rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
computer code in GAMS that underpins most if not all Yemen CGE applications.<sup>5</sup> This model is user-friendly thanks to the inclusion of pre-programmed alternatives for factor and macro closures, separation between computer code and database (facilitating applications of new databases with different disaggregations), and permits regional disaggregation of sufficient data are available. As a complement to dynamic simulations with these CGE models, many of the Yemen applications have included different types of micro or household simulation modules that, drawing on the CGE simulation results, analyze the consequences for more disaggregated indicators, often related to households and nutrition.

The issues addressed in these studies were typically selected in the context of discussions between these international institutions and Yemeni authorities and on the basis of the issues that IFPRI and the World Bank identified as being of high priority for Yemen’s development progress. The analyses were most often forward-looking (at the time when the work was done), addressing the future impacts of packages of complementary policies. However, some studies were also designed to decompose the roles of past external and internal shocks on economic developments.

Among these studies, forward-looking analyses have addressed prioritization of public spending between health, education, and agriculture (Chemingui 2007); the long-run impact of climate change (Wiebelt et al. 2011); fuel subsidy reform combined with direct income transfers and infrastructure investments (Breisinger et al. 2012), strategies for achieving the millennium development goals (MDGs; Al-Batuly et al. 2013), the potential roles of growth and targeted measures for improving nutrition among poor groups (Breisinger and Ecker 2014), and conflict recovery (Mukashov et al. 2022). The backward-looking analysis of the determinants of recent economic performance have focused on the impacts of natural disasters and conflict on food security (Ecker et al. 2010), impacts of international price shocks and the financial crisis (Breisinger et al. 2011), and the effects of the 2008 tropical storm and flash flood (Breisinger et al. 2016).

In terms of topic, the analysis presented in this paper has most in common with Mukashov et al. (2022) who also address conflict recovery. Methodologically, it is most similar to Al-Batuly et al. (2013) who use the Maquette for MDG Simulations (MAMS), a model developed at the World Bank, which is the predecessor of SDGSIM, the model used in this paper.

> 5 The computer code is written in GAMS, a software for optimization and simulation modeling developed at the World Bank, also in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For more information, visit www.gams.com.

11
The point estimate of the impact of the standard workshop on the likelihood of employment is 1.9 percentage points. This is very much in line with global evidence on the limited impact of information provision, counseling programs, and a broader range of ALMPs (Altmann et al., 2015; Card et al., 2015; McKenzie, 2017). On the other hand, the effect of the Workshop Plus intervention is 4.9 percentage points.

**Table 4:** Effects on Employment Outcomes

||(1)<br>Responses|(2)<br>Responses|(3)<br>Ofers|(4)<br>Ofers|(5)<br>Employed|(6)<br>Employed|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|WS Basic|_−_0_._025|_−_0_._027|0_._023|0_._022|0_._021|0_._019|
||(0_._058)|(0_._059)|(0_._022)|(0_._022)|(0_._025)|(0_._025)|
|WS Plus|0_._112<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0_._102<sup>_∗_</sup>|0_._058<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0_._061<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|0_._047<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0_._049<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
||(0_._053)|(0_._053)|(0_._020)|(0_._020)|(0_._020)|(0_._021)|
|Covariates|_No_|_Y es_|_No_|_Y es_|_No_|_Y es_|
|Observations|1895|1894|1882|1881|1971|1969|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0_._101|0_._109|0_._012|0_._021|0_._017|0_._024|
|Control Mean|0_._544|0_._544|0_._130|0_._130|0_._115|0_._115|
|P-value|0_._027|0_._036|0_._126|0_._099|0_._321|0_._249|

Notes: * p _<_ 0.10, ** p _<_ 0.05, *** p _<_ 0.01. Regressions use panel data over two follow-up periods. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. P-value compares WS Plus to WS Basic. All regressions control for location-fixed effects and baseline value of the outcome variable. Outcome variables are winsorized at the 5% level.

It is also worth noting that our data shows that the jobs found by participants in the Workshop Plus group do not differ with regard to salary or job satisfaction compared to both the Control and Workshop groups (results not reported). This suggests that the positive employment effect of plan-making does not come at the cost of inducing individuals to apply to (and accept) lower quality jobs.

