rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
that a reshuffling of resources and output to the more efficient producers was largely responsible for aggregate productivity growth in Chile following trade liberalization. She concludes that “barriers to plant turnover are important determinants of the success of trade liberalization.” In a survey of studies of transition economies, Djankov and Murrell (2003) find that productivity is enhanced by import competition in Eastern European countries, but is in general reduced by import competition in the former Soviet Union—where business regulations tend to be more burdensome. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that trade promotes growth only in the presence of benign regulation on factor movements.

In sum, these results imply that cross-country studies of trade and growth will suffer a bias since they do not control for the regulatory regime. This paper provides a remedy by allowing the elasticity of trade to growth to be different in highly regulated economies. Most importantly, this allows us to determine whether the regulatory environment matters for trade to have positive effects on growth.

# **III.  Data**

The dependent variable is income. We use the level and average growth of real per capita income at PPP. For the levels regressions, per capita income is measured as the log-level of per capita GDP at constant 1996 dollars in PPP terms for the year 2000, from the Summers-Heston dataset version 6.1. For the growth regressions we use average growth in real income during the 1990s, from the same dataset. It is standard practice to use PPP-adjusted GDP because it more accurately captures the standard of living across different countries, and is not subject to large reorderings in rank as a result of exchange rate fluctuations.

6
Table A6: Relationship between management and energy intensity (value), by country income group.

||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||High|Upper Middle|Lower Middle|High|Upper Middle|Lower Middle|
|General|-0.442<sup>_∗_</sup>|-0.389|-1.563<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.339|0.229|-1.238<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
||(0.239)|(0.263)|(0.588)|(0.235)|(0.261)|(0.579)|
|No. Employees||||0.822<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.052<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.533<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|||||(0.224)|(0.173)|(0.298)|
|Log(Sales)||||-1.168<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-1.727<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-1.710<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|||||(0.194)|(0.145)|(0.185)|
|3-digit sector|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Age|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Country|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Observations|2013|2664|1394|2012|2656|1393|
|Adjusted _R_<sup>2</sup>|0.266|0.234|0.135|0.302|0.306|0.208|
|df<br>m|85|89|73|87|91|75|

Standard errors in parentheses Capital, labor, and output enter in logs. _∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 1, _p <_ 0 _._ 05, _p <_ 0 _._ 01

**48**
# **A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement**

## <u>Abstract</u>

We examine the theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to securities laws and their enforcement by regulators and courts to establish what is known and what is yet unclear. Recent empirical research in the field has established that law matters. Mandatory disclosure requirements, insider trading laws, safeguards against self dealing transactions, adequate regulatory powers and simple laws that are easily enforced aid in the development of capital markets. The debate is now focused on identifying which components of securities laws matter most and on what the optimal regulatory framework for each country should be. Although public enforcement of securities laws is important, I find that the largest impact comes from aspects of the law that facilitate private enforcement. This means that the development of capital markets depends crucially on the creation of laws that facilitate enforcement and the improvement of court procedures that allow for a more efficient dispute resolution.

2
# **Can Effective Policy Implementation Alter Political Selection? Evidence from Female Legislators in India**<sup>∗</sup>

S Anukriti Rossella Calvi Abhishek Chakravarty The World Bank<sup>†</sup> Rice University<sup>‡</sup> University of Manchester<sup>§</sup>

**Keywords:** DPEP; Political Selection; India; Leader Competence; Female Leaders; Gender

**JEL Codes:** J16, I24, O12

> ∗We thank Samson Alva, Adam Auerbach, Britta Augsburg, James Banks, Anne Brockmeyer, Caitlin Brown, Michael Callen, Claudio Ferraz, Rachel Griffith, Sonya Krutikova, Stephen O’Connell, Imran Rasul, and seminar and conference participants at Ashoka University, Indian Institute of Management (Bangalore), Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi), Institute of Fiscal Studies, Krea University, NEUDC, Paris School of Economics, and University of Manchester for their comments. All remaining errors are our own. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

> †Development Research Group and IZA. `sanukriti@worldbank.org` .

> ‡Department of Economics. `rossella.calvi@rice.edu.`

> §Department of Economics. `abhishek.chakravarty@manchester.co.uk.`
# **DO MANAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS LAST?**

# **EVIDENCE FROM INDIA**

**Nicholas Bloom**<sup>**a**</sup> **, Aprajit Mahajan**<sup>**b**</sup> **, David McKenzie**<sup>**c**</sup> **and John Roberts**<sup>**d**</sup>

<u>JEL No. L2, M2, O14, O32, O33.</u> <u>Keywords: management, organization, productivity, and India.</u> <u>Acknowledgements: Financial support was provided by SEED at the Graduate School of</u> Business at Stanford, by the Stanford Center for Poverty and Development, and by the World Bank under the Strategic Research Program (SRP). This research would not have been possible without the consulting team of Saurabh Bhatnagar, Shaleen Chavda, Rahul Dsouza, Sumit Kumar, and Ashutosh Tyagi. We thanks our formal discussant Rebecca Henderson, Larry Katz and seminar participants at Duke, IGC, Maryland, NBER, Stanford and the World Bank for comments.

