rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
24 collected, we observe only a fraction of the citations that the patents will eventually receive. Older patents clearly would have less of a truncation problem, namely because they would have had the opportunity to receive a higher fraction of the total number of eventual citations, whereas the truncation problem is more severe for the more recent patents. Another possible source of bias with patent citation data is that the number of citations received by any one patent tends to increase or decrease with the total number of new patents being granted. In the case of utility patents, the number of patents granted has been steadily increasing since the late 1970s, and there is even a sharp increase toward the end of the 1990s. This would imply that the number of patent citations received would tend to be larger the more recent the specific year we are looking at.

Our data on the annual number of patent citations received by USPTO utility patents were constructed from data on individual utility patents obtained from Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). It spans the period 1975 and 1999.

# **Published Scientific and Technical Journal Articles**

Another measure of domestic innovation is the annual number of scientific and technical journal articles published by the residents of a specific country. The scientific and technical fields include the following: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and space sciences. While this indicator does measure domestic innovative activity, its does not focus only those innovations that have commercial value and thus economic production. Data on scientific and technical journal articles were obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators.

# **Royalty Payments and Receipts**

Royalty and license fees are payments and receipts between residents and nonresidents for the authorized use of intangible, nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and proprietary rights (such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes, and franchises) and for the use, through licensing agreements, of produced originals of prototypes (such as manuscripts and films). As such, the amount of royalty and license fees an economy receives from the rest of the world can be used as a measure of domestic innovation. In fact, apart from being indicative of the amount of innovative activity taking place within the economy, royalty receipts also show the value of the innovation that is exported or sold abroad.

On the other hand, royalty and license fee payments measure the amount innovation or technology that an economy imports from aboard. Indeed, royalty and license fee payments are our only measure that focuses exclusively on technological
Table A.13: Eect of a direct SLM training intervention on contact farmers' adoption of individual SLM techniques, controlling for lagged rainfall

|Adoption|(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|any plot|Control<br>Mean|T|Dry Year|TÖ<br>Dry Year|N|R<sup>2</sup>|T+TÖ<br>Dry Year|
|Mulching|0.929|0.045<br>[0.059]|0.034<br>[0.077]|-0.058<br>[0.060]|347|0.042|-0.013<br>[0.035]|
|Strip-tillage|0.548|0.174<br>[0.099]|0.101<br>[0.129]|-0.050<br>[0.119]|347|0.127|0.124<br>[0.072]|
|Pit planting|0.560|0.161***<br>[0.026]|0.125<br>[0.104]|-0.017<br>[0.059]|347|0.097|0.144**<br>[0.046]|
|Contour farming|0.226|0.146<br>[0.097]|0.052<br>[0.086]|-0.002<br>[0.099]|347|0.242|0.145**<br>[0.043]|
|Crop rotation|0.726|0.059|-0.054|0.025|347|0.166|0.084|
|||[0.047]|[0.164]|[0.098]|||[0.100]|
|Row planting|0.440|0.040|0.198|0.137|347|0.117|0.178**|
|||[0.089]|[0.111]|[0.132]|||[0.050]|
|Improved fallowing|0.310|0.101<br>[0.065]|0.166***<br>[0.035]|-0.074<br>[0.038]|347|0.175|0.027<br>[0.078]|

Sources: Contact farmer survey, 2010, 2012, 2013; Household survey, 2012, 2013. Notes: Dry year indicates that the precipitation amount falls in the rst quartile of the historical distribution of cumulative rainfall during the rainy season (1981-2013). Regression model includes the same controls as in Table 4. T+TÖDry Year (col 7) presents the total eect of the treatment T and its interaction with Dry Year on adoption. The associated standard errors are in brackets. Signicance on the additive eect is determined by a Wald test.

***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. ITT=intent-to-treat; SLM=sustainable land management.

56
# **KENYA: GROWTH PROJECTIONS**

## **1988-1991**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 6<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>2 -<br>C5:<br>0. 1<br>-2 -<br>-2 iTarget<br>-<br>4<br>__SustinableX<br>1988 1989 1990 1991<br>Fiscal Years<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Policy Research Working Paper 9829

