rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
principals supported the study and intervention. The schools that met these criteria were chosen and randomized across the three interventions described above.

As we depict in Figure 2, we conducted a stratified randomization at the country (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala) and school-risk levels (high or low risk, proxied by the homicide rate in the school’s municipality). A school was considered high risk if it was located in a municipality with a homicide rate greater than the mean rate at the country level in 2018. The design includes a total of six strata based on three values for country and two for school-risk level. Then, we randomly assigned the 21 participating schools to the three treatment arms— _Clubs_ , _Virtue_ , and _Mindful_ (7 schools per arm). We used a self-coded randomization procedure in Stata to randomly assign schools to the ASP variations. Then, we informed our implementing partner about the treatment allocation. The NGO distributed materials, trained mentors, and supervised implementation accordingly. Treated schools were aware of their treatment status and the research project’s evaluation goals, but the schools were not aware that another treatment group existed.

We test the SEL component by comparing the main outcomes (that is, behavior, school dropout, and academic performance) of students enrolled in schools that were randomly assigned to any psychology-based intervention (either _Virtue_ or _Mindful_ ) to the same outcomes of the students enrolled in schools assigned to _Clubs_ .<sup>32</sup> Moreover, we test which curriculum ( _Virtue_ or _Mindful_ ) more efficiently improves participants’ outcomes by using the experimental variation and comparing the average outcomes of the students who were randomly assigned to _Virtue_ with the average outcomes of those assigned to _Mindful_ . Both outcomes are then compared to the average outcomes of students allocated to _Clubs_ . Last, to study the mechanisms driving these effects, we conduct similar comparisons to those described above but using the variables that measure the potential channels, as specified in our conceptual framework—that is, students’ socio-emotional skills, fluid intelligence, and emotion regulation.

> 32In other words, we pooled students assigned to these two treatment arms together and compared them to students assigned to _Clubs_ .

14
**-** **<u>Table 3. Summary Statistics: decentralized vs. non decentralized enterprises</u>**

||SOEs<br>decentralized<br>during 1999-2007|SOEs NOT<br>decentralized<br>during 1999-<br>2007|t-statistic of<br>mean<br>difference test|
|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|Different city(t-1)|0.593|0.299|0.294***|
|Distance(t-1)|4.415|2.957|1.457***|
|Firm asset(t-1)|10.398|10.725|-0.327***|
|ROS(t-1)|-0.108|-0.082|-0.026***|
|TFP OLS(t-1)|0.420|0.426|-0.006|
|TFP Olley-Pakes(t-1)|1.315|1.329|-0.014|
|TFP Index Number(t-1)|1.209|1.182|0.027|
|Firm importance(t-1)|0.181|0.298|-0.117***|
|Fully state-owned(t-1)|0.800|0.812|-0.012|
|Provincial GDP per capita(t-<br>1)|8.535|8.526|0.010|
|Provincial state sector share<br>(t-1)|0.512|0.512|0.000|
|Provincial unemployment<br>rate(t-1)|3.607|3.361|0.247***|
|Number of firms|1,116|13,304||
|Number of observations|3,493|56,781||

This table lists summary statistics of SOEs that were decentralized and those that were NOT decentralized during 1999-2007. Column (3) shows the t-statistics of mean difference tests. An SOE is defined as _decentralized_ if is affiliation level is changed from a higher-level government to a lower-level government.

*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

34
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Table –1.: Service affordability impact of the reform

|price of calls (US$/min.)|Alg|eria|Mo|roco|Tunisia||France||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|<br>|<br>|<br>|Fixed<br>|service<br>|||||
|Local|0.|013|0.|087|0.012||0.025||
|Domestic long distance|0.|044|0.|105|0.105||0.064||
|International|0.|600|0.|559|0.668||0.500||
||||Mobile<br>|services<br>|||||
||AT*|Djezzy|IAM|Meditel|TT|Orange|SFR|Bouygues|
|Intra-Mobile|0.041|0.081|0.15|0.15|0.138|0.275|0.313|0.288|
|Inter-Mobile|0.081|0.119|0.202|0.198|0.138|0.290|0.290|0.290|
|Mobile–Fixed|0.041|0.119|0.148|0.198|0.138|0.186|0.313|0.288|
|Fixed-Mobile|0.113|0.113|0.163|0.206|0.138|0.226|0.226|0.294|

Source: ARPT, June 2003 – (*) prices subject to price floors decided by ARPT.

