rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
would be willing and able to engage in these activities. In total, 630 individuals were recommended by the CGFs (about 10 people per reforestation plot), of which half were randomly selected to participate in the program. Participants employed in the PES contract were randomly grouped into teams of five and informed that they could collectively earn money based on maintenance and survival of the newly planted trees on their assigned reforestation plot. PES contracts assured the groups that they would receive about $0.70 for every tree that was still alive at verification and that every group member would receive an equal share (20%) of the total amount. About 9 months later, in June/July 2018 (just before the start of the next rainy season), all reforestation areas were visited by independent monitors and participants received their payments based on the number of trees that were still alive. From those selected to be part of the PES scheme, more than 95% received a positive payment. The individual payments ranged from about 840 FCFA ($1.50) to 25,620 FCFA (about $45.6) with an average of 8,300 FCFA ($14.8), which represents approximately a week of food consumption for the median rural household in Burkina Faso<sup>3</sup> , and about half the monthly agricultural income of households in our study sample. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the payment amounts received by the participants.

Our baseline data suggest that the participants in the scheme come from

> 3Authors’ calculations from the BF 2014 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data estimates the median rural household’s daily consumption expenditures at about 1580 FCFA ($3). In July 2018, 1000 FCFA = US$ 1.78.

7
shares of the physical investment that have been financed through debt, equity, and capital grant from the government.

The total debt used to finance the 1,202 active greenfield and brownfield PPP projects in electricity and transport in our sample is estimated at $274 billion, and the total equity financing is estimated at $226 billion. The average leverage ratio at the time of financial closure is 2.25. Debt financing makes up 60–80 percent of total physical investments in most countries in the sample (figure 8). The two notable exceptions are Argentina and Brazil, which have debt financing ratios of about 30 and 50 percent, respectively. These ratios are lower because a significant portion of PPPs in these countries was implemented through the sale of shares of state-owned utilities, which translated into financing strategies that are different from those used to achieve financial closure in a project finance scheme.

# **Figure 8 Composition of public-private partnership financing for active projects in the sample, by country**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>Debt Equity Capital subsidy<br>AlbaniaArgentina Bhutan BrazilBulgariaBurundiEthiopiaGeorgia GhanaIndonesia KenyaKosovo PeruRomaniaSolomon IslandsSouth AfricaUkraine<br>Percent of total<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Authors, based on data from PPI database and own data collection.

# **_5.4 Value at Risk_**

The losses from debt and equity obligations in the case of early termination depend on the causes of termination. There are three major reasons for early termination of PPPs: the government’s default or voluntary termination of the project, the private partner’s default or breach of contract, and force majeure.

In the first case, the private party expects to be compensated for the full amount invested in the project (debt and equity) plus the equity return it had forecasted (World Bank 2019). In the
consists of the international airport in Cotonou, and basic and rudimentary airstrips in remote towns. The deterioration of Cotonou’s airport runway surface and its need to be reinforced is a major challenge. Users identify the main infrastructure problems affecting Cotonou airport as: (i) insufficient length of the runway; (ii) insufficient apron space, and (iii) lack of capacity of the passenger terminal at peak hours.

Safety oversight is among Benin’s most important challenges. Benin’s ICAO safety oversight audit from 2007 reveals that the rate of non-implementation of recommended standards and practices exceeds 80 percent, more than double the global average of 40 percent. There is a need to improve and complete the fence around the airport in order to comply with ICAO’s security standards.

19
**Figure 3: Growth accounting (ctd.)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> B. Capital/output ratio approach<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>‐2<br>‐4<br>1970‐2016 1970‐1980 1980‐1990 1991‐1998 1998‐2005 2005‐2012 2012‐2016<br>‐6<br>TFP K/Y Labor Schooling Overall<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: own calculation based on PWT 9.0 and WDI. As the standard approach in the top panel may somewhat overestimate the contribution of capital accumulation that is really due to productivity-induced capital deepening, we alternatively follow an approach by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) in the lower panel that focuses on the capital/output ratio. As one can see, there is little qualitative difference between both approaches, only that the contribution of capital accumulation is qualitatively less in the latter case, as should be. See appendix B1 for details on the methodology and the data.

