rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
studies by Beck et al. (2003a and 2003b), which illustrate the use in combination of expert surveys and firm-level surveys.

From 2002, an expanded version of the WBES known as the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS) has been running and plans to cover 20 surveys per annum with results reported so far from 49 countries (see list in Table 2)<sup>22</sup> . The sample size per country has been increased to several hundred business establishments, and (for most countries) the focus has narrowed to manufacturing. The core questionnaire is rather longer now (82 questions, many subdivided), reflecting a broadening of the areas of interest, which now include innovation, labor relations and productivity as well as the areas covered in the WBES. In addition, national questionnaires may explore additional areas of specific national interest.

The finance questions of PICS now cover seven areas in more detail: sources of financing divided (miraculously) into sources for working capital and for new fixed investment;<sup>23</sup> existence and utilization of a line of credit; collateral, interest and duration of most recent loan; currency denomination of total borrowing; speed and cost of payments system; audited accounts; whether land owned or leased.

The PICS were drawn on extensively for the WDR 2005 recently published, but no comprehensive detailed write-up of the cross-country results has yet been released.

# **4 Provider surveys and administrative records**

Information can be obtained from financial services providers and their regulators regarding both the scale of operations and the degree to which their services reach household and business customers, and on the operations and management etc. of the provider itself, both of which aspects have been identified above as relevant to the questions at issue.

# _Information published by providers_

Although much regulatory information is routinely obtained from banks and other financial service providers for regulatory purposes and also, for many banks, published for the benefit of shareholders or the general public, relatively little of
TABLE II: Labor Supply Statistics of Children and Parents, 1997

|Parents with children aged 12-15|Mean|Std. Dev.|
|---|---|---|
|Has job (father)<br>|0.97|0.18|
|Has job (mother)<br>|0.14|0.34|
|Weekly income (father, inc_>_0)|174.2|129.2|
|Weekly income (mother, inc_>_0)|137.2|141.0|
|Boys aged 12-15|Mean|Std. Dev.|
|Enrolled|0.69|0.46|
|Has job (not enrolled)|0.63|0.48|
|Has job (enrolled)|0.075|0.26|
|Hours worked per week (not enrolled, has job)|42.4|13.3|
|Hours worked per week (enrolled, has job)|14.2|5.92|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0)|132.5|90.6|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0, not enrolled)|143.7|90.2|
|Ofered weekly transfer (1998, semester 1)|38.8|17.6|
|Girls aged 12-15|Mean|Std. Dev.|
|Enrolled|0.62|0.49|
|Has job (not enrolled)|0.20|0.40|
|Has job (enrolled)|0.029|0.17|
|Hours worked per week (not enrolled, has job)|45.6|16.8|
|Hours worked per week (enrolled, has job)|14.6|6.85|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0)|139.0|100.4|
|Weekly income (inc_>_0,
]** <mark>Myers, N. (2002). Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century.</mark> _<mark>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>357</mark>_ <mark>(1420), 609-613.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 1]** <mark>Nawrotzki, R. J., Riosmena, F., & Hunter, L. M. (2013). Do rainfall deficits predict US-bound migration from rural Mexico? Evidence from the Mexican census.</mark> _<mark>Population research and policy review</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>32</mark>_ <mark>(1), 129-158.</mark> **<mark>[</mark> 1]** <mark>Neumann, B., Vafeidis, A. T., Zimmermann, J., & Nicholls, R. J. (2015a). Future coastal population growth and exposure to sea-level rise and coastal flooding-a global assessment.</mark> _<mark>PloS one</mark>_ <mark>,</mark> _<mark>10</mark>_ <mark>(3),</mark> 47
as intent-to-treat (ITT) effects. That is, the treatment effect coefficients measure the effect of receiving a forbearance offer, rather than the effect of accepting the offer.

