rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Policy Research Working Paper 8912

# **Abstract**

Adding a module designed to measure land tenure-related Sustainable Development Goals indicators to the 2018 round of Zambia’s labor force survey shows low transferability and high levels of tenure insecurity. Having a title is associated with greater transferability and reduced insecurity. Although demand for titles, including willingness to pay, is high, current policies limit the scope for tenure regularization and reinforce rather than reduce gender discrimination. Efforts in this direction need to be preceded by (i) procedural reform to reduce costs, streamline procedures, and make them gender-sensitive; (ii) institutional change to increase the efficiency of service delivery and ensure record maintenance; and (iii) legal change to recognize customary tenure and improve land management and transferability. Adding the Sustainable Development Goals land tenure module to ongoing surveys has the potential to provide the evidence base needed to design results-based approaches for the land sector and reliably track progress.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at dali1@worldbank.org, kdeininger@worldbank.org, thilhorst@worldbank.org, and yyi@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
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# Degendent Variables

A mathematics test similar to that developed by IEA, covering arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statistics and measurement, was administered to students at the beginning (pretest) and end (poattest) of the scho.ol year. All students were administered a 'core" test of 40 items (27 items from the IEA core test and 13 other IEA items) and one of four "rotated" tests. This paper analyzes data from the core test.

# Indegendent Variables

The indepencent variables analyzed in this paper include fixed student socioeconomic background variables, characteristics of students that changed over the course of the year, school characteristics, teacher characteristics and practices, and peer characteristics.

Fixed Student Characteristics. The basic background information about each student included: gender; age in months; type of material used in the construction of the student's residence, an indicator of socioeconomic status ([a) block, brick or cement or [b] other e.g., mud brick); highest maternal education (years completed); maternal occupation ([a] full-time worker or [b] part-time or not employed outside the home); and paternal occupation ([a] white-collar, [b] blue-collar, [c] agricultural or [d] unclassified; in the analyses used i. this paper, 'blue-collar" serves as the comparator group). The actual data set included a wide variety of variables related to the social class background of students, but the analyses revealed considerable collinearity among them. Therefore we chose those that provided the greatest information without excessive collinearity.
10 stock without regulatory approval. These restrictions may arise due to concerns about concentrations of power in the economy or about the type of people who control a bank. These restrictions are put into effect usually by requirements that purchasers of bank stock have to alert government officials as their holdings increase above a certain level, and may need regulatory approval above some proportion. Of the 107 countries in the Barth, Caprio, Levine (2003, henceforth BCL) database of bank regulation and supervision, 41 have a limit on the percentage of bank capital owned by a single entity that is less than 50% and 38 have limits less than 25%. Additionally, there may be constraints on who can own banks, such as the prohibition on ownership by nonbank firms, or by securities firms or insurance companies in some countries (such as the United States till recently).

Nonetheless, a perverse paradox seems to operate: government regulatory restrictions are often ineffective at limiting family dominance of banks, but the regulatory restrictions on purchasing equity actually protect these family-controlled banks from takeover and hinder corporate governance. There are a plethora of channels by which powerful families have built up control in banks and nonbank firms, as in the case of East Asia (Claessens, et al). More broadly, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2003, henceforth CLL) show that families frequently enjoy control rights over banks through pyramid and other schemes. Indeed, CLL show that around the world, banks are typically not widely-held; rather, 75 percent of banks have a single owner that holds more than 10 percent of the voting rights.<sup>5</sup> Of these controlling owners, more than half are families. The regulatory restrictions on share purchases, therefore, do not prevent family ownership but rather defend the existing owners from competition for control.

# 2. Regulations: Implications for governance by depositors

Deposit insurance – implicit or explicit – substantively changes the equity and debt channels of corporate governance in a number of manners. First, deposit insurance reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor banks, which directly hinders corporate governance. Second, deposit insurance induces banks to rely less on uninsured creditors with incentives to monitor and more on insured depositors with no incentives to exert corporate governance. Third, deposit insurance – along with the
**_<u>________________________________________________________</u>_**

# **Conclusions**

There are a number of important cautions and limitations to the data available on the impact of trade costs and facilitation on competitiveness. These include:

- Lack of harmonized definitions and measurement tools which can lead to different indicators of the same barriers;

- Limited country coverage;

- Poor quality data that can be difficult or impossible to replicate;

- Lack of time series data sets;

- Aggregation of various data sources is problematic or impossible;

- Difficulty to use same indicators for cross-country analysis and for measuring project performance.

