rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
initial marital status. Figure 2 clearly shows that, conditional upon staying in the U.S., the probability of a change in marital status is substantially higher for initially unmarried than for initially married migrants, with the same pattern applying to both men and women. In other words, getting married after migration for initially unmarried migrants is substantially more likely than getting divorced/separated from one spouse for initially married migrants. This (admittedly intuitive) stylized fact is obtained under the assumption that initially married individuals who are separated or divorced at the time of the survey dissolved their marital union after migration, thus magnifying the probability of a change in their marital status.<sup>17</sup> Figure A.1 in the Appendix also reveals that this stylized fact is independent of the assumption that we need to introduce on the (unobserved) relative timing of an earlier marriage with respect to migration for individuals married more than once (representing 13.0 percent of the sample, see Table 1).<sup>18</sup>

# **4.2 Transnational marriages are largely a temporary phenomenon**

Panel B of Table 1 reveals that married migrants from developing countries mostly co-reside with their spouses; this finding, which also applies to migrants from Mexico, differs from the evidence provided in McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), who draw on earlier rounds of the ACS to show that two out of three married Mexican male immigrants have their spouse absent, while the same does not apply to married Mexican female migrants, consistently with the predominant sequential nature of the migration of married Mexican couples (Cerrutti and Massey, 2001). Crucially, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) focus only on recently arrived migrants (no more than two years before the survey). Figure 1 reconciles these different findings, as it reveals that, among migrants married before migration, the share who do not co-reside with their spouse sharply declines with the time since migration, in particular for men. The share who are separated or divorced tends to increase, in particular for women. Figure A.2 in the Appendix focuses on Mexican male migrants (married before migrating)

> 17This assumption also explains why the probability of a change in marital status is (for up to 1 or 2 years since migration) larger for initially unmarried migrants.

> 18Figure 2 is obtained by excluding migrants married more than once and who married after migration, as we cannot determine the relative timing of an earlier marriage with respect to migration. In Figure A.1, we instead examine the probability of changes in marital status under two alternative assumptions about migrants married multiple times: either that their first marriage occurred after migration or that their first marriage occurred before migration.

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# SME REGISTRATION

EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL IN BANGLADESH<sup>_∗_</sup> Giacomo De Giorgi<sup>_†_</sup> Aminur Rahman<sup>_‡_</sup>

> _∗_ We are grateful to PEDL initiative for the partial funding. Thanks to seminar participants at the SME Initiative workshop at the MIT and at World Bank Group workshops in Washington and Singapore. We thank Najy Benhassine, Andrei Mikhnev, Massimilano Santini for their comments, Syed Estem Dadul Islam, Farin Islam, Rotbah Nitia, Ismail Hossain, and Belayet Hossain for survey and data collection assistance, and Isaac Opper for excellent research assistance. Corresponding author: Giacomo De Giorgi (degiorgi@stanford.edu) Economics Department, Landau Economics Building, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305-6072.

> _†_ Stanford University, BREAD, CEPR and NBER

> _‡_ World Bank Group

<mark>1</mark>
sources (e.g., FAO 2017; World Bank 2017; WFP 2019; etc.).

Combined, these results suggest that novel internet-based surveys can be another important tool used to more accurately collect sensitive information. In the case of the Republic of Yemen and the strict restrictions on questionnaires, novel internet surveys are one of the only modalities in which some sensitive questions can be asked.<sup>2</sup> Used alongside indirect survey methods, such as list experiments, endorsement experiments, and randomized response design (e.g., Glynn 2013; Blair et al. 2013; Blair et al. 2015; etc.), these surveys can expand the range of questions and types of information collected on sensitive topics; and used alongside embedding key informants in the community (e.g., Blattman et al. 2016), these surveys can be used to direct the content of and validate key informant surveys. Given the difficulty of fully validating questions on sensitive topics, the broad alignment of a large number of techniques, potentially including internet-based surveys depending on the context, is likely the best evidence on which to base policy decisions.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes existing methods typically used to collect sensitive information; Section 3 describes the difficulties in collecting a broad range of information in the Republic of Yemen’s conflict; Section 4 describes the internet survey and the mobile phone survey used in the analysis; Section 5 describes the empirical strategy; Section 6 reports the empirical results; and Section 7 concludes.

