|Dollar and Levin, 200|5 No|What are the effects of country-specific institutional and<br>policy indicators on project-level success?|Existence of high-quality institutions in a recipient country raises the probability of<br>project success. The study considers for each country the average of outcomes of<br>projects in the country rather than each project individually.|
|---|---|---|---|
|Dreher et al., 2008|No|To investigate education-specific aid effectiveness in terms of<br>achieving universal primary school enrollment.|The analysis suggests that higher per capita aid for education significantly increases<br>primary school enrollment, while increased domestic government spending on education<br>does not.|
|Dreher et al., 2013|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|How might political favoritism negatively influence the impact<br>of foreign aid in general and the performance of World Bank<br>projects in particular?|<br>Politics affect World Bank project performance only in exceptional cases of high political<br>stakes and challenging economic circumstances. The authors find no significant average<br>effect of political influence on the likelihood of a successful project evaluation, but when<br>examining projects granted to UNSC members experiencing economic mismanagement<br>or vulnerability, there is evidence that project performance suffers.|
|Dreher et al., 2017|No|To investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid<br>grant to recipient governments when their preferences over<br>how to implement the aid are different, and both the donor<br>and recipient possess some private information about the<br>most effective policies.|The authors propose a model of donor decision and test it using data dyadic data for 28<br>bilateral aid donors, considering "centralized" aid as project aid and budget aid as<br>"decentralized" aid. Their empirical findings are aligned with the model.|
|Dreher et al., 2019|No|To investigate whether foreign aid from China is prone to<br>political capture in aid-receiving countries. Specifically, the<br>authors examine whether more Chinese aid is allocated to the<br>birth regions of political leaders, controlling for indicators of<br>need and various fixed effects.|<br>Foreign aid from China is prone to political capture in Africa (more allocated to the birth<br>regions of political leaders when incumbents face upcoming elections), but such pattern<br>is not observed in World Bank projects.|
|Dreher et al., 2020|No|To investigate whether foreign aid from China is effectiveness<br>in boosting economic growth and whether it impairs the<br>overall effectiveness of aid from Western donors.|Chinese aid boosts short-term economic growth, with no evidence of impairing the<br>overall effectiveness of aid from Western donors.|
|Dreher et al., 2021|No|Is favoritism and political capture a threat to Chinese aid<br>effectiveness in Africa?|Chinese aid improves local development outcomes - as measured by per-capita nighttime<br>light emissions - , regardless of whether such aid is given to politically favored<br>jurisdictions.|
|Feeny and Vuong,<br>2017|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|What macro and micro determinants are relevant for ADB<br>project and program success, and to what extent is the<br>variation in project and program success determined by<br>project-level versus country-level factors?|The paper tested both macro (country-level) and micro (project-level) determinants. The<br>rate of per capita income growth has a positive association with project outcomes whilst<br>probability of success appears higher in less democratic countries. Projects are found to<br>have a higher probability of success than programs, with project size positively<br>associated with final outcomes. The authors also find evidence of capacity constraints<br>reducing the probability of success since interventions that received less funding than<br>anticipated are less likelyto be successful.|
|Gehring et al., 2017|No|How does aid fragmentation affects its effectiveness (country-<br>level outcomes)?|Aid fragmentation has mixed effects. In education, donor concentration appears to be<br>detrimental. For economic growth, only if fragmentation is conceptualized as a lack of<br>lead donors is a negative effect found.|
|Geli et al., 2014|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|Can information on WB project characteristics, available early<br>in project implementation, predict final project outcome<br>ratings?|Project size, preparation time, initially planned project length, a TTL’s track record and<br>country policy performance create a model more capable of predicting final WB project<br>outcomes than implementation progress report ratings, with TTL track record and<br>country policy performance beingthe most significant correlates ofproject outcomes.|

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