|Goyal and Howlett,<br>2019|No|By how much and how do internal and external evaluations<br>from ADB projects differ?|The results show that internal evaluations focused more on micro- and meso-level<br>characteristics, while external evaluations laid more emphasis on meso- and macro-level<br>constructs, such as dimensions of policy and the institutional environment in the<br>recipient country, or its level and rate of economic growth.|
|---|---|---|---|
|Guillaumont and<br>Laajaj, 2006|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|Does aid effectiveness increase when receiving countries face<br>exogenous shocks and does it decrease when the total amoun<br>of aid increases?|t<br>During economic vulnerability, as the total amount of aid increases, project effectiveness<br>decreases, likely due to absorptive capacity limitations.|
|Hanson and Sigman,<br>2019|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|In what types of institutional environments are international<br>development projects most likely to succeed?|Using a new measure of state capacity with continuous coverage from 1960-2015 from<br>Hanson and Sigman (2013), the authors find that projects are most likely to succeed<br>where state capacity is relatively high, regardless of regime type or Freedom House<br>scores. In turn, successful World Bank projects can have a positive impact on state<br>capacity.|
|Hernandez, 2017|No|To investigate whether World Bank conditionality in DPLs is<br>affected by the presence of ‘‘new” donors (such as China) by<br>using panel data for 54 African countries over the 1980–2013<br>period.|Empirical results indicate that the World Bank delivers loans with significantly fewer<br>conditions to recipient countries which are assisted by China. In fact, these receive 15%<br>fewer conditions for every percentage-point increase in Chinese aid.|
|Honig, 2020|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|To investigate the relationship between staff presence in<br>recipient countries and aid project performance.|Merely placing WB staff in developing countries has little effect on the success of<br>development projects. However, in the most fragile states, the presence of senior<br>personnel (WB Country Director) is associated with greater project success after the<br>"Strategic Compact" increased CD's power. In short, the impact of WB staff<br>decentralization is mixed and appears to be driven primarily by the power of senior<br>personnel in the field, not the ability of field staff to gather local information.|
|Ika et al., 2012|Yes (Text<br>only)|What is the relationship between critical success factors (CSFs)<br>for World Bank projects and projects’ success?|<br>There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between project success and<br>each of the five CSFs: monitoring; coordination; design; training; and institutional<br>environment. The most prominent CSFs for project supervisors are design and<br>monitoring.|
|Isham et al., 1997|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|Is there a link between WB project success and country<br>governance indicators?|There is a strong statistical link between a country’s civil liberties and WB project<br>performance, however type of political regime and the status of more purely political<br>liberties do not appear to significantly affect project performance.|
|Kersting and Kilby,<br>2016|Yes (Text<br>only)|Investigates how WB lending responds to upcoming elections<br>in borrowing countries, according to U.S. foreign policy<br>interests|Projects in geopolitically important countries and are disbursed faster before elections.|
|Kilby, 2000|Yes (Table<br>A1.2 and<br>Text)|What is the impact of donor supervision on WB development<br>project performance?|Early supervision (measured by number of staff weeks spent on supervision) has a<br>positive impact on performance. Supervision is most effective early in implementation<br>and in projects with smaller loans but has a relatively homogenous impact across regions<br>and sectors. An interaction term between supervision and loan amount indicates that the<br>marginal impact of supervision falls as the size of the loan increases.|
||Yes (Table|How do agency problems between the World Bank and|Evidence from WB projects suggests that agency problems have a substantial impact on|
|Kilby, 2001|A1.2 and<br>Text)|borrowing countries affect the implementation and<br>performance of WB projects?|project implementation, due to limits on supervision and the absence of direct WB<br>implementation.|

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