rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
# **Robustness to Changes in Parameters**

The quantitative predictions of our model depend on the calibrated parameter values. In this section we compute some robustness exercises by changing some parameters that are difficult to measure or subject to controversy. In particular, we consider changes in � , the capital share in output; in � , the depreciation rate of capital; and in � , the targeted level of foreign liabilities as percentage of GDP. Tables 1 and 2 present the results of these experiments, along with those corresponding to the benchmark calibration. Table 1 displays the national saving rate that is necessary to finance a GDP per‐capita growth rate of 4 percent under the three scenarios regarding TFP growth. The rows labeled “Baseline calibration” report results of the baseline model. The remaining rows report results of the different calibrations. Likewise, Table 2 reports projected per‐capita growth paths when the national saving rate remains fixed at 20 percentage points of GDP.

Consider first the capital share in output. Reliable estimates of � require reliable estimates of national account data on employee compensation. Gollin (2002) and Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2002) argue that, in many developing countries, series on employee compensation substantially understate the labor share in output because of the large number of self‐ employed workers or employees working outside the corporate sector. Adjusting these series with complementary data, these authors find that, in those countries for which these adjustments can be made, the capital share in output is about one third, consistent with the values obtained in developed countries.

In our benchmark calibration, the capital share in output � was set equal to 0.5, which is an average of available Egypt‐specific estimates. We now check the robustness of our results using ��0.35 , a value more aligned with the international evidence cited above. Under the new calibration, the main message of the paper is, in fact, reinforced. Take, for example, the economy with moderate TFP growth in Table 1. The required national saving rate to finance 4 percent of GDP per capita growth increases to 41 percent in five years, 49 percent in 10 years, and 81 percent in 25 years. These rates are substantially larger than those obtained under the baseline calibration. Likewise, Table 2 shows that when the capital share in output decreases, projected growth rates decrease as well over the next 25 years relative to the baseline 18
The prevailing view that R&D activities are undertaken only in headquarters of multinational corporations is no longer valid. According to UNCTAD’s survey of the world’s largest R&D investors conducted in 2004–5, the average respondent spent 28 percent of its 2003 R&D budget abroad, including in-house expenditure by foreign affiliates and extramural spending on R&D contracted to other countries (UNCTAD 2005). The shift of R&D activities abroad has been driven by the need to adapt products to the host country conditions and by cost saving.

The above arguments suggest that FDI can serve as a channel of knowledge transfer across international borders.

_Evidence of the Productivity Advantage of Foreign Affiliates_ Establishing a causal relationship between foreign ownership and the productivity of foreign affiliates is challenging because of selection bias. The superior performance of foreign affiliates documented by many studies (e.g., Aitken and Harrison 1999; Javorcik 2004) may simply reflect cherry picking of the bestperforming local producers as foreign acquisition targets, or it may be a result of greenfield investments (i.e., newly set up plants) occurring in the most productive industrial niches rather than being due to productivity advantages brought by foreign ownership per se _._ 13
Game theory has often been used to analyze climate-change treaties.<sup>2</sup> The analyses generally assume that the players are rational and self-interested and they generally are pessimistic. This paper reviews a different strand of research, which focuses on the behavior of individuals—who as well as affecting emissions directly also influence the behavior of governments in treaty negotiations. Some of this research asks how much cooperation can be expected of rational and self-interested individuals. But some of it emphasizes imperfect rationality or preferences about what happens to others.<sup>3</sup> And some of it assumes only that successful behavior tends to become more common over time and asks when cooperation will evolve despite incentives not to cooperate. Although a few studies in this literature are explicitly about cooperation to reduce climate change, most are not.

The problem of climate change is more complex than the games considered here. The range of decisions about greenhouse-gas emissions is enormous, and there is great uncertainty about the payoffs associated with different combinations of actions. The payoffs also differ greatly among players; if climate change is moderate, some people may benefit. The players themselves are diverse, including individuals, businesses, and governments, each with its own decision-making style. And the number of players is enormous. So we can’t assume that the research will yield conclusions that can immediately be applied to the problem of climate change. We can hope only that it captures important features of the problem and that it throws some light on how much cooperation can be expected and what can be done to increase cooperation.

# **Two-person climate-change games**

The best models of the dilemma created by climate change are multiperson games. But two-person games are simpler, and prominent in research, so it is useful to consider them briefly before turning to their more-realistic multiperson counterparts.

