rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
and other services, and originate orders for many products sold over the internet. As of December 2003, 7- Eleven had placed Vcom kiosks in nearly 1,000 of its approximately 5,800 stores located across the U.S. (7-Eleven news release, December 11, 2003). If this technology succeeds, it could lower the cost of delivering payment services to the unbanked and lower the fees that they pay.

# <u>Summarizing the effectiveness of these initiatives</u>

As implied in the discussion above, we cannot know the aggregate impact that the outreach initiatives outlined above have had on the percentage of U.S. households without deposit accounts. It is quite likely, however, that the aggregate effect has been quite small. This is true for three reasons. First, almost all of the initiatives have been small scale, pilot initiatives that would have small aggregate impacts even if they were effective. Second, we argued that the major reason that people do not have bank accounts is because they do not have any month-tomonth savings. Assuming that successful methods can be found to help lower-income households build financial savings, the savings are likely to accumulate slowly. Finally, available data do not indicate any major changes in the percentages of unbanked households over the past 25 years. In 1977, the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances found that 9.5 percent of all households did not have deposit accounts (Caskey and Peterson, 1994). As noted in the introduction to this paper, the same survey in 2001 found that the percentage was 9.1 percent.

36
teaching; but there is a significant positive change in the returns to hours teaching. This alone accounts for 16 percent of the improvement in test scores over time. This shows that Jordanian teachers have become more effective at conveying the material in the classroom.

# **Conclusions**

Over the last two decades, the Jordanian education system made significant advances. Significant gains were made in international surveys of student achievement, with a particularly impressive gain of almost 30 points in science. This paper shows that several policy actions, spurred by initial reactions to the shock of low scores in international comparison, and practical guidance from policymakers to implementers and teachers, were responsible for the gains in student achievement. Benchmarking education systems and constant feedback between researchers and providers contributed to this achievement.

Therefore, education systems can stand to learn from the Jordanian experience. The proper use of assessment results can provide significant returns. Also, the cost of assessment is worthwhile, given the significant benefits that the system receives. While there are many uses to assessments – national and international – primarily as part of the effort to evaluate the education system, this case shows that it can be a wake-up call for action, a tool for informing the system, and an objective metric to monitor progress over time.

Assessments, therefore, can be used to establish benchmarks – in international comparison and as national standards. Most importantly, assessments can be used to inform policy responses, and to generate real-time, useful information to providers.

Jordan’s experience suggests how countries can use international assessments and education reforms to improve the quality of their education systems. First, participation in international assessments is a must. It provides the country with useful international benchmarks and a wealth of information. Second, rigorous analysis of the determinants of learning and comparison with top performers is needed. Third, implementation of the benchmarks and analyses into curriculum development and teacher training is needed. There must be feedback loops between the research, curriculum and professional development as part of a comprehensive reform
participation in different markets through an economic lens, abstracting from the political and social preferences of individual policy makers. This also allows to provide guidance on the different alternatives and tailored solutions for SOE reform beyond ownership transformation and which can be strongly related to the type of sectors where these companies operate.<sup>11</sup> The proposed taxonomy is also critical to allow for cross-country comparison of the SOE footprint. Political economy and social objectives vary from country to country, and, as such, it is impossible to objectively justify the presence of the state in the market on the basis of those objectives. However, since economic market failures are uniquely identified based on the characteristics of the markets in which goods and services are produced and the technologies used, the proposed taxonomy allows analysts to compare SOEs’ presence in the economy across countries according to a homogeneous classification system. This taxonomy is already feeding into the Businesses of the State Database of the World Bank Group which is described in a companion paper to this work (Dall’Olio et al., 2022).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the economic literature on SOEs and market failures. Section III provides the conceptual framework according to which economic sectors are classified. Section IV analyzes the economic sectors, disaggregated to the level of the NACE four-digit classification, and classifies each of them into the three proposed categories. Section V presents a data driven exercise to validate the taxonomy classification. Section VI concludes.

