rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
even if subjects had different expectations about future account use, expectations could not explain why account holders without the transfer preferred the basic account to the Pafupi account.

# **5 Conclusions**

The conclusion of a previous study of subsidized bank accounts provided a unique opportunity to examine the role of experience in shaping financial decisions. From a sample of subjects who opened and owned subsidized savings accounts beginning in 2012, some were randomly selected to receive a transfer in 2015. Such transfers did not have persistent effects on savings or spending, but they did increase the number of transactions and thus experience with the account. In 2016, all account holders were visited at home and presented with the choice of keeping their existing account but paying previously subsidized maintenance fees, closing their accounts entirely, or switching to a new type of account (Pafupi) with a cheaper fee structure. Importantly, based on the number of transactions individuals had made in the past, the new Pafupi account was cheaper than the original account for everyone in the sample as long as their usage patterns continued and they planned to keep the account for at least four months.

While 54 percent of the individuals who received transfers in 2015 switched to the Pafupi account, only 37 percent of individuals without transfers did so. We estimate a multinomial logit model of account disposition allowing the cost of visiting the bank and the valuation of both the old and new accounts to vary by the experience of the account-holder. We find that differences in the propensity to switch accounts is not driven by differences in the cost of visiting the bank but by the fact that individuals that received transfers in 2015 value the Pafupi account more than those who did not. We conclude that individuals who were induced to use the basic account became familiar with it and subsequently switched to the cheaper Pafupi option when presented with a choice.

While policymakers frequently consider active policies to broaden financial inclusion using financial literacy campaigns, our results suggest that making transfers directly into the accounts of individuals may be beneficial as these deposits induce account holders to transact, and the resulting experience can raise financial awareness and improve financial decision making.

14
4 trade flows and calculates that NAFTA (modeled as simply entailing tariff removal among member countries) would re¶ult in a reduction of less than three-quarters of one per cent in the value of exports to the United States from the other countries in the Western Heniisphere. For all industrialized countries, a NAFTA limited to tariff elimination would result in a reduction of only one half of one per fent of their exports to the United States.

Laird also estimates NAFTA's trade expansion effect (i.e., the summation of trade creation and trade diversion). under the assumption that the agreement would be implemented in tandem with a liberalization jn trade barriers achieved by the Uruguay Round negotiations. His assumptions concerning the results of the Round were: a 20 per cent reduction in tariffs and NTBs affecting agriculure; the elimination of MFA quotas, while textile and clothing tariffs remain at present levels; ad tariffs for all other products are reduced by 30 per cent with remaining NTBs being left untouched. Under these conditions, trade creation (magnified by the MIFN Uruguay Round liberalization) completely dominates trade diversion resulting from NAFTA. The developing countries in the Western Hemisphere would experience a 1.8 per cent increase in their exports to the United States while there would be a 2.4 per cent increase for all industialized countries. If the results of the Uruguay Round are estmated in connection with a NAFTA that encompasses the complete removal of both tariffs and NTBs among its member countries, the final outcom4 is marginal: exports to the United States would decline by only 0.07 per cent in the case of the WNestern Hemisphere developing countries (and would expand by 1.6 percent for industrial countries).

A second aggregate partial equilibrium study also confis NAFTA's limited potential for trade diversion with respect to other Western Hemisphere countries and that the
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consumption reduces household air pollution with potential effects on health (see Lam et al. 2012; WHO 2016). Environmental benefits arise due to inappropriate dry‐cell battery disposal (see Bensch et. al 2015) that is reduced if dry‐cell battery consumption goes down. Third, we analyze the productivity of domestic production, that is, production not intended to be traded on competitive markets. This we refer to as _domestic productivity_ effect in what follows. The reason for only focusing on domestic production is that income in such remote rural areas is virtually only generated by subsistence agriculture. The Pico‐PV kit, in turn, is too small to affect agricultural production. For non‐agricultural products, access to markets is very limited and, hence, local nonagricultural labor markets are nonexistent. At baseline, only seven percent of head of household’s main occupation and one percent of spouse’s main occupation was a non‐agricultural activity. Yet, since in theory the Pico‐PV kit could liberate time from domestic labor and extend the time awake of household members, we examine at least the time dedicated to any income generating activity (agricultural and nonagricultural activities). Labor demand in such rural regions is too low, though, to absorb increases in labor supply, and therefore measurable effects on nonagricultural income cannot be expected.