# **3.3 Search Strategy**

The results in the previous sections (Tables 3 and 4) indicate that job offers increase by twice the margin than applications (30% vs. 15%) in response to our plan-making treatment. This 14
**Table 6** <u>.</u> _<u>Pantawid</u>_ <u>program impact on other economic activities of beneficiary households</u>

||Farming<br>Household<br>househo|Non-farm<br>business<br>level, past 12 m<br>ld members invo|Fishing<br>onths. Any<br>lved in:|Worked|Worked for<br>private<br>household or<br>establishment<br>Adult level, p|Worked for<br>government<br>ast 7 days|Self-<br>employed,<br>employer, or<br>worked on<br>household<br>farm or<br>business|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|
|OLS only controlling for municipality|0.042|0.001|0.006|0.007|0.038*|0.007|-0.037|
||(0.033)|(0.019)|(0.028)|(0.020)|(0.023)|(0.007)|(0.023)|
|Additional information:||||||||
|Number of observations||830|832|2,480|2,480|2,480|2,480|
|Observations in control group||422|422|1,251|1,251|1,251|1,251|
|Observations in treatment group||408|410|1,229|1,229|1,229|1,229|
|Mean in control group|0.608|0.077|0.134|0.627|0.295|0.023|0.291|
|Mean in treatment group|0.668|0.075|0.123|0.635|0.333|0.028|0.256|

Note. Estimates of program impact on household and adult level economic activities. Sample restricted to eligible households with children aged 10-14. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 54
Table A.13: Robustness checks, controlling for trade, FDI and remittances. Estimating the effect of migrants’ legal status on wages after return, unconditional on return

||(1)<br>Migrate|(2)<br>Illegal|(3)<br>Return|(4)<br>Log of<br>hourly wage|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Age|0.012***<br>|-0.072**<br>|-0.017***<br>|-0.001<br>|
||(0.001)|(0.034)|(0.006)|(0.005)|
|Age squared|-0.000***<br>|0.001*<br>|0.000***<br>|0.000**<br>|
||(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|(0.000)|
|No education|0.019***|0.494***|-0.005|-0.446***|
||(0.004)|(0.117)|(0.019)|(0.026)|
|Primary or preparatory|0.032***|0.480***|0.040**|-0.419***|
||(0.004)|(0.125)|(0.019)|(0.025)|
|Secondary|0.017***|0.369***|0.034**|-0.286***|
||(0.003)|(0.102)|(0.015)|(0.020)|
|Rural|0.009***|0.257***|0.010|-0.029*|
||(0.003)|(0.083)|(0.014)|(0.016)|
|Oil prices|0.013***<br>(0.000)||||
|Diplomatic exchange||-0.196*<br>(0.104)|||
|Confict|||0.094***||
||||(0.012)||
|FDI|||-0.007*||
||||(0.004)||
|Remittances|||-0.042***<br>(0.003)||
|Exports|||0.022***<br>(0.002)||
|Imports|||0.010***<br>(0.002)||
|Illegal status||||-0.208***<br>(0.055)|
|Legal status||||0.185***<br>(0.046)|
|Observations|14,879|1,955|2,064|8,054|
|Parental controls|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Decades of migration dummies|Yes|Yes|Yes|No|
|Labor market controls in Egypt|No|No|No|Yes|
|Predicted log wage: Non-mig.=1.|515; Illegal mig|.=1.355; Legal|mig.=1.777||

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1 _Notes_ : Equation 1 is the probability of temporary migration. Equation 2 is the probability of undocumented migration. Equation 3 is the probability of return migration. Equation 4 models the logarithm of hourly wages upon return. Equation (4) controls for FDI, remittances, and the exports and imports of goods and services (all as % of GDP). For identification of equation (1), we use the inflation adjusted historical oil prices (in US dollars). For identification of equation (2), we use diplomatic exchange between Egypt and the countries of destination of Egyptian migrants at time of migration. It is a dummy variable equal zero if there is no evidence of diplomatic exchange neither in Egypt, nor in the country of destination and is equal one if there is evidence of diplomatic exchange either in Egypt or in the country of destination at the level of charg ́e d’affaires, minister, ambassador or other. For identification of equation (3), we use the number of active armed conflicts that is both country and year specific from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP). Equation (4) estimates the effect of illegality on the logarithm of hourly wages, conditional on return migration. The predicted logarithm of hourly wages for non-migrants, illegal migrants and legal migrants are reported in the last row. 60
**Figure 6:** _Russia - Private participation in infrastructure_ (as a share of GDP)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 5%<br>4% Payments to government<br>3%<br>Investment in physical assets<br>2%<br>1%<br>0%<br>1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: PPIAF PPI Database, 2013 Note: Data includes: electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; natural gas transmission and distribution; fixed or mobile local telephony; domestic long-distance telephony; international long-distance telephony; airport runways and terminals; railways; toll roads, bridges, highways, and tunnels; port infrastructure, superstructures, terminals, and channels; potable water generation and distribution; sewerage collection and treatment.

