**<mark>Box 1. An unintended positive lock-in: The case of the French nuclear power program</mark>**

<mark>17.</mark> **<mark>One example of a “good” lock-in, from the climate change point of view, is the French nuclear program, even though climate change mitigation was not an objective at the time the program was passed.</mark>**<sup>20</sup> <mark>In 1974, after the first oil embargo, France embarked on a massive program to develop nuclear energy capacity in the name of energy independence.</mark> **<mark>The program</mark>** <mark>(consisting of the construction of a multitude of similar plants</mark><sup>21</sup> <mark>based on a single standard technology)</mark> **<mark>was implemented in a very short period of time (lumpy investment)</mark>** <mark>. In fact, half of the total program</mark> capacity was online within a decade (i.e., by 1985), and nearly 80% by 1990.

<mark>18. Following the implementation of the program, the share of nuclear energy in total electricity generation jumped from 16.5% in 1979 to 65% in 1990, and reached its plateau of around 77% in 1995. Between 1979 and 2007, overall electricity production in France grew 2.4-fold, from 241 to 540 TWh, but nuclear power production grew 11-fold, from 40 to 440 TWh. As a result, the production of thermal electricity has been cut in half during this period. And as a consequence, overall CO</mark> 2 <mark>emissions from energy generation have been cut in half since the early 1970s. CO</mark> 2 <mark>emissions per KWh of electricity and heat generated in France are now 1/5</mark><sup>th</sup> <mark>of that in other large OECD countries,</mark> such as Germany, the UK, or the U.S.<sup>22</sup> <mark>19. From an industrial point of view, the cost-effectiveness of the program required that nuclear power plants be built faster than expected demand, leading to excess supply. As a result, electricity exports increased. In addition, the government pushed for the development of demand for electricity, notably water heating and electrical heating both directly via incentives and indirectly via uniform pricing of electricity across the country (including overseas departments), thereby</mark> _<mark>de facto</mark>_ <mark>subsidizing electricity generated from the grid relative to other energy sources. Between 1975 and 1988, the share of electric heating in total domestic electricity demand increased from 26% to 44% (de Gouvello and Jannuzzi,</mark> 2002).

<mark>20. As of January 2009, about three quarters of the generation capacity was between 21 and 30 years old. This points to the need for</mark> **<mark>another round of lumpy new investment in power generation capacity to compensate for the retirement of the current nuclear capital stock</mark>** <mark>around 2020-2030 (depending on the effective average lifespan of nuclear reactors, currently estimated at around 40 to 45 years, even though extensions to 60 years are being discussed).</mark> <mark>21. Looking forward, scenarios for electricity generation until 2050 (Charpin et al., 2000) suggest that for a given energy demand scenario,</mark><sup>23</sup> <mark>cumulative CO</mark> 2 <mark>emissions from electricity generation 2000-2050 will double if the nuclear capital stock is not renewed in the 2020-2030 period relative to scenarios in which the nuclear capital stock is renewed. The difference is significant, on the order of magnitude of 3-5 years of (current) emissions of the country. Interestingly, extending the 30-year average design horizon by 15 years, through modification of existing plants, will save as much in avoided emissions as the difference between the with vs. without nuclear power scenarios.</mark>

> 20 This historical example aims to illustrate how investments in networks of long-lived capital stock can lock in a country’s emission path over a long period of time even though they unfold in a very short period of time. This example does not discuss or evaluate the overall merits of nuclear power generation, neither historically for France, nor in the future for France or for other countries.

> 21 Subtype 2 of long-lived capital stock noted in the decomposition above.

> 22 Data for Box 1 are from the French Ministry of Industry (http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/cgi-

> bin/industrie/frame23e.pl?bandeau=/energie/statisti/be_stats.htm&gauche=/energie/statisti/me_stats.htm&droite=/en ergie/statisti/se_stats6.htm)

> 23 And assuming significant but limited penetration of alternative renewable energy sources.

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