# **3.5.1 Loan repayment**

We begin by examining the effect of debt forbearance offers on loan repayment. As reflected in our survey of beliefs about debt relief in the population, reported in Section 2, there is widespread concern that granting repayment flexibility will create moral hazard in loan repayment by damaging the reputation of the lender or generating expectations of future relief. We test this hypothesis by examining whether receiving a debt forbearance offer reduces the likelihood that borrowers repay their loans fully and on time. In addition, we test whether the repayment response differs when the repayment moratorium is framed as an initiative of the lender or the regulator. Intuitively, if granting repayment flexibility during a crisis damages the reputation of the lender or generates expectations of lenient credit enforcement in the future, one would expect this effect to be _less_ pronounced if forbearance is presented as an initiative of the regulator rather than the lender.

Table 2, reports the results. We find that none of the forbearance offers extended as part of our experiment had a negative impact on loan repayment. We find no impact of forbearance offers on loan repayment when the offer is framed as an initiative of the regulator (b=0.003, s.e.=0.015). By contrast, we find that forbearance offers _improve_ loan repayment when the offer is presented as an initiative of the lender. The likelihood of loan default is 4 percentage points (6.9 percent) lower in the relationship offer treatment condition (b=0.041, s.e.=0.015) and the difference between the two offers is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (b=0.037, s.e.=0.015).

# **3.5.2 Borrower beliefs**

In Table 3, we
of terrorist attacks on consumption, we find a heterogeneous effect across different parts of the consumption distribution. The point estimates increase with the consumption decile. Incidents affect exposed households from most of the consumption distribution, except those in the top 20%. The estimates for deciles 1, 2 and 3 are either significant at the 10% level or not significant because these groups are underrepresented in the survey sample considered.<sup>28</sup> Most of the households

> 26 It is unlikely that the difference in cost of consumption baskets is explained by a seasonal pattern as all interviews of households in these groups were conducted within a period of 13 days.

> 27 We cannot extend the analysis to measure the effect beyond 7 days after an incident occurred as only one exposed household was interviewed in this period during data collection of Wave 2.

> 28 Households in the bottom 30% of the consumption distribution accumulate 40% of the sum of sampling weights from the total sample, ultimately indicating they are underrepresented in the survey data.

19
administered by Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, which also oversaw collection of the SDS. This created significant administrative and cost benefits because separate survey collection infrastructure did not need to be created.

- <u>Sample.</u> <mark>Adding the SDS to the Labor Force Survey also permitted the use of the Labor Force Survey’s sampling frame, which includes information about respondents’ occupation at the VSCO 4-digital level. The sampling frame was drawn from the March and September</mark> rounds of the Labor Force Survey. <mark>In total, 543 workers answered the survey. Out of the 30 occupations selected, 15 had a sample size larger than 20 and only 6 smaller than 10.</mark>

- <u>Data collection mode. The SDS survey was conducted in-person and through telephone</u> interviews. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 67 percent of interviews were conducted inperson and the remainder through phone calls. These delivery methodologies were preferred to a web-based instrument (as in previous pilots) given the availability of a sampling frame and to improve the survey’s ability to capture lower-skilled occupations.<sup>15</sup>

> 13 However, analysts were preferred for practical considerations (i.e., time, costs, and convenience) (Tsacoumis and Van Iddekinge, 2006) .

> 14 For example, the skills data have a sample of 8 analysts across all occupations, while the tasks data have a range of sample sizes from occupations answered by 3 experts to occupations answered by 247 job incumbents. 15 For cost efficiency in the case of Vietnam and because of precautions necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, the pilot surveys were carried out using web-based forms. Web-based instruments may not be suitable for collecting data related to low-skilled occupations given the possibility that less-skilled workers have less access to digital technologies and low digital literacy.

