rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
of the postal addresses were either for immigration agents, or were outside of Tonga (especially in New Zealand). We used two strategies to derive a sample of 78 unsuccessful ballots from this information: first, as part of our survey of the migrants in New Zealand we had obtained details about the location of remaining family (almost 60% of migrants still had family occupying their previous dwelling in Tonga). We used this information to draw a sample of unsuccessful ballots from the same villages (implicitly using the village of residence when the applicant entered the ballot as a stratifying variable). We also used the Tongan telephone directory to find contact details for people included in the list of names supplied by DoL. To overcome concerns that this would bias the sample to more accessible areas around the capital city of Nuku’alofa, who are more likely to have telephones, we deliberately included in the sample households from two of the four Outer Islands (Vava’u and ‘Eua).<sup>11</sup> Table 1 examines how random the sample we have is by comparing means of ex-ante characteristics for lottery winners and lottery losers among the principal applicants in our sample. The point estimates of the means are similar in magnitude for the two groups and we can not reject equality of means for any of the variables. This is as would be expected with the random selection of ballots among applicants in the Pacific Access Category.

The sample of non-applicants was obtained by selecting 60 households, with at least one member aged 18 to 45, in either the same villages that the migrants had been living in prior to migrating or in the same villages that unsuccessful ballots were found in. An

> 11 The main island of Tongatapu contains 69% of the Tongan resident population, while the population distribution across the Outer Islands is: Vava’u, 16%; Ha’apai, 8%; ‘Eua, 5%; and Niuas, 2%.

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robust to three alternative constructions: (i) using the continuous disruption index; (ii) defining disruption to be within-district, so that a quarter of villages in all districts, by construction, are high-disruption; (iii) additionally using information on the disruption of daily and periodic markets to construct _Evd_ .

# **4.6**

We use a potential outcomes framework to make precise the identifying assumptions under which the factorial design yields causal estimates of ELA, exposure to high disruption, and their interaction. For expositional ease we ignore covariates ( _yi_ 0 _, Xivd, Xvd, λd_ ). Let _Yi_<sup>_TE_</sup> be the potential outcome for individual _i_ , receiving ELA treatment _T ∈{_ 0 _,_ 1 _}_ and low/high Ebola-related disruption _E ∈{_ 0 _,_ 1 _}_ as defined above. One of the following potential outcomes is then observed, 21
Figure 4 provides one explanation for the increased concern over “protectionism” and the associated response. The left panels of Figure 4 take the US and EU model estimates from Table 3 – i.e., based on pre-crisis data – and generate the _predicted_ import protection response over 2008:Q42010:Q4 given the realized macroeconomic data from this period. The historical models for the US and EU predict a sharp increase in import protection beginning in 2009:Q2 and lasting through 2010:Q1, peaking in 2009:Q3. To provide some context, the median number of products subject to new US TTBs against these 15 trading partners per quarter between 1988:Q1 and 2008:Q3 was 12. The model’s US prediction for 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 peaks at _647 products_ being subject to new TTBs in 2009:Q3. The median number of products subject to new EU TTBs against these 15 trading partners per quarter between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q3 was 9. The model’s EU prediction for new TTBs peaks at _264 products_ in 2009:Q3.

To provide additional context, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest the historical models forecast an upper bound of roughly 15 percent of US and EU nonoil imports becoming subject to _new_ import protection during the Great Recession. In particular, the US model predicted that cumulatively 1558 new imported product – trading partner combinations would become subject to new TTB investigations during the period of 2008:Q4 through 2010:Q4. If we multiply the value of imports for a relevant target in 2007 by the predicted number of TTBs, we arrive at an upper estimate that 15.4 percent of US non-oil imports could expect to face new US TTBs.<sup>27</sup> Similarly for the EU, the cumulative effect of its predicted 623 imported product – trading partner TTBs (see again Figure 4) translate into 14.0 percent of EU non-oil imports.<sup>28</sup> Estimates from Bown (2011a) put the tradeweighted share of US
<u>Table 6: Effect of the Number of Nudges (Dosage) in Fokontany on Long-Term Outcomes with Controls</u>

||Preparing<br>meals|diverse|Child<br>interaction|Parenting<br>Behavior|Language<br>Learning|Social<br>Skills|Fine<br>Motor|Composite<br>MDAT|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Number of nudges|0.03**||0.11**|0.03**|0.03|0.06**|0.01|0.05*|
||(0.01)||(0.04)|(0.01)|(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|(0.02)|
|HH Size|-0.00||-0.03|-0.02**|-0.02|-0.03**|-0.01|-0.03*|
||(0.01)||(0.02)|(0.01)|(0.02)|(0.01)|(0.01)|(0.02)|
|Child’s age|-0.02||1.75**|0.09**|-0.04|-0.03|-0.02|-0.03|
||(0.01)||(0.08)|(0.02)|(0.04)|(0.04)|(0.04)|(0.04)|
|Distance to school (KM)|
111. The current account balance of a country reflects its savings-investment balance. The above analysis explains China‘s large current account surplus. The reasons for the large and growing trade imbalance between the U.S. and China were, however, mainly the relocation of many of the low value-added labor-intensive products from other East Asian economies to China. The U.S. has long had a trade deficit with East Asia because of imports of labor-intensive products. This relocation concentrates the trade surplus of East Asia with the U.S. on China, which can be observed in the changing patterns of the United States‘ trade deficits with Japan and China from 1985 to 2009 (Figure 53).

