rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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was actually introduced at a time of _falling_ inflation, it is possible that the decision of the Hungarian government to reduce and finally abolish the taxation of interest in 1994 was motivated partly by the need to account for inflation. However, the discussions about the reintroduction of interest taxation through the year 1996 (see above) confused agents and once more highlighted the ad hoc nature of tax policy.21 To contrast Hungary with other Central European economies, table 5 shows effective tax rates in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.

**Table 5: Inflation, Interest Rates, and Effective Tax Rates in Transition Economies**

||Czech R|epublic|Pol|and|Slovak|Republic|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1994|1995|1994|1995|1994|1995|
|Inflation (CPI)|10.1|9.1|33.3|26.8|13.4|9.9|
|Nominal interest rate|9.0|9.7|31.1|26.2|10.7|9.0|
|Effective tax rate on interest|- 130.2|220.3|0.0|0.0|- 59.1|- 153.4|

All figures in %. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, nominal tax rates on deposits and securities differ. The effective tax rates correspond to the rate on deposits.

Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics, and own calculations.

In contrast to Hungary, real interest rates were negative in the Slovak Republic and Poland in 1994 and 1995. The patterns of inflation were different, however. The Slovak Republic reported inflation of 13% in 1994 and 10% in 1995, which, in combination with a final withholding tax of 15% on deposits, led to high effective tax rates. In Poland, despite inflation rates of 33% and 27%, respectively, the effective tax burden was zero as interest payments were tax exempt. The Czech Republic had positive real interest rates in 1995. However, because of high inflation and a final withholding tax of 15%, the effective tax burden reached 220%.

This brief analysis shows that, even if tax rates are modest, the higher the inflation rate, the stronger the ,,leverage effect" of capital income taxation on interest payments. Authorities have three options to counteract this effect, thus providing incentives to increase national savings. First, of course, bring inflation under control. Second, impose a tax on the _real_ value, rather than nominal, of capital income so as to prevent the principal from being eroded by inflation.<sup>2 2</sup> Third, tax interest

> 21 An effective tax rate of 202% would result from a nominal tax rate of 10% in combination with 13% inflation and a real interest rate remaining at its 1995 level of 0.6% -- another indication for the strong impact of inflation, even when nominal tax rates are low.

> 22 Taxing real income would also prevent bracket-creeping from occuring.
high military spending, this hypothesis does not generalize to other countries.

In support of a “global awareness” perspective, citizens in countries with larger populations show reduced support for foreign aid. The WVS and GI samples both show a significant negative effect of population size on support for foreign aid. That is, in countries with larger populations citizens appear less willing to assist disadvantaged people across national boundaries. But the WVS result is again heavily influenced by the United States – the coefficient is approximately halved and loses significance if the U.S. is removed from the analysis. The GI analyses are also influenced by the U.S., but to a lesser extent. There, the coefficient remains largely stable but loses significance, reaching only p<.10.

Finally, we see the more expansive colonial powers exhibit greater support for foreign aid. A 10% increase in number of former colonies is expected to increase the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 2%. While not an extremely strong effect size, it can make a substantial difference in countries that have colonized many countries, namely the U.K., France, and Spain. Increasing colonies by 50% is expected to increase the odds of individuals in that country supporting foreign aid by 12%.<sup>10</sup> Overall, we see that both individual-level and contextual-level variables have effects on support for foreign aid. At the individual level, we find some support for all five theoretical perspectives: demographic factors matter, as does religion, attention outside one’s country, left/right position and attitudes toward poverty, and psychological characteristics. At the aggregate level, national aid disbursement impacts public opinion, as does GDP and links to former colonies.

> 10 Auxiliary analyses considered other country-level variables, including income growth rates, income inequality, foreign-born, exports, unemployment, tax revenue, and estimates of private charitable giving. In some cases the variable was not significant in either survey, e.g., exports measured as a share of GDP. Other variables were significant in one survey and not another.  For example, the percent foreign born (including refugees) was negative and significant in GI and non-significant in the WVS.  In some cases, results for these variables were significant but with differing signs in the two surveys.  For example, the average growth rate for the preceding 5 years has a positive effect in the GI sample, but negative in the WVS sample.  Similarly, income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) was positive for the GI countries, but negative for the WVS sample.  Chong and Gradstein (2006) obtained a similar negative effect of inequality using the WVS, but it is contradicted by findings from the larger GI sample.

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generation activities should be promoted in both farm and nonfarm businesses. In order to do so, it is critical to improve the rural investment climate (RIC) for rural businesses.

