rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
primary education policy choices. If they do, then na ̈ıve estimates of the effects of revenue and its interactions with income and inequality would be biased by omitted variables.

There are several possible sources of omitted variable bias (I detail three below). First, having an older population may mean more working adults as a fraction of the population, and thus more tax revenue. However, if having fewer children reduces the need for pre-primary education, ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of revenue and its interactions with income and inequality would be biased. The magnitude of the bias would shrink as measures of population-by-age are added to equations (11), (12), (13), and (14), but it would be impossible to know when all bias had been eliminated. This would downward-bias estimates of the effects of revenue on pre-primary enrollment and quality, and education investment. Second, mayors with high discount rates or who are corrupt may generate higher revenue to maximize private gains.<sup>30</sup> However, short-sightedness may also lower investment in education, which has long-term payoffs. This, too, would downward-bias the estimates. Finally, municipalities with higher revenue may pay higher wages to public officials. Ferraz and Finan (2009b) show that, in Brazil, this leads to more political competition, and to the election of better-educated, more experienced, more productive candidates. If these qualities increase public pre-primary investment, this would upward-bias estimates of the effects of revenue on such investment.

Municipal revenue per capita can also be a response to education policy. This is a classic problem of reverse causality. Municipalities that invest heavily in pre-primary may need to level more taxes to pay for it. The best response to these identification problems is a set of valid instruments. These instruments should affect revenue and its interactions with per capita income and inequality, but should be uncorrelated with factors affecting the demand for revenue.

# **5.2 Instruments for per capita revenue
In Table 5, we explicitly test our “marginal” child hypothesis that UCTs and CCTs would have similar positive effects increasing enrollment for children who are traditionally more likely to go to school, but CCTs are more effective at getting parents to invest in children they normally do not prioritize. We test this hypothesis by examining the impact of the two types of transfers on school enrollment for marginal and non-marginal children, as defined by their baseline enrollment status, gender, age, and cognitive ability. We focus our analysis on the more objective and reliable school-based measure of enrollment and on the Equation 3 specification, a difference-in-difference regression using the baseline and second follow-up surveys.<sup>24</sup> This specification acknowledges the absence of round 2 impacts and focuses on the round 3 impacts. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 compare the impacts of the different types of transfers for children who were already enrolled at baseline (column 1) and those who were not enrolled at baseline (column 2). All else equal, children not initially enrolled can be considered more marginal. Both types of transfers lead to positive and significant increases in enrollment for both types of children. Yet while the UCT and CCT coefficients are similar and not significantly different from each other for children enrolled at baseline, the CCT coefficient is significantly larger than the UCT coefficient for children who were not initially enrolled. Thus, CCTs seem to outperform UCTs in bringing into school children who had not been enrolled.

In columns 3-4 of Table 5, we compare the impact of conditional and unconditional cash transfers for boys and girls aged 7 to 15. For boys, CCTs and UCTs have a similar impact in magnitude, positively increasing enrollment by around 11 percentage points. In contrast, for girls

> 24 Baird and Özler (2012) suggest that self-reported enrollment is often overstated and recommend collecting schoollevel administrative enrollment data. In our survey, when comparing parental self-reports and school administrative data, we find that 11.4 percent of all children reported by their parents
or disability are more frequently identified in standard household surveys, but their sampling is typically not designed to be statistically representative. Addressing such challenges requires huge efforts in harmonizing national household surveys worldwide; expanding the number and scope of questions typically collected by censuses; and improving sampling methods for household surveys.

Yet challenges in defining social sustainability do not automatically mean that measuring multiple social gaps is impossible. Moves towards more inclusive and harmonized data are already underway. Some examples include the <mark>Integrated Public Use Microdata Series managed by the Minnesota Population Center; the development of disability statistics suitable for census and national surveys by the Washington Group; efforts by the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Database to produce comparable poverty statistics worldwide; or the Inclusive Data Charter sponsored by the UN. S</mark> imilar methodological challenges have been overcome in the past: witness systems that monitor global food prices and warn of acute food insecurity; the internationally agreed system of national accounts; definitions and measurement of decent work; or international statistics on crime and justice. <mark>Clearly, greater a</mark> nd better-coordinated efforts are still needed before we can measure social sustainability at a granular level and on a global scale. But both previous and current experiences offer lessons about the value of concerted action, arriving at technical agreements, operationalizing monitoring, and using data for effective policy making.

