rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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# **Graph (10): Scaled Residuals of Parsimonious Closed Economy VECM:**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.5 r Drm2<br>0.0<br>-0.5<br>1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015<br>r Drgdp<br>0.25<br>0.00<br>-0.25<br>1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015<br>5 r DDISC<br>0<br>-5<br>1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015<br><!-- End of picture text --> 63
14 Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank in Brazil found fewer instructional activities carried out during school visits in lower-income states (Table 2-3). About 92% of the activities in the higher-income state of Goias focused on basic skills acquisition in comparison to only 35% activities in Ceará.

**Table 2-3.  Classroom Activities during an IEG Mission Visit in Brazil (2002)**

|**_State_**|**_Ceará_**|**_Rio Grande de Norte_**|**_Alagoas_**|**_Goias_**|**_São Paulo_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Copying|6<br>40%|6<br>33%|2<br>22%||8 (2 secondary)<br>17%|
|Text production|1<br>7%|3<br>17%|3<br>33%|4<br>28%|2<br>4%|
|Reading lesson in class|2<br>13%|1<br>6%|1<br>11%||1<br>2%|
|No activity|1<br>7%|5 (2 waiting for bell)<br>28%|1<br>11%||8<br>17% (some teachers<br>absent)|
|Teacher busy with 2-3 students<br>only|1<br>7%||1<br>11%||4<br>8%|
|Teacher teaching whole class|2<br>13%|1<br>11%||6<br>43%|10<br>22%|
|Group practice|1<br>7%|2<br>11%||3<br>21%|4<br>8%|
|Art and Play|1(scheduled activity)<br>7%|1 (play with letters)<br>6%|1 (play with letters)<br>11%|1 (drawing)<br>7%|8 (during subject<br>matter)<br>17%|
|No. classes|15|18|9|14|45|
|No schools|8|6|7|5|8|
|Apparently instructional<br>activities (some suboptimal)|34%|45%|48%|92%|40%|

_Source: OED 2002_ The scarcity of school resources, such as textbooks, and the presence of unqualified teachers (especially in rural schools) often result in reductions in classroom time.<sup>70</sup> A comparison of classroom instructional time in three Latin American countries found that Brazilian students spent significantly more time copying instructions than Chileans and Cubans. Few Brazilian schools used prepared activities, instead requiring students to copy math problems from the board before beginning work; test scores tended to reflect these differences.<sup>71</sup> In the Gambia and Burkina Faso, a large amount of time was lost writing lessons and problems on the board, because students lacked access to textbooks.<sup>72</sup> However, students must know how to read and understand the textbooks in order to learn. A study on a Kenyan program where an NGO provided textbooks to all pupils found improved used instructional time in classrooms, but test scores did not improve.<sup>73</sup> Other things being equal, time on task distinguishes between students who learn a lot about a subject and students whose learning gains are modest. Some teachers are willing

