# **5.2 Alternative Measures of Management Practice**

Our measures of management practice at the organization level are all aggregated from individual responses on management to our civil servant survey. The measure used for our core analysis averages management scores over the most senior divisional-bureaucrat reports. We now consider alternative constructs for management practices, based on all the senior bureaucrats in an organization, or as elicited from non-senior bureaucrats, namely those that are being managed. We can thus compare and contrast top-down versus bottom-up views of management practices, an underexplored element of the BSVR approach to measuring management.

The results are in Table 10, where we focus on project completion. Column 1 repeats the baseline specification from Column 3 in Table 3. Column 2 shows the findings to be robust to constructing management practice scores from all senior bureaucrats in the organization, while Column 3 shows them to be weaker if bottom-up views of management are used based on all non-senior bureaucrats only. Column 4 constructs management scores based on all bureaucrats in each organization, and these closely replicate the baseline findings in Column 1 in terms of the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest ( _γ_ 1, _γ_ 2) and the precision with which they are estimated.

Given these results, we probe further where the top-down and bottom-up views of management diverge. Figure 5 shows the CDF of management scores for CS-autonomy and CSincentives/monitoring elicited from senior and non-senior bureaucrats. We see that non-seniors generally report there being more autonomy than seniors (the average of the CS-autonomy score for non-seniors is _._ 021, while for seniors it is _−._ 003); and they also report their being more incentives/monitoring (the average of the CS-incentives/performance score for non-seniors is _._ 004, while for seniors it is _−._ 018 and seniors often report the lowest scores in this dimension).

We then examine what individual characteristics of non-senior bureaucrats predict the difference between their raw individual management score, along each dimension of autonomy and incentives/monitoring, and the corresponding organizational average derived from seniors. We create a dependent variable of the di↵erence between the individual and senior scores, where the unit of observation is bureaucrat _i_ in organization _n_ . We then regress this di↵erence on: (i) bureaucrat characteristics ( _Xi_ ); and (ii) organization _n_ fixed e↵ects.

These results are shown in Table 11 and highlight that: (i) women bureaucrats report higher autonomy, and a greater use of incentives/monitoring; and (ii) older bureaucrats and those with an undergraduate degree report lower levels of autonomy and incentives/monitoring. We also control for other bureaucrat characteristics such as their tenure, Raven test score of cognition, their aggregate PSM score and the extent to which they share an undergraduate institution or ethnicity with their manager/most senior bureaucrat in their division. These other characteristics do not systematically correlate with di↵erences in management scores with seniors. These findings all hold: (i) controlling for organization fixed e↵ects (Columns 2 and 5); and (ii) limiting attention to those 30 organizations for which we have project completion data for (Columns 3 and 6).

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