rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
than private platforms and has a better coverage of secondary cities in the country. This suggests that private and public platforms are complementary and serve different markets. We encourage further applications of this approach to other Western Balkan countries to compare skills requirements across borders and to account for enhanced regional mobility of predominantly young labor market participants.

_This paper was written prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. While the severity and duration of the pandemic and the resulting impact on labor markets are uncertain, analysis of online vacancy data provides real-time insight into firms’ demand and severe distress in the spring of 2020. Kahn et. al. (2020) for example show that job vacancies in the United States collapsed by 30 percent in late March compared with early 2020. The continued monitoring of job vacancy data will signal when labor markets are starting to recover._

> 45 For a recent example of an analysis on skills evolution in the context of the Great Recession, see Hershbein and Kahn (2019).

- 30 -
production data are converted to US dollars at the current average exchange rates, to make them consistent with trade data from COMTRADE which is denominated in US dollars. These are nominal UD dollar values which include US dollar inflation and changes in the real exchange rates of local currencies against the US dollar.<sup>5</sup> Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States were selected as the industrial countries, and China, Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey were selected as the developing countries.

Import growth in these countries is decomposed into changes due to demand increases and changes due to market share changes. The contribution of demand changes is estimated assuming a constant share of imports in gross domestic demand between the two time periods, i.e. the market shares do not change. The market share changes are then estimated as the difference between the actual import growth rate and the import growth rate under a constant market share assumption. The periods of 1991/92, 2000/01, and 2007/08 are used as benchmarks to estimate the growth rates and import shares. Two year averages are used to minimize the annual fluctuations in output and trade. 2007/08 is used as the final year both due to data availability, and more importantly, it is the last year before the global financial crisis. The analysis of the impacts of the crisis on trade values requires a separate study.

This simple method has some limitations. First, it assumes that the income elasticity of demand for specific products exported by a group of countries is identical to the average income elasticity for the sectors as a whole. This bias decreases as the number of products exported increases and as product categories get narrower. Second, it assumes that market share changes are independent of demand growth. Normally, one would expect that when the rate of growth of demand accelerates, there would be spillovers to imports that will increase the import shares. This relationship
|0.00504|0.01064|0.09900|0.01995|0.03733|0.20204|
|2004–08|0.00334|0.00751|0.08268|0.01640|0.03294|0.19090|
|||**Real**|||**PPP**||
||||_with mi_|_gration_|||
|1984–88|0.01667|0.02288|0.17114|0.03513|0.05369|0.27763|
|1994–98|0.01059|0.02088|0.14169|0.02682|0.04824|0.22984|
|2004–08|0.00569|0.01261|0.11994|0.01726|0.03574|0.21274|

* Authors’ calculations, using data from the World Development Indicators. Index generated from first principal component of (1)–(5), variously excluding and including (4). Real GDP and PPP-adjusted indicate growth rates calculated from GDP data in real 2000 U.S. dollars and constant 2005 international dollars. _†_ Migration flows are calculated for 1985, 1995, and 2005, respectively, the years where data are available.

# **5.2 Toward a multipolar world**

What do the changing polarities mean for the distribution of economic influence in the global economy as a whole? To the extent that growth polarity is an accurate measure of such influence, the results in the previous section suggest that multipolarity increased steadily through the end of the Cold War, fell during the final decade of the 20th century, and finally rose again in the first decade of the 21st century; indeed, over the past decade, the world has attained some of the most diverse distributions since 1968.<sup>22</sup>

> 22The sharp decline in the early 1970s deserves some comment. This
6 apparel wage premium improved in the following years, it never regained its pre-MFA phase-out levels. Furthermore, the male-female wage gap widened in the post-MFA period in both countries, as predicted.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the simple theoretical model. Section three provides relevant context by describing export, price, and employment trends in Cambodia and Sri Lanka. Section four contains the empirical results. We conclude in section five.

