rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
women who gave marriage as the principal reason for their move. International migration for the purpose of marriage also takes place through various forms. Briselli (2022) shows how internal migration of women in Korea has led to an increase in international migration of foreign brides into the areas with high out-migration of local women. Charsley et al. (2012) provide a review of marriage-related migration to the U.K., and note that many settled British citizens of South Asian heritage marry from their parental or grandparental homeland, often through arranged or semi-arranged marriages. For example, they note the proportion of British Pakistanis married to Pakistani nationals is 48 percent of men and 57 percent of women. For some other nationalities, they note the presence of international introduction agencies, or so-called “mail-order brides”, with individuals marrying British men in order to be able to migrate. This is not a new phenomenon: Sinke (1999) writes that “in the late nineteenth century commentators on migration began to write of an ‘international marriage market’ ”, where the tendency of labor migration movements to be dominated by men led to skewed sex ratios and a rearrangement of traditional marriage patterns. Dziadula and Zavodny (2023) analyze, using data from the ACS between 2008 and 2019, the extent to which natives and foreign-born in the US tend to have a spouse who is a “marriage migrant”, i.e., someone who got married in the year in which he or she arrived in the US. The sample is restricted to individuals who were living in the US one year before the survey, and with at least one of the two spouses who is aged 20 to 65. Their analysis reveals that less than 1 percent of the natives but over 7 percent of the foreign-born who got married in the year before the survey opted for a “marriage migrant”, and men do so to a much larger extent than women.

# **3.3 Migration may affect the stability of marriages and lead to (or prevent) family dissolution**

This is often raised as a policy concern with temporary migration programs that result in one spouse moving and another remaining behind. For example, a Samoan NGO notes that infidelity is an issue among some Samoan seasonal workers, resulting in family separations.<sup>13</sup> Using migration event histories, Davis and Jennings (2018) document that Nicaraguan migration is associated with an increased rate of marriage dissolution. Boyle et al. (2008) 13SeeSee

> 13SeeSee `https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/469161/ infidelity-is-an-issue-among-samoa-rse-workers-says-ngo` (last accessed on November 5, 2023).

13
average. Distances between fragments seem less of a problem with an increase in distance of a similar magnitude contributing to a 0.67% increase in costs.

With ill-functioning land markets, farmers may try to offset adverse effects of fragmentation in several ways. Substitution between inputs, in particular replacing machinery and to a lesser extent seeds and chemicals with bullocks and labor, is found to be an important mechanism for doing so. Differentiating by farm size group also illustrates that addressing different dimensions of fragmentation separately is important: Increases in the number of fragments have limited effect on unit costs by large farms while the opposite is true for fragment-fragment distances. With a cost elasticity of total cost with respect to the Simpson index of 0.63 for small farmers, 0.41 for medium sized, and insignificant effects for large farmers, the cost associated with more fragmented holding structures falls disproportionately on the smallest farm size group. By comparison, estimated cost elasticities with respect to distances between fragments are, with 0.107 for large, 0.68 for medium and zero for small farms, more modest.

Our findings suggest that moves towards a more consolidated structure of operational holdings could disproportionately benefit small farms. But policies to address this phenomenon will be warranted only if they reinforce rather than run counter to market forces, cost less than the benefits they bring, and can be sustained over time. The restrictions on leasing and other forms of land transfer prevailing in most Indian states undermine producers’ ability to use market mechanisms to move closer towards their optimum holding structure. Eliminating the restrictions in ways that recognize the rights of tenants and landlords can potentially deliver high benefits. Unambiguous land records, together with mechanisms to keep them current over time, will be essential to underpin any market transactions. By comparison, one-off efforts to consolidate holdings are less attractive in terms of costs and sustainability and, if deemed to be needed, should be combined with elimination of restrictions on functioning of market and clarification records.

The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature to lay out the conceptual framework and measurement issues and introduce the econometric approach. Section three describes the data, provides descriptive statistics at holding and fragment level, and explores to what extent fragmentation is voluntary. Section four presents the results regarding cost functions and factor shares. Section five concludes by drawing out implications for policy in India and beyond.

# **2. Measurement, conceptual framework, and econometric approach**

Drawing on existing studies, we argue that, because they may affect the cost of production quite differently, dimensions of fragmentation that relate to fragment size and distance between fragments should be considered separately from each other. This provides a basis for introducing the cost function 3
the taxes: ―The feeling of being controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an honorable taxpayers and, as a consequence, tax morale will fall. In contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to find out the reason for the error by contacting the taxpayer in an informal way, the taxpayer will appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld‖ (p. 4). They divide respectful treatment, by the tax administration into two components (p. 5): (i) transparent and clear procedure, (ii) respecting taxpayers‘ character. Their empirical analysis shows that treating taxpayers respectfully reduces tax evasion.

