39 There are grounds for hoping that a development assistance effort – comprised of aid, private and public investment and the fostering of a business‐friendly economic environment – which succeeds in stimulating sustained economic growth can reduce the likelihood of civil conflict. However, a policy still needs to contend with two issues. First, the scope of development agencies amid conflict is evidently limited. Second, in the best of circumstances, the development that materially changes the probability of conflict is a long‐term multi‐ decade proposition while the refugee problem is pressing today.

One should not, however, dismiss the possibility that – once conflict abates (whether because of diplomacy or exhaustion of one or both parties) – recovery can be very rapid. In their study, Collier and Hoffer find that per capita income tends to bounce back after a conflict and the longer the conflict the sharper the recovery. Moreover, historical studies of large migration flows suggest that emigration can create more employment opportunities for stayers<sup>42</sup> and/or increase wages of stayers<sup>43</sup> . In their study of mass migration in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hatton and Williamson conclude that emigration from Ireland and Sweden was a significant contributor to the growth of wages in those countries, which tended to converge gradually towards those of the United States, and were only partly moderated by capital outflows towards the New World. (1998) Can the recovery be so rapid as to attract large numbers of refugees to return? There is no single answer to this question, as it depends on the country of origin’s endowment, its level of development, who left and why, who prevails in the war, the rate at which conflict deescalates, etc. One can speculate, for example, that a higher middle‐income country such as Iraq – which has one of the world’s large oil endowments – and which has seen massive displacement of its population and destruction of its capital stock in recent years, would present returnees, especially those who have skills and capital, with considerable opportunities in a period of reconstruction and rapid growth. On the other hand, a resource‐ poor low‐income country in Africa where the exodus was small as a proportion of its population may remain unattractive to returnees even during the reconstruction phase.

It should be noted that the civil war in Syria, which had a population of 22 million, has produced an estimated 4.8 million refugees since 2011 and resulted in massive, impossible to measure, capital flight. If peace returned and with‐it capital, the reconstruction effort would require labor that is in short supply. Still, even in 2010 – before the civil war – Syria’s PPP – adjusted per capita income was about 10% lower than Jordan’s. Assuming a post‐ conflict Syria can eventually return to a level of income per capita roughly equal to that of Jordan today, $9,000 – the difference with respect to Jordan and Lebanon would be small, that with Turkey is 2‐3 to 1 and to advanced countries would be 4‐6 to 1. This suggests that voluntary mass return to Syria from neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey where Syrian refugees live in dire conditions is quite possible – depending on the regime that prevails in the war, and that this will create the need for large‐scale development

> 42 Examples come from Sri Lanka and Albania (Lucas 2005)

> 43 Examples come from Pakistan and the Philippines (Lucas 2005)