rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_Table 2.1. First Stage Regression Results_

||Dependen|Model A<br>tVariable: ∆Exp|ort Index|Depende|Model B<br>ntVariable: ∆Exp|ort Index|Dependent|Model C<br>Variable: ∆Exp|ortUSIndex|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Total|Unskilled|Skilled|Total|Unskilled|Skilled|Total|Unskilled|Skilled|
|U.S. tariff cut measure|1.21***|1.39***|.94***|1.39***|1.60***|1.02***|1.03***|1.07***|.93***|
||(.026)|(.033)|(.042)|(.034)|(.043)|(.055)|(.013)|(.017)|(.020)|
|Observations|1718|1051|647|1718|1051|647|1718|1051|647|
|R<sup>2</sup>|.567|.648|.448|.708|.760|.636|.885|.893|.873|
|F test of excluded instrument|5.29|6.99|4.09|6.40|10.51|3.14|28.76|33.28|24.91|
|[p-value]|[.025]|[.011]|[.048]|[.015]|[.0022]|[.083]|[.000]|[.000]|[.000]|

_Notes_ : At the first stage, I regress the change in Export Indices on the measure of the U.S. tariff cut (excluded instrument) and on all the other exogenous variables included in the second stage.

The regressions are estimated using STATA’s ivreg2 command with the robust and cluster options (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). The classification between skilled and unskilled workers is based on the status in 2002.

*** indicate that the coefficients are significant at the one percent level.

The standard errors in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix and corrected for within province correlation (clustering).

45
24 Second, as the literature survey reveals, MNC affiliates indicate that several characteristics of local suppliers limit the extent of backward linkages. Likewise, domestic firms indicate that product demands, specifications, and requirements from MNC affiliates are often more stringent compared to domestic client firms. This suggests that, even without technology dissemination, positive productivity effects may occur when domestic suppliers are able to improve their performance in response to the more stringent demand conditions exercised by foreign client firms. Host economy governments can assist local suppliers in making such improvements. In more general terms, it is important that governments ensure that their policies to improve the local supplier base are addressing limitations of suppliers as experienced by MNC affiliates, actively involving the affiliates in the design and implementation of relevant policies and supplier development programs.

# **4.3. Technology Dissemination and Productivity Spillovers**

In order to assist MNC affiliates in their efforts to disseminate technologies and other forms of support to their local suppliers, governments need to recognize that these efforts are the outcome of costbenefit analyses, whereby MNC affiliates compare the costs of providing support with the benefits of obtaining higher quality and more cost-effective local inputs. Systematic supplier development programs, in which MNC affiliates and local firms participate jointly, provide good settings to identify the types of support that are most needed and to ensure that foreign firms benefit from the support that they provide to local suppliers (UNCTAD 2006; Arraiz, Henriquez, and Stucchi 2013). When local suppliers commit to using technologies and support that they receive to improve the quality and costeffectiveness of inputs for participating MNC affiliates, foreign firms will be more inclined to provide the necessary support. Host economy governments can also work with MNC affiliates to facilitate technology dissemination and support to further lower the costs for the foreign firms.

Furthermore, host economy governments need to support efforts to improve the absorptive capacity of local suppliers to absorb and implement the more advanced technologies and knowledge from their foreign client firms—especially given the evidence that a large technology gap between MNC affiliates and local suppliers increases the potential scope for productivity spillovers. This is also important as MNC affiliates expect domestic firms to make independent investments to improve their performance. Host economy governments can help by facilitating information dissemination between MNC affiliates and domestic firms, given that domestic firms often lack information about the types of improvements that they need to make and/or what the priority areas of investment are. Host economy governments also need to implement policies that create and facilitate access to investment funds and other financial resources to domestic firms. These efforts will address a market failure:
||_DV:_|_Vote Share _|_(First Ro_|_und)_|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||populatio<br>(1)|n-weighted<br>(2)|unwe<br>(3)|ighted<br>(4)|
|_OLS coefcients_|||||
|Fraction embezzled (baseline)|-0.046|-0.051<sup>_∗_</sup>|-0.041|-0.047<sup>_∗_</sup>|
||(0.028)|(0.028)|(0.025)|(0.025)|
|Distance from optimal ballot position<sup>6</sup>||-0.031<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.011)||-0.041<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup><br>(0.0093)|
|Constant|0.42<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.47<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.42<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.48<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
||(0.012)|(0.020)|(0.011)|(0.018)|
|Groups|236|236|236|236|
|Observations|1180|1180|1180|1180|

Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by group.<sup>_<u>∗</u>_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 1<sup>_<u>∗∗</u>_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 05<sup>_<u>∗∗∗</u>_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 01 (two-sided)

**Table 2.** A greater willingness to embezzle group resources is associated with a lower vote share. Columns (1) and (2): Vote shares are population-weighted. Columns (3) and (4): Unweighted data, overrepresenting voters from low-population areas.

