rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
unreasonably high. On balance, we believe that the Robust and GLS estimates provide a much more plausible and complete quantification of model relationships.

# **6.  Implications of the Results**

To assess the significance of the salinity results, we use model (1)<sup>15</sup> in Table 3 to generate regression predictions for the sample median _pucca_ share (64%) and sample minimum and maximum values for groundwater salinity (2.00 and 5.76 dS/m, respectively), while holding municipality revenue, development income and network road length constant at their mean log-values. We divide predicted maintenance expenditure in each case by sample mean income (local revenue + development income) to obtain the predicted expenditure share. The predicted road maintenance expenditure shares are 1.86% and 6.55%, respectively: At the sample median for _pucca_ road share, increasing groundwater salinity from sample minimum to maximum value increases the road maintenance expenditure share by 252%.

We conclude that existing variations in groundwater salinity play an important role in determining road maintenance expenditures in coastal Bangladesh. By diverting resources from community health and education programs, saline groundwater may have a particularly adverse impact on poor households. The problem seems likely to worsen significantly in Bangladesh’s coastal regions, as groundwater salinity is increased by climate-related changes in the sea level and river flows.

# **7.  Summary and Conclusions**

This paper has used new monitoring and expenditure data to assess the impact of groundwater salinity on road maintenance expenditures in the coastal region of Bangladesh. The potentially-adverse impact of salinity on paved roads is well-established in the engineering literature, but its magnitude depends on local conditions (e.g., the level of groundwater salinity, the height of the water table, and the

> 15 We select model (1) because it separates the effects of municipal revenue and development income.  Model (3) yields identical estimates (only the standard errors are different), and predictions from the other models are not meaningfully different from the predictions reported here.

17
ETHIOPIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 4. Ethiopia has the potential to export significant amounts of power**

|||Net Revenue<br>||Required Inves<br>|tments<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Exports (TWh pa)|($m pa)|(% GDP)|($m pa)|(% GDP)|
|DRC|51.9|519|6.1|749|8.8|
|**Ethiopia**|**26.3**|**263**|**2.0**|**1,003**|**7.5**|
|Guinea|17.4|174|5.2|786|23.7|
|Sudan|13.1|131|0.3|1,032|2.7|
|Cameroon|6.8|68|0.4|267|1.5|
|Mozambique|5.9|59|0.8|216|2.8|

_Source:_ Rosnes and Vennemo 2008. Note: net revenue based on illustrative profit margin of $0.01 per kWh.

# **Challenges**

It will take time for Ethiopia to develop its substantial hydropower capacity. Ethiopia has one of the most underdeveloped power systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its installed generation capacity is less than 10 megawatts per million of population, which is less than half of the (already low) low-income country benchmark (table 5). Power consumption, at 33 kilowatt-hours per person per year, is about one-third of the (also already low) low-income country benchmark. Access to electricity at 12 percent is below the already low benchmark for low-income countries in Africa; although urban access to electricity is actually exceptionally high at 86 percent, the rural majority of the population has almost no access to power. Ambitious plans exist to expand electrification over the coming years.

**Table 5. Benchmarking power infrastructure and capacity, access, and utility performance**

||Unit|Ethiopia|Low-income countries|
|---|---|---|---|
|Installed power generation capacity|MW/mil. people|9.8|24.4|
|Power consumption|kWh/capita|33.6|99.5|
|Power outages|day/year|44.2|40.6|
|Firms’ reliance on own generator|% consumption|6.9|17.7|
|Firms’ value lost due to power outages|% sales|0.9|6.1|
|Access to electricity|% population|12.0|15.4|
|Urban access to electricity|% population|86.0|71.0|
|Rural access to electricity|% population|2.0|12.0|
|Growth access to electricity|% population/year|0.4|1.4|
|Revenue collection|% billings|96.5|88.2|
|Distribution losses|% production|22.0|22.1|
|Cost recovery|% total cost|46.0|90.0|
|Total hidden costs as % of revenue|%|132.7|121.2|
|Tariff (US cents per kWh)|Ethiopia|Predominantly hydro<br>generation|Other developing regions|
|Power tariff (residential at 75 kWh)|4.07|10.27||
|Power tariff (commercial at 900 kWh)|8.26|11.73|5.0 – 10.0|
|Power tariff (industrial at 50,000 kWh)|4.76|11.39||

_Source_ : Eberhard and others 2008.

