rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
24 Mexico MFA fixed rent-sharing coefficient a'.<sup>19</sup> However, the coefficient on the U.S. price in Table 6 is close to zero and not significant. Only the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is significant and<sup>positive as</sup> expected.

Several tests can be performed to gauge the importance of the presumed<sup>quality difference. If</sup> the fixed quality difference can explain all the spread between the U.S. and Mexican<sup>prices then the</sup> coefficient on pjt'J would be equal to one, and all other coefficients, excluding the<sup>dummies and the</sup> intercept, would be equal to zero. Tests for this hypothesis are presented below Table<sup>6. The t test</sup> and F test for P3' = 1 are rejected at the one percent level. The F test for f' = 1 and the<sup>coefficients</sup> on all other variables except the dummies equal to zero is also rejected at the one<sup>percent level.</sup> The fact that we have one group (3) whose exports are not quota bound<sup>may be an explanation</sup> for the lack of significance of the coefficient on pjtus To see whether rent-sharing exists<sup>for those</sup> groups that are quota bound, group 3 was dropped from the sample and the regression<sup>was re-</sup> estimated. The results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient on pjtus is now positive at<sup>0.514 and</sup> significant at the one percent level. Of the other coefficients, those on the Herfindahl<sup>index and the</sup> time trend are significant. The positive coefficient on the Herfindahl index suggests that a<sup>small part</sup> of the spread between the U.S. and Mexican prices may be due to the existence of concentration among Mexican exporters. The negative time trend coefficient indicates an increasing<sup>discrepancy</sup> between the Mexican and U.S. prices over time which may be due to increasing quality<sup>differentials.</sup> The fact that neither the intercept term, a6, nor the coefficient on D5, nor the intercept<sup>a5 are</sup> significant suggests that this effect was not specilic to either of the groups in the sample.<sup>The tests</sup> presented below Table 7 also reject the hypothesis that fixed quality differences are<sup>the sole</sup> explanation for the differences between the price of U.S. production and the price of imports<sup>from</sup> Mexico.

The results of Table 7 indicate that the price difference in groups 5 and 6 cannot be<sup>explained</sup> 19Although we have been referring to this constant term as the fixed rent-sharing effect throughout the paper it is possible that other considerations aside from rent-sharing or constant quality differences<sup>may explain part of this</sup> difference between the prices. Other possible explanations might be fixed costs in<sup>the quota allocation system.</sup>
roads in London. The United Kingdom's Department of Trnsport has since begun reinvestigating the feasibility of road pricing.

# Criteria for a 'Good' Road Pricing System

9. In order to implemen **t** he economic principles of road pricing, a 'good' road pricing system should include a number of opational requirements Listed below (Ministry of Transport, 1964, pp. 7-8; The Chartered Institute of Transport, 1990, pp. 18-20; Thompson, 1990, p. 526; and Stoelhorst and Zandbergen, 1990).3 A. From Users' Point of View (1-4) (1 Userfr -sjn . The system should be simple to understand and j convenient for motists to use. Exemdy complex and continuous pricing gradations should best be avoided because of 'bounded rationality' on the part of drivers' cognitive linitations. For safety reans, drivers' attention ought not be diverted for more than a very short time period in the proce of using the system.<sup>4</sup> (2) Transa y (via _a_ pricing). The system should inform the motorist of the prices to be charged ahead of time and place, so that the trip decision can be rationally made and rerouted if necesury. At the time when the trip decision is undertake, a user ought to be made aware of _wen, wher_ and _how mch_ the charges wil be. This is to be contrasted with _expost_ pricing, where users are charged only _qfer_ the fact (as in the proposed Cambridge road priCing scheme).

