rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
between foreign and governmental ownership. We observe that large firms are owned either by the government or by a foreigner (local private investors own only 6% of large firms). Moreover, 85% of firms owned by private investors can be classified as either micro or small firms. Medium firm ownership is more evenly distributed (35% foreign owned, 27% in the hands of the government and 38% privately held).

Table 1B shows summary statistics by ownership structure. It must be noted that ownership information becomes more widely available as we move from micro to large firms. Although there are only few cases of firms which are wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries, we observe considerable participation of wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries in the sample.<sup>7</sup> This approximates 6%, 9%, 15% and 19% for micro, small, medium and large firms respectively. We find that 40-50% of firms with non-missing ownership information have a single domestic shareholder with a stake larger than 50% (i.e. majority shareholder). On the other hand, more than 20% of firms have a majority foreign shareholder (this percentage is smaller for the micro firms and grows along with firm size). This implies that 65% of the sub set of firms with non-missing ownership information, has one majority owner, either domestic or foreign.

Among investors with absolute majority stakes, we can further identify whether they are state, individuals or industrial shareholders. Larger and older firms are primarily held by the state. About 40% of large firms have the state as a majority shareholder; another 25% of those firms, however, have an industrial majority shareholder. Individuals, on the other hand, are majority shareholders of about 45% of micro firms, but hold a majority stake only of less than 9% of large firms. Individuals also hold the greater proportion of newborn firms that have a majority shareholder.

Combining sector and ownership information, we find that the vast majority of agricultural firms are held by domestic shareholders (about 70% of the subset for which ownership information is available), and, more specifically, by a state majority owner (about 55%). In comparison, firms in the industry and service sectors are more likely to be private individuals or corporations. We further notice that most industrial majority owners are foreigners, while most individual investors are domestic.

# **<u>Summary Statistics</u>**

Table 2 shows summary statistics for 2002. Even though the firms in our sample are mostly young (with a median age of 9 years) and small (median total assets in PLN equal to 8,704), they exhibit significant positive growth rates. The median growth rate is about 5%, although a number of high-growth firms cause an average asset growth is about 17% a year.

A potential concern could arise, however, by looking at the low employment growth rate. Both median and average employment growth rates are zero. Moreover, at least 75% of the sample reveals zero employment growth rates at the year 2002. This is a potential

> 7 Where wholly-owned domestic (foreign) firms are defined as 100% owned by one domestic (foreign) industrial shareholder.

8
Chapter 2 10 rises markedly and is of the size that one expects: well below unity in the sample of middleand-high income countries, and only little above unity for the enlarged set that includes the lowincome countries. For developing countries, failing drastic changes in transport policy, one may expect rail freight to rise not much faster than GDP.

## "DEVEOPED" AND **"SocASoSr" COUNTRIES**

# Transport Intensity

32. The socialist economies of Europe have long been known for their high transport intensity. Recent analysis, motivated by the search for methods of reforming the economies after their turn from socialist organization, has revealed the full extent of their transport intensity.<sup>4</sup> ' No unique explanation can be advanced for what is apparently the joint result of high industrial concentration, large activity in investment and construction, an absence of market relations and of market-based decisions on location, output and investment. The average transport intensity in the countries is declining, but remains high by the standards of Europe's market economies (Figure 1). This high _average_ intensity (a high ratio of ton-kilometers to GDP) is the background to the _marginal_ relations shown by regression analysis.

# Elasticities

33. The eccentrically large volume of ton-kilometers of freight in the socialist economies shows through in the elasticity estimates. From each of the three modes (all modes, road, rail), we obtain elasticities of ton-kilometers with respect to GDP which move in opposite directions when we merge the sample of "developed" countries, first with "developing" countries and then, with "socialist" countries. In the first case, the elasticity rises, in the second case it falls. To illustrate, we excerpt from Table 1 the elasticities for ton-kilometers by all three modes:

|Elasticity|Developed|Developing|Socialist|
|---|---|---|---|
|w.r.t.|countries|+ countries|or + countries|
|Area|.22|.19|.23|
|GDP|1.06|1.24|.94|

