rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Subgroup analyses show, somewhat surprisingly, that training impacts did not differ much by age, marital status, gender, educational attainment or home ownership. In Shenyang, training appears to have had a stronger negative impact on men and those with lower education. In both Shenyang and Wuhan, individuals who contributed personally to the cost of training had higher reemployment rates. It is expected that individuals who expect to benefit the most from an intervention would be willing to contribute more to its cost.

To understand the reason for the observed discrepancy in impact estimates across the two program sites, it is useful to consider the details of the program‟s operation. It appears that the Reemployment program may not have been properly implemented in Shenyang, as many workers seemed not to have received the layoff stipends that they were supposed to have received under the program. In Wuhan, the program appears to have been better implemented. Quality of training remains an issue in both sites, though, because it may have been difficult for workers to learn new skills in large, overcrowded classrooms.

# **3.2  Sectoral Policies: Commodity Commercialization in Nepal**

Paolisso, Hallman, Haddad and Regmi (2001) study the impact of a training program in Nepal that was designed to commercialize fruits and vegetables, improve farm output diversification and improve agricultural productivity. The program, called the Vegetable and Fruit Cash Crop Program (VFC), provided training on how to grow and process vegetables and fruits (e.g. into jams). Paolisso et al. (2001) base their analysis on data collected in 1991-1993 fieldwork on 264 households. The surveys collected detailed information on activity patterns in the household and their study examines how participation in the program affected time use patterns of both male and female program participants.<sup>12</sup> The VFC program was successful in the sense that household participation in the VFC program resulted in increased male and female time spent growing vegetables and fruits. The estimated average increase for women ranged from 3 to 55 minutes and the estimated increase for men ranged from 24 to 64 minutes. Although the income from sales of VFC products was relatively small, in many cases it represented the first opportunities for these women to earn income without leaving the community.

The authors also examine how participation in the program altered time spent on other activities. Although female labor is useful in agricultural production, it is also important to

> 12 Some households have multiple wives and only head wife is used in analysis

24
_Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia_ _46_ common good. It stands to reason that this is more readily achieved among people who are kin or share religious convictions.

**Table 12: Social Capital and Collective Action**

|||**Collecti**|**ve Action**<sup>**1**</sup>**'**||
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**Hous**|**ehold**|**Vill**|**age**|
|Intercept|-11.6570|(1.41)|-43.5740|(0.29)|
|_Social Capital Dimensions_|||||
|Number of Memberships|1.2831|(4.01)|0.0332|(0.02)|
|Heterogeneity Index|-0.1063|(2.42)|-0.1288|(0.44)|
|Meeting Attendance|-0.0358|(0.28)|-1.2797|(1.02)|
|Index of Participation in Decision Making|0.0172|(0.63)|0.0473|(0.21)|
|Cash Contribution Score|0.0135|(0.02)|-1.8735|(0.44)|
|Work Contribution Score|1.2161|(4.65)|4.4582|(3.60)|
|Community Orientation|0.0537|(1.54)|0.1190|(0.45)|
|Household Size|0.6247|(1.62)|7.0000|(1.54)|
|Years of Education|0.0231|(0.07)|-1.8229|(0.55)|
|Asset Score|-5.3349|<br>(3.17)|-13.9125|(0.94)|
|Coefficient of Variation Expenditure|-|_|-0.0632|(0.59)|
|Female Head of Household|-5.7515|_(1.45)_|21.3046|(0.47)|
|Age of Head of Household|0.8233|(2.28)|1.9153|(0.30)|
|Age of Head of Household Squared|-0.0096|(2.67)|-0.0211|(0.31)|
|Farmer Household|8.9465|(4.70)|14.6116|(0.76)|
|Jawa Tengah|15.1462|(7.00)|16.1773|(1.21)|
|<br>Nusa Tenggara Timur|1.1588|<br>(0.43)|-30.0477|(1.68)|
|Number of Observations|1137||48||
|R-squared|0.18||0.65||
|F-statistic|17.9||8.6||

Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the number of times the household participated in collective action (gotong ryong) during the last year. Reported are OLS coefficients and t-statistics based on robust standard errors.

The second different finding is that households which provide in-kind contributions (i.e. through working) to their associations are more likely to participate in collective action. In our previous results, the nature and amount of membership dues was not found to have a significant effect. Since in-kind contributions occur almost solely in NTT, this result reflects primarily a cultural factor of this province.
to the lack of transparency comes with an improvement of accounting standards and disclosure rules as well as with deeper institutional development (Radelet 1998).

