rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
domestic and private firms, a missing middle emerges in the data.

Another key component in the deconstruction of the missing middle is the role of entry barriers and productivity-dependent idiosyncratic distortions in explaining the missing middle and its driving forces. To this end, the paper extends a standard model of firm dynamics and feeds it with calibrated values of entry barriers and idiosyncratic distortions using the Ghana’s census of manufacturing firms covering the universe of formal establishments. The calibration strategy of distortions follows the approach in Fattal-Jaef (2022). The productivity-elasticity of idiosyncratic distortions is calibrated as the regression coefficient from projecting between _logTFPR_ and _logTFPQ_ , defined as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and the entry barrier is inferred residually so that the distorted economy’s average formal firm size replicates the Ghanaian economy.

Equipped with these estimates of the distortions, a model of firm dynamics with endogenous informality is proposed to characterize their implications for the firm-size distribution and aggregate outcomes. The model treats formal and informal goods as imperfect substitutes. Consumers confront a nested constant elasticity of substitution demand system combining baskets of formal and informal varieties. There is endogenous entry to the formal and informal sectors. Upon entry, formal producers are endowed with an endogenous innovation technology that shapes growth over their life cycle. The informal sector’s productivity evolves exogenously. Both supply and demand side forces interact in shaping the economy’s response to the distortions. When these are introduced,

> 4 The inference on the life-cycle properties of the firm-size distribution is limited by the cross-sectional nature of the data, which do not allow disentangling the role of firm growth from the role of survival in explaining the rise of the right tail

3
0|100.0|100.0|100.0|100.0|

_Source:_ Authors' calculations with data from RIGA for Ghana and Nepal, from household surveys for Bangladesh, Moldova, Romania, Peru, and Thailand, and from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank) for countries with income-based measures of welfare.

33 _a/_ FGT0 refers to the Foster,Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) measure of the headcount index, which measures the proportion of the population that is counted as poor. _b/_ FGT1 refers to the Foster,Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) measure of the poverty gap index, which adds up the extent to which individuals on average fall below the poverty line, and expresses it as a percentage of the poverty line.

_<mark>c/</mark>_ <mark>FGT2 refers to the Foster,Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) measure of poverty severity, calculated as the poverty gap index squared, which implicitly puts more weight on observations that fall</mark>
input into the national production function, and environmental conservation can lead to increased inputs of natural capital and thus to an increase in income. The use of environmental assets is generally characterized by market failures – external costs and ill-defined property rights being common – and correcting these market failures can increase the effective supply of natural capital, an important input to the production function, hence increasing output; it can also increase human well-being directly by improving air and water quality, something that is not necessarily captured by conventional GDP statistics but is nevertheless the ultimate goal of economic policy.

Indirect contributions of environmental protection to economic growth are also possible because world economies are far from their “optimum.” Indeed, there are many market failures that are not directly due to environmental issues, but that have negative consequences on the environment and the economy. Correcting these market failures thus has co-benefits that go beyond the environment. An obvious example is urban congestion which causes air pollution but also reduces the productivity and economies of scope typically offered by cities.

3
sub-sector have been implemented in thr nast, the subsequent development and analysis of a household energy database has led to the overturning of irR - a.e preconceptions and false paradigms upon which these real actions had been based. For example, the *ed promotion of LPG as a charcoal substitute in Senegal for the last sixteen years has been based o. ssumptions that increased use of butane would lead to a commensurate reduction in charcoal use, and that cubsidies alone would lead to widespread adoption of the fuel. However, a 1987 survey indicated that, despite th. fact that 65% of households in Dakar possess some type of LPG stove, only 2% use the fuel exclusively and, of the 25% of families which use both LPG and charcoal, their consumption of the latter fuel has not changed. In Niger, it was thought that wealthy residences would be the logical market for modern fuels due to their lifestyles and income levels. However, a 1986 study revealed that they were significant consumers of wood because they could afford to buy in bulk, thus making it the cheapest fuel. Also, family members did not have to suffer the negative health and other consequences of wood fires as servants did the cooking. These are just two instances of how, in the absence of accurate information, well-intentioned prejudgments concerning household energy use have or could lead to misdirected actions and investments.

Thus, representative information on household energy plays a pivotal role for institutions which seek to: (a) identify problems and trends; (b) prepare supply and demand projections; (c) engage in energy sector planning, (d) conduct market research; (e) develop effective policies and programs; and (f) eval?ate ongoing and completed projects. To create this resource, a variety of instruments can be employed. On the demand side, a set of information-gathering tools are briefly assessed and the most promising one -- the household energy survey -- is delineated in more detail. For this type of survey
Performance Survey could provide further valuable insights (see, e.g., Hellman and Kaufmann, 2002; Uslaner, 2010).

