rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
_US-China_ : In two influential papers, Autor et al. (2013, 2014) examine the impacts of increased Chinese import competition on labor markets in the United States. Autor et al. (2013) emphasize that US local labor markets are differentially exposed to Chinese import competition because of initial heterogeneity in their production structure, and argue the transition of China to a market economy (and the consequent rise of its productivity and trade flows) may be regarded as an exogenous trade shock to those local labor markets. They provide evidence that rising import competition from China caused higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets that house import-competing manufacturing industries. Import competition is found to explain about one-quarter of the contemporaneous aggregate decline in US manufacturing employment. Transfer benefit payments for unemployment, disability, retirement and health care also rose sharply in local labor markets more exposed to import competition. The empirical approach adopted by Autor et al. (2013) hinges on the assumption that labor is relatively immobile across space. This hypothesis is supported by evidence showing insignificant population adjustments for local labor markets with substantial exposure to imports. This appears to reflect frictions in labor mobility across sectors and regions.

An important implication of these findings is that federally-funded transfer programs, like the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), implicitly insure US workers against trade-related employment shocks. Autor et al. (2013) also report evidence that import exposure predicts an increase in in-kind medical programs benefits from Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), which is the primary federal program that offers financial support to workers who face a trade-induced job loss. However, TAA grants are relatively small and temporary, while most workers who take disability receive social security benefits until retirement or death. Autor et al. (2013) estimate that for regions affected by import competition from China, the estimated dollar rise in per capita SSDI payments is more than 30 times as large as the estimated dollar increase in TAA payments (which account for a negligible part of trade-induced increase in transfers). Unemployment insurance and income assistance play a significant but secondary role.

Autor et al. (2014) complement this analysis by pairing industry-level competition shocks stemming from China’s rise as manufacturing exporter with panel data on individual earnings by employer during 1992-2007. They find that individuals who in 1991 worked in manufacturing 32
Yet understanding the effects of China’s privatization is particularly relevant in light of the diverse interpretation of the Chinese experience. Unbeknown to most, China features the world’s largest privatization program. Indeed, China’s privatization of SOEs at the turn of the century is the largest privatization program in human history (Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh 1994). The total amount of worldwide revenues raised by privatization, as estimated by the end of the last century, was $860 billion (D’Souza and Megginson 1999), while a conservative estimate of the revenues raised from China’s privatization program alone is US$700 billion (Gan, Guo and Xu 2017). Despite its gigantic privatization program, China’s government involvement in the economy has also been exceedingly strong, and China’s experience has contributed to the popularity of state capitalism. As of 2018, SOEs still accounted for 27.1 percent of total industrial output, and 13.2 percent of total urban employment in China.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, China’s post-reform economic system can be characterized as a dual-track system with both a strong government and strong marketization (Lau, Qian and Roland 2000). Even though this system was used to jump-start the reform program to reduce resistance, the dual track of strong marketization and strong government control has remained intact to this day (Long, Xu and Yang 2020). Is China’s growth a result of privatization, competition and opening up, or a result of its strong state control, industrial policies and a large SOE sector?

Not surprisingly, both of these interpretations have strong proponents. Some pundits emphasize strong government involvement as fundamental to Chinese growth in the past decades. Ramo (2004), for instance, coined the term Beijing Consensus, to characterize China’s unique approach to managing its economy. Others quickly embraced his interpretation and endorsed strong and direct government involvement in the economy, claiming that the BeijingConsensus approach would dominate the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Halper 2010).<sup>4</sup> Some influential economists have also embraced the strong government interpretation, including industrial policies (Lin 2012; Rodrik, 2006; Stiglitz 1994, 2008), or the sufficiency of competition without changes in state ownership (Lin, Cai, and Zhou 1998). In contrast, many economists argue that China’s strong growth in the past decades reflects its adoption of standard

> 3 The figures are from _China Statistical Yearbooks_ . 4 See Yao (2015) for a discussion of how the overall Chinese experience corresponds to the Beijing Consensus. `4`
# **BOX L3: Ss** and **SECls**

SEOAL SII The principal objective of the Sdn6gal Primaty Education Development Project (1987) was to assist the government in accelerating the qualitative and quantitative development of primary education, within the framework of its adjustment program. The adjustment measures promoted through the project are In most respects as comprehensive as those promoted through recent SECALs or hybrids. The project combines an investment component (that addresses textbooks provision, planming and research capabilities, construction), with a policy component. The policy component has two types of measures: To increase primary school enrollments by reducing unit costs through more efficient use of teachers and facilities: double-shift and multigrade teaching, higher student/teacher ratios, increase the ratio of "instituteurs" to "instituteurs-adjoints."

* To contain spending in post-primary education: reduce scholarships and indirect subsidies, establish cost recovety, and limit budget growth.

