rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Policy Research Working Paper 8624

# **Abstract**

This paper summarizes and discusses the results of a survey on country practices in the management of sovereign assets and liabilities. Twenty-eight countries, mostly high-income economies, responded to the questionnaire. The survey responses provide detailed information about various approaches to the sovereign asset and liability management framework in terms of balance sheet production as well as objectives, priority areas, and challenges associated with integrated management. In addition to the survey results, where possible and relevant, this paper provides insight through prominent country examples. The survey results confirm that the number of countries that have developed such a framework is limited. Although most of the respondents indicated that they regularly produce an accounting balance sheet, the objective of this exercise is often limited to monitoring sovereign assets and liabilities rather than determining mismatches between them. In the cases where a sovereign asset and liability management framework is implemented, there are significant differences across countries. Most countries include state-owned enterprises in the sovereign balance sheet, but only a minority also considers central banks, in some cases only international reserves and sovereign funds. The challenges cited include institutional arrangements, uncertain or lacking mandate, coordination between institutions, data availability, and valuation of assets. Most of these challenges are related to the implementation of the approach. The development of sound practices for sovereign asset and liability management could benefit governments and facilitate the implementation of a holistic approach to manage their balance sheets and related risks, increasing their resilience to shocks.

This paper is a product of the World Bank Treasury. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at ccangoz@worldbank.org and sboitreaud@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
_Private Sector Approaches to Effective Famnly Planning_ _4_

# McGreevey 1988; Zschock 1988).

Given an array of health outlets and financing mechanisms, the choice of outlet at a given point in time will depend on such factors as the availability of the service needed and its cost, including both absolute and relative price and user's opportunity costs such as time spent to reach the outlet and waiting time. Thus a woman may use a private medical group for prenatal and sick baby care, give birth at a social security hospital, vaccinate her child at a Ministry of Health post, and purchase simple medications at a pharmacy. Where she would go for a contraceptive method would depend on where family planning services were available, how much they cost, the convenience and quality of the service, etc.

The decision to seek medical attention and the outlet chosen depends on a number of factors, including the perceived gravity of the situation, relative costs, and the perceived quality of care. In a recent survey in Lima, Peru, 36.5 percent of those individuals with an accident or symptoms perceived to warrant medical attention did not, in fact, obtain treatment. In contrast, only 12.8 percent of pregnant women did not receive any. prenatal care and 10.3 percent did not receive medical attention at delivery, while 38.2 percent did not receive postpartum care for themselves (INE 1988). Clearly, illness and postpartum care are seen as less needing of medical attention than prenatal care and childbirth. A similar pattern of behavior has been noted in other countries, such as Kenya (Mwabu 1986).

Moreover, the sources chosen for medical attention among those who do seek treatment also vary by condition, as can be seen from Table 1.

TABLE 1 Use of public and private commercial health outlets: metropolitan Lima, Peru

|||CO|NDITION||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|SECTOR|ILLNESS|PRENATAL|DELIVERY|POSTPARTUM|
|Public sector|32.5%|66.8%|73.5%|44.1%|
|Private commercial|27.4%|19.7%|16.1%|16.0%|
|No care|40.1%|13.5%|10.4%|39.9%|

Source: 1984 National Health and Nutrition Survey It is interesting to note that the use of public sector facilities is lowest for illness and highest for prenatal and delivery care. Perceived quality may be a factor; medical supplies, especially prescription drugs, tend to be in short supply at public facilities, which may encourage potential clients to go directly to pharmacies for treatment and bypass physicians altogether (almost one third of private zommercial use for illness is provided by pharmacies). On the other hand, public facilities-especially social security hospitals-have a reputation for adequate maternity care, which may encourage clients to use them for prenatal and delivery care rather than resorting to paying private providers. Furthermore, maternity care in private hospitals is priced beyond the reach of most consumers, even those with private health insurance.
22

