rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
ability to migrate.<sup>5</sup> We now zoom in on three important sources of heterogeneity to better understand the implications of potential stabilization on migration intentions. We see that the effects of political stabilization on reducing migration intentions are stronger in high-conflict areas.<sup>6</sup> This could be because political stability is especially valued in conflict-affected areas where a return to political stabilization would represent a bigger change from the status quo. Interestingly, even in less affected areas, economic stabilization does not appear to affect migration intentions.

#

||Individual ac<br>job for curr<br>abr|cepts similar<br>ent job pay<br>oad|Average Wag<br>Induce Work<br>(|e Premium to<br>er to Migrate<br>%)|Individual ne<br>migrate regar<br>premium|ver chooses to<br>dless of wage<br>(upto 11x)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Low<br>Confict|High<br>Confict|Low<br>Confict|High<br>Confict|Low<br>Confict|High<br>Confict|
|Scenario: Political<br>Stabilization (PS)|-0.056<sup>*</sup><br>(0.034)|-0.064<sup>*</sup><br>(0.034)|59.924<br>(36.560)|76.237<sup>**</sup><br>(34.650)|0.017<br>(0.032)|0.067<sup>**</sup><br>(0.029)|
|Scenario: Economic<br>Stabilization (ES)|-0.040<br>(0.034)|-0.030<br>(0.035)|-30.008<br>(36.146)|47.856<br>(35.330)|-0.048<br>(0.031)|0.043<br>(0.029)|
|Mean|0.310|0.374|415.142|368.941|0.244|0.219|
|N|1121|1158|1121|1158|1121|1158|

Standard errors in parentheses * _p_ < 0.10, ** _p_ < 0.05, *** _p_ < 0.01 Reference Category: No signal for any changes in the future Controls include respondents’ gender, age, marital status, parenthood, self-assessed risk appetite, dummy for interviews conducted after 11 February 2024, perceived difference in costs of living between origin and intended destination, daily survey response rate.

by absolute income and by a subjective assessment of the respondent’s income compared to others with similar experience and qualifications in the same occupation in Myanmar. We see that the effects of political stabilization on migration intentions are driven by lower-income individuals in the sample. Equally, however, we see that those who perceive their earnings to be on par with or higher than comparable peers respond more to prospects of political stabilization than those who believe their income is lower than peers’.

> 5 Measured through a combination of having a passport, as well as social networks and financial resources that can finance migration.

> 6 Defined as townships with above-median number of conflict events since 2021 in the sample. Conflict events data is taken from ACLED.

15
treatment is computed and ranked across countries. The p-value is computed by dividing the rank of the treatment country (unit) by the total number of countries in the pool (Cunningham, 2021). Figure A5 in the appendix shows the distribution of the post-pre RSMPE ratio for all countries in the pool. Based on the results in the figure, Ghana is ranked second out of the 23 country units, which implies an “exact p-value” of 0.086.<sup>59</sup> In other words, the SCM results are statistically significant at 10% error level.

These results provide suggestive evidence that the quality of electricity supply is a major determinant of FDI flows. To the extent that unreliable provision of electricity supply reduces FDI inflows, the findings suggest that a reduction in firm entry via falling (greenfield) FDIs is a mechanism through which electricity shortages affect employment since FDI is an important avenue for job creation in many developing countries (Toews and V ́ezina, 2021). It is important to acknowledge that the estimated effect of outages on FDI only reflects the impact on the entry of foreign firms.

# **_Robustness_**

To test the robustness of the SCM results, I conduct two placebo (“in-time” and “inspace”) tests. Starting with the placebo “in-time” test, I explore the possibility of finding a similar gap in the FDI trends between Ghana and its synthetic control assuming a placebo treatment period. Specifically, I focus on the period 2007-2013 and assign 2011 as the treatment year. Finding a large placebo gap suggests that the results in Figures 4 and 5 are unlikely to be the causal impact of the power crisis on FDI. That is the effect could arise out of chance and not related to the impact of the power crisis. As shown in Figure A6, I find no evidence of significant divergence between Ghana and its synthetic control using the placement treatment period.

In the case of the “in-space” placebo test, I iteratively assign treatment status to countries in the control (donor) pool while using the remaining countries (including Ghana) 59i.e., 1 _/_ 23 = 0 _._ 086 44
electricity program (a proxy for environmental measures) have increased their electricity consumption by 2.5%.

