rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
been more successful than FSU countries at designing tax systems, tax administrations, and government structures in which taxpayers can put their trust. Hence, our results suggest that CEE countries have been more successful than FSU countries at designing tax systems, tax administrations, and government structures in which taxpayers can place their trust. Such institutional improvements and observable changes may help to explain the higher willingness to cooperate in CEE countries, some of which exhibit higher values of tax morale than some Western European countries.

Torgler (2007) explores the differences between CEE and FSU in different stages, namely in 1989-1993, 1995-1998 and 1999-2001 across 22 transition countries. Using a multivariate analysis, the study finds that that in most of the three time periods there is a statistically significant difference between CEE and FSU countries; interestingly, the difference between CEE and FSU is statistically significant in all specifications. The marginal effects are much higher in the years 1995-1998, indicating a higher divergence between the regions. The study also indicates that the respondents originating from a CEE rather than from a FSU country, increases the probability of stating that ―tax evasion is never justified‖ by around 13 percentage points (compared to around 2 percentage points in 1989-1993). Looking at the 1999-2001 data, FSU countries have still significantly lower tax morale than the CEE countries. However, the marginal effects have not increased as in the previous years and some are even observed to be lower (close to 9 percentage points).

What are the driving forces that shape tax morale in Central Eastern and Former Soviet Union countries? Trust in the government and the legal system seemed to be key factors. Governments fulfill a leading role in the transition process; institutional changes are connected to uncertainty. Institutions provide a reduction of uncertainty by designing the provided structure of interaction. As a consequence, greater certainty in the political process is gained. Ensley and Munger (2001) argue that ―if rules are not formalized, the players may spend too much time arguing over the rules and less time competing in productive activities‖ (p. 116). And Kasper and Streit (1999) stress that ―Strong institutional controls and accountability are required to control deeply rooted agent opportunism. The rule of law has to be imposed on all government agents‖ (p. 432). Thus, stable and easily knowable institutions help create reliability. A government based 49
tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check using local courts in the country’s largest city. They collect information derived from questionnaire answered by attorneys from 109 countries associated to Lex Mundi and Lex Africa. The questionnaire covered detailed information regarding the amount of the claim, the location and main characteristics of the litigants, the presence of city regulations, the nature of the remedy requested y the plaintiff, the merit of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s claim, and the social implications of the judicial outcome.

Figure 7 shows that court formalism clearly maps into a longer duration of the Judicial Process. The results are statistically significant at the one percent level. It is often argued that even if extra formalism leads to lengthier processes, this should not be a concern because it is the cost a country must pay for a fairer and more objective legal system. Figure 8 however shows this to be false. Contrary to what might be expected, greater formalism in the judicial system is related to less fairness and impartiality of the system. Not only does formalism come at a cost in terms of the length of the process, but there seems to be no upside to it it terms of fairness or impartiality. These results are robust to instrumental variables that take into account the possible endogenous nature of court formalism.

# **Conclusion.**

It is clear from available empirical evidence that securities laws make a difference; the answer to the question of whether “law matters” is a definite yes. Although there are theoretical arguments for and against securities regulations, there is mounting evidence that securities laws matter to the development of capital markets. Evidence from the studies on insider trading laws and disclosure through cross-listing suggests that enforcement is equally important. Laws that 28
complete primary education. The results from the earnings functions can be used to estimate the

# earnings premium associated with each level of education and the private rate of return to each

# level of schooling.

Table 6: Vietnam: Earnings Functions with Schooling Levels

|Variables|All|Males|Females|Public|Privatea|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Constant|0.870|1.181|0.617|0.845|1.220|
|Primary|0.134|0.035|0.214|-0.278|0.233|
||(2.2)|(0.5)|(2.3)|(2.0)|(3.2)|
|Secondary|0.325|0.269|0.423|0.404|0.260|
||(3.8)|(2.4)|(3.1)|(3.7)|(1.9)|
|Vocational|0.207|0.240|0.259|0.276|---|
||(2.8)|(2.3)|(2.4)|(3.4)||
|University|0.437|0.414|0.488|0.429|---|
||(3.8)|(2.8)|(2.7)|(3.5)||
|Experience|0.064|0.057|0.066|0.053|0.072|
||(9.9)|(6.6)|(6.7)|(5.1)|(8.3)|
|Experience-squared|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|-0.001|
||(8.4)|(5.5)|(5.8)|(4.2)|(7.3)|
|Log hours-worked|0.750|0.732|0.751|0.888|0.618|
||(12.1)|(9.3)|(7.5)|(10.8)|(6.8)|
|R-squared|0.124|0.111|0.142|0.179|0.087|
|N|2,259|1,355|904|950|1,309|

