rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text --> Size-weighted 1.1<br>growth rate<br>0.9 United States<br>0.7<br>Western Europe<br>0.5 Japan<br>0.3<br>China<br>0.1<br>India<br>-0.1<br>Former USSR<br>-0.3<br>1-999 1000- 1500- 1600- 1700- 1820- 1870- 1900- 1913- 1 1940- 1 1960- 1980-<br>1499 1599 1699 1819 1869 1899 1912 939 959 1979 1999<br>Source: Authors' calculations, from Maddison (2009)<br>(a) Long historical evolution<br>Size-weighted<br>growth rate<br>China<br>1.7<br>1.2 Western Europe<br>United States<br>0.7 India<br>0.2<br>Japan<br>1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-002001- 052006- 08<br>-0.3<br>Former USSR<br>-0.8<br>Source: World Bank staff calculations, from Maddison (2009)<br>(b) Modern economic history<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: Time paths of selected economies according to contribution to global growth, 1–1999 (top panel) and 1951–2008 (bottom panel). Growth rate calculated as compound annual (fiveyear average annual) growth rate for the long historical (modern history) periods. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Former USSR includes all successor republics of the former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The time series on the abscissa of Figure 1(a) is not scaled to constant intervals.

11
# **I.** **<mark>Introduction</mark>**

The cause of global development is at an important crossroads. Despite remarkable gains over the last several decades, a growing number of persistent and emerging challenges are jeopardizing the prospects for continued progress. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, global growth and the pace of poverty reduction had slowed (Alvaredo et al. 2018; Lakner and Milanovic 2016; Schoch, Lakner, and Fleury 2020; World Bank 2016, 2022c, 2022d). During the pandemic, the number of extremely poor people (measured at 2017 purchasing power parity US dollars) increased by 71 million globally (World Bank 2022b, 2022c). Likewise, while inequality between countries has been declining for decades (see, for instance, Deaton 2013; Milanovic 2016; World Bank 2016), it remains high, and progress may be slowing for the first time in a generation (Yonzan, Lakner, and Gerszon Mahler 2021). Recent evidence suggests that a growing share of income is going to the world’s top earners, widening the gaps between the ultra-rich, the middle class, and the poor (Alvaredo et al. 2018; Lakner and Milanovic 2016). Beyond poverty and inequality, nearly one-third of the world’s population is at risk of social exclusion due to economic status, gender or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, age, or sexual orientation (Cuesta, López-Noval, and Niño-Zarazúa 2022). These challenges are compounded by the gnawing persistence of racism, prejudice, discrimination, and social injustice; globally, billions of people face deep-rooted structural barriers to participating equally in society.

In recent years, the ‘three Cs’ of COVID-19, climate change, and rising levels of conflict have enflamed these long-standing challenges and constrained efforts to address them — and the current global economic slowdown only threatens to make matters worse. The number, 2
# **Figure 7: Short-term debt and credit information quality**

This figure presents the average short-term debt to total debt ratios (STD/TD) of firms in each country for the 1994-2004 period. The Y-axis is STD/TD. The X-axes are the coverage of private credit registries or the quality of accounting standards.

<!-- Start of picture text --> CHN<br>MYS<br>GRC TUR<br>HUN POL<br>TWN<br>HKG JPN KOR<br>SGP<br>PAK THA<br>RUS ITA<br>IDN CZEPER AUT<br>PHL<br>FRAISR ESP BRA ZAF ARG<br>PRT BEL DEU<br>GBR<br>DNK NLD<br>IND CHL<br>MEX<br>CHE IRL<br>LUX<br>FIN SWE AUS CAN<br>NZL<br>NOR<br>USA<br>0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Private Credit Registries Coverage (%)<br>MYS<br>TUR GRC<br>TWN<br>KOR JPN HKG<br>SGP<br>THA<br>ITA<br>PER AUT<br>PHL<br>ARG BRA ESPISR FRAZAF<br>PRT BELDEU<br>GBR<br>DNKNLD<br>CHL IND<br>MEX<br>CHE<br>CANAUSFIN SWE<br>NZL<br>NOR<br>USA<br>40 50 60 70 80<br>Accounting Standards<br>70<br>60<br>STD/TD (%) 5040<br>30<br>20<br>70<br>60<br>STD/TD (%) 5040<br>30<br>20<br><!-- End of picture text --> 35
# **DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SEXUAL MINORITIES IN EDUCATION AND HOUSING: EVIDENCE FROM TWO FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN SERBIA**

### **Dominik Koehler, Georgia Harley, Nicholas Menzies**

**JEL classification:** I24 Education and Inequality; O15 Human Development; O18 Housing; O35 Social Innovation

### **Keywords:**

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, LGBTI, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, SOGI, Development Outcomes, Serbia, Education, Housing, Discrimination, and Experiments

