rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
<!-- Start of picture text -->
-15<br>Headcount (H)<br>MPI<br>-10<br>-5<br>0<br>Regions ranked from the least deprived to the most deprived<br>Grand Lomé Centrale Kara Maritime Savanes Plateaux<br>Gender differences<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **_4.3 Robustness analysis by gender_**

A robustness analysis is carried out next to compare the levels of multidimensional poverty between genders. As deprivation rates vary in function of multidimensional cutoff _d_ , it is therefore appropriate to check whether the gender gap holds for a significant range of _d_ values. Figures 3 and 4 present the situation, respectively for Burkina Faso and Togo. Figure 3 suggests that gender inequality in the MPI is still observed in Burkina Faso with value of _d_ between 0.5 and 5.5. We can say that women are stochastically dominated by men in terms of multidimensional poverty. This is almost the case for the headcount (H), except that the deprivation rates for men and women are very close for small values of _d_ ( _d_ < 1). Figure 4 shows that this dominance also holds in Togo for most values of _d_ . Regarding the MPI, the gender gap seems to be significant enough for values lower than 4, beyond which this gap becomes more negligible. A similar pattern can be observed for the headcount measure.

<u>Figure 3: Comparisons of multidimensional poverty between genders in Burkina Faso</u> 24
Policy Research Working Paper 5229

# **Abstract**

To the surprise of many observers, the 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) found substantially higher purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, relative to market exchange rates, in most developing countries. For example, China’s price level index—the ratio of its PPP to its exchange rate—doubled between the 1993 and 2005 rounds of the ICP. The paper tries to explain the observed changes in PPPs. Consistently with the BalassaSamuelson model, evidence is found of a “dynamic Penn effect,” whereby more rapidly growing economies experience steeper increases in their price level index.

This effect has been even stronger for initially poorer countries. Thus the widely-observed static (crosssectional) Penn effect has been attenuated over time. On also taking account of exchange rate changes and prior participation in the ICP’s price surveys, 99 percent of the variance in the observed changes in PPPs is explicable. Using a nested test, the World Bank’s longstanding method of extrapolating PPPs between ICP rounds using inflation rates alone is out performed by the model proposed in this paper.

This paper—a product of the Director’s office, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand and improve current macroeconomic data. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mravallion@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
_Fareed M. A. Hassan, ECSPE_ 18 return to high tax rates and more complex schedule **8.** Under the 1993 Personal Income Tax Law there were ten income tax brackets, an increase of three brackets with higher rates: 44, 48, and 52 percent. Such amendment would complicate -rather than simplify- and strain existing scarce administrative tax capabilities<sup>9</sup> . Under such circumstances, the revenue, redistributive, and developmental objectives of tax amendment may prove difficult to attain. Fortunately, the 1997 amendment of the tax law has moved the personal income tax system toward less nominal progressivity in its rate schedule. For instance, the top-bracket rate has been reduced from 52 percent to its 1992 level of 40 percent. Second, the number of tax brackets has been halved in comparison with its number in 1993. Finally, the threshold at which positive personal income tax payment must be made is increased by 20 percent, reducing the tax burdens on the poor.

One of the reasons why the proposecl tax systems surpassed the 1992 system in its revenue raisinlg and re-distributional effects lies in the fact that the underlying income distribution is not adequately taken into consideration in designing the 1992 tax rates and brackets. Table 5a shows the tax bracket income level relative to mean per capita income as obtained from the 1992 household budget suLrvey. This ratio shows several interesting characteristics of the 1992 tax brackets. The zero bracket (exemption level) is very narrow, extending from zero to less than half the mean per capita income. Positive income payments start at higher income level. However, it is only at incomes above 7 times mean per capita income that **the** marginal tax rate becomes substantial -- at 36 percent rate. The narrowness of higher tax brackets is evident. The top tax rate of 40 percent requires an income of 14.3 8/Bulgaria's 1993 personal income tax schedule is given in _Tax Notes International,_ Volume 6, No. 19, 1993, page 1139.