In the meantime, national estimates of multidimensional social sustainability and its fragilities in the form of social gaps, as produced here for South Africa and Peru, still provide impactful findings for policy makers. Threats to social sustainability are driven primarily by process legitimacy in both countries. These results not only confirm the multidimensional nature of social sustainability, but also the need for intervention packages separate from other policies related to poverty reduction,

> 15 Official reports in Peru come from INEI (2022) and in South Africa from STATSSA (2022).

27
) found that economic growth is weaker in countries with a higher degree of path dependence in their export specializations. We revisit this relationship using our activity export data. Following Coniglio et al. (2021) a country is denoted as “path-defying” when its new specializations are weakly related to its initial basket. For a particular country, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of proximity for new activity specializations between time _t_ and time _t + T_ is compared with a hypothetical random CDF of proximity for all possible new specializations, that is, activities in which the country did not have a comparative advantage yet.<sup>13</sup> Subsequently, stochastic

> 13 Specialization is also shaped by the exit of activities in exports, i.e., de-specialization. This paper focuses on the entry of activities in which countries gain specialization.

22
represent close to 600 million people. Hence, one way to explore the sensitivity of our “global” estimate to the omission of these countries is to posit some plausible trends for these omitted countries and then recalculate the global figures.

With regard to China, the assessed GWP observations for 2006 and 2008 suggest an unrealistically large drop in food insecurity over that time (20 percentage points), which is probably related to the aforementioned problems with the ordering of questions in the 2006 round. It is therefore pertinent to consider a more plausible scenario for China and what this scenario would suggest about global trends in food insecurity. Given China’s phenomenal economic growth and rather limited level of food inflation (nominal mean incomes increased by 65 percent over 2006–08, whereas the food CPI increased by approximately 30 percent), it is plausible that food insecurity fell several percentage points in China. We thus consider a 3- percentage-point reduction from 2006 to 2008 to be relatively conservative. However, the countries omitted from one of more rounds of the GWP include many that could be suspected to have experienced rapid food inflation, including the Philippines (the largest rice importer in the world), a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries (some of the largest wheat importers in the world), and Ethiopia (the second largest country in Africa, one of the poorest countries in the world, and a country that experienced one of the fastest inflation rates in the world over 2007–08). In table S1.3 in the appendix, we make rather pessimistic assumptions about trends in food insecurity in these 16 countries (based largely on observed food inflation data) and adjust the raw GWP estimates by adding the assumed changes in food insecurity from the omitted countries. The results of this exercise are assessed in table 9. The inclusion of assumed changes for these 16 countries adds 62 million people falling into food insecurity rather than coming out it, but the assumed trend in China would result in close to 40 million people 29
/age nt<br>nt<br><!-- End of picture text --> Cargo iQ’s reporting system captures the path of air cargo shipments defined by a master operating plan (MOP) consisting of 19 milestones.<sup>**13**</sup> These events along the supply chain capture the OriginDestination movement of cargo between and at origin airports, destination airports and transit locations. Figure 2 demonstrates the milestones at the destination airport that were available for the LPI 2023. A shipment is tracked from the point of departure of the flight (DEP) to its arrival (ARR) and checking into a warehouse at a destination airport (RCF), followed by the advisory to the consignee of the freight’s arrival (NFD) and the consignee’s final collection of the freight from the carrier at the destination airport (DLV).

As with the other shipment tracking databases, it is the carrier’s responsibility to enter the data in the system. The time differences between the milestones provide information on the reliability and performance of individual carriers, freighters, operators and on the aggregated level, i.e., individual airports and countries. To avoid leakage of sensitive information for specific carriers operating on lanes with total market share exceeding 80 percent and on those lanes where the total number of carriers is below 3, 46 countries were excluded from the final dataset, bringing the total number of countries reported in the LPI 2023 aviation pillar to 141.

> 12 https://www.cargoiq.org/value-proposition

> 13 https://www.iata.org/en/programs/cargo/cargoiq/

7
BURKINA FASO’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE The international market is among the most concentrated (that is, least competitive) in the region, with a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of 23 percent (table 7). Not surprisingly, only Air France provides regular links to Europe and the bulk of Burkina’s air transport market is international, though intra-African flights are double the number of intercontinental flights.

**Figure 11. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Burkina Faso**

<!-- Start of picture text --> a. Seats b. City pairs<br>450,000 16<br>400,000 14<br>350,000 12<br>300,000<br>10<br>250,000<br>8<br>200,000<br>6<br>150,000<br>100,000 4<br>50,000 2<br>- 0<br>Total International Intercontinental Domestic Total International Intercontinental Domestic<br>2001 2004 2007 2001 2004 2007<br>City Pairs<br>Number of seats<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). _Note:_ As reported to international reservation systems. Intercontinental flights excludes flights between Nigeria and South Africa.

