rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
- 32 -

However, Rotberg's plan also has certain weaknesses. It is organizationally complex, notably in requiring the creation of a new World Bank affiliate. It involves complex financial engineering. Only new lending in US dollars would be eligible for the Bank's puts, which would exclude nonUS creditors th, t elect to lend in their own currencies. The dollar emphasis may also be sub-optimal if it increases the dollar exposure of countries whose export earnings have a large non-dollar component. Finally, there are no "sticks" to deter free riders.

Among other credit enhancement proposals is that of First Interstate Bank **_321._** This plan incorporates some of the features of Mexico's securitized debt defeasance scheme of 1987: a condition of new loans by commercial banks would be that part of the loan proceeds be set aside by the borrowers to purchase US Government zero-coupon bonds that would serve as collateral.

# Interest stabilization

The principles and techniques of interest-rate stabilization were set out in the previous section. One variant to protect debtor countries against future increases of the nominal cost of debt is to use the principles applied in adjustable-rate mortgages, so that a ratchet would limit interest-rate increments from one interest payment date to another. This is based on the assumption that most debtors can accommodate small variations in nominal--and real--costs, but are destabilized by extreme fluctuations of interest rates, such as those that occurred at the start of this decade.

Implementation of that type of protection would require an institutional framework, for instance an Interest Stabilization Facility (ISF), sponsored and funded by industrial countries. The ISF that would bear similarit3, with Interest Compensation Facility of the now defunct Herrhausen proposal and with de Carmoy's Compensatory Financing Facility. Its role would be to determine the appropriate ceiling for a "moving interest-rate cap" in any given period. Maximum increments would be defined in light of anticipated interest-rate trends, and of the capacity by eligible debtors to absorb certain rate increments. The ISF would also be a central clearing house between lenders and debtors. Whenever market rates exceed the cap, the ISF would pay that excess to commercial creditors on the debtors' behalf, and capitalize it as a direct claim on the debtors. To amortize that claim, debtors would continue to pay the ISF the capped rate when interest due on the original floating-rate loan falls below the cap. Depending on whether any residual claim oustanding is extinguished at the maturity of the cap, debt stabilization of this kind could involve a concessional element, akin to interest-rate relief.

31/ The Economist, 5/14/1988, p 83.

32/ The International Economy, July/August 1988, p. 104.
Yunnan. The total investment per capita under the SWP was roughly equal to mean annual income per capita of the project villages.

Within the selected villages, virtually all households were expected to benefit from the infrastructure investments under SWP, such as improved rural roads, power lines and piped water supply. Widespread benefits were also expected from the improved social services, including upgrading village schools and health clinics, and training of teachers and village health-care workers. Those with school-aged children also received tuition subsidies as long as the children stayed in school. Over half of the households in SWP villages also received individual loans at a lower interest rate than for commercial sources of credit. The loans financed various activities including initiatives for raising farm yields, animal husbandry and tree planting. There was also a component for off-farm employment, including voluntary labor mobility to urban areas and support for village enterprises. The selection of project activities aimed to take account of local conditions and the expressed preferences of participants.

Chen, Mu and Ravallion (2009) report results from an intensive survey data collection effort over 1995-2005 spanning both treatment and comparison villages.<sup>11</sup> All surveys were implemented by the Rural Household Survey (RHS) team of the government’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The baseline survey covered 2,000 randomly-sampled households in 200 villages, with roughly half not participating in the SWP. A final post-intervention survey was done in 2004/05. Surveys were also done during the disbursement period up to its end, in 2000.

There are 112 SWP villages and 86 non-SWP villages in the sample. The SWP villages were a random sample from all project villages, while the non-SWP villages were a random sample from all other villages in the designated poor counties. Ten randomly sampled households were interviewed in each village.

The surveys included community, household and individual questionnaires. The community schedule collected data on natural conditions, infrastructure and access to services. The household survey collected data on ( _inter alia_ ) incomes, consumptions and assets. The individual questionnaires covered gender, age, education and occupation.

> 11 The attrition rate was 12% over the full period. Chen et al. discuss tests for attrition bias and for bias in selecting replacement sample households.

