rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# FIGURE 11: SHARE OF GOVERNMENT. HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC SERVICES IN VALUE ADDED: USSR AND OECD

<!-- Start of picture text --> 30%-<br>DWISVWE<br>20%-_ DNK<br>NED NED<br>~~~I}L sAN _ - ;USA<br>IRL<br>BEL<br>10%- USSR USSR<br>GRC<br>0x- __ ~I lI I I _I<br>8 8.5 9 9.5 10<br>LOG OF PER CAPITA INCOME<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Policy Research Working Paper 6021

# **Abstract**

A broad consensus has emerged among practitioners and researchers that failure to build accountable and legitimate institutions is a critical risk factor associated with vicious circles of repeated violence. Despite this consensus, very few studies have tested the extent to which local government performance and decentralized service provision shape citizens’ beliefs toward political authorities. This paper contributes to fill this gap by examining the antecedents of trustworthy local government authorities in a post-conflict and fragile setting, Sierra Leone. Taking advantage of a unique longitudinal survey, the National Public Services, it examines the impact of sub-national variation in local government performance on citizens’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of local government authorities. To test the hypothesis, it uses multilevel models to exploit variation over time and within and across subnational units in Sierra Leone. The results suggest that improvements in the quality of decentralized service delivery, as well as perceptions of local councillors’ honesty, are positively associated with perceptions of local government officials as trustworthy political authorities. These findings speak to the possibility that local service provision can play a role in shaping the relationships between citizens and the state and in overcoming the root causes of fragility and conflict.

This paper is a product of the Public Sector Governance Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network; and the Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at asacks@worldbank.org and mlarizza@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
during the 1986-87 period. An eailier study by Bhatia (1989) of 1982-83 infant deaths in the Matlab study area found that tetanus accounted for 20 percent of all neonatal deaths in the comparison area. However, the Bhatia study did not adjust the effects of the 1974 vaccine trial, so that tetanus deaths are likely to have been underestimated in this study.

It should also be emphasized that the earlier findings from Matlab, indicating reductions in neonatal mortality by one-third or mora (Black, et al. 1980; Koenig, et al. 1991a) may not be inconsistent with the cause of death estimates of neonatal tetanus cited above. There is evidence of a steady decline in 4- 14 day mortality in the Matlab study area since the late 1970s among births to unimmunized mothers (Koenig, et al. 1991b), although the factors which have contributed to this decline remain poorly understood. At the same time, a recent study in a separate area of rural Bangladesh, based upon one year retrospective survey data, reported somewhat higher levels of tetanus-related mortality (34 percent of reported neonatal deaths), raising questions about whether neonatal tetanus levels may be somewhat lower in the Matlab area than for Bangladesh as a whole (Hlady, et al. 1991).

# Duration of Immunity

In the Colombian study, no neonatal tetanus deaths were reported among mothers who were immunized during pregnancy with 2 or 3 injections of tetanus toxoid and gave birth over the 1961-66 period (tNewell, et al. 1966). This result provided evidence that the protection conferred by maternal tetanAus immunization appeared to last for a period of at least four years. Black, et al. (1980) in their Matlab study found that two injections of tetanus toxoid resulted in significantly lower 4-14 day mortality levels through 21-32 months after immunization. The study by Rahman, et al. (1982) in Matlab also provided evidence of extended durations of protection through maternal tetanus immunization. Their findings showed that 1978-79 births to mothers immunized with two injections of tetanus toxoid during the 1974 cholera vaccine trial continued to experience significantly lower 4-14 day mortality rates than among the nonimmunized group, indicating that two iniections of tetanus toxoid may confer significant levels of protection against tetanus for a duration of as long as five years.

These upper bounds on the duration of immunity reported in all of forementioned studies have been defined by the end of the respective study periods, rather than by a quantifiable dimunition in protective immunity. The recent study by Koenig, et al. (1991b), which examined the duration of immunity conferred by tetanus immunization in the 1974 cholera vaccine trial over the 23
Given the relatively low quality of institutions in Africa, the particularly large pro-trade effect of African migrants can thus be partly explained by the role of migrants to act as a substitute 13 for good institutions. The finding that migrants stimulate exports and that their pro-export effect grows in proportion to the weakness of institutions in exporting countries highlights the contract enforcement channel through which the African diaspora is promoting African exports.

# 4.2. The pro-exports effect of African migrants

We turn now to the sample of the 52 African countries and their 195 commercial partners in the world to investigate further the migration-trade relationship for both all exported goods and differentiated goods only. The results of the estimation of equation (1) on this sample are presented in Table 2. From columns 1 and 2, with the OLS and IV-OLS estimators, we see that there is a positive and significant relationship between African migrants and total African exports.

