rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table 27. Regressions with fiscal variables – disaggregated central spending per capita

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|∆Total Personnel Spending per capita|-0.251***|-0.296***|||
||(0.0466)|(0.0721)|||
|∆Total Social Security Spending per capita|-0.0663***<br>|-0.0537***<br>|||
||(0.0148)|(0.0176)|||
|∆Total Purchases on Goods and Services per capita|-0.0471***|-0.0403*|||
||(0.0118)|(0.0229)|||
|∆Total Current Transfers per capita|0.00890|0.0143|||
||(0.00860)|(0.00860)|||
|∆Total Capital Spending per capita|0.0118|0.00953|||
||(0.00764)|(0.00979)|||
|∆Total Capital Transfers per capita|-0.00102<br>|-0.00107<br>|||
||(0.00113)|(0.00200)|||
|∆Total Personnel Spending per capita*West|||-0.224***|-0.308***|
||||(0.0463)|(0.0943)|
|∆Total Personnel Spending per capita*East|||-0.367***|-0.426***|
||||(0.0576)|(0.128)|
|∆Total Social Security Spending per capita*West|||-0.0671***|-0.0501**|
||||(0.0167)|(0.0202)|
|∆Total Social Security Spending per capita*East|||0.00397<br>|0.0626<br>|
||||(0.0203)|(0.0524)|
|∆Total Purchases on Goods and Services per capita*West|||-0.0374***|-0.0174|
||||(0.0127)|(0.0284)|
|∆Total Purchases on Goods and Services per capita*East|||-0.0673***|-0.143***|
||||(0.0131)|(0.0172)|
|∆Total Current Transfers per capita*West|||0.000624|0.0106|
||||(0.00658)|(0.00894)|
|∆Total Current Transfers per capita*East|||0.0191*|0.0164*|
||||(0.00976)|(0.00857)|
|∆Total Capital Spending per capita*West|||-0.000906|-0.00307|
||||(0.00715)|(0.00823)|
|∆Total Capital Spending per capita*East|||0.0539**|0.0219|
||||(0.0208)|(0.0180)|
|∆Total Capital Transfers per capita*West|||-7.66e-05|-0.000868|
||||(0.00106)|(0.00246)|
|∆Total Capital Transfers per capita*East|||-0.00983***|-0.0116**|
||||(0.00287)|(0.00493)|
|Constant|0.00731**|0.00971**|0.00823**|0.00981**|
||(0.00325)|(0.00432)|(0.00343)|(0.00411)|
|Sector Shares||X||X|
|Observations|156|104|156|104|
|R-squared|0.268|0.401|0.378|0.585|

_Notes_ : W1=West, W0=East. Results from Equation 3 are shown. Regressions without sector controls are over the period 20072013. Regressions using sector controls are limited to 2007-2011. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 _Source_ : Ministry of Finance, LFS, SILC 2007-2011; authors’ calculations.

56
CÔTE D’IVOIRE’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE Overall, the efficiency and performance of the port of Abidjan compare favorably with those of its neighbors, but the port is relatively costly to use (table 5). In addition the port has started the specialization of its quays while reaching international volumes of traffic. In April 2010 it issued $50 million in bonds to modernize its equipment.

**Table 5 Benchmarking port indicators: port of Abidjan compared with other West African ports**

||Abidjan<br>Côte<br>d'Ivoire|Freeport<br>of<br>Monrovia<br>Liberia|Cotonou<br>Benin|Tema<br>Ghana|Apapa<br>Nigeria|Dakar<br>Senegal|Lome<br>Togo|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**CAPACITY:**||||||||
|Containers handled ( ̳000s TEU/year)|**500**|50|158|471|336|306|460|
|General cargo handled ( ̳000s tons/year)|||1,100|7,900|3,400|6,109||
|**EFFICIENCY:**||||||||
|Container dwell time - average(days)|**12**|15|12|25|42|7|13|
|Truck processing time for receipt and<br>delivery of cargo (turn-round time) -<br>average (hours)|**2.5**|5.5|6|8|6|5|4|
|<br>General cargo vessel pre-berth waiting<br>time - average (hours)|**2.9**|2.5|48|9.6|36|24||
|General cargo vessel stay (turnaround<br>time) - average (hours)|**2.2**|3|48|48|40.8|60||
|Container crane productivity* (container<br>per hour)|**18**|||13|12|||
|General cargo crane/gang productivity -<br>average (tones per hour)|**16**|16|15|13.5|9||22.5|
|**TARIFFS:**||||||||
|General cargo handling charge, ship to<br>gate - average ($/tonne)|**260**|200|180|168|155|160|220|
|Dry bulk handling charge, ship to gate or<br>rail - average ($/tonne)|**13.5**|10.5|8.5|10|8|15|9|
|Liquid bulk handling charge –average<br>($/tonne)|**5**|4|5|3||5|5|

