rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
37 Targeting services through growth monitoring is often seen as essential to the cost-effectiveness of nutrition projects, including supplementary feeding projects. Besides making most productive use of the field worker's time, it minimizes the consumption of food, which is normally the most expensive recurrent budget item in such projects. Growth monitoring is also generally recognized as an important educational aid for parents. But growth monitoring should in addition be seen from a broader perspective, as an effective way of identifying the most disadvantaged children and families for the purposes of any poverty-oriented program, in the common situation where the poor are either not visible (because they may live farthest from the village center) or if visible not easily identifiable (because child malnutrition, when not in its most extreme forms, is seldom obvious to the naked eye). Its potential has been underexploited, for example, as a means of identifying those in need of health and other social services as opposed to just nutrition services. The complexity and costs of establishing large-scale growth monitoring systems (TINP's measures the weight of 800,000 children a month) need therefore to be set against such a system's potential benefits to a number of sectoral programs, not simply nutrition.

# Case 3: ETHIOPIA FAMILY HEALTH: THE USE OF RAPID ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN PROJECT PREPARATION

# Background

What is now known in the Bank as "beneficiary assessment' began in 1982 when a consultant anthropologist lived among the beneficiaries of an urban slum improvement project with the aim of feeding back their perspective to project management. As of mid-1987, assessments had been completed in 11 other projects, were ongoing in 3, and were proposed in 4 others. The main methods employed are participant observation, in which the observer gains an tnderstanding of clients' social situation by living among them, and structured interviewing, conversations conducted around a set of previously chosen topics. The purpose is to understand the point of view of the clients, in the belief that if the project is planned in the knowledge of peoples' values and perceptions, is responsive to their needs, and is adapted to their behavior, it is more likely to be successfully implemented and bring about sustained development. A major difference between this and traditional sociological/anthropologic **a** pproaches is speed. Wherel anthropologists have often studied communities for years before drawing conclusions, the Bank's assessments have taken from three to six months and hence are of almost immediate ise to planners and communities.

The assessments have had a number of different types of benefits for project planners. In several projects, they showed that clients had little knowledge of the project and its services, and led to improved communication. In others, they revealed that so-called participative projects had little real community participation, or that client groups were more divided into different strata than had been previously thought; these insights led to the design of new arrangements for incorporating communities
# **4. Results**

The analysis of the IHPS data suggests that (long-term) rights to bequeath and sell -but not for decisionmaking- affect land-related investment. Women’s right to bequeath in matrilineal systems or to sell in nonmatrilineal ones affects organic manure use while men’s bequest rights affect take-up of cash-crop production. Using the full IHS4 data or the subset of self-reported (co-)owners yields completely different results that are often counterintuitive, suggesting that beyond measurement error due to respondents’ lack of knowledge, reliance on proxy respondents may also encourage strategic behavior.

# **4.1 Evidence from self-reported IHPS data**

The results from household fixed effects regressions for application of organic manure and planting of cash crops are presented in Table 3. The regressions presented in columns 1 and 3 do not control for parcel-level characteristics, while the opposite is true regarding the regressions presented in columns 2 and 4. The rights to make decisions or invest are consistently estimated to have insignificant effects regardless of the choice of outcome variable. By contrast, transfer rights are highly significant, similar to what was found in Ethiopia (Deininger and Jin 2006): the right to bequeath or sell land is estimated to significantly increase the likelihood of long-term investment via organic manure application. With 0.12 and 0.08 percentage points, the estimated effects are large; increasing bequest or sale rights by half a standard deviation (0.2) each would be expected to lead to an increase in organic manure application by 10 percent or 6 percent from the mean value of 0.23. The estimated effects are weaker for cash crop production where bequest rights are marginally significant at the 10% level if parcel characteristics are controlled for. An estimate of 0.06 points suggests that increasing bequest rights by half a standard deviation would increase cash crop production by 17 percent.

