rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Mediation processes should, but typically do not, address the issue of imbalance of power and information between a financial institution and a consumer.** For example, even though mediation and conciliation committees exist in Bulgaria, there is no court-imposed obligation on potential litigants to exhaust efforts in good faith to seek a mediated settlement prior to a trial on the issues taking place. Thus, because the use of a mediation committee is voluntary, the financial institution can avoid responding to any consumer complaint simply by refusing to attend any session of the relevant conciliation committee. Furthermore, mediation processes assume roughly equal balances of power and information (as is true in business-to-business disputes). Even a well-informed consumer will have difficulty in maintaining a power balance with a large financial organization unless the mediator who is acceptable to both parties is especially well trained in this respect.

**In none of the country studies were private forms of mediation used.** However in high-income countries, private forms of mediation are often successful and might be useful approach for consideration in middle-income countries.

**Going to court is not a viable alternative for most financial consumers.** The vast majority of consumer disputes relate to claims from the equivalent of $100 to no more than the equivalent of $5,000. For most consumers, the amount of money involved is too small to make it worthwhile for them to spend the time and money to pursue a court case—or for over-burdened courts to give priority to cases involving financial consumers. Where no viable out-of-court mechanism is in place, consumers will generally abandon their efforts to gain a satisfactory resolution of their claims. As a reference, Table 8 provides a cross-country comparison of the costs of going to court to resolve commercial disputes in the nine country studies.

**Consumer organizations are generally not sufficiently active in helping financial consumers.** In eight of the nine countries studied, non-government organizations (NGOs) lacked sufficient expertise and sustained funding to follow financial sector issues. The one exception was Russia, where the consumers’ union (KonfOP) has initiated lawsuits on behalf of financial consumers.

**Table 8: Cross-Country Comparisons of the Costs of Going to Court**

|**Country**|**Number of**<br>**Procedures**|**Duration of Procedure**<br>**(Days)**|**Cost in Fees**<br>**(% Claim)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Azerbaijan|39|237|18.5|
|Bulgaria|39|564|23.8|
|Croatia|38|561|13.8|
|Czech Republic|27|611|33.0|
|Latvia|27|309|23.1|
|Lithuania|30|275|23.6|
|Romania|31|512|28.9|
|Russia|37|281|13.4|
|Slovakia|30|565|30.0|

_Source_ : World Bank Group, _Doing Business 2010_

**Policy-makers should consider other alternatives, such as an office of financial ombudsman that can take and enforce decisions regarding claims for small amounts of money.** For financial institutions, consumer disputes often cost more in administrative time than the amount of the dispute. It is therefore to the advantage of financial firms to support an independent third-party form of dispute

30
**Table 6: Water shortages – Sector and location averages**

||**Labor Prod**|**uctivity (logs)**|
|---|---|---|
||**coef/se**|**coef/se**|
|Total water duration cell average: size, region, and fixed premise location|-0.038*||
||(0.021)||
|Total water duration: cell average of size, sector, region, and fixed premise location||-0.034*|
|||(0.018)|
|Log of total number of employees in regular month|-0.596***|-0.562***|
||(0.129)|(0.140)|
|Largest owner has secondary education or higher: Y/N|0.263**|0.317**|
||(0.127)|(0.142)|
|Manager experience (years)|0.014*|0.013|
||(0.007)|(0.009)|
|Largest owner has a job in formal sector or looked for one over last 2 years Y/N|-0.099|-0.180|
||(0.146)|(0.156)|
|Largest owner started another business in the last three years Y/N|-0.119|-0.078|
||(0.087)|(0.115)|
|Firm uses electricity for activity Y/N|0.102|0.030|
||(0.088)|(0.127)|
|Firm uses machinery in its current operations Y/N|0.085|0.103|
||(0.089)|(0.099)|
|Firm uses vehicles in its current operations Y/N|0.455***|0.471***|
||(0.111)|(0.173)|
|Manufacturing firm Y/N|0.110|0.126|
||(0.082)|(0.106)|
|Produces or sells under contract from another business or person Y/N|0.357***|0.295***|
||(0.115)|(0.092)|
|Firm uses bank account to run business Y/N|0.119|0.141|
||(0.139)|(0.143)|
|Firm has a loan at this time Y/N|0.051|-0.034|
||(0.093)|(0.124)|
|Firm pays informal payment to remain unregistered Y/N|-0.171|-0.171|
||(0.268)|(0.364)|
|Firm experienced crime last month Y/N|-0.013|-0.011|
||(0.263)|(0.239)|
|Firm pays for security Y/N|-0.057|-0.127|
||(0.233)|(0.183)|