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 53: Share of US-Japan and US-China Trade Deficits in Total US trade<br>Deficit<br>50%<br>45%<br>40%<br>35%<br>30%<br>25%<br>20%<br>China<br>15%<br>Japan<br>10%<br>5%<br>0%<br>1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: United Nations Comtrade, World Integrated Trade Solution database; authors' calculations.

112. This relocation as well as the regional integration through production networks also caused China‘s trade deficit with other East Asian economies. Figure 54 illustrates the rising importance of China in U.S. imports from East Asia. Related to this, Figure 29 above shows how China‘s trade balance with other East Asian economies deteriorated, as China increasingly imported raw materials and semi-finished products from these countries. Many subcomponents of these commodities are produced in advanced countries and assembled in China, as a result of relocation of labor-intensive production to China.
based); educational data; health, hygiene and health seeking behaviors; economic data; time use and adult and child care patterns; emotional wellbeing; mobility and migration; coping behaviors; and characteristics of the house and inhabitants. The household questionnaire was administered to the person registered to receive the cash transfer (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010b).

> 6 The District Secretariat trained a Community Social Protection Committee (CSPC) to help implement the scheme. The CSPC made a list of ultra poor labor constrained households based on community knowledge and the local Village Headman signs on this list. The CSPC then visited the households to fill out an application for each household. Next, the CSPC ranked households and chose the 10% poorest. A community meeting occurred where the ranking was discussed.  Then Village, District, and National Committees approved the list of eligible households. Once fully approved, recipients started receiving transfers on a monthly basis.

9
Those holding tertiary education diplomas (university or in 2 cases also graduate courses) are assigned 4 more years of education after general high secondary education (from age 19 to 22 years). Those holding a master’s degree (in 2 cases only) are assigned 2 more years of education after tertiary education (from age 23 to 24 years).

Actual work experience was computed by imposing two main corrections to potential work experience. The latter has been computed in the usual way as the difference between current age of the respondent, years of education completed, and the age when primary education starts, which, in the case of Azerbaijan is 6 years. The first correction subtracts the time that the respondents declare to have spent to find his/her current job. Question 57 in the survey asks for how long the individual has been seeking a job, answers are constrained within given intervals of time; the average value within the interval has been transformed into fractions of a year and subtracted from the person’s

> 4 At the time of the survey, namely in August 2005, the exchange rate was: US$ 1 = AZM 4908, which means also a US$ / AZM exchange rate of 0.00024. Note that the exchange rate now reported is based on the old Manat, not the new one (AZN).

> 5 It is not clear from the wording of the questionnaire whether this is the gross wage or the wage net of taxes. In the other SWT surveys, wages referred to net monthly wage.

> 6 For a general description of the educational system of Azerbaijan, please see the following: http://www.classbase.com/Countries/Azerbaijan/Education-System.

5
communication from the tax authorities). Being confronted with the tax withholding mechanism (another form of enforcement) may then lead taxpayers to revise _p_ ̃ upwards and increase _π._ ˆ<sup>15</sup> We proceed to estimate the impact of third-party reporting and withholding empirically using policy variation in Costa Rica.

# 3 Context and Data

Costa Rica's tax system relies predominantly on the income tax for rms and the sales tax. Firms in Costa Rica register either as persona física (unincorporated rm, i.e. self-employed individuals) or as persona jurídica (corporation), using the D140 registration form. There are no size thresholds or other requirements obliging rms to chose one rm type or the other, but the governance structure and income tax schedule for the two rm types dier.<sup>16</sup> This section presents rst the income and sales tax system in Costa Rica, and then the compliance mechanisms used to enforce taxes, and nally the administrative data used in this study.

> 14See Figure XII for an illustration of the type of information provided by card processing companies in Costa Rica to aliated businesses.

> 15Note however that a model as in Finkelstein (2009), in which salience merely increases the link between the perceived and actual tax rate, but without moving the misperception in a particular direction, a change in salience has an ambigious eect on taxpayer behavior.

> 16 Wage earners are taxed according to yet another tax schedule, which features three tax brackets with marginal rates of 0, 10 and 15% respectively. The highest kink for wage earners is below the lowest kink for the self-employed.

