rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
028)|
|Observations|17,233|13,888|10,432|4,681|5,738|
|R-squared|0.413|0.440|0.283|0.252|0.341|

Note: This table reports the effects of financial structures on concentration of the exporters in 2-digit ISIC industries (columns 1-2), and on the second year survival rate (columns 3-5). Export concentration is captured by the Herfindhal index (column 1) or the share of export sales of the top 5% of exporters (column 2). The financial structure is captured by the ratio of bank credit to the sum of stock market capitalization and bank credit (panel A); the share of foreign bank assets in total bank assets in the country (panel B). In columns 4 and 5, smaller exporters are those with export values below the median, and bigger exporters are those with export values above the median. All regressions include FinDev*ExtFin, country-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects, where FinDev is measured as all credit over GDP to control for total financial development. Regressions in panel B also include Bank Concentration*ExtFin to control for the concentration of the banking sector. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
.249***|0.232***|0.249***|0.232***|0.232***|0.231***|
|_DVAR*Property rights_|(0.0226)<br>0.0011**<br>(0.0005)|(0.0258)|(0.0225)|(0.0258)|(0.0255)|(0.0257)|
|_DVAR*Political stability_||0.0154<br>(0.0137)|||||
|_DVAR*Corruption_|||0.0009**<br>(0.0004)||||
|_DVAR*Doing business_||||0.0037***<br>(0.0009)|||
|_DVAR*Dom. competition_|||||0.0776***<br>(0.0195)||
|_DVAR*For. competition_||||||0.0603***<br>(0.0158)|
|_Constant_|4.958***|5.077***|4.701***|5.026***|4.962***|5.187***|
||(0.159)|(0.185)|(0.152)|(0.175)|(0.181)|(0.184)|
|Observations|7,180|7,284|7,180|7,164|7,284|7,284|
|R-squared|0.876|0.870|0.876|0.873|0.871|0.871|

Source: OECD ICIO database. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.
census data and estimate regional childhood exposure effects using migrants. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to document IGM at a very disaggregated regional level for almost the entire population in LAC.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes data and methodology. Section III reports the main descriptive results at country level and the geography of mobility. Section IV looks at correlates of intergenerational mobility. Section V concludes with final remarks.

# **II Data and Methodology**

Three sources of data have been typically used to estimate intergenerational mobility: (1) cross-sectional samples of adult populations with retrospective questions about parental education, for example, Narayan et al. (2018) use household survey data that covers the 96% of the world population; (2) panel data long enough in its time dimension to include the socioeconomic or educational attainment of two generations, for example, Celhay, Sanhueza, and Zubizarreta (2010) use the Chilean CASEN to estimate mobility in schooling and income; and (3) administrative/registry data with linked information for parents and adult children, for example, Chetty et al. (2014) use tax records in the U.S. to estimate income mobility.

In the case of Latin America, most of the literature has used household survey data or public opinion surveys (see for example, Hertz et al., 2007; Narayan et al., 2018; Neidh ̈ofer et al., 2018) given that long panel data as well as administrative/registry data that allow the researcher to link generations are rare. In contrast, in this paper, I use census data obtained from IPUMS International (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, IPUMS, 2019), hosted at the University of Minnesota Population Center, which reports harmonized representative samples (typically 10%) of full census micro data sets for a large number of countries. In particular, I use 91 samples of population and housing censuses from 24 countries, which are run to compute
, 21 percent in Syria, and 8 percent in Morocco between 2007 and 2009.

> 11 According to World Bank data, during the period 2007–09, food subsidies declined as a share of GDP from 1.8 percent to 0.8 percent in Jordan, and from 2.1 percent to 1.4 percent in Syria. Food subsidies remained at 0.7 percent in Morocco, and increased from 1.3 percent to 2.0 percent in Egypt. 12 Note the analysis does not change if we assume that the country can affect prices and is facing an upward sloping import supply curve.

> 13 Commitment to price stability is signaled by the prevalence of price controls in MENA on certain types of food products. Price controls can be viewed as flexible subsidies that accommodate perfectly fluctuations in the price. According to Ortiz _et al._ (2011), Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Djibouti use also price controls on certain food products. Some of these use both price controls and price subsidies.