This study assesses the RIC and provides directions for key improvement in the RIC to promote the rural private sector in both farm and nonfarm sectors. The study provides unique analyses. First, unlike urban enterprise surveys, which only include enterprise data, it uses community and household survey data provide rural micro-level environment, such as business services, financial services, market, infrastructure, education, and health. Second, the RIC related constraints to farm and nonfarm enterprises, which were not studied in previous RIC literature, can be analyzed. Third, the new approach of the RIC over labor migration at the community level could be studied to see which community RIC components influence the migration.

Using this rich survey data set, the following questions can be addressed. Which RIC components are critical to rural business entry and performance? How do business services and management innovation influence business entry and performance in rural settings? What are the differences in major constraints between farm and nonfarm enterprises? What are women specific business constraints? What are the major different constraints in rural areas from those in urban areas? How do we need to improve those identified RIC constraints for businesses?

# **2. Literature Review**

The RIC is a largely uncharted area though there is rich research related to urban investment climate survey and assessment (Klapper and Inessa 2002; Dollar et al. 2005; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Dinh et al. 2010; Jensen and Meckling 1976; La Porta et al. 1998; and Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Urban investment climate assessment (ICA) has been more successful in improving investment climate compared to the RIC. The first pilot RIC studies of Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, and Tanzania revealed the RIC to be much different and more complicated than the urban investment climate (World Bank 2006a). Informality, small scale in terms of enterprise size and production, and seasonality in terms of employment all bring significant uncertainty and risk into the growth of rural enterprises. Compared with research on urban investment climate, research on RIC is more challenging and vital for least developed countries like Yemen. Informality is one of the key characteristics of rural enterprises, which creates more difficulty in analyzing the accuracy of the data than urban enterprises (Klapper et al. 2006; and Djankov et al. 2002).

> which posed a significant risk to the stability of Yemen’s macroeconomic and monetary policy shown by the large decline in net foreign assets and negative private sector credit growth. Fuel exports were 92.2 percent of total exports in 2009 reduced from 96.9 percent in 2000 (WDI 2011).

3
12 economic growth; this section will examine the relevant nationalization policies, macroeconomic variables and labor market regulations and institutions that affect foreign labor and complement immigration policy and growth objectives.

# Nationalization

In conjunction with Malaysia's existing immigration rules, policy makers introduced several nationalization measures in an effort to encourage firms to hire Malaysian citizens instead of foreign workers. Under the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000), labor market policies focus on promoting local (i.e. Malaysian) workers through flexible work arrangements and the re-employment of qualified retirees. Additional measures include incentives to increase labor mobility toward areas with excess labor demand by providing transportation, for example, and to encourage the replacement and repatriation of expatriate workers. By directly increasing the demand for Malaysian labor, nationalization policies effectively reinforce the permit system of foreign labor management.

It is important to consider foreign labor management policies (both immigration and nationalization policies) in the context of on-going measures to promote the employment of Malays in particular. Malaysia has a long history of multi-culturalism and ethnic diversity; in 1975, indigenous Malays represented only half of the population, while ethnic Chinese represented another 35 percent and the remaining share was mostly Indian (Blau, 1986). The share of Malays in the total population has grown, and is projected to reach 63 percent by the year 2000 _(The Star Online,_ May 7, 1996). Economic activity tends to be segmented along ethnic lines, with Chinese Malaysians dominating the comrmiercial sector. Malays fare the least well; they live mostly in rural areas and have lower average incomes and higher rates of poverty. To address this disparity, affirmative action measures were adopted in the early 1970s to encourage the employment of Bumiputra (i.e. Malay) citizens. Despite the intervening period of strong economic growth and increasing incomes, Malay nationals continue to occupy the lower echlelons of income distribution. In 1987, poverty incidence was estimated at 21 percent for Malays, 9 percent for Indians and only 4 percent for Chinese (Ahuja, 1997; World Bank, 1991). The 1995 household sujrvey data indicates that two-thirds of the poor are Malay, and although poverty incidence for the entire population is between 8 and 10 percent, some 13 percent of Malays fall below the poverty line (according to calculations by Branko Milanovic).<sup>6</sup> 6 N.B. The poverty incidence definitions used in the 1987 and 1995 analyses are slightly different.
transitional northern regions where the SPLM has military presence and a measure of political influence; and resolving the status of Abyei, a disputed oil-rich region between North and South, which had often times witnessed violent conflicts between nomadic Northern and Southern tribes over water and grazing areas<sup>4</sup> . The CPA has so far led, among other accomplishments, to the appointment of a government of National Unity (GNU) dominated by the NCP (52%) and the SPLM (28%); the establishment of a government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), dominated by the SPLM, with authority in the South; and the implementation of an oil revenue sharing formula, which applies to the oil produced in the South. This formula allocates 2% of the net revenues from this oil to Southern producing states, leaving the remainder 98% to be equally shared by the GNU and the GOSS.

