rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
A framework for regulating
            microfinance institutions
The continuum of institutions providing
            microfinance cannot develop fully without a regulatory
            environment conducive to their growth. Without such an
            environment, fragmentation and segmentation will continue to
            inhibit the institutional transformation of microfinance
            institutions. The authors recommend a tiered approach to
            external regulations, one that takes into account the
            different types of microfinance institutions, the products
            they offer, and the markets they service. A tiered approach
            can be useful in designing regulatory standards that
            recognize the basic differences in structure of capital,
            funding, and risks faced by different kinds of microfinance
            institutions. The model they develop for a regulatory
            framework identifies thresholds of financial intermediation
            activities, thresholds that trigger the requirement that an
            institution satisfy external or mandatory regulatory
            guidelines. It focuses on risk-taking activities that must
            be managed and regulated. They illustrate the usefulness of
            the model by practically applying prudential considerations
            to various categories and values of financial risk for each
            of three broad categories of microfinance institution: 1)
            Those that depend on other peoples' money (such as
            donor or public sector funding). 2) Those that depend on
            members' money. 3) Those that leverage the general
            public's money to fund microfinance loans. For each
            category, the model highlights: 1) The observed value ranges
            for selected indicators of financial risk. 2) Recommended
            ranges of value suitable for consideration under internal
            governance. 3) Suggested threshold values that indicate the
            need for external regulation. A transparent, inclusive
            framework for regulation will preserve the market
            specialties of different types of microfinance institutions
            - and will promote their ultimate integration into the
            formal financial system. One example of the kind of
            regulation the authors recommend: Require standard
            registration documents and procedures - no different from
            those required of regular corporations - including the
            designation of a central government agency with which they
            should register as corporate entities.
Managing foreign labor in Singapore
            and Malaysia : are there lessons for GCC countries
The emerging economies of Singapore and
            Malaysia have labor markets with large foreign components
            because excess labor demand was for a long time met by
            foreign workers. Immigration policy to manage the inflow of
            expatriate labor in the two countries consists of highly
            regulated work permit systems that differentiate workers by
            nationality, skill level, and sector of activity. The
            associated permit fees vary across these parameters. Has
            immigration policy effectively managed foreign labor flows?
            These two countries' containment of the foreign labor
            force at a time of rapid, sustained growth suggest that it
            has. It is not enough to establish a stable macroeconomic
            climate with favorable investment incentives (as Kuwait has
            learned). In Singapore and Malaysia, complementary measures
            help make their immigration policies effective. Those
            measures include nationalization policies that limit
            opportunities for expatriates, institutional capacity to
            implement and enforce policy, a macroeconomic environment
            conductive to growth and job creation, and wage and
            employment policies that are mutually reinforcing. Trends in
            employment composition in both Singapore and Malaysia
            support the assertion that foreign labor policy effectively
            targets workers with skills at both extremes of the scale to
            fill gaps in labor demand unmet by nationals. But the news
            is not all good . A huge informal sector of illegal foreign
            workers in both countries suggests a degree of policy
            failure. Household survey data for Malaysia show that
            foreign workers earn less than their citizen counterparts.
            Foreign labor shares in labor markets in the Golf
            Cooperation Council (GCC) countries range from 50 to 90
            percent of the total labor force in the context of
            persistent excess demand for labor concurrent with emerging
            unemployment among nationals. Policymakers could look to
            Singapore and Malaysia for lessons in managing foreign
            labor. But replicating Singapore's or Malaysia's
            immigration policies alone, without addressing existing
            employment and pay distortions, may have limited success,
            given the very different economies and institutional
            environments in the GCC.
