rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
in both Russia and elsewhere shows that when implemented poorly, i.e., as a new source of discretionary authority, competition policy can do great harm. While Russian competition law is, for the most part, up to par with international standards, the institutional regime for its implementation and enforcement responsibilities is extremely weak and subject to excessive discretion, especially in light of the power and involvement of sub-federal governments in promoting regional industrial policy. Several steps could be taken. The Government at the very highest levels should review the mission of the current MAPSE, with a view towards developing, in consultation with renowned international experts, recommendations to introduce a rulesbased competition policy institutional regime at the federal and sub-federal level of government. To institutionally strengthen MAPSE, the agency should be twinned with competition authorities in OECD countries to carry out a series of sectoral appraisals. Consideration should also be given to promoting the establishment of a non-governmental "foundation for competition" whose role is primarily educational initially; in time, it could serve as an ombudsman.

_Conduct_ **_Comprehensive Empirical Assessment_** _of_ **_Horizontal and Vertical Structures._** The task of de-monopolization or dis-integration in the industrial sector is a complex one and should be part of the medium term agenda. A prerequisite for any proactive competitive restructuring is comprehensive empirical investigation examining current horizontal and vertical concentration in key product and geographic markets. Efforts here can build on existing Goskomstat data. The investigation should assess the competitive impact of emerging economic agglomerates, including FIGs, in priority sectors.

# **Policies to Foster** New **Entry**

**_Implement Rules-Based Streamlined Business Licensing at the Federal and Local Levels._** In January 1998 new initiatives were discussed at a Government meeting on the problems of SMEs, including changes in issuing of licenses. But the measures do not address the problem that the setting of license fees is subject to the discretion of local authorities, which results in price discrimination and

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Saccardo et al., 2024).

Lastly, we were limited in exploring additional study-level moderators (e.g., World Value Surveys [2024]; Hofstede’s cultural dimensions [Culture Factor Group, 2024]) given scarcity of data available for LMICs. While we were able to draw from the Wellcome Global Monitor Indicators to explore the moderating role of country-level beliefs and trust in healthcare workers and beliefs about vaccines, these concepts may be better explored at the individual level, as evidenced by modest empirical evidence for aggregation to the country level described in Appendix D. Our analysis focused on only demographic characteristics as individual-level moderators, as other potentially relevant factors were omitted from surveys to keep them brief for participants. Future research could explore additional moderating factors that might have more explanatory power.

# **4.5. Conclusions**

This study is part of the World Bank's COVID-19 response, aimed at diagnosing vaccine hesitancy and related factors, and informing and guiding real-time risk communication efforts across multiple governments simultaneously. While the WHO declared the end of the COVID-19 pandemic in May 2023 (WHO, 2023), ensuring high immunization rates remains crucial for public health. Our findings demonstrate that behaviorally-informed messages have the potential to nudge vaccine-hesitant individuals towards vaccination. Impacts of such messages can represent significant public health gain, as up to 6 million people were vaccine hesitant in these 23 countries and territories by the time of the study. However, one lesson from our study is that a "one-size-fits-all" approach will not work. Our research emphasizes the importance of testing and tailoring messages to specific audiences and contexts, as the effectiveness of some messages varied across countries. This study highlights the value 27
age 6, this proportion is consistently over 15 percent and reaches 22 percent for children aged 15. Not all of these children are orphans; the survey only indicates that their biological parents are not present in the household in which they live. However, Siaens, Subbarao and Wodon (2003) suggest that many of them _are_ orphans. It appears, however, that many them are not necessarily orphans, or at least double orphans. Figure 1 also plots, from the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey for Rwanda, another nationally representative survey of Rwanda, the proportion of double orphans.<sup>4</sup> Starting with age 7<sup>5</sup> , the proportion of double orphans is about one-half the proportion of children who are not living with both their

> 3 Table 6, panel A, using regressions with household fixed effects for households where both biological and non-biological children live, confirms the finding that, controlling for age and gender, the latter are less likely to be enrolled in school than the former.

