rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Table 3: Effect of the Islamic Inheritance Rule on the Total Number of Children Ever Born and Excess Fertility**

||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|||Dependent Variable:<br>|<br>|
||Actual Number of<br>Children Ever<br>Born|Dummy of<br>Fertility in Excess<br>of Women’s Ideal|Dummy of<br>Fertility in Excess<br>of Men’s Ideal|
|Muslim* At least one brother at|-0.059|-0.00073|-0.048|
|childbearing|(0.60)|(0.12)|(0.15)|
|Muslim * At least one brother at|-3.11*|-0.50|-0.88**|
|childbearing * Childbearing after 1994|(1.48)|(0.31)|(0.28)|
|Mean, dependent variable|3.79|0.38|0.39|
|R-squared|0.26|0.08|0.10|
|Observations|1931|1614|1673|
|Sample|Wife age 40 to 49|Wife age 40 to 49|Wife age 40 to 49|

* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.

Note: OLS estimates of interactions between indicators of Muslim religion, having at least one surviving brother at the time of first child birth, and starting childbearing in the post-compilation period. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the PSU-level. Regressions use survey weights. Baseline sample excludes mixed-religion and polygamous couples. Columns (1) to (3) report estimated coefficients for a subsample of couples in which women are 40 to 49 years old. All regressions include fixed effects for the men’s total number of siblings, women’s age, the year of first child birth, and area and region of residence. Other controls included are men and women’s educational attainment and indicator of household wealth. Data summary is provided in Appendix 1.

34
associated with an increase in intra-regional trade on the order of 7.5%, as compared with only 0.9% for scenario II and 1.8% for scenario III. In monetary terms, these effects equate to approximately US$148bn, US$18bn, and US$35bn respectively.<sup>19</sup> Overall, we conclude that the potential intra-regional trade gains from reform are substantial for all three counterfactual scenarios. This is reinforced by a consideration of the distribution of export and import gains, which shows that certain economies stand to benefit to a level far in excess of the regional average.

Before concluding this Section, it is important to stress that our results, like all simulation results, are subject to a number of caveats. First, we are dealing with trade effects and not economic welfare as such. Second, our results apply only to intra-regional trade in manufactures, and do not take account of possible extra-regional effects. Given that the policy reforms contemplated here—in particular in Scenario I—can be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, there is considerable scope to produce gains for economies outside APEC as well. Assuming that non-discrimination is adhered to, our results could therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the likely range of overall (worldwide) effects. Third, our simulations implicitly assume that the elasticities on which they are based remain constant before and after the policy shock. While this may be the case for small policy changes, it is unlikely to hold for major regime shifts. Fourth, our simulations are based on data for the year 2004. As new data become available, we expect that the results for economies having undergone major policy shifts since then— such as WTO accession for Vietnam—may change significantly. Finally, Scenarios II and III do not take account of quantitative restrictions that may represent binding constraints on bilateral trade even once tariffs and other NTBs are lowered.

> 19 Region-wide aggregates obscure the fact that these results are subject to considerable heterogeneity across economies. Our results in Table 8 suggest that the import gains from reform tend to be concentrated in a few economies, while the export (market access) gains are spread more widely across the region. Such a distribution is inherent in the design of our counterfactuals: only those economies with transparency, tariff, or NTB scores below the regional average receive a policy “shock”, and therefore only those economies can reap an import gain from reform. However, to the extent that other APEC member economies export to reforming economies, then they can take advantage of a corresponding market access gain.

28
First, the society attaches a high value to learning and promotes talent by means of cultural reinforcements such as a stable, nurturing family environment from early childhood through the formative years. An analysis of the scores obtained from the Trends in International Math and Science Study (TIMSS)<sup>10</sup> suggests that such an upbringing (and the adequacy of nutrition) strengthen cognitive and analytic capabilities, as well as motivation which are critical to scholastic performance. The cultural environment of the home needs to be buttressed by the quality of schooling provided from primary all the way through tertiary levels.<sup>11</sup> Better schooling is becoming a priority as technological advances and computerization have increased the demand for workers capable of superior problem solving skills, the capacity to convey complex information and to work effectively in groups (Murnane and Levy 1996; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2001). Quality is partly a function of lab and classroom facilities and the enlightened use of IT to stimulate learning, to pique curiosity, and to enhance the ability to solve problems without recourse to rules. More importantly, it depends on the caliber of teachers (Hanushek 2004) and on how classroom instruction is reinforced by encouragement and supplementary tutoring at home.<sup>12</sup> These factors overshadow class size or the length of the school year (Hanushek 2002).

