rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
increased vaccine take-up in Sub-Saharan Africa. With a renewed focus on creating a positive social norm around COVID-19 vaccination, messaging that leverages trusted and accessible information sources and channels, and more easily accessible vaccination sites at the community level, countries can speed up this process and successfully turn vaccines into vaccinations.

# **Bibliography**

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12
studies of individual countries. The results presented in this study indicate the effects on poverty in the absence of functioning schemes of this type.

In all of the analyses reported in this paper, we assume full transmission from world market prices to the prices facing producers and consumers, a finding supported by Mundlak and Larson (1992). The resulting poverty impacts will certainly be sensitive to this assumption. However, the nature of the impact will depend on the specific situation. In some countries, where many poor consumers are in areas strongly integrated with world markets, and net sellers are to some degree insulated, the impacts on poverty may be more adverse than under our assumption. By contrast, in other countries, consumers may be more insulated than producers, perhaps by consuming goods that are more strongly differentiated from imported goods, and the impacts on poverty may be more favorable than under our assumption. The extent and nature of price transmission should be taken into account when considering the actual impacts in particular countries.

We calculate the real income level after the change in food prices by adding the change in households’ real incomes their initial income levels in order to find their real incomes after the price changes. By comparing the new achievable level of expenditure with the established poverty-line level of expenditure for each country, we are able to use individual survey records to identify and count the number of households in poverty and the gap between their income level and the poverty line after the change in policy. We then cumulate these shocks to see the impact on poverty, and compare these impacts with those prevailing when wages are also able to adjust. Finally, we use these data to calculate two complementary poverty measures (Ravallion and van der Walle 1991)—the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. The first measures the percentage of people falling below the poverty line and the second the average percentage of the poverty line by which the incomes of the poor fall below the poverty line relative to the poverty line.

6
<!-- Start of picture text --> Policy llesearch<br>Counlry Operations<br>WPS 990<br><!-- End of picture text --> This paper-ajoint product of the Southem Africa Department and of the Industry and Energy Operations - Division, Middle East and North Africa Country Department I is part of a larger study of India's trade regime undertaken by the South Asia Country Department III. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Matenda, room J 1 1-217, extension 35055 (October 1992, 51 pages).

Effective protection rates in India are so high and vary so greatly that anything short of low uniform tariffs and the complete elimination of quantitative restrictions would not make the industrial incentive scheme transparent, as it needs to be.

Aksoy and Ettori produce evidence to show that there is ample scope for reducing tariffs and quantitative restrictions and that most industries could coexist with much less protection than they now have.

By eliminating all surcharges on inputs (tariffs on imported inputs, price differentials on local inputs, nondeductible excise taxes) - even without correcting for the effects of high investment costs - most projects (including importsubstitution projects) would earn from current intemational prices a positive profit margin on theirmarginal as well as full production costs.

The proportion of projects with a positive profit margin would triple, from 20 percent to 63 percent.

Among import-substituting projects that are not candidates for export under the present trade regime, under the proposed new regime half would be candidates for export if they would procure their inputs at intemational prices.

Lower tariffs would fulfill their primary purpose more effectively: providing protection and incentive signals. The function of generating public revenues, another critical issue in India, should be fulfilled not through tariffs but through more efficient and protection-neutral instruments - in particular, direct taxation (income tax) and nontariff indirect taxation (neutral excise taxes, MODVAT, and preferably the value-added tax on consumption).

T'hePolicy ResearchWorking Produced by Policy Research athe dis of workder way in ienBane Anrobjectiveof theseies is to get thtese findings out quickly, even if presentaions are less than fully polished. The fmdings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of ficial Bank policy.

Produced by the Policy Research Dissenmmation Center
Policy Research Working Paper 8903 Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity _Background Paper_ Methodology and Findings for the Exposure Analysis of the Chinese Wastewater Sector to Flooding and Earthquakes Hazards _Xi Hu Raghav Pant Conrad Zorn Weeho Lim Elco Koks Zhimin Mao_ Climate Change Group Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery June 2019
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<!-- Start of picture text --> Most disadvantaged Most advantaged<br>lo} fo}<br>oe) [oe}<br>67 66<br>60<br>lo}© fo}Oo<br>49 48<br>: 1 41<br>9 37 38 =) “<br>29<br>23<br>a 18 &<br>13<br>8<br>5<br>1 22<br>lo} QO 1-8 9-11 12+ QO 1-8 9-11 12+ O 1-8 9-11 12+ fo} O 1-8 9-11 12+ O 1-8 9-11 12+ O 1-8 9-11 12+<br>1988 1998 2006 1988 1998 2006<br>Most disadvantaged: born in rural lower or upper Egypt, uneducated parents, father in agriculture or<br>elementary occupation.<br>Most advantaged: born in Great Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, or Port Said, parents with secondary or college,<br>higher occupation father.<br><!-- End of picture text -->
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- Zarsky, L. (1999), “Havens, Halos and Spaghettis – Untangling the Evidence between Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment,” in: _Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment_ , OECD proceedings, Paris, 47-74.

