rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_Polish Flcal_ **_CrUia 23_** privatization), it is peculiar that these firms are given a tax break on top of the free use of state-owned capital; if anything, they should be paying for the use of the capital.' A different rationale for distinguishing between pre-1990 and post-1990 investment in the depreciation regulations,<sup>2</sup> " and one that applies to private as well as state-owned firms, is that the book value of pre-1990 capital is not liable to be a good guide to their economic value, and one can readily argue that one can start a fundamental system change with a clean slate. Thus pre-1990 investment could be allowed to depreciate slowly, and/or less than 100% of the value of the capital could be deductible; post-1990 investment could be allowed to depreciate more quickly, and kept 100% deductible. The definition of 'pre-1990" and "post-1990" would ideally be the purchase date of the capital and not when it was manufactured, because many new private firms purchase used equipment from state firms. Unfortunately, this would encourage (small and medium-sized) firms to maximize their deductions by reorganizing themselves into new firms, including selling their pre-1990 fixed capital to the new firm **u** part of the reorganization.

How much revenue would be raised by these changes would depend on the exact rule changa chosen, but a rough upper limit is simple to calculate. If all amortization allowances were simply removed, and the increase in profit were taxed at the average rate of 37 %, revenue amounting to about 1.5% of GDP would be raised. Unless the government is willing to strongly discourage investment, the revenue raised by adjusting a mortization allowances would be unlikely to exceed 1/2 of 1% of GDP.

To conclude: an increase in tax revenues from the enterprise sector seems practical, but could not alone solve thb buidget crisis. Additional revenues of 2-3% of GD" at most seem attainable. There is furthermore a medium- to long-term problem, namely that as the state sector stagnates/shrinks and the emerging private sector grows, the tax net will get leakier and leakier. There seems no alternative but for the government to try to get control of the social security portion of the budget, notably pensions. But this is beyond this scope of this paper.

**20.** **_One_** possibility would be the following: (1) abolish the dividend tax and **disallow** amortization deductions for **capitl** acquired for 1 January 1990; (2) make state-owned enterprises pay to the state a rental charge for statowned **fixed** capital, i.e. fixed capital acquired before 1 January 1990; this rental charge **would be** deductible for profit **tax purposes. The easiest** way to do **this** would be to **set the** rental charge **as** (some or all of) the amount of capital amuruzo. **l%lis** would amount to making enterprises pay their **amorization** deductions on pro-1990 **fixeo** capital to the **state,** and continuing to deduct them from taxable profit. But the political obstacle to **implementing** this **_weme_ are** probably insurnountable.

**21.** 1 understand this is **already** happening.
**Table 8: Scope of responsibilities of Revenue Inspectors**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Collection of dues ti4= Issue certificates, Respond to<br>*1 ~~attend courts miscellaneous enquiries<br>attendecourts from the Tehsildar<br>40% 25% 10% 25%<br>December to March and , l The RI is expected to The RI is responsible for<br>June, is the collection 1~s,~~i' 1e~ s provide information to sending reports to the<br>season in which the RI l concerned departments Tehsildar on:<br>camnps in particular on: . ceiling surplus cases<br>villages. In spite of * income, under the Orissa Land<br>focusing on the post- ~ 0 solvency, Reforms Act,<br>harvest season when * caste status, * mutation cases where<br>collection is likely to be . -a nationality, fraction plots are<br>easy, annual arrears is l . * residence, involved,<br>around 15%. Half of the &. legal heir, u encroachment cases,<br>amount is usually property valuation, lease of goverment<br>pending for more than 3 ~ o~i~n> and lands,<br>years. * professional status * property statements for<br>to relevant departments execution of attachment<br>of sa*rd ~for issue of certificates warrants in Certificate<br>~.~,..-'to people within the RI cases***,<br>2111 | | circle. * fire accidents, and<br>y~i~ The RI also attends *naulhzrd<br>'7revenue or civil courts as<br>and when necessary.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

_Sairat_ sources are those that are auctioned e.g. tanks, mines, etc.

_* Siha_ refers to the ledger of petty cash. _Sadar siha is_ the ledger maintained for urban areas. *** Certificate cases relate to late payment of dues.

The shaded portion suggests the tasks which might benefit from computerisation of land records Source: Compiled from field notes.

