rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
sup>9</sup> Any policy should, however, be directed towards increasing productivity in these units rather than artificially maintaining unproductive ones in operation.

Input utilization, especially of labor, has been slow to react; this implies lower factor productivity or, alternatively, higher real costs per unit of output.<sup>**10**</sup> The private sector survey showed that the median firm decreased its sales by 29 percent<sup>11</sup> , while employment fell only by 5.6 percent. Hence, while output (measured by sales) fell quickly, employment has been slow to adjust, and the capital stock remains fixed, increasing the cost per unit of output. The fall in measured productivity resulting from external shocks has been documented before. For instance, Calvo et al. (2006) documented it in countries that suffered sudden stops in capital flows.<sup>12</sup>

> 9 El Mahdi and Rasheed estimate that 39 percent of total employment is in SMEs, or enterprises with fewer than 50 workers.

> 10 Harberger (2005) uses interchangeably the terms "productivity growth" and "real cost reduction" (RCR), arguing that growth and production take place at the enterprise level and that the second term is better understood by entrepreneurs.

> 11

> This figure drops to 20 percent when sales-weighted results are considered. Inventories increased moderately by 4 percent, hence the drop in sales implies a fall in output.

> 12 Other studies are: Conesa _et al._ (2007) studied the case of Finland after the collapses of its major trading partner, the Soviet Union. Also, Bergoeing _et al._ analyzed the case of Chile and Mexico after the interest-rate shock of the 1980s.

17
br>Seeds only taken into account<br>if they were bought.<br>MLI: all seeds are assumed to<br>be purchased (no question<br>asking for the quantity<br>purchased). This might lead to<br>an underestimation of seed<br>prices as a portion may be<br>obtained for free as gifts or<br>leftover from the previous<br>season.<br>UGA: all seeds are assumed<br>to be purchased (no question<br>asking for the quantity<br>purchased). This might lead to<br>an underestimation of seed<br>prices as a portion may be<br>obtained for free as gifts or<br>leftover from the previous<br>season. In w1 w2, w3 no<br>question asking for the<br>quantity of seeds used, only<br>value. Median prices could<br>therefore not be computed,<br>and seed values are taken as<br>they are reported. Seeds only|Summed up to the plot level in the<br>plot dataset|

27
biased nature of the data. It is restricted in the sense that it doesn’t cover trade between all the bilateral region pairs. Rather, it only contains flows from regions where exporters and importers are situated to regions where ports are. Being based on shipments of exporting firms could bias estimates of trade costs as these firms are more productive than non-exporting firms. Under the assumption that regional distribution of exporters is not endogenous, one can still identify relative trade costs across regions. Since this may be the only data source available for many countries, it is still a useful venue for researchers to pursue. Recent examples are Van Leemput (2021) for India, Cosar and Demir (2016) for Turkey, Baldomero-Quintana (2020) for Colombia and Fan, Lu and Luo (2021) for China.

More recently, a number of countries have made available administrative databases that contain information about firm-to-firm transactions. While such transactions are not direct evidence for cargo shipments—even if they were related to freight, they do not contain information about the characteristics of the goods involved—they inform researchers about trade flows between locations. Such links can be very granular if the addresses of firms or establishments are also observed. Otherwise, they can be aggregated to a regional level to create an internal trade flow matrix. In a recent application using Turkish data, Coşar et al. (2021) estimate the impact of road capacity (i.e., lanes) and quality improvements. According to their results, a one-hour reduction in travel time between two districts increases bilateral trade between those districts by around 8.2 percent. This effect translates into an almost 1 million USD increase in trade flows for a typical supplier district over 10 years. If two districts were not trading prior to the road investment program, a one-hour travel time reduction increases the probability that they will start doing so by 11 percent.

In estimating the elasticity of transport costs to travel distances, a threat to identification arises from the fact that travel distances emanate
**Figure 2: Passport Costs and Per Capita Income**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 4 6 8 10 12<br>Log GDP per capita<br>Log Cost of a Passport OLS line<br>6<br>5<br>4<br>3<br>Log Cost (US$)<br>2<br>1<br><!-- End of picture text --> One might expect high passport costs to have much less affect on ability to migrate in high-income countries than in low-income countries. In particular, the cost of a passport relative to income may determine whether individuals are able to migrate or not. We therefore standardize passport costs by per capita Gross National Income in 2004, taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.<sup>7</sup> Table 2 then lists the 23 countries in our sample in which a passport costs 5 percent or more of annual per capita income. The most expensive passport relative to income occurs in the Democratic

> 7 2003 GNI data was used for a few countries where 2004 GNI was not available.

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not available<sup>10</sup> ; it is thus unknown which share of the full value of the property to apply. In order to obtain a tentative estimate of the value of the use rights to be subtracted from the full value of these properties, and then from the wealth of these households, we will resort to some imputations based on different hypotheses, to test the robustness of our results.

