rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
assume that the informal sector corresponds to sole-traders (own account workers) and those in small or micro enterprises. “Small” or “micro” is defined arbitrarily and may depend on questionnaire design. For example, from recent research which makes use of such a definition of informality, Prahan and van Soest (1995, 1997) and Maloney (1999) use a definition of fewer than six employees for Bolivia and Mexico respectively; Funkhouser (1996) uses fewer than five employees for an analysis of five Central American economies; Marcoullier et al. (1997) use fewer than six for Mexico and Peru; Cohen and House (1996) use fewer than 20 for Sudan; Livingstone (1991) uses fewer than 10 for Kenya. Galli and Kucera (2004) undertake an international comparative study across 14 Latin America countries. They employ a definition adopted by the ILO based on employees in firms of either fewer than 5 or 10 employees (depending on the country). Comparability is compromised because of limited detailed information on the size distribution of firms.

Where authors have been particularly concerned to highlight the role of informality in promoting entrepreneurship this definitional approach has been explicitly preferred over alternatives. However the attractiveness of defining informality as equivalent to the “entrepreneurial” sector side-steps the important conceptual question of how large does an establishment have to become for it to cease to be part of the dynamic, entrepreneurial sector. Some authors have introduced a further distinction into the definition of the informal sector by including some industrial activities and excluding others (most notably professional service activities). A shortcoming of this approach is that it excludes the possibility, even if it is an unlikely one, that some employees in small establishments may have contracts of employment which conform to labor market regulations and may contribute to social insurance schemes. It 7
This article examines the empirical determinants of the probability of product innovation in a large sample of over 25,000 manufacturing firms from around the world, covering 68 developing and high-income economies and eight manufacturing industries. We assess the merits of the three alternative sets of hypotheses related to microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the probability of product innovation by incumbent firms. This multi level analysis, encompassing the firm, industry and country levels of analysis, thus provides a novel nested empirical assessment of competing hypotheses regarding the nature of the probability of product innovation. The econometric evidence supports the Global Engagement and Informational Spillover hypotheses at both the firm and national levels of analysis, but provides mixed evidence for the Market Structure hypotheses.

# **Three sets of hypotheses on the probability of product innovation in economics and IB**

Even in the context of high-income countries, the determinants of the probability of product innovation across firms might be different from those of patentable innovation. In the IB literature, there has been some analysis of how patents can help solve informational problems that affect firm valuations (Heeley _et al._ 2007). When innovation, including product innovation, cannot be patented, then the incentives facing firms to introduce new products are somewhat different. In the economics literature, Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter (2005) find in a panel of firms from the United Kingdom that the correlates of patents and product innovation are different, particularly with respect to the role played by linkages between firms and universities, the latter being more important for patentable innovations. Another example is the study by Aghion _et al._ (2006) that found that the response of U.K. firms (measured by productivity changes and patenting) to increased competition due to the regulatory reforms of the Thatcher government was different across firms, depending on their distance to the technological frontier (the productivity gap with respect to the most productive firms in each industry). Yet we still have much to learn about the empirical correlates of product innovation around the world.

# The Global Engagement literature

A distinct literature concerns the relationship between Global Engagement and innovation by firms. One strand of this literature, surveyed by Keller (2004), focuses on the role of international technology diffusion. That is, firms might be able to innovate and improve their productivities if they have access to imports of foreign technology or capital goods used for production. Eaton and Kortum (1996), however, found that imports are not necessarily correlated with technology flows proxied by patent applications, after controlling for bilateral distance among trading partners in the context of the gravity model of trade. More recent evidence provided by MacGarvie (2006) with French firm data combined with data on patent 2
After taking office in July 1990, Albert Fujimori pursued a bold reform agenda, moved the Peruvian economic onto a right track. (1) When price control was eliminated in August 1990, price rose 500% overnight and then inflation dropped several months later. (2) Public spending was cut through down-sizing the public sector. (3) Tight monetary policy under the term of he 1993 IMF agreement required informal currency fully backed by foreign reserves. (4) Privatization and investment promotion to finance economic development. (5) Tax reform led to tax collection from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 13.9% of GDP in 1995. In 1995, Albert Fujimori was elected for the second term.

## Reference

1. World Bank. _Country Brief: Peru._ February 23, 1996.

2. Economic Intelligence Unit. _Country Profile: Peru._ 15 Regent Street, London SWIY 4LR United Kingdom. 1992/93, 1993/94, 1995/96, & 1996/97.

