rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
electricity program (a proxy for environmental measures) have increased their electricity consumption by 2.5%.

Several studies use economic or financial analysis to evaluate investments in clean technologies (EE and solar home systems). Below we briefly highlight the findings of the studies by technology types. First, we discuss energy utilization technologies followed by solar home systems.

Analyzing data from a national survey in Ghana, Opoku et al. (2019) estimate that the cost savings from reduced electricity consumption by adopting energy-efficient air conditioning (AC) systems is about US$1.96 billion from 2018 to 2030. Suástegui Macías et al. (2018) report that 39% of households in Mexicali, Mexico, use oversized ACs and that replacing these ACs with more energy efficient ACs would save 32% in energy consumption annually.

By setting optimal HAVC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) temperature setpoints in office buildings in seven climate zones across the USA, Papadopoulos et al. (2019) show that up to 60% of annual HVAC-related energy is saved without compromising occupants’ thermal comfort. Wu et al. (2018) find 13.1% to 14.7% of energy savings with more efficient HVAC (e.g., ground-source heat pump with two and three boreholes) compared to conventional HVAC (e.g., air-source heat pump) in a single-family house in Maryland, USA. The estimated value of operation cost saved is about US$186 to US$191 per household annually. However, for the same net electricity generation, the ground-source heat pumps required US$7,934 (2 boreholes) and US$9,739 (3 boreholes) higher initial cost than the air-source heat pump.

Some studies examine net energy savings (or net benefits) due to the adoption of clean energy supply systems in buildings. Timilsina (2021) finds that the benefits of distributed photovoltaics (DPV) system in Bangladesh would be more than 1.5 times in residential and commercial buildings.
/doi.org/10.1057/s41278-020-00180-5.

Rodrigue, J-P. 2020. “The Geography of Transport Systems”, Fifth Edition, London: Routledge. 456 pages. ISBN: 978-0367-36463-2. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429346323.

Sea-Intelligence, "Press Release: Schedule reliability improves M/M in February 2024" (April 2024), Global Liner Performance (GLP) report https://www.sea-intelligence.com/press-room/254-schedule-reliability-drops-again-injanuary-2024 Shanghai Shipping Exchange. 2024. "Shanghai Containerized Freight Index" https://en.sse.net.cn/indices/scfinew.jsp, Accessed: April 25, 2024 S&P Global and Institute for Supply Management (ISM), 2024. US Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) Retrieved on April 25, 2024 from https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/composite-pmi S&P Global & Global eProcure (GEP). 2024. "Global Supply Chain Volatility Index" https://www.gep.com/newsroom/demand-at-asian-factories-rises-at-strongest-rate-in-over-2-years-improving-nearterm-growth-outlook-for-manufacturing-worldwide-gep-global-supply-chain-volatility-index , Accessed April 25, 2024 UNCTAD. 2024. “Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI)”, Geneva Switzerland, March 2024, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/shared-report/8df8f52c-de5e-4090-84ea-5d428b94011f Verschuur, J., Koks, E.E. & Hall, J.W. 2022. “Ports’ criticality in international trade and global supply-chains”. Nat Commun 13, 4351 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-32070-0 19
<!-- Start of picture text --> Share of economies (%)<br>45<br>40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>World Bank Group Regional development banks Bilateral agencies<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source: Reform Committee data Note: Share of economies with reform committees_ As a part of their work program, reform committees also engage in peer-to-peer learning initiatives, such as meetings with states or other departments that have successfully implemented reforms. These initiatives capture knowledge sharing across states and can play a role in reforming, as studies show countries can learn from their neighbors’ efforts to establish reform committees. Sub-Saharan Africa followed by East Asia and the Pacific and high-income OECD are the regions with the highest number of peer-to-peer learning initiatives organized by and within the reform committee/council.

# **5. Case Studies**

In this section, we present the following four case studies: Djibouti, Moldova, Mexico, and Malaysia.

# **5.1. Djibouti**

The Republic of Djibouti launched the Djibouti Economic Development Council (Conseil de Développement Economique or CDED) in 2016 to organize and closely monitor the implementation of national reforms, for the purpose of promoting sustainable economic growth and overall prosperity of the country. To ensure the soundness and appropriate handling of the State’s ventures and projects, CDED oversees and maintains harmony between the various domestic organizations and ministries involved in the development of economic policies. In this regard, the reform committee aims at stimulating the commercial and industrial growth of Djibouti, along with generating employment (Décret No 2016-242/PRE, 2018).

