rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
|_(Table C.4 continued.)_||
|---|---|
|Joint (Index)|Index of joint decision-making in seven decisions in the household:<br>1. Decision for her to take up work outside the home for income,<br>2. Decision for her to accept a promotion<sup>86</sup>,<br>3. Decision to purchase large household appliances,<br>4. Decision about large house repairs,<br>5. Decision to purchase clothing and jewelry for herself,<br>6. Decision for her to take a bus to run an errand,<br>7. Decision for her to visit a friend in the neighborhood.<br>For each decision, an ordinal variable was coded such that<br>1=Woman is involved in joint decision-making, 0=Woman decides<br>alone without needing permission, OR<br>Woman decides alone, but needs permission, OR<br>Others decide, but need the woman’s permission, OR<br>Woman is not involved.<br>I create dummy variables for each ordinal category and decision, and<br>then compute a standardized index following Anderson (2008) and<br>O’Brien(1984).|
|Cosmetics (% in house-<br>hold income)|Monthly expenditures on cosmetics, winsorized at a fraction of 0.01<br>in each tail. Two different variables are used capturing expenditures<br>for different groups of respondents:<br>1. Women and Girls|
||2. Men and Boys|

> 86For the selected or nominated women who had been offered a promotion in the wave 2 survey, these questions refer to the decision-making about the actual offer instead of the generic question.

68
.

In addition to this two-fold policy challenge within countries, experiences regarding the labor market effects of trade vary between countries. To emphasize such differences in country experiences, it helps to look at one aspect of the literature examining the impacts of increased import competition from China following its 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. Estimates of the impact vary for the United States, but the key insight is that the biggest changes are at the local level: aggregate impacts are much smaller, though still substantial. A reduced form estimate from Acemoglu et al. (2016) gives the figure of 2.0 million to 2.4 million US manufacturing jobs lost, which translates into a substantial amount of labor market disruption, which in turn means lost jobs and impaired wellbeing. But a similar approach using data for Ethiopia by Ngoma (2022) finds a stunningly different result: increased imports from China translated into major economic gains, including more jobs for Ethiopian workers, with corresponding increases in incomes and well-being.

Better understanding the mechanisms that give rise to these disparate labor market impacts from changing trade costs is a key objective of this paper. Clearly, the United States and Ethiopia differ along many dimensions, so it is important to make an effort to identify which ones give rise to such distinct labor market experiences from closely related changes in policy—in this case reductions in trade costs vis-à-vis China, combined with gains in Chinese competitiveness in a variety of manufacturing sectors. But understanding the underlying mechanisms also matters from a human and

> 3 Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) define trade costs as the set of factors that drive a wedge between producer prices in the exporting country and consumer prices in the importing country. They therefore include “classical” trade policy factors like tariffs, but also behind-the-border regulations, institutional quality, and other factors that affect the costs of moving goods or services between countries. This paper uses the term “trade policy” broadly to refer to any policy that affects trade costs. It therefore includes standard
- Capuno, J. J., A. D. Kraft, S. Quimbo, C. R. Tan, and A. Wagstaff (2016). Effects of price, information, and transactions cost interventions to raise voluntary enrollment in a social health insurance scheme: A randomized experiment in the Philippines. _Health Economics 25_ (6), 650– 662.

- Chetty, R. (2015). Behavioral economics and public policy: A prgramtic perspective. _American Economic Review 105_ (5), 1–33.

- Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, and E. Saez (2013). Using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the EITC on earnings. _American Economic Review 103_ (7), 2683–2721.

- Chetty, R., A. Looney, and K. Kroft (2009). Salience and taxation : Theory and evidence. _American Economic Review 99_ (4), 1145–1177.

- Chetty, R. and E. Saez (2013). Teaching the tax code: Earnings responses to an experiment with EITC recipients. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5_ (1), 1–31.

- Das, J. and J. Leino (2011). Evaluating the rsby: Lessons from an experimental information campaign. _Economic and Political Weekly 46_ (32), 85–93.

