rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
: Inputs - Plot area, total labor, any hired labor dummy, seed quantity, improved variety dummy, inorganic fertilizer quantity, any organic fertilizer dummy; Household - dependency ratio, any HH member has primary education dummy, agricultural asset index; Manager - female dummy, age, primary education dummy; Plot - intercropped dummy, precipitation of wettest month, soil fertility index; Zone fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 _Table A 8_ : Ethiopia - Shock prevalence across different proxies.

||||**Pl**<br>|**anted area loss**<br>||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Round|Any|Drought|Irregular rains|Insects|Animals|Other|
||ESS13|0.13|0.04|0.04|0.01|0.03|0.03|
|Maize|ESS15|0.19|0.11|0.11|0.01|0.03|0.02|
||ESS18|0.17|0.02|0.05|0.03|0.03|0.04|
||ESS13|0.21|0.03|0.13|0.08|0.04|0.02|
|Sorghum|ESS15|0.34|0.21|0.20|0.01|0.03|0.01|
||ESS18|0.25|0.02|0.16|0.01|0.04|0.02|
||||**Plan**<br>|**t productivity loss**
# **6. Conclusion**

This paper analyzed the well-being and characteristics of those subject to forced migration during the recent (ongoing) crisis in Northern Mali. We based our study on a unique micro-data set that used new technologies to collect information in highly risky environments and among a population with relatively high mobility. We provided descriptive statistics on respondents’ welfare over time, their employment status, their wealth, and access to basic services.

In addition to this, we compared refugees, returnees and internally displaced people. We looked at differences between those who were willing to go back to Northern Mali and those who did not want to return, and noted how the decision to return voluntarily reflect the conditions during displacement as well as perceptions about the situation at home. Better conditions during displacement (receipt of assistance; having a job) favor remaining displaced, while the prospect to be reunited with one’s family incentivizes return. Age or gender do not affect the decision to return.

We find that considerations of benefits and costs that affect the decision to return may help shape public policies, aimed at stimulating the voluntary return of displaced people. More support in host communities or refugee camps is likely to reduce the incentive to return; better conditions in the location of origin are likely to stimulate return.

It is important to note, however, that while the decision to return is subject to typical economic incentives of costs and benefits, it is remarkable that over the course of the study few additional households returned. Most displacement was of short duration and most returned prior to our survey. Even though the expressed willingness to return among those who were still displaced was high (more than 90% for refugees and over 80% for displaced people), actual return rates during the 12 months of the study were low for IDPs as well as refugees.

There is another, more sobering policy conclusion that follows from this analysis, namely that most people who remained forcibly displaced at the time of the study are likely to
ZIMBABWE‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE A major issue has been the country‘s rampant inflation causing frequent tariff changes to ICT pricing (POTRAZ 2009). The dollarization of the economy in 2009 brought this to an end by introducing stability to tariffs, which are now expressed in U.S. dollars. Zimbabwe‘s fixed-line and mobile retail pricing is similar to peer averages. Fixed broadband is expensive, almost twice as much as the Sub-Saharan average, which is already high by international standards.

Internet-access penetration in Zimbabwe is average for the southern African region (figure 17). There are no comprehensive official data on the number of Internet users in Zimbabwe, though the Zimbabwe All Media and Products and Services Survey found that 22 percent of urban dwellers aged 15 years and older used the Internet in mid-2010 (Ndlela 2010). This amounts to some 645,000 people or 5.1 of the total population.<sup>11</sup> International connectivity is a challenge for Zimbabwe due to its landlocked situation. Much of Zimbabwe‘s international connectivity has been through satellite. Activities are under way to build out national fiber networks to obtain cross-border connectivity to undersea fiber cable. For example, Powertel, a subsidiary of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, inked an agreement with the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) for supply of international bandwidth via its links to undersea cables (Smarts 2010). Tel-One is building a fiber-optic cable to Mutare on Zimbabwe‘s eastern border where it will connect to a submarine cable in Mozambique ( _Technology Zimbabwe_ , June 24, 2010). Econet is also busy laying a nationwide fiber-optic cable backbone with spurs planned for connection to undersea fiber systems in Mozambique and South Africa (Econet Wireless Zimbabwe 2010). If these initiatives achieve fruition, they would create competing sources of international bandwidth, driving down bandwidth costs and retail broadband prices. Wireless broadband will also create greater competition with Econet having launched 3G and WiMAX<sup>12</sup> networks while Powertel and
on the decrease in trade barriers that can be achieved from a reduction in shipping time and estimated associated decrease in ad‐valorem costs. We now need to account for the fact that trade costs encompassing these other elements. In particular, we assume that total trade costs are defined as follows:

# **Trade Cost = tariff + transport + time cost**

Assuming that both tariff and transportation costs are unchanged, we now compute the decrease in total trade costs that can be expected from the sheer decrease in shipping time and the value of time computed above.

