allocation of public offices to key elites (van de Walle 2012: 113).<sup>3</sup> In such settings, a cabinet position forms the top echelon of elite offices and can be seen as the ultimate gift, “bringing with it patronage opportunities as well as significant perks and status-enhancing privileges” (van de Walle, 2001: 103; see also Kroeger 2018, LeVan and Assenov 2016).

Elite clientelism in the form of prebendalism is closely linked to grand corruption, which channels benefits other than the official salary to a political office holder. In an earlier empirical analysis, Mills (2012) uses data for 42 African countries over the period 1985-2010 and finds that cabinet size is associated with higher levels of grand corruption. One reason is that horizontal accountability – whereby members of a country’s legislature hold the executive branch to account – is a likely victim of prebendalism. The handing out of cabinet positions to members of parliament based on loyalty acts as a disincentive for them to exercise effective oversight. For instance, Ghana’s former President John Kufuor picked about three-quarters of his cabinet ministers from among parliamentarians, who in order to be considered had to be loyal rather than scrutinize the executive (Lindberg 2010).<sup>4</sup> Elite clientelism can be contained by programmatic political parties, which appeal to voters on the basis of specific policies that are grounded in an ideological program (Keefer 2013: 7). Programmatic parties are able to solve collective action problems and make credible commitments to deliver public goods, which requires mechanisms to discipline and sanction party leaders and members whose actions are not conducive to delivering promised policies. In contrast, clientelist politicians prefer discretion and weak oversight of the implementation of policies, so that they can extract personal benefits and channel resources to their supporters (Cruz and Keefer 2015). This implies that the potential for cabinet size to be associated with poor governance and corruption is especially likely in settings where programmatic political parties are weak or absent, as is the case in many Sub-Saharan African countries.

Clientelistic politics is not the only driver of cabinet size. Examining data on post-war cabinets in 17 Western European countries, Indridason and Bowler (2014) find that inter-party politics influences the size of the cabinet. As coalition parties require an agreement about the division of ministerial portfolios, increasing the size of the cabinet can at times smooth that process. Portfolios tend to be allocated roughly proportional to the government parties’ legislative strength. Achieving proportionality is difficult in small cabinets, but the problem can often be solved by adding a portfolio. Intra-party politics matters, too, when otherwise dissatisfied party members and/or factions are brought on board by altering the size of the cabinet. The need for coalition building through cabinet appointments is not limited to parliamentary democracies, as Cheibub (2007) shows for presidential systems in Latin America.

> 3 In the words of van de Walle (2012: 114): “Hiring a member of one’s ethnic group to a senior position in the customs office is an example of patronage. Allowing the customs officer to use the position for personal enrichment by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend.”

> 4 This problem is not limited to African countries. In the United Kingdom, there has been a significant increase in junior ministers without cabinet rank over the past decades. This has boosted the “payroll vote”, comprising Members of Parliament with a government job who are expected to vote as instructed or resign (House of Commons 2010: 8).

3