41 Esra Bennathan, Jeffrey Gutman and Louis Thompson, 'Reforming and Privatizing Poland's Road Freight Industry, The World Bank, WPS 750, August 1991; Esra Bennathan, Jeffrey Gutman and Louis Thompson, 'Reforming and Privatizing Hungary's Road Haulage,' The World Bank, WPS 790, October 1991.
9 Cumulatively, the combination of mutually reinforcing financially and regulatory restrictive policies, coupled with the exit of 23 banks over the 1960-1980 have led to highly concentrated market structure, and an overbranched, inefficient banking system. By 1980, the top 5 banks controlled about 70 percent of deposits, 64 percent of assets and owned 60 percent of all branches, as well as controlled more than 10 percent of the number of deposit accounts (see table 1). Overhead costs in the sector reached to atound 7 percent of total assets, almost triple the OECD average by 1980. Hence, although the developnit strategy and its related financially and regulatory restrictive policies contributed to the industrialization of Turkey, they may have introduced distortions that are difficul **t** o eliminate with respect to the systems' efficiency and competitiveness. Fry (1979) for example noted that even if all interest rate restrictions were abolished, " a minimum deposit rate might be needed to force Turkey's cartelized and oligopolistic banking system to achieve the competitive ideal solution".
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The increase in the income threshold to become middle class has consequences for who makes up the middle class. Between 2008 and 2018, the composition of households in the middle class shifted to include more households headed by a person with tertiary education and a greater prevalence of households headed by a person in a professional or managerial occupation. Many formerly middle-class households with lower levels of education and households engaged in elementary occupations no longer qualified as middle class. Education and occupation now play a vital role in defining middle-class status.

The results of the analysis show that focusing only on the size of the middle class hides changes in key aspects of middle-class identity, such as lack of vulnerability, education, and type of job. Households that previously could aspire to be middle class can no longer do so, and a sizeable share of them are now vulnerable to falling into poverty.

# **References**

- Acemoglu D., and D. Autor. 2011. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings.” _Handbook of Labor Economics_ 4B: 1043–171.

- Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” _Handbook of Economic Growth_ , vol. 1, 385–472.

- Acemoglu, D., and F. Zilibotti. 1997. “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance?” _Journal of Political Economy_ 105 (4): 709–51.

- Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik. 1994. “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 109 (2): 465–90.

Alesina, A. and R. Perotti. 1996. “Income distribution, political instability, and investment.” _European Economic Review_ 40 (6): 1203-1228

- Atkinson, A. B., & Brandolini, A. 2013. “On the identification of the middle class.” In _Income inequality: Economic disparities and the middle class in affluent countries_ , ed. J. C. Gornick and M. Jäntti, Stanford University Press.

- Banerjee, A.V., and E. Duflo. 2008. “What Is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the World?” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ 22 (2): 3–28.

Barro, J. R. 1999. “Determinants of Democracy.” _Journal of Political Economy_ 107 (6): S158–S183.

- <mark>Besharov, Douglas J., Antonio López Peláez, and Sagrario Segado Sánchez-Cabezudo. 2016. "The Decline Of The Middle Classes Around The World?."</mark> _<mark>Journal of Policy Analysis and Management</mark>_ <mark>vol. 35 (1): 245-251.</mark>

- Birdsall, Nancy. 2007. “Reflections on the macro foundations of the Middle Class in the Developing World” Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1101658

- ———. 2010. “The (Indispensable) Middle Class in Developing Countries; or, the Rich and the Rest, Not the Poor and the Rest.” In _Equity in a Globalizing World_ , ed. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence.

16
# REFERENCES:

Anand, Sudhir and Paul Segal, “What Do We Know about Global Income Inequality?, _Journal of Economic Literature_ , No. 1, 2008, p. 85.

Bourguignon, François and Christian Morrisson (2002), “The size distribution of income among world citizens, 1820-1990”, _American Economic Review_ , September, pp. 727-744.

Deaton, Angus (2005) “Measuring poverty in a growing world”, _Review of Economics and Statistics_ , vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 1-19.

Korinek, Anton, Johan A. Mistiaen, and Martin Ravallion (2005), “Survey Nonresponse and the Distribution of Income”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3543, March.