# **Abstract**

Preferential trade agreements are growing in number and deepening in content by incorporating disciplines that go beyond market access. They increasingly encompass nontrade-related disciplines as diverse as intellectual property rights, environment laws, or labor market regulations. Moreover, because investment is complementary to trade, preferential trade agreements provide relevant institutional frameworks to partner countries that wish to regulate their foreign investments. This paper studies the impact of deep trade agreements on foreign direct investment and examines three sub-questions. First, is the impact of trade agreements on foreign direct investment heterogeneous across types of business activity? Second, is this impact heterogeneous across disciplines covered in the agreements? Third, does the level of development of home and host countries matter for this impact? The analysis exploits the World Bank’s data set on the content of preferential trade agreement and data on announcements of bilateral greenfield investment at the activity level. The findings show that deep trade agreements matter for investment: every additional discipline in a preferential trade agreement increases foreign direct investment by 1.4 percent, on average. Deep agreements do not impact foreign direct investment in natural resources and extractive activities and have heterogeneous effects across manufacturing- and services-related activities. The results also reveal that disciplines that go beyond the mandate the World Trade Organization matter more for foreign direct investment. Disciplines related to investment liberalization and protection, intellectual property rights, or migration increase foreign direct investment, whereas disciplines on labor market regulations reduce investment. The results are mostly driven by investment between developed and developing countries.

This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at nrocha@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Table 3: Socioeconomic and farming characteristics of contact farmers and other farmers

|||Means|Dierence in mean|
|---|---|---|---|
||CFs|Other farmers||
|Household Characteristics: In the curr|ent year|||
|Is the head of household|0.994|0.590|0.405***|
|Age|42.364|38.243|4.121***|
|Years of schooling completed|5.481|2.054|3.427***|
|Single|0.011|0.056|-0.044*|
|Married|0.974|0.849|0.126***|
|Divorced, separated, or widowed|0.057|0.095|-0.038|
|Number of children (ages < 15 years)|3.744|2.830|0.913***|
|Total hectares of owned land|3.439|2.171|1.269***|
|Number of rooms in the house|1.763|1.423|0.340**|
|Housing walls made of brick|0.168|0.099|0.068|
|Housing roof made of tinplate|0.207|0.079|0.128**|
|Production: In the current rainy seaso|n|||
|Grew maize|0.725|0.637|0.088|
|Grew sorghum|0.139|0.255|-0.116|
|Grew cotton|0.133|0.076|0.058|
|Grew sesame|0.270|0.156|0.113*|
|Grew cassava|0.058|0.157|-0.099|
|Grew cow pea|0.278|0.347|-0.069|
|Grew pigeon pea|0.191|0.200|-0.009|
|Farm characteristi<br>|cs: In th|e current rainy s|eason|
|Plot size (hectares)|1.215|1.047|0.167|
|Plot was at|0.727|0.616|0.111*|
|Plot was burnt|0.060|0.244|-0.184***|
|Used herbicides/pesticides/fungicides|0.133|0.042|0.091***|
|Used natural fertilizer|0.484|0.351|0.133|
|Used chemical fertilizer|0.099|0.006|0.092***|
|Number of observations|351|10,960|11,311|

Sources: Household survey, 2012, 2013. Notes: T-test inferences are based on standard errors clustered at the community level. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level for t statistics. CF abbreviates contact farmer.

 This variable is only available in Midline.

34
**Table 5 Comparative results**

|**Selected studies**|**Events**|**Media**|**Observed**<br>**Reaction**<sup>**a**</sup>|
|---|---|---|---|
|Muoghalu et al. (1990)|Filing of lawsuit for<br>violationof RCRA<sup>b</sup>|Newspaper (USA)|-1.2%|
|Lanoie and Laplante<br>(1994)|Court finds firm guilty<br>for violating environ.<br>Regulation|Newspaper<br>(Canada)|-1.65%|
|Klassen and McLaughlin<br>(1996)|Environmental crisis|Newspaper (USA)|-1.5%|
|Hamilton (1995)|List of polluters|Toxics Release<br>Inventory (USA)|-0.3%|
|Konar and Cohen (1997)|List of polluters|Toxics Release<br>Inventory (USA)|-1.3%|
|Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy<br>(1998)|List of polluters|British Columbia<br>(Canada)|-2%|
|Dasgupta et al. (2001)|Citizens complaints and<br>environmental accidents|Newspaper<br>(Argentina, Chile,<br>Mexico and<br>Philippines)|-4% to -15%|

a Average estimated change in market return. b Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

