rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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Table (G14) Jordanian Neighbor Primary Outcomes Heterogeneity by: Grandparents Non-Native Jordanians

||(1)<br>Social Attitudes<br>and Perceptions|(2)<br>Economic Attitudes<br>and Perceptions|(3)<br>PolicyPreferences|(4)<br>Altruism to Syrians|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Treat|-0.385***|0.122|0.212|0.235|
||(0.135)|(0.192)|(0.163)|(0.199)|
|Treat*Non-Jordanian Grandparents|0.347|-0.627|-0.270|-0.139|
||(0.449)|(0.406)|(0.445)|(0.521)|
|Non-Jordanian Grandparents|0.161|0.135*|0.414***|0.201*|
||(0.109)|(0.079)|(0.118)|(0.115)|
|p-value: T + T*Het|0.93|0.14|0.89|0.84|
|Control Mean|0.16|0.16|0.16|0.16|
|Control SD|0.37|0.37|0.37|0.37|
|N|1102.00|1102.00|1102.00|1102.00|

This table shows heterogeneity analysis of the primary outcomes for Jordanian neighbors, by whether any of the Jordanian neighbor respondent’s grandparents are of non-Jordanian decent, indicating a likely family history of migration or displacement. The outcomes are as defined in table G1. The regressions have enumerator fixed effects, communitylevel controls (Irbid/Mafraq governorate and population quartile), refugee household-level controls (shelter program, baseline number of children, baseline number of children plus adults), the Marlowe–Crowne scale, and respondent gender, education, and age. In the parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the locality level. Statistical significance represented by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).

Table (G15) Jordanian Neighbor Primary Outcomes Heterogeneity by: Proximity to Study Refugee Household

||(1)<br>Social Attitudes<br>and Perceptions|(2)<br>Economic Attitudes<br>and Perceptions|(3)<br>PolicyPreferences|(4)<br>Altruism to Syrians|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Treat|-0.427**|-0.014|0.190|0.067|
||(0.204)|(0.191)|(0.215)|(0.285)|
|Treat*Above Median Distance|0.392|0.122|-0.018|0.283|
||(0.282)|(0.280)|(0.277)|(0.527)|
|Above Median Distance|-0.069|0.033|0.046|-0.036|
||(0.076)|(0.071)|(0.071)|(0.131)|
|p-value: T + T*Het|0.85|0.67|0.39|0.33|
|Control Mean|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|
|Control SD|0.50|0.50|0.50|0.50|
|N|1044.00|1044.00|1044.00|1044.00|

This table shows heterogeneity analysis of the primary outcomes for Jordanian neighbors, by whether the distance (in meters) from the Jordanian neighbor respondent’s home to the refugee household from the study is above or below the median distance of all neighbors in the control group. The outcomes are as defined in table G1. The regressions have enumerator fixed effects, community-level controls (Irbid/Mafraq governorate and population quartile), refugee household-level controls (shelter program, baseline number of children, baseline number of children plus adults), the Marlowe–Crowne scale, and respondent gender, education, and age. In the parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the locality level. Statistical significance represented by * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%).

50
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|||Table|1.13:|EXPENDIT<br>-Varia|URES B<br>tion|YLEVEL<br>Index,|OFGOV<br>1975-100|ERNMENT<br>a/||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1975|1976|1977|1978|1979|1980|1981|1982|1983|1984|Average|
|LAC SAMPLE AVERAGE_bI_||||||||||||
|Subnational Government|24.4|23.8|22.8|<br>23.0|23.0|<br>23.0|21.0|20.1|19.8|20.4|22.1|
|Central Government|73.6|76.2|77.2|<br>77.0|77.0|<br>77.0|79.0|79.9|80.2|79.6|77.9|
|MARKET ECONOMIES||||||||||||
|Subnational<br>GovernmenL|26.5|26.5|25.4|<br>25.5|25.1|25.4|24.7|24.7|23.8|24.0|25.2|
|Central Government<br>-------------------------------------------------------------------|73.5|73.5|74.6|<br>74.5|74.9|<br>74.6<br>__-|75.3<br>-------__--------------|75.3<br>-----------|76.2|76.0|74.8|

_ai_ Total expneditures comprise expenditures and lending minus repayment. Expenditures have been consolidated eliminating transfers (interest payments, subsidies, lending-repayment) among levels of government. _kl_ Weighted averages. Comparability over time affected by the availability of data.

Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

1.14 Urban Service Financing as a Policy Concern. As a result of political, fiscal and economic considerations, the financing of urban services has become a central issue in the social policy of most LAC governments. The economic recession and the stabilization measures required by the external debt crisis have imposed new constraints to urban spending but have also brought into sharper focus the need to complement adjustment policies with programs which may alleviate their impact on the masses of urban poor. These come at a time in which, almost everywhere, subnational government finances have fallen into severe deficitary conditions, after years of steady erosion in the real value of local revenues and unrelenting pressures for overspending. (See Section 2).

Table 1.14: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS DEFICITS (as Percentage of General Government Deficit)

|Years|74|75|76|77|78|79|80|81|82|83|84|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|World|28|15|13|1|11|12|14|11|12|na|na|
|Industrial||||||||||||
|Countries|22|12|15|3|12|14|.15|11|14|5|1|
|Developing||||||||||||
|Countries|47|16|4|+|6|-|4|9|10|na|na|
|LAC Countrles|48|35|28|20|26|29|14|16|8|35|na|

Source: Staff elaboration of data derived from IMF Government Finance Statistics. Note: See Table 4.2 for country data in percentage of GDP, Table 3.1 for relation vith public enterprise sector.
# **Ownership Structure and Initial Public Offerings**

# **I. Introduction**

A recent survey paper on initial public offerings<sup>(IPOs)states,"the topicofshare</sup> allocations and subsequent ownership ranks among<sup>themostinterestingissuesinIPOresearch</sup> today" (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Researchers<sup>havecorrectlystartedpayingattentiontothese</sup> institutional issues. We believe that in order<sup>to exarnineallocationof IPO shares andsubsequent</sup> ownership, it is first important to understand<sup>the ownershipstructureofthe firm justpriorto</sup> going public. Firms deliberately attempt<sup>tochangetheir ownershipandcorporategovernance</sup> structure in preparation for going public. The<sup>structure createdprior to theoffering can influence</sup> the whole IPO process, the allocation process, and<sup>subsequent ownership.This paper attempts to</sup> partly fill this gap in the current literature.

We analyze the ownership structure of firms just<sup>priortogoing public.Thedifferent</sup> groups of owners examined include domestic<sup>andforeigninstitutions,bankswithandwithout</sup> lending relationships with the firm, venture capitalists<sup>(VCs)andcorporations.</sup> Ownership structure is also related to the corporate<sup>governancestructureof thefirm.</sup> Proxies used for corporate governance include ownership by insiders,<sup>theroleof the founder inmanagementof</sup> the firm, ownership by VCs, and the<sup>existenceofemployeestock optionplans (ESOPs).</sup> Empirical research examining ownership structure of<sup>IPOsis quitelimitedpartlydue tothelack</sup> of data. A unique dataset of Indian IPOs during<sup>the period1999-2001allowsus toexaminethe</sup> ownership and corporate governance structure of<sup>firms going public.Thedetaileddataon the</sup> number of shares held by the 10 largest shareholders<sup>allowsustostudytheroleoflarge</sup> shareholders. The analysis is also able to shed light on the<sup>roleof financial institutionsin</sup> corporate governance. India provides an interesting<sup>emergingmarkettoanalyzewith its hybrid</sup> 2
# Fitures and Tables

