rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
4 Investment in physical infrastructure (e.g. water, sewerage, roads, transit, power, telecommunications) has long been considered to be important for economic growth. Indeed, some of the earlier writings on economi( growth, like some of the early prctices of agencies dispensing foreign aid, appear simply to have assumed that investment in infastructure was not only a necesary but almost a sufficient condition for growth. Although subsequent analysis and experience has undermined this simple belief, several recet studies have again awakened interest in the connection between public sector investment in infrastructure and private investment and economic growth.' Whatever the stren of the connection between infstructure and economic growth, infrastructure investments almost invariably constitute the core of both national and regional developmet policy in most countries. Infhstructure investment projects, and the services they provide, are inherently located,in, and serve, particular areas and customers . A road built in the middle of an uninhabited desert is not the same as a road built in a major urban area, even if the physical characteristics of the two projects - the thickness of the pavement, the width of the roadway, etc. - are identical. The productivity (in terms of growth) of an infrastructire project thus depends largely upon its environment - upon where it is located. Moreover, location also determines to a considerabl **e** xtent who benefits from infrastrucure investment: water supply systems with pipes that serve only the rich do not do much for the poor. The efficiency and equity of any particular investmen **t** hus depends in part - often in large part - upon its physica **l** ocation. Infrastructure investment is thus invariably locationor site-specific.

Infrastructure investment is also jurisdiction-specific. In principle, there are many alternative ways in which ocal infrastructure may be provided (Box 1). Is the project designed, financed, regulated, operated and/or maintained by the national government? A regional government? A local government? A state enterprise or other agency reporting to any of these governments? Some sort of public-private interaction (e.g.BOI?<sup>2</sup> How does the government or agency responsible for these different aspects of the investment finmce its responsibilities? To whom is it accountable, in what sense, and how is this accountability exercised?

Seo, notably, Aschauer (1989), and, for an application to developing countries, World Bank (1993). **As a** aide point, it appears that moat such studies assume that infrastructure is provided to the private sector free of cose this may be an ccurate depiction of reality, but it is not a particularly desirable state of affairs.

2 There am many possible forms of public-private interction in the provision of infrastructur: for a recent discussion in the context of a developed country, see Bird and Slack (1993), chap. 7, and also Kitchen (1993).
increased in harder-hit regions. This indicates that trade-displaced workers spend some time unemployed or out of the labor force, but eventually nd reemployment in the informal sector. The evidence thus suggests that informal employment constitute an important margin of labor market adjustment in response to trade shocks. In order to shed light on this issue, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2021) build an equilibrium model of a small open economy with labor market frictions and imperfectly enforced regulations. They estimate the model using data from Brazil and use counterfactual simulations to understand how trade aects economic outcomes in the presence of informality. They nd that trade openness leads to large declines in informality in the tradable sector. On the other hand, the eects of trade openness on informality in the non-tradable sector are more context-dependent. As a result, the overall eect of trade on informality is ambiguous, and generally small. They also nd that trade openness is associated with substantive increases in productivity and that the productivity gains from trade are understated in studies focusing exclusively on the formal sector of the economy.

# 5.2 Credit reforms

## 5.2.1 Repossession of collateral

There is a large literature documenting the relationship between collateral and better credit conditions, in particular larger loan volumes and lower interest rates.<sup>27</sup> To remove ineciencies in the auto loan and other credit markets, the Brazilian government enacted in 2004 the Law 10.931, the Lei de Alienação Fiduciária (Fiduciary law), which aected the auto loan, mortgage, and capital markets. Among other changes, the credit reform simplied the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans. Before the reform, even though banks were allowed to repossess the autos of borrowers who failed to repay their loans, they could not resell these repossessed cars without court approval. As a result, the time from repossession of a car to its resale by the bank averaged more than two years. After the reform the process of reselling a repossessed car became simpler and faster. Borrowers and creditors engaged in direct relationships and courts played a signicant role only when borrowers explicitly requested it. The law thus avoided unnecessary trials, reduced the reliance on courts and increased the enforceability of auto loan contracts.

Assunçao et al. (2014) use micro-level data from one of the largest banks in Brazil to provide direct evidence on the consequences of the reform. They show that the reform resulted in larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities. It also expanded credit

> 27See Djankov et al. (2007).

