rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
Sustainable Development Report 2019 further recommends reshaping both national and international financial systems in line with sustainable development (United Nations 2019).

The WBG’s Maximizing Finance for Development approach is helping to fill SDG financing gaps by attracting private sector financing and solutions to development challenges. Consistent with the broader view of financing identified in the 2015 paper, the WBG introduced its “Cascade” approach (Development Committee 2017a). The approach aims to mobilize private sources of financing for infrastructure development and address relevant policy constraints prior to tapping public financing from domestic or international sources. Under the WBG’s Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD) approach, the institution systematically leverages financing, expertise, and policy solutions from all sources (public and private) for its client countries <mark>(Development Committee 2017b).</mark><sup>23</sup> The effort to increase and broaden the sources of development-related financing has been undertaken across the institution. Under an expanded set of resources under IDA18, IDA is contributing to the advancement of the SDG agenda in the poorest countries. The IFC is helping to strengthen policy frameworks, promote competition, and develop local capital markets through its Creating Markets strategy.<sup>24</sup> Private sector involvement is especially relevant to SDGs in sectors in which goods and services are produced partially or completely by the private sector (e.g., energy).

The WBG plays a critical role in facilitating financing vehicles with private components. For instance, the WBG has a long history of helping arrange public-private partnerships (PPPs) for financing the physical and human investment needed to achieve the SDGs. In the infrastructure sector, the WBG tracks private investment at the country and sectoral levels and evaluates the quality of the regulatory framework for PPPs, through its Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. For the past 10 years, the WBG’s green bonds have helped the private sector invest in projects related to climate change (SDG 13), mostly for renewable energy and clean
tell how these attitudes arise, but there appears to be a virtuous circle whereby VFs borrow to on-lend, so they are more willing or able to borrow to on-lend, so they borrow to on-lend. It is possible that familiarity with borrowing to on-lend demystifies the process, and makes it easier to sustain. If so, encouraging VFs to borrow even modestly for on-lending may ultimately help nudge some to a “higher” equilibrium, moving them from social intermediaries to true financial intermediaries.

Despite the fact that one in five VFs borrow to on-lend, there is a strong reluctance to become a financial intermediary. Most village funds say they would like to lend more; in the 2010 survey of Village Funds, 75% said they want more funds to lend, and 72% said they could lend an additional million baht (about US$29,000) safely. When asked to specify the ideal size of their loan portfolio, the median response was 2 million baht (compared to median actual lending of 1.14 million baht). On the other hand, only 13% would be willing to borrow more from the BAAC (or GSB or KTB) in order to expand their borrowing, despite 22
facilitate fieldwork, many surveys therefore aim to minimize the level of proxy reporting, but do not prohibit it. A comprehensive ILO review of LFS shows that in half of the LFS 30% to 50% of the responses are provided by proxy informants (ILO, 2018d). The DHS is in that sense an exception because it administers a separate men’s and women’s questionnaire and interviews each household member aged 15 to 49. Interestingly, men’s employment status and main occupation is self‐reported (in the men’s questionnaire), but also reported by their wife in the women’s questionnaires.

The LSMS reference work and enumerator manuals recommend self‐reporting, but do not require it (Grosh & Glewwe, 2000, chapter 9). The enumerator records by whom the questions are answered. Although self‐reporting is preferred, proxy reporting is common in practice (Table 3). The rate of proxy respondents for the age group 15 to 64 ranges from 24% in Nigeria and Tanzania to 85% in Mali. Although there are some exceptions (such as Mali and Niger), the results indicate that the proxy respondent is usually a male household member, especially for youth.