# Source: VLSS 1992-93

Note: t-statistics in parentheses; all variables are significant at the 10% level or better, except where indicated by *; the omitted category for level of education is no education a Vocational and university coefficients not shown because of an insufficient number of observations

# Large earnings premiums translate into relatively high private returns to schooling (Table

7). Overall university is a good private investment. For females primary and university education are profitable investments. In the public sector, university is a good investment, while primary education is not. The highest private rate of return is at the primary level for private sector workers. Secondary academic and secondary vocational education are consistently poor investments.

17
**Table S3.3: Alternative meta-regression models**

||(1)<br>Probit<br>5%|(2)<br>Ordered<br>probit<br>10%|(3)<br>RE<br>GLS|(4)<br>WLS<br>1/SE(g)<br>weights|(5)<br>WLS<br>1/Var(g)<br>weights|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|RCT|-0.794***|-0.802***|-0.087***|-0.086***|-0.044**|
||(0.225)|(0.196)|(0.024)|(0.020)|(0.022)|
|TOT|0.052|0.002|0.049**|0.038**|0.058***|
||(0.189)|(0.176)|(0.023)|(0.016)|(0.015)|
|Delay|-0.001**<br>|-0.000<br>|-0.000<br>|-0.000<br>|0.000<br>|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|1/SE|0.001<br>(0.001)|-0.000<br>(0.001)||||
|SEg|||0.486***<br>|0.611**<br>||
||||(0.173)|(0.272)||
|SEg<sup>2</sup>|||||3.147**<br>|
||||||(1.496)|
|Intensity /week|0.018|0.027*|0.003**|0.003*|<br>0.006**|
||(0.014)|(0.015)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.003)|
|Duration|0.008*|-0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|Low inc. clients|(0.004)<br>-0.566***|(0.005)<br>-0.561***|(0.001)<br>-0.060***|(0.000)<br>-0.014*|(0.000)<br>-0.000|
||(0.160)|(0.148)|(0.019)|(0.007)|(0.002)|
|Years of schooling|-0.154***|-0.136***|-0.024***|-0.022***|-0.018***|
||(0.058)|(0.044)|(0.006)|(0.005)|(0.006)|
|Low/lower-mid. econ.|-0.872**<br>(0.392)|-0.792**<br>(0.314)|-0.105**<br>(0.042)|-0.086***<br>(0.032)|-0.076*<br>(0.045)|
|Mandatory|0.172<br>|0.130<br>|-0.030<br>|-0.026<br>|-0.017<br>|
||(0.245)|(0.272)|(0.026)|(0.020)|(0.018)|
|Teach. moment|0.326|0.404**|0.063***|0.042**|0.068***|
|Constant cut 1|(0.219)|(0.192)<br>-3.977***<br>(0.636)|(0.024)|(0.017)|(0.015)|
|Constant cut 2||-1.999***<br>(0.594)||||
|Constant|2.009**<br>(0.783)||0.356***<br>(0.079)|0.304***<br>(0.066)|0.210***<br>(0.079)|
|R<sup>2</sup>|||0.197|0.301|0.336|
|Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>|0.109|0.084||||
|n (Studies)|90|90|90|90|90|
|n(Effect Sizes)|349|349|349|349|349|

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a categorical indicator of sign and significance of intervention impact. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is effect size (Hedges’ g) on financial behavior. Column (1) reports results from probit-regression with a binary outcome indicating whether financial education had a significantly positive effect on financial behavior at the 5%-level. Column (2) provides results for ordered probit regression with a dependent categorical variable taking the value “-1” if financial education had a significantly negative impact on financial behavior, “0” if financial education had an insignificant effect on financial behavior, and “1” if financial education had a significant positive effect on financial behavior at the 10%-level. Column (3) reports results from GLS random-effects regression. Column (4) reports results of weighted least squares estimation with inverse variance weights. Standard errors clustered at the study-level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

