rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
## _Measuring skills_

To measure firm-level skills, entrepreneurs were asked questions on their own and their staff’s education and training. These questions were based on the World Bank Enterprise Skills Survey, which has been conducted in Tanzania (Tan, Bashir & Tanaka 2016) and in Zambia (Cao and Saeki 2018). Table 2 presents the list of questions used for measuring skills in the main analysis. In addition, the survey complemented these with questions about the skills profiles and skills deficits of managers and workers.

**Table 2. Survey questions on worker and management skills**

|Area|Question|Answers|
|---|---|---|
|Education and<br>training|What is the highest level of education completed by this<br>establishment’s top manager?|•<br>No school<br>•<br>Primary School – First level<br>•<br>Primary School – Second level<br>•<br>High School- First level|
|||•<br>High School- Second level<br>•<br>Professional School|
|||•<br>Undergraduate Degree|
|||•<br>Post-graduate degree|
||What percentage or how many of the full-time permanent<br>workers completed secondary school?|... %|
||What percent of this establishment’s permanent full-time<br>employees employed at the end of the last complete fiscal<br>year had a university degree?|... %|
||Over the last complete fiscal year, did this establishment<br>have formal training programs for its permanent, full-time<br>employees?|•<br>Yes<br>•<br>No|
||Referring to the training programs run over the last<br>complete fiscal year, what percentage of permanent, full-<br>time employees of
# **1. Introduction**

Constituents arguably consider a national leader’s ability to deliver economic growth to be one of his or her most important attributes. Rewarding good economic outcomes while a leader is in office is a natural consequence of a principal-agent framework, where it is hard for voters or other constituents to directly observe the leader’s abilities or to assess the quality of his or her actions (Wolfers 2007). Although previous literature addresses the importance of leaders to growth in general, we do not know how to quantitatively attribute growth to particular leaders—as constituents must—and there are no estimates of the growth contributions of individual national leaders.<sup>3</sup> This paper aims to fill these gaps.

Perceptions of economic competence are possibly even more important for leaders in nondemocracies/autocracies (which we define using Polity data, see Section 3). These leaders have fewer constraints on their power, which arguably makes economic performance more sensitive to their intentions and abilities. Although they do not face competitive elections, leaders of nondemocratic countries usually rely on the support of different constituents, who must assess if the leader is a “benevolent autocrat” or a “bad emperor.” Fast economic growth forms part of the narrative justifying the rule of famous leaders such as Deng Xiaoping (China), Augusto Pinochet (Chile), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), and Paul Kagame (Rwanda), often to an audience well beyond their borders: media, foreign powers, foreign aid donors, and other policy makers.<sup>4</sup> The modern leaders-and-growth literature starts with Jones and Olken (2005), who used random leader deaths in office (due to illness or accident) to investigate the effect of leaders on growth. They found that leaders have a significant effect on growth in both directions: specifically,

> 3 Aruoba et al. (2019) estimate the probability that US state governors are good, based on job approval ratings.

>
18.** _Larger ports serve as hubs accommodating larger ships, making hub-to-hub transportation significantly cheaper and hubs essential for maritime trade._

Most networks in liner focus on cross-sectional data The papers analyzing shipping analysis. literature is scant when it comes to documenting the network evolution of containerized shipping 24The discussion on (i) crewing and registration and (ii) trade and transport facilitation is beyond the scope of this review.

25They also document that, for a given leg, a 1% increase in traffic reduces transportation costs by over 0.05%.

27
# (1) _before tax profits/ta= net margin/ta+ non-interest income/ta_ - _overhead/ta_ - _loan loss provisioning/ta_

The _non-interest income/ta_ accounts for the fact th.at many banks also engage in non-lending activities,' such as investment" banking and brokerage services .. The _overhead/ta_ variable represents the bank<sup>1</sup> s entire overhead, while· _loan loss provisioning/ta_ simply measures actual provisioning for bad debts.

