rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
——— 2017a. “World Migration Report 2018.” International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

——— 2017b. “Analysis: Flow Monitoring Surveys. The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Prevalence Indication.” International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

Kondylis, F. 2008. “Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in Rwanda.” _Economic Development and Cultural Change_ 57 (1): 31–66.

Koser, K. 2010. “Dimensions and Dynamics of Irregular Migration.” _Population, Space and Place_ 16 (3): 181–93.

Koser, K., and Pinkerton, C. 2002. “The Social Networks of Asylum Seekers and the Dissemination of Information About Countries of Asylum.” London Home Office, Research Development and Statistics Directorate.

Leone Sciabolazza V. 2018. “A Net of Moving People: Network Analysis of International Migration Flows.” In _Networks of International Trade and Investment_ , edited by A. Amighini, S. Gorgoni, and Smith M., Vernon Press, Wilmington Delaware (USA), ch.11: 249 - 296 Lergetporer P., M. Piopiunik, and L. Simon. 2018. “Do Natives’ Beliefs About Refugees’ Education Level Affect Attitudes Toward Refugees?” Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiments.” _CESifo Working Paper Series_ 6832.

Manchin M., and S. Orazbayev. 2018. “Social Networks and the Intention to Migrate.” _World Development_ 109: 360–74.

Marshall, M. G., and G. Elzinga-Marshall. 2017. “Global Report 2017: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.” Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA USA Maystadt, J.-F., and P. Verwimp. 2014. “Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population.” _Economic Development and Cultural Change_ 62 (4): 769–809.

Melander, E., and M. Öberg. 2007. "The Threat of Violence and Forced Migration
(2013), and Sexton (2015) find that violence, as perceived by households, declines with the presence of international troops.

The impact of international troops on conflict intensity typically varies spatially. The abovementioned study by Hegre, Hultman, and Nygard (2010) suggests that it is important to take time and location into account, in addition to troop numbers. Using data from the Kunduz and Badakhshan Provinces in Afghanistan’s Northeast region, Derksen and Ruttig (2013) provide further evidence that the ability of troop deployments to contain conflict is not even.

Dynamics can be complex as well. Condra et al. (2010) document the persistence and pervasiveness of the conflict in Afghanistan, claiming that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces has led to increased insurgent violence over the long run. Also using data from Afghanistan, Trebbi and Weese (2015) show that the insurgency is capable of acting strategically across districts and provinces.

Another relevant strand of this literature focuses on the relationship between conflict and household wellbeing. Brück et al. (2016) review the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys to suggest concrete ways to capture in these surveys the causes, functioning, and 5
foreign ownership in labor markets may differ between developed and developing countries (Almeida, 2007). For instance, using the panel of Indonesian manufacturing data to control for unobserved plant level characteristics, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2006) find that acquisition of Indonesian plant leads to substantially higher average wages of employees in acquired firms. Their results contrast with those for European countries which tend to find much smaller wage effects of foreign acquisition on employees (e.g., Almeida (2007) for Portugal, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002) for the United Kingdom).

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Figure 13 demonstrates the time-series of debt levels in our data. We see a steadily declining trend over time, going from average of about 25% in the beginning of the sample to under 20% at the end of the sample.

In our sample the approximate average interest rate (for those firms with non-missing or nonzero observations) ranges from about 2% to 28% with an average of about 8-9%. Figure 13 shows that mean and median estimated interest rate has been rather stable in our sample period.

**Figure 13.  Debt to Assets and Interest Rate over Time**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Debt to Assets Interest Expense to Debt<br>0.3 0.15<br>0.25<br>0.1<br>0.2<br>0.15 0.05<br>0.1<br>0<br>0.05<br>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br>0<br>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Interest Expense to Debt (Mean)<br>Debt to Assets (Mean)<br>Debt to Assets (Median) Interest Expense to Debt(Median)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: EGX data, staff calculations.

Figure 14 shows evolution of two measures for cash flows over time in our sample. Gross operating margin is on average about 0.3-0.4 and is relatively stable over time. Net income is about 10% of total assets in 2008. It has been steadily increasing since the earlier part of the period, following the years of rapid growth in Egypt.

