rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
<br>Belarus<br>Bosnia and Herzegovina<br>Bulgaria<br>Croatia<br>Georgia<br>Kazakhstan<br>Kosovo<br>Kyrgyz Republic<br>Moldova<br>Montenegro<br>Republic of North Macedonia<br>Romania<br>Russian Federation<br>Serbia<br>Tajikistan<br>Turkey<br>Turkmenistan<br>Ukraine<br>Uzbekistan<br>0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%<br>Percent of adults<br>Owns mobile and uses Internet Owns mobile and does not use Internet<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Global Findex database.

_Note:_ The length of the bars represents the percentage of adults aged 15 and above who report owning a personal mobile phone.

26
of responses by interviewers can in fact lead to larger design effects than area clustering. This finding is consistent with the findings of Schnell and Kreuter in Germany (2005).

This paper provides evidence that simpler questions lead to smaller interviewer design effects. This finding reinforces the intuition that time invested in designing, testing and refining questions to make them as simple as possible is likely to yield data quality improvements.

In general, good survey implementation practices can contribute to lower interviewer design effects. These include recruiting qualified interviewers; budgeting adequate time for questionnaire design, review and programming for tablets; conducting a high-quality training using a close to finalized questionnaire; budgeting adequate time for piloting and finalizing the questionnaire; and managing survey implementation well, including early identification of reoccurring interviewer-level issues that might affect data quality.

Another recommendation emerging from these findings is that interviewer identifiers should always be included in all survey data. Interviewer identifications in data allow for multi-way cluster robust standard errors by both area cluster and interviewer (Cameron _et al._ , 2011). Given the evidence of interviewer design effects in survey data collected in developed countries and 10
is shown below: where _DF_ is the design effect, _c_ is the size of the cluster and ρ the ICC. In the case of interviewer effects, _c_ is the number of respondents per interviewer. To correct for clustering of responses and the consequent increase in variance, the design effect is multiplied by the sample size requirement obtained through simple random sampling.

In their seminal work on interviewer design effects, O’Muircheartaigh and Campanelli (1998) used an interpenetrated design, randomly assigning interviewers to respondents in a household survey in the United Kingdom (UK). They calculated interviewer ICCs for 820 variables and found median interviewer design effects of 1.8 with a maximum of 5, implying an 80 percent and 400 percent increase in the sample size required to maintain the same variance. Brunton-Smith et al. (2016) found evidence of interviewer design effects in UK Household Longitudinal Survey data ranging between 2.5 and 3.3. Schnell and Kreuter (2005) analyzed face-to-face and mail-in 3
**Table 1: Theory-based hypotheses and expected findings**

||**Hypothesis**|**Expected finding**|
|---|---|---|
|**H1**|_There is a critical wealth threshold below which_<br>_households fall into climate immobility traps._|Negative impacts of weather anomalies on migration<br>for households with lower endowments (e.g., asset<br>levels).|
|**H2**|_Households exposed to recurrent shocks are_<br>_more likely to experience resource-constrained_<br>_immobility._|Concave relationship between the estimated effect of<br>contemporaneous weather shocks on migration and<br>lagged weather conditions.|
|**H3**|_Local adaptation and migration are substitute_<br>_risk management strategies that households_<br>_adopt to deal with climate risk._|Negative relationship between the estimated impact of<br>weather shocks on migration and pre-shock levels of<br>local adaptive capacity.|
|**H4**|_There also exists a wealth threshold above which_<br>_climate mobility is no longer needed or_<br>_desirable._|Negative impacts of weather anomalies on migration<br>for households with higher endowments (e.g., asset<br>levels).|

# **3. Data**

Our main data source is the recently released _Uniform Panel Dataset_ which is derived from the past longitudinal rounds of Nigeria's General Household Survey - Panel (GHS-Panel).<sup>5</sup> The GHSPanel is a national, longitudinal, multi-topic household survey that has been implemented by the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics since 2010, in collaboration with the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS). The past GHS-Panel rounds were implemented in 20102011, 2012-2013, 2015-2016, and 2018-2019. Each round is composed of two visits, one conducted after crop planting
developing countries nds that the VAT is not necessarily regressive. Empirical evidence from Bangladesh based on household income expenditure survey data nds that the VAT may have progressive elements (Faridy and Sarker (2011)). Therefore, as pointed out by the International Tax Dialogue (2013), the incidence of this regressivity is very country specic and generalizations can be misleading. Moreover, Ciminelli et al. (2019) nd that the labor market response does matter to assess the redistributive eects of the VAT. The VAT can reduce income inequality by triggering a positive labor supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labor supply. This eect tends to be stronger for middle-aged women.