> 4 Contrary to the EICV, the Demographic and Health Survey 2000 explicitly asked whether the biological parents were still alive.

> 5 The analysis will focus on children 7 to 15 years of age. Notice in figure 1, the sharp increase, just before age 7, of the proportion of double orphans and the percentage of children living without both biological parents: this marks the effect of the Genocide which took place between April and July 1994. Given the difference in survey dates (June-November 2000 for the DHS and October 1999-July 2001 for the EICV) and the long span of the EICV, the discontinuity due to the Genocide might be less sharp than if I could have used exact date of births, which are not available in the EICV.

5
and southern interior of India. We predict _average_ consumption declines as high as 13% for some of these districts, even after incorporating the moderating influence of cereal price

# **5.4 Climate change incidence curves**

We now turn our attention to the main objective of this study, understanding the distributional implications of climate change. We do so using a climate change incidence curve (CCIC), the smoothed relationship between per capita household expenditure percentiles and predicted changes in per capita expenditures induced by increases in temperature over the next three decades (%∆<sup>�</sup> _c_ ). Economic growth over this time-frame is presumed to be neutral with respect to wealth ranking; a rising tide that lifts all boats, proportionally speaking. Thus, in the absence of warming, our assumption is that a household’s–or, more precisely, a household _type’s_ –per-capita expenditure percentile would remain unchanged.

We draw CCICs, in Figure 10, that sequentially incorporate each of the three price effects, beginning with the land price effect alone, then adding the labor price or wage effect, and finally the cereal price effect. Our initial focus is, once again, on rural areas. Panels (a)-(c) show CCICs using different versions of the Ricardian parameter estimates, though the curves look practically identical across scenarios. Doubling the discount rate used to transform land values into annualized income has no detectable impact on the incidence of climate change losses, only exacerbating the predicted consumption declines a bit. While the Extended Ricardian scenario, as we have just noted, alters the geographical distribution of impacts relative to the Baseline, it makes no discernible difference for the distribution of impacts across per-capita expenditure percentiles.

Ignoring cereal price effects, climate change appears ”progressive” insofar as wealthier households suffer proportionally greater consumption losses. A household in the top percentile of the per capita expenditure distribution would experience nearly a two percentage point greater decline in consumption than a household in the bottom percentile.
# 1. **Introduction**

Do incumbents use social programs to get themselves re-elected? Much theoretical and empirical work on public expenditure patterns in democratic regimes argues that politicians manipulate the timing, composition, and geographic distribution of expenditures to maximize the likelihood of remaining in office. Increases in public expenditures are timed to coincide with upcoming elections; budgetary tradeoffs are made to satisfy important constituencies; and expenditures are directed towards areas of the country that are considered critical for an incumbent's re-election bid.

This paper discusses the relationship between elections and the expenditures made by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) during President Alberto Fujimori's first tern in office (1990-1995). FONCODES was created in 1991, during a severe recession which followed the adoption of stringent stabilization and structural adjustment measures by the Fujimori government. Its stated objectives were to generate employment, help alleviate poverty, and improve access to social services (World Bank 1998). By 1993, the Peruvian economy had begun a remarkable recovery, and FONCODES was being hailed by govermnent officials and foreign donors alike as an important component of a medium-term strategy to reduce poverty.

Scholars in Peru and abroad have generally been more guarded in their praise. Critics argue that social funds like FONCODES undermine line ministries and local governments. And questions about the "politicization" of FONCODES have bedeviled the program from its creation (Graham 1994, Kay 1995, Ball6n and Beaumont 1996). Yet there are no satisfactory studies of the impact of elections on FONCODES expenditures.

