rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
training provider data collected during the matching meetings in 2013, and the endline applicant data collected from mid-2017 through May 2018. On average the endline data were collected about four years after the start of training. Since apprenticeships typically last three years, the endline data would capture short-run returns to training. The endline data focus primarily on labor market outcomes, but they also measure training history and include a trade-specific skills test designed in collaboration with local Ghanaian industry experts. Focusing only on the set of applicants that were randomized into the treatment and control groups, we find that the randomization was balanced across both groups. Typically, evaluations of training programs in developing countries are plagued by high attrition (McKenzie, 2017). In this study, sample attrition was relatively low (10 percent) and balanced across the treatment and control groups. This provides some assurance about the validity of our experiment. Our data show that the offered under the NAP was the same as that in the traditional training essentially apprenticeships available in the market. Given the geographic scope of our evaluation, our results provide insights into the effectiveness of the traditional apprenticeship system in Ghana.

We report three main findings. First, we find that access to the program led to modest increases in the probability of starting an apprenticeship, the probability of completing training, and the duration of training. Youth offered training under the NAP were 13 percentage points more likely to commence training, and 10 percentage points more likely to complete training, than the control group. Because the training completion rate among the control group was relatively low (25 percent) compared with its starting rate (63 percent), this suggests that the program was relatively more effective at encouraging the completion of training than it was the start of training. In addition, the treatment group completed four more months of training than the control group. The data suggest that female participants in cosmetology were the most responsive to the program offer, while male participants in construction were the least responsive (in terms of completion).

Second, with respect to labor market outcomes, we find that access to the program shifted participants out of wage work and into self-employment. Since wage work is generally more lucrative than self-employment, this resulted in a reduction of 12 Ghanaian cedis (GHS), or about 13 percent, in average total monthly earnings compared with the control group.<sup>5</sup> This reduction in monthly earnings was most pronounced among male participants in construction (47 GHS). But it was almost negligible among female participants in cosmetology (2 GHS), since reductions in wage earnings among this group

> 5 The exchange rate was roughly 1 USD = 4.5 GHS.

3
health events by self- and proxy respondents. In their U.S. study, Mathiowetz and Groves (1985) found that a randomly selected person reports fewer health events for him/herself compared to what he/she reports for other household members, but they are not able to offer a clear explanation of why this is the case.

Most survey experiments that study the effects of using proxy respondents in lieu of self-respondents on employment statistics are from developed countries.<sup>9</sup> Martin and Butcher (1982) compared self-responses with the proxy responses of 1,324 paired adults in the same household from the U.S., 70 percent of which were husband-wife pairs. When comparing the answers of husband and wife, the study found that employment variables (class of worker, occupation, hours worked, etc.) had less than a 10 percent disagreement rate, while higher level of disagreement was obtained for income variables. Moreover, approximately 20 percent of the proxies did not know the income of their spouse. In a similar U.S. survey, Boehm (1989) interviewed pairs of individuals in households to compare proxy and self-reports. Both individuals were interviewed separately about their own status and the other member’s status. The study found that self and proxy responses resulted in the same labor force classification 83 percent of the time. However, this study was based on a small sample of 84 individuals from a group of participant volunteers, 42 pairs from 42 households. In general, the little experimental evidence and the non-experimental studies indicate that self-respondents produce higher household and person non-interview rates, but proxies produce higher item non-response rate, especially for wages and income

> respondents will typically have different characteristics than those who are absent from the household and those characteristics are generally correlated with the type of information that it is collected. 9 Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) examine the implications of measurement error in survey data and provide a detailed review of many studies of labor statistics, mostly U.S., and measurement error in reports of earnings, hours, and unemployment. The validation sources for these studies are usually employer records and administrative records (for taxes and transfer program income), but sometimes it is re-interview and time dairies. Tables 1, 2, 4 and 5 in their study summarize these studies.

9
accuracy of the records. This survey found false reporting was below 5 percent (Health Development and Performance, 2008).

Quarterly payments go directly to facilities and are used at each facility’s discretion. In the sample of 10 treatment facilities in our study, the P4P payments amounted to 14 percent of overall expenditures in 2007. On average, facilities allocated 60 to 80 percent of the P4P funds to increase personnel compensation.

It is worth noting that the Rwanda P4P scheme was implemented in the context of a larger health sector reform and during a period in which HIV/AIDS services, including delivery of antiretroviral treatment, were extensively scaled-up. As of 2005, 83 health facilities were delivering ART to 19,058 persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), and 229 facilities were providing HTC services with 449,259 individuals ever tested (Center for Treatment and Research on AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis and Other Epidemics, 2007). By 2008, coverage of ART had increased more than threefold and more than doubled for HTC (Center for Treatment and Research on AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis and Other Epidemics, 2008).

# **3. Impact evaluation design, data and baseline characteristics**

# _3.1 Impact evaluation design_

The evaluation design with sample sizes is presented in Figure 1. The evaluation design took advantage of the phased implementation of the program at the district level. Administrative districts with pre-existing NGO P4P pilot schemes were excluded from the sampling frame. The remaining districts were then grouped into eight blocks based on similar characteristics for rainfall, population density, and predominant livelihoods using data from the 2002 Census blocks included between two and four districts depending on characteristics and size. Facilities within each district within each block were then randomly assigned into the treatment group and the other into the comparison group.