# 6 Conclusions

In this paper, we show that trade liberalization boosts economic activity in both developed and emerging countries. However, we nd that trade liberalization is associated to higher informality, which ultimately implies less job security and lower employment quality.

Policy makers should consider placing a high priority on promoting job quality and income equality. Policy interventions to curb informality should follow a comprehensive approach that rests on three pillars: increasing the benets of formality, decreasing the costs of formalization and improving enforcement methods. In this respect, we investigate whether taxation may smooth the way for formalization of jobs. To this purpose, we extend the Melitz (2003) model and develop a two-country DSGE model, featuring a developed and emerging (or developing) country as in Cacciatore and Ghironi (2015). In addition, we embed the tax system and the informal labor sector in the model with the aim to analyze whether taxation may correct the bias toward informality introduced by trade liberalization. We argue that a scal reform can mitigate these adverse eects of trade on the labor market. A Social VAT, switching the tax burden from payroll taxes paid by rms in the formal sector to the consumption tax, can increase the incentives to operate in the formal sector.
Brück, T., M. d’Errico, and R. Pietrelli. 2019. “The Effects of Violent Conflict on Household Resilience and Food Security: Evidence from the 2014 Gaza Conflict.” _World Development_ 119 (July): 203–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.05.008.

- Bundervoet, T., P. Verwimp, and R. Akresh. 2009. “Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi.” _Journal of Human Resources_ 44 (2): 536–63.

- Chamarbagwala, R., and H.E. Moran. 2011. “The Human Capital Consequences of Civil War: Evidence from Guatemala.” _Journal of Development Economics_ 94 (1): 41–61. <u>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.005.</u>

- Clementi, F., A.L. Dabalen, V. Molini, and F. Schettino. 2017. "When the Centre Cannot Hold: Patterns of Polarization in Nigeria," _Review of Income and Wealth_ 63(4): 608–32. <u>https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12212.</u>

- Corral Rodas, P.A., V. Molini, and G. Oseni. 2019. "No Condition Is Permanent: Middle Class in Nigeria in the Last Decade." _Journal of Development Studies_ 55 (2): 294–310. <u>https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2017.1366453.</u>

- Croke, K., A. Dabalen, G. Demombynes, M. Giugale, and J. Hoogeveen. 2012. “Collecting High Frequency Panel Data in Africa Using Mobile Phone Interviews.” Policy Research Working Paper 6097, World Bank, Washington, DC.

-
research examining the impact of refugee-host interaction on host community attitudes towards refugees had focused on Europe (one exception comes from Rozo and Vargas (2021), who assessed the impact of the recent refugee crisis in Colombia). Consequently, it is particularly interesting to explore how our findings diverge from the existing, predominantly rich-country literature on contact and ‘native’ attitudes. What is similar and what is different?

While the European literature focuses on both contact (as sustained interaction) and exposure (as short-term interaction during transit), our focus is very much on the former (Ajzenman et al. 2020; Steinmayr 2021). Our OLS regression analysis findings are consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), revealing a positive and statistically significant correlation between interaction and positive perceptions. We have sought to address issues – – of endogeneity issues reverse causality in particular by using an IV approach. The introduction of the IV leads to the disappearance of the positive correlation between contact and attitudes when considering the full Uganda sample or data from the Nakivale settlement.

31
relationships.

Increasingly, however, economists and policy makers are looking for continuous insight, as shown by the surge in literature on “now-casting” and real-time indicators (Khan et al., 2022). The literature has put forward many promising applications, but now-casting composite variables is specifically hard as it involves tracking the evolution of multiple contributing factors in a structured manner.

As an example, economists looking at inflation generally track a price index, comprising the combined prices of a consistent basket of important goods. Nonresponses in the price data gathered for the entire basket are highly problematic. Inflation calculation requires all prices in the basket to be observed without bias. Thus, an accurate assumption for the value of the non-response is necessary. For this reason, price surveys traditionally follow a deliberate sampling and measurement process (Reinsdorf et al., 2009) that minimizes measurement errors, missing price quotes, or biases that stem from the locations or methods of measurement, as all are sources of error (Baker, 1996; Lebow and Rudd, 2003; Greenlees and McClelland, 2010). The deliberate approach makes traditional price data gathering methods robust, but highly inflexible, and typically not suitable for tracking inflation in near-real-time or high-frequency settings, except in few countries with exceptional statistical capacity.

