Table 1: Average Markups and Market Imperfections, By Sector

|ISIC|||P|re-WT|O<br>|P|ost-WT|O<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Rev. 2||Sector|ˆ_μ_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_ψit_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_ψit_|
|31||Food|1.36|3.43|-2.13|1.26|3.79|-2.36|
|32||Textiles|1.55|2.36|-0.78|1.40|2.47|-1.04|
|33||Wood|1.88|1.89|0.24|1.91|1.89|0.13|
|38||Metals|1.72|2.59|-0.99|1.54|2.65|-1.18|
|||All sectors|1.63|2.57|-0.91|1.55|2.60|-0.95|

**_Source:_** Author’s analysis based on data from the World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise Development (RPED) and Ghana Manufacturing Survey (GMES) from 1992 to 2003.The surveys were conducted by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, University of Ghana, and Ghana Statistical Service. **_Note:_** Table reports average markups computed on materials and labor; as well as the joint parameter of product/labor market imperfection. The sample is divided into two periods: Pre-WTO (1991 - 1994) and Post-WTO (1995 - 2002).

regime. The observations are distributed as follows: 36.50 percent in perfect competition, 3.81 percent in efficient bargaining, and 59.69 percent in a monopsony. The distribution of firms across the regimes varies over time. Based on relative frequencies, 76.49 percent of firms who were in perfect competition regime in the previous year are likely to remain so in the current year. Likewise, 31.03 percent of firms in the efficient bargaining regime in the previous year are likely to remain in the same regime in the current year. Finally, 84.47 percent of firms in the monopsony regime in the previous year remain in the same regime in the current year. Based on these figures, one can deduce that the Ghanaian manufacturing sector is characterized by a majority of firms exercising monopsony power, along with a few cases where workers can engage in efficient bargaining with employers over wages.

Table 2: Average Markups and Market Imperfections Based on Regimes, By Sector

||PA|NEL A:||PANEL|B:||PAN|EL C:||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Perfect|Competition|Efci|ent Ba|rgaining||Mono|psony||
||ˆ_μ_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_ψit_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_μ_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_|ˆ_ψit_|ˆ_γit_|
|31 Food|1.60|1.69|2.64|0.70|1.95|1.18|4.66|-3.54|0.29|
|32 Textiles|1.54|1.53|1.83|1.28|1.06|1.40|4.33|-3.10|0.35|
|33 Wood|2.02|1.79|3.86|2.48|2.81|1.54|4.46|-3.14|0.35|
|38 Metals|1.69|1.40|2.47|0.79|1.73|1.53|4.27|-2.95|0.36|
|All Sectors|1.71|1.60|2.70|1.31|1.88|1.41|4.43|-3.18|0.34|

**_Source:_** Author’s analysis based on data from the World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise Development (RPED) and Ghana Manufacturing Survey (GMES) from 1992 to 2003.The surveys were conducted by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, University of Ghana, and Ghana Statistical Service. **_Note:_** Table reports market imperfection parameters divided into panels. Observations are distributed between regimes as follows: Perfect Competition (PR) 36 _._ 50%, Efficient Bargaining (EB) 3 _._ 81%, and Monopsony (MO) 59 _._ 69%.

Although table 1 offered a snapshot comparison on markups between Pre-WTO and 13