rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
12 unions, organized special interest groups) or with ethnic, geographic or other identity-based ties to elites in power.

Finally, corruption is intricately linked to these systems. It is facilitated by the combination of creation of rents that are controlled by state (or sometimes nonstate) actors. It is also linked to both forms of rent-sharing, manifest in high-level corruption in major business deals, and the widespread petty corruption faced by citizens in their daily lives. It is also linked to patterns of inequality, since it typically benefits political and business elites in the sharing of rents, and, at a lower level, officials in public sector jobs.

These deeply embedded political economy and institutional drivers of accountability are being subject to incremental changes through at least two powerful forces developing in Africa—increasing political competitiveness, and greater organization and communication among citizens. We discuss each of these trends in turn, to examine how they might be leveraged for greater civil society action for accountability.

# _2.3 Accountability and democratization in Africa_

Data from the Polity IV effort, which uses expert opinion of political scientists to categorize the extent of autocracy and democracy of a regime, can be used to illustrate the nature of the democratic change moving across Africa over the past 20 years. There is a continuum of regimes, from completely autocratic to a fully consolidated democracy, with a large range of intermediate types (that they refer to as “anocracies”) that have elements of both autocratic and democratic processes. Their synthetic classification uses a numerical system, in which -10 to -7 are classified as autocratic, -6 to +6 as intermediate, and +7 to +10 as democratic.

Figure 2 illustrates both the size of the change between 1985 and 2009, and the current classification for most of the countries. In the mid-1980s, 31 out of a total of 40 in the data base were fully autocratic, with only two full-fledged democracies (Gambia and Mauritius), and 6 intermediate regimes, most of which had a heavy
)|(34)<br>(42)|(68)||
|Elderly 60+ yr.|1543|1801|2260<br>2368|3109|1,920|
||(54)|(46)|(89)<br>(106)|(118)||
|Pregnant &||||||
|Lactating Adult|1353|1886|1908<br>2290|2336|532|
||(54)|(124)|(143)<br>(138)|(110)||

_Note_ : Food expenditures are calculated by multiplying food consumption information from NNS 2013 (household per AME food consumption and individual food consumption are obtained from household diet and individual diet module separately) with unit price information derived from FIES 2015. Expenditures are in 2015 Philippine pesos. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Considering Table 2, we find that average individual monthly food expenditure increases with the level of household per AME expenditures, as gauged by household food expenditure quintiles. This is as we would expect. Generally, expenditure also increases, based on individual age: typically, adults have greater food expenditure, relative to children. Notable exceptions to this trend are that teenagers (between 13 and 19 years old) tend to have greater expenditure than adults 13
are stronger in monitoring vis-`a-vis structured management practices relating to workers’ incentives and target setting (Bloom et al., 2019a,b).

Structured management practices may affect productivity by interacting with a firm’s input choices. Prior literature has focused mainly on labor and capital. Ichniowski and Shaw (1999) highlight the effectiveness of labor management practices, including problemsolving teams, orientation, training, job rotation, employment security, and profit sharing, and linked them to economic performance. Management practices also correlate positively with improved labor conditions in firms (Distelhorst et al., 2017). Bloom et al. (2016) find that a high capital-labor ratio is systematically correlated with higher monitoring and target scores, relative to incentive scores, suggesting that management styles may differ, depending upon the nature of a firm’s productive activities.

A subset of this literature has attempted to explicitly discern the association of management with energy use. Bloom et al. (2010a) found that management practices were inversely correlated with energy intensity (measured as the proportion of expenditure on energy relative to the value of output), leading the authors to conclude that management may also be good for the environment. Boyd and Curtis (2014) conducted a similar study in the United States using the Annual Census of Manufactures, and found similarly that management practices are negatively related to energy intensity, but that the negative effect was conditional on a firm’s level of broad target-setting practices. Using BEEPS data, Schweiger and Stepanov (2019) examine the relationship between generic management practices and energy intensity in 2,000 firms from 40 countries, differentiating between firms in countries with high and low fuel subsidies. They find a 23% reduction in fuel intensity as management score improves from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution. In the face of high fuel subsidies, this decline in energy intensity is only 2%. Table A5 provides a survey of the available literature that relates management practices to firm outcomes.

