rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table 2: Program outputs

|**District**<br>|**Population**<br>**size**|**Wards**<br>**sampled**|**TSSM /**<br>**Combination**<br>**Wards**|<br>**Masons**<br>**trained**|**Villages**<br>**with**<br>**trained**<br>**masons**|**Number of**<br>**CLTS**<br>**facilitators**<br>**trained**|**Number of**<br>**communities**<br>**triggered**|**People**<br>**reached**<br>**in TSSM**<br>**DCC**|**HWWS /**<br>**Combination**<br>**Wards**|<br>**Frontline**<br>**activators**<br>**trained**|**People**<br>**reached**<br>**in DCC**<br>**(1)**|**People**<br>**reached**<br>**in DCC**<br>**(2)**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Igunga|399,727|24|12|42|42|32|282|36,500|12|40|35,509|29,093|
|Karagwe|332,020|24|12|50|49|40|465|21,700|12|46|16,893|39,138|
|Musoma|178,356|24|12|47|48|40|289|NA|12|50|25,441|37,229|
|Rufiji|247,993|16|8|49|46|45|185|34,950|8|45|8,783|14,483|
|Masasi|217,274|15|7|36|34|50|217|28,100|8|42|25,283|13,935|
|Iringa|254,032|12|6|28|30|18|168|15,580|6|28|14,471|15,071|
|Sumbawa|305,846|16|8|40|144|24|211|21,350|8|32|29,219|29,077|
|Kiteto|244,669|8|4|13|30|18|50|5,700|4|53|3,936|10,403|
|Kondoa|269,704|30|15|76|149|5|183|7,600|15|67|24,418|32,016|
|Mpwapwa|305,056|12|6|26|58|10|63|9,200|6|30|36,618|13,631|
|Total|**2,754,677**|181|90|407|630|282|2,113|180,680|91|433|220,571|234,076|

Table 3: Program contamination (monitoring data)

||Planned|Lost Wards<br>(Masasi)|Final<br>Assignment|Contamination|Actually<br>treated|Not triggered<br>byCLTS|Didn't receive<br>TSSM DCC|Didn't receive<br>HWWS DCC|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Control|48|2|46|-|46|-|-|-|
|HWWS|47|2|45|-|45|-|-|2|
|TSSM|47|3|44|-1|43|7|5|-|
|HWWS + TSSM|48|2|46|+1|47|4|4|3|

Notes: no reported problems with (i) mason training or (ii) training of front-line activators (FLAs); no available information for delivery of villagelevel media (wall drawings, posters, etc.) 37
years prior to the takeovers) and matched controls. Again, column (1) reports statistics on acquirer firms and columns (2)-(3) report statistics on target firms (and their matched controls). Comparing the acquirer and target firms, workers at acquirer firms tend to have longer tenure, be slightly higher skilled, have higher labor income, and are less likely to be fixed-term contract workers. Given their presence in the matching algorithm, treatment and control target workers are similar in terms of their average tenure and earnings. Reassuringly, even worker characteristics that are omitted from the matching algorithm, including gender, age, country of birth, and contract type are fairly well balanced. However, treated targets have slightly fewer skilled workers.<sup>10</sup>

# **2.4 Event Study Estimation**

We are primarily interested in the impact of the takeover on incumbent target workers. For workers to enter our estimation sample, they must be employed at the target firm four years prior to the takeover. Importantly, we do not require these workers to remain employed for the interim four years prior to the takeover. This allows us to test for pre-trends in retention and compensation of these workers for the years leading up to the takeover. An advantage of focusing on incumbent workers is that it prevents endogenous selection of workers into our sample (e.g., anticipation effects).

We use a standard event-study framework to estimate how worker outcomes change around the takeover event.

where _i_ indexes workers, _t_ indexes event time, and _Yit_ is an outcome at the level of an individual worker. Takeover _i_ is an indicator for being an incumbent worker employed at a firm involved in a takeover four years prior to the event, the _βk_ are event-time indicators, the _ψi_ are worker fixed effects, the _νt_ are event-time fixed effects, the _γl_ are calendar-year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the event level. Because of the staggered timing of these events, we use the weighting approach proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021).<sup>11</sup>

> 10We use actual skill levels as reported in the Education Database as well as imputed skill values using an inverse Mincer equation (see Appendix B). Low-skilled refers to workers who have up to and including a low (junior) secondary education. Medium-skilled refers to workers with upper-secondary or post-secondary education excluding tertiary education. Workers designated as high-skilled have tertiary education.