(3) Anonlymit rtecffon ffom Invasion of Prdva. The system should have safeguards - both legal and ohewis - that are capable of assuring its citizenry of their privacy. For instance, monitoring of vehicle movements for other than stricdy ttaffic- _As somm_ of to zequitmto onfict, not al of m ca be hieved Iy. 4 Similuly, th qstm shld be rlaively st Wa for ators to impl
participating in the project, and performed think-aloud exercises with students to better understand their answers and make adjustments, and (d) a panel of experts reviewed the final assessment instrument.

The outcome of this process was an 11-item Science test of approximately one hour of duration. It consisted of both multiple-choice and open-ended questions. This combination allowed evaluators to capture a wider range of student responses, including stronger evidence of critical thinking skills, than is typically associated with only multiple-choice tests (Stanger-Hall 2012). The test was administered at the end of the intervention at each school by external observers to guarantee the fidelity of its implementation under strict exam conditions. The test had sound psychometric properties. The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) is 0.79 in the full sample data and 0.76 in the Control Group. The test also shows a statistically significant correlation of 0.37 across schools with the Language score in the local end-of-primary exam of seventh grade (FEPBA, for its Spanish acronym).<sup>14</sup> The Science test questions were weighted according to difficulty, with higher-order questions scoring three points, medium-order questions scoring two points, and basic-skills questions scoring one point. Answers were classified as either “Correct,” for which they achieved full marks; “Partially correct,” for which they achieved half of the maximum marks for the given question; “Incorrect,” for which no marks were given; and “Omitted,” when no answer was given and for which no marks were given. Specialists corrected all tests using a common rubric, which was shared and discussed during a half-day training session. Answers that were challenging to classify were discussed and determined by multiple assessors.

# Experimental Data

> 14The FEPBA test was prepared and administered to seventh-grade students of both private and public schools in CABA by the Ministry of Education of CABA in 2014.

14
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4314

# **Abstract**

A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India compiled by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys shows that 27 percent of the stores report labor regulations as a problem for their business. Using these data we analyze the effect of labor regulation on employment at the store level. We find that stricter labor regulation has a strong negative effect on employment. Our estimates show that labor reforms are likely to increase employment by 22 percent of the current level for an average store.

This paper—a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency, Enterprise Analysis Unit —is part of a larger effort in the department to to better understand the functioning of private sector. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mamin@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
on), a negative relationship between an explanatory variable and the numeric rating implies that higher values of the explanatory variable are associated with better credit ratings. Similar is true for the GNI per capita, the reserve ratio, and the rule of law—higher values should be associated with lower numeric ratings and better letter rating. The coefficients associated with GNI per capita, the reserve ratio, and the rule of law variables have the expected negative signs. On the other hand, external debt (as a share of GDP) and the volatility of GDP growth are associated with a lower letter rating (and hence the positive sign). The coefficient of inflation is positive (as expected) but not significant. Given the cross-sectional nature of the regression, the R<sup>2</sup> presented in table 3 is adjusted for the degrees of freedom.

**Table 3: Regression results using 2005 explanatory variables for ratings in December 2006**

|Dependent variable: Sovereign rating|**S&P**|**Moody’s**|**Fitch**|
|---|---|---|---|
|GDP growth|-0.50***|-0.43***|-0.29***|
||(0.07)|(0.09)|(0.09)|
|Log of GNI per capita|-1.63***|-2.17***|-1.49***|
||(0.24)|(0.47)|(0.22)|
|Ratio of reserves to import and ST debt|-4.23***|-4.41***|-3.76***|
||(1.03)|(1.15)|(0.98)|
|Ratio of ext. debt to exports|0.57**|0.92***|0.82***|
||(0.22)|(0.31)|(0.14)|
|GDP Volatility (5-yr std. dev.)|0.63***|0.76***|0.49***|
||(0.10)|(0.14)|(0.10)|
|Rule of law|-1.77***|-2.15***|-1.95***|
||(0.45)|(0.71)|(0.43)|
|Inflation||0.05||
|||(0.08)||
|Observations|55|47|60|
|Adjusted R-squared|0.81|0.82|0.81|

_* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. White robust standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates._ In trying to get a better fit, we excluded some outliers from these regressions (Belize and Kazakhstan in the Moody’s regressions; Belize, Grenada, Madagascar and Uruguay in the S&P regressions; and Lebanon and Iran in the Fitch regressions). The adjusted R<sup>2</sup> was lower when these outliers were included (for example, 0.76 versus 0.82 in the Moody’s regressions), but the signs and significance of the explanatory variables were unchanged.<sup>13</sup> 13 Note that Belize was downgraded from CC to Selective Default by S&P in December 2006 following the announcement of a debt restructuring; it was subsequently upgraded to B in February 2007 after the completion of the restructuring. Our predicted shadow rating for Belize is in the range of BB- to BB+. Similarly, Grenada had been rated as being in Selective Default in early 2005, and was upgraded back to B15
# **References**

- Boskin, M., E. Dulberger, R. Gordon, Z. Griliches and D. Jorgenson. (1996); “Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living,” Final Report, Senate Finance Committee.

- Crawford, I. and Z. Smith (2002); “Distributional aspects of inflation,” IFS _Commentary_ 90.

- Deaton, A. (1998); “Getting Prices Right: What should be done?,” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ 12, 37-46.

- DeFerranti, D., G. Perry, F. Fereira and M. Walton (2004); _Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History ?_ Washington DC: The World Bank.

- Diewert, W. (1998); “Index number issues in the consumer price index,” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ 12, 47-58.

- Easterly, W. and S. Fischer (2001); “Inflation and the Poor,” _Journal of Money, Credit and Banking_ 33 _,_ 159-178.

- Garner, T., D. Johnson and M. Kokoski (1996); “An experimental consumer price index for the poor,” _Monthly Labor Review_ 119, 32-42.

- Hagemann, R. (1982); “The variability of inflation rates across household types,” _Journal of Money, Credit and Banking_ 14, 494-510.

- Hobjin, B. and D. Lagakos (2003); “Inflation inequality in the United States,” Staff Report no. 173, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

- Ley, E. (2005); “Whose inflation? A characterization of the CPI Plutocratic Gap,” _Oxford Economic Papers_ , forthcoming.

- Lieu, P., C. Chang and J. Chang (2004); “Inflation rate variations across households: empirical evidence for Taiwan,” _International Journal of Business_ 9, 103-124.

- Lódola, A., F. Busso and F. Cerimedo (2000); "Sesgos en el IPC: el Sesgo Plutocrático en Argentina," _Anales de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política_ .

- Moulton, B. and K. Stewart (1999); “An overview of experimental U.S. price indices,” _Journal of Business and Economic Statistics_ 17, 141-151.

- Muellbauer J. (1974); “The Political Economy of Price indices,” Birbeck Discussion Paper, No. 22.

Prais, S. (1959); “Whose cost of living?,” _Review of Economic Studies_ 26, 126-134.

- Ruiz-Castillo J., E. Ley, and M. Izquierdo (2002); “Distributional aspects of the quality change bias in the CPI: evidence from Spain,” _Economic Letters_ , 76, 137-144.

13
This study measures the effects of the sanitation and handwashing interventions on the health of children under five years old. These children represent the age group most susceptible to diarrheal disease, growth faltering and acute lower respiratory infections, which are major causes of childhood morbidity and mortality in developing countries.