# **The Philippines**

## **History**

In 1521, the Spanish expedition led by Ferdinand Magellan reached the Philippines. Forty years later, European settlers come for the purpose religious conversion, with little resistance from the local Malay people. At the beginning of the 19th century, the European settlers engaged in economic activities. The Chinese entrepreneurial class formed the elite based on land ownership. In 1896 the local people mounted a rebellion against Spain. After the US intervention, Spain ceded the Philippines to the USA in 1898. The struggle for independence continued against the US. The Filipino-American War (1899-1902) ended with the imposition of the US colonial rule, and semi-colonial control after 1935. Both English education and democratic institutions were introduced into this country. The planned independence of 1946 was interrupted by Japanese invasion in December 1941. The US forces under the leadership of General MacArthur liberated the land during the World War II. The Philippines gained its full independence on schedule in 1946.

## **Close Tie with the US** (1946-1974)

The newly independent republic maintained preferential economic relations with the USA. Under the Laurel Langley Agreement, certain quota of goods was allowed duty-free access to the US market until 1954 and the tariffs gradually moved up to full scale by 1974. The parity for US citizen also continued until 1974. Two major US military bases, the Clark Field air base and the Subic Bay naval base were stationed in the Philippines until 1991-92. Like the political system in the US, power was alternated between two parties, the Nationalists and the Liberals.

## **Marcos Autocracy (1967-72-83-86)**

64
**Table 1: Study estimates of the demand for emission reductions and the size of the CDM market.**

||**Annex I countries' demand**<br>**for emission reductions**<br>**under the Kyoto Protocol**|**Potential size of the CDM**<br>**market**|
|---|---|---|
|**Study**|**MtCO2e**|**per year**|
|Blanchard, Criqui, and Kitous (2002)<sup>a</sup>|688−862|0−174|
|Eyckmans et al. (2001)<sup>a</sup>|1414−1713|261−499|
|Grutter (2001)<sup>a</sup>|1000−1500|0−500|
|Haites (2004)<sup>b</sup>|600−1150|50−500|
|Halsnaes (2000)<sup>b</sup>|600−1300|400-520|
|Holtsmark (2003)<sup>b</sup>|1246−1404|0−379|
|Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002)<sup>a</sup>|1040|0−465|
|Vrolijk (2000)<sup>b</sup>|640−1484|300−500|
|Zhang (2000)<sup>b</sup>|621|132−358|
|**Range **|**600−1713**|**0−520**|

Note:<sup>a</sup> Model ssumes that only the United States does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol;<sup>b</sup> Model assumes that Australia and the United States do not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

Sources: Haites (2004); Zhang (2000).

53
important indicators of the improvement in the overall welfare as individuals and households tend to engage in purchase of more durable goods and other long-terms assets than basic consumption commodities as they and their national economy become more prosperous. Thus, understanding the dynamics of ownership of durable goods is useful and possibly more reliable alternative to consumption and income measures when it comes to understanding structural poverty and longer-term socio-economic dynamics.<sup>4</sup> In Bulgaria, much like elsewhere, less emphasis has been paid to the understanding of individual and household welfare dynamics associated with the accumulation of durable goods. For example, we have no answer to the following questions: What happened to the distribution of durable goods over time? Who in the asset space benefited the most from the enhanced economic growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s and by how much? What is the trend in ownership of durable goods among various socio-economic groups?

This paper uses the repeated cross-sections of Bulgaria’s household survey data (1995, 1997, 2001, and 2003) and a comparable list of durable goods to investigate the dynamics and the distribution of durables over time, including the period of the 1996-1997 economic crises and the subsequent period of relatively robust economic growth leading up to 2003. It examines the dynamics of the ownership of durable goods by wealth classes, geographic locations, and various ethnic groups, including the Roma. We examine how measures of material deprivation (durable goods ownerships) move as the economy grows and incomes rise. For instance, we look at the share of low- income families owning durable goods such as a car, washing machine, color TV, or computer over time and across socio-economic groups. Understanding how these measures of material deprivation move is important to draw inferences about the well-being of the poor as this will depend in part on whether households with low incomes nevertheless possess similar material goods, or whether they are lacking items possessed by more affluent households.

The paper uses a straightforward, yet very reliable approach to investigating the changes in the distribution of ownership of durable goods over time. We look at the trends in the possession of

> 4 The literature on the poverty dynamics increasingly recognizes the importance of adopting an asset-based approach to the study of the changes in well-being to better distinguish the deep-rooted, persistent structural poverty from the transitory one (see Carter and Barrett, 2006, and the literature reviewed there).

