rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
....................... 45|
|Annex 3. Water Catchment Project SEI Calculations, by Region ...................................................... 47|
|Annex 4. Water Catchment Project FEI Calculations, by Region...................................................... 50|
|Annex 5. Road Transport Raw Project Data ........................................................................................... 53|
|Annex 6. Road Transport Project SEI Calculations, by Region (with standard poverty rate) .... 54|
|Annex 7. Road Transport Project SEI Calculations, by Region (with multidimensional index|
|poverty rate) ............................................................................
# **6 Conclusion**

This paper uses the employer-employee census in Brazil and data from ORBIS to better measure the state footprint in Brazil. BOS in Brazil are, on average, larger, older, and more innovative than the average private sector firm. This is especially the case for private firms with public investments, which are almost double the size of public firms and much more innovative when proxied by the share of technical occupations. This may suggest that the government’s investment decisions are strategically focused on large, more productive, and innovative companies. In addition, SOEs are more present in sectors with high sunk costs and natural monopolies, but participated firms are more present in some manufacturing sectors, such as spacecraft or motor vehicles. Another interesting result is that there are heterogeneities across BOS types - public, mixed-capital, and private firms with direct or indirect state participation. In the three dimensions explored, participated firms outperformed public and mixed firms, which suggests inherent differences between this group of firms and other BOS.

Furthermore, we have explored the employment outcomes associated with working on a BOS in more detail. Consistent with the findings in other countries, we find a positive and significant wage premium associated with working on a BOS. Workers in BOS enjoy a wage premium ranging from 15.6% to 18.5%, partially due to their skill composition. However, when controlling for worker fixed effects, the premium decreases in magnitude to 4.5%. Although the average wage of BOS relative to private firms is highest for participated firms, this difference disappears once we account for occupation and worker characteristics essential to the wage-setting mechanism. Hence, in our preferred specification, we observe a wage premium only with public and mixed firms.

As an additional exercise, we use some episodes of privatization of public and mixed firms, especially in 2018, to explore what happens to wages and employment when firms are privatized. Consistent with the episodes in the 1990s (Arnold, 2022), we find that
<sup>41</sup> The high perceived mortality rates expressed by the potential migrants are consistent with the effect on perceptions generated by a single death and their exposure to migrant deaths. The inexperienced potential migrants expect the mortality rate to be 27.6 per thousand per migration episode. From the estimates above, they only need 4.1 deaths in their district to generate this level of expected mortality rate starting form a prior of zero. In 2013, an average district experienced 4.3 deaths in five months, suggesting that such high level of mortality perception can be generated even if potential migrants are making decisions about mortality risks only based on past five months of migrant mortality incidences in their districts.

In Shrestha (2017), I also find evidence that potential migrants react more adversely when there have been more migrant deaths in the recent past. Subsequent migrant flow falls more drastically in response to a migrant death in districts which have experienced many migrant deaths in the recent past compared to the response in districts which have experienced few migrant deaths in the recent past. That is, potential migrants seem to be over-weighting recent deaths in forming their priors on mortality rate. In Shrestha (2017), I show that the amount of updating following a migrant death, and the responsiveness of updating recent deaths cannot be generated by a rational Bayesian learnings model. A model of a learning fallacy, the law of ‘small’ numbers, correctly predicts the over-inference result as well as the dependence on the number of deaths in the recent past (see Rabin, 2002, for mathematical formulation). Belief in the law of ‘small’ numbers, in conjunction with availability or other heuristic decision rule could also explain the high observed overestimation of mortality rate (as in Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). One such heuristic explanation could be that potential migrants do not pay attention to migrant deaths unless they are actively thinking about migrating abroad, in which case they form their priors by
U.S. branches during the Great Recession with sizable effects on their U.S. lending. They estimate that the average-sized branch experienced a 12% net internal fund withdrawal and that, on average, for each dollar of funds transferred internally to the parent, branches decreased lending supply by about 40 to 50 cents. Similar findings are also documented in Coulibaly, Sapriza, and Zlate (2012).

> 9The BEEPS data do not track the firm-specific export destinations. We use aggregate trade data from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database.

