rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
Table 2: Percentage change in Labor Force composition by selected industry group over time <u>(Workers with positive reported earnings)</u>

|Industry||||% change||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Indonesia<br>1994-07|Philippines<br>1988-06|Thailand<br>1990-04|Vietnam<br>1992-06|Cambodia<br>1997-07|China<br>1999-05|Mongolia<br>1998-07|
|Agriculture/Forestry/Fishery|-19.0|-27.8|-22.1|-36.8*|-19.0*|-81.8*|10.7|
|Mining|123.1|-66.7|0.0|-|-|-|-|
|Manufacturing|-11.7|-12.1|10.6|-10.0|96.7|-38.6|104.1|
|Utilities|20.0|0.0|-37.5|22.2|n/a|-60.8|35.3|
|Construction|-16.0|22.0|16.0|53.5|94.1|-50.0|168.6|
|Trade|28.4|37.2|60.8|97.9|-47.2|74.1|24.0|
|Transportation/Communication|6.8|54.0|-12.5|0.0|26.2|16.9|95.5|
|Finance/Business|34.6|117.6|-|122.2|171.4|n/a|-|
|Other Services|2.5|-1.8|-9.5|8.5|-45.8|36.5|-31.3|

* Combined with Mining

Using the sample of workers with reported earnings, in Cambodia (as reported in Table 2), besides the decline in the share of agriculture, other sectors which declined are trade and other services (mostly due to a decline in the share of public administration). The shares of manufacturing, construction and finance/business exhibited large increases over the last decade. However, when using the larger sample of employed individuals, the results are different with respect to the change in the share of trade: now this share shows a small increase as opposed to a large decline; otherwise, the two sets of results for Cambodia are generally consistent between the two samples.

With the exception of Cambodia (for upper secondary and above) and Mongolia, the proportion of skilled workers in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and China increased substantially on average (especially the proportion of workers with tertiary education) as well as across almost all major industries (Tables 3a and 3b). Increasing shares of skilled workers in the service sector combined with changing employment shares in its favor make it as a particularly dynamic market for skilled workers – as will be further confirmed with the wage skill premium analysis. The largest increase in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines is observed in agriculture where the proportion of skilled workers (defined as those with upper secondary education or higher), while it still remains low, nearly tripled in Indonesia and more than doubled in Thailand. In Vietnam the largest increase is found in transportation/communication, while the proportion of 8
# **1. Introduction**

HIV testing and counseling (HTC) is a gateway to improving prevention and care efforts, and has become a core strategy for decreasing HIV transmission and incidence (Glick, 2005). There have been calls to devote more resources to couple HTC since HIV transmission is highest in discordant couples, i.e. couples in which only one of the partners is infected, especially if the infected partner either does not know his or her status or has not revealed it to the uninfected partner (Padian et al., 1993). Recent evidence demonstrates that antiretroviral treatment (ART) of HIV+ individuals is very effective in preventing transmission of the HIV virus within couples (Cohen et al., 2011; Dodd et al., 2010; El-Sadr et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2010). As a result, HTC couple testing, especially among discordant couples, has become a key component of prevention programs in generalized epidemic countries.

Despite the promise of HTC to reduce HIV transmission and the large amount of development assistance for HIV/AIDS, HTC uptake has only recently seen modest improvements (United Nations, 2011). Moreover, there are few documented successful experiences of HTC programs reaching couples (Padian et al., 1993; Painter, 2001).<sup>1</sup> A promising, yet largely untested, intervention to increase testing is to pay health providers for increasing participation in HTC. This is part of the more general Pay-forperformance (P4P) movement that gives financial rewards at the facility and/or provider levels to improve performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. P4P is now being piloted or scaled up in over 20 low- and middle-income countries (Eichler and Levine, 2009; Meessen et al., 2011).

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of Rwanda’s national P4P scheme on individual and couple HTC. Building on the lessons from pilot experiences in a few provinces, Rwanda initiated in 2006 a national P4P scheme at the health center level to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. We use data from a prospective impact evaluation we nested into the national scale-up of P4P in Rwanda, producing evidence from an

> 1 An important exception is from Thornton (2008) who demonstrated that cash value vouchers doubled the percentage of individuals who obtained their HIV test results, given that they had been tested.

