rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
multiple styles combine to give SHG member’s participation a qualitatively deeper and richer character than that of non-SHG women.

The 'coding density' analytic on NVIVO helped support our finding regarding the higher quality of SHG member’s participation at the _gram sabha_ . Coding density is determined by the total number of codes utilized in analyzing a particular event of participation. The greater the number of codes that are relevant to and utilized for analyzing an event of participation the greater the coding density. An increase in coding density in our data is explained most by the number of issues raised and the styles utilized within a particular event or excerpt of participation. Simply put, this means that SHG women, per segment of coded participation, raised a greater number of issues and used a greater number of narrative styles than their non SHG counterparts. The high coding density associated with SHG women's events of participation is an objective corroboration of our subjective assessment of their higher quality of participation at the _gram sabha_ . However, women in general are able to meet the demanding bar of high quality participation at least half of the times they verbally participate. This is an encouraging finding with respect to women’s inclusion into civic discussions and their substantive political inclusion.

# **CONCLUSIONS**

This paper began with the aim of re-theorizing ‘deliberative democracy’ into _oral democracy_ to gain new analytical purchase on talk-centered democracy, with a special interest in investigating women’s oral participation in the _gram sabha,_ and any potential impact that associational membership in SHGs might be having on it. Through in-depth analysis, we hope to have demonstrated what a talk-centered analysis of participatory, oral democracy would look like and why a talk-centered analysis is important. Talking in civic forums is a form of public speaking, 41
Did the dibao program provide a minimum income guarantee? In all three years the percentage of dibao recipients with ex ante incomes below the dibao thresholds exceeded the percentage with ex post incomes below the thresholds (last column of Table 5). For example, in 2009 12 to 15% of dibao recipients had ex ante income below the dibao thresholds, and only 5.7% had ex post income below the dibao thresholds. In other words, the dibao transfers raised more than half of dibao recipients who started out below the local dibao threshold above the local threshold. We conclude that the rural dibao program was reasonably successful in providing an income guarantee for dibao recipients who started out below the local dibao threshold.

Of course, these numbers ignore non‐recipients whose incomes were below the dibao thresholds. About 90% of individuals with income below the local threshold did not receive dibao transfers. For these individuals, the dibao program did not provide a minimum income guarantee. The lack of guarantee to this group reflects a substantial exclusionary error in targeting, which we discuss in the next section.

Did the dibao program reduce rural poverty, and if so, to what extent? We answer this question by comparing poverty incidence and the poverty gap calculated using ex ante versus ex post incomes. Table 6 reports estimates of poverty incidence calculated using three absolute poverty lines.<sup>7</sup> In all cases poverty incidence was higher for ex ante incomes than for ex post incomes. This is consistent with a poverty‐reducing impact of the dibao program. In all cases, however, the difference in ex ante versus ex post poverty incidence is smaller than half a percentage point. In other words, the dibao program’s impact on poverty incidence was small.

Table 7 shows estimates of the poverty gap calculated using ex ante incomes and ex post incomes. As expected, the poverty gap calculated using ex ante incomes is larger than that calculated using ex post incomes. In 2007 and 2008 the ex ante poverty gap was 2‐3% larger than the ex post poverty gap, and in 2009 it was 6.5% larger. Again, the difference is fairly modest, especially when compared to total dibao expenditures.

> 7 For estimates of absolute poverty, we use China’s official poverty line as of 2011 (adjusted back to 2007, 2008 and 2009 using the national rural consumer price index).  We also use the $1.25 and $2 per person per day international poverty thresholds based on purchasing power parity (PPP) income. See notes to Table 6 and Golan, Sicular and Umapathi (2014) for further details.

