rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
services individually.<sup>8</sup> As discussed later in Section 5, domestic accounting firms and individual accountants are prevented by law from providing auditing services.

**_Table 5: Professional Services Firms in 2002_**

||Number of Firms|Average<br>Number of|Median<br>Employees|Average<br>(excluding<br>top/bottom 1%)<br>Sales (millions o|Median<br>f 2002 USD)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Accounting and Auditing|69|19|5|723|23|
|Legal|42|6|4|66|3|
|Architecture and Engineering|41|34|7|277|76|
|IT (Programming and Consulting,||||||
|Maintenance, Equipment|50|10|6|198|39|
|Consulting, and Other)||||||

Source: CEMPRE 2002 from National Statistical Institute (INE).

The market structure in the accounting and auditing services resembles an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. According to industry insiders, the revenues in the market served by the multinational big 4 are divided as follows: 37% for Ernst and Young, 30% for KPMG, 10% for Deloitte, and 13% for PWC. The market structure among the domestic accounting firms is unclear. The average size of the big 4 firms ranges from 35 professionals to about 115 professionals working on accounting and auditing, while the better known domestic accounting firms employ no more than 10-12 accountants.

The main clients for the services provided by the big 4 are: multinationals, large domestic firms, firms listed in the Mozambican stock exchange, public sector (ministries, public institutes), NGOs and donor-funded projects. Multinationals and large domestic firms originate in mining, manufacturing, and other services sectors (e.g., banking, telecommunications).<sup>9</sup> The main clients for the services provided by the domestic accounting firms are smaller and medium-sized domestic firms.<sup>10</sup> As Table 6 shows, only a small fraction of firms have their annual financial statements reviewed by an external auditor in Mozambique, and this fraction is much lower than that in other African countries. The absence of audited accounts may be one reason, though not necessarily the decisive one, why many firms find it difficult to access the formal financial market.

An official from the Mozambican business association CTA ( _Confederação das Associações Económicas_ ) mentioned that small firms often do not know how to present

> 8 Note though that some of those registered accountants are actually in management jobs and thus not providing accounting services.

> 9 Incidentally, we should note that there are exceptions to these patterns: we interviewed in Maputo a domestic SME that uses auditing services from one of the big 4 because that is a requirement for the SME to receive financing from the IFC.

> 10 Apparently, a couple of years ago, one of the big 4 firms offered free diagnostics of accounting problems to SMEs (most of the problems identified were cash flow and credit-related) and then offered to be hired by the SMEs to solve their problems on a ‘pay as you can’ basis. The SMEs did not take advantage of that opportunity reportedly because they were “afraid” and they did not feel that the accounting services provided by the big 4 firm were useful.

18
## _Through opportunities_

Existing opportunities play a substantial role in nurturing aspirations. For instance, in Japan, where boys tend to have higher expectations and aspirations than girls, gender gaps are notably smaller in regions with higher female employment rates (Molina and Usui 2023). In these areas, parents invest more in their daughters financially and in time, resulting in better education achievements among girls compared with other areas. Using survey data on social norms and role models, Molina and Usui (2023) rule them out as the primary mechanisms for the relationships that they document and hypothesize instead that labor market conditions affect aspirations by changing individuals’ predictions about future returns to the relevant outcomes.

Specific interventions that target opportunities may also contribute to raising aspirations. Programs designed for adult workers may indirectly affect beneficiaries' aspirations regarding their children's future. For example, an on-the-job training program focusing on enhancing socioemotional skills improved the productivity of adult women workers in India's largest ready-made garment export firm (Adhvaryu, Kala, and Nyshadham 2023).<sup>24</sup> It also had cascading effects because it increased the savings and aspirations among the women with regard to their children’s education.