Second, a creative society is one which attaches equal importance to the building of human capital through better health, again starting from childhood when good nutrition and care have profound and lasting implications for learning capacity in later life (Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 1999; Bloom 2000). Physical health is one part of the picture, mental well being is a second and equally significant complement. The burgeoning interest in gross human happiness, while still in its infancy and beset by problems of measurement,<sup>13</sup> is pointing to a correlation between perceived happiness of societies and their ranking according to indicators of international economic

> 10 The details of this analysis and a survey of related literature can be found in Yusuf and others (2003, ch5).

> 11 The close relationship between the quality of education and economic outcomes is analysed and empirically supported by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Wößmann (2007). 12 Finland, which ranks high on student achievement scores, is noted not for the length of the school year but the emphasis on home tutoring and support. After – school learning of math, reading and communication skills is also underscored by  Murnane and Levy (1996).

> 13 See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a recent review of the methodological issues and findings from the research on happiness initiated by the “Easterlin Paradox” which came to light in the 1970s. See also Layard (2005).

4
and 2.78, respectively, which replicate their average counterparts in the LAC region during the 1990s (Table 4).

Due to lack of information about cross-sectoral resource allocation in the LAC region, total nontradable investment, importable investment and labor input are split between the two producing sectors in proportion to these sectors’ steady state contributions to total value added. The fraction of time devoted to market activities is generally set to 1 3 in real business cycle studies. Ellery et al. (2002), using the National Household Survey found that Brazilian households spent, on average, exactly 1 3 of their nonsleeping hours working. The sectoral allocation of labor effort is based on sectoral contributions to total value added, as was just mentioned.

The steady state interest rate that the representative economy is charged on world capital markets is set at 9.5% which is the sum of two components: the exogenously given world interest rate (r<sup>∗</sup> ) , proxied by the U.S. interest rate (4% according to Prescott, 1986, and Backus et al., 1994), and a borrowing premium measured by the JP Morgan Latin American Eurobond Index (LEI) spread. The average LEI spread amounted to 550 basis points (s = 0.055) over the 1994-2001 period. The parameter β can be set to 0.913 by exploiting the relationship between the subjective discount rate and the interest rate that arises from the steady state version of the household’s first order conditions ∗ (1 = β (1 + r + s)) . Note that the length of a model period is one year.

For a sample of developing countries, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between nontradables and importables in consumption to be 1.279. This implies a value for υ equal to -0.22. From the equilibrium versions of the household’s first order conditions for<sup>c and</sup> nt<sup>c</sup> mt<sup>, evaluated at the steady state, and setting relative</sup> prices at equal to unity in the steady state, an expression for α can be obtained: where C mva and C nva are the average shares of imported and nontradable consumption expenditures in total value added respectively. All the information on the right-hand side is known, in particular, the structure of the model economy described above. Then set α = 0.853 . Lacking specific evidence on the elasticity of substitution between nontradable and importable goods in investment, I use Ostry and Reinhart’s (1992) consumption elasticity estimate as an alternative. This implies ν n = ν x = − 0.22 .

