rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
to select beneficiaries. We know from MAFC administrative data that all agro-dealers claimed to the partner bank NMB that _all_ of the vouchers distributed in 2010/11 had been redeemed, and so there is a discrepancy between the number of inputs that beneficiaries purchased with vouchers, and the number of vouchers claimed by agro-dealers for payment (see Section A.2 of the Online Appendix for details of the process that agro-dealers followed to redeem the vouchers collected from beneficiaries). This suggests that agro-dealers either forced farmers to sign and turn over all three vouchers while only selling two of the three inputs on average, or agro-dealers allowed the face value of one voucher to be used as top-up for the purchase of the two inputs. For example, for the purchase of urea, the farmer would hand out the urea and DAP voucher and use all or part of the face value of the DAP voucher towards payment of the urea top-up.

We also checked whether the quantity of inputs purchased with vouchers corresponds to the package designed by MAFC and find that it is the case. That is, for each input purchased, farmers bought the amount stipulated by the program (enough for 1 acre of land), but they only purchased two of the three inputs, on average, even though agro-dealers claimed that farmers had redeemed all three vouchers.

Column 4 of Table 4 reports satisfaction with the selection process of beneficiaries. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent reported being very satisfied with the selection of voucher beneficiaries in 2010/11. We find that, unsurprisingly, beneficiaries are 16 percentage points more likely to report being satisfied with the selection process compared to non-beneficiaries. Interestingly, nonbeneficiaries in lottery villages are 11 percentage points more likely to report being satisfied with the selection process than non-beneficiaries in non-lottery villages (an increase of 18 percent from a base of 62 percent). In fact, in lottery villages there is no difference in satisfaction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (p-value is 0.396). Arguably, respondents in lottery villages may think
Policy Research Working Paper 10671

# **Abstract**

Healthy diets have been characterized as responding to four universal principles—nutrient adequacy, dietary diversity, macronutrient balance, and moderation. With rising incomes, diet concerns globally have shifted from inadequacy of nutrients and lack of diversity, to lack of balance and moderation. This has occurred alongside declining rates of stunting and wasting in children under five and increasing rates of overweight and obesity across a broad age span. Calculations undertaken for low- and middle-income countries for policy and advocacy purposes of the economic cost of unhealthy diets have used nutritional status as a proxy or have made estimates of the impact of noncommunicable diseases by simply adding up known risks of individual diet factors. Both these methods have problems. This paper proposes a new methodology, taking advantage of recent, more holistic, measures of diet quality. Preliminary regression results are presented using cross-country data and the Global Dietary Recommendations Score and Minimum Dietary Diversity for women. The results suggest that diet quality variables generally have the expected signs, but there are also clear limitations of using cross-country data. The methodology could be applied in future to a limited number of broadly representative low- and middle-income countries data sets containing both diet recall data as well as measures of noncommunicable disease risk status. The analysis suggests that this work could inform policies such as the repurposing of existing agrifood policies to complement existing public health policies, to reduce the economic and health burdens imposed by unhealthy diets.

This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Food Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at sehotrton@uwaterloo.ca.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series
1990<sup>4</sup> ). This definition accounts for both protection on the product side that might increase gross revenues, as well protection on the input side that might increase costs. The following algebraic presentation is meant to arrive at a final, practical equation for the calculation of ERPs from observed cost-share data and applied tariffs (and where available ad valorem equivalents of NTBs).

_a. Deriving the basic ERP formula_

> The observed value added in some industry g, VA g , is defined as gross revenues less the costs of tradable inputs; and this net is therefore the fund available for payments to non-tradable inputs (labor and capital) used in the industry. Gross revenues in industry g, R g , are simply the quantity produced of the good, yg , sold at its domestic price, which is the unprotected price, pg , (referred to as the border price) adjusted by the ad

> valorem equivalent of domestic protection, 1(  t g ) , and any net subsidies per unit of

> output, (1  sg ) ; that is, value added at exchange prices might be less to the degree subsidies are positive (a negative subsidy would be a tax). The tariff could be the “formal” as stated in the tariff schedules, and should be distinguished from the nominal tariff rate (or nominal rate of protection) usually defined as the ad valorem equivalent of tariffs and non-tariff barriers expressed in relation to the CIF price of imports.<sup>5</sup> (In addition, the two tariffs differ if the formal rate is applied to FOB prices, as some

> countries do.) In what follows the tariff adjustment factors (1 <sup>_t_</sup> _i_ ) includes the formal applied tariffs on output and inputs and the ad valorem tariff equivalents due to NTBs. Annex 3 discusses the estimation of the additional component of the ti’s due to NTBs.