# **Citizens’ Willingness to Sanction Embezzlement**

In all four experimental conditions, study participants were willing to sanction the embezzlement of group funds at a cost to themselves, even though they had no instrumental reason for doing so. This behavior is consistent with evidence from ultimatum games and other allocative dilemmas, where individuals willingly forgo own payoffs in order to prevent others from receiving a greater, unequal payoff (e.g. Henrich et al., 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Leibbrandt and L ́opez-P ́erez, 2012). Of the study participants, 63.3 percent in the transparency condition and 63.7 percent of study participants in the private information condition spent money to reward or punish the decision maker. Study participants who rewarded or punished the decision maker spent on average 20.3 percent of their sanctioning budget. High levels of embezzlement by the decision maker

> 6Due to a recording error, information on ballot order is missing for 20 groups containing 100 individuals. Since ballot order was randomized at the group level, distance from the optimal ballot position has been imputed at mean for those groups.

22
direct contradiction of the Second Principle as it denies equal access to all.

The perceptions of inequality of opportunity are quite widespread in the region. For instance, almost half of the adults in the region believe that it is very important or essential to have connections to get a good government job, in Croatia and in FYR Macedonia the share exceeds three quarters, and in Serbia it is greater than 80 percent. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom and in Sweden no more than 20 percent of adults share this view. In some of the transition countries the need for connections to get a good public sector job is also perceived to be low, such as in Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where less than one-third of adults believe that connections are very important or essential for public sector jobs. The need for connections is generally perceived to be lower in other domains of life, although the share of adults who believe that connections are necessary in these other areas remains non-trivial in most countries (Table 2).<sup>5</sup> The first part of Rawls’s Second Principle of Justice allows for inequalities to exist to the extent that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. This is not the case in practice. In the LiTS survey the respondents are further asked if they knew of anyone (friends, relatives, classmates, local boss, etc.) who could influence decisions with respect to getting a good government job, or getting into university etc., should such influence be needed. Overall in the LiTS survey 32 percent of the adult population reported that they do not know any such person, but this share is generally higher for individuals who place themselves at the bottom of the welfare ladder, or those who (or whose parents) had low levels of education. It is perhaps not surprising that disadvantaged groups are least likely to thrive in the presence of – inequality of opportunity. These two characteristics the importance of connections – to get ahead and lack of such connections combine to create what Bourguignon et al. (2006) call“inequality traps”or the persistence of relative positions (and implicitly

> 5The last column in Table 2 is our measure of inequality of opportunity, which, for each individual evaluates to 1 if connections in any of the five areas are very important or essential, and zero otherwise.

10
- 26 -

# **Table 9:  Fixed Effects Estimation, with Robust Standard Errors**

|**R**<sup>**2**</sup> **= 0.790**<br>|**Depe**<br>**Sample: 1993Q1**<br>**Total Panel**<br>**9; Adj. R**<sup>**2**</sup> **= 0.7787;**<br>|**ndent Variable: A**<br>**– 2003Q3; Cross-S**<br>**Observations (Unb**<br>**F-Statistic= 65.11**<br>|**R(OLD)**<br>**ections Included: 2**<br>**alanced): 675**<br>**10; P-Value (F-Stat**<br>|**4**<br>**istic)= 0.0000**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Variable**|**Coefficient**|**Std. Error**|**t-Statistic**|**p-value**|
|Constant|2.7371|0.1976|13.8525|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|RF|0.3961|0.0196|20.2453|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|SOFI|0.0030|0.0018|1.6559|0.0982<sup>*</sup>|
|SOA|0.0070|0.0039|1.7942|0.0733<sup>*</sup>|
|LEV|0.0121|0.0057|2.1144|0.0349<sup>**</sup>|
|MIS|0.0247|0.0648|0.3810|0.7033|
|MSHARE|-2.0611|0.9332|-2.2088|0.0275<sup>**</sup>|
|AP(OLD)|0.0001|1.67 *<br>5<br>−<br>_e_|8.8551|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|CR|-0.0280|0.0158|-1.7696|0.0773<sup>*</sup>|
|HER(OLD)|-3.4204|0.5765|-5.9336|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|TREND|0.0055|0.0024|2.2893|0.0224<sup>**</sup>|
|D|-1.8350|0.2995|-6.1268|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|RF*D|0.5536|0.0490|11.3063|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|AP(OLD)*D|-0.0001|5.85 *<br>5<br>−<br>_e_|-2.2645|0.0239<sup>**</sup>|
|CR*D|-0.1340|0.0329|-4.0739|0.0001<sup>***</sup>|

