rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
consumption survey every year. Consequently, most developing countries are likely to implement the household consumption survey every few years. In such contexts, poverty imputation methods can offer a (far) less costly option to provide estimates for the intervening years between the surveys.<sup>26</sup> Case (iii), although less common, certainly represents the scenario where poverty imputation is the only route to provide poverty estimates for surveys fielded in the past.

Another advantage with poverty imputation methods that has received little attention is the fact that such methods, particularly survey-to-survey imputation, can help us bypass the oftentimes thorny issues of obtaining the appropriate (intertemporal and intraregional) price deflators. This issue worsens for cross-country comparison, since in that case we have to employ conversion factors to convert the different currencies to the same base.

Notably, a promising direction for further development with poverty imputation methods is that they need not be restricted to the topic of poverty alone but can be utilized in other fields as well. For example, Fujii (2010) and Sohnesen _et al._ (2017) employ the Elbers _et al._ (2003) method to provide a map of child malnutrition respectively in Cambodia and Ethiopia; Gibson (2018) uses the same method to study the effect of deforestation on subsequent inequality in the rural Solomon Islands. As another example, a recent study by Dang and Ianchovichina (forthcoming) constructs synthetic panels from the cross sections in the Gallup Poll for 16 countries in the Middle East to offer analysis of dynamics of subjective well-being during the Arab Spring period. Figure 3, taken from this study, plots the percentage of the poor or vulnerable in the first year who move up one or two welfare categories in the second year for major population groups classified by gender,

> 26 Recent estimates suggest that the average cost of implementing a household consumption survey (in 2014 or later) ranges from approximately $US 800,000 to US$ 5 million depending on the context and sample sizes (Kilic _et al.,_ 2017). At the same time, implementing poverty imputation may require only a fraction of this cost since its major expense is to cover analytical time. Indeed, selective pairing of international experts with national statistical agencies’ staff can form small teams that provide both cost-effective analysis and local capacity building.

24
witbin the North and within the<sup>South but it</sup><sup>**was**more reluctant</sup> to move longer distances from the Soutb to the industrializing Wortb (Williamson, forthcoming, chp.2). The result was lower wages and greater poverty in the South.

MacRinnon's regressions also show that pauper rates in the 1860s<sup>were</sup> significantly lower in those areas which had<sup>population</sup> growth rates above the regional average. These were areas in which growth was<sup>occurring</sup> fastest and to which labor was migrating. There is a problem of simultaneity here: were the low pauperism rates one reason why the labor imigrated<sup>or was the rapid</sup> growth in these areas pulling people<sup>out of poverty?</sup> Probably both forces were at work. As yet we do not have the<sup>necessary</sup> evidence to untangle these two effects but what we do have is not<sup>inconsistent</sup> with the view that the poor were better off in rapidly growing areas.

Wbat about urbanization itself? Linear regression analysis comparing the degree of urbanization (local population density) with the pauper ratio on both sides of the Atlantic shows only a weak tendency for poverty to be worse in larger and more dense towns after<sup>controlling</sup> for employment six, policy and other influences (Rannon, 1984b; MacKinnon, 1986). A result from the British 1892 enquiry that also shows<sup>up in the general</sup> pauper census of 1906 is that there is no clear relation between the degree of urbanization and pauperism. Table 11 shows that pauper rates were<sup>highest</sup> in London but for smaller towns and cities the relation is mixed.

Within towns it appears that concentration on a single, high skill industry resulted in the lowest poverty rates. At the end of the period, we have household survey evidence from six medium sized towns: York (Rowntree, 1901), Bolton, Northampton, Reading, Stanley, and Warrington (Bowley and 45
<mark>Table 2c: Transition Matrices - Synthetic vs. Actual Panel Data Peru 2008 and 2009</mark>

