rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- Those who sell financial services and products should be qualified and certified. The level of training and qualification required will depend on the nature of the services or products being sold.

- Unfair or deceptive practices should be explicitly prohibited and sanctioned.

- Financial institutions should be obliged to ensure that they (and their registered agents) provide accurate and complete information and are held accountable for the information they provide to consumers.

- Financial products offered under high-pressure sales tactics, and those with long-term savings components, should be subject to a cooling-off period where the consumer can cancel, without penalty, any signed contract for 14 days following receipt of the contract.

- Consumers should be allowed to choose the provider of any financial product supplementing or complementing a primary financial product.

- Credit institutions should be required to file annual audited financial statements. The supervisory agency should verify that the significant owners (and those who control ownership), as well as the senior managers, satisfy fit and proper requirements, including no history of bankruptcy or criminal conviction.

- Anyone who solicits funds from the public for the purpose of investment or speculation should be required to obtain a license from the securities supervisory agency, or the insurance supervisor as appropriate.

- The securities supervisory agency should have broad powers to investigate Ponzi and other pyramid schemes and then assist the criminal authorities in prosecution.

- The law should identify a multi-level sales scheme as a pyramid scheme if: (1) the scheme requires a payment for the right to receive compensation for recruiting new salespersons into the plan; (2) there is inventory loading, that is, new salespersons must purchase an unreasonable quantity of a product or service; and (3) purchases of services are required as a condition of entry into the scheme.

- Personal data should be protected. Contracts with financial institutions signed by consumers should have a separate form that requires consumers’ signed approval for personal data to be shared by the financial institution with other institutions, including any credit register (using an “opt in” approach).

- Consumers need an easy and inexpensive way to verify their own personal information in the credit register and correct any errors that may arise.

- Responsible finance should be encouraged. Codes of conduct help to improve business practices of financial institutions but the codes need to be adequately disclosed, known and enforced.

# **Complaints & Dispute Resolution**

- Financial consumers should have access to a redress mechanism that is fast, inexpensive and effective.

- All financial institutions should be obliged to have a designated department (or at least an officer) responsible for handling customer complaints.

- When opening a new account and buying any new service, the consumer should be advised in writing as to where to submit complaints, inquiries and disputes.

- Financial supervisors should review the complaint files of the financial institutions they oversee.

4
contributed to raising the issue of cotton subsidies on the global political agenda. More substantial benefits in terms of price rise and market share remain to be seen in light of the 2012 US Farm Bill.

_The diplomatic route: The ‘Cotton Initiative’_ One might wonder why WCA countries have not followed more closely the Brazilian legal route. Between 1999 and 2002, WCA saw its share in world cotton exports decline from about 10 to 8 percent, while that of the US increased from about 18 to 33 percent (UN Comtrade, 2010). The rationale for the Brazilian complaint could therefore have suited the WCA situation too. In fact, Benin and Chad have been involved in the Brazilian case, but only as third parties.<sup>14</sup> Initiating a WTO procedure indeed has a cost that might be prohibitive for a large number of least developed countries (LDCs).<sup>15</sup> The participation of Chad and Benin as third-parties was made possible by the involvement of NGOs: the countries benefited from _pro bono_ legal support from two private law firms and economic expertise from an IFPRI researcher. However, financial support is not sufficient. The value of C-4 countries’ imports from the US represents a very small share of the value of total American exports. Countermeasures would therefore not have offered a credible retaliation threat (Bown, 2009). Besides, as noted by Baffes (2011), WCA countries already impose high tariffs, notably for tax raising purposes. Increasing these tariffs would have had a nonnegligible cost to their economies and could even have resulted in suppressing imports.

Instead of following the legal route, the C-4 thus took the diplomatic route and launched an offensive known as the ‘Cotton Initiative’.<sup>16</sup> Requests were first expressed in April 2003, during a Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture of the Cancun Trade Ministerial Conference. Three demands were voiced: a reduction of Western production and export support schemes and their progressive elimination over three years; temporary financial compensation for the losses incurred by cotton producing LDCs as long as the subsidies would remain; and the creation of a mechanism for the control and elimination of support measures operated under the supervision of the WTO.