# II. Literature Review: SOE Participation and Market Failures

A systematic and comprehensive classification of the rationale for SOE presence in various economic sectors could usefully inform the analysis of SOEs from a policy perspective. As important is to have a harmonized definition on SOEs to allow cross-country comparison, it is relevant to have a unified conceptual framework to classify economic sectors based on the rationale for government presence in the provision of goods and services to inform assessments of SOEs, guide reform efforts in individual countries, and facilitate
The next section compares our approach to alternatives suggested by the literature.

Section 3 outlines our theoretical model, demonstrating that an enrollment subsidy increases schooling, but need not reduce child labor. We then turn to our data and econometric model in section 4. Our main empirical results can be found in section 5, and section 6 concludes.

# **2. Testing for Substitution between Child Labor and Schooling**

Children are a current economic resource for poor parents. It is common to find children doing productive work of some sort in poor rural economies. Cain (1977) found that children in a Bangladeshi village were economically active from the age of six, and that boys were net producers by 15. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that child labor helps smooth the incomes of rural Indian families, consistent with poorly developed credit and risk markets.

However, there are ways that poor families can protect the schooling of working children, because there are other things that children do besides school and work. To allow double shifts (given limited school building and other facilities), primary school days of four hours or so per child are common. Longer school days than this also create logistic problems of feeding the children. Public primary ("vernacular medium") schools in Bangladesh are open about 120 days a year and the school day entails 3-4 hours of class time (about 17 hours per week, with slightly less at junior grades, and slightly more at private schools). A survey for Bangladesh found that boys (5-14) in rural areas classified as being in the workforce (including work on the family farm or non-farm enterprise) did an average of 26 hours work per week; the corresponding average for girls was 20 hours (BBS, 1996, Table 6.10). So one cannot assume that the time these children spend working must come at the expense of formal time at school, although there may be displacement of informal (after-school) tutorials or homework.

4
announcement and the closing, a period which usually lasts several months, are included in the dataset. We use these dates because, although institutions are not merged, the new owner is in charge and managing the assets as it sees fit—which is apparent from the many changes in the assets of the acquired and not yet merged banks.

In cases of bank liquidations, there are two important dates: (1) announcement of a regulatory action that may suspend some of the licensed operations and/or impose certain restrictions on bank activity, (2) withdrawal of the banking license. The dataset of bank financials recognizes the second date and right after that date, the financials of the exiting banks are excluded. The bank financials during the transition period between the first and the second date, which may last up to several months, are included in the datasets.

- _4.2 Frequency and cost of financial distress_

The first variable of interest in our study is the occurrence of financial distress and the cost of resolving this distress. We define broadly an event of “acute” distress as the occurrence of either government support or private/market solutions that terminate the operations of a bank. Although the latter is a debated typology in the literature, in the case of Kazakhstan, an explicit recognition of an extraordinary operation to resolve financial instability is authorized and issued by the National Bank of Kazakhstan. The defining feature of an “acute” event of distress is an action taken for the main purpose of stabilizing the financial sector. Therefore, our scope does not include monetary or fiscal policy actions aimed at supporting the broader Kazakh economy. This definition presents some limitations as we are unable to include cases of vulnerabilities that are solved in a non-assisted way. Yet, resolution events are responses to events of distress and are observable. We, therefore, opt to classify banks in distress if there is a measurable objective ex-post outcome of this distress (i.e., a government expense) which can be related to cases
The distribution of education from the RPED data across gender and geographical regions reveals that in the formal manufacturing sector, the majority of workers have completed middle or secondary education (see tables 1 and 2). The data contain three notable features. First, middle school is the most conmmon level of completed education (46 percent). Second, almost twice as many employed females as males have not completed any education.<sup>7</sup> Third, fewer of the workers employed in Accra (9 percent) have completed less than secondary education, compared with workers employed elsewhere in Ghana.

Table 2 presents the percentage of workers in each sector that has completed each level of education. Most notably, the share of workers with no or primary education is quite small in the metal sector (6 percent) compared with the average share across all across sectors (13 percent). University graduates make up the largest share in the food sector (3 percent).