A sectoral perspective highlights the role of services and structural change: Figure 2.B depicts a typical pattern of structural change where the share of value added declines over time. Somewhat atypically, this was not accompanied by an increasing role for manufacturing, which remained remarkably stable. Labor instead moved straight into the services sector.<sup>5</sup> This is mirrored in Figure 2.C that shows a strong sectoral contribution of services to growth, while the contribution of manufacturing is barely visible for most years. It is important to understand, however, that the relevant growth contribution of services does not stem from productivity increases within the aggregate service sector. If anything, productivity in services was declining after 2005 (see Figure
||Control mean|(1)|(2)|(3)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Child health**(children < 5years old)|||||
|Diarrhea prevalence 48 hours|0.033|0.000|-0.002|0.001|
|||(0.010)|(0.010)|(0.010)|
|Diarrhea prevalence 7 days|0.061|-0.005<br>(0.015)|-0.005<br>(0.014)|-0.005<br>(0.014)|
|ALRI prevalence 48 hours|0.049|-0.011<br>(0.022)|-0.017<br>(0.020)|-0.018<br>(0.020)|
|ALRI prevalence 7 days|0.056|-0.012|-0.020|-0.021|
|||(0.025)|(0.023)|(0.023)|
|Weight-for-age z-score|-0.82|0.0994|0.148|0.107|
|||(0.094)|(0.091)|(0.087)|
|Length/Height-for-age z-score|-1.619|0.12|0.119|0.0833|
|||(0.094)|(0.091)|(0.088)|
|Weight-for-length/height z-score|0.165|0.0743|0.135|0.106|
|||(0.090)|(0.083)|(0.083)|
|Anemia (Hb < 110 g/L)|
Dellacha and Hahn, 2005). The majority of surveyed investors are active in the generation and off/mini-grid sector, but around 25% were active in distribution, transmission and retail. As the majority of the literature has focused on equity investors (see Section 4), our research also includes debt providers. Yet, these constitute only 7 of 51 surveyed investors, as development finance institutions (DFIs)<sup>10</sup> still provide a substantial part of financing for power projects in SSA (Eberhard _et al._ , 2017).

**Figure 2: Overview of Characteristics of Participants**

<!-- Start of picture text --> a) Half of survey respondents are b) Participants are mainly active in<br>incorporated in Africa generation and off/mini-grid<br>Middle East<br>Retail<br>Asia Unknown Generation<br>1 Transmission 6<br>2 1<br>Americas 12<br>5 34<br>16<br>51 survey 26 Africa Distribution 51 survey<br>participants participants*<br>16<br>Europe 24 25<br>Mini-grid Off-grid<br>c) Most participants are equity investors<br>Financiers<br>7<br>51 survey<br>participants<br>44<br>Equity investors<br><!-- End of picture text -->

*Investors can be in multiple categories so total adds up to more than 51

In rating the readiness of each country and supply-chain segment, participants could choose which countries and segments to rate. The reasoning was that participants may be uninformed on the readiness of some countries or segments. While this ensures participants do not provide inaccurate data, there is a potential for selection bias. For example, participants might only provide their opinion for the most extreme cases. However, our

> 10 DFIs were not included in the survey as they are not fully commercial.

13
9 the information published under the Petroleum Industry Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Program. As one lawmaker put it, “We do have some information now on margins, but we don’t know what profits are. Is there excessive profit or not? We need that information and we don’t have it” (AP 2007). The program was repealed in 2010.

Many governments in developing countries keep retail prices of one or more oil products artificially low, thereby subsidizing them. Oil was considered a strategic good and price controls were common worldwide decades ago. While many governments today treat oil no differently from other commodities, a large number of governments have not moved from the era of price controls to deregulation. In some countries, consumers have become accustomed to relatively low prices, and in the last decade a confluence of food crisis, oil price shock, financial crisis, and, in some countries, political crisis has made it politically difficult to press on with price reforms. Reasons cited by the opponents of price reforms include protecting the economy from high world oil prices, curbing inflation, promoting economic development by making relatively cheap energy available, and making modern energy affordable to them. In major oil producing countries, low oil product prices are regarded as windfall dividends from oil revenue to which many citizens consider themselves entitled.

