rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
necessary but not sufficient condition for a net effective brain gain is _BGS_ > _p_ . In fact, a net effective brain loss may also occur in the case of _BGS_ > _p_ .<sup>7</sup> The arguments presented in the following sections strongly suggest that, even in the case of a homogeneous population with identical abilities, the _net_ brain gain is likely to be negative. However, even if one assumes that the net brain gain is equal to zero, the _reduction_ in the average ability level (a net effective brain loss) associated with migration under heterogeneity is likely to have negative implications for welfare and growth.<sup>8</sup>

# 2.2.2. Group Heterogeneity

Heterogeneity may occur across groups rather than across individuals. This situation is depicted in Figure 3 which shows three groups with different ability levels. In the absence of migration, two groups acquire education and the lowest-ability group does not. Once migration takes place, the expected return to education rises, though not sufficiently for the low-ability group which does do not acquire education in this case either. Thus, the brain drain does not result in a brain gain ( _A** = A*_ ), and the source 7 In an interesting paper, Fan and Stark (2005) present a model where decision-making takes place in three stages or less, and which generates equilibrium unemployment of skilled workers. The model assumes heterogeneity with respect to educational ability. However, given that ability in the job market tends to be positively related to educational ability, incorporating this feature would affect the results.

8 In fact, the impact of migration on welfare and growth is likely to be significantly greater than might be inferred from the analysis above. Section 2.2.1 assumed, for simplicity, a uniform distribution of ability or talent. As Haque (2005) notes, there is evidence that the distribution of talent in developing countries is highly skewed (Power Law distribution), with a large number of individuals at most talent levels and a relatively small number of highly talented individuals. Thanks to recent advances in information and communication technology, there has been a dramatic acceleration in the globalization of knowledge. The highly talented individuals in developing countries tend to belong to the global knowledge community, cognizant of the latest advances in their field or contributing to them. Such individuals tend to generate very large positive externalities by imparting frontier knowledge to their colleagues, assistants and students, thereby also enabling those who benefit from that knowledge to further diffuse it. For instance, surgeons who are pioneers tend to form medical centers with teams of doctors working with them, and top scientists often generate top scientists. Haque (2005) provides an analysis that shows that, given that the cost of migration is lowest for highly talented individuals, they are the most likely to migrate, and their departure is likely to have an enormous impact on their country of origin that goes way beyond their tiny share in the skilled population.

10
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<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.15%<br>0.12%<br>0.09%<br>0.06%<br>0.03%<br>0.00%<br>Damages Estimated Losses Estimated Total Impacts<br>1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 4-3 (c). Historical Trends of Hydrological Disasters (normalized) <!-- Start of picture text --> 0.40%<br>0.35%<br>0.30%<br>0.25%<br>0.20%<br>0.15%<br>0.10%<br>0.05%<br>0.00%<br>Damages Estimated Losses Estimated Total Impacts<br>1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 4-3 (d). Historical Trends of Meteorological Disasters (normalized) 21
Data for the transition economies clearly show the role of market forces in shaping firm dynamics (Figure 2). At the beginning of their transition to a market economy, both gross and net firm flows were large compared to industrial and other emerging economies: in some of the transition economies a large fraction of firms were closed down and replaced by new small ventures, and this process accounted for more than 10 percent of total employment. As the transition moved forward gross and especially net flows declined to reach, at the end of the 1990s, values fairly close to those observed in other countries.