The mechanism leading to the budget and health and environmental effects are quite intuitive, whereas the transmission channel for the domestic productivity effect might be less obvious. Productive activities at home include cooking, cleaning, and making and repairing of household goods as well as studying and charging a cell phone. Since the visual performance of humans strongly increases with the lighting level (Brainard
Finally, we look at the correlation of real interest rates with various macroeconomic variables. The fact that real interest rates are countercyclical with GDP suggests that they may also be negatively correlated with investment, government expenditures, and consumption. Indeed, we find that this is the case for investment, where the correlation with interest rate is equal to -0.29, on average; and for consumption, where the correlation ranged from -0.51 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines to -0.21 in Antigua and Barbuda, with the average of -0.33. The correlation of the interest rate with government expenditures was close to 0, on average, although with a significant spread ranging from -0.23 for St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 0.24 for St. Kitts and Nevis. Our finding that real interest rates are volatile and countercyclical in the OECS countries mirrors the results in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), and others for developing economies.

**<u>Table 3. The correlation of GDP with key macroeconomic variables: 1980-2014</u>**

||||**Correlatio**<br>|**n of GDP with**<br>|<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Inv|Gov exp|Cons|TB/GDP|TOT|Int rate|
|**Antigua and Barbuda**|0.48|0.31|0.63|-0.44|-0.27|-0.33|
|**Barbados**|0.79|0.20|0.50|-0.33|0.39|-0.27|
|**Dominica**|0.56|0.65|0.23|-0.32|-0.23|-0.30|
|**Grenada**|0.56|0.49|0.32|-0.10|0.19|-0.21|
|**St. Kitts and Nevis**|0.65|0.38|0.04|-0.33|0.31|-0.32|
|**St. Lucia**|0.72|0.22|0.44|-0.27|-0.32|-0.55|
|**St. Vincent and the**<br>**Grenadines**|0.55|0.52|0.38|-0.10|-0.08|-0.51|
|**Average**|0.61|0.39|0.36|-0.27|0.00|-0.36|

_Notes_ : TOT is terms of trade; TB/GDP is exports minus imports over GDP; Int rate is the real interest rate computed as the lending rate minus inflation rate. _Source_ : World Economic Outlook.

**<u>Table 4. The correlation of interest rates with key macroeconomic variables: 1980-2014</u>**

||||**Corre**<br>|**lation of**<br>|**Interest rat**<br>|**e with**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||GDP|Inv|Gov exp|Cons|TB/GDP|TOT|Effective int rate|
|**Antigua and Barbuda**|-0.33|-0.30|0.04|-0.21|-0.08|0.00|0.79|
|**Barbados**|-0.27|-0.21|-0.17|-0.40|0.39|0.11|0.93|
|**Dominica**|-0.30|-0.50|-0.18|-0.22|0.72|0.43|0.87|
|**Grenada**|-0.21|-0.01|0.01|-0.35|-0.06|0.04|0.92|
|**St. Kitts and Nevis**|-0.32|-0.06|0.24|-0.37|0.03|-0.04|0.94|
|**St. Lucia**|-0.55|-0.53|0.02|-0.27|0.31|0.14|0.86|
|**St. Vincent and the**<br>**Grenadines**|-0.51|-0.43|-0.23|-0.51|0.40|0.37|0.92|
|**Average**|-0.36|-0.29|-0.04|-0.33|0.24|0.15|0.89|

_Notes_ : TOT is terms of trade; TB/GDP is exports minus imports over GDP; Int rate is the real interest rate computed as the lending rate minus inflation rate. _Source_ : World Economic Outlook.

