were selected by township authorities (often on the recommendation of village elders rather than by village consensus), or were long-term incumbents (QSEM 2012). The research also found a link between trust and collective action. Research across 2012 and 2013 also found that levels of trust between villagers and local leaders were higher in communities where villagers perceived themselves as more distant from the central government (QSEM June 2013), such as in parts of Shan State. In remote areas, the need of villagers need to act collectively to meet village needs helped to build social bonds (QSEM June 2013).

Other actors played important roles in distinct aspects of village life. Village elders, for example, either helped to legitimize village administrator decisions within the village or to balance power. Networks of village elders tended to function as closed groups: their members generally consulted privately, reaching agreements that were then announced publicly to the village. Religious leaders were influential in social and religious affairs and advised village administrators on specific issues. Women, poorer households, and other marginalized groups had limited opportunities to influence village meetings. Across the QSEM panel, no women were identified as holding local leadership positions (i.e., village tract administrator, village administrator or ten household head) in early rounds of research.<sup>5</sup> Despite this, the early research found few complaints about these developments: research participants perceived little divergence between their interests and those of village leaders (QSEM 2012).

A new law results in rapid and consequential changes The _Ward and Village Tract Administration Law,_ passed in 2012, fundamentally changed the village governance institutions that had evolved under military rule. These changes are laid out most clearly in Susanne Kempel and Aung Thun’s memo (Kempel 2016), which emphasizes three areas. The first was the decision to empower communities to indirectly elect village tract administrators (VTA) via ten household heads and make the VTA an officially recognized part of the state at the village tract-level. VTAs had access to a clerk, were provided with a stipend<sup>6</sup> and were responsible for representing the village tract at the township level. The second was the formalization of the role of village elders to manage local elections. The last change is what was left out: village administrators were not included in the 2012 law (Kempel 2016). Some of the new law’s effects on village institutions became rapidly visible following the first VTA elections in late 2012/early 2013; others took root more slowly.<sup>7</sup> Following these changes, village tract administrators rapidly became the most important center of local power at the expense of village administrators. Research in 2013 in Ayeyarwady, for example, showed clear evidence of increased village tract authority as VTAs took over a range of administrative functions ranging from registering land to approving applications for the SIM card lottery. The process of approving land registrations was of particular importance, as it gave the VTA the right of approval over even the most influential villagers. Similarly, in Magway, VTAs changed committee memberships to better suit their vision and instituted reforms—some of which simply consolidated power into the VTA’s hands. There were some regional variations, however. In remote areas of Rakhine, there was little immediate indication that the VTA was becoming more important relative to other institutions, whereas in Shan State, village tract dynamics varied significantly (QSEM, December 2013).

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