_sanctions_ —the widespread condemnation of corruption, and a refusal to see it as acceptable or inevitable—play a role too. This state of affairs cannot be created all of a piece; generally, it emerges through long processes of contention and development, as suggested at the outset.

_The Coalitions Strategy._ But today's high-corruption countries cannot afford to wait for such outcomes eventually to emerge. The pace of change in the world economy and the harm corruption does to growth (Mauro, 1997) mean that societies with serious corruption become more vulnerable to forces beyond their control, and are missing development opportunities that will not last forever. The challenge is to build an anticorruption force rooted in society, possessing real influence, and sustained by credible incentives—and to build it quickly.

We suggest that _social action coalitions_ are essential to any strategy for broadbased, sustained reform. By social action coalitions we mean _self-conscious, freelyorganized, active, and lasting alliances of elites, organizations, and citizens sharing partially overlapping political goals—in this instance, including but not restricted to the control of corruption—and a basic commitment to peaceful reform_ .<sup>1</sup> These coalitions unite elites and civil society in a multi-faceted program of reform<sup>2</sup> , deepening and rewarding political will while strengthening civil society. They are distinct from formal party coalitions (Geddes, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), but are more concrete than mere coordination or consultation groups (Wilson, 1973: 267-68), as they must be able to resolve internal conflicts, redirect members' actions in limited ways, and back up a strategy of action with meaningful incentives not available to outsiders.

Such coalitions—particularly where economic resources are scarce, and where formal organizations are the target constituents—are not easy to build, and may be even more difficult to sustain. At their best, they offer a range of incentives to many different kinds of constituencies and stakeholders. But that is also one of their main problems, for their projects and appeals may conflict with each other, and potential backers' agendas will very likely overlap only partially at best. Circumstances matter, too: if the regime is repressive, openly exploitative, or skilled at using its resources to undermine the coalition and co-opt its members, the most determined efforts may come to naught.

Still, social action coalitions are the best strategy we have for creating a visible, legitimate reform movement quickly, and for mobilizing resources from within a society. They allow reform constituencies to "borrow" size and resources from each other as they work together. Even more important in the long run, the internal incentive systems of coalitions can _sustain_ reform after initial enthusiasm has faded, and can help protect members from reprisals. Particularly critical is their potential for moderating costs and risks for "first movers"—that is, those who take the first steps against corruption in the

> 1 On the theory and analysis of coalitions, see Gamson, 1964; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Burgess and Robinson, 1969; Groennings _et. al.,_ 1970; Rounds, 1970; and Mahon and Bigelow, 1990.

> 2 For studies of coalitions and public participation in reform, see Tendler, 1979; Hede _et. al.,_ 1992; Nickson, 1996; Clay, 1997; Klitgaard and Baser, 1997; and Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1998.

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