In addition to Stern and Holder’s attempt to measure informal regulation, Magetti develops a framework to assess the real independence of regulatory agencies. His framework is composed of two main features: 1) the degree of self-determination of agencies’ preferences and 2) the degree to which those preferences are translated into regulatory acts. The first feature is assessed through the measurement of the agency’s independence from both government authorities and the utilities it regulates. Indicators used to measure the agency’s independence from government authorities are: a) autonomy of low-level employees (need for collaboration with experts from the public administration); b) autonomy of resources; c) autonomy of board members (influence of partisan membership on nominations); and d) the vulnerability of the board (measured by how the substitution rate and political changes correlate with the frequency of early departures of board members). Indicators that measure the independence of the agency from those it regulates are composed of a) and b) above, as well as a third indicator related to conflict of interest ( _e.g._ , business connections, family ties). The second feature is measured through the degree of influence of relevant actors on legislative processes that define or redefine the competencies of the agencies. Its main purpose is to determine how much new laws integrate the agency’s point of view. He applies his approach to the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), finding that the SFBC has higher levels of informal independence from political authorities than from the regulatees. With regards to the degree of influence of relevant actors on the legislative process, Magetti finds the informal independence of the SFBC to be quite low, particularly vis-à-vis political decision makers.

Two comprehensive approaches to assessing the governance of regulatory agencies have been those developed by Correa _et al._ (2006) and Brown _et al._ (2006). Correa _et al_ . provide a detailed analysis of Brazilian regulatory agencies. The authors select four aspects of agencies’ governance and, based on information collected through surveys, construct three indexes. Selected governance variables are a) autonomy (political and financial autonomy and the degree of delegation); b) decisionmaking (degree to which administrative procedures are adopted and reflect respect for due process, rule of law, transparency, and stakeholder participation); c) decision tools (legal means to collect information, appropriate budget to manage and process this information, qualified personnel and regulatory tools); and d) accountability (appeals mechanisms, role of oversight institutions, and transparency of regulations and procedures). Agencies’ governance is measured through three indexes. The first index, the Regulatory Governance Index, is the base-line indicator and represents the most comprehensive dataset of all the indexes. The second index, the Parsimonious Index, captures those variables of the survey that are less subjective. The third index, the Facto Index, is related to actual practices of regulatory agencies. The report finds that independence and accountability are more developed than regulatory means and instruments (particularly qualified personnel and regulatory tools) and decision-making procedures (particularly with respect to those mechanisms that can guarantee consistency of decisions and reduce arbitrariness). It also finds that there is a clear difference between federal and state regulatory agencies, with the former achieving higher results in the autonomy, decision-making, and decision tools components of the Regulatory Governance Index.

Brown _et al._ (2006) develop a framework to assess the effectiveness of a regulatory system. They aim to provide the policy-maker with different types of evaluations (quick, mid-level, and in-depth) to carry out these assessments. The authors include aspects related not only to the governance of the regulatory system (independence, transparency, and accountability of the regulator) but also to the substance or content of the regulation (decisions about tariff levels and structures, network access conditions for new and existing customers). Using the independent regulator model as the benchmark of analysis, they select 10 principles that should be followed in order to create an independent regulatory agency. The principles are: independence (freedom to make decisions within their scope of authority without having to obtain prior approval from other officials or

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