rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
14 Some evidence is consistent with this alternative view. One is that weak constraints on leader‟s actions towards their own group are characteristic of conflict countries. Data already cited show that conflicts occur disproportionately in countries without competitive elections. Subjective measures of opportunistic behavior by governments (the rule of law and corruption indicators from International Country Risk Guide, available for 39 conflict countries) tell a similar story: they stood at 2.1 and 2.6 the year before conflict, compared to 3.8 and 3.5 for all non-conflict country/years (higher scores indicate greater rule of law and less corruption; the maximum is six).

Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2009) observe that a negative productivity shock reduces the reservation wages of potential military recruits. However, because shocks are transitory, they have a negligible effect on the value of future production around which conflicts are fought. Two groups each choose a subset of their members to fight the other group. Non-fighters continue to be productive, paying wages to fighters sufficient to cover their opportunity costs of foregoing productive activity. A negative economic shock reduces this opportunity cost more than it does the future rents from productive activity, triggering conflict.

However, this asymmetric effect depends on another, implicit assumption: that armed citizens refrain from using their military advantage to expropriate a share of all future rents. The greater the share of future rents that armed members of the group can capture, the less it is the case that temporary income shocks reduce the costs of conflict more than the stakes of conflict. This implicit assumption holds precisely in countries where armed forces are disorganized and less able to enforce their claims on future rents. Among countries where this is likely to be the case, the observed link between income shocks and conflict is predictably strong. Miguel, et al. (2004) show that negative income shocks, instrumented by rainfall, have a large, positive effect on the probability of civil war in SubSaharan Africa. They emphasize that this region is appropriate
no significant effect, (b) the marginal effect of the anticipated price shock is increasing as the land size becomes larger, and (c) the marginal effect of the anticipated price shock is decreasing as the initial wealth increases. Less wealthier farmers have a greater incentive to invest when they anticipate an increase in price (the interaction term is significant at 5%). The result indicates that households’ general wealth level (i.e. ownership of non-liquid wealth) is an important determinant of productive asset investments.

For the anticipated shock, the marginal effect is peaked at ∆P<sup>P</sup> =0.15 for poor farmers and at ∆P<sup>P</sup> =0.13 for rich farmers. In both groups, the effect diminishes as the anticipated shock increases beyond the above peaked price levels. As shown in the lower panel, for large land owners, the positive price effect becomes larger linearly with the anticipated price shock. The impact of the unanticipated shock on farm investments is always negative, regardless of the initial wealth and land sizes).<sup>12</sup> Finally, in column (3), we examine whether households’ risk aversion on future price volatility reduced their incentives to increase farm investments. For this purpose, we adopt the method used in Kazianga and Udry (2006) and investigate whether higher moments of future price shocks affected investment decisions by controlling for a price volatility measure in Eq. (10). We assume that farmers rationally expected the volatility of the post-crisis food prices based on the difference between realized prices Pt and the mean price level (Et−1(Pt)), which they (we) can predict based on the pre-crisis food price data from 2004 to 2007. We include the

> 12 We note that the concavity of anticipated price shocks is partly driven by some outliers (i.e., those with anticipated price shocks above one), and therefore the concave
**Figure 2: Segregation of the poor across provinces in Viet Nam: 2002-2020**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 1<br>Equality<br>2002 0.9<br>2020<br>0.8<br>0.7<br>0.6<br>0.5<br>0.4<br>0.3<br>0.2<br>0.1<br>0<br>0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1<br>cumulative proportion of population<br>cumulative proportion of poor<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: i) Authors’ estimation based on VHLSSs data 33
bidder entry strategy. If a project site is far from firms’ locations, they are less likely to apply for the public tender. Hence, the local contractors’ capacity will emerge as an important challenge for the country. Clearly, more local enterprises exist in some districts than others. Particularly, the share of local firms in the pool of potential contractors is low in the districts of Kailali, Palpa and Rautahat (Figure 39).<sup>27</sup> In addition, local firms do not appear

> 26 Ditto.

> 27 There is no significant difference even if the figure is calculated with the data of firms that actually participated in the competition, because there is no systematic difference in firms’ entry decisions between local and nonlocal firms. The probability of participation is slightly higher for local firms (0.31) than nonlocal enterprises (0.26).
burdens among otherwise similar taxpayers owing to unequal tax policies, or unequal enforcement. Horizontal equity is similarly relevant to both individual and business taxpayers. Vertical equity asks whether the distribution of the tax burden is equitable across the wealth spectrum. This of course depends to an important degree on societal beliefs about what a “fair” vertical distribution of the tax burden looks like. In most countries there is a broad belief that individual tax burdens should be progressive -- that is, that the wealthy should pay more, as a share of income, than the less wealthy. The story for businesses is more complex. In most countries, corporate tax regimes apply a single tax rate to all firms, with a stated goal of ensuring competitive balance. However, effective tax burdens may vary owing to exemptions and incentives, while many countries apply special regimes for smaller firms, sometimes with the official goal of delivering somewhat lower burdens to those firms. Discussions of equity from the perspective of firms may thus focus on the relative balance of effective tax burdens across differently-sized firms.

