rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
treatment 2 were 7.5 p.p. more likely than the control to add the VAW frame “End violence against women” to their picture, an increase of 91% (p<0.05). ToT estimates were twice as large: individuals who watched at least half of the documentaries were 15.3 p.p. more likely to add the banner, an increase of almost 190% (p<0.05). For treatment 1, the observed increases are not statistically significant.

Although these impacts were recorded only four months after program exposure, we were able to observe their potential cascade effects within the social network in the long run. We found that about one and a half years after the frame was first presented to the respondents, it was used by more than 34,000 people all over the world.<sup>37</sup> This is 55 times larger than the sample receiving the frame at first, and almost 500 times larger than the number of respondents who used it initially. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that treatment 2 alone was responsible for about 6,300 of such uses.

> 35We discard the possibility that recall bias from the short-term survey drives this result. In fact, we find no medium-term information-seeking effects even when focusing on the subsample of individuals who were not interviewed at the short-term followup (58%).

> 36This outcome was only measured in the four-month data collection.

> 37The figure was objectively measured by the Facebook Frame Manager.

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(Porter externalities).

Most of the empirical literature that tried to assess which type of externalities would be more favorable to local productivity growth has used employment growth to proxy for productivity growth based on the assumption that in the long-run, more productive regions would attract more workers. In general, evidence for the U.S. and Europe using employment growth as a measure of productivity growth is mixed with respect to the effect of sector concentration and diversity on regional productivity growth in manufacturing. Glaeser et al. (1992) and Peri (1992) find that local competition and urban diversity, but not regional concentration, foster employment growth in the U.S. and Italy, respectively. Combes (2000), finds evidence for France that concentration and diversity negatively affect employment growth in several sectors<sup>1</sup> . Henderson et al. (1995) find evidence of MAR externalities for the traditional capital goods industries, and of Jacobs and MAR externalities for “new” high-tech industries using data for the U.S.<sup>2</sup> .

However, using employment growth to proxy for productivity growth requires strong assumptions since employment and productivity growth need to covary positively across regions. There are several situations where this might not be the case. If there are local labor markets and labor supply shifts differently across regions (caused, for example, by labor migration), employment and productivity growth do not necessarily covary. The change in employment growth might also be smaller than increase in labor demand if there are congestion externalities such as air pollution shifting labor supply and labor demand simultaneously. Also, if the demand for output is very inelastic in some sectors, increases in productivity may translate into a small increase in labor demand since firms become able to produce more output with the same labor, and there may be reductions in the sector’s employment in that region<sup>3</sup> . Furthermore, if in some sectors technological growth is labor biased, productivity
sourcing provision is present in 58 percent of the sample. Because of the strong overlapping between preferential treatment and domestic sourcing (81 of the 83 countries that have domestic sourcing provision also have preferential treatment provisions in their procurement law), we use a composite indicator that equals one if the country is protectionist in all the three areas (discrimination, preferential treatment and domestic sourcing).

Figures 1 and 2 display the relationship between the protectionist indicators derived from the coding of procurement law and relevant economic and institutional characteristics. The national legal provisions might reflect the commitments that governments have taken in international agreements concerning their procurement markets. This is supported by our data. Countries that are members of the WTO GPA, a plurilateral agreement promoting openness in government procurement, have a significantly lower level of protectionism. A portion of the difference between WTO GPA signatories and non-signatories can be attributed to EU member countries, as these represent 65 percent of WTO GPA members. As depicted in Figure 1, the average value of the protectionist index is indeed lower for EU countries. We also find that middle and low income countries have legal systems that are more protectionist than those of high income countries in our sample (as classified by the World Bank).

In Figure 2, we explore the relationship between the protectionist indicators and institutional characteristics, as measured by the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database. We calculate the average percentile rank across the six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) for each country, using available data for each year. We then take the average across years for each country. Figure 2 shows a negative correlation between this overall measure of quality of institutions and protectionism in government procurement. Countries where procurement laws lack an equal treatment provision, provide for preferential treatment or impose domestic sourcing have worse institutions on average, with the difference being particularly large when considering domestic sourcing. Given the strong correlation between the different WGI indicators, we will
where it is assumed that _y_ 1  ...  _yi_  ...  _yn_ .