**Figure 2: The evolution of gross and net firm flows in transition economies, business sector Panel A:  Gross firm flows**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Slovenia Hungary<br>50.00 50.00<br>45.00 45.00<br>40.00 40.00<br>35.00 35.00<br>30.00 30.00<br>25.00 25.00<br>20.00 20.00<br>15.00 15.00<br>10.00 10.00<br>5.00 5.00<br>0.00 0.00<br>92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 94 95 96 97 98 99<br>Gross firm flows Net firm flows Gross firm flows Net firm flows<br>Latvia Romania<br>50.00 50.00<br>45.00 45.00<br>40.00 40.00<br>35.00 35.00<br>30.00 30.00<br>25.00 25.00<br>20.00 20.00<br>15.00 15.00<br>10.00 10.00<br>5.00 5.00<br>0.00 0.00<br>94 95 96 97 94 95 96 97 98 99<br>Gross firm flows Net firm flows Gross firm flows Net firm flows<br>Panel B: Employment-weighted firm flows<br>Slovenia Hungary<br>20.00 15.00<br>13.00<br>15.00<br>11.00<br>10.00 9.00<br>7.00<br>5.00 5.00<br>3.00<br>0.00<br>1.00<br>-5.00 -1.00<br>92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 94 95 96 97 98 99<br>Gross weighted firm flows Net weighted firm flows Gross weighted firm flows Net weighted firm flows<br>Latvia Romania<br>15.00 15.00<br>13.00 13.00<br>11.00 11.00<br>9.00 9.00<br>7.00 7.00<br>5.00 5.00<br>3.00 3.00<br>1.00 1.00<br>-1.00 -1.00<br>94 95 96 97 94 95 96 97 98 99<br>Gross weighted firm flows Net weighted firm flows Gross weighted firm flows Net weighted firm flows<br><!-- End of picture text --> 17
13 research may not depict accurately the educational environment for Nigerian females in the 1980s.

In almost all of the research on single-sex and coeducational schooling in both developed and developing countries, we see a confounding of school governance issues (private vs. public or state-supported schools) with school gender grouping (single-sex vs. coeducational). This is because coeducation is more common in state-supported institutions, whereas single-sex grouping is often a characteristic of privately funded schools. The research in American Catholic schools is, of course, confined to the private sector. Although single-sex schooling exists in the public sector in Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and Canada, the research from those countries typically does not identify school sector -- public or private -- leaving us unable to untangle school governance from school organi¶zation as causal factors. The study of Thai schools has sector and school sex grouping totally confounded. However, the study described here investigates the question of single-sex and coeducational school organization exclusively in the Nigerian public educational sector.

Method

# SamRle and Data

The IEA Nigerian SIMS sample was comprised of 41 mathematics teachers in state-owned Secondary Grammar Schools which prepared students for the West African School Certificate Examination and their 1126 Form 3 students; it was derived from a three-stage, stratified random sampling plan.
14

# 4.2 Financial Liberalization and the Real<sup>Exchange Rate</sup>

In section 2, we presented the theoretical<sup>case for</sup><sup>**expecting**</sup> complementarity, operating via the real exchange rate,<sup>between financial</sup> liberalization and the outcome of trade liberalization.<sup>In particular, it</sup> was postulated that financial deepening would<sup>help sustain depreciation in</sup> the real exchange rate by containing<sup>aggregate demand pressure and by</sup> tilting household asset demand away from<sup>nontradable assets and towards</sup> interest-bearing bank deposits.

The empirical evidence presented in the<sup>previou3 section showed that</sup> both financial savings and total private<sup>savings responded favorably to</sup> interest rate reform. This evidence,<sup>in turn, supports the view that</sup> interest rate reform was instrumental in<sup>dampening the impact on nontraded</sup> goods prices of the surge in private income<sup>(expenditure) triggered by</sup> trade reform. In the absence of high interest<sup>rates, the expansion of</sup> domestic demand would have been stronger, and<sup>thus would have created</sup> greater pressure to push the real exchange rate<sup>upward.</sup> Any attempt to make a detailed analysis<sup>of the impact of interest rate</sup> policy on household asset-holding behavior<sup>was hampered by an absence of</sup> time series data. Nevertheless, data from<sup>the Consumer Finances Survey of</sup> the Central Bank provide some support for<sup>our hypothesis (Table 9). Bank</sup> deposits as a share of household asset portfolios<sup>reached 33 percent in</sup> 1981-82, as compared with a historical figure<sup>of less than 10 percent.1 4</sup> (continued from previous page) from clear. (see Fry, 1989, Gonzales-Arrieta, 1988<sup>for surveys of this</sup> literature). While some studies come down<sup>against any interest rate</sup> effect on savings, the others find a positive<sup>but rather small interest</sup> elasticity (around 0.1 percentage point) which<sup>is "not large enough to</sup> warrant great policy significance" (Fry,<sup>1989, p.20).</sup> The appropriateness of the multi-country cross-section<sup>approach (which</sup> implicitly assume that the observations<sup>are drawn from a "homogenous</sup> universe") to measure the average saving<sup>propensity for a diverse group</sup> of countries is, however. highly queltionable. The few available country studiec (eg. anis and Riedel 1QPQ.<sup>Y-usuf and Kyle-Feters, 1984</sup> have, in fact, produced int-r-t- ola<sup>iit</sup> Pstimates which ars qimilai in magnitude to our estimate for Sri Lanka.

