rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Annex Figure 2: Restrictiveness of services trade policies by region, 2007**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60.0 56.8<br>50.0<br>43.9<br>38.2<br>40.0<br>30.0 24.1<br>21.5 20.8<br>20.0 15.4<br>10.0<br>0.0<br>SAR (3) EAP (7) MENA LAC (9) Africa (6) ECA (6) OECD<br>(5) (20)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Gootiiz and Mattoo (2008) The survey reveals that developing countries have significantly liberalized a range of service sectors over the last couple of decades, but in some areas protection persists. In fact, the overall pattern of policies across sectors is increasingly similar in developing and industrial countries. In telecommunications, public monopolies seem in most countries a relic of history, with at least some measure of competition introduced in both mobile and fixed services. In banking too, domination by state-owned banks has given way to increased openness to the presence of foreign and private banks. Very few countries restrict foreign investment in retail. However, even though the markets for these services are now more competitive, they are in most countries some distance from being truly contestable. In telecommunications, governments continue to limit the number of providers and, particularly in Asia, the extent of foreign ownership. In both banking and insurance, the allocation of new licenses remains opaque and highly discretionary. In retail, a range of domestic regulations, such as zoning laws, severely impede entry in both developing and industrial countries.

Transport and professional services remain a bastion of protectionism in high-income countries and are also subject to high barriers in developing countries (Annex Figure 2). In maritime transport, even though international shipping is today quite open, entry into cabotage and auxiliary services such as cargo handling is in many countries restricted. In air transport, restrictions on foreign investment co-exist with limitations on cabotage and cross-border trade – though conditions for freight transport are much more liberal than those for passenger transport. In professional services, even though there is increased scope for international trade through electronic means, there remain restrictions on foreign presence. In general, accounting and the practice of international law tend to be more open than auditing and the practice of domestic law. The restrictions on foreign investment are far less stringent than the restrictions on the presence of foreign professionals.

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# IV.3 Credibility of Reform Process

<!-- Start of picture text --> 7- = _<br>3- - _ d _ il _ 1x, _ 1, . 1- _<br>2- - ~ :i| ~ t _ ~ _ F- 1- _<br>~~~ ~i<br>s o : B ,! <@,<br>,1 01999 9<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Figure 12: Perceptions of investment risk<sup>incasestudy</sup> countries (Intemational Country Risk Guide) Source: International Country Risk Guide, Note: Score is calculated on a ten-point scale, equally weighting<sup>risks related</sup> to contract repudiation by government, expropriation by<sup>government,ruleof</sup> law, corruption and bureaucratic quality. For 1999, PRS changed<sup>the scoring</sup> system. Scores for the likelihood of contract repudiation and<sup>expropriation</sup> were rolled into a general index related to investor confidence.<sup>For the1999</sup> measure, we replace contract repudiation and expropnation<sup>with'investor</sup> confidence', which received twice the weight in the aggregate<sup>measures.The</sup> large increases for Malawi (and Uganda) are visible if we restrict<sup>the index to</sup> include only the three other measures (i.e., corruption, rule of<sup>lawand</sup> bureaucratic quality). See Knack and Keefer (1995) for a description of<sup>the</sup> ICRG measures.

In addition to being politically desirable and feasible, reform must also be attractive to private sector investors if they are to invest in the sector. One aspect of this, the credibility, independence and power of the regulatory agency, is discussed in detail Section IHI. As discussed above, several factors related to the formation of MACRA reduced its credibility: the regulatory agency had considerable discretionary powers; it was only modestly insulated from politcal pressure; and it had not yet established a track record regarding its regulatory performance.

However, other factors worked in Malawi's favor. Although Malawi ranked lower on the International Country Risk Guide, than<sup>theearlyreformersin the other case</sup> studies (e.g., Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Tanzania) in<sup>1994,perceptionsofriskinMalawi</sup> improved significantly following democratization. In fact,<sup>by1999,Malawiwasrankedhigher</sup> (i.e., as less risky) than any of the other case study countries<sup>except Uganda(see Figure12).One</sup> area where Malawi ranked favorably is on 'law and order tradition',<sup>whichmeasures the ICRG's</sup> assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system<sup>anditsassessmentof popular</sup> observance of the law. Since the democratization process<sup>began inMalawi,Malawi'shave</sup> courts ruled against the government in several high-profile cases.<sup>For example,beforethe1999</sup> elections, the _Electoral Commission_ ruled that the presidential<sup>candidateforthe two main</sup> opposition parties, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and<sup>the MalawiCongress Party(MCP)</sup> could not run under a single banner. However, the courts ruled against the Electoral 34
# **Box 1: OECS Customs: More than an Administrative Transaction (cont...)**

On the side of the risk management, the SEMCAR program has produced a Risk Management Framework (RMF). This Framework promotes the adoption of risk management practices based on risk profiling of authorized operators and agile trade facilitation. One of the OECS countries has piloted the RMF by setting up an information solution that enables data exchanges between the revenue agency and the customs office, in order to build up and update risk profiles of authorized operators. This approach to RMF is compatible with the existing core customs information system.

