rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
**_Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries, Jamasb, Mota, Newbery, Pollitt_**

dates back to 1996 and, therefore, precedes the macroeconomic crisis that eroded much of the achievements of the regulatory regime in Argentina.

In Argentina, the majority of state-owned firms were privatised between 1989 and 1993, with privatisation proceeds from the electricity sector amounted to about 25% of the total. Delfino and Casarin (2001) examine the welfare impacts of the program in the Gran Buenos Aires area of Argentina, using a family expenditure survey of about 5,000 households. Between the time of privatisation and the end of 1999, expenditure on electricity in real terms for a representative small consumer (average monthly maximum consumption <150 KWh) increased by about 20%, while an average large user (>150 KWh) enjoyed a tariff reduction of about 23%. The paper shows that nearly all income groups among the existing customers increased their consumer welfare after privatisation, with the exception of the lowest income group. The results indicate that higher income groups have, in absolute terms, benefited more than low-income groups, although in percentage terms, the benefits are more similar. It also finds that losses to the poor are lower than the reduction in variable charges to high consumption customers. Also, new customers enjoy higher welfare measured as the difference between the cost of provision of access and consumer surplus.

Ennis and Pinto (2002) examine the effect of privatisation on income distribution and the welfare of the poor. Argentina’s macroeconomic performance in the 1990s as measured by inflation control, growth and budget deficit was positive, but weak on unemployment and inequality. Privatisation of the electricity industry resulted in increased collection rates and improved quality of service. Cross-subsidies were eliminated and the government financed some of the subsidies. Household survey data shows that between 1985/6 and 1996/7, the budget share of water and electricity rise sharply for the lower deciles. In real terms electricity prices for residential users, inclusive of taxes, remained
variation (Column 2), and remain uncorrelated to treatment assignment (as shown under various specifications in Columns 3 to 6). The overall disruption dummy _Evd_ is then equal to one for 25% of villages, and again remains orthogonal to treatment assignment.

In the robustness check Table A6, the last row in each panel then shows the main results under this alternative construction for _Evd_ . We see that of the 12 significant coefficients in the baseline specifications, 9 remain statistically significant, and with similar point estimates.

# **References**

- [1] acevedo.p, g.cruces, p.gertler and s.martinez (2017) Living Up to Expectations: How Job Training Made Women Better Off and Men Worse Off, NBER WP23264.

- [2] adda.j (2016) “Economic Activity and the Spread of Viral Diseases: Evidence from High Frequency Data,” _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 131: 891-941.

- [3] alfonsi.l., o.bandiera, v.bassi, r.burgess, i.rasul, m.sulaiman and a.vitali (2018) Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda, mimeo UCL.

- [4] allen.h (2004) “Prostitution,” in R.S.McElvaine (ed.) _Encyclopedia of the Great Depression_ , Vol.2., Macmillan Reference USA, New York.

- [5] amnesty international (2015) Shamed and Blamed: Pregnant Girls’ Rights at Risk in Sierra Leone,Amnesty International Publications, London.

- [6] anderson.m.l. (2008) “Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects,” _Journal of the American Statistical Association_ 103: 1481-95.

- [7] aral.s.o, j.s.st.lawrence, l.tikhonova, e.safarova, k.a.
official records), while controlling for district characteristics generated by the most recent LSMS household survey.

Our empirical results show that cooperative parents are significantly more likely to participate in the elections of parent class representatives. This relationship remains significant after controlling for a range of variables including the degree to which parents are informed about the presence of local accountability institutions and district fixed effects. We also found that parents who behaved cooperatively in the public good game were more likely to self-report voting in the latest national elections. The district-level analysis indicates that districts characterized by a higher proportion of cooperative parents have a higher degree of participation in school accountability and a higher turnout in the 2009 elections, according to official records. So, both across individuals within districts and across districts participation in accountability systems, short and long, is associated with a willingness to cooperate.

Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we provided evidence of important yet heretofore overlooked behavioral mechanisms that could prevent or limit the effectiveness of accountability institutions. Second, we provided evidence of the external validity of the public good game.