7
which field work was organized in 17 three week cycles with all 69 districts covered in each cycle.  The consumption data collection during the KIHBS was also more detailed.  During the WMS consumption data was collected for broad (aggregated) categories:  79 food (7 day recall) and 48 non-food items compared with the use of more detailed categories during the KIHBS: 140 food items (7 day recall) and 184 non-food items (1 month recall).
# **Table A2: Description of Survey and Administrative Data**

## **Summary statistics**

||**Source**|**(1) Mean**|**(2) Standard**<br>**deviation**|**(3) Skewness**|**(4) Autogregressive**<br>**parameter from DF**<br>**regression, no time**<br>**trends**<br>|**(5) Autogregressive**<br>**parameter from DF**<br>**regression, linear**<br>**time trends**|**(6)**<br>**Z Statistic from**<br>**Harris Tsavalis Unit**<br>**Root Test (linear time**<br>**trends)**|**(7)**<br>**P-value from Harris**<br>**Tsavalis Unit Root**<br>**Test (linear time**<br>**trends)**|<br>**(8)**<br>**Fixed-N exact critical**<br>**value for the Im-**<br>**Pesaran-Shin test at**<br>**the 5% level (linear**<br>**time trends)**|**(9)**<br>**Fixed-N Im-Pesaran-**<br>**Shin Test statistic**|**(10)**<br>**N**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
category can be found in the Data Appendix. The overall take is that the higher _parreg_ is, the better the influence of interest groups on government policies is regulated. The disadvantage of using this measure is that it is not as well-known and used as _ICRG_ , therefore it is difficult to compare with other studies. Nonetheless it captures better the degree of influence that powerful groups have over government, which will be a key feature in the model presented in Section 3. Although I cannot rule out the potential endogeneity problem of using regulation of participation, that is, when default crisis cause government structure and rules to change, I argue that institutions are very persistent and thus evolve slowly.<sup>9</sup> To calculate default probability, my main data source is Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).<sup>10</sup> I supplement it with a dataset constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2008), De Paoli et al. (2006) and Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011). Default probability for each country is calculated as the number of sovereign default episodes that occurred between 1960 and 2008 divided by the number of years since 1960 (or year of independence). As a proxy for countries’ default history, I follow Reinhart and Savastano (2003) and use the percent of years in a state of default or restructuring between 1800 (or year of independence) and 1959.<sup>11</sup> As control variables, I include the log of average real GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars from the WDI database and debt as a percent of gross national income (GNI), the 1970 to 2008 average, from the Global Development Finance database.

Table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics of the sample of countries and Table 2 reports the pairwise correlation among the determinants of default crisis.

# **2.2 Stylized Facts**

The main objective of the paper is to explain why some countries default on their sovereign debt more often than other countries
G20 agreed to “take the financial inclusion agenda forward” and “to assist countries, policymakers and stakeholders in focusing global efforts on measuring and sustainably tracking progress on access to financial services globally.” Furthermore, according to a recent survey of bank regulators across 143 jurisdictions, 67 percent of regulators are charged with promoting financial inclusion (Cihak et al., 2012). For more information See item 9 in: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/g20/g20_120420.htm. 2 See Karlan and Murdoch (2009) for a review of the literature.

2
By focusing on costs, this study contributes to the missing half of the conversation about the costs and benefits of microfinance. We measure the size of subsidies using proprietary data on 1,335 microfinance institutions between 2005 and 2009. The 930 institutions in the 2009 sample served 80.1 million borrowers globally.

We calculate that on average, subsidies amounted to $132 per borrower, but the distribution is highly skewed. The median microfinance institution used subsidies at a rate of just $26 per borrower, and no subsidy was used by the institution at the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile.

These data suggest that, for some institutions, even modest benefits could yield impressive cost-benefit ratios. At the same time, the data show that the subsidy is large for some institutions. Counter to expectations, the most heavily-subsidized group of borrowers are customers of the most commercialized institutions, with an average of $275 per borrower and median of $93. Customers of NGOs, which focus on the poorest customers and on women, receive far less subsidy: the median microfinance NGO used subsidy at a rate of $23 per borrower, and subsidy for the NGO at the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile was just $3 per borrower.<sup>3</sup> While most firms earn positive accounting profits, only a minority earn economic profit (which accounts fully for the opportunity costs of inputs). Accounting profit reflects an institution’s ability to cover its costs with its revenues, without accounting for implicit grants and subsidies. We find 67 percent of institutions were profitable on an accounting basis (weighted by the number of borrowers per institution; just 58 percent were profitable weighted by institutional

> 3 As a robustness check, we estimated these figures on a subset of the sample (814 institutions) for which we had complete data on every variable. Those results are very slightly lower than those reported below (the results from the balanced panel were so similar that we do not
# **I. Introduction**

In the last three decades, emerging countries have gone through extensive decentralization reforms that devolved fiscal and administrative authority to regional and local governments. The underlying and widespread belief behind these reforms is that local jurisdictions remain “more accountable” to the people and are in a better position to understand and address the needs of the local population (Oates, 1999). But little is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). Political economy considerations have often pushed for rushed implementation, leaving little space for experimenting and tailoring, and leading to mixed successes. In sum, evidence of a positive impact of decentralization reforms in low and middle income countries remains mixed (Smoke, 2001).

