rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
1 pp), which shows that some of the difference between men- and women-led businesses in the probability to remain closed six weeks after the peak crisis reflects gender differences in firm size and the fact that male and female entrepreneurs tend to operate in different industries. This finding is qualitatively in line with the evidence from other works in the literature. Based on data for 488 small and growing businesses in emerging markets, ANDE (2020b), for example, reports that women-led businesses were significantly more likely to shut down due to COVID-19 than men-led businesses. The Future of Business Survey (FBS), a data source for small- and medium sized enterprises with a Facebook Business page, reports that businesses led by women were seven pp more likely to be closed at the time of the survey compared to businesses led by men (Facebook et al., 2020).

Further disaggregation of our results by firm size using the conditional estimates shows that the gender gap in temporary business closure is significant among micro-enterprises (-2.6 pp) and medium and large firms (-1.6 pp). In terms of sectors, we see that the gender gap is largest, and to the disadvantage of women, in the hospitality sector (-5.3 pp) followed by other services (-4.7 pp)–two sectors in which female entrepreneurs are disproportionately engaged. Conversely, there is a gender gap to the disadvantage of men among manufacturing enterprises (2.6 pp). Moreover, female entrepreneurs’ disadvantage in the likelihood that their businesses remain closed is driven by countries that experienced severe shocks and large declines in mobility (third or fourth quartile, as per Google data). Among countries with less severe shocks, gender differences in the probability of businesses to remain closed are either not significant (first quartile) or to the

> 12We run our computations using STATA. We use the command margins to compute the gender gaps.

> 13Our preferred specification to disentangle price from composition effects is interacting
a state resulted in a 4.4 percent contraction in public spending after the Law (with the state’s ratio of public expenditure to GDP dropping by -0.012*0.7=0.7 p.p.). The second indicator, _Infrastructures,y_ , is the ratio of public spending on infrastructure to the state’s GDP. This

> 34 To validate our difference-in-difference strategy in the firm-year-level data, we again conduct several checks. First, we compare firm outcomes in the pre-reform period for firms located in municipalities with local public debt exposure above and below the median (Table A3C). The data confirms that both groups of firms are statistically indistinguishable on our outcomes of interest prior to the Law. Second, we check if the firm-level outcomes followed parallel trends in the pre-reform period. To conduct this test, we run regressions outlined on equation 2 on our firmyear data, restricting the sample to the period prior to the introduction of the FD Law. Results summarized in Table A2F, confirm that in the pre-reform period, the outcomes of interest follow parallel trends across states of varying indebtedness.

22
contacts also trust others less, the more heterogeneous their community is” suggesting strategic complementarities in trust that can lead to multiple equilibria whereby high levels of trust encourage further trust building and vice-versa. A third strand of the literature goes back to basics to ask what trust questions like those used in the World Values Surveys really measure. For instance, Glaeser and others (2000) show that individuals do not show the same trust characteristics in experimental games as they do in their responses to trust questions—although more trusting responses to survey questions are given by those who are themselves more trustworthy in experimental games. People may confuse trusting others and being worthy of the trust of others. These results appear to hold in the middle-income settings of Thailand and Vietnam as well (Carprenter and others 2004). Glaeser and others’ (2000) initial contribution ignited a lively debate (see for instance, Fehr and others 2003); recent work by Sapeinza and others (2008) shows that the lack of a relationship between experimental and survey-based approaches arises because experimental games confound the respondent’s characteristics (such as risk aversion) with their belief/trust in others. They argue that questions such as those in the WVS legitimately measure variation in trust in populations. Related to the notion that respondent characteristics are correlated with their responses on questions of trust, Eckel and Wilson (2004) experimentally test the idea that trust is related to risk aversion (Ben-Ner and Putterman 2001 and Karlan 2005)—individuals with more risky attitudes also trust more. Their results suggest little relationship between risk attitudes and trust; in a complementary study, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) suggest that the psychological costs of perceived betrayal may be closely related to trust.