# **2. Theoretic Foundation**

Following Bernard et al. (2007) we present a simple Melitz-like model (Melitz 2003) in which firms differ by idiosyncratic technology and have two factors. Bernard et al. (2007) show that the introduction of firm-level heterogeneity may not affect the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of endowment-based trade determination and its effects (e.g., the Stolper-Samuelson relationship between output price changes and relative factor earnings). Juhn et al. (2014) apply the same logic with the two factors being defined by gender and use Mexican data to test some of the model’s implications. Our model is more modest in presentation but is meant to capture the essential features of these models, with the goal of simply illustrating the different effects and empirical implications of short- and long-run price changes.

To begin, consider a model with two goods, _(a)_ and _(b)_ . At the firm level, goods are produced with three factors: males ( _m)_ , females ( _f)_ , and a single unit of capital ( _k_ ). The fixed unit of capital that is necessary for production leads to diminishing returns to scale. The assumption of fixed capital reflects our focus on the short and medium run. We will define the medium run as the period in which labor is mobile between industries, and the short run as the period in which labor is not mobile. The capital represents an idiosyncratic amount of technology
/mark> <u><mark>Table 3. Lower-income groups of the population are</mark></u> <mark>systematically more responsive to price changes in cigarettes. On the other hand, the sensitivity of these Deaton results in Georgia to the model specification calls for deeper investigation (see also Gibson and Kim</mark> 2016 and McKelvey 2011 for a discussion on the empirical limitations of the Deaton method).

Table 4. Estimates of price-elasticities of demand for filtered cigarettes, using the Deaton methodology

||1|2|3|4|5|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Terciles|-0.62|-0.04|-0.05|||
|Quintiles|-0.74|-0.40|-0.33|-0.10|-0.27|

_Source_ : Authors’ estimation based on data from the IHS (2002-2016) and HIES (2017). _Notes:_ Income groups are created based on household per capita consumption, based on the ECAPOV harmonized aggregate by the World Bank. The Deaton method was adapted based on previous applications by Deaton (2018) and Chelwa et al. (2019). Clusters are aggregated at the year, region, and urban-rural level.

# VI. Smoking-attributable medical expenses, mortality and YWLL

## Tobacco-related medical expenses

The parameter for direct medical expenses from tobacco-attributable diseases in Georgia is taken from the estimations for 192 countries in 2012 by Goodchild et al. (2018). After updating the estimate for changes in the price level, total tobacco-related direct medical expenses are estimated at GEL 80.8 million in 2017. Additionally, taking the national share of out-of-pocket payments in total health care expenses (56 percent, from the WDI), it is estimated that households bear GEL 44.9 million in tobacco-related medical expenses.

> 13 In the common
N. 1984 assessment (published in 1986), Eurostat (1987), the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985), and Celade (1987). The specific source for each country is listed in the Appendix.

The 1985 population of each country was distributed by age and sex using a percentage distribution from either the latest census, adjusted for errors in age reporting, or the U.N. 1984 assessment (the 1988 revision was not yet available for this purpose).

# Mortality level and trend

The base-period mortality levels in the projections are represented by life expectancies obtained, sometimes indirectly, from a variety of sources. Most commonly, figures are based on official or other estimates appearing in PoRulation and Vital Statistics ReRort or government publications. Other figures are taken from the U.N. 1988 revision or the
and NGOs (Choudhury, 2021; Radio New Zealand International, 2021; Save the Children Australia, 2021) should not focus disproportionately on the issue of misinformation on social media.

Second, people in PNG already appear to be concerned about catching COVID-19. However, this concern is not related to their stated willingness to be vaccinated. On the other hand, willingness to be vaccinated is related to views on the vaccine itself. These findings suggest that the COVID-19 vaccine is not seen by most people as a way to minimize the threat that COVID-19 presents to people’s lives and livelihoods, or that it is perceived as having risks that outweigh its benefits. As such, efforts to simply further raise people’s concerns about COVID-19 are unlikely to generate greater demand for the vaccine. Rather, it is likely policy makers need to explicitly highlight that receiving the COVID-19 vaccine can reduce people’s concerns about COVID-19 by preventing severe illness and death.

