rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table 7: Relationship between energy management and energy intensity in quantity terms.

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||All Firms|Manufacturing|Services|All Firms|Manufacturing|Services|All Firms|Manufacturing|Services|
|Energy|0.064|0.054|0.068|0.192<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.097|0.186<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.261<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.163<sup>_∗_</sup>|0.227<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
||(0.040)|(0.053)|(0.063)|(0.040)|(0.061)|(0.060)|(0.060)|(0.088)|(0.094)|
|General|||||||0.240<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.435<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.015|
||||||||(0.090)|(0.139)|(0.138)|
|No. Employees||||0.457<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.319<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.478<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.480<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.304<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.447<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|||||(0.034)|(0.054)|(0.053)|(0.061)|(0.089)|(0.101)|
|Capital Stock|||||0.210<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|||0.211<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>||
||||||(0.027)|||(0.037)||
|Log(Sales)||||-0.534<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.591<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.569<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.573<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.626<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.574<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|||||(0.024)|(0.039)|(0.036)|(0.041)|(0.061)|(0.068)|
|3-digit sector|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Age|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Country|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Observations|7666|4352|3166|7653|3326|3161|3582|1837|1153|
|Adjusted _R_<sup>2</sup>|0.241|0.241|0.228|0.300|0.319|0.299|0.315|0.332|0.318|
|df<br>~~m~~|121|84|63|123|86|65|113|82|61|

Standard errors in parentheses Capital, labor, and output enter in logs. _∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 1, _p <_ 0 _._ 05, _p <_ 0 _._ 01

**26**
empirical evidence. Previous empirical studies also highlight that adding household assets helps to improve on poverty estimates, and Model 2, which adds asset and animal ownership to Model 1, is consistent with this evidence. However, adding more variables may lead to overfitting, resulting in less accurate welfare estimates. The results of Model 3 could be placed in this context.

# **V. Targeting Performance**

The imputed welfare estimates can be useful in evaluating ex post the inclusion/exclusion errors of the food assistance programs administered by the government and humanitarian organizations during 2016/17. The targeting strategy for food assistance was agreed to and implemented by the <mark>UNHCR, WFP, and the government agency in Chad responsible for refugees, the CNARR.</mark> We perform an analysis to show how accurately the current targeting strategy identifies poor households in terms of inclusion (leakage) and exclusion (undercoverage) errors. Both error types are important but from different perspectives. The inclusion error matters primarily from a budget perspective, as it represents a waste of resources. The exclusion error summarizes the program’s failure to cover households in need.

The current <mark>UNHCR/WFP/CNARR targeting approach relies o</mark> n the Food Consumption Score (FCS) generated by the WFP’s PDM surveys, which is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and the relative nutritional importance of different food items. As is the case for any index, the FCS is contingent on the selection of the food group weights as well as the food item thresholds, which are based on inherently subjective choices. Survey-tosurvey methods have been shown to outperform these types of index approaches, whereas the Dang et al. (2017) cross-imputation method has been shown to perform better than the proxy means testing also in refugee contexts (Dang and Verme 2019).<sup>10</sup> In light of the previous findings, we empirically evaluate how the UNHCR/WFP/CNARR targeting strategy performs relative to the targeting method based on predicted consumption and

> 10 On optimal targeting in humanitarian contexts, see also Verme and Gigliarano (2019).

13
Policy Research Working Paper 7932

# **Abstract**

This paper studies the question of whether exchange rate policy affects the impact of remittances on economic growth in recipient countries. The paper utilizes a comprehensive data set that comprises annual observations for 135 developing and transition countries, spanning 1970−2007. The data for exchange rate regimes is based on the Reinhart and Rogoff exchange rate regime classification, whereas the data for remittances and all other variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The findings indicate that more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with a greater increase in economic growth following an increase in remittances, but also that the impact of remittances on growth is positive under a fixed exchange rate regime. The estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in remittances increases per capita growth by about 0.79 percent under a fixed exchange rate regime, and that this effect increases by about 0.13 percent for a 1 point increase in the exchange rate flexibility - index. The results further suggest that the effect of remit tances under a fixed exchange rate regime is positive in less financially developed countries as well, but do not provide conclusive evidence that this effect varies inversely with exchange rate flexibility in such economies as theorized.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at elartey@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Will players establish a convention of cooperation and thereby obtain the 70% return each period? High-caste pairs usually did not, but the low-caste pairs usually did. 73 percent of low caste pairs played the efficient equilibrium in the final (fifth) period of a partnership, compared to 50 percent of mixed (low-high) caste pairs, and only 32 percent of high caste pairs.