Information, accounting, and the
            regulation of concessioned infrastructure monopolies
Economists often characterize the
            regulation of monopolies as a "game" (between the
            regulator and the service provider) in which the two players
            do not share the same information. The regulator is assumed
            to have poorer information than the service provider about
            the scope of future efficiency gains and the size and timing
            of future investment plans. Over time, the regulator must
            increase its information base so that regulatory targets
            become more realistic - but this is a costly process. The
            authors examine the ways such information can and should be
            generated, especially through the accounting requirements a
            regulator can impose on private operators of infrastructure
            concessions. (They view concessioning and regulation as
            complementary, not substitute, activities.) Concessionaires
            should provide regulators with the information they need to:
            1) Compare outcomes with expectations. 2) Evaluate the cost
            of adverse shocks that may warrant relaxed regulations. 3)
            Evaluate whether lower costs than expected are the result of
            better performance or diminished output. 4) Properly
            evaluate the asset base and charge for the consumption of
            capital. Information that regulators get from private
            operators of infrastructure monopolies should be used to
            make both regulators and concessionaires accountable. In
            Chile, for example, the privatization of monopolies led to
            significant efficiency gains, but it took a long time for
            these gains to be passed on to users because neither the
            firms nor the regulators were held accountable - until
            Congress expressed reluctance to endorse further
            privatization because earlier waves of privatization had not
            benefited consumers. In other words, information should be
            used to make regulatory decisions more transparent and to
            reduce the risk of the private providers
            "capturing" the regulators.
Circuit theory of finance and the
            role of incentives in financial sector reform
The author analyzes the financial
            system's role in economic growth and stability,
            addressing several core policy issues associated with
            financial sector reform in emerging economies. He studies
            finance's role in the context of a circuit model, with
            interacting rational, forward-looking, heterogeneous agents.
            He shows finance to essentially complement the price system
            in coordinating decentralized intertemporal resource
            allocation choices made by agents operating with limited
            information and incomplete trust. He discusses the links
            between finance and incentives for efficiency and stability
            in the context of the circuit model. He also identifies
            incentives and incentive-compatible institutions for reform
            strategies for financial sectors in emerging economies.
            Among his conclusions: 1) Circuit theory features important
            methodological advantages to analyze the role of finance,
            and to assess structural weaknesses of financial systems
            under different institutional settings and in different
            stages of economic development. 2) Incentives for prudence
            and honesty can protect the stability of the circuit by
            directing private sector forces unleashed by liberalization.
            In particular: a) Financial institutions should be
            encouraged to invest in reputational capital. b) Governments
            should complement the creation of franchise value by
            strengthening supervision and by adopting a regulatory
            regime based on rules designed to align the private
            incentives of market players with the social goal of
            financial stability. c) Safety nets to reduce systemic risk
            should minimize the moral hazard from stakeholders by
            limiting risk protection and by making the cost of
            protection sensitive to the risk taken. d) Governments
            should encourage self-policing in the financial sector. e)
            Where information and trust are scarce, there is a potential
            market for them, and governments can greatly improve
            incentives for optimal provision of information. f)
            Governments should strengthen the complementarity between
            the formal and the informal financial sectors. Emphasizing
            incentives is not to deny the importance of good rules,
            capable regulators and supervisors, and strong enforcement
            measures. It is to suggest that the returns on investments
            to set up rules, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms
            can be greater if market players have an incentive to align
            their own objectives with the social goal of financial stability.
Capital inflow reversals, banking
            stability, and prudential regulation in Central and Eastern Europe
The authors show that capital inflows
            into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
            (CEE)--inflows that are mainly private, debt-driven, and
            increasingly supplied by banks on a shortening maturity--are
            especially vulnerable to reversals. They show that the
            region's banking systems are disproportionately exposed
            to those reversals, and absorb the lion's share of
            bank-supplied inflows. They analyze the main links through
            which external finance turbulence is transmitted to the
            domestic banking industry, especially during the transition.
            Mechanisms for prudential regulation are in place in the
            region--and largely mimic the standards directed by the
            European Union--but the authors argue that these standards
            are insufficient for CEE countries. They base their
            arguments not on actual enforcement (a genuine concern) but
            on the fact that EU banking directives were designed for
            more stable economies and for banking systems less
            vulnerable to reversals in capital inflows. A strong case
            can be made, for CEE countries to overshoot those
            directives, at least until the transition is complete.