Overall, we show that the business cycles in the OECS countries exhibit the properties that are typical of developing countries. In particular, these countries, very much like other developing countries, are characterized by (i) higher volatility of most macroeconomic variables when compared to other more advanced economies as exemplified, for example, by the volatility of the 9
**Table 14: Carbon soil sequestration and net revenue gain under alternative farming practices.**

||No external<br>inputs|Improved seeds|Improved<br>seeds and<br>fertilizer|Agroforestry|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Carbon sequestration rate (tCO2e)|0.5|1.0|1.5|4.0|
|Values ($/ha)|||||
|Annual carbon payments|$1.15|$4.90|$8.65|$27.40|
|Annual revenues from yield improvements|$34|$225|$450|$225|
|Total additional revenues|$35|$230|$459|$252|
|Seed costs|$0|$29|$29|$23|
|Fertilizer costs|$0|$0|$60|$0|
|Additional labor costs|$45|$68|$90|$75|
|Total additional costs|$45|$68|$150|$75|
|Net revenues|‐$10|$162|$309|$177|

Note: Carbon is prices at $4.90 per ton CO2e, maize at $0.15/kg. Source: Tennigkeit et al. (2009).

**Table 15: Most common investment structures in ECA**

||Projects in ECA|Rank|Share of ECA<br>projects|Projects in other<br>regions|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Unilateral projects in**|||||
|Czech Republic|46|1|8%|0|
|Russia|34|2|6%|0|
|Lithuania|8|15|1%|0|
|**Investments by governments**|||||
|Denmark|32|3|5%|81|
|Netherlands|13|9|2%|23|
|Spain|10|12|2%|30|
|**Multilateral investment banks**|||||
|World Bank|16|6|3%|86|
|European Bank for Reconstruction and Development|15|7|2%|2|
|Nordic Climate Facility|11|10|2%|16|
|**Private firm participants**<br>|||||
|Global Carbon|24|4|4%|1|
|Camco|23|5|4%|115|
|Kommunalkredit|14|8|2%|57|
|Carbon-TF|10|11|2%|1|
|Mitsubishi Group|10|13|2%|110|
|StichtingCarbon Finance|8|14|1%|1|

Source: Risoe and authors‘ calculations.

51
CÔTE D’IVOIRE’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 7 Long term trends in improved water**

||1990|2000|2008|
|---|---|---|---|
|Drinking Water||||
|Total improved|76|78|80|
|Piped on premises|22|31|40|
|Other improved|54|47|40|
|Unimproved|24|22|20|
|Sanitation||||
|Improved|20|22|23|
|Shared (unimproved)|15|16|18|
|Unimproved facilities|29|30|32|
|Open defecation|36|32|27|

Source: WHO – UNICEF, JMP, 2010.

**Table 8 Benchmarking water access**

||Unit|Low-income<br>countries<br>Mid-2000s|**LSM88**|**Côte d**<br>**DHS94**|**’Ivoire**<br>**MICS00**|**MICS06**|Middle-income<br>countries<br>Mid 2000s|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Access to piped water|% pop|10.5|18.10|23.28|24.51|19.13|52.1|
|Access to standposts|% pop|16.2|13.70|23.35|19.00|22.03|18.9|
|Access to wells/boreholes|% pop|38.3|55.22|45.28|54.10|49.54|6.0|
|Access to surface water|% pop|37.4|13.00|7.69|7.72|9.20|13.0|

Source: Banerjee and others 2009; Morella and others 2009, derived from AICD water and sanitation utilities database downloadable from <u>http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data</u> **.** Côte d’Ivoire was a pioneer for private sector participation in the water sector. SODECI’s concession contract for potable water and lease contract for sanitation dates back to 1959 and was renewed and redesigned in 1987 for a 20-year period. The 1987 contract has withstood a range of financial, economic, and political shocks. The concessionaire implemented and almost entirely self-financed the impressive gains in utility water access described above. Moreover, operational performance has been very strong. Revenue collection rates are close to 100 percent, and distribution losses are close to best practice levels, although they have risen lately from 17 percent in 2001 to closer to 23 percent in 2008 (table 9).