Exploring differences by right holders’ gender points towards marked differences between manure use and cash crop production (Table 4). Female bequest rights emerge as key determinants of long-term investment. The estimated coefficient of 0.16 is highly significant and large: an increase of women’s bequest rights by half a standard deviation (0.2) each is estimated to increase manure application by 13 percent. This is consistent with evidence of inheritance rights as key determinants of long-term investment in the form of applying organic manure in Zambia (Dillon and Voena 2018) using a completely different specification.

By contrast, the adoption of cash crops is estimated to be enhanced by males’ bequest rights with an increase of male bequest rights by half a standard deviation (0.2) predicted to increase cash crop production by 61 percent. This is consistent with the notion that males have better access to markets for output and other factors especially capital (Bhaumik _et al._ 2016) but that such market access will translate into cash crop adoption only if they have secure long-term rights to the land that benefits from such investment.

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_Figure 6: Estimation Results - Wage Premium (%) for Various Aspects in the DTS Implementation_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Times visited TVI teacher during in-company<br>-0.4<br>training (1=yes)<br>Reported to TVI during in-company training<br>0.9<br>(1=yes)<br>How to learn work process - from all 4.2<br>How to learn work process - by yourself -20<br>How to learn work process - from peers -1.3<br>How to learn work process - from supervisors 12.7<br>Number of hours per week for in-company training -1.1<br>Weeks spent for in-company training -0.2<br>Weeks spent for in-school learning 0.3<br>Given training plan from TVI (1=yes) 1.9<br>DTS implementation scheme dummy (1=Block<br>10.4<br>release)<br>-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15<br>% change in wage<br>Monitoring<br>In-company training<br>Time allocation<br>Training strategy<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: _DTS Tracking Survey Data, 2015, World Bank; World Bank calculations._ Note: _Wage premium (%) rate, percentage increase or decrease to the monthly earning with one unit change to the listed controls, is computed from an OLS estimation. The estimation controls for gender, years of work experience and squared term, maternal education level, TVI dummies, and enrollment year dummies. (See Table 1.3 for regression results in detail)_ 22
Most self-employed, who are not members of professionaP associations, are exempted from compulsory insurance in the public pension system. They may, however, join the system as voluntary members in which case they have to pay both the employee's and the employer's share of contributions. Since 1985, self-employed artists and journalists are also required to join the public system; they pay only their share of contributions, while all "users" of artistic and journalistic products such as theaters, museums, advertising agencies, and the media are required to pay an earmarked "artists social tax" on their profits.

All statutory pension institutions are administered jointly by the insured and the employers in equal board representation without government involvement. But since benefit levels, contribution rates and all other key parameters are determined by law, the autonomy of these administrative councils is limited and relates mainly to operational administration and management issues.

**Table 1: Coverage of Public Pension System**

|Contributors|30.9 million|
|---|---|
|% of EAP|85.0|
|% of dependent employees|94.3|
|Pensioners*|18.9 million|
|System dependency ratio(%)|61.0|

* insured' and widows' pensions Source:VDR, Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993

The public pension system was originally designed as a funded system but its reserves were wiped out twice, first during hyperinflation in 1923 and then during World War II and the subsequent currency reform. After World War II, reserves started to build up again; initially the scaled premium method was applied. Due to the high demands on the system after the war, the funding periods were shortened and the official move to a pay-as-you-go system was made in 1957. Today, the system has practically no funding, apart from a liquidity reserve amounting to one month's expenditure.

Contributions to the public system are shared in equal parts by employers and employees. The total contribution rate for 1996 is 19.2 percent, applicable up to a monthly income ceiling of DM 8,000 (corresponding to about twice average earnings). Contributions are deducted from after-tax earnings but some deductions for public and private insurance are allowed. Contributions are collected by approximately 1,200 statutory sickness funds and then transferred to the respective pension insurance institutions; the sickness funds are reimbursed by the pension system for the collection costs. The public pension institutions conduct on-site supervision both of sickness funds and employers to determine whether contributions were collected correctly.