|Status in 2008 2009|Low|er Bou|nd Estim|ates|Truth|Upp|er Boun|d Estim|ates|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|,|[1]|[2]|[3]|[4]|[5]|[6]|[7]|[8]|[9]|
|Poor,Poor<br>|33.90<br>|31.72<br>|28.70<br>|29.01<br>|23.61<br>(21.89,25.31)|16.20<br>|17.64<br>|17.56<br>|18.57<br>|
|Poor,Non-poor<br>|1.26<br>|2.50<br>|4.87<br>|4.18<br>|9.74<br>(8.54,10.93)|20.32<br>|17.24<br>|17.25<br>|16.40<br>|
|Non-poor,Poor<br>|0.19<br>|2.38<br>|5.40<br>|5.09<br>|10.49<br>(9.25,11.72)|17.90<br>|16.46<br>|16.54<br>|15.53<br>|
|Non-poor,Non-poor<br>|64.65<br>|63.41<br>|61.03<br>|61.73<br>|56.17<br>(54.16,58.16)|45.59<br>|48.67<br>|48.66<br>|49.51<br>|
|R-squared|0.39|0.52|0.57|0.62|.|0.39|0.52|0.57|0.62|
|Residual Correlation|0.69|0.64|0.62|0.56|.|0.69|0.64|0.62|0.56|
|Observations|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|2,368|
|Data source: INEI - Pe<br>Note: R-squared is cal|ruvian N<br>culated|ational<br>for oppo|Househo<br>site hal|ld Surv<br>ves of th|ey (ENAHO),20<br>e total 2008 sam|08-2009.<br>ple. Res|<br>ults are|constrai|ned to|

<mark>Note: R-squared is calculated for opposite halves of the total 2008 sample. Results are constrained to the panel sample of households whose heads are between 25 and 65 years old. Results are weighted using household-level survey-sampling weights. Columns [1] and [6] show a simple model with household time invariant characteristics. Columns [2] and [7] add sub-national controls from census and region of birth fixed-effects. Columns [3] and [8] add interactions between household time invariant characteristics and sub-national controls. Columns [4] and [9] add retrospective variables (asset ownership). Results in column [5] show actual panel mobility. 95 percent confidence interval between parentheses. Upper bound estimations are based on 50 repetitions.</mark> 25
21 to equalize profitability within a sector, given that the differential structure of product tax-cum-VAT rates can only achieve such equalization on a cross-sectoral basis. Part of its rationale derives from the need to charge enterprises for variations in profit arising from historically given and unequal endowments of free fixed assets. However, it is difficult to distinguish between differences in profitability arising for this reason as opposed Lo variations in quality of management. The income adjustment tax is based on 1983 profit margins and is seen as temporary.

# Collective Enterprises

An income tax on collective enterprises was introduced in 1985. Collective enterprises are collectively owned rather than state owned and range from large businesses to small partnerships. Taxable income equals collective enterprise income minus business costs and indirect taxes. Depreciation, which must be accumulated in a fund, is broadly similar to that allowed for State enterprise. While interest payments on bank loans are fully deductible, only 60 percent of principal payments enjoy tax-deductibility. Income tax is computed accordingly to an eight bracket progressive schedule that is different from that used for small State enterprise. The income tax burden on collectives is generally lower than that on a State enterprise earning the same profits.

# Individual Household Enterprises

An individual household enterprise income tax was introduced in 1986. As with state and collective enterprises, taxable income equals business income minus costs and indirect taxes. Individual household enterprises face a ten bracket progressive schedule with rates rising from 7 to 60 percent. A surtax of 10 to 40 percent is imposed on taxable income above 50,000 yuan per year.

# Other Enterprises

The taxation of joint ventures and foreign enterprises is complex and lies outside the scope of this paper.' Taxes on state enterprises raise the bulk of the revenue from enterprise income tax, the remainder of this section concentrates on them.

# 3.2 Contract Responsibility System

Income taxation of state enterprises can be substantially altered by the contract responsibility system. This appears to be modelled on the "responsibility system" for agriculture, which set quota outputs that had to be sold to the state at fixed prices, leaving farms free to sell any output over the quota on the free market. It is also based on the old quota responsibility system, otherwise known as the "economic responsibility system", that was tried in some enterprises in 1981/82 as part of the 12See World Bank (1990, pp. 172-174) for a description of the main features of the tax treatment of joint ventures and foreign enterprises.
asset transfers as a component (TUP) from lower and middle income countries. We classify programs as “UCT” when they include cash or mobile money transfers, and do not include any conditionalities stricter than attendance at meetings at the frequency of transfer payments. We allow for attendance requirements because these are in principle similar to distribution of cash at a centralized location.<sup>5</sup> We restrict our analysis to studies that meet the following criteria:<sup>6</sup>

