rafmacalaba/datause-encoder-data huggingface dataset:
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may be forced to either rely heavily on debt or to restrict their growth. Growth based on imprudent financial structures has been a frequent case among the small and medium clients of private and public DFCs. Results in recent years are well known to the Bank, through the portfolio reviews of its client DFCs. Because venture capital expertise is so scarce, the leading venture capital countries can play an important role in providing the necessary technical assistance and training which will not only help developing countries but could also help internationalize the venture capital business.

# 5. Concludinq remarks and recommendations

While a precise and strict definition of venture capital is not available and the exact contours of industry vary from country to country, there are a number of characteristics which are present in all cases: i) the existence of an individual or group of individuals with a marketable idea seeking to bring it to the market and someone else prepared to assist in the financing and management needed to bring the venture to success; ii) while venture capital is mostly equity or quasiequity, it is not limited to any financial instrument. In addition to technical expertise and know-how, a venture capitalist is expected to have sufficient flexibility to adjust his response to the particular needs of any given project; iii) although in some countries ex-post data show an important preference for technology based projects, any innovative idea-whether involving high, low or no technology--qualifies for venture capital support; iv) while there is no limit to the size of enterprises receiving venture capital, ex-post data shows an overwhelming preference for growth-oriented small- and mediumsize businesses (relative to their environments); v) venture capitalists' participation are always temporary and take, in most cases, the form of a minority shareholding or the irrevocable right to acquire it.

The complexity of developments in industrial finance markets needs to be recognized from the outset. Venture capital is one of the elements of those markets. In its most highly developed form, its an amalgam of financial, managerial and marketing know-how. Venture capital clients have assets structures and cash flows which do not meet the eligibility criteria of traditional financing, as their collateral is often in the form of intangible assets such as research results, new ideas or technical skills. They require different kinds of industrial finance such as equity and managerial support. Venture capitalists support entrepreneurs rather than projects and are not scared by initial long periods of negative cash-flow. The difference between venture capital and conventional financing lies in the preferred investment instruments or mix of such instruments, in the type of collateral required and in the magnitude of the risk involved. A venture capitalist has,
group ranking).<sup>9</sup> If the relative development level of many provinces is around 1, that is to say, near the national average level, the distribution is egalitarian; if the relative development level of a large number of provinces concentrates in one extreme and that of the others concentrate in the other extreme, the regional development is unequal.<sup>10</sup> Our results show that, apart from the three municipalities, in early 1980s, the relative development levels of the provinces tended to cluster around the national average, few provinces were much poorer or richer than the others – apart from the three provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Heilongjiang) that had a relative GDP per capital ratio higher than 1.3, all the other 22 provinces clustered together with the peak value around 1 (ie. around the national average level); however, in the late 1990s, the number of provinces whose development level is around the national average shrank to 7, the poor group emerged – 14 provinces clustered together with a peak value of 0.65, and the number of the provinces belonging to the rich group slightly increased to 4.<sup>11</sup> The graph 1 shows that (i) at the end of our period of study, all provinces belonging to the poor group were inland provinces (predominantly western provinces); and all provinces belonging to the rich group were costal provinces<sup>12</sup> ; and (ii) during this period, all provinces that suffered a relative decline in ranking were inland provinces (predominantly western provinces), and all the provinces that caught up were coastal provinces. The Chinese provinces converged to different clubs – the coastal provinces clustered together to form the rich club, while the inland provinces declined to the level of periphery. The emergence of the two peaks, rich and poor (consisting of the coastal provinces and the remote inland provinces, respectively), vividly demonstrates the centerperipheral development pattern in China.<sup>13</sup>

> 9 For the sake of simplicity and to smooth out the impact of short-term shocks, we examine the distribution of the provincial average relative GDP per capita of the first and the last seven years of our period of study (1978-1984 and 1992-1999). The evolution of annual relative provincial GDP per capita, 1978-1999, is available from the author upon request.

> 10 See Ben-David (1994; 1997), Quah (1996; 1997), Cozzi (1997).

> 11 Here, the groups (rich, intermediate, and poor) are classified in order to maximize the homogeneity of the relative GDP per capita level among the members in the same group, and the heterogeneity among members in different groups.

> 12 The three municipalities are already separated as the richest group from the other provinces. For the reasons of readability, we do not illustrate these three provinces in graph 1.

> 13 See Quah (1997; 1999), Desdoigts (1999).

