Interacting men’s and women’s rights with the prevalent inheritance regime leaves estimates of impacts of female bequest rights on organic manure use virtually unchanged (see Table 5), while pointing towards no significant difference between matrilineal and patrilineal systems. Significant coefficients on women’s right to sell land in non-matrilineal systems suggest, however, that in such a regime, women’s ability to sell land further increases the likelihood of long-term investment. With a point estimate of 0.24, the estimated effects of increasing sales rights are meaningful economically. By comparison, the significance of estimated effects of male bequest rights on cash crop adoption weaken slightly in this specification.

# **4.2 Comparing results from self-reporting to indirect reporting**

As the size of the IHS4 sample exceeds that of the IHPS by an order of magnitude, it should, in the absence of measurement error, result in more precise coefficient estimates of the impact of land right variables included in both surveys. Inability to replicate results from the IHPS using the full or restricted IHS4 samples in most cases points towards the presence of not only measurement error but also strategic response bias. Tables 6 through 8 report the results from estimating equations (2) and (3) with the IHS4 data, with a focus on the bequest and sale rights. Columns 2 and 5 of each table include the results based on the full IHS4 sample; columns 3 and 6 include the results based on the sample of IHS4 respondents who report to be (co-)owners; and columns 1 and 4 include the results based on the IHPS sample for comparison purposes.

While both the IHPS and the full IHS4 samples point towards weakly significant positive effects of bequest rights on use of organic manure, the estimated coefficient is much smaller for the full IHS4 sample and loses significance if only owner-respondents are considered (Table 6). The estimated effects of land rights on cash crop production are insignificant throughout. The loss of significance is consistent with the notion that relying on one respondent per household only increases measurement error that is not eliminated for those claiming to be a (co-)owner of a parcel.

Allowing for heterogeneous effects by gender (Table 7) accentuates the differences between the two surveys: compared to point estimate of 0.16 for the impact of female bequest rights on manure use, estimates for both IHS4 samples are insignificantly different from zero for bequest and sale rights. For planting of cash crops, where the IHPS sample suggests a positive and significant coefficient on male bequest rights with an estimate of 0.20, the results from the full and restricted IHS4 samples imply insignificant effects of male rights and negative and significant effects of female bequest rights.

Finally, interacting gender-specific rights with the inheritance regime indicators (Table 8) produces results that are similarly inconsistent with those obtained from the IHPS sample. While the estimated coefficients on women’s or men’s bequest rights for manure application and cash crops are insignificant in matrilineal communities, a negative and marginally significant effect of male bequest rights on cash crop adoption 13