# **_2.2._** _Context: Rural Tanzania_

Approximately 70% of Tanzania’s population lives in rural areas characterized by subsistence livelihoods, poor access to health and education services, and high morbidity and mortality rates. The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey estimated that 9.2% of children in rural Tanzania died before their fifth birthday, 13.6% experienced diarrhea within a 2 week period, and 57.8% could be classified as anemic. Stunting and wasting, as measured by height-for-age and weightfor-age z-scores, is also commonplace, with 44.5% of children under 5 falling below two standard deviations of the reference population mean in height-for-age measures and 4.9% for weight-for-age measures. Less than half of the rural population has access to an improved water source, and more than half spends over 30 minutes collecting water. The country experienced a rapid acceleration of sanitation coverage following a cholera outbreak in the late 1970s, with widespread adoption of basic latrines in rural areas. Coverage in rural areas was estimated at 50 percent by 1980 and the 93/94 HRDS<sup>16</sup> survey found that 92.3% of rural Tanzanian households had a traditional or improved pit latrine. Over time, these (mostly shared) facilities gradually fell into disrepair and, currently, do not meet the JMP standards for “improved” sanitation (World Bank, 1996). As such, while most Tanzanian households have access to some form of latrine, the majority of these latrines can be more accurately described as ‘fixed-point open defecation’. While approximately 80% of households have access to a pit latrine, only 8% have a slab to ensure that fecal matter is safely separated from human contact. Open defecation continues to be the most common form of toileting among 18% of households and child feces are disposed of in an unsafe manner 40% of the time.

The 92 villages in 46 wards included as our study control sample provide a nuanced snapshot of sanitation and hygiene conditions in our study area absent the intervention.<sup>17</sup> While 80% of households have a pit latrine with slab or VIP latrine, more than 40% of these slabs are in disrepair and a third of the facilities are shared with other households. Furthermore, only 17% of these latrines have a cover for the squat hole to contain the feces and reduce potential transmission by flies, and more than two-thirds of the households with squat hole covers did not have them in place when visited. Our data show that, although people are aware of the

> 16 Tanzania Human Resources Development Survey, 1993/94 17

> Note that control areas were exposed to mass media campaigns on the radio.

8
number of banks in Uganda contracted substantially over this period.<sup>13</sup> Credit extended to the private sector by deposit-taking banks hovered between 4 and 5 percent of GDP from 1993 to 2003. Only in 2004 did that figure eclipse 6 percent of GDP.

Not surprisingly, UCB also had problems during this time. But because it was the backbone of the payments system, especially in rural areas, and because the deposit insurance program was not fully capitalized, meaning that liquidation or failed privatization would have imposed a heavy fiscal burden on the government (Kasekende, 2004), closure and liquidation were not options. To preserve confidence in the payments system, the government took a cautious approach towards restructuring UCB, keeping the bank open throughout the process and maintaining its majority shareholding.

In 1995, the government established the Nonperforming Asset Recovery Trust, which assumed UCB’s nonperforming assets. The government also sold noncore assets, reduced staffing levels, and invested substantial amounts to upgrade computer systems (Kasekende, 2004). In 1998, UCB was recapitalized and a minority shareholding block (49 percent) was sold to a Malaysian Company, Westmont Land Bhd.

Evidence from other developing countries indicates that postprivatization performance improvements are smaller when the government maintains a substantial shareholding (Clarke et al., 2005; Megginson, 2005). The privatization of UCB was no exception. Unknown to the government, Westmont had borrowed money from Greenland Bank to purchase its equity stake in UCB. Greenland had signed an agreement with the Bank of Uganda (BOU) in that same year to remedy insolvency and correct violations of insider lending and single loan exposure limits (Brownbridge, 2002). After the transaction, UCB began lending to Greenland and its related companies despite the inherent conflicts of interest.

In 1999, the BOU had to intervene in UCB, but not before 64 percent of its assets were nonperforming. The government decided to reprivatize UCB, only to more competent owners. It did this only after conducting market surveys to gauge interest and preferred sale options. The government announced that it would prefer to maintain a 20 percent shareholding although it would consider selling its entire stake, and multiple

> 13 Two banks were closed in both 1998 and 1999 (Brownbridge, 2002; Kasekende 2001). In 2002, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) reported that one small bank was intervened and two others were experiencing difficulties.

