rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
the second quarter of two consecutive years. With these observations, transition matrices can be produced. The following analysis makes use of these rotating panels for our periods of study.<sup>6</sup> The first transition matrix we analyze is an estimation of gross job flows before the recession—that is, between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008. In this case, we observe that around 9 million people became employed and 8.1 previously employed people became unemployed or inactive, thus a net job creation of around 0.9 million people was produced during the year before the recession. On the other hand, unemployment grew in only around 90 thousand people because around 1.5 million people previously employed or inactive became unemployed while nearly 1.4 million previously unemployed either found a job or left the labor market.

**Table 3.6a: Transition Matrices for the Recession Period**

||||Secondqu<br>|arter 2008<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Inactive|Employed|Unemployed|Total|
||Inactive or out|23,687,896|8,199,919|684,809|**32,572,624**|
|Second quarter 2007<br>|Employed|7,385,503|34,766,246|754,907|**42,906,656**|
|<br>|Unemployed|451,074|900,531|153,591|**1,505,196**|
||Total|**31,524,473**|**43,866,696**|**1,593,307**|**76,984,476**|

**Source: Own estimates using rotating panels from ENOE.
Policy Research Working Paper 9125

# **Abstract**

Economists often default to the assumption that cash is always preferable to an in-kind transfer. Do beneficiaries feel the same way? This paper addresses this issue using longitudinal household data from Ethiopia where a largescale social safety net intervention (PSNP) operates. Even though most payments are made in cash, and even though the (temporal) transaction costs associated with food payments are higher than payments received as cash, most beneficiaries stated that they prefer their payments only or partly in food. Higher food prices induce shifts in stated preferences towards in-kind transfers. More food secure households, those closer to food markets and to financial services are more likely to prefer cash. Though shifts occur, the stated preference for food is dominant: In no year do more than 17 percent of households prefer only cash. There is suggestive evidence that stated preferences for food are also driven by self-control concerns.

This paper is a product of the Knowledge and Strategy Team, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at jfh246@cornell.edu.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
Berkely, University of California Press.

- Feldstein, M. (1980) 'Inflation, portfolio choice, and the prices of land and corporate stock', _American Journal of Agricultural Economics,_ 62:910-916.

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- Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira. 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics." _Review of Economic Studies_ 60: pp. 3 5-52. Oxford: The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

- Gavian, Sarah and Fafchamps, Marcel. (1996) 'Land tenure and allocative efficiency in Niger', _American Journal of Agricultural Economics,_ 78:460-471.

- Geertz, Clifford. 1968. _Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia._ Berkeley: Published for the Association of Asian Studies by University of California Press.

- Glaeser,-E.L. 1996, The Incentive Effects of Property Taxes on Local Governments, Public-Choice;89(1-2), 93-111..

- Glover, D. (1990) 'Contract farming and outgrower schemes in East and Southern Africa', _Journal of Agricultural Economics,_ 41: 303-315.

- Gordillo, Gustavo, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet 1997, Mexico's second agrarian reform : household and community responses, 1990-1994, La Jolla, Calif. : Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

- Guinnane, Timothy W. and Miller, Ronald I. (1997) 'The limits to
changes in model specification and estimation method, while the effect of inequality on growth, which has been the focus of a massive literature, is not.

# **IV.3. Weak instruments analysis**

System GMM relies on lagged levels and differences of the regressors as internal instruments. Bazzi and Clemens (2013) and Kraay (2015) have recently raised the potential problem of weak instruments when using system GMM estimation in growth regressions. Weak identification arises

> 27 The conclusions do not change if we take orthogonal deviations instead of first differences to remove the fixed effects in (12). The results are available upon request.

> 28 Data for the infrastructure index included in Model M4 are available for only 88 countries under the system GMM specification and 79 under the first difference GMM specification. Thus, the estimates of this model shown in the top panel feature a number of instruments exceeding the cross-section dimension of the data. However, reducing the number of instruments by collapsing the matrix of instruments (as in the bottom panel) or erasing instruments manually from the matrix of instruments (for example, using instruments for lagged income, Gini and poverty only) leads to results (available upon request) very similar to those shown in the table.

> 29 Since the coefficient estimates on the controls themselves are of no direct interest here, they are omitted from the table to save space. However, it is worth noting that in most cases they are not significant. The main exception is lagged income, as well as lagged infrastructure and lagged female education in model M4.