If we include all events with market reaction, we note in Table 6 that 69% (36/52) of the events with market reaction are violation of emission standard, which is a slightly higher percentage than the percentage of those events in our dataset (65%). On the other hand, the failure to operate PCE properly represents only 15% of those events exhibiting market reaction, which is a slightly lower percentage than the share of those events in the dataset. This would appear to indicate, perhaps as may have been expected, that the market react slightly more frequently to the violation of emission standard than to the failure to operate PCE properly. However, the average percentage reduction of market value for those events pertaining to the violation of emission standard is 8.96%, while the average reduction is calculated to be 15.3% for those events pertaining to the failure of operating PCE properly. It should be noted however that we accept the null hypothesis at 19
# **Graph (9): Stability (One Step and N Down Chow Test) of Parsimonious Closed Economy VECM:**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2010 2010 2010 2010<br>2000 2000 2000 2000<br>1% 1% 1% 1%<br>1990 1990 1990 1990<br>1up Drgdp 1up CHOWs Ndn Drgdp Ndn CHOWs<br>1980 1980 1980 1980<br>1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5<br>2010 2010 2010 2010<br>2000 2000 2000 2000<br>1% 1% 1% 1%<br>1990 1990 1990 1990<br>1up Drm2 1up DDISC Ndn Drm2 Ndn DDISC<br>1980 1980 1980 1980<br>1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5<br><!-- End of picture text --> 62
We also control for a number of country level variables to further deal with the potential omitted variable problem. Specifically, since both bank performance and deposit insurance can be affected by economic conditions in a country, we obtain economic development measures from the World Bank’s World Development Indictor (WDI) database. We use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita to measure the economic development of a country, the variance of GDP growth rate to measure economic stability, the natural logarithm of population to measure country size, and imports plus exports of goods and service divided GDP to measure global integration (Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk 2011). We also use stock market capitalization divided by GDP and private credit divided by GDP from the Financial Structure Dataset (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010)) to control for differences in financial development and structure.

We define a crisis dummy to be equal to 1 for years 2007 to 2009 and 0 for years 2004 to 2006. A full list of variables and definitions are provided in Appendix I.

# **3. Empirical Methodology and Results**

# **3.1. Summary Statistics**

Table 1 provides the summary statistics of variables used in this study. An average bank in the sample has a logzscore of 3.50, stock return volatility of 0.03 and systemic risk of -0.07. In addition, the average bank has log total asset value of 7.66, and leverage ratio of 0.90. These numbers are comparable to those in previous studies such as Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2012).

Table 2 presents the sub-sample comparisons of means of our main variables of interest. In Panel A of Table 2, we partition our sample by whether a country offers deposit insurance and whether the country is in a crisis period. The results suggests that in the non-crisis period, banks in countries without deposit insurance have higher z-score, lower return volatility, and slightly lower systemic risk. Entering into crisis years substantially increases bank risk, stock return volatility and systemic risk. More importantly, compared to countries with deposit insurance coverage, countries without such coverage experienced larger increases in bank risk, stock return volatility and systemic risk. In Panel B of Table 2, we partition our sample by whether a country of deposit insurance may indicate high potential to the offering of generous financial safety nets (Gropp and Vesala 2004 and Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven 2005).

10
- 23 -

# **Regional Profile of Exports in the Maghreb (All Products)**

||_1970_|_1980_|_1986_|_1990_|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||_Percen_|_tage_||
|To Algeria|||||
|CEE (12)|81.0|43.4|73.4|67.2|
|Other countries of Western Europe|1.9|1.0|1.8|4.4|
|Other developing countries|1.1|51.1|18.0|18.6|
|Total|84.0|95.5|93.3|90.3|
|Ancient EPCs|9.1|1.9|1.1|1.7|
|To Morocco|||||
|CEE (12)|72.8|62.7|58.2|65.0|
|Other countries of Western Europe|2.7|4.3|6.2|4.5|
|Other developing countries|3.7|2.3|3.3|4.0|
|Total|79.1|69.3|67.7|73.5|
|Ancient EPCs|10.4|12.1|7.9|2.6|
|To Tunisia|||||
|CEE (12)|62.1|72.1|73.8|77.8|
|Other countries of Western Europe|4.5|_1.5_|2.8|1.6|
|Other developing countries|0.7|13.4|1.0|0.4|
|Total|67.2|87.1|75.7|79.7|
|Ancient EPCs|9.8|2.2|6.6|2.4|