8
Policy Research Working Paper 5522

# **Abstract**

Using panel data from Mozambique collected in 2007 and 2008, the authors explore the impact of the food crisis on the welfare of households living with HIV/ AIDS. The analysis finds that there has been a real deterioration of welfare in terms of income, food consumption, and nutritional status in Mozambique between 2007 and 2008, among both HIV and comparison households. However, HIV households have not suffered more from the crisis than others. Results on the evolution of labor force participation suggest that initiation of treatment and better services in health facilities have counter-balanced the effect of the crisis by improving the health of patients and their labor force participation. In addition, the authors look at the effect of the change in welfare on the frequency of visits to a health facility of patients and on their treatment outcomes. Both variables can proxy for adherence to treatment. This is a particularly crucial issue as it affects both the health of the patient and public health, because sub-optimal adherence leads to the development of resistant forms of the virus. The paper finds no effect of the change in welfare on the frequency of visits, but does find that people who experienced a negative income shock also experienced a reduction or a slower progression in treatment outcomes.

This paper is a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at ddewalque@worldbank.org, harounan.kazianga@okstate.edu, mover@cgdev.org and julia.vaillant@gmail.com.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if
MULTILINGUAL CHILD ASSESSMENT

# **Appendix B: Expressive Vocabulary Test Creation**

To create the expressive vocabulary measure, we began with images from pieces of the BPVS III plates, local storybook illustrations used in a related project, as well as other simple drawings, we presented up to 200 individual pictures to 61 children 2 to 6 years of age, asking them to name the object or concept the picture showed. We recorded responses in the language (English, Swahili or Luo) children used.

We then reviewed pass rates (in any language) by age (younger or older than 5 years) for each picture, and discarded words with no clear response (e.g., multiple responses for any picture). We again grouped words as hard, average or easy, based on response by age. This resulted in 20 items (scores range from 0-20), and children received credit for responding in any of the three languages. Four items overlapped with those occurring in the receptive tests (two words on the Swahili list, and two on the English list). The rest were a mix of distractors in the BPVS, and stimulus words. A local artist then created all 20 original drawings used in our assessment, displayed below. A child could respond in any of the three languages to score a pass for expressing the word verbally. During instrument development and pretesting, we worked with our field team to identify words that were similar across languages, and understand how they would be differentiated. English and Swahili are not a tonal languages, while Luo is. Thus, for all similar words, the field team agreed on the differences in their pronunciation that would identify a child’s response in a given language.

The full expressive vocabulary assessment is provided below, with the intention of making the tool freely available for use for research purposes only. The tool is not meant for, and should not be used for diagnostic purposes. We did not establish any norms. It is also not intended
# **Making Gravity Great Again**

## **I. Introduction**

The gravity model has become enormously important both for economic theory and for policy analysis. Since its first use in the 1960s (Tinbergen 1962), it has been popular because of its ability to represent patterns in many bilateral flows, including aid, investment, migration and trade. The progress made in providing strong theoretical foundations (see Head and Mayer 2014) has greatly increased its popularity for estimating critically important parameters, such as the effects of distance on trade flows (Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo 2013) and the welfare costs of economic distortions (Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare 2014). It is now widely seen as a basis for new quantitative models to supplement (Ottaviano 2016) or replace computable general equilibrium models for policy analysis. Unfortunately, popular estimators yield different parameter estimates, with some seriously biased because of frequent zero flows, missing data presented as zeros and a combination of nonlinearity and heteroscedasticity.

Bilateral trade data sets often contain many zeros, with around half common for total trade and larger shares for sectoral trade. Up to the early 2000s, gravity equations were typically estimated in logarithms, excluding the zero observations, despite the evidence (eg Olsen 1980) that such sample truncation results in bias. Trade datasets frequently also include many missing data not reported to UN COMTRADE and conflated with true zeros. An enormously influential paper by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (SST) (2006) highlighted the potential for bias from the combination of heteroscedasticity and nonlinearity in gravity equations. They provided a very thoughtful explanation of why their preferred estimator, the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML), deals with this problem.

2
2020). Additional challenges also arise in terms of potential differences between annual and lifetime impacts of consumption taxes (see, e.g., Thomas, 2022), and regarding combining analysis of income and consumption taxes given that their underlying bases differ.

