rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
issued exclusively in the name of men with 8% joint and the remainder in the name of women only.

While perceived risk of conflict is, with 2% negligible, levels of perceived transferability are also very low; with 30%, the share of parcels that can be sold is comparable to the average (26%) from a nation-wide household survey (Ali _et al._ 2020), implying that land cultivated by large farms is no more transferable than that by smallholders despite much higher levels of formalization. Only about half of titled land is perceived to be transferable by sale, suggesting that rights supposedly associated with having title may be difficult or impossible to exercise, possibly because traditional authorities continue to exercise oversight over patterns of land use. Such limited transferability can reduce investment incentives and slow structural transformation by constraining productive farmers’ ability to take over land from less productive ones and to access credit which banks may not be willing to provide if lack of an active land sales market (as indeed supported by our data) would increase the cost of foreclosure. Indeed, self-assessed ability to access credit is, with 20% for titled land, only slightly above the level for the entire sample (17%).

Quite surprisingly in light of the high demand and willingness to pay for formal documentation noted above, possession of title also does not seem to be related to either the self-assessed risk of land dispute or the level of soil conservation investment. For the subset of cultivated parcels, levels of crop output or profit per ha are not affected by title status. However, self-assessed land values for titled land are, with ZMK 14,300 per ha well above the sample mean of 10,600 per ha. This could indicate speculative land holding or imply that barriers to acquisition of title generate rents that are capitalized in land prices.

13
marginal delay caused by one extra vehicle is  _Tf_<sup>_A_</sup>  _V_  1 . Multiplying by _V_ gives the added delay aggregated over all road mileage. Thus, we can see that the marginal delay is a constant multiple ( _θ =_ 4) of the average delay.

We assume a free flow travel speed of 25 miles per hour for cars, which implies a free flow time per mile (<sup>_T_</sup> _fA_<sup>) of 2.4 minutes (Parry and Strand 2010 estimate a free flow speed of 28 miles per hour</sup> based on simulating a model of the Santiago road network). And based on averaging over estimates for average auto travel speeds from IAPT (2007), 12.4 miles per hour, and for the representative 6<sup>th</sup> of October road, 15.5 miles per hour, we assume the current auto speed (averaged across the GCMA and time of day) is 14 miles per hour, implying a time per mile ( _T_<sup>_A_</sup> ) of 4.3. Thus, the average delay is 1.9 minutes per mile and the marginal delay is 7.5 minutes per mile, or 0.13 hours per mile.

The gross hourly wage rate for Cairo is taken to be $1.55 (IMF 2007). Following US studies (e.g. see the review in Small and Verhoef 2007) we assume the value of travel time is one-half the wage rate, or $0.78 per hour. Multiplying by the marginal delay per mile gives a marginal congestion cost for autos of 9.7 cents per vehicle mile. Marginal congestion costs for other vehicles are obtained by scaling up according to their passenger car equivalents.

_Accidents_ . According to police-reported data, there were 730 road deaths in Cairo in 2006 (CAPMAS 2010).<sup>19</sup
Figure 5: Main Livelihoods of Sudanese Households, 2009 and 2014/15 <!-- Start of picture text --> 60%<br>40%<br>20%<br>0%<br> Crop Farming Animal Wages & Other Crop Farming Animal Wages & Other<br>Husbandry Salary* Livelihood Husbandry Salary* Livelihood<br>Urban Rural<br>2009 2014/15<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors’ calculations using 2014/15 NHBPS and 2009 NBHS.

_Note:_ * 'Wages and salary' may include some households that are employed in agrarian work but are paid in wages. The individual survey, as opposed to the household survey, suggests that around 20 and 30 percent of such individuals in rural Sudan were in fact farming crops or raising livestock in 2009 and 2014/15, respectively.

Poverty rates among agricultural households are significantly higher than the poverty rates of nonagricultural households (Figure 6a). This disparity is observed both in the rural and urban population and holds true for both 2009 and 2014/15. Though overall rural poverty has reduced significantly between 2009 and 2014/15, this disparity has stayed almost constant. Within rural Sudan, poverty is especially high for those engaged in crop farming, as opposed to those engaged in animal husbandry (Figure 6b). The higher rates of poverty for agrarian households further motivate this study to examine agricultural production in Sudan and its impacts on household welfare.

6
12 classified under three main lists: a liberalization list consisting essentially of raw materials and spare parts not competing with domestic production for which importation is free: a restricted list consisting of intermediary and final goods mostly manufactured in Turkey for which an import license is required; and a · quota list, with commodity-specific quotas further allocated between industrialists and importers.

