rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
# **_Own industry concentration_**

Several different metrics of localization have been employed by agglomeration studies including single industry employment in a region, same industry establishments in a region, or an index of concentration that indicates disproportionate specialization of the region in the industry when compared to the nation. Measures such as single industry employment and the location quotient, an indicator of specialization, have been commonly used in empirical studies, but are problematic because they do not account for local differences in the industry’s firm-size distribution. Single industry employment in a particular region may be due to common location of several similar firms or a single firm with many workers and the conventional measures treat both circumstances equally.

Localization economies require interaction between firms so a more appropriate measure should recognize the importance of the number of firms in addition to the number of workers in an industry because both these factors affect the scope and scale of interaction.

For the analysis in this paper, we develop a measure of own industry concentration that adjusts industry employment in each region for the industry’s local firm-size distribution. This measure<sup>~</sup> eri is firm-size adjusted employment for industry _i_ in city _r_ , and is defined as:

> access a larger pool of potential buyers and complementary services that cannot be provided in-house. Larger cities also provide a larger home market for end products, make it easier to attract skilled employees who are attracted by urban amenities not available in smaller towns, and support a large number of complementary service providers such as financial and legal advisers, advertising and real estate services. Manufacturing firms will also require complementary services such as legal, financial and other advisory services. These are likely to be available in larger, more diverse urban areas.

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# **8 Conclusions**

Since the turn of the 21st century, the World Bank has been obtaining small area estimates of poverty and inequality indicators using the ELL approach. One of the reasons for the method’s popularity was the existence of software that made applying the method to real data relatively easy. This began with an implementation in SAS by Demombynes (2002), which was followed by PovMap implemented by Zhao (2006), and finally a Stata version (“sae” package by Nguyen et al., 2018). Along those lines, the research effected in this paper also represents a considerable update to the “sae” package in Stata.<sup>36</sup> Countries often set out to obtain small area estimates because more precise poverty estimates at a more granular level allow for improved allocation of resources, see Elbers et al. (2007). This research comes just in time for the 2020 round of population census and should provide an improved tool for the operationalization of the SDGs at a sub-national level.

An important aspect of the small area estimation procedures is how parameter estimates from an assumed population model are applied to census data to obtain the small area estimates. As noted in this document, the traditional ELL procedure is aligned to the approach used in multiple imputation, where the main aim is not prediction. Under multiple imputation, the method that yields the lowest MSE yields invalid statistical inference (Van Buuren, 2018). On the other hand, the goal of small area estimation is to improve precision.

This paper presents a substantial revision to the traditional methods by ELL (2002, 2003) and the updates by Van der Weide (2014) for small area estimation.<sup>37</sup> Our results show substantial gains of the proposed Census EB method with respect to the previous methods in all the considered scenarios (varying area population sizes and sampling fractions, model prediction power and distributional assumptions) and also of the considered parametric bootstrap MSE estimators
but not for education. Percentile ranks in schooling distribution calculated by mid rank method often fails to equalize inequality across generations, because, unlike income, schooling is a discrete variable with limited support. They also show that the shape of the rank-based CEF may be fundamentally dierent from the husband joins the family of the wife after marriage. A substantial anthropological literature suggests that matrilocal (and neolocal) kinship norms in South East Asia including Indonesia are important for better health and educational outcomes of women, especially when compared to the patrilineal and patrilocal kinship norms in South Asia (Dube (1997)). Evidence on the importance of kinship norms for women's education in the more recent cohorts in Indonesia is, however, conicting: Levine and Kevane (2003), using 2000 IFLS, nd no signicant dierences between matrilocal vs. patrilocal communities, but Rammohan and Robertson (2012), using the 1997 round of IFLS, report that patrilocal residence has a negative eect on women's educational attainment in Indonesia. Recent evidence also indicates signicantly higher decision making autonomy for women in matrilineal tribes in Indonesia. See, for example, the evidence based on the 2000 round of IFLS by Rammohan and Johar (2009).

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. 2010, Brown et al. 2013, El Khanji & Hudson 2016, Sadoff et al 2016 – See Table Sup 1).<sup>2</sup> All these studies use national data. Only Brown et al. (2013) find an impact of precipitation shocks on GDP growth, noting that both dry and wet episodes of rainfall lead to a decline in per capita GDP growth rates. Surprisingly they find no impact on agricultural GDP growth, though it is the sector that is most affected by rainfall. None of the other papers finds a robust relationship between the chosen measure of precipitation or water availability (which varies across papers) and indicators of economic growth. Further details are provided in Sup 1.

