2018; Gubler, 2013). Typically contact is more beneficial to higher power groups as they are able to learn about the lower power group. However, given the length of time refugees have been in their respective host communities and the history between groups (for example, Syrians having had significant presence and even influence in Lebanon for years) and the high degree of economic and social contact outside of the program, knowledge about each other wasn’t a factor. We do note that this is speculative given our inability to compare single identity vs mixed training sessions, limiting our ability to examine the role of contact.

One reason we may have seen more movement from refugees is that they were feeling grateful that after 7 years of conflict, they were still being afforded opportunities. Hosts wouldn't feel the same gratitude for the program, at least not towards refugees. Indeed, our results fit broader outcomes from the reciprocation literature, where individuals seek to “repay” kindness, not just to those individuals from whom they have received kindness (Whatley et al., 1999; Burger et al., 2006) but also towards society as a whole, or particular groups within it (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Hugh-Jones and Leroch, 2017). In our case, it is potentially important that some structure is imposed on such reciprocation – that refugees are not being more generous generally, but specifically to hosts. That results only arise in the dictator game – and not the stag hunt game – suggests that some measure of otherregarding action underpins the behavioral changes we see. In the dictator game, individuals choose between their own outcome and that of another person and can, therefore, be interpreted in some way as generosity. In the stag hunt game, by contrast, an individual seeks to maximize private outcome through coordination, which cannot be so easily attributed to these motives.

Our results also point to some potential difficulty in sustaining these effects over a longer time horizon. Unless the anticipated economic benefits of the program (e.g. employment, higher or more secure incomes) are realized, it is unclear how or why optimism about one’s future, or perceptions about abilities to meet immediate needs, would endure. Should refugees become more pessimistic about their futures, it is possible that at least some component of the observed changes in interpersonal behavior will follow suit. Given the observed and known difficulties in the labor markets in Jordan and Lebanon, for both hosts and refugees, it is unclear how likely it is that these positive outcomes will be sustained into the medium- or longer-term. Similarly, it is important to recognize that these findings do not arise, in any sense, for members of the host community. In the immediate-term, this suggests that the program has failed to improve social relationships or mitigate tensions running from hosts to the refugee community. In a more general sense, this could reflect that while employment-based interventions for host communities are important in an economic sense, it does not follow that they also bring social or attitudinal change. Other interventions, focused on perspective-taking (Adida et al, 2018; Alan et al., 2020) or understanding similarities between groups (Williamson et al. 2021) may provide a more direct way of shifting host perceptions of refugees and mitigating tensions.

# **Policy and Program Implications** :

Numerous donor-funded programs - not only jobs programs, but also infrastructure and educational programs - aim to address challenges between host communities and refugees 23