rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
faster withdrawal, possibly due to some combination of increased competition and pesticide resistance or toxicity build-up.

Beyond the differences in the time-varying proportion of community producers, the coefficients on the community fixed effects make it clear that the snowpeas production experience has not been uniform among the six communities. Living in El Rejón, especially, corresponds to longer production spells. While El Rejón households did generally adopt later than the others, which otherwise predicts shorter withdrawal spells, it is known that El Rejón was the last to be allowed to join the cooperative. If this group’s delayed adoption was geographically imposed rather than reflecting households’ self-determined hesitation or poor suitability to grow NTXs, it seems likely that such a result reflects learning from others over time, or better overall environmental conditions. Similarly, Pacul also tends to exhibit slower withdrawal patterns.

Finally, the shape parameter _ρ_ is significantly greater than 1, confirming that, even after controlling for all other time-varying covariates, the likelihood of withdrawal increases over time.

# **V. The welfare impact of NTX adoption**

Thus far, the analysis has focused on examining which households are likely to adopt early on and sustain cultivation over time and how external factors such as global market changes and the performance of local institutions influence this choice. The next obvious step is to look into the degree to which NTX cultivation and export to the global market actually has been able to translate into higher incomes for adopters in the long run, particularly poor adopters, the primary rationale for introducing snowpeas in the first place. Early indications showed potential for pro-poor growth, justifying widerspread promotion of NTX crops (von Braun et al., 1989). However, the von Braun et al.’s study measured impacts after a relatively short exposure and, if returns have held after 30
- 7 -

liquidity to the market and they are extensively discussed in the literature. ' Ultimately, these effects will result in high rates of long-term growth. i"

# **_11.3 Improved Financial Structure of Governments, Banks and Firms, and Reduced Sovereign Debt_**

If there is an increase in the demand for long-term and risky assets, then in equilibrium both the debt/equity ratio of enterprises and the short-term debt/long-term debt ratio of enterprises and governments will fall. This will also be reflected in banks undertaking less term transformation risk. As we argued above, we also expect the substitution of loans for securities to have important implications for the economy.

The 1997 East Asia financial crisis has been, in great part, due to excessive term transformation undertaken by financial institutions, excessive leverage of enterprises and their excessive dependence on short-term debt as opposed to long-term debt and equity finance. This was in part due to the relative scarcity of long-term savings in these economies. Therefore, the development of long-term savings and capital markets would reduce pressures on the banking system, thereby lengthening the maturity of debts and providing more equity-based financing for enterprises.

Furthermore, increasing funding of pension liabilities reduces the implicit government debt. The second potential impact is the development of the market for longterm government bonds. Many developing countries are trying to extend the maturity of the public debt to make their economies less vulnerable to refinancing. Thus, a developed contractual savings sector will increase the set of possibilities of the government having more degrees of freedom to perform an adequate debt management policy.

Accordingly, a developed contractual savings sector contributes to build a more resilient economy, one that would be less vulnerable to interest rate and demand shocks, while creating a more stable business environment, including macroeconomic stability. The result will be a lower country risk premiumn, hence lower equilibrium interest rates, which increase investments and, ultimately, accelerate growth.

# **_11.4 Linkages Between Contractual Savings and Banking Regulation_**

We should keep in mind that the banking sector and the pension fund sector can be seen as imperfect substitutes in their role as financial intermediaries, so these sectors should not be regulated without taking into consideration their links. Independent regulation cannot do better than regulation when all the linkages between banks, pension funds, other financial intermediaries, and the productive sector are considered. Because 10 See, for example, OECD, 1997, Davis, 1995, Vittas, 1998,1999. 11 For discussions on the impact of capital market development on growth see, for example, Levine and Zervos, 1996, and Levine, 1997.
**Figure 4:  Health Indicators**