*** = significant at the 1% level;** = significant at the 5% level;* = significant at the 10% level

|**Tabl**<br>**R**<sup>**2**</sup> **= 0.793**|**e 10: Fixed Effects**<br>**Depe**<br>**Sample: 1993Q1**<br>**Total Panel**<br>**3; Adj. R**<sup>**2**</sup> **= 0.7821;**|**Estimation, with**<br>**ndent Variable: A**<br>**– 2003Q3; Cross-Se**<br>**Observations (Unb**<br>**F-Statistic= 71.302**|**Robust Standar**<br>**R(OLD)**<br>**ctions Included: 2**<br>**alanced): 675**<br>**0; P-Value (F-Stat**|**d Errors**<br>**4**<br>**istic)= 0.0000**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Variable**|**Coefficient**|**Std. Error**|**t-Statistic**|**p-value**|
|Constant|2.7150|0.1973|13.7634|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|RF|0.3987|0.0189|21.0905|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|SOFI|0.0031|0.0020|1.5814|0.1143|
|SOA|0.0075|0.0032|2.3210|0.0206<sup>**</sup>|
|LEV|0.0122|0.0059|2.0549|0.0403<sup>**</sup>|
|MSHARE|-1.5149|0.9939|-1.5242|0.1279|
|AP(OLD)|0.0001|1.63 *<br>5<br>−<br>_e_|8.8935|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|CR|-0.0273|0.0157|-1.7313|0.0839<sup>*</sup>|
|HER(OLD)|-3.5768|0.5652|-6.3288|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|TREND|0.0050|0.0025|2.0480|0.0410<sup>**</sup>|
|D|-1.8897|0.2834|-6.6676|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|RF*D|0.5483|0.0446|12.3071|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|
|AP(OLD)*D|-0.0001|5.03 *<br>5<br>−<br>_e_|-2.1317|0.0334<sup>**</sup>|
|CR*D|-0.1257|0.0289|-4.3552|0.0000<sup>***</sup>|

*** = significant at the 1% level;** = significant at the 5% level;* = significant at the 10% level
**Expanding access to financial services is also an important public policy goal, particularly in developing countries.** Providing a low-cost bank account, for example, can provide an “entry-level” product that brings new consumers into the financial sector.<sup>22</sup> While expanding access to financial services helps spur the economy, both financial institutions and financial consumers need to be responsible in their use of financial services.

**The primary areas of concern regarding consumer protection will likely depend on the level of development of the financial sector.** Not all recommendations from the Working Paper are equally applicable to all countries and not all countries have the same areas of concern. For example in lowincome countries, the major concern may be about remittances and non-bank payments systems. By contrast, in high-income countries, major areas of focus may be investment funds and “exotic” residential mortgages. Table 1 provides a simplified listing of key issues by level of financial sector development.

**Table 1: Areas of Major Consumer Protection Concern by Level of Financial Sector Development**

||**Low-Income**<br>**Countries**|**Middle-Income**<br>**Countries**|**High-Income**<br>**Countries**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Exotic mortgages|||x|
|Securities||x|x|
|Collective investment funds||x|x|
|Private pensions||x|x|
|Life insurance||x|x|
|Debit/credit cards|x|x|x|
|Data protection|x|x|x|
|Consumer credit|x|x|x|
|Ponzi schemes/pyramids|x|x|x|
|Microinsurance|x|||
|Microcredit|x|||
|Remittances/payments|x|||

# **International Benchmarks for Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy**

**No international benchmarks for consumer protection and financial literacy are currently in place.** The World Bank, working with the Bank for International Settlements have developed standards related to consumer protection for remittances<sup>23</sup> but there are no general benchmarks for consumer protection across the financial sector. In the absence of accepted international benchmarks or guidelines, policymakers often focus (sometimes in reactionary mode) on only a few of many consumer protection

> 22 For a review of financial access in developing countries—and the pitfalls in providing access to financial services in low-income countries---see World Bank, _Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access,_ 2008. See also CGAP, _Financial Access 2009: Measuring Access to Financial Services around the World_ , 2009

> 23 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank for International Settlements and the World Bank, _General principles for international remittance services_ , January 2007

14
employees), and large firms (100 or more employees)), and _Geographical location_ (selected based on centers of economic activity in the country).