7
## _Q.3.18: “What was the main reason for moving to the current place of residence?”_

And, among the options, there is the following possible reply: “ _Drought, flood or other weather-related condition_ ”. This is exactly the type of question that would enable more research on the climate-migration relationship. Unfortunately, however, this question disappeared from the latest rounds of the Uganda panel collection and is currently not found in any other collection of surveys across other countries (cf. Table A.1). Our general conclusion, therefore, is that given the current limitations of the LSMS-ISA data sets, there is limited scope for these data to help shed light on some aspects of the climate-migration relationship. However, we believe that a change of perspective on some key issues and relatively straightforward amendments to the questionnaires could greatly enhance the potential of this multi-topic household survey collection in this research field. This is the focus of the next section.

# **5. Adapting LSMS-ISA surveys to collect literature-based migration data**

In this section, we elaborate on what is the opportunity window for: i) current LSMS-ISA surveys to enhance the understanding of the climate-migration nexus; ii) adapting future LSMS-ISA surveys to collect migration data and position itself as a leading data collection program for the field.

In particular, we identify promising areas to which, with minor improvements, LSMS-ISA surveys can greatly contribute, including the issues of migration as adaptation, climate-induced immobility and potential migrants, the role of mediating channels and contextual factors. Finally, we provide an assessment of the potential integration of LSMS-ISA surveys with other non-traditional data sources. Clearly, given the reliance on longitudinal migration information tracking individuals and households over time (and across space), all these data-related opportunities crucially depend on the continuation of existing panels and the launch of new ones, which should go in parallel with efforts towards improving questionnaire design and interoperability with other data sources.

## **_A. Look at (im)mobility in the broader framework of adaptation to climate stress_**

While the issue of small sample sizes of households with migrants, stemming from the ‘rare event’ nature of migration, is an intrinsic shortcoming of general-purpose multi-topic representative surveys, a change of perspective on the issue can help in thinking about new research directions. In particular, our review has emphasized that the potential immobility traps of climate-related hazards are at least as important as the mobility effects triggered by such events. In this respect, household surveys could be employed not 30
consumption, and they should be matched by individual household, using the IDs available in the ProGres registration data.

Further, the PDM data measure consumption using relatively fewer variables than those in round 4 of the Chadian Household Consumption and Informal Sector Surveys (ECOSIT4). As such, the poverty estimations from the PDM data could be improved. <mark>The poverty estimates used in this paper do not reflect the official poverty estimates monitored by the government and the international community. The interest of this paper was to test a cross-survey methodology, and, for this purpose, we used a subsample of UNHCR refugee data that are not nationally representative of the refugee population in Chad. By contrast, official poverty statistics require national consumption surveys conducted by the national statistical office, with samples that are nationally representative. T</mark> he UNHCR and the World Bank are working closely to improve and increase comparable refugee data to nationals. Thanks to these recent efforts, in 2018/19, refugees were included for the first time in the ECOSIT4. When these data become available, it will be possible to run a similar analysis to assess how cross-survey imputation fares using nationally representative consumption measures for poverty, and to understand how cross-survey imputation can predict household poverty outcomes for refugees and host populations alike with comparable data.

Although the work presented in this paper remains a valid experiment for cross-survey imputations, the data did not cover the entirety of refugees in Chad, including some refugees who live outside camps. As the latter live in different environments, predicting their welfare may require different sets of variables. And measuring consumption among refugees who rely on a combination of handouts and informal incomes is a relatively new science. Existing survey instruments may need to be adapted, and the meanings of concepts such as utility and capabilities among refugees need to be reconsidered.

# **VII. Conclusion**

UN General Assembly Sustainable Development Goal 1— _End poverty in all its forms_ by 2030— explicitly pledges that “no one will be left behind.” Tracking the progress made toward this objective requires the availability of high-quality household consumption surveys. However, the 15
In contrast to the cognitive issues discussed above, which tend to originate from _how_ time use questions are asked, seasonality bias, as it is commonly referred to, stems from _when_ time use questions are asked. Depending on the length of the reference period, time use surveys typically only capture a small cross-section of how a person spends their time over the course of a year. The shorter the reference period, the more likely it is to miss seasonal variation in time use patterns. Thus, seasonality bias is a much greater concern for time diaries, which tend to focus on a single 24-hour period of time, than for stylized questions, which may cover multiple days—though, of course, as noted above, there are other risks associated with using longer reference periods. While there are certain precautions that can be taken, such as follow-up questions designed to distinguish between patterns of time allocation that are out of the ordinary (e.g., holidays, festivals, etc.) or posing questions about “usual” or “typical” days, none of these are perfect solutions. Ideally, time use data should be collected at multiple times for each respondent to ensure coverage across seasons (Frazis and Stewart 2012). However, given concerns over rising costs, such a sampling strategy is unlikely to be tenable for most researchers. In this case, the best advice may be to become informed about the seasonal labor patterns associated with the study setting, perhaps by conducting qualitative interviews or focus group discussions prior to the survey, and to stage time use data collection at the most appropriate time for your particular research question.