54
-18-

sclerosis taking hold of stable and prosperous societies [Olson, 1982]. A characteristic of such societies is the spreading and strengthening of what Olson calls "distributional coalitions",, in other words organizations, such as professional associations, cartels, trade unions, etc., whose main aim is that of pursuing the interests of their own members at the expense of those of society as a whole. The longer the period of stability during which these groups have strengthened their position, the greater their retarding effects on growth. Conversely, periods of upheaval, for instance wars, foreign invasions or revolutions, tend to sweep away such special interest organizations and recreate conditions of greater openness and competition during which the energies of society are again devoted to wealth creation rather than solely to its distribution. The inevitability of slowdown arises from the obvious realization that wars and revolutions, at least in advanced Western countries, are hardly realistic policy options to restore growth, while even a return to complete free trade and a total absence of impediments to firm or factor mobility may, in Olson's view, not be sufficient to outweigh the negative influence of the ubiquitous cartels and lobbies. The weight of historical material assembled by Olson to document his thesis is impressive and, no doubt, a correlation can be found between social upheavals of one sort or another and growth accelerations, in some countries at least. But, whereas defeat in 1945 may well have spurred growth in France, Germany, Italy or Japan, similar defeats and changes in political regimes had much less of a perceptibl **e** ffect in the American South after the Civil War, in France in the 1870s, or in Austria in the 1920s. And, in the opposite direction, periods of increased cartellization, protectionism and goverment interference in the economy,
- Besede ̆s, Tibor & Thomas J. Prusa (2007). “The Role of Extensive and Intensive Margins and Export Growth”. _Working Paper_ 13628, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research

- Brenton, Paul & Richard S. Newfarmer (2009). “Watching More Than the Discovery Channel to Diversify Exports”. In Richard S. Newfarmer, William Shaw & Peter Walkenhorst (editors), _Breaking into New Markets: Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification_ , pp. 111–124. Washington, DC: The World Bank

- Cadot, Olivier, C ́eline Carr`ere & Vanessa Strauss-Kahn (2007). “Export Diversification: What’s Behind the Hump?” _Discussion Paper_ 6590, Centre for Economic Policy Research

- Carr`ere, C ́eline, Vanessa Strauss-Kahn & Olivier Cadot (2007). “Export Diversification: What’s Behind the Hump?” _Discussion Paper_ 6590, London, England: Centre for Economic Policy Research

- Chemingui, Mohamed Abdelbasset & S ́ebastien C. Dessus (2008). “Assessing Non-Tariff Barriers in Syria”. _Journal of Policy Modeling_ 30(5): 917–928

- De Benedictis, Luca, Marco Gallegati & Massimo Tamberi (2009). “Overall Trade Specialization and Economic Development: Countries Diversify”. _Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv_ 145(1) (April): 37–55

- di Giovanni, Julian & Andrei A. Levchenko (2009). “Trade Openness and Volatility”. _Review of Economics and Statistics_ 91(3) (August): 558–585

- Easterly, William R., Ariell Reshef & Julia M. Schwenkenberg (2009). “The Power of Exports”. Mimeograph: New York University

- Edwards, Lawrence & Robert Z. Lawrence (2008). “South African Trade Policy Matters: Trade Performance and Trade Policy”. _Economics of Transition_ 16(4) (October): 585–608

- Estevadeordal, Antoni & Christian Volpe Martincus (2006). “Specialization and Diverging Manufacturing Structures: The Aftermath of Trade Policy Reforms in Developing Countries”. _Development Working Paper_ 220, Milan, Italy: Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano

- Frankel, Jeffrey A. & David H. Romer (1999). “Does Trade Cause Growth?” _American Economic Review_ 89(3) (June): 379–399

- Goldberg, Pinelopi K., Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik & Petia Topalova (2008). “Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from India”. _Working Paper_ 14416, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research

- Gourdon, Julien & Claudia Nassif (2009). “Is FDI Increasing Export Diversification in MENA?” Mimeograph: The World Bank

- Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang & Dani Rodrik (2007). “What You Export Matters”. _Journal of Economic Growth_ 12(1) (March): 1–25

- Hausmann, Ricardo & Bailey W. Klinger (2008). “South Africa’s Export Predicament”. _Economics of Transition_ 16(4) (October): 609–637