While distributional analysis of the above taxes is challenging, the data exists to make it possible. With regard to most other taxes, there is often simply no data available to distinguish poor and rich taxpayers and allocate tax liability among them. For example, the corporate income tax (CIT) is applied to corporations rather than individuals, making it extremely challenging to attempt to allocate the CIT paid by the corporations to the individuals and households that will eventually bear the economic incidence of the tax. It is nevertheless possible to draw the broad conclusion that the CIT is progressive – based on the conventional view that capital owners bear the majority of the CIT, and given that capital income is disproportionately earned by high-income households (see, e.g., Nunns, 2012). That said, empirical evidence does suggest that at least some of the CIT may be borne by workers (in the form of lower wages), which would reduce the progressivity of the tax (see, e.g., Fuest et al., 2018).<sup>4</sup> While similar, high-level views of the likely distributional effects of other taxes can be made (e.g., the progressivity of a net wealth tax), detailed measurement of the degree of progressivity is not typically feasible (at least not in the absence of administrative data).

All in all, these limitations mean that detailed measurement of the _degree_ of progressivity is limited to the PIT, and to a lesser extent, VAT and excise taxes. These taxes, and particularly the PIT, are consequently the main focus of this paper. However, because of the need to provide an assessment for IDA countries of the progressivity of the entire tax system, the paper also
engagement, like public planning meetings, participatory budgeting, report cards and user satisfaction surveys.

Despite these many ways to promote accountability, empowerment of citizens and local governments is seldom fully realized because decentralization is often incomplete. This occurs either because central governments are reluctant to fully decentralize or because government employees resist giving up their career opportunities at the national level (Blair 2000). As a result, field officers maintain strong links with their original line ministries, thereby enjoying some insulation against local control. Hence, local administrators are not fully accountable to elected representatives, who in turn are not always accountable to the citizenry. In these cases, local governments continue to report to upper tiers of government, which partially remain in control of their political, administrative, and financial conditions. For example, when local finances are too centralized and budgets mostly consist of national revenue sources, local governments are more responsive to the upper tiers of government than to citizens’ needs. In practice, this reduces the capacity of both citizens and local electoral representatives to make effective choices.

# **2. Fiscal determinants of empowerment**

Decentralization entails a downward shift of authority and resources from central to subnational governments; thus, local governments increase their revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities. In developing countries, subnational revenues as percentage of GDP more than doubled from 2.3 percent in 1980 to 5.5 percent in 1999. Similarly, subnational expenditures as percentage of GDP doubled from 3 percent in 1980 to 6.1 percent in 1997 (Shah 2004). In decentralized governments, control over the use of resources also shifts from central governments to citizens and voters, who are the ultimate users of goods and services. In the past, local governments could attribute their inability to deliver services to weak fiscal conditions, but now that they have access to more –yet limited– revenue sources, citizens turn to them for an efficient and responsible management of public resources.

In this new context of local responsibility, accountability is crucial for effective choice
The probabilities of advancing one additional year of schooling conditional on having completed prior years are interesting. Thirteen percent of the sample, 9 percent of boys and 16 percent of girls, never attended school, but for those who began school, most finished primary and junior secondary schooling. But only 60 percent of those who completed junior secondary schooling (64 percent of boys and 56 percent of girls) go on to senior secondary school, where the advancement probabilities again increase until the end of senior secondary schooling (12 years). Similarly, while only 48 percent of those who completed senior secondary schooling entered university, once there, the advancement probabilities are again high.

The costs of a year of school combine Ghana Ministry of Education data for public expenditure per student plus the average amount reported for tuition and fees, expenditure on books, uniforms and sports clothes, transport to school, and PTA dues in the 2016/17 GLSS for students in public schools, by level. These are quite similar across males and females except for senior secondary school where they are 18 percent higher for girls.

Note that some of the year-by-year net present value calculations actually show losses in labor earnings for an additional year of schooling. These correspond to years when the slope in figure 7 is flat or negative so that the loss of a year of work is greater than the additional labor income earned. However, the recursed estimates smooth this out as there is a benefit to, for example, the fourth year of schooling beyond the difference in labor earnings compared to those with only three years: the chance to advance to lucrative higher years of schooling. Note that the benefits to additional years of schooling are higher for women than men even though their labor earnings are lower, especially after completion of junior secondary school.

Figure 8a shows our estimate of the benefit-cost ratios for men and women by year of schooling completed. The benefit-cost ratios are always greater than one except for men who complete exactly 17 years of schooling, i.e.,
consented that the research team access their clinic and hospital records to collect the latter information.

