rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
of reproductive age who consume FAFH at lunch and the average household expenditure are calculated based on data of the ENAHO household survey. In addition, information on the socioeconomic strata of each neighborhood from the ENAPREF survey is used to determine typical household expenditures. For ease of interpretation, the five original strata are collapsed into four groups for the analysis by socioeconomic strata.<sup>9</sup>

# **3 Diet quality index**

Several diet quality measures are commonly used in the nutrition literature. To exploit the detailed information available on nutrients in our restaurant survey more effectively, we propose a new index inspired by two existing indexes: the Ratio of Recommended to Restricted Food Components (RRR) and the Mean Adequacy Ratio (MAR). Most indexes in the nutrition literature are based on food groups or a combination of the RRR and the MAR (Drewnowski 2005; Scheidt and Daniel 2004). The underlying approach in both indexes is to examine the daily intake of nutrients relative to a recommended nutrient measure. The main difference between the two is that the RRR divides food components into six recommended nutrients (protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A, vitamin C, and fiber) and five restricted nutrients (energy, saturated fat, cholesterol, sugar, and sodium) (Scheidt and Daniel 2004), whereas the MAR does not differentiate between these two.<sup>10</sup> The RRR can be written as follows: The daily value (DV) expresses the share of the real to the required nutrient intake. This value is truncated at a maximum of 100 percent. The interpretation of the RRR is based on a standard of 1.0 (equal to 100 percent) that represents an equal proportion of recommended and restricted nutrients. Values below 1.0 show a higher percentage daily value for restricted values than for recommended values and are therefore an indicator of less nutritious food.

Following Drewnowski (2005), the MAR is an alternative, but similar diet quality measure. It
confirmation, self-esteem or self-serving bias study prediction tasks concerning choice _outcomes_ – e.g., the returns to stock choices, entrepreneurial efforts, technology adoption, etc. or the welfare gains from consumption choices among goods or services (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Handel, 2013; Hanna et al., 2014; Handel and Kolstad, 2015; Bhargava et al., 2017; Hastings et al., 2017; Kohlhas and Walther 2021). However, estimation of respondent learning about outcomes requires accurately specifying the outcome data generating process, typically represented as a production, cost, or profit function. The possibility always exists that a respondent's beliefs accurately reflect unobservable farmer attributes that cause their outcome distribution to deviate from the analyst's estimates. Our experimental design, by contrast, rules out the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity by studying directly measurable, observable, and valuable agricultural inputs. No unobservables should materially influence answers to questions such as: what is the size of this plot? Nor should it influence responses to questions about how much fertilizer or labor the farmer applied to the plot before or during planting. Errors in reporting observable production inputs almost surely reflect either misreporting or systematic behavioral errors that lead to mistaken beliefs. NCME in directly measurable inputs are less likely confounded by other, unobserved arguments to the respondent's mental model of the relevant data generating process.

Furthermore, failure to update completely in response to demonstrably accurate, corrective information about an objectively verifiable value, such as the size of a plot, signals asymmetric or incomplete learning – or even complete learning failures, i.e., no updating at all – carries important implications for information-based interventions, such as extension messaging, market information services, cadastral surveys, public health, and nutrition education. The literature on attention and learning typically focuses on learning about outcomes, technologies, or some other phenomena that are not directly observable. By studying response to corrective information about a directly observable variable, we offer a more direct test of incomplete
2005). Contracting institutions refer to those that “enable private contracts between citizens”, while property rights institutions refer to those that “protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites.” They argue that government officials, and to a lesser extent, economic elites, can use force or other means to back up their demands and therefore pose real dangers. In contrast, when contracting institutions increase the costs of doing business in some way, contracting parties may use other ways of transacting. For example, instead of using bank finance, firms may rely on reputation-based financing methods such as trade credits (Coase 1960; Allen et al. 2005; Cull et al. 2009; Long and Zhang 2011). Cross-country empirical analysis tends to find much more pronounced effects of property rights institutions relative to contracting institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Knack and Xu 2017), while China-specific firm study finds both to be relatively important (Cull and Xu 2005).

