rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
section 5), although good approximations to the experimental results are achieved using the same survey instrument.

There are concerns about how well surveys measure the outcomes typically used in evaluating anti-poverty programs. Survey-based consumption and income aggregates for nationally representative samples typically do not match the aggregates obtained from national accounts (NA). This is to be expected for GDP, which includes non-household sources of domestic absorption. Possibly more surprising are the discrepancies found with both the levels and growth rates of private consumption in the NA aggregates (Ravallion. 2003b).<sup>18</sup> Yet here

> 17 For excellent overviews of the generic issues in the collection and analysis of household survey data in developing countries see Deaton (1997).

> 18 The extent of the discrepancy depends crucially on the type of survey (notably whether it collects consumption expenditures or incomes) and the region; see Ravallion (2003b).

14
Policy Research Working Paper 10640

# **Abstract**

Motorbike-based ride-hailing services are widespread in many of the most congested cities in the developing world. These services often predate the construction of modern public mass rapid transit systems. Ride-hailing services may complement such investments by providing important first and last mile connectivity. However, it has also been argued that they undermine the viability of mass rapid transit systems as people prefer to use ride-hailing services given their convenience and low prices. This paper applies an event study research design to proprietary, high-frequency data from one of Indonesia’s largest ride-hailing services, Gojek. The findings show that the opening of stations on Jakarta’s first mass rapid transit line led to large increases in ride-hailing activity in the immediate vicinities of the stations. This was accompanied by a significant decline in the average distance of ride-hailing trips to and from the station locations. These findings are consistent with ride-hailing services complementing public transport by providing first and last mile connectivity to the newly opened mass rapid transit system. Interestingly, this holds for both commuting and non-commuting trips and is strongest for mass rapid transit station locations that were not already served by Jakarta’s bus rapid transit system.

This paper is a product of the Urban, Disaster Risk Management, Resilience and Land Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at mroberts1@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of
the crops was subject to some form of non-tariff control over imports or exports or both. Largely but not entirely for this reason, for most crops included in the study, there were no imports or exports in most years. Consequently, with only a few exceptions, scheduled tariffs or export taxes and subsidies had no relation whatever to the actual differences between domestic and international prices. This also meant that direct observations of relevant international prices from Indian sources was not possible. Moreover, for products of which there were significant exports or imports during certain periods, the trade was frequently in varieties or grades that were not representative of domestic production. For example, during the 1 980s and after there were regular exports of high quality basmati rice, but these prices were far above the international prices of the common rice varieties which constitute the vast bulk of Indian rice production. Another problem was that even when there were regular imports or exports, the actual prices of these transactions could be obtained with great difficulty, or more often not at all, notably for periods more than a few years in the past. The only easily available data in such cases were unit values calculated from the official trade statistics, but because these usually aggregate different grades and varieties in unknown proportions, which moreover change in unknown ways from year to year, they are notoriously unreliable as indicators of either the level or trends in international prices.

For these reasons, the principal starting point for the estimation of reference prices was published data on international commodity prices. In doing this, we generally followed the choices in the original detailed studies, but these comparisons sometimes had to be modified in going back to earlier years. In doing so we tried as far as possible to find international prices for the same or a similar specification, variety and quality as the domestic product. By the same token, we used averages of the international prices during the same periods as the average xiii
to convert household expenditure in per capita terms, was obtained from Prof. Heba El-Laithy, one of the authors of the Abu-Ismail et al. (2011) study who was in possession of 2007 HIES microdata. Through this consultancy, grouped data poverty estimates for 2007 were compared and validated with estimates based on the full distribution. Lacking information on average household size by decile for 2009, per capita expenditure by decile in 2009 is obtained using 2007 estimates. _Source_ : <u>Poverty and Inequality Platform Methodology Handbook</u> Table 2 below reports grouped data estimates of poverty incidence at different values of international poverty lines for 2007 and for 2009. Based on grouped-data estimation approach, in 2009, the latest year for which data are available before conflict started, Syria’s poverty at LMIC was 14.50 percent using 2011 PPP and 16.02 percent using 2017 PPP, whereas corresponding estimates based on the UMIC poverty line were 40.29 percent (2011 PPP) and 47.52 percent (2017 PPP). When comparing to 2007 group-based estimates, evidence suggests that poverty had stagnated, possibly reflecting the impact of the drought that affected the country over the period.