Public investment collapsed and has never recovered its pre-1991 level. At the break-up of the Soviet system, the public sector owned and operated all infrastructure and non-infrastructure related assets, resulting in little commercial orientation and weak incentives for cost recovery. Public investment in capital represented a significant share of government budgets. In the 1990s, and later in response to the global financial crisis in 2008, governments in Eurasia severely cut their overall budgets. In Russia, for example, public investment fell from 28 percent of GDP in 1992 to 3 percent in 1995 (Figure 8). This level of public investment is relatively low compared to the 7 percent of GDP for infrastructure only in the fast-growing Asian economies (Commission on Growth and Development 2008). There is no marked difference between the resource-rich countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, and the other countries in the region like Moldova. If anything, there has been indication that public investment in the latter group is now higher than that in their resource-rich neighbors. This observation is consistent with other findings, which noted much lower public investment in the resource-rich developing countries than in the non-resource rich ones (IMF 2012), and a level of domestic investment inversely related to dependence on primary product exports (Gylfason 1999).

15
- 36 -

ceiling and future interest defaults or arrears would be covered by an Insurance Fund. That Fund would be managed by an existing multilateral bank and capitalized by commercial, bilateral official and multilateral lenders in proportion to their exposure. The World Bank and IMF would oversee the implementation of the relief pLan, apply the necessary conditionality and commit themselves to continued lending to the debtors concerned.

This plan has several merits. Local currency balances could serve to promote VDR through debt-equity swaps; the World Bank and IMF would set surveillance of conditionality criteria; there would be a case-by-case approach. Moerover, it could serve to stimulate new commercial lending by tying it to the disbursements of World Bank loans, and the debtors would have to forego certain interest-rate concessions if commodity prices rise. However, on the debit side one should stress the risk of inflation, caused by the expansion of the domestic money supply in the debtor countries.

# **The** Dornbusch **plan** (1988) 381

This proposal by a leading US acae "ic takes Nova Scotia's approach one step further. It advocates that a. interest payments in foreign currencies be suspended for an undetermined period, and accrue instead in the creditors' favor in local currencies. This could ease the way for debt-equity swaps, as local currencies could be reinvested locally, but not repatriated. As a complement, debtors would undertake major policy reforms. This plan shares the infaltionary risks of Nova Scotia's proposal.

# The Niyazawa plan (1988) 391

This second Japanese initiative was presented at the 1988 Toronto Siummit. Its structure is threefold and combines menu options and interest reduction. First, debtor nations would securitize part of their debt, with principal guarantees through liens on their exchange reserves and on the proceeds of the disposal of state-owned assets. Second, the remaining, unsecuritized debt would be rescheduled with grace periods of up to five years, during which interest payments could be lowered, suspended or forgiven. Finally, multilateral and bilateral agencies would increase their lending to countries that had taken the first two steps.

The main drawback is that countries with scarce reserves would not be able to provide collateral security for princiapl repayments. Eligibility to this plan would thus be restricted to debtors that have sufficient foreignexchange reserves.

4/30/1987.

38/ New York Times, 5/13/1988.
# **A.1. Evidence on Age of School Enrollment, Duration in School and Incidence of Repeated Grades**

China’s Compulsory Education Law, passed in 1986, mandated that all children enroll in school at age six regardless of gender, but allows enrollment to be postponed to age seven in those localities (urban and rural) where enrollment at age six is not feasible.<sup>1</sup> In its aspiration for early start dates, the implementation of the Compulsory Education Law bears striking similarity to other legal and institutional reforms in China (ranging from governance over land, to employment protections and protections over intellectual property, and as exploited in this paper, the distribution of national identity cards). In education, as in all of these other areas, legislation is used to set out a future national goal, but provinces, counties and sometimes even local communities (villages and urban neighborhoods) are granted flexibility to implement these changes as local conditions evolve. The high incidence of an age seven start date for school enrollment is evident from both census data and other surveys conducted in the early 2000s. China’s 1990 national census shows that only 17 and 16 percent of male and female rural children who turned 6 by August 1990, respectively, were enrolled in school (Appendix Figure A4). By contrast, the enrollment rates of seven year olds were 60 and 55 percent for boys and girls, respectively.

