Information technology in this setting clearly introduces efficiencies within the renewal process, including accessing the vital records of the applicants online and reducing administrative shortcomings such as deficient record keeping, typing mistakes, etc. Further, information technology significantly facilitates the process for applicants by allowing them to perform all of the renewal process steps within one physical location. Yet, the differential effects of this technology across the characteristics of applicants, and the fact that the characteristics of applicants are important determinants of variation in renewal outcomes, is not fully consistent with a simple story of efficiencies within this process. In particular, the fact that the characteristics of applicants are important predictors of variation in renewal outcomes is consistent with four hypotheses. First, police officers might not be providing a homogeneous service across the population, wherein police officers provide different service quality to applicants based on their intrinsic characteristics. The provision of different service quality to applicants in detriment of applicants of relatively disadvantaged backgrounds has been previously reported as an important barrier in access to ID cards by citizens in Bolivia (e.g. World Bank (2000), Mansilla (2003), Quintana (2003), and Wanderley (2007)). The results of this study are consistent with all of this previous evidence based on qualitative data. Further, to the extent that information technology reduces the possibility of exercising discretion as far as missing vital records across applicants, this hypothesis is also consistent with the observed reduction in success rates gaps across applicants resulting from the use of this technology. Yet, if differential service quality provision to applicants based on their characteristics were the only mechanism operating to lower barriers in access to ID cards in this setting, we would not expect to observe changes in the time it takes to complete a renewal resulting from the adoption of this technology. In particular, information technology does not introduce any particular incentive for police officers to change their service provision patterns based on the type of renewal. To this end, it is plausible that something else, in addition to differential service quality provision to applicants based on their characteristics, might be operating here that is forcing police officers to discriminate less frequently against relatively disadvantaged applicants when randomly assigned to the digital process.

A second hypothesis that is consistent with the fact that applicants’ characteristics are important determinants of access to ID cards is that police officers might be practicing selective enforcement of rules. Selective enforcement of rules is possible, in this setting, because of the opportunities that police officers have to exercise discretion in completing some of the renewal steps. The intuition behind the selective enforcement of rules is as follows. To maximize the possibility of extracting bribes from applicants, police officers would purposely complicate the process to create incentives for applicants to incur in extra-legal payments and finish with the process. Applicants at higher risk of being targeted are those from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds, which tend to be less demanding and less likely to voice complaints. These results would be consistent with previous literature on petty corruption within public service delivery in several developing countries, and would also be consistent with the possibility that information technology might act as a brake to curb petty corruption within this specific bureaucratic process.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the existence of petty corrup-

> 10The literature on corruption within public service delivery has looked mainly at how bureaucrats price discriminate when setting bribes and the social and economic costs of corruption. Svensson (2003) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) find evidence that corrupt bureaucrats act as price discriminators in determining access to public services. Olken and Barron (2009) collect field data on bribe payments by truckers to road post officials, in Indonesia, and find evidence that corrupt bureaucrats behave like price discriminating profit-maximizing firms. Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2007) provide experimental evidence that bureaucrats undercut existing regulations on obtaining a driving

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