this an agent-based approach, in which broad strategies emerge as descriptive summaries of the types of agents chosen to aid enforcement. That approach can be seen most clearly in the foundational analytical approach to understanding inter-firm agreements, game theory, which begins with the naming of agents. Our survey question effectively does the same, by asking respondents to consider specific sets of agents (e.g., government officials).

An alternative approach would begin with strategies, not agents. The most popular form of this approach in the literature contrasts contractual and relational transactional strategies, with the origins of the former often interpreted as lying within economics and the latter reflecting sociological theory.<sup>11</sup> Measures of the use of these two strategies usually aggregate responses to multiple questions on various behaviors and beliefs that characterize the formation and implementation of inter-firm agreements.<sup>12</sup> Strategy-based approaches have been successfully applied across multiple contexts, especially using smaller, bespoke samples that reflect narrower ranges of cultures, sectors, or activities.<sup>13</sup> Such a focus facilitates the use of highly nuanced survey questions, which is crucial in understanding strategies and their use. We chose the agent-based approach since the terms designating distinct types of agents will likely have a more consistent meaning than terms that correspond to the nuances of broad strategies when implemented via

> 11 The definitions of these two strategies vary across different studies, often significantly. For example, contrast the narrow approach on whether the use of social sanctions is implied in relational strategies used by Gil et al. (2019) with the broader approach of Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002). For definitions, see, e.g., Cao and Lumineau (2015) and Abdi (2017). Contractual and relational transactional strategies can be used together or separately. Argyres et al. (2020) argues that a contractual approach might be embedded in a relational approach to produce more powerful inter-firm cooperation. For the roles of economics and sociology in conceptualizing these strategies, see, e.g., Poppo and Zenger (2002), Greif (2005).

> 12 For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002) measure relational governance by combining responses to three questions on the level of collaborative relationship, on the extent of shared goals, and the reliability of the partner to keep promises. Zhou and Xu (2012) measure it by aggregating information on whether the exchange is frequent and whether the parties keep each other informed about changes. Homburg et al. (2009) include multiple questions on trust, along with multiple questions on the extent to which the relationship is governed by written contracts.

> 13 See e.g., Homburg et al. (2009) who collect data on contracts in the US and Germany in the chemical mechanical and electrical industries. To examine the effect of national culture on the comparative use of contractual and relational governance, Handley (2015) collects data from firms that are large, US-based, and engaged in outsourcing of business processes. To analyze the effect of culture on the relationship between governance and of opportunism, Handley and Angst (2015) survey service providers that are located across countries but all having customers that are based in the US.

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