rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
_Size._ The large fixed costs associated with setting up an international distribution or service network will generally make exporting easier for large enterprises. Further, large enterprises generally have better access to finance than small enterprises—especially in developing countries—making it easier for them to finance these costs.<sup>21</sup> Several studies have found that large enterprises are more likely to export than smaller enterprises in low and middle-income countries. For example, Clerides _et al._ (1998) find evidence consistent with this for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. Similarly, Grenier _et al_ . (1999) found that large Tanzanian enterprises export more than smaller enterprises. Finally, using data from several countries in sub-Saharan Africa from the mid-1990s, Bigsten _et al_ . (2004) and Söderbom and Teal (2003) found similar results. The results of this study are consistent with these earlier results. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on enterprise size indicates that large enterprises export more than smaller enterprises do. The point estimate indicates that a 1-point increase on the log-scale (e.g., from about 20 workers to about 54 workers) increases exports by about 4.3 percentage points.

_Ownership._ It is unclear whether state ownership will encourage or discourage exporting. On the one hand, state-owned enterprises might be less likely to enter export markets than similar private enterprises are. Many studies have shown that state-owned enterprises are less efficient on average than private enterprises, especially in competitive industries.<sup>22</sup> This might prevent state-owned enterprises from entering export markets—although barriers to trade allow inefficient firms to operate in domestic markets, it is more difficult for them to operate in international markets. On the other hand, state-owned enterprises might be better able to negotiate their way past regulatory barriers and might find it easier to access government programs designed to encourage exports. In practice, the evidence for Africa is mixed.<sup>23</sup> The results from this study suggests that
Fires being used more intensively following MNREGA would also explain a larger increase in emissions than raw fires. While the MODIS satellite can detect fires as small as 100m<sup>2</sup> it does not distinguish between pixels that have one fire and those that have many fires (Korontzi et al., 2006). As a result, if the implementation of MNREGA induces the use of fires in areas that already had frequent fires, MODIS will underestimate the increase in fires. Using more finely resolved data on fires in the period after 2014 from the VIIRS satellite platform, I show in the appendix that MODIS does indeed under-count fires relative to VIIRS (appendix Figure A14a and A14b).

Translating these increases in emissions rates into precise changes in pollutant concentrations is difficult and would require a model of pollution dispersion. I do not create such a model here. Rather, I estimate the impact of the change in emissions on pollution concentrations in two ways. First, I estimate the correlation between emissions rates of black carbon, organic carbon, and SO2 using data on emissions concentrations from MERRA at the district _×_ month level.<sup>28</sup> These estimated correlations suggest that in months with emissions rates that are higher than average, PM2 _._ 5 concentrations are also higher than average.

Consistent with this correlational evidence, I show that the implementation of MNREGA is associated with an increase of approximately 11% in the number of months in which PM2 _._ 5 levels exceed the annual ambient standard set by the Indian government.<sup>29</sup> I look specifically at PM2 _._ 5 as it has the largest negative impacts on health (Behrer and Mauter, 2017; Muller and Mendelsohn, 2007; Nel, 2005; Chen et al., 2016). The annual threshold for ambient concentrations is set by the Central Pollution Control Board at 40 _μg/m_<sup>3</sup> . I calculate the share of district
A. Sanghi and D. Johnson

# **2.3.1 Kenya exports raw goods and metals to China**

Crude materials such as raw hides and skins are the major exports to China (figure 7). Between 2010 and 2014, exports of crude materials were 55 percent, manufactured goods were 21 percent, food and live animals made up 15 percent, and chemicals and related products were 9 percent of exports to China. In the crude materials category, major exports to China include hides and skins, scrap metals, and sisal; coffee and tea were major exports in the food and live animals category.<sup>4</sup> In general, tea, coffee, sugar and flowers are sources of major foreign exchange earnings for Kenya, but it has managed some diversity in earnings (UNCTAD 2013). Value-added products such as chemicals and plastics have also reached China, a shift from the more common story of oil and resource exports.