# **4.3 PRELIMINARY SOCIAL IMPACT**

The reform has so far been implemented without any employment losses. This has been possible because of a combination of factors and political decisions. First, in order to gain the social support of its reform agenda, the government committed itself to protect employment and refrain from initiating redundancy programs. The 43,000 staff of the ministry of post and telecommunications were therefore transferred respectively to AT (19,000), AP (22,000), ARPT (30) and around 2,000 remained with the ministry. Second, OTA has created around 1,300 direct employment positions and claimed to have contributed to the creation of 5,000 indirect employment positions. In addition, 15 ISPs and 4,000 _cybercafés_ have also created a significant number of direct employment. In total, the sector has generated a net surplus in terms of employment creation since the launch of the reform program. This positive outcome is likely to be sustainable in the long run, even though the privatization of AT, which has been delayed after 2005, would imply further employment downsizing in the company. Overall, telecommunications revenues generated by licensed operators in Algeria represented 1.5% of the GDP in 2003 as opposed to 1.06% in 2002.

Although it is too early to derive any conclusive opinion on the sector reform impact, it is important to underscore that most of the development objectives have been attained. A new regulatory framework and new institutions have been established. The number of service providers has exploded, and competition is progressively taking roots including in the core business that used to fall under the public monopoly. Despite its difficult start, there is hope that AT will also overcome most of its operational weaknesses and 17
particularly true for traded goods – their growth will start high in the initial periods (year 1 to 5) and accelerate the most in subsequent periods.

**Table 17: Annual growth rates of real output by aggregate sectors**

||**lnitial**<br>**Period**<br>**(Y1-Y5)**|**Middle**<br>**Period**<br>**(Y6-Y10)**|**All**<br>**Periods**<br>**(Y1-Y22)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Traded Goods**||||
|Base Case|5.30|5.14|5.08|
|Bird in Hand (BIH)|4.95|4.12|4.27|
|Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)|3.21|5.36|4.91|
|Borrow (BOR)|2.01|6.25|4.90|
|Boom & Bust (BB)|2.01|6.42|4.96|
|BIH with Public Investment|7.76|7.81|9.04|
|PIH with Public Investment|8.16|10.02|10.22|
|BOR with Public Investment|6.90|10.70|11.03|
|BB with Public Investment|6.90|8.86|10.84|
|**Non-traded Goods**||||
|Base Case|3.71|3.67|3.65|
|Bird in Hand (BIH)|3.75|3.77|3.71|
|Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)|3.69|3.56|3.59|
|Borrow (BOR)|3.81|3.59|3.59|
|Boom & Bust (BB)|3.81|3.93|3.62|
|BIH with Public Investment|5.84|6.55|7.20|
|PIH with Public Investment|6.96|6.32|7.10|
|BOR with Public Investment|7.41|6.19|7.76|
|BB with Public Investment|7.41|6.04|7.65|
|**Semi-traded Goods**||||
|Base Case|3.71|3.72|3.70|
|Bird in Hand (BIH)|3.72|3.74|3.71|
|Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)|3.85|3.64|3.69|
|Borrow (BOR)|3.85|3.58|3.70|
|Boom & Bust (BB)|3.85|3.47|3.71|
|BIH with Public Investment|6.13|6.81|7.44|
|PIH with Public Investment|6.99|7.34|7.78|
|BOR with Public Investment|6.89|7.21|8.24|
|BB with Public Investment|6.89|6.42|8.09|

_Source_ : Model simulations.

