rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Policy Research Working Paper Series**

||**Title**|**Author**|**Date**|**Contact**<br>**for paper**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|WPS 842|Capital Flows to South Asia and<br>ASEAN Countries: Trends,<br>Determinants, and Policy Implication|Ishrat Husain<br>Kwang W. Jun<br>s|January 1992|S. King-Watson<br>31047|
|WPS843|How Financial Markets Affect Long-<br>Run Growth: A Cross-Country Study|Ejaz Ghani<br>|January 1992|A. Nokhostin<br>34150|
|WPS844|Heterogeneity, Distribution, and<br>Cooperation in Common Properly<br>Resource Management|Ravi Kanbur|January i992|WDR Office<br>31393|
|WPS845|Inflation Stabilization in Turkey:<br>An Application of the RMSM-X Model|Luc Everaert<br>|January 1992|B. Mondestin<br>36071|
|WPS846|Incorporating Cost and Cost-<br>Effectiveness Analysis into the<br>Development of Safe Motherhood<br>Programs|Larry Forgy<br>Diana M. Measham<br>Anne G. Tinker|January 1992|0 Nadora<br>31091|
|WPS847|Coping with the Legacies of<br>Subsidized Mortgage Credit in<br>Hungary|Silvia B. Sagari<br>Loic Chiquier|January 1992|M. Guirbt<br>35015|
|WPS848|How EC 1992 and Reforms of the<br>Common Aaricultural Policy Would<br>Affect Developing Countries' Grain Tr|Merlinda D. Ingco<br>Donald 0. Mitchell<br>ade|February 1992|P. Kokila<br>33716|
|WPS849|Financial Structures and Economic<br>Development|Ross Levine|February 1992|W. Pitayatonakarn<br>37666|
|WPS850|Fiscal Adjustment and the Real<br>Exchange Rate: The Case of Bangla|Kazi M Matin<br>desh|February 1992|D. Ballantyne<br>38004|
|WPS851|Sources of World Bank Estimates<br>of Current Mortality Rates|Eduard Bos<br>My T Vu<br>Patience W. Stephens|February 1992|0. Nadora<br>31091|
|WPS852|How Health Insurance Affects the<br>Delivery of Health Care in Developing<br>Countries|Joseph Kutzin<br>Howard Barnum|February 1992|0. Nadora<br>31091|
|WPS853|Policy Uncertainty, Information<br>Asymmetries, and Financial<br>Intermediation|Gerard Capnio|February 1992|W. Pitayatonakatn<br>37664|
|WPS854|Is There a Case for an Optimal Export<br>Tax on Perennial Crops?|Takamasa Akiyama|February 1992|G. llogon<br>33732|
|WPS855|Sovereign Debt: A Primer|Jonathan Eaton|February 1992|S. King-Watson<br>31047|
**Table 5:** Extensive margin effects

**Panel A: After one** **<u>year</u>**

||For|mal|Perm|anent|Temp|orary|Info|rmal|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|Incentive|0.038|-0.046|0.076<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.012|-0.026|-0.031|-0.028|-0.010|
||(0.025)|(0.045)|(0.024)|(0.037)|(0.018)|(0.033)|(0.029)|(0.056)|
|Observations|1539|385|1539|385|1539|385|1170|271|
|R square|0.10|0.08|0.09|0.06|0.04|0.07|0.05|0.15|
|Control Mean|0.44|0.30|0.33|0.17|0.17|0.14|0.51|0.66|
|Std Dev|0.49|0.49|0.47|0.47|0.35|0.35|0.50|0.50|
|Sample|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|

**Panel B: After two years**

||For|mal|Perm|anent|Temp|orary|Info|rmal|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|
|Incentive|0.054<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.053|0.086<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.020|-0.011|-0.047|-0.030|-0.006|
||(0.025)|(0.048)|(0.025)|(0.043)|(0.021)|(0.037)|(0.029)|(0.055)|
|Observations|1539|385|1539|385|1539|385|1170|271|
|R square|0.09|0.08|0.09|0.09|0.04|0.07|0.04|0.12|
|Control Mean|0.54|0.38|0.42|0.24|0.23|0.18|0.55|0.71|
|Std Dev|0.50|0.50|0.49|0.49|0.41|0.41|0.50|0.50|
|Sample|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|Techn.|Gener.|