While the underlying data reflects international accounting standards as much as possible, some differences in accounting conventions regarding the valuation of assets, loan lpss provisioning, hidden reserves, etc., no doubt remain.<sup>4</sup> We focus on accounting meastires of income and profitability, as (risk-adjusted) financial returns on bank stocks are equalized by investors in the absence ofprohibitive international investment barriers.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Schranz (1993) focus on accounting measures of profitability when examining managerial entrenchment and bank takeovers.

In section 3 below, we provide information on aggregate income statement items for domestic and foreign banks in 80 countries. Also, we present accounting averages for country groups, by income and geographical location: Such average statistics for different groupings illustrate the differences between domestic and ·foreign banks in developing and developed countries.

: Next, we analyze of the determinants of the interest, profitability, and overhead variables, or _net margin/ta, before tax profits/ta,_ and _overhead/ta._ The regression analysis addresses' what are the ultimate determinants of these three variables and serves to inform us who is affected by these underlying determinants, in an economic sense. The relationship between a bank's net interest margin and its overhead, for instance, tells us to what extent the bank can pass on its overhead cost to its depositors and lenders. The relationship between before tax profits and overhead, in turn, tells
**Figure 1. Oil price and production growth, 1992-2022**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100% 10%<br>5%<br>50%<br>0%<br>0%<br>-5%<br>-50%<br>-10%<br>-100% -15%<br>1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022<br>Oil Prices Growth Oil Production Growth<br>Oil Price Growth<br>Oil Production Growth<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: All energy prices are taken from the World Bank Commodities Price Data (‘ _The Pink Sheet’_ ). Global crude oil prices are measured as the average between Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices, represented as U.S. dollars per barrel. World oil production, obtained from the International Energy Agency, is measured as millions of barrels.

21
.00*|0.01|
|2008<br>Source: Authors’ ca|Arabic<br>lculations based o|11<br>n NAfKE 2006 a|1.44<br>nd 2008 surveys|0.36|1.69|0.27|

Source: Authors’ calculations based on NAfKE 2006 and 2008 surveys <mark>Note: * Significant with at least a 10 percent confidence level</mark> 11
In recent years, the number of studies that deal with the effects of politics on economics has flourished. These studies are particularly useful for developing economies in order to better understand why long overdue reforms are not implemented as they focus especially on the incentive framework. The emergence of an explicit political economy of development can be seen clearly in the evolving intellectual diagnosis of the “development problem” by donors and in how this diagnosis has translated into policy on development assistance to low-income countries (Adam and Dercon, 2010).

The studies dealing with PE analysis can be carried out at the (i) country level, dealing with issues of governance and decentralization; (ii) sector level, focusing on reforms in sectors such as electricity, transport, telecommunications, water, etc; and (iii) policy or project level.

For example, in a comparative analysis, Hickey (2006) attempted to identify the nature of politics most likely to reduce chronic poverty in developing countries. This analysis shed light on the politics underlying successful social protection policies, including pension schemes in India, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa; assistance programs for vulnerable groups in Bangladesh and Mozambique; and mainstreaming social protection in national development plans in Uganda and Zambia. The author suggests that greater attention should be paid to interacting with the political leadership instead of civil society; to the link between political discourse and poverty analysis rather than simply focusing on poverty data; and to the importance of political contracts in sustaining pro-poor policies.

By analyzing the PE of sector reform in two sectors - agriculture, and water and sanitation, a World Bank study (2008) identified ways to improve the effectiveness of the policy reform process. By looking at stakeholder interests, incentives, institutions, risks and opportunities from a social analysis perspective, the study points out the need for development partners to establish a sustainable process for building broad coalitions and to promote transformative institutional change that includes supporting bottom-up accountability.

While PE studies appear to be useful in providing insight into the country context and
either

> 7 In PPP terms, Jordan’s per capita GDP in 2019 was $10,497.00, substantially lower than Georgia’s level of $15,623.00. 8 National estimate, 2019. ILO models predict 14.6 percent in 2019.

> 9 National estimate, 2019.

