rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
# **3. Econometric Methodology**

The core of our empirical analysis consists in estimating the following production function: where _y_ denotes real output, _k_ and _h_ represent physical capital and human capital, respectively, and _z_ denotes the infrastructure capital. All variables (except human capital) are expressed in log per worker terms (e.g. _kit_ = ln( _Kit_ / _Lit_ ) where _Lit_ represents the workforce) and, in keeping with the majority of earlier literature, constant returns to scale have been imposed. The subscripts _i_ and _t_ index countries and years, respectively;  i and  t capture country-specific and time-specific productivity factors, and  it is a random disturbance that will be assumed uncorrelated across countries and over time.<sup>20</sup>

## **3.1 Panel unit root testing**

Empirical assessments of the output contribution of infrastructure using time-series data have often failed to deal adequately with the non-stationarity of the variables. Here we address the issue using panel unit root and cointegration tests developed in the recent panel time-series literature. Unlike the traditional panel literature, which deals with samples in which the crosssectional dimension _N_ is large but the time dimension _T_ is small, the panel time-series literature is concerned with situations in which both _N_ and _T_ are of the same order of magnitude; see Breitung and Pesaran (2008) for an overview. As a considerable literature has shown, the panel time-series (or multivariate) approach to integration and cointegration testing yields higher test power than separate, conventional tests for each unit in the panel; see, for example, Levin, Lin and Chu (2002).

The first step is to test for the stationarity of the variables under consideration, namely, output, the stocks of physical and human capital, and the composite index of infrastructure capital, all (except for human capital) measured in logs per worker. As a preliminary step, we remove the cross-sectional means from the data, to render the disturbances cross-sectionally

>
of gross output (LVA share) has remained fairly constant since 1995, for both the direct and total LVA share. This finding suggests that the determinants of labor shares in exports may be divorced somewhat from those in output, potentially due to different changes in the composition of exports and output.

**Figure 2. Direct and total LVA share**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.6<br>0.5<br>0.4<br>0.3<br>0.2<br>0.1<br>total LVA share direct LVA share<br>0<br>1995 1997 2001 2004 2007 2011<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: Based on export-weighted data for 31 countries that are present in the database every year since 1995, including: China, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, China, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, China, UK and USA.

In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we split the world into three income groups to understand the drivers of these aggregate trends.<sup>13</sup> In order to gauge the evolution of our indicators over time we draw trend lines using data only for the 31 countries that are present in the database over the whole period 1995-2011, and group countries according to their 1995 income classification. The group of high-income countries is the only group that experienced a considerable and steady decline in both the direct and total LVAX share, and drives the observed declining trend at the global level. In the middle-income group both the direct and the total LVAX share remained rather stable. In the low-income group the total LVAX share increased, notably
we allowed for project participation by host governments through carried interests, which is another mechanism by which resource rents can be taxed away.

The simplified analysis allows three points to be made. First, resource rent is a stock concept, a present value at the project’s inception, which in theory has an infinite number of ways to be taxed as flows during the project’s life. A project’s resource rent does not equal profit during operations. Nor is it approximated by profit. Second, the proper calculation of resource rent requires an intertemporal estimation of project

> 25 _ICMM Members’ Tax Contribution - Focusing on Corporate Income Tax and Royalties – 2022 Update._ ICMM, December 2023. The effective tax rate is the ratio of total corporate income tax payments and royalty payments across 25 member companies making up one-third of global mine and mineral production divided by total company profits before tax, impairments, other exceptional items, and royalties charged above the profit before tax line for these same member companies. ICMM does not provide a range across the sample, although it does show that the average is relatively stable from year to year.

> 26 The most useful surveys of mining project and company taxation include Boadway and Keen (2015 and 2010), and Guj (2012).

19
the respective financial accounts.

The World Bank’s Public Expenditure Database BOOST compiles information on the level and composition of the first category of on-budget government expenditures for a growing number of emerging and low-income countries at quite a high level of granularity, currently around 75.<sup>3</sup> The sample is heterogeneous ranging from large countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa) to several small islands. It spans all major country income groups, including 22 low-income (LIC), 26 lower-middle income (LMIC), 21 upper-middle income (UMIC), and 8 high-income (HIC) countries, classified according to the level of gross national income per-capita. Due to the relatively small number of high-income countries, no disaggregated analysis is performed for this group. While the sample is not representative by design, with disproportionate representation of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, it does account for about 40 percent of the population and 30 percent of the GDP of low- and middle-income countries globally (Appendix Table A2.2). Moreover, by excluding China and India, which are known to be relatively large spenders on infrastructure and often disproportionately influence global developing country averages, the sample provides a more realistic picture of the infrastructure spending situation across the bulk of emerging nations.

