rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
(second) case, our coefficient of interest is identified by exploiting the within firm-originproduct (firm level) changes in export values due to the variation in the number of NTMs imposed by the importing country on HS6-digit product _p_ from origin _c_ over time _t_ . The results reported in Table A4, are qualitative similar to our baseline estimates (Table 2), although they are less precisely estimated. We note, however, that these estimates are not directly comparable to our main one as they are identified based on a different source of variation.

# **6 Conclusions**

Despite sustained tariff concessions, African countries continue to play a marginal role in global trade. While tariffs have traditionally been a major focus of trade policy, NTMs, particularly standards and technical regulations, have emerged as a growing concern for policy makers, exporters, and importers alike. Despite their importance, relatively little is known about the impact of NTMs on firm-level exports in Africa, particularly in comparison to other regions. Hence, we bridge this gap in the literature by examining how NTMs influence firms’ export strategies in Africa, utilizing data from selected African countries.

We explore the effect of non-tariff measures, specifically standards and technical regulations, which are fast replacing tariffs as the main trade policy tool, on the export margins of 20
Table A.2: Average Cost Shares and Variations

||Pre-|WTO|Post-|WTO|Percent|Change (%)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||_α_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_<br>(1)|_α_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_<br>(2)|_α_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_<br>(3)|_α_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_<br>(4)|_α_<sup>_l_</sup><br>_it_<br>(5)|_α_<sup>_m_</sup><br>_it_<br>(6)|
|31 Food|0.1012|0.6368|0.1042|0.6538|2.97|2.66|
|32 Textiles|0.1728|0.5436|0.1203|0.6287|-30.38|15.66|
|33 Wood|0.1993|0.5057|0.1753|0.4731|-12.03|-6.43|
|38 Metals|0.1646|0.5722|0.1280|0.6109|-22.24|6.77|

**_Source:_** Data for the study comes from the World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise Development (RPED) and Ghana Manufacturing Survey (GMES) from 1992 to 2003.The surveys were conducted by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, University of Ghana, and Ghana Statistical Service. **_Note:_** Columns (1) & (2) report sector-level input shares on labor
strategy exploits the variation over time within sub‐regions. Results are clustered at the regional level.

## ���� � ������ ������ ��� ��� ������        �5�

## Where:

- ���� is labor income, total income, poverty, extreme poverty for household _i_ in sub‐region _j_ and year _t;_

- ���� is the hurricane damage index for major events for sub‐region _j_ in year _t_ (SS ≥ 1);

- ���� is a matrix of control variables at the household level;

- �� are year fixed effects; �� are country fixed effects.

The model includes rich set of time‐varying observable household characteristics ( ���� ) such as the maximum level of education of the most educated employed member of the household, access to water 16
2 the gains from full reform compare with the gains that could be expected if and when (a) the US complies with its WTO obligations as laid out in the WTO’s dispute settlement Panel and Appellate Body reports (WTO 2004b, 2005a) and (b) the partial reforms proposed in the Hong Kong Trade Ministerial meeting in December 2005 are implemented as part of the DDA?

The Cotton Initiative under the WTO’s DDA has not only the trade policy reform component but also a development component (WTO 2004a,c). The latter is aimed at boosting the international competitiveness of cotton producers in low-income (especially West African) cotton-exporting countries. One prospective way to do that is for governments of those countries to allow the adoption of new varieties of cotton emerging from the biotechnology revolution, the affordability of which will be greater in the absence of cotton market distortions. We therefore compare the estimated gains from cotton subsidy and tariff reform with the prospective gain from wider adoption by developing countries of genetically modified (GM) cotton, and also ask: how much greater would be the gains to cotton-producing developing countries from GM cotton adoption if global cotton markets were not distorted by subsidies and tariffs?

