rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
option of paying some back in the form of subsidies is a way of taking “hostages” to enforce corrupt agreements. If one also controls the banks and allows numbered bank accounts one has a way of moving money in ways that are hard to trace.

These various features are what one used to observe ex post in Korea. The government aggressively promoted the Chaebols, Korean conglomerates, under Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s. Business associations helped manage state-business collaboration. Initially, the goal was a “self-reliant” import-substituting economy under state control. Control was exercise through the banking system via preferential terms for credit. Even when banks were formally private, managers were appointed by the government. The use of anonymous accounts in banks was allowed. Accounting in Chaebols allowed detailed money flows to be obscured. A critical later innovation by the Park regime was that favors were provided to the Chaebol, only if they performed in export markets and paid unofficial political contributions (You, 2005). This set up a contest that provided incentives for the Chaebol to raise productivity (Stiglitz, 1996).

“Cultivating good relationships with the President became a golden road for business expansion” (You, 2005). The good relationships were punctuated by occasional prosecution of business owners or politicians for tax evasion or corruption, with cases typically dropped later, possibly because the desired disciplinary effect had been achieved. In one case the owner of Samhak, one of the largest conglomerates in the late 1960s, supported the opposition candidate Kim Dae-Jung in the 1971 election. He was convicted of tax evasion and the conglomerate forced into bankruptcy.

The outcome was spectacular economic growth and probably rising amounts of corruption in absolute terms till the early 1990s (based on data on actual corrupt payments culled from newspaper reports and trials – see You, 2005).

One might thus potentially interpret Korean industrial policy not just as a clever technocratic response to market failure, but also as a device to allow corruption to function in a system that generates productivity growth. Shleifer and Vishny (
whole. The creation of innovative input access mechanisms and of efficient (and targeted) social safety-nets which would not be tied to the production of one particular crop appears as a priority.

Finally, this paper illustrates the interest of looking at the impact of structural adjustment in African agriculture in a difference-in-difference framework using precise institutional variables. Additional work on the effects of reforms in particular countries, building on household level data (for example along the lines of the forthcoming study by Brambilla and Porto) would contribute to a better understanding of the mechanism underlying the trends identified in this paper which reflect average effects. In such a framework, instrumenting reforms might be easier and help control more formally for potential endogeneity problems.

21
direct democracy helps spend taxes according to citizen preferences, and the motivation to pay taxes may increase. Such results are similar to some previous findings. Two studies have explored Switzerland due the fact that the level of direct democracy varies among the 26 cantons. Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) use cross-section/time series regressions with Swiss data and find that tax evasion is lower in cantons with a higher degree of direct political control. Torgler (2005b) also finds with Swiss survey data that a higher direct democracy leads to a higher tax morale. Looking at papers on voting and tax compliance, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999), Feld and Tyran (2002) and Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) use experimental methods, and show that voting on tax issues has a positive effect on tax compliance. Moreover, more recently the link between local autonomy and tax morale and tax compliance has been analyzed (Torgler, Schneider and Schaltegger, 2010). The advantage of smaller structures in tax policy is that citizens‘ preferences are able to be better served than in a framework where a uniform tax system is designed for a population with heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, there is an intensive everyday interaction between taxpayers and local politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between taxpayers, the tax administration and the local government may induce trust and thus enhance tax morale. Politicians and members of the administration are better informed about the preferences of the local population. Furthermore, there is a politico-institutional aspect: if politicians are elected at the local level, they have an incentive to take the preferences of their constituency into account and thus to spend the local tax revenues according to local preferences (see Frey and Eichenberger, 1999). Decentralization brings the government closer to the people. Many economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments the taxing power (see, e.g., Bahl, 1999). One of the strengths of a decentralized system is greater transparency between the tax price and the public services received. Taxes are comparable to
, and information asymmetries (adverse selection or moral hazard) are less important with good collateral, so synnergy effects should play a lesser role. In accordance with this conjecture, in column (3) of Table 5 we show that the interaction of asset tangibility ( _rp_ )

> 15Rajan and Zingales’ measure of financial dependence is an industry-level variable calculated for 27 3-digits ISIC industries and nine 4-digits ones using compustat data for the US. Let _k_ be capital expenditure and _x_ operational cash flow at the firm level. Rajan and Zingales’ index for industry _j_ , _rj_ , is the median value of ( _k −x_ ) _/k_ across all compustat firms in industry _j_ . Index values, given in Table 1 of Rajan-Zingales (1998), range from -0.45 for tobacco (ISIC 314) to 1.49 for drugs (ISIC 3522).

