rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
The scores for these two utilities are not directly comparable, but MERALCO can be compared to the utilities from Peru, Colombia and Vietnam.

Distributors are a regulated common carrier business operating on franchises and subject to regulation be the ERC. Distributors vary widely in size/technical/financial capacity and operating standard (e.g. voltage levels and metering). MERALCO is the Philippines’ largest distribution utility serving over a quarter of the population and the regions that accounts for 50 percent of the country’s GDP. Performance Based Regulation, which MERALCO is subject to, calculates a Performance Index Factor which includes service interruption, system loss and voltage level criteria. Consumers are to be compensated if guaranteed service levels are not met.

BENECO is organized and registered as a non-stock non-profit service-oriented entity providing services in the City of Baguio and Benguet province under a franchise of 50 years granted by the NEC. As a cooperative, BENECO is owned and operated by the consumers it serves which also elects the board of directors.

Electric cooperatives (EC) are generally smaller in terms of the market they serve. The ECs distribution infrastructure was financed almost completely by public money through the NEA. Most of the loans were subsequently mandated by EPIRA to be absorbed by PSALM. EPIRA also

> 11 For details on the electricity access index, see the annex.

33
Figure 14: Variation in the task content performed by part-time workers. (Change from Mid-90s) <!-- Start of picture text --> 1,5<br>1<br>0,5<br>0<br>‐0,5<br>‐1<br>‐1,5<br>Argentina Uruguay Brazil Chile Peru Bolivia Dominican Mexico El<br>Rep. Salvador<br>NRCA NRCI RC RM NRM<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own calculations based on Household surveys.

Note: NRCA refers to Non-Routine Cognitive Analytical, NRCI is Non-Routine Cognitive Interpersonal, RC is Routine Cognitive, RM is Routine Manual and NRM is Non-Routine Manual.

Figure 15: Variation in the task content performed by temporary workers. (Change from Mid-90s) <!-- Start of picture text --> 0,8<br>0,6<br>0,4<br>0,2<br>0<br>‐0,2<br>‐0,4<br>‐0,6<br>‐0,8<br>‐1<br>Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico El Salvador<br>NRCA NRCI RC RM NRM<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: Own calculations based on Household surveys Note: NRCA refers to Non-Routine Cognitive Analytical, NRCI is Non-Routine Cognitive Interpersonal, RC is Routine Cognitive, RM is Routine Manual and NRM is Non-Routine Manual Page 23 of 51
# _Disentangling Input and Output trade liberalization_

A further question worthwhile exploring is related to the types of goods: which are the French exported products that are affected the most by Asian liberalization? To test the relationship between market access and types of traded products, we estimate equation (3) by splitting the sample into firms producing intermediate and final goods.

To classify HS6 products into intermediate and final products, we use BEC (Broad Economic Categories) classification from United Nations.<sup>21</sup> In line with the firm-level tariff built in section III, we construct construct a similar measure for both intermediate and final goods using information at the HS6 to classify products.

Table 5 reports the estimate results for our two subsamples of firms: firms exporting intermediate and final products respectively. When controlling for observable country characteristics and foreign competitive pressures, we find that Chinese tariff cuts are mainly significant for French exports of intermediate products (columns (1) and (3)). Our point estimate implies that a 10 percentage points fall in Chinese applied tariff, increases by almost 17 percent the number of intermediate products exported and by almost 28 percent French export sales to China relative to the other Asian destinations. When we restrict the sample to firms exporting only final goods, interestingly we do not find any significant effect of Asian or Chinese liberalization on French extensive margin (column (2)), while the effect on the intensive margin is only significant at the 10 percent level (column (4)).

