flood risks. This risk-reducing innovation is thus both efficient in enhancing capacity to cope with shocks, but also equitable in favoring the most excluded social groups.

Reduction of the risk of crop loss in case of flooding induces behavioral changes among farmers who cultivate Swarna-Sub1. Using the RCT in Orissa, we observe that, during the second year of the experiment, producers who use the technology cultivate more land in rice, use more fertilizer early in the season in spite of the risk of flooding, reduce the use of traditional seeds which are less productive but also less risky, and use more costly labor-intensive transplantation methods that result in higher yields. The yield gain derived from all these practices is, on average, 283kg/ha. The technology also induces less holding of precautionary savings and more use of credit (Dar et al., 2013b).

The lesson from this micro-level experiment in risk reduction for SDRFI is that the gain by avoided loss in bad years (improved shock-coping) can be more or less equal to the gain that would not have been obtained in good years (reduced need for riskmanagement). If there are two normal years for one bad, the expected gain from risk management in good years can be double the expected gain from shock coping, even though the intervention (like SDRFI) is typically motivated just by the latter. This is an important result in establishing the economic rationale and in mobilizing political support for SDRFI in reducing the consequences of a natural disaster.

# **Other examples of committed risk coping**

The argument made here is that a key aspect of SDRFI is availability of a credible commitment device that relief, recovery, and reconstruction expenditures will be forthcoming post-disaster at a given pace, in a given magnitude, and for well-identified stakeholders. It is well known that one of the main weaknesses of public programs, and policy reforms in general, is lack of commitment devices for governments when there is a time consistency problem (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2008). “Read my lips” statements are not credible, and democratically elected leaders have short-term horizons and can be challenged in re-election. Authoritarian regimes cannot guarantee length of tenure and may consequently be seen as “roving bandits” (Olson, 1993). For this reason, a number of governments have turned to constitutional rights, enshrining at the highest levels of the law the right to social protection (HLPE-CFS, 2012). This has applied to the right to work through India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa have introduced major programs to implement the right to food (de Schutter, 2013). In Brazil, this is done through the Zero Hunger Program, Bolsa Familia, and the National School Meals Program. In India, the right to food is implemented through subsidized food delivered by the Public Distribution System running Fair Price Shops. The right to work is delivered through the NREGA that guarantees 100 days of employment per adult and per year. In South Africa, the rights to food and to social security are implemented through seven social grants including Old Age Pensions and Child Support programs.

The key point here is that legally enforceable rights not only improve shock coping, but also can induce sharp reductions in risk management, with the associated 9