6
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All of the components of the HCI are measured with some error, and this uncertainty naturally has implications for the precision of the overall HCI. To capture this imprecision, the HCI estimates for each country are accompanied by upper and lower bounds that reflect the uncertainty in the measurement of the components of the HCI. As described in more detail in Section A4.4, these bounds are constructed by calculating the HCI using lower‐ and upper‐bound estimates of the components of the HCI. The resulting uncertainty intervals are shown in **Figure 8** , as vertical ranges around the value of the HCI for each country. These upper and lower bounds are a tool to highlight to users that the estimated HCI values for all countries are subject to uncertainty, reflecting the corresponding uncertainty in the components. In cases where these intervals overlap for two countries, it indicates that the differences in the HCI estimates for these two countries should not be over‐interpreted since they are small relative to the uncertainty around the value of the index itself. This is intended to help to move the discussion away from small differences in country ranks on the HCI, and towards more useful discussion around the level of the HCI itself and what it implies for the future productivity of children born today.

Another feature of the HCI is that it can be disaggregated by gender, for the 126 countries where gender‐disaggregated data on the components of the index are available. Gender gaps are most pronounced for survival to age 5, adult survival, and stunting, where girls on average do better than boys in nearly all countries. Expected years of school is higher for girls than for boys in about two‐thirds of countries, as are test scores. The gender‐disaggregated overall HCI is shown in **Figure 9** . Overall, HCI scores are higher for girls than for boys in the majority of countries. The gap between boys and girls tends to be smaller and even reversed among poorer countries, where gender‐disaggregated data also is less widely available.

The HCI uses returns to education and health to convert the education and health indicators into worker productivity differences across countries. The higher are these returns, the larger are the resulting worker productivity differences. The size of the returns also influences the relative contributions of education and health to the overall index. For example, if the returns to education are high while the returns to health are low, then cross‐country differences in education will account for a larger portion of cross‐country differences in the index. The information in **Figure 5** and **Figure 6** provides a sense of the relative contributions of the different components of the HCI. Learning‐adjusted years of school range from around 3 to a potential maximum of 14. This gap implies that children in countries near the bottom of the distribution of expected years of school will only be 40 percent as 6
Table 2: Are there compound shocks in related products?

||(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|
|VARIABLES|ln(_SM_<sup>4</sup><br>_it_<sup>) =</sup>|ln(<sup>_SM_4</sup><br>_it_<br>_M_<sup>4</sup><br>_it_ <sup>)</sup><br>+|ln(_M_<sup>4</sup><br>_it_<sup>)</sup>|
|1 Qtr before fle|0.17***|0.10***|0.07***|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.014)|
|2 Qtrs before fle|0.15***|0.09***|0.06***|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.014)|
|3 Qtrs before fle|0.12***|0.07***|0.04***|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.014)|
|4 Qtrs before fle|0.10***|0.03*|0.07***|
||(0.020)|(0.019)|(0.013)|
|5 Qtrs before fle|0.09***|0.02|0.06***|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.013)|
|6 Qtrs before fle|0.04*|0.00|0.03**|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.014)|
|7 Qtrs before fle|0.00|0.00|0.00|
||(0.021)|(0.019)|(0.014)|
|Constant|11.66***|-2.02***|13.68***|
||(0.022)|(0.021)|(0.015)|
|Observations|35328|35328|35328|
|R-squared|0.814|0.794|0.912|

Estimates include month, year, petition and HS-10 fixed effects Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1

shock. However, the second feature (the pronounced decline in total imports) is not evident in the reference products. Inspection of column (3) reveals that imports from all sources are consistently higher than in the base period. Allowing ourselves to speculate, this suggests that AD petitions are associated with very narrow, product-specific demand shocks, rather than economy- or sector-wide demand shocks. Figure 1 plots these coefficients to make this point graphically. While the blue lines (imports from subject countries) mirror each other in the two graphs, there is no such tendency for the red lines (total imports). Consequently an import surge by itself does not seem to be sufficient to trigger an AD petition. However, a relatively modest increase in imports when accompanied by a subsequent domestic demand shock (as proxied by the level of imports from all sources), does appear to be necessary for the filing of an AD petition.

16