Short-burst rapid surveys are increasingly relied on to complement traditional
but they can also disrupt the ability of _gram sabhas_ to make rational collective decisions. In other words, deliberation in low literacy settings raises the possibility that _gram sabhas_ are simply “talking shops” that bear no relationship to democratic dialogue. This hypothesis is explicitly tested by Ban, Jha, and Rao’s (2012) quantitative analysis of coded versions of the same _gram sabha_ transcripts examined by Rao and Sanyal (2010). Deriving hypotheses from rational choice models of group decision making under uncertainty, they analyze the transcript data to test three competing hypotheses of the types of equilibrium that characterize _gram sabha_ interactions: (a) “cheap talk,” in which discussions are not substantive even though they may appear equitable; (b) elite capture, in which discussion is dominated by the interests of landowning and wealthy citizens; and (c) “efficient democracy,” in which meetings follow patterns of good democratic practice. They find that in villages with more diversity in caste groups, and less village-wide agreement on policy priorities, the topics discussed track those of interest to the median household. In villages with less caste heterogeneity, the priorities of landowners are more likely to dominate the discourse (consistent with elite domination). The authors conclude that _gram sabhas_ are more than mere opportunities for cheap talk, that they more closely follow patterns observed in a well-functioning “efficient” democracy.

In addition to elite domination by landed and wealthy classes, scholars have also begun to examine whether deliberation in _gram sabhas_ is gendered in nature, and how policies aimed at inclusion might mitigate gender biases. This question is explored in a working paper by Palaniswamy, Parthasarathy, and Rao, who use text-as-data methods on an original sample of transcripts from Tamil Nadu to evaluate whether and how women participate in village assemblies. They find that despite the relatively high rates of attendance, women are the “silent sex” (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014); however, they also show that a state intervention which builds women’s networks and trains them
green patents granted. In comparison, high-income countries were granted nearly 1,500 green patents in 2010 alone.

Though small, the ̳importance‘ of green patenting as measured in absolute numbers in developing regions is rising, particularly in EAP and S Asia. This reflects the general rise in patenting by developing countries. Measured by their share in overall patenting per region, green innovations are as prominent in ECA and LAC as in high-income countries, having grown relative to all patents; in this relative sense, green patents have actually declined since the late 1990s in EAP and S Asia and been stagnant across the 2000s (Figure 1, Panel C).<sup>5</sup> But we stress caution in interpreting these trends. For one, these ratios are sensitive to even small changes in the number of patents granted to a few countries. Secondly, scale matters in R&D: even if the relative importance of green patenting is similar to high-income countries, most developing countries have not reached a critical mass of green patenting.

# **2.2 Technologically-sophisticated countries emerging as significant innovators, but limited to a few technologies**

**<u>Figure 2: Increasing Patenting in the most Technological Sophisticated Countries</u>** Number of Green Patents Granted

<!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40 1996-2000<br>30 2001-2005<br>20<br>2006-2010<br>10<br>0<br>Low-tech Hi-tech Developing High Income (in<br>Developing 100s)<br>Total USPTO grants in OECD Green Technology Areas for three periods. Patents granted to high-income<br>countries are in 100s. Source: USPTO grants in PATSTAT.<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 2 suggests that a significant capacity for frontier green innovation exists in a small group of more technologically-sophisticated developing countries. Hence
sector|82.5|82.1|78.6|73.0|64.5||
|Non-farm enterprise|4.2|4.1|6.1|7.6|10.4||
|Non-farm wage worker|2.7|2.5|5.3|5.5|11.6||
|At school|6.0|7.5|6.2|10.8|10.9||
|_Number of observations_|_2713_|_2750_|_2874_|_2880_|_2026_||
|Mean Wage for non-farm wage workers(Rwf)|||||||
|Primaryoccupation|72.9|76.6|79.6|105.2|171.3|_1523_|
|Secondary occupation|110.0|43.7|77.2|102.6|278.6|_296_|
|Mean Wage for non-farm self-employed<br>(Rwf)|||||||
|Primaryoccupation|40.8|71.0|107.4|140.7|422.7|_632_|
|Secondaryoccupation|80.8|119.1|166.7|142.3|341.8|_412_|

In rural areas richer households are also more likely than poorer ones to diversify into non-farm enterprise activities (Table 3). This is consistent with previous findings that households from the upper income strata have higher shares of non-farm income in total income and higher absolute non-farm earnings (Reardon, 1997). Moreover, households that have a non-farm enterprise in addition to their farm own on average higher land areas — 1.08 ha — than those who have only a farm — 0.72 ha.

> 5 The main occupation for non-farm wage workers with secondary education is as primary school teacher (61.5 percent of rural adults with secondary or further education who hold a non-farm occupation for their main
| POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1941

# Summary findings

There is a long tradition of viewing as disadvantaged the roughly 40 percent of workers in developing countries who are unprotected by labor legislation and work in small "informal" firms.

Maloney offers an alternative to traditional views of the relationship between formal and informal labor markets: For many workers, inefficiencies in present labor codes and relatively low levels of human capital (labor productivity) may make employment in the informal sector more desirable.

He offers the first study of worker transitions among sectors, using detailed panel data from Mexico, and finds little evidence to support the traditional dualistic view.