39
directed to the regulator. They control for the exogenous factors embodied in both inter-firm and intra-firn comparisons. Box 6.1 presents several examples that could be -obtained relatively easily from international statistical sources.<sup>27</sup>

**Box 6.2. Management indicators in the rail industry.**

|_ Prices<br>Average passenger fare (revenues per passenger-km)<br>Average freight price (revenues per ton-kxn)<br>**.***<br>ality<br>oservice<br>2 S<br>Average train-speed (in passengers<br>and freight)<br>Delayed arrivals or depatures (as % of scheduled)<br>Commercial<br>% of lost or damaged freight<br>Average passenger load factor<br>Traffic density (trains per hour)<br>* Pollution and safety<br>Rate of fuel usage (per train-kin)<br>Level of noise<br>Level of emission of pollutants<br>Number of accidents or incidents|
|---|
|* Labr~produc~tivity<br> <br>|
|Passengers-km<br>per-employee<br>Tons-km<br>per empoe<br>Passenr train-km per,employee<br>Freigh**t**rains-km per employee<br>Operational<br>Total trains-km per emploeee<br>*CapiWa productiit<br>Numberikms. traveled by locomotives<br>Locomotive<br>availability (in °)<br>Tons-km per wagon-km<br>Wagons-km<br>per wagon<br>Tonskm per wagon|
|Efficiency<br>Costs per employee.-<br>I<br>..<br>Costs per unit of capital<br>Financial<br>Unit cost (per passenger-km.<br>ton-km, train-km)<br>* Profits<br>Revenues/costs<br>.______________________________<br>Subsidies|

Simultaneously, there are many indicators (particularly, those about prices and quality of service) that are both informative to transport users and constitute inputs for the regulator's control tasks. Jointly with the contextual indicators, these _management indicators_ provide the necessary instruments to judge the management and the behavior of the company, and can be grouped at three different levels, as summarized in the examples in Box 6.2. These boxes only provide indicative examples of possible performance indicators for the most relevant categories

> 27 In particular, the International Union of Railways (UIC) publishes a yearly summary of the main statistics of its affiliated railways, although not all of them are always available for all railroads. 28 See also Section 5.

- 52 -
**Table S19. Concerns about health and finance by gender of household head**

|Concerned about<br>household health<br>Concerned about<br>household finances|
|---|
|Female Head<br>-0.059***<br>-0.003|
|(0.022)<br>(0.016)|
|Ethiopia<br>-0.228***<br>-0.144***|
|(0.021)<br>(0.017)|
|Nigeria<br>-0.119***<br>-0.020|
|(0.017)<br>(0.014)|
|Uganda<br>-0.213***<br>-0.124***|
|(0.018)<br>(0.015)|
|Observations<br>8,814<br>8,815|
|R-squared<br>0.028<br>0.035<br>_Note_: Each column reports results from a single regression of a binary|

_Note_ : Each column reports results from a single regression of a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question of whether they were concerned that a household member may fall ill with COVID-19 or that the household would experience financial distress due to COVID-19. The binary variable is regressed on indicators for each country, with Malawi as the base case, along with an indicator equal to 1 if the household head is female, as opposed to male. Data come from the most recent round of phone survey data available. This is round 3 in Ethiopia, round 2 in Malawi and Uganda, and round 1 in Nigeria. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10).

46
24 Moreover, singlehood is uncommon **Table 3: Household Characteristics in Malaysia, 1995 Citizens Non-citizens** among Malaysians, less than 10 percent Marital Status (% of sample): of those surveyed were single, Single 9.1 27.5 compared to 27.5 percent of nonMarried 79.8 68.1 Other 11.1 4.4 citizens. Average household size also Household size (# of members) 4.6 3.8 varies according to citizenship. For Age _(years):_ Male 44 34 Malaysians, households have a mean of Female 49 33 4.6 members, with a fairly normal Total sample of 36,700 observations, of which 95.5 % are Malaysian. distribution. Non-citizens, however, typically reside in smaller households, averaging 3.8 members; the observed log-normal distribution also indicates a higher concentration among smaller households. The age composition of foreign workers compared to Malaysian nationals lends further support to the assertion that immigration policy targets foreign labor for only temporary contracts, discouraging permanent settlement among the low-skilled. The mean age for males interviewed was 34 for non-citizens and 44 for citizens. The discrepancy aLmong women is even greater, with female non-citizens averaging 33 years of age, compared to 49 yeairs for citizens.