27
argues that urban and rural employment and labor market conditions are fundamentally different, that there are serious issues of segmentation of urban labor markets into formal and informal employment, that urban housing, transport and social (education, health, and social protection) policies can have significant effects on how urban labor markets work, especially for the poor, and that community based civil society organizations (CSOs) have demonstrated a special capacity to generate employment for the poor.<sup>7</sup> An alternative reading of the economists’ argument suggests that long term trends in employment generation depend on the development of competitive industries that demand labor. This in turn depends from a number of national policies and institutions to support that growth, in addition to local supporting measures. Local job creation actions and policies that help people live in desirable locations and healthy environment can create limited employment benefits, but they cannot compensate for a tepid job generation. In the end it appears to us more a question of interactions of multiple causality rather than one of competing hypotheses about what drives the labor market. Research should help to understand these interactions better.

As in the case of slum improvement, Linn (2010) explores how a research design on the employment challenge can be tailored to consider specific other related challenges (the gender dimension, the functioning of land markets, the investment climate, etc.), specific instruments (micro‐credit schemes, multi‐stakeholder alliances, conditional cash transfer programs, etc.), analytical tools (happiness analysis, cost‐of‐doing‐business surveys, etc.) and institutions (especially the role of CSOs), with again perhaps a special focus on Africa and South Asia.

# 2. <u>Small and medium‐size cities</u>

Over half the world’s urban population lives in cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants, and almost 2/3 in cities below 1 million, with only 4 percent in “hyper‐ cities” with populations over
2019a) while increasing rental market transfers of land to more productive young producers, off-farm labor supply by older farmers, and profits through a shift from grains to vegetables and other higher value crops (Deininger _et al._ 2020b). Rural land record computerization that did not alter the nature of rights but the ease of accessing them increased the level of rental market activity and allocative efficiency in Pakistan by allowing land transfers to more productive farmers (Beg 2022). Documentation of use rights activated rental markets in Ethiopia, increasing women’s participation (Bezabih _et al._ 2016) and reducing resource misallocation (Chen _et al._ 2022). Historically, reforms to replace oral short-term rental contracts with written ones for a longer term, together with a public body for enforcement, fostered tenants’ investment in irrigation and drainage, leading to significant efficiency gains in Taiwan, China (Fan & Yeh 2019).

_Credit access:_ Given its immobility and virtual indestructability, land is excellent collateral. If land markets are active, foreclosure in case of default is possible, and lack of title prevents credit-worthy borrowers from implementing profitable investment projects, registering land rights can quickly increase credit access and investment (de Soto 2000). While hopes of land titling in developing countries increasing credit access were often disappointed as one or more of these conditions were not in place, privatization of state housing in China alleviated credit constraints by allowing households to capitalize on the value of the real estate (Wang 2012). Data from the developed world also document the importance of this channel: Legal changes allowing land to be used as collateral resulted in higher property values (Zevelev 2021) while exogenous fluctuations in housing wealth improved financial well-being (Atalay & Edwards 2022) or increased property owners’ propensity to take up entrepreneurship (Schmalz _et al._ 2017). In India, record digitization improved credit access in relatively less distorted urban markets (Deininger & Goyal 2012).

_Individual empowerment and risk taking:_ By providing implicit insurance, documented
(i) the proportion of area sown<sup>to modem</sup> wheat varieties, and (ii) cropping intensity. Cropping intensity is a proxy for adoption<sup>of MVs in</sup> summer crops (for which varietal adoption data were not available), since one<sup>of the major</sup> impacts of MVs of cotton and rice was to shorten the growing period, and thus to resolve<sup>the</sup> conflict between harvesting of the summer crop and planting of the following wheat<sup>crop</sup> (Byerlee et al., 1987.; Sharif et al., 1992; Ali et al., 1997). The effect of resource degradation<sup>was</sup> estimated through the soil and water quality variables described above. The adult<sup>literacy rate</sup> was used to capture the effect of changes in labor quality. The inverse of the distance of a village from the nearest metal road was used to quantify the effect of improvement in<sup>physical</sup> infrastructure. Region-specific time-trend dummies were included to capture the<sup>remaining</sup> unspecified effects of technological change, resource degradation, or change<sup>in resource</sup> productivity not included in the function.