> 11As demonstrated in Goodman-Bacon (2021) two-way fixed effects models (TWFE) can produce biased estimates in

10
3 Suppressing firm subscripts, the complete model is presented ln Table 1. For future reference we first call the reader's attention to the portfolio vector, a a -alt, a2t, ... , a 1, whicn Ls the focus of our t It" 2t' ~Kt analysis. This vector is defined to include a financial asset subvector at- (a,t, a,t, ... , ak 2, inventories (ak.I,t), and fired capital (akt). Debts e..cer the financial asset subvector negatively, so summing the portfolio vector over all items yields net worth (equation 5).

We now review the model's structure, beginning with the determination of income and net worth. By accounting identity we write real net income for a representative firm in period t as equation (1). Here Yt is real net income, Gt is operating earnings, and a' x is the vector product of financial assets (it_) held by the firm with the real yields (xt) these St I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~assets generate. Financial assets and real yields may be of either sign, so the second right-hand-side term of equation (1) may be positive or negative.

Real financial yields will be viewed as determined by macro conditions, and hence exogenous to the firm. So, since it_1 is predetermined, some assumptions regarding the determinants of operating earnings will complete the linkage between macro conditions and current net income. Suppose output (qt) is Cobb-Douglas in labor (Lt) and beginning-of-period nonfinan'cial assets; i.e., fixed capital and inventories: qt L Lt ki aj,t.-i) J -k-i Also let the market for manufactured products be represented as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), so that under Bertrand competition the representative firm believes it-can sell output level qt for price:
<!-- Start of picture text --> ‐0.5% 1 in 5<br>‐3.5% 1 in 10<br>‐7.2% 1 in 15<br>‐10% 1 in 25<br>Change in GDP % Points<br>Frequency of Drought Event<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Figure 2** . Impact of Drought Events on Malawi’s Annual GDP

Source: GFDRR available at <u>http://www.preventionweb.net/files/15520_gfdrrecon.vulnerabilitydrrmalawimoz.pdf</u> Figure 2 indicates that Malawi, and other countries with a similar drought risk profile, are highly vulnerable to events that happen on a regular basis. The regularity with which significant reductions in crop production and its adverse macro impact on a nation’s GDP occur leads to a vicious cycle of development gains being eroded by drought, and requiring the country to depend on emergency food aid from international agencies. However, even with the best of intentions, international food aid is slow to arrive and the longer the wait is, the worse the longer term impacts of food insecurity are (Clarke and Hill 2013). Therefore, at the national level the rationale for having an insurance scheme is to enhance the state's ability to quickly respond to food crisis situations. For a scheme like this to be meaningful and sustainable the cost of developing such a system and its financial viability need to be assured as has been examined in Clarke & Hill 2013 and from the perspective of the state the premiums should be affordable and the payout should be immediate at times of actual disasters in the future (which implies that basis risk should be low so as not to miss such actual drought disasters). Issues related to sustainability of the insurance scheme, affordability, reliability of insurance being triggered, amount of cover (is it a 1‐in‐10 year loss or 1‐in‐25 year loss) above which insurance payout begins and below which the state makes alternative arrangements through other safety net programs, and limits on insurance payments have been extensively investigated in Clarke & Hill 2013 for the African Risk Capacity, ARC, multi‐national insurance scheme.

<mark>A similar rationale to support governments in the event of a natural disaster to infrastructure was earlier used in the establishment of the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility in 2007 which pools earthquake and hurricane risks across Caribbean countries (CCRIF 2013). The insurance payout in CCRIF is based on objective model triggers (for earthquakes and hurricanes) that correlate with property losses in each country. CCRIF was initially conceived to insure public infrastructure and the payment if triggered was made to the government to partially offset its infrastructure loss. The</mark> 8
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Sudan and minor protests in Djibouti, Mauritania, the West Bank and Gaza, and Saudi Arabia.

