rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
|**Table 6: Follow-up Survey Timing of**<br>**Study**|**Different Studies**<br>**Number of Follow-up Surveys Months since Intervent**|**ion Attrition rate**|
|---|---|---|
|Berge et al. (2012)|2<br>5 to 7, 29-31|13 to 18 (c)|
|Bruhn and Zia (2012)|1<br>5 to 6|11|
|Calderon et al. (2012)|2<br>8, 28|15-26 (b)|
|De Mel et al. (2012)|4<br>4, 8, 16, 25|6 to 8|
|Drexler et al. (2012)|1<br>12|13 to 46 (a)|
|Field et al. (2010)|1<br>4|5.3|
|Giné and Mansuri (2011)|1<br>19-22|16|
|Glaub et al. (2012)|2<br>5, 12|11|
|Karlan and Valdivia (2011)|1<br>12 to 24|24|
|Klinger and Schündeln (2011)|1<br>12|28|
|Mano et al. (2012)|1<br>12|17|
|Premand et al. (2012)|1<br>9 to 12|7.2|
|Valdivia(2012)<br>_Notes:_<br>(a) Attrition rate is 46% for business<br>(b) Rates are for first and second foll<br>had closed down by the first (seco<br>(c) Note the study only surveys 644 o|1<br>10<br>outcomes like sales, 13% for business practices.<br>ow-ups respectively. Additionally note that 21 (50) percent of<br>nd) follow-up surveys, so profit and revenue outcomes are on<br>ut of the 1164 clients, based on accessibility by phone.|18<br>non-attritors<br>smaller sample.|

32
4 capital expenditure in total expenditure can alter tne composition of total expenditure between tradables and non tradables. However the direct,on of the real exchange rate effect of changes in level and composition of expenditure are a priori ambiguous and must be ascertained empirically.

This =del of real exchange rate is estimated with data from Bangladesh. Though many developing countries have experienced changes in the composition of government expenditure2, Bangladesh presents an interesting case for several reasons. First unlike other countries that reduced total expenditure by reducing capital expenditure more than current expenditure (Hicks 1991), Bangladesh reduced total expenditure in the face of rising current expenditure. This implied a much larger shift in the composition of government expenditure towards consumption or current expenditure than in most other countries. Second, given the higher propensity of government's current outlays to spend on non tradables, this large shift in composition towards current expenditure implied an equally large shift in composition towards non-tradables. Third, since fiscal adjustment and trade liberalization is being implemented simultaneously in Bangladesh, the effect of fiscal adjustment on RER is of considerable interest.

The paper is orgauiized as follows: Section II describes the nature of Bangladesh's fiscal adjustment over the 1980s. Section III develops the dependent-economy model of equilibrium real exchange rate and Section IV undertakes econometric estimation of the model. Section V concludes by highlighting the implications of the results.

2A recent review of adjustment experience in the IMF shows that in nearly a dozen countries fiscal adjustment was accompanied by a rise in current expenditure and a large decline in capital expenditure.
Policy Research Working Paper 10841

# **Abstract**

Micronutrient deficiency, or hidden hunger, remains a significant problem affecting more than 2 billion people globally. Consuming a diet that is diverse in agricultural products is a primary way of decreasing hidden hunger. Nutrition-sensitive agriculture is recommended as a means of ensuring that investments in agriculture also translate into nutritional gains. Nutrition-sensitive agriculture is a multisectoral approach that requires coordination and cooperation across what are often gendered domains of control inside and outside the home. Agriculture is usually treated as men’s domain and nutrition women’s, with programming generally targeting recipients based on their assumed domain of control. Using evidence from a study of a video-based nutrition-sensitive agriculture program in Ethiopia, this paper provides an in-depth qualitative examination of why targeting both men and women with information on nutrition-sensitive agriculture is preferred by both female and male farmers. The findings indicate that the participation of men and women within the same household not only reduces inequalities in access to information, but also changes whether and how conversations about household production and consumption happen. Household investments in nutrition-sensitive agriculture often involve risk-taking and may require the labor of both men and women. Nutrition-sensitive agriculture interventions that provide information to both women and men ease information-sharing frictions, including those related to intrahousehold gender inequality, and encourage consensus building and the joint assessment of potential benefits and risks. The findings from this study indicate that dual targeting is important for promoting nutrition-sensitive agriculture and addressing hidden hunger because of the potential benefits related to intrahousehold collaboration.