9
expected to have large effects on bank profitability if banks depend primarily on wholesale funding, large depositors, and foreign depositors. Banks that rely primarily on retail deposits, which exhibit limited interest rate pass through from NIRP would likely suffer larger margin compression than banks that rely mainly on wholesale funding. The fact that interbank market rates have moved deeper into negative territory than retail deposit rates, as documented earlier, highlights this differentiated impact. The effect of NIRP on bank profitability also depends on banks’ ability to diversify income sources and raise bank fees.

The euro area Bank Lending Survey of April 2016, found that there is a perception among banks that NIRP has already hurt or is expected to hurt profitability (Figure 11). For instance, more than 80 percent of banks participating in the survey stated that the negative deposit facility rate contributed to a decrease in their net interest income (ECB 2016b). According to the survey, the asset purchase programs of the ECB also reduced net interest margins and profitability of banks, despite improving capital gains. The decline in euro area bank equity prices since mid-2015 could partially be ascribed to market concerns about future profitability.

However, bank profitability depends more fundamentally on the overall health of the economy, affecting both the volume of lending and its quality.<sup>22</sup> Stronger growth should help reduce nonperforming loans, reinforce banks’ capital base and steepen the yield curve, which are all important factors supporting lending and profitability conditions (Shin 2016). Evidence suggests that net income of large euro area banks have not been significantly affected so far, thanks to lower impairments and higher non-interest income (ECB 2016c).<sup>23</sup> Across NIRP countries, bank lending margins remain within post crisis ranges, despite showing some signs of compression.

Recent empirical research documents an increase in loan growth upon the introduction of NIRP in the euro area. Rostagno et al (2016) show that under NIRP, euro area banks have become more likely to turn
# _Legal Traditions_

As individual income (and thus wealth) grows, the need to protect property rights likely becomes greater. Explicit deposit insurance may, therefore, be one example of improved property rights.1 Another view is that there is little point in adopting deposit insurance in a country where legal traditions are especially weak. In those instances, depositors are unlikely to believe that insurance coverage is meaningful. Countries that **scored high on the ICRG index of legal development should have been more likely than** others to adopt deposit insurance.<sup>14</sup>

# _External Pressure_

Some countries may be prodded into adopting explicit deposit insurance. For example. countries that joined (or were attempting to join) the European Union were required to adopt an explicit program. Similarly, countries may be required to adopt explicit insurance as parrof the IMF's or the World Bank's loan conditionalities. In addition, close links between countries may prompt some to mimic the policy choices of

- **13** Knack and Keefer (1995) argue the reverse, however. In their view, because the income gains associated with improved property rights are so high, it is more likely that changes in property rights drive income rather than the reverse. Co-determination between these variables is a difficult problem. one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Each of these variables is used in the models of deposit insurance choice that follow.

- **14** The index was created by a private international risk service, the International Country Risk Guide. Here we use only the "rule of law" component of their ratings. This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims
Migration and remittances have become increasingly important factors in the development of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras over the past three decades. According to the most recent global estimates of international migration, an estimated 1.6 million Salvadorans, 1.1 million Guatemalans, and nearly 800,000 Hondurans lived outside their countries of birth in 2013.<sup>4</sup> These migrants represent 6 and 8 percent of all people born in Guatemala and Honduras, respectively, and 20 percent of all Salvadorans. These migrants, in turn, remitted over $17 billion in 2017. Remittances accounted for 18 percent of the national GDP in Honduras, 17 percent in El Salvador, and 11 percent in Guatemala in 2016; the world average is 0.8 percent.

What impact do remittances have on the labor markets of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, collectively referred to as the Northern Triangle of Central America? Out-migration can negatively impact labor supply through two channels – directly through outflows of labor and indirectly through labor substitution effects of remittances. Migration from the Northern Triangle has historically been biased towards young adults, disproportionately decreasing the size of the labor force. Due to positive selection into migration, migration also leads to a decrease in the skills composition of the labor force (Del Carmen and Sousa, 2018). However, through remittances migration can also reduce the labor supply of those who do not migrate. In per capita terms, El Salvador receives $724 per year in remittances, followed by Guatemala with $450 and Honduras with $424 - six times higher than the world average ($77) and representing a significant income source for the households receiving them. As with other income types, receiving remittances can raise reservation wages and reduce labor supply. This may be of particular concern in the countries of the Northern Triangle, where labor supply, particularly of women, is below the regional average.

In this paper, we analyze the impact of the receipt of remittances on the labor supply and employment
any case a good deal of the output of food farmers is non-market. The level of income of this group varies mostly with the level of production. However, "uncertainty surrounds the robustness and reliability of the national accounts estimates of agricultural output of Ghana. Government crop production statistics give a more positive account of agricultural production during the ERP years" (World Bank 1995b, p 40). Food crop production, measured in terms of calorie equivalents of starchy and cereal crops seem to have increased 60 per cent between 1987-9 and 1991-2 (ibid, Figure 3.2). In sum, the agricultural production and price data are consistent with the decline in rural poverty suggested by the GLSS data sets, but seem to suggest that the latter might have exaggerated the decline.