9/The inherent administrative weaknesses necessitate simple tax system with few brackets and rates. Tanzi (1991) pointed to the adverse effect of the transition to a market economy on the efficiency of tax administration -- from centralized tax collection or, in some cases, confiscation under the planned regime to the new decentralized market environment -- which requires the introduction and development of an entirely new tax administration machinery, a process which inevitably takes time. This was perhaps especially the case for taxing IBulgarian self-employed and non-wage income in a rapidly growing small-scale service sector which is difficult to bring into the tax net.
Figure 4: Bootstrapped GIRFs for a one percent decline in China’s growth using the trade weights of 2013 <!-- Start of picture text --> china usa euro japan<br>0.0 .00 .00 .00<br>-0.4 -.04 -.04 -.04<br>-0.8 -.08<br>-.08 -.08<br>-1.2 -.12<br>-.12 -.12<br>-1.6 -.16<br>-2.0 -.16 -.16 -.20<br>-2.4 -.20 -.20 -.24<br>5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20<br>austlia india indns kor<br>.050 .02 .05 .08<br>.025 .01 .00 .04<br>.000 .00 -.05 .00<br>-.025 -.01 -.10 -.04<br>-.050 -.02 -.15 -.08<br>-.03<br>-.075 -.04 -.20 -.12<br>-.100 -.05 -.25 -.16<br>-.125 -.06 -.30 -.20<br>-.150 -.07 -.35 -.24<br>5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20<br>mal nzld phlp sing<br>.05 .08 .08 .10<br>.00 .06 .05<br>-.05-.10-.15 .04.02 .04.00 -.05.00<br>-.20-.25-.30-.35 -.02-.04.00 -.04-.08 -.10-.15-.20-.25<br>-.40 -.06 -.12 -.30<br>5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20<br>thai oil agri m etal<br>.04 0.0 0.4 0.0<br>.00 -0.4 -0.5<br>-.04-.08-.12 -0.8-1.2 -0.40.0 -1.0-1.5<br>-.16-.20-.24-.28 -1.6-2.0-2.4-2.8 -0.8-1.2 -2.0-2.5-3.0<br>-.32 -3.2 -1.6 -3.5<br>5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for a glossary of acronyms. The lines correspond to the paths of standard GIRF( _blue_ ), median( _red line_ ), and 16th and 84th percentiles ( _red long dash_ ) of the distribution.

exchange rate). To make the figures concise and easier to understand, we have shortened the horizontal axis from 21 quarters (five years) to 13 quarters (three years), and added two vertical lines, corresponding to four quarters and eight quarters after the shock.

For the rate of inflation, it drops after a negative Chinese shock for all the countries, except Indonesia. For the equity price, the markets of most countries are negatively impacted, although there are notable differences. New Zealand is the only exception whose equity market positively responds to a negative Chinese shock. As we have obtained a positive response path for its real GDP, this might be the reason. Lastly, for the real effective exchange rate, all countries experience depreciation.

27
Table 13: Variance of Industry and Skill Premiums across Countries and Time

|**Variance:**<br>**Industry Premiums**|Indonesia<br>1994-07<br>|Philippines<br>1988-06|Thailand<br>1990-04|Vietnam<br>1992-06|Cambodia<br>1997-07|China<br>1999-05|Mongolia<br>1998-2007|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||(1996-07)|||||||
|1988<br>||0.050||||||
|1990|||0.158|||||
|1991||0.051||||||
|1992||||0.016||||
|1994|0.004*|0.036|0.212|||||
|1996|0.011|||||||
|1997|0.010|0.063|||0.008|||
|1998||||0.019|||0.016|
|1999|0.009|||||0.018||
|2000|||0.276|||||
|2001|0.012|0.079||||||
|2002||||||||
|2003|0.009||||0.076|||
|2004||0.076|0.196|0.016||||
|2005|0.013|||||0.021||
|2006||0.082||0.013||||
|2007|0.008||||0.121||0.009|
|_Change in Variance_|**0.004**<br>**_(-0.003)_**|**_0.032_**|**_0.038_**|**_-0.003_**|**_0.113_**|**_0.003_**|**_-0.007_**|
|**Variance:**||||||||
|**Skill Premiums**||||||||
|**(Secondary and above)****||||||||
|1988||0.026||||||
|1990|||0.064|||||
|1991||0.025||||||
|1992||||0.061||||
|1994|0.017*|0.019|0.032|||||
|1996|0.047|||||||
|1997|0.047|0.024|||0.008|||
|1998||||0.101|||0.031|
|1999|0.053|||||0.020||
|2000|||0.026|||||
|2001|0.101|0.035||||||
|2002||||||||
|2003|0.083||||0.034|||
|2004||0.048|0.036|0.023||||
|2005|0.060|||||0.012||
|2006||0.047||0.051||||
|2007|0.071||||0.016||0.043|
|_Change in Variance_|**_0.054_**|**_0.021_**|**_-0.028_**|**_-0.010_**|**_0.008_**|**_-0.008_**|**_0.012_**|
||**_(0.024)_**|||||||
|**Variance:**||||||||
|**Skill Premiums**||||||||
|**(Tertiary and above)*****||||||||
|1988||0.008||||||

