rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
kindergartens.<sup>4</sup> For language test scores, we no longer found that children who enrolled in playgroup at age 3-4 then kindergarten at age 5-6 perform significantly better than their peers who only enrolled in kindergarten at age 5-6. In contrast, for math test scores, we continued to find that children who enrolled in a sequence of playgroup and kindergarten at developmentally appropriate ages yielded significantly higher test scores than their peers who enrolled in other early education pathways. It is worth noting that once we controlled for duration of ECED in Table 5c in addition to timing, the magnitude of the coefficient for playgroup at age 3-4 then kindergarten at age 5-6 dropped for all subjects (in the case of language the point estimate dropped from 0.418 to 0.277 and in the case of mathematics it dropped from 0.477 to 0.238 and in the case of cognitive skills from 0.205 to a statistically insignificant 0.0387). Meanwhile, the coefficients on duration of playgroup and kindergarten showed significantly higher test scores (on average) for those who enrolled for at least two years compared to those who only enrolled for one to two years (Table 5c shows that comparable point estimates for both language and mathematics). This suggests that over and above enrolling in ECED services in the right sequence at the intended ages, the duration of enrollment in playgroups and kindergartens is a significant predictor of children’s subsequent learning outcomes in primary school.

We did not find significant results for general cognitive skills (table 5c). The divergent results of the general cognitive skills compared to the language and math results may be explained by the fact that the items in the language and math assessments were pooled from a battery of questions that align with the national curriculum for lower primary school grades while the general cognitive items are based on the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices. The matrices measure abstract reasoning and can be regarded as a non-verbal estimate of fluid intelligence. While we would have hoped that participation in ECED services would have shown enhancement of general cognitive skills, none of the programs included specific educational activities to enhance such skills, such as working memory games. Instead the ECED services in Indonesia exposed children to the basics of language and mathematical concepts to prepare them for primary school, in a manner aligned with the national early learning curriculum.

Overall, our analysis of early education pathways, as it relates to early grade learning, shows that on average, children who enrolled in playgroup followed by kindergarten scored

> 4 If age cut-offs of admission were strictly enforced duration and timing would likely be highly correlated. However, in Indonesia, age cut-offs are rarely strictly enforced.

18
available with only a 10-year frequency (e.g., 1981, 1991, 2001), the data for 1997 are estimated through nonlinear interpolation.<sup>16</sup> The two sets of fixed effects included in (1) absorb some of the unobserved heterogeneity likely to bias the estimation. In particular, the district fixed effects absorb any time-invariant component at the district level, such as geographical position, climatic factors, and natural resources. The state-year fixed effects capture any state-specific time-variant shocks (including economic dynamics and policies). This specification, however, may not completely account for other sources of potential bias in the coefficient _β_ , including endogeneity. For this reason, in the next section, we address a number of possible remaining concerns by means of several robustness tests and instrumental variable (IV) estimations.

# **<<B>>Disentangling** **_economic linkage_ from** **_location_ effects**

As mentioned above, it is important to empirically distinguish the _economic linkage_ effects from the simple composition effect due to the migration of the poor from rural to urban areas ( _location_ effects) when identifying the impact of urbanization on rural welfare. To disentangle these effects, we start from the observation that a district’s urban population grows more rapidly than the rural population because of two phenomena: intradistrict rural-urban migration or rural areas becoming urban (either because they are encompassed by an expanding urban area or because their population has grown sufficiently to upgrade from the status of village to that of town).<sup>17</sup> These two phenomena directly change the composition of both the rural and the urban populations, including their poverty rates. If the distribution of rural-urban migrants is skewed toward low-income individuals (i.e., the incidence of poverty is higher among migrants than nonmigrants) and if the poverty incidence in rural villages that become urban is higher than it is in the total rural 13
-25-

could Improve the overall financial performance as well as the economic rate of return of proJects.

We have noted earlier, the need to pay greater attention to the treatment of uncertainty, and scenario-oriented approaches. As part of the forecasting exercise, it Is advisable to make greater use of risk analysis particularly In connection with financial projections. Until recently, sensitivity analysis was done only In connection with the economic evaluation but no discussion was required (in the SAR financial analysis) of the Impact on project and program financing should revenues be less than forecast or If capital costs for the program as a whole were significantly greater than estimated. However, Bank policy now requires discussion of sensitivity to changes In the market, etc. (OPN 2.02).