|Tablelt|Education Level of the Chinese<br>Labor Force, 1981|2|
|---|---|---|
|Figure l|The Structure of Secondary VTE|12|
|Table 2:|Secondary Vocational and Technical Training<br>Institutions<br>and Enrollment: 1985|13|
|Figure 3:|Secondary VTE Policy Documents|16|
|Table 3:|Enrollment Planning, Hubei Province<br>7th 5-Year Plan for Vocational and<br>Technical Educational Development,<br>1986-1990|19|
|Table 4:|Skill Composition of the Labor Force,<br>Shashi City, 1984|24|
|Figure 4:|VTE Planning Process in Liaoning Province|26|
|Table 5:|Applications, Intake and Examination Cut-off<br>Scores, Anshan City Secondary Education|29|
|Table 6:|Distribution<br>of Curriculum Specializations<br>By Type of School&Sectoral Relevance,<br>Hubei, Shaanxi and Liaoning Provinces, 1986|31|
|Figure 5:|Labor Market Linkages in Liaoning Province|36|
|Figure 6:|Location of VTE|43|
The data used in this paper suggest that total on-chain transaction volumes reached US$2.8 trillion in the first half of 2021 alone. In comparison, industry data indicate that total volumes, which include “off-chain” transactions, were approximately US$16 trillion during the same period (CryptoCompare (2021)). Off-chain transactions are facilitated by intermediaries such as cryptoexchanges and are only registered on private ledgers and order books rather than the distributed ledgers that underpin crypto-assets. As such, it is important to keep in mind that the on-chain activity we study in this paper is not fully representative of all crypto-assets activity.

A limited, but growing number of institutions such as corporations, asset managers, and pension funds around the world have started to invest in crypto-assets, bitcoin in particular.<sup>9</sup> Crypto-asset derivatives and futures markets have grown rapidly, and spot- and futures-based exchange-traded products are already active in various countries. Several large international banks, payment card companies, and payment processors have started to offer crypto-asset wallets and related services. And new services have appeared such as crypto-asset-based lending (i.e., on a collateralized basis), borrowing, trading, asset management, and custody solutions, including by asset management companies and large banks which have expressed a desire to become more involved in the cryptoassets space (GFMA, et al (2021)).

The ascent of crypto-assets has put a welcome spotlight on various well-known weaknesses in the traditional financial and monetary system. Some of these deficiencies are related to: financial inclusion, since 1.7 billion people around the world remain “unbanked” and have limited or no access to financial services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2017)); (cross-border) payments and remittances, which can be slow, costly, and opaque; citizen’s trust in and efficiency of traditional financial intermediaries, as in some countries competition is limited and memories of banking sector stress are still fresh; and macroeconomic policies, given that some countries experience regular bouts of excessive inflation and currency depreciation or volatility. Indeed, crypto activity has risen in various countries that have experienced sharp and persistent declines in macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, given their ease of storage and portability without the need for intermediaries, crypto-assets may also support people “living under the threat of harm by their families, people in their communities, or repressive governments” (Peirce (2021)). More broadly, crypto-assets typically operate on open platforms and open-source software protocols which are

> 9 According to Coingecko.com, in November 2021, over 25 public companies around the world, many of them in the crypto industry, collectively held more than US$13.6 billion in bitcoin on their balance sheets.

4
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# EVALUATION OF THE USE OF EXCISES

The justification for excises must be approached in terms of each of the major types, as the rationale and objections differ substantially.

# The Traditional Levies

Perhaps the most significant case for the traditional excises is their ability to yield substantial revenue with relatively little popular complaint.12 This reflects in part the low price elasticity of demand, in part the rather general consensus that they are more acceptable forms of taxes than others, especially income taxes. Beyond revenue, the strongest justification rests upon negative externalities; use of the commodities to excess results in costs to society not borne by the purchasers of the commodities. This is particularly true of alcoholic beverages, but of cigarettes as well, given the effects on lung cancer, not only of the smokers but of nonsmokers inhaling the smoke. The third, and perhaps oldest, argument is the desire to place a deliberate "penalty" upon use of these commodities--that their use contributes little to the welfare of society, and their purchase takes funds away from goods essential for health and well being. This view in part reflects the Victorian notion that use of the commodities is in a sense sinful, and in part the antagonism of Islamic countries to the use of alcohol.