# **2.3 Socio-demographic and other characteristics of the study population**

Table 1 reports selected baseline characteristics of the FEATS patient study population. Study participants were mostly in their late 30s. As is the case in the ARV program in general, approximately three in four study participants were women. Two-thirds of patients enrolled into the FEATS study were single, while one in four lived with their partner or spouse. Three-quarters lived in formal dwellings and one in five in informal dwellings. Only in one in five participants had completed secondary school or held some tertiary education, while almost half had some level of secondary education [grade 8-11]. Households generally included 2-4 members, one in three of which represented a child or elderly person. With the exception of age (attrited study participants were marginally, but statistically significantly younger than study participants interviewed in both rounds of follow-up interviews), socio-demographics did not differ statistically significantly across FEATS study participants that stayed in the study and those that were lost to follow-up, thus suggesting the absence of major attrition bias.

# **3. Methods**

Adherence outcomes for study participants were measured as follows: a continuous and dichotomous version of the CASE index of self-reported adherence (Mannheimer et al.. 2006); a continuous, normalized index of self-reported adherence derived from five categorical variables on self-reported adherence using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA adherence index); a selfreported, dichotomous 0/1 variable for a missed clinic or hospital visit; and timeliness for scheduled clinic and hospital visits, which represents a more objective proxy of adherence than self-reported adherence (Blacher et al., 2010; Kunutsor et al., 2010). Delays in clinic and hospital visits, used here to measure timeliness of visits, were calculated by subtracting the scheduled visit dates from the actual visit dates for consecutive clinic and hospital visits. The latter variable was also converted into a dichotomous variable indicating whether the patient
Use of the term “underclass” rose through the 1970s and 1980s, but peaked in the mid1990s. The idea of a “culture of poverty” started to fall out of favor earlier, from about 1970 (Figure 9).<sup>35</sup> References to “welfare dependency” rose in the 1980s and (particularly) 1990s, coinciding with the (highly politicized) debate on welfare reform in the US in the mid-1990s. References to the “working poor” were more common, and also rose from the 1970s (Figure 9). This was happening while attention to the “working class” as a concept was abating.

The English Poor Laws back to the early 17th century had been premised on the idea that there were both “deserving” and “undeserving poor,” usually defined according to the ability to work, and that public relief should focus on those unable to work. (Indeed, according to the Peel <u>Web, under Elizabethan Poor Law, the able-bodied paupers were “severely beaten until they</u> realized the error of their ways”.) Much later in the 20th century, there were concerns about “welfare dependency”—that the provision of welfare itself left little incentive for poor people to take actions that would lift them out of poverty.<sup>36</sup> Social surveys have suggested that whether welfare recipients are considered “deserving” influences public support for welfare payments.<sup>37</sup> While antipoverty policies have tried often to target the “deserving poor,” the meaning of this distinction is unclear in the models of poverty that show how the behaviors that make one seem “undeserving” have deeper structural roots; then the label risks adding insult to injury.<sup>38</sup> Figure 10 plots both terms. (There were no references to either before 1790.) References to the “deserving poor” peaked around 1900, but there has been a recent
<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>91%<br>86%<br>90%<br>80%<br>70% 62%<br>60%<br>50% 44%<br>40%<br>29%<br>30% 26%<br>20%<br>20% 15%<br>10%<br>0%<br>High income Low income Upper middle Lower middle<br>income income<br>2014 2017<br>(age 15+)<br>Sent or received digital payments in last year<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Findex.

Digital payments empower digital businesses meanwhile brings significant benefits to traditional businesses. Businesses that provide products or services online rely on digital payment mechanisms. Traditional businesses find digital payments to be three times more cost-effective than purchase order processes, with additional benefits of convenience and security.<sup>67</sup> By reducing travel time and expenses, digital payments help accelerate business registration and payments for business licenses and permits.<sup>68</sup> In 2018 Argentina launched an online portal for businesses to enroll with the tax authorities and adopt an electronic wallet for tax payment. According to the _Doing Business_ data set, the time to register a business fell from 24.5 days to 11 days thanks to the reform. This outcome shows the great potential of digital payment tools in reducing informality.<sup>69</sup> The traceability of digital payments also enables governments to better prevent fraud, money hoarding, and tax evasion.<sup>70</sup> The key players providing digital payment services differ in developed and developing countries. Developed countries have been using modern cashless payment methods by means of credit and debit cards since the 1950s. Banks are at the center of this payment system. Acquiring banks