> 16Braun proxies asset tangibility by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to market value at the firm level, using US compustat data. The industry-level variable is constructed, like in Rajan-Zingales, by taking the industry median at the ISIC 3-digit level. Index values, given in Table 1 of Braun (2003), range from 0.09 (leather products) to 0.67 (petroleum refineries).

27
</sup> and World Bank lending classifications<sup>14</sup> used in this paper are as of July 1, 2021, and differ from the previous papers.

> 10 In the absence of actual data on school closures, the simulations in Azevedo (2020) and Azevedo, Hasan et al. (2021) assumed that schools are closed only for 3-9 months in a 10-month school year. A few regional simulations (for the East Asia and the Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa regions only) relied on World Bank internal data from Task Team Leaders on actual closures in those regions to inform this parameter. 11 Under the optimistic scenario, mitigation effectiveness is assumed to be 10% for low-income, 14% for lower-middle-income, 20% for upper-middle-income, and 30% for high-income countries.

> 12 Under the intermediate and pessimistic scenarios, mitigation effectiveness is assumed to be 5% for low-income, 7% for lowermiddle-income, 10% for upper-middle-income, and 15% for high-income countries.

> 13 See income classifications here.

> 14 See World Bank lending classifications here.

5
<mark>Energy Poverty Advisory Hub (2023). N</mark> ational Indicators: "Uncovering New Possibilities Expanded - - Knowledge" https://energy <u>poverty.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 10/EPAH2023_2nd%20Indicators%20Report_Final_0.pdf</u> <mark>EU Energy Poverty Observatory (EPOV) (2019). Case Study: French National Energy Poverty Observatory (ONPE). Link:</mark> <u><mark>https://energy-poverty.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202110/epov_case_study_france.pdf</mark></u> <mark>European Commission (2023). Energy poverty in the EU. Link:</mark> <u><mark>https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/energy-consumer-rights/energy-</mark></u> <mark>-</mark> <u><mark>poverty eu_en</mark></u> European Commission (2023b). Smart grids and meters. Link: Smart grids and meters (europa.eu) European Union (2016). Energy Poverty Handbook. Link: https://bpie.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/energypovertyhandbook-online.pdf Fehrer, D., and Krarti, M. (2018). Spatial distribution of building energy use in the United States through satellite imagery of the earth at night, Building and Environment, Volume 142, Pages 252-264, ISSN 0360-1323, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2018.06.033.

Fergus, P., & Chalmers, C. (2021). Energy sobriety: a behaviour measurement indicator for fuel poverty using aggregated load readings from smart meters. In Towards Energy Smart Homes: Algorithms, Technologies, and Applications (pp. 21-47). Cham: Springer International Publishing
No less contentious is the role played by urban economic growth—whether it helps absorb surplus rural labor and unemployed urban workers or merely benefits urban elites.<sup>8</sup> Past research on these issues has relied mainly on cross-country comparisons, often in single cross-sections (such as in the many tests of the Kuznets hypothesis) but sometimes using panel data, though the typically short time-series has meant that the cross-country variability is dominant. (While one can track economic growth annually for almost all countries, the household surveys needed to monitor living standards are far less frequent.) In addressing these issues, it is clearly desirable to have a reasonably long time series of surveys; a short series can be deceptive for inferring a trend.

Among developing countries, India has the longest series of national household surveys suitable for tracking living conditions. The surveys are reasonably comparable over time since the basic survey instruments and methods have changed rather little (though we note, and address, some comparability problems). India thus provides rich time series evidence—uniquely so among developing countries—for testing and quantifying the relationship between living standards of the poor and macroeconomic aggregates.

All the substantive issues about growth and poverty in the general development literature have been prominent in the literature and policy debates on India. Famously, India's postindependence planners hoped that the country's urban-based industrialization process would bring longer-term gains to poor people, including through rural labor absorption.<sup>9</sup> However, that hope was largely shattered by the evidence of the slow pace of poverty reduction in the period from Independence until the 1980s.<sup>10</sup> In explaining this, a number of observers pointed to the slow pace of labor absorption from agriculture associated with the more inward-looking and capital-intensive development path of this period.<sup>11</sup> The urban population share has been rising steadily over time in India, from 17% in 1950 to 31% today. However, India
Policy Research Working Paper 10656

# **Abstract**

To monitor the evolution of household living conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank conducted COVID-19 High-Frequency Phone Surveys in around 80 countries. Phone surveys are cheap and easy to implement, but they have some major limitations, such as the absence of poverty data, sampling bias due to incomplete telephone coverage in many developing countries, and frequent nonresponses to phone interviews. To overcome these limitations, the World Bank conducted pilots in 20 countries where the Survey of Wellbeing via Instant and Frequent Tracking, a rapid poverty monitoring tool, was adopted to estimate poverty rates based on 10 to 15 simple questions collected via phone interviews, and where sampling weights were adjusted to correct the sampling and nonresponse bias. This paper examines whether reweighting procedures and the Survey of Wellbeing via Instant and Frequent Tracking methodology can eliminate the bias in poverty estimation based on the COVID-19 High-Frequency Phone Surveys. Experiments using artificial phone survey samples show that (i) reweighting procedures cannot fully eliminate bias in poverty estimates, as previous research has demonstrated, but (ii) when combined with Survey of Wellbeing via Instant and Frequent Tracking poverty projections, they effectively eliminate bias in poverty estimates and other statistics.

