rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**_Figure 3._** _Farmers use soil texture (left) and color (right) as indicators of soil quality._

# _2.3 Objective Data_

Soil samples were collected from up to two randomly selected plots per household (where applicable, one pure-stand maize plot was selected for crop-cutting). The in-field sampling protocol was designed with ICRAF, adapting the Land Degradation Surveillance Framework of the African Soil Information Service to fit the smallholder farm structure.<sup>4</sup> From each selected plot, two samples were tested: (1) a composite sample collected from four points within the plot at 0-20 cm depth following the layout in Figure 4 (referred to as _topsoil_ ), and (2) a single sample from the center of the plot at 20-50 cm depth (referred to as _subsoil_ ). Field staff were trained by ICRAF personnel to ensure comparability of field protocols. A thorough explanation of the soil collection, processing, and analysis protocols followed in LASER are found in the guidebook by Aynekulu et al. (2016).

Soil samples were delivered to local processing laboratories within five days of collection to prevent decomposition of organic matter. Local laboratories, which were also trained on ICRAF protocols, were responsible for drying, grinding, sieving, and weighing the samples. After processing, samples were shipped to ICRAF laboratories in Nairobi, Kenya for analysis. All analyses completed by ICRAF were done following African Soil Information Service (AfSIS) protocols so as to ensure comparability of results with separate pre-existing and ongoing research in the region. On average, soil sample collection took approximately 40 minutes per field . In a replication study, also by the LSMS, this time was reduced by incorporating implementation lessons from LASER, such as using barcoded labels rather than handwritten labels (see the guidebook by Aynekulu et al. (forthcoming) for details).

> 4 - For more information on the Land Degradation Surveillance Framework see http://www.africasoils.net/data/ldsf <u>description.</u>

10
The instrument specification to be used in the health care use models presented in the next section includes cohort and region fixed effects, interaction terms and regionspecific controls that reflect the pre-program enrollment rate and share of children in the population. Allocation of water and sanitation programs to the region is excluded as it was not significant (jointly and individually) in (16) and (17) above, and had little effect on the program effect terms.

It was noted earlier that this instrument was originally constructed by Duflo (2001) to estimate returns to schooling in Indonesia. Duflo used national intercensal survey data with a sample of 152,989 individuals while I use IFLS data with a sample of 3,921 women. Having a much smaller sample made it necessary to simplify the instrument specification used in my analysis. Duflo’s specification controls for _district_ of birth and _year_ of birth for each woman. Fixed effects in my model control for _region_ of birth<sup>4</sup> because there was an insufficient number of individuals within districts to include district fixed effects; _cohort_ of birth<sup>5</sup> fixed effects are used instead of year of birth fixed effects for the same reason. Secondly, region-specific controls in Duflo’s model consist of characteristics (e.g. enrollment rates) of the district of birth interacted with year of birth; I interact district of birth variables with cohort of birth instead. The interaction term

> 4 I grouped the 222 districts in which IFLS respondents were born into 5 regions: Sumatera, Java, Jakarta city, Bali, Nusa, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. These classifications are based on geographical location as well as economic development levels.

> 5 I grouped all women into the following cohorts based on age in 1974: 1-12 years, 13-18 years, 19-23 years, and 24 years. The last group was created because it formed the control group in many of the models.

32
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# **Figure 1. Distribution of the fee income share.**

The fee income share is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. The plot shows the frequency distribution of the fee income share in our dataset. The horizontal axis represents intervals of the fee-based income share. The data are obtained from Bankscope.

57
**TABlE 18**

# **International Migralion Movements by Intended Duralion** of Residence (Arrivals) or Absence (Departures): New Zealand, 1974/75-19S3/84

|||_Arri_|_vals_|||_Depa_|_rtures_||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Yearended_<br>_31 March_|_Short-Term_|<br>_long-Term_|_Permonent_|<br>_Tolal_|_Short-Term_|<br>_Long-Term_|_Permanent_|_Total_|
|1975|612,755|31,758|34,142|678,655|606,053|34,411|9,050|649,514|
|1976|630,204|28,414|20,046|678,664|630,312|35,852|7,308|673,472|
|1977|630,204|23,620|13,400|667,224|627,402|43,044|13,048|683,494|
|1978|678,808|22,784|14,188|715,780|674,256|45,344|18,336|737,936|
|1979|765,068|30,848|9,960|805,876|751,412|61,328|19,680|832,420|
|1980|884,332|30,838|10,769|925,939|871,229|52,149|23,875|947,253|
|1981|925,462|32,437|12,528|970,427|916,846|44,254|25,536|986,636|
|1982|900,995|32,980|12,312|946,287|894,256|37,055|19,719|951,030|
|19,83|869,609|33,259|12,595|915,463|857,347|30,360|12,314|900,021|
|1984|882,163|30,676|10,029|922,868|878,164|24,965|9,182|912,311|