20
**Figure 8. Workers with earnings between the current and the proposed minimum wage, % workers in selected categories (gender, age, education, location and breadwinner status), 2018**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 23.3<br>25<br>20.7<br>20<br>15 12.6<br>9.4 10.0 9.5<br>10 8.2 7.8 6.1 6.5<br>4.5<br>5 2.6<br>0<br>Total Gender Age Education Breadwinner<br>Percent<br>Total Male Female 15-19 20-34 35-54 55-64 Primary or less Secondary Post-secondary Unique Not unique<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Own estimates using the 2018 Kosovo LFS._

**Figure 9. Workers with earnings between the current and the proposed minimum wage, % workers in selected categories (type of job and contract), 2018**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 25<br>20.5<br>20<br>15 12.8<br>9.9<br>10 7.6<br>4.7<br>5<br>2.1<br>0<br>Private Public Informal Formal Temporary Permanent<br>Percent<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Own estimates using 2018 Kosovo LFS._ 17
). Moreover, better remittance data is encouraging authorities in developing countries to develop new policies to maximize the developmental impact of those flows by increasing the availability of savings and investment instruments for senders and recipients of remittances. For instance, in some countries in Latin America poor families can use their regular remittance income as the basis to acquire life and non-life insurance products, and become eligible for housing financing and consumer credit, which may help them improve their living conditions. Also, recent studies suggest that better remittance data has encouraged an increasing number of private financial institutions –especially international banks -- to enter into the remittance market or offer new financial products to serve the needs of senders and recipients of remittances (see Raul Hernandez-Coss, 2004).

At an international level more guidance is needed to improve the existing tools to collect data on remittances. In particular, there is a need to establish homogeneous reporting requirements across countries that do not undermine the competitive position of market players, especially small institutions. In addition, there is a need to develop better tools to measure remittance transactions that occur through increasingly sophisticated financial instruments, such as dual debit cards, store-value cards and other card-based transactions, as well as remittances that occur through informal channels.

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as compared to nearly half of farmers in Asia and the Pacific, and 43% for the developing rural world. An estimated 75% of farmers are located more than 4 hours to the nearest market, by motorized transport, as compared to 45% in Asia and the Pacific (Kate Sebastian, pers. comm). Of course, most rural people in Sub-Saharan Africa have no access to motorized transport, so these figures understate the magnitude of the problem.

In sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, the highest growth in maize area, yields, and production from 1961 over the entire period has been in West Africa, and the least has been in Southern Africa where yields have stagnated at a little over 1 t/ha.<sup>2</sup> These differences are 1 For consistency, despite well-known limitations, all figures reported in this section are calculated from FAOSTAT data available at http://faostat.fao.org. Regional names are those used by FAO, although countries included by region differ. Country lists are compared in Annex 1.

> 2 An additional 2.8 million ha is grown in South Africa, mostly on large-scale commercial farms (averaging about 380 ha each), much of it yellow maize for animal feed.  Owing to its apartheid legacy, smallholder maize contributes less than 15% of national production, and accounts for only a minor fraction of household income of black rural families. Maize marketing and pricing policy issues focus primarily on keeping food prices at tolerable levels for urban consumers, and ensuring the continued viability of the large commercial farm sector, with very little attention to smallholder maize production or marketing. National yields have steadily improved to reach about 5 t/ha while area has declined.  Except in drought years, South Africa produces a modest maize surplus for export.  Yield increases partly reflect deregulation of the industry and the reduction of maize area where it is no longer competitive because of lower yields and higher risks. Commercial farmers have also invested substantially to improve
used to group countries and are as follows: LIC = low-income country, and LMIC = lower-middle-income country. FCS = country classified as a fragile and conflict-affected situation.

The lack of data on financing in fragile and conflict-affected countries and the need to go beyond national aggregates to understand spending inequalities make it difficult to draw any firm conclusions on public spending on education in these countries. Fifty-five countries have appeared on the Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations list since its introduction in 2006. Data on public education spending as a percentage of GDP are only available for approximately half of these countries at any one time. It is possible the countries that fail to report are those in which systems have broken down and, as a result, they spend less on education. Even when FCS countries have managed to report spending data, weaknesses in their public financial management systems make it more likely that the funds are not distributed fairly and are not used for their intended purposes.

