**Table 3:  Effects of trade liberalization on exports in the presence of Chinese imports**

||Effects<br>All products<br>|of GSP on EU<br> <br>Textile, a<br>leather<br>|imports<br>pparel, and<br>products<br>|Effects o<br>All products<br>|f AGOA on<br>Textile, app<br>pr<br>|US imports<br>arel, and leather<br>oducts<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1a)|(2a)|(3a)|(1b)|(2b)|(3b)|
|(a) Effect of discrete i<br>|ndicators of tr<br>|ade liberalizat<br>|ion<br>||||
|GSP|0.0603**<br>(0.004)|0.0453*<br>(0.020)|0.0417*<br>(0.020)|0.0299***<br>(0.006)|||
|GSP+|0.0945***<br>(0.007)|0.0127<br>(0.041)|0.0026<br>(0.041)||||
|EBA|0.1272***<br>(0.005)|0.0642*<br>(0.032)|0.0196<br>(0.032)||||
|Apparel provision||||0.2170***<br>(0.013)|0.1509***<br>(0.012)|0.1479***<br>(0.012)|
|log(Chinese imports)|0.0224***<br>(0.000)|0.0183***<br>(0.001)|0.0168***<br>(0.001)|0.0169***<br>(0.000)|0.0077***<br>(0.001)|0.0074***<br>(0.001)|
|GSP * log(Ch. imp)|||-0.0162***<br>(0.002)||||
|GSP+ *log(Ch. imp)|||-0.0066*<br>(0.003)||||
|EBA * log(Ch. imp)|||-0.0371***<br>(0.002)||||
|AP * log(Ch. imp)||||||0.0355***<br>(0.005)|
|Observations|15,345,396|3,105,872|3,105,872|12,856,448|3,100,768|3,100,768|
|(b) Effects identified f|rom the size o|f trade prefere|nces||||
||(1c)|(2c)|(3c)|(1d)|(2d)|(3d)|
|DIFF|0.7308***<br>(0.046)|1.9234***<br>(0.164)|1.9860***<br>(0.162)|0.3015***<br>(0.028)|0.7462***<br>(0.066)|0.7272***<br>(0.062)|
|log(Chinese imports)<br>DIFF * log(Ch. Imp)|0.0225***<br>(0.000)|0.0181***<br>(0.001)|0.0181***<br>(0.001)<br>-0.0533**<br>(0.018)|0.0170***<br>(0.000)|0.0078***<br>(0.001)|0.0077***<br>(0.001)<br>0.0591*<br>(0.026)|
|Observations|15,345,396|3,105,872|3,105,872|12,856,448|3,100,768|3,100,768|

_Notes:_ Results are based on fixed effects regressions that include all double interaction dummies: exporterproduct, product-year, and exporter-year. The sample includes all products, except for oil, art objects, products with missing MFN tariffs in some years, and products with MFN tariffs equal to zero over the entire sample period. Results in columns labeled (a) are for exports to the EU and in (c) columns for exports to the United States. Results in the top panel use discrete liberalization indicators to identify the effects (using the same identification as in Table 1) and results in the bottom panel (b) use the magnitude of trade preferences to identify the effects (as in Table 2). Standard errors are clustered at the country-product level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Finally, in column (3) we include interactions of the measures for trade liberalization and Chinese import. The results are entirely robust for the two identification methods, i.e. using discrete GSP or AGOA indicators in panel (a) or using the magnitude of the tariff reduction in panel (b). But the effects now consistently show the opposite sign on EU and US imports. In the US case, the positive coefficient on the interaction coefficient implies that countries receiving large Chinese imports not only export more to the US overall, they take disproportionately advantage of the AGOA market access improvement, raising their exports of eligible textile products more than for ineligible products. The absolute difference is not 29