## **Acknowledgments**

This study is part of a large World Bank LGBTI data collection initiative in the Western Balkans led by Dominik Koehler, Georgia Harley, Nicholas Menzies, Runyararo Gladys Senderayi and Marko Karadzic. IPSOS Strategic Marketing conducted the field experiments under the leadership of Svetlana Logar. This project could not have been possible without the support from Andrew Park and Andrew Flores from the Williams Institute at UCLA, as well as Dragana Todorovic and Amarildo Fecanji from the LGBTI Equal Rights Association for Western Balkans and Turkey. The authors would like to thank the following for thoughtful guidance and comments: Linda Van Gelder, Lada Strelkova, Adrian Fozzard, Roby Senderowitsch, Clifton Cortez, Mattias K. A. Lundberg and Bojana Naceva.

All errors are the authors’ alone, and the views expressed herein do not represent the position of the World Bank or its Executive Directors.

Funding for this work was generously provided by the Nordic Trust Fund, a knowledge and learning platform promoting human rights‐based approaches to development.
Policy Research Working Paper 9154

# **Abstract**

A vast literature shows the importance of socioemotional skills in earnings and employment, but whether they matter in getting hired remains unanswered. This study seeks to address this question and further investigates whether socioemotional skill signals in job applicants’ resumes have the same value for male and female candidates. In a large-scale randomized audit study, an online job portal in Turkey is used to send fictitious resumes to real job openings, collecting a unique data set that enables investigating different stages of candidate screening. The study finds that socioemotional skills appear to be valued only when an employer specifically asks for such skills in the vacancy ad. When not asked for, however, candidates can face a penalty in the form of lower callback rates. A significant penalty is only observed for women, not for men. The study does not find evidence of other gender differences in the hiring process.

This paper is a product of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice and the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank. org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at snasozen@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Aghion, P., P. Bacchetta, and A. Banerjee. 2004. “Financial Development and the Instability of Open Economies.” _Journal of Monetary Economics_ 51: 1077–106. Aguiar, M., and G. Gopinath. 2007. “Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 115 (1).

Alp, H., Y. S. Baskaya, M. Kilinc, and C. Yuksel. 2012. “Stylized Facts for Business Cycles in Turkey.” Working Paper No. 12/02, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.

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Aslund, A. 2012. “Lessons from Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis.” Working Paper No. 12-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Backus, D. K., and P. J. Kehoe. 1992. “International Evidence on the Historical Properties of Business Cycles.” _The American Economic Review_ 82 (4): 864–88. Bernanke, B., and M. Gertler. 1989. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations . ” _American Economic Review_ 79 (1): 14–31.

Blunch, N.-H., S. Canagarajah, and D. Raju. 2001. “The Informal Sector Revisited: A Synthesis Across Space and Time.” Social Protection Discussion Paper Series 0119. World Bank, Policy Research Department, Washington, DC.

Buch, C. M., J. Doepke, and C. Pierdzioch. 2005. “Financial Openness and Business Cycle Volatility.” _Journal of International Money and Finance_ 24: 744– 765.

Campbell, J. Y., and N. G. Mankiw. 1991. “The Response of Consumption to Income: A Cross-country Investigation.” _European Economic Review_ 35: 723– 767.

Chinn, M. D., and H. Ito. 2008. “A New Measure of Financial Openness”. _Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis_ 10 (3): 309–22.

31
of household appliances and other durable goods (Presniakova, 2006).<sup>3</sup> Within this same time period, as mentioned earlier, consumer loans grew at a very fast rate, reaching US$ 170 billion in 2008 (preceding a decline to about US$ 120 billion in 2009). This accounted for about 10% of GDP in 2009 versus about 2% in 2003.

# **[Insert Figure 2 about here]**

In aggregate, the Russian banking system grew at a rate of over 40% between 2003 and 2008, with almost a trillion US$ in assets in 2008. Yet, despite this recent growth, the Russian banking system remains small by international standards; domestic credit to the private sector was 41% of GDP in 2008, relative to other markets such as Brazil (54%), India (49%), and China (104%). In addition, the proportion of household loans as a percentage of GDP in 2007 is below 10%, lower than the rate in many developing Eastern European states (15%) and developed Western European states (above 50%) (Oxford Analytica, 2007b). Furthermore, in 2006, close to 60 million Russians (42% of the population) were estimated to not be part of the formal banking system (Rohland, 2008).

Banks in Russia generally face an unfavorable investment climate, as indicated by Russia’s ranking of 123rd out of 181 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking (where 1 indicates the most favorable business environment) (Doing Business, 2011). In this measure, Russia is ranked 89th in ―getting credit,‖ which takes into account creditor protection and the credit information sharing infrastructure.