Although greater data transparency would reduce the cost of borrowing, enriched data transparency combined with better institutional quality would further enhance the benefits of investing in open data. Higher level of institutional quality plays a key role in the financial market development because greater data transparency along with a higher quality of institutions help reduce information asymmetries and eliminate and/or revise inaccurate information. The review of the literature suggests that the quality of institutions improves economic outcomes, creates the incentives and exerts constraints on economic actors (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005). Stronger institutions may also lead to greater resilience to shocks (Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman 2000), better allocation of capital (Wurgler 2000), and more developed financial sector (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1998). Therefore, data transparency might be a by-product of good institutions and economic performance rather than the other way around (Glennerster and Shin 2008).

# **3. Estimation Technique and Data**

# **3.1 Econometric Methodology**

We regress sovereign bond spreads on pull and push factors —including indicators of data transparency— using both fixed effects and instrumental variables estimations. External (push) factors and internal (pull) factors can influence investors’ behavior as they may impact the cost of borrowing. We run Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations. We use instrumental variables techniques for panel data to overcome two main challenges. The first is controlling for the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects. The second challenge is that data transparency is highly likely to be jointly endogenous with shocks to sovereign bonds spreads. To address the first challenge, we include country and time effects in the regression. For the second, we control for biases due to the presence of simultaneous or reverse causality in the regression analysis. We control for the endogeneity of data transparency by using Freedom of Information (FOI) and the lagged values of explanatory variables as instruments.<sup>3</sup> Our IV estimations robustly show that data transparency instrumented with FOI can predict bond spreads and that FOI cannot predict future shocks to bond spreads.

Our baseline regression equation of capital flows presents the following specification:

> 3 We also conducted regressions instrumented with the lagged values of policy variables. These results are available from the authors upon request. The political indicators used as instruments are the index of political constraints expressed as 3-veto points and 5-veto points in the policy-making structure (polcon3 and polcon5, respectively) from Henisz (2000 2002), the polity score and the executive constraints from the Polity IV codebook, measures of checks and balances and government stability from the WBG database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001).

6
# attended the workshop.<sup>17</sup>

At the end of the workshop, based on the random assignment, students received a package with different documents. Students assigned to the treatment group received a personalized letter informing them of their eligibility to receive financial support for employment in the formal labor market, as well as the instructions to register (Appendix Figure B7).<sup>18</sup> All envelopes, including for students in the control group, contain a prepaid card through which participants could receive a small monetary compensation for completing surveys. The same day in school, immediately after the LMLW, individuals in the treatment group received a 15-minute talk delivered by members of the research team to further explain details of the wage incentive, including the process for receiving the money. The 8% of students not attending the workshop received their letter and instructions at a later point in time.

The size of the wage bonus offered (900 pesos per month, around 45 USD) was equivalent to about 17% percent of the average monthly wage in a full time entry-level formal job. This bonus was paid on a monthly basis as a top-off to their salary for up to six months conditional on holding formal employment. The six months could be split between employment spells over the course of two years after graduation. Beneficiaries needed to provide identification documents and proof of formal employment in order to receive payments.<sup>19</sup> Importantly, the incentive was transferred directly to beneficiaries (using the prepaid card) and was thus not observable to potential or actual employers. This is a key distinction from most existing wage subsidy programs tested in developing countries (e.g. Levinsohn et al. (2014); Galasso et al. (2004)). It ensures that benefits went fully to workers and that treatment effects are not driven by a reduction in hiring costs for firms or by other factors such as stigma.

The size of the incentive was calibrated based on wage growth data. Figure 1 shows that after six months, average (median) formal sector wages have increased by about 23% (16%).

> 17Those that do not want to attend are assigned another activity by the school director (like studying, completing classwork, etc.). Among participating students, 76% report the LMLW was useful. 18Participants are (truthfully) informed that due to limited resources the incentive cannot be provided to all graduates and are thus allocated through a lottery.

> 19Several actions were implemented to encourage wage bonus take-up. First, participants could claim the payment of the economic incentive remotely and could electronically certify their formal employment status each month by sending a digital copy or photo of the documentation requested. The project team validate documentation using public records. Second, the project team answered information requests, provided clarifications, and sent reminders to participants through different channels such as SMS, WhatsApp, phone calls, and emails. Take-up rates can be seen in Appendix Table A4.

17
# **Annex I Unemployment and the Unemployed**

Table AI.1 Unemployment Rate

|Year|LaborForceSurvey|Registered|
|---|---|---|
|1990||1.5|
|1991||11.8|
|1992||10.4|
|1993|13.7|14.4|
|1994|14.1|14.6|
|**1995**|12.4|13.1|
|1996|10.9|12.8|
|1997|11.8|12.5|
|**1998**|12.5|15.6|
|1999|17.1|19.2|
|**2000**|18.7|17.5|

Source: Labor Force Survey and Unemployment Registry.

