rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# <u>Table A3 (Cont.)</u>

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Local labor market variables_||||||
|Male-to-Female employment ratio|-0.0154|-0.016|-0.0155|-0.0147|-0.0162|
||[0.00382]***|[0.00291]***|[0.00371]***|[0.00255]***|[0.00276]***|
|Log of per capita GDP|0.0454|0.0345|0.0497|0.034|0.0321|
||[0.0246]*|[0.0103]***|[0.0249]**|[0.0127]**|[0.0112]***|
|Crime rate|-1.713|-2.042|-1.54|-1.66|-1.516|
||[1.729]|[1.554]|[1.711]|[1.288]|[1.320]|
|Share of male employment in primary sector|0.00408|0.0255|0.00216|0.0114|0.0227|
||[0.0543]|[0.0486]|[0.0538]|[0.0429]|[0.0434]|
|Share of male employment in construction|-0.103|-0.0837|-0.0931|-0.0894|-0.0772|
||[0.0781]|[0.0914]|[0.0782]|[0.0830]|[0.0800]|
|Share of male employment in white services|0.0121|0.046|0.0162|0.0534|0.055|
||[0.0815]|[0.0905]|[0.0814]|[0.0747]|[0.0815]|
|Share of male employment in other services|0.0143|0.0225|0.0091|0.0257|0.0304|
||[0.0626]|[0.0658]|[0.0623]|[0.0643]|[0.0628]|
|Constant|-0.833|-0.677|-0.849|-0.822|-0.767|
||[0.234]***|[0.126]***|[0.235]***|[0.135]***|[0.125]***|
|Observations|1,696,260|1,696,260|1,696,260|1,696,260|1,696,260|
|R-squared|0.256|0.255|0.256|0.255|0.256|
|Department fixed effects|Yes|No|Yes|No|No|

Sources: 2018 National Census of Guatemala, 2017 and 2018 municipality statistics (FUNDESA and INE), 20172018 Census of Human Resources in Central Government (INE), 2017 Latinobarometro survey.

Notes: Women ages 25 to 49 who either have spouses that are household heads or that are household heads themselves. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in columns 1 and 3 and at the department level in columns 2, 4 y 5 between brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

33
<mark>Mbiti, I., Muralidharan, K., Romero, M., Schipper, Y., Manda, C., & Rajani, R. (2019). Inputs, incentives, and complementarities in education: Experimental evidence from Tanzania.</mark> _<mark>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>134</mark>_ <mark>(3), 1627-1673.</mark> Mexico News Daily. (2019). Oaxaca teachers declare strike action, erect blockades. January 29.

<u>https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/oaxaca-teachers-declare-strike-action-erect-blockades/</u> (retrieved March 20, 2020) Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. Human Behavior & Social Institutions No. 2.

Mizala, A., & Ñopo, H. (2016). Measuring the relative pay of school teachers in Latin America 1997– 2007. _International Journal of Educational Development, 47_ , 20-32.

<mark>Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011). Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from India.</mark> _<mark>Journal of political Economy</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>119</mark>_ <mark>(1), 39-77.</mark> <mark>Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2013).</mark> _<mark>Contract teachers: Experimental evidence from India</mark>_ <mark>. NBER Working Paper No. 19440.</mark> Mwenda, D. B., & Mgomezulu, V. Y. (2018). Impact of Monetary Incentives on Teacher Retention in and Attraction to Rural Primary Schools: Case of the Rural Allowance in Salima District of Malawi. African Educational Research Journal, 6(3), 120-129.

NCES. (2018). Characteristics of Public School Teachers.

<u>https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_clr.asp</u> OECD. (2011). How much are teachers paid. _Education at a Glance._ Retrieved from

- - <u>http://www.oecd.org/education/skills beyond school/48631286.pdf</u>

<mark>Okafor, O., Iriobe, C., Nwajiaku, C., Onyene, V. 2016. Service compensation and social prestige as predictive of Nigerian teachers' inclination to job retention. Journal of Innovation in Education in Africa 1, 1 2016, 119-135.</mark>

- <mark>Paglayan, A. S. (2019). Public‐Sector Unions and the Size of Government.</mark> _<mark>American Journal of Political Science</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>63</mark>_ <mark>(1), 21-36.</mark>

Programme d’analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la confemen (PASEC). (2015). PASEC 2014: Education System Performance in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. Retrieved from

- <u>https://www.pasec.confemen.org/wp content/uploads/2015/12/Rapport_Pasec2014_GB_webv2.pdf</u>

<mark>Pugatch, T., & Schroeder, E. (2014). Incentives for teacher relocation: Evidence from the Gambian</mark> <mark>hardship allowance.</mark> _<mark>Economics of Education Review</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>41</mark>_ <mark>, 120-136.</mark> Pugatch, T., & Schroeder, E. (2018). Teacher pay and student performance: evidence from the Gambian hardship allowance. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 10(2), 249-276.

