rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
charge of all FDI aspects.

Six national IPAs participated actively in the survey and provided extremely useful data as requested. These included four of the top five African recipients of Chinese investment according to MOC statistics: Nigeria, Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana.<sup>13</sup> The two additional countries were Liberia and Rwanda. Together, the six countries count for about one-third of all Chinese investment projects in Africa as certified by the MOC.

Most participating IPAs provided specific data on the Chinese investment, both “committed” and “actual,” by project number and capital amount, by year of entry and by sector. Most provided data comparing Chinese investment with overall FDI inflows to their countries. Regarding economic impact, most IPAs were able to include numbers of jobs created but unable to provide data on export earnings and tax revenues generated. Finally, participating IPAs generously shared perceptions of Chinese investment, regarding both positive impact and major concerns.

> 13 South Africa, ranked as number 2 recipient, was omitted by this research for the reason that it is a mid-income country.

11
# **Abstract**

This paper provides estimates of the impact that removing all merchandise trade distortions (including agricultural subsidies) would have on food and agricultural production, trade and incomes. Using the latest versions of the GTAP database and the World Bank’s LINKAGE model of the global economy (projected to 2015), our results suggest farm employment, the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise substantially in developing country regions with a move to free merchandise trade, thereby alleviating rural poverty – despite the decline in international terms of trade for developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of high-income countries.

## **JEL codes: C68, D58, F17, Q17**

**Key words:** Trade policy reform, computable general equilibrium modeling, agricultural markets, economic welfare

## **Contact author:**

Kym Anderson Development Research Group The World Bank Mailstop MC3-303 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 USA Phone +1 202 473 3387 Fax +1 202 522 1159 kanderson@worldbank.org ii
women who gave marriage as the principal reason for their move. International migration for the purpose of marriage also takes place through various forms. Briselli (2022) shows how internal migration of women in Korea has led to an increase in international migration of foreign brides into the areas with high out-migration of local women. Charsley et al. (2012) provide a review of marriage-related migration to the U.K., and note that many settled British citizens of South Asian heritage marry from their parental or grandparental homeland, often through arranged or semi-arranged marriages. For example, they note the proportion of British Pakistanis married to Pakistani nationals is 48 percent of men and 57 percent of women. For some other nationalities, they note the presence of international introduction agencies, or so-called “mail-order brides”, with individuals marrying British men in order to be able to migrate. This is not a new phenomenon: Sinke (1999) writes that “in the late nineteenth century commentators on migration began to write of an ‘international marriage market’ ”, where the tendency of labor migration movements to be dominated by men led to skewed sex ratios and a rearrangement of traditional marriage patterns. Dziadula and Zavodny (2023) analyze, using data from the ACS between 2008 and 2019, the extent to which natives and foreign-born in the US tend to have a spouse who is a “marriage migrant”, i.e., someone who got married in the year in which he or she arrived in the US. The sample is restricted to individuals who were living in the US one year before the survey, and with at least one of the two spouses who is aged 20 to 65. Their analysis reveals that less than 1 percent of the natives but over 7 percent of the foreign-born who got married in the year before the survey opted for a “marriage migrant”, and men do so to a much larger extent than women.

# **3.3 Migration may affect the stability of marriages and lead to (
2014; La Porta et al., 2008) but also because they use valuable resources leading to misallocation and aggregate productivity losses. _Third_ , informal firms tend to employ low-skilled or low-educated managers and workers (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; De Mel et al., 2010). _Fourth_ , informal firms lag behind in innovation, investment in new capital, and technology adoption, perhaps due to smaller size and lack of complementary factors (intangibles) such as human capital and managerial capabilities.

# **2.3 Informality Types or Views: Exit and Exclusion**

In exploring the root cause of informality in Latin America, Arias et al. (2010) propose two distinct but complementary lenses: informality driven by ‘exclusion’ from state benefits vis-

> 3See Medina and Schneider (2019) for an example of macroeconomic-focused methods, Medina and Schneider (2018) for a survey of macro methods and Elgin et al. (2021) for a comprehensive database using both model-based and survey-based measures of informality that covers more than 160 economies for the period 1990-2018.

> 4Some surveys use indirect questions about the sector in cases where firms might have strong incentives to provide incorrect responses (Putnin, š and Sauka, 2015; Gërxhani, 2004; Reilly et al., 2019).

5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database on BRI transport projects and the methodology used to measure shipping times. Results of the network analysis are presented in Section 3, while the impact of the BRI on trade costs is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 presents two extensions of the analysis. Concluding remarks follow.

