SPLM have been locked in bitter disputes about demarcation of the North-South borders, especially near oil fields; the transparency of operations in the oil sector<sup>7</sup> ; the population census; redeployment of forces; and the status of Abyei<sup>8</sup> . These issues threaten to be the thorniest challenges facing the two partners (ICG, 2008). These difficulties, in addition to differences between the two partners regarding resolving the conflict in Darfur<sup>9</sup> were cited among the main factors behind the decision by the SPLM in October 2007 to suspend participation in the GNU. However, with active mediation by the US and other external actors, just two months later the two parties were able to resolve their disputes and return to the GNU, with the exception of the Abyei issue, which will be directly addressed by the Presidency<sup>10</sup> . Consequently the SPLM has decided to resume its participation in the GNU. Nonetheless, this crisis demonstrates the precarious nature of the Sudanese peace process and the importance of long-term strategic planning to avoid similar crises in the future. While the CPA may have been instrumental in bringing about the end of the war, the recent crisis demonstrates that even the most exhaustive 7 See Deng (2007a,b) for a perspective from GOSS and the SPLM.

8 The CPA calls for the resolution of the Abyei problem in two steps. First, a boundary commission would determine the boundary of the district as well as whether it belongs to the north or south; and, second, the Southern Sudanese Dinka people of Abyei will decide in a referendum whether to be part of the south or the north. The boundary commission has ruled that the district belongs to the South and that the northsouth border in that area should be adjusted accordingly. While the SPLM has accepted the committee’s ruling and considers it binding, the NCP has rejected it, arguing that the Commission has surpassed its mandate. It is pertinent to note that what makes this matter so complicated is that the Messeriya, the main northern tribe who has lived side by side with the Dinka in Abyei for centuries, are adamantly opposed to the Commission’s ruling. Moreover, almost all of the northern Sudanese political parties, though critical of the NCP monopoly over the CPA, also remain sympathetic to the Messerya’s position. See footnote 4 for recent progress on Abyei.

> **9** While the NCP and the SPLM were heavily engaged in the negotiations leading to the CPA, a new insurgency erupted in 2003 in Darfur, the far western region of northern Sudan.  This new civil war has touched off an international uproar due to the high number of civilian casualties; the vicious intercommunal violence associated with it and the massive scale of internally and externally displaced populations. It has been viewed with a lot of concern from the perspective of its corrosive effects on the CPA. (For analysis and assessment of the prospects for peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict, see, for example, Ahmed and Elbadawi (2008).)

10The Presidency, as stipulated in the CPA, is composed of the President of the Republic, the First Vice President and the Vice President. Though the President and his VP come from the NCP, the First VP, nominated by the SPLM, enjoys a veto power on all key decisions. See footnote 4 for recent progress.

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