through relationships and accountability mechanisms directly between the service providers and the beneficiaries of the service (and their communities). Another key message is the need for donors to reinforce the accountability of service providers rather than inadvertently undermining accountability by making direct payments to them (in the form of cash, salary top-ups, in-kind contributions, etc.). This framework can also shed light on financing issues related to service delivery, specifically that there is scope for cost recovery (a financial flow from beneficiary to service provider) to be an instrument of accountability as well as for covering the cost of services.

# **4.2. Distinctive Features of Security**

In applying this conceptual framework to the security sector, it needs to be kept in mind that security as a public service has some distinctive characteristics that affect the way it is delivered and the options for accountability and financing arrangements.

First, as discussed earlier, a state of security of the public from violence of all kinds comes close to being a **pure public good** , meaning that everyone in the locality (in the case of internal security) or in the country (in the case of external security, i.e. defense) benefits from a situation with a general level of security. This implies that the set of actual or potential beneficiaries is no different from the population of the locality or the country, and that cost recovery from beneficiaries is not possible. However, access to public security services (ranging from the police to courts) may be far from equitable for all, and moreover individuals may have very different capacities to mitigate and cope with security-related risks (for instance, vulnerability and coping strategies depend on income and assets: richer households are able to augment their own personal security through expending resources on private security guards, better physical protection of their property, locks and alarm systems, etc.; see Box 1).

Second, security in a fundamental sense involves the **threat and use of force** against internal or external threats to security. This capacity to use force can be misused, as seen in many countries affected by civil conflict as well as in other countries characterized by repressive or predatory states. Even potential—as opposed to actual—misuse of force can generate risk mitigating and risk coping measures that negatively affect people’s lives and businesses’ prospects. Security forces easily can become a source of insecurity rather than security for the populace. Moreover, monitoring the performance of security service providers can be difficult, as security forces (such as police) are armed and potentially can threaten civilian monitors (see World Bank, 2003b, Box 3.3, p. 54, for a discussion on creating conditions for accountability in the police).

Third, and related to the other two characteristics, effective provision of public security involves a **monopoly in the provision of the service** , i.e. the legitimate exercise of force, which is a fundamental attribute of a functioning state (see World Bank, 2005a, Box 4.1, p. 45). Competition in the realm of security results in insecurity rather than improved security.<sup>12</sup> Fourth, the function of reducing or mitigating security-related risks is in essence **difficult to monitor** . Some exactions of armed forces for instance are difficult to monitor, because of the threat of use of force or because they happen in remote areas (e.g. border areas).

> 12 However, competitive tendering can and should be used in contracting for certain security-related services like landmine clearance (see World Bank, 2005b, Volume V, Box 6.1, p. 63).

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