# **4. FEASIBILITY AND ACCURACY OF STYLIZED QUESTIONS AND TIME DIARIES**

# **4.1. FEASIBILITY**

Of the two most common time use methods used in developing countries, stylized questions and time diaries, which is the most feasible for use in a developing country setting? It is possible that despite the outward appearance of fewer costs (e.g., fewer questions added to the survey), stylized questions may, in fact, be costlier to implement than time diaries, when one takes into consideration potential increases in the cognitive burden imposed on respondents, which may produce longer interview times. To answer this question, we look to data from the pilot testing of the WEAI 2.0 survey in Bangladesh and Uganda in 2014.

12
18 15. Kakwani, N., A. Wagstaff, and E. Van Doorlsaer, Socioeconomic inequalities in health: Measurement, computation and statistical inference. _Journal of Econometrics,_ 1997. 77(1): p. 87-104.

16. Kunst, A.E., J.J. Geurts, and J. van den Berg, International variation in socioeconomic inequalities in self reported health _J Epidemiol Community Health,_ 1995. 49(2): p. 117-23.

17. Mackenbach, J.P., A.E. Kunst, A.E. Cavelaars, F. Groenhof, and J.J. Geurts, Socioeconomic inequalities in morbidity and mortality in western Europe. The EU Working Group on Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health _Lancet,_ 1997. 349(9066): p. 1655-9.

18. Pamuk, E., Social class inequality in mortality from 1921-1972 in England and Wales. _Population Studies,_ 1985. 39: p. 17-31.

19. Pamuk, E., Social class inequality in infant mortality in England and Wales from 1921 to 1980. _European Journal of Population,_ 1988. 4: p. 1-2 1.

20. Schalick, L.M., W.C. Hadden, E. Parnuk, V. Navarro, and G. Pappas, The widening gap in death rates arnong income groups in the United States from 1967 to 1986. _International Journal of Health Services,_ 2000. 30(1): p. 13-26.

21. Wagstaff, A., _Caring more about the poor: Inequality aversion, health inequalities and health achievement._ 2000, World Bank: Washington DC.

22. Deaton, A. and S. Zaidi, _Guidelines for constructing consumption aggregates for welfare analysis._ 2000, World Bank: Washington DC.

23. Hentschel, J. and P. Lanjouw, _Constructing an indicator of consumption for the analysis of poverty. Principles and illustrations with reference to Ecuador._ 1996, World Bank: Washington DC.

24. Buhmann, B., L. Rainwater, G. Schmaus, and T. Smeeding, Equivalence scales, wellbeing, inequality and poverty. _Review of Income and Wealth,_ 1988. **34:** p. 115-142.

25. de Onis, M., C. Monteiro, J. Akre, and G. Clugston, The worldwide magnitude of proteinenergy malnutrition: An overview from the WHO global database on child growth _Bulletin of the World Health Organization,_ 1993. 71(6): p. 703-712.

26. World_Health_Organization, _WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition._ 1997, World Health Organization: Geneva.

27. Contoyannis, P. and P. Forster, The distribution of health: a theoretical framework. _Hournal of Health Economics,_ 1999. **18:** p. 605-622.

28. Wagstaff, A., _If the health of the poor matters more: Child survival inequalities in nine developing countries._ 2000.
**Graph 1. Investments in higher education in percentage of GDP (2001)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2.5%<br>2.0%<br>1.5%<br>1.0%<br>0.5%<br>0.0%<br>Chile Colombia Brasil Paraguay Peru Argentina Mexico<br>Public subsidies Private Resources Total<br>% of GDP<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: OECD (2002a), World Bank (2002d) and World Bank (2002b and 2003)_ Public sector funding of tertiary education comprises only 0.6 percent of GDP. This translates into one of the lowest public expenditure per tertiary student in Latin America. Moreover, spending on tertiary education is well balanced against the primary and secondary level. Primary education is currently averaging about 64 percent of annual funds allocated to education, secondary 20 percent and higher education only 16 percent (MINEDUC 2004).

_Decreto Fuerza de Ley_ no. 4 from 1981 regulates public financing of Chilean tertiary education. Funding is allocated through four mechanisms: (i) **direct public support** (AFD) to the 25 traditional public and private universities; (ii) **indirect public support** (AFI) of public and private institutions linked to a best-student formula; (iii) **funding for institutional development and quality improvement** ; and (iv) **student financial assistance** in the form of scholarships and a loan system for students enrolled in traditional universities based on an income contingent repayment scheme<sup>2</sup> .

