power are a common flaw in the early stages of creating power markets, and this requires specific regulatory oversight to identify and address. Further research may be useful to distinguish between various private agenda and their differential impacts on the process of reforms.

**Case studies show how strong courts can bolster legislated reforms, while reforms can also occur in countries with weak courts when political backing is strong.** Multi-country statistical studies by Rufin (2003) and Foster & others (2017) find no significant correlation between market reforms and judicial independence or rule of law. Victor & Heller (2007) contrast China where both courts and the power sector regulator are weak, to India where courts are famously independent and electricity sector regulators have relatively great authority. India’s Supreme Court upheld the authority of regulators in a case in 2002, showing how courts can reinforce the credibility of regulators’ decisions. In Mexico and Brazil, as cases where support from the courts is uncertain, government support for regulators has been politically opportunistic. In both countries the governments variously upheld or undermined the regulator’s authority depending on how well the regulators’ decisions served the governments’ interests of the day (Victor & Heller 2007). Latin American case studies led Rufin (2003) to conclude that judicial independence can support institutional change with regards to property rights, but not necessarily competition. In Bolivia, politicized courts and weak property rights led suppliers to resolve competition disputes by directly lobbying the government. In Argentina, despite a weak court system, extensive private ownership and competition was achieved due to a strong ideological commitment (Rufin 2003).

**There is mixed evidence that model reforms are greater under a government with concentrated political power.** Given potential controversy around reforms, one might expect they are more feasible under governments with concentrated power i.e. where the country has one ‘pole’ of political power across the legislature and executive, and long tenures (Bhattacharyya 2011: 690). However, studies have found mixed results. Foster & others (2017) find no statistically significant association between competitive political systems and reform elements in developing countries. Erdogdu (2014b) finds no association of model reforms with concentration of power in non-OECD countries.<sup>43</sup> Zelner & others (2009) find that lowto high-income governments renegotiate more IPPs when domestic political conflict is high. To explain this, the authors cite ‘breakdown theories’ that “protest groups are more likely to be accommodated during periods of elite disunity or upheaval” (p.384), assuming that protest groups generally oppose IPPs. At the same time, IPP agreements are more stable in countries where there are less veto points in the policy-making process. Zelner & others (2009) explain this counterintuitive observation by suggesting that veto powers give competing actors a high-profile way to contest government decisions, with the effect that government decisions are more likely to change over time. Further research would be required to test this proposed explanation. Considering another perspective, Wengle (2015) argues market reforms have actually enabled a concentration of power in Russia.<sup>44</sup> This demonstrates how “markets and political authority co-evolve and continuously redefine each other”, in contrast to ‘neoliberal’ theory that pits markets and government as opposing forces (p.248).

> 43 For OECD countries, in contrast, Erdogdu (2014b) confirms a finding of Chang & Berdiev (2011) that single-party governments compared to coalitions go further to privatize ownership and unbundle utilities in the power sector.

> 44 Centralization of authority under President Vladimir Putin enabled liberal power sector reforms that in turn “solidified the centralization by sidelining [other state-oriented] actors that had critically undermined the sovereign authority of the federal government” (Wengle 2015: 248).

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