rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
induced improvement in the extent to which officials were perceived to be present to perform their duties. Although women did not share this positive assessment -in fact the contemporaneous impact on females is estimated to have been negative and significant- they did perceive positive reservation effects with a lag as evident from both panel 1 and panel 2. The positive and marginally significant coefficient on the second lag of reservation for the entire sample and for women specifically supports this, reinforcing the notion that the reservations can continue to have an impact long after administrative measures directly affect outcomes. One reason for lagged impacts could be that using information on officials‟ performance to hold them accountable through political processes requires skills which women who had not participated in political processes before might still need to acquire.

Regression results regarding the impact of reservation on the ease with which officials can be held to account support this interpretation. The three dimensions considered are (i) the ability to get concrete local public good problems fixed; (ii) the scope for holding local officials to account in a more abstract sense; and (iii) the transparency with which beneficiaries for programs sponsored by the central government are selected. Results in table 7 suggest that reservation significantly improves the ease with which local problems can get resolved by both males and females. The positive impact of reservation, in particular on females, persists in the post-reservation period; in fact some specifications estimate the impact on females‟ ability to ensure accountability to be significantly larger than for males. Similarly, while we find no concurrent effects on the ability to hold officials to account or to ensure transparent beneficiary selection, there is evidence of a significant lagged impacts (overall and for females) for both, reinforcing the notion that learning on how to best take advantage from the opportunities by the political system to make ones voice heard in a constructive way may be involved.

# **4.2 Political participation**

While there are many avenues for political participation, relevant legislation designed village assemblies ( _gram sabhas_ ) as key mechanism to ensure democratic deliberation and accountability at local level. The extent to which previously disadvantaged individuals -including women- participated in such meetings thus allows us a more direct test of the impact of reservation on voice and the ability to effectively articulate issues. Moreover, as individuals will continue to attend meetings only if they find that doing so is worth their while, attendance can also be interpreted as an indicator of the relevance ascribed to these meetings. Using member-level data on meeting attendance in the last four meetings in each village and, for those attending, the nature of participation points, suggests that reservation-induced effects vary markedly by respondents‟ gender (see table 8).

16
# **The Critical Mass Approach to Achieve a Deal on Green Goods and Services:**

**What Is on the Table? How Much to Expect?***

**Jaime de Melo**<sup>†</sup> **Mariana Vijil**<sup>‡</sup>

Keywords: Environmental Goods, Environmental Services, Doha Round, Tariff Reductions. JEL Categories: F18 and Q56 †FERDI. E-mail: Jaime.de_melo@ferdi.fr ‡ DG Treasury and FERDI. E-mail: mariana.vijil@dgtresor.gouv.fr

* This paper draws on and extends Melo and Vijil (2014) supported by the World Bank. Thanks to Gaëlle Balineau, Ian Gillson, Bernard Hoekman, Sebastien Miroudot, Aymeric Pontvianne, Jehan Sauvage, Gisèle Schmid and Ronald Steenblik for comments. Melo thanks FERDI for financial support. Any opinions are those of the authors and should not be attributed to their respective affiliations.
Gregorio Impavido

**<u>Table 10: Investment Limits by Type of Issuer for Technical Provisions</u>**

|**Investment type**|**Limit (in percent)**|
|---|---|
|(1) Federal government|100.0|
|(2) Banks or international financial bodies|18.0|
|(3) SINCAS|0.5|
|(4) Institutions different from those in (1), (2), and (3)|7.0|
|(5) Groups and institutions in the same economic sector (shares) 1/ 2/|10.0|
|(6) Financial institution (shares) 1/|5.0|
|(7) Stock and papers issued inter-related groups|18.0|
|(8)Foreign securities belongingto investment funds|1.0|
|(9) Securities registered in the SIC (_Sistema Internacional de_<br>_Cotizaciones_) oftheMexicanStock Exchange.|1.0|

**Notes** : 1/ Constitute standard risk for mutual insurance companies; 2/ For manufacturing, this limit can reach up to 20 percent. **Source** : RIRT and CNSF (2006b).

⎯ **Liquidity requirements** In order for investment portfolios to maintain an adequate degree of liquidity, companies must cover short term technical reserves with equivalent assets. The determination of these short term obligations is obtained by assigning a percentage short term requirement to each type of reserve and the total must be covered with investments with maturities of a year or less or equity shares classified as highly traded. The shares of reserves that have to be invested in liquid instruments used to be based on prudent limits that varied from 100 percent for the loss reserve to 6 percent for the NPR, the contingency and the special mathematical reserves. Starting with 2006, liquidity requirements must be calculated according to the calculation derived from the asset ⎯ matching analysis for the pensions.

