rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Making negotiated land reform work :
            initial experience from Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa
The author describes a new type of
            negotiated land reform that relies on voluntary land
            transfers negotiated between buyers and sellers, with the
            government's role restricted to establishing the
            necessary framework for negotiation and making a land
            purchase grant available to eligible beneficiaries. This
            approach has emerged-following the end of the Cold War and
            broad macroeconomic adjustment--as many countries face a
            second generation of reforms to address deep-rooted
            structural problems and provide a basis for sustainable
            economic growth and poverty reduction. The author describes
            initial experiences in Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa.
            It is too soon to know whether negotiated land reform can
            rise to the challenges administrative land reform failed to
            solve but the data so far suggests that: 1) Negotiated land
            reform can succeed only if measures are taken to make the
            market for land sales and rentals more fluid transparent. 2)
            Productive projects are likely to be the key to
            market-assisted land reform. The potential for project
            productivity establishes an upper bound on the price to be
            paid and a basis for financial intermediaries to evaluate
            the project. It also requires beneficiaries to familiarize
            themselves with the realities they're likely to
            confront as independent farmers and the limits to how much
            land reform can help them achieve their goals. 3) The only
            way to effectively coordinate the entities involved in the
            process is through decentralized, demand-driven
            implementation. 4) The long-run success of land reform
            depends on getting the private sector involved and using the
            land purchase grant to "crowd in" private money.
Industrial environmental performance
            in China - the impact of inspections
Little empirical research has been done
            on monitoring and enforcement issues in environmental
            economics, especially to analyze the impact of monitoring
            and enforcement on polluters' environmental
            performance. No studies have been done in developing
            economies. The authors explore the impact of inspections,
            and the potential impact of pollution charges and
            citizen's complaints, on the environmental performance
            of polluters in China. Their analysis of plant-level data
            from the city of Zhenjiang shows that: 1) Inspections have a
            statistically significant impact on firm's
            environmental performance. 2) Pollution charges do not have
            a statistically significant effect on firms'
            performance - although the lack of variation in pollution
            charges in Zhenjiang precludes effectively capturing their
            impact. 3) Complaints have a significant impact on
            inspections and therefore on pollution control. Currently
            available data do not allow analysis of whether the cost of
            additional inspections is justified, but it is reasonable to
            speculate that additional inspections would improve social
            welfare in Zhenjiang, and that information and education
            campaigns are probably a good way to encourage citizen complaints.
Exchange rate overvaluation and
            trade protection - lessons from experience
Despite a trend toward more flexible
            rates, more than half the world's countries maintain
            fixed or managed exchange rates. In the 1980s and 1990s,
            developing countries as a group progressively liberalized
            their trade regimes, but some governments defend their
            exchange rate in actions that run counter to long-run plans
            for liberalization. Without discussing the relative merits
            of fixed and flexible exchange rate systems, the authors
            note that exchange rate management in many countries has
            resulted in overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Roughly
            twenty five percent of the countries for which data are
            available have overvalued exchange rates, with black market
            premiums from 10 percent to more than 100 percent. After
            surveying the literature, the authors present lessons from
            experience about what has worked (or not) in response to
            crises involving external shocks and external trade deficits
            - and why. Trying to defend an overvalued exchange rate with
            protectionist trade policies is a classic pattern, but
            experience shows such protection does significantly retard
            the country's growth, and delay its integration into
            the world trading community. In fact, and overvalued
            exchange rate is often the root cause of protection,
            preventing the country from returning to more liberal trade
            policies that allow growth and integration into the world
            community without exchange rate adjustment. Most developing
            countries have downward price and wage rigidities and, with
            an external trade deficit, require some form of nominal
            exchange rate adjustment to restore external equilibrium.
            The authors present cross-country econometric and case study
            evidence - citing examples from Argentina, Chile, Ghana, The
            Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Turkey, Uruguay, and
            Sub-Saharan Africa (including the CFA zone) - that
            overvalued exchange rates reduce economic growth. Defending
            the exchange rate, they show, has nor no medium-term
            benefits, since falling reserves will eventually force
            devaluation. Better to have devaluation occur without
            further debilitating losses in reserves and lost
            productivity because of import controls. After devaluation
            the exchange rate will reach a new equilibrium, strongly
            influenced by government and central bank policies.
The use of asset management
            companies in the resolution of banking crises -
            cross-country experience
Asset management companies have been
            used to address the overhang of bad debt in the financial
            system. There are two main types of asset management
            company: those set up to expedite corporate restructuring
            and those established for rapid disposal of assets. A review
            of seven asset management companies reveals a mixed record.