_Notes:_ Source: IMSS administrative data for formal employment and endline survey data for informal employment, June 2019-May 2021. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status, work experience, time and school fixed effects.<sup>_∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 10, _∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 05, _p <_ 0 _._ 01 To analyze the effect of the wage incentive on job retention, we apply the AG extension of the Cox proportional hazards model for discrete recurrent events, such as losing employment. Figure 5 shows employment survival rates for work spells starting with permanent contracts (Panel 5a) and temporary contracts (Panel 5b). While there is no discernible difference between treatment groups for work spells beginning with permanent contracts, treatment youths who start with temporary contracts face a lower risk of exiting employment. To formally test differences in retention, Appendix Table A3 reports hazard rates separately for the first six months of employment (Panel A) and over the full employment spell (Panel B). There is no change in retention for permanent jobs during the first six months. By contrast, we observe a more than 50% reduction in turnover for jobs with temporary contracts over this period (Panel A, Col. 3). For the full employment period, retention effects decrease. However, hazard rates for temporary jobs continue to be 26.1% lower.<sup>22</sup> This is partly ex-

> 22It is also noteworthy that there is no discontinuity in retention when participants exhausted their wage

24
**Table** 3

||ECM**for t**|**otal wage**|**s**|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Variable|Coefficient<br>Std. Error|t-value|t-prob|Part R<sup>2</sup>|Instab|
|-U|-1.392<br>0.521|-2.671|0.015|0.263|0.16|
|CPI_1|0.103<br>0.058|1.782|0.090|0.137|0.03|
|-CPI|0.098<br>0.135|0.727|0.476|0.026|0.03|
|Trend|0.028<br>0.010|2.902|0.009|0.296|0.03|
|Constant|2.765<br>1.295|2.135|0.045|0.186|0.03|
|W_1|-0.253<br>0.112|-2.266|0.035|0.204|0.03|
|U_1|-0.383<br>0.269|-1.423|0.170|0.092|0.04|
|i80-84|0.086<br>0.019|4.505|0.000|0.504|0.03|
|il984|-0.118<br>0.034|-3.492|0.002|0.379|0.07|
||**Definitions**|**of Variable**|**s**|||
||W_I is log total<br>U_1 is log total unemp<br>-U is the first ord<br>CPI_I is the log of the cons<br>-CPI is the di<br>iXXXX is a dummy va|wages lagged<br>loyment rate l<br>er differenc<br>umer price in<br>fference of C<br>riable for the|once<br>agged once<br>e of U<br>dex lagged<br>PI<br>(se) year(s)|<br>once<br>||
||**Test S**|**tatistics**||||
||R<sup>2 </sup>= 0.791 F(8, 20) =9.436 <br>RSS = 0.017 for 9 vari|[0.000] C=0<br>ables and 29|.029 DW =<br>observation|2.54<br>s||
||Variance instability test: 0.3<br>Information Criteria: SC -6.|85 Joint inst<br>393 HQ =-6|ability test:<br>.684 FPE|1.943<br>=0.001||
||AR 1-2F(2, 18<br>ARCH 1 F( 1, 1<br>Normality Chi<sup>2</sup>(<br>Xi<sup>2</sup><br>F(16, 3)<br>RESET F( 1, 19|)= 1.825 [0.1<br>8)=0.047 [0<br>2)= 5.141 [0<br>= 0.329[0.9<br>)=1.923 [0.|901<br>.832]<br>.077]<br>4 1]<br>182]|||

Additionally, Table 3 summarizes test statistics and based on these statistics; there is no evidence of misspecification of the wage model. _7_ The charts presented in Figure 7 substantiate these findings showing the actual and the fitted values, the residuals, the 7 The variance instability and the joint instability test statistics; a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation in the residuals with the null of no serial correlation (AR); an LM statistic for testing the null of no autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH); a statistic for testing the null hypothesis of unconditional homoscedasticity against the alternative that the residuals are correlated with the model's regressors and their squares (Xi<sup>2</sup> ); a regression specification test which test the null of correct specification against the alternative that the residuals are correlated with the squared fitted values of the regressand (RESET); and the test statistic for normality, where the null is that the residuals are normally distributed.

17
refugees did not catch up with natives and the male literacy gap only narrowed from -10 to -5 percentage points between the 1910-1917 cohorts. In contrast, in provinces where the increase in school supply was higher, the literacy gap closed entirely by 1917, with a stark catching up from -15 to +1 percentage point in just seven cohorts.