The most conspicuous, and problematic, horizontal inequity in most countries appears to be the result of unequal enforcement of many taxes. Among those with enough income to be liable for individual income taxes, those whose primary income is from formal employment – and who thus

> 112 Paler, L., Prichard, W., Sanchez de la Sierra, R., & Samii, C. (2017). Survey on total tax burden in the DRC, Final Report. Kinshasa: Department for International Development.

> 113 Piracha, M., & Moore, M. (2015). Understanding low-level state capacity: Property tax collection in Pakistan. _ICTD Working Paper 33_ . Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development.

> 114 Hassan, M., & Prichard, W. (2016). The political economy of tax reform in Bangladesh: Political settlements, informal institutions and the negotiation of reform. _Journal of Development Studies_ , 52 (12)
# **1. Introduction**

Corruption is one of the most vexing problems confronting us today, as it inflicts many different layers of economies by distorting incentives and weakening institutions. The most harmful consequence of these distortions is that they cause misallocation of resources and retard fundamentals of an economy such as investment, innovation, entrepreneurship, growth and productivity (i.e. Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Mauro 1995, Fisman and Svensson 2007). Yet, lack of reliable data has hampered the understanding of the sorts of conditions that make some countries more prone to corruption than the others. The present paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by using firm-level survey data for 135 countries on the experience of the firms with corruption to analyze how the level of corruption is related to the size of the country. Economic theory suggests contrasting effects of country size on corruption, implying the issue is essentially empirical. Our empirical results indicate that corruption is significantly higher in the relatively larger countries. The finding is robust to several controls, alternative use of corruption indicators, exclusion of some of the smallest and largest countries in the sample, and different measures of country size. Thus, institutional checks aimed at combating corruption may require additional strengthening in the relatively large countries.

Economic explanations of corruption are typically couched in terms of the crime and punishment model (Becker 1968, Becker and Stigler 1974) or the principal-agent model (RoseAckerman 1978, Klitgaard 1988). According to the crime and punishment model, corrupt public officials choose an optimal level of corruption by equating marginal benefit (bribes received) and the marginal cost (probability of getting caught and losing legal wages and pension plus any penalty). Thus, corruption is lower when benefits from legal activity (government wages) are higher, the probability of a corrupt official being caught and punished is greater, and/or when the returns to corruption are lower due to for example, limited government intervention. According to 2
Markets Raises Plant-level Productivity...For Some Plants,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 125 (3), pp. 1051–1099 Manova, K., and Z. Zhang (2012) “Export Prices Across Firms and Destinations,” Quaterly Journal of Economics, 127, pp. 379–436 Matsuyama, K. (2007) “Beyond Icebergs: Towards A Theory of Biased Globalization,” The Review of Economic Studies, 74 , pp. 237–253 Munch, J.R., and J.R. Skaksen (2008) “Human Capital and Wages in Exporting Firms,” Journal of International Economics 75 (2), pp. 363–372 Park, A., D. Yang, X. Shi and Y. Jiang (2010). “Exporting and Firm Performance: Chinese Exporters and the Asian Financial Crisis,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 822–842 Pellandra, A. (2017) “Export Destinations, Employment and Wages: Firm-level Evidence from Chile,” mimeo CEPAL 13
to the following two questions in the baseline data:  (i) ― _Have you had to reduce visits to the doctor between October 2008-May 2009_ ?‖   and (ii) ― _Have you had to reduce the utilization of preventive health services from October 2008-May 2009_ ?  Both questions when answered positively involve a reduction in the utilization of health care in the time period t0 to t1.

6
2 The emphasis on long-term finance and on the potentially adverse consequences when it is in short supply is somewhat at odds with recent theoretical contributions that emphasize the fact that the use of short term debt may be associated with higher quality firms and may have better incentive properties. In particular, the possibility of premature liquidation may act as a discipline device that improves firms' performance. A rethinking of the role of long term debt, particularly when heavily subsidized, has also been prompted by the problems encountered in many countries by development banks in terms of non performing loans and by doubts about the selection criteria used in allocating funds.