5
**Table 3: Sample statistics on output and fertilizer use, average values**

||**2004**|**2006**|
|---|---|---|
|Value of Output in Birr per ha|1,405.90|1,807.70|
|Chemical Fertilizer in Kg|42.00|55.70|
|Manure in Kg|229.00|549.30|
|Chemical Fertilizer in Kg per fertilized hectare|116.00|167.00|
|Percentage of households using:|||
|Chemical Fertilizer|68.50|63.30|
|Manure|28.10|58.00|
|Improved Seeds|35.60|30.10|

Source: Authors’ calculations based on EEA-World Bank survey.

31
which the poor would benefit from adjustment policies. The IMF also issued a series of studies (e.g. IMF, 1986, but these were of a mainly theoretical nature, whereas the World Bank's work had a more applied focus. A World Bank study of COte d'lvoire concluded that 'the poor may be little affected by strucural adjustment policies because most of them are subsistence farmers in rural areas" (Glewwe and de Tray, 1988). More helpfully, methodologies were proposed as a basis for modelling the impact of adjustment on the poor (Kanbur, 1987; and Addison _et al.,_ 1990) - but unfortunately it has taken time for model results to permeate the literature which has been dominated by the other two approaches discussed in Chapter 2.

An important conceptual distinction is that between primary and secondary income, the former deriving from income from factors of production (which, for the poor, is mostly labor) and the latter from "unearned sources". Primary income is therefore mainly affected by movements in relative prices and other changes in the incentive structure and secondary income by the government's subsidy policy (mcluding provision of health and education services). Broadly speaking, models have analyzed changes _via_ adjustments in primary income, whereas the nonmodeling literature has focussed on issues relating to secondary income.

As stated, much of the literamre has relied on before versus after or the simple control group approach. Maasland and van der Graag (1992) and Behrman and Deolaikar (1990) look at deviations from trend, rather than a simple before-after, which is an improvement, but stll takes no account of changes in the external environment. Maasland and van der Graag also control for some factors using regression techniques but do not apply the full modified control group approach. In fact, to my knowledge, the modified control group approach has not been applied to analyze this aspect of adjustment policies- Despite the reservations expressed here about the approach the absence of such a study seems a surprising omission, and a regrettable one since the results may be expected to be different to those of the work adopting less sophisticated methodologies.

The before-after and simple control group approaches are first reviewed. An intermediate literature, which uses country case studies, but without formal modelling, is introduced before moving to the limited cases of actual modelling. Finally, some related literatures are discussed- _Before-after and control group approaches_ As a broad (but not entirely accurate) generalization, studies that are critical of the impact 95
Robertson, D., and J. Symons. 2003. “Do Peer Groups Matter? Peer Group versus Schooling Effects on Academic Attainment.” _Economica_ 70:31-53.

- Rodríguez, V.L., J.O. Prewitt Diaz. 1990. “Correlations among GPA and Scores on the Spanish Version of WISC-R and the Woodcock-Johnson Achievement Subtests for 10- to 12Year-Old Puerto Rican Children.” _Psychological Reports_ 66(2):563-6.

- Rosselli, M, A. Ardila, J.R. Bateman, M. Guzman. 2001. “Neuropsychological Test Scores, Academic Performance, and Developmental Disorders in Spanish-Speaking Children.” _Developmental Neuropsychology_ 20(1):355-73.

- Ruhm, C.J. 2004. “Parental Employment and Child Cognitive Development.” _Journal of Human Resources_ 39(1):155-192.

- Schultz , T.P. 2004. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 74(1): 199-250.

- Schweinhart, L. J.2005. “The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 40: Summary, Conclusions, and Frequently Asked Questions.” High/Scope Press.

- Shrimpton, R., C. Victora, M. De Onis, R. Costa Lima, et al. 2001. “Worldwide Timing of Growth Faltering: Implications for Nutritional Interventions.” _Pediatrics_ 107:75-81.

- Smith, J.R., J. Brooks-Gunn and P.K. Klebanov, 1997. “Consequences of Living in Poverty for Young Children’s Cognitive and Verbal Ability and Early School Achievement.” In : Duncan, J. Brooks-Gunn J. (eds.) _Consequences of Growing up Poor_ , Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 132-189.