This paper attempts to fill this gap using highly disaggregated data on expenditures, socioeconomic indicators, and electoral outcomes. I use econometric techniques to analyze the timing and geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures, and reach two main conclusions. First, FONCODES expenditures increased significantly prior to national elections. Second, FONCODES projects were directed to provinces in which the marginal political impact of expenditures was likely to be largest. The results are robust to a large number of specifications and controls. The Peruvian data thus support predictions made in the literature
suggests that since the 1990s, about 1.3 mn. ha had been transferred to a total of 6,612 commercial farms,<sup>3</sup> most of which cultivated more than 50 ha. The annual rate of new farm establishment dropped from a peak of close to 800 in 2007/08 to some 250 in 2011/13. Also, 95% of land is transferred to Ethiopians or joint ventures rather than foreigners. With an average area of 200 ha (172 ha for Ethiopians and 840 ha for foreigners), this implies that the extent of land transferred to operational farms is well below media reports (Rahmato 2011; Rulli _et al._ 2013). By respondents’ own estimates, 55% of land transferred remains unutilized, largely due to labor and technology constraints. Less than 20% of farms accessed credit, investments focused on land clearing and machinery, and only 36% made any lease payments. Below we will use these data to explore whether local people were affected by –positive or negative– spillovers from this phenomenon.

# **2.2 Methodological considerations**

A presumption of positive economy-wide spillovers from FDI prompted creation of investment promotion agencies worldwide. But the nature of spillovers and the channels through which they materialize will be

> 2 A report by the Oakland Institute (2011) suggest that “our research shows that approximately 3,619,509 ha of land have been awarded, as of January 2011” (p.18). This is  in line with the land matrix (Anseeuw _et al._ 2012) which reports demand for 3.14 million ha in Ethiopia, second in the world after Mozambique. Yet the most recent revision of this database (as per Aug. 8, 2015) reports that only 1.42 mn. ha had been contracted and production started only on 39,528 ha (see <u>http://www.landmatrix.org/en/get-involved/).</
Policy Research Working Paper 10121

# **Abstract**

The combined forces of population aging, weakening family and village risk-sharing networks, and low formal pension coverage will make financing elderly consumption a major challenge for the future. This study examines whether households in high-informality settings, where participation in pension schemes is rare, accumulate wealth over the life cycle and what mix of assets and liabilities composes that wealth. Pakistan is an ideal setting, with 88.5 percent of the population in informal employment and limited wide-scale social protection targeting the elderly. Data on housing wealth, land holdings, financial wealth, household durables, and owned businesses are assembled from eight rounds of representative household surveys that span 18 years (2001–18). Changes associated with age are disentangled from differences between cohorts and year effects by applying decomposition analysis. The average informal Pakistani household accumulates 4.2 years’ worth of consumption between the head’s ages of 25 and 65, mostly in the form of residential housing. Wealth accumulation is slower early in the life cycle and picks up speed between ages 40 and 65. Land is an important part of rural households’ portfolio but grows little over the life cycle (10 months’ worth). More liquid forms of wealth such as financial wealth also grow with age, but in much more modest amounts. Overall, consistent with improving living standards and expectations that family support may be less available than in the past, the fraction that reaches old age with significant net worth has increased over the period analyzed, suggesting a potential demand for long-term saving schemes designed for the informal sector.

This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at cjoubert@worldbank.org.
|
||Sri Lank& (k985)|.09,.13|.1S.5S<br>.32||||
||Taiwan. China (1986)|<br>.50|.3S||||
||Thailand (1985)|.19 .26 .33|.36,.46 .64||||
|Latin Ameriea|Barbados (1984)|1.26|3.00||||
|and the|Bolivia (1966)|.25|.25||||
|Caribbean|El Salvador (1963)|.40|1.36<br>.03||||
||**Guatemala**(1963)|.61|2.08<br>.09||||
||Honduras (1966)|.73|2.46||||
||Jamaica (1967)|.18|.44||||
||Mexico (1965)|.37|2.64,3.96,.516|1.40||4.35|
||Colombia (1966)|.20-.40|.46<br>.10||||
||(PROVANILIA)||||||

Ntoe: Two or **ore numbors** In one call denotes multiple brands.

