rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
PPP projects in Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean are more likely to receive MLS. The model shows that compared to Greenfield projects, Brownfield concessions and management and lease contracts are less likely to involve multilateral participation. Transport projects tend to receive less MLS than power projects (the base comparator). Lastly, projects reaching financial closure in earlier years were likelier to receive MLS.

Finally, PPP projects with funding from multilateral banks have an average estimated probability of getting MLS (i.e., the propensity for those projects as estimated by the regression model) almost three times higher than the probability of PPPs without MLS (10.7%). This result supports the point made before –that projects with and without MLS may be systematically different, in turn making a direct comparison in their outcomes misleading regarding the role of multilaterals in the performance of PPPs.

<mark>Table 2. Probability of a PPP project to receive multilateral support (MLS) Mixed-effects probit regression Group variable: country</mark>

|Group variable: country<br>MLS(1=With Multilateral Support)<br>Empty|Basic|Full|
|---|---|---|
|Total investment|0.634<br>***|0.849<br>***|
|Square: Total Investment|-0.090<br>**|-0.120<br>***|
|Sector|||
|Transport|-0.290<br>***|-0.311<br>**|
|Water and sewerage|-0.045|-0.055|
|Type of PPP|||
|Concession|-0.276<br>***|-0.311<br>***|
|Management and lease contract|-0.375<br>***|-0.337<br>**|
|Country|||
|GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)||-0.0001<br>***|
|Population(millions)||-0.006<br>***|
|Region|||
|AFR||0.559<br>**|
|EAP||-0.290<br>*|
|ECA||0.675<br>***|
|LAC||0.794<br>***|
|MENA||0.225|
|Financial Closure Year|-0.018<br>**|-0.007|
|Constant<br>-0.749<br>***|36.095<br>***|13.479|
|_Country level variance_|||
|_var(investment)_||_0.120_<br>_*_|
|_var(constant)_<br>_0.379_<br>_***_|_0.456_<br>***|_0.147_<br>_***_|
|_LR test vs. probit regression: chi2(2)_<br>_521.39_|_500.88_|_123.74_|
|_Prob > chi2(2)_<br>_0.000_|_0.000_|_0.000_|
|_Wald chi2()_|_88.9_|_340.4_|
|_Prob > chi2_|_0.000_|_0.000_|
|_Multilevel Structure_|||
|_Intraclass Correlation_<br>_0.275_<br>_***_|||
|_# Obs (PPP projects)_<br>_5054_|_5054_|_4927_|
|_# Groups (countries)_<br>_120_|_120_|_117_|
|_Pseudo-R2_<br>_0.136_<br>* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01<br>Robust Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on country|_0.172_|_0.211_|

Source: Author’s calculations 9
al., 2006). Agents such as the political elite, administration staff, and legislators wield discretionary power if institutions are neither credible nor working well. This has the negative consequence that citizens lose their trust in the authority. In countries where corruption is systemic and the government budget lacks transparency and accountability the obligation of paying taxes cannot be assumed to be an accepted social norm. Institutional instability, lack of transparency and rule of law undermine the willingness of frustrated citizens to be active in the formal economy. Furthermore, there might be a crowding-out effect of morality among the tax administrators when there are a great number of corrupt colleagues. Moreover, regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures not only limit competition and the operation of markets, but also provide a better foundation for corrupt activities. If individuals and businesses believe that neither contracts will be enforced nor productive efforts protected, their incentive to be active in the shadow economy increases. Citizens will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread, their tax burden is not spent well, their government lacks accountability, and that they are not protected by the rules of law.

_2. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Institutions, Governance and Tax Reforms_ Frey and Torgler (2007) explore the determinants of tax morale in Eastern and Western Europe using the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000. The study covers a large set of countries<sup>3</sup> using a micro data set at the individual level (covering more than 32‘000 observations). To investigate whether institutional quality matters they use six proxies of the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). The variables measure the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence), the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies (government effectiveness, regulatory quality) and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions (rule of law and control of corruption). All scores estimated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) range

> 3 Eastern European countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine), Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, North Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden).

