rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Estimating education production functions based on such observational data certainly has its limitations (cf., e.g., Glewwe and Kremer 2005). While the extensive PIRLS data does allow for several important features, including the estimation of a limited value-added specification, it cannot solve all the problems imminent to retrospective studies using observational data. What the presented results provide are informative knowledge on the relationship between students’ reading performance and a host of student, family and school characteristics, conditional on all the other characteristics considered. These are useful descriptive results which can inform policymaking when properly – and thus cautiously – interpreted. It should be clear from the start that they do _not_ necessarily always reflect a causal relationship in the sense that the student or school characteristics causally influenced reading performance by the amount of the estimated parameters. Given that observational data always emanate from individual choices, unbiased causal empirical estimates – if ever possible – can ultimately only come from experimental setups of one form or the other. It is hoped that the descriptive results presented here can serve as a first step that leads towards a better-informed quest for causal identifications in the future.

So far, little research has been done on the determinants of educational quality in Argentina and Colombia, and actually in Latin America more widely. The existing empirical research on educational production in Latin America is ably reviewed in Mizala and Romaguera (2002). For Argentina, the only work they cite is Llach et al. (1999), who analyze a national achievement test. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) provide an analysis of secondary school decentralization on educational test performance in Argentina. Research on Colombian educational quality focuses mainly on the relative performance of private and public schools (Cox and Jimenez 1991; Piñeros and Rodríguez 1998) and the Colombian voucher system (King et al. 1999; Angrist et al. 2002). With respect to other Latin American countries, somewhat more research has been done on Chile (cf. Sapelli 2002 and the contributions introduced therein), again with special emphasis on its voucher system (e.g., Mizala and Romaguera 2000; Sapelli and Vial 2002; Vegas 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola 2003) and the relative performance of private and public schools (Mizala et al. 2002). Further examples of the little recent work on educational quality in Latin America include Jimenez and Sawada (1999) on the effect of community involvement in El Salvador, Urquiola (2000) on class-size effects in Bolivia and Lopez-Acevedo (2004) on the effects of teacher development policies in Mexico. Schultz (2004), Coady and Parker (2004) and Bourguignon et al. (2003) analyze the effects on the enrollment of students of cash transfer schemes that are 3
27

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CÔTE D’IVOIRE’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 13 Côte d’Ivoire’s infrastructure spending needs**

Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP <!-- Start of picture text --> capital expenditure % of GDP operations and maintenance<br><!-- End of picture text --> Legend: LIC = low-income country, MIC = middle income country, ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009.

In the mid-2000s, Côte d’Ivoire spent $750 million per year on infrastructure (table 19). Power captures nearly 70 percent of spending, and O&M in the energy sector accounted for the majority of this total ($ 476 million per year). Capital expenditure accounts for only 34 percent of total spending<sup>1</sup> . Operating expenditure is entirely covered by budgetary resources and payments from infrastructure users. Strikingly, the private and household sectors accounts for 65 percent of total infrastructure investment. The largest areas of non-governmental finance are household investment in on-site sanitation facilities and private sector investment in ICT. Public investments account for another 30 percent of total investment. External financial support – whether from ODA or non-OECD financiers – is very low accounting for less than 10 percent of the total. ODA used to be a significant source of financial support for Côte d’Ivoire during the 1990s, but tailed-off during the crisis period and has only begun to resurface since 2008 (figure 16).

> 1 Operating expenditure here includes payments to the various Independent Power Producers and hence includes an important element of capital depreciation.

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Trade Organizations, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, is urging members to facilitate the transfer of technology for vaccine production to more countries. A spokesperson for the Switzerland-based public-private vaccine alliance GAVI has stated that the US supports manufacturers to transfer not only intellectual property but also know-how in a bid to boost global production (Zarocostas 2021).