17
to a permanent loss of stature of 2.3 cm on average. Other long-term negative effects include a delay in starting school by 3.7 months and a decline in completed years of schooling by 0.4 years. According to the authors, these effects altogether result in an average reduction in lifetime earnings of 7 percent. Being in a vulnerable age group at the time of a shock can affect a child’s lifetime welfare whether or not the household's income recovers from the shock.

This paper reviews 29 studies and summarizes their findings on the effect of covariate shocks on the nutrition status of children below age five in developing countries. The paper also reviews the findings on some specific sub-questions, namely the pathways through which shocks may affect child nutrition status, the relationship between the timing of exposure to a shock and the shock’s effect on child nutrition status, the potential mitigating role of public interventions on the negative effect of shocks on child nutrition status, and on the long-run persistence of effects and potential catch-up growth.

The different child nutrition indicators examined in the review comprise height-for-age z-scores (HAZ), the probability of stunting status, weight-for-age z-scores (WAZ), the probability of underweight status, weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ), and the probability of wasting status.<sup>1</sup> The review also examines child micronutrient deficiency, which can impair growth and development, weaken immunity, and increase the severity of illness.

Covariate shocks comprise extreme events such as natural disasters, civil war, and economic crisis, as well as anomalies in rainfall and temperature compared to historical means. Given the diversity of shocks and outcome measures in the reviewed papers, we opt for a narrative review of the evidence rather than a formal meta analysis.

To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically review the evidence on covariate shocks and child nutrition status in developing countries. Studies that test for household-level consumption insurance have traditionally served as the basis for public policy recommendations. However, a stronger
|<br>0.08|0.08|0.12|0.11|0.12|0.06|0.07|<br>0.04|
|Vocational|0.12|<br>0.10|0.16|0.26|0.22|0.31|0.03|0.03|<br>0.03|
|University|0.07|<br>0.08|0.07|0.17|0.19|0.15|0.01|0.01|<br>0.00|
|Earnings/month|152|170|124|167|188|143|140|159|107|
|('OOOs VND)||||||||||
|Public sector|0.42|0.38|0.48|1.00|<br>1.00|<br>1.00|0.00|0.00|0.00|
|Hours-worked/week|46.2|46.8|45.5|43.5|43.2|43.8|48.2|48.9|47.0|
|N|2,259|1,355|904|950|516|434|1,309|839|470|

Source: VLSS 1992-93

* Highest level attained

Males are about one year older than females and their earnings nearly 40 percent higher (VND 170,000 vs. VND 124,000). Men and women have nearly the same educational attainment. Private sector workers are much younger than public sector workers and work nearly five hours more per week. Educational attainment in the private sector is much lower than in the public sector (more than four year's difference). In the public sector, even small state enterprises employ workers with at
the de facto exemption of the informal sector achieves on average as much inequality reduction as the actual direct tax policies (income taxes and social security) in developing countries. Equally remarkable is that this policy achieves 75% of the inequality reduction obtained in a counterfactual world with enforcement in which can perfect governments tax both formal and informal varieties (thereby taxing a much larger base) and optimally differentiates rates between food and non-food goods. In the realistic world in which informal varieties cannot be taxed, the inequality reduction obtained by the de jure optimal rate differentiation is half that obtained by the de facto exemption of the informal sector.

We investigate the robustness of our results to changing our main assumptions. First, we obtain similar results when changing how we assign places of purchases to the formal (informal) sector. This is because the association between budget shares and household income is strongest for places of purchase which are clearly informal (non-market consumption) or clearly formal (large supermarkets). Second, we assume at baseline a zero pass-through of taxes to prices in informal stores. This assumption may not hold if, for example, informal retailers buy inputs from formal suppliers. We relax this assumption by combining our model with microdata from Mexico on formal input purchases of informal retailers. We find a slightly smaller redistributive effect of the de facto exemption of the informal sector, but our main results remain unchanged. Third, due to data limitations, we use total household expenditure to proxy for household income.<sup>2</sup> We relax this assumption by using estimates of saving rates across the income distribution and similar results. we discuss the of our find Finally, implications modeling assumption that no direct tax instrument is available to the government. An important theoretical result in public finance is that redistribution is better achieved through direct rather than indirect taxes (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976). This result, however, is derived under the assumption of perfect enforcement of direct taxes, which is unrealistic in lower income countries (Jensen 2019
underlying measure of ENSO cycles, which alter ocean temperature. Data on ONI are publicly available from the National Weather Service Climate Prediction Center.<sup>6</sup> These data are matched to every cooperative purchase in the logbook data. The second half of 2007 and first half of 2008 were marked by a “cold episode” (more negative values), while the second half of 2009 saw the onset of a “warm episode” (more positive values).