<!-- Start of picture text --> 150<br>100<br>Chemicals and related products<br>Crude materials. Ex: raw hides and skins, metal ores<br>Food and live animals<br>Manufactured goods. Ex: plastics, vegetable textile fibres<br>50<br>0<br>Commodity<br>Export Value (USD millions)<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 7: Kenya exports metals and hides and skins to China (2010-2014) Source: UN Comtrade database 2015 In figure 8, we show the top products in the crude materials and manufactured goods categories. For crude materials, titanium ores and concentrates exports were the highest, followed by copper, vegetable textile fibers such as cotton, hemp, or sisal, and plastics.<sup>5</sup> Kenya’s exports feature minimal value addition, and the prices of Kenya’s major exports to China are low on international markets.
benefitting households living in (or nearby) project areas relatively more than households residing in nonproject areas. Given that the allocation of project locations was not determined randomly, a simple (ordinary least squares) regression of household outcomes on the corresponding treatment indicator would clearly suffer from endogeneity, since the treatment indicator would be correlated with (unobservable) factors that also tend to affect the considered outcomes. The DiD approach helps to circumvent this issue, based on additional assumptions which we discuss in detail below.<sup>4</sup> The analysis shows that a combination of demand-side and supply-side interventions was associated with a statistically significant increase in electricity access, a decrease in the reported frequency of blackouts, and a switch from traditional fuels to electricity as the main source of energy for lighting (albeit not for cooking).<sup>5</sup> These results are based both on evidence obtained from national household survey data and from the fact that nighttime radiance (as measured by satellite images) increased relatively more in grid cells belonging to areas with project components than in non-project areas. There is no evidence that the project caused households to pay more for electricity (e.g., due to excessive rebound effects).

The paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on the impacts of development interventions aimed at improving EE and facilitating the adoption of modern technologies to mitigate climate change. Due to limited data availability on EE outcomes, especially at a nationally representative level, existing EE project evaluations are often based on information collected during the project’s implementation phase or on expert ratings and stakeholder analysis at the end of the project (e.g., SENER and World Bank 2015; Agyarko et al. 2020). The methodology and data sources used in this study offer several benefits over traditional approaches to project evaluation. Specifically, our evidence is obtained from data that are (a) nationally representative, (b) collected independently of the studied project, and
A second channel relies on the technology embedded in imports—either in improved intermediate goods or in capital good imports. Access to greater varieties of inputs can increase productive efficiency,<sup>22</sup> and consumers can also benefit from a greater choice of varieties. This avenue for growth emphasizes the services sector reforms in Russia.

A third channel is offered by the linkage between trade reform and increased FDI inflows, the latter bringing in new capital, knowledge, and management skills. This channel may be hard to separate out from either the import or export channel because FDI is typically associated with increased imports of technology-laden inputs or capital or both and with a high share of exported output.

Finally, there is the linkage between increased exports and productivity growth. Here, the evidence is mixed. Empirical estimates are problematic because of the direction of causality. Looking at firm level data for Indonesia, Sjöholm (1999) finds evidence supporting the exportproductivity linkage, with weaker evidence supporting an import-productivity linkage. Bernard and Jensen (2004) report a similar finding using firm data for the United States.

In an effort to capture some of these effects, an alternative dynamic specification is introduced in which sector-specific labor productivity is allowed to respond to changes in sectoral openness. The latter is measured by the export to output ratio. This relation is modeled as follows:

> 22. See, for example, Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).

14
%|Yes|2.8%|
|Family and children|0.0%|n/a|n/a|
|Social protection n.e.c.|4.5%|Yes|2.7%|
|Social contributions (employee benefits)|1.8%|Partial|1.4%|
|Education of which:|5.0%|Partial|4.0%|
|Basic|2.2%|Yes|2.2%|
|Secondary|1.7%|Yes|1.7%|
|Health of which:|3.9%|Partial|3.3%|
|Primary healthcare facilities|0.8%|Yes|0.8%|
|Hospital healthcare facilities|2.5%|Yes|2.5%|
|Non-Social Expenditure, of which:|13.3%||0.2%|
|Subsidies*|0.2%|Yes|Less than<br>0.2%**|

Source: Tax revenue from PCBS. Government Financial Statistics for 2017 prepared by the Ministry of Finance. For further disaggregation, data was supplemented with reports from the Ministry of Education (for education expenditure disaggregation) and National Health Accounts (for health disaggregation).

* Disaggregation for fuel and water subsidies is not available in the Government Financial Statistics and amounts in other technical documents included both explicit and implicit subsidies therefore it is not included here, but instead used in the macro-validation section.

** We cannot estimate the proportion of the total subsidy amount that we cover given that we do not know the share of total subsidies allocated to types of subsidies such as non-fuel and electricity subsidies, water.

11
Pritchett, Lant, Rukmini Banerji, and Charles Kenny. 2013. 'Schooling is not education! Using assessment to change the politics of non‐learning', _Center for Global Development Report_ .

- RTI International. 2009. "Early Grade Reading Assessment Toolkit." In.

