Table 5: Nigeria- correlations between IPV and respondent characteristics across methods

||Q1: emoti|onal violence|Q2: physic|al violence|Q3: sexu|al violence|Method<br>from|difference<br>tests of di|s: P-values<br>fferences|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Variable|(1)<br>List|(2)<br>F2F|(3)<br>List|(4)<br>F2F|(5)<br>List|(6)<br>F2F|(1)-(2) <br>Q1|(3)-(4)<br>Q2|(5)-(6)<br>Q3|
|Vulnerability index|0.02|-0.08***|0.09|-0.05***|0.03|-0.05**|0.14|0.05|0.25|
||(0.06)|(0.02)|(0.07)|(0.02)|(0.07)|(0.02)||||
|Unequal village gender norms index|0.06|0.08***|0.09*|0.05***|0.08*|0.05***|0.61|0.43|0.50|
||(0.04)|(0.02)|(0.05)|(0.02)|(0.04)|(0.02)||||
|Relationship quality index|-0.07|-0.21***|-0.02|-0.21***|-0.04|-0.27***|0.11|0.04|0.01|
||(0.08)|(0.03)|(0.09)|(0.02)|(0.08)|(0.03)||||
|Public speaking confidence index|-0.02|-0.08***|0.01|-0.03***|0.00|-0.01|0.11|0.34|0.68|
||(0.04)|(0.01)|(0.04)|(0.01)|(0.04)|(0.01)||||
|Progressive gender attitudes index|-0.12*|-0.13***|-0.23***|-0.09***|-0.16**|-0.16***|0.91|0.11|0.95|
||(0.07)|(0.03)|(0.08)|(0.03)|(0.07)|(0.03)||||
|**Bargaining power measures**||||||||||
|Wife's age|0.00|0.00**|0.00|0.00|0.00|-0.00|0.57|0.49|0.59|
||(0.00)|(0.00)|(0.00)|(0.00)|(0.00)|(0.00)||||
|Wife reads and writes|0.12|-0.08**|0.00|-0.12***|0.11|-0.04|0.03|0.20|0.12|
||(0.08)|(0.03)|(0.10)|(0.02)|(0.09)|(0.03)||||
|Polygamous: wife number (1-4)|-0.03|0.02|0.06|0.03|0.13|-0.02|0.56|0.74|0.13|
||(0.08)|(0.04)|(0.10)|(0.03)|(0.09)|(0.03)||||
|Wife brought assets to marriage|-0.04|-0.18***|0.03|-0.13***|-0.02|-0.09***|0.04|0.03|0.34|
||(0.06)|(0.02)|(0.07)|(0.02)|(0.07)|(0.02)||||

**Note:** Standard errors are shown in parentheses (List method estimates show robust standard errors). All regressions are adjusted for sampling stratification. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-6 show the relevant covariate coefficients from separate regressions. Columns 7-9 show the p-values from a chi-squared test of the differences between these coefficients. The vulnerability index includes measures of food poverty and household economic insecurity, and wife's stress. The unequal village gender norms index includes beliefs about unequal gender attitudes held by others in the village. The relationship quality index includes measures of  trust, satisfaction, empathy and communication in the marriage. The public speaking confidence index includes measures of willingness to speak up in public. The progressive gender attitudes index includes measures of personal views on the acceptability of IPV and on gender roles.

increase in a woman’s perception of unequal village gender norms was associated with a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of experiencing IPV when violence was measured face-to-face, a 4 percentage point increase when measured using ACASI, and a 37 percentage point increase when using the list method. However, the positive conservative norms-IPV relationship was only statistically significant when IPV was measured using the list method. In Rwanda, the differences between the list and direct methods were statistically significant; in Nigeria, they were not.<sup>29</sup> Table A9 shows that the gender norms-IPV relationship difference between the methods was driven by the respondents who believed their village had the most conservative norms. There was no IPV reporting difference across the list and direct methods for respondents who believed their village had progressive norms. As with vulnerability, these results demonstrate that the relationship between community gender norms and IPV can be very different if estimated using anonymous list experiment data.

> 29In Nigeria, the lack of IPV reporting difference across the methods by perceived norms may be due to the different gender norms questions that comprise the index in the two countries. The Nigerian norms index included only unincentivized questions about perceptions of other villagers’ attitudes regarding the acceptability of women working or traveling outside the home. In Rwanda, the norms index focused on IPV-specific norms and included both unincentivized questions about perceptions of village IPV prevalence and others’ attitudes, as well as four incentivized norms vignettes based on an adapted version of the Krupka-Weber norms coordination game (Krupka and Weber, 2013). In this game, respondents were paid if they selected the modal answer in their village about whether described behaviors about IPV and women leaving violent husbands were considered socially acceptable or unacceptable in their village. This incentive-compatible measure was intended to overcome social desirability bias.

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