# **Table 9. Regression discontinuity estimates of the impacts on examination scores of receiving** **<u>the performance grant</u>**

||Jakar<br>20<br>|ta governme<br>15<br>|nt primary s<br>2<br>|chools<br>016<br>|Jakar<br>20<br>|ta governmen<br>sch<br>15<br>|t junior sec<br>ools<br>2<br>|ondary<br>016<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||No<br>control<br>(1)|Full<br>controls<br>(2)|No<br>control<br>(3)|Full<br>controls<br>(4)|No<br>control<br>(5)|Full<br>controls<br>(6)|No<br>control<br>(7)|Full<br>controls<br>(8)|
|**Received rant**|-0.90|-0.84|0.34|0.93|0.78|0.51|-3.27|-3.51|
|**g**|(1.17)|(1.13)|(1.75)|(1.71)|(1.09)|(1.04)|(3.11)|(3.03)|
|Observations|275|275|323|323|124|124|145|145|
|Controls for students<br>per classroom, teacher<br>education and<br>graduating students|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|No|Yes|

Note: Each column is the result of a separate regression. All regressions use a triangular kernel and optimal bandwidth that reduces the mean squared error as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). Controls are share of teachers with education degree S1 or above, the number of students in the graduating class and the student classroom ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1-2 and 5-6 show the estimated impact of receiving the performance-based grant in 2015 while columns 3-4 and 7-8 show the impact in 2016.

The results show that the additional resources provided by the performance component of the grant do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on examination scores. While the results show a small negative impact of receiving the performance grant in 2015 on primary school examination scores they are not statistically significant - the impact of the performance grant on the 2015 national examination scores ranges from -0.9 to -0.8 percentage points at the margin of the cutoff. In contrast, receipt of the performance grant improved national examination scores in 2016 for primary schools (0.3 to 0.9 percentage points) but again, these coefficients are not distinguishable from zero.<sup>23</sup> The results for junior secondary schools suggest that the additional funds improved examination scores in 2015 but had a negative impact on scores in 2016. However, none of the results are statistically significantly different from zero (see columns 5-8 of Table 9).

One possible explanation for these null results on test scores using the RDD approach is that receipt of the performance grant is not sufficient to boost schools at or near the threshold to increase performance on the national examination. The performance grants may have helped schools allocate resources to improve school quality but these changes may not reflect quickly enough into improvements in test scores.

In order to test this hypothesis, the regression discontinuity model is re-estimated for two different outcomes - the share of temporary, auxiliary, or honorary teachers, which is a proxy measure for the quality of teachers. Second is the share of classrooms in good condition, which is a proxy measure for the quality of school infrastructure. The additional funds that schools receive appear to have had no significant effect on the share of temporary, auxiliary, or honorary teachers in either primary or junior secondary schools. At the secondary school level, the additional funds schools receive from the performance component has a significantly negative impact in 2015 on the share

> 23 All of these results are robust to different bandwidth specifications (see Annex Table A2.2).

20