David Hess and Gregorio Impavido general accountability to society. In her study, Miller found that some boards were able to articulate an "ownership" group-typically arising through the organization's perceived accountability to the community-while other boards only stated a general accountability to the board itself, founded in a responsibility to maintain the organization as a going concern.

For those boards that could articulate an ownership-like group, the trustees were able to meaningfully discuss the interests and expectations of that group. These board members recognized a clear mission for the organization and were able to keep their focus on that mission. By contrast, those boards that viewed themselves as only accountable to themselves were seen as less capable of fulfilling their oversight roles. While the board members recognized a fiduciary responsibility to the organization and the management of its finances, they did not know how to work toward these goals. Miller stated that for such boards, their "objectives for monitoring lack specificity." In addition, she found that board members would use the rhetoric of fulfilling fiduciary duties, but they usually uncritically accepted all of the information that was provided to them by management staff. These boards did not believe that they could change the organization's behavior and were less vigilant than the boards with an identified ownership group.

Boards thus need to have a clear and specific statement citing to whom they are accountable. Many pension funds have already identified this group as the plan participants, or have had this group identified for them by statute or regulation. If this "ownership" group is to be expanded, those other stakeholder groups that are to be included must be specified. Without a clear understanding of to whom it is accountable, the board is likely to be ineffective in monitoring or managing the fund.

# _IV.D Performance Measures_

Related to accountability is the issue of how a board measures its performance. For corporations, performance can easily be measured by share value or return on investment. For public pension funds, however, the board could base its performance on funding levels, the size of investment return, achieving a set investment return target, reducing administrative costs, or some other measure (or any combination of these measures). Similar to the issue of identifying an ownership group, failure to specify a performance goal can lead to a less vigilant board of trustees. Miller's study of nonprofit organizations is again instructive on this issue.

For nonprofits, there is no widely accepted clear measure of performance. In her study, Miller found that some boards had developed a consensus on clear performance goals in such areas as budgetary issues, recruitment of donors, and the success of community service programs. Other boards, however, could not articulate a set of performance goals. For the boards with performance goals, the members had a better understanding of the information they needed to perform their oversight role and of how to use that information. For the boards that were unable to articulate performance goals, the members typically monitored them based on their personal skills. For example, board members who were lawyers in their professional lives considered the legal issues and accountant members considered the financial issues. These members gathered information they needed to fulfill these limited roles but had little knowledge of the performance of the organization outside these areas. In some cases, and even though they

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