rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
|**Table 15 Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal**|**Performance- A Summary of Empirical Results**|
|---|---|
|**Fiscal Performance Indicator**|**Impact of Fiscal Decentralization**|
|**_Central Bank Independence_**|Positive and significant|
|Growthof Money Supply|Positive butinsignificant|
|Inflation|Negative butinsignificant|
|**_Management of inflation and macroeconomic_**<br>imbalances|Positive but insignificant|
|Quality of DebtManagement|Positive butinsignificant|
|**_Quality of Fiscal Policies and Institutions_**|Positive and significant|
|Efficiencyin Revenue Collection|Mixed butinsignificant|
|**_Prudent Use of Tax Monies_**|Positive and significant|
|**_Growth of government spending_**|Negative and significant|
|Controlof fiscaldeficits|Negative butinsignificant|
|Growthof PublicDebt|Positive yetinsignificant|
|**_Public Sector Management_**- Transparency and<br>Accountability|Positive and significant|
|GDPgrowth|Positive butinsignificant|
|Source: Econometric results||

# **5.  Some Lessons for Developing Countries**

The following important lessons for reform of fiscal systems in developing countries can be distilled from a review of past experiences.

- _Monetary policy is best entrusted to an independent central bank with a sole mandate for price stability_ . Political feasibility of such an assignment improves under federal systems (decentralized fiscal systems).

- _Fiscal rules are neither necessary nor sufficient for fiscal discipline. However, fiscal rules accompanied by “gate keeper” intergovernmental councils/committees provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy coordination for countries with fragmented political regimes._ In this context, one can draw upon industrial countries’ experiences with ‘golden rules’, Maastricht type guidelines and ‘common budget directives’ to develop country specific guidelines. To ensure voluntary compliance with the guidelines, an appropriate institutional framework must be developed. Transparency of the budgetary processes and institutions, accountability to the electorate and general availability of comparative data on the fiscal positions of all levels of government further strengthen fiscal discipline.

30
market prices, and the lack of other income-generating opportunities (such as piecework), were consistently the reason given for poor food security, and were seen to be a major obstacle to poverty reduction.

Somewhat surprisingly given the large cash transfer, the change in consumption assets such as consumer durables was significantly lower than that of controls. This contrasts with reports from program administrators that beneficiaries had spent money on “luxury” items such as radios and tin roofs. As the qualitative work found that beneficiaries moved from living with larger extended families to only living with their nuclear families in the new location, it is possible that consumption assets were left behind to extended family members. Consumption assets include beds, tables, cupboards, and other bulky items, which beneficiaries potentially did not have enough cash left over to reacquire after spending it on farm inputs, food, and consumer goods mentioned above. Another possible explanation for the negative coefficient is that respondents may have accounted for the assets of everyone in the extended family at baseline, and only those who moved at follow-up.

The follow-up survey included several subjective questions related to changes in economic welfare since the time of relocation; these range from adequacy in income to general satisfaction. People who participated in the program had a positive perception of changes in their income and economic well-being two years after relocation as compared to the control group’s perception. This change is most apparent, 20 percent more for beneficiaries, when asked about general economic well-being which may proxy for a more permanent measure of economic security.

[INSERT TABLE Va and Vb] 24
USA (+110%), Austrian real estate and financial firms (+110% and +210%), and the agricultural intensity of MNEs with affiliates in Luxembourg (+400%).

# **4.2 Empirical analysis**

We start our analysis from the premise that an MNE’s incentive to shift profits is inversely related to the level of withholding taxation. Where domestic withholding taxation applies to cross‐border interest‐, royalty‐, or service fee payments, the potential tax advantage of lower corporate income taxation abroad is reduced. Double taxation agreements thus likely affect reported firm profitability by altering the financial structure, the provision/use of intellectual property, or the use of internal services. We link group structure information with firm‐level variables to investigate this premise.