The costs of tradable inputs are similarly
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Total 68 78 _Source_ : Global Findex database.

# _Use of Mobile Phones or the Internet for Financial Services_

Along with advancements in digital technologies, mobile phones and the Internet increasingly offer an alternative to debit and credit cards for making direct payments from an account. Globally, in high‐ income economies, 51 percent of adults (55 percent of account owners) reported making at least one financial transaction the previous year using a mobile phone or the Internet. In developing economies, the average share was much lower, at 19 percent of adults (30 percent of account owners).

There is wide variation among the developing economies in ECA in the use of mobile phones or the Internet to access accounts (figure 7). In the South Caucasus, more than 20 percent of adults in Armenia reported having used a mobile phone or the Internet to make payments; the share is much lower in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In Central Asia, more than 30 percent of adults reported doing so in Kazakhstan; the share is much lower in other Central Asian countries. In Eastern Europe, 40 percent of adults in Belarus use mobile or online payments, a larger share than in Moldova or Ukraine. In Central Europe, Croatia stands at with 38 percent. The use of mobile and online payment is also high in Turkey (40 percent) and Russia (44 percent).

16
administrative/discretionary measures. A few municipalities and states have moved away from this system to establish a more transparent method based on tangible items such as location, land use, area among other things. Andra Pradesh uses sample surveys of prevailing market rents for different categories of properties (Mathur, 2001).

The point is that much variation can be maintained to take account of differences in values and economic needs while trading to enhance welfare. By extrapolation, the presumption is that as other countries integrate (foster flows of goods and services across borders), they too will be able to maintain their institutional diversity.

At this stage one might ask what the evidence says about the effect of institutional differences on cross-border flows of goods and services? The available empirical evidence on how certain types of institutions affect trade flows and competitiveness is mixed. It is intuitively obvious that domestic institutions as well as international ones will affect the pattern of trade and are affected by it but it is not obvious whether in affecting a particular flow a single institutional feature would always have more of an effect than others. To be more precise, it is not obvious that labor standards alone would be a determining factors for competitiveness of a country’s exports or that corporate tax rates would always be the determining factor when choosing incorporation in one country versus another.

Rodrik (1997) does find that countries with less expensive labor standards have a comparative advantage in labor intensive products. Freeman (2003) on the other hand, argues that looking at labor standards alone as directing trade flows is misleading. While labor standards may increase labor costs, lower wages, or depreciation may be used to counter the higher costs. Others have found that reducing direct regulations on cross 23
population of the LFS has a similar slope to the increase in the SUTP population from administrative data. The trend in the recent migrant population near the Syrian border is almost identical to the movement in the UNHCR and government numbers.

A caveat to the analysis in this paper is the small sample of foreign-born households in the LFS. In the 2009 survey, there are only 58 foreign-born households, and only three are located near the Syrian Border. Applying sampling weights, these three households represented 1,368 people in the population. By 2013, the number of surveyed foreign households increased substantially to 120, with 34 households in the NSB region. In 2014, the sample of foreign-born almost tripled from the year before and the estimated foreignborn population over the age of 15 reached 1.3 million. One very important change in the survey that cannot be emphasized enough is that the sampling of the LFS changed in 2014. Therefore the population estimates in 2014 are only of the population aged 15 and over. From 2009 to 2013, estimates reflect the entire population. However, estimates of the number of households should not be affected by this sampling change.

Table 6 through Table 9 highlight statistics on host community and foreign-born households and population. An interesting trend is the movement of the local population away from the East. In 2013, 16.6 percent of host community households were located near the Syrian border. This value dropped to 15.7 percent in 2014. The recently (<=4 years in Turkey) arrived foreign households, are also mobile and able to move inland. In 2013, 25.7 percent of recent foreign households were located Near the Syrian Border compared to 22.2 percent in 2014. However, the sampling frame of the LFS also changed in 2014 which might have impacted population trends.