More recently Silber and Verme (2010) defined the relative deprivation <sup>_d_</sup> _i_ , _SV_ of individual _i_ as  where both<sup>_y_</sup> _i_<sup>and</sup> _y Pi_ are ranked by decreasing values of the actual incomes<sup>_y_</sup> _i_<sup>.</sup>

# **III) An Empirical Illustration**

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the use of the deprivation indices proposed and to test whether these indices capture effectively situations of deprivation as perceived by respondents in household surveys. The theoretical and statistical literature on relative deprivation is rich and diverse in terms of measures of deprivation. However, the empirical literature has paid very little attention to verifying whether existing indices capture effectively situations of deprivation as perceived by individuals. Here we can partly fill this gap by using a very comprehensive and little exploited set of European survey data.

The database we use is the Consortium of Household Panels for European Socioeconomic Research (CHER).<sup>3</sup> This is a collection of panel survey data whose variables have been harmonized into a consistent data set. It includes 19 panel studies carried out

> 3 The consortium was established in 2000 and is coordinated by CEPS/INSTEAD in Luxembourg who also holds the rights for the use of the data. For more information on the CHER project see Schmaus et al. (2003).

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evidence that natural resource dependence is associated with monopolization of imports, and that trade policy is a mechanism behind this association. The term ‘monopolization’ is used to describe a shift in market structure toward one that is more concentrated.

The analysis exploits a novel database of all firm-level import transactions in 53 developing economies. These data reveal that natural resource-dependent economies have more concentrated markets for imported products. This main result is illustrated in Figure 1a, which shows a positive association between countries’ commodity exports as a share of total merchandise exports and the weighted average Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) across their imported product markets. The HHI for an imported product market is the sum of the squared market shares of every firm importing that product. Econometric estimates show this relationship is robust to a variety of controls including country-product and productyear fixed effects. An alternative specification shows exogenous increases in world commodity prices also increase import market concentration, suggesting the relationship is causal.

Traditional models of Dutch disease emphasize the increase in the price of non-tradable goods relative to the price of tradable goods hence the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. Yet, these models ignore elements of market structure and the presence of markups. These elements can affect prices over and above the effect on relative prices stemming from the traditional Dutch disease. Our results suggest that prices are elevated due to higher markups ensuing from monopolistic or oligopolistic pricing by importers. Data on import unit values and domestic price levels show that import market concentration can account for higher prices. This result is not obvious ex-ante: if higher market concentration is associated with a higher fixed cost but lower marginal cost of importing, import market concentration could be associated with lower prices, even if it contributes to higher markups. Along these lines, contributions by Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2023) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) show that increased markups stemming from high market concentration may (though need not) harm welfare. Higher prices associated with concentration could shape firms’
_Prices_ . The database includes 120 results on prices where prices refer to all types of prices from food and non-food items, to rents and services. Results in Table 7 show that 37-46% of results are positive and significant, between 18 and 23% are non-significant and between 36 and 39% are negative and significant. As mentioned, there is no good or bad interpretation of these results as changes in prices benefit some hosts and damage others. An analysis of the positive results shows that these are almost entirely represented by food and rents prices whereas an analysis of the negative values shows that these are represented mostly by overall inflation, luxury goods, services, and labor-intensive products.

Overall, a forced displacement crisis generates significant changes in prices. The probability of these changes to be positive or negative is approximately similar but associated to the type of product or service observed. Prices for food and rents tend to increase whereas prices for labor intensive products and services tend to decline. As compared to the basic theory illustrated at the outset of the paper, these results show that prices do not unequivocally increase. The main surprise and in contrast to popular views, in some cases prices decline. These findings remain working hypotheses based on very preliminary data and future research will need to be much more comprehensive in coverage of different products and countries. It will also be essential to expand research on price elasticities, including cross elasticities, and relate this research with the research on household well-being.