25
To strengthen women’s lack of control over income and general economic agency, starting at an early age can yield dividends later in life. Studies have shown that teaching girls about their rights in school makes them more intolerant of domestic violence (Friedman et al., 2016), and that adolescent girls’ clubs can not only increase their later employment, but also reduce the likelihood of adolescent pregnancy and early marriage (Bandiera et al., 2020). Among adult couples, men can be taught to take up more of household responsibilities and inform them about gender equality (Doyle et al, 2018), which could free up time for women to do other economic activities. Finally, expanding access to childcare services can help women to work in economic activities (Ajayi et al. 2022, Bjorvatn et al. 2022, Donald and Vaillant 2022).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background data and summary statistics on the Burkinabè context and covers our estimation strategy. Our results on the magnitude of the gender gaps and their drivers are covered in Section 3. Section 4 provides additional data and policy recommendations, while Section 5 concludes.

# **2. Setting and Empirical Strategy**

## **2.1 Context and Data**

Burkina Faso is a largely rural country, with about 70 percent of the population living in rural areas (World Bank 2020). Labor force participation (across both paid and unpaid work) is high, increasing from 70 to 80 percent between 2014 and 2019.<sup>3</sup> However, this does not translate to low poverty levels. In 2021, Burkina Faso had a GDP per capita of less than $800 in constant 2015 dollars, and the expected years of schooling, according to the Human Capital Index data, for both boys and girls in Burkina Faso is seven years. Moreover, the country is undergoing political turmoil and a series of military coups<sup>4</sup> , which could have a severe economic impact.

Although the overall educational attainment remains low, the gender gap in both gross primary and secondary school enrollment has reversed in recent years. Enrollment for boys and girls in primary school is approximately equal (92.2 percent for boys vs. 93 percent for girls), and enrollment for girls in secondary school is slightly higher at 39.4 percent for boys vs. 41.8 percent for girls (UNESCO 2020). These gaps are smaller than the Sub-Saharan African average of a 4-5 pp gender gap in favor of boys for both primary and

> 3 Changes in labor dynamics have been largest in the North, where labor force participation grew from 67 to 87 percent over the same period.

> 4 “Burkina Faso soldiers announce military takeover, Kaboré ‘suspended’” France24. <u>https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220124-burkina-faso-president-kabore-held-by-mutinying-soldierssources-tell-france-24; “The old junta leader makes way for the new in Burkina Faso's second coup of the year” NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/10/02/1126478594/burkina-faso-coup.</u>

4
<!-- Start of picture text --> Ye)ak - =<br>2<br>=ohn<br>= Inflation Targeting<br>2<br>ocoO<br>&<br>=<br>2°<br>S<br>x<br>uw<br>°<br>ANAKTOOTS YTOMOAKTOAKYOMOAKTOATKYOAKYTOATYTOATT COCOOOOOOOoOoOoOoOoOOOOoOoOoOoOoOoOOOSD<br>BSMPHBHBSOOCSCSCoCSCOCOOSCSeooo69 9 6 2 5 S SSS 3355 SSSlEVQ8VOQOOQ@QEQO®LSS er rrrrrrrres<br>HTK OKHANANNANANANANANNANNANNANNANANANNANNANA RoRoRo oho ohoRoRohoRoRokol Rol ooo ono onolononono)AN<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> st -<br>=<br>=<br>is)<br>><br>rf“KNnInfiation Targeting<br>aGi<br>°<br>SoSSCoe SoC COU TU OUT UCU TUE UTE<br>ee ee oS eee ee SUS er eee<br>BODBOOOSSOOOOOOOOOOOOSS A ee ee eS Se SSSOOO SS OOOOOOOO 888888<br>See ee<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> — FPI Equity Flows Volatility (s.d of levels) — FPI Debt Flows Volatility (s.d of levels) —- —-<br>x 1<br>1<br>H<br>oD Inflation Targeting 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>N.1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>_ 1<br>eS)<br>DBHOXKANMTHONGRDDDOKBaAadsooocoseeosesePAHSOSSSSSCSOSSSCSSOSGSOSSCSCSCSOSODOOOOCOSSKYTOMONHKYTMAKT[oo Mo Momo mo Momo Momo MomoMomoMAKSCoqqggqrrrrrerrrrrreYTMAHKYTOMOAHK mMo Romo MomoMoKE NANTTNHNORNADS momoTMAH Mo Momo moTMAST Momomeorrg”<br>HK NANNNANNANANANNANNANNNNANNNANNANNANNAN<br><!-- End of picture text -->
- 13 -

exceed 10 to 15%. Freight rates are quoted according to the weight-volume ratio which is to the advantage of the transport operator.

