demobilized in 2004<sup>19</sup> but factions re-emerged as emerging criminal bands ( _Bacrim),_ which are considered organized crime groups seeking control of drug and illicit goods’ traffic (Zelik 2015).

Even though the conflict has reached a large part of the country, the violence and its intensity have been geographically heterogeneous. Moreover, it has had periods of lower and higher intensity, and shifting ‘hotspot’ areas. Between 1965 and 1981, the intensity of violence was low and stable. This steadily increased and peaked between 1996-2002, falling again thereafter (CNMH 2013). In recent years, relatively peaceful periods associated with ceasefires during the peace negotiations with FARC were followed by violence escalations when ceasefires were broken. After FARC’s demobilization, violence has intensified in strategic, coastal and border areas where dissident and rival groups battle for the control of vacated territory, drug cultivation and trade corridors (International Crisis Group 2015, 2017). Geographically, in the 1990s the conflict spread from the areas of historic origin of guerrillas in peasant colonization areas to large parts of the country, even those integrated into national markets and politics. The late 1990s saw the territorial expansion of the conflict and the consolidation of armed groups in the strategic corridors for drugs and war, especially those in the corridor between the inland-Caribbean region and the Andean region, and that in the low Putumayo and south-eastern Orinoquía. The early 2000s, marked by the military offensive against guerrillas and the paramilitary demobilization, saw a retreat of armed groups to the areas of historic presence, but also to new peripheral areas, particularly along the Pacific southwest (Vásquez 2014). These patterns respond to aspects such as the limited state presence in certain areas of the country, the struggle for control of strategic and war-economy areas, and the pressures from the army’s military strategies (González, Bolívar, and Vásquez 2003; Gutiérrez and Sánchez 2006). The peak of violence in the late 1990s, for instance, resulted from a mix of the military strengthening of guerrillas, the expansion of paramilitary groups, the weakness of the state, the economic crisis and the reshuffling of drug cartels’ structure (CNMH 2013).

Different armed groups have preferred different types of violent actions, although these have also varied though time. In the case of violent attacks against civilians, the main perpetrator since the mid-1990s have been guerrilla groups, though that does not imply this was the main type of violence they perpetrated. Between the late 1980s and 1993 attacks were highly associated with drug cartels,<sup>20</sup> but since then, the cartels favored a low profile, which resulted in a reduction in their use, and a parallel pick-up of this strategy by guerrilla groups (CNMH 2013). The peak of violent attacks in the early 2000s was linked to the guerrilla’s desire to demonstrate their growing power, as well as being a contention strategy against the paramilitary growth and, later on, the state’s military recovery (CNMH 2013). These attacks have been, with some notable exceptions, aimed at the local sphere.

# **IV. Empirical strategy**

# **A. Violence data**

A key challenge for identifying the effect of violence is to find a measure of a _shock_ instead of one reflecting persistent _levels_ of violence in a municipality. Violent attacks against civilians have

> 19 31,000 combatants demobilized but former paramilitary leaders have stated that these numbers were inflated and that the actual number of combatants was about half.

> 20 Particularly the Medellin cartel.

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