candidates who make clientelist appeals (Banerjee et al, 2010b; Banerjee et al, 2010c). Our work adds to this literature by identifying the effects of mass media, a market institution for information provision, broadcasting programming that was not directly intended to change attitudes towards clientelism.

In sum, prior research on media effects on political attitudes raises three questions that we address here for the first time. First, does media access influence household demand for broad public services compared to targeted benefits? Second, do the effects of radio access depend on the salience of the programming for the audience? Finally, third, does the content or framing of radio programming explain the pattern of its influence? As will be discussed in the following section, we know that community radio in Benin broadcasts significant content on the importance of health and education investments for the well-being of children and families. Furthermore, these programs tend to frame the issues in terms of parental responsibility towards their children, to influence private household behaviors, as opposed to public accountability for the delivery of services. We have no indication that radio programs devote similarly systematic attention to the practices of clientelism, such as gift-giving or vote buying at the time of elections, and their consequences. If content and framing matter, radio should only impact attitudes towards health and education, and through these, indirectly, attitudes towards clientelism, rather than directly reducing voter taste for targeted benefits. Our survey vignettes allow us to distinguish between direct and indirect effects of radio on the support for clientelism.

# **3. The media market in Benin**

Benin is a small country in Francophone West Africa with a land area of approximately 110,000 square kilometers (slightly smaller than the state of Pennsylvania) and a population of about 8,400,000. However, it has several advantages for the study of media effects. By the standards of the region, it has a relatively long (nearly 30 year) history of competitive elections and peaceful turnover of political power, so it is a plausible setting in which to examine competing hypotheses on whether media effects operate through accountability channels. Benin is also known for relatively greater press freedom. According to ratings of _Reporters Without Borders_ from 2009, the year of our survey, Benin ranks 72<sup>nd</sup> in the world, out of 175, in terms of freedom of the press, just behind Brazil (number 71), Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Liberia and Togo, but substantially ahead of most other African countries. Furthermore, the media market in Benin is characterized by a vibrant network of local radio stations that several household surveys, including our own, reveal as the preferred media. According to the nationally representative Afrobarometer (2005) survey of Benin, 25 percent of households own televisions. In our sample of 4,200 households from northern Benin, only 8 percent own a television, but 84 percent own radios.

Benin has 77 communes. These are the relevant “market” for potential entrants of local radio stations (Ahokpossi, 2009). Communes serve as the electoral districts from which 83 members of the national assembly are elected through a system of party-list proportional representation. It is also the lowest tier of government, with each commune government consisting of a council of directly elected members who elect a mayor from among their ranks.

During March and April 2009 we collected ownership, licensing, programming and other details on all 68 radio stations operating in Benin. The data revealed little within-commune variation in radio access in the more urbanized and densely settled southern region of the country, where most areas have access to multiple national and commercial radio stations. However, the 32 northern communes of the country exhibit significant intra-commune variation in access to 7