Opponents of subsidy reduction often argue that higher oil prices hurt the poor more than the rich. This may be true when both the direct and indirect effects on household expenditures are considered. For example, a detailed study of households in Madagascar found that a 17percent price rise would increase household expenditures by 2.1 percent for the bottom quintile, compared to 1.5 percent for the top. About three-fifths of the increase in expenditures was due to indirect effects, mostly through higher food prices. At the same time, because the poor spend far less on energy and food in absolute terms, the top quintile captured 40 percent of the total benefits of lower oil prices, whereas the
I POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2523

# Summary findings

Duty drawback (or rebate) systems reduce or eliminate the duties paid on imported intermediate goods or raw materials used in the production of exports. When a firm imports an intermediate product for use in the production of an export good, tariff payments on the imported intermediate good are either waived (duty drawback) or returned to the producer once the final product is exported (rebate). These incentive systems are often justified on the grounds that they tend to correct the anti-trade bias imposed by high tariff levels.

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it assumes that tariffs are predetermined policy variables; if they were, the easiest way to reduce their anti-trade bias would be to eliminate them. But this is rarely done because existing levels of protection correspond to a political economy equilibrium difficult to modify in the presence of lobbying pressures.

Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga show that in a political economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, full duty drawbacks are granted to exporters that use imported intermediate goods in their production. This in turn decreases their incentives to counterlobby against high tariffs on their inputs. Indeed, under a full duty drawback regime, tariffs on intermediate goods are irrelevant to exporters because they are fully rebated. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods.

Creating a regional trading bloc alters the incentives by eliminating duty drawbacks on intraregional exports, which leads to lower tariffs for goods that intraregional exporters use as inputs.

Evidence from Mercosur suggests that eliminating duty drawbacks for intraregional exports would lead to increased counterlobbying against protection of intermediate products. Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga estimate that without this mechanism, the common external tariff would have been 3.5 percentage points _(25_ percent) higher on average.

This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study the political economy of trade policy. The research was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under
Policy Research Working Paper 9016

# **Abstract**

Interventions in highly insecure and fragile contexts are always confronted with the latent risk of not being able to implement the program as intended. Despite its high policy relevance, little is known about the impacts of program disruption or cancellation on beneficiaries. This study uses the unplanned cancellation of the South Sudan Youth Business Start-Up Grant Program to assess the socioeconomic, behavioral, and psychological consequences of a program that fails to be implemented as intended. Originally planned as a randomized trial, the Youth Startup Business Grant Program consisted of an unconditional cash grant combined with a business and life skills training targeting the youth in South Sudan. Due to the intensification of violence in the country, the disbursement of the grant was terminated in late 2016 before most of the intended beneficiaries had accessed the grant. The study uses survey data from face-to-face interviews and experimental data from lotteries, trust games, and a list experiment to assess the consequences of the cancellation in a comprehensive form. The empirical analysis employs instrumental variable regressions to control for individual characteristics that might have made it more likely to access the grant before disbursement was frozen. The results show that participants who received the originally planned treatment displayed significant improvements in their consumption, savings, and psychological well-being. However, participants who vainly expected to receive the cash grant showed reduced levels of consumption and women among this subgroup also experienced strong reductions in their trust level. In addition, the study finds some evidence that these women were less likely to migrate.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice and the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank. org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at upape@worldbank.org and lralston@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research
6 towards them in production. Such substitution behavior is likely to take place both between food and other goods, and among food commodities whose relative prices change. The substitution effects, which clearly depend on own- and cross-price elasticities both on the demand and on the supply-side, cause the total welfare impact of price changes to deviate from the first-order approximation. Attempts to estimate these deviations, through second-order Taylor expansions of the expenditure function, can be found, for example, in Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) and Robles and Torero (2010).

Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) investigate the welfare impact of large price increases during the Indonesian currency crisis of 1997. Following Deaton (1988, 1990), they use spatial variation in quality-adjusted unit values within a single cross-section of the Indonesian SUSENAS household survey to estimate the matrix of cross-price elasticities for 21 food groups (and one non-food category). They find overall welfare impacts that are generally large, but that differ considerably not only between urban and rural areas, but also across different provinces. Effects were generally more regressive in urban than in rural areas. Although allowing for substitution behavior made substantial level differences, the authors argue that “the distributional consequences were the same whether we allowed households to substitute towards relatively cheaper goods or not” (Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002, pp. 419-420).

