rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
networks, setting the tariffs for the utilization of transmission and medium-voltage grid and ensuring the efficient functioning of the market.<sup>26</sup> As ANRE’s mandate covers the ‘free market’, the Ministry of General Affairs will remain responsible for tariff setting in the regulated segment of the electricity market. A director-general was appointed in 2018 but the agency is yet to begin operations. Implementation of the legislation is underway and should enable ANRE to manage conflicts between operators and network users.<sup>27</sup> ONEE’s transmission network will be administered independently of energy production to avoid discrimination against new producers.

In 2016 still, MASEN’s scope was expanded to include the development and operation of all types of renewable energy facilities. The agency was renamed the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy and ONEE was required by law to transfer all its renewable energy assets to the new entity. This measure emphasized the role of renewables in the energy sector’s future development and to fast-track the realization of the country’s RE targets in power generation. The low cost of wind and hydroelectricity should allow MASEN to balance the high cost of solar CSP.<sup>28</sup> Much remains to be established regarding the institutional relationship between ONEE and MASEN, and the latter’s role in energy planning and policy making. ONEE is wary of any arrangement that could lead to inheriting what they view as MASEN’s liabilities for the solar CSP incremental cost and other operational costs, without adequate compensation.

# 2 MOROCCO’S POWER SECTOR PERFORMANCE

Having examined Morocco’s experience with power sector reforms, this section analyzes the implications for the sector’s performance and institutional development. This evidencebased analysis aims to first establish whether Morocco’s power sector performance improved over the period 1990-2017 along four dimensions. These are security of energy supply; electricity access and affordability; efficiency and financial viability of utilities and; tariffs and cost recovery. Then we evaluate the extent to which specific institutional arrangements explain this performance.

# 2.1 Security of Supply

## 2.1.1 Performance

Since the 1990s, Morocco has taken steps to increase its generation capacity, diversify its energy mix, and secure its energy supplies. This is within a context of high dependence on imported energy supplies – coal, oil and oil products; gas from Algeria; electricity from Spain – and significant greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>29</sup> The result is that the structure of Moroccan power generation is changing. From a configuration where, oil-fired generation alone constituted 70 percent in 1993 to the situation in 2017 where coal (55 percent), oil (10.5 percent) and natural gas (18.8 percent) account for over 80 percent of all production and renewables (hydro, wind and solar) account for 15 percent. Renewable power plants

> 26 (IEA, 2019, p. 21)

> 27 (International Trade Administration, 2017) 28 Interviews with Moroccan policy makers, 3 January 2017. 29 (IEA, 2014)

13
internationally.<sup>3</sup> Labor productivity in services has been between 3.4 and 3.7 times as high as in agriculture (in constant prices) (this ratio has been unchanged since 1993 at around 3.7).<sup>4</sup>

# **3. IDENTIFYING CHINA’S PATTERN OF GROWTH AND POLICY FACTORS**

Given the large surplus labor and large productivity gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy, why has so little reallocation of labor from agriculture to the higher productivity sectors taken place? Why has China’s economic growth led to such modest urban employment growth? The answer is directly tied to China’s growth pattern and the associated policies pursued.

China’s pattern of growth especially since the early 1990s can be characterized as follows:

- The bulk of GDP growth since the early 1990s has come from explosive growth of industrial production. Industrial value added increased on average over 11 percent per year during 1993 and 2004, and the share of industry in GDP rose from 38 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in 2004 (Figure 4), the highest among countries for which the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database has data. In 2002-04, industry contributed around 2/3 of GDP growth.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 4. Shares in value added<br> (in percent)<br>60<br>Industry<br>50<br>40<br>Services<br>30<br>20<br>Agriculture<br>10<br>0<br>1978 1986 1994 2002<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: NBS, and authors' estimates._ Over 90 percent of the growth in industry in 1993-2004 was in the form of labor productivity growth rather than employment growth, mainly led by a large-scale investment effort and increased capital-labor ratio. As a result, absorption of agricultural surplus labor was largely left to the service sector, and has been limited since the mid 1990s. Urban employment growth slowed from 5.4 percent per year during 1978-93 to 2.9 percent during 1993-2004.

> 3 The definition for industry used here is that of the “secondary” sector in the Chinese statistics, which includes mining (3.4 percent of GDP in 2003) and construction (7 percent of GDP in 2003). 4 In current prices, the gap has varied more over time, as the terms of trade for agriculture have varied.