The findings raise the question whether and how proxy reporting affects labor market statistics and whether the effect of proxy reporting differs by age and sex of the subject and respondent.<sup>19</sup> Using a survey experiment in Tanzania, Bardasi et al. (2011) show that proxy

> 19 A distinct question is whether household members who self‐report their employment status differ systematically from household members whose status is reported by proxy respondents. In Malawi, for instance, the self‐reported (fe)male employment rate was 79% (65%), whereas the (fe)male employment of individuals who did not self‐report was 63% (50%)

19
sales, in addition to technology sophistication, is the size of the firm (see Tables B1, B2, B3, and B4 in the appendix). Whether the manager has a post-graduate degree has an indirect effect on performance during the pandemic, but the direct effect is not statistically significant. In contrast, the dummy for whether the business is part of a multi-national has a direct effect but the indirect effect is not statistically significant. The z-score for management practices is not statistically significant in the equation for additional use of digital technology during the pandemic (the mediator) nor in the equation for the shock to sales.

# **5 Robustness checks**

Our estimations combine the four digital responses available in the COV-BPS data in a single binary indicator. In this section we show results for each digital adjustment separately. We also present results for the indirect effect using matching estimators.

## **5.1 The treatment effect under different mediators**

Our estimation results are robust to different definitions of the mediator. Figure 3 shows estimates for the direct and indirect effects using each potential digital response as an indirect channel for the effect of technology sophistication. The total effect remains close to 6.5 pp when the response is the additional use of digital platforms or the new investment in equipment, software, or digital solutions. When the response is more home-based work the effect increases by 1 pp, and close to 2 pp when we consider the higher share of online sales.

17
that in the developing world, climate change in regions reliant on subsistence farming is a prominent reason behind migration to urban areas.

That said, existing literature also finds evidence for the trapping effect we discussed in section 2. This literature argues that where there is extreme poverty and migration is costly, climatic shocks might trap people rather than induce them to abandon their homes. This insight is consistent with the heterogeneous effect we observe when investigating how droughts affect urban growth across different levels of average annual precipitation. Our measure of precipitation captures the yearly total amount of precipitation (in mm) in a given cell, based on monthly meteorological statistics from the GPCP v.2.2 Combined Precipitation Data Set. We find that the effect of drought is stronger in grid cells that fall above the developing world median in terms of precipitation. In line with the logic suggested by the trapping effect, we interpret this as evidence that people migrate _before_ recurrent droughts make migration too costly an option for many households to consider. It also suggests that people in grid cells located above the precipitation median might have developed fewer coping strategies that could be deployed once extreme weather shocks arrive.

To zoom in on the last push factor suggested by extant research, we examine the role of conflict. We do this by calculating the average number of conflict events (as recorded by the UCDP-PRIO dataset) in the neighboring cells. We then distinguish between cells where the number of events falls above the national mean and conflict cells that fall below country-level means.<sup>13</sup> We find evidence that conflict amplifies the effect of drought even if our analyses cannot ascertain whether climatic shocks cause conflict which then leads to migration or whether conflict and migration are two discrete consequences of global climate change. To sum up, we find relatively consistent evidence for the importance of push factors, indicating that what happens in neighboring cells does not there but rather the of urban in destination cells. stay intensifies pace growth We find evidence that is broadly supportive of the
in the data. It emerges that work in non-enterprise work, which households could use to bolster waning agricultural production, is indeed more prevalent in the lean season. Pooling all EHCVM countries except Chad, both household heads and all household members are about 3.6 percentage points more likely to be engaged in non-farm enterprise work in the lean season than the non-lean season (Table 7). This difference is statistically significant at (at least) the 5 percent level and is robust to the inclusion of controls. Nevertheless, altering the mix of activities in this way is unlikely to be possible for all Sahelian households. Looking across the countries, the effects are much stronger in Senegal, where household heads are as much as 5.8 percentage points more likely to engage in non-farm enterprise work in the lean season. Yet the descriptive statistics in Section 3 also demonstrate how non-agricultural activities are generally far less prevalent in rural areas; rural households may therefore struggle to find such activities when faced with the effects of the lean season.

> 25 For a detailed description of some additional income-generating activities undertaken by young people in Central Mali, see Von Der Goltz et al. (2022).

