- <mark>negotiating concessions (Congress and Judiciary);</mark>

- <mark>designing a media strategy centered on the reform‘s objective of increased efficiency and clientcitizen focus, new HR policies, yearly recruiting for stats careers, and defending national interest; and</mark>

- <mark>disseminating New Public Management ideas through Brazil‘s main School of Public Administration ENAP.</mark>

<mark>While the literature is divided on the reform dynamic after Bresser‘s departure in 1998, the positive reform results have been measured (Echebarría and Cortazar 2007) in terms of the decline in the public sector wage bill (from 50% of federal expenditure in 1995 to 35% in 2001), the average wage increase of public officials (21% in 2001), and the rising percentage of federal officials with a university degree (from 39% in 1995 to 63% in 2001). In addition, substantive policy change was achieved in organizational arrangements and personnel legislation (Gaetano 2003). The bureaucratic merit index (IDB 2006) which evaluates the degree to which ―effective guarantees of professionalism in the civil service are in place‖ and civil servants are ―effectively protected from arbitrariness, politicization, and rent-</mark> seeking‖, ranks Brazil amongst the region‘s top performers.

Importantly, factors that facilitate public sector reforms are likely to co-exist with those that running counter to them. The range of countries and of reform attempts discussed in the literature suggest that, although public sector reforms are frequently not politically attractive as such, they may nonetheless be initiated in response to crises or other pressures (see above). This implies that, reform pronouncements or initiation may be more frequent than real commitment to it (see the case of Ghana, Text Box 2). This is confirmed by the portfolio review below. The following section turns to discussions about reform _implementation_ specifically.

# **Text Box 2. Public sector reform in Ghana: Fluctuating  political commitment and policy reversal**

<mark>Ghana has been reforming its public sector for over two decades. Reform efforts have included ̳first generation‘ reforms aimed at reducing the cost of the public sector, as well as ̳second generation‘ reforms that have sought to improve the quality of the public service, and to strengthen its capacity and performance. The most significant reform drivers have been economic and fiscal crisis; a concern about bureaucratic and institutional weaknesses; and donor pressure (Antwi et al 2008, Hutchful 2002, Stevens</mark> and Teggemann 2004).

<mark>Facing negative GDP growth, Ghana pioneered World Bank-/IMF-sponsored structural reforms (cutting government employees and the wage bill) in 1983 under J.J. Rawling‘s military rule. But the interventions had little direct link to service improvement, some undermined capacity, and any gains were subsequently reversed (Kiragu 2002, Hutchful 2002). Ghana‘s second wave reforms thus focused on service delivery and capacity building (Antwi et al 2008). By the 1990s, Ghana‘s GDP growth had turned</mark> positive again. At this stage, key reform objectives included the following (Antwi et al 2008):

- <mark>developing performance improvement plans (PIPs) and performance-linked reward schemes;</mark>

- <mark>greater responsiveness to public and private sector needs and support of the national development agenda; and</mark>

- <mark>increasing efficiency, transparency, competency, accountability, and cost effectiveness.</mark>

<mark>By the end of 2000, 85% of all ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) had completed PIPs (Antwi et al. 2010). However,</mark> <u><mark>while some studies report marginal capacity improvement, the reforms did not</mark></u> 16