After presenting a brief background to the world’s cotton market in Section 2, this paper seeks to address these questions by using a well-received model of global economy known as GTAP (developed by Purdue University’s Global Trade Analysis Project) and a slight modification of the latest version of its related trade and protection database, described in Section 3. Empirical simulation results are presented in Section 4 for full trade and subsidy reform and in Section 5 for partial cotton policy reform either by the US in response to the WTO dispute settlement case brought against it by Brazil or as
# **_World Sugar Prices_**

Figure 5 shows average annual world free market prices for raw sugar and estimated free market prices for plantation white refined sugar for the sugar years (October-September) 1970-95. A longer constant-world price series for plantation white for the period 1965-95 is illustrated in Fig. 11. In the past world free market prices have been extremely volatile, with particularly sharp peaks and collapses between 1973 and 1976 and again between 1979 and 1982. Since 1982 prices have been less volatile, however, and in real terms have been on average at about the same level as they were in the 1960s and early 1970s i.e. at about US 10 cents/pound in constant 1981 prices. In contrast to most other primary commodity prices, there was no statistically significant downward trend between 1965 and 1995. The reduced volatility since 1982 is probably in part a consequence of the much larger volume of sugar traded in the world free market than before 1975 ( Data S5) and also of the increased role of corn and other sweeteners, which have become a significant constraint to massive price increases of the kind which occurred in between 1973 and 1975, and 1979 and 1981 .

Figure 5: **Nominal world prices for raw and refined (plantation white) sugar, 1970-95** <!-- Start of picture text -->
-RAW  REFINED<br>i  I  S  .'\\.  . .<br>. ~  I  ...<br><!-- End of picture text -->

Source: See Data SI for details World prices for plantation white sugar are not published regularly, and so the series of international prices for Indian plantation white sugar shown in Figs 5 and 11 has been estimated from the free market international price of raw sugar plus an average refining margin equivalent to 90 percent of the margin between international raw sugar prices and the international prices of fully refined sugar. Taking 90 percent of the full margin follows Goldar and Gulati (1991)
More broadly, a wide range of empirical literature identifies the importance of financial inclusion in promoting economic growth and reducing income disparities. Demirgüç-Kunt et.al (2013) observed a strong positive correlation between the use of formal financial services and the level of GDP per capita in a country. A similar conclusion was drawn by King et al. (1993) who studied the sources of growth of 80 countries between 1960 and 1989, which illustrated that advancement in bank assets (measured by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) was positively associated with economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic efficiency, even when controlled for country and policy characteristics. This relationship was further evidenced by the study of financial inclusion and economic growth in a research paper covering 55 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries by Dai-Won et al. (2018). A study of 37 developing Asian economies by Park and Mercado (2015) showed that financial inclusion contributed significantly to reducing poverty and lowering income inequality in those countries. Financial inclusion is therefore recognized as a key enabler for 7 of the 17 United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals and for meeting the World Bank’s twin goals of reducing extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity.

Access to a basic account at a formal financial institution where money can be stored safely is a primary metric of financial inclusion. Access to stored funds can be used as a bulwark against sudden economic shocks among the poor, as seen in the study of financial diaries of 250 poor households by Collins et al. (2009). Other studies have shown that access to a formal account by underserved individuals helped them to meet unexpected expenses such as health needs (see Dupas and Robinson (2013)).

Yet financial exclusion is still widespread around the world. World Bank estimates show that 1.7 billion adults worldwide still have no access to formal financial services – meaning that nearly 38 percent of the world’s population is still financially excluded (Demirgüç-Kunt et all., 2017). Within the South
two-thirds of households are in debt. Indicators for women paint an even starker picture: less than 4% of primary women in the household can read and write, two in three of these women are depressed, and just over half of eligible girls attend school.

These multiple constraints may give rise to poverty traps, i.e., stable equilibria from which it is difficult to escape unless multiple constraints are relieved simultaneously. For example, human capabilities (e.g., skills) and nonhuman capabilities (e.g., capital) could be complements, and if both are below what is needed for a non-poor equilibrium, cash or other forms of nonhuman capital alone may not reduce poverty. In such cases, multi-dimensional interventions would be needed to reduce persistent poverty (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy et al., 1989; Azarriadis and Stachurski, 2005; Barrett et al, 2019; Buera, Kaboski and

> 1 World Bank Fragility and Conflict and Violence Overview. Accessed on April 29, 2019 from http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview. 2 Statistics are derived from the 2016 baseline survey. 3 Throughout the document, monetary amounts are reported in nominal and purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted USD terms. The latter is set at 2018 prices using the Afghanistan CPI and PPP conversion factor from the IMF, unless otherwise stated.  Figures in current USD are converted at the exchange rate for the year the data were collected with the IMF exchange rates for the corresponding year: 2016 (for baseline data), 2017 (for implementation), and 2018 (for follow-up data). The exchange rates used are: 1 USD = 67.87 AFN (2016), 1 USD = 68.03 AFN (2017), and 1 USD = 72.08 AFN (2018). All tables report PPP-adjusted amounts only.