> a Stanford Economics; b UC Berkeley Agricultural and Resource Economics; c Development Research Group, The World Bank;<sup>e</sup> Stanford Graduate School of Business
Our results show that unemployed educated youth turn down many opportunities for jobs that they consider low prestige or undesirable. High levels of reservation prestige may be rationale if there is an economic or social cost of taking low prestige jobs. Our data allow us to provide some insights on what these costs may be.

An economic cost of taking a low prestige job may be that it entails a cost in terms of reducing the chances of getting a better job later.<sup>7</sup> A direct channel for this would be if it reduces the time available for job search. However, the median time that unemployed educated youth report looking for a job in our surveys is only 4 hours per week, and so it seems unlikely that taking on a low prestige job would not leave enough time for this level of job search. A less direct channel is if employers view work in a low prestige job as a negative signal when considering candidates for higher prestige jobs. We asked employers in our survey whether finding out that a job candidate had worked as a waiter, outdoor salesperson, or telemarketer after graduation would affect their willingness to hire this person. Only 3.9% of firms said it would make them less likely to hire the person, 52.9% say it would make them more likely to hire the person, and 43.1% say it would make no difference. However, there may be a mismatch between what employers think, and what graduates think – 29.4% of employers thought that youth were reluctant to take on such jobs because the youth would view this as negatively affecting their employment prospects.

It thus does not appear that the economic costs are the main reason for not taking on low prestige jobs – after all, in a large city it seems likely that youth would be able to simply not tell future employers that they had previously worked in such positions. This suggests the main reason for high reservation prestige may be the social costs of working in low prestige jobs. Our surveys have less evidence on this aspect, although in our firm survey, 48.7% of firms who agree that Jordanian youth are less willing to take low paid, less skilled jobs than youth in other countries think that it is because doing so would have negative effects on the way they and their family is perceived in terms of prestige.

> 7 The disutility of work may be much higher for these low prestige jobs than for higher prestige jobs. Indeed the individuals in our sample who quit low prestige jobs within days of accepting them complained that the jobs were tiring, hard work, and monotonous. However, in theory this should be able to be compensated for through wage adjustments in order to clear the market. As discussed above, employers appear to be able to fill these jobs relatively quickly, so the main question is why wages don’t fall further given the excess supply of educated labor.

24
Banerjee, Abhijit, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. 2015. "Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps." _<mark>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</mark>_ <mark>, 7(1): 1-21.</mark> Barber, Sarah L. and Paul J. Gertler. 2008. “The Impact of Mexico’s Conditional Cash Transfer Programme, _Oportunidades_ , on Birthweight.” _Tropical Medicine and International Health_ , 13 (11): 1405-1414.

<mark>Barham, Tania, Karen Macours, and John A. Maluccio. 2013. “More schooling and more learning? Effects of a three-year conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua after 10 years.” No. IDB-WP-432. IDB Working Paper Series.</mark> <mark>Barrera-Osorio, Felipe, Marianne Bertrand, Leigh L. Linden, and Francisco Perez-Calle. 2011. "Improving the Design of Conditional Transfer Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Education Experiment in Colombia."</mark> _<mark>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</mark>_ <mark>, 3(2): 167-95.</mark> <mark>Basu, Kaushik and Pham Hoang Van. 1998. “The Economics of Child Labor.”</mark> _<mark>American Economic Review</mark>_ <mark>, 88(3): 412-427.</mark> <mark>Beegle, Kathleen, Dehejia, Rajeev and Gatti, Roberta. 2006. “</mark> Child labor and agricultural shocks. <mark>”</mark> _<mark>Journal of Development Economics</mark>_ <mark>, 81(1): 80-96.</mark> <mark>Behrman, Jere R. and Petra E. Todd. 1999.</mark> "Randomness in the Experimental Samples of PROGRESA (Education, Health and Nutrition Program)." Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute; 1999.