**Table 2. Education by Manufacturing Sector (percent)**

||||lvlanufac|turing Secto|r|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Educational level completed|Total<br>Manufacturing|Metal|Textile|Food|Wood|
|None|9.3|3.7|1]0.0|16.6|7.8|
|Primary school|3.3|2.0|3.8|3.9|3.5|
|Middle school|45.8|50.8|46.7|_35.5_|58.3|
|Secondary school|13.5|12.6|4L3.8|15.4|8.7|
|Vocational school|13.6|15.0|40.7|13.5|13.0|
|Professional and technical schools|13.
guarantees, and forbearance did not recover faster. Rather, liquidity support appeared to make recovery from a crisis longer and output losses larger—a finding confirmed by Bordo et al. (2001). Their findings suggest that the two most important policies during the containment phase are to limit liquidity support and not to extend blanket guarantees.

There are also cross-country studies investigating specific systemic bank restructuring policies that do not involve fiscal outlays. One study, Baer and Klingebiel (1995), analyzes the exceptions to the model of governments guaranteeing all liabilities in an effort to restore confidence. They show that in some crises—notably the United States (1933), Japan (1946), Argentina (1980–82), and Estonia (1992)—governments imposed losses on depositors with little or no adverse macroeconomic consequences or flight to cash or foreign currency. Economic recovery was relatively rapid and financial intermediation, including household deposits, was soon restored. Thus allocating losses to creditors or depositors will not necessarily lead to runs on banks or end in contraction of aggregate money, credit, and output. Baer and Klingebiel also suggest that intermittent regulatory intervention and forbearance make depositors more nervous and undermine regulatory credibility—especially if regulators had previously argued that the institutions involved were solvent. Both findings suggest that more accommodative policies and higher fiscal outlays do not necessarily lead to faster recovery.

Another effort to distinguish the impact of policy on recovery, but using individual firm level data, is Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003). They study 687 corporations from eight crisis countries. When analyzing the impact of policies on firms, they find that a package of specific resolution measures can help accelerate recovery from a crisis. These policies, however, did not necessarily lead to more sustainable, longer-run debt 10
created a Durable Solutions Secretariat (DSS) and adopted a national IDP policy alongside National Evictions Guidelines. This response aims to protect the rights of IDPs, ensure that any evictions are carried out in legal way, and provide alternative housing options (Refugees International, 2019).

Prolonged conflict has had far reaching effects, including the emergence of a large number female-headed households, with reports of nearly half of all households being female headed going back for nearly a decade (Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit [FSNAU], 2012; United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2012). This is often attributed to the conflict related death of male family members or the inability of men to flee to certain areas (World Bank, 2014). As has been observed in other conflict settings, family splitting is also a strategy to cope with lack of economic opportunities (Brück & Schindler, 2009; Ibáñez, 2008). In Somalia sometimes men opt to return to their areas of origin and women and children are left behind with the intention of returning if and when the situation improves (World Bank, 2014).

Somalia ranks among the bottom dozen countries on the Women, Peace and Security Index, which measures women’s inclusion, justice, and security.<sup>4</sup> It has one of the lowest female labor market participation rates in Sub-Saharan Africa with only 43 percent of women in the labor force compared to 67 percent of men. However, women have always contributed to work on family farms. Gender roles have changed; increased numbers of female-headed households have led to changes in herd management practices and women’s greater involvement in livestock trade (ElBushra & Gardner, 2016). Currently, women are engaged in the informal sector and microenterprises and work in agricultural production and livestock activities. Women are heavily involved in crop production, provide more than 60 percent of labor in subsistence farming, and are mainly responsible for marketing fruits and vegetables for domestic consumption and account for 60-80 percent of domestic
low income, there are five lower middle and four upper middle income countries in the mix as well. Finally, four countries are classified as fragile and conflict-affected situations.<sup>15</sup> There is significant cross-country variation in unit costs. While the average unit cost is about USD 170, the unit costs range from USD 36 to nearly USD 360. Some of the cost patterns are instructive: for example, surveys in sub-Saharan Africa tend to be more expensive, while in three of the four fragile countries unit costs are lower than the average. Since we do not have actual survey implementation costs per household for all 78 countries of interest, to estimate the total costs of implementing 390 surveys over the period of 2016-2030, we would need to compute average costs from our sample of 18 surveys. The divergent costs across surveys suggest that the method for calculating the average (by region, income group or fragility) will have a stated impact on the total cost estimates. Furthermore, the large disparity in unit costs suggests the importance of gathering detailed information from more countries. Currently, there is no representation from small island countries, and Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and Pacific are represented by only one country. If we restrict our focus to the estimation of survey implementation costs for IDA and IDA/IBRD blend countries, this is less problematic. However, once we expand this costing exercise to all countries facing data gaps, the lack of data on unit costs from small island countries could cause a potential bias in our estimates.