Alm and Torgler (2006) combine a large number of Western European countries into an empirical study using multiple regression analysis. They differentiated between Romanic and Northern Countries. The results indicate that people from Northern Europe possess higher tax morale than people from Southern Europe. The marginal effects indicate that being from a Romanic country rather than from Northern Europe reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justified by 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, Weck (1983), Weck, Pommerehne, and Frey (1984), and Frey and WeckHannemann (1984) use cross-country survey results for the years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1978 in order to develop an aggregate, country-level ―tax immorality‖ index for various countries. Their index indicates that Romanic countries have a higher tax immorality than most other countries. In this context, Kirchgässner (1999) argues that state and religious authority were largely held by one person in the northern states of Europe (in contrast to the majority of Catholic countries in the south). Offenses against the state were therefore also religious offenses and consequently a sin. Torgler and Schneider (2007b) looking at Switzerland, Spain and Belgium observe that cultural and regional differences within a country also affect tax morale in both Switzerland and Spain.

Looking at Europe and the US, Alm and Torgler (2006) also find that the highest tax morale is observed in the United States and in Switzerland, two countries with very strong direct democratic traditions. Taxpayers are treated as ―citizens‖ with extensive rights and obligations (Frey, 2003b). The possibility of taxpayers voting on fiscal issues, and thereby being involved directly in the political decision process might enhance their sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey, 2002a) and thus their tax morale. The instrument of 23
procedure. This latter step often involved artificial stamp shortages and stamp price hikes by the officials, and stamp forgery (causing government revenue leakages). Further impediments included hassle and harassment by officials and the need for middlemen at every step to navigate the bureaucratic maze of the registration process and side payments and bribes.

Due to the ICT led reform, the registration time has been reduced to 1 day, and one final visit to pick up the registration certificate. The payment of fees can be completed in 15 minutes through leveraging one of the country’s leading bank networks (BRAC bank). The applicant can access a transparent online system in which a business can check its status without the need to visit the agency. Overall, it seems safe to assume a reduced scope of corruption due to limited interactions with the

# **4 Intervention**

## **4.1 Information campaign**

We implemented an information experiment around this business registration reform to test if a simplified registration regime would encourage informal firms to register and become formal once they learn how to register and about the potential benefits of registration.

We extracted a sample of informal firms (3,000) from two waves of the IFCs quarterly Business Confidence Surveys, BCS (Q1 and Q2, 2009) and IFCs Informality Survey of 2010.<sup>2</sup> These are all representative surveys of the businesses operating in Bangladesh.

The data from these surveys form our baseline sample with information regarding business registration as well as several variables concerning business performance and composition. We then randomly assign these firms to a treatment and control group. The assignment is implemented at the firm level.

We then had members of our staff visit the “treated” firms and provide information on the process and potential benefits of registration. In practice the staff members presented a set of potential legal and economic benefits of the registration and the step-by-step registration process. They were equipped with two booklets containing all the information in easy to understand (Bangla) language. The benefits booklet also contained virtual stories of different entrepreneurs, so that the treatment group could relate their personal situations to these fictitious characters. The potential legal and economic benefits of the registration are as follows: protection of business name and goodwill, greater access to bank loans, limited liabilities, continuity of businesses, better business confidence, raising finance, greater ownership rights, and enhancement of social status. The visits were conducted in two waves, according to the original spacing of the BCS and informality surveys. The first set of firms were visited in March-June of 2010, while the remaining firms were visited during January-February of 2011. We then conducted follow-ups (phone) interviews in April-July 2011 for the first batch of firms

> 2Details of the surveys are available from the authors.
rate expectations. To elicit respondents’ nominal exchange rate expectations, the surveyor informs the respondent of the current nominal exchange rate (“as of April 2019, 1 U.S. Dollar is worth around 4.05 Malaysian Ringgit”) and then asks what, in their opinion, “[...] the exchange rate will be 12 months from now, in April 2020”. This way of eliciting beliefs is consistent with previous work by Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia (2017) and was adapted to our research setting through a series of pilot tests and consumer interviews.

# **4.3.3 Information Provision**

In the information provision stage of the experiment, all respondents are first read the following message: “In this stage, we randomly select respondents to receive some feedback about the previous questions.” Each respondent is then randomly assigned to one of the following three treatment groups with equal probability:

- (a) **Treatment** **_Inflation_** : In the first treatment condition, respondents receive a signal about the future inflation rate: “The consensus among experts from the government and private sector is that inflation in Malaysia will be 2.3% over the next 12 months.”