Several studies use economic or financial analysis to evaluate investments in clean technologies (EE and solar home systems). Below we briefly highlight the findings of the studies by technology types. First, we discuss energy utilization technologies followed by solar home systems.

Analyzing data from a national survey in Ghana, Opoku et al. (2019) estimate that the cost savings from reduced electricity consumption by adopting energy-efficient air conditioning (AC) systems is about US$1.96 billion from 2018 to 2030. Suástegui Macías et al. (2018) report that 39% of households in Mexicali, Mexico, use oversized ACs and that replacing these ACs with more energy efficient ACs would save 32% in energy consumption annually.

By setting optimal HAVC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) temperature setpoints in office buildings in seven climate zones across the USA, Papadopoulos et al. (2019) show that up to 60% of annual HVAC-related energy is saved without compromising occupants’ thermal comfort. Wu et al. (2018) find 13.1% to 14.7% of energy savings with more efficient HVAC (e.g., ground-source heat pump with two and three boreholes) compared to conventional HVAC (e.g., air-source heat pump) in a single-family house in Maryland, USA. The estimated value of operation cost saved is about US$186 to US$191 per household annually. However, for the same net electricity generation, the ground-source heat pumps required US$7,934 (2 boreholes) and US$9,739 (3 boreholes) higher initial cost than the air-source heat pump.

Some studies examine net energy savings (or net benefits) due to the adoption of clean energy supply systems in buildings. Timilsina (2021) finds that the benefits of distributed photovoltaics (DPV) system in Bangladesh would be more than 1.5 times in residential and commercial buildings. A study for the Waukegan area of Illinois, Baek et al. (2020) find that electricity bill savings from solar PV and energy storage system pay back the investments in 11– 12 years, as most homes and businesses in the region could cut their electricity bills by more than half. Park et al. (2019) show that the refrigerator electricity consumption can be reduced by about 50% and 70% using commercially available energy-efficient components at an incremental cost of about US$45–US$60 and US$100–US$120 per unit, respectively. They also find that the total annualized cost of an off-grid solar home system together with refrigerator can be decreased by 32
Financial Regulation and Development Figure 5: Policy Change and Trends: NBE Bills and Safe Assets <!-- Start of picture text --> 0 5 10<br>Quarters<br>NBE Bill − Small B. NBE Bill − Big B.<br>Safe Assets − Small B. Safe Assets − Big B.<br>1500<br>1000<br>500<br>Million Birr − Real 2010<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note:_ This figure plots the coefficients of the overall trend exhibited by small and big banks for NBE bills and safe assets over all quarters available in the data (NBE bills in black and safe assets in green). Big banks are reported using a solid line, while small banks are reported with a dashed line. The policy is announced in mid-March 2011 and implemented in April 2011 (shown by the vertical red line). As is evident, there occurs an important discontinuity around the policy introduction (Quarter 5) and larger banks respond substantially more than smaller banks by purchasing more NBE bills and purchasing overall more safe assets, though their composition changes. As is evident from Table 1, the pre-policy trends are not statistically different from zero, while post-policy all of them are. Appendix F reports the same picture with 95% confidence intervals, also exploiting two-month dummies rather than quarters.

# **2.2.2 Evidence from a Branch Map of Ethiopia**

In this section, we present further evidence on a key feature of Propositions 1 and 2, where we show that the 27% rule is associated with greater branch expansion. In order to test this hypothesis, we construct a map of all branches in Ethiopia, where for each bank we know all the branches installed, their region and city of introduction with the month and year of opening. Our map covers 2,023 branches, installed by all 14 banks registered until 2013 and opened between 2000 and 2015. The Annual Report by the NBE in 2014 counts 2,208, and therefore our map considers more than 90% of existing branches. Unlike the balance sheet exercise, which is based on short-run fluctuations, we are interested in verifying that long-run branch installation has changed. Thus, we focus on those banks that have been in existence since early 2000 and for which we see the evolution of monthly branch opening: these are Awash, BOA, CBB, Dashen, NIB, and United. As for our identification strategy, we shall verify the evolution of branch opening of the two largest banks, Awash and Dashen, with the remaining four, which are substantially smaller.