Students of Turkey's foreign trade regime have noted that these extensive QRa have led to rent-seeking activity on the part of tnduatrtalista. 12/ Grais, de Melo and Urata (1985) draw on the concept of 11virtual11 prices introduced by Neary and Roberta (1980) to estimate the welfare coats of rationing in Turkey with an 8-sector CGE model calibrated to 1978 Turkish data. The use of virtual prices (i.e. those prices which would induce an unrationed household or firm, to behave in the same manner as when faced with a vector of ration constraints) allows reoptiaization over unrationed quantities, thereby allowing for spillover into other markets when adjuatment to the quota is by quantity rather than price.

In the simulations, consumers are rationed .in their purchases of i~orta of final goode and producers in their purchases of imports of interaediatea. ~ Furthermore, producers are assumed to engage in rentaeeking activity. The approach to implementing rent-seeking behavior· is to aaau.e that the production function for rent seeking is the same as the production function of what the authors refer to as "traditional" output. The producer, however, must purchase both the "traditional" and the "rent-seeking" ca..odities. Furthermore, we assume that the entire value of the rents, R, is apent ·on the production of the rent-seeking activity. Dropping sector aubacripta, at equilibriua the following will hold:

-~ ' .
crop cutting and satellite-based methods for crop yield estimation.<sup>3</sup>

## **2.2 Fieldwork details**

Four 10x10 km areas (henceforth referred to as strata) were geospatially delineated in Dio ̈ıla to ensure heterogeneity in terms of relief and terrain type. In each stratum, 150 households were to be selected and the number of households selected in each of the 17 villages located across the four strata was proportional to the total number of households in the villages found during the listing exercise. Given the low incidence of inter-cropping in our study area, only households with pure stand sorghum plots were considered for data collection. In each sampled household, one pure stand sorghum plot was randomly selected among the pure stand sorghum plots cultivated by the household. The result of this sampling exercise was 600 sorghum pure stand plots (one in each) of 600 households distributed in 17

> 1Sorghum yield and varieties identification methodological survey. The survey was designed as part of the World Bank LSMS methodological research agenda on measurement of crop yields in household surveys.

> 2Author’s calculation based on the Mali LSMS-ISA 2017 data.

> 3The analysis related to remote sensing measurement of yields and how the method compares to other methods is pursued in (Lobell et al., 2019). We compare part of the results obtained in both studies later in this analysis.

4
%|9.0|
|Oman|2.45|53%|25%|-28.1|54%|25%|-28.3|
|Qatar|3.77|24%|9%|-15.4|24%|9%|-15.4|
|Saudi Arabia|1.53|63%|44%|-19.0|63%|44%|-19.0|
|United Arab Emirates|2.62|29%|14%|-19.0|29%|14%|-15.1|
|* Workingagepopulatio|n(15-64years). Data fro|m WDI serie|s SP.POP.15|64.FE.IN an|d SP.POP.15|64.MA.IN for|2020.|

28
classification belong to the non-tradables sector, are exporters. Therefore, our non-tradable sector includes mostly firms serving the domestic market, while our analysis of the moderating effect of exporting and foreign ownership considers to the extent possible the influence of services firms operating in the tradable sector. Details are provided in Appendix Table B2.

# _Mobility and congestion variables_

We obtain measures of mobility and congestion indexes from Akbar et al. (2018; 2021), who use travel time predictions from millions of simulated trips to compute city-level speed indices. Specifically, the database of Akbar et al. (2021) makes use of roughly 538 million trip instances in 1,228 cities<sup>8</sup> that have been queried on Google Maps between June and October 2019. In each

> 8 Countries in which Google Maps is restricted (e.g., China and the Republic of Korea) and a few other cities that are missing credible variation in real-time travel data were excluded.

10
ARM MYS PAK LKA<br>KEN<br>40% BGD KHMTZA GEOARMLAOVNM UKR 40% BGD KHM TZA TJKGEO LAOKGZVNM IND UKR<br>20% TJK BLR 20% BLR<br>IDN KGZ IDN THA<br>RUS RUS<br>0% IRN 0% NPL PHL IRN<br>NPLTURTHA PHL KAZ TUR<br>-20% KAZ -20%<br>AZE AZE<br>-40% -40%<br>0% 50% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%<br>Debt to GDP ratio at end-2016 Debt to GDP ratio at end-2016<br>Debt to GDP ratio at end-2030 Debt to GDP ratio at end-2030<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: WEO, WIND Database, LIC DSF DSAs and de Soyres (2019).

Sources: WEO, WIND Database, LIC DSF DSAs and de Soyres (2019).