This paper is a product of the Gender Innovation Lab, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at friedsonridenour@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
<!-- Start of picture text --> Which factor is the top driver of women’s economic success in Niger? Which factor is the top barrier to women’s economic success in Niger?<br>Intrapersonal Relational Intrapersonal Relational<br>50%:<br>50%+<br>> 40%+ 40%4<br>ao}r=®Dc88 90%: 30% Respondent sample<br>xo}z vos | Participants (Niger)a .<br>a§ | 20%: | | Predictionsict (US)<br>/0% 70%+ i<br>Self- Hard work Social Peacefulness Not planning Not being Tension Not respecting<br>initiative connections for the future persistent in the others<br>household<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# **6. References**

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- Alan, S., T. Boneva, S. Ertac 2019. “Ever Failed, Try Again, Succeed Better: Results from a Randomized Educational Intervention on Grit.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 134(3): 1121– 1162.

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- Anderson-Butcher, D., and D. E. Conroy. 2002. “Factorial and criterion validity of scores of a measure of belonging in youth development programs.” _Educational and Psychological Measurement_ 62(5): 857–876.

- Appadurai, A. 2004. “The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition.” in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds.) _Culture and Public Action_ . pp. 59–84. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Avitabile, C., and R. de Hoyos. 2018. “The heterogeneous effect of information on student performance: Evidence from a randomized control trial in Mexico.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 135: 318–348.

- Bandura, A., C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli. 2001. “Self-efficacy beliefs as shapers of children's aspirations and career trajectories." _Child Development_ 72(1): 187–206.

- Beaman, L., E. Duflo, R. Pande, and P. Topalova. 2012. “Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India.” _Science_ 335(6068): 582–586.

- Bernard, T., and A. S. Taffesse. 2014. “Aspirations: An Approach to Measurement with Validation Using Ethiopian Data.” _Journal of African Economies_ 23(2): 189–224.

- Bernard, T., S. Dercon, K. Orkin, G. Schinaia, and A. S. Taffesse. 2022. “The Future in Mind: Aspirations and Forward-Looking Behaviour in Rural Ethiopia.” _Manuscript_ . Oxford: University of Oxford. August 9 version, available at: https://bit.ly/3UIadkE.

- Blackwell, L. S., K. H. Trzesniewski, and C. S. Dweck. 2007. “Implicit theories of intelligence predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an intervention.” _Child Development_ 78(1): 246–263.

- Bloem, J. R. 2021. “Aspirations and Real Estate Investments in Rural Myanmar.” _Journal of Economic Inequality_ 19: 727–752.

- Breda, T., J. Grenet, M. Monnet, and C. Van Effenterre. 2020. “Can female role models reduce the gender gap in science? Evidence from classroom interventions in French high schools.” Revise and resubmit at the Economic Journal. April 2020 version (IZA Discussion Paper 13163) available at: https://bit.ly/3QtkPl2.

27
of spreads as dependent variable. Moreover, while the reported regressions use Standard & Poor‘s credit ratings, we reached similar conclusions when we combined data from Standard & Poor‘s and Moody‘s (considering either the lowest credit rating of the two or an average). Also, we obtained broadly similar results when we used ratings converted to a numerical scale as a control variable, instead of controlling for dummies for the different credit rating categories. Furthermore, we found that the differences in spreads between issues abroad and at home exist for both financial and non-financial firms and when restricting the sample to U.S. firms.