To put the social integration of refugees into perspective, it is useful to examine another group of immigrants. I focus on the largest group of immigrants in Greece (about two-third of the immigrant population), the Albanians, most of whom arrived in the 1990s, after the the collapse of the Soviet Union.

# **5.2 Refugees’ integration compared to Albanian immigrants**

**Education and occupation** Table A.4 in the appendix presents regression estimates of the educational gap between Albanian immigrants and Greek natives, for different generation of migrants. In terms of secondary schooling Albanian migrants who arrived in Greece when adults are 22 percentage points less likely to have completed secondary schooling relative to natives (71% of whom hold secondary education). There is absolutely no catching up over generations: the educational gap with natives remains almost unchanged for migrants who arrived at a younger age, i.e., below 12, and even below 5. The same is true in terms of tertiary education. Furthermore, the ESS data allows to examine the occupations of second-generation refugees, either in their current or in their last job.<sup>23</sup> As Table A.5 in the appendix shows, refugees are less likely than natives to report being farmers and they have comparable household income (by decile). In contrast, first-generation Albanian immigrants are more likely to work in low-skill occupations (in the non-primary sector) and have a lower household income than natives.

**Intermarriage** Refugees are more socially assimilated than recent Albanian immigrants in terms of intermarriage. Figure 3 reports the intermarriage rate of refugee women who were displaced at a young age, below 15. By 2001, almost 50% of refugee women got married with a Greek native. This represents a very high intermarriage rate in international comparison, with a typical rate between 2% and 25% among immigrant women in Western Europe in the 2000s (Lucassen and Laarman, 2009). In particular, the refugees’ high propensity to intermarry stands in contrast with Albanian immigrant women, who, despite living in Greece since childhood (15 or younger), have a less than 10% probability of getting married to a Greek native.

> 23The occupation of first-generation refugee cannot be observed in the 2001 census since most refugees are retired (being 79 or older).

15
**<mark>Tracking Wage Inequality Trends with Prices and Different Trade Models: Evidence from Mexico</mark>**<sup>**1**</sup>

Timothy Halliday University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization IZA Daniel Lederman World Bank Raymond Robertson Macalester College and IZA

**Keywords:** Mexico, Inequality, Labor Markets, Firm Heterogeneity

**JEL Codes:** F66, J31

> 1 The authors thank seminar participants at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Tulane University, Texas A&M, and the Authors’ Workshop for the World Bank’s Latin American and Caribbean Regional Study on “Wage Inequality Trends,” especially William Cline, Caroline Freund, Joseph Francois, Arvind Subramanian, Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Joana Silva, Julian Messina, and Augusto de la Torre.  We also thank Mario Solis-Garcia for helpful comments. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by Regional Studies Program of the Office of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean of The World Bank Group.
- 6t -

# FIGURE 7

# REAL INTEREST RATE ON DOMESTIC PUBLIC DEBT

<!-- Start of picture text --> Ida oo 4 fw<br>at" a '- m Awara<br>0_<br>I 0"""_ ;;~_~\ I I I _<br>~~~ao~U ide. aeh Otr ii IdS Ub t<br>.00 . _<br>w ........... . ............<br>s ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' .,.,<br>ides ides Id. iab~~~~~~~ i1* Ide Ito tab? Iis a<br><!-- End of picture text -->
||institutional investors||region|
|---|---|---|---|
|Comoros 1/||34.9|2011|
|Swaziland|Commercial banks|30.4|2011|
|Gabon 1/||22.1|2011|

1/These countries had no recent domestic issuance when DeMPA was conducted. Source: DeMPA reports, WDI, IMF staff reports and staff calculation based on ECCU statistics.

**_Instrument_** : Although the preference may be for a wide array of instruments, it is better to maintain a degree of simplicity and standardization. For example issuing zero coupon bills at shorter maturities and bonds carrying semiannual coupons for longer maturities, makes it easier to lay the foundation of a yield curve and attract retail investors. Among the small states in the sample group the vast majority of instruments used were Treasury bills, with maturity ranging from one month to one year. For example, of the 223 securities issued via the Regional Government Security Market (RGSM) of the ECCU since its establishment in 2002 up to February 2011, 189, or 85 percent of total issuance, were Treasury bills with maturity of 91-, 180- or 365- days, Treasury bonds of 5-year, 7-year and 10-years have also been issued in the ECCU but in small states outside of those in the sample group<sup>27</sup> . The gross value of Treasury bills amounted to EC$ 3,388 million, and Treasury bonds EC$1,222 million. In 2012, 42 auctions had taken place up to end-October and 9 were scheduled for the rest of the year. Out of these 51 issues, 44 (86 percent) are Treasury bills, and 2 (4 percent) 4-year Treasury notes and 5 (10 percent) Treasury bonds. In some countries **,** such as Guyana and Samoa, longer term securities were issued in the past but the operation was discontinued due to lack of interest from market participants.