While the rather blooming economic context in which the Arab Spring broke out prompted some development economists to label it a puzzle or a paradox (Devarajan, 2015), examining these events through the lens of the SC, which places emphasis on the political context as well, allows to greatly improve the understanding of their root causes. In the first decade of the 2000s, the standard indicators of economic well-being (growth, poverty, and inequality) and human development (child mortality and school attainment) all had encouraging levels and trends. Yet, as shown by World Values Surveys and Gallup surveys, there existed significant dissatisfaction of citizens in MENA and much of it was about political factors such as voice and accountability and freedom of speech to which the middle class and the youth were aspiring. The authoritarianism of governments was also of great concern to these populations.

With no doubt the Arab Spring has given rise to a magnificent wave of hope among young people in the MENA region who have raised their voices strongly against corrupt practices and called for more jobs, freedom and dignity. But recent events in the region suggest the possibility that this hope may have evaporated.<sup>23</sup> Even in the few cases where protest movements have taken place in an extremely peaceful manner, for various reasons that certainly deserve to be explored but go beyond the scope of this document, what has happened is, instead of the advent of a new SC responding to the aspirations of the frustrated population, at best, governments attempted to return to a governance of the authoritarian bargain-type discussed earlier.<sup>24</sup> Thus, although the SC of the post WWII in the MENA region has been seriously challenged by the difficulties of the countries of this region in the 1980s and 1990s and that the Arab Spring 2010 has severely shaken their social structures to the point of alerting governments to the urgent need to facilitate the emergence of a higher-quality SC (Devarajan and Mottaghi, 2015; Ibrahim, 2020), the events that have followed the Arab Spring have demonstrated, once again, that the development in peace of the region would necessarily require a new SC. It is striking, however, that, despite the richness of the historical events that marked the evolution of MENA's SC, to the best of our knowledge, the only attempt to develop a unified

> 23 As a high-level World Bank manager has recently put it: "But as we now know, the wave crashed into a maelstrom of disillusionment, political opportunism, authoritarianism, violence, and civil war." (Belhaj, 2021). 24 For a long time, MENA states have chosen the politically easy but economically disastrous SC where basic goods and services are made available at low prices in return of political allegiances and social peace. Governments can no longer bear the cost of such a policy and the population, especially the youth, is no longer willing to accept a quid pro quo that silences their aspirations (Belhaj, 2021).

12
countries in 1998<sup>6</sup> . In addition to stripping out expenditures on salaries and wages of state employees, this study differentiates between current government expenditures and capital expenditures. The estimates of the size of the procurement markets are reported (as a share of each nation’s respective Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) in Appendix 1.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1: The skewed size of procurement markets<br>in 106 Non‐OECD nations<br>1000<br>100<br>10<br>1<br>0 20 40 60 80 100<br>0.1<br>0.01<br>Final Consumption Expenditure (FCE)<br>FCE excluding compensation and defense<br>Billions of dollars, 1998<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1 plots the distribution (from smallest to largest) of the computed size of government procurement outlays for the 106 developing economies. The skewed nature of this distribution is clear: in 1998 about half of the developing countries covered in this OECD study had state procurement outlays less than or equal to $1 billion. Only six developing countries had state procurement markets<sup>7</sup> whose total size exceeded $10 billion. Table 1 makes clear just how few of the developing countries have public procurement markets that are of any magnitude. This finding raises the question whether there could be a large payoff to OECD firms in improved “market access” to developing countries’ state procurement markets.<sup>8</sup>

> 6 For the purposes of the figure 1 and table 1 reported here a country that is not an OECD member is taken to be a developing country. Separately, it is worth noting that the OECD (2002a) study also reports data on the size of procurement markets in the OECD nations.

> 7 See the “FCE excluding compensation and defence” line in Figure 1.