23
# **Figure VI-7: Medium- and Short-term Real Credit Cycle**

# **A- Oil exporters**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Kuwait: real credit medium and short term cycle Iran: real credit medium and short term cycle<br>(in percent) (in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year year<br> Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle<br>Algeria: real credit medium and short term cycle Bahrain: real credit medium and short term cycle<br>(in percent) (in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year year<br> Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle<br>UAE: real credit medium and short term cycle Oman: real credit medium and short term cycle<br>(in percent) (in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year year<br> Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle Medium-term credit cycle Short-term credit cycle<br>40 20<br>20 10<br>0 0<br>cyclical component cyclical component<br>-20 -10<br>-40 -20<br>40<br>10<br>20 5<br>0<br>0<br>-5<br>cyclical component cyclical component<br>-20<br>-10<br>-40 -15<br>30 40<br>20<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>0<br>cyclical component cyclical component<br>-20<br>-10<br>-20 -40<br><!-- End of picture text --> 47
high-value-added activities are delocalized (including R&D and other services) and the recipient country might be used as a regional hub for production and export.

The regional dimension is essential when it comes to GVCs. Trade integrated regions are more attractive to GVC lead firms for a number of practical reasons. These include:

- the reduction of the cumulative value of tariffs within free-trade areas;

- the reduction of the administrative burden associated with rules of origin and the traceability of products;

- the harmonization/mutual recognition of standards along the production chain; and

- the reduction of the thickness of the border at large, including customs and trade facilitation procedures.

For example, the European Union could develop a number of competitive industries through the constitution of regional value chains (e.g., Airbus in aeronautics). A number of value chains tend to be regional, such as the bulk of the automotive industry (Sturgeon, Memedovic Van Biesebroek and Gereffi, 2009). The objective is not necessarily to develop an integrated industry, but to capture an important part of the chain’s value-added by providing a regional bundle of tasks or services at pinch points of the GVC (see World Bank, 2012, for the analysis in the context of the Deauville Partnership). Matrixes decomposing gross exports into domestic and foreign value-added provide a good indication of the level of integration of the region with regard value chains (see Figure 9 and Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013).

GVCs create a new impetus for regional and multilateral trade agreements (OECD-WTO, 2013b). It is possible to design, at the domestic as well as the international level, supply chain agreements that bundle a number of policies useful to the facilitation of merchandise and services flows within GVCs, and that better link the private sector to trade and competitiveness strategies (WEF, 2013).

15
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41
to 1993 in China is contributed by fertilizer inputs. The payoffs were remarkable as there were dramatic gains in farm output, diversification, and an accompanying rise in peasant incomes. By privatizing agriculture, reform politicians made allies of rural producers and created a base for further growth in the rural nonfarm sector.

However, the reforms could not have been sustained without the concern among top Chinese policymakers on the paramount importance of food security. Heeding Lester Brown’s warning of China’s possible inability to feed itself, China started stockpiling food and grains and shifted from a net grain importer in the 1970s to a net grain exporter in the 1990s. Technology has been the driving force of Chinese agricultural growth. Through a combination of technological development, institutional change, and agricultural pricing policy, China has succeeded in developing food grain self-sufficiency and increasing both cropping area and cropping intensity. By creating new technologies and crop varieties, China’s research system has raised total factor productivity in agriculture and expanded crop production in the face of declining output-input price ratios (World Bank, 1997). Chinese success in the agricultural arena has been helped by government support for agricultural academies and a network of technical specialists around the country since at least the mid 1970s. It conducted major agricultural research, including the largest field experiments of genetically modified plants in China. Hybrid rice, which was pioneered by Chinese scientists in the 1970s, spread to large parts of the rice growing areas in the 1990s. Researchers at IFPRI have found that increased investment in agricultural research accounted for almost 20 percent of overall growth in Chinese agriculture from 1965 to 1993 (Fan and Pardey, 1997).

A few simple empirics reveal the contrast with African agriculture. While China now produces an average 6.4 tons of rice per hectare, most comparable African countries produce around two tons per hectare. China feeds more than 20 percent of the world’s population with less than 10 percent of the world’s arable land, while Africa has had to import large amounts of food aid and faces occasional famines. Less than 10 percent of cropped area in Africa is irrigated 21
17