31
**Table** 1 **: Household consumption by tariff block and tariffs paid in 2014 (EgyptERA, 2014)**

|Residenti|al tariff blocks|Consumers per<br>block|Total<br>consumption<br>billed per<br>block (GWh)|Tariff<br>(PT/kWh)|Total value of<br>consumption<br>per block<br>(million EGP)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|0 100 kWh|0 – 50 kWh|4.240 million|2,442|11.0|269|
|–|51 – 100 kWh|2.650 million|2,932|19.0|557|
||0 – 200 kWh|8.215 million|16,956|21.5|3,646|
|101 – 1,000|201 – 350 kWh|7.685 million|22,271|42.0|9,354|
|kWh|351 – 650 kWh|3.180 million|17,057|55.0|9,381|
||651 – 1,000 kWh|0.265 million|2,353|95.0|2,235|
|Above 1,000<br>kWh|0 -> 1,000 kWh|0.265 million|3,513|96.0|3,337|
||**Total**|**26.500 million**|**67,524**||**28,779**|

aAssuming 1,700 full load hours per year.

In addition to the net metering scheme, Egypt introduced a FIT scheme in October 2014. Under the scheme, the electricity transmission company and the distribution companies are committed to purchase all power from eligible solar plants through 25-year PPAs. Distributed solar projects are to be handled by the distribution companies. The government set a target of 4,300 MW under the FIT to be achieved by 2016, including 300 MW for distributed PV and 2,000 MW for utility scale solar. The tariff rates are differentiated by system size (see Table 2), with original tariffs for distributed PV (set in 2014) ranging from EGP 0.844 per kWh for systems below 10 kW up to EGP 0.973 per kWh for systems between 200 kW and 500 kW. These tariffs were lower than those for utility scale projects because the government envisioned that distributed solar investors would have access to concessional finance in local currency. Specifically, the Ministry of Finance had proposed a financing program under which investors could receive concessional loans at 4% interest for installations below 10 kW and 8% for installations below 500 kW. However, this financing program was not implemented.

Egypt’s FIT program generated considerable investor interest in the utility-scale segment. More than 40 utility scale solar PV projects with a total of 2,000 MW of capacity are under development, and development banks including the IFC, EBRD and AfDB are considering concessional finance in the order of US$3bn. However, the program ran into a roadblock when projects failed to reach financial closure in the summer of 2016 amid the foreign exchange shortage and unfavorable arbitration arrangements, leading lenders to wait for conditions to improve.

11
Policy Research Working Paper 10878

# **Abstract**

In recent years, Myanmar has witnessed considerable economic and political instability, leading many young people, particularly the higher-skilled, to consider migrating abroad for improved prospects. This paper employs an innovative method to quantify migration intentions among high-skilled youth by analyzing the take-up of migration at different wage premia. A randomized survey experiment then evaluates how hypothetical political and economic stabilization scenarios impact these intentions. The findings show that 35 percent of the respondents would be willing to take a similar job abroad for pay equal to their current income. Randomization within the survey indicates that political stabilization would potentially reduce high-skilled workers’ desire to migrate by about 15 percent, especially among men, those living in high-conflict areas, and persons with lower absolute income but higher perceived relative income. In contrast, prospects of economic stabilization do not have a significant effect on migration intentions. In the absence of political stability and a reduction in conflict, economic stabilization is unlikely to reduce talent outflows among the young.

This paper is a product of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted atyghorpade@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Finally, we estimate the average trade-flow and trade-consumption elasticities as: This specification is the same as in Romalis (2007) with the exception that we use _yzt_<sup>_DD_</sup> = ̃ _m_<sup>_DD_</sup> _zt_ to obtain the trade-flow elasticity and _yzt_<sup>_DD_</sup> = _qzt_<sup>_DD_</sup> to estimate the trade-consumption elasticity. Product and year fixed effects are included to account for relative shipment costs to the US and the EU12. Note that this cross-sectional or pooled approach is the most common in the literature and is usually interpreted as the long run elasticity.<sup>32</sup> Table 5 reports the results.<sup>33</sup> Panel A shows that for the average of all goods, the trade elasticity drops from 8.9 to 7.7 when consumed imports are used instead of imports.<sup>34</sup> This implies a considerable difference of 16%. Not surprisingly, Panel B shows that this is also driven by the phased-out goods, for which the difference is 21%. Note that the difference in the average elasticities is larger than the ones documented for the long run or 7-year elasticities. We view this as being driven by the fact that the average elasticities are the outcome of averaging over the elasticities at all horizons _h_ in (4) and hence assign more weight to the anticipatory slumps than the long run elasticities.

# **3.3 Robustness**

The results described above are robust to several alternative choices in the measurement of consumed imports. All results are reported in Table 6.

