information campaigns, and transparency initiatives more generally; and, how to use performance incentives from higher to lower tiers of government (or from donors to recipients in general).<sup>31</sup> If politicians can get away with poor service delivery performance because of vote buying strategies, how might information and transparency initiatives overcome this problem? Voter education campaigns to reduce demand among citizens for selling their vote can be fraught with problems. In the specific context of the Philippines, Schaffer (2005) presents evidence that such campaigns offend target groups who are convinced of the legitimacy of receiving benefits from politicians, as a mark of political responsiveness, and their right to reward this, should they choose to, with their vote. As a result, Schaffer argues, such campaigns are ineffective both in changing voter behaviors, and in addressing political incentives to improve service delivery. Second, demand-side interventions directly targeting vote selling behavior could be particularly constrained in having impact when votes are purchased through coercive power.<sup>32</sup> Other evidence of the impact of differently-styled information campaigns from a diverse range of countries, however, suggests that these can be effective in increasing voter turnout, vote shares of better performing politicians, and in reducing instances of vote buying (Aker et al, 2011; Banerjee et al, 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2012; Pande, 2009, provides a review). However these studies are not designed to be able to measure impact on subsequent incentives of politicians to, in fact, improve service delivery. Open questions remain on whether the estimated shifts on the demand-side of voting behavior would be sufficient to generate a supply-side response in terms of stronger political incentives to improve service delivery, or of better quality candidates that improve the platforms of political competition. Humphreys and Weinstein (2011), for example, find no impact on politician behavior in Uganda. Bobnis and Fuertes (2009) show how politicians can anticipate voter information, and simply change the timing of rent-seeking.

Furthermore, in contrast to hot-button issues such as corruption, broad social services such as health and education may particularly suffer from clientelist political competition, and quietly,<sup>33</sup> because the poor may have lower demand for these services, in contrast to private targeted transfers. There is a large literature examining how and why poor households would be likely to under-invest in and under-demand health and education (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011), which can spill-over to their expectations from governments or politicians.<sup>34</sup> A growing body of research shows that when it comes to services in health and education people can use information to change their private behaviors but not their demands and expectations from

> 31 Schaffer (2007) also discusses the role of law enforcement policies to crack-down upon and punish politicians who engage in vote buying, providing examples of successful cases from Taiwan, China.

> 32 Although, Collier and Vicente (2008) find that an NGO in Nigeria was able to design and implement a campaign to impact the use of violence as an electoral strategy.

> 33 The World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators 2010 described the failures in pro-poor public service delivery as “quiet corruption”, not making news headlines as bribery or theft scandals do.

> 34 In the Philippines survey studied here, for example, respondents appear constrained in evaluating municipal performance in delivering health services: their ranking of health services is not correlated with more objective indicators of access to services. There are several instances (about 19 percent of respondents) where a household ranks municipal performance in delivering health services very high, while responding on a separate question about their perceptions of child health outcomes that more than half the children in the municipality are likely to be severely malnourished.

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