# **Challenges**

Two of the common concerns raised about the prospects for manufacturing in African nations of are the business climate and the risk of political instability. These issues are real, but we believe they are much less important than a more fundamental issue: manufacturing around the world shows a pattern of rising capital intensity, which raises questions about the prospects for manufacturing in countries with a comparative advantage in low-skilled labor.

# _Rising Capital Intensity of Manufacturing_

Technological innovation in manufacturing in recent decades has favored capital over labor. At the same time, the spread of global value chains and increased openness to trade have had the effect of homogenizing technology around the world (Rodrik 2018). As a result, trade integration tends to reduce the employment intensity of manufacturing production in developing countries (Sen 2019). Thus, participation in global value chains tends to increase labor productivity, but not employment (Pahl and Timmer 2020). Indeed, Pahl et al (2019) show that technological change in formal manufacturing has led to employment declines in Kenya, Senegal and South Africa. This confluence of events makes it more difficult for low-income African countries to gain a foothold in formal manufacturing – even in their own domestic markets.

Using firm-level data from Ethiopia and Tanzania, Diao et al. (2021) show that the capital intensity of formal manufacturing in both countries far exceeds economywide capital intensity. This is especially true of the larger, most productive firms, where capital intensity approaches (or exceeds) levels observed in the Czech Republic, a country with per capita income around 20 times higher. High levels of capital intensity (and possibly of skill intensity as well, although the study does not measure that) appear to be an important reason behind the poor employment performance of Africa’s most productive manufacturing firms. This creates a conundrum for countries in Africa: competing with established producers on world markets is only possible by adopting technologies that make it harder to generate significant employment.

22
|Author (Year)|Study Type &<br>Location|Participants|Diet Assessed|Nutrition, health<br>outcomes assessed|Key findings|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||sectional), various<br>HICs and LMICs||legumes, whole grains)<br>[diet assessed by FFQ<br>(n=15), 24HR (n=5), 4-d<br>food record(n=1)]|GDM (n=6), PTB (n=9),<br>LBW (n=2)|(OR 0.78; 0.70, 0.86), GDM (OR 0.79; 0.56,<br>0.99), preterm birth (OR 0.75; 0.57, 0.93)|
|Tan, Zhao, and Wang<br>(2019)|SRM of 19<br>observational<br>studies|Pregnant women|Vegetarian Diet|LBW, birth weight,<br>GDM, maternal anemia|Association between vegetarian diet in<br>pregnancy and LBW was marginally<br>significant (1.27 (0.98, 1.65), P = 0.07). No<br>conclusive results regarding the risks of<br>maternal anemia and GDM|
|Liao et al. (2023)|SRM of 12 cohort<br>studies, including<br>China (5), the<br>Islamic Republic of<br>Iran(2)|Pregnant women<br>18+ y|Fruit, vegetable<br>consumption, highest vs<br>lowest intake quartile|GDM|Fruit consumption (n=8 studies)RR 0.92<br>(0.86, 0.99)<br>Vegetable consumption (4 studies) RR 0.95<br>(0.87, 1.03)|

Abbreviations: ASF animal source foods; BP blood pressure; F&V fruit and vegetable; GDM gestational diabetes mellitus; GHT gestational hypertension; GWG gestational weight gain; HT hypertension; LBW low birth weight; LGA large for gestational age; OR odds ratio; OWOB overweight and obesity; PTB preterm birth; RR relative risk; SGA small for gestational age; SSB sugarsweetened beverages; T2DM type 2 diabetes mellitus; UPF ultra processed food; Zn def’y zinc deficiency 30
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# spending. Section VI summarizes our findings.

# 11. LEVELS OF MIL1TARY EXPENDiTURE

In order to analyze the economic effects of military expenditures, it is<sup>useful to examine trends</sup> in such spending. Do some regions si 'ud more on the military than others?<sup>Are military expondita.ts</sup> increasing over time? As discussed in detail below, the available data suggest<sup>that military expenditure</sup> has generally been falling in recent years, that it is particularly high in specific<sup>regions, and that the poor-</sup> growth regions have relatively low levels of military spending.