- Snilstveit, Birte, Jennifer Stevenson, Daniel Phillips, Martina Vojtkova, Emma Gallagher, Tanja Schmidt, Hannah Jobse, Maisie Geelen, Maria Grazia Pastorello, and et al. 2015. 'Interventions for improving learning outcomes and access to education in low‐and middle‐ income countries: A systematic review', _Systematic Review 24, London: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie)_ .

- State of Texas Assessments of Academix Readiness. 2013. "Vertical Scale Technical Report " In.

- Strom, Bjarne. 2004. 'Student Achievement and Birthday Effects', _Working Paper. Norwegian University for Science and Technology._

- Utah Education Association. 2013. "Student Assessment of Growth and Excellence (SAGE): Overview " In.

- Valerio, Alexandria , María Laura Sánchez Puerta, Namrata Tognatta, and Sebastían Monroy‐Taborda. 2016a. 'Are there skills payoffs in low‐and middle‐income countries? Empirical evidence using STEP data', _Policy Research Working Paper Series 7879, The World Bank_ .

- ———. 2016b. 'Are there skills payoffs in low‐and middle‐income countries? Empirical evidence using STEP data', _Unpublished manuscript._

- Valerio, Alexandria, Maria Laura Sanchez‐Puerta, Namrata Tognatta, and Sebastian Monroy‐Taborda. 2016. "Are there skills payoffs in low‐and middle‐income countries? Empirical evidence using STEP data." In.

- World Bank. 2016a. "The STEP Skills Measurement Program " In.

- ———. 2016b. 'World Development Indicators '.

- ———. 2017. 'World Development Indicators '.

- ———. 2018. _World Development Report 2018: Learning to Realize Education'
capacity of banks to undergo an extreme, but plausible, financial stress event. With respects to credit risk, in general banks losses are modeled as a function of bank specific (types of credit, loan portfolio quality and concentration, etc.) and macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, unemployment, etc.) behaving in accordance with the agreed scenario, which may be deterministic (historical or subjective) or stochastic (typically, derived by Monte Carlo). Regardless of how the scenarios are assembled, the effect on banks’ loan portfolio quality can be obtained with a top-down analysis, directing the impact of the shock to the bank portfolio as a whole, or bottom-up, assessing the effect on each market segment or business line and aggregating the results across the bank. The latter type of analysis is much more precise and detailed, and therefore requires a rich set of data. Much of this necessary information is normally collected by PCRs as part of their normal operational business procedure. Detailed PCR data can also allow supervisors to perform a precise analysis tracing the impact on banks largest borrowers, who typically account for a large share of their assets and thus may have systemic relevance. In all these cases, detailed loan data will allow bank supervisors to better model the impact on banks portfolios of the shock as well as banks’ capacity to remain solvent.

These and other off-site techniques require detailed credit information of banks’ loan portfolio to evaluate their underlying risk. Although some of these data may be obtained from the bank themselves by means of regulatory reports or from the latest on-site report, PCRs usually contain updated data of practically all borrowers in the loan portfolio and consequently outperform other sources of information.

# **IV. PCRs and the implementation of Basel III**

Published in 1988, the former Basel I Accord became obsolete as the banking industry developed new financial products to circumvent its capital requirements.<sup>27</sup> Most sophisticated larger banks had gone through a rapid evolution of their risk management. Financial
research and development (R&D), among other things. Several papers argue that small firms are more likely to be financially constrained and that these constraints might get relaxed as firms grow and as countries develop financially.<sup>12</sup> Other papers study whether firms in China and India are financially constrained. In China, state-owned enterprises seem to have better access to finance and thus seem less financially constrained (Chow and Fung, 1998, Li et al., 2008, Poncet et al., 2010, Guariglia et al., 2011, Hale and Long, 2011b). In India, smaller firms seem to be more financially constrained (Love and Martinez Peria, 2005 and Oura, 2008). The results in our paper show that new capital market financing is related to higher growth and investment for publicly listed firms. This seems consistent with financial constraints affecting even the large, publicly listed firms that arguably have access to formal markets.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 analyses the development of capital markets in China and India and how firms use them to raise financing. Section 4 studies the dynamics of firms around the use of capital markets. Section 5 concludes.

