**Table 9: Detailed tagging for Moldova**

<u>(Moldovan Leu and percents)</u>

|**Levels**|**2006**|**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**2010**|**2011**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1. Benefit principle funding|7,229,827,026|8,721,409,736|10,741,797,634|13,783,944,306|15,688,441,347|16,727,140,185|
|2. Rights and guarantees established in various k|1,632,003,403|2,173,174,504|2,640,840,224|2,792,805,314|3,302,523,206|3,638,445,229|
|3. Intergovernmental relations|2,389,312,542|3,175,557,166|4,276,482,461|4,346,908,569|5,614,745,177|5,742,981,688|
|4. Macroeconomic dynamics|454,557,829|634,606,583|732,694,633|843,090,629|557,604,625|673,289,746|
|5. Extraordinary income|606,485,394|767,999,129|673,432,076|726,832,356|889,180,541|1,382,323,742|
|6. Resource disputes within government|4,446,967,865|5,845,227,372|6,940,841,015|7,655,611,262|8,465,242,647|10,029,362,979|
|7. Implicit in fiscalpolicy|0|0|0|0|0|0|
|**Rigid Spending**|**16,759,154,059 **|**21,317,974,489 **|**26,006,088,044 **|**30,149,192,437 **|**34,517,737,544 **|**38,193,543,569**|
|**Discretionary Spending**|**5,187,229,141**|**5,702,525,935**|**5,779,165,284**|**4,255,365,322**|**3,894,641,902**|**2,842,961,319**|
|**Percentage**|**2006**|**2007**|**2008**|**2009**|**2010**|**2011**|
|1. Benefit principle funding|32.94|32.28|33.79|40.06|40.84|40.76|
|2. Rights and guarantees established in various k|7.44|8.04|8.31|8.12|8.60|8.87|
|3. Intergovernmental relations|10.89|11.75|13.45|12.63|14.62|13.99|
|4. Macroeconomic dynamics|2.07|2.35|2.31|2.45|1.45|1.64|
|5. Extraordinary income|2.76|2.84|2.12|2.11|2.31|3.37|
|6. Resource disputes within government|20.26|21.63|21.84|22.25|22.04|24.44|
|7. Implicit in fiscalpolicy|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|**Rigid Spending**|**76.36**|**78.90**|**81.82**|**87.63**|**89.86**|**93.07**|
|**Discretionary Spending**|**23.64**|**21.10**|**18.18**|**12.37**|**10.14**|**6.93**|

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Cetrangolo et al (2010)

# **5: Using Force and tagging to discover the pressures within detailed public expenditures**

In this section we tie the previous sections together to demonstrate the value of using force and momentum together with the rigidity and discretionary tagging. We do so by analyzing detailed expenditure data from the World Bank’s BOOST datasets for a range of countries. However, even in the absence of detailed BOOST data, we show that force and momentum can still be used to determine valuable information about how rigid and discretionary items are affecting a country’s budget. The key lessons we take away from this section are that once the momentum in a country’s expenditure begins to grow, it takes a correspondingly large amount of force to slow it down. However the share of discretionary items is often small and, for some countries, shrinking. If these countries enter a period of fiscal crises, reducing aggregate expenditures will require even greater reductions in discretionary spending or very difficult reforms of rigid items.

We begin by analyzing Moldova at the aggregate level as it illustrates the interactions of force and momentum. Building further on the earlier example that momentum is the speed that a car is travelling, force acts as the accelerator pedal or brake pedal to adjust your speed. Thus a positive force number means your car has increased its speed from what it was at the previous point, on the other hand (or foot in this example) a negative force number acts like the brakes which will reduce the car’s speed (negative force number). At some point however, if the force applied is strong enough it will not only bring your car to a stop it could even propel you backwards (i.e. have negative momentum).