**14.** The, mild decline in this -hare in l 37-7 as reflected in the survey data iq come-w'hat puz7linc. Thp '7ontL1l Pank ascribes this decline to "oneun)lts' ruTh to iati-v thloii 1-n-up domarnd ( accumulated<sup>Ovftr</sup> a

_lonw period_ of import iestrictionq, fi JouLalle consumer goods. following the trade liberalizati.n (C.-nttal Bank. Consumet Finances Survey 19?e,'79. Part 1, p. 171.
# **1. Introduction**

Since the late 1990s, the importance of multinational banks has grown dramatically. Between 1999 and 2009 the average share of bank assets held by foreign banks in developing countries rose from 26 percent to 46 percent.<sup>1</sup> The bulk of the pre-global crisis evidence analyzing the consequences of this significant transformation in bank ownership suggests that foreign bank participation brought many benefits to developing countries, especially in terms of bank competition and efficiency.<sup>2</sup> The recent global financial crisis, however, highlighted the role of multinational banks in the transmission of shocks across countries. Most of the research has focused on transmission through the lending channel – how foreign bank lending behaved during the crisis. A number of papers, including some before the recent global crisis, have documented that lending by foreign bank affiliates declines when parent banks’ financial conditions deteriorate. Peek and Rosengren (2000) offer evidence based on the behavior of Japanese banks operating in the US during the 1990s Japanese crisis. Schnabl (2012) studies the lending behavior of foreign bank affiliates in Peru in the aftermath of the 1998 Russian crisis. In the context of the recent global crisis, Claessens and van Horen (2013), Choi et al. (2013), and de Haas and van Horen (2013), among others, show that foreign bank lending across countries declined more than domestic bank lending during the period 2008-2009. The last two studies, in particular, find that foreign bank affiliates whose parents relied more on wholesale funding (in the case of de Haas and van Horen, 2013) and had lower capital ratios (in the case of Choi et al., 2013) experienced a sharper decline in lending.

> 1Data from the World Bank Regulation and Supervision surveys at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK: 64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html

> 2 For a review of the literature see Cull and Martinez Peria (2008).

2
• Given the input prices pl, pb and housing price, ph, we get equilibrium supply of land per residence by inserting Equation (17) into (5) as The amount of land developed and supplied by the developer decides the availability of land in the city. However, land availability is a function of availability of loan, ω , through the loan rate, r (Equation 14).

• Based on available land and its fixed share in production, we get equilibrium building structure with given prices as • To maintain the same steady state housing quality (such that _qt_ = _qt_ − 1 = _q_ ), the equilibrium values of land (Equation 18) and building structure (Equation 19) estimated above determine the optimum amount of infrastructure in the following way: • From Equation (10), (18) and (19) we get equilibrium loan requirement per house for the construction of one unit residence as