Source: Mundy and Penfold 2009. Derived from AICD ports database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data TEU = 20-foot equivalent units.

# **Challenges**

As traffic in the port of Abidjan increases, expansion, specialization, and modernization will have to be on the port’s agenda. In 2008 the port initiated a project to add major new deepwater container capacity at Île Boulay, thereby promoting the port’s role as a major transshipment hub for West Africa. When the project is complete, the port of Abidjan will be able to handle up to three million containers per year, or about six times recent levels. Also on the agenda is the construction of a bridge connecting the port directly to the northern highway and bypassing the center of Abidjan, which will improve the port’s connecting landside infrastructure.

The port will also have to address the fragmented nature of labor unions, which complicates labor negotiations. With 14 different syndications, a strike by one union can significantly prejudice the work of 14
# **1. Introduction**

It is intuitively logical that non-cognitive skills would affect labor market outcomes. To complete a challenging task on time, workers must be hardworking, committed and punctual, as well as cognitively and technically capable. Traditionally, social scientists have focused on the educational, demographic, and socioeconomic backgrounds of individuals to assess the impact of cognitive skills on wages (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Card, 2001). Recently, the focus has shifted to measuring cognitive skills through test scores to assess the relationship between cognitive abilities and labor market outcomes (Levy _et al_ ., 1995; Lee and Newhouse, 2013; Pritchett, 2013). However, in most cases a large amount of the observed variance in wages cannot be explained by cognitive traits alone (Heckman _et al_ ., 2006).

In this context, studying the economic literature can enhance our understanding of the relationship between non-cognitive skills and labor market outcomes. A diverse range of definitions can be applied to the concept of non-cognitive skills, and different terminologies are often used to describe similar or overlapping concepts, including socioemotional skills, soft skills, noncognitive skills, character skills, personality traits, 21<sup>st</sup> century skills, or life skills (Puerta, Valerio and Bernal, 2016). Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) introduce psychological variables into their study of social and economic outcomes. Building on the Roy model (1951), they treat noncognitive skills as endowments and model choices that are determined by non-cognitive skills and other factors as they affect productivity and skills. They find that non-cognitive skills are about equally strong or sometimes stronger predictors of wages, educational attainment, employment status, and choice of occupation, than other factors commonly associated with labor market outcomes.

