rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
protected and that a lasting peace will prevent any disruption of operations or damage to fixed assets. However, they will need incentives to do so, and experience shows that firms are more likely to invest when in better technology and raise productivity when there is pressure on their profit margins and they realize that (apart from the promise of strong institutions, the protection of property rights and reliable infrastructure) there will be no special help forthcoming from the government. In other words, when hard budget constraints and competition, both from domestic and foreign sources, are present.<sup>13</sup> Box 6 discusses competitiveness in Sri Lanka (with more details in Annex 3), while the next section focuses on hard budget constraints for state-owned enterprises.

## **Box 6. Sri Lanka: A Survey of Constraints to Doing Business**

A scan of the recent survey-based indicators of the business climate and overall competitiveness in Sri Lanka reveals a promising outlook for the business environment provided the commitment to implement stated government policy remains strong. The main take away from the survey-based evidence is that macroeconomic policy constraints have been consistently at or near the top of the main constraints to doing business in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka ranks 89 out of 183 countries in the World Bank Group‘s overall ―Doing Business‖ rankings in 2012, with tax policy being long considered a major drag on private sector investment. The same result comes out when looking at recent Global Competitiveness reports. Sri Lanka ranks 62 out of 139 countries in the overall Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2010-11. Sri Lanka seems to be lagging in terms of _Macroeconomic environment_ , especially when it comes to Government budget balance, Government debt, and Country credit rating. _Labor market efficiency_ and _Technological readiness_ come out quite low (Sri Lanka ranks 128, 111 and 85 out of 139 countries respectively).

The emergence of internationally competitive firms in Sri Lanka will also depend importantly on the trade regime. Here too the conclusion is that it is squarely in
# Introduction

Doll, Muller, and Elvidge (2000) were the first to use satellite data to spatially distribute GDP on a geographic grid. Their methodology relied on night‐time lights, which generally gave an indication of where cities were, while the intensity of the light gave an indication of both population density and intensity of production, with the more intense lights being associated with higher GDP per unit area. The methodology they used was especially helpful in countries for which finely distributed subnational data on economic activities were not available. It allowed researchers and policy makers to have a better idea as to which cities and locales were of high importance to the national economy, and which were under‐ developed.

However, this methodology performed poorly for countries with relatively large agricultural GDPs, since the night‐time lights were more of an indication of manufacturing and urban population rather than farming and rural population. In 2006, Nordhaus (2006) proposed using population to distribute GDP. If GDP per capita were relatively evenly distributed within administrative areas in which the values were aggregated, this could provide a reasonably accurate estimate of the geographic distribution of GDP. Several authors since then have used this idea and similar methodology to distribute agriculture GDP using rural population<sup>5</sup> or land cover (e.g. Ghosh, Powell, and Elvidge, et al., 2010; Gunasekera et al. 2015; Rafa, Moyer, and Wang et al., 2017).

In this paper, we propose two new methods for distributing agricultural GDP across a geographic grid. The first is a spatial allocation methodology which relies on several gridded data sets showing location of agricultural production. It starts with several components of agricultural GDP such as crop, livestock, fishery and timber production to provide a prior estimate of gridded agricultural GDP. The estimate is then reconciled with national and sub‐national agricultural GDP values using an entropy‐based data fusion method. The second is a “spatial disaggregation” method that relies on imposing
‐level data from one common source.<sup>7</sup> The results of this paper suggest that regulatory barriers in services have diverse effects on downstream manufacturing performance depending on the _type_ of regulatory measure in question. Our policy variables are split into pure _entry_ barriers and those that relate to the anti‐competitive policies on the operations of the firm, which we call _conduct_ regulations. At the aggregate level for the economy as a whole, conduct regulations have a most significant negative effect. A second result found in this study is that economic gains arising from reform in services are particularly large, and in some instances larger than previously has been found for individual developing countries. This finding is interesting in itself as services market reforms have been particularly on the minds of policy makers as a tool for development for lower income countries. Our results suggest that at least equally large gains can be reached for developed economies, which are expected to have already better functioning services sectors.

Third, our findings using interaction terms also show that in fact regulatory measures that are restrictive in countries with weaker institutions are relatively more burdensome for downstream firms. One potential explanation is that services are regulation‐intense and sound institutions in the form that strong regulators would be able to put in place a well‐designed set of regulations so as to correct the many market failures from which services suffer. Further interaction results show that firms holding a significant foreign share are particularly hurt by regulations on the conduct of the firm compared to firms which are purely domestic, which points to the fact that although these regulations are in principle applied on a non‐discriminatory basis affecting domestic and foreign firms equally, they nonetheless _de facto_ are more burdensome for international firms. Finally, we also check whether the results are any

> 7 In addition, this paper also uses international comparable reform indexes from the OECD, plus comparable input‐ output linkages that are obtained from Eurostat and are hence developed methodologically in a consistent manner.

