|Thailand|Thai-Chinese RayongIndustrial Zone|2006|Operational|
|---|---|---|---|
|Cambodia|Sihanoukville SEZ|2006|Under construction|
|Indonesia|China-Indonesia Economic Trade Zone|2007|Under construction|
|Korea,Rep.|Korea-China Industrial Park|2007|Delayed due to funding problem|
|_South Asia_<br>||||
|Pakistan|Haier-Ruba Industrial Zone|2006|Operational|
|_Latin America_|VlChi Si Thl Id|||
|Venezuela|enezuea-na cence ecnoogy nustry<br>Zone|2007|Not Implemented|
|Mexico|Mexico and China (Ningbo) Geely industrial and<br>trade cooperation zone|2007|Not Implemented due to land<br>access issue|
|_Eastern Europe_|<br><br>||<br>|
|Russia|Ussuriysk Economic and Trade Cooperation<br>Zone<br>Tomsk Timber Industry and Trade Cooperation<br>Zone<br>St. Petersburg Baltic Economic and Trade<br>Cooperation Zone|2006<br>2007<br>2006|Under construction and partly<br>operational<br>Operational<br>Dropped|

_Note:_ Due to limited information, the status of the zones is not necessarily the latest. _Source:_ World Bank (2010), Brautigam and Tang 2013, and Author’s compilation.

Chinese investments in SEZs in SSA are not limited to the projects that were approved by MOFCOM in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Zambia. Chinese companies and provincial governments have also invested in industrial zones elsewhere in Nigeria, and in Sierra Leone and Guinea (some of which subsequently competed unsuccessfully for MOFCOM support.) (Bräutigam and Tang 2010). More recently, projects have been initiated in Botswana and South Africa; there are also reportedly Chinese zone proposals in Angola, Mozambique and Uganda. However, there is limited information on the progress of these initiatives and few of the underlying development agreements between governments and the investors have been made available to a wider audience.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, several features of the Chinese investments in SEZs in SSA can be identified based on the information provided on these projects. First, the companies that were successful in the MOFCOM competitive selection process were usually those that had already established a business presence in the host countries in trading, construction or manufacturing. Second, the business models of each of these SEZ investments range from fully Chinese-owned companies (as in Ethiopia and Mauritius) to joint-ventures often with the host governments (as in Nigeria and Zambia). Third, the Chinese zone developers established consortiums with multiple Chinese investors (as in Nigeria and Mauritius), often with the participation of provincial SOEs. Fourth, the Chinese investments were primarily for on-site infrastructure― _i.e._ within the perimeter of the zone―and based on the expectation that the host governments will provide the required off-site infrastructure investments<sup>8</sup> . Finally, all these zone projects involved high level political support from both the Chinese and African governments.

> 7 Zones that are not supported formally by MOFCOM were not covered in this study.

> 8 The Eastern industrial Zone is an exception since the Chinese developer is responsible for both on-site and off-site infrastructure (with the government committing to reimburse 30% of the costs of both investments).

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