The design of the Initiative has very much been led, or at least supported, by a trio of NGOs. Building on the dispute initiated by Brazil, the IDEAS Centre, Oxfam International and

> 14 The thirteen third parties were: Argentina; Australia; Benin; Canada; Chad; China; Chinese Taipei; European Union; India; New Zealand; Pakistan; Paraguay; Venezuela; Japan; Thailand

> 15 As reported by Bown (2009: page 128): the evidence produced by Brazil has involved “technical economic studies generated by high-cost economic consultants with professional expertise that assess the market impact of agricultural subsidy policies.”

> 16 Its full name is ‘Sectoral Initiative in favour of Cotton’.

6
recognized. While internet access is nearly universal in high-income countries, the share of the total population with internet access in the study countries varies from 25 percent to 86 percent (see Table 1). Thus, it is necessary to be cautious when inferring how the results of an online survey would relate to the sizable share of the population without internet access. At best, online surveys can be broadly representative of the internet-using population, and survey responses can be weighted to match the characteristics of the general population (e.g., older people are less likely to access the internet, and survey weights can be applied to somewhat compensate for this issue). The following subsection provides more information about how and when weights are applied.

A leading global research firm was engaged to collect the sample of respondents for this study by drawing on a panel of survey participants who are broadly representative of the population with internet access in each country. While alternative sampling strategies exist for online surveys (see Appendix A), this approach of drawing respondents from a pre-registered pool was determined to be the most suitable for this study: it is a very reliable and quick way to access a broadly representative sample of respondents with internet access, and it allows incentives to be provided in order to maximize completion rates.<sup>12</sup> Recent examples of seminal studies using an identical sampling strategy for online cross-country surveys include studies testing the impact of information about climate change on public support for policies in high- and middle-income countries (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022; Dabla-Norris et al. 2023). The survey firm that was used, YouGov, regularly runs online surveys to reach a pre-registered pool of people in these countries who already have experience taking part in surveys on different topics for compensation (e.g., phone credit). YouGov ensures that respondents have a track record of being attentive during the surveys (e.g., they exclude respondents who regularly rush through surveys or only partly complete surveys); this approach is particularly valuable for this type of survey, which includes questions about

> 12As respondents were somewhat familiar with online surveys and received an incentive for completing the survey, it is likely they were more attentive than a typical internet user in their country. For this reason, the results might differ if the treatments were provided to an alternative set of internet users, such as those found through advertisements on social media.

24
its limitations. A critical observation here is that the Poverty Space, in its current iteration, does not fully emulate spillover networks in the strictest “causal” sense. Proper modeling of these networks demands longitudinal data, which is rarely available in developing economies and often inconsistent across regions. The Poverty Space navigates around this limitation by projecting a structure that can help to predict potential spillovers, but with the understanding that it might not precisely mirror the actual dynamics of these interplays in all settings.

While imperfect, this approach offers a new way to begin answering critical policy questions. This paper offered a first look at how these methods can enrich our understanding of multidimensional poverty, and points toward fresh avenues for deeper exploration. In particular, looking at dimensions that are relevant in specific contexts or regions (without the limitations of cross-country comparability) may allow more granularity in terms of variation over time and across space is a key area where future research could help to advance our understanding of the interconnected and dynamic structure of multidimensional poverty. If the world is to get back on track in its efforts to eradicate poverty, efforts to accelerate progress will be necessary. Acupuncture-like approaches, based on the complex interactions among poverty dimensions, considering the underlying structural interdependencies between deprivations, appear promising as one innovative means for amplifying development impact.

# **References**

Alkire, S. _et al._ (2021) ‘Global multidimensional poverty and COVID-19: A decade of progress at risk?’, _Social Science & Medicine_ , 291, p. 114457.

Alkire, S. and Ballon, P. (2012) ‘Understanding association across deprivation indicators in multidimensional poverty’, in _Research Workshop on ‘Dynamic Comparison between Multidimensional Poverty and Monetary Poverty’. OPHI, University of Oxford_ .

Alkire, S. and Foster, J. (2011) ‘Counting and multidimensional poverty measurement’, _Journal of public economics_ , 95(7–8), pp. 476–487.

Athey, S. (2017) ‘Beyond prediction: Using big data for policy problems’, _Science_ , 355(6324), pp. 483–485.

Balland, P.-A. _et al._ (2019) ‘Smart specialization policy in the European Union: relatedness, knowledge complexity and regional diversification’, _Regional Studies_ , 53(9), pp. 1252–1268.

Balland, P.-A. _et al._ (2022) ‘The new paradigm of economic complexity’, _Research Policy_ , 51(3), p. 104450.

Ballon, P. (2023) ‘Statistical issues in multidimensional poverty measurement: redundancy analysis’, _Chapters_ , pp. 463–474.

32
their first KUR loan, 11% of KUR borrowers had received at least one commercial loan from a bank. As shown in Table 1, eligibility criteria for KUR loans issued between 2015 and 2023 did not restrict access to firms without a lending history. In the five years before receiving KUR, 9 percent of borrowers received loans from a commercial bank, 10 percent from microfinance institutions, and 2 percent from regional development banks (Figure 5). After receiving KUR, the usage of these funding sources significantly decreased, indicating that KUR may be displacing other sources of formal lending for some borrowers. The finding of a possible crowding-out effect for some borrowers is supported by qualitative interviews in which some firms reported attempting to switch their non-KUR loans to KUR loans due to their lower interest rates.

Figure 5: After receiving KUR, fewer firms use alternative sources of formal and informal finance for their businesses **Formal Financing Used Before and After Receiving KUR** <!-- Start of picture text --> 12%<br>10%<br>10% 9%<br>8%<br>6%<br>4% 3%<br>2% 2%<br>2%<br>0% 0% 0%<br>0%<br>Non-KUR Loans Micro Finance Institutions Digital Lender Regional Development Banks<br>Prior to receiving KUR for the first time After receiving KUR for the first time<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Author calculations using survey of KUR borrowers While some studies suggest that microbusinesses may divert business loans to household consumption (Casano et al 2013), KUR loans are primarily used for business purposes. The primary use of KUR loans is working capital for the primary business (55.3% of loan value), followed by investments in physical capital for the primary business (27.2% of loan value, Table 3). Qualitative interviews shed light on the various ways in which these loans are utilized for business expansion and improvement. Many firms choose to expand their operations by hiring additional workers, opening a new branch location, or increasing their stock.<sup>19</sup> Others focus on enhancing the attractiveness of their businesses by moving to a better business location or renovating the store. Businesses also aim to improve productivity by investing in new production equipment or additional productivity-enhancing inputs.<sup>20</sup>

> 19  For instance, in the agriculture sector, firms utilize KUR loans to increase their purchases of fertilizer to maximize their yields and increase the area of agricultural land cultivated by either renting or purchasing new land or by purchasing inputs to expand production area of idle land.

> 20  While the majority of KUR loans are used for business purposes, funds are also fungible, and not all of the credit is allocated for productive purposes. Among the study population, 10% of the loan value was allocated towards non-business expenses, and 24% of KUR borrowers used at least part of their KUR loans for non-business expenses.

**15**
growth rates. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) further show that this effect is especially pronounced for smaller firms.

However, the channels through which access to finance affects firm growth is not well understood. Clearly, access to external finance can facilitate capital accumulation. However, on a macro scale, historians have identified innovation and technological progress as the principal causes of material progress over extended periods of time (see for example, Landes (1969), Rosenberg (1982) and Mokyr (1990)). Solow’s (1957) path breaking analysis of growth in labor productivity in the U.S. has established that technological advances (broadly defined) and skill, rather than capital accumulation are the prime drivers of increases in labor productivity. Solow (1957) argues that approximately 80% of the increase in labor productivity in the U.S. over the period 19091949 was due to more productive use of capital and increases in the skill level of the labor force. More recently, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) have shown that financial sector development helps economic growth through more efficient resource allocation rather than through increases in the scale of investment or savings mobilization.

Given the importance of technological advances for growth, it is important to ask whether financial development promotes growth by fostering innovation and thus increasing efficiency. Such an effect would occur if the financial system has an important role in supplying capital to firms that are innovating or restructuring their operations in ways that make them more efficient.

We consider innovation, both narrowly defined as a firm’s adoption of new technology and introduction of new product lines, and a broader definition that takes into account changes in the firm’s operations such as a decision to outsource certain activities or open a new plant.<sup>3</sup> We investigate below whether access to external finance is associated with greater firm innovation whereby firms adapt their operations at a higher rate.<sup>4</sup>

> 3 In the next section, we define the activities we analyze more precisely.

> 4 Using UK data, Aghion, Bond, Klemm, and Marinescu (2004) find that firms that report R&D activity are financed differently than firms that do not report any R&D activity.

5
Table 4. Breakdown of built-up proportion by agro-ecological zones

|||S|oil quality|||So|il humidity||No info|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Year||Poor|Moderate|Good|.|ep|Moist/dry|humid|Humid||
|1975|0.55%|0.30%|0.21%|0.41%|0.09%|0.21%|0.47%|0.15%|3.56%|
|1990|0.89%|0.70%|0.43%|0.81%|0.23%|0.37%|0.88%|0.42%|5.88%|
|2000|1.31%|1.08%|0.66%|1.07%|0.29%|0.50%|1.32%|0.66%|8.09%|
|2014|2.03%|1.69%|1.02%|2.71%|0.75%|0.69%|2.07%|1.34%|9.32%|
|N.obs.||1,447,084|1,816,564|282,295|64,568|189,485}|648,635|2,666,937|484,424|53,277|

Table 5. Breakdown of built-up proportion by presence of a road

|Year|Road in|1976|Road in|1986|Road in 2|008|Road in|2014|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|
|1975|0.35%|2.94%|0.34%|3.01%|0.37%|3.53%|0.22%|6.84%|
|1990|0.67%|5.21%|0.64%|5.39%|0.70%|6.23%|0.46%|11.44%|
|2000|1.01%|7.15%|0.97%|7.44%|1.05%|8.61%|0.74%|14.96%|
|2014|1.59%|10.00%|1.55%|10.35%|1.66%|12.21%|1.29%|19.17%|
|N.obs.|3,737,881|115,392|3,723,869|129,404|3,783,821|69,452|3,732,420|120,853|

Table 6. Breakdown of built-up proportion by boundary status

||Presence on t|he cell of:||
|---|---|---|---|
|Year<br>Waterbody|Land border|Sea|None|
|1975<br>0.01%|0.27%|30.75%|0.42%|
|1990<br>0.03%|0.52%|49.73%|0.80%|
|2000<br>0.06%|0.70%|60.40%|1.19%|
|2014<br>0.20%|1.11%|61.87%|1.86%|
|N.obs.<br>105,035|4,041|1,978|3,742,297|
Redding, Stephen J, (2016) “Goods Trade, factor mobility and welfare,” Journal of International Economics, 101, 148–167.

Redding, Stephen J. and Rossi‐Hansberg, Esteban, (2017) “Quantitative Spatial Economics" Annual Review of Economics, 9, 21‐58.

Roberts, Mark, Uwe Deichmann, Bernard Fingleton, and Tuo Shi, (2012) “Evaluating China’s road to prosperity: A new economic geography approach,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42 (4), 580–594.