Reuters. (2019). Start of Argentina school year postponed by teachers' strike. March 6.

<u>https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-strike/start-of-argentina-school-year-postponed-byteachers-strike-idUSKCN1QN26B</u> (Retrieved March 20, 2020) 27
**Table 9: Categorization of Studies across Reviews**

||||**How it is cat**|**egorized in**|||**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Study**|**Conn 2014**|**Glewwe et al. 2014**|**Kremer, Brannen, &**<br>**Glennerster 2013**|**Krishnaratne, White, &**<br>**Carpenter 2013**|**McEwan 2014**|**Murnane & Ganimian 2014**|<br>**citations**|
|Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin<br>(2009)|School supplies|Textbooks|Textbooks|Materials|Instructional materials|Textbooks|6|
|Glewwe et al. (2004)|School supplies|Flipcharts|Flipcharts|Materials|Instructional materials|Flipcharts|6|
|Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton<br>(2009)|Student incentives|Merit-based scholarships|Merit scholarships|School fees|Performance incentives|Cash transfers|6|
|Banerjee et al. (2007)|-|Computers & electronic<br>games|Reducing class<br>size/Computer-assisted<br>learning/Contract teachers|Materials|Instructional<br>materials/Computers or<br>technology/Teacher<br>training/Class size or<br>composition/Contract or<br>volunteer teachers|Computer-assisted learning|5|
|Barrera-Osorio and Linden (2009)|-|Computers & electronic<br>games|-|Materials/School-based<br>management|Computers or<br>teachnology/Teacher<br>training|Computers in schools|5|
|Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010)|Teacher incentives|-|Incentivising teacher<br>presence|Additional teaching<br>resources|Performance incentives|Pay for performance|5|
|Nguyen (2009)|Information for<br>accountability|-|Providing earnings<br>information|Providing information|Information|Information on returns to<br>education|5|
|Bold et al. (2013)|Teacher incentives|-|Contract teachers|-|Class size or composition<br>/Contract or volunteer<br>teachers|Contract teachers|4|
|Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012)|-|-|Incentivising teacher<br>presence|Additional teaching<br>resources|Performance incentives|Pay for attendance|4|
|Kremer, Duflo, and Dupas (2011)|Class size & composition|-|Contract<br>teachers/Streaming|-|Class size or composition|Class size|4|
|Lassibille et al. (2010)|Management intervention|-|-|School-based<br>management|Information|Capacity-building on school<br>management|4|
|Miguel and Kremer (2004)<br>Notes: This includes all 12 studies t|Health intervention<br>hat appear in four,five,or si|-<br>x of the reviews.|-|Health intervention|Deworming drugs|Medications|4|

31
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# **Box  2.2  Wastewater Use in Agriculture—A Typology**

Various attempts have been made to provide a broad typology of wastewater reclamation and use in agriculture (e.g., Asano _et al_ , 2007) or a more restricted typology for wastewater irrigation in developing countries (e.g., von der Hoek, 2004), but differences persist in the terminology used by professionals in this field. The following definitions and distinctions are used in this paper:

- _Direct use of treated (or reclaimed) wastewater_ is the use of reclaimed water that has been transported from the point of treatment or production to the point of use without an intervening discharge to surface water or groundwater body.

- _Direct use of untreated wastewater_ is the use of raw wastewater from a sewage outlet, directly disposed of on land where it is used for crop production.

- _Indirect use of untreated wastewater_ is the abstraction of usually diluted wastewater (or polluted stream water) for irrigation.  This is common downstream of urban centers where treatment plants are limited. Farmers might or might not be aware of the water quality challenge.

