Table 9: Contract Enforcement and Export Intensity

|**_Dep. Variable_**:|**_ln(Ex_**|**_port)_**|**_ln(No. of_**|**_Varieties)_**|**_ln(Expor_**|**_t/Variety)_**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Contract|-0.083<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.082<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.024<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.023<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.059<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.059<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|Contract x Inst-Int|0.249<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.241<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.080<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.076<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.169<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.164<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|Contract x Inst-Int x OECD|-0.034<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.046<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.007|0.002|-0.041<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.048<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnH|-0.378<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.309<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.337<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.308<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.041|-0.001|
|lnH x H-Int|0.100<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.088<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.076<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.071<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.023|0.016|
|lnH x H-Int x OECD|-0.043<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.041<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.016<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.016<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.026<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.025<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnK|-0.785<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.749<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.145<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.129<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.640<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.621<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnK x K-Int|0.528<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.540<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.001|0.005|0.526<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.535<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnK x K-Int x OECD|-0.200<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.186<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.103<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.098<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.097<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.089<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
|NR|-0.013<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.009<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.010<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.008<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.003|-0.001|
|NR x OECD|0.015<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.010<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.015<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.013<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.000|-0.003|
|NR x N-Int|-0.011<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|-0.012<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.006<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.006<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|-0.006|-0.006<sup>_∗_</sup>|
|NR x N-Int x OECD|-0.010|-0.009|-0.001|-0.001|-0.009<sup>_∗_</sup>|-0.008<sup>_∗_</sup>|
|lnESTABLISH|0.083<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.078<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.023<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.020<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.061<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.057<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnGDPE|2.561<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|2.328<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.150<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.056<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.411<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|1.272<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|lnGDPI|0.309<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.305<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.047<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.046<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.261<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0.259<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|
|No. of Observations|720679|720679|720679|720679|720679|720679|
|F-Statistic|269.103|66.239|663.157|94.809|83.83|38.155|
|Prob _>_ F-Statistic|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|0.000|
|R<sup>2</sup>|0.707|0.707|0.839|0.839|0.526|0.527|
| ̄_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.703|0.704|0.837|0.837|0.521|0.521|

_∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ p <_ 0 _._ 1, _p <_ 0 _._ 05, _p <_ 0 _._ 01. Each regression includes (unreported) industry, year and exporter-importer fixed effect. Error terms are clustered by exporter-importer pairs. Selection-bias is corrected using the Inverse Mills Ratio and polynomials of _z_ in Columns 1, 3 and 5, and using the dummy variable approach in Columns 2, 4 and 6.

**Alternative Sample** One might wonder whether the results are being driven by broad differences between developing and developed countries or whether the importance of contract enforcement can also be seen within each country group. In order to check this, we re-run the regressions on restricted samples. More specifically, we re-run regressions for trade among the OECD countries (i.e., where both the exporter and the importer are OECD members) and similar (separate) regressions for trade among non-OECD countries. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 present the results for these _within OECD_ and _within non-OECD_ trade, respectively. In Column 3, we merge the two samples to estimate the effect for the whole within-group trade, be it within OECD or within non-OECD country groups. In other words, we exclude the between/across region trade, i.e., trade between an OECD member and a non-member. We subsequently estimate the role institutions play in this latter form of trade – between OECD and non-OECD – in the last column.

Table 10 shows the effect of institutions on both the probability of exporting ( _Panel A_ ) and the volume of export conditional on exporting. The effect of institutions on the extensive margin (probability of exporting) is positive and highly significant for within non-OECD (Column 2), within region (Column 3) and across region (Column 4) trades. The effect on within OECD trade (Column 1) loses statistical significance though at the margin (the p-value is 0.108).

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