To our knowledge, there is currently no information on the effect of foreign aid on trust or on the impact of disasters on trust. Closest to our study is the fascinating work by Berman, 8
sixth recommendation would be to consider in greater detail whether the limited time frame of the priority survey will yield accurate estimates of expenditure given seasonality in expenditures. If a limited time frame is adopted, including questions on normative monthly food purchases would be a useful supplement to the monthly recall estimate for those households that do not purchase an item during all months of the year.

Three puzzles emerge from the household survey data that merit special consideration in future household surveys in CMte d'Ivoire. First, what accounts for the huge increase in poverty at various points in time in the West Forest ? Are there special sampling problems in the West Forest? Or special difficulties in estimating the value of consumption of home production? Second, why did the Savannah do relatively much better than the Forest region after the devaluation? Here one suspects that the problem may be misspecification of the regional deflators. But perhaps off-farm sources of income may vary significantly from the rest of the country. And third, did the situation of agricultural workers really improve between 1993 and 1995? If so, will it continue to improve? What will happen to labor earnings as the land frontier vanishes? Labor will become a less scarce commodity, and the forms of labor hire, which have depended heavily on sharecropping-type contracts which give the sharecropper eventual rights to the land, will likely shift. It would be useful in future surveys to think about ways of distinguishing among different types of agricultural workers. At this point in time, the household surveys in C6te d'Ivoire raise as many questions as they answer about the changes in poverty over time.

33 Unfortunately the analyses that have been carried out of poverty rates among different socioeconomic groups with respec **t** o the 1985-1988 do not provide information about how the classification of the socioeconomic groups correlates with sources of income.

47
Policy Research Working Paper 0

# **Abstract**

This paper studies the medium-term impact of early-life welfare transfers on children’s learning. It studies children who were exposed to the randomized controlled trial of the Mexico’s Food Support Program (the P _rograma de Apoyo Alimentario_ , PAL), in which households were assigned to receive cash, in-kind food transfers, or nothing (a control). The children are matched with administrative data on primary school standardized tests, which were taken four to 10 years after the experiment began. The findings show that in-kind transfers did not impact test scores, while cash transfers led to a significant and meaningful decrease in test scores. An analysis of the mechanisms driving these results reveals that both transfers led to an increase in child labor, which is likely detrimental to learning. In-kind food transfers, however, induced a greater consumption of several key micronutrients that are vital for brain development, which likely attenuated the negative impacts of child labor on learning.

This paper is a product of the Education Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted atcavitabile@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the
with a large margin of error. Our preschool interaction is only significant at 15% (t-statistic is 1.61) in the larger sample (column 3). One additional preschool per 1,000 children appears to increase the number of female workers by 1 percent. The coefficient remains positive but becomes instead close to zero in the restricted TFP sample (column 4).

Second, we corroborate the finding that plants are more able to tap into female workers’ skills by using the data from SAKERNAS. We use repeated cross-section, spanning the years from 2007 to 2014, and estimate individual-level regression: where yidt is a labor market outcome for individual _i_ in district _d_ at time _t._ We analyze three binary outcomes: employment in manufacturing, employment in services and wage employment. Femalei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman, and Preschooldt is defined based on PODES data: number of preschools per child in district _d_ at time _t._ Xidt is a vector of time-variant variables, which include education, experience, and experience squared. γdt is a district-time fixed effect.

While we cannot establish a causal impact, we can explore associations between preschool availability and women’s employment. Table 10 shows that being a woman is negatively associated with employment in manufacturing, services and wage employment. However, the availability of preschools in the district appears to reduce this gender penalty. The coefficient on interaction between Femalei and our measure of preschool density is positive and strongly significant. An increase in one standard deviation (0.003 additional preschool per child) increases the likelihood of employment in manufacturing by 0.27 percentage points more for women.

We also limit the sample to women, and check whether preschool availability affects women’s employment differently, depending on the presence of children under 10 in the household.<sup>7</sup> We estimate:

> 7 SAKERNAS only establishes the presence of children in the household, not the relationship with female respondents. It also
# **4. The Distributional Impact of Cambodia’s Fiscal System**

## **Size effect of fiscal interventions**

Comparisons of average income per capita at each income concept reveals the size effect of fiscal interventions. The difference between _market income_ and _disposable income_ reflects the net effect of direct taxes and direct transfers. The difference between _disposable income_ and _consumable income_ reflects the net effect of indirect taxes and subsidies. The difference between _consumable income_ and _final income_ reflects the net effect of in-kind transfers. The difference between _market income_ and _final income_ reveals the overall change in average per capita income from the operation of the full fiscal system.