The two-person game that best captures the tragic aspect of climate change is the wellknown prisoners’ dilemma (figure 1), in which cooperation is interpreted as reducing emissions and defection as continuing with business as usual. In a true one-shot prisoners’ dilemma, in which payoffs represent preferences, not material outcomes like money received, defection is the only rational option. If we assume that the problem of climate change can be modeled as a true prisoners’ dilemma, we assume that each player prefers business-as-usual to reducing emissions whatever the other player does. Thus, business-as-usual dominates emissions reductions and the only Nash equilibrium is for each player to choose businesses-as-usual. Backward induction shows that the same thing

> 2 The IPCC’s working group on mitigation discusses this research in Gupta _et al_ 2007 and Toth _et al_ 2001. Examples include Barrett 2003 and Dutta and Radner 2004.

> 3 World Bank 2005, ch. 4, reviewed some of this research for a different purpose.

3
Table A.10: Under-5 mortality: Controls for mother’s preferences and gender gaps in enrollment

|Dep Var: Death before age 5|(1)|(2)|
|---|---|---|
|_Firstborn girl_ * _Female_|0.793|2.899**|
||(1.367)|(1.101)|
|_Firstborn girl_ * _Female_ * _Post_1|-0.747|-1.360|
||(1.009)|(0.899)|
|_Firstborn girl_ * _Female_ * _Post_2|-1.877**<br>(0.687)|-2.028**<br>(0.839)|
|_Ideal number of children × Female_|-0.652***<br>(0.223)||
|_Ideal sex ratio × Female_|2.256***<br>(0.479)||
|_Ideal number of children × Firstborn girl_|-0.414*<br>(0.226)||
|_Ideal sex ratio × Firstborn girl_|0.0418<br>(0.330)||
|_Ideal number of children × Female × Firstborn girl_|0.413<br>(0.334)||
|_Ideal sex ratio × Female × Firstborn girl_|0.572<br>(0.637)||
|_Girl-boy enrollment rate 6-11_ * _Female_||-0.795<br>(2.514)|
|_Girl-boy enrollment rate 6-11_ * _Female_ * _Firstborn girl_||0.327<br>(1.454)|
|_Girl-boy enrollment rate 14-17_ * _Female_||0.145<br>(0.226)|
|_Girl-boy enrollment rate 14-17_ * _Female_ * _Firstborn girl_||-0.384<br>(0.251)|
|N|182,287|179,799|

NOTES: Estimates of specification (1) with additional controls for son preference. Ideal fraction of sons = _idealboys_ + _ideal_ <u>(0</u> _._ 5 _kids∗idealeither_ <u>)</u> if _idealkids >_ 0, where _idealkids_ is the ideal number of total children; _idealboys_ is the ideal number of boys; and _idealeither_ is the number of children that parents are indifferent over the gender of, as reported by a woman. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Data: NFHS. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

57
# **I.  INTRODUCTION**

According to conventional wisdom, the poor growth and employment performance of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is primarily due to the “slow, uneven and hesitant pace” of structural reforms launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see World Bank (2003a) and Richards and Waterbury (1996)).<sup>1</sup> In particular, governments in the region continue to dominate most economies, with pervasive involvement in production, labor markets, banking systems, and social services. Despite efforts to reduce their size, the share of MENA’s public sectors in output and employment still exceeds the average for developing and industrialized countries. In addition to the size and scope of government intervention, private sector development in the region continues to be stifled by limited progress in building market-oriented institutions and in integrating the region into the world economy (see World Bank (2003b)). As a result, the economic recovery of the 1990s was weak, labor productivity remained low, and unemployment rates continued to increase.

The absence of dynamic private sectors in MENA’s economies has been especially felt in the area of investment. Observers in the early 1990s had taken the view that the public sector has “over invested” and that public investment competes, rather than fosters, private investment (see Page (1998) and World Bank (1995)). But the decline in public investment rates was not always compensated by a rise in private investment. As a result, capital accumulation rates on a per worker basis stagnated in the past two decades (see Nabli and Keller (2002)). Indeed, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA has the lowest private investment ratios among developing regions. Moreover, in countries where public investment levels remained high, the productivity of capital was limited. The very nature of the network utilities that were built to provide infrastructure services (vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies) often resulted in weak delivery of services such as

> 1 See World Bank (2004) for a review of employment and growth outcomes in the 1990s and their links to trends in physical and human capital accumulation. Elbadawi (2004) emphasized the role of conflict and instability whereas Hakura (2004) found that excessive government intervention and poor institutions were key factors hampering growth.

3
from 5 studies in Eastern and Southern Africa before highly active antiviral therapy. The probability of survival to year _t_ conditional on getting infected at year _τ_ is estimated as with _ψτ_ reducing with age of infection. (Parameter estimates and median survival time are presented in Table 5.) The mortality hazard increases with both duration and age of infection. The median survival time of an individual infected at ages 15 to 19 is 13.3 years, while it is 8.4 years for an individual who gets infected at ages 40 to 44.