36
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# R **eference:**

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18
parenting practices based on 24 items adapted from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC) (Zubrick et al. 2008). The primary caregiver of each child was asked a range of questions about their parenting practices that reflect different levels of warmth, consistency, and hostility. The resulting scores for parenting practices were standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

# <u>ECED Characteristics</u>

Lastly, our data also included ECED characteristics averaged at the village level. The Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale-Revised (ECERS-R) – a classroom assessment tool designed to measure the quality of early education through classroom observations – was applied to two ECED centers in each village (see Brinkman et al. 2016 for details of the ECERS-R in Indonesia). Similarly, our data included information on the average monthly fees of ECED services. We used the monthly mandatory fee charged by the services directly to the families, which ranged from zero (free) to 67,500 Indonesian rupiahs, with an average of 10,779 Indonesian rupiahs. Only 303 villages out of 310 were sampled for ECED characteristics; as a result, we have missing observations for ECED characteristics for children in these 7 excluded villages.

# **5. Differences in enrollment patterns and gaps in test scores**

Table 2 documents the various enrollment patterns observed in the data and how they vary between children of different backgrounds. 39.7 percent of the children from the bottom quintile report having no ECED at all. This is in contrast to 10.5 percent of children from the top wealth quintile. 7.6 percent of children from the bottom quintile report having attended playgroup and then kindergarten before primary school. By comparison 22.7 percent of the top quintile follow this enrollment pattern. Enrolling in kindergarten before primary school is much more common among the top quintile – 50.4 percent of this quintile does so – while only 28.3 percent of the bottom quintile does so.

As Table 3 documents, considerable disparities in test scores already exist in the early years of primary school between children who are socially disadvantaged compared to those who are less so – even among children living in poor villages in Indonesia. Children whose mothers had less than the mean years of education (7.7 years) scored between 0.372 standard deviations (in cognitive skills) to 0.404 standard deviations (in language) less than those whose mothers had more than the mean years of education. The test score gap is particularly striking between children 10
different sub-sectoral disaggregation considered. In fact, when we average KLEMS labor productivity and EBRD indexes for the 6 sub-sectors shown in Panel B to the level of the 3 sub-sectors in Panel A, the results provide broad evidence of a positive correlation between performance and progress in policy reform (see Appendix Figure C.1). This finding can be rationalized by the fact that a sub-sector may benefit from policy reform affecting closely related sub-sectors.