**_Infrastructure_** : This is an essential element that provides the enabling environment for issues in primary and secondary markets, price and market data publication, clearing and settlement systems, physical infrastructure, the legal system and the regulatory framework.  As markets develop, issuance will occur further down the credit spectrum and require more transparent accounting standards, similar to the International Accounting Standards [IAS].  A flexible, interlinked and automated registry clearing and settlement system is an imperative. Within the ECCU the RGSM utilizes the platform of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and its subsidiaries to provide the infrastructure for the primary and secondary trading of member governments’ securities, as well as a registry system. The market was established in 2002 and its settlement, clearance and registry system are fully electronic. The instruments on the market include Treasury bills and bonds, with maturity ranging from 91- days to 10- years.

> 27 St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines government have issued T-bonds with maturity up to 10 years in regional market.

26
objects; and helping child with any homework. Typical behavior control strategies or disciplinary techniques were also measured, adapted from the MICS.<sup>33</sup> Two scores were derived from this module: ( _i_ ) the _Stimulation Index_ sums over a set of indicators describing activities that the primary caregiver does with the child (13 variables at baseline and the 18-month follow-up, and 18 variables at the 36-month follow-up); ( _ii_ ) the _Positive Practices Index_ sums over a set of six indicators for the use of positive methods to address child behavioral problems. Both the _Stimulation Index_ and the _Positive Practices Index_ were standardized at each round (baseline, 18-, and 36-month follow-up) using the control group’s mean and standard deviation.

We used Inverse Covariance Weighting (ICW) as described in Casey et al. (2012) to generate a _Parenting Quality Index_ by aggregating over parenting-related variables ( _Stimulation Index_ , _Positive Practices Index,_ and _Parental Stress Index_ ) at baseline and the 18-month follow-up. The ICW methodology is described in detail under _Kaufman Assessment Battery-Children, 2_<sup>_nd_</sup> _Edition (KABC-II)_ above. The _Parental Quality Index_ is not computed at 36-Month Follow-Up since we did not administer the _Parental Stress Index_ during that round.

# **Community-based child care center (CBCC) quality measures**

We used two strategies for gathering data on the quality of the CBCCs to estimate impacts of the interventions on the functioning of the centers. These included a questionnaire, completed by the director and teachers; and an observational tool, completed by a pair of enumerators during typical operation of the center. The CBCC questionnaire and observation measures were adapted from the _La Escala de Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa de Centros de Educación Preescolares_ (ECCP) (Martínez et al., 2004) from Mexico, and a preschool quality tool used in Cambodia (Rao et al., 2012). Items on both tools were based on theoretical and empirical data recommending assessment of both the _structural_ (e.g., building characteristics, water and sanitation facilities, availability of appropriate and diverse learning materials, provision of snacks, safety of environment, schedule of activities) and _process_ (e.g., warmth

> 33 The UNICEF MICS questionnaires can be accessed at <u>http://mics.unicef.org/tools.</u>

62
# **Background**

Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aiming at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Qualitative information was collected from importers, retailers, brokers, and middlemen in the five sectors in which informal trade prevails in Cameroon: furniture, secondhand clothing, secondhand cars, computer hardware, and electronic and household appliances. As far as possible, the qualitative information in this study is supported by quantitative data provided by the Cameroon Customs information technology (IT) system.

In recent years, Cameroon has undertaken major customs reform in three steps:<sup>2</sup>

- The first step (2008) was implementation of a new automated system, ASYCUDA that allows data crosschecking in order to reduce the scope of corruption.

- The second step, undertaken in parallel with the first step, introduced a policy of performance measurement based on a series of quantitative indicators (economic activity, processing times, effectiveness of control and sensitive procedures, and customs channels compliance). The policy was then implemented in 11 customs offices in Douala (Libom, Cantens, and Bilangna 2009). It resulted in a systematic performance assessment of the clearance operations of customs.

