rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
**Figure 3. Growth in Mobile Broadband and Economic Growth in Ethiopia (2000-2017)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017<br>Year<br>% smartphone connections<br>% mobile data only connections<br>% mobile internet subscribers<br>% of connections<br>Annual Growth of Connections (%)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 300<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 250<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 200<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 150<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 20072008200920102011201220132014201520162017<br>Year<br>Annual growth rate of 3G connections<br>Annual growth rate of smartphone connections<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 12<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 10<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 8<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 6<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 4<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: GSMA, 2020_ 3G broadband connections allow multiple types of communication services including transmitting either one or all of the following at the same time: simple voice, video, data and other multimedia services. It facilitates communications allowing the spread of information either for firms or consumers, reducing information asymmetries. In most SSA countries including Ethiopia, where fixed broadband communication is limited and there is poor infrastructure in transport and other necessary market infrastructure, the role of mobile broadband connection is far reaching. It would play significant role in reducing information asymmetry particularly with respect to prices and other product characteristics. The easy dissemination of market information reduces transaction costs and information asymmetries by using mobile technologies. For example, the market price for goods or services depends on whether there is information about the prices charged by other 10
**Figure 1: Evolution of the Commodity food price index and number of media reports on foreign land acquisitions**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 200 160<br>180<br>140<br>160<br>120<br>140<br>100<br>120<br>100 80<br>80<br>60<br>60<br>40<br>40<br>20<br>20<br>0 0<br>Commodity Food Price Index No. of press reports<br>Index number<br>Jul-05 Sep-05 Jan-06 Jul-06 Nov-06 Jan-07 May-07 Nov-07 Mar-08 May-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Jan-10<br>Press reports on large6scale land acquisition<br>Nov-05 Mar-06 May-06 Sep-06 Mar-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 May-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 May-10<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ IMF Commodity food price index and GRAIN (http://farmlandgrab.org) for press reports.

20
would be prohibitively costly on a survey of such vast scale as the CHS. Thus, it is encouraging that the distribution of death by reported cause looks quite sensible in the CHS data. This suggests that modifying future DHS survey instruments to incorporate the collection of simple cause of death information, especially for high mortality countries, may be worthwhile. Indeed, a particularly useful experiment for evaluating this accuracy-cost tradeoff would be to collect respondent-based information alongside verbal autopsy data in the same DHS.

14
Figure 3 ACTUAL REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE<sup>U.S.</sup> AND CEILINGS ON REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, FY 75-87 (As of September 30, 1987) <!-- Start of picture text --> Total Refugews<br>250.000<br>225,000<br>200,000 0<br>-<br>175,000 Ceiling<br>i50,000 -<br>125.000 -<br>100,000 a<br>-<br>75,000 jt~^^__<br>50;00 i<br>1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988<br>Fiscal Year<br>Source: Refugee Reports, December 18, 1987, page 9.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 ° ao H<br>g :<br>eo 2 :<br>5 :<br>:<br>2 ‘<br>i]2Bae) ‘:: % %%<br>=3 H °2 55<br>e : o<br>wi 4 : °°<br>© Consumption expenditure :<br>_g_ @ Imputed observation :<br>AS 4.0; 05 0.0 05ns1.0 1.5: 20 25<br>Per capita welfare (logis)<br>Note: dashed line is $5.5iday (2011 PPP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0) v0<br>gc7 hi<br>zs22 H:H'<br>225 H H<br>‘<br>= :<br>23a :H “ Boy<br>& ; a )<br>uo HH %, a<br>© Consumption expenditure ' ° a<br>_4 © Imputed observation i °<br>T T T * T T<br>1.0 05 00 05 1.0 15 20<br>Per capita welfare (logis)<br>Note: dashed line is $5.5iday (2011 PPP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0 0° H<br>g H:<br>ao 2 '<br>s H<br>3 ‘<br>2 ‘<br>i]5D 34 HHi: ‘a<br>3= ' o B,55<br>4 : °<br>wie 4 i ag o<br>© Consumption expenditure H<br>ig © Imputed observation '<br>ASi 1.0 05 0.0i 05at 1.0 153 20: 25 3.0<br>Per capita welfare (logo)<br>Note: dashed line is $5.Siday (2011 PPP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> oye<br>c 7 .<br>g22€ H:H<br>22s :i<br>2 :<br>= : Fi<br>g2 34 :: @ 5B,<br>& i a<br>wi H: °° 5<br>© Consumption expenditure ' 5<br>_4 © Imputed observation :<br>r T T T * T T<br>10 05 0.0 05 1.0 1.5 20 25<br>Per capita welfare (logo)<br>Note: dashed line is $5.Siday (2011 PPP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 0 ° ° '<br>g h<br>2 H<br>< '<br>3 ‘<br>2 ‘<br>2=3 ‘H: =<br>$33 H _<br>H<br>wiE ! ee<br>© Consumption expenditure H °<br>_4 © Imputed observation H a<br>1.0 05: 00i 05i A 1.0E 15i 20<br>Per capita welfare (logis)<br>Note: dashed line is $5.Siday (2011 PPP)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
electricity substitution elasticity to zero, which implies an electricity demand elasticity of around 75% of the central case. (2) Setting the electricity-non-electricity substitution elasticity to five times the central parameter value, which implies an electricity demand elasticity twice that of the central case.

