politicians from the party collectively responsible for failure to pursue policies that are consistent with the party‘s program. The untargeted social transfer programs of both the MPRP and the Democratic Party are indicative of programmatic elements.

- Even though individual MP‘s face considerable uncertainty regarding their re-election prospects, which encourages them to focus on ―consuming now‖ rather than ―investing for the future‖, Mongolia is a relatively stable democratic system with little prospect for a regime change.  Therefore, there is some assurance for individual MPs that while they may lose the next election, they can eventually return to power, and will not risk getting jailed through a military coup.

- Mongolia has some socio-economic advantages that reduce clientelist pressures.  First is its ethnic homogeneity and strong sense of national identity.  Second, is its high and growing level of urbanization (Ulaanbaatar has 40% of the country‘s population) that will reduce incentives for pork-barrel funding to rural communities.  Third, is the high education level (universal literacy and over 30% tertiary enrollment rates) that should ameliorate some of the informational roots of clientelism.  Fourth, is the relative egalitarian nature of the society and the absence of landed elites and powerful oligarchs.

In particular, reform is possible because Mongolian political parties, while factionalized, do have a corporate identity that sets them apart from political parties in many developing countries. There are numerous indicators of the programmatic nature of these parties. First, there is reasonably strong partisan identification among the electorate because of the strong grass-roots presence of the MPRP, which as the former communist party, has existed for over 80 years. Second, there has been virtually no switching of MPs from one party to another — a common feature in many low and middle income democracies — suggesting a reasonable degree of corporate identify. As shown in Figure 7, between 1996 and 2004, there were no MPRP

**Figure 7:  Mongolian MPs do not switch parties**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Percentage of MPRP elected MPs who were past<br>MPs from same or different political party<br>80%<br>42%<br>29%<br>0 0 0<br>Same Different Same Different Same Different<br>1996 2000 2004<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Election Commission MP‘s who had in the past been parliamentarians from the Democratic party. Similarly there were virtually no Democratic party MPs who in the past were with the MPRP. These results are particularly striking given that the Democratic Party is a significant political force (it has been in power twice, between 1996 and 2000, and between 2004 and 2008 in a coalition with the MPRP) and therefore would certainly attract the interest of MPRP MPs. Third, there are virtually no independent candidates who win elections. Fourth, the size of Mongolia‘s cabinet has remained modest, at between 11 and 15, over the past two decades, even during coalition governments of 1996 and 2004, suggesting that MPs allegiance was not required to be bought with a cushy cabinet post to prevent defection.

There are also institutional rules with parliament that help collective action by MPs. In particular parliamentary standing committees, such as those on the budget, social policy, and state structure, exercise considerable power, and their membership is based on seniority. While budget amendment sessions are essentially a time of intense bargaining as individual MPs lobby to get their pet projects into the budget, the process carried out under the authority of the budget standing committee, with the chairman of the committee exercising considerable authority. It is therefore important for individual MPs 15