# Local elections in 2013 and 2016: How village politics evolved

The first VTA elections were held in 2013. The QSEM research period that followed showed clearly that the new law had reshaped local competition for power. There was VTA turnover in 44r percent of villages visited, while interviews with VTAs and VTA candidates across the QSEM panel indicated that the new elections process had encouraged increased political competition. In fact, a handful of tract elections caused local social tension as new leaders and old sought to gain or retain political power. Respondents perceived the competition to be spurred in part by the potential for private gain (QSEM, December 2013).

This level of electoral competition was, however, temporary. The sixth round of QSEM research following local elections in late 2015/early 2016 found a decline in competition for VTA positions. Less interest among incumbents in extending their terms resulted in a high rate of turnover (there was 75 percent turnover across the QSEM panel compared to 44 percent in the 2013 election). Few reports of local campaigning emerged, and unlike in 2013, no villages reported social tension emerging from the election result.

A number of factors account for this reduction in interest. Others have identified limitations in the administration of the VTA election process as constraining interest in the role (Kyed, 2016). The QSEM research indicates that the lack of interest, instead, reflects broader substantive changes in the tasks associated with being a VTA. First, as has been discussed above, the actual authority enjoyed by VTAs has not lived up to early expectations, and the autonomy of VTAs remains constrained by administrative authority of townships officials. Second, recent reforms have reduced the scope for VTAs to engage in cottage (or localized) authoritarianism. The ability of VTAs to force contributions from villagers has been banned (in practice it remains, but in a greatly reduced fashion), limiting the potential for personal enrichment. While social pressure to contribute to public goods projects (frequently organized by the VTA and sometimes benefitting them directly) and to local religious institutions remains strong, VTAs reported that they were less able to ‘make’ villagers contribute as in previous years. New sources of development assistance have reduced the controlling role of the VTA or sidelined them to advisory roles. Finally, during the most recent election, villagers and VTAs alike expressed uncertainty about the validity of the election process, assuming that the NLD would at least call new elections, or possibly reform local governance via new legislation. As one respondent in Magway Region commented “Why hasn’t the administrator transferred their tasks yet to someone from the newly elected party?” (QSEM, forthcoming).

All told, some movement toward accountability The 2015 research round showed that local governance institutions were being pushed to be more responsive to their communities. VTAs across the panel reported that they had been told in regular township meetings to better manage interactions with villagers. In particular, they were informed that the collection of fees from villagers to cover operational costs was no longer allowed.<sup>9</sup> Numerous examples have also been documented of VTAs being scolded by township officials in response to complaints made by community members. This accountability no doubt reflects changes in top-down policy in line with the previous government’s emphasis on peoplecentered development (Nixon 2014). The research, however, suggests that bottom-up 7