Within this weak business environment, there is concern that the tremendous growth of credit will be associated with high rates of default, in particular if rapid growth

> 3 It is possible that Russians are more comfortable borrowing for durable goods, as buying goods on installment was quite popular in Soviet times.

9
COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA

# Annex H Cost recovery of African utilities

|||**C**|**ost recov**|**ery**||**C**|**ost recov**|**ery**||**C**|**ost recov**|**ery**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||Actual||||Actual||||Actual||
|Utility|Effective<br>price at<br>4m<br>3|O&M<br>(GWI)|O & M<br>cost<br>(AICD)|Capital<br>cost<br>(GWI)|Effective<br>price at<br>10m<br>3|O&M<br>(GWI)|O&M<br>cost<br>(AICD)|Capital<br>cost<br>(GWI)|Effective<br>price at<br>40m<br>3|O&M<br>(GWI)|O&M<br>cost<br>(AICD)|Capital<br>cost<br>(GWI)|
|SONEB|0.41|y|n|n|0.63|y|n|n|0.79|y|y|n|
|ONEA|0.90|y|y|n|0.76|y|y|n|1.12|y|y|y|
|SODESI|0.04|n|n|n|0.06|n|n|n|0.53|y|n|n|
|ELECTRA|2.67|y|—|y|3.09|y|—|y|4.27|y|—|y|
|REGIDESO|0.05|n|N|n|0.05|n|N|n|0.07|n|n|n|
|AWSA|0.19|n|N|n|0.24|n|N|n|0.36|n|y|n|
|ADAMA|0.26|n|N|n|0.29|n|N|n|0.39|n|y|n|
|Dire Dawa|0.14|n|N|n|0.17|n|N|n|0.24|n|y|n|
|GWCL|0.52|y|—|n|0.52|y|—|n|0.63|y|—|n|
|NWASCO|0.18|n|n|n|0.18|n|n|n|0.29|n|n|n|
|KIWASCO|0.60|y|y|n|0.60|y|y|n|0.45|y|n|n|
|WASA|0.40|n|y|n|0.43|y|y|n|0.88|y|y|y|
|JIRAMA|0.11|n|n|n|0.06|n|n|n|0.08|n|n|n|
|ADeM Beira|0.96|y|n|n|0.38|n|n|n|0.53|y|Y|n|
|Adem Maputo|0.96|y|n|n|0.38|n|n|n|0.62|y|n|n|
|AdeM Nampula|0.96|y|y|n|0.38|n|y|n|0.48|y|y|n|
|AdeM Pemba|0.96|y|n|n|0.38|n|n|n|0.46|y|n|n|
|AdeM Quelimane|0.96|y|n|n|0.38|n|n|n|0.46|y|y|n|
|LWB|0.91|y|n|n|0.54|y|n|n|0.51|y|n|n|
|BWB|0.12|n|n|n|0.29|n|n|n|0.45|y|y|n|
|CRWB|0.58|y|y|n|0.23|n|y|n|0.00|n|n|n|
|Walvis Bay|0.71|y|—|n|0.71|y|—|n|1.26|y|—|y|
|Windhoek|1.45|y|n|y|1.27|y|n|y|1.32|y|n|y|
|Oshakati|1.97|y|y|y|1.46|y|y|y|1.48|y|y|y|
|SEEN|0.52|y|n|n|0.36|n|n|n|0.52|y|y|n|
|FCT WB|0.39|n|—|n|0.39|n|—|n|0.39|n|—|n|
|Kaduna WB|0.16|n|—|n|0.16|n|—|n|0.17|n|—|n|
|Katsina WB|0.19|n|y|n|0.19|n|y|n|0.20|n|y|n|
|Electrogaz|0.44|y|n|n|0.50|y|n|n|0.63|y|y|n|
|NWC Khartoum|0.37|n|y|n|0.37|n|y|n|0.37|n|y|n|
|NWC South Darfur|0.64|y|y|n|0.64|y|y|n|0.64|y|y|n|
|NWC Upper Nile|0.59|y|n|n|0.59|y|n|n|0.59|y|n|n|
|SDE|0.37|n|n|n|0.37|n|n|n|0.78|y|n|n|
|STEE|0.22|n|—|n|0.22|n|—|n|0.38|n|—|n|
|DAEASCO|0.39|n|—|n|0.45|y|—|n|0.50|y|—|n|
|DUWASA|0.99|y|n|n|0.40|n|n|n|0.44|y|y|n|
|MWSA|0.51|y|y|n|0.35|n|y|n|0.27|n|y|n|
|NWSC|0.88|y|y|n|0.74|y|y|n|0.67|y|y|n|
|Drakenstein|0.00|n|n|n|0.25|n|n|n|0.51|y|n|n|

40
degree of country specificity in both diagnosis and remedial action. This is more timeand labor-intensive – i.e., expensive – than is the adoption of (international) norms “off the shelf.”