12
go around, they are not distributed equally. If we divide the number of accounts in each country by the adult population, we obtain an estimated figure of 3.2 accounts per adult in developed countries, but fewer than 0.9 accounts per adult in developing countries. It should be noted that these accounts are not all held by individuals, but also include accounts held by businesses and government agencies.<sup>18</sup> Neither are they evenly distributed within countries; in poorer countries household surveys show that the majority of accounts are often held by the well off.

According to the estimates presented in Table 13, banks are the main providers of deposit services holding over 80 percent of all deposit accounts in the world (Table 13). At least 20 percent of accounts are held outside the commercial banking sector in cooperatives, credit unions, government banks, and MFIs. Due to data limitations and the conservative nature of our assumptions during the counting exercise, the estimate of the number of accounts in non-bank institutions is likely more conservative than the one for banks, understating the true size of nonbank sector.

Though the numbers are rough, Table 13 shows large differences in the structure of the non-bank markets in developing and developed countries. In developed countries, nearly 16 percent of accounts are held with cooperatives, credit unions, and other institutions with a mutual ownership structure compared to an estimated 3 percent in developing countries (though, again, the true share of cooperatives in developing countries is likely to be underestimated). Public institutions such as postal and specialized state savings banks are also important providers of savings services in developing countries, holding 14 percent of total deposits. Microfinance institutions, as a separately regulated type of institution, hold only about 2 percent of deposits and are concentrated in developing countries.

> larger as it is difficult to tell how many accounts are not being counted in the countries for which no data was reported, and how many do not get reported in the countries which did provide numbers. 18 The Financial Access Survey did not ask for the breakdown of deposit account data by individuals and businesses, but it is likely that these business and government accounts to be an important fraction of the total in some cases.

21
# **References**

Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991), ‘Why are Stabilizations Delayed’, _American Economic Review_ **81** (5), 1170–1188.

- Alesina, A. F. and Dollar, D. (2000), ‘Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?’, _Journal of Economic Growth_ **5** (1), 33–63.

- Anbarci, N., Escaleras, M. and Register, C. A. (2005), ‘Earthquake Fatalities: The Interaction of Nature and Political Economy’, _Journal of Public Economics_ **89** (9-10), 1907–1933.

- Atkinson, A. B. and Brandolini, A. (2001), ‘Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of ’Secondary’ DataSets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study’, _Journal of Economic Literature_ **39** (3), 771–799.

- Bermeo, S. B. (2007), Utility Maximization and Strategic Development -A Model of Foreign Aid Allocation, mimeo, Department of Politics, Princeton University.

- Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1991), ‘Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income’, _American Economic Review_ **81** (4), 979–984.

- Browne, M. J. and Hoyt, R. E. (2000), ‘The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence’, _Journal of Risk and Uncertainty_ **20** (3), 291–306.

- Buchanan, J. M. (1975), The Samaritan’s dilemma, _in_ E. S. Phelps, ed., ‘Altruism, morality and economic theory’, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 71–85.

- Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000), ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, _American Economic Review_ **90** (4), 847–868.

- Cashel-Cordo, P. and Craig, S. G. (1990), ‘The Public Sector Impact of International Resource Transfers’, _Journal of Development Economics_ **32** (1), 17–42.

- Coate, S. (1995), ‘Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy’, _American Economic Review_ **85** (1), 46–57.

- Cohen, C. and Werker, Eric, D. (2008), ‘The Political Economy of ’Natural’ Disasters’, _Journal of Conflict Resolution_ **52** (6), 795–819.

- Correlates of War 2 Project (2008), ‘Colonial/Dependency Contiguity Data, 1816-2002. ’, http://correlatesofwar.org **Version 3.0** .

- Dilley, M., Chen, R. S., Deichmann, U., Lerner-Lam, A. L., Arnold, M., Agwe, J., Buys, P., Kjekstad, O., Lyon, B. and Yetman, G. (2005), Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis, Disaster Risk Management Series No. 5, The World Bank and Columbia University.

