rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text --> a<br>Trade and liberalization are generally applicable<br>conflict<br>failures<br>commitments<br>Risks and limitations<br>Rights and International Market Policy trans. costs<br>Typical bands Across the spectrum Several bands 56–395 MHz Several bands 6–78 GHz<br>Nr of users ++ ++ ++<br>Summary description Support for strategic planning, conduct of operations, and a large variety of military applications. In many countries, defense and security is the largest spectrum user. Safety services to the public. Includes fire, police, and ambulance services, and emergency coordination also with other bodies. Systems used for the operation of public transport services, such as railways, buses, trams, underground, road and traffic control.<br>Continued<br> developed from Analysys etal. 2004.<br>Many user rights, often in the thousands<br>Moderate number of users rights, often in the hundreds<br>Table 3.2 Spectrum uses Reserved user groups Military Public safety Public transport Source: +++ ++ Few user rights, typically less than 10+ European Union, 2004a<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**27**
Particularly salient from a transparency perspective are mechanisms through which foreign firms can provide feedback to authorities about whether and how easy it is to get accurate information on what is needed to participate in a market. The WTO does not have a comparative advantage in this regard, as the approach to transparency is centered around a “notification mindset” – reflected in numerous provisions in WTO agreements requiring governments to notify policies and changes in policies to the WTO secretariat. This is important but can be slow and may only imperfectly reflect conditions that prevail “on the ground.” On this front it is firms that have up-to-date information on what in practice is needed to satisfy regulatory requirements and whether governments live up to transparency commitments. Options to mobilize such granular, real-time information have been developed by many countries and have become simpler to implement as a result of new technologies. In the goods trade facilitation context systems have been put in place to allow traders to transmit information to the relevant authorities, e.g., through smartphone apps or “voting” type systems where satisfaction can be expressed regarding the quality of entry and clearance processes. Regular surveys of firms are another means of collecting data and assessing facilitation performance. International agencies that work with both governments and the private sector such as the World Bank Group and the International Trade Centre (Geneva) can assist countries to put in place such systems for services providers and in the process help stakeholders to provide information needed to establish baseline trade facilitation performance metrics and monitor progress over time in facilitating trade in services.

**_Quality of regulation and regulatory heterogeneity._** A major element of facilitating trade in services is to enhance the quality of regulation and related institutions, and to reduce the costs for firms that are created by differences in regulatory requirements for a given service across jurisdictions.  Transparency will help do so to some extent by clarifying what is required in each jurisdiction but will not reduce market-specific compliance and certification-related costs. Such costs may additionally be influenced by regulations affecting access and use of goods needed for the provision of services that differ across countries. Reducing the costs of regulatory heterogeneity calls for proactive efforts by governments to cooperate. As noted, this need not extend to liberalization in the sense of pursuit by governments of ‘deregulation’ by trading partners and thus continues to fall under the umbrella of ‘facilitation’.

Such facilitation can be pursued through various channels. Governments can pursue different types of regulatory cooperation efforts, ranging from sector-specific initiatives such as mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) to cross-sectoral, horizontal efforts that center on basic ‘good practice’ principles such as consultations with stakeholders and use of impact assessments to learn from (international) 16
Table **C8.** Distrlbution of Manufacturing Establishments Radio Equipment by Employment Size, Indonesia RADIO (CO RADIO EWUIP) FIMSIZE (EMPLOYEES per FIUE) <!-- Start of picture text --> Frnwwcy<br>Pecnt<br>Rue Pct<br>Cot Pct 1-19 120-49 15O99 P100-199 1 2 00 - 49 9 1500-999 11000 A Tot l<br>YES 1 4 4 9 10 3 4 35<br>0.34 1.3 1.38 310 3.45 1.03 1.38 12.07<br>2.06 I 11.43 11.43 25.71 20.57 6.57 11.43<br>- 20.00 I 4.26 7.14 14.52 22.73 15.79 40.00<br>................ .....................-.-- -- ....... ........ .-.-- - ...... -.<br>nO I 4 90 S 2 53 34 16 61 255<br>1.38 1.57 1 31.03 35.29 l 20.39 1.93 20.78 18.28 13.33 11.n 1 5.52 6 6.27 2.07 2.35 87.93<br>1 80.00 1 95.74 92.86 85.48 77.27 8 4.21 60.00 1<br>................ - -4 .. ................. -------.--.----.----.---- -<br>Total 5 94 56 62 44 19 10 290<br>1.72 32.41 19.31 21.38 15.17 6.55 3.45 100.00<br><!-- End of picture text -->
**Figure 15: NDC Reforms X DB and Multipillar**