We have conducted two sensitivity analyses to assess the vulnerability of BRI recipient countries to a change in the cost of borrowing. Projections presented in Figure 17 are based on the historical average of the real interest rates,<sup>46</sup> which results in a negative real interest-growth differential for all but one country in our sample. We therefore assess the sensitivity of debt sustainability to increased cost of financing

> 45 The 5 LIDCs are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal and Tajikistan; The 6 EMs are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia. 46 1 2016 ) ∑ 10 � ) ii ii 2007 (1 + aan nna nn nnaai rri ii rraai ıı̅ = (−1) + ii (1 + nnaaiinnaaiin aa rraai

27
placement.<sup>3</sup> They argue that infrastructure placement can be presumed exogenous in the equations measuring women’s work or school attendance, once these geographical characteristics have been included as additional explanatory variables.

We here adopt a novel approach, by building a (pseudo) panel of clusters/communities based on their spatial GPS coordinates. The use of panel data specific techniques will then allow us to account for cluster/community-specific unobserved effects and hence to control for the endogeneity of infrastructure placement.

In order to control for potential endogeneity bias due to unobserved individual/household characteristics, we propose to estimate school attendance at the cluster/community level, by calculating community averages from household data, along the lines of Dinkelman (2009) and Koolwal and van de Walle (2013). As argued by these authors, under the assumption that endogeneity arises from individual choices within communities, access to water can be treated as exogenous if community averages are used instead of household data.

# **4. Data and descriptive statistics**

The Republic of Ghana (hereafter only Ghana) is a country in West Africa, on the Gulf of Guinea. Situated at only a few degrees northern latitude, it enjoys a warm climate throughout the year. Ghana is divided into ten administrative regions, and has a population of about 24 million (a map of the ten regions is provided in Appendix A). Gross National Income (GNI) was assessed at USD 1,190 per capita in 2009 (World Bank, 2011).<sup>4</sup> Agriculture contributed about one-third of the country’s gross domestic product. Although Ghana has been classified by the World Bank as a middle-income country, it struggles with a water deficit and widespread lack of sanitation. Access to an improved water source rose from only about half of the population in 1990 to 82% in 2008.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, access to sanitation has increased from 7% to only
possible for any of the 86 countries or country groups in Version 6 of the GTAP model and any of its 57 sectors of production (20 agricultural and processed food sectors, 22 other manufacturing sectors, and 15 services sectors). Since Armington elasticities are included, bilateral as well as total trade effects can be explored. This enables far more sophisticated analyses for preferential and multilateral trade negotiations than was possible only a few years ago.

GTAP is of course not the only such global CGE model, but it is certainly the most widely used. Others were also used in the ex post analysis of the Uruguay Round (see the various chapters in Martin and Winters 1996) and are now being used for ex ante analyses of the current WTO round of trade negotiations and the numerous bilateral and regional freetrade-area proposals that have become fashionable again in recent years.

Another popular family of models arose from expanding a global macro model by adding some sectoral detail (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1995). While having far fewer sectors and regions than GTAP, and while relying heavily on the GTAP database, the McKibbin family of models includes capital markets and is dynamic and so is able to generate paths of adjustment to simulated shocks. As in dynamic national CGE models, the latter feature has obvious appeal to policymakers concerned with the short to medium term effects of reform on their constituents.

# **_c._** _Adjustment costs_

The private costs of adjustment for firms and workers to trade reform are paramount in many people’s minds, as reform forces some industries to downsize or close so as to allow others to expand (Matusz and Tarr 2000; Francois 2003). There are also social costs to consider, involving social safety net provisions in so far as such schemes are developed/drawn on by losers from reform (e.g., unemployment payments plus training grants to build up new skills so displaced workers can earn the same wage as before), and perhaps increased costs of crime in so far as its incidence rises with
what extent Brazilian banks are exposed to the loss of biodiversity through their lending to non-financial corporates. First, we describe the extent to which the banking sector is indirectly dependent on ecosystem services, which is our proxy for physical risks. Using the ENCORE database, which details and assigns a score on the dependencies on 21 ecosystem services for 86 business processes, we link the latter with economic sectors and then we determine bank credit exposures to those sectors using BCB data. This gives us evidence of Brazilian banks’ exposure to sectors that are highly or very highly dependent on one or more ecosystem services. Second, we describe the extent to which Brazilian banks finance companies that potentially operate in protected areas and priority areas for biodiversity conservation, and that are involved in environmentally controversial activities. This is the proxy we use to measure transition risks. Based on _Relação Anual de Informações Sociais_ (RAIS) and BCB data, we first map bank loan exposures at the municipal level. In a further step, we merge those geographical exposures with data from the World Database on Protected Areas and the Brazilian Ministry of Environment to determine banking sector loans to companies in protected or priority areas as determined by the Brazilian authorities. Finally, we use the MSCI ESG Controversies database to

> 6 According to country’s national space research agency INPE, in the first half of 2020 deforestation was up 25 percent, for a total 1,184 square miles, compared to the same period in 2019, on track to be the worst year for deforestation in more than a decade. See http://www.inpe.br.