2.11 Ninety percent of transport charges, both on imports to Morocco and exports to France, are paid in Europe. Insurance costs are included in scheduled rates and are subject to the clauses and conditions of the Geneva Convention (CNN).

## **Barriers and Excess Costs**

## 2.12 Several barriers and potential savings were identified in this case study:

- The charges payable to forwarding agents are computed ad valorem. For example, on a shipment worth 200,000 dirhams (Dh), HAD _(honoraires d'agrees en douane)_ fees were 0.4% and fixed fees were of DH 800 per customs declaration. Potential savings could amount to 50% if transit charges wee paid per ton.

- Port taxes in Casablanca, unlike those in most other countries, are assessed ad valorem at rates of 0.2% on imports and _0.15%_ on exports. Potential savings could amount to 50% if taxes were charged on a tonnage basis. Moroccan customs regulations require that all trailers be unloaded after disembarkation for inspection and clearance. This procedure gives rise to double handling charges and thus generates an excess cost, as well as added risk of damage and loss. If customs authorities have allowed goods to be cleared at factories, potential savings would be 100%.

- Customs clearance, which still includes some manual processes (verification of value of goods and possible adjustment by the customs office, issue of delivery order, audit of manifest), can take anywhere from 24 to 72 hours 1/m an average of 60% of transportation time.

- IRestrictions on ship registry on these sea routes precludes free competition. Savings from undoing restrictions could amount to 25%.

- Moroccan insurance is compulsory on all f.o.b. purchases and C&F sales. The premium of 0.88% is much higher than the Lloyds figure. Savings from matching Lloyds' figure could amount to 50%.

# Tunisia: Transport Chain for Citrus Fruits

2.13 Tunisia's citrus export trade consists almost exclusively of its Maltese-variety oranges, nearly all of which are shipped to France through Marseilles. Even today this traffic follows its traditional route: it is centered on the Marseilles fruit exchange and is based on longestablished Franco-Tunisian personal and commercial relations. Adherence to this pattern remains because of proximity, personal and commercial relationships stretching back to the days of the Protectorate, and certain advantages available to Tunisian exporters, including rebates at Marseille (paid in French francs) to offset the strictness of the Tunisian foreign exchange authorities.
# **Parallel Systems and Human Resource Management in India’s Public Health Services A View from the Front Lines**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

There is growing evidence from some states in India that the delivery of public and private health services suffers both from an actual shortfall in qualified human resources, especially physicians, but also from unsatisfactory performance of existing service providers. A number of studies using large-scale quantitative data show that there is widespread absenteeism among medical providers in the public sector (Chaudhury et al., 2005, Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster, 2008, Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004) and that even though public sector providers are at least as knowledgeable as trained providers in the private sector, and certainly more knowledgeable than informal sector providers, the low effort that these providers exert in clinical interactions reduces their efficacy relative to other alternatives (Das and Hammer, 2007; Das et. al. 2012). Although improving health outcomes is linked to a number of factors, supply side delivery deficiencies evidenced by absenteeism, work shirking, and low productivity limit the ability of government to improve service delivery and, ultimately, contribute to lagging health outcomes (Chaudhury et al., 2005; Misra et al., 2003; Lewis and Pettersson, 2009a,b; MOHFW, 2005a; Das and Hammer, 2007; Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster, 2008; Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004).

Analytical work on human resources in health in India tends to center on the shortfall in actual numbers of personnel that public delivery systems require in order to meet the needs of the growing population as specified in population-based norms and policies (IPHS, GOI. 2007; MOHFW, 2008, 2005b). In contrast, understanding the high incidence of absenteeism, low productivity and low quality of service delivered by providers _already in the system_ draws less attention.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there are relatively few studies that have examined the institutional workings of states and factors that may contribute to provider behaviors and performance.