NOTE: see lext for discussion of categories (i.e. short-term, long-term, permanent)

**iorme:** Deparinient of Siatisics (1977-1985), Trlin and Spoonley, 1986:24.
“transforms” farm-labor into non-farm labor and vice-versa. This transformation function permits wages to diverge between the farm and non-farm sectors, a key driver for our distributional analysis. With segmented labor markets, the impact of reduced subsidies to agriculture in the rich economies will not be shared equally between the farm and nonfarm labor forces. Similarly, the benefits from higher farm prices in developing countries following rich country reforms will not be shared as widely with non-farm households in the presence of factor market segmentation.

Much of the reasoning behind differing agricultural and non-agricultural labor rewards similarly applies to returns to agricultural investment. Therefore, we also introduce a constant elasticity of transformation function governing capital movements between agriculture and non-agriculture, with full capital mobility (a unique rental rate on capital) only applying across uses within these two broad sectors.

The extent of burden shifting between farm and non-farm labor and capital will depend on the size of the associated factor supply elasticities. In order to calibrate these key parameters, we draw on the OECD’s (2001) parameterization of agricultural factor markets which derive from comprehensive econometric reviews for the EU (Salhofer, 2001) and for North America (Abler, 2001) as well as an modeling panel’s assumptions for the Japanese economy.

We assume a constant aggregate level of land, labor, and capital employment reflecting the belief that the aggregate supply of factors is unaffected by trade policy. This is not the ‘full employment’ assumption sometimes ridiculed by advocates of

> dampens the gains to poor countries from rich country reforms. However, this makes their model less stable, and, given our focus on agricultural reforms, this feature seems less critical.

10
But even if antidumping contributes to a country’s process of trade liberalization, it is equally important to identify the potential long-term economic costs of this contribution.<sup>32</sup> As a caveat, we conclude by pointing to some of the costs experienced by the historical users of antidumping where the policy has a longer track record. First, it is perhaps not surprising to learn that it is difficult for governments to remove an antidumping measure once it has been imposed and an industry is benefiting from the protection it provides. While Article 11 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement introduced a mandatory 5-year “sunset review” investigative procedure for each imposed measure, evidence for the US suggests that this requirement has little impact on the removal of already imposed measures (Moore, 2006; Liebman, 2004). Furthermore, among WTO members, there is no historical precedent for a country that has been an intensive user of antidumping suddenly to curtail that use (Zanardi 2004; table 2). When combined, these findings suggest that over time, the _cumulative_ impact of antidumping measures in place in an economy may be substantial even though each distinct antidumping investigation may cover only a few products and may thus seem to pose little overall economic threat. Indeed, in a study of the cumulative effects of the US use of antidumping law, Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn (1999) conclude that US-imposed import protection under antidumping made it the second most costly trade policy program in terms of lost US economic welfare in 1993, trailing only the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.

> 32 There is also the concern that many antidumping laws are designed so as not to give legal standing during the investigative process to the domestic industries or consumers that would be adversely affected by import restrictions (Finger, 2002). Thus even the short-run economic costs of imposed measures may be nontransparent, which makes the reporting requirements mandated by the WTO and data generation efforts on the use of antidumping such as those collected in Bown (2005a) an important step in improving transparency.

21
we believe that the pattern of export specialization from all preference receivers should be more closely aligned with relative world prices then the solution is simple: for each of them use a fi xed subsidy rate that is equal for all the products it exports to all preference granting countries. This maintains the relative prices in the receiver equal to the world’s relative prices. So the subsidy can be designed in a way that addresses problems of specialization in the wrong sector and still minimizes the stumbling block

# 5 Conclusion

The large numbers of recent PTAs suggest that policy makers have decided they are desirable. Nonetheless the potential costs of these agreements in terms of their effect on multilateral liberalization must be estimated and taken seriously. In this paper we described recent theoretical and empirical evidence that preferential liberalization can slow down multilateral liberalization even when the countries receiving the preference are small from a trade perspective. As large developed countries often use unilateral preferences to small countries as a payment for cooperation in non-trade issues they will hold back their own MTL to be able to provide preferential tariffs below the MFN value. In this setup, decoupling preferences from MFN liberalization can be Pareto improving provided that the alternative policy is designed to target the problem. Our proposal is conceptually very simple; use import subsidies, possibly with the initial rate fi xed at the current preference. As we argued the subsidies would ensure that the countries that receive preferences would move from opposing MFN reductions in the granting countries to supporting it. The granting countries could maintain their preferential treatment, now via subsidies, and thus continue to extract cooperation from those countries in a range of other issues on which preferences are conditional.

