rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
secondary school (UNESCO, 2020). Burkina’s adolescent fertility rate is also lower than that of peer countries such as Mali, Niger and Uganda, but still high at 100 births per 1,000 adolescent girls. Moreover, Burkina Faso has reduced its maternal mortality rate from 516 to 320 per 100,000 live births between 2000 and 2017, in line with the overall reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa of 39 percent over this period (WHO 2019).

Despite this progress, stark gender disparities in Burkina Faso persist. As of July 2022, merely 16.9% of seats in parliament were held by women (Parline 2023). Only 9.9% of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education, compared to 15.7% of their male counterparts (UNESCO 2020). Women of reproductive age (15-49 years) often face barriers with respect to their sexual and reproductive health and rights; only 28.1% of women in 2020 had their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods, e.g., condoms or the pill (UNDP 2021). Women are customarily expected to be submissive to their husbands (Nikièma et al., 2008; Kieran et al., 2015), and while a high proportion of women work in agriculture, most of them are engaged in subsistence farming (Weber, 2018), often on their husband’s plots. Although the law allows for women to own property, the prevalence of local norms ensures that few women own land (Kieran et al., 2015). These gender disparities could widen further as the county is facing armed conflicts with Islamist groups, who reportedly now control about 40 percent of the country, and there have been armed conflicts in 10 of the 13 regions in Burkina Faso.<sup>5</sup> How do gender disparities manifest in terms of labor force participation and earnings? Our primary source of data to investigate this question is the “Enquête Harmonisée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages 2018-2019” (EHCVM). The EHCVM is a nationally representative survey carried out in each country of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Burkina Faso survey was conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography (INSD), the national statistical agency of Burkina Faso. The survey used a stratified two-stage sampling, with 585 enumeration areas randomly selected in the first step, and 12 households randomly drawn from each enumeration area in the second step. EHCVM surveyed around 7,000 households. The survey asked a rich variety of questions about different individual characteristics, such as income, educational attainment, and sector of employment.

Figure 1 shows male and female employment by sector in the EHCVM data, depicted as a Venn diagram. Individuals can have more than one occupation—for example, someone may be both a farmer and a business manager, or a farmer and a paid employee. In each of the 7,000 households covered by the survey,

> 5 “Burkina Faso – Events of 2022” _Human Rights Watch_ . https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/countrychapters/burkinafaso#:~:text=Burkina%20Faso's%20human%20rights%20situation,result%20of%20two%20military%20coups.

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# **Are Stable Agreements for Sharing International River Waters Now Possible?**

## **_D. Marc Kilgour & Ariel Dinar_**

### **1. Introduction**

Many of the world's river and lake basins and ground water aquifers are shared by two or more countries. In a United Nations study, international river and lake basins were estimated to comprise about 47 percent of the world's continental land area (United Nations, 1978). In Africa, Asia, and South America, this proportion rises to at least 60 percent (Barrett, 1994). Of the 200 international rivers in a survey cited by Barrett (1994), 148 are shared by two countries, 30 by three, 9 by four, and 13 by five or more countries--as many as ten.

Most countries that share ownership of water resources also depend on those resources. Thus, the size of a country's share of a commonly-held water body has important direct and indirect effects on the country's well-being. If the common waters are rivers, these direct and indirect effects are unidirectional, and can create problems are particularly difficult to resolve.

The direct effects of water allocation in international river basins are crucial because water is an essential input for many productive processes, and alternative sources may be impractical. But neither is it possible to ignore the indirect outcomes (externality effects) of water allocation. These considerations may include not only reduction of water level and flow volume (because of excessive withdrawals upstream), but also deterioration of water quality (as a result of pollution in return flows upstream). It is hardly surprising that international rivers have often been the focus of regional tensions and conflicts.

Examples of upstream-downstream disputes (Vlachos, 1990; Barrett, 1994; Kirmany and Rangeley, 1994) include the proposal for out-of-basin diversion of the Mekong River (Thailand and Laos); the operation of the Farraka Barrage diversion of the Ganges (India and Bangladesh); the proposed desalination plant near Morales Dam on the Colorado River (Mexico and U.S.A.); and the recent dispute over the 1959 Nile water agreement (Egypt, Sudan, and now Ethiopia).

In the literature on international water disputes, several principles have been proposed to prevent or resolve disputes within an international water basin (Sofer 1992):

- The _Harmon Doctrine,_ that a state has absolute sovereignty over the area of the river basin within it. This principle clearly favors upstream states.