# What else can be done in OECS Customs?

The implementation of integrated systems and the initial adoption of the SMF and the RMF are positive steps towards building modern Customs in the OECSs. However, these steps are only the beginning. Changing the culture of Customs as entities for fee collection is evidently a challenge to overcome. Dealing with distorting incentives for perpetuating and deepening inefficiencies in trade facilitation is another big challenge. For OECS critical next steps include:

- a) _Removing the overtime practice_ . This implies that the basic salary is the only compensation for customs inspectors. However corruption might come up in order to compensate the loss of overtime compensations;

- b) _Introducing a fee for customs services paid by the private sector_ . To be effective this fee must not be linked to physical examinations and should contribute to an overall compensation fund. Since the private sector is already paying the cost of overtime, this should not be a problem for them; and

- c) _Revising salary scale and incentive for Customs officers._ This action might have important fiscal implications and should come along with a reform program oriented towards converting customs offices in the Caribbean into performance-oriented entities.

_Prepared by José Eduardo Gutierrez Ossio, based on Gutierrez, Alessandro, and Neyra (2013)._
**Figure 14: Coverage, HOI and D for access to basic infrastructure**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Improved water Electricity 2000 Registration<br> Non-shared toilet Electricity 2008<br> Non-shared toilet<br> Registration Composite indicator<br> Improved water<br>C omposite indicator<br>HOI = 80%<br>HOI = 60%<br>Coverage (%) HOI = 40%<br>Housing and Basic Services 2000<br>Housing and Basic Services 2008<br>Source: DHS 2000 and 2008; HIECS 2000 and 2008 used for imputation of household<br>HOI = 20 %<br>HOI = 20%<br>Equality of Opportunity<br>(1-Dissimilarity Index) (%)<br><!-- End of picture text --> The Shapley decomposition reveals that regional variables explain the largest share of the variations in access to improved water at home and in whether the child is registered. In fact, regional variables explain more than half of the variation in access to improved drinking water at home and about a third of the variation in whether the child is registered (Figure 15). For access to a non-shared toilet and electricity at home, the asset index of the household is the main indicator that explains variation in outcomes.

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**Table 1. Summary of Rural Income Data From Egypt and Jordan, 1997**

||Rural|Egypt|Rural J|ordan|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Source of<br>income|Mean annual<br>per capita<br>household<br>income(LE)(')|Percent of total<br>per capita<br>household<br>income from<br>source|Mean annual<br>per capita<br>household<br>income(JD)(b)|Percent of<br>total per<br>capita<br>household<br>income from<br>source|
|Nonfarm|414.1<br>(626.1)|42.2|323.4<br>(3,702.6)|50.6|
|Agricultural|241.3<br>(1,161.3)|24.7|54.5<br>(1,799.5)|8.5|
|Transfer|150.9<br>(360.8)|15.4|174.3<br>(3,510.8)|27.3|
|Livestock|92.6<br>(268.7)|9.4|-|-|
|Rental|81.3<br>(311.6)|8.3|87.2<br>(1,926.1)|13.6|
|Total|980.2<br>(1,480.7)|100.0|639.5<br>(5,988.6)|100.0|

- Sources: Egypt: Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997. Jordan: Jordan Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1997.

- Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Mean income figures include negative source incomes recorded for some households. N = 1,301 households (Egypt) and 1,451 households (Jordan).

(a) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$ 0.295.

- (b) In 1997, 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = US$ 1.410.
might both be poorly capturing food access and instead the FIES might be correctly identifying the population with poor food access. However, this possibility does not seem likely. Specifically, we perform a common check on the validity of monetary poverty and corroborate that the share of expenditure devoted to food, itself a measure of food access, is declining for higher expenditure deciles in the household survey (Engel’s Law); and we verify using sub-national food access estimates from other data sources that the regions with the poorest food access are correctly identified by the FCS and monetary poverty and incorrectly identified by the FIES. Furthermore, other research using the same data used in this analysis has extensively validated the quality of the household survey used in the analysis (e.g., Lain and Vishwanath 2021).<sup>6</sup> Combined, the evidence suggests that the FIES is not working well in the particularly important context of Nigeria. However, we further find that although the overall scale is poorly aligned with monetary poverty and the FCS, the alignment varies by the specific coping strategies and behaviors that make up the scale. First, some of the more subjective questions on food access had significant deviations from the predicted relationship between food access and poverty, which is consistent with previous work illustrating difficulties in interpreting subjective welfare questions (e.g., Ravallion 2013; Tandon 2021; etc.). And second, for the more objective questions, some of the questions aligned well with monetary poverty, while others performed less well. This pattern is consistent with the validation of other indices based on food coping strategies (e.g., the Coping Strategy Index), where many coping strategies are not necessarily universal and it is important to adapt the coping strategies that are captured to specific country contexts (e.g., Maxwell and Caldwell 2008).

