rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **_Global Value Chains in the Electronics Industry                       Sturgeon and Kawakami_**

Sturgeon, Timothy, JohannesVan Biesebroeck, and Gary Gereffi. 2008. “Value Chains,

- Networks, and Clusters: Reframing the Global Automotive Industry.” _Journal of Economic Geography_ 8: 297–321.

- Sutherland, Dylan. 2003. _China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialization._ London: Routledge Curzon.

- Tatsumoto, Hirofum, Koichi Ogawa, and Takahiro Fujimoto. 2010. “The Effects of Technological Platforms on the International Division of Labor: A Case Study of Intel’s Platform Business in the PC Industry” In _Platforms, Markets and Innovation_ , ed. Annabelle Gawer, 345–67. UK: Edward Elgar.

- Teece, David. 2009. _Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: Organizing for Innovation and Growth_ . New York: Oxford University Press.

- Ulrich, K. 1995. “The Role of Product Architecture in the Manufacturing Firm.” _Research Policy_ 24: 419–40.

Vance, Ashlee. 2009. “Acer’s Everywhere. How Did That Happen?” _New York Times,_ June 28.

Vind, I., and N. Fold. 2007. “Multi-level Modularity vs. Hierarchy: Global Production Networks in Singapore’s Electronics Industry.” _Danish Journal of Geography_ 107 (1): 69–83.

- Weiss, Linda, and John Hobson. 1995. _States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis_ . Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

- Whittaker, D. H., T. Zhu, T. Sturgeon, M. H. Tsai, and T. Okita. Forthcoming. “Compressed Development.” _Studies in Comparative International Development_ .

Yeung, Henry Wai-chung. 2009. “Regional Development and the Competitive Dynamics of Global Production Networks: An East Asian Perspective.” _Regional Studies_ 43 (3) (April): 325–51.

51
within-firm estimates. This means that they control for both time-invariant individual- and firm-specific effects, thus accounting for a systematic sorting of individuals across firms. Once they do so, the small foreign ownership premium found in less demanding specifications becomes negative and equal to -2 percent. In their data, foreign ownership is defined as the majority (more than 50 percent) of a firm’s votes being foreign owned. This means that in the analysis, a change from foreign ownership of 49 percent to more than 50 percent would be defined as a foreign acquisition. Presumably, we would not expect to see large wage effects of such an ownership change, which would suggest that their findings should be treated as a lower bound.

Almeida (2007) considers matched employer-employee data from Portugal from the 1990s and uses a conventional cut-off of 10 percent to define foreign ownership. Unfortunately, due to the poor quality of worker identifiers, she is unable to control for unobservable worker heterogeneity. However, she is able to keep the composition of the workforce fixed before and after the acquisition and to examine the evolution of the average wage at the firm level. When she considers only manufacturing firms, she finds that following foreign acquisition, average wages increase by 2.2 percent for low-educated workers (with no more than nine years of schooling) and by 4.3 percent for highly educated workers (with more than nine years of schooling). In both cases, these changes are expressed relative to the average wages paid by domestic firms in the same time period. Almeida 6
# **Appendix Table 6: The Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Business Revenues by Age**