# **Section 2. Background on Capturing Sensitive Information**

There are a wide variety of techniques to try and capture sensitive information from respondents that broadly fall into two categories. First, there are indirect methods where researchers can infer the population level responses to sensitive questions and protect the anonymity of the respondent through subtle changes in survey questions or through the introduction of randomization of responses to survey questions. These methods include endorsement experiments (e.g., Lyall et al. 2013), list experiments (e.g., Imai 2011; Blair 2See both the background section on the Republic of Yemen and the data section for a discussion of the difficulties we had inserting some sensitive questions in a mobile phone survey of Yemeni households conducted outside of the country.

5
of λ<sup>ac</sup> rs<sup>andS</sup> t<sup>ac,conditionalontheincludedfixedeffects,andisduetochangesinthe</sup> size of cohorts in source countries (which are experiencing their demographic transition at different rates) and their differential propensity to be employed in certain industries and regions in Malaysia. The variation in the instrument generated by the differential propensity of immigrant groups (defined by nationality and age) to work in different local labor markets is similar to the commonly used Altonji-Card instrument (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001). The variation induced by the demographic changes in source countries is similar to Hanson and McIntosh (2010) who find that Latin American migration to the US is highly responsive to labor supply and demographic shocks, as predicted by earlier changes in birth cohort sizes.

Considering potential threats to the validity of this instrument, it is worth noting that the supply of potential migrants to Malaysia from different source countries (St<sup>ac)</sup> is determined by the demographic patterns and transition in those countries, and hence clearly exogenous with respect to contemporaneous labor market shocks in Malaysia. However, it is also necessary that the only channel by which it affects outcomes in Malaysia is through changing the supply of potential immigrants. A reason this may not be the case is that demographic changes in source countries may affect the price of internationally traded goods produced in Malaysia (as a result of both changes in the demand for those goods and changes in the supply of competing products). The inclusion of year by industry fixed effects and region by year fixed effects, as in our main specification addresses these concerns.<sup>27</sup>

> 27The major immigrant source countries - Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand - accounted for only 7 percent of Malaysian exports in 2000 and 10 percent in 2010 (Department of Statistics, Malaysia) and hence the direct effect of their demographic transition on the consumption of Malaysian exports is likely modest.

28
member from all sources. Sources are listed in the survey questionnaire. In all analyses, household incomes are annualized by aggregating the quarterly data and are in per capita terms. Incomes have been regionally deflated on the basis of the unit values of food reported in the survey.

# **3. Identifying the Middle Class in Kazakhstan**

## **3.1 The Absolute Income-based Approach**

The absolute approach identifies the middle class as those households with income or consumption within a specific range, fixing a lower threshold of particular income (e.g., $10 per household member) and a corresponding upper threshold (e.g., $50). Thresholds are usually set in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms for the sake of international comparison.

Since the welfare aggregate for official poverty in Kazakhstan is income (World Bank, Country Poverty Brief, October 2017), we focus on income aggregate.<sup>4</sup> The fundamental question is naturally how to set the thresholds; to some extent, the choices for the middle-class range are arbitrary. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) acknowledged use of an ad hoc range of values considering two groups of households: the lower middle class whose daily per capita expenditures valued at PPP are between $2 and $4, and the upper middle class between $6 and $10. Ravallion (2010) sets the lower bound of a “developing world middle class” at the global poverty line ($2 per day) and the higher bound ($13) at the U.S. poverty line. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), in defining the global middle class, set the lower threshold equal to the mean earnings in Brazil ($12 per day) and choose the upper bound of $50 per day—the average income in Italy, the least wealthy G7 member.

Given the rate of absolute poverty in Kazakhstan, it is not appropriate to categorize anyone who is not poor as middle class, as Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Ravaillon (2010) did for a group of developing countries. It is more appropriate to follow the vulnerability approach, which defines the middle class as those who are not vulnerable to falling into poverty in a few years’ time, as López-Calva and

> 4 On average, however, income and consumption are in balance. In 2013 the log-balances, defined as the logarithms of the ratios of consumption and income, have a mean of −0.0113, corresponding to consumption that is 1.13% lower than income, and standard deviation of 0.335. Details on the income and consumption distributions are available upon request.