MALAWI SEC:L, Malawi's First Education Sector Credit (1987) financed a three-year time slice of the government's 1985-1995 education investment program. Responsibility for project design and implementation was transferred to the government because the latter had demonstrated, in the course of five preceding education projects, adequate appraisal and implementation capability. The government prepared a series of policy actions that the program supported:

- To improve education equity by increasing primary education's share of education resources.

* To improve education efficiency, i.e., improved student flows especially at the primary level). Specific measures targeted curriculum reform, teacher training, lower student/teacher ratios, and sufficient supply of materials.

- To contain the growth of public expenditures on education by reducing unit costs and increasing cost recovery measures at postprimary levels.

- To improve access to primary (self-help primary school construction program), secondary (shift system and more day schools), and vocational education (better utilization of existing facilities).

# Qrces: Fredriksen (1990a), World Bank (1987c).

11
- 57 -

||Bo|x 3:|CASE ST<br>NORTHE|UDY: SUB<br>AST REGIO|NATION<br>N OF BR|AL<br>FINA<br>AZIL (|NCES I<br>CONT.|N THE<br>)||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Also In 19<br>follows:|83, the|situa|tion In|the 90 M|unicip|aliti|es,<br>cla|ssifle|d by ty|pe,-/|was as|
|Municipalities|RC|ROR|<br>IER|<br>PCI|SIR|OTT|<br>DET|<br>DPT|<br>DNT|DST|GPCI|
|Metropolitan|0.70|.27|0.21|23,675|0.90|0.73|0.01|0.22|0.06|0.38|(30.0)|
|Industrialized|0.63|.25|0.24|47,850|0.35|0.75|0.01|0.13|0.02|0.46|(20.1)|
|State Capitals|0.75|.41|<br>0.16|16,498|1.11|0.59|0.02|0.15|0.07|0.36|(40.6)|
|Residentlal|0.73|.17|0.24|6,678|<br>1.24|0.83|0.02|0.39|0.10|0.33|(51.6)|
|Agglomerations|0.70|.25|0.26|10,003|1.12|0.75|0.01|0.35|0.05|0.34|(36.6)|
|Industrlalized|0.72|.26|0.28|13,405|0.98|0.84|0.01|0.32|0.03|0.48|(24.8)|
|State Capitals|0.86|.33|0.12|8,251|1.04|0.67|0.02|0.27|0.11|0.27|(61.3)|
|Residential|0.52|.27|0.39|8,354|<br>1.34|0.73|0.01|0.45|0.60|0.28|<br>1.8|
|Isolated Centers|0.76|.18|0.19|6,688|<br>.65|0.82|0.01|0.40|0.12|0.28|(18.0)|
|>100,000 Inhabit.|0.75|.23|<br>0.22|8,914|<br>1.31|0.77|0.01|0.36|0.16|0.25|(9.6)|
|<100,000 Inhabit.|0.78|.14|0.16|4,462|1.91|0.86|0.01|0.44|0.08|0.32|(30.9)|

Observatlons:

- (a) Independent revenues generally cover less than half of the Municipal resource commitments. (b) per capita Investment Is quite high In metropolitan areas and secondary irban agglomerations, where their proportion Is nearly four times as much as In the Isolated centers.

- (c) per capita Investment Is highest In Industrialized communities and administrative capitals. The less urbanized the municipalitles, the lowest their average Investment.

- (d) local revenue generation Is more significant In the administrative centers of both metropolitan areas and urban agglomeration and lowest In non Industralized communities.

- (e) categorical and negotiated transfers do not represent an Important share total transfers except In the administrative centers.

- (f) Federal transfers (tled) are relatively more Important In small centers and residential comeunities.

- (g) State transfers are specially significant In the Industrialized communities which receive Important shares of the value added tax.

- a/ The sample analyzed Included 90 Municipalities with more than 30,000 Inhabitants In 1980 out of a universe of 1,390 Municipalities. The sample was organized as follows: (a) 22 Municipalitles belong to 3 Metropolitan Regions; (b) 35 Municipallties belong to 9 Urban Agglomerations; 33 Municipalities represer.t Isolated centers of which 6 had populations greater than 100,000 Inhabitants, 10 had populations between 50,000 and 100,000 Inhabitants and 17 had 30,000 to 50,000 Inhabitants six Mu6!cipalities were considered relatively Industralized, six predominantly residential and nine were state administrative capitals. (Source: Brazil: Urban Development In the Northeastern Region, Special Sector Report, IBRD NO. 6585a-BR, May 6, 1986).
household may not have an explicit market value. In addition, respondents may be unwilling to name a price if they think the enumerator is interested in purchasing it. In such case, they may want to say that it is invaluable.