> 3 While there are 77 countries covered in BOOST, two had to be dropped. The first is Pakistan, where coverage is limited to the province of Punjab. The second is São Tomé Príncipe, where there were some concerns about data quality and coverage.

3
lack of collateral, informational asymmetries and largely imperfect local capital markets. For instance, Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010), in a study investigating 947 small and medium entrepreneurial firms in several manufacturing firms in eleven Sub-Saharan African countries<sup>22</sup> , report that financial constraints are singled out as the major obstacle (from between eleven

> 21 Consistent econometric outcomes can also be found in Mead and Liedholm (1998); Gunning and Mengistae (2001); Bigsten and Söderbom (2006); Coad and Tamvada, 2012. 22 The authors extracted their firm-level data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey.

20
**Figure 1  Estimates of primary student dropouts by 2020 growth projections release**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 0.0 4.5<br>MPO-Mar WEO-Apr MPO-May MPO-Oct<br>4.0<br>-1.0 -0.9 3.8<br>3.5<br>-2.0 3.0<br>2.9<br>-2.4<br>2.5<br>-3.0 2.3<br>-3.4<br>2.0<br>-4.0 1.5<br>1.4<br>1.0<br>-5.0<br>-5.1<br>0.5<br>-6.0 0.0<br>Projection Release Date<br>Growth Projections 2020 (p.p.)* Number of Primary School drop-outs (in millions of students)<br>(in millions of students)<br>Growth Projections 2020 (p.p.)*<br>Number of primary school drop-outs<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: GDP per capita growth projections in for 2020 from WB-MPO (March, 2020); IMF-WEO (April, 2020); WB-MPO (May, 2020); and WB-MPO (Oct, 2020); (*) Growth projections are weighted by the student cohort of each country, and will different from other global averages reported in the original publications, in are weighted by GDP.

# **Scenarios**

- All scenarios assume that, as of today, remote learning cannot fully match face-to-face delivery. <mark>Although most countries have made heroic efforts to put remote and remedial learning strategies in place, learning losses are accumulating rapidly. A recent survey on national education responses to COVID-19 by UNICEF, UNESCO, and the
policy of “slum declaration.” Similar policies are implemented under the name of “slum notification” in other parts of India, as well. This formalization of land tenure differs from common titling programs that provide full property title; slum declaration only guarantees the occupancy of slum residents and their entitlement to basic services. Even in formalized or “declared” slums, people have no legal basis in other bundles of property rights, such as the right to develop, inherit, sell, lease, or mortgage their houses. This characteristic of slum declaration offers a researcher an opportunity to examine whether the legal assurance of occupancy rights, rather than the provision of a full bundle of property rights, can benefit slum dwellers.

For the empirical investigation, this paper assesses the slum residents’ willingness to pay for the benefits of slum declaration. Applying a generalized spatial two-stage least square (GSTSLS) model developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and Kelejian and Prucha (2010), this paper develops a spatial hedonic model to identify and estimate the premium captured in housing rent in the informal housing market. Accounting for spatial autocorrelation and heterogeneity, as well as a host of housing, slum, and locational characteristics, the model makes it possible to reveal the tenure security premium associated with slum declaration status. Based on the identification strategy proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005), this paper then explores the heterogeneity of the estimated marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) depending on household characteristics.

This paper draws on rare datasets that help to adequately take into account the legal, social, political, and geographical factors that are deeply embedded in the local contexts. The primary data source is a household survey conducted by the author in 2013. The surveys were collected from 562 slum households that represent the slum households in the entire city of Pune. This paper also retrieves slum-level information from the _Pune Slum Atlas_ , prepared by the Maharashtra Social Housing and Action League, or MASHAL (MASHAL, 2011)
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.08.003

- Rentschler, J., Kornejew, M., Hallegatte, S., Obolensky, M., & Braese, J. (2019). Underutilized potential: The business costs of unreliable infrastructure in developing countries. _World Bank Policy Research Working Paper_ .

- Schmink, M. (1986). The &quot;Working group&quot; approach to women and urban services. _Women and Space in Human Settlements_ . Athens Center of Ekistics. https://doi.org/10.2307/43621947

- UN-Habitat. (2009). _Planning sustainable cities : global report on human settlements 2009_ . Retrieved from https://unhabitat.org/books/global-report-on-human-settlements-2009-planningsustainable-cities/

- van Asselt, M. B. A., & Renn, O. (2011). Risk governance. _Journal of Risk Research_ , _14_ (4), 431–449. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2011.553730

WEF. (2018). _The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018_ . Cologny: World Economic Forum.

