rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
that had twice as many Venezuelan immigrants receiving a regular migratory status experienced an increase of 25 percent more crime reports. These effects are not explained by higher domestic violence caused by the PEP program. In fact, the improvements in economic and mental health conditions observed among PEP participants (Ib ́a ̃nez et al., 2024) are inconsistent with patterns typically associated with increased domestic violence. Additionally, the program did not disproportionately increase female income relative to male income.

Particularly, a twofold increase in the number of Venezuelan migrants who received regular migratory status (relative to population) explains an increase of 40 percent and 70 percent in reports of sexual crimes and domestic violence, respectively. Given that the effects stem mostly from female Venezuelan migrant victims of crimes, it is plausible to conclude that these women felt more empowered to report such abuses without fear of deportation or other penalty. We support this hypothesis with data from a representative survey of Venezuelan refugees with and without the PEP that was collected as part of the Venezuelan Refugee Panel Study (VenRePs).<sup>5</sup> As we demonstrate, female migrants with the PEP increased the rate at which they filed complaints with the police and other institutions relative to their peers without the PEP. Additionally, and consistent with our main estimates, there was a mechanical increase in convictions and trials of male Venezuelan perpetrators of these crimes, who were likely partners of the victims.

Second,the program led to a reduction in total crime reports by Colombian natives and a decline in crimes committed by Venezuelans, excluding domestic and sexual crimes (which might be higher mechanically due to the increased reports). The results aligns with qualitative evidence from local officers suggesting that undocumented migrants were previously difficult to apprehend and prosecute due to legislative loopholes in the Colombian law. The regularization program addressed this gap, ensuring better enforcement of criminal laws. Moreover, documented increments in migrants’ income and con5Ib ́a ̃nez et al. (2024) collected the data in 2021
(monts)|(0.004)|(0.004)|
|**Int**|T4 HihfA|0.016|0.007|
||x egt-or-ge z-score|(0.040)|(0.022)|
||Mean (standard deviation) of dependent variable for the|0.062|0.046|
||control group|(0.242)|(0.210)|
||Joint F-test of Baseline Controls (minus interactions) - p-<br>value|0.314|0.023**|
|||with T2:<br>0.363|0.338|
||Joint F-test of Interactions - p-value|with T3:<br>0.793|0.180|
|||with T4:<br>0.178|0.147|
||Number of observations|2,035<br>2,035|2,120<br>2,120|

Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Cross-sectional OLS regressions using 18- and 36-month attrition data and baseline variables. Regressions are at the child level, standard errors are clustered by CBCC, and sampling weigths are used (at the 18-month follow-up, 42 randomly tracked observations are reweighted and 85 randomly untracked observations are not included). All regressions control for district-bin fixed effects. All test scores and Height-for-Age z-score are standardized by using (weighted) means and standard deviations from the control group at baseline. We replaced the missing values of index variables and Height-for-Age z- score with their (weighted) averages at baseline for the overall sample.

44
|0.0106|0.0043|0.0105|

w.r.t. ≡ with respect to. All ≡ total merchandise exports. Comm. ≡ commodity exports only. All estimated elasticities are statistically different from zero. Source: Calculated using data from UNCTAD database

# 13. **In addition to the sensitivity to international price changes, DRC’s exports appear to**

**be also sensitive to foreign income fluctuations in general.** The sensitivity of the exports to changes in GDP is not surprising, since mineral products which are in general income elastic commodities (Rankin, 2011), heavily dominate DRC’s exports. The supply and demand of these type of commodities are generally elastic to the change in the income of client countries. The first two columns of Table 2 present the estimates of the GDP elasticity of DRC’s exports for each specific market destination (see Annex 1 for a brief note on estimation of elasticity). There is no significant difference between the total merchandise exports elasticity to foreign GDP and of commodity exports elasticity. Indeed, while the former is 1.363, the latter is at 1.357. This is due to the very high share of minerals and commodities in exports, reaching above 90 percent of the

> (uranium); 4001-4006 (rubber); 41 (hides); 4401-4412 (timber, excluding 4402, 4404, 4406); 5101-2110 (wool); 5201 (cotton).

9
mothers with the hope mothers will spend the money more wisely, we randomly selected mothers or fathers to receive the payments. Hence we contribute to the long-standing question on the effects of resources controlled by the mother or the father on a child’s human capital.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the cash transfer pilot program as well as its experimental design and presents some descriptive statistics from the household survey. Section 3 discusses our empirical identification strategy and Section 4 presents main results. Section 5 concludes.