Using the first order conditions for<sup>i</sup> nnt ,<sup>i</sup> nxt ,<sup>i</sup> mnt and<sup>i</sup> mxt , evaluated at the steady state, it is possible to express φ and n φ in terms of known magnitudes: x 18
# Table of Co4Aents

||Page|
|---|---|
|Executi<br>S|ve<br>ummary<br>...........<br>.<br>....................|
|Intro|duction<br>.......................<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>..<br>.<br>.<br>.|
|I.|Problems<br>with Exchange Rate Conversion.<br>.<br>. _5_<br>|
||a. Background ..............<br>.5<br>b. Attempt to Estimate Multiple Exchange Rates .....<br>.. .. .....<br>6<br>c. The Ruble as Regional Currency .....................<br>9|
|H.|SyntheticAtlas-Type<br>Conversion Factor .........<br>.........<br>10|
||a. Role of Purchase Power Parities (PPPs) .........<br>......<br>10|
||b. Attempts Using Regressions .......................<br>11|
||c. Preferred Synthetic Atlas-Type Conversion Factor (SACF) ....<br>12|
||d. More Narrowly Focused SACF .....................<br>13|
|HI.|Implications for Other CMEA Economies .................<br>14|
|IVt|.National Accounting Issues .........<br>.................<br>15<br>|
||a. Basic Data Issues ..............<br>................<br>16|
||b. Estimates of Outside Experts ......................<br>17|
||c.Treatment of Cross-Border Transactions ................<br>18|
|V.|Relationship to OtherStudies ........................<br>19|
|VI.|Directions for Near-Term Work .......................<br>22|
|Table 1:|Basic Indicators ..................................<br>3|
|Table 2:|Composition of FSU's Extra-Union Trade in 1990.<br>8|
|Table3:<br>Table 4:|GDPEstimates of Different Compilers, 1987 and 1990.18<br>Alternative Relativities for FSU in International Comparisons<br>20|
|Annex 1:|Estimation of FSU Economies' GNPs inRuble<br>Terms.28|
|Annex 2:|Conceptual Approach to Converting GNP into US$ for<br>FSUEconomies<br>.<br>.33|
|Annex 3:|Conversion Factors Adjusted by Foreign Trade Price<br>Differentials (FTDs) .<br>......<br>38|
|Annex 4:|<br>Synthetic Atlas-Type Conversion Factor (SACF).<br>40|
|Annex 5:|ICP 1990 Preliminary Results for Austria and the FSU..<br>45|
|Annex 6:|Quality<br>and Diversity<br>Adjustments<br>.....................<br>54|
|Annex 7:|<br> <br> <br>Overlap between ICP 1990 and CIA 1976 Item Prices<br>.68|
|References|.....<br>.<br>......................<br>.........<br>70|
# **1** **_Introduction: what are public services worth?_**

The provision of public goods and services is the major function of governments, and governments have traditionally been the major providers and financers of services. Governments, particularly in developing countries are facing increased demand for services and greater responsibilities in the face of more rising financial constraints. This compels policymakers to set priorities, and to enhance the efficiency of service delivery. The World Development Report of 2004 (World Bank 2004) focused on the efficiency and management of public service delivery, emphasizing the importance of accountability and outcomes. That report provided new insights on the supply side; that is, how governments can improve service delivery. The demand side however has received less attention. One of main objectives in this paper is to examine the demand for services – the motivation comes from two disparate fields: first, the estimation of explicit reduced-form demand functions or demand systems, in which the quantity consumed is determined by prices and incomes; second, the work on capitalization and hedonic estimation of house prices.

We use a variant of the hedonic method to estimate the private returns to public services. That is, we estimate the change in house prices resulting from the provision of selected public services. This is implicitly a measure of the household’s own subjective estimate of the value of public services. This paper focuses exclusively on the _private_ value of public services.<sup>1</sup> The services that we examine here are those that are important for improving a household’s quality of life. These include access to piped water supply and sanitation, solid waste management, basic transport services, education, and crime

> 1 We can’t estimate the public value – the externalities – explicitly.

