rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
capital were similar across income groups in 1970. Nearly half of total agricultural capital was composed of fixed capital. Treestock accounted for one-third, and the livestock share was around 20%. By 2000, the differences in the composition of capital were pronounced. In high-income countries, the share of fixed capital did not change, but livestock only accounted for 9% of total agricultural capital and treestock increased to 45%. In middle- and low-income countries, the share of treestock increased to 47% as well. Livestock still accounted for 17% of total agricultural capital, while the share of fixed capital fell to 37%.

# **Comparison of data on agricultural fixed capital with FAO data on tractors**

The new database on agricultural fixed capital has several advantages, in particular the sound theoretical basis for the construction of the series, as well as the broad coverage of fixed capital to include structures and all types of equipment and machinery. From the United Nations’ System of National Accounts (2008), fixed assets are defined as “produced assets that are used repeatedly or continuously in production processes for more than one year.” Tractors represent one component of fixed capital.

The obvious drawback to the new database is the limited availability of national accounts data on gross fixed capital formation needed to construct the stock of fixed capital.<sup>19</sup> In the absence of cross-country data sets on agricultural fixed capital, the most commonly used proxy is FAO data on the numbers of tractors in use. This is a partial measure, in that it does not include buildings, irrigation systems, local infrastructure, as well as other types of machinery, nor does it take account of the varying quality and horsepower of tractors.<sup>20</sup> We compute the correlation between the FAO data series on the numbers of tractors in use and our data on agricultural fixed capital (of which tractors are one component) for each country; the average of the country correlations is 0.
, most of the local government data is based on estimates. This is the main reason why we used a case study from Germany where we conducted an original data collection and verified the results with supportive field work before using the definitions of data we used in the final analysis. The cases of Germany and Korea provide qualifying evidence of the findings in the cross-country cases.

I There may be an overestimate of the length of roads pertaining to a class called "baranguay" which may overstate the importance of the class of roads at the subnational level in the case of the Philippines. To avoid the effect of classification on the results of the analysis, we use the overall network length at the national level. We expect that the incentives to over- or under-state the length of a particular category of roads to vary by country and have used a country-specific dummy in a cross-country analysis presented in a companion paper (see Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1995).

12 The period 1982-86 for which data for Indonesia is available is a period when there was a priority given to betterment and reconstruction of the existing main road network (arterial and collector). That is, substanntial improvement in quality with little extension, and substantial external funding. In the same period, the local (district) network was extended about 100% by inclusion of low standard roads which would appear to reduce the average "quality". The analysis conducted in this study is based on the total netwrok of arterials, collectors, and low standard roads. This could mean that the "preference costs" for Indonesia are underestimated due to the "dilution" of the quality impacts.

10
potential. Past IMF country reports mentioned electricity exports of $250 million by 2019 and of $1 billion by 2023 as the country becomes a “regional energy superpower”. The question is whether this is realistic. Besides, boosting exports would require eliminating the tax on exporters imposed by mispricing foreign exchange. A 20% parallel market premium amounts to a 17% implicit tax on exports.

One way of bringing the interrelationships between debt sustainability and development to the forefront is to make the public sector DSA the centerpiece of country reports instead of relegating it to an annex.

> 12 This number is obtained by recomputing “automatic debt dynamics” (ADD) for 2019 assuming r=3.0%, giving it as -3.3 instead of the -7.8 shown in the public sector DSA table in IMF (2020). All other numbers remain the same, raising d by 4.5 percentage points of GDP.

> 13 We assume that the parallel market exchange rate is the marginal cost of foreign exchange and the rate that would emerge if the birr were floated. This is an empirical question, so we take a low premium, but there is evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1980s that the equilibrium exchange rate is close to the parallel rate. See Pinto (1991).

