rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
45 Figure A2.3: Main source of energy for cooking across all households in Pakistan <!-- Start of picture text --> Wood 56<br>Natural gas* 23<br>Crop residue 9.4<br>Dung cake 7.3<br>LPG* 2.5<br>Kerosene 0.78<br>Charcoal/coal 0.25<br>Electricity 0.06<br>Others 0.91<br>0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br>Percentage of households<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors’ calculations.

Note: * = estimated by splitting gas users into piped gas and LPG users based on fuel purchase patterns (very few purchased both).

In both rural and urban areas, the purchase of LPG increased with quintile level (Table A2.13). The uptake of LPG was notably higher in rural than in urban areas at the highest quintile, reflecting the widespread use of natural by higher-income urban households. The quantity purchased increased with quintile level, and urban households consumed more on average. The dominant cylinder size for residential customers is 11.8 kg. For all but the top quintile, the quantity consumed was less than the content of one cylinder, suggesting that respondents indeed reported what the household consumed, rather than purchased. However, LPG is sold illegally in smaller unauthorized cylinders and through decanting from legal-size cylinders. Because these transactions are illegal, the amounts sold for less than 11.8 kg at a time are not known. The coefficient of variation of prices was 0.11, indicating that 95 percent of prices were within 80– 120 percent of the national average price.

Table A2.13: Number of households purchasing LPG and average quantity purchased per month by purchasing households in Pakistan

|**Quintile**|**Number of pur**<br>**Rural**|**chasing househ**<br>**Urban**|**olds (percent)**<br>**Total**|**Kg purchase**<br>**Rural**|**d per household**<br>**Urban**|**(per capita)**<br>**Total**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**1**|68,373 (2.8)|20,650 (3.3)|89,023 (2.9)|3.0 (0.3)|5.4 (0.6)|3.6 (0.4)|
|**2**|122,554 (4.8)|39,931 (4.9)|162,485 (4.8)|3.8 (0.5)|6.0 (0.8)|4.4 (0.5)|
|**3**|196,654 (7.2)|74,687 (7.5)|271,341 (7.3)|5.0 (0.6)|7.2 (1.2)|5.6 (0.8)|
|**4**|274,347 (9.9)|103,759 (7.8)|378,106 (9.2)|6.5 (1.0)|9.0 (1.4)|7.2 (1.1)|
|**5**|431,426 (17)|196,419 (8.0)|627,845 (13)|9.3 (1.9)|15.8 (2.8)|11.4 (2.2)|
|**All**|1,093,354 (8.4)|435,446 (7.0)|1,528,800 (7.9)|6.8 (1.2)|11.3 (1.9)|8.1 (1.4)|

_Source:_ Authors’ calculations. _Note_ : See notes for Table A2.3.
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32
# **Congestlon** Chargilg Mechanisms for Roads: An Evaluation of Current **Practce**

1. Ovwr 80 percent of the world's megacities are projected to be in developing countries by the year 2000. It is un1iky, however, that road capacity will be able to keep pace with the rapid growth in travel demand resulting from increases in population and vehicle ownership. Thus it is inevitable that urbanization yields tffic congestion as a by-product.' Some form of regulatory restraint or pricing mechaniw **i** s necessary to curtail congestion, where congestion is fonrally defined to be the additional cost that a motorist imnposes on otners.

2. This paper is the second of two papers on road pricing in theory and practice. In the previous paper, the theory of road pricing-cum-inveatment is reviewed and synthesized into an integrated analytical framework (Hau, 1992). Even though I deal only with charging for the congestion externality in this paper, congestion pricing would also have as a by-product the reduction of air and noise pollution from mobile sources. This market-based approach could serve as an effective deterrent to the ovemse of roads by intemalizing negative extemalities and would thus enhance society's welfare within an urban area. Even though congestion pricing _per se_ is practiced only in Singapore, road use charging in the form of electronic toll collection is rapidly flounshing in countries such as Norway, France, Italy and the United States. Charging by daylight hours in Trondheim, Norvay (and further discounts for electronic tag holders during the moning peak) can be viewed as crude forms of road pricing. As part of the Intermodal Surface Tansportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) signed into law in December, 1991, the U.S. Federal Highway Adminstration invites state and local governments to participat n five federally-funded congestion pricing pilot pgrams (which include the funding of parking prcing (see U.S. Department of Transportation, 1992; Office of the Federal Register, 1992)). Further, bills to implement variants of road pricing are in the parliament of cities suffering from both L pollution and congestion such as Sandago and Stockholm.

