**<u>Table C5.3: Impact of Political Turnover on Competition – broad connections</u>**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Entry|Exit|PCM|PE|HHI|MS4|lnN|lnP|Z|
|PC (broad)*1993|0.017|0.015|-0.067|-1.158|-0.031|-0.010|0.022|0.015|1.862|
||(0.041)|(0.042)|(0.058)|(1.001)|(0.049)|(0.041)|(0.084)|(0.040)|(1.254)|
|PC (broad)*1994|0.006|-0.059|-0.008|-1.053|-0.017|-0.003|-0.013|0.013|0.000|
||(0.056)|(0.043)|(0.041)|(1.250)|(0.043)|(0.034)|(0.065)|(0.030)|(1.121)|
|PC (broad)*1995|-0.023|-0.062*|-0.024|-0.430|-0.006|0.002|-0.019|0.011|-0.712|
||(0.057)|(0.033)|(0.034)|(0.960)|(0.029)|(0.030)|(0.055)|(0.013)|(0.912)|
|PC (broad)*2000|0.043|-0.022|-0.004|-1.389|-0.045|-0.031|0.001|-0.172*|1.697|
||(0.039)|(0.031)|(0.060)|(1.147)|(0.053)|(0.038)|(0.120)|(0.092)|(1.349)|
|PC (broad)*2001|0.010|-0.033|-0.020|-0.623|0.036|0.004|-0.007|-0.146*|0.157|
||(0.038)|(0.037)|(0.095)|(1.029)|(0.063)|(0.050)|(0.135)|(0.086)|(1.440)|
|PC (broad)*2002|-0.017|0.023|0.066|-0.472|0.090|0.053|-0.032|-0.131|-0.522|
||(0.031)|(0.040)|(0.085)|(0.955)|(0.067)|(0.060)|(0.143)|(0.081)|(1.508)|
|PC (broad)*2003|0.020|-0.008|0.109|-0.148|0.056|0.016|-0.052|-0.122|-0.850|
||(0.039)|(0.030)|(0.075)|(1.208)|(0.061)|(0.056)|(0.147)|(0.078)|(1.522)|
|PC (broad)*2004|-0.015|0.026|0.104|-0.424|0.077|-0.006|-0.094|-0.149|-0.465|
||(0.038)|(0.034)|(0.088)|(1.489)|(0.063)|(0.061)|(0.154)|(0.090)|(1.933)|
|PC (broad)*2005|0.087**|-0.036|0.037|-2.514|0.019|-0.012|-0.035|-0.112|1.773|
||(0.043)|(0.054)|(0.086)|(1.816)|(0.064)|(0.064)|(0.171)|(0.097)|(2.619)|
|PC (broad)*2006|-0.054|-0.043|-0.083|-1.491|-0.017|0.019|-0.185|-0.019|0.336|
||(0.065)|(0.045)|(0.081)|(1.213)|(0.072)|(0.060)|(0.195)|(0.119)|(1.769)|
|PC (broad)*2007|-0.008|0.011|0.035|0.049|0.083|0.055|-0.169|-0.028|-0.994|
||(0.041)|(0.032)|(0.084)|(1.091)|(0.071)|(0.056)|(0.193)|(0.122)|(1.330)|
|PC (broad)*2008|0.025|0.004|-0.082|-0.414|0.065|0.049|-0.194|-0.107|0.599|
||(0.035)|(0.044)|(0.085)|(0.831)|(0.088)|(0.070)|(0.215)|(0.150)|(1.890)|
|PC (broad)*2009|0.029|-0.031|-0.009|-0.609|0.050|0.021|-0.194|-0.102|-0.087|
||(0.034)|(0.040)|(0.090)|(0.768)|(0.078)|(0.073)|(0.215)|(0.145)|(1.670)|
|Observations|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|2,800|
|Industries|200|200|200|200|200|200|200|200|200|
|R-squared|0.546|0.148|0.069|0.089|0.080|0.083|0.284|0.934|0.303|

_Note_ : Table reports results of estimation of specification (3) for the dependent variables specified. PCM=price cost margin, PE=profit elasticity, HHI=Herfindahl index of market concentration, MS4=cumulative market share of 4 largest firms, lnN=natural logarithm of the number of firms, lnP=natural logarithm of price, Z is a summary competition index. PC (broad) measures the aggregate Suharto-era market share of firms with broad connections to Suharto (the average of their aggregate market share in 1996 and 1997). The sample period spans 1993–96 and 2000–03. All specifications include industry and year fixed effects and Suharto era (averaged over 1993-1996) industry controls interacted with year dummies. Industry controls include aggregate imports, exports, the cumulative market shares of state-owned and foreignowned firms, entry regulation, dependence on external finance, and asset tangibility. Appendix A defines all the variables. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and presented in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** - at the 5 percent level, and *** - at the 1 percent level.

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