Similarly, in India, women in villages who were provided with three years of recruiting services for jobs in the business process outsourcing industry were significantly less likely to marry or have children during that period (Jensen 2012). Instead, they entered the labor market or pursued more schooling or post-school training. These women also expressed a desire to have fewer children and maintain more stable careers throughout their lifetimes, indicating an increase in their aspirations for a career. In Poland, an intervention aimed at helping women develop work portfolios for the information technology industry as an affordable alternative to mentoring resulted in a nine percentage point increase in the likelihood of finding a job in information technology (Athey and Palikot 2023).

# **3.3. Avoiding frustrated aspirations**

This subsection reviews mechanisms to prevent frustration from multiple sources, including policy interventions, shocks, and other country-level phenomena.

> 24 Although opportunities tend to be associated with internal constraints (e.g., a loan for a small business, a cash transfer, or vocational training), socioemotional skills training may also be considered as such, given that it provides ways for the worker to be more productive.

20
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iu ~~OT~~ wo, <u>00 +79) X (13.68 — 6.84)</u> wo =<sup>~~WEFT)~~</sup> ~~* Cobos 08)~~ = 441.18 <!-- Start of picture text --> Wo = — x LoRW? x TER?<br>= 5 x 441.18 x 1.25 = 275.74<br><!-- End of picture text --> = ALEY =0 4 = ALE? — ALF’ = 275.74 — 0 = 275.74 ”° = [180,607 x (0.451 — 0.357)] = 16,977.06 wo = ~~—~~ x LoFW? x TERY?
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# Temporary policie

Equation (5) sakes three things clear. Firxt, as long as tsere is some prospect that tariff/subsidy levels will change over time (i.e., *2 ' 0), a UTCS alters **the** real interest rate facing **the** private sector. A UTCS that is announced today but belioved to be temporary ('1 > 0 and *2 - 0, *° _62_ < 0) **makes** consumption today expensive relative to consumption in **the** future; if substitution effects dominate wealth effects, this rise in the real interest rate will **man an** improvemnt in the current account.

Second, a temporary UTCS is equivalent in its effects on the real interest rate to an anticipated change in the gap between **the** comercial and the financial exchange rates in a dual exchange rate system. This is apparent from the interchangeability of S and i in (5): any time pattern of wedges (gl.g2) between the co mercial and financial rate can be reproduced by a combination (51a92) of uniform trade **taxes.** A temporary UTCS therefore works just like an expected depreciation of the financial rate (with the comnercial rate fixed) or an xpected appreciation of the coiercial **rate** (with the financial rate held fixed).

Finally, a temporary UTCS and a variable dual exchange rate system are equivalent in their effect on the real interest rate to a subsidy to foreign lending. To **see** this, simply rewrite (5) **as** (l+r2) - (l+r1)(l162/(1+62)1)(1-172/(1+72)1); setting 72 - 0 (for example), a subsidy at rate s on principal and interest income from International londing has exactly the **same** effect on **the** real Interest **rate as** a temporary UTCS satisfying - 62/(1+62) - 8,9 8 The equivalence of a dual exchange rate systeo to a tax on principal and Interest on foreign bonds is eophasized by Adams and Greenwood (1985).

12
**Figure 1: Timing of land registry computerization in Andhra Pradesh**

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**Figure 2:  Evolution of retail credit and transaction volume in Andhra Pradesh, 1997-2007**

16
Operations," the PAR indicated that these effects could have been avoided had the Bank's best practice been followed: We must be mindful that the liberalization of financial markets, even more than in other sectors, can be dangerously destabilizing, unless the preconditions for efficient, competitive market operation are in place.'<sup>3</sup> The PAR concluded that macroeconomic stability was among the more obvious of these preconditions."4 To have privatized public banks during this unstable period probably compounded Venezuela's problems: if the regressions are any guide, even after controlling for macroeconomic instability, the Bank has, on average, had less luck with bank privatizations than other reforms. Interestingly, the PAR gave the Government passing marks for privatizing four of the nine commercial banks that it owned and liquidating an agricultural credit institution. However, the PAR also noted that in midJanuary 1994, the second largest bank in the country stopped operations and seven other banks became unable to continue operating without large cash infusions from the Central Bank.<sup>75</sup> Rather than assume a more forceful role, the Central Bank continued to provide liquidity to these seven for months until they, too, proved insolvent (at which point the Governmen **t** ook them over). While it is unclear from the PAR whether any of the newly privatized banks were among the seven insolvencies, it nevertheless may have been unwise, in retrospect, to have privatized banks in such a turbulent environment.