I For estimates of congeto coa and indices an tdo United Statos, wse s **ad Idmux (1990, 1992).**
# **Understanding the Economic Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies on Shipping**

**_What Is the State of the Art of Current Modeling Approaches?_**

Ronald A. Halim Tristan Smith Dominik Englert

## _Keywords:_

<mark>International Maritime Organization (IMO), initial Strategy, greenhouse gas (GHG), emissions, reduction, mitigation measures, international, maritime, transport, shipping, modeling, modelling, models, economic impacts, costs, choices, prices, trade, trade flows, gross domestic product, market-based measures, carbon pricing, carbon tax</mark> _Version:_ <mark>Originally published: January 2019 / Updated version: 24 September 2019, v1.2</mark>
Table 2

# Fiscal Revenue Trends: Period Averaaes for Low Income ILYJ and Middle-Income tMY) Countries

|Period Averages|To<br>Revenue<br>LY|tal<br>(TR)/GDP<br> <br>MY|Income<br>LX|Tax/(TR)<br>MY|Dom<br>Tax<br>LY|estic<br>/(TR)<br>mY|Inter<br>Tax<br>LY|national<br>/(TR)<br>MY|Gran<br>LY|ts/(TR)<br>MY|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1975 to 1978|16.1|17.5|23.2|25.0|24.1|30.9|32.3|23.8|8.0|4.3|
|1979 to 1981|15.8|19.3|22.4|28.3|27.9|35.1|35.1|21.6|10.2|4.0|
|1982 to 1985|17.0|20.4|23.2|28.3|19.1|40.9|29.2|19.8|8.3|3.1|
|1986 TO 1988|16.3|20.8|22.4|26.7|27.3|37.7|30.9|17.6|9.9|3.4|

Notes; Same definitions and same sample as in Table 1.

Data Sourcess Same as Table 1.
# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared as part of a project on pricing, cost recovery, and efficient resource use in transport under the overall direction of Ian G. Heggie. The report was prepared by Professor Roy Bahl (Consultant), based on a series of case studies carried out in Argentina, Bolivia, Ghana, India, and Yugoslavia. Roy Bahl is a Professor of Economics and Director of the Policy Research Program, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia. The case studies were carried out by R. Carruthers (Consultant), K. L. Luthra (Consultant), and D. Walker (Consultant). Material also was used from other studies carried out in Indonesia, Nepal, and Tanzana.

The author would like to thank Ian Heggie for many helpful comments on this manuscript and for calling attention to much of the literature that underlies this research. The author also is indebted to Jim Furis, Sonya Gadoly, and Jim Reteneker for helping prepare the manuscript.
# **Figure 3-1 Income concepts in the CEQ framework**

CEQ Income Concepts in the Palestinian Territories; Pensions as a Government Transfer scenario <!-- Start of picture text -->
- Direct transfers<br>Government cash<br>and in-kind, and<br>pensions<br><!-- End of picture text -->

<!-- Start of picture text --> + Indirect subsidies<br>Electricity and Fuel<br>subsidies<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> + In-kind transfers<br>Education & Health<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Final income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Market income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Disposable income<br>Official<br>consumption<br>expenditure from<br>the PECS 2016/17<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Net market income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Consumable<br>income<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> + Direct taxes<br>Personal Income Tax, Pension<br>Contributions, Property Tax<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text -->
- Indirect taxes<br>VAT, Customs, Excise<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Source: Adapted from Lustig (2022)

# **Box 3.2 A CEQ Assessment should be interpreted with several important caveats in mind**

CEQ Assessment Caveats

- a) **A CEQ assessment excludes important tax and public expenditure categories** , such as corporate income taxes (an important share of government revenues), and expenditure on infrastructure, defense, and other public goods because of data limitations and because there is no generally accepted methodology for assigning these benefits or burdens to any single individual or household.