|||**Group**|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|VARIABLES|(1)<br>Overall|(2)<br>Age 15-29<br>Endow.|(3)<br>Coeff.|(4)<br>Overall|(5)<br>Age 30-64<br>Endow.|(6)<br>Coeff.|
|Male|11.717***|||11.878***|||
||(0.208)|||(0.119)|||
|Female|10.672***|||10.995***|||
||(0.122)|||(0.068)|||
|Raw Difference|1.045***|||0.883***|||
||(0.241)|||(0.137)|||
|Difference due to|0.001|||0.668***|||
|Endowments|(0.432)|||(0.186)|||
|Difference due to|1.044**|||0.215|||
|Coefficients|(0.512)|||(0.234)|||
|Individual Lives in Urban||0.007|-0.190||-0.001|-0.168*|
|Area Dummy||(0.020)|(0.176)||(0.008)|(0.100)|
|Individual Age||0.086|-26.923||-0.002|2.069|
|||(0.186)|(17.916)||(0.009)|(4.894)|
|Individual Age Squared||-0.075|13.366||-0.000|-0.430|
|||(0.194)|(9.801)||(0.004)|(2.359)|
|Number of Adults in HH||-0.051|0.007||-0.002|-0.209|
|||(0.032)|(0.465)||(0.006)|(0.212)|
|Number of Children Aged 0-5||-0.015|0.293||-0.036|0.277*|
|In HH||(0.059)|(0.245)||(0.030)|(0.153)|
|Individual owns a Financial||0.113|0.479*||0.265***|0.128|
|Account||(0.075)|(0.246)||(0.046)|(0.107)|
|Individual is Married||-0.030|1.035**||0.006|0.468|
|||(0.073)|(0.469)||(0.026)|(0.475)|
|Individual is Divorced/Married||-0.001|0.003||-0.019|0.030|
|/Separated||(0.007)|(0.012)||(0.031)|(0.047)|
|Individual Completed||0.033|0.094**||-0.019|-0.042|
|Secondary Schooling||(0.033)|(0.038)||(0.023)|(0.037)|
|Individual has a Vehicle||-0.071|0.532||0.077*|-0.191|
|(bicycle, motorcycle, car)||(0.077)|(0.397)||(0.045)|(0.257)|
|Business has Electricity||0.045|0.027||0.105***|0.051**|
|||(0.027)|(0.040)||(0.030)|(0.022)|
|Business has Running Water||-0.003|0.001||-0.000|0.001|
|||(0.027)|(0.013)||(0.027)|(0.027)|
|Business has a Phone||0.108**|-0.823||0.024|-0.084|
|||(0.051)|(0.601)||(0.020)|(0.477)|
|Business Maintains||0.016|-0.037*||-0.003|0.030|
|Accounting Records||(0.020)|(0.020)||(0.055)|(0.022)|
|Business is registered||0.003|0.023||-0.045|-0.073*|

48
# **How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the Recent Crisis**

Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Min Zhu<sup>1</sup> _JEL Classifications:_ G21, G28 _Keywords_ : Bank risk, systemic risk, deposit insurance.

> 1 Anginer, World Bank, danginer@worldbank.org; Demirguc-Kunt, World Bank,  ademirguckunt@worldbank.org; Zhu, World Bank, mzhu1@worldbank.org. This paper’s findings, interpretations and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, their Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
**Table 3: Technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores (2005-2006 average)**

|**Country**|**Airport**|**TE-CRS**|**TE-VRS**|**SE**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||**AEP**|0.612|0.998|0.614|
|**Argentina**|**EZE**|0.414|0.417|0.993|
||**FTE**|0.115|1.000|0.115|
||**BSB**|0.498|0.536|0.931|
||**CGH**|1.000|1.000|1.000|
|**Brazil**|**GIG**|0.318|0.320|0.994|
||**GRU**|0.677|0.678|0.998|
||**MAO**|0.377|0.692|0.544|
||**VCP**|1.000|1.000|1.000|
|**Chile**|**SCL**|0.786|1.000|0.786|
|**Colombia**|**BAQ**|0.329|0.524|0.628|
||**CLO**|0.496|0.734|0.676|
|**Costa Rica**|**SJO**|0.594|0.983|0.605|
|**Ecuador**|**GYE**|0.472|0.646|0.739|
|**El Salvador**|**SAL**|0.114|0.127|0.900|
||**CUN**|0.860|1.000|0.860|
|**Mexico**|**GDL**|0.643|0.649|0.991|
||**MEX**|0.961|0.963|0.998|
||**MTY**|0.403|0.410|0.982|
|**Panama**|**PTY**|0.164|0.178|0.926|
|**Peru**|**LIM**|0.621|0.961|0.646|
|**Dominican Rep.**|**SDQ**|0.260|0.372|0.699|
|**ALL**||0.532|0.690|0.801|

The use of DEA allows the identification of peers for each airport, which are the set of efficient airports that make up the relevant frontier for a given airport. Table 4 presents the peers for LAC airports in 2005 under the VRS model. Observations for peers corresponding to 2006 are in brackets and airport peers from the LAC region appear underlined. It should be noted that, by construction, technically efficient airports do not have other airport as peers. Technical inefficient airports have, on the contrary, a benchmark composed by other units. Given the 3- output 3-inputs dimensionality of the production setting, the maximum number of peers is 6 but an airport can have less than 6 peers.