# a. Oral rohydratlon Salts

Sources% Much of the above Information is provided courtesy of the Social Marketing Forum, which regularly iLsues price data and made some figures available prior to publication. Data for 1984 and 1985 **are** from **J.** D. SherriL et &L., PopulatLon Reports, Serics J-30 (July-August 1985). Other information **comes** from the 1987 qLestionnaire described In tho text.
China, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand) as well as smaller users and even non-members of the WTO for which detailed data have not yet been collected and compiled.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the variables and the data contained in the global antidumping database that is common across the 15 user countries. Section 3 then provides more details for each of the 15 user countries on additional, country-specific data included in the database, as well as particular elements of missing data for each user. Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the WTO Member countries that are also users of antidumping but that are not yet part 6
, 2015) and its provisions (Dür et al., 2014; Kohl et al., 2016; Mattoo et al., 2017) by focusing on trade where the public sector is the buyer.<sup>7</sup> When we focus on specific TA provisions on government procurement, we rely on recent work showing how to identify the effect of unilateral trade policy within a structural gravity model (Heid et al., 2021; Sellner, 2019; Beverelli et al., 2018). We isolate provisions, like the pubic sharing of information and statistics, whose application is non-excludable (i.e., conditional on compliance by the member countries, non-member countries benefit as well for construction, and 130 thousand euros for supplies and services). The U.S. Federal Procurement Data System collects contract award data for procurement contracts at the federal level only.

> 6Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) use similar data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the parameters of a non-homothetic gravity equation.

> 7A theoretically-consistent estimate of the comparative statics effect of TAs requires to specify the full general equilibrium model because changes in trade costs generally affect the allocation of resources across sectors. Different assumptions on the underlying structure of the economy can lead to a common formulation of the comparative statics effect of a change in trade costs as reviewed by Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2015). Egger et al. (2011), for instance, estimate the full trade effect of TAs.

7
**1. Introduction**

The East Asian financial crisis has in part been attributed to the weak performance and risky financial structures of corporates. Ex-post, it has become clear that the operational performance of East Asian corporates was indeed not as stellar as many had thought and in fact involved investment with high risks. Also ex-post, it has become apparent that the financial structures of many East Asian corporates could not withstand the combined shocks of increased interest rates, depreciated currencies, and large drops in domestic demand. This poor performance and risky financing structures of East Asian corporates were, however, not notably featured among observers writing on East Asia prior to the financial crisis. Quite the opposite, East Asian corporates were considered an important contributing part of the East Asian miracle and were generally viewed upon as very competitive and adept at exploiting new market opportunities, and consequently attracted considerable amounts of (foreign) capital.

Reconciling the differences between these ex-post and ex-ante view will likely be a topic of much future research.' In this note, we are less ambitious and start with documenting the basic record in corporate perfornance and financing structures for East Asian corporates over the last decade. Analyzing whether this record led or contributed to a financial crisis will be pursued in future work. We use a database of balance sheet and income statement data for 5550 East Asian firms in nine countries over the period 1988-1996 for establishing the stylized facts on corporate performance and financing structures. The main data source are annual reports of the companies listed on the major stock exchanges in the region.

We find large differences in performance and financial structures across countries. Profitability, as measured by real return on assets (ROA) in local currency, was relatively low in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore throughout the period, while corporates in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand had high returns, on average twice higher than those recorded in Germany and the United States over the same period. In the years 1994-1996, measured performance declined somewhat in several East
skill jobs are filled through informal channels. Job postings require on average 2.5 years of work experience and tertiary education, are mostly full-time, and exhibit strong regional focus on Pristina. Foreign language, extraversion and computer skills are the most demanded skills across all industries and occupations, which confirms that they are “horizontal” skills requirements. Some industries such as the IT sector express high demand for particular software skills, such as programming skills, thereby signaling specific industry needs. From an applicant’s perspective, it points at the importance of more specific abilities that need to be trained beyond these transversal skills before entering the job market.