# **2. Network analysis: Method and assumptions**

The Belt and Road Initiative covers a large number of transport projects in many countries. The consequences of implementing all those improvements is a priori very hard to forecast: for example, the benefit from building a new segment of rail might depend on the construction or upgrade of a new port at the end of the rail when joining the coast. Furthermore, the optimal route between two cities might depend on the implementation of several projects, which means that one cannot study transport infrastructures independently from one another. The interconnectedness of all elements in the transportation network poses a challenge to any researcher trying to estimate the changes in trade costs that can reasonably be gained from the BRI.

In order to embrace the complexity of network effects while at the same time taking into account all planned BRI transport projects and all countries in the world, our analysis is based on an estimation of shipping times. Specifically, our goal is to develop and implement a structured method to compute the shipping time between all city pairs in the world before the BRI and after the implementation of all identified BRI transport projects. This section presents our methodology and assumptions in detail.

## **a. Overall method**

As a starting point, we build a network model which takes into account in a precise way the current transportation network and we use it to compute shipment times between all city‐pairs using a shortest 4
significant at the 1 percent level.

> 6 The practical implementation of the three-step procedure is greatly facilitated by a number of STATA ado-files programmed by different researchers: Below, _oaxaca_ by Jann (2008) is used for the Oaxaca type decompositions and code based on the one in _selmlog_ by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2007) for the numerical computation of correction terms. Besides, the quantile regressions of Section 4.3 rely on _rifreg_ by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007, 2009). 7 As mentioned above, the BLFS contains data on 23,587 individuals. 14,137 of these fulfill the restrictions underlying the baseline decomposition (as detailed in Table 1, this implies in particular that they are between 15 and 65 years old and are neither unpaid family workers nor graduates of institutions of religious education). Of these, 7,178 individuals work either in the public or the private sector. Finally, for 6,562 individuals valid information on all control variables is available in the BLFS. Accordingly, they form the basis of the analysis of this section. Table 2 shows that the unweighted sample of 6,562 individuals can be broken down into 3,180 observations for public sector workers and 3,382 observations for private sector workers. Using appropriate sample weights, this translates into 58,068 public sector workers and 118,853 private sector workers.

- 14 -
, leading to underinvestment in education and to lower labor productivity than it would have been in a more equitable world (Stiglitz, 2012). Increasing concentration of incomes could also reduce aggregate demand, undermining economic growth, because the wealthy spend a lower fraction of their incomes than middle- and lower-income groups (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015).

Even if mean growth explains a large portion of the income growth for the two poorest quintiles once pertinent factors are controlled for, there is still substantial noise. Just because the average elasticity of lower-income growth to mean income growth is close to 1 does not mean that some countries cannot have elasticities of 0.85, while others have elasticities of 1.15.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, a number of variables in addition to mean growth influence the income of the poorest, both negatively and positively.

Just eye-balling the data, one can notice that something is amiss. Figure 2 plots the data from Dollar et al. (2016) covering a sample of 299 growth spells over the period 1967 to 2011 (see below for further details). One notices that while overall the observations could fit on a 45 degree

> 5 Kraay (2015) has recently questioned the robustness of these results. See also Brueckner and Lederman (2015) who argue that the relationship is negative on average but heterogeneous across countries.

> 6 In fact, the 95 percent confidence interval of the elasticity implied by Dollar and Kraay (2002: table 3, column 3) is 0.83 to 1.13.

-5-
labor market consequences of school construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. _American Economic Review_ , _91_ (4), 795–813.

- Engle, P. L., Black, M. M., Behrman, J. R., De Mello, M. C., Gertler, P. J., Kapiriri, L., ... others (2007). Strategies to avoid the loss of developmental potential in more than 200 million children in the developing world. _The Lancet_ , _369_ (9557), 229–242.

- Fischer, M., Karlsson, M., Nilsson, T., & Schwarz, N. (2019). The long-term effects of long terms – Compulsory schooling reforms in Sweden. _Journal of the European Economic Association_ , _jvz071_ .

- Gershoff, E. T., & Grogan-Kaylor, A. (2016). Spanking and child outcomes: Old controversies and new meta-analyses. _Journal of Family Psychology_ , _30_ (4), 453.

- Giles, J., Satriawan, E., & Witoelar, F. (2020). Early childhood nutrition, availability of health service providers and life outcomes as young adults: Evidence from Indonesia. _Working Paper_ .