**Figure 17. Foreign Claims of European Banks on EMDEs (percent of GDP)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Foreign Claims of European Banks, b. European Bank Claims to Total Claims on<br>2000:Q1– 2011:Q4 (Median) EMDEs, 2000:Q1–2011:Q4 (percent)<br>30 100 74%<br>25 72%<br>80<br>70%<br>20<br>60 68%<br>15<br>40 66%<br>10<br>64%<br>20<br>5 62%<br>0 0 60%<br>ASIA MENA LATAM<br>SSA OTHER CEE (Right)<br>EUR (Right)<br>c. Foreign Claims of GIIPS Banks d. Cross-Border Bank Claims<br>(2000:Q1–2011:Q4) (Median) (2000:Q1 –2011:Q4) (Median)<br>2.0 12.0 30 60<br>1.8<br>10.0 25 50<br>1.6<br>1.4<br>8.0 20 40<br>1.2<br>1.0 6.0 15 30<br>0.8<br>4.0 10 20<br>0.6<br>0.4<br>2.0 5 10<br>0.2<br>0.0 0.0 0 0<br>ASIA MENA SSA ASIA CEE MENA<br>OTHER CEE (Right) EUR (Right) LATAM SSA OTHER<br>LATAM (Right) EUR (Right)<br>e. Local Claims of Foreign Affiliates in All f. Loan to Deposit Ratio, 2010<br>Currencies, 2000:Q1–2011:Q4 (Median) (In percent)<br>20 50<br>140<br>120<br>40<br>15 100<br>80<br>30 60<br>10 40<br>20 20<br>0<br>5<br>10<br>0 0<br>ASIA MENA LATAM<br>SSA OTHER CEE (Right)<br>EUR (Right)<br>Q1 2000 Q4 2000 Q3 2001 Q2 2002 Q1 2003 Q4 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2006 Q4 2006 Q3 2007 Q2 2008 Q1 2009 Q4 2009 Q3 2010 Q2 2011 Q1 2000 Q4 2000 Q3 2001 Q2 2002 Q1 2003 Q4 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2006 Q4 2006 Q3 2007 Q2 2008 Q1 2009 Q4 2009 Q3 2010 Q2 2011<br>Q1 2000 Q3 2000 Q1 2001 Q3 2001 Q1 2002 Q3 2002 Q1 2003 Q3 2003 Q1 2004 Q3 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2008 Q3 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q3 2010 Q1 2011 Q3 2011 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2008 Q3 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q3 2010 Q1 2011 Q3 2011<br>Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2008 Q3 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q3 2010 Q1 2011 Q3 2011<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: Panels a–e, IMF, _World Economic Outlook_ , and BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics, table 9A, table 9B, table 9C; Panel f, World Bank, FinStats.
PPR Working Paper Serias

||IWa|||Contact<br>tor pa,oer|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|WPS32|Municipal Development Funds and<br>Intermediaries|Kenneth Davey|July 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS33|Fiscal Policy in Commodiy-<br>Exporting LDCs|John Cuddington|July 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS34|Fiscal Issues in Macroeconomic<br>Stabilization|Lance Taylor|September 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS35|<br>Improving the Allocation and<br>Management of Public Spending|Stephen Llster|August 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS36|Social Security Finance in<br>Developing Countries|Douglas J. Puffert|August 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS37|<br>Black Market Premia, Exchange<br>Rate Unification, and Inflation in<br>Sub-Saharan Africa|Brian Pinto|July 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS38|<br>Intergovernmental<br>Grants in<br>Developing Countries|Larry Schroeder|September 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS39|<br>Fiscal Policy in Low-Income Africa|Stephen A. OConnell|July 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS40|<br>Financial Deregulation and the<br>Globalization of Caphtal Markets|Eugene L. Versluysen|August 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS41|<br>Urban Property Taxation in<br>Developing Countries|William Dillinger|August 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS42|Government Pay and Employment<br>Policies and Government Performa<br>in Developing Economies|David L. Lindauer<br>nce|August 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS43|Tax Administration in Developing<br>Countries: Strategies and Tools<br>of Implementation|Tax Administration<br>Division, IMF Fiscal<br>Affairs Department|August 1989|WDR Office<br>31393|
|WPS44|The Size and Growth of<br>Government Spending|David L. Lindauer|September 1988|R. Blade-Charest<br>33754|
|WPS45|<br>How Much Do State-Owned<br>Enterprises Contribute to Public<br>Sector Deficits in Developing Coun<br>-- and Why?|Govindan Nair<br>Anastasios Filippides<br>tries|December 1988|L. Mattheisen<br>33757|
|WPS46|The Management of Public<br>Expendiures: An Evolving Bank<br>Approach|Robert Lacey|January 1989|L. Matthiesen<br>33757|
# **Legal knowledge and economic development:**

