rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- 40 -

106. The depressing reality is that in 1987, world military expenditures may have topped $930 billion, a sum, equivalent to the income of 2.6 billion people in the 44 poorest countries.<sup>57</sup> Anyone who has followed the protracted U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations can be under no illusion about the difficulty of effecting major reductions, even under the best diplomatic circumstances. Throughout the world large and politically influential military-economic structures remain in place and are ready to respond to the still painfully real security needs of developing countries. It is, alas, unrealistic to imagine that military symptoms will be treated ahead of curing the underlying political and social ills.

107. Gathering ard analyzing data on militarv expenditures in order to build theories about disarmament vs. development trade-offs, that actually have little political salience for the governments concerned, has been a favorite exercise among academic peace researchers for years. This is, however, not a task for the research departments of multilateral development institutions. Monitoring international arms flow3 and production trends involving developing countries, including a growing number of Third World procducers and exporters, is relatively easy and could be a useful indicator of regional tensions and of development plans gone awry and would complement the multilateral peace built on efforts of the multilateral financial institutions noted earlier.

Continued from previous page statements can be obtained from Michael Intriligator, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1486.

- / Chris Smith, "Weapons for the Third World," Peace and Security, Summer 1987, pp. 2-4.

5-7/ Sivard, op. cit. p.5.
<!-- Start of picture text --> A:Public Schools B:Charter Schools C:Private Schools<br>80% — Se<br>%, 60% SE —<br>£<br>53 40% — OTT oS —=2003<br>& 20% —=2007<br>0% a EECEEERDEEE ECE<br>K12345678 9101112 K12345678 9101112 K12345678 9101112<br>Grade Grade Grade<br>Note: Shares are calculated relative to the total enrollment per grade, where total = aggregate enrollment over public, charter and private schools.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Shares are calculated relative to the total enrollment per grade, where total = aggregate enrollment over public, charter and private schools.

<!-- Start of picture text --> A. Number of Public, Charter and Private Schools by Grade, 2003 and 2007 B. Average Grade Enrollment in Public, Private and Charter Schools, 2007<br>120 =<br>100oe [RESee 200wl dr<br>*9 a:| ee<br>os Charter 2003 LdCS<br>{| Chanter 2007 iaoo. 5]<br>50 SO SBeS re, “Public 2003 ‘ee aaa _—<br>40 Public 2007 80 yg sé) :<br>30 |oY ie —®=Private 2003 60 y<br>10 OOO VO Mo Ngee nooooeseed<br>00<br>K1234567Grade 8 9 101112 PUFAROH E EOD<br>Grade<br><!-- End of picture text -->
_23_ _whereby Japan and Europe gradually caught up with best practice technology, as it had evolved in the Vnted States over the preceding thirty, forty years, together perhaps with the stimulus and the posltive shock, in a sense, due to the combination of post-war reconstruction and the liberalization of international trade, the reduction of trade barriers._ _It Is, of course, quite possible that the Keynesian consensus, as Boltho describes It, dld also contribute. There were very high growth expectations. Governments actively sought co smooth out the cycle and to stimulate growth. But in examining and coming out with a hypothesis of the possible contribution of this Keynesian consensus, I would also take into account some of the problems that followed after the war. Expanslonary flscal policies perhaps were pursued a bit too long wlth the result 'hat wage expectations became unrealistic relative to underlying productivity growth, with the result that wage earners, unions in many countries essentially forgot that they also had a kind of responsibility for what happened to real wages and thereby demand for labor._ _To adjust these expectacions again was obviously associated with enormous costs. So, in discussing and trying to measure the impact of the Keynesian consensus, there was probably a positive impact during those twenty-five years, but I would deduct from that some of the subsequent adjustment costs that were associated with adjusting expectations downward to a more sustainable level._ _As a basis for looking ahead, given that I think it is not unreasonable to make the claim that there is not much more of a productivity gap -o close between the major countries. I think it is safe to start out with the assumption that maybe the underlying secular trend, wherever it comes from, may have reasserted itself. Raising growth And the question then becomes: Are there factors that relative to its would allow us, temporarily perhaps, to ra,se growth relative to this trend... underlying trend of perhaps 2-1/2 to 3 percent -- are the faccors that would allow us to raise growth relative to that or are chere factors that would tend to suggest that growth might accually turn out co be weaker than this trend?_ _I believe that it is the positive factors which will emerge -- and it is mainly the positive factors you have been looking at_ - _- I would agree- with most of what Boltho has said -md what he has written in his interesting paper. But I would also very much emphasize the possible gains that might arise from further trade liberalization, particularly in the area of agricultural policies. This could provide a significant boost to potential upward growth in Japan, in Europe and in the United States._ _I would also, in general, emphasize the contribution of micro policies to structural reforms, although it is hard co quancify or measure them._ WPIPROCISF: **jsq**
More interesting than the aggregates in Table 7 are the columns on migration between neighboring countries. For these major migrant countries, we have used the bilateral dataset to calculate the proportion of migrants who come from or go to countries with a land border with the target country. The striking feature of these columns is the wide variety of experience. For India and Iran, over 90 percent of the flow is from such neighboring countries and for Hong Kong and Côte d'Ivoire over 80 percent. Pakistan, on the other hand, receives most migrants from Bangladesh and has only 17 percent from contiguous countries. At the other extreme, Australia and Israel have hardly any. It is not difficult to explain these patterns intuitively. Australia has no land neighbors and Israel’s immigration is mainly religious, but it is useful to have them confirmed statistically and useful also to recognize the difficulty of making generalizations about neighborhood effects on migratory flows.