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Our data has two limitations related to the level of detail at which contract information is reported. First, for some firms we do not know the municipality, so we always use the region of the firm as the firm’s location to keep as many firms in our analysis as possible. Second, for most of the observations, the product code information is not provided at the 9 digit level, but at a more aggregated category (between 2 and 9 digits)<sup>10</sup> . We next explain our procedure to classify buying agencies into national vs. subnational governments. We provide more detailed descriptive statistics of our final data set in Appendix B.

# **3.1 Classifying agencies into government types: national vs. subnational**

At the core of our data work is to classify buying agencies into different government types. Our main goal is to divide all contracting authorities into four geographical levels: national, regional, provincial, and local. Additionally, we want to isolate some government agencies that do not 9Currently, these thresholds are determined by the EU Directives (Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors). The thresholds for publication depend on the type of government and type of contract. For example, the threshold for supplies and services contracts by central government authorities is e139,000. We provide more details about the procurement system in Europe in Appendix A.

> 10In our clean sample, 10.6% of observations only have information at the 2-digit product code level, 62.2% of observations have information of the product code at the 3 to 5 digits level and 27.2% of contracts have information at 6 digits or higher.

9
the World Bank’s open data library: Nominal Naira were converted into real (January 2018) Naira using the Consumer CPI of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Key outcomes are measured as follows:

# **Table 4:**

**Index of ten Finance and Accounting practices** , averaging the practices that a firm carries out (coded: ‘1’ if the practice was implemented in the last three months; and ‘0’ if not). This is the average of the following practices:

- a. Records all money in to the business on a daily or weekly basis

- b. Records all money out of the business on a daily or weekly basis

- c. Prepared an income statement (profit and loss statement)

- d. Prepared a balance sheet

- e. Analyzed a statement of cash flow

- f. Analyzed which products/services are the most profitable

- g. Used cost-control methods

- h. Prepared and used a budget

- i. Set financial goals or financial performance targets

- j. Conducted feasibility studies before starting a new venture or investment

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Despite numerous theoretical arguments developed on corruption’s impact on social welfare, empirical contributions measuring the widespread of this phenomenon and its relationship with other economic or social dimensions remain quite sparse. Exceptions to the above are studies that have focused (sometimes exclusively) on the unidirectional link between corruption and key economic and social indicators. Treisman (2000) points out that the difficulty to measure the corruption levels in various countries remains one of the major hindrances faced by researchers interested in studying this phenomenon. Although some of these difficulties were over recent years lifted with the development by some international organizations (e.g., Transparency International, World Bank, ICPR) of “perceived corruption” indices based on independent surveys of local agents, yet very few empirical contributions have been carried out to better understand the interaction of this phenomenon with other indicators of the economic or social spheres. In this endeavor, we attempt to contribute to this empirical literature by addressing the causal relationship between corruption and youth unemployment from two different perspectives. First, we discuss how the corruption practices within government institutions that encourage the payment of bribes to access the job opportunities contribute to reducing the efficiency of the resources (labor force) allocations. The resources are diverted from the most productive economic sectors toward those (usually less efficient economic sectors) where self-motivated officials have more discretionary power in selecting the candidates who are less qualified for the job. We examine how bribed bureaucrats are more concerned with their own personal interests at the expense of national welfare when positively reacting to the highest bribe payers. Second, we ask the question why the resulting mismatching between supply and demand in the labor market tends to sustain its underlying causes (i.e., bribes) by giving more incentive to new agents and economic actors to adopt these practices.

