rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
3. Acknowledgement of the absence of other important dimensions in the discussion on TFiS, such as the temporary movement of people, trade costs associated with regulatory heterogeneity, and regulatory cooperation as a means to reducing trade costs.

4. The critical importance of involving the private sector as a source of relevant information.

5. The potential role of plurilateral arrangements, as part of the WTO multilateral architecture, as a way to deal with TFiS and other relevant trade-related topics in the future.<sup>6</sup> Looking forward, future research would benefit from further refinement of the techniques used to estimate trade costs in services, particularly by categories of trade costs, which would allow for a prioritization of measures to be developed that could incentivize international collaboration and action on addressing these sources of cost. Also, due to significant differences in trade costs among service sectors, for each specific sector a research effort is required to identify the most important critical areas of trade facilitation. Finally, the services trade facilitation agenda would also benefit from a close collaboration with the private sector to help both identify additional trade facilitation measures as well as to identify their priorities for reform.

> 6 A discussion of future international cooperation can be found in World Bank (2020).

16
**<u>Table A.34. The district fixed-effect RDD-DD regressions of households’ income using districts with a large model specification</u>**

|||||Dependent variables<br>|<br>|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Explanatory variables|Log of per<br>capita income|Log of per<br>capita income<br>from wages|Log of per<br>capita income<br>from nonfarm<br>production|Log of per<br>capita income<br>from farm<br>production|Log of per<br>capita<br>remittances|Log of per<br>capita public<br>cash transfers|Log of per<br>capita income<br>from other<br>sources|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|Program *Post-program period|-0.0326|0.4782|0.8274**|-0.3462*|0.4848|0.8810***|0.9782**|
||(0.0826)|(0.4940)|(0.3510)|(0.1818)|(0.5703)|(0.3076)|(0.4105)|
|(Poverty rate – 50) *Post-program|0.0073|-0.0766*|-0.0664*|0.0079|-0.0268|-0.0568*|-0.0143|
|period|(0.0088)|(0.0438)|(0.0392)|(0.0220)|(0.0560)|(0.0316)|(0.0411)|
|Program * (Poverty rate – 50) *Post-|-0.0120|0.0230|0.0493|-0.0035|-0.0077|0.0453|0.0205|
|program period|(0.0093)|(0.0500)|(0.0421)|(0.0226)|(0.0610)|(0.0373)|(0.0457)|
|Age of household heads|0.0195***|-0.0609***|0.0255***|0.0986***|0.0406***|-0.0696***|-0.0095|
||(0.0022)|(0.0159)|(0.0092)|(0.0117)|(0.0091)|(0.0095)|(0.0120)|
|Age squared of household heads|-0.0002***|0.0005***|-0.0003***|-0.0009***|-0.0003***|0.0008***|0.0002|
||(0.0000)|(0.0001)|(0.0001)|(0.0001)|(0.0001)|(0.0001)|(0.0001)|
|Gender of household head (male=1,|0.0363***|-0.3626***|0.0360|0.6278***|-0.1916***|-0.0918*|-0.3783***|
|female=0)|(0.0123)|(0.0914)|(0.0628)|(0.0733)|(0.0483)|(0.0535)|(0.0654)|
|Ethnic minorities (yes=1, Kinh=0)|-0.4101***|0.1067|-1.6502***|0.7840***|-0.3530***|0.5370***|-0.6138***|
||(0.0341)|(0.1648)|(0.1667)|(0.1076)|(0.1221)|(0.1166)|(0.0990)|
|Additional control variables|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|District fixed effects|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Year fixed effects|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Constant|8.9691***|4.1633***|1.6549***|4.7474***|3.4436***|1.6957***|1.4939***|
||(0.0642)|(0.4084)|(0.2953)|(0.3386)|(0.2956)|(0.2891)|(0.3439)|
|Observations|40,468|40,468|40,468|40,468|40,468|40,468|40,468|
|R-squared|0.496|0.214|0.119|0.187|0.252|0.159|0.101|

Note: This table reports district fixed-effect RDD-DD regressions of income and poverty of households using household-level observations. The additional control variables include education levels of individuals (dummy variables), education levels (dummy variables), household size, the proportion of children in households, the proportion of older members in households. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by district and village-year levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