1. Consumption over a defined reference period is an outcome

2. Value of transfers and program cost are reported 3. The time of estimates is after transfers are completed 4. Includes a randomized control group that did not receive the intervention at the time of the estimate 5. Treatment is randomized across households, or authors argue that spillover effects are small We require (1) and (2) to construct our primary outcomes of interest, impacts on household consumption per unit of transfer and per unit of cost. We require (3) because continuing and temporary transfers both empirically and theoretically have different types of impacts (Pennings, 2021). In addition, temporary transfers are the relevant benchmark for a wide range of temporary development interventions, including the TUP programs we consider in Section 6. We require (5) because our primary interest is in partial equilibrium effects. Empirically, a majority of candidate studies satisfied this requirement, while a much smaller number of studies argued their estimates reflect both partial and general equilibrium effects.

> 5We provide two examples of programs that provide unconditional cash transfers with meetings or trainings, one we classified as UCT and another as TUP, that clarify the distinction. Blattman et al. (2016), which we classify as TUP, study a program that provided a one time cash grant of 150 USD cash, eight days of training covering business and group dynamics, and five supervisory visits from program staff. Carneiro et al. (2020), which we classify as UCT, study a program that provided 25 months of 22 USD cash transfers to women during and following pregnancy, along with community level messaging on health information, and for a subset of households optional monthly meetings on child feeding support and options to request one-on-one counseling.

> 6To identify studies, we follow the approach of Croke et al. (2016). We began with the sample from GiveDirectly Cash Research Explorer (primarily UCT) and articles cited by or citing Banerjee et al. (2015) (primarily TUP). We then included any additional studies we could find that satisfied our inclusion criteria.

9
# **Tables April 11, 2012**

**Table 1 Applied Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs in Russia in 2001-2020**

|**Year**|**Number of**<br>**product**<br>**lines**|**Number**<br>**of**<br>**product**<br>**lines**<br>**with**<br>**non-zero**<br>**specific**<br>**tariffs**|**Un-weight**<br>**Mean**|**Applied M**<br>**ed average**<br>**Standard**<br>**deviation**|**FN rate**<br>**Weight**<br>**Mean**|**ed average**<br>**Standard**<br>**deviation**|**Bound**<br>**MFN tariff**<br>**rate**|**Number**<br>**of**<br>**product**<br>**lines**<br>**with**<br>**bound**<br>**MFN**<br>**rate**<br>**above**<br>**applied**<br>**MFN**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||||**rate**|
|**2001**|11,076|1,609|11.7|10.8|11.4|9.5|||
|**2002**|11,148|1,624|12.2|13.7|13.3|14.9|||
|**2003**|11,161|1,774|12.8|18.7|14.3|18.0|||
|**2004**|11,218|1,783|12.4|13.3|14.1|17.0|||
|**2005**|11,365|1,792|12.1|12.7|14.0|15.2|||
|**2006**|10,875|1,920|11.7|11.3|13.7|12.2|||
|**2007**|11,001|1,856|11.4|11.3|11.7|11.2|||
|**2008**|11,057|1,924|11.3|10.8|13.4|22.7|||
|**2009**|11,067|1,891|11.9|13.2|11.6|16.6|||
|**2010**|11,051|1,948|11.1|13.5|11.0|17.6|||
|**2011**|11,125|2,020|11.5|14.8|13.0|20.8|||
|**2012**|11,557|1,422|10.9|10.7|9.3|8.1|12.4|2 623|
|**2013**|11,557|1,421|10.0|10.3|8.3|7.8|11.2|2 498|
|**2014**|11,557|1,420|9.2|10.0|7.6|7.6|10.1|2 204|
|**2015**|11,557|1,407|8.4|9.9|6.9|7.4|9.1|1 682|
|**2016**|11,557|1,401|8.1|9.8|6.3|6.6|8.8|1 551|
|**2017**|11,557|1,390|8.0|9.7|6.0|6.2|8.7|1 498|
|**2018**|11,557|1,372|8.0|9.7|6.0|5.9|8.6|1 498|
|**2019**|11,557|1,371|8.0|9.7|5.9|5.7|8.6|1 498|
|**2020**|11,557|1,371|7.9|9.4|5.8|5.1|8.6|1 498|

Note: Due to changes in classification, there are tariff lines in the 2012-2020 that do not correspond to tariff lines in our base period of 2009-2011; we call these ―unmatched‖ tariff lines. Weighted averages for 20112020 are computed based on matched tariff lines only. As a result, for the years 2011-2020, the weighted average calculation appears to be biased down by about one percentage point.

