rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
market losses are not necessarily intangible). Market losses are losses to goods and services that are traded on markets, and for which a price can easily be observed. Even though droughts or heat waves affect directly the economic output (especially in the agriculture sector), direct market losses from most disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.) are losses of assets, i.e. damages to the built environment and manu‐ factured goods. These losses can be estimated as the repairing or replacement cost of the destroyed or damaged assets. Since building and manufactured goods can be bought on existing markets, their price is known. Direct market losses can thus be estimated using observed prices and inventories of physical losses that can be observed (as recorded, e.g., in the EM‐DAT database or insurance‐industry databases) or modeled (using, e.g., catastrophe models of the insurance industry or simplified methodologies; see Ranger et al., 2011).

Non‐market direct losses include all damages that cannot be repaired or replaced through purchases on a market. For them, there is no easily observed price that can be used to estimate losses. This is the case, among others, for health impacts, loss of lives, natural asset damages and ecosystem losses, and damag‐ es to historical and cultural assets. Sometimes, a price for non‐market impacts can be built using indirect methods, but these estimates are rarely consensual (e.g., the statistical value of human life).

Indirect losses (also labeled “higher‐order losses” in Rose, 2004) include all losses that are not provoked by the disaster itself, but by its consequences. Different hazards communities have different approaches for defining indirect costs (e.g. Meyer and Messner (2005) and FLOODSite (2009) for floods; Wilhite (2000) and Wilhite et al. (2007) for droughts). Contentious issues may emerge around the edge of these definitions across
According to information obtained from the Central Bank, the share of dividends paid to portfolio investors remained on average below 5 percent of all dividend payments to Cyprus during the period from 2005 to 2015. Similarly, the shares of portfolio investments for the Netherlands, Russia, the UK, Austria, Switzerland, the US, France, and Germany and Sweden on average stood below 5%. Given differences in portfolio and non‐portfolio investor definitions across DTTs and the Central Bank classification<sup>21</sup> we assume that just about 80%<sup>22</sup> of dividend payments qualify for the non‐portfolio rates stipulated in treaty provisions.

# **3.2 Measuring the behavioral response to withholding rate changes**

We attempt to quantify behavioral responses to changes in withholding taxation by looking at historical variation in Ukrainian treaty provisions. This variation is limited and largely driven by new treaty formation,<sup>23</sup> leading to important imprecisions of our results as discussed further below.

Combining information on (limited) variations with administrative information on income flows, we estimate the magnitude of country‐specific dividend, royalty and interest payments, conditional on the structure of the withholding tax regime. To derive estimates on the impact of a partial tax reform, we assume that income flows with partner country i, denoted I(i), are functions of the entire set of withholding tax rates, {T(1),T(2),..T(n)}. Governmental income accruing from the taxation of capital transfers is thus given by ��∑���� T�i� I�i� . We are interested in the impact of a small change of tax rate T(k). Using the above notation, this reads: The first term represents the mechanical effect. Its magnitude is readily available by combining information on current capital transfers with the hypothesized reform, dT(k). The second term accounts for
**Table 1 Poverty Measures According to CEQ-Income Definitions** **<u>(In percentage)</u>**

|**Poverty measures**|**Market**<br>**income**|**Net market**<br>**income**|**Disposable**<br>**income**|**Consumable**<br>**income**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Headcount poverty|25.00|22.77|22.77|26.35|
|Poverty gap * 100|8.24|6.73|6.73|7.80|
|Poverty severity * 100|4.10|2.97|2.97|3.45|
|Watts Index * 100|11.94|9.23|9.23|10.71|
|Sen Index * 100|11.56|9.06|9.06|10.54|

_Source_ : Authors’ estimation based on SLCHBS 2018.

Although the net balance of transfers and taxes (direct and indirect) translates into a higher incidence of poverty, the same is not true for the poverty gap (it decreases the poverty gap by about one percentage point) and other poverty measures. All of these show a reduction after the fiscal interventions.

# **5.2. How Does the Fiscal System Affect Inequality?**

The fiscal system in Grenada has heterogeneous redistributive characteristics with a significant potential to reduce inequality. The effects of fiscal interventions on income distribution are heterogeneous, as seen in Table 2. First, the direct transfers (SEED and School Feeding Programme) have low redistributive potential; between the market income and net market income, the Gini index change is below one percentage point. The potential of these transfers is better understood
where �ct0 and hct0 are endowments of physical and human capital of country c, ^ and �kt0 and h<sup>^</sup> kt0 are the corresponding revealed factor intensities of product k, all in log terms.

We di¤er from Cadot et al. (2011) in using the normalized di¤erences between the product factor intensities and the country factor endowments, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. This assures equal weights of physical and human capital in the overall distance, as � and h are measured in di¤erent units.