However, and despite the elaborate implementation modalities detailed in various protocols annexed to the CPA, little or no progress has been made on key areas, such as demarcation of the borders between North and South, a population census and the repatriation of the internally displaced Southern Sudanese<sup>5</sup> . Lack of progress on these areas casts doubts on the prospects for holding the mid-term general election in 2009, a critical step in the democratic transition, judged to be necessary for providing popular legitimacy to the CPA and for promoting the option of unity for Southern Sudanese in the referendum of 2011- so called “making unity attractive”<sup>6</sup> . Moreover, the NCP and the

> 4 As this working paper is being revised a tentative agreement (the “Abyei Roadmap”) on Abyei has been signed (June 8, 2008) – which includes provisions for replacing military forces in the area with fresh units that do not have histories of conflict in the region, increased access for UNMIS, transparent civil administration of the region and return of displaced persons.

> 5 See various CPA Monitor reports by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) at www.unmis.org.  Also see Ali (2007) for an analysis of the implementation issues regarding the wealth-sharing component of the CPA.

> 6 The making “unity attractive” was a phrase coined by the late SPLM leader Dr. John Garang, which suggests that Southern Sudanese would be persuaded to cast the unity vote, should the Northern Sudanese demonstrate commitment to the ideals of the “new Sudan”, espoused by the SPLM and its late leader.

6
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1.03 PoRulation Movements. While still a significant componenu, the ruralurban exodus is no longer the major factor of the continued growth of Latin American cities. By now, the main force driving their expansion is the natural increase of large numbers of residents and their mobility from one urban area to another. Cities continue to grow even in temperate South America, where the pace of natural increase has long subsided, because people keep moving from the metropolitan core areas to the peripheral communities, from the smaller to the larger cities and from the rural hamlets to the nearby towns. A trend towards more localized movements is gradually replacing the historical patterns of massive inter-regional migrations, as can be observed also in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. Therefore, the incremental demand for urban services is likely to remain high in all countries over the next decades particularly at the fringes of metropolitan areas and in the medium size cities.

1.04 Urban Hierarchies. Forty percent of LAC urban dwellers live now in twenty five metropolitan areas with more than one million inhabitants; a fourth of them are found in "megacities" with ten million people or more (Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires), of which the first two will be the world-largest urban agglomerations by year 2000.31 While the prominence of these megacities is assured by the combination of their present size with relatively high growth rates, several other cities will graduate into the million rank. However, the share of total urban population accounted for by these 'secondary' metropolises seems relatively stable over time, fluctuating between 15 and 18 percent of the total urban population. Settlements below this size (intermediate cities and small towns) are far too numerous to be counted. As an indication, the number of Latin American centers that are important enough to be seats of local government is now in the order of 13,000. (See Table 1.4).

1.05 Urban Services Defined. This expression has been used throughout the report in a broad sense, to identify those services which have a discrete spatial incidence within an urbanized area (the benefit region) where they are provided to the general public. Within this area, urban services (such as sidewalks or street lighting) are virtually available to all members of the resident community and their consumption is neither rival, nor exclusive. For this reason, consumers need not reveal their individual preferences through price competition and tend to set out as free riders. Thus, the correct amount and appropriate kind of urban services to be produced in a given jurisdiction does not depend on horizontal aggregates of effective demand, as is the case for private consumption goods, but on budgetary decisions taken for the end users by their

i2/ UNCHS Projections: Mexico City: 25.8 million; Sao Paulo: 24 million; Rio de Janeiro: 13.3 million; Buenos Aires: 13.2 million. Cities over one million inhabitants will pass from the present number of 25 to 46.
over 52% of the total area, and Maharashtra for about 10 percent. Between 1965 and 1994 the cultivated area grew at 0.64% per annum, but production grew faster, at 1.23 percent per annum.

Sugar beet production in India is very small. It is grown on a commercial basis only in the area of the Ganganagar Sugar Mills, Sriganganagar, Rajasthan where the beet yield is about 22-25 MT per HA.