_Note:_ traded goods = mining which is exported only, there are no imports; Semi-traded goods = food agriculture, other agriculture, food manufacturing, other manufacturing, there are both imports and exports; and non-traded goods = construction, services, public services, and education/health, there are no imports or exports (with the exception of services which has a very small share of consumption imported and a very small share of production exported).

32
due to a combination of several factors at the time of crisis, such as preexisting vulnerabilities combined with weak government responses, or with democratic institutions and cultural norms. Otherwise, we should not observe such big differences in the pandemic outcomes, for instance, within the high-income-and-democratic countries sample, such as those between the United States, Germany, and South Korea.

Based on cross-country regressions and when appropriate, the spatial autoregressive models, we find that countries with demographic and environmental vulnerabilities tend to have a greater pandemic spread (as in the case of higher urbanization and air pollution), while the share of elderly is associated with lower pandemic spread. Government delay in restricting international mobility is associated with higher pandemic mortality rate. Increasing the number of days to impose international-travel closedown by one standard deviation (SD) is associated with an increase in pandemic mortality rate by 0.4 percentage points, or 17% of the mean mortality rate. Furthermore, government delay in restricting domestic mobility is associated with higher pandemic mortality when the country has higher obesity prevalence and air pollution (i.e., SO2). Increasing obesity by one standard deviation (SD) would imply a change in the marginal effects of _DelayD_ on mortality (i.e., ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ) from -0.004 to 0.003. Similarly, increasing SO2 by one DD SD from the mean would imply a change in the marginal effect of _DelayD_ on mortality from - 0.008 to 0.003.

Contrary to the notion that authoritarian countries may have an advantage in combating the pandemic,<sup>2</sup> we find that democratic countries have done better in handling the pandemic. Relative to non-democratic countries, democratic countries have responded faster by having significantly lower delay in domestic closedown by about a month. They also have significantly lower pandemic mortality rate, by 0.9 percentage points, or 43 percent of the mean. They seem to be able to reduce the harm to the vulnerable population. In particular, the marginal effect of the share of elderly on pandemic spread is lower in democratic countries by about 100 percent; that of the share of obese on pandemic mortality rate is roughly zero in democratic countries, in contrast to 0.07 in nondemocratic countries. However, government policy delays appear to be more harmful in democracies. The marginal effect of the delay in domestic closedown on pandemic spread in

> 2 See, for instance, Powers-Riggs’ blog here: Covid-19 is Proving a Boon for Digital Authoritarianism | Center for <u>Strategic and International Studies (csis.org).</u>

4
response rates. Participants who did not complete a single survey were less likely to be female, less likely to have access to an alternative phone, and more likely to have been offered a pre-paid credit of 10 SDG.

As additional socioeconomic characteristics of households were available from the NBHS for about half of the SSEPS households, an additional set of regressions was run to explore the association between survey participation and the level of educational attainment of the household head, poverty status, and television ownership. Results from this set of regressions (Annex A) show that respondents belonging to households in which the head member completed post-secondary education were more likely to complete at least one survey. The poverty status of the household and ownership of a television were not associated with the rate of survey completion.

# _Call Center Outcomes_

Horizon Contact Center kept records of the attempts to reach respondents (Figure 5). In December, among 3617 dials, 36 percent resulted in a contact with a respondent and 19 percent resulted in a completed survey. The efficiency of the calling process improved significantly in January—for every 100 dialed numbers, 34 resulted in a completed survey—but subsequently fell off in February and March where out of every 100 calls, only 17 and 15, respectively, resulted in a completed survey.

Major challenges related to reaching the correct respondent involved an unreachable number (37 percent of calls) and no network coverage (18 percent).<sup>8</sup> Problems with the network increased over the course of the four month period, peaking at 32 percent of all dialed numbers in March. Calls to Bentiu and Torit in December and January and Aweil and Bor in March were cited as being particularly and consistently problematic due to poor network connectivity. The fraction of unreachable numbers was particularly high in February, when 47 percent of all dialed numbers were unreachable.