We use data from the latest release of the GTAP database, version 10. One of the main advantages of the GTAP database is the ability to use data related to both tariffs and transport costs at the sectoral level. The complete database contains a total of 57 sectors. In our analysis, we focus on the 47 good sectors and do not consider the remaining 10 service sectors as the value of time and the economic determinants of trade costs for services are very different and outside of the scope of this paper. Moreover, the complete data set also contains information on other macroeconomic variables such as input‐output matrices or sectoral employment and sales, which can be very useful when using our estimates in the context of a lager general equilibrium model that needs to be calibrated.

One of the caveats of using GTAP, however, is the geographical aggregation is less precise than our previous shipping time analysis. The data contain a total of 140 “regions” and an aggregated rest of the world. While this aggregation means that we are decreasing the geographical granularity of our results, it enables us to build trade costs estimates in a consistent way for a large number of countries and sectors.

# **b. Results**

We now present the key results of the impact of BRI related transport projects on trade costs based on the global database. Compared to the figures presented in Section 3, which related to changes in shipping 23
data scattered across multiple sources are preferable to partial records even if they are in a single publication.

Reflecting these priorities, this section focuses on a sub-index that aggregates five core indicators that describe each country’s data availability, and excludes: data format (indicator 1), periodicity (indicator 5), and time lag (indicator 6). Indicator 9 on other debt statistics/contingent liabilities is also removed as it does not apply to all countries (e.g., a country may not have guarantees or arrears).

The index is therefore obtained as a simple average of the following sub-components of the heatmap that measure: instrument and sectoral coverage of debt statistics, availability of financial terms on new loans, and publication of DMS and ABP.

The index is standardized to have mean zero and unit variance in the sample of IDA countries to facilitate the interpretation of the results. Relying on cross sectional data of 74 IDA countries, the role of different factors on debt transparency is estimated using the following equation: where Yij denotes the transparency level for country i in subregion j .<sup>11</sup> The matrix Xij includes the following set of determinants:

- _Type of debt recording and management system (DRMS)_ . Debt Management Offices (DMOs) in LIDCs uses either off-the shelf recording systems, developed by the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS-DRMS/Meridian) or UNCTAD (DMFAS), or idiosyncratic procedures (mostly Excel-based).

- _Portfolio Composition_ : presence of collateralized debt or Eurobonds in the public debt portfolio.

- _External scrutiny_ : availability of a rating from one of three major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s).

- _Debt management capacity_ , proxied by the share of college graduates among DMO staff (source: WB 2020 survey)

- _DM Legal framework:_ presence of legal requirements to produce debt statistics, strategy and/or annual borrowing plan (source: WB 2020 survey)

The matrix Zij adds a set of controls including categorical
# **I. Introduction**

Over the past three decades, globalization has been rapidly intensifying, generating opportunities for firms in many countries to enter new markets. The growth of international trade and the expansion of global value chains (GVCs) have proved to be a powerful means of economic development. Incomes and productivity have increased, while poverty has fallen in many developing countries (World Bank, 2020). Opening up the global economy and the fragmentation of production have been instrumental in enabling them to develop comparative advantages in the manufacture of certain products. This has been facilitated by trade liberalization and declining trade costs, especially after the 1980s.

More recently, the COVID-19 crisis has disrupted economic activity across the globe. In particular, global merchandise trade fell by 7% in 2020. The pandemic forced governments to impose strict containment measures, generating international supply and demand shocks across many countries (Baldwin, 2020). While GVCs have remained quite resilient to date, it is an open question whether COVID-19 will have a long-term impact on international trade and the organization of GVCs.

International trade is a key determinant of firms’ competitiveness and innovation. Trade participation, profitability and survival are driven by different aspects of the business environment in which firms operate. These include the export capacity of domestic firms in an industry, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade costs and barriers, the quality of infrastructure and the availability (or migration) of skilled workers. Trade integration also plays a critical role in shaping the incentives for firms to innovate through various channels, including larger market size, increased competition, induced specialization and international knowledge spillovers (Melitz and Redding, 2021; Buera and Oberfield, 2020; De Loecker, 2013; Gorodnichenko et al, 2010).

In this paper, we examine trade participation and innovation activities and how they are intertwined in MENA. Using cross-sectional and panel data on more than 6,000 private firms in six MENA economies (the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
fundamental rights of every human being

> 75 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Morocco Act on the Right of Association, http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files /Morocco/Act-2002-en.pdf.

> 76 For example, see UNCERD (2010).