A further challenge is that there may be some systematic bias in reported values depending on who is asked. Doss et al (2016), using the Gender Asset Gap Project data, find that the values provided by women have a narrower distribution than those provided by men for housing and agricultural land. Linked to the discussion in Section 4.4, respondent selection may too influence the size of the calculated gender wealth gap. There is much more scope for understanding how patterns of reported values vary systematically in accordance with sex and other individual attributes. Additional research with the MEXA data may be able to provide further insights into this question.

Given the difficulties associated with obtaining monetary values for some assets, it may be possible to obtain information on the characteristics of the asset. For example, many surveys collect data on housing characteristics such as size, amenities, construction materials, etc. This allows for the construction of a housing quality index that may be compared across owners.

Finally, to understand gender gaps in land ownership, it is useful to have information on land areas. Carletto et al. (2015), using the LSMS-ISA data for 4 African countries, document substantial measurement errors in farmer-reported plot areas compared to the GPS-based area measures for the same plots. These differences result in underestimation of land inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and biased estimates of the relationship between land and productivity. Carletto et al. (2016) further show that GPS provides highly accurate land area measures compared to the gold standard methodology of using compass and rope, and does so across the entire distribution of plot areas. Although research has not addressed whether men and women provide systematically different estimates of land area, using GPS would avoid these potential biases.

# **5 Conclusions and Moving Forward**

While there is strong evidence that ownership, control, and use of assets is important for creating livelihoods, reducing vulnerability, and increasing voice within the household and community, there are still numerous gaps in our knowledge about how best to obtain these data and what aspects of the data are most relevant.

Many research questions remain. We can begin to answer some of them with existing data, while others will require collection of additional data. First, to what extent are the various 26
arming and financing militias from Southern Sudanese tribes that have been historically non sympathetic to the SPLM. This is has been a bone of contention between the NCP and the SPLM, which demanded the dissolution of these militias. On the other hand, the SPLM has been able to mobilize allies from the so called transitional regions of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, which are part of the North. Military Balance estimates the size of the paramilitary “Popular Defense Force” as 17,500 active with 85,000 reservists<sup>23</sup> . In addition, the more populous and powerful Arab nomadic tribes in South Darfur (who have largely not been part of the Darfur conflict)<sup>24</sup> and Kordofan are likely to be drawn into the conflict against the SPLA in the context of a dispute on Abeyei or other border areas<sup>25</sup> . In these respects, investments in alliances can be likened to military spending, decreasing the costs of conflict for each actor and increasing the possible gains. Indeed, this brinksmanship is apparent in Sudanese President Omar alBashir’s October mobilization of some of these allied forces, “Now we order the Popular Defense Force (PDF), the legitimate son of the people, to open their camps and gather their mujaheddin” to which he added that the purpose of this call was “not to wage war” but that “it is obvious we should be ready” (IWPR, 2008). This, corroborates the main premise of our model as President al-Bashir, representing Khartoum, has an incentive to signal a strong willingness for conflict even if he has no intention of going to war.

> 23 Recent reports suggest that the Janjawid in Darfur may be being assimilated into the Popular Defense Forces, suggesting that measures of total military expenditures and force size in the north may not reflect actual strength of Khartoum (Winter and Pendergast, 2008).  How and whether these forces would be employed in conflict with the South is unclear.

> 24 See for example, Flint and De Waal (2005).

> 25 Indeed, the recent bloody skirmishes (January and February 2008) between the SPLA and the Messeriya tribesmen over grazing lands around Abyei and Abak is a testimony to this potential conflict. For details on these events, see the _Media Monitoring Reports_ from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), specifically January 7 and February 24, 2008.

21
15 change. If one is willing to assume that the marginal responses of supply and demand to a price change are the same in aggregate, then _a_ = _b_ =0.5.<sup>6</sup> Thus from a practical viewpoint, _Bj_ can be computed with all the information available for calculating NRAs and CTEs (or the PSEs and CSEs generated by the OECD), provided two assumptions are made: (1) equal domestic price elasticities of supply across products within a country (and the same for domestic price elasticities of demand); and (2) equal responsiveness of aggregate supply and demand to price changes for the set of products of concern for an economy. Ideally policy analysts would incorporate elasticity estimates and information on responsiveness of aggregate supply and demand where available. However, where they are not available, estimates of the indexes _Bj_ , _RBj_ and _SBj_ are nonetheless superior to existing widely-used agricultural policy measures of trade distortions. Analogous assumptions can be made for the domestic measures derived in this paper.

# **The Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database**

A new database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), generated by the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives research project using a methodology summarized in Anderson et al. (2008), provides a timely opportunity to estimate indexes of the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of different policy instruments. The database includes estimates of different agricultural policy instruments for 75 countries that together account for over 90 percent of the world’s population, farmers, agricultural GDP and total GDP. The estimates in the database are consistent estimates of annual NRAs and CTEs over the years 1955 to 2007. The country coverage is most complete for the years 1960 to 2004 so only that period is reported in this manuscript. The series contains data at the commodity level for a subset of agricultural products (called covered products) that account for around 70 percent of total agricultural production in each of the 75 countries.