15
**0** _G_

n

**0**

# **Table 1. Degrees of Informality (continued)**

||Formal Sector<br>Enterprises|Taxicabs|Kiosks|Boot repair<br>("black<br>market" and<br>street)|Selling used<br>parts/tools<br>(tech. mkt)|Selling<br>individual<br>cigarettes,<br>soft-drinks<br>or chewing<br>gum (street)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Percent earning less than the legal<br>minimum wage*t|_- 0%_|**01/o**of full-time drivers<br>36% of part-time drivers|4%|0%|17%|24%|
|Degree of moonlighting|na|17% of full-time drivers<br>72% of part-time drivers|32%|7%|24%|32%|
|Percent who consider themselves<br>"employed"*|- _100%_|26%|16%|26%|8%|0%|
|Division between capital and labor<br>Percentage non-family ownership|_very high_<br>-100%|low<br>23%$|low<br>12%|none<br>0%|none<br>0%|none<br>0%|
|"Permanent" place of business|yes|no|yes|no|no|no|
|Security of rights to premises &<br>terms of premises use|high.<br>owned or leased<br>with high<br>contractual<br>rights|medium.<br>mobile enterprises;<br>however garages may be<br>owned or leased with<br>weak contractual<br>rightsa|low.<br>kiosks rent<br>land from the<br>city, no<br>contractual<br>rights.a|none.<br>daily<br>occupation|none.<br>daily<br>occupation|none.<br>daily<br>occupation|
|Percent keeping written records*|- _100%_|27%|72%|7%|46%|8%|
|Relative ease of estimating<br>aggregate<br>value added|high|medium|medium|low|low|low|

_Source:_ Informal sector surveys conducted by the author.

* excludes moonlighters; t per full-time equivalent; $ applies to ownership of the vehicle - as many taxicab drivers use their employer's vehicles without their knowledge, the separation of labor and capital is overstated; **d** the level of "contractual rights" ascribed to taxicabs and kiosks is based on the experience in the spring of 1997 when many garages and kiosks were summarily ordered to move; items in italics are reasonable _a priori_ assumptions.
number of questions of the surveys, we run our checks using the January 2011 and September 2013 surveys. All tables containing robustness check results are shown in AppendixA.

The first set of checks considers different samples, including the observations omitted in the baseline (those for which the respondent replied ’NS/NR’). We treat these individuals as unsatisfied and assign a value of ’0’ in the corresponding entry of the dependent variable.<sup>10</sup> The number of observations increases to 1,200 for the January 2011 and to 610 for the September 2013 survey, significantly larger than the baseline case. The results of this check, reported in tables A.8 and A.9 are extremely close to the baseline in terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients. All coefficients remains significant and in most cases the magnitude of the coefficients differs only at the margin. Therefore, the baseline results are fully robust to changes in the sample considered.

The second set of checks considers alternative definition to the three variables of interest: political partisanship, information and delivery. We start by checking whether the partisanship effect applies only to FMLN voters or it applies also to ARENA (the major opposition party) voters.<sup>11</sup> In this check the variable ’Partisanship’ is a dummy variable taking the value of ’1’ if the respondent is a voter of the ARENA party in the 2009 elections and ’0’ otherwise. The results, shown in tables A.10 and A.11 are similar to the baseline. The estimated coefficients of the variable ’Partisanship’ are highly significant for both surveys. They have negative sign as expected and their magnitude (in absolute value terms) is in line with the baseline case. These results suggest that the marginal effect induced by political partisanship (either in favor or against the governing party) is a non trivial contribution to satisfaction.

We further check our definition of ’information’. The baseline case considers ’informed’ those individuals who explicitly answered to be ’informed’ or ’well informed’ about the subsidy reform. This robustness check exercise redefined the variable ’Information’ using a different question in the 2011 survey. This variable reflects whether the respondent is informed not only about the reform but also about the unsubsidized gas price, or in other word, the value of the subsidy. In this check the variable ’Information’ is the same dummy variable as in the baseline however it is conditional on knowing the correct unsubsidized price. The

> 10While in principle the ’NS/NR’ responses could be treated both ways (as ’satisfied’ or ’unsatisfied’ people), we think that treating them as unsatisfied is more appropriate given how widespread was the opposition to the reform.

> 11FMLN and ARENA are the two major parties of the country representing almost 70 percent of preferences in the last elections.