Among three main categories of fiscal interventions, indirect and in-kind fiscal interventions have the largest size effect on incomes in Cambodia. There is a sizable decline in average per capita income due to indirect fiscal interventions as revealed in the transition from _disposable income_ to _consumable income_ . The reduction in income indicates that on average indirect taxes paid exceed subsidies received. There is a sizable increase in average per capita income due to the receipt of public education and health services as revealed in the transition from _consumable income_ to _final income_ . Direct taxes and transfers have a small size effect on incomes, reflecting the small size of the formal sector in Cambodia and limited social protection spending as is shown later. We ought to bear in mind though that a high proportion of salary taxes, and other direct taxes, on the highest earners cannot be simulated on the CSES data due to underrepresentation of high-income households, as is common in household survey data. This implies that both the total and the average values of incomes, and the differences between them would have been different if we could account for the top income households correctly. Similarly, average implications of different forms of fiscal interventions would look differently if richest households were fully represented in the data.

Figure 6: Average monthly per capita income (KHR) by income concept Figure 7: Net effect of the fiscal system and its elements on average monthly
Policy Research Working Paper 10887

# **Abstract**

How redistributive are fiscal policies in China? This paper applies the standard fiscal incidence analysis to data from the China Family Panel Study 2018 to study the effect of government taxes and spending on inequality in China. The analysis includes fiscal elements, such as personal income tax, contributions to social insurance, value-added tax, consumption tax, cash transfers, contributory pensions, and spending on education and health, and accounts for 63 percent of total revenues and 43 percent of total government spending. Consistent with previous studies, the paper finds that fiscal policy in China continues to redistribute quite effectively, achieving inequality reduction of about 10.3 Gini points, placing China around the median of upper-middle-income country peers on the level of redistribution achieved by fiscal policy. Not unlike several other countries where similar analysis has been done, most of the inequality reduction achieved by China is through education and health spending. Findings from the paper further suggest that while the fiscal system delivers more to those who need the most support, the heavy burden of user fees— relative to disposable income—may prevent some families from accessing needed health care services and imply high costs of raising children. In addition, there is room for the progressivity of the overall package to be enhanced. In particular, the fiscal system could make a greater dent in inequality by collecting more from those who could afford to pay more and leaving more money in the pockets of those who need it the most. This could be done by increasing the share of fiscal revenues collected through progressive taxes such as personal income tax and increasing the level of cash-based social benefits (such as residents’ pensions and transfers).

This paper is a product of the Human Development Practice Group and the Poverty and Equity Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http
Policy Research Working Paper 5442

# **Abstract**

Although Kenya’s financial system is by far the largest and most developed in East Africa and its stability has improved significantly over the past years, many challenges remain. This paper assesses the stability, efficiency, and outreach of Kenya’s banking system, using aggregate, bank-level, and survey data. Banks’ asset quality and liquidity positions have improved, making the system more resistant to shocks, and interest rate spreads have declined, in part due to reduction in the overhead costs of foreign banks. Outreach remains limited, but has improved in recent years, driven by mobile payments services in the domestic remittance market. Fostering a level regulatory playing field for all deposit-taking institutions is a key remaining challenge. Specifically, an effective but not overly burdensome framework for regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions and cooperatives is a priority. Maintaining an openness to new, and non-bank, providers of financial services, which has enabled the success of mobile payments, could also further outreach.