# **_2.6. Estimating Equilibrium Parameter Values_**

We quantify our model using data for three municipalities in Brazil - Brasilia, Curitiba and Recife, based on parameter values developed in recent research. From Serra et al (2004), we use total housing stock (Ht), total urban developed land, land price per square 14
|Pr(IQ=1,IV=1)|5.44E-06|[0.0000]***|-2.49E-06|[0.0000]***|0.00063|[0.00033]*|-8.57E-06|[0.00000]***|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Pr(IQ=0,IV=1)|0.00080|[0.00024]***|-0.00037|[0.00016]**|0.09411|[ 0.04729]**|-0.00127|[ 0.00028]***|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49||||
|Pr(IV=1|IQ=1)|0.00052|[0.00016]***|-0.00024|[0.0001]**|0.06099|[0.03172]**|-0.00082|[0.00021]***|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|. One of the|The other is||
|Pr(IV=1)|8.10E-04|[0.00024]***|-0.00037|[0.0001]***|0.09474|[0.04761]**|-0.00128|[0.00029 ]***|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|bi-variate probit|lity up-grading.|ods.|
|Pr(IQ=1,IV=1)|0.00003|[0.00001]**|-1.00E-05|[0.0001]***|0.00244|[0.0059]|-0.00005|[0.00004]|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|al efects) of a|frm reports qua|uction of new go|
|Pr(IQ=1,IV=0)|7.49E-06|[0.0000]***|-3.52E-06|[0.0000]***|0.00049|[0.0012]|-0.00001|[0.00001]|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|results (margin|es value 1 if the|ports the introd|
|Pr(IQ=1|IV=1)|0.00010|[0.0004]***|-0.00005|[0.00002]***|0.00705|[0.01701]|-0.00015|[0.00011]|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|s the estimation|dummy that tak|e 1 if the frm re|
|Pr(IQ=1)|0.000044|[0.00002]***|-0.000021|[0.00001]***|0.00294|[0.0071]|-0.00006|[0.00005 ]|Yes|Yes||Yes|Yes|17271|-16068.49<br>|s table present|variables is a|hat takes valu|
||Know.spillovers||Distance to Innovators|*Know.spillover|International Know.spillovers||Distance to International Innovators|* International Know.spillovers|Firm ’ s characteristics|Firm’ s and Industry-Country’ s|characteristics|Country-Time fxed efects|Industry fxed efects|Num. of observations|Log pseudolikelihood<br>|Note: Thi|dependent|a dummy t|

32
Policy Research Working Paper 5531

# **Abstract**

According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development until they are able to sustain long-term development without further recourse to Bank financing. Graduation from the Bank is not an automatic consequence of reaching a particular income level, but rather is supposed to be based on a determination of whether the country has reached a level of institutional development and capital-market access that enables it to sustain its own development process without recourse to Bank funding. This paper assesses how International Bank for Reconstruction and Development graduation policy operates in practice, investigating what income and non-income factors appear to have influenced graduation decisions in recent decades, based on panel data for 1982 through 2008. Explanatory variables include the per-capita income of the country, as well as measures of institutional development and market access that are cited as criteria by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory variables that capture the levels of economic development and vulnerability of the country. The authors find that the observed correlates of Bank graduation are generally consistent with the stated policy. Countries that are wealthier, more creditworthy, more institutionally developed, and less vulnerable to shocks are more likely to have graduated. Predicted probabilities generated by the model correspond closely to the actual graduation and de-graduation experiences of most countries (such as Korea and Trinidad and Tobago), and suggest that Hungary and Latvia may have graduated prematurely—a prediction consistent with their subsequent return to borrowing from the Bank in the wake of the global financial crisis.

This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sknack@worldbank.org or hrogers@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
of deep RTAs in the next section.

# **5.2 Firm heterogeneity**

In line with the theoretical discussion in section 2, deep RTAs may have a different effect on low- _versus_ high-productivity firms and/or on firms with different involvement in GVCs. This section explores the heterogeneous effects of deep RTA across different types of firms based on size and GVC participation. Namely, we interact the _DTAijt_ variable with four firm specific indicators: (i) large firm dummy variables equal to one if the total exports of the firm (across destination and years) is in turn above the 75<sup>_th_</sup> and 90<sup>_th_</sup> percentile of the distribution, (ii) large firm dummy if the exports of the firm at _t_ 0 is in turn above the 75<sup>_th_</sup> and 90<sup>_th_</sup> percentile of the distribution, (iii) a dummy equal to one if the exporting firm imports some products (i.e. GVC firm indicator), and (iv) a dummy variable equal to one if the firm exports and imports to/from the same destination _j_ ( _GVC bilateral_ ).

