rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Active labor market policies in the
            OECD and in selected transition economies
Transition economies have introduced a
            range of OECD active labor market policies to combat
            unemployment - albeit often on paper only, as with rising
            unemployment passive policies have crowded out active ones.
            But even in the Czech Republic, active labor market policies
            have contributed only marginally to reducing unemployment.
            One task for policymakers in Central and Eastern Europe must
            be to convey the message that, even under the best
            circumstances, active labor policies can play only a
            marginal role in reducing unemployment.  OECD labor policies
            cannot be applied mechanically in Central and Eastern Europe
            because the situation there is different.  Severe and
            persistent shortages in capital and managerial ability are
            sure to keep labor demand weak in the medium term, while
            labor supply will be abundant.  As enterprises are
            restructured and liquidated, the newly unemployed workers
            cannot be absorbed by the weak private sector and must
            compete for scarce jobs.  Women and older, less educated men
            have particular trouble finding work.  Which active labor
            policies does the author suggest might be effective?
            Limited funds for active labor policies might best be spent
            retraining the most able unemployed workers to develop
            skills needed in the private sector.  Public employment
            programs might be targeted especially to problem groups of
            workers and to the long-term unemployed - more for reasons
            of equity than of efficiency.  The point is to  have a clear
            idea whether both aims of efficiency and equity can be
            pursued and, if efficiency gains are unrealistic, whether
            equity considerations are politically indispensable.
            Because nontradable services are underdeveloped, Central and
            Eastern European countries might eliminate credit rationing
            that discourages self-employment (the self-employed have
            trouble getting financing).  Improving consulting services
            for the unemployed in Hungary, Poland, and Russia makes more
            sense than applying a broad menu of OECD programs.  The
            labor market in the Russian Federation appears to be more
            dynamic than in Hungary and Poland, but this is probably
            because of massive labor hoarding in Russian enterprises.
            Once they start shedding labor in earnest, their employment
            figures will look more like those in the other Central and
            Eastern European countries.
Agricultural trade liberalization in
            the Uruguay Round : one step forward, one step back
After evaluating the Uruguay
            Round's impact on agriculture and border protection in
            the next decade, the author concludes that while there was
            significant reform of the rules - particularly the
            conversion of nontariff barriers into tariffs and the
            reduction and binding of all tariffs - in practice, trade
            will probably be liberalized less than expected. The
            objective of the Round was to reverse protectionism and
            remove trade distortions. This may not be achieved in
            practice, at least not until further reductions are carried
            out in future rounds of negotiations. The major exception to
            this conclusion is in high-income Asian countries, where
            protection for major commodities will be significantly
            reduced. The tariffication and binding of all tariffs on
            agricultural products represents a significant step forward.
            Liberalization is implicit because countries are prohhibited
            from arbitrarily raising tariffs to new higher levels. But
            many of the newly established tariffs are so high in many
            countries as to effectively prohibit trade. Patterns of
            liberalization vary considerably by commodity and by
            country. Generally, the extent of liberalization was
            diminished by binding tariffs to the base period of 1986-88,
            when border protection was at a high point. In most OECD
            countries, this was worsened by "dirty
            tariffication:" the new base tariffs offered even
            greater protection than the nontariff barriers they
            replaced. Even after the commitments to tariff reductions in
            the Round, the ad valorem measure of the final binding
            tariffs will remain higher than the average rate of
            protection in 1982-93. A number of developing countries in
            East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East chose to lock
            in prior liberalization efforts on some products. But for
            most commodities, there will be little actual
            liberalization, since most developing countries chose to
            bind their tariffs at a maximum level. Even when countries
            reduced already-bound rates, bound tariffs remained
            significantly higher than current applied rates, giving
            countries the flexibility to raise tariffs later. The high
            level of bound tariffs may allow countries to apply variable
            tariffs below the bound level, thus failing to stabilize
            tariffs and improve market access. Moreover, the Round did
            not touch many of the worst distortions in developing
            countries, such as import subsidies, export taxes,
            state-trading monopolies, and domestic policies that
            implicitly tax agriculture.
