rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Introduction**

Migration flows in Vietnam in the past were strictly controlled by a combination of government migration policies and the household registration system ( _ho khau_ ). In order to redress imbalances in population density across the country, urban to rural and intra-rural migration were explicitly encouraged (Dang _et al_ ., 2003). Until the early 1990s, officially organized migration was the most common form of internal movement observed in Vietnam (Guest, 1998; Dang _et al_ ., 2003). Since the middle of the 1990s, however, organized migration has been replaced increasingly by a more spontaneous migration phenomenon (Hardy, 2000).

The _doi moi_ (renovation) program has been the main driving force behind the apparent shift from organized to spontaneous migration in Vietnam. Dang _et al_ . (2003), for example, argue that the _doi moi_ policy affected internal migration in three distinct ways: (1) decollectivization in the agricultural sector rendered farmers less tied to the land (see Fforde and Huan, 2001); (2) the marketization of the economy allowed people, particularly those in the urban sector, to be considerably less dependent on government subsidies and rationing for their daily necessities; and (3) the increased flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam attracted migrant workers to certain regions, that were the main recipients of these investment flows (e.g., the Southeast region). This in turn created regional disparities in labor market earnings that provided incentives for internal migrants. Pham and Reilly (2007), for example, report that the average hourly wage rate in the Southeast region is about 50% higher than the national average.

2
# **Figure A.1. Comparison of our Firm Death Rates to Those Reported in Existing Literature**

Note: Black circles are death rates from existing literature in Table A.4. Open diamonds are data points in our study. Curve shown is fitted quadratic in Figure 1. The two outliers in the existing literature at 10 years are from Davies and Kerr (2015).

**Figure A.2. Reopening rate over different horizons for firms that closed within 1 year**

Notes: only surveys in which 85 or more firms died within a year and subsequent re-opening can then be observed are shown.

74
# **Table 8: Non-Sensitive Questions**

||N|N<br>Reticent|Coefficient<br>Reticence<br>Dummy|t‐statistic|Uncond.<br>Mean|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Does this establishment have an internationally-<br>recognized quality certification (ISO 9000,<br>9002 1400, etc.)?|3853|526|0.0354***|(3.01)|0.0635|
|In 2008, did your establishment use its own<br>transport to make shipments to customers?|2751|359|-0.0099|(-0.36)|0.414|
|In 2008, did labor regulations affect your<br>decision about hiring or firing permanent<br>employees in a significant way?|4641|610|0.0016|(0.28)|0.0153|
|In the past 24 months, has your workforce<br>been affected in any way by high absenteeism<br>among workers who need to care for family<br>members or friends due to HIV/AIDS?|4639|610|-0.0105|(-1.60)|0.0198|
|In 2008, did this establishment apply for loans<br>or lines of credit?|4639|610|-0.0076|(-0.48)|0.1468|
|(for all 5 questions: 0=no; 1=yes)||||||

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01

24
**Lothian** , Tamara, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt and the Revision of Legal Doctrine, _Wisconsin International Law Journal_ 13 (1994-95), 421.

- **Ludington** , Sarah, and **Gulati** , Mitu, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, _Virginia Journal of International Law_ 48 (2008), 595.

- **Mahmud** , Mohammad, Illegitimacy of odious and dubious debt, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, No. 22, May 29 – June 4, 2000.

- **Mancina** , Emily F., Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, _George Washington International Law Review_ 36 (2004), 1239.

- **Mandel** , Stephen, Odious Lending – Debt relief as if morals mattered, nef-publication (new economic foundation), available at: <u>www.jubileeresearch.org/news/Odiouslendingfinal.pdf.</u>

- **Marcelli** , Fabio, Il debito estero dei paesi in via di sviluppo nel diritto internazionale, 2004.

- **Menon** , P.K., The Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, State Property, Archives, and Debts, 1991.

- **Michalowski** , Sabine, Unconstitutional Regimes and the Validity of Sovereign Debt. A Legal Perspective, 2007.

- **Ochoa** , Christiana, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, _Harvard International Law Journal_ 49 (2008), 109.

- **O’Connell** , Daniel Patrick, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, vols. I and II, 1967.

- **Paulus** , Christoph G., Odious Debts vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, _Brooklyn Journal of International Law_ 31 (2005), 83.

- **Paulus** , Christoph G., The Concept of Odious Debts: A Historical Survey, _mimeo_ ., World Bank.