> 77 Worth mentioning is that the government of Vietnam has recently taken the initial steps toward an alternative system that could ultimately supplant the household registration system. Under the Law on Civil status, which came into effect at the beginning of 2016, the government is establishing a national population database and a citizen identification card with a citizen identification number linked to the database. The national database will hold basic information on each individual, including gender, ethnicity, and marital status. It will also include place of permanent registration and current residence. Public officials have described a gradual expansion of the system, with citizen identification cards linked to the national database largely replacing other administrative papers, such as the _hộ khẩu_ booklet. See World Bank and Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences 2016, http://documents.worldbank .org/curated/en/158711468188364218/pdf/106381-PUB-P132640-ADD-ISBN-ON-BACK-COVER-PUBLIC.pdf; See also World Bank and Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam 2016, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23724 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

Anti-Discrimination Law and Shared Prosperity 26
where _Yij_ is the outcome of interest -either value of gross or net revenue excluding family labor and level of input use per acre or an indicator of investment having been made during the past- on plot _j_ by cultivator _i_ ; _αi_ captures unobserved determinants of productivity by _i_ including farming skills, access to technology and credit etc; _Rij_ is an indicator variable for sharecropped plots; and _Xij_ is a vector of observable plot characteristics including size, soil type or quality, access to irrigation and drainage, and distance from the operator’s homestead.<sup>5</sup> Empirically, identification and truncation issues need to be considered.

On the first set of concerns, as _αi_ will be correlated with _Rij_ (or _E(αi|Rij=1) ≠ 0_ ), OLS estimation of _β_ will be biased. To deal with this, we follow other studies using plot level data (Jacoby and Mansuri 2009; Shaban 1987) and limit our sample to owner-cum-tenants so that _β_ can be identified from within household variation.<sup>6</sup> A second source of bias is that E( _εij_ |Rij=1) _≠_ 0; in fact sharecropped plots are often assumed to be of lower quality than owned ones. Two factors alleviate concerns that such bias may affect our estimates. First, we control for a wide range of observable plot attributes. Second, many unobserved soil quality attributes such as texture, capillarity, drainage, and salinity, respond to farmers’ management decisions over longer periods of time and can thus be considered an investment. As acquisition of new _barga_ plots came to a virtual standstill after 1978, differences in these attributes can at least partly be attributed to tenants’ actions since receiving the plot as an indicator of tenure-induced under-investment. If there were still unobserved differences in soil quality, they would likely lead us to overestimate the magnitude of the Marshallian inefficiency. Although such bias will be unlikely in our setting, it will be useful to bound the
migrants from here on).

The sample of RAMV migrants was randomly selected from the RAMV census. The sample of non-RAMV migrants was randomly selected by combining databases shared by associations of Venezuelan and referrals from who were sur- refugees migrants being veyed as part of the RAMV sample frame. The sample is representative of the three cities in Colombia that host the largest share of Venezuelan migrants (Barranquilla, Bogot ́a and Medell ́ın) and a fourth “region” that aggregates smaller cities. Ib ́a ̃nez et al. (2022) provides a detailed description on the survey, and shows that the initial conditions before migration to Colombia and the roll-out of PEP for the two sources of the non-RAMV samples (referrals and the list of organizations) are not systematically different.

In the second wave, we re-interviewed 1,432 households (64% of the sample in the first wave). Attrition from the sample was not systematic with respect to baseline conditions, although better-off households (male headed, better educated and with both spouses) and those residing for a longer period in Colombia were less likely to drop out of the sample (see Table A.6 in the Appendix).<sup>3</sup>

> 3Table A.7 also shows that the attrition rate per survey round between PEP eligible applicants and nonapplicants is significant and negative, but small (5.1 p.p.).

2
country’s provinces (National Control Centre for COVID-19, 2021). The bulk of vaccination sites are located in hospitals or local health centers. Although vaccination sites are located across the country, Papua New Guinea’s geography is such that accessibility is less than ideal. By the end of July, around 61,000 of the people who had been vaccinated were either health or other essential workers, with the remaining around 25,000 people being from the broader population.

# <u>3.2 Existing evidence about vaccine hesitancy in PNG</u>

The limited existing evidence on attitudes to COVID-19 vaccines in Papua New Guinea points to very high vaccine hesitancy rates by international standards. A nationwide study of health care workers conducted in 2021 found that only 56 percent were willing to be vaccinated against COVID-19. When the same survey was extended to a convenience sample drawn from the public, it found only 39 percent of people were willing to take the vaccine (Pogo et al., 2021, p. 17). Among both survey groups combined (data are not provided in which health care workers are separated), concerns about vaccine safety were very prevalent (Pogo et al., 2021, p. 18). Social media was found to be the most common source of information on the vaccine, although local health authorities and health workers were the most trusted (Pogo et al., 2021, p. 23). Belief in vaccine misinformation and misunderstandings were common, even among health care workers (Pogo et al., 2021, p. 20). The role of social media as a source of information, and misinformation, on COVID-19, has been noted by health care practitioners and journalists working in PNG as a major concern, with high-profile examples of existing misinformation being spread by social media (Ahearn, 2021).

