The program defined that customs agents that were successful in meeting their performance goals would receive mainly non-financial incentives including congratulatory letters that were put in the official’s permanent file and disseminated publicly to provide wider recognition as one of the best inspectors in the customs service. Other incentives included options to participate in training courses, and other similar measures. With regards to sanctions for bad behavior, the program introduced a process of interviews with the program team when the performance contracts commitments were being broken, and warnings as to possible disciplinary action that could be taken if performance did not improve. The main sanction was removal from their position, as in the targeted offices, the possibility of earning money legally through disputed claims was high (since Cameroonian customs agents receive a share of any revenue obtained from fines levied on claims). The concrete sanction of being transferred to an office with lower earning potential was a financial disincentive that was considered to have a greater impact on personal behavior than a positive financial incentive. This illustrates the use of the principle of loss aversion as a strong motivation for changing behaviors.

As result, an increase in the volume of declarations processed generated an additional $16.5 million in revenue over the six month period. The effect of the contracts program on trade facilitation was positive. Prior to the implementation of the program, less than 80% of declarations were assessed on the day they were registered, compared with almost 90% during the program. Broadly speaking, three non-quantifiable results have been observed. First, performance contracts made it easier to conduct inspection procedures with the operator of the container terminal. Second, customs agents became more “diligent.” The performance contracts induced agents to stay longer in the office—time at work increased by between 3% and 10% in the two offices, whereas other Cameroonian offices that were not part of the program had time at work decrease by -4%. Third, customs officials became more aware of their responsibilities, improving the relationship between customs agents and their managers.

The improvements in customs processes have also been noted by private sector actors. At the start of the program only 17% of respondents from a survey of brokers had a positive perception of the customs agents participating in the program; these same companies had a very positive perception of the customs agents at the conclusion of the program (other 90%). According to the survey, the most important impact of the program has been the speeding of the clearance process and the better attitude of customs inspectors.

As a result of the program, in less than two months the behavior of participating customs inspectors changed significantly for the better, leading to reduced clearance time, increased revenues for the Cameroonian Treasury, and a reduction in harmful corruption-related practices. Moreover, the pilot was extended to two other offices and to large importers a year after.

It is always difficult to attribute without a doubt, success to such experiment. However, what could be easily perceived (confirmed by interviews of private operators) was that the “reformers” in the organization were strengthened and some of them promoted. Based on positive results in terms of revenues collection, it became a little bit easier for the head of customs to get approval from the 13