84
**Table 5: Water shortages and sales by water intensity**

|**Y = Log of sales**|||
|---|---|---|
||**Water intensive**<br>**manufacturing sectors**|**Other manufacturing**<br>**sectors**|
||**(1)**|**(1)**|
|Log of labor (lnL)|0.778***|0.762***|
||(0.036)|(0.026)|
|Log of capital (replacement value) (lnK)|0.035**|0.016|
||(0.015)|(0.010)|
|Log of raw materials (costs) (lnM)|0.219***|0.242***|
||(0.017)|(0.012)|
|No of water shortages per day in a typical month|-0.124*|-0.075**|
||(0.071)|(0.037)|
|Average duration of water shortage|0.003|0.001|
||(0.005)|(0.004)|
|No of electrical outages per day in a typical month|-0.014|0.021|
||(0.035)|(0.027)|
|Average duration of electrical outages (hours)|0.002|-0.000|
||(0.002)|(0.001)|
|lnLxlnK|-0.007***|-0.007***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|
|lnLxlnM|-0.035***|-0.035***|
||(0.002)|(0.002)|
|lnKxlnM|0.002|0.002*|
||(0.002)|(0.001)|
|lnL<sup>2</sup>|0.042***|0.042***|
||(0.003)|(0.002)|
|lnM<sup>2</sup>|0.033***|0.033***|
||(0.002)|(0.001)|
|lnK<sup>2</sup>|0.005***|0.005***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|
|Firm owns or shares a generator Y/N|0.027|0.141***|
||(0.053)|(0.044)|
|Losses due to breakage/spoilage shipped domestically (% of<br>value of the products|0.004|-0.004|
||(0.006)|(0.004)|
|Log of age of firm|0.024|0.007|
||(0.026)|(0.022)|
|Foreign ownership Y/N|0.121*|0.092|
||(0.067)|(0.072)|
|Exports 10% or more of sales Y/N|0.121**|0.104**|
||(0.061)|(0.045)|
|Security costs (% of sales)|-0.013***|-0.011*|
||(0.004)|(0.007)|
|Establishment competes against unregistered or informal<br>firms Y/N|-0.078*|-0.025|

27
-18-

infrastructure. Kalat district had nearly double the level of chronic malnutrition than other districts. The area with the least amount of malnutrition is Faisalabad, which is the only area in the sample with reliable irrigated agriculture.

The other measure of malnutrition indicated in Table 1 is that of wasting (or weight-for-heights more than two standard deviations below the WHO reference standards). Approximately 5.8 percent of the children in the sample are wasted (or acutely malnourished). This rate is somewhat lower than the national data from the 1985 National Nutrition Survey or the 1990 DHS. Being a short-term indicator of malnutrition, wasting is subject to high fluctuations in any given population. Wasting is an indication of recent weight loss (or absence of gain) and is a condition of chronic semi-starvation resulting from a deficiency in calories. Badin have the highest proportion of wasted children with 8.7 percent (which is close to the national data) followed by Dir. Surprisingly, Kalat area has the least wasting although it has the most stuntihg. The two measures of malnutrition should be uncorrelated, although errors in the measurement of height could produce negative correlations. In this sample, th ecorrelation of -0.13 is not significant at any commonly used level.

The patterns by age groups (Table 2) shows dramatically increasing levels of wasting after 6 months of age. Stunting is also shown to increase as the children grow older. It has been hypothesized that such dramatic shifts in nutritional status in early childhood have been correlated with poor feeding practices. This situation usually occurs
liabilities, while an entitlement program is paid to all eligible persons. But there are fundamental differences in the appropriation of funds to tax expenditures and to entitlement programs. Tax expenditures are generally enacted as permanent legislation. Entitlement programs must be appropriated periodically through the budgetary process. There are many critics who argue that tax expenditures, like entitlement programs, should periodically be thoroughly reconsidered to determine whether they are efficiently meeting the needs and goals for which they were originally established (the US Congressional Research Service, 2002).

# **Box 2. Tax Expenditure, Incentive, and Tax Penalty**

**Tax expenditures vs incentives.** All tax incentives are tax expenditures; they are designed to change behavior to achieve particular economic and social targets. But not all tax expenditures are tax incentives.  Tax expenditures could be used to subsidize particular taxpayers.  For example, tax subsides that are used to reduce hardships are tax expenditures, but they are not tax incentives.

**Tax penalty** . A tax expenditure is a deviation from a normative or a benchmark tax system. When a tax provision allows the government to collect more revenue than it would under the normative tax, this provision is equivalent to a directly imposed governmental fine or penalty. Such a provision is called a “tax penalty.”