> 70. Attar 2001; Njie 2001

> 71. Carnoy, Gove, and Marshall 2004

> 72. Dia 2003

> 73. Glewwe et al. 1999
<!-- Start of picture text --> Le<br>\ >.<br>M<br>igs = oe Changein Poverty Rate<br>(Numberof Provinces)<br>7 15%-20%deqessa (3)<br>1.0% - 1.5% deqease (11)<br>Pe 0.5%0.0% - 1.0%0.5% de wm e sa s se (2 73)3)<br><!-- End of picture text -->
Figure 10: Robustness: Combined wage effects in the baseline vs. involuntary unemployment scenario <!-- Start of picture text --> 45 degree line<br>CHE<br>CHE<br>LUX<br>PRT<br>PRTLUX ESP<br>ESP<br>−30% −20% −10% 0% 10% 20% 30%<br>Baseline scenario<br>Young, LS Young, HS Old, LS Old, HS<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>−10%<br>Involuntary unemployment (with benefit)<br>−20%<br>−30%<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure contrasts equilibrium wage responses in the baseline scenario to those from a scenario where we allow for involuntary unemployment Figure 11: Robustness: Combined wage effects in the baseline vs. fixed capital stock scenario <!-- Start of picture text --> 45 degree line<br>−30% −20% −10% 0% 10% 20% 30%<br>Baseline scenario<br>Young, LS Young, HS Old, LS Old, HS<br>30%<br>20%<br>10%<br>0%<br>−10%<br>Fixed capital stock scenario<br>−20%<br>−30%<br><!-- End of picture text --> The figure contrasts equilibrium wage responses in the baseline scenario to those from a scenario where capital stock is 40
Carter, R.A.L., A.L. Nagar, (1977) Coefficients of Correlation for Simultaneous Equations Systems, _Journral of Econometrics._ vol. 6. p.p. _39-50_ CNR (1992) Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, _Economic, R&D, and Patent Indicators of the Seven Major Countries, 1970-1991,_ Istituto di Studi sulla Documentazione Scientifica, Rome Coe, D., E. Helpman, (1993) _International R&D Spillovers,_ NBER working paper 4444 Coe, D., E. Helpman,. A. Hoffmeister (1994) _North-South R&D Spillovers,_ IMF working paper 94/144 De Melo J., A. Panagarya (eds.) (1993) _New Dimensions in Regional Integration,_ Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dollar D., E. Wolff (1993) _Competitiveness, Convergence and International Specialization,_ Cambridge, MIT Press.

Fagerberg, J. (1988), International Competitiveness, _Economic Journal,_ vol. 98 p.p. 355-374 Freeman, C. , J. Hagedoorn (1994) Catching Up or Falling Behind: Patterns in International Inter-Firm Technology Partnering , _World Development,_ vol. 22, 771780 Gandolfo, G. (1981) _Qualitative Analysis and Econometric Estimation of Continuous Time Dynamic Models,_ Amsterdam, North Holland Grossman G.M., and E. Helpman (1991) _Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy_ Cambridge MIT Press Keller, W. (1995) _International R&D Spillovers and Intersectoral Trade Flows: Do They Match?_ mimeo, Yale University Keller, W. (1996) _Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-related? Analyzing Spillovers among Randomly Matched Trade Partners_ mimeo, University of Wisconsin-Madison Krugman P., A.J. Venables (1996) "Integration, Specialization and Adjustment", _European Economic Review_ 40 (3-5) 959-67 Lichtenberg F., R van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996) _International R&D Spillovers. A Closer Examination_ NBER w. p. 5763 Lucas R. (1988) On the Mechanics of Economic Development, _Journal of Monetary Economics,_ 22: 3-42 _17_
30 Figure 5: Relative contributions of different border policy instruments to welfare reduction from agricultural policies (IWRI), 1960 to 2004 (percent) <!-- Start of picture text --> (a) Developing countries<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Import tax<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Import tax Export tax Import subsidy Export subsidy<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 120<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000<br>Import tax Export tax Import subsidy Export subsidy<br><!-- End of picture text -->
contributions to inequality (redistributive effect), and poverty (poverty reducing effect). The effect will also depend on the size of each fiscal intervention (Figure 10) with respect to households’ income.

# **_Taxes and Contributions_**

**Direct taxes and contributions in Albania are progressive with modest equalizing effects** . The Kakwani index of progressivity is positive (indicating progressivity) and highest for the Personal Income Tax (PIT) (0.202), and positive but lower for health and social insurance<sup>38</sup> contributions (Figure 11). With the exception of the PIT, the distributional impact is small, mostly due to the small size.   Overall direct taxes and contributions result in a modest redistributive effect of 0.093 Gini points (Figure 12). Annex 3 provides a cross-country benchmarking of the progressivity of direct taxes in Albania; it shows that although smaller than a large share of countries with available data, it is in line with that of other countries in Europe.

