2002 and 2003 for the SG in Table 5, and the year of and year after the initiation of the AD/CVD investigation in Table 6.

We summarize our comparison of the two different classes of TTB policies with Figure 3, which plots the overall time path and the size of the effects for these different policy outcomes to show the full effect on trade after two years.<sup>32</sup> In the case of products and countries hit with the SG, imports fell to roughly 56 percent of their pre-SG level after two years. This is slightly larger than products hit with AD/CVD, for which imports fell to only 46 percent of their pre-investigation level after two years.

Figure 3 also illustrates that products that were excluded from the 2002 SG were 44 percent higher than their pre-SG level after two years. This is quite close to the estimated 9 percent higher level of imports for products that were “excluded” from applied AD/CVD import restrictions after two years, relative to their pre-investigation level. This is our most striking evidence of the similarity in the discriminatory trade effects – or policy substitutability – between the US steel safeguard applied in 2002 and the other applications of US TTBs under antidumping and countervailing duty policies.

We next consider Table 6, column (4), which is the same specification as column (3) but which further subdivides the instances in which an exporter _i_ was excluded from US applied AD/CVD on product _h_ into three outcomes: a) exporter _i_ was not part of the investigation; b) exporter _i_ was part of the investigation but did not even face preliminary duties; or c) exporter _i_ was part of the investigation and faced preliminary duties but they were revoked and final duties were not imposed. To interpret the coefficient estimates, begin with the year of the initiation of the investigation. Column (4) provides evidence of a substantial positive differential for the import growth rates of countries that were not even part of the investigation (123 percentage points), or which were investigated, but for which not even preliminary duties were imposed (123 percentage points). However, some of this differential effect reverses itself the following year.

Figure 4 plots the implications of these estimated differentials on the trade flows for the three years following the initiation of the investigation to illustrate both the time path and the full effect of these trade policy outcomes under AD/CVD. Over the three years, Figure 4 illustrates some evidence of what Staiger and Wolak (1994) term an “investigation effect” that is associated with AD/CVD cases. To establish the benchmark, products from countries that were never investigated (but for which they are exporters of a product _h_ that was investigated) have exports after three years that are 117 percent higher than pre-investigation levels. Products that were investigated but for which not even preliminary duties

> 32 This figure is based on the estimates in column (3) of Table 5 and 6. They are thus based on import growth rates for these products relative to the set of steel products that also faced investigations but for which no countries faced an import restriction.

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