2
The Asia Foundation, “Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing Society”, 2014. < <u>https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MyanmarSurvey20141.pdf> (accessed 22</u> November 2016).

Tripartite Core Group (Government of Myanmar, ASEAN and the United Nations). “Post-Nargis - Joint Assessment”, 2008. < https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/GFDRR_Myanmar_Post <u>Nargis_Joint_Assessment_2008_EN.pdf> (accessed 22 November 2016).</u> Turnell, Sean. “Recapitalizing Burma’s Rural Credit System”. In _Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections,_ edited by Cheesman, Nick, Skidmore, Monique and Wilson, Trevor. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

Turnell, Sean, Allison Vicary, and Wylie Bradford. “Migrant Worker Remittances and Burma: An Economic Analysis of Survey Results.” in Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (eds.) _Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar_ . Canberra: ANU E-Press, pp. 63-86, 2008.

UNDP. “The State of Local Governance Trends in Ayeyarwady”. UNDP Local Governance Mapping Series, 2014. <u>http://www.mm.undp.org/content/dam/myanmar/docs/Publications/PovRedu/Local%20Governa nce%20Mapping/UNDP_MM_LG_Mapping_Ayeyarwady_web.pdf?download</u> (accessed 22 November 2016).

________ “Women and Local Leadership: Leadership Journeys of Myanmar’s Female Village Tract/Ward Administrators”. UNDP, 2015.

Wells, Tamas and Kyaw Thu Aung. “Village Networks, Land Law, and Myanmar’s Democratization”. In _Debating Democratization in Myanmar_ , edited by Cheesman, Nick, Farrelly, Nicholas and Trevor Wilson. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.

World Bank. “A Country on the Move: Domestic Migration in Two Regions in Myanmar”. QSEM Thematic Study. World Bank. 2015a.

________ “Myanmar – Post-disaster Needs Assessment of Floods and Landslides: July – September 2015”. World Bank. 2015b.

________ “Realigning the Union Budget to Myanmar’s Development Priorities: Public Expenditure Review”. World Bank. 2015c.

________ “Social Accountability E-Guide”. 2013 <https://saeguide.worldbank.org> (accessed 14 November 2016).

20
insulating policies, on average, EMDEs implemented policies that raised domestic prices relative to world prices (Figure 5).

_Wheat._ Between February 2007 and March 2008, world wheat prices more than doubled, partly in response to lower-than-anticipated wheat production caused by drought in Australia, Ukraine and other major exporters.<sup>14</sup> Strong policy intervention partially insulated domestic markets from the global wheat price spike and their subsequent collapse in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2009-10. Similarly, during the 2010-11 event, world wheat prices more than doubled between June 2010 and May 2011.<sup>15</sup> This time, the increase in world prices was partly driven by lower-than-expected production and exports in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine and excessive rains in Australia that damaged wheat crops (World Bank 2010). Large orders from major wheat importers in the Middle East and North Africa added to price pressures. Since 2011, global and domestic wheat prices have fluctuated, broadly synchronously.

_Maize._ During the 2007-08 food price spike, the world price of maize almost doubled, partly as a result of increasing U.S. demand for maize stimulated by mandatory targets for ethanol production.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, during the 2010-11 episode, the world price of maize increased significantly. As in the case of wheat, adverse weather-related events in major maize exporting countries contributed to the spike in world prices. In contrast, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa benefited from excellent maize harvests, which in combination with unpredictable trade policies led to sharp falls in domestic prices.

# **3.2 Insulation of domestic food markets**

**Measuring the insulation of domestic markets.** The degree of insulation of domestic markets from world food price swings can be quantified using an Error Correction Model (Annex 6.1). The model regresses the log of the protection rate on the log of world prices and the deviation from long-term “equilibrium” food prices. The model estimates the degree of insulation to global price changes in both the short run (specifically, a negative coefficient on short-term changes in global food prices) and long run (specifically, a negative coefficient on the long-term relationship between domestic and global food prices). The sample used here includes annual data for 8 food commodity prices in 82 countries, of which 44 are EMDEs and 12 are LICs, during 1955-2011.

