impacts on collective capacity, with the exception of the community education diversity index in column B, where the variable is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that representative leadership and broad-based participation in community organizations are effective at ameliorating the negative effects of heterogeneity. Furthermore, collective capacity is found to increase both when communities receive in-migrants looking for work, and with greater shares of members temporarily migrating out. A positive impact from in-migrants is consistent with the hypothesis that more dynamic communities with greater exposure to different experiences gain greater collective capacity. Temporary outmigration may increase knowledge and experience, leading to greater cooperative capacity, but is not consistent with the hypothesis that greater exit options will reduce collective capacity. Interestingly, the coefficients for the number of households and its squared term are not statistically significant, indicating that once we control for divergent interests, the sheer number of households alone does not have a separate impact on the dependent variable.

Moreover, collective capacity is positively associated with favorable rainfall and agro-ecological zone placement. This is in line with the hypothesis that more promising agro-climatic conditions increase returns to local public goods and thus favor greater collective capacity. The measure of rainfall variability also assumes a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in column B, indicating that collective capacity is higher when communities face greater climate shocks. Lastly, the attributes that would be positively correlated with agricultural productivity and welfare outcomes, such as the presence of an agricultural extension officer in the community and the district metric tons of subsidized fertilizer per household, take on negative and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that these attributes serve as substitutes to collective capacity for local public good provision. On the other hand, district-level MASAF wage funds per household has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in column B. Thus, while access to non-locally-provided inputs appear to substitute for local public goods provision, the availability of extra-local insurance appears to serve as a complement.

# **5.2.    Second-Stage Estimation Results**

We now turn to the discussion of the regression results reported in Table 4. While the estimates are reported from the OLS and TSLS regressions of the two dependent variables, namely logarithmic measures of community median plot maize production per hectare and community median household real annual consumption expenditures per capita, we focus on the TSLS results, presented in columns B and D.<sup>17</sup> The collective capacity for local public good provision

> 17 We see that the TSLS coefficient associated with the collective capacity index in Table 4 is always higher than its OLS counterpart, and note that improvements in agricultural productivity and living standards that arise from collective action that spurs local public good provision may be realized through additional alternative mechanisms that are “substitutes” for local public good provision and that may have been omitted from our model; particularly

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