9
# **1. Introduction**

Multilateral trust funds at the World Bank and at other international organizations are increasingly popular with donors of foreign aid. These new funding modalities allow donor governments to cooperate with like‐minded donors only, and to earmark their aid for specific countries, sectors or objectives (as with other bilateral aid), while using the financial and implementation infrastructure of the multilateral organization hosting them.<sup>1</sup> The increasing importance of this “multi‐bi” aid channel raises questions about its distinctiveness in relation to unearmarked multilateral aid and other bilateral aid, particularly with respect to country allocation patterns. Trust funds could potentially undermine the policy‐ and poverty‐selectivity of the World Bank’s IDA (International Development Association) aid, if donors’ earmarked contributions come partly at the expense of their core contributions to IDA, and if trust fund allocations are not sensitive to recipients’ quality of governance or income levels.

In this paper, we exploit a novel and rich data set on World Bank trust fund disbursements from 2002 to 2012 to analyze the determinants of trust fund allocations across countries, differentiating trust funds by type and sector. We specifically compare the policy‐ and poverty‐ selectivity of multi‐bi aid to that of other bilateral aid and of the World Bank’s IDA disbursements. We find that trust funds are similar to IDA, and different from other bilateral aid, in being highly sensitive to recipient’s income and quality of governance. Multi‐bi funds administered by the World Bank thus do not appear to undermine IDA’s allocation criteria, even if donors’ contributions to them partially crowd out their IDA contributions. We leave for future research the question of whether the increase in trust funds has had an impact on core contributions to IDA,<sup>2</sup> their potential effects on other aspects of World Bank operational policies,<sup>3</sup> and the effectiveness of trust funds relative to traditional bilateral
# **1 Introduction**

What social rate of return should public infrastructure projects be required to achieve in Africa? What is the next challenge in the reform of African tax structures? The answers to these questions require knowledge of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). If a project does not yield a social return greater than the MCF, it is not worth having. Holding revenue constant, welfare can be increased by reducing taxes with high MCFs and increasing taxes with low MCFs, so estimates of MCFs provide directions for reform of tax structures.

The central role of the MCF in these important public policy issues is well known. So it is surprising that there are few empirical estimates of MCFs. Table 1 summarizes existing estimates. We know of only three papers in which estimates of the MCF have been derived for developing countries. We know of only one African country, Cameroon, for which the MCF has been estimated. Moreover, for methodological reasons existing estimates are not all truly comparable.

Perhaps the major reason for this relative paucity of MCF estimates has been the amount of data required and the time expense of creating and calibrating the computable general equilibrium (CGE) models used for estimation. CGEs are required because real tax systems are complex, and because it is necessary to take account of multiple interactions within tax systems.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the challenge as we have conceived it is to develop a simple CGE model that can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data, and which can be used to provide consistent estimates comparable across countries. To be useful for tax policy analysis, the model should take account of the major classes of taxes in African countries: taxes on domestic goods, exports, imports, corporate income tax, and personal income tax. On average, in the Sub-Saharan African countries that we examine, these taxes represent respectively 25%, 3%, 35%, 13%, and 14% of tax revenue, with the remaining 10
In other words, new RTAs are not flooding the Egyptian market with new imports that could be competing with domestic production. Imports seem to have a weak connection with wages, informality, and female labor force participation. In the case of wages, the correlation we find is harmful to the manufacturing workers and, depending on the specification, for female workers. The correlation between informality and increasing imports is positive for manufacturing workers, at least in the short term. For women’s labor participation, estimates are less robust.

Two plausible factors limiting trade’s effects on Egyptian labor markets are the size of top importing industries and their capital-intensive nature. On the one hand –and as previously mentioned in Figures 3 and 4–goods from top importing industries are not the same top employer industries in Egypt. Thus, it is possible that we do not observe stark negative effects on labor markets due to the small size of the potential domestic production that would be substituted from increasing imports. In fact, most imported goods in Egypt are not produced domestically anyway, only 15% of imported goods are also exported when analyzing HS codes at the 6-digit level from UN Comtrade's database.