> 14The world price of U.S. Hard Red Wheat (HRW) increased from $196/mt to $440/mt.

> 15The world price of U.S. Hard Red Wheat (HRW) increased from $158/mt to $355/mt.

> 16Between January 2007 and June 2008, the world price of maize increased from $165/mt to $287/mt.

14
- 46 -

horse shay assumption of a capital recovery factor of 0.125, the annualized capital cost is then _HK$30_ million _[US$3.85_ miUion] and the annual op tng cost is _HK$19.80_ [US$2.54 miliionJ, representing three fifths and two fifths of the total annual cost respectively. The annual benefitcost ratios are 14.7, 17.8, 17.8 and 24.1 for each of the three scenarios and the theoretical upper bound option." With traffic growth and technological improvements, the benefit-cost ratios will most likely rise. The number of trips made by private cars is forecast to be 549,450 per week day in 1991 and the annualized capital and operating costs amount to just under _HK$50_ million [US$6.38 million] in 1985.3 Using the number of operating days per year of 260, the system cost per transaction is HB34.9 cents in 1985 _[US6.6_ cents in 1990]. Even though over 10% of the capital cost and about 12-1/2% of the operating cost are required for the 'data capture' enforcement system, the cost per transaction would be even lower if account were taken of multiple transactions, that is, crossing several screenlines a day.<sup>3</sup> 9 _59._ In comparison with other mechanisms, electronic road pricing fares well. The annual - benefits of a car ownership fiscal restraint measure an indirect charging method levied on vehicle ownership via annual license fee discussed earlier - amoun **t** o HK$301 million [US$38.6 million] in 1985, about a quarter of those of the optimum option and less than half of those of ERP Scheme A (see Hau, 1989, 1990).40

- 3 The sligt differce in annualized costs for ERP Schems A, B and C, reflect the fact that the capitd cost varies somewhat in relation to the 130, 115 and 185 toil sites required espectively for each scheme.

- 3' The average number of transactions per weekday was estimated by takng the proportion of those who 'stay and pay' (45%) and the total mber of peak users (374,000) and interpeak users (847,000) remaining under Scheme A (Trnspotech, 1985, p. 2.69 - 2.70). (Relative to Scheme A, Schemes B and C have less _transactions_ due to the higher charges, so te costs per transactions would climb by 12% and 22% respectively.) The cost per trmnsaction would be lower if one computes all the result on a six-day wori week basis rater than five.

- 3' If one were to use the nunber of vehicles forecas for 1991 of 275,000 (as opposed to using the 210,000 ENP figure on which the capital costs ae based), th number of trips averged per weekday by a motorist is exactly 2.00. This fortuitous result would make the Ho ong figures comparable with mul charn and Singapore's ALS, etc., since tho cargs made elsewhere could be viewed as a round trip charge.

The fgure includes the disbufits of those resurined or would-be car owners who m 'taxed ofP fromno being able to own a private car (bocuse of _already_ existing hefky first registration taxes and annual liense fees). The disbenefits amoun **t** o a total of H$244 million [US$31 milLion] in 1985 (Harrison, 1986, Table
Bank study of investment climate in 120 Chinese cities found that the ones that had created a good climate for private investment had also done the best job in terms of meeting social and environmental objectives (World Bank, 2006). In the cities with good investment climates wages have risen rapidly leading to other social advances such as low unemployment, low infant mortality, and high levels of investment in education. Somewhat surprisingly, the best investment climate cities also had better environmental indicators such as more clean airs days per year, more green space per capita, and more industrial waste properly treated. This correlation likely arises from a number of different sources. The same effective governments that create non-bureaucratic and efficient production environments for private firms, seem to be better at meeting human needs as well. Also, as cities prosper and move up the value chain to more sophisticated products, it becomes increasingly important that they have good living environments in order to attract and retrain the best talent. At the high end of the value chain, a good living environment is a crucial part of a good investment climate.

I have not said anything so far about political developments. The reason for this is that political developments are much harder to predict than economic outcomes. Also, in developing Asia there is no clear relationship between political systems and good economic governance. Good economic governance provides wide economic opportunities to the populace through measures such as broad-based public education, sound investment climate to start firms, and openness to the global market to permit division of labor and specialization. While governance is hard to measure, researchers have often used ICRG’s property rights/rule of law index as a summary measure of economic governance and Freedom House’s political index as a measure of democracy.