17
improvements in the coverage of public and especially private credit registries, as well as in the quality of accounting standards, may increase firms’ access to long-term finance. These findings confirm our previous results reported in Panel A of Table 3.

Additionally, the quality of the legal framework appears an important determinant of corporate debt maturity. Consistent with Fan, Titman and Twite (2006), we find a higher share of long-term corporate debt in less corrupted countries and in countries with common law origins. As pointed out by LLSV (1998), countries with a common-law tradition provide better protections for shareholder and creditor rights. After controlling for countries’ legal origins, we find a higher share of long-term corporate debt in countries where creditor rights protection is relatively poor, a result similar to that of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). This is consistent with the view that poor protection of creditor rights may cause lenders to liquidate short-term loans at maturity even for good borrowers. Thus, borrowers have an incentive to lock in long-term loans in order to avoid the liquidation risk (see Diamond, 1991).

We also find that corporate debt maturity is influenced by the development of domestic financial markets. In general, countries with a large banking sector, compared to the size of their economy, are characterized by a higher share of short-term corporate debt, similar to the finding by Fan, Titman and Twite (2006). We also observe a significant shortening of the maturity structure of corporate debt during banking crises (consistent with the literature).

Furthermore, a number of firm characteristics, in addition to firm size and profitability, appear relevant in explaining corporate debt maturity structures across countries. By taking into account both cross-country and time-series variations in firm characteristics, we find that firms with more fixed assets tend to borrow long term, consistent with the hypothesis that firms try to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities (see, Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Finally, countries with higher dispersion of firms’ credit qualities are characterized by more long-term debt. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions in Section 4: when the pool of obligors is more heterogeneous, screening high-risk from low-risk firms is relatively easier. By contrast, when differences in default risks among firms are more opaque, screening may take longer and banks need to resort to more short-term lending. This is also consistent with Flannery’s (1986) prediction that debt maturity is an upward-sloping function of risk.

The overall conclusion of our empirical analysis is that – controlling for other macro and micro characteristics – the quality of credit information and the legal framework are crucial 21
# Appendix A7: Sentiment and FDI Inflows

The following section investigates the effect of international sentiment and discussions on FDI inflows to the GCC countries. The analysis is particularly important today as more and more GCC countries engage in reforms targeted toward improving FDI.

We perform our analysis using a panel of all six GCC countries over the period 2000-2020. We include a set of macroeconomic and structural variables in our estimation based on the existing literature. Data on GDP growth, inflation, FDI inflows, and trade openness are obtained from the World Development Indicators database; data on six institutional quality indices are obtained from the World Governance Indicators database.

Using the data described above, we estimate the following equation: R R The dependent variable in all specifications is FDI inflows as a percentage of lagged GDP. Our main FFDDIIiiIIRRvvRRwwppii,tt = ααii + ββtt + λλR λλRRIIiiaaii,tt + XXii,tt + εεii,tt variables of interest are a group of reform media variables (international reform chatter, international reform sentiment, Twitter reform intensity, and Twitter reform sentiment). Each of these variables is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance in the regression. The construction of these variables is described in the main text. In addition, we control for GDP growth, inflation, trade openness, and institutional quality in all regressions. We consider the latter to be a good proxy for the attractiveness of a country for FDI investors. Finally, we include country and time fixed effects—the former control for unobserved, country-specific, and time-invariant differences in FDI attractiveness across the GCC countries. Time fixed effects capture the effects of any large shocks (e.g., Global Financial Crisis, Arab Spring) on FDI attractiveness across all countries.

Our main results on FDI inflows using news media are presented in Table A7.1. The results from Column 3 suggest that sentiment about GCC economic reforms in international media is significantly and robustly correlated with the level of FDI inflows. Moreover, the size of this effect is economically significant: one standard deviation increase in reform sentiment is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in FDI inflows or a 34% increase from the mean level of FDI inflows. This finding suggests that support for current reforms matters for FDI. Put differently, ‘talk is not cheap’. Interestingly, international reform chatter and the interaction between chatter and sentiment are not significantly associated with FDI inflows.