The cost function in equation (2) along with the factor- and revenue-shares equations in<sup>(4) and</sup> _(5)_ and cross equation restrictions in (3) were simultaneously estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure. In view of the adding-up requirement<sup>of the input share,</sup> one equation (for draft animal) was deleted. The interactions of one input price<sup>with all other</sup> prices and resource stock variables, as a group, were tested. Similarly, interactions of output<sup>with</
(Table 1). The reverse is observed in 2016-17. The absence of a clear pattern could partly stem from the fact that data from national accounts are themselves a source of contention (see e.g. Subramanian, 2019 and Goyal and Kumar, 2020 for details).

In Figure 8, the variance of log consumption per capita in the CPHS is lower than the variance observed in the NSS-2011 (on average 0.267 in the CPHS compared to 0.368 in the NSS-2011). The gap in consumption inequality is larger in urban areas. The Gini coefficient of inequality obtained using reported CPHS weights would rank urban India at par with Sweden, the 25<sup>th</sup> most equitable country in the world. By comparison, the NSS-2011 would rank urban India around the 60th most unequal country in the world.

The third moment of the log consumption per capita distribution is also markedly lower in the CPHS when compared to the NSS-2011. Figure 9 compares the third moment between the two surveys for urban and rural separately<sup>21</sup> . The gap in the third moment is larger in urban India, and larger than the gaps observed for the second moment (Figure 8). The second and third moment of log per capita consumption in CPHS are on average about 27 and 70 percent lower than the respective moments from the NSS-2011.

||Mean per|Private fnal|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
||capita|consumption|||
||consumption|expenditure|Growth in|Growth in|
||expenditure|per capita|survey|nominal|
||(MPCE,|(PFCE,|nominal|PFCE per|
|Year|nominal)|nominal)|MPCE|capita|
|2015-16|2193|6334|||
|2016-17|2315|7026|5.6%|10.9%|
|2017-18|
selected six to nine research participants (maximum one per enlisted household, always the head of the household) according to the following criteria: _i)_ engaging in commercial farming; _ii)_ having cultivated or planning to cultivate maize; _iii)_ reporting land holdings from two to six acres; _iv)_ having a mobile money account. The participants in the Burchardi et al. (2022) experiment were enrolled at the end of 2016 and had participated in up to four survey interviews and one willingness-to-pay elicitation by the time the field work for the experiment in this paper started; all research activities connected to Burchardi et al. (2022) were completed by 2017.

The data I use come from four surveys: an in-person baseline survey, an in-person willingness-to-pay elicitation survey, a phone follow-up survey, an in-person follow-up survey. All surveys have been written by the research team and approved by the Ugandan ethics authorities. The enumerators who administered the survey have at least a high school diploma, speak the Eastern local languages (Ateso, Japadhola, Luganda, Lugisho, Swahili) and were recruited through a local research firm. The timeline of data collection is summarized in Figure A.1, while Appendix F provides details about each variable used

> 10www.gaez.fao.org

> 11Villages are commonly referred to as LC1 (Local Council 1) in Uganda, and they are the smallest administrative unit, governed by a chairperson (LC1 chairperson) and nine executive committee members.

10
Kilic, Talip. 2018. “Focus on Women’s Employment: The Value of Time.” Presentation made at the Workshop on Improving Data Collection on Women and Youth Employment, World Bank and IFAD, November 2018, Rome.

Kilic, Talip, Amparo Palacios-Lopez and Markus Goldstein. 2015. “Caught in a Productivity Trap: A Distributional Perspective on Gender Differences in Malawian Agriculture.” _World Development_ 70: 416– 463.

Kochhar, Kalpana, Sonali Jain-Chandra, and Monique Newiak (eds). 2017. _Women, Work and Economic Growth: Leveling the Playing Field._ International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

Koolwal, Gayatri. 2018. “Counting Rural Women’s Work Under 19th ICLS: New Insights from ILO’s Country Pilots.” Working Paper, Data2X.

