rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
economic sector of the job, whether they were paid a wage or piece rate, the daily wage and/or the total amount earned, and when they had been in the labor force. Using this information, we determined labor force participation,<sup>8</sup> when the worker was employed,<sup>9</sup> and the wage or average piece rate earnings when employed.

Table 3, also from Jarvis and Vera-Toscano, presents additional labor related information. Both men and women averaged about 5 separate jobs per year, with the number slightly higher for men. Men worked more days during the year (265 versus 166), mainly because men worked steadily throughout the year while women averaged sharply fewer days per month during the slack season (Figure 1). Women reported working, on average, less than 10 days a month during five months (May –September) compared to 15 to 21 days per month during the peak season. Although a significant proportion of the individuals surveyed lived in or close to towns, roughly 85% of the jobs reported by this sample of workers were in agriculture. Females had greater packing shed employment experience than males.

Most workers lived in households with several workers. Twenty-five percent of the females surveyed and half of the males provided more than 50% of their household’s annual income. Only a third of the females who were widows or separated were their

> 7 When analyzing a 1983 sample of California agricultural workers, Rubin and Perloff found that a higher proportion tended to seek piece rate employment when they were young or old.  However, the bulk of piece rate workers in their sample were relatively young.

> 8 Information on Labor Force Participation was collected for every day in 1991.  However, since some workers were employed on a monthly basis during at least part of 1991, we arbitrarily (after some descriptive analysis) used observations only from the second Tuesday of each month. Thus, the sample contained 12 observations for each worker and a total of 7188 observations.  On average, workers in this sample participated in the labor force 72% of the time.

> 9 Workers were asked to indicate whether there were any periods during which they had not been in the labor force.  Next, they were asked whether, for those periods when they claimed to have been in the labor force, they had actively looked for work.  Finally, they were asked whether they had looked for work locally, regionally and/or nationally. The latter questions were intended to cause them to reflect on whether and how hard they had looked for work. Workers were categorized as being unemployed in a given period only if they had declared themselves to be in the labor market and actively looking for work.

- 9 -
or, in other terms, as the differences between the damages in the absence of intervention and the unavoidable damages. The furst requirement is therefore to detemine the damages of global warming in the absence of intervention. Damages from global warming are determined by the estimated increase in temperature; which largely depends on the so-called climate sensitivity parameter.

In expression (11) is specified the linkage between the increase in temperatue from global wanning and the level of CO2 emission. Two scenarios are successively examined (the central and the high cases) which correspond to an increase in temperature in the long term of about 10 C° and 18 C° respectively.'<sup>0</sup> The increase in the level of temperature is assumed to depend on (i) the degree of radiative force above industial level, which in tum is influenced by the level of CO2 concentration at time t, (ii) the relationship between the degree of radiative force and the increase in temperature, and (iii) the feed-back effect caused by water vapour, snow and ice albedo. In short, global warming is defined as follows: where _ZO_ is the initial atmospheric concentfation of carbon dioxide in 1990, E, the C02 emission at time t, X warming per unit of radiative forcing before utking account the feedback effect (set a 0.3), and B is the feedback multiplier (set at 1.9 in the central case and 3.4 in the high case). The values of these parameters are those used by Cline (1992).

The increase in temperature will produce world damages that are esfimated

> 10. The 'central casoe is in line with the IPCC estimates, while the 'high case' is relatively pesimistic.