- (b) **Treatment** **_Exchange_** **_<u>Rate</u>_** : In our second treatment condition, respondents receive a signal about the future nominal exchange rate: “The consensus among experts from the government and private sector is that 1 U.S. Dollar in Malaysia will be worth 4.10 Malaysian Ringgit 12 months from now.”

- (c) **Treatment** **_Exchange_** **_<u>Rate</u> and Inflation_** : In our final treatment condition, respondents receive two signals. The first one relates to the inflation rate: “The consensus among experts from the government and private sector is that inflation in Malaysia will be 2.3% over the next 12 months”. The second one relates to the exchange rate: “The consensus among experts from the government and private sector is that 1 U.S. Dollar will be worth 4.10 Malaysian Ringgit 12 months from now”.The order of these two pieces of information was consistent with the (randomized) order of the questions on prior beliefs: i.e., if the prior inflation expectations was elicited before the prior exchange rate expectations, then feedback about inflation would come before the feedback about the exchange rate.

The inflation and exchange rate information we provide is based on forecasts published on popular forecasting websites, including Statista.com, TradingEconomics.com, and WalletInvestor.com. These sources are widely known and respected in our setting and comparable to professional forecasting sources that have been used in similar information-provision experiments (see, for example, Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia, 2017; Fuster et al., 2020; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020). It is worth noting that our research design does not include an information treatment 12
Croke et al. (2016) WHO recommends MDA deworming, the estimated treatment effect is 0.148 kg [95% CI: 0.039,0.258; p=0.008]. In areas with more than 50% prevalence, where the WHO recommends multiple doses annually, the estimated effect is 0.182 kg [CI: 0.070,0.293; p=0.001].

Our full sample estimate has more statistical power than TMSDG. Using the same approach as above, we find an MDE of 0.15 kg in the full sample, roughly half the MDE of 0.28 kg using the TMSDG sample. Using the random effects estimate of 0.13 kg, we find that the full sample analysis has 72% statistical power to detect a significant effect at 95% confidence. This compares to 18% statistical power to detect an effect of 0.08 kg, or 31% statistical power to detect an effect of 0.13 kg using the TMSDG sample (see Figure 3).<sup>25</sup> This full sample effect remains robust (at p<0.05) when any individual trial estimate is dropped from the meta-analysis, as shown in Table 4. The level of significance with which the null hypothesis that the mean effect is zero can be rejected remains high even when simultaneously dropping any two of the 22 estimates: among the 231 possible combinations of two studies that could be dropped simultaneously, in 96% of cases the estimated effect remains statistically significant at p<0.05, and the largest p value is just 0.067 (not shown). The results are similarly robust to dropping any one or two studies in

> Cochrane pre-analysis plan (Dickson, Awasthi, and Demmellweek, 1997). Examining all studies conducted in environments in which the WHO recommends MDA while excluding studies where the WHO does not recommend MDA would enhance policy relevance.

> 25 Using an effect of 0.13 kg and the value of estimated in the full sample (0.038 in the full sample as opposed to 0.074 in the TMSDG sample), we find that the TMSDG analysis has 44% statistical power to detect a significant effect at 95% confidence. ττ̂<sup>2</sup>

25
8 The violence peaked with the 1994 genocide, when extremist Hutu militia known as Interahamwe, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Rwandan police forces organized massacres against the Tutsi minority and, to a lesser degree, moderate Hutu intellectuals who were opposed to the regime of President Habyarimana. The human suffering during the genocide was enormous. Death toll estimates range between at least 500,000 deaths (Desforges 1999; Prunier 1999) to over a million deaths (African Rights 1995), about 10 percent of the 1994 population. Most of these individuals were Tutsi, killed in one-sided violence, causing the death of an estimated 75 percent of the Tutsi population (Desforges 1999). A smaller number of soldiers died in combat between the FAR and the rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which eventually stopped the genocide and took power. The breakdown of the health care system and displacement also contributed (although to a much lower extent) to excess mortality (de Walque and Verwimp 2010). Sexual violence was widespread during the genocide, leading to a cohort of children conceived through rape (Nowrojee 1996).

Estimates of death tolls are politically sensitive in Rwanda and the available demographic data are scant. Reconciliation policies enacted after 1994 have strictly prohibited the collection of information on ethnicity and other characteristics that would facilitate reconstruction the demographic impact of the genocide in more detail. The few studies that attempt to differentiate deaths according to gender (e.g. de Walque and Verwimp 2010; Ministry for Local Government 2002) conclude that adult men made up the majority of casualties.<sup>4</sup> In the aftermath of the genocide, sex ratios (the ratio of males to females) became severely unbalanced. Primarily, this is because more men and boys than women and girls died. Further, about 2 million Rwandans, commonly referred to as _new caseload refugees_ , escaped to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania immediately after the genocide in fear of revenge by the RPF and persecution for their crimes. Among the new caseload refugees were perpetrators of the genocide, who were mostly males, and Rwandan civilians. About 600,000 new caseload refugees returned from Congo to Rwanda and another 500,000 refugees returned from Tanzania to Rwanda in late 1996 (World Bank 2003). A smaller portion of the new caseload refugees, mostly former militias, became involved in the Congo wars and were repatriated to Rwanda in the period 1997-2000 (Verwimp and van Bavel