The study has also revealed the need for more consideration of projects In a sectoral context. Project audits have by and large concluded that projects have been justified and for the most part have been successful In meeting objectives. Taken as a longer-term trend, however, It Is clear that the power sector has been In a state of continuous decline despite remaining probably the best performlrng of all sectors supported by the Bank. It Is recommended, therefore, that PCRs and PPARs look more broadly at sector performance and assess overall performance over a longer time span than the project period. The project should be revlewed In the light of total sector performance and Its prospects for the future. The justification of projects depends In large measure on sustaining the sector over the physical life of the assets. For many utilities, this Is a questionable prospect given the performance over the past two decades.

Specific recommendations for Improving project and sector performance are summarized as follows:

1. systematically examine options for sector restructuring, In order to strengthen market forces, Improve the environment In which the utility functions, and Increase incentives for enhanced utility efficiency;
# A.2.4 English Speaking Countries

According to the World Factbook 2001 English is an o¢ cial language in Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Hong Kong, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malta, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and the UK. Countries were English is an o¢ cial language but used by a limited minority are Sierra Leone, India and Pakistan. Countries were English is not an o¢ cial language but widely used within certain population groups applies to Jordania, Panama, South Korea and Western Samoa.

30
the double-difference is exactly equal to zero. This means that an increase (decrease) in inequality generated by market forces is exactly equal to the increase (decrease) in the inequality in disposable incomes, i.e. there has not been any additional redistribution.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, if the expression is larger than zero, redistribution has increased over time.

Using this double-difference, Figure 3 plots ∆RS����,���� for Western and Eastern EU countries. The values on the vertical axis correspond to Gini points. The chart shows that in Western Europe, the size of the redistribution has increased in most countries between 2007 and 2014.<sup>6</sup> The largest increase in the size of redistribution among Western European countries can be observed in Greece, where the reduction in market income inequality grew by 7 Gini points – although, as we show later, most of this change was not due to changes in taxes and transfer policies but rather to an almost automatic effect in a context of worsening market incomes. On the contrary, in Germany, Sweden and France, the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers have slightly declined.

In Eastern Europe, the evidence is mixed: in about half of the countries, redistribution has increased over time, while in the other half, it has decreased. In Hungary, for instance, there has been a significant reduction in redistribution between 2007 and 2014, equivalent to over 5 Gini points. Reductions in the size of the redistribution are also observed in Romania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania.

> 5 In this case, inequality levels are indeed going up. Note, however, that maintaining the same level of redistribution at higher levels of inequality may still mean that the redistribution systems play a larger role. As Kanbur (2018) highlights, in this case of higher levels of inequality, the volume of redistribution is higher.

> 6 2007 was chosen as a reference year as it was the earliest year available in EUROMOD. This year also has the advantage that it pre-dates the financial crisis. 2014 was the most recent year in which survey data were available when running the simulations in the first quarter of 2018. Later years’ simulations were also based on 2014 survey data.

7
Policy Research Working Paper 6103

# **Abstract**

While innovation is a source of competitiveness, it may expose plants to survival risks. Using a rich set of plantproduct data for Chilean manufacturing plants during the period 1996–2006 and discrete-time hazard models controlling for unobserved plant heterogeneity, this paper shows that innovating plants have higher survival odds. However, risk plays an important role for the innovationsurvival link: only innovators that retain diversified sources of revenues survive longer. Single-product innovators are at greater risk of exiting. In addition, only innovators facing lower market risk, measured by fewer innovative competitors, low-pricing strategies, or lower sales volatility in the new products’ markets, see their odds of survival increase significantly. Technical risk, measured by the proximity of product innovations to the plants’ past expertise, the degree of sophistication of new products, or their novelty to the Chilean market, does not play a substantial role in the innovation-survival link. Engaging in risky innovation is not an irrational decision, since plants reap big payoffs—higher productivity, employment and sales growth—from such innovations. However, those payoffs are not always higher than those from cautious innovation, suggesting that constraining factors, such as credit constraints, force plants to take on more risk when innovating. An implication of the findings for industry dynamics is that among innovators, only the survival of cautious innovators is guaranteed. Since engaging in cautious innovation may not be feasible for all plants, there could be a role for policy in reducing innovators’ exposure to risks and providing assistance to deal with failed innovations, while setting the right incentives.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at afernandes@worldbank.org and caroline.paunov@oecd.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Table 7. Household tobacco consumption and total expenditures, 2017