- **Rajan** , Raghuram, Odious or Just Malodorous? Why the odious debt proposal is likely to stay in cold storage, Finance and Development, December 2004.

- **Reinisch** , August, State Responsibility for Debts – International Law Aspects of External Debt and Debt Restructuring, 1995.

- Page 41 -
**<u>Panel B: Correlation Table</u>**

||Narrow<br>Spread|Wide<br>Spread|Overhead|Liquidity|Loan Loss<br>Provisions|M. S.<br>Deposits|Equity|Int. Inc.<br>Share|Inter-<br>mediation|HHI<br>Deposits|HHI<br>Loans|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Narrow Spread|1|||||||||||
|Wide Spread|0.600***|1||||||||||
|Overhead|0.186***|0.263***|1|||||||||
|Liquidity|-0.040*|-0.122***|-0.110***|1||||||||
|Loan Loss Provisions|-0.126***|-0.115***|0.230***|0.0201|1|||||||
|Market Share Deposits|-0.033|-0.057**|-0.135***|0.011|-0.048**|1||||||
|Equity|0.042*|0.002|0.029|0.138***|-0.141***|-0.240***|1|||||
|Interest Income Share|-0.022|-0.054**|-0.043*|-0.177***|0.001|-0.121***|0.149***|1||||
|Intermediation|-0.221***|-0.005|0.019|-0.519***|0.053**|-0.233***|0.017|0.241***|1|||
|Herfindahl Deposits|-0.067**|-0.091***|-0.032|0.018|-0.006|0.114***|-0.015|-0.074***|-0.023|1||
|Herfindahl Loans|-0.011|-0.031|-0.035|0.040*|0.008|0.118***|-0.040|-0.063***|-0.042*|0.871***|1|
|**Observations:**|1806|||||||||||

# Source: Own calculations based on CBN data

Notes: The 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution of the narrow spread are excluded; the 99th percentile of the distribution of liquidity, loan loss provisions and interest income share is excluded; negative observations for the equity variable are excluded.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;

24
essentially designed to get the rest of the world to subsidize the US use of the Internet is not a local issue.

_In fine,_ it is going to be a while until regulation manages to do what it is supposed to do. It will require national and international commitments and much more analytical work to turn laws, decrees and rules into practical instruments with the expected impact on competition and on costs. The scary part is that a demand for new laws and new regulation is already emerging with the information revolution well before the first wave of legal instruments have been fully enforced. The full success of reforms and its fair distribution among all segments of the population will require much more blood, sweat and tears from regulators than these have been willing to give so far.

# REFERENCES

- Armstrong, M. (2001a), "The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection," in M. Cave, S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang (eds.), _Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,_ Elsevier Science, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

- Armstrong, M. (2001 b), "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service", _American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings_ 91(2): 297-301.

- Atkinson, A.B. and J. Stiglitz (1976), "The Design of Tax Structure: Direct and Indirect Taxation", _Journal ofPublic Economics_ 6: 55-75.

- Benitez, D., A. Estache, M. Kennet and C. Ruzzier (2001), "The Potential Role of Economic Cost Models in the Regulation of Telecommunications in Developing Countries", _Information Economics and Policy, forthcoming_

- Chisari, O., A. Estache and C. Romero (1999), "Winners and Losers from Privatization and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons From a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina," _World Bank Economic Review_ 13(2): 357-78.

- Estache, A., A. Gomez-Lobo and D. Leipziger (2001), "Utilities Privatization and the Poor: Lesson and Evidence from Latin America," _World Development_ 29(7): 1179-98.

- Estache A., V. Foster and Q. Wodon (2001), "Accounting for Poverty in Infrastructure Reform: Learning from Latin America's Experience," _World Bank Institute Studies in Development_ (forthcoming).

- Farrell, J. and G. Saloner (1985), "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," _RAND Journal of Economics_ 16: 70-83.