The purpose of our paper is three fold. First, we plan to document the maturity structure of debt for Ecuadorian firms in the 80's and early 90's. We will also discuss how the maturity structure has been affected by government interventions in credit markets and by the process of financial liberalization that started in the mid 80's. Second, using firm level panel data, we intend to analyze how the access to long term debt is related to various firms' characteristics. Third, we provide some empirical evidence on the impact of the access to long terrn debt on firms' productivity and on capital accumulation. The empirical work contained in this paper is based both on aggregate financial data and on micro level data (especially the latter). The micro data consists of accounting data for several hundred of firms collected by the Superintendencia de Companias.

Although the empirical analysis we provide constitute a useful preliminary step, it must be clear that the paper does not allow one to answer the ultimate question whether
many countries in the year following the pandemic.

# **IV. Discussion and concluding remarks**

Food price inflation is an important metric to inform economic policy and is closely watched by both economists and humanitarians, yet official figures are often missing, lacking in spatial detail, or published with delay. More important, crisis situations, or vulnerable populations in general, are often characterized by high geographic specificity while traditional price indicators do not provide insights beyond the major (urban) markets where prices are formally measured. Traditional CPI data in these situations, if available, may be insufficiently unbundled into distinct price estimates for it to be put into a relevant context. Recognizing this, international institutions have invested substantially in subnational price surveys. However, the capacity to monitor inflation has continued to be severely limited by challenges related to missing data. To overcome some of these shortcomings, this paper proposed an approach for real-time imputation of survey data drawing on multiple imputation and ensemble learning ideas.

The paper highlighted the new price monitoring capabilities using survey data gathered in 25 fragile and conflict-affected countries. The final estimates of food price inflation documented in this paper were shown to accurately capture important inflation events including the World Food Price Crisis of 2007-08 and the
Did some people purposely misreport outcomes in the hopes of influencing resource allocation?

While some respondents who experienced severe (and socially undesirable) outcomes may have reported them more honestly in the relative anonymity of an online survey, a different set of respondents may purposely have reported more severe outcomes than they experienced to try to influence resource allocation. This type of misreporting has not been widely studied, but Kaplan et al (2019) offer evidence that some vulnerable Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) households in South Sudan may underreport consumption in surveys. They link this behavior to a desire to influence the allocation of humanitarian assistance, and find that light-touch honesty primes reduce the gap in reported consumption between IDP and non-IDP households for respondents more likely to be underreporting and in measures more easily manipulated.<sup>8</sup> The framing and contexts of the PPCS and Facebook surveys suggest that strategic misreporting to influence resource allocation may have been more prevalent in the Facebook survey than in the PPCS. The role of the World Bank was prominent in the framing of the Facebook survey, with World Bank Surveys sponsoring the Facebook advert and the Bank logo branding the online questionnaire. In the previous year, the Bank had co-led a Rapid Damage Needs Assessment that informed international assistance strategies. Introductory text to the Facebook survey noted that the Bank wanted to understand how people had been affected by the May 2021 violence, but did not mention the importance of accuracy. By contrast, the PPCS was implemented by enumerators from the national statistical office (PCBS). The detailed adult individual interview inquiring about conflict exposure and mental health outcomes was embedded in a larger household survey, and 91 percent of PPCS adult respondents had previously responded to the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey 2018 individual module (itself a continuation of a panel that started in 2013). At no point in this panel were respondents offered incentives to participate. The introductory letter sent to potential participants in the PPCS also emphasized the importance of providing accurate information.

# _Hypotheses_

H3a: Some people report
|MoFEC|Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (former Ministry of Finance<br>and Economic Development (MoFED))|
|---|---|
|NDRMC|National Disaster Risk Management Commission|
|NGO|Non-Governmental Organization|
|NMA|Ethiopia’s National Meteorological Agency|
|NPDPM|National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (1993)|
|NPDRM|National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (2013)|
|PAD|Project Appraisal Document|
|PIM|Project Implementation Manual|
|PSNP|Productive Safety Net Programme|
|RFM|Risk Financing Mechanism|
|SNNPR|Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region|
|TLU|Tropical Livestock Units|
|TSF|Targeted Supplementary Feeding|
|UN|United Nations|
|WFP|World Food Programme|
|WMS|Welfare Monitoring Survey|
|WRSI|Water Requirement Satisfaction Index|
1,689 firms. By country, our sample size ranges from a low of 71 firms in the Philippines to a high of 309 firms in Malaysia (see Table 1).

We calculate external capital ratios for equity and both short-term and long-term debt. External equity is defined as the market value of equity multiplied by one minus the average percentage of market capitalization closely held as reported by Dahlquist et al. (2003, p. 95). Following LLSV, we calculate capital ratios by dividing external capital measures by total sales.<sup>5</sup> We calculate several control variables that have consistently been shown to be related to capital structure such as firm size (log of sales in U.S. dollars), asset tangibility (fixed assets as a percent of total assets), profitability (operating margin), and the ratio of market-to-book value of equity.