10
regions. Sizable additional outlays on human capital investment could alleviate poverty and increase the productive potential of millions of citizens (Estache and Garsous 2012; Romer 2016).

# 9.4 Regional policy priorities

With limited fiscal space in the region, meeting investment needs will be challenging. It will require reforms that reduce longstanding obstacles to the growth of productivity and investment, and more efficient spending. A targeted, multi-pronged, policy strategy is needed that encourages investment by increasing returns on capital, and by expanding sources of financing (Henckel and Mckibbin, 2017; Nataraj 2007).

Public investment promoting private investment. Under the right conditions, public investment can crowd-in private investment (World Bank 2016c).<sup>13</sup> For example, private firms may be able to reap the benefits of scale if public infrastructure facilitates market access (Calderón, Moral-Benitob, and Servéna 2010). Literature on India appears to suggest a positive crowding-in effect (Bahal, Raissi, and Tulin 2015; Jesintha and Sathanapriya 2011; World Bank 2006).

Efficiency of public investment. On average, countries lose about one-third of public investment expenditures through inefficiencies, and the rate is highest among Asian economies (Baum, Mogues, and Verdier 2020). One way to boost the efficiency of public investment would be to reform weak public investment management practices (Vu, Bizimana, and Nozaki 2020). Reforms could include improving project appraisal (with better technical, economic, and financial analysis), improving project selection (by centralizing project review and increasing transparency), improving maintenance funding throughout the project’s life, and creating up-to-date and efficient registries to monitor public assets.

Financing. Financing for public and private investment can be expanded in several ways to help meet investment needs (ADB 2009, 2012, 2022; Andres, Biller, and Dappe 2014; Dobbs et al. 2013). First, public-private partnerships may offer gains in efficiency and cost-effectiveness (for example, by limiting the increase in public debt), raise economic growth, and at the same time alleviate fiscal pressures (Anadon and Surana 2015; Bizimana et al. 2021; Lee et al. 2018; Nataraj 2007). Such partnerships can draw private funding and expertise into socially desirable projects that would not be undertaken by the private sector alone because of low private rates of return; the provision of water services and sanitation projects are good examples. Between 2010 and 2021, one-fifth of EMDE infrastructure projects with private participation were in South Asia.

Second, domestic savings can be better mobilized both by improving access to the financial system (for example, encouraging pension funds) and by broadening and raising government revenue collection. Goods and services taxes implemented in India in 2017,

> 13 Public investment could also lead to crowding-out of private investment, for example in Pakistan (World Bank 2016e).
**_<u>________________________________________________________</u>_**

meta-information, documentation and related datasets. DDP is developed and maintained by the Development Data Group (DECDG) and its partners.

The internal database system for the World Bank contains 40 databases from the Bank and other international institutions (IMF, FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of The UN), UN, ITU, IEA etc.). The time series component of DDP provides access to databases from the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, and other international organizations which gather and disseminate international statistics.

The World Bank's central database, GDF & WDI Central combines over 900 key annual indicators taken from many of the other databases and includes the officially published crosscountry comparable data from World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF).

World Bank regional databases contain data directly from country management units in the Bank's six regions. These data are intended for country-focused analysis and may differ from officially published data. Other World Bank databases include those from specialized units across the Bank. Infrastructure data (compiled from various sources) can give an indication of the infrastructure network in many countries, and explain costs of domestic transport. (See <u>Annex H for details)</u> DDP Microdata, developed and maintained by the Development Data Group (DECDG), is a federated repository of survey data and documentation, providing authorized users with access to unit record-level datasets. The catalog is maintained through collaborative efforts by several depositors and holds information on household, investment climate, service delivery and client feedback surveys. A web-based tool allows users to perform online analysis on selected datasets.

# _<u>Best Practices Database</u>_

Over 2,150 award-winning solutions to common social, economic and environmental problems in over 140 developing and developed countries. Searchable by country, scale (global, national, regional, village, etc.) and by subject category. Best Practices is a joint product of UNHABITAT and The Together Foundation and is supported in part by the Dubai Municipality, the Best Practices Partners, and the Government of UK. Coverage: 1996 - present.