In addition, liquidity requirements for life operation must be calculated for each type of life insurance policies issued by companies and more specifically taking into account the proportion of technical provisions generated from short term insurance policies relatively to the proportion of technical provisions generated from long term life insurance.

**Custody and investment administration** ⎯ All titles and securities referred in the regulations and issued in the country must be administered by credit institutions or securities firms, and must be kept in custody by depository institutions for securities.  In the case of investments in foreign currency operated outside the country, only Mexican Financial Entities or its subsidiaries may act as intermediaries which may use, as custodians, the authorized depositary entities in the applicable jurisdiction in the foreign country.

⎯ **Matching rules** Solvency Margin Rules ( _Reglas para el Capital Mínimo de Garantía de las Instituciones de Seguros_ ) were amended to include the matching of assets and liabilities for life insurance starting in January, 2006. For pension annuity companies these rules were established in 2000 and include duration, inflation and currency matching of liabilities and assets admitted in their representation. In general terms, for the annuity companies, obligations must be covered by assets same currency (indexed to the inflation) although there are specific exceptions:

- 16 -
Two additional sources of data are used. The tariff information does not capture the advalorem equivalents of quotas such as those on apparel exports under the MFA. We use information on whether an exporting country and MFA category defined by OTEXA faced a quota in the US market in 1992-2004 from Brambilla et al. (2010).<sup>17</sup> To analyze potential trade diversion effects from GSP LDC and AGOA, we use a new EU database that we constructed along similar lines as the US database, relying on Eurostat’s COMEXT trade flow data and on European Commission’s TARIC tariff data and WITS data for other countries’ imports.

# **4. Trade preferences in the US: GSP and AGOA**

The US has provided developing countries with preferential access to its markets through the GSP program since 1975.<sup>18</sup> Until 1997, for eligible LDCs, 3,507 out of 10,184 tariff lines (at HS 8-digit level) faced a preferential zero rate of duty, and another 3,131 faced an MFN zero rate of duty (see Panel A of Table 1). In 1997, the US GSP expanded the benefits for LDCs by allowing duty-free entry for an additional 1,670 tariff lines.<sup>19</sup> For Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries the US GSP program was supplemented by the AGOA non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement that entered into force in 2001. The number of SSA countries eligible for AGOA increased from 34 in 2001 to 49 in 2017.<sup>20</sup> Firstly, AGOA extended US GSP duty-free treatment for non-apparel products. It granted to non-LDCs duty-free access for 1,610 tariffs lines that were duty-free for LDCs under GSP LDC (see Panel A of Table

> 17 The quota information is available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm. The 3-digit MFA categories defined by OTEXA are mapped to 10-digit US HS codes using a concordance.

> 18 The Sub-Saharan African countries eligible for US GSP and for US GSP LDC in 1995-2017 are listed in Online Appendix A. To be eligible for US GSP, countries must _not_ be classified as “high income” by the World Bank. Eligibility for GSP LDC is determined by the United Nations based on three criteria: per capita gross national income, human assets, and economic vulnerability to external shocks (see http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/).

> 19 US GSP expired in January 2011 until its renewal by the US Congress in November 2011 retroactively (Hakobyan, 2020). 20 This very brief description of AGOA rules draws heavily on Chapter 1 in USITC (2014). The SSA countries eligible for AGOA and textiles and apparel provisions in 2001-2017 are listed in Online Appendix A. Some countries lost eligibility during the period (with some later regaining it) due to political violence, rule of law problems, and human rights abuses.

13
- 62 -

Nevertheless, by pursuing the multicriteria analysis<sup>introduced here, the road authority or</sup> decision maker could - on the basis of other<sup>criteria listed-choose from amongst a variety of</sup> congestion charging instruments.

Recommendations of Congestion Charging Mechanisms for Developing<sup>Countries</sup> 80. While the principles of road use charging enunciated<sup>here are applicable worldwide, the</sup> following guidelines are put forth with developing<sup>countries in mind:</sup>

**0** On the basis of benefit-cost calculations, the labor-intensive technology of supplementary licensing outranks the capital-intensivt **e** chnology of electronic road pricing via AVI and is especially suitable for those developing countries<sup>that have a pool of unemployed work</sup> force and limited gateways. (A fairly reliable<sup>guide to the appropriateness of</sup> implementing ALS in a particular city is the citizenry's<sup>adherence to general traffic</sup> regulations.) This charging instrument is definitely<sup>worth revisiting, with the proviso</sup> that improved alternative **s** uch as public transport<sup>and bypass routes be offered (as in</sup> the Singapore ALS).

