results from Table 5 (and year _t+1_ results for AD/CVD to year 2003 results for the SG, etc.), given that many AD/CVD cases result in import protection being applied in the same year as the initiation of the investigation. In terms of the comparison of specific results, the _magnitudes_ of the coefficients in these column (2) results are also similar across the two tables.<sup>31</sup> Column (3) of Table 6 introduces an indicator for exporters _i_ that were “excluded” from an applied US AD/CVD imposed against product _h_ . Like Table 5, the column (3) results in Table 6 help explain why the estimated _differential_ between the subset of products _h_ against which a SG was applied against some country (-0.06) in column (2) was not statistically different from zero.

For the AD/CVD results in Table 6, column (3) is the first evidence of the negative effect of the applied policies for the products and trading partners that were targeted by the import restrictions. The products _h_ for which a particular trading partner _i_ faced an applied AD/CVD had an import growth rate in the year of the initiation of the investigation that was an additional 48 percentage points lower (coefficient of -0.65) than products only subject to an investigation (and which no trading partners faced an applied import restriction). Overall, products _h_ for which a particular trading partner was subject to the AD/CVD had import growth that was 59 percentage points lower than non-investigated steel products in the year of the initiation of the investigation.

Column (3) also provides our first evidence of the _differential_ trade impact of being “excluded” – or not subject to an AD/CVD imposed on the same product from other foreign competitors. First, trading partners _i_ and products _h_ that did not face an imposed AD/CVD had import growth that was 112 percentage points higher than targeted countries and products in the year of the initiation of the investigation. Second, their import growth was 64 percentage points higher than investigated products in cases in which no countries faced AD/CVD, and 53 percentage points less than non-investigated steel products.

We next compare the impact of these AD/CVD policies on imports (column 3 of Table 6) with the 2002 steel SG policy on imports (column 3 of Table 5). Under both SG and AD/CVD there is a sharp differential for the import growth of the exporting producers of _h_ that are in the countries hit with the import restriction, vis-à-vis the exporting producers of _h_ that are excluded from the import restriction. Furthermore, this differential exists over the two relevant years that were associated with each policy:

> 31 Table 6, column (2) indicates that in the next year (after the initiation of the investigation), relative to noninvestigated products, the import growth rate for investigated products for which no exporting country was subject to the applied AD/CVD was 10 percentage points higher. However, the other products for which some trading partner faced an applied AD/CVD grew at a rate that was a 8 percentage points lower. In total, products _h_ for which some trading partner was subject to the AD/CVD had import growth in the year after the initiation of the investigation that was 2 percentage points lower than products that were not investigated.

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