18
12.50|11.11|18.18|12.50|11.11||
|Within +/‐ 1 of benchmark<br>80.00|87.50|88.88|81.82|81.25|88.88||
|**Income vs. Consumption surveys (%, by benchm**|**ark year)**||||||
|**Consumption**<br>80|87.5|88.89|90.91|93.75|100.00|91.67|
|**Income**<br>20|12.5|11.11|9.09|6.25|0.00|8.33|
|**GDP (in 2011 PPP‐adjusted USD) (% of regional**|**GDP represe**|**nted in the**|**database)**||||
|**EAP**<br>95.00|99.02|99.55|99.38|99.48|96.30|98.12|
|**East Asia**<br>95.78|99.80|99.79|99.61|99.50|96.56|98.51|
|**CHN, IDN, PHL only**<br>100.00|100.00|100.00|100.00|100.00|100.00|100.00|
|**Other East Asia**<br>76.92|99.00|98.79|97.19|95.83|60.71|88.07|
|**Pacific islands**<br>0.00|0.00|55.88|32.71|92.
financial crises (e.g. Parker and Skoufias 2004). In such times, households in developing countries cope with declines in income by sending household members to seek employment in paid work (Jones _et al_ . 2009). Furthermore, cross-country evidence indicates that women‟s labor supply, particularly in Asia and Latin America, is counter-cyclical. That is, women engage in more employment and self-employment when aggregate income falls (Bhalotra and UmanaAponte 2010).

Nepal‟s decade-long conflict is likely to have had an impact on women‟s employment probabilities because of disruptions to family life. Not only did the conflict cause widespread mortality, especially among men, it also led to an increase in family separation rates and in disability rates among husbands. Thus women may have had to work more as they took on the role of sole bread-winners in their family. Another channel through which conflict may have induced greater labor force participation for women is through displacement of men in the household. As noted in Seddon and Adhikari (2003), mainly men left home on a temporary basis seeking work and security. It was not common for entire families to move as women often remained behind to look after land. Hence conflict may have induced additional work for women through different channels.

This study employs a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of war on women‟s employment decisions using data from the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey from 1996, 2001, and 2006. These data are used to test the hypothesis that with the displacement of male workers as a result of the Maoist insurgency, women‟s employment decisions exhibited an added worker effect. We find strong evidence that as compared to 1996, the year in which conflict started in Nepal, women‟s employment probabilities are significantly higher in 2001 and 2006 as a result of the conflict. These trends are evident in patterns of self-employment work as 3
|0.00|7.00|6531|
|mem5_10|# of members 5 – 10 years old|0.96|0.00|7.00|6531|
|mem10_15|# of members 10 – 15 years old|1.14|0.00|7.00|6531|
|mem15_64|# of members 15 – 64 years old|3.65|0.00|15.00|6531|
|mem_65|# of members 6 5 years and older|2.08|0.00|23.00|6531|
|farmsize|Farm size (ha)|5.19|0.00|517.10|6520|
|dmarket|Distance to market (km)|24.32|0.00|258.00|6531|
|_Instrumental varia_<br>|_bles_<br>|||||
|CSA-advice|Received advice on aspects of CSA|0.90|0.00|1.00|6531|
|div-advice|Received advice on crop diversity|0.74|0.00|1.00|6531|
|Mem-loan|Member of a loan/creditgroup|0.13|0.00|1.00|6531|

# 5. Results

- 5.1. What climate shocks do farmers face in Zambia and do these vary by locality, household type and socio-economic status?

This is based on the 2019 wave of the RALS survey which includes retrospective questions on whether households experienced any droughts or floods during the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 seasons. Over these four agricultural seasons, droughts were the most prevalent climate shock at the national level. The worst droughts—affecting nearly 63 percent (or 1,041,217) farm households—occurred during the 2018/2019 agricultural season (Tables 2 and S2). The worst floods—affecting about 12 percent or about 202
in elephant poaching relative to the mean poaching rate among control areas (Figure 3 and Table S3, Row 1). Areas destined for AP management experience rising rates of elephant poaching over the five years before transference, which suggests that law enforcement is weakening or poaching effort is escalating (Figure S1). AP may reduce elephant poaching by even more than 35% because in the absence of AP management, elephant poaching would likely have continued to increase (SI A.1). Spillover reductions in elephant poaching near areas transferred to AP management provide further evidence that the true reduction in elephant poaching due to AP management may be even larger than 35% (SI A.1.1).