Maddison, Angus (2004), “World population, GDP and GDP per capita, 1-2000 AD”. Available at <u>http://www.eco.rug.nl/~Maddison/.</u> Maddison, Angus (2007), C _ontours of the world economy, 1-2030: Essays in macro-economic history_ , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Milanovic, Branko (2011), “Global inequality and the global inequality extraction ratio: the story of the past two centuries", _Explorations in Economic History,_ vol. 48, November, pp. 494-506.

Milanovic, Branko (2012), “ Evolution of global inequality: from class to location, from proletarians to migrants”, _Global Policy,_ vol. 3, No. 2, May.

Van Zanden, Jan Luiten, Joerg Baten, Peter Foldvari and Bas van Leeuwen (2010), “The Changing Shape of Global Inequality, 1820-2000”, typescript, December 2010.

28
# **1 Introduction**

The persistence in productivity differences among firms, even within the same narrowlydefined industry, is striking and puzzling. For example, within four-digit industries in the United States, labor productivity in manufacturing plants at the 90th percentile is four times as high as it is in plants at the 10th percentile (Syverson, 2011). A growing literature suggests that management practices play a key role in explaining the large variation in productivity across industries and countries (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2012b). In a world facing climate change, patterns of energy use and associated greenhouse gas emissions have taken center stage in discussions on firm performance. To this end, methodologies have been adapted to study the relationship between management practices and energy demand at the firm level, albeit mostly in developed countries (Bloom et al., 2010a; Boyd and Curtis, 2014; Martin et al., 2012; Schweiger and Stepanov, 2019). Our paper builds on this nascent literature to explore the link between firms’ management practices and energy use.

Despite the implications of business decisions for climate change, and climate change for business, the firm as a unit of analysis is not common in the literature on energy efficiency. Energy use by firms is a major driver of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. Direct emissions from manufacturing and construction account for 20% of global CO2-equivalent emissions from fossil fuel combustion (World Bank Data, 2020), and is much larger once indirect (e.g., electricity and heat) emissions are included. Firm energy use decisions not only have implications for firms’ private costs, but also affect the global and local environmental impacts of economic activity. Prior studies focus heavily on individual decisions, or aggregated outcomes at the industry or country level, such as total production, given that energy data at the firm level are often aggregated into a firm’s materials inputs or not reported at all.