The following regression specification summarizes two related hypotheses: ������� ���������������������<sup>�</sup> ������������ The dependent variable y(it) varies over time t and firms i. It is either (a.) the return on assets (profit over tangible assets), or (b.) the leverage ratio (debt over tangible assets) of Ukrainian MNEs. The main explanatory variable, _withholding_ , is the relevant withholding tax rate which varies across observations in accordance with the location of affiliated companies.<sup>35</sup> We expect withholding taxation to exert a positive influence on firm profitability by reducing the incentive to shift profits abroad. Accordingly, the coefficient on the withholding tax rate should take a positive sign when using the return on assets as the dependent variable. The underlying mechanisms are twofold. First, withholding taxation on interest payments decreases the tax benefit of debt financing. For instance, by applying a high rate of withholding to interest payments to a related entity in a low tax jurisdiction, the return to shifting profits out of Ukraine decreases. We thus expect higher withholding taxation to impact the leverage ratio of MNEs in Ukraine negatively. The second mechanism works through the use of intellectual property. If royalty payments are taxed when crossing the border, the benefit of relocating profit using excessive royalty charges is reduced.

Ukraine’s withholding tax rates on royalty‐ and interest payments are highly correlated (around 0.8). To avoid multicollinearity, we use an average of these rates as an explanatory variable. Furthermore, to account for MNEs’ affiliation with several partner countries, we proxy for the relevant withholding tax rate by taking the minimum of the applicable tax rates. Limited variation in withholding tax rates between 2006 and 2014 limits our control for arbitrary correlation between unobserved effects at the firm level

> 35 Variation in withholding tax rates is limited thus complicating tests for reverse causality. Withholding tax rates, however, are less flexible and determined by the negotiators of two countries with competing interests on a range of policy objectives.

22
irrespective of how many appliances are covered by voluntary standards or labeling schemes (see Table 6f for the framework used for assessing EE policies, regulations and incentives).<sup>7</sup> The CIRI scores for EE reveal that, within the South Asian region, India is well ahead in terms of relevant policies, regulations and incentives as well as institutional structures for EE (See Annex III). India‘s high scores are largely due to a larger number of electric appliances being covered by mandatory energy performance standards, as well to the higher weights assigned to building codes. India has also introduced a trading scheme for EE credits—the first of its kind in South Asia. As EE initiatives get underway in other South Asian countries and more mandatory standards are introduced, the climate for diffusion of energy efficient appliances will certainly improve. However, India—due to the sheer size of its market, coupled with strong economic growth and its imperatives for energy conservation, energy security and greenhouse gas reductions—is likely to remain the most attractive market for energyefficient products in South Asia.

# **Comparative Analysis of Energy Efficiency CIRI Scores for South Asia and Other Countries**

The scores obtained in the case of EE policies, regulations and incentives in some ways provides a more robust and quantitative basis to assess where countries stand in terms of the environment to deploy energy-efficient products. This is because while the presence of voluntary standards and labeling initiatives are acknowledged with a nominal score, countries are really rewarded for the presence of mandatory standards and labeling initiatives (which carries a greater weight of 2). Further the more appliances that are covered by mandatory standards and labeling initiatives, the higher the CIRI score countries chalk up.

## **Box 3:  Key Indicators for Construction of CIRI EE**

||**Cross-cutting**|
|---|---|
|1|Existence of Law and Policy on EE|
|| Existence of EE Policy|
|| Existence of EE Law|
|2|Existence of EE Targets|
|3|Designated Implementing Institution/Department|
|4|Availability of Trading Schemes/Tradable Instruments for EE|
|5|Existence of Procurements for Energy-efficient products/Construction|

> 7 Information and numbers for lighting and electrical appliances have been obtained from the Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) at http://www.clasne.org/index.php. Ballast related standards and labels have been included under the category of  ̳Lighting.‘

22
mechanism, to some degree or another, to involve local communities in the management process and create awareness of MPA purposed and objectives.<sup>7</sup> MPAs, often with technical and financial assistance from NGOs, also promote alternative income generating activities (AIGA) to reduce pressure on fisheries resources. A broad range of activities fall under these _AIGA_ strategies, some of which are alternatives to fishing (beekeeping, tree planting, farming, direct employment in MPA, etc), while others are alternatives to improve fishing practices, such as through fishing gear exchanges or loans to acquire specific fishing equipment to allow offshore fishing. We expect involvement and awareness of MPA activities, and participation in AIGA to positively influence household fishing gear choices.