- b) **A CEQ assessment considers only the** **_redistributive_ effects of taxes and transfers,** which represent only one of many criteria to take into account when making public policy. A CEQ Assessment does not attempt to assess the sustainability of taxes and transfers from the macroeconomic, demographic, or natural capital perspectives, nor effects on future inequality, poverty, or vulnerability from fiscal policies that increase current economic growth. Results therefore should be weighed against other evidence before deciding whether a specific tax or transfer is desirable or is in need of reform.

- c) **The fiscal incidence analysis used in CEQ assessments is an accounting framework and is point-in-time.** It is a first-order approximation and does not incorporate behavioral or general equilibrium effects. This limits the framework in important ways:

- CEQ Assessment results cannot inform the trade-offs between public expenditure to alleviate present poverty against investments in physical and human capital (through health

24
- 7a -

TABLE I1: Climatic Zones In FAO/IIASA (19RO) Study Clitmate Zone Dry Rainfall Seasons Natursl Land Area **I** of MM Hontha Vegetation Land Use N he Total Prchl*s Desert Less Over Ntil to **sparee** Nomadic grasing. 525 29 De5radatton by than 10 grasses, Isolated No crops overgrastng and 100 shrubs cutting Arid 0on Over 9 Grssees **and** Nomadic grazing. 486 17 Overgr tasg to scattered trees No crops Desertificatton 400 In dratnage **area** Errattc vater supply Semi-Arid 400 a to 9 Savanna and open Grazing; 233 a Overgraaing to woodlacds precarious crops Desertifecation 600 beans, millets, Lack of Potable barley In north water Dry Sub-fu td 600 6 'oodlands (mdombo) Cereals, 314 11 Overgrading to Tall Grass groundauts Sotl eroston 1200 Savanna mixed ftrding Water supply Moist Sub-Humid 1200 * Closed evergreen Maits, **cassava, 547** 20 Tsetse, Trype. to forest bannan., yANS, River Blindness 1500. sugar Poor shallow Bolls Huid Over - Tropical rata Tree crops. 440 14 leached, acid 1500 forest Palm oil, cocoa. *oils rubber, bananas, Low **sun** hours **casava,** rice High humidity

- 17 Overgr tasg Desertificatton Errattc vater supply

- a Overgraaing Desertifecation Lack of Potable water

Source: 'Tha Capacity of the African Envitrormnt to Sustain Population Growth' by S. Charles Perstra, p. 34 (dmio).
lable 2 Analssis ot Chnes in Oevelopld Countries NOB Frequency Indicos fOr lajor PrOduct Groups 11966 ladex expressed In per _cont,_ 1966-86 cheap ln percentage points)