- World Bank. (2017). Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

World Bank. (2018a). Logistics Performance Index. Retrieved from https://lpi.worldbank.org/

- World Bank. (2018b). Open Budgets Portal - BOOST initiative. Retrieved February 11, 2018, from http://boost.worldbank.org/

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# **Conclusions**

Workers’ remittances constitute an increasingly important source of income for many families in developing countries, especially poor families, whose relatives have emigrated to other countries in an effort to improve their own and their family’s well-being. While in 1996 developing countries received $58 billion dollars in remittances, in 2003 they received $96 billion dollars. For 25 developing countries, remittances represented more than 5% of their GDP in 2003. If the upward trend in international migration and mobility of people continues, workers’ remittances are likely to become even more important for developing countries in the future.

Despite the increasing volume and value of remittance inflows to developing countries, this study found that most countries do not have in place the mechanisms that would allow them to maximize the developmental effect of remittance inflows. Data on remittances is not adequate, fees paid by senders and recipients of remittances are still high, and many recipients of remittances in developing countries do not have access to financial products that would allow them to improve their living conditions –such as bank accounts, life and non-life insurance products, consumer credit, etc. Moreover, if more people in developing countries had better options to save a part of their remittance income in formal financial institutions, then a larger part of the remittance flows that countries receive could be channeled to finance productive investments, thus fostering economic growth.

The study found that there is a need to improve the data on remittances in most countries covered in the survey. In many countries, remittance statistics are based on data that commercial banks provide to central banks or other financial sector authorities. However, remittances paid by money transfer companies – which tend to dominate the remittance industry in many countries – or other types of financial institutions (such as credit unions, post offices) are often not captured in remittance statistics in developing countries. Only 38% of countries collect data from money transfer companies. Moreover, less than 25% of countries measure remittance transactions that occur through informal channels,
The further use of implicit stratification proposed by the “Poverty map” design is able to further reduce the design effect to 1.87. This could lead to a reduction in the needed sample size (and costs) and the desired maximum percentage error.

**Figure 2. Sample sizes (left) and gains in cost (right) as function of expected maximum error**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 40000 6<br>35000 5<br>4<br>30000<br>3<br>25000<br>2<br>20000<br>1<br>15000<br>0<br>10000<br>-1<br>5000 -2<br>0 -3<br>4.5 5 5.5 5.7 5.9 6 7 8 9 10<br><!-- End of picture text --> Based on the right column of Table 5, the INS has decided to adopt a final size of 21,600 households selected from 1,800 PSUs. This choice, also seen in Figure 2, is based on two main considerations: i) this size not only permits getting maximum percentage errors less than 10%, which can also reach 5.7%, which is even below the estimated maximum value in the EBCNV 2015; ii) thus, the total cost of the survey will be about 5.2 million Tunisian dinars, with a 1.7 million dinar increase in cost when compared with the initial estimated budget.

# **5. Discussion, further research, and concluding remarks**

In this paper we have proposed an original methodology for improving the design effect of household surveys in general and Household Budget Surveys in particular. This is carried out by using the results of a poverty mapping exercise implemented by the method developed by the World Bank. Moreover, we have described how the new JRR method, proposed by Verma
present the top 1% share using the microdata complementing survey data with tax records, but before any adjustments to national accounts. For recent years, this series roughly doubles the top 1% share from 10% to 20%, but still falls 5 - 10 p.p. short of the estimates using National accounts information. This gap is explained in large part by the discrepancy between microdata and national accounts’ aggregates of capital income.

# **7 Additional Results - Tax panel data**

In this section we explore more in depth the top of the income distribution using tax records. We focus on three dimensions – the importance of undistributed corporate profits at the top; the dynamics and persistence of individuals at the top; and gender gaps among highest earners. For all the analyses in this section, we use the income distribution observed in the tax records, without any adjustments for macroeconomic aggregates or merging with survey microdata. For a more detailed description of of . income levels and composition in tax records see Appendix E 15
growth of skills demand.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the model can easily be updated with new data to deliver timely analysis of emerging labor market dynamics.

Prospective job seekers and training institutions can use these forecasts to tailor their education and training curricula to reflect trends in the demand for specific skills. Similarly, policy makers can identify skills gaps and make demand-driven policy decisions. These gaps may reflect the types of skills demanded or differences in demand conditions across geographical locations. Real-time data can also provide an early warning of disruptions in the labor market. For example, slowing wage growth during 2015 may pose a sign of weakening trend in workforce skills demand.