For example, one measure of trade facilitation is the time required to clear goods through customs. While there exist several sources of such data, there is no uniform and commonly accepted definition of customs clearance times. Measurement methodology differs around the world and there is no standard template or methodology for calculating, on a time series basis, days required to clear customs at national points of entry. The ICAs calculation is based on firmlevel surveys, while TTFSE measures clearance at the border. There is a discrepancy between firm surveys and on the ground interviews and observations. For Uzbekistan, WBES gives an average clearance time of 11 days compared to 5 days by UNESCAP. The question is at what point to measure customs clearance.

The data can suffer from limited or unreliable statistical base, or diverging definitions. Moreover, the involvement of different agencies in the clearance process can yield different results in baseline calculations of customs clearance. Other factors such as origin of goods, mode of transport, loading/unloading time, delays due to phytosanitary standards etc., are factors to be considered, as well.

It is necessary to achieve consensus on definitions, as well as focus attention on achievable goals in this area. It is clearly problematic to capture progress in trade facilitation through one indicator. The sequence of the supply chain can provide a beginning: international transport, border crossings, handling and storage, inland transportation. Some indicators measure the performance at a particular point in the supply chain, while others encompass several elements of the chain.

While a comprehensive indicator is useful, often project specific indicators provide a better picture of progress at the country level. A country could have an efficient customs system, for 40 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________
different types of resolutions within the same context.

Third, we validate out-of-sample predictions derived from a household survey against the census. Such validations are not commonly performed by studies using “bottom-up” methods (Wardrop et al., 2018), except Biljecki et al. (2016) and Harvey (2002). The estimates are more accurate than previous studies that make use of two-dimensional satellite data. Our out-of-sample _R_<sup>2</sup> of 0.78 is higher than the 0.72 reported for Australia (Harvey, 2002). Our median RE at 28% is lower than those reported by Biljecki et al. (2016) in the Netherlands, which ranges from 42% to 85.4%. These higher errors could be attributed to their usage of fewer satellite indicators, linear (rather than non-linear) regressions and simple (rather than stratified) random sampling for the survey.<sup>9</sup> Overall, the results demonstrate the feasibility of national statistics offices utilizing geospatial data in combination with frequently conducted surveys to produce accurate local population estimates in the between-census years and in areas where surveys are not conducted. Improved availability of such statistics would provide useful inputs into a wide variety of policy decisions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents the model, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 finally concludes the paper and discusses policy implications.

# **2 Data sources and description**

## **2.1 Population sources**

Our main measures of population density at the village level are the Census of Population and Housing, Sri Lanka, 2012, and the 2012-13 Sri Lankan Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). The HIES is a detailed survey of about 25,000 households in all the districts and sub-districts of Sri Lanka, but only covers about 2,421 of the total 14,103 villages of the country. The HIES follows a two-stage stratification process: the census blocks form the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), and the households form the Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs) or Final Sampling Units (FSUs).

The PSUs used in the HIES are census blocks, which are portions of villages.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the HIES can yield direct density estimates only at the PSU-level, and not at the villagelevel. Unfortunately, it is not possible to model population density at the PSU-level due to the lack of a PSU-level Geographical Information System (GIS) boundary file. We therefore

> 9 Interestingly, Biljecki et al. (2016) find lower errors (18.3% or 18.5%) by utilizing floor-space or volumetric 3D data and functional information about buildings. But these 3D models and data are costly to obtain periodically in low-income countries.

> 10 A PSU is contained within the village. There were 62,571 PSUs versus 13,984 GNs (villages) in the 2012 census.

5
|Manager Controls Income from||-0.003|0.579***||0.015**|0.745***|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Plot||(0.005)|(0.190)||(0.007)|(0.131)|
|Total Days Worked by HH Men||0.052|0.001||0.041***|0.011|
|||(0.033)|(0.089)||(0.012)|(0.045)|
|Total Days Worked by HH||0.005|-0.187||0.000|-0.018|
|Women||(0.009)|(0.127)||(0.001)|(0.042)|
|Total Days Worked by Men||0.028**|0.014||0.019***|0.009|
|(non-HH)||(0.013)|(0.068)||(0.005)|(0.015)|
|Total Days Worked by Women||-0.004|0.036||0.004|0.043***|
|(non-HH)||(0.008)|(0.044)||(0.003)|(0.015)|
|All Harvest Sold||0.085***|0.081||0.029***|-0.014|
|(1=Yes)||(0.028)|(0.063)||(0.008)|(0.029)|
|Plot of Land uses||0.051*|-0.185**||0.142***|-0.019|
|Urea/Phosphates/NPK/DAP||(0.027)|(0.083)||(0.017)|(0.037)|
|Plot of Land uses||0.055**|0.049||0.069***|0.167***|
|Pesticides/Fungicides/Herbicides||(0.025)|(0.086)||(0.014)|(0.051)|
|Constant|||-2.532|||-1.981|
||||(4.054)|||(1.217)|
|Observations|785|785|785|4,167|4,167|4,167|