5
public transport does not rely on any assumptions as it is built in the transit network data that was collected.

Second, the threshold of 20 minutes is used as the maximum walking time _per leg_ of the trip. For example, an entire trip may include a 10-minute walk from home to a bus stop, and then a further 5-minute walk to connect between two buses, and another 15-minute walk to arrive at the final destination of the trip. But each of these walking times are limited to 20 minutes. This restriction is chosen to reflect particularly vulnerable and time constrained mobility. A trip could hypothetically involve walking any distance, and in networks with poor transit coverage, long walking distances may provide substantial added accessibility. However, for the purpose of this analysis focusing on women – whose movements are more time constrained, often physically constrained, and who are more vulnerable in waking long distances – a relatively 43
Valerio, and T. Rajadel, 2014. “STEP Skills Measurement Surveys - Innovative Tools for Assessing Skills." _<mark>Social protection and labor discussion paper</mark>_ <mark>1421. World Bank Group, Washington, DC.</mark>

- Primi, R., C. Zanon, D. Santos, F. De Fruyt, and O. P. John, 2016. “Anchoring Vignettes Can They Make Adolescent Self-Reports of Social- Emotional Skills More Reliable, Discriminant, and Criterion-Valid?” _European Journal of Psychological Assessment,_ <mark>32: 39-51</mark>

- Pritchett, L. and A. Beatty, 2015 “Slow down, you’re going too fast: Matching curricula to student skill levels” _International Journal of Educational Development: 40C : 276-288._

- Radloff, L.S., 1977. “The CES-D Scale: A Self-Report Depression Scale for Research in the General Population”, _Applied Psychological Measurement_ 1(3): 385-401.

- Rammstedt, B., C.J. Kemper and I. Borg, 2013. “ Correcting Big Five Personality Measurements for Acquiescence: An 18-Country Cross-Cultural Study”, _European Journal of Personality_ , 27(1): 71-81.

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Policy Research Working Paper 10130

# **Abstract**

Using the Commitment to Equity methodology, this study investigates differences in the welfare impact of taxes and government spending on men and women in Ethiopia. It analyzes the incidence, progressivity, and pro-poorness of various taxes and transfers and their effects on income mobility, poverty, and inequality using individual-level data from the 2018/19 Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey. The results show that the fiscal system as a whole is progressive, equalizing, and poverty-reducing. It moved about one in five individuals from one income group to another, and more women than men transitioned to a higher income group, making them relatively better off. However, some of its elements have differential effects on gender equality. Direct and indirect taxes have differential inequality-reducing and poverty-increasing effects for men and women. The inequality-reducing effects are stronger for men, whereas the poverty-increasing effects of some of them, including informal taxes and value-added taxes, are higher for women. On the transfer side, direct social protection transfers and indirect transfers, mainly spending on primary education and health services, promote gender equality better than other types of government spending.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at aambel@worldbank.org, wtesfaye@worldbank.org and myonis@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.
and the largest share of all households within each decile that are beneficiaries (red bars). The differences between the top three deciles and the remaining ones are remarkable in all countries, although less pronounced in Nigeria. As noted above, in Niger, the poor (i.e., the first four deciles) do not benefit from the subsidy at all; Uganda shows a similar pattern, and in Mali only the fourth decile shows a very small amount of beneficiaries. We conclude that in the five African countries analyzed, and using the household data, tariff data, and the methodology described, consumption subsidies are regressive (albeit relatively less so in Nigeria).

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strategy where treatment is continuous and corresponds to the ratio of a state’s total public debt to its free disposable income in 2016Q1.<sup>4</sup> That is, the treatment status of states is fixed over time and determined by their indebtedness one quarter prior to the implementation of the Law.<sup>5</sup> To examine the impact of the Law on fiscal consolidation, we match data on the indebtedness of local governments with information on their public expenditures and revenues. We also match to this data information on poverty rates as well as GDP and employment growth to analyze the impact of the reform on economic activity of states. Finally, we use exhaustive loan-level credit register data matched with information on bank and firm balance-sheets. This data helps us explore if the debt restrictions imposed by the FD Law trigger a reallocation of bank lending away from local governments and into private firms. Importantly, as local governments in Mexico fund themselves almost exclusively through banks, our loan-level data allows us to examine the effect of the Law on the supply of credit.<sup>6</sup> We find that following the FD Law, ex ante more indebted states undertake larger fiscal consolidation, in the form of higher tax rates and larger public expenditure cuts—including in areas such as infrastructure and social protection. Regarding fiscal adjustments, we find that a onestandard-deviation increase in state ex ante indebtedness is associated with a 10 percent increase in tax rates, while on spending adjustments, there is a 4.4 percent contraction in the ratio of public spending to GDP, driven in part by a reduction of spending on both social protection and on infrastructure projects (though there are stronger effects on non-infrastructure projects).