No matter how good political institutions may be, however, countries will always encounter difficulties in dealing with distributive issues. How one thinks about taxes and inequality reflects ideas of fairness or social justice (Bird et al., 2006). Income inequality is a central social and economic problem in many transition countries. Surprisingly, the link between income inequality and tax morale, tax compliance and tax performance is not well explored. As inequality in the distribution of wealth and income is strongly connected with public views as to how well the fiscal system addresses social objectives with respect to fairness, social justice and redistribution, a higher level of income inequality may lead to lower levels of trust in institutions and eventually to lower tax effort because of widespread tax avoidance and evasion. Highly unequal distributions of income can also lead to low levels of solidarity by the elites toward lower income groups. Furthermore, income inequality may be associated with political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). It may therefore be interesting to explore empirically the link between income inequality and tax morale/tax compliance and tax performance in transition countries (exploring also CEE and FSU countries independently).

In addition, it is important to better understand tax administration‘s behavior, its behavior and its structure in CEE and FSU countries over time. Results in the literature indicate that if the tax administration tries to be honest, fair, informative, and helpful, acting as a _service_ institution and thus treating taxpayers as partners and not inferiors in a hierarchical relationship, tax morale increases and taxpayers have stronger incentives to pay taxes honestly. One could, e.g., conduct surveys with tax administrations to generate further insights.

In summary, the findings clearly indicate the relevance of models of tax compliance that go beyond the conventional economics-of-crime approach and which capture the role of institutions, more in particular, how individuals perceive their governments, in
have a finite pool of worry (Weber, 2006). As concern about one type of risk increases, worry about other risks frequently decreases, as if people had a limited budget to spend on worry. A Pew (2009) opinion poll found that levels of concern about climate change had declined in October 2009 relative to a high in 2006 that was still maintained in May of 2008. Presumably this recent decline in climate change concern is the result of recent increases in concern about the national and world economy and unemployment. Hansen, Marx and Weber (2004) found evidence consistent with a finite pool of worry among farmers in the Argentine Pampas. As concern about climate risk increased in the course of a two-day farm decision workshop that provided information about the potential impacts of increased climate variability, concern about political risk went down (post- vs. pre-workshop) even though the level of political risk had not changed over those two days. In addition, those who stated greater worry about political risk (either pre- or post-workshop) worried less about climate risk. If people’s capacity for worry or concern is finite, then efforts to raise greater concern to motivate protective or mitigation action against some risk by, for example, providing concrete images of possible damages, comes at the cost of potentially reducing concern about other risks. The finite pool of worry concept is related to, though certainly not identical to the concept of risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1998).

Fear appeals are also problematic because of the single-action bias (Weber, 1997), which refers to the propensity to take only a single action in response to a fear signal, even in situations where a broader set of remedies might be called for. Taking the first action to respond to a problem at hand seems to reduce or remove the feeling of worry or concern. Without this affective marker, motivation for further action is reduced. Weber (1997) found that Midwestern farmers engaged in only one of three plausible classes of protective actions against climate
<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 8. Kernel density function of monthly and hourly wages by gender<br>(a) Monthly wages (b) Hourly wages<br>2 4 6 8 10 4 6 8 10 12<br>wage wageh000<br>Monthly wages (women) Monthly wages (men) Hourly wages (women) Hourly wages (men)<br>2 2.5<br>2<br>1.5<br>1.5<br>1<br>1<br>Kernel density Kernel density<br>.5<br>.5<br>0 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Note: In order to avoid negative values in the hourly wage distribution, we multiply by 1000 the Manats of monthly wages before dividing by the hours worked. The monthly wahes are the log transformation of thousands of Manats._ _Source: own elaboration on the ILO School-to-work transition survey of Azerbaijan._ 37
Policy Research Working Paper 7765