Warmer ocean temperatures have three potential effects on organisms. First, they negatively affect juvenile recruitment of some species and positively affect recruitment of others. These population growth rate effects ultimately impact catch with a lag that generally ranges from one to seven years. Second, warmer temperatures can either positively or negatively affect adult population abundance by causing individuals to migrate. Third, adult size may be affected through changes in individual growth. The model focuses on population growth rates and does not incorporate the other two effects for the sake of tractability. Therefore, the empirical tests also focus on the first effect.

Finally, we conducted a thorough review of the ecological literature to construct a detailed classification of species on two dimensions. First, we classify species as “large scale” (i.e., large scale of movement, or highly mobile) or “small-scale” (i.e., small scale of movement, or less mobile). This classification is based primarily on knowledge of the movement of adult organisms, rather than on knowledge of larval dispersal. Second, we create a variable equal to 1 if higher ONI has a positive effect on recruitment (and hence population growth rates) and equal to -1 if higher ONI has a negative effect on recruitment. If the effect on recruitment is unknown to us or if there is no effect on recruitment, we set the variable to 0.

Table 1 provides summary statistics on the final merged data set.<sup>7</sup> The first panel shows summary statistics
_Brazilian spatial labor dynamics Page 35_

# Teacher Qualification Growth.  Brazil.  1991/2000.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Crescimento da qualificação dos professores - 91/00<br>-7.044 - 0<br>0 - 1.5<br>1.5 - 3<br>3 - 8.056<br>N<br>W E<br>0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 Kilometers S<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Map 6**

Percentage of income from government transferences. Brazil. 2000 <!-- Start of picture text --> Percentage of income from government transferences - 2000<br>2 - 13<br>14 - 18<br>19 - 23<br>24 - 35<br>N<br>W E<br>1000 0 1000 2000 Miles<br>S<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Map 7**
remote learning cannot fully match face-to-face delivery. <mark>Although most countries have made heroic efforts to put remote and remedial learning strategies in place, learning losses are accumulating rapidly. A recent survey on national education responses to COVID-19 by UNICEF, UNESCO, and the World Bank shows that while countries and regions have responded in various ways, only half of the initiatives are monitoring usage of remote learning (Figure 2, top panel).  Moreover, where usage is being monitored, the remote learning is being used by less than half of the student population (Figure 2, bottom panel), and most of those cases are online platforms in high- and middle-income countries.</mark>

20
**Table D.12:** Health outcomes (z-scored)

||(1)<br>Control<br>Mean|(2)<br>Pooled|(3)<br>CM|(4)<br>NFA|(5)<br>N|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Health outcomes index**(SUR)||0.021<br>(0.023)<br>[0.322]|0.055<br>(0.025)<sup>_∗∗_</sup><br>[0.094]<sup>_∗_</sup>|_−_0.010<br>(0.027)<br>[0.463]|5053|
|(1) U5 Child death per HH|0.000<br>(1.000)|_−_0.047<br>(0.025)<sup>_∗_</sup>|_−_0.075<br>(0.027)<sup>_∗∗∗_</sup>|_−_0.019<br>(0.030)|5053|
|||[0.544]|[0.039]<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|[1.000]||
|(2) Maternal death per HH|0.000|0.000|0.017|_−_0.017|5053|
||(1.000)|(0.026)|(0.031)|(0.028)||
|||[1.000]|[0.462]|[1.000]||
|(
of the advanced-economy average since 2010. However, fragile and conflictaffected economies—14 out of the 39 SSA economies in the sample—had less than half of the labor productivity level of the SSA average.

The stark divide between advanced economy and EMDE labor productivity levels significantly exceeds regional variations among EMDEs—a polarization exists in the distribution of productivity levels, with EMDEs concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, while advanced economies occupy a wide range of significantly higher productivity levels (Quah 1996b, 1997a, **Figure 1** ). On average during 2010-18, EMDE productivity was concentrated around $7,000 of output per worker per year, while advanced economies are clustered around a high level of productivity peaking at $95,000, below the United States ($109,000) but above lower-productivity advanced economies such as the Republic of Korea ($48,000). The fact that EMDE and advanced economies cluster around these highly differential productivity levels is strong evidence both for convergence being conditional and for the presence of multiple points of attraction for productivity.