We also note that data from a six-province survey collected by the Chinese Center for Agricultural Policy (CCAP) in 2000 lends further support to our assumption that children start school at age seven. Geographically, the CCAP sample overlaps with our sample as it is drawn from the same region of the country.<sup>2</sup> The CCAP survey form asked respondent household members to report the age each child began primary school, and the modal year of respondents answering in 2000 was seven (Appendix Table A.3). CCAP repeated their survey (in the same villages, with the same form) in 2009, and the modal answer was again seven. Another well-known survey (The Gansu Study of Families and Children) focusing on education in a poorer province, Gansu, enumerated the first grade start date in rural households as well, and the overwhelming majority of students surveyed in 2000 and 2004 also reported starting elementary school at age seven.

> 1 《中 华人民共和国义务教育法》(1986 年 ) ,第五条,凡年 满六周岁的儿童,不分性别、民族、种族,应当 入学接受规定年限的义务教育。条件不具备的地区,可以推迟到七周岁入学。(Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China `,` 1986, Article 5. All children who have reached the age of six shall enroll in school and receive compulsory education for the prescribed number of years, regardless of sex, nationality or race. In localities where this is not possible, enrollment may be postponed to the age of seven.)  The Articles of Compulsory Education Law could be found here (both the English version and the Chinese version): <u>http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1166&CGid.</u>

> 2See de Brauw et al (2002) for a description of the CCAP survey.

49
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26
outcome of a transaction depends on trust. The game is set up as follows. The individual in the trustor role is asked to select his counterpart in the trust game. The counterpart can be from his own primary group, or an anonymous player from the population. Individuals choosing a member from their own primary group do so at a cost to efficiency. The study uses naturallyoccurring groups: In the US, the groups are based on Rice University‟s residential college system; in Pakistan the groups are based on undergraduate cohorts. In this study, nepotism is inefficient by design. That is, selecting an in-group member is costly for the dyad.<sup>21</sup> The authors found that approximately 44% of subjects in the US (individualist) were willing to bear the costs to efficiency in order to be matched with a counterpart from their own group, whereas in Pakistan (collectivist), a significantly higher percentage (65%) of subjects were willing to bear the same costs. In the US, this decision is motivated by two factors, beliefs regarding trustworthiness, and risk preferences (to avoid betrayal). In Pakistan, however, beliefs regarding trustworthiness do not play a role. That is, Pakistani‟s are purely motivated by risk aversion when selecting their partners. US “nepotists”<sup>22</sup> compensate for the costs to efficiency through higher levels of trust. Pakistani nepotists, however, do not compensate for these costs. Thus, costly nepotism is efficiency-neutral in the US, but reduces efficiency in Pakistan.

The studies cited above are different in their approach to nepotism. Fershtman et al. (2005) are interested in empirically establishing the difference between nepotism and discrimination, and manipulate information about the partner across treatments, while Banuri and Eckel (2012c) are interested in the level of nepotism across cultures. However, since the basis of the groups differs in both studies, they cannot be perfect comparisons. Nevertheless, we can draw a few insights from each of these studies. First, Fershtman et al. (2005) demonstrate the importance of groups at the micro-level when studying nepotism. Since both Belgium and Israeli societies are fairly individualistic at the aggregate level, group size or religiosity may be the driving factors behind their results. Furthermore, the US and Pakistan are farther apart on Hofstede‟s individualist-collectivist rankings, and on rule of law indices. The results (greater levels of nepotism in Pakistan driven by risk aversion) in light of this makes sense. Future

> 21 Selecting a non-in-group member as partner in this game means that the trust amount sent is multiplied by 3. Selecting an in-group member as partner means that the trust amount sent is multiplied by 2.5.  Thus, there is a 0.5X cost of selecting an in-group member as partner.

> 22 By “nepotist” we mean subjects choosing to partner with their group members.

20
Policy Research Working Paper 6452

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the microeconomics behind the dramatic export boom experienced by Turkey during the 2000s. Using disaggregated customs data covering the universe of export transactions for Turkey during the period 2002–2011, it characterizes firm-level dynamics in the export sector and decomposes export growth at the aggregate, sector, and destination market levels to identify the role of firm turnover, destination turnover, and product turnover. The paper shows that in the shortrun, aggregate export growth is dominated by growth in continuous exporters, and for these, growth is dominated by exports to their continued destinations and of their continued products. However, the observed high degree of churning across firms, destinations, and products accounts in the long run for a substantial part of Turkey’s export growth. The patterns of micro-dynamics of export growth are verified across sectors and across groups of destination markets with some exceptions regarding exports to new emerging markets where net entry by Turkish-based exporters plays a more critical role for long-run growth.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at afernandes@worldbank.org and tcebeci@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team