exemptions can be emulated.<sup>3</sup> This again does not necessarily require formal legislation. As competition offices are responsible for granting exemptions, they can determine the categories of agreements that do not have to be notified. Flassig (1993) has noted that during the transition, firms and consumers that are negatively affected by restrictive business practices may be unwilling to bring cases given their dependence on existing relationships. It is therefore also important that the competition authorities take a lead role, and exploit their mandate to self-initiate.' Finally, transparency can be further improved by publishing not only decisions but also the underlying analysis and reasoning.

Competition authorities can act as the 'conscience' of the government, recognizing and publicizing the costs to consumers of government policies and actions that restrict competition. Trade policy is one obvious area that should be given priority in this connection, the service sector another. cbmpetition policy offices could consider actively applying antitrust law in the light of maintained trade policies (e.g., accounting for the effect of protection on market structure, concentration, etc.). Much can be done in this connection through appropriate wording of criteria and implementation guidelines within the framework of currently existing legislation. For example, trade policy considerations can be linked to the definition of the relevant antrst market.<sup>3</sup> " In principle, the more an industry is protected, the narrower could be the definition of the relevant market, thereby reducing the expected profitability of seeldng protection, and thus the incentive to lobby for it. In a similar vein, GATT ilIegal or 'grey-area' measures such as voluntay export restraint and import expansion agreements should be publicly stated to be unenforceable, and subject to competition policy enforcement.32 _De nmirumis_ provisions can also be .relatea to the trade policy stance that affects an industry. The more liberal are market access conditions for foreign firms/products, the higher can be the threshold that is applied.

29As was done by the Czech Republic in November 1993, and is also envisaged in the draft Slovak law.

30 Polish and Slovak statistics suggest that complaints account for two-thirds of total investigations (OECID, 1994). Hln Hungary, the majority of the pxocedures in 1992 started on the basis of applications (236 cases), the Office of Economic Competition using its right to initiate proceedings _er offico_ in only 17 cases (OECD, 1993b). In part this may reflect the wording of the laws and the tanstion proces. As noted by Fomnalczyk (1993), the Polish Anuimonopoly office was obliged to initiate investigations whenever a complaint was' received, and we required to review applications for all mergersfuasformationi. Resource constraints then "crowded out" a _ofici6_ actions.

> **"** Aahorities have substanti latitude in this connection, as the relevant market is not clearly defined in any of the laws. ln most jurisdictions the concept is defined through case law and administrative practice.

'2 It can be noted in passing that GATT obligations and disciplines have little impact on the pursuit of domestic competition law, even though in principle the linkages betwecn GATT's trade policy disciplines and domestic competition policies are greatr than is commonly thought. See Hockman and Mavroidis (1994).

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