|**Study**|**Results**|**Place**|**Time**|**Reform indicator**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Liu & others<br>(2016)| Reform is greater in democracies than autocracies.<br> Renewable energy feed-in tariffs are more common in countries<br>that have undergone power sector reform, especially<br>authoritarian regimes, and in particular in countries with<br>independent power producers and an independent regulator.|158<br>countries|1990-<br>2011|Erdogdu’s (2011) electricity<br>market reform score|
|Nagayama<br>(2009)| Reform is greater after high electric prices (assuming a two year<br>lag of reform after high prices) in Asian developing countries,<br>former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.<br> Reforms are followed by lower prices for industry in Asian<br>developing countries, but by higher prices for all users in<br>developed countries.|73 countries;<br>global<br>sample|1985-<br>2003|Nagayama’s (2009) own<br>liberalization model code|
|Rufin (2003)| Private ownership and competition are greater in countries with<br>greater economic freedoms. Competition is greater in countries<br>with less distributional conflict.|75 countries,<br>global<br>sample|1998|Rufin (2003) for ownership<br>and competition; Bacon<br>(1999) for overall reform.|
|Sen & others<br>(2016)| Reform of distribution utilities correlates with political freedoms,<br>political reform and civil liberties.<br> Countries perceived as less corrupt trade more electricity with<br>each other.<br> Distribution privatization without a regulator correlates with<br>positive GDP growth, but with regulator does not. Countries with<br>a regulator improved income equality more than countries without<br>a regulator.|17<br>developing<br>Asian<br>economies|1990-<br>2013|Sen & others’ (2016) own<br>reform index with six dummy<br>variables|
|Urpelainen &<br>Yang (2016)| A country is more likely to reform to the extent that its regional<br>neighbors have reformed.<br> Market reform legislation and introduction of IPPs are highly<br>effective at attracting private investment, even in countries with<br>few constraints on executive power. They attract more domestic<br>than international investment.|177 non-<br>OECD<br>countries|1982-<br>2008|Erdogdu’s (2011) electricity<br>market reform score|
|Urpelainen &<br>others (2017)| A country is more likely to reform when its regional neighbors<br>have reformed.<br> Reform increases generation capacity (by up to 5% for each<br>reform; 40% for full reform) especially in developing countries,<br>even with hybrid reforms (i.e. with no privatization or free<br>competition). Reform decreases T&D losses (up to 2 percentage<br>points for each reform; 11 points for full reform). Reforms benefit<br>countries with poor bureaucracies and authoritarian regimes<br>more than countries with good bureaucracies or democratic<br>regimes, as the latter already had relatively good sector<br>performance before reform and therefore had less to gain.<br> T&D losses are lower in countries with democratic political<br>institutions.|184<br>countries|1982-<br>2008|Erdogdu’s (2011) electricity<br>market reform score|
|Zelner &<br>others (2009)| Governments renegotiate more IPPs when the country’s trading<br>partners have too. Renegotiation occurs less in countries with<br>higher multilateral debt. <br> Governments renegotiate more IPPs when there is political<br>conflict, and during periods when public sentiment toward private<br>enterprise is negative (measured by coding sentiment in news<br>articles). Governments selectively renegotiated the terms of<br>private investment in roughly 20 percent of private power<br>generation projects in countries that liberalized.|974 private<br>generation<br>projects in<br>62 countries<br>globally<br>(excluding<br>US and<br>Canada), of<br>which 20%<br>of projects<br>were<br>renegotiated|1989-<br>2001|Zelner & others’ (2009) own<br>concept of ‘retrenchment’<br>defined as the number of<br>private electricity generation<br>projects whose formal terms<br>were changed by the<br>government so as to reduce<br>project investors’ net revenue<br>stream, severe enough to<br>warrant press coverage, but<br>without formal repeal of a<br>liberalization policy (p.388-9)|

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