This paper is a product of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at kzhang2@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the
elections. The findings suggest that composition change was large, if not total: the average change was 73 percent, equivalent to almost three new members; all four elected members were replaced in slightly more than one-third of schools (36 percent). This was measured during the school endline in 2015, demonstrating that the changes in SMC composition were sustained for a period of at least two years.

We also measure the attendance rate at the capacity building for SMC members, the second key aspect of the ELECTIONS-CAPACITY intervention. The mean attendance for the three meetings, in both MEET+ELECTIONS and SMS+ELECTIONS schools, was 96 percent, and members from all schools in ELECTIONS-CAPACITY groups participated.

Overall, fidelity to treatment was sufficiently consistent across treatment groups to enable accurate assessment of impact of interventions on key outcomes. Variance in take-up between districts does pose a potential threat to internal validity; this is addressed by the inclusion of district fixed effects.

# 3. Data and Estimation Strategy

## **3.1 Data**

Data for this study come from a village-level household census, and school and household surveys conducted both at baseline and endline. First, a census of households and schools was conducted in three study districts in 2011, which provided a population frame for random selection of villages and schools. Second, a baseline survey was conducted in schools and sampled households between 27
immigrants or 26 times their share of the male population. As Annex 1 shows, the share of investment and production by foreigners is even greater, especially in mining, suggesting that our census data may be understating foreign influence in all countries. This is in line with Hansen (1971) who argues that industrialization was undertaken almost entirely by the resident

> 7 ... the lack of entrepreneurs and of qualified national workers gave to the incipient Chilean industry, a markedly foreign air. Anwandter and Meschner (Beer), Poppe (cotton), Tiffou (tanneries) Rudlof and Benedetti (shoes), Gleisner (furniture, tanning, soap), Kuppfer (smelting), Reiche (spinning), Sciaccaluga (canning), Goeckel (soap), Osthaus (rigging), are some of the names linked to the earliest manufacturing activities....p. 94.

8
There is suggestive evidence that women have lower aspiration for successes. Part of the reasons may be the lack of confidence.<sup>5</sup> Representative population surveys in 17 countries show that women are less confident of their entrepreneurial skills (Koellinger et al. 2013). Furthermore, placing lower value on money than men, women may care less about achieving traditional monetary successes (Blau and Kahn 2017).<sup>6</sup> Consistent with this, female owners are found to be less motivated than male owners by firm growth and profitability, and more by goals such as personal fulfillment, flexibility and autonomy (Anna et al. 1999; Morris et al. 2006; Klapper and Parker 2010). Female corporate leaders may also be more motivated by social goals such as labor welfare. Based on evidence of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway, female-headed firms tend to be more prolabor, with higher labor costs and lower short-term profits (Matsa and Miller 2013). Higher labor costs could hinder the adoption of labor-saving technologies and hurt productivity growth.<sup>7</sup> Time allocation of female corporate executives may also hinder corporate successes. Greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours account partly for the female earning disadvantage in the financial and corporate sectors after graduation from MBA programs (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2010). Similarly, the gender gap among young lawyers is partly attributable to the presence of young children (Azmat and Ferrer 2017). Along the same lines, self-employed women (some of which are likely to be entrepreneurs) do more housework, have shorter hours at work, and spend more time on childcare, and these factors account for a large share of the gender earnings differentials among the self-employed (Hundley 2001). Gender norms reinforce the roles played by aspiration and time allocation in constraining women’s corporate leadership success. The short work hours for married females is likely partly due to gender norms that push married women to do more household work to
implausible jump for 1980. The Cohen and Soto (2002) estimate provides the closest approximation. Additionally, not shown by Figure 2, the average years of schooling estimates here come close to values obtained from census and survey data. For example, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) report that mean education in the labor force was in the order of 1.7 for 1964. Edwards (2002) reports a value of 4.3 years for 2000. According to the estimate here, average years of schooling was in the order of 1.9 years in 1964 and 4.4 years in 2000.