10
# **3.3 Representativeness and Weighting**

The HFPS surveys are not nationally representative at either the household or individual level. Only households where a member owned a phone, had access to electricity and mobile network coverage as well as was willing to participate were interviewed. To partially address this, most surveys adjusted the household sample weights to account for the non-random selection of households.<sup>5</sup> Questions of representativeness at the individual level are more serious, because many surveys drew their sample from an existing pre-pandemic survey, and these explicitly sought to interview heads of households or their spouses. For these surveys, we therefore mainly observe the labor market outcomes of household heads. We observe data on relation to head in 20 countries, which unfortunately excludes the surveys from LAC, which did not collect this information. In these 20 countries, 67 percent of the sample are heads (vs 23 percent in the GMD), 18 percent are spouses (vs 17 percent in the GMD), and 11 percent (vs 44 percent in the GMD) are children. To the extent that heads have different labor market outcomes than others in the households, the phone surveys that explicitly sought to interview heads will present a biased picture of labor market outcomes.

Selection bias in labor market outcomes is a particular concern when comparing labor market outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa to those in Latin America & the Caribbean, for two reasons.<sup>6</sup> First, the surveys in LAC were conducted through random digit dialing rather than recontacting households interviewed in an existing survey. The latter sampling strategy usually sought to re-interview household heads while the former did not. As mentioned above, this means that the surveys outside LAC are highly skewed towards heads. Second, the

> 5The only surveys that did not use household weights were those from Poland and South Sudan.

> 6Within-household decisions, such as between the head and non-head of the household, on labor market participation and labor supply may also be important
**Table 6.  Occupational Segregation**<sup>**a**</sup> **of Employees by Gender – -** **<u>in the Baltic Countries (1997 2000) and Central Europe (1997 1999)</u>**

||**1997**|**1998**|**1999**|**2000**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**Estonia**|0.432|0.423|0.411|0.408|
|**Latvia**|0.406|0.407|0.407|0.409|
|**Lithuania**|0.335|0.339|0.312|n. a.|
|**Poland, public sector**|0.468|0.458|0.465|n. a.|
|**Poland, private sector**|0.362|0.345|0.342||
|**Czech R.**|0.340|0.340|0.375|n. a.|
|**Hungary**|0.390|0.380|0.390|n. a.|

_Notes:_<sup>a</sup> Dissimilarity index by nine major groups of occupations according to ISCO 88. _Sources_ : Enterprise census results for Latvia and Lithuania, LFS results for Estonia, and own calculations; Laxton (2001) for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

Estimated earnings functions, presented in Appendix Tables 24, 25, and 26, predict about 25 percent lower net wage for women than for otherwise similar men after the impact of other observable factors is accounted for. This gap stays almost unchanged if occupation and/or working hours are controlled for
large productivity differences across firms within narrowly defined industries (Syverson, 2011), it is likely that only the more productive firms servitize.

External competition can induce servitization by firms as a strategy to maintain their sales. With trade liberalization, for instance, firms adapt through quality upgrading, innovation or improving management to survive and even grow.<sup>13</sup> Breinlich et al. (2015) use firm-level data from the United Kingdom to show that servitization could be an additional channel of adjustment. The increase in servitization of UK manufacturing between the period 1997-2007 can be associated with the decline in import tariffs. In an attempt to flee competition, even firms for which it would not be otherwise optimal, such as low productivity manufacturing firms, may find it attractive to bundle their manufactured goods with services valued by consumers. Services that are either more protected from global competition or innately nontradable or both are natural candidates for such manufacturers. Foreign manufacturers find it harder to provide such bundles because trade costs are much higher for many services than goods. For example, the absolute level of ad valorem trade costs in services is estimated to be over 200 percent for India (Mirdout et al., 2013).

# **_3.2 Data sources_**

Given the dearth of firm-level studies for developing countries, we work with firm-level data for India. The firm-level data used in this paper is constructed from the Prowess database which is collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess accounts for 60 to 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector and the firms included in this data set contribute to 75 percent of corporate

> 12 Consumers clearly benefit from servitization  when they prefer the bundling of goods and services (Table 1, column 1). Consumers could also benefit when servitization is motivated by economies of scope in production, because quality-adjusted prices are likely to be lower.