This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to study the efficiency and outreach of African financial sectors. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rcull@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._
||Energy expenses<br>by income<br>quintile|Consumption<br>expenditure on<br>electricity, gas, and other<br>fuels as a share of<br>income-by-income<br>quintile|EUROSTAT<br>based on<br>Harmonized<br>HBS<sup>17</sup>|Yes, but only<br>for 2005,<br>2010, 2015,<br>and 2020|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Ability to keep<br>home adequately<br>warm|Share of the population<br>unable to keep home<br>adequatelywarm|EU-SILC|Yes|
||Arrears on utility<br>bills|Share of population with<br>arrears of utilitybills|EU-SILC|Yes|
|Consensual|Dwellings<br>comfortable cool<br>in the<br>summertime|Share of the population<br>able to keep home<br>comfortably cool|EU-SILC|Not available<br>for BGR<sup>18</sup>|
||Dwellings<br>comfortable<br>warm in<br>wintertime|Share of the population<br>able to keep home<br>comfortably warm|EU-SILC|Not available<br>for BGR|
||Presence of leak,<br>damp, rot.|Share of population<br>reporting leakage|EU-SILC|Yes|
||Biomass prices|Average household price<br>per kWh generated from<br>biomass|BSO|No|
||Coal prices|Average household price<br>per kWh generated from<br>coal|BSO|No|
|Energy|Fuel oil prices|Average household prices<br>per kWh generated from<br>fuel oil|BSO|No|
|Prices|Household<br>electricity<sup>
**The external tariff liberalization agenda has yet to be completed.** Notwithstanding the progress made in the last decade, the level of tariff protection in the MENA region vis-à-vis the rest of the world remains relatively high by international standards. According to the Tariff-only Trade Restrictiveness Index (TTRI),<sup>14</sup> only the South Asia region had a level of tariff

restrictiveness higher than the MENA region in 2008 (Figure 4). The MENA region compares unfavorably with its main competitors in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific—the new dynamic poles of the world economy. In particular, agriculture in the Arab world is still relatively heavily protected by high tariffs. Further external liberalization is all the more important as some countries may be adversely affected by trade diversion and the economic size of the Arab world is limited. Arab countries that are members of the PAFTA represents a little less than Spain’s GDP. With relatively small domestic markets, trade and investment liberalization become key to integrate the region into production sharing or processing-type of trade, where each country specializes in its areas of comparative advantage and factor endowment to serve bigger markets. As discussed below, a pre-condition for this to materialize, however, is a substantial increase in the efficiency of logistics and other trade services.

**_Figure 4.  Tariff-only Trade Restrictiveness Index (TTRI) by region, 2008_**

<!-- Start of picture text --> TTRI<br>Percent<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>East Asia & Europe & Central Latin America & Middle East & South Asia Sub-Saharan<br>Pacific Asia Caribbean North Africa Africa<br>Total trade Agrigulture Manufacturing<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank and UNCTAD staff estimates.

**Non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become the
and capital reallocation. This paper finds that, in the context of a developing economy characterized by highly distorted markets, job creation by entrants is inefficient, and job destruction is largely explained by unproductive, older firms that continue to operate. Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on the pivotal role of firm outcomes in explaining wage inequality. Papers such as Faggio et al. (2010), Barth et al. (2016), Berlingieri et al. (2017), Manning (2021), and Criscuolo (2020, 2021, 2022), among others, have documented that firms are important for explaining wage variation among workers. Furthermore, Criscuolo (2020, 2021, 2022) have studied potential drivers of misallocation that are linked to wage inequality outcomes for OECD countries. This paper builds upon this work by simultaneously linking drivers of misallocation to wage inequality in a developing economy, underscoring the relevance of non-wage labor costs and product market distortions for wage dispersion.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset leveraged for the different empirical analyses. Section 3 provides aggregate motivating facts about aggregate productivity and inequality trends in Ecuador. Section 4 documents productivity, market selection, and life cycle patterns of Ecuadorian firms. Section 5 studies the main channels and drivers of aggregate productivity growth in Ecuador. Sections 6 and 7 characterize firm distributional and job flow patterns, respectively. Section 8 assesses the role of firm dynamics on wage inequality in Ecuador. Last, Section 9 concludes.

# **2 Data**

This paper utilizes two firm-level datasets and one employee-level database to construct a comprehensive employer-employee matched dataset, facilitating a simultaneous examination of firm and labor outcomes. The first source is the Directory of Companies and Establishments (Directorio de Empresas y Establecimientos [DIEE]), a public database created by the Ecuadorian Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos [INEC]), which incorporates firm administrative data from the national revenue service (Servicio de Rentas Internas [SRI]) and firms’ employment