Data from dierent longitudinal studies with repeated assessments of HIV status of adults show higher mortality rates of children born to infected women. In these studies, the HIV status of the children was generally not available. Controlling for dierent background characteristics, mortality rates of children born to HIV-infected mothers were estimated to be about three times higher than those for children born to uninfected mothers, with the eect lasting throughout childhood years (Newell et al., 2004). Crampin et al. (2003) report child mortality rates by status of mother at birth from a retrospective cohort study with more than 10 years of follow-up in Karonga district in Northern Malawi. The rates are reported in Table 6.

# 4 Estimation

The main estimation sample contains data on 1006 women from the MDICP dataset. The information on the _i_ th woman consists of up to 4 years of pregnancy choices _pi_ ( _t_ ) _, t_ = _tpi, ..., tpi_ , � <u>�</u> up to 2 reports of subjective assessments of HIV status � _bi_ ( _t_ ) _, t_ = _tbi, ..., tbi_ <u>�</u> , up to 3 HIV test results (collected in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds), and a vector of xed characteristics: region of residence, schooling level, year of birth, age of marriage, polygamy status of husband, and household's land.

I also use an auxiliary sample containing data on 612 households from the IHS-2 dataset.

21
_Table 2: Summary Statistics – CAMU and WAMU_

|**Statistics**|**GDP**<br>**Growth**|**Inflation**<br>**Rate**|**POP**<br>**Growth**|**Investment**<br>**Rate**|**TOT**|**NRES**|**D.TOT**|**D.NRES**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||**CEMAC**|||||
|**Mean**|4.2|4.6|3.1|23.4|143.7|22.1|0.0|0.2|
|**Median**|3.6|2.9|2.9|19.1|104.2|16.3|0.0|0.3|
|**S.D.**|10.4|10.4|1.0|14.6|102.8|15.9|0.3|7.6|
|**Min**|-36.7|-17.6|0.3|3.3|23.2|5.0|-2.1|-21.3|
|**Max**|95.3|84.0|8.3|88.4|712.7|84.2|0.6|23.5|
|**# Observations**|228|234|228|234|240|224|234|217|
|||||**WAEMU**|||||
|**Mean**|3.9|6.8|2.8|18.0|138.4|8.5|0.0|0.1|
|**Median**|4.3|2.9|2.8|16.9|117.0|6.8|0.0|0.1|
|**S.D.**|5.4|12.9|0.7|8.3|62.4|5.8|0.2|2.6|
|**Min**|-17.0|-14.9|0.1|3.2|35.4|1.3|-0.7|-13.1|
|**Max**|37.2|112.7|4.8|58.0|383.1|32.4|0.6|14.6|
|**# Observations**|384|392|384|392|400|384|392|376|

# **6. Results**

Before estimating coefficients in equations [1] or [2] and its related form, we perform unit root tests to avoid spurious regressions, and cointegration tests at the country and regional levels. At the country level, PP unit root tests show that all series are _I(1)_ in the CEMAC and WAEMU regions (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). For each country, we estimate the potential long-run relationship by using the _Basic Model_ , and the _Augmented 1 and 2 Models_ to derive residuals. Unit root tests of these residuals show that they are stationary and can thus be used to estimate short-term coefficients. At the regional level, Fisher unit root tests suggest that some level and first differenced time series are stationary, and others are nonstationary (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4). Unit roots with structural breaks are used to test the significance of the impact of potential structural breaks on the stochastic properties of time series. These tests are justified by the inclusion of several dummy variables by AMOA (2016) in country level equations. We specifically focus on the GDP series and the Zivot & Andrews (1992) unit root test concludes that there is a structural break point in 1990 or 1993 (depending on the deterministic function of the break) in Cameroon, and in the mid-1990 for Burkina Faso and Mali. Different from AMOA (2016), who includes several country dummy variables without robust statistical reasons, we thus include Page | 17
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World Bank. 1986. _Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing_ _Countries_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.

<u>http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/166331467990005748/Poverty-and-hunger-issuesand-options-for-food-security-in-developing-countries.</u> World Bank. 2019. _Poverty and Equity Brief: Sub-Sahara Africa, Nigeria, April 2019._ Washington, DC: World Bank.

<u>http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdf.</u> 32
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conditional on having an idea and trying to realize it, the success and failure rates are not statistically different between the treatment and control groups.<sup>18</sup> As such, the increase in the probability of having set up a project at some point is driven by additional attempts, not a higher success rate conditional on attempting to launch a new project.

