rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **References**

- Baetschmann, Gregori, Kevin E. Staub, and Rainer Winkelmann. (2015). “Consistent estimation of the fixed effects ordered logit model”. _Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A,_ 178(3): 685–703.

- Biewen, Martin, and Andos Juhasz. (2017). “Direct estimation of equivalence scales and more evidence on independence of base.” _Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,_ 79(5): 875905.

- Bishop, John A., Andrew Grodner, Haiyong Liu, and Ismael Ahamdanech-Zarco. (2014). “Subjective poverty equivalence scales for Euro Zone countries.” _Journal of Economic Inequality_ , 12(2): 265-278.

- Bollinger, Christopher R., Cheti Nicoletti, and Stephen Pudney. (2012) “Two can live as cheaply as one... but three's a crowd.” _Institute for Social and Economic Research Working Papers_ , No. 2012-10.

- Borah, Melanie, Carina Keldenich, and Andreas Knabe. (2018). “Reference income effects in the determination of equivalence scales using income satisfaction data.” _Review of Income and Wealth_ , 0(0): 1-35

- Charlier, Erwin. (2002). “Equivalence scales in an intertemporal setting with an application to the former West Germany.” _Review of Income and Wealth_ , 48(1): 99-126.

- Dang, Hai‐Anh, Dean Jolliffe, and Calogero Carletto. (2019). “Data Gaps, Data Incomparability, and Data Imputation: A Review of Poverty Measurement Methods for Data‐Scarce Environments.” _Journal of Economic Surveys_ , 33(3): 757-797.

- Dang, Hai‐Anh, Michael M. Lokshin, Kseniya Abanokova, and Maurizio Bussolo. (2019). “Welfare Dynamics and Inequality in the Russian Federation during 1994-2015.” _European Journal of Development Research_ . doi: <u><mark>https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-019-00241-3.</mark></u>

- Das, Marcel, and Arthur Van Soest. (1999) “A panel data model for subjective information on household income growth.” _Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization_ , 40(4): 409-426.

- Deaton, Angus, and Christina Paxson. (1998) “Economies of scale, household size, and the demand for food.” _Journal of Political Economy,_ 106(5): 897-930.

23
driverless cars); and (d) policies and institutions supporting innovations evolve over time. Moreover, extrapolating the effects from one country, where most of the innovation is conceived and tested, to one where it may be adopted, is not straightforward. (e) Countries differ in terms of their market specificities, policies or endowments.

# **Empirical findings: Summary**<sup>**13**</sup>

The main findings, with the caveat that the future and past may be different, are that (1) R&D tends to be associated with product innovations and employment growth; (2) higher consumption and investment demand are both important in the process that raises employment; population growth and changes in the composition of income are important determinants of the increase in demand; (c) the location of demand spillovers influences the location of employment growth; (d) financing for all types of firm sizes, and for innovators as well as those adopting innovations is key; (e) the pace of digitization varies substantially between countries; (f) the welfare impacts of new technology differ across time and space; and (g) the changing demand for skills is an old phenomenon.

**_Various types of studies are needed_** _._ Firm‐level analyses capture the reasons and modalities by which firms undertake innovation, but they cannot capture spillover effects among firms and sectors. For example, finding that innovation increases employment at the firm level and concluding that

innovation and employment are overall positively related could be wrong. Not all firms innovate and those that do not can lose market share or exit and the effect of these overall dynamics would be negative for employment.<sup>14</sup> Firm‐level analyses also miss intersectoral linkages and they do not provide insights into aggregate labor dynamics. Sectoral studies can capture cross‐firm spillovers, and more of

> 13 This paper does not provide a comprehensive list of all the papers, but enough of a collection to illustrate the main conclusions.

> 14 Note that at the level of the single firm, innovative firms tend to be characterized by better employment performance as they gain market share and even with labor saving technology they can end up hiring more labor, if they expand output sufficiently.