A key problem in analyzing military expenditures Is obtaining reliable<sup>and accurate data on</sup> aggregate military spending. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Renearch<sup>Institute (SIPRI) are</sup> generally more comprehensive than those of the IMP's Government<sup>Financial Statistics (GFS) or the U.S.</sup> Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This paper uses military expenditure<sup>data from SIPRI,</sup> supplemented by data from ACDA for some earlier years.

Table 1 gives the mean levels of the military expenditure share (percentage)<sup>in GNP -</sup> abbreviated MES hereafter - for seven regions over the period<sup>1969-89. In addition, it provides the</sup> mean for all 71 countries in the sample ("PF!! Sample") and the mean<sup>excluding the Middle East and</sup> North Africa ("Full Sample 2").3 As can be seen from Table 1<sup>and Figure 1, the full sample was at its</sup> lowest level in 1939 at 3.9 percent of GDP, much below the peak of 5.3<sup>percent in 1976. In the sample</sup> excluding the high-spending Middle East and North Africa, military<sup>spending has varied very little on</sup> average over the years. In the Middle East and North Africa,<sup>spending in 1989 was far below their peak</sup> levels.' More important, from the standpoint of the relationship between<sup>military spending and growth,Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America-have</sup> the two regions with the most serious growth problems<sup>-</sup> on average been the lowest spenders on the military. Overall,<sup>therefore, the figures show that the bigest</sup>
I POLICY **RESEARCH WORKING PAPER** 1518

# **Summary findings**

Since 1989, private capital flows to a select group of developing countries have increased sharply, but developments in 1994 have caused concern about the sustainability of those flows. Several highly indebted developing countries that are implementing reform are concerned that a generalized reversal - similar to - episodes of capital flight in the early 1980s might disrupt their economies and threaten economic reform.

Because the surge in private capital flows coincided with a period of low international interest rates and intensive policy reform in developing countries, debate has been active about whether the surge is driven mainly by domestic (pull) or external (push) factors. Under the pull hypothesis, successful domestic policies are the key to ensuring sustainable capital inflows; under the push hypothesis, an increase in international interest rates would cause a reversal of those flows (back to the industrial world).

and Rudolph explain why private capital flows to some developing countries but not to others (using panel data for 1986-93 for 22 countries).

They argue that a generalized reversal is unlikely in countries that maintain a fundamentally sound macroeconomic environment. In fact, their empirical results show that domestic factors such as domestic savings and investment ratios significantly affected the recent surge in capital inflows.

Further, they suggest that countries that have not - received significant foreign capital including countries in Sub-Saharan Africa - could begin to if they implemented structural reforms that allow them to export, save, and invest at higher rates. Reducing their foreign debt (which might call for a continuation of recent debt reduction operations) could also help attract foreign private investors.

Using a partial adjustment model in which both domestic and external variables are defined, Hernandez

- - This paper a product of the International Finance Division, International Economics Department is part of a larger effort in the department to analyze policy implications of private capital flows to developing countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room N3046, telephone 202-473-1047, fax 202-522-3277, Internet address hvol@worldbank.org. October 1995. (35 pages)

**_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates_** _the findings of work_ **_In progress_** _to_ **_encourage_** _the_ **_exchange_** _of_ **_ideas_** _about_ **_development issues. An objective_** _of the_ **_series is toget the findings out_** _q,uickly,_ **_even_** _if the_ **_presentations_** _are less than fully polished. The_ **_papers carry the names_** _of_ **_the authors and_** _should be_ **_used and cited accordingly._** _The_ **_findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the autl7ors' own and_** _sbould_ **_not_** _be_ **_attributed_** _to_ **_the_** _World_ **_Bank, its_** _Executive_ **_B9oard_** _of Directors, or_ **_any_** _of_ **_its_** _member_ **_countries._**