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industrially developed: Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim, and Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) Islands. For the rest of the states/UTs, the Census Sector includes (i) units having 100 or more workers and (ii) all factories covered under Joint Returns. All other units belonging to the strata (state x four-digit industry of the NIC-04 framework) having four or fewer units are also considered as Census Sector units. Finally, the remaining units, excluding those of Census Sector, called the Sample Sector, are arranged in order of their number of workers and samples are then drawn circular systematically considering a sampling fraction of 20% within each stratum (state x sector x four-digit industry) for all states. An even number of units with a minimum of four are selected and evenly distributed in two sub-samples.

ASI is the principal source of industrial statistics for the formal manufacturing sector in India. It provides statistical information to assess changes in the growth, composition, and structure of organized manufacturing sector comprising activities related to manufacturing processes, repair services, gas and water supply, and cold storage. As noted in Ghani et al. (2012), organized manufacturing contributes the substantial majority of India’s manufacturing output, while the unorganized sector accounts for the substantial majority of employment for Indian manufacturing workers.

Manufacturing activity undertaken in the informal sector, such as households (own-account manufacturing enterprise, OAME) and unregistered workshops, is covered by the NSSO. Following the first Economic Census 1977, small establishments and enterprises not employing any hired worker (that is, OAME) engaged in manufacturing and repairing activities were surveyed on sample basis in the 33<sup>rd</sup> round of NSSO during 1978-79. Subsequent surveys covering OAEs and Non-Directory Manufacturing Establishments (NDME) were conducted in the 40<sup>th</sup> and 45<sup>th</sup> rounds of NSSO during 1984-85 and 1989-90, respectively. In 1994-95, a first integrated survey on unorganized manufacturing and repairing enterprises covering OAMEs, NDMEs, and DMEs was undertaken during the 51<sup>st</sup> round of NSSO. Subsequently, surveys of manufacturing enterprises in the unorganized sector were conducted in the 56<sup>th</sup> (2000-01), 62<sup>nd</sup> (2005-06), and 67<sup>th</sup> (2010-11) rounds.<sup>13</sup>

> 13 Thus surveys on unorganized manufacturing enterprises usually covered: (a) manufacturing enterprises not registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act,  1948; (b) manufacturing enterprises registered under Section 85 of Factories Act, 1948; (c) non-ASI enterprises engaged in cotton ginning, cleaning, and baling

13
in per student costs for these schools. The current annual cost standard for STS students is 1,300 yuan; actual annual recurrent costs reported by schools surveyed varied in 1985-86 between 300 and 2400 yuan. Cost standards for the SWS are currently set at 600 yuan per student per year; reported annual recurrent costs ranged from 350 to 2300 yuan. The estimated annual recurrent costs per student in the SVS surveyed ranged from 250 to 950 yuan.

Characteristics of Planning A number of important conclusions emerge from this description of the various planning processes which guide VTE in China.

First, while the flow of information in the manpower forecasting and planning process is complex, decisions on skill match seem to be effectively decentralized to the lowest possible level. This decentralization, combined with the emphasis on annual plans and a great deal of formal and informal consultation at and below the provincial level may indicate the capacity of the system to make reasonably effective adjustments at the margin as quantitative demands change across levels and specialties.

In addition, one gets the distinct impression that though the authorities are following the formal steps of manpower forecasting and the development of manpower targets and plans, they are not locked into a rigidly deterministic stance toward the figures that are passed back down the line. A great deal of latitude is granted to modify targets and procedures according to local conditions and priorities. This essentially pragmatic view of plan implementation is likely to serve China well, as against a more doctrinaire, authoritarian approach. If only because incentive structures and forms of economic control are changing so fast, no forecasts of skill needs can be expected to give more than the most general guide to the optimum skill-mix of the Chinese labor force 5, 10, or 15 years ahead.

For enterprise-owned SWS, the effective distance between the determination of employment targets and the establishment of the enrollment pattern for the school may be no longer than the walk from enterprise main offices to the school located in the factory complex. STS that serve national manpower needs within an industry are planned for nationally, and SVS enrollments are planned interactively at municipal levels. Only the municipal and provincially-owned STS enrollment decisions are effectively made at the province level. In addition, the ability of SVS and STS to train over-quota further increases local adaptability.

