village-level female workers (CHWs) give injections **to** Table 2. Percentage distribution of contraceptive users by different methods among total number of users: 1979 and 1985

|||_1979_|||_1985_||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Method_|_Yeannent_<br>_Area_|_Compari-_<br>_son Area_|_Bangla-_<br>_desh_|_7Veatmewn_<br>_Area_|_t Compari-_<br>_son Area_|_Bangla-_<br>_desh_|
|Tubectomy|20|34|19|23|70|26|
|Vasectomy|3|3|7|1|3|13|
|Injectable|49|3|2|37|3|2|
|Pill|13|38|28|14|30|17|
|IUD|3|12|2|18|19|_5_|
|Condom|4|12|12|3|3|13|
|Foam|2|0|1|1|0|1|
|Traditional|_5_|N.A.|30|3|N.A.|23|

N.A. = Not **available**

**Source: Estimated fom** Tables **m-i** (p. 28), **m-9** (p. 42), and fIS-14 **(p.** 48) of **Balk et** a. (1988).

3Verbd **mmwnica with Michal** A. **Koenig** in **Maty** 1991.
Working Paper, No. 2719, Washington, DC PACKARD, Truman, Naoko Shinkai and Ricardo Fuentes, (2001), "The Reach of Social Security in Latin America and the Caribbean", Background paper for a Regional Study on Social Security Reform, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Caribbean Region, The World Bank PINERA, Jose, (1995) "Empowering Workers: The Privitization of Social Security in Chile" CATO Journal, No. 15, pp. 155 - 166 PRIESO 2000, _Encuesta de Prevision de Riesgos Sociales, Santiago, Chile,_ Social Risk Management Survey, designed by Truman Packard & Jose Cuesta, PRITCHETT, Lant & Lawrence H. Summers, (1993) "Wealthier is Healthier", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1150, Washington, DC ROSENZWEIG, Mark R.,(2001), "Savings Behavior in Low Income Countries", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 40 - 54 SAFP, (1999), El Sistema Chileno de Pensiones Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, Santiago, Chile SAMWICK, A. (1997), "Discount Rate Heterogeneity and Social Security Reform", NBER Working Paper 6219.

SCHMIDT-HEBBEL, K. and Luis Serven, (1996), "Hacia una Menor Inflacion en Chile: Contraccion Monetaria Bajo Expectativas Racionales", Analisis Empirico de la Inflacion en Chile, F. Morande and F. Rosende Eds., ILADES & Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile SCHWARZ, A. (1998), Comment to 'The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina', In Privatizing Social Security (Ed., Martin Feldstein), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

SCMIDT-HEBBEL, Klaus, (1998) "Pension Reform and Labor Market Adjustment" mimeo THALER, Richard H., (1994), "Psychology and Savings Policies", American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 2., pp. 186 - 192 THOENISSEN, Christoph, (1998), "Pensions, Longevity and the Pursuit of Leisure: An Analysis of Pension Reform and Ageing in an Overlapping Generations Model with Edogenous Labor Supply" University of Reading, Discussion Papers in Economics and Management, No. 385 UTHOFF, Andras, (1997), "Baja Cobertura de la Seguridad Social en America Latina: Un Problema de Incentivos o de Exclusion Social?" paper delivered at the seminar "Social Security, Micro-enterprise and Self Employment in Latin America" organized by World Bank, ILO, CEPAL & IASS, San Jose, Costa Rica, September 3 - 5 (2001), "La Reforma del Sistema de Pensiones en Chile: Desafios Pendientes", CEPAL/ECLAC Serie, Financiamiento del Desarrollo, No. 112, Santiago VITTAS, Dimitri, (1996). "Pension Funds and Capital Markets", FSD Note No. 71, February, Washington D.C.: World Bank.

YERMO, Juan, (2001), "Simulation of Minimum Pension Distributions Based on PRIESO Survey Data," Background note for Regional Study on Social Security Reform, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank 38
Acquisitions by non-EU and non-EFTA firms of 25% or more of a German company’s voting rights will be reviewed by the Government if they threaten “public security” or “public order.” This amendment entered into force on April 24, 2009.<sup>22</sup> As in the case of the US, foreign investors can voluntarily pre-notify the Government before an intended acquisition to obtain legal certainty.

