CSG is the least well known because of its relatively recent arrival on the scene – it is an instrument to which WTO members negotiated access beginning in 2001 as part of China’s agreement to accede to the WTO, and it remains in place as a potential import-restricting policy instrument through 2014. The other lesser known and historically lesser-utilized instrument is the CVD policy. There may be some cause for speculation of a global shift toward increased use of this particular anti-subsidy instrument associated both with increased pressure relating to exports from China, as well as the current spread of the use of subsidies in government stimulus packages in light of the global economic crisis.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, while we are interested in tracking the combined use of these relatively substitutable forms of import protection especially in light of the global economic crisis, doing so requires more than simply additively aggregating their use. Some of these trade remedy instruments apply to specific foreign countries while others are applied on a more nondiscriminatory, most-favored-nation (MFN) basis across foreign sources.<sup>5</sup> In the presence of multiple trade remedy instruments which can be “substitutes” providing the same access to import protection, one way to normalize the data to assess the frequency of their _combined_ use over time is to examine _non-redundant_ requests for new protection undertaken within a policy-implementing economy at the _product_ level.<sup>6</sup> For example, such an approach does make a country’s use of AD or CVD targeting multiple foreign sources of the same imported product more comparable to global safeguard (SG) protection. This is the approach we adopt in sections 2.1 through 2.5, before then examining in section 2.6 the collective size of the imports likely to be affected by the use of these trade remedy instruments.

4 The first reason is the increasingly prominent role of China’s exports in the world trading system and the fact that, unrelated to the financial crisis, the U.S. changed a 23 year old policy in March 2007 when the Department of Commerce indicated it would now “consider” industry petitions for import protection under the nation’s countervailing duty initiations against China. As one of the pivotal players in the rules-based WTO system, the signal that the U.S. sent by initiating CVD use against China may spur other WTO member countries to adopt a similar approach. The second reason is due to the massive subsidies that major economies are currently imposing as part of their stimulus packages to deal with the global economic crisis. Some trading partners may seek to use CVDs to address what they perceive as trade-distorting effects of such subsidies.

5 In principle these trade remedy instruments do require different forms of evidence before they can be applied. AD requires evidence of less-than fair value pricing (dumping) and injury to the domestic industry from the dumped imports; CVD requires evidence of foreign subsidization and injury, SG requires evidence of injury caused by increasing imports, and CSG requires evidence of injury caused by increasing imports from China. Nevertheless, economic research such as Bown (2004) and Bown and McCulloch (2003) has shown that these instruments can be applied in ways that have similar effects on trade flows.

> 6 For example, by an initiation or measure being defined at the _product level_ , we mean that the U.S.’s two 2Q 2008 antidumping investigation of “Certain circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe” from Korea and from China are treated as one product-level investigation. Furthermore, to ensure product-level initiations are not _redundant_ across policy instruments, a WTO member’s simultaneous AD and CVD cases over the same product are treated as one case. For example, the U.S.’s 2Q 2008 simultaneous AD and CVD investigations of “Certain circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe” from China are also treated as one product-level investigation.

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