rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Third, sectoral distribution data as reported in the ILO's _Wlorld Labor Report_ [ILO 1994] are used. Fourth, country statistical publications are used for China [China 1993a, 1993b], Bangladesh [Bangladesh 19921, India [India 1992], Indonesia [Indonesia 1993]. Where there is more than one observation for a particular country, only the latest date is used<sup>5</sup> .

The share of the work force in each sector is then averaged by income group or region using the 1995 working age population as the weight. The data used in these aggregations are given in Table 3 (see previous section for note on new countries in Europe and Central Asia).

# 2.4. Status of workers within sectors

When there is a breakdown of workers by status, the breakdown is usually as follows

- Employers and own-account workers

# D Employees

- Unpaid family workers

- Not classifiable by status

Within each aggregated sector (agriculture, industry, services), the share of workers that are reported as employees is treated as the share that is in wage employment. The residual is the share that in is nonwage employment. Since actual data on the share of each sector that is in wage employment is only available for a relatively small sample of countries, a simple statistical model is used to estimate data where they are missing.

'Except for Bangladesh, where Labor Force survey data for 1989 are used over 1990 ILO estimates.

6
**_<u>________________________________________________________</u>_**

under which urban mobility indicators have been gathered and analyzed in a sample of 50 cities worldwide for the year 2001.

This project follows in the steps of the Millennium Cities Database which made it possible to highlight the existing links between urban planning, use of the various transport modes, and performance of the transport system, by collecting reliable and comparable indicators of urban mobility economics. The comparison of indicators through time also allows a sophisticated analysis of the most recent evolutions in urban mobility, the identification of successful mobility policies, and the outline of future prospects. The database and the analysis report will be available via a CD-ROM enabling easy search and exploitation of data.

# **2.5 Services and Information Technology Indicators**

The role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in economic growth and social change has received considerable attention in recent years. Information and communication technology in the form of state-of the art information management systems is an important factor for successful implementation of trade facilitation by reducing costs. Transmission delays, inefficient procedures etc., can be eliminated through automated technology. Computerized systems such as UNCTAD’s Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) and the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) (Whose is this system) can speed the flow of information of cargo.

# _<u>The WTO Services Database</u>_

The WTO Services Database contains the schedules of commitments and lists of Article II (MFN) exemptions of WTO Members. The database is maintained by the Trade in Services Division of the WTO. Only the commitments of countries which were members of WTO prior to 31 December 2004 are included in the database.

By using the predefined reports you can sort information:

- by country (select a country and retrieve details of all commitments of that country, listed by sector)

- by mode of supply (select from commercial presence, consumption abroad, cross-border supply or presence of natural persons to retrieve a list of countries and their commitments)

- by sector and level of development (choose a sector, and within that sector choose a level of development – developed, developing, least developed, transition). To obtain a complete list of commitments in a given sector you need to compile the four resulting lists

- by region

- by level of development

You can also retrieve a complete list of horizontal commitments, or a list of MFN exemptions. Finally, a sector/country matrix report is available. This is a table which identifies instances in which a given Member has made a commitment in a given sector. Totals are supplied for each 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
we defined the poor as those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, and empirically investigated the determinants of growth in incomes of the poorest quintile. In a large panel of countries, we found that growth in incomes of the poor tracked growth in average incomes roughly one-for-one. Since the growth rate of average incomes of the poor is just the sum of the growth rate of average incomes and the growth rate of the first quintile share, our paper showed that neither average incomes, nor a large set of other control variables, were significantly correlated with changes in the first quintile share. That paper contributed to a growing literature on the determinants of inequality, including Li, Squire and Zhou (1998), Gallup, Radelet and Warner (1998), Spilimbergo, Londono and Szekely (1999), Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Schott (1999), Easterly (1999), Barro (2000), Foster and Szekely (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2003).