- Stifel, D., and H. Alderman. 2003. “The "Glass of Milk" Subsidy Program and Malnutrition in Peru.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3089. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- Strauss, J., and D. Thomas. 1998. “Health, Nutrition, and Economic Development.” _Journal of Economic Literature_ 36: 436-82.

- Taylor, B., E. Dearing and K. McCartney. 2004. “Incomes and Outcomes in Early Childhood.” _Journal of Human Resources_ 39(4):980-1007.

- Todd, P.E., and K.I. Wolpin. 2003. “On the Specification and Estimation of the Production Function for Cognitive Achievement.” _The Economic Journal_ 113: F3-F33.

- Umbel, V.M., B.Z. Pearson, M.C. Fernandez, and D.K. Oller. 1992. “Measuring bilingual children's receptive vocabularies.” _Child Development_ 63(4): 1012-20.

- Victora, C., F. Barros, and J. Vaughan. 1989. _Epidemiologia da Desigualdade_ , Sao Paulo: Hucitec.

- Waldfogel, J., W. Han, and J. Brooks-Gunn. 2002. “The Effects of Early Maternal Employment on Child Cognitive Development.” _Demography_ 30(2): 369-92.

- Walker SP, S.M. Grantham-Mcgregor, C.A. Powell, S.M. Chang. 2000. “Effects of Growth Restriction in Early Childhood on Growth, IQ, and Cognition at Age 11 to 12 Years and the Benefits of Nutritional Supplementation and Psychosocial Stimulation.” _The Journal of Pediatrics_ 137(1): 36-41.

- World Bank. 2005a. _World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development_ . The World Bank and Oxford University Press, New York.

- World Bank. 2005b. Development Database Platform. Washington, D.C.. Available online at available at <u>http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html;</u> accessed October 1, 2005.

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' 0 4,.

projects. It is believed, however, that a number of biases operate at the levels of donor agency, ecipient government and the project itself to mitigate against successful poverty alleviation. These biases include the pressure for rapid disbursement, the "big is beautiful" syndrome, lobbying by powerful pressure groups, elite identification (on the part of either local or expatriate staff), and inadequate research into how the poor earn their living (a lack of knowledge which is itself the product of a bias).

Donors are making attempts to overcome these biases. Renewed concern with poverty and basic neuds received impetus from work carried out under the auspices of UNICEF. By the late 1980s the World Bank was taking these concerns on board and has become an important player in the development of the "New Poverty Agenda'. Some data on the poverty impact of aid to different sectors is available from efforts that the Jnter-American Development Bank (IDB) made in this direction. In the early 1980s IDB adopted the target that 50 per cent of project benefits should go to the poor and set about monitoring atainment of the target. The coefficient of income distribution (CIM) is defined as the share of benefits accruing to the poorest 50 per cent - sectoral CIDs for two time periods are shown in Table 6. **11** These figures, which demonstrate that efforts at poverty alleviation should be intensified, are an aggregation of micro-level projects. Tle concern here is to tace the impact at the macroeconomic level. All the analysis conducted at tlis level considers the impact of aid-supported policy reforms, rather than aid monies. The former literature is discussed before considering how the latter may be tacldedc As in chapter 4, analysis must be concerned to trace the links from conditionality to policy reform to living standards. The first of these links was discussed in Part 4.2. Here we consider the second link. A first issue which immediately arises is the measurement of living standards, given the paucity of incoGme data in many countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.

# _Measuring the Uivng standards of the poor_

The most appropriate measures of the poor's living standards might appear to 1,e data from household income and expenditure surveys. However, such data are frequently scanty, unreliable and only available with a considerable lag. In many cases we need different indicators. One such indicator is beneficiary assessment - if you want to know how well off people are then ask them. The use of such indicators is relatively undeveloped and could be more widely used in future.<sup>2</sup> 92
security system,<sup>35</sup> so: The instantaneous utility can be rewritten more compactly as: An incumbent worker in the formal sector has a different value function than a new hire since, as will be explained later, the wage (and therefore utility) determined in a Nash bargaining negotiation is different. When the firm negotiates with an old hire it must pay severance if they mutually decide to discontinue the match. Therefore, severance weakens the firm’s bargaining position.

