24 is considerable variation across countries, depending on the composition of the immigrant population, their participation in the labor force, the structure of taxes, and the nature and extent of social benefits provided. The net fiscal impact of immigrants across the OECD sample in 2007‐2009 is on average slightly positive (0.35% of GDP), but ranges from positive 2% in Switzerland (which hosts many skilled immigrants) to negative 1% of GDP in Germany (which hosts many unskilled and older immigrants). Excluding outliers such as Switzerland, there is no correlation between the share of immigrants in the population and the fiscal impact, underscoring the fact that other factors than the number of immigrants are at work (IMF, 2016), such as age structure of the immigrant stock, time since arrival, etc.

With this as background, we now turn to the fiscal impact of refugees. A rigorous examination of the fiscal impact of refugees requires the identification of refugees. Since historical statistics on refugees are not sufficiently reliable, or are not available, estimations must use indirect methods to identify refugees that combine various sources and make many assumptions. Typically, this is done by including in the refugee count all immigrants from countries known to have been the origin of large numbers of refugees during years of conflict or persecution. Below, we examine examples of three types of study, relating to a given year, relating to the long‐term, and relating to a specific locality.

<u>Short‐term fiscal impact of refugees</u> The Swedish case examined by Ruist is especially interesting because Sweden accepts large numbers of refugees, and, since its welfare state is among the most developed, social spending in support of refugees is especially generous. The refugee population in Sweden is estimated at 5.1% of the population<sup>30</sup> : “If all 15 pre‐2004 EU members would have had the same rate of refugee immigration per capita as Sweden in 2005‐2014, total refugee immigration in these countries would have been 5.9 million instead of the actual 740,000.” (Ruist, 2015) His assessment of the net transfer to refugees from the rest of the Swedish population in 2007 (a year chosen because it is the last year where the needed data is available) amounted to 1% of Swedish GDP. Of this transfer, about 20% reflects the greater draw of refugees on social support expenditures, including integration grants, language training, diverse types of social assistance and individual grants, and expenditure on crime and justice. Although refugees draw less on pensions, disability, and education spending, their disproportionate cost on the former services dominates.

The lion’s share of the transfer to refugees ‐80%‐, however, reflects their lower contribution through taxes, which is due in turn to the lower share of refugees that are employed, estimated at 56.5% as compared to 78.5% among natives, and the lower earnings of refugees that are employed, estimated to be 40% less than those of natives. However, policies towards refugees must also recognize that time since arrival matters. As the chart below shows,

> 30 This number differs from UNHCR statistics‐ presumably because it is based on estimates of refugees arriving in prior decades, many of whom have been accorded some form of permanent residence status or have been accorded Swedish citizenship.