rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
are coeducational, 28% are exclusively for boys and 21% exclusively for girls. Public elementary schools are far more likely to be single-sex (62%) compared to private ones (13%).

We consider all children who were age 9-15 in the survey year; practically all of the children who ever enroll in school have already done so by the age of nine. Married girls, which constitute just one percent of females in this age range, are

> 2Given the difficulty in identifying all schools to which children in a village may have access, the school census was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, all schools inside the village, as well as all schools within a 2 km radius of each settlement, were visually identified and a school list was drawn up. This list was provided to all survey teams conducting the household survey. During the household survey, any non-listed schools identified by sample households were added to the initial list. Likewise, any additional schools identified during the community focus group exercise were incorporated into the final school census list.

3
suggests that a real appreciation of the yen against the USD will raise the real price of Japanese cars imported into the US. However, models of strategic pricing also predict that the Japanese car producer will respond to the prices — and hence exchange rates — of its foreign competitors (from Europe, Canada, etc). That is, a real appreciation of the euro or Canadian dollar will lead the Japanese car producer to raise its prices in the US, even if the real bilateral yen-USD exchange rate is unchanged.

Figure 1 illustrates these patterns in the aggregate data for real import prices from Japan, Europe and Canada. On the left is the standard relationship in the literature between import prices (y-axis) and bilateral real exchange rates (RERs) (x-axis). On the right is the new relationship between the same import prices (y-axis) and competitors’ RERs (x-axis) at the aggregate level, which turns out to be at least as strong. I show that similar patterns hold at the product level using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) microdata. Quantitatively, standard univariate bilateral pass-through to import prices is around 0.23 in both the BLS microdata and in the aggregate (Figure 1 LHS) compared with pass-through of competitors’ RERs to import prices of around 0.35 in the BLS microdata (after controlling for bilateral RERs).<sup>1</sup> This is consistent with Date: November 2016.

> * Development Research Group, World Bank, 1818 H St NW, Washington DC 20433 USA Email: spennings@worldbank.org I would like to thank Ariel Burstein, Virgiliu Midrigan, Raphael Schoenle, Pete Klenow, Jonathan Kearns, Emi Nakamura, Jon Steinsson, and seminar participants at the World Bank, May 2012 Midwest Macro Meetings, NYU, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for helpful comments. This research was conducted with restricted access to BLS data on US import and producer prices. The findings, interpretations, and
in poor countries, using a framework similar to that of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) but in a dynamic environment, and therefore making the distribution of productivity endogenous. This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by presenting a general equilibrium model of bribing to highlight bribing’s effects on the economy through misallocation (a static effect) and on the distribution of firm-level productivity through reductions in innovation (a dynamic effect). The paper’s quantitative model is guided by establishment-level data on bribing and captures 30
1974. Afterwards, they allowed the won to depreciate gradually through the end of 1985.

The most telling result of Korea's policy of exchange rate flexibility is that from 1953 to 1960, per capita GDP measured in constant purchasing power parity dollars grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent. From 1960 to 1991, it grew at an average annual rate of 6.9 percent, from $904 to $7,251. Analyzing data for 126 countries for the period 1960 to 1992, Pritchett (1997) showed that Korea had the highest growth rate of real per capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity dollars.'<sup>5</sup> Nam reported that in addition, exports rose even more rapidly than GNP. The ratio of exports to GNP was 2.4 percent in 1962, and 25.6 percent in 1991. Manufactured goods as a share of exports rose from 27 percent in 1962 to 95.4 percent in 1991.

**Malaysia.** In some ways, the problems faced by Malaysia in the early 1980s were similar to those of Africa, to be described in section IV. Malaysia faced decreases in

14 The nominal rate appreciated once again betweenl986 and 1989, and then depreciated through 1991, the end of the period under study in Nam.

