37 time. Efforts might be made to create wage incentives in poorer areas, though incentives are difficult to manage, and their impact is uncertain.<sup>118</sup> Study participants also suggested _enforcement of rules that already exist_ . However, many governments are unwilling or unable to control teachers and unions. In some countries, teachers, rather than parents of poor students, may be the governments’ clients. They are a large electoral block that is capable of much mobilization, long strikes, and also allegiance to favorable governments. Unions may thus be able to hold frequent and prolonged strikes with impunity and with pay. Also, unions may secure important concessions that include 1-2 days of personal leave per month and thus making absenteeism legal. Medical leave may be abused by teachers, who may abandon classes for months at a time despite a lack of substitute teachers. However, few countries dare to fire non-compliant teachers or even hold them accountable. To deal with teachers’ interaction stress and the low pay that often comes with large numbers of employees, teachers may be programmed for fewer hours than expected to teach by law (only 15-18 hours in many Indonesian schools and in the Middle East; Chapter 2).<sup>119</sup> It is important to communicate effectively to teacher unions the specific effects of time loss, possibly through public awareness and pressure. There is also a need to get more buy-in from teachers on time use. Many may not be well aware of how their habits add up to disadvantage the poor, who cannot afford private coaching classes. The World Bank has made various attempts at policy dialogue, particularly in the LAC region. The donor community can prioritize dialogue on this and on related issues shown below.

# **EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION - STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISORY CHAIN**

Sometimes a low-level equilibrium of instructional time seems to exist that meets minimum requirements for employment and community complacency. This level may become the norm in a certain locality, and families may be unaware of the discrepancy between intended and actual instructional time. Education officials may also implicitly accept the gap.<sup>120</sup> Lack of accountability means that there is no pressure to change this equilibrium.

Typically teachers have the obligation just to deliver the lessons, rather than ensure their mastery, and mere delivery can be done in relatively little time. Nominally, school administrators should be doing quality control. However, in areas such as Pernambuco, principals stated that they were merely responsible for recording absenteeism, not for doing something about it. If administrators do not show interest into how time is used and do not urge teachers to use it well and follow up with them, teachers receive a clear signal that attendance is left up to their conscience.

The lack of interest from superior to subaltern suggests a breakdown in the supervisory chain from the central, state or municipal authorities down to schools. Governments should take actions to strengthen this chain, providing training and feedback to teachers and principals on use of time, and empowering communities to monitor teacher activities 118. Vegas 2006 119. IEG 2006a. 120. EARC 2003