An example, in the personal income tax, would be the denial of a deduction for an expenditure that constitutes a cost of producing income, even though this expenditure would be deductible under normative principles. This denial does not relate to any incentive.

Therefore, in terms of tax expenditures, a tax penalty is the opposite of a tax expenditure, which increases revenue. Therefore, if we represent tax expenditures as positive figures (consistently with the treatment of direct expenditures), then tax penalties should be negative figures.

_Source_ : McDaniel, P.R. and S. Surrey, _“International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study”_ 1985.

6
- 40 -

Table 8 User Coat of Capital for Forelan Firms Investina In Thailand by Tope of OvWerahip and Home Countrv Tax Retlme for Varioua Financial Models - 1989

|||Trade-o|ff<br>Model|Tax|Planlina|Peckin|a-Order|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Country|Tax Regime|SET|Ron-SET|SET|Non-SET|SET|Non-SET|
|Thailipnd|Exemption|19.7|21.3|17.8|17.7|20.4|23.5|
|Hong Kong|Exemption|12.6|13.3|12.3|12.6|12.3|13.7|
|Taiwan|Exemption|16.8|17.4|15.8|16.8|17.9|18.7|
||Deferral|16.4|18.1|16.5|17.2|17.6|18.2|
||Accrual|16.0|17.0|15.3|16.2|16.3|17.3|
|United<br>States|Exemption|16.4|17.5|13.6|15.3|16.2|18.5|
||Deferral|15.3|17.5|14.5|15.2|17.6|18.5|
||Accrual|15.8|17.4|13.9|15.2|16.7|18.4|
|United<br>Kingdom|Exemption|15.8|16.9|13.6|15.4|16.1|18.4|
||Deferral|15.3|17.5|14.7|15.4|17.2|18.0|
||Accrual|14.5|15.9|13.0|14.1|15.2|16.6|
|West Germany|Exemption|21.4|21.5|14.5|15.4|18.9|20.4|
||Accrual|20.1|20.8|15.8|16.2|22.0|22.8|
|Japan|Exemption|19.8|20.5|13.0|14.2|15.7|17.7|
||Deferral|15.0|17.0|13.5|14.2|17.3|18.3|
||Accrual|16.4|18.1|13.5|14.5|17.7|19.6|
|Singapore|Exemption|17.1|17.7|14.6|15.4|15.9|16.8|
||Deferral|15.3|16.2|14.6|15.1|15.9|16.4|
||Accrual|14.9|15.2|14.0|14.3|15.3|15.6|
|Netherlands|Exemption|19.8|20.6|16.4|17.3|19.0|20.3|
|Switzerland|Exemption|17.4|17.8|13.6|14.2|14.4|15.2|
|France|Exemption|18.4|18.9|15.0|15.9|18.l|19.5|
||Accrual|18.8|19.3|16.1|16.5|19.9|20.5|

# lUser cost of capital ia eetlebted as:

F' - _(6'er)(1-A)I(1-s)_ u * Combined host **and** home country company tex rate, **A** " present value of capital cost allowaaces.

6 - Economic depreciation rate, r - real coat of finance.
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enshrined by law, whether or not “consumers” are exercising their sovereignty. Therefore, this paradigm would fail to induce any accountability where the regime in power may not be receptive to citizens’ views as citizens are disempowered in this framework. In fact, some corrupt regimes and interest groups may abuse so-called participatory approaches to unleash a tyranny of the elite (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001 and Shah, 2007).

# **Box 1.  The Practice of Social Accountability – Often cited “Success” Stories**

The following are the often cited “successful” examples of social accountability.

- Mexico Electoral Accountability: The Federal Electoral Institute has the mandate  to hold elections and has done so far successfully by having all political parties represented on the executive council. It is not clear whether this indeed represents a successful case as the last federal election was disputed by the main opposition.

- Philippines Local Government Code: The code mandates participation by the nongovernmental organization (NGOs) in local decision making. It is not clear that this would be desirable if NGOs simply represent  special interest groups.

- Croatia Budget Transparency: An independent think tank, The Institute of Public Finance, publishes independent analysis of government budget which receives media attention. This is to be commended but impact may be small as governments typically are artful in dealing with such exposure.

- Brazil Participatory Budgeting:  Porto Alegre’s experience is well documented as a successful experience but awaits critical evaluation in terms of satisfaction of the median voter with the process and also its broader applicability.

- Niger Participatory M&E System: Donor supported monitoring and evaluation of community projects is reported to be working well. Is it sustainable? Will it work without donor assistance? These questions remain to be answered.