Trade reform design as a signal to
            foreign investors : lessons for economies in transition
A few years ago, many western companies
            were eager to consider investing in Eastern Europe and, more
            recently, in South Asia, where ongoing reform, large
            domestic markets, and cheap but qualified labor are
            transforming the region into a potentially fierce competitor
            for foreign direct investment (FDI). Although this growing
            interest was reflected in large commitments by foreign
            investors announcing major FDI reforms, actual disbursements
            have been modest. This reflects the investors' concern
            about the credibility of governments' long-term
            commitment to change. The credibility of policy
            announcements is important to investors because the returns
            from the sunk investment can be affected by later changes in
            policy. To reduce investors' concern, governments can
            send clear signals to show their commitment to change. The
            achievements of trade reform can be an effective indicator
            of a government's commitment to change as indicated by
            the strong correlation between increases in trade flows and
            increases in FDI disbursements. The authors examine how
            countries can design trade reform to speed up increases in
            trade. Countries can tailor their commitment to reform to
            foreign investors by targeting the design of these
            instruments to the source of their credibility problem.
            Governments face two credibility problems: 1) investors know
            the current government's policy preferences (whether
            they are protectionist or free trade-oriented) but ignore
            those preferences if the government will later have an
            incentive to change its position; and 2) investors are
            uncertain about actual government's commitment to a
            reform program. The model presented in the paper shows that
            the recommendations in favor of free trade prevail when
            investors know the government's preferences and have
            reason to doubt the government's commitment to a reform
            program. But in the most realistic scenario in which
            investors do not know the government's preferences and
            the policymakers cannot otherwise demonstrate their
            commitment to reform, a government actually committed to
            change may want to signal this commitment by subsidizing
            investments or imports if it wants to be competitive in the
            market for FDI. In this model, the quickest way to attract
            FDI is through an investment subsidy, but it is also the
            most costly -- an import consideration for a reforming
            government trying to keep tight fiscal control.
Cities without land markets :
            location and land use in the socialist city
The authors describe the structure of
            Russian cities after 70 years of Soviet development. This is
            the longest socialist experience on record and its results
            are of paramount interest to urban economists. In the
            absence of price signals and of economic incentives to
            recycle land over time, the administrative-command process
            has led to a startling pattern of land use. It's
            central feature is a perverse population density gradient,
            which rises as one moves away from the center of the city.
            (Driving from the center of Moscow, one passes through rings
            of Stalin-era, Krushchev-era, and then Brezhnev-era flats.)
            The Soviet city is also characterized by rusting factories
            in prime locations and high density residential areas in
            distant suburbs. Such a structure tends to maximize the
            economic and social inefficiency of the socialist city as
            well as its environmental ill effects. With market-oriented
            urban reform, real estate prices are now emerging. Their
            negative gradient signals again the massive scale of past
            land misallocation in the Soviet city. The experience of
            socialist cities is also a powerful warning about the ill
            effects of public ownership and the allocation of land to
            achieve the  "socialization" of land rents.
Corporate control in Central Europe
            and Russia : should banks own shares
The authors review corporate governance
            arrangements in the West and conclude that for a system
            based on bank ownership and control of firms to succeed, the
            banking system must be free of perverse incentives and state
            interference, as well as subject to adequate supervision by
            banking authorities and competition from market forces.