- The principle of _Territorial Integration of all Basin States._ Symmetrically, this principle favors downstream states, to which it accords "equal" use, without regard to their contribution to the flow.
same vein, if fast layoff increases by itself the size of the job-to-job transition costs, then the optimal speed of layoff would be reduced further.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, there is ample evidence that the labor market is already weakening considerably. The pace of restructuring has intensified since the CCP's Fifteenth Congress in 1997. Large unproductive firms are encouraged to convert to joint stock or limited liability companies. Small- and medium sized SOEs have been restructured through annexation, shareholding, bankruptcy, business closedown, leasing, auction and private sales. As a result, there were 11.5 million state workers made redundant by 1997, and three million were laid off during the restructuring process in 1998. A recent study shows that the non-state sector is absorbing many of those laid-offs. Within a year, more than half of the laid-off worker found new jobs, with sixty percent of those joining the private sector either by setting up their own company or working for private companies (See China Business Review, Oct. 1998). However, it appears that unemployment has risen sharply, the official unemployment rate has risen to over 7 percent, but the real rate is probably much more.

Second, we need to look at financial complications relative to the simple model. Note that the compensation that needs to be offered is of a stock (or promisary) nature, while the benefit is a flow. This has no bearing on the analysis as long as the public sector is not credit constraint, since the layoff decision creates value overall, even if it is initially unfavorable from a cash flow perspective. In the current situation of a weak and over-indebted banking sector however, overall

> 16 Aghion and Blanchard (1994) argue that hasty restructuring in the state sector, due to the resulting high unemployment which generates congestion costs and increased search costs for new jobs.

_15_
We also consider primary and secondary school enrollment rates using data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. Because education is one of the most important opportunity costs of child employment, child labor market changes are likely to be reflected in school enrollment rates. Furthermore, primary school enrollment rates in particular should reflect changes in under 14 employment without potential misreporting due to cultural stigma or legal prohibitions on child labor. School enrollment rates should also capture child labor market changes at both the intensive and extensive margin. Our child employment rates only capture changes in child labor at the _extensive_ margin—entry and exit from employment—while changes in the intensity of child employment might also be reflected in school enrollment rates.

We also include in the Appendix estimates on what we refer to as wage “premia” for these age groups. We calculate these child wage “premia” as the median wage for the age group divided by the median wage over the entire population.<sup>11</sup> As with our relative household equality measures discussed above, these relative wage measures will avoid confounded results driven by cross-sectional income or exchange rate differences. In addition to these child wage premia, we also calculate a skill premium as the median wage for survey respondents who completed secondary education divided by the median wage for respondents who did not complete secondary schooling.

From this pseudo-panel, we construct as our analysis data set a “stacked” country panel with a _±_ 3 year event window around entry into force of any RTAs. To do so we consider every year an RTA enters into force for a country and include three years before and three years after. If a country has multiple RTAs enter into force in adjacent years, each of _±_ 3 year event windows enter into the analysis dataset separately and are “stacked” or pooled.<sup>12</sup> We report summary statistics from this analysis dataset in Table 1.

Our data on RTAs and agreement content have been collected as part of the broader World Bank

> 11Here we condition on strictly positive wages. Numerous respondents report a wage of zero despite reporting employment. The majority of these respondents are employed in the agriculture sector or the “commerce” sector; we speculate these individuals are employed by family-owned businesses in which household members do not draw individual wage compensation. Including such zero wages will severely bias aggregated wages to zero in our pseudopanel.

> 12Given our focus on child employment, we filter our data on country-year observations for which aggregated child employment rates (both under 14 and 14–17) are not missing.

16
**Figure 1:  Fraction of inputs that are sourced domestically by multinationals**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0 20 40 60 80 100<br>% domestically sourced inputs by MNEs<br>5 20 35 50 65 80 95<br>% domestically sourced inputs by MNEs (country average)<br>-20 0 20 40<br>Change in domestically sourced inputs by MNEs (country average)<br>.02<br>.015<br>.01<br>Density<br>.005<br>0<br>15 .03<br>10 .02<br>Density<br>Frequency<br>5 .01<br>0 0<br>10<br>5<br>Frequency<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> .

Notes: The top graph shows the fraction pooling all firm-year observations. The middle graph shows the distribution of the country-average pooling over all survey years. The bottom graph shows the change in the country-average between the last two survey years for countries with multiple surveys (standardized to represent the change over 5.8 years). The dashed lines in the top two graphs are comparable statistics for non-MNEs.