Panel A: Adult Survival Rate <!-- Start of picture text --> Adult Survival Rate<br>LBRNERMWICODMDGGNBCOMTGOETHGINMLIGMBHTIBFARWAAFGBENKIRTLSSLBYEMNPLTZASENVUTKENTJKBGDFSMKHMMRTSTPDJIKGZGHAPNGSDNSYRCOGPSEHNDNICPAKMDATONWSMINDVNMMMRLAOBOLCPVGTMGUYPHLMARJAMAGOBTNSFJIBPRYARM L UZBXKXUKRVZGEOVCTDMAJORLCATUNEGYIDNECUBIHLKACUBALBPERMNGGRDCOLDZAIRQLBNBRAMKDDOMCHNSRBVENSURGABBRBTHAMDVCRIAZEMNEBWAMEXIRNBLRBGRMUSARGTURURYPANCHLBHSATGROUTKMHRVRUSKAZMYSLVAGRCPOLSYCHUNPRTESTCYPLTSVKSVN T ISRCZEMLTPRINZLUOESPJPNITAKORABWOMNFRAFINGBRBHRCANAUSTWNBELDNKDEUISLSWEAUTSAUNLDHKGUSACHEKWTIRLBRNNORARESGPMACLUX QAT<br>BDI MOZ SSDUGA MHLZMB NAMZAF<br>ZWE CMR GNQ<br>TCD NGA<br>CAF SLE CIV<br>SWZ<br>LSO<br>6 8 10 12<br>Log Real GDP Per Capita at PPP<br>Note: Dataset version 21 Sept 2018<br>Panel B: Fraction of Children Under 5 Not Stunted<br>Fraction of Children Under 5 Not Stunted<br>LCA CHL KORAUSUSA<br>LBR SLEGNBCOMTGOGINMLIGMBHTIBFASSDZWEUGABENSLBTZASENLSOCMRVUTKENTJKMRTKHMSTPDJITUVKGZGHACIVSYRCOGPSEHNDNICMDATONWSMVNMMMRLAOBOLGUYPHLMARJAMBTNSWZFJISLVBLZPRYARMGEOJORTUNEGYIDNECUBIHLKANAMALBPERMNGZAFNRUCOLDZAIRQBRAMKDDOMSRBCHNVENSURGABBRBTHAMDVCRIAZEMNEBWAMEXIRNTURURYPANTKMKAZMYSSYCTTOGNQJPNOMN KWTBRN<br>CAFNERMWIMOZCODETHRWATCDAFGNPL BGDZMBSDNPAKNGAINDAGO<br>YEM GTM<br>MDG TLS PNG<br>BDI<br>6 8 10 12<br>Log Real GDP Per Capita at PPP<br>Note: Dataset version 21 Sept 2018<br>1<br>.9<br>.8<br>.7<br>.6<br>Adult Survival Rate (Age 15 to 60)<br>.5<br>1<br>.8<br>.6<br>Fraction Not Stunted<br>.4<br><!-- End of picture text --> Notes: Adult survival rates are estimated by the UN Population Division and refer to the fraction of 15 year‐olds who survive to age 60. Stunting rates are taken from the WHO‐UNICEF‐World Bank Joint Malnutrition Estimates and refer to the fraction of children under 5 who are more than two reference standard deviations below the reference median height for their age. Data are supplemented with estimates provided by World Bank staff. The graph reports the complementary proportion of children who are not stunted. Real GDP per capita adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity is taken from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et. al. (2015)) , with missing countries filled using data from World Bank estimates of GDP at PPP. Graph shows the most recent data for all countries.

13
gap in services productivity between EU-8 countries and EU-15 countries, the gap has been reduced between 1997 and 2004. For all services sub-sectors, we find large disparities in labor productivity across ECA countries, with Ukraine exhibiting generally the lowest productivity. Most services sub-sectors are characterized by strong labor productivity growth from 1997 to 2004 in all ECA countries. Services sub-sectors that are ICT producers or users or those that are high skill intensive exhibit on average higher labor productivity levels during 1997-2004 in most ECA countries and higher labor productivity growth rates since 2000, relative to other sub-sectors. We find evidence of a positive effect of liberalization on labor productivity growth of services sub-sectors, which is stronger for EU-8 countries. Finally, we find a positive and significant effect of services liberalization in both finance and infrastructure on labor productivity of downstream manufacturing in several ECA countries.