27
and salary jobs are being created, much of the labor force cannot access these jobs due to their low education levels. In rural areas, not only is the labor force poorly educated, but the remote locations do not favor investments which would create these jobs. The only opportunity the labor force has to access the non-farm sector is through the creation and development of household enterprise employment.

**Figure 5 Difficulty of doing business is not correlated with high number of informal HEs**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 47.0 Ghana<br>42.0 TanzaniaUganda Burkina Faso<br>37.0<br>Cameroon Congo, Rep.<br>32.0 Mozambique<br>27.0 Rwanda<br>22.0<br>17.0<br>12.0<br>0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0<br>Ease of Doing Business Rank<br>Share of Households with HE<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: WB Doing Business 2011. Note: a higher rank indicates a higher difficulty for doing business_ Contrary to results from Latin America (Loayaza et al, 2009), more employment in HEs is not associated with a bad business environment. Figure 5 shows that employment in HEs has no correlation with the country rankings of the business environment shown in the Doing Business data base (www.doingbusiness.org). No doubt some aspects of the reported poor business environment in SSA countries reduced investment in labor intensive enterprises (which would create more wage and salary jobs), but these factors do not seem to be primarily responsible for the growth in informal non-farm enterprise employment.

A final point on recent employment trends: in OECD countries it is unusual for adults who have entered employment to engage in more than one income earning activity at a time. But in SSA countries, it is not unusual for this to occur as about 40 percent of the labor force reports a secondary economic activity in a different sector. Often, especially in rural areas, the secondary activity is an HE. On average across the countries in our study, about 17 percent of the labor force reported NFEs as primary employment. _However, this only shows about 60 percent of the number of people that are engaged in the sector_ , as another 10 percent, on average, reported non-farm HE or ME as secondary employment (Table 1). Combining primary and secondary employment shows that, on average, 28 percent of the labor force (with a high 37 percent in Ghana) works in HEs or MEs in this sample of SSA countries.<sup>7</sup>

> 7 Even this is an underestimate of total employment because our employment data do not allow us to track which wage and salary employees work in informal NFEs.  However, as shown in the next section, the number is quite small as about 90% of informal NFEs do not have any employees outside of the family.

11
Overall, the studies suggest an economically large impact of financial development on economic growth.<sup>14</sup> The literature on the channels through which access to finance affects firm growth is however, more limited. Clearly, access to external finance can facilitate capital accumulation. However, on a macro scale, historians have identified innovation and technological progress as the principal causes of material progress over extended periods of time (see for example, Landes, 1969; Rosenberg, 1982; and Mokyr, 1990). Solow‟s (1957) path breaking analysis of growth in labor productivity in the U.S. has established that technological advances (broadly defined) and skill, rather than capital accumulation are the prime drivers of increases in labor productivity. Solow (1957) argued that approximately 80% of the increase in labor productivity in the U.S. over the period 1909-1949 was due to more productive use of capital and increases in the skill level of the labor force. More recently, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) have shown that financial sector development helps economic growth through more efficient resource allocation rather than through increases in the scale of investment or savings mobilization. Cross-country time-series studies by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001, 2005) also show that financial liberalization boosts economic growth by improving the allocation of resources and the investment rate.

Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) identify an entrepreneurship channel. They use data on more than 3 million firms across Europe across the Amadeus database and find that easier access to external finance is positively related to the number of start-ups. While they find that onerous entry regulations such as high registration costs impede firm entry, they find that regulations associated with improving access to external finance such as accounting standards and property rights protection have a positive effect on firm entry.

Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2011) use Enterprise Surveys (from the World Bank) from 2002 to 2005 across 47 developing economies and posit innovation as one of the channels through which finance contributes to overall growth. They define innovation broadly to include not only core innovation activities, such as introducing new product lines and new technology, but also sourcing decisions that affect the overall organization of firms activities, and other types of activities that promote knowledge transfers, such as signing joint

> 14 See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2007) for a discussion of how financial development influences income distribution and poverty.

