of [0.440, 0.492].<sup>50</sup> The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns of Table 8 reports consumer surpluses for all consumers, SNAP consumers, and non-SNAP consumers, respectively, evaluated using equation (10) and its component terms. Using again our estimated reduced-form benefit pass-through elasticity, we obtain [0.0466, 0.305], [0.405, 0.664], and -0.358, respectively.<sup>51</sup> Summarizing incidence, the increase in producer surplus takes up around 49%, whereas the increase for SNAP consumers is around 66%. These increases come at the expense of non-SNAP consumers whose loss is close to 36%, which comes out to about 5% per non-SNAP consumer.<sup>52</sup> Given the large standard errors on our MPC estimate, we prefer the calculations using the larger MPC estimate from HS. Overall, these results imply that as SNAP benefits increase, producers benefit because they raise prices to extract additional surplus, although SNAP benefits increase SNAP consumer surplus the most.

Several points are worth noting regarding our incidence calculations. First, because the MPCF out of SNAP is not 1, some of the benefits disbursed lead to changes in consumption in other product markets. Hence, the changes in surplus calculated above apply only to the SNAP-eligible goods market, that is, the market for food. Because SNAP is a food-consumption safety-net program, this market is of particular interest for policy. Effects on other product markets could either increase or decrease both consumer and producer surplus, but the same mechanism for incidence can apply. We show in Appendix Table N17 the incidence for the ineligible goods market in grocery stores. Because ineligible goods account for only around 25% of revenue in grocery stores, the magnitudes of consumerand producer surplus- changes are smaller. At a calibrated market conduct parameter of 0.5, a marginal dollar of SNAP benefits increases producer surplus by about $ 0.1, decreases SNAP consumer surplus by about $ 0.01, and decreases non-SNAP consumer surplus by about $ 0.02 per non-SNAP consumer on average, because grocery stores raise markups on ineligible goods.

Second, our results take the MPCF out of SNAP as given and is agnostic to whether fungibility is violated. If we assume the MPCF out of SNAP is equal to the MPCF out of cash of around 0.1 as found in previous literature, the calculated changes in surplus would be much smaller and changes in consumption in other product markets become more important.<sup>53</sup> The price response under a unit-subsidy pass-through rate of 1 would be around

> 50If we use the calibrated benefit pass-through elasticities instead, we obtain [0.287, 0.442].

> 51If we use the calibrated benefit pass-through elasticities, we obtain [0.239, 0.368], [0.437, 0.674], and [-0.199, -0.306], respectively. Note that the non-SNAP consumer-surplus term gives a single number if we use the reduced-form pass-through elasticity, because the term does not vary with the shift magnitude.

> 52In 2010, there were about 6.7 non-SNAP consumers for every SNAP consumer. If we use the calibrated benefit pass-through elasticities, the decrease in per-non-SNAP-consumer surplus comes out to 0.029-0.046%.

> 53HS use changes in gas prices to estimate a MPCF out of cash of no more than 0.1 and earlier literature

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