Republic, Nicaragua, and Bolivia) did not significantly change their positions in the Regulatory Autonomy Index, some countries in the middle and lowest positions of the Political Autonomy Index experienced a significant improvement in their standing in the Regulatory Autonomy Index. This was particularly the case for Panama, Guatemala, Colombia, and Chile. Panama leads the Regulatory Autonomy Index with the maximum score (1.00), leaving its middle position in political autonomy (0.68). Guatemala experiences a notorious improvement that places it among the leading countries in regulatory autonomy (0.92), leaving its middle position in political autonomy (0.66). Finally, both Colombia and Chile leave their places as worst performers in political autonomy (0.53 and 0.40, respectively), reaching an average score of 0.76 in the Regulatory Autonomy Index.

The changes experienced by regulatory agencies in political vs. regulatory autonomy explains the importance of linking political independence to the expansion of the agencies’ regulatory powers. In other words, an agency can have the highest level of independence from political authorities, but no relevant powers in the regulation of the sector, making independence an abstract characteristic of the agency’s functioning with no real impact on regulation. The same conclusion was observed in an assessment of European electricity regulators, where it was found that even if regulatory agencies shared the same regulatory objectives, there were significant variations in the means the regulators have to pursue to achieve those objectives (Johannsen, 2003).

# **D. Formal vs. Informal:**

It was previously said that there were no significant differences between the formal and informal elements of agencies’ autonomy at the regional level. At the specific agency level, only Uruguay’s _Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Energía y Agua_ and Ecuador’s _Consejo Nacional de Electricidad_ experience a variation between the formal and informal aspects of their autonomy. Uruguay significantly improves upon its formal autonomy position (0.67), becoming the best performer in the Informal Autonomy Index (0.93). On the other hand, Ecuador experiences a significant drop from its formal autonomy score (0.82), becoming the worst performer in the Informal Autonomy Index (0.54).

**Figure 11: Formal Autonomy Index**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Formal Autonomy Index<br>Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.<br>1<br>.8<br>Index (0-1) .6.4<br>.2<br>0<br>PER R D NIC BOL ESV BRA PAN T1 BAR ARG ECU JAM C R T&T MEX GUA T2 COL URU HON CHI<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 12: Informal Autonomy Index**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Informal Autonomy Index<br>Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.<br>1<br>.8<br>Index (0-1) .6.4<br>.2<br>0<br>URU BOL NIC R D C R ARG GUA BRA T&T T1 PER BAR ESV PAN MEX JAM HON COL CHI T2 ECU<br><!-- End of picture text --> There is not necessarily a relationship between the indicators of formal and informal elements of agencies’ autonomy. Indicators of formal autonomy represent several aspects of an agency’s political, managerial, and regulatory autonomy. Indicators of informal autonomy are mostly represented by political autonomy characteristics. Hence, the presence of Uruguay and Ecuador at the top and bottom, respectively, of the informal autonomy index might explain the degree of actual

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