Based on the above discussion, we expect the variables measuring transferability and overall awareness of the land law to have positive effects on land-related investments by enhancing tenure security. Moreover, we can test for differences in tenure security that affect investment between lands held under freehold or _mailo_ , and differentially for owners and occupants of such lands, by assessing whether the sign of the coefficient on the freehold/ _mailo_ dummy or the sum of this coefficient and its interaction with the occupancy dummy is significantly different from zero. The magnitude of the latter allows quantification of the increment in investment incentives that could be expected from regularizing _mailo_ tenants while comparing the former will help to assess the importance of knowledge relative to more traditional indicators of tenure security.

_Productivity of land use:_ While the general framework is similar, separate regressions for the productivity of land use, where past investments are included as right hand side variables allow us to test the extent to which tenure security and transferability have an impact over and above their impact on investment. As discussed above, finding such an effect would point towards increased incentives to supply effort (for tenure security) or greater ability to obtain credit (for transferability). We estimate a production function where the gross value of output is a function of input use, the presence of improvements and other parcel as well as household characteristics, and our tenure security variables. The specification takes the form _Yhi_ = α 2 + **_β_** 2 **_X_** _h_ +φ 2 _K h_ + **_γ_** 2 **_R_** _hi_ + θ 2 _Thi_ + θ 2 _Thi_ ⊗ _Ohi_ + **_η_** 2 **_P_** _hi_ + **_δ_** 2 **_Q_** _hi_ +φ 2 **_Z_** _hi_ + **_λ_** 2 **_V_** + υ _hi_ , (2) where _Yhi_ is the value of crop output of household _h_ from parcel _i_ , **_Z_** _hi_ is the value of purchased inputs on each parcel, **_Q_** _hi_ is a vector denoting the pre-existing stock of different types of land-related investments (number of trees, soil and water conservation infrastructure), and υhi is an error term. All the other variables are as defined in (1). In addition to expecting positive coefficients on standard land quality and human capital characteristics, we also expect the stock of land-related improvements (visible and nonvisible) will increase the productivity capacity of land, the variables that measure tenure security may have an additional positive impact on productivity by increasing labor effort or the ability to obtain credit.

_Land values:_ As land sale values are the present value of expected profits from cultivating a plot, any factor that affects land productivity should have a similar impact in a hedonic land price regression (Rosen 1974). Regressing self-assessed land prices on the same set of right-hand side variables as was used in the productivity regression thus provides a way of checking for the robustness of our results, in addition to allowing the derivation of a monetary value for some of the tenure security variables included earlier. Presence of considerable noise in the land price data by occupants forces us to restrict the sample to owned plots for which we estimate a land value function of the form 7