These findings confirm the results found by a number of recent works on the increasing role of intermediate inputs in international trade and the effects of input liberalization on firm performance. Amiti and Konings (2007), using firm-level data for Indonesia, show that the effect of reductions on input tariffs on firm total factor productivity improvements is much important than the effect of reductions on final good tariffs. Goldberg et al. (2010), using firm level data for India, demonstrate that input tariff liberalization allows firms to
|3|
|Djibouti|1|1|0|2|3|3|
|Egypt, Arab Rep.|1|1|0|2|3|3|
|Iran, Islamic Rep.|1|2|2|2|3|3|
|Iraq|2|1|1|1|2|2|
|Jordan|1|1|2|2|2|2|
|Lebanon|1|0|1|2|2|3|
|Libya|0|0|0|1|2|2|
|Morocco|1|0|0|2|2|3|
|Syrian Arab Republic|0|0|0|1|1|1|
|Tunisia|1|2|0|2|2|3|
|West Bank and Gaza|1|1|2|2|2|3|
|Yemen,Rep.|0|0|0|1|2|1|
|Source|||||||

Algeria, for example, conducted its latest HBS in 2011, its latest labor force survey (LFS) in 2014, its MICS in 2017, and its Arab Barometer in 2019. Using this information, we ranked different methods and data for measuring well-being the following way. “Conducting a new household budget survey” as a top priority, and calculation of an MPI/asset index and measuring subjective well-being as second-best options. Alternatively, we note that imputation is not feasible because the existing HBS is too old. Using administrative and big data can help, but it is unclear how we might access credible welfare information.

Overall, collecting new HBS data is a top priority for nine of the 13 countries. Imputation is feasible in a number of countries for years they have not conducted HBSs. As expected, conflict affected countries (highlighted by grey color in Table 6) use different strategies to measure well-being, with most relying
-37-

countries, and it is highly likely that this labour force was relatively cheap and flexible. Equally, it is well known that Europe and Japan borrowed technology from the United States on a very large scale, as shown, directly, by the latter country's large balance of payments surplus on patent and royalties account, and the direct investment activities of its multinationals, and as suggested, indirectly, by the transformation of European and Japanese industry towards what many would call a US production model.

The explanation, however, has a serious limitation since it is unable to discriminate between circumstances in this period and in earlier periods of the economic histories of Europe and Japan. Thus, surplus agricultura **l** abour was present in even greater quantities during the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, as shown by the very high proportions of the labour force employed on the land at the time. Similarly, migration flows were possible, and indeed occurred on a large scale at the turn of the century from Europe to North America. Yet, despite the presence of cheap labour supplies, neither Europe nor Japan were able to achieve the growth rates that were recorded in the period under examination.

More surprisingly, perhaps, the same argument can also be applied to the technology-bas **e** d xplanation. It is undoubtedly true that, after World War II, the United States' technological lead was overwhelming. But a technological gap vis-a-vis the United States had also existed well before 1945, even if its size may not have been quite as pronounced as it-was then, as shown by Table 5 which presents data on GDP per man-hour taken as a rough proxy for technological achievement. Though these very aggregate findings are clearly tentative, they are confirmed by more careful
Hoeffler (1997). Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Spiegel (1994) find a negative effect for increased years of schooling using a standard growth accounting framework. Spiegel (1994) shows that the negative effect is robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of variables such as regional dummies, size of the middle class, political instability, share of machinery investment, and inward orientation.

Lau, Jamison, and Louat (1991) estimated the Cobb-Douglas production function using log-difference variables, employing panel data for 58 developing countries. They investigated the effects of education level in five regions and found that education had an estimated negative effect in Africa and the Middle East and North Africa and insignificant effects in South Asia and Latin America; only in East Asia was the effect positive and significant. Jovanovic, Lach, and Lavy (1992), using annual data on a different set of capital stocks and the NSD education data, find similar negative coefficients for their sample of developing countries. The World Bank's _World Development Report 1995_ on labor issues also notes the lack of importance of education in explaining aggregate growth (World Bank 1995, figure 2.4). Using other proxies for human capital, such as adult literacy and enrollment, gives similar results. Behrman (1987) estimated a production function using data from 68 developing countries, and found that literacy has a positive effect on output in the level regressions while it has a significantly negative coefficient in the differences regressions. Dasgupta and Weale (1992) find that changes in adult literacy are not significantly correlated with changes in output. Gregorio (199?) studied the growth experience of 12 Latin American countries and found enrollment indices have negative but insignificant coefficients on growth.