> 8 The size of public procurement spending on goods and services may understate the total trade impact of procurement rules. For example, local content requirements for inputs may imply that transactions that do not directly involve a state agency can be influenced by public procurement policies. More generally,

6
The Mexican Pension Annuity Market

- Before 1999 investment rules prescribed the investment of technical reserve only in inflation indexed instruments.  After 1999, companies were allowed to invest in nominal instruments with yield higher than inflation as long as they acquire derivative products to cover the inflation risk.  After the year 2000 companies were allowed to invest up to 10 percent of technical reserves in foreign currency instruments issued or guaranteed by the federal government.

- Institutions may cover obligations in foreign currency with their equivalent in local currency by means of acquiring derivative products exclusively for covering exchange rate risk with authorized intermediaries and recognized markets by the Central Bank.

**Credit risk rules** ⎯ In order to minimize the risk, all private debt securities as well as titles in investment funds used by insurance companies to cover technical reserves must have a minimum acceptable rating determined by a rating agency approved by the Banking and Securities National Commission (CNBV).

The following table reports the evolution of investment of technical reserves. Most of the provisions are invested in government bonds. Companies are required to fully hedge inflation and interest rate risk and only a very small currency mismatch is allowed by regulation between assets and liabilities. Since private sector issuers of inflation linked long term bonds are essentially non existent, this is done by purchasing inflation linked instruments with long maturities that are mostly issued by the federal government.

**Table 11: Investment of Technical Provisions (1997–2005)**

|**(percent)**|**1997**|**1998**|**1999**|**2000**|**2001**|**2002**|**2003**|**2004**|**2005**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Other Inv.|1.5|1.5|4.7|4.9|6.8|7.8|10.6|15.3|11.8|
|Private Sec.|20.0|16.3|10.4|14.4|10.4|11.6|15.7|16.2|11.9|
|Government Sec.|78.5|82.2|84.9|80.7|82.8|80.6|73.7|68.5|76.3|
|Total(MXN mln.)/1|3,602|16,191|29,713|43,743|60,039|69,061|78,112|84,112|79,852|

**Notes** : 1/ constant prices as of Dec 2005. **Source** : CNSF

The following table reports instead how the investment of technical reserves has shifted over time from nominal and foreign assets to real and domestic assets; thus considerably reducing exposure to inflation and currency risk.

**Table 12: Inflation and Currency Risk in Technical Provisions (1997–2005)**

|**(percent)**|**1997**|**1998**|**1999**|**2000**|**2001**|**2002**|**2003**|**2004**|**2005**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Local nominal|36.1|40.7|14.0|4.0|5.1|4.8|0.2|0.5|0.4|
|Foreign nominal|3.9|1.3|1.6|2.6|2.4|2.3|2.2|3.6|0.8|
|Local real|60.0|58.0|84.4|93.1|92.2|92.6|97.4|94.2|91.3|
|Local and foreign nominal 1/|0.0|0.0|0.0|0.4|0.3|0.3|0.3|1.7|7.6|

**Notes** : 1/ with inflation rate guaranteed. **Source** : CNSF

- 17 -
Annexes 14 and 15 present the aggregated results on the importable and exportable hypothesis respectively. Cane was heavily protected during the periods 1965-72 and 1984-88, The NPC was as high as 5.24 in 1966 on the the importable hypothesis and it was 6.14 in 1985 on the exportable hypothesis. The lowest NPCs for this period were 0.23 and 0.24 in 1975 (importable and exportable hypotheses respectively). This was largely due to a low computed reference price of cane. The reference prices followed a similar trend to sugar reference prices. The NPC dipped in 1975 for cane as it had done for sugar. As is apparent form Figure 17, both NPCs move together.

Figure 17: **Weighted averages of NPCs for mill sugarcane in UP, Maharashtra and TN,** 1965-94 <!-- Start of picture text --> 5 -4-t O IMPORTABLE<br>-'!! EXPORTABLE<br><0; 4 -2 n - "' -- '.' I 'N'<br>.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - sY .~ vN. WwX4N....'6 N,NE°<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources and notes: See Annexes 14 and 15. The importable and exportable hypothesis NPCs are identical during 1965-68 owing to identical reference prices based on minimum cane cultivation costs (see text).