Recent analyses that studied decentralization reforms suggest that decentralization requires a significant set of prerequisites that are often lacking in developing countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Prerequisites include educated and politically aware voters, the prevalence of law and order, fair election and effective political competition, a capable local administration, and the prevalence of effective oversight mechanisms. Because of data constraints, most studies on fiscal decentralization remain however of qualitative nature, or only consider selected constraints to decentralization abstracting from the broader context. Yet, while there are many factors affecting decentralization, some are bound to be more important than others, but to the best of our knowledge no study has yet compared the relative importance of each prerequisite in affecting decentralization outcomes.

This paper attempts to disentangle how different factors such as institutional capacity, political economy, and structural characteristics are playing out in the decentralization of spending to local governments (in particular municipalities) in Peru. The paper builds on a comprehensive dataset we have constructed that merges municipal fiscal accounts with information at the municipal level about municipalities’ characteristics such as population, poverty, education and local politics to analyze leading factors affecting the outcomes of the decentralization process. We conduct the empirical analysis using complementary statistical 2
# **Social Insurance Fund contributions**

Social Insurance Fund contributor status is directly observed in the HIECS (for all those individuals who answer the module capturing their labor market participation). We attribute to each individual making pension contributions a share of total household income from wages that is equivalent to total household income from wages divided by the total number of wage earners in the household. We create from each individual’s wage income a “basic wage” variable equivalent to 25 percent of total wage income.<sup>28</sup> Basic wages (so defined) are then multiplied by statutory contribution rates (40 percent) to estimate individual pension contributions. The goal is to attribute the right magnitude of pension contributions to each household with at least one contributor.

Cumulative HIECS Social Insurance Fund contributions are then scaled down—individual by individual—by the same ratio of cumulative _personal income taxes_ we expect to allocate in HIECS divided by the _cumulative estimated personal income tax_ taken from HIECS as estimated above. Budgeted Social Insurance Fund contributions were not available, so we scaled total Social Insurance Fund contributions based on our overestimate of another revenue-side fiscal instrument. The goal in generating this scaling—as before, for personal income taxes—is to estimate a cumulative Social Insurance Fund contributions pool in HIECS that is commensurate with the amount of disposable income in HIECS (relative to national accounts).

# **Direct transfers**

Takaful and Karama were pilot programs in 2015; HIECS 2015 does not directly identify beneficiaries of either program. Instead, the team implemented a proxy-means test based on a means function directly within HIECS 2015 that replicated as closely as possible the actual means function and proxy means test used in the field to identify Takaful and Karama beneficiaries.<sup>29</sup> The implementation of the proxy means test within HIECS was calibrated so that each governorate represented in HIECS absorbs the same number of beneficiaries and benefits as confirmed in administrative totals.<sup>30</sup>

# *
, such complementarity requires that returns to education for the parents is higher in non-farm occupations, i.e., _R_<sup>_pn_</sup> _> R_<sup>_pf_</sup> .<sup>26</sup> This is one of the predictions that we take to the data as a test of the importance of economic mechanisms underlying the observed pattern of intergenerational educational persistence.

# **(4) Data**

For our main empirical analysis, we use two exceptionally rich surveys that collected data on children irrespective of their residency status at the time of the survey. The data for rural India come from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) carried out by the National Council for Applied Economic Research, and the source of the data for rural China is the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) implemented by the Institute of Social Science Survey unit of Peking University.<sup>27</sup>

> 26If private school locations are motivated by higher income associated with nonfarm activities, then school quality may also play a role in generating complementarity. In this case, the productivity of parental investment _θ_ 2 will be correlated with occupation, i.e., _θ_ 2<sup>_n> θ_</sup> 2<sup>_f_.</sup> 27One might wonder why we chose not to use the IHDS 2012 round survey for India which would provide a survey year close to the survey year of CFPS in China. The CFPS and REDS are the most comparable in that they provide _a random sample of parents_ with information on all their children irrespective of the residency status of a child at the time of the survey. The IHDS, in contrast, contains _a random sample of children_ with information on their parents irrespective of their residency status at the time of the survey.