# 4.2.2 Employment and Wages

_Employment_ . The database on employment contains 334 observations where employment can be a rate, a status or a probability. In all these cases a positive value indicates that employment among host communities has improved as a result of forced displacement. Results in Table 7 show that between 12 and 14% of results are positive and significant, between 65 and 67% are non-significant and between 19 and 24% are negative and significant. Therefore, the majority of results is non-significant, and this reaches 7681% of
Rio’s feeds were provided by transport operators (Fetranspor and SuperVia) and represent a typical day of operations in November 2018 for the metro, rail, light rail, BRT, municipal bus, and ferry services operating within the municipal boundaries. The municipal buses provide the most comprehensive service across all areas of the city acting as both trunk and feeder services, however, the metro, rail and BRT services provide more efficient access along key trunk routes. Fare information was incorporated based on the fares in effect in December 2021.<sup>18</sup> Rio’s transit users can use a smartcard to enjoy fare discounts partly subsidized by the municipal and state government, but this study considered the full undiscounted fares to understand how climate change-related fuel taxing policies may affect transit affordability and accessibility without government intervention. Unfortunately, the available GTFS data does not extend across Rio’s greater metropolitan region, meaning that the study needed to focus on the municipal boundary rather than the functional labor market.

Data for Kinshasa was provided by GoMetro, a service provider specializing in the mapping and quantification of transit networks - particularly in environments with high informality and data scarcity as part of work carried for a study completed for the World Bank (He et al., 2021). Kinshasa has several transit services including a public bus operator (Transco), public minibus operators (Esprit de Vie), private

> 17 Details of which are described on the Conveyal website and github repository. Available at <u>https://docs.conveyal.com/learn-more/generalized-cost and</u> https://github.com/conveyal/r5/blob/43068e168138bc5636d895861209c1c0049e0f1a/src/main/java/com/convey al/r5/rastercost/ToblerCalculator.java#L32

> 18 Please refer to the Riocard Mais website for the full set of up-to-date fares. Available at https://www.cartaoriocard.com.br/rcc/institucional/tarifas

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**Figure 4:** Major obstacles in the Republic of Congo (percent of companies surveyed)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br>70<br>60<br>50<br>40<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source:_ World Bank Enterprise Surveys website custom query and World Bank (2009) Growth remains constrained by the underdeveloped physical infrastructure. A cross-country statistical analysis conducted by the World Bank (World Bank 2010b) shows that the contribution of the infrastructure sector to Congo’s per capita growth over the past decade, at 0.5 percentage points, was considerably lower than in other countries in the region: 0.87 for Nigeria, 0.91 percentage points for DRC, 0.89 percentage points for CAR, and 0.99 for the SSA average. The growth in Congo stemming from infrastructure was due mainly to increased access to mobile telephony while the poor quality and inadequacy of power supply acted as a brake on the economy.

Given this, infrastructure improvements can contribute substantially to growth. Infrastructure has the potential to contribute more than 3 percentage points a year to per capita GDP growth in the future, if access to and quality of infrastructure services were improved to the level seen in Mauritius, the leading African country in infrastructure quantity and quality (World Bank 2010b). This compares with an average of 2.3 percentage points for the whole Africa continent. Upgrading Congo’s infrastructure, in particular in the power sector, is a prerequisite for economic development and the provision of social services.

# 2.3 <u>Government investment and efficiency in the Republic of Congo</u>

As a response to the challenges faced by the country, the Congolese government has embarked on an ambitious investment program to improve access to and delivery of basic services. The authorities have, hence,
Policy Research Working Paper 9822

# **Abstract**

Conflict-induced displacement is associated with loss of human and physical capital and psychological trauma. Households and social structures that produce and reproduce gender norms are disrupted, providing opportunities for change. This paper operationalizes a definition of gender norms that brings together the behaviors and attitudes of displaced and non-displaced women using household survey data for Colombia. The results of a two-step estimation involving kernel-based propensity score matching and multilevel linear regression models show that gender norms condoning violence against women relax with displacement, while those that limit women’s economic opportunities become more rigid. The findings also reveal a misalignment between attitudes and behaviors in other domains. Displaced women have less rigid patriarchal attitudes, but their ability to decide about contraception and their own earnings decreases following displacement.