Graph 2 shows the evolution and composition of public expenditures in tertiary education. Public expenditures for tertiary education more than doubled in real terms between 1980 and 2003. Notably, public subsidies for student financial support, direct public support (AFD) and funds for institutional quality improvement projects increased (MECESUP). Meanwhile, indirect public support (AFI) has remained stable. In 1990, AFI represented 18 percent of total public expenditures on tertiary education; in 2003, it was reduced to 7 percent.

> 2 A project law is currently under review in the Chilean legislature, which would open up financial assistance to students attending other tertiary institutions than the traditional 25 universities.

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SENEGAL’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 13. Hidden costs of select water utilities, as a percentage of revenues**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 140<br>120<br>100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>Mali Liberia Niger Cote d'Ivoire Ghana Benin Senegal Burkina Faso<br>Collection Inefficiencies Underpricing Losses<br>Percentage of revenues<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).

# **Challenges**

In both rural and urban areas, access to improved water and sanitation has improved substantially since the early 1990s, but there are still important access gaps between rural and urban areas as well as between Dakar and other urban areas (table 11). As of 2005, 89 percent of the population living in cities had access to tap water, compared to only 41 percent in rural areas. Among urban areas, the Dakar area has almost universal coverage while in other urban centers up to two-thirds of the population has access to utility water. Among rural areas, too, there are wide disparities in access to piped-water systems ranging from 22.7 percent in the Kolda region to 73 percent in the Fatick region.

**Table 11. Rural and urban access to improved water and sanitation in Senegal**

|**Improved water**|
|---|
|**Improved sanitation**|

||1986|1993|1997|2005|2009|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Rural|29.2|43.9|46.2|64|73.6|
|Urban|55.1|90.6|89.9|92|97.0|
|Rural|25.9|24.9|24.0|26.2|28.9|
|Urban|79.5|77.1|78.3|—|—|

ß _Source_ : WHO Joint Monitoring Program 2010a and 2010b, from the Demographic and Health Surveys for 1986, 1993, 1997, and 2005. _Note_ : Improved water defined as piped water, stand posts, and safe wells/boreholes; improved sanitation defined as flush toilets, septic tanks, and improved latrines, accordingly to the JMP methodology. — = Not available.

In terms of sanitation, 25 percent of the population still practices open defecation. This figure, while much better than that of other African low-income countries, is twice as high as what is seen in middleincome countries and a source of concern in itself.

In general, progress on the sanitation front has been much more modest than in the water sector, due to the enormous and widening gap in access to improved water supply between rural and urban areas. As of 2008 access to sanitation in urban areas was estimated at 63.6 percent; in rural areas it was as low as 28.3 percent.

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obtained accreditation from agencies such as the US Joint Commission International (JCI) which certifies foreign health institutions. These facilities treat a large number of foreign patients annually, have internationally trained physicians and nurses, and maintain extremely high surgical success rates. For example, the Apollo hospital chain based in India has reportedly maintained a success rate of 99 percent in the over 50,000 cardiac surgeries performed, which is on par with the surgical success rates of some of the best cardiac surgery centers (e.g., Cleveland Clinic) in the US.

Similarly, for trade in education to truly flourish, the quality of education must credibly meet similar standards in different locations. Quality assurance is, in turn, closely related to regimes for accreditation and recognition of qualifications. Existing national systems often focus exclusively on services provided by domestic institutions to domestic students. Even if the foreign final medical or engineering degree is recognized, intermediate qualifications are not – creating an artificial indivisibility in tertiary education. But initiatives are being taken at the national and international level. The Bologna Process, although of European origin, is an example of an international initiative to foster harmonization and comparability of programs and degrees.<sup>16</sup> The process, which has the goal of permitting students, faculty and graduates to move freely across national borders, started with 29 economies and now includes over 40, with the inclusion of many developing countries. Greater cooperation between national quality assurance agencies, and the development of common standards will be critical for the internationalization of education services.

# **V. The Political Feasibility of a Grand Bargain**

In economic terms, there are large gains to be realized from flows of people in both directions. Broadly speaking, from a Northern perspective, flows from rich countries would serve to enhance the consumption possibilities of those who move; flows in the other direction would enhance production possibilities by making the economic pie larger for all.

The foregoing discussion has suggested that there are strong macroeconomic and microeconomic reasons why the world needs to see freer two-way mobility of labor. the components of two-way flows would be the following:

# South-to-North mobility

- (i) Unskilled workers move for work, possibly on a temporary basis, to boost the productive base in the North and improve the fiscal situation; with the proviso that they could be remunerated at levels below nationals of the host country;

> 16 See the official Bologna Process website July 2007 - June 2010 http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/

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