**Figure 6. CFIUS filings and investigations, 2001-2008**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 180<br>165<br>160 Filings 147<br>140 Investigations<br>120 113<br>100<br>80 65<br>55 53<br>60 43 41<br>40<br>22<br>20 7 6<br>1 2 2 2<br>0<br>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: US Treasury Department._  **France** : A decree was issued at the end of 2005 identifying 11 strategic sectors in which investment proposals fall under the purview of the review authorities. In 2008, action was taken to earmark 20 billion Euros for a new state investment fund, among other things, to protect France’s strategic industrial assets from foreign takeovers.<sup>23</sup>  **Australia** : Under the _Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975_ , the Government must determine whether proposed foreign acquisitions are consistent with Australia's national interest (not defined). A new policy was announced on February 17, 2008 for proposed investments by sovereign investors. It requires that reviews of applications by such investors consider six specific issues, including whether an investor’s operations are independent from the relevant foreign government; the investor’s observance of standards of business behavior; the investment’s impact on

> 22 _See_ <u>http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Service/gesetze,did=223394.html. Thirteenth Act amending</u> the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, available at:

> <u>http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/englischer-gesetzestext-eines-dreizehnten-gesetzeszur-aenderung-aussenwirtschaft,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf.</u> 23 Decree No. 2005-1739, JORF no. 304, p. 20779, <u>http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/. See also “The French</u> investment climate,” _American Chamber of Commerce in France_ website, http://www.amchamfrance.org/theme1.php?idcontenu=107&idpage=15.

10
- Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2002), “Technology, Geography and Trade,” _Econometrica_ , Vol. 70(5), 1741-1779.

- Ethier, Wilfred (1982), “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modem Theory of International Trade," _American Economic Review_ , Vol. 72(2):389-405.

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- Feenstra, Robert C. (2010), “Measuring the Gains from Trade Under Monopolistic Competition,” C _anadian Journal of Economics_ ,” Vol. 43(1), 1-28.

- Feenstra, Robert C. (1994), “New Product Varieties and the Measurement of International Prices,” _American Economic Review_ , Vol. 84, 157-177.

- Francois, Joseph, M. Manchin and Will Martin (2013), “Market Structure in CGE Models of International Trade,” in Peter Dixon and Dale Jorgenson (eds.), _Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Models_ , Amsterdam: North Holland, Elsevier.

- Harris, Richard, 1984. "Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Economies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition," _American Economic Review_ , Vol. 74(5), pages 1016-32.

- Harrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr (1997), "Quantifying the Uruguay Round," _Economic Journal_ , Vol. 107, No. 444, September, 1405-1430.

- Harrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr (1997a), "Trade Policy Options for Chile: A Quantitative Evaluation,” World Bank Working Paper No. 1783. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/538631468015839517/pdf/WP1783.pdf,

- Hillberry, Russell and David Hummels (2013), “Trade Elasticity Parameters for a Computable General Equilibrium Model,” in _Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, Vol. 1B_ , Peter B. Dixon and Dale W. Jorgenson (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier.

- Jafari, Yaghoob and Wolfgang Britz (2017), “Modelling Heterogeneous Firms and Non-Tariff Measures in Free Trade Agreements Using Computable General Equilibrium,” _Economic Modelling_ , https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.04.004, in press.

- Jensen, Jesper, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr (2010), “Modeling Services Liberalization: The Case of Tanzania,” _Journal of Economic Integration_ , Vol. 25 (4), December, 644-675. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2010.25.4.644

- Jensen, Jesper and David G. Tarr (2003), “Trade, Exchange Rate and Energy Pricing Reform in Iran: Potentially Large Efficiency Effects and Gains to the Poor,” _Review of Development Economics_ , Vol. 7, Number 4, November, 543-562.

- Krueger, Anne O. (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” _American Economic Review_ , Vol. 3, 291-303.

- Krugman, Paul (1979), “Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition and International Trade,” _Journal of International Economics_ , 9(4), 469–479.

