China’s proportion in 2006 and also appreciably higher than around 1980.<sup>11</sup> The current population growth rate of SSA (2.3% per annum in 2000-06) is well above China’s rate now (0.6%) or China’s rate at the outset of its reform period (1.6% per annum in 1978). China had started to enter the period of “demographic transition” (with both birth rates and death rates falling) well before reforms began around 1980.<sup>12</sup> Thankfully, many African countries have begun the demographic transition (with faltering cases, such as Kenya in which birth rates have started to rise again<sup>13</sup> ).

Third, the average African country has a much lower population density than China. A number of arguments have been made about the costs to African development of low population density. Herbst (2000) argues that Africa’s relative land abundance entailed less inter-country conflict; such conflict (Herbst argues, based on European history) helps forge stronger states in the longer term.<sup>14</sup> (Nor has Africa’s political geography—borders based on rather arbitrary, but now fixed, colonial partitions—helped in fostering cohesive and strong states.) It has been argued that there may well be other costs of low population density; for example, it is believed to dull technological innovation.<sup>15</sup> Low population density also makes it more expensive to supply certain forms of basic infrastructure, such as roads.

At least two of these differences—the high inequality (in various dimensions) and low population density—have probably influenced another evident difference to China: African countries tend to have weaker state institutions, with an adverse feedback effect on ( _inter alia_ ) the quality and quantity of key social services and infrastructure.<sup>16</sup> These are all important differences between China around 1980 and the typical African country today. However, even if there were no such differences, it is also relevant that SSA is 48 countries not one. There is a quite fundamental difference in the degree of internal (economic,

> 10 For recent evidence on this point using country-level panel data see Ravallion (2007).

> 11 Tabulations from the 1982 Census indicate that 36% of the population of China were in the 0-15 age group.

> 12 This process of demographic transition probably began around 1970. Note that 1980 was also the year in which the controversial “one-child policy” was introduced, though with the widespread exceptions allowed locally (particularly in rural areas); the target level of fertility is closer to 1.5 children per couple; see Baochang et al. (2007).  While fertility rates had started to fall well before the one-child policy, there can be little doubt that this policy helped in bringing the birth rate below replacement levels from the early 1990s.

> 13 See Cleland et al. (2006). 14

> For a critical perspective on Herbst’s theory see Robinson (2002). Also see the discussion in Clapham (2001) on the role played by colonialism and post-colonial international relations.

> 15 For evidence on this point at a global level see Klasen and Nestmann (2006).

> 16 The strength of the Chinese state (at all levels) is evident; on the weaknesses of most African states see Herbst (2000), Clapham (2001) and van de Walle (2001).

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