# **b. Sample size formulation for implementation cost projections**

The sample size of household surveys is another important determinant of survey implementation costs. According to our database, the sample size of the household surveys varies largely from slightly under 3,000 (Uganda 2009/10) to around 27,000 (Peru 2014). The average survey size is about 11,000 households and the median is 9,000. While the required sample size
more likely to be enrolled in college (Cortes, 2013). Prior research has also shown that immigration enforcement is associated with negative school performance (repeating a grade in school) among those without legal status (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez, 2015). Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico have made some advances in migrant inclusion, but the effects of these programs have not been carefully evaluated despite showing some positive initial results (OAS, 2011). Thus, we can expect that:

**H3 (Financial Aid):** Migrant students who apply for financial aid will have higher enrollment in higher education compared to native students.

Although most research presents evidence that migrant status has negative educational effects, some studies on the educational performance of second-generation migrants highlight that investment in education is a priority for migrant families. For instance, Becker et al. (2020) illustrates that descendants of forced migrants in Poland have higher educational attainment than those of non-forced migrants. This helps close the educational gap between second-generation migrants who prioritize education and natives (Card et al., 2000; Alexander and Ward, 2018; Bauer et al., 2013; Borjas, 1992).

# **Research design**

## **Data**

Our analysis is based on official administrative data from the Chilean government. We obtained disaggregated and de-identified individual information, including nationality, for the entire population of enrolled students in all Chilean academic institutions between 2016 and 2020 from the Ministry of Education. We merged this data with the college admission test scores.<sup>1</sup> We therefore have information on enrollment, financial aid access, and scores for the various higher education tests for the entire graduating student population in 2018. Table 1 presents the number of observations and data sources. Table 1 shows the summary of all students in the Chilean educational system, however, we need to analyze ”regular” students, and the group of interest. In this case ”not regular” students are older students and students
and firms’ outcomes are also covered, including firms’ age, legal status, international markets’ engagement, workforce composition, gender, innovation, and performance. The gender section includes information on whether the firm has a female owner. The 16 ES conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa included a section on mobile money adoption and use. To the extent of our knowledge this is the most extensive firm-level data on mobile money adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Summary statistics for the sample are provided in table 1.

# **3.1 Mobile Money Adoption**

Table 1 shows that 27 percent of firms in the sample have adopted mobile money. About 15 percent of firms used mobile money to receive payments from customers, which is the most common use of mobile money by firms in the sample. This is followed by paying utility bills (10 percent), paying suppliers (8 percent) and finally paying employees (4 percent). Table A1 provides the breakdown by whether or not the firm has at least one woman among the owners (female-owned firms). About 29 percent of female-owned firms and 26 percent of fully male-owned firms use mobile money for financial transactions. The difference is not statistically significant. With regards the use of mobile money, 76 percent of female-owned firms use mobile money to receive payments from customers in contrast to 60 percent of fully male-owned firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The other uses of mobile money do not show any statistically significant difference between female and male-owned firms.

There is considerable heterogeneity in the adoption of mobile money by firms across economies. Kenya (2017) had the highest penetration with 77 percent of firms using mobile money (Table A2). This is followed by Zimbabwe in 2015 (68 percent) and Uganda in 2012 (54 percent). At the other end, Guinea (6.7 percent) in 2015, and Ghana (4.2 percent) and Zambia (3.7 percent) in 2012 have the lowest rates of mobile
This paper aims to predict transitions into critical states of food insecurity with sufficient lead time for Official IPC data is only available from 2018 to the present. Since the objective is to calibrate indicators July 2023. The data quantifies food insecurity using the IPC-compatible analytical framework Moloney (2012) provide a review of the process). The IPC scale distinguishes five phases of food food insecurity reaches crisis levels, the IPC scale advises a significant policy shift. Specifically, for 7% of IPC observations could be classified as IPC escalations when compared to the previous