Other financial and economic factors have also played a role in stimulating the demand for land: because of weak savings institutions, or the scarcity of opportunities for investment, and in a context of limited social protection, holders of monetary assets and/or idle funds view land as a profitable and inflation-proof investment. With the development of the market economy, land can also be seen as an asset that allows access to mortgage finance. Although provision of land by the ACI over the last two decades and demand for land from formal private developers have contributed to the development of housing finance institutions, the lending system in Mali remains limited to short-term credit. It is also hindered by a series of obstacles: weak public administration capacity such as a poor vital records system, especially issues of faulty identity and birth certificates, and lack of reliability of the land titles used as collateral.

Speculative investments have a strong impact on the demand for land.<sup>19</sup> Land market activity in Bamako is partly driven by speculative strategies as many investors look for urban plots to buy, expecting a price increase with their future incorporation into the urban area, or, following improvement of the tenure status of the land. Speculative investment strategies in the rural hinterland have been observed as far as 70 to 80 km away from the city center. According to agents and brokers, this is fuelled by investments from Bamako-based merchants and from expatriate Malian communities. Speculative strategies are encouraged by widespread illicit practices and corruption among government institutions and local administrations (see Section 6 below).

# **1.3.4. Increases in land prices in urban and peri-urban areas**

Over the last 5 years, there has been a steady increase in land prices in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bamako (with several observers mentioning annual increases of up to 100% in some locations), which is further stimulating the demand for land due to expectations of further increases. The disappearance of cheap options to access land may have been exacerbated by the upgrade from affordable to more expensive land tenure forms (for those who can afford it or benefit from good personal links with the land administration).

# **1.3.5. The relationship between land delivery and political cycles**

There is some parallel in Bamako between political cycles (elections), allocation of land plots by the state or local authorities, and the business cycle in real estate: before elections, allocation of land plots may serve a political clientele. After elections, candidates who go into debt to finance their campaign may be tempted to reimburse their debt by selling in their own name plots obtained from the state to develop housing. This observation is corroborated by key informants involved in land allocations and transactions as well as by researchers (Bertrand, 2006; ISTED 2009).<sup>20</sup>

# **1.4. Purpose of the study and outline of the paper**

Our principal objective is to identify the different ways various social groups have access to land and the security of tenure they may obtain. We focus in particular on the peri-urban areas and the rural hinterland of Bamako where most land use conversion occurs and try to understand observed differences in access to land in these areas. In this respect, it is important to consider that land tenure does not simply refer to the rights on land conferred by documentation, but are embedded in social relations which determine the rules, practices and associated rights involved in the processes of land appropriation. These processes depend on the roles played by the different stakeholders in the land delivery channels and on the practices regarding land management and land administration. Another objective of the paper is to analyze the links between the various land delivery channels, which constitute

> 19 We consider as speculative investments that are not intended to develop the purchased land or to make productive use of it, but to keep it undeveloped and put it back onto the market when the value has increased.

> 20 On this topic, J. Coulibaly & Traoré (see Ville de Bamako, 2012), report an interview with the director of a project engineering and territorial development consultancy where the latter declares:  ‘The political system is somewhat perverse in Mali, inasmuch as anyone wishing to be elected first on the list will have to fund the bulk of the campaign.  This means that some people will get into debt to do so, telling themselves that they can recoup their outlay after the elections by selling or subdividing some land.’

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