The Council, which has a permanent mandate, meets at least once a month; if judged necessary the President may call a meeting at any time (Décret No 2016-242/PRE and Reform Committee Survey).
# **5.3 Trust, Political preferences and civic engagement**

Was the successful integration of refugees sufficient to lead to full cultural assimilation and the disappearance of refugees’ distinctive identity and values? Or, to the contrary, has the historical strife between refugees and natives (detailed in section 2) cemented into persistent mistrust, discrimination, and polarized political attitudes?

**Trust and self-perceived discrimination** To address these questions, I first look at trust and selfperceived discrimination, as elicited in the ESS survey. Table 2 shows that only 3% of secondgeneration refugees report to have ever felt discriminated against, no differently from natives. This stands in stark contrast with first-generation Albanian immigrant, 50% of whom declare to have been discriminated against, as Table 3 shows. This difference is also related to the fact that only 54% of Albanians report to speak Greek at home, while 99% refugees do. Another crucial difference is that only 12% Albanians report to have the Greek citizenship while all refugees have it. With respect to self-declared trust in others or in institutions (legal system, police, politicians), I find no significant differences between refugees and natives, with a gap of typically less than 5% of the standard-deviation in the attitudinal scale between the two groups.

**Voting** I also examine the voting patterns of second-generation refugees and of Greek natives. The ESS asks respondents the political party they have voted at the last national election. Table 2 shows that, on average, the voting patterns of refugees and natives are virtually identical. Self-reported political preferences measured with a 11-point left-right scale are also very similar between refugees and natives, with a gap of less than 2% of the standard-deviation of this scale between the two groups.

**Political values** Forced displacement, a life-changing experience of “uprootedness”, can have longlasting effect on individual preferences. An important body of evidence has documented how exposure to violence, conflicts, or economic shocks, even temporary,
**_Figure 2. Annual TFP growth rate for all, OECD, and developing countries, median and simple average by decade_**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1.0%<br>0.8%<br>0.6%<br>0.4%<br>0.2%<br>0%<br>-0.2%<br>-0.4%<br>-0.6%<br>-0.8%<br>-1.0%<br>85-94 94-04 04-14 85-94 94-04 04-14 85-94 94-04 04-14<br>All OECD Developing<br>Median Average Median Average Median Average<br>Source: Authors' calculation, using PWT 9.0 data complemented, in a few cases, with GTAP data.<br>Note: The OECD group includes high-income countries that have been members of OECD for more than 40 years;<br>the former Soviet Union countries are excluded in the period 1985-94 considering their independence in the early 1990s.<br>Figure 3. Annual TFP growth rate for developing countries, median and simple average by region and decade<br>3%<br>2%<br>1%<br>0%<br>-1%<br>-2%<br>85 94 04 85 94 04 85 94 04 85 94 04 85 94 04 85 94 04<br>-94 -04 -14 -94 -04 -14 -94 -04 -14 -94 -04 -14 -94 -04 -14 -94 -04 -14<br>East Asia Europe Latin America Middle East South Sub-Saharan<br>and and and and Asia Africa<br>Pacific Central Asia Caribbean North Africa<br>Median Average<br>Annual TFP growth rate<br>Annual TFP growth rate<br><!-- End of
: 81-94.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2004. Promoting SMEs for Development: The Enabling Environment and Trade and Investment Capacity Building. OECD.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2013. Multi-dimensional review of Myanmar. Initial assessment, OECD Development Pathways. OECD publishing.

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Journal of Southeast Asian Economies (35): 319-332.

The World Bank Group’s World Development Indicators. 2019. World Bank.

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J.C. Duque, N. Lozano-Gracia, J.E. Patino, P. Restrepo / LCR Flagship Report on Cities and Productivity 25

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- Wu, J., Ma, L., Li, W., Peng, J., & Liu, H. (2014). Dynamics of urban density in China: Estimations based on DMSP/OLS nighttime light data. IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Applied Earth Observations and Remote Sensing, 7(10), 4266-4275.
equation is estimated by IV, using the fitted probabilities from the first stage for _Pk_ , **Xk** and **Xi** as instruments. Identification comes from _Zk_ in the first stage. An attractive feature of this approach is that the results are robust even if the placement equation is not correctly specified (Wooldridge 2002, p. 623).

In addition to the instrumental variable results, for comparison we also present OLS results, where

> 13Because of incompleteness in the WHFC survey and the census, another 25 communities could not be merged to

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detailed company databases. The Pew Center, for example, defines the ‘clean energy economy’ as follows: “The ‘clean energy economy’ generates jobs, businesses and investments while expanding clean energy production, increasing energy efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, waste and pollution, and conserving water and other natural resources” (Pew, 2009). It comprises five categories: Clean Energy; Energy Efficiency; Environmentally Friendly Production; Conservation and Pollution Mitigation; and Training and Support. Using data about individual companies, Pew estimates the USA’s ‘clean energy economy’ to account for about half a percent of all US jobs.