            In two of three cases, asset management companies for
            corporate restructuring did not achieve their narrow goal of
            expediting bank or corporate restructuring, suggesting that
            they are not good vehicles for expediting corporate
            restructuring. Only a Swedish asset management company
            successfully managed its portfolio, acting sometimes as lead
            agent in restructuring - and helped by the fact that the
            assets acquired had mostly to do with real estate, not
            manufacturing, which is harder to restructure, and
            represented a small fraction of the banking system's
            assets, which made it easier for the company to remain
            independent of political pressures and to sell assets back
            to the private sector. Asset management companies used to
            dispose of assets, rapidly fared somewhat better. Two of
            four agencies (in Spain and the United States) achieved
            their objectives, suggesting that asset management companies
            can be used effectively for narrowly defined purposes of
            resolving insolvent and inviable financial institutions, and
            selling off their assets. Achieving these objectives
            required an easily liquefiable asset - real estate - mostly
            professional management, political independence, adequate
            bankruptcy, and foreclosure laws, appropriate funding,
            skilled resources, good information and management systems,
            and transparent operations and processes. The other two
            agencies (in Mexico and the Philippines) were doomed from
            the start, as governments transferred to them politically
            motivated loans or fraudulent assets, which were difficult
            for a government agency susceptible to political pressure
            and lacking independence to resolve or sell off.
Broad roads in a thin country -
            infrastructure concessions in Chile
To increase investment in
            infrastructure, in the early 1990s Chile's government
            introduced private capital into the transport infrastructure
            sector, covering roads and highways, bridges, tunnels, and
            airports. The chosen mechanism: a concession scheme through
            which private firms would finance and build a given project
            and then operate the infrastructure for a set of number of
            years, recovering their investment by collecting tolls from
            users. Among the lessons learned from the experience: 1) As
            much as possible, avoid concessioning roads for which there
            are convenient alternative freeways nearby. 2) Choose the
            right variable for awarding a concession. Avoid mechanisms
            that (by promoting large payments to the state or short-term
            concession periods) encourage high tolls, and if you choose
            to award a concession to the firm charging the lowest tolls,
            place a floor and ceiling on possible bids. The floor is to
            guarantee the concession's financial viability; the
            ceiling is to prevent inefficient traffic diversions. Ties
            at either end should be resolved by a second variable, such
            as the level of transfers between the state and the firm. 3)
            Allow downward toll flexibility so that the concessionaire
            can react to unexpectedly low traffic flows, especially for
            certain types of vehicles. 4) Pay special attention to the
            tendering mechanism and to the general incentive structure.
            There are limits to the pure least-present-value-of-revenue
            (LPVR) auction, but income guarantees do enhance liquidity.
            In fact, a minimum-income guarantee through an LPVR auction
            is an instrument for credit enhancement, not income support.
            Alternatively, some form of financial innovation should be
            encouraged to make debt service commitments more flexible.
            5) If concessions are tendered by traditional methods and
            income guarantees will be given, cover only a fraction of
            the concessionaire's expected income stream, to reduce
            the state's financial exposure and to improve the
            incentives to the concessionaire. 6) Make the contracts as
            complete as possible but allow for later modifications or
            renegotiations, and include a well-designed dispute
            resolution mechanism.
Tackling health transition in China
Over the past three decades, China has
            made commendable strides in improving the health status of
            its population. Between 1965 and 1995, its infant mortality
            rate declined from 90 per 1,000 live births to 36. During
            the same period, life expectancy at birth rose from 55 to 69
            years and the maternal mortality rate fell from 26 to 15 per
            100,000 deliveries. This performance compares favorably with
            that in similar Asian economies. China's infant
            mortality rate, for example, was less that half the rate
            predicted for its income level, Similarly, life expectancy
            at birth was higher than that in many comparable Asian
            countries. These favorable results conceal more recent
            trends, however. Since the early 1990s, mortality rates have
            increased in many provinces, particularly among infants and
            children under age five. And health status and
            health-related process indicators have improved more slowly
            than in the mid -1980s. What accounts for relatively
            stagnant, even deteriorating health indicators, and what
            strategies should be designed to address them as China
            enters the 21st century? Overall, the author argues, the
            recent erosion in health gains stems from three factors: a)
            changes in government financing of the health sector have
            increased inequity, inefficiency, and costs for medical
            treatment; b) the main contributors to the burden of disease
            have shifted from maternal conditions and infectious disease
            toward noncommunicable diseases and injuries, the prevention
            of which has not been a tradition part of China's
            public health programs; and c) the shift to a more
            market-oriented economy has changed environmental and
            behavioral risk factors, thus diversifying the types of
            disease across regions. The author suggests strategies for
            mitigating China's current and emerging health problems.
