Traditionally, most studies of employment and crime were conducted using American data and many found conflicting or small effects of labor market outcomes on crime (Bushway, 2010). But more recent empirical evidence from the OECD on the relationship between employment and crime suggests more significant effects (Mustard, 2010). Fougere et al (2008) find that increased youth unemployment, instrumented for by changes in industry structure, increased burglaries, thefts, and drug offenses, with particularly large effects for youth. In the US, Lin (2007) estimates that a 1 percentage point increase in the average state unemployment rate raises property crime by about 4 to 6 percent. Gould, et al (2002) document that both wage levels and unemployment rates are significantly related with crime, with estimated elasticities with respect to wage levels of ‐0.55 for property crime and ‐1.08 for violent crime. Finally, a randomized evaluation of the youth job corps, a program for disadvantaged 16‐24 year olds that offers 30 weeks of training and a stipend, found that it reduced crime among all subgroups. However, the monetary benefits of the reduction in crime were estimated to be only about 6 percent of all program costs (Kluve, 2014). Heller (2014) finds that the provision of an 8 week summer job to disadvantaged youth in Chicago reduced the probability of violent‐crime arrest by 43 percent.

The few existing studies from developing countries on how employment‐related interventions affect engagement in illicit activities or violent conflict suggest more nuanced effects than in the OECD. One set of studies examines the effects of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), and generally finds weak effects. For instance, Das (2015) examines at the district level, how implementation of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) affected official reports of violent crime from 2001 to 2011. The results indicate that the program reduced reports of kidnapping, but most of the relationships between crime and program implementation were not robust to the inclusion of district‐ specific time trends. Other studies have examined the effect of NREGS on the prevalence on Maoist violence, and found mixed results. Dasgupta et al. (2014) find that NREGS substantially reduced the prevalence of armed conflict as proxied by local news reports. This is consistent with Feltzer (2014) who found that NREGS mediated the effect of adverse rainfall shocks on conflict. However, Khanna and Zimmerman (2015) study the same program using a different methodology, and find that the program increased insurgent activity, which they ascribe to increased cooperation between villagers and the police outweighing the increase in the opportunity cost of conflict.

A second set of studies evaluates the social effects of training programs in Latin America. Calearo and Rozo (2016)) use experimental data from the Galpao training program in Brazil. The results fail to show a discernible average effect on risky behaviors such as tobacco and alcohol use, though positive effects were apparent for a subset of participants with stronger self‐reported socio‐emotional skills. In the Dominican Republic, meanwhile, a youth training program reduced the probability of teenage pregnancy by about 8 percentage points, or 20 percent (Novella and Ripani, 2014), though no evidence is available on the effects on crime.

Finally, Blattman and Annan (2015) examine the results of a randomized evaluation of a program to rehabilitate high‐risk men in Liberia, and also find mixed results. The program provided agricultural training and capital inputs to former soldiers in Liberia. Program participants reduced hours devoted to illicit resource extraction by 20 percent, and reduced interest in fighting in a short‐lived conflict in 5