_One Period Time to Market Lag._ - Under the baseline measure, once imports are received at the destination, they are immediately available for consumption. If instead there are lags in domestic deliveries or lead times to market the imported goods, current imports would be unavailable for consumption or usage. The process that assumes a one

> 32See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Simonovska and Waugh (2014) or Caliendo and Parro (2015).

> 33We delete the first year of our sample since our measure does not generate sales in the first month of the sample and makes our assumption on the initial inventory holdings more relevant. This does not the results.

> 34Our estimate using import flows is below that obtained by Romalis (2007), who obtains 10.9. This is most likely from the fact that we exclude 1989 and 1990 from our sample period. In fact as we exclude earlier years from our sample the estimate falls, suggesting that the early years with less trade contribute towards larger elasticity estimates.

20
5: 10-11(in Chinese).

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27
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# Table 9: The 1981 Economic and Pension Crisis

||1980|1981 1|1982|1983<br>percentag|1984<br>e of net w|1985<br>age|1986|1987|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|a. Contribution rate|_15.5_|25j|33|33|33|33|43|38|
|_______________________|_________|_______|______|millions|of person|s||||
|b. Number of pensioners|_4.5_|4.8|5.3|5.8|6.1|6.2|6.3|_6.5_|
|c. Active population|17.3|17.4|17.0|17.0|17.0|17.1|17.2|17.1|
|d. ZUS contributors|14.0|14.1|13.7|13.7|13.9|14.0|14.3|14.5|
|||||previous|year = 1|00|||
|e. Real prod. income|94.0|88.0|94.5|106.0 j|105.6|103.4 [|104.9|102.0|

Source: a. Wiktorow (1994),. p.5, the 38 percent rate applied in 1987-89. b. GUS Rocznik 1991, p. XXVI, line 6.

c,d,e. GUS Rocznik 1991, p. XXIV, lines 15, 25, and 27.

## 5.5. Financing and cost

There are three ways to finance pensions: through taxes, debt, or savings. The first two have been used, and the third one has often been mentioned.

There are interesting theoretical arguments in favor of debt and taxes (pay-as-you-go) in fast growing economies. Uncertainties about the long-run sustainability of the promised benefits, future productivity and population growth, the rate of return on capital, and the current opportunity cost of funds call for caution. In addition, taxes cause distortions that have to be weighed against the benefits of raising revenue.

A funded pillar in the pension system is always a useful complement-especially so in transition countries for two reasons. First, it should be relatively easy to start in transition countries.

32
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weighted average of the daily changes in the interest rate and the log difference of the exchange rate, as a measure of financial distress. This approach allows us to distinguish country-specific crisis periods without resorting to the use of ex-post data.<sup>28</sup> The crisis periods in the respective countries are determined as follows. First, we construct a series of EMP volatility, measured as the 15-day rolling standard deviations of the EMP. A crisis initiates when the EMP volatility exceeds a threshold level and remains above that level for at least four weeks, where the threshold is defined as the mean of the EMP volatility plus one standard deviation, computed for each country over the period covered by the sample. A crisis ends if the EMP volatility declines below the threshold and remains there for three months (in which case, the end date coincides with the date of the initial decline). The exchange and interest rate series come from Bloomberg and Datastream. The interest rates used vary according to data availability (in all cases, we verify that all available market-determined interest rates behave similarly over the sample period).<sup>29</sup> Table 3 reports the crisis periods identified by our methodology. All non-crisis periods are called tranquil periods, and are the ones used in the previous section.

# **6.2. Summary Statistics**

Figure 3 displays the evolution of the simple average of the cross-market premium of all stocks selected for each country. For the particular case of Korea, we include two graphs: one including stocks that have been subject to restrictions over the whole sample period, and one including only the unrestricted stocks. Light shaded areas indicate crisis periods, while darker shaded areas indicate control periods. Periods when crises coexist with controls (as is the case for Argentina, Chile, Korea, and Venezuela) are considered as control periods. Thus, in what follows, crisis periods specifically refer to periods of

> 28 The weights are equal to the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the respective variables. Ideally, one would also like to include the change in reserves; unfortunately, these data are not available on a daily frequency for the countries in our sample. To define the crisis period, Broner et al. (2004) additionally use the 9-year bond spread, which is not readily available for all countries in our sample.

> 29 The following rates were used: 7-day interbank rate (Argentina), the bank deposit certificate rate (Brazil), the 30-day CD rate (Chile, Venezuela), the interbank call money rate (Indonesia, Korea, Russia), the 90day bank deposit rate (Mexico), and the 3-month discount rate (South Africa).

18
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