According to column 2, a one percent increase in the population of African migrants living all over the world raises the exports of African countries by a coefficient of 0.178 percent. Given that the mean value of bilateral African migration in our sample is 16,770.4 migrants in 2010 and the mean value of African exports is 194.97 million dollars, our result would suggest that one additional migrant creates about 2,100 dollars a year in additional exports for his country 14 of origin. This order of magnitude is comparable to the results found by Felbermayr and Jung (2009), who provide evidence that one additional migrant would create US$ 2,700 in additional exports for his home country.

We turn next to examine the size of the pro-export effect of African migrants on differentiated goods. As detailed in Section 2, a large share of African exports is constituted of homogeneous goods. The export of differentiated products may face higher information costs than homogeneous ones, which are traded on organized exchanges. Their quality may be difficult to assess or their sheer existence may not be well known. The role played by the diaspora would thus be more critical for non-homogeneous goods and the pro-trade effect should be more prominent (Rauch and Trindade 2002).

> 13 According to descriptive statistics, the average level of institutional quality in African countries is substantially lower than the world average. On a scale from 0 to 6, the world average of the law and order index from the ICRG database is 3.72, whereas the average value for African countries is only 2.8. 14 0.178 x (1/ 16770.4 ) x 194 965 700 ≈ US$2100.

14
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We also supplement our analysis with two other surveys that have information on an individual’s birth place: i) the 1992-93 VLSS, which was the first household consumption survey that was implemented for the country, and ii) the 2014 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). There are, however, limitations with these surveys. The 1992-93 VLSS has a smaller sample size and collects data on around 4,800 households; most of these households were resurveyed in the 1997-98 VLSS. In addition, we discuss later some potential issues with data quality of certain variables in this survey. The 2014 VHLSS, on the other hand, has a larger sample size but was implemented further away from the Indochina War period; thus, sample attrition issues with this survey pose more severe challenges (e.g., a child age 6 in 1945 was 75 years old in 2014). Still, it may be useful to provide some limited robustness checks using these surveys. Besides the V(H)LSS data, we also analyze UNESCO’s WIDE database (UNESCO, 2017) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2017).

But importantly, we generate for the first time several new variables related to the First Indochina war that help construct our treatment measures. In particular, since each province in Vietnam produced a book on the history of its local communist party and its army, we manually glean data from these books to construct these variables. The most interesting variable is the years of the DRV’s occupation at the province level, which allows us to construct different measures of exposure to the ME program as earlier discussed: whether a school-age child was exposed to it, and the durations of exposure (both at the individual and province levels). Furthermore, we are also able to construct a variable that indicates the number of battles that were fought in each province, which will be employed for a robustness check on the potential confounding effects of 18
# **V. Annex 1   Summary of Migrant Labor Remittances in the South Asia region**<sup>17</sup>

At a time that remittances are receiving renewed interest in international remittances four countries in the South Asia region stand out in terms of the volume of remittances they receive, the national policies in place to attract increased flows, and the efforts of formal financial institutions to deliver remittances faster and more cost effectively.

Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have all experienced a sharp increase in remittances during the past decade. At the end of 2004, recorded remittances had increased to US$1.3 billion (Table 1). Together with Bangladesh (US$3.4 billion), India (US$23.0 billion), and Pakistan (US$4.2 billion), Sri Lanka was among the 20 largest recipients of remittances, collectively making the South Asia region the second largest regional recipient of remittances in the world after Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Table 1  Estimates of Workers’ Remittances Channeled through the Formal Financial Infrastructure (US$ Billion)**

||1999|2000|2001|2002|2003|2004|2003<br>(per<br>capita<br>US$)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Total|14.0|16.0|15.9|21.4|25.9|31.9||
|Bangladesh|1.8|2.0|2.1|2.8|3.2|3.4|23.2|
|<br>India|11.1|11.7|11.1|13.7|17.4|23.0|15.8|
|Pakistan|0.1|1.1|1.5|3.6|4.0|4.2|27.0|
|Sri Lanka|||1.2|||1.3|67.7|
||1.0|1.2||1.3|1.3|||

_Source: World Bank (2005)_ That this increase in the quantity of remittances is taking place at a time of declining overseas development assistance **(** ODA) flows to the region is of additional importance. Interest in the development impact of remittances has increased because they continue to be the largest financial flow to the region after foreign direct investment.

