increase as _caused by_ the crisis, given the measured increase is consistent with pre‐crisis trends and one not far from forecasts of what may have taken in place even in the absence of the crisis.<sup>5</sup> My second main contribution of the paper is to provide a thorough measurement of the exporter incidence of the growing use of antidumping and its implications for discriminatory patterns of import protection across the trading system. Section 4 provides evidence of substantial heterogeneity; this time across affected exporting economies. Over time, the main impact of the foreign use of antidumping is increasingly on developing economy exporters. First, China’s exported products face the largest stocks of foreign‐imposed antidumping barriers, at nearly four times the amount of the second most‐targeted economies – South Korea; EU; Taiwan, China – more developed economies whose stocks of exports affected by foreign antidumping have remained relatively stagnant over recent history. Overall, in 2009, 2.6% of China’s exported products to developing economies were subject to antidumping and 1.6% of its products to developed economies were subject to antidumping, percentages that have accelerated since its 2001 WTO accession (Messerlin 2004, Bown, 2010c). I illustrate additional data that shows this feature of antidumping as increasingly a “South‐South” phenomenon is not unique to China’s exports. A number of other developing countries face trends similar to China in that the share of their products exported to other developing economies that is targeted by foreign antidumping is higher than the share of their products exported to high income economies.

In addition to these two main empirical contributions, my approach allows us to address a number of other important questions raised by the data. For example, while focusing on annual stock measures of TTBs is an important and previously underemphasized area for research, my approach also allows for construction of other measures of TTB policy activity, including more precise “flow” measures based on product coverage. Capturing more information on the rate of new application of such barriers over time can better speak to the volatility of trade policy and important questions regarding policy uncertainty now emerging in the literature (e.g., Limão and Handley, 2010). While there is substantial variation in flows, in section 2 I also find that some major economies average 0.5% to 1.0% of imported

> 5 It is arguably not too early to begin to assess the stock of TTBs resulting from the crisis period given that increased flows of new investigations have shown signs of leveling off by the end of 2009, and my measurement of TTBs will account for flows and it will “time” the contribution to the stock of newly imposed TTBs as the year the first (even a preliminary) barrier is imposed. As of the latest Temporary Trade Barriers Database released in July 2010 (covering data through second quarter (2Q) 2010), there had been a substantial moderation in the count of newly initiated TTB investigations relative to the run‐up that took place in 2008‐2009. The count of new investigations began to taper off in 4Q 2009, and this has continued into 1Q and 2Q 2010. See, for example, Bown (2010b).

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