In the early 1990s, between 40 and 50 percent of the cane was being crushed by sugar mills, about the same proportion was being used to produce gur and khandsari, and a balance of about 12 percent was used for seed, animal feed, chewing etc. (Data S3 and Fig.7). The share of production being crushed by sugar mills has been steadily increasing: in the 1960s only 25-30 percent was consumed by the mills, and 60 percent or more was used for gur and khandsari. The increasing share of the mills reflects the faster growth of production in the southern and western areas than in the traditional sugar areas in UP. In Maharashtra in particular, sugar is dominated by sugar mill cooperatives of the supplying farmers, and there is negligible gur or kahndsari production. By contrast, gur and khandsari were still dominant in UP during the 1 990s. For example, in 1990 the sugar cane produced was estimated to have been used as follows: gur 43.4 percent, mill sugar 33.2 percent, khandsari 11.5 percent, seed, feed etc 11.8 percent.( Data S3) Figure 7: **Shares of cane used in production of mill sugar, gur and khandsari, and for chewing, animal feed, seed etc.** <!-- Start of picture text -->
*SUGAR 0 GUR & KHIANDSARI 0 CHBINGFE  EC<br>C;j  4;..:XR -FI  i -00  :S<br>6  0%.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Source: See Data S3 for details Molasses, a by product of mill and khandsari sugar, on average forms 4.5 percent of the cane crushed by the licenced mills and about 5.3 percent of the cane processed by khandsari units. Gur -which includes both sugar and molasses, normally constitutes about 10 percent of the weight of the cane. Most gur is from UP, but significant quantities are also produced in TN, Karnataka, AP, Haryana, Punjab and Assam. As noted previously, gur is mainly consumed locally in the 17
<mark>Milova, Olta and Arjeta Vokshi – Abazi. 2014. “Empirical Evidence of Fiscal Policy Impact on Endogenous Models of Economic Growth - the Case of Albania”.</mark> _<mark>Journal of Knowledge Management, Economics and</mark> Information Technology_ , Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 1-13.

<mark>Patonov, Nikolay. 2016. “Fiscal Impacts on Output in a Small Open Economy: The Case of Albania”.</mark> _<mark>Scientific Annals of Economics and Business</mark>_ <mark>. Vol. 63, Issue 2, pp. 161-169. Retrieved 11 Nov.</mark> 2017. doi:10.1515/saeb-2016-0113.

<mark>Rajemison, H., S. Haggblade and S. Younger, 2003, “Indirect Tax Incidence in Madagascar: Updated</mark> Estimates Using the Input-Output Table” (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program).

<mark>Shijaku, Gerti and Gjokuta, Arlind. 2013. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: The case of Albania”,</mark> _Bank of Albania_ Working Papers. 04 (63), pp. 1-32.

<mark>Souza, Pedro H. G. F., Rafael G. Osorio, and Sergei Soares. 2011. “Uma Metodologia para Simular o</mark> Programa Bolsa Familia.” _Insituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada_ Working Paper, Brasília.

<mark>State Social Service (2016) “Raport 2015”, URL:</mark> <u><mark>http://www.sherbimisocial.gov.al/wp-</mark> content/uploads/2016/05/Raporti-Shssh-2015.pdf, date of access 23 October 2017.</u> <mark>Trebicka, Brunela. 2015. “Does Fiscal Policy Matters for Economic Growth? Empirical Study of Albanian Situation”.</mark> _<mark>Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Development</mark>_ <mark>. Vol. 2, Issue 2.</mark> World Bank. 2016. Ten Messages About Youth Employment in South East Europe”. Regular Economic Report for South East Europe, Special Topic 9S. World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank. 2015. Indonesia’s Rising Divide: Why Inequality Is Rising, Why It Matters and What Can Be Done. World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank (2018) Riding the Wave. World Bank, Washington DC.

# **Country studies:**

Argentina: Rossignolo, Dario. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Argentina. Version: May 19, 2017,” CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University).

Armenia: Younger, Stephen D. and Artsvi Khachatryan. 2014. “CEQ Master Workbook: Armenia. Version: May 31, 2014,” CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank).

Bolivia: Paz Arauco, Veronica, George Gray-Molina, Wilson Jimenez and Ernesto Yañez. 2014. “CEQ Master Workbook: Bolivia. Version: September 22, 2014,” CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University).

Brazil: Higgins, Sean and Claudiney Pereira. 2017. “CEQ Master Workbook: Brazil. Version: April 19, 2017,” CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (CEQ Institute, Tulane University).

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<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 8: Extensive Form Model of Referendum and<br>Response with an Election<br>Democratization (2009 Elections) [Khartoum]<br>None<br>Limited<br>Basic Game (Figure 1)<br>Referendum [Juba]<br>Table 1 δR> γM*J δR< γM*J<br>Khartoum A+(R/2)-M * K A-M * K<br>Juba B+(R/2)-M * J B+R-M * J<br>Unity Partition<br>Khartoum A+(R/2)-M D K Response [Khartoum]<br>Juba B+(R/2)-M D J<br>Peace War<br>Khartoum A-M D K Khartoum A+δR-γM D J -MD K<br>Juba B+R-M D J Juba B+(1-δ)R-γM D K -MD J<br><!-- End of picture text --> Under these assumptions, the solution for the democratization game is similar to that of the non-democratization game, with some very important distinctions. If the level of democratization is such that this level of militarization is credible on both sides, then the payoffs for each actor i for every outcome increase by M<sup>*</sup> i<sup>-MD</sup> i<sup>, suggesting that</sup> 34