# **2. Data**

To analyze the capital market financing and performance of firms in China and India, we assemble a new and comprehensive firm-level data set covering firms’ security issuances in capital markets around the world as well as balance sheet data. Our data on capital raising activity come from the Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum database, which provides transactionlevel information on new issues of common and preferred equity and publicly and privately

> 12 See Kumar et al. (1999), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Guiso et al. (2004), Beck et al. (2005, 2008a, 2008b), Mitton (2008), Musso and Schiavo (2008), and Arellano et al. (2012), among many others
daughters; the latter was not used to substitute away from the former. While the reforms did not necessarily close the gap between males and females in terms of intergenerational transfers, they did improve the overall socioeconomic status of women.<sup>13</sup> Yet, there are studies that illustrate the unintended consequences of amendments to inheritance law as well. For example, unlike Deininger et al. (2013), Roy (2015) finds that reforms to the 1956 HSA did not result in a higher likelihood that girls would inherit property. Instead, parents found a way to circumvent the law by “gifting” family property to sons, and compensating daughters for the disinheritance by providing a larger dowry or educational investments. While the increase in educational investments in daughters is encouraging, Roy’s (2015) study also indicates how differences in the treatment of boys and girls persisted despite legislative reform. The results of this analysis pertaining to inheritance are broadly supported by ethnographic work by Bates (2004),<sup>14</sup> and mixed methods work by Brown et al. (2002).<sup>15</sup> The disparity between Deininger et al.’s (2013) and Roy’s (2015) results can be explained by differences in the empirical strategy used. Roy’s (2015) empirical strategy is relatively similar to Deininger et al.’s (2013), however, she uses variation in the timing of death of the grandfather, not the timing of death of the father, to define treatment status. Citing Agarwal (1994), she argues that the initial amendments to the 1956 HSA relate to ancestral property owned by the grandfather. She uses 1999 REDS data for her analysis.

Rosenblaum’s (2015) study paints a starker picture of the unintended consequences of inheritance law reform in India. The purpose of his study was to estimate the causal impact of the legislative amendments in the four reform states on female child mortality.
of panel firms. We find that increasing the police force has a large negative association with crime under high inequality, high voter turnout, in larger cities, and when the firm is owned and managed by women. Expansion of the police force is also negatively associated with crime experienced by firms for slow-growing economies, economies with higher religious fractionalization, and economies with bad governance.

It is worth noting that given the data limitations, our results may underestimate the true effect of police on crime experienced by firms, since we cannot fully limit the issue of simultaneity bias between police presence and crime. However, given the mixed empirical validation in the literature, this result of a negative impact of police on crime experienced by firms is still significant, even if this study presents a lower bound of the effects. We also concede that it may not be possible to completely address empirical issues, such as endogeneity and omitted variable bias, given the data at hand, and we caution against making any causal statements. However our results do not seem farfetched given estimates in the literature between police and overall crime instead of firm-specific crime. We hope that these preliminary findings serve as a starting point for future research in this rather under-researched area.

To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: (i) This study quantifies the effect of police presence on the burden of crime experienced by firms, and thus sidesteps issues of underreporting of crime in country aggregates, and also accounts for the intensity of crime by using losses due to crime as a percentage of sales. (ii) The data used for this study were obtained from the World Bank’s Enterprise Analysis unit (Enterprise Surveys), which uses the same survey and sampling methodology across surveys, allowing for cross-country comparisons, and thus addresses the issue of external validity which country specific survey 6
In this essay, we evaluate the experience with health insurance in LMICs over the last 20 years, where health insurance is provided by a specific scheme that is additional to the subsidized care available through public clinics. We start by documenting the transition to health insurance drawing on data from 100 Demographic and Health Surveys across 62 countries between 1989 and 2019. Then, using countrylevel examples and a review of existing evaluations, we describe how governments have structured their health insurance schemes and how these schemes have functioned in practice. Our conclusion from this review is that health insurance schemes have successfully increased financial protection and utilization but there is (yet) little evidence of improvements in health outcomes and little demand for health insurance among households, even when it is heavily subsidized.

Motivated by this review, we discuss—and rule-out—the possibility that health insurance has not improved health outcomes because of systemic constraints in the delivery of health care. Instead, we believe that health insurance triggered behavioral responses among providers that have systematically undermined the objectives of insurance schemes. These responses have led to prices that are higher than those mandated under the program, an increase in unnecessary care, and new sources of uncertainty as insured patients do not know whether the insurance will be honored or whether they will be correctly treated.

While such behavioral responses (sometimes called “provider moral hazard”) are also a concern in highincome countries, health insurance schemes typically work with a variety of institutions that seek to curb these forms of physician excess, including review boards, professional norms, public reporting, and punitive enforcement through courts.<sup>3</sup> In LMICs however, non-price incentive systems are poorly developed and have not been used successfully in combination with health insurance schemes, often creating social tensions in which patients take matters into their own hands: as one example, there were an estimated 17,000 attacks and agitations against doctors in China in 2010 alone (Tussing, Wang, and Wang 2014).

We conclude that the first twenty years