13
# **Technical Appendix**

The next pages show results from a Monte Carlo simulation of the simultaneous model in Section 4.1 of the paper. The Monte Carlo simulation shows that:

- (1) Instrumental variables estimation where in

step 1 _u_hat_ is generated by applying IV estimation to equation (2), with _R_ as an instrument for _Y_ step 2 _u_hat_ from step 1 is used as an instrument in IV estimation of equation (1) yields an unbiased estimate of _b_ in equation (1). This is the approach we take in the paper.

- (2) Instrumental variables estimation where in

step 1 _u_hat_ls_ is generated based on least squares estimation of equation (2) step 2 _u_hat_ls_ from step 1 is used as an instrument in IV estimation of equation (1) yields a biased estimate of _b_ in equation (1). This is not the approach we take in the paper. We show this result to make it clear that one needs an instrument R to identify one equation, in order to then identify the other equation.

- (3) Least squares estimation of equation (1) yields a biased estimate of b. Since the parameter _a_ is chosen to be negative (-1) in the Monte Carlo simulation, the least squares estimate of b is downward biased.

38
- National Statistical Office (NSO) (2017). Malawi Fourth Integrated Household Survey 2016-2017. Public Use Dataset. Ref: MWI 2016 ~~I~~ HS-IV ~~v~~ 04 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https://microdata. worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2936` on 6 September 2019.

- National Statistical Office (NSO) (2020a). Malawi Fifth Integrated Household Survey 2019-2020. Public Use Dataset. Ref: MWI ~~2~~ 019 ~~I~~ HS-V ~~v~~ 06 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https://microdata. worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3818` on 9 February 2024.

- National Statistical Office (NSO) (2020b). Malawi Integrated Household Panel Survey 2010-20132016-2019 (long-term panel, 102 EAs). Public Use Dataset. Ref: MWI ~~2~~ 010-2019 ~~I~~ HPS ~~v~~ 06 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3819` on 21 May 2024.

- Novella, N. S. and W. M. Thiaw (2013). African rainfall climatology version 2 for famine early warning systems. _Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 52_ (3), 588–606.

- Parker, W. S. (2016). Reanalyses and observations: What’s the difference? _Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 97_ (9), 1565–72.

- Ritchie, J. and D. NeSmith (1991). Temperature and crop development. In R. J. Hanks and J. T. Ritchie (Eds.), _Modeling Plant and Soil Systems_ , pp. 5–29. American Society of Agronomy, Crop Science Society of America, Soil Science Society of America.

- Sarsons, H. (2015). Rainfall and conflict: A cautionary tale. _Journal of Development Economics 115_ , 62–72.

- Shah, M. and B. M. Steinberg (2017). Drought of opportunities: Contemporaneous and long-term impacts of rainfall shocks on human capital. _Journal of Political Economy 125_ (2), 527–61.

- Survey and Census Division, National Institute of Statistics, Niger (NIS) (2014). National Survey on Household Living Conditions and Agriculture 2011. Public Use Dataset. Ref: NER ~~2~~ 011 ~~E~~ CVMA ~~v~~ 01 M. Downloaded from `https://microdata.worldbank.org/index. php/catalog/2050` on 6 September 2019.

- Survey and Census Division, National Institute of Statistics, Niger (NIS) (2016). National Survey on Household Living Conditions and Agriculture (ecvma) 2014. Public Use Dataset. Ref: NER 2014 ~~E~~ CVMA ~~v~~ 02 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https://microdata.worldbank. org/index.php/catalog/2676` on 6 September 2019.

- Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (TNBS) (2011). Tanzania National Panel Survey 20082009, Wave 1. Public Use Dataset. Ref: TZA ~~2~~ 008 ~~N~~ PS-R1 ~~v~~ 03 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https: //microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/76` on 6 September 2019.

- Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (TNBS) (2012). Tanzania National Panel Survey 20102011, Wave 2. Public Use Dataset. Ref: TZA ~~2~~ 010 ~~N~~ PS-R2 ~~v~~ 03 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https: //microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1050` on 6 September 2019.

- Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (TNBS) (2015). Tanzania National Panel Survey 20122013, Wave 3. Public Use Dataset. Ref: TZA ~~2~~ 012 ~~N~~ PS-R3 ~~v~~ 01 ~~M~~ . Downloaded from `https: //microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2252` on 6 September 2019.

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- 5 -

Empirically, De Silva, _et al_ . (2002; 2003), investigating the case of Oklahoma State’s auction market for road construction projects, finds that new entrants actually bid more aggressively than incumbents did, especially in the lower tail of the bid distribution. Of particular note, in their analysis only 70 entrant bids are identified out of about 2,800 bids. Moreover, a single firm bided 218 projects and a single firm was awarded with 59 contracts. These facts may characterize road construction auctions as a typical repeated game involving a closed set of a few incumbent bidders.

On the other hand, the prediction that weak bidders tender aggressive bids may raise a concern about the winner’s curse (e.g., Klemperer, 1998). Executing agencies (i.e., auctioneers) will be faced with great difficulties when contractors of infrastructure projects go bankrupt or attempt to undergo renegotiation, because they are trapped in a classic hold up problem.<sup>3</sup> Theoretically, it is shown that a “high bid and broke winner” phenomenon is difficult to avoid (Zheng, 2001), and in reality such a problem is not rare.

The current paper aims at identifying incumbent bidders somehow and estimating the impact of their presence in an auction on the equilibrium bid function. The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of market concentration and the existence of potential fringe firms and entrant bidders in our ODA procurement data. Section III establishes an empirical model and describes our data. Section IV summarizes the main regression results and discusses several policy implications.

# **II. MARKET CONCENTRATION AND FRINGE BIDDERS IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENTS**

Our data initially cover 211 procurement auctions for 69 infrastructure projects in 29 developing countries from 1997 to 2007. When the fact that any single firm can possibly

> 3 The more valuable the contract is, the difficult it is to terminate the existing contract. This is typical in largescale national development projects.
participation rates, expected and realized rates of return, product risks, commission levels, and other aspects of life insurance contracts.

The IC needs to build a solid reputation for effectiveness and consistency in its intervention action. It should have the operational independence and strong political backing to take action to ensure that only companies that are financially strong and are able to adopt sound marketing, reinsurance, reserving and investment policies are allowed to continue to operate in the market.

The IC is taking steps to reduce delays in settlement and to address consumer complaints against insurers. It has created a settlements and enquiries office that listens to complaints and seeks to settle disputes on an amicable basis. Plans are also under way for establishing a complaints committee (similar to an ombudsman service) for mediating in insurance disputes with a binding effect on insurance companies. Moreover, the IC is establishing an alternative disputes resolution center for insurance disputes to be settled through arbitration and mediation.

There is a need to develop an insurance information bureau for motor insurance business to facilitate sharing of data on loss experience, driving records and fraudulent claims among all licensed companies. Its development could make easier the lifting of administered tariffs on third party motor liability (TPML) and the elimination of the unified bureau. It could allow companies to offer discounts to good drivers and penalize bad ones as well as reject bad risks. The creation of a national pool for bad risks could be considered. The insurance information bureau could also collect data on other retail policies as well as assist in the development of mortality tables and lapse and surrender data for life business.

The need for establishing one or more compensation funds to cover the unpaid claims of failing companies should be reviewed in consultation with the Federation. However, effective supervision and full implementation of the risk-based capital requirements would provide a better safeguard against such losses.

Some concern is expressed by insurers about the cost of regulation, the risk of over-regulation, and the fast pace of implementation of the new instructions. However, many of these concerns need to be taken in context. The insurance industry has long been used to operating with inadequate regulation and weak supervision. Adjusting to the new approach creates difficulties, although there is widespread strong support for the basic objectives of the IC.

Nevertheless, compliance with some instructions is likely to prove difficult. For example, observance of modern corporate governance principles will face difficulties given the preponderance of family control and the absence of non-executive directors with professional knowledge of insurance matters. The requirement of actuarial certification of general insurance business may turn out to be expensive because of the dearth of qualified actuaries in the local market. In this respect, an approach that could mitigate the cost of foreign actuaries would be to facilitate group contracts, covering 35