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24 (WIDOW x YEAR05) was even lower (by a factor exp(-0.41) = 0.66) compared to widows before the genocide. In 1992, sex ratios (SEXRATIO) do not significantly influence fertility rates among middle age women. This is very different after the genocide: more balanced sex ratios significantly increase fertility rates in the early post-war period (SEXRATIO x YEAR00). Given that most of the women of middle age are in union, this finding again suggests that fertility and partnership are linked. Considering the number of living children in 2005, women of middle age who lost a child during the genocide do not have significantly fewer living children than women who were not exposed to conflict (holding other characteristics constant). In short, it seems that women who were exposed to the genocide aged between 14 and 28 fully adjusted their fertility in the post-war period.

This is not the case for women in the oldest age group of 35-49 years during the survey collection (Table 9). In this age group, the negative effects of conflict exposure on fertility prevail – through widowhood (WIDOW x YEAR00; WIDOW x YEAR05), the loss of a brother in the short term (BROTHERDEATH), and the loss of a child (CHILDDEATH) and a sister in the long term (SISTERDEATH). In fact, women in the oldest age group who lost a child or their husband during the genocide have 0.91 and 0.72 fewer living children in 2005, respectively compared to women not affected by the genocide. Considering the fact that the dependent variables of interest only capture births given during the past five and ten years – and that many of the women in the old age group may have reached menopause – this result is not surprising. Women who were exposed to conflict between age 29-43 (those surveyed in 2000) and 24-38 (those surveyed in 2005) have fewer chances to replace close kin who died in 1994. To conclude, it is the oldest group of women whose family structure is affected most strongly by mortality during the genocide.

# **d) Simulation results**

In order to explore the magnitude of the effects, we predict the number of births and the number of living children for women exposed to conflict through different channels for each month between January 1990 and January 2005 (Fig. 5). All other socio-economic characteristics are held constant at their mean values. Women who lost at least one child during the genocide were able to adjust their fertility, although they could not fully make up for the lost child (Fig. 5a). However, conflict-affected women were not able to narrow the gap in the number of living children compared to women who did not lose children during the genocide (Fig. 5b). In part, this is due to higher mortality rates of children born to these
29 Based on government reports (2016, 2017) and Alberini et al. (2019), it reasonable to assume that energy efficiency improvements reduce gas consumption by some 20% on average. For a home improvement project costing 18,000 UAH, a household that seeks to borrow half of that amount would be receiving 3150 UAH from the government. Excluding interest payments, this would bring the cost of the project to 14,850 UAH, which would be easily “paid back” by the savings on the gas bill over the lifetime of the equipment and materials (20 years) at no loss of welfare for the household.<sup>30</sup> It should be noted that the 3,150 UAH payment from the government would be a onetime payment that is just about equal to or less than the average annual HUS payment during 2018 (4,800 for the full HUS on all utilities, and 2,949 UAH for the gas HUS), but that it helps secure gas consumption reductions over many years. The approximate cost to the government per year would be, if it continued at the same rate as in the past, some 400 million UAH for a saving of 800 × 0.20 × 14,934,919 households × 0.08 (the share of households participating in a year)=19,117 million cubic meters of gas per year. The program budget has been, and would continue to be, a fraction of that for the HUS.<sup>31</sup>

> 30 The household would demand less gas but be equally or more comfortable in a better insulated, and warmer, home. The low-price elasticity of gas demand ensures that any “rebound effect” would be negligible (Sorrell et al., 2009).

> 31 Unfortunately, the 2021 budget for the Warm Loans program is only 150 million UAH, much less than the 400 million UAH in each of 2018, 2019 and 2020.
12 equations are the rates of fertility and mortality mutually consistent. Thus, the consistent or equilibrium levels of infant mortality and total fertility, for a society with the behavior encapsulated in the two equations, are I 1RO and TFRO.

13. The effects of a policy change that results in an increase in family planning acceptors, for example an increase in government family planning expenditures (REXFPP), can be traced out on the diagram. The exercise illustrates the difference batween the direct effect of the policy change and the total effect including the interaction of mortality and fertility. An increase in REXFPP would shift the TFR equation down to TFR'.