14
does not markedly change the distribution of partially built-up cells: while the levels are different between the two figures, the shape of the distribution is similar. This is true even though each transition matrix is estimated from two distinct sets of observations.

Next, we expand on the above analysis to investigate the effect of adding or removing a nearby road. We use the data from 1976 and 1986 since they are comparable. We define four categories: cells not close to a road in either 1976 or 1986; cells close to a 1976 road that no longer existed in 1986; cells close to a road that did not exist in 1976 but was present in 1986; and cells close to a road that existed both in 1976 and 1986. Abandoning a road may signal that the road was no longer economically useful which, if true, should predict less growth and less subsequent buildup. In contrast roads that remained in existence across both years should be correlated with a preexisting and persistent economic usefulness. Hence, we expect them to be most associated with economic activity and thus most likely to attract population and buildup. Roads that were added in 1986 should occupy an intermediate position: they were not initially deemed useful but were added later, perhaps when sufficient funds became available to add less essential roads. For the analysis, we construct four transition matrices from the 1975-2014 data on these four categories of cells. We then predict buildup in 2053 and 2092 as before. To save space, we present in Figures 4a and 4b only the results for unbuilt and fully built cells, respectively. Indeed, as noted earlier, the actual and forecasted distributions of partially build cells are fairly stable across time. We see that, as anticipated, cells near a road are predicted to receive a lot more buildup over time. The buildup forecast is particular strong for locations that had a road in 1986. Whether or not they also had a road in 1976 matters less, contrary to what we expected. Cells near an abandoned road do less well
Statistics Yearbook for 2001, and International Monetary Fund Staff Country Report, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 2000 to 2002; Standard & Poor’s, Sovereigns Ratings Analysis; Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2001; African Development Bank, ADB Statistics Pocketbook 2002; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Country Strategies; Inter-American Development Bank; U.S. Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 10 ; and official government publications of each country. Sources other than the OECD and the IMF are noted in the text.

- 5 Very high Corporate tax rate greater than 45 percent.

- Government Expenditures Scale for Developed Countries

- 1 Very low Less than or equal to 15 percent.

- 2

- Low Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent

- 3 Moderate Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 35 percent

- 4 High Greater than 35 percent but less than or equal to 45 percent 5 Very high Greater than 45 percent

- Government Expenditures Scale for Developing Countries

- 1 Very low Less than or equal to 15 percent 2 Low Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal to 20 percent.

- 3 Moderate Greater than 20 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent

- 4 High Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 30 percent 5 Very high Greater than 30 percent

41
Generally, individuals who have a threatening but treatable ailment that is found in the course of a clinical trial are removed from that trial and given appropriate therapy.<sup>8</sup> This stands in partial contrast to communication with respondents in observational studies, for example in regards to whether they or their children are malnourished or anemic. Arguably there are few curative (rather than preventative) therapies for stunting, although there clearly are recommended practices to address the heighted risk of mortality attendant to severe acute malnutrition as indicated by low weight for height (wasting) or low upper arm circumference. The former measure of weight for height requires comparison to international reference tables and is often not calculated in the field, although upper arm circumference cutoffs for acute malnutrition can be assessed in the field with the data routinely collected in many household surveys.

Protocols for Demographic and Health Surveys advise direct advice on anemia for individuals deemed at risk and referrals to clinics for severe cases<sup>9</sup> . However, neither acute malnutrition nor anemia can be treated in a single visit and in many contexts knowledge of the status is ineffective without the presence of a health system that facilitates regular interaction between health workers and the individual at risk.

<u>Communication at the cluster level. One of the authors of this essay submitted a randomized</u> cluster-based trial of deworming that analyzed data from over 30,000 children derived from registers at child health days in Uganda. The paper was initially rejected primarily because it was not a double blind study. A letter was sent to the journal suggesting that scale trials should have different methodologies than clinical trials. The journal’s ‘hanging committee’ – their

> 8 This may set up an incentive for willful ignorance in which a researcher avoids ascertaining information such as parasite loads or anemia before the final stages of a trial.

> 9 Some techniques for assessing anemia such as Hemocue© require additional analysis not generally conducted in the field.

24