Third, people’s prior history of vaccination does not appear to be linked to their willingness to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. The phone survey showed that, on average, less than half of respondents had previously received a vaccination (for example, for measles or polio) and this was not positively associated with willingness to get a vaccine. In fact, there was a slightly negative relationship. Similarly, there was no relationship with getting one’s children vaccinated and willingness to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Collectively, these findings suggest that hesitancy about the COVID-19 vaccine is quite distinct from hesitancy about vaccines in general. The implication that flows from this for policy makers is to develop a unique communication strategy for mass vaccination against COVID-19, as opposed to rolling them into existing efforts to minimize hesitancy about vaccines in general.<sup>6</sup>

# <u>6.3 Generalizability of findings</u>

There is good reason to believe the results presented in this paper will have good external validity across PNG. We draw on different survey platforms (
of the 2000s.

**Figure 2.3. Exports are driven by increases in volume rather than price.** Unit and volume index, 2000-2021

<!-- Start of picture text --> 250 1,200<br> 1,000<br> 200<br> 800<br> 150<br> 600<br> 100<br> 400<br> 50<br> 200<br> - -<br>Export unit value index (2000 = 100)<br>Import unit value index (2000= 100)<br>Export volume index (2000 = 100)<br>Volume index 2000=100<br>Unit value index 2000=100<br>2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** Authors’ elaboration using data from the World Development Indicators.

**Figure 2.4. Trade flows remain relatively moderate in the second half of the 2000s.** Imports & exports, % of GDP, 2000-2020

<!-- Start of picture text --> 80<br> 75<br> 70<br> 65<br> 60<br> 55<br> 50<br>Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 45<br>Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)<br> 40<br>2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020<br><!-- End of picture text -->

**Source:** Authors’ elaboration using data from the World Development Indicators.

3 | P a g e
: Applied Economics_ , 2022.

- **Willame, Jean-Claude** , “Za ̈ıre,” _L’ ́epop ́ee d’Inga. Chronique d’une Pr ́edation Industrielle, Paris, L’Harmattan_ , 1986.

- **World Bank** , “Zaire - Third Highway Project,” Technical Paper, World Bank, Washington D.C. 1975.

- , “Second High Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project (P161877) Project Information Document/Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (PID/ISDS),” Technical Paper, World Bank Report No: PIDISDSC20608, Washington D.C. 2017.

- **Zhukov, Yuri M.** , “Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence,” _Political Geography_ , 2012, _31_ (3), 144–156.

34
at baseline, midline and endline.<sup>47</sup> For example, we show that significantly more _Choices_ participants disagree that dowry is more important for the family’s esteem rather than having educated daughter at endline. Overall, our results suggest variation in the types of attitudes that were influenced by the _Choices_ intervention. The program was mostly successful in shifting beliefs to be more gender progressive with respect to a girl’s right to education and a women’s role in the economic sphere.

_Choices_ adolescents whose parents were also invited to attend the EMB training saw no additional impact on their overall gender equitable attitudes. _Choices_ girls whose parents also attended the EMB training were more likely to express more progressive masculinity norms. In Appendix Table A9 we also show there is a positive treatment effect at midline and endline on a standardized index that is composed of the 3 gender statements that were included in the lab-in-the-field experiment.<sup>48</sup> The private responses in the lab context were overall more gender egalitarian than the average responses captured during the endline survey and treatment effect sizes are higher in magnitude. This may reflect a certain comfort that the adolescents had within the lab session held around peers, peer pressure, or for other reasons. Importantly, since the private and public responses were measured within the same lab session, results should be considered internally valid.

