Table 12: Heterogeneous effects by migration duration. Estimating the effect of migrants’ legal status on hourly wages after return, conditional on return migration

||(1)<br>Migrate|(2)<br>Illegal|(3)<br>Return|(4a)<br>Log of<br>hourly<br>wage|(4b)<br>Log of<br>hourly<br>wage|(4c)<br>Log of<br>hourly<br>wage|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Age|0.012***|-0.074**|-0.015**|-0.046|0.055|-0.174*|
||(0.001)|(0.035)|(0.006)|(0.050)|(0.085)|(0.102)|
|Age squared|-0.000***|0.001*|0.000***|0.001|-0.001|0.002*|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|
|No education|0.019***|0.523***|-0.032|-0.567***|-0.186|-0.503*|
||(0.004)|(0.121)|(0.021)|(0.154)|(0.189)|(0.277)|
|Primary or preparatory|0.032***|0.482***|0.048**|-0.383***|-0.456**|-0.684**|
||(0.004)|(0.130)|(0.022)|(0.138)|(0.179)|(0.303)|
|Secondary|0.017***|0.418***|0.032*|-0.258**|0.013|-0.200|
||(0.003)|(0.107)|(0.017)|(0.119)|(0.136)|(0.179)|
|Rural|0.009***|0.255***|0.008|-0.088|0.026|-0.013|
||(0.003)|(0.086)|(0.015)|(0.085)|(0.117)|(0.163)|
|Oil prices|0.013***<br>(0.000)||||||
|Diplomatic exchange||-0.273***<br>(0.104)|||||
|Confict|||0.044***<br>(0.013)||||
|Illegal status||||0.079|-0.574*|-0.671*|
|||||(0.311)|(0.296)|(0.401)|
|Observations|14,879|1,955|2,071|357|199|161|
|Parental controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Decades of migration|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|No|No|
|Labor market controls|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Migration duration in years||||_≤_2|_≥_3 & _≤_5|_≥_6|

Predicted log of hourly wage (4a): Illegal mig.=1.613; Legal mig.=1.523 Predicted log of hourly wage (4b): Illegal mig.=1.306; Legal mig.=1.902 Predicted log of hourly wage <u>(4c):</u> Illegal mig.=1.183; Legal mig.=1.926 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1 _Notes_ : Equation 1 is the probability of temporary migration. Equation 2 is the probability of undocumented migration. Equation 3 is the probability of return migration. Equation 4 models the logarithm of hourly wages upon return. For identification of equation (1), we use the inflation adjusted historical oil prices (in US dollars). For identification of equation (2), we use the diplomatic exchange, which is the diplomatic representation of each country of destination of Egyptian migrants in Egypt at time of migration. It is a dummy variable equal zero if there is no evidence of diplomatic exchange and is equal one if there is evidence of diplomatic exchange at the level of charg ́e d’affaires, minister, ambassador or other. For identification of equation (3), we use the number of active armed conflicts that is both country and year specific from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP). Equations (4a), (4b) and (4c) estimate the effect of illegality on the logarithm of hourly wages, conditional on return migration. Three models are separately estimated, relying on the percentile distribution of migration duration. In equation (4a), we consider individuals who belong to the lowest 33rd percentile of the distribution (with two years of migration duration or less). In equation (4b), we consider individuals who belong to the middle 33rd percentile of the distribution (with 3 to 5 years of migration). In equation (4c), we consider individuals who belong to the highest 33rd percentile of the distribution (with 6 years of migration or more). The predicted logarithm of hourly wages for illegal migrants, and legal migrants in equations (4a) to (4c) are reported in the bottom of the table.

46