The increase in remittance volumes has renewed academic and public policy interest in their potential to reduce poverty and economic vulnerability, improve family welfare, and stimulate local economic development in the face of much lower, sometimes temperamental, foreign direct investment flows.

To encourage higher flows into the region, governments in all four countries have taken active steps to support the migration of their nationals. The public infrastructure to support the search for employment abroad, the migration of successful applicants, and their subsequent stay is, in principal, in place. In all four countries, the public infrastructure includes emigration legislation, government ministries and departments, and a plethora of incentives for nonresident nationals.

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This paper uses three primary datasets. The first is a market-level monthly panel for 37 markets over a 10-year period (1999–2008) collected by the Agricultural Market Information Service (AMIS) of Niger. This dataset includes monthly producer and consumer prices for millet, sorghum, and cowpea.<sup>14</sup> A producer price observation is calculated as the average monthly price that farmers received for selling a given crop in that market. In addition, we have data on factors that may affect arbitrage, such as fuel prices, transport costs, rainfall, market latitude and longitude, and the distance and road quality between market pairs.<sup>15</sup> These data are combined with information on the location and date of mobile phone coverage in each market between 2001 and 2008, which was obtained from the mobile phone service providers.

The second dataset is a panel survey of traders and farmers interviewed in Niger between 2005 and 2007. The survey includes traders and farmers in 32 markets and 37 villages across six geographic regions of Niger. A majority of traders in Niger are male, from the Hausa ethnic group, and have never attended school. Traders search for price information in an average of 3.9 markets and buy and sell commodities in four markets. Traders have an average of 16 years’ of trading experience, and only 10 percent had changed their market since they began trading (Tack and Aker 2014). Table 1A provides summary statistics for farmers. Despite their low levels of production, on average, 25 percent of farmers sold millet, and 75 percent sold cowpea. Compared to traders, farmers traded over a smaller geographic area, selling in 1.46 markets and searching for price information in 1.5 markets.

Fewer than 5 percent of the villages in the farmer survey had mobile phone coverage between 2005 and 2007. As a result, inferences drawn from farmer-level dataset have low power. To provide additional insight into the relationship between mobile phone coverage and farmers’ marketing behavior, we also rely on a 2009 survey of 1,038 farm households from 100 villages in two regions. The survey collected data on agricultural production and marketing behavior, as well as mobile phone coverage and ownership. Table 1B provides summary statistics from this survey. Overall, many of the sociodemographic indicators are similar to those of the 2005–7 survey; households have low levels of education and are primarily from the Hausa ethnic group. Millet and cowpea are the primary crops grown 11
<!-- Start of picture text --> 9<br>8<br>7<br>6<br>5<br>4 zero<br>3<br>low<br>2<br>1 medium<br>0 high<br>perfect<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 1.** Real macro indicators by scenario (percent change from base).

_Note_ : In this figure the definition of the real exchange rate was changed so that an increase means an appreciation.

_Source_ : Authors' calculations.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>low medium high perfect<br>Effient employment Physical employment<br>Output<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 2.** Employment and real output in food processing (percent change from base). _Source_ : Authors' calculations.

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high temperatures (similar to 2020) with higher precipitation, providing favorable conditions for crop growth. Failure to include weather-related variables may thus bias estimates of the effects of the conflict.

# **3.2 Methodology and results**

To estimate the impacts of concurrent or past conflict on area cultivated with winter and summer crops at the village level, we use data from a panel data set covering 10,770 VCs over 2019–23. Indexing VCs by and years by , the model to be estimated is vv tt v v v −1 v v (1) vv vv YY = αα + ββC + δδC + γγXX + λλ + εε where v is the outcome variable of interest (area covered with summer or winter crops) in village in year ; C v is a vector of conflict indicators (intensity of conflict or area damaged by conflict based on YY vv satellite imagery at different stages of crops’ vegetative cycle based on public sources); v is a vector of tt time-varying variables including weather (number of GDDs) and precipitation at different stages of crop XX development and their squares and, for summer crops, the winter crop area to allow for substitution effects<sup>8</sup> ; are village fixed effects that control for time invariant factors such as agronomic suitability, access to infrastructure or economic opportunities, and quality of local leadership; vv s are time fixed effects; and v αα is a random error term. vv λλ εε Beyond providing an estimate of the effect of contemporaneous conflict ( ), this regression allows testing whether there is persistence in the sense that exposure to conflict in the past affects current production _(δ)_ , ββ at least for one lag. Moreover, to the extent that control for time invariant factors, such as access to infrastructure, soil quality, or village leadership, and vv v as well as for periods before 2022 capture timeαα varying factors not affected by the war, 2022 or 2023 would provide an upper bound estimate of the vv XX λλ indirect or macro effects of the conflict on area cultivated. λλ λλ Table 4 presents the main coefficient estimates from (1) for winter crops in columns 1 and 2 and summer crops in columns 3 and 4. All the estimated coefficients from the full specification are reported in appendix tables A2 and A3. For each outcome variable, the first column uses data on conflict incidence from publicly available sources, and the second column adds information on damaged area obtained from remote sensing and, for summer crops, an interaction with winter crop area to allow for substitution effects. With R<sup>2</sup> values close to or above 0.9, all the coefficients of interest are significant at 1%. Three conclusions stand out.