While the Enterprise Surveys have been produced since 2002, we restrict our sample to surveys administered during 2006-2010 since these provide sampling weights that take care of the varying probabilities of selection across different strata and are thus indispensable to making assertions about the whole population.<sup>8</sup> For countries that were surveyed twice during this period, we retain data for the year with the largest number of firms surveyed. Our results are also robust to retaining the most recent survey data for each country. Our final sample consists of surveys across 104 countries.

We examine and compare the role of small firms in each country along two dimensions. First we construct the small firm share of **Total Employment** where total employment is the population estimate of the number of permanent, full-time employees in the country derived by aggregating the employment reported each firm in the country multiplied by its sampling weight. Second, we construct the small firm share of **Job Creation** where job creation is the population estimate of the change in the number of permanent, full-time employees over two years, also derived by aggregating the change in employment reported by each firm in the survey multiplied by its sampling weight.<sup>9</sup>

> 8 Most surveys contain three sets of weights – strict, median, and weak weights depending on the eligibility criteria used to construct the sample universe. Under the strict assumption, eligible establishments are those for which it was possible to directly determine eligibility, under the median assumption, eligible establishments are those for which it was possible to directly determine eligibility and those that rejected the screener questionnaire and under the weak assumption only observed non-eligible units were excluded from universe projections. So under the weak assumption, all establishments for which it was not possible to finalize a contact were assumed eligible. The survey implementation manual recommends the use of median weights for cross-country comparisons.

> 9 The Enterprise Surveys ask establishments to report the number of permanent, full-time employees at the end of the fiscal year prior to the year of the survey and three fiscal years ago. So we do not have a measure of job creation and destruction in the year the establishment was born, that is, first started operations in the country.

7
# **B Supplementary Tables and Figures**

## Table 4: Commodities

|Crude oil|Crude oil, Dubai Fateh 32‘ API for years 1985-present; 1960-84 refer to Saudi Arabian Light, 34‘ API|
|---|---|
|Coal|Coal (Australia), thermal GAR, f.o.b. piers, Newcastle/Port Kembla from 2002 onwards, 6,300 kcal/kg<br>(11,340 btu/lb), less than 0.8%, sulfur 13% ash; previously 6,667 kcal/kg (12,000 btu/lb), less than 1.0%<br>sulfur, 14% ash|
|Natural gas|Natural Gas (US), spot price at Henry Hub, Louisiana|
|Soybean oil|Soybean oil (Any origin), crude, f.o.b. ex-mill Netherlands|
|Barley|Barley (US) feed, No. 2, spot, 20 days To-Arrive, delivered Minneapolis from May 2012 onwards; during<br>1980 - 2012 April Canadian, feed, Western No. 1, Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, spot, wholesale<br>farmers’ price|
|Maize|Maize (US), No. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports|
|Sorghum|Sorghum (US), No. 2 milo yellow, f.o.b. Gulf ports|
|Rice|Rice (Thailand), 5% broken, white rice (WR), milled, indicative price based on weekly surveys of export<br>transactions, government standard, f.o.b. Bangkok|
|Wheat|Wheat (US), No. 1, hard red winter, ordinary protein, export price delivered at the US Gulf port for<br>prompt or 30 days shipment|
|Sugar|Sugar (World), International Sugar Agreement (ISA) daily price, raw, f.o.b. and stowed at greater<br>Caribbean ports|
|Cofee|Cofee (ICO), International Cofee Organization indicator price, other mild Arabicas, average New York<br>and Bremen/Hamburg markets, ex-dock|

27
a fall in demand for middle-skill workers). Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) find that wage inequality at the bottom half of the income distribution has not increased since the 1980s and that, instead, wage inequality has risen in the upper tail. Goos and Manning (2007) and Goos, Manning and Salomon (2014) show that there has been a decrease in the share of middle-skill occupations in total employment in the UK and in 16 European countries. The unifying idea behind these findings is based on the tasks approach: occupations in the middle of the skill distribution are more susceptible to automatization than occupations at the lower and upper tails.