Prior to implementation of the baseline survey, the administrative district boundaries were redrawn in the context of a decentralization effort (MINALOC (Ministry of Local Government), 2006). As a result, some of the experimental areas were combined with areas that already had the NGO run pilot P4P schemes. Because P4P could not be “removed” from health 6
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# **Table S7. Estimated population counts in accordance with response to false beliefs about COVID-19**

## _<mark>Panel A: Malawi</mark>_

|Response|Africans<br>immune|Not affect<br>children|Survive<br>warm<br>weather|Common flu|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Yes|2,372,739|1,333,154|2,550,250|3,140,407|
||(264,328)|(211,726)|(267,776)|(296,737)|
|No|5,711,152|5,620,943|4,798,198|4,550,404|
||(281,989)|(244,100)|(279,246)|(293,239)|
|Don't Know|871,254|738,656|1,291,835|1,007,683|
||(173,078)|(163,452)|(179,043)|(184,135)|
|Observations|731|679|764|723|

|||_Panel B: Ugand_<br>|_a_<br>Survive||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Response|Africans<br>immune|Not affect<br>children|warm<br>weather|Common flu|
|Yes|3,271,887|1,661,419|6,115,156|1,307,071|
||(346,188)|(242,429)|(451,666)|(237,573)|
|No|14,205,739|14,780,783|11,799,655|15,115,205|
||(383,993)|(278,064)|(493,215)|(311,635)|
|Don't Know|1,109,367|831,381|3,629,792|1,137,212|
||(205,851)|(147,278)|(357,983)|(220,189)|
|Observations|947|880|1,080|881|

_Note_ : Each column reports the estimated total number of people living in households that respond “yes,” “no,” or “don’t know” to whether a series of statements were true. The questions about false beliefs were only asked in the first phone survey round in Uganda and only asked in the second round in Malawi. Standard errors are in parentheses.

34
inputs of the group is greater than one-third of total inputs).<sup>4</sup> The categories and threshold values for exporting and importing are based on Veugelers et al (2013) and are similar to those used by Gereffi and Fernances-Stark (2016). Firms are categorized into one of five categories:

- (1) Highly Integrated/ Triple Mode of participation in GVCs- The firm fulfils all three criteria i.e., it exports intensively, import intensively and has well established global linkages.

- (2) Intermediate Depth/Dual Mode of participation in GVCs – The firm fulfills two of the three criteria (intensively exporting, intensively importing or being well linked internationally).

- (3) Low Depth/Single Mode of participation in GVCs-   The firm fulfills one of the three criteria (intensively exporting, intensively importing or being well linked internationally).

- (4) Very Low/Limited participation in GVCs - The firm exports only a small share of its output (exports < 2/3 of output), its intermediated imports account only for a limited fraction of total inputs (intermediate imports <1/3 inputs) or the firm has only limited linkages to international networks.

- (5) No participation in GVCs– The firm is purely domestically owned and does not engage in exporting or importing activities.

Table 1 reports the share of firms by mode of GVC Participation. In 2015, only 1.6 percent of firms were triple mode firms (High GVC involvement), around 6 percent were Dual (Intermediate) mode firms, 23.18 percent were Single (Low) mode firms, 32.45 percent had limited participation in GVCs, and 36.69 percent of firms had no GVC involvement. See Manghnani et. al (2021) for a more detailed documentation of the integration of Indian firms in GVCs.

Table 1: Share of Firms by mode of GVC Participation

|Mode of Participation in GVCs|Share (%)|
|---|---|
|High /Triple Mode of GVC Participation|1.64|
|Intermediate/ Dual Mode of GVC Participation|6.04|
|Low/Single Mode of GVC Participation|23.18|
|Very Low/ Limited GVC Participation|32.45|
|No GVC Participation|36.69|

Note: Shares pertain to year 2015

# **_GVC Participation and Firm Performance_**

A premium in productivity is in general associated with GVC participation (see among others Amiti and Konings, 2007, and Goldberg et al., 2010b). Moreover, a higher intensity of use of complex service inputs can be associated with a higher productivity. The productivity premium associated with different depths of GVC integration and service input use is estimated in the baseline by: lnTfpist = β1GVC mode ist + γ1service intensityist + XistΓ+ αt + αi + εist (1) where GVC modeist is the depth of GVC integration of firm i operating in industry s at time t . The mode of GVCs is classified as zero, low, single, dual, and triple modes of internationalization.

> 4 As Gereffi et al. (2005) emphasize, being in the same business group can be interpreted as vertical integration of firms in GVCs. Even if a firm in a business group exports or imports a small share directly, it may do so much more intensively indirectly at arm’s length.