This paper is a product of the Gender Global Theme. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted at erubiano@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team
This paper provides an overview of Lesotho’s export competitiveness based on the analysis of publicly available data and evidence, by examining export dynamics and outcomes and using field interviews with representatives of the public and private sectors. It examines the relevance of trade for the macroeconomic context, and vice versa, as well as the degree of diversification and sophistication of exports over time and relative to a series of relevant comparators.<sup>2</sup> It builds on this with CGE analysis of potential impacts based on specific trade-related scenarios. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis carried out for this study finds that the negative impacts due to a sudden suspension of AGOA privileges would reach 1% of GDP in 2020, while exports of textiles and apparel would drop by 16% leading to a drop of textiles and apparel output by 9%. The decline of average real consumption by 0.5% would have significant negative consequences for the poor.

As demonstrated in the paper, an immediate loss of AGOA preferences would have a significant economic impact that far exceeds that of a potential future US-Vietnam FTA. If these preferences were suspended in 2018, the country would face 1% loss in income by 2020, relative to the baseline. However, to a large extent the impact of the sudden loss of AGOA privileges would depend on the behavior of the textiles and apparel companies, many of which are highly footloose and could decide to move their operations somewhere else given the tight margin at which the industry operates. FTAs between the United States and Asian competitor countries would have a far less significant impact. The CGE simulations stress the need to strengthen the efforts to support structural transformation leading to diversification of export products and markets, improving backward and forward linkages and lowering trade costs. They also indicate that a decrease of trade costs of an average 2% per year would eliminate the negative consequences of the loss of AGOA in terms of the loss of income.

These findings emphasize the need for a new approach to trade and trade policy
% of children age 6-24 in treated and control households live in urban areas (77% of them did not change their location at all; 17% moved from a city to another city); 1% moved from a village to another village; and only 5% moved between urban

> 25Since 2010, HIES is collected as a rotating panel based on a 3-in-then-out method, however, the rotating nature of the panel can not be used in this study because households’ id is changed for confidentiality purpose in the version available to researchers. About 90% of children in the main sample of this paper are distinct observations.

> 26HIES report detail information on labor income including permanent, non-permanent, and non-labor incomes for each member of the family.

> 27Less than 5% of students are aged above 25.

> 28Almost all young adults who do not live with their parents are married.

> 29Most workers in rural areas work in agriculture and construction industries

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5

**Figure 1:  Global privatization proceeds**

<!-- Start of picture text --> East Asian crisis<br>70 Russian debt<br>crisis<br>60<br>Brazil crisis<br>50<br>Turkey crisis<br>40 Mexico<br>peso Argentina<br>crisis<br>crisis<br>30<br>20 9/11<br>10<br>0<br>1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003<br>ECA LAC Others<br>Billions of $<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: World Bank Privatization Database 10. The average value of transactions increased over time as larger companies were privatized. While close to 70 percent of the 7,800 plus transactions occurred before 1997, they consisted mostly of small and medium firms resulting in an average transaction value of $30 million (Figure 2). The bulk of the transactions were concentrated in Europe and Central Asia where the early years of transition involved a massive transfer of small-scale firms to the private sector, followed by Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, fewer but larger firms were privatized after 1997 in these and other regions (East Asia in particular), increasing the average transaction size to $96 million. Another indicator of increasing average size shows the top ten transactions in 1990-99 accounting for 16 percent of total proceeds, compared to 40 percent in 2000-03.
‐employed|Self‐employed as percent of total employed, 2007|World Development Indicators|
|Share of rural population|Rural population (percent of total population) 2007|World Development Indicators|
|SME definition ‐ loan size|Regulatory agency uses loan size as criteria to define SMEs|Financial Access Database<br>(2010)|
|SME definition ‐ max number<br>of employees|Regulatory agency uses member of employees as criteria to define SMEs|Financial Access Database<br>(2010)|
|SME definition ‐ sales|Regulatory agency uses sales as criteria to define SMEs|Financial Access Database<br>(2010)|
|Starting a business ‐ time|The total number of days required to register a firm, 2007|World Bank Doing Business<br>Indicators (2008)|
|Value of outstanding loans to|Regulatory agency provided the latest estimate for the total value|Financial Access Database|
|SMEs|of outstandingloans to SMEs|(2010)|

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