12
<!-- Start of picture text --> 100% 40%<br>90% 35%<br>SES<br>as) 80% S<br>S 70% 30% ¥&%<br>= 60% 25% &<br>c 50% 20% ¢<br>2 &<br>gS 15% 3<br>> 30% r=<br>oO 10%<br>20% fa}<br>10% 5%<br>0% 0%<br>2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br>Ga Collectionrate mf Distribution Losses<br><!-- End of picture text -->
committees in Uttar Pradesh and efforts to increase interest in and awareness of schooling quality and the role of village education committees, outcomes remain poor and village education committees are dysfunctional.<sup>25</sup> The authors of the education study conclude that large-scale oversight mechanisms work best when stakeholders can directly and easily observe problems. This may suggest the more appropriate oversight focus for any direct community oversight role. In road construction, for example, this might be to spot problems such as the lack of a road where one should be, one lane where there should be two, or potholes where there should be repairs.

A second feature worth noting is the considerable costs that can be associated with active transparency and oversight. The Indonesia Urban Poverty Program, financed by the World Bank, disburses about $100m a year to over 8,000 villages across Indonesia and provides one example of both benefits and costs. As part of the oversight mechanism, 100,000 elected volunteers serve as project overseers. In addition, a website records project details including individual project details, implementation status, full consultant contracts, consultant invoices, status of disbursement and details on travel expenses related to the project and a complaint handling mechanism.<sup>26</sup> The project website is visited more than 2,000 times a day, and recorded 6,423 complaints in 2007. 84 of these complaints involved mis-use of funds totaling $80,000. As a result of the complaints a court action has been launched and $32,000 in funds has been returned to date.

At the same time, the total cost of capacity building and oversight mechanisms is estimated at 13 percent of project costs, or a little over $24m out of a $186m project. These costs are lower than the benefits frequently associated with oversight and transparency in community projects, and many are one-off expenditures associated with benefits that will far outlast the life of the project –but they are still considerable.

This suggests the possibility that measures to improve governance, much like other regulation designed to minimize market or government failure, can carry higher costs than the economic benefit of the reduced corruption that they are associated with. Ben Olken’s examination of anti-corruption interventions in community-driven road projects in Indonesia suggested that sending out invitations to village meetings to discuss projects might fall into that category, for example.<sup>27</sup>

# **Publishing Contracts and Implementation Details**

With that caveat, one comparatively cheap and potentially powerful tool to improve outcomes in public procurement is the regular publication of contract and implementation details. In particular, the publication of government contracts would improve transparency (and so hopefully reduce corruption). There is a clear public interest in access to such documents as they involve distribution of public funds or publiclycontrolled properties. Publication would also provide a large stock of public intellectual

> 25 Banerjee et al 2008. 26 Soraya, 2009a.

> 27 Olken, 2007.

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coastal hazards. However, this paper focuses on another crucial aspect of the vulnerability of coastal populations in developing countries to climate change, which is its impact on poor rural LECZ populations. This impact has three channels. First, in the poorest developing countries, LECZ populations remain predominantly rural and have a high incidence of poverty. These poor rural LECZ populations can least afford to adapt to or protect themselves against sea-level rise and other coastal hazards, such as storm surges, coastal erosion and saltwater intrusion. Second, the disruptions and losses caused by such coastal hazards impact _directly_ the livelihoods of many rural coastal households, such as agriculture and fishing. Finally, rural coastal populations and their livelihoods are also affected _indirectly_ , as they are supported and protected by coastal and near-shore ecosystems, such as mangroves, marsh, coral reefs, seagrass beds and barrier islands, which are disappearing rapidly in many developing countries and are also threatened by climate change.

The purpose of this paper is to review and assess these three channels of the impact of climate change on poverty in coastal areas of developing countries. First, the paper reviews the main trends in LECZ coastal populations worldwide. Second, using spatially referenced data for infant mortality and child malnutrition reveals the extent and incidence of poverty among rural LECZ populations in specific developing regions and countries. Third, based on this spatial analysis, the vulnerability of the rural LECZ poor to the impacts of climate change is analyzed, including examining the specific effects on their main coastal livelihoods. The paper concludes by summarizing the findings and discussing their policy implications for improving the protection and adaptation of poor rural LECZ populations given future climate change hazards.

# **2. Population Trends in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone**

Approximately 28% of the population living within 100 km of the coast globally can be found in the LECZ (see Table 1). This share is almost one-third for developing countries, and around 47% for low-income economies. East Asia & Pacific has around 40% of its coastal population in LECZ, followed by 35% in South Asia and 27% in Middle East & North Africa.

Although about 29% of the rural coastal population of developing countries is in the LECZ, this share is almost one-half for low-income economies (Table 1). In South Asia, 35% of the rural coastal population is located in the LECZ, 33% for East Asia & Pacific, and 28% for Middle East & North Africa.