Higher electricity demand elasticity generally lowers the cost per ton abatement, except in Phase 1, where it raises unit costs due to greater emissions leakage under CAT-NO. The effect of higher electricity demand elasticity on the cost gap of DEPS-NO and CAT-NO is also ambiguous. It depends on the combined influences of carbon price changes and supply elasticity. A higher elasticity increases the impact of the implicit output subsidy under DEPS but also reduces the size of the implicit output subsidy by lowering the carbon price.

Additionally, higher elasticity makes electricity use more sensitive to price changes, enhancing the benefits of implementing an electricity consumption tax. Consequently, overlapping policies become more critical when the substitution elasticity is larger.

**Table D3. Sensitivity Analysis with Different Settings of Substitution Elasticity between Electricity and Non-Electricity Inputs**

|**Policy**<br>|**Emissions**<br>**Reduction**|**Cost per T**|**on Abateme**|**nt (yuan/t)**|**Cost**<br>**DEPSR2/**|**Ratio**<br>**DEPSNO/**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Case**|**(%)**|**CAT-NO**|**DEPS-R2**|**DEPS-NO**|**-**<br>**CAT-NO**|**-**<br>**CAT-NO**|
|**Zero**|||||||
|Phase 1|-2.5|5.2|15.9|20.0|3.1|3.9|
|Phase 2|-5.4|9.0|18.4|21.7|2.0|2.4|
|Phase 3|-11.0|14.6|24.5|32.6|1.7|2.2|
|All|-8.6|13.5|23.4|30.8|1.7|2.3|
|**Central**|||||||
|Phase 1|-2.6|5.4|15.3|19.6|2.8|3.6|
|Phase 2|-5.5|8.8|17.3|21.0|2.0|2.4|
|Phase 3|-11.0|14.1|22.5|32.0|1.6|2.3|
|All|-8.7|13.1|21.5|30.2|1.6|2.3|
|**Five times**|**of the central**||||||
|Phase 1|-2.7|5.8|13.6|18.8|2.4|3.2|
|Phase 2|-5.6|8.8|14.2|17.9|1.6|2.0|
|Phase 3|-11.1|14.1|16.6|27.4|1.2|1.9|
|All|-8.7|13.1|16.2|25.9|1.2|2.0|

