rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
of size and R and D to sales ratio; firms have been also split on the basis of their exchange listing. 18 I/K = 0+ OIQ + **02** (CF/K) + 33(S/K) + **e** (1) where Q is the q ratio, CF is cash flows, S is sales, and K is the replacement cost of capital. In this specification, Q is regarded as a measure of expected profitability, CF is a measure of the availability of funds, and S shows current demand conditions.<sup>1 9</sup> As noted before, this is also a convenient strategy to distinguish between the role of cash flows as a measure of expected profitability and as a measure of the availability of funds. All the coefficients in this specification are expected to be positive.

11

# Results

The empirical results are based on a panel of 603 manufacturing firms from the Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT database for the 1972-1990 period; the sample excludes firms that were involved in major mergers representing contribution to sales exceeding 50 percent of the acquiring firm's net sales for the year in question. The q ratio has been computed following the methodology outlined in Salinger and Summers (1983).

> Regressions20 were run for eq. 1 after splitting the sample on the basis of median values

's Dividend pay-out ratio was not used to split the sample, since it is not useful in distinguishing between managerial and information-theoretic approaches.

" It should be noted that in addition to sales, Fazzari et al. (1988) also used the desired capital stock term from neoclassical theory to model the demand side and still found the cash flow term to be significant.

20 In general, the relationship is specified as Yi, = _(3_ + XjX + ai + v, + ei, where ai is the individual firm effect and v, is the year effect. The standard approach for sweeping out fixed effects,
57 Table A1: List of Fertilizer Products Subject to Import Bans

|HS8|Description|
|---|---|
|31024000|Mixtures of ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate or other inorganic non-fertilizing<br>substances|
|31026000|Double salts and mixtures of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate|
|31028000|Mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution|
|31029000|Other, including mixtures not specifed in the foregoing subheadings|
|31031100<br>31031900|Superphosphates containing by weight 35% or more of diphosphorus pentaoxide (P2O5)<br>Other|
|31039000|Other|
|31049000|Other|
|31051000|Goods of this Chapter in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not<br>exceeding 10 kg|
|31052000|Mineral or chemical fertilizers containing the three fertilizing elements nitrogen,<br>phosphorus and potassium|
|31053000|Diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate)|
|31054000|Ammonium dihydrogenorthophosphate (monoammonium phosphate) and mixtures<br>thereof with diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate)|
|31055100|Containing nitrates and phosphates|
|31055900|Other|
|31056000|Mineral or chemical fertilizers containing the two fertilizing elements phosphorus<br>and potassium|
|31059000|Other|

_Notes_ : The table displays the list of HS8 fertilizer products that were subject to import bans at some point in 2021. An HS8 product is classified as fertilizer if it is listed in Chapter 31 of the HS system. The data is from Sri Lanka’s Extraordinary Gazettes.

# **A.B Trade Flows**

We use novel high-frequency granular trade data obtained from S&P Global Market Intelligence’s Panjiva data platform covering the universe of Sri Lanka’s export and import transactions from January 2017 to October 2022 based on bills of lading (BoL). The data includes the name and address of the shipper (exporter) and the consignee (importer) of each shipment as well as HS8 product codes. Exporting and importing
by between 13% and 17%, depending on the specification. Allowing land sales to legal entities on January 1, 2024, is estimated to have been associated with an added lease price increment of between 7% and 9% for legal entities only, beyond the lease price premium of 39% to 43% paid by legal entities as compared to individuals. While this effect can plausibly be explained as a result of increased competition, price data would need to be complemented with production data to ascertain whether it is indeed the most productive producers that access land markets (or what types of barriers prevent this, if not) and how resulting surplus is split between tenants and landowners.

_Local competition and length of lease terms:_ With an elasticity of between 3.0% and 4.4%, higher levels of land rental activity at village level (as captured by the number of transactions in the village in the previous year) are estimated to be associated with higher lease rates. If the amount of land available for lease in a locality is constant and tenants cannot renegotiate or cancel leases unilaterally, market volume is a function of the term structure of existing leases, implying that, as long as lease prices are expected to increase, greater flexibility in adjusting lease terms has a benefit (Grenadier 1995) as confirmed by empirical studies (Bond _et al._ 2008; Hüttel _et al._ 2016).

