literature on public sector reforms in OECD countries tends to argue that in countries in which single-member districting created an absolute majority for the governing party, the chances of adopting significant PFM reforms where higher (e.g. UK, New Zealand). Geddes (1991) explores how different electoral and party systems affect legislators‘ incentives to initiate CSRs, focusing on merit-based hiring in Latin America.<sup>9</sup> She finds that open lists of proportional representation reduce the probability of reform because ―it makes patronage a valuable resource to incumbents in their struggle against challengers within their own party.‖ Cruz and Keefer (2010) argue that countries without strong programmatic political parties are less likely to pursue public sector reform<sup>10</sup> given the shortage of the accountability structures this implies which could prompt politicians to be more sensitive to public sector management and performance issues. While programmatic parties exist in a number of middle income countries, they are rather rare in low income environments.

The argument that implementing reforms in autocratic regimes may be easier than in democratic regimes (given the limited opposition forces, and less dependence on electoral cycles) derives from the literature examining economic reforms (for a more detailed discussion on the reasons see, for example, Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1994; see also Haggard and Kaufmann 1992). In the case of civil service reforms, including transparent and systematic personnel policies, however, Gehlbach and Keefer (2011) find that autocrats confront a tradeoff. On the one hand, such reforms ―allow the autocrat to make credible commitments to reward public officials who undertake efforts that contribute to regime goals.‖ On the other hand, they ―also make it easier for bureaucrats to organize against the regime in case it reneges.‖ Some nondemocratic regimes such as Vietnam (Painter 2003) or China (Moon and Ingraham 1998) have undertaken significant public sector reforms (building on long if variable historical legacies of public sector meritocracy as noted by Fukuyama 2011); while other authoritarian as well as hybrid regimes have either not engaged in reforms, or have followed a pattern of partial or startstop reforms.

Despite, these numerous disincentives and obstacles, public sector reforms are on the agenda in many countries – and show progress at least in some. When then do such reforms become nonetheless feasible?

# **II.2 Political Economy Factors** **_Facilitating_ Public Sector Reforms**

The literature highlights several positive ̳macro‘ drivers, as well as institutional variables, and more proximate political economy reform facilitators. In contrast to the obstacles discussed above which are mostly linked to stakeholder interests, time horizons, and social structures, the enabling factors are often structural. However, the more proximate positive drivers also center around stakeholder constellations.

> 9 Electoral rules have also made a difference in countries, such as New Zealand, which embarked on major reforms in the 1980s. As Schick (1996) argues in case of economic management reforms with the first past the post-electoral arrangements then in effect, one party typically had a majority in Parliament and did not have to dilute its reform program to gain coalition support. Interestingly, voters then opted to change electoral rules in the country in the 1990s to more proportional representation, resulting in successive coalition governments and more compromises in reform efforts.

> 10 To support their finding, the authors draw on the ratings of 511 World Bank PSR loans in 109 countries which were systematically higher in countries with programmatic political parties.

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