**Table 9: World Commercial Service Imports and Shares by Income Group and Region**

||19|80|19|90|20|00|2|010|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|CountryGroup|Imports<br>($bill)|Share<br>(in %)|Imports<br>($bill)|Share<br>(in %)|Imports<br>($bill)|Share<br>(in %)|Imports<br>($bill)|Share<br>(in %)|
|**BY INCOME LEVEL**|||||||||
|Developed economies|275|66.6|661|78.7|1,102|74.2|2,263|65.5|
|Developing economies|106|25.6|163|19.4|352|23.7|1,098|31.8|
|High income developing economies|29|6.9|62|7.4|111|7.5|325|9.4|
|Upper middle income economies|47|11.4|60|7.2|152|10.3|478|13.8|
|Lower middle income economies|26|6.2|35|4.2|80|5.4|271|7.8|
|Low income economies|5|1.1|6|0.7|9|0.6|23|0.7|
|Of which: Least developed countries|6|1.4|8|1.0|12|0.8|44|1.3|
|**Memo:**|||||||||
|Developing econ, excl. China & India|101|24.4|153|18.2|297|20.0|789|22.8|
|Upper middle income, excl. China|45|10.9|56|6.7|117|7.8|286|8.3|
|Lower middle income,excl. India|23|5.5|29|3.5|61|4.1|155|4.5|
|**BY REGION**|||||||||
|World|413|100.0|839|100.0|1,486|100.0|3,456|100.0|
|Developing economies|106|25.6|163|19.4|352|23.7|1,098|31.8|
|Asia|27|6.5|80|9.5|209|14.1|705|20.4|
|Latin America & Caribbean|28|6.7|34|4.0|69|4.7|156|4.5|
|Europe, Middle East & North Africa|33|7.9|31|3.6|48|3.2|147|4.3|
|Sub-Saharan Africa|18|4.4|19|2.2|25|1.7|89|2.6|
|**Memo:**|||||||||
|BRICS 5 countries|12|3.0|36|4.3|92|6.2|458|13.2|
|OPEC 12 members|38|9.1|28|3.3|38|2.6|137|4.0|

Source: Based on World Bank World Development Indicator database.
||**Table**<br>**Nigeri**|**2: Value of Harv**<br>**a (excluding We**|**est**<br>**st)**|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|_Variable Name_|_All_|_Male_|_Female_|_Difference_||
|Harvest Value (Naira)|112,561|125,107|65,897|59,210|***|
|Harvest Value (Naira)/HA|747,672|724,536|833,727|-109,191||
||**North E**<br>|**ast and North Ce**<br>|**ntral**<br>|||
|_Variable Name_|_All_|_Male_|_Female_|_Difference_||
|Harvest Value (Naira)|127,004|134,689|50,629|84,060|***|
|Harvest Value (Naira)/HA|439,411|454,075|293,688|160,387|*|
||**South E**|**ast and South So**|**uth**|||
|_Variable Name_|_All_|_Male_|_Female_|_Difference_||
|Harvest Value (Naira)|84,611|94,748|71,968|22,781||

25
which will be discussed in the context of industrial clustering as a development strategy, it also carries with it a concentration of risk should the industry experience a downturn. By diversifying a regional economy, the region would be diversifying the risk of employment downturn in the same way as an investor guards against heavy losses by diversifying her stock portfolio. Diversification, then, would be expected to contribute to employment stability.

Despite the more recent emphasis on potential economies of industrial clusters and implications for more rapid growth, industrial diversity remains an important indicator of economic structure. Whereas the LQ and related concentration measures focus on individual industries, there is another set of measures that are used to quantify the degree of specialization or diversity of industry structure for all industries in a region. Among the most common regional industrial diversity indices are the National Average Index, the Herfindahl Index, and the Entropy Index. Each of these metrics provides a summary measure of the difference between a given region and its national economy in terms of industrial distributions. The implication is that the national economy itself is in some sense optimally diversified, hence these indices become normative. Of course, it would be possible to substitute any alternative industrial distribution for the national economy if there were rational economic reasons for doing so. These measures are also usually based on income or employment statistics, largely because these data are typically more readily available and reliable than estimates of output. However, any of these measures could be used.

# **_Common Diversity Indices_**

Each of the industrial diversity indices rests on a normative assumption concerning the ideal regional industrial economic structure. Because the normative ideal can be expressed in a variety of ways, the measures differ accordingly. The national average index is among the earliest and simplest measures of regional industrial diversity. It emerged in the context of highly developed economies, where the national economy could be assumed to be diverse, and its structure taken as the norm. A perfectly diverse regional industrial structure would therefore mirror the national industrial structure, and departures from the national industrial concentrations reflect regional specializations, or departures from perfect diversity. When deviations are expressed in absolute value, the virtually identical to the coefficient of localization. When deviations are expressed as squared differences, the equation for the National Average index for region _R_ is 27