cantly more likely to interact with citizens on a daily basis (column 3). This finding holds when using a standardized measure of interaction frequency (column 4), as illustrated in Figure 3, panels (c) and (d). These results suggest that bureaucrats under newly elected leaders are more proactive in engaging with constituents. Notably, however, these interactions appear to occur outside formal settings, as we find no evidence that turnover increases attendance at village assemblies ( _Badan Permusyawaratan Desa_ or BPD) after a turnover (RD estimate = 0 _._ 0003, p-value = 0 _._ 941).

**Robustness Checks.** Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 consider alternative specifications for the estimates in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. The first row of each table reports our baseline estimate. In the second row, we remove from our baseline equation (1) the controls for election-year dummies and the 4. survey experiment treatment indicator described in footnote In the third row, we include region fixed effects in addition to dummies for pairs of election years (2015-2016, 2017-2018, etc.). In the fourth row, we use a third degree polynomial in the running variable to construct the RD point estimate, instead of the local linear regression in our baseline. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh rows, we vary the RD bandwidth to half, three-fourths, and two times the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014), respectively. In the eighth row we also report RD estimates when excluding 27 villages with at least one bureaucrat appointed under a Suharto-appointed district mayor (Martinez-Bravo et al., 2017). The ninth row reports the fuzzy RD specification described above, instrumenting for leadership changes in our survey data with the victory dummy from equation (1). Overall, these specification changes leave unchanged the main takeaways from Tables 2 and 3.

# **4.2 Reduced Nepotism**

In many villages, entrenched nepotistic practices sustain the dominance of old village elites, undermining good governance and local democracy (Simanihuruk and Sihombing, 2019; World Bank, 2023). Appendix Table A.8 shows that nepotistic hiring practices in the village bureaucracy correlate negatively with the quality of service provision measured in administrative _Podes_ data (column 1) as well as perceptions of service access and quality in our surveys conducted with citizens (columns 2–3).

In Table 4, we examine the likelihood that relatives of the village head are employed in the village government, as reported by the village heads themselves. At the RD cutoff, we find a substantial, statistically significant decline in this measure of nepotism (column 1). This effect may partly reflect the continued presence of bureaucrats who were relatives of the previous village head (the defeated incumbent) but are unrelated to the new leader, and retained their positions after a turnover. As a result, the presence of bureaucrats related to the village head would be lower in turnover villages than in villages where the incumbent won. The estimate in column 1 of Table 4 suggests that, at a minimum, new leaders do not systematically replace these prior nepotistic appointees with their own relatives.

In columns 2 and 3 of Table 4, we consider two additional measures of nepotism using data collected from bureaucrats, addressing the concern above. We look at the probability that bureaucrats had a parent who ever served as village head (column 2) or a parent who ever served in the village government (column 3). Overall, a large fraction of bureaucrats (27%) had a parent who served in the village govern12