The data on national factor endowments are from Cadot et al. (2009). The stock of physical capital per capita (�ct0) is constructed according to the perpetual inventory method. Human capital per worker (hct0) is calculated from the average years of schooling in a country, using attainment data.

The product revealed factor intensities of product k are from Cadot et al. (2009). They are calculated as weighted averages of the factor endowments of the countries exporting that product, following the methodology introduced by Hausmann et al. (2007). For instance, the revealed physical capital intensity of product k is calculated as: where �ct0 is country c’s endowment of physical capital, and the weights are given by !ckt0 = ~~P~~ Xc ckt<sup>Xckt</sup> 0 =X0<sup>=X</sup> ct0<sup>ct</sup> 0<sup>,withXdenotingexports.Theseweightscorrespondto</sup> the revealed comparative advantage of country c in product k. The numerator, Xckt0=X ct0, measures the importance of product k in the overall exports of country c (<sup>P</sup> k<sup>Xckt</sup> 0<sup>=Xct</sup> 0<sup>).Thedenominator,P</sup> c<sup>Xckt</sup>
. 2004. Nepal Living Standards Survey: Statistical Report. Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics.

- Ohashi, Hiroshi. 2009. ―Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works.‖ _Review of Industrial Organization_ 34: 26785.

- Paarsch, Harry J. 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," _Journal of Econometrics,_ Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215

- Paarsch, Harry J. 1997. ―Deriving an Estimate of the Optimal Reserve Price: An Application to British Columbian Timber Sales.‖ _Journal of Econometrics_ , 78(2): 333-357.

- Porter, Robert, and Douglas Zona. 1993. ―Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions.‖ _Journal of Political Economy_ 101: 518–38.

- Price, Michael. 2008. ―Using the Spatial Distribution of Bidders to Detect Collusion in the Marketplace: Evidence from Timber Auctions, _Journal of Regional Science_ 48: 399417.

- Rezende, L. 2005. Auction econometrics with least squares. Mimeograph, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champlain, IL.
strategy. Building on successful products and targeting markets that have been successfully reached or are reachable by virtue of implementable policy measures should be a guiding principle. Figure 5 presents the expansion potential of some products in four regional markets where Tajik products have had some success: the CIS, the EU, the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia.

**Figure 5. Tajikistan Export Potential in Four Markets**

(Bubbles represent Tajikistan export value of specific products) <!-- Start of picture text --> 45<br>45<br>40<br>40<br>Aluminum wire<br>35 35 Aluminum wire<br>30<br>30<br>25<br>Other parts and 25<br>20 accesoires of Other parts and<br>motor vehicles 20 accessories of<br>15 motor vehicles<br>15<br>10 Apricots,<br>5 cherries, peaches Aluminum, not 10 Onions and<br>alloyed 5 shallots<br>0 Aluminum<br>-10 -5 0 10 20 30 40 0 alloys<br>-1.5 -1 -0.5 -5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5<br>-10<br>Import growth rate in CIS, 2005-10 -10<br>EU import growth rate, 2005-10<br>45 45<br>40 40<br>35 Aluminum wire 35<br>Aluminum wire<br>30 30<br>25 25 Other parts and<br>Other parts and accesories of<br>20 accessories of 20 motor vehicles<br>motor vehicles<br>15 15<br>Apricots,<br>105 Apricots, cherries Onions and shallots Aluminum waste and scrap Copper waste Aluminum, not 105 Dried fruits Onions and shallots cherries and peaches<br>peaches and scrap alloyed Aluminum<br>0 0 waste and scrap<br>-0
about ongoing conflict to inform return choices. Unsurprisingly, security considerations come first. Building on this insight, we use causal mediation analysis to reveal that information sharing on social media mediates the relationship between violent events in an area and return to that area, Figure 9.

# **5.1 Content in Return and non-Return Areas**

We first consider a model run on the `Location Mentions` dataset. This model was run with a ‘four way’ covariate including information about returnees and IDPs. The covariate equaled 1 for areas with both, 2 for areas with returnees and without IDPs, 3 for areas with IDPs and without returnees, and 4 for areas with neither. For a wholistic analysis, we considered prevalence of image clusters given the same ‘four way’ covariate. Images are from the `Researcher Coded` groups, in which no locations with only IDPs are represented. The `Location Mentions` STM model is dominated by violence related topics, motivating the use of the models discussed later in this section to attain additional insights. The most common words for each topic are in Figure 4, and the Arabic versions are available in Appendix 8.2. For the image analysis, sample clusters can be seen in Figure 5.

