rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- 11 -

Table 2 examines the ability of selected countries to utilize different transport modes by tabulating their 1987 shipments to the United States by air freight and by ocean transport. 9/ The table also indicates the share of each country's exports to the U.S. by air over 1985-1987. These statistics indicate that the reliance on air transport can vary dramatically from country-to-country, but exporters in the Caribbean generally have the highest reliance on air transport of any of the different country groups outside of Israel (whose share is highly influenced by diamonds), South Asia and some other Asian countries that specialize in exports of labor intensive products to the United States. 10/ Overall, approximately one quarter (by value) of the Caribbean countries' exports to the United States enter by air but this figure is influenced by crude and refined petroleum shipments from Trinidad-Tobago and the Bahamas as well as by sugar. Both of these major export products employ ocean transport exclusively. If sugar and petroleum are excluded ($241 million in petroleum shipments from the Bahamas, $677 million from Trinidad

- 9/ The value of air and water shipments reported in Table 2 may sum to lower totals than are shown in other tables in this report. This is mainly due to the fact that shipments made partly by air and partly by water are not reported in the former. It should also be noted that United States import statistics include imports of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands from foreign countries. They do not include imports of the United States from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

- 10/ See Yeats (1989) for an analysis of changes in the level and composition of these exports. United States import statistics show that countries like Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Taiwan (Province of China) and Singapore rely almost exclusively on air freight for compact high value items like transistors and valves, statistical machines, office machines and various types of telecommunication equipment. The proportion of textile and clothing exports by air freight appears to vary between 30 to 40 per cent. In contrast, items like furniture, wood products and pottery (which are important exports of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) are shipped almost exclusively by vessel.
which would in turn result in watered-down credits with limited environmental benefits [1, 3].

Table 2 lists the number and mitigation potential of projects in the CDM pipeline – that is, projects that are at some stage in the formal CDM project cycle. A quick comparison with the previous table reveals that the distribution of pipeline projects differs from the distribution of project types that the potential-mitigation studies predict. The data in the table is from September 1, 2009 and to that point in time, most of the mitigation potential in identified projects stemmed from hydro-electric power generation, from improvements in manufacturing processes that lowered emissions of heavy greenhouse gas emissions like those associated with hydrofluorocarbons, from land-fills and from improvements in “own generation” energy projects in which electricity is recovered or produced from waste gas.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, despite large potential, few projects having to do with forests or soils are in the pipeline. This is because procedures for constructing baselines and monitoring outcomes for land projects are especially complex under current CDM rules and because the projects face additional restriction on how the CERs that they produced are used [2, 25, 26]. Similarly, few projects that have to do with improving the efficiency of new or existing buildings are in the pipeline, in part because of issues of scale and prohibitions on sector-wide baselines.

All of this suggests that project developers have drawn on a sub-set of identified economically viable mitigation sources, presumably because of constraints and incentives provided by current CDM rules. In contrast, model predictions of the eventual flow of CERs predicted by well-known models are not similarly constrained and are built up from the type of abatement cost curves that underlie the IPCCC reports. An important implication then is that the volume of CERs produced during the Kyoto Protocols first accounting period may fall short of the volumes anticipated by economic models. This, in turn, implies that developed countries would find it more difficult to meet reduction targets pledged in Kyoto and that the cost of the treaty would be greater than anticipated.

With this as background, table 3 summarizes early model predictions of the Annex B countries’ potential demand for total emission reductions and the potential size of the CDM

> 8 This last class of projects is most often associated with iron, steel and cement production.

7
Furthermore, as shown in table 7, firm capabilities are positively associated with other measures of performance including number of employees, the likelihood of having innovative practices such as developing new products and processes, exports and profits. Increasing the workers and managers skills is also associated with larger and more innovative firms, suggesting that jointly better firm capabilities are common in more productive and innovative enterprises in Mozambique.