37
# **3. Panel survey design, sample attrition, and data characteristics**

The World Bank, in collaboration with Institute of Sociology (IOS) of the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, initiated a study in 2001 of its RE projects in Vietnam to demonstrate how living standards have changed over time in communes with electricity provided through the project. The survey design framework was prepared by the World Bank and ECL (Empower Consultants). As part of the design, a stratified random sample technique was utilized to identify households for the survey interviews. Two stratification criteria were adopted: regional and geographical variation, and electrification status of the commune. To make the sample nationally representative, all 8 geographical regions of Vietnam were initially considered. However, two regions (Red River delta and North East South regions) were excluded because they did not have any communes that were electrified under the RE project. Thus, 6 regions were considered for the study - North East, North West, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, and Mekong River delta (Table 1).<sup>1</sup> Seven provinces were randomly selected from these 6 regions, and in each of these provinces 6 communes were randomly selected as follows: one commune that already had electricity (not funded by World Bank projects), three communes that were identified as part of the electrification project (no electricity yet but eligible to be electrified under the World Bank project), and two non-project communes without electricity (not expected to receive electricity until after 2005).

A representative sample of 30 households was drawn from each of the 42 communes, making up 1262 households.<sup>2</sup> Initially, three rounds of surveys were planned with two-year intervals in 2001, 2003 and 2005. However, the first survey was not conducted until in 2002 and the follow-

> 1 Further details on the sample selection can be found in IOS (2005).

> 2 The survey team consulted commune leaders in selecting the households. First, commune leaders ranked all households into three income levels: poorest, middle and upper. Then, survey team picked 10 households randomly from each level.

7
Policy Research Working Paper 10786

# **Abstract**

The Covid-19 pandemic, followed by financial tightening due inflationary pressure, has raised public debt in developing economies as governments grapple with public health investments to curb the pandemic and collapse in revenues due to slower economic activity. The rise in debt may further disrupt the formal private sector in developing economies. Using two to three waves of panel firm-level data across developing economies, this study finds that higher public debt is correlated with low investment by formal private sector firms. The finding is largely driven by small and medium-size enterprises, domestic firms, and non-exporters—raising concerns about the distributional impacts. Potential channels are uncovered. High levels of debt reduced the accessibility of finance for private sector firms, limiting investment. Furthermore, a regulatory channel is observed. As public debt rises, firms spend more time with regulatory and tax officials, which is possibly indicative of higher efforts of governments to raise revenues. This channel is stronger for small and medium-size enterprises.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Middle East and North Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at aislam@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
from 36 panels in four Latin American countries and cross-section data from 43 countries across the world.

In general, validation results indicate that LASSO-PMM predictions are statistically indistinguishable from actual household level poverty rates, transitions, and income changes. A series of validation exercises support the method’s overall performance. We divide these exercises into two groups: i) _sensitivity tests_ , in which the actual poverty rates and transitions do not change; and ii) _robustness exercises_ , when we change the estimation procedure, sample, or other attributes that may change the actual welfare estimates. The validation exercises show that the LASSO-PMM approach for predicting poverty and mobility approximates actual welfare changes. The two main conclusions from this validation are: i) changing parameters to make the method more computationally intensive provides only marginal changes; and ii) models with greater explanatory power improve LASSO-PMM’s predictions. These findings are sufficiently encouraging to suggest that estimating welfare dynamics using LASSO-PMM may accurately approximate actual welfare indicators in settings where panel data are unavailable. Interestingly, the robustness exercises show that OLS and LASSO yield similar results. A plausible explanation for this is that, if the underlying model exhibits an adequate fit, the two estimation methods find suitable neighbors throughout the original welfare distribution in a similar way. However, the two estimation methods might arrive to different predictions in situations in which the underlying model does not have a good fit.

We then apply the LASSO-PMM method to harmonized cross-section data. Aggregate poverty rates are accurately approximated when using cross-sections across a heterogeneous group of countries. Mobility probabilities are also estimated at the world, regional, and country-levels. Worldwide, we predict that 24 percent of all households are in chronic poverty, 9 percent are 35
11 16 experience) have tended to obtain a higher share of central bank credit . To this extent, the members have been able to benefit from the risk-pooling afforded by the diversity of export products in the union. However, efficient pooling of these risks requires the available credit to be used as a revolving fund, with borrowings to cover short-term disturbances being repaid in better times.

