7 A recent World Bank report “Sustainable Refugee Return” (2015) examined 8 case studies of large‐scale refugee return, namely return to Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, and South Sudan. In all these cases, except Bosnia‐ Herzegovina, refugees were hosted mainly in nearby developing countries – often in a precarious condition and under pressure to leave. Approximately 350,000 Bosnian refugees found shelter in Germany, however, they were never granted permanent status. Furthermore, in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords, they were under strong pressure to leave, being denied of rights and support. Some 250,000 did so, returning to Bosnia or resettling in third countries<sup>9</sup> .

These statistics on the return of refugees contrast strongly with those relating to economic migrants among relatively advanced countries. It is estimated, for example, that about 30% of migrants to the United States during the great age of migration 1890‐1914, returned, and that return rates varied from around 5% of those originating from Russia, Ireland, and Scandinavia, to about 50% of those originating from Italy. Post‐World War II, guest worker programs helped to facilitate large‐scale migration within Europe and from countries such as Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia. These programs collapsed in the wake of the first oil shock in 1973‐75, and return/circular migration has been a prominent feature in Europe ever since. For example, in 1975‐1985 the outward flow of the foreign population in Germany exceeded the inflow. In subsequent years, net migration resumed, and circular migration did not stop the migrant stock from increasing, as the foreign population in Germany increased from less than 1 million in West Germany in 1960 to 3 million in 1970, 4.5 million in 1980, to 7.5 million in unified Germany in 2000.

Unlike the United States, Europe never encouraged permanent settlement. Over 1990‐2003, the foreign population outflow to inflow ratio was 73% in Germany. In Belgium, the ratio was 49%, in Denmark and Sweden it was 25% and in the Netherlands, it was 19%. Among the most accurate estimates of return are from social registers available for Finland and Sweden, which enable a longitudinal monitoring of individuals and a reliable sorting by country of origin and by the nature of migration. Some 30% of the 1990 immigrant cohort in Finland had left within 10 years. While 60% of those whose country of origin was the OECD returned, only 20% returned to Estonia and only 15% of those originating from Russia. Only 15% of those who came in as refugees, typically low‐income countries, returned. A similar picture is obtained in Sweden. Over 1970‐1990, 25% of the immigrant cohort had left within 5 years, with the return more common to Nordic countries or other OECD countries and least common among refugees and immigrants from low‐income countries.

The data shows that return is more likely the shorter the distance, the shorter the permanence and the wealthier is the country of origin. Financial incentives for return appear to have played only a minor role (Dustmann 1996). Based on a survey of 273 returnees to 8 origin countries, Kuschminder and Koser concluded: “returnees who migrated for economic reasons were more likely to be reintegrated than those who migrated for other reasons; returnees who both had a sense of belonging to the community prior to migration and

> 9 <u>http://www.dw.com/en/refugees‐reloaded‐lessons‐from‐germanys‐approach‐to‐bosnian‐war/a‐ 19021249</u>