In the absence of sufficiently broad theoretical and empirical research on the impacts of performance pay and other incentives, only tentative theoretical arguments are presented here. Linking procurement administrators’ pay to procurement outcomes such as discounts achieved, number of bidders, or project completion on time and budget can potentially increase their effort hence contribute to better value for money and counter corruption. This impact pathway nevertheless crucially depends on a number of conditions: first, bureaucrats’ effort should be able to meaningfully and measurably influence outcomes which may not be the case if for example inter-bidder collusion puts competition off. Moreover, if bureaucratic action is over-regulated to the degree that even the best effort and skill cannot push a tender beyond the required minimum process, again the link between bureaucrats’ effort and outcomes is broken. Second, public bureaucracies are often governed by informal rules and power relations, especially in developing countries which implies that it is very hard to incentivize those who are really in charge. For example, incentivizing a front-line procurement administrator to widen access to tenders while his boss is corruptly linked to a particular bidder is likely to create frustration rather than better outcomes. Third, material rewards have proven to crowd out intrinsic motivation in a number of contexts including the public sector and procurement project management (Rasul & Rogger, 2015).

Empirical work should be carried out regarding each of the identified mechanisms for adequately underpinning policy advice.

# 6. <u>Professionalization and capacity development</u>

As shortage of staff and lack of capability has been identified as one of the primary barriers to effective procurement reform (Telgen et al., 2016), professionalizing and improving the capacity of the public procurement workforce has been one of the key reform avenues sought by developed as well as developing countries in the last decade (OECD, 2012; World Bank, 2007). It is acknowledged that these reforms need to involve providing training for procurement staff advancing their skills and knowledge of procurement systems and management techniques, offering specialist advice, and supporting effective leadership of and knowledge sharing among procurement bodies (Telgen et al., 2016; UK Office of Government Commerce, 2007).

# _a) Theory_

Unfortunately, only one systematic assessment of public procurement professionalization and capacity development programs could be identified which provides some pointers for impact mechanisms, potential barriers and enablers (Telgen et al., 2016). Hence, the theoretical considerations enlisted here remain preliminary. First, given that public procurement regulations and IT systems are highly complex and dynamically change, capacity development is essential for increasing and updating comprehension among procurement administrators even for maintaining compliance with the most basic rules (OECD, 2009). Second, increasing the performance rather than compliance orientation among staff, for example through the spread of state-of-the-art supply chain management techniques, is a key promise of capacity development trainings. Third, establishing a procurement code of conduct or code of ethics and promoting integrity can also be pursued through training and workshops (Telgen et al., 2016). All these point at the potential of capacity development for improving value for money as well as widening access to public contracts. However, in organizations plagued by systemic corruption, it will only achieve more sophisticated corruption strategies (i.e. making corrupt transactions look legal) if anything. Similarly, if it has an insufficient mandate or when motivations, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, are low, more information and knowledge will achieve little more than a tick-box exercise.

# _b) Evidence_

The aforementioned meta-study by Telgen et al. (2016) examines the existing evidence on the impact of interventions that aim to improve transparency in public procurement. It uses an evidence base consisting 27