Overall, one of the key implications of these findings is that it is important to continue to collect a variety of food access indicators and that the FIES should not crowd out other measures. These results corroborate previous research and help demonstrate that widely

> 6For example, as enumerators interview more households, they may begin to learn the ways that significantly reduce the amount of work they have to do in each survey, such as reducing the number of people in the household roster or reporting fewer distinct food items consumed. These and other household characteristics were analyzed over time and demonstrate little change over the survey implementation period, which is consistent with proper monitoring and good survey implementation. For more details, see Lain and Vishwanath (2022).

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Highlands and North Central Coast, have poverty headcounts above 45 percent. When rural areas are considered separately from urban areas, rural poverty is also found to be high in most of the remaining provinces of the Northem Uplands together with Gia Lai and Kon Tum and the Central Highlands. A group of moderately poor rural provinces (with rural headcounts between 45 and 50 percent) can also be seen clustered in the North Central Coast and Red River Delta. However, even relatively prosperous regions have their own pockets of poverty: such as Ha Tay in the Red River Delta and Ninh Thuan in the Southeast.

To consider the effectiveness of Vietnam's existing geographically targeted anti-poverty programs, we apply the relatively novel technique of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to the VLSS data. Our results confirm that a consistent ranking of communes has high potential to identify Vietnam's poor population. However, the existing officially designated list of "poor and remote communes" is less effective in targeting the poor as it excludes a large number of poor people living in other areas. Among the additional household level variables that might be used to help sharpen the focus of targeting, demographics (in particular, the number of children in a household under 15 years old), housing characteristics (especially floor type) and ownership of durable assets perform well. A simple index of radio and television ownership dominates all other individual targeting variables with the exception of communes ranked by their median per capita expenditures. Combining several household level variables into a composite targeting indicator offers the potential to further improve the targeting of the poor, especially in urban areas.

When household level data from the full sample of the 1999 Census becomes available, it should be possible to extend this poverty mapping to the district level. Since the determinants of expenditures and poverty are likely to remain relatively stable over time, we believe this will be a useful exercise even though the Census and VLSS are now three to four years out-of-date. In addition, although censuses are only conducted every ten years, the first step of the poverty mapping calculations (the expenditure regressions) can be re-estimated and new poverty maps derived, each time a nationally representative household sample survey is conducted. The complete provincial poverty map could also be redone every five years using information from 36
December 2005, 97.7 percent of issued bonds were inflation-linked bonds, and 1.5 percent were linked to the U.S. dollar. In December 2010, a similar composition was observed, when almost 94 percent of bonds were linked to inflation and 1.5 percent were linked to the exchange rate.<sup>3</sup> Domestic bonds are also mostly rated at investment grade, with very few high-yield issues. Non-investment-grade bonds correspond to 0.2 percent of issues, and by the end of 2010 the percentage of bonds rated BBB or below was about 3 percent, which is significantly lower than those in developed countries: high-yield bonds have reached almost 40 percent of issues in Japan and around 10 percent in the United States (statistics from LarrainVial 2011).

Although primary bond markets for the private sector seem highly developed, liquidity in secondary markets remains limited. According to LarrainVial (2011), trading of corporate bonds in Chile corresponds to about 20 percent of the total value traded in domestic bond markets, a disproportionate amount given its size relative to government bonds. Even though turnover ratios increased consistently in the 2000s, going from about 30 percent in 2002 to almost 60 percent in 2010, they stood in marked contrast to a turnover ratio of 294 percent for government bonds in 2010.<sup>4</sup> Liquidity in corporate bond markets in Chile also seems limited when compared to other LAC countries: about 463 percent in Mexico, 123 percent in Brazil, and 75 percent in Colombia.

