<mark>as clusters for large farm development had been put in place.</mark><sup>11</sup> <mark>The idea was that through such schemes, infrastructure and markets would be easily available (Middelberg</mark> _<mark>et al.</mark>_ <mark>2020)</mark> together with land to stimulate commercial agriculture and boost food security. <mark>The impact of this strategy is debated, partly because it mixed political and economic objectives</mark> (Roth 1995): <mark>some studies find blocks</mark> generated employment- and income- benefits (Matenga & Hichaambwa 2017) by providing market linkages (Burke _et al._ 2020b) and involving out-growers (Manda _et al._ 2020). Others suggest that s <mark>ettlement schemes were not associated with higher levels of productivity (</mark> Sitko _et al._ 2014), raising concerns that such schemes may, by tying up land, do more to forestall future development than to encourage it (Sitko & Jayne 2014).<sup>12</sup> <mark>Assessing performance and prospects of Zambia’s large farms is complicated by the lack of clarity on the amount of land they own or cultivate. Ex</mark> perts agree that 94% of the country’s 74 million ha was under customary tenure in 1995 when conversion of customary to state land became legally possible (Roth 1995). Although based on a somewhat weak basis,<sup>13</sup> recent studies put the share of land owned by large farms above 50% (Jayne _et al._ 2014a), with estimates of up to 60% (Honig & Mulenga 2015). This would imply a transfer of more than 30 million ha of state land to large farms since 1995 -a more than six-fold increase with potentially far-reaching consequences if woodlands were affected (Wilson & Scholes 2020). The fact that according to FAO statistics (FAOStat) Zambia’s agricultural output at most doubled over the same period suggests that either land thus transferred is not used productively or the amount of land transferred is lower.

Zambia’s long-standing policy stance in favor of large farms is also evident from it having adopted one of Africa’s most dualistic land policies. It is one of few countries that maintains a clear dichotomy between customary and statutory land rights based on an implicit assumption of a linear progression from customary to statutory tenure (Alden Wily 2018).<sup>14</sup> The only way to have land rights formally documented is to convert customary to ‘state land’. Effecting such a conversion is complex (Adams 2003) and costly (Larson 2014). The fact that it involves high levels of administrative discretion (German _et al._ 2013b) and weak procedural

> 11 The 2006 Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Act as amended establishes ZDA to consolidate different agencies that had historically been involved in administering such schemes (see Roth (1995), p. 173-99 for a concise summary of the historical evolution). 12 Before 2000, retired or retrenched civil servants accounted for a significant share of land acquisition while after 2000, speculative land acquisition by those who accumulated resources in non-agricultural ventures seem to predominate (Sitko & Jayne 2014). “Land titling may be implicated in process of elite capture of land at the possible expense of future small-scale farm growth and farm consolidation” (Sitko and Jayne 2014, p. 199).

> 13 The estimate by Jayne _et al._ (2014a) is based on binned DHS data. Sitko _et al._ (2015) noted that “Data on state lands (which include farm blocks) are from a spatial boundary dataset in wide circulation within the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Planning, and other governmental and nongovernmental entities, although the provenance of this dataset cannot be determined with certainty. To evaluate the validity of these datasets, we confirmed that mapped boundaries conformed to knowledge held by managerial and operational personnel within the relevant ministries” (p.13). 14 Land relations in Zambia are governed by the 1995 Land Act. After long deliberations, a National Land Policy was adopted in May 2021. Studies have long pointed out that limited capacity and local presence of relevant state institutions makes implementing this ‘replacement’ paradigm (Bruce & Migot-Adholla 1994) difficult, implying that relevant laws may have little effect on local realities (Atwood 1990; Pinckney & Kimuyu 1994).

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