This analysis examines correlations between non-cognitive skills and wages by using unique employer-employee matched labor market data from Bangladesh. As is consistently argued in the literature, cognitive skills and education levels alone do not fully explain variations in labor market outcomes, and this analysis explores the extent to which non-cognitive skills are correlated with wages. The findings show some association between personality traits, a type of psychological taxonomy comprising of non-cognitive skills, and labor market outcomes in Bangladesh’s formal sectors, including a positive correlation between emotional stability and wages. A comparison of 2
|T**able A2: Descriptive Statistics at Bloc**|**k Level: Full S**|**ample**||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**1990**|**2000**|**2010**|**2015**|**2019**|
|**Panel A: Total**||||||
|Parcels reg. sporadically #|1.3|3.0|6.0|9.0|11.0|
|Area parcels reg. sporadic m<sup>2</sup>|2,223|4,516|6,915|9,730|11,883|
|Parcels reg. syst. #||||16|17|
|Area reg. syst. m<sup>2</sup>||||15,349|15,554|
|No. reg. sales annually|0.04|0.03|0.06|0.34|0.34|
|No. reg. mortgages annually|0.10|0.01|0.08|0.19|0.16|
|Share of built-up reg. area|NA|0.05|0.08|0.24|0.20|
|Population density indiv/km<sup>2</sup>|954|1,356|1,570|1,722|1,847|
|**Panel B: Treatment (systematic & sp**|**oradic)**|||||
|Parcels reg. sporadically #|1.2|3.0|5.0|7.0|9.0|
|Area parcels reg. sporadic m<sup>2</sup>|1,896|4,202|5,854|7,896|9,448|
|Parcels reg. syst. #||||25|25|
|Area reg. syst. m<sup>2</sup>||||23,358|23,637|
|No. reg. sales annually|0.03|0.02|0.05|0.33|0.30|
|No. reg. mortgages annually|0.09|0.01|0.04|0.19|0.12|
|Share of built-up reg. area|NA|0.05|0.08|0.30|0.24|
|Population density indiv/km<sup>2</sup>|1,042|1,562|1,809|1,984|2,129|
|**Panel C: Control (sporadic only)**||||||
|Parcels reg. sporadically #|1.6|3.0|8.0|11.0|14.0|
|Area parcels reg. sporadic m<sup>2</sup>|2,771|5,041|8,694|12,803|15,965|
|Parcels reg. syst. #|||-|2|2|
|Area reg. syst. m<sup>2</sup>||||1,926|2,009|
|No. reg. sales annually|0.06|0.04|0.08|0.36|0.40|
|<br>No. reg. mortgages annually|0.11|0.02|0.14|0.20|0.24|
|Share of built-up reg. area|NA|0.06|0.09|0.14|0.12|
|Population density indiv/km<sup>2</sup>|794|1,011|1,170|1,282|1,375|

_Sources:_ LAA land administration database from 2011 and digitization of paper records, 1981–2011 for parcels, transfers, and mortgages registered. WSFE for built area; and gridded population of the world v4 (CIESIN) for population density.

32
children in Nigeria (Azomahou and Yitbarek 2016; Razzu and Wambile 2021). Northern Nigeria has some of the poorest educational attainment rates for older adults. Only 40 percent of 30-34-year-olds have ever attended school in the North East and North West zones, compared to 90 percent in the South East and South West regions of the country.

Another factor that may contribute to low school enrollment and deficient learning outcomes is that the region is also characterized by a strong adherence to traditional norms. The formal legal institution of Shari’a law applies in most northern states, covering social, civil, and criminal matters (Suberu 2009; Human Right Watch 2014). This has reinforced social norms that encourage early marriage and childbearing for Muslim adolescents and in the process create additional barriers to education. This is also reflected in attitudes toward education for women and labor force participation of mothers. According to the World Values Survey (2017 -2021), in Nigeria, 42% of respondents believes that university is more important for a boy than for a girl and 41% believes that pre-school children suffer if the mother works. These adverse norms contrast with those observed in other countries where education plays a more prominent role, such as Kenya, where the proportions of the population holding these views are 18% and 23%, respectively.

Further, the emergence of the militant terrorist group Boko Haram, which translates as ”Western education is forbidden”, creates an additional barrier for school enrollment and attendance. As a result, the predominant forms of schooling available to young children in the north include: 1) Qur’anic schools, which exclusively focus lessons on Islamic theology and religious texts, or 2) Islamiyya schools, which also cover Islamic subjects but follow a more typical school structure with regularized time schedules.<sup>2</sup>

# **3 Entertainment Education**

Entertainment education (EE) encompasses a wide umbrella of interventions that use entertainment media with the goal to positively reshape attitudes and promote behavioral change. The theoretical framework underpinning its narrative format is informed by social cognitive theory and social learning theory, both of which suggest that individuals observe and learn through the success and mistakes of others (Bandura 1971, 2003). By modeling and contextualizing desired behaviors, EE interventions can be more effective than the delivery of information alone. Research finds that EE narratives can promote

> 2Most of these schools do not offer teaching on secular subjects (e.g., science, math), either due to preference or a lack of qualified teachers. Some of these schools, however, have been integrated into the national public school system, with the introduction of secular subjects with full or partial government support (Antoninis 2014).