**Reforms**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>I .<br>0<br>-I __I<br>-2 - - - - - - - - - -<br>1997 2003 2009 2015 2021 2027 2033 2039 2045 2051 2057 2063 2069<br>DB Reforms<br>-M M u Iti Pillar<br>| N NDC with interest= gdp growth<br>l - - - NDC with interest = gdp growth+l% I<br><!-- End of picture text -->

second pillar. The overall pension balances produced by the multi-pillar reform are better than those produced by the NDC schemes.

The computation of the implicit pension debt under these alternative reform scenarios provides another interesting tool for comparisons across scenarios. As shown in Table 5, the implicit pension debt (IPD) falls in all the reform scenarios, but is lowest in the multi-pillar scenario, due to the voluntary reduction of accrued rights by switchers. The IPD of a pure DB reform is initially lower than that generated by an NDC paying GDP growth, because of initially lower replacement ratios. In the long-run, the NDC paying a modest interest rate would produce a lower IPD, but again this is because the replacement ratios would drop under an NDC scheme paying GDP growth rates. A pure DB reform would also be capable of producing lower IPDs if accrual rates and replacement ratios were reduced.

**Table 5: Implicit Pension Debt under Different Reform** Scenarios **(in** % of **GDP)**

|Scenario||Base|**Year**||
|---|---|---|---|---|
||1997|2010|2020|2030|
|No Reform|309|340|363|378|
|Pure DB Reform|241|226|246|254|
|Multi-Pillar Reform|232|208|216|214|
|NDC with i= gdp growth|248|233|245|232|
|NDC with i= gdp growth + 1%|257|255|281|288|

The reforming Government decided not to adopt a pure NDC reform for the same reasons why it decided not to adopt a pure DB reform (e.g. excluding a second pillar). The initial surpluses produced by a pure NDC reform could be depleted by politically-motivated increases in pension benefits, by increases in the central budget deficit, or by political interference in the management of the assets leading to negative returns. Moreover, an NDC scheme would still be operated by the public sector on a PAYG basis and would not have the risk-diversification properties of a mixed 91
Policy Research Working Paper 9002

# **Abstract**

The long-term effects of Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program, PROSPERA, on poor households are of great interest to policy makers and academics alike. This paper analyzes the long-term effects on the welfare of the original participant households and their offspring, about 20 years after the inception of the program. To complement other studies that look into the effects on schooling and health, the analysis focuses on a utilitarian definition of welfare and employs two empirical strategies. The first uses the 1997– 2000 experiment as the cleanest, albeit limited, source of variation. The analysis finds that by 2017–18, the offspring of original beneficiary households are more likely to have formed their own households, to have migrated to different localities, and to have more durable assets and larger consumption expenditures than their control counterpart.

The second strategy confirms and expands those findings using a difference-in-difference methodology based on the localities’ rollout of the program and the age of the individuals, as a proxy of exposure. This second approach covers a much larger and representative sample, while also directly observing self-reported vulnerability in food consumption. The findings confirm the generally positive outlook in terms of durable assets and lower food vulnerability. Perhaps more interestingly and relevant for evaluating the success of the program is that it improved intergenerational mobility. Using the 1997–2000 experiment, the analysis finds that the young adults who benefited from the program improved with respect to their parents in education, assets holding, and income. They appear to be climbing the ladder of assets and income.