17
# FIGURE 4: SHARE OF COMMUNICATION SERVICES IN VALUE ADDED: USSR AND OECD

<!-- Start of picture text --> 3%'<br>NZL<br>USA<br>AUT AWT II)NOR USACAN4 DEU R<br>IRL CAN ew Um=<br>2%- _ PRT NOR Fl4<br>ORC U9BR<br>0%-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N I |l<br>. GRC<br>8 8.5 9 9.6 10<br>LOG OF PER CAPITA INCOME<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Eletropaulo and AES Elpa are listed on the Brazilian stock exchange, and both are majority owned and controlled by AES. Figure 3 shows Eletropaulo Metropolitana’s ownership structure as at 31 December 2002. While the ownership of the company is complex, the net effect is that AES owns around 70 percent of both the ordinary and the preferred shares in Eletropaulo.

**Figure 3: Eletropaulo Metropolitana Shareholder Structure**

<!-- Start of picture text --> AES Market<br>11.8% ON<br>100% 100% 88.2% ON<br>Transgas I Ltd Transgas II Ltd<br>(Cayman) (Cayman)<br>99% 1%<br>AES Empreend.<br>Transgas Ltda AES Elpa S.A.*<br>(Cayman)<br>7.4% PN 64.1% PN 77.8% ON<br>AES Shareholding: 22.2% ON<br>68.6% ordinary shares 28.5% PN<br>71.5% preferred shares Eletropaulo<br>Metropolitana*<br><!-- End of picture text --> Notes: * indicates listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange, BOVESPA. ON stands for ordinary shares. Each ordinary share entitles the holder to a minimum dividend of 25 percent of net income and to one vote at general shareholders meetings (thus ordinary shares confer control). PN stands for preferred shares. Preferred shares do not (in general) confer voting rights, but entitle shareholders to dividends 10 percent higher than ordinary shareholders and give priority rights if the company is wound-up. Source: Eletropaulo Metropolitana Quarterly Report, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2002.

# **3.4.2 Leverage and regulation**

Eletropaulo’s leverage was approximately 30 percent immediately before privatization, and increased only gradually to around 40 percent by the end of 2001.<sup>15</sup> A recent increase

> 15 For this purpose we measure leverage as short- and long-term debt (principal and accrued interest costs) divided by the book value of total assets. We base this calculation on the company's consolidated balance sheet (i.e. including subsidiaries).

26
## Policy Research Working Paper 10350

# **Abstract**

This paper presents a meta-analysis of the infrastructure research done over more than three decades, using a database of over a thousand estimates from 221 papers reporting outcome elasticities. The analysis casts a wide net to include the transport, energy, and digital or information and communication technology (ICT) sectors, and the whole set of outcomes covered in the literature, including output, employment and wages, inequality and poverty, trade, education and health, population, and environmental aspects. The results allow for an update of the underlying parameters of interest, the “true” underlying infrastructure elasticities, accounting for publication bias, as well as for heterogeneity stemming from both study design and context, with a particular focus on developing countries.

This paper is a product of the Infrastructure Chief Economist Office. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at vfoster@worldbank.org, mvagliasindi@worldbank.org, ngorgulu@worldbank.org, stephane.straub@tse-fr.eu, and jain.dhruv@tse-fr.eu. A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, click **here** for direct access.

<!-- Start of picture text --> TRANSPARENT<br>ANALYSIS<br>G<br>R E<br>N<br>S<br>I P<br>Y E<br>K A<br>C A<br>R P<br>LI R<br>O E<br>O C<br>W R<br>H<br>S<br>P<br><!-- End of picture text --> _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
When partner countries eliminate the tariff against home country exports, the new equilibrium quantity and price are E' and D. Producers' surplus of the home country expands to ABCD. Thus the gain in producers surplus for the home country is less when partner countries have downward sloping demand curves and the difference in welfare between the price taking and market power cases is DCEF. With market power, the price does not rise as much since with a downward sloping demand curve, the home country must accept a lower price to increase the quantity supplied. Thus, it is unambiguous that the value to the home country of a given level of preferential tariff reduction will be greater with no market power on its exports in regional markets.