39
distributions do not vary much by PFA as shown by the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> inter-quartile range calculated across PFAs and averaged over time. The fraction of the fixed-term portfolio invested up to one year varies only between 21% and 28% during the entire sample period and between 32% and 37% during the multi-fund period. Even smaller degrees of dispersion are observed at other ranges of the CDFs. Panels A2 and B2 show that the portfolio weights decline exponentially, similarly to the case of mutual funds although presenting a higher degree of volatility.

Figure 3 compares Chilean mutual and pension funds.<sup>11</sup> The distributions of both types of institutional investors differ at very short and very long maturities, but otherwise are very similar. For example, Panel C shows that both pension and mutual funds hold around 60% of their fixed-term assets at a maturity of up to three years, and above that maturity pension funds are slightly more short-term investors relative to mutual funds: pension funds hold 79% of their assets up to five years and 88% up to seven years, while mutual funds hold 73% and 80% up to that maturity, respectively. These small differences are not statistically significant. As shown in Columns (ii) to (viii), for most of the reported maturity cuts, standard t-tests cannot reject the hypotheses that the average fraction of assets held by pension funds and mutual funds are equal. As a result, the average maturities of assets held by pension funds (3.16 years) and mutual funds (3.88 years) are not very different (even in statistical terms), as shown in Panel D Column (i). However, because of the differences observed at maturities shorter than six months and longer than 15 years (Columns ii and vii), a two-sample goodness-of-fit test for

> 11 We compare mutual and pension funds during the multi-fund period (September 2002 to December 2005). Although pension fund data are available for a longer time period, the rest of the paper (with the exception of Figure 7) uses pension fund data for only the multi-fund period to have a comparable sample period across all investor types.

13
OZIER - REPLICATION REDUX – p. 12 of 41

# 2. Case in point: Miguel and Kremer (2004)

With an understanding of the possible meanings of reproducibility established, but before offering any recommendations, it is instructive to examine a recent, prominent case. In introducing this case, I first recapitulate the arc of the original underlying paper; I discuss its relationship to the prior and subsequent literature; I then proceed to describe the specifics of a replication, reanalysis, and review.

## 2.1. Worms

Nearly two billion people around the world are infected by intestinal worms (World Health Organization 2017). These species of parasitic worm inhabit the human digestive tract; they spread by expelling their eggs via excrement of infected people. Without good sanitation, these microscopic eggs can find their way, unnoticed, onto the skin (or food) of another person. Once someone ingests an egg, the reinfection cycle continues. Some of these parasites’ life cycles are more exotic and complex, but they have in common that poor sanitation facilities and hygiene practices allow infections to spread locally. The medication to treat the worms has few side effects and is remarkably cheap. Many of the people most infected by worms, it should be noted, are children.

## 2.2. The original study and the “Worm Wars”

In 2004, Miguel and Kremer published a study showing that an inexpensive deworming medication improved health and school attendance in Kenya. Miguel and Kremer (2004) went on to show that these effects could previously have been hidden from view by a subtlety in the design of many randomized trials: many studies had not accounted for the ways that worm infections can spread from one person to another, as I discuss further below. With a randomized trial designed to overcome this obstacle, the effects on health and school attendance were easy to see. The World Health Organization, the international donor community, and country governments all supported policies of deworming.<sup>11</sup> When, in 2015, _the Guardian_ headline described deworming as “debunked,” dozens of blog posts,

> 11 Note that the WHO already supported community‐level deworming treatment prior to the publication of the 2004 study.  See, for example, WHO (1987), Table 3.
Cunha, F., J. Heckman, L. Lochner, D. Masterov. 2005. “interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation.” 2005. NBER Working Paper 11331, Cambridge, MA.

- Currie,J. 2001. “Early Childhood Education Programs.” _The Journal of Economic Perspectives_ , 15(2): 213-238.