# <u>Other control factors</u>

The survey design included _control_ villages that were located outside of the MPAs included in the study. In Kilwa, since there is no MPA, all villages are considered control villages. This provides a comparison group to evaluate whether MPAs have an impact on household fishing gear choice through other means which are not captured in the questions posed in the household questionnaire.

We also examine the impact of household choice of fishing gear on household welfare. If destructive fishing gear types are more productive, then one would naturally expect that households’ motivation to use such gears is the realization of a higher income. We use per capita consumption as a measure of household welfare rather than income, however, as extensive experience with household surveys has shown that income data are often more susceptible to measurement error and show more variance, due to saving and consumption smoothing behavior (Deaton, 1997). We follow the standard specification adopted in many poverty assessments, and which has been previously used in a study of rural poverty in Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). In this framework, consumption is determined by the households endowments of human (H), natural (N), social (S), physical (K), and financial (F) capital, and the constraints present in their socioeconomic and physical environment (Z).

> 7 The Tanga Coastal Zone Conservation and Development Program, on one hand, follows a highly decentralized model of community based costal management, where communities alone decide on nearly all aspects of fisheries management in their area. In other MPAs, such as Misali Island and Menai Bay Conservation Areas, the management model involves co-management at three levels, local, district, and national. Households may also be involved in the MPA management activities through less formal methods, by attending MPA public meetings.

20
Table 4: Correlation between migration and land tenure arrangements (OLS with main controls)

||(1)<br>fxed rent|(2)<br>fxed (money)|(3)<br>fxed (crop)|(4)<br>sharecropping|(5)<br>relatives|(6)<br>contract length|(7)<br>written contract|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|migration|-0.165|0.0194|-0.184*|-0.210|0.263***|0.196|-0.0558|
||(0.157)|(0.143)|(0.110)|(0.160)|(0.0935)|(0.145)|(0.108)|
|bank branches (number)|0.0236|0.0354*|-0.0118|-0.0279|0.0118|-0.000616|0.0323**|
||(0.0221)|(0.0195)|(0.0103)|(0.0227)|(0.0107)|(0.0152)|(0.0146)|
|road length (km)|6.74e-06|-6.72e-05|7.39e-05|0.000191|-0.000207|0.00165***|-0.000420|
||(0.000457)|(0.000440)|(0.000283)|(0.000476)|(0.000269)|(0.000428)|(0.000322)|
|2012 year|-5.238*|-2.888|-2.350|-4.203|7.715***|22.50***|3.854**|
||(2.880)|(2.638)|(1.933)|(2.860)|(1.812)|(2.700)|(1.864)|
|observations|878|878|878|878|878|878|878|
|R-squared|0.027|0.075|0.035|0.055|0.079|0.129|0.034|
|mean dep. var.|45.34|27.83|17.51|34.13|4.92|36.90|11.25|