Turning to the genuinely bilateral data, Table 8 aggregates the data into 12 receiving and sending regions, expressing the recorded stocks as percentages of the total migratory stock: each 0.01 percent corresponds to about 17,500 people. The first feature to note is the strong diagonal: much migration takes place within regions. Nearly 17 percent of recorded migration occurs with Europe and Central Asia (ECA): we do not know precisely how much of this is created by border changes, but we suspect that the majority of it is. The second largest item in this aggregation is the stock of Latin Americans (including Mexicans) in the USA. The third and fourth largest are those within Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) and South Asia (SAS). The latter two show clearly that SouthSouth migration is quantitatively significant.

18
I use the bias-yield relationship observed in Figure 6 to estimate district TFPs.<sup>11</sup> The principal assumption is that the dependence continues to hold for districts in Bihar. I also assume that the relative yields in the initial year reflect differences in relative TFPs. Table 7 reports the convergence results after adjusting for the bias. Panels A and B correspond to the two 20-year periods shown in Figure 6. The patterns of convergence remain broadly consistent with the baseline results where rice and wheat productivities are moving from convergence to divergence. Like in the case of yields, the pace of divergence in maize TFPs has been increasing. Therefore, under the above assumptions, the exercise suggests that the baseline results are robust to the choice of productivity measure. Still, future research should try and bring first-hand data on inputs under analysis, which will help establish the yield-TFP relationship at smaller geographical units.

# **References**

**<mark>Avila, Antonio Flavio Dias, and Robert E. Evenson.</mark>** <mark>“Total factor productivity growth in agriculture: the role of technological capital.”</mark> _<mark>Handbook of Agricultural Economics</mark>_ <mark>4 (2010): 3769-3822.</mark>

**<mark>Ball, V. Eldon, Jean-Christophe Bureau, Jean-Pierre Butault, and Richard Nehring (2001).</mark>** “Levels of farm sector productivity: An international comparison.” _Journal of Productivity Analysis_ 15.1: 5-29.

**Ball, V. Eldon, Charles Hallahan, and Richard Nehring (2004).** “Convergence of productivity: An analysis of the catch-up hypothesis within a panel of states.” _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_ 86.5: 1315-1321.

**Bandyopadhyay, D. (2009).** “Lost opportunity in Bihar.” _Economic and Political Weekly_ : 12-14.

**Banerjee, Abhijit (2004).** “Who is getting the public goods in India? Some evidence and some speculation.” _India’s Emerging Economy_ : 183-213.

**Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer (2005).** “History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India.” _American Economic Review_ 95.4: 1190-1213.

**Bansil, Puran Chand (2011).** “Bihar agriculture: A perspective.” _Concept Publishing Company_ , Delhi, India.

**Barro, Robert J., Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Olivier Jean Blanchard, and Robert E. Hall (1991).** “Convergence across states and regions.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 107-182.

**Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992).** “Convergence.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 100.2: 223251.

**Baumol, William J. (1986).** “Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: What the long-run data show.” _American Economic Review_ , 1072-1085.

**Bhalla, G. S., & Singh, G. (2010).** “Growth of Indian agriculture: A district level study.” _Planning Commission_ , Government of India.

> 11 By regressing the TFP growth on yield growth, I first obtain the slope and intercept coefficients to predict TFP growth for Bihar districts. Then, under the assumption that relative yields in the initial year approximate relative TFPs, it is straightforward to construct TFP series using estimates of TFP growth.

19
|Household consumed biscuits, buns, scones|0.047|0.023|0.047|0.023|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Household consumed potato|0.080|0.040|0.079|0.040|
|Household consumed beef|0.130|0.062|0.129|0.062|
|Household consumed eggs|0.105|0.040|0.104|0.040|
|Household purchased cigarettes or other tobacco|0.005|0.001|0.001|0.000|
|Household purchased matches|-0.024|-0.010|-0.023|-0.010|
|Household purchased toothpaste, toothbrush|0.131|0.063|0.130|0.063|
|Household purchased personal products|0.058|0.029|0.058|0.029|
|Household purchased petrol or diesel|0.167|0.047|0.164|0.046|
|Household purchased cleaning products|0.162|0.042|0.161|0.042|
|Household spent on taxes|0.032|0.008|0.032|0.008|
|Household spent on wedding|0.076|0.035|0.075|0.035|
|Household purchased education|0.078|0.012|0.074|0.011|
|Household purchased schoolbooks|-0.044|-0.017|-0.043|-0.017|
|Cereals, Grains, and Cereal Products|-0.089|-0.022|-0.088|-0.022|
|Fruits|0.077|0.038|0.077|0.038|
|Meat, Fish and Animal Products|0.041|0.014|0.039|0.013|
|Milk/Milk Products|0.124|0.056|0.123|0.056|
|Nuts and Pulses|0.060|0.024|0.059|0.023|
|Root, Tubers, and Plantains|0.045|0.020|0.044|0.019|
|Spices/Condiments|-0.290|-0.066|-0.282|-0.064|
|Sugar/Sugar Products/Honey|0.080|0.032|0.080|0.032|
|Vegetables|-0.000|-0.000|-0.005|-0.001|
|_cons|14.281|0.000|14.277|0.000|
|MSE|0.18||0.18||
|R squared|0.63||0.63||
|N|1182||1,182||

70
- Finan, F. and L. Schechter. 2011. “Vote Buying and Reciprocity,” Available at SSRN: <u>http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330137</u>

- Fujiwara, Thomas and Leonard Wantchekon, 2012. “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin,” Working Paper, Princeton University

- Fujiwara, Thomas. 2011. “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil,” Working Paper, Princeton University

- Ghuman, Sharon, Jere R. Behrman, Judith B. Borja, Socorro Gultiano, and Elizabeth M. King. 2005. “ Family background, service providers, and early childhood development in the Philippines: Proxies and interactions,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 129-164.

- Glewwe, Paul and Elizabeth M. King. 2001. “The Impact of Early Childhood Nutritional Status on Cognitive Development: Does the timing of malnutrition matter?” The World Bank Economic Review, 15(1): 81-113.

- Gwatkin D., Shea Rutstein, Kiersten Johnson, Eldaw Suliman, Adam Wagstaff and Agbessi Amouzou, 2007. Socio-economic differences in health, nutrition and population: Philippines 1998, 2003, The World Bank, Washington DC

- Hutchcroft, Paul D. and Joel Rocamora. 2003. “Strong demands and weak institutions: the origins and evolution of the democratic deficit in the Philippines,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 3: 259-292.