Considering only the direct fertility effects<sup>9</sup> , the estimated fertility reduction wauld be TFRj - TFR1. However, the direct effect is only part of the total effect. The fall in fertility will be accompanied by a fall in infant mortality to IMR1 which would lead to further reductions in TFR, and so on, in the direction of the stair stepped arrow, until the process comes once again to a new equilibrium at TFR2 and IfR2 1<sup>0</sup> . The total change in fertility with the new level of REXFPP is, thus, TFRO-TFR2, which is greater than estimated from the direct effect alone. In addition, the increased family planning expenditures have had a substantial effect on the infant 9Approximated for example by the standard couple years of protection calculation or through application of a demographic estimation procedure such as the Population Council's TABRAP (Nortman, 1975) or TARGET (Bongaarts, 1985). 1OThe process will converge on a new equilibrium only if the IHR equation has a steeper slope than the total fertility rate. If the reverse is true, that is the IMR equation zuts the TFR equation from above, any small change from equilibrium will be dostabilizing.
from the largest 40 industrial cities in the country, which were selected from 12 of the largest 15 states by picking the largest three or four industrial centers from each state. These 12 states were Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. These states account for more than 90 percent of India’s industrial GDP while the three or four cities covered in each state accounted for the bulk of manufacturing outputs of their respective states. In each city, samples were drawn from the population of firms with more than 10 workers and in one of the eight exporting or import competing manufacturing industries.<sup>4</sup> The total sample was allocated among states in proportion to a state’s share in the national employment total of the eight industries. The systematic sampling rule sets an establishment’s probability of selection proportional to the establishment’s number of employees.

In the China survey, 2,400 enterprises were sampled from 18 cities in 15 provinces considered to be representative of China five geographic divisions. The cities include in the northeastern region, Benxi and Dalian (Liaoning Province), Changchun (Jilin), and Harbin (Heilongjiang); in the coastal region, Hangzhou and Wenzhou (Zhejiang), Jiangmen and Shenzhen (Guangdong); in the central region, Changsha (Hunan), Nanchang (Jiangxi), Wuhan (Hubei), and Zhengzhou (Henan); in the southeastern region, Guiyang (Guizhou), Chongqing (Sichuan), Kunming (Yunnan), and Nanning (Guangxi); and in the northwestern region, Lanzhou (Gansu) and Xi’an (Shaanxi). The total GDP of these provinces accounted for almost exactly half of the national GDP in 2007.<sup>5</sup> Each of the selected cities was allotted a sample size of either 100 or 150 firms. These firms were then randomly drawn from an electronic database of firms. Unlike the India survey, the China survey sampled firms from manufacturing and service industries.<sup>6</sup> The sample in China was restricted to businesses that had an employment size more than 20 workers for manufacturing and 15 employees for service industries.

To ensure comparability, we select only manufacturing firms drawn from the industries covered in both the India and the China surveys.<sup>7</sup> In addition, while Indian firms are largely all private firms, some Chinese firms in our sample are state owned. Many commentators suggest that

> 4 The industries are textiles, garments and leather goods, household electronics, electrical equipment and parts, auto and parts, food processing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and metallurgical products and tools. 5 National Bureau of Statistics, http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed March 1, 2010.

> 6 The manufacturing industries include garments and leather goods, household electronics, electrical equipment and parts, auto and parts, food processing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, metallurgical products and tools, and transport equipment.

> 7As a result, we exclude textiles producers from the India sample and establishments in services and transport equipment sectors from the China sample.

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55 were found in Indonesia.38 It is quite common for grant programs to encourage recipient governments to alter their behavior in a manner that results in local or national welfare losses, or both. The grant system in Indonesia provides several such examples.39 One example is provided by the subsidi daerah otonom (SDO) which pays the salaries and allowances of essentially all local government employees, including primary school teachers. While this cost reimbursement grant guarantees a uniform pay schedule for local government employees without regard for the financial health of any single locality, the lack of any cost sharing can encourage local governments to attempt to employ inefficiently large amounts of labor. To prevent this possibility, the system requires central approval of local staffing decisions; however, there is no objective system used to ascertain local manpower needs.

Another potential economic inefficiency of the Indonesian system is tied to the budget process. While block grants are allocated to provinces as well as to municipalities in urban areas (kotamadya) and regencies or 38 Brian Binder, Financial Management in Local Government, Development Administration Group, Institute of Local Government (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1982).

39For discussions of the Indonesian grant system that all reach similar evaluative conclusions see Kenneth Davey, Central-Local Financial Relations," Development Administration Group, Institute of Local Government (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1979); Schroeder, Rural Development Grants to Local Governments in Asia; and The World Bank, "Indonesia: Public Resource Management Study, Local Government Finance Sector Report," Urban and Water Supply Division, Projects Department, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, mimeo (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1987).
perceived power of conferences. A possible way forward is to strengthen the provision of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), dealing with anticompetitive business practices to ensure that the gains from liberalization are not eroded by collusive pricing.