2
from the Spanish acronym for _Servicio de Administraci ́on de Rentas_ or Revenue Administration Service), the tax authority in Honduras.

## **3.2.1 Personal Income Tax (PIT) data**

Honduras has a dual personal income tax system, with income from labor and mixed sources (operation of non-incorporated firms and service provision) being taxed at a progressive schedule and capital income (bank interests, dividends, capital gains) taxed at a flat rate. For the period we study, income from capital was taxed at a flat 10% rate. Income from labor and mixed sources face a progressive schedule with marginal

> 4It is also relevant to document which incomes EPHPM does not cover: in the period we study, information on capital income was very limited, with specific questions on interests present in some but not all years, and no other detailed questions on other sources of capital income such as dividends. As we show below using tax data and, as has been widely documented (Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015), capital income is particularly important at the very top of the income distribution.

5
to live in conflict-affected countries by 2030, including Somalia.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is important to shed light and improve our understanding on the links between conflict and poverty.

This paper estimates the immediate (within a week) impact of terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab against civilians in Somalia using micro-data from two waves of the Somali High Frequency Survey (SHFS), combined with geo-tagged information on attacks.<sup>5</sup> We exploit the spatial and time variation of interviews through a difference-in-difference identification strategy that compares outcomes of control and exposed households, before and after terrorist incidents. We also derive a shift-share instrument using changes in the number of US air/drone attacks against Al-Shabaab and employ an instrumental variables approach. We provide evidence to support the validity of our identification strategies and that our estimates are robust to different specifications, samples considered and several sensitivity checks.

Our results suggest that consumption of households exposed to terrorist incidents decreases by 33%, mainly driven by a decline in food consumption. The reduction in consumption increases poverty and the depth of poverty among the poor. The impact on consumption seems to be associated to a smaller share of household members (aged 15 to 50) working and earning income after an attack. In addition, we document that the negative impact on consumption is clustered within a 4 kilometer radius from the incident and has a heterogeneous impact, not affecting households in the top 20% of the consumption distribution. The perception of police competence also worsens as a result of a terrorist incident.

The literature models terrorists as rational actors, with terrorism having large consequences on economic outcomes, besides the loss of life, damage to persons and negative psychological effects.<sup>6</sup> Conflict can also lead to sharp increases in poverty and vulnerability and other adverse outcomes.<sup>7</sup> Our findings are in line with the disruption that could be expected from a terrorist attack. We contribute to the literature on the intersection
restricted to those individuals with the relevant initial status in 2012, and the dependent variable takes the value one if the individual reached the corresponding destination status in 2018. The reference category for the educational dummies is having no formal education qualification.

Table 1 shows the transition regression outputs from the two initial baselines women are most likely to be in, either out of the labor force or employed in the public sector. We find that younger women are more likely to transition from OLF to employment than older women. Aging by one year makes a young woman more likely to enter employment, with the highest likelihood at age 33. We also find that having primary, secondary or post-secondary schooling (relative to having no formal education) reduces the probability of transitioning to employment from OLF for women. Among women, we also find that having post-secondary education is associated with a lower probability of remaining OLF for those already OLF at baseline. Being married at baseline

> 11 We have attempted to explore labor market states’ persistence in further detail in ELMPS, but substantial measurement errors preclude a useful analysis. We tracked individual labor market status in 2012 based on retrospective information provided in the 2018 survey and cross-checked the accuracy of this information based on a sample of panel observations that were also interviewed in 2012. The data analysis revealed significant discrepancies between what individuals report in the current section of the 2012 round and what they report in the retrospective section of the 2018 round. Of those who retrospectively reported in 2018 that they were not employed in 2012, 44% were found to be employed in 2012. On the other hand, of those who retrospectively reported being employed in 2012, 20% were found to be unemployed.

19

**Official Use**
increase in grocery-store prices of 0.08%. The effect is stronger in counties with higher SNAP participation rates and higher grocery market concentration. Increases in sales, after controlling for price effects, are also larger in counties with higher SNAP participation rates. We estimate small and statistically insignificant effects on other store types, firm dynamics such as retailer entry and exit, and market structure. We estimate a positive price effect not only for SNAP-eligible products but also for SNAP-ineligible products, although the sales effect is much stronger in high-participation counties for SNAP-eligible goods but not SNAP-ineligible goods. We regard this as evidence consistent with multi-product pricing models such as that of Chen and Rey (2012), suggesting that retailers are able to raise markups on both eligible and ineligible products.