- _Planned wastewater use_ is the conscious and controlled use of wastewater either undiluted (direct) or diluted (indirect).  Most use of untreated wastewater is unplanned and indirect.  Within the category of planned wastewater use for irrigation, two subcategories are important:

- _Restricted irrigation_ is the controlled use of wastewater to grow crops that are not eaten raw by humans; and

- _Unrestricted irrigation_ is the controlled use of treated wastewater to grow crops that are normally eaten raw.

_Source:_ WHO 2006; Jiménez _et al_ ., 2010.

Data on current wastewater use in agriculture in different countries worldwide are mostly based on rough estimates. Estimates of the volume of wastewater used in for irrigation are shown in Table 2.1.<sup>4</sup> Estimates on the agricultural areas irrigated with wastewater, both treated and untreated, are shown in Figure 2.1.

**Table  2.1 The twenty countries with the largest volume of wastewater used for irrigation**

|**Country**|**Wastewater used for**<br>**irrigation(m**<sup>**3**</sup>**/d)**|**Country**|**Wastewater used for**<br>**irrigation(m**<sup>**3**</sup>**/d)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Mexico|4,493,000|Iran|422,000|
|Egypt|1,918,000|Chile|380,000|
|China|1,239,000|Jordan|225,000|
|Syria|1,182,000|UAE|200,000|
|Spain|932,000|Turkey|137,000|
|USA<sup>a</sup>|911,000|Argentina|130,000|
|Israel|767,000|Tunisia|118,000|
|Italy|741,000|Libya|110,000|
|Saudi Arabia|595,000|Qatar|80,000|
|Kuwait|432,000|Cyprus|68,000|

a California and Florida. _Source:_ Jiménez and Asano, 2008.

4 The volume estimates mask the exemplary practices of some of the smaller countries in arid zones. See Table 2.5.

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> Employment in male-owned firms<br>=<br>@------ 7-77 HT BO He,<br>MLO ~~<br>ge ~<br>s ~~<br>fet ~.<br>=<br>Bo<br>37<br>1995 2000 2005 2010<br>Year<br>——*— Informal tradables —-—#*—- Informal non-tradables<br>“@--- Informal apparel<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Male-owned firms<br>oo —)<br>e-------7-7-77 7 a ae<br>at. ae<br>7) © Te~<br>=‘=<br>—<br>ot<br>=<br>1995 2000 2005 2010<br>Year<br>——*—_ Informal tradables —-—@#-—- Informal non-tradables<br>ve@eo- Informal apparel<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Employment in female-owned firms<br>Lo Uo<br>a“ sy<br>Pea ~ew<br>+ oT ~~<br>no 7 ~<br>g =~ a<br>s oa ~<br>Qacdt ==<br>= uot<br>eae® _" we . @<br>1995 2000 2005 2010<br>Year<br>——*— Informal tradables ——#—- Informal non-tradables<br>“-@-- Informal apparel<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Female-owned firms<br>a<br>7 a<br>=&® oa a ot -- _ wet <7~ ~ ~~L~e<br>sS ao ry)<br>on ace ae<br>c “7 ca<br>1995 2000 2005 2010<br>Year<br>——*——_ Informal tradables ——@®—- Informal non-tradables<br>v@---- Informal apparel<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The insurance industry can play a very important part in the development of the private sector and the modernization of the securities markets. At present, the industry is underdeveloped because of restrictive regulations, deficient capital, and a bad public image. The industry has also suffered from the structural adjustment of the economy.

To encourage the development of the industry and allow it to play its full part in stimulating economic growth, a more conducive environment would be needed. This would involve the creation of a contestable but well regulated market, allowing greater freedom of innovation and competition to individual companies, but imposing an effective system of prudential regulation and supervision. In this respect, the following measures would seem appropriate and would involve a partial but extensive revision of the insurance code. These would generally engender a harmonization with insurance regulation in EU countries.

- Strengthening of insurance supervision, involving a more forceful and equal application of corrective measures.

- Restructuring and recapitalization of capital-deficient companies.

- Privatization of state-owned companies.

- Opening of the Tunisian market to majority-owned foreign firms or foreign majority controlled joint ventures.

- Stipulation of solvency margin in relation to retained premiums (instead of gross premiums) and introduction of solvency margins related to average annual losses.

- Liberalization of premiums for the compulsory third-party coverage of motor insurance.

- Study and possible introduction of "baremization" system that would put economically meaningful limits on court awards for personal injuries and loss of life.

