rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
The literature on governing public sector agencies mirrors the private corporation literature in many ways, with the roles of shareholders and managers replaced by citizens and public officials. Like the literature on corporations, these studies also focus on governance as a set of relationships, goal-setting processes, and incentive structures. However, public sector agencies face a number of additional issues because they respond to a larger number of interest groups. When an organization answers to multiple groups, the ability of any one group to achieve its goals is diluted and the resulting organizational performance is influenced by contesting principals (see, for example, Spiller 1990 and Spiller & Urbiztondo 1994). The existence of multiple principals can create space for the organization to pursue goals that are beneficial to its own staff, promoting their vested interests, rather than the agency‟s public purpose. The agency is also vulnerable to capture by particular groups who have a strong interest in the agency‟s actions when other groups are less strongly affected and, therefore, less likely to organize and pursue their interests (Olsen 1971).

A recent study in this literature defines public governance as, “The ways in which stakeholders interact with each other in order to influence the outcomes of public policies.” (Bovaird and Löffler 2003).This definition emphasizes two key aspects of the public sector governance literature: that governance involves the interaction of multiple stakeholders and that its relevance depends on how it influences outcomes.

A third literature focusing on governance concerns international development. The World Bank has played a central role in developing an entire research agenda around the question of how governance affects a country‟s ability to grow and benefit its citizens. Studies in the late 1990s were concerned with poor performance of many countries receiving aid and found the explanation might lie in the quality of how the recipient countries were governed. Over the last decade numerous studies have looked at governance indicators – ranging from perceptions of corruption to the strength of property protections – to see if they influence economic and social outcomes.

A
The first factor is the rapid rise in wages and fringe benefits such as housing, education, health care, and retirement pensions (Sachs, Woo, 1994, Gordon and Li, 1997). Wages have generally risen at a slightly slower pace than output growth<sup>6</sup> reflecting strong labor demand by the nonstate sector. Previous studies argued that the increasing autonomy of SOEs in the absence of private property rights has led to excessive workers remuneration. Specifically, in their enterprise sample Woo et al. (1994) report a large increase in the share of labor incomes through valueadded. A study by Fan and Schaffer show that the increase in government subsidies is due to a faster increase in wages, fringe benefits and other unauthorized expenditures (Fan an Schaffer 1991). The social obligation of SOEs is not a new phenomenon. However, in recent years the cost of providing social welfare has risen fast.<sup>7</sup> There are two main reasons for this rapid increase during the 1990s: aging population, and rising medical costs. As the proportion of employed labor shrinks and the number of pensioners rises, SOEs are forced to draw on current revenue to fund spending on increasingly expensive social welfare.<sup>8</sup> Data from China Yearbook shows that the share of insurance and social welfare funds" in the state sector has risen from 17% in 1980 to 33% of total wage bill in 1997 (if we include employer subsidies to housing and the cost to enterprise of dealing with redundant workers, estimated ratio could be up to 75% of total wage Two possible reasons: first, the Chinese governuent has been able to maintain substantial implicit taxes and transfers among workers in the state sector, implemented through direct controls over relative wage rates. Second, lack of influence of labor union over wage rates (Gordon and Li, 1997) 7For example, the social welfare bill increased from 11.6 billion in 1980 to 257.8 billion in
.05]|[0.04]|[0.03]|[0.04]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|
|strong letter||||||||||||
|# post=1|-0.03*|0.03|0.05|0.02|0.02|0.01|0.01|0.01|-0.00|-0.01|-0.03|
||[0.01]|[0.03]|[0.05]|[0.04]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|
|Constant|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.25***|11.24***|11.24***|11.24***|
||[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.03]|[0.04]|[0.04]|[0.04]|
|Observations|10342|10225|10005|10013|10019|10005|9943|9912|9835|9796|9738|

Source: Authors' calculations using historical tax declaration records. Random effects model estimated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis
trade openness, as unproductive sectors are wiped out by foreign competition but the capital and labor attached to them fail to divert to more efficient uses.

We then present some cross-country empirical evidence on how the growth effect of openness depends on a variety of structural characteristics, including some that may be subject to reform. We build on the panel-data growth regressions presented in Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2005). As these papers do, we use a GMM procedure that controls for endogeneity and unobserved country-specific factors in order to estimate the growth effect of openness, as well as those of other policy and nonpolicy variables. We, however, depart from those studies in that we interact the openness measure with proxies of, respectively, educational investment, financial depth, inflation stabilization, public infrastructure, governance, labor-market flexibility, and ease of firm entry and exit. Our objective for using this non-linear specification is to assess whether an increase in openness may have a growth effect that depends on country characteristics that, at least in principle, are subject to improvement through economic and institutional reforms. We find that the growth effect of openness is positive and economically significant if certain complementary reforms are undertaken. This quantitative assessment may contribute towards identifying the specific reforms that are most needed to complement a trade liberalization agenda.