Similar findings have emerged from the other two surveys conducted on attitudes to COVID-19 in Papua New Guinea thus far. A survey of 281 University of Papua New Guinea
|-0.000496|-0.000036||-0.0000378|0.00002|
||(0.000364)*||(0.000365)*|(0.000381)|(0.000283)||(0.000284)|(0.000284)|
|Share of hhlds with computer||-0.0454|-0.0458|-0.0322||-0.00662|-0.0077|-0.000524|
|||(0.0560)|(0.0553)|(0.0538)||(0.0460)|(0.0460)|(0.0459)|
|IDN exports per worker *||||-0.00269||||-0.00142|
|Share of hhlds with computer||||(0.00140)*||||(0.000970)|
|Observations|2,734|2,734|2,734|2,734|2,734|2,734|2,734|2,734|
|R-squared|0.979|0.979|0.979|0.979|0.834|0.834|0.834|0.834|

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Sakernas 2005-2010 and 2011-2015, Susenas 2005-2010 and 2011-2015, 2015-2016 Philippines STEP survey, and UN Comtrade database 2005-2010 and 2011-2015.

Notes: IV regressions. IV: IV: Global demand for foreign products excluding Indonesian products. Low-educated workers: workers with uncomplete secondary education or less. Indonesian exports per worker in thousands of USD at 2010 prices and global demand for foreign products in millions of USD at 2010 prices. ICT variable at the province level is the share of households with computer. Province level controls include the age structure of the population, the share of urban population, real GDP per capita, and the minimum
Since Turkey has been importing vegetable oils and related products, we assume that increases in sunflower productivity and production do not bring lower prices. Thus, as for maize, sunflower hybrids boost farm profits rather than consumer surplus.

However, we met problems measuring impact of sunflower hybrids on farm income. A regression using time-series data understates hybrid impact on yields if we do not factor into the model how much the orobanche parasite would have reduced yields for pre-reform OPVs; we do not have information to make those adjustments. Also, sunflower area increased with hybrids, and one cannot assume that new fields realize the same increase in profits per hectare as old fields. Ideally, data from detailed farm-level surveys over time would show changes in costs and benefits, including risk of parasite damage, as sunflower farmers adopt hybrids or shift into sunflower. In the absence of such data, we estimate hybrid impact from changes in sunflower national area and average yield.

From information on seed import and production (see Figure 3.2), we identify 1980-84 as the immediate pre-reform period, and we take 1985-92 as the post-reform period. Period average sunflower area increased from 540,000 hectares during 1980-84 to 690,000 hectares in 1985-92. Similarly, period average yields went from 1.26 t/ha for 1980-84 1.43 t/ha for 1985-92.

Multiplying the increase in average yield from base to post-reform periods (170 kg/ha) times base period planted area (540,000 hectares), we get an increase of 91,800 tons of oilseed production worth $ 24 million at 1990-92 Rotterdam CIF prices, or 14 percent of the gross economic value of Turkey's average annual sunflower production ($ 173 million) during those years. This figure excludes gains from: increases in planted area; higher oil content of private hybrids; and preventing further decline in sunflower area and yield due to the orobanche parasite. On the other hand, the economic benefit would be lower to the extent that production costs are higher for
exception of consumer electronics (radio/television), where employment was estimated to be some 70 percent lower than it would have been in the absence of import competition. Freeman and Katz (1991), Gaston and Trefler (1997) and Revenga (1992) are other early studies that conclude that trade does have effects on labor market outcomes—as measured by inter-sectoral changes in employment—but that domestic factors (demand for skilled labor, skill-biased technical change) were much more important drivers of job losses in the developed countries studied (mostly the US and Canada). In general, little impact of trade (policy changes) on wages was observed.

More recent work has suggested more mixed conclusions regarding the impact of trade (and trade reforms) on sectoral employment in developed countries. Kletzer (2000) found a relationship between trade and job displacement in sectors identified as import sensitive, but not for other sectors. Conversely, Dewatripont, Sapir and Sekkat (1999) finds essentially no effect of (developing country) trade on European labor markets. The evidence from plant-panel data for OECD economies is also not uniform. Some studies find increased trade exposure is associated with more labor churning and sometimes negative net effects on employment.

Much of the work on developed countries has focused on the impacts of exchange rate changes as opposed to trade reforms, the former being a more important source of changes in the terms of trade. Klein, Schuh and Triest (2003) use establishment panel data to analyze how the pattern of gross job flows in the US is affected by the path of the real exchange rate. They find that changes in the trend of the real exchange rate affect allocation but not net employment, whereas cyclical variation of the real exchange rate induces changes in net employment mainly via job destruction. In related work, Klein et al. (2002) study the joint impact of trade liberalization (NAFTA) and real exchange rate changes in the US. The way in which the reduction in tariffs impacted upon job flows