McKenzie, David, and Christopher Woodruff. 2014. “What are we learning from business training evaluations around the developing world?” _World Bank Research Observer_ 29(1): 48-82.

Mammen, Kristin, and Christina Paxson. 2000. “Women’s Work and Economic Development.” _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ 14(4): 141-164.

Malapit, Hazel J., Kathryn Sproule, and Chiara Kovarik. 2017. “Using cognitive interviewing to improve the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index survey instruments: Evidence from Bangladesh and Uganda.” _Journal of Gender, Agriculture and Food Security_ 2(2): 1-22.

Malapit, Hazel J. L., and Agnes R. Quisumbing. 2015. “What dimensions of women’s empowerment in agriculture matter for nutrition in Ghana?” _Food Policy_ 52: 54-63.

Mellor, John W. 2017. _Agricultural Development and Economic Transformation: Promoting Growth with Poverty Reduction._ Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy (Christopher Barrett, ed.), Palgrave Macmillan.

Moser, Christine M., Barrett, Chris B. 2006. “The complex dynamics of smallholder technology adoption: The case of SRI in Madagascar.” _Agricultural Economics_ 35 (
# **A Additional Figures**

Figure A1: Informality Rates-Latin America and the Caribbean <!-- Start of picture text --> Chile UruguayCosta Rica BrazilVenezuela ArgentinaEl Salvador ColombiaDom. Rep. Mexico PeruGuatemala Nicaragua Bolivia Paraguay<br>80<br>60<br>40<br>Informality Rate<br>20<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ This figure plots informality rates across countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. The data source is the online appendix from Ulyssea (2018) that uses data from _SEDLAC_ , an initiative from the World Bank and Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Informal workers are defined as those without social security. The orange line represents the average informality rate of countries from the OECD. The figure shows that informality rates in LAC are very high, and even within the region, Mexico is one of the countries with the highest informality rates.

Figure A2: Firm size and Productivity Distribution-Economic Census 1999 <!-- Start of picture text --> 1 4 16 64 256 1024 4096 16384 65536 -5 0 5 10<br>Firm Size Sales per worker<br>Legal and informal Illegal and informal Legal and informal Illegal and informal<br>Mixed Legal and formal Mixed Legal and formal<br>(a) Firm size (b) Productivity<br>.6<br>.4<br>.3<br>.4<br>.2<br>Density function .2 Density function<br>.1<br>0 0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ This figure plots the firm size and productivity distribution for the four different categories of firms: 1) Legal and informal 2) Illegal and informal, 3) Mixed, and 4) Legal and formal. I use the 2004 economic census. Panel (a) plots the firm size distribution and panel (
|GVC1|GVC4|
|ATE|0.243***<br>(0.019)|0.491***<br>(0.118)|
|ATT|0.206***<br>(0.022)|0.406***<br>(0.039)|
|Observations|41,356|41,356|
||(b) MEN|A region|
||GVC1|GVC4|
|ATE|0.188***<br>(0.047)|0.341<br>(0.295)|
|ATT|0.252***|0.317***|
||(0.052)|(0.146)|
|Observations|6,864|6,864|

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: All the regressions include country, year and sector dummies.

42
the Economics of Immigration. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2006. Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September.

Hu, Wei-Yin. 2000. “Immigrant Earnings Assimilation: Estimates from Longitudinal Data.” The American Economic Review, 90(2): 368-372.

Kim, Seik. 2009a. “Economic Assimilation of Foreign-Born Workers in the United States: An Overlapping Rotation Panel Analysis.” Working Paper, University of Washington.

Kim, Seik. 2009b. “Sample Attrition in the Presence of Population Attrition.” Working Paper, University of Washington.

LaLonde, Robert J. and Robert H. Topel. 1990. “The Assimilation of Immigrants in the US Labor Markets.” 1990. NBER Working Paper No. 3573.