- Fitzgerald, J., P. Gottschalk, and R. Moffitt (1998). An analysis of sample attrition in panel data: The Michigan panel study of income dynamics. _Journal of Human Resources 33_ (2), 251–99.

- Frijters, P., R. Gregory, and X. Meng (2015). The role of rural migrants in the Chinese urban economy. In C. Dustmann (Ed.), _Migration: Economic Chanage, Social Challenge_ , pp. 33–67. Oxford University Press.

- Gallagher, M., J. Giles, A. Park
of the self-assessed autonomy for each of the three groups. _Source:_ Calculation with ESS data When both size and composition of informal workforce are taken into account, all countries considered can be arranged in 11 clusters, as shown in Table A4 (in the Annex).

An important finding from Table 3 and Figure 1 is that median country in the East features a substantially higher proportion of employees without contracts than median country in the West. In fact, in 5 out of 8 Western European countries (and in 7 out of 12 countries when the Nordic countries are added) workers without contracts account to less than 3% of extended labor force, while among 12 Eastern European countries this is the case only for four countries, and the median is about 4%. This provides at least some support to an ̳intuitive‘ belief that there ̳should‘ be more informality in the East.

16
.0685***||0.0428***||
||(0.0091)||(0.0129)||
|_FVADP_|0.252***|0.232***|0.124***|0.142***|
||(0.0268)|(0.0257)|(0.0170)|(0.0207)|
|_DVAR_||0.217***||0.157***|
|||(0.0160)||(0.0377)|
|_Employment_|-|-|0.322***|0.273***|
||-|-|(0.0598)|(0.0497)|
|_Capital Stock_|-|-|0.295***|0.257***|
||-|-|(0.0454)|(0.0464)|
|_Constant_|5.869***|5.179***|2.663***|2.564|
||(0.180)|(0.183)|(0.451)|(0.417)|
|Observations|7,276|7,284|10,455|10,514|
|R-squared|0.852|0.870|0.885|0.894|

Sources: OECD ICIO database and WIOD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. _FVAX_ and _DVAR_ lagged. All level variables in natural logarithms. WIOD sample values in constant terms.

Focusing on the OECD sample, a 10 percent increase of GVC integration as a buyer increases domestic value added by 0.7 percent (column 1). Using
Equally, a tax system with low tax rates requires a highly progressive system to achieve the same degree of redistribution.<sup>17</sup>

# 2.3 Examples

This section presents examples of effective progressivity measures from the recent empirical literature. It focuses on PIT and VAT.

## 2.3.1 Income taxes

There is a significant literature examining the distributional impacts of the PIT (see, e.g., for OECD countries, Joumard et al., 2012; Causa and Hermansen, 2017). However, given the significant data requirements for calculating effective progressivity metrics, results for IDA countries are sparce. For example, results are available from detailed CEQ distributional analyses for more than 40 developing countries, but for only six IDA countries. The CEQ analyses emphasize the importance of examining the distributional impact of tax and expenditure systems together, particularly given the interactions between different fiscal instruments.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, results focusing on direct taxes can be drawn out from the CEQ’s database (Commitment to Equity Institute Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution, 2022). Results for the six available IDA countries are presented in Table 1. Direct taxes include the PIT together with SSC but excluding pension contributions (which are considered compulsory savings).<sup>19</sup> The results for IDA countries can be expected to predominantly reflect the PIT due to the minimal use of social contributions in IDA countries.

In addition to global metrics, it is quite common to present a visual representation of the distribution of tax burdens by plotting average tax rates across deciles or quintiles.<sup>20</sup> Table 1 presents both global indicators and graphical results for each country. To provide context to the IDA country results, Table 1 also presents results available for the United States. Results all relate to the particular year of the underlying microdata used in the analysis. Note that income survey microdata was available in only two of the six IDA countries (
example, arise when handwritten records are not fully digitized, reported with error, or records are not passed on by all health care providers (Shapira et al. 2021). In the case of COVID-19, evidence from a survey of 42 USAID country offices has documented that such issues have been commonplace (Rosenbaum and Waugaman 2022).

