� openness is below (above) the world median by decade.<sup>7</sup> Hence, we assume that ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for � countries with low financial openness, and ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for countries with high levels of financial openness.

_Resource-rich vs. nonresource-rich countries (Case 5)_ . Further analysis leads us to analyze whether the cyclical behavior of the government consumption expenditure differs between nonresource-rich and resource-rich countries among Sub-Saharan African countries. Our prior is that, in the event of commodity windfalls, resource rich countries will be more prone to conduct expansionary fiscal policies (say, increase government spending). To distinguish between resource and nonresource-rich countries, we need to define criteria to classify countries in the region. First, we define resource rich countries ( _RNR_ ) as those with rents from natural resources (excluding forests) that exceed 10 percent of their GDP (World Bank 2011).<sup>8</sup> Our econometric specification then assumes that ��� = ��� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for countries where ����� � exceeds 10 percent of GDP in the decade, and ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for countries that are not abundant in natural resources. Finally, to avoid exceptional observations, we average the rents coming from the natural resources (excluding forest) as a percentage of GDP by decade (see footnote 7). A second criterion to classify SSA countries by resource abundance requires their average net commodity exports exceeding � 25 percent of total exports throughout the sample period. Again, ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for countries � surpassing the 25% value of exports threshold and ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for those countries unable to surpass that threshold. A final method to characterize (although imperfectly) resource abundance is to test whether SSA countries have established a sovereign wealth fund (which is typically commodity-based in the region). The list of countries with SWF (and their corresponding year of inception) is obtained from � the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. In this case, ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for countries with a sovereign � 9 wealth fund and ��� = �� ( _i=0,1,2,3_ ) for those countries without one.

_Foreign aid (Case 6)_ . Net official development assistance (net-ODA) is an important source of funds for many cash-strapped countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>10</sup> The size of ODA flows to the region have increased from a median value of 6.8 percent of the gross national income (GNI) in the 1970s to 13.3 percent in the 1990s (Figure 4.a). After 2000, the median value of net ODA has declined to 9.3 percent of GNI, reflecting the faster pace of economic growth of the region’s countries with respect to the nineties (see Figure 4.b).

To examine how the relative size of ODA inflows affect the cyclicality of fiscal behavior, we need a threshold to determine the impact of net ODA on a country’s fiscal policy. Given that the median netODA to GNI ratio among Sub-Saharan African countries is 9.5 percent over the period 1970-2014, it seems reasonable to classify countries into low (high) recipients of net ODA if it received the corresponding country receives foreign aid (net of repayments of principal) of at least 10 percent of its GNI. All SubSaharan African countries in our sample have received some type of ODA during the last forty-five years,

> 7 After 2000, we take the average and median for the 2000-2014 period.

> 8 Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.

> 9 Note that we use to different ways to code countries with sovereign wealth fund: (a) we assume constancy over time, and (b) we code a fund only for the years since it was established.

> 10 ODA is concessional finance from bilateral and multilateral donors.  It does not include non-concessional development financing from these donors.

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