Note: This table uses an OLS regression to present the correlation between the percentage of rented-in acreage under various terms and the number of high-skilled male out-migrants between the ages of 20-64 years (as a percentage of the total male out-migrants between the ages of 20-64 years). The population controls include total population, sex ratio, population density and share of high-skilled males. Remaining controls include the percentage of adverse rain events and the percentage of adverse temperature events. The dependent variable is as a percentage of acreage of rented in land. Robust standard errors. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1.
<!-- Start of picture text --> a<br>a4<br>oe .<br>7LFLFF Z .<br>a<br>*<br>ry<br>a4<br>L : : : : aie<br>Zz 4 & & 1<br>Satewry (pp)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
#4<br>*<br>Be<br>Se-<br>834<br>.<br>35 “4 *<br>.<br>z4° :<br>ao11 21 31 47 51 6.<br>Salindy {ppt}<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> a #4<br>a4 *<br>oe .<br>Be<br>7LFLFF Z . Se-<br>a 834<br>.<br>*<br>ry 35 “4 *<br>a4 .<br>L : : : : aie z4° :<br>Zz 4 & & 1 ao11 121 131 747 151 .6.<br>Satewry (pp) Salindy {ppt}<br>*<br>a4 ** *<br>m4PP .<br>ar<br>ht5a¥ *<br>. : als<br>a. * .<br>.<br>ei.<br>it 4 :<br>‘Saterity (pet 1 15 ry 2 Salinity44 tpt) 6 a<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> a4 *<br>. :<br>a. *<br>.<br>ei.<br>it 4 :<br>‘Saterity (pet 1 15<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
*<br>m4PP .<br>a¥¥ *<br>als<br>.<br>ry 2 Salinity44 tpt) 6 a<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Countries Opening Up.** Over the last two decades, newly formed countries such as Timor-Leste and South Sudan, as well as countries undergoing dramatic political transformations, for instance, Myanmar and Afghanistan, have begun using CDD approaches. Several of these countries have had years of conflict and fragility, and are now attempting to reverse decades of poor governance and ineffective centralization. The governments recognize that effective local government delivery systems are still lacking or nascent. Partnering with communities and nongovernment organizations to deliver services directly and quickly to poor citizens is an efficient way to use resources and to gain legitimacy.

# **VI. What Has Worked, What Hasn’t and What Don’t We Know?**

There is a growing body of evidence documenting the results and impacts of CDD interventions, especially in terms of its main twin goals of delivering community-level infrastructure and services and allowing villagers the opportunity to decide upon the use of public funds to improve their lives. Findings from CDD evaluations may vary in terms of longer-term impacts, but with only a few exceptions, there is ample evidence to show what has been achieved on several fronts:

**Delivering Cost-effective Tertiary Infrastructure and Services** .  In many of the CDD infrastructure-related programs, there remains little doubt that CDD programs have been able to provide large amounts of much-needed village infrastructure, particularly in less developed areas.  Impact evaluations show that some of the largest government-run CDD programs (Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Nepal, and Morocco) are able to improve access to all-weather roads, clean water, sanitation, education, and health.  Evidence across the programs is generally strong regarding positive impacts on access to and use of services, especially involving health, education, and drinking water (Beatty et al. 2017; Casey 2017; Voss 2016; Wong 2012).

Several independent technical audits and studies have also shown that infrastructure and public works are built at comparatively lower costs than other forms of service delivery, without sacrificing technical quality. Studies from the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Burkina Faso, and Malawi, for example, have demonstrated 15 percent to 40 percent lower costs, depending on the type of investments (World Bank 2007, Wong 2012).

These cost savings come primarily from factoring in community contribution of labor and materials and/or eliminating the middleman or contractor overhead. Given the size of 16
# 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we build on the DM06 data set, update the data using new sources, homogenize 1990 and 2000 concepts, and introduce the gender breakdown. We provide revised stocks and rates of emigration by level of schooling and gender. We repeat the exercise for 1990 and 2000, thus shedding light on the recent feminization of the brain drain. We provide emigration stocks and rates for 195 countries in 1990 and 2000. Although our data set deserves some extensions (e.g. adding points in time and accounting for migration to non OECD destination countries), it can be used to capture the recent trend in women’s brain drain, as well as to analyze its causes and consequences for developing countries.

Our gross data reveal that the share of women in the skilled immigrant population increased in almost all OECD destination countries between 1990 and 2000. Consequently, for the vast majority of source regions, the growth rates of skilled women emigrants were always bigger than the growth rates obtained for unskilled women or skilled men. This evolution particularly occurs in the least developed countries. This feminization of the South-North brain drain mostly re‡ects gendered changes in the supply of education. The cross-country correlation between emigration stocks of women and men is extremely high (about 97 percent), with women’s numbers slightly below men’s ones. However, these women skilled migrants are drawn from a much smaller population. Hence, in relative terms, the cross-country correlation in rates (88 percent) is much lower than in stocks. On average, women’s brain drain is 17 percent above men’s. This gender gap in skilled emigration rate is strongly correlated with the gender gap in the educational attainment of adult populations, re‡ecting unequal access to education in many source countries. Equating men and women’s educational attainment at origin would almost strongly reduce the gender gap in skilled migration.