- Goodman, A., Lamping, D. L., & Ploubidis, G. B. (2010). When to use broader internalising and externalising subscales instead of the hypothesised five subscales on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ): Data from British parents, teachers and children. _Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology_ , _38_ (8), 1179–1191.

- Hasan, A., Hyson, M., & Chang, M. C. (2013). _Early childhood education and development in poor villages of Indonesia: Strong foundations, later success_ . The World Bank.

- Haveman, R., & Wolfe, B. (1995). The determinants of children’s attainments: A review of methods and findings
, the private capital depreciation rate of

> 13 TFP is measured using growth accounting based on the standard Solow‐Swan growth model with human capital. Syria data for output, physical capital, human capital, and employed persons are taken from Penn World Tables (PWT) 9. Labor share is proxied by the average for four relatively conflict‐free middle‐income Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies (Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).

8
The OECD (2011a) provides a mixed picture on progress toward greater donor use of country systems, apart from the issue of responsiveness to system quality. For the 32 countries included in both the 2005 and 2010 surveys, it reports that average use of country PFM systems increased from 40% to 48%, and increased from 40% to 44% for country procurement systems. These improvements may appear impressive for the short 5-year time span covered, but as the report notes, the 48% figure fell far short of the 55% target value. This “failure” should be interpreted in its broader context. The PD targets – as with the Millennium Development Goals – were designed to be ambitious, to motivate action more effectively. In these same 32 countries, for example, the number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) declined by nearly a third (from 1,696 to 1,156) between 2005 and 2010, but the target was for an even more dramatic decline of two-thirds (to only 565).

This study follows the methodological approach of Knack (2013), namely by applying panel data methods to the three-round PDMS dataset, controlling for other factors that influence use of country systems, and correcting for possible selection and endogeneity bias. However, it differs from Knack (2013) in several important respects. First, it directly tests the importance of PFM systems quality for their use by donors, measuring quality with the CPIA indicator specified in the PD. The CPIA indicator is more appropriate for a second reason: it is designed specifically to assess public sector systems for managing public funds including aid. Other wellknown “governance” indicators are designed for commercial (e.g. assessing risks to foreign investors) or advocacy (democracy, human rights, transparency) purposes. Second, it addresses the related issue of quality and use of recipient government procurement systems. Finally, this study goes beyond Knack (2013) in reporting not only results for the full three-dimensional (donor/recipient/
et al. (2012), satellite data on nighttime lights have gained popularity in the economics literature as a proxy for measuring economic activities, particularly, in districts where high frequency and disaggregated data on economic outcomes are scant. These nightlight data come from NASA’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program/Operational Linescan System (OLS) covering the period 1992-2013 and the Visible Infrared Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)<sup>11</sup> from 2012 to present. However, due to incon-

> 7Data for 2005 and 2010 were not available due to a change in the company in charge of the data collection. Following Manacorda and Tesei (2020), I use linear interpolation across years to obtain estimates for the missing years.

> 9reflecting the maximum coverage for all available networks, i.e., 2G, 3G, 4G

> 10reflecting the maximum coverage for 3G or 4G networks

> 11https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/download.html

6
use of Internet purchasing of travel products and the growth in numbers of people with Internet access has led to continued growth in travel consumers (Ramos & Rodrigues, 2010). These consumers are continually developing in terms of their needs for information, and research should evolve in terms of the areas of focus to address practitioner concerns and requirements.”

# **IIc. Transport and connectivity**

<mark>Geographical proximity and cultural affinity positively influence tourism demand especially for small islands. The literature survey of McElroy and Parry (2010) clearly identifies geographic proximity as the main factor explaining the tourism attractiveness of small islands, followed by dependent, colonial, or political status and uncrowded island ambience. In fact, the same factors are observed by Coscia, Hausman and Neffke (2016) using anonymized and aggregated foreign transaction data from credit card expenditures: distance, a country’s reported wealth, and cultural afinity in</mark> affecting tourism demand.

<mark>Increased airlift connectivity benefits the destination country and the inbound tourists. The evidence on the effect of airlift supply is clear: more airlift benefits any tourism destination (see, for instance, the review and the econometric evidence for the Caribbean of Acevedo et al., 2016). Another issue is that more airlift supply should increase competition among airlines for a destination, and as such, it should be expected that less money would be spent on transportation</mark>

> 5 Of theoretical relevance is the question of whether, as more islands participate in the informational game, competition among them may be used strategically by agents to capture rents. For instance, Zhang et al. (2016) indicate that expert reviews influence consumer ratings. As such, information might be manipulated by the bigger players, a concern that the recent focus on digital platforms such as Facebook clearly illustrates.