Table 4 in part explains why the projects were not more successful. Respondents who attempted to set up projects or were in the process of doing so by the time they took the medium-term follow-up survey were asked about the steps they had taken to realize their project. This helps assessing whether participation in the entrepreneurship track led to better-prepared and ultimately better-quality projects. It also helps understanding at what point in the process of trying to set up projects participants faced obstacles. Results indicate that individuals in the treatment group were more likely to prepare a business plan for their projects. However, they were not more likely to have undertaken other actions, such as doing extra studies, working to gain experience, requesting loans to fund the project, enrolling in training, talking to parents, friends, and relatives, asking help from university/ANETI, or using their savings. As such, the entrepreneurship track only affected a relatively narrow set of preparatory actions and did not trigger broader pro-activity in setting up projects.

Some indicators also shed light on whether the program led to an increase in ‘entrepreneurial culture’, entrepreneurial intentions, or ‘latent entrepreneurship’, which we proxy by having more ideas or anticipating to attempt to create projects beyond the medium-term follow-up survey. Impacts on latent entrepreneurship could indicate that impacts on final outcomes may take even more time than 4 years. As indicated above, the increase in active projects among program participants seemed to be driven by a one-off increase in project ideas and attempts to set-up projects. However, there was not a sustained effect on the generation of new ideas or attempts to set up projects. Overall, it does not seem that beneficiaries are more likely to have project ideas at the time of the follow-up survey than non-beneficiaries. Indeed, those who failed a project are not more likely to have a new idea (Table 5). A slightly larger share of individuals in the treatment group has not fully given up and is still trying to realize past ideas, but the effects are limited.

> 18 Program participants are slightly less likely to still have an idea under preparation (conditional on having tried to realize their projects), although the difference is not statistically significant.

17
- 74 -

- Theft of a smart card is a problem, aldthougt **h** e card could be made invalid when oprat **in** conjunction with another in-vehicle unit.

- Counterfeiting of monthly licenses (or seasonal pss) is a potental problem

- **32** Visitors from out of town will have to incur additional time in searching for outlets where are licenses or electronic tags could be leased.

Even though Beqen Toll Ring has a 16-hour charging period, a non-zero toil still serves as an investment signal reflecting the scarcity value of land use.

- _14_ Each revemn-cost ratio reported i based on the respective charging policy of the case studies examined. Since the revenue-cost ratios are high, i.e., low cost per doilar of revenue raised, the Norwegian schem - Bagen, Oslo (and Trdhaeim) Toil Rngs - are al toll-financing schemes.

- **is** Despite insufficient data, it is likely that the net benefits of cordon pricing would not be high sincoe mnual toll collection by tollbooths impedes traffic flow and causes congestion itself.

- is Hoiland and Watson (1978) report a tough estimation of the economic rate of retum for the first year of the Singapore ALS at 60% to 150%. Data fiom the Hong Kong ERP Project indicates that the benefit-cost ratios for ALS in Hong Kong, if implemented, wouldbe in the rango of 22.5:1 to 33.8:1, even higher than those of the Hong Kong ERP itself. All benefit-cost ratios are based on the specific case studies reported in th text.

- _7_ nTh lower bound estimate of the benefit-cost ratio is based on the actual Oslo Toll Ring, whers the correspon upper bound estimate is for a 'perfict' (link-based) road pricing scheme.

Is

- noe _soci_ benefit-cost ratio for the Dutch EW Proposal using smart card technology is 3.2.

- to Despite the fact that the capital cost for smart card technology is high, the multiple transactions yield a level of cost per tansaction that is in tho mid rage. The annalzed capital cost of a project is arrived at by using a capital recovery factor of 0.125, coreponding to the interest rate of 8% and a project life of 12 _yeas._

- MmTh Hong Kong ERP Scheme required some amont of road work, whes current AVI technologies we gantry-mounted antennas or in-pavement antennas requiring minimal road wodL

- Current AVI tecbnology allows a simple version of vehiclo classfication by linkig an AVI trnsponder with a vehicle's class. Classicatin equipment for heavy vehicles is available and further advances in atomatc vehicle classification (AVC) are curmnly being made.

- Implementdatin of road pricing with manually-operated toil plans is not expaen. Implementation of eleconic road pricing with existn electrmnic toll collection facilities is feasible, especilly with a modular desig.

Seasonal passe and area licenses may not be compatible with other cities nearby.

- CurCurmly, there is a move to come up with an intraionaly agreed upon standard for AVI technology, as part of tho DRIVE project in Europe and the HELP project in the United States, plus its integrtion with automaic vehicle classificaon and weigh-in motion equipment