# **7.2 Impacts on Conformity (Private vs. Public Responses)**

In the following we analyze the social dynamics of how an adolescents’ views are influenced by others around them using an experiment that measured attitudes in private vs. public. Our measure of conformity considers whether the adolescent changes their response from private to public based on the responses of others and by having to respond publicly. For the games we randomize: (i) the gender composition of the team i.e. all boys, all girls or mixedgender teams; and, (ii) the position that the adolescent responds in public.
—all of which hinder efficient concentration and raise costs (Lall, Lebrand, and Soppelsa 2021). Further, if Glaeser and Resseger (2010) found that areas in the US with below average human capital showed no agglomeration benefits because of limited benefits of pooling differentiated labor and knowledge spillovers, we might expect even fewer benefits in skillpoor developing countries.

This paper contributes to a resolution of this puzzle. It first conceptually disaggregates the canonical wage elasticity into component parts and shows that increasing productivity is only one possible driver – rising urban costs are as well – but also that the data employed to date is not capable of distinguishing between them. We then study four countries ranging across regions and the development spectrum – in order of income, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Colombia and Chile – four of the very few countries whose nationally representative establishment level databases permit separating plant prices from physical output, linkable to a standard set of geographical covariates, which have substantial subnational variation, and which are available for use. This allows estimating physical productivity or efficiency (TFPQ), which should capture the effects of better matching and externalities, and marginal costs, thereby showing how they contribute to the counterintuitive wage elasticity estimates.

2
similar results using a wide range of alternative assumptions for the inference of standard errors, the construction of the hurricane damage function, and the calculation of mangrove width. We additionally show that our results hold among the sample of most affected countries, and that they are not driven by differential policy responses captured using state-year fixed effects.

# **4 Conclusion**

In this paper, we show that wide mangrove belts in Central America have the potential to mitigate the disruption to economic activity generated by hurricanes. We measure local economic activity using remote sensing data on nightlights; potential hurricane destruction using a damage index derived from a wind field model calibrated for Central America; and mangrove protection by calculating the cumulative width of mangroves along the closest path to the coast. Using these data, we estimate the impact of hurricanes on economic activity, under the assumption that hurricane strikes are exogenous conditional on cell and year fixed effects. We then explore, using a binning estimator, whether there is a negative, and plausibly non-linear, relationship between mangroves and hurricane damages.

We find that hurricanes have negative short-run effects on economic activity, with losses likely concentrated in coastal lowlands at risk of both wind and storm surge. Within the coastal lowlands, we further show that the impact of hurricanes declines with mangrove width, and specifically that the effect of hurricanes in our sample is entirely mitigated by one km or more of mangrove width. We additionally conduct various robustness checks and rule out that these findings are driven by the physical characteristics of the mangrove habitat or by the distance to the coast.

Our results are important for policy makers, because they highlight that mangrove conservation and restoration efforts can be used in coastal lowlands to protect economic activity against tropical cyclones. One important observation from this analysis, however, is that the benefit of protection is only accrued from wide mangrove belts. This observation implies that large-scale efforts will be required to achieve the benefits of mangrove protection.

Last, there are two important caveats of this analysis concerning the benefits of mangrove
</mark>_

**When looking at factors that relate to energy poverty and vulnerability, Thomson et al. (2017) take a vulnerability approach to energy poverty and divide energy vulnerability into six factors.** Thomson

> 16 Gouveia et al. (2022) limit their assessment to data from EUROSTAT, EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), HBS (Household Budget Survey), and BSO (Building Stock Observatory).

6
not fall into misleading sampledependent conclusions regardless of the country under study. Indeed, the cyclical component explains 0.5 and 2.7 percent of the variance of the HDI rate in Chile and Argentina, respectively.