'5 Using real GNP data from the Bank of Korea, Nam reported an aggregate growth rate of 3.6 percent annually in the 1950s, and 10.6 percent annually from 1962 to 1991. World Bank (1999) showed an average annual growth rate of real aggregate GDP of 8.6 percent from 1962 to 1991, but did not have data for the 1950s. The per capita GDP figures cited in the text and by Pritchett are from the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6 (Summers and Heston, 1991). We downloaded the data from the University of Toronto, http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/index.html.

13
and summarized the data to the country-level using the mean, minimum, and maximum value to get a broad description of the vegetation in a country.

# **3.4 Other data**

For our economic variables and data on carbon dioxide emissions, we rely on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). To ensure cross-country comparability, we

> 11Available at https://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/dataprod/mod13.php.

14
; Muradian et al., 2013; Schröter et al., 2014) because of concerns that they could make landowners worse off or could disrupt existing social structures. Although landowners accept PES voluntarily, these programs could still reduce welfare if participants do not fully understand risk-reward tradeoffs or underestimate program participation costs. In addition, while incentives to perform land management activities could support community collaboration, they might also undermine social capital by reducing intrinsic motivation for land conservation, disrupting norms of fairness within the community, or crowding-out contributions to other pro-social activities (Bowles et al., 2008; Schröter et al., 2014; Bruner and Reid, 2015).

This study contributes to these key empirical questions about the environmental and social impacts of PES by evaluating the 2011-2014 cohorts of Mexico’s federal payments for environmental services program. Mexico’s program provides an important global case to study because of its size, longevity, and efforts to improve program targeting. Specifically, we investigate program impacts on land-cover management and forest-cover change, household socioeconomic indicators including wealth, and community and household indicators of social capital. We estimate program impacts using a regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares accepted and rejected program applicants close to state- and year-specific cutoffs determined by the scoring system that prioritizes applicants.

Impacts on forest management, socioeconomic outcomes and social capital are based on survey data from 2016 for a representative sample of more than 800 community leaders and 8,000 households across 12 states. Impacts on forest cover change are derived from satellite-based forest cover loss data (Hansen et al. 2013; v 1.2) from 2011-2014 for all program applicants within 25 points of scoring 3
highly interconnected economies may result in lower short-term welfare losses than those suggested by trade models using aggregated data with homogeneous trade elasticities. In this vein, our results would suggest that the current US-China trade disputes with tariff hikes may not impact trade significantly in the short run due to their existing trading relationship. Long-term impacts may involve relocation of firms, which is beyond the scope of the current paper.

# **References**

- [1] Anderson, J., Neary, P. (1992). “Trade reforms with quotas, partial rent retention and tariffs”, _Econometrica_ 60(1): 57-76.

- [2] Anderson, J., Neary, P. (1994). “Measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy”, _World Bank Economic Review_ 8(2): 151-69.

- [3] Anderson, J., Neary, P. (1996). “A new approach to evaluating trade policy”, _Review of Economic Studies_ 63(1): 107-25.

- [4] Anderson, J., Neary, P. (2003). “The Mercantilist index of trade policy”, _International Economic Review_ 44(2): 627-49.

- [5] Anderson, J., Neary, P. (2007). “Welfare versus market access: the implications of tariff structure for tariff reform”, _Journal of International Economics_ 71(1): 187-205.

- [6] Anderson, J., Yotov, Y. (2016). “Terms of trade and global efficiency effects of free trade agreements, 1990–2002,” _Journal of International Economics_ 99: 279-98.

24
So far, we have looked at two channels by which the trainings could have changed profits. This section has shown that practices did not meaningfully move. However, the previous section showed that the psychological outcomes moved for participants in the DOT training but not at all for those in the PI and BSED trainings - both of which are aimed at psychology. We now turn to the likely main culprit for the lack of impact in the PI/BSED cohorts: the quality of the trainers.

# **4.3.4 Role of the trainer**

Using detailed trainer characteristics and student data from the PI/BSED study we attempt to match which teacher attributes may have mattered for student outcomes.