This paper is a product of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at giacomo.degiorgi@unige.ch and the coordinators of the studies may be contacted at cavilaparra@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
This paper uses unique survey data combined with a natural experiment in order to assess the accuracy of these concerns by determining whether potential emigrants have correct expectations about the incomes they would earn working abroad. We survey Tongans who applied to emigrate to New Zealand under the Pacific Access Category (PAC), which allows a quota of Tongans to immigrate each year, in addition to those approved through other categories.<sup>2</sup> Many more people apply than the quota allows, and so a lottery (referred to as a ballot) is used to determine who can emigrate through the Pacific Access Category.<sup>3</sup> We elicited expectations about employment and income in New Zealand from individuals in Tonga who had applied to emigrate but whose names were not chosen in the ballot. Expectations were elicited by adapting the probabilistic expectations questions used by Dominitz and Manski (1997), Dominitz (1998) and Manski (2004). These responses are then used to estimate the subjective distribution of earnings in New Zealand of ballot losers, which can be compared to the distribution of earnings realized by the ballot winners who emigrated.

In contrast to the concern that migrants could be over-optimistic, we find striking evidence that they underestimate both the odds of being employed, and the incomes that they could earn if employed abroad. The mean percent chance of being employed in New Zealand expressed by the ballot losers is 57 percent, compared to a 75 percent actual employment rate among emigrant ballot winners. The means of the mean and median expected weekly earnings in New Zealand conditional on being employed are $337 and $303, much less than the actual mean ($564) and median ($515) incomes earned by the ballot winners. Combining the expectations of employment with the conditional earnings distribution, we arrive at mean unconditional expected earnings which are only 46 percent of the actual mean earnings of immigrants in New Zealand.

> 2 The main other categories are family sponsored migration and a business/skilled category. In the 2004/05 financial year New Zealand admitted 58 Tongans through the business/skilled category and 549 through family sponsored channels. Most migrants under the family sponsored categories enter as parents, children, or spouses/domestic partners of existing New Zealand residents.

> 3 Individuals must also fulfill other eligibility requirements in order to migrate through the Pacific Access Category, including being aged 18 to 45, and meeting English, health and character requirements.

3
||||ETH:_ea_id_(wave 1)_, ea_id2_(wave<br>2)_, ea_id2_(wave 3)_, ea_id_(wave 4)_,_<br>_ea_id_(wave 5)<br>MWI:_ea_id_(wave 1)_, ea_id_(wave<br>2)_, ea_id_(wave 3)_, ea_id_(wave 4)<br>MLI:_not uniquely identified by ea,_<br>_ea_id in ag questionnaire_(wave 1)_,_<br>_no community questionnaire, ea_id in_<br>_ag questionnaire_(wave 2)<br>NER:_not uniquely identified by ea,_<br>concatenation of_ms00q10 ms00q11_<br>_ms00q12 ms00q14 (wave 1) not_<br>_uniquely identified by ea,_<br>concatenation of_MS00Q10_<br>_MS00Q11 MS00Q12 MS00Q14_<br>(wave 2)<br>NGA: concatenation of_lga and ea_<br>(wave 1), concatenation of_lga and ea_<br>(wave 2), concatenation of_lga and ea_<br>(wave 3), concatenation of_lga and ea_<br>(wave 4)<br>TZA: concatenation of_region,_<br>_district, ward_and_ea_(wave 1),<br>carried over from wave 1 for waves<br>in extended panel. Concatenation of<br>_hh_a01_1 hh_a02_1 hh_a03_1_<br>_hh_a04_1_(wave 4, refresh), carried<br>over for wave 5 refresh.<br>UGA:_comm_(wave 1), carried over<br>from wave 1 (waves 2, 3, 4)|
|---|---|---|---|
|_pw_|Household<br>weight|||
|_strataid_|Strata ID|Variable created by assigning<br>a numeric code to each<br>unique stratum. The first<br>number of the code<br>determines the country.||
|_urban_|Is this an<br>urban EA?|||
|_admin_1_|Administrative<br>level 1||Source:https://data.humdata.org|
|_admin_2_|Administrative<br>level 2||Source:https://data.humdata.org|
|_admin_3_|Administrative<br>level 3||Source:https://data.humdata.org|
|_admin_1_name_|Name of<br>administrative<br>level 1|||
|_admin_2_name_|Name of<br>administrative<br>level 2||ETH: not available<br>MLI: not available|
|_admin_3_name_|Name of<br>administrative<br>level 3||ETH: not available<br>MLI: not available|

22
- Besley, T. (1995). Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and evidence from ghana. _Journal of Political Economy_ , 103(5), 903–937.