First, our results suggest that omitting the measure of damaged area derived from remotely sensed imagery would result in underestimation of the impact of the conflict and reduce the regressions’ explanatory power.

> 8 We include levels and quadratic terms to allow for decreasing marginal effects from rain or temperature or negative flooding or drought effects.

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# **Table 1: Estimation results: Group trade participation**

||Dependent variable:<br>Participation in group trade<br>||
|---|---|---|
||[i]|[ii]|
|Constant|-3.002 ***<br>(0.526)|-3.289 ***<br>(0.366)|
|GEND|0.087<br>(0.167)||
|EXPE|-0.091<br>(0.169)||
|ASSO|2.316 ***<br>(0.271)|2.277***<br>(0.263)|
|FORM|0.606 ***<br>(0.163)|-0.595 ***<br>(0.154)|
|FUEL|0.479 **<br>(0.220)|0.507 **<br>(0.212)|
|TIME|-0.230<br>(0.164)||
|PERI|0.137<br>(0.219)||
|PROT|-0.010<br>(0.023)||
|Observations|581|581|

_Note_ : Estimation results for location dummies omitted. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance, respectively, at the 90%, 95% and 99% level.

One caveat to the findings is that given the cross-sectional nature of the underlying data, reverse causality cannot be ruled out. If, for example, a traders’ association plays a prominent role in the organization of group trade shipments, a trader may decide to join the association in order to be in a better position to participate in group trade. That said, a substantial minority of 20
## **Box  4  The Benefits of an integrated regional electricity market**

Integration of electricity markets can yield significant benefits by:

- exploiting complementarities and comparative advantages in primary energy endowments and thus facilitating more efficient utilization of existing generating resources and giving access to lower-cost supplies;

- reducing supply risks through the provision of multiple links between system loads and crosscountry generating resources;

- sharing generation reserve margins among several utilities or countries;

- reducing environmental degradation;

- providing the basis for actual and potential competition, and hence increased efficiency, in national markets that are otherwise too small to permit significant competitive entry;

- exploiting economies of scale through large regional projects; reducing investment requirements through sharing of reserve capacity;

- facilitating benchmarking of costs, managerial efficiency, and operational practices;

- and by advancing domestic policy reform, enhancing credibility, and helping countries overcome policy commitment problems and technical capacity constraints.

# **Complementarity of Primary Energy Endowments**

The Southern African region is endowed with diverse energy resources and the different endowments of these resources among member states of SADC provide a strong rationale for promoting regional electricity trade and ultimately integrating the regional electricity markets.

There is a huge and largely undeveloped hydro capacity in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and especially the DRC. These regional hydro resources include the Inga Reservoir in the DRC, the Cahora-Bassa Reservoir in Mozambique, and the Kariba dam on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. It should be noted that less than 3 percent of DRC’s potential hydro capacity is actually exploited (table 7)--this hydroelectric power potential is estimated to be as high as 150,000 MW.<sup>86</sup> The Congo River’s huge potential for hydroelectric power could play an important role in providing power for the region.

The South African region has an abundance of coal (over 20 percent of the world’s recoverable reserves), primarily located in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (table 7). South Africa’s recoverable reserves are estimated at 55 billion short tons. Botswana has huge potential reserves of over 210 billion short tons. Its Mmamabula coal mine has the potential to become an important energy source for the entire region. The planned Mmamabula power plant is expected to have between 2,400 and 3,600 megawatt capacity.<sup>87</sup> Moatize

> 86 Expo Times. 2003. Tapping Africa’s Epicentre of Energy-21/02/2003 (www.expotimes.net).

> 87 Namibia Economist. 2006.  “Whose Power Comes First?” January 27, 2006.

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