# **_Education’s Share of Government Budgets Has Remained Relatively Stable over the Last 20 Years_**

Governments must make difficult trade-offs when deciding how to allocate public funds to support a variety of priorities and policy objectives. Channeling more resources into education inevitably means channeling less into other sectors and it can be difficult for governments to take such action. In some cases, increased peace and stability–and corresponding declines in military spending–have allowed governments to devote a greater share of public spending to education. During its war with Eritrea, Ethiopia spent nearly one-third of the government budget on military expenditures, but this figure began to decline as the conflict wound 10
Policy Research Working Paper 9570

# **Abstract**

The World Bank’s Statistical Capacity Index has been widely employed to measure country statistical capacity since its inception two decades ago. This paper builds on the existing advantages of the Statistical Capacity Index, conceptually and empirically, to offer new statistical performance indicators and the Statistical Performance Index, which can better measure a country’s statistical performance. The new index has clearer conceptual motivations, employs a stronger mathematical foundation, and significantly expands the number of indicators and countries covered. The paper further provides empirical evidence that illustrates the strong correlation of the new index with other commonly used development indicators of human capital, governance, poverty, and inequality. The framework can accommodate future directions to improve the index as the global data landscape evolves.

This paper is a product of the Development Data Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at hdang@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
|Manufacturing|1,404,570|2,879|754,379|53.7|2,547|650,191|46.3|
|Public utilities|39,633|133|32,441|81.9|31|7191.704|18.2|
|Construction|607,792|2,378|586,746|96.5|83|21,046|3.5|
|Commerce|1,063,299|2,869|738,379|69.4|1,247|324,920|30.6|
|Transports &<br>communications|737,296|2,532|648,494|88.0|350|88,802|12.0|
|Financial &<br>business services|356,071|906|237,835|66.8|449|118,236|33.2|
|Public<br>administration|575,378|1,463|360,764|62.7|872|214,613|37.3|
|Other services,<br>Unspecified|960,634|1,891|492,266|51.2|1,804|468,368|48.8|
|Total|7,709,543|20,303|5,075,641|65.8|10,384|2,633,903|34.2|

Source: Staff estimates based on Sri Lanka HIES 2016; confidence intervals of estimated workers can be requested from the authors.

9
. A health subsidy is included that does not exist in other programs.

3. The focus of asset provision is on cows rather than smaller livestock assets like goats, pigs and chickens.

4. Asset values transferred are larger than other programs where data exist.

The program variations were decided by MISFA based on earlier pilots conducted in Bamyan Province, where the program attributes were finetuned to address local constraints.

# 4. DESIGN AND METHODS

## **Experimental Design and Sample**

We use a household-level randomized experimental design to estimate the causal effect of the intervention on socioeconomic outcomes of UP households. The evaluation sample comes from 80 villages in four districts of Balkh province (Dehdadi, Dawlatabad, Nahr-e Shahi and Khulm). The participatory wealth ranking was conducted in all study villages of Balkh 12
from a nationally representative survey on labor-market outcomes of the Turkish population; these data include representative samples of those who are employed (in formal and informal work), and those who are unemployed or out of the labor force. We estimate the effects of the minimum wage increase by exploiting a sharp rise by 33 percent in nominal terms that took effect in 2016. Though we mainly focus on firm destruction, our findings also shed light on impacts on workers’ employment in formal and informal firms, and unemployment in the wake of the wage increase. Thus, the paper also provides insights on the broader employment and welfare

> 1 In high-income countries, primarily in the US and the UK, the literature has looked at the effect of the minimum wage on firm profitability, stock market value, productivity, location, entries and exits, and consumer prices (Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson and French, 2007; Aaronson et al., 2018; Allegretto and Reich, 2018; Bell and Machin, 2018; Draca, Machin, and van Reenen, 2011; Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2017; Rohlin, 2011). 2 In contrast, the vast majority of studies looking at firm responses to the minimum wage, including in high-income countries, rely on a sample of firms above a given size threshold and in specific sectors of the economy.

2
As Basel I has been applied around the world with different basic capital requirements – 8% and higher – there is a natural question as to whether the calibration of Basel II is appropriate for developing countries where credit and other risks are generally higher. In a series of recent papers with coauthors from the Central Bank of Argentina, and in a project sponsored by the World Bank including the Central Banks of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, a set of related methodologies have been developed that may be applied to test the calibration of Basel II’s, IRB approach in the context of a developing country<sup>47</sup> .

The different approaches have two elements in common, (a) the estimation of loan default probabilities typically using historical data on loan default rates and econometric techniques such as a logit or probit analysis and (b) the application of a credit risk portfolio model<sup>48</sup> . An alternative is to use the Carey (2002) sampling methodology to estimate credit risk directly. Clearly a pre-requisite in each case is the availability of reliable and appropriate data.