73 World Bank, R89-163, August 1, 1989. The Bank's Development Economics and Chief Economist Office (DEC) had also criticized this loan ex ante, arguing that interest rate de-regulation with insolvent institutions subject to poor supervision and insufficient prudential regulations was a bad recipe.

74 The PAR does, however, point out that it was not until February, 1992 that the Bank issued new Operational directives that emphasized caution in financia **l** iberalization in the face of macroeconomn **i** c nstability or sharp changes in relative prices. PAR, p. 30. 75 PAR, p. 20.

46
unlikely to be repeated over the foreseeable future (commodity boom), while structural factors that could support growth present lasting policy challenges that will require various policy reform efforts. Prospects for progression of today’s LICs to middle-income status are, therefore, more challenging. Compared to the LICs of 2001 that became MICs, today’s LICs have per capita incomes that are further below the middle-income threshold, are more likely to be fragile, are more often landlocked and clustered with other LICs, are heavily reliant on agriculture, and face weaker prospects for long-term commodity demand.

Today’s LICs account for about 40 percent of the global poor and have average poverty rates in excess of 40 percent. Subdued prospects for lifting average per capita incomes in most of today’s 31 LICs to middle-income levels pose a challenge for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and reducing global extreme poverty to 3 percent by 2030. To reach this goal, per capita GDP would need to grow by 6 percent per year up to 2030 and per capita incomes of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution would need to grow at 8 percent per year (Figure 7; World Bank 2018b). Even during the global economic expansion that preceded the global financial crisis, per capita growth in today’s LICs fell well below such rates (2.8 percent during 2001-07). Overall growth in LICs has been lower when growth is weighted according to the share of the world’s extreme poor as opposed to output shares, implying that growth has been slower where it is needed most: in countries with the largest numbers of extreme poor.

Coordinated and multi-pronged policy efforts are needed to boost both domestic and external drivers of LICs’ growth. Efforts to harness external drivers of growth include integrating LICs into global trade, diversifying exports, and encouraging foreign direct investment (Lee and Zhang 2019). Domestically, this can help embody upgrades to skills and technologies, but needs to be supported by continued investment in human and physical capital, while maintaining sustainable government debt profiles. Further efforts to foster domestic sources of growth include developing stronger and deeper financial systems, ensuring greater financial inclusiveness, and strengthening governance and business climates to help the private sector to thrive while overcoming some of the challenges of informality (EBRD 2019; World Bank 2017c; 2018c; 2019a). Enhanced competition policies, including the liberalization of unwarranted price controls, can encourage innovation, boost productivity and improve international competitiveness (World Bank 2016c; 2017d). Growth could further be supported by measures aimed at ending conflicts and reducing social tensions, mobilizing domestic resources more effectively for sustainable government finances, and managing and adapting to growing climate risks.

15
As indicated in Figure 4, there are three different approaches that can be adopted for the treatment of operational risk: Basic Indicator, Standardized and Advanced Measurement Approach. Under the Basic Indicator approach, capital requirements for operational risk are simply 15% of Gross Income. Under the Standardized Approach capital requirements are the weighted sum of the gross income stemming from different sources with the weights ranging from 12% for gross income from the retail portfolio to 18% for gross income from corporate finance and trading. Under the Advanced Measurement Approach the regulatory capital will be given by a risk measure generated by a bank’s own model of operational risk. This model must be calibrated on the banks own experiences with regard to operational risk related losses and hence the bank must have a methodology for measuring such losses and the relevant historical data<sup>35</sup> .