By adopting a system GMM approach that simultaneously accounts for the dynamic effect between perceived bribery among officials and the youth unemployment rates, we intend to look at the underlying causal link running between the two variables. To the best of
relationships, without considering explicitly international trade flows. For instance, it is possible to retrieve the GDP of Germany that is finally absorbed in China (i.e., Johnson and Noguera (2012) “value-added exports”), that according to the WIOD database in 2014 is: ``` .icio_load Loadingtablewiod2014...loaded ```

- `. *What is the value-added originated in Germany and absorbed in China? . icio, origin(deu) destination(chn)`

``` Value-Addedbyorigin/destination: Origin:DEU Destination:CHN Output:Value-Added ```

||`Millions of $`|`% of total`|
|---|---|---|
|`Value-Added`|`101042.25`|_`100.00`_|

The Stata output displays the value, in millions of US dollars, and the share of total value-added produced in a specific country, when the complete list of countries or sectors of destination is selected by specifying the code `all`<sup>6</sup> (or absorbed by

> 6This is the case if a certain country/sector of origin is specified, `origin(` _country_ _~~-~~ code_ `[,` _sector_ _~~c~~ ode_ `])` , as well as the complete list of countries/sectors of destination, i.e.

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. 2021. Financing firms in hibernation during the COVID-19 pandemic. _Journal of Financial Stability 53_ , 100837.

- Diez, F. J., R. A. Duval, J. Fan, J. M. Garrido, S. Kalemli-Ozcan, C. Maggi, M. S. Martinez Peria, and N. Pierri. 2021. Insolvency prospects among small-and-medium-sized enterprises in advanced economies: Assessment and policy options. _IMF Staff Discussion Note_ .

- Duchin, R., X. Martin, R. Michaely, and H. Wang. 2021. Concierge treatment from banks: Evidence from the paycheck protection program. _Journal of Corporate Finance_ , 102124.

- Feyen, E., T. Alonso Gispert, T. Kliatskova, and D. S. Mare. 2021. Financial sector policy response to COVID-19 in emerging markets and developing economies. _Journal of Banking & Finance 133_ , 106184.

- Gilchrist, S., J. W. Sim, and E. Zakrajˇsek. 2014. Uncertainty, financial frictions, and investment dynamics. NBER Working Paper No. 20038.

- Giupponi, G. and C. Landais. 2022. Subsidizing labour hoarding in recessions: The em-

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ultimately increase the number of workers who seek jobs in the rural and urban household sector, increasing the supply of labor where most of the poor are found.

# _a) Regulations_

In Vietnam, the minimum wage level is set at different rates for domestic and foreign enterprises. For the domestic sector -whether private or public- the monthly minimum wage is set at 144,000 VND (about $10.35) since January 1997. In the public sector, this minimum wage is used as the base on which actual salaries are calculated. All public sector wages are a multiple of the minimum wage. Thus, any increase in the minimum wage leads automatically to an increase in all public sector wages (which probably explains why its level has remained unchanged since 1997). In foreign companies and joint ventures the minimum wage is higher. Until July 1999, minimum wages were denominated in dollars. Thus the dollar cost of wages in foreign companies was not affected by the currency slide in the previous years. Nowadays, these minimum wages are quoted in domestic currency and are set at 626,000 VND in the inner districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, 556,000 VND in other large cities and 487,000 VND everywhere else. So for foreign companies, the minimum wage represents between 338% and 435% of the minimum wage for domestic companies. How does this affect labor costs?

# _b) Evidence: domestic companies_

For domestic companies, the minimum wage is very low. Annually, it would yield an income of less than VND 1.73 million. This falls below the World Bank's general poverty line set at VND 1.787 million for 1998 (World Bank, 1999). As can be seen in table 17, VLSS data shows that such a minimum wage represents roughly one fourth of Vietnam's average wage and one third of rural wages. This is modest by international standards. Table 17 also shows that Vietnam's minimum wage is far below average wages in
point. For example, ‘The New Era of Unconditional Convergence’ argues that the era of _unconditional divergence_ is over, and that developing countries have been growing fast enough to be driving overall global convergence in incomes (Patel et al. 2021).<sup>3</sup> This convergence narrative echoes similar recent results from Kremer et. al (2021) who find that there is now evidence in support unconditional convergence at the global level since 1990 and convergence since 2000 due to a faster catch-up growth between the poor and higher income countries. A more sober note is struck by Johnson and Papageorgiou (2020) who argue