China has made significant progress in the legal system, though it likely remains weak in comparison to developed countries. A decade ago, the prevailing view was that China had a rather weak legal system (Clarke, Murrell and Whiting 2005), and the Chinese legal system likely has changed little since. Key issues with the legal system include government intervention, the lack of judicial independence, and the low density of lawyers in the population. For instance, there was one lawyer per 9,000 people in China in 2005 (right in the middle of our sample period), and the density was one lawyer per 300 people in the United States (Long 2010). Furthermore, firm-level Chinese data in the early 2000s suggest that firm-perceived quality of contract enforcement does not affect FDI inflow to Chinese districts (or counties), but local leadership characteristics matter, indicating relative importance of “rule of man” rather than the “rule of law” (Wang et al. 2012).

However, despite this prevailing view and related evidence, there are
trending techniques to estimate potential output growth, or vector autoregressions.<sup>9</sup> The IMF has chosen to construct long term growth scenarios for the transition countries based on the long term growth experiences in other parts of the world.<sup>10</sup> A major shortcoming of this approach is the need to estimate the rate of total factor productivity growth, which typically varies substantially over time and across countries.<sup>11</sup> Although we could choose from the myriad of cross-country growth regression models in the literature, we adopted the growth framework and forecasting methodology in Loayza _et al._ (2005). The main reason for our choice is the fact that we had access to their panel dataset. It meant that we could avoid the cost of building a large panel data. Another reason is the fact that Loayza _et al._ (2005) employed state-of-the-art panel estimation techniques. Their published forecasts for 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period 20012010 are already widely used in the World Bank’s economic and sector work.<sup>12</sup> Loayza _et al._ (2005) obtain these forecasts by estimating a cross-country growth regression model based on a panel dataset that included 78 countries from various regions in the world (Table 1)<sup>13</sup> spanning the period 1961-99 and then forecasting real per capita GDP growth by generating simple univariate forecasting models for the growth determinants in the model.

Loayza _et al._ (2005) depart from the standard practice and emphasize the importance of differentiating between trend output growth and cyclical output movements (Figure 4). The cyclical output movements are bound to be important in their panel dataset representing

> 9 Kraay and Monokroussos (1999) suggest that vector autoregressions in a small set of key macroeconomic variables, estimated country by country, may be a way to improve over the forecast performance of both univariate time series and cross-country growth regression models. The
wage offered to nationals in their occupation. McKenzie et al. (2014) show that this effectively results in binding minimum wages for immigrants, which provides one reason for the large wage gains possible with migration, but means that the supply of potential migrants exceeds demand at the legally required wage. Some migrant-origin countries also impose these restrictions. For example, McKenzie et al. (2014) show that when the Philippines increased the minimum wage at which Filipinas could take jobs as domestic workers abroad, this increased the wages of those who did migrate, but resulted in a large fall in the number who were able to migrate.

While these policy barriers matter, some research suggests that they may not be the main reason more people do not migrate in many cases. For example, Jasso and Rosenzweig (2008) compare immigration into Australia and the United States, and argue that the differences in their migration policies matter far less than the differences in the returns to skills in the two countries, and than their geography – which determinants the size and level of development of close neighbors. Moreover, we still see many people not move even in cases where there are no formal policy barriers. For example, Akee (2010) finds that less than 1 percent of the population moves from the Federated States of Micronesia to the United States within three years, despite per capita income levels being one-tenth of those in the United States and a compact of association allowing free movement. Likewise, the expansion of the European Union to include poorer Eastern European countries was accompanied by fewer than 5 percent of the population of the EU accession countries residing abroad five years after EU enlargement (Kahanec, 2012).

Although we might think explicit policy barriers to directly limit internal migration are much rarer, apart from a few exceptions such as China’s hukou household registration system, in fact many governments do try to discourage rural to urban migration. Bundervoet (2018) reports on a 2013 United Nations survey, in which 148 out of 185 countries had
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).<sup>13</sup> The variable is logged, _lFDIstock_ip_ .

# 3.2.4 Infrastructure

_Infrastructure_ is strongly correlated with income levels, but it is difficult to measure, particularly over a longer time period (for surveys, see Välilä 2020; Timilsina, Hochman, and Song 2020). The empirical literature hence often uses a composite

> 10 Since the variable is constructed on annual data, it ranges from 0 to 0.6 for five-year periods, the latter indicating three years of crisis in a five-year period (3/5 = 0.6).

> 11 Since this index stops in 2014, we interpolate the missing years with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Index from UNCTAD. The correlation between both series in the sample is high, 0.90.

> 12 We consider terms of trade changes as shocks to income levels and hence include them in changes in our equation in levels (see the section on estimation and equation (2) below).