Table **AI.2 Distributi2n** of Unemp oyment Spel s by Duration

||1994|**1995**|**1996**|1997|1998|1999|2000|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**<6 montbs**|32.4|30.3|32.3|32.8|32.1|30.83|24.45|
|<**12months**|49.9|44.9|46.9|47.4|48.8|50.88|44.95|
|**12+ months**|50.1|55.1|53.1|52.6|49.7|49.12|55.05|

Source: Labor Force Survey.

> Table AI.3 Registered Unemployment Dynamics

||**1991**|**1992**|**1993**|**1994**|**1995**|**1996**|**1997**|**1998**|**1999**|**2000**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Inflow/Stock|18.3|8.8|10.7|7.4|8.5|9.8|99|94|7.9|7.1|
|Outflow/Stock|5.2|10.0|7.9|8.2|9.4|9.9|9.4|7.7|6.1|7.5|
|**Outflow/Inflow**|28.4|113.8|73.9|110.0|110.7|100.9|95.5|81.4|76.9|106.6|
|**(Outflow+Inflow)/Stock**|23.5|18.9|18.5|15.6|17.9|19.7|19.3|17.1|13.9|14.6|

Source: Unemployment Registry.

||TableAI.|4Unempl|mentRates|**by**Educati|onLevels|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1994|1995|1996|1997|1998|1999|2000|
|None|44.2|39.5|64.3|66.7|88.5|NA|NA|
|Basic|27.4|26.9|23.7|27.6|25.8|33.6|39.0|
|**Apprent.low**|14.4|13.1|10.8|11.0|12.7|17.4|20.6|
|**Vocationallow**|13.6|12.7|10.0|11.3|10.8|18.95|19.9|
|**Apprent.com.**|15.3|9.5|8.1|10.6|9.6|15.6|19.6|
|**Vocationalcom.**<br>|9.8|7.1|7.4|8.2|8.7|13.10|14.0|
|Grammar|13.1|14.3|11.8|14.6|13.8|17.12|17.7|
|University(+)|3.8|2.9|3.4|3.2|4.2|_5.5_|4.8|

Source: Labor Force Survey.

39
example from 1.0 to 2.8 percent of the loan portfolio) and allowing a reduction in bad times (for example from 2.8 percent to 1.0 percent)<sup>10</sup> .

Second, ULs too became smaller. Measured at the level of the 99.9 percentile, they went from 12.4 to 10.1 percent of the loan portfolio with a reduction of almost 25 percent. These figures refer to “leverage” ratios (i.e. Tier 1 capital over total loans) and therefore suggest a quite demanding level of capital requirements. Table 7 shows that levels of protection between 95 percent and 99 percent would be more realistic in the case of Chile and more coherent with capital requirements of 4 percent (Basel requirement for Tier1 capital).

Third, what differentiates this pattern from that of portfolios of small loans, reported in Chart 3 and Table 8? The main feature worth stressing is the greater stability of both ELs and ULs displayed by portfolios of small loans across the cycle. These portfolios displayed oscillations of ELs around the mean of approximately 10 percent, considerably smaller than the 30 percent of large loan portfolios. Similarly, the oscillations of ULs around the sample mean reached 5 percent for small loans and approximately 20 percent for larger loans. The greater stability of the distribution of loan losses for small loan portfolios can be very clearly spotted in the sequence of panels of Chart 9, where we have reported the evolution of the two distributions for each year of our sample period.

The greater cyclical stability displayed by small loan portfolios reinforces the elements which already emerged in the previous section in favor of the automation of loan application procedures. In fact, credit loss distributions for short term loans appear to be less sensitive to variations of the level of economic activity. In contrast to the previous section, where the regularity of the distribution of loan losses was attributed to statistical factors, in this case the causes of the observed stability should be found in different repayment patterns linked to the different economic behavior of households and firms of different size during the different phases of the economic cycle.

> 10  See Laeven and Majnoni (2003) for a survey of the debate on loan loss provision smoothing over the economic cycle.

16
Vietnam’s experience in the aftermath of the BTA highlights the importance of economic integration of a developing country with developed countries, in particular, in terms of creating job opportunities for its abundant unskilled workers and its positive impacts on their wages. The rise in wages for unskilled workers in the process of export-oriented industrialization is consistent with the East Asian experience, in particular, the historical shift of production locations to lower wage countries as wages increase; and the recent rise of wages for production workers in China.<sup>47</sup> The findings of this study also support the view that improving access to developed country markets for developing countries, in particular for unskilled-labor intensive goods, is essential for the latter countries to reap the benefits predicted by traditional trade theory.