# **4. Taking account of use rights in Italy**

As recalled earlier, standard household wealth estimates do not include use rights. According to our approach, this implies an underestimate of the wealth for those households who live in usufruct and an overestimate for the households who grant usufruct rights to others. Some evidence on the need to assign a wealth value to the use rights based on SHIW data is provided in Appendix B.

Using data from SHIW we can estimate both cases in several waves (1991, and from 2004 to 2016). However, as explained before, information on the age of the usufructuary is available only when the interviewed household is the usufructuary and not when he is the bare owner. For such cases we have assumed (H1) that the usufructuary is 25 years older than the corresponding bare owner, being this the approximate age gap between fathers and sons. This situation approximately corresponds to that of a parent who transfers bare ownership to their child, retaining usufruct. A similar age gap could also be the case of an elderly person who, perhaps in the absence of heirs, sells bare ownership of the house of residence to ensure a more comfortable old age while retaining the right to live there for free.

As we have seen in the previous section, partial support for this hypothesis is offered by the interviewed usufructuaries that, when asked about the bare owners of the homes they occupy, most of the times indicate their children, with a share little below 50 percent (Table A3, top panel). However, in one-third of the cases the relationship
line with other countries for which data are available, the highest contribution is explained by highest relative size of the pensions in Moldova comparing to other countries. Social contributions also have the highest equalizing effect in Moldova and direct transfers are the second highest after Ukraine (</mark> Figure 1 <mark>3). Indirect taxes have the highest negative marginal contributions to inequality reduction (they actually increase inequality in Moldova more than in other countries (F</mark> igure 1 <mark>3). In terms of progressivity, most interventions are similar in Moldova, Belarus, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, however the indirect taxes are most regressive in Moldova (F</mark> igure 14).

**Figure 13. Marginal contributions to inequality reduction in Moldova and peers, percentage points.**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 14<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>4<br>2<br>0<br>-2<br>-4<br>SSC Direct Taxes Pensions Direct Transfers Indirect Taxes Indirect In-kind Health In-kind<br>Subsidies Education<br>Belarus Moldova Romania Russia Ukraine<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Some numbers on this chart are estimated using backward calculations from the original source and might be not fully precise. Source: authors’ calculations using HLCS-2016 data for Ukraine and respective CEQ analysis for other countries: Belarus – Bornukova et al., 2017; Poland - <mark>Goraus and Inchauste, 2016; Russia – Popova et al., 2018.</mark> 27
additional countries for which S and R* are available (but not IP*). For the other 21 countries, they are insufficient in either S or R*. Since we wish to analyze the responses of exchange rates and interest rates, we keep the former 34 countries in a “Partial” analysis which investigates S and R* responses in models without IP*. We drop the other 21 countries. This selection produces a broader sample of 78 countries, 34 of which we are unable to control for output. See Table A2 for details.

# **2.2 Monetary Policy Shocks and Econometric Methodology**

As our baseline measure of U.S. monetary policy shocks, we use the policy news shock (NS shock) of Nakamura & Steinsson (2018).<sup>8</sup> As highlighted by Nakamura & Steinsson (2018), the NS shock is similar to the “path factor” in Gurkayanak et al. (2005). It contains an information component that alters private-sector beliefs in non-monetary fundamentals, in contrast with the implications of standard New Keynesian model featured by price rigidity. To check robustness, we consider two alternative measures: the “unified measure” of Bu, Rogers & Wu (2021) (BRW shock) and the forward guidance shock (SS-FG shock) of Swanson (2021). The BRW shock is derived from a two-step, partial-least squares estimation using daily interest rate data across a wide spectrum of maturities. It has three appealing features, which together distinguish it from other shock series in the literature. First, by using the full maturity spectrum of interest rates, this series is able to stably bridge periods of conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Second, the shock is largely devoid of the central bank information effect, the notion that monetary policy announcements also reveal information regarding the central bank’s future macroeconomic outlook (Nakamura & Steinsson 2018). Finally, the Bu, Rogers & Wu (2021) monetary policy shock series is
professional secondary education, college, and university without taking enrollment examination in order to train public officials according to the tasks, job positions, and payroll norms; to train public employees according to working demand, job positions, professional title standards, and salary fund of public administration units for areas meeting with extraordinary socio-economic difficulties and ethnic minorities with no or few officials of college, university, or professional secondary education degrees.” Given the above definition, “nomination quotas” in the context of Article 90.2 of Law on Education 2005 means the maximum number of students who may be enrolled into professional secondary education, college and university without taking an enrollment examination, which the State sets aside for an ethnic minority.

54 Education Law (2005), art. 90 para 1.

55 Education Law (2005), art. 61.

56 “Action Plan for Implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria (2012–2020) and the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015,” http://www.romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9305_file2_bg-action-plan-updated.pdf.