In our evaluation of the effect of AP on bird abundances, we replicate the primary specification of a recent paper that used eBird data to study the relationship between air pollution regulation and bird abundances [59]. This approach limits researcher degrees of freedom (SI A.2). We estimate that AP management significantly increases bird abundances by 0.318 log points, or approximately 37% (Figure 3, Row 2). The downward trend in bird abundances prior to AP management means we may underestimate the true increase in bird populations (Figure S2).

This increase in bird abundances may occur because AP reduces bird hunting. Plausible alternatives do not fully explain our findings, such as AP changing where 7
Table 1 column 1 reports cross-region transfer multiplier estimates for permanent Social Security benet increases. In general, I nd that a $1 increase in permanent Social Security transfers to the residents of a state increases that state's relative labor income by around $1.5 contemporaneously, though the size of the multiplier can vary from 0.91.9 (about one standard error) across all specications in Table 1. In the parsimonious specication (row A1), the relative permanent transfer multiplier is almost exactly 1.5 (signicant at the 1% level). For the benchmark specication (row A2), the relative multiplier falls slightly to 1.3 (also signicant at 1%). This reects partially osetting eects of the two controls; if added individually, US GDP growth _×_ state FEs tend to reduce the permanent transfer multiplier to around 1.14 (row B1, signicant at the 1% level), whereas population growth tends to increase the multiplier to 1.61 (not reported, also signicant at the 1% level).<sup>18</sup> Table 1 Columns 2 and 3 reports cross region transfer multiplier estimates for one-o stimulus transfers, using per capita labor income or GDP (respectively) as the income measure. Unlike the scatter plots in Figure 1, the regressions control for state and time FEs, impose that the withdrawal of transfers reverses any earlier increase in income, and for labor income, pools across the 2001 and 2008 stimulus payments (recall GDP data are only available from 2005 so excludes the 2001 transfer). In general, I nd that $1 one-o transfers to the residents of a state increases that state's relative labor income or GDP by around $1/3 contemporaneously, with multipliers around $0.4 for GDP (range 0.350.47), and $0.25 for labor income
Policy Research Working Paper 7924

# **Abstract**

The majority of enterprises in many developing countries have no paid workers. This paper reports on a field experiment conducted in Sri Lanka that provided wage subsidies to randomly chosen microenterprises to test whether hiring additional labor would benefit such firms. In the presence of labor market frictions, a short-term subsidy could have a lasting impact on firm employment. Using 12 rounds of surveys to track dynamics four years after the end of the subsidy, the study finds that firms increased employment during the subsidy period, but there was no lasting impact on employment, profitability, or sales. Two supplementary interventions and treatment heterogeneity suggest the lack of impact is not due to complementarities with capital or management skills, and detailed survey data help rule out a number of theoretical mechanisms that could result in sub-optimally low employment. The study concludes that the urban labor market facing microenterprises does not have large frictions that would prevent own-account workers from becoming employers.

This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at dmckenzie@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by
*|**ted**|**S**|**patially **|**defate**|**d**|
|**Non-poor status:**||Non-|poor|Po|or|Non-|poor|Po|or|
|**DB:**||Urban|Rural|Urban|Rural|Urban|Rural|Urban|Rural|
|**DOU:**||||||||||
|Non-poor|Urban|96.3|1.8|0.0|1.9|97.6|1.9|0.5|0.0|
||Rural|34.6|32.0|0.0|33.3|64.7|32.3|2.3|0.7|
|Poor|Urban|0.0|0.0|96.9|3.1|7.0|0.3|90.3|2.4|
||Rural|0.0|0.0|44.7|55.3|1.1|2.2|58.9|37.9|

Source: International Urban Poverty Database. Note: WorldPop 250m is used for the DOU and DB methods. Poverty is measured using the $2.15 poverty line. In Panel (A), welfare is deflated using official spatial deflators. In Panel (B) and (C), welfare is deflated using our updated spatial deflators.

