differs for each output series we consider, in part because the growth rates are computed differently and in part because these data sets have different temporal and geographical coverage.

– **Table 6** Robustness: policy variables

||||_Policy _|_variable_|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Policy<br>Volatility<br>(1)|Government<br>Size<br>(2)|Infation<br>(ln[1 +_δ_])<br>(3)|RER<br>Underval<br>(4)|Export<br>Share<br>(5)|Trade<br>Openness (d.f.)<br>(6)|
|||_Panel (a) St_|_ructural break_|_s estimated w_|_ith size = 0_|_.10_|
|Executive Constraints ( <sup>�</sup><br>_INS_0)<br>Fractionalization ( <sup>�</sup><br>_ELF_15)<br><br>|-0.255***<br>(0.075)<br>0.020***<br>(0.005)|-0.254***<br>(0.073)<br>0.020***<br>(0.005)|-0.235***<br>(0.073)<br>0.019***<br>(0.005)|-0.253***<br>(0.075)<br>0.020***<br>(0.005)|-0.239***<br>(0.079)<br>0.018***<br>(0.005)|-0.260***<br>(0.078)<br>0.018***<br>(0.005)|
|�<br>_INS_0_×_ <sup>�</sup><br>_ELF_15|-0.004***<br>(0.001)|-0.004***<br>(0.001)|-0.004***<br>(0.001)|-0.004***<br>(0.002)|-0.004***<br>(0.001)|-0.004***<br>(0.001)|
|Policy Variable|-0.011<br>(0.027)|-0.000<br>(0.012)|0.005***<br>(0.002)|0.142<br>(0.388)|0.019**<br>(0.009)|0.006<br>(0.006)|
|Exits|43|43|32|43|43|43|
|Spells|54|54|39|54|54|54|
|||_Panel (b) St_|_ructural break_|_s estimated w_|_ith size = 0_|_.20_|
|Executive Constraints ( <sup>�</sup><br>_INS_0)<br>|-0.243***<br>(0.062)|-0.241***<br>(0.062)|-0.221***<br>(0.060)|-0.238***<br>(0.062)|-0.238***<br>(0.062)|-0.250***<br>(0.067)|
|Fractionalization ( <sup>�</sup><br>_ELF_15)<br><br>|0.013***<br>(0.005)|0.014***<br>(0.005)|0.014**<br>(0.005)|0.013***<br>(0.005)|0.012**<br>(0.005)|0.012**<br>(0.005)|
|�<br>_INS_0_×_ <sup>�</sup><br>_ELF_15|-0.003**<br>(0.001)|-0.003**<br>(0.001)|-0.003**<br>(0.002)|-0.004**<br>(0.002)|-0.003**<br>(0.001)|-0.004**<br>(0.001)|
|Policy Variable|-0.013<br>(0.022)|0.003<br>(0.010)|0.005***<br>(0.001)|0.069<br>(0.295)|0.014**<br>(0.007)|0.005<br>(0.004)|
|Exits|61|61|45|61|61|61|
|Spells|74|74|54|74|74|74|

_Notes_ : All models include region FEs, the US real interest rate, the log of initial GDP, and a constant. The standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for repeated spells.<sup>_∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 1,<sup>_∗∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 05,<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup> _p <_ 0 _._ 01 _Source_ : Authors’ analysis based on data from the Penn World Tables version 9.0 (series _rgdpna/pop_ ). The policy variables are computed using data from the PWT version 9.0, the World Development Indicators and the International Financial Statistics. Additional data come from the Polity IV project, Desmet et al. (2012), and the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database.

The relationships reported here survive many other sensible tests. They are robust to ( _i_ ) using different bootstrap techniques, ( _ii_ ) varying the interbreak period, ( _iii_ ) using longer time series, ( _iv_ ) adding other controls individually or in groups, ( _v_ ) changing the functional form, and ( _vi_ ) dropping individual countries one-by-one. Using different institutional indicators shows that—in line with theory—a narrow measure of constraints on the executive generates stronger interactions than broader measures of political institutions. All corresponding 31