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Bernanke, B. (2016). “The Relationship Between Stocks and Oil Prices.” <u>https://www.brookings.edu/blog/benbernanke/2016/02/19/the-relationship-betweenstocks-and-oil-prices/</u>

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_— 28 —_
Finally, the Treasury could pressure dealers to carry all its products. From a logistical standpoint, the Treasury could argue that it has provided efficient and cost-effective securities custody and delivery facilities. In exchange, dealers should demonstrate their ability to attract investors for different sections of the Treasury’s maturity spectrum.

_Zero investment cost._ Aside from contributing connectivity to the Registry of Scripless Securities, the Treasury did not have to make any hard investments to acquire an e-business platform comparable with private offerings. Smetrix took the entrepreneurial risk in building the platform and partnered with the Data Center to provide it to the Treasury.

_Ability to offer all retail government securities._ The Expanded Small Investors Program provides a platform for the Treasury to offer all retail government security products. The Retail Treasury Bond program is currently offered to retail investors through firm underwriting. By offering the bonds through the program on a similar noncompetitive basis, the Treasury could generate savings by eliminating underwriting fees.

_Investor education._ Philippine regulators have had a hard time suppressing financial scams. The Expanded Small Investors Program provides an opportunity for the Treasury to expose new or less sophisticated investors to such essential issues as market risk and differences between bank deposit products and fixed income securities and between registry and book-entry recording of ownership, as well as to increase investor expectations in terms of risk and reward propositions **.** _Increased investor expectations for service and convenience._ The real-time nature of the Expanded Small Investors Program and the provision of transactions and information over the Internet will give investors new levels of convenience and service. Until now government investment services in the Philippines have been unable to match the convenience of private services.

_Expanded savings mobilization._ The 1998 launch of the Small Investors Program made the Treasury aware of the program’s ability to attract participants even among those without bank services. The expanded program will offer a product for retail investment that directly competes with other investment products, such as deposits and mutual funds. And given the program’s better rates, it should attract investor attention away from products with unattractive yields, as well as pressure the market to be more innovate in offering savings products—which will translate into increased savings.

_Investor protection._ Registration in the Registry of Scripless Securities occurs at the investor level. This will protect investors from dealer failures and closures because ownership records will be maintained directly by the Treasury.

36
# **_Defining Socioeconomic Status_**

Socioeconomic status (SES) is a multidimensional, context-specific concept that is not measured consistently across household surveys (Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov 2001). The same problem may affect studies of the link between SES and HIV. Although, since most of these studies focus on the DHS datasets, the lack of consistency with which different studies define SES is not necessarily the issue. The focus here is rather on three potential problems of interpretation related to: measurement of SES and underlying causes, proxy measures of income in lieu of explicit income data, and, current income position versus accrued wealth.

First, measuring differences in the SES gradient with respect to HIV does not explain underlying causes of the gradient. Education as an SES measure, for example, encompasses many underlying factors that influence its relation with HIV status. The link between education and HIV may reflect the fact that, on average, people with less education have less disposable income, have less access to information about safer sex, live in more remote areas, and are less physically mobile than people with more education.<sup>6</sup> All of these factors can affect likelihood of HIV infection. Even if some of these relationships can be decomposed by added additional variables to an analysis (see Wagstaff et al 2003), one is likely still left with multiple story lines on the pathway through which a singular SES measure results in differential HIV outcomes.

Second, the asset index approach (developed by Filmer and Pritchett 1999), which is often applied to DHS data in lieu of detailed income or consumption measures, closely approximates the ranking of households based on consumption (which underlies the poverty definition in the first MDG) in specific settings but not necessarily everywhere (Filmer and Scott 2008). The extent to which there is a congruence of rankings of households between the asset index and consumption affects how one interprets the asset index (as a good or weak proxy for poverty, for example).

Third, terms such as _wealth, poverty,_ and _income_ are often used interchangeably to describe the asset index (see, for example, Mishra et al. 2007), which may not reflect current income or even current poverty status (Filmer and Scott 2008).

> 6 Jukes et al (2008) develop and discuss a theoretical framework for the link between education and HIV.

6