This paper differs from Dollar and Kraay (2002), as well as much of the existing literature on determinants of inequality, in two key respects. First, instead of looking at relative poverty measures or inequality, here I focus primarily on changes in absolute poverty measures as the dependent variable.<sup>1</sup> As is well understood, changes in absolute poverty measures are complicated and non-linear functions of underlying changes in average income and income distributions.<sup>2</sup> The second contribution of this paper is to empirically construct the exact measures of distributional change that matter for changes in poverty for a large sample of countries, rather than simply looking at common summary statistics of inequality such as the Gini coefficient or quintile shares. This means that I can empirically study the contributions of growth and distributional change to changes in poverty, without having to make restrictive assumptions about the shape of the underlying income distribution.<sup>3</sup> Despite these differences, the main conclusions of this paper are similar to those in Dollar and Kraay (2002). In particular, both papers find that growth in average incomes matters a great deal for reductions in both relative and absolute poverty. Both

> 1 A notable early exception is Ravallion and Chen (1997), who estimate regressions of changes in absolute poverty on changes in mean incomes using a panel of household surveys from developing countries.

> 2 See for example Bourguignon (1999) for a lognormal example.

> 3 For example, Lopez (2003) investigates the determinants of growth and change in the Gini coefficient, and then draws conclusions regarding the likely effects on poverty by assuming that the distribution of income is lognormal, so that there is a one-to-one mapping between the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve.

3
<!-- Start of picture text --> 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009<br>USA 2<br>−4<br>D1 2<br>−4<br>D2 2<br>−4<br>D3 2<br>−4<br>D4 2<br>−4<br>S4 2<br>−4<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: A wavelet-based multiresolution decomposition of income per capita growth series of USA.

_Notes:_ This multiresolution decomposition is performed using Maximum Overlap Discrete Wavelet Transformation (MODWT) on first difference of the annual series from Penn World Tables 7.0. It is implemented using the pyramid algorithm shown in Figure 3. The top panel shows the actual series (growth rate of income per capita). Variations due to 2 – 4 year frequency oscillations are shown in the second panel ( _D_ 1), others as follows: 4 – 8 year frequencies in the third panel ( _D_ 2), 8 – 16 year frequencies in the fourth panel ( _D_ 3)and 16 – 32 year frequencies in the fifth panel ( _D_ 4). The last panel ( _S_ 4) shows the “smooth” component, e.g. all frequencies lower than 16 years. These components are approximately independent to each other and the original series can be recovered by aggregating the four sub-components.

4
- Corden, W. Max, & Neary, J. Peter, 1982 – _Booming sector and deindustrialization in a small open economy_ . Vol.92. No. 368. The Economic Journal.

- Dessus, Sebastien & Astrup, Claus, 2005 – _Exporting goods or exporting labor?: long term implications for the Palestinian economy._ Published in the Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, Vol. 3, No.1, 39-61.

- Devarajan, Shantayanan, Go, Delfin S., Lewis, Jefferey D., Robinson, Sherman, & Sinko, Peka, 1997 – _Simple general equilibrium modeling._ Chapter 6 in “Applied methods for trade policy analysis – A handbook”, Cambridge University Press.

- Devarajan, Shantayanan & Go, Delfin S., 1998 – _The simplest general equilibrium mode of an open economy._ Journal of policy modeling, published by Elsevier Science Inc.

- Domaç, I., & Shabsigh, G., 1999 – _Real exchange rate behavior and economic growth: evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia_ . Working Paper No. 99/40. Published by the International Monetary Fund.

- Firro, Kais, 1990 - _Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon, 1860-1914_ . International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 151-169

- Harberger, Arnold C., 2004 – _The real exchange rate: issues of concept and measurement._ University of California, Los Angeles.

- International Monetary Fund, 1999 _– Back to the future: postwar reconstruction and stabilization in Lebanon_ . Occasional Paper No. 176.

- International Monetary Fund, 1999 _– Economic dislocation and recovery in Lebanon_ Occasional Paper No. 120.

