rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
and B. Parks (2015): “Listening to leaders: which development partners do they prefer and why?,” AidData, Willamsburg VA.

- Dollar, D., and V. Levine (2006): “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984–2003,” _World Development_ , 34(12), 2034–2046.

- Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, B. Parks, A. M. Strange, and M. J. Tierney (2016): “Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of Chinas Foreign Assistance,” AidData Working Paper 3 Revised, Williamsburg, VA: AidData.

- (2017): “Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset,”

- AidData Working Paper 46, Williamsburg, VA: AidData.

24
2002)<sup>2</sup> , assets and land holdings (e.g. Fields et al. (2003), Strauss et al. (2004)), and weight (Glewwe and Nguyen, 2002).

A key condition for the validity of such instruments is that any measurement error in the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error in income. Glewwe and Nguyen (2002) question this assumption in the case of expenditure, where individuals may systematically underreport both income or expenditure, or interviewers may reduce the level of detailed questioning on both measures. However, even when the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error, consistency of the instrumental variables estimator still requires that the instrument also be uncorrelated with the non-measurement error component of the error term in the data generating process. Glewwe and Nguyen state that such an assumption is extremely unlikely to hold when variables such as education or land, which have a causal relationship with income, are used as instruments. In this paper we show further that if the instrument itself follows an AR(1) process, then the instrumental variables estimator will converge to the autocorrelation coefficient of the instrument. As a result, instrumental variables will only be consistent if the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error and has the same amount of mobility as earnings. This condition appears extremely unlikely to hold in practice.

The literature has devoted less attention to assessing the impact of attrition on estimates of mobility. However, the typical labor force panel in developing countries reinterviews dwelling units, rather than households, so that households that move attrit from the sample. The Mexican Urban Labor Force Survey (ENEU) used in this study is a quarterly rotating panel which follows this approach, and on average loses 35 percent of the sample due to attrition over the five periods. Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) discuss the experience of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, which explicitly tracked movers, and do find that those who move are different in terms of initial characteristics than those
However, there is a general lack of up-to-date evidence on child poverty and specifically so on children in Nigeria. Even irrespective of age groups, the latest detailed poverty assessment for Nigeria was published in 2016 (see World Bank, 2016), using data up until 2013. This is, apart from survey specific reports, the latest systematic analysis of poverty indicators available for Nigeria and does not provide detailed child poverty estimates. The current, post-economic crisis poverty situation may though well be different, as also the pattern of child versus adult poverty in its different dimensions.

The objective of this study is therefore threefold: It aims at providing a) an evidence base of the extent and heterogeneity of monetary and multi-dimensional poverty of children and households with children throughout the country and how these types of poverty overlap; b) insights to what extent poverty appears to be an intergenerational concern, coinciding with the children’s parents’ level of education; and c) insights to whether poverty is chronic or transitory over the years these survey spans. Study results may provide an evidence base for policy makers and development partners to design anti-poverty policies and targeted interventions under circumstances with limited resources.

This study will proceed with a review of the existing literature on poverty measurement, in particular child poverty in Nigeria. Thereafter the methodology and datasets used in this analysis will be discussed, followed by the presentation of results. The final section concludes.