Following a steep decline in EMDE productivity growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, caused by a series of financial crises in SSA and LAC, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, growth rose sharply in the late 1990s (World Bank, 2020a). For the first time since the dataset began in 1970,

> 4Saudi Arabia and Qatar have labor productivity levels that are close to that of the United States, but TFP levels are just half those of the United States as measured in the Penn World Table.

5
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1864

# Summary findings

Filmer and Pritchett use cross-national data to examine the impact on child (under 5) and infant mortality of both nonhealth (economic, cultural, and educational) factors and public spending on health. They come up with two striking findings:

* Roughly 95 percent of cross-national variation in mortality can be explained by a country's per capita income, the distribution of income, the extent of women's education, the level of ethnic fragmentation, and the predominant religion.

* Public spending on health has relatively little impact, with a coefficient that is numerically small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Independent variations in public spending explain less

than one-tenth of 1 percent of the observed differences in mortality across countries.

The estimates imply that for a developing country at average income levels, actual public spending per child death averted is $50,000 to $100,000. This contrasts markedly with a typical range of estimates for the costeffectiveness of medical interventions to avert the main causes of child mortality of $10 to $4,000.

They outline three possible explanations for this divergence between the actual and apparent potential of public spending: the allocation of public spending, the net impact of additional public supply, and public sector efficacy.

This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the impact of health sector policies. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research Project "Primary Health Care: A Critical Evaluation" (RPO 680-29). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Sheila Fallon, room MC3-63 8, telephone 202-473-8009, fax 202-5221153, Internet address sfallon@worldbank.org. December 1997. (41 pages) _The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage_ **_the_** _exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to
To investigate this further, we compute separate distribution functions and transition matrices for areas located near a road or not. Buildup forecasts based on fitted transition matrices predict a strong increase in fully built-up areas – i.e., towns and cities – but no similar increase in the proportion of cells that are partially built-up. Apart from a small proportion of lowly built cells that seem to correspond to scattered farms, partially built-up areas seem to serve a transitory role as urban areas expand over time. This analysis also confirms that proximity to roads is associated with a much larger increase in future buildup.

We also investigate whether new construction locates near newly built roads. For this purpose, we use the 1975 and 1990 data and compare the new construction in cells that are close to a road in 1986 but not in 1976 to cells that are already close to a road in 1976, and also to cells that not close to a road in either years. We find that proximity to either type of road predicts a larger increase in future buildup – but proximity to a road in 1986 is the more robust predictor. Of course without proper identification we cannot tell whether new construction near a new road is a net addition or whether it displaces construction that would have taken place either near pre-existing roads or far from a road. More research is needed, using quasi-natural experiments if they can be found, such as those used by Banerjee et al., 2012 and by Faber, 2014, among others.

The last part of the analysis examines the evidence regarding agglomeration effects by examining spatial correlograms. Because cells located near a road are so different from those that are not, we conduct the analysis separately. We find in both cases that buidup in a cell predicts more buildup in cells located up to 3 to 5 km. For cells located near roads, there is still some evidence of more buildup up to 40-50 km away. For cells not near a road, the effect fades away faster. We find no evidence that densely
|
|p-value UCT vs. CCT|0.581|0.864|0.414|0.699|0.815|0.142|0.728|0.327|0.177|
|p-value Treatment|0.551|0.984|0.519|0.627|0.969|0.218|0.768|0.514|0.395|
|Mean in Control Group|0.303|0.455|0.701|0.335|0.559|1.045|0.175|0.308|0.563|
|Sample Size|1,965|2,016|2,048|1,964|2,016|2,047|1,965|2,015|2,048|

_Notes:_ Regressions are OLS models with robust standard errors clustered at the EA level. All regressions are weighted to make them representative of the target population in the study EAs. We correct for inconsistencies in 'ever had sex' across rounds. Baseline values of the following variables are included as controls in the regression analyses: age indicators, stratum indicators, household asset index, highest grade attended, and an indicator for never had sex. We restrict the sample to respondents who were surveyed during the latest household survey conducted two years after the program (Round 4). Parameter estimates statistically different than zero at 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90% (*) confidence.