# **II. An overview of international maritime transport**

Maritime transport services consist of three types of activities: _international maritime transport_ (freight and passengers), i.e. the actual transportation service performed once the commodity is on board of a ship in a country until the moment when the vessel reaches the destination port of a different state;<sup>9</sup> _maritime auxiliary services,_ i.e. any activities related to cargo manipulation in ports and on ships;10 and _port services,_ i.e. activities related solely to ship management in ports.1 I In this paper, we use data pertaining to restrictions affecting each segment of the market.

Due to differences in commodity types as well as to technological improvements in the shipping industry (most importantly, containerization), international maritime freight transport has developed specialized branches. Thus, _liner shipping,_ meaning maritime transport of commodities by regular lines that publish in advance their calls in different harbors, is distinct from _tramp shipping,_ which refers to transport performed irregularly, depending on momentary demand. Typically, liner carriers transport commodities with a higher degree of industrial processing using containers, while non-containerized raw materials (crude and refined oil, iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite), generically known as bulk, tend to be carried in tramp carriers.12 Tramp shipping is generally believed to be a fairly competitive market, mostly free from restrictions (WTO, 1998). In contrast, liner shipping has traditionally been subject both to 9 International transport as defined by GATS, excludes cabotage, which refers to transportation of commodities between ports of the same country.

° In the GATS classification, maritime auxiliary services include maritime cargo handling, storage and warehousing, customs clearance, container station and depot, maritime agency, and maritime freight forwarding.

" In the GATS classification, port services include pilotage, towing and tug assistance, provisioning, fuelling and watering, garbage collecting and disposal, port captain's services, navigation aids, shore-based operational services, emergency repair facilities etc.

12 Bulk traffic is typically divided into two categories: tanker (including crude oil and oil related products) and dry bulk (including iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite, phosphates). Note that the distinction between liner and bulk is not watertight. There exists a gray area which includes "break-bulk" (i.e. loose, non-containerized cargo transported using liners), general cargo (non-bulk commodities transported on liners without using containers), or containerized goods transported by tramp carriers.

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with a poverty line of US$1<sup>10</sup> per day for the nine regions and Haiti as a whole. Because the West, where the capital is located, contains the lowest proportion of extremely poor households in Haiti (29 percent) and is also where nearly half of all youth live, concern for metropolitan (Port-au-Prince) youth could appear to be less than for those in the country as a whole (49 percent in extreme poverty). Nevertheless, metropolitan youth do not have better opportunities than those in other urban (outside Port-au-Prince, henceforth referred to as urban) and rural areas. For example, youth unemployment and crime rates are higher than average in the capital. With Port-au-Prince as a magnet, Haiti’s degree of urbanization changed rapidly from less than 25 percent in 1982 to over 40 percent in 2003. As a result, migrants have been forced to change their lives dramatically and family structures have also changed (see Section 5). In general, poverty is seen as a very serious problem—two-thirds of youth have this opinion—with the largest proportion in the metropolitan area. This may be explained to some extent by the high income inequality,<sup>11</sup> the crime and disorder that follow, and differences in family size and structure between poor and nonpoor households (see Section 5).

|Table 3.2 Household PovertyIncidence 2001<br>|
|---|
|ExtremePoverty (percent)|
|Artibonite<br>58.6|
|Center<br>55.6|
|Grand-Anse<br>60.8|
|North<br>62.7|
|Northeast<br>80.3|
|Northwest<br>65.0|
|West<br>28.9|
|South<br>63.0|
|Southeast<br>56.6|
|Haiti<br>48.9|

_Source:_ Verner (2005).

Extreme poverty is a serious risk factor for youth development. The macro environment in general provides insufficient opportunities for youth. The government’s lack of means has led to malnutrition, degradation and lack of investment in infrastructure, and low quality and quantity of public education and health services. This situation leads to serious negative impacts on youth including low educational attainment, low social capital accumulation, poor health, and violent behavior (Moser and Bronkhorst 1999, Schneidman 1996). In addition, extreme poverty forces Haitians to discount the future heavily, engaging only in short-run engagements with immediate returns.<sup>12</sup> Thus, besides having a direct impact on people’s lives, alleviating poverty would also have secondary positive effects on livelihoods by allowing a change in focus to the medium and longer term.

> 10 Including self-consumption and PPP adjusted. 11 Gini coefficient of 0.66 for Haiti as a whole.

> 12

> This includes working in the informal sector, but also undertaking illegal activities.

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