# 2. Literature Review on Defining (Child) Poverty and Poverty Measurement

## 2.1 General

Poverty has by the World Bank and others traditionally been measured using income in relation to a certain poverty line threshold, and in the absence of income data, consumption and expenditure data has been used to estimate a welfare aggregate as a proxy for income (see Haughton and Khandker, 2009). While there had long been strands of literature arguing in favor of alternative and multi-dimensional approaches to poverty measurement, such as Amartya Sen’s (1987) capability approach, only around the change of the millennium
therefore to analyze empirically the effect of importer uncertainty on exports. We do so using a dataset of bilateral trade between 32 developed and developing countries. We find that elevated uncertainty has significant negative effects on trade even when controlling for potentially confounding factors such as financial constraints and reductions in wealth, that tend to accompany major uncertainty periods. In line with our expectations, the negative effect of uncertainty shocks on trade is higher for trade relationships more intensive in durable goods. Surprisingly however, the relationship is non-linear: we find that the top trade relationships in durables intensity are resilient to uncertainty. Supply chain considerations or the possibility that the relationships with the highest durability lead to important compositional effects may have a bearing on the results. This finding calls for additional research on the linkages between durability, uncertainty and trade. Lack of intra-annual bilateral data by product category however does not allow us to identify better the role played by durability. We also show that prior experience with major uncertainty shocks does not reduce the effect on trade, i.e., we do not find evidence of learning from prior shocks that would help smooth out the adverse impact. Finally, the response of trade to uncertainty in the 2008-2009 crisis reflected the behavior of trade in past confidence crises. The difference was in the size of the drop and subsequent recovery which was much stronger in the most recent crisis compared to the past.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the insights from the theory and discusses the predictions for the impact of uncertainty on aggregate trade. Section 3 provides a preliminary empirical analysis using the U.S. data. Section 4 discusses our methodology and data. Section 5 brings the empirical investigation to an international setting. By means of a dynamic bilateral model it investigates the impact of exceptional uncertainty on imports and tests the main predictions outlined in Section 2. Finally, Section 6 concludes and draws the implications of our results.

# **2 Producer and consumer uncertainty**

The fact that a temporary
, and coordinating aid provision (Voluntas (2019)).

Since the defeat of ISIS by the International Coalition forces in Ar-Raqqa in October 2017 the war in Syria seems to be nearing its end. However, though 75% of displaced Syrians would like to one day return to their former homes (UNHCR (2019)), ongoing violence has resulted in continued displacement (NRC (2021)). Syrians in Damascus, especially the young and educated, indicate they would be interested in emigrating if the opportunity presented itself, but they are unable to do so for monetary and other reasons (Jalabi (2021)). Furthermore, desire to return is linked to strong ties with one’s home country and hometown, ties which are likely to erode the longer the war drags on and the longer individuals are displaced (Ghosn et al. (2021)). Return to Syria in general has been infrequent and selective, though better security and service access increases returns (Bank (2019)).

Within Syria some governorates including Deir-ez-Zour, Ar-Raqqa, and Al-Hasekah have lost a large share of their population (all over 25%) whereas others such as Idlib and Rural Damascus have gained inhabitants (Bank (2019)). In the 2015-2016 Syrian Refugees and Host Communities Surveys (SRHCS) most refugees reported less than a week to prepare to leave, with the majority ending up in a neighboring country (Krishnan (2020)). Refugees in neighboring countries are less likely to be highly educated, with only 1% having completed a university degree and most working in wage jobs and construction. In Lebanon, manufacturing, construction, and agriculture are the only sectors available for refugee employment. More Syrian men are able to work in Syria, but refugees have better access to resources than IDPs and residents in Syrian governorates with a high level of conflict. Conversely, refugee children often have worse access to education. Housing conditions in Syria are poor, especially in Idlib, and many returnees lack documents (Bank (
J.C. Duque, N. Lozano-Gracia, J.E. Patino, P. Restrepo / LCR Flagship Report on Cities and Productivity 23

- Foster, K. A. (1993). Exploring the links between political structure and metropolitan growth. Political Geography, 12(6), 523-547.

Freire, S., & Pesaresi, M. (2015). GHS population grid, derived from GPW4, multitemporal (1975, 1990, 2000, 2015). European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) [Dataset] PID: http://data.europa.eu/89h/jrc-ghsl-ghs_pop_gpw4_globe_r2015a.

Goodman, J. S. (1980). The Dynamics of Urban Growth and Politics. New York: Macmillan.

Grassmueck, G., & Shields, M. (2010). Does government fragmentation enhance or hinder metropolitan economic growth?. Papers in Regional Science, 89(3), 641-657.