> 1 For each global region according to PIP data (1990-2019, mean growth): East Asia & Pacific, 6.07, Europe & Central Asia, 1.24, Latin America & Caribbean, 1.93, Middle East & North Africa, 1.27, Other High Income Countries, 1.37, South Asia, 2.85, Sub-Saharan Africa,0.76, World 1.57.

> 2 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-newreport-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience

> 3 Unconditional convergence here the authors refer to an overall convergence in incomes across the world without controlling for other factors. This terminology originates in earlier work such as from Lucas (1988), King et al. (1988), and Romer (1990), who explored whether controlling for factors such as human capital, investment, financial sector development, foreign aid, trade, etc., could recover conditional convergence (Barro, 1991). Other lines of work focused on non-linearities in the growth process that create convergence clubs (Quah, 1993; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995) and on the cross-country dispersion in the level of income per capita (called σ-convergence).

2
overhang, bail outs and capital flight. The first break in 1983 coincides with the assassination of the opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino, the trough occurs in 1985, and the second break takes place in 2001—a few years before the formal end of the slump. Although the duration of the decline phase is only two years, GDP per capita contracted by 18.63% in this short period of time. Last but not least, panel (d) shows an unfinished slump with a continuing decline in Madagascar. Madagascar grew rapidly for over a decade following independence from France in 1960 but then experienced a dramatic and ongoing collapse from 1971 onward. This roughly coincides with the transition of power from Philibert Tsiranana—Madagascar’s first president—to Didier Ratsiraka who fully seized power in 1975 by means of a coup. By 2002, the average Malagasy was about 50% poorer than in 1971. Madagascar’s GDP per capita did not recover its pre-slump level over a period of 31 years. At the end of the observed period, the decline is still ongoing and the provisional trough coincides with the censoring cutoff in 2014.

# **3 Characteristics of slumps**

We apply the sequential algorithm to the entire Penn World Table (v9.0, series _rgdpna/pop_ ) yielding 57 or 77 slumps between 1950 and 2014, depending on how permissive we are towards type I errors.<sup>8</sup> Supplementary Appendix S2 lists all episodes and Supplementary Appendix S4 provides summary statistics.

We detect many well-known growth collapses and deep recessions. Most slumps begin between the 1970s and the early 1990s. Several downbreaks occur following the oil shock in 1973–1974 and another peak occurs between 1979 and 1981 during the second oil shock and debt crisis of the early 1980s. The period between the 1970s and early 1980s is generally marked by heightened volatility, as has been documented in a number of studies (Easterly

> 8 We run the algorithm on all the PWT (v9.0)
variable twice: once interacted with an indicator for African countries and once interacted with an indicator for non-African countries.

# **_<u>Appendix Table C2. Impacts of US preference margins</u>_**

||<br> <br>Data at country-HS 6-digit-year level (<br>used<br>Dependent variable|<br>including zeros) is<br>is:|
|---|---|---|
||Log (imports + 1)<br>Log (imports + 1)|Log (imports + 1)|
||(1)<br>(2)|(3)|
|Preference margin|0.007<br>(1.01)||
|Preference margin * Africa|1.650***<br>(8.90)||
|Preference margin * Non-Africa|-0.0003<br>(-0.39)||
|Preference margin * Africa * Agriculture||0.370***<br>(3.44)|
|Preference margin * Africa * Apparel||3.360***<br>(8.23)|
|Preference margin * Africa * Manufacturing||1.567***<br>(9.40)|
|Preference margin * Africa * Mining||-1.257<br>(-0.74)|
|Preference margin * Non-Africa * Agriculture||0.358<br>(1.95)|
|Preference margin * Non-Africa * Apparel||-2.423***<br>(-3.95)|
|Preference margin * Non-Africa * Manufacturing||0.0002<br>(0.37)|
|Preference margin * Non-Africa * Mining||6.317***<br>(5.58)|
|Country-product
# Excessive subnational borrowing

The second macroeconomic concern in countries implementing decentralization is that elected mayors and governors will use their independence to borrow beyond their jurisdictions' capacity to repay. This raises the specter of defaults, followed by failures in the banking system and pressures for national government bailouts.