12
|ral Upper Egypt<br>Total<br>0.216<br>11.365<br>0.000<br>8.949<br>0.000<br>10.811<br>0.202<br>14.307<br>0.054<br>28.155<br>24.754<br>26.414<br>25.226<br>100.000|0.139<br>6.964<br>0.000<br>4.178<br>0.000<br>12.535<br>0.836<br>11.003<br>0.139<br>39.554<br>23.955<br>25.766<br>25.070<br>100.000<br> the region of birth and the<br>e two time periods. The cells<br>birth.|
|---|---|
|and return migrants<br>Rural Lower Egypt<br>Ru<br>0.229<br>0.175<br>0.256<br>0.027<br>27.048<br>0.094<br>27.831|0.279<br>0.000<br>0.557<br>0.000<br>37.604<br>0.000<br>38.440<br>migrants (Panel B) between<br>he same region between th<br>ompared to their region of|
|Table A.1: Geographical transition matrices for non-migrants<br>Region of residence in 2012<br>Cairo<br>Alexandria and Canal<br>Urban Lower Egypt<br>Urban Upper Egypt<br>**Panel A: Non-migrants (N=7,409)**<br>10.514<br>0.148<br>0.148<br>0.108<br>0.081<br>8.652<br>0.027<br>0.013<br>0.108<br>0.391<br>10.055<br>0.000<br>0.445<br>0.162<br>0.027<br>13.443<br>0.283<br>0.418<br>0.351<br>0.000<br>0.513<br>0.108<br>0.013<br>0.931<br>11.945<br>9.880<br>10.622<br>14.496|**Panel B: Return migrants (N=718)**<br>6.267<br>0.000<br>0.139<br>0.139<br>0.139<br>3.900<br>0.139<br>0.000<br>0.139<br>0.418<br>11.421<br>0.000<br>0.418<br>0.000<br>0.000<br>9.749<br>0.418<br>0.557<br>0.836<br>0.000<br>0.557<br>0.000<br>0.139<br>1.114<br>7.939<br>4.875<br>12.674<br>11.003<br>sents geographical transition matrices for non-migrants (Panel A) and return <br> 2012. The diagonal cells represent the percentage of individuals who stayed in t<br>iagonal represent the percentage of individuals who moved to a diferent region c|
|**Region of birth**<br>Cairo<br>Alexandria and Canal<br>Urban Lower Egypt<br>Urban Upper Egypt<br>Rural Lower Egypt<br>Rural Upper Egypt<br>Total|Cairo<br>Alexandria and Canal<br>Urban Lower Egypt<br>Urban Upper Egypt<br>Rural Lower Egypt<br>Rural Upper Egypt<br>Total<br>_Notes_: This table pre<br>geographical region in <br>above and below the d|

49
**Figure 14: But within rural and urban areas, gender gaps are often** **_smaller_ for the poorest quintile**

<!-- Start of picture text --> sole and joint ownership of property sole and joint ownership of property<br>rural urban<br>NGA BFA<br>BEN NER<br>NER KEN<br>TGO TGO<br>BFA UGA<br>TCD NGA<br>GMB BEN<br>GHA TCD<br>UGA GMB<br>CIV BDI<br>MLI TZA<br>SEN GHA<br>TZA ZWE<br>GIN COD<br>COD CIV<br>KEN RWA<br>RWA MLI<br>MOZ ETH<br>BDI LSO<br>ZWE NAM<br>ZMB SLE<br>SLE GIN<br>ETH MWI<br>MWI ZMB<br>LBR SEN<br>NAM MOZ<br>LSO LBR<br>-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>Male ownership (%) - female ownership (%) Male ownership (%) - female ownership (%)<br>richest quintile (rural) all quintiles (rural) poorest quintile (rural) richest quintile (urban) all quintiles (urban) poorest quintile (urban)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note:_ Data for 27 countries from 2010-16 (excluding Comoros). Population aged 20-49 years. _Source:_ DHS.