Annexes 11, 12 and 13 show the sugarcane NPCs in UP Maharashtra and TN. Period averages are given in Table 9. The NPCs are consistently higher in UP than in the other two states. Part of the explanation for this is the lower reference price of sugar in UP, discussed previously. For example, in 1991/92, if UP's sugar reference price had been the same as Tamil Nadu's, i.e. Rs 842.8 per quintal instead of Rs 806.6 per quintal, then the NPC to cane producers on the importable hypothesis would have been 0.75 instead of 0.79. Another reason for the higher cane NPCs in UP, is that the mills have to compete with khandsari and gur units for sugarcane. For example, in 1991/92, about half the cane was used by khandsari and gur units compared to about 37 percent used by sugar mills. As there are no controls on gur prices or the prices of khandsari sugar and khandsari molasses, the gur and khandsari units are able to pay relatively high cane prices despite their technical inefficiency, which in turn forces the mills to pay higher cane prices than the prices they generally pay in other states 43
These findings complement evidence, mostly from less developed economies, that decentralization can facilitate capture of local governments and collusion between local officers and local elites. For instance, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) find that the targeting performance of the Food for Education program in Bangladesh is worse in communities where land inequality is greater. They interpret this as evidence of elite capture. In Ecuador, Araujo et al. (2008) find evidence of local capture of a social development fund. Local capture was also more likely in villages with greater inequality. In China, Jia and Nie (2015) show how decentralization has facilitated collusion between coal mines and industry regulators. This has translated into poorer safety standards, and increased mortality rate of workers.

An important observation is that the success, or failure, of decentralization may depend on existing institutions that can increase political accountability and safeguard against local capture. For instance, using a cross section of 75 countries, Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007) find that strong political parties substantially improve the effect of decentralization on growth, public goods provision, and government quality.

Some papers examining the effectiveness of community-driven monitoring are consistent with the importance of political accountability. For example, in Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show that a newspaper campaign that provided parents information about school revenue reduced diversion of funds. Francken, Minten and Swinnen (2009) document a similar finding in Madagascar. In that case, media significantly reduced the local capture of public education funds, especially among more educated communities that may be more able to use the information to monitor local officers.<sup>29</sup> Björkman and Svensson (2010) also find that communitybased monitoring can be effective to improve health services, but this monitoring is less effective in fractionalized, unequal communities.

# **4.3 How are mining revenues distributed?  Selected case studies**

In practice, the distribution of mining revenues varies across countries. In this section we discuss selected case studies that fall within four commonly used approaches: no formal redistribution rule, revenue sharing, fiscal decentralization, and direct contributions to communities.<sup>30</sup>

> 29 See section 3.2. in Mookherjee (2015) for additional information.

> 30 This section is based on ICMM (2006) and (2009).

40
a63concern **Is** the performance of the 28% of utilities that had poor operating ratios **at** appraisal (I.e., 0.80 and over): about three quarters elther did not significantly Improve their performance or performance actually deteriorated during the 'course of the project.

Fro,m a regional point of view, utilities In East Africa were more successful at meeting the forecast operating ratio and thereby Improving financial performance during the course of project Implementation than other regions, as can be seen In Table 4. EMENA was particularly poor at meeting the forecast operating ratlo, followed by LAC, and East and South Asia.

Table 4 Reg onal Breakdown of Operatina Ratios for Completed Prolects

||E. Asia|S. Asia|E. Africa|W. Africa|LAC|EMENA|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Averaae|||||||
|SAR Forecasi<br>0.62|**u.7o**|0.61|0.60|0.67|0.54|0.67|
|Actual at<br>Completion<br>0.75|0.80|0.79|0.66|0.80|0.65|0.86|

# Self-financina Ratio

The self-financing ratio Is an Indicator of the success and sustainability of a utility an'd measures the amount of Investment requirements financed by Intemal cash generation. Unfortunately, It Is one of the hardest ratios to compare from one project to another because of the Inconsistent ways In which n Is estimated, despite very specific OMS guidelines. Many estimates In appraisal reports do not Include changes In working capial and a few even exclude payment of taxes. Consequently, the self-financing ratlo had to be reestimated for a sample of projects for the purpose of this review according to the standard OMS deflnition: