rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
paid less than their fair wage. The reduction in effort is proportional to the distance between the fair and the actual wage. The fair-wage hypothesis may explain both corruption types considered here: informal payments and moonlighting. As Akerlof and Yellen (1998) state it “when people do not get what they [think they] deserve, they try to get even.” Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume the only instrument at the disposal of the worker to get even is adjusting the level of her effort. In the health sector and maybe others, however, the worker has many instruments to get even. She can withdraw effort and work outside of the workplace, but she can also levy payments on the facility’s clients. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) show in a cross-country regression framework that relative civil-service pay is strongly correlated with corruption levels and thereby corroborate the fair-wage and corruption relationship. Van der Gaag et al. (1989) show using household data from Côte d’Ivoire and Peru that civil servants’ wage disadvantage is a strong determinant of moonlighting. This paper tests both the fair-wage corruption and fair-wage shirking or moonlighting hypotheses. During the survey, the health workers are directly asked what they consider to be a fair wage for the work they provide.<sup>3</sup> Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) use the manufacturing sector’s wage as a comparator for all civil-servants; however, the salary a worker considers as fair crucially depends on personal circumstances and characteristics.

# _2.2 Gender and Corruption_

There is a large literature on gender differences in social preferences, risk-taking behavior and taste for or reaction to competition.<sup>4</sup> For social preferences, the available experimental evidence offers a mixed picture with many papers showing that women are less selfish, more altruistic and willing to help others (Eckel and Grossman 1998, Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, and Seerneels et al. 2005). Other authors however find no differences across genders (Bolton and Katok 1995, Eckel and Grossman 2001, Croson and Buchan 1999); others still

> 3 We do not try to assess whether the workers compare themselves to their peers in the facility as Akerlof and Yellen (1990), or in similar health facilities as in Summers (1988), or in the country at large using the manufacturing sector as reference as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).

> 4 Croson and Gneezy (2004) provide a nice survey of this literature which mostly consists of experiments such as prisoner dilemma games, dictator games, ultimatum games, or public good provision games.

5
KLEMS database, the Baltic countries appear to be particularly productive in some subsectors.

**_Figure 8: Average WIIW Labor Productivity across Countries – By Sub-Sector_**

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# _4.1.1 Community Characteristics_

We control for three important community characteristics the facility is located and the health worker lives in. We use data from the recent Tajikistan map which combines data from the 2000 census and the 2003 LSMS. We control for the size of the community by including the number of households. We control also for the level of development of and inequality in the community by including the average household’s total consumption per capita adjusted for regional prices and its Gini coefficient. Socio-economic variables may impact the willingness and the ability to charge patients. Indeed, one may think that health workers are less reluctant to charge wealthier people, in part because, the latter are likely more able to defend themselves against such predatory practices. Which effect dominates is then an empirical question we tackle next. Moonlighting is more likely in wealthier communities with more vibrant local economies which increases the opportunity cost of time. We also control for regional characteristics by including dummy variables for the 5 regions of Tajikistan, using Dushanbe as the reference.

# _4.1.2 Facility Characteristics_

For a fixed supply of patients, the higher the number of health workers in the facility the more intense the competition for bribe extraction. It could also reduce the likelihood of asking informal payments because there are more “eyes” that monitor. We therefore control for the size of the facility. A related variable is the type of the facility. It has been shown by several studies (see e.g. Lewis 2007) that informal payments are more likely in in-patients services. This may be due to the frailty of hospitalized patients who come with severe illnesses which reduce their refusal power and make them more willing to pay for care. Finally, we introduce a dummy for facilities that operate in rural areas.

# _4.1.3 Household and Individual Characteristics_

The most difficult variables to control for are at the household and individual levels. It is for instance impossible in cross-country analyses to include these important controls. Even studies based on firm-level surveys or experimental data rarely include additional 17
_Gender Equality and Economic Development: The Role for ICTs_ 9 One of the most obvious benefits associated with ICT usage is the increased flow of information and knowledge. Because ICTs allow information to be transmitted relatively inexpensively and efficiency (in terms of cost), ICT usage tends to decrease reduce uncertainty and transactions costs of participating in economic transactions. This, in turn, tends to lead to increase in the volume of transactions leading to higher level of output and productivity. Moreover, with the increased flow of information, technologies can be acquired and adapted more easily again leading to increased innovation and productivity.

Apart from increasing the supply of information and knowledge, ICTs are able to overcome geographic boundaries. Therefore, as international buyers and sellers are increasingly able to share information, reduce uncertainty, reduce transactions costs, increase competitiveness across borders, all of which results in a more efficient global marketplace. Also, production processes can be outsourced, based on comparative advantage, across national boundaries resulting in further global efficiency gains. Market access and coverage also tend to expand, along with increased access to global supply chains.

With the increased information flows, ICT availability and usage tends to allow greater transparency, accountability and accessibility in the delivery of public services. In addition, the public becomes informed of their rights and increases their awareness of political and development processes that influence their lives. The informed constituency is thus able to pressure policymakers to be responsive to their interests and demands. Also, better institutions and governance has been shown to be a substantial factor in increasing long-term economic growth.

# **4.2 Improving Gender Equality with ICTs**<sup>7</sup>

The unique characteristics of ICTs that have enabled it to be an effective tool for economic development also make them an effective mean through which gender equality can be improved. There are several ways in which an established ICT infrastructure or a high level of ICT availability can lead to improvements in gender equality.

> and Kemerer (1996) and Gandal et al. (1999) indicate the existence of spillover benefits from ICT capital at the firm level.

> 7 This section on the ways in which ICTs can improve gender equality borrows heavily from World Bank (2003c).
To examine the implications of conditioning insurance premiums on forecast rainfall for the coming growing season, we calculate the ‘historical burn’ insurance price appropriate for each ENSO phase. ENSO years were classified based on anomalies of the NINO3.4 sea surface temperature (SST) index in the eastern equatorial Pacific, observed in October when contracts are signed. A year was identified as El Niño if the NINO3.4 index was more than 0.5°C warmer than average, or La Niña if it was at least 0.5°C cooler than average. The remaining years were categorized as neutral. We choose the premium payment of the current insurance scheme as a constraint for the premium for all phases, using the ENSO-based insurance rate to adjust the maximum liability, and therefore the respective loan size and budget for inputs.

# **4.2 Management scenarios**

Banks participating in the Malawi index insurance implementation imposed the constraint that the loan plus interest must be equal to the maximum liability of the insurance, which in the current scheme is constant across years and designed to cover inputs for 0.405 ha (1 acre). According to focus groups and the household survey, most farmers were interested in obtaining larger loans, and were able and willing to dedicate at least 1.62 ha (4 acres) to the improved varieties and management that the loans support. Farmers elsewhere in southern Africa are known to adjust cultivated area in response to predicted rainfall as a rational means of avoiding losses and exploiting opportunity (Phillips et al., 2002). For this exploratory exercise we propose to adjust the total area cultivated with high-yield inputs provided by the bundled loaninsurance contract, depending on expected rainfall. When La Niña conditions suggest a low probability of drought, farmers receive more inputs and can therefore cultivate more land with the hybrid seeds and fertilizer provided by the scheme. When El Niño indicates high risk of crop 13
POLIcY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1832

# **Summary findings**

Bolivia's bold program of pension reform involved the immediate closing down of the old pay-as-you-go system and its replacement by a defined-contribution system based on individual capitalization accounts and managed by the private sector.

The pensions of the old system will be covered by the Bolivian Treasury. Workers will receive compensatory pensions for their contributions to the old system. These will be calculated on the basis of a simple formula that could be improved to reduce the cost of transition.

To avoid high marketing costs, Bolivia has entrusted management of the system to two groups selected through international competitive bidding (to minimize fees). Individual accounts have been preallocated to those two groups on a regional basis or, in large cities, on the basis of the birthdays of affiliated workers. Competition for individual accounts will be allowed in the year 2000 and the market will be opened to other private pensionfund administrators (AFPs) in 2002.

Proceeds from the "capitalization" program will be used to pay an annuity to all Bolivians 65 and older. Funds from the capitalization program will also be managed by the two selected AFPs. Custodianship has been entrusted to a multinational group offering global custodial services.