This study focuses on understanding the institutional environment, in particular the policies, rules and processes that govern human resource management (HRM) in the public health system.<sup>2</sup> We analyze four HRM subsystems: postings, transfers, promotions and disciplinary practices from the perspective of front line workers – physicians working in primary care facilities and hospitals operated by state governments in rural areas.<sup>3</sup> These functions are considered major determinants of human resource performance (Sims, 2
# The Apprenticeship-to-Work Transition: Experimental Evidence from Ghana<sup>_∗_</sup>

Morgan Hardy<sup>_†_</sup> Isaac Mbiti<sup>_‡_</sup> Jamie McCasland<sup>_§_</sup> Isabelle Salcher<sup>_¶_</sup>

**JEL Classification:** C93, I21, I25, I26, J24, J46, O12, O15, O17 **Keywords:** Apprenticeship, Youth Labor Markets, Skills, Ghana

> _∗_ This project was conducted in cooperation with the Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Ghana. We thank the Executive Director, the management team, and staff for their support and input. We are grateful to Emily Beam, Kathleen Beegle, Alex Eble, Andrew Foster, Louise Fox, Jessica Goldberg, Maddalena Honorati, Dhushyanth Raju, Jay Shimshack, Tavneet Suri and seminar participants at Boston University, the Washington Area Development Economics Symposium, University of Virginia, Brown University, University of Vermont, University of Houston, Penn State University, University of Washington, and New York University, for helpful comments and suggestions. The project would not have been possible without the efforts of numerous individuals including Yani Tyskerud, Charles Sefenu, Lois Aryee, Robert Obenya, Anthony Mansaray, Dina Grossman, Taylor Salisbury, Stephanie Adjovu, Renaud Comba, Eric Protzer, Ishita Ahmed, and Kym Cole. We are grateful for the hard work of the field teams at IPA-Ghana. We are especially grateful to Dr. Daniel Baffour-Awuah for his input and guidance in the early phases of this project. We also acknowledge Kim Lehrer’s efforts and intellectual inputs at the start of the project. This research was supported by funding from 3ie, the Center for Economic Policy Research, the International Growth Center, USAID, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, the University of Virginia, the University of British Columbia, New York University Abu Dhabi, and the World Bank Jobs Umbrella Trust Fund which is supported by the Department for International Development/UK AID, and the Governments of Norway, Germany, Austria, the Austrian Development Agency, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. This paper was partly written while Mbiti was visiting the Department of Economics and the Population Studies and Training Center at Brown University. The research protocols were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Innovations for Poverty Action, Southern Methodist University, NYU-Abu Dhabi, the University of British Columbia, and the University of Virginia. The project is registered under the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0001948). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the the position of any agency or funder.

- NYU- Abu Dhabi; morgan.hardy@nyu.edu

> _‡_ University of Virginia, J-PAL, IZA; imbiti@virginia.edu

- _§_ University of British Columbia; jamie.mccasland@ubc.ca

- New York University; isabelle.salcher@nyu.edu
855 assumption of equivalent amounts of delay for each policy suite would be violated.

856 Hence, we have 857 and by (C.14) we have 858 Therefore, it must be the case that 859 as desired.

860

# **D Calibration of numerical experiments**

861 We follow the prescriptions of Vogt-Schilb et al. (2018) and Bauer et al. (2024a) to calibrate our 862 numerical experiments. We lift marginal abatement cost and abatement potential rates from Intergov863 ernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022b), and utilize the algorithm presented in Vogt-Schilb et al. 864 (2018) to compute the marginal investment costs for each sector. We use estimates for the capital 865 depreciation rates of capital in each sector from Philibert (2007) and World Bank (2012). We lift the 866 central estimate of the RCB for the 1.7 °C temperature target from Friedlingstein et al. (2023). This 867 approach gives us the parameter values found in Table II.

868

# **References**

- 869 D. Acemoglu, P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous. The Environment and Directed Technical 870 Change. _American Economic Review_ , 102(1):131–166, Feb. 2012. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer. 871 102.1.131. URL `https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.102.1.131` .

- 872 M. B. Andaloussi, B. Carton, E. Christopher, J. Florence, D. Muir, J.-M. Matal, A. J. Panton, and 873 S. Voigts. Near-term Macroeconomic Impact of Decarbonization Policies. In _World Economic Out-_ 874 _look: Countering the Cost-of-Living Crisis_ , World Economic Outlook. International Monetary Fund, 875 Washington DC, Oct. 2022. URL `https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/10/` 876 `11/world-economic-outlook-october-2022` .