Management practices could interact with energy decisions via several channels. By easing information and coordination frictions, management practices may help reduce “hidden” administrative and time costs associated with energy efficiency investments (e.g. in identi1
Figure 5: Wage effects of socio-demographic changes, 2000 – 2010 (%), by age-education group <!-- Start of picture text --> NZL<br>USA IRL LUX SWE NOR<br>CAN AUS BEL FIN<br>DEU<br>DNK JPN<br>AUT CHE FRA NLD GRC CZE TUR<br>GBR ESP SVK<br>ITA PRT HUN<br>POL<br>Young, LS Old, LS Young, HS Old, HS<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>−10%<br>−20%<br>−30%<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure plots equilibrium wage responses to changes in the age-education composition of natives Figure 6: Decomposition of education and ageing effects <!-- Start of picture text --> Education wage effects Ageing wage effects<br>USA NZL USACANAUSNZLGBR IRL DEUAUTCHEFRABELNLDLUX ITA ESPPRTGRCDNKSWENORFIN CZEHUNSVKPOLJPN<br>CAN AUS IRL DEU BEL LUX SWENORFIN TUR<br>NLD DNK JPN<br>CHEFRA<br>AUT<br>GBR GRC<br>ESP CZE<br>ITA PRT HUNSVK TUR<br>POL<br>Young, LS Old, LS Young, HS Old, HS<br>30% 30%<br>20% 20%<br>10% 10%<br>0% 0%<br>−10% −10%<br>−20% −20%<br>−30% −30%<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure splits the equilibrium responses presented in Figure 5 into changes due to ageing and those due to education 36
|**Table 5: Per-capit**<br>Estimation technique|**a GDP gr**|**owth and se**|**rvice sector**<br>OLS fixe|**policies in a**<br>d effects|**panel of 24**|**transition**|**economies**|T|wo-stage least s|quares fixed ef|fects||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Dependent variable|||Per-capita|GDP growth|||||Per-capita|GDP growth|||
|Model No.|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|(11)|(12)|
|Independent variables|||||||||||||
|(a) Investment/GDP|0.67||||||0.17||||||
||(0.74)||||||(1.10)||||||
|(b) ?Investment/GDP||0.56|0.39|0.44|0.28|0.32||1.49|0.79|0.65|0.70|0.72|
|||(5.97)***|(4.73)***|(2.45)**|(3.80)***|(4.21)***||(5.62)***|(3.57)***|(2.05)**|(3.58)***|(3.56)***|
|(c) Inflation|||-0.002|-0.006|-0.0011|-0.0012|||-0.002|-.006|-.001|-.001|
||||(-4.50)***|(-5.36)***|-2.68***|(-3.06)***|||-(4.09)***|(-4.87)***|(-2.19)**|(-2.77)***|
|(d) Crisis|||-16.36|-1.77|-12.1|-13.23|||-15.15|-1.67|-11.27|-12.6|
||||(-8.29)***|(-0.59)|(-6.90)***|(-7.36)***|||(-6.32)***|( -0.55)|(-5.20)***|(-5.72)***|
|(e) FDI/GDP||||0.22<br>(5.61)***||||||0.21<br>(5.07)***|||
|(f) Finance|||||8.29<br>(10.26)***||||||8.47<br>(8.38)***||
|(g) Infrastructure||||||6.8||||||6.24|
|||||||(8.81)***||||||(7.11)***|
|Instruments|||||||lags (1,2) of|lags (1,2) of|lags (1,2) of|lags (1,2) of|lags (1,2) of|<br>lags (1,2) of|
||||||||variable (a),|variable (a),|variable (a),|variable (a),|variable (a),|variable (a),|
||||||||service,|service,|service,|service,|service,|service,|
||||||||invclim|invclim|invclim plus|invclim plus|<br>invclim plus|<br>invclim plus|
||||||||||exogenous|exogenous|exogenous|exogenous|
||||||||||variables =|variables =|variables =|variables =|
||||||||||(c), (d)|(c), (d), (e)|(c), (d), (f)|(c), (d), (g)|
|R-squared|0.01|0.09|0.29|0.26|0.37|0.37|0.01|0.04|0.24|0.25|0.32|0.33|
|No. of obs.<br>Note: t-values in brac<br>reform index and the|348<br>kets, asteris<br>investment|332<br>ks denote sign<br>climate|329<br>ificance at 10|198<br>*,5**, and 1*|329<br>** percent le|329<br>vels. Model|309<br>4 = 17 countr|310<br>ies only. Vari|309<br>ables ‘service|194<br>’ and ‘invclim|309<br>’ are the ave|309<br>rage services|

12
83

# **References:**

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Azariadis, Costa and Allan Drazen (1990). “Threshold Externalities in Economic Development.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ . Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 501-526.

Barro, Robert J. (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ . Vol. 106, No. 2, pp. 407-443.

Barro, Robert J. (1997). _Determinants of Economic Growth: Across-Country Empirical Study_ . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Barro, Robert J. (1999). “Human Capital and Growth in Cross-Country Regressions.” _Swedish Economic Policy Review._ Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 237-277.

Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee (1993). “International comparisons of educational attainment.” _Journal of Monetary Economics_ . Vol. 32, pp. 363-394.

Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2001). “International data on educational attainment: updates and implications.” _Oxford Economic Papers_ , Vol. 3, pp. 541-563.

Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1995). _Economic Growth_ . New York: McGraw-Hill.

Benhabib, Jess and Mark M. Spiegel (1994). “The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country and Regional US Data.” _Journal of Monetary Economics_ . Vol. 34, pp. 143-173.

Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (2000). “Does Schooling Cause Growth?” American Economic Review. Vol. 90, No. 5 (December), pp. 1160-1183.

Bishop, John (1992). “The Impact of Academic Competencies of Wage, Unemployment, and Job Performance.” _Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy_ . Vol. 37, pp. 127-194.