We provide the fi rst estimates of the welfare costs of PTAs as a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. Our focus is on the subset of preferences that the E.U., U.S. and Japan extend to LDCs and we use the import subsidy scheme as a feasible counterfactual to calculate the opportunity cost of these preferences. This cost is $2934 million per year for the TRIAD, or, to put it differently, the E.U., U.S. and Japan would gain $2934 million per year if they switched from the preference to the subsidy scheme in the context of the liberalization anticipated in the Doha round. This occurs because under the subsidy those countries can now further reduce their MFN tariffs without negatively affecting the bene fi ts associated with the “side payment”. The switch would also increase annual welfare in LDCs by $520 million and in the rest of the world by $900 million.

23
Muendler, M.A., (2002); “Trade, Technology, and Productivity: A Study of Brazilian Manufacturers, 1986– 1998,” University of California, Berkeley, mimeo.

Nassif, A. and F. Pimentel (2004); "Estructura e competitividade da Industria Brasileira: o que mudou?, Revista do BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, 2(22):3-19 Oliveira, A. (1999); “Relatório Metodológico: Microdados da Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego,” CEDEPLAR / UFMG, mimeo.

Paes de Barros, R. and C. Corseuil (2001); “The Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance,” IADB, Research Network Working paper #R-427.

Pan American Health Organization - PAHO (2005); “Brazil health system profile” Petrongolo, B. and Ch. Pissarides, (2001); "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," _Journal of Economic Literature_ , 39(2):390-431.

Pinheiro, A. and G. Bacha de Almeida (1994); “Padrões Sectoriais da Proteção na Economia Brasileira,” IPEA. Texto para discussão N. 355.

Pries, M. and R. Rogerson (2005); “Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions and Labor Market Flows,” _Journal of Political Economy_ 113(4):811-839.

Ramos, L. (2002) “A evolução da informalidade no Brasil metropolitano: 1991-2001,” IPEA. Texto para Discussão N. 914.

Ramos, L. and M. Brito (2003) “O funcionamento do mercado de trabalho metropolitano brasileiro no período 1991-2002: tendências, fatos estilizados e mudanças estruturais,” IPEA. Nota tecnica. Mercado de trabalho.

Ramos, L. and V. Ferreira (2005a); “Padrões espacial e setorial da evolução da informalidade no Brasil 1991-2003,” IPEA. Texto para discussão N. 1099.

Ramos, L. and V. Ferreira (2005b); “Padrões Espacial e Setorial da Evolução da Informalidade No Período Pós-Abertura Comercial,” IPEA Ramos, L and J. Reis (1997); “Grau de formalização, nível e qualidade do emprego no mercado de trabalho metropolitano do Brasil,” Mercado de Trabalho - Conjuntura e Análise - no 5.

Reis, C., J. Ribeiro and S. Piola (2001); “Financiamento das Políticas Sociais nos anos 1990: O Caso do Ministério da Saúde,” IPEA. Texto para Discussão 802 Rogerson, R., R. Shimer and R. Wright (2005); “Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey,” _Journal of Economic Literature_ , 43(4):959-988.

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# **Hidden Human Capital: Psychological Empowerment and Adolescent Girls’ Aspirations in India**<sup>**1**</sup>

Sanchari Roy (University of Sussex) Matthew Morton (World Bank) Shrayana Bhattacharya (World Bank) Key words: social-emotional skills, self-efficacy, aspirations, adolescents, youth, gender, labor market, education JEL classification: I20, I31, Z00

> 1 **Funding and disclaimers:** This material has been funded by UK aid from UK Government’s Department for International Development. However, the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s, or the World Bank Group’s, official policies.
(Revision 2) level. The price series is calculated based on a survey of wholesale prices for imports in the United States. Since the BLS price i.ndices control for quality changes, these indices are likely to be superior to unit price data, which may exhibit fluctuations due to changes in quality.

