than $1.90 per day increased by 0.12 percentage point from 13.7 percent. This is equivalent to an additional 8.3 million, or a 1 percent increase in the number of extreme poor.

**Heterogeneity in poverty impact.** The increase in world food prices, combined with government intervention, was most strongly felt in countries such as India and Uganda, where the extreme tend to be net whose real incomes declined.<sup>24</sup> The poor food-buyers poverty impact of the 2010-11 food price spike on some regions such as East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is estimated to have been limited: low rates of poverty combined with the benefits of the price increase for countries that are heavy exporters of rice (EAP) or maize (LAC) offset some of the losses incurred due to the increase in prices. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa—the region that accounts for two-thirds of the global increase in poverty—countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria implemented insulation policies that reduced poverty.

**Comparison with 2007-08 food price shock.** These poverty impacts are less pronounced than those induced by the 2007-08 food price shock. The 2007-08 food price shocks may have increased extreme poverty by 105 million (Ivanic and Martin 2008). Government policies reduced poverty impacts and their combined effect was close to zero (Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin 2014). The difference in poverty impacts reflects the greater severity of the 2007-08 price shocks, the stronger transmission of price changes from world to domestic markets and higher initial poverty rates (the poverty headcount in India, for instance, fell from 31 percent in 2009 to 21 percent in 2011).<sup>25</sup> While the 2007-08 event was led by rice prices, exacerbated by export restrictions imposed by major rice producers, the 2010-11 food price surge was led by maize and wheat prices, triggered by adverse weather events in major wheat and maize producers in Australia and the Black Sea Basin. During 2007-08, large rice consumers, such as India, imposed export restrictions to contain domestic rice price increases. These were gradually unwound over the following years. In 2010-11, some large wheat and maize producers, such as Russia and Ukraine, introduced export restrictions and import bans to contain domestic price pressures.

24Results reported here do not take into account the impact of safety-net programs such as India’s Public Distribution System, which distributes food to poor households at fixed prices.

25World Bank (2012) estimate that the 2010-11 food price spike increased the number of poor by 50 million in the short run, and by 34 million in the long run. These higher estimates do not explicitly account for insulation policies and consider price increases of a wider range of food commodities (also beef, chicken, dairy, vegetable oils and soybean prices). In addition, there is uncertainty around poverty estimates due to systematic measurement errors in household surveys that may bias the poor’s dependence on food purchases (Headey and Martin 2016). Finally, Jacoby (2016) and Jacoby and Dasgupta (2018) highlight the importance of accounting for the endogenous agricultural wage response and spillover effects to non-agricultural wages (also accounted for in this paper).

21