In contrast, among those who do not report facing a social tax on savings, the estimated effects are significantly lower, and we cannot reject that there is no impact of the Private treatment for these workers ( _p_ =0.95).

**Table 4:** Treatment effects heterogeneity

||**Redistribu**|**tive Pressure**|**Intra-hous**|**ehold Control**|**Productivity**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Savings<br>not taxed<br>(1)|Not taxed by<br>acquaintances<br>(2)|Has a<br>partner<br>(3)|Limited control<br>over earnings<br>(4)|Baseline earnings<br>above median<br>(5)|
|Private account|249.4|312.8|281.7|220.9|274.6|
||(104.8)|(126.6)|(117.7)|(106.3)|(75.15)|
||[0.018]|[0.014]|[0.017]|[0.038]|[0.000]|
|Private account|-258.1|-211.7|-160.3|-288.6|-203.1|
|X Covariate|(138.9)|(130.2)|(115.9)|(179.5)|(78.75)|
||[0.064]|[0.105]|[0.167]|[0.109]|[0.010]|
|Mean if covariate = 0|1665|1790|1778|1660|1254|
|Mean if covariate = 1|1782|1568|1603|1754|1811|
|Share: covariate = 1|0.22|0.74|0.59|0.17|0.50|
|P-val: sum = 0|0.95|0.32|0.27|0.71|0.40|
|N: observations|137678|137678|137678|137678|137678|
|N: workers|474|474|474|474|474|

_Notes:_ Dependent variable is earnings. Unit of observation is worker-day. Private account is an indicator that equals 1 if the worker is assigned to the Private treatment. The omitted category is being assigned to the Control or Non-private condition. Covariate in each column is a binary indicator. Col. (1) covariate equals 1 if the worker strongly disagrees with the statement “I have difficulty saving over time for large goals because if I put money aside, someone else will need it for something urgent.” Col. (2) covariate equals 1 if the worker answers ’never’ to the question: “How often do you financially support acquaintances (not close friends or family)?”. Col. (4) covariate equals 1 if the worker does not answer “input into most or all decisions” to the question “How much input do you have in making decisions about the money you earn?”. Covariates in Cols. (1)-(4) are from baseline surveys conducted prior to the assignment of treatment status in each phase. Baseline covariates are missing for initial enrollees in Phase 1: any missing values are coded as 0, and a dummy indicating which observations have missing values as well as the interaction between that dummy and Private are included in the regressions. The bottom of the table reports the share of non-missing observations for which the covariate equals 1, as well as the p-value of the F-test for Private + PrivateXCovariate=0. Regressions build on the specification in Table 3, Col. (1). All regressions include day and worker fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by worker.

Due to the short length of the baseline phone surveys, we could not ask extensive questions about redistributive pressures or transfers.<sup>30</sup> However, we supplement this with another proxy for the severity of redistributive pressure: whether the individual reports making transfers to “acquaintances”, defined as individuals who the worker does not consider close family members or friends; such transfers are especially likely to reflect a social tax rather than altruism. In qualitative work, workers expressed particular frustration about such transfers. Among such individuals, gaining access to the Private accounts raises earnings by a striking 313 FCFA or 17.5% (Col. 2, _p_ =0.014). Among workers who do not report such extreme social taxation, the treatment effects are substantively smaller and not statistically significant at

> 30Specifically, among the questions in Figure 3, at baseline in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, we only asked the question in Panel D; this is the source of heterogeneity in Table 4, Col. (1).

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