2
Table 6: Quality of Contracting Environment

||Securityof<br>Property<br>Rights'<br>(Indexof<br>Economic<br>Freedom)|Contract<br>Enforcementb<br>(BERI)|RuleofLawc<br>(ICRG)|Creditor<br>Rightsd<br>(LLSV)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Argentina|4|2.07|3.21|1|
|Chile|_5_|2.42|4.21|2|
|Colombia|3|1.93|1.25|0|
|Peru|3|1.73|1.50|0|
|U.K.|5|3.42|5.14|4|
|U.S.|5|3.54|6.00|1|

**a** Index from 1-5, from 1997 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. A score of (5) indicates that "Private property guaranteed by the government, and efficient court system enforces contracts. Adequate justice system to punish those who unlawfully confiscate private property. Expropriation not likely"; (4) "Private property guaranteed by the government, but enforcement is lax. Expropriation unlikely"; (3) "Government recognizes some private property rights, such as land, but property can be nationalized. Expropriation possible"; (2) "Property Ownership is limited to personal items with little legal protection. Communal property is the rule. Expropriation likely, and government does not protect private property adequately. The legal system has collapsed"; (1) "Private property is outlawed. Everything belongs to the people or the state. Expropriation is certain, or the country is so corrupt and chaotic that property protection is nonexistent."

**b** Index from 14, from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). Measures the "relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications presented by language and mentality differences." Higher scores indicate greater enforceability. Values averaged over 1980-95. As reported in Knack and Keefer (1995).

' Index from 1-6, from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, and strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Upon changes in government in countries scoring low on this measure, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime." Values averaged over 1982-95. As reported in La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).

**d** Index from 04, that aggregates various creditor rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Table 1. Index formed "by adding I when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in this distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization."

28
_-6_ provides an indicator of the concentration of public resources on education.<sup>3</sup> The relative extent of structural equity is captured by a Lorenz curve and the corresponding gini concentration ratio (fig 4). The Lorenz curve for China is close to the line of equality and the gini coefficient is quite low (0.39). It is useful to note that the gini coefficient is smaller than it was in 1985 (0.43), reflecting that the distribution of public spending on education has become much more equitable in the past seven years.

_Table 2: Gross Enrollment Rates by Quintile of Provincial Per Capita Income_

|||||_1_|_993_|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||_Age_|_group of ch_|_ildren_||||
|||_7-11 years o_|_ld_|_1_|_2-14 years o_|_ld_||_14 and abo_|_ve_|
|_Quintile_|_Male_|_Female_|_Total_|_Male_|_Female_|_Total_|_Male_|_Female_|<br>_Total_|
|I|90.2|83.2|86.7|28.5|24.0|26.2|3.8|1.9|2.8|
|II|92.0|90.3|91.1|38.1|33.0|35.5|5.2|2.3|3.7|
|m|93.1|91.0|92.0|39.2|37.1|76.3|6.8|3.0|4.9|
|IV|95.1|94.8|94.9|66.3|71.4|68.8|7.9|3.3|5.6|
|V|97.6|97.2|97.4|72.9|78.6|75.8|9.2|3.8|6.5|
|Rural|92.3|87.6|90.1|34.8|31.0|32.9||||
|Urban|96.8|96.6|96.7|70.2|75.0|72.5||||

Source: Staff estimates from SSB and State Education Commission data.

This trend owes much to the increasing enrollments in private universities and introduction of user fees in public higher education. However, the differences in the rates of cost recovery and unit costs within higher education are not captured here. But, it is very unlikely that a more sophisticated calculation would reverse the finding that Chinese system of education is fairly egalitarian in its global structure of access and public expenditure.

Yet, the structural equity has not translated into equitable educational benefits across provinces. While primary education are relatively targeted to poor provinces, accessibility to post-primary education shows marked interprovincial variance. When provinces are ranked by per capita income from poor to rich, the avowed policy of the government to ensure an egalitarian distribution of educational expenditure increasingly vanishes (Fig 5). Per-pupil expenditures are disproportionately higher in rich provinces compared to those in poor provinces. The richest quintile of provinces Shanghai,