- Keefer, P. and S. Knack, 2007. “Boondoggles, rent-seeking, and political checks and balances: public investment under unaccountable governments,” _Review of Economics and Statist_ ics, 89(3): 566-572

- Keefer, Philip and Razvan Vlaicu. 2008. “Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,” 24(2): 371-406.

Keefer, P. and Stuti Khemani. 2011. “Mass Media and Public Services: The Effects of Radio Access on Public Education in Benin,” Policy Research Working Paper Number 5559, Development Research Group, The World Bank

- Keefer, P. and Stuti Khemani. 2012. “Do Informed Citizens Receive More or Pay More? The Impact of Radio on the Government Distribution of Public Health Benefits,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 5952, Development Research Group, The World Bank

- Khemani, Stuti. 2012. “Political economy of infrastructure spending in India,” In Chetan Ghate (Ed.) _The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Economy_ . Oxford University Press

- Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2008. _Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition._ Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

27
language uses a sex-based system of grammatical gender are less likely to implement gender quotas for political office, while Santacreu-Vasut, Shenkar, and Shoham (2014) find that countries those countries also have relatively fewer women in corporate leadership positions. Hicks, Santacreu-Vasut, and Shoham (2015) show that immigrants to the United States assign tasks within the household along gendered lines if they grew up speaking a gender language; no such difference is found among immigrants who came to the U.S. before the age of language acquisition, or among the children of immigrants.<sup>10</sup> Importantly, these findings suggest that one’s native language plays a particularly crucial role in shaping one’s views on the appropriate role for women in society. Our main contribution is the creation of a new data set characterizing the grammatical gender structure of most of the world’s native languages, allowing us to replicate and extend existing work to a much larger range of countries and contexts.

# **3 Data**

More than four thousand of the world’s living languages have at least one thousand native speakers, and 383 languages have more than one million native speakers (Lewis, Simons, and Fennig, eds., 2016). Moreover, very few countries are entirely devoid of linguistic heterogeneity, and many countries have two or more widely spoken languages that differ in terms of their gender structure.<sup>11</sup> Developing countries, in particular, tend to be characterized by relatively high ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997).

We compile a new data set characterizing the gender structure of more than 4,000 living languages. Together, the languages that we classify account for over 99 percent of the world’s population. As discussed below, we compile data from a range of academic publications, pedagogical materials (e.g. language textbooks), and historical sources. The

> 10In related work, Gay, Hicks, Santacreu-Vasut, and Shoham (forthcoming) find that female immigrants to the United States exhibit lower labor market participation (working fewer hours, fewer weeks, etc.) if they speak a gender language at home.

> 11Only four countries are linguistically homogeneous (i.e. have only one native language that is common to all citizens): Cabo Verde, Maldives, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and San Marino (Lewis, Simons, and Fennig, eds., 2016).

12
- 1.16 -

Tabt LS.1 0: Mean Lbr Requiremnt for Farm **OperatioB** (man days)

|**Region**|Bush<br>Ceaing|Tres<br>**Chopping**|Buming|Cleaning<br>('am)|W"ding/<br>Hoeing|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|North|6.9|3.2|1|4.8|7.1|
|South|13.2|8.1|1|9.1|14.2|
|_Ghana_|'V.S|7 6|1|8.7|_14_3|

Land preparation begins before the onset of the rains. In the South, the months of January, February and the fIrst half of March _are_ devoted to land preparation. The rains do not start In the North until late April or early May. Land preparation therefore starts around February and continues until April.

Plants can be planted In different ways, somethnes depending upon the crop and other tkmes upon the practice. For some crops, seeds can be sowed directly and for others, the seeds would have to be nursed Into seedlings before transplanting. The time required for planting depends upon the type of crop. It can take anything fr m one day for rice to 17 days for cocoyam. For instance, whereas rice can be broadcast, seed drills would have to be made for maize, mounds are made for yams, and holes are dug for oil pakm seedlings, cocoyam corms and plantain suckers. Fresh cocoa beans can be sowed directly. This Is the normal practice during rehabilitation of a farm when some dead trees are replaced. As recommended, replanting requires that the cocoa seedlings are raised In a nursery before transplanting them In the field.

When the seeds or seedlings are planted, certain operatlons are carrled out to take care of the plants. Cocoa trees need shade when they are young and so apart from leaving a few trees on the land durng land preparation, plantains and cocoyams are planted. These food crops provide the shade and also give the farmer some food and cash **ncome** during the non-yIelding years of the cocoa trees. Traps are made to
“inclusive” banking, it becomes integral to understand how efforts to reach low-income and excluded populations relate to larger economic and financial contexts. The small scale of transactions means that microbanks tend to operate in niches which are littlepenetrated by mainstream commercial banks, though competition is emerging, especially with the increasing commercialization of microfinance. Economic theory suggests that a more developed banking sector can both help and hinder the profitability of microbanks. The balance rests largely with the relative strengths of positive spillovers from agglomeration effects and a stronger regulatory environment versus negative spillovers that arise as competition undermines the dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance loan contracts. Determining the balance is ultimately an empirical question. Our results show that the strongest impacts on microbanks of competition from the formal financial sector are on the nature of microbanking services and markets, rather than their profitability. Competition appears to drive microbanks toward niches characterized by smaller-scale loans (suggesting poorer customers) than would otherwise be the case.

To a large extent, competition has gone under-studied due to lack of data, regarding both the reach of formal (non-microbank) providers of financial services and the performance and outreach of microfinance institutions themselves. Recent improvements in the data on both fronts enable us to undertake our analysis. We build on Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) which contains indicators of banking sector outreach for 99 countries that are constructed from aggregate data provided by bank regulators. The focus is on banks because they provide the vast majority of financial services in developing countries. As regulated institutions, their statistical information is relatively reliable and comparable across the sector.

We add measures of the number of bank branches, ATMs, and loan and deposit accounts to complement standard indicators of the depth and efficiency of financial systems, such as the ratio of private credit to GDP and net interest margins.<sup>4</sup> The additional variables add potentially useful information (for example, the correlation between branches per square kilometer and the ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.44:

> 4 Recent empirical research indicates strongly that financial development as measured by these indicators has a causal effect on economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; and Rajan and Zingales 1998).

3
# IV. **Data Description**

The data to be used in the analysis is collected by the Lithuanian Department of Statistics and covers the period of 1995-1997. The dataset is unique as it contains information on over 5,300 small, medium and large enterprises for each year in Lithuania with very detailed and consistent coverage of financial data 20. Along with Balance Sheet and Income Statement data, the set contains information on employment, ownership structure, regional as well as sectoral division of enterprises. We have every reason to assume that the sample is not statistically different from the entire population of enterprises, which is being monitored by the Lithuanian Department of Statistics. It should be noted that the dataset covers approximately 35 percent of economically active population (labor force) in Lithuania for 1997.

Distribution of enterprises by number of workers is provided in Table 2. The average size of the enterprises has dropped by more than 20 percent since 1995 owing primarily to reduction in the number of large enterprises (over 200 employees) in the sample from 555 in 1995 to 465 in 1997. It is important to note that there is a consistent increase in the share of enterprises with number of workers between 10 and 50.

# **Table** 2. Basic Employment Statistics

Table 3 shows some productivity indicators for a balanced panel of 5,139 enterprises for 1996-1997 by sectors. An interesting pattern emerges here: all five sectors have cut their employment levels by amounts ranging from 2.8 to 25 percent in 1997 while enjoying considerable increases in labor productivity measures. The highest average real increase in Value Added per worker was registered in Utilities (over 50 percent) with the lowest being in Manufacturing (16 percent). However the relative ranking changes for Revenueper-worker figures with the highest increase of 25.3 percent observed in Manufacturing and the lowest of 13.4 percent in Utilities. While in general this could be viewed as a sign of successful restructuring by enterprises, further analysis of the data is needed to 20 After excluding observations with missing values for Total Assets, Revenues, or Employment the set still contains 5,799, 5,347 and 7,185 observations for 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively.

15