The following analysis focuses on the sample of students who were trained (619 students; 17 primary trainers). The question we address: among the women entrepreneurs who participate in the trainings, what characteristics of the trainer are correlated with changes in their personal initiative, self-efficacy, error competence, entrepreneurial identity and locus of control scores, as measured at follow-up? The analysis incorporates various hypotheses by sequentially adding explanatory factors grouped into trainer attribute themes: demographic characteristics, business ownership, cognitive and noncognitive skills, job and career satisfaction and experience as a trainer. These themes were formulated based on various hypotheses by which we believe the trainer could influence the effectiveness of a training. For example, perhaps younger trainers are more dynamic and open towards a new training approach or those trainers with a higher error competence may be more likely to encourage entrepreneurs to act and learn from their errors and are therefore better trainers. The full set of hypotheses are discussed in more detail with the results presented below.

Table 8 first presents summary statistics of the 17 trainers included in the analysis. The average age of the trainers was 35 years which is similar to the average age of the WEDP entrepreneurs. There was an even split of female and male trainers and the likelihood that the trainer had ever been a business owner themselves was 41%.
poverty tends to fall with economic growth can be found in World Bank (1990, 2000), Ravallion (1995, 2001), Ravallion and Chen (1997), Fields (2001) and Kraay (2005).

There are a number of reasons for caution in interpreting this finding of a lack of correlation between changes in inequality and growth. Firstly, finding that there is no change in overall inequality can be consistent with considerable “churning” under the surface, with gainers and losers at all levels of living. This cannot be seen in cross-sectional surveys. The (more limited) panel data sets available point to churning.<sup>1</sup> Simulations of the impacts of specific policy changes intended to promote economic growth also point to such heterogeneity, or “horizontal inequality,” in the impacts of reform. In the context of trade reform, Ravallion (2005a) reviews evidence on the extent of horizontal inequality, as indicated by the dispersion in welfare impacts of reform at any given level of pre-intervention income. This dispersion reflects differences in variables such as household demographics and location that influence the net trading positions in relevant markets and (hence) the welfare impacts of trade reform.

Secondly, the measures of “inequality” in this literature are typically measures of relative inequality, whereby multiplying all incomes by a constant leaves the measure of inequality unchanged. Finding that a relative inequality measure is unchanged during an aggregate economic expansion is perfectly consistent with large increases in absolute income disparities. Growth in average income tends to come with higher absolute disparities between the “rich” and the “poor” (Ravallion, 2003). Arguably, it is the absolute changes that are more obvious to people living in a growing developing economy than the proportionate changes.<sup>2</sup> So it may well

> 1 A useful compilation of studies using panel data can be found in the August 2000 special issue of the _Journal of Development Studies_ ; see the introduction by Baulch and Hoddinott (2000
restitution program is heavily biased in favor of urban areas which account for more than 90% of the cases lodged.

A program of _redistributive land reform_ was established with the aim of providing opportunities for the large number of black households who wanted to gain access to land but did not have specific documentation to enter the restitution program nor were eligible to benefit from tenure reform. The general principle of the program is to provide a grant, equal to the maximum subsidy under the National housing program (R 16,000 or about US $ 2,500) that would allow poor households to acquire land plus associated productive infrastructure in the regular market. While this was not expected to be sufficient to establish an independent agricultural operation, it was designed to provide the start-up funds for such an enterprise, to be complemented from other sources. Recognizing the limitations on the first two programs, the Government set very ambitious targets for land redistribution - aiming to transfer 30% of South Africa's 99.07 million hectare farmland, or 29.72 million hectares, between 1994 and 1999. After three years of operation, about 200,000 hectares of land have been transferred to about 20,000 households, representing 0.6% of the target, and 0.2% of the households demanding land.

