our results imply that ESW is a particularly cost-effective way that the World Bank can influence the policy priorities of its client countries.<sup>27</sup> A less consistent pattern emerges when we consider the treatment variables that measure exposure to development policy lending and investment lending. One’s level of exposure to development policy lending ( _lnaid_ _~~d~~ pl_ _~~d~~ isb_ _~~p~~ c_ _~~0 m 1~~ p_ ) is negatively and significantly associated with the agenda-setting influence of the World Bank, but the direction and significance of this estimate changes when we use _dpl_ _~~p~~ roj_ _~~n m 1~~ p_ an alternative measure of DPL treatment in column (9). Exposure to policy conditionality ( _pa_ _~~m 1~~ p_ ) is positive but statistically insignificant.<sup>28</sup> In Table 2, rather than using an outcome measure that captures the World Bank’s influence on the direction of policy (i.e., agenda-setting influence), we use a measure from the _2014 Reform Efforts Survey_ that asked respondents how much influence the World Bank had over the design of policy. We do so because the stated purpose of World Bank ESW is to influence both the _direction_ and the _design_ of government policy in client countries (World Bank 2004, 2006). The fixed-effects structure of the models in Table 2 is the same as in Table 1. The results demonstrate that the _n_ _~~e~~ sw_ _~~m 1~~ p_ variable still registers a positive and statistically significant effect.

In Table 3, we replicate the same models but with another outcome measure from the _2014 Reform Efforts Survey_ : respondent evaluations of the World Bank’s helpfulness during

> 27ESW products are relatively inexpensive. In 2012, the World Bank delivered 874 ESW products to its client countries at total cost of $34,266,769. In 2013, it delivered the 772 ESW products to its client countries at a total cost of $24,503,120. In 2014, it delivered 1,199 ESW products to its client countries at a total cost of $38,588,088. The average unit cost of an ESW product during this time period (2012-2014) was $34,376. These summary statistics are drawn from the World Bank’s Business Intelligence Database.

> 28With some exceptions, the results for the control variables are mostly consistent across the columns in Table 1. Our measure of per capita income ( _lngdp_ _~~p~~ c_ _~~1~~ st_ ) and its squared term ( _lngdp_ _~~p~~ c 1st_ _~~2~~_ ) together suggest that increases in per capita income are negatively associated with the World Bank’s level of agendasetting influence, but that this effect dampens at higher levels of per capita income. The population size variable ( _lnpop 1st_ ) is negatively signed in all but one model, but only statistically significant in model (6). The aid dependence variable ( _aid gni_ _~~1~~ st_ ) is negative in all model specifications but never statistically significant (and close to zero). We also find no statistically significant relationship between the strength of democratic institutions ( _polity2_ _~~1~~ st_ ) and the World Bank’s level of agenda-setting influence, and the sign of the coefficient changes depending on the model specification. We find some evidence that the World Bank enjoys less policy influence in countries with left-wing governments ( _left_ _~~1~~ st_ ), but this estimate fails to achieve statistical significance in most models.

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