- Re-examination of the decision to transfer responsibility for work accident insurance to the social security system and introduction of nominal policies for this line of business.

- Consideration of reform of pension system, encompassing the creation of a complementary capitalized pillar that would lead to the generation of long-term savings and would transform the prospects for life insurance business.

- Rationalization of the tax treatment of insurance premiums.

- Enhancement of financial and technical risk management throughi further relaxation of investment rules and development of loss experience and mortality data.

- Relaxation of professional qualifications for selling agents and creation of an insurance ombudsman office to provide better consumer protection.

22
Figure A1: Comparison of Tariff Measures <!-- Start of picture text --> 200 200<br>160 160<br>120 120<br>80 80<br>40 40<br>0 0<br>1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>ISIC: 31 ISIC: 32<br>200 200<br>160 160<br>120 120<br>80 80<br>40 40<br>0 0<br>1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>ISIC: 33 ISIC: 34<br>200 200<br>160 160<br>120 120<br>80 80<br>40 40<br>0 0<br>1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>ISIC: 35 ISIC: 36<br>200 200<br>160 160<br>120 120<br>80 80<br>40 40<br>0 0<br>1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>ISIC: 37 ISIC: 38<br>200<br>160<br>120<br>80<br>40<br>0<br>1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>ISIC: 39<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Note: The dark line corresponds to version 1, v1 (multiple observations per opening/tariff). The lighter line corresponds to version 2, v2 (one observation per unique opening/tariff combination).

21
- Choi, S., Ohrel, S. and Sohngen, B.: 2011a, Extending the GTAP Family of Models: A Partial Equilibrium Approach to Measuring the Costs of Carbon Sequestration and Avoided Deforestation, Selected Paper Prepared for Presentation at the GTAP 2011 Annual Meeting Venice, Italy.

- Choi, S., Sohngen, B., Rose, S., Hertel, T. and Golub, A.: 2011b, Total Factor Productivity Change in Agriculture and Emissions from Deforestation, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(2), 349 355.

- Conrad, J.: 1997, On the Option Value of Old-growth Forest, Ecological Economics 22(2), 97102.

- Conrad, J.: 2000, Wilderness: Options to Preserve, Extract, or Develop, Resource and Energy Economics 22(3), 205219.

- Costanza, R., d'Arge, R., De Groot, R., Farber, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., Limburg, K., Naeem, S., O'Neill, R., Paruelo, J. et al.: 1997, The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, Nature 387(6630), 253260.

- Craneld, J., Eales, J., Hertel, T. and Preckel, P.: 2003, Model Selection when Estimating and Predicting Consumer Demands using International, Cross Section Data, Empirical Economics 28(2), 353364.

- Daily, G.: 1997, Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems, Island Pr.

- Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J.: 1980, An Almost Ideal Demand System, The American Economic Review 70(3), 312326.

- Dunn, J., Eason, J. and Wang, M.: 2011, Updated Sugarcane and Switchgrass Parameters in the GREET Model, Technical report, Center for Transportation Research, Argonne National Laboratory.

- EIA: 2010, Annual Energy Outlook, Publication DOE/EIA-0383, U.S. Department of Energy.

- EIA: 2011, International Energy Outlook, Publication DOE/EIA-0484, U.S. Department of Energy.

- Eichner, T. and Pethig, R.: 2011, Carbon Leakage, the Green Paradox and Perfect Future Markets, International Economic Review 52(3), 767805.

40
# **Annex 11.  Sub-national revenues and equalization**

Indonesia’s transfer system is designed to reduce disparities in the country. The DAU, which finances almost two third of sub-national spending, has been the predominant tool in Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization policy (World Bank 2007a). However, with the increase in the price of oil, disparities widen as regions with a high share of natural resources are benefitting disproportionately. At the same time, the DAU has increased significantly over the past years providing much needed resources to poor districts. The horizontal doted line in the below figure marks the highest quintile with respect to per capita revenues from revenue sharing (substantially from oil and gas) while the vertical dotted line marks the national average per capita DAU allocation. All the dots above the horizontal line represent the richest districts, which should have enough fiscal resources to fund their expenditure responsibilities without the DAU. Some of these districts were receiving per capita DAU allocations above the national mean (dots above and to the right of the dotted lines in the figure) but this practice has ended with the phasing out of the “hold-harmless” policy in 2008.