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19. To the extent that the Bank project is representative of the sector as a whole, it is instructive to examine the project financing plan. The table below summarizes the average percent accounted for by each source of funds for the 10 projects of our sample.

||Average<br>Percent|<br>BAnu|Comments|
|---|---|---|---|
|Internal cash generation|<br>32|0- 70|0in 4 cases; 53% ave.<br>in other 6 cases|
|IBRD/IDA|30|13- 59||
|Otherexternal<br>loans|23|**0**- 50|0 in 1 case (Hungary)|
|Government loans|4|0- 43|0 in 9 cases; 43% in<br>Hungary|
|Government equity|7|0- 35|0 in 6 cases; 17% ave.<br>in other 4 cases|
|Other<br>TOTAL|4<br>100|0- 40|0 in 9 cases; 40% from<br>private operators in 1|

20. Beyond the financial health of the eniterprise, it would be useful to know the net contribution that sector revenues make to the government budget. This is generally significant in the oil producing countries, but such information is rarely included in SARs. Most of the pricing studies financed under project loans provide such figures.

# B.5 Use of Pricing Covenants

21. Eight of the ton projects included at least one pricing covenant. In many cases these required specific changes in the level or structure of prices, sometimes following from the recommendations of pricing studies carried out under earlier loans. With respect to oil prices, four projects contained producer pricing covenants and two dealt with consumor prices. In Pakistan, producer prices were linked with border prices. In China a costing study was to be carried out to provide better management information and improve operating performance. In India and Thailand a cost-plus formula was agreed for producer prices of crude oil (India) and ex-refinery product prices (Thailand). Consumer prices were the subject of covenants in Hungary and Argentina. In Hungary the general principle of linking domestic prices to border prices was reaffirmed, while in Argentina specific increases in the prices of diesel and fuel oil were agreed to meet relative price targets in terms of gasoline prices. It is inappropriate to judge these recommendations out of context, but at least in this sample efficiency objectives were more often sacrificed at the producer price level than at the consumer price level.
Among the IUCN status variables, the results for national parks are the most consistent and noteworthy. Across Africa, LAC and Asia/Pacific, national parks achieve greater protection, and the effect has similar orders of magnitude in all three regions. Strict nature reserves benefit significantly from stronger protection in Asia/Pacific and LAC, but not in Africa. On the other hand, habitat management areas are more effectively protected in LAC and Africa, but not in Asia/Pacific. Parks that are zoned for sustainable natural resource use are significantly better protected in LAC, but not in the other two regions.<sup>7</sup> In Asia/Pacific, we have apparent confirmation of the species charisma effect: The presence of tiger habitat in parks has a positive, significant impact on the effectiveness of protection.<sup>8</sup> This may well reflect additional funding by domestic and international conservation donors, as well as greater administrative focus on monitoring and enforcement within park boundaries.

In the literature, there is a disagreement on the “best practices” for forest conservation (for example, Shahabuddin and Roa 2010 and Wilshusen et al 2002). Our results for eleven park management categories are almost entirely insignificant, with one stellar exception: Management by indigenous peoples has large, highly-significant positive effects on protection in Asia/Pacific and Latin America. We have no result for Africa, where collinearity has forced exclusion of this variable. Only one other management variable has significance in any region: Management by sub-national ministries makes a large, positive, highly-significant contribution to protection in Asia/Pacific. In light of Indonesia’s sizable representation in the sample, this provides at least a hopeful suggestion that Indonesia’s recent emphasis on administrative decentralization has yielded positive results in this domain.

> 7 High variability of  effectiveness between Protected Area categories has been documented for East Africa’s evergreen forests also by Pfeifer et al. 2012. Three global studies conducted by Joppa and Pfaff, 2011, Scharelmann et al. 2010, and Nelson and Chomitz, 2009 also highlighted increase in effectiveness  of  Protected Area with stricter protection as implied by the IUCN categories  (Geldmann et al. 2013).

> 8 For tiger habitats see Forrest et al. (2011)

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