- Currie, J. and D. Thomas. 2000. “School Quality and the Longer-Term Effects of Head Start.” _The Journal of Human Resources_ 35(4): 755-774.

- Currie, J. and D. Thomas. 1995. “Does Head Start Make a Difference?” _American Economic Review_ 85(3): 341-64.

- Currie, J. and D. Thomas. 1999. “Early Test Scores, Socioeconomic Status and Future Outcomes.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6943. Cambridge, MA.

- Danziger, S. and J. Waldfogel. 2000. “Investing in Children: What do we Know? What Should We Do?” CASE paper 34. Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London, UK.

- Donohue, J. and P. Siegelman. 1998. “Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime.” _Journal of Legal Studies_ 27(1): 1-43.

- Feinstein, L. 2003. “Inequality in the Early Cognitive Development of British Children in the 1970 Cohort.” _Economica_ 70: 73-97.

Fernald, L.C., L.M. Neufeld, L.R. Barton, et al. 2005 “Parallel Deficits in Linear Growth and Mental Development in Low-Income Mexican Infants in the Second Year of Life.” _Public Health Nutrition_ , in press.

- Fryer, R.G. and S.D. Levitt. 2004. “Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap in the First Two Years of School.” _The Review of Economics and Statistics_ 86(2): 447-464.

- Garces, E., D. Thomas, J. Currie. 2002. “Longer-Term Effects of Head Start.” _The American Economic Review_ 92(4): 999-1012.

- Gertler, P.J. and L.C. Fernald. 2004. “The Medium Term Impact of _Oportunidades_ on Child Development in Rural Areas.” Unpublished manuscript.

- Gomby, D., P. Culross and R. Behrman. 1999. “Home Visiting: Recent Program EvaluationsAnalyses and Recommendations.” _The Future of Children_ 9(1): 4-26.

- Grantham-McGregor, S.M., C.A. Powell, S.P. Walker and J.H. Himes. 1991. “Nutritional Supplementation, Psychosocial Stimulation, and Mental Development of Stunted Children: The Jamaican Study.” _Lancet_ 338:1-5.

- Grantham-McGregor, S.M., S.P. Walker, S.M. Chang and C.A. Powell. 1997. “Effects of Early Childhood Supplementation with and Without Stimulation on Later Development in Stunted Jamaican Children.” _American Journal of Clinical Nutrition_ 66: 247-253.

- Griliches, Z. 1977. “Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Some Econometric Problems.” _Econometrica_ 45(1): 1-22.

- Guo, G., and K.M. Harris. 2000. “The Mechanisms Mediating the Effects of Poverty on Children’s Intellectual Development.” _Demography_ 37(4): 431-447.

Gupta, V.B., N.M. Nwosa, T.A. Nadel, S. Inamdar. 2001. “Externalizing Behaviors and Television Viewing in Children of Low-Income Minority Parents.” _Clinical Pediatrics_ 40(6): 337-41.

25
35 AM C

# **CASE SIUDIES**

## C **M.1:** ZIIADWE FAMILY HEALTH PROJECT: TARGETS AND INDICATORS

### Target Lewis for Key District Indicators

||||Percent|to beA|chievedb|yDistrict|||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Key**Indicator<br>sei|tbtfdge|Gokwe|Karol|Pfura|Nutoko|Ndgnsa|Nyang|a Teholotasho|
|Contraceptive prevalence**3/**|50|50|50|SO|40|50|50|65|
|Imuinization coverage**I/**|80|70|80|70|85|85|85|80|
|Antental car*31|85|95|90|70|90|90|90|85|
|Supervised deiveries<br>J|75|60|80|80|90|90|60|75|
|Growth monitoringl|50|70|80|60|70|100|80|60|
|Oral rehydration use_W_|30|45|60|60|50|100|100|30|
|Nursestrainedinfamily plamning|100|100|100|400|100|100|100|100|
|Supervision of village<br>health workers/|80|70|80|50|100|50|80|80|
|Rural health center supervision<br>by camuaity sisterf_/|90|100|<br>100|<br>100|<br>100|<br>100|<br>100|<br>90|

### Definitions

- **I/** Proportion of mirried wmen in the reproductive **ages** using a modern method of contraception. **3/** Proportion of children aged 0-12 oanths imn ized aginst **all** six of the target diseases of the **expended** progrm of **imanization.**

- _31_ Proportion of pregnant women who receive entenutal care at **lent twice** durlng their pregancy.

