social outcomes in Columns 4-6, the performance of Soc-FAs is not significantly different from those of control FAs.

We construct a CO quality index similar to the credit index, by taking an equally weighted average of all six measures of CO quality standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one.<sup>17</sup> The effect of social bonus on the CO quality index in Column 7 is slightly negative (-0.051 standard deviations) but not statistically different from zero. For Cr-FAs, however, this index is large and negative, and statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Cr-FAs also performed worse on the CO quality index as compared to Soc-FAs (p-value is 0.014). Appendix Figure E.1 plots the bonus effects on FA outcomes (credit and social indices) month-by-month for the 15-month bonus period. In contrast to Jayaraman et al. (2016) that find a large productivity response immediately following a change in the incentive contract followed by a decline four months after the change, the plots in Appendix Figure E.1 suggest that monthly effects of the bonus were fairly consistent across the 15 months and similar in size.

Table 5 examines the effects of the bonuses on subjective measures of CO quality constructed from a survey of CO members. Among the sample of CO members who were interviewed, we do not find any statistically significant difference on client characteristics between the two treatment arms and the control (see Appendix Table D.4). These client-level data provide us with complementary measures of CO quality and more detailed information on the CO and its members’ activities that are directly related to community mobilization and social empowerment. Client data were only collected for a subset of COs in 10 of the 35 FUs as part of the baseline for another study. The group of clients in each arm has similar client characteristics (see Appendix Table D.4).

In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we find that clients of Soc-FAs are more likely to engage in buying and selling agricultural inputs and outputs collectively with others in their village and that they are more likely to turn to their CO leaders for help or advice. The estimated impacts on these two outcomes are large (50.0 and 68.6 percent respectively compared to the control means), and they are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Additionally, members of COs managed by Soc-FAs increased active participation in CO decisions and are also more likely to discuss non-credit related social issues during CO meetings. While these effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels, the point estimates however are not trivial in magnitude (77.4 and 86.9 percent respectively compared to their means in the control group). In contrast, the estimates of the credit bonus in Columns 1-4 are close to zero and not statistically significant, but the standard errors are large and thus the difference between the impact of the credit compared to the social bonus is not statistically significant.

> 17While calculating the CO quality index, the sign of one of the outcomes, i.e. “Dead COs,” is reversed so that for all the outcomes, positive values represent an increase in social empowerment.

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