> 8 Unreachable numbers exist when a number is out of service or a connection cannot be made to the number being called. No network refers to the situation where all numbers fail to go through because of a hitch on the network either the originating network or the destination network.

15
**Figure 13(c): China: Return to skill by sector over time (Tertiary and above)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.7<br>0.6<br>0.5<br>0.4 Agriculture/Minin<br>0.3 g<br>Manufacturing<br>0.2<br>Trade/Services<br>0.1<br>0<br>1999 2005<br>Return<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Year**

**Figure 13(d): China: Proportion of skilled labor by sector over time (Tertiary and above)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>1999 2005<br>Year<br>% skilled<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Agriculture/Mining<br>Manufacturing<br>Trade/Services<br><!-- End of picture text --> 56
Chiquiar, Daniel (2008). “Globalization, Regional Wage Differentials and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: Evidence from Mexico,” _Journal of International Economics_ 74: 70–93.

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D’Amico, R., K. Dunham, A. Goger, M. Mack, R. Kebede, J. Lacoe, and J. Salzman (2007). “Initial implementation of the 2002 TAA Reform Act: A Report Prepared as Part of the Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program”, Report to the U.S. Department of Labor, Social Policy Research Associates.

Dix-Carneiro, Rafael and Brian Kovak (2017). “Trade liberalization and regional dynamics.” _American Economic Review_ , 107 (10): 2908-2946.

Finger, Joseph and Mordechai Elihau Kreinin (1979). “A measure of export similarity and its possible uses.” _Economic Journal_ , 89(356): 905-912.

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41
even for non-exporters. The economic crisis was accompanied by sharp rises in interest rates and falls in their currencies' value in the foreign exchange market; but even if interest rates and exchange rates were restored to their pre-crisis levels, the debts of many firms have now mushroomed to levels which may never be serviceable.

**Table 1**

**Salient Corporate Statistics**

||_Indonesia_|_Korea_|_Malaysia_|_Philippines_|_Thailand_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1998 to 1996 Real<br>GDP ratio|0.88<br>|1.00<br>|1.00<br>|1.05<br>|0.92<br>|
|1998 GDP|$105b|$309 b.|$69.4 b.|$68 b.|$121 b.|
|Nominal Exchange<br>Rate ratio: mid-1999<br>to mid 1997|2.75|1.31|_1.5_|1.43|1.44|
|Capacity utilisation'<br>(mid-1998)___|58%|71%|65%|68%|60%<br>|
|Total Corporate Debt<br>(b. US$ equivalent)|118.0|444.0|120.2|47.5|195.7|
|Of which extemal|67.1|64|40|23.3|32.5|
|... domestic debt<br>(b. US$ equiv).|50.9|380.0|80.2|24.2|163.2|
|Banking Sector's<br>External Debt<br>(b US$)|50.3<br>|72.4<br>|23.0<br>|17.8|46.8<br>|
|Debt to Equityratio<br>1996|2.0|_3.5_|1.1|1.4|2.4|
|'World Bank surve|y of firms (mid-1|998)||||

The firms have been generally well run. While total factor productivity appears to have been declining in recent years, making East Asia's growth less miraculous than was earlier believed, few doubt that firms' managers (who are very closely linked to the controlling owners) are generally competent and able to adapt to the new situation: there are vigorous attempts to restore the firms' profitability. Even so, debts that cannot be serviced must be renegotiated, and this is not occurring rapidly. The _status quo_ erodes the owner-managers' incentives to operate the firm efficiently because any increase in firm value accrues entirely to the creditors. Put differently, the owners' call options are now far "out of the money" because the exercise price far exceeds the asset value of the firm.

