Coalition building on this scale is unprecedented in Ghana, at least with respect to corruption issues. Moreover, GACC sees its efforts as differing from previous attempts at reform because they are based upon collective action and common ownership of the corruption issue by all stakeholders, emphasize sustained and coordinated action, and seek both to build synergy and eliminate duplication. GACC proposals are to be integrated with broader public-sector reforms with the goal of creating a national integrity system supporting strong and open decision-making procedures. Such goals, and the diverse membership of GACC, both reflect the essence and reveal the difficulties of the coalition strategy; a critical question will be GACC's success in backing up this ambitious purposive agenda with other incentives strong and diverse enough to sustain it.

Thus, GACC will face serious sustainability and credibility problems. Scarcity of key resources will threaten the effectiveness of the organization. GACC's total reliance upon foreign donors will raise questions about commitment to address the problem from within. The new Government's plans for an Office of Accountability, anchored in the President’s office and serving as the official focal point for corruption issues, is a hopeful sign, as is the Government's offer of liaison through the office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. But where does this leave both CHRAJ and SFO, the two organizations that have the mandate to address problems of corruption and fraud in addition to other issues, and two “core members” of the coalition? The future roles, and resources, given to those bodies will be a critical test of Government commitment to them, and to GACC, as will the Government's willingness to back GACC publicly and provide funds for its operation.

Another issue central to GACC's repertoire of purposive incentives is the problem of setting an agenda. Although the coalition was formed as a result of the World Bank Institute’s Core Course, a clear-cut and manageable agenda still has yet to emerge. The coalition currently has no structure other than a category of “Core Members” (the participants identified above), a Secretary, and a Spokesperson. The core group has so far successfully supervised the execution and release of the diagnostic survey, proposed an action plan, and has conducted a national workshop (as well as two regional workshops in Tamale and Kumasi) to disseminate survey findings and seek input from citizens. However, coalition members have indicated there are no clear definitions of roles, which leaves them constantly engaged in “negotiations” to reach binding agreement. The current action plan reflects this mode of operation, and the coalition still needs to move to the stage of establishing credibility through early successes. While the goal of collegiality and collective ownership is laudable in many ways, the current fragmented structure and tactics of repeated internal negotiation may, in the long run, mean the agenda will always be _ad hoc_ and unfocused, and will make the provision of solidary, as well as specific material, incentives difficult if not impossible. GACC must provide such incentives, and must clearly define the roles of various institutional members, in order to prevent distrust from brewing among its members, and to ease reliance upon purposive appeals.

One could argue that some of the core members, such as CHRAJ and SFO, would have purposive reasons to support a strong GACC because of their current institutional 23