6
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4419

# **Abstract**

Few representative surveys of households of migrants exist, limiting the analysis of the effects of international migration on sending families. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to compare the performance of three alternative survey methods in collecting data from Japanese-Brazilian families, many of whom send migrants to Japan. The three surveys conducted were 1) Households selected randomly from a door-to-door listing using the Brazilian Census to select census blocks; 2) A snowball survey using Nikkei community groups to select the seeds; and 3) An intercept point survey collected at Nikkei community gatherings, ethnic grocery stores, sports clubs, and other locations where family members of migrants are likely to congregate. The authors analyze how closely well-designed snowball and intercept point surveys can approach the much more expensive census-based method in terms of giving information on the characteristics of migrants, the level of remittances received, and the incidence and determinants of return migration.

This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to study migration and remittances. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dmckenzie@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
|Macaroni (liter)|-6.16|-6.58|-6.62|-6.67|-6.66|-6.48|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Vegetable Oil (kg)|-5.29|-5.68|-5.84|-5.87|-5.89|-5.64|
|Paste tomatoes (kg)|-2.78|-3.00|-3.05|-3.04|-3.04|-2.95|
|Milk for children (kg)|-0.04|-0.08|-0.12|-0.18|-0.25|-0.11|
|Milk(concentrated) (kg)|-1.42|-1.63|-1.61|-1.52|-1.50|-1.53|

Source: Libyan Household Consumption Survey 2007/8; Libyan authorities; and Bank staff calculations.

# **5. Energy subsidies**

The benefits to households from energy subsidies are multiples of those derived from food subsidies— households in the lowest quintile derive 2.5 times more monetary benefit from energy than from food subsidies, and that ratio increases gradually to 6.5 times for the upper quintile.

The analysis in this section covers five energy products: gasoline, diesel, electricity, LPG and kerosene. Gasoline is the main energy product used by the road transport sector for individuals –both in private cars and taxis (there are no other means of public transportation). Diesel is mainly consumed by businesses (for transportation) and by the electricity generation company. Electricity and LPG are almost universally consumed. Half of the kerosene sold on the market goes to the air transport sector, while the rest is likely used by lower income households as a substitute for electricity, but no data are available to corroborate the latter hypothesis.

# **5.1.The distribution of energy subsidies**

Gasoline and electricity represent the bulk of energy consumption and, together with other energy products, are heavily consumed by the rich. Gasoline and electricity take up more than 90% of household energy consumption and, correspondingly, the same share of government spending on subsidies. Subsidies for these two products are clearly regressive in absolute terms. An individual in the upper quintile benefits 3.5 times more from subsidies on electricity and gasoline than an individual in the bottom quintile (that ratio is 2.8 and 2.7 for Diesel and LPG respectively).

Households’ direct benefits from energy subsidies are close to 2.5 billion LYD, which only represents about a third of the total cost to the budget of energy subsidies.<sup>19</sup> Given the extremely low subsidized prices, energy products represent a very small share of household expenditure—about 3 percent of total expenditures, equivalent to 370 million LYD (Table 16). Gasoline and electricity represent the greatest share while expenditure on kerosene is very low. The share of household spending on energy products is slightly higher for poorer households (3.6%) relatively to richer households (2.5%). The share of expenditure on gas LPG shows the largest difference across quintiles (Table 17), suggesting that it is used more intensily by poorer households.

> 19 The budget data do not include administrative costs associated with the subsidy system.

20
<!-- Start of picture text --> _ |<br>| | a | |<br>B<br>(3)<br>&<br>8 —_<br>oD<br>&|—<br>S<br>oO<br>5<br>8<br>g<br>zZ 10,000-} [_] ma mm i. ae... ae... im. oo<br>2011 2012 2013 2014 +2015 2016 2017 #=#2018 #2019 2020 £2021 2022<br>150 GOODS (~:~ SERVICES {| )~WORKS<br><!-- End of picture text -->
financing, relative to other young firms. First, some surveys focused exclusively on manufacturing companies, so in part by design, the majority of firms in our sample are manufacturing firms (60%), followed by services (30%) and construction (6%). Since manufacturing companies are likely to be more capital intensive, sources of entrepreneurial finance should be particularly illustrative of country-level barriers to access to credit. Next, we find 4% of firms with state-ownership (particularly in lower income countries) and 5% with foreign ownership. Both types of firms might receive preferential access to financing. Finally, about 23% of firms in our sample are identified as exporters, which might have greater access to overseas customer and bank financing.