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table 3 displays the estimation results. It highlights that men have a greater chance (5.2 percent) than women of being top performers. In addition, the probability of inclusion as a top performer rises with age, albeit at a decreasing pace. Vocational training is a key determinant of being a top performer. Individuals who have started businesses because they could not find jobs in large firms exhibit a higher probability (approximately 4.2 percent) of inclusion among the top performers. Moreover, the inverse Mills ratio is not significant, that is, there is no selection bias in the model estimation.

**Table 3. Step 2: Probability of being a Top Performer**

||(1)<br>Coefficients|(2)<br>Marginal effects|
|---|---|---|
|Age owner|0.117***<br>(0.0287)|0.00878|
|Age squared owner|-0.00142***<br>(0.000352)|-0.000107|
|Male(=1)|0.701***|0.0528|
||(0.156)||
|Age firm|0.0239<br>(0.0426)|0.00180|
|No diploma|Ref.||
|Primary completed|0.128<br>(0.399)|0.00740|
|Some secondary|0.439<br>(0.311)|0.0288|
|Post-secondary|0.599<br>(0.374)|0.0419|
|Other post primary|1.057**<br>(0.432)|0.0886|
|No opportunity in large firms|0.564***<br>(0.183)|0.0424|
|Family tradition|0.171<br>(0.266)|0.0129|
|Inverse Mills ratio|-2.129<br>(1.341)|-0.160|
|Constant|-4.769***<br>(0.924)||
|Sector fixed effects|yes||
|Region fixed effects|yes||
|Pseudo-R2|0.08||
|Observations|3,401|3,401|
|Standard errors in parentheses ***|p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *|p<0.1|

# **4.3. Identification of the constrained gazelles and survivalists**

Based on regression (3), the paper predicts, for each entrepreneur in the country, the statistical probability of being a top performer. This probability is conditional on the estimated parameters  _0_ and  _1_ and on the vector of observed variables  . The following model is performed: where β̂ is the vector of estimated coefficients. To separate the sample of informal entrepreneurs into three categories: top performers, constrained gazelles and survivalists, the paper uses these predicted probabilities.

Top To determine the shares of the other segments, the cut-off point is selected for Pr̂(Yi = 1) between constrained gazelles – a group of entrepreneurs who have business skills that resemble 12
4 and that almost all water and transport privatizations were concessions while in telecommunications, the norm was divestiture. The popularity of concessions is easily explained by the fact that they allowed a relatively easy handling of constitutional, legal or political constraints on privatizations. With concessions, governments could, for instance, argue that they were not selling the assets of the country and hence bypass legal or constitutional constraints and reduce the criticisms of reforms by anti-privatization segments of civil society. 7 These concession contracts also became the main regulatory instrument, while the main mandate of the regulators established as part of the reform process was to monitor compliance with these contracts.<sup>8</sup> The more specific the content of the contracts on all parties' obligations, the clearer the mandate of the regulators. In most cases, these contracts cover a wide spectrum of regulatory issues such as regulatory regimes and tariff design. It is thus in these contracts and the related legal instruments that the concern for efficiency stemming from the proposals made by Professor Littlechild for the UK had the most impact.

**Table 1: Relative importance of Concessions Contracts in Infrastructure Privatization in Latin America**

||**1990--2000**|
|---|---|
|Sector|**Concessionasa % ofPPIProjects**|
|_WATER_|89%|
|_TRANSPORT_|_97.5%_|
|_ENERGY_|54.4%|
|_TELECOM_|0.5%|
|_TOTAL_|_65.5%_|

Source: World Bank PPI Database The practical institutional solution adopted by most reforming governments to monitor these contacts was very similar to the British model. To control private operators, reformers created a regulatory agency, which was sector specific in most countries, but multi-sectoral in a few others, covering a group of sector industries. The formal role of this agency was to ensure compliance by all parties with the terms of the contract, and to balance the interests of users, operators and government, and to act and interpret on circumstances loosely described or not