> 13 Since no stock data are reported before 1980, we fill the missing decade of data with an interpolation from FDI flow data (as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation). The sample correlation of both variables is high, at 0.87.

-9-
19-related policy measures on SSCBT points to a contraction in small-scale trade volumes that in percentage terms by far exceeded the reduction in global trade (Mvunga & Kunaka, 2021; World Bank, 2021).

This paper analyzes group trade as a coping strategy that has been employed by smallscale traders to deal with the sanitary restrictions following the COVID-19 outbreak.<sup>2</sup> By consolidating their consignments, small-scale traders were able to jointly send their products across the border in a larger vehicle, using the formal border clearance channel. This arrangement overcame the closure of the pedestrian border crossing lanes and reduced the number of individuals that needed to cross the border and were, thus, vulnerable to contracting or spreading the virus. Some observers see this new institution of group trade as a promising arrangement to advance formalization and achieve benefits from scale economies in regional trade, and advocate that it should be sustained and promoted even once the COVID-19-related measures have been phased out (Uganda MTIC, 2020).

Using evidence from a field survey of small-scale traders at the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with Burundi and Rwanda, this paper addresses two related questions. First, what have been the determinants that made some small-scale traders participate in group trade while others pursued other coping strategies? And second, among the group traders, what aspects of the group trade arrangement are susceptible to making cooperative trade clusters viable in the long term?

Due to the scarcity of available data, there has been relatively little research into the characteristics of SSCBT and the behavior of small-scale traders. Aker et al. (2014) analyzed commodity price data across 70 rural markets in Niger and Nigeria and found that markets across

> 2 This coping strategy of group trade has alternatively also been called co-operative trading arrangement (CTA), cluster trade, or association trade.

3
Mughal and Vechiu (2009) document negative effect of FDI on tertiary school enrollment. Using data from 80 developing countries over 1980-2014, Wang and Zhuang (2021) show that inward FDI promotes primary school enrollment and completion rates for both boys and girls, has no significant impact on male secondary and tertiary enrollment, but a significantly negative effect on female secondary and tertiary enrollment. FDI from OECD countries promotes secondary and tertiary enrollment rates while non-OECD FDI does not. Rong et al. (2020) documented a positive effect of FDI on employment and human capital in China, with labor market flexibility playing a significant positive moderating role.

While structural transformation and human capital accumulation are largely studied in two separate strands of literature, they happen concomitantly with economic growth and are mutually reinforcing. Economists are increasingly interested in the intersection between structural transformation and human capital accumulation. Buera et al. (2021) found that increases in GDP per capita are associated with a systematic shift in the composition of value added to sectors that are intensive in high-skill labor, a process they labeled as skill-biased structural change. Given the interconnection of the two topics and the same underlying dataset and methodology, this paper assesses the effect of FDI on structural transformation and human capital accumulation in China together.

This paper contributes to the literature on globalization, growth, and the labor market in three ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the causal effects of FDI on city level transformation and human capital accumulation in China, while previous papers mostly study the two outcomes on the national or provincial level. Second, the paper exploits China’s FDI liberalization policies and the differences in initial industry composition across regions to establish causal links between FDI inflows, structural transformation and school enrollment. While there is a growing body of literature adopting this method (Edmonds et al. 2010; Topalova 2010; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2017; McCaig 2011; Costa et al. 2016; Erten and Leight 2021; Kis-Katos et al. 2018
# **2. Analytical Framework**

To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of river basin organizations, the project team has developed a framework that identifies a number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water resource management at the basin scale. These factors, and their hypothesized relationships with basin management in a country that has decentralized or is attempting to decentralize water resource management institutions, are derived from the institutional analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management and to decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). Our information gathering and analysis focuses on the following sets of variables.

- Contextual factors and initial conditions

- Characteristics of the decentralization process

- Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities

- The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements

- Motivation of stakeholders

Variables considered within each set are listed the Appendix. The Fraser Basin case is discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 8.

# **3. Methodology**

A case study approach was pursued for this project in order to examine closely the processes of institutional change as well as the current situation. A site visit was facilitated by Fraser Basin Council staff who arranged a schedule of interviews with basin stakeholders and observers, and by a local consultant engaged by the Fraser Basin Council who prepared a background paper on the basin prior to the visit. Background papers for all case study visits are based on a common outline. During the site visit, team members met with and interviewed 28 individuals, including basin-level stakeholders, past and current central, provincial and local government officials, basin council staff and members, and academic researchers with perspectives on governmental structure and water management in Canada.<sup>2</sup> The interviews were focused on understanding the processes of institutional
# **REFERENCES AND B IBLIOGRAPHY**

- Bank of Ghana, Nonbank Financial Institutions Department. 2000. _Nonbank Financial Institutions Business Rules (As Applicable to Institutions in Credit Business)._ Accra: Government of Ghana.

