on (i) consumption shares of women’s private goods; (ii) consumption shares of household public goods; and/or (iii) women’s labor supply.

Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) examine the impact of the wife’s bargaining power on food, education, health, child clothing, and alcohol/tobacco shares using data from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia and South Africa. Their most robust result is a positive impact of the wife’s bargaining power on education across the three countries. However, most coefficients on women’s absolute and relative bargaining power are only significant and positive for one or two share categories across the four countries. Other studies on consumption shares give similar results, with the most robust positive impacts on education, some positive impacts on food consumption and women’s goods, some negative impacts on men’s goods, and often a large number of nonsignificant impacts, including on health and children’s clothing (Quisumbing and de la Briere, 2000; Doss, 2006; Backiny-Yetna and Wodon, 2010; Bussolo et al., 2009).

Duflo and Udry (2004) use male, female, and joint household income to predict consumption expenditures, and proxy for male, female and joint incomes with different crop incomes that have been identified in the anthropological literature as falling under the control of husbands, wives or the household as a whole. This paper is one of the few to include a measure of jointly controlled income in an analysis of consumption expenditure patterns. The authors find that male and female incomes both have a significant positive impact on adult goods, and that female incomes have a statistically significant impact on most food categories. On the other hand, jointly controlled income exerts a significant positive impact on all household public goods, including education as well as food, and significant negative impacts on adult goods.

Another strand of literature looks at the impact of the wife’s bargaining power on subjective measures of the wife’s decision-making powers. For instance, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find that the wife’s landholdings and her independent income earnings both have statistically significant impacts on various measures of autonomy. Doss et al. (2014) also look at the impact of both women’s sole ownership of and joint ownership of land on women’s self-reported level of input into several farm and non-farm decision-making processes. In the three African countries included in their study, both sole and joint land ownership increase women’s input into decisionmaking across most of the domains considered, though neither has a statistically significant impact using the Indian data. Interestingly, results from a study of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program, which provided cash transfers to women in poor households, indicate that such transfers have positive impacts on women’s autonomy over many decisions only in urban, and not rural, areas (de Brauw et al., 2014).

A number of empirical papers have also tested whether household outcomes are Pareto efficient in rural, developing country settings, an assumption underlying the hypotheses of the collective bargaining models. While much of the evidence from developed countries supports Pareto 6