# _<u>Creditor Reporting System (CRS)</u>_

Contains data on Official Development Assistance (ODA), Official Aid (OA) and other lending to developing countries and countries in transition. Data are collected from the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, the World Bank, and the regional financial institutions. The system is sponsored jointly by the OECD and the World Bank and operated by the OECD.

# _<u>DAC Online</u>_

These statistics, collected annually from the Members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, measure the flows of aid and other financial resources to aid recipients (developing 38 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________
elevate the credit status of their issues and access the Afores funds. Figure 3 shows the nearly MX$ 100 billion of market issuance from 2001-June 2003, broken down by credit rating, and illustrates how the market is heavily biased toward highly rated debt. Corporate debt represents a 11% share of the Afores portfolios (higher than Chile AFP’s holdings of 6%), though concentration is high; 55% of this amount was invested in securities of only six companies.<sup>6</sup>

# **Figure 3:  Fixed Income Issuance Activity by Rating, Chile,  2001-2003**

<!-- Start of picture text --> AA<br>31.6%<br>A<br><= BBB<br>5.8%<br>1.7%<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> AAA<br>61.0%<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:  Bancomer**

Mutual funds also represent a significant source of investable funds, with about MX$370.5 billion under management in December 2003. About 10% of these funds are invested in private paper, but most tends to be short term (such as commercial paper). There are no rating restrictions placed on mutual funds, but in practice these funds tend to mimic the holdings of the pension funds, at least as far as corporate names are concerned.

# **B.  Costs of Issuance for Mexican Firms**

Table 4 shows the costs a typical Mexican firm faces when issuing a plain vanilla bond, in pesos. Investment banking fees typically fall below 1% of the face value in these type of deals; for large sizes (near US$400 million) fees drop to around 0.4%. One reason behind these low fees is due to the low placement fees as a result of the investor structure of the Mexican market, as discussed above. Investment bankers do not have to search across many investors to place a highly rated deal; phone calls to a few of the twelve Afores can likely place the entire issue. However, for deals that are not highly rated, issuing companies often seek the securitization route, and thus incur structuring costs up to another 1.5% of the issue size. Companies who have lower ratings and do not

> 6 These companies are Cemex, America Movil, Telmex, Bimbo, Coca-Cola Femse, and Televisa.

12
A high opportunity cost of lending may in some cases be the most important hindrance to the broadening of access to credit to the private sector. It may reflect doubts about fiscal solvency and a history of asset confiscation or inflation volatility, and will be often associated with high financial crowding out—i.e., the absorption by the government of a large share of society’s financial savings. Under such circumstances, the appropriate policies to foster access to credit would be those that aim at enhancing the resiliency of fiscal solvency and at establishing a credible record of low and stable inflation.

A shallow credit market with low access may also result from major shortfalls in the contractual and informational frameworks.<sup>49</sup> The appropriate policies in this case would span a wide range: from titling of land property to the upgrading of laws affecting collateral repossession or execution of guarantees; from the modernization of corporate reorganization and bankruptcy proceedings to improvements in the functioning of the judiciary; from raising accounting and disclosure standards to establishing the appropriate legal framework and right incentives for the development of debtor information systems. Improvements in the contractual and informational environment facilitate the expansion of arm’s-length financing: equity and debt contracts that are more impersonal in nature and that, therefore, rely more on transparency and enforcement rules of general application.

A final class of market-developing policies aims at raising the possibilities frontier by widening the scope for idiosyncratic risk diversification and thus, essentially, completing markets. To a significant extent, policies in this category coincide with those that aim at

> 49 There is considerable empirical evidence showing the adverse effects of a weak contractual and informational environment on credit depth and access. See Beck and Levine (2005) for an overview and IDB (2005) for an extensive survey of issues regarding creditor rights and debtor information systems in Latin America, providing ample evidence of the adverse role of poor creditor rights systems on credit depth, volatility, and access.  There is also considerable empirical evidence showing that smaller, younger and more opaque firms are more financially constrained in economies with less developed financial and legal institutions and with less effective systems of credit information sharing (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic, 2006; Love and Mylenko, 2003).