> 1 At the same time, developed countries are responsible for by far the largest share of the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  They have also probably made a disproportionate contribution to long-lived solid waste.  Hence some of the green jobs reflect the unsustainability of developed countries’ economies.

5
76 kg CO2 per year in the context of rural Bangladesh. The study by Posorski et al (2002), using different method, shows that about 9 tons of CO2 equivalent GHG emissions are avoided (which is equivalent to about 450 kg CO2 per year) within a 20-year period of use of one SHS of 50 Wp compared with the baseline case.

The reported CO2 emissions avoided from SHS from other countries, including the Bangladesh study, are summarized in Table 4. The estimate from the Bangladesh survey is significantly smaller than that reported in other studies (Ybema et al, 2000)<sup>6</sup> , possibly due to two factors. First, the estimates from this study is based on a large scale household survey that allows the control for household socio-economic characteristics and location effects while other studies do not control confounding factors that may affect the kerosene use. Second, the Bangladesh study focuses only on kerosene displacement due to data limitation, but some studies reported in the table include multiple fuels (kerosene, dry cell batteries, and diesel used for battery charging).

While displacing kerosene use for lighting and diesel use for battery charging are the most direct carbon benefit, SHS dissemination can also avoid GHG emissions from new connection to grid-

> 6 The estimated reduction is 3.9 liter/month from a smaller scale household survey (441 households) conducted by Grameen Shakti in 2009.  Chaurey and Kandpal (2009) provide an estimate of 9.6 liter/month for rural households in India and the World Bank project report finds 19.6 liter/month displacement for rural households in Indonesia.

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# Table (F8) Impacts of the Program on Child Outcomes

|**Outcomes**|**Treatment**|**(se)**|**FDR**<br>**q-values**|**Control**<br>**mean**|**(sd)**|**N**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Child SDQ score, std|0.56***|(0.17)|[0.01]|0.01|(1.00)|859|
|Count of non-adult dependents (under 18)|-0.22|(0.20)|[0.37]|3.44|(2.02)|1,321|
|Share of non-adults attended school all of last week|-0.02|(0.07)|[0.55]|0.78|(0.35)|981|
|Days child slept hungry last week|0.32|(0.23)|[0.31]|0.89|(1.50)|1,118|

**_Notes_** :

- The table shows the regression results on pre-specified main outcomes using the 2022-2023 phone survey data. Each row is its own dependent variable.

- Child SDQ score, std reports the standardized SDQ score where higher scores reports worse difficulties. Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) is a screening questionnaire administered to a randomly selected child aged three to eight years old and covers emotional, conduct, hyperactivity, peer, and prosocial problems. Count of non-adult dependents under 18 reports household members under 18. Share of non-adults attended school all of last week reports the share of children aged 6-17 who attended 5 days of school last week
# **1 Introduction**

In April 2024, the average price of one gallon of fresh fortified milk in US cities was $3.868.<sup>1</sup> Consumers in the northeast paid, on average, $4.395, and consumers in the west purchased milk at an average price per gallon of about $0.60 less ($3.757). In the same month, the urban consumer index of rent on a primary residence was about 5.4 percent higher in the west than in the northeast.<sup>2</sup> The existence of differences in the prices of consumption goods and services across space is well established. These variations are sometimes considerable between urban and rural areas, across regions, provinces or states, cities, and so on. The simple statistical evidence has, however, important effects on the purchasing power of money. The higher the prices, the lower the purchasing power of households.

Welfare economists, practitioners, statisticians, and analysts interested in living standards are aware that any meaningful comparison of material well-being among individuals living in different geographical areas requires some adjustment to transform a nominal welfare aggregate, be it consumption or income, into a metric that does not conceal spatial differences in the cost of living.<sup>3</sup> First, adjusting for spatial price differentials has important implications for monetary poverty and inequality. Examples of relevant statistics that are affected by spatial differences in prices include poverty headcount ratios, the depth of poverty, the number of the poor, poverty profiles, and indicators of inequality. Second, such statistics on living standards are key inputs to poverty reduction strategies. Adjustments for spatial price differences are therefore relevant to the design of policies aimed at helping people move out of poverty and to the allocation across ministries or across subnational state or provincial governments of resources derived from national budgets, international donors, or multilateral development banks.

Somewhat paradoxically, it is precisely low-income countries, in which
# **Annex. The Progression of Severity: Full Sample**

To focus on just a few countries, this paper restricted the sample from a total of 160 countries to just 48, which will be discussed below. As shown in Table A1, our dataset includes 160 countries (including 15 that report zero COVID-19 deaths). We focus on countries with over 10 million inhabitants and at least 100 COVID-19 fatalities. The population restriction removes a large number of small HICs, whereas the fatality restriction removes many poorer countries.