The World Bank Report (1995a) has, however, drawn attention to another source of income growth and poverty reduction which might hold the key to the clarification of the factors involved. The GLSS data show that for the rural households as a whole the proportion of income accruing from non-farm self-employment increased from 14.8 percent in 1987-8 to 21.5 percent in 1991-2 (ibid, table 3.3, p.28). The growth in nonfarm activities during the recovery of the economy-involving increase both in trade and non-food commodities-could indeed have been a powerful source of poverty reduction.

# **6.4.4 Absolute Levels of Poverty in the Rural and Urban Sectors and Labor Migration**

While the work reported in the Extended Poverty Studies (World bank, 1995b) show a decline in poverty in the rural areas, and an increase in the capital city, it still maintains that in 1992 the absolute level of poverty was much higher in the rural areas. The poverty ratio was reported to be 23.0 percent in Accra, 27.7 percent in other urban areas, and varied from 28.6 percent to 38.3 percent in the different rural regions.

**Table 6.9: Net Migration Flows
Alkire, S., Meinzen-Dick, R., Peterman, A., Quisumbing, A., Seymour, G. and Vaz, A., 2013. The women’s empowerment in agriculture index. _World Development_ , 52, pp.71-91.

Anderson, L. 2014 Self-Help Groups in Development, University of Washington, EPAR Brief No 283 Anand, P., Hunter, G., Carter, I., Dowding, K., Guala, F. and Van Hees, M., 2009. The development of capability indicators. _Journal of Human Development and Capabilities_ , 10(1), pp.125-152.

Anand, P., Krishnakumar, J. and Tran, N.B., 2011. Measuring welfare: Latent variable models for happiness and capabilities in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity. _Journal of Public Economics_ , _95_ (3-4), pp.205-215.

Ashraf, N., Karlan, D. and Yin, W., 2010. Female empowerment: Impact of a commitment savings product in the Philippines. _World Development_ , 38(3), pp.333344.

Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R. and Kinnan, C., 2015. The miracle of microfinance? Evidence from a randomized evaluation. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_ , 7(1), pp.22-53.

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data on technical assistance, and data on enrollment and the number and type of teachers. The details of the institutional cost calculations are in Appendix 3 and here we present only the summary results in Table 22.

Four main categories of expenditures are distinguished.

Personnel expenses include salaries and benefits of Ivorian and expatriate staff. For the latter only the part of salaries and benefits assumed by Cbte d'Ivoire (71.5Z) is included in the calculations. Operating expenses include spending for utilities, communications, transportation, office and school materials, maintenance, school lunch programs, etc. Purchases of equipment is included here if its estimated life span is one year or less. Scholarships include cash payments to students as well as the salaries of teachers who are on paid leave to attend courses to upgrade their qualifications. All cost figures pertain to 1987 budgets, and enrollments are those for the 1986-87 school year. The use of budgets as a data source rather than actual expenditures is necessitated because the latter are only available with a lag of several years. However, in the current climate of fiscal austerity in C8te d'Ivoire, requests for funding above originally approved budgets are rarely granted. Hence the 1987 budget should be a reliable indicator of 1987 expenditures. The amortization figures assume an economic life of 20 years for buildings and 5 years for equipment. Where applicable, the figures are based on construction and purchases that took place under the Bank's Third Education Project.

Several features of the composition of costs are noteworthy. First, a large share of personnel expenses goes to expatriate staff. At
machine learning approach to guide the selection of the relevant dimension of heterogeneity. We follow Chernozhukov et al.’s (2018) general framework, which provides valid inference to test whether there is heterogeneity in impact based on a set of baseline covariates. If heterogeneity is detected, then Chernozhukov et al.’s method makes it possible to (i) compute the magnitude of such heterogeneity and characterize the difference in the treatment effect across the most and least impacted groups, and (ii) identify the key observable correlates of the most and least impacted groups. Annex C contains a more detailed discussion on this approach.

We applied these methods to test for heterogeneity on key primary outcomes of interest, such as the woman and husband’s employment status, the woman’s labor income, and

> 15 Since the unit level of randomization is the household and within-cluster dependence of the main outcomes is not meaningful, we do not cluster at the site level. Therefore, the baseline intra-cluster correlation for women’s employment is 0.006 and for women’s inactivity is 0.004.

> 16 These indicators control for the possibility of arising or worsening economic conditions emerging after the baseline to midline and the endline surveys. Notably, we do not find any evidence for this after examining time patterns in total per capita expenditure for control households while leveraging 8 survey data points (month/years) from the baseline through to the last endline surveys.

16