# **4.1 Results from the DID approach**

Estimated program effects based on estimation of (1) are reported in table 3 panels A and B with columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 without and columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 with heterogeneity of gender effects. Regressions are weighted by the matching weight and all standard errors are clustered at village (survey cluster) level.

Results in panel A suggest no statistically significant effect on the share of land/property managed or controlled by women except for female headed households where the point estimate of LARP effects is about 11 percentage points compared to a control mean at baseline of 35.1 percent. Estimated program effects on knowledge about women’s inheritance rights and LAA existence remain largely insignificant (except about the 4 percentage points increase in the former for male-headed househols and about the marginally significant 10 percentage points increase in the later for female-headed households), implying weak impact on female empowerment and awareness of institutional reforms. With less than 5% of the sampled households from the control area expressing concern of becoming involved in land-related conflict at baseline, perceived tenure security seems to have been high even without the program so that an estimated program effect of about 5 percentage points, significant at 5%, seem non-negligible.

Although land market activation was a key project objective, the data presented in panel B suggest no significant impact on land purchase market activity. This holds irrespectively of whether we use responses to retrospective questions about land transactions for the last 3 (i.e., 2010-2013 and 2016-2019) or the last 7 years (i.e., 2007-2013 and 2013-2019) for baseline and endline, respectively. Finally, panel C suggests that estimated program effects on credit market access, proxied by whether a secured home loan was taken, the household applied for a formal loan or had a credit card or bank account are all insignificant (except a marginally significant negative effect on loan application in col. 3). The only coefficient that is precisely estimated (significant at 1%) suggests a treatment-induced 20% decrease in the likelihood of land-related investment, consistent with the notion of investment having been made to stake out claims in anticipation of formal registration.

Data on area under complete or incomplete structures from satellite imagery as described above allows estimating investment effects in a more narrow band along the road separating treatment from control area. Table 4 displays results from using built-up area for all (cols. 1-3) or finished (cols. 4-6) structures for 40,684 structures in the entire treatment and control areas (cols. 1 and 4) or 16,236 and 8,578 in the 1,000 m (cols. 2 and 5) and 500 m (cols. 3 and 6) bands on both sides of the road, respectively. The estimated coefficient on the relevant parameter is negative throughout but loses significance for the 500 m band (and the 1,000 m band for finished structures). As mean built-up area per plot at baseline in the control was about 50%-60% of the level in the treatment group, investment in built-up area seems to be driven more by urban expansion and catch-up than by access to documented land rights. We thus reject the hypothesis of positive 14