25
- (1) The surveys included detailed information on occupation, working hours, earnings, educational attainment and other basic demographic characteristics of surveyed household members or individuals.

> 7 One recent report examines teacher pay across 13 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and finds that primary school teachers are underpaid by the hour, compared to other professionals, and secondary school teachers are comparably paid. However, the analysis is pooled for the 13 countries, with no indication of country-by-country variation (see Bashir et al. 2018, Figure 4.7).

> 8 We use the World Bank 2019-2020 income and regional classifications (World Bank, 2019b).

5
review and approval. The FCSD decides on the cash‐food split for each region based on region requests and the predicted availability of food and cash; this availability reflects the level of multi‐year (or in some instances, annual) commitments made by the international donors who provide cash (such as the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development) to the program. It also produces a “food flow requirements” analysis indicating when food will be made available to woredas for payment (a similar plan is made for cash payments). Once these plans are finalized, the decision to provide food and/or cash is effectively locked in for the upcoming year.<sup>8</sup> Food payments consist of three kilograms of cereals (usually wheat or maize) for each day worked (Government of Ethiopia, 2010). Cash payments are intended to be approximately equal to the value of the food payments. When the PSNP began operations, cash payments were set at a uniform six birr per day, but by 2015, they had risen to 14‐18 birr per day in nominal terms (Berhane et al 2015).

# **_Data: Households_**

Since 2006, Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency has administered a large household panel survey in localities in which the PSNP operates. The initial sample was based on a stratified sampling. Districts (woredas) were randomly selected proportional to their size from a list of chronically food‐insecure woredas stratified by region where the PSNP was operating in 2006. Within each woreda, enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly selected from sub‐districts

> 8 In principle, these allocations can be revised after PSNP operations commence. However, the process of doing so is so disruptive – in particular, it leads to significant delays in making payments – that this only occurred in 2008.

9
Trade-Related Policies. _OECD Trade Policy Papers_ 179.

- Krifa-Schneider, H., & Matei, I. (2010). Business climate, political risk and FDI in developing countries: Evidence from panel data. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2(5), 54-65.

- <mark>Kusek, P., & Silva, A. (2018).</mark> _<mark>What Investors want: Perceptions and experiences of multinational corporations in developing countries</mark>_ <mark>. The World Bank.</mark>

- <mark>Morisset, J., & Andrews-Johnson, K. (2003).</mark> _<mark>The effectiveness of promotion agencies at attracting foreign direct investment</mark>_ <mark>. The World Bank.</mark>

- <mark>Mistura, F., & Roulet, C. (2019). The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Do statutory restrictions matter?. OECD.</mark>

- Moran, Theodore H. 2014. “Foreign Investment and Supply Chains in Emerging Markets: Recurring Problems and Demonstrated Solutions.” Working Paper 14-12, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC.

- <mark>Moran, T., Görg, H., Serič, A., & Krieger-Boden, C. (2018). Attracting FDI in middle-skilled supply chains.</mark> _<mark>Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>12</mark>_ <mark>(2018-26), 1-9.</mark>

- <mark>North, D. C. (1990). A transaction cost theory of politics.</mark> _<mark>Journal of theoretical politics</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>2</mark>_ <mark>(
thousands of local newspaper reports, Yamane et al. (2010) compile a database of 2,324 SLCS events covering the years 1990 to 2005. Their data illustrates the strong seasonality of SLCS, the majority of which are concentrated in April and May (Figure 2.2).

While Yamane _et al._ (2010) provide a clear picture of the seasonality of SLCS, their data does not cover the relevant period up to 2017. However, ERA5 climate data is not well suited to capture short, intense, and very localized storms, not least since wind speeds over 50 km/h cannot be reflected due to model restrictions and methodology. While the variance of ERA5 based wind speeds increases significantly in April, average wind speed from ERA5 do not capture well Nor'wester storms. Monthly average wind speeds do not peak during the Nor'wester season (Figure 2.1 (Left)).

> 13 <u>https://www.spc.noaa.gov/misc/AbtDerechos/derechofacts.html</u>

7