A potential explanation for this reversal is that, urban-rural compositional effects aside, property ownership is related to wealth. As poor men and women often do not own any property, there is less room for gender gaps. However, to better disentangle inter-correlated factors the next sections turns to the multivariate analysis of male and female property ownership.

# **4. Multivariate analysis of women’s and men’s property ownership**

# **4.1 Model specification**

This section investigates what factors are statistically associated with individual property ownership in a multivariate regression framework.<sup>28</sup> This has the advantage that, unlike with the descriptive statistics in the previous section, we can control for confounding factors. For example, despite recent gains in girls’ school enrollments, adult women still have lower levels of education than men in most African countries. Regression analysis allows us to isolate the gender gap, holding other factors (such as education, age, marital status) constant. In addition, regression analysis is a useful way to summarize the relationship between various explanatory variables and our outcome of interest, male and female property ownership.

The regressions use a sample of all individuals –women and men – for whom data on property ownership were collected. We then repeated the analysis using the DHS’s ‘couple sample’, that is men and women who were both interviewed, lived in the same household and who named each other as a spouse. This excludes households where a married couple was not interviewed because there was no married couple in the household or for other reasons. Comparing husbands and wives across the sample allows us to focus more explicitly on intra-household bargaining and abstract from some of the demographic factors described in the previous section. Results from both samples are qualitatively similar. We only describe the results that draw on the sample of all women and men.

We estimate the following model:

> 28 The analysis cannot identify causality, even though most explanatory variables plausibly contribute to property ownership.

21
WPS4196 <mark>P</mark> OST <mark>-C</mark> ONFLICT <mark>T</mark> RANSITIONS <mark>W</mark> ORKING <mark>P</mark> APER <mark>N</mark> O <mark>. 9</mark>

# **Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace**<sup>∗</sup>

Colin Jennings The Queen’s College University of Oxford Oxford, OX1 4AW United Kingdom <u>colin.jennings@queens.ox.ac.uk</u>

## **Abstract**

The emphasis in constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and as a result lower levels of welfare, this paper attempts to analyze why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. The key idea is that expressively motivated group members may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be found, would the expressive perspective alter the conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of constitutional reform that should be undertaken?

Key words: Leadership, Conflict, Constitution JEL Classification numbers D72, D74

# World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4196, April 2007

_The Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about post-conflict development (more information about the PostConflict Transitions Project can be found at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict_ ). _An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org ._

> ∗ I would like to thank Alan Hamlin, Roger Congleton, Amihai Glazer, Iain McLean and participants at the Public Choice Society meeting in Nashville, 2003 and the European Public Choice Society meeting in Aarhus, 2003 for their helpful comments.

1
Dual to the output indices in equation (2.4) are cost functions. When firms minimize the cost of purchasing foreign (domestic) varieties of services, the cost of one unit of the composite foreign (domestic) variety ZM (ZD) is: Substituting the symmetry of the equilibrium into the cost functions for a unit of _ZM_ or _ZD_ , implies that _CD and CM_ can be written as: Since the elasticities of substitution exceed unity, the cost of obtaining an aggregate unit of foreign or domestic services declines as the number of varieties increases. That is, additional varieties convey an externality to the final goods sector X by lowering its cost of obtaining a unit of composite services. The elasticity of the cost of a unit of composite foreign services with respect to the number of foreign varieties is (1-ζm). Thus, an additional variety conveys a smaller externality on the final goods sector the better foreign varieties substitute for each other. A similar argument applies for domestic varieties.

We make the "small country assumption,‖ that prices to the country are fixed. This means we assume, in addition to fixed prices of X and Y, that there are a large number of potential foreign firms in production in the rest of the world so the domestic market has no "world" effect on the number of multinationals.