-14-
includes administrative costs of running the program (e.g. verifying employment status, transfer fees). We additionally consider benefits both on the extensive and intensive margin. One factor that decreases the cost of our intervention is that a substantial share of eligible youths do not complete the paperwork required to receive the incentive. Despite receiving SMS reminders and replacing lost debit cards, only 46.2% of youths with formal employment completed the registration and 38.3% submitted pay stubs (Appendix Table A4). While these figures are substantially higher than those of many related programs that pay wage subsidies to firms (e.g. Galasso et al. (2004); Levinsohn et al. (2014)), it raises the question of how the process can be simplified to increase program take-up. When we ask eligible beneficiaries in the endline survey why they did not complete the paperwork, the most frequent responses include that the registration process was too complicated (23%), people forgetting about it (21%), and that they lost the payment card or contact information (20%).

Focusing on vocational school graduates, we find a narrow (broad) cost-benefit measure of US$1,177 (US$1,404) per _additional_ person with formal sector work experience compared to the control group over the first two years. The corresponding figure for permanent formal sector experience is US$739 (US$882) per person. These figures compare favorably to alternative ALMPs such as vocational training, which tend to cost at least $10,000 per additional person with formal work experience. Other interventions such as search and matching assistance tend to be cheaper but in most cases fail to lead to significant employment gains (see McKenzie (2017) for a review).

Turning to our cumulative results, we find that the program costs US$63 (US$75) per additional month with formal sector work experience and US$5.3 (US$6.4) per
activity. Given that the history of rapid urbanization in Korea mirrors the process of rural to urban migration taking place in China, one might be concerned that incidence of delayed retirement of China’s rural farmers, who are less affluent and have lacked pension support, may follow a similar pattern to Korea.

**Phased or Gradual Retirement?** The literature on retirement in developed countries has emphasized that retirement is often a gradual process: workers may reduce work hours at present employers, move to work arrangements requiring fewer hours per week or even transition in and out of retirement.<sup>18</sup> Using the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) find that twenty-two percent of the population reported being partially retired at some point, and that a fifth of the population had partially retired by age 65. Exits from employment, or the labor force, are also not always permanent: Gustman and Steinmeier’s study finds that over four waves, 17 percent of the sample experienced a reversal in which they moved from lessintensive work to more work.

The particular set of incentives influencing the labor supply decision of older workers in urban China, both before and after reaching mandatory retirement age, are likely to lead to similar patterns of gradual retirement as observed in other countries. In urban areas, low unemployment rates and shortages of skilled labor in a rapidly growing economy offer opportunity for older skilled workers. On the other hand, older long-term urban residents who own residences have experienced a sharp increase in their wealth over the last decade (Park and Porter, 2011), which may raise reservation wages and reduce the likelihood of returning to work.

In order to gain a sense of the importance of gradual, or phased retirement, we show average hours of work per week across the age distribution in Figure 3 below. The first panel shows average work hours unconditional on work status, with the labor hours of respondents who are not working equal to zero. In panel
and changing patterns of migration and a brief history of forestry management practices in Nepal. In Section 3 we develop a model of a village economy that captures the key aspects of the interaction between migration, remittances and forests. In Section 4, we describe the data and in Section 5 we outline the estimation method and discuss some key results. We conclude with an outline of the next steps in Section 6.

# **2 The Context**

## **2.1 Background**

With an average per capita GDP of about $440 ($1,180 in purchasing power parity terms), Nepal is the poorest country in South Asia and one of the poorest in the world. About 30 percent of the Nepali population was poor in 2004, 46 percent of the adult population illiterate, and almost half the children under five years are malnourished. During the period of liberalization in the mid1980s and early 1990s, the economy grew at about 5 percent per year. The impact of this relatively high rate of economic growth on improvements in living standards was dampened by the country’s high population and urban-centered growth, limited access to basic services, poor governance, and persistent political instability. Economic growth slowed in the early 2000s due to a global economic slowdown that diminished export markets, and the escalation of a violent Maoist conflict that took a heavy toll on the economy. Although the conflict eventually came to an end in 2006, the overall pace of economic growth has not been as robust as it was in the early 1990s.

The Nepali economy is overwhelmingly rural and agriculture comprises 40 percent of the GDP. A Labor Force Survey completed by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 2008 found that 74 percent of the working age population was engaged in agriculture. However, unlike neighboring India that witnessed substantial growth of the rural economy, particularly the agriculture sector, during its Green Revolution, rural incomes in Nepal were by and large stagnant between 1965 and 1995. The initial challenges of a difficult geography have never
migration. Even though the OLS regressions control for wealth and other pre-determined characteristics, migrant-sending households might correlate with some unobservables such as connectedness, which also affects investment in education.

Interaction terms with female migrants indicate that households with more female migrants show almost no difference in explaining the fraction of all children enrolled in school, as shown in columns 5-10. This finding holds for the indicator for households with only female migrants, and the female share among migrants. Even though the sign is oftentimes negative, the point estimates are small and insignificant.