6
15.17|12.44|17.08|2.56|
|Rest of Sub-<br>Saharan<br>Africa|0.13|13.43|86.01|-28.44|-32.15|-34.30|
|S. Asia<br>|0.15|-2.41|-11.09|5.40|-3.76|8.89|
|Southern<br>Africa|-0.11|-43.46|-2.49|25.86|0.04|-49.22|
|Tanzania|1.00|18.60|15.84|-0.10|-13.10|-16.69|
|Uganda|0.20|16.84|-25.59|-28.96|-3.22|-0.07|
|USA|-0.01|-14.96|-0.47|-0.33|19.26|-40.63|
|W. Europe|0.01|-8.69|0.74|-0.59|8.22|3.12|
|Zambia|0.29|-29.00|-14.53|-22.26|-37.99|-22.64|
|Zimbabwe|-0.13|-52.31|6.07|-14.77|1.90|-48.75|

Note: Global maize production time series data for the period 1971-2001 were obtained at the national level from FAOSTAT (2010), and then de-trended using a statistical model that explains physical production of maize as a function of time. The time series of estimated residuals, expressed as percentages of predicted production, is taken to represent the percentage deviations of production from trend. Percent
living in income poor households are more likely to drop out of school or work, experiencing severe deprivation of education and/or income. Therefore, there is an increasing probability that today’s children exposed to deprivation will pass it on to their children in the future. Failure to enhance opportunities for children today will require costly remedies tomorrow.<sup>6</sup> Although health deprivation has remained almost unchanged, food and information deprivation have deteriorated. Children’s risk of suffering health deprivation remained almost the same between 2000 (2.9 percent) and 2008 (2.4 percent), mainly because of the expansion of the national immunization program. Food deprivation deteriorated over time; the prevalence of severe food deprivation drastically increased from 6.3 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2008. In addition, the 2008 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) paper shows that 29 percent of children in Egypt age 0-4 years showed evidence of chronic malnutrition or stunting, and 7 percent were acutely malnourished. A comparison of the results with the 2005 EDHS suggests that children’s nutritional status deteriorated during the period between the two surveys. For example, the stunting level increased by 26 percent.

# **1.2** **_Major Public Policy Initiatives Linked to Human Development Opportunities_**

Multiple public policy programs and policies to enhance the human development of children and youth in Egypt were undertaken during the past decade. Greater attention was given to less privileged segments of the population, including poor children. The initiatives focused on four sectors: social protection, health and nutrition, basic housing services, and education. Nevertheless, in most sectors, public expenditures for human development declined, with the exception of social protection, which expanded substantially. After 2006, the programs devoted nearly all the funds to finance fuel and food subsidies, which are costly and poorly targeted programs.<sup>7</sup> In recent years, the country has reformed laws regulating responsibilities to care for
# Policy Makers Can Increase Account Ownership and Use in Various Ways

Governments and businesses could help dramatically reduce the number of unbanked adults by moving routine cash payments into accounts. Such payments could include public sector wages, public pensions, and government transfers of social benefits. Globally, digitizing such payments could reduce the number of unbanked adults by up to 100 million (Demirgüç‐Kunt and others 2018). Many unbanked adults have the basic technology to receive payments digitally. Of the 60 million unbanked adults worldwide who receive government transfers in cash, two‐thirds have a mobile phone.

Digital payments have played an important role in boosting financial inclusion in ECA. About 1 in 6 account owners opened their first account with a financial institution to receive digital government payments. The share of adults in the region receiving government wages, pensions, or social benefits is twice the developing world average—and two‐thirds of recipients receive their payments digitally.

More can be done. Nearly 25 million unbanked adults in ECA receive government payments in cash— and 75 percent of them have a mobile phone. Moving public sector pension payments into accounts would reduce the number of unbanked adults in the region by up to 20 million, including 8 million in Russia alone. In the private sector, about 19 million unbanked adults receive their wages in cash—and more than 90 percent of them have a mobile phone. About 15 million unbanked adults receive agricultural payments in cash—and more than 90 percent of them have a mobile phone.

Although financial inclusion starts with providing the unbanked with an account, the benefits come from actively using the account for saving, managing risk, borrowing, and making or receiving payments. The Global Findex database reveals many opportunities to help account owners make better use of their accounts. These benefits are considerable in ECA, given the ample room for promoting account use. For example, 80 million adults in ECA are banked but still pay utility bills in cash—and 95 percent of them own mobile phones. Digitizing these