Robles and Torero (2010) - probably the paper whose subject is closest to our own - investigate the effect of the 2007-2008 “food crisis” on four Latin American countries: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. Like Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) they too estimate a second-order Taylor expansion of the household net expenditure function around initial prices. They classify food commodities into six groups, and find much smaller welfare effects than Friedman and Levinsohn found for Indonesia. The average national compensating variations were of the order of 1.5 – 2.5% of initial expenditure in Guatemala, Honduras and Peru, and 7% in Nicaragua. In every country, the effects
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2046

# Summary findings

Using enterprise survey data for 1995-97, Djankov studies and compares how different modes of privatizing to insiders affect enterprise restructuring in two former Soviet republics, Georgia and Moldova.

Restructuring in companies in which incumbent managers received significant ownership stakes for free was similar to that in companies that were still stateowned.

By contrast, restructuring was faster in companies bought by their managers.

Djankov interprets these results as suggesting that managers' incentives to restructure decrease when they regard their newly acquired ownership as a windfall gain.

- - This paper a product of the Financial Economics Unit, Financial Sector Practice Department is part of a larger effort in the department to study the restructuring process in transition economies. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Rose Vo, room MC10-627, telephone 202473-3722, fax 202-522-2031, Internet address hvol@worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sdjankov@worldbank.org. January 1999. (16 pages)

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out 4uickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represen_ **_t_** _he view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent._ Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
foreign ownership exceeds 10 percent. Should foreign ownership be below 10 percent we assume it is portfolio investment. Second, we consider only firms that are also in the merger and acquisition data from Securities Data Corporation (2000) or have a foreign ownership share exceeding 25 percent. 67 of the 103 firms with FDI in 1999 fall into this category.

Table 3 presents summary statistics of the ownership data on publicly-traded firms in Korea in 1998 and 1999. The 1999 sample is smaller because several dozen firms went bankrupt or were delisted from the Korea Stock Exchange in 1999. In the 1998 sample, 156 firms (25 percent of the sample) had foreign ownership exceeding 10 percent. The summary statistics suggest that firms that attracted significant foreign investment were larger and more profitable than the average firm in the sample in both 1998 and 1999. In contrast, the characteristics of firms that attracted only foreign portfolio investment (0<FI<10) were similar to the sample averages in both 1998 and 1999.

To evaluate how these variables affect the decision to make a large investment, we estimate the likelihood of receiving foreign investment in excess of 10 percent. Specifically, the dependent variable, Fl, is a binomial variable and equals one if foreign ownership exceeds 10 percent and zero otherwise. The estimating equation is where X* is a vector of characteristics of the firms in the sample, including firm size, firm profitability, firm debt, and access to distribution. We measure size by log of assets and log of sales (ASSET, SALE), profitability by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total sales, and we proxy for access to distribution channels and government preference with a dummy for membership in a top 33 chaebol (CHAEBOL). We use debt-asset ratios instead of debt-equity ratios (FDEBT) because several firms report negative book value of equity. We expect the coefficients on 13
**Strengthening government support to help Tanzanian firms cope and recover from shocks.** About 87 percent of firms report that they have not received any financial support in the aftermath of a disaster, and only 1 percent of firms report having received insurance payouts for damaged buildings, pointing to the potential of a larger role for governments in ensuring private sector resilience to disasters. With limited options for firms to absorb losses and rebuild from disasters, governments can improve access to insurance to help firms cope with disaster losses with a mix of subsidies and regulations. Governments can also support firms to develop business continuity plans to improve overall disaster preparedness.

Complementing existing household survey-based analyses, this new Tanzanian firm survey yields detailed insights on the direct and indirect firm-level costs of natural hazards, along with firms’ decision-making factors to deal with increasing extreme events. More research on firm-level effects of natural hazards is called for to better target policy interventions towards the needs of firms – and the critical goods, services, and jobs which they provide.

# References

- Acemoglu, D, Carvalho, V M, Ozdaglar, A, and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. 2012. "The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations." _Econometrica_ , 80(5): 1977–2016. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9623

- Adams, A V, Johansson da Silva, S, and Razmara, S. 2013. Skills Development in the Informal Sector:

- Tanzania. In _Improving Skills Development in the Informal Sector_ , edited by A Adams, S Johansson da Silva and S Razmara, 239–268. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/9780821399682_ch09

- Asgary, A, Anjum, M I, and Azimi, N. 2012. "Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity After the 2010 Flood in Pakistan: Case of Small Businesses." _International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction_ , 2(1): 46–56. https://doi.org/10.1016