AFP investments are only subject to upper limits, including relatively high limits for foreign assets. However, they must initially purchase a certain quantity of treasury bonds to help finance the cost of transition. Bolivian pension reform faces major challenges: * To create a competitive market for management of pension fund resources and hence achieve competitive returns on investment and higher pensions.

* To eliminate the requirement of investment in treasury bonds.

* To insulate the system from attempts to use AFP funds and capitalization proceeds for public projects. (One way to achieve this would be to transfer ownierslhip of the capitalization proceeds to individual Bolivians.)

This paper-a product of the Private Sector Development Cluster, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department - draws on work done for the Bolivia Financial Markets and Pension Reform Project. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Cecilia Pavlak, room 15-030, telephone 202-458-2099, fax 202-334-0113, Internet address cpavlak@worldbank.org. September 1997. (26 pages) _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represen_ **_t_** _he view of the 'World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent._ Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
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also an insignificant but suggestive reduction in rental debt in the endline, equivalent to approximately a quarter of average rental debt in the control group, where the average household owes the equivalent of four months of rent. There is also a smaller but marginally significant reduction in rental debt in the follow-up 1.5 years after implementation. Additionally, we find some indication that monthly rent paid to landlords (including from the implementing organization) increases in the treatment group, consistent with more reliable rental payments through the program (see Appendix).

There were no statistically significant impacts on other outcome measures that were collected across multiple rounds, including for household composition, migration, and employment. However, there are some meaningful effects in particular survey rounds and we turn to them next.

# **5.2 Impacts in the midline round**

Recall that the midline phone survey was conducted while the HSP was ongoing and many households were still receiving assistance. The midline survey data indicates that HSP improved several dimensions of housing quality in the short run (Panel A, Table 5): households experienced a 21 percentage point increase in access to clean water (SE 0.06, control mean 17%) and a 0.51 room increase in dwelling size (SE 0.17), likely the result of door installation and other construction. Yet, as in the pooled results, there is not a statistically significant change in the overall housing quality index.

Food security outcomes at midline echo those in the pooled sample and also shed light on the possible mechanisms (Panel B, Table 5). As in the pooled results, respondents were more likely to report that they and others went to sleep hungry in the past 7 days, with a robust 23 percentage point (q-value = 0.01) increase in respondents’ hunger, and other adults and children in the household being 17 and 24 percentage points more likely, respectively, to go to sleep hungry (SE 0.06 and SE 0.07). Most importantly for understanding why, treatment households report substantial decreases in food aid received, consuming 53 USD PPP less in food from assistance 23
Table 8: Classification of response patterns for the Asian countries with a one percent decline in China’s GDP growth rate

|response patterns|countries|
|---|---|
|signifcantly lower|japan, indns, mal, sing, thai|
|mostly lower|austlia, india, kor|
|indeterminate|nzld, phlp|

Note: Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for a glossary of acronyms.

negative, the level and shape does not change across different trade matrices, which was the case for China given its growing presence in the global economy.

Figure 8 shows that a decline of the US real GDP growth rate has a negative impact on Asian countries, including New Zealand and the Philippines, which both showed a more muted response to a Chinese shock. By comparing Figure 8 with Figure 3, it is easy to infer that although the impact of a US shock will be considerably larger than a Chinese shock, the magnitude of response progressively increases reflecting China’s increased economic ties and on Asian economies.

In Figure 9, we calculated the 68% confidence interval using a bootstrapping method contrasting the GIRFs of 2013 and 1985. The impacts on the Republic of Korea and Singapore are statistically significant at 68% confidence interval when using a trade weight matrix in 1985 and 2013. With the more recent trade structure, the response of Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand also becomes statistically significant. For New Zealand, the significant effect of the US is observed for four quarters after the shock. However, some of the remaining countries show a borderline statistical significance, while others are not statistically significant. In general, the distribution of GIRFs with respect to a one percent decline in US ’ s growth rate remains the same over the last three decades for the Asian countries. This finding contrasts with the effect of a Chinese shock. Although the US has a stronger influence on Asian economies than China, these countries are more exposed to China than ever through increased economic ties.