# References

- [1] Adams, R. (2003): International migration, remittances and the brain drain: a study of 24 labor-exporting countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, n. 2972.

- [2] Alders, M. (2001): Classi...cation of the population with foreign background in the Netherlands, Statistics Netherlands, Paper for the conference ”The measure and Mismeasure of Populations. The statistical use of ethnic and racial categories in multicultural societies”, CERI-INED, Paris, 17-18 December.

- [3] Barro, R.J. and J.W. Lee (2000): International data on educational attainment: updates and implications, Oxford Economic Papers 53, 541-563.

29
|tock<br>(7)<br>(8)|(-3.04∗∗∗)<br>(-3.80∗∗∗)|-(0.43)∗∗∗<br>-(0.41)∗∗∗|(-0.21∗∗∗)<br>(-1.11∗∗∗)<br>-(0.08)∗∗∗<br>-(0.07)∗∗∗<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)|(-Yes∗∗∗)<br>(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)|-12060∗∗∗<br>-12060∗∗∗<br>-0.32∗∗∗<br>-0.23∗∗∗<br>ing in Helmand and Kandahar which<br>ls include gender, age, marital status,<br>5, ∗p<0.1.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Lives<br>(6)|(-3.79∗∗∗)|-(0.41)∗∗∗|(-1.11∗∗∗)<br>-(0.07)∗∗∗<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|-12060∗∗∗<br>-0.22∗∗∗<br>useholds resid<br>ld-head contro<br><0.01, ∗∗p<0.0|
|(5)|(-3.64∗∗∗)|-(0.32)∗∗∗|(-1.18∗∗∗)<br>-(0.07)∗∗∗<br>(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|-12060∗∗∗<br>-0.03∗∗∗<br>e excludes ho<br>old/Househo<br>levels: ∗∗∗p|
|(4)|∗)<br>(-0.37∗∗∗)|∗∗<br>-(0.47)∗∗∗|∗)<br>(-0.90∗∗∗)<br>∗∗<br>-(0.07)∗∗∗<br>)<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)|)<br>(-No∗∗∗)|)<br>(-Yes∗∗∗)|∗∗<br>-12060∗∗∗<br>∗<br>-0.10∗∗∗<br>3 =0. The sampl<br>entheses. Househ<br>ling. Signifcance|
|& Silver<br>(3)|)<br>(-0.41∗∗|∗<br>-(0.47)∗|)<br>(-0.97∗∗<br>∗<br>-(0.08)∗<br>)<br>(-Yes∗∗∗|(-Yes∗∗∗|(-No∗∗∗|∗<br>-12060∗<br><br>-0.17∗∗<br>etting β2 = β<br>ors are in par<br>type of dwel|
|Gold<br>(2)|(-0.37∗∗∗|-(0.47)∗∗|(-0.90∗∗∗<br><br>-(0.07)∗∗<br>(-Yes∗∗∗|(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|-12060∗∗<br>-0.10∗∗∗<br>on (2) after s<br>standard err<br>usehold, and|
|(1)|(-0.45∗∗∗)|-(0.52)∗∗∗|(-1.25∗∗∗)<br>-(0.07)∗∗∗<br>(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|(-No∗∗∗)|-12060∗∗∗<br>-0.06∗∗∗<br>ents of equati<br>nces. Robust<br>males per ho|
|Variables|Variance of Income (log)||Income (log)<br>Household Controls|Province Fixed Efects|Confict|Observations<br>R-squared<br>The table shows the estimated coefci<br>are the two most confict-ridden provi<br>education, household size, number of|

34