Table A7.2 presents a complimentary analysis of the effects of Twitter reform intensity and sentiment on FDI inflows. The results are very similar to those in Table A7.1, confirming the important influence of media tone on investment behavior. The coefficient on Twitter reform sentiment suggests that a one standard deviation increase in tone is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in FDI inflows or a 23% increase from the mean.

46
The preferred destinations for those who migrate to work are Lower Egypt (56.6 percent), followed by Cairo (22.8 percent). Those who left Cairo for work reasons went largely to Lower Egypt (70.8 percent) or Upper Egypt (19.4 percent). Lower Egypt was also the prime destination for migrants from Upper Egypt (41.4 percent), followed by Cairo (30.5 percent).

Table 9- Direction of Migration (for work only) – Regions (classified according to origin)

||Current Region|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Previous location|Cairo|Lower Egypt|Upper Egypt|Frontier|Total|
|Cairo|2.9|70.9|19.4|6.8|100|
|Lower Egypt|20.5|69.3|5.6|4.6|100|
|Upper Egypt|30.6|41.5|21.2|6.8|100|
|Frontier|14.8|14.8|11.1|59.3|100|
|Total|22.9|56.6|13.5|7.1|100|

Source: Authors’ calculations using Labor Force Survey The majority of those migrating to Cairo for work came from Upper Egypt (55.3 percent) and Lower Egypt (41.9 percent). Migrants from Lower and Upper Egypt tend to change localities within their home region.

Table 10- Direction of Migration (for work only) – Regions (classified according to destination)

||Current Region|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Previous location|Cairo|Lower Egypt|Upper Egypt|Frontier|Total|
|Cairo|1.2|11.7|13.4|9.0|9.3|
|Lower Egypt|41.9|57.4|19.5|30.8|46.8|
|Upper Egypt|55.3|30.4|65.1|39.7|41.4|
|Frontier|1.6|0.6|2.0|20.5|2.4|
|Total|100|100|100|100|100|

Source: Authors’ calculations using Labor Force Survey

# **Wages and Internal Migration**

There is a positive correlation between governorates with higher net migration inflows and higher average monthly wages in these governorates. The relation is more obvious when the migration rates are calculated using only those who migrate to work only (i.e. discarding those who migrate for marriage, or studying). Figure 3 shows the relationship between demeaned net migration to work against demeaned monthly wages by governorate.

9
# b) Variable Returns to Scale

The results from the VRS-DEA are different from the CRS-DEA and the SFA. Under a Variable Returns to Scale specification, the number of ports on the frontier tends to increase with the number of input variables. Therefore, the use of 3 production inputs places 18 container ports on the frontier, and only 7 of these ports also rank in the top quartile of the SFA technical efficiency distribution. By construction, the smallest ports in the sample, such as Boca Chica (Dominican Republic) and Vieux Fort (St. Lucia), are also on the frontier. The average efficiency is relatively high (67%) and the standard deviation is 27%. Moreover, the results point out that most ports in LAC are operating with increasing returns to scale, _i.e._ additional throughput would allow ports to achieve higher levels of efficiency, as was confirmed in the estimation of the parameters of the Stochastic Frontier Analysis. On the other hand, according to the result, there are 5 ports operating with decreasing returns to scale: Cartagena (Colombia), San Juan (Puerto Rico), Santos (Brazil), Kingston (Jamaica) and Puerto Cabello (Venezuela).

_Table A3-2: Container Terminal Technical Efficiency Ranking, Variable Returns to Scale DEA, 2009_