<mark>Benhassine, Najy, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Victor Pouliquen. 2015.</mark> <mark>"Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A "Labeled Cash Transfer" for Education."</mark> _<mark>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</mark>_ <mark>, 7(3): 86-125.</mark>

- Bleakley, Hoyt. 2007. “Disease and Development: Evidence from Hookworm Eradication in the ‒

- American South.” _Quarterly Journal of Economics,_ 122(1): 73 117

28
13 Consider backward and forward linkages separately. In presence of backward linkages, a depreciation increases the cost of imported intermediate inputs used in final-good production, thus lowering the competitive gain. When a country exports intermediate goods (forward linkages), a depreciation also increases the competitiveness of downstream producers, which stimulates demand for their goods, thus counterbalancing the expenditure-switching mechanism. Therefore, our conjecture is that backward and forward linkages are associated to a lower exchange rate elasticity of exports. We expect higher GVC participation to lower the REER elasticity of exports, while GVC position has in principle an ambiguous sign. The empirical model allows us to formally test these ideas and identify the key transmission channels in the data.

# **B.   GVCs and REER Elasticity**

In order to test whether the integration in GVCs affects the REER elasticity of exports, we exploit the panel variation of the different GVC measures. Specifically, we use value-added exports data from the OECD-WTO TiVA database to build measures of GVC participation, backward and forward linkages, and GVC position for each country and, when available, for each manufacturing subsectors, from 1996 to 2012, using the definition provided in the previous subsection. As data are available only for selected years, we also rely on time-series constructed by Duval _et al._ (2014) interpolating the OECD-WTO data in some of our regressions.

The regressions reported in this section build on Equation (1) and can be grouped in three categories. First, we add to the regressions for manufacturing exports growth the interaction of the REER with each of these GVC variables. Since the underlying data used to construct GVC data is published approximately every five years, we consider five-year average time series instead of annual time series in our panel regressions as well.<sup>13</sup> Second, we increase the cross-sectional variation of GVC

> 13 As discussed in the literature, there are also benefits to estimating regressions with data averaged for five-year periods: lag structure becomes less important, outliers are less of a concern because they are averaged out, and,
I Dividends taxed under personal income tax for low-income earners (who face a PIT rate smaller than 25%).

225% rate applies to shares issued before 1.1.1994 and bonds issued before 1.3.1990.

3 Taxed under PIT (highest marginal tax rate is reported).

4Taxpayers may opt for taxation under PIT.

5 In case of ,,substantial shareholders" or ,,substantial capital gains".

6 Combined effect of personal income tax (highest rate: 60.2%) and CIT that is partly creditable against the PIT payment.

745 / 30 % plus temporary surcharge of 7.5% of the tax amount due. Not taking account of local taxes.

8 53% highest marginal PIT rate plus 7.5% temporary surcharge. Not taking account of local taxes.

9 Capital gains are taxed under PIT when realized by ,,substantial shareholders", or within a given period (,,speculative capital gains").

'° Taxed under PIT. In case of long-term capital gains (asset has been held for more than 3 years), a 25% final tax rate applies (increased to 40% on gains exceeding DKr 33,800).

1 lHighest PIT rate. Withholding tax of 27% is creditable against personal income tax due.

12 A reduced rate of 27% applies to capital gains of certain shares.

13 Capital gains are taxed at a flat-rate of 25 % when realized by ,,substantial shareholders", or within a given period (,,speculative capital gains").

14 Capital gains are taxed at a flat-rate of 20 % when realized by ,,substantial shareholders".

_15_ Personal income tax rate is applied to net dividend times 1.4 (i.e., tax credit of 40% of net dividend is granted).

16 33% CIT plus highest personal income tax rate; 25% of the net dividend is creditable against CIT.

Sources: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation: GET III: The Taxation of Private Investment Income, and GET VI: Taxation of Individuals in Europe. Amsterdam (loose leaf).
of our knowledge this is one of the first studies to conduct a detailed analysis about how intrahousehold dynamics relate to attitudes towards vaccines. On topics other than vaccines there has been extensive work showing that intra-household dynamics shape attitudes (a notable example is pioneering work on social contagion theory (Christakis and Fowler, 2013)). There has also been some work on vaccines, prior to COVID-19, showing the existence of peer effects (e.g., see a review by Kontantinou et al., 2021). Previous studies that have focused on levels of acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines have relied on surveys with only one respondent per household, which limits the authors’ ability to dive deeply into intra-household dynamics. We overcome this hurdle by drawing on an in-person data set with individual level surveys covering all household members (aged 10 years and older) from a nationally representative sample of households in Zambia. The findings from the in-person survey informed the design of the randomized experiments that explicitly tested whether emphasizing benefits for individuals or their household had a greater impact on people’s willingness to get vaccinated. In addition, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects based on people’s beliefs about the attitudes of other household members towards vaccines and their role in household decision making. The small amount of prior experimental work has almost exclusively focused on individual benefits from vaccination and had not examined heterogeneous treatment effects along these dimensions.

