Since Turkey has been importing vegetable oils and related products, we assume that increases in sunflower productivity and production do not bring lower prices. Thus, as for maize, sunflower hybrids boost farm profits rather than consumer surplus.

However, we met problems measuring impact of sunflower hybrids on farm income. A regression using time-series data understates hybrid impact on yields if we do not factor into the model how much the orobanche parasite would have reduced yields for pre-reform OPVs; we do not have information to make those adjustments. Also, sunflower area increased with hybrids, and one cannot assume that new fields realize the same increase in profits per hectare as old fields. Ideally, data from detailed farm-level surveys over time would show changes in costs and benefits, including risk of parasite damage, as sunflower farmers adopt hybrids or shift into sunflower. In the absence of such data, we estimate hybrid impact from changes in sunflower national area and average yield.

From information on seed import and production (see Figure 3.2), we identify 1980-84 as the immediate pre-reform period, and we take 1985-92 as the post-reform period. Period average sunflower area increased from 540,000 hectares during 1980-84 to 690,000 hectares in 1985-92. Similarly, period average yields went from 1.26 t/ha for 1980-84 1.43 t/ha for 1985-92.

Multiplying the increase in average yield from base to post-reform periods (170 kg/ha) times base period planted area (540,000 hectares), we get an increase of 91,800 tons of oilseed production worth $ 24 million at 1990-92 Rotterdam CIF prices, or 14 percent of the gross economic value of Turkey's average annual sunflower production ($ 173 million) during those years. This figure excludes gains from: increases in planted area; higher oil content of private hybrids; and preventing further decline in sunflower area and yield due to the orobanche parasite. On the other hand, the economic benefit would be lower to the extent that production costs are higher for private hybrids than for local varieties.

# **4.2.3 Wheat**

After 1980s reforms, private companies began to introduce wheat varieties and public agencies introduced new varieties at an accelerated rate. Information on seed production suggests that seeds of these new varieties are beginning to reach farmers in sufficient quantities to shift varieties over a significant share of wheat area. However, average yields do not show any impact to date. We may be several years early to measure the impact from private wheat varieties.

Private companies in 1993 planned to produce 4,000 tons of seed for varieties that companies had introduced from 1987 (including CIMMYT and foreign public varieties), plus 5,000 tons of other varieties. In 1993, TIGEM planned to produce 275,000 tons of wheat seed, of which about 70,000 tons was for varieties introduced after 1982. Gross figures of actual seed production show that private companies roughly met their plans, while TIGEM produced only about 40 percent of its plan (see Table 3.2). We have no breakdown of actual production or sales by varieties; assuming that TIGEM's actual production fell short evenly for all varieties, TIGEM would have produced about 30,000 tons of seed for varieties introduced after 1982.

-24-