- 3 -
# ¢ **abl** 14: BqpaitL*s **(as a** percentage of **assets)**

||1970|1975|1960|1985|1990*|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|UK|49|30|52|62|63|
|us|45|42|41|43|46|
|**Germany**|4|5|9|12|is|
|Japan|6|10|9|16|27|
|Canada|22|25|21|28|29|
|Netherlands|11|11|5|11|20|
|Sweden|0|0|0|0|1|
|Iwltzorland|3|5|9|12|16|
|Denmark|0|0|3|6|7|

* 1989 for Canada 1987 for Denmark

# !able 15: Mortgages **(as a perceutage** of **assets)**

||1970|1975|1980|1985|1990*|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|UK|-|-|-|-||
|US|6|3|2|2|2|
|oermany|19|22|15|12|9|
|**Japan**|0|4|11|2|1|
|Canada|11|12|11|6|4|
|Notherlands|8|6|6|4|4|
|Sweden|-|-|-|-||
|Swltzerland|15|13|10|9|8|
|Denmark|6|2|3|8|6|

- 1989 for Canada 1987 for Denmark

28b
**Table 5. Human Capital of Traders in Benin and Malawi**

||B3enin|Malawi|
|---|---|---|
|**Education (% of traders)**|||
|Trader- no education/ illiterate|68.08|9.90|
|Mother - no education/illiterate|97.71|26.70|
|Father- no education/illiterate|90.40|53.20|
|**Marital status (% of traders)**|||
|Married|89.26|82.20|
|Single|3.78|7.50|
|Divorced|1.82|5.00|
|Widow/er|5.14|5.30|
|**Traders' Age**|||
|<br>Mean (S.d)|40.71(10.52)|33.44 (9.16)|
|N|660|738|
|**Number of languages poken**|||
|Mean (S.d)|2.65 (1.39)|2.14 (1.15)|
|_N_|661|738|
|**Past primary occupation (% traders)**|||
|Agriculture/fishery/livestock|18.94|27.60|
|Agricultural trade|23.33|2.20|
|<br>Non-agricultural<br>trade|11.97|30.10|
|<br>Wage/civil servant|1.36|13.70|
|Student|7.88|12.20|
|None/housework|13.03|8.50|

Employees. Apart from the trader himself or herself, surveyed enterprises do not employ abundant manpower. The average total manpower of surveyed firms is 2.2 individuals in Benin and 1.5 in Malawi. Most employees are family workers. Non-family employees only amount to 0.4 to 0.5 persons on average. Employment levels also appear extremely stable, with no perceptible trend in employment levels.

Wages paid are very low. A large proportion of family workers receive no wage-around 70% in Benin, 40% in Malawi. Non-family workers nearly always receive a wage. Cases when they do not receive a wage probably correspond to apprenticeship contracts. For those non-family workers who receive a wage, the remuneration level is around $7 per month in Benin and $27 in Malawi. The large discrepancy in wage levels may be due to the presence of a small number of large, formal employers in Malawi. Contrary to 14
39 Sorge, Amdt and Wolfgang Streeck. 1988. Industrial<sup>Reations and Technical Change: The Case for</sup> an Extended Perspectlve. In R. Hyman and W. Streck<sup>**eds.,**New Technoloov and Industrhl</sup> RebtLnsa Oxford: Basl Blackwell: pp. 19.47.

Soskice, David. 1990. ^Ronterpreting Corpora_s **and** Explaining Unemployment: Coordinated<sup>and</sup> Non-coordinated Market Economies', In R. Brunedt and C. Del'Aringa, eds.,<sup>Labour Relations</sup> and Economic Perlormnce London: MacMUlian Pre.

Strck, Wolfgang. 1984a. Indusftl Reltions In Ws<sup>Gmanv: ACaseStudy of the Car Indusi,</sup> New York: St. Martin's Pre.

- Streeck, Wolfgang. 1984b. NeoCorporatiut Industrial<sup>Reltions and the Economic Crisis In West</sup> Germany,' In John H. Goldthorpe ed., Order and Cnflict In Contemoranrv<sup>Ceoltalism, Oxford:</sup> Oxford University Press: pp. 291414.

Tumrn, Lowell. 1991. Democracy at Workg: hanaina World Market<sup>and the Future of Unions, Ithaca,</sup> Now York: Cornell Universty Pres.

Ulman, Uoyd. 1968. Collective Bargaining **and** Industrial EfficIencyy inRonald E. Caves and Associates, Britain's Economic Prosoeitv, Washington, DC: The Brookings<sup>Institution.</sup> Wachter, Mihhael. 1976. wTh Changing Cyclical Revoansiveness ofWage InationO. Brookinas Papers on Iconomig ActMt. Vol. 1, Washington, DC: **The** Brookings Insitution: pp. 115-59.

Wekzman, Martin L 1984. The Shr Econom Cambridge: Harvard Univesty Press.

Windolf, Paul. 1989. ProducvMty Coalitins and the Future of Corporatism*, Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, (Winter): pp. 1-20.
representative household surveys permit proxy reporting for cost reasons, then further research is needed to assess the implications of this survey method on welfare indicators in each country.