Yet, including a measure of the length of the lease term in the regression produces counter-intuitive results as lease rates for contracts with terms beyond 20 years suffer a discount of 16 to 21 percent. Recalling that almost 75% of leases are for 7 (the legal minimum) to 10 years, this suggests that up to a quarter of tenants lack awareness of available options or the ability to resist contracts that not only lock them in for more than a generation but also punish them for doing so by paying lower prices than short-term contracts. A possible explanation for this is that the Soviet valuation system
# **A1.13 World Bank/University of E3asel (WDR)**

The World Bank is an internal:ional organization dedicated to eradicating poverty in the world. It was founded in 1945 and is located in Washington. As of May 1999, the World Bank can be reached at httPJl/www.worldbank.orq.

As background for the 1997 VVorld Development Report (WDR) on the role of the state, the World Bank conducted a survey of approximately 3000 enterprises on 69 countries. This survey was designed to measure the perception of firms on the constraints that government actions impose on them. The results of this survey are in the public domain and may be downloaded from http:l/www.worldbank.orp/html/edi/gac/ ubs.htm.

In a separate effort, the same questionnaire was implemented by Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder of the University of Basel, in five additional countries. Data and information on this research project can be found at: http://www.unibas.chlwwz/wifor/survev In the governance database, we combine information from these two sources and use the country average responses to the questions listed in Table Al .13.

# **Appendix 2: Components of Aggiregate Governance Indicators**

**Table Gl. Voice and Accountability**

|**Code**|**Table**<br>**Row**<br>**(Appendix 1)**|**Concepts measured**|
|---|---|---|
|**Represe**|**ntative sources**||
|EIU|A 1.5<br>3|Change in government, orderly transfer|
||9|Legal system, transparency, fairness|
|FH|A 1.6<br>2|Civil Liberties: Freedom of speech, of assembly and<br>demonstration, of religion, equal opportunity
and (labor) productivity. SOEs are defined as firms where national or subnational governments have ownership stake of at least 10%. All regressions are at the 2-digit NACE industry level and include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent.

## _SOE, Business Dynamism and Market Outcomes_

**On the other hand, SOE presence in Romanian markets has limited effects on business dynamism** . Using the revenue share of SOEs in markets as a proxy of SOE footprint , the results suggest that business dynamism has not suffered a significant slowdown. However, on average, the higher market share of SOEs is associated with a low entry rate of firms, including private firms that may want to enter and compete (Table 9, Column 1, Row (a)). This is more true in partially contestable and natural monopolies sectors, where one would expect lower entry rates, but  not in competitive markets (Table 9, Column 1, Row (b)).

# 6. Conclusion

**This paper compared the performance of, and subsidy allocation to, Romanian SOEs of various ownership degrees and control levels to POEs** . In addition, the paper assessed whether Romanian SOEs could provide a buffer in terms of  jobs, revenues, and wages to mitigate the early negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the paper examined the effects of SOE presence on market outcomes, including business dynamism, competition, and contribution to allocative efficiency. In all cases, the paper uses the Romanian MoF firm-level data from 2011 to 2020 and the World Bank BOS database.

**Several key messages emerge. First, SOEs in Romania were larger—employed more people and had larger assets per worker—and paid better wages, on average, than their POE peers from 2011 to 2019.** On average, they had lower revenue per worker  than POEs over
-6-

The aim of this paper is to present a simple model for a.."lyzing the efficiency of a tax administration agency. The model can be used by the tax collecting agency for allocation of resources, or by an outsider, who wants to insure optimal el., %tion of resources in the agency.<sup>6</sup> It is assumed that the tax law and by-laws, the penalties .nd tax rates are given. It is also assumed that the tax administration has two targets: to maximize revenue in the short run, and to see to it that the tax law is obeyed by all taxpayers. It is further assumed that the allocation of resources between the two targets is made outside of the model, and so the model is concerned only with the target of maximization of the revenue in the short run. The tax collection agency is assumed to face a budget constraint.7 As we explained before, this kind of modeling is not general in its nature and it is constructed for the specific tax administration we are dealing with. However, the principles of the analysis can be used in miodeling other tax administrations.

The structure of the paper is the following: the next section describes the process of administering the tax law as a decision tree. The third section presents some uses of the decision tree, while the fourth section addresses some problems of estimation. In the fifth section the decision tree approach is implemented using Israeli data.

- 6/ Similar goals are examined in papers by Wertz (1979), Dubin and Wilde (1987).