- Marshall Island Gender Sensitive Budget: Donor supported initiative with great promise of success is reported to have already faltered.

- Source: Adapted from World Bank Institute (2005).

11
We conclude from this that the insourced and outsourced treatments do not appear to significantly crowd out the entrepreneur spending time on her business, and that they seem to complement rather than substitute for the entrepreneur’s time. Indeed, entrepreneurs tended to focus more attention on marketing and sales activities in the short run, possibly in an effort to learn about novel practices in this functional area from their insourced or outsourced marketing/sales specialist.

# **5.2 Boundary of the Firm: Investment, Innovation and Technology**

Separate from influencing an entrepreneur’s individual-level actions, moving beyond the boundary of the firm to acquire specialized human capital could also improve a firm’s practices and growth through business-level channels. We next explore whether insourcing a worker or outsourcing a professional may stimulate growth by: (i) helping the firm attract new financing for investments in the business; (ii) spurring innovation in the development of new products; and (iii) enhancing access to new technologies such as social media. The results in Table 7 examine these mechanisms, which were only measured at the time of the second follow-up survey (or shortly after in the case of social media).

<u>Financial Investment.</u> We might expect a financial expert or accountant to not only improve record-keeping, but also help the firm in applying for loans or attracting other types of investments. However, only a small percentage of firms assigned to insourcing (17%) and outsourcing (23%) chose a finance/accounting specialist (over a marketing/sales specialist). Consistent with this choice, we find small and statistically non-significant changes in our investment index in column 1. This suggests that firms were not obtaining new financing or making new large investments.

<u>Product Innovation.</u> In contrast, column 2 shows that firms in the insourcing and outsourcing treatments have a significant increase of 7 to 8 percentage points in their innovation activities. This impact is robust to correcting for multiple testing across all our different mechanisms (Appendix Table 9.2). Further, Appendix Table 7.1 shows these innovation effects are largest in the areas of product improvements and product design, which are areas that specialists with marketing/sales expertise may be particularly helpful in implementing. This also accords with the main tasks done by insourced workers and outsourced professionals in Table 3, in which understanding customer needs and helping to introduce or improve products to meet them are among the top 10 activities.

24
century United States also concludes that legislation was not the major factor contributing to the dramatic reduction in the magnitude of child labor witnessed during the period. These studies attribute the decrease in child labor to a change in societal attitudes towards children’s work and rights and also to the improvement in technology which reduced the demand for unskilled labor. A similar study by Margo et al. (1996) (using data from the 1900 Census of the United States) does not find a significant effect of the compulsory school laws on school attendance. However, they find a significant positive effect on the school attendance of children in the states where compulsory school laws were combined with child labor laws. Lleras-Muney (2001) also analyses the legislation on compulsory education and child labor in the United States (period 1915-1939). She studies the effect of changes in laws on compulsory education and child labor; such changes include, for example, increasing the minimum legal requirement for a child to be in school by increasing minimum age to obtain work permit or decreasing school entrance age. The results suggest that such changes significantly increased the education attainment of children. Results show, however, that the impact was not consistent over all races. For instance there was no impact on African American men.

Manacorda (2003 and 2006) analyses the effect of child labor on household labor supply, using the 1920 US Census data, to study the degree of parents’ altruism towards their children. He uses State specific child labor laws to identify a source of exogenous variation in child labor. As a part of his analysis of labor supply responses of different household members to changes in the proportion of working children Manacorda finds a strong impact of child labor laws on children’s labor market participation in the USA in 1920, such that children below the minimum age were found not to participate in work but the participation increased once the child reached 5
- 22 -

into income-contingent payment systems where loans are repaid according to the postgraduate earnings of the borrower'<sup>4</sup> .

Finally, although ample scope exits for cost savings and revenues from the sales of services to SOEs, donations, too much dependence on these sources may be counterproductive. Experience shows that the advantage in these cases may diminish beyond a revenue recovery rate of 15 percent, and educational institutions may turn into profit-making organizations. Evidence shows that in several OECD countries these sources do not contribute more than 10 percent of total university revenues'<sup>5</sup> . Universityrun enterprises played an important role in income generation and may continue to do so. But institutions should undertake investments on the basis of comparative advantage and the demand for their products, sale and marketing of new technologies.

