Opponents argue that the lack of human, financial, and technological capacities among local governments may hinder appropriate public services under decentralization, and thus control should remain in the hands of the central government (Crook and Sverrisson 1999; Smith 1985). Moreover, given the existence of externalities, distortions to mobility, and economies of scale, decentralization often entails costs that require corrective mechanisms through the central government (Gordon 1993).

Incomplete contracts within federal systems may also limit the coordination of fiscal policies and increase the occurrence of pork barrel politics and other problems of coordination (Saiegh and Tommasi 1999; Seabright 1996; Shah 2006; Weingast 1995).<sup>5</sup> The literature on pork barrel politics suggests that legislators tend to support projects for which they can claim credit with the electorate (Mayhew 1974). Selod and Soumahoro (2019) find strong evidence of a prevalence of political bias in the federal funding of highways in constituencies electing legislators in Mexico. Costa-i-Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia, and Lunapla (2003) also find a positive relationship between the regional allocation of public investment and past support for the ruling party in Mexico. Using data on Turkey, Celbis, de Crombrugghe, and Muysken (2014) find evidence of a partisan bias in the allocation of public investment in regional transportation and communication. Other research finds less persuasive results. For example, Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) indicate that, although electoral concerns matter in the allocation of public investment across regions in Turkey, the magnitude of pork-barreling is relatively low compared with the role played by socioeconomic factors.

Following the decentralization wave, countries have implemented, to a lesser or greater extent, decentralization in administrative responsibilities (Dick et al. 2016; Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Many factors affect the success of these endeavors, including the dynamics of political economy, the budgetary process, and the need for effective local capacity in implementation (Loayza, Rigolini, and Calvo-González 2014). Yet, supportive conditions locally, such as accountability and responsiveness, financial resources to provision services, and administrative capacity, are often absent in many countries (Robinson 2007). Obstacles also include flaws in the design of decentralization reforms, resistance from those holding traditional or central power, and weak central government institutions (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt 2011). Indeed, in addition to the incentives available to local and national politicians, the success of decentralization in better service delivery has been associated with the design of the systems and the process of implementation (Ahmad et al. 2005). Von Braun and Grote (2009) argue that, to assess the effectiveness of decentralization in improving social indicators, one must consider the simultaneous effect of the sequencing and pace of different types of decentralization, as well as country-specific conditions, target groups, and the types of public services.

Paying attention to the specific country factors and context, as well as the management of tasks and the lines of accountability, can inform the possibility for more appropriate design and implementation (Smoke 2015). If expenditure decentralization is not accompanied by revenue decentralization, this may limit the expansionary impact on service provision (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b). However, effective formal institutions, such as functioning electoral rules, can play a positive role in the success of the decentralized delivery of local public goods, as suggested by the analysis of a conditional cash transfer program aiming to reduce school drop-out rates in Brazil (de Janvry et al. 2012).

Decentralization requires more monitoring and greater accountability. In the absence of an adequate system of checks and balances, local representatives have incentives to maximize their incomes rather than to seek greater regional development as their resources and authority grow. In this way, local governments may be subject to elite capture (Reinikka and Svensson 2004). The effects of decentralization may be influenced by the method

> 5 More generally, Golden and Min (2013) offer a comprehensive review of studies of distributive politics around the world.

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