|Decile|Population|Household<br>size|Female<br>household<br>head, share of<br>households|Household<br>head age|Household<br>aggregate<br>consumption,<br>annual GEL<br>per capita|Household<br>aggregate<br>consumption,<br>annual USD<br>per capita|Smoker -<br>All<br>cigarettes,<br>percentage|Smoker -<br>Filtered<br>cigarettes,<br>percentage|Expenditure<br>in all<br>cigarettes,<br>annual GEL<br>per capita|Expenditure<br>in all<br>cigarettes,<br>annual USD<br>per capita|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|371,049|4.5|33.1|56.3|640.1|255.0|19.0|10.8|19.1|7.6|
|2|371,594|4.4|35.3|58.4|1,073.7|427.8|24.5|18.1|35.0|14.0|
|3|371,737|4.0|31.8|59.3|1,368.6|545.3|25.4|19.1|41.8|16.6|
|4|371,419|4.0|35.6|60.4|1,660.2|661.4|26.1|21.3|52.5|20.9|
|5|371,509|3.7|35.5|60.0|1,975.4|787.0|27.6|24.2|64.1|25.5|
|6|371,100|3.5|36.2|61.0|2,344.2|934.0|28.8|25.6|81.6|32.5|
|7|371,906|3.3|31.9|59.7|2,772.3|1104.5|29.9|25.9|89.9|35.8|
|8|371,362|3.2|33.1|59.3|3,339.8|1330.6|30.4|27.7|103.2|41.1|
|9|371,589|3.0|34.9|57.8|4,266.4|1699.7|27.7|25.5|107.3|42.7|
|10|371,558|2.5|39.5|55.9|7,896.6|3146.0|31.4|30.4|154.1|61.4|
|All|3,714,823|3.5|34.9|58.7|2,734.0|1089.2|27.6|23.7|74.9|29.8|

_Source:_ Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2017 and World Development Indicators (WDI).

_Notes:_ Deciles are created based on household per capita consumption, based on the ECAPOV harmonized aggregate by the World Bank. Households are classified as “smokers” if they report positive expenses in tobacco products. Exchange rate = 2.51 GEL/USD.

16
In exploring these issues, we are highlighting an important though somewhat ignored aspect of the trading system. In the European Union, for example, internal trade in motor vehicles has been hampered by an antitrust exemption for the distribution and servicing of automobiles. (See both Flam and Nordstr ̈om 1995, and Lutz 2004.) Access to the distribution system was also at the heart of a dispute between the United States and Japan involving Kodak and Fuji film (Nanto 1998). These issues also lurk behind the impact on trade of the retail distribution systems both in Switzerland and Japan, as well as the German experience with retailing cartels and the threat of foreign retail entry to established domestic players. With the elimination of trade barriers for textiles and clothing under the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005, the market power of such huge buyers as Wal-Mart may also be an important factor in the transmission of price and quantity changes across global textile and clothing markets. Finally, evidence is emerging that the benefits of non-reciprocal tariff preference schemes may be captured by high-income country importing firms, rather than the low-income country exporter firms for which the programs are intended. (See, for example, Olarreaga and Ozden 2005.<sup>1</sup> ) We proceed in this paper as follows. In Section 2 we develop a basic analytical model, involving a domestic distribution sector with market power. It sources both internationally and domestically. We work with this model to examine the impact of imperfect competition in services for the pattern of trade in goods. In Sections 3 and 4, we then examine the impact on gains from trade for both importers and exports. In Section 5, we work with data on competition in distribution and sales in several OECD countries, examining econometrically the issues highlighted in Sections 3 and 4. This involves modeling the interaction between import protection, competition, and the pattern of trade in the con-

> 1There is also a nascent literature focused on international aspects of competition policy, including Head and Ries (1997), Francois and Horn (2006), and Horn and Levinsohn (2001). However, this literature is not concerned with the interaction between market access and antitrust policy so much as with open economy aspects of merger policy and the beggar-thy-neighbor potential of antitrust.

2
**<u>Table 1 (Cont’d)</u>**

|Demographic<br>and Health<br>Surveys|Nationally<br>representative in<br>over 90<br>countries|Individuals|Questions<br>including in<br>larger survey|Woman age 15-49;<br>some countries<br>interview men of<br>similar age; Man of<br>similar age.|Land and housing|Reported|Asks if they<br>own any,<br>individually,<br>jointly, both,<br>or neither|No|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|World<br>Programme<br>for the<br>Census of<br>Agriculture|Nationally<br>representative in<br>many countries|Agricultural<br>holdings|Census<br>questionnaire|Holder|Land, livestock|Holder of land,<br>owner of livestock||No|
|LSMS-ISA|8 Countries in<br>Africa,<br>nationally<br>representative|Asset<br>With unique<br>individual ID<br>codes so can<br>assign<br>individual<br>ownership to<br>household<br>members||**Dwelling:**Most<br>knowledgeable<br>household member<br>**Agricultural Land:**<br>Manager for each plot<br>or holder<br>**Livestock:**<br>Manager for each<br>livestock type or most<br>knowledgeable<br>household member<br>**Non-Farm**<br>**Enterprises:**Manager<br>for each enterprise<br>**Consumer** **Durables:**<br>Most knowledgeable<br>household member|Dwelling,<br>Agricultural Land;<br>Livestock;<br>Non-Farm Enterprises;<br>Consumer Durables<br>(selected surveys).|Reported,<br>Documented (as<br>applicable)|Yes||
|Global<br>FINDEX|Nationally<br>representative of<br>140+ countries|Individuals|Individual level<br>survey|Sampled respondent|Financial assets|Ownership|Doesn’t<br>distinguish<br>between<br>individual<br>andjoint|No|