> 7 See https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/sustainability.

4
policy in good times (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004; Talvi and Vegh 2005). Using a quarterly data set on 49 countries for the period 1960–2006, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) document the procyclicality of government spending, establishing a causal relation between output and government consumption in developing countries.

The revenues of subnational governments are strongly procyclical in most advanced economies and developing countries (box 2). Countries whose subnational governments are most constrained by the basic fiscal contract to rely on an inflexible income-elastic tax base often display greater procyclicality (Rodden and Wibbels 2010).The decline in local own-source revenues is often exacerbated by cuts in tax revenues shared with the central government. Stimulus transfers from the central government often fail to fully offset the procyclicality of subnational fiscal position (IMF 2012b). As a result, in the absence of substantial borrowing or 14
table 3 and table 4 shows the results in the winsorized data. The estimated effects are somewhat smaller in magnitude, but they are still statistically significant.

# **4.4 Falsification exercise**

Although the analysis uses eligible and ineligible industries that displayed the same employment trends in the pre‐program period, a potential concern is that employment across these industries would have behaved differently in the post‐program period even in the absence of the wage subsidy program. For example, the concern may be that the industries show similar employment trends in good economic times, but respond differently to downturns. I conduct the following falsification exercise to address this concern. I estimate equations 3 and 4 for the time period January 2000 to December 2004, which coincided with a recession in Mexico (from the second quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2002), where the variables are defined as in equations 1 and 2 and RecessionAndAftert is equal to one for April 2001 through December 2003 and zero for all other months.

The results in table 6 show that employment in eligible and ineligible industries did not recover differently after the 2001 recession. This finding lends support to the assumption that eligible and 10
2) qualitatively through empowered market mechanisms. The quantitative effect can be explained by concepts such as the above discussed Environmental Kuznets Curve<sup>11</sup> . Only when basic needs are fulfilled, do people start worrying about more indirect needs such as the environment, global warming, or ethical firm behavior. Then, in a development perspective, in the initial process of industrialization people only care about jobs and income while public environmental spending and regulations are weak and unpopular. As income rises, however, technology improves pollution levels, and preferences as well as regulation begin to favor environmental protection.

Besides regulation, markets constitute a relevant mechanism to match such demand with supply. Both regulation and markets, especially in today's international framework, are constrained by imperfect information. Here, technology has greatly improved the availability and flow of information over the last 20 years. In a recent (2005) US consumer survey conducted by Fleishman Hiller and the National Consumer League it is found and concluded that [t]echnology is changing the landscape in which consumers gather and communicate information about how well companies are being socially responsible. The majority of consumers seek out information about social issues (77 percent) or the social responsibility record of companies (52 percent) "some" or "all of the time." Furthermore, [t]he respondents' demographic characteristics appear to influence their level of interest in seeking out CSR information. For example, those who tend to seek out this information tend to have Internet access and/or have at least some college education. In sum, both purchasing power and information through education and

> 10 In the international context a candidate for such failure is coordination failure. 11

> Originally outlined by Grossman and Krueger (1993) and revisited later by Dasgupta et al. (2002)

Page **6** of **27**
# Introduction

Even before COVID-19 shut schools, the world was in the middle of a learning crisis that threatened efforts to build human capital—the skills and know-how needed for the jobs of the future. More than half of children (53 percent) in low- and middle-income countries either were out of school or failed to learn to read with comprehension by age 10 and so were in learning poverty.<sup>1</sup> The most recent historical trends suggest that it will take 50 years to halve learning poverty in the developing world. COVID-19 is likely to slow that rate by deepening learning gaps and so increasing the number of children in learning poverty in many countries.

<mark>Temporary school closures in more than 180 countries have kept nearly 1.6 billion students out of school, further complicating global efforts to reduce learning poverty. Although most countries have made heroic efforts to put remote and remedial learning strategies in place, learning losses are accumulating rapidly. A recent survey on national education responses to COVID-19 by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank shows that while countries and regions have responded in various ways, they have found it difficult to reach even half of students.</mark> COVID-19-related school closures are forcing countries even further off track from achieving their learning goals. Students currently in school stand to lose $10 trillion in labor earnings over their working lives.<sup>2</sup> That is one-tenth of global GDP, or half the United States’ annual economic output, or twice the global annual public expenditure on primary and secondary education.

The objectives of this paper are twofold. First it presents some of the properties and limitations of the Learning Poverty measure and proposes complementary aggregations such as the learning poverty gap and the learning poverty severity (or inequality-sensitive-gap), while discussing their main motivations and shortcomings. Second, this paper complements other COVID-19 related simulations by