# **2. Burkina Faso Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project**

# _2.1. Program Design_

The pilot cash transfer program was conducted in Nahouri province in southern Burkina Faso, located approximately 100 miles from the capital, Ouagadougou. The 75 villages in Nahouri province that each have a primary school were randomly allocated to the following five groups (see Figure 1, panel A): (i) conditional cash transfers given to the father (CCTF), (ii) conditional cash transfers given to the mother (CCTM), (iii) unconditional cash transfers given to the father (UCTF), (iv) unconditional cash transfers given to the mother (UCTM), and (v) a control group. There were 15 villages in each treatment arm and in the control group. Based on our experience with previous randomized program evaluations in Burkina Faso, as well as qualitative focus groups we conducted in Nahouri province, we believed that transparency in the randomization process was critical for maintaining a household’s participation in the surveys and to guarantee the local authorities’ support. Therefore, the village-level treatment randomization took place during a public meeting in the Nahouri provincial capital in which each village was represented by their local leaders.

Özler (2011) also report results from a randomized experiment in Malawi comparing conditional and unconditional cash transfers, but their target population are adolescent girls and they mainly focus on education outcomes.

5
*|0.2157***|
||**|**|||
||11.24|8.42|7.8|9.86|
|1 if year 2004; 0 otherwise|0.3368*|0.3367*|0.3385***|0.33537***|
||**|**|||
||36.4|35.88|35.18|44.92|
|1 if year 2006; 0 otherwise|0.6360*<br>**|0.6387*<br>**|0.6458***|0.64451***|
||69.34|67.54|67.28|88.39|
|**Constant**|7.5505*|7.6402*|7.8854***|7.0465***|
||**|**|||
||95.01|94.78|86.6|67.38|
|r2/ln L|0.57|0.57|0.58|‐23,761.1|
|F|481.45|404.4|359.8||
|N|46985|46985|46985|47,167|

Pooled VHLSS data from 2002, 2004 and 2006. Drought if 20% below annual median rainfall; excess rainfall if > 300 mm in 5 consecutive days at least once in a year; flooding recorded in Darthmouth Flood Observatory and within 2 m elevation difference from river or coast; hurricane force winds if wind 65 knots (118 km/hour) or more.

ln(hours) from 500k city are in effect the ln(1+ tenths of hours) from 500k city with tenths of hours being 6 minute periods
# _Impact heterogeneity and stated demand_

We now turn to studying whether targeting these interventions on observed baseline characteristics would have resulted in higher returns. First, to analyze potential returns to targeting on demand, we use a set of questions from the baseline survey asking households to state their demands for different types of programs. Households were asked in an open question which type of intervention they would prefer in order to increase their incomes. In this open question, none of the households asked for training. About 30% expressed spontaneous demand for credit, indicating a potential liquidity constraint limiting productive investments which the grant could address (Table 2). The majority of households (55%) expressed spontaneous demand for temporary unskilled employment in public works, such as cash-forwork programs. This likely reflects more severe cash constraints, suggesting need for cash for daily expenditures, rather than productive investments. In a following question, households were asked specifically for their interest in training. They were also asked to indicate their preference between the income generating intervention they had stated first (in the open question), and the training option they had mentioned when probed. Almost half of households stated they were indifferent between both options, while 38% preferred training. Among those, only 13% preferred non-agricultural training. Overall, these patterns seem to indicate weak demand for liquidity for investment in business development and for training in skills for nonagricultural employment. Table 2 further shows that stated demand differs significantly between the poor and the non-poor, with the poor less likely to ask for credit or agricultural training, and more likely to ask for cash-for-work programs or to be indifferent.

We use this stated demand to analyze whether returns to grants or training are higher for households with preferences for those interventions. In particular, since spontaneous demand for credit suggests households perceive cash constraints for productive investments, we analyze whether the returns to the cash grants are higher for households stating such demand. We also show heterogeneity by demand for the cash-for-work program. Similarly, we analyze whether returns to
Policy Research Working Paper 10255