Our findings suggest a potential for services-driven growth in the ECA region if policy-makers sustain the momentum of productivity growth in services by pursuing further liberalization, removing product market barriers still limiting competition in various sub-sectors, allowing more FDI, and providing the incentives to promote trade in services. Productivity growth in services would also benefit from further penetration of ICT which requires improvements in competition and continued liberalization of the telecommunications sub-sector as well as from skills development. Finally, in order to better assess the impact of policy reforms on the performance of the services sector, policy-markers in ECA countries would benefit from various data collection efforts: (i) sub-sectoral FDI inflows over time, (ii) regulatory reform data for sub-sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, and (iii) firm-level census data for the services sector to capture the entry and exit of firms in sub-sectors undergoing reforms.

# **References**

Anos-Casero, P. (2007) “Sectoral Output, Employment and Productivity Growth in Transition Economies: Patterns and Drivers,” World Bank mimeo.

Chenery, H. and L. Taylor (1968) “Development Patterns: Among Countries and Over Time,” _The Review of Economics and Statistics_ 50, pp. 391-416.

39
# **6.5 Human Capital**

**Some of Togo’s human capital indicators are relatively weak but do not stand out compared to the rest of the region.** Figure 39 suggests that Togo fares relatively well with respect to health – infant mortality rate is the second lowest in the group and the share or birth attended by a skilled health worker is the second highest. With regard to education, Togo has a relatively high primary enrollment rate but the primary completion rate is relatively weak, which indicates high repetition rates and a high number of dropouts.

**Figure 39: Health and Mortality Indicators, Togo and benchmark countries, 2007.**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 180<br>160 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 10090 Total enrollment, primary (% net)Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)<br>140 Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 80<br>120 70<br>60<br>100<br>50<br>80 40<br>60 30<br>40 20<br>10<br>20<br>0<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ DDP data, World Bank.

**Despite the prolonged economic stagnation, public expenditures per capita have been maintained at least a few years back.** Public health expenditures are more or less constant and even though public education expenditures as a share of government revenues and GDP may have a downward trend, the expenditure per capita is more or less constant (Figure 40).

**Figure 40: Public health and education expenditure, Togo 2002‐2006.**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2 Health expenditure, public (% of GDP) (lhs) 12 5 25<br>Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure) (rhs)<br>1.8 Per capita public health expenditures (const US$) (rhs) 10 4.5<br>1.6 4 20<br>1.4 8 3.5<br>1.2 3 15<br>1 6 2.5<br>0.8 2 10<br>4<br>0.6 1.5<br>0.4 1 Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) (lhs) 5<br>2<br>Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure) (rhs)<br>0.2 0.5<br>Public spending on education, per capita (const US$) (rhs)<br>0 0 0 0<br>2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br>Source: DDP data, World Bank.<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Total health expenditure per capita is relatively low, and the share of private health expenditures to total expenditures is high compared to the benchmark countries (** Figure 41 **).** The high share of private expenditure indicates a response to a lack of public health care but may be an expected result of a conscious health policy. Around half of the population in urban areas seeking treatment chooses a private facility. In rural areas, the same number is one third. Access to health facilities seems not to be a major issue in most parts of the country ‐ the absence of a health facility as a reason for not seeking treatment in rural areas was only given in around 10% of the cases. The vast majority of those who considered treatment necessary but did not seek treatment rather did so because they considered treatment to be too expensive. Satisfaction with the treatment is higher in private clinics, especially in urban areas where 82% of those treated in a private facility are satisfied with the treatment versus 65% in public facilities.