3 Cordon pricing via standard manual tollbooths<sup>and unattended reserved lanes (as in</sup> Bergen) - supplemented by periodic videographs<sup>-may yet prove to be a worthwhile,</sup> labor-intensive technology to consider in developing<sup>countries.</sup>

* The lesson of using electronic toll collection<sup>as in the Oslo Toll Ring amply</sup> demonstrates that it is the peak/off-peak pdcing strategy,<sup>rather than the electronics per</sup> se, that is benefit enhancing (as opposed to being<sup>merely revenue enhancing).</sup>

* Electronic road pricing via AVI alone technology<sup>is a viable alternative for the newly</sup> industrializing economy whose standard of living<sup>is rising but whose rapid urbanization</sup> and motorization growth rates are a major problem.
Policy Research Working Paper 5731

# **Abstract**

Household surveys in Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were analyzed using a two-stage Heckman model to examine the factors influencing the decision to use liquefied petroleum gas (stage 1) and, among users, the quantity consumed per person (stage 2). In the first stage, liquefied petroleum gas selection in all six countries increased with household expenditure and the highest level of education attained by female and male household members. Electricity connection increased, and engagement in agriculture and increasing household size decreased, liquefied petroleum gas selection in five countries; urban residence increased selection in four countries; and rising firewood and kerosene prices increased selection in three countries each. In the second stage, the quantity of liquefied petroleum gas consumed increased with rising household expenditure and decreasing price of liquefied petroleum gas in every country. Urban residence increased and engagement in agriculture decreased liquefied petroleum gas consumption. Surveys in Albania, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, which did not report quantities, were also examined by calculating quantities using national average prices. Although fuel prices faced by individual households could not be tested, the findings largely supported those from the first six countries. Once the education levels of men and women were separately accounted for, the gender of the head of household was not statistically significant in most cases across the ten countries. Where it was significant (five equations), the sign of the coefficient was positive for men, possibly suggesting that female-headed households are burdened with unmeasured economic disadvantages, making less cash available for purchasing liquefied petroleum gas.

This paper is a product of the Oil, Gas, and Mining Unit, Sustainable Energy Department. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mkojima@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
<!-- Start of picture text --> GREATER THAN 80<br>65 - 80<br>50 - 65<br>35 - 50<br>LESS THAN 35<br>This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.<br>The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information NO DATA<br>APRIL 2014 GSDPM Map Design Unit shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> GREATER THAN 80<br>65 - 80<br>50 - 65<br>35 - 50<br>LESS THAN 35<br>NO DATA<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> IBRD 40869<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: Geographical distribution of crisis experience. Crisis experiences appear to be greater in North and South America and Western Europe. The full list of countries and their crisis experiences is documented in the annex.

that may be regarded as more resilient to financial crises were actually significantly more crisis-prone in the past (Germany and Greece, for instance, experienced the same number of crises between 1800 and 2005). In seeking to establish whether such accumulated experience matters, it is important to turn to a more systematic analysis, which is the goal of this paper.

# **3.2 The distribution of crisis experience across foreign banks**

Among banks, the distribution of crisis experiences suggests that the country-level distribution of crisis experiences roughly conforms with the distribution of crises at the bank level.<sup>5</sup> Kernel density estimates indicate that the distribution is broadly normal,<sup>6</sup> with the average bank owned by a prototypical country that experienced 72 financial crises (Figure 2). A slight majority of the banks—more than 60 percent—are domiciled in countries that experienced between 52 and 87 crises.

Two local maxima exist at the lower and upper ends of the distribution. These correspond, respectively, to banks from a mix of high income and developing economies that experienced a

> 5The discussion here is based on the effective sample of 365 foreign-owned banks across 77 developing (host) countries, and owned by entities established in 39 (home) countries.

> 6The kurtosis in the distribution is not significantly different from a normal, although it exhibits a mild right skew.

9
Since the decision to migrate is a function of the expected discounted life-time gain from migration, the di¤erence between pre and post-migration returns to experience determines the age at immigration. The fact that the return to post-migration experience exceeds the return to pre-migration experience may lead to a decrease in the probability to immigrate to the US as home country experience increases even if US returns to home country experience exceed home country returns. This would induce a positive correlation between �j and Xj and an upward bias of the return to home country experience estimated on the subsample of US immigrants.