A closer look at Figure 2 yields two important descriptive outcomes. First, the data suggest that mean education evident in the labor force slightly declined during the early 1990s. This outcome is associated with the disastrous effect of the civil war on the country’s human capital base. Those disadvantaged cohorts from the 1980s entered later into the labor force. Second, there has been substantial increase in the average years of schooling within the economically active population since 1998. This can be attributed to improvements within the education system and increased attention to education after the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords.

Even so, as it can be appreciated from Figure 2, this increased attention to education only has compensated for the loss of educational capital caused by civil strife. Consequently, recent educational progress does not represent a major improvement regarding the long-run growth of the country’s human capital base. In this context, it is worth recalling that educational attainment in Guatemala remains lowest compared to other Latin American countries.

# **4.2 Labor Force**

The measure of labor quantity here is the economically active population. For Guatemala there are several estimates. The National Statistic Institute (INE) provides calculations different from those of the Ministry of Work, both of which date back to 1980. Based on census and survey data, estimates for selected years have also been provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for
Although in most contexts, only a small fraction of the poorest women are part of female-headed households, this segment of the population has nonetheless been the subject of significant interest and concern from a gender perspective. The question is whether female-headed households face different constraints or have different preferences for adoption of new fuels, technology, and electricity. In this case, we might expect household decisions to more strongly reflect women‘s preferences, but also to be subject to the legal and cultural constraints on the women who head those households.

There is a substantial literature and mixed evidence on whether female-headed households tend to be poorer (Buvinic and Gupta 1997; Quisumbing et al. 1995; Fuwa 2006). There are both countries and categories of female-headed households (e.g., widows vs. married, urban vs. rural) for which this is the case, and others for which it is not. One reason to expect that female-headed households may be poorer, controlling for household size, is that their heads are more likely to be responsible both for generating income and for child care and domestic chores. However, the causal impact of having a female head on socio-economic status is difficult to establish, because of potential endogeneity (with the possible exception of widows, whose status could be considered due to random bad luck).

Where female-headed households are more likely to be poor, targeting either female-headed households or poor households can also have implications for the other category. For example, in Kenya, ―female heads of households constitute a higher proportion of the poor both in the rural (54.1% female vis-à-vis 52.5% for male heads) and urban areas (63.0% female vis-à-vis 45.9% for male heads). Also, female headed households rely more on the fuelwood than the male headed households. For instance, 81 percent of all female headed households used firewood compared to 68.1 percent for males,‖ according to the Population and Housing Census the Popular Report Aug 2002
violence from both parents and teachers. These opinions correlate with estimates of the prevalence of sexual violence. In the EAP region, the guessed prevalence of sexual violence toward children is 16 percent, versus 32 percent for respondents outside of the region.

Domestic violence against children is lower in the surveyed East Asian countries, in line with officials’ beliefs. The share of parents reporting that they violently discipline their children in household surveys is correlated with the estimated/perceived share of children victims of sexual violence (Figure 12). Although these two types of violence are different, they are often correlated (Ney, Fung, & Wickett, 1994). The share of child victims of sexual violence is unknown but according to self-reported surveys, the share of children violently disciplined by their parents is significantly lower in East Asian countries than in the other countries surveyed. But this share remains as high as 70 percent in Lao PDR and Vietnam (Source: UNICEF, 69 percent in Lao PDR (2017) and 68 percent in Vietnam (MICS, 2014).

There is a robust statistical link between the share of respondents justifying violence toward children and per capita GDP of their country. After accounting for the difference in per capita GDP, the share of respondents claiming that violence toward children is never justified is not statistically different in the EAP region than outside of it.

14
**<mark>Table 24.  Debt and VF loans by household financial asset class, 2010</mark>**

|Value of household|Share of households|Household outstanding|% of households indicating|
|---|---|---|---|
|financial assets(‘000 baht)||debt(‘000 baht)|VF as source of first loan|
|None|<0.1|52|..|
|< 10|36.2|96|26|
|10 - 29.9|25.0|136|21|
|30 – 49.9|14.9|232|16|
|50 – 99.9|11.8|316|13|
|100 – 499.9|8.4|532|9|
|500 – 999.9|2.2|851|4|
|1,000 – 4,999.9|1.2|1,765|7|
|5,000 – 9,999.9|0.2|1,583|0|
|≥ 10 million baht|0.1|1,517|0|

_Source:_ Thailand Socio-Economic Survey 2010. Note: .. = sample size too small.

**<mark>Table 25.  Main sources of borrowing, 2010</mark>**

|Source of main loan|% breakdown<br>for all<br>households|Outstanding debt per<br>household (‘000 baht)|% breakdown for households<br>in the poorest expenditure<br>quintile|
|---|---|---|---|
|Commercial bank|3.5|839|0.6|
|BAAC|19.6|136|26.8|
|GSB|3.7|703|0.3|
|