38
**Table 9 Correction for selectivity bias in TFP equation: correction via reduced form estimation**

||**Depende**|**nt variable**|**Log TFP(**|**adjusted f**|**or skills)**||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Conditio|nal logit sele|ction||||Multinomi|al logit sele<br>Random|ction<br>effects|
||O|LS||Ra|ndom effect|s (GLS)|O|LS|(GLS)||
||(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|(7)|(8)|(9)|(10)|(11)|
|Adjustment for market|||||||||||
|power|1.869||1.525||1.526|1.519|1.845||1.545||
||(49.69)**||(51.51)**||(51.46)**|(51.22)**|<br>(51.22)**||(50.92)**||
|Foreign market access|-0.090|-0.115|-0.080|-0.099||-0.063|-0.081|-0.105|-0.076|-0.095|
||(7.56)**|(7.39)**|(4.35)**|(4.13)**||(3.64)**|(7.06)**|(6.87)**|(4.27)**|(4.03)**|
|Domestic market access|1.697|1.738|1.709|1.771||0.240|1.625|1.610|1.748|1.828|
||(4.41)**|(3.44)**|(2.74)**|(2.19)*||(0.41)|(4.36)**|(3.24)**|(2.89)**|(2.28)*|
|Own industry local size|0.216|0.445|0.388|0.600||0.645|-0.001|0.210|0.284|0.465|
|Constrained by labor regulation|(1.38)|(2.17)*|(1.59)|(1.89)||(2.74)**|(0.01)|(1.06)|(1.21)|(1.50)|
|<br>(%)|-0.032|-0.046|-0.039|-0.053|-0.009||-0.041|-0.055|-0.043|-0.056|
||(3.27)**|(3.63)**|(2.44)*|(2.57)*|(0.63)||(4.47)**|(4.48)**|(2.85)**|(2.81)**|
|Output lost to power outage (%)|-0.232|-0.133|-0.219|-0.145|-0.243||-0.104|0.007|-0.170|-0.089|
||(7.83)**|(3.43)**|(4.83)**|(2.47)*|(6.04)**||(3.53)**|(0.18)|(3.87)**|(1.53)|
|Business age|0.153|0.182|0.154|0.194|0.160|0.159|0.093|0.105|0.120|0.151|
||(9.64)**|(8.75)**|(6.55)**|(6.32)**|(6.74)**|(6.70)**|(5.38)**|(4.58)**|(5.04)**|(4.80)**|
|Estimated Pr(High FDI)|-0.099|-0.048|-0.066|-0.080|-0.077|-0.075|-3.021|-3.801|-1.172|-1.448|
||(0.87)|(1.04)|(2.07)*|(1.11)|(2.09)*|(1.18)|(9.60)**|(9.07)**|(4.59)**|(4.26)**|
|Estimated Pr(Low FDI)|-0.159|-0.108|-0.077|-0.058|-0.064|-0.063|-2.410|-2.798|-0.791|-0.947|
||(2.00)*|(0.32)|(1.24)|(1.16)|(1.20)|(2.03)*|(13.20)**|<br>(11.50)**|(5.32)**|(4.79)**|
|Constant|-17.585|-9.817|-16.867|-10.846|-3.620|-8.429|-14.064|-5.420|-16.069|-9.739|
||(6.93)**|(2.95)**|(4.11)**|(2.03)*|(19.59)**|(2.17)*|(5.70)**|(1.65)|(4.03)**|(1.84)|
|Industry dummies?|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Yer dummies?|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Observations|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|3440|
|Establishments|||1427|1427|1427|1427|||1427|1427|
|R-squared|0.59|0.29|0.58|0.30|0.57|0.57|0.62|0.32|0.61|0.32|
|Rho|||0.89|0.88|0.89|0.89|||0.87|0.87|
|Hausman-wu test:|||||||||||
|df|||15|14|12|13|||||
|chisquare|||44.71|42.53|25.16|76.61|||||