# **Abstract**

With 70 percent of its population living in coastal areas and low-lying deltas, Vietnam is exposed to many natural hazards, including river and coastal flooding. These hazards are expected to worsen due to climate change, and the impacts of any change in hazard magnitude may be particularly acute in this region. This paper examines the exposure of the population and poor people in particular to current and future flooding at the country level, using new high-resolution flood hazard maps and spatial socioeconomic data. The paper also examines flood exposure and poverty at the local level within Ho Chi Minh City. The national-level analysis finds that a third (33 percent) of today’s population is already exposed to a flood, which occurs once every 25 years, assuming no protection. For the same return period flood under current socioeconomic conditions, climate change may increase the number exposed to 38 to 46 percent of the population. Climate change impacts can make frequent events as important as rare ones in terms of exposure: for instance, the estimates suggest a 25-year flood under future conditions can expose more people than a 200-year flood under current conditions. Although poor districts are not found to be more exposed to floods at the national level, the city-level analysis of Ho Chi Minh City provides evidence that slum areas are more exposed than other parts of the city. The results of this paper show the benefits of investing today in flood risk management, and can provide guidance as to where future investments may be targeted. Furthermore, while the main strategy in Vietnam today to manage flood risk is to reduce exposure, the increase in exposure estimated in this paper provides support that alternative strategies to reduce vulnerability (such as financing for floor-raising) or improve the ability-to-adapt of households (such as social safety nets) may warrant increased attention.

This paper is a product of the World Bank Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice Group and the Climate Change Cross-Cutting Solutions Area and is a background paper for the World Bank work on “
as well as their family’s quality of life in current day and five years hence. These outcomes are measured both for female (primary grantees) and male (grantees’ partner) respondents.

Second, to measure bargaining power, we create an index, which encapsulates women’s role in intrahousehold decision making. Specifically, we ask questions on decision making across 13 domains (such as decisions on large household purchases, using contraception, taking loan, etc.)<sup>18</sup> and evaluate the following outcomes: (i) fraction of domains for which respondent makes the decision (independent/joint); (ii) fraction of domains in which respondent's opinion is heard; (iii) fraction of domains in which respondent cares about making the decision; (iv) number of domains for which respondent cares AND makes decision; (v) absolute difference in number of domains for which respondent cares about making the decision and actually makes the decision.

Third, women’s empowerment is measured using two outcomes. The first outcome measures self-efficacy among respondents (construction closely follows Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995)) and the second outcome - relative autonomy index (RAI)- measures the extent to which a respondent has autonomy over her motivation in undertaking actions (construction closely follows Seymour and Peterman (2018)).

Fourth, to examine the pathway on social networks, we record information on whether the respondent receives information - on topics such as family planning, child health, education, government services and income earning opportunities - from a community worker/representative of the family development sessions (commissioned under the 4P program) or through some other source.

Finally, to encapsulate men’s response to plausible increase in women’s empowerment and bargaining power, we evaluate changes in men’s personal attitudes towards gender equity. To measure these attitudes, we seek answers on respondent’s personal attitude on 9 statements that relate to gender equality and assumed gender roles in the society (
their use results in a loss of information when applied at a local scale. The distorting effect of this is somewhat reduced by using spatial buffers around asset location points. Conceptually, these buffers could be imagined as reducing the asset location point resolution and thus counteracting some of the distorting effects of low-resolution hazard data. In addition, the underestimation of flood extent for extreme coastal flooding in tropical regions, together with the absence of wave setup in the coastal data, will probably result in an underestimation of the effect of flooding, especially in regions where the coast is relatively steep. In future, the development of localized natural hazard models at the national scale could add significant value to risk assessments, especially in the case of coastal flooding.

As the flood maps used here are modelled without information on flood protection, this paper uses an unconventional approach to incorporate flood protection infrastructure into the exposure estimates (section 4.1). The flood exposure offset determined for each province, every return period, and every flood type requires some limiting assumptions – for example, that protection infrastructure protects all assets within a province uniformly. This assumption might be violated for assets like industrial zones, which might be more likely to be situated in places with more advanced protection infrastructure. For other assets such as rice fields, this assumption seems more likely to hold. Still, to avoid severely overestimating exposure when not accounting for protection systems in place, this approach seems reasonable for the scale of the analysis conducted. While it prohibits exposure estimates at the subprovincial level, it proves useful for estimates at the provincial and national level. Future research aimed at incorporating protection infrastructure into large-scale flood modelling could help make such workarounds redundant.

As exposure is derived from the combination of hazard and asset information, the results produced hinge on the quality of the asset data to the same degree. The geolocated datasets of hotels and schools are sourced from volunteer contributions, and do not represent all hotels and schools in Vietnam (sections 3.6 and 3.5)
variable, the spending coefficient collapses, becoming undistinguishable from zero. Statistically, the interaction is driven by a positive correlation between spending and governance quality, aligning with what has been documented in the literature.

Quantitatively, these effects are considerable. Doubling spending is estimated to significantly increase transport infrastructure performance as measured by the LPI:Timeliness by roughly 0.27 index points. For example, this corresponds to improving the transport service reliability of Mozambique to that of Cambodia. However, keeping governance fixed statistically, the effect on transport reliability of one additional dollar of public spending is reduced by a factor of 6 Evaluating effect sizes through standardized coefficients reveals that governance quality actually explains the bulk of statistical variation in transport reliability.