# **III. The Institutional Background to the CEMAC Reform**

A brief review of the events that led up to the formation of CEMAC will help explain the choice of some of the parameter values in the modelling and place the quantitative work in context.

# **The pre-reform trade regime: the UDEAC Experience**

**The** data for our model comes from 1989 to 1993, during which time Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea participated in the _Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)._ UDEAC was formed in 1964 with the objective of promoting economic integration among the members. Although per capita income is relatively low in all six countries, as table 1 indicates Cameroon accounts for more than 54% of the GDP of the entire Union, and its population is 50% of the Union. Under the treaty establishing the union, the member countries were to progressively liberalize their trade with other members, encourage freedom of movement for factors of production and coordinate their economic policies. Indeed, the

-10-
!.64 <!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1.C.17<br>COCOA ACREAGE ADJUSTMENT. POPULATION<br>AND INCOME GROWTH<br>(Incrosing WVga)<br>4<br>2 -J I<br>I187 1997 2007 2017 2027 2037<br>PERIOD MIDPOINTS<br>0 120 + 140 o I0 I O 2<br><!-- End of picture text --> .
28 As a result of the priorities given to state firms in financial markets, large capital-intensive firms have been favored relative to small, medium-sized and labor-intensive firms.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, according to estimates by the People’s Bank of China (2004), small and mediumsized firms received less than ten percent of the bank loans in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, although they produced more than half of GDP.<sup>43</sup> There is a multitude of explanations of why the state banks favor large firms, such as lower perceived risk (because of implicit government guarantees on the loans to large firms) and political pressure from local authorities that fear severe employment problems if large firms run into financial difficulties. The alleged discrimination of SMEs in financial markets has, of course, also considerably disfavored private firms, and hence indirectly the service sector, both of which are generally regarded as disfavored also in other ways, for example by various regulations, including the allocation of land-lease contracts, building permits, etc. (World Bank, 2003b). The emergence and expansion of informal financial markets have, of course, mitigated the distortions of the allocation of resources brought about by deficiencies in formal financial markets. However, the development of informal financial markets cannot possibly have eliminated the distortions, since the duality of financial markets in itself is a distortion, reflected in different levels of interest rates.

The large resource costs of the growth path in China are also reflected in the high investment ratio, about 43 percent of GDP in recent years (“fixed capital formation”). This reflects not only the exceptionally large industrial sector (about 46 percent of GDP) but also the high capital-output ratio _within_ that sector.<sup>44</sup> By comparison, during similar development phases, Hong Kong, Taiwan/China, and South Korea grew nearly as fast, with smaller investment ratios (about 35 percent of GDP). The high capital intensity in China is also reflected in the relatively high marginal capital/output ratio – in the interval of 4-5, while more “normal” ratios are 2.5 to 3.5.<sup>45</sup> The marginal capital/ output ratio has also increased during the last decade in connection with a rise in the investment share from 35 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s. It is tempting to interpret

> 42 SMEs are defined in China as enterprises with between 8 and 2.000 employees, less than US $ 50 million assets, and less than US $ 37 million sales. 80 percent of these firms are estimated to have been privately owned in 2001 according to Citybank.

> 43 For similar calculations, see McKinsey (2006, Exhibit 3.5).

> 44 As in many other developing countries, this figure may be biased upward because statistics are likely to be more complete on investment spending than on GDP. Presumably, the revision of the national accounts reported in December 2005 has taken care of this problem, at least to some extent.

> 45 With an investment ratio of 0.45, the marginal capital/output ratio is 4.7 when GDP growth is 9.5 percent.