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

48
**<u>Figure5.1 Seasonal Fluctuation of Average Sales: Farm and Nonfarm</u>**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Farm Nonfarm<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ 2010 Yemen RIC Survey _Notes:_ 4 is the highest sales level, 3: the average sales level; 2 the low sales level; and 1 no sales Finally, rural income generation activities need to overcome seasonal fluctuation in sales by promoting farm and nonfarm enterprises together, and focusing on value addition activities by nonfarm enterprises (figure 5.1). Knowing the constraints for farm and nonfarm enterprises are similar, promotion activities should be focused on small rural enterprises of both farm and nonfarm. Farm and nonfarm enterprises need business management knowledge to earn more or improve profitability. Delgado et al. (1998) conclude that farm and nonfarm enterprises have economic multiplier effects. That is, when promoting rural enterprises, both farm and nonfarm enterprises should be targeted simultaneously in order to generate synergy effects to the rural economy, rural livelihood, and well-being of the poor.

# **6. Conclusion**

Through this study, four critical RIC components are identified to be improved: weak market demand, poor access to market, limited access to finance, and missing management service to rural entrepreneurs. Among those critical RIC components, providing business management services is a key component because management knowledge can increase market demand using marketing knowledge, increase access to market and inputs identifying appropriate transportation and technology, and increase access to finance improving financial literacy of rural entrepreneurs. The management knowledge would help rural entrepreneurs start, operate, and expand their farm and nonfarm businesses. Without increasing market demand, supply-side RIC improvement may not do any good. It is important to focus on increasing both demands and supplies to promote rural private sector.

Rural income generation activities could be promoted by improving the critical RIC for businesses. Farm and nonfarm enterprises should be promoted together to create synergy since major constraints for farm and nonfarm entrepreneurs are similar except electricity for nonfarm 22
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NBS (2002a) “Integrated Labor Force Survey 2000/01”, National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Available at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/Statisticsf.html NBS (2002b) _Household Budget Survey 2000/01: Final Report_ , National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Available at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/Statisticsf.html NBS (2002c) Employment and Earnings Survey 2001: Analytical report, National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania. Available at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content &view=article&id=185:employment-and-earnings-survey-&catid=100:labour-force-andees&Itemid=135 NBS (2008) “Integrated Labor Force Survey 2006”, National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Available at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/tnada/index.php/ddibrowser/4 NBS (2012) “Basic information document: National Panel survey (NPS 2010-11), United Republic of Tanzania.

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24
# **1 Introduction**

The accumulation of international reserves and public debt in emerging economies is puzzling because economies facing default risk pay high interest rates on their liabilities and receive low interest rates on their reserves.<sup>1</sup> Why, then, do economies paying significant sovereign spreads prefer to accumulate international reserves instead of paying back public debt? Moreover, what is the social welfare effect of reserve accumulation? Even though a large and growing literature addresses these questions, all previous studies have ignored the interaction between the central bank and the government by assuming a consolidated entity that simultaneously chooses reserves and debt.<sup>2</sup> In practice, the central bank often manages international reserves, the government issues public debt, and policymakers may have different incentives driving their choices. This is particularly possible if the central bank is independent from the government. Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates a positive association between the accumulation of reserves and the widespread adoption of central bank independence (CBI) legislation in Latin America. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to explore the role of CBI in the accumulation of international reserves.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 20 1<br>15 0.75<br>10 0.5<br>5 0.25<br>Reserves (Avg Latin America)<br>Independence (Avg Latin America)<br>0 0<br>1970197519801985199019952000200520102015<br>CBI Index<br>Reserves (% GDP)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 1: International Reserves and Central Bank Independence _Notes:_ The figure presents the average levels of international reserves and central bank independence for 11 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The left y axis presents the reserves-to-GDP ratio using data from the IMF and the right y axis reports a _de jure_ central bank independence index based on the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti index.

> 1Rodrik (2006) estimates that emerging economies incur an annual average GDP loss of 1% by maintaining high levels of reserves and debt.

2The assumption of a consolidated entity choosing reserves and debt implies perfect coordination between policymakers. Subsection 2.3 presents evidence on the lack of perfect coordination between the central bank and government.

1