**_Table 4: Key statistical studies’ findings relevant to the political economy of electric power sector reform_**

|**Study**|**Results**|**Place**|**Time**|**Reform indicator**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Bacon &<br>Besant-<br>Jones (2001)| Reform does not vary significantly with income per capita. Reform<br>does not vary significantly with dependency on aid, independent<br>of other variables that already incorporate the effect of aid<br>dependency. Reform is greater in countries with lower political<br>risk, and with stronger institutions andpublicpolicy.<sup>71</sup>|115<br>developing<br>countries|1998|Bacon’s (1999) score for<br>energy reform|
|Chang &<br>Berdiev<br>(2011)| Reform is greater in countries with greater ‘political globalization’<br>(embassies, membership of multilateral organizations, treaties).<br> Reform is greater under center or right-wing governments (than<br>left-wing), legislatures with fewer parties sharing power, and<br>greater institutional constraints.<br> Reform is not correlated with length of tenure.|23 OECD<br>countries|1975-<br>2007|Conway & Nicoletti’s (2006)<br>anti-competitive regulation<br>indicators for energy|
|Cheng &<br>others (2016)| Reform is greater among geographical neighbors. No significant<br>correlation with foreign loans.<br> Reform is greater in states with less corruption. Reform is not<br>associated with difference in politics between parties.<br> Reform is greater in states with inadequate electricity generation<br>capacity, and states with poor financial performance of utilities.<br>Reform greater where leaders face pressure to avoid adjustment<br>costs (electoral opportunism) and where interest groups (labor<br>and agricultural)mobilize to oppose reform.|20 largest<br>states of<br>India|1991-<br>2012|Cheng & others’ (2016)<br>indicators of reform outcome<br>success|
|Cubbin &<br>Stern (2006)| Generation capacity per capita is higher in countries with an<br>electricity regulatory law, and in countries with higher quality<br>regulator governance|28 middle<br>and low<br>income<br>countries,<br>most in Latin<br>America|1980-<br>2001|Domah & others’ (2002) four<br>variables for regulation;<br>Henisz & others’ (2004) two<br>indicators for private<br>participation and<br>liberalization|
|Domah &<br>others (2002)| Developing countries face high fixed costs relative to market size<br>in establishing independent regulatory agencies. Regulators in<br>the median developing country has less staff (30-34) than in the<br>median developed country (53), despite having three times the<br>number of electricity users and three rather than two sectors to<br>regulate.|34<br>developed<br>and 26<br>developing<br>country<br>regulators|2000-<br>2001|Domah & others’ (2002) own<br>devised indicators for<br>regulation of electric utilities|
|Erdogdu<br>(2011)| Income level and other country specific features are more<br>important determinants of industry efficiency than the reform<br>process<br> Greater reform correlates with higher plant load factor in<br>developed countries and in developing countries of Asia and<br>Oceania, but not in Eurasian developing countries. Reform<br>correlates with closer proximity to optimal reserve margin, but<br>higher T&D losses.|92 countries,<br>global<br>sample|1982-<br>2008|Erdogdu’s (2011) own<br>electricity market reform<br>score|

> 71 The ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’ combined twenty indicators of “macroeconomic management and sustainability of reforms, policies for sustainable and equitable growth, policies for reducing inequalities, and public sector management”. ‘Country risk’ included nine indicators including political risk with a 25% weighting (Bacon & Besant-Jones 2001: 344).

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