- Khater, Akram, 2017 - _Why did they leave? Reasons for early Lebanese migration_ . Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies, North Carolina State University.

- Khater, Akram, 2001 - _Inventing Home - Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 18701920._ University of California Press

- Krugman, Paul R., & Obtsfeld, Maurice, 2003 – _International Economics, theory and policy._ Sixth Edition, published by Addison Wesley.

- Lebanese University Publications, 1970 - _Lubnan, mabaheth ilmiah wa ijtimaya (Lebanon, scientific and social studies)._ Ordered by the Governor of Mount Lebanon, Ismael Haki Bek in 1918.

- Ministry of Planning, Central Administration of Statistics, 1974 - _Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises, Année 1973 (Lebanon Statistical Abstract, 1973)._

- Nahas, Charbel, 2003 – _Huzuz ijtinab al azama wa churut takhatiha (Chances of avoiding the crisis and conditions of overcoming it)._ Published by Dar An-Nahar.

- Nowak, Jean-Jacques, 1998 – _Syndrome néerlandais et théorie du commerce international (Dutch Disease and theory of international trade)_ . Published by Economica.

15
27

- Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to farmers and consumer tax equivalents in high-income and developing countries, all covered farm products, 1960 to 2007

(percent, averaged using weights based on gross value of production or consumption at undistorted prices)

- (a) Nominal rates of assistance

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>1960-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04<br>-20<br>High-income countries<br>High-income countries (incl. Europe's transition economies)<br>Developing countries<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- (b) Consumer tax equivalents

<!-- Start of picture text --> 60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>1960-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04<br>-20<br>High-income countries<br>High-income countries (incl. Europe's transition economies)<br>Developing countries<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
3

# Table I

# Profitability and Exposure to Foreign Trade

|Year|Mean<br>Tariff|(la) C<br>Mean<br>Price-Cost<br>Margin|hilean Manufactu<br>4-Firm<br>Concentration<br>Ratio|ring<br>Exports<br>Output|Import Share<br>in apparent<br>Consumption|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1967|742|482|49.0|4.0?|20.0?|
|1979|iiZ|**32Z**|61.6|13.0X|29.02|

(lb) Korean Manufacturing

|Mean|Per. r<br>Monopoly/<br>Oligopoly|mance of Diffe<br>(Average of<br>Competitive|rent Market<br>1978 and 198<br>More<br> <br>Protected|Structures<br>3)<br>Less<br> <br>Protected|High<br>Export<br>Share|Low<br>Export<br>Share|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Price Cost|||||||
|Margin|**29Z**|262|34%|**242**|252|29?|

# Sources:

(la) de Melo and Urata (1986, table **1).** (lb) Lee, Urata, and Choi (1988, tables 3 and 8).
_15_ _Tax Reform in Transition_ Table 3: Alternative Income **Tax** Systems and Their Revenue Potentials

# (a) A Flat 11 Percent Income Tax With Exemption for the Poor

|Income interval (Lev)|Income share_(%)_|Tax rate_(%)_|Average tax<br>revenue (Lev)|
|---|---|---|---|
|3324 - 10133|20|0|0|
|10134-16669|40|11|1454|
|16670 -26864|30|11|2284|
|26855 +|10|11|4032|
|Weighted average||8.8|1881|

# (b) A Flat 20 Percent Income Tax With Exemption for the Poor

|Income interval (Lev)|Income share_(%)_|Tax rate_(%)_|Average tax<br>revenue (Lev)|
|---|---|---|---|
|3324 - 10133|20|0|0|
|10134- 16669|40|20|2643|
|16670 -26864|30|20|4152|
|26855 +|10|20|7331|
|Weighted average||16|3036|

# (c) A More Progressive, Three Bracket Income Tax System

|Income interval (Lev)|Income share(%)|Tax rate(%)|Average tax<br>revenue (Lev)|
|---|---|---|---|
|**3324**<br>**- 10133**|**20**|**0**|**0**|
|**10134 -16669**|**40**|**20**|**2643**|
|**16670 - 26864**|**30**|**30**|**6228**|
|**26855 +**|**10**|**40**|**14661**|
|**Weighted average**||21|4391|