14
18 Chisari, O., A. Estache and C. Romero<sup>(1999),"WinnersandLosersfromthePrivatizationand</sup> Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from<sup>aGeneralEquilibriumModelofArgentina",</sup><sup>_TheWorld_</sup> _Bank Economic Review,_ Vol. 13, No 2 Delfino, J.A. and A. Casarin (2003), "The<sup>Reformof the UtilitiesSectorin Argentina",in Ugaz,</sup> C. and C. Waddams Price, ed.

Engel, E, R. Fisher and A. Galetovic (2000),<sup>"TheChileanInfrastructureConcessionsProgram:</sup> Evaluation, Lessons and Prospects<sup>fortheFuture",(withR.FischerandA.Galetovic),in</sup> Spanish, in F. Larrafn and R. Vergara<sup>(eds),The EconomicTransformationof Chile,Santiago:</sup> CEP, 201-246, 2000.

Ennis and Pinto (2003), "Privatization and<sup>IncomeDistribution in Argentina", paper presentedat</sup> the Center for Global Development<sup>Conferenceon PrivatizationandIncomeDistribution,</sup> February Estache, A. (2003), "Argentina Privatization:<sup>ACure oraDisease?"inC.vonHirschhausen,</sup> Proceedings of a Workshop on Applied<sup>InfrastructureResearch.Berlin University</sup> Estache, A, M. Gonzalez and L. Trujillo<sup>(2002a)"WhatDoesPrivatizationDo forEfficiency?</sup> Evidence from Argentina's and Brazil's<sup>Railways",</sup><sup>_WorldDevelopment,_Vol.30,Nol l,</sup> November Estache, A, M. Gonzalez and L. Trujillo (2002b)<sup>"EfficiencyGainsfromPort Reformandthe</sup> Potential for Yardstick Competition: Lessons<sup>from Mexico",</sup><sup>_World Development,_April</sup> Estache, A and L. Trujillo (2002), "How<sup>muchdidEconomicEfficiencyImproveinArgentina</sup> since Privatization -A Brief Survey of the<sup>EmpiricalEvidenceon the "X"factorforArgentina's</sup> Regulated Industries", mimeo, The World<sup>Bank</sup> Estache, A., V. Foster and Q. Wodon<sup>(2002),Accountingfor PovertyinInfrastructureReform-</sup> Learning from Latin America's Experience, World Bank Institute Publications, Studies in Development Series Fay, M. (2000), "The Infrastructure Needs<sup>of Latin America", mimeo, The World Bank</sup> Fischer, R., and Serra, P. (2000), "Regulating<sup>theElectricitySectorinLatinAmerica",</sup> _Economia,_ 1(1): 155-198.

Fisher, R. and Serra, P. (2002),<sup>"Evaluaciondelaregulacionde lastelecomunicacionesen</sup> Chile", _Perspectivas en Politica,Economia_<sup>_y Gestion,_vol.6 N. 1, 45-78</sup> Foster, Vivien, J. Luis Guasch, Maria<sup>ElenaPingloandSophieSirtaine, (2003),"Has Private</sup> Investment in Infrastructure in Latin America<sup>beenProfitable?: AnEmpiricalAnalysis1990-</sup> 2000", mimeo, World Bank.