The empirical growth literature offers some examples of non-linear specifications considering interaction effects. On the related topic of foreign direct investment, Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (forthcoming) find that the growth effect of FDI is significantly positive only when the host country has, respectively, sufficiently high human capital and financial depth. Specifically in the analysis of growth effects of trade openness, an important antecedent of our work is the empirical study by Bolaky and Freund (2004). Using cross-country regressions in levels and changes of per capita GDP and controlling for simultaneity via external instruments, they find that trade opening promotes economic growth only in countries that
**o** z **0 r >** _co,_ **_C,,_** 0

|**Table B8. Informal Income and Expenditure**<br>from Informal Sector Surveys conducted by the author|_<25_hours per<br>week|245 hours<br>per week|Entire<br>Sample|Entire<br>Sample|Entire<br>Sample<br>|Entire<br>Sample<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||Stre<br>|et Services &<br>|
||Taxicabs|Taxicabs|Taxicabs|Kiosks|Markets|Vendors<br>|
|Number of Observations (actual number may vary depending on the<br>question)|99|101|308|245|137|80|
|Written records|||||||
|Yes|28.9|31.7|26.8|74.3|32.1|28.8|
|Daily profit...|||||||
|Overall|_5.1_|13.1|8.8|7.0|2.4|1.8|
|Estimated value of vehicle (thousands togrogs)|||||||
|Mean|4482.4|5759.6|4979.4|na|na|na|
|Nightly garage expenses (thousands togrogs)|||||||
|Mean|1.0|1.2|1.1|na|na|na|
|Weekly expenditure on ...|||||||
|inventories.(thousands<br>togrogs)<br>|na|na|na|103.8<br>|na|na
prices doubled between 1978 and 1979 and remained twice the 1978 price level for the next three years, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began to dismantle price regulation in the 1980s. Several factors contributed to this policy change. The commercialization of very large crude carriers reduced transport costs beginning in the late 1960s, and after 1973 the share of transport in the landed cost of imported oil declined precipitously, helping to equalize prices across different regional markets. The globalization of oil markets in the 1970s was further assisted by the rise of paper markets. Heating oil in 1978 became the first widely traded oil financial contract sold through a regulated exchange. By 1990, there were 10 active oil futures contracts trading worldwide (Medlock and Jaffe 2009). Today crude oil and oil products are commodities bought and sold in one international market; the only exception among the oil products considered in this paper is LPG, which is derived more from natural gas production than from oil refining and for which distinct regional markets still exist.

Instead of regulating prices or allocation, governments in high-income OECD countries over the past three decades have focused on creating market conditions conducive to healthy competition, ensuring fair trading and acting on anti-competitive behavior. The UK Office of Fair Trading, for example, has acted twice in the last two years to boost the transparency of heating oil prices for end-users (OFT 2011, 2012). Even so, as recently as 2003, the government of Portugal was still setting price ceilings for gasoline and automotive diesel (IEA 2004), and the U.S. State of Hawaii, fearing a lack of adequate competition, imposed ceilings on wholesale gasoline prices from September 2005 to May 2006. Producer subsidies also continue, although at relatively low levels. For example, according to the OECD database on fossil fuel subsidies, between 2009 and 2011, the largest annual producer subsidies in the oil sector among its members were found in the United States, averaging US$2.4 billion a year, followed
business. Minas Fácil is a one-stop-shop system, where firms obtain municipal, state, and federal tax registrations simultaneously instead of having to request these from separate offices. However, despite these efforts, survey data from 2009 revealed that 72 percent of firms were still informal. As a result, the State Government wanted to test several competing mechanisms for reducing formality.

A listing survey was used to identify potentially informal firms, which were then randomized into four treatment groups and a control group. Survey data revealing a lack of knowledge about how to formalize motivated the first treatment, which was to provide information about how to register by means of a glossy brochure and a dedicated helpline. A second treatment coupled this information with an exemption in the registration fees and free use of mandatory accounting services for a year to test if reducing registration costs would induce formalization. The third treatment randomly assigned municipal inspectors to firms, to see whether increased enforcement would get firms to formalize. The final treatment consists of having a neighboring firm visited by an inspector, to test whether there is a spillover impact of inspection on the formalization behavior of other firms.