# **Abstract**

The assignment of social programmes to their target population, known as targeting, is key to effective policy implementation. Proxy means testing is a widely used targeting approach where means testing is infeasible due to economic informality. This paper proposes a novel, practically feasible assessment approach that aims to reduce average proxy means test data collection costs, or allow more extensive data collection within a given resource envelope. Combining variable selection and prediction intervals, it develops a household-level truncated early stopping algorithm, which can reduce average interview length while maintaining predictive accuracy close to a standard proxy means test baseline. Applying the approach to Indonesian data, simulation of a 40 percent population coverage programme shows that targeting questionnaires could be shortened by 61 percent while maintaining PMT-level accuracy. A case study of a large health insurance programme in an urban area suggests that the share of intended beneficiaries who are among the targeted population can potentially be increased from 65.6 percent to 78.3 percent if enumerators conducted more of the shorter surveys that the truncated early stopping algorithm generates.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at email@ timohlenburg.com, jpinxten@worldbank.org, d.fricke@ucl.ac.uk, and f.caccioli@ucl.ac.uk.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely
dominant among low‐income households. By contrast, in Ethiopia, the share fell markedly in the top quintile, meaning shared meters were, unexpectedly, most common among the top quintile. To the extent that progressive tariffs are intended to help the poor, shared meters among the richest 20 percent do not defeat the purpose of progressive tariff design.

Perhaps not surprisingly, in Senegal—which does not charge the connection fee if a household is within 40 meters of the nearest power line—a much lower percentage reported not having a contract with the utility and paying their neighbors instead. The actual percentage of households with shared meters depends on the assumption about how many households are connected to a single meter on average, with the highest percentage of shared meters corresponding to only two households per meter. If only two households are assumed to be connected to the same meter on average, then 84 percent of households would have had their own meters. This percentage was lowest in the bottom quintile, 53 percent, and highest in the top two quintiles, 90–91 percent. If three households are connected to a meter on average, the percentage increases to 88 percent of all households having their own individual meters.

If there is only one distribution company and the number of residential consumers is separately reported by that company, comparison of the number of households connected to the grid found in the survey and the number of residential customers reported by the utility gives another indication of the prevalence of multiple connections. Such comparison is possible only in Malawi, where the utility data are available for the survey year. If every shared meter is assumed to be connected to two households, the percentage of grid‐connected households with their own unshared meters is 57 percent. If more than two households are connected, this percentage increases, for example to 68 percent if three households on average are connected to a single shared meter.
ratio between firms' profits after taxes over total assets. Finally, we also include a variable that reflects the production mix. This is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is a producer of tradable goods, and zero otherwise. Tradable producers have the capacity to generate revenues in foreign exchange; thus, they might be able to obtain different kinds of financing.

The variables in the second category measure the effects of expanding the financing opportunities through access to international bond and equity markets. The variable capturing access to international bond markets is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for periods in which a given firm issues bonds in international capital markets, and zero otherwise.<sup>9</sup> The variable capturing access to international equity markets is defined as the monthly average of the proportion of equity traded in international markets relative to the total value traded for that firm in each year. This variable takes a value of zero for firms without access to international equity markets.

The third category involves macroeconomic factors that affect firms' financing. These factors include three variables. The first one captures financial liberalization. This variable is key in the paper, since it shows the effect of economic liberalization on financial structure. We work with the index of financial liberalization created **by** Kaminsky and Schmukler **(1999).** The index is an average of several indicators of financial liberalization in the economy. These indicators include liberalization of the domestic financial sector, as well as removals of restrictions on foreign borrowing and transactions in foreign currency. High values of the index reflect high degree of financial liberalization. The index reflects sharp liberalization processes in the following years for each country:

> **9** Notice that the variable takes a value of one only for the period in which a firm issues international debt.

11
- 5 -

Yet evaluation of outcomes has been weakly supported. Only 08% of the project components studied by Verspoor supported the development of testing systems. In a review of 76 World Bank investments in vocational education and training, Middleton and Demsky (1988) found the same low level of attention to examination and certification processes, and to assessment of the employment outcomes of training. In general, this lack of attention to assessing educational and economic outcomes is a clear indicator of low levels of investment in the development of permanent evaluation capacity, by Borrowers and the Bank alike.

# Monitoring and Evaluation in Projects: Design and Achievements

To gain more specific insight into the design of Bank support for monitoring and evaluation (both for projects and for broader system capacity), a sample of ongoing and completed projects was studied. Current design practice was identified through a review of the 16 project appraisal reports approved in FY85-86. The design and effectiveness of past investments were assessed through an analysis of the appraisal reports and project evaluations for the 17 education sector projects completed in the same period.<sup>2</sup> / The review of investment design in completed and ongoing projects indicates increasing attention to the design of project monitoring systems at the appraisal stage. Evaluation of outcomes, however, has received very little attention. Tihe data suggest that efforts to build Borrower capacity for system-wide M&E may be declining.

The record of success in completed projects has been very weak for project monitoring and evaluation as well as for the development of system capacity. Reasons include inappropriate designs, and lack of the policy and incentive support that might overcome Borrower reluctance to support monitoring and evaluation efforts.