6
developing countries, particularly in Asia, to meet increasing demand. Future trends for these essentially landless production systems are outlined in Steinfeld et al. (2006), who describe a two-step process: as developing countries industrialize, large-scale monogastric production systems spring up and tend to be located close to urban centers to minimize the problems associated with product conservation and transportation. In the second step, transport infrastructure and technology develop sufficiently so that these intensive livestock systems are located further away from the centers of demand for the products. This movement can help to reduce some of the economic costs of production (via lower land and labor costs), improve access to feed resources via reduced feed transportation costs, and may also reduce (or make it easier to deal with) some of the environmental and human and livestock health issues associated with intensive, industrialized production (Steinfeld et al., 2006). If this two-step characterization of this process is broadly correct, then in the future these largely landless systems will become concentrated outside peri-urban areas, particularly in regions with good access to long-distance transportation facilities (ports, railways) and/or with good access to plentiful feed resources. There are likely to be strong regional differences in the growth of industrial (confined) livestock production systems. The FAO assessment (Bruinsma, 2003) estimates that at least 75% of total production growth to 2030 will be in confined systems; however there will be much less growth of these systems in Africa, for example.

Mixed crop-livestock systems, where crops and animals are integrated on the same farm, represent the backbone of smallholder agriculture throughout the developing world. Globally, mixed systems provide 50% of the world's meat, over 90% of its milk, and 50% of its cereals. As noted above, estimates of increases in crop areas are relatively small across a range of assessments: e.g., from 1.5 billion ha now to 1.60 or 1.77 billion ha in 2030 (Van Vuren et al., 2009). These modest increases in crop area are plausible (i.e. within the scope of what is possible), although even these levels raise questions as to the impacts of further losses in area of unmanaged ecosystems. In a continuation of historical trends, crop production growth will come mostly from yield increases rather than from area expansion. Compared with crop production, the increases in livestock production will come about much more as a result of expansion in livestock numbers in developing countries (see Tables 3 and 4 above), particularly ruminant numbers. The impacts on the mixed systems in many developing countries are likely to be substantial, therefore (Herrero et al., 2009a). The more intensive mixed systems in some regions of South Asia, for example, are already feeling the pressures of increasing human population and livestock product demand, as production factors are 31
the three years following the grants, these gains resulted in accumulation of household durable goods and financial assets in the households of the male grant recipients. In contrast, females, on average, did not generate a sustained source of income from the grant. They did not do so either because they did not invest the grant in their enterprise, or because they did not earn additional profits when the grant was invested. Why women lack profitable investment opportunities, and why they are more likely to enter sectors with lower returns are questions which we see as first order for future research.

# **References**

Ashraf, Nava (2008), “Spousal Control and Intra-Household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines,” _American Economic Review_ , _forthcoming._ Baum, J. Robert and Edwin A. Locke (2004) “The Relationship of Entrepreneurial Traits, Skill, and Motivation to Subsequent Venture Growth”, _Journal of Applied Psychology_ 89(4): 587-98.

Bluedorn, Allen C., Thomas J. Kalliath, Michael J. Strube, and Gregg D. Martin (1999) “Polychronicity and the Inventory of Polychronic Values (IPV)”, _Journal of Management Psychology_ 14(3/4): 205-231.

Burjorjee, Deena M., Deshpande, Rani, and Weidemann, C. Jean (2002), "Supporting Women's Livelihoods Microfinance that Works for the Majority. A Guide to Best Practices", United Nations Capital Development Fund, Special Unit for Microfinance. <u>http://www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/pubs/thematic_papers/gender/supporting/part _1.php</u> de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff (2008a) “Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, _Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming_ .

de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff (2008b) “Measuring Microenterprise Profits: Don’t ask how the sausage is made”, _Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming._ Department of Census and Statistics (DCS) (2007) _Sri Lanka Labor Force Survey: Final Report- 2006._ Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Djankov, Simeon, Edward Miguel, Yingyi Qian, Gerard Roland and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2005, “Who are Russia’s Entrepreneurs?,” _Journal of the European Economic Association_ 3(2-3): 587-97.

Duflo, Esther (2005) “Gender Equality in Development,” working paper,. MIT 29

-  -
||Number of<br>freight<br>forwarders|Absorb<br>losses/<br>shipment<br>continues as<br>normal|Redirect<br>shipments<br>Share of firms|Driver<br>responds<br>indicating ea|No costs<br>involved/ No<br>delays<br>ch option as a re|It depends<br>sponse to cle|Contact<br>customs<br>officials to<br>expedite<br>process<br>arance delays|Not<br>applicable|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Small|134|55%|22%|15%|2%|1%|1%|3%|
|Medium/Large|12|50%|8%|17%|8%|0%|8%|8%|
|Total|146|55%|21%|15%|3%|1%|2%|3%|

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Survey of Serbian Freight Forwarders.