In common with many other African countries, Burkina continues to face significant safety and security issues in air transport. Burkina Faso has not undertaken the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration/International Aviation Safety Assessment (FAA/IASA), audit and none of its carriers have passed the International Air Transport Association/IATA International Safety Audit (IATA/IOSA).

Burkina Faso’s existing airport is unsuitable, and the country needs to address capacity constraints and security issues. The immediate challenge for the government is to keep the existing airport in an operational condition
1. _Firm Longitudinal Data_ : Our main source of information comes from ISSS, the Social Security agency in El Salvador. The data cover the universe of firms operating in the formal sector independent of their economic sector and size.<sup>13</sup> We use monthly data between 2010 and 2018 on annual wages, number of employees per firm separated by gender, and number of branches per firm. The data also include information on firms’ general characteristics— such as location (municipality and department), economic sector and activity, the year it started operating, and whether the firm stopped operating.<sup>14</sup> Once a firm becomes formal, it is followed over time until it goes out of business.

As described Table 1, our sample consist of the universe of firms operating in the formal sector, which employ an average of 25 workers. On average, the firms in our sample pay a monthly salary of US$310 per worker, with an important difference between men and women—20.1 percent more to male workers. In our data set, we observe the location of the branch of each firm. Since a firm can have branches in many municipalities, we impute the location of each firm according to the location of the biggest branch. On average, we find that there are 80 firms operating at the municipality level. The average firm is in a municipality where returnees represent about 0.05 percentage points of the local population.

2. _Repatriations:_ data on returned migrants comes from records of the General Directorate of Migration ( _Direcci ́on General de Migraci ́on y Extranjer ́ıa_ , DGME) and are available at the individual level. In total we have information on 403,851 repatriations of Salvadoran citizens from 1995 to 2018. Starting in 2011, we have rich administrative information on specific characteristics on all returnees. Upon their arrival in El Salvador, each returned migrant has to visit the repatriation center in the country. In this
For accurate estimation of the standard error of W, ELL advocate repeated MonteCarlo simulations. In each round, a simulated regression coefficient  ~( _r_ ) is drawn (from its estimated distribution), where r denotes the _r-th_ round of simulation. Further,  ~ _c_ ( _r_ ) and ~ ( _r_ )  _ch_ are drawn from their estimated distributions, which means we will have a simulated cluster error for each cluster and a simulated household error for each household in the census. The imputed dependent variable for household h in cluster c, in the r-th round, is therefore given by: Each round of simulation yields a new estimate _W_ ~ ( _r_ ) . By taking the average and standard ~ ( _r_ ) deviation over the _r_ different simulated values of _W_ , we obtain both the point estimate and the corresponding standard error.

In this paper, we use measure poverty using three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indexes including the poverty headcount index, poverty gap index and poverty severity index (see Foster et al, 1984). Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient. The FGT indexes and Gini index are the most popular measures of poverty and inequality, especially for developing countries. They are often reported in poverty assessment studies in Vietnam such as Vietnam Development Reports (see World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2007).

# _III.2 Two key assumptions_

The ELL method is based on two key assumptions: _The model is accurate at each level it is applied_ : Tarozzi and Deaton (2007) refer to this as the `area homogeneity’ assumption. While the model is typically estimated at the regional level, predicted expenditures are aggregated over much smaller areas (think of provinces and districts). Consistency therefore requires that any omitted variables, which end up in the error term, have zero expectation at any level of aggregation.

_Spatial correlation is accurately accounted for_ : The errors for different households are likely to exhibit a level of correlation, in particular when the households live close to each other such
et al. 2018). The 10-item scale has been shown to strongly predict clinical diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorders (Weissman et al. 1977). We find that victimization is related to a higher level of symptoms of depression. It is also possible that the extent of trauma following an event varies across different types of events. Indeed, contrary to our results on economic well-being, we find that whereas violent attacks are related to lower mental health, property-related events are not. Furthermore, as the motivations of different perpetrators can vary, the consequences of their attacks might also differ. Indeed, we find that events perpetrated by insurgents, bandits, and criminals are related to lower mental health, but those of communal clashes are not. Our findings highlight the importance of further studying the links between the economic and mental health consequences of victimization.

Our third contribution relates to the method of collecting the data. The victimization data used in the study are from a telephone survey among households that were part of the GHS panel collected between 2010 and 2016 (a Living Standards Measurement Study, or LSMS, data set by the World Bank). Information on household welfare and characteristics before, during, and after the conflict comes from the GHS panel. We have complemented these data with annual telephone survey data on the recall of victimization dating back to 2010.

