problem because a large proportion of the people depend on it for a livelihood: agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa employs 65 percent of the labor force and generates 32 percent of GDP growth.<sup>12</sup> Productivity growth in agriculture has been hampered by policies discouraging innovation by smallholders. In a seminal study, Bates (1981) showed how in many countries, policies have depressed the prices smallholders can obtain for their output, and limited their access to subsidies for agricultural inputs and credit. This reduces smallholders‘ incentives to invest in their land, and to grow more than they need for subsistence. By contrast, elite farmers with political connections are given access to highly beneficial terms.<sup>13</sup> Djurfeldt et al (2006:10) note that ―The result was a dual structure comprising, on the one hand a small group of ̳modern‘ often well-connected and sometimes absent, commercial farmers and estate owners and, on the other hand, a vast majority of low-productivity, semi-subsistence oriented smallholders growing traditional varieties using only small amounts of fertilizers and improved seeds.‖ Added to this are investment disincentives in areas with insecure tenure arising from traditional patterns of communal landownership (Besley 1995, Otsuka and Place 2001).

Rates of technological uptake have been low (World Bank 2007b:52-55). The use of modern inputs such as fertilizers, improved varieties of cereals, and irrigation are far lower in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions. Soil degradation is widespread. This contrasts with the policies that helped most Asian countries to increase agricultural production by providing credit, support prices, and input subsidies to farmers, as well as by investing in research and development and in infrastructure such as roads and irrigation. The good news is that policies are improving. Djurfeldt et al (2006:10, 62) note policy shifts that will improve incentives for smallholders to invest in their land and enhance productivity. Agricultural taxation has fallen in several countries (World Bank 2007b:100).<sup>14</sup> In recent years, agricultural output has increased in several countries (Badiane 2008). And a study in Machakos, Kenya finds that with improved agricultural policies it is possible to raise productivity and reverse soil degradation (Tiffen et al 1994).

Meanwhile, population pressures are growing on the land. Jayne et al. (2003) found that almost a quarter of rural households in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia were virtually landless and had little non-farm income to supplement their livelihood. Aggregate availability of cropland per agricultural person fell by 40 percent between 1960 and 2003 (World Bank 2007b:63). Land quality is another issue ─ although cropland availability was still double that of Asia in 2003, population densities on the land are similar to those of Asia when adjustment is made for land quality (World Bank 2007b:55,63). The land-quality-adjusted population density in Kenya was estimated in the 1980s to be higher than that in Bangladesh (Binswanger and Pingali 1988, cited in World Bank 2007b:55). In response to population pressure, people are degrading land through over-cropping and over-grazing, and expanding into more fragile lands (World Bank 2007b:55). The FAO (2003) estimates that the demand for food will increase by 2.9% per year, heavily fuelled by population growth of 2.4%.

Other pressures are also building up. Africa is one of the regions projected to be most severely affected by drought and temperature rises due to global warming. Water availability will shrink significantly, especially in the South, West, and North of the continent (World Bank 2010a:137). Land degradation and drought have already caused much movement of people seeking livelihoods elsewhere, and the Sahel is especially at risk.

Demographic, economic and political pressures ─ population growth, land degradation, government crises ─ generate conflict, which in turn can create further economic and political pressures. Conflicts over land and livelihoods are intensifying in many countries (Peters 2004, Green 2010). Mamdani (2001: ch 6,7) points out that rapid population growth was one of the factors underlying the Rwanda genocide, generating resentment among locals who experienced heavy in-migration of people seeking areas with richer land. Large flows of refugees and other migrants create pressures for the receiving areas: Hatton 12