Secondly, we contribute to the sparse literature that generates causal evidence about what underpins the acceptance of vaccines in LICs and LMICs, being among one of the first experiments to explicitly focus on COVID-19 vaccines. Seminal studies prior to the COVID19 pandemic have tended to focus on how mistrust towards vaccines was influenced by questionable activities being brought to light (Archibong and Annan, 2021; Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann, 2022). Since the outset of the pandemic there has been some experimental work in high-income countries about ways to boost COVID-19 vaccine acceptance (e.g., Kaplan and Milstein, 2021), but in LICs and LMICs existing publicly available studies have been almost exclusively descriptive (e.g., Kanyanda et al., 2021). An exception is a study by Hoy et al. (2021) in Papua New Guinea (PNG) that also uses social media to 4
- 13 -

goes towards meeting the immediate needs of the young; education, for example, often commands 25 to 35% of recurrent government expenditure.

Demographically, the large proportion of young people gives a strong built-in momentum to future population growth. Children less than 15 years old account for more than 45% of Africa's population, compared with 37% in Asia and 40% in Latin America (Fig. 4).

_Fig._ 4 Zambia; Population Age Distribution, 1985 <!-- Start of picture text --> AGE<br>75+<br>7g4<br>65-69<br>MALES FEMALES<br>SO-54<br>45-4<br>40-<br>25r29 Chddren undar 15<br>2 29 47.396<br>20-24 of populton<br>15-19 4Q<br>10-14<br>5-9<br>0-4<br>10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10<br>PERCENT<br>Source: United Nations (U.N.). Population Division.<br>Oemographic 'ndicarors by Countnes as Assessed in<br>1982, medium variant, New York, December 14.<br>1963. computer pnntout.<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source._ Goliber, T. J. (1985): p. 12.

Demographic considerations apart, the grave health consequences of adolescent pregnancy are sufficient reasons for young people to have access to fertility regulation services. The medical and social risks of pregnancy are greater for adolescents than for adult women. Rates of prematurity, low-birth-weight babies, maternal and infant mortality, anaemia, and pre-eclampsia are dramatically higher for adolescent mothers.

People often contend that it is unethical to provide contraceptive services for adole:cents, on the grounds that it encourages promiscuity, or at least greater, as well as earlier, sexual activity. The available
36 Thus the evidence is ambiguous on the questions of whether the projects leveraged productivity increases in government spending in respect of infant mortality and hence whether the intrasectoral fungibility resulted in any forgone benefits. What can be done is to produce estimates of the overall effect of the projects on infant survival, without trying to establish which mechanisms were responsible. Table 2 shows the estimated number of infant deaths averted for each model specification. These have been computed using eqn (17). Some clarifications are in order. Given the evidence above concerning intersectoral fungibility, the parameter  has been set at 1. _N_ 1 is the number of live births in the project provinces.<sup>24</sup> _X_ 13 is average government spending on health in the project provinces and has been computed using the data used to estimate the models in the above tables. _D_ is the total amount of donor outlays per annum. However, in deriving eqns (16) and (17), it was implicitly assumed that _N_ 1 and _N_ 2 together comprised the total number of beneficiaries of the donor support. In this exercise, however, _N_ 1 and _N_ 2 refer to a subpopulation, namely those born in the relevant year. This means that _D_ needs to be scaled down accordingly, since other age groups will also have benefited from the Bank credits. Live births in 1999 totaled 1.35 million, equivalent to 1.7% of Vietnam’s population of 78 million. Using 1.7% as the scaling factor would, however, seem inappropriate as both projects prioritized the health of (expectant) mothers and children. A figure of 10% was used instead: hence in computing averted infant deaths, we have replaced _D_ in eqn (17) by 0.1 _D_ .

> 24 This number is for 1999, and has been computed from provincial data on the infant mortality rate and the number of children aged 0. The data are from Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee (2000).
Policy Research Working Paper 6900

# **Abstract**

The impact of immigration on native workers is driven by two countervailing forces: the degree of substitutability between natives and immigrants, and the increased demand for native workers as immigrants reduce the cost of production and output expands. The literature so far has focused on the former substitution effect, while ignoring the latter scale effect. This paper estimates both of these effects using labor force survey data from Malaysia (1990–2010), a country uniquely suited for understanding the impact of low-skilled immigration. The instrumental variable estimates imply that the elasticity of labor demand (3.4) is greater than the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants (2.5). On average the scale effect outweighs the substitution effect. For every ten additional immigrants, employment of native workers increases by 4.1 in a local labor market. These large reallocation effects are accompanied by negligible relative wage changes. At the national level, a 10 percent increase in immigrants, equivalent to 1 percent increase in labor force, has a small positive effect on native wages (0.14 percent). The impact of immigration is highly heterogeneous for natives with different levels of education, resulting in substantial changes in skill premiums and hence inequality. Immigrants on net displace natives with at most primary education; while primarily benefiting those with a little more education, lower secondary or completed secondary education.

This paper is a product of the Trade and International Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cozden@worldbank.org and mathis.wagner@bc.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team