Gomez-Ibanez, J.A. (2003), Regulation<sup>ofPrivateInfrastructure:Monopoly. Contractsand</sup> Discretion, Harvard University Press Green, J.L. and M. Rodriguez-Pardina<sup>(1999),ResettingPriceCaps.TheWorldBankInstitute</sup> Publications, Studies in Development<sup>Series</sup> Guasch, J. L. (2003), Concessions: Bust<sup>orBoom?AnEmpiricalAnalysisofFifteen Yearsof</sup> Experience in Concessions in Latin<sup>AmericaandCaribbean,TheWorldBankInstitute,</sup> Washington DC.
||PPR Working Paper Series||Contact|
|---|---|---|---|
|Tite|AuLhor|Date|for aaLer|
|WPS323 The Old and the New in Heterodox<br>Stabilization Programs: Lessons<br>from the Sixties and the Eighties|Miguel A. Kiguel<br>Nissan Liviatan|||
|WPS 324 Ethical Approaches to Family<br>Planning in Africa|F. T. Sai<br>K. Newman|December 1989|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS325 Manufacturers' Responses to Infra-<br>structure Deficiencies in Nigeria|Kyu Sik Lee<br>Alex Anas|December 1989|L. Victorio<br>31015|
|WPS326 Do Exporters Gain from VERs?|Jaime de Melo<br>L. Alan Winters|||
|WPS327 Making Noisy Data Sing: Estimating<br>Production Technologies in<br>Developing Countries|James R. Tybout|||
|WPS328 Europe, Middle East, and North<br>Africa (EMN) Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS329 Latin America and the Caribbean<br>(LAC) Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|<br>S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS330 Africa Region Population<br>Projections, 1989-90 Edition|Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|<br>S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS331 Asia Region Population Projections<br>1989-90 Edition|, Rodolfo A. Bulatao<br>Eduard Bos<br>Patience W. Stephens<br>My T. Vu|November 1989|<br>S. Ainsworth<br>31091|
|WPS332 India: Effective Incentives in<br>Agriculture: Cotton, Groundnuts,<br>Wheat, and Rice|Ashok Gulhati|||
|WPS333 Secondary Market Prices under<br>Alternative Debt Reduction<br>Strategies: An Option Pricing<br>Approach with an Application to Me|Stiin Claes,sens<br>Sweder van Wijnbergen<br>xico|||
|WPS334 Built-in Tax Elasticity and the<br>Revenue Impact of Discretionary<br>Tax Measures: An Econometric<br>Estimation Method with Application<br>to Malawi and Mauritius|Jaber Ehdaie|||
- 39 -

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Our main contribution is to shed light on the solutions to environmental health challenges of the upcoming decades. We quantify the role of household-level tools for adaptation, underscoring the positive consequences of recent development policies in mitigating climateinduced disease. Our findings underscore the critical role of sanitation as an adaptation strategy in the face of escalating environmental challenges. However, the results also shed light on the urgency of a diversified portfolio of adaptation strategies to address the complex health risks posed by environmental factors in Cambodia. Without other strategies, only universal toilet ownership would temporarily contain the climate-driven increase in diarrhea incidence.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we delve into the dataset used for our analysis and provide descriptive statistics. Section 3 outlines our baseline empirical strategy. In Section 4 we present the impacts of weather on health and explore the heterogeneity of these impacts and potential climate adaptation actions. Section 5 shifts our focus to assessing the impact of climate change on diarrhea incidence and evaluating the effectiveness of toilet ownership as a climate adaptation strategy. Section 6 summarizes our key findings and discusses their broader implications.

# **2 Data**

The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been conducted in low- and middle-income countries worldwide for over three decades, providing nationally representative household survey data on a wide range of population, health, and nutrition indicators (Cambodia NIS, MOH, and ICF, 2023). The DHS is a repeated cross-section of geo-referenced data, allowing researchers to track spatial changes over time. We use the 1998, 2000, 2005, 2014, and 2021 Cambodia DHS rounds as our main source of information on individual-level health outcomes for children. The DHS questionnaire separately asks whether children have experienced these symptoms in the past two weeks, allowing us to assess recent health status accurately.

To measure exposure to environmental hazards, we use two datasets, the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) and its analogous version for temperature (CHIRTS), published by Funk et al. (2015). These data products have better resolution and are better calibrated for regions near the equator than existing alternatives, including ERA5r (Copernicus Climate Data, 2024), which is crucial for our study in Cambodia. Moreover, their daily frequency enables us to estimate the acute impacts of extreme 5
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Asian Development Bank. “ADB, IFC to help extend mobile telecom services across Myanmar”. ADB press release, 8 February 2016. < <u>https://www.adb.org/news/adb-ifc-help-extend-mobiletelecom-services-across-myanmar> (accessed 22 November 2016).</u> Corbridge, Stuart, Glyn Williams, Manoj Srivastava and Rene Veron. _Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India_ . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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Kempel, Susanne and Myanmar Development Research. “Village Institutions and Leadership in Myanmar: A View from Below.” United Nations Development Program, 2012.