We provide indicative evidence of such flaws and weaknesses, which had previously also been documented in the case of routine immunizations (Lim et al. 2008; Sandefur and Glassman 2015; Cutts et al. 2016; Galles et al. 2021) and quantify their potential effects on reported COVID-19 vaccination rates. Survey data can thus serve as a complementary source to countercheck the official administrative figures and inform policy.

To this end, phone surveys can provide flexible, cost-effective, and rapidly deployable tools for high-frequency monitoring. Phone surveys also facilitate iterative experimentation with design choices to ascertain the robustness of the evidence compiled. This would either be prohibitively expensive or outright impossible at similar scale in the case of in-person surveys or administrative data.

Both monitoring and experimentation was possible because of the existing survey infrastructure building on longitudinal in-person households, which allowed for broad population coverage and comparatively low non-response rates (Gourlay et al. 2021) as well as providing a nationally representative benchmark for the phone surveys.

# 6 Conclusion

Studies from before the COVID-19 pandemic have found substantial discrepancies in LMICs between routine childhood immunization rates reported in survey and administrative data, hence creating a dilemma for research and policy (Galles et al. 2021; Danovaro-Holliday et al. 2021; Cutts et al. 2016; Burton et al. 2009; Lim et al. 2008). In this study, we show that such misalignment is also widespread in the context of COVID-19 vaccinations. In a sample of 36 LMICs, the survey data statistically significantly exceeds figures reported in administrative sources in 35 out of 57 survey rounds and by 47% on average. This pattern is particularly striking and consistent in Sub-Saharan Africa.

We investigate a number of potential
)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|Per capita nonfarm income (Tk./month)|639.3|668.3|801.8|
|Share of enterprise income (%)|41.8|36.0|36.1|
|Share of nonfarm wage income (%)|31.3|35.0|35.1|
|Share of salaried income(%)|27.0|29.0|28.9|

Note: Income figures are CPI-adjusted (2000=100). The sample is restricted to households that are engaged in nonfarm activities. Source: HIES 2000, 2005 and 2010

**Table 3: Distribution of rural microenterprises by activity: 2000-2010**

|**Activities (%)**|**2000**|**2005**|**2010**|
|---|---|---|---|
||**(N=1,427)**|**(N=1,426)**|**(N=1,909)**|
|Manufacturing and processing|11.9|10.3|13.9|
|Transport|9.3|6.3|13.1|
|Trading|2.4|2.5|2.3|
|Service|65.3|75.8|61.5|
|Other miscellaneous activities|11.1|5.1|9.2|

Note: Manufacturing and processing activity includes manufacturing and processing in food and beverages, tobacco, textiles, wood and furniture, rubber/plastic, basic metal and nonmetal products. Transport activity includes operation and rental of various transport vehicles. Trading activity includes wholesale and retail trading of various farm and nonfarm products such as livestock, poultry, vegetables,
Following Kraay (2014), we use predicted disbursements on loans by official creditors from the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System (DRS) as an instrument for changes in public investment. Official creditors include both multilateral institutions like the World Bank and African Development Bank, and bilateral creditors including sovereign governments like China, Japan, and the United States. This does not include official aid flows. The DRS provides comprehensive coverage of all individual external public and publicly guaranteed loans from all creditors and for all countries that borrow from the World Bank. It tracks the original amount of the loan, loan commitments, terms, disbursements, and repayments of all external loans. The data is confidential. The original amount of the loan as well as disbursements are recorded in the original denomination currency. Loans are generally tied to multi-year spending projects with disbursements linked to the stages of project implementation. See annex B for a discussion of the process of cleaning the data and some of its properties.