Let _w_<sup>_s_and current</sup> _F_<sup>(</sup><sup>_x, y_) and</sup><sup>_us_</sup> _F_<sup>(</sup><sup>_x, y_) be the wage and utility of an incumbent worker of type</sup><sup>_y_</sup> productivity _x_ , respectively.<sup>36</sup> The flow value of continuing in a formal-sector job for this worker is: where _x_<sup>_′_</sup> is a another draw from the distribution _HF_ ( _. | y_ ) and

The flow value of taking an informal-sector job for a worker of type _y_ and match specific productivity _y_<sup>_′_</sup> is: The flow utility for a worker of type _y_ and current productivity _y_<sup>_′_</sup> in the informal sector can be expressed as: where _wI_ ( _y_<sup>_′_</sup> _, y_ ) is the hourly wage<sup>37</sup> in the informal sector for a worker of type _y_ and match-specific productivity _y_<sup>_′_</sup> , _δ_ 3 is the amount of social assistance (subsidized health) that workers receive from

> 35Notice that _δ_ ˆ2 _<_ 0 if _τ_ ( _δ_ 1 + _δ_ 2) _> δ_ 2. Therefore, if the value of the SS services received is higher than the cost of contributing to the system, _δ_<sup>ˆ</sup> 2 works as a transfer and not as a tax.

> 36The superscripts indicate that the firm would have to make a severance payment if its match with this worker ended.

> 37Since there are no severance payments in the informal sector, there is no distinction between wages for a new hire versus an incumbent worker.

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# **Exhibit 3e: Evidence from cross-regional studies (V/V)**

|**Study**|**Brief description**|**Time**<br>**period**|**Key findings**|**Implications for market**<br>**vs. intervention**<br>**question**|**Implications for**<br>**centre vs. region**<br>**question**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Gardiner<br>et. al.<br>(2004)|• NUTS 2 regions<br>of EU 15|1980-<br>2001|• Slowσandβconvergence in productivity as measured<br>by LFS hours-worked<br>• Slow convergence of barely 1% per annum|• NA|• NA|
|Le Gallo<br>and<br>Dall'erba<br>(2006)|• 145 EU regions|1980-<br>1999|• Rejection of assumption of temporal independence in<br>βConvergence between 1980-89 and 1989-1999;<br>1989 being the year of reform of structural funds<br>• Two tiers of convergence, one in core richer regions<br>and one in peripheral poorer regions. Peripheral<br>regions converge faster.|• Little or no impact of<br>structural funds on<br>convergence rates.|• NA|
|Leonardi<br>(2005)|• Objective 1 and<br>non-objective 1<br>regions|1988-<br>99|• Objective 1 regions have converged to EU mean, while<br>non-Objective 1 regions have remained stable|• Suggests EU funds<br>effective|• Suggests central<br>intervention<br>effective|
|Quah<br>(1996)|• Examines how<br>host countries &<br>surrounding<br>regions affect<br>regional<br>performance|1980-<br>1989|• Both national factors and physical location<br>(surrounding regions) affect regional distribution<br>dynamics<br>• However, physical location & geographical spillovers<br>matter more than national macro factors in explaining<br>distribution dynamics|• Assuming policy more<br>similar within nations,<br>this suggests that<br>markets matter more<br>than policy<br>• Geographical proximity<br>explanation also<br>evidence of impact of<br>market links|• Suggests that top-<br>down redistribution<br>may have little<br>impact<br>• Decentralized<br>regions should<br>have freedom to<br>create market links<br>with other regions<br>irrespective of<br>national boundaries|

**Evidence for market         Evidence for interventionist policy         Evidence for decentralized approach Evidence for centralized approach**

29