- Bank for International Settlements. 2001. _Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems._ Final report of the Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Deposit Insurance. Basel.

- Bank of Tanzania. 2001. “Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies in Tanzania.” Draft report of a survey carried out by the International Co-operative Alliance Regional Office for East, Central, and Southern Africa for the Bank of Tanzania and several donor agencies. Dar es Salaam.

- _____. 2000. _Final Report: Microfinance Donor Survey Update_ . Prepared with technical support from the Canadian International Development Agency. Dar es Salaam: Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

- Christen, Robert P., and Richard Rosenberg. 2000. _The Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks for Microfinance_ . Occasional Paper no. 4. Washington, D.C.: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.

- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Edward J. Kane. 2001. “Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where Does It Work?” Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2679. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

- Gallardo, Joselito, and Bikki Randhawa. 2003. “Microfinance Regulation in Tanzania: Implications for Development and Performance of the Industry.” Working Paper, no. 51 World Bank, Africa Region, Washington, D.C.

- Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network. 2001. _On-Lending to Savings Collectors in Ghana._ Africa Region Studies in Rural and Micro Finance no. 12. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

- Jannson, Tor, and Mark Wenner. 1997. _Financial Regulation and its Significance for Microfinance in Latin America and the Caribbean._ Washington, D.C.: . Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Development Department, Microenterprise Unit.

- Kowubaa
In the absence of good outcome data (and this is usually the case in a transition economy where wages may not well reflect productivity differences), much can still be said with cost data alone. For example, in considering the benefits of education, "switching values" are very useful in the absence of reliable data on earnings differentials. The analysis, sometimes referred to as "reverse cost-benefit analysis," consists of estimating the productivity differential required in order for an education investment to be acceptable in terms of its rate of return. The question is framed in the following manner: given the cost of producing a graduate, what productivity differential would be required for the investment to exhibit a 10 percent social rate of return (assuming 10 percent to be the social opportunity cost of capital)? The reverse cost-benefit method can be shown as: where DS/S-l is the required productivity differential between a person who has graduated from schooling level S and one who has graduated from level S-1; ts is the number of years required to complete level S (seven years, say, for secondary education, assuming no grade repetition); Cs is the per student direct resource cost of each year of the investment and Ws-, is the earnings foregone during each year of the investment. This method provides guidance on investment in education in the absence of reliable earnings information. It is up to the policymaker to decide whether the estimated required differential is likely to be realized.

8
To conclude, informal safety nets provided by relatives, friends, and community and religious organizations were important for coping everywhere. Even though the amount of support through informal safety nets was inadequate relative to the large and growing need, it was often the only source of support available.

# **4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

The research summarized in this paper has shown that qualitative analysis of how people lived through the crises can be a valuable addition to the quantitative studies on the subject. First, the research permitted a closer look at the impacts on the informal sector that employs the majority of population in developing countries, yet is rarely covered in sectoral assessments or industrial growth strategies prepared by government ministries. Second, the research helped draw attention to the plight of the people who are usually excluded from household surveys, such as the Roma in Serbia, beggars in Bangladesh, informal gold miners in Mongolia, or the illegal cross-border migrants in Thailand. Third, it was useful for an in-depth analysis of crisis impacts by age and gender, highlighting in particular the role of women’s unpaid work in household resilience. Fourth, qualitative monitoring helped assess a wider range of impacts beyond the material, pointing to the enormous psychological stress inflicted by the crisis and its effects on family and community relationships, demonstrating the importance of communal solidarity in cushioning against shocks. Qualitative monitoring also assessed the damaging impact of prolonged economic stress to traditional support mechanisms.

This study has shown that the analysis of macroeconomic indicators alone can conceal important aspects of the process of economic recovery. In particular, the resumption of GDP growth in late 2009 or 2010 in many developing countries gave optimism to governments and the donor community that the impacts of the crises were relatively short-lived and that the livelihoods of the poor were not strongly affected. The findings of this study do not support this argument. Despite the narrow employment base of export production in developing countries, formal sector workers fuel the rural economies through remittances and provide a customer base for a large