Second, as presented in Table 7, the dependent variable is the fraction of children 6- 18 years old in the household that are working in the last 12 months of the 2007 survey. The sample average indicates that 17% of children work, probably in family business or informal jobs. Children in urban households with Islamic and educated head are less likely to work in the labor market.

The OLS regression for this outcome variable suggests that children in migrantsending households are significantly less likely to work, whether or not controlling for community variables. As shown in column 1, the share of children in migrant households who work is 7 percentage points less than that in non-migrant households. This finding becomes more nuanced when we use the instrumental variable approach. The coefficients on the ―migrant households‖ variable, reported under columns 3 and 4, are not distinguishable from zero.

Columns 5-10 of Table 7 show that the coefficient of the gender interaction term is robustly negative. We find that children work less when it comes to households with more female migrants. This finding holds for the indicator for households with only female migrants, as well as the female share among migrants. To interpret column 6, for example, households with only female migrants reduce the share of children working by 32 percentage points more than the impact of households with at least some male migrants. The coefficients of ―Migrant Households‖ variable, reported in the IV regressions (Columns 9 and 10), are positive but indistinguishable
The campaign was developed as a set of simple visual aids with two different messages: the importance of voting which focused on the relationship between the electoral process and policy, and the significance of secret balloting which explained the actual balloting process. Treated women received either the first message or the first and the second, allowing us to test whether the knowledge that ballots are cast in an environment of secrecy enhances female participation, as well as independence in candidate choice.

We find that turnout increases by about 12 percent for women in treated households compared to women in control clusters, with somewhat larger and more precise effects for women exposed to both messages. More importantly, we find comparable turnout rates for treated women and their untreated close neighbors, indicating large geographical spillovers. We then assess whether spillovers among close friends are larger than those among neighbors. The results are qualitatively similar. This is not too surprising given that close friends typically reside nearby. In addition, we use the GPS location of households to estimate spillovers beyond the (arbitrary) boundaries of the treatment clusters and find even larger effects.

We also use administrative data from all polling stations that served the study villages and find that for every 10 treated women, (roughly 4 households), female turnout increases by about 9 additional votes. Once we take this externality into account, the cost of the intervention drops from US $16.7 to about US $2.2 per additional vote. In contrast, using the same administrative data we find no effect on male turnout, suggesting either that the provision of information on electoral participation and processes is less salient for men or that there is little communication about political matters between men and women. Of course, it is also possible that men are simply not influenced by information provided by women.

We then study whether the campaign influenced candidate and party choice. We find that it did. Treated women are significantly more likely to vote for the second most voted for political party. Control women in treated clusters behaved again
determinant of learning is age for grade, a proxy indicator for students who may have repeated one or more years in school.

These findings linking learning outcomes with exogenous factors at the individual level have also been confirmed in Argentina. Recent evidence using standardized testing data (including PISA, LLECE, and Argentina’s national standardized test, _Operativo Nacional de Evaluación, ONE_ ) have found that socioeconomic background and individual characteristics, such as attending preschool and not repeating grades, are hugely important in determining learning outcomes in students (Albornoz, Furman, Podesta, Razquin, and Warnes, 2015, Marchionni, Pinto, and Vazquez, 2013, Fresoli, Herrero, Giuliodoli, and Gertel, 2007, and Kruger, 2011).

# _2.1 School Characteristics_

A recent meta review of studies and impact evaluations in developing countries finds strong evidence that textbooks and other similar materials increase student learning, as do basic furniture such as desks, tables, and chairs, and characteristics of the school buildings themselves. Importantly, there is some evidence that students in the bottom of the performance distribution are most affected by poor school conditions (Fertig and Schmidt, 2002). The availability of electricity also has a strong effect (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, and Ravina, 2014). While the presence of computers on their own doesn’t seem to generate an impact, computer-assisted learning programs have proven effective when instruction is integrated into the curriculum and tailored to individuals, and where teachers are well prepared to support the students (Evans and Popova, 2015). The availability of computer facilities and science laboratories is also significantly correlated with better learning outcomes in Mexico (De Hoyos, Espino, and García, 2012).

Evidence from Argentina is consistent with these findings. Educational resources such as libraries, multi-media resources, science laboratory equipment, facilities for the fine arts, and computers were all found to be correlated with higher test scores (Fuchs and Wößmann, 2004, and Santos, 2007), although school infrastructure was found to be
Any of the above tariff structures may be complemented by a fixed monthly charge, and are then described as two-part electricity tariffs. The fixed charge can be used to cover the fixed administrative costs associated with serving a customer, and is sometimes also used to discriminate between customers based on other cost-related characteristics such as load served and network location.