24
## **Box 5: Measuring Tax Expenditures**

There are three principal ways to estimate the costs or value of tax expenditures: revenue forgone; revenue gain, outlay equivalence. All three methods are used within the OECD area.

- Revenue forgone. It is defined as the amount by which tax revenue is reduced because of the existence of a particular provision. It is based upon a comparison of the existing legislation and the legislation without the tax provision in question. It is an ex-post measure of the cost of a particular relief.  The behavior of tax payers is taken as observed in the year for which the calculations are being made.

- Revenue gain: it is defined as the amount increased in revenue that could be expected if a particular relief were to be abolished.  To obtain an accurate estimate of the revenue gain that could be expected from the withdrawal of a relief requires, in principle, that the behavioral or secondary effects associated with such a change be taken into account. These effects include: the behavioral effects of taxpayers, feedback effect and interaction between taxes (which do not take into account these secondary effects because o the difficulties involved in measuring them).

- Outlay equivalence approach. This approach estimates what direct expenditure outlays would be required, in pre-tax dollars, to achieve the same after-tax dollar benefit if a tax expenditure were replaced by a corresponding direct expenditure programmer, under which the direct outlay is accorded the tax treatment appropriate to that type of income in the hands of the recipients. This is essentially a resource cost measure.

Source: K.C. Messere, “Tax Policy in OECD Countries,” Amsterdam, 1993.

# **Building block 3.  Integrating tax expenditures into annual budget appropriations and MTBF for fiscal accountability**

Tax expenditures must be integrated into the budget to form a complete budget for fiscal accountability. As discussed previously in fiscal accountability section, integrating tax expenditures into the budget process would better coordinate tax expenditure with direct expenditures to achieve the fiscal accountability at the three levels: first, overall control within sustainable limits; second, strategic prioritization of resource allocation, and third, efficiency and cost-effective management of programs.

At first level, tax expenditures should be subject to overall controls within sustainable limits (involving medium-term expenditure frameworks), financial discipline and compliance with laws and budgets (similarly to direct budget expenditures). Tax expenditures must be analyzed along with imputed normative tax revenue, tax revenue received, direct expenditures, and fiscal deficit to form a comprehensive spending ceiling within sustainable limits.

Tax expenditures should also integrate with direct budget expenditures in order to jointly control aggregate spending and the deficit. That means tax expenditures should be 23
If the pattern of returns to different levels of education is indeed changed in this way, then primary school completion is not sufficient any more to provide access to lucrative jobs and reduce poverty.<sup>†</sup> The poor would need to attain well beyond primary education in order to enjoy high labor market rewards that enable them to climb out of poverty. The definition of basic education is also changing, now it is not just primary school completion or six years of schooling. In addition, while more years of schooling are required, higher academic standards and learning outcomes are needed. The world is becoming more educated – or, at least, more schooled – and the average return to a year of schooling is going down, as would be predicted by human capital theory (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Average Private Returns to an Additional Year of Schooling over the Decades <!-- Start of picture text --> 12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>1970 1980 1990 2000<br>Rate of Return (%) Years of Schooling<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> † Nevertheless, education would continue to be important in a rights-based perspective and due to its social benefits such as reductions in fertility and mortality, empowerment, better democratic participation, enlightenment and so on.

8
Furthermore, the marginalization of SSA in the financial and capital markets is exacerbated by the financial hemorrhage in the form of capital flight that the region has experienced over the past decades. The volume of capital flight from SSA exceeds that of the main forms of external capital such as debt, official development aid including debt relief, and private capital flows (Figure 2). The cumulative stock of capital flight from the 40 countries in the sample from 1970 to 2004 exceeds external debt stock (in 2004) by a staggering USD 398.4 billion dollars, making this group of countries clearly a _net creditor to the rest of the world_ [Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2003)].