# **5.5. Experimental Studies**

Firms often pilot new business strategies to test their effectiveness. Horton and Tambe (2015) found that experimentation in digital markets is often simple and inexpensive, since interactions between users are computer-mediated and interfaces are relatively easy to modify. Horton (2016) conducted an experiment in which oDesk<sup>22</sup> introduced algorithmic recommendations for employers about which workers to hire. He found that the employers with technical job vacancies that received recruiting recommendations had a 20 percent higher fill rate compared to the control group, and there was no evidence that the treatment crowded out the hiring of non-recommended candidates. Gee (2015) collaborated with LinkedIn on an experiment that tested whether access to additional information affects job application behavior and found that additional information increased completed job applications by 1.9 percent overall, and by as much as 6 percent among female applicants.

# **_Application of the Analysis to Babajob Data_**

Babajob is currently considering an experimental study designed to improve employment transitions and promote better matches between job seekers and employers.<sup>23</sup> Frictional unemployment is the time that workers spend between jobs, which can be extended if inadequate information constrains employers’ capability to select good candidates. This is particularly the case for subjective employee characteristics and skills that are not
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Bank’s January _Global Economic Prospects_ , the International Monetary Fund’s January _World Economic Outlook_ , January Consensus Forecasts, January Focus Economics Forecasts, the World Bank's _Statistical Capacity Indicator,_ the World Bank's _Statistical Performance Indicators,_ the World Bank’s _World Development Indicators_ , the Export Commodity Price Shocks data from Gruss and Kebhaji (2019), and the UCDP-PRIO Dataset for Conflict, the World Bank’s _Worldwide Governance Indicators,_ Polity5 dataset version 2018 from the Center for Systemic Peace, and the EM-DAT (The International Disaster Database).

Note: GDP growth forecast errors are calculated as the forecasted GDP growth rates minus realized GDP growth rates. Absolute growth forecast errors are calculated as the absolute value of the forecast errors. The summary statistics are based on the sample of the main regression results. Variables used in robustness checks or extensions of the main results may have fewer observations than the main regression results.

Additional robustness checks of our models required data on institutions, informality and natural disasters. Data on the quality of institutions were obtained from the Polity5 Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset by the Center for Systemic peace, mainly the Polity Index, as well as the Rule of Law Indicator from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. Informality is proxied by the share of “self-employed” individuals in total employment from ILO estimates. Finally, a natural 11
. The total amount of funding to each village was the same regardless of the size of the village, so village size provides a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the amount of credit increase per household. The funds were not directly targeted at women, but women were among the program beneficiaries. Kaboski and Townsend‟s (2007) analysis samples came from the Townsend Thai project, which gathered panel data on rural and semi-urban households and businesses from 64 villages in four Thai provinces from 1997 to 2007.

The behavioral model is based on the standard buffer stock model of savings behavior under income uncertainty (e.g., Aiyagiri (1994) and Deaton (1991)) with the additional feature that households have an investment option in each period. The household‟s problem is to maximize 34
the average years of schooling) is a far-from-perfect proxy for a country’s human capital but, given the lack of alternative education indicators, this measure plays a satisfactory role in growth regressions. The indicator does not capture the changes either in the quality of education or in the education system capacity to meet the skill composition of labor demand. We use the Barro and Lee (2010) educational attainment international dataset and refer to population above 25 years of age. An additional limitation of the measure of average years of schooling is that it ―assumes unrealistically that a year of education adds a constant quantity of human capital, whether undertaken by a primary pupil or a college student‖ (Barro and Lee, 2001, pp. 558). Nevertheless, the expected sign is positive since human capital formation is expected to exhibit growth-conducive effects.

The relationship between population growth ( _popgr_ ) and growth continues to raise controversies among development economists. ―Population pessimists‖ argue that population growth inhibits development since greater population requires additional production capital per worker and involves public costs for raising children (e.g., Johnson and Lee, 1987). The mainstream neoclassical growth models predict that population growth has the same effect as depreciation: the increased supply of labor reduces the capital stock per unit of labor. According to this class of models, the steady state level of output will, all other things equal, increase if the rate of population growth decelerates. On the other hand, the camp of ―population optimists‖ conjectures that population growth in the long run brings ―improvement of productivity through both the contribution of new ideas and also the learning-by-doing consequent upon increased production volume‖ (Simon, 1987, p. 168). In particular, the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Lucas, 1990; and Romer, 1990 and 1994) emphasizes that the non-rivalry of new ideas accompanied by population growth are strong engines of economic growth. The proponents of 8