These developments in Chilean corporate bond markets need to be viewed in light of their main institutional investors, pension funds, insurance companies, and, to a lesser extent, mutual funds. These investors, and particularly pension funds, provide stable demand for corporate bonds given their sheer size (about 65 percent of GDP for pension funds and 20 percent for insurance companies in 2010). Pension funds, for instance, held about 50 percent of the stock of bonds in 2010, while insurance companies held 32 percent. Given their status as large market players in corporate bond markets, their investment behavior will be tightly linked to developments in this market. For example, their large size implies that investments are usually made in large amounts, which limits the potential demand for smaller issues. These investors typically pursue buy-and-hold strategies, keeping bonds in their portfolios until maturity, as shown in Opazo, Raddatz, and Schmukler (2009) and Raddatz and Schmukler (2013), which can explain the low liquidity of the secondary private bond markets. In addition,

> data availability.

> 3. Notice, however, that, while nominal bonds are still a very small fraction of total issued corporate bonds, they have increased significantly over the past five years. 4. The trading of bonds issued by banks accounts for a large fraction of total trading in secondary bond markets in Chile—60 percent on average during 2010.

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both for sale and for self-consumption. The sewing cooperative has contracts with several enterprises and has become well known in the market.

The longer term prospects for employment are unknown though this will remain a major challenge for residents of Ribeira Azul and other low-income neighborhoods. While many of those living in the _favelas_ migrate to the cities in search of work, unemployment in Salvador is reported at around 20 percent, almost twice the national average.<sup>4</sup> While data are not available for Ribeira Azul, the unemployment rate is thought to be substantially higher.

International evidence on youth training programs has been mixed.<sup>5</sup> Four evaluations of programs in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay) show that intensive investments which combine training and work experiences with other services including psychological development, vocational assessment, etc. can be beneficial. Implementation involves important roles for civil society and the private sector requiring flexible, competitive and decentralized service delivery. While the impacts on employment and earnings in the short run (size months to one year after the training) appear to be quite positive, little or nothing is known on the impact over time.

A recent study in the United States analyzes the impact of investments in human development at different stages in people’s lives on competence and coping skills and concludes that investments in early years of life, even before the formal school system, give the greatest return.<sup>6</sup> From an economic perspective, this would indicate that investing in early childhood education will yield a much higher return. Linking this back to the unit cost data in Section III, annual costs for youth training were almost 60 percent higher than the costs for early childhood programs (R$3500 for training versus R$2200 for the crèche).

The job creation programs in Ribeira Azul are considered to be effective by those interviewed, though given the relatively high cost and mixed international experiences, it would be important to further investigate the economic efficiency of these programs visà-vis other social programs such as the early childhood programs. As the Viver Melhor/IBRD Program scales up, linking the training and cooperatives to the demands in the labor market will be important to ensuring opportunities for employment. Partnerships with specialized and well-experienced agencies such as SENAI and the national service for micro-enterprises, SEBRAE _(Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas_ ) will also be necessary to ensure broad coverage.

> 4 _IBGE Social Indicators 2003/PNAD._

> 5 Betcherman, G., Olivas, K. and A. Dar, 2004, Impacts of Active Labor Market Programs: New Evidence from Evaluations with Particular Attention to Developing and Transition Countries, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0402, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

> 6 Carneiro and Heckman, 2003

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World Bank’s _Governance Indicators_ also rank Chile better than Argentina in terms of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. With higher rankings here indicating better outcomes, Chile is in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile in terms of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, while Argentina ranks in the 20<sup>th</sup> to 40<sup>th</sup> percentile depending on the indicator considered.<sup>7</sup> According to The Heritage Foundation’s _Property Rights Index_ (one of the components in the Economic Freedom Index), Chile stands at 90 while Argentina receives a 30, with higher numbers (on a scale from 0 to 100) indicating greater protection of property rights.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the _Doing Business in Latin America_ 2008 report shows that Chile ranks better than Argentina in terms of legal rights protection and regarding the time and cost to register property (World Bank, 2007c). Given all these alleged differences in the institutional environments in Argentina and Chile, this paper studies whether banks view them as shaping their involvement with SMEs.

The paper’s main findings regarding banks’ perceived drivers and obstacles to financing SMEs are as follows. First, despite the mentioned institutional differences, SMEs have become a strategic sector for most banks in both countries. Furthermore, banks perceive the SME lending market as large, unsaturated, and with good prospects. Second, this interest in SMEs is not based on government programs. Banks seem to be focusing on SMEs because, among other things, they argue that the segment’s profitability will more than compensate for the higher implied costs and risks, especially given thinning margins in the corporate and retail sectors due to competition in those segments. Third, since banks have developed coping mechanisms to deal with potential institutional deficiencies, they do not perceive any

> 7 See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) for a detailed description of these governance indicators. For rankings, go to <u>http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.</u>

> 8 Data for the Heritage Foundation Index of Property Rights can be downloaded from http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm.

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