> 6 With linear demand and supply curves for a country’s economy, this equates to an assumption that the aggregate demand and supply curves have the same slope, so that each side of the economy contributes equally to the ITRI.
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**Spain:** 1939; 1946-1974; 1979; 1981-2015

**(http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Diputados/Hist** **<u>oria).</u>**

**República Bolivariana de Venezuela:** 1819; 1830-1856; 1858; 1860; 1865-1868; 1870; 1873; 1875; 1876-1877; 1881-1883; 1885-1891; 1896; 1898; 1901-1905; 1907; 1909-1945; 1947-1948; 1954-1957; 1959-1969 (Antonio Moreno (1972), "Mensajes Presidenciales"); 1975 (Rafael Caldera, “Metas de Venezuela”) 1976-1978 (Carlos Andres Perez, “Manos a la Obra”); 1984; 1988;1989 (Jaime Lusinchi, “Papeles del Presidente”); 1994-1995; 19971998(Rafael Caldera, “Compromiso Solidario); 1999 (Formación PSUV); 2000 (Formación <u>PSUV); 2001 (Formación PSUV); 2002 (Formación PSUV); 2003 (Formación PSUV); 2004 (Formación PSUV); 2005 (Formación PSUV); 2006 (Formación PSUV); 2007 (Todo Chavez); 2008 (Formación PSUV); 2009 (aristobulo.psuv.org.ve); 2010-2012 (Todo Chavez); 2014 (vtv.gob.ve/).</u>

Considering all the speeches mentioned above, the different countries are represented in our database according to Figure A1.

Figure A1. Share of total speeches in each country (in %) <!-- Start of picture text --> 8.3<br>14.1<br>7.3<br>1.8<br>6.8<br>6.5 13.7<br>1.9<br>16.8<br>9.0<br>13.7<br>Argentina Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dom. Rep. Ecuador<br>Mexico Peru Paraguay Spain Venezuela<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Authors’ elaboration.

The distribution of speeches by decade and country is shown in Table A1.

# **About the missing speeches**

Although we made efforts to compile as many presidential speeches as possible, there are a number of countries for which the speeches from certain years are missing. In what follows, we attempt to outline what we believe are the most probable causes.

28
campaigns. His simple policy simulations suggest that building more schools not only has the largest impact but is also the most cost-effective means to raise enrollment. At a unit cost of US$70,000, building 140 schools per district would raise national net primary enrollment by 35 percentage points (from a base level of approximately 50 percent), which implies a cost of US$2.8 million per percentage-point increase. The cost-effectiveness of an adult literacy program—estimated by simulating the impact of turning all initially illiterate household heads in the bottom two quartiles into literate ones—would be even more cost-effective (US$1.9 million per percentage-point increase), but would have a smaller impact at 15 percentage points. The effects of an unconditional cash transfer would be fairly small: a 4-percentagepoint increase at a very high cost of US$22.8 million per percentage-point increase.

Glick and Sahn (2006) examine the cost-effectiveness of interventions in Malagasy primary schools intended to increase enrollment. They simulate a 50 percent reduction of multigrade teaching by adding teachers and rooms to existing schools. This intervention increases enrollment from 43 to 48 percent, a 5-percentage-point increase that involves fairly heavy costs. The lower bound cost-effectiveness ratio (assuming a no-capital-costs case) is approximately US$25 per additional student enrolled, close to recurrent spending per public primary student. Although the authors do not simulate a demand-targeted intervention, they show that a cost-recovery scheme would more than eat up the positive effects of the supplyside improvement for the poor. A policy that would recover approximately 50 percent of the costs through schooling fees would reduce primary enrollment from 32 to 28 percent for the poorest quintile, compared to an increase of 38 percent without any fees. This simulation represents a supply-side- _cum_ -demand-side policy.

Based on the evaluation results for PROGRESA in Mexico, Coady and Parker (2004) calculate the costs of generating an extra year of secondary schooling for a representative cohort of students for two policy alternatives. They compare the cost-effectiveness of building schools, that is, reducing the distance to school, with that of schooling subsidies. They find schooling subsidies to be far more cost-effective in keeping children in school. At a cost of approximately $10,000 Mexican pesos<sup>28</sup> (US$1000) per extra year of schooling, the education grant—as actually implemented as part of PROGRESA—generates 393 additional years of schooling for 1000 children in a representative cohort. This compares to a cost of more than

> 28 More precisely $12,500 for boys and only $6,900 for girls.

25