_Table 2: Poverty estimates using income class international poverty lines_

||||**Pover**|**ty Rate (%)**<br>||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||**Estimates based on microdata**|**Estimates based**|**on grouped-data**|
||**PPP**|**PL value**|**2003**|**2007**|**2009**|
|**LIC**|2011|1.9|0.79|2.43|2.08|
||2017|2.15|0.93|2.
Page 35 103. But do parents get involved in participatory accountability structures? What are the factors that determine whether parents get involved? And if they do participate, does this have an impact on student and school performance?

104. As discussed in earlier sections of this report, the empirical literature exploring the impact of parental involvement in education is relatively new. The existing studies can be categorized generally into two types: those using retrospective survey data of the sort presented earlier; and those that use an experimental or randomized controlled trial (RCT) approach, which involves the random allocation of participatory institutions of various types to different schools. Retrospective studies focus mainly on the existence of participatory institutions and actual parental participation, and their association with school outcomes. As discussed earlier, while these retrospective, ex post evaluations provide encouraging findings, they can be compromised by endogeneity and omitted variables<sup>34</sup> as schools with participatory institutions or more parental involvement in general may differ from other schools in a number of ways that may both drive the difference in parental participation and have an independent effect on school outcomes. This problem can, of course, be addressed by randomly allocating participatory programs to schools and measuring the effect by conducting ex ante and ex post surveys, but this approach can be costly.

105. Parents‟ willingness to participate in holding teachers to account depends on the actual and expected costs and benefits associated with participating. The actual costs include: transportation costs; the opportunity cost of time; and the internal psychological costs that parents may suffer when holding teachers to account, especially when they have personal relationships with teachers or feel somehow inferior or beholden to teachers. The expected benefits from participation include the better education that parents expect their children to receive if teachers are held to account and any intrinsic benefit associated with believing that holding teachers to account is “the right thing to do”. This section of the report discusses the use of experimental techniques to help measure these less tangible intrinsic costs and benefits
in the 1985-90 period). But much of this growth has been fueled and led by the services sector. According to the National Accounts this sector has surpassed agriculture as the major contributor to GDP-since 1992 its share has exceeded 46 per cent. There are several positive aspects to the growth in the services sector. Government services no longer dominated the growth in services, in spite of the sharp increase in wages particularly in 1992. Growth has been strong because of the relatively strong performance in the major sub-sectors like tourism, communications and financial services. Some part of this growth can be directly traced to liberalization and the strengthening of private banking and other service activities. It has also been noted that the restoration of agricultural production to a somewhat higher level has encouraged the growth of off-farm trading activities. However, it is arguable that some of this increase in service sector incomes is a once-for-all adjustment to the recovery and cannot be sustained at this growth rate without commensurate growth of the production sectors-in agriculture as well as in non-agriculture.

In this connection the recent experience of the manufacturing sector in Ghana is a matter of concern. The immediate impact of the ERP was encouraging as the growth 49
they had experienced other events related to conflict and criminal activity since 2010. These events are thus based on participants’ recall of the period between January 2010 and May 2017. Participants were asked to recall events that occurred each year during this span. The survey covered the three most conflict-affected geographical zones within the 16 states of Nigeria.<sup>8</sup> Households from local government areas (LGAs) that had high conflict exposure were oversampled based on

> 7 The GHS waves include between 4,500 and 5,000 households. During the last visit—the second visit of the third round—the sample size was 4,579. 8 The telephone-based survey was conducted between March and May 2017. See appendix B for details on how the geopolitical zones were selected based on conflict exposure.

8
Starting with the 51<sup>st</sup> round, NSSO surveys collected information on the owners of establishments. Establishments are asked to identify broadly from the following categories: co-operative society; female individual proprietorship; male individual proprietorship; partnership; private limited company; public limited company and others. Our work concerning the gender of the owners considers only those establishments that identify themselves as either female or male individual proprietorships. These constitute over 97% of total observations in our cleaned sample. The information captured in this field is an outcome of the survey and not a factor in the stratification design.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, the NSSO also provides the gender of each employee engaged in the establishment. Our work on women’s labor market dynamics using the gender composition of employees is supplemented with the organized manufacturing data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The ASI provides microdata on the organized manufacturing sector of the economy, which is not covered by the NSSO. The ASI is undertaken annually by the Central Statistical Organization, a department in the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, Government of India. Under the Indian Factory Act of 1948, all establishments employing more than 20 workers without using power or 10 employees using power are required to be registered with the Chief Inspector of Factories in each state. This register is used as the sampling frame for the ASI.<sup>31</sup> The ASI extends to the entire country, except the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim and the Union Territory (UT) of Lakshadweep.