We find that efforts to help firms formalize by giving them information, and by reducing the initial cost to zero along with offering a free accountant resulted in an increase in knowledge about the role of accountants in the formalization process, but did not lead to firms formalizing. In fact, it resulted in a small reduction in firms registering through a separate formal category – that of individual entrepreneur – which the information campaign did not target and which had its eligibility criteria relaxed during the course of our study. Moreover, firms which were assigned to either of these two treatments expressed less trust in government in our follow-up survey.

In contrast, assigning firms to receive a visit from a municipal inspector did result in an increase in municipal registration, although the impact was much less than anticipated by the government, with only an additional 3 percent of those assigned to treatment formalizing. This low rate results from the
, leading to a negative marginal effect of profitability on short-term debt.

The fourth control variable is asset turnover ( _asset_turnover_ ), which is calculated as net sales (Compustat item “sale”) divided by total assets (Compustat item “at”). As argued in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), firms with high turnover ratios may need short-term debt to support their sales. Because these firms are likely to generate current assets in the form of cash and account receivables, they may have an incentive to match the maturity of these short-term assets to liabilities by holding more short-term liabilities. Thus, high turnover firms may hold more short-term debt. Our final control variable is market-to-book ratio ( _mb_ ). It proxies for growth and investment opportunities as well as for the costs of financial distress. We measure it as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (Compustat item “ceq”). We calculate the market value of equity by utilizing the “Security Daily” database in Compustat Global. Myers (1977) 13
**Figure 2: Bribe payment and the severity level of access to finance as an obstacle to firms’ current operations**

<!-- Start of picture text -->
1.75<br>1.69<br>1.70<br>1.65<br>1.60<br>1.55<br>1.50 1.47<br>1.45<br>1.40<br>1.35<br>Firms that report zero bribes Firms that report positive bribes<br>obstacle<br>Severity level of access to finance<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Enterprise Surveys data.

Note: The bribe variable used here is based on the question in the ES that asked firms about the amount of bribes firms like itself pay to public officials to “get things done”. The figure uses sampling weights provided in the ES. The qualitative nature of the results shown in the figure remains unchanged even without the use of sampling weights. The severity level of access to finance (Y-axis variable) is measured on 0-4 scale as No obstacle (0), minor obstacle (1), moderate obstacle (2), major obstacle (3) and a very severe obstacle (4).

32
urban coefficients. The coefficient on log primary wage income for urban households is 0.87 compared to 0.93 for the equivalent measure in the ENEU data. This difference is not statistically significant.

Panel B of Table 5 adds cohort fixed effects and presents the estimated slope coefficients from equation (18). The point estimates suggest very high rates of conditional mobility, with the slope coefficients close to zero. The point estimates also show less conditional mobility in expenditure than in wage income.

23
**Figure 4: PISA 2012 results compared with School Infrastructure Quality**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Vietnam<br>−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5<br>School Infrastructure Quality Index<br>700<br>600<br>500<br>400<br>PISA Math Average Score 2012 300<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source:OECD-PISA database

# **4 Regression Approach II: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition**

A key weakness of the Fryer-Levitt approach is that the pooled regression does not allow for regression coefficients to be different across countries. In this section, we set aside the Fryer-Levitt method to look at the data from a different analytical perspective. We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (OB) method, that has recently become quite popular for PISA analysis after the initial work by [Ammermueller, 2007] comparing the PISA results of Finland and Germany.

## **4.1 Overview of the OB Decomposition**

The objective of OB is to decompose the mean differences. In this case it is the mean difference in Vietnam’s PISA performance with each of the DEV7 countries individually. Extensions of OB allow for decompositions to be made throughout the distribution rather than only at the mean values, but we leave such an extension for further research regarding Vietnam’s PISA performance. OB is based on a simple algebraic rearrangement of terms of the OLS regression of test scores. The mean outcome difference to be explained (∆ _Y_<sup> ̄</sup> ) is simply the difference of the mean outcomes for Vietnam and the comparison country. Let us denote the scores as _Y_<sup> ̄</sup> _V_ and _Y_<sup> ̄</sup> _O_ , respectively: 28
estimates than, those found in Paglialunga _et al._ (2022), which show a one percent temperature increase to be associated with 0.5 percentage point increase in the Gini index.

To investigate the potential long-run effects, we estimate Equation (2) and present the results in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2. We document strong and statistically significant effects of hotter temperature on income inequality for both country-level analysis and subnational-level analysis and both measures of inequality. Again, we also find the effects at the subnational level to be stronger than those at the country level. Specifically, higher temperature by 1<sup>◦</sup> C is found to increase the Gini index and the Theil index by 0.35 (1 percent) and 0.59 (2.3 percent) percentage points (Panel B, Columns 2 and 4). Comparing the panel FE and long differences models, the magnitudes of effects appear larger for the latter. This may suggest inequality could accumulate over the longer term (i.e., intensification of negative effect). But we also note that the t-tests for the differences with the two models are only statistically significant for the Theil index with the subnational analysis, but not for the Gini index (and the country-level analysis).