Caste status is correlated with many individual characteristics, and one might suspect that it is covariates of caste rather than caste culture that is driving the divergence in outcomes. However, the study observes measures of the subjects' wealth and education. Once caste status is controlled for in regression analysis, the covariates are statistically insignificant.

Why do the high-caste pairs fail to form the Pareto efficient convention? The evidence from the game and from surveys of attitudes to vignettes points to the high caste’s culture of honor as the cause. The culture may have given the loser’s payoff the meaning of an insult. In the culture of honor, any slight to one’s well-being tends to be viewed as an insult that must be avenged, regardless of whether the insult was intended or not: _cross me and I’ll punish you_ . Under this view, the loser’s payoff would be interpreted as a wrong to be punished.<sup>6</sup> The only means a player has to punish the wrong is not to cooperate in the next period. Figure 6 shows that high-caste players with high-caste partners are much less likely than low-caste players with low-caste partners to continue to take the cooperative action after obtaining the loser’s payoff. “Punishing” – withdrawing cooperation in one period—can insult high-caste partners and cause even low-caste players to try less often for cooperation. Thus any expectation that each player will try to cooperate can unravel.

> 6 A similar culture of honor is held by men in the US South, but not by men in the US North.   Nisbett and Cohen (1996) expose Northern and Southern men to the same insult and find significantly more aggressive responses from the Southerners. On average, the Southern but not the Northern subjects experienced surges in levels of cortisol and testosterone.

22
# **`1. Introduction`**

The relation between openness, inequality and poverty within countries continues to be subject to considerable controversy in the debate about globalization and in the academic literature where the relative importance of the different transmission channels linking openness to inequality and poverty remains elusive. First, detailed case studies decomposing the sources of the evolution of income inequality within countries reveal very different patterns across countries. As to trade liberalization and openness--usually understood to mean the ease with which goods and services and factors of production (e.g. capital, labor and skills) move across countries as transaction costs fall-—they are often used interchangeably and captured by a trade-to-GDP ratio which captures many other features of a country’s exposure to trade. Second, whether from specific trade liberalization episodes or from cross-country studies, the evidence on the relation between trade liberalization and inequality is conflicting.<sup>1</sup> Third, in most cross-country studies, identification comes from cross-country variability in the inequality measure and no attempt is made to control for the source of the data on inequality.

If one were asked to point towards an emerging consensus, it would probably be that increasing openness has been reflected in a growing wage gap between skilled and unskilled wages. Moving to the association between openness and overall

> 1 Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig eds. (2005, table 10.1) show the variety of underlying changes in inequality across four countries. Using four household surveys spanning the period of Mexican tariff liberalization, Nicita (2004) explores systematically the channels by which the Mexican trade liberalization affected households. He finds differential passthrough effects across commodities and strong effects on spatial inequality and concludes that, overall, tariff liberalization might have been associated with a reduction in poverty, but that inequality increased. Case study evidence is not considered further in this paper. Also see Galiani and Porto (2006) for a country study on trade liberalization and wage inequality in Argentina.

2
# Measuring the Middle Class in Kazakhstan: A Subjective Approach

M. Grazia Pittau and Roberto Zelli<sup>12</sup> JEL: D31; C25; I30.

Keywords: Middle class; Income distribution; Kazakhstan.

> 1 Affiliated with Sapienza University and the World Bank Poverty group.