- Besley, T. & Ghatak, M. (2010). Property rights and economic development. In _Handbook of development economics_ , volume 5 (pp. 4525–4595). Elsevier.

- Bleakley, H. & Ferrie, J. (2014). Land openings on the georgia frontier and the coase theorem in the short-and long-run.

- Breza, E., Krishnaswamy, N., & Kaur, S. (2018). Scabs: The social suppression of labor supply.

- Conley, T. G. (1999). Gmm estimation with cross-sectional dependence. _Journal of Econometrics_ , 92(1), 1–45.

- Conley, T. G. & Udry, C. R. (2010). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in ghana. _The American Economic Review_ , (pp. 35–69).

- De Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., & Suri, T. (2017). Field experiments in developing country agriculture. In _Handbook of Economic Field Experiments_ , volume 2 (pp. 427–466). Elsevier.

- Deininger, K. & Feder, G. (2009). Land registration, governance, and development: Evidence and implications for policy. _The World Bank Research Observer_ , 24(2), 233–266.

- Dillon, A. (2011). The effect of irrigation on poverty reduction, asset accumulation, and informal insurance: Evidence from northern mali. _World Development_ , 39(12), 2165–2175.

- Dillon, A. & Fishman, R. (2019). Dams: Effects of hydrological infrastructure on development. _Annual Review of Resource Economics_ , 11.

- Dillon, B. & Barrett, C. B. (2017). Agricultural factor markets in sub-saharan africa: An updated view with formal tests for market failure. _Food policy_ , 67, 64–77.

- Dillon, B., Brummund, P., & Mwabu, G. (2019). Asymmetric non-separation and rural labor markets. _Journal of Development Economics_ , 139, 78–96.

47
# **Table 9: Reduced-Form OLS Regression of Household Income on Observed Circumstances**

||**BRAZIL**|**COLOMBIA**|**ECUADOR**|**GUATEMALA**|**PANAMA**|**PERU**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Member of an ethnic minority|-0.414***<br>[0.009]|-0.015<br>[0.032]|-0.236***<br>[0.025]|-0.350***<br>[0.036]|-0.922***<br>[0.057]|-0.230***<br>[0.023]|
|Father agricultural worker|-0.295***<br>[0.009]||-0.291***<br>[0.019]|-0.192***<br>[0.034]|-0.210***<br>[0.032]||
|Father primary education|0.248***<br>[0.010]|0.218***<br>[0.022]|0.135***<br>[0.021]|0.166***<br>[0.041]|0.211***<br>[0.044]|0.189***<br>[0.026]|
|Father secondary education|0.696***<br>[0.018]|0.689***<br>[0.039]|0.446***<br>[0.035]|0.386***<br>[0.080]|0.473***<br>[0.057]|0.442***<br>[0.031]|
|Mother primary education|0.299***<br>[0.010]|0.245***<br>[0.023]|0.254***<br>[0.021]|0.362***<br>[0.058]|0.298***<br>[0.043]|0.215***<br>[0.026]|
|Mother secondary education|0.789***<br>[0.018]|0.703***<br>[0.039]|0.630***<br>[0.035]|0.893***<br>[0.082]|0.768***<br>[0.059]|0.572***<br>[0.034]|
|Birth region 2|-0.378***<br>[0.012]|0.176***<br>[0.022]|-0.124***<br>[0.018]|-0.278***<br>[0.051]|-0.044<br>[0.043]|0.058***<br>[0.021]|
|Birth region 3|-0.740***<br>[0.013]|0.460***<br>[0.028]|0.170***<br>[0.025]|-0.258***<br>[0.045]|-0.361***<br>[0.042]|0.376***<br>[0.030]|
|Constant|5.372***<br>[0.013]|11.578***<br>[0.022]|4.415***<br>[0.020]|5.857***<br>[0.046]|6.977***<br>[0.053]|5.786***<br>[0.023]|
|Observations|71,670|22,436|12,643|6,847|5,649|13,649|
|R-squared|0.32|0.19|0.24|0.28|0.34|0.25|

Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted categories are: male, ethnic majority, father and mother with no or unknown education, and birth region 1 (see Table 2 for the country-specific definitions).

42
ago)/average; labor productivity growth is constructed similarly. To measure the exposure of African firms to global markets, we also compare firm-level export intensity, defined as the share of exports in total sales.

Since our primary focus is to shed light on what determines the performance of non-rich African countries, we exclude from our SSA sample the richest four countries: South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia, which have GDP per capita higher than 3000 US dollars (in 2005 value). The countries in our new African sample consist of all SSA sample countries that have GDP per capita lower than 3000 U.S. dollars (in 2005 value) at the time of each country’s survey.<sup>17</sup> However, later in the paper we also report the results when including the four richest African countries.

Evaluating African economic performance necessarily entails comparing Africa with other countries. We thus construct two comparison groups for Africa. The first, _the average comparison group_ , consists of countries in non-SSA countries with per capita GDP lower than 3000 U.S. dollars (in 2005 value). The second, _the better comparison group_ , consists of the top half countries of the average comparison group in terms of performance. We measure country performance in the following way. We first standardize each of the six performance measures so that each now has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. We then add up the six standardized measures to form an aggregate performance measure. Countries whose mean aggregate performance ranks in the top half of the average comparison group are defined to be members of the better comparison group.

> 17 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, we also exclude Ghana.

14
# **1 Introduction**

Support programs for micro-businesses have become increasingly common in developing countries in recent years for at least two reasons: first, micro-enterprises employ a substantial fraction of individuals in these economies (about 47 percent in Mexico ); and second, despite their prevalence, the majority of these micro-enterprises tend to stay small and have low productivity. However, the impact of such programs —many of which provide business grants, training or a combination of both— has been mixed at best. This raises the question about whether these impacts depend on characteristics or attitudes of the entrepreneur, and therefore better targeting could significantly improve them. In fact, some recent evidence suggests that, even though the mean effects of business training might be small and not significant, greater returns are concentrated in high-potential entrepreneurs, who are the most likely to adopt better entrepreneurial practices and earn higher profits after training (Calderon _et al._ 2013, De Mel _et al._ 2012, Fafchamps _et al._ 2014).

In this paper, we provide some novel evidence on the heterogeneity of female microentrepreneurs in urban Mexico by comparing those who started their business out of opportunity with those who did so out of necessity. Our data come from the baseline survey for the randomized evaluation of a large business training program for female entrepreneurs, funded by the National Institute of Entrepreneur and implemented by the NGO CREA, _Mujeres Moviendo M ́exico_ . This data set is unique in that it provides detailed information on business outcomes, access to credit, cognitive and non-cognitive skills for a large sample of female micro-entrepreneurs in selected urban areas in Mexico.

For the empirical analysis, we first show mean differences in business performance, characteristics and skills between the two groups of microentrepreneurs. Then, we use discriminant analysis to find the combination of observable characteristics that best distinguishes opportunity from necessity entrepreneurs.<sup>1</sup> Finally, we estimate the effect of being an opportunity entrepreneur on the profitability of the business and the quality of management practices, using state GDP growth at the time when the business was opened as an instrument for opportunity.

Our results suggest that on average opportunity entrepreneurs have significantly higher profits, better management practices, and higher cognitive and selected non-cognitive skills. Our discrim-

> 1Discriminant analysis is a technique of species classification that has been used before to study microentrepreneurship by de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2010) for Sri Lanka; and by Bruhn (2013) for Mexico.

2