Overall, the results in this section show that there are pricing differences across markets, reaffirming the main conclusion of the paper that domestic and international markets seem to offer different financial services. The differences in yield spreads we find between dollardenominated issues at home and abroad remain when controlling for country-year dummies and firm-level fixed effects, when analyzing only those firms that issue bonds both in domestic and international capital markets, and also when focusing only on issues that take place after internationalization. In other words, dollar-denominated issues conducted abroad by a given firm tend to have lower yield spreads than those conducted in the domestic market by the same firm.

Our finding that yields spreads differ across markets, even when comparing issues by the same firm, raises the question of why lenders and borrowers might fail to compete these pricing differences away. Borrowers that issue bonds both in the domestic U.S. and Eurobond markets (which constitute the bulk of the sample used in these regressions) tend to be big corporations, many with international operations, and investors in these markets are mostly large, sophisticated institutional investors. One might expect that such market participants would notice persistent differences in pricing across markets and would attempt to exploit them. However, as discussed above, several factors, including regulations, transaction costs, and information asymmetries, 27
To conclude this section, we note how  ˆ varies when we use the neighborhood weights matrices **W1** and **W2** instead of **W3** (table 4). The results for **W2** are very similar to those for **W3** , except that, for the OECD countries,  ˆ is now significant at the 5 % level. By contrast, using **W1** (shared borders) dramatically reduces  ˆ for the OECD countries to 0.1170, which is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This is not too surprising. After all, membership of the OECD is based not on a country's geographical region, but on its level of development. Based on these results we can hypothesize that the primary mechanisms driving spillovers between the OECD countries are likely to be related to trade.

[table 4 about here]

# **6. The Role of Infrastructure and Geographic Location**

Earlier in this paper we outlined Collier and O'Connell's (2007) finding, based on shortrun growth data, that, whereas globally, resource poor landlocked countries are more dependent on the growth of their neighbors, the opposite is true for such countries in SSA. This is significant because, according to Collier and O'Connell, spillovers of growth from their neighbors represent the best hope for development for SSA's landlocked countries, assuming that these neighbors eventually succeed in taking-off. In this section, we investigate the interrelationships between the strength of longer-run growth spillovers experienced by a country, whether or not the country is landlocked, and the country’s 25
estimations could be used to derive either country specific estimates, or to use the average for the panel. It maybe also useful to check the sensitivity of stochastic simulations to various values for alpha, the fiscal policy reaction coefficient – high values of alpha maybe good for sustainability, but may imply excessive surpluses, for example.

Next, we compare our results, using the default value of alpha of 0.02 and the estimated Turkey specific coefficient – 0.22. The results of the various runs are shown in Figures 7a, 7b, 8a and 8b. As expected, the higher the value of alpha, the narrower the confidence interval is (See Figure 7a and 7b). Similarly, our measure of required deficit reduction would also be sensitive to the value of alpha. The higher the value of alpha, the narrower the fan-chart is for the rdr measure. There is 95 percent probability that Turkey will have additional headroom, larger than 2 percent of GNP at the end of the projection period (see Figure 8b).

_Figure 7. “Fan chart” for Public Debt-to-GNP ratio with a. alpha=0.02 and b. alpha=0.22_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Public sector debt, alpha=0.022 Public sector debt, alpha=0.22<br>70 70<br>60 60<br>50 95-97.5 50 95-97.5<br>5-95 5-95<br>40 40<br>2.5-5 2.5-5<br>30 30<br>20 Baseline 20 Baseline<br>10 10<br>0 0<br>2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br><!-- End of picture text --> 32
|Schedule<br>Peo|of Fees at Competing Plans<br>ple's Bank and E Plan<br>Feb. 1998,|
|---|---|
||People's Bank<br>E Plan<br>'Cashpoint'|
|Withdrawal at ATM|(Bal < 1000) R 2.28 for<br>first RlOO, then RO.34<br>2.70<br>perR1<br>_00_<br>-|
|Withdrawal at ATM of another<br>bank|5.70<br>5.50|
|Cash withdrawal at teller|7.98<br>10.00|
|Monthly ledger fee|3.42<br>2.70|
|Replacement card|25.08<br>6.00|

The E Plan fees on basic services had a relatively high price to cost margin as of July 1997 when these comparisons were made. With the marginal cost of a withdrawal estimated to be about R 0.89 (US$0.20) at the volumes then experienced in the operation, the fee for that service was about R. 2.5 so the fee for service was about three times marginal cost. But average cost was above marginal cost and part of the differential between marginal cost and price of withdrawal must cover the account maintenance and account opening fees. Relatively light competition assisted the bank in recovering costs.