# **_Improving domestic access to better services_**

For the poorest countries in particular, the desired investment response to liberalization (entry by foreign providers) may be muted and take long to materialize.<sup>14</sup> Structural factors such as economic size or location may imply that some countries or parts of countries will not be attractive enough to induce entry by private firms, whether foreign or domestic. Or, the market may be too small to allow vigorous competition. Such situations will result in limited access, if any, for many poor households or rural communities. Improving the distribution of access to services could be achieved by targeting aid for trade on service providers to encourage them to provide services in remote and disadvantaged regions in poor countries and/or to lower the prices of such services below what would be needed to cover costs. In our view this could be an important dimension of an effective “aid for trade” strategy to complement and support multilateral trade reforms. Here we are not thinking of fiscal investment or entry incentives of the type offered by virtually all developing countries to foreign investors. These are costly and of dubious value. Instead, the idea is to use development aid funds to induce services firms – foreign or nationally owned – to provide specific services to households that otherwise would not be served.

The experience of a number of countries in the last decade has improved our understanding of how universal access policies can be used to complement market-based reforms to improve access for the poor to infrastructure services. In network industries such as telecommunications or electricity private providers could compete for performance-based subsidies related to providing services to the poor.<sup>15</sup> This would ensure that the poor to reap some of the benefits of competition, and while minimizing outlays for the government – the “reverse auction” process allows it to discover the true

> 14 What follows draws in part on Hoekman and Mattoo (2007).

> 15 The picture is less clear for other, especially social, services. We do not know whether this is because these services are inherently different, e.g. because performance is so much more difficult to measure, or because governments have been less willing to experiment with new policies in these areas.

18
IPCC, 2000. Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. Cambridge University Press, UK. <u>http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/land_use/index.php?idp=177</u> Jeuland, M.A. and S.K. Pattanayak. 2012. Benefits and costs of improved cookstoves: Assessing the implications of variability in health, forest and climate impacts. _Plos ONE_ 7(2): 1-15.

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Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation (MoFSC), Department of Forests. Community Forestry Division Website. <u>http://dof.gov.np/dof_community_forest_division/community_forestry_dof Accessed May 1, 2017.</u> Nepal, Mani, Apsara Nepal, and Kristine Grimsrud. 2011. “Unbelievable but Improved Cookstoves Are Not Helpful in Reducing Firewood Demand in Nepal.” _Environment and Development Economics_ 16 (01): 1–23. doi:10.1017/S1355770X10000409.

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38
_Mexico: The 1997 Pension Reform_ _20_ rights, which made it difficult to explicitly attach a value to a worker's acquired benefits under the old PAYG system up until the time of the reform<sup>4</sup> .

Commissions. The Mexican Law is the only one to date that allows freedom of commissions and fee structure, with discounts allowed.

# V. ESTIMATION OF THE FISCAL COSTS OF THE REFORM

# **_What is the Bill?_** _A_ **_Summary of Results_**

The full benefits of a pension reform are not felt unless the fiscal costs of the existing unfunded system are made explicit to the extent possible and are funded through a credible financing plan. Governments must also define what combination of additional fiscal savings (higher revenues or lower spending) and borrowing will finance the transition costs. As part of the design of the reform, the Ministry of Finance (SHCP - _Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico)_ developed a model to estimate the fiscal costs of the transition, including sensitivity analyses under various assumptions. A discussion of the estimated fiscal costs of transition of the Mexican reform is summarized below.

The reform of the Mexican old age security system generates three fiscal consequences:<sup>5</sup>

- _the cost ofproviding pensions to existing pensioners before September 1,_ 1997 (without the income provided by the PAYG defined benefit system, since all contributions will go to AFORES starting September 1, 1997)

- _the costs of providing pension guarantees,_ including the guarantee of pension benefits under the old PAYG system to transition workers resulting from the lifetime switch option at retirement, and the MPG to new workers; and

- _the costs of the Social Quota_ contribution to individual accounts indexed to the CPI (the Social Quota) and Government contributions of 0.425 % of salary towards workers' pension.

Pensions for Existing Retirees. Fiscal costs for providing for existing pensioners and those receiving invalidity payments can be estimated accurately since IMSS knows the number of pensioners receiving benefits and the amount of benefits paid. These costs equal about 0.4% of GDP for 1997 and will decline rapidly over time.

> 4A discussion of the implications of this approach is presented in section V.

> _5_ In addition, pension contributions can no longer support health insurance.