US immigrants from a given country are on average younger than potential immigrants de...ned as home country residents who are between 15 and 64 years old. When arriving to the US, immigrants are on average 30 years old which compares to a mean age of 34 in the potential immigrant population.<sup>28</sup> US immigrants from all countries in the sample, with the exception of South Korea and South Africa, are younger at arrival then the potential immigrant population in the home country. Cross-country variation in mean age at arrival for immigrants is substantial, ranging from 26 year for Mexico and Saudi Arabia to 34 year for South Korea.

The probability to migrate for immigrants who completed their education in the home country is hump-shaped with respect to age. Constructing migration rates conditional on age and male gender for eleven ...ve-year age brackets reveals that for 67 out of 81 countries in the sample on migration rates the probability to migrate is highest for immigrants who are between 25 and 29 years old.<sup>29</sup> Immigrants proceeding from Bahamas, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, Sierra Leone and Saudi Arabia are most likely to immigrate between the age of 20 and 24. For immigrants from Sri Lanka, Bulgaria and Poland the probability to migrate is highest when they are between 30 and 34 years old. The cross-country di¤erence in the age that maximizes the probability to migrate may re‡ect di¤erences in the level of education across immigrant groups. The average Bulgarian and Sri Lankan immigrant, for example, is far more educated then the average US immigrant, while immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Puerto Rico and Yemen fall within the

> 28 Data on population within given age brackets is taken from the International Data Base of the US Census.

> 29 These migration rates are constructed by estimating the number of immigrants at di¤erent age brackets living in the United States based on data of the 1980 and 1990 Census. By combining these estimates with data on the population within the same age bracket. Data on the population within age brackets is taken from World Development Indicators of the World Bank.

21
_COTE D’IVOIRE: Volatility, Shocks and Growth_

# **5. CONCLUSIONS**

We set out to investigate sources of volatility that affect growth in Cote d’Ivoire. We have found evidence in support of the following results:

- GDP per worker, trade indices, and cocoa time series all share common cyclical patterns in Cote d’Ivoire.

- Two transition points define eras in Cote d’Ivoire’s economic history: `o` A little-recognized cocoa-related break-point in 1976 and

- The well-understood devaluation-related break in 1994

- Cote d’Ivoire has developed strong market power in cocoa, and the cocoa pricequantity relationship experienced a shift in 1976.

- World prices generally (TOT), real exchange rates, and cocoa prices specifically are a source of significant volatility to Cote d’Ivoire’s economy with major impact on growth.

- Given the underlying macroeconomic dynamics, the downward trend in perworker growth can be expected to continue in the immediate years ahead unless there is radical and immediate improvement in the political and security environment and economic management that could reverse the downward spiral.
24 Hoekman, B., F. Ng, and M. Olarreaga (2004), ‘Agricultural Tariffs versus Subsidies: What’s More Important for Developing Countries?’, _World Bank Economic Review_ 18(2): 175–204.

- Irwin, D. (2008), ‘Trade Restrictiveness and Deadweight Losses from U.S. Tariffs, 1859-1961’, NBER Working Paper No. W13450, Cambridge MA.

- Kee, H.L., A. Nicita and M. Olearraga (2009), “Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indexes”, _Economic Journal_ 119(534): 172-99, January _._

Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff and A. Valdes (1988). ‘Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries: Measuring the Effect of Sectoral and Economy-wide Policies’, _World Bank Economic Review_ 2(3): 255–72, September.

Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff and A. Valdes (1991), _The Political Economy of_

- _Agricultural Pricing Policy_ , Vol. 1: Latin America, Vol. 2: Asia and Vol. 3: Africa and the Mediterranean, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.

Lloyd, P.J., J.L. Croser and K. Anderson (2010), ‘Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets: New Indicators of Trade and Welfare Impacts, 1960 to 2007’, _Review of Development Economics_ 14(2), May (forthcoming).

- Narayanan, G., and T.L. Walmsley (eds.) (2008), _Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 7 Data Base,_ West Lafayette IN: Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, <u>http://www.gtap.org</u>

- OECD (2005), _Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation_ , Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

- OECD (2009), _Agricultural Policies in Emerging Economies: Monitoring and Evaluation_ , Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, March.

- Orden, D., F. Cheng, H. Nguyen, U. Grote, M. Thomas, K. Mullen and D. Sun (2007), _Agricultural Producer Support Estimates for Developing Countries: Measurement Issues and Evidence from India, Indonesia, China and Vietnam_ , IFPRI Research Report 152, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.