||**Ranking**|**Port**|**Technical**<br>**Efficiency**||**Ranking**|**Port**|**Technical**<br>**Efficiency**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1<br>2|Arica<br>Barranquilla|100%<br>100%||32<br>33|Havana<br>Lirquén|66%<br>64%|
||3<br>4|Belize City<br>Boca Chica|100%<br>100%||34<br>35|Montevideo<br>Zárate|62%<br>62%|
||5|Puerto Barrios|100%||36|Guayaquil|61%|
||6|Puerto Limón|100%||37|Itajaí|61%|
|**p 1**|7|San Juan|100%|**p 3**|38|Cartagena|55%|
|**ou**|8|Vieux Fort|100%|**ou**|39|Lázaro Cárdenas|53%|
|**Gr**|9|Freeport|100%|**Gr**|40|Puerto Cortés|49%|
||10|Corinto|99%||41|Caucedo|49%|
||11|Colon CT|95%||42|Manzanillo|48%|
||12|Salvador|91%||43|Progreso|46%|
||13|Santos|90%||44|Willemstad|44%|
||14|Castries|90%||45|Exolgan|44%|
||15|Fortaleza|89%||46|Kingston|44%|
||16|Veracruz|86%||47|Vitória|43%|
||17|Antofagasta|84%||48|San Antonio|43%|
||18|Salina Cruz|82%||49|Rio Haina|42%|
||19|PuertoQuetzal|80%||50|Port of Spain|42%|
||20|Point Lisas|80%||51|Pointe-A-Pitre|41%|
||21|Buenaventura|78%||52|Iquique|40%|
|**2**|22|Balboa|74%|**4**|53|Puerto Cabello|39%|
|**up**|23|San Vicente|74%|**up**|54|Suape|37%|
|**ro**|24|Bridgetown|70%|**ro**|55|Santo Tomás de Castilla|37%|
|**G**|25|Paranaguá|68%|**G**|56|Rio Grande|35%|
||26|Pecém|67%||57|Sepetiba|34%|
||27|Puerto Manzanillo|67%||58|Valparaiso|32%|
||28|La Guaira|67%||59|Altamira|31%|
||29|Belem|66%||60|Rio De Janeiro|30%|
||30|St John's|66%||61|Buenos Aires(excl. Exolgan)|18%|
||31|Ensenada|66%||62|Tampico|13%|

Source: own calculations 28
4

# **2. Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.: Significance of Foreign Tourism Lobbies**

A ban on direct contributions by foreign nationals to politicians was first enacted in 1966 as part of the amendments to a 1938 internal security statute known as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The goal of the FARA was to minimize foreign intervention in U.S. elections by establishing a series of limitations on foreign nationals.<sup>5</sup> However, foreign nationals could hire U.S.-based foreign agents (primarily law firms) to gain access to U.S. policymakers and influential persons associated with policymakers. It was a requirement under FARA for all such activities to be reported.

Foreign lobbying encompasses a wide range of activities, including lobbying those connected with the U.S. government, lobbying the media, and incurring expenditures on promoting trade through advertising (see e.g. Husted, 1991). Jobst (2002, Table 7) indicates that 85 percent of FARA expenditures by Latin American lobbies during the 1990s was spent on export promotion. We presume that money is expended primarily to informationally lobby U.S. policymakers in order to promote exports. Informational lobbying seeks to inform rationally ignorant politicians about the benefits of changing their policy position, to a policy position closer to that of the lobbyist (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2002).<sup>6</sup> In this paper we consider the case of lobbying of policymakers or individuals with access to policymakers in the U.S. by Caribbean principals (via their agents in the U.S.). Many Caribbean principals are in fact government agencies, primarily tourism boards, entrusted with 5 In 1974, this ban was incorporated into the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). FECA prohibits any foreign national from contributing, donating or spending funds in connection with any federal, state, or local election in the United States, either directly or indirectly.

6 A simple idea that has been examined in other trade contexts (Rauch and Trindade 2002, 2003) is that trade occurs only if traders in different countries want to trade. The process by which buyers are matched with sellers is not costless. Rauch and Trindade (2002) investigate how ethnic networks are able to overcome frictions due to language barriers, differing customs, and unfamiliar institutions and promote trade. They conclude: “Our results point to .... inadequate information regarding trading opportunities... Regarding information, it is common for governments to sponsor trade missions and to run international trade promotion organizations...... Yet ... such efforts complement rather than substitute for the services of private intermediaries because the latter provide greater depth of information.” We imagine that in our case lobbying by Caribbean principals is used to overcome informational barriers in order to “match” their natural amenities with potential tourists. Just as ethnic networks do, lobbying arises as a mechanism to promote tourism via the use of private intermediaries (U.S. agents) that are specialized in their connections with groups of policymakers.