**Figure 2: Capital flight, ODA, debt service, and FDI flows to/from 40 SSA countries (billion constant 2004 dollars)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 40000<br>35000<br>30000<br>25000<br>real KF<br>real ODA<br>20000<br>real debt service<br>real FDI<br>15000<br>10000<br>5000<br>0<br>1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002<br>million constant 2004 $<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: capital flight is from Ndikumana and Boyce (2008); other series from GDF 2006. Note: For capital flight we exclude countries with a negative end-of-period stock of capital flight<sup>17</sup> (where capital flight reversals outweigh capital flight) to obtain a comparative measure of financial hemorrhage to compare to other forms of inflows and outflows.

Table 2 gives averages per country as well as total values of the flows and stocks for the sample of 40 countries for capital flight and other forms of capital flows. The first column gives the annual averages of capital flight and other flows while the second column contains the stock and the total real values of flows over the 1970-2004 period.

From table 1, it is clear that capital flight dominates other forms of capital flows from and to SSA. The data show that the sub-continent “financed” the rest of the world with capital up to USD 299.9 million per year from capital flight. This compares to an annual average per country of USD 329.1 million per year of official aid, USD 234.9 million of net private capital inflows, USD 147.6 million per year in FDI, and only 41.5 million in debt relief.

> 17 Countries with end-of-period stock of capital flight are: Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

**12**
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Klapper, L., Singer, D., Ansar, S., and Hess, J. (2018). _The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Espinoza-Delgado, J. and Klasen, S. (2018). ‘Gender and Multidimensional Poverty in Nicaragua. An Individual Based Approach’, _World Development,_ Vol. 110: 46691.

- Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2014). ‘Gender and Forced Migration’, in Loescher, G., Long, K., Sigona, N., and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (eds.) _The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies_ . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Fukuda-Parr, S. (1999). ‘What does feminization of poverty mean? It isn’t just lack of income.’ _Feminist Economics_ , 5(2), 99–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 135457099337996.

- García, S. and Ritterbusch, A. (2015). ‘Child poverty in Colombia: Construction of a multidimensional measure using a Mixed-Method approach’, _Child Indicators Research_ , 8(4), pp. 801–823.

- Hong, G., Kim, S., Park, G., and Sim, S-G. (2019). ‘Female Education. Externality and Inclusive Growth’, _Sustainability,_ Vol. 11, No. 12: 3344.

- IDMC. (2020). _Global Report on Internal Displacement: GRID 2020_ . Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

- ILO. (2020). _Employment and decent work in refugee and other forced displacement contexts: Compendium of ILO’s lessons learned, emerging good practices and policy guidance_ . Geneva: International Labour Office.

- ILO. (2018). _World Employment Social Outlook: Trends for Women 2018, Global snapshot_ . Geneva: International Labour Office.

International Organization for Migration. (2020). Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 5 (June — July 2020). Retrieved from 31
original estimate of national poverty from the poverty map, and to the estimate of the poverty associated with an untargeted lump-sum transfer.

Table 4 presents results of transferring our given budget on the basis of our naïve scheme. It is striking that the reduction in the FGT2 achievable in rural areas with a naïve scheme, applied at the most disaggregated level possible in the poverty map, is fairly sizeable. Broadly, the reduction in the rural FGT2 on the basis of this scheme is only a few percentage points behind the impact with the optimal scheme. For example, in the baseline case with naïve district level targeting (column 1) the new FGT2 is less than half as much (47%) as it was prior to the transfer. This compares with a new FGT2 of 42% of the original FGT2 measure if targeting had been carried out optimally.

Note, however, that there is no guarantee that a naïve targeting procedure as applied here will, indeed, yield such good results. For example, in urban areas, naïve district level targeting leads to a new FGT2 that is 49% of original measure. This compares with an FGT2 that was just 19% of the original FGT2 when the optimal targeting scheme had been applied (Table 3). Moreover, in column 3 of Table 4 – referring to the baseline budget in combination with a particularly austere poverty line - we can see that naïve targeting at the regional level even in rural areas achieves _less_ reduction in overall poverty than is the case with uniform targeting (a post-transfer FGT2 of 69% of the original with naïve targeting versus a posttransfer FGT2 of 61% of the original with uniform targeting). Again in urban areas this is even more clearly seen: naïve targeting at any geographic level higher than the district always leads to a post-transfer FGT2 that is higher than the FGT2 that would obtain with a uniform transfer. And when the poverty line is set at 75% of the official line, even district level targeting under the naïve scheme is less successful than a uniform transfer. The intuition for this finding is 16