Results reported in Table 5 show an interesting and robust pattern: large and GVC firms benefit from deep RTA.<sup>17</sup> For small firms, and firms that do not participate in GVCs, the depth of RTAs has a negative effect on exports. Specifically, for large high-productivity firms, one additional legally enforceable provision implies a 0.3% - 0.6% increase in exports (see columns 1 - 4). This means that, moving from _shallow_ to _deep_ RTAs implies a 3.6% - 7.2% increase in exports. For GVC firms exporting/importing to/from the same country _j_ , moving from _shallow_ to _deep_ RTAs implies a 9.6% increase in exports (see columns 6). These results uncover an interesting selection effect à la Melitz (2003). Deep RTAs reduce variable and fixed trade costs between members, and more productive firms are more likely to take advantage of this policy change. In addition to this size/productivity channel, GVC firms benefit as they see a reduction in trade costs on imports of intermediate products used in production for exports. The heterogeneous effect of deep RTAs is confirmed also by using the weighted sum of provision as a proxy for the depth of RTAs (see Table A9).

The negative effect on small firms is in line with trade models with heterogeneous elasticity of demand (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008; Crowley et al., 2022) that predict a strong within-country competition effect hurting less productive firms, and implying an increase in the concentration of foreign market shares among high-productivity firms. So, deeper RTAs favor the export sales of firms with certain characteristics (large, more productive and GVC firms) at the expense of small and less productive firms. Such a selection effect of deeper RTAs is shown in Table 6

> 17The same conclusion holds by using a non-parametric binned model where the _DTA_ variable is interacted by three firm size bins based on whether the total exports of the firm (across destination and years) are below the 25<sup>_th_</sup> percentile (small firms), above the 75<sup>_th_</sup> percentile (big firms), or in between (medium size firms). See appendix table A8.

13
(2013b) also demonstrate that unit values are unsuited to measure differences in food prices between income and spatial groups. In the poorer metropolitan areas of Vietnam, food prices are 4.5% lower than in upper income neighborhoods, but unit values for the richest households are 20% higher than for poorest households. Gibson and Kim (2019) compares the UM with the Standard Price Method (SPM) and Deaton’s method using the VHLSS 2012. In this instance, Gibson and Kim demonstrate that the own-price elasticity of quantity demand is overstated by a factor of four when the quality response is disregarded.

Looking at the expenditure and price elasticities in tables 1 and 2 we note a strong heterogeneity across studies. For example, the expenditure elasticity of “Other meats and seafood” ranges from 0.25 (Le, 2008) to 1.75 (Vu, 2020), passing from normal to luxury goods; the uncompensated own price elasticiy of rice ranges from -0.06 (Le, 2008) to -1.01 (Niimi, 2005), covering many degreases of inelastic responsiveness. This heterogeneity is mainly explained by publication bias, demand system (AIDS, LAIDS, QUAIDS), sample size and data (Colen et al. 2018). Time differences are also very important as income growth can increase food consumption and inequality growth can increase the diversity of diets and preferences.

As discussed so far, the demand analysis literature of Vietnam focuses mainly on foods and beverages, sometimes including other goods in the demand system, while studies specifically addressing other goods and services are rare. One noticeble exception is the study of Phu (2020) that estimates the elasticity of residential electricity demand for various income groups in Vietnam, using 2015 microdata. Instead of a demand system, Phu (2020) adopts a double-log function with a two-stage instrumental variable (2SLS) estimator and finds an own price elasticity from − 1.48 to − 0.94; a very low income elasticity between 0.05 and 0.08; and a limited elasticity of substitution between electricity and other fuels (LPG, coal or firewood) with a cross-price elasticity from 0.05 to 0.06.

8