Operating profits, defined as transaction fee revenue minus costs of account maintenance, including allocated capital costs, and transactions costs, were still negative. But interest earnings, which were not included in transaction fee revenue, helped E Plan to break even. Average daily balances for E Plan accounts was approximately R 320 (US$71). Average balances were slightly higher than what had been expected in the design of E Plan, and the differential greatly enhances the revenues of E Plan operations because of the current structure of interest rates. Interest was paid as long as the balance remains above R 250 (US$56). The basic deposit rate was 2 percent, while the money market rate in South Africa was about 14 percent. Hence, the relatively high interest rate environment, and the greater propensity to hold balances on account, has contributed to 15
_given reference period_ .” (ILO, 2003, p. 13) Informal employment is therefore a broader concept encompassing employment in the informal sector (excluding those in formal jobs) and informal jobs in the formal sector. The latter includes employees in formal enterprises who are not covered by social protection and are not entitled to employment benefits (ILO, 2003). Here, we consider both approaches to studying informality and structure the remaining discussion around the informal sector and informal employment.

Countries vary in how they operationalize definitions of the informal sector and informal employment (Kanbur, 2017). In Indonesia, there is no single way of measuring the informal sector. Consistent with the ILO definition, most studies on Indonesia have primarily relied on registration status, tax payments, and/or bookkeeping practices as indicators of informality at the enterprise level (e.g., Rothenburg et al., 2016). Legally, all enterprises in Indonesia, regardless of their size (employment or revenue) must be registered as per Government Regulation 7/2021 art. 37 clause 1.<sup>3</sup> This implies that an unregistered firm operates outside the law and is therefore automatically considered informal. This differs from countries like India, where manufacturing firms with fewer than 10 employees are not required to register (Bussolo & Sharma, 2022). Regarding taxation, Indonesia enforces revenue thresholds below which enterprises may be exempt from paying different taxes. For value-added tax (VAT), firms earning revenue below 4.8 billion IDR per year are considered exempt, while for final income tax, firms with revenue less than 500 million IDR per year are exempt. Perhaps most applicable to smaller household enterprises are local taxes for businesses in the food and entertainment industry, where the threshold is 3 million IDR per year as per Government Regulation 7/2021 art. 124. Accordingly, enterprises earning revenues above these thresholds but not paying taxes are considered informal.

Measures of informal employment, on the other hand, have evolved significantly. Up until 2016, Statistics Indonesia (BPS) used two definitions known as Proxy 1 and Proxy 2 (Figure 1). The

> 3 See <u>https://jdih.setkab.go.id/PUUdoc/176384/PP_Nomor_7_Tahun_2021.pdf for more details.</u>

4
BENIN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Table 6. Railway indicators for OCBN and selected other railways**

Latest available year

|Indicator|Unit|OCBN<br>Benin<br>Niger|SITARAIL<br>Burkina Faso<br>Cote d'Ivoire|GRC<br>Ghana|TRANSRAIL<br>Mali<br>Senegal|NRC<br>Nigeria|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Concessioned<br>company|1-concessioned,<br>0-non-concessioned|1|1|1|1|1|
|Network density|km/km2|5.1|2.2|4|5.4|3.8|
|Network density|km/million pop|66|39|40|77|23|
|Labor productivity|1,000 traffic units per<br>employee|40|481|84|26|37|
|Carriage productivity|1,000 passenger-km per<br>carriage|900|862|416||737|
|Locomotive<br>productivity|million traffic units per<br>locomotive|3|35|7|40|13|
|Wagon productivity|1,000 net ton-km per wagon|74|1020|458|804|59|
|Traffic Unit - Freight|million net ton-km|24|670|224|409|77|
|Traffic Unit -<br>Passenger|million passenger-km|18|25|64|113|174|
|Freight average yield|US cent/ntkm, average<br>2000–05|5.8|5.5|4.4|3.3||
|Passenger average<br>yield|US cent/pkm, average<br>2000–05|2|3.3|2.4|2.2||

_Source_ : AICD railways database.