The second, and quantitatively most important, element of the RDP is the old age pension program. This is an enormous program under which the Department of Welfare pays social grants on a monthly basis to 1.6 million beneficiaries. The payments made under the pension scheme are relatively large, accounting for 22% of rural incomes and 28% of income for the poorest groups. As illustrated in Table 2, the annual cost of this program in 1997/98 (with an exchange rate of about 4 R per US $) amounted to more than US $ 1.5 billion. Evaluations, most of them based on the 1993 SALDRU data, suggest that the program provided a significant source of income, on
official PEP decree declared otherwise. This pattern is likely due to administrative and bureaucratic loopholes that may have let non-RAMV migrants apply for PEP. Importantly, we know these discrepancies were not due to recall error regarding the migration date because we compared the reported arrival dates in our survey with those reported on PEP applications to migration authorities; in 98.2 percent of cases, they were the same. Moreover, results from the qualitative survey suggest that the arrival date was extremely salient for migrants, marking as it did the end of one life and the start of another. Finally, these discrepancies are also not due to misinformation or misreporting by migrants without PEP since we requested proof of PEP registration for anyone who reported applying for PEP.

For completeness, our main results include the full sample depicted in Figure 3. Robustness tests show the results are remarkably robust (both in magnitude and statistical significance) when the observations of these “defiers” are dropped (see Figure F.1 and Tables F.1– F.3).

Figure 3 also plots gray bars that illustrate the density of migrants who arrived in Colombia each week. Visual inspection of the figure indicates no discontinuity in the number of individuals who arrived in Colombia before or after June 8, 2018. Further, the McCrary test rejects the existence of any discontinuity in the density of the sample or manipulation by individuals (p-value=0.96). This is expected because when RAMV opened, it was not intended to regularize migrants, and there were no public discussions, announcements, or expectations in this regard. Moreover, the data from the survey indicates that only 0.5 percent of respondents reported migrating to register in RAMV.

Panel B in the figure illustrates the discontinuity in the probability of treatment, estimated as the average treatment take-up in each bin. This figure illustrates the discontinuity using a linear polynomial to confirm the existence of a large, robust discontinuity in the probability of treatment around June 8, 2018. At each point, the figure
liberalisation also allowed unhedged foreign borrowings, which, as Lim (1998) notes, was attractive because the central bank's policy of a stable currency made sure that domestic interest rates were above foreign rates. Financial liberalisation without sufficient prudential regulation and enforcement by the central bank led also in the Philippines to an overexposure to risky loans, especially real estate loans, foreign borrowings and consumer loans to high risk groups.

# **4. Data**

The data used in this study are taken from BankScope, which is a rich source for balance sheet and profit & loss account data for individual banks across the world. In order to estimate the bank efficiencies we have gathered the following variables: interest expenses on deposits and borrowings, personnel expenses, operating expenses (on equipment, building, machinery, etc.), net loans (equal to gross loans or credit plus accrued interest minus loan losses), and investments in securities (including securities purchased with a resale agreement). In addition, we have collected data on total assets, deposits, equity capital, loan loss provisions, short-term borrowings (domestic and foreign) and ownership structures. The data is on 54 commercial banks in Indonesia, 25 in Korea, 34 in Malaysia, 29 in the Philippines, and 29 in Thailand for the years 1992-963 (see Appendix, Tables 1-4, for summary statistics of the data).

The coverage of the data is quite good. In terms of bank loans, the coverage of the total commercial banking system by our sample of commercial banks is about 70% in Indonesia, 90% in the Philippines, 98% in both Korea and Malaysia, and 100% in Thailand. In terms of number of commercial banks, the coverage by our sample is 23% in Indonesia, 96% in Korea, 97% in Malaysia, 57% in the Philippines and 100% in Thailand (see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2).