29
14 For example, one could try to estimate the impact of past inequality (at time t- 1) on how the poor may benefit from growth (at time t)? As noted by Ravallion (1997), one of the reasons why inequality may reduce the prospects of the poor of escaping poverty through growth is that the higher the initial inequality, the lower the share of the poor in the benefits of growth. Imagine that a single person has all the resources in an area. Then, whatever the growth, poverty will never be reduced through growth. More generally, the higher the inequality, the less elastic poverty will be to economic growth for a large class of poverty measures (but in a recession, the poor will be less affected if the level of inequality is higher). To test this argument, Ravallion proposed the restricted form r = P (l-IG)g where r is the rate of poverty reduction for the area from t- 1 to t, IG is the initial Gini index at time t- 1, g is the rate of growth between t- 1 and t, and f3 is a parameter to be estimated. Using a panel for 23 countries with 41 spells, Ravallion tested this specification against an ad hoc encompassing model, and accepted the restricted form. We replicated this estimation with our regional panel. The results proved highly sensitive to the specification of the encompassing model, and in most cases, we had to reject the Ravallion's hypothesis that what matters for poverty reduction is the rate of growth corrected for the extent of initial inequality.

Another reason why initial inequality (or poverty) may matter for future poverty reduction is known as the induced-growth argument, according to which higher initial inequality (or poverty) may result in lower subsequent growth, and thereby in a smaller rate of poverty reduction. The negative impact of inequality (or poverty) on growth may result from various factors (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Clarke, 1995, Deininger and Squire, 1996). Economic distortions hampering growth may result from the redistributive policies implemented to reduce inequality (or poverty) for political economy considerations. Or access to credit may be concentrated in the hands of privileged categories, thereby preventing the poor to invest. To test for these hypotheses, one would use growth as the dependent variable, and include past levels of inequality (and poverty) as right-hand side variables. As for the impact of growth on inequality however, one would have to be careful in that many factors
Table 1: Vietnam: Means of Selected Variables by Sex and Sector of E loyment

|||All|||Public|||Privat|e|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Variable|Total|Males|Females|Total|Males|Females|Total|Males|Females|
|Age (years)|30.8|31.2|30.2|34.1|35.7|32.2|28.4|28.5|28.2|
|Years of schooling|7.9|7.9|7.8|10.5|10.5|10.4|6.0|6.3|5.4|
|Years of experience|17.0|17.4|16.4|17.7|19.2|15.8|16.4|16.2|16.9|
|_Education level (0,1)_|*|||||||||
|No education|0.22|<br>0.21|0.24|0.06|0.06|0.07|0.34|0.31|<br>0.40|
|Primary|0.50|<br>0.53|0.44|0.39|0.43|0.35|0.57|0.59|<br>0.53|
|Secondary|0.08|<br>0.08|0.08|0.12|0.11|0.12|0.06|0.07|<br>0.04|
|Vocational|0.12|<br>0.10|0.16|0.26|0.22|0.31|0.03|0.03|<br>0.03|
|University|0.07|<br>0.08|0.07|0.17|0.19|0.15|0.01|0.01|<br>0.00|
|Earnings/month|152|170|124|167|188|143|140|159|107|
|('OOOs VND)||||||||||
|Public sector|0.42|0.38|0.48|1.00|<br>1.00|<br>1.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|Hours-worked/week|46.2|46.8|45.5|43.5|43.2|43.8|48.2|48.9|47.0|
|N|2,259|1,355|904|950|516|434|1,309|839|470|

Source: VLSS 1992-93

* Highest level attained

Males are about one year older than females and their earnings nearly 40 percent higher (VND 170,000 vs. VND 124,000). Men and women have nearly the same educational attainment. Private sector workers are much younger than public sector workers and work nearly five hours more per week. Educational attainment in the private sector is much lower than in the public sector (more than four year's difference). In the public sector, even small state enterprises employ workers with at least ten years of schooling (Ronnas and Sjoberg 1995). This is a result of the past policy of government's allocating labor with more than primary schooling. Graduates of secondary and tertiary education, including higher-level vocational graduates, were assigned jobs in the public sector. Only primary school graduates and those without any education operated in a labor market of sorts. A reliance on market signals to allocate educated labor was announced, however, as Government policy at the 1991 Party Congress. Few primary school 10