_Source: Author's estimates using 1992 Individual Budget of households Survey, NSI._
and covering more recent years. It also concurs with a World Bank report on India (World Bank, 2002), which, in addition to labor regulation, identifies power shortages as a factor in economic performance gaps across states.<sup>7</sup> There are two important methodological differences between the analysis of the role of labor regulation presented in this paper and that of Besley and Burgess (2004). First, Besley and Burgess (2004) measure labor regulation in terms of a state level labor dispute law index registering “pro-employer” or “pro-worker” reforms over the 34 year period covered by their study.<sup>8</sup> A possible drawback in using legislative events to measure the degree of labor regulation is that it would entail suppressing possible differences across locations and regions in the implementation or enforcement of the same laws. It is also possible that firms respond differentially to the same enforcement effort due to differences in the nature and magnitude of other binding constraints. One way to minimize the bias in the estimation of local effects of labor regulation would seem be to measure it in terms of each firm’s evaluation of how far its choices are constrained by labor laws and regulation.

The second, and more important, methodological difference between Besley and Burgess (2004) and our analysis is that we estimate the short run effects of business environment on productivity, while their analysis is of a long run nature. Our data are such that we observe the business environment in a cross section of plants over a certain year, but along side inputs and output for the same year plus the previous two years leading up to it. In the analysis we assume that that the business climate indicators observed at the time of the survey also characterize a plant’s environment over the preceding two years. This enables us to use the longitudinal observations in productivity

> 7 Dollar et al (2002) also provide some evidence that differences in power shortages help to explain some of the observed regional gaps in manufacturing productivity across states.

> 8 They find that states that used their labor legislative prerogatives to introduce pro-employer amendments to India’s federal Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, had better economic performance over the period in terms of growth as well as productivity. In contrast, states that reformed the act in a “pro-worker “ direction registered lower growth and lower productivity. Aghion et al (2004) also use the Besley –Burgess index in their analysis of inter-state gaps in industrial productivity and growth at the three-digit Standards of Industrial Classification Code level, basically to confirm the Besley-Burgess finding on the role of labor regulation.

5
<!-- Start of picture text --> 208,876 Net employment variation Employment82,357 Variation Intensive vs Extensive margin<br>200000 200000<br>100000 104,002 100000. aS.A8<br>g F3 $7,336<br>2S 23520 26,063 —3 4219 767<br>=aa __ am i5 P == or<br>= 6,339 wo 2 -33,816 -20,236<br>2 -28,555 -100000<br>-100000<br>146,529<br>145,742 -200000 -158,903<br>-200000 rea 2013 «2014 «2015 2018 2017 2018 eu) 2020<br>2013 2014 2018 2016 2017 2018 2010 2020<br>Employment Variation: Entry/Exit/Expanding/Contracting<br>600,000<br>400,000<br>200,000<br>0<br>-200,000<br>-400,000<br>600,000<br>2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020<br>Bentry exit expanding «contracting<br><!-- End of picture text -->
# Estimated Trends in Direct & Indirect External Financing for Maternal Health in Developing Countries by Source of Financing, 1986-1988

<!-- Start of picture text --> U8 * MiliIons<br>1000 -<br>780.7<br>691.5<br>600<br>~396.7 _<br>400-<br>400 r _ =2~~~~~78.7<br>-<br>200<br>0<br>1986 1987<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 818.8<br>i<br>1988<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> _1 Bilateral LI Multilateral<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1
**Lig** j7t, e_ _'_7

Labor reforms and the **change in unionization in Chile** <!-- Start of picture text --> 150 60<br>U) I r~-~ ',TrAvera3ge vlember-ship<br>E ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~_t-v--Unioriw:afion rate<br>, 1 oeoiE C) 0 C) C0L) C<br>1- 1 r [- 1- C OD 0 CD C)<br>CD 0, O) 0) CF C) 0N C) 0a<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Cortazar, 195.