42
In Pakistan, political instability and feudal interests have contributed to setting aside constitutional dictums and introducing a system of centralized governance. Pakistan has been under military rule for a major part of its existence and military mind set does not accommodate decentralized decision making. During the periods, political activities were permitted, feudal influences dominated the political system and these influences favored either a centralization or provincialization of authority. This is because, while Pakistan has experienced heightened urbanization in recent years with over forty percent of the total population as urbanized, electoral system still recognizes 1981 basis of population distribution (17% urban)<sup>2</sup> . In rural areas of Sind and Balochistan, and to a more limited extent in rural areas of Punjab and NWFP provinces, feudal lords do not allow effective political participation. The use of antiquated basis of population allows feudal lords to dominate politics at the federal and provincial levels. A centralized system allows these lords to have greater effective control than would be possible under a decentralized system where the urban sector would have a more significant voice. To further entrench feudal lords, under the leadership of the former Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto in 1994, local governments were disbanded in all metropolitan areas and not restored even when in 1996 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found this practice to be in contravention of the law. Grants to members of national and provincial legislatures for development projects as practiced until 1997, may have worked against the development of local governments as these members enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in project execution in the absence of a well functioning system of local government.

# _Bureaucratic Factors_

Many countries in Africa and Asia share a common colonial heritage. The British Dutch and French colonial systems instituted a system of bureaucratic control to achieve with maximum efficiency colonial objectives of a predatory state. The system created a core of civil service elite which was highly educated and highly dedicated to serving the colonial rulers. Their loyalty to rulers and detachment from the common man was duly rewarded by allowing them preferential access to all public services through elite institutions and by ensuring them financial security through a system of cash rewards and land grants. Thus colonized countries such as 2 The population census scheduled for 199 1 was finally held in 1998.

10
under a warm-glow assumption: The lower bound of the base payment is obtained by rearranging _DICCs_<sup>_WG_</sup> : _p ≥ c_ ( _qt_ ) _−gsqt−c_ ( _<u>qδ</u>_ <u>)+</u> _gsq_ <u>+</u> _<u>u</u>_ _~~−~~ b_ ( _q_ ) + _c_ ( _<u>q</u>_ <u>)</u> _− gsq_ . Because the buyer only pays as much as necessary to ensure seller participation, the _IRSs_<sup>_WG_</sup> binds and rearranging for _p_ it becomes: _p_ = _c_ ( _q_ ) + _<u>u</u> − gsqt − b_ ( _q_ ). Now substituting one in the other, the structure of the optimal contract is identical to that given in the next Proposition.

**Proposition 11.** _The optimal REDD contract, ⟨p_<sup>_∗_</sup> _, b_<sup>_∗_</sup> ( _q_<sup>_∗_</sup> ) _⟩, when the buyer and the seller have warm glow preferences, implements conservation of the forest land_ _<u>q</u> if δ ≥ δ_<sup>_WG_</sup> _and satisfies IRSs_<sup>_WG_</sup> _, IRSb_<sup>_WG_</sup> _, DICCs_<sup>_WG_</sup> _and DICCb_<sup>_WG_</sup> _. The contract is characterized by:_

Proposition 11 presents the total payment and payment structure under warm-glow preferences. The payment is independent of the buyer’s warm glow coefficient, _gb_ , but it relates inversely to the seller’s warm glow coefficient, _gs_ . The larger the carbon sink maintained, the lower the payment the seller accepts to participate and cooperate. This happens because the warm glow that the seller receives from an additional unit of carbon sequestered compensates the loss in utility she gets from a lower payment. By the same token, the more satisfaction a unit carbon sink gives the seller the lower the payment per unit of carbon she accepts as it compensates for the lower payment with warm glow.

From the first order conditions we get _V_<sup>_′_</sup> ( _q_ ) + _gb_ = _c_<sup>_′_</sup> ( _q_ ) _− gs_ and by assumption we know that _V_<sup>_′_</sup> ( _._ ) _> c_<sup>_′_</sup> ( _._ ) _∀ q ∈ Q_ , therefore, the highest level of forest conservation is always achieved in the presence of warm glow. Furthermore, parties cooperate if _<u>δ</u> ≥_ _<u>δWG</u>_ , and they 28