As shown in Figure 3 discussion around organized war violence, such as “Regime military action, Air strike”, is more represented in areas without return and without IDPs, with an increase of 0.045 between neither and both (52% more prevalent). Other violence related topics such as “Air strike warning” (0.05, 29%), “Liberation army, Regime military” (0.029, 49%), and “anti-ISIS campaign” (0.01, 33%) are also more prevalent in areas without returnees or IDPs. This result supports research indicating that individuals are unlikely to want to return to areas with ongoing violence and military campaigns, especially if they were exposed to violence prior to leaving (Ghosn
Policy Research Working Paper 9267

# **Abstract**

Can consumption taxes reduce inequality in developing countries? This paper combines household expenditure data from 31 countries with theory to shed new light on the redistributive potential and optimal design of consumption taxes. It uses the place of purchase of each expenditure to proxy for informal (untaxed) consumption which enables characterizing the informality Engel curve. The analysis finds that the budget share spent in the informal sector steeply declines with income, in all countries. The informal sector thus makes consumption taxes progressive: households in the richest quintile face an effective tax rate that is twice that of the poorest quintile. The paper extends the standard optimal commodity tax model to allow for informal consumption and calibrates it to the data to study the effects of different tax policies on inequality. Contrary to consensus, the findings show that consumption taxes are redistributive, lowering inequality by as much as personal income taxes. These effects are primarily driven by the shape of the informality Engel curve. Taking informality into account, commonly used redistributive policies, such as reduced tax rates on necessities, have a limited impact on inequality. In particular, subsidizing food cannot be justified on equity or efficiency grounds in several poor countries.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at pbachas@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
Figure 22: Proportion of Crop Produce Sold and Poverty, 2014/15 <!-- Start of picture text --> 50%<br>millet<br>40% lentils<br>roselle<br>sorghum groundnut tomato<br>30%<br>sesame other_crop<br>20%<br>10%<br>egypt_beans onion<br>wheat dates<br>0%<br>0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%<br>Proportion of Crop Sold<br>Poverty Rate<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Authors’ calculations using NHBPS 2014/15.

There are important regional differences in which crops are grown (Figure 23). Dates are the most common crop grown in the Nile region (Figure 23a). Sorghum is the most common crop grown in the Eastern region, Khartoum, and the White and Blue Nile region (Figure 23b–d). It is also the second most important crop grown in Darfur and Kordofan (Figure 23e–f). Millet is most common in Darfur and is important in Kordofan but is not grown extensively elsewhere. The most important crop in Kordofan is sesame.

Sesame is a common cash crop in the Kordofan region, where it was grown by almost half of all farmers in 2014/15 (Figure 23e). As the 2009 survey did not include sesame as a potential crop grown, it is difficult to confirm whether the current production of sesame is a recent trend or if it has been a common crop produced by Sudanese farmers. However, as shown in Figure 4b, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) statistics show that sesame production and exports have grown significantly during this time. Substantial reduction in rural poverty (Figure 10b) in two of Kordofan’s three states (the states not affected by conflict) may be partly explained
Report, Malawi ranked 109 out of 129 countries in terms of private credit to GDP, a frequently-used measure of financial development. Malawi also gets the lowest marks in the “depth of credit information index” which proxies for the amount and quality of information about borrowers available to lenders. Using more micro data,

> 1 The following quote from 1973 by Robert McNamara when he was the World Bank president exemplifies this view: “The miracle of the Green Revolution may have arrived, but for the most part, the poor farmer has not been able to participate in it. He simply cannot afford to pay for the irrigation, the pesticide, the fertilizer... For the small holder operating with virtually no capital, access to capital is crucial.”
The literature on firms’ issuance activity tends to study the size of issuers through balance sheet data using, for example, firms’ assets.<sup>5</sup> The downside of this approach is that balance sheet data

> 5 See, for example, Pagano et al. (2002), King and Segal (2009), Adrian et al. (2013), Becker and Ivashina (2014), Didier et al. (2015), and Bruno and Shin (2017).

10
distant from urban centers; on average, the nearest city with a population of 20,000 people or more is 46 km away (median: 40 km).

Previous research on PSNP finds that in years of high inflation the real value of the unindexed cash payments lost value relative to food payments (Sabates‐Wheeler and Devereux 2010). Given the lower real value of the cash payments, high food inflation should shift infra‐ marginal households towards wishing that they could receive food payments. The challenge is to construct a meaningful measure of inflation that is specific to the PSNP localities where the data were collected. To address this, note that each survey round includes 12 months recall data on the prices paid by consumers for staples. This information can be used to construct a cereal price index, specifically a weighted average of prices of the 6 main cereals (maize, teff, barley, wheat, sorghum, and millet) in each community in each survey round. The weights are based on the consumption shares of each cereal type in the community and derived from the data collected in the food consumption module of the household questionnaire. Applying weights from the first (2006) and last (2014) survey rounds, a Fisher Ideal price index is constructed (see Deaton and Tarozzi 2000) that captures both the temporal and spatial differences in price levels. Appendix B provides more information on this cereal price index; Figure B1 shows how the index varied over the survey rounds in each region.