4
# **_2. Analytical Framework_**

To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of river basin organizations, a framework has been developed that identifies a number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water resource management at the basin scale. These factors and their hypothesized relationships with basin management in a country that has decentralized or is attempting to decentralize water resource management institutions are derived from the institutional analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management and to decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991).

For brevity, we present these political and institutional factors in an outline fashion, gathered under four headings. Our information gathering and analysis focus on the following sets of variables:

- Contextual factors and initial conditions

- Characteristics of the decentralization process

- Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities

- The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements.

Variables considered within each set are listed in the appendix . The Brantas basin case is discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 7 below.

# **_3. Methodology_**

A case study approach for this project was chosen in order to examine closely the processes of institutional change as well as the current situation of water resources management in the basin. The site visit was facilitated by an expert and active participant in water policy and management affairs in the Brantas basin and within Indonesia and interviews with basin authority officials and other basin stakeholders were held during a week-long visit. A consultant with extensive experience observing the institutional developments within Indonesia and the Brantas River Basin prepared a background paper on the basin prior to the visit. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with a focus on understanding the processes of institutional change and the performance of water management institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, matters that were closely within
ii E E E tt <u>,</u> ~~.~~ iiEE R RREERREE AARRttiiEEAARRssii tt CChaat IIRRIIii,tt TTEEttTTAA AARRttiiEEAARRssii,tt The reform chatter index can be classified by source: local news (e.g., UAE newspapers writing about the UAE), GCC international news (e.g., Bahraini newspapers writing about the UAE), and non-GCC international news. The index can also be classified into different reform topics based on topic analysis techniques. Appendix A5 provides a detailed description of the topic analysis as well as its findings.

Figure IV.1 shows the overall index and the subindices by source type. The reform chatter index for the GCC is in the same range as emerging G20 countries in recent years. However, Saudi Arabia has the highest chatter index in recent years, much higher than the emerging G20 average. In addition, reform talks spike around important years. For example, the chatter index rises for Bahrain and Oman around the Arab Spring, indicating a response of economic reform discussions to political pressure. Saudi Arabia has seen a strong rise in reform chatter, consistent with its significant reform agenda in recent years. The figures also show how reform chatter from local sources is consistently lower than that from international sources in many GCC countries, except Qatar. This finding suggests a _relative_ disengagement from economic reform discussions from local media and potentially other local stakeholders.

Another aspect of the relative local disengagement is that reform chatter in local media is less responsive to economic shocks than international media. We focus on commodity price shocks (which is dominated by oil price for the GCC countries).<sup>10</sup> When commodity prices are low, chatter in the GCC increases. Interestingly, in these moments, chatter rises more significantly in international news than in local news (see Figure IV.2), pointing to relative disengagement with economic reforms from local media.

> 10 A commodity price shock of a country at time is constructed by Gruss
|(6)|
|Proportion of Clinics Treated|0.059<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.059<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.059<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.059<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.015<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|0.015<sup>_∗∗_</sup>|
||(0.024)|(0.024)|(0.024)|(0.024)|(0.006)|(0.006)|
|Population (1000s)||||0.007<br>(0.005)|||
|Number of Clinics||||||0.008<sup>_∗∗_</sup><br>(0.003)|
|Ebola Sample|✓||||||
|Full Sample||✓|✓|✓|✓|✓|
|Sections|160|205|205|205|205|205|
|Observations|5,440|6,970|6,970|6,970|6,970|6,970|

_Notes_ : Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.

A44
moving elderly into the households of migrant adult children. Reforming these obstacles to mobility would facilitate movement of the rural elderly and continued use of support through coresidence with adult children.