Importantly for our analysis, the WBES data is a random sampling of firms. An important caveat, however, is that many country surveys do not include new firms: 79% of surveys have a minimum firm age of one; 8% a minimum firm age two; 4% a minimum firm age three, and 9% a minimum firm age four.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, summary tables include an increasing number of country and firm observations along the age dimension. Figure 4 shows the distribution of total firms, by age. We find that over 8% of the total sample is three years old or younger, while 58% of all firms are twelve years or younger. The largest number of observations is for age four, which includes observations from all country/year surveys, regardless of survey-specific minimum firm age.

# **2.1** **_Variation in usage of financial products_**

We begin by examining whether age is related to usage of a bank line of credit or overdraft facility (L/C). Figure 5 shows that usage of L/Cs increases with firm age, from

> 3 In robustness regressions, reported in section 5, we discuss our results using only surveys that include one year old firms, i.e. eliminating the sampling bias in some countries.

8
# **Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer** in Nine Countries: Lessons for Developing Countries

# Jun Ma

# PART L INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanisms in nine major industrial and developing countries, with special reference to the design of equalization transfers. The countries selected are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea, India, ancl Indonesia. Most of these countries have relatively developed formula-based transfer systems, and represen **t** he major varieties of transfer systems adopted in the world. The three sections in Part I present a brief review of the economic rationales and basic criteria for designing an intergovernmental transfer system. The following nine sections in Part II discuss the mechanisms adopted by these nine countries, respectively. Part Im compares and contrasts the nine countries' transfer systems and, based on the comparison, attempts to draw implications for developing countries that are considering or are in the process of reforming their intergovernmental transfer systems. It classifies the transfer formulas into four categories, analyzes the data requirements of each type of formula, and uses illustrative examples to show how the calculations should be implemented. A few implementation issues, including the transitional arrangement from an old to a new system, are also considered in this part. Part IV presents an illustrative equalization transfer model for China and the simulatiom results using 1994 data. The appendix of this paper discusses a number of country cases on fiscal transfers from state (provincial) level governments to lower level governments.

In this paper, we use "grant" and "transfer" interchangeably to refer to paynent of funds from one level of the governmen **t** o another.

# 1.1. Economic Rationales for Intergovernmental Transfer

The literature of fiscal federalism suggests several economic rationales for intergovernmental transfers: 1 A. Addressing vertical fiscal imbalances. In most countries, the national government retains the major tax bases, leaving insufficient fiscal resources to the subnational See Broadway et al (1993), Shah (1994), and Rosen (1995).

1
method can be leveraged in the context of a small, open economy. There are a set of possible extensions that have been implemented in other contexts, particularly promising is incorporating a higher level of granularity in the “down” part of the framework relying on firm-level, census, or new databases that use high-frequency data.

**Policy implications should aim to distribute the gains with more equity** . By understanding the varied impacts across regions and sectors, policy makers can design policies to mitigate negative impacts on selected groups of workers and facilitate the transition of workers across regions and sectors. In doing so, the gains from trade could be distributed more equally. Possible specific policies might include:

• **Skills for migrant workers** : Increasing economic activity in urban areas is expected with a major reallocation of labor from districts with large agriculture and vegetables/fruit sectors into urban areas that host emerging sectors (chemicals, textile and apparel, and other manufacturing). Policies that promote the acquisition of job-related skills will benefit both workers and firms. While workers’ technical knowledge and expertise are critically important, the emphasis on managerial and administrative capacities should be underscored, particularly for firms engaging in exporting activities.

• **Better mobility and communication** . Some non-tradable sectors, such as social services, construction, trade and transport sectors which are essentially in highly urbanized districts experience positive effects on the extensive and intensive margins of labor demand. Still, geographic labor mobility in Sri Lanka is very limited. Infrastructure and communication investment policies can help to reduce the gap between the less connected, isolated and job loss prone locations with the expanding urbanized districts. Domestic labor mobility could also be promoted with security and socio-political integration, which is crucial in the aftermath of a prolonged civil war.

**• Enforce progressive labor standards and policies that protect vulnerable workers.** Textiles and wearing apparel experience the highest rate of labor demand expansion with large increases in employment of women. Policies that prevent the exploitation of vulnerable workers, particularly migrant unskilled women, can help to guarantee the long-term viability of the expanding sectors and expanding urban communities. Policies that protect the safety in the workplace and that promote that workers obtain a fair share from their labor guarantee the long-term sustainability of the sector, and the economic viability of the new urban areas that they will populate.

36
Capacity building as a route to export market expansion: A six-country experiment in the Western Balkans<sup>∗</sup> Ana P. Cusolito<sup>1</sup> , Ornella Darova<sup>2</sup> , and David McKenzie<sup>3</sup>

> 2University of Pennsylvania

> 3Development Research Group, World Bank

_JEL Classification: F14; O25; O12; L26; C93_ _Keywords:_ Export market expansion; training; consulting; digital presence; customer acquisition.