Balance, accountability, and
            responsiveness : lessons about decentralization
The author examines the reasons
            developing countries are reexamining the respective roles of
            the private sector, civil society, and various levels of
            government--and considering new fiscal arrangements between
            national and lower levels of government. Decentralization
            may be particularly well-suited to developing countries,
            where central governments are not as well developed as in
            industrial countries--because information requirements and
            transaction costs are lower at lower levels of government
            and the government can be more responsive and accountable to
            the citizenry. Vital to the success of decentralized
            decisionmaking, says the author, are: 1) A broad public
            consensus that decentralization is appropriate. 2) Civil
            service reform designed to encourage a service orientation,
            to discourage command-and-control governance and
            rent-seeking, and to prevent the central government from
            having a direct say in the recruitment and promotion of
            subnational civil servants. 3) Proper monitoring and
            oversight of governance. Other lessons from experience
            (include): 1) When there is citizen participation and
            transparency in decisionmaking, limited budgeting, auditing,
            and accounting systems at the subnational level should not
            be considered a barrier to decentralization. Those technical
            capabilities can be borrowed from higher levels of
            government. 2) Indonesia and Pakistan provide good examples
            of "asymmetric" decentralization, in which various
            powers can be assigned to different levels of government,
            depending on capacity. 3) The delinking of taxing and
            spending decisions leads to lack of accountability in the
            public sector. 4) Revenue-sharing (tax-by-tax) distorts
            incentives for efficient tax collection. 5) Properly
            structured (simple, transparent, consistent with objectives)
            fiscal transfers can improve government accountability.
            Fiscal transfers can also be used to encourage competition
            for the supply of public goods. In Canada and Chile, for
            example, Catholic schools compete with public schools for financing.
Trade policies and incentives in
            Indian agriculture : methodology, background statistics, and
            protection and incentive indicators, 1965-95
This paper is the first in a series of
            studies to provide background data and protection and
            incentive indicators for 13 major Indian crops, which have
            been estimated in connection with extensive research on
            Indian agricultural incentives. The general methodology of
            the studies is described in the first section of the paper.
            The second section of the paper focuses on sugarcane and
            sugar. It shows that between 1965 and 1994 real domestic
            prices of sugar and cane were quite stable in India,
            declining an average of 0.6 percent (sugar) and 0.3 percent
            (cane) a year. During the same 29 years the free market
            price of sugar fluctuated widely (expressed in India rupees)
            but in real terms increased about 1.3 percent a year. This
            contrasts in trends reflects the real devaluation of the
            rupee after 1986 but meant that by the early 1990s, at world
            sugar prices of US 13-15 cents a pound or higher,
            India's domestic prices were roughly equivalent to, or
            below, world reference prices. Because of the fluctuations
            in world free market prices, nominal protection of sugar and
            sugarcane production in India--as measured by differences
            between domestic prices and border reference prices--also
            fluctuated. Nominal protection was 1) high during low world
            prices in the 1960s and the mid-1980s; 2) negative when
            world prices were high in the mid-1970s and early 1980s; and
            3) moderate to low by previous standards between 1989 and
            1994. Incentives for cane production did not change much
            when allowance is made for the nominal protection and
            tradable inputs (principally fertilizers) or subsidies for
            the principal nontradable imports (canal irrigation, credit,
            and electricity for pumpsets). Incentives for cane
            production were somewhat higher in Uttar Pradesh than in
            Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Half of Indian cane production
            is used by artisanal producers of gur and small-scale de
            facto unregulated producers of khandsari sugar. Because of
            India's complex regulatory system--especially in the
            important sugar producing state, Uttar Pradesh--incentives
            are significantly higher for unregulated activities than for
            the modern sugar mill sector. Regulations subject sugar
            mills to controls that require them to 1) sell specific
            quantities of their sugar productions at low
            "levy" prices; 2) sell molasses production at a
            fraction (0.1 or less) of open market and border prices; and
            3) pay minimum prices (for specific quantities of cane) at
            above free market prices, except in years of cane shortages.
Managing fiscal risk in Bulgaria
To understand the fiscal position of a
            country, contingent liabilities and other sources of fiscal
            risk need to be considered. The authors develop a framework
            to assess and manage fiscal risk in Bulgaria.