# **References**

- Anh, T.S., B.T. Cuong, D. Goodkind and J. Knodel. 1997. “Living Arrangements, Patrilinearity and Sources of Support Among Elderly Vietnamese,” _Asia-Pacific Population Journal_ 12(4): 69-88.

- Barro, Robert J. 1974. “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” _Journal of Political Economy_ 82(6): 10951117.

Becker, Gary. 1974. “A Theory of Social Interactions,” _Journal of Political Economy_ 82(6): 1063-1093

- Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt and John Giles. 2005. “The Evolution of Income Inequality in Rural China,” _Economic Development and Cultural Change_ , 53(4) (July 2005): 769-824.

- Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt and Scott Rozelle. 2000. “Aging, Well-Being and Social Security in Rural North China,” _Population and Development Review_ 26: 89-116.

- Cai, Fang, John Giles and Xin Meng. 2006. “How Well Do Children Insure Parents Against Low Retirement Income? An Analysis Using Survey Data from Urban China,” _Journal of Public Economics_ , 90(12) (December 2006): 2229-2255.

- Cai, Fang, John Giles and Dewen Wang. 2009. “The Well-Being of China’s Rural Elderly,” Background Paper for East Asia Social Protection Unit, The World Bank (Beijing).

- Cai, Fang, Albert Park, and Yaohui Zhao. 2008. “The Chinese Labor Market.” In China’s Great Transformation, edited by L. Brandt and T. Rawski. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- Cameron, Lisa and Deborah Cobb-Clark. 2008. “Do Coresidency and Financial Transfers from the Children Reduce the Need for Elderly Parents to Works in Developing Countries?” _Journal of
data for the sample of 694 that received the home visit. Of those, 596 had valid balance data and this is the sample we use in the structural estimation.

Appendix Table A4 reports balancing tests for the choice environment treatments implemented in 2016 and the same variables in panels A and B of Table 1. Judging by the p-values of the F-tests that all the variables are jointly zero reported in column 6, there are no statistically significant differences, indicating that the randomization of the show-up bonus and timing of the bank visit were balanced.

# **4 Empirical strategy and results**

Consider an account holder deciding what to do with the account. We assume that the utility that account holder _i_ obtains from alternative _j_ (i.e. _Uij_ ), which is fully known to the decision-maker, can be decomposed into a part known to the researcher _Vij_ and an unknown part _eij_ such that _Uij_ = _Vij_ + _eij_ . We assume further that the unobserved part of the utility (to the researcher) for all alternatives is jointly distributed as a generalized extreme value.

In particular, we assume that the set of alternatives can be partitioned into two subsets or nests that depend on whether the account holder decides to visit the bank. If the bank is visited, the account holder can keep the old account, close the account or open a Pafupi account. For any two of these three choices, we assume that the ratio of probabilities is independent of existence of other alternatives. That is, there is no correlation between alternatives and the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds. Alternatively, the only option available to account holders that do not visit the bank is to keep the old account. In contrast to the assumption of zero correlation between alternatives when the bank is visited, we allow for some correlation between any of the alternatives when visiting the bank and the choice of keeping the old account when the bank is not visited. We therefore estimate a nested logit model with the tree diagram shown in Appendix Figure
outside of export sectors (construction and services) and that while rural registered residents experienced a severe employment shock, the vast majority were reemployed by late 2009. By early 2010, China’s research community was again speaking of labor shortages.

# **7. References**

- Chen, Dahong. 2010. ―Trend of Migration Employment and Demand for Migrant Workers in 2010: Analysis Based on MOHRSS Survey.‖ In _Population and Labor Report in 2010_ , Cai Fang, ed, pp 23-34. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

- China Customs. 2010. China Customs Statistics Information, Customs General Administration of China, Beijing. (www.cusstat.cn).

- China Labor Market Information Center. 2010. Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Beijing. (http://www.lm.gov.cn/DataAnalysis/node_1041.htm)

CULS. 2010. _China Urban Labor Survey_ , 2010. Institute for Population and Labor Statistics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing.