5
**Table 4. Change in the FLFP rate after a US$100 increase in imports per worker**

|Type of w|orker|2009-2010|2009-2012|2009-2015|2009-2017|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||(1)|(2)|(3)|(5)|
|All|Coefficient|0.00173|-0.00039**|-0.02863|-0.00030|
||t-statistic|(0.38)|(-2.06)|(-0.04)|(-0.43)|
||N|249|250|251|246|
|Low skill|Coefficient|0.00055|-0.00012|0.00816|-0.00014|
||t-statistic|(0.44)|(-1.35)|(0.14)|(-0.37)|
||N|247|248|248|244|
|High|Coefficient|-0.00484|-0.00010|-0.00099|-0.00001|
|skill|t-statistic|(-0.42)|(-0.51)|(-0.56)|(-0.04)|
||N|244|245|246|242|
|Young|Coefficient|0.00049|-0.00012|-0.01108|0.00028|
||t-statistic|(0.28)|(-0.51)|(-0.08)|(0.94)|
||N|249|250|251|246|
|Old|Coefficient|0.00259|-0.00059***|0.33254|-0.00096|
||t-statistic|(0.41)|(-6.13)|(0.00)|(-0.63)|
||N|247|248|249|245|
|Rural|Coefficient|-0.00547|0.00598|-0.02224|0.00036|
||t-statistic|(-0.30)|(0.22)|(-0.11)|(0.11)|
||N|148|149|145|146|
|Urban|Coefficient|0.00124|-0.00028**|-0.02681|-0.00021|
||t-statistic|(0.37)|(-2.37)|(-0.03)|(-0.44)|
||N|156|156|156|149|

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# IV. BOTTLENECKS

The historical survey of Section III has looked at a number of conditions that have facilitated high growth rates in the past. Some of these cannot be repeated (e.g. the stimulating influence coming from reconstruction after war). Others, however, could materialize in the future, such as a return of more favourable entrepreneurial expectations consequent on lower union power, greater flexibility, etc. Others still, such as higher levels of demand, could be achieved via new policy initiatives. But even if more favourable conditions were forthcoming, specific problems could still imperil the return to faster growth. In particular, a sudden acceleration, whether generated by policy changes or spontaneous forces, may, in the short run, encounter some obstacles and bottlenecks. Rapid growth, once set in motion, may well be able to remove many of these constraints, but it is precisely their prior existence that could frustrate the achievement of the required growth rates.

A number of physical bottlenecks have often been suggested. Most of these are usually raised in the context of a policy-led recovery, but some would also face a more spontaneous, supply-induced, upsurge. First and foremost, is the possibility that, despite high levels of unemployment, at least in Europe, other impediments may make a quick reabsorption of surplus labour very difficult. Alternatively, it is possible that, because of low investment levels for more than a decade, capacity msy now (and a fortiori in the early 1990.), be insufficient to sustain an upward spurt in demand. Similarly, the supply of some primary commodity may be highly inelastic. Finally, it could be held that even if no physical shortages were to impede a resumption of more rapid growth, financial constraints might have a similar deterring effect.
_Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh_ . World Bank Policy Research Paper 6543, Washington, DC: World Bank.

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The Amendments required states to adjust or amend local elections to comply with the provisions of the Amendments, and all states amended existing laws or passed new laws to be compliant within one year of the passing of the Amendments. Compliant elections were eventually held by most states/union territories (UTs), and there was considerable variation in the timing of “effective implementation” (i.e., the first election held which implemented the provisions of the Amendments) across states. This implementation timing varied exogenously primarily due to state authorities waiting for the term of existing elected local governing bodies to expire before conducting compliant elections. Upon implementation, local bodies were randomized for the initial implementation of the reservation system such that the one-third goal of seats for women was reached. For each appropriate level of government, the reservations subsequently rotate over the included bodies to maintain the one-third level.

Figure 1 shows the considerable variation in timing of effective implementation of the Panchayati Raj across states/UTs. Beyond the visible variation in timings, two features are important to note. First, two states incorporated provisions regarding political reservations for women before the Amendments. Andhra Pradesh provided for 22% to 25% reservations for women in 1964; Karnataka introduced a similar level of reservation for women in 1985 (GOI 2008).<sup>5</sup> Second, reservations were not implemented in all Indian states/UTs during our sample period. Some states (Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) were explicitly excluded from the purview of the Amendments. Jammu and Kashmir introduced reservations at a level consistent with the Amendments via state-level legislation, but the election of panchayats under its own Act has not yet taken place. In the empirical section we describe steps to take these features into account.<sup>6</sup>

> 5 Kerala and West Bengal restructured their institutions of local government before the passing of the 73rd Act (in 1991 and 1992, respectively), but elections implementing these reservations were not held until after enforcement in 1993. Bihar was prevented from implementation due to legal issues regarding certain provisions of the Amendments (Iyer et al. 2012).

> 6 Data on the timing of political reservations comes from several publications documenting the implementation and progress of the reservations (Mathew 1995, 2000; GOI 2008; Iyer et al. 2012). Appendix Table 1 lists years. Beginning with Bihar in 2006, several states increased their reservations for women above the 33% required by the Amendments. These changes occur after our sample period ends in 2005.

7