In fact, not all countries appear to treat central bank credit to the banking system as a revolving fund. Somehow, at least in the UMOA, the larger and more prosperous countries have gained a disproportionate share in the regional distribution of credit. The major shifts in the distribution of credit over the years in favor of these countries have shown no tendency to be reversed. Figure 1 shows lending to banks by the BCEAO expressed as a percentage of wide money. The upper panel of the figure shows the three countries, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Benin, which have received the greatest proportionate share rising to more than 60 per cent of each country's wide money stock; the lower panel show the other three<sup>17</sup> , none of whom ever received more than about 40 per cent of wide money (less than 20 per cent for Togo) and whose credit has tended to revert to low levels. Since excessive credit expansions have leaked out through the balance of payments, this skewed distribution of credit has resulted in a skewed pattern of external deficits and external reserves, with the three larger countries holding disproportionately low gross external reserves.

16 Thus in a pooled cross-section and time series of seven UMOA countries for ten years (1978-87), regressing annual changes of each countries' shaLre in monetary authorities claims on banks and government (L) on the fall in its share of exports (X) gives the following equation: L - 0.428 X RSQ-0.194 No. Obs. - 70. (s.e.-O.105) The direction of effect is as predicted, but clearly many other factors play a part in determining the manner in which central bank lending is divided between countries, as the equation explains only twenty per cent of the total variation in the lending series. Since the size of total lending is of the same order of magnitude as total exports, we may say that the increase in lending predicted by the equation is a very substantial fraction of the fall in export receipts. Thus in the short run the monetary mechanism provides a very considerable buffer. Note, however, that the data on monetary authorities' claims on the government includes the counterpart of IMF drawings which are channeled through the central bank and actually provide the largest part of the lending.

17 Mali is not shown; it 'oined the union in 1984.
**0**

Figure 2: GNP per Capita and Capital Intensity of Textile and Clothing Exports to the EC under the MFA <!-- Start of picture text --> 11 ---- ~- - ' __________________________________________________________.. -- Singapore<br>Macau 0 i<br>10 Hong Kong<br>9<br>8 Taiwan (China,<br>7<br>6<br>0-<br>a-.1 5<br>ZCD) Korea<br>0<br>4 -N<br>Czechoslovakia<br>0<br>3- Brazil Romania Hungary Yugoslavia<br>2 - Malfysia Bulgaria Poland<br>0<br>Peru Thailand<br>I - l D Philippines<br>China P Sn Lanka<br>0 1J India<br>0-- 1 1 I 1 II I -<br>15 17 19 21 23 25 27<br>Capital Intensity of MFA Exports<br>(US$ Thousand per Worker)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: The World Bank computer files on the _MFA; The World Bank Atlas_ (including unpublished figures); the 1977 U.S. Census of Manufactures.

Note: The average capital intensity of textile and clothing exports is calculated using value added per production worker in the U.S. industry. The averages given here are based on each supplier's total exports to the EC under the _MFA_ between 1987 and 1989.
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proceeded as follows. First, we fi ltered the retail and wholesale fi rms’ data from the SIC 4- digit level to the North American Industrial Classi fi cation System (NAICS). Assuming that importers lobby according to the importance of each agricultural and manufacturing NAICS code in its production process, the 1997 U.S. Input-Output matrix provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) was used to determine the level of service fi rms’ contributions by each agricultural and manufacturing NAICS code. Finally, a concordance between the Input-Output codes and the HS 10-digit codes provided by the BEA was used to map the contributions to the international trade data system.

Political organization of importers for each agricultural and manufacturing ISIC 3-digit and HS 8-digit code was determined using thresholds following Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Krishna, Gawande and Robbins (2004). The fi rst, second and third quartiles of the importers’ distribution of political contributions were used to determine which manufacturing and agricultural sectors present politically organized importers. For example, using the fi rst quartile of the distribution of political contributions to determine whether importers are organized or not means that those sectors with lower (higher) contributions than the one displayed by the fi rst quartile code are assumed to be not politically organized (are politically organized) so that Ik<sup>i= 0(I</sup> k<sup>i= 1) .</sup> Political Organization of Exporters The data set used to determine Latin American exporters political organization is the same one used in Kee, Olarreaga and Silva (2003). Latin American exporters contribution data were provided by the U.S. Department of Justice under the legislation known as the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). First, the foreign lobbying expenditure data related to trade on agricultural and industrial goods were separated from those involving trade in services and other types of foreign lobbying. Kee, Olarreaga and Silva explain in details the procedure used to select contributions related to trade in goods. The same process was used for fi rms’ and governments’ contributions. Then, each lobbying expenditure related to trade in goods was mapped into 3-digit ISIC industries. Latin American governments’ contributions were spread across sectors using sectorial 24
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