            Admirable progress over the past few years notwithstanding,
            these conditions do not now exist in the countries of
            Central Europe and Russia, so a corporate governance system
            based on bank ownership is not appropriate.  That is not to
            say that such a system would not eventually be appropriate -
            but not before much more effort is made to create a
            competitive, private, well-supervised banking system (which
            is needed in any case).  Changes in the banking system that
            are prerequisites for any large-scale bank involvement in
            the ownership and governance of firms are simple to
            enunciate but less easy to implement: (1) Sever existing
            relationships between the state and banks.  Privatization is
            the strongest guarantee that bank investment decisions will
            not be subject to state influence, but bank privatization
            has been slow in most countries.  This reflects limited
            understanding of the financial sector's poor condition,
            the many institutional and political obstacles to bank
            reform, and the initial decision in many countries to focus
            first on the "real economy" (a decision that in
            hindsight seems unfortunate). (2) Dispel the belief (which
            still exists in some countries) that poor lending and
            investments will enventually be underwritten by the
            government, with few consequences for managers.  (3) Greatly
            strengthen competition in the banking system, in part by
            encouraging new private banks and the entry of foreign
            banks. (Some countries, such as Poland, have taken the
            opposite tack, refusing to issue new licenses.)  (4) Provide
            effective bank supervision and an effective prudential and
            regulatory framework.  This requires investing substantially
            in setting up institutions, accounting systems, and
            information networks, in hiring and training qualified
            personnel, and in ensuring that the system is immune from
            political intervention.  Developing such a system will
            surely be long and drawn out, and may require foreign assistance.
Tunisia's insurance sector
The main economic functions of the
            insurance sector are to cover financial risk and to mobilize
            long-term savings.  The sector can also play an important
            role in developing the private sector and modernizing the
            securities market.  But to play its economic and financial
            roles, the insurance sector must operate within a framework
            of stable, liberal regulation that provides incentives for
            efficiency, allows companies to innovate, and creates a
            contestable market with relatively free entry and exit.  In
            most developing countries, regulation has deviated greatly
            from this ideal.  Often dominated by state-owned companies,
            the insurance industry in many developing countries
            features: (a) strict controls on new entry; (b) prohibitions
            against majority ownership by foreign companies; (c) fixed
            premiums (especially for compulsory lines); (d) prior
            approval of tariff changes and new products; (e) high local
            retention ratios (which discourage reinsurance from overseas
            companies); (f) insurance reserves used as a captive source
            of funding for public deficits; and (g) weak prudential
            controls and inadequate monitoring of solvency. In recent
            years there has been a growing trend away from direct
            controls on premiums, products, and investments, and toward
            more monitoring of the solvency of companies, through more
            effective supervision and clear prudential controls.  The
            author argues that Tunisia's insurance sector has been
            hampered by restrictive regulations, by the country's
            low incomes (which limit long-term savings capabilities),
            and by it pay-as-you-go social pension system.
            Tunisia's life insurance is seriously underdeveloped.
            The insurance is seriously underdeveloped.  The insurance
            industry also suffers from structural problems.  Worst of
            all, prudential regulations and standards are unequally
            applied, and some companies are still operating with
            insufficient capital (in a few cases, with greatly negative
            equity).  What is needed?  Capital-deficient companies need
            to be restructured and recapitalized, state-owned companies
            need to be privatized, and the market needs to be opened up
            to majority foreign-owned firms.  Supervision must be
            strengthened and corrective measures applied more equitably
            and forcefully.  The social pension system must be radically
            reformed, to include one fully funded pillar that will
            generate long-term savings and transform the prospects for
            life insurance business.
Equity markets, transaction costs,
            and capital accumulation
There is a close, if imperfect,
            relationship between the effectiveness of an economy's
            capital markets and its level (or rate of growth) of real
            development. This may be because financial markets provide
            liquidity, promote the sharing of information, or permit
            agents to specialize. There is literature about how these
            functions help increase real activity, but surprisingly
            little literature predicting how the volume of activity in
            financial markets relates to the level or efficiency of an
            economy's productive activity. The authors address this
            question:  how does the efficiency of an economy's
            equity market -- as measured by transaction costs -- affect
            its efficiency in producing physical capital and, through
            this channel, final goods and services? The answer: As the
            efficiency of an economy's capital markets increases
            (that is, as the transaction costs fall), the general effect
            is to cause agents to make longer-term -- hence, more
            transction-intensive -- investments. The result is a higher
            rate of return on savings and a change in its composition.