# **The case of land rights in Uganda**

**Abstract:** Mixed evidence on the impact of formal title in much of Africa is often used to question the relevance of dealing with land policy issues in this continent. We use data from Uganda to assess the impact of a disaggregated set of rights on investment, productivity, and land values and to test the hypothesis that individuals’ lack of knowledge of the new law reduces their tenure security. Results point towards strong and positive effects of greater tenure security and transferability. Use of exogenous knowledge of its provisions as a proxy for the value of the land law suggests that this piece of legislation had major economic benefits that remain to be fully realized.

# **1. Introduction**

There are few issues on which neoclassical development economists seem to be able to agree as easily as the importance of secure property rights. Giving secure land rights to households has been shown to increase land-related investment, augment land values, reduce the level and likelihood of conflict, and spur economic participation. It will also provide a basis for reallocating an important factor of production to more efficient users and, if accompanied by a low-cost and formal means of verifying land ownership status, improve credit access (de Soto 2000). Based on this view of formalizing property rights as a key element for expanding the rule of law and reducing poverty, policy-makers all over the world have spent significant resources on programs to formalize land tenure, award title to land, and establish the administrative infrastructure to maintain the records created in this process.

However, empirical evidence concerning the impact of traditional methods to increase land tenure security in Africa is rather mixed (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994, Besley 1998). In fact, a large number of rather ineffective interventions (Atwood 1990) led some to characterize efforts to increase tenure security as “unimportant” or even dangerous (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994) while prompting others to warn against “institutional midwifery” that would combine an overly teleologic worldview with unrealistic perceptions about the ability to transfer blueprints between countries (Platteau 1996, Sjaastad and Bromley 2000a). African land tenure institutions are subject to extraordinary strains arising form a major economic transition and urbanization, demographic and ecological pressures, and recently the tragedy of HIV/AIDS (Andre and Platteau 1998, Deininger and Castagnini 2005). Given the limited outreach of formal tenure systems (Oosterberg 2002), the main burden falls on customary institutions. Even though these have proven to be quite adaptive in the past, their ability to deal with gender and interethnic conflict, and to maintain traditional structures of control in an increasingly impersonal “modern” environment can not be taken for granted. In fact, such limitations have led to problems related to gender discrimination (Khadiagala 2001, Tripp 2004), wealth bias (Goetz 2002, Peters 2004), and corruption (Fitzpatrick 2005).