# **Calibration of the Model**

The computer code for this model (with explanations) and the social accounting matrix for the calibration are available in an appendix to Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (1999). In the initial equilibrium, the value of Y is 120 and the value of X is 80. Y does not use services, and X 17
effective in India (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, & Linden, 2007). Alternatively, a way to use longer school days cost-effectively would be to target them to communities with high concentrations of low learning outcomes. Extending the school day – in and of itself – is unlikely to deliver the best return on investment for ministries of education.

# **7. Works Cited**

Alfaro, P., & Holland, P. (2012). _Case Studies in Extending the School Day in Latin America._ Washington DC: World Bank.

- Almeida, R., Bresolin, A., Borges, B., Mendes, K., & Menezes-Filho, N. (2016). Assessing the Impacts of Mais Educação on Educational Outcomes: Evidence between 2007 and 2011. _World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 7644_ . Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/316291468185036423/pdf/WPS7644.pdf

- Arzola González, M. P. (2010). _Impacto de la Jornada Escolar Completa en el Desempeño de los Alumnos, medido con la Evolución en sus Pruebas SIMCE._ Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. Retrieved from

http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/tesis_mparzola.pdf

- Banerjee, A., Cole, S., Duflo, E., & Linden, L. (2007). Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India. _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ , 1235-64.

- Bellei, C. (2009). Does lengthening the school day increase students’ academic achievement? Results from a natural experiment in Chile. _Economics of Education Review_ , 629-640. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775709000405

- Berthelon, M. E., & Kruger, D. I. (2011). Risky behavior among youth: Incapacitation effects of school on adolescent motherhood and crime in Chile. _Journal of Public Economics_ , 4153.

- Bloom, N., Lemos, R., Sadun, R., & Van Reenan, J. (2015). Does Management Matter in Schools? _Economic Journal_ .

- Bonilla Mejia, L. (2011). _Doble jornada escolar y calidad de la educación en Colombia._ Cartagena: Banco de la República – Sucursal Cartagena. Retrieved from http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/Lectura_finanzas/pdf/DTSER-143.pdf

- Bruns, B., & Luque, J. (2015). _Great Teachers: How to Raise Student Learning in Latin America and the Caribbean._ Washington DC: World Bank Group.

- Cerdan-Infantes, P., & Vermeersch, C. (2007). More Time Is Better: An Evaluation of the FullTime School Program in Uruguay. _World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 4167_ .

- Contreras, D., Sepúlveda C., P., & Cabrera, S. (2016). The e ects of lengthening the school day on female labor supply: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Chile. _World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 7599_ . Retrieved from

- http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-7599

- De Aquino, J.M. (2011). A ampliação da jornada escolar melhora o desempenho acadêmico dos estudantes? Uma avaliação do programa Escola de Tempo Integral da rede pública do Estado de São Paulo. Thesis. Universidade de São Paulo.

26
- <mark>In Pakistan, an open and transparent bidding process has resulted in savings of more than Rs 187 million (US $3.1m) for the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board.</mark>

- After introducing transparent procurement procedures in the energy sector, <mark>Bangladesh was able to reduce electricity prices to less than US $0.03 a kilowatthour, roughly half the price of directly negotiated deals in Indonesia.</mark>

- Source: OECD (2003).

On close inspection, the sources for the Bangladeshi, Columbian, Guatemalan, and Pakistani cases do not provide sufficient data to demonstrate the claims made.<sup>15</sup> The point here is not to criticize the authors of the OECD study; rather it is to make the point that if procurement reform is to be given a higher profile in national policymaking better studies of actual reform experiences are needed.

Other information is more quantitative in nature and offers some _circumstantial_ evidence that is suggestive of sizeable gains from procurement reforms. Using the OECD (2002a) data on the size of national procurement markets in 1998, one can calculate the dollar value of the savings that would result if procurement reforms yielded a 10 percent reduction in the prices paid by the government on its existing purchases. This gain can then be compared to the amount of aid a given country received in 1998, providing an “equivalent” percentage increase in aid that would free up the same amount of resources as the procurement reform specified above. This calculation provides a sense of how large self-help (that is, domestic procurement reform) compares to current levels of assistance from abroad.