> 10 To delineate formal from informal employment in the respective labor force surveys, which are available in the original micro datasets from the respective countries. Appendix Table 2 in the longer version of this paper explains how we define "permanency" in CFUWBES (Jordan and Georgia), LMPS (Jordan), LFS (Georgia), and CMMHHS (Jordan).

9
310,000, and eligibility expires after 3 years for incorporated companies or 4 years for other registered businesses. Firms in the construction, real estate, shipping, and airline services sectors are also subject to special final tax rates on their gross turnover, instead of the CIT. There is a statutory VAT rate of 11 percent. There are various exempted or zero-tax-rated categories, including essential food, health, education, financial services, and exports. Participation in the VAT regime is only compulsory for firms with gross annual revenues of at least US 310,000, though smaller firms may voluntarily opt-in.

There is considerable evidence that incomplete tax compliance by firms is pervasive in Indonesia. Previous studies have found that nine out of ten firms were not registered with the revenue authority (Rothenberg et al., 2016), and that most registered firms reported zero net income and paid no income tax (e.g., Ikhsan et al., 2005). Audit data suggests that in some instances there is substantial misreporting between taxpayer self-declared liabilities and auditor-assessed liabilities among firms that do pay tax.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, such noncompliance seems exceptionally high among professional services corporations (Breuer et al., 2018). Recent World Bank (2024b) research has estimated Indonesia’s combined CIT and VAT compliance gap at around 3.8 percent of GDP in lost revenues per year from 2016 to 2021. This includes losses due to deliberate or unintentional underpayment of businesses’ tax obligations, such as the type of tax evasion focused on in this paper. More generally, a few studies have also estimated Indonesia’s tax losses based on estimates of the informal economy. Tax losses are calculated by applying an average tax rate to this economic activity which is assumed to have remained outside the tax net. These studies have arrived at a wide range of tax-loss estimates, from 0.7 to 3.8 percent of GDP per annum (see Tatariyanto, 2014; Mulyawan, 2017; Nizar and
Solution (ORS) and for adults, sodium chloride injections, are viable rehydration treatments. The survey results indicate that 62% of facilities in Tanzania, 58% in Sierra Leone, and 39% in Kenya have stocks of both. Figure 10 indicates that hospitals are more likely than lower-level facilities to stock both types of rehydration treatment. ORS is more commonly available than sodium chloride injections, and lower-level facilities are more likely to stock only ORS than are hospitals (Appendix Table 3). The relatively low availability of these basic rehydration treatments is concerning not only from a COVID-19 preparedness standpoint, but also for readiness to treat diarrhea and other common conditions that manifest with dehydration.

**Figure 10** : Availability of rehydration supplies by facility type (hospital vs. non-hospital) and urban/rural location in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100.0<br>90.0<br>80.0<br>70.0<br>60.0<br>50.0<br>40.0<br>30.0<br>20.0<br>10.0<br>0.0<br>Hospital Non-hospital Hospital Non-hospital Hospital Non-hospital<br>Kenya Sierra Leone Tanzania<br>No hydration available Sodium chloride inj. only<br>Oral rehydration sol. only Both treatments available<br><!-- End of picture text --> During a pandemic, supply chain functionality is important to ensure that needed stocks of equipment, supplies, and medicines are available in facilities under conditions of high utilization. The Kenya SDI captures some information along these lines. For instance, 62% of facilities in Kenya reported that the average time between ordering new supplies and receiving them is more than two weeks. During emergencies, a more efficient supply chain may be required.

As mentioned previously, large facility surveys like the SDI do not collect information on available stocks
a more critical view of _SAH_ data, arguing that responses on _SAH_ are influenced by various emotional, psychological and knowledge-dependent factors.

Amartya Sen’s critique of self-reported morbidity data has been influential:

> 2 Using micro data, economic gradients in health status have been reported by Marmot et al. (1991), Pappas et al., (1993), Sorlie et al. (1995), Mackenbach et al. (1997), Adams et al. (2003), Deaton (2003), Finch (2004).  An economic gradient in health indicators is also found across countries; see, for example, Preston (1980), Anand and Ravallion (1993), Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Deaton (2003).