> 2 In this discussion we exclude a handful of country-specific studies and studies that use simple correlations between GDP and rainfall or runoff, or cross sectional regressions as the latter group can make no claim about causal impacts and the findings of the former are similar to those of the global studies – no consistent pattern is found between GDP or GDP growth and rainfall.

2
Flow and the Water Point Data Exchange (WPDx)<sup>11</sup> were created to not only collect information and indicators on water points across different countries but also harmonize the data definitions which are often collected and measured differently. A recent World Bank study which analyzes a range of indicators from countries and development partners, including 20 national monitoring systems and 20 monitoring frameworks from donors proposed a shortlist of indicators and associated metrics as a global framework: (1) service levels (the characteristics of water that users receive); (2) functionality (the physical condition and functioning of a supply system); and (3) upkeep (those factors, including external backup support, that affect the performance of the service provider in its roles of operation, maintenance, and administration).

> 9 Additionally, the Water Point Data Exchange (WPDx) was also launched in May 2015 with the aim of compiling and harmonizing statistics of water points globally which are often collected and shared using unique approaches. Data from Akvo Flow for example will also be shared on WPDx. 10

> 11 WPDx’s website: <u>https://www.waterpointdata.org/</u>

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**Figure 1: What are in your opinion the primary reasons for doing undeclared work? (share of respondents who mentioned this reason as the main reason)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Salaries in the regular businesses are too low<br>Taxes and/or social security contributions are too high<br>Lack of control by authorities<br>50% Lack of regular jobs on the labour market<br>45%<br>40%<br>35%<br>30%<br>25%<br>20%<br>15%<br>10%<br>5%<br>0%<br>EU27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Undeclared Work in the European Union‖ Eurobarometer survey, October 2007 15. Relatively low regular salaries together with relatively high taxes on labor, may also explain why in the new EU countries undeclared work often takes the form of underdeclaration of income by paying part of the wage to registered workers on a cash-in-handbasis (so-called envelope wage) or registration as self-employed, both of which result in more opportunities to evade taxes. Employers who pay envelope wages not only evade labor taxes but will also have to conceal some of their taxable sales in order to receive unregistered cash. For Estonia, the Estonian Institute of Economic Research (Eesti Konjunktuurinstiituut) estimated that in 2008, 12 percent of employees received unreported wages (of which 6 percent received unreported wages on a regular basis and 6 percent only occasionally); the share of employees who received part of their wage undeclared declined from 16 percent in 2003 to 11 percent in 2006 before increasing again in 2007 to 14 percent. The decline to 12 percent in 2008 may not be sustainable given the recent deterioration of the economy.
a median of 11.5.<sup>6</sup> In each country, representative surveys of between 198 (Togo) and 472 (Madagascar) schools were implemented using a multistage cluster-sampling design. Primary schools with at least one fourth-grade class formed the sampling frame.<sup>7</sup> In general, in each school, 10 students were sampled from a randomly selected grade 4 classroom. In addition, the students’ current (i.e.

> 6 There is sometimes some uncertainty as to the exact date of the FPE reform as the announcement does not always match the implementation. The FPE years used in this paper are derived from the following sources: Kenya: Ngugi et al (2015); Madagascar: Republic of Madagascar (2012); Mozambique: Fox et al (2012); Tanzania: Mbelle (2008); Togo: Hoogeveen and Rossi (2019); Uganda: Grogan (2009).

> 7 This description of the sample and assessments draws from Bold et al. (2019). Further details are available in Gatti and others (2021).

6
To ensure comparability across countries, these elasticities are estimated for the period 2005‐2012 for all countries (116 for which estimates are possible), using interpolated estimates of poverty rates for countries where survey years do not match the exact period.

> 30 Rankings based on 116 developing countries for which growth elasticity of poverty reduction could be estimated. It is important to note, however, that these elasticity estimates might be affected by the aforementioned divergence between NSS consumption series and NAS, although it is difficult to assign the direction of the bias.