For 39 of the 106 developing countries in the OECD (2002a) study data on aid receipts is reported in _World Development Indicators Online_ . Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of the aid “equivalent” of a 10 percent reduction in state expenditures brought about by a potential procurement reform. The findings are quite striking: in all but two developing countries the expansion in aid that would free up as much resources as the stated procurement reform was over 25 percent. In over half the sample of 39 developing countries, the equivalent aid expansion was over 50 percent. In

> 15 The study supporting the claims made about Nicaraguan pharmaceuticals is not on the internet, and therefore is not easily verifiable. Even if it were available, one would want to know how much of the reported reduction in drug costs was due to implementing a transparent procurement agency and how much due to implementing an “essential” drugs list. The effects of one should not be conflated with the other.

16
Bridging the Gap: Identifying What Is Holding Self-Employed Women Back in Ghana, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo, and Uganda Emily Nix, Elisa Gamberoni, and Rachel Heath<sup>1</sup> JEL: J16, J31, D04

> 1 Nix: Yale University, emily.nix@yale.edu; Gamberoni:World Bank, egamberoni@worldbank.org; Heath: The University of Washington, rmheath@uw.edu. This work was made possible with support of the UN Foundation – ExxonMobil Foundation research collaboration on women’s economic empowerment (http://www.unfoundation.org/features/building-a-roadmap.html) and with support from the Bank Netherlands Partnership Program. We also thank Elena Bardasi, Louise Fox, and participants at the United Nations Greentree Convening on Women’s Economic Empowerment for helpful comments. We are grateful to Paolo Falco, Thomas Pave Sohneson and Jorge Huerto Munoz for help with the data used in the report.

.
rates and loan size vary with rm characteristics. The results show that, even controlling for several loan characteristics, the loan interest rate and the volume of credit vary considerably with rm characteristics, such as rm size and age. In particular, young and small rms pay higher interest rates. The calibrated nancial frictions lower output per capita by 31 percent relative to a frictionless credit benchmark. TFP is 25 percent lower and capital is 26 percent lower relative to the frictionless credit benchmark. Counterfactual simulations reveal that spread variation coming from direct intermediation costs drive the vast majority of impacts. The evidence thus suggests that the high average level and large dispersion of spreads in Brazil has signicant negative eects on output and productivity. There is also some evidence that lack of competition and high intermediation costs may contribute to high spreads. In Section 5 we will examine the potential role of poor collateral in also accounting for these patterns.

# 4.2 Labor market frictions

## 4.2.1 Labor informality

The previous discussion about informality emphasized the decision of rms to not register their business (extensive margin) and their implications for aggregate productivity. Next we will focus on distortions that may aect the rm ́s choice to hire workers o the books (intensive margin).

Meghir et al. (2015b) show that search frictions reduce the competition for workers and make it harder for workers to locate to higher productivity rms. In their model, search frictions increase the prevalence of low-productivity rms and reduces the probability of workers matching with higher productivity rms, thus reducing output.

One of the most important stylized facts of the Brazilian labor market is the decline in labor informality in the 2000s. Between 2003 and 2012 the informality rate among salaried workers fell by 10.5 percentage points and unemployment fell by 7.5 points. This decline in labor informality is particularly puzzling because, during the same period, the minimum wage increased by 61 percent in real terms and changes in other labor regulations were negligible.<sup>18</sup> Haanwinckel and Soares (2020) develop a search model of informal labor markets with worker and rm heterogeneity, intra-rm bargaining with imperfect substitutability across types of workers, and a comprehensive set of labor regulations. They estimate the model using Brazilian data and use it to understand the main determinants of the reduction in labor informality. The model accounts for 57 percent of the decline in informality and 58 18 See Haanwinckel and Soares (2020) . Barbosa Filho and Veloso (2016) provide a detailed discussion of the decline in labor informality in Brazil during the 2000s.

17