> 4 One key identifying assumption to estimate the causal effects of the introduction of the FD Law is that all outcomes of interest would have followed parallel trends across states in its absence. While we cannot explicitly test for this assumption, we check if all our outcomes of interest (
this form of migration. The migrants are about evenly split between urban and rural areas in Senegal. Very few are involved in agricultural activities, unlike in their rural areas of origin, with the main occupations being working in construction and self-employment activities such as small-scale trading. We do not have income data for many of these migrants, but for those that we do, the average reported income is 6,333 Gambian dalasi (GMB) per month. This is in line with the wages of 75,000 to 100,000 CFA (6,500 to 8,700 GMB) reported by the Gambian migrants residing in Senegal who were interviewed for our informational video, and is more than 80 percent higher than the average earnings of 3,452 29
city and country level corruption leads to better performance of cities in providing access to services.

In summary, we find that there is an effect of city globalization on performance of cities using both the Taylor and the UN databases. While the strength of the effects appears to be somewhat more robust for governance variables than for globalization, it is present for the latter.

# **5 Determinants of City Governance**

## **5.1 A simple Framework**

The dramatic increase in empirical work on governance over the past few years has spearheaded a more in-depth analysis of the manifestations, causes, and consequences of misgovernance and corruption. It has drawn from cross-country data as well as in-country diagnostic perspectives. Significant inroads have been made in unbundling governance to measure and analyze its detailed components, as well as in exploring empirically the governance performance of different institutions—such as parliament, police, and customs.

We use three indicators of governance to investigate the relationship between globalization and governance. The first is an indicator of governance from the political perspective which we represent by an indicator of low illegal party financing. The second is a measure 26
between 2005 and 2010, prior to application. The deforestation data come from Hansen et al. (2013). This dataset provides information on annual forest loss beginning in 2000

> 8Housing characteristics included brick or wooden walls, concrete, metal, fiber, cement, or tile roof, cement, wooden, mosaic or marble floor, number of rooms. The housing index also includes measures of access to public services, including existence of water and sewage connections, and amount of water and electricity availability. The assets index is composed of responses to questions on the presence or absence of the following items: television set, refrigerator, blender, microwave oven, laptop, car, truck, motorbike, bicycle, gas or electrical cooker, telephone landline, and mobile phone.

> 9The Mexican government has its own deforestation risk index (“Index of Economic Pressure”) which is used for targeting the PES program and setting payment levels (Table 1). We do not use this index due to the fact that it does not have complete coverage of the entire country, is not specific to the types of land that are of interest for the current study, and is not limited to the specific, pre-treatment years that we use to create our index.

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chosen, because the KKZ rule of law index does not vary dramatically over time.<sup>6</sup>

# <u>D.  Depositor Monitoring</u>

We use the level of deposit insurance to measure the intensity of depositor monitoring. More specifically, we compute, for each country _i_ , the inverse of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage to per capita GDP:

> 5 KKZ data set and its description are available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html. See Haselmann et al. (2010) on the effects of alternative legal changes on bank lending in transition economies. 6 The correlation between the 2004 data and those from other years runs from .91 to .98.

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*4.4.2 Analysis of Administrative Data**

Administrative data were gathered at the subdistrict level, covering a total of 395 subdistricts across the 79 districts included in the analysis. Focusing on smaller areas rather than the entire district reduces measurement error and increases the precision of our estimates. Moreover, the subdistrictlevel analysis also alleviates concerns about health facility records in control districts potentially including outcomes for individuals exposed to the campaign. The smaller scale of subdistricts allows for a more precise matching with our targeted areas.<sup>29</sup> In practice, we use GIS tools to identify

> 28State governments in India play a significant role in the administration of health services, including hospitals, public health programs, and healthcare infrastructure within their territories.

> 29Recall that the implementation of our cluster-level design did not rely on the boundaries of the districts but on a series of circles around their major cities. These circles were used in the control group to identify areas within a district to be excluded from the campaign (see Section 4.1). This implies that some parts of the districts in the control group received ads. While this is not a problem for the survey-based analysis -in fact, respondents were precisely sampled within the circles, it creates potential concerns when analyzing administrative records. In the control group, districtlevel data would reflect records from individuals who were potentially exposed to the campaign, which would confound and downward-bias our estimates. Focusing on subdistricts alleviates this concern, as their smaller dimension allows us to consider those that better coincide with our circles.