# **a. Residential tariffs**

Two-thirds of the prevailing pricing schemes in Africa are IBTs, and the remaining third are linear (figure 1a). The use of linear rates is more common in countries with prepayment systems (Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa) (table 1). The prevalence of IBTs is consistent with recent trends in power regulation. IBTs have often been put forward as a good tool for reconciling cost-recovery targets with distributional aims, although their success in doing so is critically dependent of the details of tariff design (Filipovid and Tanid 2009; Borenstein 2008). A more detailed description on residential tariff structures practiced in Africa can be found in Annex 2.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Figure 1. Prevalence of specific tariff schemes<br>a. Block tariff pricing b. Fixed charges<br>70% 60%<br>60% 50%<br>50%<br>40%<br>40%<br>30%<br>30%<br>20%<br>20%<br>10%<br>10%<br>0% 0%<br>Increasing Block Linear Rate Fixed No Fixed Fixed No Fixed<br>Charge Charge Charge Charge<br>(Linear) (Linear) (IBT) (IBT)<br>tariff schemes tariff schemes<br>schemes schemes<br>percentage of prevailing percentage of prevailing<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database.

About half of the sample countries have adopted two-part tariffs
||||
|_Replaceability_ * _init. GDPpc_ * _global robot stock_||||0.0035***|0.0035***|0.0035***|
|||||(0.0003)|(0.0003)|(0.0003)|
|Observations|888,813|888,813|888,813|888,813|888,813|888,813|
|_R_<sup>2</sup>|0.6382|0.7753|0.3868|0.6349|0.7683|0.3850|
|Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat||||109.622|109.622|109.622|
|importer-exporter-year efects|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|
|Industry-year efects|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|Y|

_Notes_ : Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the inverse hyperbolic sine to account for zeros in the regression variables. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
14 _Figure 3. Average Annual Salary_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 25,000<br>2 0 ,0 0 0 - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -<br>~M 15,000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<br>10,000 -- --<br>5,000-- - - - -- -- - - - - - -<br>1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Author's Calculations based on data from SEDAPAL Annual Reports The reduction in labor expenses and the rise in tariffs allowed SEDAPAL to make a profit in 1993 for the first time in more than a decade. Further price increases, as well as improvements in billing and collection have kept SEDAPAL solvent (Figure 4).

_Figure 4. SEDAPAL Profits_ <!-- Start of picture text --> 50<br>08 (50) , /.<br>C (100o), ....<br>(150)<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996<br>Source: SEDAPAL AMual Reports<br><!-- End of picture text --> The increase in SEDAPAL's liquidity and the World Bank project allowed a surge in investment in expansion and maintance. As Figure 5 shows, investment per connection rose from US$26 in 1990 to US$80 by 1996. Most of the investment has been earmarked for expansion and there has been less emphasis on rehabilitiation and maintenance of the existing network.
for supplementary funding provided to woredas in times of drought, based on a crude microeconomic analysis of drought-induced transitory poverty. Other papers have proposed a range of benefits from implementing a rules-based approach for PSNP scale-up and humanitarian response, including speed, accuracy (Drechsler 2016) and provision of good incentives to woreda administrations and vulnerable populations (Clarke and Wren-Lewis 2016). This paper does not consider the costs or benefits of moving to a rulesbased approach, but rather it focuses on potential financing strategies if the PSNP were to move to a rulesbased approach.

To further focus our analysis on the financial costs and benefits of alternative risk financing strategies, in the analysis that follows we assume that the cost of delivering the additional benefits is fixed, and does not depend on the financing strategy. To do this, we assume that the additional benefits to be financed through the risk financing strategies are delivered through the scaling-up of the PSNP. This allows us to use the existing unit cost of delivering the PSNP, as described below. In using this approach, the paper is not taking a view on whether one delivery mechanism is better than another or that the costs of delivery are higher or lower. Rather, the purpose is to allow us to focus the analysis squarely on the risk financing issues at hand. The methodology proposed in the following sections could equally be extended to allow for different delivery instruments, provided that the differential costs of delivery could be estimated.

In this paper the hypothetical PSNP scale-up rules and corresponding contingent liability were constructed using the crude econometric methodology detailed in Annex 2. First, historical household survey data and satellite data on drought intensity were combined to estimate how different rainfall patterns, as measured by a satellite-based index of rainfall deficit (the Water Requirements Satisfaction Index, WRSI), might be 4