1
||**Table 6.**<br>**Time Al**<br>T|**location**<br>CO member<br>obit|||Spouse of CO m|ember|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Business|Paid Work|Agriculture|Business|Paid Work|Agriculture|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|**Panel A: Intent to Treat Effect**|||||||
|Business Training (1=Yes)|1.578|-0.451|0.616|-0.659|-0.374|-1.45|
||(1.042)|(2.048)|(1.325)|(0.609)|(2.051)|(1.415)|
|Lottery Winner (1=Yes)|-0.022|-2.867|-0.264|-0.709|0.011|1.579|
||(1.386)|(2.621)|(1.470)|(0.835)|(3.065)|(1.655)|
|BT and LW|1.248|2.864|-1.033|0.822|-1.613|-4.552**|
||(1.304)|(2.733)|(1.621)|(0.855)|(2.895)|(1.867)|
|R- square|0.07|0.04|0.04|0.03|0.01|0.03|
|P-value of t - test of ...|||||||
|BT = BT and LW|0.78|0.19|0.24|0.06|0.65|0.06|
|LW = BT and LW|0.39|0.06|0.66|0.11|0.63|0.00|
|BT = LW|0.25|0.40|0.58|0.95|0.90|0.09|
|**Panel B: Intent to Treat Effects with Gender Interactions**|||||||
|Business Training (1=Yes)|2.034|0.513|1.349|0.116|3.671|-0.927|
||(1.372)|(2.477)|(1.548)|(0.932)|(3.009)|(1.688)|
|BT x Female|-1.085|-2.346|-2.252|-1.546|-7.282*|-1.655|
||(2.109)|(4.279)|(2.693)|(1.189)|(4.005)|(2.878)|
|Lottery Winner (1=Yes)|-0.520|-3.428|2.198|-0.995|-0.72|2.464|
||(1.634)|(2.993)|(1.695)|(1.150)|(4.681)|(1.862)|
|LW x Female|1.275|2.218|-7.281**|0.766|1.770|-2.626|
||(2.695)|(5.248)|(3.034)|(1.508)|(5.924)|(3.405)|
|BT and LW|2.142|0.577|2.976|0.637|-2.956|-1.581|
||(1.591)|(3.237)|(1.863)|(1.192)|(4.301)|(2.071)|
|BT and LW x Female|-2.184|6.810|-11.755***|0.462|2.532|-9.142**|
||(2.511)|(5.115)|(3.541)|(1.536)|(5.272)|(4.051)|
|R-square|0.07|0.04|0.04|0.03|0.01|0.03|
|P-value of t - test of ...|||||||
|BT = BT and LW|0.94|0.98|0.32|0.63|0.10|0.72|
|LW = BT and LW|0.15|0.27|0.70|0.25|0.68|0.09|
|BT = LW|0.14|0.25|0.65|0.38|0.34|0.11|
|BT + BT x Female = 0|0.55|0.60|0.69|0.06|0.18|0.28|
|LW + LW x Female = 0|0.74|0.79|0.05|0.83|0.79|0.96|
|BT and LW + BT and LW x Female = 0|0.98|0.09|0.00|0.32|0.91|0.00|
|Mean of dependent variable among controls with positive hours|1.73|1.74|0.95|0.16|1.88|0.75|
|Percentage of observations among controls with 0 hours|54.6%|77.4%|56.0%|29.4%|78.4%|63.8%|
|N. Observations|3494|3494|3494|3494|3494|3494|

Note: The reported mean of the dependent variable is computed using CO members not offered business training nor assigned to be lottery winners. Only the mean for postive log hours is reported. The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are log of hours spent by the CO member in various activities the day prior to the survey. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 are log of hours spent by the spouse of CO member in various activities the day prior to the survey. All regressions are estimated using Tobit and include as covariates the stratification variables (eligibility for loan lottery, business ownership at baseline, gender and branch dummies). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the CO level. The following symbols *, * * and ** * denote significance at the 10 , 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
# 1. **Introduction**

The link between the political system of a country and its economic growth has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years.' Empirical studies.have yielded mixed results. Authors from Friedman (1962) to Scully (1988) have argued that politically open societies grow at much faster rates than do societies where freedoms are restricted. On the other hand, others such as Kormendi and Meguire (1985) have found a negative relationship between civil liberties and growth; one reason for this, summarized by Barro (1994), is that more political freedom may also entail a greater role for interest groups in the legislative process, which may in turn act to retard growth.<sup>2</sup> The general finding from this literature is best summarized by Landeli-Mills and Serageldin (1991): benevolent dictators are rare but democracies often resort to populist policies that are inimical to growth.

This paper has a narrower focus: it only considers labor market policies. What, if any, is the link between such policies and political regimes? Many governments in developing countries have adopted labor policies-including high minimum wages, public sector overemployment and tough job security regulations-which may benefit a small group of "insiders" who already have modem-sector jobs. But these same policies hurt "outsiders" by limiting their opportunities for better employment, and thus have a negative impact on income distribution. In addition, these labor market distortions can lead to efficiency losses and may discourage investment and growth. Governments usually adopt those policies for political rather than economic motives. Hence, the question we address here is whether the probability of 1 For an extensive survey of the literature see Alesina and Perotti (1994).