34
11. -

- -

on which valuations are based is unreliable, as property markets are driven underground by high transaction taxes and rent controls. Data on property ownership is inaccessible, either because ownership is disputed, or because deeds registries are unwilling or unable to cooperate with taxing authorities. The rapid growth of cities in developing countries exacerbates the difficulty of administering the property tax, as subdivisions and new construction must be constantly discovered and incorporated if the tax base is to reflect the physical growth of the city.

|3.6<br>Efforts to||
|---|---|
|improve property tax<br>|Table 1: PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS IN|
|administration<br>must be|DEVELOPING COUNTRIES|
|adapted<br>to<br>this|PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION|
|environment.<br>In||
|general, this argues|PROBLEMS<br>OPTIONS|
|for<br>sacrificing||
|precision for ease of<br>administration, and--|no maps<br>self declaration<br>street<br>lists, "tax mapping"|
|while<br>exploiting||
|opportunities<br>for|no market information<br>extrapolation,|
|coordination<br>with|construction<br>data,|
|title<br>offices<br>and|"valuation<br>commissions"|
|public<br>utilities--||
|confining the scope|no clear title<br>ad rem liability,<br>broad|
|and<br>standard<br>of|ad personam liability|
|information gathering||
|to the requirements of|rapid urban growth<br>cross referencing|
|the<br>property<br>tax||
|itself.|high inflation<br>indexation|

# A. Discovery and Identification

3.7 The objective of discovery is to find all the properties subject to taxation and obtain the information needed to impose the tax. Two basic approaches are used:

- (a) self-declaration- -where the taxpayer is induced to provide the information to the taxing authority; and

- (b) government inventory--where the taxing authority obtains the information in the field.

3.8 Under a self-declaration system, all taxpayers are legally required to periodically declare the property they own to the taxing authority. The virtue of this approach is that it is inexpensive. The taxpayer has to do all the discovery work (and part of the valuation) himself. But it is rarely successful. Self-declaration is workab<sup>1</sup> e only if the taxing authority is able to induce the cooperation of taxpayers, and this has proven difficult.
Although the Indian sugar market has been insulated from the world market by import and export controls, domestic prices have consistently been at or below the prevailing levels of domestic prices in the efficient exporting countries, and much lower than domestic prices in protected markets such as the US and the EU. Some inter-country comparisons of domestic prices for the years 1980, 1986 and 1992 are given in Data S2.

Figure 9: **Levy prices and free market prices for sugar, 1965 -94 (nominal Rs/quintal)** <!-- Start of picture text --> .1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7 E : 1<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source :Annex 5.**

**Note : In 1972 and 1978 there was no levy price. All sugar was sold on the free market.**

# _Trade policies_

Before 1994 sugar imports were controlled by import licensing. Scheduled import duties were extremely high, but if imports were allowed, either by STC or by private importers to whom licenses were issued, special tariff exemptions reduced the import duties, in some cases to zero. In any case, as with nearly all other Indian products before the 1991 reforms, the binding controls were the quantitative controls, not the tariffs. No change was made to this basic policy in 1991, but in March 1994 sugar imports were delicensed and tariffs were cut to zero. If maintained, this new policy will have a major impact on the industry and potentially on the world sugar market.

Before 1991 exports of sugar were canalized by STC. Mainly in order to maintain a presence in quota markets, sugar was frequently exported at a loss .To cover these losses, the Sugar Export Promotion Act of 1958 gave STC the power to administer a scheme under which the losses were shared by the sugar mills in proportion to their production. Exports were decanalized i.e. STC's export monopoly was abolished, as part of the 1991f92 reforms, but are still subject to the 1958 Act. Under this Act, the sole exporter of sugar is now an agency nominated by the government, the Indian Sugar Export Import Corporation (ISEIC), which is a 2 4