- y Proportion of deliveries carried out by trained health perstnnel (including trained traditional birth attendants).

- _I_ Proportion of children aged 12-36 months iho receive at Least four weighings annually.

- _I_ Proportion of mothers using oral rehydration therapy in the lest diarrheal episode of a child under five years old.

- y Proportion of VNWs WAo are supervised at least twice a mnth by a SCM/SONW or HA in the cmminity.

- _§l_ Proportion of ruwal health centers visited _bv_ a commity sister at least once a month.
# **Hunting for Leopards: Long Run Country Income Dynamics in Africa**

Jorge Saba Arbache and John Page<sup>1</sup> Keywords: GDP per capita, Growth, Sub-Saharan Africa. JEL Code: O11, O47, O55, O57.

Corresponding author: Jorge Saba Arbache, The World Bank, 1800 H St, NW, Washington, DC, 20433; email jarbache@worldbank.org.

> 1 Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region, The World Bank, and The Brookings Institution, Washington DC and The World Bank, respectively.  The findings and interpretations of this paper are those of the authors.  They do not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent.  We would like to thank participants at the World Institute for Development Economics Research “Southern Engines of Global Growth: China, India, Brazil, and South Africa” conference, held in Helsinki, Finland, September 7–8, 2007 for helpful comments and suggestions on an early version of this paper.
that the AGOA preferences plus strict ROO in period (B2) equipped Mauritian apparel firms to cope with international competition from the MFA end in period (B1). This finding is at odds with the suggestion in Rotunno et al. (2013) that stricter ROO would have led to greater local value added and more durable benefits. In fact, Mauritian exports only revived when ROO were relaxed in period (B2). The revival was marked by a shift in input sourcing by Mauritian firms, from African fabric made using US or African yarn to the presumably cheaper foreign, mostly Asian, fabric (see Online Appendix Figure D5).

# **_8.3 What explains Ethiopia’s late spurt?_**

A final piece of firm-level evidence on the dynamics of responses to AGOA comes from interviews with exporters in Ethiopia. Enterprise executives in Ethiopia and testimonies corporate executives in the US (described in Online Appendix d) suggest that US tariff preferences played a crucial role in offsetting Ethiopia’s cost disadvantages relative to countries like Vietnam due to its lower labor productivity and higher logistics costs. The leading apparel companies said that they would not have set up their production plants in Ethiopia if AGOA preferences did not exist. These statements suggest that AGOA was necessary for the growth of Ethiopian exports.

However, the local production process remains of a “cut-make-trim” type and is characterized by routine steps used to produce basic products using fabric largely imported from Asia. There is so far no significant presence of internationally competitive firms that could survive without preferential access. The interviews suggest that trade preferences boosted apparel export performance but have not yet led to durable competitiveness. Hence, tariff preferences alone were yet not sufficient to boost Ethiopian exports.

32
17 in a poverty trap: a situation where low income and low human capital levels create incentives for high population growth and low i ¢-tment in human capital that perpetuate the state of poverty. Policies that stimulate investment in human capital can break the economy out of this stagnant situation.

The new models also stress the importance of trade policy, fiscal policy, and financial policy, confirming earlier empirical work. The World Bank has been at the forefront of empirical studies of trade policy and growth. Along with large multicountry case studies, recent work by Feder (1983), Balassa (1985), Easterly and Wetzel (1989), de Melo and Robinson (1989), Nishimizu and Page (1990), Dollar (1990), and Levine and Renelt (1990) have carefully examined the cross-country evidence on trade policy and growth. The result of this empirical work indicates that, after adjusting for factor accumulation, countries with more open economies have had higher rates of growth.

Governments are capable of policies that enhance growth and also of policies that hinder growth. In Easterly (1990) and Barro (1990), governments may have positive growth effects by providing essential public goods; they may have negative growth effects by wasting funds sn worthless projects and bloated bureaucracies, or by imposing taxes and regulations that distort saving and investment decisions. It is thus necessary to conduct a detailed study of the composition of government expenditures and the structure of taxes to evaluate the effects of any country's fiscal stance on growth. These studies find a negative effect cf higher government consumption on growth. However, the complexity of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth is borne out by recent empirical work in Levine and menelt (1990). They find