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18
La Porta and Schleifer (2013) conclude that “lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into the formal sector, nor unleashes economic growth; and that the informal economy is largely disconnected from the formal economy”. From the evidence presented here, it seems there are no immediate effects of just simplifying formalization if it is not coupled with other interventions. Not only do firms require a helping-hand to formalize, but, in addition, formalization alone does not seem sufficient to lead to changes in key intermediate outcomes of interest. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity for helping firms to formalize if this is attached to interventions like business bank accounts that complement formality and bring the firm closer to important aspects of its development. In this case, the complementary interventions seem to be effective initially for both men and women, although typically larger for male-owned businesses. This opportunity seems to facilitate access to new services.

While we will next discuss these findings with the government of Malawi, we will move for the next stage of this study where we will analyze the mid-term and long-term impacts of the different interventions. We will do that for the intermediate outcomes of interest mentioned here, as well as others like access to markets and harassment. On this latter factor, anecdotal evidence suggests that informality could expose female entrepreneurs to more risks, such as confiscation of merchandise or requests for transactional sex from authorities threatening to shut down their businesses. Thus, women could benefit from formalization in terms of less harassment and its potential relationship with business performance. Additionally, we will analyze the effects of the interventions on firms’ performance (profits, investment, etc.) by following all groups through two more rounds of follow-ups. We will use administrative data from the financial institution that we work with to learn from the usage of financial services when accessing the SME Department of a Bank.

26
positive test results assign signicantly higher likelihood to being infected two years later relative to individuals who received negative test results, some individuals who tested positive later assign a probability of less than one to being infected. I therefore assume that a woman assigns a probability to the accuracy of the test. Given the test result, the woman updates the probabilities assigned to infection and the corresponding probabilities of survival.

I structurally estimate the model parameters using maximum likelihood and then use the estimated model to perform several counterfactual simulations. First, I simulate life-cycle fertility in an environment with no HIV exposure. The results indicate that the presence of HIV has an average negative eect on fertility. Overall, women in the no-HIV environment have on average 0.15 more births over their life-cycle. However, there is heterogeneity in the eect of the presence of HIV on fertility, with some women decreasing the number of births and fewer women increasing it. I also simulate the eects of prevention of mother-to-child transmission and HIV testing programs on fertility outcomes. Although these programs are not necessarily intended to inuence fertility, they have the potential to aect reproductive choices by altering beliefs about HIV status, life expectancy, and child survival. Such policy interventions are implemented in Malawi and are continuously expanding in scope. I nd these programs to have negligible eects on the overall number of births. However, elimination of mother-to-child transmission will reduce fertility by infected women who respond to child mortality by additional pregnancies either because they have high marginal utility of an additional child or because they assign low likelihood to being infected. I also nd that HIV testing can reduce fertility by HIV-positive women, leading to a reduction in child mortality and orphan hood. However, the eect of testing is limited by the partial updating of beliefs.

trading centers (Obare et al., 2009).

5
**_<u>________________________________________________________</u>_**

[A] 3. What are the top 3 destination markets for your top (up to 3) products? _[Links with Question 11.c – in the Core PICS]_

||Product name|Destination (national/<br>domestic)|Destination<br>(international)|
|---|---|---|---|
|A||||
|B||||
|C||||

- [A] 4. a. If you are already exporting, have you tried to expand the markets to which you export?             Yes__ No___

- b. If you are not already exporting, in the past two years, have you actively tried to enter export markets? Yes__   No__

- [A] 5. What is the method of payment for a typical export order?

- a.   letter of credit

- b.   open account,

- c.   cash against document

- d. other __________________________

- [A]6. What INCOTERMS do you use in pricing the product ?

- a. FOB

- b. CIF

- c. CFR

- d. Other (specify) _______________

- [A]  7. a.  Do you produce/ manufacture on an order by order basis? ____  1=Yes ;   2=No

- b.   If no, what percentage of sales orders are filled from inventory held? __ [Link with Question 13 in PICS2002]_

- c.   Do you produce against long term contracts? ____  1=Yes  ;  2=No

44 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________