Having a precarious title (CR) makes it possible to obtain, in a later stage, a property title (TF) (see Annex 3.2). Obtaining a TF is very profitable. With it, land will be sold at a much higher price, commonly up to three times that of land bought with a mere _attestation de vente authentifiée_ (see Annex 4.1). According to our informants, in the _commune_ of Dialakorodji, the price is multiplied by three; in the village of Kanadjiguila, in the _commune_ Mandé, by four; and, in the _commune_ of Kalabancoro, by five,<sup>37</sup> which makes rent capture possible for agents of the administration and beneficiaries of a TF.

The issue of CRs on farmland encourages privatization of customary land. It is also increasingly seen by authorities as one of the causes of urban sprawl.<sup>38</sup> This is one of the reasons why the Council of Ministers decided to suspend the issue of CRs in 2011. Since then, an April 2013 decree reauthorized the issue of CRs but under new conditions, which strengthen the powers of the central state.

Figure 3.1 on the previous page represents the processes whereby a property title can be obtained for land initially purchased from a customary holder. In most cases, buyers may not complete the whole formalization process and may either keep the plot as it is, may possibly improve its tenure or/and sell it on the informal market. Figure 3.1 also shows the possibility of registration of customary land in the name of the state after the “purge” of customary rights.

# **3.2. The public and para-public land delivery channel**

There are different ways public land can be transferred: (i) the administrative allocation of residential plots; (ii) the allocation of land for auction sale after subdivision and provision of services of serviced land; (iii) the transfer of land by the state to property development companies and cooperatives; and (iv) the provision of land for social housing.

# **3.2.1. Administrative allocation of residential plots**

Before 1992, it was the Governor of Bamako (the supervisory authority for the _communes_ of Bamako) who granted authorization to occupy plots (by _lettre d’attribution_ ) on the private domain of the state. Half of the LAs were to regularize occupation whereas the rest was for resettlement. However, as demand for plots was much greater than supply, people who were unable to find a place began to engage in “spontaneous settlements”, which involved more than 45% of households by the early 1990s, because there was no more land available for resettlement (Bertrand, 2002).

This led to the launch in 1993 of a program to upgrade 24 spontaneous settlements, known as the Save our Neighborhood (SNQ) program, supported by the World Bank. At the same time, there was a change in connection with the decentralization process: _commune_ officials would no longer be appointed but elected. This led to changes in the administrative allocation of land. Although the state retained ownership of the land in these 24 neighborhoods, physical upgrading operations were organized by the mayors of the _communes_ in which these settlements were located. Municipal committees chose the beneficiaries of plots located either in the neighborhood or in the resettlement areas, who then obtained LAs after paying local development taxes (infrastructure and services). People who could not afford these charges, which were very high in relation to the average income of Bamako residents, sold their LAs (which is not allowed in principle) to others who would pay the charges in their stead and then receive precarious title to the plot (Bertrand 1998). In addition, plots were allocated to wellconnected individuals who, as they did not live in the neighborhood, could not claim regularization. Shortly before, a considerable amount of land in Bamako District had been allocated for the development of the formal market (see Section 3.2.2 below), which encroached on areas that the _communes_ could have developed. Elected officials then stepped up the number of subdivisions of land and sold plots despite not being entitled to do so.

> 37 Sources: interviews with key informants in Bamako between June 2011 and January 2012 and Durand-Lasserve (2009). 38 In the report “Bamako 2030” (Ville de Bamako, 2012), it is noted that the process of farmland sold with a CR to “private individuals" who divide it up into residential plots is “a real threat because it encourages urban sprawl to the detriment of rural natural resources.”

14