Countries have promulgated new bankruptcy laws or amended old ones and are improving their courts' functioning. It is nevertheless clear that the courts are - and should be - designed to deal with 3
common property problems. To address this possibility, we remove dams that received funding from the World Bank from the equations. Information on the World Bank funding of dams comes from the non-governmental organization International Rivers; we matched their lists of dams that received World Bank funding from 1948 through 1999 to the GRanD data by the name of the dam.<sup>21</sup> Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 report results from re-estimating equation (1), dropping dams that received World Bank funding between 1948 and 1999 from the dam counts in the dependent variable.<sup>22</sup> Column 1 considers all dams and column 2 the large dams that are systematically included in the GRanD data and likely to be priorities for World Bank financing. The results differ little from those in the basic model in Table 4, suggesting that external funding source does not significantly influence the common resource problem.

# **_4.3  International water resource management institutions_**

Countries aim to use international water resource management institutions, such as treaties, to replace regimes of resource conflict with cooperation. In this subsection, we provide some evidence on the success of these institutions. In particular, we examine whether the presence of a water treaty pertaining to a given international river basin limits the degree of free riding.

The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) project at Oregon State University has compiled more than 400 international, freshwater-related agreements, dating from 1820 to 2007 (TFDD, 21 International Rivers produced a hardcopy list of dams receiving funding from the World Bank between 1948 and 1994 (Sklar and McCully 1994) and provided us with an Excel file for dams funded between 1994 and 1999. We thank Aviva Imhof at International Rivers for her assistance in obtaining these data.

22 Dams constructed with World Bank funds between 1999 and 2005 are not identified in our dataset, but we expect the effect of this omission to be small.

16
**Figure 2: High-growth Firm Thresholds**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East and North Africa<br>East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia<br>Latin America and Caribbean South Asia<br>6 2<br>4 1.5<br>1<br>2<br>.5<br>0 0<br>NGA LSOCIV GAB TZA BEN MUSAGO SSD LBR TGOTCD GIN GHA COG NERBWA SLE NAM ETH MRTSWZ ZWE ZMB ZARSEN RWA MWI MLI MDGKEN CPV CAF BDI GNBGMB MOZ ZAF BFACMR UGA ERI SDN IRQ WBG MAR LBN YEM DJI TUN JOR EGY<br>2 4<br>1.5 3<br>1 2<br>.5 1<br>0 0<br>VUT FSM WSM VNM SLB CHN FJI THA PNG MMR KHM TON MYS PHL TMP MNG IDN LAO GEO KSV RUS UZB MKD TJK TUR BLR ROM BGR ARM ALB BIH MDA KAZ HUN KGZ SRB AZE MNE UKR<br>2 2<br>1.5 1.5<br>1 1<br>.5 .5<br>0 0<br>PAN BRA VEN PER GRD PRY COL MEX DOM BOL GUY ECU CRI VCT NIC GTM SLV HND DMA ARG BLZ LCA JAM SUR AFG BTN NPL PAK BGD LKA IND<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: This figure shows the standard growth rate thresholds for HGFs. Countries are labeled per their 3-letter ISO code. Countries are grouped into regions following the World Bank Group country classification. The red line represents the unweighted average threshold in each region. For the 15 countries with information for 3 years, the growth rates have been converted to 2-year growth rates as follows: ��<sup>��</sup> = ���<sup>��</sup> + 1�<sup>~~�~~</sup> �<sup>�</sup> ~~�~~ −1 Source: Author computation using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

A crucial characteristic of HGFs is that they tend to be small and young. In fact, most HGFs in the developing world have fewer than 20 employees. While the same is true of other firms in the developing world, HGFs are relatively more represented in the group of small enterprises (Figure 3). In total, there are 89 countries in our dataset for which the median size of HGFs is less than 10 employees. On average, HGFs are also younger than other businesses (Figure 4). In our set of 121 countries, the median age of HGFs is lower than that of other firms in 105 countries.<sup>9</sup>

> 9 Annex 2 presents the median size and age of HGFs in each country.

- 9 -