Hawkins, B. W. (1971). The environmental base of urban government reforms. Politics and urban policies, 44-47.

Hendrick, R., & Shi, Y. (2015). Macro-level determinants of local government interaction: How metropolitan regions in the United States compare. Urban Affairs Review, 51(3), 414-438.

- Hill, R. C. (1974). Separate and unequal: governmental inequality in the metropolis. American Political Science Review, 68(4), 1557-1568.

- Hsu, F. C., Baugh, K. E., Ghosh, T., Zhizhin, M., & Elvidge, C. D. (2015). DMSP-OLS radiance calibrated nighttime lights time series with intercalibration. Remote Sensing, 7(2), 1855-1876.

- Kim, S. J., Schumann, A., & Ahrend, R. (2014). What Governance for Metropolitan Areas? OECD Regional Development Working Papers.

- Kim, Yoonhee, and Bontje Zangerling, eds (2016). Mexico
outcomes suggest that intensity-based approaches may be useful to policymakers seeking deeper greenhouse gas reductions than current approaches, while still maintaining political feasibility.

Of course, conditional rebating mechanisms do not come without efficiency costs, since they prioritize intensity reductions over other cost-effective means for reducing emissions. In particular, intensity-based rebating systems lead to diverging marginal abatement costs across sectors, and even across firms within the same sector in the case of intensity-based emissions rebating. Our analysis has focused on a first-best setting without initial market distortions in order to clarify the fundamental economic implications of alternative rebating schemes. In subsequent work, we plan to explore the implications of such rebates in a second-best setting, including initial distortions such as preexisting taxes and subsidies. Further research will be also necessary to investigate the relative attractiveness of the different rebating schemes to foster global cost-effectiveness of unilateral action by combating carbon leakage through policy-induced changes in international prices. Such research calls for a multi-region setting, which goes beyond the scope of our current paper.

# **References**

- **Aguiar, Angel, Maxim Chepeliev, Erwin Corong, Robert McDougall, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe** ,“The GTAP Data Base: Version 10,” _Journal of Global Economic Analysis_ , 2019, _4_ (1), 1–27.

- **Anger, Niels, Christoph B ̈ohringer, and Andreas Lange** , “The political economy of energy tax differentiation across industries: theory and empirical evidence,” _Journal of Regulatory Economics_ , 2014, _47_ , 78–98.

- **Armington, P.S.** , “A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of production,” _International Monetary Fund Staff Papers_ , 1969, _16_ , 159–76.

- **Baranzini, Andrea, Jeroen Van den Bergh, Stefano Carattini, Richard Howarth, Emilio Padilla, and Jordi Roca** ,“Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, com-

33
0.5*(Percent|age of generation capacity with private sector participation)<br>+<br>age of distribution utilities withprivate sectorparticipation)|

## B. Generation and transmission planning index for Pakistan and comparators, 2015

||**India**|**Pakistan**|**International**<br>**benchmark**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Generation Planning**|**57%**|**29%**|**56%**|
|Countryhas ageneration masterplan|||94%|
|Countryhas an overall energy plan|||65%|
|Competent entityis responsible forproducingtheplan|||88%|
|Inter-governmental committee oversees theplanningunit|||29%|
|Powergeneration systemplan is mandatory|||19%|
|Plan leads to timelyinitiation ofprocurement|||38%|
|Planning process is transparent andparticipatory|||59%|
|**Transmission Planning**|**75%**|**25%**|**72%**|
|Competent entityis responsible forproducingtheplan|||100%|
|Explicitlylinked topowergenerationplans|||88%|
|Plan is mandatory|||29%|
|Planning process is transparent andparticipatory|||71%|

68
)|(0.301)|(0.300)|(0.300)|
|Population (logs)|||-35.761***|-35.262***|-35.328***|
||||(10.819)|(10.743)|(10.887)|
|Urbanization (%)|||1.857***|1.882***|1.840***|
||||(0.399)|(0.401)|(0.391)|
|WBL Index|||17.226**|17.122**|28.064**|
||||(8.478)|(8.398)|(11.187)|

77
description of our research methods, see the technical annex on the Skills Demand Model.) The following four specifications are used in the model:

- (1) In the baseline specification, which is the production function typically estimated from establishment census data, log labor productivity is regressed on the log of capital per employee, measures of education and skill composition of workers, and sector dummy variables. The estimated coefficients of capital per worker and skill shares provide estimates of the returns to capital and to different skill investments.