> 3 Also see Appels et al., (1996) and Groot (2000).

2
yes**|**yes**|**yes**|
|**Stage 3. Montly charges should not exced 0.01**<br>|**% of monthly incom**<br>|**e: yes or no**<br>||
|**Maintenance fee**<br>**$18.6**|**$16.6**|**$6.0**|**$2.6**|
|**Income percentile 25 th:**||||
|**$ 1, 547**<br>**no**|**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|
|**Income percentile 50 th:**||||
|**$ 2, 380**<br>**yes**<br>**Income percentile 75 th:**|**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|
|**$ 3, 703**<br>**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|
|**Income percentile 100 th:**||||
|**$ 11, 619**<br>**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|**yes**|
|**Source: Own estimatios with datum of Bansefi.**||||

The Mexican government recognizes that a lack of competition among banks likely contributes to high bank fees and the high percentages of people outside of the banking system. It has embarked on a three-pronged policy to address the problem. First, it has recently begun to apply verbal pressure to encourage large banks to make basic deposit accounts
s traditional agricultural export crops halved due to lower output and higher input prices, though land prices suffered only modest declines. High levels of unsatisfied credit demand are one factor limiting small producers’ ability to respond to the associated relative price changes by diversifying into higher value crops. The PSG per-ha grant provides working capital rather than investment support and was indeed used in this way by most recipients, though survey data provide no conclusive evidence on its targeting or impact.

# **3.1 War effects**

For descriptive analysis of how PSG resources help to better deal with war impacts, we use data from two rounds of a nationwide phone survey of small and medium-scale farmers conducted by MAPF.<sup>17</sup> specifically for this purpose. Using all producers registered in SAR by October 15, 2022, as a frame, the sample was stratified by whether or not an application for PSG had been lodged by this date and by four

> 14 Location of fields in areas outside of the government-maintained list of conflict-affected locations is verifiable from parcels’ cadastral numbers. 15 Due to restricted interoperability with the registry of rights, the amount of PSG funds obtained was based on farmers’ declaration of total area cultivated rather than on automatically aggregating total cultivated area from the parcels to which the farm had registered rights. Fully automated controls are expected to be hard-coded in future versions of the SAR software.

> 16 Reasons for excluding farms were that (i) some or all of the parcel shapefiles needed for overlays with crop cover data was missing for 605 farms; (ii) 530 farms were excluded as they did not cultivate summer crops but only winter crops and pastures in the 2019 to 2023 period; (iii) although they received grants only for the area located in non-conflict areas, 227 farms also had registered parcels in the conflict zone, making them quite different from the rest; and (iv) 28 farms had 2022 cultivated area in excess of the 120 ha cutoff.

> 17 The survey was implemented
in our sample during 2001–2012. Moreover, for the status of mining activities, the table shows that out of the 17 per cent, active mines constitute about 15.3 per cent, and closed mines about two per cent. Classifying the districts’ mining sites by scale of mining operations, the table further shows that mining operations in Africa are predominantly large scale (about 16.2 per cent), with small-scale operations constituting only one per cent. This is not surprising in a sector that is capital intensive and on a continent where the mining sector has attracted significant direct foreign investment in recent years. Whereas most of the operations are large scale, the table shows that most of these districts’ operations are extractive industries (12.4 per cent) and of low value (13.4 per cent). High-value minerals and transformation industries constitute a small share—3.8 and 4.8 per cent respectively—of districts where mineral deposits and mining activities are present or closed.

Table 4 reports the summary statistics for all variables of interest in our analysis. These descriptive statistics cover the period 2001–2012. Overall, the table indicates that except for Gini, rainfall, NDVI, and population sizes, the dispersion of average district MLD, Theil, and mineral prices (in logarithms) varies quite considerably around their respective means. In the next section we present our empirical strategy.