The key variable we need from the loan-level data are disbursement rates over the life of a loan defined as the amount dispersed in each year since the loan agreement as a ratio to the original loan amount. Figure 2 shows the average rate of disbursement over 1970-2021 based on the year in which the disbursement occurred. In the year of the loan, about 15 percent of the loan is disbursed to the debtor on average.<sup>9</sup> This rate of disbursement declines over the life of the loan to 11 percent in the year after the loan is agreed. After five years about half the loan amount is disbursed. There is a difference in the rate of disbursement between multilateral and bilateral lenders. Multilateral lenders tend to disburse loans more evenly over several years, with disbursements averaging about 10 percent per year for the first five years of a loan. Bilateral lenders tend to disburse more upfront with less disbursed in later years. These rates of disbursement are below those found in Kraay (2014) despite only updating the data
and factory, enumerator and month dummies. Where available, the baseline outcome is included in the amelioration set. The sample in Columns 1-3 is limited to those respondent who had not yet been officially promoted at the time of the household surveys. The sample in Columns 4-5 is limited to those respondent who are unmarried with a household size of 1.

**Table 5: Effects on attitudes and beliefs**

||(1)<br>Overall self-beliefs<br>(Index)|(2)<br>Confdence<br>(Index)|(3)<br>Negotiating<br>(Index)|(4)<br>Gender attitudes<br>(Index)|(5)<br>Aspirations<br>(Dummy)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|selected|0_._22*|0_._15|0_._13|0_._07|0_._07|
||(0_._13)|(0_._13)|(0_._11)|(0_._09)|(0_._07)|
|N|363|363|363|363|363|
|Nominated mean|_−_0_._17|_−_0_._12|_−_0_._10|0_._04|0_._49|
|Nominated SD|1_._14|1_._11|0_._95|0_._74|0_._50|

Notes: Selected is a dummy variable indicating whether the female sewing-line operator is quasi-randomly selected for the promotion program. Nominated is a dummy variable indicating whether the female sewing-line operator is an eligible, shortlisted runner-up that was quasi-randomly not selected for the promotion program, and represents the comparison group for the selected group. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Controls chosen using pdslasso from demographic controls and baseline bargaining measures, their squares, and
might claim positive attributes that are in fact exaggerations. This is something that AM found in Romania, where reticent respondents claimed higher moral values when faced with a set of questions taken from the World Values Survey. For example, AM found that reticent respondents were much more likely to answer that 'Lying in your own interest' was unacceptable. We find a similar result for Nigeria. Respondents were asked to name the three most important skills for a successful entrepreneur and given twenty to choose between. One of these was 'demonstrate high moral standards', which reticent respondents named 33% more 13
344|<br>32,344|<br>32,344|
|R-squared|0.308|0.308|0.308|0.308|0.308|0.308|

_Note_ **_:_** Results are from 2019-2022 panel regressions where the unit of observation is the village council and the dependent variable is the NDVI for fields planted with winter wheat in each of the relevant years. Crimea and areas that have been occupied since 2014 are excluded. GDD is cumulative growing degree days above 0°C between October 1and May 31 approximated hourly by sinusoidal distribution of minimum and maximum temperature (d’Agostino and Schlenker, 2016); and fall, winter and spring months are Oct-Nov, Dec-Feb, and Mar-May, respectively. ‘Any’ (Col. 5) is the maximum over the 8 two-week periods considered whereas ‘conflict intensity’ (col 6) accounts for the temporal dimension by taking a value of 1 for any of the 8 two-week periods when any conflict activity was observed. See appendix table 1 for full specification including weather variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

33
are provided. These profiles add relevant scope for the relatively new—and still lackluster—capital markets in Southeast Europe. These markets are an inept form of strong capital market efficiency because of their apparent market transaction and information costs. Without liquid daily trading data, the capital markets in Southeast Europe are also likely to be considered inept when using the semi-strong form of capital market efficiency.

Finally, the empirically confirmed weak form of capital market inefficiency in Southeast Europe would bring up considerations that the capital markets may fail to play a fully functional role in the economies of those countries. Such a failure would be apparent in the lack of price discovery, improved transparency, and, ultimately, in an increase in the liquidity and cost effectiveness of those capital markets to be able to provide financing to the most productive economic sectors. In contrast, developed markets are efficient capital markets. This is clearly evident in the absorption of publicly available macroeconomic information in stock prices.