34
**<u>Table 8: Impact of changes in distance to large farms or neighboring large farm area on smallholders’ labor supply</u>**

||**Paid work**|**Temp. wor**<br>|**k**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|
|||**General **|**Agric.**|
|||**Panel A: Distance measures**<br>||
|Dist. to town|-0.000990***|-0.000101|0.000481|
||(0.000211)|(0.000107)|(0.000324)|
|Distance|-0.000144|-0.000162|-0.000130|
||(0.000205)|(0.000103)|(0.000314)|
|Distance<sup>2</sup>|9.74e-08|6.91e-07|-1.54e-06|
||(1.46e-06)|(7.38e-07)|(2.25e-06)|
|No. of obs.<br>|15,738|15,738|15,701|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.110|0.043|0.156|
|||**Panel B: Area measures**||
|Dist. to town|-0.00101***|-0.000120|0.000414|
||(0.000209)|(0.000106)|(0.000321)|
|0 - 25 km|3.34e-05|-3.07e-05|4.84e-05|
||(7.51e-05)|(3.79e-05)|(0.000115)|
|25 - 50 km|-5.19e-05|8.32e-06|5.59e-06|
||(3.95e-05)|(1.99e-05)|(6.06e-05)|
|50 - 100 km|6.70e-05***|1.38e-05|8.64e-05***|
||(1.93e-05)|(9.76e-06)|(2.96e-05)|
|No. of obs. (hhs)|15,738|15,738|15,701|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.111|0.043|0.157|
|**Mean of dep. var.**||||
|Round 1|0.048|0.012|0.081|
|Round 2|0.041|0.008|0.162|

_Note:_ Zone fixed effects and year trends included throughout. Standard errors clustered at zone level.

24
# **Correlates of Participation in Employer-Based Unemployment Insurance**

# Dependent Variable: Participation (1=Yes, 0=No)

Probit Marginal Effects

|Controls|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Age|0.018***<br>(0.004)|0.018***<br>(0.004)|0.017***<br>(0.004)|0.018***<br>(0.004)|0.018***<br>(0.004)|0.018***<br>(0.004)|
|Age-Squared|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|-0.000***<br>(0.000)|
|Years of Schooling|0.021***|0.021***|0.018***|0.020***|0.021***|0.021***|
||(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.003)|
|Post-Secondary Education|-0.045***|-0.021|-0.014|-0.021|-0.021|-0.022|
||(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.017)|(0.017)|
|Married|0.021|0.014|0.011|0.014|0.015|0.015|
||(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.014)|(0.014)|
|Female|-0.033***|-0.005|-0.004|-0.005|-0.013|-0.013|
||(0.009)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.011)|(0.011)|
|Urban Migrant w/ Other Urban|-0.179***|-0.161***|-0.155***|-0.179***|-0.168***|-0.190***|
|<br>Hukou|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.018)|(0.013)|(0.021)|
|Rural Hukou Migrant|-0.299***<br>(0.008)|-0.257***<br>(0.009)|-0.242***<br>(0.009)|-0.255***<br>(0.016)|-0.268***<br>(0.011)|-0.248***<br>(0.020)|
|Year 2010|0.085***|0.078***|0.102***|0.075***|0.078***|0.075***|
||(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.009)|(0.010)|(0.009)|(0.010)|
|Female x Rural Migrant|||||0.045|-0.038|
||||||(0.033)|(0.055)|
|Female x Urban Migrant|||||0.029|0.060|
||||||(0.034)|(0.073)|
|Urban Migrant x Year 2010||||0.044||0.060|
|||||(0.041)||(0.054)|
|Rural Migrant x Year 2010||||-0.004||-0.049|
|||||(0.034)||(0.039)|
|Female x Rural x 2010||||||0.122|
|||||||(0.080)|
|Female x Urban x 2010||||||-0.037<br>(0.067)|
|Has Labor Contract|||0.203***<br>(0.010)||||
|Industry and|||||||
|Ownership Dontrols|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|9,830|9,830|9,820|9,830|9,830|9,830|
|Average Participation|0.294|0.294|0.294|0.294|0.294|0.294|

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes 9830 working age adults, aged 1860, who are employed for a wage. The sample is drawn from the five cities common to the 2005 and 2010 CULS survey rounds (Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan and Xian). All models include city dummy variables. Models (2) through (6) control for 17 industries and 8 work unit ownership types.

44