11
||Column 1|Column 2|Column 3|Column 4|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||t<br>Asn. .<br>P|Newsprint|Printi<br>d<br>Write an<br>ns|Household<br>and<br>Sanitary|
|Internet|||||
|Pentration (per<br>= <br>100people)|-0.00501***<br>|-0.00937*** <br>|-0.00519***<br>|-0.00334<br>|
||(0.0013)|(0.0017)|(0.0020)|—(0.0033)|
|RonbereapiaG<br>logarithm)|15g1#**<br>|0.354<br>|1.980%** <br>|—2.952"<br>|
||(0.1940)|(0.2620)|= (0.2980)|_—-(0.5290)|
|Percentage Post<br>High School<br>Students (over<br>whole population)|7-471|10.40**|11.04*|= -10.45|
||(3.7390)|(4.8850)|(5.7510)|(9.9880)|
|Workers in<br>Primary Sector<br>(percentage)|0.929<br>|-2.285**<br><br>|=<br>2.231" =<br>|4.285**<br>|
||(0.6950)|(0.9240)|(1.1590)|—(1.8140)|
|Workers in|||||
|Manufacturing<br>Se**ctor**<br>~<br>e|1.207|-5.274***|1.072|5.727**|
|(percentage)|||||
||(1.0830)|(1.3800)|(1.6220)|—(2.6630)|
|Workers in the<br>Services<br>(percentage)|1.935***<br>|0.874<br>|-0.141<br>|0.693<br>|
||(0.4440)|(0.5660)|(0.6580) _|—(1.0280)|
|Constant|-11.72***<br>|-0.545<br>|-16.46***<br>|=-28.36***<br>|
||(1.8520)|(2.4950)|(2.8340)|<br>—(5.0020)|
|Observations|460|455|424|353|
|R-squared|0.972|0.962|0.952|0.911|
11. ;

> ; ALITY TRENDS BY SAVINGS GROUP IN COTE D'IVOIRE, 1970-86 (LSMS 1985/1986)

<!-- Start of picture text -->
*  --' _ Low  savings<br>Medium savings<br>0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Al0<br>_ .... U  ligh  savings<br>U~_U<br>Year (1)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# NOTE: (1) 5 - YEAR MOVING AVERAGE
29 this as a fall in the macroeconomic return on real investment<sup>46</sup> -- a fall to be expected when the capital stock rises extremely rapidly.

The large aggregate investment in real capital assets may be compared with the modest spending on education, which is often reported to be 4-5 percent of GDP (4.3 percent according to the OECD, 2006), of which 2.7 percentage points are financed by the public sector.<sup>47</sup> It is unlikely that these proportions can be rationalized with reference to the relative returns on these two types of investments<sup>48</sup> . Hence, there is probably a general efficiency argument for reallocating spending from (aggregate) investment in physical assets to (aggregate) education in China, a point made, for instance, by James Heckman (2005). In principle, resources could then be freed for the consumption of both ordinary consumer goods and human services, such as health care, without jeopardizing fast GDP growth. (Today, private consumption is not more than 40 percent of GDP.)<sup>49</sup> The modest size of the service sector is often regarded as another indicator of inefficiencies in the allocation of resources across production sectors in China. This point has recently been weakened, although not eliminated, by revisions of the national accounts (in December 2005), whereby the reported GDP share of services was raised from 32 percent to 41 percent – still, however, a fairly modest figure for a country at China’s current stage of development.

Naturally, China’s capital-intensive growth strategy has also constrained the ability of non-agricultural sectors to absorb the surplus labor in agriculture. This helps

> 46 McKinsey Global Institute (2006, Exhibit 3.23) calculates that the marginal capital/output ratio has increased from 3.30 in the first half of the 1990s to 4.9 after 2001.

> 47 Revised national accounts 2005, and UNDP (2005 Figure 3.9).

> 48 Studies of the return on secondary and tertiary education in China in recent years, based on wage differentials, usually give returns in the interval 7-8.5 percent. A recent study by Zhang et al. (2005) concludes that the return on education has increased from 4.0 percent per year of schooling in 1988 to 10.2 percent in 2001. By contrast, a twin-study (to avoid selection bias due to innate ability) gives lower figures (Li et al., 2005), basically because of an asserted zero return on high school education, which the author asserts to function just as a device for screening ability. By contrast, one more year of _collage education_ and _vocational training_ is asserted to give returns of 10 and 7.3 percent, respectively. Studies based on production functions rather than wage differences suggest that the return was as high as 30-40 percent in the 1990s (Giles et al., 2003; and Fleisher and Wang, 2001). These calculations seem to have covered the return on the sum of education and on-the-job training.

> 49 Naturally, specific investment projects in physical assets are likely to have higher returns than specific investment in human capital because of misallocations of resources _within_ each of these investment categories.
Policy Research Working Paper 8144

# **Abstract**

Trade growth has slowed sharply since the global financial crisis. U.S. trade data highlights that arm’s-length trade—trade between unaffiliated firms—accounts disproportionately for the overall post-crisis trade slowdown. This is partly because arm’s-length trade depends more heavily than intra-firm trade on emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), where output growth has slowed sharply from elevated pre-crisis rates, and on sectors with rapid pre-crisis growth that boosted arm’slength trade pre-crisis but that have languished post-crisis.

Compounding such compositional effects, arm’s-length trade is also more sensitive to changes in demand and real exchange rates. For example, the income elasticity of arm’s-length exports is about one-fifth higher than that of intra-firm exports. Hence, post-crisis global growth weakness has weighed more on arm’s-length trade than on intra-firm trade. Unaffiliated firms may also have been hindered more than multinational firms by constrained access to finance during the crisis, heightened policy uncertainty, and their typical firm-level characteristics.

This paper is a product of the he Development Prospects Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at clakatos1@worldbank.org; fohnsorge@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
As discussed earlier, our aquifer dataset consists of four types of aquifers. In our simulations, we focus on groundwater supply through local shallow aquifers, due to their lower costs and relatively higher recharge rates than other aquifer types.

In Table 2, we present the per-capita concentration of local shallow water aquifers in the African context compared with other aquifer types. SSA has the highest share of local shallow aquifers among all regions worldwide (see Figure 1).

Furthermore, we observe that grids predominantly composed of local shallow aquifers are distributed across the region (see Figure 3). Comparing these areas with recharge rates (see Figure 2a) reveals that regions with a high share of local shallow aquifers also coincide with high recharge rates, supporting the earlier observation of sustainable recharge in these aquifers. Similarly, comparing groundwater depths (see Figure 2b), we find that regions with low groundwater depth align with areas predominantly containing local shallow aquifers.

One potential concern regarding local shallow aquifers is their lower productivity relative to major alluvial aquifers, which may make them unsuitable for irrigation purposes. Therefore, we map aquifer productivity across SSA (see Figure 2c) and find only a few regions have aquifer productivity below low to moderate levels. This observation suggests the aquifers in the region can, at the very least, support small-scale irrigation.

Given the availability of local shallow aquifers and their ease of access, the possibility of using them sustainably for irrigation presents an opportunity for African farmers.

## **4.2 Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa**

This paper aims to explore the potential increase in agricultural production and productivity that can be achieved through groundwater irrigation. Currently, only 6.4% of the GAEZ grids have irrigated croplands. However, by examining the descriptive statistics presented in Figure 4, we can observe that although the harvest area of irrigated grids has remained constant over the years, the productivity, measured in terms of crop yields, of these irrigated croplands is nearly three times higher, on average, than that of rain-fed croplands.

To conduct our analysis, we focus on cereals in the year 2010. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of existing rain-fed croplands in green, irrigated croplands in blue, and regions where cereals are not grown in grey. Our analysis primarily investigates the potential increase in production that can be achieved by implementing groundwater irrigation in the existing croplands.

# **5 Methodology**

Given the minimal adoption of groundwater irrigation in SSA, we undertake a simulation approach to our analysis, where we quantify the potential gains in agricultural production and productivity achievable through access to groundwater irrigation.

8
information costs, contract enforcement costs, currency costs, and legal and regulatory costs<sup>6</sup> (Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)). Poor countries have higher trade costs. The quantity and quality of port infrastructure closely affect transport costs. Expansion of port capacity and improved port facilities can streamline and speed-up embarking and disembarking, loading and unloading process and enable to use more efficient container vessels. This section surveys the existing literatures on the infrastructure and transport costs, focusing on the empirical findings on the ocean ports, in particular.

# _Limited Availability of Trade Cost Data_

The existence of trade costs is a key theoretical assumption of the standard gravity model of trade. Bilateral trade in the gravity model is determined by the magnitude of the economies of the trading partners and relative bilateral trade costs. A major analytical obstacle to this model is the limitation of official statistics on the trade cost, which prevents the researchers from directly regressing the bilateral trades on the amounts/rates of trade costs in total. As a compromise, proxy variables – such as distance, required time for trade, geographical and policy dummies, and various surveyed indexes – appear in the trade regressions, in addition to published nominal tariff rates. This enables us to estimate the effect of trade costs, represented by these factors, on trade. However, the degree to which these variables affect trade cost itself and the degree to which trade cost affects bilateral trade remain unclear.

The limitation in availability of the data is also true for the narrowly-defined transport costs between the ports that constitute a part of trade costs. The authorities of most countries only publish the amounts of import on the CIF base, inclusive of export prices of the goods and costs for insurance and freight without showing any details. If researchers would like international transport cost data between the ports of trade partners, they must estimate the international transport cost by separating that part from the CIF import prices in most of the countries. Only

> 6 Even the lack of transparency in the trade policies would increase the trade costs because of higher risks in trade, obliging the traders to pay the premium for preventative measures in case the risks realize. See Helbel, Shepherd and Wilson (2008), and Abe and Wilson (2008).

10
<!-- Start of picture text --> Panel A: Trade exposure and official lending Panel B: Banking exposure and official lending<br>(1800 - 2015) (1984- 2015)<br>15 15<br>a=] “ae =<br>5 10 Beta coefficient: 0.48 «toe “ i. a = 10 Beta coefficient: 0.28 . Le<br>z 5 | + + i MM 25) yt an eeRa<br>FE of 7 See 3 = 0 aN N See<br>z ° oe thet sgovestiatu’. ° 8 oot x, ” “2 8: ees :<br>oD . moet pe I fren ont, 7 ra} * oe, — t “ee .<br>2 -5 mee ae Bet<br>4 . . eee. pam]3 -5 . eo<br>-10 -10<br>-15 -10 -5 0 -15 -10 -5 0<br>Log trade share Log BIS bank exposure share<br><!-- End of picture text -->
transfers and pensions in Pillar II are treated as deferred income, the Gini for market income, including pensions is 0.391. Once direct taxes, social security contributions and noncontributory transfers are accounted for, we end up with a measure of disposable income that has a Gini of 0.325 in all three scenarios. Indirect taxes are unequalizing as the Gini increases for consumable income to 0.355, which includes the impact of VAT, excise taxes, and other indirect taxes. Finally, in-kind transfers in the form of education and health helped to reduce inequality. The overall reduction in inequality was equivalent to 0.090 Gini points from market income to final income when old-age pensions are considered to be deferred income, but as much as 0.222 Gini points when pensions are treated as transfers.

The reduction in Figure <u>3. Decline in Inequality from Market to Disposable Income</u> inequality 0.00 achieved in -0.05 -0.10 Croatia on -0.15 account of direct -0.20 taxes and -0.25 transfers is -0.30 substantial relative to what is observed in other countries (such as Chile and Uruguay), Euromod estimates CEQ estimates (pensions as transfers) although less so when Pensions as deferred income Pensions as transfers considering oldSource: Armenia: Younger et al (2016); Brazil: Higgins & Pereira (2014); Georgia: Cancho age pensions as & Bondarenko (2016); Russia: Lopez-Calvo et al (2016); EU countries (*): Euromod (2014); Poland: Goraus & Inchauste (2016); Croatia: own estimates using PHBS 2014. deferred income Pensions <u>are treated as transfers in this figure to ensure comparability with Euromod.</u> (Figure 3). The redistributive effort through direct taxes and transfers in Croatia is comparable to other countries in Europe, with most of the reduction in inequality largely being achieved by pensions. This finding is in line with the existing literature that has so far focused on the impact on disposable income.