**_Figure 14: Policy Reform and Labor Productivity_**

**_Panel A. WIIW Labor Productivity_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Electricity, Gas & Water Transport & Telecommunications<br>80 4.5 50 4.0<br>70 4.0 45 3.5<br>6050 3.53.02.5 403530 3.02.5<br>40 25 2.0<br>3020 2.01.51.0 201510 1.51.0<br>10 0.5 5 0.5<br>0 0.0 0 0.0<br>Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004 Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004<br>Financial Intermediation<br>80 4.0<br>70 3.5<br>60 3.0<br>50 2.5<br>40 2.0<br>30 1.5<br>20 1.0<br>10 0.5<br>0 0.0<br>Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004<br>Panel B. KLEMS Labor Productivity<br>Electricity & Gas Water<br>80 4.5 70 4.0<br>70 4.0 60 3.5<br>60 3.5 50 3.0<br>5040 3.02.5 40 2.52.0<br>2.0 30<br>3020 1.51.0 20 1.51.0<br>10 0.5 10 0.5<br>0 0.0 0 0.0<br>Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004 Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004<br>Inland Transport Telecommunications<br>45 4.0 45 4.5<br>40 3.5 40 4.0<br>35 3.0 35 3.5<br>30 2.5 30 3.0<br>25 2.0 25 2.5<br>20 20 2.0<br>15 1.5 15 1.5<br>10 1.0 10 1.0<br>5 0.5 5 0.5<br>0 0.0 0 0.0<br>Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004 Labor Prod. 1997-2004 EBRD Index 1997-2004<br>Slovenia Czech Rep. Slovak Rep. Estonia Poland Lithuania Hungary<br>Czech Rep. Slovenia PolandSlovak Rep. Hungary Croatia Bulgaria Macedonia Romania Czech Rep.Slovak Rep. Slovenia Croatia HungaryMacedonia Romania Poland Bulgaria Ukraine<br>Slovak Rep. Slovenia Croatia HungaryCzech Rep.Macedonia Romania Bulgaria Ukraine Poland<br>Estonia Lithuania Slovenia Poland Czech Rep. Slovak Rep. Hungary<br>Poland Slovak Rep. Czech Rep. Slovenia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Estonia Slovenia Hungary Latvia Slovak Rep. Czech Rep. Poland Estonia Lithuania<br>Employee Index Employee Index<br>Thousands of PPP USD per Thousands of PPP USD per<br>Index<br>Employee<br>Thousands of PPP USD per<br>Employee Index Employee Index<br>Thousands of PPP Euros per Thousands of PPP Euros per<br>Employee Index Employee Index<br>Thousands of PPP Euros per Thousands of PPP Euros per<br><!-- End of picture text --> 31
|||**Table 5. Deter**|**mination of Dece**|**ntralization- Base**|**line Results**||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)<br>Whole Sample|(2)<br>CentralSOE|(3)<br>Province SOE|(4)<br>MunicipalSOE|(5)<br>Whole Sample|(6)<br>CentralSOE|(7)<br>Province SOE|(8)<br>MunicipalSOE|
|Distance(t-1)|0.0063***|0.0049**|0.0042***|0.0055***|||||
||(0.0008)|(0.0022)|(0.0007)|(0.0009)|||||
|Different City(t-1)|||||0.0272***|0.0187***|0.0147***|0.0444***|
||||||(0.0030)|(0.0047)|(0.0030)|(0.0092)|
|Firm asset(t-1)|-0.0024***|-0.0036***|-0.0020***|-0.0020***|-0.0025***|-0.0037***|-0.0021***|-0.0018***|
||(0.0007)|(0.0010)|(0.0005)|(0.0006)|(0.0007)|(0.0009)|(0.0005)|(0.0007)|
|ROS(t-1)|-0.0030***|-0.0020|-0.0032***|-0.0016|-0.0033***|-0.0023|-0.0034***|-0.0022**|
||(0.0012)|(0.0037)|(0.0010)|(0.0010)|(0.0012)|(0.0037)|(0.0010)|(0.0011)|
|Firm importance(t-1)|-0.0040*|0.0333|-0.0046|-0.0039*|-0.0045*|0.0330|-0.0048|-0.0044*|
||(0.0023)|(0.0321)|(0.0032)|(0.0024)|(0.0023)|(0.0325)|(0.0033)|(0.0024)|
|Fully state-owned(t-1)|-0.0055***|-0.0001|-0.0138***|-0.0015|-0.0061***|-0.0003|-0.0142***|-0.0017|
||(0.0018)|(0.0052)|(0.0035)|(0.0017)|(0.0018)|(0.0054)|(0.0035)|(0.0017)|
|GDP per capita(t-1)|0.0084|-0.0050|-0.0661**|0.0931**|0.0058|-0.0057|-0.0679**|0.0977**|
||(0.0056)|(0.0064)|(0.0300)|(0.0383)|(0.0050)|(0.0059)|(0.0295)|(0.0416)|
|State sector share(t-1)|0.0181|-0.0794**|0.1210***|0.0612|0.0155|-0.0811***|0.1256***|0.0631|
||(0.0344)|(0.0326)|(0.0360)|(0.0397)|(0.0300)|(0.0281)|(0.0363)|(0.0406)|
|Unemployment rate(t-1)|-0.0004|0.0030|0.0001|-0.0017|-0.0002|0.0020|-0.0000|-0.0022|
||(0.0017)|(0.0028)|(0.0034)|(0.0019)|(0.0020)|(0.0037)|(0.0033)|(0.0020)|
|Year dummies|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|Oversight government|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|YES|
|dummies|||||||||
|Observations|41,681|8,724|15,681|16,727|41,681|8,724|15,681|16,727|
|PseudoR-squared|0.120|0.0858|0.157|0.188|0.118|0.0854|0.156|0.186|

This table reports probit regression results on the determination of SOE decentralization. **Marginal effects** on the probability of decentralization that are evaluated at the mean and their standard errors are listed. All these firm-specific and province-specific variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the same oversight government.

*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

36