Banks opting for the Simplified Standardized Approach will adopt the Basic Indicator methodology for Operational Risk. Banks adopting the Standardized Approach for Pillar 1 capital, in theory, can choose between any of the methodologies but are likely to adopt either the Basic Indicator or the Standardized Approach and only those banks adopting Pillar 1, IRB are likely to adopt the Advanced Measurement Approach for Operational Risk. Indeed banks that adopt IRB are certainly expected to opt at least for the Standardized Approach and to graduate to an AMA approach over time.

An explicit capital charge for operational risk is clearly new. It is also undoubtedly relevant for developing countries. While the Basel Core Principles require a bank to consider all risks including operational risk, to date there has not been a formal benchmark laid down in an international standard.

It is likely that most banks in developing countries will not have developed operational risk models and will therefore adopt the Basic Indicator or the Standardized Approach. The inclusion of an explicit operational-risk, capital charge should not in theory imply a significant increase in required supervisory resources, as supervisors should be assessing operational risk anyway. However, as the BCP compliance data above makes clear in practice

> 35 There has been much detailed work on the identification, measurement and management of particular aspects of operational risk that may then feed into the AMA approach.  For example the World Bank has been working on E-Finance and associated operational risks including security risks – see Glaessner et al (2002) for example.

23
# **Table A3: Differential Clustering**

## **Dependent Variable: Completion Binary [yes=1] Standard Errors: Clustered by Organization OLS Estimates**

||**(1) Baseline:**<br>**Organization**|**(2) Robust**|**(3) Project Type**<br>**Within Organization**|**(4) Project Type**<br>**Within Sector**|**(5) Sector**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**CS-Autonomy**|0.28***|0.28***|0.28***|0.28***|0.28***|
||(0.04)|(0.05)|(0.05)|(0.06)|(0.05)|
|**CS-Incentives/Monitoring**|-0.18***|-0.18***|-0.18***|-0.18**|-0.18***|
||(0.05)|(0.05)|(0.07)|(0.07)|(0.06)|
|**CS-Other**|-0.07***|-0.07***|-0.07**|-0.07**|-0.07***|
||(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.04)|(0.04)|(0.02)|
|**Noise, General and Capital Controls**|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|**Project Controls**|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|**Fixed Effects**|Project Type,<br>Sector|Project Type,<br>Sector|Project Type, Sector|Project Type,<br>Sector|Project Type,<br>Sector|
|**Observations (clusters)**|3620 (30)|3620|3620 (167)|3620 (41)|3620 (6)|

**Notes:** *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by organization in Column 1, by project type within organization in Column 3, by project type within sector in Column 4, and by sector type in Column 5. In Column 2, robust standard errors are reported. All columns report OLS estimates.The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the project is fully completed and 0 otherwise. Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is 'Advocacy and Policy Development', 'Financial & Budget Management', 'ICT Management and Research', 'Monitoring, Training and Personnel Management', 'Physical infrastructure', 'Permits and Regulation' or 'Procurement'. Sector fixed effects relate to whether the project is in the administration, environment, finance, infrastructure, security/diplomacy/justice or social sector. Project controls comprise project-level controls for whether the project is regularly implemented by the organization or a one off, whether the project is a bundle of interconnected outputs, and whether the division has to coordinate with actors external to government to implement the project. Capital controls comprise a count of the number of interviews undertaken, which is a close approximation of the total number of employees. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications, and the span of control. Noise controls are averages of indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of all respondents, the average time of day the interview was conducted and of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
21 Future studies will be challenged to develop feasible and salient incentive strategies for reducing risky FSW behaviors, as well as in recruiting an even larger sample than the already large sample size of over 2,000 FSW that we enrolled. The FSW who remained in the study reported favorable views of the study—even those in the control group. Although these responses could reflect social desirability bias, their decision to remain in the study suggests that they did find value in the services offered them. How best to leverage this interest with other behavior change intervention designs remains a high priority research question for slowing HIV/STI transmission among this key node for disease spread.

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