            These general equilibrium effects on the composition of
            savings cause agents to hold more of their wealth in the
            form of existing equity claims and to invest less in the
            initiation of new capital investments. As a result, a
            reduction in transaction costs can cause the capital stock
            either to rise or fall (under scenarios described in the
            paper). Further, a reduction in transaction costs will
            typically alter the composition of saving and investment,
            and any analysis of the consequences of such changes must
            take those effects into account.
Efficiency and equity considerations
            in pricing and allocating irrigation water
Economic efficiency has to do with how
            much wealth a given resource base can generate. Equity has
            to do with how that wealth is to be distributed in society.
            Economic efficiency gets far more attention, in part because
            equity considerations involve value judgements that vary
            from person to person. The authors examine both the
            efficiency and the equity of different methods of pricing
            irrigation water. After describing water pricing practices
            in a number of countries, they evaluate their efficiency and
            equity. In general they find that water use is most
            efficient when pricing affects the demand for water. The
            volumetric, output, input, tiered, and two-part tariff
            schemes all satisfy this condition and can be efficient
            although whether efficiency is short-run or long-run, first-
            or second-best, varies. Pricing schemes that do not directly
            influence water input -- per-unit areas fees for example --
            lead to inefficient allocation. But they are usually easier
            to implement and administer and require less information.
            The extent to which water pricing methods can effect income
            redistribution is limited, the authors conclude. Disparities
            in farm income are mainly the result of factors such as farm
            size and location and soil quality, but not water (or other
            input) prices. Pricing schemes that do not involve quantity
            quotas cannot be used in policies aimed at affecting income
            inequality. The results somewhat support the view that water
            prices should not be used to effect income redistribution
            because water prices are a poor vehicle for reducing income
            inequality. But pricing schemes that involve water quota
            rules can reduce income inequality. The authors demonstrate
            this with a two-rate tiered pricing scheme combined with
            equal quotas of the cheaper water.
Pension funds in Central Europe and
            Russia : their prospects and potential role in corporate governance
Social pension systems in most countries
            in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union face severe
            financial pressure. Aging populations are increasing that
            pressure, which stems mainly from in thesign in the in the
            flaws and incompatible incentives in the systems. The
            authors describe the features of the ion systems that have
            led to the current dire predicament: a big discrepancy
            between system and demographic dependency ratios,
            unsustainable targeted replacement rates, the high
            contribution rates needed, growing evasion, and growing
            deficits. Radical basic reform is inevitable, they say, but
            may not be politically feasible or even advisable in the
            short run. After reviewing experience in other countries,
            they conclude that restructuring and downsizing the social
            ion system will leave adequate but affordable (thus
            sustainable) benefits and will allow for the creation and
            growth of private pension funds. The shortcomings of
            company-based defined benefit plans (limited portability,
            restricted vesting, inadequate funding) suggest that
            transitional economies should opt in the longer run for
            non-employer, defined contribution plans based on individual
            capitalization accounts with full immediate vesting, full
            portability, and full funding. To cope with the need for a
            targeted replacement rate, such schemes could operate with
            variable contribution rates, reset each year in accord with
            the salary growth of each worker, the cumulative investment
            return on his/her acount, and the  targeted pension benefit.
            Once private pension funds are established, long-term
            financial resources should accumulate rapidly. They can then
            play a major role in modernizing securities markets,
            stimulating innovation, fostering better accounting and
            auditing standards, and promoting more disclosure of
            information. They could also greatly help improve corporate
            governance and the monitoring of corporate performance.
            Their "voice" in corporate affairs could be
            exercised more effectively through collective bodies. They
            could thus help create more robust structures of corporate
            governance, lower monitoring costs, and avoid the problems
            caused by "free riding".