Decentralization of financial planning and decision-making fits well with demand and supply planning. The current practice of requiring SVS principals to generate local financing for capital expenditures appears, in the well-developed provinces studied, to be working. This 'entrepreneurial" approach supports the orientation of these schools towards close linkages with enterprises. It is less likely **to** be effective, however, for rural SVS with fewer -- and poorer -- sources of capital financing.

- 33 -
_and DICCb_<sup>_m,whereIRC_</sup> _s_<sup>_mandDICC_</sup> _b_<sup>_mbind,andthecompensationschemeisgivenby:_</sup> _Proof._ See appendix Equality (12) identifies the total compensation that the buyer offers the seller in the contract. Equality (11) gives the maximum fixed payment that the seller receives during date _t_ and equality (10) gives the minimum bonus that the buyer promises to pay at the end of the period to induce the seller to not change the land-use.

Recalling the assumptions about the cost of forest conservation, _c_ ( _<u>q</u>_ <u>)</u> = 0, the fixed payment included in the optimal REDD contract equals zero. That means that under the optimal relational contract the seller does not get paid anything upfront or during the time she is under the contract until the end of the period. The contingent payment includes the complete payment to the seller. It includes the cost of providing optimal forest conservation and the opportunity cost of the alternative land use. This is intuitive because the seller knows that if she deviates from the contract and changes the use of land, the buyer does not pay the performance payment and furthermore he does not do business again with her. As a consequence she cannot get any future benefits from the relationship. This happens even with the smallest change in the land use as the carbon sinks differ from the baseline established at the beginning of the period and renegotiation is not possible under the assumptions of the optimal relational contract. Therefore, if the seller deviates from the contract she chooses the most profitable actions which include not incurring any cost for forest conservation and converting all land to agricultural or timber activities. Because an up-front fixed payment does not give incentives to the seller to remain in the relationship as it is not conditioned on performance, the buyer needs to provide enough additional incentives to the seller to perform under imperfect verifiability of carbon sinks. Moreover, because the contingent payments are limited by the future gains from the relationship and because the buyer’s utility decreases when the fixed payment is positive, then all compensation is shifted to the contingent payment so that the seller has enough incentives to perform. The result is highlighted in the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.1.** _For imperfect enforcement regimes when parties are purely profit maximizers, all compensation is paid as a performance payment upon delivery of the carbon sinks, and_

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iii

# **SUMMARY**

With increasing investments in development programs in general and water-related programs in particular, there are obvious concerns regarding their actual impacts on development objectives. Two persistent aspects hamper their proper evaluation both in economic literature and in development policy: (a) the specific roles that institutions play in the process of impact generation and transmission, and (b) the impact synergies that a development program derives from past, ongoing, and planned programs. Exclusion of these aspects is very important, particularly in the evaluation of _meta_ development goals such as food security, where the realization of the final objective is linked with the progress of several intermediate but related targets of a hierarchy of programs spanning across sectors and time.

This paper develops and applies a methodology that explicitly captures the effects of both institutional roles and development synergies within a unified framework and quantitative context. The development of the framework is illustrated by (a) referring to a set water and agriculture-related development programs (system rehabilitation, bulk water delivery, and crop diversification), (b) tracing their impact pathways and interaction points, (c) locating relevant institutions in these points and pathways, and (d) linking them all with the final goal of food security—one of the key targets of the Millennium Development Goals. This framework is, then, translated into a system model with 21 sequentially linked equations, comprised of a set of development, institutional, and impact variables. For the practical application of the framework, the Kala Oya Basin in Sri Lanka is taken as the empirical context and the perception-based information collected from a sample of 67 experts is used as the data source.

The estimation of the model coefficients provides considerable insights on the nature of both the roles that different institutions play at various points of the impact pathways as well as the synergies that development programs derive from each other. The sensitivity analysis performed with the reduced form equation suggests that, in terms of the marginal effects on food security, market institution has the highest effect, followed by others such as price regulation and trade policy. Unlike these institutions with a positive effect, there are others with a negative contribution such as land tenure and rural development policy.

From the perspective of practical policy, this paper has two main contributions. First, it demonstrates the importance of accounting for the institutional impacts and development synergies when planning and implementing any new development program in a given region. Second, it provides a diagnostic tool both for locating the weak spots and slack links in various impact pathways of a development program by identifying the institutions and impact chains that are to be strengthened to improve the impact flows of development programs.