- (2) A second specification adds a set of measures to capture the productivity differences across firms arising from skill deficits. Informed by the previous analyses of skill deficits, several drivers of skills demand are included: a set of firm attributes – education of top managers, foreign and female ownership, multi-firm organization, and young firms – and indicator variables for high-skill firms – their exporter and innovator status.

- (3) The third specification replaces the set of firm attributes and demand-drivers in (2) with employers’ responses to these skill deficits. Skill-deficit mitigating strategies include firm provision of in-house training, external training, employment of expatriate MPT workers, outsourcing of professional services, and hiring of new workers. Their estimated coefficients provide insights into the productivity impacts of these different skill mitigation strategies.

- (4) The final specification adds back the firm attributes and demand-drivers to (3). This specification provides insights into how much of the demand-driven productivity differences across firms are explained by skill-deficit mitigating strategies and whether different firm attributes and demand-drivers have residual productivity effects independent of their roles in employer decisions about skills and skill strategies.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. Before turning to the findings on skill deficits and skill strategies, consider the two estimated results of capital and skills composition in the baseline production function:

- _Capital intensity is positive and statistically significant in most specifications_ , suggesting that workers are more productive (by about 6.6 to 7.5 percent) the higher the
|-0.771|

Method: * Household ranked by original income. ** Kakwani index.

_Source:_ Authors’ calculations based on HBS.

An alternative way of looking at the effect of fiscal policy on poverty is to consider its redistributive effect. This can be done by comparing the Lorenz curve for original income with the concentration curves for taxes and benefits. Figure 8 compares the redistributive impact of the system in 1998 and 2002. The comparison points to some interesting conclusions. The first surprising result is that in 1998 the concentration curve for taxes dominated the Lorenz curve for original income (i.e., it was above the Lorenz curve for all points in the income distribution). This suggests that the overall tax system was regressive (i.e., that the poor paid more than the better-off as a proportion of their income). However, since the distance between the two curves was very small, the magnitude of the redistribution involved was very limited. In 2002 the situation for the poorest individuals had not changed. The share of taxes that they paid exceeded their share of income, which pointed to a redistribution away from the poor. However, in 2002 the concentration curve for taxes crossed the Lorenz curve, making impossible to derive firm conclusions about the overall level of redistribution.

**Figure 8: Progressivity of the Tax and Benefit System in 1998 and 2002**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100 100<br>1998 2002<br>90 90<br>80 80<br>70 70<br>60 60<br>50 50<br>40 40<br>30 45 degree line 30<br>45 degree line<br>Original inco me<br>20 20 Original inco me<br>Taxes<br>10 B enefits 10 Taxes<br>B enefits<br>0 cumulative % of population 0 c umulative % of population<br>0 10 20 30 40 50
# **5. Evidence from Senegal**

We now assess whether the patterns we find in FINCA DRC transactions also hold in another African context – Senegal. Senegal is more financially developed, slightly more gender equal (ranked 166 in the UN Gender Equality Index compared to 179 for the Democratic Republic of Congo) and a more stable, higher-income country than the Democratic Republic of Congo (Senegal is a lower-middle income while the Democratic Republic of Congo is a low-income country).

We use data from an experiment with banking agents from Baobab (previously known as Microcred), a large MFI in Senegal (Buri et al., 2018). Baobab offers savings and microcredit products, mostly focused on low income clients. The company started its activities in Senegal in 2007 and launched its network of banking agents in 2014. Baobab is now one of the largest microfinance institutions in Senegal, with more than 500 agents and 37 branches in both urban and rural areas of the country.