Next, we use consumer scanner data to estimate the effect of SNAP on household consumption. We classify consumption by eligible and ineligible households, as well as by eligible and ineligible products. We estimate a marginal propensity to consume food (MPCF) out of SNAP of about 0.44 for eligible households, in line with previous literature. We estimate that the MPCs for ineligible products and ineligible households are statistically insignificant and different from the MPCF out of SNAP for eligible households. Using cross-state variation in issuance schedules, we find that the MPCF out of SNAP is larger in weeks of benefit disbursement, complementing previous literature on impacts of issuance schedules (Goldin et al. 2022). We also investigate the effect of SNAP on shopping behavior, and report small and mixed effects.

In order to understand economic incidence, we develop and calibrate a simple partial-equilibrium model of supply and demand, extending upon the tax-incidence analyses from Weyl and Fabinger (2013) to shed light on the incidence of social-safety-net transfers. The exercise allows us both to test the consistency of empirical findings with theory and to interpret the results. The framework takes our reduced-form estimates of the price response and the MPCF out of SNAP as a set of sufficient statistics to measure the local incidence of changes in SNAP
public anti-poverty strategy of the _Partido de la U_ during the two terms of President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), reaching almost national coverage. Juan M. Santos, the former Defense Minister in the second term of President Uribe and also affiliated to his political party, became the presidential candidate in early 2010. In the runoff election held on June 20, 2010, the electoral process examined in this paper, Santos achieved a landslide victory, with 69 percent of the votes.

# **2.2 The** **_Familias en Acci ́on_ Program**

Colombia suffered a severe economic downturn during the late 1990s that led to a serious increase in poverty and a deterioration of several social indicators. One of the responses of the Government of Colombia to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the poor was to launch a social transfer program in 2001 inspired in a successful scheme applied in Mexico, the widely known _Progresa/Oportunidades_ . The Colombian FA program offers cash transfers -ranging from approximately US $8 to US $16 per school age child and nutrition packages of approximately $28 dollars for children below 7- contingent upon school attendance of the beneficiary children and regular participation in growth monitoring sessions and nutrition workshops, respectively. In addition to having children in the relevant ages, households are offered the program based on their poverty score index in a proxy means test system known as _SISBEN_ .

The _SISBEN_ poverty index score is constructed with information from a registry of the poor. This register, through household level interviews, collects information on households’ demographics, structure, durable goods, housing characteristics, human capital, labor force participation, income, and access to basic services. The poverty index score is calculated with an algorithm that weighs several variables to predict household welfare. The score takes values from 0 to 100 for the poorest and less poor households, respectively. At the time of this study, the distribution of the score is divided into 6 brackets and households assigned to the lowest 7
# **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The gradual elimination of barriers to global capital and trade flows and the increasing mobility of international firms have stimulated competition among countries for foreign direct investment, often through the use of tax incentives (Morisset, 2003). From tax holidays and import duty exemptions to investment allowances and accelerated depreciation, the global phenomenon of using fiscal incentives to attract multinational corporations, with the resultant technology and knowledge spillovers, appears to have strengthened since the early 1990s. However, the debate over the outcomes of tax incentives is not settled.  A number of studies have shown that tax incentives are not the most influential factor for multinationals in selecting investment locations. Factors such as basic infrastructure, political stability, and the cost and availability of labor seem to be more important. Still many other cases (e.g. Ireland or tax havens in the Caribbean and South Pacific) suggest that tax incentives did play a relevant role in attracting foreign investment. The literature suggests several interesting corollaries. For instance, tax incentives affect the composition of foreign direct investment more than on its level.  Also, large foreign companies – such as those in the automobile sector – are generally in a better position to negotiate special tax regimes and thus extract rents from host governments (Oman 2000). Furthermore, survey evidence (James 2010) suggests that export oriented investors are much more responsive to incentives than investors oriented towards the domestic market.

2. Mainstream economics cautions us about the use of industrial policies that target sectors, firms and regions. In addition, the implementation of WTO-consistent policy and incentive frameworks is shifting the emphasis from tax benefits towards infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), for instance, prohibits subsidies that are conditional on exports. Countries subject to these WTO rules<sup>2</sup> , will in principle need to revise their incentive regimes to avoid being subject to potential legal challenges from other WTO members.

3. Certainly, tax incentives