savings in jewelry or precious metals that are traditionally considered an integral part of the dowry in India. The higher savings that we find are financed through higher earnings; fathers of firstborn girls work more days in a year relative to FB fathers as expected dowry burden goes up. We also find that brothers in FG families decrease their years of schooling as expected dowry expenditure goes up, suggesting that they may also be working more in order to finance higher savings for their sisters’ dowry (these results are available upon request).

In the context of India, it is frequently claimed that dowry is an underlying cause of son preference, male-biased fertility, and discrimination against girls. Contrary to this, we find that dowry is unlikely to be a root cause of son-preferring behaviors in India.

Future research should examine if the results of this paper also hold true for urban India, for a more recent time period, and for other dowry-paying societies. How alternate marriage market institutions, such as bride price, affect households’ financial decisions also remains a fruitful area for future research. ■

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