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Broersma, Lourens and Robert H. McGuckin (1999). “The Impact of Computer on Productivity in the Trade Sector: Explorations with Dutch Microdata.” Research Memorandum GD-45, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, October.
- 54 -

surplus has vanished with the rapid devaluation of user charges on public utilities such as water, sewerage, electricity, and telephone services. The IMF records show that, except for few exceptional cases (thay still allow for some 3 percent of total revenues in Brazilian states and municipalities), this item has virtually disappeared from Latin America subnational finance statistics. A more buoyant form of non-tax revenues and one directly related to urban development are betterment charges, or lump-sum payments through which beneficiary landlords must compensate the public authorities for the social costs of infrastructure improvements. The relative importance of these receipts and the extent to which they meet investment costs is difficult to determine since betterment charges basically accrue to the departmental enterprises involved and do not appear explicitly in government statistics. Although most Latin American cities are entitled to make use of betterment charges, which are reportedly applied with some success at the local level in Colombia, Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere, their administration is not always simple and experience with this instrument remains rather mixed.

4.11 Intergovernment Transfers and Revenue Sharing. Besides their own independent sources of tax and non tax revenues, briefly reviewed above, transfers from the higher levels of government constitute the most relevant item in the budgets of regional and local authorities in Latin America. These may take place in form of outright grants or in form of revenue-sharing. In practice, the central (or regional) government reserves the right to collect specific taxes on the local base and to remit a set proportion of their yield to the originating jurisdictions."/ As most of these resources are derived from the more affluent urban areas or from industrialized regions, redistributive criteria may be incorporated in such schemes. The amounts granted to particular jurisdictions may be: (i) directly proportional to their contributions (origin based schemes); (ii) independently decided by superior authorities on the basis of perceived needs (discretionary schemes); (iii) attributed on the basis of pre-determined criteria (formula-driven schemes); or (iv) simply refunding local expenditures on programs previously approved by superior authorities (reimbursement schemes). In all cases, intergovernmental transfers imply a

- f3I In Venezuela, as in Colombia, revenue sharing takes the form of a tax allowance (Situado Constitucional and Situado Fiscal respectively reverting to the States or the Departments). These Tax allowances represent a fixed percentage of all ordinary tax revenues of the central government, with certain exceptions.
# **Table 4**

# **Hazard Model for Distribution of ID cards**

|||Dependent<br>|Variable: 1 when card is issu<br>|ed; 0 otherwise<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||(1)<br> <br>|(2)<br> <br>|(3)<br> <br>|
||coefficient|<br>marginal|coefficient<br>marginal|coefficient<br>marginal|
|Squared Rainfall|-2.433|-0.030||-2.439<br>-0.030|
|Shock, lagged once|(2.892)|(0.038)||(2.907)<br>(0.039)|
|Squared rainfall|||0.356<br>0.004|0.385<br>0.005|
|shock, lagged twice|||(3.126)<br>(0.039)|(3.108)<br>(0.038)|
|Number of Obs.||314|304|304|
|Log Likelihood|-|86.8|-89.5|-89.3|
|Chi-Square Statistic||||0.72|
|p-value, est. coeffs.<br>arejointlyzero||||0.698|

Notes: We alternatively use the square of the rainfall shock for the July to November period in year t-1 and year t-2, and combine them. Giles and Yoo (2007) analyze the crop calendar for these four provinces and demonstrate that large shocks during the July-November period (represented by the square of the deviation from average rainfall) are a strong predictor of a poor winter wheat harvest in the following year (driven by the effects of water-logging with heavy rain, or draught with little rain), and has a negative impact on the value of agricultural production, returns to local employment, and returns to agricultural production. Giles and Yoo (2007) show that one- and two-year lags of the squared rainfall shock are associated with increased out-migration, more days of work as migrants, and increases in migrant remittances. Provincial dummies and year dummies included in all equations. Hypothesis tests are chisquared tests for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero. Marginal effects are estimated at the mean values of the square of rainfall shocks. The shock is defined as the difference of current year rainfall over the July to November period from thirty year average of total rainfall during these months.

41
# Does India‘s Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment?

Puja Dutta, Rinku Murgai, Martin Ravallion and Dominique van de Walle<sup>1</sup> _World Bank_

**JEL:** H53, I38 **Keywords:** workfare, rural poverty, employment, targeting, women **Sector:** POV

> 1 We would like to thank Maria Mini Jos for her very able research assistance. These are the views of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank or of any of its member countries. The authors are grateful to Emanuela Galasso, Pablo Gottret, Ghazala Mansuri and Giovanna Prennushi for comments.