On the other hand, most papers studying the imports-labor market outcomes relationship that find adverse effects of increasing imports focus on labor-intensive and manufacturing industries (Feliciano, 2001; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013). All major imported goods in Egypt are capital intensive, particularly from the machinery, chemical, and mineral –mainly petroleum– industries. Even if imports were substituting for domestic production, since imported goods are not laborintensive, the impact on local labor markets would be low. Further, the total share of employment in the manufacturing industry is close to 10%, suggesting that changes in the local labor market outcomes do not necessarily rely on the latter industry.

Although estimating productivity gains is out of the scope of this study, it is possible that capitalintensive imported goods could be increasing the productivity of labor for Egyptian firms.
social pressure to share. Individuals who know they will be subject to demands from others in their social network can prevent others from claiming their money by spending it preemptively. Rapidly consuming income makes it unavailable to others; it is consistent with signaling a high marginal utility of consumption in a model where income is taxed and redistributed from those with low marginal utility of consumption to high marginal utility of consumption. Goldberg (2010) found support for such a model in an experiment that demonstrated that Malawian cash crop farmers who received money in public settings spent significantly more of that money immediately than farmers who received money in private settings. In this project, we do not have the high-frequency consumption data necessary

> 17 This result is reminiscent of Chandrasekhar et al. (2011), who show in a lab-in-the-field experiment among Indian villagers that savings access does not crowd out transfers to others.

> 18 We cannot shed light on this, however, because our follow-up survey did not ask questions on transfer activity within the study participant’s household. These would be important data to collect in future research.

18
the economic differences appear to persist into 2013, although this may be due to many control areas from Phase I being treated in Phase II. One challenge in detecting economic impacts is the relatively small sample size, which is clustered in communes, such that standard errors are imprecisely estimated.

For early childhood development outcomes, we do not see INDH program impacts. It may take even longer than the number of years from program implementation to 2013 for additional economic impacts and infrastructure to affect human development, but the fairly substantial time span covered makes this unlikely. We are, however, limited in the outcomes we can assess given the available impact evaluation data. We are also limited by the relatively small sample size of children within the survey. Additionally, as is discussed below, challenges in implementing the INDH program may limit the generalizability of these findings to contexts with similar challenges in implementation; greater impacts might be observed with alternative program designs and organization.

# _6.3 Challenges in Implementation of the INDH_

Actual program implementation helped us identify certain obstacles at the local level; coordination between the local and national level may have limited the program’s impact. There is not much decentralization of decision making in the various public sector departments in Morocco, which led to redundancies in investments (World Bank, 2012b). This situation poses two major challenges to improving the impact of the INDH. The first involves the need for rapid, flexible coordination between the local and central authorities in each government department. The second has to do with intersectoral coordination on local projects. Additionally, elite capture may be a problem with the CDD design of the INDH (Bergh, 2012; Economic Social and Environmental Council, 2013; World Bank, 2012b). The sustainability of the INDH projects is often mentioned as one of the challenges to be overcome and may be why we see fade-out of program effects in the results (World Bank, 2012b). This challenge should be fully considered in the selection and approval stage of future projects.

#
(higher levels are associated with lower health safety). To quantify the later, we use the index based on O*NET surveys task descriptions created by Avdiu and Nayyar (2020).

The relationships between these four measures and the share of workers in the labor force who fall into each category are shown in Figure 1 below. For example, 38% of the workers in our sample are considered essential (Measure #1 – blue circle). Similarly, 38% of the workers are able to work from home (Measure #2 – red circle). Some 12 % of these teleworkable and essential jobs overlap, which means 64% of the workers in our sample have “income-safe” jobs (Measure #3 – combined area of blue and red circles). We find that 48% of the jobs do not require face-to-face interaction (black circle). An estimated 15% of these jobs are also essential, and 20% are telework jobs. In total, 17% of all jobs are exposed to health risks (Measure #4 – area of the blue circle that does not overlap with either of the red of black circles). These are the essential jobs that require face-toface interaction but cannot be performed from home via telework. In our sample, 6% of jobs can be considered the “best” jobs with the minimal economic and health risk exposure to COVID-19. That is, they are essential, can be done from home, and do not require face to face interaction. These jobs fall into the overlap of the three circles. By contrast, 17% of the jobs (those outside the three circles) can be considered to have the highest risk level. These jobs are non-essential, cannot be done from home, and require extensive face-to-face interactions.

The measures of income safety by occupation are strongly correlated with the relative task content of those occupations, as shown by the literature (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Autor and Handel, 2013). To calculate