> 13 See Khandelwal, 2010; Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2013; Bloom, Draca
imum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. This second measure of labor protection captures regulation of labor conditions more broadly.

– – For civil and human rights, we use an electoral democracy index _polyarchy_ a measure of freedom of expression, obtained from the Variety of Democracy database, which ranges between zero and one, with higher values indicating better outcomes; a female political participation ( _empowerment_ ) index; a _political liberties_ index; and an index for _freedom of association_ which measures the right of citizens to assemble freely and associate in political parties, unions, or cultural organizations.

Figure 2 provides a snapshot for the three areas of the average direction of change over time and across countries in the non-trade outcome indicators used in the empirical analysis.<sup>9</sup> They reveal that for several developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America there were improvements in environmental outcomes, while the trend appears to be less positive in terms of labor standards and civil rights protection. There is significant heterogeneity across indicators and countries during the period considered, with deterioration in non-trade outcomes observed in numerous instances.

Data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows are sourced from the OECD Creditor Reporting System.<sup>10</sup> This includes disaggregated data on aid allocated for environmental, labor protection and civil rights projects as well as total ODA received by a country. To improve the match between treated countries (those having signed NTPs in these areas) and their synthetic counterfactual, in the empirical analysis we include measures of country-level economic openness using trade data from UN COMTRADE (excluding gas and oil) and market and country size (population, GDP, per capita GDP).

> 9Ferrari _et al._ (2021) use principal components analysis to construct outcome indicators for these three areas to analyze the role of NTPs in EU PTAs.

> 10https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.

8
digital new actors and public action, can improve access for all (Birner _et al._ 2021)  (Reinhardt 2023) and involves challenges (Finger 2023).

> 3 A complete overhaul of the Filipino farmer registry (https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1218397) has yet to produce tangible results.

> 4 Refer to <u>https://agristack.gov.in/#/ and https://www.nic.in/products/fruits/.</u>

> 5 Refer to <u>https://www.kalro.org/kiamis/ and https://www.fao.org/kenya/news/detail-events/fr/c/1630294/.</u> 6 Premand and Rohner (2024) show that in Nigeria, beyond reducing conflict through an increase in poor households' opportunity cost for fighting, transfers created incentives for looting that increased conflict. Digital transfers can and are less likely to be intercepted by rebel groups than public cash transfers that are transmitted via analog means (Ghorpade 2020).

4
## **1. Introduction**

Natural disasters are estimated to cause an average of over $300 billion in direct asset losses every year; this estimate increases to $520 billion when considering the well-being (or consumption) losses experienced by people (Hallegatte et al. 2017). While each country faces its individual set of natural hazards – including cyclones, earthquakes, or wildfires – floods are one of the most common and severe hazards to disrupt people’s livelihoods around the world. Especially in lower income countries where infrastructure systems – including drainage and flood protection – tend to be less developed, floods often cause unmitigated damage and suffering. Recent events, ranging from Bangladesh and Nigeria to the United States and Vietnam, illustrate that the threat is a global reality. Not only rare and major floods, but also smaller and frequent events can revert years of progress in poverty reduction and development. In the coming years, land subsidence, rapid coastal urbanization, and climate change are bound to result in increasing exposure of people and their livelihoods.