The ASI provides statistical information to assess changes in the growth, composition, and structure of the organized manufacturing sector, comprising activities related to manufacturing rural/urban FSU. Two frames were used (as per the 62nd round survey): List frame and Area frame. List frame was used for urban manufacturing enterprises only. For unorganized manufacturing enterprises, a list of about 8000 large non-ASI manufacturing units in the urban sector prepared
1. This includes respondents who report having a debit card.

2. According to the latest available data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, there are 5.08 billion adults age 15 and above worldwide.

3. Exceptions include, for example, Italy (with an account penetration of 71 percent) and the United States (88 percent).

4. Reported _R-_ squared of a country-level ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of account penetration on the log of GDP per capita.

5. GDP per capita as shown for all economies in this section is in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.

6. Gallup’s regional-level statistics on population shares living on less than $2 a day are calculated using Gallup World Poll household data on monthly income, which is converted to international dollars using household consumption data from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program 2005 report (World Bank 2008b) adjusted for inflation relative to the United States. The regional averages are broadly consistent with the 2008 poverty line estimates from the World Bank’s Development Research Group (see http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/ index.htm?0,0). The two estimates are within 5 percentage points of each other for East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. For the Middle East and North Africa, Gallup’s regional estimate is 37 percentage points higher than the World Bank’s, though both estimates omit several populous countries in the region. For South Asia, Gallup’s estimate is 15 percentage points lower than the World Bank’s. The World Bank measures are based mostly on pre-2008 data and cover 127 economies. The 2005 World Bank estimates are discussed at length in Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula (2010).

7. FDIC 2009.

8. Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone (2011) find no evidence of discrimination or lower inherent demand for financial services by women when
: OECD TiE data, covering 51 countries and 45 sectors for the period 19952018. The country sample covers 38 OECD countries plus 13 non-OECD countries. The red line indicates employment growth in exports equals employment growth sustained by domestic demand.

# 3.2 In which countries and sectors are jobs in exports created?

Until the global financial crisis the number of jobs in exports increased strongly in emerging markets, dominated by jobs linked to manufacturing exports, but have started to decline since. Figure 10 plots the development of employment in exports for the sample of 51 countries by broad sector over the period 1995-2018, differentiating between high-income (top left panel) and LMICs (right panel) using the 1995 income categorization (see Appendix 8). In the sample of emerging countries, the number of jobs in exports increased from 177 million to 310 million between 1995 and 2007. This compares with total employment expanding from 1,343 million to 1,642 million over the same period in these countries. China and India alone added over 80 million and 30 million jobs in exports, respectively (bottom left and right panels). The number of jobs in manufacturing exports almost doubled from 107 million to 210 million over this period, representing an increase from 60 to 67 percent of the total, and driven in large part by China and India. However, jobs in exports dropped strongly in 2009 and continued to decline hovering around 255 million jobs between 2016 and 2018. Jobs linked to agriculture and mining exports combined now represent 9 percent of the total in emerging markets, while employment sustained by business services exports makes up over 27 percent. Here, China and India differ strongly, with India’s share of jobs in business services exports representing 36 percent in 2018, while China’s share makes up less than 20 percent.

13
the young men had not been readmitted to the detention center within 18 months, whereas the treatment increased that rate by two-thirds (p. 27). In post-civil war rural Liberia, Blattman et al. (2012) found that a training program in mediation gave people new conceptual tools for understanding conflict—for instance, seeing the interaction as positive-sum instead of zero-sum—and new norms that improved coordination. A survey of over 10,000 people one year after the intervention found that the training program did not reduce dispute levels, but it reduced the level of unresolved conflicts and increased the proportion of people satisfied with their resolution.

In these interventions, large social changes were brought about by more or less simultaneous frame switches by many individuals, a mechanism of social change highlighted by DiMaggio (1997). Interventions can target and change the mental models through which people interpret the situations they are in, and the responses that their interpretations trigger. Mental models and rules of thumb are understudied in economics—a gap that our study and other recent work tries to address.

