||(0.002)|(0.017)|(0.024)|(0.186)|(0.010)|(0.028)|(0.025)|(0.193)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Year 1974|0.003|-0.056<sup>***</sup>|-0.033|-0.465<sup>**</sup>|-0.016|-0.058<sup>***</sup>|-0.073<sup>***</sup>|-0.335|
||(0.005)|(0.019)|(0.025)|(0.191)|(0.010)|(0.018)|(0.021)|(0.195)|
|Year 1975|0.001|-0.032<sup>**</sup>|-0.026|-0.453<sup>*</sup>|-0.027<sup>***</sup>|-0.043<sup>**</sup>|-0.009|0.236|
||(0.002)|(0.012)|(0.032)|(0.246)|(0.009)|(0.020)|(0.023)|(0.237)|
|Year 1976|0.003|-0.055<sup>**</sup>|-0.055<sup>*</sup>|-0.435<sup>*</sup>|-0.024<sup>***</sup>|-0.047<sup>**</sup>|-0.054<sup>**</sup>|-0.028|
||(0.003)|(0.023)|(0.027)|(0.234)|(0.008)|(0.020)|(0.024)|(0.203)|
|Year 1977|0.004|-0.052<sup>***</sup>|-0.018|-0.322|-0.025<sup>**</sup>|-0.045<sup>***</sup>|-0.044<sup>*</sup>|0.080|
||(0.003)|(0.015)|(0.029)|(0.212)|(0.009)|(0.015)|(0.022)|(0.252)|
|Year 1978|0.003|-0.078<sup>***</sup>|-0.073<sup>**</sup>|-0.704<sup>***</sup>|-0.027<sup>**</sup>|-0.056<sup>***</sup>|-0.083<sup>***</sup>|-0.151|
||(0.003)|(0.021)|(0.028)|(0.234)|(0.010)|(0.019)|(0.022)|(0.209)|
|Year 1979|0.002|-0.066<sup>***</sup>|-0.049<sup>**</sup>|-0.453<sup>***</sup>|-0.029<sup>***</sup>|-0.047<sup>**</sup>|-0.063<sup>**</sup>|0.230|
||(0.003)|(0.016)|(0.021)|(0.152)|(0.008)|(0.019)|(0.023)|(0.191)|
|Year 1980|-0.001|-0.087<sup>***</sup>|-0.032|-0.449|-0.027<sup>***</sup>|-0.054<sup>***</sup>|-0.058<sup>***</sup>|0.131|
||(0.003)|(0.018)|(0.029)|(0.263)|(0.008)|(0.013)|(0.020)|(0.240)|
|Year 1981|0.002|-0.080<sup>***</sup>|-0.054<sup>*</sup>|-0.536<sup>**</sup>|-0.038<sup>***</sup>|-0.057<sup>***</sup>|-0.105<sup>***</sup>|-0.102|
||(0.003)|(0.018)|(0.029)|(0.221)|(0.009)|(0.016)|(0.023)|(0.225)|
|_N_|14384|14384|14384|13452|14666|14666|14666|11672|
|adj._R_<sup>2</sup>|0.013|0.045|0.029|0.042|0.023|0.032|0.031|0.062|

Notes: All regressions add birth governorate fixed-effects, household size and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the birth governorate level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Now, we consider the impact of the Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq war on female and male labor market outcomes. The results show that most of the male cohorts of 1970-1981 are statistically significant for dummy variables for social security or pension plan, however, the female cohorts of 1970-1981 are not statistically significant. Similarly, we find that the Islamic Republic of Iran– Iraq war decreased the probability of men having health care, paid leave and job permanence for most of cohorts of 1969-1981. While we find little evidence of the impact of the Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq war on women for the cohorts of 1969-1981. In terms of wage, the results are negative and highly statistically significant for most of the male cohorts of 1969-1981. The Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq war also has negative impacts on female wages for the cohorts of 1973 - 1981.

Female labor force participation in Iraq is limited due to lack of government backing and social norms. Women's labor force participation in Iraq is low: only 12.3% of working-age women in Iraq were employed or searching for employment in 2018 (Reach, 2019). Table 7 also shows that only 1,715 women participated in the labor market while 8,823 men did in the labor market. In other hand, women participating in the labor market accounted for only 16.3 percent in 2006 in Iraq. Furthermore, of those workers who were exposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran–Iraq war during childhood, about 72 percent of workers with social security, pension, or paid leave were male, 74 percent of workers with health care were male, and 85 percent of workers with job permanence were male in 2006. This may suggest why the effect of the Islamic Republic of Iran– Iraq war on female labor market outcomes is smaller compared with male market outcomes.

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