These levies, however, are not without criticism. As noted, they tend to be regressive, because of the low income elasticity of demand and they tend to place a very unequal burden on families at given income levels. A widespread argument in some developing countries is that their primary effect is to deprive the families which use these commodities of funds for milk, and other items essential for health,while, it is argued, the taxes have little effect in reducing

> **"**<sup>**2**</sup> **A** recent discussion is provided by Joseph Cordes, Eric Nicholson and Frank Sammartino, "Raising Revenues by Taxing Activities with Social Costs," National Tax Journal, 43 (Sept. 1990), pp. 343-57.
duopoly). Increasing the number of unregulated competitors, including a foreign firm reporting its profit in a third country, would only worsen the negative business stealing. Similarly, a laissez-faire policy would not suppress the welfare losses related to business stealing.<sup>20</sup> For values of _|_ ∆ _| ∈_ [∆ _,_ ∆],<sup>ˆ</sup> the most efficient country wins, and the less efficient country loses. If one region loses and the other wins, there will be resistance to integration. In contrast, welfare increases in both countries for values of ∆smaller than _−_ ∆and<sup>ˆ</sup> larger than ∆despite<sup>ˆ</sup> the uncoordinated policies. In other words, the theory predicts that integration will be easier to achieve when the cost difference between the two countries is large.

In addition to the global welfare impact, the creation of an integrated market with a common price _P_ ( _Q_<sup>_O_</sup> ) has redistributive effects. To see this point, let us focus on _|_ ∆ _| ≤_ ∆<sup>_O_</sup> . Market integration induces a price reduction in country _i_ = 1 _,_ 2 if and only if the cost difference is not too large, that is, if _θj − θi ≤_<sup>Λ</sup> 1+<sup><u>(</u></sup><sup>_d_</sup> _γ_<sup>_−_</sup> +Λ<sup>_θi_</sup><sup><u>)</u>.21Consumersfromtherelativelyefficientregionarethus</sup> worse off after integration, which may be a source of social discontent and opposition toward sectorial integration. The interests of the national firm/taxpayers conflict with the interests of the domestic consumers.<sup>22</sup> If the government is unable to seize a firm’s rents, both domestic taxpayers and consumers are worse off (shareholders are the only winners).

In contrast, if the firms are not drastically different (i.e., if _|_ ∆ _| ≤_<sup>Λ(</sup> 1+<sup>_d−_</sup> _γ_<sup>_θ_</sup> +Λ<sup><u>min)</u>),pricesdecrease</sup> in _both_ countries because of the business stealing effect. Benevolent regulators are willing to increase their transfers to the national firm to sustain low prices so that taxation by regulation

decreases, harming taxpayers and the total welfare. The negative fiscal effect is a major concern

> 20The trade and competition literature shows that when firms are identical, the welfare losses can be reduced by jointly banning the subsidies and committing to a laissez-faire policy (Brander and Spencer 1983; Collie 2000). When firms are identical, we obtain similar results for some values of Λ (as in Collie 2000). However, this result is not robust to the assumption of heterogeneous firms.

> 21Substituting _QO_ from equation (12) in the inverse demand function yields the equilibrium price _P_ ( _QO_ ) = _d_ (<sup><u>Λ</u></sup> <u>2</u><sup>+</sup> 1+<sup>_γ_</sup> _γ_<sup>)+</sup> +<sup>_θ_</sup><sup><u>Λ</u></sup> 2<sup><u>1+</u></sup> <u>2</u><sup>_θ_</sup><sup><u>2</u></sup> if _|_ ∆ _| ≤_ ∆<sup>_O_</sup> ( _θ_ min). Comparing this price with the price in the closed economy, _P_ ( _qi_<sup>_c_) =</sup><sup>_θi_+ (Λ +</sup> _γ_ ) 1+ _d−γθ_ +Λ _<u>i</u>_<sup>yieldstheresult.</sup>

> 22In the international trade literature, a similar conflict of interest arises between domestic producers and consumers (see Feenstra, 2008).

18
and 2017, it grew by about 21% between 2017 and 2020. Figure A1<sup>6</sup> shows that such significant discontinuity is not observed in the other northern states, providing evidence for Venezuelan influx to be behind the population shock.