# **_Freight forwarders pay penalties when shipments are delayed but rarely lose business as a result_**

Considering the standard delivery contract for a freight forwarder, it sets up a delivery date for 74% of freight forwarders but sets up a specific hour of delivery for only 8% of freight forwarders.<sup>16</sup> Among freight forwarders with either a delivery date or a specific hour of delivery in their contracts, 70% report that penalties apply for a late delivery.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, all freight forwarders report that no penalties apply to early delivery. When asked about the type of penalties for delays 80% of freight forwarders report that penalties are established as a fixed rate (rather than as a proportion of shipment value).<sup>18</sup> The fixed penalty rate reported for a shipment held unexpectedly at the border post or terminal overnight (thus delivered 1 day later than specified in the contract) is 210 euros on average and 150 euros at the median.<sup>19</sup> The reported rates are very similar regardless of freight forwarder sizes.

A third of the full sample of freight forwarders report that penalties are incremental with each day of delay but the magnitude of such increments is not generic, rather it often depends on the contract negotiated between the freight forwarder and its client (the importing firm). Therefore it is not possible to construct a generic schedule of the penalty rates associated with different delays.

One conceptually useful measure that has been introduced elsewhere in the literature is the tariff equivalent value of a day. Hummels and Schaur (2013) use transport mode choices (air versus sea) in an econometric study of the implicit value that importers attach to time savings. They estimate that a day saved in transport is worth between 0.6 to 2.1 percent of the value of the

> 16 These percentages are calculated out of responses by 152 freight forwarders (140 small and 12 medium/large).

> 17 These percentages are calculated out of responses by 113 freight forwarders (103 small and 10 medium/large).

> 18 These percentages are calculated out of responses by 91 freight forwarders (84 small and 7 medium/large). 19 The statistics on the penalty fixed rates are reported based on responses by 79 freight forwarders (72 small and 7 medium/large). The penalty at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution is 500 euros and the maximum penalty reported is 2000 euros. Coincidentally, 150 euros also corresponds to the current level of charges associated with using a truck for one more day than is contracted.

22
have stopped operating by mid-2009 than similar smaller, younger firms. This could be because larger established firms have better access to financing. Because informational asymmetries between borrower and lender are less severe for large, old firms, lenders find it easier and cheaper to extend credit to them (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). Moreover, firms that had loans and overdraft facilities were also less likely to have stopped operating. Controlling for financial access and firm performance reduces the difference in survival rates between large and small firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms that lacked access to external funds were most vulnerable to the drop in demand that accompanied the crisis.<sup>5</sup> Foreign banks, mostly from developed economies, held over half of banking assets in ECA by the middle of 2005 (Claessens et al., 2008a). Given the high foreign bank participation rates in many countries in the region—and that the financial crisis started in developed economies—it is plausible that foreign banks contributed to a contraction in credit. Although multinational banks might be able to extend capital to affiliates that were affected by a financial shock (the _support effect_ ), they might also shift capital among affiliates in response to real sector shocks that affect the profitability of lending (the _substitution effect_ ).<sup>6</sup> Foreign bank participation might, therefore, have contributed to problems with access to financing during the crisis. However, the empirical analysis below suggests that having a well-established foreign bank presence helped to ease financial constraints during the crisis. That is, firms were less likely to report that access to financing was a serious problem in countries with high foreign participation in the banking sector.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops hypotheses about how the crisis affected different firms and how foreign bank participation affected the depth of the crisis in different countries in the region. The third section discusses the two sources of data used in the paper: the Financial Crisis Survey (FCS), which was conducted in six

> 5 When firm managers were interviewed, most said that the biggest problem that their firm faced during the crisis was a drop in demand—between 70 and 80 percent of the surveyed firms in each country identified this as the most serious problem.  By comparison, less than 10 percent said reduced access to credit was the most serious problem (Ramalho et al., 2009).

> 6 See Morgan et al. (2004).

5