<mark>Responding to Yolanda, DSWD replaced what was initially the Food for Work program with the Cash for Work (CFW) program on 28 November, 20 days after the disaster hit. Given the severity of the disaster, the 10 day ceiling on individual work activities was extended to 15 days, and workers in CFW programs were paid 100 percent of the prevailing minimum wage. Tasks given to beneficiaries in the CFW program included: loading/unloading of goods, repacking of relief goods, food preparation, sorting and inventory of damaged property, clearing of debris, coastal clean-up, canal dredging, among other things. In this way, the CFW helped to provide much needed additional assistance to DSWD relief programs on the ground, while providing beneficiaries with cash based assistance. By January 2014, 15,188 affected persons from the Eastern Visayas had availed the CFW program. However, the CFW program was noted as having beneficiary selection issues in some instances with some government and private sector employees electing to participate in the program instead of their regular jobs.</mark><sup>87</sup> <mark>While the screening of takers should be more stringent, this also points to a trade-off between setting the CFW wage at the minimum wage level for a higher rate of assistance, but potentially distorting the labor market, versus the typical 75 percent CFW wage that is less distortionary but offers less assistance to beneficiaries. Moreover, there may be scope for DSWD to enhance the capacity of the CFW program to be delivered to a greater number of beneficiaries. Despite the presence of the DSWD CFW program and a large number of humanitarian CFW programs, survey work conducted by the Protection cluster reported “lack of income generating activities” as the most reported protection problem among respondents during the response phase (May 2014).</mark><sup>88</sup> <mark>It appears that significant effort was undertaken to coordinate the provision of humanitarian CFW with GoP requirements, especially with regard to a unified wage rate. Nevertheless, it is unclear the extent to which wage rate guidance was followed by each implementing agency. Humanitarian agencies operating outside of the official inter-agency response were also not party to these agreements, with one such agency reportedly delivering CFW with a wage rate twice the value of the minimum wage, creating a large distortion. Similarly, targeting of CFW was highly varied among programs, with some targeting 4Ps beneficiaries, others certain vulnerable groups, others IDPs etc. As in the case of the impact of 4Ps in disaster (see previous section), without rigorous analysis, an assessment of the adequacy of coverage is impossible. The overall CFW picture is, therefore, a blurry one that indicates a patchwork of programming coverage, benefit levels and project types. A more detailed discussion of governmenthumanitarian CTP coordination follows this section.</mark> <mark>As operations transitioned from response to recovery and rehabilitation activities, DSWD also transitioned its public works program from CFW to the “Cash for Building Livelihoods Assets” (CBLA) program. Led by DSWD’s Sustainable Livelihoods Program, CBLA was initiated to support longer term efforts for the rebuilding of lost livelihoods after Yolanda. While CFW in the response phase fills an immediate need, the work undertaken is rudimentary and disconnected from longer term livelihood resumption. CBLA is more directly geared to the restoration of lost livelihoods, key to recovery and rehabilitation. Activities of the CBLA projects focus on river dredging and embankment; digging and dredging of canals and irrigation systems; restoration of farmlands, farm-to-market roads, public markets, and school facilities; communal farm preparation; clearing of destroyed crop and crop diversification. Priority beneficiaries are identified through the Listahanan database as being poor, with 4Ps beneficiaries prioritized. Displaced families whose heads of household did not have employment prior to Yolanda, and families whose heads are engaged in informal labor are also prioritized. As of Aril 2014, DSWD anticipated that CBLA would reach 150,000 families, dispersing a total of PHP1.5 billion in financial capital in that same year.</mark><sup>89</sup> <mark>Nevertheless, SLP staff reported that the program would likely reach only 16.8 percent of total affected households due to the SLPs relatively limited capacity to deliver, indicating significant potential for the CBLA to be expanded for future disasters.</mark> 26