uniformly upward to generate a total fertility rate of 1.65 in 2005, in line with other estimates.<sup>16</sup> We subject the age-specific fertility rates to varying assumptions about fertility growth. Fertility is allowed to vary between three scenarios: no change, uniform increase in all age-specific fertility rates such that TFR increases to 1.96 in 2012 and remains there (the “late” growth scenario), and linear increase in each age-specific fertility rate starting in 2010 such that the NRR equals 1 under the current sex ratio of 1.18 (replacement fertility) by 2030 (the “slow” or “gradual” growth scenario).

The potential trajectories for the sex ratio at birth in China are summarized by two scenarios. The first assumes that the government's policy is effective at stabilizing the SRB at 1.09 for all births since 2005, identified as a policy target for the near future (Li 2007). The second scenario assumes that the SRB persisted indefinitely at 1.18, close to its 2005 level. We find that alternate assumptions regarding the sex ratio at birth and the possibility of fertility growth would lead to the same basic outcomes (shown in Table A2). It is worth noting that _none_ of these assumptions about future fertility patterns affect our predictions for marriage markets through 2030, since these cohorts have already been born. Even if a lower sex ratio at birth was achieved immediately, the percentage of unmarried adult men age 30+ and 30-39 in 2050 would remain high (Tables 7 and A2). Sensitivity analysis to account for the possibility of fertility growth (either slow growth beginning immediately or rapid growth in the near future) projects that a change in fertility could lower the share never married in 2050 by no more than 1.8 percentage points (Table A2). Correcting the sex ratio is the most prudent course of action, but even immediate improvements are insufficient to relieve the demographic squeeze in the shortto mid-term.

Flexibility in spousal age gaps can be understood through the lens of demographic translation as a mechanism for ensuring clearing of the marriage market in the context of skewed sex ratios (Ni Bhrolchain 2001). In recognition of this fact, we allow for an age gap between spouses of 8 years, which is one of the largest observed average age gaps for marriages among men or women of any age (Lloyd 2005; Casterline et al. 1986), and which would represent a significant break from Chinese cultural norms.<sup>17</sup> This wide age gap is an alternative to a world in which males must marry women of the same age, in which case the never-married rate for males 16 This is based on age specific fertility rates from China NBS Sample Survey on Population Changes (2004). The fertility rate in China is the subject of much debate. Some have argued that official statistics are distorted due to the tendency of parents to mislead census officials out of a fear of punishment for violations of the One Child Policy. The lowest estimate in currency is that of the China NBS, which estimated TFR in 2005 at 1.38. The highest mainstream estimate is by the CIA Factbook, estimated at 1.79 in 2009. Cai (2008) summarizes the debate and estimates a value of 1.5-1.6, in line with other third party calculations. See also Goodkind (2008) and Lutz et al. (2007) for current discussions of competing estimates and Zeng et al (2008) for an implementation of a similar upward fertility adjustment.

17 The current average age gap between spouses is under 2.5 years, and has remained under 3.5 years for as many years as China’s modern Census data can be projected backwards (Ebenstein & Sharygin 2009). 8 years is in excess of the average age gap among marriages of men or women 20-30 of all world populations for which DHS surveys have been conducted (with the exception of some countries in West Africa; see Lloyd 2005) and among the highest in populations included in the World Fertility Survey (Casterline et al. 1986). The age gap between spouses is highly sensitive to the male’s age. Marriages among males age 30+ tend to have a large age gap between spouses, largely but not entirely due to remarriages. In order to account for the possibility that the average age gap might increase further, we additionally used a dynamic (increasing with age) gap that generated an age gap of 8 years at female age 22 and increasing thereafter; our results with this method were consistent with these estimates. We opted to use the 8-year age gap in order to be consistent with earlier estimates produced from our population projection model.

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