28
# **1 Introduction**

In spite of great strides since the late 1990s, low-income country exports are still marginal in world trade and suffer from various vulnerabilities, ranging from low unit values to volatility, concentration and low survival (see for example Fugazza and Molina 2009). Low survival is not necessarily a sign of welfare loss if it reflects strong experimentation at the extensive margin, but it can be inefficient if sunk costs of entry and exit are substantial, as suggested by the work of Das, Robert and Tybout (2007). In particular, the weak contribution of the extensive margin to overall export growth (Besedes and Prusa 2007) may be explained by high failure rates, the flip side of low survival. Thus, identifying drivers of the ‘sustainability margin’ of exports is important for our understanding of the constraints to low-income country export growth. This is what the present paper sets up to do, using a new transaction-level export dataset obtained from Customs authorities in four African countries.

The key contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we document, for a sample of four low income African countries, a set of stylized facts on export survival that is broadly consistent with the emerging firm-level literature, so far confined to OECD or middle-income countries. Second, we provide novel evidence on a key outcome of interest, namely survival beyond the first year after entry into export markets. In particular, we identify a cross-firm “synergy effect” suggestive of external economies in export survival, a potential driver of sustainability that has been hitherto overlooked in the literature. Increasing the number of exporters of similar products to the same destination exerts a positive externality on new entrants. That is, the more similar they are, the higher the survival probability of new entrants. When evaluating the mechanisms behind these results we find evidence consistent with the existence of information spillovers driving them. For a Senegalese exporter, for instance, the probability of surviving past the first year (22% in 2001) would rise to 26
*|4|17|#N/A|19|1|5|4|#N/A|8|#N/A|#N/A|1|3|1|12|77|
|Candor Gap Set: % MU-|50.0|23.5|#N/A|36.8|100.0|20.0|25.0|#N/A|75.0|#N/A|#N/A|100.0|100.0|0.0|25.0|38|
|FY12-13 Sample #|6|12|1|11||4|5|1|6||1|1|4||10|62|
|FY12-13 Sample % MU-|33|33|0|64||50|40|0|83||0|100|100||30|48|
|Predicted MU- %|50%|24%|100%|37%|100%|20%|25%|100%|75%|100%|100%|100%|100%|0%|25%|38%|
|# IPFprojects inportfolio|9|108|1|34|4|20|13|10|14|8|5|1|4|4|52|298|
|Sample Size for Watch list†|5|25|1|13|4|4|3|10|11|8|5|1|4|0|13|112|

_Notes:_ FY08-FY13 data are from IEG RAP report.

* Kiribati and Samoa were not in the FY12-FY13 set.

**The calculation of candor gap for this report used the number of projects reviewed in the 18-month period 07/01/2103-12/31/2014.

†Watch list sample size was calculated using the candor
# **4   Calibration**

I now move on to the quantitative analysis and begin by discussing the calibration of the model.

## **4.1   Calibration of time-invariant parameters**

First, let me consider the parameters of the model that remain invariant over the decades. There are seven such parameters. Barring the elasticity of substitution across occupation-specific labor inputs , all time-invariant parameters are calibrated at the country level. For the baseline results, I assume 4 and report the responsiveness of the results by considering other values of in the appendix. σσ σσ= The preference parameter captures the trade-off between consumption and time dedicated in σσ accumulating human capital. I calibrate to match the Mincerian returns to schooling at the occupationββ group level after adding gender controls. ββ To calibrate the elasticity of human capital with respect to associated expenditures, I use the share of GDP (adjusted for the share attributed to labor) spent on education. The education expenditure ηη share includes both private and public spending. The World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2019) contains annual series on the government expenditure on education as a share of GDP for many years since 1970. The average of this series serves as one component of the total education expenditure.<sup>12</sup> The OECD Indicators database (OECD, 2019) comprises some information on the private education spending across countries. However, the data are sparse both in terms of country and time coverage. The only CENAM for which the private education expenditures are available is Costa Rica. Moreover, this data is available only for 2013. The private education spending as a share of GDP stood at 2 percent in 2013 and I use this as a baseline for all countries.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, I note that this value is higher relative to many countries in the OECD database and it is likely that the actual values are lower. Finally, I use a labor income share of 0.65 to adjust the education expenditure share for