# **Concluding Remarks**

As China consolidates the momentum of its rapid economic gains and drives more openly into the market environment, the quality of human resources will be an important determinant of the country's competitiveness. China has made impressive gains in human resource development in the past two decades, and continuing its strides will help redress poverty, both indirectly by increasing the productivity and efficiency of its labor force and directly by fostering the earning capacity of the poor. Eventually an enhanced human resources will spur economic growth and welfare. Yet, its progress has slowed steadily in recent years, mainly because of two broad problems. First, the distribution of educational services continues to discriminate against the poor, largely because they have not benefited from the recent gains in economic growth and are being choked off from service access. Second, some current mechanisms and arrangements for devolving services have created targeting inefficiencies. As such, this paper argues that the government's priorities are to enhance financing and improve the equity, efficiency and quality of social services

> 14 In countries where credit culture and discipline within the student population is relatively weak, early preparation for incomecontingent deferred payment scheme is better. Such schemes have led to low default rates in Tunisia, Australia, Sweden, and Quebec Province of Canada.

> 15 For evidence see OECD, "Financing Higher Education" Paris, OECD 1990.
<u>Table 7. Mean hours per day over the life cycle, by type of activity and sex</u>

|||||Women|||Market|work|||Men||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Young<br>|Adult (20-<br>in the<br>|44) alone<br>hhld|Adult (20<br>in the|-44) both<br>hhld|Adult an<br>adults|d senior<br>(45-64)|Young<br>|<br>Adult (20-<br>in the|44) alone<br>hhld|Adult (20<br>in the|-44) both<br>hhld|Adult an<br>adults|d senior<br>(45-64)|
||(15-19)|With<br>children|Without<br>children|With<br>children|Without<br>children|With<br>children|Without<br>children|(15-19)|With<br>children|Without<br>children|With<br>children|Without<br>children|With<br>children|Without<br>children|
|Albania|0.24|2.85|2.07|2.82|1.88|2.50|2.47|1.36|6.72|3.45|6.16|4.79|5.64|5.38|
|Argentina|0.69|2.94|3.17|2.27|3.44|2.60|2.89|1.93|4.51|4.36|6.04|5.12|5.69|5.08|
|Bangladesh|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|
|Colombia|0.93|3.93|4.18|3.03|3.86|2.90|3.07|1.82|5.93|5.60|6.82|6.00|6.40|6.03|
|Ecuador|0.72|3.81|4.16|2.59|3.54|3.09|3.10|1.73|6.00|5.35|6.99|5.98|6.77|6.18|
|Ghana|1.52|2.91|3.42|2.61|3.99|2.79|2.92|0.93|3.02|3.79|3.54|4.45|2.98|3.54|
|Guatemala|1.79|3.67|4.02|2.48|2.56|2.78|2.86|4.24|7.58|6.77|7.74|7.52|7.63|6.95|
|Iraq|0.15|0.71|1.32|0.54|1.15|0.65|1.20|2.27|5.79|5.13|6.67|5.72|5.60|4.56|
|Mexico|1.31|4.23|4.84|2.96|4.39|2.97|3.23|2.64|6.98|6.49|8.00|6.82|7.24|6.71|
|Moldova|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|
|Mongolia|0.76|4.28|3.55|2.83|3.54|3.06|2.93|0.85|4.34|3.43|4.13|3.83|3.70|3.50|
|Pakistan|0.67|0.46|0.56|0.45|0.54|0.74|0.52|2.56|5.68|4.75|5.64|5.75|4.51|4.28|
|WB and Gaza|0.42|1.09|2.10|0.89|1.42|1.09|1.27|2.79|5.93|5.48|6.11|5.23|5.41|4.62|
|Peru|1.12|4.23|4.75|2.87|4.38|3.65|3.91|2.23|6.30|6.51|7.38|6.02|7.61|7.11|
|South Africa|0.51|2.53|4.19|2.51|2.95|2.49|3.76|0.77|5.30|6.10|6.57|6.99|5.40|5.74|
|Timor|0.33|1.52|1.93|0.91|1.50|1.82|2.14|0.58|1.95|2.71|3.35|3.06|3.50|4.25|
|Turkey|0.95|1.39|1.41|0.74|1.24|0.89|0.71|2.59|5.34|3.91|4.82|4.17|3.60|2.62|
|Uruguay|0.52|4.91|5.77|4.51|5.64|4.47|4.82|1.62|7.14|6.57|8.92|7.80|7.92|6.83|
|USA|1.16|3.66|3.89|3.02|4.70|3.20|3.81|1.18|6.20|5.06|6.00|5.42|5.62|4.83|

35
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