65
47 Table 23. Estimated annual road **transport** anissions by mode in selected countries, 1988 ('000 tons)

|Country||**A**|**utoao**|**bdi**|||B|uses||||2 -3|wheek|er|||Good|sVed|,clea||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||CO|HC|NOx|SOx|PM|CO|HC|NOx|SOx|PM|CO H|C N|Ox<br>S|Ox<br>|PM|CO|HC|NOx|SOx|PM|
|Asia|||||||||||||||||||||
|Thailand|337|28|11|<br>2.2|3.5|43|31|70|86|4.2|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|**n.as**|**.**n.a.|196|32|324|23.0|12.0|
|South Korea|298|23|9|1.9|2.9|28|20|46|57|2.8|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|na.|n.a.|165|27|273|19.0|10.0|
|Hong Kong|123|10|4|0.7|1.2|54|4|9|11|0.5|2.7|1.6|0.01|-|0.03|30|_5_|50|3.5|1.8|
|Jordan|166|13|5|1.1|1.6|1|1|2|2|0.1|1.9|1.1|0.01|-|0.02|29|5|49|3.4|1.7|
|Africa|||||||||||||||||||||
|Tunisia|413|32|13|2.6|4.1|60|43|96|119|5.8|0.3|0.2|-|-|-|I|-|1|0.1||
|South Africa|1600|125|50|10.0|16.0|43|31|70|86|4.3|50.0 3|0.0|0.20|0.07|0.60|34|57|567|41.0|20.0|
|Latin Americ|at||||||||||||||||||||
|Colombia|44|32|13|2.6|4.1|20|15|32|40|2.0|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|<br>n.a.|71|12|117|8.4|4.2|
|Chile|41|32|13|2.6|4.0|3|2|5|6|0.3|n.s.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|<br>n.a.|24|4|40|3.0|1.4|
|Argentina|1080|84|34|6.7|10.0|15|11|24|30|0.1|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|n.a.|<br>n.a.|203|33|335|24.0|12.0|
|n.a.<br>not av|ailable||||||||||||||||||||

- = negligible

Table 24. Annual aggregate transport emissions **in** selected countries, **1988** (in '000 tons)

||CO|HC|NOx|
|---|---|---|---|
|OECD Cowntries||||
|USA|47,700|7,200|8,800|
|Germany|5,330|624|1,692|
|UK|8,327|535|546|
|Asia||||
|Thailand|403|71|92|
|Jordan|198|20|56|
|South Korea|491|70|339|
|Hong Kong|210|21|63|
|Africa||||
|Tunisia|474|75|110|
|South Africa|1,727|243|687|
|Latin Amerca||||
|Colombia|135|59|162|
|Chile|68|3S|58|
|Argentina|1,298|12S|393|

Source: OECD countries; [OECD 19871, data for 1983. Other countries; estimnates from Table 23.
Strategies, Technical Report PNNL-SA-63186, Pacic Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (US).

- National Research Council: 2005, Valuing Ecosysten Services: Toward Better Eenvironmental Ddecision-Making, National Academies Press.

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- Nesshöver, C., Aronson, J., Blignaut, J., Lehr, D., Vakrou, A. and Wittmer, H.: 2009, Investing in Ecological Infrastructure, in P. ten Brink (ed.), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: National and International Policy Making. An Output of TEEB, Earthscan, pp. 401448.

- Nordhaus, W. D.: 1973, The Allocation of Energy Resources, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1973(3), 529576.

- Odum, E.: 1969, The Strategy of Ecosystem Development, Science 164, 262 270.

- Paltsev, S., Reilly, J., Jacoby, H., Eckaus, R., McFarland, J., Sarom, M., Asadoorian, M. and Babiker, M.: 2005, The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model: Version 4, Technical report, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.

- Pindyck, R. S.: 1999, The Long-Run Evolutions of Energy Prices, The Energy Journal 20(2), 127.

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43
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics on our investment data. Aggregating information on individual deals across years, we have a total of roughly 19,000 M&As. The total value of investment covered amounts to 5 trillion USD, of which 2.8 trillion are in services sectors. Half of these investments (1.4 trillion) is concentrated in the services sub-sectors for which we have policy information.<sup>3</sup> Banking is quantitatively the most important sector in our sample, followed by Telecommunications. The distribution of M&A flows between countries, although aggregated across years and sectors, still exhibits a large mass point at zero. This is made clear by the third column, where we report the percentage share of non-zero observations over the 21,525 possible country-pair observations . Even considering the totality of the sectors, we observe positive M&A flows only in 14% of the possible cases. This probability is naturally lower in the case of each single sector.

We characterize the M&A data further by looking at the profile of M&A inflows into host countries. The distribution of inbound investment is highly skewed. At the top end, one country receives a total of 588 inflows (the U.S.). Figure 1 shows that the attractiveness for M&A, which underpins the data’s skewness at the extensive margin, is closely linked to the host economy’s GDP A similar relationship holds between the number of deals received and a country’s GDP per capita, though it is not as tight as with market size, see Figure 2. Highlighted in a lighter color are seven East Asian economies that appear to be particularly sought-after locations for services M&A inflows, at least beyond levels their per capita income would suggest in this unconditional scatter plot.<sup>4</sup> The extensive margin displays similar features when sliced along the home country dimension, indicating that a few economies account for the majority of outbound M&A activity.

> 3The category “Other services” includes Construction Services, Gas and Electricity, Business Services and Personal Services such as Health Services and Education Services.

> 4Interestingly, firms from India, China and Malaysia are also initiating more outward services M&A deals than their country’s income per capita would suggest.

6
Spinanger and Woerz, 2005), of the impact of the January 1, 2005 elimination of remaining textile and clothing quotas for developing countries. This was the final stage of implementing the 1994 WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). These restrictions were another form of beggar-thy-neighbor trade preferences, as they (implicitly) favored smaller, higher-cost developing country suppliers at the expense of exports from China. The reason of course is that by restricting the most competitive suppliers, incentives were created for importers to source from other developing countries. As can be seen in Table 8, for subSaharan Africa the negative effects of the ATC are significant, although they are smaller than for Asian countries such as India and Vietnam. These losses reflect a combination of greater competition from China and loss of quota rents.

For Africa, the ATC-induced negative impact is smaller than our estimates of the potential magnitude of Doha Round preference erosion if no account is taken of compliance costs. However, if account is taken of compliance costs, the potential trade preference losses are a less important issue than those associated with lifting of ATC textile and clothing quotas.<sup>28</sup> From a practical perspective this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the ATC effect is “here and now,” whereas additional Doha Round-based erosion will only occur in the future and thus needs to be discounted appropriately.<sup>29</sup> As other recent studies of this issue (like the IMF 2003) focus on trade effects, in Table 9 we report on export effects. These map to the income effects reported in Table 8. Again, for some countries, like Botswana, Mozambique, and Madagascar, there is a significant drop in exports with full preference erosion. However, these preference-based export gains are, in a sense, at the expense of other countries in the region. Overall, it is clear the region would benefit overall from MFN-based tariff reductions by the OECD, despite the erosion of preferences.

> 28 Note that strictly speaking this comparison cannot be made as the textiles and clothing erosion estimates assume zero compliance costs. However, as the ATC was based on quotas with associated rents that were equivalent to tariffs well above our threshold value of compliance costs, overall such costs are not likely to have had major effects in relative terms.

> 29 As mentioned previously, the ATC effects noted here have been incorporated into the baseline scenario, i.e., it is assumed that the associated effects have already played themselves out.

22
dependence (municipal, state, federal, or private), and computed the quality measures described earlier. Annual data on income per capita, population, and population-by-age are available from IBGE.<sup>35</sup> I use population-by-age data to compute school enrollment _rates_ . IBGE provided 2000 Census data (an 11.7% sample covering 20.3 million people). I have data on individual income, demographics, and school attendance (including level and administrative dependence).

The National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional) provided data on revenue and expenditure by type. A valid concern is that a nominal amount of currency may have more purchasing power in some areas—possibly in poorer or more rural parts of Brazil—than in others. To address this concern, I convert all measures of revenue, expenditure, and income to constant, 2005 S ̃ao Paulo currency using a set of spatial income deflators for Brazil computed by Ferreira _et al._ (2003).

The Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) provided data on the results of municipal elections during 1996-2008. From these, I computed the three time-varying political variables described earlier, and coded a dummy for whether the mayor represented a socialist party. Brian Wampler, Leonardo Avritzer, and Yves Zamboni provided data on which municipalities with populations over 50,000 had participatory budgeting (PB) during 1992-2008. I used these to construct a dummy for a municipality having PB sometime during the sample period.

Finally, the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)<sup>36</sup> provided data on hectares of coffee, cocoa, and bananas in each municipality in 1994. Annual price data for these commodities are available from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.

# **6 Results**

## **6.1 First stage results**

Table 6 presents estimates of the first-stage regressions. Actual municipal revenue is robustly positively correlated with simulated revenue. Column (1) indicates that a 1 Reais increase in simulated revenue is associated with 0.42 Reais more revenue.<sup>37</sup> The F-statistic on the excluded

> 35I have population by age data for 1991, 1996, 2000, 2007. I compute annual estimates by linear interpolation.

> 36In Portuguese, Instituto de Pesquisa Econˆomica Aplicada.

> 37Several factors can explain why this coefficient is not equal to 1.0. First, municipalities can reduce collections of tax revenue in response to an influx of money from FUNDEF/B. Second, the panel is rather long; changes in the political and economic landscape of a municipality over time may drive the coefficient up or down.

22
- 34 -

2009), although the recent OECD (2011a) study on inequality concludes that the society-wide effect is probably neutral. This conclusion reflects a dynamic whereby unions narrow wage differentials among their members but widen disparities between unionized and non-unionized workers. Second, unions can contribute to economic security through their effect on increasing job tenure and negotiating benefits (e.g., health insurance, pensions) that provide social protection to workers and their families. Third, through their “voice” role, unions can provide a vehicle for workers to participate in decisions and activities within their workplace, and in some cases, in the broader community. The outcomes of this process can have various benefits related to social cohesion; for example, unionized workplaces are more likely than others to have flexible working time arrangements and other policies that help employees balance work and family. Fourth, unions and the social dialogue process associated with collective representation provide opportunities for resolving disputes before they become conflicts (OECD 2011b). This can be true at the workplace and at the broader societal level.

Two additional considerations need to be kept in mind when assessing the impact of unions and collective bargaining on social cohesion. The first concerns the extent to which the benefits of unions accrue to society at large. In some cases, they clearly have: for example, through the widespread diffusion in some countries of social benefits and better working conditions that originated in the unionized sector. However, in societies where these advantages are limited to union members, the benefits for social cohesion are less clear because of the resulting duality between covered and uncovered workers.

The second consideration stems from the fact that unions differ substantially from country to country in terms of how they function, their objectives, and their impacts (OECD 2011b). Where their role is less tied to workplace representation and more to the political process, it becomes difficult to assess unions as an institutional feature of the labor market and as a factor in contributing to social cohesion.
World Bank education aector atudyy carried out in May-June _l990,_ Major ioeues addressud in the sector study includes low levels of learning achievements, especially iL the recently established aecondary echcola, the unattractive prospects for many school-leavers due to the high level of youth unemployment, whether the Government will be able to continue increasing its financ4al support to the education sector, whether exiating esources are being used optimally, and what additional resources can be utilized for education.

# It. RESEARCH DESIGN

Many countrie, produce 'league, tables of school examination results which ars meant to Identify the beat and the worst schools. Such league' tables do, of course, tell us which schools produce the top grades, but as &very parent and teacher knows, the schools which attract the best students, i.e. those having already proven academic ability, A-e bound to produce the best examination results. Such league tablea are more indicative of the intake of schools than the actual output, for they do not account for the students' prior ability, and therefore they do not measure what has actually been achieved at school. Of far greater interest than a table showing which schools produce the top grades is a rather different sort of 'league' table, which shows the increment in achievement after controlling for schoolel intake of students.

7