This cereal food price index can be used to adjust the nominal daily public work wages to assess their purchasing power over time. Figure 1 shows how the real daily wage rates (expressed in 2014 birr) have fluctuated over time. The most dramatic is the reduction in the purchasing power of the PSNP Public Works wage between 2006 and 2008, a consequence of the massive food price spike that occurred across Ethiopia (and indeed, around the world) in 15
# **Preferential Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR**

**Chad P. Bown**<sup>**†**</sup> **Peterson Institute for International Economics & CEPR**

**Patricia Tovar**<sup>**‡**</sup> **Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú**

JEL: F13 Keywords: preferential trade agreements, tariffs, MFN, antidumping, safeguards, temporary trade barriers, Argentina, Brazil, MERCOSUR † Bown: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1750 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 USA. Tel: +1.202.454.1306, email: <u>cbown@piie.com, web: https://sites.google.com/site/chadpbown/</u> .

‡ Tovar: Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, Lima 32, Perú, Tel: +51.1.626.2000, email: ptovar@pucp.pe, web: https://sites.google.com/site/patriciatovarrod/ Thanks to Antoni Estevadeordal, Caroline Freund, and Emanuel Ornelas for making available their tariff data, and to Alessandro Nicita, Marcelo Olarreaga and Peri Silva for making available their estimated trade elasticities. Research for this paper has been supported in part by the World Bank’s Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development and the Strategic Research Partnership on Economic Development. All remaining errors are our own. Bown thanks the World Bank’s Development Research Group for its hospitality during the period in which much of the work on this paper was completed.
it a weak source of information for Argentina. Additionally, export duties, which are among the most distortive taxes, have exhibited significant fluctuations ( **Figure 15** ).

To measure the cyclicality of tax rate policy, it is crucial to consider that tax rates tend to vary very little or remain unchanged compared to government spending and other macroeconomic variables. While government spending is a continuous process, changes in tax rates typically result from parliamentary discussions, leading to a more rigid dynamic. Consistent with recent findings (Vegh Vuletin, 2015) and based on the database used (i.e., CIT, PIT, and VAT top rates), the average frequency of tax rate changes per year ranges from 0.12 to 0.20 globally. Moreover, the frequency of changes in Argentina is even lower, approximately 0.10. This means that top-statutory tax rates of the three main taxes change, on average, once every 10 years. Therefore, while the usual approach to measure cyclicality involves using the cyclical component of a fiscal variable (e.g., government consumption), it is more appropriate to utilize the percentage change in tax rates for analyzing the cyclicality of tax policy. A positive (negative) correlation between the change in tax rates and real GDP indicates a countercyclical (procyclical) tax policy stance. Furthermore, to capture the overall cyclical behavior of taxes in each country, a tax index is constructed, which comprises a weighted average of the three tax rates (weighting on their respective share of tax revenue).

# Ti = CITi ∗ WeightCIT + PITi ∗ WeightPIT + VATi ∗ WeightVAT

When analyzing the three main taxes included in the tax index, it appears that Argentina has pursued a relatively acyclical tax policy. The correlation between changes in the tax rate index and the real GDP cycle for Argentina is +0.27, although not significantly different from zero. This suggests a tax policy that is neutral in terms of its cyclical impact, at least for the
usually, the head of household provides the information on child labor. The advantages of using proxy-based reports rather than child-based reports in the context of child labor are not clear. On the one hand, child-reported information may be more accurate than proxy responses, given that a child knows best how she allocates her time. On the other hand, the head of household may be familiar with the children’s activities since many child laborers in developing countries work on the family farm or enterprise, however, due to social normal and cultural values, a proxy respondent may tend to underreport these activities (Dammert and Galdo 2013).

In order to understand the effects of survey design, experimental studies have randomized the survey instrument to different households in Tanzania and Ethiopia (Dillon et al. 2012; Dammert, et al. 2016). Both studies show that survey design matters for child labor outcomes, in particular in contexts where a large share of children are working on the family farm or home enterprises and respondents may provide the socially desirable response of not sending their children to work. These results have important implications for the reliability of current household survey instruments and published estimates of child labor for monitoring and guiding efforts towards child labor elimination. More attention needs to go to the survey instrument when we measure child labor. An area that deserves attention concerns the worst forms of child labor, which are rarely considered in rigorous empirical research.

# **_2.2 Theoretical Framework_**

In this section, we present a heuristic explanation to illustrate the different mechanisms through which policies may have an impact on child labor. This discussion draws on the theoretical framework presented in Cigno and Rosati (2005) and Edmonds (2008). Economic theory largely focuses on child labor as labor supply. Consider a unitary household in which parents maximize utility over current consumption, children’s education, and leisure. The parent's labor supply is inelastic and yields an exogenous income, fertility is exogenous and fixed at one child, and school