He shows that traditional earning differentials cannot prove or disprove segmentation in developing countries, and patterns of worker mobility do not suggest a rigid labor market - or one segmented into formal and informal divisions.

It is possible that the market is dualistic in the sense used in the industrial world, but the division between good jobs and bad jobs seems to cut across issues of formality.

- This paper a product of the Poverty and Economic Management Unit, Latin Arnerica and the Caribbean Region- is part of a larger effort in the region to reexamine the role of the informal sector. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Marta Cervantes, room 18-095, telephone 202473-7794, fax 202-522-0054, Internet address mcervantes@worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at wmaloney@worldbank.org. June 1998. (34 pages)

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represen_ **_t_** _he view of the World Bank
employment. Although traditionally capital-intensive sectors (non-metallic minerals, publishing and printing) are increasing intensity faster, this is also true of labor-intensive industries (such as wearing apparel, tanning and dressing, etc.).

**What is the importance of firm size in job creation** ? Figure 8 shows the distribution of employment and the total number of firms for the period of 2000-2011.<sup>7</sup> Clearly, enterprises with fewer than 50 employees dominate  the account for close to 60% of the total number of firms. However, the bulk of employment (i.e. more than 60%) is

> 6 Capital intensity is based on the firm’s capital-per-labor ratio.

> 7 The data are shown for 36 cities, which account for 77 percent of the total firms, and 73 percent of the total employment generated within the LMMIS data.

9
year lagged value of the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP as a measure of credit availability (DC_GDPt-1). As shown in Table 4, these macroeconomic indicators are highly correlated. Therefore, we try alternative specifications and find that our results are robust to the exclusion of the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP.

Our next set of explanatory variables includes indicators of the business and legal environment. First, we include the “Credit information index” (CreditInfo) from the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, which measures the scope, access and quality of credit information available through either public or private bureaus. We expect factoring to be larger in countries with quick and comprehensive credit information on many buyers. Next, we include “Creditor Rights” (CreditorRts), which is an index aggregating four indicators of creditor rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005).<sup>6</sup> We also include from the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators the “Cost of enforcing contracts as a % of debt” (Enforce_Debt), which measures the cost of going through court procedures as a percentage of the debt value (a higher value indicates a weaker contract environment). It is difficult to predict the sign of these two variables, since on the one hand, factoring can substitute for collateralized lending in countries with weak collateral laws and contract enforcement (since the receivables are sold, rather than collateralized), but on the other hand, factoring requires strong creditor rights for the factor to collect from the buyer in the case of default.

Our regression results are shown in Table 5. In column 1 we include country fixed effects and in all columns (except column 6) we include year fixed effects. Since our business environment variables are constant over time, in column 6 we use country

> 6 Our results are robust to the substitution of creditors rights with the broader “Legal rights index”, which is measures the degree to which collateral and
,114 and 9,393. The outliers have a large influence on the average elasticity in our dataset of consecutive spells: The average GEP across all spells amounts to an implausibly large (in absolute value) -17.6 when growth is measured by survey means and -3.8 when

> 6 If country X has five “spells” each of them will get weight of 1/5, while country Y with one spell will get the weight of one.

> 7 Whenever a survey spans two years, we use weighted GDP across both years as our measure of GDP per capita.

> 8 Given that poverty rates and household consumption are both measured from the same surveys, there is a clear and approximate identity-like relationship between both variables (see for instance Bergstrom, 2022). This is not the case for GDP, which is measured through national accounts.

4
The first indicator is regulatory quality which is obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). This index captures the ability of a government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Details of how this indicator is constructed are presented in Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). The indicator is standardized between -2.5 and 2.5 with high scores corresponding to better outcomes. The second indicator measures financial development. It is the log of the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to GDP which is collected through World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). This is a standard macro level indicator of financial development in the literature. The third indicator is an index of business entry regulations. It is collected through the Doing Business surveys of the World Bank and it measures the number of procedures it takes to start a business. The forth indicator is a measure of country’s customs efficiency. Time to export is measured as the log of the duration (in days) of the goods to be exported. It is also collected by Doing Business. The fifth indicator is the quality of overall infrastructure (e.g. transport, telephone, and energy). This indicator is collected by World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness report. The last indicator measures protection of property rights. It is obtained from Economic Freedom of the World database. However the original data is collected by World Economic Forum. The last two indicators vary between 1 and 7 where 1 corresponds to lowest rating.

In the estimation, in addition to the trade policy variables and the indicators for investment climate, I control for the size of the country with two measures: log of real GDP and log of its area. Real GDP is measured in constant 2005 US dollars at PPP. I follow Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Alcala and Ciccone (2004) to use the PPP for converting GDP values into US dollars. Presenting GDP in PPP is more appropriate