|Country<br>196|Allloo<br>ISIlC 0#1*2<br>6 Inden<br>19|ds<br>2*4)<br>66-06c .|AO.9"<br>b<br>ISOIC2lyss <br>1966ladte1|aterlais<br>22. 21. 26)<br>966-66 chg,|Foels<br>tSliC3)<br>1966loend196|<br>6-86 chg,|Ores& <br>tSlIC 21, 2<br>1966 ldndu|Hotels<br> and68)<br>1966-86<br>chg.|tinutac<br>tSlIC5to 6<br>1966 ldend 1|tures<br>los<br>t61)<br>966-66<br>ctg.|AllCodities<br>(SIIC 0 <br>1966 lad1n|to 6)<br>1966-6ch.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|All ountries|36|53|2|49|83|2?|2|25|5|46|I1/|37|
|Euroeoton<br>Cuntlty|38|5(|2|49|13|is|I|26|2|tS|i/|43|
|tgium-tuneebourg|<br>40|36|3|46|3)|53|2|20|3|55|19|*2|
|Ienmark|45|51|3|40|6|-6|0|11|I|31|11|43|
|France|46|52|6|49|_25_|7i|0|36|1|61|17|49|
|Geroanv, Fed. Rep.|46|50|3|41|6|-2|0|31|*|54|16|44|
|GreeceS/|na|494)|na|(36)|na|40)|na|(6)|no|(46)|na|1491St|
|Ireland|no|491) 3/|<br>0|33|0|0|0|a|I|44|na|(471)i|
|Italy|59|59|0|53|0|0|4|50|2|63|Is|<br>49|
|Netherlands|33|61|0|S0|0|72|0|_2?_|3|33|89|40|
|Unltd<br>Ksngdom<br>|19|75|2|46|3)|-31|0|17|1|44|to|42|
|Finland<br>|as|466)J3|/<br>0|33|19|59|4|4|2|o|no|141) St|
|Japan|51|46|2|67|23|66|10|11|Is|30|34|16|
|**kwrway**|36|60|2|31|0|0|0|6|2|23|14|16b|
|Swhiterland|29|60|2|69|0|a|2|14|2|13|12|s0|
|United States|17|40|5|41|13|-3|0|52|27|_S2_|_21_|30<br>n X|

- I/ Finland. Greece and _Ireland_ are *xcluded ftrom ft totals sinco cnlete In1or0etlon on these countries trad barriers was no avallable In 1966. 2/ Ireland and Grenc are excluded trom the EEC totals in 1966 since craplete Intorm_tlon on these country*s trade barriers was not available. As such, the group of countries used in computing 1966 NTO indices ditlers _trm_ that _loyed for the 1966 date. ticlusIon ot Greece and Irelttnd Irom the 1966 computatlons should not have a mJor Inlluence on the results since these countries only account tor about two per csnt ol UtC iports.

- St Since 1966 date were not available the ligures in parentheses show the actual share o0 trade stlectod by nomleritl barriers In 1966.

- ABLt lOltE: As an alternative to the "affacted' trde concept, recent investigations have utilized peations it) end _42)_ In connection with tar it line trade nd tFt Intor-atlon to derive actual frequency nd tefr c<verae Indices. In addithn, trhse _Indices how._ otten ben copuled using the noro Il-itad group of type I measures lIsted In _Table 1._ :hts _alternatlve_ procsduro yields the tollowlng _results_ tIn _parentheseS)_ **when** tariff lIn level date mere employed to compte hard care (type I) _NIS_ irequency Indices tor 1966: Beglum-Inmabourg 16.6); DOrwuL (9.2); France (14.); Germny, Fed. Pep. (l2.3); 6rA 480.6); Ireland (6.51; Italy (18.31; Netherlands 01.1), UAitad Ktingdom t6.11i finlnd 4l.41; Japan 412.5); _Norway_ (11,4); Swltterland i9.7); liIted Satess (6.3). Corresponding 1966 trequency InlIces based on "etfected" trade by all type I aod it HIBs can be derived trom Table 2 _by_ noting they equel the reported 1966 inden plus the 1966-06 chang In the seasure.
- 21 -

landed prices (after duties) of imports and have generally been more than 100% above international prices. One exception is Ferro-Silicon, where the recent doubling of inteinational prices (from US$500 to US$1,000 per ton) made Indian prices competitive.

39. As a result, the profitability has been high for mini-steel plants, particularly for those with production capacities above 50,000 tons p.a. Financial results for a sample of 9 MSPs indicate net profit to net worth rates ranging between 12% to 52% and dividend rates of 3 to 15%. On the other hand, most MSPs with small furnaces and obsolete technologies have mediocre financial results.

40. The analysis of the production cost structures presented in Table 9 indicates high efficiency of raw materials use and good profits in TISCO (the only private ISP) as compared to SAIL and MSPs. Among mini steel plants, the efficiency and cost structures vary greatly depending on the capacity utilization which in turn is dictated largely on availability of power, a critical input for MSPs.