57 See art. 35, para. 1 and 3, Protection Against Discrimination Act, Bulgaria; and art. 8 and art. 12, para. 3, General Education Law, Mexico.

58 Bulgaria recently enacted the new Primary and Secondary Education Act. The law entered into force on August 1, 2016, and includes provisions for the protection of LGBTI individuals in education.

59 See the International Labour Organization NATLEX database, which contains national laws regarding equal opportunity in employment and occupation, including specific laws on ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples, at http://www.ilo.org/natlex. See also OECD (2008) and ILO (2015).

Anti-Discrimination Law and Shared Prosperity 19
). The same applies for ‘Traveling and commuting’. Therefore, predicting some time use activities using physical activity sensor signal data can be more difficult than other, more exclusive activities like ‘Fetching water’, ‘Watching TV’, or ‘Resting’.

All these limitations can affect the performance of machine learning models. This study therefore also aims to assess the extent to which broadly grouped activities can be predicted using sensor signal data from wearable devices in combination with background information like age, gender, and the time of day.

# **3 Methods**

To achieve the goal of predicting time use activities using real-time physical activity sensor data, we leverage the power of machine learning techniques. In the past ‘vector magnitude’ methods have been employed to objectively gauge the intensity of physical activity from accelerometer data in large datasets (e.g., Mannini et al., 2013; Doherty et al., 2017; Menai et al., 2018; Kapteyn et al., 2018). More recent studies also employ machine learning methods in large scale accelerometer datasets to objectively measure specific activities (Willetts et al., 2018; Sundararajan et al., 2021; Nunavath et al, 2021; Pfeiffer et al., 2022), demonstrating the broad applicability of such methods.

Some of these studies effectively used machine learning techniques in similar contexts. For example, Willets et al. (2018) conducted an extensive study on 24-hour level physical activity on 96,220 UK Biobank participants. Utilizing a Random Forest machine learning algorithm trained on data from 132 adults, they were able to classify six distinct activities based on accelerometer data, which are bicycling, sitting/standing, walking, driving, sleeping, and mixed activities. Impressively, their model achieved an average prediction accuracy of 87 percent. Furthermore, their research highlighted variations in activity patterns on an hourly, daily, and seasonal basis among adults aged 45 to 79. In a more recent study, Sundararajan et al. (
Samir Jahjah (2003), “Are Migrant remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development”, Working Paper WP/03/189, International Monetary Fund.

Chami, Ralph, Ekkehard Ernst, Connel Fullenkamp and Anne Oeking (2018), “Are Remittances Good fpr Labor Markets in LICs, MICs and Fragile States? Evidence from CrossCountry Data”, Working Paper WP/18/102.

Chowdhury, Murshed (2016), “Financial Development, Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence Using a Dynamic Panel Estimation”, _The Journal of applied Economic Research_ , 10: 1, pp35-54.

Drinkwater, Stephen. Paul Levine and Emanuela Lotti (2003), “The Labor Market Effects of Remittances”, FLOWENLA Discussion Paper 6.

Felipe, Jesus; Kumar, Utsav (2011) : Unit labor costs in the eurozone, Working Paper, No. 651, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY Gazi, Hassan M. and Mark J. Holmes (2013), “Remittances and the real effective exchange rate”, _Applied Economics_ , Vol 45, Issue 35, pp4959-4970.

Golub, Stephen S., Janet Ceglowski, Ahmadou aly Mbaye and Varun Prasad (2017), “Can Africa compete with China in manufacturing? The role of relative unit labor costs”, _The World Economy_ , 2017;00:1–21. <u>https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12603</u> 23
period, while average profits are always below 30,000 dinars.

Each year, approximately 20% of firms report non-missing revenue from exports in their tax declarations, and those firms have average export revenue of 500,000 dinars. When we consider export value from customs data, the share of firms with non-missing values is much smaller at less than 10%, and the average export values are much larger at 3 million - 4 million dinars. The reason for that large discrepancy is in large part because customs data only includes the export of goods, while tax data also includes – revenue from the export of services an important component of the offshore sector in particular, as we document below. When we compare total aggregates of both export measures in our sample (see Table A3), they are often within 10-15% of each other. We also observe that total exports are extremely concentrated in a small number of firms, mostly manufacturers, and for those the yearly values declared from both sources are often very similar. We return to these discrepancies when we estimate the impacts of the reform below, since using customs data as an outcome will exclude exports from a large share of firms.