- 7/ Note that this assumption is not in conflict with the argument that the tax administration should not maximize revenue (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1987). In the latter case, the concern is about the optimal size of the administration. The concern of this paper is the objective of the tax administration, for a given budget.
Further, the counselors have information on specific needs (demand) of firms and a fit may have arisen for a jobseeker of low skill who was otherwise judged to be less employable. For those rated _highly employable_ , and who had a higher likelihood of being referred to specific matching, treatment effects were close to zero as even in the control group these individuals managed to find employment.

Given their importance for assignment to specific matching, the paper next examines the correlations of worker characteristics with employability ratings from job counselors. Among characteristics observable by jobs counselors, jobseekers over age 30 are more likely to be judged employable, which may be a proxy for prior work experience, and those with less than high school education and those unemployed for more than a year, are judged to be less employable. Gender and characteristics including household size and income are uncorrelated with employability assessments. Exploiting data from a separate survey highlights the importance that personality traits may play in the counseling process. Jobseekers who are extraverted and open to new experiences are viewed to be more employable. While some types of jobs, particularly those in the service sector, may require workers who are more extraverted, attention to how personality traits of jobseekers influence the ratings of job counselors may be useful when considering contracts with the private sector in the future. Not all positions involve facing customers, even in the service sector, and thus will not necessarily require workers to exhibit high levels of extraversion and openness to new experiences.

This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on outsourcing private employment services. First, it examines the relative impact of the services provided by a private employment service provider and finds that job matching in addition to counseling services can have significant positive impacts on employment outcomes, particularly for youth and low-skilled workers who may struggle to otherwise signal their skills in the labor market. Second, it opens the “black box” of the jobseekercounselor relationship to better understand the behavior and incentives of a private employment service provider. Counselors act upon their assessments of jobseeker
of opening a Pafupi account, the individual must pay MK _c_ 1 = 1 _,_ 300. Finally, _δij_ = 1 if the account holder was asked to come to the bank the week following the visit, while it takes value _δij_ = _δj ∈_ (0 _,_ 1] if asked to come to the bank after the two-week delay, where we allow _δ_ to depend on choice _j_ , that is, on whether the account holder keeps the old account ( _j_ = 0), closes the account ( _j_ = _x_ ) or opens a Pafupi account ( _j_ = 1).

Intuitively, the two different treatments implemented during the home visits of the 2016 experiment help identify different parameters of the model: the show-up payment helps identify the cost of visiting the bank _ci_ (along with whether they received the transfer in 2015), while the timing of when they should visit the bank helps identify the discount parameters _δij_ . In addition, the balance data and whether they received the transfer in 2015 identify the parameters governing the value of the two accounts _vi_ 0 ( _m_ ) and _vi_ 1 ( _m_ ).

The probability of each choice can be written as:

> 7We note that _b_ refers to the cash incentive promised during the home visit. While some households were randomly selected to receive an additional amount (up to 1,500 MK) once they visited at the bank, the nested logit model cannot accommodate this surprise incentive in the second stage (choice of accounts). We estimate the model assuming that _b_ includes both the amount promised during the home visit and the additional surprise incentive and we obtain similar results.

10
This paper’s empirical analysis uses intra-daily exchange rate data from 2004 to 2009. Because the BCRP’s interventions are always made public at the end of its official participation in the foreign exchange market, we are able to differentiate between the effect of past information of interventions and expectations of future interventions on the exchange rate. This distinction is important because the whole purpose of making the information on intervention activities public is to reduce uncertainty and to establish that the BCRP is committed to achieving certain goals. Moreover, we use the intervention decisions that are observed by the market to test the significance of the signaling channel (Mussa (1981)) of the intended monetary policies. Expected future and unannounced central bank participation in the foreign exchange market involves a good deal of asymmetric information; as a consequence, uncertainty may or may not dissipate completely. We will study the significance of this uncertainty.

The studies outlined in the relevant literature that examine the effect of central bank interventions on the volatility of the exchange rate have obtained mixed results. However, these differences are mainly attributable to the varying quality of the data used in the empirical exercises, as well as the monetary policy regimes, data frequencies, and the econometric methods used to measure the effects of interventions on the exchange rate.

We use the methodology of Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) to model an optimal intervention policy for central banks to stabilize the exchange rate. Two types of controls are considered: discrete interventions, which cause a jump in the exchange, and continuous small interventions, with the purpose of smoothing variation in the exchange rate. The first control represents the infrequent but large interventions to prevent large variability due to random 4
set of professions (and thus employees). All indications suggest that employers and employees targeted in our experiment had not been directly or indirectly exposed to this type of campaign in the past.

> 4 In some cases, employees were employed with more than one firm, but these represent less than 1% of all employees targeted.