Table A1. Sample Selection by Population Size and Minimum COVID-19 Fatalities

|||Number of countries||
|---|---|---|---|
||Total|Population ><br>10 million|+ COVID-19<br>deaths >100|
|Total|160|82|48|
|High income|52|19|19|
|Upper-middle-income|48|48|16|
|Lower-middle-income|36|36|12|
|Low income|24|24|1|

Source: Johns Hopkins University; World Health Organization; World Population Prospects.

Having obtained 48 countries, we then split the sample up into four groups that proxy the level of severity: high, medium, lower and low. The summary metric used to divide the sample is the peak daily severity ratio observed over the course of the pandemic thus far. The peak daily severity ratio not only dimensions the extent of the health emergency of each country; it also helps us organize the sample in buckets with similar ranges for the daily severity ratios. The high group comprises 8 countries with peak severity above 50 percent; medium refers to 11 countries with peak severity between 50 and 10 percent; lower refers to 13 countries with the ratio between 10 and 2.5 percent; and low refers to 16 countries with peak severity below 2.5 percent.

In what follows, we illustrate the progression of the pandemic for the full set of 48 countries
# 3 Data and Linear Models of Productivity

We consider the same data as those used by Canning (1999) and Canning and Bennathan (2000). For output we use purchasing power parity<sup>5</sup> GDP per worker (chain index). In both studies, physical capital stocks are constructed using a perpetual inventory method. The initial stock is obtained by assuming a capital-output ratio of 3% in the base year. The ‡ows of investments are taken from the Penn World Tables 6.00. As Canning, we assume a constant depreciation rate of 7% for the private capital. Canning shows that his results are robust to variations in the initial choice of capitaloutput ratio and the depreciation rate. Finally, human capital per worker is taken to be the average years of schooling of the workforce. Given the data availability, the average years of schooling of the workforce is approximated here by the average years of schooling of the total population aged 15 and above<sup>6</sup> , from Barro and Lee (2000). Since these human capital data are available only every ...ve years, Canning proposes to interpolate to give annual data.

We use four infrastructure capital stock variables: the number of telephones, kilowatts of electricity generating capacity and the length of paved roads and the railways line length, both expressed in kilometers. The infrastructure ...gures are the processed data from Canning (1998). The corresponding maximal sample is 1950-1995. As stated by Canning, these physical measures do not re‡ect the quality di¤erences in infrastructure across countries and over time. The e¤ectiveness of infrastructure may depend on its quality both initially and in terms of maintenance. But as noted by Canning, a simple ...xed e¤ect speci...cation allows to capture a part of these cross country quality di¤erences, more precisely the part which is constant over time. Consequently, in all our models, individual
6 residential or business line (normalized in the same way) was about 14 times larger in developing countries than in developed countries.

Even though the service is expected to become somewhat more affordable after the implementation of reforms, the elimination of cross-subsidies after the incumbent is privatized and the tariff rebalancing that often takes place may both increase the price of some services, including some of the residential services. Also, some characteristics of the reform process, such as the existence of exclusivity periods may influence the price upward. It is thus difficult to theoretically define the expected sign of the impact of reform policies on these indicators and hence on affordability.

Data on quality enjoys a much more limited coverage. There are some indicators on the quality perception of telephone services, but these are only available for two or three years at most. Thus, we rely on technical quality data reported by the telephone companies, which is available for a longer period of time. Specifically, we selected the number of reported telephone faults per 100 mainlines as a proxy for the quality of telephone services. The indicator is formally calculated by dividing the total number of reported faults during the year by the total number of mainlines in operation and multiplying by 100. It is important to note that the definition of faults might vary. Some countries include faulty customer equipment. Others distinguish between reported and actual faults found. There is also sometimes a distinction between residential and business lines. Another consideration is the time period as some countries report this indicator on a monthly basis; in these cases data are converted to yearly estimates. As measured here, quality seems to be remarkably worse in developing countries, with an average failure rate of 73%, compared to 19% in developed countries.

Our proxy for quality might be misleading in two ways. First, reporting faults might depend on the rules, regulations and dynamic of the sector in the country. Second, after reforms are implemented, companies may simply improve their reporting systems which may result in a larger number of
br>.6<br>.4<br>.2<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> Figure 2: Commutative Density Function (Log Number of Workers) Notice, too, that re-weighting observations for small firms according to the weights provided by the

> 3Since there is no alternative data source, we are not able to verify if this is an the quality of Kenyan data. Nevertheless, the size distribution of firms in Kenya looks similar to Uruguay and the Rep ́ublica Bolivariana de Venezuela (Busso et al., 2013).

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