11
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Like efficiency, postal trust is correlated with income, suggesting that it may be difficult for developing countries to greatly increase trust in the postal network. For those countries that do manage to improve trust, however (perhaps through institutional reform), the payoff may be high. One possible avenue suggested by the strong positive correlation between letters/staff and trust, is to reduce over-staffing in the postal network. It is worth noting that it appears efficiency and high quality of service are _positively_ related. Countries with low postal efficiency in the postal system (an index of below 0) average a trust score of 3.62, compared to countries with high efficiency index (above 0) which average 4.97. In other words, at least at first examination, there does not appear to be a necessary efficiency-quality trade-off—instead, it is possible that greater efficiency can drive improvements in both variables.<sup>22</sup> Regarding the impact of incumbent reform on efficiency and letters per capita, countries where no secondary post office is staffed by people outside the postal administration score an average of -0.43 on the performance index, while those with at least one such office score an average of 0.17. Having said that, the link appears statistically weak. There are at least two possible reasons for these results. There are significant data weaknesses. The measure of “percentage of offices that are privately staffed” is also only a crude and partial indicator of sector reform.<sup>23</sup> Second, it may be that the indicator does not capture what is important as part of a successful reform agenda. The case studies in Walsh (2001) covering Argentina, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago suggest that privatization without successful regulation (Argentina) can produce worse results than corporatization and various types of management contract (Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago). An important factor behind increasing the letter flow of the incumbent captured in UPU statistics may be better
# **Figures**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1 - How many countries have legislative frameworks on financial consumer protection?<br>77 77<br>67<br>42<br>General CP law CP law with financial services<br>CP under financial law Other CP legal framework<br>Source: Financial Access Database<br>Figure 2 - Enforcement mechanisms are lacking in many countries<br>>=1 disclosure option at opening<br>>=1 fair treatment option<br>Dispute resolution mechanism<br>Unit for CP<br>0 50 100 150<br>Number of Countries<br>Source: Financial Access Database<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Number of Countries<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> 21
Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to determine the prevalence of price controls across EMDEs. To help answer the first question, this research contributes to the literature on price controls by presenting the findings from a new data set covering an almost complete set of EMDEs. This data set extracts the list of products subject to price controls from the latest available Trade Policy Reviews for each EMDE member country of the World Trade Organization. This list of products is compiled using existing legislation and additional material provided by country authorities. The data set provides a rough view of the prevalence of price control measures across countries. When combined with detailed information on country-level trade flows, the data set also provides an indication of imports and exports potentially subject to controls.<sup>2</sup> Armed with this data set, this study finds that while price controls are seldom imposed on goods in advanced economies, they are near ubiquitous in EMDEs and LICs in particular.

Second, this study seeks to enumerate the challenges that price controls impose for growth and development and government policies. While they may be introduced with the best intentions to improve social outcomes, available evidence suggests that price controls often undermine growth and development, impose fiscal burdens and can weaken the effectiveness of monetary policy. At least in part, this is because price controls cause a shift in consumption towards the subsidized good, and away from other non-subsidized goods. Moreover, when there are trend increases in international prices, or when they interact with barriers to entry, price control measures frequently morph into distortive subsidy regimes. Important social, fiscal and environmental costs are likely to follow, as well as adverse consequences for investment and employment, and productivity growth.

# **2. Use of price controls**

# **_Price controls on goods and services_**

Price controls are widely employed across advanced economies and EMDEs. They tend to be much more pervasive in EMDEs than in advanced economies, especially so for energy and food-related goods (Figure 1.A).
Results from regressions in table 8 allow us to explore if reservation increased women’s demand for work as well as their income and bargaining power. As one would expect if reservation relaxes constraints to female labor supply, it triggers significant lagged increases of women’s individual income, estimated to have increased by some 78% and females’ (but not males’) demand for work by some 16 percentage points. Although not available for the entire sample, data on intra-household bargaining power support the notion of a role-model effect of reservation having, with a lag, led to higher levels of female autonomy: The share of women who participate in decision-making on food, health, and education is estimated to have increased by 16, 14, and 7 percentage points, respectively.

We conclude that, beyond improving supply of jobs that are suitable and attractive for females, reservation enhanced female decision-making autonomy and their potential and actual participation in the labor force. A possible interpretation of the above evidence is that the role model effect provided by past female leaders enhanced women’s ability to take advantage of changes in the availability of jobs, including those made available via NREGs, available to everybody.

# **5. Conclusion and policy implications**

Motivated by the recent decline of female labor force participation in India, this paper explores if random reservation of political leadership positions for women affects women’s labor force participation as well as supply- and demand-related factors. While there is no contemporaneous effect, past leadership reservation for women significantly increased females labor supply by allowing individuals to join the labor force and increasing the amount of time spent working by those already in work.

While large part of the observed effects is attributable to females’ improved ability to take advantage of public workfare under NREGS, female participation in non-NREGS labor markets (especially nonagricultural casual and self-employment) expands as well. Estimated effects are stronger for married than for unmarried women. Labor force participation allows women to obtain higher levels of individual income, increases their demand for