2 In a theoretical paper Azam (1994) takes a different approach. He argues that if democracy provides positive utility, then at the margin one would expect it to be negatively correlated with output.
This work also contributes to the on-going examination of what has driven the increase in agricultural burning in North India over the last 20 years. In addition to Garg et al. (2022), recent work has shown that shifting the beginning of the cropping season to minimize groundwater extraction has contributed to the increase in burning (Kant et al., 2022). I show that wage changes driven by MNREGA appear to be an additional driver of the increase in burning on top of changes induced by regulations around the timing of planting and the construction of rural roads.<sup>7</sup>

# **2 Agricultural fires in India and MNREGA**

## **2.1 Fires in Indian agriculture**

While slash-and-burn agriculture is still widely used in some parts of the world (notably Africa and Indonesia) (Korontzi et al., 2006; Andini et al., 2018), the predominant use of fire in agriculture in India today is to clear harvest residue off of fields in order to prepare the field for the subsequent season’s planting (Jain et al., 2014; Bhuvaneshwari et al., 2019).<sup>8</sup> Fires are widely used despite being nominally illegal since the mid-1990s (Lohan et al., 2018). While governments in some states have begun to enforce these laws, the expected cost of violation during my period of study is small. In 2012 the state government of Haryana handed out a total of roughly $12,000 in fines (Anand, 2016). That works out to an expected fine of 0.75$USD per fire in the state. Farmers face an average marginal cost of roughly 50$USD to clear their fields of residue without using fire (Ministry of Finance, 2018).

While fires offer an inexpensive means of clearing crop residue, they have substantial negative effects. The primary negative effect is the increase of both local and global air pollutants. The largest source of carbonaceous particulate matter globally is crop residue burning (Cassou, 2018). More significant than their contribution to climate change is the impact that agricultural fires have on local air pollution and health. Source-apportionment studies have suggested that pollution from agricultural fires can raise local concentrations of PM2 _._ 5 to more than 1,000% above the WHO 24-hour guideline of 15 _μg/m_<sup>3</sup> (Bikkina et al., 2019; Balakrishnan et al., 2019; Liu et al.,

> 7While not examining the drivers of burning directly, Jack et al. (2022) show that an up-front payment for ecosystem services (PES) program that provide farmers payments not to burn their fields can reduce burning, underlining the fact that burning behavior is responsive to economic incentives.

> 8For a brief discussion of the history of fire use and details of its global use, see Appendix 1.1.

6
- 32 -

**Chart 10**

Central **Bank of** Turkey: Sources of **Reserve Money Growth, %** <!-- Start of picture text --> 300<br>250<br>200]<br>150<br>100 * EXTERNqAL<br>E PUBLIC SECTOR<br>50 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 BANKING SECTOR<br>50<br>-50<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- Note: Extemnal=Foreign assets-FX liabilities to non-residents-FX liabilities to banks Public sector=Credits to public sector+Other items+Revaluation account-FX deposits of Treasury-Public sector deposits Banking sector=Credits to banks-Liabilities due to open market operations

Source: Central Bank of Turkey.

# **Sterilization of Capital Flows**

Whether the Central Bank engages in active sterilization of reserve flows by offsetting changes in net domestic assets can be assessed by estimating a policy reaction function, which relates a measure of monetary policy, including its net domestic assets (NDA) to the change in net foreign assets (NFA) of the central bank. The estimation of such a function is complicated by the fact that there are two-way simultaneous interactions between these variables when a Central Bank is engaged in sterilized intervention, calling for instrumental estimation. Here, we follow the methodology of Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) to estimate the Central Bank sterilization reaction function, with consideration of the endogeneity problems. We also take into account the time series properties of the variables in the regression, as proposed by Siklos(1996).

Our dependent variable (MP) is the change in Central Bank domestic assets, which includes the revaluation account and is adjusted for reserve requirements. The revaluation account is included in this variable, and excluded from the foreign assets, since the decision