> ∗This study was funded by the European Union under the Western Balkans Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility. We thank Maja Andjelkovic and Alberto Criscuolo from the World Bank for their support and collaboration in implementing this project; Muhamed Semic, Elma Delalic and the Deloitte team for their work implementing the project and responses to our many questions; and Vladimir Panic for excellent research assistance. We also thank comments received from Ana Fernandes, Natasha Kapil, and participants at the IPA 12th EPSD working group meeting. This study was registered in the AEA RCT Registry on May 21, 2021, and the digital object identifier (DOI) is: 10.1257/rct.7711-1.0

1
would care about remaining eligible for the employment opportunities in their home state government.

While all states reserve some government jobs for resident SC/STs and are reported to de facto prefer residents of that state, some states even have explicit “jobs for natives” policies that cut across communities. For example, the state of Karnataka announced a policy in 2016 under which both private and public sector firms would have to reserve 70 percent of their jobs for state residents to be eligible for any state government industrial policy benefits. Orissa, Maharashtra and Himachal Pradesh have similar quotas for state residents in factory jobs.<sup>21</sup> To our knowledge, there is no systematic quantitative evidence on the extent, enforcement and impact of such policies. Potentially, such policies can create yet another disincentive to migrate across state boundaries.

In Figure 4b, we plot the partial regression of in-state skilled emigration on public sector employment at the state level. The dependent variable (on the y-axis) is number of high-skilled (i.e. those who completed at least secondary education) emigrants who moved to destinations within the state of their origin, divided by the total number of high-skilled migrants from that state. The explanatory variable on the x-axis is the share of high-skilled workers who are employed by the public sector. This variable comes from the employment module of the National Sample Survey (1999-2000). Log average household income per capita is also calculated from the NSS data, and controlled for in the regression. The positive relationship shown in the graph suggests that the higher the share of government job opportunities for the high-skilled, the stronger the incentive for potential migrants to stay in their home states. The argument that state domicile requirements for public sector employment inhibit high-skilled workers from moving across state borders is novel and requires more careful analysis.

> 21See newspaper article published in the Economic Times: “Karnataka’s 70% jobs quota for locals faces criticism; Phenomenon not limited to the state”. November 9, 2014 Edition.

26
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the history of violence in Burundi and sketches the spatial and temporal event data for the most recent civil war. Section 3 describes the survey data used in the analysis and explains the key variables. Section 4 describes the empirical identification strategy and section 5 presents the main results as well as robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.

# **2. Conflict in Burundi**

# _2.1 Political History_

Civil conflict in Burundi began in 1965, three years after independence from the Belgian colonial administration, when a group of Hutu officers unsuccessfully tried to seize power and overthrow the monarchy. This failed coup led to a purge of Hutu from the army and government and marked the beginning of political exclusion of the Hutu majority by the Tutsi minority. Power became the sole monopoly of the Tutsi, who effectively seized power in 1966 and proclaimed the First Republic, headed by Captain Micombero. During Micombero’s regime, power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Tutsi Hima clan, a small ethno-regional group from the southern province of Bururi, that the French historian Chrétien calls the Bururi mafia (1997).

In 1972, a Hutu insurgency started in southwestern Burundi resulting in considerable loss of life among the Tutsi residents. The subsequent Tutsi army repression was dramatic. From May to August 1972, all educated Hutus and members of the Hutu elite were systematically eliminated or fled into exile (Lemarchand, 1994). This massacre of educated Hutus reduced their status to an oppressed underclass and reduced future Hutu opposition for over a generation.

The next major violent confrontation took place in 1988, when a Hutu insurgency was launched in the north of the country.<sup>7</sup> As in 1972, army repression was swift and took a heavy toll on the local Hutu population. However, contrary to 1972, this time the international community condemned the massacres and put pressure on the Buyoya regime to liberalize its political system. This led, in June 1993, to the first free and fair elections in post-independence Burundi.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, this democratic transition did not last. In October 1993, Melchior

> 7 In the intervening years, Colonel Bagaza replaced Micombero in a palace coup in 1976, and then he was ousted by Major Buyoya in another bloodless coup in 1987.  Both leaders are Tutsi and from Bururi.

> 8 The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition party, Frodebu, with 65 of 81 Parliament seats and 64 percent of all votes in the presidential elections (Reyntjens, 1993).

3