            Bulgaria's Currency Board Arrangement has effectively
            imposed fiscal discipline, but leaves only limited room to
            accommodate potential fiscal shocks. Through risks embedded
            in the portfolio of government contingent and direct
            liabilities, significant fiscal pressures could arise in the
            future. Major sources of risk include environmental
            liabilities and investment requirements, collection
            capacities of the social protection institutions, and
            further engagement in off-budget programs, such as
            government guarantees. To limit the Government's
            exposure to risks, yet accommodate investment needs crucial
            to growth and development, Bulgaria must find an optimal
            strategy for liability management, fiscal reserves, and risk
            mitigation. Priorities for dealing with existing risks and
            limiting further accumulation of risks include: 1)
            Mitigating currency and interest rate risks in the
            government liability structure. 2) Implementing proposed
            institutional and finance reform of the country's
            pension and health care systems. 3) Building adequate
            contingency reserves. 4) Introducing risk-sharing
            arrangements. 5) Prioritizing and placing strict limits on
            the amounts of new guaranteed obligations. 6) Developing
            government capacity to analyze and manage risks. 7) Fully
            integrating fiscal risk management with other policy
            considerations in fiscal management, as part of an
            integrated asset and liability management strategy.
Do high interest rates defend
            currencies during speculative attacks
Drawing on evidence from a large sample
            of speculative attacks in industrial and developing
            countries, the author argues that high interest rates do not
            defend currencies against speculative attacks. In fact,
            there is a striking lack of any systematic association
            between interest rates and the outcome of speculative
            attacks. The lack of clear empirical evidence on the effects
            of high interest rates during speculative attacks mirrors
            the theoretical ambiguities on this issue.
Risk and efficiency in East Asian banks
The author uses a linear programming
            technique (data envelopment analysis) to estimate the
            inefficiencies of banks in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
            Malaysia, the Philippines, and, Thailand. He applies this
            technique to the pre-crisis period 1992-96. Assessing a
            Bank's overall performance requires assessing both
            efficiency and risk factors, so the author also introduces a
            measure of risk taking. This risk measure helps predict
            which banks were restructured after the crisis of 1997. The
            author finds that foreign-owned banks took little risk
            relative to other banks in East Asia, and that family-owned
            and company-owned banks were among the highest-risk takers.
            Banks restructured after the 1997 crisis had excessive
            credit growth, were mostly family-owned or company-owned,
            and were almost never foreign-owned.
Designing pro-poor water and sewer
            concessions : early lessons from Bolivia
The Bolivian government awarded a
            concession for water and sewer services in La Paz and El
            Alto in 1997. One goal of doing so was to expand in-house
            water and sewer service to low-income households. The author
            uses the Aguas del Illimani case to explore how the design
            of typical concession agreements (with monopoly private
            service suppliers) can affect outcomes in poor
            neighborhoods. She finds that outcomes in services can be
            affected by the concession contracts, by the contract bid
            process, by sector regulations, and by regulatory
            arrangements. To increase the likelihood of improvements in
            low-income areas, policymakers should: a) Make contract
            objectives clear and easily measurable. b) Eliminate policy
            barriers to serving the poor (including property title
            requirements and service boundaries that exclude poor
            neighborhoods). c) Design financial incentives consistent
            with service expansion or improved objectives for low-income
            areas. Contracts are subject to negotiation, so expansion or
            connection mandates alone do not guarantee that
            concessionaires will serve poor areas. Provisions and
            standards that reduce service options (for example,
            requirements that eliminate all alternatives to in-house
            connections) or restrict the emergence of new service
            providers (for example, granting exclusivity in the service
            area) could do more harm than good. In two years of
            operation, Aguas del Illimani met its first expansion
            mandate and tool many steps to facilitate income areas. The
            company and the Bolivian water regulator were willing to
            discuss and seek possible solutions to problems associated
            with servicing poor neighborhoods. It is too early to tell
            whether these gains will be sustainable or to predict how
            privatization will ultimately affect poor households in La
            Paz and El Alto.