- CNFS 2009. _China National Survey of Manufacturing Firms_ , Research Bureau of the People’s Bank of China, Beijing.

- IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2009. _World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery._ Washington, DC: IMF.

- Huang, Jikun, Huayong Zhi, Zhurong Huang, Scott Rozelle, and John Giles. 2011. ―The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Off-farm Employment and Earnings in Rural China.‖ _World Development_ 39 (5): 797–807.

- Johnson, Ian, and Andrew Batson. 2009. ―China’s Migrants See Jobless Ranks Soar.‖ _Wall Street Journal_ , February 3, A1.

- Kong, Sherry Tao, Xin Meng, and Dandan Zhang. 2009. ―Impact of Economic Slowdown on Migrant Workers.‖ In _China’s New Place in a World in Crisis: Economic, Geopolitical and Environmental Dimensions,_ ed. R. Garnaut, L. Song, and W. T
|-1.341***|-0.195|0.057|
||(0.243)|(0.370)|(0.142)|(0.229)|
|East Asia Dummy|-0.434**|-0.239|0.007|0.005|
||(0.188)|(0.184)|(0.094)|(0.097)|
|Socialist Dummy|-0.106|-0.317*|-0.033|-0.027|
|___|___<br>_(0.223)|(0.184)|(0.141)|_(0.150)_|
|Number of Observations|105|91|105|91|
|R-squared'|0.8723|0.8811|0.8494|0.8404|

*** significant at 1% level significant at 5% level * significant at 1% level

'Standard errors, corrected for heteroscedasticity, are in parentheses.

b For all IV regressions in Table 7, the instruments for the following variables are the previous five year lag of itself and regional decade dummy variables: social spending/GDP; political freedom; and income inequality. The instrument for GDP growth is the prediction from the growth instrumental variable regression reported in Table 6. All other variables in the regression were treated as exogenous.

The R-squared is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit with instrumental variable regressions.

37 I
of climate variables, including temperature and precipitation, for the period 1901-2009, and covering the global land surface, excluding Antarctica, at 0.5 degrees resolution. Poverty rates were obtained through small area estimation techniques using data from the 2000 Census on Population and Housing and the Count of Population and Housing 2005. Population projections come from the National Population Council (CONAPO). All data are available at the municipal (county) level (See Annex 1 for summary statistics).

> 5http://climateknowledgeportal.wordlbank.org.

5
The most common indicators of financial development address financial depth, primarily because of their widespread availability. Conventional variables used as proxies for the depth of the financial sector are total liquid liabilities of the financial sector, credit to the private sector, and various measures of monetary aggregates. The aforementioned variables depict the development of the banking sector, in stock market studies, broadly employed proxies include the ratio of total market capitalization to GDP, the total value traded to GDP (stock market activity ratio), and the total value traded to the total value of listed shares (turnover ratio).

The extent to which these traditional measurements reflect the ability of financial intermediaries to serve the functions assigned to them in theory remains unclear. For instance, Cihak et al. (2013) illustrate that private bond market capitalization represents a substantial share of the total securities market capitalization within a country. However, when addressing the question of depth, private bond markets are often ignored. In addition, total credit data do not include trade credit, where firms de facto act as financial intermediaries (Petersen and Rajan 1997). In addition, Levine (2005) notes that this factor may be particularly important in countries with poor legal environments or overly regulated financial systems. Ultimately, there is no general consensus among researchers regarding the appropriate approach to measure financial development. Generally, studies consider several potential indicators to assess the robustness of their results, but these indicators are typically only proxies for the level of financial depth (Valickova et al. 2015).

Finally, some financial development measures such as the (rarely used) bank efficiency can be conceptually much more closely related to the theory (Pagano 1993) than the traditional quantity measures such as the volume of credit granted. Bank efficiency is also less likely to be prone to causality issues because technical efficiency of banks respond less to the business cycle in comparison to, for 10