The possibility ofthiring workers temporarily or otherwise to replace striking workers had been, Festrictcd in Chilean law uLrtil the reforms of the early 1980s. The reform lifted that resi:r-ictiion. C'urrently, the law _gives_ employers the right to hire temporary replacements from the first day of a strike as long as the last offer rejected by striking worker s was equivalern **t** o the previous compensation adjusted for inflation and offered fiuther automatic adjustments. 1'emporary replacements are allowed only after 15 days of a strike if the last ofler Cild not keep up with cost of living adjustments. At the same tinme, inclividual worker-s are -guayanteed the righit to return to their jobs at the same real wage (allowing for the cost of living adjustments) after 15 days of strike in the first case and after 30 days in tthe second case. This law induces employers and workers to think in ternms of the costs and benefits of rejecting each other's offers and brings an economic rationale **'o** the resolution of industrial conflicts. This economic rationale encourages the paries to resolve their disputes quickly and in a bilateral way. 3 In Chile, labor reforms were put in place after broad market-oriented reforms, and after the country had seen two episodes of major real exchange misalignment and high unemployrnent. _Mktc-r_ labor relfrms, the economy recovered its in economic growth and employment -wpao.tcula:riy wagc enoployment--has been growing steadily. Real wages rose 20% between l QS) and i Q0l4 ar1qd s-rike activity has been substantially lower than in the pre-military period. E'stimates oft lhe level of labor-related conflicts for the period 1988-91 shows that they have declined to about one tifth of their 1966-70 level (OIT, 1994) _Malaysica. Unions_ recluire the prior authorization from the government in order to legally represent workers in collective bargaining. Malaysian law gives considerable authority to the PRegistrar ard the -NMJinistry of Labor, and to employers who have to "recognize" the uinions in a ral.-er lenigthy procedur,. For example only 33 percent of trade union attermpts ,o take partin collective bargrining in l 988 succeeded outright (Nayar, 1995). Union;zed enterprises in N4alaysia's manufacturing sector are

- It should be 'siie at i 'eie hapc: seen attcnhpts b) the unionr movement to climinate this "right" from the Chilean labor law There is also a proposal to introduce employer "duty to bargain" with unions that represent workers across enterprises. These are both efforts on the part of unions to gain bargaining power **by** lavw.

31
<!-- Start of picture text --> NS Shock BRW Shock SS-FG<br>6.0 PE copL 4.0 3.01 pp ID<br>4.0 oH<br>R* . 3.0 we co 2.0 ; cL PL<br>2.0} Ti KR DZ 2.0 sI 1.0) tttneeeeee<br>-2.00.0 uc 'p 0.01.0 i wDcy PE BDPZ -1.00.075 um AU BD IN<br>00 02 04 06 08 1.0 0.0 0.2 04 06 08 1.0 00 02 04 06 08 1.0<br>0.4 0.2 HU KR 0.2 ID<br>03 SE st. CH , 0.1 HU<br>Ofk ee 0.0 ppP 0.1 WAT gp Pepa ---<br>. SG gy ID IN "PE MY IN<br>0.0 BD -0.1 se 0.01_UG<br>00 02 04 06 08 1.0 0.0 02 04 06 08 1.0 00 02 04 06 08 1.0<br>Average KC 1995-2019<br><!-- End of picture text -->
<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Bulgaria b. Latvia<br>f=] So<br>co ie)<br>a8&©<br>aa<br>a)Qaa aaa)<br>~ ~<br>So P=)<br>N Nv<br>2ao Oo 2aesSo<br>g~ 8<br>aa<br>oo<br>==<br>33<br>££<br>=2<br>88 BR<br>Oo o<br>0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>Probability of falling into poverty (percent) Probability of falling into poverty (percent)<br>—e— 2005-08 ——*— 2015-18<br><!-- End of picture text -->