**Figure 11. Progressivity of Direct Taxes and Figure 12. Marginal Contributions of Direct Taxes Contributions in Albania (Kakwani Index) and Contributions in Albania**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.25 0.035<br>0.025<br>0.2<br>0.015<br>0.15 0.005<br>-0.005 PIT Social Health All direct<br>0.1 insurance Insurance taxes and<br>-0.015 contributions<br>0.05 -0.025<br>-0.035<br>Redistributive Effect<br>0<br>PIT Social Health All direct Poverty reduction effect ( $ 2.5 PPP )<br>insurance Insurance taxes and Poverty reduction effect ( $ 4 PPP )<br>contributions<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own estimates using the Albania HBS 2015.

Source: Own estimates using the Albania HBS 2015. Note: A positive value means that the contribution is in the desired direction (e.g., equalizing or poverty reducing) and a negative value is the contrary. The marginal contributions of the redistributive effect are estimated from market income plus pensions to final income; for poverty reduction effect, from market income plus pensions to consumable income (as per the literature).

**The poverty increasing effect of direct taxes and contributions is small but not trivial (Table 3).** Poverty increases by 0.23 percentage points under the $2.5/day poverty line. The effect is larger for the $4/day line, with a marginal contribution to poverty from PIT of 0.87 percentage points and 0.91 for social and health insurance contributions (Figure 12), raising the poverty rate by 1.48 percentage points when combined. This is reflected in the overall picture of poverty changes across income concepts, in which poverty increased by this amount when moving from market income (including pensions) to net market income. The impact on poverty of direct taxes is linked to the relatively low thresholds for paying each of

> 38 Social insurance contributions include sickness, maternity, pension, accident and unemployment insurance.

23
Table 4: Additional checks

||||Hours w|orked|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|A. Households|with susceptib|le individual|s||||
|PM 2.5|-0.152***||-0.188***|-0.161**||-0.167***|
||(0.053)||(0.052)|(0.062)||(0.049)|
|Contemp.||-0.042|||||
|PM 2.5||(0.046)|||||
|Log(PM 2.5)|||||-7.478***<br>(1.746)||
|Observations|2,167|2,245|2,167|1,817|2,167|2,167|
|R-squared|0.436|0.422|0.430|0.425|0.429|0.202|
|B. Households|without susce|ptible individ|uals||||
|PM 2.5|-0.019||-0.038|-0.053||-0.027|
||(0.063)||(0.053)|(0.044)||(0.035)|
|Contemp.||0.004|||||
|PM 2.5||(0.045)|||||
|Log(PM 2.5)|||||-0.501<br>(1.614)||
|Observations|3,051|3,078|3,051|3,401|3,051|3,051|
|R-squared|0.451|0.432|0.447|0.447|0.447|0.178|
|Model|Additional<br>time-varying<br>controls|Contemp.<br>PM 2.5|Quadratic<br>polynom.<br>weather|Suscept.=<br>children<br>under 5|Semi-log<br>specif.|Conley<br>S.E.|

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, except in Column 6 in which they are estaimted using the procedure proposed by Conley (1999). * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include the same controls as the baseline specification (see notes of Table 2. Panel A and B use two different samples. Unless specified, PM 2.5 refers to average PM2 _._ 5 in week _t −_ 1, where _t_ is the week of reference of labor outcomes. Column 1 adds quarter-by-year fixed effects and year fixed effects interacted with indicators for being poor, having a number of income earners above the median, and above-median age. Column 2 uses the contemporaneous value of PM2 _._ 5, i.e., the average value during the reference week for labor outcomes. Column 3 adds temperature and humidity squared to the baseline regression. Column 4 defines as susceptible individuals only children 5 years and younger. Column 6 estimates model without sample weights.

