rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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- Vasilaky, K. (2010). ‘As Good as the Networks They Keep? Expanding Farmer’s Social Networks Using Randomized Encouragement in Rural Uganda.’ Yale University, New Haven, CT.

- Weber, M. (1978), _Economy and Society (2 volumes),_ Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press

- Wietzke, F.B and McLeod, C (2012).‘Jobs, Wellbeing, and Social Cohesion’, Background paper for the WDR 2013.

- Wietzke, F.B. (2009). ‘Neighborhood Effects: A Critical Review of the Literature’. Background paper for the World Bank's World Development Companion Report on spatial inequality in Latin America.

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- Wilson, W.J. (1987). _The Truly Disadvantaged. The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy,_ Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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conventional measures of socioeconomic development. In the following section, we begin with a description of the UNCED reports. Section 3 explains our indexing method, while Section 4 sets out some preliminary hypotheses about the relationships linking environmental policy and performance to socioeconomic development. Section 5 reports and discusses some statistical tests of the hypotheses; and Section 6 concludes the paper.

# **2. The UNCED Reports**

As part of the preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED - Rio de Janeiro, June 1992), all UN member governments were asked to prepare national environmental reports. Detailed preparation guidelines were laid down at the First Preparatory Committee meeting in Nairobi in August, 1990.' The UNCED secretariat suggested that the reports be prepared by working groups representing government, business and non-governmental organizations (NGO's). The guidelines recommended that the reports provide information on: (i) the drafting process; (ii) problem areas; (iii) past and present capacity building initiatives; (iv) recommendations and priorities for environment and development; {v) financial arrangements and funding requirements; (vi) environmentally sound technologies; ! United Nations General Assembly document A/CONF.151/PC/8 and A/CONF.lSl/PC/B/Add.1 2
Policy Research Working Paper 9627

# **Abstract**

This paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of social transfer payments to individuals for a sample of 23 developed and Latin American countries. The findings show that the social transfer multiplier is 0.3 in developed countries, but 0.9 in Latin American economies. The paper studies the role of hand-to-mouth consumers, who have no access to financial markets and a high marginal propensity to consume, as a first order factor to explain the heterogeneity in the size of social transfer multipliers. Using survey-based data from the Global Findex dataset, the paper finds that the average share of the population living hand-to-mouth is 23 percent in developed economies versus 60 percent in Latin American countries. This evidence is interpreted with a two-agent New Keynesian model. The findings show that the difference in the share of hand-to-mouth consumers explains 80 to 90 percent of the difference in the estimated social transfer multipliers. The paper also documents that the share of hand-to-mouth individuals in emerging countries is in general 47 percent which suggests that a larger social transfer multiplier may be expected for this type of economy.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at gvuletin@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
# **V. A General Equilibrium Assessment of the Impact of WTO Accession on Ukrainian Agriculture**

# **V.1. Introduction**

On May 16, 2008, Ukraine became a member of the WTO. In this chapter we provide a numerical assessment of the impact that WTO accession will have on agriculture in Ukraine. The previous two chapters have introduced the GTAP modeling framework as a publicly available analytical tool that is widely used by trade economists and governments around the world as a standard platform for systematic, numerical trade policy analysis. An assessment of the impact of WTO accession on agriculture in Ukraine is clearly interesting in its own right. However, the modifications to the GTAP model that are required to generate this assessment are also important for future work on FTA scenarios, because whatever is agreed to between Ukraine and the EU in their FTA negotiations will take the post-WTO accession situation in Ukraine as a starting point. In the following Section 2 we outline the data preparations and projections that are needed to establish a realistic baseline, and the formulation of WTO accession scenarios. In Section 3, simulation results are presented and discussed. Section 4 concludes. A detailed Appendix D with a broader selection of sectoral and national simulation results is also provided.

# **V.2. Establishing a realistic baseline and relevant policy scenarios**

## **_V.2.1. Adjusting GTAP-7 for an analysis of Ukraine's WTO accession_**

To simulate the impact of a trade policy change such as WTO accession, modelers compare two scenarios. The first is the baseline scenario which depicts the situation that is expected if the trade policy change does not take place. The second is the change scenario that depicts the situation that is expected if the trade policy change does take place. The difference between the baseline and the change scenarios is attributed to the trade policy change. This type of analysis is often referred to as ‘comparative static’ because it involves comparing two static ‘snapshots’ of an economy, one with and one without a policy change. In the present context, for example, we wish to compare scenarios that simulate the Ukrainian economy with and without WTO accession, to see what impact accession is expected to have on key variables such as production, prices and trade.

The GTAP-7 pre-release data that we are using are a consistent input-output database account of the world economy and benchmarked to the base year 2004. Thus, these data, although they are the currently most up-to-date source for modeling of larger trade policy changes, do not take Ukraine’s recent WTO commitments into account. Instead, the GTAP-7 data reflect applied tariffs, production and trade volumes from around the year 2004. Ratification of WTO accession is expected to take place in Ukraine in mid-2008. Therefore, to establish a realistic baseline, changes that have taken place in the Ukrainian economy and the rest of the world since 2004 have to be incorporated into the GTAP-7 data.