WorldScope does not have data on the currency denomination of debt so we rely on a database created by Swiss Bank Corporation – Warburg Dillon Reed (SBC-WDR) that estimates the level of both short-term and long-term debt in local and foreign currency. This is the same database examined by Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) and includes data on 315 firms from the same East Asian countries; 179 firms out of the 315 have foreign currency debt. Additional details regarding these data are available in the appendix of Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003).

Our measure of legal effectiveness is the “Legality” index generated by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003). The variable is generated by taking the first principal component of the five “enforcement” variables reported by LLSV (1998). Specifically, _Legality = 0.381*(Efficiency of the Judiciary) + 0.579*(Rule of Law) + 0.503* (Corruption) + 0.349*(Risk of Expropriation) + 0.384*(Risk of Contract Repudiation)_ This measure (the first principal component
commodities. For instance, the demand for fuel and food might decline proportionately less than the demand for automobiles or electronics when incomes fall.

In spite of these contradictory predictions, there are very few analyses that systematically compare the volatility of commodity and manufactured goods prices. An important exception is the historical study by Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011), who examined the volatility of domestic prices since 1700 in several countries; however, it covered only few commodities due to data constraints. In contrast, analyses of the evolution and volatility of the average price of baskets of commodities relative to the average price of a basket of manufactured goods – usually the manufacturing unit value index (MUV) constructed by the International Monetary Fund – are omnipresent in the literature and policy documents (e.g. Cashin and McDermott 2002 ; Calvo-Gonzalez et al. 2010).

Figures 1 and 2 display time series of aggregate price indices for various definitions of primary commodities. These series seem to corroborate the conventional view that commodity prices are more volatile than non commodity prices. The present paper challenges this conventional wisdom by providing a new stylized fact on the relative volatility of primary commodity prices using the 10-digit HS data from U.S. imports data.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes more directly to the literature studying the behavior of commodity prices. This literature does not necessarily compare commodity prices to non commodity prices but focuses on the former. For instance, Deaton and Laroque (1992) used coefficients of variation of aggregated price indexes as a measure of volatility to analyze the volatility of 13 commodities. They argue that “commodity prices are extremely volatile" but do not provide an explicit comparison with 4
|16.8|
|Hours worked per week (enrolled, has job)|14.6|6.85|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0)|139.0|100.4|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0, not enrolled)|146.5|99.6|
|Ofered weekly transfer (1998, semester 1)|42.6|18.7|

_Note:_ Sample: all households in 1997 with two parents where one parent reports to be the head and with at least one child aged 12-15 years. Has job takes value 1 if individual reported to work in a paid or unpaid job last week, or reported to have a job but did not work last week. Weekly income is summarized for those reporting positive incomes (we remove those reporting positive incomes outside of the 1<sup>_st_</sup> _−_ 99<sup>_th_</sup> percentiles). All incomes are inflation adjusted to be in 1998 values (inflation is calculated as the median percentage change in reported annual incomes by state).

One may wonder what the 37% of boys and 80% of girls who report not being in school and not having a job do with their time. As noted in Parker and Skoufias (2001), domestic activities and some other unpaid activities are not included in the survey definition of having a job. Fortunately, however, Progresa carried out an additional survey, the June 1999 Time-Use Survey, where individuals were asked about how they allocated their time in the previous day, allowing one to investigate the extent that schooling and _all forms_ of work are substitutes. Using this survey, Parker and Skoufias (2001) find that conditional on going to school, girls and boys aged 12-17 spend on average 6.3 hours a day at school (prior to grants).<sup>18</sup> Moreover, they find that a) there is no change in hours spent at school
|31%|62%|49%|26%|
|HP filter|-|27%|46%|39%|21%|
|Overval. using coefficients in column (1)||||||
|No HP filter||25%|114%|70%|12%|
|HP filter||21%|110%|64%|4%|

> 31 In Table 3 column 3, coefficients for reserves and trade openness are significant with opposite signs to theoretical predictions. We believe this is because after 2008: (i) the REER appreciation arose due to inflationary pressures rather than higher demand for pesos (explaining the negative sign on reserves), and (ii) there was a rise in prices of traded goods (in part due to the commodity boom raising export prices) rather than a rise in trade volumes. For the next version of the paper, we could consider using data on trade volumes rather than values to test this hypothesis, although such data is only available from INDEC since 1986.

> 32 In the robustness section, we provide evidence supporting our claim that the CPI-to-PPI ratio is underreported, making 62% an upper bound using our adjusted-REER measure.

18