The Theil indexes range from 0.13 to 1.06 nationally among the countries analyzed in this study (Figure A14 and Figure A15). In most countries, urban Theil indexes are higher than rural Theil indexes, with a few exceptions such as Lesotho, Gabon, and Mauritania in the DOU definition, as well as Ghana and Gabon in the DB definition. The
matrix results, and finally, examine the performance of specific subsamples, such as men and women, and urban and rural.

Table 4 compares the percentages of NEETs in 2010 and 2018 derived from the cross-section data sets, the actual panel data tracking the same individuals in four survey rounds—notably 2010– 2011 and 2017–2018—and the synthetic panel based on cross-sectional data in 2010 and 2018. For 2010, there are no separate estimates of NEET rates based on the synthetic panel, because they are obtained using the share of individuals in the 2018 sample estimated from those who were NEET in 2010 and 2018, then adding the share of individuals falling into the NEET condition over the considered period.

**Table 4: NEET Percentage Rates in 2010 and 2018: Comparison of Cross-Section, Actual Panel and Synthetic Panel Lower- and Upper-bound Estimates**

|**Year**|**Lower-bound estimate**|**Cross-section**|**Actual panel**|**Upper-bound estimate**|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|**_2010_**|-|31.41<br>(30.96; 31.86)|31.82<br>(31.14; 32.51)|-|
|**_2018_**|46.66|46.66<br>(46.20; 47.12)|46.92<br>(46.33; 47.52)|46.66|

_Notes:_ results are restricted to the sample of individuals aged 15 to 24 in 2010 and aged 23 to 32 in 2018. “Lower” is the upper bound and “Upper” is the lower bound. Synthetic panel upper-bound estimates are based on 50 replications. Individual-level sampling weights are applied; 95 percent confidence intervals are given in parentheses.

Two key elements emerge from this comparison. First,
rural areas and with no formal education face more obstacles in regard to obtaining diagnostic services.

# **Drug Availability and Quality**

In Colombia, the regulatory framework for medicines for human use is not fully developed. The processes of price-setting and reimbursement are not regulated (i.e., the Government does not fix the price of drugs). There are no measures to control drug offering (no reference pricing systems, negative or positive drug lists, etc.), or to promote the rational use of drugs (measures on drug prescriptions, incentives to generic drug uptake, etc.)—and the pharmaceutical distribution processes are complex.

Regarding the availability of drugs, the Health Regulation Commission ( _Comisión de Regulación en Salud_ , CRES) has established two specific lists of medicines to which people have access, depending on their insurance status:

- A list of drug products for persons who are affiliated with the contributory regime and for persons who are younger than 18 and are affiliated with the subsidized regime. The doctor of the IPS is required to choose from this list when making prescriptions, and the drugs have to meet the characteristics described in the POS.

- A second list of drug products for persons who are 18 or older and are affiliated with the subsidized regime. The POS of the subsidized regime describes the conditions, cases and treatment uses of the drugs authorized to be used.

In 2005, 72% of people with HIV/AIDS had access to ARV therapy. Goal 8 of Objective 3 of the PEN was to achieve an access rate of 86% by 2009, and of 96% by 2011.<sup>48</sup> However, as can be seen in table 6 below—which uses data from UNGASS 2010<sup>49</sup> —the rate of access to ARV therapy has gone down.

> 48 MPS (Enero 2008) Plan Nacional de Respuesta ante el VIH y Sida 2008-2011, Bogotá: MPS.

> 49 MPS (2011) Informe