Acemoglu and Autor (2011) develop a more sophisticated model of the task content of jobs in which output is produced by a continuum of tasks and where each task can be performed by low, medium or high-skill workers, or by technology. Their model can account for job polarization, as tasks performed by middle-skill workers are subject to be substituted by technology. This is the mechanism that drives the concentration in high and low pay occupations. The model that we develop in Section 3 is loosely based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011).

Autor and Dorn (2013) study the impact of computerization on the demand for lowskilled labor. They use district-level data for the US and show that areas with high levels of routine tasks have experienced greater adoption of ICT, greater reallocation of workers from routine tasks to the service sector, wage polarization, and large inflows of high and low skilled workers.

Michaels et al (2014) study whether ICT has contributed to the rise in polarization. They put together a comprehensive industry-level data set on 11 advanced countries from 1980 to 2004. Their findings indicate that the industries which invested more heavily in ICT demanded more highly qualified workers in detriment of workers with intermediate education. Additionally, the estimated effect is quantitatively large, and can explain onequarter of the college wage bill in the economy as a whole.

The firm-level evidence on skilled-biased technological change, occupations and tasks, and labor outcomes is scarce. One example is Akerman et al (2014). They study skill complementarity of broadband internet in Norway and show that access to broadband internet improves the labor market outcomes and the productivity of skilled workers.

# _Labor market institutions_

To the extent that digital technology is a substitute for certain types of workers or tasks, investment in ICT is associated with employment reallocation. Employment protection laws that make labor adjustment costly, such as firing costs, are expected to negatively affect the adoption of ICT. This effect is larger the larger the substitutability between ICT and certain types of workers.

6
**Figure 5: Thailand Trade by Country, 1980 to 2003**

# A. Exports <u>by Country (Percent of Total Exports)</u>

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br>US EU Japan China Singapore Malaysia Hong Kong Mekong WO China Other destinations<br><!-- End of picture text --> B. Imports <u>by Country (Percent of Total Imports)</u> <!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70%<br>60%<br>50%<br>40%<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004<br>Japan EU China US Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Mekong WO China Other origins<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> C. Average Tariff Rates in Selected Asian Countries D. Coverage Ratio of Non-tariff barriers in import<br>(Unweighted) trade<br>50 100<br>90<br>40 80<br>70<br>30 60<br>50<br>20 40<br>30<br>10 20<br>10<br>0 0<br>1985-87 1990-91 1995-96 1999-2001 1984-87 1988-1990 1991-93 1997-2000<br>China Indonesia Korea, Rep. Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Indonesia Korea, Rep. Malaysia Philippines Thailand<br><!-- End of picture text --> 14
- 32 -

# Table 3.6. Value of Private Generators and Boreholes as Percent of Total Value of Machinery and Equipment by State, Nigeria

# (Percent)

|**state**|Firm<br>Size|Generotors|Soreholes|
|---|---|---|---|
|Lagos|SmtllI|25.6|2.81|
||Large|11.5|2.08|
||Atl|11.40|2.09|
|Anr_bra|sma|27.80|21.33|
||Large|6.35|1.88|
||_Alt|7.34|21.33|
|lino|Small|30.75|1.58|
||Large|4.42|1.57|
||All|4.49|1.88|
|KadIua|Smll|29.21||
||Large|12.97|.1.57|
||ALL|13.36|1.57|
|Kano|Smtt|12.49||
||Large|7.21|0.49|
||AtL|7.47|0.49|
|Five<br>States|<br>SmaLL|22.10|2.81|
||Large|9.65|1.91|
|_____________|Att|9.96|1.91|

- NOTE: (1) The values are for the firm in each cell **as** a uholc (i.e., ratios of the in).

- (2) The vaLues of genrators, boreholes, and radio quipmnt ore Included in the total vatlu of mchinery and quipmnt, but those of vehicles nd motorcycles **are** not included.

- (3) From Appendix Tables El wnd E2.

Sall firms **are** establshmnts uith **less** than 50 _eployees_ Source: World Bank Nigeria Infrastructure Project EstabLishment Survey 198. World Bank Research Project (RPO 676-71) Establishmnt Survey for Indonwsi end Thalal 1992.