30
14 woman becomes a widow, it is likely that she does not marry again given a lack of suitable partners of similar age.<sup>8</sup> Finally, we calculate a demographic conflict proxy that captures the extent of deaths across age groups (SEXRATIO). The data on sex ratio comes from two secondary sources: the 1991 Census (which is matched with the 1992 RDHS) and the 2002 Census (which is matched with the 2000 RDHS and the 2005 RDHS). Women are assigned the average sex ratio (defined as the ratio of males to females) in the cohort of their potential partners in a given province, taking into account the typical age difference between spouses in Rwanda. More precisely, sex ratios in a woman’s five-year age group, one younger age group and two older age groups were averaged. These provincial, age group-specific sex ratios are the closest approximation to the local marriage market possible with publicly available data. Still, sex ratios derived from census data overestimate the number of men potentially available on the marriage market, as tens of thousands of male perpetrators of genocide were in jail (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning et al. 2003).

It is important to note that our analysis is based on a sample of survivors. Households in which all (female) members died during the genocide are by definition not accounted for. In other words, the impact of the genocide is underestimated in the present analysis. However, given that the focus of this paper is on the impact of the genocide on the fertility of the survivors in the post-genocide period (and not on estimating excess mortality), this does not bias our analysis.

# **5 Estimation strategy**

We employ two slightly different estimation strategies to explore the impact of the two channels – replacement and marriage market – on fertility. This is due to the fact that proxies for conflict exposure measuring replacement effects are only available for post-genocide RDHS data, while conflict proxies measuring marriage market effects are available for both pre-genocide and post-genocide RDHS data. Table 2 provides a schematic summary of the estimation strategy.

> 8 Unfortunately, most information on marital history available in the RDHS refers to the current partnership. Hence, we do not know whether a woman has ever been widowed and then remarried. Such a woman would simply appear as ‘married’ in the data.
1

# **Introduction**

There is by now a substantial empirical literature documenting the ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox of plenty.’<sup>1</sup> Resource-rich countries should enjoy an advantage in the development process, and yet these countries experienced lower GDP growth rates post-1970 than less well endowed countries. A number of plausible explanations for this phenomenon have been suggested: inflated currencies may impede the development of the non-oil export sector (‘Dutch disease’); easy money in the form of resource rents may reduce incentives to implement needed economic reforms; and volatile resource prices may complicate macroeconomic management, exacerbating political conflicts over the sharing and management of resource revenues.

In the most extreme examples, levels of welfare in resource-rich countries are lower today than they were in 1970 – development has not been sustained by Pezzey’s (1989) definition. The Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977) offers what Solow (1986) termed a ‘rule of thumb’ for sustainability in exhaustible resource economies – a maximal constant level of consumption can be sustained if the value of investment equals the value of rents on extracted resources at each point in time. For countries dependent on such wasting assets this rule offers a prescription<sup>2</sup> for sustainable development, a prescription that Botswana in particular has followed with its diamond wealth (Lange and Wright 2004).

Drawing on a 30-year time series of resource rent data underlying the _World Development Indicators_ (World Bank 2004), we construct a ‘Hartwick Rule counterfactual’: how rich would countries be in the year 2000 if they had followed the Hartwick Rule since 1970? The results are, in many cases, striking.

Our empirical work draws upon new results<sup>3</sup> showing that the Hartwick Rule is a special case of a more general rule for sustainability. We extend the results in Hamilton and Withagen (2004) to determine the properties of a constant net saving rule – constant positive net savings entails a path for consumption that rises without bound. We then apply this rule and the standard Hartwick Rule to our historical data on investment and resource rents covering 1970-2000.

# **The Generalized Rule for Sustainability**

For a quite general model of a dynamic economy, Hamilton and Withagen (2004) establish that if the economy is competitive (households maximize utility while firms maximize profits) and if externalities are internalized through Pigovian taxes, then utility _U_ , consumption _C_ , net (genuine) saving _G_ and interest rate _r_ are related as follows:

> 1 See Auty 2001, Ch. 1 for a good overview. One of the earliest studies was Sachs and Warner (1995).

> 2 Note that Asheim _et al._ (2003) question whether the Hartwick rule is truly prescriptive. This is partly because a commitment to invest resource rents _now_ cannot commit future generations to do the same.