One limitation of this paper is that, whereas it focuses on identifying the S-S type effect exploiting regional variation, it does not analyze other factors which affected the wage structure. In fact, for the period 2002-2004, the skill premium increased at the aggregate level for the sample of panel individuals. Thus, the results imply that the S-S type effect mitigated, but did not outweigh the impacts of other factors which contributed to the rise in skill premium. It is also noted that the theory illustrated in this paper is not the pure version of the H-O-S whose simplified assumptions tend to be inconsistent with the complexity of the real world. For instance, the assumption of full employment would not strictly apply to Vietnam’s economy where a large majority of workers tend to be underemployed (Fukase, Table 2, 2013c) in agricultural and other informal sectors. Nonetheless, this paper suggests that the basic insights from the H-O-S theory remain valid as an important _component_ of globalization and that, given

> 47 Several articles in _The New York Times_ (e.g., February, 20, 2012) and _The Economist_ (July 31, 2010) report the rising wages of production workers in coastal industrial areas in China. As labor costs have risen in China, some production of labor-intensive goods may be moving to lower-wage countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia ( _The New York Times_ , July 16, 2010; January 31, 2011).

33
moves counter-cyclically; the marketing margin tends to decline when the international market price is on an increasing trend, and the margin increases when the international price is on a declining path. The behavior of domestic price is consistent with widely discussed incomplete pass-through of international prices in the literature; the domestic prices do not transmit the full extent of the changes in the international market prices, both at the upswing and downswing of the international market.

This dependence of the margins on the phase of the international market makes the standard DID specification as in equation (23) above potentially misleading. For example, it is likely that a sustained increase in international price will strengthen the political resolve for a policy reform, and we are more likely to see a policy reform to be implemented after such a period of persistent price increase in the international market. This also implies that it is more likely to observe a declining international price following the policy intervention, for example, when policy is implemented at the height of the international market cycle, as was the case with the banning of DOTs in Bangladesh. Since the marketing margins increase during the downturn because of incomplete pass-through irrespective of the policy regime, one might incorrectly attribute this increase in the margins to the policy reform if one compares margins from inappropriate market phase from the pre-reform period.

We address the issue of the dependence of the marketing margins on the world price trend in two ways. First, we include a dummy that takes on 1 when the international price is rising. Second, and more important, for the “before sample”, we identify a time period that matches closely the international market phase observed after the policy intervention, and exclude the observations from the other pre-intervention periods. This strategy uses a subset of the preintervention sample, but is clearly more satisfactory in dealing with the counter-cyclical margins issue.

# **(6) Data**

Several data sets are utilized in the empirical analysis. The daily price data come from the Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM) unit of Ministry of Agriculture. The Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB) also reports daily price data from major urban centers. We compared daily price data from both sources. The price trends in both data sets are nearly 24
territory from one location, rather than establish a commercial presence in every FTA member. For example, such a scenario would apply to the creation of hub-and-spoke networks for the provision of transport services.

Rules of origin would also not be binding when service suppliers from outside the region would voluntarily establish a presence in the intermediate country and voluntarily access other FTA markets from this presence. But in many circumstances, this will not be the preferred route. Assuming that rules of origin are indeed binding, their de facto restrictiveness is determined by the costs they impose on service suppliers from non-member countries. In general, one can distinguish among the following two types of costs:

- _Tax obligations_ .  Exporting services from a subsidiary within the FTA territory rather than from the parent firm outside the FTA territory may lead to different tax obligations. Depending on the tax rules and tax rates prevailing in different jurisdictions, exports from a subsidiary may lead to lower or higher tax payments.

- _Business transaction costs_ .  Establishing and maintaining a commercial presence in the intermediate country can create non-trivial transaction costs.  For example, a strict definition of ‘substantial business operations’ may imply greater investments into the local market than a foreign service supplier would undertake voluntarily—especially if the local market is small.  A ‘domestic ownership and control’ requirement would force the foreign service supplier to enter into a (minority) joint venture arrangement with a local partner, which can entail significant transaction costs.  Similarly, domestic employment requirements could drive up operational costs, if the service supplier preferred hiring expatriate workers.

Similar considerations apply, in theory, also to individual service providers. But in practice, they seem less relevant for Mode 4 trade, because immigration and residency requirements typically pose a sufficiently high barrier against using an FTA member as a transit point to other FTA markets.

# **3.  Simulation of different rules of origin in five ASEAN countries**

In order to assess more fully the economic and bargaining implications of alternative rules of origin that may be adopted in FTAs, it is necessary to obtain a better empirical understanding of the issues outlined in the preceding discussion. A research project of the ASEAN Economic Forum research network has taken a first step at providing some empirical guidance, focusing on the rules of origin for juridical persons in selected service sub-sectors. National research studies were conducted in the following five ASEAN countries: Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.<sup>6</sup> A core element of these studies is a simulation exercise assessing which service providers would or would not be eligible for preferences negotiated under a region-wide FTA.

> 6 See, respectively, Douangboupha, Thiengthepvongsa, and Vilavong, (2006), Tham and Zainal Abidin (2006). Avila and Manzano (2006), Arunanondchai and Nikomborirak (2006), Nhu-Van, Chien-Thang, Hoang-Dat (2006).

9