The approach presented in this paper provides valuable insights for policy makers and other stakeholders on priority skills demanded by employers and this information should be useful in aligning curricula with labor market needs in general education and training programs. The findings on skill needs and education requirements by sectors and occupations are very detailed and directly actionable. Such findings can also benefit parents and youth looking for more information on career and education choices.

Nevertheless, skill needs are dynamic and thereby evolve quickly over time, especially technical skills in rapidly evolving sectors (for example IT and computer science), often linked to technological progress and overall economic development. The construction of time series of skill requirements to follow skill demand over time would be a key extension of this analysis. Several years of such data could allow us to monitor the changes in demand for skills, for policy use.<sup>45</sup> Another main avenue for analysis is the inclusion of data from public platforms, which would improve the coverage of the labor market. Discussions with the public employment agency of Kosovo suggest that the public platform includes more middle and low-skilled jobs than private platforms and has a better coverage of secondary cities in the country. This suggests that private and public platforms are complementary and serve different markets. We encourage further applications of this approach to other Western Balkan countries to compare skills requirements across borders and to account
macroeconomic stability and robust growth for the Argentine economy. The declining real effective exchange rate since 2005 suggests an undervalued exchange rate of approximately 30%, as of October 2015. Depressed price statistics decrease the REER and lessen the peso’s implied overvaluation. On the other hand, our inflation-adjusted REER,<sup>50</sup> exhibits an increasing trend and signals an overvalued US$/Peso exchange rate of 46% in 2015 relative to the base year 2005<sup>51</sup> (see Figure 10). Yet, the caveat of a assuming a constant real exchange rate remains.

Figure 10: Overvaluation Implied by the Big Mac Index and PPP <!-- Start of picture text --> % Big Mac Index (US$/Peso) S ource: The Economist Implied Overvaluation Relative to 2005 (%)<br>100 Source: BIS, INDEC, PriceStats, and authors' calculations<br>80<br>50 60<br>‐5.04 46.5<br>0 40<br>‐50 20<br>‐56.3<br>‐100 0<br>‐20 ‐30.5<br>‐150<br>Misalignment ‐40<br>‐200<br>Adjusted misalignment ‐60<br>‐250 Inflation‐adjusted REER REER<br>‐80<br>Figure 11: Overvaluation Implied by the iPad index in US$/LCU<br>iPad Index Implied Overvaluation (%)<br>Source: Commsec and authors' calculations, September 2015<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>‐20<br>‐40<br>‐60<br>Apr‐00 Apr‐01 Apr‐02 Apr‐03 May‐04 Jun‐05 Jan‐06 May‐06 Jun‐07 Jun‐08 Jul‐09 Jan‐10
; Books<br>and school supplies; School<br>transportation; School<br>uniform; Other expenses.|Over the last<br>school year|Cell heads|5 items: School fees; Books<br>and school supplies; School<br>transportation; Private<br>lessons; Vocational training.|Frequency is<br>reported by the<br>respondent who can<br>choose among|
|**Personal items**|Household<br>head|8 items: Soaps; Perfumes<br>and cosmetics; Tobacco<br>and cigarettes;<br>Recreational services,<br>books and newspapers;<br>Clothing; Shoes; Cloth;<br>Tailoring.|Over the last 30<br>days (and if not<br>purchased, amount<br>usually spent over<br>a month).|Cell heads|6 items: Transport; Clothing<br>and shoes; Personal care<br>(soaps, perfumes and<br>cosmetics, tobacco and<br>cigarettes etc.); Personal<br>belongings (jewelries etc.);<br>Recreational services;<br>Books and newspapers.|twelve modalities<br>from every day to<br>every year.<br>Respondent is asked<br>about both usual<br>expenditure and last<br>expenditure.|

> 1 In the PSF survey, jewelry expenditures are covered in the personal item section of the questionnaire.

6