# Recent and Past Practice in M&E Design

This component of the analysis focused on the design of support both for project monitoring and evaluation and for the development of system capacity in both ongoing and completed projects. The basic question was whether or not provision was made for project monitoring and evaluation, development of M&E capacity, or
EU related’ countries in 2004 (in US dollars)_

<!-- Start of picture text --> 948<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 620<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 422<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> 352 343<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: IMF Balance of Payments database.

Trade in services plays, however, much more important role in Turkey’s trade than per capita statistics would indicate. The share of services in total trade was 18 percent in 2004, which is well above this share in trade of most other “EU-related’ European economies. Albania (41%), Croatia (35%), Estonia (25%) and Latvia (20%) had a higher share of services in total trade.

# **_D._** _Reorientation of foreign trade away from Middle East towards Pan-European markets_

A very significant reorientation of Turkey’s foreign trade towards the EU did not occur after entry into force of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement on 1 January 1996 but much earlier. In fact, 1996 marked historically the highest share of the EU-15 in Turkey’s total trade turnover. The striking feature of Turkey’s dynamics in geographical pattern of foreign trade has been the stability in the share of the EU-25 in total trade turnover since 1996. Interestingly, the
rate decreases around 3 percentage points.

We calculate four complementary indicators that measure the efficacy and efficiency of _direct transfers_ in reducing poverty ( **Table 5** ). First, the vertical expenditure efficiency measures the percentage of transfers that go to the poor: the index is 46.5 percent when using the official poverty line. Secondly, the spillover index measures how much of the transfers received by the poor population are above the strictly necessary to cover their basic needs (i.e. bringing them out of poverty). If we use the threshold set by the official line, the spillover effect is 21.3 percent. Finally, we report the poverty reduction efficiency and the poverty gap reduction efficiency. The 20 Welfare and poverty analysis in Uruguay, as in most countries in Latin America, uses an income-based welfare aggregate. Official estimations of poverty are carried out by the National Institute of Statistics ( _Instituto Nacional de Estadística_ – INE) and updated annually with the information captured in the Continuous Household Survey ( _Encuesta Continua de Hogares_ ). A household is considered poor if the sum of a series of income sources of all its members do not allow them to purchase a basket of basic goods and services (i.e. food and non-food items) that are deemed to be a minimum required to enjoy a decent living. The average official poverty line is roughly equivalent to US$ 10.67 (2011 PPP) per person per day and higher than the US$5.5 typically used by the World Bank for upper-middle income economies. The official poverty rate for 2017 was 7.9 percent. There are major conceptual differences between the methodology used by INE to calculate the official households’ welfare measure (i.e. total household income) to measure poverty and the CEQ income concepts that will lead to differences in the estimated poverty rate. The CEQ analysis presented here is not intended to replicate the official poverty measurement methodology, but to show how government interventions affect the purchasing power of households
The only paper to our knowledge which explores managerial practices within public agencies delivers highly policy relevant results worth further exploring in other contexts (Rasul & Rogger, 2015). Using a survey of Nigerian civil servants, bureaucratic autonomy and the use of incentives/monitoring within agencies has been established and linked to project performance in the social sector. Surprisingly, 1 standard deviation increase in bureaucrats’ self-reported discretion led to 18% higher project completion rate whereas one standard deviation increase in the use of incentives/monitoring resulted in 14% lower project completion rate. Project complexity, ambiguous project design, and organizational IT facilities mediated these observed relationships. While the findings cannot be interpreted as causal, they do point at the significant and non-trivial impact of public sector management practices on value for money and corruption.

Overall, the limited evidence on the role discretion and rule-bound decision making play in producing public procurement outcomes calls for significantly more research. First, the impact of different procedure types clearly varies with contract as well as organizational characteristics which need to be more directly addressed if seemingly contradictory findings are to be reconciled. Second, the black box of bureaucracies must be opened if we are to understand procurement outcomes, for example analyzing the impact of diverse management practices, politicization of the bureaucracy, and organizational control mechanisms could lead to policy advice with high impact.

# 4. <u>Audits and supervision</u>

# _a) Theory_

Our discussion of audits and supervision is restricted to those specifically designed for public procurement rather than broader processes such as financial audits concerning entire public organizations (for the discussion of such broader institutions’ impact see section C.2). Audits and supervision can be carried out by any organ of the state which is to some degree independent of the contracting body, that is we focus on horizontal accountability mechanisms.

Audits and monitoring by higher-level or independent state organs are expected to increase the risk of detecting misconduct, corruption in particular, and the threat of punishment as a result. Increased risk of punishment