19
_On the Dangers of Decentralization 23_ _Table 4. i: Central Government Share of Total Taxes Before and After 1988 Constitution of Brazil_

||_Previous Constitution_|_New_<br>_Constitution_|
|---|---|---|
|Taxes raised nationally|100|100|
|Taxes raised by central government|57|52|
|Transfers from central to other government|-27|-30|
|Share of national taxes left to central government|30|22|

_Source:_ Prud'homme 1989, p.32 4.10 Before the changes in the Constitution, the share of taxes raised by the central government was relatively small (the tax decentralization ratio was high), and the share of the central government expenditures was smaller (the expenditure decentralization ratio was very high). This, however, must be qualified by the fact that the rates of most state taxes were set by the central government that had a degree of control over the overall fiscal burden (although taxes raised in Brazil are a function of tax administration-controlled by the States-as much as a function of tax rates).

4.11 The new Constitution reduces the ability of the central government to conduct macroeconomic policies in three ways. First, it decreases the share of taxes raised by the central government (it increases the tax decentralization ratio), as shown in table 4.1. Second, it gives more tax freedom to the states in terms of rate setting, thereby increasing the tax discretion ratio (see section 1). Third, it increases automatic transfers from central to subnational governments, thereby increasing even further the share of states and municipalities in total expenditures (the expenditure decentralization ratio). As a result, macroeconomic policy was made difficult in Brazil. The changes in the Constitution certainly contributed to the poor macro-economic performances of the country in recent years.

4.12 The extreme case of Yugoslavia can also be cited as an example (Bogoev 1991). Yugoslavia, during the 1970s, became one of the most decentralized countries of the world. In 1986, the central government (the Yugoslav Federation) accounted for only 22 percent of total public revenues. In addition, central government revenues consisted primarily of sales taxes and custom duties, a revenue type not appropriate for stabilization policies. Furthermore, the central government revenues were insufficient to discharge its responsibilities. It relied upon 'contributions" from lower levels of government negotiated each year. The federal government found it impossible to conduct stabilization policies, resulting in high inflation and poor macroeconomic management.

4.13 Thus theory and experience suggest that fiscal decentralization creates problems for a country's macroeconomic management.
Table 3: Power Sector Reform Components in Various Studies

|**Component Study**|**ESMAP 1999**|**Jamasb et al. 2005**|**Joskow 2008**|**Gratwick & Eberhard**<br>**2008**|**Erdogdo 2010, 2011b**|**Jemasb et al. 2014**|**Ba & Gasmi 2017**|**Urpelainen 2017**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Commercialization and corporatization**|X|X||X|X|||X|
|**Energy law**|X|X||X|X|||X|
|**Creation of independent regulator**|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|
|**PSP on greenfield site**|X|||X|X|||X|
|**Unbundling vertical and horizontal**|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|
|**Integration of transmission and network operation**|||X||||||
|**Privatization of all or part of SOE**|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|
|**Third party access to networks**||X|||||||
|**Regulatory reform**||X|||||||
|**Competitive wholesale generation market**||X|X|X|X||X|X|
|**Liberalization of retail supply**||X|X|X|X|||X|
|**Unbundling retail tariffs for power supply and services**|||X||||||
|**Rules for consumer protection**||X|X||||||
|**Establishment of transition mechanisms**|||X||||||

The literature of the last decade, particularly that aimed at estimating the benefits of sector reform, has concentrated on unbundling, the entry of the private sector, regulation, and competition as the key steps for analysis. Lists of the variables evaluated as tools of reform in the various econometric studies surveyed are presented in table 6. It is notable that few studies have investigated the impacts of more than four reform components, and there have been no statistical tests of the impacts of each component of the full reform agenda in developing countries.

# 3.2 The expected role of the main energy sector reform policies

Each of the separate policy actions that make up the reform strategy for a given country is expected to have a role in achieving an overall improvement in sector performance. Some of these policies have a direct effect, but other policies act as necessary facilitators. Without their enactment certain direct policies cannot be effective. This distinction is important for statistical testing where it is desired to make an evaluation of the impact of each policy component.