This data may exist at the level of the bank. However in some countries, extensive loan databases have been built up. These are reviewed in a recent book, Miller (2003). While the origins of these databases are various and their uses multiple, one increasingly common use is to monitor provisions. In other words, the databases are used to check which loans are past due and to set and monitor bank provisioning policies.

Some countries have gone further than this and asked banks to provide a forward-looking rating for borrowers according to a standardized scale. In this case the ratings of different banks for the same borrower can be compared very easily and discrepancies investigated. These databases have then become important tools of banks’ reserving policies.

These types of public credit registries are also an extremely useful source of information to estimate probabilities of default and other parameters to feed in to credit risk models. For each
urban areas. Four waves have been conducted since 2011, and ESS4 is the most recent in 2018/19. ESS4 included a total of 6,770 households. In the ESS4 interview, households were asked to provide phone numbers, either of their own or that of a reference household (i.e., a friend’s or neighbor’s), so they can be contacted in the follow-up ESS surveys should they move from their sampled location. At least one valid phone number was obtained for 5,374 households. These households established the sampling frame for the HFPS. While the Ethiopia COVID-19 HFPS drew its sample from the ESS4 database, the final sample size decreased to 3,249 households due to non-responses.

The phone penetration rate in rural Ethiopia is around 40 percent, which contrasts with a phone penetration rate of over 90 percent in urban Ethiopia. The ESS4 data was used as a sampling frame, a reference survey for reweighting, and for developing the SWIFT-based poverty projection model for Ethiopia’s pre-COVID poverty estimates.

21
indices representing the different impacts of governance: for example, Mauro (1995) use these measures to create an index of governance instability while Knack and Keefer (1995) select some indicators as being of greatest relevance to the security of private property and the enforceability of contracts.

Expanding on surveys designed and implemented by Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997), the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank surveys firms in more than 75 countries, inquiring about corruption, the quality of government-provided services, and the predictability of laws and policies. Kaufmann et al. (1999) provide a methodology for constructing indices of perceptions on corruption, by aggregating governance indicators from numerous sources including surveys of enterprises and households.

These subjective governance indicators have attained wide usage in the growth and development literature. Its application when discussing the impact of reforms, however, should be very careful. First, ratings may be affected by the expert's knowledge of recent economic performance. Second, these measures typically represent conditions facing foreign or large investors, not necessarily those confronting most domestic investors. Subjective risk evaluations remain only partial indicators of the institutional environment that can affect economic performance.

An alternative to subjective ratings was proposed by Clague et al. (1999). They suggest using the proportion of M2 within the banking system, an objective measure not subject to contamination by the expectations of surveyed country experts. The justification for this measure is that individuals will hold a larger proportion of their financial assets in the form of currency in environments where third-party enforcement of contracts is unreliable. Money lent to financial institutions (i.e. bank deposits) is less safe where contracts cannot be relied upon. The ratio will increase where governments better enforce and respect contracts and private property rights. The main limitation of the CIM is that, at best, it only measures the tradeoff between holding assets in currency or bank deposits. Moreover, other elements affect this decision rendering its comparability across countries dubious (e.g., inflation
THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

**Figure 5. Household budget shares for electricity, 2005**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 2<br>1.5<br>1<br>0.5<br>0<br>Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5<br>quintile<br>national urban semi-urban rural<br>electricity as % of budget<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : IMF 2009.

# Information and communication technology

## **Achievements**

Competition has increased in the Republic of Congo’s mobile market in recent years. As a result, about 70 percent of the country’s population is covered by a GSM signal, compared with 48 percent for resource-rich African countries (table 3). Mobile telephony penetration is also higher in the Republic of Congo—35 percent compared with the 24 percent resource-rich benchmark. Furthermore, the subscriber base grew by 8.2 percent of the population from 2006–08 compared with 1.7 percent in the typical African country. In 2003 there were 330,000 subscribers, and by the end of 2007, this had risen to an estimated 760,000 served by three key mobile operators: Zain, MTN, and Warid Telecom (box 1). The three main existing operators (Zain Bharti Airtel, MTN Congo and Warid) entered the market between 1997 and 2007. A fourth operator entered the market in 2010. The progression of the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI Index) during the last decade reflects the market structure’s dynamism (figure 6).

The Republic of Congo has committed to undertaking several transformational ICT projects. First, the _projet couverture nationale_ is intended to extend broadband access to remote areas and get closer to broadband universal access. The country also intends to connect to the West Africa fiber op **t** ic cable system through the Project West Africa System Cable (WACS,