Regression analysis in Table 19 confirms that multinationals are significantly more likely to disclose information related to anti‐corruption initiatives and to reveal the value of political contributions than non‐MNEs. Specifically, MNEs are significantly more likely to report the communication and training on anti‐corruption policies and procedures (SO4). The probability of multinationals to disclose their total value of political contributions by country and recipient/beneficiary (SO6) is also significantly higher than for non‐MNEs.

**Table 19: Governance indicators, regressions, Probit model**

|**GRI G4**<br>**Metric**|**GRI Indicator**|**_MNE_**|**p‐value**|**_Large_**|**p‐value**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|G4‐SO3|Total number and percentage of operations assessed for risks related to corruption and<br>the significant risks identified|‐0.050|0.646|**0.969*****|**0.000**|
|**G4‐SO4**|**Communication and training on anti‐corruption policies and procedures**|**0.265****|**0.014**|**0.810*****|**0.000**|
|G4‐SO5|Confirmed incidents of corruption and actions taken|‐0.161|0.126|**0.687*****|**0.000**|
|**G4‐SO6**|**Total monetary value of financial and in‐kind political contributions by country and**<br>**recipient/beneficiary**|**0.210***|**0.065**|0.189|0.267|
|G4‐SO9|Percentage of new suppliers that were screened using criteria for impacts on society|0.051|0.651|0.238|0.174|
|G4‐SO10|Significant actual and potential negative impacts on society in the supply chain and<br>actions taken|0.107|0.386|**0.808*****|**0.000**|
|G4‐SO11|Number of grievances about impacts on society filed, addressed, and resolved through<br>formal grievance mechanisms|0.126|0.284|0.255|0.148|
|**G4‐EC4**|**Financial assistance received fromgovernment**|**‐0.272****|**0.014**|0.219|0.182|

Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01. Note: Variables refer to 2015 GRI data (see section 2.2). All regressions control for country‐sector fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

By contrast, disclosure shares on financial assistance received from government and incidents of corruption and actions taken are significantly lower for MNEs than for non‐MNEs. Multinationals are less likely to reveal if they received financial assistance from governments (EC4), and the difference is statistically significant. They also report less on confirmed incidents of corruption and actions taken (SO5) than non‐MNEs. In both cases, the large firms disclose more (Figure 10).

# **<mark>5. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS</mark>**

MNEs are not only different from other types of firms in terms of their engagement in GVCs, but also enjoy technological and other advantages and higher productivity rates. At the same time, MNEs are under increasing pressure to comply with international labor and HSE standards. As a result, the number of companies producing corporate sustainability reports has strongly increased within a relatively short amount of time. Sustainability reporting provides insights into priorities given by the private sector to certain sustainability issues. In addition, mandatory and voluntary sustainability reporting can be linked to better development outcomes.

This paper examined the role of MNEs in sustainability reporting. In particular, this study assessed how MNE status correlates with a company’s disclosure rate and probability of reporting on economic, labor and social, environmental and governance indicators. It uses a unique data set that offers company‐level information on sustainability reporting from the GRI which covers 2,020 companies in 81 countries and 54 sustainability indicators.

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