**Table 7. Associations of firm capabilities with measures of success**

|Dependent variable|(1)<br>(Log) Total<br>employees|(2)<br>(Log) Capital|(3)<br>New<br>products|(4)<br>Z-score<br>innovation|(5)<br>Exports|(6)<br>Annual<br>profits<br>winsorized<br>at 95th|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||All firms|Manufacturing|All firms|All firms|All firms|All firms|
|Management practices|0.347***|0.157|0.107***|0.172**|0.043*|111,137**|
||[0.075]|[0.299]|[0.034]|[0.069]|[0.025]|[55,037]|
|Skills|0.345***|-0.021|0.082*|0.295***|0.022|-41,847|
||[0.081]|[0.237]|[0.043]|[0.092]|[0.028]|[56,307]|
|Controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|647|256|647|647|647|611|
|R-squared|0.306|0.324|0.116|0.147|0.106|0.213|
|Adjusted R^2|0.297|0.308|0.104|0.135|0.0938|0.201|
|Adjusted R^2 considering strata|0.295|0.300|0.099|0.131|0.090|0.197|
|P-value: Management practices<br>= Skills=0|0.000|0.871|0.000|0.000|0.096|0.112|
|P-value: Management practices<br>> Skills|0.506|0.676|0.655|0.176|0.694|0.938|

Note: Controls: (log) employees (except in column 1), sector of activity, Maputo, firm's age, manager's age. Standard errors in brackets.

# _Heterogeneous effects_

Table 8 shows the interaction of management practices and skills with different groups of firms. The analysis suggests that the relationship between firm capabilities and business performance is present across the spectrum of enterprises, but the interaction terms are by and large statistically insignificant. The exception is firms exporting status, where the relationship between management practices and performance is stronger for exporters compared to non-exporters.

26
than from the WTO, reflecting in part the incidence of tariff rate quotas and specific tariffs in this sector.

Tunisia has also signed a trade agreement with GAFTA countries, and has been reducing its formal tariffs from this source. But reports are that any reduction in tariffs on imports from GAFTA has been countered by an increase in administrative barriers, with no real increase in market access. So the extent of true protection from GAFTA imports now is probably the same as that shown in table 17 for 2001. It generally lies somewhere between that for the EU and that for other countries.

The policy dilemma facing Tunisia is that the further reductions in its tariffs on imports from EU, while reducing the average level of protection, may greatly increase the dispersion in protection — both the dispersion between agriculture and manufacturing, and the dispersion between different country sources of manufactured goods. Since the welfare damage done by import protection comes from the dispersion and well as the average level, Tunisia’s current policy course may not yield benefits unless the question of dispersion is also addressed.

The extent of this policy dilemma is now examined empirically. For this purpose, the structure of protection from the GTAP version 6 database is used, since although it slightly overstates the current tariffs on manufactures from the EU, it picks up the incidence of tariff rate quotas and specific tariffs in agriculture, as well as the likely real structure of protection against imports from GAFTA countries.

# _Reform scenarios_

One way that Tunisia could address the issue of dispersion in protection is by including agriculture in its bilateral reductions in protection with the EU — currently agriculture is largely omitted by both sides. This forms the basis of one reform scenario — Tunisia eliminates its border protection (import barriers and export subsidies) on agricultural goods from the EU, and the EU reciprocates.

Tunisian agricultural producers could have difficulty taking full advantage of this market access, without improvements in the quality of the exportables they produce.

‘The cases of citrus and olive oil illustrate how potential is not being realized. The key issue is quality. Supply chains must be responsive to consumers’ specific demands. But to get premium oranges and oil onto the market, farmers need firstrate technical and marketing support from research, extension and producers’ organizations. And Government interventions, in the form of fixed retail margins and the Office des Huiles’ control over quotas and testing, are interposed between the producer and consumer. The result is that Tunisian oranges and olive oil command low prices and EU quota is left unused. Conversely, when Government has made partial reforms, such as the removal of the ONH’s olive oil export monopoly, the private sector has responded.’ (World Bank 2006, pp. 6–7) 15
Variable #147 | Question #29 | **wrmiaresponsibleallocation** | responsibility for water allocation before RBO existence | 0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int

Variable #148 | Question #30 | **wrmiaresponsiblemodfore** | responsibility for modeling and forecasting water availability after RBO existence | 0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int

Variable #149 | Question #31 | **wrmiaresponsiblemonit** | responsibility for monitoring and enforcement of water quality after RBO existence | 0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int

Variable #150 | Question #32 | **wrmiaresponsibletariff** | responsibility for collecting tariffs after RBO existence | 0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int

Variable #151 | Question #33 | **wrmiuser1** | existence of water tariff on irrigation | 0 = n/a,1 = yes,2 = no | int

Variable #152 | Question #33 | **wrmiuser2** | existence of water tariff on industry | 0 = n/a,1 = yes,2 = no | int

Variable #153| Question #33 | **wrmiuser3** | existence of water tariff on domestic use | 0 = n/a,1 = yes,2 = no | int

