firms with and without an IRA (24 had an IRA and 34 did not). Losses were significantly lower, and generation per capita was significantly higher when there was an IRA, while GDP per capita was not significantly different. One of the regression studies also found a significant impact of regulation on generation per capita, while none found that regulation had a significant impact on T&D losses.

Malik et al. (2015) used an unusually rich data source to test for the impact on efficiency of unbundling generation units in India. Most studies of the impacts of reform use country- or utilitylevel data, but this study used data at the plant level. In the 1990s the Government of India passed legislation which made it possible for state Electricity Boards to unbundle generation from transmission and distribution, and from 2003 this became mandatory. This provides a test of the impact of unbundling (not involving privatization) at various times during the period. The data set included observations on 385 generating units during the period 1988-2009. The basic model allowed for one dummy variable if unbundling took place prior to 2003, and a second dummy if unbundling took place post 2003. Four performance indicators were used: heat rate (kcal/kWh); specific coal content (kg/kWh); availability (%); and forced outages (%). Time trends, plant fixed effects and year fixed effects were included, as well as various technical variables relating to the plant installed. It is expected that the thermal efficiency and operating reliability should increase with unbundling because the plant managers have more discretion. The purchase of new equipment and improvement of the pre-treatment of coal could both impact performance positively. In fact, the regressions showed no significant impact on thermal efficiency, but firms that unbundled prior to the 2003 reform showed an improvement in operating reliability. However, a check on capacity utilization showed that this did not improve. This result is in contrast to that of Sen and Jamasb (2012) who found a significant increase in capacity utilization based on statewide data. Further exploration of the data by disaggregating plants into four size groups indicated that the main driving factor was a reduction in forced outages at small (<100 MW and 110–120 MW) plants.

Anaya (2010) carried out a social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) for Peru, following the privatization of the two largest distribution companies. Revenues were compared with costs, and the counterfactual cost fall was based on trends in other public companies. The calculations depend on the discount rate, since there are a stream of costs and benefits to evaluate. At a central discount rate, the government benefitted by $268 million and producers by $335 million, while consumers lost by $390 million, with a net overall benefit to the country of $214 million. The increase in tariffs post-privatization largely explained the loss to consumers. Because privatization resulted in an increase in access above the counterfactual rate, further welfare gains from this were calculated amounting to $328 million, implying a total welfare gain of $541 million.

Toba (2007) carried out an SCBA for the Philippines following the introduction of the private sector into generation during the power crisis of 1990–1993. The welfare change was expressed as the sum of changes in benefits to consumers (consumer surplus and avoided cost), the change in private investors’ profit, changes to government via income and tax, and the change in externalities. It amounted to $10.4 billion, of which consumers benefited by $10.9 billion, investors by $ 2.8 billion, the government had a net loss of $1.5 billion, and there were external costs of $1.7 billion.

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