In Colombia the total debt stock of departments and municipalities actually declined as a share of GDP from 1991 to 1998, but several departments and municipalities nonetheless had debt crises. The decrease in total debt was all due to the amortization of external debt, much of which was due to multinationals for electrification projects in the 1 980s, before the subnational governments had political or fiscal autonomy. Domestic debt of the subnational governments grew in the 1 990s, especially to the banking sector (Perry and Huertas. 1997). Although the data are not complete, the debt to the domestic banking system increased from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 4.6 percent in 1997, according to estimates of the Superintendency of Banks. 1<sup>4</sup> See table 5. Of this was debt, 30 percent was owed by territorial power companies to the National Electricity Fund (FEN) and was backed by electricity tariffs. Excluding this power-sector debt, in 1991 territorial bank debt totaled 1.8 percent of GDP; by 1997 it had increased to 3.2 percent. In addition to bank debt, several of the larger municipalities have outstanding bonds. Total bond debt (as of August 1997) was estimated at $500 billion.

> 14 National government data imply somewhat lower debt levels, but following the same pattern. Subnational debt levels in Colombia compare favorably with provincial and state debt inl997 of 6 and 12 percent of GDP in Argentina and Brazil, respectively.

34
the two years, although the 2020 bump happens to line up with the start of the pandemic, though the jump in prayer seems to be larger in 2020.

# 3.3 Food prices

Figure 11 breaks down the average prices by region. There is a single pattern tying all of these different food items together: there is a marked drop in average prices between March and May/June. The largest drop differs by food – for example, the largest drop for eggs is in South Asia in June through August, while the largest drop for chicken is in East Asia and the Pacific as well as the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, while exact patterns differ across regions – bread and egg prices seem relatively flat in the Middle East and North Africa, for example – there appear to be clear similarities.

It seems unlikely that this is driven by, for example, simple seasonal patterns for a couple of reasons. First, the same patterns are seen throughout all regions, with relatively few exceptions. Since these regions are quite heterogeneous – for example, the agricultural season is at different times of the year in many of the countries – it seems unlikely that seasonal patterns could drive the shared variation. Second, Figure A1 in the appendix presents average global prices for rice, taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the IMF. It does not appear that yearly prices, at least for rice, tend to be lower in May and June than in January. If anything, it is usually the opposite.

The final set of results breaks down food prices by country income category. We present these results in Figure 12. The results are consistent with the patterns seen in the previous figure, although this breakdown adds a bit more information. Specifically, the drop was much lower in low-income countries for several foods – eggs, milk, rice, and, especially, chicken and onions. For 10
>15</sup> Basic features are as follows:

- SEWA Brand (Yes or No): SEWA has worked for many years in the study villages, while IFFCO-TOKIO is almost unknown. In the “Strong SEWA brand” treatment, videos clearly indicate the product is offered by SEWA. Alternatively, SEWA is not mentioned.

- Peer vs. Authority Figure: Farmers may weigh information sources differentially when learning about insurance. In the “Peer” treatment, a product endorsement is delivered by a local farmer. In the “Authority” treatment, a teacher delivers the endorsement.

> 14 The use of video players allows SEWA to explain the product to the households in a consistent manner. It allows for a more careful experimental treatment, as the individual conducting the marketing is not solely responsible for delivering the experimental message.

> 15 For households that were part of our 2006 household survey, four videos are used (A-D in Online Appendix B Table 2). For this group, the SEWA brand is included in all videos. For households that receive a video marketing treatment but were not part of the original survey, one of the eight different videos is randomly assigned, four of which include the SEWA brand.

12