4
5 rather than double differences (looking at differences in changes between ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ households before and after a program’s implementation). The reason for using single differences is that there are no suitable baseline data that would allow double-differencing to be undertaken. Some of the households in the 2004 Vietnam Household and Living Standard Survey (VHLSS)—the survey used in what follows— were interviewed two years before in the 2002 VHLSS. However, although the HCFP program did not exist at that date, its predecessors did, so already in 2002 there were poor people who had been assigned a health card or who had been enrolled in the health insurance program. If the aim is to get an estimate of the impact of being covered by one or other of the HCFP modalities versus not being covered (but eligible for the program), the 2002 VHLSS cannot therefore serve as a baseline. Aside from this, only a minority of households in the 2004 survey can be found in the 2002 survey, and the health utilization questions are different, making a double-difference somewhat heroic. The limitations of the single-difference approach used in the paper are discussed further below.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of the HCFP program. Section III outlines the methods used to estimate its impact. Section IV presents the data and evidence on targeting. Section V presents the estimation results of the model used to estimate the propensity score for the analysis of impacts, and the results of balancing tests. These estimation results also shed further light on the issue of targeting. Section VI presents the estimates of the impacts of HCFP, and the final section (VII) contains a summary and discussion.

# II. **VIETNAM’S HEALTH CARE FUND FOR THE POOR**

In October 2002, through an edict known as Decision 139<sup>5</sup> , the government mandated all provincial governments to provide free health care to three groups: households defined as poor according to official government poverty standards introduced in November 2000; all households regardless of their own assessed income living in communes covered by a program set up as a result of another policy known as Decision 135 dating from 1998, which provides support and services to especially

> 5 This section draws heavily on the excellent reviews of Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006).
**Table A10. Amounts of scholarships for the students enrolled in tertiary education (cycle 1, cycle 2, integrated studies, medical and pharmaceutical education) and those enrolled in post-secondary and non-tertiary post-secondary professional-technical education and secondary professional-technical education, MDL/month**

|Nr.<br>crt.|Categories of scholarship|In tertiary level|In postsecondary level|
|---|---|---|---|
|**I.1.**|CategoryI|880|690|
|**I.2.**|CategoryII|750|575|
|**I.3.**|CategoryIII|690|530|
|II.|Social|465|405|
|III.|Cycle II|945|n.a.|

_Source: Annex 1 of the Regulatory framework for provision of student scholarships, Government Decision no.1009 of September1, 2006._

**Table A11. Amounts of scholarships for students enrolled in secondary** **<u>professional education</u>**

|Category of students|Category of scholarships|Amount of scholarship, MDL|
|---|---|---|
|**All students except those studying in classes for**<br>**deaf and hearing-impaired persons**|Category I<br>Category II|510<br>430|
||Category III|360|
|**Students studying in classes for deaf and hearing-**<br>**impaired persons**||390|

_Source: Annex 1 of the Regulatory framework for provision of student scholarships..., Government Decision no.1009 of September 1, 2006_ Students having permanent residence outside the city where the educational establishment functions are entitled to 50% subsidy for two trips per year to their hometown and back. Also, they are reimbursed 50% of the regular accommodation and per diem expenditures during their mandatory internship practices and 100% of the related travel expenditures.

Students from some social groups (orphans, parents are persons with disabilities, families with many children, persons who are teachers) benefit of free accommodation in the student dormitories owned by educational institutions where they are enrolled.

# Transport subsidies

A number of social categories are entitled to free travel in the public transport units in the municipality of Chisinau, including:

- Local elected officials

- Employees in the security and law-enforcing bodies;

- Veterans of war and holders of high-rank state orders and medals;

- Honorable citizens of the Chisinau municipality (a title awarded by municipal authorities to distinguished persons)

- Blood donors;

- Victims of political repression in the Soviet times.

According to the municipal sources, a total number of 20,000 persons are entitled to free of charge travel in the public transportation system of the municipality of Chisinau.<sup>11</sup> Pensioners of age and persons with disability are also entitled to compensated annual tickets. In 2018, the local authorities in Chisinau allocated 68 million MDL for transport compensation.

Besides, the municipal council adopted a set of lower transportation fees for pupils and students, including those from vulnerable families. For a normal monthly fee of 180 MDL, the pupils and students are entitled to pay only 70 MDL, whereas students from vulnerable families – only 50 MDL.

> 11 <u>https://www.timpul.md/articol/20-de-mii-persoane-calatoresc-gratuit-cu-transportul-public-in-chiinau-131461.html.</u>

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