Finally, Figure 3, Panels B, D, and F translate the previous results (i.e., Panels A, C, and E) into density plots for the 10-year differences in the unemployment rate, monetary poverty, and the inverse of the HDI, respectively. The relatively high dispersion in the distributions of the 10-year differences in the unemployment rate displayed in Figure 3, Panel B shows that both Argentina and Chile are highly exposed to myopic views of the long-term improvements in the unemployment rate. While the case of Argentina is more extreme, both countries display relatively high standard deviations for the 10year difference observations. For monetary poverty, Figure 3, Panel D, tells us that, again, a policymaker from Argentina is quite exposed to large errors assessing long-term improvements. In this case though, given the dominance of the trend component of monetary poverty in Chile, the Chilean policymaker would be correct in her assessment of long-term gains no matter the year she starts the study or the length of available data. Finally, using the HDI, the latter situation would apply to both countries. The HDI not only lowers the chances of sample-dependent errors but also eliminates the differences across countries, as shown in Figure 3, Panel F.<sup>14</sup>

> 14 Appendix C also illustrates that not all social indicators are created equal in Indonesia and Thailand, two other emerging economies where long-time series are available.

7
Figure 4: Innovation score by IT use and Chinese competition levels (a) _Mean Products and Processes Innovation Score_ <!-- Start of picture text --> Lower IT use Higher IT use Lower IT use Higher IT use<br>Lower Chinese Competition Higher Chinese competition<br>(b) Mean Marketing and Organization Innovation Score<br>Lower IT use Higher IT use Lower IT use Higher IT use<br>Lower Chinese competition Higher Chinese competition<br>3<br>2<br>Mean innovation score<br>1<br>0<br>1.5<br>1<br>Mean innovation score<br>.5<br>0<br><!-- End of picture text -->

- (b) _Mean Marketing and Organization Innovation Score_

Source: Authors’ calculations with data from ENTIC 2009 and 2013, INEGI. The innovation scores range from 0-10. Note: Results are only shown for our main IT use variable (computers-per-worker) but for our other proxies are available upon request.

In order to test statistically this relation, we estimated the probability of innovating as a function of the change in IT use, competition and the interaction of both. We use the change in these variables between 2008 and 2012 because the Innovation Module of ENTIC was included for the first time in the 2013 wave. The equation estimated is as follows: 37
changes in the relative prices faced by consumers. Lastly, step 5 accounts for economy-wide changes in per capita household consumption growth.<sup>6</sup>

# 3. Scenarios and assumptions

We first generate the long-term baseline, then run a number of counterfactual scenarios. By comparing the two, we can isolate the impacts of various policy changes.

## Baseline

The GTAP 9 database is benchmarked to 2011. We run the model to 2018, replicating the key macroeconomic aggregates from the World Bank’s _Global Economic Prospects_ report (World Bank 2016a).<sup>7</sup> Population growth is based on the medium fertility variant of the 2012 UN’s population projections. Labor force growth follows the growth of the working age population – defined here as the demographic cohort between 15 and 64 years of age. The evolution of supply of skilled and unskilled workers is consistent with the IIASA constant educational trends (CER) scenario, where growth rates of the supply of skilled workers exceed that of unskilled. Capital accumulation is equated to the previous period’s (depreciated) capital stock plus investment. Productivity growth in the baseline is “calibrated” to achieve the growth rates for the baseline scenario (as in the World Bank (2016a)) up to 2018, then we fix the productivity growth for 20182030 to be consistent with historical trends. These productivity growth rates remain fixed in the counterfactual scenarios.

The baseline scenario also incorporates tariff reductions in existing PTAs. These are based on the data set provided by International Trade Center, including all TPP members FTA commitments up to 2030 (ITC and MAcMap (2015)). In addition, the baseline also includes pre-existing trade agreements among member countries (e.g., NAFTA, AFTA, the ASEAN-Japan FTA, the ASEANAustralia-New Zealand FTA and the P4 Agreement among Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand).

## RCEP, FTAAP and EU-IDN CEPA

RCEP and FTAAP scenarios include liberalization of tariffs and NTMs following Wignaraja et. al