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- Lucas, A. M. (2010). Malaria Eradication and Educational Attainment: Evidence from Paraguay and Sri Lanka. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 2(2):46.

- Lucas, A. M. (2013). The Impact of Malaria Eradication on Fertility. _Economic Development and Cultural Change_ , 61(3):607–631.

- Lucas, A. M. and Mbiti, I. M. (2012a). Access, Sorting, and Achievement: The Short-Run Effects of Free Primary Education in Kenya. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 4(4):226–253.

- Lucas, A. M. and Mbiti, I. M. (2012b). Does Free Primary Education Narrow Gender Differences in Schooling? Evidence from Kenya. _Journal of African Economies_ , 21(5):691–722.

- Lundborg, P., Nilsson, A., and Rooth, D.-O. (2014). Parental Education and Offspring Outcomes: Evidence from the Swedish Compulsory School Reform. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 6(1):253– 278.

- McCrary, J. and Royer, H. (2011). The Effect of Female Education on Fertility and Infant Health: Evidence from School Entry Policies Using Exact Date of Birth. _American Economic Review_ , 101(1):158–195.

- McGavock, T. J. (2015). Child Brides, Bargaining Power, and Reform of Ethiopia’s Family Law. Working Paper.

- Minnesota Population Center and the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (2017). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.5.

- Negash, T. (1996). Rethinking Education in Ethiopia. Uppsala. Nordiska Afrikainstituet.

- Ofcansky, T. P. and Berry, L. B. (1993). Ethiopia, A Country Study. Washington DC. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

- Osili,
_N_ , so that the wave size is _Nt_ = _N/T_ (assuming equalsized waves for simplicity). We would expect more efficient learning with more waves and more chances to adapt, and indeed the simulations in Kasy and Sautmann (2021a) with data from three existing experiments show how splitting the sample into 2, 4, and 10 waves monotonically shrinks the expected policy regret. In practice, however, the marginal gains are likely decreasing in _T_ .<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the gains must be weighed against the cost. The experimenter might solve The second term penalizes the cost of increasing _T_ . The first term is the term of interest: the expectation of the number of beneficiaries _M_ times the per-person outcome in the chosen arm _θ_<sup>_k∗_</sup> , discounted by _δ_<sup>_T_</sup> due to the implementation delay.

> 9This is at least in part due to indivisibility issues. As _T_ grows and the wave size shrinks, it becomes harder to implement the adaptive algorithm faithfully, and the actual assignment shares may differ substantially from the exploration sampling shares _qt_<sup>_kN_</sup> _t_<sup>_k_,especiallyifthesampleisalsostratified(seealsosection5).Withmanytreatmentarms,insmallwavessomearmsmay</sup> not be assigned at all, updating about these arms will proceed slowly in terms of _t_ , and the assignment shares may remain far from optimal for a long period of time.

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outcomes, it is inefficient to fully correct for baseline imbalances between treatment and control groups.

Section 2 begins with a theoretical discussion of what power calculations tell us about the gain to be had from using more rounds of data, and provides examples for common types of economic data. Section 3 then derives implications for the choice of how many pre-treatment and post-treatment waves to use. The bottom line is that collecting multiple measurements posttreatment will make most sense when the data have low autocorrelation; whereas baseline data is of most use when the autocorrelation is high (although there are of course other important uses of baseline data apart from improving the power to estimate treatment effects, such as for examining treatment heterogeneity, and so one may still wish to do a baseline for these other reasons – something I discuss at the end of the paper). It would appear that for many economic outcomes, experiments with a fixed budget to conduct a total of K surveys would have greater power when dividing that K over multiple post-treatment rounds than having a baseline and single follow-up. Section 4 then discusses additional practical issues which are likely to arise when considering multiple measurements in economic experiments, many of which are not common concerns in clinical trials. Section 5 concludes.

# **2. What is the gain from more rounds?**

Let _Yi,t_ be an outcome of interest for household or firm _i_ in survey round _t_ . Consider an intervention which assigns units to receive a binary treatment (such as getting business training or not, or getting a conditional cash transfer or not). Suppose there are _m_ pretreatment survey rounds (labeled –( _m_ -1) through 0) and _r_ post-treatment survey rounds (labeled 1 through _r_ ). A common method in economics for estimating the treatment effect<sup>3</sup> of the intervention on the outcome of interest is via the following difference-in-differences specification: where _EVERTREATi_ is a dummy variable which takes value one if unit _i_ is assigned to the treatment group and zero if it