that previously was not readily available to them. Across a range of issues, this information has been used to mobilize communities to act. Examples have included village activists who have drawn on improved information networks to hold awareness raising meetings in their villages mobilizing around land confiscation issues close to the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine State, or around land ownership in townships where land is controlled by Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprises (MOGE) in Magway Region. In the same township in Magway Region, villagers received regular updates on advocacy efforts in a neighboring township hoping that resolution there would provide a pathway forward for resolution of their own issues. Similarly, in a number of villages, particularly in the uplands, villagers closely followed news through social media of land confiscation cases being resolved, which generated expectations that their own grievances could be acted on. At times, as is discussed in the following section, this access to information flows can further entrench differences in opinions among local groups and fuel contestation.

Improved connectivity through migration is also likely to have an influence on pre-existing social networks and power relations. The research has documented an almost doubling of migration rates across villages in each state or region between 2012 and 2015. At the higher end, average rates increased from estimated 10.2 percent of the population to 16 percent across villages in Mandalay Region. The lowest migration rates were in Shan State, with increases from 0.8 percent of the population to 2.6 percent.<sup>14</sup> Migration patterns varied: migrants from Chin and Rakhine favored international migration, while Ayeyarwady and Magway Regions saw increasing domestic migration to Yangon (QSEM 2016). More extensive research on domestic migration (World Bank 2015a) has yet to identify definitive implications on sending communities as a result of these increases in migration, at least in Ayeyarwady and Magway Regions. Our research suggests, however, that there is a significant likelihood that a combination of stronger social networks beyond the village generated through increased migration, combined with changes in socioeconomic wealth of households resulting from migration remittances and changes in demographics are likely, over time, to have an equally significant influence on local power dynamics and social relations.

A commonality across the cases explored above and throughout the research is that improved connectivity has implications for village governance and local power structures. The cases emphasize that improved connectivity can either strengthen the position of existing leaders or provide alternatives and, in the process, generate contestation. The work of the youth group in Chin State supported the village leadership while also providing an avenue for emerging leaders to play a role in village affairs. Similarly, the pursuit of claims for many of the land confiscation cases in the uplands has mobilized large parts of the village and improved information flows support the work of village leaders. Across several villages in Kachin State, however, this created friction with village tract administrators, who were perceived as being implicitly involved in the transfer of land. The strengthened activist networks in the examples from Magway Region or Rakhine State provided alternative options than those presented by traditional village leaders. To date, the competition generated from these alternative views has not generated social tension, but it does represent a change in village affairs. As one villager from Rakhine State noted after distributing information on the SEZ to villagers, “twelve months ago the village leader would never have let us hold meetings in this village. Now we can hold meetings, but he will attend and take notes of who came and what we discussed” (QSEM 2016).

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