the local laboratory capacity to genetically sequence the virus and provide the sequence information electronically – have been urged to contribute human and avian samples.

The WHO views the free sharing of samples as a ‘collective responsibility’<sup>77</sup> . The recently released best practices<sup>78</sup> , by asking for the open posting by collaborating centers of all the genetic sequence data on the viruses, has given such information the status of an international public good. However, some governments have shown in their actions that they view the viral samples (or both the samples and related sequencing information) as ‘national’ public goods, which are to be protected from use by other governments or foreign commercial concerns without a defined contract. There are three factors that are driving this dissonance. First, the divergence of the H5N1 viruses into genetically and antigenically distinct clades – like the Indonesian strain – has given specificity to the viral information that is valuable for vaccine development. Additionally, governments – through both national and international law – have sovereignty over the viral information collected under their jurisdiction, which means that both the WHO and other fore gn partiesi can be excluded<sup>79</sup> .

Second, the governments in developing countries have had some justification in questioning the free sharing of sample and sequence information under an ‘international public good’ system, given the current lack of an accepted global vaccine plan, backed by adequate financing and logistical details. It is a fact that the preponderance of vaccine manufacturing capacity is in the industrialized world, and national pandemic plans ask for securing stockpiles to cover domestic populations first. In such a situation, even if governments honor their international collective responsibility and share information, they cannot be assured that in the use of the information, the information has characteristics of being ‘non‐rival’ in consumption, i.e., affordable global availability of adequate vaccine doses to cover at‐risk populations. In fact, global manufacturing capacity for such vaccines, and the technologies involved, remain in the private sector, which would not undertake the massive investments in producing capacity without a compelling commercial logic.

Third, in nationalizing the information, governments stand to make large revenues when they sign privileged commercial contracts. Most developing countries do not have the production capacities or technology to capitalize on the specificity of the viral strain. However, in exclusive revenue‐sharing contracts with foreign pharmaceutical companies, both funds as well as technical know‐how can be procured, which benefits domestic health security. In contrast, there is a government’s net‐loss view of the world where other commercial oncerns w ll sell the country a vaccine based on the local strain. c i The WHO has been sympathetic to the country governments’ concerns, while insisting on the continuing free transfer of sample and genetic sequence information. However, if governments proceed to view viral information as a national good, this may create a major challenge for the response against a potential pandemic of influenza. Some governments have indicated they would honor the global sharing of information if WHO collaborating centers and foreign countries sign Material Transfer Agreements (MTA) that would prevent release of the data for commercial use. However, given that vaccine production capacity remains privatized; such MTAs would be tantamount to crippling the creation of a multi‐sourced and robust global influenza vaccine strategy.

Three policy efforts would secure a system of ethical and cooperative international sharing of disease information. First, further urgency is needed for the development of candidate H5N1 vaccines with true cross‐protection across the strains currently circulating. Second, an internationally brokered and financially comprehensive plan is needed that sets 39