14
based on the following accounting. Let TO and TA denote implicit subsidies via tax offsets and tax arrears (including to EBFs), respectively; and ISE, implicit energy subsidies, i.e., subsidies to the real sector provided by energy companies. Then:

# Implicit subsidies to enterprises excluding energy companies = TO + TA + (1 -a) * ISE,

where a is the fraction of the implicit subsidies channeled through the energy companies, but whose cost is ultimately born by the fiscal accounts when the energy companies do not pay their own taxes and EBF contributions in full, and engage in offsets (which are incorporated in TO and TA). Table 4 below summarizes implicit subsidies based on Annex Table 1: Table 4 : Implicit Subsidies, 1996-97 (% of GDP)

|Year|1996|1997|
|---|---|---|
|TO|2.2|2.7|
|TA|5.5|4.7|
||7.7|7.4|
|ISE|4.2|3.2|

Using the above formula, implicit subsidies to the non-energy enterprise sector were 7.7-11.9 percent of GDP in 1996 and 7.4-10.6 percent of GDP in 1997.

# _Effect on Public Debt_

The impact of hidden subsidies on the federal government's debt can be gauged from the change in tax arrears to the federal government plus payment arrears to the EBFs (which become the contingent and then actual liabilities of the federal government).23 This would capture subsidies stemming from weak tax enforcement, as well as the pass-through of the implicit subsidy costs incurred by the energy monopolies. This adds up to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1996, and 3.6 percent of GDP in 1997. Interestingly, net new borrowing at the federal level as a share of GDP was 7.5 percent in 1996, and 5.6 percent in 1997. In these two years, we recall from Table xx that the fiscal deficit of the enlarged government exceeded the original target under the IMF program by 3.7 and 4.1 percent of GDP respectively. Table 5 shows the deficit of the enlarged government when adjusted for implicit subsidies.
marketable asset rather than as a public good whose wide and inexpensive distribution increases overall welfare.

Public policies should facilitate the development of market based instruments for better managing disaster risk, provide the right regulatory environment, and selectively intervene where clearly defined social and environmental externalities exist. Common institutions that allocate property rights, manage land use, monitor zoning compliance, and disseminate credible information on hazard risk are fundamental building blocks for balancing gains from economic density with risk from natural hazards.

# **References**

Adhvaryu, Achyuta and Uwe Deichmann (2009), Information economics aspects of risk reduction in urban settings, Development Research Group, World Bank, processed.

- Alonso, W. (1964), _Location and Land Use_ . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

- Anbarci, Nejat, Monica Escaleras and Charles Register (2005), Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of nature and political economy, _Journal of Public Economics,_ 89: 1907-1933.

- Atuesta, Laura, Uwe Deichmann, Somik V. Lall, and Luis Yamin (forthcoming). Is hazard risk capitalized into housing prices? Evidence from Bogotá. World Bank, processed.

- Barrios, Salvador, Luisito Bertinelli and Eric Strobl (2006), Climatic change and rural-urban migration: The case of sub-Saharan Africa, _Journal of Urban Economics_ , 60, 357-371.

- Bin, O., J. Brown Kruse, and C.E. Landry (2008), “Flood hazards, insurance rates, and amenities: Evidence from the coastal housing market,” _Journal of Risk and Insurance_ , 75, 1: 63-82.

- Bin, Okmyung and Stephen Polasky (2004), “Effects of flood hazards on property values: Evidence before and after hurricane”, _Land Economics_ , 80 4: 490-500.

- Bonell, M. and L.A. Bruijnzeel (2004), _Forests, water and people in the humid tropics_ , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

- Brookshire, David, Mark Thayer, John Tschirhart and William Schulze (1985) “A Test of the Expected Utility Model: Evidence from Earthquake Risks, _Journal of Political Economy,_ vol. 93, no. 2: 369-389.

- Da Mata, D., U. Deichmann, J.V. Henderson, S.V. Lall, and H Wang (2007). “Determinants of city growth in Brazil.” _Journal of Urban Economics_ , 62, 2.

- Dilley, Maxx, Robert S. Chen, Uwe Deichmann, Art L. Lerner-Lam, and Margaret Arnold (2005), _Natural disaster hotspots: A global risk analysis_ , World Bank and Columbia University, Washington, DC

45