# **V. Determinants of earnings in Malaysia**

The results comparing the group profiles of Malaysians and non-Malaysians on the basis of age, marital status, household size, type of employment and sources of income, are consistent with the predicted effects of foreign labor management policy. In an effort to assess the actual policy impact, the analysis in this section investigates the determinants of earnings using regression analysis on household income data and controlling for individual characteristics. Malaysia's immigration policy suggests that foreigners will be paid less than Malaysian citizens with similar characteristics, due to the added unit labor cost incurred by employers for work permit fees. In theory, the wage gap between citizens and non-citizens at the margin should be equal to the permit fee (minus any savings in employer charges for social benefits unavailable to foreigners). The following analysis measures the difference in earnings on the basis of citizenship and other variables such as employment status, region of work and gender. By assessing the variables that contribute to earnings, I derive precise and robust conclusions with respect to that contract employees and self-employed workers (including small business owners) earn more than salaried workers in Mexico's formal sector.
local firm numbers can be weighted based on what industry _k_ purchases or sells nationally.

I use the Herfindal measure to examine the degree of economic diversity in each district. I refer to this measure as urbanization economies ( _U jt_ ) in each district in a given year _t_ . Urbanization economies are a reference to large urban areas, which are industrially diverse, which enjoy access to large labour pools with multiple degrees of specialization, access to financial and professional services, better physical and social infrastructures etc. The Herfindahl Index, although it captures only the level of industrial diversity within a region, is a proxy for these larger urbanization economies. The Herfindal Index of a district _j_ ( _U jt_ ) is the sum of squares of firm shares of all industries in district _j_ : Unlike measures of specialization, which focus on one industry, the diversity index considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for _U j_ is one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Thus a higher value signifies a lower level of economic diversity.

# **_First-Nature Geography Variables_**

In principle, improved access to consumer markets (including inter-industry buyers and suppliers) will increase the demand for a firm’s products, thereby providing the incentive to increase scale and invest in cost-reducing technologies. The proposed model will use the formulation proposed initially by Hanson (1959), which states that the accessibility at point A to a particular type of activity at area B (say, employment) is directly proportional to the size of the activity at area B (say, number of jobs) and inversely proportional to some function of the distance separating point A from area B. Accessibility is thus defined as the potential for opportunities for interactions with neighboring districts and is defined as: Where, _MAjt_ is the accessibility indicator estimated for location _j_ in year _t, Sm_ is a size indicator at destination _m_ (in this case, district population) in a given year, _d jm_ is a measure of distance between origin _j_ and destination _m_ , and _b_ describes how increasing distance reduces the expected level of interaction<sup>7</sup> . The size of the district of origin _j_ is not included in the computation of market access – only that of neighboring districts is taken into account. Thus, the accessibility indicator is constructed using population (as the size indicator), distance (as a measure of separation) and is estimated without exponent values. The measure of distance is

> 7 In the original model proposed by Hanson (1959), _b_ is an exponent describing the effect of the travel time between the zones.

9
# **<mark>Table C.4a: Comparison of modal class assignments across the 4-class and the 5-class models for relations with suppliers</mark>**

|Read by rows: from 4-class (row) to|5-class (<br>|column)<br>|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Class<br>1|Class<br>2|Class 3|Class 4|Class 5|Total|
|Pure bilateralism|**89.04**|0.84|0.29|0|9.83|100|
|Bilateralism with private support|9.23|**88.93**|0.03|0|1.81|100|
|Bilateralism with legal support|0|1.06|**88.53**|0.01|10.4|100|
|Strong comprehensive governance|0|0|0|**100**|0|100|
|Total|60.69|14.88|14.32|1.62|8.49|100|