> 4 Using population data from the province of Gikongoro, Verpoorten (2005) concludes that Tutsi women had only a moderately higher probability of survival than Tutsi men, with the respective probabilities being 0.29 and 0.21.
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# **<u>4.2.5 Innovation</u>**

If the underlying motivation to start a new firm is linked to innovative projects, then a better post-entry performance should be expected. Empirically, this seems to be the case. In fact, a propensity for innovation emerges in general as a firm’s growth driver (see, for instance, Freel, 2000 and Coad and Rao, 2008; Altindag, Zehir and Acar, 2011; Corsino and Gabriele, 2011) and specifically as a positive predictor of survival and an above-theaverage post-entry performance of newborn firms (see Esteve-Pèrez, Sanchis and Sanchis, 2004; Raspe and Van Oort, 2008). For instance, Arrighetti and Vivarelli (1999), after applying a factor analysis to a sample of 147 Italian spinoffs, found that innovative factors<sup>28</sup> were significantly correlated with post-entry performance; their subsequent cluster analysis also revealed that the innovative group was more likely to have a better post-entry performance (see also Vivarelli and Audretsch, 1998).

Consistently with the discussion above, Cefis and Marsili (2006) found convincing evidence of an ‘innovation premium’ in survival time: using Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy, they showed that young firms (less than four years old) in the ‘science-based’ and ‘specialized supplier’ sectors were characterized by significantly higher chances of survival than firms in other sectors. More specifically, Cefis and Marsili (2005) have shown that being an innovator enhanced the expected time of survival by 11% compared with non-innovator counterparts.

Turning our attention to the DCs, the middle-income ones are mainly importing innovation produced elsewhere in the global economy, while the low-income ones are often completely excluded from any innovative process (see Robbins and Gindling, 1999; Keller, 2002; Robbins, 2003; Lall, 1992 and 2004; Lee and Vivarelli, 2006; Srholec, 2011). In both contexts, the role of endogenous R&D and local NTBFs<sup>29</sup> is extremely limited and so it is not surprising that very few studies try to link innovation with entrepreneurship within a DC context.

> 28 Related both to the innovative motivations of the founder and to his/her previous innovative experience in the mother firm.

> 29 Rather, R&D based initiatives in the DCs are often the outcome of the outsourcing by US, European and Japanese multinationals; see Moncada-Paternò-Castello, Vivarelli and Voigt, 2011.

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# **1. Introduction: Financial crises, economic downturns, and aid outflows**

This paper investigates how financial crises and economic conditions in donor countries have affected flows of international aid in the past, with the aim of understanding how the current global financial crisis could affect future flows. We do this by using fixed-effects regressions on a 24nation panel dataset covering 1977-2007 to estimate the effects of banking crises and other economic and political variables on aid. Consistent with other research, we find that donor-country income levels are strong predictors of aid flows, suggesting that a recession that has driven incomes well below their trend could substantially reduce aid in the years to come. Our main contribution is to estimate the effects of donor-country banking crises on aid. These effects turn out to be large, significant, and surprisingly long-lived, with aid from crisis-stricken countries falling relative to the counterfactual by 20 to 25 percent even 10 years after the banking crisis hits. Moreover, because they are estimated in regressions that control for donor-country per-capita income, these bankingcrisis effects are additional to those of the economic downturns that coincide with the banking crises.

_Aid and economic slowdowns in donor countries_ In recent past crises that have hit the developing world, development finance has helped to cushion the effects of private capital flow reversals and economic decline. During the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, for example, multilateral and bilateral donors provided almost $100 billion in loans and grants to the crisis-afflicted countries (International Monetary Fund 1998). While some of this lending was ostensibly at market rates (as in the case of IBRD lending from the World Bank) and therefore would not count as official development assistance (ODA), in practice even these loans had a substantial subsidy component in a crisis in which private finance had largely dried up. Official development flows were also crucial in helping Mexico to rebound from its 1994-95 crisis, for example.

But the current crisis has brought new and perhaps unparalleled stresses to the developing world. Unlike most recent past crises, which have primarily affected one developing region (such as East Asia or Latin America) or group (such as major emerging markets), this one has affected all regions. In 2009, growth is expected to be nearly 7 percentage points lower for the developing and emerging economies as a group than it was in 2007, with the drop exceeding 4 percentage points in every 2