The starting point for policy design is the state-owned enterprise (SOE) with its monopoly on all aspects of electricity production and supply. Privatizing the SOE can lead to improved performance as the profit motive provides an incentive to lower costs but private monopolies, in the absence of regulation, tend to use their monopoly power to maximize profits by restricting output via excess prices, and hence absorb much of the gain from efficiency improvement, 11
-6 -

tax revenues cannot be rejected because the parameters of lagged tax effort appear jointlysignificant at a 10 percent level (as shown by the F-stalistics in lhble 2). On the other hand, we did not find Granger causality from tax revenues to iax effort. Reg,1rdless if this test defines properly the concept of causality, it is important for at least two reasons. First, it indicates some prediction capacity of changes in tax effort in forecasting future variations in tax revenues. Second, the absence of Granger causality from tax revenues to tax effort allows us to reject the hypothesis that variations in tax revenues precede changts in tax effort.

# 2.3 rm inants of Tax Effort

Since changes in tax effort are likely to precede rather than follow the variations in tax revenues, it is imporant to determine the economic and political variables which can aff6 changes in tax effort. Bird (1992) and Richuptan (1987) argue that macroeconomic variables are important in explaining taxpayers cormpliance and the efficiency of tax administration. However, the influence of macroeconomic variables on tax effort (or tax evasion) has been relatively little explored in the economic literature. The behavior of taxpayers can be viewed as ar. attempt to adjust their satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with government services and the macroeconomic environment, but the existing literature has only focused its attention on the explanation of the behavior of taxpayers in terms of micioeconomic factors (see Richuptan (1987) for a review of this literature). Assuming that risk-averse taxpayers want to maximize their expected utility (Allingham and Sandmo (1972)) or their expected income (Srinivasan (1973)), t6- effect of microeconomic factors --including tax rates, tax base, the probability of being detected and penalized, and the size of the penalty-- on tax evasion is discussed.<sup>5</sup> However, this approach is difficult to test empirically because most of the explanatory variables are not directly observable.

rax effort is also influenced by the fiscal authorities's decisions (as well as by the bargaining process between these authorities and taxpayers). One popular approach to understand the fiscal behavior of the public sector is t' ssume that it reflects the actions of a

> _5_ Other factors such as the characteristic of the population --age, sex, educational background-- have also been explored.
because the crisis effects are more severe. In the case of Ireland, for example, the IMF estimates that GDP will drop more than 13 percent from 2008 through 2010, and that even in 2014 the potential GDP growth rate will not have recovered to its pre-crisis level (International Monetary Fund 2009a).

One caution is that this analysis does not take into account any possible strategic interactions among donors. The economic fluctuations and banking crises between 1977 and 2007 tended to affect smaller groups of countries, whereas this time the macroeconomic downturn and banking crises are highly synchronized across countries. This synchronization could either exacerbate or dampen the effects of crisis on aid, depending on the strategic interactions among donor countries. Imagine that the standard approach of the aid community in the past has been for donors to compensate for each other in the case of economic shocks – that is, for one donor to increase its aid when another is forced to cut back in a recession. In that case, the effect on aggregate aid of a downturn in one country would be less than the effect on that country’s own aid. But with the synchronized global recessions this time around, there may be no donor-of-last-resort that is willing to step in and compensate for shortfalls elsewhere, so aid could drop farther than predicted. Alternatively, if donor countries become concerned about the dangers of simultaneous cutback in aid across many countries, they may be able to coordinate to maintain aid above the levels that would otherwise emerge from their unilateral decisionmaking. In that case, aggregate aid would not drop by as much as predicted.

# **5. Conclusions**

Using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2007, the results presented above show that banking crises in donor countries are associated with substantial declines in aid flows. Even after controlling for income and other factors, net ODA disbursements from crisis-affected countries fall by an average of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and bottom out only about a decade after the onset of the banking crisis. One possible channel for this effect is governments’ attempts to deal with the large fiscal debt overhangs that typically result from banking crises. Our results also confirm that donor-country per capita income is strongly related to aid flows, with an elasticity of about 3.

21