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minimum wage in the administration and the corruption due to greed which according to Tanzi (1998) would not necessarily be affected by such a measure. In the same vein, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) ascertain that in a weak institutional environment with low probability of punishment, the equilibrium wage level at which the self-interested officials are less motivated to extract bribes is high. In this case, the authors argue, governments are forced to pay the “low capitulation wage” attracting only self-motivated officials rather than increasing the wage to the level that would discourage bribery (but not necessarily completely eliminate it). We use **(the inflation rate)** as an indicator of the real wage deterioration of government officials which, we hypothesize, is positively correlated with the development of rent seeking behaviors. Further, in a situation of a growing youth unemployment rate, a high inflation rate that dampens the economic conditions of marginalized segments of the population (in particular those with no regular income) could provide an additional incentive for an unemployed job seeker to increase the odds of his recruitment by providing a bribe to the government agent in order to secure the job.

As an indicator of the labor market distortion, we consider the degree of rigidity of the hiring and firing regulations. This indicator captures how corrupt officials are tempted to collect bribes when selecting candidates for jobs offering enforced labor regulations such as higher minimum salaries or rigid rules for firing workers. In other words, all rules and regulations that are often seen as beneficial to the employees once recruited will be “monetized” and used by corrupt officials to “legitimize” his request for bribes before the position is granted to the candidate. The higher the protection imposed by local labor legislation, the higher the incentives for collecting the bribes and the higher the mismatch and distortion found in the labor market. To capture the institutional characteristics of the labor market, we use the **(Worker’s right)** index from the Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and
paid by employee), (ii) a defined contribution component (3 percent paid by both the employer and employee), and (iii) a lump sum “welfare” payment of 700 NIS.<sup>38</sup> For pension contributors that are tax resident in Israel (5,750 pension contributors), a rate of 5.5 percent is applied for workers, and 12 percent for employers.

# **4.2 Direct transfers**

**The PECS 2016/2017 directly identifies cash transfers and near-cash**<sup>**39**</sup> **transfers from social protection.** The survey disaggregates transfers households received from the government (cash vs in-kind) but does not differentiate between types of cash transfer received. The unconditional Cash Transfer Program (CTP) was the main government-funded social protection program in 2016-17, covering households in both the West Bank and Gaza and representing about 63 percent of the Ministry of Social Development’s (MoSD) total budget.<sup>40</sup> According to MoSD’s 2017 Annual Statistical Report, CTP provided benefits to roughly 110,000 households in 2017 (72,000 in Gaza and 38,000 in the West Bank), constituting 687,000 individuals (493,000 in Gaza and 195,000 in the West Bank).  The CTP identifies beneficiaries using a Proxy Means Test Formula (PMTF), which sorts households into categories relative to the extreme and national poverty lines. The exact PMT formula and threshold being used by the government to identify beneficiaries of the CTP was not available for inclusion in the model, and we approximated coverage through a combination of the location of the household and the average monthly transfer amounts to match the administrative data. For the social protection in-kind transfers, all households reported as receiving this transfer from the government have been directly identified and included.

# **4.3 Direct taxes**

## _4.3.
# **Data**

We employ both administrative data and data from a large-scale longitudinal survey.

**Education Management Information System.** The Government of Malawi operates an Education Management Information System (EMIS) with data on all public schools in Malawi. The EMIS data, which is collected primary through an Annual School Census (ASC) completed by Head Teachers and zonal EMIS officers, includes data on a wide range of indicators including enrollment, dropout and repetition rates, staffing, availability of infrastructure and textbooks. Because it is available for all public schools, the EMIS data is available for the entire sample of public primary schools in all districts of Malawi. For our difference-in-difference analysis, we compare data from EMIS 2016, collected during the 2015/16 school year prior to the start of MESIP; with data from EMIS 2020, collected during the 2019/20 school year towards the end of MESIP implementation.<sup>14</sup> We employ EMIS data for measurement of PTR, PCR, and repetition rates.

**Malawi Longitudinal Schools Survey.** For test scores, we draw on data from the Malawi Longitudinal School Survey (MLSS). The MLSS is an independent, nationally representative survey that provides data on students, teachers, schools and school communities with the objective of capturing and evaluating the impact of MESIP over 2016-2020. The MLSS is designed to align with the MESIP project cycle to both provide information to the government on implementation and outcomes of the project and to support evaluation of the project. Visits are unannounced.<sup>15</sup> Data is collected through observations and interviews – for example, observations of school and classroom facilities; observation of lessons and teaching practices; interviews with Head Teachers, teachers, and members of community committees; and interviews and testing of students in both a cohort and longitudinal sample (see below). Testing is conducted under classroom conditions in a primarily multiple-choice format supervised by the class teacher as well as MLSS enumerators. For
province, illustrating that the spatial distribution of poverty differs across markedly across provinces. Poverty rates are highest in the Northern Province and Free State, although the depth of poverty is highest in the Free State and Eastern Cape<sup>5</sup> The poverty gap (i.e. the amount that is needed annually to wipe out poverty through a perfectly targeted transfer to the poor) in 1995 was about R15 billion, or about 4% of GDP. In the case of the Northern Province, the poverty gap amounts to 21% of the Gross Provincial Product.