The data from Buri et al. (2018) include withdrawals and deposits made by Baobab customers at a few banking agents between February 2015 and April 2016. Baobab was expanding its network of agents at the time of the experiment and, for the purposes of the experiment design, Buri et al. (2018) selected a small number of agents recently established in the suburbs of the capital Dakar, in Thies (the third most populous city), and in a rural area outside Thies.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the Senegalese sample consists of only 936 transactions made by 44 female and 54 male clients (98 clients in total).

Table 8 presents summary statistics for our sample from Senegal. Each transaction was made with one of the 74 male or 12 female agents (86 agents in total) that operated in 20 markets. All transactions were made in West African CFA francs and the values were converted to US dollars as of January 2015.

As shown in Table 8, among the 936 transactions, 34
an unshared toilet facility compared to urban households (DHS, 2016). Within urban communities, slum dwellers are poorly served. Only 13 percent of households in the country’s slums have access to their own sanitation facilities (World Bank, 2018). It is common for 10 households or more to share a single sanitation facility (World Bank, 2018). Shared sanitation facilities are considered more unhygienic compared to private ones. As a result, children living in urban slums are more likely to be stunted compared to those living in other urban areas (World Bank, 2018).

Poor sanitation could affect the timing of children’s school enrollment. For example, repeated diarrhea and environmental enteric dysfunction (EED) could result in malnutrition, which could negatively affect early childhood cognitive development indicators such as learning abilities and motor skills. As a result, parents could be motivated to keep their children at home, waiting for them to grow and get stronger. Several studies have investigated the impact of water quality at the community level on education outcomes (Beach et al., 2016; Zhang & Xu, 2016). However, studies on the impact of sanitation on education outcomes are virtually non-existent.

In this study it is hypothesized that exposure to poor sanitation early in life, defined as the prevalence of unimproved sanitation facilities in the community,<sup>5</sup> adversely affects young children’s school enrollment.<sup>6</sup> Due to poor sanitation, the child is likely to be enrolled in primary school late (or not at all). Conversely, a child who is exposed to improved sanitation is more likely to be enrolled in primary school on time. It should also be noted that delayed enrollment in primary school can have a serious impact on a child’s cognitive development.<sup>7</sup> We use the children’s residence (specifically communities known to have unimproved sanitation), and the primary school enrollment data at the time
# **Table 4 Working Hours and Earnings in China from September 2008 to February 2010**

||Weekly w orking<br>hours|Monthly earnings<br>(yuan)|Hourly earnings<br>(yuan/hour)|
|---|---|---|---|
|L ocal workers||||
|Sept. 2008|43.50|2,104|11.96|
|Mar. 2009|43.69|2, 319|13.12|
|Feb. 2010|44.88|2,4 54|13.53|
|Migrant workers||||
|Sept. 2008|55.13|2, 290|10 .81|
|Mar. 2009|55.69|2, 466|11. 61|
|Feb. 2010|56.98|2, 5 91|11.94|

# _Source_ : China Urban Labor Survey (CULS3, 2010)

1. China’s labor contract law, effective January 1, 2008, mandates contract terms, severance conditions, and payment of social insurance benefits. After two fixed-term contracts or 10 years of employment, whichever is shorter, the law requires firms to provide employees with open-ended contracts. The probationary period for new hires is limited to one to three months, depending on contract length, and regulations were placed on temporary work agencies (labor service companies) to prevent using them to circumvent the labor law. Finally, severance provisions require that employees receive 30 days written notice before termination, one month’s severance pay for each year of service (half-month’s pay if less than six months), and double severance pay for unfair dismissal.

2. In its first year, the survey was conducted in 59 cities and has expanded gradually over time to 159 cities in 2009.

3The Rural to Urban Migration in China and Indonesia project assembles comparable survey data on migrants in China and