> 2 This paper draws on the work of the Kazakhstan middle class analysis project led by Sarosh Sattar, task team leader. We are grateful to Nicholas T. Longford for invaluable help, especially in data processing. We would like to thank Francisco Ferreira and Maria Ana Lugo for their useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Sarosh Sattar, Luis Felipe López-Calva, William Hutchins Seitz and participants at the ECAPOV HBSS seminar in April 2017 at the World Bank, Washington DC. A special thank to Aibek Baibagysh Uulu for providing assistance and clarification when needed.
- 24 -

more conventional pattern of new borrowings, after creditworthiness is improved. The more comprehensive debt proposals that aim to combine debt reduction with new lending adhere to the same principles.

As was argued in the 1988-89 edition of the World Debt Tables, the main advantage of a properly structured debt relief _21,an is that it can provide a solution to free riding by smaller creditors. **_ZlI_** For example, some proposals include a combination of incentives to participate and deterrents to minimize free riding (non participation): the so-called "carrots and sticks" approach. Carrots can include more favorable risk weighting of the remaining loans--after debt reduction--to the same debtors, on the presumption that lower debt stocks will increase the co'lytries' ability to service them, and thus improve the quality of those loans.' Ar. alternative is to enable banks to spread the amortization of write-offs over time, so as to reduce the immediate impact on their capital and maximize tax benefits. One of the most standard sticks to deter free riders is the obligation for non-participants to mark down their loan assets to the level of discounts agreed by the participating creditors and to absorb that financial loss in the first year. The introduction of such sanctions would require the cooperation of bank regulators.

The advantage of offering a potential solution to free riding could nevertheless be offset by other legal, operational and financial considerations that are basic obstacles to the implementation of debt relief proposals.

- 0 Debt forgiveness is exposed to moral hazard by the debtors. If, as is suggested in many proposals, an IDF were to purchase the banks' claims at discounts that are a function of prices in the secondary loan market, the debtors' gains would be commensurate to the depth of the discount. This could create an incentive to manipulate market conditions with threats to suspend debt service. As discounts in the secondary loan market deepen in response to such threats, the debtors would benefit from any subsequent debt repurchase at lower prices. Potential moral hazard can be minimized by delinking the IDF's purchase price from market discounts and by imposi n strict conditionality as an eligibility criterion for debt relief.__/

principles, but are not relevant in this context.

- 21/ Free riding is generally difficult to avoid in market-based menu options and debt reschedulings, given that national legal systems protect banks against coercion. However, in September 1988 a provisional agreement to reschedule debt for C6te d'Ivoire attempted to deal with this problem. The agreement, which is not yet effective, would ensure that free riders do not receive interest payments from new resources made available by the participating banks.

- 22/ Under the Basle Committee guidelines loans to non-OECD countries will be weighted at 100 percent of face value.
Table 9a: Change in the volume of imports in 2030, percent change from baseline, ctd.

