over the life cycle, again repeated for both subsamples. As discussed in the previous section, the results are broadly robust to this alternate definition.

Taken together, Tables X, XI and XII support our belief that none of these main results are being driven by any particulars of our baseline measure of family management.

_Including Alternative Legal Forms of Firm Registration._ Our baseline sample includes only private limited liability companies. These account for a large majority of 68.8% of firms in our sample, with the remainder comprising of joint stock companies (12.7%), limited liability partnerships (4.2%), sole propiertarships (4.1%), public companies (1.4%), general partnerships (0.13%) and other (8.7%). In Table XIV, we assess how our main results change when we consider all legal forms. In column (2), we see the relationship between employment, trust and family management is robust to including all legal firms (compared to the baseline result repeated in column 1). In column (8), we find the management mode decisions of large firms are less affected by trust for this alternative sample in the same way as in the baseline specification (repeated in column 7).

_Including Alternative Size Cutoffs._ which we prefer since the coverage for smaller firms is inconsistent across countries in the BvD database.<sup>27</sup> One question is whether our results wash out once we consider the full sample of firm sizes. In columns (3) and (9) of Table XIV we repeat our two main specifications without applying this firm size cutoff. Our results are statistically and economically unchanged in this wider sample.

An additional concern is whether we incorrectly measure the location of multi-plant establishments. For example, a multi-plant establishment in the US might produce across many locations but register in Delaware. The level of trust in Delaware would therefore be an inaccurate measure of the level of trust between the firm and its managers where it operates. Unfortunately, our firm-level dataset does not permit us to observe the location of firms’ plants and address this issue directly. Instead, we take an indirect route and restrict the sample to a group of smaller firms who are much more likely to be single-plant establishments. For these firms, the location of registration should be the same as where production occurs. Columns (4) and (10) consider firms with between 10 and 250 employees. While this approach to deal with multi-plant firms is imperfect, the stability of our estimates across this restricted sample suggests this unlikely to have too much of an effect on our results.

Lastly, to match the sample used by the World Management Survey, columns (5) and (11) use a minimum size cutoff of 50 employees. The results are qualitatively unchanged.

_Alternative Measure of Firm Size._ In the model, firms differ in a single attribute (productivity). Since there is only one input (labor), this is perfectly correlated with productivity under our assumption of common input prices and motivates our use of firm employment to proxy heterogeneity across firms. There are, of course, other ways to measure firm size, the most common of which is capital or assets. Our framework can easily be extended to a Cobb-Douglas technology over labor and capital. Intuitively since there

> 27We also drop firms with more than 5000 employees to trim outliers. These constitute 0.01% of observations in our sample.

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