Rosenthal, S. and W. Strange. (2004). ‘Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration economies’. In V. Henderson and J‐F Thisse (eds.) _Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics_ , volume 4. Amsterdam: North‐Holland, 2119–2171.

31
**Table 8.  Sharing Township Taxes, 2004.**

|**Province**<br>|**Hun**<br>|**an**<br>|**Cho**<br>|**ngqin**<br>|**g**<br>||**Jilin**<br>||**Jia**<br>|**ngsu**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**County**|**X.**|**N.**|**F.**|**T**|**.**|**H.**|**J**|**.**|**Y.**|**W.**|
|**Township**||||**T.**|**Y.**||**K.**|**M.**|||
|Province<br>**VAT**||||||12.5|12.5|12.5|||
|County|||||||3.75|12.5|25|18.75|
|Township|25|25|25|25|25|12.5|8.75|||6.25|
|Province<br>**BT**||||40|40|50|50|50|||
|County||||35|30|||50|100|40|
|Township|100|100|100|25|30|50|50|||60|
|Province<br>**EIT**|12|12||||16|16|16|||
|County|||||||||40*|16|
|Township|28|28|40|40|40|24|24|24||24|
|Province<br>**PIT**|12|12||16|16|16|16|16|||
|County||||4|||||40*|16|
|Township|28|28|50|20|24|24|24|24||24|

Source: fieldwork survey.

The high dependence on turnover and enterprise taxes also implies that these fiscal resources are unequally distributed, as enterprises are more concentrated in coastal regions and peri-urban locations. This is illustrated in Table 9, which compares the revenue compositions of selected counties, including two visited by the study team. The poor, agricultural county of Huaxian in Henan drew more than half of its revenues from agricultural taxes, three times the national average for counties. In contrast, the much more prosperous Shuangliu county on the periphery of Chengdu relied on agricultural taxes for only 11 percent of its revenue in 2003, and business taxes alone supplied 35 percent of its revenue.

17
Bord, Fisher and O’Connor (1998) also review international survey data on public knowledge, concern, perceived risk and willingness to pay regarding global warming. They found that at that time concern was highest in Canada, most of Europe and South America. Yet they report that, “although the public expresses considerable perceived threat from global warming, the threat is less so than for most other issues surveyed” (77). The other issues addressed in their study were air pollution, water pollution, loss of rainforest, loss of ozone, loss of species and contaminated soil. In conclusion, they find that although global warming is an issue of concern worldwide, it is not a ‘front-burner’ issue. They also find a “limited willingness to sacrifice” in response to climate change. The authors note that “Our own data support but go beyond earlier data by implying that global warming is not a salient issue, and that people across the globe will support global climate change initiatives that do not levy unusual hardships; but they cannot be expected to voluntarily alter their lifestyles” (75). Exactly why climate change is such a back burner issue may be answered in part by ethnographic work on denial to be discussed below. At least in wealthy nations few people see the connections between climate change and daily life (Norgaard and Rudy 2008).

Two more recent studies on the United States are especially important. Data on public concern is somewhat conflicting and varies by survey as well as how the questions are asked. Nisbet and Myers’ (2007) review of US trends includes questions on concern. This work again provides a useful meta analysis of what is happening in the United States. Nisbet and Myers’ review indicates that concern regarding climate change has increased since the mid-1990s in the United States. They summarize data showing that the proportion of Americans who say that global warming is either personally “extremely important” or “very important” increased from 27 percent in 1997 to 52 percent in 2007. When asked about climate change alongside other environmental issues however, it ranks lower than other problems (authors here cite data from Carroll 2006, 2007; Saad 2006). Nisbet and Myers also note that Americans “discount” the threat of climate change, perhaps because it is an environmental problem with consequences that are perceived to be far off in the future (see e.g. Moser and Dilling 2004). They provide data from poll trends that back up these conclusions.

Gallup asked respondents to evaluate the timeline for global warming effects. Queried in 1997, and then each year between 2001 and 2005, only a bare majority 9