||Rest of<br>East<br>Asia|Bangladesh|India|Nepal|Pakistan|Sri<br>Lanka|Rest of<br>South<br>Asia|EU ECA|Russian<br>Federation|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Agriculture|6.4|30.6|4.9|6.3|52.4|7.0|-2.4|0.7|5.2|
|Minerals n.e.s.|0.9|1.8|0.2|0.1|12.1|-1.6|1.2|-0.4|0.0|
|Coal|10.2|17.7|5.6|-1.7|4.4|0.3|8.1|2.7|1.9|
|Oil|-2.3|12.7|1.2|1.7|-9.5|-1.5|2.8|-0.6|-0.3|
|Gas|1.0||0.8|3.7|||8.4|0.1|1.3|
|Textiles|5.7|6.4|5.2|1.2|20.0|1.9|1.7|0.2|1.9|
|Wearingapparel|3.7|10.1|5.4|1.6|19.4|3.6|2.2|0.5|2.3|
|Leathergoods|5.0|12.5|6.6|3.7|30.9|2.4|7.9|0.3|3.2|
|Processed foods|5.7|12.4|3.1|2.9|19.1|5.4|7.4|0.4|2.9|
|Woodproducts|9.3|18.9|9.3|4.1|48.3|3.2|-1.0|0.1|3.2|
|Paper products,<br>publishing|1.6|0.0|8.4|1.5|0.2|0.9|2.1|0.0|1.8|
|Petroleum, coal<br>products|1.8|10.2|7.9|0.5|16.1|3.6|3.8|1.3|4.4|
|Chemical, rubber,<br>plastic|2.5|3.4|5.9|-1.7|-8.6|3.3|5.8|-0.2|1.7|
|Energyintensive man.|2.2|-4.3|2.9|-0.6|1.9|1.3|3.0|-0.7|1.0|
|Metalproducts|5.2|-6.0|10.0|2.5|-2.3|3.3|8.0|-0.1|2.5|
|Electronics|7.4|3.4|10.4|6.9|6.3|8.7|5.2|-2.0|2.7|
|Machinery and<br>equipment|3.2|-0.4|12.9|0.4|4.8|5.3|3.0|0.1|4.7|
|Transport equipment|4.2|-6.6|10.3|0.6|-5.5|0.6|3.8|0.0|2.3|
|Manufactures,n.e.s.|5.3|-21.2|7.0|2.3|-3.0|4.0|4.9|0.7|3.5|
|Electricity|1.2||0.7|-3.6|5.6||1.5|0.0|0.7|
|Construction|5.2|16.6|10.8|6.4|15.4|10.1|12.8|1.5|6.2|
|Trade services|3.6|-7.3|10.9|7.6|4.1|12.3|9.9|0.7|4.2|
|Other transport|3.7|1.7|9.0|6.5|9.5|9.5|8.0|2.1|6.5|
|Water transport|3.1|3.4|3.5|5.5|14.0|7.7|7.0|1.6|3.7|
|Air transport|4.3|10.0|5.2|6.8|11.6|11.6|10.1|1.0|4.9|
|Hospitalityservices|0.9|-0.7|0.6|1.2|4.1|1.5|2.2|-0.5|-0.1|
|Other business services|0.9|4.2|0.2|0.8|8.3|2.1|1.4|-1.1|0.9|
|Other services|0.9|-2.3|0.7|0.6|-0.4|1.6|1.9|-0.8|0.4|
|**Agriculture**|6.4|30.6|4.9|6.3|52.4|7.0|-2.4|0.7|5.2|
|**Manufacturing**|4.5|3.7|6.7|0.8|6.7|2.9|5.2|-0.2|2.7|
|**Services**|2.1|3.9|2.7|3.5|7.7|5.8|4.7|0.0|2.9|
|**Other**|-1.8|11.5|1.3|-1.2|-7.4|-1.5|1.5|-0.3|0.9|
|**Total**|3.2|7.4|4.4|1.2|9.3|3.0|4.5|-0.1|2.8|

- 39 -
_Privatization._ CFS Discussion Paper Series, no. 1 1 1, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

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- _65_ -
# **Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment***

Bernard Hoekman World Bank and CEPR

# **JEL classification:** F13, F5

**Keywords** : WTO, governance, institutional reform, consensus, trade negotiations, dispute settlement, international cooperation

***** This paper is a contribution to the UK‐supported Global Trade and Financial Architecture project and will be published in the _Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization_ edited by Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert M. Stern. I am grateful to Petros Mavroidis for helpful comments. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank.
Policy Research Working Paper 8502

# **Abstract**

This paper presents new evidence that cronyism reduces long-term economic growth by discouraging firms’ innovation activities. The analysis is based on novel establishment survey data from The Arab Republic of Egypt which provides information on establishments’ political connections, their innovation activities, and their access to policy privileges. The analysis finds that the probability that firms invest in products new to the firm increases from under 1 percent for politically connected firms to over 7 percent for unconnected firms. The results are robust across different innovation measures. Despite innovating less, politically connected firms are more capital intensive, as they face lower marginal cost of capital due to the generous policy privileges they receive, including exclusive access to input subsidies, public procurement contracts, favorable exchange rates, and financing from politically connected banks. These privileges are largest when compared with their direct competitors operating in the same 4-digit sectors. The findings suggest that connected firms out-rival their competitors by lobbying for privileges instead of innovating. In the aggregate, these policy privileges reduce Egypt’s long-term growth potential by diverting resources away from innovation to the inefficient capital accumulation of a few large, connected firms. A wide array of supporting evidence suggests that this effect is causal and not due to selection.

This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at dfrancis@worldbank.org, shussain6@worldbank.org, or mschiffb@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team