where they are, owing to the unequal bargaining power between agents, attempts to 'fix' relations in one sphere can lead to compensatory shifts in other contracts to leave tenants net worse off (Mearns 1998).

This section examines the extent and nature of land-lease (tenancy) markets and the terms of the contracts across Orissa to understand how formal restrictions on tenancy along with loopholes in the law, its lax implementation, lack of updated land records, and the manipulation of revenue administration by the relatively rich and powerful, combine to restrict access to land by the rural poor.

# _4.4.1 Extent and nature of tenancy in Orissa_

There is general agreement that available data on both the number of tenants and the acreage under tenancy are underestimates (Singh, 1988). Both the Census of Land Holdings carried out by the National Sample Survey Organisation, and the Agricultural Census, tend to underestimate the proportion of land under tenancy. However, the former is considered more reliable as it is based on independent household surveys while the agricultural census is based on a retabulation of the land records of owner-cultivators. The under-estimation of tenancy stems from reporting bias as lessors tend to understate the leased-out area owing to (i) the fear that tenants will stake claims in favour of continued right of cultivation; (ii) desire to escape the ceiling on land holdings; or (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii). The share of operated area leased-in is therefore considered to be a more reliable measure of the magnitude of agricultural tenancy than the share of owned area leased-out as lessees have fewer incentives to under-report the extent of area leased-in (Narain and Joshi, 1969). Nonethless, land reform legislation designed to prohibit sub-letting, regulate rents, and confer security of tenure has given many landlords and tenants a common interest in concealing agreements which may be deemed illegal (Singh, 1988). Only intensive field surveys and careful village studies can provide more precise estimates of tenancy since '[Tihe longer the period of stay in villages, the higher is the tenancy recorded' (Laxminarayan and Tyagi, 1977: 880).

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of surveys and few village studies in Orissa which offer such insights. This section combines field notes gathered in the course of the present study with material from two in-depth field studies (Sarap, 1998; Swain, 1998) to form a partial picture of the extent and nature of tenancy arrangements in different parts of Orissa.

It is estimated that on average, 10-20 percent of households in each village participate in the landlease market in Orissa, although this is subject to wide inter- and intra-regional variation. Using NSS data, Swain (1998) reported that 17 percent of households leased-in land in 1981-82. More than 80 percent of the leased-in area is in the size class of less than 10 acres, and the percentage of leased-in area to operated area decreases with the increase in size of operational holding. At the same time, nearly 85 percent of the area leased-out is by farmers with less than 10 acres. Together these results indicate considerable leasing activity (both in and out) by small and marginal farmners.

Land leasing or tenancy may take the form of fixed rentals or sharecropping arrangements, in which rents are paid in cash, in kind, or a combination of the two. Sharecropping is the predominant, though declining, form of tenurial arrangement in Orissa. About 42 percent of the leased-in area is under sharecropping as against about 14 and 8 percent respectively under fixed-produce and fixed-rent contracts (Swain, 1998). However, share tenancy seems to be more prevalent in non-irrigated villages than in irrigated villages. For example, Swain (1998) reports that more than 40 percent of the operational area is under share tenancy in a dry village in Dhenkanal district as against 12-19 percent in irrigated villages in Cuttack district. This pattern seems to confirm the persistence of the potential for risk-sharing under share-cropping contracts.

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