- The third step involved establishing performance contracts for customs agents in 2010 and for some importers in 2011 in order to provide non-financial incentives for improving compliance and practices; lower risks from a customs standpoint; and lighter controls and fewer visits for importers.

The impacts of the reforms were noteworthy for most quantitative indicators (Cantens et al. 2012). There was a significant reduction in the number of bad practices reported by inspectors and brokers, increases in the amount of duties and taxes per declaration, and better transactional and operational performance for importers (e.g., reductions in transactional delays).

> 2 For more detailed information, see Cantens et al. (2012).

2
# **2 Institutional Background**

Colombia’s higher education system offers bachelor’s programs (four- to six-years long) and SC programs. The latter (akin to asssociate’s degrees in the U.S.) encompass technical and technological programs, lasting two and three years respectively. The system includes several HEI types: universities, university institutes, technological institutes, and technical-professional institutes. Universities and university institutes are allowed to offer either bachelor’s or SC programs, while technological institutes and technical professional institutes are only allowed to offer SC programs. In what follows we use the terms "SC HEI" to refer to institutions specialized in SC programs (technological institutes and technical professional institutes), and "Other HEIs" to refer to institutions that offer bachelor’s (and perhaps SC) programs (university and university institutes).

During the early 2000s, Colombia experienced a sizable increase in higher education enrollment (Camacho et al., 2017; Carranza and Ferreyra, 2019) due to an expansion in the number of programs offered by existing institutions as well as the opening of new institutions and campuses. As a result, the number of municipalities with at least one HEI increased by about 20% between 2000 and 2004.<sup>6</sup> We focus on local availability of higher education as defined by the presence of HEIs in the vicinity of each municipality. To this end, we identify HEIs within a 10-kilometer radius from each municipality’s centroid.

Figure 1 displays the number of municipalities with SC HEIs and other HEIs in the 2000-2006 period. While the local supply of both HEI types grew, it grew faster for SC HEIs. Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the number of municipalities with SC HEIs grew by 40% relative to 2000, yet the number of municipalities with other HEIs grew by only 10%. These differential trends define the relative availability of higher education programs within a specific community. Our analysis seeks to uncover the effect of opening SC HEIs.

We focus on higher education supply as of 2004, one year before students in our sample graduated from high school. Of the 300 HEIs operating at the time, only one-third were SC HEIs. SC programs in Colombia are also provided by SENA ( _Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje_ ). This public institution has been providing workforce training for many decades; it only started offering SC programs in 2003 and had a negligible SC market share by 2004. It is not an HEI and operates outside the purview of the Ministry of Education. As a result, we do not include it in our analysis.

Of the 918 municipalities in our sample, 14% had an SC HEI within a 10 km radius (Table 3, municipality-level panel). This figure was 28% for other HEIs. Moreover, during our period of analysis, the vast majority of SC HEIs were located in cities that already

> 6Own calculations using data from the National System of Information on Higher Education (SNIES, in Spanish).

6
**_Figure 1: Gender gaps in labor productivity (percentage)_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> No controls<br>Control for sector<br>Control for size of enterprise<br>Control for size of enterprise,<br>sector and capital intensity<br>-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Hallward-Driemeier (2013)

# **3. Underlying gender constraints to firm performance in Africa**

This note follows a framework articulating three dimensions in the development of women-owned firms: (1) the set of gender-specific underlying constraints that shape the strategies of female entrepreneurs; (2) the choices that these entrepreneurs make; and (3) the business outcomes that reflect these choices. This is presented in Figure 2.

Gender differences in outcomes can be explained by the systematically different choices that men and women make, which are in turn driven by gender-specific constraints. The constraints considered here are the contextual factors, gender gaps in endowments and gender differences in preferences which restrict the range of economic choices women can make and impede the development of their businesses.

The subsequent sections review the existing evidence on the gender-specific constraints faced by female entrepreneurs. These barriers impose limits on female entrepreneurs’ choices regarding their level of investment and risk-taking, the decision to compete, the degree of sophistication and formalization of their activity, and the type of activities and sectors in which they engage. In terms of investment, Fafchamps et al. (2014) suggest that female business owners in Ghana channel a lower share of the capital they have access to into their activity than male owners. Nordman and Vaillant (2014) indicate that 42 to 51 percent of the gender gap in firm performance in Madagascar can be explained by differences in the capital and labor used to operate the firm. Women-owned firms tend also to adopt fewer advanced business practices such as marketing strategies and human resources management than men-owned firms (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2015). Moreover, the sector in which 4