In this study we estimate the number of people who are directly exposed to the risk of intense flooding in 189 countries. We do so by using high-resolution flood and population data that enable a global yet detailed analysis of flood risks. We find that 2.2 billion people, or 29 percent of the world population live in areas that would experience some level of inundation during a 1-in-100 year flood event. About 1.47 billion people, or 19 percent of the world population, are directly exposed to inundation depths of over 0.15 meter, which would pose significant risk to lives, especially of vulnerable population groups. While the largest number of exposed people live in East and South Asia (1.36 billion people), subnational poverty estimates highlight another regional hotspot of risk: At least 71 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to live in both extreme poverty (using a $1.9 a day definition) and significant flood risk – thus making
Policy Research Working Paper 8950

# **Abstract**

This paper explores the sovereign-bank nexus in emerging markets and developing economies: the interconnectedness between the health of the sovereign and the banking system. Data from 140 emerging markets and developing economies suggest that this nexus is rising. First, banks have increased their exposure to their sovereigns in the past decade. Second, government debt has grown, and fiscal positions have deteriorated, raising the specter of sovereign stress. Third, banking system assets and bank credit to the private sector have steadily increased, which may restrict the sovereign’s capacity to contain a banking crisis. Fourth, empirical evidence from 36 emerging markets and developing economies documents the existence of the nexus and suggests that it has increased recently. However, deeper country analysis is required for a better understanding of the sovereign-bank nexus, given country idiosyncrasies, including the structure of sovereign debt and the composition of the investor base, and data lags and opacities. To minimize the adverse effects of the sovereign-bank nexus, efforts should be focused on maintaining fiscal and bank buffers, strengthening surveillance and supervision of the banking system, improving transparency and data quality of bank-sovereign linkages, better addressing the regulatory treatment of the sovereign exposures and government support of the banking sector, and carefully evaluating the policy trade-offs in the sovereign-bank nexus.

This paper is a product of the Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at efeijen@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and
|169|
|Clinics in 2006|CQ25|0.49|1.37|0.28|0.48|0.21|(0.16)|170|
|Churches in 2006|CQ26|1.62|1.76|1.68|1.75|-0.06|(0.27)|169|
|Halls in 2006|CQ27|0.02|0.15|0.07|0.46|-0.05|(0.05)|169|
|IDPs in 2006|CQ136|3.3|9.51|2.93|12.53|0.37|(2.11)|114|
|IDPs returned in 2006|CQ137|2.36|12.52|7.79|28.52|-5.43|(4.26)|110|
|Refugees in 2006|CQ138|0|0|1.1|5.24|-1.1|(0.7)|119|
|Refugees repatriated in 2006|CQ139|0|0|0.05|0.38|-0.05|(0.05)|122|
|Share of male respondents|QF7|0.5|0.5|0.5|0.5|-3.79|(0.01)|5457|
|Average age respondents|QF9|20.49|17.21|19.81|16.84|-0.45|(0.47)|5198|

Note: Question number responds to 2010-2011 survey (Humphreys et al. 2012). Tests of difference based on simple OLS regressions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed). Data only from the 190 villages that participated in the gender parity
impoverished, whereas 6.1 percent of the total population (or 82 percent of the pre-fiscal poor) are fiscal gainers. If the official moderate poverty line is employed instead, the proportion of impoverished (7.5 percent of the total, or 47.1 percent of the post-fiscal poor) is lower than that of the fiscal gainers (10.6 percent of the total, or 65.1 percent of the pre-fiscal poor). A second result is that the magnitude of annual fiscal gains (274.3 million dollars) is almost 13 times larger than that of FI (21.2 million dollars) when using the $4/day poverty line, whereas the ratio is slightly above 4 times when using the official moderate poverty line (with 619.7 million dollars of FGP and 144.3 million dollars of FI).<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 9: Headcounts and amounts of fiscal impoverishment and fiscal gains to the poor** _(Percentages of population and millions of dollars adjusted by PPP)_

<!-- Start of picture text --> $274.3 million FGP Moderate poverty line (official)<br>$619.7 million<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> FGP $4/day poverty line<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> FGP Moderate poverty line (official)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Author’s elaboration based on Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez (2016). _Notes_ : The size of the bubbles is relative to the total monetary amounts of FI and FGP. The amounts are annual and expressed in millions of dollars adjusted by PPP at 2005 prices. The headcounts and amounts of FI and FGP for the official extreme poverty line are close to those for the