In other words, increasing spending and improving governance in parallel enhances transport system performance on average 6 times faster than increasing spending alone. Figure 3 illustrates the strength of this interaction, i.e. how the marginal effect of public road spending per capita melts once governance quality is taken into account. Statistically, results suggest that only about 8% of variation in transport reliability may be explained by investment spending, while about 44% is explained by a country’s governance quality.

Apart from that, population density and high rates of urbanization are significantly associated with better transport infrastructure resilience while dynamic economies, as measured by GDP growth, show more transport service irregularities.

To conclude, various empirical specifications, across infrastructure types, suggests that governance quality is a major determinant of infrastructure quality. Often enough, it outweighs the relevance of natural risk or socio-economic factors.

_Figure 3: Relation between transport resilience and public road spending per capita_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 5<br>4<br>3<br>2<br>1<br>0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400<br>Annual public road spending per capita in constant 2009 USD (OECD + BOOST)<br>WB Logistic Performance Index: Timeliness (1-5)<br>
# **3. Scale, technology adoption and global food supplies: Past lessons and future prospects**

Despite many changes brought about by Asia’s Green Revolution, sector productivity in Asia is still driven by what happens on small farms, and the same is true in Sub-Saharan Africa. In East Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 95 percent of the farms are less than 5 hectares and these farms occupy most of the farmland in these regions (Lowder, Skoet and Singh, 2014). Additionally, historical farm census data suggest that the small scale of farming in Asia and Africa persists, even when economic growth in non-agricultural sectors is high. In fact, if there is a noticeable trend, the trend is toward smaller average farm size (Table 1).

Nonetheless, the small scale of farms in Africa need not stand in the way of technology adoption and productivity gains. The breakthroughs that launched Green Revolutions in Asia and Latin America largely centered on seeds, not machines, so the benefits were available to farms of all sizes. Nevertheless, initial adoption rates were highest on Asia’s small farms. For example, Evenson (2003, p. 450) reports that by 1998, about 82 percent of the area in Asia planted to major crops used improved seeds. In Latin America, where farms are larger, adoption rates were similar for wheat, a significant export crop; however, rates were lower overall, with 62 percent of the land planted to modern varieties by 1998.

Only in Africa did the spread of the new technologies stall. By 1998, only 27 percent of farmland in Sub-Saharan Africa was planted to modern varieties. Adoption rates improved subsequently, but remained well below rates on Asia’s small farms. By 2005, the adoption of new varieties were 45 percent for maize, 26 percent for rice, and 15 percent for sorghum (Binswanger and McCalla 2010; Pingali 2012).

However, gains outside Africa were sufficient to drive global food markets. During the first
humanitarian assistance, underscoring the importance of establishing a sound drought response framework. To manage drought risks systematically, in 2005 the GoE began implementing jointly with its DPs the Productive Safety Net Programme to respond to food insecurity and droughts, and has established a seasonal needs assessment process to monitor food security and issue humanitarian appeals where necessary.

## III.1 The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)

The PSNP represents the second-largest social safety net in Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>24</sup> , and provides cash or food assistance, depending on availability of food in the market, to chronically food insecure households in chronically food insecure _woredas_ (districts). Since 2005, transfers have been made for six months in a given calendar year, and are equivalent in value to 15 kg of cereals per household member per month, or its cash equivalent. Under the current PSNP IV, which commenced in 2015, the transfer value will be adapted to 15 kg of grain and 4 kg of pulses in order to increase the nutritional value of the transfer. Beneficiary selection within the PSNP is completed based on geographic and community targeting. Based on a history of emergency food needs, the GoE identified the most food insecure _woredas_ . As a second step, beneficiaries are selected within communities according to pre-identified criteria.

> 20 FDRE (2015).

> 21 World Bank (2014b).

> 22 Additionally to the PSNP and humanitarian appeals to address drought risks, the GoE’s GTP II includes objectives to enhance resilience to drought risks. These include, for instance, initiatives to strengthen natural resource management and watershed development, as well as scaling up best practices to help mitigate vulnerability to drought. Furthermore, the GTP II envisages reducing the vulnerability to drought risks through small and large scale irrigation development (FDRE, 2015).

> 23 Guha-Sapir, Below and Hoyois, EM-DAT database.

> 24 Following South Africa’s Child Support Grant, see World Bank (2014a).

4