Variable #154-156 | Question #33 | **wrmi33other1user** | **wrmi33other2user** | **wrmi33other3user** | other user groups paying water tax | 0 = n/a,1 = electricity,2 = tertiary sector,3 = tourism,4 = fisheries,5 = thermal energy,6 = sewerage charges,7 = animal breeding, 8 = mining & oil | int

Variable #157| Question #33 | **wrmitariff1** | value of tariff (2002 USD) on irrigation | float Variable #158 | Question #33 | **wrmitariff2** | value of tariff (2002 USD) on industry | float Variable #159 | Question #33 | **wrmitariff3** | value of tariff (2002 USD) on domestic use | float

Variable #160-162 | Question #33 | **wrmi33other1tariff** | **wrmi33other2tariff** | **wrmi33other3tariff** | value of tariff (2002 USD) on other user groups | float

63
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**Table 4: Changes in reported prevalence of unofficial payments in transition countries, 2006-10**

||||||Pe|r cent|of resp|onden|ts that|report|unoffici|al pay|ments|are usu|ally/a|lways n|eeded|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Pub<br>s|lic heal<br>ystem|th|T<br>|raffic<br>police||O<br>doc|fficial<br>ument|s|Ed<br>(T|ucation<br>ertiary)||Unem<br>be|ploym<br>nefits|ent|Oth<br>secur|er soci<br>ity bene|al<br>fits|Ci<br>co|vil<br>urts||
||2006|2010|Ch.|2006|2010|Ch.|2006|2010|Ch.|2006|2010|Ch.|2006<br>|2010|Ch.|2006|2010|Ch.|2006<br>|2010|Ch.|
|Macedonia|23|13|-10|10|5|-5|11|5|-6|17|8|-9|11|8|-4|11|7|-4|13|7|-7|
|Bulgaria|24|17|-7|21|13|-8|9|3|-6|11|7|-4|6|3|-3|6|3|-3|16|8|-8|
|Uzbekistan|33|20|-13|22|18|-3|15|12|-2|30|25|-5|12|9|-2|14|11|-3|12|8|-3|
|Russia|24|19|-5|19|13|-6|9|3|-5|20|12|-8|4|2|-2|6|3|-3|7|6|0|
|Ukraine|40|43|3|28|28|-1|20|14|-6|33|26|-8|11|7|-4|13|8|-5|18|17|-1|
|Albania|48|39|-8|23|19|-4|28|22|-5|17|23|6|15|15|1|15|14|-1|21|14|-7|
|Poland|15|8|-7|4|4|-1|1|1|0|4|2|-3|1|1|0|1|1|0|1|2|1|
|Latvia|13|12|-1|6|5|-2|3|2|-1|3|1|-1|1|1|0|1|1|0|2|3|1|
|Mongolia|17|19|3|18|12|-5|16|11|-5|15|16|1|6|8|2|7|9|1|15|15|0|
|Montenegro|18|13|-5|4|7|3|3|4|1|8|6|-2|3|4|0|4|4|0|4|3|0|
|Estonia|3|4|0|0|1|1|1|0|0|1|1|0|0|1|0|1|0|0|1|1|0|
|Georgia|8|7|0|1|1|1|2|1|-1|4|5|1|4|2|-2|4|4|0|2|3|1|
|Lithuania|23|22|-1|6|6|-1|4|2|-2|4|3|-1|0|7|7|2|4|2|5|2|-3|
|Croatia|14|17|3|6|8|2|3|2|-1|5|8|3|4|3|-1|6|3|-4|5|6|1|
|Bosnia-Herz.|19|22|3|16|11|-5|7|6|0|8|11|2|4|6|2|5|6|1|7|8|1|
|Czech Rep.|10|11|1|6|5|-1|2|3|1|7|7|-1|1|3|2|1|3|2|3|3|0|
|Slovenia|7|8|1|2|3|1|1|3|2|5|3|-2|2|3|1|1|3|2|2|5|3|
|Romania|31|44|13|10|12|2|8|5|-2|9|9|0|6|4|-2|7|4|-2|7|10|2|
|Serbia|17|23|6|7|11|4|4|6|2|5|7|2|3|5|2|3|4|1|6|6|1|
|Slovak Rep.|21|22|1|12|12|-1|3|5|2|13|19|6|2|6|4|2|8|5|12|12|1|
|Kazakhstan|11|18|7|16|21|5|10|12|1|16|16|0|4|8|4|6|7|1|9|13|4|
|Belarus|12|21|9|9|14|5|4|3|-1|5|9|4|1|2|1|2|3|1|1|4|3|
|Hungary|33|42|10|6|11|5|5|6|1|5|6|1|0|3|3|1|4|3|5|7|2|
|Armenia|19|28|9|18|22|4|11|19|8|16|18|2|8|13|5|10|13|3|7|12|5|
|Tajikistan|33|39|6|14|29|15|15|16|0|23|32|9|8|10|2|8|10|2|8|13|5|
|Turkey|11|17|6|8|16|7|6|15|9|6|14|8|4|11|7|5|11|7|4|11|7|
|Moldova|32|45|14|18|32|14|12|23|11|17|24|7|8|11|3|9|9|0|12|19|7|
|Kyrgyz Rep.|28|49|21|24|43|18|22|37|15|29|51|22|12|29|17|14|32|18|14|33|20|
|Azerbaijan|30|72|42|11|66|56|15|60|45|16|65|49|7|63|55|7|65|57|8|61|53|