|Read by columns: from 5-class (col|umn) to 4<br>|-class (row<br>|)<br>||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Class<br>1|Class<br>2|Class 3|Class 4|Class 5|Total|
|Pure bilateralism|**97.58**|3.77|1.34|0.07|77.06|66.52|
|Bilateralism with private support|2.42|**95.09**|0.03|0|3.4|15.91|
|Bilateralism with legal support|0|1.13|**98.63**|0.09|19.54|15.95|
|Strong comprehensive governance|0|0|0|**99.84**|0|1.62|
|Total|100|100|100|100|100|100|
|Estimated class membership probab<br>|ilities and<br>|standard<br>|errors<br>||||
|Pure bilateralism|0.657|0.0243|Class 1|0.5932|0.0273||
|Bilateralism with private support|0.166|0.0218|Class 2|0.1655|0.0244||
|Bilateralism with legal support|0.160|0.0171|Class 3|0.1496|0.0171||
|Strong comprehensive governance|0.017|0.0043|Class 4<br>Class 5|0.0165<br>0.0751|0.0043<br>0.0204||

30
# Box 4.3. Instruments for quality control in the rail industry.

|I.W;V. 'St\; age0 :<br>:<br>;'|- Sp.i"ao<br>ATf<br>seric crcteristic<br>in .iens|- Rue<br>n rqece|
|---|---|---|
|||- ianelstre<br>gt|
|C, i '; ';eSt|idut00 t0'','4<br>, _ .. ~~~~........<br>....|<br>MM,t,^,q ?000i E;0|
||*<br>- Qulity<br>ipricecontr lea.istns.jONE<br>.|5~~~~~~~~~~~|

-41 -
basic relationship of interest is between socioemotional skills and cognitive skills: Table 5 presents results on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ)— separating out the three attributes: prosocial, internalizing, and externalizing—and on the Big 5—separating by its five traits: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN).

Overall, we reject the hypothesis of impacts on any subcomponent of these two 22
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24
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34
# 4.2 Supervision and Productivity

## 4.2.1 Main results

Our analysis of supervision and yields is based on a sample of 1256 plots cultivated by multi-plot households in PRHS-01 (see Table 1). Replicating speci fi cation (3) in Table 2 on this smaller sample, we obtain a yield differential of -4.2% (4.8), which is very similar to, but less precise than, our earlier result. To estimate the monitoring threshold k, we search over values of mci within a reasonable range and fi nd the<sup>�</sup> k that minimizes the sum of squared residuals (<sup>�</sup> �η<sup>2</sup> ci<sup>)fromequation4(seeHansen,1999,fordetails).19</sup> Although conventional standard errors on the coefficients in equation 4, which treat<sup>�</sup> k as the true value of k, are asymptotically valid, the test of the null hypothesis δ = 0 is non-standard, since k is not identi fi ed under the null. We thus adopt the bootstrap F -test proposed by Hansen (1999).

Household fi xed effects regressions, including plot characteristics and crop composition, are reported in Table 3. For baseline speci fi cation (1), the estimation algorithm produces an optimal threshold value of 10 meetings. In other words, the de fi nition of supervision that best fi ts the data is one in which the tenant meets his landlord at least 11 times per year, or about once each month. Notice that the average yield differential between sharecropped plots and owner-cultivated/rented plots remains about -4% after including this supervision variable. Supervised tenants, however, achieve 28% higher yields than unsupervised ones, and this difference is just about signi fi cant using the bootstrap F -test (p-value=0.051). According to our data-derived de fi nition, about two-thirds of the 351 share-tenanted plots in this sample receive supervision from their landlords and/or the landlord’s kamdar.<sup>20</sup> Viewed in comparison to owner/rented cultivated plots (after a suitable rescaling of the coefficients), plots cultivated by supervised tenants realize 3.0% (5.6) higher yields, a trivial difference. By contrast, land cultivated by unsupervised tenants is 17.8% (7.2) less productive than owner/renter cultivated land. This latter fi gure is remarkably close to the -16% yield differential relative to owner-cultivated land found by Shaban (1987) for all share-tenanted plots in his Indian sample.

> 19 We restrict the search for k between the 10th and 50th percentiles of mci among the 351 sharecropped plots in this sample. The 50th percentile is 21 annual meetings, which is already fairly intensive supervision.

> 20 Note that this subsample of tenants is somewhat unrepresentative as it excludes sharecroppers of single plots, who are more likely to be from Sindh province and have large landlords. Supervision is considerably higher (75%) in the full sample of share-tenants.

15