decline was exacerbated in the aftermath of the 2011 demonstrations, as GNI per capita since 2010 essentially flat-lined (growing on average only about 0.1 percent per annum). In spite of this, Egypt has improved in some important SDG indicators at a rate faster than GNI per capita growth: **under-five mortality rate; infant mortality rate; improved drinking water sources; access to electricity; access to improved sanitation facilities; labor share of GDP; population living in urban slums; and protected marine areas** . However, in other equally critical SDG indicators, Egypt’s performance has deteriorated at a rate greater than GNI per capita growth: **overweight children; malnourished children; trained educators; proportion of youth not enrolled in education, employment, or training; unemployment rate; and debt service** .

22. Commencing our analysis with SDG 1, No Poverty, we observe that Egypt is performing well relative to its peers with respect to percentage of population living below the international poverty line (2011 PPP USD $1.90 per day). The slightly decreasing trend in poverty between 1999-2015 is interesting given Egypt’s tumultuous period, notably marked by great highs and lows; however, such progress may be in part attributed to an expansion of the food subsidy system (FSS).<sup>13</sup> Despite Egypt’s many spells of instability, policy makers have persistently prioritized food subsidies and the availability of affordable staples in an effort to achieve social equity (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby 2017). In mid-2014, a significant reform was implemented to replace subsidized commodity quotas with a monthly cash allotment in the form of “smartcards” targeting Egypt’s most vulnerable, contributing to the alleviation of poverty (World Bank 2017). However, in contrast, according to the 2015 Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Expenditure Survey (HIECS), national poverty rates have observed an increase from 16.7% in 1999/2000 to 27.8% in 2015. With that being said, despite the fact that the eradication of extreme poverty has been statistically achieved, it is of increasing importance to prioritize the needs of those living below the national poverty line.

23. The Egyptian economy during the mid-2000s performed relatively well: real GDP growth averaged 7% per annum, nominal GDP per capita was recorded at $2,600 by 2010 (an increase of almost 50% since 2006), and public debt fell by a third from 2004 to 2009 (Abdellatif and Fakhry 2017).<sup>14</sup> However, in the wake of such dynamic growth, economic success appeared to be reserved for the privileged as the poverty headcount ratio (calculated using the national poverty line) increased from 16.7% in 1999/2000 to 27.8% in 2015 (Abdellatif and Fakhry 2017), as noted above. Further, as Devarajan and Ianchovichina (2017) assert, “the dynamics of middle-class incomes and the size of Egypt’s middle class” declined substantially at the end of the decade, indicating that the deterioration in living standards extended beyond the extreme poor. As growth appears to not have been evenly distributed, the conclusion is that the nexus of power and wealth in Egypt became more concentrated in the hands of the higher income cohorts. Nonetheless, the official estimate of inequality, as measured by the Gini index,<sup>15</sup> was recorded at 0.31 in 2010/2011,

> 13 The contemporary food subsidies program ( _tamween_ ) has two dynamic components: _baladi bread_ (BB), sold at US$.01 per loaf, for which there are no entitlement restrictions and distribution takes place on a first-come-first-serve basis; and ration cards (RC), which entitles beneficiaries a monthly ration of specific subsidized goods. In 2014, the ration cards were revolutionized into “smartcards” in the government’s interests of increasing efficiency. Though the program has a plethora of benefits for beneficiaries, it has been under renewed scrutiny given the large literature that addresses historic pitfalls, leakages, and challenges of the program. 14 Additionally, the size of foreign debt dropped below the value of the foreign reserves, with foreign currency reserves at $35 billion, indicating dynamic growth.

> 15 The Gini coefficient is an indicator to measure inequality in terms of consumption and expenditure. The closer the Gini coefficient is to zero, the more equally distributed consumption/expenditure, and the closer it is to one, the unequally distributed consumption/expenditure.

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