However, total Roraima’s government expenditure data, which includes both the federal and the state level expenditure, fails to show any expenditure increase shock in 2018. Figure 4b shows bimonthly expenditure data after adjusting inflation using national IPCA (Broad National Price Index) of the period 2015-2020 from SICONFI (National Treasury Secretariat), where the y-axis is in millions of Brazilian reais and the x-axis is the distance in 2 months from the second bimonth of 2018. There is no evidence of an increase in government expenditure and government expenditure does not seem to increase before June 2019. In 2018, there seems to be a decrease in total government expenditure in Roraima, which suggests that the influx of Venezuelan refugee and migrants was not accompanied by a positive public expenditure shock. Figure A2 also reveals that other states seem to have experienced no significant change in government expenditure in 2018. The fall in total expenditure in 2018 in Roraima is also evident in the yearly data in Figure A3, which may reflect partially the state’s response to cutback expenditure as a response to the 2015/2016 crisis and shows that total expenditure was not significantly impacted by the Venezuelan influx.

Figure 4: Population and government expenditure time series of Roraima <!-- Start of picture text --> .<br>−15 −10 −5 0 5<br>Years from 2018 −20 −10 0 10 20<br>(a) Population in Roraima (b) Public expenditure in Roraima<br>700000 300<br>600000<br>200<br>500000<br>400000 100<br>300000 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Panel (a) shows the yearly data on population of Roraima from 2001 to 2020 and the x-axis shows the years from 2018, where 0 represents 2018. Panel (b) shows the bimonthly data on total government expenditure in Roraima from year 2015 to 2020 and the x-axis shows distance from the second bimonth of 2018 in units of 2 months with 0 representing April 2018 and y-axis is in millions of Brazilian reais and is adjusted for inflation using national IPCA. The solid line represents the predicted values of a local linear smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the threshold at zero. Outer dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

The humanitarian assistance provided to the forcibly displaced Venezuelans has been mainly conducted by the military in Brazil at the federal level. Operation Welcome, the flagship strategy of the Brazilian government in response to the influx of Venezuelans was initiated in February 2018 and incurred an expense of 152 million Brazilian reais in 2018, followed by an expense of 259 million Brazilian reais in 2019 and 219 million Brazilian reais in 2020, and amounts to about 732 million Brazilian reais till July 2021 (Figure 5a). This expenditure was not exclusively spent on Roraima and

> 6Due to unavailability of a good control, we compare Roraima with the other Northern states.

8
Since Oxford has a very diverse student body, Barr and Serra were able to capture behavior of students from a large cross section of societies, all in an identical environment (as in Fisman and Miguel 2007). Their bribery game is similar to Cameron et al. (2009) in that it is one-shot and sequential, and carries a similar structure (with three players and negative externalities). It differs from the earlier study in two ways. First, the negative impact of bribes affects five experimental participants (referred to as “other members of society”) rather than a single player. Second, the “other members of society” have a passive role in the game, i.e. they cannot engage in bribery themselves, and cannot punish those acting corruptly. In their first study (data collected in 2005), the authors find partial support for the hypothesis that individuals carry corruption norms across borders. They find that the country of origin predicts corrupt behavior, but only among undergraduate students. This suggests that Fisman and Miguel‟s findings may not be generalizable to entire populations, and that some form of selection may be taking place. In 2007, the authors ran a second study consisting of a modified version of the original experiment, which resembles extortion, rather than bribery. In this game, the public official moves first and demands a bribe, while the private citizen decides whether or not to pay it. Other than this modification, the game (including parameters) remains the same as before. In order to test the socialization hypothesis – that the more an individual spends time in a new environment, the more he conforms to said environment – they collected data on the amount of time spent in the UK by each subject. They find that, while country of origin is still a strong predictor, time spent in the UK is also important, suggesting that some socialization is taking place. Furthermore, their prior result for graduate students is replicated. Thus, they show that some (but not all) individuals carry the norms prevalent in their home countries across environments, and the propensity to conform to such norms declines over time.

The puzzle that these two experiments raise is that, while the findings of Barr and Serra (2010) line up with the CPI, those of Cameron et al. (2009) do not. Barr and Serra‟s argument is intuitive and simple: individuals from corrupt countries carry their social norms (i.e. expectations of corruption) across borders, and conform to them. Over time, these individuals update their values through socialization to conform to the new norms. This argument assumes that corruption norms are different across cultures, and are portable. This would imply that, if the same bribery game is conducted in countries with different cultures, the same pattern of results will be found as with immigrants to the UK. However, Cameron et al. (2009) do not find this to 13