# **4 Empirical strategy**

This section describes the empirical strategy we use to estimate the effects of mineral resources on district inequality. The analysis relies on panel data across districts during 2001–2012. Since the main covariates of interest are dummies, the first difference models of panel data analysis are inappropriate. Thus the empirical framework uses linear fixed effect estimators (i.e. least square dummy variable—LSDV) to model and estimate the effects of mining activities on district inequality. One natural advantage of LSDV is its ability to address endogeneity concerns. Given the hierarchical nature of our data
_<mark>Economic Surveys</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>36</mark>_ <mark>(1), 214-234.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 4]** <mark>Choquette-Levy, N., Wildemeersch, M., Oppenheimer, M., & Levin, S. A. (2021). Risk transfer policies and climate-induced immobility among smallholder farmers.</mark> _<mark>Nature Climate Change</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>11</mark>_ <mark>(12), 10461054.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 1]** <mark>Clement, V., Rigaud, K. K., de Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Adamo, S., Schewe, J., ... & Shabahat, E. (2021).</mark> _<mark>Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration</mark>_ <mark>. World Bank.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 1]** <mark>Clingingsmith, D., Khwaja, A. I., Kremer, M. (2009). Estimating the Impact of The Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering,</mark> _<mark>T</mark> he Quarterly Journal of Economics_ <mark>, Volume 124, Issue 3, August 2009, Pages 1133–1170.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 2]** <mark>Cottier, F., & Salehyan, I. (2021). Climate variability and irregular migration to the European Union.</mark> _<mark>Global Environmental Change<
: HS6||3973|
|sd: HS6 (Intercept)||0.32145|
|<br>sd: HS6_×_log(seadistance)||0.01625|
|Included Fixed Effects:|Year,District|Year,District,Country|
|Distance ElasticityCV:|0.466|0.079|

> _∗∗∗ p <_ 0.01; _∗∗ p <_ 0.05; _∗ p <_ 0.1, sd - standard deviation

Table 2: Heterogeneity of Distance Elasticity (based on US imports) maritime transport) for 223 importers and 23 partners annually for 2006 and 2007.

# **4.4 Port Infrastructure**

Ports infrastructure is vital to the integration of countries in the global economy via international trade. Consequently, there is an ongoing discussion of port reform and challenges associated with it (Haralambides, 2017). This discussion requires careful estimation of port efficiency, its sources, and its effect on transportation costs. Blonigen and Wilson (2008) classify the literature on evaluating port efficiency into three major groups: (i) Production function approaches, (ii) Surveys of port efficiencies, and (iii) Estimating port efficiencies from international trade data. In what follows, we will 36
A new household consumption survey was introduced in 2014, the Consumer Pyramid Household Survey (CPHS), collected by the private data collection company called the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). This is the first time since the NSS-2011 there is household consumption expenditure data to work with, opening new doors for the measurement of poverty and inequality in India. There are two limitations of the CPHS however that have to be addressed. The first is that the survey in its current form is not nationally representative (see e.g. the biases documented in Somanchi, 2021). The second is that it uses its own measure of consumption expenditure that is not readily comparable to the NSS measure of consumption.

This paper makes a comprehensive effort to address both of the above-mentioned concerns. We implement a rigorous reweighting exercise using multiple nationally representative benchmark surveys to obtain adjusted sampling weights that make the CPHS nationally representative. The adjusted weights will be put in the public domain and hopefully serve as a public good to anyone looking to use the CPHS. We address the second concern by estimating the relationship between CPHS- and NSS-consumption and using this to impute NSS-type consumption directly into the CPHS. This allows us to compare our estimates of poverty to the official estimates for 2011, and by extension evaluate how poverty and inequality have evolved over the last decade.

We find that extreme poverty in India has declined by 12.3 percentage points between 2011 and 2019 but at a rate that is significantly lower than observed over the 2004-2011 period. Poverty reduction rates in rural areas are higher than in urban areas. We detect two incidences of rising poverty in our period of analysis: urban poverty rose by 2 percentage points in 2016 during the demonetization event and fell sharply thereafter; and, rural poverty rose by 10 basis points in 2019 likely due to a growth slowdown. Our estimates of poverty for recent periods are more conservative than earlier projections based on consumption growth in national accounts and other survey data. Finally, we do not find evidence of