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However, the practicability of transit corridors depends not only on the physical infrastructure of transit countries but also on their political climate and on the quality of their governance, which, in the case of Central Asia’s transit partners, is a particular cause for concern.

# **_Difficult neighbor relations_**

Landlocked countries are heavily dependent on their political relations with transit countries. If there is conflict, whether military or diplomatic, between a landlocked country and its transit neighbors, the latter can easily block borders or set up regulatory impediments to trade. Even where there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are vulnerable to the political vagaries of their neighbors. According to Faye et al. (2005), “although there is a legal basis for rights of landlocked transit as outlined in Article 125(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982), in practice, this right of access must be agreed upon with the transit neighbour (Article 125(2) and (3)) and is determined by the relationship between the countries.” As these authors also pointed out, Central Asian Republics have been badly affected by cross-border disputes. After the collapse of the USSR, the former Soviet republics were divided along previous administrative boundaries, which have since been the source of many disputes. As a result, borders are regularly defended with landmines and physical blockades. Ongoing tensions have also resulted in a general failure of regional cooperation.

# **_Many borders to cross_**

Politically-motivated obstacles aside, landlocked countries have to deal with the direct costs of crossing the national borders of transit countries. Using different specifications of the gravity model, a number of empirical studies (McCallum 1995, Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003) have sought to estimate the trade-reducing effect of border crossings by comparing cross-border trade with intra-national trade across regions. Even for relatively “tradefriendly” borders, such as the Canada-US border, these authors found that borders inhibit trade by very large orders of magnitude.

Whatever the route taken by Central Asian trade, in all cases several borders have to be crossed, compounding the inhibiting effect of borders. The costs involved are multiple, with 11
**Table 2. Comparison of effects of preschool availability on maternal employment across econometric strategies**

||||**Work par**|**ticipation**|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Econometric strategy:|D|D|DD|D|DDD|-FE|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|**Panel A: Public**|||||||
|Preschool * Eligible|||0.048**|0.050**|0.080***|0.079***|
||||(0.021)|(0.021)|(0.022)|(0.022)|
|Preschool density|-0.014|0.013|-0.011|0.005|-0.017|-0.008|
||(0.026)|(0.031)|(0.015)|(0.018)|(0.015)|(0.018)|
|Eligible child|||-0.051***|-0.052***|-0.034***|-0.034***|
||||(0.008)|(0.007)|(0.007)|(0.007)|
|**Panel B: Private**|||||||
|Preschool * Eligible|||-0.000|-0.000|0.001|0.001|
||||(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|
|Preschool density|-0.010***|-0.008***|-0.003|-0.003*|-0.001|-0.004**|
||(0.003)|(0.003)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|(0.002)|
|Eligible child|||<br>-0.042***|<br>-0.044***|<br>-0.025**|<br>-0.025**|
||||(0.012)|(0.011)|(0.010)|(0.010)|
|Observations|22,737|22,737|76,951|76,951|76,951|76,951|
|Mean|0.538|0.538|0.534|0.534|0.534|0.534|
|District Trend||X||X||X|

Note: Sample in column 1-2 is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample in column 3-6 includes mothers with and without preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Column 1-2 regress work participation on preschool density in a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy (Section 4.1). Column 3-4 regress work participation on preschool density, a dummy for having a preschool-aged child, and the interaction between the two in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy (Section 4.2). Column 5-6 builds on the DDD strategy and adds individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) to allow comparison within-mothers (Section 4.3). Column 2, 4, 6 add district-specific trends. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban residence dummy. Panel A and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Observations, work participation means, and inclusion of district trends are indicated in the last three rows.

47
unconditional, namely provided to all potential beneficiaries, regardless of whether they are enrolled in school or not. The _ex ante_ AIT (conditional) estimates compare quite well with the _ex post_ estimates. Both types of estimates show the impact of _PROGRESA_ on enrollment to be much higher among children of age 12-17 years than children of age 8-11 years, and higher among girls than boys in the 12-17 age group. While the _ex ante_ and _ex post_ estimates are almost identical for boys of age 12-17 and girls of age 8-11, the _ex ante_ estimates understate the impact for girls of age 12-17 and boys of age 8-11. Boys of age 8-11 years are the only group for which the two types of estimates disagree on whether there is any significant impact or not – the _ex post_ estimate show a small positive impact while the _ex ante_ estimate is not different from zero. The confidence intervals of _ex ante_ and _ex post_ estimates for the same group overlay each other to a large extent. One advantage of _ex ante_ methods is that they allow for the simulation of hypothetical scenarios. In the hypothetical case where transfers are unconditional, the simulated effect on enrollment rate is found to be zero for all age/gender groups.