TABLE **9:** PRODUCTION COST STRUCTURES

||SAIL|TISCO|MSPs (1|988/89)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1987/88)|(1988/89)|Range**(in**t)|Average**(1)**|
|Raw Materials|43|340|25-62|46|
|Energy|9|]|15-46|18|
|Labor|14|]<br>40|3-12|9|
|Other Inputs|23<br>|]|9-28|20|
|Interest/Depreciation|11|20|5-19|7|
|Total Costs|100|100|100|**100**|
|Gross Profit**(1**Output)|-1.0|11.0|6-11|9.5|
Figure 1 presents a stochastic dominance analysis for GLSS1 and GLSS3 data. It shows that 1992 distribution dominates 1988 distribution. This demonstrates that there was a general improvement in living standard in Ghana from 1988 to 1992, as measured by expenditure per capita. It shows that, the improvement especially came from between 20 to 65 percentile of population, represented by the wide gap between the two distributions in this range. Even for the population which remained in poverty, the social welfare has improved. There appears to be minimum improvement among top five percent of the population. This confirms the findings in CEM, which states that the improvement in income occurred mainly at the lower end of income distribution, through favorable changes in terms of trade for the rural poor involved in farn and nonfarm activities (Jones and Ye, 1995). The comparison between GLSS2 and GLSS3 shows very similar trend, which is presented in the Appendix A.

Figure 1 Ghana: Cumulative Distribution functions, 1988-1992 <!-- Start of picture text --> 90<br>80<br>70<br>60 __ _<br>*50 Povert I ne<br>20<br>10<br>0 -4-<br>150 300 450 600<br>Expenditure Per Capita<br>1988 . 1992<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# _3. b) Changes in inequality and social welfare by locality_

Although on average the expenditure per capita and the inequality has been improved for Ghana between 1988 and 1992, as shown above, more detailed analysis reveals that the improvement only occurred in the Rural Areas and the Other Cities, but not in Accra. According to the calculation of the CEM (1995), between 1988 and 1992, poverty incidence fell from 42 to 34 percent in rural areas and from 33 to 28 percent in Other Cities, respectively. Poverty incidence, however, increased in Accra from nine to 23 percent, which was nevertheless still the lowest poverty incidence among the three localities in 1992.

Given the poverty reduction in Rural Areas and Other Cities and the poverty increase in Accra, a natural question one would like to ask is how the degree of inequality has evolved within these different localities and how much each locality contributed to the over all inequality? Table 2a presents the within-group inequality and the weighted 4
10

# 11. FINANCIAL REFORMS

# Im. 1. Financial Liberalization

In June 1980, simultaneously with the structural adjustment and broad liberalization policies that put an end to the import substitution era, the Government launched financial reforms.<sup>8</sup> The goal was to develop a competitive and efficient financial system that would support a more liberal economy. This was to be achieved through deregulation and promoting entry into the system. Reforms eliminated interest rate restrictions on deposits and loans, and eased entry into the market and permitted new types of financial instruments and institutions. The initial phase of deregulation saw sharp increases in interest rates and attempts by the larger banks to hold them low through the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" which in essence was open collusion. However, this proved unsustainable. Faced with higher rates offered by the unregulated brokerage houses, larger banks increased their rates which resulted in fierce competition and extremely high real interest rates. This situation, combined with financial distress in real sectors led to the collapse of six banks during 1983 and 1984. These developments in turn has led to partial reversal of reforms and the Central Bank began to reregulate deposit interest rates, though at much higher levels relative to pre-1980 situation. However, as much as this was to restore financial stability it was also a measure to deal with collusive practices of banks.

The Central Bank continued with the regulation of deposit rates until 1988 occasionally adjusting them to maintain positive real rates of return. In late 1988, deposit rates were again liberalized and this policy was maintained since then although there were a number of temporary interventions. Therefore, the

> 8For a more detailed review of financia **l** iberalization experience of Turkey, see OECD (1988), Onis and Ozmucur (1988), Akyuz (1990), Atiyas (1990), Akkurt et.al (1992), and Atiyas and Ersel (1994).