# **9 Conclusion**

Labor market policies that address existing inequalities in access to and quality of jobs are needed more than ever, but especially during global crises (UN, 2023). As existing data reveal, a fundamental challenge when drafting such policies is the fact that measurements of female and youth labor market outcomes may be biased compared to measurements of these same outcomes for men. In this paper, we argue that part of the gap in employment and work between women and men as well as between young and older adults can be attributed to measurement bias—that is, standard survey methods might not be sensitive enough to measure these outcomes as accurately for women and youth as they do for men. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the sensitivity of survey methods by analyzing the data of a randomized survey experiment conducted in urban and peri-urban regions in El Salvador. The study design made it possible to compare employment and work estimates, obtained from a traditional labor module embedded in a household survey, with two variations in the collection of these outcomes: the LOA module and enforced self-reporting.

In addition, this paper illustrates the effectiveness of our novel survey methods in the context of the prevalence of informal employment and gender norms. We find that the LOA module increases women’s reporting of labor outcomes relative to other women who were not exposed to this module, irrespective of the level of peers’ informal employment within their communities. On the other hand, exposure to informality can influence the effectiveness of selfreporting survey methods (compared to proxy reporting) in the sample of men. We further observe that proxy respondents in communities with high levels of youth informal employment tend to underreport the labor indicators of their young household members. Conversely, those exposed to high levels of adult informal employment tend to overreport the labor indicators of their adult household members.

23
The most important result of this analysis is the identification of the WASP(-1) and WASP(+1) variables as the most significant climate factors in the regressions on GDP growth. The results are important for several reasons. First, they contradict the findings of previous studies that identify temperature as the most influential climate variable on GDP growth. Previous studies have used a coarse measure for precipitation that may obscure the precipitation effect. The WASP variables preserve the spatial variability, and the nonlinearity and asymmetry of precipitation effects and hence better capture their impacts on economic activity. Second, the prevailing thinking on climate change presumes that temperature is the key climate impact on economic activities. Estimates of temperature effects on economic growth are typically used in static projections of the economic impacts of climate change. This analysis shows that those projections are likely to be too simplistic. Precipitation variability has a stronger influence on economic growth than temperature. This complicates climate change impact assessments, since much more uncertainty surrounds projections of precipitation than temperature. Finally, these results should influence strategy for adaptation to climate change. These findings indicate that national economies are impeded by precipitation anomalies, periods of too much or too little precipitation. To prevent increasing damage to economic progress as a result of a changing climate, these results imply that adaptation strategies should focus on reducing the negative consequences of precipitation extremes. Hence, security of water resources should be a priority topic for adaptation planning.

Another interesting finding from this analysis was the significant effect of the WASP(+1) variable on GDP growth and on Industrial value added. The WASP(+1) is indicative of excess rainfall that may be associated with flooding. As discussed earlier, flooding is difficult to specify using monthly precipitation data. Unfortunately, there is a lack of globally available daily precipitation or streamflow data that could be used to more precisely describe flood risk for a particular country. Nonetheless, the results of the regression analysis using WASP(+1) are consistent with expectations for a flood effect. The WASP(+1) variable was found to be a significant explanatory variable for GDP growth at a slightly less significance 24
# **4. Results**

_Long-term effects_ We first investigate whether individuals that were exposed to severe droughts or floods while in utero or during their first year of life are less likely to participate in the labor market later in life. The 2008-09 IOF collects several variables that can be used to construct measures of participation in paid and unpaid activities. We constructed two indicators. The first one (Labor Participation 1) measures engagement or desire to work in remunerated activities, whereas the second one (Labor Participation 2) adds participation in non-remunerated activities –a form of labor engagement that is quite prevalent among workers in the country– to the first definition.

The results indicate that excess of rainfall while in utero had a negative effect on the probability to participate in the labor market in adulthood (Table 1). Affected individuals exhibit on average a participation rate that is 6% compared to the control mean. This finding is consistent across subsamples (all versus rural) and is also robust to the inclusion of spatial (i.e. district) fixed effects. Since the 2008-09 IOF survey did not collect the exact month of birth (but only the year) of the individuals interviewed, the window used to define the in utero and first year of life periods are a noisy measure of the actual stage of life. Arguably, this could explain why the effects of floods are seen only for individuals classified as being in utero. As for the droughts, they are not found to influence labor force participation, regardless of whether they were experienced while in utero or in the first year of life.

We also assess the effects of extreme weather on the well-being of individuals investigating the relationship between droughts and floods and expenditures per capita, as measured by the IOF 2008-09. The results indicate that extreme floods are associated with lower expenditures per capita and, consequently, higher likelihood of households with affected individuals to be poor (Table 2). Seeking to pinpoint the direct effects on household well-being, the subsample for this part of the analysis consists of individuals that are household heads. In line with the results on labor participation, households headed by individuals that were hit by floods while in utero and during early childhood record lower consumption per capita, approximately 14% lower than the median consumption of the comparison group. The results are statistically weaker for the rural subsample. Therefore, lower consumption per capita due to floods that affected individuals early in life 9