We consider five different ownership forms: state-owned, family-owned, companyowned, foreign-owned
# <mark>3.1.1 Survey Sample</mark>

The selection of the HFPS sample of households proceeded differently in the four countries. In Nigeria, 3,000 households were selected from the frame of 4,934 GHS-Panel households with contact details. The target number of successfully interviewed households to produce nationally representative estimates with reasonable precision was 1,800. Given the large amount of auxiliary information available in the GHS-Panel for these households, a balanced sampling approach using the cube method (Tille, 2006) was adopted for the selection of the 3,000 households for the HFPS.<sup>8</sup> For the first-round of the Nigeria HFPS, all the 3,000 sampled households were contacted and 69 percent of them were successfully reached by the interviewers (2,057 households). Of those contacted, 94 percent or 1,950 households were successfully interviewed. This yielded an overall crude response rate<sup>9</sup> for the sample of 65 percent.

Figure 3.2: Phone Ownership Share of Households Who Own a Phone <!-- Start of picture text --> 100.0<br>88.7 88.0<br>90.0<br>80.0 73.3 76.0 75.7<br>70.5<br>68.8<br>70.0 65.6<br>58.9<br>60.0<br>51.8 National<br>47.9<br>50.0<br>Urban<br>40.0 35.7<br>Rural<br>30.0<br>20.0<br>10.0<br>0.0<br>Ethiopia Malawi Nigeria Uganda<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Authors’ calculations from the ESS 2018/19, IHPS 2019, GHS-Panel 2018
- Van Toor, J., D. Piljic, G. Schellekens, M. van Oorschot, and M. Kok. 2020. “Indebted to Nature: Exploring Biodiversity Risks for the Dutch Financial Sector.” Amsterdam: DNB (De Nederlandsche Bank).Wendling, Z. A., Emerson, J. W., de Sherbinin, A., Esty, D. C., et al. (2020). 2020 Environmental Performance Index. New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy

- WEF (World Economic Forum). 2020. Nature Risk Rising: Why the Crisis Engulfing Nature Matters for Business and the Economy. Geneva: WEF.

World Bank and BNM (Bank Negara Malaysia). 2022. An Exploration of Nature-Related Financial Risks. Kuala Lumpur: World Bank.

<mark>World Bank Group. 2021. Unlocking Nature-Smart Development: An Approach Paper on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36047 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.</mark> 12
# V. Conclusion

TIETP incentivizes end‐consumers to pay electronically for their purchases, and at the same time, it induces owner‐operated retail businesses to honestly report their incomes to tax authorities. End‐consumers, to claim tax deductions, use electronic payments that are then automatically reported to tax authorities. It is equivalent to business buyers reporting their business sellers’ sales to claim their input VAT credit in B2B transactions. Thus, retail businesses whose sales are reported by third parties (the consumers) file their income tax returns honestly; in fact, they are only required to confirm their electronically traceable sales on prefilled tax return forms provided by NTS if they find no errors. This paper shows TIETP’s effectiveness as a tool for reducing underreporting in cash‐intensive retail businesses by incentivizing end‐consumers to use electronic payments. In Korea, TIETP was successful in turning a predominantly cash economy into one based on cashless transactions, with a consequent considerable reduction of the shadow economy, in a relatively short period of time.

Future implications and challenges for countries pursuing an incentive structure to induce electronic payment are as follows: First, critical to TIETP’s success is a legal framework and tax information system that enables tax authorities to gain access to and to analyze the financial transaction information. Without the tax authorities’ legal and technical competence to collect and process the information, TIETP would not induce retail businesses’ voluntary compliance. Korea’s 2000 Act on the Submission and Management of Taxation Data played a pivotal role in enabling tax authorities to gather electronic financial transaction information and in inducing voluntary tax compliance in cash‐ intensive business sectors. In addition, NTS established its Tax Integrated System (TIS) in 1997 to integrate all transaction data obtained from electronically traceable payments, including credit cards, debit cards, cash receipts in B2C transactions, e‐invoices in B2B transactions, financial income information, property transaction information, and other third‐party information provided by public and private institutions. NTS now make use of TIS