**Figure Annex 11.  Sub-national revenues by type of revenue**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15<br>DAU/capita (Rp million)<br>Revenue sharing/capita (Rp million)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: World Bank calculations based on Ministry of Finance data. DAU data is for 2007, Natural Resource Revenues represent 2006 data._ 34
Table 3 demonstrates robustness to the inclusion of a broad range of additional control variables. The main results hold even when controlling for gross secondary school enrollment, newspaper circulation and natural resource exports, and for the inclusion of political controls (whether the electoral system is proportional representation; whether the political system is presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary; mean district magnitude; and democracy, as determined by ACLP).

Other results (not reported) reject two additional alternative hypotheses. One is that countries with programmatic parties have different policy preferences than those without and that it is these preferences that drive the public sector reform results. We investigate this possibility by controlling for whether the main government party is right, left or center; our main variable of interest remains highly significant. Second, it might also be the case that party fractionalization and divided government both increase incentives to form programmatic parties and introduce conflicts of interest between different branches of government, increasing the demand for public sector reform. Our results are robust, however, to controls for party fractionalization and divided government (defined as whether the executive is from a different party than the majority party in the legislature).

**Table 3.  Programmatic Parties and Project Ratings for Public Sector Reform-Additional Controls**

||Media,<br>Education, and<br>Natural<br>Resources|Political<br>Controls|Media,<br>Education, and<br>Natural<br>Resources|Political<br>Controls|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Inst. Dev. Im|pact Rating|Overall Outco|me Rating|
|Programmatic<br>Pi|6.629<sup>**</sup>|2.766<sup>*</sup>|2.815<sup>*</sup>|2.302<sup>+</sup>|
|artes|(0.002)|(0.033)|(0.011)|(0.062)|
|Newspaper<br>circulation|0.999||1.005||

33
14 The hospital spends only a small fraction of the cost of diagnostic tests called for under a basic standard of care.>' The "savings" for these five diagnoses over a one week period amount to $DR4,358.44 (US$694.02), or over 90 percent of the resource cost of DR$4,767.64 (US$759.18). Moreover, as mentioned above, this is an underestimate because the costs of needed tests not performed by the hospital are excluded from the savings estimates. This is balanced to some unknown extent by patients who have alreaAy been diagnosed and have completed test results.

The implication of these results is that quality is quite low as measured by compliance with Dominican norms for diagnostic testing, at least for certain diagnoses. Although these data represent only a sample of the diagnoses the hospital treats, there is no reason to believe that they represent extremes. Observation, experience and interviews suggest that these are not exceptions but are instead indicative patterns for the general patient population.

DruQs. The comparison between indicated drugs and the number and value of those received by patients for the six diagnoses are provided in Figure 2 and Table S. The information is similar to that provided for diagnostic tests in Figure 1 and Table 4. The criteria for whether a drug was ordered are the same as that for diagnostic tests, and no deviation from the norms is considered. The drug definition is based on the WHO drug code number.

Drug ordering differs from diagnostic tests in that some drugs only apply to inpatients or to surgical procedures (i.e., anesthesia). In either case this is indicated in the footnotes to the table. The use of drugs in surgery is based on drug use recorded in the sample of surgeries.

The average number of drugs required ranges from one for mild diarrhea to six for appendicitis. The latter is due to some extent to surgical procedures, which require additional drugs for both anesthesia and fighting post-operative infection. As shown in Figure 2, on average 30.6 percent of required drugs are ordered for patients, a significant increase above the 12.1 percent average for diagnostic tests. For cataract surgery, almost 63 percent of the indicated drugs are ordered for patients.

The hospital spends a small percentage of the amount required to meet the value of drugs indicated by the norms. As indicated in Figure 2 on average 9.4 percent of the expected expenditure on drugs is spent by the hospital. The range is between less than 1 percent for appendicitis to 65.3 for cataract surgery. Drugs are not provided to emergency appendicitis patients, and the inpatients in the sample received only two of the six drugs indicated in the norms. Cataract surgery patients have drugs ordered that exceed the value of the drugs indicated in the norms and they receive a sBgnificant proportion of what is required by the norms. The reasons for the divergence from the nor.ns was not pursued in the survey.

8/ This calculation assumes that all ordered tests are completed, which is unrealistic given the high proportion of uncompleted tests. Thus the total "savings" are greater than those reported here.