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34. Restrictions on output of the "job and finish" type may, in addition to their impact on ship productivity, also have a negative impact on labor productivity, though this is not so clear-cut. For the men directly involved in the agreement, it may be argued that the tonnage agreed is a "reasonable" figure for a shift's work and that it is a matter of personal choice whether it is done earlier or later in the shift. More serious is the impact such agreements have when a second group of men, not subject to the same agreement, is involved for example in Montevideo, Uruguay, as described above (para. 21).

35. Limitations on job entry and on job demarcation within the registered work force naturally have as one of their objectives the maintenance of a wage level that is higher than would be achieved with unrestricted entry. Port workers, protected by such restrictions, and given the crucial role of ports in the national economy, have tended to achieve a privileged wage level compared with those employed in similar though arguably less arduous jobs in warehousing and other occupations. In recent years there have been several examples where this privileged position has resulted finally in a negative attitude towards the port workers on the part of the general public and - probably more importantly - on the part of the other unions affiliated with the central union organization. This change in attitudes has enabled the employers and government to achieve major changes in port labor arrangements. Such examples are to be found in the UK, in Spain, possibly in Venezuela and maybe, in the future, in Colombia.

36. Systematic estimates do not exist of the overall cost impact of restrictive practices in a given port. Evidence to the Devlin Enquiry in the UK (1965) estimated the cost of the continuity rule alone to be between 8Z and 10? of the direct labor cost of unloading (CMD 3104, 1966). The recent Australian enquiry (ref 14 and Annex 1) heard evidence from one company that a 27% saving in direct labor costs cculd be achieved by removing restrictive practices. This figure is derived from the increased productivity, moderated by the cost necessary to achieve that productivity. Thus the Australian Ce.,tre for Transport Policy Analysis estimated in the same enquiry that stevedoring productivity improvements of up to 602 were possible, with direct labor cost savings of nearly 35Z (Robinson, 1987).

37. The US West Coast Agreement of 1968, which essentially "bought the book", that is achieved an agreement under which all restrictive practices were in principle abolished, provided for the establishment of a fund of US$10 million from the employers over a 5 year period, in order to compensate displaced longshoremen. The later East Coast Agreement was rather different in concept in that men continued to draw a wage, although not actually working (or impeding the introduction of new methods, chiefly containerization). More recently (1990) under a new agreement between the AFL-CIO International Longshoremen's Association and the New York Shipping Association, approximately 1500 dockers have been retired and cargo tonnage charges dropped by US$l per ton, probably representing a reduction of about 10% of the handling cost.