Our data are also novel because we collected the information about household victimization over the phone;<sup>3</sup> this was considered a strong alternative to face-to-face interviews because close to 90 percent of all households in the GHS regions had phones. In addition, phone surveys have several advantages. Survey fatigue is less of an issue when interview time is short and the topic is limited to victimization only. Also, talking about conflict events might be psychologically burdensome, which is why keeping the interview short is particularly important. Finally, people living in conflict-affected areas might be afraid to be seen reporting these events to enumerators who work for the Nigerian government; therefore
index. The _F − Index_ is measured by the following expression: where _i_ can be _e_ , _f_ , _c_ and _p_ . This paper reports the F-Index in the main body of the paper. The relative probability index is reported in the appendix. The _F − Index_ runs from 0 to 100, with higher number signalling more integration. A F-index of 0 means that Venezuelans are not present at all, while a F-index of 50 means that Venezuelans are as likely to be present as Brazilians and F-index of more than 50 means that Venezuelans are more likely to be present than Brazilians. Although there is no upper bound of relative probability, there is an upper limit of the F-index.

> 16Art.4,l Law n. 9394/96.

> 17Working-age population.

> 18The Unified Registry of Social Programs ( _Cadastro Unico_ ) is a database that collects details about low-income families in Brazil, which can be used to identify vulnerable people in the society and develop appropriate benefits for them.

> 19The flagship conditional cash transfer program for the poor in Brazil.

11
pinpoint at which screening stage, if any, different CV characteristics, including gender and socioemotional skills, come into play.

Examining selection at various stages of the hiring process, we do not find strong evidence of gender discrimination. There is suggestive evidence of a small bias in favor of women during the longlisting process, but this effect is only marginally significant. Furthermore, we find that employers value socioemotional skill signals positively only when they specifically ask for such skills in the vacancy ad. On the other hand, when socioemotional skill signals are not solicited in the ad, employers do not appear to value them; indeed, in these cases, job seekers may even face a penalty (i.e. lower probability of callback) for including such signals on CVs . This particular penalty for signaling unrequested socioemotional skills is only observed for female candidates, however. The gender-specific penalty for signaling unsolicited socioemotional skills suggests that such signals on CVs may be interpreted differently for men and women.

The following section provides details on the design of the experiment and the collected data, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes the paper.

> 5  The 2017 national estimate of labor force participation for women aged 15 and above was 34 percent, the lowest female labor force participation rate among the OECD countries. Unemployment levels among working-age women were at 14 percent, almost double the OECD levels (Source: World Bank World Development Indicators).

> 6 Source: Calculated using Turkey Household Labor Force Micro Dataset 2016.

> 7 To our knowledge, the only other study using a similar data set, albeit with a smaller sample, is Balkan and Cilasun (2018), which investigates whether gender discrimination plays a role in the low female labor force participation in Turkey.

> 8 See Neumark (2018) for a survey of audit studies in the labor market.

4
We then analyze how the formation of a regional trading bloc alters these incentives. Intra-regional exporters may be, in terms of profit levels, better off than before since they are now the beneficiaries of the area's external tariffs, but at _the margin,_ their incentive to lobby against intermediate-good protection rises as duty-drawback and rebate schemes are endogenously eliminated on intra-regional exports. In equilibrium, this results in a lower level of external protection for those intermediate goods that are used heavily in sectors where intra-regional exports are large. Indirect effects of that type are at the very least consistent with the reduction in MFN tariffs that has accompanied the "New Regionalism" that has been observed by several authors.

We then try to see if the model's predictions are borne out in the case of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) which is an interesting case-study for at least three reasons. First, Mercosur members all had duty-drawback systems for exporters in place when they negotiated their Common External Tariff (CET) in 1994 which will no longer be allowed for intra-regional trade, once convergence to the CET is achieved in December 2000. Second, Mercosur has been identified as one of the recent regional blocs satisfying the "New Regionalism"'s characteristics that preferential tariff reductions are accompanied by general MFN tariff reductions. Third, recent work has shown that industry lobbying was an important determinant of Mercosur's **CET.** Our approach to testing the political-economy hypothesis explained above proceeds in two steps. First, we assume that the Mercosur's CET is endogenously determined through cooperative bargaining among its members, and there is evidence that this was indeed the case as will be discussed later. Then, using input-output tables to trace the use of imported intermediates in downstream industries, we test whether deviations from the optimal CET are correlated with the intensity of input use in downstream industries. The interest of the exercise is two-fold. First, it gives a statistical indication of the magnitude of the lobbying effects attributable to the elimination