> 5 Of these firms, 165 are excluded from the results below because they submitted no declarations in 2020 filing periods (targeting was done based on December 2019 filing data). There are no statistical differences in treatment assignment for those excluded and those included in the analysis.

5
br>0<br>1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11<br>Pakistan<br>percent<br>4<br>3.5<br>3<br>2.5<br>2<br>1.5<br>1<br>0.5<br>0<br>2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11<br>All trading partners' exports under any TTB in effect<br>China's exports under any TTB in effect<br>Other emerging economies' (non-China) exports under any TTB in effect<br>High income countries' exports under any TTB in effect<br><!-- End of picture text --> Notes: Shares of nonoil imports, constructed by the author with policy data from Bown (2012) and trade-weighting with HS-06 import data from UN Comtrade via WITS, following Appendix equation (A2).

21
plausible. Although we have in fact controlled for many other factors which may have affected output - such as the CMEA collapse, demand and supply shocks and the durability of goods - a few more may still be missing. Among them, credit availabity is the first to come to mind: all-union industries received from the central government not orny the information but also the credit resources necessary to complete their trades. The collapse of the Soviet system, therefore, led to both a loss of information and a loss of credit resources. This point becomes less relevant, however, if we realize that the information lost with the transition was not only about trading and production, but also about access to credit sources.

The previous remark is related to the broader issue of the omission of potentially important variables because of data availability problems. In Eastern Europe and in Central Asia, for example, researchers have documented the somewhat different role played by business associations.?9 To make this analysis more robust, the collection of additional finn-level data and more empirical work are therefore necessary.

Cross-country comparisons are also needed to test the robustness of our findings and to reconcile the observed discrepancies in the evolution of institutions. Our intuition suggests that the differences in institutional pattems between Eastem Europe, the Former Soviet Union countries, and other emerging economies may lay in the coordinating mechanisms existing before transition in each one of these countries and in the institutional disorganization faced by fimms. In line with the recent works on groups in Latin America and East Asia, a comparison between Russia and any of these countries will provide us with further, deeper insights on the possibility and the role of selforganizing institutions on finn's activities.

> 28 For a more complete treatment of this topic, see Kaufmann, 1995.

> 29 See, for example, Anderson (2000) and Broadman (1999).

27
(2012), using individual-level DHS data from Africa and South Asia, suggest that first-born South Asian children are _taller_ than first-born African children. The country-level data studied here, however, show no similar reversal. If country means are computed using only first-born children, I find that South Asian children are 0.22 standard deviations shorter ( _s.e._ = 0 _._ 05), a reduction but not an elimination of the 0.36 gap in table 5. In this sample of country means of first-borns, the gap falls to 0.15 with a control for open defecation and to 0.08 with a control for open defecation per square kilometer. In the full sample of country-level means of first-borns, analogously to column 1 of table 1, moving from an open defecation rate of 0 to 1 is linearly associated with a decline in height for age of 1.11 standard deviations.

14
labor supply. This may be of particular concern in the countries of the Northern Triangle, where labor supply, particularly of women, is below the regional average.

In this paper, we analyze the impact of the receipt of remittances on the labor supply and employment outcomes of men and women in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Using household surveys for the years 2006 and 2014, we analyze the extent to which remittances affect the labor decisions of recipients. There is a well-known problem of endogeneity in establishing causal links between non-random income (such as remittances) and household labor decisions. In short, the population of households that receive remittances differs from households that do not receive remittances in systematic yet unobserved ways. These differences may themselves explain differences in other outcomes, including labor supply. Hence, the crucial question – do remittances reduce labor supply? – requires addressing issues of selection. Given the data limitations in these three countries, the strategy undertaken in this study is propensity score matching.

# Background

Given the central role of labor markets as determinants of growth and poverty reduction, the impact of remittances on labor supply is an important factor to understand in countries with high remittance inflows. An increase in income (such as via remittances) increases the household budget which, as shown in the economics literature, affects the relative value of “leisure” (including home production) and market activities of household members.<sup>5</sup> The resulting income effect increases the reservation wage of recipients, altering the utility-maximizing allocation of time between leisure and market activities. That is, individuals are able to buy more leisure or home production time because of remittances, at the expense of time in the labor market. Simultaneously, the change in the demographic composition of the household resulting from migration can alter the value of home production. The returns to home production for households with migrating members may be higher than for households without migration if the individuals who do not

> 4 Migration and remittance estimates for 2013 are from