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|Authors|Methodology|MainFindings|
|---|---|---|
|Ownership<br>Concentration<br>and<br>EnterprisePerformanceinUkraine."<br>IMF<br>Working<br>Paper<br>WP/01/42.<br>Washington<br>D.C.:<br>Intemational<br>MonetaryFund.|investigatethe relabonship<br>between<br>ownership concentrabonand enterprise<br>performance.|Ukraine,andthatownershipbyforeigncompanies<br>and banksisassociatedwithbetterperformance<br>over domesticowners.|
|Pohl,Gerhard, RobertE.Anderson,<br>Sbjn<br>Claessens,<br>and<br>Simeon<br>Djankov.<br>1997.'Privatzatonand<br>RestructuringinCentralandEastem<br>Europe:<br>Evidence<br>and<br>Policy<br>Options."<br>_WorldBankTechnical_<br>_Paper368._WashingtonD.C.:World<br>Bank.<br>htto://www.worldbank.oro/ecspflfinal<br>/htmll/aDers/entr509.htrm|Thestudyanalyzesthefinancialand<br>operabng data (1992-1995)formore<br>than6,300 industnal firmsinseven<br>countries:<br>Bulgaria,Czech<br>Republic,<br>Hungary,<br>Poland,<br>Romania,<br>Slovak<br>Republic,andSlovenia. Aneconometric<br>analysismeasuringchangesintotal<br>factorproductivityisusedtoidentfythe<br>govemment<br>polides<br>that<br>most<br>encouragedfirmsto restructure.|Privatizabonhasalarge impactonrestructunng.On<br>average,afirmthathas beenprivahzed forfour<br>yearswillincreaseproductivity3-5tmesmorethana<br>similarfirmthatisstilinstateownership.|
|Sachs,Jeffrey,CliffordZinnes,and<br>YairEilat<br>2000.'TheGainsfrom<br>Privatzation<br>in<br>Transition<br>Economies:<br>Is<br>Change<br>of<br>Ownership<br>Enough?"<br>_CAER_<br>Discussion_Paper_63.Cambridge,<br>MA:<br>Harvard<br>Institute<br>for<br>IntemationalDevelopment.<br>httn://www.hiid.harvard.edu/caer2/ht<br>mlcontentl)aoers/confoubs/laoer63<br>/paoer63.pdf|The authors<br>examinetheempirical<br>evidence<br>across<br>24<br>countnes<br>to<br>determinewhetherchange-of-btlealone<br>hasbeensufficienttoachieveeconomic<br>performance<br>gainsorwhetherother<br>factors<br>(e.g.<br>institubons<br>toaddress<br>agency<br>issues,<br>hardening<br>budget<br>constraints,market compebtiveness,and<br>depolitisizabonoffirmobjectivesaswell<br>as<br>theimplementabon<br>challenge<br>of<br>developinginsfitutionsandaregulatory<br>framework<br>to<br>address<br>them)<br>are<br>important|Privatzatoninvolvingchange-of-titlealoneisnot<br>enough<br>to<br>generate<br>economic<br>performance<br>improvements.Whilereformsdirectedatprudental<br>regulation,<br>corporategovemance,<br>hardeningof<br>enterprise<br>budget<br>constraints,<br>management<br>objectves,anddeveloping capital marketscontribute<br>toeconomicperformanceontheirown, therealgains<br>toprivatzaboncomefromcomplementingtheabove<br>with change-of-Utlereforms. Thehigherthe levelof<br>prerequisitereforms, the<br>more posibveisthe<br>economicperformanceimpact fromanincreasein<br>change-of-tite privatzabon.Infactthestudyfindsa<br>thresholdlevelofreformsinorderforchange-of-tiUle<br>privatization<br>to<br>have<br>a<br>posibve<br>economic<br>performanceresponse.Theconclusionisthat while<br>ownershipmatters,insttubonsmatterasmuch.|
|Shirley, MaryM.,andUxinCoinXu.<br>2000.<br>'Empirical<br>Effects<br>of<br>Performance Contracts: Evidence<br>fromChina.'Paperpresentedata<br>Senior<br>Experts'<br>meeting<br>on<br>Corporate<br>_Govemance_ofState-<br>_owned Enterpnses_<br>_inChina_in<br>Beijing, onJanuary18-19.2000.|Thisstudyexaminestheperformance<br>contracts issuedinChinaandtheir<br>effectsonproductvity.|The large sampleofmanufacturingfirms shows that<br>on<br>average<br>these<br>contracts donotimprove<br>performance. Howeverimprovementsdidoccurin 38<br>percentofthefirmsinthestudy,and theseoccurred<br>wheretheperformancecontract providedsensible<br>targets, strongerincentives,longerterms andwere<br>basedinmorecompetitive industries.|
|Smith,StephenC.,Beon-CheolCin,<br>and<br>Milan<br>Vodopivec.<br>1997.<br>'PrivatizationIncidence, Ownership<br>Forms,<br>and<br>Firm<br>performance:<br>EvidenceFromSlovenia.'<br>_Joumal_<br>of_Comparative_Economics.<br>25:<br>158-179.|Thisstudy examinestheimpactof<br>foreignandemployee ownershiponfirm<br>performanceusingasampleof22,735<br>firm-yearsofdatafromSlovenia(1989-<br>1992).|The authorsfindthataone percentagepoint<br>increaseinforeignownershipbringsabouta 3.9<br>percentincreaseinvalue-added, while employee<br>ownershipadds1.4percenttovalue-added. Firms<br>withhigher revenues, profits andexportsarealso<br>foundtobemorelikelyto haveforeignandemployee<br>ownership.|
|D.DevelopedCountries|||
|Allen,Franklin,andDouglasGale.<br>1999.'Corporate Govemanceand<br>Competition.'<br>Working<br>Paper.<br>Philadelphia,PA Wharton School,<br>TheUniversityofPennsylvania.<br>htto:/ffic.wharton.upenn.edufficlwfic;/<br>vaoers/99/9928.0df|Anoverviewoftheeffectivenessof<br>different<br>corporate<br>govemance<br>strategiesandcompetiion.|Thecorporategovemance systemsoperaingin<br>differentcounbriesaredistinct.IntheU.S.and U.K.it<br>isoftenarguedthatthethreatoftakeoverensures<br>managersactintheshareholders'interests.In<br>countriessuchas Germany, Japan,and Franceitis<br>suggestedbanksandotherinstitutionsactas<br>monitors.Thereissomeevidencethatneither<br>systemisparticularlyeffectve.Theauthors argue<br>thatcompetitonamong firmsmaybemoreeffective<br>thaneitherofthese mechanismsinensuring that<br>resourcesareusedefficenUy.|