To put our estimates into perspective, within our sample, Finland has one of the lowest Gini indexes (i.e., less inequality), with a value of 26.5, while the Central African Republic has one of the highest Gini indexes (i.e., more inequality), at 53.7. Given this, our estimated increase in the Gini index of 0.349 percentage points (Column (2) of Panel B) suggests that 1°C increase in temperature widens the gap in inequality between these two countries at the two ends of the inequality spectrum by 1.3 percent. This shift is substantial, especially when considering the cumulative and intensified impacts
# **Table 7: Descriptive OLS Regression of Migration and Welfare Shocks Indices**

|||**OLS: Consi**<br>|**der Migrate=**<br>|**1**<br>||**OLS: Curre**<br>|**nt Migrant=**<br>|**1**<br>|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||**(1)**|**(2)**|**(3)**|**(4)**|**(5)**|**(6)**|**(7)**|**(8)**|
|Food Shock Index|-0.004||||-0.009||||
||(0.005)||||(0.010)||||
|Services Shock Index||0.018***||||0.024***|||
|||(0.005)||||(0.008)|||
|Health Shock Index|||0.006**||||0.014**||
||||(0.003)||||(0.006)||
|Coping Shock Index||||0.019***||||0.000|
|||||(0.004)||||(0.008)|
|Constant|0.032***|0.027***|0.026***|0.034
# **Introduction**

Although Egypt (pop. 83 million in 2011) experienced striking economic growth alongside a variety of developmental improvements from 2004 till 2010, spatial inequality and poverty persist. Egyptians in urban and Lower Egypt enjoy higher living standards than those in rural and Upper Egypt, yet internal migration rates are surprisingly low compared to other countries.

This paper offers three explanations for the low migration rates: 1) low educational level, 2) labor is tied up in agricultural activity either as paid workers or unpaid family workers, and 3) rural households’ ability to raise a portion of their food offsetting the impact of soaring food prices and reducing the incentive to migrate. The paper also finds two telling characteristics of internal migrants: 1) they are more likely to find employment than non-migrants; and 2) they earn higher wages, in particular the more educated individuals.

# **Literature Review**

All existing studies address the issue of internal migration in Egypt without, however, suggesting why the rates are comparatively low: Wahba, “An Overview of Internal and International Migration in Egypt” (2007) used the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 06) to demonstrate that while internal migration increased in 1998 -2006, the rate remained very low. The author notes that both rural-to- urban and urban-to- rural migration increased in that period as did commuting patterns.

Zohry, “The Development Impact of Internal Migration: Findings from Egypt” (2009) discussed the main motivations behind internal and international migration in Egypt drawing on field work in two governorates (Cairo and Beni Suief ). Zohry suggested that migrants were more often forced to move by dire economic necessity rather than the wish to seek a better living situation.

# **Stylized Facts**

# Data

This study used the Labor Force Survey conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) for the first quarter of year 2010. The survey has over 60 questions, clustered in three sections: 1) demographic
and four-digit National Industry Classification (NIC) stratification. Districts are administrative subdivisions of Indian states or territories. We use the provided sample weights to construct population-level estimates of total establishments and employment by district and three-digit NIC industry. Employment is formally defined as ―persons engaged‖ and includes working owners, family and casual labor, and salaried employees.

Currently there are approximately 630 districts spread across 35 states/union territories. In order to overcome empirical issues presented by small districts or those with an insufficient sample size, we exclude any districts with a population less than one million (based on 2001 census) or with fewer than 50 establishments sampled. For our main specifications we also exclude states with persistent conflict and political turmoil (Jammu-Kashmir and Nagaland) that make data quality questionable. After these adjustments, the resulting sample retains districts in 20 major states that include more than 94% of Indian employment in both manufacturing and services.

9
.

C. Unweighted averages. 2001 LICs, “LICs turned MICs” and “Continued LICs” include 62, 35 and 27 countries, respectively. Non-FCV and FCV LICs include 14, and 18 countries, respectively.

D. Unweighted averages. Neighbors of LICs only include countries with shared land borders. Sample includes 12 landlocked 2001 “LICs turned MICs”, 14 2020 landlocked LICs and 8 2020 landlocked non-FCV LICs.

E. Unweighted averages.

F. Data reflect annual averages of extreme weather events in the LICs of 2020.

13