# **Challenges**

Boosting freight and passenger traffic on OCBN’s tracks is an important challenge for Benin, as traffic levels are among the lowest in the region. On average, between 2001 and 2005 only 24 million net ton-km and 18 million passenger-km were registered, levels that put the Beninese railways behind other railways in West Africa (table 6). The situation has deteriorated since 2005. Passenger traffic stopped in 2007.

OCBN also needs to enhance its productivity, which lags most railways in West Africa. At 40,000 traffic units per employee, OCBN’s labor productivity is comparable with NRC’s but behind the labor productivity of SITARAIL and GRC, with 481,000 and 84,000 traffic units per employee, respectively. On average, OCBN locomotives transported 3 million traffic units, the lowest figure of concessions in the region. Similarly, wagon productivity, at 74 thousand net ton-km per wagon, was just a fraction of the figures for SITARAIL, GRC and TRANSRAIL. Only carriage productivity, at 900,000 km per carriage, was comparatively high (table 6).

OCBN’s freight tariffs are the highest in the region, with an average of $ 5.8 cents/ton-km. Only SITARAIL has freight tariffs comparable with OCBN’s. However, the passenger tariffs, at $2 cents/passenger-km, were the lowest—until passenger traffic was halted in 2007.

17
TFP. Given _Doing Business_ ’s tendency to capture a firm’s de jure access for a typical small and medium enterprise (SME), we would place a greater weight on the findings on the Enterprise Survey and Global Competitiveness indicators of access to finance.

_Barriers to Entry._ There is some evidence that entry barriers are associated with lower productivity. The Enterprise Survey’s Land Acquisition Obstacle indicator is negatively and significantly associated with productivity. Reducing it by one standard deviation is associated with a 3-percentage point increase in productivity. The Doing Business Construction Permit measure, however, is not significantly associated with productivity.

To summarize, the three groups of indicators offer independent sources of variations in explaining firm performance. The Enterprise Survey indicators seem to work best in explaining firm performance; they explain the largest share of variations in firm performance. Their qualitative results best confirm our priors. For instance, corruption is negatively associated with firm growth when using the Enterprise Survey indicator, but positively associated when using the Global Competitiveness indicator. Physical safety is positively associated with firm performance according to the Enterprise Survey indicator but is insignificant according to the Global Competitiveness indicator. Access to finance is positively associated with firm performance in the case of the Enterprise Survey indicator, but insignificant in the case of the Doing Business indicator. Physical safety and ease in land access have significant and positive effects only in the case of the Enterprise Survey indicators.

By comparing the three sets of estimates, we are able to modify our priors on the effects of the BE. In particular, we increase our confidence concerning four aspects of the BE (given that findings from at least two sets of data are robust and the third set does not contradict the other two): access to finance (DB and ES); electricity/basic infrastructure (ES and DB); internet/modern infrastructure (ES and GC); and human capital (DB or World Bank HLO, ES, and GC). We are less sure about the negative effect of corruption (given that findings from the Enterprise Survey and the Global Competitiveness data are contradictory).

# **Importance of contract enforcement**

The systematic differences between the effects of the de jure and de facto BE indicators suggest that enforcement might play an important role in determining BE effects. We thus turn to how the _Doing Business_ BE indicators depend on contract enforcement, as measured by the Contract Enforcement indicator from Doing Business. The results of interacting _Doing Business_ BE indicators and the Contract Enforcement indicator are presented in table 6.

The _Doing Business_ indicators tend to be more effective for improving firm performance 17