Note: Ch. denotes change in prevalence of unofficial payments between 2006 and 2010. Countries sorted in reverse order of average prevalence rates across all seven services.

17
# WPS3638

## **Workers’ Remittances to Developing Countries: A Survey with Central Banks on Selected Public Policy Issues**

### **José de Luna Martínez**<sup>*****</sup>

#### **Abstract**

This paper presents the findings of a survey of central banks in 40 developing countries across different regions in the world. The survey focused on the following four topics: (i) coverage of national statistics on remittances, (ii) cost of transferring and delivering remittances, (iii) regulatory regime for remittance transactions, and (iv) efforts of developing countries to channel remittance flows through formal financial institutions. The study found that in most countries existing data do not reflect the full amount of remittance inflows that they receive every year. Coverage of instruments and financial institutions through which remittances take place is limited. Moreover, only a few countries measure remittances that take place through informal channels. It was also found that the scope of financial authorities in developing countries to reduce remittance fees is limited, because a large part of the fees charged to customers are set by financial institutions located in the countries where transactions originate. Cooperation between sending and recipient countries is needed to reduce remittance costs. The survey found that in several countries money transfer companies are not properly supervised. Given the increasing international concerns on money laundering and terrorism financing issues, it is important that basic registration and reporting requirements are introduced for this type of company. Registration and reporting requirements should be designed in a way that they do not deter the further development of this type of financial institution. Finally, the survey found that most countries need to establish better mechanisms that would allow them to maximize the developmental effect of remittance inflows. By establishing new savings and investment instruments for remittance recipient households, a larger part of remittance flows might be channeled to finance productive investments, thus fostering economic growth.

#### World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3638, June 2005

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org._

* José de Luna Martínez is a Senior Financial Economist at the World Bank. Comments on this paper are welcome. They can be sent to the author’s email address: Jdelunamartinez@worldbank.org

1
recruitment, with workers particularly going into pack houses. While this ongoing and special set of facilitation measures was successful in the short-run, if employers faced the burden of these extra costs it is likely that they would look for workers from nearer Pacific countries.

The cap of 8,000 workers effectively was binding in the 2012/13 season. In this year 8,175 RSE visas were approved, but the actual number of arrivals was 7,456 since employers at times find themselves needing fewer workers than they apply for. Marquet (2013) reports some requests from the horticulture and viniculture industries for this cap to be raised, but that currently there is no plan to do so. However, it does not appear to be the case that the cap is vastly lower than employer demand, with recruitment occurring throughout the year and the available permits not all being exhausted within a few days as occurs with programs like the U.S. H1-B worker program.

# **3. Circularity and Worker Return**

Circularity is one of the key features of the RSE policy. By allowing workers the opportunity to return again to work in subsequent seasons, the policy helps provide incentives for workers to return home at the end of each season, and provides the potential for employers to benefit in subsequent seasons from the training they have provided to workers in the current season.

Merwood (2012) uses administrative data to investigate the rate of return migration over the first four seasons of the RSE. Table 3 summarizes this data. Each year in the first three years saw approximately half the workers return to work immediately in the next season. Most of these workers returned to work for the same employer. For example, 52.2 percent of workers from the first year (2007/08) returned to work in the RSE in the 2008/09 year, and 86.1 percent of these did so by returning to work for the same employer. Some workers who did not return immediately did so in a subsequent season, so that 60 percent of those who had participated in the first season also returned for at least one of the subsequent three years. Just under one-quarter (23 percent) of the workers from the first season participated in every single one of the first four seasons.

13