_Source : Infonnation of the CA1T exchanges accessed by the BIRD, TARS System_
problems) a more bank-oriented financial system leads to a lower turnover of exporters (row 3, column 5).<sup>17</sup> In Panel C, we experiment with a measure of the stringency of sanctioning of banks’ behavior, an indicator that takes the value of one if bank directors are legally liable when the information they disclose is erroneous or misleading. We obtain that in countries where bank managers are not subject to adequate sanctions in case of misleading information on banks’ accounts (i.e., with possibly more severe SBC problems), more bank credits, relative to stock market capitalization, lead to lower turnover of exporters (row 5, column 5). In Panel D, we obtain even stronger results when we exclude high-income countries from the sample, which is consistent with the widely held view that soft budget constraints especially plague banks’ behavior in middle- and low-income countries, due to stronger interference of governments or lower quality of regulation and supervision.<sup>18</sup> Altogether, the results in Table 3 suggest that in countries where banks are less independent from the pressure of external parties (Panel A), where bank managers are subject to looser scrutiny of bank auditors and supervisors (Panel B) and to weaker sanctioning in case of misleading information on banks’ accounts and decisions (Panel C), domestic banks can reduce the dynamism (turnover) of the export sector, in line with the SBC hypothesis. Consistently across regressions, the estimates thus point to soft budget constraint attitudes in domestic banks’ behavior.

# **5.2 Banks’ long-termism: Buffering exporters from shocks**

In the previous section, we tried to disentangle the presence of soft budget constraint issues. The tests of this section and of the next intend to get evidence on the possible role of banks’ long-termism. To the extent that the baseline results reflect banks’ ability to buffer exporters from negative shocks by renegotiating contracts, we would expect this buffering effect to be stronger during crises and recessions. To probe this point, in Tables 4a-4b we differentiate the effects of financial structures between tranquil times and contractions. Exploiting information on episodes of financial crises in Laeven and Valencia (2013), we first code a dummy variable equal to one if during the year the country was hit by a financial crisis, zero otherwise. In Table 4a, we then augment our regressions by adding the interaction term between the financial crisis dummy and the industry-level measure of external financial dependence and the triple interaction between the financial crisis dummy, the industry-level measure of external financial dependence, and the financial structure indicator (the ratio of

> 17We find less compelling evidence on the impact of foreign banks in countries where supervisors’ monitoring is less stringent.

> 18In untabulated results, we also considered alternative proxies for the stringency of sanctioning and accounting standards, such as the requirement for supervisors to make public formal enforcement actions and to operate on an early intervention framework.

17
# 5. References

Acharya, V. V., Le, H. T., & Shin, H. S. (2017). Bank capital and dividend externalities. Review of Financial Studies, 30(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw09 Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. (2017). Measuring systemic risk. Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 2–47. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw088 Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2016). CoVaR. American Economic Review, 106(7), 1705–1741. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20120555 Anginer, D., Bertay, A. C., Cull, R., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Mare, D. S. (2019). Bank regulation and supervision ten years after the Global Financial Crisis. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers (No. WPS9044). The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9044 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2009). Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision. Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.pdf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2019). Cre20. Standardised approach: individual exposures. Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/CRE/20.htm Brownlees, C., & Engle, R. F. (2017). SRISK: A Conditional Capital Shortfall Measure of Systemic Risk. Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 48–79. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw060 Casanova, C., Hardy, B., & Onen, M. (2021). Covid-19 policy measures to support bank lending. BIS Quarterly Review, September. Bank for International Settlement. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2109d.pdf Cihák, M. (2007). Introduction to applied stress testing. IMF Working Papers (WP/07/59). International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451866230.001 Demirguck-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (1998). The determinants of banking crises in developing and developed countries. IMF Staff Papers, 45(1). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/FT/staffp/1998/03-98/demirguc.htm Eberhardt, M., & Presbitero, A. F. (2021). Commodity prices and banking crises. Journal of International Economics, 131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103474 Feyen, E., Alonso Gispert, T., Kliatskova, T., & Mare, D. S. (2020). Taking stock of the financial sector policy response to COVID-19 around the World. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (No. 9497). The World Bank. <u>http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34941</u> Feyen, E., Alonso Gispert, T., Kliatskova, T., & Mare, D. S. (2021). Financial Sector Policy Response to COVID-19 in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 133, 106184. <u>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106184</u> Feyen, E., & Zuccardi, I. (2019). The sovereign-bank nexus in EMDEs: What is it, is it rising, and what are the policy implications? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (No. 8950). The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8950 Goodhart, C. A. E., & Segoviano, M. A. (2009). Banking stability measures. IMF Working Paper (WP/09/4). International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451871517.001 Kinda, T., Mlachila, M., & Ouedraogo, R. (2018). Do commodity price shocks weaken the financial sector? World Economy, 41(11), 3001–3044. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12667 13