> 3 Hamilton and Hartwick (forthcoming) and Hamilton and Withagen (2004).
<!-- Start of picture text --> a ay ; oo<br>Naty | % R E <?* |<br>; Nee ass . ve. 4 Q .<br>Ss, S nr “tyly1S Reaw t g aat 5 » if.s - . 3 Se 0 :<br>ou ‘ lh + OF a Ey a<br>VaN ag e SO\ae.DSy cfxha ear Oey SA , FV S et ea<br>Q S L F<br>- A<br>Oct 2009: Eligible<br>teachers in treatment<br>© schools invited for<br>accelated access to<br>certification<br>> surveyNov 2009:YO baseline Ps April/Maysurvey 2011:Y2 > Apsu r il/Mayvey 2012: Y3<br>re eee r rece c reece cece eee eee ence ene eee eee<br>1-Jan-09 1-Jan-10 1-Jan-11 1-Jan-12 31-Dec-12<br>SS ——<br>school year 1 school year 2 school year 3<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Policy Research Working Paper 7630

# **Abstract**

This paper seeks to find an empirical explanation of Vietnam’s outstanding performance on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2012. Only a few developing countries participate in the assessment. Those who do, with the unique exception of Vietnam, are typically clustered at the lower end of the range of the Programme for International student Assessment scores. The paper compares Vietnam’s performance with that of a set of seven developing countries from the 2012 assessment’s data set, using a cut-off per capita GDP (in 2010 purchasing power parity dollars) of $10,000. The seven developing countries’ average performance lags Vietnam’s by more than 100 points. The “Vietnam effect” is difficult to unscramble, but the paper is able to explain about half of the gap between Vietnam and the seven countries. The analysis reveals that Vietnamese students may be approaching their studies with higher diligence and discipline, their parents may have higher expectations, and the parents may be following up with teachers regarding those expectations. The teachers themselves may be working in a more disciplined environment, with tabs being kept on their own performance as teachers. Vietnam may also be benefiting from investments in pre-school education and in school infrastructure that are disproportionately higher when compared with Vietnam’s per capita income level.

This paper is a product of the Education Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at esedmik@ worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
- Felman, Josh, Sandefur, Justin, Subramanian, Arvind and Duggan, Julian (2019). Is indias consumption really falling? Blog. Center for Global Development.

- Ghatak, Maitreesh, Kotwal, Ashok and Ramaswami, Bharat (2020). What would make indias growth sustainable. Blog. The India Forum.

- Gibson, John, Datt, Gaurav, Murgai, Rinku and Ravallion, Martin (2017). For indias rural poor, growing towns matter more than growing cities. _World Development_ , **98,** 413–429.

- Gibson, John and Kim, Bonggeun (2007). Measurement error in recall surveys and the relationship between household size and food demand. _American Journal of Agricultural Economics_ , **89,** 473–489.

- Gideon, Michael, Helppie-McFall, Brooke and Hsu, Joanne W. (2017). Heaping at round numbers on financial questions: The role of satisficing. _Survey research methods_ , **11, No. 2** .

- Goyal, Ashima and Kumar, Abhishek (2020). Indian growth is not overestimated: Mr. subramanian you got it wrong. _Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies_ , **13.1,** 29–52.

- Gravel, Nicolas and Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop (2010). Is india better off today than 15 years ago? a robust multidimensional answer. _Journal of Economic Inequality_ , **8,** 173–195.

- Gupta, Arpit, Malani, Anup and Woda, Bartek (2021a). Explaining the income and consumption effects of covid in india. NBER Working Papers w28935. National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Gupta, Arpit, Malani, Anup and Woda, Bartosz (2021b). Inequality in india declined during covid. NBER Working Papers w29597. National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Haziza, David and Beaumont, Jean-Franois (2017). Construction of weights in surveys: A review. _Statistical Science_ , **32.2,** 206–226.

- Himanshu (2019). Inequality in india: A review of levels and trends. WIDER Working Paper 2019/42. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

- Himanshu, Lanjouw, Peter, Murgai, Rinku and Stern, Nicholas (2013). Nonfarm diversification, poverty, economic mobility, and income inequality: A case study in village india. _Agricultural Economics_ , **44,** 461–473.

67