One of the dataset's limitations is that it does not specify the amount of the duty imposed. Consequently, we cannot estimate the amount which was passed on to the buyer. However, since the import price data are taken from wholesale buyers of imported products, the import price series should incorporate the price effects of the duties. Another potential estimation issue arises from specifying a duty or investigation as 0 or 1, which introduces a classic measurement error problem. As with all such problems, it is possible to show that this will lead to underestimating the true value of the coefficients on INV and DUTY. Consequently, these coefficients should be interpreted as a lower bound for measuring the effect of LFV cases on import prices.

Exchange rates were calculated using bilateral nominal rates weighted by 1980 trade volumes for each 4-digit SITC category. Foreign wholesale prices at the aggregate level, which we used as a measure of factor costs in foreign currency, were also calculated using 1980 trade weights and wholesale prices from the International Monetary Fund. Non-tariff barrier data is taken from UNCTAD, which collects data on non-tariff barriers for most developed countries. The United States NTB data was collected at the US tariff code (TSUSA) level and aggregated to the 4-digit SITC level using a concordance made available by the ITC. **6** Since the UNCTAD database only contains information on whether or not

**6** When several tariff categories were merged into one 4-digit SITC code, if one LFV case was associated with any one of the TSUSA categories then the SITC category was considered as subject to a LFV casa. It can be shown that the measurement error which follows from this concordance leads to underestimating

12
there is a new and growing literature that has begun to fill in the lacuna. Beegle et al. (2009), studies a five year panel of school children in Vietnam and finds that child labor has negative consequences on school participation and educational attainment. Orazem and Lee (2010) uses Brazilian household data to examine the impact of working as children on self-reported health outcomes and finds negative impacts of child labor. Emerson and Souza (2011) examines retrospective data from Brazil and finds that child work before 13-14 years old negatively a↵ects adult incomes, but that this a↵ect turns positive after these ages. Interestingly, this study finds that the e↵ect of child work on earnings remain even when controls for years of education are included, raising the possibility that child labor may a↵ect the learning of those workers who remain in school, which provides a motivation for the current study.

Research on the consequences of child work on education have mainly focused on attendance rather than learning (e.g. Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Assaad et al., 2001; CanalsCerda and Ridao-Cano, 2004; Beegle et al., 2008, 2006; Assaad et al., 2005) and have found modest negative e↵ects of child work. But as Emerson and Souza (2011) suggest, school enrollment may not be the only important measure, especially in countries like Brazil where combining work and school are common.

The direction of the expected impact of child work on learning is unclear. Working requires time and energy that could hamper a student’s ability to learn, but some work activities could involve tasks that are either directly related to learning (like reading, writing and math) or indirectly related but still involve use of these skills. If a work activity involves learning-by-doing or is otherwise positively correlated to learning the skills tested in school (in our case math and Portuguese), work could, in fact, have a positive impact. In the end the true nature of the relationship between work and learning, if the two are substitutes or 5
**Table 6: Percentage of Adults and Children Living with HIV Receiving ART, 2007, 2008 and 2009**

||**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Number ofpeople receivingART|12.237|17.551|16.302|
|Number ofpeople that should receive ART|17.090|26.922|22.924|
|ART coverage|72%|65%|71%|

**Source:** MPS 2011. UNGASS 2010, Table 24, page 74.

In fact, the representatives from patient associations and civil society organizations interviewed for the Study pointed to drug supply problems leading to treatment discontinuities and a lack of adherence. One example concerns the availability of second line ARV treatments. Informants revealed that when there is a second therapeutic failure, the Technico-Scientific Committee of the IPS grants the patient a CTC authorization to request the alternative treatment from the EPS. This process may take between one month and one year—mainly due to the delay of the FOSYGA in providing the funds for the treatment.

# **_(c) Service Delivery_**

There is a high degree of patient and public satisfaction with the health system in Colombia.<sup>50</sup> About two-thirds (71.4%) of surveyed adults in 2010 who had used health services in the previous year reported that the quality of those services was good or excellent; only 7.1% reported that the quality was bad or awful. However, there is no data available specifically regarding patient satisfaction with HIV/AIDS care services.

Colombia has a well-structured network of services to deliver the care needed for HIV/AIDS. There are preventive, diagnostic and treatment services (including those for opportunistic diseases), as well as palliative and support services. On the one hand, the Study found no evidence indicating that new or different services need to be developed to meet the needs of patients with HIV/AIDS in Colombia. On the other hand, the current network of services could be complemented with programs and interventions for targeting the most at risk groups as identified by research at the local level.

> 50 MPS (Febrero 2011) Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud 2010, Bogotá: MPS.

48