The results in frontier and emerging markets are not so clear, and that is often because of the specific ineptitudes inherent in the business environment. Recent research on the development of capital markets in Southeast Europe using capitalization and turnover ratios shows that there is a relationship between structural and macroeconomic indicators and the fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP) (Fink, Haiss, & Vuksic, 2005; Lazarov, Miteva-Kacarski, & Nikoloski, 2016; Drazenovic & Kusanovic, 2016). A number of comparative studies also consider capital market efficiency by using bivariate tests on the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the performance of stock market indexes in Slovenia and Croatia (Barbic & Condic-Jurkic, 2011). This research complements that study with extensive and approximated full-economic cycle data, as well as with more reliable multivariate and panel study tests. A number of researchers have proven that the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and capital markets increases with the length of time that it is under study (Fama, 1990; Binswanger, 1999).

Price variations in capital markets over time are common and related,
J.C. Duque, N. Lozano-Gracia, J.E. Patino, P. Restrepo / LCR Flagship Report on Cities and 3 Productivity form and productivity can shed light on whether urban policy has a role to play in supporting city productivity and through that, economic growth.

In this paper we examine the linkages between urban form and city productivity using different urban form metrics for a comprehensive sample of Latin American cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in the year 2010. We use a consistent time series of Defense Meteorological Satellite Programs - Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) nighttime lights (NTL) imagery to identify city extents, characterize urban structure and create a proxy measure of a city’s economic performance. In terms of methodological approach, our first base model includes the estimation of urban productivity using time-lagged measures of urban form and other control variables. In a second model we follow Harari (2016) and explore the use of synthetic instruments that use the potential shape of city as a starting point, and calculate the city form indicators based on such potential form. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the analysis of linkages between urban form and city productivity has important policy implications in regards to the potential benefits or consequences of land use, transport and other city planning policies that can influence city form. Second, it contributes to the advancement in the measurement of urban form, by using open data available at a global scale that allow for benchmarking of cities across the globe.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 presents the empirical models. Section 4 describes the source data and the construction of the proxy measure of a city’s economic performance, the measures of urban form, and the construction of the synthetic instrument. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 presents our conclusions.

# **2 Literature review**

Density, size and sprawl have been commonly referenced in economic literature as some of the
generally narrow in countries that reported the presence of IRCs in these markets, with only three countries showing a gap of zero. Actual deposit rates are negative in a few economies with deposit rate ceilings. Finally, actual deposit rates paid by commercial banks unsurprisingly show a general convergence towards floors, with a few economies showing negative real floors and actual rates.

- The degree of bindingness of lending IRCs is associated with other financial repression policies. Pairwise correlations suggest that the relative bindingness of real lending ceilings is associated with a higher share of state-owned commercial banks, which governments can use to direct credit, and more stringent _de jure_ capital controls, which can be used to influence the size and composition of capital flows. Correlations become stronger, including for other proxies of financial repression, when lending ceilings that are determined relative to a market benchmark are excluded from the sample.

Further research is needed to advance knowledge on IRCs and investigate their effects on welfare. The hope is that our database on IRCs can contribute to generate renewed interest and additional research on the topic, which can help provide concrete policy prescriptions. It would be important to complement our effort with country level analysis at the bank-product level over time to ascertain whether legal limits to interest rates in a country are in fact binding and what are the welfare implications. In this context, it would also be important to include _de facto_ IRCs in the analysis, especially those introduced by subsidized government programs. It would also be interesting to collect data on other forms of financial repression, especially lending quotas on which there is very limited knowledge, and investigate the interactions among various forms of financial repression. It is likely that IRCs in a country are part of a wider toolkit of financial repression policies, as we have preliminarily shown in this paper, and interaction and complementarity of policies may have different welfare outcomes. Finally, given the prospect that IRCs might become an increasingly important feature of domestic financial systems in the post Covid-19 world, it would be important to closely monitor these developments