**Table 2: Impact of Transfers on Children’s Occupational Choice (1997-1999)** Actual and counterfactual proportions of children working for _PROGRESA_ target population

|||_Baseline_<br>_(pre-program)_|_Ex post AIT_<sup>_1_</sup>|_Ex ante A_<br>_Conditio_|_IT_<sup>_2_</sup><br>_nal_|_Ex ante AIT_<sup>_2_</sup><br>_Unconditional_|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||8-17 years-old|23.0%||-2.6%|******|0.0%|
|||||(0.3%)||(0.5%)|
|Bo|8-11 years-old|6.7%|-1.1%|0.3%||0.0%|
|ys|||(0.8%)|(0.4%)||(0.4%)|
||12-17 years-old|37.3%|-4.7%<br>******|-3.7%|******|0.0%|
||||(2.2%)|(0.5%)||(0.7%)|
||8-17 years-old|9.7%||-0.7%|*****|0.0%|
|||||(0.3%)||(0.3%)|
|Girl|8-11 years-old|4.2%|0.0%|0.4%||0.0%|
|s|||(0.0%)|(0.3%)||(0.4%)|
||12-17 years-old|14.6%|-2.3%<br>*****|-1.3%|*****|0.0%|
||||(1.3%)|(0.5%)||(0.5%)|

_Source_ : Baseline Survey 1997 and Rounds 1-4 – authors' calculation. _Note_ : 1: Results from Skoufias and Parker (2001) - Table 5 (only the results for November 1999 are reported). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of the _PROGRESA_ program on the probability of children working; 2: Results from simulation on baseline data using BFL model

- ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level.

Standard errors and standard deviations in parentheses. For _ex post_ AIT, robust standard errors are shown, which account for clustering of individuals within villages. For _ex ante_ AIT, standard deviations computed by bootstrap method.

22
Policy Research Working Paper 5159

# **Abstract**

It has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little, especially downwards, to shocks that hit their employer. This paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across Europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms. The authors analyse which firmlevel and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity. The results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models (e.g. efficiency wage theory, insider-outsider theory). The analysis also finds that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment. Collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity, measured on the basis of wage indexation. Downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations.

This paper—a product of the Office of the Regional Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the functions of labor markets in a comparative perspective. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jmessina@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Policy Research Working Paper 8076

# **Abstract**

This paper examines the effect of energy costs on industry export competitiveness. Most studies in the literature use direct energy consumption (energy consumption at the final stage of production) and domestic energy prices to compute energy costs faced by domestic industries. Using multi-country input-output information, this study measures the effect of aggregate energy costs on export performance, where aggregate energy costs include not only direct energy costs, but also indirect energy costs passed on through the upstream supply chain. This study develops a theoretical trade model that incorporates tradable intermediate goods to inform its empirical strategy. It then estimates a reduced-form model using a panel data for 10 manufacturing sectors in 43 countries from 1991 to 2012. The analysis finds that ignoring input-output relationships can lead to significant over- or underestimates of the effect of energy price shocks on exports, depending on intermediate factor intensities and trade relationships. Using estimated trade elasticities, the study simulates the economic consequences of energy cross-subsidies and carbon taxes. The results show that energy cross-subsidies that raise energy tariffs on industry to support lower rates for households and farmers in India could reduce the country’s net manufacturing exports by $6.1 billion a year. Similarly, a carbon tax that unilaterally increases energy prices by 10 percent in the European Union could reduce European Unionwide net manufacturing exports by 1.9 percent annually.

This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, South Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at fzhang1@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
**Figure 1.** Brazil: Short-term interest rates, September 2010-September 2013<sup>a</sup>

<!-- Start of picture text --> SELIC and 1Y DI<br>13<br>12<br>11<br>10<br>9<br>8<br>7<br>6<br>Oct-10 Apr-11 Oct-11 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13<br>1Y DI SELIC O/N<br><!-- End of picture text --> a DI funds are indexed to one year CDI. Selic is the overnight rate targeted by the Central Bank for monetary policy purposes. Source: Deutsche Bank

**Figure 2** . Brazil: Points of the Nominal Yield Curve, October 27, 2010<sup>a</sup>

<!-- Start of picture text --> 12<br>11.8<br>11.6<br>11.4<br>11.2<br>11<br>10.8<br>10.6<br>0 2 4 6 8 10 12<br><!-- End of picture text -->

> <sup>a</sup> Points in the yield curve reflect prices of NTNF Source. Deutsche Bank

It could be argued that even if performance were measured properly (against long term benchmarks rather than short-term volatility) individuals would not be able to assess this properly due to low levels of financial literacy.

Given the complexity of the decisions that contributors are required to make, it becomes difficult for a funded pension system to function based purely on a competitive basis. Member disclosure has been predicated on the view that increasing disclosure will enhance competition between pension funds as members elect to join funds with superior returns.

17