> 3 Cumulative public spending on education refers to the total amount of public resources appropriated to a generation of people passing through their schooling years. It captures the distribution of cumulative benefits (education) among people with different school careers, rather than the distribution of single period benefits at a given level of education. For details on calculation, see Alain Mingat and Jee-Peng Tan," On Equity in Education Again: An International Comparison" _Journal of Human Resources,_ no 2, 1985
# Table I Price Indices In Ukraine

|**_Year_**or Month|Overall<br>|<br>Index|**Fo od**|Clothing and<br>**Foowar**|Rent, Water,<br>**Fuel and**<br>|HouIehld<br>|<br>**Good**|Medical Caf<br>|**Tranedt**<br>**and**Camm<br>|**RRooeation** <br>Education||**Personal Cue**<br>andEffoct|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||Power||I|t:u|_||
||||**Ratin**Pie* Ind|ex frfm 19W0 to|19Oand Cun|eumer Mae Index|1991**and 1992**|||
|1980|100||||-|-|-||r<br>|
|1985|104|-|-|.|-||-||r|
|1986|106|-|||||-|-||
|1987|107<br>||-||-||||||
|1988|107|||||||||
|Ig89|109|.|.|.||||||
|1990|114|.|.|.||||||
|1991|213.6|-||.||||||
|1992|3232.5|'|.|||-||||
|||||Coneumer Ma<br>|e Indices Oct<br>|oberI 1990=100<br>||||
|Doe1990|100|100||<br>100|100|100|100|100|100|100|
|Jan 91|103.7|101.9|105.7|100.|104.5|100.2|100.9|109.1|106.1|
|Feb|109.6|103.3|115.2|101.6|119.4|100|101.7|119.9|113.4|
|March|117.7|109|121.3|123.7|157.8|99.8|103.4|133|131.8|
|April|195.9|199|225.4|150.9|229.8|100.3|173.4|155.9|186.8|
|May|198.3|194.2|236.2|153.5|249.3|99.1|176.5|162|203.6|
|Juno|199.9|191.9|241.4|161.6|259.8|100.3|177.2|167.2|206.2|
|July|200.9|190|243.8|162.4|267.6|101.3|180.2|171.5|207.6|
|Aug|201.5|186.2|250.9|166.3|275.4|102.3|180.4|174.1|198.9|
Every year, vaccinations avert two to three million deaths from diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and measles worldwide (WHO, 2014). Vaccination is an extremely cost-effective way to improve health. For example, treating one case of measles costs 23 times the cost of one vaccination, and $24 is saved for every $1 spent on the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine (Ehreth, 2003). Despite the huge benefits of preventing diseases at low cost, the persistent low vaccine take-up remains a puzzle (for example, see Suk, Lopalco, and Celentano, 2015). This paper reports results of a field experiment explicitly designed to evaluate psychic and monetary costs as potential barriers to tetanus vaccine take-up among women of childbearing age in rural Nigeria.

Psychic costs of vaccination, which we define as residuals that cannot be explained by monetary factors, such as beliefs and perceptions about vaccines, could influence vaccination decisions (Pebley et al., 1996; Steele et al., 1996).<sup>1</sup> Most extant studies examine barriers to vaccine takeup using qualitative methods, typically by asking respondents their reasons for non-vaccination (Jheeta and Newell, 2008; Nichter, 1995). Such observational studies, however, cannot identify the causal effects of potential barriers to vaccination.<sup>2</sup> This paper presents a causal examination and compares the behavioral effects of psychic costs and monetary costs on vaccine take-up.

The relevance of psychic costs as barriers to vaccination has been commonly documented in Africa.<sup>3</sup> In northern Nigeria, a polio vaccination campaign was famously boycotted by Islamic leaders due to a false rumor that polio vaccines make women infertile or cause them to contract HIV (Jegede, 2007).<sup>4</sup> This distrust of vaccine efficacy led to a widespread refusal to receive polio vaccinations among the general population, resulting in increased polio-virus transmission throughout the country and the spread of polio into 20 countries (Kaufmann and Feldbaum 2009). Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS, 2008) shows that more than one third of women (36.8 percent) did not take their children for vaccination because of reasons related to psychic costs, such as fear of side effects, fear that their children might get diseases from the vaccine, and a belief that vaccines did not work.<sup>5</sup> Rainey et al. (2011)’s systematic review shows that psychic costs account for 17.2 percent of reasons for non-vaccination in 51 low- and middle2