45
**Table 4: Circumstances and drop-out rate: Probit estimates**

||**1988**|**1998**|**2006**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Girl|0.2268***<br>(0.000)|0.0813***<br>(0.000)|0.0777***<br>(0.000)|
|Alex, P.Said, Suez|0.0951***<br>(0.001)|0.1189***<br>(0.001)|0.0592***<br>(0.001)|
|Urban lower|0.0663***|0.1483***|-0.0339***|
||(0.001)|(0.001)|(0.001)|
|Urban upper|-0.0015<br>(0.001)|0.0944***<br>(0.001)|-0.0036***<br>(0.001)|
|Rural lower|0.1679***<br>(0.001)|0.1223***<br>(0.001)|-0.0251***<br>(0.001)|
|Rural upper|0.2055***<br>(0.001)|0.1416***<br>(0.001)|0.0932***<br>(0.001)|
|Mother w/ primary or preparatory|-0.2383***<br>(0.001)|-0.1839***<br>(0.001)|-0.1610***<br>(0.001)|
|Mother w/ secondary|-0.3488***<br>(0.001)|-0.2936***<br>(0.001)|-0.2790***<br>(0.000)|
|Mother w/ college|||-0.3128***<br>(0.001)|
|Father w/ primary or preparatory|-0.2032***<br>(0.001)|-0.0954***<br>(0.001)|-0.0608***<br>(0.000)|
|Father w/ secondary|-0.2196***<br>(0.001)|-0.1365***<br>(0.001)|-0.1234***<br>(0.001)|
|Father w/ college|-0.3563***<br>(0.001)|-0.1594***<br>(0.001)|-0.2776***<br>(0.001)|
|Father service or industry worker|0.0441***<br>(0.001)|0.1026***<br>(0.001)|0.0310***<br>(0.001)|
|Father in agriculture or element. ocup.|0.0544***<br>(0.001)|0.1349***<br>(0.001)|0.0287***<br>(0.001)|
|Number of Obs|5075557|7396773|7812837|
|PseudoR2|0.123|0.094|0.136|

_Source_ : 1988 LFSS; 1998 ELMS; and 2006 ELMPS. _Note:_ * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. _Sample_ : 15-19 year-olds; reference categories are: boy, birth in Great Cairo, uneducated mother (or missing value), uneducated father (or missing value), and father professional, manager, technician or clerk.

**Table 5** documents the reasons reported for never attending school and dropping out (using

information collected among 10-29 year-olds by the SYPE 2009 survey). About half of neverattenders report family or own choice as a reason for not going to school. A higher proportion for girls reported that cultural views toward gender roles still enter in these decisions. Financial constraints and opportunity costs of schooling (i.e. the foregone economic contribution of children attending school) were mentioned by 52 and 46 percent of never-attending boys and girls, respectively. Customs, traditions and marriage are cited as reasons by 24 percent of girls. Hence, 11
F(t). The mean value of Vi is  i and the standard variance is  i. The WTP model can be written as, where  i is a random term with a mean of zero. Individual i knows his valuation distribution. When given a price tij, the probability for the person to say ―yes‖ to the offered price, tij, will be, Pij = Prob(Vi>tij)=1-F(tij) (2) Once Pij, the probabilities for individual i to agree to the price tij, is known to a researcher, either by assigning numerical values to the verbal MBDC data or by directly asking individuals of their numerical likelihood information as did with the SPC approach (Wang and Whittington, 2005), equation (2) can be estimated for each individual. The estimation model can be constructed as follows: Pij = 1-F(tij) + λi (3) where λi is an error term with a mean of 0 and a standard variance of <sup>2</sup> .  can be constant for a respondent i, but are different for different respondents. Pij is a dependent variable, which is the likelihood answer given by respondent i at price j. Pij takes values between 0 and 1, and can be viewed as a continuous variable. tij is an independent variable, which corresponds to the bid price proposed in the questionnaire, and tij is also a continuous variable.

Assume a specific functional form for Fi(•), such as of a normal distribution, with a mean  ( _tij_  <u></u> _i_ )  i and a standard variance  i , i.e., F(tij)=  _i_ , then the model (3) becomes, The major purpose is to estimate and analyze  i, the mean value of Vi for each respondent, which is a function of personal information such as personal characteristics and uncertainties, etc. A two-stage approach proposed by Wang and He (2010) to estimate the equation (4)<sup>16</sup> can be summarized in the following.

# <u>Stage 1: Estimate equation (4) for each individual i</u>

Assume λi has a normal distribution. Then, The log likelihood function then is:

> 16 In contrast to the estimation model presented in Wang and Whittington (2005), the equation (4) adds an error term to the probability model, which reflects the consideration that the probability values given by respondents may have deviations from their valuation distributions.

11