How has poverty changed since 1993? A 1998 resurvey in KwaZulu Natal of the households included in the SALDRU sample indicates that, in the immediate post-apartheid period, both the depth and the level of poverty increased. This was accompanied by a widening of the income distribution (Carter and May, 1999). While a few households close to the poverty line, endowed with relatively high levels of productive assets, were able to take advantage of the more favorable policy environment and move ahead, a much greater number of households -especially those with low asset endowments- fell behind. This suggests that strategies to increase households' access to productive assets will be a key element of any strategy aimed at sustainable poverty reduction.

# **3 The land reform program in the context of the RDP strategy**

To understand the character of the land reform program, its objectives, and the way in which these were to be implemented, we discuss this program within the overall context of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) launched by the ANC government in 1994. Looking at the key RDP programs jointly allows not only to appreciate the amount of resources involved but also to highlight potential linkages between them.

In 1994, the first democratically elected government of South Africa committed itself to the RDP as policy framework to promote a fundamental transformation of the social, economic and moral foundations of South African society (ANC, 1994; GNU, 1994).
variables reported in Table A-1. EU and WTO GPA variables are indicators for being EU and WTO GPA members respectively as of 31_<sup>_st_</sup> _December 2018. The Ln(GDP cap) variable is the country’s GDP per capita, in logs, averaged across the years. Middle income and Low income are indicators for middle income and low income countries, repsectively. Institutions WGI is the average percentile rank across the six WGI indicators. All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis. * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% percent level._ These results are indicative of a negative correlation between protectionist laws on government procurement and aggregate trade openness. In section A of the Appendix, we investigate how this correlation holds up for purchases by governments and those by private agents, measured from the ICIO tables of the TiVA database. We confirm a negative correlation that is not significantly different across the public and private sector. Overall, the relationship between protectionism and trade openness is weaker in the restricted sample of 66 countries of the TiVA data than in the full sample – a finding that is confirmed when we use the aggregate data from the ITPD-E database on the 66 countries. Under the assumption that the TiVA data can capture (at least partly) true differences in purchasing patterns between governments and the private sector, the lack of differences in the results between these two buyers suggest that our indicators of protectionism in government procurement identify restrictions that operate also on the sourcing decisions of firms.

To gain further insights into the relationship between trade openness and protectionism in government procurement, we leverage the industry dimension of the ITPD-E database. There are 170 industries in the data: 118 in manufacturing, 35 in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining), and 17 in the service sector. Because of missing data on internal trade especially in primary and services industries
an important insight: the premium received by unions is not mirrored in the wage differential between the unionized and non-unionized high-wage sectors. In the absence of unions, wages in both these sectors would decrease and employment in the two sectors would increase, while the third low-wage sector would remain unaffected.

In the analysis above, we have not included such a third sector since the data do not allow it. Instead, we have what can be considered as the two high-wage sectors. Hence, to the extent that such a spillover effect exists, our measure of the impact from unions must be considered a lower bound, since any such spillover effect will lead to a downward bias in the returns to unionization.

The idea of a third sector may also explain part of the establishment-size wage effect since, presumably, small non-unionized firms are less prone to have their wage setting tied to the wage setting in the unionized firms. This does not explain the difference between the premium to blue vs. white-collar workers that we observed above and, hence, cannot be the only reason for the establishment size wage effects.

# **7. Conclusion**

# _Summary of findings_

The objective of this paper has been to analyze possible channels of distortions in the labor markets in Côte d’Ivoire by using enterprise micro-level data. The tool kit used is the technique of quantile regressions, which has proven its usefulness by providing a much more detailed analysis across the distribution than least square techniques could have accomplished. The main findings are the following: (1) Basic education: The wage premium related to basic education is insignificant across all quantiles when the entire sample is used as well as for all sub-samples.

(2) Higher education: The wage premium from higher education is very significant and positive at all quantiles for all sub-samples, except for firms with less than 40 employees, and the premium is relatively high.

(3) Occupational groups: The effect from occupational groups on wages, on the other hand, are generally very significant,