> **7** Bolivia offered an additional interesting creative experience and combined traditional privatization transactions with capitalization a new mechanism to transfer of public enterprises. Under capitalization, the State transferred shares equivalent to 50 percent of the firm to the operator who won the right to run the service in an auction. It also yields about 45 percent to private pension fund who use the funds derived from this share to pay old-age benefits complementary to those stemming from individual retirement accounts. The remaining 5 percent accrues to the company's employees. For more details, see for instance, Barja and Urquiola (2003) **8** For a longer discussion, see Gomez-Ibanez (2003)
migrant activities (14 percent). In contrast with rural residents, nearly all children born in urban areas complete high school education, and a substantial and growing share continue on to university or post-secondary vocational-technical training programs.

# **_C. Evidence on Educational Attainment and Age of Migration from the_**

# **_RCRE Supplemental Survey_**

For our primary analysis, we use household and village surveys conducted in collaboration with the Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) at China’s Ministry of Agriculture. Conducted in 52 villages located in four provinces, all 3999 households in the 2003 wave of RCRE’s household panel for these four provinces were enumerated between August and October 2004, allowing us to match households and villages from the 2004 supplemental survey with a household and village panel survey conducted annually by RCRE since 1986.<sup>1</sup> A unique feature of the supplemental survey is that it enumerated the educational attainment, birth year, current occupation, work and migration history, and residence location for all children and other current and former residents (including deceased former residents) of survey households. The survey design allows us to avoid the selection bias that would occur if we used household survey data that only includes current household residents to study educational attainment. One might yet be concerned that entire families may migrate to locations with better education, but this was a rare occurrence prior to the mid-2000s.

Figure 1 summarizes trends in high school enrollment by cohort for individuals born after 1940 and residing (or previously residing) in RCRE households. Consistent with research using the population census (e.g., Hannum et al. 2008), the supplemental survey data also show that educational attainment rose steadily over time, with the average educational attainment of girls and boys converging by the 1975 birth cohort (Appendix Figure A.1). Summary statistics on the age of first migration are consistent with findings from surveys of migrants in urban areas. Between 1987 and 2004 the number of migrants of all ages increased while the average age at 1A detailed discussion of a larger nine-province sample from the RCRE panel dataset (The National Fixed Point Survey), including discussions of survey protocol, sampling, attrition, and comparisons with other data sources from rural China, can be found in the data appendix of Benjamin, Brandt and Giles (2005), and source documents on sampling, survey design and survey instruments are available at: https://sites.google.com/site/decrgjohngiles/datasets. This paper makes use of village and household data from the four provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu and Shanxi) where the authors conducted follow-up household and village surveys in 2004.

6
project studies, G.D. Kalra (1992) analysed gur production in UP and made separate estimates of the nominal protection of the cane used to produce it for the period 1981 to 1991. His estimates worked back from estimated reference prices for gur, which in turn were derived from fob export prices at Bombay and from UP to Nepal. However world trade in gur (i.e. non-centrifugal sugars -see previous discussion) and the quantities periodically exported from India (of the order of 15,000 tons ) were negligible in relation to UP gur production (over 4 million tons in the 1990s). We therefore decided that it would be more meaningful to compare the domestic prices of sugarcane used in gur production, with the reference prices of mill sugarcane, since the latter are derived from world prices of sugar and molasses, in which there is substantial international trade. The counterfactual scenario for these NPC estimates is therefore a situation in which there is free trade in mill sugar and molasses, and in addition the abolition of the controls (including minimum cane prices imposed on the mills) which prevent free competition for cane between the gur and khandsari units on the one hand and the mills on the other.

Figure 19: **UP: Comparisons of the NPCs of cane used in mill sugar production and cane used in gur production.** <!-- Start of picture text --> .1o N - -+CANE FROM GUR<br>* ........- CANE FROM SUGAR<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources and notes: See Annex 17.

The details of these estimates are shown in Annex .and the resulting NPC series for sugarcane is compared with the NPC series for mill sugarcane in Fig 17. The prices paid for cane by gur producers are not reported, but consistent annual series of wholesale gur prices are available for the entire period from 1965 to 1995. As gur has always been exempt from excise and other taxes, on the assumption that gur production is competitive, Kalra uses these prices to infer the average price paid for cane for 1981 to 1991 by deducting transport costs from the gur producing units (which are typically in the cane producing areas) to the wholesale markets and estimated average processing charges including a competitive profit margin. In calculating the processing charge he assumes a constant ratio of gur production to cane processed of 10 percent 46