Managing guarantee programs in
            support of infrastructure investment
The author discusses the risks of
            infrastructure projects and the costs of capital, rationales
            for government support of private infrastructure ventures,
            and approaches to managing government guarantees of private
            infrastructure investments. Among his recommendations: 1)
            the decision to grant a guarantee for debts associated with
            infrastructure projects should be based on an explicit
            cost-benefit analysis for the project to be guaranteed,
            including an assessment of the likely cost to taxpayers and
            the impact of alternative forms of government support. 2) In
            principle, when the rationale for government support arises
            from the difference between effective willingness to pay and
            social benefits, the support should take the form of
            subsidies supplementing the price customers are willing to
            pay for a service. Such subsidies are contingent on the
            effective provision of the subsidized service. They allow
            the private provider to be guided by the full benefits of
            the project without reducing the incentives to perform (as
            would occur with risk sharing through cofinancing or
            guarantee). 3) Guarantees of policy risks should support a
            credible reform program but not substitute for it. In the
            medium term, policy reform should obviate the need for a
            guarantee. Beneficiaries of guarantees should bear a part of
            the risk, as with a deductible. In structuring guarantees,
            governments need to take care that performance incentives
            for private investors are nor undermined. Essentially, this
            means not covering normal business risk, including exchange
            rate and interest rate movements. 4) Governments should
            consider sharing normal business risks only as a last
            resort, if at all. To prevent excessive government exposure,
            decisions should be transparent and based on explicit
            cost-benefit analysis. Monetary limits should be placed on
            total government exposure, and there should be an exit
            strategy for the government wherever possible. 5)
            Governments should consider creating a central office
            charged with managing guarantee exposure, to limit taxpayer
            exposure and to strengthen private performance incentives.
            6) Governments should establish a system to update the
            valuation of its guarantee exposure periodically as well as
            mechanisms to adjust guarantees or to seize collateral when
            fees are not paid. The use to which guarantees can be put
            should be clearly limited, and policies for appropriate
            guarantee fees and coinsurance requirements should be established.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer in
            nine countries : lessons for developing countries
The author presents an overview of
            intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems used in nine
            developing and industrial countries, and draws implications
            for other developing countries. On the basis of a comparison
            of these countries, the author classifies equalization
            transfer formulas into four categories, analyzes the data
            requirements of each type of formula, discusses the
            applicability of these formulas in developing countries, and
            uses illustrative examples to show how the calculations
            should be carried out. The author also discusses
            implementation issues, including the transition from an old
            to a new transfer system. Finally, he presents an
            illustrative equalization transfer model for China. He
            concludes that the formula-based equalization transfer
            system has at least three advantages over the discretionary
            system prevailing in many countries: 1) It provides the
            single most important means to address regional disparities;
            2) It bases the evaluation of a subnational
            government's entitlement on objective variables, thus
            minimizing bargaining and lobbying, and keeping distribution
            fair; 3) If properly designed, the formula-based system
            eliminates the disincentive inherent in many discretionary
            systems that encourages overspending and weak tax collection efforts.
Returns to regionalism : an
            evaluation of nontraditional gains from regional trade agreements
The past decade has witnessed an
            explosion in the number of regional trade agreements. There
            seems to be a general, if ill-defined, belief on the part of
            many policymakers and academics that there is more to such
            agreements than the traditional gains from trade (thus the
            term "new regionalism"). The author examines
            several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may
            confer on their partners, including credibility, signaling,
            bargaining power, insurance, and a mechanism for
            coordination. She assesses the condtions necessary for each
            of these benefits, gives stylized examples of policies that
            might bring about those conditions, and discusses the
            plausibility of those conditions existing. In this light,
            she examines the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
            and the European association agreements between the European
            Union and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. She
            concludes that regional trade agreements can serve a useful
            economic purpose beyond the direct gains from trade
            liberalization, by reducing uncertainties and improving
            credibility, and thus making it easier for the private
            sector to plan and invest. Indeed, reducing uncertainty may
            be essential for realizing gains from liberalization.
            Whether economies benefit from a particular regional trade
            agreements depends on the scope and coverage of its
            provisions, the nature of the enforcement mechanism, the
            circumstances in which the agreement can be amended, and
            changes in the behavioral incentives for various agents in
            the economy that result from it. It is important to examine
            these factors carefully and to evaluate the feasibility of
            freer trade in their absence when determining the effects of
            regional trade agreements on world welfare.
Interpreting the coefficient of
            schooling in the human capital earnings function
The "human capital earnings
            function" (HCEF) has become a fundamental tool in
            research on earnings, wages, and incomes in industrial and
            developing economies. It is accepted procedure in litigation
            about earnings, such as cases involving the value of lost
            earnings due to injury, death, or discrimination. It is also
            often used to make educational policy decisions based on
            estimates of the rate of return from schooling. The HCEF
            relates the natural logarithm of earnings to investments in
            human capital measured in time, such as years of schooling
            and years of post-school work experience. Among its
            desirable features: 1) it is not an ad hoc specification; it
            is derived from an identity. So the coefficients of the
            equation have economic interpretations; 2) it uses data
            effieciently; 3) it is flexible, allowing for easy
            incorporations of variables appropriate for a particular
            study; and 4) the coefficients of the HCEF are devoid of
            units, facilitating comparisons across space (such as
            countries) or across time periods (such as decades). In
            estimating the rate of return from schooling, the
            coefficient of the schooling variable is often interpreted
            as the rate of return from schooling. This may be the
            correct interpretation but the author shows that in
            principle -and in many circumstances- it is not. He also
            discusses the effects on the coeffiecient of schooling of
            the treatment of the labor supply (weeks worked and hours
            worked per week) and other measures of labor market outcomes,